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REPORT 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL 


Year  ending  January  19,  1916. 


Compliments  of 

HENRY   C.   ATTWILL, 

Attorney-General. 


BOSTON : 

WEIGHT  &  POTTER  PRrNTING  CO.,  STATE  PRINTERS, 

32  DEENE  STREET. 

1916. 


Public  Document  No.  12 


iS\\s  (llnmmnnttipaltJ;  of  liaBaailfttaftts. 


REPORT 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL 


FOR  THE 


Year  ending  January  19,   1916. 


BOSTON: 

WEIGHT  &  POTTEK  FEINTING  CO.,  STATE  PEINTEES, 

32  DEENE  STEEET. 

1916. 


®l)e  Commonroedtl)  of  i1Ia00acl)U0ett0 


Departmext  of  the  Attobxet-Gener.\l, 
Boston,  Jan.   19,   1916. 

To  the  Honorable  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives. 

I   have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  my  report  for  the 
year  ending  this  day. 

Aery  respectfully, 

HENRY  C.  ATTWILL, 

Attorney-General. 


^l)t  Commonixiealtl)  of  illaasactjueetta 


DEPARTMENT    OF   THE   ATTORNEY- GENERAL, 
State  House. 


A  ttorney-General . 
HENRY  C.  ATTWILL. 

Assistants. 
Nelson  P.  Brown. 
H.  Ware  Barnum. 
Wm.  Harold  Hitchcock. 
Arthur  E.  Seagrave. 
John  W.  Corcoran. 
James  J.  BACiGALuro. 


Law  Clerk. 
Charles  W.  Mulcahy. 

Chief  Clerk. 
Louis  H.  Freese. 


Statement  of  Appropriation  and  Expenditures. 


Appropriation  for  1915, $50,000  00 

Exyencliiures. 

For  law  library, S636  14 

For  salaries  of  assistants, :  18,273  35 

For  clerks, 5,929  90 

For  office  stenographers, 4,371  05 

For  telephone  operator, 576  00 

For  special  legal  services  and  expenses,         ....  3,218  01 

For  office  expenses, •       .        .        .        .  5,035  54 

For  court  expenses, 5,716  18 

Total  expenditures, $43,756  17 

Costs  collected, 2,659  87 

Net  expenditures,      ........  $41,096  30 

Appropriation  for  expenses  in  ice  investigation,  .        .        .  $1,555  17 

Expenses  in  ice  investigation, $1,555  17 

Appropriation  for  expenses  in  Haverhill  Gas  Light  Com- 
pany litigation, $2,704  03 

Expenses  in  Haverhill  Gas  Light  Company  litigation,  2,490  00 

Balance, $214  03 

Appropriation    for   printing   trial    of    Commonwealth    v. 

Spencer, $1,919  S3 

Printing  trial  of  Commonwealth  v.  Spencer,         .        .        .  $1,919  83 


®l|?  (JInmmnttujfaltli  of  iMaasarI|Ufl^ltj0 


Depabtment  op  the  Attorney-General, 
«  Boston,  Jan.  19,  1916. 

To  the  Honorable  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives. 

Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  section  8  of  chapter  7  of  the 
Revised  Laws  I  herewith  submit  my  report  for  the  year  end- 
ing this  day. 

The  cases  requiring  the  attention  of  this  department  dur- 
ing the  year,  to  the  number  of  7,569,  are  tabulated  below:  — 

Corporate  franchise  tax  cases, ".        .1,192 

Extradition  and  interstate  rendition, 130 

Grade  crossings,  petitions  for  abolition  of, 87 

Indictments  for  murder, 39 

Inventories  and  appraisals, 7 

Land  Court  petitions, 98 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the  Harbor 

and  Land  Commission, 4 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the  Charles 

River  Basin  Commission, 23 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the  Massa- 
chusetts Highway  Commission, 22 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the 

Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston, 4 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the  Met- 
ropolitan Water  and  Sewerage  Board, 2 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the  Met- 
ropolitan Park  Commission, 3 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the  State 

Board  of  Insanity, 6 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the  Mt. 

