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Full text of "Report of the attorney general for the year ending .."

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Public Document ^o- ^^ 



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REPORT 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL 



Year ending January 19, 1916. 



Compliments of 

HENRY C. ATTWILL, 

Attorney-General. 



BOSTON : 

WEIGHT & POTTER PRrNTING CO., STATE PRINTERS, 

32 DEENE STREET. 

1916. 



Public Document No. 12 



iS\\s (llnmmnnttipaltJ; of liaBaailfttaftts. 



REPORT 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL 



FOR THE 



Year ending January 19, 1916. 




BOSTON: 

WEIGHT & POTTEK FEINTING CO., STATE PEINTEES, 

32 DEENE STEEET. 

1916. 



®l)e Commonroedtl) of i1Ia00acl)U0ett0 



Departmext of the Attobxet-Gener.\l, 
Boston, Jan. 19, 1916. 

To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith my report for the 
year ending this day. 

Aery respectfully, 

HENRY C. ATTWILL, 

Attorney-General. 



^l)t Commonixiealtl) of illaasactjueetta 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY- GENERAL, 
State House. 



A ttorney-General . 
HENRY C. ATTWILL. 

Assistants. 
Nelson P. Brown. 
H. Ware Barnum. 
Wm. Harold Hitchcock. 
Arthur E. Seagrave. 
John W. Corcoran. 
James J. BACiGALuro. 



Law Clerk. 
Charles W. Mulcahy. 

Chief Clerk. 
Louis H. Freese. 



Statement of Appropriation and Expenditures. 



Appropriation for 1915, $50,000 00 

Exyencliiures. 

For law library, S636 14 

For salaries of assistants, : 18,273 35 

For clerks, 5,929 90 

For office stenographers, 4,371 05 

For telephone operator, 576 00 

For special legal services and expenses, .... 3,218 01 

For office expenses, • . . . . 5,035 54 

For court expenses, 5,716 18 

Total expenditures, $43,756 17 

Costs collected, 2,659 87 

Net expenditures, ........ $41,096 30 

Appropriation for expenses in ice investigation, . . . $1,555 17 

Expenses in ice investigation, $1,555 17 

Appropriation for expenses in Haverhill Gas Light Com- 
pany litigation, $2,704 03 

Expenses in Haverhill Gas Light Company litigation, 2,490 00 

Balance, $214 03 

Appropriation for printing trial of Commonwealth v. 

Spencer, $1,919 S3 

Printing trial of Commonwealth v. Spencer, . . . $1,919 83 



®l|? (JInmmnttujfaltli of iMaasarI|Ufl^ltj0 



Depabtment op the Attorney-General, 
« Boston, Jan. 19, 1916. 

To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives. 

Pursuant to the provisions of section 8 of chapter 7 of the 
Revised Laws I herewith submit my report for the year end- 
ing this day. 

The cases requiring the attention of this department dur- 
ing the year, to the number of 7,569, are tabulated below: — 

Corporate franchise tax cases, ". .1,192 

Extradition and interstate rendition, 130 

Grade crossings, petitions for abolition of, 87 

Indictments for murder, 39 

Inventories and appraisals, 7 

Land Court petitions, 98 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Harbor 

and Land Commission, 4 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Charles 

River Basin Commission, 23 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Massa- 
chusetts Highway Commission, 22 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the 

Directors of the Port of Boston, 4 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Met- 
ropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, 2 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Met- 
ropolitan Park Commission, 3 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the State 

Board of Insanity, 6 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Mt. 

Everett Reservation Commission, 1 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the 

Armory Commissioners, 3 

Miscellaneous cases arising from the work of the above-named 

commissions, 32 

Miscellaneous cases, 526 

Petitions for instructions under inheritance tax laws, ... 43 

Public charitable trusts, 117 

Settlement cases for support of persons in State Hospitals, . 39 
All other cases not enumerated above, which include suits to re- 
quire the filing of returns by corporations and indi^^duals and 
the collection of money due the Commonwealth, . . . 5,191 



viii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Capital Cases. 
Indictments for murder pending at the date of the last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows : — 

Cleophas Blanchard, indicted in Bristol County, Novem- 
ber, 1914, for the murder of Malvina Blanchard. He was 
arraigned Feb. 15, 1915, and pleaded guilty to murder in 
the second degree. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph T. 
Kenney. 

Albert H. Brodeur, indicted in Hampden County, De- 
cember, 1913, for the murder of Matilda Case, at Spring- 
field, on Sept. 20, 1913. He was arraigned March 18, 1914, 
and pleaded not guilty. Richard J. Morrissey, Esq., was 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. Feb. 
8, 1915, the defendant was committed to the Bridge water 
State Hospital for observation. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney Clarence P. Niles. 

Guiseppe Catania, indicted in Suffolk County, October, 
1913, for the murder of Agrippino Capra, at Boston, on 
Oct. 3, 1913. He was arraigned Feb. 18, 1915, and pleaded 
not guilty. John E. Crowley, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. On May 19, 1915, the 
defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
a term not exceeding four years nor less than three years. 
The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. 
Pelletier. 

Giovanni Cinicolo and Maria Sonzino, indicted in Suf- 
folk County, October, 1914, for the murder of Antonio Son- 
zino, at Boston, on Sept. 17, 1914. They were severally 
arraigned Oct. 19, 1914, and pleaded not guilty. Thomas J. 
Grady, Esq., and F. M. Zottoli, Esq., were assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendants. The defendant Gio- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ix 

vanni Cinicolo later retracted his former plea, and pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Com- 
monwealth, and the defendant Giovanni Cinicolo was sen- 
tenced to State Prison for a term not exceeding six years nor 
less than five years. The indictment against the defendant 
Maria Sonzino was nol prossed. The cases were in charge 
of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Alphonso Collura, indicted in Middlesex County, 
November, 1914, for the murder of Salvatore Pulsseli, at 
Groton, on Oct. 4, 1914. He was arraigned March 5, 1915, 
and pleaded not guilty. On March 19, 1915, the defendant 
retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to man- 
slaughter. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, 
and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for a term 
not exceeding eight years nor less than five years. The case 
was in charge of District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Rafaelle Martello, indicted in Suffolk County, De- 
cember, 1913, for the murder of John Francisco, at Boston, 
on Dec. 8, 1913. On April 26, 1915, the indictment was 
nol prossed. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Wheeler Mills, indicted in Suffolk County, December, 
1913, for the murder of Edward Howcott, at Boston, on 
Nov. 2, 1913. He was arraigned Oct. 14, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. Daniel J. Gallagher, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. On Jan. 13, 1915, the 
defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to three years in 
the house of correction. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Ghvout Moodian, indicted in Middlesex County, Novem- 
ber, 1914, for the murder of Zilfo Alie, at Tyngsborough, on 
Oct. 22, 1914. He was arraigned Nov. 18, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. W. D. Regan, Esq., was assigned by the court 



X ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORP. [Jan. 

as counsel for the defendant. On March 26, 1915, the de- 
fendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to the Massachu- 
setts Reformatory. The case was in charge of District At- 
torney William J. Corcoran. 

Antonino Pedaling, indicted in Middlesex County, Sep- 
tember, 1914, for the murder of Antonio Gimalaro, at New- 
ton, on June 28, 1914. He was arraigned Nov. 18, 1914, 
and pleaded not guilty. James H. Vahey, Esq., and A. F. 
Whalen, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendant. In January, 1915, the defendant was tried by 
a jury before Irwin, J. The result was a verdict of guilty 
of manslaughter. The defendant was thereupon sentenced 
to State Prison for a term not exceeding twenty years nor 
less than eighteen years. The case was in charge of Dis- 
trict Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

John Poulacas, indicted in Hampden County, December, 
1914, for the murder of Mary Pappaspiropoulis, at Holyoke, 
on Dec. 11, 1914. He was arraigned Dec. 29, 1914, and 
pleaded not guilty. James O'Shea, Esq., and Laurence J. 
Montgomery, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. Feb. 8, 1915, the defendant retracted 
his former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and 
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Clarence P. Niles. 

Anton Retkovitz, indicted in Bristol County, June, 1914, 
for the murder of Domka Peremebida. He was arraigned 
June 12, 1914, and pleaded not guilty. Frank M. Silvia, 
Esq., and Harold E. Clarkin, Esq., were assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. In November, 1914, 
the defendant was tried by a jury before Dubuque, J. The 
result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. 
The defendant's bill of exceptions w^as sustained. The case 
is in charge of District Attorney Joseph T. Kenney. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi 

William Roy, indicted in Hampden County, September, 

1914, for the murder of an infant male child, at Springfield, 
on Jan. 15, 1914. He was arraigned Sept. 24, 1914, and 
pleaded not guilty. John T. Moriarty, Esq., was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. On Feb. 8, 1915, 
the defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty 
to murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to 
State Prison for life. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney Clarence P. Niles. 

Indictments for murder found since the date of the last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows: — 

Andrew Barkis and Peter Sanuta, indicted in Middlesex 
County, January, 1915, for the murder of Charles Gingras, 
at Lowell, on Oct. 2, 1914. The defendants were severally 
arraigned Jan. 11, 1915, and each pleaded not guilty. 
D. J. Donahue, Esq., and William Hogan, Esq., were assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendants. In March, 1915, 
the defendants were tried by a jury before Sisk, J. The 
result was a verdict of not guilty in each case. The cases 
were in charge of District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Moses Blood, indicted in Middlesex County, July, 1915, 
for the murder of William Barnaby, at Townsend, on July 9, 

1915. He was arraigned Sept. 22, 1915, and pleaded not 
guilty. Thomas L. Walsh, Esq., and George L. Wilson, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
On Nov. 3, 1915, the defendant retracted his former plea, and 
pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea 
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was 
sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

John Coumatos, indicted in Middlesex County, July, 1915, 
for the murder of John Demos, at Lowell, on June 30, 1915. 
He was arraigned Sept. 30, 1915, and pleaded not guilty. 
James F. Owens, Esq., and Benjamin J. Maloney, Esq., 



xii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
Nov. 3, 1915, the indictment was nol prossed. The case was 
in charge of District Attorney WilHam J. Corcoran. 

BiAGio Falzone, Ignazio Marello and Luigi Grassi- 
DONio, indicted in Middlesex County, January, 1915, for the 
murder of Morris A. Albertson, at Wakefield, on Dec. 20, 

1914. The defendant Biagio Falzone was arraigned Jan. 15, 

1915, and pleaded not guilt}^ and the defendants Ignazio 
Marello and Luigi Grassidonio were arraigned Jan. 11, 1915, 
and each pleaded not guilty. J. W. Connelly, Esq., was 
assigned by the court to represent the defendant Biagio 
Falzone, Thomas J. Grady, Esq., was assigned by the court 
to represent the defendant Ignazio Marello, and Joseph T. 
Zottoli, Esq., was assigned by the court to represent the 
defendant Luigi Grassidonio. In February, 1915, the de- 
fendants were tried by a jury before Irwin, J. The result 
was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree in the 
case of Biagio Falzone, a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
second degree in the case of Ignazio Marello, and the case of 
Luigi Grassidonio was placed on file by order of the court. 
Thereupon the defendant Biagio Falzone was sentenced to 
death by electrocution - during the week beginning May 9, 
1915, which sentence was executed May 27, 1915. The de- 
fendant Ignazio Marello was sentenced to State Prison for 
life. The cases were in charge of District Attorney William 
J. Corcoran. 

ViTO Florentino, indicted in Suffolk County, March, 1915, 
for the murder of Antonio Aiello, at Boston, on Feb. 22, 1915. 
He was arraigned March 9, 1915, and pleaded not guilty. 
John F. McDonald, Esq., was assigned by the court as coun- 
sel for the defendant. Later the defendant retracted his 
former plea, and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This plea 
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was 
sentenced to State Prison for a term not exceeding five years 
nor less than four years. The case w^as in charge of District 
Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xiii 

IsMAiEL IsMAiEL, iiidicted in Essex County, April, 1915, 
for the murder of Peter Karambelas and Arthur Perolides at 
Peabody, on April 15, 1915. He was arraigned April 30, 
1915, and pleaded not guilty. Michael L. Sullivan, Esq., 
and James J. Ronan, Esq., were assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. In September, 1915, the defend- 
ant was tried b}^ a jury before White, J. The result was a 
verdict of not guilty. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney Michael A. Sullivan. 

Julian Layne, indicted in Middlesex County, March, 
1915, for the murder of Gustaf Frederickson, at Cambridge, 
on Feb. 28, 1915. He was arraigned March 11, 1915, and 
pleaded not guilty. William H. Lewis, Esq., was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. On June 10, 
1915, the defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to the 
Massachusetts Reformatory. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Harry E. Nutting, indicted in Middlesex County, Sep- 
tember, 1915, for the murder of Everett Nutting and Mattie 
L. Nutting, at Groton, on July 19, 1915. He was arraigned 
Oct. 28, 1915, and pleaded not guilty. F. L. Blood, Esq., 
appeared as counsel for the defendant. The defendant was 
adjudged insane, and was committed to the Bridgewater 
State Hospital. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
William J. Corcoran. 

Demetrius Pantazopoulos, indicted in Essex County, 
July, 1915, for the murder of Dionisios Hadjidakis and 
Eurene Pantazopoulos, at Lynn, on July 10, 1915. The 
defendant was arraigned July 22, 1915, and pleaded not 
guilty. Walter W. Pyne, Esq., was assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. On Sept. 24, 1915, the defendant 
retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in 
the second degree. This plea was accepted by the Common- 



xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Michael 
A. Sullivan. 

Erminio Passeri, indicted in Suffolk County, June, 1915, 
for the murder of Settimino Carbone, at Boston, on May 9, 
1915. He w^as arraigned June 21, 1915, and pleaded not 
guilty. Thomas J. Grady, Esq., was assigned by the court 
as counsel for the defendant. Later the defendant retracted 
his former plea, and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This 
plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant 
was sentenced to State Prison for a term not exceeding six 
years nor less than five years. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Joseph L. Roy, indicted in Plymouth County, February, 
1915, for the murder of Albertine Roy, at Brockton, on 
Nov. 3, 1914. Feb. 1, 1915, the defendant was committed 
to the Bridgewater State Hospital for observation. No 
further action has been taken in this case. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney Albert F. Barker. 

Antonio Scerra, indicted in Worcester County, January, 
1915, for the murder of Filippo Lore, at Gardner, on Sept. 13, 

1914. He was arraigned Feb. 10, 1915, and pleaded not 
guilty. Thomas L. Walsh, Esq., and Patrick H. Murray, 
Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend- 
ant. Later the defendant retracted his former plea, and 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to 
State Prison for a term not exceeding twenty years nor less 
than fifteen years. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney James A. Stiles. 

George Spiridakis, indicted in Suffolk County, February, 

1915, for the murder of Emmanuel M. Papadakis, at Boston, 
on Jan. 20, 1915. The defendant was never arraigned but 
was placed in the Psychopathic Hospital for observation, and 
later was committed to the Boston State Hospital. The case 
was in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv 

Petro Torchia, indicted in Middlesex County, July, 1915, 
for the murder of Anthony Weinitsky, at Framingham, 
July 11, 1915. He was arraigned Sept. 23, 1915, and pleaded 
not guilty. John W. Connelly, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. On Dec. 1, 1915, the 
defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
a term not exceeding eight years nor less than six years. 
The case was in charge of District Attorney William J. 
Corcoran. 

Cpiarles E. Warren, indicted in Middlesex County, 
June, 1915, for the murder of Walter G. Green, at Newton, 
on June 5, 1915. He was arraigned June 11, 1915, and 
pleaded not guilty. Albert E. Lewis, Esq., and Joseph 
Abbott, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendant. On Oct. 6, 1915, the defendant retracted his 
former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and 
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Felix Vadenais, Jr., indicted in Worcester County, Janu- 
ary, 1915, for the murder of Joseph S. Goldberg, at Sutton, 
on Dec. 21, 1914. He was arraigned Feb. 10, 1915, and 
pleaded not guilty. David F. O'Connell, Esq., and James 
F. McGovern, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. In April, 1915, the defendant was tried 
by a jury before Sanderson, J. The result was a verdict of 
not guilty. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
James A. Stiles. 

John Verderico, indicted in Suffolk County, January, 
1915, for the murder of Antonia B. Verderico, at Boston, on 
Dec. 14, 1914. He w^as arraigned Jan. 13, 1915, and pleaded 
not guilty. John F. McDonald, Esq., and Vincent Brogna, 
Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend- 
ant. Later the defendant retracted his former plea, and 



xvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to 
State Prison for a term not exceeding ten years nor less 
than six years. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Gabrus Yurgalavicz, indicted in Norfolk County, Sep- 
tember, 1915, for the murder of Mary Yurgalavicz, at 
Norwood, on July 26, 1915. H. E. Ruggles, Esq., was 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. He 
was arraigned Dec. 14, 1915, and pleaded guilty to murder 
in the second degree. This plea was accepted by the Com- 
monwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison 
for life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Albert 
F. Barker. 

The following indictments for murder are now pending : — 

Elizabeth C. Cannon, indicted in Hampden County, 
December, 1915, for the murder of Lucille Monty Thomas, 
at Russell, on Nov. 8, 1915. The defendant has not yet 
been arraigned. The case is in charge of District Attorney 
Joseph B. Ely. 

Harry Hinds, indicted in Middlesex County, June, 1915, 
for the murder of Marvil Elizabeth Hinds and Barbara 
Jesstena Hinds, at Cambridge, on April 9, 1915. He was 
arraigned June 24, 1915, and pleaded not guilty. William 
H. Lewis, Esq., and Isidore H. Fox, Esq., were assigned by 
the court as counsel for the defendant. In November, 1915, 
the defendant was tried by a jury before Raymond, J. The 
result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. 
Two motions for a new trial filed by the defendant are 
now pending. The case is in charge of District Attorney 
William J. Corcoran. 

Salvatore Mazzaferro, indicted in Plymouth County, 
October, 1915, for the murder of Pasquale Femia, at Hing- 
ham, on Aug. 1, 1915. He was arraigned Oct. 27, 1915, and 
pleaded not guilty. John E. Crowley, Esq., was assigned by 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xvii 

the court as counsel for the defendant. Xo further action 
has been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District 
Attorney Albert F. Barker. 

Julian Olesiewski and Peter Olesiewski, indicted in 
Hampshire County, October, 1915, for the murder of Bolack 
Klmocy, at Easthampton, on July 27, 1915. The defendants 
were arraigned Oct. 27, 1915, and each pleaded not guilty. 
N. Seelye Hitchcock, Esq., was assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendants. No further action has been 
taken in these cases. The cases are in charge of District 
Attorney John H. Schoonmaker. 

Domenico Raia, indicted in Suffolk County, September, 
1915, for the murder of Guiseppe Varano, at Boston, on 
Aug. 3, 1915. He was arraigned Nov. 19, 1915, and pleaded 
not guilty, John F. McDonald, Esq., and F. P. Fralli, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
No further action has been taken in this case. The case 
is in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Joseph Rogers, indicted in Suffolk County, June, 1915, 
for the murder of Samuel Cohen, at Boston, on May 29, 
1915. He was arraigned June 21, 1915, and pleaded not 
guilty. R. J. Cotter, Esq., was assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. No further action has been 
taken in this case. The case is in charge of District Attor- 
ney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Oscar F. Russ, indicted in Suffolk County, September, 
1915, for the murder of Emily Russ, at Boston, Aug. 23, 
1915. He was arraigned Oct. 8, 1915, and pleaded not 
guilty. Wendell P. Murray, Esq., and Morris Katzeff, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
No further action has been taken in this case. The case is 
in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Theodore Semox, indicted in Suffolk County, November, 
1915, for the murder of Johanna E. Donovan, at Boston, 



xviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

on Oct. 7, 1915. The defendant has not yet been arraigned. 
The case is in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pel- 
letier. 

Bow Young, indicted in Hampden County, September, 
1915, for the murder of Ng Hong, at Springfield, on Sept. 
12, 1915. He was arraigned Sept. 24, 1915, and pleaded 
not guilty. No further action has been taken in this case. 
The case is in charge of District Attorney Joseph B. Ely. 

Grade Crossings. 

During the past year construction necessary to complete 
the work at Lynn, Westfield and Clinton has been in prog- 
ress, and eleven hearings before commissioners and auditors 
have been attended by the engineer representing the Com- 
monwealth. 

Statements of expenditures numbering 27, amounting to 
$969,997.22, have been examined. Objection to items, 
amounting to S340,217.96, has been made, $19,521.70 of 
which has been withdrawn or disallowed, and decisions as 
to $318,721.99 are pending. Of objections made in previous 
years items amounting to $88,517.05 have been disallowed, 
withdrawn or transferred to later statements. 

The following statements show in detail the expenditures 
which have been examined from Jan. 1, 1909, to date, the 
amounts objected to and their disposal : — 



1916.J 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



XIX 



^§ 






1 


Pending 
Jan. 1, 1913. 


$292 81 
4,043 17 
88,267 18 
73,072 53 




1 i 

o u 2 

ri 


IP. 


CD 
00 


0> 


si 


$292 81 

4,412 52 

157,362 69 


o 

CD 


u 

3 ■? 




O 
CO 


1 




ii 

S22 


CO 

OO 


It 


::^ 

I-- OO 

oco 
co'oT 


05 

5 

i 


i 


4 


- 

i 




IJ 


i 


i 


Objec- 
tions 
made to 

Items 
amount- 
ing to — 


$56,713 06 
86,906 61 
168.682 89 
86.230 78 
107.457 93 
197.095 32 
340.217 96 


CO* 


Total 
of State- 
ments. 


.$2,324,575 12 
2,193,112 50 
2.182.670 51 
2,454,485 25 
1,440,708 73 
1,240,446 85 
969,997 22 


OO 


Num- 
ber of 
State- 
ments. 


OCOOOCO — »ot^ 
U3 U5 -*<•>«• 't' cc IM 




< 


^^^.^!J" 


oSSSSSS 





1 

i 


CO 


- 

$6,055 76 

14,116 32 

51,270 65 

318,721 99 


i 


u 


$28,910 58 
29,882 97 
29,723 50 
19,521 70 


00 
CO 

i 






$34,966 34 
28,391 96 
81,174 64 


3 


Disallowed 

or 
withdrawn. 

$34 89 
3,935 44 
88,267 18 
29,961 34 
18,100 74 
68,762 91 






ii 

-5 - 


$292 81 
4,043 17 
88.267 18 
65,053 22 
59.953 38 


5 
s 


T3 d 

IJ 


'"is" 

com 


5 

2 


Objec- 
tions 
made to 

Items 
amount- 
ing to— 


$56,713 06 
86,906 61 
168,682 89 
86.230 78 
107,457 93 
197,095 32 
340,217 96 


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2,182.670 51 
2,454,485 25 
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PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



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xxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Opinions of Supreme Judicial Court. 
A serious problem now confronts the legal profession of 
the country growing out of the multiplication of law reports. 
In our own State the reports of the decisions of the Supreme 
Judicial Court of the Commonwealth have now reached the 
two hundred and twenty-second volume, and between four 
and five volumes are being added annually. In many of the 
decisions reported in these volumes the court is merely ap- 
plying well-settled principles of law to the special facts in- 
volved in the particular case. In such cases, particularly 
when the action of the court below is affirmed, a published 
opinion can be of little or no value as a precedent. Almost 
its only purpose is to inform the parties to the litigation of 
the reasons for the decision made by the court. In my 
opinion, and in that of many members of the bar, no useful 
purpose is served by the writing and the publishing of 
opinions in cases of the character which I have described. 
It has, however, been the practice of the court for many 
years to hand down opinions in all cases decided, though 
they are not required by law to do so. Revised Laws, chap- 
ter 156, section 12, requires that the rescript formally stating 
the court's decision shall contain a brief statement of the 
reasons for the decision, and further provides for the pub- 
lishing of the rescript in the event that no opinion is written. 
As rescripts are merely formal documents, it is plainly not 
desirable to have them published in any substantial num- 
bers, and for this reason opinions are not infrequently writ- 
ten which might be omitted if the requirement that the 
rescript be then published did not exist. I feel that the 
court should be given an unlimited opportunity to decide 
cases without opinion* in its discretion in all cases where it 
is apparent that the writing of an opinion would serve no 
substantial public purpose. Accordingly, I recommend that 
the section of the Revised Laws referred to be amended so 
as to provide that if no opinion is written the reporter shall 
publish only a brief memorandum of the decision. I have 
in mind in making this suggestion such memoranda of deci- 
sions as are published in the reports of the decisions of the 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCmiENT — No. 12. xxiii 

Supreme Court of the United States and of the Court of 
Appeals of New York. If some such amendment is adopted, 
it will be an indication to the court that the General Court 
agrees with the views which I have herein expressed, and 
will enable the court without embarrassment to omit opin- 
ions in many cases where it now feels obliged to write them. 
This will not only check the overgrowth of our law reports, 
but will remove an unnecessary burden from the judges of 
this court and give them more time to devote to the prepa- 
ration of opinions in the remaining cases and to their other 
important public duties. 

Counsel for the Public Service Commission. 

Under the provisions of section 1 of chapter 7 of the 
Revised Laws it is provided that the Attorney-General shall 
appear for the Commonwealth, the Secretary, the Treasurer 
and Receiver-General, the Auditor of Accounts and for State 
boards and commissions in all suits and other civil proceed- 
ings in which the Commonwealth is a party or interested, 
or in which the official acts and doings of said officers are 
called in question, in all the courts of the Commonwealth, 
and that such suits and proceedings shall be prosecuted or 
defended by him or under his direction. It is further pro- 
vided that all legal services required by such officers, boards, 
commissions and commissioner of pilots for the harbor of 
Boston in matters relating to their official duties shall be 
rendered by the Attorney-General or under his direction. 
From the passage of St. 1896, chapter 490, to the passage 
of St. 1913, chapter 784, providing for a reorganization of 
the Board of Railroad Commissioners under the name of 
the Public Service Commission, the provisions of law con- 
tained in Revised Laws, chapter 7, section 1, applied to all 
State boards and commissions, except that in a few instances 
State boards, in their character local, such as the Police 
Commissioner for the city of Boston, the Licensing Board 
for the city of Boston and the Finance Commission for the 
city of Boston, were authorized by law to employ counsel 
without regard to the Attorney-General. 

By the provisions of St. 1913, chapter 784, section 9, the 



xxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Public Service Commission was authorized to appoint a 
counsel to the commission and such attorneys as they deemed 
advisable, for such term of office or employment and at such 
salaries as they deemed proper. It was provided, however, 
that in the conduct of litigation and court proceedings such 
counsel and attorneys should act under the direction of the 
Attorney-General. Under the provisions of section 28 of 
said chapter it was provided that the commissioner might 
direct counsel for the commission to begin proceedings in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the enforcement of its orders, 
subject to the supervision of the Attorney-General. 

The result of this provision of law is that the Attorney- 
General has no supervision or control over the advice which 
may be given the Public Service Commission, yet under the 
provisions of law the responsibility is placed upon him to 
enforce its orders. I deem it desirable that the entire re- 
sponsibility for advice given and actions taken by counsel 
outside of court, as well as proceedings taken in court, 
should be lodged either in counsel who act free and inde- 
pendent of the Attorney-General or in the Attorney-General 
and counsel who are at all times under his supervision and 
control. 

I therefore recommend legislation to accomplish one of 
these results. 

Sentences to the Massachusetts Reformatory and 
Reformatory for Women. 

Many judges have construed the provisions of section 29 
of chapter 220 of the Revised Laws, as amended by chapter 
252 of the Acts of 1907, chapter 209 of the Acts of 1903 and 
amendments thereto, and chapters 347 and 356 of the Acts 
of 1910, relating to the Massachusetts Reformatory and the 
Reformatory for Women, as creating additional or alter- 
native punishments for all misdemeanors, or at least all 
misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment. 

If this construction is correct, the punishment of misde- 
meanors, the maximum penalty for which was limited to 
days or a few months in the statutes creating the offences, 
has been automatically increased to an imprisonment of two 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxv 

years. As a result of this construction sentences have been 
imposed by courts for offences the character of which is not 
such as in the opinion of the Prison Commissioners should 
be dealt with in the reformatories. I have grave doubts 
whether this construction given the statutes by many of 
the judges of the courts is correct. I think it would cause 
some astonishment on the part of the public to learn that 
the punishment for a misdemeanor, the maximum punish- 
ment for which was defined by the Legislature in the act 
creating it to be not more than a month in the house of 
correction, by these provisions relative to the reformatory 
prisons has been increased to not more than two years. 

In view of the uncertainty pertaining to these statutes 1 
think it desirable that legislation should be enacted clearly 
defining what crimes and offences may be punished by im- 
prisonment m the reformatory prisons, together with the 
limitation of punishment, and what may not, and so recom- 
mend. 

Bonds given to the Commonwealth by Contractors. 
Bonds or other security are in all cases required where 
contracts are made on behalf of the Commonwealth by 
public officers for the construction or repair of public build- 
ings or other public work under the provisions of Revised 
Laws, chapter 6, section 77. These bonds ordinarily include 
a stipulation insuring the faithful performance of the work 
by the contractor. It has been customary for contractors 
to secure bonds from surety companies. As the arrange- 
ment between the surety company and the contractor is for 
the payment of an annual premium so long as liability re- 
mains on the bond, contractors have often been very much 
embarrassed in being relieved of their liability to the insur- 
ance company for the premiums, as there is no way, after 
the contract has been completed and sixty days have expired 
under the provisions of law for the filing of claims by sub- 
contractors and others, to assure the insurance company that 
there is no further liability to them by reason of the bond. 
Some of the boards and commissions have attempted at 
times to relieve this situation by passing votes attempting 



xxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

to discharge or release the sureties from their obligation on 
their bonds. I am of the opinion that such action by the 
boards is unauthorized by law and is of doubtful effect. 

To clear up the uncertainty and to provide some method 
of definitely determining the liability of the surety upon 
these bonds and a way to release security which may be 
deposited with the Commonwealth in lieu of such bonds, I 
advocate that the Governor and Council be authorized, upon 
the expiration of sixty-five days after the completion of the 
contract, where no claims under the provisions of said sec- 
tion 77 are pending, to release and discharge the sureties 
from any further liability upon such bond and to release 
any security which may have been given in lieu of a bond. 

Collections. 

The collections made by the department during the last 
fiscal year have been unusually heavy, amounting to $740,- 
620.55. A special effort has been made to collect all out- 
standing claims due to the Commonwealth under the col- 
lateral legacy tax statute, St. 1891, chapter 425. There has 
been collected during the fiscal year $41,156.46 of these 
taxes, as against $16,116.06 during the preceding year. 

Under an arrangement made by my predecessors in office 
with the Treasurer and Receiver-General an assistant has 
been designated by the Attorney-General to take charge of 
these collections, and his office has been in the Treasurer's 
department. He has not only taken care of collections 
which properly were for this department to collect, but he 
has in addition performed a large amount of clerical work 
in estimating taxes due and sending notices in relation to 
the same, which properly falls upon the Treasurer's depart- 
ment to handle. There will of necessity be considerable 
work in relation to these taxes for some years to come, for 
the reason that in many instances the tax is not yet due 
on account of the fact that the inheritance under the pro- 
visions of the will by which it is derived is postponed to 
await the termination of some life or some contingency or 
event. 

The work of collection has now been so well advanced 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxvii 

that there is no further occasion for an assistant of this 
department to be longer located in the Treasurer's office, 
and there is no further occasion why this department should 
be burdened with work properly belonging to the Treasurer 
and Receiver-General. The number of collection cases which 
properly are ripe to be handled by the Attorney-General does 
not now amount to more than 100. The services of the as- 
sistant designated to take charge of this work would have 
been discontinued before this but that the Treasurer had no 
appropriation to employ a clerk to take charge of the clerical 
work which will necessarily be thrown upon his department 
upon the withdrawal of the assistant. 

I urge that a sufficient appropriation be given the Treasurer 
that the services of a clerk capable of taking care of the 
work may be secured. 

Interest upon Damages for the Taking or Injury to 
Real Estate by the Commonwealth. 

Under the provisions of chapter 148 of the Acts of 1913 
interest upon the damages sustained by persons whose real 
estate has been taken or injured by the city of Boston under 
authority of any law or statute is limited to a rate of 4 per 
cent, per annum. Under the provisions of chapter 525 of 
the Acts of 1913 interest upon damages to real estate taken 
or injured by the Metropolitan Park Commission or by the 
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board under authority 
of law or statute was limited to a rate of 5 per cent, per 
annum. 

I can see no reason in principle why the Commonwealth 
should be made liable to a greater rate of interest upon 
damages sustained by the taking or injury of real estate by 
the Commonwealth than is the city of Boston under a like 
situation. 

I recommend that in all cases where land is taken or 
injured by the Commonwealth, acting by or through any 
officer, board or commission, interest upon the damages 
sustained shall be limited to 4 per cent., as in the case of 
the city of Boston. 



xxviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Evasion of Inheritance Tax on Property of a De- 
ceased Person. 
It has been called to my attention that by reason of the 
facility with which stocks and bonds can be transferred from 
one person to another without requiring registration of trans- 
fer on the books of the corporation, the presumption being 
that the possessor of such stocks and bonds indorsed in 
blank is the real owner, it is a matter of easy accomplish- 
ment to evade the payment of the inheritance tax upon 
securities of this kind. With a friendly executor or admin- 
istrator, or one who is interested in the estate, securities of 
this type may be handed over to the heirs of a deceased 
person, with the State having no knowledge of it. I suggest 
the advisability of legislation to in a measure prevent such 
occurrences by the passage of an act similar in character to 
that obtaining in the State of New York where property 
has been deposited by a deceased person with persons or 
corporations for safe keeping. 

Taxation of Life Insurance Policies. 

On Nov. 15, 1915, at the request of the Tax Commissioner, 
I felt it my duty to advise him that he should take the atti- 
tude that the taking out of a life insurance policy payable 
to a beneficiary constituted a gift of the beneficial interest 
in the policy made or intended to take effect in possession 
or enjoyment after the death of the insured, within the 
meaning of the legacy and succession tax law, and that 
therefore upon the death of the insured the proceeds of such 
a policy were taxable to the beneficiary under this law. This 
advice caused considerable discussion among members of the 
bar and persons interested in insurance, but as yet no pro- 
ceedings have been begun to test the matter in the courts. 

In view of the doubt as to what extent, if at all, the 
statute covers such cases, I recommend the consideration of 
legislation which shall definitely determine whether such 
policies are to be taxable, and if so, to what extent, with 
special consideration as to the exemption of small policies 
payable to w^idows and other dependent beneficiaries. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxix 

Party Walls on Property taken by the Commonwealth 
ON Beacon Hill. 
At the time of the acquisition by the State House Building 
Commission of the properties on Beacon Hill, to be used in 
connection with the new west wing of the State House, and 
in order to adjust certain elements of damage to adjacent 
property owners by reason of the taking of certain party 
walls and the extinguishment of the rights of such adjoining 
owners therein, an agreement was made by this office with 
such adjoining owners that legislation should be sought at 
the present session of the Legislature to enable the Com- 
monwealth to grant and release to these adjoining owners 
the rights and easements in such party walls, w^hich were of 
no value to the Commonwealth but of substantial impor- 
tance to the proper enjoyment of such adjoining properties. 
In accordance with such agreement I recommend that the 
State House Building Commission be authorized to convey, 
on behalf of the Commonwealth, its right, title and interest 
in said party walls and the land thereunder upon such terms 
as they shall determine. 

Publication of the Opinions of the Attorneys-General. 
I recommend that the sum of $2,500 be appropriated for 
the purpose of continuing the publication of the opinions of 
the Attorneys-General, there now being, in my judgment, a 
sufficient number of public interest to make a volume of the 
size heretofore published. 

Revision of the Statutes. 
I renew the recommendation made by my immediate 
predecessor in office, the Hon. Thomas J. Boynton, that 
measures be taken to provide for the revision, codification 
and arrangement of the statutes of the Commonwealth. 

Attorney-General's Report. 
Under the provisions of section 8 of chapter 7 of the 
Revised Laws the Attorney-General is required to report 
to the General Court the cases tried, argued or conducted 



XXX ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

by him during the preceding year. Apparently under this 
provision it has been held by my predecessors in office that 
lists of the cases in which the Attorney-General has ap- 
peared should be attached to the Attorney-General's report. 
As a matter of fact it has become impracticable to include 
all of the cases and as a result a practice has grown up of 
inserting such as it has been thought might be of some 
public interest. In my judgment this practice of attaching 
lists of these cases might well be discontinued, as they serve 
no useful purpose. The statute should be amended so as 
to require the Attorney-General to report the number of 
cases tried, argued or conducted by him during the pre- 
ceding year. Information in relation to any case or cases 
that the Legislature may at any time be interested in can 
from time to time be required, as the Legislature or any 
committee thereof may deem desirable. In this way much 
time and expense would be saved to the department and 
the Commonwealth. 

Department of the Attorney-General. 

The work imposed upon this department during the fiscal 
year, in my judgment, has not been unusual in amount or 
character. 

Necessarily there is some increase growing out of the in- 
creased governmental functions. The number of cases tried 
in the Probate Court was 13. The number of cases tried in 
the Superior Court was 6, 1 being before a jury. Sixteen 
hearings before a single justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court have been attended. There have been 16 cases argued 
before the Supreme Judicial Court, and 1 case tried before 
a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. Two cases have 
been tried and argued before the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission at Washington, and 2 before the United States Dis- 
trict Court. 

The number of official opinions rendered by the depart- 
ment during the year, up to Jan. 1, 1916, was 209. So 
far as possible written opinions have been discouraged 
where the opinion rendered did not involve a useful prece- 
dent as a guide to the departments to be followed in future 
actions. 



1916.J PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxi 

It seems to have been the policy of the department 
in recent years in cases growing out of petitions for the 
assessment of damages for land taken by the Common- 
wealth to await action for the trial of these cases by the 
petitioners. This year all petitions for the assessment 
of damages for land taken, unless there has been some 
extraordinary reason for delay, have been marked by 
the department for trial, and this will result in either the 
trial or disposition of cases which have for a long time been 
drawing 6 per cent, interest against the Commonwealth upon 
the value of the land taken. As cases ordinarily must be 
marked for trial in the fall to insure trial during the year, 
there has been but 1 case tried by the department of this 
character. Many cases, however, during this fiscal year will 
be tried or disposed of by reason of the cases being marked 
for trial by the Commonwealth. I doubt the wisdom of a 
policy which allows cases of this character to drag along, 
as interest is constantly running against the Commonwealth. 
Furthermore, the public improvement usually involved in 
the taking of land by the Commonwealth results in an im- 
provement of the neighborhood, and juries upon a view, 
made several years later, are apt to get a wrong impression 
of the value of the land at the time of the taking. 

Annexed to this report are such of the opinions rendered 
during the current year as it is thought are of interest to the 
public. 

Respectfully submitted, 

HENRY C. ATTWILL, 

Attorney-Ge7ieral. 



OPINIONS. 



Directors of the Port of Boston — Powers — Construction of 

Dry Dock. 

St. 1911, c. 748, § 5, providing that the Directors of the Port of Boston "may 
lay out and build . . . such piers, wdth buildings and appurtenances, 
docks, highways, waterways, railroad connections, storage yards 
and pubHc warehouses as, in the opinion of the directors, may be de- 
sirable," did not authorize them to enter into contracts for the con- 
struction of a dry dock substantially as described in the report of the 
Directors for the year ending Nov. 30, 1913, the final decision as "to 
whether such a dry dock should be built having been reserved to itself 
by the General Court. 

Jan. 28, 1915. 

Directors of the Port of Boston, 40 Central Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to 
"whether or not, under the terms of chapter 748 of the Acts 
of 1911, or any acts in amendment thereof or in addition 
thereto, the Directors of the Port of Boston are authorized to 
enter into contracts for the construction of a dry dock sub- 
stantially as described in the report of said Directors for the 
year ending Nov. 30, 1913." 

None of the acts amendatory of chapter 748 of the Acts 
of 1911 have increased the powers of the Directors of the Port 
in that respect. 

The power to construct a dry dock like that described must 
be found, if at all, in the provisions of section 5 of the act 
of 1911, the pertinent portions of which are as follows: — 

With the consent of the governor and council, the directors . . . may 
lay out and build . . . such piers, with buildings and appurtenances, 
docks, highwaj^s, waterways, railroad connections, storage yards and 
public warehouses as, in the opinion of the directors, may be desir- 
able. . . . 

It may be suggested that a dry dock is but one kind of 
a dock, and that the opinion of the Directors as to the de- 
sirability of that particular type is conclusive. It is true that 



2 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

in some cases arising under different circumstances and in 
different localities a dry dock has been regarded as but one of 
many types, but primarily, in this country, I believe it has a 
more limited sense. 

Bouvier defines "dock" as "the space between two 
wharves." 

A dock is defined by philologists, according to the American use of 
the term, to be "the space between wharves." City of Boston v. Lecraio, 
17 How. at 434. 

In Webster's Dictionary we find the following : — 

An artificial basin or inclosure in connection wiih a harbor, for the 
reception of vessels; the slip or waterway' extending between two piers 
or projecting wharves or cut into the land, for the reception of ships. 

The Century Dictionary says : — 

An inclosed water-space in which a ship floats while being loaded or 
unloaded, as the space between two wharves or piers; by extension, 
any space or structure in or upon which a ship maj^ be berthed or held 
for loading, unloading, repairing or safe-keeping. 

A dry dock such as is described is a decided extension of 
the idea of an inclosed water-space in which a ship floats 
while being loaded or unloaded. The principal use of a dry 
dock is for the repairing or overhauling of ships, for the effi- 
cient performance of which "shops and other buildings" are 
"necessary." If the difference be considered as one of degree, 
the degree of difference is so great that, in my opinion, in 
this country it has become one of kind, and a dry dock is 
considered more as a repair shop than as a dock, in its pri- 
mary meaning. 

Under the provisions of section 5 the Directors of the Port 
are restricted in the acquiring of real property, and rights 
and easements therein, to that necessary for the purpose of 
constructing, or securing the constructing or utilizing of, piers 
and, in connection therewith, highways, waterways, railroad 
connections, storage yards and sites for warehouses and in- 
dustrial establishments. The main object of the first part of 
this section is to provide for the securing of land upon which to 
build piers, and the provisions for the constructing and secur- 
ing the constructing or utilization of highways, waterways. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 3 

railroad connections, storage yards and sites for warehouses 
and industrial establishments are incidental to the main 
object, and for the purpose of making the piers convenient 
and available for use. Docks necessarily would be created 
by the construction of piers. 

No provision is made for the taking or acquiring of land or 
other rights for docks. If the Legislature had in mind the 
granting of the right to build a structure which would require 
about one-third of the total appropriation of $9,000,000 for 
its construction, it seems probable that it would have given 
as wide a latitude in selecting the most advantageous site 
therefor as it did with respect to piers. 

Moreover, under the provisions of the latter part of section 
5 the Directors of the Port are authorized to lay out and 
build such piers with buildings and appurtenances as may be 
desirable, and no provision is made for appurtenances in con- 
nection with docks. A dry dock without appurtenances for 
its operation is useless. 

It would appear, therefore, that the docks referred to in 
the latter part of the section are those docks only that are 
incident to or connected with the use of piers or like struc- 
tures which the Directors of the Port are authorized to con- 
struct. 

While the foregoing furnish reasons for doubting whether 
in using the word " docks" the Legislature intended to include 
such a gigantic construction work as is described, section 12 of 
the act deals particularly with the matter of a dry dock. It 
provides: — 

It shall be the duty of the directors f orth\\ath to make, and, so far as 
may be practicable, to put into execution, comprehensive plans pro\ad- 
ing on the lands now o^\Tied or hereafter acquired by the common- 
wealth in the area described in section four of this act, adequate piers, 
capable of accommodating the largest vessels, and in coimection Tvith 
such piers suitable highways, waterways, railroad connections and 
storage yards, and sites for warehouses and industrial estabhshments. 
The directors shall report to the next general court, on or before the 
fifteenth day of January, nineteen hundred and twelve, all necessary 
plans and estimates of cost for the construction of a drj- dock equipped 
with modern facihties and appliances, sufficient in size for the accom- 
modation of any modern ocean steamship. 

The effect to be given to this section must be determined 
with reference to what had gone before. 



4 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

In the report of the Board of Harbor and Land Commis- 
sioners for the year 1904 the subject of dry docks was exten- 
sively dealt with and the conclusion reached that the building 
of one was not advisable. The joint commission originally 
appointed under chapter 108 of the Resolves of 1907 sub- 
mitted their final report in 1911 to the Legislature of that 
year. It was printed as House Document No. 1550. On 
page 25 is found the conclusion of this commission: — 

In view of these facts the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would 
not be warranted in constructing, owning and operating a dry dock 
for the use of docking merchant ships; to do so would be a waste of the 
public funds to satisfy a mistaken sentiment. 

It therefore appears that the Legislature of 1911, when con- 
sidering the bill which ultimately became chapter 748 of that 
year, had before it this emphatic condemnation of the prop- 
osition of building a dry dock. In fact, the portions of this 
report immediately preceding that mentioned were referred to 
the same committee (metropolitan affairs) as that portion of 
the Governor's address concerning transportation which re- 
lated to the development of the port of Boston, and a bill for 
such development. It was as a result of the reference of all 
three of these matters that the bill "Relative to the develop- 
ment of the port of Boston" was reported. 

The particular portion of the above-mentioned report of 
the joint commission which dealt with the matter of a dry 
dock was referred to the committee on harbors and public 
lands, which reported "no legislation necessary." This report 
was accepted by both branches of the Legislature. 

While the question is not free from doubt, I am of the 
opinion that the events preceding the passage of this act, 
taken in connection with the act itself, indicate that the 
Legislature intended to reserve to itself the final decision as to 
whether there should be built a dry dock, equipped with 
modern facilities and appliances, such as is described in the 
report of the Directors of the Port for the year ending Nov. 
30, 1913; and that without further authorization by the Legis- 
lature the Directors of the Port are not warranted in entering 
into contracts for the construction of such a dry dock. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



1916.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



Pilots — Coastwise Steam Vessels — Requirement of Federal 
License — Effect on State Statute. 

R. L., c. 67, §§25 and 28, so far as they relate to coastwise steam vessels, 
are inconsistent with and annulled by U. S. Rev. Stats., §§ 8153 and 
8206, and, therefore, a Boston pilot must in addition to his State com- 
mission carry a Federal Ucense in order legally to pilot coastwise 
steam vessels not sailing under register. 

Feb. 11, 1915. 

Messrs. Frederick C. Bailey and John H. Frost, Pilot Commissioners. 

Gentlemen: — Answering your favor of the 1st inst., re- 
questing my opinion upon the question ''whether a Boston 
pilot should in addition to his State commission carry a Fed- 
eral license," I beg to advise you that in order legally to 
pilot coastwise steam vessels not sailing under register a Bos- 
ton pilot must carry a Federal license. 

You state that by the terms of their State commissions 
Boston pilots are required to serve on any vessel requiring 
their services. This is so by virtue of the provisions of R. L., 
c. 67, § 25, directing a pilot " to take charge, within the limits 
of his commission, of any vessels, not exempt from compul- 
sory pilotage by section twenty-eight, and of vessels not 
bound from one port to another within the commonwealth, 
unless they are in the completion of a voyage from a port 
out of the commonwealth." Among the exceptions included 
in section 28 are "steam vessels regulated by the laws of the 
United States and carrying a pilot commissioned by United 
States commissioners" and "vessels regularly employed in 
the coasting trade," but as to these exempted vessels, the 
pilot is required, by a later provision of section 28, to serve if 
requested. 

The Federal statutes material to this opinion are United 
States Compiled Statutes (1913), sections 7981, 8153 and 
8206. 

Section 7981 (R. S. § 4235) is as follows: — 

Until further provision is made by Congress, all pilots in the bays, 
inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall continue 
to be regulated in conformity ■v\dth the existing laws of the States re- 
spectively wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the States 
may respectively enact for the purpose. (Act Aug. 7, 1789, c. 9.) 

Section 8153 (R. S. § 4401) is as follows: — 

All coastwise sea-going vessels, and vessels navigating the great 
lakes, shaU be subject to the navigation laws of the United States, 



6 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

when na^dgating within the jurisdiction thereof; and all vessels, pro- 
pelled in whole or in part by steam, and na^dgating as aforesaid, shall 
be subject to all the rules and regulations established in pursuance 
of law for the government of steam-vessels in passing, as provided by 
this Title; and every coastwise sea-going steam-vessel subject to the 
navigation laws of the United States, and to the rules and regulations 
aforesaid, not sailing under register, shall, when under way, except on 
the high seas, be under the control and direction of pilots Hcensed by 
the inspectors of steamboats. (Act Feb. 28, 1871.) 

Section 8206 (R. S. § 4444) is as follows: — 

No State or municipal government shall impose upon pilots of 
steam-vessels any obligation to procure a State or other hcense in 
addition to that issued by the United States, or any other regulation 
which will impede such pilots in the performance of the duties required 
by this Title; nor shaU any pilot-charges be levied bj^ any such author- 
ity upon any steamer piloted as provided by this Title; and in no case 
shall the fees charged for the pilotage of any steam-vessel exceed the 
customary or legall}^ established rates in the State where the same is 
performed. Nothing in this Title shall be construed to annul or affect 
anj^ regulation estabhshed by the laws of any State, requiring vessels 
entering or leaving a port in any such State, other than coastwise 
steam-vessels, to take a pilot dul}^ licensed or authorized by the laws 
of such State or of a State situate upon the waters of such State. (Act 
Feb. 28, 1871.) 

Under i^rticle I., section VIII., clause 3 of the Constitu- 
tion of the United States, Congress has power "to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, 
etc." It has been established by decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court that this power includes the regulation 
of navigation, including the regulation of the qualifications of 
pilots, the modes and times of offering and rendering their 
services, and the responsibilities which shall rest upon them. 
Cooley V. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 
144. 

This power is not limited to navigation on the high seas,, 
but extends to every part of the voyage from wharf to wharf. 
The subject covered by this clause of the Constitution is not 
one the exclusive control over which resides in Congress. 
It is the exercise of its power to regulate commerce among 
the several States which is incompatible with the exercise of 
the same power by the States. In the absence, therefore, of 
congressional regulation, the provisions of our Revised Laws,, 
chapter 67, sections 25 and 28, are in full force and effect. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 7 

So far, therefore, as the statutes or regulations of the Com- 
monwealth conflict with the acts of Congress above* quoted, 
they are null and void. Section 8153 requires that pilots 
licensed by United States inspectors of steamboats shall con- 
trol every coastwise sea-going steam vessel not sailing under 
register. The question of the effect of this regulation, among 
others, upon existing State regulations is specifically treated 
in section 8206, wherein it is stated that "Nothing in this 
Title shall be construed to annul or affect any regulation 
established by the laws of any State, requiring vessels enter- 
ing or leaving a port in any such State, other than coastwise 
steam-vessels, to take a pilot duly licensed or authorized by 
the laws of such State. . . ." As to coastwise steam vessels 
not sailing under register, therefore, Congress has expressly 
said that it annuls any State regulation requiring pilot service 
thereon. It follows that the provisions of R. L., c. 67, §§ 25 
and 28, cannot protect a pilot serving by request or other- 
wise "coastwise steam vessels not sailing under register," 
and in order legally to pilot such vessels the pilot must hold 
a license issued by the United States inspectors of steam- 
boats. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company — Con- 
trol of Boston & Maine Railroad through Boston Railroad 
Holding Company — Effect of Compliance with Decree of 
United States District Court — St. 1914, c. 766, not ac- 
cepted. 

History of acquisition of control of the Boston & Maine RaUroad by the 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company through the 
formation of the Boston Raihoad Holding Company, with a state- 
ment of charter powers of the latter corporation. 

St. 1914, c. 766, has not been complied with by the New York, New Haven 
& Hartford Railroad Company or by the persons named as liquida- 
tors in Appendix A annexed to that statute. 

The terms of Appendix A to St. 1914, c. 766, have not been substantially 
incorporated in the decree entered in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York on Oct. 17, 1914, by consent 
of the parties, in the suit brought by the United States against the 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, the Boston 
Railroad Holding Company and others, alleging an illegal combina- 
tion in violation of the Sherman act. 



8 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

St. 1914, c. 766, § 1, did not authorize the Governor to modify the provi- 
sions of sections 3, 4 and 5 of that statute creating an option in the 
Commonwealth to take or purchase shares of stock in the Boston & 
Maine Raihoad owned by the Boston Raihoad Holding Company. 
Appendix A to that statute could not, therefore, be modified to con- 
form to this decree. 

Unless the trustees appointed by the decree referred to are hereafter di- 
rected by the United States District Court to sell the shares of the 
Boston & Maine Railroad owned by the Boston Railroad Holding 
Company, subject to the condition stated in St. 1914, c. 766, a com- 
pUance with that act is inconsistent with a compKance with the decree. 

The mere transfer by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company of the shares of the Boston Raihoad Holding Company 
owned by it to the trustees named in the decree referred to in accord- 
ance with the order of the court was not a violation of the laws of this 
Commonwealth. If hereafter this stock is sold by these trustees by 
order of the United States District Court without the consent of the 
General Court, and the purchaser acquires a good title, the terms of 
the act creating the Boston Railroad Holding Company will then be 
violated. 

The transfer by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Raihoad Company 
of the shares of the Boston Raihoad Holding Company owned by it 
to the trustees named in the decree referred to by order of the United 
States District Court was not an acceptance by it of the provisions of 
St. 1914, c. 766. 

Feb. 23, 1915. 

Hon. Channing H. Cox, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Sir: — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of an 
order passed by the House of Representatives on February 
11 in the following form: — 

Ordered, That the following questions of law be submitted to the 
Attorney-General, with the request that his opinion be returned to the 
House of Representatives at his earhest convenience: — 

1. Whether the pro\dsions of chapter 766 of the Acts of the year 1914, 
to which there is an appendix entitled ''Appendix A," have been com- 
plied with by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com- 
pany and the persons named therein as Uquidators. 

2. Whether the terms of said Appendix A have been substantially 
incorporated in a decree of the United States District Court of the 
Southern District of New York. 

3. Whether under the provisions of said act said agreement set 
forth in said Appendix A could have been modified or amended so as to 
conform in all respects with said decree. 

4. Whether a comphance with said act is in any way inconsistent 
with comphance with said decree. 

5. Whether the transfer of the shares of the Boston Railroad Hold- 
ing Company or any of them to the said persons named as liquidators 
in a manner not contemplated in said act and without the execution of 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 9 

the agreement set forth in Appendix A or any amendment thereof 
is a violation of the laws of the Commonwealth. 

6. Whether the transfer of said shares to said persons, though not 
in accordance with the pro^dsions of said act, is in effect an acceptance 
of all the pro\isions of said act, and particularh^ of section 3 of said 
act, or whether by the transfer of said shares in a manner not con- 
templated by said act the provisions of said section have been evaded. 

In order adequately to answer these inquiries it is necessary 
to recall some incidents in recent railroad history, most of 
them matters of public knowledge. I shall refer to the New" 
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company as the New 
Haven Company, to the Boston Railroad Holding Company 
as the Holding Company, and to the Boston & Maine Rail- 
road as the Maine Company. 

On May 8, 1908, the Supreme Judicial Court decided (At- 
torney-General V. Neio York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company, 198 Mass. 413) that the New Haven Company was 
prohibited by the statutes of this Commonwealth from directly 
or indirectly subscribing for, taking or holding the stocks or 
bonds of any other corporation without the authority of the 
General Court. The stocks involved in that decision were 
shares in certain street railway corporations located in central 
and western Massachusetts. The decree in that case was 
finally affirmed on March 1, 1909. Prior to this decision the 
New Haven Company had acquired and was holding a large 
number of shares of the Maine Company. About this time, 
and apparently in view of the decision just referred to, these 
shares were transferred by the New Haven Company to a cor- 
poration formed under the laws of another State. 

On April 20, 1909, His Excellency Governor Draper called 
the attention of the General Court to this situation, and sug- 
gested to it the advisability of creating a corporation which, 
under prescribed limitations, should have the right to pur- 
chase and hold shares of stock in the Maine Company. (See 
Acts and Resolves, 1909, p. 965.) The result was the statute 
of 1909, chapter 519, incorporating the Holding Company. 

Section 1 of that act defined the general charter powers of 
that corporation in the follow^ing language: — 

. . . for the sole purpose of acquiring and holding the whole or any part 
of the capital stock, bonds and other evidences of indebtedness of the 
Boston and Maine Railroad, and of voting upon all certificates of stock 
so acquired and held, and of recei\dng and collecting dividends and 
interest upon said stock, bonds and other evidences of indebtedness. 



10 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 3 provided, in part: — 

The stock of the Boston and Maine Railroad which may be ac- 
quired by said Boston Railroad Holding Company shall not be sold by 
it without express authority from the legislature; . . . 

Section 4 authorized any railroad incorporated at that date 
under the laws of the Commonwealth to guarantee dividends 
and interest upon the stocks and bonds of the Holding Com- 
pany, and to acquire and hold such stocks and bonds. It 
further provided : — 

Any railroad corporation acquiring said stock as hereinbefore pro- 
^dded shall not thereafter sell the same without the express authority of 
the legislature. The commonwealth may at any time by act of the 
legislature, upon one year's notice, take or acquire by purchase or 
otherwise the stock, bonds, notes and other evidences of indebtedness 
issued by the said Boston Railroad Holding Company. 

The section then went on to provide the conditions under 
which this taking should be made, and the manner in which 
compensation for the property taken should be determined. 

The Acts of 1910, chapter 639, authorized the Holding 
Company to issue preferred stock which should have no voting 
power. It expressly made this preferred stock a lien upon all 
the stock of the Maine Company at any time held by the 
Holding Company. It provided that any railroad owning 
common stock of the Holding Company might acquire, hold, 
own and sell any of its preferred stock. 

Under the authority of these statutes the Holding Com- 
pany was formed. It acquired the stock of the Maine Com- 
pany which had been transferred by the New Haven Company 
to a foreign corporation as hereinbefore stated, and also, as 
I am informed, certain of the stock of the Maine Company 
held by various individuals. The New Haven Company ac- 
quired, and up to the date of the decree referred to in your 
order was holding, 31,065 shares of the common stock and 
244,939 shares of the preferred stock of the Holding Company. 
This was all the common stock and all but approximately 
28,000 of the preferred stock. 

Subsequent to the perfection of this arrangement it was 
claimed by the Attorney-General of the United States that 
the relations between the New Haven Company and its asso- 
ciated corporations, including the Holding Company, were a 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 11 

violation of the Sherman anti-trust law. It was expressly 
claimed that the control of the Maine Company by the New 
Haven Company through the instrumentality of the Holding 
Company was a part of an illegal combination in restraint of 
trade and commerce among the States. The New Haven 
Company denied that it was violating the law, but, owing to 
its financial condition, felt that it was unwise for it to engage 
in a long and expensive contest with the United States. 
Accordingly, numerous conferences were held between the 
representatives of the railroad and the Attorney-General of 
the United States for the purpose of bringing about, by agree- 
ment, a dissolution of the alleged illegal combinations. When 
an agreement had been nearly, if not quite, reached, though 
not executed, the matter was called to the attention of the 
General Court by His Excellency Governor Walsh, and 
thereafter chapter 766 of the Acts of 1914 was passed, and 
approved on July 7, 1914. 

Thereafter, as I am informed, the directors of the New 
Haven Company by vote expressly declined to accept the 
provisions of this act. So far as I am informed no agreement 
in the form of Appendix A, annexed thereto, was ever exe- 
cuted by the New Haven Company. 

On July 23, 1914, a bill in equity was brought by the At- 
torney-General of the United States in the United States Dis- 
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, in the 
name of the United States, against the New Haven Com- 
pany, the Holding Company and various other defendants, 
alleging that the defendants were parties to combinations in 
violation of the Sherman act, and seeking a dissolution by 
decree of court of these combinations. Thereafter further 
negotiations were held between the parties, and finally, on 
Oct. 17, 1914, by written consent of the defendants, the 
decree referred to in your order was entered for the purpose 
of bringing about a dissolution of the alleged illegal combina- 
tions. So far as appears from the records of that court this 
formal assent is the only written agreement made by the 
parties in connection with the entry of this decree. I submit 
herewith an attested copy of the decree. I am informed that 
the New Haven Company has duly transferred to the trustees 
named in the first section of the decree the stock of the Hold- 
ing Company therein described. 

Before proceeding to answer your questions, it is important 
to note an essential and distinguishing feature of chapter 



12 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

766 of the Acts of 1914. Section 3 provided that upon the 
acceptance of that act the Holding Company should forth- 
with cause to be printed on each certificate of stock of the 
Maine Company held by it the words, "This stock may at 
any time be taken or purchased by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts at the fair value thereof in accordance with 
law." The statute directs that the same words be printed on 
all certificates thereafter issued by the Maine Company to 
future transferees representing any stock held by the Holding 
Company, and also upon all certificates for new issues. Sec- 
tion 5 then provides that the Commonwealth may at any 
time by act of the General Court take or acquire any or all 
stock of the Maine Company so printed, held by any person. 
The method of determining the compensation to be paid is set 
forth. The obvious effect and purpose of these provisions if 
accepted and complied with were to give the Commonwealth 
an option to take or purchase this stock at any time from any 
holder of it. The statute authorized (section 2) the Holding 
Company to sell its Boston and Maine stock only upon the 
condition that it be subject to this option to the Common- 
wealth to acquire it from the purchasers or their subsequent 
transferees. 

With this review of the situation, I proceed to answer your 
questions. 

1. I am of opinion that chapter 766 of the Acts of 1914 
has not been complied with by the New Haven Company or 
by the persons named in Appendix A as liquidators. 

While the decree entered in the United States District Court 
followed in most respects Appendix A, as I shall later point 
out, there are certain important differences between the decree 
and Appendix A. Then, the decree in no way attempts to 
preserve or create any option to the Commonwealth to ac- 
quire the Maine Company stock owned by the Holding Com- 
pany from subsequent purchasers in the event that a sale of 
it by the trustees is thereafter ordered by the court. Section 
7 of chapter 766 provides that a transfer of shares of the 
Holding Company by the New Haven Company, to be held 
in accordance with the terms of Appendix A, shall be deemed 
an acceptance of the act by the New Haven Company. 
Neither Appendix A nor any similar agreement has been 
executed by the New Haven Company. Though the general 
scheme and most of the terms of Appendix A have been in- 
corporated in the decree entered by agreement, no provision 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 13 

has been made for creating or enforcing the proposed option 
to the Commonwealth, which was the distinguishing feature 
of chapter 766. In my opinion the consent of the New Haven 
Company and the liquidators to the decree was not intended 
to be and did not in fact constitute an acceptance by them 
of chapter 766 of the Acts of 1914. 

2. As I have already stated, a very large part of Appendix 
A was incorporated in the decree. I have carefully com- 
pared the terms of the two docum.ents. While there are some 
differences of order and phraseology, for the most part made 
necessary by the natural differences between an agreement 
and a decree, I find but two substantial differences. 

By Section First, paragraph F of the decree, the trustees 
are authorized to exchange the shares of the Maine Company 
held by. the Holding Company for shares or securities in an- 
other corporation in case "a reorganization of the Maine 
Company with or unthout its leased lines, or any of them, shall 
be proposed." Paragraph 7 of Appendix A gives a similar 
authority to exchange only in case *'a reorganization of the 
Maine Company and its leased limes shall be proposed." 
Thus, the authority to exchange in case of reorganization is 
considerably broader under the decree than that contem- 
plated by Appendix A. 

The main point of difference, however, is to be found in the 
provisions for the sale of the Maine Company stock held by 
the Holding Company. Paragraph 2 of Appendix A is as fol- 
lows: — 

As early as may be the liquidators shall make proper arrangements 
to protect the rights of the Holding Company's preferred stockholders, 
and after such arrangements have been made shall exercise their powers 
so that there shall be a sale at such time or times, together or in parcels, 
and by public auction or by private contract, of all the shares of the 
Maine Company belonging to the Holding Company free from the 
statutory lien of the preferred shares hereby transferred, and of any 
other property belonging to it whenever in their judgment such sale or 
sales can be made to the best advantage. 

The counterpart of this provision in the decree (paragraph 
B of Section First) is as follows: — 

As early as may be the trustees shall make proper arrangements to 
protect the rights of preferred stockholders of the Holding Company, 
after which, but not until further order of the court, they shall exercise 
their powers so that there shall be a sale or sales, together or in parcels. 



14 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

by public auction or private contract, of all the shares of the Maine 
Company owned by the Holding Company, free from the statutory 
lien of the preferred shares of the Holding Company hereby directed 
to be transferred; and also a sale or sales of any other property owned 
by the Holding Company, whenever in their judgment that can be 
done to the best advantage. 

No order directing the sale of such shares of the Maine Company or 
any portion of them or fixing the terms or conditions thereof shall be 
made by the court until after July 1, 1915, unless the New Haven Com- 
pany shall in writing consent thereto. If no such order has been made 
before July 1, 1915, the court on appHcation of any party and after a 
hearing at which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts shall be in\dted 
to appear, shall direct the sale and fix the terms and conditions thereof. 

Thus it is to be seen that while Appendix A authorized and 
directed a sale of the Maine Company stock by the liquida- 
tors without further authority, the decree provides merely 
that the trustees shall arrange and prepare for a sale, but that 
this sale shall not be held "until further order of the court." 
No sale is to be ordered before July 1, 1915, without the 
written consent of the New Haven Company. On any ap- 
plication for authority to sell after that date the Common- 
wealth is to be given an opportunity to be heard, and the 
court is then to direct the sale upon such terms and condi- 
tions as it may fix. Thus the entire matter of the terms and 
conditions of the sale of the Maine Company stock is reserved 
for the future determination of the court. 

As I view it, this difference in the power of sale granted by 
the decree from that stated in Appendix A is a substantial 
one. I must answer your second question in the negative. 

3. I understand your third question to refer to the last 
clause of section 1 of chapter 766, namely, "said stock to be 
held and disposed of by said liquidators in accordance with 
the terms of such written instrument or any written modifica- 
tion thereof hereafter approved by the attorney-general of the 
United States and by the governor of the commonwealth.'' 

I interpret this clause to mean that after the New Haven 
Company has transferred the stock of the Holding Company 
to the liquidators under a written instrument in the form of 
Appendix A, that instrument may subsequently be modified, 
so far as the powers of the liquidators to hold and dispose of 
the stock are concerned, by a written instrument entered into 
between the parties and approved by the Attorney-General of 
the United States and the Governor of this Commonwealth. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 15 

I do not understand that this clause refers to substantial 
changes in Appendix A before it is executed and the statute 
thus accepted by the New Haven Company and the Holding 
Company. In any event, I am of opinion that chapter 766 
gave no authority to the Governor to modify the conditions 
imposed by sections 3, 4 and 5 of that act creating an option 
in the Commonwealth as already described. 

4. If, on an application made under paragraph B of Section 
First of the decree, the United States District Court should 
direct the trustees to sell the Maine Company stock upon 
the conditions imposed by chapter 766, a compliance with 
that act would not be inconsistent with a compliance with the 
decree. Unless thus directed by future orders of the United 
States District Court, the trustees cannot comply with terms 
or conditions contained in chapter 766 or the appendix thereto, 
and not expressly made a part of the decree. 

5. Section 4 of chapter 519 of the Acts of 1909 provides: — 

Any railroad corporation acquiring said stock as hereinbefore pro- 
vided shall not thereafter sell the same without the express authority 
of the legislature. 

This refers only to the common stock. Express authority is 
given by chapter 639 of the Acts of 1910 to a railroad owning 
preferred stock to sell the same. Your fifth question, there- 
fore, can relate only to the 31,065 shares of common stock 
transferred under the decree. 

It is to be noted that no sale of this common stock has 
taken place, and that none is contemplated by the decree. 
The legal title has merely been transferred to trustees to hold 
for the ultimate benefit of the New Haven Company, its 
owners. The trustees are to liquidate the affairs of the Hold- 
ing Company, and then to bring about its dissolution and a 
distribution of its assets. 

It has been judicially determined by this decree that the 
holding of this stock by the New Haven Company, and the 
consequent control by it of the Maine Company, was a viola- 
tion of the laws of the United States. This determination is 
binding upon the New Haven Company, though not, of 
course, upon the Commonwealth. In order to dissolve this 
combination the New Haven Company has been in effect 
ordered to liquidate and dissolve the Holding Company. This 
is to be brought about by independent trustees who are to hold 
the Holding Company stock for the financial benefit of the 



16 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

New Haven Company as its owner, but in such a manner 
that the laws of the United States shall not be violated. 

In my opinion the mere transfer by the New Haven Com- 
pan}^ of the shares of the Holding Company to the trustees 
named in the decree in accordance with the order of the 
United States District Court was not a violation of the laws 
of this Commonwealth. The decree, however, plainly con- 
templates a sale of the Maine Company stock held by the 
Holding Company under such terms and conditions as the 
court shall hereafter fix. Ordinarily it would not be pre- 
sumed that the United States District Court would direct 
such a sale to be made in any manner in violation of the laws 
of this Commonwealth. But the execution of this decree 
necessarily involves a sale upon some conditions of the Maine 
Company stock now owned by the Holding Company, a dis- 
tribution of its assets and a dissolution of the corporation. 
Chapter 519 of the Acts of 1909 expressly forbade any sale 
of that stock "without the express authority of the legis- 
lature." That statute also seems to contemplate the con- 
tinued existence of the Holding Company as an instrumentality 
created by this Commonwealth for the better supervision by 
it of the Maine Company. If, under these circumstances, as 
seems to be contemplated by the decree, the United States 
District Court shall hereafter, without the consent of the 
Legislature of Massachusetts, order a sale of this stock, and 
the purchaser at such sale shall thereby acquire a good title 
to the stock, it is apparent that the terms of the act creating 
the Holding Company will then be violated. 

The provision of the decree, already quoted, seems to con- 
template that an order directing a sale of the Maine Company 
stock may be entered at any time before July 1, 1915, upon 
the written consent of the New Haven Company, without 
notice of any sort to this Commonwealth. The decree recites 
that upon an application made after July 1, 1915, after a 
hearing at which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts "shall 
be invited to appear," the court shall direct the sale and fix 
the terms and conditions thereof. The decree is silent as to 
the purpose of this invitation, nor does it suggest what would 
be the effect of its acceptance by the Commonwealth. 

An examination of the record in this suit, made on Febru- 
ary 19, shows that there have been no proceedings of record 
since the entry of the decree on Oct. 17, 1914. That such 
rights as the Commonwealth may have acquired by the act 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ^ 17 

creating the Holding Company be not prejudiced by any sub- 
sequent proceedings without notice, I have requested the 
court and the Attorney-General of the United States to give 
me notice of all future applications made to the court in this 
case before any order is entered thereon. However, there 
may be some doubt whether the Commonwealth would be 
permitted to intervene in this suit. For that reason, and in 
view of the history of the Holding Company, it may be ap- 
propriate for the General Court to consider the advisability 
of taking action to enable the Attorney-General to appear, in 
the present suit or in any subsequent proceeding, in behalf of 
the Holding Company, in order to protect whatever interest 
the Commonwealth may have in the stock of the Holding 
Company or in the Maine Company stock held by the Holding 
Company, and also the rights of the Holding Company itself as 
an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 

6. As stated in my answer to your first question, a transfer 
by the New Haven Copipany of -the shares of the Holding 
Company in accordance with the decree and in a different 
manner from that contemplated by chapter 766, section 1, 
is not in my opinion an acceptance of the provisions of that 
act. Section 3 takes effect only upon such acceptance of the 
act by the transfer, as provided in sections 1 and 7. In my 
opinion section 3 has not been in effect accepted by this trans- 
fer made under the decree. This section has been evaded 
only in the sense that the determination of the terms and 
conditions under which the Maine Company stock is to be sold 
has been postponed by the court for future adjudication, 
without reference to said section. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Towns — Firewards — Appointment by Selectmen. 

The office of fireward estabhshed by the General Court of the Province in 
1711 and existing under R. L., c. 32, § 9, was not abolished by St. 1907, 
c. 475, §§5 and 10, creating forest firewards; firewards may still be ap- 
pointed by selectmen of towns when there is no organized fire depart- 
ment . 

March 1, 1915. 

Frank W. Rane, Esq., State Forester. 

Dear Sir: — You ask if the selectmen in towns ftiay now 

appoint firewards under R. L., c. 32, § 9, or if the office of 

fireward has been abolished by St. 1907, c. 475, §§5 and 10. 



18 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Firewards have been recognized by law in this Common- 
wealth for more than two hundred years, and up to the en- 
actment of the law creating forest firewards it was the duty 
of firewards to direct the work of fighting forest fires as well 
as other fires. 

The earliest law providing for the appointment of firewards, 
which constituted the nucleus of the first official fire depart- 
ment in the Commonwealth, was passed bj^ the General 
Court of the Province of Massachusetts Bay on Oct. 31, 1711. 
The first section of the act provides : — 

That it shall and may be la^^ul, to and for the justices of the peace 
and selectmen of the town of Boston, from time to time to appoint such 
number of prudent persons, of kno"v\Ti fidelity, not exceeding ten, in the 
several parts of the town, as they may think fit, who shall be denomin- 
ated and called firewards, and have a proper badge assigned to dis- 
tinguish them in their office: \iz., a staff of five feet in length, coloured 
red, and headed with a bright brass spire of six inches long; and at 
times of the breaking forth of fire, and during the continuance thereof, 
shall and herebj^ are fully authorized and impowered to command and 
require assistance for the extinguishing and putting out the fire, and for 
removing of household stuff and furniture, goods and merchandizes, 
out of any dweUing-houses, storehouses, or other buildings actually on 
fire, or in danger thereof, and guards to secure and take care of the 
same; as, also, to require assistance for the pulling dowTi or blo^wdng up 
of any houses, or any other service relating thereto, by the direction of 
two or three of the chief civil or militaiy officers of the town (as is by 
law pro\aded), to stop and prevent the further spreading of the fire, 
and to suppress all tumults and disorder. 

The extension of the fireward system was provided for in 
1744 by chapter 30 of the acts of that year, section 1 of which 
reads: — 

That the several towns within this province may, if thej^ see fit, at 
their anniversary meeting in March, annually appoint a suitable num- 
ber of persons, not exceeding ten, who shall be denominated firewards, 
and have each, for a distinguishing badge of the office, a staff of five feet 
long, painted red, and headed vdih. a bright brass spire six inches long. 

Sections 9 and 10 of chapter 32 of the Revised Laws, which 
is the last enactment on the subject, are as follows: — 

Section 9. The selectmen of a town may annually, in March or 
April, appoint firewards and forth^vith give them notice thereof. Who- 
ever neglects, within seven daj^s after such notice, to file ■with the town 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 19 

clerk his acceptance or refusal of the office shall, unless excused by the 
selectmen, forfeit ten dollars. 

Section 10. If a fire breaks out, the firewards shall immediately 
repair thereto, and shall carr}^ a suitable staff or badge of office. 

By the laws of 1784, chapter 64, provision was made for 
the appointment of enginemen in towns, and chapter 42 of 
the Acts of 1785 provided that the "said enginemen ap- 
pointed as aforesaid shall be held and obliged to go forward 
either by night or by day under the direction of the firewards 
in the same town." Laws authorizing the organization of 
fire departments were later enacted, but in no enactment was 
the fireward law repealed. 

The office of for*est fireward was created by St. 1886, c. 296, 
which provided that such firewards should, in respect to fires 
in woodlands, have and exercise the powers and duties pre- 
scribed for forest fires. This law was amended by St. 1907, 
c. 475, and the powers and duties of forest firewards, with the 
change of name to forest wardens, were more clearly defined. 
No repeal of the original fireward law was effected, and that 
law, as revised and codified in the Revised Laws, still stands. 

Firewards may be appointed, but they no longer have juris- 
diction over forest fires, and in towns having organized fire 
departments there would seem to be no reason for their ex- 
istence. ^Yhere there is no fire department in a town, engine- 
men and hosemen are, by R. L., c. 32, § 28, "under the direction 
of the firewards." In such communities the historical char- 
acter of fireward still exists, and he may even carry a badge 
or staff to distinguish him, though the original staff five 
feet in length, colored red, headed with a bright brass spire 
six inches long, is not now required. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Executive Council — Powers — Removal of Public Officer — 
No Right to reconsider Removal after Appointment and 
Qualification of Successor. 

The Executive Council has no power on its own initiative to reopen or in 
any manner revise the matter of the removal of the Commissioner of 
Animal Industry by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the 
Council, during the previous political year and after the appoint- 
ment and quaUfication of his successor, assuming that removal to have 
been legal. 



20 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

In such a case the Executive Council cannot properly, on petition of the 
person thus removed, hear or consider any evidence bearing upon the 
charges made against him at the time of his removal, whether that 
evidence was then heard or not. 

The Executive Council has no power to reconsider the consent given by it 
to an appointment to public office by the Governor after the appointee 
has duly quahfied as such public officer, whether that consent was 
given during the term of the councillors then in office or that of their 
predecessors. 

March 9, 1915. 

To His Excellency the Governor and the Honorable Council. 

Gentlemen: — I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of February 25, in which you ask my opinion 
upon the following question: — 

Has the Executive Council the constitutional power to reopen on its 
own initiative the case of the Commissioner of Animal Industry, who 
has been removed from office during the preceding political year by the 
Governor, with the advice and consent of the Council? 

Also the communication of your committee appointed by His 
Excellency "to frame such other questions as they desire in 
reference to the petition of Mr. Walker to the Executive 
Council, asking to have his case reopened," dated March 4, 
1915, requesting my opinion upon the following questions: — 

1. Can the present Executive Council hear such evidence as the 
petitioner may wish to present, and after such hearing may the Council 
give such advice to the Governor as the facts seem to them to war- 
rant? 

2. Does the question of hearing the petitioner come under the pro- 
visions of Article I., section III., chapter II. of the Constitution of 
Massachusetts, and if coming under said provisions is the Governor 
simpty a member of the Council vdih one vote? 

3. If a public official has been removed by the Governor with the 
advice and consent of the Council, can that Council, or its successor in 
office, consider evidence which such official desires subsequently to 
present and which he claims was not formerly heard, to determine 
whether the advice given to the Governor was warranted in view of the 
evidence thus brought to its attention? 

I shall refer to the question contained in your communication 
of February 25 as your first question, and I shall refer to the 
questions contained in your communication of March 4, num- 
bered 1, 2 and 3, as your second, third and fourth questions. 

Your first question, I take it, has for its purpose your de- 
sire to ascertain whether the Council can, of its own initiative, 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 21 

in any way set aside or alter the effect of the action of the 
Governor and Council of the political year ending Jan. 7, 
1915, in removing Fred F. Walker from the office of Commis- 
sioner of Animal Industry. It assumes that his removal was 
lawful, and acting upon that assumption I proceed to answer 
your question. 

In an opinion rendered to the Governor and Council on 
May 29, 1906 (190 Mass. 616), it was said by the justices of 
the Supreme Judicial Court that "where the Constitution 
declares the power to act is in the Governor, or that the act 
may be done by the Governor, 'by and with the advice of 
Council,' or *by and with the advice and consent of the 
Council,' " they were of the opinion that the only connection 
that the Council can have with the power is advisory, and that 
" unless the Governor first determines upon the act there is no 
occasion for their participation by way of advice or consent." 

While the appointment of the Commissioner of Animal 
Industry by the Governor, w^ith the advice and consent of the 
Council, is not made by virtue of the Constitution but through 
authority granted by the General Court in an act entitled " An 
Act to abolish the Cattle Bureau of the State Board of Agri- 
culture and to create a Department of Animal Industry," 
chapter 608 of the Acts of 1912, yet the principles involved 
are the same, and the reasoning of the justices of the Supreme 
Judicial Court in the opinion referred to is applicable to the 
question presented. 

It would appear, therefore, that, assuming the removal of 
Fred F. Walker was lawful, the Council has no authority, 
of its own initiative, to take any action toward the reinstate- 
ment of Mr. Walker to the position of Commissioner of 
Animal Industry. Furthermore, assuming that the Council 
has the right to initiate proceedings looking toward his rein- 
statement, it is apparent that any action it may at this time 
take will be without any legal effect whatever. The records 
of the Governor and Council for the political year ending 
Jan. 7, 1915, disclose that on the first day of January, 1915, 
the Governor, acting by and with the consent of the Council, 
removed Fred F. Walker from the office of Commissioner of 
Animal Industry, and that on the same day the Governor, 
acting by and with the consent of the Council, appointed 
Lester H. Howard Commissioner of Animal Industry, and 
that on the second day of January, 1915, the said Lester H. 
Howard duly qualified as such commissioner. 



22 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Obviously, the present Council has no power to revise the 
action of the former Council in its confirmation of the ap- 
pointment of the said Lester H. Howard, who has accepted the 
appointment of Commissioner of Animal Industry and duly 
qualified therefor, nor, in my opinion, could the former Coun- 
cil vote to reconsider its advice and consent to his appoint- 
ment after he had duly qualified as such commissioner. If 
the law were otherwise it would tend to chaos in government, 
as it would follow that appointees, iu'^luding judges, after their 
appointment and confirmation, and after they had duly quali- 
fied and entered into the performance of their duties, could 
be later ousted from oflSce by a reconsideration by the Coun- 
cil of its advice and consent to the appointment. This would 
result in the acts of the officials ousted being put in question, 
if not made null and void. 

The Hon. Dana Malone, a predecessor in this office, on 
March 6, 1907, rendered an opinion to His Excellency Gov- 
ernor Guild, that the Council, having once given its advice 
to the Governor in relation to an appointment to or removal 
from office, and gone upon record, could not initiate of them- 
selves further discussion of the matter. 

It follows that in my opinion the answer to your first ques- 
tion must be in the negative. 

Your second question asks my opinion as to whether the 
present Council can hear such evidence as the petitioner, 
Fred F. Walker, desires to present in relation to a petition 
filed by him with the Governor and Council on the twenty- 
sixth day of January, 1915. This petition, a copy of which 
was submitted to me with your questions, alleges that Mr. 
Walker's removal was unlawful, and that by reason of his re- 
moval being unlawful he desires a hearing upon certain charges 
contained in a report of the Commission on Economy and Ef- 
ficiency, in order that, in the event that the present Council 
finds the charges unfounded, the petitioner may be reinstatecL 
You ask me to answer your question upon the assumption 
that his removal was lawful. 

Assuming that the removal was lawful, the Council, in n y 
opinion, has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter containei 
in the petition, and any advice given or any action taken I y 
it upon the petition would be without an}^ force or efi'ect 
whatever. 

While it is apparent that if the members of the Council, 
notwithstanding their want of jurisdiction in the pren i^e.s. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 23 

desire to listen to such evidence as Mr. Walker may wish to 
present, they may do so, I am of the opinion that they can- 
not, as the Council, properly hear or consider such evidence, 
as the matter to which the evidence relates is not one within 
its province. 

In reply to your third question, assuming that the removal 
of Mr. Walker was lawful, I am of the opinion that as the 
Governor and Council are without jurisdiction of the subject- 
matter contained in the petition, the question of a hearing 
upon the same does not fall within the provisions of Article 
I. of section III. of chapter II. of the Constitution of Massa- 
chusetts. 

In reply to your fourth question, the question being asked 
upon the assumption that the removal of the official was 
lawful, I am of the opinion that the Council cannot properly 
hear evidence of the character stated in your question. Mani- 
festly, the only purpose of hearing and considering such evi- 
dence, where an official has been legally removed from office, 
would be to pass upon the wisdom of the judgment of a 
former Council. The duties and powers of the Council, except 
such as are created by the General Court, are defined in the 
Constitution of Massachusetts. I know of no act of the Gen- 
eral Court nor provision of the Constitution which warrants 
such action by the Council. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Constitutional Law — Freedom of Contract — Police Power — 
Regulation of Sale of Newspapers and Periodicals in Com- 
bination. 

A proposed act declaring illegal any agreement by news dealers, news 
agents and publishers which provides for the sale of two or more 
newspapers or periodicals only in com.bination with each other, or 
unless offered separately at the current price, would be unconstitutional 
if enacted, as denying the equal protection of the law in violation of 
the Fom-teenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
and as not being a reasonable regulation in the interests of the public 
health, safety, morals or general weKare under the police power. 

March 15, 1915. 
Hon. Channing H. Cox, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Sik: — I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of an order, 
passed by the House of Representatives on March 3, 1915, 



24 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

requesting the Attorney-General to inform the House of Rep- 
resentatives whether or not in his opinion the bill printed as 
House Bill No. 437, which provides for the regulation of the 
sale of newspapers and periodicals, would be constitutional if 
enacted. 

The main purpose of the bill seems to be declared in sections 
2 and 3.^ These sections are directed solely at news dealers, 
news agents and publishers of newspapers and periodicals. 
Section 2 appears to make illegal any agreement by persons 
engaged in such business which provides for the sale of two or 
more publications only in combination with each other. Any 
such agreement, the natural effect of which is to deprive any 
person within the Commonwealth of the privilege of buying any 
newspaper or periodical separately and at its current price, 
comes within the prohibition of the statute. All agreements 
to sell two publications only at a single price are rendered 
criminal, even though the price set for the combination is 
substantially less than the sum of the usual prices of the single 
publications when sold separately. Thus many agreements 
between publishers and agents which are for the purpose of 
establishing so-called club rates, often most advantageous to 
the public, would seem to be rendered illegal. 

Section 3 makes it unlawful for any person to offer for sale 
any combination of two or more publications at any price 
however low unless each publication is also offered for sale 
separately at its current price. Thus dealers in one kind of 
property are forbidden to sell their wares in combination when 
dealers in other kinds of property are permitted to sell their 
goods as they please. 

Plainly, these sections, if enacted, would impair the freedom 
of contract and deny equal protection of our laws to certain 
of our citizens. Therefore, they come within the limitations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu- 
tion and the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 

^ These sections are as follows: — 

Section 2. Every newspaper or other periodical publication offered for sale in this 
commonwealth shall be offered separately at the current price for such pubUcation, and it 
shall be unlawful for any newsdealer, news agent or publisher of any newspaper or other 
periodical to enter into any agreement, compact or understanding with any person, firm 
or corporation in this commonwealth with the intent to deprive any purchaser of the priv- 
ilege of buying any newspaper or periodical singly and separately at the current price of 
each publication. 

Section 3. It shall be unlawful to insert one newspaper within another newspaper or 
periodical issued from a different office of publication or to offer such combination or pub- 
lications for sale without affording the purchaser the opportunity to buy either newspaper 
or publication separately if he so desires at the current price of each publication. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 25 

Massachusetts, unless they can be supported as reasonable 
regulations under the police power. This power is defined by. 
Part II., chapter I., section I., Article IV. of the Constitution 
of Massachusetts as the power "to make, ordain, and estab- 
lish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, 
statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions, either 
with penalties or without; so as the same be not repugnant 
or contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge to be for 
the good and welfare of this commonwealth, and for the gov- 
ernment and ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the 
same. . . ." . 

Regulations enacted under this power, particularly those 
which impose burdens upon a limited class of our citizens, 
must be reasonably directed toward the preservation of the 
public health, the public safety, the public 'morals, and, to a 
more limited extent, of the public welfare. Under the guise 
of the police power the General Court cannot impose upon 
one class of our people special burdens which, when tested by 
sound reason, can be found to perform no reasonable service 
in advancing those fundamental public interests. 

The publishing and the selling of newspapers and periodi- 
cals are not public callings. Persons engaged in those callings 
have the right to sell or to refuse to sell to whom they will. 
It is doubtful if the General Court would have any consti- 
tutional authority to regulate the prices at which such publi- 
cations should be sold. They are not necessaries of life, and 
no person has any inherent right or privilege to buj^ them 
at any price singly or in combination. The bill discloses, and 
I am able to perceive, no reasonable basis for placing persons 
engaged in this business in a class by themselves, and im- 
posing upon them special burdens not imposed upon persons 
engaged in the production, distribution and sale of other 
commodities. This classification seems to me to bear no rela- 
tion to the public health, safety, morals or the general welfare 
within the meaning of the police power. 

I therefore reply to your order that in my opinion, for the 
reasons above stated, the bill printed as House 437 would 
be unconstitutional if enacted. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



26 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Co-operative Banks — Loans to Shareholders — Matured Shares. 

A co-operative bank is not authorized to execute loans to shareholders on 
matured shares held in accordance with St. 1912, c. 625, § 17, as 
amended by St. 1914, c. 643, § 6. 

March 19, 1915. 
Hon. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
a co-operative bank is authorized to execute loans on matured 
shares belonging to a shareholder. 

The provisions of law relating to this subject are found in 
St. 1912, c. 623, § 17, as amended by St. 1914, c. 643, § 6, and 
§§22 and 25, which are as follows: — 

Section 17. Whenever shares of a given series reach the value of 
two hundred dollars, either by the pajTiient of dues, the addition of a 
regular dividend or the addition of interest as hereinafter pro\aded, 
they shall be deemed matured and all pajTnents of dues thereon shall 
cease, and the ov»^ner of each unpledged share shall be paid out of the 
funds of the corporation the matured value thereof; or if he shall so 
elect, and at the option of the directors, there may be entered on his 
pass book any number of shares that have matured, not exceeding ten, 
and such shares shall continue as matured shares in said corporation, 
subject to be "withdrawn or retired as provided in sections fourteen and 
sixteen of this act, but at no time shall more than one half of the funds 
in the treasury be applicable to payment of shares, either matured or 
unmatured or both, without the consent of the directors and except as 
hereafter provided in section eighteen. . . . 



Section 22. A borrowing shareholder shall, in addition to dues on 
shares, paj'' monthly interest, or interest and premium, on his loan at 
the determined rate until his shares reach their matured value, or the 
loan has been repaid; and when said matured value is reached, the 
shares shall be cancelled, the loan discharged and the balance, if any, 
due upon the shares, shall be paid to the member. 



Section 25. Loans may be made upon unpledged shares to an 
amount not exceeding ninety-five per cent of their withdrawal value 
at the time of the loan, and for every such loan a note shall be given, 
accompanied by a transfer and pledge of the shares borrowed upon. 

Co-operative banks are not ordinary institutions for savings, 
and are not intended to be banks where money may remain 
on deposit indefinitely, although, under certain conditions, 



1916.J PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. . 27 

ten shares are permitted to be continued in the corporation as 
matured shares. 

The purpose of co-operative banks may be said to be to 
effect the saving of money by a compulsory method as dis- 
tinguished from the permissive policy maintained by other 
banks. The only departure from this purpose is the provision 
in the statute giving the right to hold ten matured shares as 
above stated. 

The statute does not specifically provide for loans on these 
matured shares, and in my opinion does not authorize such 
loans by implication. 

Very truly yours, 

Hexry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Boards of Health of Cities and Towns — Power to Regulate 
Trade — Ice Cream. 

Under the provisions of R. L., c. 56, § 70, as amended by St. 1912, c. 448, 
boards of health of cities and towns may, subject to the approval of 
the State Department of Health, make and enforce rules and regula- 
tions governing the manufacture, the care and the sale of ice cream. 

March 22, 1915. 
Allan J. McLaughlin, M.D., Commissioner of Health. 

Dear Sir: — Your request for an interpretation of chapter 
448 of the Acts of 1912, as relating to the authority of local 
boards of health over the manufacture, sale and care of ice 
cream, has been given consideration. 

The statute referred to is an amendment of section 70 of 
chapter 56 of the Revised Laws, which chapter relates to the 
regulation of trade. The original section was not altered, ex- 
cept by adding another paragraph. This statute as amended 
is as follows : — 

Boards of health of cities and towns, by themselves, their officers 
or agents, may inspect the carcasses of all slaughtered animals and 
all meat, fish, vegetables, produce, fruit or provisions of any kind 
found in their cities or towns, and for such purpose may enter any 
building, enclosure or other place in wliich such carcasses or articles 
are stored, kept or exposed for sale. If, on such inspection, it is found 
that such carcasses or articles are tainted, diseased, corrupted, decayed, 
unwholesome or, from any cause, unfit for food, the board of health 
shall seize the same and cause it or them to be destroyed forthwith or 
disposed of otherwise than for food. All money received b}^ the board 



28 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of health for property disposed of as aforesaid shall, after deducting 
the expenses of said seizure, be paid to the owner of such property. 
If the board of heal1 h seizes or condemns any such carcass or meat for 
the reason that it is affected -^dth a contagious disease, it shall imme- 
diately give notice to the board of cattle commissioners of the name 
of the owner or person in whose possession it was found, the nature 
of the disease and the disposition made of said meat or carcass. 

Boards of health of cities and towns may make and enforce reason- 
able rules and regulations, subject to the approval of the state board 
of health, as to the conditions under which all articles of food may be 
kept for sale, or exposed for sale, in order to prevent contamination 
thereof and injury to the public health. Before the board oi health 
of any city or town submits such rules and regulations to the state 
board of health for approval it shall hold a pubhc hearing thereon, 
of which notice shall be given by publication for two successive weeks, 
the first publication to be at least fourteen daj^s prior to the date of 
the hearing, in a newspaper published in such cit}^ or town, or, if 
none is so published, in a newspaper pubhshed in the county in 
which such city or town is located. Any person affected by such 
rules and regulations, in the form in wliich they are presented to the 
state board of health for approval, maj^ appeal to the said board for 
a further hearing, and said board shall not grant its approval to rules 
and regulations concerning which such an appeal has been taken until 
it has held a public hearing thereon, advertised in the manner specified 
above in this section with reference to hearings before boards of health 
in cities and towns. 

Naturally the question arises because the first paragraph 
of the section gives authority to the boards of health to in- 
spect slaughtered animals, meat, fish, vegetables, produce, 
fruit or *' provisions of any kind," while the added paragraph 
empowers such boards to make and enforce regulations as to 
the conditions under which all articles of food may be kept 
ior sale. Do the specific articles mentioned in the first para- 
graph of the section limit the words "all articles of food" in 
the last paragraph? 

It has been held by a former Attorney-General that these 
words do not include milk, and therefore local boards of 
health have no authority, under this section, to make regu- 
lations dealing with that commodity. Sections 51 to 67, in- 
clusive, of said chapter 56 of the Revised Laws are milk 
regulations, and the former Attorney-General was of the 
opinion that these sections dealt with the milk question so 
effectively that sections 70 to 76, inclusive, do not extend 
the authority of boards of health to milk, since the word 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 29 

''milk" was not used in the following sections. This ruling, 
however, was limited to milk, and very properly so. 

Ice cream is not covered by the statute on regulation of 
trade, unless section 70, as amended, applies to this com- 
modity. Ice cream may be classified under the head of 
"provisions," and it also comes within the definition of a food. 
Hence, I am of opinion that local boards of health may make 
and enforce rules and regulations governing the manufacture, 
the care and the sale of ice cream, subject to the approval of 
the State Department of Health. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Statutes — General and Special — Codification — Special Stat- 
ute not repealed by Codification of General Statutes — 
Boston Consolidated Gas Company. 

St. 1906, c. 422, entitled "An Act to promote the reduction of the price 
of gas in the city of Boston and its vicinity," generally known as 
the "sliding scale act," was not repealed or superseded by St. 1914, c. 
742, entitled "An Act to consolidate the laws relative to the manufac- 
ture, distribution and sale of gas and electricitj'." 

March 23, 1915. 
Hon. Channing H. Cox, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Dear Sir: — By an order adopted by the House of Repre- 
sentatives on March 10, 1915, my opinion was requested as to 
whether " chapter 422 of the Acts of the year 1906, entitled 
'An Act to promote the reduction of the price of gas in the 
city of Boston and its vicinity,' and especially section 10 of 
said chapter, was repealed or superseded by chapter 742 of the 
Acts of the year 1914, entitled 'An Act to consolidate the 
laws relative to the manufacture, distribution and sale of gas 
and electricity. ' " 

The 1906 act, generally known as the *' sliding scale act," 
provided a method of fixing the price of gas sold by the Bos- 
ton Consolidated Gas Company, and of the dividends to be 
paid by that company. The 1914 act is a consolidation and 
revision of the general laws relative to the manufacture, dis- 
tribution and sale of gas and electricity. Section 199 thereof 
repeals by express mention seventy-two acts and sections of 
acts. It is significant that in this list chapter 422 of the Acts 
of 1906 is not included. 



30 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

It has been suggested that section 199 repeals chapter 121 
of the Revised Laws "and all acts in amendment thereof," 
and that section 10 of chapter 422 of the Acts of 1906 is an 
amendment of that chapter. It may be that in discussing the 
meaning of the word "amendment," when used in other con- 
nections, courts have used at times language which in its 
broadest sense might include such a case as this. 

Bouvier defines "amendment" as an alteration or change 
of something proposed in a bill or established as law. The 
Century Dictionary says: — 

The act of freeing from faults; the act of making better, or of 
changing for the better; correction; improvement; reformation. An 
alteration of a legislative or deliberative act or in a constitution; a 
change made in a law either by way of correction or addition. 

The term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within 
the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or 
better carry out the purposes for which it was framed. Liver more v. 
Waite, 102 Cal. 113. 

Section 10 of chapter 422 of the Acts of 1906 hardly comes 
within such definitions. Furthermore, it has been expressly 
held that neither extending a general law to a corporation 
not included within it, nor exempting a particular municipal 
corporation from the terms of a general law, is an amendment 
thereof. Quinlan v. H. & T. C. Ry. Co., 89 Tex. 356; Barron 
V. Smith, 108 Md. 317. 

I am of the opinion that section 10 of chapter 422 of the 
Acts of 1906 was not an amendment of R. L., c. 121, in the 
sense here intended. 

Section 199 also repeals "all other acts and parts of acts 
inconsistent herewith." 

Without the express words an absolutely inconsistent or 
repugnant provision of earlier laws would be superseded or 
repealed, although such repeal by implication is not favored by 
the courts. Copeland v. Springfield, 166 Mass. at 504. In- 
deed, it has been said that the insertion of a clause like that 
quoted above adds nothing to the legal effect consequent upon 
the passage of the new act. The Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa., 
139, 142. 

The question here is whether, in view of these principles and 
the language of the 1914 act, the earlier special law is incon- 
sistent with the later general one, and therefore repealed. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 31 

It is to be observed that a special law as to one locality 
or corporation is not necessarily inconsistent with a different 
rule applicable to localities or corporations generally. Things 
are consistent which can stand together harmoniously and 
are not contradictory. If there had been included in the 1914 
act, after the general provisions in sections 43, 162 and 163, 
other sections such as are found in the 1906 act, it could not 
well have been said that the consolidated act was inconsistent 
or self -contradictory. 

Cases may be found which hold that the passage of a gen- 
eral law containing such a repeal clause as is here found 
operates as a repeal of special laws upon the same subject. 
The cases of People v. Wenzel, 105 Mich. 70, O'Malley v. 
County, 3 Kulp (Pa.), 41, 46, and Brown v. Mullica Town- 
ship, 48 N. J. L. 447, are examples of this. 

Nevertheless, the general rule is otherwise, and it is well 
stated in the last-named case, as follows: — 

It has been well settled in this State that a general law on a subject- 
matter which has been provided for in certain localities by special 
laws wdll not, although it contain a general repealer of acts inconsistent 
with, it, annul or alter the special provisions in those localities. But if 
the general law expressly repeals the special laws, or shows b}'' impli- 
cation a manifest intent to supersede their provisions, the latter must 
jdeld. 

This intention is to be gathered from the language of the 
entire act, construed in the light of its history. In constru- 
ing an act, "the title of the act, the objects to be accom- 
plished, the other provisions found in connection with those 
under especial consideration, the provisions and arrangement 
of the statutes which were amended, the mode in which the 
embarrassing words were introduced, as shown by the journals 
and records, the history of the times, and especially of prior 
legislation upon the same general subject, may all be con- 
sidered." {Simpson v. Story, 145 Mass. 497, 498.) 

Where a general law is passed for the first time there is 
much more reason for holding that prior special acts are re- 
pealed than in a case of codification and revision. In the 
former case it is far easier to discover a legislative purpose to 
repeal special provisions, because the Legislature is then for 
the first time declaring that it is making a law applicable to 
all, and thus it may more naturally be construed to exclude 
the idea of special laws continuing. Where, however, a gen- 



32 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan, 

eral and special law have been in existence, working har- 
moniously side by side, the re-enactment in codification, of 
the general law, either in identical terms or with some per- 
fecting amendments, furnishes little, if any, ground for such 
argument. 

At the time of the passage of the 1906 act, and through- 
out the time of its operation, there were in force and effect 
general laws covering the same subjects as those portions of 
the codification which could be argued to be inconsistent with 
the 1906 act, and for large part in the same language. This 
is especially true of sections 162 and 163, which are re-enact- 
ments of R. L., c. 121, §§ 34 and 35, referred to in section 10 
of chapter 422 of the Acts of 1906. 

Section 200 of the 1914 act, adopting in general the law as 
laid down in Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400, provides: — 

The provisions of this act, so far as they are the same as existing 
statutes, shall be construed as a continuation thereof and not as new 
enactments, and a reference in a statute which has not been repealed 
to provisions of law which have been revised and re-enacted herein, 
shall be construed as applying to such provisions as so incorporated 
in this act. 

This section makes provision whereby both acts may work 
in harmony with each other. The enactment of sections 162 
and 163 was not in any sense the making of a new law, but 
merely a continuation of the law from which the 1906 act 
expressly exempted the Boston Consolidated Gas Company. 

The history of the 1914 act is especially enlightening. In 
1912, by resolve, chapter 51, the Legislature directed the 
Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners *'to revise, 
consolidate and arrange the general laws of the Common- 
wealth pertaining to the manufacture, transmission, distribu- 
tion and sale of gas and electricity, and to corporations 
engaged therein, not including street railway, telephone or 
telegraph companies, and in connection therewith to consider 
the expediency of additional legislation affecting the relation of 
such corporations to the public and to one another, and of 
extending the provisions of law for supervision and regula- 
tion to any or all of them." In 1913 that Board reported, 
recommending certain extensions and changes of the existing 
general laws, with a bill codifying those laws and embodying 
therein the extensions and changes recommended. These rec- 
ommendations did not mention the extension of the general 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 33 

laws to the Boston Consolidated Gas Company so far as it 
was exempted by the 1906 act. The bill contained a repeal- 
ing section substantially in the same words that now appear. 
After some consideration and alterations the 1913 Legislature 
referred this matter to the next General Court. 

In 1914, upon motion, it was taken from the files and re- 
ferred to the committee on public lighting. This committee 
inserted the word "general" in section 199, so that the re- 
pealing clause in question read, "and all other general acts 
and parts of general acts." Said clause remained in this form 
throughout its consideration in the Senate and until referred 
to the House committee on bills in the third reading, in 
which committee the word "general" was stricken out, and 
the committee reported to the House without specific mention 
of its action in so doing. In view of House Rule 26 it cannot 
be that the committee intended to make *' any change in the 
sense or legal effect, or any material change in construction" 
of the act. Neither can it be thought that the committee 
intended to exceed its powers; and, especially in a bill of the 
length of this, the members of the Legislature undoubtedly 
acted in the later stages of the passage of the act on the pre- 
sumption that the bill was the same in effect as before its ref- 
erence to the House committee on bills in the third reading. 

In these events there is nothing to indicate an intention to 
repeal this special act, but, on the contrary, the insertion of 
the word "general" by the committee which considered the 
bill on its merits, and the presence of that word during the 
passage of the act up to the time of reference to the House 
committee on bills in the third reading, shows a clear inten- 
tion not to do so. 

I am of opinion that the legislative purpose was clearly 
disclosed by the resolve authorizing the codification; that such 
act directed the Board to deal primarily with general statutes; 
and that the history of the passage of the codification, taken 
together with its phraseology, indicates no intention upon the 
part of the Legislature to repeal the provisions of chapter 422 
of the Acts of 1906. 

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that chapter 422 of the 
Acts of the year 1906 was not repealed or superseded by 
chapter 742 of the Acts of the year 1914. 
Yours respectfully, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



34 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORI. [Jan. 



Fire Protection — Storage of Inflammable Fluids — Gasoline in 
Automobile Tanks — Storage in Bulk. 

Neither St. 1911, c. 477, nor any other statutes then in force concerning 
the storage of inflammable fluids were repealed by St. 1914, c. 795, 
entitled "An Act to provide for the better prevention of fires through- 
out the metropolitan district," and, accordingly, gasoline may st.'ll be 
kept in the tanks of automobiles without license or permit in those 
buildings in which it could be so kept prior to the passage of the last- 
mentioned statute, but in no others. 

Inflammable fluids kept in unopened original receptacles, other than bar- 
rels, no one of which contains more than ten gallons, are not kept in 
bulk within the meaning of St. 1914, c. 795, § 6. 

Varnishes and shellacs which are of substantially the same inflammable 
character as the least inflammable article enumerated in St. 1914, c. 
795, § 6, come within the provisions of that section. 

March 29, 1915. 
John A. O'Keefe, Esq., Fire Prevention Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — In your letter of the 17th inst. you request 
my opinion as to whether the provisions of section 6^ of 
chapter 795 of the Acts of 1914 permit gasoline to be kept in 
the tank of an automobile without regulation by the Fire 
Prevention Commissioner, and if so, do the provisions of said 
chapter 795 repeal the provisions of chapter 477 of the Acts 
of 1911; and also my opinion as to whether the phrase "in 
bulk," in said section 6, includes varnishes, shellacs, etc., in 
cans, and if it does, is the size of the can a material element. 
In order properly to determine the questions raised, considera- 
tion must be given to the state of the law in relation to ex- 
plosives and inflammable fluids at the time of the passage of 
chapter 795 of the Acts of 1914 and the various acts estab- 
lishing the law. 

By chapter 370 of the Acts of 1904 it was provided that no 
building should thereafter be erected or used for the keeping, 
storage, manufacture or sale of explosives or inflammable 
fluids without a license granted by the mayor and aldermen 

1 Reads as follows: — 

Section 6. No paint, oil, benzine, naphtha, or other inflammable fluid shall be kept 
stored in bulk or barrel otherwise than in the tank of an automobile or motor boat or sta- 
tionary engine in total quantity exceeding ten gallons in any part of any building used for 
habitation, or within fifty feet of any building used for dwelling purposes, unless such 
paint, oil, or other inflammable fluid is enclosed within a fireproof room or structure, con- 
structed and arranged to the satisfaction of the commissioner, and no paint, oil, benzine, 
naphtha, or other inflammable fluid, except for domestic purposes shall be kept, used, 
stored or sold in any part of any building used for habitation, unless a permit therefor has 
first been obtained from the commissioner under such terms and conditions as he may 
prescribe. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 35 

or selectmen after a public hearing and a permit granted by 
the fire marshal's department of the District Police. The act 
provided, however, that any building lawfully used for any of 
said purposes at the time of its passage could still be con- 
tinued in such use without a license or permit, but it should 
be subject to the regulations for protection against fire or ex- 
plosion of the fire marshal's department. 

By chapter 502 of the Acts of 1909 it was provided that any 
building or other structure once used lawfully for any of said 
purposes could be continued to be so used from year to year 
if the owner or occupant thereof should, while such use con- 
tinued, annually file for registration a certificate reciting such 
use and occupancy with the city or town clerk of the city or 
town where such building or other structure was situated, and 
with the chief of the District Police or the official designated 
by him to grant permits in such city or town. 

By chapter 477 of the Acts of 1911 it was provided that 
gasoline in an automobile or motor vehicle where more than 
two such vehicles were kept should be deemed to be a keeping 
of gasoline in a building under the provisions of chapter 370 
of the Acts of 1904, and amendments thereof; provided, how- 
ever, that it should not apply where not more than two au- 
tomobiles were kept in a building erected prior to the enact- 
ment of said chapter, i.e., May 26, 1911, if such building or 
any part thereof was not used either for human habitation 
or for holding gatherings of, or giving entertainments, in- 
struction or employment to, more than twenty persons. 

By chapter 223 of the Acts of 1910 provision was made that 
"the detective and fire inspection department of the district 
police may by regulation prescribe the amount of explosives, 
crude petroleum or any of its products, or any other inflammable 
fluid or compound, that may be kept for private use in a build- 
ing or other structure without a license, permit or registration." 

In substance, therefore, at the time of the passage of 
chapter 795 of the Acts of 1914 the keeping, storage, manu- 
facture and sale of explosives or inflammable fluids in a build- 
ing was prohibited unless a license was first granted by the 
mayor and aldermen or selectmen after a public heaiing and a 
permit was granted by the fire marshal's department of the 
District Police, except that no permit or license was required 
for the keeping of explosives or inflammable fluids for private 
use in a building or other structure where regulations were 
established by the District Police prescribing the amount 



36 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

thereof. The exceptions to this general law were the keep- 
ing, storage, manufacture and sale of explosives and inflam- 
mable fluids in buildings that were lawfully used for such 
purposes prior to the passage of chapter 370 of the Acts of 
1904, which could be continued to be used under the pro- 
visions of law, and the keeping of not more than two auto- 
mobiles in any building erected prior to May 26, 1911. Thus, 
at the time of the passage of chapter 795 of the Acts of 1914 
there were many buildings in the metropolitan district which 
were being lawfully used for the keeping, storage, manu- 
facture and sale of explosives and inflammable fluids; and, in 
buildings in which automobiles in excess of two were kept prior 
to the passage of chapter 370 of the Acts of 1904, more than 
two automobiles could still be continued to be kept without 
any license or permit therefor; and in all buildings not used 
either for human habitation or for holding gatherings of, or 
giving entertainments, instruction or employment to, more 
than twenty persons, erected prior to May 26, 1911, not more 
than two automobiles could be kept, and the gasoline in their 
tanks did not come within the provisions of the general law. 

By the passage of chapter 795 of the Acts of 1914 the Leg- 
islature, in my judgment, did not intend to allow the keep- 
ing of automobiles with gasoline in their tanks in greater 
numbers and in buildings other than those in which they could 
be kept at the time of the passage of the act. To construe 
the act otherwise would be to interpret an intention of the 
Legislature to authorize the keeping of gasoline in automo- 
biles under less stringent regulations in the metropolitan dis- 
trict, where the liability of fire and explosion is greater, and 
more stringent regulations are needed than in other parts of 
the Commonwealth. 

It is my opinion that the Legislature, by the passage of 
said chapter 795, had no intention to repeal the existing law 
applicable to the metropolitan district in relation to explosives 
and inflammable fluids, but intended that said chapter 795 
should be in addition to the law already in operation. This 
view is given additional force by reason of the provisions of 
section 3 of said chapter 795, — that all existing powers, in 
whatever officers, councils, bodies, boards or persons, other than 
the General Court and the judicial courts of the Common- 
wealth, they may be vested, to license persons or premises, 
or to grant permits for or to inspect or regulate or restrain 
the keeping, storage, use, manufacture or sale of explosives 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 37 

and inflammable fluids, shall be transferred to and vested in 
the Fire Prevention Commissioner. 

I am therefore of opinion that in all buildings or other 
structures over which the District Police had the power of 
supervision and regulation prior to the passage of chapter 795 
of the Acts of 1914, the Fire Prevention Commissioner has 
now the same power; and that as to all buildings, including 
those buildings in which gasoline and explosives could be kept 
without a permit or license in the metropolitan district before 
the passage of that act, no paint, oil, benzine, naphtha or 
other inflammable fluid shall be kept or stored therein in bulk 
or barrel, otherwise than in the tank of an automobile or 
motor boat or stationary engine, in total quantity exceeding 
ten gallons, in any part of such building if used for habitation, 
nor within fifty feet of any building used for dwelling pur- 
poses, unless such paint, oil or other inflammable fluid is en- 
closed within a fireproof room or structure constructed and 
arranged to the satisfaction of the commissioner; and that, in 
any building used for habitation, no paint, oil, benzine, 
naphtha or other inflammable fluid, except for domestic pur- 
poses, shall be used, stored or sold in any part thereof without 
a permit from the commissioner. 

Accordingly, I am of opinion that chapter 477 of the Acts 
of 1911 was not repealed by the provisions of chapter 795 of 
the Acts of 1914, and that gasoline may still be kept in the 
tanks of automobiles, without license or permit, in those 
buildings in which it could be so kept prior to the passage of 
said chapter 795, but in no others. 

As to an interpretation of the phrase "in bulk," I am of 
the opinion that where gasoline or other inflammable fluids 
are kept in unopened original receptacles other than barrels, 
no one of which contains in excess of ten gallons, the inflam- 
mable fluids are not being kept in bulk, within the meaning of 
the act, and, therefore, that the size of the can or receptacle 
in which the inflammable fluid is kept is a material element. 

As to whether the provisions of section 6 of said chapter 795 
include varnishes, shellacs, etc., in my judgment is depend- 
ent upon whether they are of substantially the same inflam- 
mable character as the least inflammable article enumerated 
in the section. If they are of such inflammable character 
they come within the provisions of the act. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



38 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Insurance — Fraternal Beneficiary Insurance — Societies limit- 
ing Membership to Certain Classes — When subject to In- 
surance Laws. 

A domestic fraternal beneficiary corporation which Hmits its membership 
to certain classes of persons, as provided in St. 1911, c. 628, § 12 h, 
and pays a death benefit in excess of $200, does not come within the 
exemption provided by section 29 h of that statute, and must conform 
to the insurance laws of the Commonwealth. 

April 5, 1915. 

Hon. Frank H. Hardison, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
a fraternal beneficiary corporation, referred to in section 29 a 
of chapter 628 of the Acts of 1911, which pays a death benefit 
of $500, is exempted under the provisions of section 29 b of 
said act from otherwise conforming to the provisions of the 
insurance statutes. 

Section 29 b, as amended by section 5 of chapter 617 of the 
Acts of 1913, is as follows: — 

A domestic fraternal beneficiary society, as defined in section one 
of this act, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which limits, its 
membership as provided in division b of section twelve ; or which Hmits 
its membership to the members and ex-members of any social organi- 
zation having a lodge system and secret form of work, or a secret order 
or fraternity, which order or fraternity operates on the lodge system 
with a representative form of government and grants insurance bene- 
fits as incidental only to the work of the order or fraternity; or a 
purely charitable association or corporation existing on the twenty- 
third day of May, nineteen hundred and one, any one of which pays 
a death or funeral benefit limited to not more than two hundred dol- 
lars, disability benefits not exceeding ten dollars per week, or any or 
all of such benefits, and which is not conducted as a business enter- 
prise or for profit, . . . may transact business in this commonwealth 
without conforming to the provisions of this act or other acts relating 
to insurance companies, except division b of this section; . . . 

You state that the attorney for the company in question 
argues that inasmuch as the preliminary clauses of section 
29 b are separated by semicolons, the words "any one of 
which pays a death or funeral benefit limited to not more than 
two hundred dollars," etc., merely apply to "a purely chari- 
table association or corporation existing on the twenty-third 
day of May, nineteen hundred and one." Such a construc- 
tion would hardly seem reasonable even if chapter 628 of the 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUJVIENT — No. 12. 39 

Acts of 1911 were the first legislation on this subject, as the 
words "any one of" would be surplusage if the interpretation 
contended for were correct, and would furnish a most awk- 
ward mode of expression for that thought. 

However, the 1911 act is but one of a rather lengthy series 
of enactments on this subject. The words in question seem 
first to appear in St. 1899, c. 442, § 17, which is as follows: — 

Any fraternal beneficiary corporation, or any association that limits 
its membership to a particular order, class or fraternity, or to the em- 
ployees of towns, cities, the Commonwealth, or the federal government, 
or of a designated firm, business house or corporation, or any secret 
fraternity or order, or any existing purely charitable association or 
corporation, any one of which pays a death or funeral benefit not 
exceeding two hundred dollars, . . . 

Under this clause the contention made is clearly untenable, 
and the limitation of ^200 applies to each of the kinds of as- 
sociation mentioned. This interpretation equally is required 
by the later enactments. See St. 1901, c. 422, § 17; R. L., c. 
119, § 12; St. 1903, c. 332. 

Under these circumstances it seems entirely plain that a 
domestic fraternal beneficiary corporation , which limits its 
membership as provided in division b of section 12 and pays 
a death benefit in excess of $200, does not come within the 
exemption provided for by said section 29 b. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



State Board of Health — Creation — Effect on Existing Health 

Regulations. 

Rules and regulations established under the authority of R. L., c. 75, § 113, 
and the penalties for the infringement thereof established by R. L., 
c. 75, § 122, were not repealed or affected by St. 1914, c. 792, entitled 
"An Act to create a State Department of Health and to amend the 
public health laws." 

April 5, 1915. 

Mr. X. H. GooDNOUGH, Chief Engineer, State Department of Health. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
chapter 792 of the Acts of 1914 in effect repealed the regula- 
tions made under section 113 of chapter 75 of the Revised 
Laws, or takes away the penalty for infringement of rules and. 
regulations made under said section. 



40 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Chapter 792 of the Acts of 1914, entitled "An Act to create 
a State Department of Health and to amend the public Health 
laws," in general provides for a State Department of Health 
which "shall exercise all the powers and perform the duties 
now conferred and imposed by law upon the state board of 
health," which latter Board was abolished by this act. Sec- 
tion 2 provides for the appointment of a Commissioner of 
Health, and "his powers and duties shall be to administer the 
laws relative to health and sanitation and the regulations of 
the department; ..." Section 3 provides for a public health 
council "to make and promulgate rules and regulations; to 
take evidence in appeals; to consider plans and appointments 
required by law; to hold hearings; . . . but it shall have no 
administrative or executive functions." Sections 4 and 5 pro- 
vide for divisions of the department and the appointment of 
directors of divisions and district health officers. The latter 
" shall have all the powers and perform the duties now pro- 
vided by law for inspectors of health and further shall, under 
the direction of the commissioner of health, perform such duties 
as may be prescribed by, and shall act as the representative 
of the commissioner of health and under his directors shall 
secure the enforcement within his district of the public health 
laws and regulations." 

Section 8 repeals sections 1, 2 and 3 of chapter 75 of the 
Revised Laws "and all other acts and parts of acts inconsist- 
ent herewith." 

The sections expressly mentioned related solely to the ap- 
pointment and administration of the State Board of Health. 

It will be seen that the new act is in all essential details 
an administrative provision. There are no sections creating 
or purporting in terms to change the public health laws, as 
such. If there had been any intention to enact such a radical 
provision as the abolition of all regulations previously made 
by the State Board of Health, there is every reason to suppose 
explicit language to that effect would be found. 

There is nothing in chapter 792 of the Acts of 1914 incon- 
sistent with allowing valid rules and regulations previously 
made by the State Board of Health to continue in effect, and 
the express provision for enforcement by the new officers of 
the public health laws and regulations indicates an intention 
that they shall continue. 

I am of the opinion that rules and regulations established 
under the authority of section 113 of chapter 75 of the Re- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 41 

vised Laws are not affected by St. 1914, c. 792, nor is the 
penalty for infringement of such rules and regulations estab- 
lished by R. L., c. 75, § 122, affected thereby. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Fire Prevention — Storage of Petroleum in Building or Other 
Structure — Requirement of License. 

R. L., c. 102, § 113, permitting the storage of crude petroleum or any of 
its products in certain buildiags without the requirement of a license, 
was repealed by St. 1904, c. 370. 

Apkil 8, 1915. 
John A. O'Keefe, Esq., Fire Prevention Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested information relative to 
section 113 of chapter 102 of the Revised Laws, and whether 
the same has been repealed by subsequent enactments. 

Said section 113 provides that "crude petroleum or any of 
its products may be stored ... in detached and properly 
ventilated buildings," under certain restrictions, and no pro- 
vision was made for licensing said structures. St. 1904, c. 
370, § 3, apparently repeals said section 113, as it provides that 
no building shall be erected or used in any city or town for 
the keeping, storage, etc., of inflammable fluids unless the 
mayor and aldermen or selectmen have granted a license 
therefor after a public hearing. St. 1904, c. 370, § 3, was 
amended by chapter 502 of the Acts of 1908 by the addition of 
the words "or other structure,'^ so as to read as follows: 
** No building or other structure shall be used in any city or 
town," etc. 

It is to be noted that by the provisions of section 5 of 
chapter 370 of the Acts of 1904 so much of chapter 102 of 
the Revised Laws as was inconsistent with said chapter 370 
was repealed. 

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that section 113 of chapter 
102 of the Revised Laws was repealed by the provisions of 
chapter 370 of the Acts of 1904 and acts in amendment 
thereof and in addition thereto. 
Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



42 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Registered Osteopath — Death Certificate. 