Everett  Reservation  Commission, 1 

Land-damage  cases  arising  from  the  taking  of  land  by  the 

Armory  Commissioners, 3 

Miscellaneous  cases  arising  from  the  work  of  the  above-named 

commissions, 32 

Miscellaneous  cases, 526 

Petitions  for  instructions  under  inheritance  tax  laws,   ...        43 

Public  charitable  trusts, 117 

Settlement  cases  for  support  of  persons  in  State  Hospitals,         .        39 
All  other  cases  not  enumerated  above,  which  include  suits  to  re- 
quire the  filing  of  returns  by  corporations  and  indi^^duals  and 
the  collection  of  money  due  the  Commonwealth,     .       .       .    5,191 


viii  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Capital  Cases. 
Indictments  for  murder  pending  at  the  date  of  the  last 
annual  report  have  been  disposed  of  as  follows :  — 

Cleophas  Blanchard,  indicted  in  Bristol  County,  Novem- 
ber, 1914,  for  the  murder  of  Malvina  Blanchard.  He  was 
arraigned  Feb.  15,  1915,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  murder  in 
the  second  degree.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Common- 
wealth, and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for 
life.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  T. 
Kenney. 

Albert  H.  Brodeur,  indicted  in  Hampden  County,  De- 
cember, 1913,  for  the  murder  of  Matilda  Case,  at  Spring- 
field, on  Sept.  20,  1913.  He  was  arraigned  March  18,  1914, 
and  pleaded  not  guilty.  Richard  J.  Morrissey,  Esq.,  was 
assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  Feb. 
8,  1915,  the  defendant  was  committed  to  the  Bridge  water 
State  Hospital  for  observation.  The  case  was  in  charge  of 
District  Attorney  Clarence  P.  Niles. 

Guiseppe  Catania,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  October, 
1913,  for  the  murder  of  Agrippino  Capra,  at  Boston,  on 
Oct.  3,  1913.  He  was  arraigned  Feb.  18,  1915,  and  pleaded 
not  guilty.  John  E.  Crowley,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the 
court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  On  May  19,  1915,  the 
defendant  retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to 
manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Common- 
wealth, and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for 
a  term  not  exceeding  four  years  nor  less  than  three  years. 
The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  C. 
Pelletier. 

Giovanni  Cinicolo  and  Maria  Sonzino,  indicted  in  Suf- 
folk County,  October,  1914,  for  the  murder  of  Antonio  Son- 
zino, at  Boston,  on  Sept.  17,  1914.  They  were  severally 
arraigned  Oct.  19,  1914,  and  pleaded  not  guilty.  Thomas  J. 
Grady,  Esq.,  and  F.  M.  Zottoli,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the 
court  as  counsel  for  the  defendants.     The  defendant  Gio- 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  ix 

vanni  Cinicolo  later  retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded 
guilty  to  manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Com- 
monwealth, and  the  defendant  Giovanni  Cinicolo  was  sen- 
tenced to  State  Prison  for  a  term  not  exceeding  six  years  nor 
less  than  five  years.  The  indictment  against  the  defendant 
Maria  Sonzino  was  nol  prossed.  The  cases  were  in  charge 
of  District  Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Alphonso  Collura,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County, 
November,  1914,  for  the  murder  of  Salvatore  Pulsseli,  at 
Groton,  on  Oct.  4,  1914.  He  was  arraigned  March  5,  1915, 
and  pleaded  not  guilty.  On  March  19,  1915,  the  defendant 
retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  man- 
slaughter. This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Commonwealth, 
and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for  a  term 
not  exceeding  eight  years  nor  less  than  five  years.  The  case 
was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  William  J.  Corcoran. 

Rafaelle  Martello,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  De- 
cember, 1913,  for  the  murder  of  John  Francisco,  at  Boston, 
on  Dec.  8,  1913.  On  April  26,  1915,  the  indictment  was 
nol  prossed.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney 
Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Wheeler  Mills,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  December, 
1913,  for  the  murder  of  Edward  Howcott,  at  Boston,  on 
Nov.  2,  1913.  He  was  arraigned  Oct.  14,  1914,  and  pleaded 
not  guilty.  Daniel  J.  Gallagher,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the 
court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  On  Jan.  13,  1915,  the 
defendant  retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to 
manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Common- 
wealth, and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  three  years  in 
the  house  of  correction.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District 
Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Ghvout  Moodian,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  Novem- 
ber, 1914,  for  the  murder  of  Zilfo  Alie,  at  Tyngsborough,  on 
Oct.  22,  1914.  He  was  arraigned  Nov.  18,  1914,  and  pleaded 
not  guilty.     W.  D.  Regan,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court 


X  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORP.  [Jan. 

as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  On  March  26,  1915,  the  de- 
fendant retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to 
manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Common- 
wealth, and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  the  Massachu- 
setts Reformatory.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  At- 
torney William  J.  Corcoran. 

Antonino  Pedaling,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  Sep- 
tember, 1914,  for  the  murder  of  Antonio  Gimalaro,  at  New- 
ton, on  June  28,  1914.  He  was  arraigned  Nov.  18,  1914, 
and  pleaded  not  guilty.  James  H.  Vahey,  Esq.,  and  A.  F. 
Whalen,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the 
defendant.  In  January,  1915,  the  defendant  was  tried  by 
a  jury  before  Irwin,  J.  The  result  was  a  verdict  of  guilty 
of  manslaughter.  The  defendant  was  thereupon  sentenced 
to  State  Prison  for  a  term  not  exceeding  twenty  years  nor 
less  than  eighteen  years.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  Dis- 
trict Attorney  William  J.   Corcoran. 

John  Poulacas,  indicted  in  Hampden  County,  December, 
1914,  for  the  murder  of  Mary  Pappaspiropoulis,  at  Holyoke, 
on  Dec.  11,  1914.  He  was  arraigned  Dec.  29,  1914,  and 
pleaded  not  guilty.  James  O'Shea,  Esq.,  and  Laurence  J. 
Montgomery,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel 
for  the  defendant.  Feb.  8,  1915,  the  defendant  retracted 
his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  murder  in  the  second 
degree.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Commonwealth,  and 
the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for  life.  The 
case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Clarence  P.  Niles. 

Anton  Retkovitz,  indicted  in  Bristol  County,  June,  1914, 
for  the  murder  of  Domka  Peremebida.  He  was  arraigned 
June  12,  1914,  and  pleaded  not  guilty.  Frank  M.  Silvia, 
Esq.,  and  Harold  E.  Clarkin,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the 
court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  In  November,  1914, 
the  defendant  was  tried  by  a  jury  before  Dubuque,  J.  The 
result  was  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
The  defendant's  bill  of  exceptions  w^as  sustained.  The  case 
is  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  T.  Kenney. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  —  No.  12.  xi 

William  Roy,  indicted  in  Hampden  County,  September, 

1914,  for  the  murder  of  an  infant  male  child,  at  Springfield, 
on  Jan.  15,  1914.  He  was  arraigned  Sept.  24,  1914,  and 
pleaded  not  guilty.  John  T.  Moriarty,  Esq.,  was  assigned 
by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  On  Feb.  8,  1915, 
the  defendant  retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty 
to  murder  in  the  second  degree.  This  plea  was  accepted  by 
the  Commonwealth,  and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to 
State  Prison  for  life.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District 
Attorney  Clarence  P.  Niles. 