An osteopath registered under St. 1909, c. 526, may not legally furnish 
the death certificate required to be furnished by physicians under R. L., 
c. 29, §§ 10 and 12. 

April 8, 1915. 

Dr. Walter P. Bowers, Secretary, Board of Registration in Medicine. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
an osteopath registered under St. 1909, c. 526, may legally 
furnish the death certificate required of physicians under 
R. L., c. 29, §§ 10 and 12. 

R. L., c. 29, § 12, provides: — 

Every undertaker or other person who has charge of a funeral 
shall forthwith obtain the physician's certificate required by section 
ten. 

Section 10 (as amended by St. 1910, c. 322, § 2) provides: — 

A physician shall forthwith, after the death of a person whom he 
has attended during his last illness, at the request of an undertaker 
or other authorized person or of any member of the family of the de- 
ceased, furnish for registration a standard certificate of death, stating 
to the best of his knowledge and beUef the name of the deceased, his 
supposed age, the disease of which he died, defined as provided in sec- 
tion one of this chapter, where contracted, the duration of his last 
illness, when last seen alive by the physician, and the date of his 
death. . . . 

R. L., c. 78, § 38, provides that no burial of a human body, 
or removal of the same, shall take place without a permit 
from the proper authorities; and for the issuance of a certifi- 
cate by certain officials in a case of a death where there was 
no attending physician. 

St. 1909, c. 526, permits of registration of osteopaths. Sec- 
tion 5 speaks of "the registration and practice of osteopathic 
physicians;" but it is expressly" provided by section 3 that 
persons registered under that act shall not be permitted "to 
hold themselves out, by virtue of such registration, as and for 
other than osteopaths." 

I am aware that it has been held that an osteopath is a 
physician, as the words are used and defined in certain stat- 
utes {Bandel v. Department of Health of City of New York, 127 
App. Div. 382; 193 N. Y. 133), while, under different stat- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 43 

utes, the opposite result has been reached {Nelson v. Staie 
Board of Health, 108 Ky. 769). 

Our statutes have long used the word "physician," and 
for many years a physician, in order lawfully to practice, must 
have been duly registered. R. L., c. 76, § 3, provides that 
after examination, if found qualified, an applicant "shall be 
registered as a qualified physician." 

In view of the express provision of section 3 of St. 1909, c. 
526, that an osteopath shall not hold himself out, by virtue of 
his registration, as and for other than an osteopath, it would 
seem that he is prohibited from attempting or purporting to 
act as a physician in giving the death certificates required by 
law. 

I am of the opinion that a registered osteopath cannot 
legally sign such a death certificate. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Boston Elevated Railway Company — 
Locations and Right to maintai7i Elevated Structure — 
Revocation — Regulation of Use of Highway. 

A proposed act requiring the Boston Elevated Railway Company to "re- 
move and forever discontinue the use of that part of its elevated struc- 
ture which extends from the junction of Washington and Castle streets 
to the entrance of the old Tremont street subway in the city of Boston" 
at its own expense would be unconstitutional, if enacted. 

St. 1894, c. 548, incorporating the Boston Elevated Railway Company and 
authorizing it to construct and operate lines of elevated railway upon 
certain specific locations, and particularly section 19 thereof, provid- 
ing that "the locations of or right to maintain any elevated lines or 
structures of the Boston Elevated Railway Company shall not be 
subject to revocation except" as prescribed in P. S., c. 112, §§7 and 
8, constitutes a contract between that company and the Common- 
wealth that, at least for a period of twenty-five years, these locations 
and the right to maintain elevated lines and structures thereon shall 
not be revoked. 

So much of such proposed act as applies to the structure located across 
the right of way of the Boston & Albany Railroad and the New York, 
New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company would, if enacted, be 
unconstitutional as taking property without compensation. 

The requirement of the proposed act, that the Boston Elevated Railway 
Company shall remove the entire structure described therein at its 
own expense and without compensation, is not a reasonable police 
regulation in the interest of the public health, safety or morals. 



44 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

It is within the power of the General Court to determine that the Boston 
Elevated Railway Company has discontinued the use of that portion 
of the structure described in the proposed act which is within the 
limits of public ways; that it unreasonably interferes with the use of 
these ways by the public; and by proper legislation to require that 
company to remove it at its own expense and without compensation. 

April 27, 1915. 
Hon. Calvin Coolidge, President oj the Senate. 

Dear Sir: — I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of a 
copy of the following order passed by the honorable Senate 
on April 16: — 

Ordered, That the Attorney-General be required to furnish to the 
Senate his opinion upon the following important question of law: — 

Is it within the constitutional power of the General Court to re- 
quire the Boston Elevated Railway Company to remove, at its own 
expense, and without compensation, and forever to discontinue a part 
.of the elevated structure owned by it in the city of Boston, located in 
part upon a public highway, in part upon the right of way of a rail- 
road corporation, and in part upon private land owned by said Boston 
Elevated Railway Company, which structure is not now used by said 
company and which, in the opinion of the General Court, is detrimental 
to the public welfare? 

This question is asked in reference to a bill pending in the General 
Court, being "An Act relative to the removal of certain elevated rail- 
way structures in the city of Boston," printed as House Document 
No. 1271, a copy of w^hich is forw^arded herewith for the information 
of the Attorney-General, and the Senate desires an opinion upon the 
constitutionality of said bill. 

The bill referred to in this order is as follows : — 

Section 1. The Boston Elevated Railway Company shall, in or 
within one year alter the passage of this act, remove and forever dis- 
continue the use of that part of its elevated structure which extends 
from the junction of Washington and Castle streets to the entrance of 
the old Tremont street subway in the citj^ of Boston. 

Section 2. Said structure being now obsolete, detrimental to the 
public welfare and a menace to public health, the expense in connec- 
tion with its removal shall be borne by said company. 

The Boston Elevated Railway Company was incorporated 
and authorized to construct and operate lines of elevated rail- 
way upon certain specific locations by chapter 548 of the Acts 
of 1894. Section 8 of that statute provided in part as 
follows : — 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 45 

The location, construction, maintenance or operation of said lines 
of railway in any public or private way shall be deemed an additional 
servitude and entitle lessees, mortgagees and other parties having an 
estate in such way or in premises which abut thereon, and who are 
damaged by reason of the location, construction, maintenance and 
operation of said Unes of railway, to recover reasonable compensation 
in the manner herein provided. . . . 

Before any work of construction had been begun under this 
statute it was amended by chapter 500 of the Acts of 1897. 
By section 3 of the last-mentioned statute certain additional 
locations \vere granted to the company, including, in the 
paragraph marked Fourth, the location involved in the bill 
submitted to me. Section 7 provides for the payment of 
damages sustained by any railroad by reason of the con- 
struction and operation of the elevated railway across the 
location or tracks of a railroad corporation. 

Section 10 authorizes the corporation to establish a fare 
not to exceed 5 cents for a single continuous passage, and 
provides that this sum shall not be reduced by the Legislature 
during the period of twenty-five years from and after the 
passage of the act. It further provides that during said 
period of tw^enty-five years no taxes or excises shall be im- 
posed upon the corporation not imposed upon street rail- 
ways in general, and then provides that ''as compensation 
for the privileges herein granted, and for the use and occu- 
pation of the public streets, squares and places, by the lines 
of elevated and surface railroad owned, leased and operated 
by it," the corporation shall pay a special franchise tax of a 
fixed percentage of its gross earnings. 

Section 19 is as follows: — 

The locations of or right to maintain any elevated lines or structures 
of the Boston Elevated Railway Company shall not be subject to rev- 
ocation except in the manner and on the terms prescribed in sections 
seven and eight of chapter one hundred and twelve of the Public 
Statutes: provided, however, that any location upon which said cor- 
poration has not constructed its railroad \\ithin ten j^ars from the 
passage of this act shall be subject to revocation by the legislature; 
but no location upon which said corporation has begun the construc- 
tion of its railroad within said period shall be subject to revocation if 
the same be completed within three years thereafter. 

The sections of the Public Statutes referred to in the sec- 
tion just quoted merely reserved to the Commonwealth the 



46 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

right to acquire by purchase or to take by eminent domain 
all the franchises and property of any railroad corporation. 
They have no application to any question presented by the 
order. 

Section 21 of the Acts of 1897 provides, in part, as fol- 
lows : — 

. . . the provisions of chapter one hundred and thirteen of the Pub- 
He Statutes or other general laws relating to the alteration or revoca- 
tion of the locations of street railway companies, shall not be deemed 
applicable to the locations or routes for elevated raihoads granted to 
said corporation. . . . 

The elevated structure described in the bill before me was 
erected and operated under these statutes. I am informed 
that various parties having estates in Castle Street and other 
public highways in which this structure is located, or in prem- 
ises abutting thereon, have been paid compensation by the 
Boston Elevated Railway Company for damages suffered by 
reason of the location, construction, maintenance and opera- 
tion of this line of railway in those streets, and that the Boston 
& Albany Railroad and the New York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Railroad Company have been paid compensation for all 
damages suffered by them by reason of the construction and 
operation of the elevated railway across their locations and 
tracks. 

By chapter 534 of the Acts of 1902 the Legislature au- 
thorized the construction of the Washington Street tunnel and 
its lease to the Boston Elevated Railway Company for the 
period of twenty-five years. By section 11 that company was 
authorized to connect this tunnel with its elevated structure 
and granted a location from the southerly end of the tunnel 
to its existing structure at the corner of Washington and 
Castle streets. Section 12 provided, in part, as follows: — 

. . . The company, upon removal of its elevated trains from the 
existing subway, may discontinue the use of its elevated structures 
and locations connecting its elevated road therewith, and may sell 
any lands or other property acquired for the purposes of such con- 
nection. . . . 

The existing subway referred to is the Tremont Street sub- 
way. 

As recited in the order, the elevated structure referred to in 
the bill is located in part on public highways, in part across 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 47 

the right of way of certain railroad corporations, and in part 
upon private land of the Boston Elevated Railway Company. 
Thus the rights of the company vary somewhat with these 
different locations. 

It is well settled in this Commonwealth that locations in 
public highways granted to ordinary street railways are 
licenses only; that they are revocable at any time without 
the payment of compensation therefor. It is also clear that 
such locations do not impose additional servitudes upon high- 
ways, and that persons owning estates in a highway or in 
premises abutting thereon are not entitled to compensation by 
reason of such locations. 

The statutes under consideration, however, expressly de- 
clared that the location, construction, maintenance and 
operation of the lines of the Boston Elevated Railway Com- 
pany shall be deemed as imposing an additional servitude 
upon the highways in which they are situated. Accordingly, 
the company has been required to compensate all persons 
whose property abuts upon such highways. It follows that 
the company has thus acquired as against these abutters 
perpetual easements in the adjoining highway to maintain 
and operate its elevated structures. Whether, in the absence 
of other provisions, it would have also obtained a similar 
right against the public need not now be determined. There 
is a strong probability that in such a case the locations of 
this company in public highways, like those of ordinary 
street railways, would be held to be mere licenses revocable 
at the pleasure of the Legislature. 

In view of the large expense involved in the erection of an 
elevated structure, this matter appears to have been given 
special consideration by the Legislature in framing chapter 
500 of the Acts of 1897. Section 10, after declaring that for 
a period of twenty-five years the Legislature should not reduce 
fares upon the lines of the company below 5 cents, or impose 
special taxes upon it not imposed upon other street railways, 
provided for the annual payment by it to the Commonwealth, 
for a period of twenty-five years, of a special franchise tax in 
addition to the tax imposed upon street railways in general. 
It is expressly declared that this special tax is to be paid " as 
compensation for the privileges herein granted, and for the 
use and occupation of the public streets, squares and places, 
by the lines of elevated and surface railroad owned, leased 
and operated by it." This tax is to be distributed among the 



48 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

different cities and towns where the company is operating 
upon a mileage basis. Then follows the provision of section 
19, that the locations of the company and its right to main- 
tain its elevated structme "shall not be subject to revocation" 
except under the general right of the Commonwealth to pur- 
chase or to take by right of eminent domain. Only locations 
not built upon within ten years are excepted from this en- 
actment. Subsequently, in section 21, it is enacted that the 
general laws concerning revocation of street railway locations 
shall not apply to this company. 

In my opinion these provisions were intended to and did 
in fact create a contract between the Commonwealth and the 
Boston Elevated Railway Company. By accepting the pro- 
visions of this statute and acting thereon the company con- 
tracted to pay, for a period of twenty-five years, a special 
franchise tax in addition to the burdens imposed upon other 
railways occupying public highways, and this payment was 
expressly declared to be compensation "for the use and occu- 
pation of the public streets, squares and places." The Com- 
monwealth, on its part, expressly obligated itself to exempt 
the company from the general laws relating to the alteration 
and revocation of locations of street railways, and formally 
covenanted that "the locations of or right to maintain any 
elevated lines or structures of the Boston Elevated Railway 
Company shall not be subject to revocation." The only right 
expressly reserved by the Commonwealth was its right under 
the general railroad laws then in force to purchase or to take 
by eminent domain for fair compensation all the franchises 
and property of any railroad. I am confirmed in my conclu- 
sion that these provisions gave rise to a contract by an opin- 
ion rendered by my predecessor, Hon. Dana Malone, on Dec. 
6, 1909, and printed as a part of House Document No. 2116 
for the year 1914. Other aspects of section 10, already re- 
ferred to, have several times been held to constitute a con- 
tract between this company and the Commonwealth by former 
Attorneys-General. II. Op. Atty.-Gen. 261; II. Op. Atty.- 
Gen. 426; III. Op. Atty.-Gen. 400. 

Whether this contract of the Commonwealth not to revoke 
these locations and rights is to be regarded as limited to a 
period of twenty-five years from June 10, 1897, the date of the 
approval of the act of 1897, need not now be considered. At 
least for that period of time the Commonwealth has made a 
binding contract not to revoke the locations of the Boston 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 49 

Elevated Railway Company or its right to maintain any 
elevated lines or structures authorized by that act. 

The erection of the elevated structure across the locations 
of the Boston & Albany Railroad Company and the New 
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, under the 
authority of the act of 1897, and the payment to them of 
compensation as required by section 7 for the right to main- 
tain and operate it, in my opinion created in the Boston 
Elevated Railway Company an easement, or a right in the 
nature of an easement, in the property of the railroads. This 
right is property of the Boston Elevated Railway Company, 
and it cannot be deprived of that property by the Common- 
wealth without compensation. In my opinion the proposed 
bill, if enacted, would be unconstitutional upon this ground, 
so far as it applies to the structure of the company located 
across the rights of way of these two railroads. 

So far as the Boston Elevated Railway Company is main- 
taining any part of this structure on its own private land, it 
stands in the same position as any other landowner. It may 
use its own property and erect such structures thereon as it 
pleases, free from any interference by the Commonwealth 
except under the police power for the preservation of the 
public health, safety or morals. 

There remains the question applicable to all portions of 
the structure described in the bill, whether, notwithstanding 
the foregoing considerations, the General Court may order 
it removed without compensation under the police power. 
Under that power the Legislature may impose any reasonable 
restraint upon the use of property for the purpose of pro- 
tecting the public health, safety or morals. The Legislature 
cannot contract away its right to exercise this power, and in 
my opinion it has not attempted to do so in this instance. 
Under the guisfc of exercising the police power it cannot dis- 
regard its contract nor recall its grant of a right to maintain 
elevated structures on these authorized locations. Yet it is 
within its power, notwithstanding its contract with this com- 
pany, to enact such laws w^ith reference to any part of the 
elevated structure of this corporation, particularly those por- 
tions of it located in public highways, as shall be reasonably 
adapted to the preservation of the public health and safety, 
and as shall insure the maintenance and operation of this 
railway system without risk of injury to the public. Such 
legislation is in no proper sense a revocation of the location. 



50 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

This bill, however, does not purport to be in the interest 
of the public safety. Apparently the structure is declared 
by the bill to be obsolete only in the sense that it is no longer 
used. There is no suggestion that it is dangerous or out of 
repair, and I do not understand that any such suggestion can 
be fairly made. The general statement that it is detrimental 
to the public welfare is too vague and indefinite a recital to 
warrant the taking of the property of this corporation with- 
out compensation. If the police power can ever be exercised 
solely in the interest of the public welfare it must be in some 
restricted meaning of that term closely related to the public 
health, safety or morals. Property cannot be taken without 
compensation merely in the interest of the artistic or aesthetic 
sense of the community. See Commonwealth v. Boston Adver- 
tising Co., 188 Mass. 348. 

The bill also recites that this structure is a menace to the 
public health. It must be assumed that this statement is 
made in good faith, yet to sustain the bill as an exercise of 
the police power on this ground it must appear to be reason- 
ably directed toward that end. In the first instance the 
General Court is to be the judge of what is reasonable, but its 
action is reviewable by the courts, and if they determine that 
there can be no reasonable relation between a given enact- 
ment and the protection of the public health, they will not 
sustain the law. I am unable to perceive how the mere main- 
tenance of that portion of the structure in question which is 
not located in public highways can be a menace to the public 
health. The fact that this structure is not now in use appears 
to render its maintenance upon private land, if anything, less 
dangerous to the public health rather than more so. So far as 
it is so located it is largely at or below the level of the ground, 
and thus there is provided in a tenement-house district an 
open space which might otherwise be covered by buildings. I 
am unable to perceive any real connection between the preser- 
vation of the public health and the requirement that the 
Boston Elevated Railway Company remove this entire struc- 
ture. 

For the foregoing reasons it is my duty to advise the Senate 
that the bill printed as House Document No. 1271, if enacted, 
would be unconstitutional. 

The question addressed to me by the order of the honorable 
Senate appears to be broader in its scope than the proposed 
bill. Accordingly, I deem it my duty in answering the in- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 51 

quiry to make some further suggestions as to the power of the 
General Court to deal with a portion of the elevated structure 
of the Boston Elevated Railway Company described in the 
order. 

Public highways are created and maintained for public 
purposes. Ordinarily it is not within the power of the Legis- 
lature, so long as they are maintained as highways, to devote 
them to private uses which interfere with the rights of the 
pubHc. Thus, the justification for the grant to a railway cor- 
poration of locations in public highways, whether revocable 
or irrevocable, is that these locations are to be used in the 
public interest. The locations granted to the Boston Ele- 
vated Railway Company in public highways, and the right to 
maintain elevated structures therein, were granted to it solely 
on the ground that it is a public service corporation, and 
that it was to use those locations and rights primarily in the 
public interest as an instrumentality of the public service. 
These grants were, therefore, charged with a trust. The loca- 
tions and the right to maintain and operate structures thereon 
were subject to an implied limitation that they were to be 
used in the public service. The contract not to revoke them 
was subject to an implied condition or agreement that the 
company should continue to use them solely for the purposes 
for which they were granted. 

Furthermore, as I have already suggested, the Boston 
Elevated Railway Company holds its locations and the rights 
granted to it by its contract with the Commonwealth subject 
to the exercise of the police power. In my opinion no Legis- 
lature, under the guise of entering into a contract, can tie the 
hands of its successors so as to prevent the exercise of this 
power to its fullest extent. 

I am informed that the Washington Street tunnel was 
opened in November, 1908, and that since that time, or for 
nearly six and one-half years, the elevated structure referred 
to in the order has not been used by this company. It no 
longer has any physical connection with the Tremont Street 
subway, and since the widening of Pleasant Street it would be 
necessary to excavate a tunnel under that street in order 
again to connect this structure with the Tremont Street sub- 
way. I am informed that no plan is now under consideration 
or in contemplation which involves again using the Tremont 
Street subw^ay for elevated trains, or the use of any part of 
the elevated structure in question as a part of any scheme 



52 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of rapid transit. So far as I am informed, no definite future 
use of this structure has ever been suggested. Though it has 
been unused for nearly six and one-half years, so far as I am 
informed the Boston Elevated Railway Company has made no 
suggestion to the General Court or to the Boston Transit 
Commission involving its use at any time in the future as a 
part of its elevated railway system. Apparently no practical 
use of this unused structure can be made without the grant 
of further locations by the General Court to be used in con- 
nection with it. 

Under these circumstances, and in view of the nature of 
the rights of this company in public highways, I am of opin- 
ion that it is within the constitutional power of the General 
Court, upon consideration of such facts as I have suggested, 
and any other facts bearing upon the matter that may be 
brought to its attention, to conclude that the Boston Ele- 
vated Railway Company has discontinued or abandoned the 
use of that portion of its structure under consideration which 
is within the limits of public ways; that this structure is and 
can be of no further public usefulness; that it unreasonably 
interferes with enjoyment and use of the public ways by the 
public to the detriment of the public health and safety; and 
by appropriate legislation to require that company, at its own 
expense and without compensation, to remove such structure. 
Such an enactment would, in my opinion, be a valid regula- 
tion of the use of these public highways in the interest of 
the public health and the public safety under the police power. 
Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Constitutional Law — Religious Belief of Public School Teachers 
— Bill Forbidding Inquiry by School Officials. 

A provision of a proposed act making it "unlawful for any public school 
committee or superintendent or supervisor of public schools to require 
or solicit from an applicant for a position in the public schools any 
information as to the religious belief or practices of the applicant" is 
not unconstitutional as inconsistent with Article II. of the Declaration 
of Rights, declaring "it is the right as well as the duty of all men in 
society, pubhcly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme 
Being the great Creator and Preserver of the universe," as that 
declaration is merely a precept for the guidance of the people and 
their legislators in the performance of their public duties, and not a 
limitation on the power of the General Court. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 53 

A provision of a proposed act making it "unlawful for any public school 
committee or superintendent or supervisor of public schools ... to 
furnish any information as to the religious belief or practice of any 
applicant for a position in any public school" would be unconstitu- 
tional if enacted, as it covers statements made outside of official duties, 
and thus denies to the officers referred to the equal protection of the 
laws. 

If from this proposed act the words "or to furnish any information as to 
the religious belief or practice of any applicant for a position in any 
public school" be struck out, and the words "and no appointment to 
such position shall be affected by political or religious opinions or 
affiliations" inserted, as thus amended it is not beyond the constitu- 
tional power of the General Court. 

May 3, 1915. 

Hon. Channing H. Cox, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Dear Sir: — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of an order from the House of Representatives dated April 
27, 1915, in the following form: — 

Ordered, That the Attorney-General be requested to inform the 
House of Representatives whether, in his opinion, House Document 
No. 1962, now pending, being a bill relative to apphcants for posi- 
tions in the public schools, would be constitutional if amended, in 
section 1, by striking out, in fines 5, 6 and 7, the words "or to furnish 
any information as to the refigious befief or practice of any appficant 
for a position in any pubfic school," and inserting in place thereof the 
words "and no appointment to such a position shall be affected by 
political or refigious opinions or affifiations." 

Ordered, That a copy of House No. 1962, together with a copy of 
the amendment, be transmitted to the Attorney-General for his in- 
formation. 

Section 1 of the proposed bill, unamended, is as follows: — 

It shall be unlawful for any pubfic school committee or superin- 
tendent or supervisor of pubfic schools to require or soficit from an 
appficant for a position in the pubfic schools any information as to the 
refigious befief or practice of the appficant, or to furnish any informa- 
tion as to the refigious befief or practice of any appficant for a position 
in any public school. 

On April 12, at the request of J. Weston Allen, Esq., chair- 
man of the committee on bills in the third reading of the 
House, I addressed to him a communication concerning House 
Bill No. 1962, a copy of which communication is as follows: — 

I have your letter of April 1 requesting me to inform your committee 
if in my opinion House Bifi No. 1962, relative to apphcants for posi- 
tions in pubfic schools, would be constitutional if enacted into law. 



54 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

When this bill in its original form was considered by me at the re- 
quest of your committee, it contained a provision making it apphcable 
to any person, firm or corporation conducting a teacher's agency. 
That provision, in my opinion, rendered the bill unconstitutional, and 
I so informed your committee. I then had no occasion to consider any 
other phase ol the bill. 

Article II. of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth declares — 

It is the right as well as the dutj^ of all men in society, publicly, and at stated 
seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of 
the universe. And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his per- 
son, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most 
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession 
of sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others 
in their religious worship. 

When reUgious tests as quahfication for office were removed from 
our Constitution at an esLvly date (see Amendments, Article VII., 
adopted April 9, 1821), this declaration was left unmodified. It has 
long been a guiding principle in our school laws. R. L., c. 42, pro- 
vides: — 

Section 18, The president, professors and tutors of the university at Cam- 
bridge and of the several colleges, all preceptors and teachers of academies and 
all other instructors of youth shall exert their best endeavors to impress on the 
minds of children and youth committed to their care and instruction the prin- 
ciples of piety and justice and a sacred regard for truth, love of their country, 
humanity and universal benevolence, sobriety, industry and frugality, chastity, 
moderation and temperance, and those other virtues which are the ornament of 
human society and the basis upon which a republican constitution is founded; 
and they shall endeavor to lead their pupils, as their ages and capacities will 
admit, into a clear understanding of the tendency of the above-mentioned vir- 
tues to preserve and perfect a republican constitution and secure the blessings 
of liberty as well as to promote their future happiness, and also to point out to 
them the evil tendency of the opposite vices. 

Section 19. A portion of the Bible shall be read daily in the public schools, 
without written note or oral comment; but a pupil whose parent or guardian 
informs the teacher in writing that he has conscientious scruples against it, 
shall not be required to read from any particular version, or to take any personal 
part in the reading. The school committee shall not purchase or use school 
books in the public schools calculated to favor the tenets of any particular 
religious sect. 

The bill before me, if enacted into law, would make it a criminal 
act for the officials in charge of our public schools to seek from any 
applicant for a position as teacher any information whatever as to his 
refigious belief or practice. It would thus be a misdemeanor for any 
such official to inquire of an appficant whether he beheves in or wor- 
ships the Supreme Being, or to ask him whether or not he is an atheist. 
Undoubtedly the Legislature has ample power to prevent and to punish 
discrimination in any form against any person on account of the man- 
ner of his worship or the form of his religious professions. It is con- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 55 

ceded that many restraints may be imposed upon public officers in the 
performance of their pubhc duties which may not be imposed upon 
citizens in general. Yet it is suggested that the positive declaration 
of the first sentence of Article II. of the Bill of Rights, that it is a duty 
of all men to worship the Supreme Being, cannot be disregarded. It is, 
therefore, urged that the General Court has no power to denj^ to school 
authorities the right to inquire from apphcants for positions as teachers 
in public schools whether or not they perform the fundamental re- 
ligious duty thus recognized and emphasized by the Declaration of 
Rights. 

The question as to what effect is to be given to this clause of the 
Constitution and to other similar provisions (see Part I., Article XVIIL; 
Amendments, Article XI.) is by no means free from doubt. The judges 
of the Supreme Judicial Court have recently declared — 

The Constitution of the Commonwealth in several clauses inculcates the 
practice of religion and urges the public worship of God, as essential means for 
the perpetuation of republican institutions. Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 
599, 601. 

It may be argued with considerable force that it is beyond the power 
of the General Court to enact laws which are at variance with the prin- 
ciples declared by the Constitution to he at the foundation of our in- 
stitutions. On the other hand, however, it can be argued with equal 
force that such declarations as that under consideration were intended 
not as limitations on the power of the Legislature, but rather as pre- 
cepts set before our people and their legislators as guides in the per- 
formance of their pubhc duties; that these precepts are directory and 
not mandatory, and that thus the General Court is the sole judge as 
to how far it may properly enact legislation not in conformity with 
them. On the whole, in view of the fact that there are no express 
words of prohibition upon the power of the Legislature in this regard, 
I am inclined to this latter view. It follows, in my opinion, that the 
only express hmitation upon legislative power is that contained in 
Article II. of the Declaration of Rights, forbidding discrimination on 
the ground of religious behefs or practices. I do not feel warranted in 
advising you that the bill in question, if deemed expedient, would be 
nullified by this clause of the Constitution. 

Another feature of the bill must be considered. If enacted it would 
make it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine, for the school officers 
mentioned 'Ho furnish any information as to the religious belief or 
practice of any applicant for a position in any public school." This 
clause seems to be broad enough to include any statement, made in 
ordinary private conversation, of any fact, whether learned officially 
or otherwise, connected with the religious beUef or practice of any 
such applicant, however harmless or innocent such statement might 
be or whatever might be the purpose of making it. This seems to me 
to be something quite different from prescribing the manner in which 



56 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

these public officers shall perform their public duties. In my opinion 
this provision, if enacted, would deny to these officers the equal pro- 
tection of our laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States. For this reason House Bill 
No. 1962 would, in my opinion, be unconstitutional if enacted into 
law. 

The proposed amendment set forth in the order removes 
from the bill the clause which, in my opinion, would render 
it unconstitutional if enacted without amendment. The pro- 
vision substituted by the proposed amendment does not appear 
to me to be subject to criticism upon constitutional grounds. 

I fully stated my views as to the constitutionality of the re- 
maining provisions of the bill in the opinion which I have 
quoted. Those views I still retain. Article II. of the Dec- 
laration of Rights has firmly established in our fundamental 
law the principle that no discrimination based upon leligious 
beliefs or practices shall be permitted. The proposed bill, if 
amended as suggested in the order, affirms that piinciple 
and extends its application to persons having no religious 
beliefs. For the reasons stated in the opinion rendered by me 
to the committee on bills in the third reading the enactment 
of such a bill, if deemed expedient, is not, in my opinion, 
beyond the constitutional power of the General Court. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Constiiutional Law — Regulation of Motor Vehicles — Classifi- 
cation — Requirement of a Bond. 

A proposed act requiring every person, firm or corporation engaging in the 
business of carrying or transporting passengers for hire in any motor 
vehicle to obtain a license from municipal authorities, and to give a 
bond conditioned to pay any judgment obtained against the licensee 
for injury to person or property by reason of acts of the licensee in 
the conduct of such business, and then exempting from the provisions 
of such act persons operating motor taxicabs, motor vehicles rented 
by the day or hour and also any person, firm or corporation engaged 
principally in the hotel business who operate motor vehicles to trans- 
port guests to and from railroad stations, would be unconstitutional 
if enacted. 

May 4, 1915. 

Hon. Channing H. Cox, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Dear Sir: — The House of Representatives has requested 
my opinion as to whether "the provisions of House Bill No. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 57 

2042/ now pending, relative to the use of certain motor 
vehicles for the transportation of passengers, are constitu- 
tional and legal, having special reference to the provision in 
the first section requiring the furnishing of a bond as a con- 
dition of receiving a license to operate certain motor vehicles, 
and also having special reference to the provisions in the 
fourth section which discriminate for the purposes of the bill 
between different classes of motor vehicles, or between motor 
vehicles used for different purposes, and between different 
classes of common carriers of passengers." 

The provisions of the act requiring the licensing of motor 
vehicles used for the transportation of passengers for hire 
would seem to be well within the police power. Laws re- 
quiring licenses before engaging in certain businesses especially 
affecting public interests are so numerous that discussion 
of this point appears unnecessary. The fact that motor 
vehicles and the operators thereof are already under the 
necessity of obtaining licenses does not prevent the Legisla- 
ture from requiring other and special licenses for their use in 
such a public business as transporting passengers for hire. 
Commonwealth v. McGann, 213 Mass. 215. 

' The important sections of the proposed act are as follows: — 

Section 1. Every person, firm or corporation engaging in the business of carrying or 
transporting passengers for hire in any motor vehicle, as defined in chapter five hundred 
and thirty-four of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and nine, shall, before engaging 
in such business, make appUcation to the board of aldermen in a city, or, in cities having 
no board of aldermen, to such city authority as may exercise the functions of such board, 
and to the selectmen in a town, and in the city of Boston to the board of street commissioners, 
for a permit to conduct such business. No permit for the conduct of such business shall be 
issued until the appUcant has filed with the clerk of the city or town where it is proposed 
to engage in such business, or, if the business is to be conducted in more than one city or 
town, then with the clerk of one of such cities or towns, a bond running to the common- 
wealth of Massachusetts, in such penal sum, not less than two thousand dollars for each 
motor vehicle operated as said aldermen or corresponding board of selectmen shall require, 
with such surety company, licensed to do business in this commonwealth, or with such 
other sureties as said aldermen or corresponding board of selectmen may approve, condi- 
tioned to pay any judgment obtained against the principal named in said bond for any in- 
jury to person or property by reason of any careless, negUgent or unlawful act on the part 
of the principal named in said bond, his agents or employees, or the driver of such motor 
vehicle, in the conduct of said business or in the operation of such vehicle: provided, however, 
that nothing herein contained shall deprive the defendants in any such action of the right, 
given by chapter five hundred and fifty-three of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and 
fourteen, to set up and prove the affirmative defense of contributory neghgence on the part 
of the person injured or killed. 

Section 4. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next, but shall not apply 
to owners or drivers of motor taxicabs, so called, or to motor vehicles rented by the day or 
hour, with or without a driver, to an individual or party of individuals for a special occa- 
sion, or to motor vehicles performing a service similar to that formerly performed by horse- 
drawn pubHc cabs and hackney coaches, nor to any person, firm or corporation engaged 
principally in the hotel business, who operates motor vehicles to transfer guests to and 
from the railroad station." 



58 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The requirement that a bond shall be filed as a condition 
precedent to the issuance of a license is also a common re- 
quirement, the constitutionality of which would hardly now 
be questioned. Similar provisions will be found on the stat- 
ute books already as to liquor dealers (R. L., c. 100, § 42), 
money lenders (R. L., c. 102, § 59), ferrymen (R. L., c. 55, § 1), 
pawnbrokers (R. L., c. 102, § 40), private detectives (R. L., 
c. 108, § 36) and auctioneers (R. L., c. 64, § 30). 

The mere fact that the provisions of the act apply to com- 
mon carriers of passengers by motor vehicles and not to 
common carriers operating by other means, in my judgment, 
does not render the provisions of section 1 of the act un- 
constitutional. 

The question then remains as to whether any of the ex- 
ceptions contained in section 4 of the proposed act are such 
as to render it, as a whole, unconstitutional as class legisla- 
tion, or, in other words, as denying to all persons the equal 
protection of the laws. 

Even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment it was a 
settled principle of constitutional law that statutes in regard to the 
transaction of business must operate equally upon all citizens who 
desire to engage in the business, and that there shall be no arbitrary 
discrimination between different classes of citizens. Commonwealth v. 
Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 266. 

The basis upon which classification is admissible is well 
stated by Harlan, J., in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 
184 U. S. 540, 560: — 

The difficulty is not met by saying that, generally speaking, the 
State when enacting laws may, in its discretion, make a classification 
of persons, firms, corporations and associations, in order to subserve 
public objects. For this court has held that classification "must 
always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just 
relation to the act in respect to wliich the classification is proposed, 
and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. . . . 
But arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classifica- 
tion. The equal protection demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids this. ... No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts 
than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to 
secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free govern- 
ment. ... It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not 
sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that in all cases it must appear not 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 59 

only that a classification has been made, but also that it is one based 
upon some reasonable ground, — some difference which bears a just 
and proper relation to the attempted classification, — and is not a 
mere arbitrary selection." 

While the class which is to be regulated may properly be 
defined by describing a larger group and then excepting 
therefrom certain distinct classes, provided there is a reason- 
able ground for the exceptions, the fact that ready language 
has not suggested itself for defining such class by itself in such 
a way as to make exception unnecessary naturally raises a 
doubt as to whether in reality a reasonable distinction exists. 
In other words, if a reasonable ground for creation of a class 
exists, it seems to follow that that class could be clearly and 
directly described, without the indirect definition of the class 
by means of exceptions. 

As stated in the language quoted above, the distinction 
must be with reference to the purposes of the act. The re- 
quirement in House Bill No. 2042, of filing a bond, has for its 
object the assurance of financial ability to respond in damages 
for injuries for which the owner is liable, and a distinction, 
to be valid, must have some relation to the danger or risk. 
So far as the act exempts persons, firms or corporations 
"engaged principally in the hotel business, who operate motor 
vehicles to transfer guests to and from the railroad station,'' 
there is, in my opinion, no reasonable ground of distinction. 

The act would penalize a hotel keeper who operated such a 
vehicle to and from a steamboat wharf or other place, while 
exempting a person in exactly the same situation who oper- 
ated one to and from a railroad station. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to see how the operation of such a motor vehicle 
between a hotel and a railroad station would be any less 
dangerous to the public or to the passengers if operated by or 
under the direction of a person engaged principally in the 
hotel business than the same vehicle operated in the same 
manner by a person whose principal business was that of 
banking or anything else, but who also was engaged in the 
conduct of a hotel. 

It is true that some courts, in their desire to uphold the 
constitutionality of acts of Legislatures, have gone to extraor- 
dinary lengths, and have found distinctions justifying classi- 
fications which are not apparent to the average citizen, but 
I cannot believe that in Massachusetts the Supreme Judicial 



60 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Court will ever go to such lengths as to uphold a classifica- 
tion such as this. 

In my opinion the provision of the Constitution, that no 
State shall "deny to any person the equal protection of the 
laws," is one the firm adherence to which is most necessary 
to the foundations and preservation of a republican form of 
government; and no discrimination should be supported be- 
tween different citizens unless in fact a substantial ground 
therefor can be stated without resort to fanciful arguments 
or attenuated distinctions. 

Undoubtedly, the Legislature may draw lines which relate 
to the liability of accident. If the classification proposed 
were along the line of the number of passengers carried, the 
size or power of the vehicle, the rate of speed at which it may 
be opprated or the skill of the person operating it, the nature 
of the district through which it operates, the control of the 
operator by the passenger, or related to common carriers of 
passengers by motor vehicles, of whom the degree of care re- 
quired could be said to be greater than of others, the dis- 
tinction could well be supported. But, in my opinion, unless 
some reason along lines similar to those suggested exists, an 
exception from such a class as is defined in section 1 of this 
act is not warranted. 

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the provisions of House 
Bill No. 2042, if enacted into law, would be unconstitutional. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Fire Prevention — Storage of Inflammable Fluids — Structures. 

A can is not a structure within the meaning of St. 1904, c. 370, § 3, as 
amended by St. 1913, c. 452, providing that ''no building or other 
structure shall be used in any city or towm" for the storage of inflam- 
mable fluids without a license. 

May 6, 1915. 

Mr. John A. O'Keefe, Fire Prevention Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — "Is a can a structure under the provisions of 
St. 1904, c. 370, § 3, as amended by St. 1913, c. 452?" Such 
is the question submitted by you for my opinion. 

The law referred to, briefly stated, is, " No building or 
other structure shall be used in any city or town for the 
keeping, storage, etc., of any articles named in section two 
(including gasoline), unless" a license is granted, etc. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 61 

A "structure" is defined to be ''a building of any kind, but chiefly 
a building of some size and magnificence; an edifice." . . . While the 
word "structure" msiy cover a great variety of form and construction, 
yet, when used in connection with the words "house" and "building," 
it is evidently intended to simply describe a varietj^ of building. Con- 
ley V. Lackawanna Iron & Steel Co., 88 N. Y. Supp. 125. 

The above definition seems to be the construction adopted in 
most jurisdictions. While it is not necessary to go to that 
length in the determination of this question, it is my opin- 
ion that a can is not a stiucture within the meaning of the 
act. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Firemen's Relief Fund — Personal hijuries — Effect of Expo- 
sure in Course of Duty. 

A fireman disabled by congestion of the kidneys, which is caused by expo- 
sure to cold and stormy weather encountered in the performance of his 
duties at a fire, is entitled to the benefits of R. L., c. 32, § 73, provid- 
ing that the firemen's reUef fund "shall be used for the refief of fire- 
men . . . who may be injured in the performance of their duty at 
a fire or in going to or returning from the same." 

May 6, 1915. 

Board of Commissioners of the Firemen^ s Relief Fund, Taunton, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — I am requested to review an opinion given 
by a former Attorney-General in answer to the following in- 
quiry presented by your board: — 

Is a fireman entitled to a benefit under chapter 32, sections 71-77, 
who can reasonably prove that he was in practically perfect health up 
to the time of responding at about midnight to a third or fourth alarm 
fii'e, the night in question being verj^ cold and sleety, and it being the 
kind of a fire that entailed much standing around and but httle work, 
and under these conditions the kidneys became congested, wdth the 
result that the man was laid up for several months, and may not ever 
become quite well again. Is this fireman ehgible to benefits under the 
chapter and specifications above mentioned? 

The law which applies to such cases is R. L., c. 32, § 73, as 
amended by St. 1903, c. 253, § 1, which is as follows: — 

Section 73. Such fund shall be used for the relief of firemen, 
whether members of said association or not, who may be injured in 



62 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

the performance of their duty at a fire or in going to or returning from 
the same, and for the reUef of the widows and children of firemen killed 
in the performance of such duty, in the manner and to the amount de- 
termined by a board of five persons, of whom three, not members of 
said association, shall be appointed by the governor in July of the 
year nineteen hundred and three, to serve, one for three years, one for 
two years, etc. 

The opinion referred to was to the effect that the firemen's 
relief fund should be used only in cases of injuries received 
by some form of external violence, and the above inquiry 
was answered in the negative. Since this opinion was ren- 
dered similar questions have arisen under the workmen's com- 
pensation act, and the construction of that act by various 
tribunals and courts would seem to have a strong bearing on 
the question presented by your board. The similarity in the 
wording of the law governing the distribution of the fund in 
your hands and the compensation act above referred to will 
be seen at a glance. 

Section 1 of Part II. of the workmen's compensation act 
reads, in part, as follows: — 

If an employee . . . receives a personal injury arising out of and 
in the course of his employment, he shall be paid compensation by the 
association as hereinafter provided. . . . 

The Industrial Accident Board has defined "personal in- 
jury," as used in the workmen's compensation act, to be 
"any injury or damage or harm or disease which arises out 
of and in the course of the employment which causes incapac- 
ity for work and takes from the employee his ability to earn 
wages." 

Among the many cases arising under the act referred to, 
which have been decided in favor of the employee, are the 
following: Stone v. Travelers Insurance Co., where an em- 
ployee got his feet wet in a leaky boat which was furnished 
by his employer, and pneumonia developed as an after-effect 
of the injury; Milliken v. Travelers Insurance Co., where an 
employee contracted pneumonia following cold and exposure. 

The Supreme Court of this Commonwealth, in the case of 
Brightman v. JEtna Insurance Co., 220 Mass. 17, upheld a decree 
in favor of the widow of an employee who died of heart disease 
which was accelerated by the excitement attending the sinking 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 63 

of a vessel on which said employee was cook, and from which 
he made his escape and died soon after reaching the shore. 

In none of these cases, it will be observed, was there "ex- 
ternal violence" in the ordinary use of the term, and yet in 
each instance it was held that there had been personal injury. 
In view of these cases, and similar cases in other jurisdictions, 
nearly all of them having been decided since your inquiry 
was first raised, I am of the opinion that if the injury to 
which your communication refers was in fact really caused 
by exposure while the fireman was actually in the performance 
of his duties he is etnitled to the benefits of the act. 

I feel, therefore, obliged to modify the ruling previously 
made by this department, and inform you that in my opinion 
the funds of your association may properly be devoted to 
the relief of firemen who may be injured in the performance 
of their duties at a fire or in going to or returning from the 
same, whether the injuries are caused by "external violence," 
from smoke or fire inhaled, from exposure, or from any dis- 
ease directly resulting from the performance of their duties. 

In your letter of April 28 you also ask whether firemen 
injured in fire service who are receiving benefits from the 
workmen's compensation act have a right to receive a benefit 
under R. L., c. 32, §§ 71-77. I am of the opinion that the 
question should be answered in the negative. St. 1913, c. 807, 
§ 5, in my judgment, clearly prohibits any such payment. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Intoxicating Liquors — Transportation into No-license Munici- 
palities — Time for granting Permits. 

St. 1906, c. 421, § 2, as amended by St. 1911, c. 423, does not limit to the 
month of April the time in which municipal authorities may grant 
permits for the transportation of intoxicating liquors into no-license 
cities and towns, and they have the power in their discretion to grant 
such permits throughout the year. 

May 11, 1915. 

Hon. William J. Corcoran, District Attorney for the Northern District, 
Cambridge, Mass. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of the 6th inst. in which you request my interpretation 
of the meaning of the provisions of chapter 423 of the Acts of 



64 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

1911. You ask me to inform you "whether or not the mayor 
and board of aldermen may grant permits referred to by the 
law in any other month except the month of April referred 
to in the statute." 

The provisions of chapter 423 of the Acts of 1911 amend 
section 2 of chapter 421 of the Acts of 1906, so as to read as 
follows: — 

The mayor and aldermen in cities and the selectmen in towns in 
which said licenses of the first five classes are not granted shall annu- 
ally in the month of April, grant and issue one or more permits under 
the provisions of this act, to become effective on the first day of May 
follo"wdng, and to be granted only to a person, firm or corporation 
regularly and la\\^ully conducting a general express business and to 
no other person, firm or corporation, and every such permit shall 
specify the residence by street and number (if any) of the holder, and 
shall be subject to all laws now or hereafter in force relative to the 
transportation of such Uquors. 

Section 1 of said chapter 421 is as follows: — 

No person or corporation, except a railroad or street railway cor- 
poration, shall, for hire or reward, transport spirituous or intoxicating 
liquors into or in a city or town in which licenses of the first five classes 
for the sale of intoxicating liquors are not granted, without first being 
granted a permit so to do as hereinafter provided. 

Prior to the passage of this statute there were no restric- 
tions placed upon the transportation of intoxicating liquors 
into no-license communities other than those imposed by sec- 
tions 48 to 51 of chapter 100 of the Revised Laws. 

The provisions of chapter 421 were enacted for the purpose 
of regulating the transportation for hire or reward of in- 
toxicating liquors into no-license communities, and to require 
a permit by the mayor and aldermen or the selectmen to the 
person so transporting. The act imposes a limitation upon 
the right of citizens to engage in a business which they for- 
merly could lawfully engage in, and therefore the limitations 
contained therein should be construed with strictness. The 
provisions of section 2 were enacted for the purpose of insur- 
ing to the inhabitants of the no-license community that there 
should be at least one person or corporation authorized under 
the act to transport such liquors into the no-license com- 
munity. Rea V. Aldermen of Everett, 217 Mass. 427. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 65 

After the passage of chapter 421 of the xVcts of 1906 there 
were many boards of mayor and aldermen and boards of 
selectmen which took the attitude that the word "shall," in 
section 2 of said chapter 421, should be read as "may," and 
therefore it was discretionary with them whether to grant one 
or more permits, and also that as section 2 did not provide the 
time when the permit should be granted, it was discretionary 
with them as to the time the permit should be granted, even 
if the provisions of said section 2 required them to grant at 
least one such permit. The provisions of chapter 423 of the 
Acts of 1911 were passed, in my opinion, to give further 
force and effect to section 2 of chapter 421 of the Acts of 
1906, so as to require the mayor and aldermen of a city and 
the selectmen of a town to grant at least one permit during 
the month of April. 

I am of the opinion that outside of the mandatory pro- 
vision in section 2, which directs the mayor and aldermen in 
cities and the selectmen in towns to grant and issue at least 
one permit in the month of April, and the provision therein 
that the permits shall be granted only to a person, firm or 
corporation regularly and lawfully conducting a general ex- 
press business, the provisions of the act in no way limit or 
control the discretionary powers vested in the mayor and 
aldermen or the selectmen, and that they therefore have the 
power at any time during the year to grant additional permits 
to those granted during the month of April. 

It is to be noted that a construction that the mayor and 
aldermen in cities and selectmen in towns were limited to 
granting permits in the month of April only might lead, in 
view of the decision in Rea v. Aldermen of Everett, to absurd 
results, as the mayor and aldermen or selectmen could not be 
compelled to grant a permit until the expiration of the month 
of April, and after its expiration they would have no authority 
to grant such permit. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attv^ill, Attorney-General. 



66 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Registered Physicians — Application of Statute Requirement to 
State Institutions — Assistants to Superintendents. 

Assistants to superintendents in State institutions, if practicing or attempt- 
ing to practice medicine in any of its branches, must be duly registered 
in accordance with the requirements of R. L., c. 76, §§ 1-9. 

May 13, 1915. 
Board of Registration in Medicine, 1 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to 
whether physicians practicing medicine in State institutions, 
as assistants to the superintendents thereof, are required to be 
registered under the Massachusetts laws; or, in other words, 
whether an unregistered person so practicing is acting con- 
trary to the statutes. 

R. L., c. 76, §§ 8 and 9, provide: — 

Section 8. Whoever, not being la^\^ully authorized to practice 
medicine within this commonwealth and registered as aforesaid, holds 
himself out as a practitioner of medicine, or practices or attempts to 
practice medicine in any of its branches, . . . shall, for each offence, 
be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five 
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for three months, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment. In a case in which a provision of this or the 
preceding section has been violated, the person who committed the 
violation shall not recover compensation for services rendered. 

Section 9. The provisions of the eight preceding sections shall not 
be held to discriminate against any particular school or system of 
medicine, to prohibit medical or surgical service in a case of emergency, 
or to prohibit the domestic administration of family remedies. They 
shall not apply to a commissioned medical officer of the United States 
army, navy or marine hospital service in the performance of his official 
duty; to a ph3^sician or surgeon from another state who is a legal prac- 
titioner in the state in wliich he resides, when in actual consultation 
with a legal practitioner of this commonwealth; to a physician or sur- 
geon residing in another state and legally qualified to practice therein, 
whose general practice extends into the border towns of this common- 
wealth, if such physician does not open an office or designate a place in 
such toTVTis where he may meet patients or receive calls; to a physician 
authorized to practice medicine in another state, when he is called as 
the family physician to attend a person temporarily abiding in tliis 
commonwealth; nor to registered pharmacists in prescribing gratui- 
tously, osteopathists, pharmacists, clairvoyants, or persons practicing 
hypnotism, magnetic healing, mind cure, massage, Christian science 
or cosmopathic method of healing, if they do not violate an}- of the 
provisions of section eight. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCimiENT — No. 12. 67 

Section 8 imposes a penalty upon any person who practices 
or attempts to practice medicine without being registered. 
It is frequently stated as a maxim of the law that statutes 
do not apply to the State or sovereign unless it is expressly 
mentioned. There are, however, many exceptions to this 
rule, and these exceptions have often been grouped under a 
general statement such as appears in Bacon's Abridgment 
(title "Prerogative," 3-5), where it is said: — 

The general rule is, that where an act of parliament is made for the 
pubhc good, the advancement of religion and justice, and to prevent 
injury and wrong, the king shall be bound by such act, though not 
particularly named therein. But where a statute is general, and 
thereby any prerogative, right, title, or interest is devested, or taken 
from the king, in such case he shall not be bound; unless the statute 
is made by express words to extend to him. Quoted in United States 
V. Knight, 14 Pet. 315. 

In Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes (§ 167) it is said: — 

The test, therefore, in every case in which the question whether or 
not the government is included in the language of a statute has to be 
met and determined, cannot be a mere general rule, either one wa}' or 
another, arbitrarily applied, but must be the object of the enactment, 
the purposes it is to serve, the mischiefs it is to remedy, and the con- 
sequences that are to follow, — starting with the fair and natural pre- 
sumption that, primarily, the Legislature intended to legislate upon 
the rights and affairs of individuals only. This is the only proper 
extent and apphcation of the rule against inclusion of government. 

The statute as to registration of physicians does not in 
terms impose any penalty or obligation upon the employer, 
but applies rather to the person who attempts to practice 
medicine. Any effect upon the State by its general enforce- 
ment in all cases, including employees in public institutions, 
would be merely an indirect result of such enforcement. 

The object of these statutes is, of course, the promotion of 
the public good and the protection of the citizens against the 
evils naturally resulting from the attempts of unskilled per- 
sons to practice medicine. No good reason suggests itself why 
the protection thus afforded should be less to those citizens who 
are cared for in State institutions than to those who are not. 

I am of the opinion that R. L., c. 76, § 8, is general in 
its application, and applies to all persons without regard to 
whether they are employed in State institutions or elsewhere. 



68 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The question, of course, will arise in each particular case 
as to whether the individual in question is or is not holding 
himself out as a practitioner of medicine or practicing or 
attempting to practice medicine in any of its branches. Many 
doubtful cases may occur, and no hard and fast rule for their 
decision can be laid down. The mere question of whether 
or not the person prescribes drugs does not furnish a con- 
clusive test, as one may practice medicine without so doing. 
Commonwealth v. Jewelle, 199 Mass. 558. The diagnosis or 
attempt at diagnosis and decision that no drugs are necessary 
may be as dangerous to the patient as an unwise prescription. 

As was said by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. 
Porn, 195 Mass. 443, 446, where a midwife was charged with 
violating this statute, it would "ordinarily be a question of 
fact" whether the ministrations are those "of a physician or 
whether of an attendant nurse and helper." 

Doubtless many assistants are assigned and perform duties 
which do not require or cause them to practice medicine, 
while others may be found who are so practicing. The de- 
cision as to each case must be arrived at with a knowledge of 
all the facts and a wise judgment as to whether a person is 
practicing or attempting to practice medicine. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Civil Service — Grade of Stenographers and Clerks — Promotions 
— Increase of Salaries. 

Under St. 1914, c. 605, entitled "An Act to establish grades for the salaries 
of clerks and stenographers employed in the departments of the Com- 
monwealth," a head of a department may promote a clerk or a sten- 
ographer for positive merit from a lower grade to a higher grade with- 
out limitation. 

When a clerk or a stenographer is assigned to a grade by promotion or origi- 
nal appointment, by section 3 of this statute he or she may be put, 
by the head of the department, in exceptional cases, at the second or 
third years of the grade; but within the grades estabhshed by this 
statute the salary of a clerk or a stenographer cannot be increased by 
more than an annual increment of $50 without the approval of the 
Governor and Council, as provided in section 5. 

May 14, 1915. 

Hon. Alonzo B. Cook, Auditor of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your letter of May 13, 
requesting my opinion in regard to certain questions which 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 69 

have arisen as to when and by what processes heads of de- 
partments may in special cases increase the salaries of clerks 
and stenographers by larger yearly increments than $50. 

Chapter 605 of the Acts of 1914 established grades for 
salaries of clerks and stenographers employed in the depart- 
ments of the Commonwealth, and provided that thereafter 
appointments and increases in salary should be made only in 
accordance with the provisions of that act. Section 9 pro- 
vided that heads of departments should, before Dec. 1, 1914, 
grade stenographers and clerks in their employ in accord- 
ance with the provisions of that act. 

In my opinion this last-mentioned section contemplated 
that before the date mentioned all clerks and stenographers 
should be placed by heads of departments in one of the three 
grades established by the act, and with such position within 
the grade as he might determine. If no such grades were ex- 
pressly established, in my opinion these employees at that 
date automatically went into the grades which the salaries 
then being paid to them indicated. At that time the status 
of the clerks and stenographers then in the employ of the 
departments was definitely settled. Thereafter they are to be 
treated as if they had worked their way to those positions 
under the act, and their salaries are not to be increased within 
the grade except as provided in sections 1, 2 and 5 of chap- 
ter 605. 

Section 6 by plain implication authorizes promotions from 
a lower grade to a higher one for positive merit and upon the 
filing of a certificate of the nature described in the section. 
There is no limitation upon this right of promotion from one 
grade to another, and I therefore see no reason why a head 
of a department may not make such a promotion from any 
step in the lower grade to the higher grade. When such a 
promotion has been made section 3 then, in my opinion, be- 
comes effective, and the stenographer or clerk, on being as- 
signed to the higher grade to which he or she is promoted, 
may be "put," as a matter of course, at the first step in the 
grade, or, in exceptional cases, at the second or third steps. 

In my opinion section 3, since Dec. 1, 1914, applies only 
to new appointments and to promotions from one grade to a 
higher one. It authorizes a head of a department, when a 
clerk or stenographer is first assigned either by appointment 
or promotion to a particular grade, to place him or her, in 
special cases, at the second or third step within the grade 



70 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

instead of at the first step. It does not, in my opinion, au- 
thorize increases of salaries within the grade in a manner not 
provided in section 5. 

It follows from the foregoing conclusions that except by a 
promotion to a higher grade the salary of a clerk or stenog- 
rapher cannot be increased by more than an annual incre- 
ment of S50 without the approval of the Governor and Coun- 
cil as provided in section 5. 

Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Savings Banks — Form of Deposits — Accou7its Payable 07ily to 
Persons Other than Depositor. 

A savings bank is not authorized to receive deposits subject to the control 
and withdrawal only of a person other than the depositor. 

June 11, 1915. 
Hon. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — The question raised by your letter of April 27, 
relative to deposits in savings banks, concisely stated is this: 
"Is it permissible for A, B, C and D to make deposits in a 
savings bank subject to the control and withdrawal only by 
E, if the aggregate deposits exceed $2,000?" 

The statute provides for deposits in savings banks by in- 
dividuals, by persons jointly, and by administrators, executors 
and trustees. In case of the death of the trustee the trust 
fund may be paid over to th^ person for whom the deposit 
was made, and such payment relieves the bank from liability, 
even though as between the parties the trustee is the true 
owner. The statute makes no provision for the deposit of 
funds in the name of A with the right of withdrawal by B. 
Even though the result might be the same if a depositor as- 
signs his deposit to another, this fact does not enlarge the 
statutory authority. 

The legislature has seen fit to place a limit on deposits in 
savings banks. One of the purposes of such a limitation is 
obviously for the protection of institutions designed to be for 
the use and benefit of depositors of comparatively small 
amounts. The law has made it difficult if not impossible for 
any person to have the right of withdrawal of large sums of 
money, which in times of stress might cripple or impair a 
bank. Even though a person may make deposits as admin- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 71 

istrator, executor and trustee in any number of cases, and 
thus withdraw such deposits on a given date, and even though 
this might perhaps be accomplished by a deposit b}^ X in the 
names of a number of other persons, such persons immedi- 
ately thereafter assigning their deposits to X, the risk in- 
volved by the owner of such deposits has evidently been 
considered such a restraining influence as to make further 
legislation unnecessary. The method suggested in your 
letter, however, would remove even the element of lisk, and 
would result in making the law of limitation of deposits of no 
practical effect. 

I am therefore obliged to advise you that such deposits are 
not authorized or contemplated by the statute. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Aiforney-General. 



Extradition — Governor — Power to revoke Executive Warrant. 

It is within the power of Governor to revoke an executive warrant issued 
in the matter of interstate rendition at any time before fugitive has 
actually been removed from the limits of the Commonwealth. 

June 16, 191.5. 
His Excellency David I. Walsh, Governor of the Commonwealth. 

Sir: — Answering your request of June 1, 1915, requesting 
that I advise you " what the power of the executive might be re- 
garding the recall of an executive warrant on which a fugitive 
from justice has been arrested," I have the honor to advise 
you as follows: — 

In my opinion you have the right to revoke an executive 
warrant issued in a matter of interstate rendition at any time 
before the actual removal of the fugitive from the limits of 
the Commonwealth, and this is true even after the surrender 
of the fugitive to the agent of the demanding State. Work v, 
Corrington, 34 Ohio State, 64. 

The powder of revocation, however, so far as the question of 
legal or moral duty is concerned, is commensurate with the 
power to issue the warrant, and its exercise should be deter- 
mined upon the same considerations as would justify the ex- 
ercise or the refusal to exercise the power to issue. Ordi- 
narily a court which has the power to issue process inherently 
possesses the power to quash or revoke such process. 

While the statutes of the United States are mandatory in 



72 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

form in requiring the executive authority of the asylum State 
to deliver the fugitive to the agent of the demanding State, 
upon the presentation of papers properly certified as au- 
thentic, and in other respects complying with the conditions 
prescribed by Congress, there is no power in any Federal court 
which can compel the issuance of such a warrant, and, from 
the same reasoning, no power exists to restrain the executive 
authority from revoking a warrant once issued. 

United States Compiled Statutes, 1913, § 10126, formerly 
Rev. Sts., § 5278, which provides for the enforcement of 
Article IV., section II. of the Constitution of the United 
States, creating the right of interstate rendition, is as fol- 
lows : — 

Whenever the executive authority of any State or territory demands 
any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any 
State or territory" to which such person has fled, and produces a copj^ 
of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of an}- 
State or territory, charging the person demanded with having com- 
mitted treason, felony or other crime, certified as authentic by the 
Governor or Chief Magistrate of the State or territory from which the 
person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive author- 
ity of the State or territorj^ to which such person has fled to cause him 
to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given 
to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of 
such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the 
fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no 
such agent appears within six months of the time of the arrest, the 
prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the ap- 
prehending, securing and transmitting such fugitive to the State or 
territory making such demand, shall be paid by such State or ter- 
ritory. 

It has been established by numerous judicial decisions, 
and the executive authority of this Commonwealth has at 
different times been advised by the Attorney-General, that 
when a case is presented which is clearly one contemplated 
by the Federal Constitution the Governor has no discretion, 
but it is his imperative duty to issue the warrant. 11. Op. 
Atty.-Gen., 368; III. Op. Atty.-Gen., 432; Kentucky v. 
Dennison, 24 Howard, 66. 

But to adopt the language of the court in Nishett v. Toole, 
69 Minn., 104, " that duty, however, is one of imperfect 
obligation, for if a Governor refuses to perform it we know 
of no power, State or Federal, to compel him to do so." 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 73 

In discussing this act in Kentucky v. Dennison, supra, the 
court says : — 

The words "it shall be the duty," in ordinary legislation, imply the 
assertion of the power to command and to coerce obedience. But, 
looking to the subject-matter of this law and the relations which the 
United States and the several States bear to each other, the court is 
of the opinion the words "it shall be the duty " were not used as man- 
datory and compulsory, but as declaratory of the moral duty which 
this compact (the Constitution) created when Congress had provided 
the mode ot carrying it into execution. The act does not provide any 
methods to compel the execution of this duty nor inflict any punish- 
ment for neglect or refusal on the part of the Executive of the State; 
nor is there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the 
government of the United States with such power. 

The first and only judicial consideration in this Common- 
wealth of the power of the Executive to revoke his warrant 
is in the case of W^yeth v. Richardson, 10 Gray, 240, decided 
in 1837. In this case the petitioner was arrested under a 
warrant issued against him by the Governor of Massachusetts 
on the requisition of the Governor of Iowa. After the issuing 
of the writ of habeas corpus the Governor revoked his war- 
rant and the prisoner demanded his discharge. The respond- 
ent contended the Governor had no power to revoke such a 
warrant once issued, but Bigelow, J., ruled otherwise, and 
discharged the prisoner. On exceptions to the Supreme 
Judicial Court the question of the power to revoke an execu- 
tive warrant was not considered, the case being decided upon 
the ground that exceptions do not lie in habeas corpus pro- 
ceedings. Judge Bigelow's action, however, in this case has 
been cited as authority for the existence of the power of 
revocation. Nishett v. Toole, 69 Minn. 104. 

In further discussing this power in the case last cited the 
court goes on to say: — 

We are not prepared to assent to the proposition that in determin- 
ing whether a case contemplated by the Constitution is presented, the 
Governor on whom the demand is made is vested with no discretion, 
even where the papers upon their lace are sufficient and in due form. 
We all know, as a matter of fact, that governors do exercise a discre- 
tion in such cases, and if they are satisfied that the demand is made 
for some ulterior and improper purpose, as, for example, the collection 
of a private debt, they refuse to issue a warrant. If a Governor may 
exercise such a discretion in regard to issuing such a warrant, we do 



74 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

not see why he may not exercise the same discretion in regard to re- 
voking it, and if he does revoke it his reasons for so doing can no more 
be inquired into than his reasons for retusing to issue it in the first 
instance. The existence of the power to revoke would seem necessary 
in order to prevent great abuses and wrongs. A warrant is, of neces- 
sity, almost always issued ex parte, and the Governor is Uable to be 
imposed upon by those demanding it, or, for some other cause, to issue 
it improvidently. It would seem that in such cases the same officer 
who had the power to issue the warrant should have the power to 
remedj^ the -wi'ong by revoking it. 

Within a very few days the Acting Governor of New Jersey 
has refused the application of the Acting Governor of this 
Commonwealth for one Merrill, for reasons, it is true, which 
this department cannot acknowledge to be sound; but, 
nevertheless, in the assumption of a discretion, with the 
exercise of which no power in this Commonwealth can inter- 
fere. 

In the case of In re James Carroll, 11 Chic. Leg. News, 14, 
arising out of a revocation by the Governor of Illinois of his 
executive warrant, in discussing the contention that the action 
of the Governor in issuing such warrant was merely miris- 
terial, and the warrant once issued cannot be recalled, the 
court says: — 

In one sense it is ministerial, — the issuing of a warrant under the 
express requirements of a statute of the United States and of a State; 
yet that warrant can only be issued, as we have seen, upon the exami- 
nation of papers required to be submitted to him, and upon the exer- 
cise of his judgment as to its sufficiency and legalit\^ He must deter- 
mine the facts and he must exercise discretion and judgment. If he 
errs, and, after issuing the warrant finds it out, then it would seem to 
be consonant with right and justice that he retrace his steps by recall- 
ing it. A case might arise in which a Governor might be grossly im- 
posed upon, as by the presentation of forged documents or requisitions 
in due legal form; or might have been presented in bad faith, with no 
object or intention of having a man tried upon the charge contamed 
in an indictment or warrant, but with an ulterior design, under the 
form of extradition papers against a man innocent of the specific 
charges, but wanted for other purposes. In such cases the Governor 
would not be obhged to issue his warrant, and would be justified in re- 
fusing, or if he had issued it, to annul and revoke it. 

The warrant is a process ministerial and quasi judicial, and I see 
no reason why the Executive who issues it may not in his discretion 
and the exercise of a sound judgment, on a review of the facts, annul 
and revoke it if done in time to be effectual. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 

12 77 

The only case which has come to my 'dtte^' 

the power to revoke such a warrant has been den. . 

V. Lovelan, 19 Barbour (N. Y.), HI- This case wi* : 

for libel founded upon an allegation that an affic 

sented to the Governor of New York, on an applies 

O-f T-p Q 

the revocation of an executive warrant in extradition P * „ , 
contained libelous matter. The defendant contended 
matter was privileged, but the court held otherwise, on 
ground that in order to be privileged the tribunal to whiv,.' 
the affidavit was presented must have been vested with au 
thority to render judgment in the proceeding, whereas in " 
the case at bar "the Governor had no power whatever to 
entertain an application to recall, revoke or modify the war- 
rant which he had issued for the apprehension of True." 

While papers for interstate rendition uniformly contain 
representations to the effect that "the demand for the fugi- 
tive is made in good faith, with the sole intent to prosecute 
and punish him for said crime and not to secure his return . . . 
to afford opportunity to serve him with civil process, nor for 
the purpose of collecting a debt, nor for any private purpose 
whatsoever; and that if the requisition applied for be granted, 
a criminal proceeding shall not be used for any of said ob- 
jects," etc., these assertions have the force of prima facie 
evidence only. These matters and others affecting the good 
faith of the prosecution are properly open to review by the 
Governor of the asylum State in determining whether or not he 
will honor the demand. 

So far, therefore, as the legal right of revocation exists, 
the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the right to 
revoke upon a consideration of the same matters which 
would justify a refusal to issue the warrant in the first ir- 
stance. 

From an examination of the authorities it appears that the 
power not only to exercise a discretion in the issuance of such 
process in the first instance, but to revoke the warrants once 
issued, has not infrequently been exercised. 
■ Very respectfully, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



76 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Hours of Labor — Employees for or upon Public Works — 

Definition. 

St. 1911, c. 494, § 1, establishing eight hours as a day's work for "all 
laborers, workmen and mechanics now or hereafter employed . . , 
by any contractor or subcontractor for or upon any pubhc works" 
apphes to all laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by any 
person contracting, directly or by subcontract, for the performance of 
any portion of a pubhc work, whether the work is performed upon the 
pubhc works or at any other place within the Commonwealth, but it 
does not apply to employees of persons merely selhng materials and 
suppHes to such contractors. 

June 21, 1915. 

To the State Board of Labor and Industries, 1 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of a 
letter addressed to me by Edward F. Wallace, counsel for your 
Board, requesting my opinion on the interpretation of chapter 
494 of the Acts of 1911, as "to what class of employees do 
the words 'for or upon any public works' apply." 

Section 1 of said chapter 494 appears to apply not only to 
laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by the Common- 
wealth, but also to laborers, workmen and mechanics em- 
ployed by contractors or subcontractors for or upon public 
works. In my opinion a contractor or subcontractor for 
public works is distinguished from a contractor or subcon- 
tractor upon public works in that a contractor or subcon- 
tractor for public works is one who is performing some portion 
of the work required by the contract for such public works 
where such portion of the work is not performed upon the 
public works themselves or the premises upon which the pub- 
lic works are being constructed, while a contractor or sub- 
contractor upon public works is one who is performing his 
portion of the contract upon the public works themselves or 
on the premises or so near thereto that in contemplation of 
law the work can be said to be performed upon the public 
works. 

The result is that one who takes a contract for the per- 
formance of a portion of the work required in the construction 
of public works is bound by the provisions of the act, whether 
the work performed by him under the contract is upon the 
public works themselves or at any other place within the 
Commonwealth. 

In my opinion the test will always be whether the de- 
fendant is in fact a subcontractor of a portion of the contract, 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 77 

agreeing with the contractor to perform a certain specified 
part of the contract, or is merely a seller of materials and 
supplies to the contractor. If he is in fact such a subcon- 
tractor, then he comes within the provisions of the act. If a 
mere seller of materials and supplies, then the provisions of the 
act do not apply. 

In my judgment the act applies only to such laborers, 
workmen and mechanics as are employed for or upon public 
works, so that to constitute a violation of the act it must 
appear that the laborer, workman or mechanic has in fact 
worked more than eight hours a day for his employer upon 
work done in the performance of the contiact. 

I have given careful consideration to the views expressed 
in briefs filed with me by counsel for Coleman Brothers, who, 
I understand, are particularly interested in the construction 
of this statute, and by counsel for the Massachusetts State 
Branch of the American Federation of Labor, and for the 
General Contractors' Association. It is contended by all of 
the counsel that the proper construction of the provisions of 
the act limits their application to laborers, workmen and 
mechanics who are employed upon the public works them- 
selves, or at least at the site of the public works. I am unable 
to agree with this construction. Counsel base their conten- 
tion upon the following decisions in the State of New York 
with relation to the construction of a similar statute in New 
York. Downey v. Bender, 57 App. Div. (N. Y.) 310, Bohnen 
V. Metz, 126 App. Div. (N. Y.) 807, affirmed 193 N. Y. 676; 
Ewen V. Thompson Starrett Co., 208 N. Y. 245. 

The phraseology of that part of the New York statute 
which relates to the hours of labor that laborers, workmen 
and mechanics may be employed is somewhat different from 
the phraseology of the Massachusetts statute relating to such 
hours of labor, and that part of the New York statute must 
be read in connection with other provisions of the act, par- 
ticularly those contained in the same section. In the inter- 
pretation of the intention of the New York Legislature the 
courts of New York have given consideration to the pro- 
visions of the entire act, and in this consideration have come 
to the conclusion that it was the intention of the Legislature 
of New York to restrict the application of the statute to 
laborers, workmen and mechanics employed "on, about or 
upon public work." 

Furthermore, it is to be noted that in a dissenting opinion 



78 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

in Ewen v. Thorny son-Star rett Co. two of the justices of the 
New York Court of Appeals, while concurring in the result of 
the decision, held that a construction of the New York stat- 
ute which limited its application to laborers, workmen and 
mechanics employed "on, about or upon such public work" 
nullified the provisions of the statute to a great extent, and 
that such a construction was unnecessary to the determination 
of the case. 

It follows, therefore, in my opinion, that in the case you 
have cited, if the workmen are in fact employed for more 
than eight hours a day upon work performed in the further- 
ance of a contract with the Commonwealth, the contractor 
is subject to the penalties prescribed in the statute. 
Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Taxation — Bond of Tax Collector — Right to discharge and 
accept New Bond. 

There is no provision of law authorizing the surrender and cancellation of 
a bond given by a tax collector under the provisions of R. L., c. 25, 
§ 77, before its condition is fully performed, and the acceptance of a 
new bond for a lesser amount in place thereof. 

June 22, 1915. 

Hon. William D. T. Trefry, Tax Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your inquiry whether, 
in my opinion, the bond required to be given by the collector 
of taxes of a town may be legally surrendered and cancelled 
before its condition is fully performed and a new bond for a 
lesser amount accepted in place thereof; if so, you ask by 
whom this may be done. 

R. L., c. 25, § 77, provides: — 

The collector of taxes shall give bond to the town for the faithful 
performance of his duties, in a sum and ^dth sureties approved by 
the selectmen. 

The only discretion given by this section to the selectmen 
concerns the approval of the penal sum of the bond and the 
sureties who execute it. If a satisfactory bond is not given 
by the collector within ten days after his election they may de- 
clare the office vacant and appoint another in his place. St. 
1913, c. 835, § 427. It plainly is their duty to do so if a satis- 
factory bond is not promptly given. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 79 

When such a bond has been given and approved it becomes 
a contract between the collector and his sureties, on the one 
hand, and the town upon the other. It cannot be discharged 
by the collector except by the faithful performance of the 
duties imposed upon him by the statutes, namely, by collect- 
ing and paying over to the treasurer of the town the full 
amount committed to him by the warrant, or by discharging 
himself from liability for the taxes thus committed to him 
in the manner prescribed by the statutes. Even though not 
re-elected it is his duty to complete the collection of the taxes 
committed to him unless his tax list is transferred to his 
successor (St. 1909, c. 490, Part I., § 13). 

I find no provision in the statutes authorizing the select- 
men of the town to discharge a tax collector or the sureties 
upon his bond from their obligation to the town under the 
bond and to accept a new bond for a lesser amount in sub- 
stitution therefor. In my opinion they have no authority to 
do so. I find no provision of law giving such authority to the 
town itself, acting through a legally called town meeting. I 
have very grave doubt if it exists even there without express 
legislative action. 

It is plain that after a substantial part of the taxes assessed 
for any particular year has been collected and paid over to 
the treasurer of the town, the extent of the liability of the 
sureties is very much reduced. Their outstanding liability 
upon the bond for that year is measured by the amount of 
taxes then remaining uncollected or unaccounted for. \Yith 
this reduction in the risk of liability a surety company which 
has executed such a bond should in fairness reduce the amount 
of future premiums to be paid to it for the execution of the 
bond. It seems to me that the burden of accumulating 
premiums upon these bonds should be reduced in this manner, 
and not by an attempt to discharge the obligation required 
by the statute or to substitute a lesser obligation therefor. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General . 



80 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Minimum Wage Commission — Authority to establish a Wage 
Board — Effect of Change in Statutory Method of Selection. 

A wage board not completely established by the Minimum Wage Commis- 
sion until after the enactment of St. 1914, c. 368, providing a new 
method for the selection of representatives on such board, can be 
legally established only by the selection of all its representatives as 
provided in that statute. 

June 30, 1915. 

Miss Amy Hew^es, Secretary, Minimum Wage Commission. 

Dear Madam: — I beg to acknowledge your letter of June 
14 inquiring in substance whether, in my opinion, the w^age 
board established by your commission to determine the 
minimum wages to be paid to candy makers was established 
in accordance with law. 

Your authority to establish this board is granted to you by 
section 4 of chapter 706 of the Acts of 1912, as amended by 
chapter 368 of the Acts of 1914. Until this amendment, 
which became effective on April 17, 1914, your commission 
was authorized to appoint not less than six representatives, of 
its own selection, on behalf of employers, and an equal num- 
ber of persons to represent the employees, and in addition 
one or more disinterested persons, not to exceed one-half of the 
number of representatives of either of the other parties, to 
represent the public. As I understand it, your commission 
voted on Dec. 9, 1913, to establish a w^age board to deter- 
mine the minimum wages to be paid candy makeis; that six 
representatives of employers were appointed by the commis- 
sion on April 14, 1914; that the chairman, a disinterested per- 
son, was appointed on April 7; that two other members to 
represent the public w^ere appointed on April 17; that six 
members representing employees were appointed on May 9 
and May 19, respectively; and that the representatives of 
both employers and employees were appointed by your com- 
mission without receiving nominations from either party. 

On April 17, 1914, chapter 368 of the acts of that year be- 
came effective. By section 1 of that chapter, section 4 of 
chapter 706 of the x\cts of 1912 w^as so amended as to require 
the representatives of employers and employees to be selected 
by your commission from nominations made to it by the 
respective parties, provided those nominations w^ere made 
wdthin ten days after the request of your commission. When 
this statute became effective your commission had not finally 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — No. 12. 81 

established the wage board in question. Merely the represent- 
atives of the employers and one of the representatives of the 
public were appointed before that date. After that date the 
only law in effect authorizing you to establish a wage board 
is that contained in section 4 of chapter 706 of the Acts of 
1912, as amended by section 1 of chapter 368 of the Acts of 1914. 
In my opinion a wage board cannot be regarded as established 
until all its members have been finally determined and ap- 
pointed by your commission. In the case under consideration 
this was not until May 19, 1914, when the last appointments 
were made. At that time your only authority to establish 
a wage board was to be found in the amended statute. By 
that statute you are authorized to make appointments only 
after receiving nominations from both employers and em- 
ployees, unless the parties fail to make such nominations 
within ten days after notice from your commission. As the 
wage board in question had not been finally established 
before April 17, 1914, in my opinion the only course open to 
your commission on that date was to then begin anew, and 
to establish the board, as to its representatives from all 
parties, in accordance with the provisions of the amendment 
which became effective on that date. It follows that in my 
opinion the board to which you refer was not established in 
accordance w^ith law. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Directors of Port of Boston — JJ^ecks — Authority to remove. 

The Directors of the Port of Boston, within the territory entrusted to 
their charge, have the powers granted to the Board of Harbor and 
Land Commissioners by R. L., c. 97, §§ 15-23, inclusive, concerning 
the removal of wrecks, and are authorized to expend such sums as 
are reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of that statute. 

July 16, 1915. 
Directors of the Port of Boston, J^O Central Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
authority of your Board with reference to the removal of 
wrecks and obstructions in Boston Harbor. 

R. L., c. 97, §§ 15-23, inclusive, deals with this matter, 
granting authority throughout the Commonwealth to the 
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 



82 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 15 provides: — 

If a wrecked, sunken or abandoned vessel, or any unlaurful or un- 
authorized structure or thing, is deposited in the tide waters of this 
commonwealth, or is suffered to remain therein, and in the judgment 
of the board of harbor and land commissioners it is, or is hable to 
cause or become, an obstruction to the safe and convenient navigation 
or other lawful use of such waters, said board shall remove it or cause 
it to be removed. 

Section 16 provides for notice by the Board in the first in- 
stance to the owner to remove the vessel or obstruction, speci- 
fying some definite date reasonably far a(5vanced in the future 
to permit of compliance with the notice. Section 17 pro- 
vides that if the notice is not complied with the Board shall 
cause or complete the removal, and the expenses thereof, 
when certified by the Board and approved bj^ the Governor 
and Council, shall be paid by the Commonwealth. Section 
18 provides for liability over to the Commonwealth on the 
part of the owner for the expense so incurred. Section 19 
provides for the sale of materials recovered in the course of 
removal, if the expense of the lemoval is not paid by the 
owners within ten days. 

It would be well for your Board to read the exact provisions 
of this chapter so as to have them freshly in mind w^hen tak- 
ing any action. 

St. 1911, c. 748, § 4, provides: — 

All the rights, powers and duties now pertaining to the board of 
harbor and land commissioners in respect to such lands, rights in 
lands, flats, shores, waters and rights belonging to the commonwealth 
in tidewaters and land under water as constitute that part of Boston 
harbor Mng v/esterly and inside of a line drawn between Point AUerton 
on the south and the southerly end of Point Shirley on the north, or as 
adjoin the same or are connected therewith, and any other rights and 
powers heretofore vested by the laws of the commonwealth in the 
board of harbor and land commissioners in respect to any part of said 
area, are hereby transferred to and hereafter shall be vested in and 
exercised by said directors. . . . 

Accordingly, it would seem to be clear that the authority 
granted to the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners 
under the provisions of chapter 97 of the Revised Laws, men- 
tioned above, is now vested in your Board with reference to 
the territorv described. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 83 

St. 1911, c. 748, § 17, provides: — 

To meet expenses that may be incurred under the provisions of this 
act the treasurer and receiver general is hereby authorized, with the 
approval of the governor and council, to issue bonds, scrip, or certifi- 
cates of indebtedness to an amount not exceeding nine milHon dollars, 
... to be issued in such amounts, from time t6 time, as the treasurer 
and receiver general, with the approval of the governor and council, 
shall determine. 

Expenses incurred in removal of obstructions in the waters 
over which jurisdiction has been conferred upon you would 
certainly be an expense incurred under the provisions of this 
act. While doubtless a special appropriation for this purpose, 
as requested in your report for the year ending Nov. 30, 1914, 
might be desirable, so that the original appropriation could be 
more exclusively devoted to permanent improvements, it does 
not seem to be necessary that such appropriation should be 
made in order for you legally to carry out the requirements of 
chapter 97. 

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that your Board has the 
powers granted to the Board of Harbor and Land Commis- 
sioners under the provisions of R. L., c. 97, §§ 15-23, inclu- 
sive, over the territory entrusted to your charge, and ife 
authorized to expend from amounts secured by the issuance 
of bonds, etc., approved by the Governor and Council, under 
the provisions of St. 1911, c. 748, § 17, amounts reasonably 
necessary to carry out the requirements thereof. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Boston Finance Commission — Duty of Attorney-General to 
advise — Powers — Witnesses — Necessity of Summons — 
Right to Counsel and Stenographer — Powers of Mayor — 
Rules of Commission. 

The Boston Finance Commission has no power to require officials and em- 
p oyees of the city of Boston or of the county of Suffolk to come before 
it except by summons, though such officers and employees may indi- 
vidually waive summons at any time, except that they may be re- 
quired not to do so by a superior officer as to the hours when they are 
actually employed. 

Such witnesses are entitled to be represented by counsel, but they are not 
entitled to have a stenographer present, and a rule of the Boston 
Finance Commission limiting this right to be represented by counsel 
s not within the authoritv of the commission. 



84 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The mayor of the city of Boston has no authority in any manner to Hmit 
the powers of the Boston Finance Commission. 

If an assistant corporation counsel of the city of Boston appears before the 
Boston F nance Commission as counsel of a person summoned before 
it at his request, the commission has no right to object. 

July 21, 1915. 
Boston Finance Commission, 4iO Tremont Building, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt 
of your communication of the 13th inst., requesting my 
opinion upon the following questions: — 

1. Has the Finance Commission power to have officials and emplo}'- 
ees of the city of Boston and the county of Suffolk come before it on 
request, without summons? If a summons is necessary, have said em- 
ployees the individual right to waive said summons? Has a superior 
officer the power or right to order them not to waive said summons? 

2. If a city employee is required b}^ law to be legall}' summoned to 
the office of the commission, is it not within the power of the commis- 
sion, under section 2, chapter 562 of the Acts of 1908, to refuse to 
allow the person summoned to be present with counsel and with a sten- 
ographer? 

3. Has any direction or order of the maj^'or to any employee or to 
the commission itself any effect upon its powers, and does the at- 
tached copy of the order of the mayor of June 18, 1915, addressed to 
the heads of departments and members of boards and commissions 
of the city of Boston, infringe the rights and powers of the Finance 
Commission as defined in chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909? 

4. Are the following rules and regulations for the conduct of hear- 
ings and the giving of testimonj^ reasonable and in conformity with 
section 2 of chapter 562 oi the Acts of 1908 and section 21 of chapter 
486of the Acts of 1909: — 

(a) A witness summoned before the commission may be represented by coun- 
sel who may cross-examine the witness for w^hom he appears for not more than 
ten minutes during his examination. This rule permitting counsel to be present 
is to be regarded not as creating a right but as extending a privilege, and the 
commission reserves the right to withdraw the same at any time. 

(6) The commission will permit any person retained in the interest of a wit- 
ness to submit to the commission in writing any questions which he thinks 
ought to be put to the witness, and such questions will be put by the chairman 
if pertinent and proper. Every witness will also be allowed, under advice of 
counsel or by his own motion, to decline to answer questions which may tend to 
incriminate him. 

(c) The witness will also be allowed to make any pertinent statement either 
at the beginning or the end of his examination. Such statement may be pre- 
pared under advice of counsel. 

(d) At public hearings held by the commission counsel for any witness maj- 
ask him any pertinent question and may offer pertinent evidence through other 
witnesses subject to cross-examination by the commission and its counsel. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 85 

(e) The commission will receive from any person not called as a witness, 
who desires to volunteer at public hearings information or testimony relative 
to the work of the commission, a request in writing addressed to the commission 
and stating in brief the matters upon which the writer desires to be heard. If 
the commission deems such information or testimony relevant and helpful, a 
time and place will be designated at which the same will be publicly given. 

5. Has the mayor, under the revised ordinances, power to order the 
law department to assign one of its assistant corporation counsels to 
attend as counsel for city employees when the latter are summoned 
before the Finance Commission? (See revised ordinances, 1914, chap- 
ters 3 and 20.) 

There is some question as to whether your commission is a 
State board or commission, within the meaning of section 1 
of chapter 7 of the Revised Laws, for which the Attorney- 
General is required to render legal services. Although you are 
appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the 
Council, and required to report to the General Court each 
year, nevertheless, your jurisdiction is confined to the city of 
Boston and the county of Suffolk. Furthermore, you are au- 
thorized to employ counsel. 

Officers and boards in a like situation have requested opin- 
ions of my predecessors in office, and they have apparently 
entertained different view^s as to w^hether they were required 
to give opinions to such officers and boards. 

On Dec. 22, 1905, the Hon. Herbert Parker rendered an 
opinion to the chairman of the Police Commission of Boston, 
expressing some doubt at the time as to whether that board 
had authority to take the opinion of the Attorney-General. 

On Dec. 8, 1910, the Hon. Dana Malone rendered an 
opinion to the Police Commissioner of the city of Boston. 

On July 6, 1911, the Hon. James M. Swift declined to ex- 
press an opinion upon questions submitted to him by the 
Police Commissioner of the city of Boston, on the ground 
that the Police Commissioner was not a State officer, within 
the meaning of section 1 of chapter 7 of the Revised Laws. 
Mr. Swift took the same attitude on March 3, 1911, in rela- 
tion to a request for his opinion by the Boston Finance Com- 
mission, and on Feb. 19, 1913, took the same attitude in re- 
lation to a communication from the Licensing Board of the 
city of Boston. 

While I have some doubt as to whether I am required to 
advise your commission, I prefer to give an opinion upon the 
questions propounded, so far as they relate to a construction 



86 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of the statutes creating and governing your commission, in 
order that I may be sure, in a situation of doubt, to perform 
my full duty. 

The first question upon which you request my opinion in- 
cludes three questions: — 

First, has the Finance Commission power to have officials 
and employees of the city of Boston and the county of Suffolk 
come before it on request without summons? 

Second, if a summons is necessary, have said employees the 
individual right to waive said summons? 

Third, has a superior officer the power or right to order 
them not to waive said summons? 

As to the first inquiry, I think it clear that as the power 
of your commission is derived solely from chapter 562 of the 
Acts of 1908 and chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909, the only 
power given to the commission to require officials and em- 
ployees of the city of Boston and the county of Suffolk to 
come before it is upon a summons. 

As to the second inquiry, I think it equally clear that such 
officials and employees have the individual right to waive 
such summons. 

As to the third inquir^^, I am of the opinion that a superior 
officer has the right to require that employees under his di- 
rection shall not leave their employment during the hours 
when they are at work for the city of Boston or the county 
of Suffolk unless they are required by law to so leave such 
employment. It follows that, as to the hours when the em- 
ployees are employed for the city of Boston or the county of 
Suffolk, the superior officer has the right to order them not 
to waive the necessity of such summons. As to the hours 
when they are not employed or on duty, I am of opinion that 
they may waive the summons and appear voluntarily before 
the commission and give such testimony under oath as the 
commission may properly require, notwithstanding any order 
or direction by a superior officer to the contrary. 

Your second question is as follows: — 

If a city employee is required by law to be legally summoned to the 
office of the commission, is it not within the power of the commission, 
under section 2, chapter 562 of the Acts of 1908, to refuse to allow the 
person summoned to be present with counsel and with a stenographer? 

Section 27 of chapter 562 of the Acts of 1908 expressly 
provides that witnesses before your commission may be rep- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 87 

resented by counsel, who may cross-examine such witnesses 
for not more than ten minutes during their examination. It 
is apparent, therefore, that your commission has no authority 
to refuse to allow the person summoned to be represented 
by counsel. I can find no provision in the acts under which 
you derive your authority making provision for stenographers 
for witnesses. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the 
commission, if it is found expedient, may deny to the witness 
the privilege of h-aving a stenographer of the witness's selec- 
tion present. 

Your third question is as follows: — 

Has any direction or order of the maj^or to anj" employee or to the 
commission itself smy effect upon its powers, and does the attached 
copy of the order of the mayor of June 18, 1915, addressed to the heads 
of departments and members of boards and commissions of the city 
of Boston, infringe the rights and powers of the Finance Commission 
as defined in chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909? 

Your commission is appointed, as I have before stated, by 
the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Council, to 
inquire into certain matters relating to the city of Boston 
and the county of Suffolk. Its functions, in my opinion, are 
entirely independent of the city government of the city of 
Boston; it is subject in no way to any control by the mayor 
or council of the city of Boston; and it follows that any di- 
rection or order of the mayor to any employee of the city of 
Boston or to the commission itself can have no effect what- 
ever upon its legal powers. 

This answers your inquiry in relation to the attached copy 
of the order of the mayor of June 18, 1915, so far as it in 
any way seeks to infringe the rights and powers conferred upon 
the Finance Commission. I think it unnecessary for me to 
determine whether any direction contained in the order is in 
effect a direction to officials and employees of the city of 
Boston to resist or interfere with your commission in the 
proper exercise of its functions, nor do I think I am called 
upon to express any comments as to the propriety of the 
order. 

Your fourth question requests my opinion as to whether 
certain rules and regulations of the commission are reasonable 
and in conformity with section 2 of chapter 562 of the Acts 
of 1908 and section 21 of chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909. The 
first rule in question is as follows: — 



88 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

(a) A witness summoned before the commission may be represented 
by counsel who may cross-examine the witness for whom he appears 
for not more than ten minutes during his examination. This rule per- 
mitting counsel to be present is to be regarded not as creating a right 
but as extending a privilege, and the commission reserves the right to 
withdraw the same at any time. 

The last sentence of said rule, I am of the opinion, is not in 
conformity with the provisions of the statutes above cited. 
The provisions of the statutes create a right in the witness to 
be represented by counsel, and it is obvious that the com- 
mission has no power to withdraw this right. As section 21 of 
chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909 provides that '' counsel for any 
witness at any public hearing may ask him any pertinent 
question and may offer pertinent evidence through other 
witnesses, subject to cross-examination by the commission 
and its counsel," it would seem desirable that the rule should 
so provide. 

As to the remaining rules submitted to me, I am of the 
opinion that they are reasonable and free from objection. 

xA.s to your fifth question — '' Has the mayor, under the 
revised ordinances, power to order the law department to 
assign one of its assistant corporation counsels to attend as 
counsel for city employees when the latter are summoned 
before the Finance Commission?" — I feel that I have done 
all that is required of me when I answer it so far as it may 
affect the powers of your commission. The question whether 
the mayor has such power affects your commission only in so 
far as it relates to the obligation of the commission to recog- 
nize the corporation counsel or one of his assistants as counsel 
for the witness. The provision of the statutes authorizing 
witnesses to be represented b}' counsel, is, in my judgment, 
for the protection of witnesses who may, as a result of the 
investigation of the commission, be charged with inefficiency, 
official misconduct or crime. Obviously, the selection of 
counsel nnust be left to the witness himself. If he sees fit 
to request a member of the legal department of the city to 
represent him as counsel, and such member of the legal de- 
partment appears for him, the commission has no power to 
exclude such counsel from being present while the witness is 
testifying. If there is any impropriety in members of the 
legal department of the city of Boston appearing for wit- 
nesses who may be later charged, as a result of the investi- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 89 

gation, with inefficiency, misconduct or crime, the .commis- 
sion, in my opinion, is without power at present to prevent it. 
It follows that the mayor has no power to direct who shall 
appear as counsel for the witness, and no official or employee 
is in any way bound by such a direction. As counsel for the 
city, the corporation counsel and his assistants have no stand- 
ing in your hearing other than such as you, in your discretion, 
may see fit to give them. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attw^ill, Aitorncy-General. 



Constitutional Law — Members of the General Court — Masters 

in Chancery. 

A master in chancery is not "a judge of any court of this commonwealth" 
within the meaning of Article VIII. of the Amendments to the Con- 
stitution, and there is no constitutional objection to the appointment 
of a member of the General Court to that office. 

July 21, 1915. 

His Excellency David I. Walsh, Governor of the CommonweaUh. 

Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your request for my opinion as 
to whether or not a member of the Legislature can be ap- 
pointed a master in chancery. 

The only provision of the Constitution of the Common- 
wealth which has any beaming upon this matter is Article VIII. 
of the Amendments, which is as follows: — 

Xo judge of any court of this commonwealth (except the court of 
sessions), and no person holding anj^ office under the authority of the 
United States (postmasters excepted) shall, at the same time, hold the 
office of governor, lieutenant-governor, or councillor, or have a seat 
in the senate or house of representatives of this commonwealth; and 
no judge of any court in this Commonwealth (except the court of 
sessions), nor the attorney-general, soHcitor-general, county attor- 
ney, clerk of any court, sheriff, treasurer, and receiver-general, reg- 
ister of probate, nor register of deeds, shall continue to hold his 
said office after being elected a member of the Congress of the 
United States, and accepting that trust; but the acceptance of such 
trust, by any of the officers aforesaid, shall be deemed and taken to 
be a resignation of his said office; and judges of the courts of common 
pleas shall hold no other office under the government of this common- 
wealth, the office of justice of the peace and militia offices excepted. 

In my opinion a master in chancery is not a ''judge of any 
court of this commonwealth," within the meaning of the fore- 



90 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

going a»ticle. His duties are to a large extent administrative 
rather than judicial; they are more closel}^ analogous to those 
performed by justices of the peace and notaries public than to 
judicial duties. In my opinion, even to the extent that a 
master in chancery exercises judicial functions, he is not act- 
ing as a judge of a court within the meaning of the Consti- 
tution. I see, therefore, no constitutional objection to the 
appointment of a member of the Legislature to the office of 
master in chancery. 

Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Cape Cod Canal — Contract for Construction — Tidal Gates — 
Extra Work — Powers of Joint Board. 

If the Joint Board created by St. 1899, c. 448, § 6, requires the construc- 
tion of tidal gates or locks in the Cape Cod Canal, as authorized by 
the contract between the Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Com- 
pany and the Cape Cod Construction Company, the latter is required 
to construct the same as additional work not covered by the price 
named in the contract, and is entitled to be paid therefor as additional 
work in accordance with the contract. 

The approval by the Joint Board of a contract between the Boston, Cape 
Cod & New York Canal Company and the Cape Cod Construction 
Company for the construction of the Cape Cod Canal, by which the 
former agreed to pay the latter for such work substantially aU the 
shares of stock and bonds which it was authorized to issue, was -wathin 
the authority granted to the Board by St. 1909, c. 476, § 1. 

The Joint Board has authority, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
contract between these companies for the construction of tidal gates, 
to approve and certify the issue by the Canal Company of capital 
stock of the par value of $5,990,000 and first mortgage bonds of the 
par value of $6,000,000, — substantially the entire amount of stock and 
bonds which the company is now authorized to issue, — for work 
which does not include the construction of such tidal gates or other 
similar devices. 

July 22, 1915. 

Hon. William S. McNary, Chairman, Joint Board consisting of the Public 
Service Commissioners and the Harbor and Land Commissioners. 

Gentlemen: — I beg to acknowledge the request of the 
Joint Board for my opinion concerning certain questions 
which have arisen concerning the completion of the Cape 
Cod Canal. 

The Boston, Cape Cod & New Y^ork Canal Company was 
incorporated by chapter 448 of the Acts of 1899, with an au- 
thorized capital stock of $6,000,000. It was empowered to 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 91 

issue bonds to an amount not exceeding the amount of its 
paid-in capital stock. Section 2 of that chapter provides, in 
part, as follows: — 

Said corporation may issue stock and bonds in payment for labor 
performed and material furnished in the construction of a canal as 
hereinafter provided, and in payment for property acquired for that 
purpose. 

As amended by section 1 of chapter 476 of the Acts of 1900 
this section contains the followihg requirement: — 

All issues of stock and bonds under the provisions of this act shall 
be subject to the approval and certification of the joint board provided 
for in section six of this act, in the manner provided in chapter four 
hundred and sixty-two of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and 
ninety-four, relative to the issue of stock and bonds by railroad and 
street railway companies; except that, if a contract or contracts shall 
be entered into bj^ said corporation, by the terms of which capital 
stock and bonds are to be issued by said corporation in payment for 
labor to be performed or materials to be furnished in the construction 
and equipment of said canal, in accordance with the plans as approved 
by the board of harbor and land commissioners as provided in this 
act, and such contract or contracts be approved by said joint board, 
after such advertisement for bids thereunder as shall be satisfactory 
to said joint board and provided such contract shall be awarded to the 
lowest bidder, satisfactory to said joint board who gives bonds to the 
satisfaction of said canal company, said corporation maj^ issue its cap- 
ital stock and bonds from time to time, pro rata to the labor performed 
and the materials furnished on the certification by said joint board 
that such work has been done or such materials furnished and in ac- 
cordance with the terms of any such contract. 

Section 4 required that the Canal Company should file with 
the Harbor and Land Commissioners plans of the proposed 
location and construction of the canal, and imposed upon that 
commission the duty of approving, disapproving or modifying 
such plans. It then declared: — 

The plans so approved or modified, being accepted by said com- 
pany, shall be deemed to be the plans of the location and construction 
of said canal, and said companj' shall be authorized to construct its 
canal in accordance therewith. 

Section 6 created a Joint Board, consisting of the Railroad 
Commissioners, now the Public Service Commissioners, and 
the Harbor and Land Commissioners, and imposed upon that 



92 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Joint Board the duty of determining at what point or points 
the Old Colony Railroad should cross the canal by bridges 
or by tunnels. This is the only question of construction re- 
ferred to the Joint Board. It may pass upon other matters of 
construction only as they may be found to be incidental to 
this single question. See opinion of Attorney-General Knowl- 
ton to the Joint Board, dated April 6, 1901, II. Op. Atty.-Gen. 
257. 

On May 8, 1907, the Harbor and Land Commissioners ap- 
proved the plans for the location and construction of the 
canal. These plans did not show any lock, tidal gate or other 
device for controlling the current in the canal. On June 3, 
1907, the Joint Board approved a contract between the Bos- 
ton, Cape Cod & New York Canal Company and the Cape 
Cod Construction Company for the construction of a canal 
in accordance with the plans approved by the Harbor and 
Land Commissioners. This contract provided that the Canal 
Company should pay the contractor for the performance of 
the contract the sum of $11,990,000, payable as to $5,990,000 
in the stock of the Canal Company, and $6,000,000 in the 
bonds of the company; and that "payments shall be made by 
the Canal Company upon written requisitions approved by 
the chief engineer as the work proceeds from time to time 
yro rata to the labor performed and the material furnished 
and on the certification by the Joint Board that such work 
has been done and such materials furnished and in accord- 
ance with the terms of this contract." 

Paragraph 5 of this contract gave to the Canal Company 
the right to require work to be done or material to be fur- 
nished in addition to that specified, upon the following condi- 
tion: — 

Provided, however, that if any such additional work to be done or 
materials to be furnished shall in the judgment of the chief engineer 
materially increase the cost of the whole to the Contractor, additional 
payments shall be made to the Contractor therefor with the addition 
of 10 per cent, for the Contractor's profit in cash or in shares of stock 
or bonds of the Canal Company at par, as the Canal Company shall 
determine. 

The specifications contained the following provision: — 

If at the expiration of one year after the canal is opened to public 
use it shall have been proved to the satisfaction of the Joint Board 
that a lock, tidal gates or some other device for controlling the current 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. . 93 

in the canal should be constructed in order to provide for the safe and 
suitable use of the canal by the public, then the Contractor shall con- 
struct such lock, tidal gates or other device satisfactory to the Joint 
Board. And the same shall be considered as additional work and be 
subject to the provisions of the fifth paragraph of the contract as re- 
gards paj^ment therefor. 

I understand that the canal has been constructed in ac- 
cordance with the specifications, and that the Joint Board has 
already approved requisitions for the issue of stock and bonds 
under the contract to the amount of $5,232,000 of stock and 
$5,240,000 of bonds, and that requisitions based upon work 
actually done by the contractor under the contract, and cover- 
ing all the remaining stock and bonds which the Canal Com- 
pany is authorized by law to issue, are now before the Joint 
Board for action. 

A serious question having arisen whether some device for 
controlling the current in the canal is not necessary for the 
safe and suitable use of the canal by the public, the Joint 
Board asks my opinion upon the following specific ques- 
tions : — 

If the Joint Board should decide, under the provisions of the para- 
graph relative to locks or tidal gates on page 30 of said contract be- 
tween the Canal Company and the Construction Compam^, that a 
lock, tidal gates or some other device for controlling the current in 
the canal should be constructed in order to provide for the safe and 
suitable use of the canal by the pubhc : — 

1. Would such construction, under the terms of said contract, be a 
part of the work for which said Canal Company has contracted to paj^ 
$11,990,000 in stock and bonds to said Construction Company, or 
would such construction be additional work, as defined in paragraph 
5 of said contract, to be paid for in accordance •v\dth the provisions of 
said paragraph ''in cash or in shares of stock or bonds of the Canal 
Companj^ at par, as the Canal Company shall determine?" 

2. If such construction, under the terms of said contract, would be 
additional work as defined in said paragraph 5, has the Joint Board 
authority, under the provisions of the acts of the General Court rela- 
tive to said Canal Companj^, notwithstanding the provisions of said 
contract, to approve and certif}^ the issue b}' said Canal Company of 
capital stock to the par value of $5,990,000 and first mortgage bonds 
to the par value of $6,000,000 (or substantially the entire amount of 
stock and bonds which said company is authorized by its charter to 
issue), for work which does not include such construction? 

3. If such construction, under the terms of said contract, would be 
a part of the work for which said Canal Company' has contracted to 



94 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

pay $11,990,000 in stock and bonds to said Construction Company, 
can the Joint Board legally withhold its approval and certification of 
an issue or issues of stock and bonds by said Canal Company to an 
amount which, in the opinion of the Joint Board, will be necessary tor 
the purpose of paying for such construction and which, with previous 
issues of stock and bonds already approved and certified by the Joint 
Board, shall not exceed the contract price of $11,990,000? 

1. The answer to your first question is plain. The provi- 
sion of the specifications already quoted submits to the Joint 
Board the determination of the necessity of the construction 
of locks or tidal gates after a year's trial of the canal without 
such devices. If the Board requires, the contractor shall then 
construct them, "and the same shall be considered as addi- 
tional work and be subject to the provisions of the fifth para- 
graph of the contract as regards payment therefor." This 
is a plain and definite statement that the construction of such 
locks or gates is not a part of the work covered by the con- 
tract for which the Canal Companj^ has contracted to pay 
$11,990,000. The same statement in negative form is made 
by the last sentence of paragraph 13 of the contract, which, if 
properly punctuated in accordance with its obvious intent, 
would read as follow\s: — 

And it is expressly agreed that the price to be paid the Contractor 
as herein prescribed includes full compensation for every such detail 
matter and thing, except as herein otherwise provided in respect of 
payments for additional work and materials including any lock, tidal 
gate or other device that may be called for as provided in the specifi- 
cations. 

Accordingly, in answer to your first question I reply that in 
my opinion such construction of locks, tidal gates or other 
devices for controlling the current in the canal would not 
be a part of the work for which the Canal Company has con- 
tracted to pay $11,990,000 in stock and bonds, but would be 
additional work as defined by paragraph 5 of the contract, to 
be paid for as therein provided. 

2. Your second question involves the further question of 
the legality of the approval of this contract by the Joint 
Board. If that approval was valid it is now not only the right 
but the duty of the Joint Board, on being satisfied that the 
labor and materials covered by the specifications, excluding 
locks and tidal gates, have been performed and furnished, to 
issue its certificate to that effect, and thus to permit the re- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 95 

maining stock and bonds specified in the contract to be 
issued in accordance with its terms. Its only duty is to 
certify that the work covered by the requisitions before it has 
been done. It has no power to modify in any respect the 
terms of the contract which it approved. 

In my opinion the approval of this contract by the Joint 
Board was a valid exercise of th« authority granted to it by 
section 1 of chapter 476 of the Acts of 1900. By section 4 
of chapter 448 of the Acts of 1899 the Canal Company was 
required to file with the Harbor and Land Commissioners 
plans for the proposed location and construction of the canal. 
These plans, when approved by that Board, "shall be deemed 
to be the plans of the location and construction of said canal, 
and said company shall be authorized to construct its canal 
in accordance therewith." The only authority granted to the 
Joint Board concerning the construction of the canal is to be 
found in section 6. That authority concerns only the deter- 
mination as to the points at which the Old Colony Railroad 
shall cross the canal, and such matters of construction of the 
canal as are incidental to that matter. The Harbor and 
Land Commissioners appear to have considered the question 
of tidal locks, but they finally approved plans which con- 
tained no provision therefor. Upon this approval, in the 
language of the statute, the Canal Company was "authorized 
to construct its canal in accordance therewith," namely, with- 
out tidal locks or gates. It follows that if the Canal Company 
had first obtained the approval of the Joint Board of the issue 
of its stock and bonds for cash, and then had entered into a 
contract for the construction of the canal for a price to be 
paid in cash, the question which you now ask could not have 
arisen. The Joint Board would then have had nothing to do 
with the performance of the contract by the Construction 
Company. 

Section 1 of chapter 476 of the Acts of 1900, however, gave 
the Canal Company the privilege of contracting to pay for 
the construction of the canal by issuing its stock and bonds to 
the contractor, provided the advertisement for bids, the con- 
tractor and the contract itself were approved by the Joint 
Board. These provisions gave the Board no control whatever 
over the plans for constructing the canal. That was to be 
done, as this section expressly recites, "in accordance with the 
plans as approved by the Board of Harbor and Land Com- 
missioners, as provided in this act." The approval of the con- 



96 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

tract by the Joint Board was required because of the right 
of supervision given to it over the issue of stock and bonds 
by this corporation. For that reason it was required to ap- 
prove such matters as the method of obtaining bids, the 
selection of the contractor, the form of the contract and par- 
ticularly the price to be paid. Being satisfied upon these 
matters the Board properly approved the contract. It would 
have had no authority to require that the contract cover the 
installation of tidal gates in addition to the work required by 
the plans approved by the Harbor and Land Commissioners. 
On matters of general construction it was bound by the action 
of that Board in approving the plans filed with it. 

It is true that by the paragraph in the specifications hereto- 
fore quoted the parties have chosen to contract for the erec- 
tion of tidal gates or other similar devices if the Joint Board 
shall deem them necessary. Doubtless by approving the 
contract the Joint Board has accepted this duty. At any 
rate, it is proper for it to undertake its performance, in the 
public interest. If it shall determine that such locks, gates or 
devices shall be erected, it will become the duty of the Con- 
struction Company to erect them to the satisfaction of the 
Board. For this work it will be entitled to receive from the 
Canal Company actual cost plus a 10 per cent, profit *'in 
cash or shares of stock or bonds of the Canal Company at par, 
as the Canal Company shall determine." (Contract, par. 5.) 
The burden will then be upon that company to raise the 
necessary cash or to obtain legislative authority to issue 
additional shares of stock or bonds. 

Accordingly, my answer to j'our second question is that the 
Joint Board has authority, under the provisions of the acts of 
the General Court relative to the Canal Company, notwith- 
standing the provisions of the contract, to approve and certify 
the issue by the Canal Company of capital stock to the par 
value of $5,990,000, and first mortgage bonds to the par value 
of $6,000,000 (being substantially the entire amount of stock 
and bonds which the company is now authorized to issue), for 
work which does not include the construction of locks, tidal 
gates or other similar devices. 

3. The answer given to the first and second questions sub- 
mitted b}^ you makes it unnecessary to discuss the third ques- 
tion. 

Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 97 



Corporations — Business Corporations — Operation of Trackless 

Trolleys. 

Locations to maintain poles in public ways to be used in connection with 
the operation of a trackless trolley Une cannot be granted by municipal 
authorities to a corporation formed under St. 1903, c. 437, commonly 
known as the business corporation act. 

July 22, 1915. 

Public Service Commission, 1 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — I beg to acknowledge your favor of July 2, 
1915, in which you ask my opinion as to the rights of munic- 
ipalities to grant locations for trackless trolleys, so called, 
their operation involving the use of poles and wires but no 
tracks or rails. 

I have conferred with the officers and counsel of the Mas- 
sachusetts Highway Service Company and find that the 
method of operating its vehicles is by powder from electric 
wires attached to poles in the highway. The type of trolley 
allows the vehicles to move fifteen feet on either side of the 
wire. It is thus apparent that the cars cannot be operated 
without the use of poles in the highw^ay sustaining the wires. 

The Massachusetts Highway Service Company is incor- 
porated under the provisions of St. 1903, c. 437, as amended 
by St. 1910, c. 385, an act known as the business corporation 
law. Paragraph (c) of section 1 of this act provides, in part, 
as follows: — 

This act shall not apply to any corporations which now have or may 
hereafter have the right to exercise franchises in pubHc ways granted 
by the commonwealth or any county, city or town. 

In my judgment the word "franchise," as used in this 
section, includes permits to maintain poles in public ways. 
Consequently, I am of the opinion that the selectmen of 
Sandwich are not authorized to grant locations for poles in its 
highway to the Massachusetts Highway Service Company. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Public Warehouses — Storage of Second-hand Goods and Fur- 
niture. 

R. L., c. 69, as amended by Gen. St. 1915, c. 98, applies to buildings or parts 
of buildings used for the storage of second-hand goods or furniture. 

July 27, 1915. 
Mr. George C. Neal, Deputy Chief, Acting Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your letter of July 22 
requesting my opinion whether the provisions of chapter 69 
of the Revised Laws, as amended by chapter 98 of the Gen- 
eral Acts of 1915, apply to buildings used for the storage of 
second-hand furniture or goods. 

Chapter 69 of the Revised Laws deals with the regulation 
and licensing of public warehouses. Section 18, added to 
that chapter by amendment by chapter 98 of the General 
Acts of 1915, declares: — 

The words "public warehouse," as used in this act, shall mean any 
building, or part of a building, kept and maintained for the storage of 
goods, wares and merchandise as a business; — ... 

In my opinion second-hand furniture or goods come within 
the class "goods, wares and merchandise." It is therefore my 
opinion that the statute in question applies to buildings or 
parts of buildings used for the storage of such goods as a busi- 
ness. 

Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Insane Persons — Temporary Treatment — Request by Police 
Officer — Probation Officer. 

A probation officer is not a police oflBcer within the meaning of St. 1911, 
c. 395, as amended by Gen. St. 1915, c. 174, providing for the receiv- 
ing of persons for temporary care and treatment in hospitals for the 
insane upon the request of certain officers or individuals. 

Aug. 2, 1915. 
State Board of Insanity, State House. 

Gentlemen: — I beg to acknowledge your request of July 
26 for my opinion as to whether probation officers are police 
officers within the meaning of chapter 395 of the Acts of 1911, 
as amended by chapter 174 of the General Acts of 1915. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 99 

That statute provides, in part, as follows: — 

The superintendent or manager of any hospital for the insane, pub- 
lic or private, may, when requested by a physician, by a member of 
the board of health or a pohce officer of a city or town, by an agent of 
the institutions registration department of the city of Boston, or by a 
member of the district pohce, receive and care for in such hospital as 
a patient, for a period not exceeding ten days, any person who needs 
immediate care and treatment because of mental derangement other 
than dehrium tremens or drunkenness. 

The provisions for the appointment of probation officers 
are to be found in chapter 217 of the Revised Laws. Section 
83 of that chapter provides, in part, as follows : — 

Said probation officers shall not be active members of the regular 
pohce force, but so far as necessar}'' in the performance of their official 
duties shall have aU the powers of pohce officers, and if appointed by 
the superior court may, by its direction, act in any part of the com- 
monwealth and shall report to the court. 

While by the section just quoted probation officers are 
given all the powers of police officers so far as may be neces- 
sary in the performance of their duties, yet, in my opinion, a 
probation officer cannot be fairly said to be a police officer of 
a city or town. The duties of probation officers are not re- 
stricted to particular municipalities. The territory within 
which they act is limited only by the jurisdiction of the court 
which appoints them. In my opinion they are not, therefore, 
police officers of a city or town within the meaning of the 
statute under consideration. It follows that that statute 
does not authorize the receiving and caring for patients at 
their request. I suggest, however, that it would be a very 
simple matter, in any case where a probation officer has in 
charge a person whom he desires to have received at a hos- 
pital for the insane under this statute, for him to arrange with 
a police officer of the particular city or town where the person 
in question is a resident, to make the formal request required 
by the statute. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



100 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Cities — Wards — Division into Precincts. — Time for Action. 

Under St. 1913, c. 217, a city may not, after the first Monday of July in 
any year, make a division of any ward into precincts which shall 
become effective dm-ing that calendar year, 

Aug. 5, 1915. 

Hon. Albert P. Langtry, Secretary of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your request of July 
29 for my opinion whether a division of Ward 2 of the city 
of Revere into two precincts, made by vote of the municipal 
council of Revere on July 26, 1915, should be recognized by 
you as legal. 

Section 217 of chapter 835 of the Acts of 1913, in provid- 
ing for the division of wards of a city into two or more voting 
precincts, makes the following enactment: — 

If a ward constituting one precinct contains less than one thousand 
voters, according to the registration of voters at the preceding annual 
city election, the aldermen may, and if it contains more than one 
thousand voters, shall, on or before the first Monday of July, divide 
it into two or more voting precincts. If a voting precinct shall, in 
any year, according to such registration, contain more than one thou- 
sand voters, the aldermen shall in hke manner either divide such pre- 
cinct into two or more voting precincts or shall make a new division 
of the ward into voting precincts; so that no precinct shall contain 
more than one thousand voters. 

Your request raises the question whether the requirement 
that this division be made "on or before the first Monday of 
July" is to be regarded as mandatory or merely directory. 
This question is to be answered in the light of the apparent 
purpose of this provision when read in connection with the 
remaining sections of this chapter relating to primaries, cau- 
cuses and elections. The primaries required by this statute 
are held in September. Before that time substantial prepara- 
tions must be made, such as preparing separate ballots and 
lists of voters for each of the more than 1,100 voting pre- 
cincts in the State. I understand that your work of pre- 
paring these ballots and the actual printing of the ballots 
must, as a practical matter, be begun soon after July 1. An 
opportunity must also be given for ample public notice to 
voters of the establishment of precincts, so that they may be 
informed of the place where they are to cast their ballots. 
For such reasons it seems plain that it is absolutely essential 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 101 

to the proper working of our present system of election laws 
that the division of wards into precincts, if made, should be- 
come effective a substantial length of time before the time 
for the holding of the primaries. 

The Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Fitzgerald v. 
Mayor of Boston, 220 Mass. 503, in passing upon chapter 630 
of the Acts of 1914, referred to its provision, that "the city 
council of the city of Boston shall, before the first day of 
January in the year nineteen hundred and fifteen, make a 
new division of the territory of the city of Boston," as con- 
taining "the positive command that the division must be com- 
pleted before Jan. 1, 1915." This language applies with equal 
force to the statute under consideration. 

Accordingly, reading this provision of section 217 in connec- 
tion with the system of which it is a part, it seems to me ap- 
parent that the Legislature intended to impose a mandatory 
requirement that, for any division of a ward into precincts to 
become effective in the year in which it is made, that divi- 
sion rriust be made before the first Monday of July. Any 
other interpretation would seriously interfere with the proper 
operation of our election laws. 

It follows that, in my opinion, the vote of the municipal 
council of the city of Revere, to divide Ward 2 into two 
precincts, passed on July 26 last, should not be recognized by 
you as effective during the present calendar year. I under- 
stand that this ward had substantially more than 1,000 reg- 
istered voters at the municipal election in December last. 
It was, therefore, the plain duty of the municipal council, 
under the statute which we are considering, to divide that 
ward into ^-t least two precincts before the first Monday 
of July last. As it failed to comply with the statute there 
rests upon it a duty to correct this error at the earliest op- 
portunity, so that the voters of this ward may suffer as little 
inconvenience as possible. I see no reason why, if the munic- 
ipal council of Revere so desires, the vote of July 26 may not 
be permitted to become effective at any time in the year 1916 
prior to the first Monday of July that the municipal council 
may determine. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



102 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Misuse of Flag — Pictures of Flag — Use on Covers of Papers 
ajid Magazines. 

R. L., c. 20, § 5, as amended by St. 1913, c. 464, and St. 1914, c. 570, for- 
bidding the use or possession of "any article or substance, being an 
article of merchandise or a receptacle of merchandise or articles upon 
which shall be attached through wTapping or otherwise, engraved or 
printed in any manner, a representation of the United States flag," 
merely forbids the engraving or printing of the flag, whether for ad- 
vertising or decorative purposes, upon wrappers or receptacles, or 
upon articles which are themselves complete articles of merchandise 
aside from the presence of the flag upon them; and articles of which 
the representation of the flag is an inherent part, and to which the 
representation of the flag is not a mere ornamental and unessential 
addition, do not come within the prohibition of the statute. 

A picture of the flag alone or a picture containing it as a bona fide part of 
the picture is not a violation of this statute when engraved or printed 
on a card or in or upon a book, paper or magazine, provided it is not 
used in any manner for advertising purposes. 

The use of a picture of the flag or one containing a representation of it 
upon the cover of a book, paper or magazine for artistic or ornamental 
purposes is not a violation of the statute, unless some part of the use 
or purpose of such cover is to attract attention to and advertise the 
pubhcation or its contents. 

Red and white stripes, with no field of blue or stars, do not constitute a 
representation of the flag when it is not obvious that it was intended 
to depict thereby a portion of the flag. 

Aug. 6, 1915. 

Mr. George C. Neal, Acting Chief, District Police. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your letter of July 16, 
1915, requesting my opinion whether certain pictures sub- 
mitted to me by you are in violation of R. L., c. 206, § 5, as 
amended by St. 1913, c. 464, and St. 1914, c. 570. That stat- 
ute is as follows: — 

Whoever pubHcly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats con- 
temptuously the flag of the United States or of Massachusetts, whether 
such flag is public or private property, or whoever displays such flag 
or any representation thereof upon which are words, figures, advertise- 
ments or designs, or who shaU in this commonwealth expose to public 
view, manufacture, sell, expose for sale, give away or have in posses- 
sion for sale or to give aw^ay or for use for any purpose, any article or 
substance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle of merchan- 
dise or articles upon which shall be attached through a wrapping or 
otherwise engraved or printed in any manner, a representation of the 
United States flag, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor 
more than one hundred dollars; but a flag which belongs to a grand 
army post, to a camp of the legion of Spanish war veterans or which 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 103 

is the property of or is used in the service of the United States or of 
this commonwealth may have the names of battles and the name and 
number of the organization to which such flag belongs inscribed thereon. 
Words, figures, advertisements or designs attached to, or directly or 
indirectly connected with, the flag or any representation thereof in 
such manner that the flag or its representation is used to attract atten- 
tion to or advertise such words, figures, advertisements or designs, shall 
for the purposes of this act be deemed to be upon the flag. 

The purpose of this statute, as declared in the title of the 
act of 1913, is "to prohibit the misuse of the national and 
the state flags." It should be interpreted in the light of this 
purpose with a view to increase respect for our flags and, if 
possible, not in such a manner as to restrict the proper use of 
the flags or to reduce the statute to an absurdity. It appar- 
ently seeks to prohibit three things, namely, first, insults to 
the flags; second, their use as a part of any form of advertis- 
ing; and third, the engraving or printing of a representation 
of the United States flag upon any article of merchandise or 
any wrapper or receptacle of articles. 