Indictments  for  murder  found  since  the  date  of  the  last 
annual  report  have  been  disposed  of  as  follows:  — 

Andrew  Barkis  and  Peter  Sanuta,  indicted  in  Middlesex 
County,  January,  1915,  for  the  murder  of  Charles  Gingras, 
at  Lowell,  on  Oct.  2,  1914.  The  defendants  were  severally 
arraigned  Jan.  11,  1915,  and  each  pleaded  not  guilty. 
D.  J.  Donahue,  Esq.,  and  William  Hogan,  Esq.,  were  assigned 
by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendants.  In  March,  1915, 
the  defendants  were  tried  by  a  jury  before  Sisk,  J.  The 
result  was  a  verdict  of  not  guilty  in  each  case.  The  cases 
were  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  William  J.  Corcoran. 

Moses  Blood,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  July,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  William  Barnaby,  at  Townsend,  on  July  9, 

1915.  He  was  arraigned  Sept.  22,  1915,  and  pleaded  not 
guilty.  Thomas  L.  Walsh,  Esq.,  and  George  L.  Wilson,  Esq., 
were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant. 
On  Nov.  3,  1915,  the  defendant  retracted  his  former  plea,  and 
pleaded  guilty  to  murder  in  the  second  degree.  This  plea 
was  accepted  by  the  Commonwealth,  and  the  defendant  was 
sentenced  to  State  Prison  for  life.  The  case  was  in  charge  of 
District  Attorney  William  J.  Corcoran. 

John  Coumatos,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  July,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  John  Demos,  at  Lowell,  on  June  30,  1915. 
He  was  arraigned  Sept.  30,  1915,  and  pleaded  not  guilty. 
James   F.    Owens,    Esq.,    and   Benjamin   J.   Maloney,    Esq., 


xii  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant. 
Nov.  3,  1915,  the  indictment  was  nol  prossed.  The  case  was 
in  charge  of  District  Attorney  WilHam  J.  Corcoran. 

BiAGio  Falzone,  Ignazio  Marello  and  Luigi  Grassi- 
DONio,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  January,  1915,  for  the 
murder  of  Morris  A.  Albertson,  at  Wakefield,  on  Dec.  20, 

1914.  The  defendant  Biagio  Falzone  was  arraigned  Jan.  15, 

1915,  and  pleaded  not  guilt}^  and  the  defendants  Ignazio 
Marello  and  Luigi  Grassidonio  were  arraigned  Jan.  11,  1915, 
and  each  pleaded  not  guilty.  J.  W.  Connelly,  Esq.,  was 
assigned  by  the  court  to  represent  the  defendant  Biagio 
Falzone,  Thomas  J.  Grady,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court 
to  represent  the  defendant  Ignazio  Marello,  and  Joseph  T. 
Zottoli,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court  to  represent  the 
defendant  Luigi  Grassidonio.  In  February,  1915,  the  de- 
fendants were  tried  by  a  jury  before  Irwin,  J.  The  result 
was  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree  in  the 
case  of  Biagio  Falzone,  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  murder  in  the 
second  degree  in  the  case  of  Ignazio  Marello,  and  the  case  of 
Luigi  Grassidonio  was  placed  on  file  by  order  of  the  court. 
Thereupon  the  defendant  Biagio  Falzone  was  sentenced  to 
death  by  electrocution  -  during  the  week  beginning  May  9, 
1915,  which  sentence  was  executed  May  27,  1915.  The  de- 
fendant Ignazio  Marello  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for 
life.  The  cases  were  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  William 
J.  Corcoran. 

ViTO  Florentino,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  March,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  Antonio  Aiello,  at  Boston,  on  Feb.  22,  1915. 
He  was  arraigned  March  9,  1915,  and  pleaded  not  guilty. 
John  F.  McDonald,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court  as  coun- 
sel for  the  defendant.  Later  the  defendant  retracted  his 
former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  manslaughter.  This  plea 
was  accepted  by  the  Commonwealth,  and  the  defendant  was 
sentenced  to  State  Prison  for  a  term  not  exceeding  five  years 
nor  less  than  four  years.  The  case  w^as  in  charge  of  District 
Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  xiii 

IsMAiEL  IsMAiEL,  iiidicted  in  Essex  County,  April,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  Peter  Karambelas  and  Arthur  Perolides  at 
Peabody,  on  April  15,  1915.  He  was  arraigned  April  30, 
1915,  and  pleaded  not  guilty.  Michael  L.  Sullivan,  Esq., 
and  James  J.  Ronan,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the  court  as 
counsel  for  the  defendant.  In  September,  1915,  the  defend- 
ant was  tried  b}^  a  jury  before  White,  J.  The  result  was  a 
verdict  of  not  guilty.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District 
Attorney  Michael  A.  Sullivan. 

Julian  Layne,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  March, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Gustaf  Frederickson,  at  Cambridge, 
on  Feb.  28,  1915.  He  was  arraigned  March  11,  1915,  and 
pleaded  not  guilty.  William  H.  Lewis,  Esq.,  was  assigned 
by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  On  June  10, 
1915,  the  defendant  retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded 
guilty  to  manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the 
Commonwealth,  and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  the 
Massachusetts  Reformatory.  The  case  was  in  charge  of 
District  Attorney  William  J.  Corcoran. 

Harry  E.  Nutting,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  Sep- 
tember, 1915,  for  the  murder  of  Everett  Nutting  and  Mattie 
L.  Nutting,  at  Groton,  on  July  19,  1915.  He  was  arraigned 
Oct.  28,  1915,  and  pleaded  not  guilty.  F.  L.  Blood,  Esq., 
appeared  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  The  defendant  was 
adjudged  insane,  and  was  committed  to  the  Bridgewater 
State  Hospital.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney 
William  J.  Corcoran. 

Demetrius  Pantazopoulos,  indicted  in  Essex  County, 
July,  1915,  for  the  murder  of  Dionisios  Hadjidakis  and 
Eurene  Pantazopoulos,  at  Lynn,  on  July  10,  1915.  The 
defendant  was  arraigned  July  22,  1915,  and  pleaded  not 
guilty.  Walter  W.  Pyne,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court  as 
counsel  for  the  defendant.  On  Sept.  24,  1915,  the  defendant 
retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  murder  in 
the  second  degree.     This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Common- 


xiv  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

wealth,  and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for 
life.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Michael 
A.  Sullivan. 

Erminio  Passeri,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  June,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  Settimino  Carbone,  at  Boston,  on  May  9, 
1915.  He  w^as  arraigned  June  21,  1915,  and  pleaded  not 
guilty.  Thomas  J.  Grady,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court 
as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  Later  the  defendant  retracted 
his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  manslaughter.  This 
plea  was  accepted  by  the  Commonwealth,  and  the  defendant 
was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for  a  term  not  exceeding  six 
years  nor  less  than  five  years.  The  case  was  in  charge  of 
District  Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Joseph  L.  Roy,  indicted  in  Plymouth  County,  February, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Albertine  Roy,  at  Brockton,  on 
Nov.  3,  1914.  Feb.  1,  1915,  the  defendant  was  committed 
to  the  Bridgewater  State  Hospital  for  observation.  No 
further  action  has  been  taken  in  this  case.  The  case  was  in 
charge  of  District  Attorney  Albert  F.  Barker. 

Antonio  Scerra,  indicted  in  Worcester  County,  January, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Filippo  Lore,  at  Gardner,  on  Sept.  13, 

1914.  He  was  arraigned  Feb.  10,  1915,  and  pleaded  not 
guilty.  Thomas  L.  Walsh,  Esq.,  and  Patrick  H.  Murray, 
Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defend- 
ant. Later  the  defendant  retracted  his  former  plea,  and 
pleaded  guilty  to  manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by 
the  Commonwealth,  and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to 
State  Prison  for  a  term  not  exceeding  twenty  years  nor  less 
than  fifteen  years.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District 
Attorney  James  A.  Stiles. 