Acts coming within the first prohibition are readily rec- 
ognized. The extent of the prohibition of the use of the flags 
for advertising purposes is indicated with reasonable plain- 
ness by the last sentence of the statute, added by the amend- 
ment of 1914. The chief diflSculty comes in applying the 
third prohibition. It forbids the exhibition, manufacture, sale, 
exposure for sale, gift or possession for any purpose of "any 
article or substance, being an article of merchandise or a 
receptacle of merchandise or articles upon which shall be at- 
tached through a wrapping or otherwise, engraved or printed 
in any manner, a representation of the United States flag." 
The broad term "any article or substance" is somewhat 
limited by the words immediately following, "being an article 
of merchandise or a receptacle of merchandise or articles." 
In a broad sense, however, a card or a sheet of paper upon 
which a picture of a flag has been printed, or a piece of cloth 
upon which the colors constituting it have been stamped, is an 
article of merchandise. Obviously, it would seem that the 
Legislature never intended to use the language of this statute 
in any such broad sense. Such an interpretation would make 
it a criminal offence to possess or to display not only any 
picture of the flag whatever, but even the flag itself in many 
of its cheaper and more common forms. Such an interpre- 
tation would prohibit the use, not merely the misuse, of the 



104 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

flag, and would reduce the statute to a manifest absurdity. 
Thus interpreted the statute would probably be void as an 
unreasonable police regulation. 

In my opinion the clause under discussion must be read 
together with the preceding clause forbidding the use of the 
flag for advertising purposes, and is to be considered merely 
as an extension of that prohibition. It should be interpreted 
merely as forbidding the engraving or printing of the flag, 
whether for advertising or decorative purposes, upon wrappers 
or receptacles, or upon articles which are themselves complete 
articles of merchandise aside from the presence of a repre- 
sentation of the flag upon them. Thus an article of which the 
representation of the flag is an inherent part, which could not 
be the complete article intended without the representation 
of the flag, and to which the representation of the flag is not a 
mere ornamental and unessential addition, does not, in my 
opinion, come within the prohibition of the statute. Unless 
such an article violates some other portion of the statute its 
possession or use is not forbidden. 

It follows that a picture or printed representation of the 
flag alone, or a picture containing it as a bona fide part of 
the picture, as, for example, displayed upon a building, is not 
a violation of this statute when engraved or printed upon a 
card or in or upon a book, paper or magazine, provided such 
picture is not used or intended to attract attention to or 
advertise such book, paper, magazine or card or its contents, 
or any other thing or matter. Accordingly, I advise you that 
the picture postcards submitted by you to me, one bearing 
merely a representation of the flag entitled "Old Glory," and 
the others being pictures of actual buildings upon which one 
or more flags are displayed, as they do not appear to be used 
for any advertising purpose, are not in violation of law. 

The use of pictures containing representations of the flag 
upon the covers of books, papers or magazines will often pre- 
sent a question of some difficulty. Such pictures, so used, do 
not necessarily come within the third prohibition of the statute 
as interpreted by me. Thus they do not violate its terms 
unless they are used or intended for advertising as defined in 
the statute. If such a picture is used or m tended solely for 
artistic or ornamental purposes, and is in no way used or in- 
tended to attract attention to the book, paper or magazine 
or its contents as it is offered for sale, there is, in my opinion, 
no violation of the law. If, however, any part of the use or 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 105 

purpose of such a coyer is to attract attention to and ads^er- 
tise the publication or its contents, the second prohibition of 
the statute has been violated. Each case must stand by 
itself. 

With reference to the cover of the Boston Sunday Post 
Magazine of July 4, 1915, submitted to me, it is my opinion 
that it was not a violation of law. Though its date indi- 
cates that it was intended to give a patriotic flavor to the 
publication, there is, in fact, no representation of the United 
States flag printed upon it. Red and white stripes with no 
field of blue or stars cannot be said to be such a representation 
when it is not obvious that it is intended to depict a portion 
of the flag. The cap represented on this cover may have been 
made of any piece of goods colored as indicated. It is the 
flag itself, not the colors that compose it, that the statute is 
devised to protect. 

Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, AUorney-General. 



Boards of Health — Persons suffering with Dangerous Diseases 
— Notice to Commonwealth in Cases of Persons ivithout 
Settlements. 

Under St. 1902, c. 213, as amended by St. 1909, c. 380, if a person afflicted 
with tuberculosis goes to a State sanatorium for treatment after the 
notices required by these statutes have been given to the State De- 
partment of Health and the State Board of Charity, and then sub- 
sequently is discharged and returns to his place of domicile, the local 
board of health is not required to give further notice to the State De- 
partment of Health, unless the patient has been discharged as cm-ed 
or in such a condition that at the time of his discharge he is not a 
source of contagion or infection. 

After a physician has once reported a case of tuberculosis to the local 
board of health, in the event that the patient leaves the city or town 
temporarily, he is not obhged under the provisions of law, when the 
patient returns, to report the case again to the local board of health, 
nor is the latter obhged so to report it to the State Department of 
Health. 

Aug. 12, 1915. 

Allan J. McLaughlin, M.D., Commissioner of Health. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter in which you submit to me the following questions for 
my opinion : — 



106 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

1. Whether cases of tuberculosis recognized as "continuing cases," 
once reported to the local board of health and by the local board of 
health immediately to the State Board of Health, are required to be 
reported a second time in the event of their recei\nng treatment in a 
State sanatorium; in other words, whether the original notice to the 
local board of health and by the local board of health to the State 
Board of Health is sufficient for the compliance of the laws so far as 
the notification requirement to the State Board of Health is concerned. 

2. Whether a physician after once reporting a case of tuberculosis 
to the board of health of the town of which the patient is resident, 
in the event of the patient leaving the town for awhile, is obfiged 
under the provisions of law when the patient returns to the town, pro- 
vided the patient continues under the care of the same physician, to 
report the case again to the local board of health, and the said local 
board again obfiged to report the case to the State Board of Health. 

R. L., c. 75, § 57, which is referred to in your communi- 
cation, was repealed by St. 1902, c. 213, and St. 1902, c. 213, 
was amended by St. 1907, c. 386, and further amended by St. 
1909, c. 380, w^hich states the law as it at present exists. St. 
1909, c. 380, amends St. 1902, c. 213, § 1, so as to read as fol- 
lows : — 

Reasonable expenses incurred by the board of health of a city or 
town or by the commonwealth in making the provision required by 
law for persons infected with smaUpox or other disease dangerous to 
the pubfic health shaU be paid by such person or his parents if he or 
they be able to pay, otherwise by the city or town in which he has a 
legal settlement, upon the approval of the bill by the board of health 
of such city or town or by the state board of charity; and such settle- 
ments shall be determined by the overseers of the poor, and by the 
state board of charity in cases cared for by the commonwealth. If 
the person has no settlement, such expense shaU be paid by the com- 
monwealth, upon the approval of bills therefor by the state board of 
charity. In all cases of persons having settlements, a written notice 
sent within the time required in the case of aid given to paupers, shaU 
be sent by the board of health, or by the officer or board having the 
powers of a board of health in the citj" or town where the person is 
sick, to the board of health, or to the officer or board having the 
powers of a board of health in the city or towTi in which such person 
has a settlement, who shaU forth-with transmit a copy thereof to the 
overseers of the poor of the place of settlement. In case the person 
has no settlement, such notice shall be given to the state board of 
health, in accordance with the provisions of section fifty-two of chap- 
ter seventy-five of the Revised Laws, and also in any case fiable to be 
maintained by the commonwealth when public aid has been rendered 
to such sick person, a written notice shall be sent to the State board 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCmiENT — No. 12. 107 

of charity, containing such information as T\all show that the person 
named therein is a proper charge to the cbmmonwealth, and reim- 
bursement shall be made for the reasonable expenses incurred within 
five daj'S next before such notice is mailed, and thereafter until such 
sick person is removed under the provisions of chapter three hundred 
and ninet3^-five of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and four, or 
is able to be so removed without endangering his or the public health. 

I assume that tuberculosis is a disease dangerous to the 
public health within the meaning of R. L., c. 75, § 52, and 
St. 1909, c. 380. Said chapter 380 makes it clear that the 
Commonwealth is to reimburse the cities and towns until the 
sick person is removed, under the provisions of St. 1904, or 
"is able to be so removed without endangering his or the 
public health." 

St. 1904, c. 395, was amended by St. 1909, c. 391, so as to 
read as follows: — 

The state board of charity may, if found expedient, remove any 
person who is infected with a disease dangerous to the pubhc health, 
and w^ho is maintained or liable to be maintained by the commonwealth, 
to any hospital provided for state paupers, or may provide such place 
of reception for such person as is judged best for his accommodation 
and the safety of the pubhc, which place shall be subject to the regu- 
lations of the board, and shall have the same authority to remove 
such persons thereto as is conferred upon boards of health by the pro- 
visions of section tliirty-six of chapter seventy-five of the Revised 
Laws, as amended by chapter three hundred and sixty-five of the 
acts of the year nineteen hundred and six. 

St. 1909, c. 380, is very clear with the exception of the pro- 
vision, "or is able to be so removed without endangering 
his or the public health." Obviously, it was not the intent of 
the Legislature by this provision that the State Board of 
Charity should elect whether to remove the patient, under 
the provisions of St. 1909, c. 391, and thereby determine the 
liability of the Commonwealth. It cannot be that because 
the State Board of Charity finds a patient in a condition 
that prohibits his removal, and later neglects to remove the 
patient when his condition permits, the liability of the Com- 
monwealth to reimburse the city or town terminates with its 
neglect. It is my view that the provision, " or is able to be so 
removed without endangering his or the public health," 
refers to the condition of the sick person at the time when 
the danger of infection or contagion is at an end. The result 



108 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

is, in my opinion, that after the proper notices have been 
sent to the State Department of Health and State Board of 
Charity, the Commonwealth is liable to reimburse the city 
or town for the reasonable expenses incurred by the board of 
health of the city or town in making the provision required 
by law for persons infected with diseases dangerous to the 
public health, until the sick person is removed under the 
provisions of said St. 1909, c. 391, or the danger of infection 
or contagion is at an end. 

Where a person afflicted with the disease of tuberculosis 
goes to a State sanatorium for treatment, after the proper 
notices have been given to the State Department of Health 
and the State Board of Charity, and then subsequently is 
discharged from the State sanatorium and returns to his 
place of domicile, I am of the opinion that the local board 
of health is not required to give further notice to the State 
Department of Health, unless the patient has been discharged 
as cured or in such a condition that at the time of his dis- 
charge he was not a source of contagion or infection. Where 
a person leaves the place of his domicile temporarily for busi- 
ness, pleasure or health he does not lose his domicile in such 
place; and it would follow that ordinarily in cases of the 
kind that you refer to, the patient in the State sanatorium 
still retains his domicile in the city or town where he had his 
abode at the time he entered the State sanatorium, and there 
is no more necessity, in my judgment, of a notice to the 
State Department of Health upon his return from the State 
sanatorium than upon his return from a week's absence from 
the place of his abode on businesfe or pleasure. 

My reasons for the answer given to your first question apply 
to the second question, and, in my judgment, the question 
must be answered in the negative. There appears to be no 
reason why the physician must notify the local board of 
health in a case such as you describe, any more than there 
would be to require a physician to notify the local board of 
health of finding a case of tuberculosis on each visit to his 
patient. 

I am aware that the Hon. Dana Malone, a predecessor in 
this office, on Jan. 8, 1910, rendered an opinion to the super- 
intendent of the State Adult Poor that, where a patient in- 
fected with tuberculosis absconded from the State Infirmary 
and returned to the place from which he had been sent to 
the State Infirmary, the Commonwealth was not responsible 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 109 

unless a new notice was sent to the State Board of Charity. 
The facts in th-at case were substantially different from the 
facts stated in your request for an opinion, and I do not in- 
tend by this opinion to intimate in any way that my view 
of the law upon the facts upon which Mr. Malone rendered 
his opinion would be other than he there expressed. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Public Service Commission — Commonwealth Pier — Intra- 
state Shipments — Alleged Discrimination in Rates hy 
Railroad. 

The shipment of imported merchandise to the Commonwealth Pier, con- 
signed by the carrying steamer to Boston business houses and shipped 
bj^ them in whole or in part from the pier to points within the State, 
does not constitute an intrastate shipment unless the Commonwealth 
Pier was intended to be the ultimate destination, and a reshipment 
of the goods from the pier to an intrastate point was determined upon 
only after the arrival of the goods in port. 

The Attorney-General dechnes to advise the Public Service Commission 
upon an assumption inconsistent with the contention being made by 
him before the Supreme Judicial Court and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 

Aug. .30, 1915. 

Public Service Commission, 1 Bea,con Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — I beg leave to acknowledge receipt of your 
communication requesting my opinion upon certain questions 
in relation to an order made by your commission on March 
29, 1915, to the Boston & Maine Railroad, and the action of 
the Boston & Maine Railroad in response to said order. Said 
order, as appears by your letter, is as follows: — 

Ordered, That the respondent, the Boston & Maine Railroad, be 
directed co file wdth this commission within thirty days from the date 
hereof, tariffs to become effective thirty days after fihng, unless other- 
wise ordered by the commission, which will discontinue the unjust dis- 
crimination which the commission in these proceedings has found to 
exist, in so far as such discrimination arises from the rates charged by 
the Boston & Maine Railroad on intrastate movements of freight to 
and from the premises of the petitioner from and to points on the Bos- 
ton & Maine Railroad in Massachusetts, as compared with the rates 
on hke traffic between the Commonwealth Pier in South Boston and 
the same points. 



no ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

As stated in your letter, the Boston & Maine Railroad, in 
response to said order, under date of May 14, 1915, effective 
May 17, 1915, issued a new tariff, designated Supplement A, 
to the Massachusetts Public Service Commission No. 1063, 
which provided that "rates made in this tariff will not apply 
on intrastate traffic to or from points in Massachusetts." 

Under date of May 19, 1915, effective June 20, 1915, the 
Boston & Maine Railroad also issued Supplement I. to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission No. 426, Massachusetts 
Public Service Commission No. 1063. This latter supplement 
provided in effect that both interstate and intrastate move- 
ments of traffic to or from the Commonwealth Pier should 
thereafter be subject to the customary switching charges. 
Thereafter, as will appear later in this letter, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of this Commonwealth issued a temporary in- 
junction restraining the Boston & Maine Railroad from 
putting these tariffs into effect. 

Your questions are as follows: — 

1. If imported merchandise shipped to the Commonwealth Pier is 
consigned by the carrying steamer to Boston business houses, and 
shipped by them, in whole or in part, from the Commonwealth Pier 
to Boston & Maine points in Massachusetts, does this transaction in- 
volve "an intrastate movement of freight" within the meaning-of the 
commission's order of March 29, 1915? 

2. Has the Boston & Maine Railroad, by filing the tariff supple- 
ments hereinbefore referred to, adequately compfied with the said 
order of the commission? 

3. If the answer to question No. 2 is "No," has the commission the 
authority to order the Boston & Maine Railroad to file a new tariff 
providing, in effect, for the absorption of switching charges on intra- 
state movements of import and export traffic to and from the docks 
of the National Dock and Storage Warehouse Company, (a) if the rates 
proAdded for in such new tariff, eUminating the question of discrimina- 
tion, are othermse reasonable, and (6) if such ra es, eliminating the 
question of discrimination, are otherwise unreasonable? 

The answer to your first question is dependent upon the 
facts of each particular shipment. 

When freight actually starts in the course of transportation from 
one State to another it becomes a part of interstate conmaerce. The 
essential nature of the movement and not the form of the bill of lading 
determines the character of the commerce involved. And generally 
when this interstate character has been acquired it continues at least 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCraiENT — No. 12. Ill 

until the load reaches the point where the parties originally intended 
that the movement should finally end. Ilh Cent. R. R. Co. v. La. R. R. 
Coin., 236 U. S. 157, at 163. 

And again, in Texas & N. 0. R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 
227 U. S. Ill, at 126, the Supreme Court of the United States 
said: — 

The determining circumstance is that the shipment of the lumber 
to Sabine was but a step in its transportation to its real and ultimate 
destination in foreign countries. In other words, the essential char- 
acter of the commerce, not its mere accidents, should determine. It 
was to supply the demand of foreign countries that the lumber was 
purchased, manufactured and shipped, and to give it a various char- 
acter by the steps in its transportation would be extremely artificial. 
Once admit the principle, and means ■\\'ill be afforded of evading the 
national control of foreign commerce from points in the interior of a 
State. There must be transshipment at the seaboard, and if that may 
be made the point of ultimate destination by the device of separate, 
bills of lading, the conmaerce •will be given local character though it 
be essentially foreign. 

It is thus clear that neither the form of the bill of lading 
nor incidental delays are determinative of this question, but 
that it depends upon the real and essential nature of the 
movement. See also So. Pac. Term. Co. v. Interstate Com- 
merce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, and Ohio Ry. Commission 
V. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101. 

The nature of the movement involved in this particular case 
depends upon whether the shipment from the Commonwealth 
Pier to intrastate points is fairly separable from the ship- 
ment of the goods from abroad to the pier, having in mind 
the substance and not the formalities of the transaction. 

In my opinion, if, before the arrival in port of goods shipped 
from abroad to the Commonwealth Pier, the intention or 
understanding of the parties is that their ultimate destination 
is to be another Intrastate point, a shipment in pursuance of 
such intention is to be considered as a part or a continuation 
of a foreign shipment, and does not constitute an intrastate 
movement. 

On the other hand, if the Commonwealth Pier was in- 
tended to be the ultimate destination, and a reshipment of 
the goods from the pier to an intrastate point was deter- 
mined upon only after the arrival of the goods in port, I am 
of the opinion that the shipment from the pier to such intra- 



112 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

state point is intrastate in its character within the meaning of 
your order of March 29, 1915, and it is immaterial that the 
goods came originally from outside the Commonwealth. 

But, from the nature of things. Commonwealth Pier itself 
cannot, in the vast majority of instances, be intended as the 
ultimate destination. The buyer does not, ordinarily, come 
into possession or control of the goods until they reach some 
other point. And as it appears that there are no storage 
facilities, properly so-called at the pier, and that goods re- 
ceived from abroad can remain there only a short time, it 
would seem that, generally speaking, some other destination 
must have been in the contemplation of the parties before the 
arrival of the goods in port. 

Applying the above principles to this particular case, the 
practical result is that, as a general rule, at least, such ship- 
ments from the pier to intrastate points retain their foreign 
character and are, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of 
your commission, although there may be isolated cases, as 
above indicated, where it would be otherwise. 

An answer to your second and third questions involves some 
embarrassment. 

The Commonwealth has brought a bill in equity in the 
Supreme Judicial Court, seeking to compel the Boston & 
Maine Railroad and the New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company to comply with the terms of a certain 
contract dated July 1, 1912, in which suit the Commonwealth 
contends that the railroads agreed that the flat Boston rates 
of the Boston & Maine Railroad should apply to goods shipped 
to and from Commonwealth Pier. 

One of the contentions of the Commonwealth in this suit is 
that no unlawful discrimination was created by this contract, 
and on application by the Commonwealth a preliminary in- 
junction has been issued enjoining the Boston & Maine Rail- 
road from putting into effect tariffs which, if they had been 
permitted to become effective, would have removed any pos- 
sible claim of discrimination. 

Furthermore, at the request of the Directors of the Port of 
Boston and of His Excellency the Governor, the Commonwealth, 
through the Attorney-General, has intervened in a petition 
brought by the National Dock and Storage Warehouse Company 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, praying for the 
discontinuance of an alleged discrimination which they contend 
is imposed upon them by reason of the absorption by the Boston 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCimiENT — No. 12. 113 

& Maine Railroad of switching charges between the Common- 
wealth Pier and the Boston & Maine Railroad in Boston. 

The position of the Commonwealth in these proceedings is 
that no unlawful discrimination was created by said contract 
and the acts of the railroad in pursuance thereof. 

Since an answer to your remaining questions would involve 
an assumption that an unlawful discrimination in fact does 
exist, I do not deem it appropriate for me to advise you 
thereon at the very moment when, in the interest of the 
Commonwealth, I am contending before the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission that that assumption is contrary to fact, 
and especially at a time when it might be claimed that the in- 
junction issued by the Supreme Judicial Court was in part 
based upon a determination contrary to such assumption. 

I am strengthened in this view for the reason that but few 
shipments would be in any event involved in any further 
order made by your commission. As indicated in my answer 
to the first question, substantially all the shipments to the 
National Dock and Storage Warehouse Company Pier must 
necessarily be destined for water transportation and conse- 
quently interstate or foreign movements, and relatively few 
from said pier would be intrastate. See So. Pac. Term. Co. v. 
Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, and 0. Ry. 
Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Taxation — Public Purpose — Construc- 
tion of Dry Dock. 

The construction and operation of a drj^ dock in Boston Harbor by the 
Commonwealth in accordance with St. 1911, c. 748, and Spec. Acts, 
1915, c. 335, is a public purpose for which money may be raised by 
taxation, and is not in violation of Ai-ticie X. of the Declaration of 
Rights. 

Sept. Id, 1915. 
His Excellency the Governor and the Honorable Council. 

Gentlemen: — Under date of Aug. 20, 1915, you have 
asked my opinion upon the following question: — 

Whether or not there is any constitutional objection to the con- 
struction and operation by the State of a dry dock for repairing and 
overhauling vessels ouTied by persons and corporations other than the 
State, who shall paj'' the State compensation therefor. 



114 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

I understand that the "operation" of the dry dock con- 
templated by your question consists of the cradling of the 
vessels preparatory to the work of repairing and overhauling 
by the owners or persons to be employed by them. 

A consideration of your question must be based upon the 
fact that by virtue of the provisions of chapter 335 of the 
Special Acts of 1915, and chapter 748 of the Acts of 1911, 
the Legislature has authorized the construction of a dry dock 
and the expenditure of the public moneys therefor. Further- 
more, it must be based upon the definite proposition now 
before you for approval, namely, the construction of a dry 
dock "equipped with modern facilities and appliances suffi- 
cient in size for the accommodation of any modern steam- 
ship." I do not understand that up to the present time 
private enterprise has constructed and equipped, nor that 
there is any reasonable expectation that it will construct and 
equip, in Boston Harbor, a dock possessing the magnitude 
and affording the facilities which the Legislature believes 
necessary to the development of the resources of the Com- 
monwealth and the preservation of her industrial and com- 
mercial prosperity. The proposition, therefore, is this: Do 
the acts of the Legislature, above referred to, authorizing the 
expenditure of the State's moneys raised by taxation for the 
construction and operation of such a dry dock in Boston 
Harbor, constitute a violation of Article X. of the Declara- 
tion of Rights, providing that "no part of the property of any 
individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied 
to public uses, without his own consent or that of the repre- 
sentative body of the people?" This provision has been held 
to mean that the property of the individual can be taken only 
for a public purpose. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417. "This 
is equally true whether the property is a dwelling house taken 
by right of eminent domain, or money demanded by the tax 
collector." Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 606. 

The legislative adjudication of the wisdom of constructing 
a dry dock carries with it a presumption in favor of its con- 
stitutionality, which can be overthrown only upon the clear- 
est proof. "Courts are bound to presume the existence of 
those circumstances which will support it and give it valid- 
ity." Wellington, Petr., 16 Pick. 96; Opinion of the Justices, 
8 Gray, 21; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417. "The purposes 
of the act as declared therein, its general structure, the 
nature of its provisions, its probable operation and effect are 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 115 

all to be considered In determining whether it is a lawful 
exercise of legislative power." 

To apply these principles of interpretation to the question 
before us, what are the declared purposes of the legislative 
act? They are expressed in the title to chapter 748 of the 
Acts of 1911, "An Act relative to the development of the port 
of Boston." They are expressed in section 2, providing that 
"the Directors of the Port of Boston shall be the administra- 
tive officers of the port, shall cause to be made all necessary 
plans for the comprehensive development of the harbor," etc. 
They are expressed in section 12, which makes it one of the 
duties of the Directors forthwith "to make, and, so far as 
may be practicable, to put into execution, comprehensive 
plans providing on the lands now owned or hereafter acquired 
by the Commonwealth in the area described in section four 
of this act, adequate piers, capable of accommodating the 
largest vessels, and in connection with such piers suitable 
highways, waterways, railroad connections and storage yards, 
and sites .for warehouses and industrial establishments," and 
requires a report of "all necessary plans and estimates of 
cost for the construction of a dry dock equipped with modern 
facilities and appliances, sufficient in size for the accommo- 
dation of any modern ocean steamship." They are expressed 
in section 5 which, by the act first referred to, includes a dry 
dock providing for "the constructing, or securing the con- 
structing or utilizing of, piers and, in connection therewith, 
highways, waterways, railroad connections, storage yards 
and sites for warehouses and industrial establishments," etc. 
In short, the purposes of the legislative acts include the com- 
prehensive development and improvement of the principal 
harbor of the Commonwealth as a gateway through which 
the products of Massachusetts industry, and the articles of her 
commerce, may come and go to the greatest advantage of 
her citizens. They include the improvement of that system of 
transportation, both by water and land, for those products and 
those articles upon which the prosperity of our citizens depends. 

The improvement of Boston Harbor is no new field for the 
legitimate expenditure of public money. In the case of Moore 
V. Sanford, reported in 151 Mass. 285, in passing upon the 
constitutionality of an act providing for the condemnation of 
flats in Boston Harbor, and the filling, improving and ulti- 
mate sale of them, — a purpose which inevitably to some extent 
entered the field of private enterprise, — the Supreme Court 



116 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

said the act "was for the avowed purpose of improving the 
harbor of Boston and also of providing better and more 
accommodations for the railroad and commercial interests of 
the city by the solid land which would take the place of the 
flats over which the tide ebbed and flowed;" and further, 
"that the improvement of Boston Harbor is an object of a 
public nature, and thus that lands taken for this purpose are 
taken for a public use can hardly be controverted." 

In commenting upon this case in Opinion of the Justices, 
204 Mass. 207, the same court refers to it as a case which 
"rests upon the ground that the work done was in a true 
sense for the promotion of commerce, through its direct and 
close relatio.n to the improvement of Boston Harbor in mak- 
ing connections between the great highways used for inter- 
state commerce and the numerous ships that are passing 
back and forth between Boston and foreign ports. All that 
was done was held to be fairly incidental to the main pur- 
pose of promoting commerce between the United States and 
distant countries. The improvement of harbors and the con- 
struction of public docks, wharves, and possibly of ware- 
houses, to be used under governmental authority as a part of 
the facilities for the transportation of merchandise in com- 
mercial enterprises, and the building of railroads to be used 
for the same object, may all affect the public so directly as to 
constitute a public purpose for which money raised by taxa- 
tion may be expended." 

In my judgment the development and improvement of the 
port of Boston is a purpose for which the Legislature may 
constitutionally authorize the use of the public moneys. The 
advisability or wisdom of appropriating them to such a use 
are matters entirely within the discretion of that body. It 
is within the power of the Legislature to determine further 
that a dry dock may be an essential part of the improvement 
of the harbor, and even necessary to its full development. 
But whether the benefits hoped for justify the expenditure 
of any of the moneys so appropriated for the particular dry 
dock now in question before the Governor and Council, as an 
essential part of such development and improvement, is a 
question the responsibility for answering which the Legisla- 
ture has placed upon the Directors of the Port and your- 
selves. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 117 



Directors of the Port of Boston — Powers — License to build 
Structure in Tide Waters — City of Boston. 

The Directors of the Port of Boston have authority, with the approval of 
the Governor and Council, under R. L., c. 96, as amended by St. 
1911, c. 748, § 4, to Ucense the building by the city of Boston of a 
structure within the boundary of the property granted to it by Spec. 
Acts, 1915, c. 326. 

Sept. 17, 1915. 

Directors of the Port of Boston, 40 Central Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — Under date of Sept. 3, 1915, you have 
called my attention to chapter 326 of the Special Acts of 1915, 
whereby the harbor line in Boston Harbor at Fort Point 
Channel is changed by advancing it approximately 50 feet 
southeasterly from Dorchester Avenue for a distance of 1,500 
feet, and the city of Boston is authorized to build a sea wall 
on the new line "and to fill solid, without payment of com- 
pensation for land of the commonwealth or for the displace- 
ment of tide water, the area enclosed by said sea wall for the 
purpose of constructing a high pressure fire pumping station;" 
and the city is further authorized "to hold, lease, sell or 
use ... so much of said area as is not appropriated" to this 
purpose; and to the further fact that the city of Boston has 
applied to your Board for a permit to build a structure 60 by 
200 feet at the corner of Dorchester Avenue and Summer 
Street. This application, therefore, requests a permit to 
build 10 feet outside of the harbor line as established by said act. 

You have since informed me, however, that the city of 
Boston has withdrawn its request as to this 10 feet, and is 
now applying for a license only as to territory within the new 
harbor hue. 

On this state of facts you have requested my opinion as to 
whether your Board has authority to grant a permit for a 
location within the boundary of the property granted by the 
Legislature to the city of Boston. 

St. 1911, c. 748, § 4, confers upon your Board all the rights, 
powers and duties pertaining to the Board of Harbor and 
Land Commissioners, in general, with respect to the port of 
Boston. Under section 2 of said act your Board is given 
immediate charge of the lands now or hereafter owned by the 
Commonwealth upon or adjacent to the harbor front, with 
certain exceptions, "and of the construction of piers and 
other public works therein." 



118 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The powers of the Harbor and Land Commissioners perti- 
nent to the question raised by you are set forth in R. L., c. 
96, §§ 14, 16 and 17. Section 14 provides, in part, that if 
harbor lines are established by the General Court *'no wharf, 
pier or other structure shall thereafter be extended into said 
harbor beyond such lines." Section 17 provides: — 

Said board may license and prescribe the terms for the construction 
or extension of a wharf, pier, dam, sea wall, road, bridge or other 
structure, or for the filhng of land or flats, or the driving of piles in 
tide water below high water mark, but not, except as to a structure 
authorized by law, beyond any established harbor line, nor unless 
wdth the approval of the governor and council, beyond the Hne of 
riparian ownership. 

Accordingly, it would seem to be clear that your Board has 
authority to grant a petition to build any structure within 
the established harbor lines. 

Your doubt apparently arises from the fact that section 2 
of chapter 326 of the Special Acts of 1915 directly authorizes 
the city to build a sea wall and fill solid the area for the 
purpose stated. 

While it is undoubtedly open to the city to proceed under 
this statute, with the approval of your Board under R. L., 
c. 96, § 16, if the city of Boston wishes to go further, and, 
disregarding the authority granted to it by the special act of 
1915, seeks a license from your Board under R. L., c. 96, § 17, 
such course would seem to be open, subject to the limitation 
against any structure "beyond any established harbor line." 
I cannot believe that in enacting the aforesaid special act of 
1915 there was any intention on the part of the Legislature 
of abrogating or limiting the powers conferred by R. L., c. 96, 
§ 17. A special act such as this would not by implication 
repeal a general law unless there was an absolute inconsist- 
ency. There seems to be nothing inconsistent in your Board 
granting a license to do something which the Legislature has 
approved, nor in the city of Boston taking the position that it 
does not choose to accept the special grant of the Legislature, 
but to proceed under the general laws. 

If the city elects to follow this course there may be con- 
siderable doubt as to whether it is not thereby debarred from 
accepting the privileges conferred by the 1915 act; but upon 
that point no opinion at present seems required. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 119 

In dealing with such a petition, however, your Board is not 
acting under the special act of 1915, since no powers are con- 
ferred upon you thereby; but under the provisions of R. L., 
c. 96, section 23 of that chapter provides: — 

The amount of tide water which is displaced by any structure below 
high water mark, or by any filhng of flats, shall be ascertained by the 
board, which shall require the persons who cause such displacement 
to make compensation therefor by excavating, under its direction, be- 
tween high and low water mark in some part of the same harbor a 
basin for a quantity of water equal to that displaced; or by pajdng in 
Ueu of such excavation an amount assessed by said board, not exceed- 
ing thirty-seven and one-haK cents per cubic yard of water displaced; 
or by improving the harbor in any other manner satisfactory to the 
board; and the money shall be paid into the treasury of the common- 
wealth, and be reserved as a compensation fund for such harbor. The 
income thereof may be used under the direction of the board for the 
improvement of the harbor. An assessment for tide water wliich has 
been displaced may be recovered in an action of contract in the name 
of the treasurer and receiver-general. 

As I understand that the city does not have title to the 
territory in question, such license can only be granted with 
the approval of the Governor and Council. 

It will also be necessary for the city to comply with the re- 
quirements of section 24, providing that in addition to such 
compensation for displacement of tide water as may be fixed 
by your Board, compensation for rights granted in land the 
title to which is in the Commonwealth shall be paid in such 
sum as may be determined by the Governor and Council. 

Answering specifically the question put, I am of the opinion 
that the Directors of the Port of Boston have authority to 
license the building of a structure, as described, within the 
boundaries of the property referred to in chapter 326 of the 
Special Acts of 1915. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General, 



120 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Prison Commission — Male Laborers — Wages. 

St. 1914, c. 458, providing that ''the wages paid by the board of prison 
commissioners to male laborers directly employed by it shall not be 
less than two dollars and a haK a day," apphes to all male laborers 
employed at the Reformatory for Women. 

Sept. 20, 1915. 

J. Warren Bailey, Esq., Secretary, Prison Commisdoners. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your letter of Septem- 
ber 11 requesting my opinion in behalf of the Prison Com- 
missioners as to whether chapter 458 of the Acts of 1914 ap- 
plies to male employees employed at the Reformatory for 
Women. 

Section 1 of this statute is as follows: — 

The wages paid by the board of prison commissioners to male la- 
borers directly employed by it shall be not less than two dollars and 
a half a day. 

You call my attention to the fact that under section 30 of 
chapter 223 of the Revised Laws the superintendent of this 
institution alone is appointed by the Prison Commissioners. 
All other officers and employees are appointed by the super- 
intendent and hold their offices during her pleasure. This is 
the same rule w^hich is in force in all the other institutions 
under the control of your Board. It is true, therefore, that, 
strictly, the laborers in question are not hired or appointed 
by your Board but by a public officer appointed by you and 
removable at your pleasure. Yet these laborers are in the 
service of the Commonw^ealth in an institution under the 
control of your Board. If they are not to be considered as 
employed by j^ou, Avithin the meaning of this statute, then the 
statute has no effect w^hatever, since in that case it would 
apply to no one. It must be interpreted in such a manner as 
to give to it a reasonable effect, and to carry out what was 
apparently the intention of the Legislature. In my opinion 
the w^ord "directly" was used to indicate persons directly in 
the service of the institutions under your control, as dis- 
tinguished from persons in the service of contractors per- 
forming work under contracts with your Board. On the 
whole, it is my opinion that this statute applies to the laborers 
in question. 

Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



1916.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 121 



Civil Service — Conviction of Crime against Laws of Com- 
monwealth — Violation of Traffic Regulations. 

A person convicted of allowing his automobile to remain standing on a 
pubKc highway in Boston for more than twenty minutes in violation 
of a traffic regulation established by the board of street commissioners 
of that city has not been convicted of a crime against the laws of the 
Commonwealth within the meaning of R. L., c, 19, § 17. 

Sept. 24, 1915. 

Civil Service Commission, Rooms 151-152, State House, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested the opinion of this 
department upon the question of whether or not the convic- 
tion of a person for allowing his automobile to remain stand- 
ing on Tremont Street, Boston, over twenty minutes is the 
conviction of a crime within the meaning of section 17 of 
chapter 19 of the Revised Laws and Civil Service Rule 8. 

R. L., c. 19, § 17, provides as follows: — 

No person shall be appointed to or employed in any office to which 
the provisions of this chapter apply within one year after his convic- 
tion of anj^ crime against the laws of this commonwealth. 

Civil Service Rule 8 is as follows: — 

No apphcation for appointment -will be accepted from . . . any 
person who within the year preceding his apphcation has been con- 
victed of any crime against the laws of this commonwealth; and the 
name of any such person may be removed from any eligible fist. 

The act of w^hich this applicant was found guilty was not in 
violation of any statute of this Commonwealth nor of any 
ordinance passed by the city council of the city of Boston, 
but was in violation of section 11 of Article V. of the street 
traffic regulations promulgated by the board of street com- 
missioners of the city of Boston. Such a rule can stand in no 
more favorable position than an ordinance itself. 

The question as to how far and to what extent proceedings 
for violations of the ordinances of municipal corporations are 
to be regarded as prosecutions for crime presents a question 
of considerable nicety. In many States they are held to be 
civil or penal actions, — State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123; 
Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 99; and People v. Jackson, 8 
Mich. 110, — although in this Commonwealth they are 



122 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

treated for some purposes as criminal in their nature. In re 
Goddard, 16 Pick. 504; Com. v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462, 474. 

The issue here, however, is not whether the violation of such 
an ordinance or by-law is essentially a public wrong, but is 
whether such violations were intended to be included in the 
disqualifying provisions above quoted. 

In many jurisdictions, although not in Massachusetts, the 
question has arisen as to whether under a statute such as our 
R. L., c. 175, § 21, which provides that the conviction of a 
witness of a crime may be shown to affect his credibility, the 
conviction of a person for a violation of a municipal ordinance 
may be shown, and the courts have uniformly held that it 
cannot. State v. Crawford, 58 Ore. 116; Coble v. State, 31 Oh. 
St. 100; Koch v. State, 126 Wis. 470, 478; People v. Manistee 
Co., 26 Mich. 422; Gillman v. State, 165 Ala. 135. 

The question here is further simplified because the term 
used is not "crime," but is "crime against the laics of the 
Commonwealth." The laws of the Commonwealth consist of 
its Constitution, statutes and common law. There is an 
obvious difference between such general laws and an ordi- 
nance or by-law of a municipal corporation. The latter is 
strictly local in its operation, and does not constitute a part 
of the law of the land. For example, although a court is 
bound to take judicial notice of the public laws of the State, 
it will not judicially notice a municipal ordinance or by-law. 
O'Brien v. City of Woburn, 184 Mass. 598; Attorney-General v. 
McCabe, 172 Mass. 417; Mahar v. Steuer, 170 Mass. 454. 

For the above reasons I am of the opinion that a violation 
of the regulations of the board of street commissioners does 
not come within the purview of the acts above quoted, and 
that the applicant in question is not thereby disqualified. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Registered Pharmacist — Ownership of Stock in Corporation — 
Payment by Promissory Note. 

The fact that a registered pharmacist holds a certificate of stock in a 
corporation formed to carry on a drug business, for which he has paid 
by giving to the corporation his personal note, does not necessarily 
make him an owner of such stock within the meaning of R. L., c. 100, 
§ 22, as amended by St. 1913, c. 410. The question of bona fide owner- 
ship must be determined on the facts of each case. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 123 

If stock held by a registered pharmacist in such a corporation is mort- 
gaged or pledged he is not an owner of it within the meaning of this 
statute. 

Oct. 5, 1915. 

Mr. Albert J. Brunelle, Secretary, Board of Registration in Pharmacy. 

Dear Sir: — You ask for an opinion as to whether a license 
may be granted to a registered pharmacist under R. L., c. 
100, § 22, as amended by St. 1913, c. 410, if said registered 
pharmacist submits a certificate of stock of the value of S500, 
and states under oath that he has paid for the same by his 
personal note to the company. , 

The material portion of the statute referred to is as fol- 
lows: — 

A registered pharmacist who owns stock of the actual value of at 
least five hundred dollars in a corporation which has been incorporated 
for the purpose of carrying on the drug business, and who conducts in 
person the business of a store of such corporation, shall be considered 
as actively engaged in business on his own account, and as qualified to 
receive a license for such store. 

In my judgment a Massachusetts corporation has no au- 
thority to issue stock in consideration of promissory notes 
made to it by the person to whom the stock is issued. Unless 
there is specific statutory authority to the contrary, the same 
holds true as to a foreign corporation. The burden is on any 
foreign corporation asserting such authority to satisfy your 
Board of the truth of the claim. 

The legislative intent is clear, that a recipient of a license 
under this act must be a bona fide owner of stock to the value 
of $500. 

If a registered pharmacist actually owns such stock by a 
purchase in good faith, and holds it in his own name, and 
neither mortgages nor pledges the same, he is the owner of 
the stock, and is qualified to receive a license under the 
statute. 

On the other hand, if the stock is mortgaged he is not the 
owner but merely has an equit}^ and the mortgagee is the 
holder of the legal title. If the stock is pledged the pledgee 
has a lien on the property. Thompson v. Dolliver, 132 Mass. 
103. In neither case can the mortgagor or pledgor be said 
to own the stock within the meaning of the statute. Even 
the colorable transfer of the stock upon the books of the cor- 
poration to the pledgor or mortgagor will not qualify him as a 



124 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

licensee under the law. See Baker's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 510, 
re Argus Printing Company, 1 N. D. 434, and cases cited. 
It is my opinion that it is the duty of your Board to require 
from each applicant for a license under the provisions of this 
statute satisfactory evidence that such applicant is in fact 
the true owner of stock in the corporation to the value of $500. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Minimum Wage Commission — Minimum Wage — Fiiies — 
Payments to cover Sick Benefits — Vacancies in Wage 
Boards. 

The payment by an employer of an amount less than the minimum wage 
prescribed by a decree of the Minimum Wage Commission constitutes 
a violation of that decree, and it may not be excused by showing that 
the prescribed sum has been reduced because of fines for misconduct 
or tardiness, or because of deductions on account of benefits to accrue 
to the employee in case of sickness. 

It is doubtful if the Minimum Wage Commission has the power to fill a 
vacancy in a wage board arising after that board has been fully estab- 
lished and organized. 

Oct. 5, 1915. 

Minimum Wage Commission, 1 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — "If any employer, who previous to com- 
plying with the decree of the Minimum Wage Commission 
recommending a minimum wage for women in his employ, 
deducts from the recommended minimum wage payable to 
a female employee, fines for misconduct or tardiness, or 
sums due on account of expected benefits to accrue in case 
of sickness, are such deductions violations of the decree?" 

Under St. 1912, c. 706, as amended by St. 1913, c. 330 and 
c. 673, and St. 1914, c. 368, your Board is officially entitled 
the "Minimum Wage Commission," and its purpose, as 
stated in the title of the act, is " to provide for the deter- 
mination of minimum wages for women and minors." 

The purpose delineated in the title is borne out by the 
enactments of the law. The wage boards established "shall 
endeavor to determine the minimum wage, whether by time 
rate or piece rate, suitable for a female employee of ordinary 
ability, . . . and also suitable minimum wages for learners," 
etc. ( section 5). The entire act shows an intention that the 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 125 

wages to be determined are the minimum wages for the 
occupation in question. It is only when the wages paid are 
inadequate "to supply the necessary cost of living and to 
maintain the worker in health" that the investigations of 
your Board become operative (sections 3, 4). 

If the wages decreed by your Board may be diminished by 
reason of fine or other excuse, the purpose of the act is de- 
feated to a considerable extent. 

It is to be noticed that the primary minimum wage is for 
a female employee of "ordinary ability." Such an employee 
is not of the highest skill, and may be expected naturally to 
make some mistakes, allowance for which must be presumed 
to have been made in determining the wage for that grade of 
ability. To reduce the wage fixed by deductions under what- 
ever name is reducing the compensation below the sum fixed 
as a minimum. 

The foregoing line of argument does not require that the 
employer pay the minimum wage fixed on the time basis for 
less time than the full period for which the rate is fixed. If 
an employee for whom a minimum wage has been determined 
on the basis of an eight-hour day should work but seven 
hours, she, of course, is entitled to pay for only the seven 
hours' work. I understand your question, however, to refer 
to an arbitrary amount above a pro rata deduction for the 
time lost imposed as a penalty or fine, and such action seems 
to be contrary to the spirit and terms of the act. Accord- 
ingly, I am of the opinion that the payment of an amount 
less than the minimum wage prescribed by a decree of your 
commission constitutes a violation of the decree, and may 
not be excused by a claim that the sum has been reduced 
because of fines for misconduct or tardiness, or of deductions 
on account of expected benefits to accrue in case of sickness. 

You have also requested my opinion as to the proper pro- 
cedure for filling a vacancy in the representation of employees 
in any industry upon a duly organized wage board. 

There is nothing in the act giving specific authority to 
your commission to fill vacancies upon a wage board. Until 
a wage board has been organized I am of opinion that you 
may make appointments to take the places of persons ap- 
pointed who may decline appointment, as this is simply an 
act incidental to creating the board. Where, however, the 
board has been organized and a vacancy occurs, I think it ex- 
tremely doubtful if your commission has such power. In 



126 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

view of the fact that your authority to publish names of em- 
ployers who do not comply with the recommendations of a 
wage board as confirmed by your commission is dependent 
upon your compliance with the statute, I think it unwise for 
your commission to attempt to fill vacancies until such time as 
you may receive further legislative authority. No permanent 
injury can come to the interests of the employees by reason 
of such a vacancy, since it is in the discretion of your com- 
mission, under the provisions of section 6, to disapprove any 
or all recommendations made by such a board and to recom- 
mit the subject to a new wage board. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General 



Licensed Electricians — Licensed Journeymen — Right to do 
Contract Work — Employment of Learners or Appren- 
tices. 

A journeyman electrician duly licensed under Gen. Acts, 1915, c. 296, has 
the right, by contract or otherwise, to do the same class of work as is 
done by master electricians, provided that he does the work himself 
with his own hands and does not employ any journeyman to assist 
him, and he may in such work employ learners or apprentices working 
with him and under his direct personal supervision, 

Oct. 6, 1915. 

State Examiners of Electricians, State House. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
interpretation to be placed upon chapter 296 of the General 
Acts of 1915, as set forth in the following questions: — • 

Can a journeyman who is licensed under the provisions of chapter 
296 of the General Acts of 1915, by virtue of such Hcense, agree to 
perform and do contract work in the installation of "wires, conduits, 
fixtures or other appliances for carrjdng or using electricity for fight, 
heat or power purposes," provided that he does the work himself, 'vvdth 
his own hands, and does not employ any journe3maen to assist him? 

Can a journeyman ficensed under the provisions of chapter 296 of 
the General Acts of 1915 agree to perform and perform the same class 
of work, by contract or otherwise, as is completed and performed by 
the master electricians, provided he does the work with his own hands 
and does not employ any journeymen electricians to aid or assist him 
in the work? 

Has a ficensed journeyman electrician, under the provisions of chap- 
ter 296 of the General Acts of 1915, the right to perform and do work 
by contract or otherwise in the installation of "wires, conduits, fix- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 127 

tures or other appliances for carrj'ing or using electricity for light, 
heat or power purposes," provided that he does the same with his own 
hands; and has he the further right to employ learners or apprentices 
working T\dth and under his direct personal supervision in the doing 
of such work? 

The statute in question nowhere in express terms forbids a 
journeyman from making a contract to do, and, in fact, per- 
sonally doing, the work in the installation of wires, conduits, 
fixtures or other appliances. 

The restrictive provisions of the act are merely that "no 
person . . . shall engage in or work at. the business of install- 
ing wires, conduits, etc., . . . either as a master or employing 
electrician or as a journeyman electrician, unless such per- 
son . . . shall have received a license." 

The words "master or employing electrician" as used in 
this act "shall mean a corporation, firm or person, having a 
regular place of business, who, hy the employ me7it of journey- 
men, performs the work of installing wires," etc. 

The word "journeyman" as used in this act "shall mean 
a person who does any work of installing wires, conduits, 
apparatus, fixtures and other appliances for hire." (Gen. 
Acts, 1915, c. 296, § 1.) 

It is expressly provided that a master's certificate "shall 
not entitle the holder individually to engage in or perform the 
actual work of installing, . . . but shall entitle him to conduct 
business as an employing or master electrician." 

A journeyman's certificate authorizes the person named "to 
enter upon or engage in the occupation of journeyman elec- 
trician," or in other words, adopting the definition of section 
1, to engage in "any work of installing wdres, etc., . . . for 
hire." 

A provision that a man licensed and certified to be com- 
petent to do the work in question could not lawfully do such 
work unless he were also licensed to employ others to do it, or 
without letting his services out to a licensed master electri- 
cian, would be such a limitation upon what have generally 
been recognized as fundamental rights of a citizen of this 
Commonwealth and country that it should not be read into a 
statute unless clearly called for. The present statute, so far 
from containing such clear language, seems rather to counte- 
nance the opposite view, and accordingly I am of the opinion 
that all of your questions should be answered in the affirma- 
tive. 



128 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Your third question raises the inquiry as to whether a 
journeyman electrician contracting and doing the work of in- 
stallation with his own hands and without employing other 
journeymen has *'the further right to employ learners or 
apprentices working with and under his direct personal super- 
vision in the doing of such work." Apart from the provisions 
of section 8 of the act it might be argued that such course of 
conduct on his part would make him a "master or employing 
electrician," for which a master's certificate would be re- 
quired. 

Section 8, however, provides: — 

Nothing in this act shall be construed as forbidding the emplojmient 
of learners or apprentices working with and under the direct personal 
supervision of journeymen electricians duly certified as provided in 
this act. 

This language is sweeping in its terms, and so long as its 
provisions are carefully complied with I am of the opinion that 
such employment by a journeyman would not subject him to 
the penalty provided. 

The opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Burke v. 
Holyoke Board of Health, 219 Mass. 219, to which you have 
referred, is a decision to the same effect as that given above 
upon a set of statutes somewhat analogous. 

As stated above, accordingly, I am of the opinion that all 
of your questions are to be answered in the affirmative. 
Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attor^iey -General. 



Taxation — Income from Annuity — Contract issued by a 
Savings Bank. 

The income from an annuity contract issued by a savings bank under St. 
1907, c. 561, is exempt from local taxation by the provision of section 
24 of that statute, that "all insurance policies and annuity contracts 
issued by such banks shall otherwise be exempt from taxation." 

Oct. 11, 1915. 
Hon. WiLLiAAi D. T. Trefry, Tax Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — I beg to acknowledge your request for an 
opinion as to whether the income from an annuity contract 
issued by a savings bank under the authority of St. 1907, c. 
561, is taxable locally under the provisions of St. 1909, c. 490, 
Part I., § 4, cl. 4. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 129 

The last-mentioned clause is as follows: — 

The income from an annuity, and the excess above two thousand 
dollars of the income from a profession, trade or employment accruing 
to the person to be taxed during the j^ear ending on the first day of 
April of the year in which the tax is assessed. Incomes derived from 
property subject to taxation shall not be taxed. 

I know of no provision of law exempting from taxation the 
income from an annuity contract issued by an ordinary insur- 
ance company. It is plain, therefore, that the income from 
such an annuity is taxable under this clause; and it is plain 
from an examination of this clause in its present form, and 
particularly from an examination of it as it appeared in R. L., 
c. 12, § 4, that the exemption of $2,000 made in cases of in- 
come from a profession, trade or employment does not apply 
to such an annuity. The annuity is taxable for its full 
amount. 

By St. 1907, c. 561, savings banks were authorized under 
certain conditions and subject to the supervision of the in- 
surance department to establish insurance departments and 
to issue from those departments life insurance contracts to 
an amount not exceeding $500 and annuity contracts calling 
for a payment of not more than $200 annually. The limita- 
tion upon the amount of a life insurance policy which such a 
department might issue was subsequently increased to $1,000. 
(St. 1915, c. 32.) 

St. 1907, c. 561, § 24, provided that savings banks should 
pay a tax upon funds held in or in connection with their in- 
surance departments "to the same extent and in the same 
manner as taxes are now payable on deposits held by the 
savings department." It provided that they should not be 
taxed otherwise, and then enacted, "All insurance policies and 
annuity contracts issued by such banks shall otherwise be 
exempt from taxation." 

The real question, then, is whether this provision last 
quoted is sufficiently broad to exclude the income of annuity 
contracts issued by savings banks under this statute. Ob- 
viously there is a distinction between the present value of an 
annuity contract and the income payable annually to the 
holder of such a contract. If the language of section 24 is 
construed strictly it exempts from taxation only the former 
and not the latter. 

It seems to me, however, that in view of the apparent pur- 



130 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

pose of St. 1907, c. 561, this provision should be given a 
broad construction. Without going into the details of the 
system of insurance created by that chapter it seems to have 
been plainly intended to establish an agency for issuing small 
life insurance policies and annuity contracts to citizens of this 
Commonwealth at a low cost and upon a sound financial 
basis. The statute provides that the Commonwealth itself, 
through furnishing the services of a State actuary and a State 
medical director and in other ways, shall bear a substantial 
portion of the expense of operating these agencies. Certain of 
the funds established for the foundation of these departments 
are held by trustees appointed by the Governor with the 
advice and consent of the Council. Though the Common- 
wealth is not strictly, through this means, engaging in the 
insurance business, it is aiding to a very substantial extent 
these agencies established by it for the purpose of providing 
sound insurance to people of small means at a low cost. 

In view of these considerations and the small amount of 
income that can be paid under such annuity contracts, it does 
not seem to me reasonable that the Legislature intended that 
the contracts themselves should be exempt from taxation, 
while the chief incident of such contracts, namely, the annual 
annuity paid on account of them to their holders, should be 
subject to taxation. Accordingly, in answer to your inquiry 
I state it to be my opinion that the income from such an 
annuity is not taxable locally under the provision of law to 
which you refer. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney -General. 



Taxation — Corporation Franchise Tax — Merchandise — Tan- 
gible Property held in Pledge. 

Tangible personal property held by a Massachusetts corporation in pledge 
as security for money loaned by it is to be treated in determining its 
franchise tax as merchandise of the corporation, within the meaning of 
St. 1909, c. 490, Part III., § 43. 

Dec. 4, 1915. 
Board of Appeal, State House. 

Gentlemen: — I beg to acknowledge your request for my 
opinion upon the question whether articles of personal prop- 
erty left in pledge at a collateral loan company's or pawn- 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. • 131 

broker's shop should be treated as merchandise or as bills 
receivable in assessing the corporate franchise tax. I under- 
stand that the question arises with reference to the assess- 
ment of the tax upon the Boston Loan Company for the year 
1915; that their tax return shows an item of "accounts re- 
ceivable, $89,908.14," and that the Tax Commissioner treated 
this item as representing merchandise pledged for loans; and 
that in computing the tax under the maximum clause he used 
this item as the value of merchandise of the corporation. 

As I understand it, this corporation loans money to its 
customers upon personal property pledged by them to it as 
security, and no notes are taken from the customers, the obli- 
gation to repay being treated merely as an ordinary item of 
bills receivable. The corporation issues at the time of the 
loan to the customer an ordinary certificate or ticket showing 
the amount and terms of the loan and the description of the 
property pledged. 

Apparently no question is raised but that the personal 
property in question is merchandise within the meaning of St. 
1909, c. 490, Part III., § 43. It is suggested, however, that 
this property is owned by the pledgors and not by this cor- 
poration, which has merely a special property in it as pledgee. 
This is undoubtedly true; but St. 1909, c. 490, Part L, § 26, 
as amended, in dealing with the local taxation of such prop- 
erty provides: — 

Personal property mortgaged or pledged shall, for the purpose of 
taxation, be deemed the property of the party in possession thereof on 
the first day of April. . . . 

It is well settled that this section applies to tangible personal 
property only. Waltham Bank v. Waltham, 10 Met. 334; 
Chase v. Boston, 193 Mass. 522, 527. The property in ques- 
tion, therefore, if held upon the same terms and under the 
same circumstances by an individual engaged in the same 
business as this corporation, or by a foreign corporation (see 
Boston Loan Co. v. Boston, 137 Mass. 332), would be subject 
to a general property tax. 

The word "merchandise," as used in section 43, includes 
all merchandise of a domestic corporation, whether taxable if 
owned by a natural person or not. Farr Alpaca Co. v. Com- 
monwealth, 212 Mass. 156. But this section must, in my 
opinion, be interpreted with reference to section 26 of Part 



132 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

I., quoted above, and therefore it should be held that all mer- 
chandise which is to be treated as the merchandise of a 
natural person for the purposes of local taxation, is, when 
held by a corporation under the same conditions, to be treated 
as merchandise of the corporation for the purpose of deter- 
mining the corporate franchise tax. It follows, therefore, that, 
in my opinion, the personal property held by this corporation 
as pledgee was properly treated by the Tax Commissioner 
as merchandise within the meaning of section 43. It is to be 
noted, however, that such merchandise should be taxed at its 
actual value as determined by the Tax Commissioner, and not 
necessarily at the amount of the bills receivable which it is 
held to secure. The Tax Commissioner and your Board may 
properly take into consideration this item of bills receivable in 
determining the value of the property, but you may also con- 
sider other evidence upon that issue and fix the value of the 
property at an amount greater or less than the total of bills 
receivable, as the evidence may warrant. 
Yours very truly, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



Insurance — Stock Insurance Companies — Participating Poli- 
cies — Restriction to One Class of Insurance. 

A stock insurance company, other than a life insurance company, which is 
transacting, as permitted by law, several classes of insurance, may 
issue policies in one class which provide for a participation in the 
profits in that class by the holders of such policies, although at the 
same time it is issuing nonparticipating policies in other classes of 
insurance. 

Dec. 9, 1915. 
Hon. Frank H. Harbison, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
a stock insurance company other than life, transacting as 
permitted by law several classes of insurance, may issue 
policies in one class or line, such as workmen's compensation, 
which provide for distribution of part of the profits in that 
class among those who have been holders of like policies 
while the profits were being earned. In other words, may 
such a company issue participating policies and confine their 
issue to one class of insurance. 

There seems to be no provision of the statutes directly 



1916.J PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 133 

limiting the powers of such companies in such way as to pre- 
vent the issuance of the type of policy described. 

It has been argued, however, that such policy would violate 
the provisions of St. 1912, c. 401, entitled, "An Act to pro- 
hibit discrimination or rebates of premiums for policies issued 
by insurance companies other than life." This act is a re- 
vision of St. 1908, c. 511, w^hich is similarly entitled. 

Section i of the 1912 act provides: — 

No insurance company . . . shall pay or offer to pay or allow in 
connection with placing or attempting to place insurance any valu- 
able consideration or inducement not specified in the policy contract 
of insurance, or any rebate of premium payable on a poHcy, or any 
special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits to accrue 
thereon; or give, sell or purchase or offer to give, sell or purchase in 
connection with placing or attempting to place insurance anything of 
value whatsoever not specified in the policy. 

There can be no contention that the action proposed would 
constitute giving a valuable consideration not specified in the 
policy or a rebate of premium. It is suggested, however, that 
if a company issuing several lines of policies permits a partic- 
ipation in the profits as to one line, it does thereby give a 
special favor or advantage in the dividends to accrue thereon. 

On the supposition of facts made it would seem to be im- 
possible to decide whether, as a matter of fact, the policy 
containing the dividend provision does grant any advantage 
over the other line, since the premium in the nonparticipating 
policy may be so low that no profits are or can be made 
thereon, while the premium on the participating policy may 
be made unnecessarily high, and the net result from the 
dividend provision be only the loss of use by the policy- 
holder of the extra amount of the premium which he may 
later get back in dividends. 

However that may be, the argument presented disregards 
the language of the phrase, and particularly the use of the 
word "special." It does not seem to have been the intent 
of the Legislature to prevent the issuance of participating 
policies. On the contrary, the language appears to contem- 
plate that there may be provisions calling for the payment of 
dividends, and it therefore prohibits the granting of any 
special favor or advantage therein. It is not dividends that 
are prohibited, but special favors in the dividends that are to 



134 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

accrue. In this connection "special" seems to be used in the 
sense of "peculiar or distinct of the kind; of exceptional char- 
acter, amount, degree, or the like; especially distinguished; 
express; particular." (Century Dictionary.) 

This clause must be read in connection with the title of 
the act and the other prohibitions, in order to arrive at its 
true meaning; and so read it must be some special favor or 
advantage in the dividends, of a character similar to or like 
the granting of rebates or payment of considerations not 
specified in the policy. The determination of a stock com- 
pany to conduct its business of workmen's compensation in- 
surance on a participating basis, and its general liability on a 
nonparticipating basis, partakes of none of these features. 
The evil sought to be eliminated is discrimination between 
individuals properly members of the same class, rather than 
difference between properly separated classes. So long as a 
class is selected upon a reasonable basis I find nothing in this 
act which, in my opinion, prevents its being treated as such, 
and the function of the act is fulfilled in preventing discrimina- 
tion between the members of such class. 

It is to be observed that St. 1912, c. 401, and St. 1908, c. 
511, are in the main but extensions to the remaining kinds of 
insurance companies of requirements long applicable to life 
insurance, and that the phrase in question has appeared in 
the statutes with reference to life insurance since 1887 (St. 
1887, c. 214, § 68; St. 1907, c. 576, § 69). Yet down to 1908 
it apparently was considered lawful for a stock company to 
issue life insurance policies on either or both a participating 
and nonparticipating basis (see St. 1907, c. 576, §§ 76, 81). 

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that it is lawful for a 
stock insurance company other than life, which is transacting 
as permitted by law several classes of insurance, to issue 
policies in one class or line which provide for a participation 
in the profits in that class by the holders of such policies, 
although at the same time issuing nonparticipating policies in 
other classes of insurance. 

Very truly yours, 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 135 



Insurance — Life Insurance — Accident Insurance — Two 
Classes in One Policy. 

A life insurance policy containing all the standard provisions required for 
such insurance, and also containing a provision for the payment of 
double the regular amount of the policy if death results from accident 
while the insured is travehng as a passenger on a pubHc conveyance, 
is contrary to the provisions of St. 1907, c. 576, § 34, prov^iding that 
pohcies for different classes of insurance shall be in separate and dis- 
tinct poUcies, and also is in violation of St. 1910, c. 493, requiring cer- 
tain standard provisions in accident pohcies. 

The provision in such a policy for the payment of an additional amount 
in case of death b}^ accident constitutes accident insurance. 

Dec. 11, 1915. 
Hon. Frank H. Harbison, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — An insurance policy has been submitted for 
your approval which in general provides for life insurance and 
contains all the standard pro vi ions required for such insur- 
ance, but also contains a further provision for payment of 
double the regular amount of the policy if death results from 
accident while the insured is traveling as a passenger on a 
public conveyance. 

The question therefore arises whether such a policy is con- 
trary to the provisions of St. 1907, c. 576, § 34 — 

Contracts of insurance for each of the classes specified in section 
thirty-two shall be in separate and distinct poUcies notwithstanding 
any provision of this act which permits a company to transact more 
than one of said classes of insurance — 

or falls within St. 1910, c. 493, requiring certain standard 
provisions in accident and health policies. 

This latter act provides that " no policy of insurance against 
loss or damage from disease or by the bodily injury or death 
by accident of the assured shall be issued or delivered in this 
commonwealth" until certain conditions are complied with 
and unless certain provisions are therein contained. 

It is earnestly argued that the policy in question is strictly 
a policy of life insurance, and it may well be admitted that such 
is the case. The question still remains, however, as to whether 
it is not also accident insurance and within the requirements 
of the statutes quoted above. 

It is to be noticed that in denominating a certain policy as 



136 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

life insurance one may proceed upon a different basis of clas- 
sification from that adopted in section 32 of the insurance 
law (St. 1907, c. 576), since the classification made therein in 
general is determined by the nature of the hazard or mis- 
chance protected against, while in life insurance, as the term 
is frequently used, it is the interest of the assured, to wit, his 
life, which furnishes the class. Naturally, under such circum- 
stances the terms used may overlap, yet in most instances it 
will be clear that one line predominates and the other is but 
an incident. 

As said by the court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
Insurance Commissioner, 208 Mass. 386, 389: — 

An ordinary life insurance policy includes the occurrence of death 
by accident as one of the conditions which call for a payment by the 
company, as well as death from any other cause, and ordinary acci- 
dent policies include injuries by accident causing death, and to that 
extent they provide insurance of life. Yet neither of these two classes 
of policies is, for that reason, brought within the other class also. 

If we assume the simple case of a policy covering death by 
accident and nothing more, it may well be said in a certain 
sense to be a contract of life insurance (see Logan v. Fidelity 
a7id Casualty Co., 146 Mo. 114), but it is just as certain, under 
the terms of our statute, a contract of accident insurance. 

The classification found in section 32 does not include life 
insurance, and nowhere in the statute is there to be found a 
categorical definition of that term. Section 66 defines what 
is to be treated as a life insurance company, but includes 
companies issuing contracts which cannot be regarded as life 
insurance, such, for example, as pure endowments and annui- 
ties. So far as the section relates to insurance the pertinent 
description is of a company doing business which involves 
"the payment of money . . . conditioned upon the continu- 
ance or cessation of human life." In other words, in this 
definition the hazard or contingency insured against is loss of 
life. In the accident policy it is the accident which furnishes 
the hazard, while the disability, loss of limb or loss of life fol- 
lowing thereafter furnishes, not the condition upon which 
payment is to be made, but determines the amount of damage 
or loss which has been suffered, and is to be compensated for 
by reason of the happening of the condition insured against, 
to wit, the accident. It would seem, therefore, that in the 
simple case suggested, of a policy merely covering death by 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUIVIENT — No. 12. 137 

accident, it should be treated primarily as an accident policy 
within the provisions of the statutes mentioned. 

St. 1907, c. 576, § 32, cl. 5, permits companies to be or- 
ganized "to insure any person against bodily injury or death 
by accident." In my opinion the simple form of policy sup- 
posed exactly comes within the language just quoted. It 
would seem to follow, applying the words of section 34, that 
contracts for such insurance (being one of the classes specified 
in section 32) must "be in separate and distinct policies." 

Similarly, such a policy seems included in the terms of St. 
1910, c. 493, § 1, which, leaving out phrases not pertinent, 
would read: "No policy of insurance against loss or damage 
. . . by . . . death by accident of the assured shall be issued" 
unless the conditions therein set forth are complied with. 
Stated in this short form the simple case of a policy covering 
death by accident is exactly what is described by the statute. 

While the policy now under consideration does not in terms 
provide in one clause for $1,000 straight life insurance, and in 
another clause for a further insurance of $1,000 for death by 
accident, neither the limitation upon the kind of accident in- 
sured against nor the fact that the amount is expressed as a 
double payment in case death occurs in the manner specified 
seems to me to change the situation. The effect in either case 
is the same. 

The reasoning of the opinion in the case of Metropolitaii 
Life Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, supra, appears 
to support this conclusion. While the decision in that case 
was to the effect that the policy then under consideration 
(which provided for only a fractional amount of the face value 
if death occurred within certain limited periods, but for the 
full amount if such death were by accident) did not involve 
any element of accident insurance, it was based upon a care- 
ful analysis of the policy, and a conclusion that the effect was 
"as if the limitation upon payments for deaths occurring 
within six months were expressed as applying to such deaths 
occurring from causes other than accidents." "It is not the 
giving of direct affirmative benefits of a special kind on ac- 
count of the accident." 

The present policy is precisely what the policy in that case 
was thus stated not to be. 

In the able and exhaustive argument in behalf of the in- 
surance company it is pointed out that some of the provisions 
required by the 1910 act to be inserted in accident policies 



138 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. ] 

are most inapt as applied to the policy in question. This, | 

however, would seem rather to demonstrate the wisdom of the ■ 

requirement of section 34, that policies of different classes ' 

shall be separate and distinct, than to lead to a conclusion 

that the feature of double indemnity is not in its essence ' 

accident insurance as to the extra payment offered in case 

death results from accident in the manner specified. ; 

In my opinion you are justified in refusing to approve the j 

form of policy submitted, both by the provisions of St. 1907, \ 

c. 576, § 34, and St. 1910, c. 493. \ 

Very truly yours, \ 

Henry C. Attwill, Attorney-General. \ 



1916.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 139 



INDEX TO OPINIONS. 



PAGE 

Banks, co-operative, power to loan on matured shares, . . . .26 

Boston Elevated Railway Company, locations of; revocability and 

abandonment of, . . . . . . . . .43 

Boston Finance Commission, whether State Board or Commission; 
powers of; witnesses; necessity for summons; procedure; rules 
of; powers of mayor, ........ 83 

Boston & Maine Railroad Company, history of acquisition of control by 

New York. New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, . . 7 

Cape Cod Canal, interpretation of contract for construction of; extra 

work, powers of joint board, ....... 90 

Cities, wards, divi?ioD into precincts, time for action, .... 100 

Civil service, grades of stenographers and clerks; promotions; increase 

of salary, .......... 68 

Violation of traflBc regulation not a crime against laws of Common- 
wealth, .......... 121 

Constitutional law, equal protection of the law, discrimination, . 52, 56 

Police power, freedom to contract, ..... 23, 43 

Taxation, dry dock in Boston Harbor a public purpose, . . .113 

Corporations, attempted incorporation of company to use franchise in 

public way under business corporation act, trackless trolley, . 97 
Crime, violation of city traffic regulation, not a, . . . . . 121 

Directors of the Port of Boston, authority to construct dry dock, . . 1 

Authority to remove wrecks, ....... 81 

Power to license erection by city of Boston on area granted to it by 

Sp. St. 1915, c. 326 117 

Dry dock, authority of Directors of the Port of Boston to construct, . 1 
A public purpose, . . . . . . . . .113 

Electricians, journeymen, license of; right to do contract work, employ- 
ment of apprentices, ........ 126 

Executive Council, no jurisdiction to reconsider removal of public officer 

after appointment of successor, ...... 19 

Extradition, power of Governor to revoke executive warrant, . . 71 

Firemen's relief fund, nature of injury entitling firemen to benefit of, . 61 
Firewards, office of, not abolished by St. 1907, c. 475; appointment by 

selectmen; jurisdiction of, ....... 17 

Flag, misuse of, interpretation of statutes relating to, . . . . 102 

Gasoline, when permit not needed to keep, ...... 34 

Health, boards of, of cities and towns, jurisdiction of, manufacture and 

sale of ice-cream, ......... 27 

Boards of, reports to, of tuberculosis patients receiving treatment in 

State sanatorium, ........ 105 

State Department of, prior regulations of, not revoked by St. 1914, 

c. 792, 39 

Insane persons, temporary treatment by insane hospitals not authorized 

at request of probation officer, ...... 98 

Insurance, fraternal orders, when not subject to insurance laws, . . 38 

Life insurance, accident insurance, two classes in one policy, . . 135 

Stock companies, participating policies, restriction to one class of 

insurance, ........•• 132 



140 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL^S REPORT. [Jan. 1916. 



Interstate Commerce, what is; discrimination, . . , . , 

Intoxicating liquors, transportation of, into no license towns, permits for, 
Labor, hours of, for employees for or upon public works. 
Master in chancery, member of Legislature may be appointed a, 
Mayor of city of Boston, authority to limit powers of Boston Finance 

Commission, ......... 

Minimum Wage Commission, authority of, to establish wage board; effect 

of change of statutory method of selection, .... 
Motor vehicles, carrying passengers, constitutionality of bill requiring 

bond for, .......... 

Newspapers, statute regulating sale of, unconstitutional, 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, history of acqui- 
sition of control of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, . 
Osteopath, no authority to issue physician's death certificate, 
Petroleum, license for storage of, required, ...... 

Pharmacist, registered, who may be licensed as; ownership of stock in 

corporation, ......... 

Physicians, applicability of statutes requiring registration to persons em- 
ployed in State institutions, ....... 

Pilots, federal license required, when, ....... 

Probation officer, not'a police officer within St. 1911, c. 395, as amended 

by Gen. St. 1915, c. 174, 

Public officer, when removed, Executive Council cannot take initiative to 

reinstate, .......... 

Public warehouse, place of storage of second-hand goods or furniture in, . 
Savings bank, deposits in, payable to person other than depositor, . 
School teachers, constitutionality of bill to prevent inquiry into religion of, 
Statutes, general and special, latter not repealed by codification of general 

statutes; Boston Consolidated Gas Company, 
Tax collector, bond of, right of town to discharge. 
Taxation; income from annuity; contract issued by savings bank, . 

Corporation franchise tax; merchandise; tangible property held in 

pledge, ......... 

Tuberculosis cases, report of, to State Board of Health, 

United States District Court, decree of, effect of compliance with as viola^ 

tion of the laws of the Commonwealth, .... 

Wage boards, vacancies in, how filled, ...... 

Wages, may not be reduced below minimum by fines or payments to cover 

sick benefits, ........ 

Of employees at the Reformatory for Women, 
Wrecks or obstructions in Boston Harbor, authority of Directors of the 

Port of Boston to remove, ....... 



PAGE 

109 
63 
76 
89 

83 

80 

56 
23 

7 
42 
41 

122 

66 
5 

98 

19 
98 
70 
52 

29 

78 

128 

130 
105 

7 
124 

124 
120 

81 



Words and phrases: — 

"Amendment," .......... 29 

"Dock," 1 

"For or upon public works," ........ 76 

"Goods, wares and merchandise," ....... 98 

"In bulk," 34 

"Laws of the Commonwealth," ....... 121 

"Merchandise," .......... 130 

"Osteopath," .......... 42 

"Personal injury," ......... 61 

"Physician," .......... 42 

"Provisions," .......... 27 

"Structure," .......... 60 



LIST OF CASES 



IN WHICH THE 



ATTORISrEY-GENERAL 



HAS APPEARED 



During the Yeae 1915. 



GRADE CROSSINGS. 



Notices have been served upon this department of the filing 
of the following petitions for the appointment of special com- 
missioners for the abolition of grade crossings: — 

Berkshire County. 

Lanesborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Valley Road and Glen Road crossings. Railroad Com- 
missioners appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's 
third report filed. Pending. 

North Adams, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition 
for abolition of State Street and Furnace Street crossings. 
Edmund K. Turner, David F. Slade and William G. 
McKechnie appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Merrill crossing in Pittsfield. Thomas W. 
Kennefick, Frederick L. Green and Edmund K. Turner 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of South Street crossing. Railroad Commissioners ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
A. W. DeGoosh appointed auditor. Auditor's first report 
filed. Pending. 

Stockbridge. Berkshire Railroad, petitioner. Petition for 
abolition of Glendale station crossing. Pending. 

West Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of grade crossing at Albany Street. James D. 
Cote, Charles W. Bosworth and James L. Tighe appointed 
commissioners. Pending. 

Bristol County. 
Mansfield. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at North Main, Chauncey, Central, West, 



144 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

School and Elm streets in Mansfield. Samuel L. Powers, 
Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commis- 
sioners. George F. Swain appointed commissioner in place 
of Wm. Jackson, deceased. Pending. 

Somerset. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing 
at Wilbur Avenue. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and 
Louis Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Edward A. Thurston appointed auditor. 
Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Swansea, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing 
at River Road. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and 
Louis Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners* 
report filed. Edward A. Thurston appointed auditor. 
Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of grade crossings at Danforth and other streets 
in Taunton. Thomas M. Babson, George F. Swain and 
Edwin U. Curtis appointed commissioners. Charles H. 
Beckwith appointed commissioner in place of Thomas M. 
Babson, deceased. Commissioners' report filed. James 
A. Stiles appointed auditor. Pending. 

Essex County. 

Gloucester. Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioner. Petition 
for abolition of crossings at Magnolia Avenue and Brays 
crossing. Arthur Lord, Moody Kimball and P. H. Cooney 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
A. W. DeGoosh appointed auditor. Auditor's third re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Gloucester. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of grade crossing between 
Washington Street and tracks of Boston & Maine Rail- 
road. Pending. 

Haverhill, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Washington Street and other crossings in 
Haverhill. George W. Wiggin, William B. French and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. 
E. A. McLaughlin appointed auditor in place of Fred E. 
Jones, deceased. Auditor's sixteenth report filed. Pend- 
ing. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 145 

Ipswich, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
High Street and Locust Street crossings. Geo. W. Wiggin, 
Edmund K. Turner and William F. Dana appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones 
appointed auditor. E. A. McLaughlin appointed auditor 
in place of Fred E. Jones, deceased. Auditor's fourth re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Lawrence, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of crossing at Merrimac and other streets in 
Lawrence. Robert O. Harris, Edmund K. Turner and 
Henry V. Cunningham appointed commissioners. Pend- 
ing. 

Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Summer Street and other crossings on Saugus 
branch of Boston & Maine Railroad and Market Street 
and other crossings on main line. George W. Wiggin, 
Edgar R. Champlin and Edmund K. Turner appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Edward A. 
McLaughlin appointed auditor. Auditor's sixth report 
filed. Pending. 

Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of grade crossings at Pleasant and Shepard streets, 
Gas W^harf Road and Commercial Street, on the Boston, 
Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad. Pending. 

Salem. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioners. 

. Petition for the abolition of grade crossings at Bridge, 

Washington, Mill, North, Flint and Grove streets in 

Salem. Patrick H. Cooney, George F. Swain and William 

A. Dana appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Salem, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Lafayette Street crossing in Salem. Pending. 

Franklin County. 

Deerfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
** Upper Wisdom Road" crossing. Edmund K. Turner, 
Calvin Coolidge and Hugh P. Drysdale appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. L^man W. 
Griswold appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Erving, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing on the road leading from Millers Falls to 
Northfield. Samuel D. Conant, Arthur H. Beers and 
Charles C. Dyer appointed commissioners. Pending. 



146 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Allen and Russell streets crossings in Greenfield. Ed- 
mund K. Turner, Walter P. Hall and Fred D. Stanley 
appointed commissioners. Stephen S. Taft appointed au- 
ditor. Auditor's first report filed. Disposed of. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Silver Street. Stephen S. Taft, Henry 
P. Field and Thomas J. O'Connor appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Stephen S. Taft, 
Jr., appointed commissioner in place of Stephen S. Taft 
resigned. Pending. 

Northfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossing on road to South Vernon. Edmund K. Turner, 
Charles W. Hazelton and Charles H. Innes appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners* report filed. James J. 
Irwin appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Hampden County. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Burley's crossing in Palmer. Pending. 

Russell, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Montgomery Road crossing. Railroad Commissioners 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Thomas W. Kennefick appointed auditor. Auditor's 
third report filed. Pending. 

Westfield, Attorney-General, petitioner. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossings at Lane's and Lee's crossings in West- 
field. Patrick H. Cooney, Richard W. Irwin and Franklin 
T. Hammond appointed commissioners. Chas. E. Hib- 
bard appointed commissioner in place of Richard W. 
Irwin, resigned. Commissioners' report filed. Walter F. 
Frederick appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. 
Pending. 

Hampshire County. 

Amherst, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Whitney, High and Main streets. Rail- 
road Commissioners appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of crossing of road from Belchertown to Three Rivers 
and road from Bondville to Ludlow. Edmund K. Turner, 
F. G. Wooden and George P. O'Donnell appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Wm. H. Feiker 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 14^ 



Middlesex County. 

Actoa, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Great Road crossing in Acton. Benj. W. Wells, George 
D. Burrage and William B. Sullivan appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred Joy ap- 
pointed auditor. Pending. 

Belmont, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossings at Waverley station. Thomas W. Proctor, Pat- 
rick H. Cooney and Desmond FitzGerald appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Chelmsford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossing at Middlesex Street. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Marble Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Concord Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Waverly Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Bishop Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Hollis and Waushakum streets crossings. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Claflin Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossing at Willis Crossing. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Middlesex and Thorndike streets crossings. 
George F. Swain, Patrick H. Cooney and Nelson P. Brown 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Boston Road or Plain Street, School, Walker 
and Lincoln streets crossings. Arthur Lord, David F. 
Slade and Henry A. Wyman appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. A. W. DeGoosh appointed 
auditor. Auditor's ninth report filed. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of crossing at Western Avenue and Fletcher 
Street. Pending. 

Maiden, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Pleasant and Winter streets crossing in 
Maiden. George W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and 



148 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Fred Joy appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Winfield S. Slocum appointed auditor. Au- 
ditor's seventh report filed. Pending. 

Marlborough, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition 
for abolition of Hudson Street crossing in Marlborough. 
Walter Adams, Charles A. iYllen and Alpheus Sanford ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
the abolition of Concord Street and Pine Grove Avenue 
crossings in Newton. George W. Wiggin, T. C. Menden- 
hall and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. 
Pending. 

North Reading, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Main Street crossing in North Reading. Alpheus 
Sanford, George N. Poor and Louis M. Clark appointed 
commissioners. Report of commissioners filed. Thomas 
W. Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's first report 
filed. Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Park Street, Dane Street and Medford Street 
crossings in Somerville. George W. Wiggin, George F. 
Swain and James D. Colt appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Patrick H. Cooney ap- 
pointed auditor. Auditor's eleventh report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Somerville Avenue crossing in Somerville. 
George W. Wiggin, George F. Swain and James D. Colt 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Patrick H. Cooney appointed auditor. Auditor's ninth 
report filed. Pending. 

Wakefield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Hanson Street crossing in Wakefield. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
aboHtion of South Street crossing in Waltham. Geo. F. 
Swain, and Geo. A. Sanderson appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Moody Street, Main Street, Elm Street, River 
Street, Pine Street, Newton Street and Calvary Street 
crossings in Waltham. Arthur Lord, Patrick H. Cooney 
and George F. Swain appointed commissioners. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUlViENT — No. 12. 149 

Watertown, Selectmen of, petitiotiers. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossings at Cottage, Arlington, School, Irving 
and other streets in Watertown. Pending. 

Wayland, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at State Road. George F. Swain, Harvey 
E. Shepherd and Arthur W. DeGoosh appointed commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Weston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Central Avenue, Conant Road, Church 
and Viles streets. P. H. Cooney, Louis A. Frothing- 
ham and Andrew M. Lovis appointed commissioners. 
Pending. 

Winchester, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of crossing at Winchester station square. George W. 
W^iggin, George F. Swain and Arthur Lord appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners* report filed and recommitted. 
Pending. 

Norfolk County. 

Braintree, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of the Pearl Street crossing at South Braintree. Patrick 
H. Cooney, Frank N. Nay and George F. Swain ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending. 

Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at School, Elm, River and Union streets in 
Braintree. John L. Bates, Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur 
H. Wellman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Pending. 

Canton. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Dedham Road crossing in Canton. Samuel L. Powers, 
Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners report filed. Recommitted. 
Pending. 

Dedham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Eastern Avenue and Dwight Street crossings in Ded- 
ham. Alpheus Sanford, Charles Mills and J. Henry Reed 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Pending. 

Dover, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Springdale Avenue and Dedham and 
Haven streets. Public Service Commission appointed 
commissioners. Pending. 



150 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Foxborough. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Cohasset and Summer streets in Fox- 
borough. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. 
Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Recommitted. Pending. 

Hyde Park, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Fairmount Avenue and Bridge Street crossings in Hyde 
Park. Boyd B. Jones, Edmund K. Turner and Fred Joy 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Thomas W. Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's third 
report filed. Pending. 

Needham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Charles River Street crossing in Needham. Pending. 

Quincy. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Saville and Water streets crossings in Quincy. John L. 
Bates, Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur H. Wellman ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Pending. 

Sharon. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Depot, Garden and Mohawk streets in 
Sharon. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. 
Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Recommitted. Pending. 

Westwood. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Green Lodge Street crossing in Westwood. Samuel L. 
Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Recom- 
mitted. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 

Rockland, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Union and other streets in Rockland. 
Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Dudley Street crossing in Dorchester. Thomas 
Post, Fred Joy and Edmund K. Turner appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. James D. Colt 
appointed auditor. Auditor's tenth report filed. Pend- 
ing. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 151 

Boston. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Neponset and 
Granite avenues crossings in Dorchester. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Freeport, Adams, Park, Mill and Walnut 
streets and Dorchester Avenue crossings. James R. 
Dunbar, Samuel L. Powers and Thomas W. Proctor ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Arthur H. Wellman appointed auditor. Auditor's twenty- 
first report filed. P^ding. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of the Essex Street crossing in Brighton. George 
W. Wiggin, William B. French and Winfield S. Slocum 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Blue Hill Avenue and Oakland Street cross- 
ings in Boston. William B. French, Arthur H. Wellman 
and George A. Kimball appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. 
Auditor's twenty-first report filed. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of all crossings in East Boston. George W. 
Wiggin, William B. French and Edward B. Bishop ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Winfield S. Slocum appointed auditor. Auditor's seven- 
teenth report filed. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of crossings at Saratoga, Maverick and Marginal 
streets in East Boston. Railroad Commissioners ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Robert O. Harris appointed auditor. Auditor's second 
report filed. Pending. 

Revere, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Winthrop Avenue crossing in Revere of the Boston^ 
Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad. Pending. 

Worcester County. 
Clinton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Sterling, Water, Main, High and Woodlawn streets cross- 
ings. George W. Wiggin, William E. McClintock and 
James A. Stiles appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. David F. Slade appointed auditor. Frederic 
B. Greenhalge appointed auditor in place of David F. 
Slade deceased. Auditor's ninth report filed. Pending. 



152 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Harvard. Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioner. Petition for 
abolition of a grade crossing near Harvard station. Pending. 

Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Dawson's crossing and Cedar Swamp crossing in Holden. 
Charles A. Allen, Arthur P. Rugg and Henry G. Taft ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. H. 
L. Parker appointed auditor. Auditor's second report 
filed. Disposed of. 

Hubbardston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Depot Road crossing in HubKardston. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Water, Summer, Mechanic and Main streets crossings. 
George W. Wiggin, George F. Swain and Charles D. 
Barnes appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Recommitted. Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of crossing on road from Southborough to Framing- 
ham. Samuel W. McCall, Louis A. Frothingham and 
Eugene C. Hultman appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed and recommitted. Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Main Street crossing at Fayville in Southborough. 
Pending. 

Southbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossings at Foster, Central and Hook streets. 
George F. Swain, P. H. Cooney and William F. Garcelon 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Webster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Main Street. Pending. 

West Boylston. Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Prescott Street cross- 
ing. Pending. 

Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of crossings at Exchange, Central and Thomas 
and other streets. Arthur Lord, George F. Swain and 
Fred Joy appointed commissioners. Pending. 

W^orcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Grafton Street crossing and eight other cross- 
ings, including alterations of Union Station. James R. 
Dunbar, James H. Flint and George F. Swain appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. James A. 
Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's seventieth report 
filed. Pending. 



1916.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 153 



CASES ARISING IN THE COUETS 

UNDER THE 

Acts relative to Inheritance and Succession Taxes. 



Petitions for Instructions. 
Barnstable County. 
Dyer, Henry K., estate of. James P. Warbasse et al., execu- 
tors, petitioners. Petition for abatement of inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Berkshire County. 
Barnard, Anna Eliza, estate of. Joseph R. Walker, adminis- 
trator c. t. a., petitioner. Decree. 

Bristol County. 

Borden, Matthew C. D., estate of. Bertram H. Borden et als., 
executors, petitioners. Rescript. 

Holmes, Albert W., estate of. Elizabeth R. Holmes, execu- 
trix, petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance 
tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Tappan, Fannie M., estate of. Charles R. Cummings, admin- 
istrator c. t. a., petitioner. Pending. 

Essex County. 

Clines, Mary G., estate of. Catherine A. Laycock, administra- 
trix, petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance 
tax. Rescript. 

Hoyt, William R., estate of. Charles Neal Barney, executor, 
petitioner. Decree. 

Meserve, Chastina S., estate of. James W. Leitch, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Nichols, Mary C, estate of. Frank O. Woods, executor, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Sears, Eleonora R., estate of. Francis C. Welch et al., ad- 
ministrators, petitioners. Petition for abatement of in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 



154 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Hampden County. 

Bellamy, Charles J., estate of. Asher Allen, administrator 
c. t. a., petitioner. Decree. 

George, Julinah R. C, estate of. Allen Webster, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Gordon, Rebecca A., estate of. Jennie Gordon Ireland, ex- 
ecutrix, petitioner. Petition for abatement of inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Spencer, Lucy Whitehead, estate of. Clarence G. Spencer, 
petitioner. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Whiting, Elizabeth E., estate of. Frank A. Whiting, admin- 
istrator, petitioner. Pending. 

Hampshire County. 
Welton, Walter B., estate of. Henry W. Kidder, administra- 
tor, petitioner. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 

Beebe, Emily Appleton, estate of. William S. Hall et al., 
administrators d. b. n., petitioners. Pending. 

Cronin, William P., estate of. Hannah J. Thomassin, execu- 
tor, petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Hawkridge, Edwin, estate of. Ella M. Hawkridge et al., 
executors, petitioners. Pending. 

Kemo, Horace G., estate of. Edythe M. Kemp et al., execu- 
tors, petitioners. Pending. 

Langdell, Margaret E., estate of. Joseph H. Beale et al., 
executors, petitioners. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Lawrence, Samuel C, estate of. Carrie R. Lawrence et als., 
executrices, petitioners. Decree. 

Palmer, Edward H., estate of. Emily M. Palmer et als., exec- 
utors, petitioners. Decree. 

Perry, Emery B., estate of. Thomas Weston, executor, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Scott, Julia A., estate of. Emma E. Doty, executrix, peti- 
tioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pend- 
ing. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCmiENT — No. 12. 155 

Slater, Andrew C, estate of. Joseph T. Brown d al., execu- 
tors, petitioners. Petition for abatement of inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Wheeler, Jeness B., estate of. Mabel R. Wheeler et at., peti- 
tioners. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Norfolk County. 

Cabot, Arthar T., estate of. Charles Almy et als., executors, 
petitioners. Decree. 

Nichols, Lucy, estate of. Edward H. Nichols et al., admin- 
istrators, petitioners. Petition for abatement of inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Tobin, Ellen A., estate of. W^illiam Sullivan, executor, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Tobin, Lawrence, absentee, estate of. Howard A. Wilson, re- 
ceiver, petitioner. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 

Blenkinsop, James S., estate of. John R. Mills, administrator, 
petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Peirce, Harriot O., estate of. Osgood Putnam, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pend- 
ing. 

Suffolk County. 

Bliss, Cornelius N., estate of. Cornelius N. Bliss, Jr., et als., 
executors, petitioners. Petition for abatement of inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Bliss, Cornelius N., estate of. Cornelius N. Bliss, Jr., et als., 
executors, petitioners. Rescript. 

Butler, Joanna C, estate of. Wilfred Bolster, executor, peti- 
tioner. Decree. 

Emery, Frederic W., estate of. Francis R. Hart, executor, 
petitioner. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Sampson, Rebecca F., estate of. William E. Murdock et al., 
executors, petitioners. Pending. 

Skinner, Eliza B., estate of. George A. Gardner et al., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Decree. 

Tucker, Lawrence, estate of. Robert H. Gardiner ef al., 
executors, petitioners. Petition for abatement of inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 



156 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Worcester County. 

Buss, Ellen M., estate of. Joseph A. Lovering, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Forrest, William A., estate of. Thomas F. Hisky, adminis- 
trator, petitioner. Pending. 

Inventoeies. 
Berkshire County. 
Daley, Eliza, estate of. Edward A. Fisher, administrator. 
Pending. 

Essex Coimty. 

Magner, Matthew J., estate of. Annie T. Magner, adminis- 
tratrix. Pending. 

Hampden County. 
Melaszansky, Joseph, estate of. Ursula J. Melaszansky, ad- 
ministratrix. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Baxter, Albert, estate of. Elizabeth A. Baxter, administra- 
trix. Pending. 

Blodgett, Minnie L., estate of. Clement B. Blodgett, admin- 
istrator. Pending. 

Dorini, Celestina, estate of. Antonio Dorini, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Shea, Mary A., estate of. John F. Shea, administrator. 
Dismissed. 



1916.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 157 



PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS. 



Berkshire County. 
Drury Academy v. Attorney-General et als. Petition for au- 
thority to administer trust under the doctrine of cy pres. 
Submitted to the determination of the court. 

Bristol County. 

North Baptist Church of New Bedford, petitioner. Petition 
to have legal title to certain premises conveyed to it. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Oldfield, Charles T., et at. z. Attorney-General. Petition for 
instructions. Rescript. 

Parker, Helen M., estate of. Charles M. Holmes, adminis- 
trator, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

White, John, estate of. Iram N. Smith, executor, petitioner. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Essex County. 

Atwood, Margaret, estate of. Henry B. Little et als., peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment of petitioners as trus- 
tees. Dismissed. 

Beach, Persis A., estate of. Edward F. Childs et als., formerly 
trustees of the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Law- 
rence, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Cliftondale Chapel Association. J. Arthur Raddin, trustee, 
petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Cliftondale Chapel Association. J. Arthur Raddin, trustee, 
petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Garden Street Methodist Episcopal Church, trustees, peti- 
tioners. Petition for instructions. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Gile, David, estate of. Charles E. Sawyer, administrator, 
petitioner. Petition for authority to adjust claims against 
estate by compromise. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 



158 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Haskins, Leander M., estate of. Grafton Butman, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee. Dismissed. 

Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Hannah T. Garret et al., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of seventh ac- 
count. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Healy, Jeremiah J., estate of. Dennis Healy, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Hill, Robert W., et als. v. John F. Moors et als. Petition to 
confirm conve3^ance of titles. Submitted to determina- 
tion of the court. 

Little, Adeline A., v. Attorney-General. Petition for instruc- 
tions. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Moore, Martha, estate of. Mary Barker, executrix, petitioner. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Moseley, Julia M., estate of. Oliver H. Perry et al., executors, 
petitioners. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Protestant Episcopal Church, Trustees of Donations to the, 
V. Attorney-General et al. Petition for authority to sell 
real estate. Submitted to the determination of the court. 

Sawyer, Samuel E., estate of. John Pickering Putnam et al., 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of ninth to 
nineteenth accounts, inclusive. Pending. 

Smith, Joseph N., estate of. Henry B. Sprague et al., execu- 
tors, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Smith, Joseph N., estate of. Henry B. Sprague et al., exec- 
utors, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Smith, Joseph N., estate of. Sarah Fuller Smith et al., execu- 
tors, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Warren, Betsey K., estate of. Isaac D. Pope et al., peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment as trustees. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Welch, Annie C., estate of. John D. Dewhurst el al., peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment as trustees. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Franklin County. 

Butterfield, Permelia A., estate of. Rufus T. Shumway, ad- 
ministrator, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pend- 
ing. 

Field, Simeon A., estate of. Henry W. Montague, trustee, 
petitioner. Petition for allowance of third account. 
Pending. 



1916.J PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 159 

Stratton, Abigail, estate of. Frank H. Montague et al., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of tenth account. 
Pending. 

Williams, Philomena A., estate of. Edward H. Shephard, 
executor, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hampden County. 

Chapin, Emily J., estate of. Carlos M. Gage, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Conner, Lydia T., estate of. James C. S. Taber, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Derby, Pardon H., estate of. Ellen B. Derby et al., executors, 
petitioners. Petition for instructions. Submitted to the 
determination of the court. 

Frary, Obadiah, estate of. Joseph C. Booth, administrator 
c. t. a., petitioner. Petition for approval of agreement of 
compromise. Attorney-General w^aived right to be heard. 

Marsh, Catherine E., estate of. Fred F. Partridge, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. • 

Morgan, Francis C, estate of. Alonzo B. Root, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Submitted to the 
determination of the court. 

Moseley, Jane A., estate of. Peter King, petitioner. Petition 
for instructions. Decree. 

Noyes, Emily C, estate of. George E. Clough, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for authority to adjust by compromise 
controversy in regard to will. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Porter, Sherman D., estate of. Edwin D. Lyford, executor, 
. petitioner. Petition for instructions. Submitted to de- 
termination of the court. 

Winter, Sarah J., estate of. Wesson Memorial Hospital, trus- 
tee, petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. 
Decree. 

Hampshire County. 

Curtis, Herbert F., et al. v. Belchertow^n Baptist Religious 
Society et als. Petition for authority to convey real 
estate. Submitted to the determination of the court. 

Russell Church in Hadley. Francis S. Reynolds, trustee. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 



160 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Tuckerman, Edward, estate of. Charles E. Cotting et aL, 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of twelfth 
account. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Middlesex County. 

Blood, Benjamin F., estate of. George G. Waite et als., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of second ac- 
count. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bull, Sara C., estate of. Joseph G. Thorp et at. v. John Lund 
et at. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Carpenter, Harriet E., estate of. Wilbur B. Parshley et aL, 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for authority to sell real 
estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Choate, Charles G., estate of. John M. Harlow et als., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of third account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Copeland, Sarah E., estate of. Alba A. Giles, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of second account. Pend- 
ing. 

Dimock, Dwight L., estate of. Marilla M. Haley, trustee, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Eddy, Mary Baker G., estate of. First Church of Christ, 
Scientist, in Boston, trustee, petitioner. Petition for 
authority to transfer real estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Fellows, James K., estate of. Winthrop P. Buttrick et aL, 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Pend- 
ing. 

Fletcher, Joel Emery, estate of. Frank A. Patch, executor. 
Petition for approval of agreement of compromise. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hammond, George P., estate of. Elizabeth F. Johnson, execu- 
trix, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Harvard College, President and Fellows of, v. Attorney-Gen- 
eral. Petition for authority to sell real estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Martin, Webster Warner, estate of. Wesley T. Lee et aL, 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of eleventh 
account. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Mellen, William H., estate of. Town of Framingham, peti- 
tioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. Pend- 
ing. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 161 

Morss, George H., estate of. Henry L. Newhall, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

O'Brien, Bartholomew, estate of. Thomas J. CoJHns, admin- 
istrator c. t. a., petitioner. Petition for instructions. 
Pending. 

Parkhurst, Emeline K., estate of. Arthur F. Pinkham et al., 
executors, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Pend- 
ing. 

Protestant Episcopal Church, Trustees of Donations to the, v. 
The Parish of the House of Prayer. Petition for author- 
ity to sell real estate. Submitted to the determination of 
the court. 

Roberts, James H., estate of. Horace M. Bickford et als., 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of first and 
final account. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Roby, Christopher, estate of. George V. Herrig et al., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of seventeenth 
account. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Smith, George O., estate of. Albert S. Parsons et als., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for authority to sell real 
estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Smith, George O., estate of. Frank D. Peirce et als., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for authority to sell real estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Southwick, Thirza W., estate of. Harry H. Ham, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Talbot, Isabella W., estate of. Adelbert L. Wait et al., peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment of trustees. Pending. 

Warner, Isaac, estate of. Massachusetts Baptist Missionary 
Society, petitioner. Petition for appointment of trustee. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

White, Daniel, estate of. Winslow Warren et al., trustees, peti- 
tionees. Petition for allowance of sixteenth, seventeenth 
and eighteenth accounts. Pending. 

Whitney, Caroline A. R., estate of. Charles A. Stone, trus- 
tee, petitioner. Petition for allowance of first, second 
and final accounts. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Whitney, Edward, estate of. Charles A. Stone et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for sale of real estate. Assented to 
petition. 



162 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Whitney, Edward, estate of. Charles A. Stone et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of first account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wright, Hapgood, estate of. Frank E. Dunbar, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 

Brigham, Elizabeth F., estate of. New England Trust Com- 
pany et al., trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance 
of third and fourth accounts. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Dyer, Benjamin F., et al. v. Attorney-General. Petition for 
instructions. Submitted to the determination of the court. 

Jones, Edwin A., estate of. Henry S. Jones et als., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Lee, Henry, estate of. Schuyler S. Bartlett, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Mann, Jonathan, estate of. Carrie S. Leeds, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for removal of trustee. Pending. 

Quincy, City of, v. James M. Swift, Attorney-General, et als. 
Petition for authority to sell land held in trust and rein- 
vest proceeds. Pending. 

Thing, Samuel B., estate of. Fred S. Sawyer et als., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Plymouth County, 
Perritt, Dora, estate of. Henry W. Barnes, administrator 
c. t. a. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Suffolk County. 

Amory, Francis L, et al. v. Trustees of Amherst College et al. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Bird, John H., estate of. Charles T. Gallagher et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allow^ance of fortieth account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bird, John H., estate of. Charles T. Gallagher et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of forty-first account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Brigham, Robert B., estate of. New England Trust Com- 
pany, trustee, petitioner. Petition for allowance of 
fourth, fifth and sixth accounts. Attorney-General waived 
■ right to be heard. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 163 

Bryant, John D., estate of. Arthur L. Howard el al., execu- 
tors, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Children's Hospital v. iVttorne^^-General et als. Petition for 
authority to sell real estate. Submitted to the deter- 
mination of the court. 

Cushing, Emeline, estate of. xlrchibald H. Grimke et al., 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of first, 
second, third, fourth and fifth accounts. Attorney-Gen- 
eral wai\ed right to be heard. 

Eckley, Frances A., estate of. Francis R. Bangs, trustee, 
petitioner. Petition for allowance of third to sixteenth 
accounts, inclusive. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Gwynne Temporary Home for Children v. Attorney-General 
et als. Petition for authority to transfer property, and 
petition for instructions. Decree. 

Hall, Conray P., et al., trustees, v. Attorney-General. Petition 
for instructions. Decree. 

Hanson, Lydia M., estate of. William A. Robinson, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. iVttorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Harris, Mary, estate of. Elizabeth L. Bond, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Harvard College, President and Fellows of, v. Attorney-Gen- 
eral. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Kimball Union Academy, Trustees of, v. Arthur L. Howard 
et als. Petition to compel trustees to carry out the terms 
of the will of John D. Bryant. Pending. 

Liversidge, Thomas, estate of. Clift Rogers Clapp et als., 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for authority to sell real 
estate. Decree. 

Locke, Elbridge W., estate of. Otis Merriam et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of eleventh and twelfth 
accounts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Locke, Elbridge W., estate of. Otis Merriam et al, trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of thirteenth account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Locke, Elbridge W., estate of. Prescott Chamberlain et al., 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for authority to sell real 
estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Lowe, Janet M., et al. v. Leopold Morse Home for Infirm He- 
brews et al. Petition for instructions. Decree. 



164 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Mabie, William L, et al. v. Edwin S. Gardner and the At- 
torney-General. Petition for instructions regarding a 
public charitable trust under will of Mary Redding. 
Pending. 

Massachusetts Babies' Hospital v. Attorney-General et als. 
Petition for authority to administer fund cy pres. Sub- 
mitted to determination of court. 

Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Society, trustee. Petition 
for authority to sell real estate. Attorney-General as- 
sented to petition. 

Massachusetts General Hospital v. Attorney-General. Peti- 
tion for authority to sell real estate. Decree. 

Newcomb, Helen D., estate of. Alice E. Stedman, adminis- 
tratrix, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Pierce, Katharine C., estate of. Frank S. White et al., execu- 
tors and trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of 
first and final account of executors and first account of 
trustees. Pending. 

Pratt, Sarah E., estate of. Laurence Minot, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for authority to pay legacy. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Ranlett, Leonard B., estate of. Dana D. Holbrook, executor, 
petitioner. -Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Smith, James, estate of. Clarence W. Dealtry, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Warren Avenue Baptist Church v. Attorney-General. Petition 
for authority to use a certain trust fund. Decree. 

Whitney, Mary D., estate of. George E. Bullard et al., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Submitted to 
the determination of the court. 

Withee, Josiah E., estate of. Daniel S. Davis, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Woman's Seaman's Friend Society v. Attorney-General. Peti- 
tion for authority to sell real estate. Decree. 

Worcester County. 

Barton, Clara, estate of. Stephen E. Barton, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for authority to transfer trust fund. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Barton, Clara, estate of. Stephen E. Barton, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 165 

Dudley, Elizabeth M., estate of. Orthodox Congregational 
Church of Petersham, petitioner. Petition for partial 
distribution under will. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Grout, Eliza P., estate of. Robert L, Carter ct als., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of tenth account. 
x\ttorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Potter, Elizabeth A., estate of. Arthur B. Chapin, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Robinson, Charlotte R., estate of. Charles F. Choate et at., 
petitioners. Petition for appointment of trustees. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wellesley College v. Attorney-General. Petition for modifica- 
tion of charitable bequest. Submitted to the determina- 
tion of the court. 



166 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



SUITS CONDUCTED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 

In Behalf of State Boards and Commissions. 



The following cases have been reported to this department 
by State boards and commissions, to be conducted by the 
Attorney-General, or under his direction: — 

1. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Petition to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land, and 
rights and easements in land, by said board. 

Middlesex County. 
Stoneham, Town of, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Ward, George A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

2. Metropolitan Park Commission. / 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said 
commissioners. 

Middlesex County. 
Shea, William P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Hamlin, Edward, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hurley, Margaret, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

3. Massachusetts Highway Commission. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for a jury to assess damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land, or injury 
to land, by said commission. Under agreement with this 
Commonwealth most of these cases are defended by the 
various towns in which the land is situated. 



1916.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 167 



Barnstable County. 
Gibbs, E. Porter, v. Commonwealth. Settled. i 

Wagner, Jeanette, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Berkshire County. '• 

Connelly, William H., v. Commonwealth. Settled. > 

Rogerson, Sophia, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Stevens, John A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Hampshire County. ' 

Flagg, Lucretia Taft, v. Commonwealth. Pending. . 

Taft, Kate P., «. Commonwealth. Pending. , 

Middlesex County. 
Hogan, James J., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Howe, Louis P., n. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Huntington, Herbert R., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
McGee, John P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. ,1 

Nourse, Joseph P., v. Commonwealth. Settled. j 



Norfolk County. 
Ireson, Jennie E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Jordan, S. Annie, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Kneisel, Joseph, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
York, Addie A., et al. '. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Plymouth County. \ 

Lynch, Jennie M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Jones, Lizzie E., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Jones, Lizzie E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Williams, William, et al. i\ Commonwealth. Settled. 

Worcester County, i 

Haven, Herbert J., et al. ?;. Commonwealth. Settled. ^ 

Ray, Foster S., v. Commonwealth. Pending. j 



168 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



4. Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 

Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages \ 

alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said i 
commissioners. 

Suffolk County. j 

Butler, Philip H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. .• 

East Boston Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 1 

Lamb, George, et at. v. Commonwealth. Pending. ■ 
Lamb, George, et al. i. Commonwealth. Pending. 

5. Charles River Basin Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 

alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said j 
commissioners. 

Suffolk County. 

Apthorp, Octave L., i. Commonwealth. Pending. \ 

Barstow, Catherine A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. ] 

Brown, Rebecca W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. J 

Cotting, Charles E., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend- j 

ing. 1 

Edmands, Katherine B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. I 

Fields, Annie, v. Commonwealth. Pending. ] 

Hooper, James R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. ! 

Hooper, Robert C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. ' 

Inches, Louise P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. j 

Jewell, Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending. ^ 
Niles, Sarah F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending, 

Parker, George W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. i 

Pierce, Katherine C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. ' 

Prince, Fannie L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. , 

Prince, Lillian C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. ; 
Sears, Mary C, i. Comrdonwealth. Pending. 
Sears, Richard D., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Shaw, Francis, v. Commonwealth. Pending. ' 

Tarbell, Arthur P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. •, 

Taylor, Georgianna O., v. Commonwealth. Pending. { 

Taylor, Mary M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. i 

Whitney, Christiana S., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. ; 
Williams, John D., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCraiENT — No. 12. 169 

6. Armory Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the 
said board. 

Berkshire County. 
Pittsfield & North Adams Railroad et at. v. Commonwealth. 
Settled. 

Essex County. 
Griffin, Henry, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Worcester County. 
Palmer, Joseph W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

7. State Board of Insanity. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the 
said board. 

Suffolk County. 
Beatty, John F., t. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Callahan, George A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Flint, James H., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Holbrook, Wellington, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Kiley, Daniel J., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Shea, Julia A., et als., trustees, x. Commonwealth. Settled. 

8. Mount Everett Reservation Commission. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts for 
assessment of damages alleged to have been sustained by the 
taking of land, and rights and easements in land, by said 
board. 

Berkshire County. 
Macnaughton, Elizabeth P., «. Commonwealth. Settled. 

9. Directors of the Port of Boston. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said 
board. 



170 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Suffolk Comity. 
Boston V. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Codman, Edmund D., et at., trustees, v. Commonwealth. 

Pending. 
Fitzpatrick, George C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Haskins, Elizabeth S., et ah, trustees, v. Commonwealth. 

Settled. 

10. Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions. 
Essex County. 
Reed, William H., v. Commonwealth. Claim for damages on 
account of injury' to horse on State highway in Gloucester. 
Pending. 
Tremblay, Paul, v. Commonwealth. Action of tort for injuries 
caused by defect in State highway in East Boston. Pend- 
ing. 

Hampden County. 
Ranger, Joseph F., x. Commonwealth. Claim for damages 
on account of injury to automobile, caused by defect in 
State highway. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 
International Automobile and Vehicle Tire Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition for damages to petitioner's prop- 
erty caused by change of east branch of Charles River 
by Park Commission. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Blaw Steel Construction Company v. Commonwealth et at. 
Claim for money due for use of steel forms in construc- 
tion of a section of the metropolitan sewer. Pending. 

Boudreau, William, i. Commonwealth. Action of tort to re- 
cover for personal injuries caused by defect in a State 
highway. Pending. 

Davis, James A., et al. v. Commonwealth et at. Petition to re- 
cover for labor and materials used in construction of 
sewer. Pending. 

De las Casas, William B., et al. v. Sewer Commissioners of 
Revere. Petition for injunction to restrain town from 
obstructing sewer built by the Park Commission for bath- 
house. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCmiENT — No. 12. 171 

Dicke}^ Lero}^ W., v. Commonwealth et al. Claim for money 
due the petitioner for materials furnished Joseph Wagen- 
bach & Son in the construction of a section of State high- 
way in Dracut. Pending. 

Doherty, James, v. Edward W. Everson ei al. and Metropoli- 
tan Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Dam- 
ages caused b}^ blasting. Pending. 

Doherty, James, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. 
Pending. 

Ellinwood, Ralph R., Commonwealth v. Petition to restrain 
respondent from infringing park regulations on Revere 
boulevard. Pending. 

Gibbons, William H., v. Commonwealth. Damage caused by 
blasting in construction of metropolitan sewer. Pending. 

H. B. Smith Company v. Commonwealth. Claim for money 
due under contract for Boston State Hospital. Pending. 

Hildreth Granite Company v. Commonwealth et al. Claim for 
money due the petitioner for materials furnished P. 
Rosetti & Sons in the construction of a section of State 
highway in Revere. Pending. 

Laffie, Martin C, v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to re- 
cover for personal injuries caused by defect in a State 
highway. Pending. 

Laffie, Ralph T., v. Commonwealth. Claim for damage to 
property caused by defect in a State highway. Pending. 

Lake, Alexander G., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to re- 
cover for injuries caused by defect in State highway in 
Natick. Pending. 

McDonough, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Claim for money 
due under contract and for extra work in constructing 
section of State highway. Pending. 

McGinniss, Margaret T., Commonwealth v. Bill in equity to 
restrain defendant from encroaching on land of the Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

National Contracting Company et al., Commonwealth v. Ac- 
tion of contract to recover on bond. Pending. 

Niland, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. 
Pending. 

Niland, Michael, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropoli- 
tan Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Dam- 
ages caused by blasting. Pending. 



172 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Normile, Francis, v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. 
Petition for a jury to assess damages caused by construc- 
tion of sewer in Roxbury. Pending. 

Normile, Francis, v. Edward W. Everson & Co. and Henry H. 
Sprague et al. Action of tort. Pending. 

O'Connell, Dennis F., v. Michael J. McGawley et als. Bill of 
complaint to restrain the respondent McGawle}^ from as- 
signing his interest in a contract entered into with the 
MetropoHtan Park Commission. Pending. 

Old Colony Construction Company, Commonwealth v. Action 
of contract to recover on bond. Pending. 

Pacific Surety Company v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to 
recover from McBride & Co. certain sums expended by 
petitioner. Pending. 

Pitts, Lemuel, v. Commonwealth. Claim for arrears of pay 
due from Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Pending. 

Smith, Frederick W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Claim for 
money due under contract for Boston State Hospital. 
Dismissed. 

Waterproof Leatherboard Company, Henry H. Sprague et als., 
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, v. Bill of com- 
plaint to restrain respondent from discharging factory 
wastes into Beaver Dam Brook. Pending. 

Waterproofing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Claim for 
money due for labor performed on Psychopathic Hospital. 
Pending. 

11. State Boards of Charity and Insanity. 
Actions of contract pending in the Superior Court to re- 
cover charges for the support of persons in State hospitals. 

Suffolk County. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Boxborough, town of. Pending. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Ellen M. Chatham, guardian. Settled. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Chelsea, city of. Pending. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Chelsea, city of. Pending. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. James E. Dunham, guardian. Settled. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Lizzie Hennessey. Pending. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Bertha Levovsky. Pending. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. John McColgan. Pending. 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Lena Morin. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 173 ^ 



Burrill, Treasurer, v. Peabody, town of. Settled. j 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Jacob I. Rosenberg. Settled. ; 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Rutland, town of. Settled. \ 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Elizabeth M. Taylor et al. Pending. { 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. John Tobin. Pending. ; 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. Ware, town of. Settled. ! 

Burrill, Treasurer, v. AYayland, town of. Settled. i 

Mansfield, Treasurer, v. Brookline Friendly Society. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Warren M. Andrews. Settled. i 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Franklin Balch, administrator of the J 

estate of Benjamin H. Potter. Settled. 1 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, city of. Settled. ' 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, city of. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, city of. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, city of. Settled. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Charles F. Bushby. Settled. i 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Caroline R. Clasby. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Caroline R. Clasby. Pending. : 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Mary E. Clasby. Pending. , 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Joseph C. CoUigan. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. John J. Cronin, administrator of the 

estate of Mary Murphy. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Fall River, city of. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. John Grieneeks. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Lowell, city of. Pending. \ 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. New Bedford, city of. Settled. 1 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Emma C. Russell, guardian. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Rutland, town of. Settled. : 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Josiah Ryder. Settled. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Thomas J. Sexton, guardian. Settled. | 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Julia Tully. Settled. \ 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Louise C. Westcott. Settled. 



174 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



MISCELLANEOUS CASES. 



A. J. Tower Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax for the year 1914. Pending. 

Abbott, Lillian, administratrix of the estate of Eunice M. Ab- 
bott, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inher- 
itance tax. Decree. 

Acme White Lead and Color Works v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Adams, Fannie A., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Ahearn, Sarah A., executrix of the will of James McGee, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Aldrich, Frank E., petitioner. Petition to register title to land 
in Northfield. Pending. 

Algomah Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Algomah Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Allouez Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 175 

Allouez Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Amalgamated Nevada Mines Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

x\malgamated Nevada Mines Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Agricultural Chemical Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Agricultural Chemical Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Agricultural Chemical Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Axe and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Axe and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



176 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Hide and Leather Company x. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

American Hide and Leather Companj^ x. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Mutual Liability Insurance Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition for abatement of franchise tax for the 
year 1914. Pending. 

American Piano Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Pneumatic Service Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Pneumatic Service Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 
1915 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Ames Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Ames Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 177 

x\mes Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth, Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Anderson, Mary J., administratrix of the estate of Elizabeth 
P. Anderson, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

Annable, Charles H., et ah, executors of the will of Mary E. 
Annable, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Arizona Commercial Copper Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Arvedson, George C, et als. v. Commonwealth. Bill in equity 
to enjoin the transfer of funds in the hands of the re- 
ceivers in bankruptcy of the American Service Union. 
Pending. 

Asbestos Protected Metal Company v. Common,wealth. Peti- 
tion for abatement of franchise tax. Final decree. 

Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 



178 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Atlas Tack Company i\ Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Atlas Tack Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

B. F. Goodrich Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1915 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

B. T. Babbitt v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise tax 
for the year 1914 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Bailen, Samuel L., executor of the will of Georgie M. Harris, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Baird, Hattie B., executrix of the will of Julian W. Baird, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Baker, George A., administrator of the estate of James T. 
Baker, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Ball, Ellen, executrix of the will of Michael J. Ball, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Dismissed. 

Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Barrett, Josephine, et aL, petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Dennis. Pending. 

Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Belding Brothers & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Belding Brothers & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 179 

Bellows Falls Power Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of franchise tax. Rescript. 

Benson, Francis H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Winchester. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Bentley, Alice L., executrix of the will of Eli E. Bentley, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Berry Brothers, Ltd., v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Berry Brothers, Ltd., v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Bingham Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Bishop, Elias B., et al., trustees, petitioners. Petition for 
registration of title to land in Newton. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Blair, Frank W., administrator of the estate of Mary F. Blair, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Blake & Knowles Steam Pump Works v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Bohemia Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Bond, Lawrence, administrator of the estate of Arthur S. 
Eddy, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

Boston & Corbin Copper and Silver Mining Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 
1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Boston & Maine Railroad et als., Commonwealth v. Bill in 
equity to enforce the provisions of a contract with said 
railroad companies in reference to switching charges. 
Pending. 

Boston & Northern Street Railway Company. Claim for 
amount expended in relaying water pipes in Washington 
Street, Lynn, destroyed by electric currents. Pending. 



ISO ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Boston & Roxbury Mill Corporation, petitioner for dissolution. 
Petition of the Commonwealth for leave to intervene. 
Pending. 

Boston & Worcester Street Railway Company t\ Board of 
Railroad Commissioners. Petition for modification of 
ruhng by Railroad Commissioners. Pending. 

Boston Bedding Supply Company v. Commonwealth et al. 
Petition for assessment of damages alleged to have been 
caused by the passage of legislation restricting the right 
to draw water from the Charles River during certain sea- 
sons. Pending. 

Boston Fish Market Corporation v. Commonwealth. Petition 
for abatement of franchise tax for the year 1915. Pending. 

Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad Company, Attorney- 
General V. Information to enjoin respondent from driving 
piles in and making any erections over tidewater at 
Point Shirley. Pending. 

Boston Rubber Shoe Company, Attorney-General c.v rel. v. 
Information at the relation of the Treasurer and Re- 
ceiver-General for the collection of corporation tax. 
Pending. 

Boston Rubber Shoe Company v. William D. T. Trefry et als. 
Petition to restrain and enjoin defendants from collecting 
franchise tax. Decree. 

Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company, executor of the will 
of Louise W. Rogers, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Peti- 
tion to recover inheritance tax. Decree. 

Boston Securities Company v. Commonw^ealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Boston Securities Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Bosworth, Charles O., executor of the will of John P. Campion, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Boulevard Trust Company v. Comm.onwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Bourne, Inhabitants of, v. Public Service Commission et ciL 
Petition for writ of certiorari. Pending. 

Bowles, George W., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Watertown. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 181 

Bowman, Joseph W., v. Commonwealth. Petition for writ of 
error. Pending. 

Boyden, Benjamin F., et al, administrators of the estate of 
Sarah T. Cart, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to 
recover inheritance tax. Decree. 

Brackett, Arthur L., v. Commonwealth. Petition for assess- 
ment of damages caused by the erection of the Anderson 
Bridge. Charles K. Darling, John T. Swift and Joseph A. 
Conry appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Branigan, Edward B., administrator of the estate of Edward 
W. Branigan, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Decree. 

Breakwater Company t\ Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
• excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Breakwater Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Briggs, Benjamin F., v. Elmer A. Stevens, Treasurer and Re- 
ceiver-General. Appeal from decree of Land Court. 
Pending. 

Bristol County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Information at the relation of the In- 
surance Commissioner for violation of insurance laws. 
Injunction issued. 

Brookside Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

Brookside Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Brookside Mine v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

Brown, George E., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Walpole. Decree. 

Browning, King & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Bruce, George H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Winthrop. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Bryne, Andrew W., et als. v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to 
recover money in hands of Commonwealth. Pending. 



182 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Buckner, Helen Frances, petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Franklin. Pending. 

Bullard, John C, executor of the will of Justina Dennison, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Bullard, John D., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Hyde Park. Pending. 

Bunzel, Gustave, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Bill in equity to 
restrain the respondent from conducting the business of 
slaughtering in Lexington. Decree. 

Burke, Edmund, administrator of the estate of John Kelley, 
Attorney-General ex rel. x. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Burkhardt, Mary A., executrix of the will of Maria Shanley, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Burrage, Clarence V., et al., trustees, petitioners. Petition for 
registration of title to land in Marshfield. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Burroughs, George, v. Commonwealth. Claim for reimburse- 
ment for damage caused by fire set by emplo^'ces of 
State Forester. Pending. 

Butchers' Slaughtering and Melting Association v. Common- 
wealth. Petition for assessment of damages caused by the 
erection of the Anderson Bridge. Charles K. Darling, 
John T. Swift and Joseph A. Conry appointed commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Butler, Robert, v. Edward F. McSweeney et als., Directors of 
the Port of Boston. Petition for writ of mandamus to 
compel reinstatement of petitioner in the position of 
mechanical foreman. Pending. 

Calumet & Hecla Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Calumet & Hecla Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Campbell, Francis A., administrator of the estate of Jane 
McLaughlin, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to 
recover inheritance tax. Decree. 

Campbell, Louise H., et al., petitioners. Petition for registra- 
tion of title to land in Wareham. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 183 

Campbell, Louise H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Wareham. Pending. 

Carey, William H., executor of the will of Annie Mitchell, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Carnegie Steel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1915 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Casey, Mary N., et al., trustees, petitioners. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Cates, Abbie Holder, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Pembroke. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Centennial Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Centennial Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid b}' foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid })y foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for. the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Charlestown Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Chicopee, city of, v. Commonwealth. Claim for difference in 
amount of money allowed by the State Board of Charit}' 
and amount expended by the town in treatment of 
typhoid patients. Disposed of. 

Childs' Dining Hall Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



184 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Childs' Dining Hall Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Clark, Mary M., executrix of the will of Elizabeth N. Clark, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Rescript. 

Clark, T. Frank, ct al., administrators of the estate of George 
E. Clark, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Clements, Lydia R., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Harwich. Pending. 

Columbian National Life Insurance Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petitions for abatement of franchise tax paid in 
1903, 1904, 1905, 1906 and 1907. Pending. 

Commonwealth v. Worcester. To recover for land taken from 
the Commonw^ealth. Pending. 

Connolly, Arthur T., executor of the will of Elizabeth Ward, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Continental Mills r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

Copper Range Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Copper Range Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Copper Range Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Copper Range Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 



1916.J PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 185 

Copper Range Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Copper Range Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Corrigan, James, administrator of the estate of Honora Lane- 
gran, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

Cosmopolitan Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Costello, Dennis J., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in North Andover. Pending. 

Costello, Francis M., executor of the will of Julia L. Manuel, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Coughlan, William J., executor of the will of Rhoda B. Ellis, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Crane, Charles T., executor of the will of Bridget O'Connor, 
Attorney-General ex rel. i\ Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Creaden, William T., administrator of the estate of Nellie 
Reardon, Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending.. 

Critcherson, William R., executor of the will of Lucy D. 
Monroe, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Crossett, Lewis A., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Coha'sset. Pending. 

Cudahy Packing Company v. Commonw^ealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

CuUiton, Edward J., et ah, executors of the will of Lucy D. 
Culliton, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Culver, Maude M., executrix of the will of James Chauncey 
Smith, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Cunningham, Henry V., et al., executors of the will of Ellen L. 
Conway, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 



186 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Curtis, Caroline G., et al., petitioners. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land in Swampscott. Pending. 

Daley, Ellen, petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in North Andover. Pending. 

Dal}^, John F., administrator of the estate of Margaret Finn, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Dana, Harold W., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Marblehead. Pending. 

Daniels, Leon, executor of the will of Susan Moore, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Decree. 

Davis Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Davis Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Dean, John J., ct al., executors of the will of Thomas H. Buck- 
ley, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inher- 
itance tax. Pending. 

Decrow, John W., ei al., executors of the will of Ellen A. 
Denver, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

De las Casas, William B., et al.. Metropolitan Park Commission, 
petitioners. Petition for appointment of commissioners 
to apportion payments from the cities and towns in the 
metropolitan parks district. Decree appointing Robert O. 
Harris, George S. Taft and J. H. P. Dyer as commissioners. 

Dewey, Henry S., v. State Officers. Actions to replevy copies 
of notes of proceedings in the case of Dewey v. Good Gov- 
ernment Association. Pending. 

Dickinson, Albert L., administrator of the estate of Frank H. 
O'Keeffe, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Dineen, Timothy, executor of the will of Julia Dineen, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

di Pesa, Alfred, petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land. Pending. 

Dogherty, Charles M., executor of the will of Caroline A. 
Gillmore, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 187 

Doherty, Owen J., administrator of the estate of Maria 
Doherty, iVttorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Dolan, Bridget, executrix of the will of Mary McKiernan, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Donahue, Abbie A., executrix of the will of Abbie McDonald, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Donnelly, Amy F., executrix of the will of Charles F. Don- 
nelly, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

Dorchester Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Drew, George A., et al., petitioners. Petition for registration of 
title to land. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Drohan, John, executor of the will of Anastasia Clapp, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Decree. 

Duddy, Joseph H., petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Rescript. 

Duffin, Simon E., administrator of the estate of Julia A. C. 
Holden, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Duffy, Elizabeth, executrix of the will of John Finnerty, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Dumas, Alfred J., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Salem. Pending. 

Dunham, Hervey, executor of the will of Sarah E. Lane, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Dismissed. 

Dunmore, Robert F., administrator of the estate of Francis 
E. B. Lewis, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

Eagleston, Allen P., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Gay Head. Pending. 

East Boston Company v. Directors of the Port of Boston. 
Writ of entry. Pending. 

East Butte Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 



188 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

East Butte Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

East Butte Copper Mining Company i\ Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Eastman, Charles Albert, v. Board of Registration in Medicine. 
Bill in equity to enjoin Board from revoking certificate. 
Pending. 

Edgerly, Frank H., et al. v. Cattle Bureau. Bill to recover for 
horse killed by order of Cattle Commissioner under R. L., 
c. 90. Pending. 

Edwards Manufacturing Company' v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Edwards Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Elm River Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Ely, John S., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to land 
in Scituate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Ennis, John D., et al., administrators of the estate of Edmund 
Walsh, Attorney-General e.x rcl. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Enright, Thomas N., administrator of the estate of Patrick 
O'Brien, Attorney-General (\v rcl. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Everton, Elfonso I., administrator of the estate of Charles H. 
Dimond, Attorney-General c.v rcl. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Ewart, James B., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in North Andover. Pending. 

E. Blumenthal Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Fairbanks Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Fairbanks Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 189 

Fallon, John, executor of the will of Kate Fallon, iVttorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Decree. 

Farr Alpaca Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax for the year 1912. Final decree. 

Fenno, Ellen M., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Falmouth. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Fidelity Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Field, John Q. A., executor of the will of Caroline Wood, At- 
torney-General ex rel. V. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Field, Lizzie K., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Bourne. Pending. 

Fields, Annie, v. Charles River Basin Commission. Bill to 
enjoin Commonwealth from interfering with riparian 
rights on Charles River. Pending. 

Fishley, Cora O., executrix of the will of Edward E. Fishley, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Fitzgerald, Francis B., executor of the will of Kate Howlett, 
Attorne\'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Fleming, Henry E., r. State Board of Health. Appeal from 
an order of the State Board of Health in regard to the 
use of ice cut from Flax Pond. Pending. 

Fleming, Peter, executor of the w^ill of Margaret Fleming, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Foley, Hannah, administratrix of the estate of Honora Foley, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Foss-Hughes Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax. Pending. 

Fowler, Charles F., executor of the will of Eliza E. Crocker, 
Attornej— General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Framingham Trust Company i\ Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 



190 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Franklin County Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
for abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Franklin Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Franklin Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Frontenac Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Frontenac Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Fuller, Edgar S., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Falmouth. Pending. 

Gadsby, John F., ct cd. v. David Snedden, Commissioner of 
Education. Petition for writ of mandamus to compel 
the Commissioner of Education to require the school 
committee of Cambridge for the year 1914-15 to print 
and distribute the annual report of the committee for the 
year 1913-14. Petition dismissed. 

Gaffey, John B., administrator of the estate of Mary J. 
Gaffey, Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Galena Signal Oil Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Galena Signal Oil Company i'. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Gamash, David, petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Ludlow. Pending. 

Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Company r. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Gardener, William R., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Pittsfield. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 191 

General Electric Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1915 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Georgia Home Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. 
Action to compel Treasurer and Receiver-General to 
return bond deposited with him b}' said company. 
Pending. 

Gillingham, James L., administrator c. t. a. of the estate of 
Ann E. Mitchell, Attorney-General ex rel. i\ Petition 
to recover inheritance tax. Pending. 

Glendon, John, petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
Pending. 

Goodale, David, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Hudson. Pending. 

Gorton-Pew^ Fisheries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Gorton-Pew Fisheries Company r. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Grant, Robert, Judge of Probate, r. William W. Risk et ah 
Contract on bond as public administrator. Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company- v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Graves, Esther H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Marblehead. Pending. 

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid b\' 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Great ^Yestern Cereal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 



192 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Greenwood, Elizabeth C; executrix of the will of Bridget 
Tannahan, Attorney-General ex rcl. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Griffin, James E., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Gloucester. Pending. 

Gutta-Percha and Rubber Manufacturing Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 
1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

H. H. Mawhinney Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of franchise tax for the year 1914. Final decree. 

Hale, Josiah L., executor of the will of Pauline H. Patterson, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Hall, Irving G., executor of the will of Mary Ann Cushing, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Hamlin, Katharine B., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Marion. Pending. 

Harmon, Rollin H., Judge of Probate, v. Samuel D. Hildreth 
et al. Action to recover on administrators' bond. Pend- 
ing. 

Harrington, Charles C, executor of the will of Elizabeth A. 
Harrington, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

Hascy, Harvey W., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Hingham. Pending. 

Hatch, Elizabeth M., ct al., petitioners. Petition for registra- 
tion of title to land in Bourne. Pending. 

Hays, Martin, et al. v. American Service Union. Bill of com- 
plaint to enjoin the transfer of funds in the hands of the 
receivers in bankruptcy of the respondent. Pending. 

Healy, Mary, executrix of the will of Patrick Healy, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jew^ell Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 193 

Henry K. Wampole & Co., Inc., v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Hill, Annie Leslie, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Webster. Pending. 

Hill, Benjamin T., executor of the will of Sarah Weiss, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Hill, Charles S., ct ah., petitioners. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Lynn. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Hobart, George A., administrator of the estate of Myron L. 
Hobart, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Hobart, Lillian M., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Hull. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Holden, Nicholas F., v. Civil Service Commission. Petition for 
writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to authorize 
the reinstatement of the petitioner as a member of the 
police department of Worcester. Pending. 

Holland, Jeremiah S., administrator of the estate of John 
W. Holland, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

Holmes, Thankful A., executrix of the will of James Churchill, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Holyoke, Eliza J., et al., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Pepperell. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Homer, Henry G., executor of the will of Mary E. Homer, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Honors, John R., administrator of the estate of Benjamin O. 
Honors, AttorneyTGeneral ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Honors, John R., v. A. H. McDonald, building inspector. 
Petition for an order of court restraining enforcement of an 
order issued by the respondent as building inspector. 
Pending. 

Houghton Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the jear 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



194 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Houghton Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Houghton, Neidhard H., administrator of the estate of Julius 
H. Houghton, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Dismissed. 

Howland, John W., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Westport. iVttorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Hoyt, Grover C, v. Alfred W. Donovan et als. Petition for 
writ of mandamus to compel the State Board of Labor 
and Industries to reinstate the petitioner as its secretary. 
Disposed of. 

Hunt, Guy H., executor of the will of Edwin Hunt, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Decree. 

Hurd, Roger H., et ah., executors of the will of Theodore C. 
Hurd, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Dismissed. 

Hurd, William M., executor of the will of Myra W. Hurd, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

International Paper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

International Paper Company t. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1915 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Isle Royale Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid b}' foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Isle Royale Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Jackson Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover ex- 
cise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Jackson Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover ex- 
cise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Jacob Dold Packing Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign cor- 
poration". Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 195 

James Cunningham Son & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

James Cunningham Son & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Jenkins, Alexander C, trustee under the will of Alexander C. 
Adams, Attorney-General ex rcl. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Disposed of. 

Jenney, E. C, executor of the will of Maria P. Stark, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Jennings, Malachi L., administrator of estate of Mary McGee- 
han, Attorney-General ex rcl. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Kattler, Gertrude M., administratrix of the estate of Elias M. 
Dustin, Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Keady, Edward J., executor of the will of Mary A. Keady, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Kearns, Thomas F., administrator of the estate of Mary 
Galligan, iVttorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Keefe. Mary E., administratrix of the estate of Kate Dawson, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Ke'iher, William J., petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Pending. 

Kennedy, Ellen F., t. W. A. Penniman, State inspector of 
buildings. Petition for injunction to restrain inspector 
from enforcing building laws. Decree. 

Kennelly, James, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in North Andover. Pending. 

Kernwood Country Club, petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Salem. Pending. 



196 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Keymes. William, administrator of the estate of James Keymes, 
V. Commonwealth. Petition to recover bank deposit in 
the hands of the Treasurer. Pending. 

Kiernan, James F., administrator of the estate of Patrick F. 
McKenna, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

King, George A., v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover bank 
deposit in hands of Treasurer. Decree. 

King Philip Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

King, Walter C, et al., administrators of the estate of Albert 
Dodge, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Kingman, Morton A., executor of the will of Fidelia H. Wil- 
bar, Attornej'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

Knight, Austin H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land. Pending. 

Lafayette Savings Bank, Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank 
Commissioner, v. Information to restrain the respondent 
from further prosecution of its business. Injunction 
issued. 

Lake Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Lake Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Lake Milling, Smelting and Refining Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lake Milling, Smelting and Refining Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lake Superior Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Lamont-Corliss Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Lamont-Corliss Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 197 

Lamson Consolidated Store Service Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lanagan. Frank E., executor of the will of Nancy L. Lanagan^ 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company %\ Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation., Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Larkin, P. O'Neill, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
bank deposit in hands of Treasurer. Decree. 

LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

LaSalle Copper Company t. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

LaSalle Copper Company i\ Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Laurium Mining Company x. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Laurium Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Lawrence Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Leonard, Fred M., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Duxbury. iVttorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 



198 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Leonard, Sarah E., executrix of the will of Otis L. Leonard, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Lever Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Lever Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Libby, George W., administrator of the estate of Oliver Libby, 
Attorney-General ex rel. t. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Linehan, Daniel J., executor of the will of Isabella McGean, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Liquid Carbonic Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Liquid Carbonic Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Liquid Carbonic Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Locomobile Company of America v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Locomobile Company of America v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Locomobile Company of America v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Long, John D., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Hingham. Pending. 

Low, Isabella B., et al., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Peabody. Pending. 

Macurdar, William E., et al., petitioners. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Maguire, James H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Nantucket. Pending. 



1916.] PLTBLIC DOCUMEXT — Xo. 12. 199 

Mahar, Joseph P., executor of the will of Thomas J. Rehill, 
Attorney-General ex rcJ. r. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Manchester, Abraham, executor of the will of Abraham E. 
Manchester, Attorney-General ex rcl. t-. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

Manitou Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Manitou Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Mann, Edwin M., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Manning, John P., executor of the will of Rose Ann Leach, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Mansfield, Henry K., executor of the will of Anna A. Dean, 
Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America, petitioner. 
Petition for registration of title to land. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Massachusetts Consolidated Mining Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Massachusetts Consolidated Mining Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Massachusetts Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
for abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Mayflower Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Mayflower Mining Company' v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

McCallum, Xellie, executrix of the will of Ellen Beggs, At- 
torney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Dismissed. 



200 ArTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

McCann, Charles J., et al. v. Charles Warren et als., Civil Serv- 
ice Commissioners. Petition for writ of mandamus to 
compel certification of the petitioners' names by the Civil 
Service Commissioners. Decree. Appeal by petitioners. 
Waiver of appeal filed. 

McCaule}^, George D., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Springfield. Decree. 

McCormick, Thomas, executor of the will of Annie M. 
McCormick, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

McCullough, Annie N., t. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover unclaimed bank deposit in the hands of the Treas- 
urer. Pending. 

McDermott, Patrick H., administrator of the estate of Daniel 
J. Crowley, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Decree. 

McDonald, Theodore H., Insurance Commissioner of Connect- 
icut, V. The ^Etna Indemnity Company. Intervening 
petition of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Pending. 

McGee, Patrick S., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Attleboro. Pending. 

McGuirk, Ann, executrix of the will of Terrence Farley, Attor- 
ney-General ^.i- rel. V. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Mclnerney, Michael, executor of the will of James Mclnerney, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Mclntire, Charles H., trustee under the will of Maria T. Clark, 
Attorney-General ex rel. t. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

McQuaid, John, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Pittsfield. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Medford Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

Melanson, Jude S., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land. Pending. 

Merrill, Charles E., administrator of the estate of Clara F. 
W^ebster, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise taxes for the years 1909 and 
1910 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 



191G.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 201 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Frank H. Hardison, 
Insurance Commissioner. Petition for review. Reserved 
for full court. Rescript. 

^Michigan Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

]\Iidvale Steel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

INIidvale Steel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Midvale Steel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1915 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Miller, William A., executor of the will of John Miller, At- 
torney-General ex rel. V. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Moore, William H., d aL, executors of the will of Edward W. 
Murray, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Morrill, Mary E., executrix of the will of Frank E. Duncan, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Morrison, Willard N., executor of the will of Alice el. Holder, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Moses, Kalman, Commonwealth v. Suit for goods furnished 
by Massachusetts State Prison. Settled. 

IMurphy, Mary E., executor of the will of Delia Martin, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Murphy, Michael, v. Harrie W. Pierce, Agent of the Commis- 
sioner of Animal Industry. Claim for damages for death 
of horse. Pending. 

Murray, James H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Salisbur}^ Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Nantucket Cranberr}^ Company, petitioner. Six petitions for 
registration of title to land in Nantucket. Disposed 
of. 

Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



202 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

National Casket Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

National Casket Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

National Contracting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover under R. L., c. 201. Pending. 

National Dock and Storage Warehouse Company v. Boston 
& Maine Railroad. (Interstate Commerce Conjmission.) 
Petition of the Commonwealth to intervene. Pending. 

National Dock and Storage Warehouse Company v. Frederick 
J. MacLeod ct als., Public Service Commission. Petition 
for writ of mandamus to compel the Commission to en- 
force compliance with an order entered by it. Pending. 

Needham, Rubina, executrix of the will of Bridget Harran, 
Attorney-General ex rcl. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Tax abated. 

New England Maple Syrup Company v. Henry P. Walcott 
et als. Bill in eguity for an injunction. Pending. 

Newell, Edward J., executor of the will of Mary Jackson, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Newport Fisheries, Ice and Cold Storage Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition for abatement of franchise tax for 
the year 1912. Pending. 

Newton, Frank B., v. Commonwealth. Petition for assess- 
ment of damages alleged to have been sustained by reason 
of the erection of a bridge across the Neponset River. 
Pending. 

Nickerson, Horace W., et ciL, petitioners. Petition for registra- 
tion of title to land in Barnstable. Pending. 

Niles, Elizabeth W., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Noonan, John G., administrator of the estate of Patrick 
Noonan, Attorney-General ex rcl. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 203 

Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Noyes, George E., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Swampscott. Pending. 

Nye, Esther F., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land. Pending. 

O'Donohue, Lillie B., executrix of the will of Joseph J. O'Dono- 
hue, Attorney-General ex rcl. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

O'Gorman, John P., petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in behalf of Margaret O'Gorman. Disposed of. 

O'Hearn, James T., executor of the will of Patrick H. Madden, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Old Colony Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Disposed of. 

O'Leary, Honora, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in North Andover. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Company i\ Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



204 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Osceola Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 

Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 

foreign corporation. Pending. 
Osceola Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 

Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 

foreign corporation. Pending. 
Osceola Consolidated Mining Company' i\ Commonwealth. 

Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 

foreign corporation. Pending. 
O'Shea, William, executor of the will of Walter I. Tapley, 

Attorney-General e.v rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 
Oxman, Maurice, Commonwealth v. Suit for goods furnished 

by Massachusetts Commission for the Blind. Settled. 
Packard, Frank E., administrator of the estate of Mary K. 

Keith, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 

inheritance tax. Pending. 
Paddock, Jay J., administratrix of the estate of Marion L. 

Pierce, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 

inheritance tax. Pending. 
Page, Mary B., administratrix of the estate of Lucinda Carter, 

Attorney-General ex rel. i\ Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 
Paige, Maurice H., administrator of the estate of Jane G. 

Paige, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 
Parker, Galen A., executor of the will of Martha R. Temple, 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 

tax. Pending. 
Patten, Ina F., administratrix of the estate of Carrie M. Fitz, 

Attorney-General ex rel. i\ Petition to recover inheritance 

tax. Pending. 
Perkins, Charles A., administrator of the estate of Alice M. 

Field, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 

inheritance tax. Decree. 
Pickthall, Richard E., executor of the will of Elizabeth A. 

Pickthall, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 

inheritance tax. Decree. 
Pierce, George H., et ah, petitioners. Petition for registration 

of title to land in Manomet. Disposed of. 
Pillsbury Flour Mills Company li. Commonwealth. Petition to 

recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



1916.] . PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 205 

Pillsbuiy Flour Mills Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid b^" foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Pillsbury Flour Mills Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Piper, Edith B., executrix of the will of Frederick B. Fanning,. 
Attorney-General ex rel. t. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Plymouth County Trust Company v. Commonw^ealth. Peti- 
tion for abatement of tax on deposits in savings depart- 
ment of trust compan3^ Disposed of. 

Poole, Clara I., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Weymouth. Pending. 

Pope Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Pratt, Eliza Groves, executrix of the will of Eliza Groves, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Preston, Frederic G., executor of the will of Francis L. Sears, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Priest, Charles H., executor of the will of John B. Kennedy, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Pullman Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1915 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Pullman Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover sur- 
tax for the year 1915 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Purinton, Charles S., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Plymouth. Disposed of. 

Putnam Machine Company, petitioner. Petition for registra- 
tion of title to land in Fitchburg. Pending. 

Quaker Oats Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Quaker Oats Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the 3'ear 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



206 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Quirk, Charles L, executor of the will of William Byrne, At- 
torney-General e.v reh v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Ranlett, Orrin B., 2d, executor of the will of Hannah F. 
Clark, Attorney-General ex rel. t. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Dismissed. 

Read, J. Bertram, et al. v. John A. Keliher et als., State House 
Building Commission. Bill in equity to restrain defend- 
ants from obstructing and interfering with the use of Han- 
cock Avenue. Pending. 

Reardon, Michael J., executor of the will of Michael Reardon, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Redfern, Mary E., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Swampscott. Pending. 

Regal Shoe Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Regal Shoe Company i\ Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Reilley, William J., et al, executors of the will of Charles A. 
Goessman, Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Rice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Rice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Richards, Fred J., et al., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Springfield. Pending. 

Richardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Richardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Richardson Silk Company i\ Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending, 

Ritchie, Christina, v. Treasurer and Receiver-General. Action 
of contract under R. L., c. 128, § 96. Disposed of. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 207 

Robinson, Charles H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Nantucket. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Roche, Teresa G., administratrix of the estate of Mary A. 
Roche, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Rockland-Rockport Lime Companj^ v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Ross, John H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Hingham. Pending. 

Roundry, George H., administrator of the estate of Mary E. 
Wigley, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Dismissed. 

RusseU-Miller Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Russell-Miller Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Sanford, Alpheus, executor of the will of Lemuel C. Stowell, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Schaaf, John L., administrator of the estate of Nicholas A. 
Schaaf, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Dismissed. 

Schaefer, Gustav, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Scott, Joseph R., et al., administrators of the estate of Robert 
W. Scott, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Seager Engine Works v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Sealshipt Oyster System v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Sealshipt Oyster System v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Seneca Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



208 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORP. [Jan. 

Senior, Mary E., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Medway. Pending. 

Sexton, Clara E., v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover un- 
claimed bank deposit in the hands of the Treasurer. 
Pending. 

Sexton, William H., ct al., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Shannon Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Shannon Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Shapleigh, Samuel B., executor of the will of Ellen L. Shap- 
leigh, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Silver, Clara J., executrix of the will of Manuel de Oliveira, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Simonds, Nathan, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Halifax. Pending. 

Simons, Charles L., v. Commonwealth. Claim for reward 
offered by Commonwealth for apprehension of the murderer 
of Martha B. Blackstone. Pending. 

Simpson, Esther P., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Chelmsford. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Skehill, Patrick J., administrator of the estate of John E. Ske- 
hill, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Rescripts 

Sloan, Benjamin B., executor of the will of Mary J. Wheelock, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Smith & Dove Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Decree. 

Smith, Amoz, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Edgartown. Pending. 

Smith, Curtis Nye, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Edgartown. Pending. 

Somerville, City of, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover for 
aid furnished indigent persons. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 209 

South Lake Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

South Lake Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Springfield Breweries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Springfield Breweries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

St. Mary's Mineral Land Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

St. Mary's Mineral Land Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Stafford Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Stafford Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Standard Plunger Elevator Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Starkey, Peter, executor of the will of Jesse Thomas Paine, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Stirlith, Annie, executrix of the will of Deborah Quigley, 
Attornej^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Stoughton Mills, Incorporated, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Bill in equity to enjoin defendant from discharging waste 
into Neponset River. Pending. 

Strauss, Leon, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Marblehead. Pending. 

Submarine Signal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Submarine Signal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending:. 



210 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Sugden Press Bagging Company, petitioner. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land in West Chelmsford. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Sullivan, Florence, Trustees of Massachusetts Training Schools 
V. Claim for wages due Mary Lynch, State ward. Pend- 
ing. 

Sullivan, Jeremiah, administrator of the estate of William 
Pearson, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Sullivan, John H., executor of the will of Johanna Sullivan, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Sullivan, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover bank 
deposit in hands of Treasurer. Pending. 

Superior Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Superior Copper Compan}^ v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Swampscott, Town of, v. Richard L. Beyer. Appeal from 
order of inspector of factories and public buildings. 
Pending. 

Swift, Lindsay, executor of the will of Sarah Allen Swift, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Symmes, Arthur P., executor of the will of Am.os W. Trow, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance. Pending. 

Symonds, Samuel L., executor of the will of John O. Page, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Tamarack Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Tamarack Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Taylor, Henry W., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Plymouth. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Taylor, Violet I., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Brewster. Pending. 



1916.J PUBLIC DOCraiENT — No. 12. 211 

Tiffany, Henry L., et at., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Dartmouth. Pending. 

Trimountain Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Trimountain Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid b}'^ foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

True, Jabez, administrator of the estate of Thomas C. DeCar- 
taret, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

Turley, Thomas J., et al., administrators of the estate of Mary 
Benson, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Tuttle, Horace F., petitioner on behalf of Isabella M. Brooks. 
Petition for discharge from Westborough State Hospital. 
Pending. 

Tyndale, Theodore H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Mashpee. Pending. 

Underwood, Henry O., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Nantucket. Pending. 

Union Copper Land and Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Union Copper Land and Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Union Copper Land and Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Union News Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Union News Company- v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Union Welting Company, petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in East Boston. Pending. 

United States Volunteer Life Saving Corps of Volunteer Life 
Savers, Attorney-General v. Information in the nature of 
quo ivarranto to annul the charter of the respondent be- 
cause of misuse of its charter privileges and franchises. 
Decree. 



212 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

United States Worsted Company, Attorney-General v. Action 
of contract to compel payment of filing fee. Disposed 
of. 

Upham, George F., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in North Brookfield. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Vahey, James H., administrator of the estate of Maria M. 
French, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Valvoline Oil Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Valvoline Oil Company v. Ccmmonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Vanderpoel, Emily M., petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Dartmouth. Pending. 

Van Greenberg, Frank J., petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Lowell. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Vining, Floretta, executrix of the will of Elizabeth Jacobs, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

W. D. Quimby & Co., Inc., v. Robert S. Bisbee et als., Mini- 
mum Wage Commission. Bill of complaint to enjoin 
commission from appointing a wage board for candy- 
makers. Pending. 

W. L. Douglas Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Walen, William W., administrator of the estate of Almira C. 
Walen, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 213 

Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Walsh, Joseph, administrator of the estate of Matthew Merry, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Ward Baking Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Watt, William D., executor of the will of Mary J. Pierson, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Webber, Elizabeth H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Needham, Pending. 

Webster, Anna C. M., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Beverly. Pending. 

Weeks, Harriet M., executrix of the will of James Weeks, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Welch, Mary Ann, executrix of the will of Thomas W^elch, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Welch, William J., v. Hosea M. Quimby, superintendent. Ac- 
tion of tort. Pending. 

Welsbach Street Lighting Company of America v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Welsbach Street Lighting Company of America v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Wentworth, William H., petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Chatham. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Western Union Telegraph Company ct al. v. Calvin H. Foster. 
Petition for review of order of the Public Service Com- 
mission. Pending. 

Western Union Telegraph Company et al., Frederick J. 
Macleod et ah., Public Service Commission, v. Bill of 
complaint to compel compliance with the terms of an 
order of the Public Service Commission. Pending. 



214 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Wheelock, Charles B., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Marblehead. Pending. 

Whitaker, Elbridge J., executor of the will of Oliver Everett, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Whitall-Tatum Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Whitall-Tatum Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

White, Agnes A., et ah, Attorney-General v. Petition for use 
of the Attorney-General's name in an information in 
equity to restrain the defendants from erecting a build- 
ing on certain land in Medford. Use of name allowed. 

White Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

White Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

W^hite Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

White Pine Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

White Pine Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

White Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

White Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Whitford, Edward D., trustee, petitioner. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land in Marblehead. Pending. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 215 

Whittemore, Charles, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Wareham. Pending. 

Whittemore, Charles, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Falmouth. Pending. 

Wholey, William L., executor of the will of Lawrence Cough- 
lin, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Wier, Charles J., v. Commonwealth. Claim for arrears in 
salary alleged to be due petitioner. Pending. 

Willard, George B., v. Frederick J. Macleod et als., Public 
Service Commission. Petition for modification of order 
of Public Service Commission. Pending. 

Willett, Lewis, petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Newburyport. Pending. 

Williams, Charles H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Wilson, John D., executor of the will of John E. Jacobs, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Dismissed. 

Winona Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Winona Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Winslow Brothers & Smith Company, Attorne^^-General ex rel. 
V. Bill in equity to restrain defendant from discharging 
waste into Neponset River. Pending. 

Wolley, William T., executor of the will of Susan C. Smith, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Woodbridge, Charles G., petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Lynn. Pending. 

Wyandot Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 



216 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Young, August, Commonwealth v. Action of contract to re- 
cover for garbage sold by State Prison. Pending. 

Young, Edward P., petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Pending. 

Young, George C., administrator of the estate of Helen C. 
Young, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 



1916.1 



PUBLIC DOCUIMENT — No. 12. 



217 



COLLECTIONS. 



Collections have been made by this department as follows : — 

Corporation taxes for the year 1914, overdue and referred 
by the Treasurer of the Commonwealth to the Attorney- 
General for collection, $442,099 83 

Interest, 5,050 85 

Costs, 2,713 72 

MisceUaneous, 186,038 96 

Total, $635,903 36 



The following table shows a detailed statement of the Cor- 
poration Taxes : — 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






A. A. Brunell Co., Inc., . 


$103 11 


$0 52 


$103 63 


A. C. Jonev Co., .... 


36 18 


1 54 


37 72 


A. Dickey Co., .... 


36 03 


06 


36 09 


A. Dodge & Son Corpn., 


99 37 


- 


99 37 


A. E. Lvon Co., .... 


86 83 


36 


87 19 


A. H. Atkinson Co., 


30 75 


40 


31 15 


A. Himmel Co., .... 


75 97 


78 


76 75 


A. I. Asher Pants Co., . 


151 95 


1 37 


153 32 


A. McArthur Co., . 


1,175 85 


7 05 


1,182 90 


A. R. Andrews Co., 


122 10 


1 09 


123 19 


A. S. Belcher, Inc., 


6 72 


28 


7 00 


A. S. Brock Rubber Co., 


96 00 


38 


96 38 


A. S. CampbeU Co., 


215 52 


1 94 


217 46 


A. S. Dorfman Cigar Co., 


72 36 


4 32 


76 68 


A. S. Tucker Co., . . . . 


8 53 


12 


8 65 


A. W. Emmons Co., 


288 89 


2 51 


291 40 


Abegweit Silver Black Fox Co., . 


11 70 


10 


11 80 


Acme Register Co., 


86 83 


2 02 


88 85 


Adams Pharmacy, Inc., . 


72 36 


67 


73 03 


Adams Square Co., 


94 97 


78 


95 75 


AeoUan Macaroni Co., . 


50 65 


49 


51 14 


Aichess Petticoat Co., . 


23 51 


20 


23 71 


Albany Supply and Chemical Co., 


9 22 


08 


9 30 


Alden Bros. Co., .... 


107 81 


99 


108 80 



218 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1914. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Alden Sheet Metal Working and 

Plumbing Co., 
Aldrich-Chipman Co., . 
Alger Paper Box Co., 
Allen & Fox Express Co., 
Allen, Doane & Co., Inc., 
American Banner Co., . 
American Belting and Tanning 

Co., .... 
American Cloak Co., 
American Coke and Charcoal 

Co., .... 
American Color and Chemical 

Co., .... 
American Cork Co., Inc., 
American Cultivator Pubhshing 

Co., . . . . . 
American DeHvery Co., 
^American Fancier and Stock 

keeper Co., .... 
American Fireworks Co., 
American Grocery Co., . 
American Iron and Metal Co., 
American Silver Black Fox Co., 
American Specialty Co., 
American Stay Co., 
American Steam Gauge 

Valve Manufacturing Co., 
American Watch Tool Co., 
Ames Plow Co., 
Anchor Laundry Co., 
Anderson & Co., Inc., 
Angus Morrison Co., 
Appleton Brass Co., 
Apsley Rubber Co., 
Archibald Wheel Co., . 
Armory Garage, Inc., 
Armour's Pattern Shop Co., 
Aroostook Farming and Lumber 

Co., .... 
Arrah Wanna Moccasin Co., 
Arthur C. Harvey Co., . 
Arthur W. Pope Co., 
Ashoyton Knitting Co., 
Associated Trust, Inc., . 
Atlantic Printing Co., . 
Atlantic Rope and Line Co., 
Atlantic Rubber Co., 
Attleboro Botthng Co., . 
Auburn Last Co., . 



and 



.$90 45 
135 67 

1,025 46 
289 44 

141 10 
21 70 

407 02 

142 91 

73 26 

10 00 
191 19 

43 41 
85 12 

58 61 
167 00 
945 20 

50 05 

200 00 

226 12 

1,085 40 

3,499 25 

128 43 

289 44 

123 01 

12 44 

14 52 

25 32 

8,713 64 

3,909 82 

27 13 

25 32 

27 02 

67 83 

2,405 97 

511 91 
36 18 
29 60 

638 46 
95 04 

276 55 
32 74 

126 44 



$0 75 
61 

5 13 
1 24 
1 42 

16 

3 46 

6 14 

40 



1 67 

60 
37 



54 
37 

80 
40 
00 
96 
95 



30 91 

64 

2 60 

1 09 

12 

24 

203 31 

15 50 

12 



18 

52 

146 82 

4 26 

33 

26 17 

36 

1 29 

16 

94 



$91 20 
139 28 
1,030 59 
290 68 
142 52 
21 86 

410 48 
149 05 

73 66 

10 00 

192 86 

44 01 
65 49 

59 15 
169 37 
960 00 

51 05 

201 00 

228 08 

1,095 35 



3,530 16 


129 07 


292 04 


124 10 


12 56 


14 52 


25 56 


8,916 95 


3,925 32 


27 25 


25 32 


27 20 


68 35 


2,552 79 


516 17 


36 51 


29 60 


664 63 


95 40 


277 84 


32 90 


127 38 



1916. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



219 





Collected on 









Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






August W. Dodge, Inc., 


$58 61 


$0 54 


$59 15 


Austral Window Co. of New 








England, 


7 23 


2 10 


9 33 


Auto Renting Co., . 


45 22 


2 71 


47 93 


Auto Sales Co., .... 


36 18 


33 


36 51 


Autocraft Co., 


106 55 


96 


107 51 


Autogenous Welding Equipment 








Co., 


9 04 


04 


9 08 


Automatic Air Brake Co., . 


54 27 


65 


54 92 


Automatic Appliance Co., 


285 46 


2 85 


288 31 


B. & B. Bed Co., .... 


57 88 


1 73 


59 61 


B. & B. Rubber Co., . 


4,713 20 


37 71 


4,750 91 


B. F. Smith Construction Co., 


727 48 


- 


727 48 


B. F. Sturtevant Co., . 


19,415 88 


132 67 


19,548 55 


B. Feinberg Sons Co., . 


215 72 


1 08 


216 80 


B. Greenwald Co., .... 


272 67 


2 21 


274 88 


B. J. Baker & Co., Inc., 


512 63 


6 32 


518 95 


B. L. Tim Lumber Co., . 


379 89 


1 13 


381 02 


Babson-Dow Manufacturing Co., . 


732 64 


5 11 


737 75 


Back Bay Auto Supply Co., Inc., 


30 39 


09 


30 48 


Back Bay Electrotype Co., . 


108 54 


98 


109 52 


Bacon-Farnum Co., 


130 24 


1 30 


131 54 


Baldwin Chain and Manufactur- 








ing Co., . . 


884 60 


7 08 


891 68 


Bangs & Ramsey Express Co., 


54 27 


43 


54 70 


Barney Leavitt Co., 


30 93 


20 


31 13 


Bartlett Box and Lumber Co., 


235 17 


2 04 


237 21 


Bash Marble and Slate Co., . 


90 46 


81 


91 27 


Bates Piano Co., .... 


158 50 


4 33 


162 83 


Baush Machine Tool Co., 


3,613 83 


30 72 


3,644 55 


Bay State Automobile Co., . 


6 33 


03 


6 36 


Bay State Fuel Co., 


1,590 11 


6 36 


1,596 47 


Bay State Hosiery Co., Inc., 


30 86 


31 


31 17 


Bay State Packing Co., . 


90 45 


80 


91 25 


Bay State Silver Co., 


9 04 


07 


9 11 


Bay State Storage and Warehouse 








Co., 


3,002 94 


15 01 


3,017 95 


Bay State Thread Works, . 


575 80 


5 18 


580 98 


Bay State Tool Handle Co., . 


18 99 


19 


19 18 


Beacon, Inc., The, .... 


217 44 


3 00 


220 44 


Beaconsfield Pharmacy, Inc., 


43 41 


39 


43 80 


Beauvais Water Heater Co., 


194 88 


89 


195 77 


Beckwith Bros. Co., 


108 54 


72 


109 26 


Bedford Coal and Grain Co., 


169 14 


1 51 


170 65 


Belle Vue Mills, . . . . 


767 19 


6 90 


774 09 


Behnont Baking Co., 


81 40 


69 


82 09 


Belmont Spring Water Co., . 


138 46 


3 23 


141 69 


Benj. N. Moore & Sons Co., 


1,752 92 


16 07 


1,768 99 


Bennett Manufacturing Co., 


12 66 


10 


12 76 


Bennett's Inc., . . . . 


108 54 


1 00 


109 54 



220 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Berkshire Cannong Co., 


$31 47 


$0 15 


$31 62 


Berkshire Manufacturing Co. of 








Pittsfield, 


837 83 


7 54 


845 37 


Berkshire Retail Grocery Co. of 








West Stockbridge, Mass., . 


27 13 


- 


27 13 


Bernard Millinery Co., . 


5 42 


07 


5 49 


Bethel Chrome Tanning Co., 


60 00 


51 


60 51 


Beverly Chemical and Supply 








Co., 


7 48 


21 


7 69 


Beverly Mattress Co., Inc., . 


53 18 


1 59 


54 77 


Bilhngs Dental Co., 


31 47 


31 


31 78 


Blanoliard & Co., Inc., . 


147 81 


1 62 


149 43 


Bon-Ton Millinery Co., . 


58 79 


65 


59 44 


Bong Binder Co., . 


8 23 


- 


8 23 


Bonny Brook Farm Co., 


84 44 


90 


85 34 


Borden, Guiney & Kendall Co., . 


357 72 


1 31 


359 03 


Boston Automatic Machine Co., . 


10 00 


- 


10 00 


Boston Baking Powder Co., . 


16 46 


- 


16 46 


Boston Bedding Supply Co., 


112 15 


1 00 


113 15 


Boston Blower Co., 


18 09 


13 


18 22 


Boston Bolt and Iron Co., . 


312 95 


- 


312 95 


Boston Brass Andiron Co., . 


86 83 


99 


87 82 


Boston Chicle Co., .... 


21 70 


22 


21 92 


Boston Commercial Co., 


312 30 


16 18 


328 48 


Boston Drug Co., .... 


149 78 


1 05 


150 83 


Boston Foundry Co., 


95 87 


48 


96 35 


Boston French Range Co., . 


18 09 


- 


18 09 


Boston Hat and Bonnet Frame 








Co., 


81 78 


74 


82 52 


Boston House Wrecking Co., 


53 18 


43 


53 61 


Boston Interior Finish Co., . 


9 04 


09 


9 13 


Boston Market Reporter Pub- 








hshing Co., 


50 00 


2 00 


52 00 


Boston Milling Co., 


97 32 


87 


98 19 


Boston Mortgage Trust, Inc., 


17 36 


- 


17 36 


Boston Optical Co., 


1,183 33 


10 65 


1,193 98 


Boston Pencil Pointer Co., . 


452 43 


4 07 


456 50 


Boston, Providence and Fall River 








Express Co., .... 


73 80 


30 


74 10 


Boston Sash Weight Co., 


25 32 


23 


25 55 


Boston Self-Locking Block Co., . 


6 00 


-""^^ 


6 00 


Boston Specialty Stores Co., 


130 24 


1 25 


131 49 


Boston Stitching and Plaiting Co., 


50 65 


53 


51 18 


Boston Tenninal Refrigerating 








Co., 


354 56 


1 42 


355 98 


Boulevard Pharmacy, . 


72 36 


1 68 


74 04 


Boutwell Bros., Inc., 


1,074 54 


4 30 


1,078 84 


Boyd Motor Co., . 


18 09 


- 


18 09 


Boyden & Co., Inc., 


23 87 


24 


24 11 


Boylston Teaming Co., . 


36 18 


3 07 


39 25 



1916. 



PUBLIC DOCUIVIENT — No. 12. 



221 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Bovnton Coal Co., Inc., 


$107 74 


$0 97 


$108 71 


Bradlec & Chatman Co., 


212 91 


1 01 


213 92 


Braintree Rubber Cement Co., . 


461 29 


12 44 


473 73 


Breton Coal Co., . 


25 00 


33 


25 33 


Bristol Motor Car Co., . 


53 18 


47 


53 65 


Broadwaj^ Garage, Inc., 


5 42 


- 


5 42 


Brockton Drug Co., 


90 45 


82 


91 27 


Brockton Ice and Coal Co., . 


707 39 


6 37 


713 76 


Brookline Press, .... 


17 36 


52 


17 88 


Brooks Construction and Lumber 








Co., .... 


75 97 


62 


76 59 


Brooks Manufacturing Co., . 


231 26 


1 08 


232 34 


BrowTi Credit Co., .... 


65 12 


23 


65 35 


BrowTi Engine Co., 


493 71 


2 14 


495 85 


Brown-Howland Co., 


371 93 


3 03 


374 96 


Brown-^Yales Co., . 


401 59 


2 74 


404 33 


Brown's Enamel Works, Inc., 


35 47 


20 


35 67 


Builders and Buyers Mortgage 








Co., 


226 12 


2 04 


228 16 


Builders' Iron and Steel Co., 


295 69 


15 60 


311 29 


Bunldo Matsuki Corpn., 


34 82 


31 


35 13 


Bunting Stevens Co., 


181 80 


3 94 


185 74 


Burdett College, . . . . 


430 10 


1 94 


432 04 


Burleigh & Martin, Inc., 


45 22 


23 


45 45 


Burt Furniture Co., 


198 99 


1 50 


200 49 


Butler Furniture Co., 


452 25 


4 07 


456 32 


Butman & Cressey Co., . 


394 36 


3 62 


397 98 


C.A.Cook Co., . . . . 


427 90 


1 71 


429 61 


C. C. Blanev Co., . . . . 


119 39 


1 07 


120 46 


C. C. CoghHn-Wilson Electric 








Co., 


173 66 


1 56 


175 22 


CD. Lyons Co., . . . . 


90 45 


95 


91 40 


CD. Wright Co., . . . . 


108 54 


- 


108 54 


C E. Trimibull Co., 


108 54 


90 


109 44 


C F. Tompkins Co., 


298 73 


2 69 


301 42 


C F. Trask Manufacturing 








Co., 


44 00 


29 


44 29 


C G. Howes Co 


217 08 


1 98 


219 06 


C J. Peters & Son Co., . 


370 91 


2 04 


372 95 


C L. Chase & Son, Inc., 


22 97 


10 


23 07 


C P. Lovering Co., 


248 73 


1 97 


250 70 


C P. Thompson Co., Inc., . 


596 97 


6 06 


603 03 


C Sargent Bird, Inc., . 


49 74 


1 72 


51 46 


Cadem Plastering Co., Inc., . 


10 85 


1 00 


11 85 


Cahill Manufacturing Co., . 


27 13 


- 


27 13 


Cambridge Brass Co., . 


65 12 


84 


65 96 


Cambridge Garage Co., . 


17 36 


41 


17 77 


Campbell Electric Co., . 


153 76 


1 05 


1.54 81 


Canton Ice Co., .... 


20 26 


20 


20 46 


Cape Cod Products Co., 


300 29 


6 45 


306 74 



222 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Cape Cod Specialty Co., . . 


U2 51 


$0 37 


$42 88 


Carder Wood Working Co., . 


81 40 


75 


82 15 


Carroll Co., ... 


6 78 


02 


6 80 


Carter, Carter & Meigs Co., . 


2,674 42 


24 07 


2,698 49 


Carver Cranberry Co., . 


419 12 


3 84 


422 96 


Cattaraugus Tanning Co., 


375 00 


1 88 


376 88 


Celcro Drug Co., . . . . 


5 42 


03 


5 45 


Centra] Biscuit Co., 


81 40 


1 90 


83 30 


Central O'J and Gas Stove Co., . 


1,494 77 


11 96 


1,506 73 


Chamberlain Huntress Co., . 


452 25 


1 96 


454 21 


Champion-Draper Co., . 


18 09 


- 


18 09 


Champion Spark Plug Co., . 


36 CO 


18 


36 18 


Champlain A'alley Lime Co., . 


12 00 


06 


12 06 


Chapel Mills Manufacturing Co., 


945 40 


8 51 


953 91 


Charles A. Bald^vdn Co., 


683 71 


4 90 


688 61 


Charles A. Jackson Co., 


45 22 


37 


45 59 


Charles E. Holske Co., Inc., . 


73 59 


50 


74 09 


Charles Emmel & Rose Co., . 


265 92 


4 50 


270 42 


Charles Mav & Son Co., 


303 91 


3 54 


307 45 


Chas. P. Whittle Mfg. Co., . . 


178 63 


6 07 


184 70 


Charles S. Sexton Co 


104 01 


90 


104 91 


Charles W. Blake Co., . 


54 27 


54 


54 81 


Charm P^lectric Co., 


48 98 


32 


49 30 


Chattel Loan Co., . 


846 41 


50 77 


897 18 


Chelsea Bag and Burlap Co., 


26 04 


12 


26 16 


Church Hydroplane Boat and 








Motor Co., 


5 48 


02 


5 50 


Clark & Dupre Mfg. Co., 


158 70 


1 44 


160 14 


Clark, Coggin & Johnson Co., 


335 28 


2 85 


338 13 


Clark Remedies Co., 


10 31 


10 


10 41 


Clearing House Parcel Deliverv 








Co., \ 


601 49 


23 26 


624 75 


Cleghorn Clothing Co., . 


122 10 


61 


122 71 


Clement Co., 


217 OS 


1 89 


218 97 


Cleveland-Cheever Co., . 


790 53 


6 85 


797 38 


Clifton Electro Chemical Co.. 


36 IS 


72 


36 90 


Clinton E. Hobbs Co., . 


137 48 


69 


138 17 


Coates Clipper Manufacturing 








Co., 


90 45 


81 


91 26 


Cochrane Manufacturing Co., 


4,260 14 


142 00 


4,402 14 


Codman & Co., Inc., 


379 89 


3 03 


382 92 


Coh asset Hotel Co 


5 37 


32 


5 69 


Cold Blast Market Co., * . 


26 04 


— 


26 04 


CoUins, Pratt & Graves Co., 


143 77 


1 33 


145 10 


Colonial Counter Co., . 


37 06 


34 


37 40 


Colonial Cranberry Co., 


40 88 


1 22 


42 10 


Colonial Engraving Co., 


36 18 


33 


30 51 


Colonial Match Co., 


55 17 


1 55 


56 72 


Columbia Manufacturing Co., 








Inc., 


36 18 


1 96 


38 14 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 


223 




Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Colurabian Amusement Co., . 


$117 58 


$0 77 


$118 35 


Columbian Corpn., 


2,443 36 


150 07 


2,593 43 


Commercial Credit Co., 


18 09 


15 


18 24 


Commercial Hotel Co., . 


72 36 


58 


72 94 


Commercial Investment Co., 


5 42 


- 


5 42 


Commonwealth Clothing Co., 


94 97 


1 78 


96 75 


Commomvealth Laundry Co., 


54 27 


41 


54 68 


Commonwealth Manufacturing 








Co., 


674 86 


1 80 


676 66 


Connecticut VaUey Street Rail- 








way Co., 


2,953 78 


20 17 


2,973 95 


Converse Rubber Shoe Co., . 


4,373 47 


39 36 


4,412 83 


Cooper & Cooper Co., . 


31 11 


14 


31 25 


Copecut Cranberry Co., 


25 88 


21 


26 09 


Corner Drug Store, Inc., 


43 41 


12 


43 53 


Corrugated Culvert Co. of New 








England, 


15 75 


17 


15 92 


Corset H. Co., .... 


1,049 22 


5 94 


1,055 16 


CosmopoKtan Rubber Co., . 


85 02 


43 


85 45 


Cote Piano Manufactming Co., . 


3,885 73 


161 78 


4,047 51 


Cotuit Oyster Co., .... 


408 72 


3 55 


412 27 


Coughlan & Shells Co., . 


90 45 


72 


91 17 


Coveney Building Co., . 


36 18 


2 26 


38 44 


Covich Finkelstein Co., Inc., 


163 58 


1 47 


165 05 


Crawford-Plummer Company, 


442 86 


- 


442 86 


Cressey Park Co., . 


54 27 


2 33 


56 60 


Crocker Drug Co., .... 


22 61 


23 


22 84 


Cross Coal Co., .... 


312 05 


2 50 


314 55 


Crown Packing Co., 


124 06 


1 03 


125 09 


Crystal Drug Co., .... 


90 45 


4 07 


94 52 


Cullen Brothers Co., 


192 47 


1 73 


194 20 


Cummings & Pearson, Inc., . 


31 53 


25 


31 78 


CummJngs Fish Co., 


16 28 


15 


16 43 


Cummings Machine Works, . 


109 31 


47 


109 78 


Curtis & Cameron, Inc., 


108 54 


1 00 


109 54 


Curtis Drug Co., .... 


14 47 


08 


14 55 


Curtis Provision Co., 


18 45 


20 


18 65 


Cushing Medical Supply Co., 


615 78 


36 94 


652 72 


Cutter & Smith Co., inc.. 


596 97 


5 38 


602 35 


D. Doherty Co., . 


417 24 


3 75 


420 99 


D. L. Rand Co., .... 


7 23 


04 


7 27 


D. W. Mellen Co., .... 


234 44 


1 87 


236 31 


DadmunCo., 


90 45 


3 88 


94 33 


Daggett & Curry Co., . 


119 39 


2 78 


122 17 


Dalton-IngersoU Mfg. Co., . 


1,649 71 


14 30 


1,664 01 


Daly Music PubHsher, Inc., . 


85 80 


40 


86 20 


Dana Hardware Co., 


2,083 11 


18 75 


2,101 86 


Daniel E. Walsh Co., . 


218 23 


- 


218 23 


Daniel Russell Boiler Works, 








Inc., 


27 13 


09 


27 22 



224 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 


1 






Account 
of Corporation 


! 

j Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 


1 




Danvers Laundry Co., .' 


S42 33 


$0 34 


$42 67 


Dart Motor Truck Co. of Mass., . 


10 85 


10 


10 95 


David Irving Co., . . . . 


271 35 


2 44 


273 79 


David J. Ingraham, Inc., 


54 27 


25 


54 52 


David M. Connell Co., . 


60 99 


26 


61 25 


Davies, Rose & Co., Ltd., . 


291 24 


1 35 


292 59 


Davis Hardware Manufacturing 








Co., 


59 69 


45 


60 14 


Da\is-Watson Manufacturing Co., 


48 11 


24 


48 35 


Da\nson Co., 


361 80 


21 70 


383 50 


Decatur-Caddick Lumber Co., . 


45 22 


41 


45 63 


DeLuxe Corpn., .... 


9 04 


07 


9 11 


Deming Park Realty Co., 


33 46 


17 


33 63 


Dewey & Co., Inc., 


144 72 


2 03 


146 75 


Dewey Square Alleys, Inc., . 


79 59 


44 


80 03 


Dine Bros. Co., .... 


369 03 


3 32 


372 35 


Dine Manufacturing Co., 


12 66 


13 


12 79 


Direct Hosiery Co., 


32 59 


29 


32 88 


Dolls' Hospital, Inc., 


21 25 


10 


21 35 


Dorchester Ice Co., 


618 13 


35 22 


653 35 


Dove Machine Co., Inc., 


94 06 


2 65 


96 71 


Dr. Hallock Drug Co., . 


45 22 


41 


45 63 


Dr. Swett Root Beer Co., . 


173 89 


1 13 


175 02 


Drake & Hersey Co., . 


271 35 


2 44 


273 79 


Dreayer Manufacturing Co., 


222 63 


1 54 


224 17 


Druggists' Manufacturing Assn., . 


154 99 


- 


154 99 


Dukelow & Walker Co., 


43 41 


1 42 


44 83 


Dummerston Granite Co., . 


60 30 


51 


60 81 


Dunning & Martin Co., 


26 55 




26 55 


Durand Co., 


217 08 


2 00 


219 08 


Duren & Co., Inc., .... 


27 13 




27 13 


Durgin Shoe Co., .... 


420 59 


1 89 


422 48 


Dyar Supply Co., .... 


231 49 


1 00 


232 49 


E. & R. Cleansing and Dyeing 








Co., 


244 21 


2 03 


246 24 


E. & R. Laundry Co., . 


585 75 


4 88 


590 63 


E. A. King Co., .... 


139 29 


1 26 


140 55 


E. B. Badger & Sons Co., . . 


2,948 34 


22 11 


2,970 45 


E. C. Bo\\Tnan & Son Co., . 


35 54 


28 


35 82 


E. C. Howard Co., .... 


38 98 


34 


39 32 


E. D. Brooks & Co., Inc., . 


253 26 


1 77 


255 03 


E. E. Cole Silver Co 


14 03 


11 


14 14 


E. E. Lincoln Shoe Co., 


72 36 


60 


72 96 


E. G. Tutein & Co., Inc., . 


50 65 


2 18 


52 83 


E. H. Allen Co., . . . . 


72 36 


24 


72 60 


E. H. Ravner Fur Co., . 


75 00 


49 


75 49 


E. H. Severy, Inc., .... 


81 76 


41 


82 17 


E. N. Jackson Co., .... 


47 48 


95 


48 43 


E. 0. Lake Lumber Co., 


43 41 


2 17 


45 58 


E. 0. Proctor Co., .... 


168 68 


1 21 


169 89 



1916. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — x\o. 12. 



225 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1914. 


1 

Interest. 


$25 21 


$0 25 


8 14 


- 


3,618 00 
807 71 


12 66 

7 40 


25 95 


23 


8 14 


- 


24 56 


1 10 


6 51 


19 


70 55 


3 11 


36 18 


30 


11 52 


28 


280 39 


1 31 


52 28 


50 


45 22 


41 


47 48 


4 74 


45 22 


17 


133 70 


8 02 


9 04 


07 


6 51 


05 


17 96 


93 


38 85 


30 


25 77 


23 


226 12 


1 04 


180 90 


6 80 


130 24 


65 


74 16 


27 


45 22 


20 


18 09 


46 


452 25 


1 81 


90 45 


- 


1,854 76 
1,207 50 


9 27 

8 05 


434 16 


3 90 


63 31 


54 


1,145 82 
18 09 


9 93 
16 


5 42 


02 


90 45 


81 


132 41 


4 77 


147 25 


1 03 


18 09 


- 


46 85 


37 


246 02 


5 11 


99 49 


3 76 


12 66 


13 


1,400 00 


16 10 


12 12 


17 



Totals. 



E, R. Brown Beer Pmnp Co., 
E. R. C. Manufacturing Co., 
E. T. Sla.ttery Co., . 

E. W. Ham Electric Co., 
Earle Pro\ision Co., 

East Douglas Clothing Co., . 

Eastburn Press, Inc., 

Eastern Athletic Association, Inc. 

Eastern Avenue Garage, Inc., 

Eastern Fountain Co., . 

Eastern Furniture Co., . 

Eastern Grain Co., . 

Eastern Handle Co., 

Eastern Showcase Co., . 

Eastern Skirt Manufacturing Co. 

Economic Steel Rack Co., 

Economy Toggle Co., 

Edgewood Garage Co., Inc., . 

Edward DriscoU Co., 

Egremont Co-operative Creamery- 
Co., 

Electric Maintenance Co., 

Electro Service Press, 

Elite Manufacturing Co., 

Elliot & Douglas Manufacturing 
Co., 

Ellis, Eddy Co., 

Ellis Financial Reporting Sys 
tern, Inc., .... 

Ehn HiU Provision Co., . 

Elmwood Poultry Farm, Inc., 

Elson Art Pubhcation Co., . 

Emergency Trunk and Bag Co., 

Emerson Shoe Co., . 

Emil Weissbrod & Sons, Inc., 

Empire Grocery Co., 

Empire Ring Traveler Co., . 

Ensign Manufacturing Co., . 

Equity Lunch Co., . 

Ernest J. Porter, Inc., . 

Essex Investment Co., . 

Essex Waste Co., . 

Eureka Syrup Co., . 

Eureka Valve Co., . 

Everett Drug Co., . 

Everett Shoe and Leather Co., 

Everson Manufacturing Co., 

Ewell-Cooper Co., . 

Export Phosphate Co., . 

F. A. Basford Co 



$25 46 

8 14 

3,630 66 

815 11 

26 18 

8 14 

25 66 
6 70 

73 66 
36 48 

11 80 
281 70' 

52 78 
45 63 
52 22 
45 39 
141 72 

9 11 
6 56 

18 89 
39 15 

26 00 
227 16 

187 70 
130 89 

74 43 
45 42 
18 55 

454 06 

90 45 
1,864 03 
1,215 55 

438 06 

63 85 

1,155 75 

18 25 

5 44 

91 26 
137 18 
148 28 

18 09 

47 22 

251 13 

103 25 

12 79 
1,416 10 

12 29 



226 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



F. B. Rogers Silver Co., 
F. B. Taylor & Son, Inc., 
F. E. Atteaux & Co., Inc., 
F. H. Day Co., 
F. H. Lane Co., 
F. H. Putnam Co 
F. H. Thomas Co 
F. J. Ross Co., 
F. L. Goldsmith, Inc., 
F. M. Harris Co., . 
F. S. Carr Rubber Co. 
F. S. McDermott Co., 
F. T. Morcombe, White Co., 
F. T. Mussey Towel Supply Co. 
F. W. Freeman Co., 
F. W. Lombard, 
Fall Brook Cranberrj^ Co., . 
Fall River Daily Herald Publish- 
ing Co., . . . 
Fall River Taxicab Co., 
Farmer's Shoe Shop, Inc., . 
Fashion, Inc., .... 
Federal Paper Box Machinery 

Fells Ice Co., .... 
Felton-TuT-ner Heating Co., . 
Ferd F. French & Co., Ltd., . 
Ferrar & Hutchinson, Inc., . 
Fifth Oakland Sj^ndicate, Inc., 
Finance Club, Inc., 
Fiske & Lane Co., . 
Fitchburg Drug Co., 
Fitchburg Machine Works, . 
Fitchburg Real Estate and Loan 

Co., 

Fitchburg Steam Engine Co., 

Fleming Foundry Co., . 

Fletcher Lumber Corpn., 

Floyd-Scott Co., . 

Foan Brothers Co., 

Foley's Clothing Store, Inc., . 

Folster Dry Goods Co., 

Forde & Nott Co., . 

Foster Company, Inc., . 

Fourth Oakland Syndicate, Inc. 

Fox, Fultz & Co., Inc., . 

Frank E. Fitts Manufacturing 

and Supply Co., . 
Frank L. Roberts Co., . 
Frank P. Bennett & Co., Inc., 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1914. 



Interest. 



$379 89 


$1 64 


416 07 


3 60 


1,197 17 


4 39 


130 24 


39 


318 38 


2 65 


108 54 


1 09 


1,281 65 


10 25 


58 01 


3 65 


10 22 


05 


86 83 


77 


58 79 


34 


90 45 


45 


48 40 


43 


83 21 


79 


45 22 


40 


75 07 


67 


16 64 


13 


440 49 


3 82 


90 45 


91 


36 18 


1 95 


452 25 


5 91 


166 42 


1 42 


271 35 


6 29 


191 03 


50 


158 28 


1 43 


6 33 


- 


24 80 


- 


123 73 


2 81 


607 82 


17 09 


226 12 


2 25 


770 63 


6 55 


106 80 


7 12 


232 45 


1 05 


36 27 


25 


668 42 


5 35 


12 50 


- 


21 70 


15 


90 45 


69 


86 83 


79 


75 97 


70 


144 72 


6 53 


13 90 


- 


192 20 


1 70 


222 94 


99 


18 56 


- 


145 44 


8 72 



Totals'. 



$381 53 

419 67 

1,201 56 

130 63 

321 03 

109 63 

1,291 90 

61 66 

10 27 

87 60 

59 13 

90 90 
48 83 
84 00 
45 62 

75 74 
16 77 

444 31 

91 36 
38 13 

458 16 

167 84 
277 64 
191 53 
159 71 
6 33 
24 80 
126 54 
624 91 
228 37 
777 18 

113 92 

233 50 

36 52 

673 77 

12 50 
21 85 
91 14 
87 62 

76 67 
151 25 

13 90 
193 90 

223 93 

18 56 

154 16 



1916.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



227 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Frank P. Brown Co., . 


$36 90 


$1 55 


$38 45 


Frank Ridlon Co., . . . . 


807 71 


8 62 


816 33 


Franklin Clothing Co., . 


90 45 


45 


90 90 


Franklin Construction Co., . 


90 45 


1 20 


91 65 


Franklin Mills Corporation, . 


167 33 


75 


168 08 


Franklin Park Lumber Co., . 


225 87 


2 03 


227 90 


Fred A. Houdlette & Son, Inc., . 


242 15 


1 09 


243 24 


Frost & Adams Co., 


904 50 


7 16 


911 66 


Frye & Crawford Drug Co., . 


9 04 


09 


9 13 


Fuller Whitney Surveys Corpn., . 


54 27 


40 


54 67 


G. A. Monroe Co., .... 


54 27 


25 


54 52 


G. A. Reidpath Co., 


50 65 


- 


50 65 


G. B. Lawrence Co., 


100 11 


86 


100 97 


G. E. Leadbctter & Sons, Inc., . 


15 91 


09 


16 00 


G. G. Roberts Corpn., . 


404 78 


2 75 


407 53 


G. H. PoUey Co., . . . . 


18 99 


68 


19 67 


G. H. Pulsifer, Inc., . . . 


36 18 


12 


36 30 


G. M. Smith Optical Co., . 


61 05 


1 72 


62 77 


G. W. Lord Co., . . . . 


180 90 


1 80 


182 70 


G. W. Peterson Co., 


9 04 


07 


9 11 


G. W. Sammet & Son Co., . 


663 90 


3 31 


667 21 


G. Wildes Smith Co., . 


19 89 


10 


19 99 


Galassi Mosaic and Tile Co., 


30 39 


10 


30 49 


Gale-Sawyer Co., . 


139 88 


1 19 


141 07 


Gem Stamped-Steel Co., 


239 14 


2 15 


241 29 


George A. Goodridge Co., 


227 93 


13 90 


241 83 


George A. Littlefield Co., . 


271 35 


2 44 


273 79 


Geo. C. Moore Wool Scouring 








Mills, 


253 26 


2 09 


255 35 


George Dietz Co., Inc., . 


12 66 


07 


12 73 


Geo. F. Daniels Corpn., 


1,024 97 


7 68 


1,032 65 


George H. Sallaway Co., 


261 67 


2 28 


263 95 


George H. Sherbert, Inc., 


39 79 


1 71 


41 50 


George H. Snow Co., 


4,150 47 


20 75 


4,171 22 


George J. Tarr Co., 


629 53 


5 77 


635 30 


George S. Stevens Co., . 


36 18 


30 


36 48 


George T. Horan, Inc., . 


334 08 


20 00 


354 08 


George T. Hoyt Co., . 


180 90 


99 


181 89 


George W. Gale Lumber Co., 


610 53 


5 60 


616 13 


Georgetown Gas Co., 


6 33 


- 


6 33 


Gibbons Contracting Co., 


86 83 


1 12 


87 95 


Ghdden Brick Co., .... 


82 45 


41 


82 86 


Globe Counter Co., 


155 57 


1 56 


157 13 


Globe Ear-Phone Co., . 


180 90 


69 


181 59 


Gloucester Basket Ball Assn., 


7 00 




7 00 


Gloucester Gill-Net Fisheries Co., 








Inc., 


134 04 


44 


134 48 


Gloucester Hospital, Inc., 


90 45 


64 


91 09 


Gloucester Loan Co., . 


130 24 


4 00 


134 24 


Golden Manufacturing Co., . 


6 00 


03 


6 03 



228 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Goose-Broidy Co., . 


$92 72 


$0 43 


$93 15 


Gordon & Sparrow Co., 


244 21 


2 65 


246 86 


Gordon-Hittl Co., . 


87 97 


88 


88 85 


Gorham Drug Store, Inc., 


54 27 


55 


54 82 


Gorham Press, 


180 90 


1 45 


182 35 


Coward's Market Co., . 


45 22 


43 


45 65 


Graham Co., . 


54 27 


1 51 


55 78 


Great Ceylon Tea Co., Inc., 


180 90 


1 45 


182 35 


Great Eastern Amusement C 


0., . 361 80 


12 67 


374 47 


Greater Plymouth Newsj 


Daper 






Co., .... 


6 51 


06 


6 57 


Grossman Cap Manufact 


uring 






Co., .... 


6 87 


06 


6 93 


Guilford, Kendrick & I 


^add. 






Inc., .... 


385 31 


6 97 


392 28 


H. A. Cook Dairy Products 


Co., 






Inc., .... 


67 51 


2 32 


69 83 


H. A. Knowles & Co., Inc., 


24 98 


- 


24 98 


H. B. Keen, Inc., . . 


38 54 


35 


38 89 


H. C. Girard Co., . . 


164 61 


83 


165 44 


H. C. H. Pant Co., 


114 87 


1 04 


115 91 


H. D. Smith Co., . . 


361 80 


- 


361 80 


H. DangelCo., 


246 02 


10 82 


256 84 


H. E. Lindbladh Co., . . 


27 13 


24 


27 37 


H. H. Brown Co., . 


1,201 10 


6 61 


1,207 71 


H. L. Handy Co., . . 


3,078 32 


10 26 


3,088 58 


H. M. Downs Printing Co., 


29 12 


08 


29 20 


H. M. Hansen Shoe Co., 


68 12 


68 


68 80 


H. M. Kinports Co., . 


79 05 


4 82 


83 87 


H. Newton Marshall Co., 


140 68 


68 


141 36 


H. Ross Maddocks Co., Inc., 


213 11 


99 


214 10 


H. T. Schaefer, Inc., . 


235 17 


1 17 


236 34 


Hackett Brothers Co., . 


45 06 


52 


45 58 


HaUfax Flower Co., 


22 61 


11 


22 72 


Hall Paint and Hardware Co 


, . 271 35 


2 44 


273 79 


Hailstone Electric Co., . 


17 63 


18 


17 81 


Hamer Improved Washer Co 


22 61 


15 


22 76 


Hampden Knitting Co., 


399 78 


3 46 


403 24 


Hanlon Thornton Co., . 


133 86 


1 23 


135 09 


Hanover Amusement Co., 


32 56 


1 43 


33 99 


Hanover Rubber Co., . 


90 45 


11 


90 56 


Harrigan Press, Inc., 


100 21 


2 67 


102 88 


Harrington Manufacturing C 


0., . 448 97 


4 04 


453 01 


Harrington Press, . 


10 85 


- 


10 85 


Hart Foundry Co., . 


5 42 


03 


5 45 


Hart Private Hospital, Inc., . 


43 41 


1 82 


45 23 


Harvard Grocery and Prov 


ision 






Co., 


63 31 


1 89 


65 20 


Harvard Trust Co., . ' . 


781 25 


3 91 


785 16 


Hatchard Ice Co., . . 


18 09 


10 


18 19 



1916. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



229 



— 


Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Hava Lunch, Inc., .... 


$113 96 


$0 93 


$114 89 


Haverhill Cement Stone Co., 


98 77 


49 


99 26 


Haverhill Construction Co., . 


128 43 


89 


129 32 


HaverhiU Steamship Co., 


11 43 


05 


11 48 


Haynes Construction Co., 


361 80 


3 32 


365 12 


Henderson & Johnson, Inc., . 


48 24 


44 


48 68 


Henry F. Farrow Co., . 


165 08 


1 55 


166 63 


Henry F. Miller & Sons Piano Co., 


2,824 24 


55 07 


2,879 31 


Henry Gray Co., .... 


30 39 


28 


30 67 


Henry J. Tracy Co., 


54 27 


1 63 


55 90 


Henry T. Bulman, Corpn., . 


14 58 


10 


14 68 


Hermann Lucke Co., 


144 72 


76 


145 48 


Herrick Aiken Co., .... 


88 64 


4 00 


92 64 


Hibernian Publishing Co., 


43 41 


26 


43 67 


Hickman & Doucette, Inc., . 


34 37 


85 


35 22 


Higgins Fraze Co., .... 


542 70 


5 42 


548 12 


Highland Drug and Chemical 








Corpn., 


38 04 


28 


38 32 


Highland Machine Co., . 


49 92 


23 


50 15 


Highland Paint and Wall Paper 








Co., 


361 80 


2 59 


364 39 


Hill Dryer Co., . . . . 


361 80 


1 81 


363 61 


Hilton Express Co., 


40 70 


1 15 


41 85 


Himmel Drug Co., .... 


108 54 


1 06 


109 60 


Hinds' Hand Laundry Co., . 


97 68 


88 


98 56 


Hjorth Lathe and Tool Co., . 


126 63 


63 


127 26 


Hodgson Kennard & Co., Inc., . 


1,083 59 


11 35 


1,094 94 


Hoffecker Co., 


121 81 


5 09 


126 90 


Holbrook Manufacturing Co., 


88 56 


88 


89 44 


Holhngs Co., 


97 68 


80 


98 48 


Holyoke Photo Engraving Co., . 


18 09 


16 


18 25 


Homer Foot & Co., Inc., 


361 80 


3 32 


365 12 


Hooper Printing Co., 


83 21 


30 


83 51 


Horse Whip Co., . . . . 


622 92 


5 60 


628 52 


Hotel Empire, Inc., 


86 83 


2 93 


89 76 


Howard Dustless-Duster Co., 


178 65 


1 60 


180 25 


Howard, Inc., 


54 01 


- 


54 01 


Howe Stove and Furniture Ex- 








change, Inc., .... 


14 36 


10 


14 46 


Howes Brick Co., .... 


117 58 


58 


118 16 


Hub Cornice and Sky Light 








Co., 


17 36 


- 


17 36 


Hub Mattress Co., . 


27 13 


27 


27 40 


Hudson Printing Co., 


81 40 


81 


82 21 


Hunter Stationery Co., . 


54 27 


49 


54 76 


Huntt's Lunch Co., 


94 15 


3 86 


98 01 


Hurlburt, Johnson Co., . 


65 59 


46 


66 05 


Huss Baking Co., .... 


90 45 


8 41 


98 86 


I. M. George Co., .... 


5 42 


- 


5 42 


I. Shactman Leather Co., 


9 04 


01 


9 05 



230 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






I. Wolper Co., 


$171 63 


$1 49 


$173 12 


Ideal Can Co., . . . . 


104 46 


52 


104 98 


Ideal Dental Laboratory, Inc., 


33 91 


30 


34 21 


Ideal Hat Co., . . . . 


80 53 


72 


81 25 


Imperial Cloak and Suit Co., 


260 62 


2 20 


262 82 


Imperial Motor Car Co., 


36 18 


29 


36 47 


Imperial Photographic Studio, 








Inc., 


203 51 


1 62 


205 13 


Imperial Upholstering Co., . 


135 67 


1 24 


136 91 


Importers Branch, Ltd., 


238 78 


10 00 


248 78 


Independent Button Fastener 








Machine Co., .... 


427 21 


15 80 


443 01 


Innovation Publishing Co., . 


5 42 


- 


5 42 


Interior Building Finish Co., 


20 62 


15 


20 77 


International Mercantile and 








Bond Co. of Mass., . 


36 18 


25 


36 43 


International Shade Co., 


61 19 


51 


61 70 


International Whip Co., 


50 00 


25 


50 25 


Interstate Manufacturing Co., 


27 64 


- 


27 64 


Interstate Pubhshing Co., 


21 70 


- 


21 70 


Ira J. Webster Co., 


3 33 


02 


3 35 


J. A. Brenner & Co., Inc., 


274 96 


2 47 


277 43 


J. A. Laraway Co., 


90 45 


65 


91 10 


J. E. Paris Co., .... 


146 52 


1 32 


147 84 


J. G. GaUishaw Co., 


39 07 


1 48 


40 55 


J. G. Walker & Son Corpn., . 


67 83 


32 


68 15 


J. H. Farris Corporation, 


160 33 


4 81 


165 14 


J. H. Franklin Co., 


50 81 


20 


51 01 


J. H. Gerlach Co., . . . . 


56 63 


21 


56 84 


J. H. Green Co., .... 


72 36 


65 


73 01 


J. H. MiUer Co., Inc., . . . 


397 98 


2 86 


400 84 


J. H. Robinson Co., 


71 27 


64 


71 91 


J. H. White Co., . . . . 


157 38 


1 42 


158 80 


J. Lipsitz Co., 


299 38 


2 55 


301 93 


J. NardiCo., 


45 22 


2 71 


47 93 


J. S. Delaney Co., .... 


143 81 


3 35 


147 16 


J. S. Meacom Co., .... 


54 27 


48 


54 75 


J. T. Meader Co., Inc., . 


480 85 


1 44 


482 29 


J. T. Wilson & Son, Inc., 


1,242 78 


3 73 


1,246 51 


J. W. Shaw Co., .... 


117 58 


37 


117 95 


Jacobs, Whitcomb Co., . 


348 77 


1 80 


350 57 


James Barrett Manufacturing 








Co., 


542 70 


4 88 


547 58 


James H. Malone, Inc., . 


171 49 


7 36 


178 85 


James H. Tarr Co., 


92 51 


57 


93 08 


James M. White Bottle Co., . 


32 77 


15 


32 92 


James Miles & Son Co., 


218 88 


2 19 


221 07 


James W. Poole, Inc., . 


185 60 


1 05 


186 65 


James Wilkinson Co., 


112 88 


1 01 


113 89 


Jerome Manufacturing Co., . 


72 36 


— 


72 36 



1916. 



PUBLIC DOCUiVIENT — No. 12. 



231 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1914. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Joe Cotter, Inc., 

John A. Dunn Co., 

John A. Frj^e Shoe Co., . 

John A. Lowell Bank Note Co 

John Babcock & Co., Inc., 

John Cavanagh & Son Building 

Mo\dng Co., 
John Chmiell Co., . 
John E. Lynch Hardware Co., 
John E. O'Neil, Inc., 
John F. Johnston Co., 
John J. Cluin Co., . 
John L. Kelly Contracting Co., 
John Maloney Grocery Co., . 
John Quin & Son Co., . 
John T. Robinson Co., . 
John W. Barlow Co., 
Johnson Educator Food Co., 
Jones Peterson & Newhall Co., 
Kakas Bros., Inc., . 
Karl Andren Co., . 
Kasino Co., 
Kempton Co., . 
Kendall Drug Co., . 
Keniston Engineering Co., 
Kenney Brothers Co., 
Kenny Clark Co., . 
Keystone Job Print, 
Kiley Hardware Co., 
King Mining Co., . 
King Philip Tavern Co 
Kinney Heating and Supply 

Co., .... 
Kinney Manufacturing Co., 
Kittredge Lunch Co., 
Klein Manufacturing Co., 
Kleno Manufacturing Co., 
Knowlton Iron "Works Co., 
Koonz Manufacturing Co., 
Korn Leather Co., . 
Kraft, Bates & Spencer, Inc. 
L. & P. Co., . 
L. B. Dow, Inc., 
L. Dimond & Sons, Inc 
L. E. Freeman Co., 
L. E. Sanborn Co., 
L. G. Fisk-Mooers Co., 
L. K. Husted Co., luc, 
L. M. Koritz Co., . 
L. Nickerson Co., Inc., 



$121 56 


$0 73 


2,872 78 


1 66 


4,496 63 


22 48 


126 63 


1 15 


89 56 


70 


252 19 


4 00 


153 76 


77 


72 36 


34 


26 04 


26 


253 26 


1 39 


18 09 


18 


54 27 


49 


180 90 


1 80 


198 99 


4 64 


153 76 


1 44 


81 40 


24 


1,590 45 


81 57 


638 21 


4 68 


859 27 


7 73 


623 48 


2 92 


18 09 


11 


226 12 


78 


99 49 


81 


126 63 


1 24 


152 22 


1 37 


130 24 


6 46 


23 51 


23 


238 78 


2 85 


21 25 


19 


59 69 


2 40 


35 85 


32 


1,736 27 


13 89 


66 57 


2 66 


21 70 


18 


14 29 


28 


68 74 


55 


34 37 


13 


27 13 


- 


500 00 


- 


90 45 


3 05 


43 41 


21 


1,480 41 


11 84 


397 98 


1 99 


72 .36 


55 


235 17 


4 31 


48 84 


49 


15 32 


- 


45 22 


42 



$122 29 

2,874 44 

4,519 11 

127 78 

90 26 

256 19 

154 53 
72 70 

26 30 
254 65 

18 27 

54 76 

182 70 

203 63 

155 20 
81 64 

1,672 02 
642 89 
867 00 
626 40 

18 20 
226 90 
100 30 
127 87 
153 59 
136 70 

23 74 
241 63 

21 44 

62 09 

36 17 

1,750 16 

69 23 

21 88 

14 57 
69 29 
34 50 

27 13 
500 00 

93 50 

43 62 

1,492 25 

399 97 

72 91 
239 48 

49 33 

15 32 
45 64 



232 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






L. P. Soule & Son Co., . . . 


$313 77 


$1 78 


$315 55 


L. Speidel & Co., Inc., . 


705 51 


6 35 


711 86 


L. W. & H. F. Morse Co., . . 


71 45 


36 


71 81 


L. W. Anthony Co., 


284 91 


2 52 


287 43 


La-Lo Co., 


30 39 


46 


30 85 


Lace Shop, Inc., .... 


180 90 


1 54 


182 44 


Lambert & Turner Co., . 


5 42 


- 


5 42 


Lamere & Robinson Co., 


13 02 


48 


13 50 


Lane-Libby Fisheries Co., 


286 25 


2 58 


288 83 


Lang & Jacobs Co., 


94 97 


85 


95 82 


Laurel Lake Mills, .... 


1,052 38 


3 33 


1,055 71 


Lawrence B. Smith Co., 


562 59 


3 64 


566 23 


Lawrence Baseball Ass'n, 


32 56 


1 10 


33 66 


Lawrence Development Corpn., . 


9 97 


05 


10 02 


Lawrence Produce Co., . 


161 94 


1 61 


163 55 


Leavitt & Rubenstein Press, 








Inc., 


6 47 


03 


6 50 


Leavitt's Scotch Polish Co., . 


27 35 


05 


27 40 


L'Echo Pubhshing Co., . 


334 66 


3 34 


338 00 


Leslie Dry Goods Co., . 


766 19 


6 17 


772 36 


Levy Bros., Inc., .... 


92 25 


4 87 


97 12 


Lewis A. Brown & Co., Inc., 


27 13 


24 


27 37 


Lewis F. Small, Inc., 


7 23 


07 


7 30 


Lewis J. Bird Co., .... 


45 22 


15 


45 37 


Libbie Printing Co., 


90 45 


32 


90 77 


Lincoln Lunch Co., Inc., 


99 35 


60 


99 95 


Linscott Motor Co., 


405 48 


4 05 


409 53 


Linscott Supply Co., 


337 77 


3 10 


340 87 


Litchfield Shuttle Co., . 


2,086 30 


14 60 


2,100 90 


Lloyd Coal Co., .... 


105 82 


40 


106 22 


Locke Coal Co., .... 


1,146 00 


5 73 


1,151 73 


London Harness Co., 


814 05 


6 92 


820 97 


London Raincoat Co., . 


48 84 


43 


49 27 


Loring Avenue Garage Co., . 


48 84 


49 


49 33 


Loring-Axtell Co., .... 


479 38 


13 11 


492 49 


Louis Cohen Shirt Co., . 


48 11 


- 


48 11 


Louis Dejonge Co., ... 


1,641 66 


10 94 


1,652 60 


Louis G. Destremps & Sons, Inc., . 


32 56 


29 


32 85 


Louis H. Ross Music Pubhshing 








Co., 


6 33 


07 


6 40 


Lovejoy-McGrail Co., . 


143 77 


1 08 


144 85 


Lovell and Covel Co., . 


515 56 


4 38 


519 94 


Lovells, Inc., 


72 36 


32 


72 68 


Lowell Paper Tube Corpn., . 


95 87 


54 


96 41 


Lunt Moss Co., .... 


863 34 


28 90 


892 24 


Lyn Home Co., .... 


26 04 


22 


26 26 


Lynch Heel Co., 


81 40 


75 


82 15 


Lynn Rubber Manufacturing Co., 


231 58 


6 25 


237 83 


Lyon Carpet Co., .... 


425 11 


3 15 


428 26 


Lyon Co., 


215 27 


2 15 


217 42 



1916.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



233 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Lyon Manufacturing Co., 


$74 16 


$0 30 


$74 46 


Lyons Hotel Co. of Mass., . 


54 27 


20 


54 47 


M. & C. Hat Co., .... 


50 65 


3 03 


53 68 


M. & C. Skirt Co., .... 


618 00 


4 33 


622 33 


M. Connell Co., Inc., . 


99 49 


2 79 


102 28 


M. J. Crowley Co., . . 


54 27 


1 42 


55. 69 


M. Marks Co., .... 


64 21 


53 


64 74 


M. T. Coffey Co., . . . . 


84 66 


2 97 


87 63 


Macdonald & Evans, Inc., . 


20 35 


20 


20 55 


Macey-Stetson-Morris Co., . 


202 60 


1 33 


203 93 


Majestic Company, 


217 08 


1 95 


219 03 


Maiden China Co., Inc., 


25 32 


23 


25 55 


Maiden Commercial School, . 


18 09 


08 


18 17 


Maiden Leather Goods Co., . 


112 15 


1 03 


113 18 


Maiden Mail Co., .... 


11 25 


- 


11 25 


Manhattan Collar Co., . 


90 45 


83 


91 28 


Manhattan Grocery and Pro\'i- 








sion Co., 


830 69 


7 48 


838 17 


Manning's Inc., .... 


21 49 


- 


21 49 


Mansfield Drug Co., 


45 22 


45 


45 67 


Mansfield MiUing Co., . 


465 81 


3 26 


469 07 


Maple Farm Milk Co., . 


27 13 


41 


27 54 


Marlborough Drug Co., 


45 22 


18 


45 40 


Marlborough Times Publishing 








Co., 


5 42 


- 


5 42 


Marshall & May Co., 


85 92 


82 


86 74 


Martin Tractor Co., 


98 13 


29 


98 42 


Marvello Co., 


46 12 


12 


46 24 


Mass. Builders' Finish Co., . 


162 81 


1 59 


164 40 


Mass. Investment and Loan Co., 


26 86 


14 


27 00 


Mass. Iron and Metal Co., . 


19 98 


15 


20 13 


Mass. Metal Pohsh Co., 


20 58 


1 03 


21 61 


Mass. Mortgage and Realty 








Corpn., 


8 68 


09 


8 77 


Massasoit Co., .... 


481 91 


7 22 


489 13 


Massasoit Manufacturing Co., 


3,443 55 


16 07 


3,459 62 


Mattapoisett Cranberry Co., 


38 67 


20 


38 87 


Matthew F. Sheehan Co., 


506 52 


4 67 


511 19 


Mayflower Laundry Co., 


158 28 


5 68 


163 96 


Maykel Automobile Co., 


36 18 


33 


36 51 


Maynard Rubber Corporation, . 


231 55 


1 99 


233 54 


McAuhffe Non Siphoning Trap 








Co., 


43 41 


39 


43 80 


McCarthur Bros. Co., . 


9 04 


02 


9 06 


McHeffey Express Co., . 


36 18 


17 


36 35 


McLean & Cousens Co., 


10 85 


59 


11 44 


McLean Black & Co., Inc., . 


1,176 57 


10 59 


1,187 16 


McNeil Corporation, 


259 59 


2 33 


261 92 


MelHsh & Byfield Manufacturing 








Co., 


173 66 


1 56 


175 22 



234 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Merchant Box and Cooperage 








Co., 


$528 22 


$2 38 


$530 60 


Merchants Co-operative Adver- 








tising Co., 


36 18 


20 


36 38 


Merchants Delivery Co., 


90 45 


75 


91 20 


Merchants Trading Stamp Co., . 


52 09 


39 


52 48 


Meredith Linen Mills, . 


136 60 


64 


137 24 


Merrill Chair and Manufactur- 








ing Co., 


31 60 


28 


31 88 


Merrimac Valley Mills, . 


203 51 


6 74 


210 25 


Methuen Granite Co., . 


29 67 


1 19 


30 86 


Metropohtan Laundry Co., . 


578 88 


29 11 


607 99 


Metropohtan Lithograph and 








PubUshing Co., . 


90 90 


- 


90 90 


Middleby Criterion Oven Co., 


28 22 


20 


28 42 


Middlesex Investment Co., Inc., . 


142 44 


1 26 


143 70 


Milk Package Exchange, Inc., 


62 37 


30 


62 67 


Millbury Steel Foundry Co., 


200 97 


1 81 


202 78 


Miller Brothers, Inc., 


276 59 


2 18 


278 77 


Millers River Box Co., . 


88 64 


79 


89 43 


Millers River Power Co., 


25 50 


14 


25 64 


Milton Laundry, .... 


22 25 


22 


22 47 


Minot Drug Co., . 


8 48 


35 


8 83 


Miscoe Spring Water Co., 


37 98 


35 


38 33 


Mitchell Press, .... 


13 02 


78 


13 80 


Mitchell Wing Co., 


644 05 


5 37 


649 42 


Moiling & Berry Co., 


26 04 


73 


26 77 


Moody Bridge Garage Co., . 


7 77 


21 


7 98 


Moquin & Fontaine Co., 


565 31 


5 02 


570 33 


Morse McDonald Co., . 


141 10 


1 27 


142 37 


Motor Car Service Co. of Bos- 








ton, 


54 27 


49 


54 76 


Motor Sales Co., . 


126 63 


1 14 


127 77 


Motor Specialties Co., . 


90 45 


90 


91 35 


Muir's Laundry, Inc., . 


74 16 


58 


74 74 


Murphy Coal and Wood Co., 


269 75 


2 47 


272 22 


Murray Tanning Co., 


180 90 


90 


181 80 


Myer Abrams Co., . 


271 35 


2 32 


273 67 


N. W. Brown Piano Co., 


90 45 


44 


90 89 


National Crash Mfg. Co., 


50 19 


45 


50 64 


National Druggists Supply Co., . 


371 46 


22 26 


393 72 


National Knitting Co., Inc., 


180 90 


1 50 


182 40 


National Manufacturing Co., 


319 19 


2 92 


322 11 


National Matzo Co. of Boston, . 


13 02 


- 


13 02 


National MetaUic Bed Co., . 


762 71 


3 06 


765 77 


National Parlor Furniture Co., 


16 28 


- 


16 28 


National Pubhshing and Trading 








Co., 


36 18 


19 


36 37 


National Scale Co., . . . . 


629 53 


5 67 


635 20 


National Tack Co., Inc., 


140 64 


9 84 


150 48 



1916.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



235 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1914. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Suit 



Neapolitan Ice Cream Co., 
Nelson Color Co., . 
New Can Co., . 
New England Biscuit Co., 
New England Cloak and 

Co., 

New England Cold Storage Co., 
New England Converting Co., 
New England Co-operative So 

ciety, . . . 
New England Directory Co., 
New England Drug Co., 
New England Nurseries Co., 
New England Publishing Co., 
New England Reed Co., 
New Home Sewing Machine Co., 
New Method Laundry Co., . 
New Public Market, Inc., 
New York Bargain House, Inc., 
New York Egg and Fruit Co., 
Newark Lunch Co., 
News Publishing Co. of New Bed- 
ford, 

Nicholas M . Williams Co . , 
Nobscot Mountain Spring Co., 
Norcross Brothers Co., . 
Norfolk Granite Co., 
Norfolk Iron Co., . 
North American Fruit Co., . 
North Shore Creamery Co., . 
North Somerville Coal Co., . 
Northeastern Lunch Co., 
Northern Construction Co., . 
Northern Massachusetts Street 

Railway Co., 
Norton Water Co., . 
Noshake Grate and Heating Co., 
Notilt Manufacturing Co., . 
0. L. Lorentzen Co., 
Oakes Knitting Mills Co., 
Office Specialty Co., 
Old Colony Cut Glass Works 

Inc., 

Old Colony Piano Co., . 

Old Colony Press, . 

Old Corner Drug Store, Inc., 

Oleic Co., Inc., 

Omiros Cigarette Co., Inc., 

Oran McCormick Publishing Co., 

Orent & Ca, Inc., . . . . 



$31 65 


$0 16 


95 87 


81 


235 17 


2 12 


256 87 


2 35 


213 46 


78 


1,958 60 


83 05 


36 18 


36 


203 47 


1 73 


14 76 


50 


9 33 


- 


267 73 


2 62 


361 80 


3 25 


389 91 


3 30 


14,385 04 


122 27 


22 61 


17 


40 81 


19 


152 20 


9 13 


9 76 


10 


60 00 


39 


22 61 


20 


63 31 


3 15 


188 13 


1 65 


2,152 47 


18 66 


21 70 


20 


106 27 


35 


77 30 


71 


184 51 


5 53 


75 34 


68 


72 00 


50 


81 40 


38 


3,806 40 


26 00 


112 15 


36 


8 77 


- 


8 41 


04 


32 56 


32 


481 19 


4 33 


20 07 


18 


75 97 


63 


313 40 


2 77 


13 38 


06 


22 61 


12 


54 37 


43 


123 91 


3 31 


32 56 


1 88 


343 71 


2 63 



$31 81 

96 68 

237 29 

259 22 

214 24 

2,041 65 

36 54 

205 20 

15 26 

9 33 

270 35 

365 05 

393 21 

14,507 31 

22 78 

41 00 

161 33 

9 86 

60 39 

22 81 
66 46 

189 78 
2,171 13 

21 90 
106 62 

78 01 

190 04 
76 02 
72 50 
81 78 

3,832 40 
112 51 

8 77 
8 45 

32 88 
485 52 

20 25 

76 60 

316 17 

13 44 

22 73 
54 80 

127 22 

34 44 

346 34 



236 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



. 


Collected on 









Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Oriental Garment Co., . 


$119 55 


$0 95 


$120 50 


Orona Manufacturing Co., . 


73 69 


59 


74 28 


Orpheum Amusement Co., . 


6 51 


26 


6 77 


Orpheum Theatre, Inc., 


14 47 


14 


14 61 


Oscar T. Gove Co., Inc., 


129 34 


1 16 


130 50 


Oxidite Manufacturing Co., . 


32 56 


27 


32 83 


P. F. Wood Boiler Works, Inc., . 


90 45 


82 


91 27 


Pach Bros., Inc., . 


5 00 


05 


5 05 


Package Confectionery Co., . 


4,263 10 


130 73 


4,393 83 


Palmer Hunter Lumber Co., 


497 47 


4 48 


501 95 


Palmer Renting Co., 


11 75 


15 


11 90 


Pamott Mines Co., 


80 00 


- 


80 00 


Panther Rubber Manufacturing 








Co., 


278 58 


2 63 


281 21 


Paris Cloak Co., 


128 07 


82 


128 89 


Parker & Page Co., 


931 63 


8 38 


940 01 


Parker Brothers Iron Co., 


86 83 


70 


87 53 


Parker-Hammerton Manufactur- 








ing Co., 


165 14 


1 49 


166 63 


Parker Supply Co., 


88 15 


81 


88 96 


Parker Wire Goods Co., 


790 53 


6 60 


797 13 


Parsons Manufacturing Co., 


470 34 


28 22 


498 56 


Patterson Rubber Co., . 


113 96 


89 


114 85 


Peabody Square Garage Co., 


72 36 


2 99 


75 35 


Pean Medical Co., . 


22 61 


23 


22 84 


Pennsylvania Textile Co., 


2,592 71 


12 96 


2,605 67 


People's Express, Inc., . 


27 13 


09 


27 22 


Perkins & Co., Inc., 


108 54 


- 


108 54 


Perlmutter Bros. Co., Inc., . 


36 18 


32 


36 50 


Perry Mason Co., . 


6,869 22 


34 35 


6,903 57 


Peter Cooper's Glue Factory of 








Mass., 


15 37 


08 


15 45 


Philip Slater Co., . . . . 


24 02 


82 


24 84 


Pico Cranberry Co., 


14 32 


— 


14 32 


Picture Shop, Inc., .... 


48 84 


15 


48 99 


Pierson Pharmacy Co., . 


144 72 


1 30 


146 02 


Pine Croft Orchard Co., 


12 27 


06 


12 33 


Pine Grove Floral Corp'n, . 


14 47 


13 


14 60 


Pinkham Press, .... 


164 29 


1 50 


165 79 


Pittsfield Auto Garage Co., . 


81 40 


64 


82 04 


Pittsfield Contracting Co., . 


18 09 


14 


18 23 


Pittsfield Journal Co., . 


231 55 


1 98 


233 53 


Place Bros., Inc., .... 


18 46 


18 


18 64 


Plymouth & Sandwich Street 








Railway Co., 


1,441 32 


- 


1,441 32 


Plymouth Manufacturing Co., 


45 22 


41 


45 63 


Plymouth Rubber Co., 


10,358 51 


93 23 


10,451 74 


Polish Industrial Ass'n, . 


43 41 


46 


43 87 


Pope-Hartford Co. of Boston, 


381 86 


15 35 


397 21 


Pope-Sisson Lumber Co., 


723 60 


5 07 


728 67 



1916." 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



23' 



' 


Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Portland Sales Co., 


S54 27 


SO 50 


$54 77 


Post Office Pharmacy, Inc., . 


58 61 


53 


59 14 


Potter Knitting Co., 


777 87 


6 74 


784 61 


Power Heating and Ventilating 








Co., 


85 52 


74 


86 26 


Power Numbering Machine Co., . 


126 01 


81 


126 82 


Presbrey-Field Co., 


361 80 


3 92 


365 72 


Presbrey Stove Lining Co., . 


877 36 


5 85 


883 21 


Pressed Aluminum Co., 


65 57 


2 00 


67 57 


Prevost Realty Co., 


37 44 


17 


37 61 


Prior & Mahoney Co., . 


43 41 


22 


43 63 


Progressive Co-operative Ass'n, . 


98 91 


5 93 


104 84 


Protective Loan Co., 


22 84 


20 


23 04 


Pure Food Package Co., 


90 45 


68 


91 13 


Puritan Fish Freezing Co., . 


47 03 


18 


47 21 


Puritan Motor Supply Co., . 


63 31 


59 


63 90 


Purity Confectionery Co., 


85 92 


3 60 


89 52 


Pyro-Febrin Co., . 


10 85 


10 


10 95 


Q-P Signal Co., . . . . 


45 22 


25 


45 47 


Queen Manufacturing Co., Inc., . 


95 87 


2 85 


98 72 


Quigley Furnace and Foundry 








Co., 


3,577 15 


32 93 


3,610 08 


Quinn Lunch Co., . 


9 04 


21 


9 25 


R. & R. System Clothes, Inc., 


10 05 


10 


10 15 


R. B. Gage Co., .... 


7 05 


05 


7 10 


R. C. Goudey Co., 


78 51 


44 


78 95 


R. D. Lidstone Co., Inc., 


208 03 


76 


208 79 


R. Holman Co 


50 65 


55 


51 20 


R. T. Sullivan Co., . . . 


143 36 


72 


144 08 


R. W. Armstrong Co., . 


37 17 


22 


37 39 


Ravine House Co. (Inc.), 


22 50 


25 


22 75 


Rayolite Co., 


39 79 


4 78 


44 57 


Reading Custom Laundry, Inc., . 


66 93 


1 56 


68 49 


Recorder Publishing Co., 


25 32 


28 


25 60 


Reed & Barton Corp'n, . 


6,099 73 


40 66 


6,140 39 


Regal Cloak Co., . . . . 


228 83 


2 06 


230 89 


Rejane Co., 


18 45 


13 


18 58 


Remington-Urquhart Press, Inc., . 


51 91 


25 


52 16 


Revere Distilling Co., 


1,266 30 


10 13 


1,276 43 


Revere Drop Forge Co., . 


162 79 


90 


163 69 


Rex Wrench Co., . . * . 


60 14 


82 


60 96 


Rice Valentine Co., 


180 90 


60 


181 50 


Richard Briggs Co., 


2,170 80 


19 90 


2,190 70 


Richard H. Booth Co., . 


466 72 


17 10 


483 82 


Richards Manufacturing Co., 


542 70 


3 62 


546 32 


Riley Pebbles Shoe Co., 


217 08 


1 09 


218 17 


Riverside Mills, .... 


520 99 


2 60 


523 59 


Roackdale Woollen Co., 


19 24 


14 


19 38 


Robert Wilson Co., 


33 46 


- 


33 46 


Robinson Bramley Co., Inc., 


9 04 


— 


9 04 



238 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Robinson-Brockway Mfg. Co., 


$118 61 


$1 18 


$119 79 


Roblin-Schiller Co., 


65 12 


52 


65 64 


Rockwood Chemical Co., 


7 19 


06 


7 25 


Rockwood, Mclntyre Co., 


452 25 


4 07 


456 32 


Rogers Isinglass and Glue Co., . 


107 72 


1 04 


108 76 


Rosengard Furniture Co., 


170 04 


1 56 


171 60 


Roxbury Distilling Co., . 


66 80 


35 


67 15 


Roxbury Theatre Co., . 


10 85 


10 


10 95 


Royal Furniture Co., 


233 07 


- 


233 07 


Royal Laundry Co., 


119 39 


5 00 


124 39 


Royal Shoe Co., . . . . 


235 17 


2 16 


237 33 


Royal Silver Black Fox Co., 


12 73 


13 


12 86 


Russian Importing Co., . 


8 68 


- 


8 68 


Ryan & Duffee, Inc., 


108 54 


98 


109 52 


''S. &A."Mfg. Co., . . . 


20 56 


10 


20 66 


S. Bloom, Inc., .... 


117 58 


94 


118 52 


S. D. Cohen Co., .... 


89 54 


- 


89 54 


S. D. Grossman Co., 


180 90 


1 63 


182 53 


S. H. Couch Co., Inc., . . . 


215 27 


1 43 


216 70 


S. L. Gabriel Co., .... 


30 75 


28 


31 03 


S. M. Howes Co., .... 


2,161 03 


19 81 


2,180 84 


S. M. Stevens Co., .... 


56 98 


45 


57 43 


St. Louis Rubber Co., . 


198 99 


1 55 


200 54 


Salem Bay Line Transfer Co., 


37 98 


1 64 


39 62 


Salem Press Co., 


63 31 


44 


63 75 


Sally's Embroidery and Cleans- 








ing Co., 


31 45 


28 


31 73 


Sampo Granite Co., 


29 07 


20 


29 27 


Samuel Cohen & Levitt Co., 


253 26 


- 


253 26 


Samuel Ward Mfg. Co., 


1,908 49 


16 85 


1,925 34 


Samuel ZoU Co., . 


176 37 


1 63 


178 00 


Santa Barbara Fruit Co., 


5 80 


05 


5 85 


Sawyer Drug Co., . 


91 17 


64 


91 81 


Saxwood Mfg. Co., 


126 63 


1 08 


127 71 


Say lor & Stewart Co., . 


9 04 


08 


9 12 


Scandinavian Co-operative Gro- 








cery Union, 


63 45 


57 


64 02 


Schiff Bros., Inc., . . . . 


6 69 


03 


6 72 


School Arts Publishing Co., . 


140 36 


1 47 


141 83 


School Street Piano Storage Co., . 


180 90 


1 80 


182 70 


Sears-Cook Corp'n, 


244 21 


2 32 


246 53 


Sears-Sprague Co., . 


54 27 


51 


54 78 


Second Oakland Sj^ndicate, Inc., . 


36 83 


17 


37 00 


Selfeedo Brush Co., 


26 95 


1 62 


28 57 


Service Specialty Co., 


15 00 


- 


15 00 


Shack & Fine Co., . . . . 


7 99 


04 


8 03 


Shaddock & Normandin Co., 


123 13 


1 02 


124 15 


Shafine System, Inc., 


36 18 


25 


36 43 


Shawmut Iron and Wire Works, 








Inc., 


123 01 


1 23 


124 24 



1916.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 



239 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Shawmut Raincoat Co., Inc., 


$45 22 


$0 36 


$45 58 


Shawmut Waxed Paper Co., 


76 43 


76 


77 19 


Shepard Mfg. Co. (Melrose), 


1,535 38 


13 59 


1,548 97 


Shepard Norwell Co., . 


13,115 25 


102 74 


13,217 99 


Shoe City Coat Co., Inc., 


14 11 


- 


14 11 


Shortstory Publishing Co., 


108 54 


98 


109 52 


Show Card Shop, Inc., . 


7 59 


- 


7 59 


Shultz-Goodwin Co., 


610 08 


4 57 


614 65 


Silas Peirce & Co., Ltd., 


2,446 79 


21 59 


2,468 38 


Silloway & Vine Shoe Co., Inc., . 


90 45 


91 


91 36 


Silver Baking Co., . 


92 20 


46 


92 66 


Silver Queen and Ruby Silver 








Mines Co., 


40 00 


26 


40 26 


Singer & Snow Co., 


397 98 


1 45 


399 43 


Sippican Cranberry Co., 


24 81 


15 


24 96 


Sisson Co., 


113 06 


1 41 


114 47 


Small Maynard & Co. (Inc.), 


1,401 97 


58 88 


1,460 85 


Smalley White & Hobbs, Inc., 


^1 33 


75 


. 92 08 


Smith & Perkins, Inc., . 


46 78 


1 40 


48 18 


Smith Paper Co., 




3,392 27 


16 96 


3,409 23 


Smith Tablet Co., Inc., . 




226 12 


2 07 


228 19 


Smith-Wallace Corp'n, . 




338 73 


7 90 


346 63 


Smithmade Suspender Co., 




72 36 


65 


73 01 


Somerset Coal Co., 




17 69 


36 


18 05 


Somerset Investment Co., 




81 40 


40 


81 80 


Somerville Mfg. Co., 




61 28 


36 


61 64 


Somerville Pubhshing Co., Inc., 


7 23 


_ 


7 23 


South Barre and District Co- 








operative Assn., .... 


75 97 


2 51 


78 48 


South Bay Storage Warehouse 








Co., 


90 45 


90 


91 35 


South End Lumber Co., 


18 09 


16 


18 25 


Southgate Press — T. W. Ripley 








Co., 


168 68 


84 


169 52 


Specialty Shop, .... 


180 90 


1 63 


182 53 


Spring Water Distributing Co., 


10 85 


45 


11 30 


Springfield Homestead Newspaper 








Co., 


84 11 


26 


84 37 


Springfield Ice and Coal Co., 


2,696 13 


52 69 


2,748 82 


Springfield Leather Co., 


125 72 


86 


126 58 


Springfield Wholesale Grocery Co., 


86 83 


47 


87 30 


Standard Co., 


16 28 


14 


16 42 


Standard Motor Car Co., 


75 97 


3 04 


79 01 


Standard Pocahontas Coal Co., . 


31 36 


16 


31 52 


Standard Supply Co., Inc., . 


95 51 


78 


96 29 


Standard Upholstering Co., . 


65 93 


44 


66 37 


Star Laundry Co., . 


9 04 


09 


9 13 


Stearns & Waterman Co., 


21 70 


30 


22 00 


Steel Specialties Co., 


10 85 


37 


11 22 


Sterling Shoe Co., . 


37 98 


97 


38 95 



240 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1914. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Stetson Coal Co. of Boston, 

Stewart, Skinner Co., 

Stickney & Poor Spice Co., 

Stoddard Union Co., 

Stone & Forsyth Co., 

Stone Leather Co., . 

Stone's Express, Inc., 

Store of QuaUty, Inc., 

Storer & Celotte Co., 

Stover & Bean Co., 

Stratton Automobile Co 

Structural Granite Co., 

Sturtevane & Haley Beef and Sup- 
ply Co., .... 

Sturtevant & Hook Corpn., . 

Stutz Motor Car Co. of Boston, 

Stutz Motor Car Co. of New 
Haven, 

Sub-Target Gun Co., . 

Suffolk Assn., Inc., . 

Suffolk Furniture Co., . 

Sullivan Colpitts Co., Inc., . 

SuUivan Sample Shoe Store, Inc 

Summit Thread Co., 

Superior Overall Co., 

Swain Construction Co., 

Swift Contracting Co., . 

Swift River Co., 

Sylvester Bros. Co., 

Sylvester Towxr Co., 

T. E. Chase & Son Co., 

T. H. O'Donnell & Co., Inc., 

T. W. Brooks Lobster Co., Inc., 

T. W. Norman Co., 

Taunton Evening News, 

Taunton Planing Mill Co., . 

Taunton Spindle Co., 

Taunton Wholesale Millinery 
Co., 

Taxi Service Co., 

Taylor & Barker Co., . 

Taylor Brothers Laundry, Inc., 

Taylor Chemical Co., 

Teel Motor Co., 

Tennessee Valley Light and Power 
Co., 

Thayer Co., .... 

Thermolac Manufacturing Co., 

Thompson Construction Co., 

Thos. D. Gard Co., Inc., 



$801 38 


$4 00 


265 01 


2 96 


1,344 08 


6 72 


36 25 


37 


2,568 78 


17 98 


153 76 


86 


271 35 


2 40 


138 18 


1 21 


73 60 


48 


651 24 


3 25 


7 23 


08 


184 51 


5 00 


1,718 55 


5 15 


96 23 


65 


189 94 


1 71 


8 00 


_ 


264 11 


2 16 


28 94 


94 


90 45 


30 


10 85 


07 


90 45 


72 


166 17 


83 


37 98 


22 


9 04 


- 


33 75 


20 


634 95 


7 55 


7 23 


60 


1,479 76 


13 31 


84 76 


42 


108 54 


2 53 


18 09 


10 


229 74 


2 05 


108 54 


1 36 


40 15 


19 


9 04 


07 


28 94 


87 


1,032 30 


5 16 


969 17 


8 88 


430 54 


2 15 


536 20 


6 70 


138 08 


1 24 


705 69 


6 35 


16 28 


19 


42 98 


36 


23 87 


22 


97 68 


44 



$805 38 

267 97 

1,350 80 

36 62 

2,586 76 

154 62 

273 75 

139 39 

74 08 

654 49 

7 31 
189 51 

1,723 70 

96 88 
191 65 

8 00 
266 27 

29 88 

90 75 
10 92 

91 17 
167 00 

38 20 

9 04 
33 95 

642 50 

7 83 

1,493 07 

85 18 

111 07 

18 19 

231 79 

109 90 

40 34 

9 11 

29 81 
1,037 46 
978 05 
432 69 
542 90 
139 32 



712 04 
16 47 
43 34 
24 09 
98 12 



1916.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



241 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






Thos. H. Logan Co., 


. $1,031 13 


$4 46 


$1,035 59 


Thos. J. Hind, Inc., 


27 13 


25 


27 38 


Thos. J. Shea Co., . 


43 77 


39 


44 16 


Three Millers Co., . 


1,763 77 


15 86 


1,779 63 


Tichnor Bros., Inc., 


293 02 


2 49 


295 51 


Totem Mfg. Co., 


39 79 


36 


40 15 


Towne & Melzard, Inc., 


20 00 


54 


20 54 


Tremont Stores, Inc., 


2,713 50 


24 87 


2,738 37 


Triumph Couch Bed Co., 


269 54 


2 00 


271 54 


Trombly Jewelry Co., . 


103 25 


- 


103 25 


Trowbridge Piano Co., . 


88 09 


79 


88 88 


Troy Cereal Co., . 


81 40 


65 


82 05 


Tudor Press, Inc., . 


144 72 


1 69 


146 41 


Turner-Brown Co., 


27 13 


27 


27 40 


Twin Cities Ice Co., 


5 42 


05 


5 47 


Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co 


., . 72 36 


82 


73 18 


Union Cahper Co., . 


558 98 


2 24 


561 22 


Union Furniture Co., 


343 80 


4 07 


347 87 


Union Seal Co., 


112 15 


_ 


112 15 


Union Square Olympia Co., 


90 45 


90 


91 35 


Union Trading Stamp Co., 


6 51 


03 


6 54 


United Building and Con 


imer- 






cial Co., 


80 95 


5 00 


85 95 


United Dress Manufact 


uring 






Co., .... 


124 82 


5 24 


130 06 


United Electric Apparatus. Cc 


)., . 474 21 


3 56 


477 77 


United States Column Co., 


271 11 


1 35 


272 46 


United States Light and He 


ating 






Co., .... 


253 26 


1 77 


255 03 


United States Metal Pro( 


iucts 






Co., .... 


2,750 00 


95 38 


2,845 38 


United States Snuff Co., 


23 80 


- 


23 80 


United States Transfer Adv 


ertis- 






ingCo., 


11 30 


- 


11 30 


United States Tropical 


Food 






Co., .... 


16 37 


38 


16 75 


United States Worsted Co., 


. 26,505 95 


185 55 


26,691 50 


Universal Trolley Wheel Co., 


40 01 


29 


40 30 


Uricsol Chemical Co. of 


Bos- 






ton, .... 


162 81 


6 83 


169 64 


V-S Undermushn Co., . 


30 75 


- 


30 75 


Vacuum Glass Co., 


45 00 


31 


45 31 


Van Tassel Leather Co., 


10 00 


- 


10 00 


Vesu\do Drug Co., . 


47 75 


43 


48 18 


Victor, Inc., 


24 42 


84 


25 26 


Victor Shoe Machinery Co., 


227 93 


3 07 


231 00 


Vodon-Curtiss Co., 


23 15 


23 


23 38 


W. & S. Blackinton Co., 


534 95 


1 87 


536 82 


W. A. HiUiard Co., 


35 22 


38 


35 60 


W. A. Norton Co., . 


43 41 


47 


43 88 



242 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






W. C. Edson Co.; . . . . 


$133 03 


%0 67 


$133 70 


W. H. I. Hayes Co., . . . 


126 63 


1 26 


127 89 


W. H. Marble Automobile Co., . 


104 01 


95 


104 96 


W. H. Virgie Co., . . . . 


386 94 


1 74 


388 68 


W.J. Ham Co., . . . . 


238 71 


2 05 


240 76 


W. M. Young Regalia Co., . 


47 03 


47 


47 50 


W. P. B. Brooks & Co., Inc., 


277 53 


12 50 


290 03 


W. P. Goode Brush Co., 


132 06 


1 32 


133 38 


W. S. Lee Co., .... 


36 18 


22 


36 40 


W. T. Shackley & Son Co., . 


126 63 


1 00 


127 63 


Wacco Supply Co., 


158 28 


94 


159 22 


Wagner Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 


200 79 


1 74 


202 53 


Walen Drug Co., .... 


18 09 


16 


18 25 


Walsh Drug Co., . . . . 


151 95 


1 37 


153 32 


Walsh Roofing Co., 


27 46 


- 


27 46 


Walter B. Hennigan Co., 


58 79 


64 


59 43 


Walter Coburn Co., 


178 18 


1 51 


179 69 


Waltham Bag and Paper Co., 


124 27 


93 


125 20 


Waltham Emery Wheel Co., 


534 55 


4 70 


539 25 


Walworth-Enghsh-Flett Co., 


649 84 


5 85 


655 69 


Walworth Mfg. Co., 


2,466 57 


11 10 


2,477 67 


Warner's Features, Inc., of 








Mass., 


58 61 


- 


58 61 


Warren- Allen Carpet Co., 


217 08 


97 


218 05 


Warren F. Eraser Co., . 


45 22 


30 


45 52 


Washbiu-n Cranberry Bog Co., 


344 99 


2 87 


347 86 


Washburn Realty Trust, ^Ltd., . 


219 06 


66 


219 72 


Washburn Jewelry Co., . 


45 2'2 


2 05 


47 27 


Waterhouse Welding Co., 


80 15 


70 


80 85 


Watson-Blood Co., .... 


362 90 


20 00 


382 90 


Watts & Cook, Inc., . 


198 53 


92 


199 45 


Wayland Inn Hotel Co., 


33 91 


34 


34 25 


Welhngton Rubber Co., 


45 22 


— 


45 22 


Wenham Lake Ice Co., . 


278 22 


1 65 


279 87 


Werner-Pazolt Co., 


678 37 


9 38 


687 75 


Wesner Drop-Arm Hanger Co., . 


9 04 


09 


9 13 


Westfield Brick Co., 


1,004 42 


- 


1,004 42 


Whitaker-Cushing Co., . 


51 55 


34 


51 89 


Whitcomb-Blaisdell Machine Tool 








Co., 


879 17 


6 16 


885 33 


White Automobile Co., . 


63 31 


57 


63 88 


White Paper Box Co., . 


104 01 


89 


104 90 


Whittier Woodenware Co., . 


542 70 


4 97 


547 67 


Wickstead Mfg. Co., 


48 84 


23 


49 07 


Wilham A. Davis Co., . 


61 50 


55 


62 05 


WiUiam Allen Son's Co., 


329 23 


1 43 


330 66 


Wilham C. Norcross Co., 


418 09 


3 83 


421 92 


WiUiam E. Bent Co., . 


244 21 


14 98 


259 19 


Wilham I. Siff Co., Inc., . . 


9 04 


- 


9 04 


Wilham J. McCarthy Co., . 


50 65 


25 


50 90 



1916. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



243 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1914. 






William L. Brown Electric Co., . 


$123 77 


$1 04 


$124 81 


William N. Flynt Granite Co., . 


431 80 


3 88 


435 68 


William Porter & Son, Inc., . 


50 00 


- 


50 00 


Williams Book Store Co., 


18 09 


15 


18 24 


Williamstown Glass Sales Co., 


404 40 


5 86 


410 26 


Williston H. Collins Co., 


162 81 


1 49 


164 30 


Wobm-n Journal Co., 


7 59 


06 


7 65 


Woburn Machine Co., . 


918 79 


6 43 


925 22 


Woman's Quality Shop, Inc., 


144 72 


1 44 


146 16 


Woman's Shop, Inc., 


515 56 


2 58 


518 14 


Woodman Lumber Co., 


9 04 


08 


9 12 


Woodward-Peopell Co., 


48 84 


1 42 


50 26 


Woonsocket Machine and Press 








Co., ...... 


600 00 


3 30 


603 30 


Worcester Automobile Co., . 


135 67 


2 03 


137 70 


Worcester Paper Box Co., . 


145 17 


1 31 


146 48 


Woronoco Heating and Phimb- 








ingCo., 


9 04 


24 


9 28 


Wright Cutter Co., 


625 60 


5 84 


631 44 


Young Men's Corporation, Inc., . 


35 98 


16 


36 14 


Zariffe Cigarette Co., . . . 


9 04 


- 


9 04 




$442,099 83 


$5,050 85 


$447,15068 



244 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



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PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



245 



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ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



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PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



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248 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





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1916.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



249 



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250 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



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1916.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



251 



S £ S S S S 



p< 


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Rape, 

Abandoning minor child, 


Cheating by false pretences, 

Larceny 

Desertion, 

Larceny, ' 


Edward Hitchcock, .... 

Edward Angier 

Eddie Cemean 

Man Sperhng, alias, 

Fanny Epstein, 

ThomasF. Maloney, Jr., . ." . 
Daniel Hagopian, 








Michigan, . 
New York, 
Vermont, . 
Maine, 
Illinois, 
New Jersey, 
California, 


June 23 
July 14 
Oct. 7 


s s «> s 

1 1" 1 1 



252 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



KULES OF PRACTICE 

In Interstate Rendition. 



Every application to the Governor for a requisition upon the 
executive authority of any other State or Territory, for the de- 
livery up and return of any offender who has fled from the 
justice of this Commonwealth, must be made by the district or 
prosecuting attorney for the county or district in which the 
offence was committed, and must be in duplicate original 
papers, or certified copies thereof. 

The following must appear by the certificate of the district 
or prosecuting attorney: — 

(a) The full name of the person for whom extradition is 
asked, together with the name of the agent proposed, to be 
properly spelled. 

(6) That, in his opinion, the ends of public justice require 
that the alleged criminal be brought to this Commonwealth 
for trial, at the public expense. 

(c) That he believes he has sufficient evidence to secure the 
conviction of the fugitive. 

{d) That the person named as agent is a proper person, and 
that he has no private interest in the arrest of the fugitive. 

(e) If theie has been any former application for a requisi- 
tion for the same person growing out of the same transaction, 
it must be so stated, with an explanation of the reasons for a 
second request, together with the date of such application, as 
near as may be. 

(/) If the fugitive is known to be under either civil or crim- 
inal arrest in the State or Territory to which he is alleged to 
have fled, the fact of such arrest and the nature of the pro- 
ceedings on which it is based must be stated. 

(g) That the application is not made for the purpose of en- 
forcing the collection of a debt, or for any private purpose 
whatever; and that, if the requisition applied for be granted, 
the criminal proceedings shall not be used for any of said 
objects. 



1916.] PUBLIC DOCUMENr — No. 12. 253 

(h) The nature of the crime charged, with a reference, when 
practicable, to the particular statute defining and punishing 
the same. 

(i) If the offence charged is not of recent occurrence, a satis- 
factory reason must be given for the delay in making the ap- 
plication. 

1. In all cases of fraud, false pretences, embezzlement or 
forgery, when made a crime by the common law, or any penal 
code or statute, the affidavit of the principal complaining wit- 
ness or informant that the application is made in good faith, 
for the sole purpose of punishing the accused, and that he does 
not desire or expect to use the prosecution for the purpose of 
collecting a debt, or for any private purpose, and will not di- 
rectly or indirectly use the same for any of said purposes, shall 
be required, or a sufficient reason given for the absence of such 
affidavit. 

2. Proof by affidavit of facts and circumstances satisfying 
the Executive that the alleged criminal has fled from the jus- 
tice of the State, and is in the State on whose Executive the 
demand is requested to be made, must be given. The fact 
that the alleged criminal was in the State where the alleged 
crime was committed at the time of the commission thereof, 
and is found in the State upon which the requisition was 
made, shall be sufficient evidence, in the absence of other 
proof, that he is a fugitive from justice. 

3. If an indictment has been found, certified copies, in dupli- 
cate, must accompany the application. 

4. If an indictment has not been found by a grand jury, the 
facts and circumstances showing the commission of the crime 
charged, and that the accused perpetrated the same, must be 
shown by afl^davits taken before a magistrate. (A notary 
public is not a magistrate within the meaning of the statutes.) 
It must also be shown that a complaint has been made, copies 
of which must accompany the requisition, such complaint to 
be accompanied by affidavits to the facts constituting the 
offence charged by persons having actual knowledge thereof, 
and that a warrant has been issued, and duplicate certified 
copies of the same, together with the returns thereto, if any, 
must be furnished upon an application. 

5. The official character of the officer taking the affidavits 
or depositions, and of the officer who issued the warrant, must 
be duly certified. 



254 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1916. 

6. Upon the renewal of an application, — for example, on 
the ground that the fugitive has fled to another State/ not 
having been found in the State on which the first was granted, 
— new or certified copies of papers, in conformity with the 
above rules, must be furnished. 

7. In the case of any person who has been convicted of any 
crime, and escapes after conviction, or while serving his sen- 
tence, the application may be made by the jailer, sheriff, or 
other ofiicer having him in custody, and shall be accompanied 
by certified copies of the indictment or information, record of 
conviction and sentence upon which the person is held, with 
the affidavit of such person having him in custody, showing 
such escape, with the circumstances attending the same. 

8. No requisition will be made for the extradition of any 
fugitive except in compliance with these rules.