George  Spiridakis,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  February, 

1915,  for  the  murder  of  Emmanuel  M.  Papadakis,  at  Boston, 
on  Jan.  20,  1915.  The  defendant  was  never  arraigned  but 
was  placed  in  the  Psychopathic  Hospital  for  observation,  and 
later  was  committed  to  the  Boston  State  Hospital.  The  case 
was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  xv 

Petro  Torchia,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  July,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  Anthony  Weinitsky,  at  Framingham, 
July  11,  1915.  He  was  arraigned  Sept.  23,  1915,  and  pleaded 
not  guilty.  John  W.  Connelly,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the 
court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  On  Dec.  1,  1915,  the 
defendant  retracted  his  former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to 
manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Common- 
wealth, and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for 
a  term  not  exceeding  eight  years  nor  less  than  six  years. 
The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  William  J. 
Corcoran. 

Cpiarles  E.  Warren,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County, 
June,  1915,  for  the  murder  of  Walter  G.  Green,  at  Newton, 
on  June  5,  1915.  He  was  arraigned  June  11,  1915,  and 
pleaded  not  guilty.  Albert  E.  Lewis,  Esq.,  and  Joseph 
Abbott,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the 
defendant.  On  Oct.  6,  1915,  the  defendant  retracted  his 
former  plea,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  murder  in  the  second 
degree.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Commonwealth,  and 
the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison  for  life.  The 
case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  William  J.  Corcoran. 

Felix  Vadenais,  Jr.,  indicted  in  Worcester  County,  Janu- 
ary, 1915,  for  the  murder  of  Joseph  S.  Goldberg,  at  Sutton, 
on  Dec.  21,  1914.  He  was  arraigned  Feb.  10,  1915,  and 
pleaded  not  guilty.  David  F.  O'Connell,  Esq.,  and  James 
F.  McGovern,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel 
for  the  defendant.  In  April,  1915,  the  defendant  was  tried 
by  a  jury  before  Sanderson,  J.  The  result  was  a  verdict  of 
not  guilty.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney 
James  A.  Stiles. 

John  Verderico,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  January, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Antonia  B.  Verderico,  at  Boston,  on 
Dec.  14,  1914.  He  w^as  arraigned  Jan.  13,  1915,  and  pleaded 
not  guilty.  John  F.  McDonald,  Esq.,  and  Vincent  Brogna, 
Esq.,  were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defend- 
ant.    Later   the   defendant   retracted   his   former   plea,   and 


xvi  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

pleaded  guilty  to  manslaughter.  This  plea  was  accepted  by 
the  Commonwealth,  and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to 
State  Prison  for  a  term  not  exceeding  ten  years  nor  less 
than  six  years.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney 
Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Gabrus  Yurgalavicz,  indicted  in  Norfolk  County,  Sep- 
tember, 1915,  for  the  murder  of  Mary  Yurgalavicz,  at 
Norwood,  on  July  26,  1915.  H.  E.  Ruggles,  Esq.,  was 
assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  He 
was  arraigned  Dec.  14,  1915,  and  pleaded  guilty  to  murder 
in  the  second  degree.  This  plea  was  accepted  by  the  Com- 
monwealth, and  the  defendant  was  sentenced  to  State  Prison 
for  life.  The  case  was  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Albert 
F.  Barker. 

The  following  indictments  for  murder  are  now  pending :  — 

Elizabeth  C.  Cannon,  indicted  in  Hampden  County, 
December,  1915,  for  the  murder  of  Lucille  Monty  Thomas, 
at  Russell,  on  Nov.  8,  1915.  The  defendant  has  not  yet 
been  arraigned.  The  case  is  in  charge  of  District  Attorney 
Joseph  B.  Ely. 

Harry  Hinds,  indicted  in  Middlesex  County,  June,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  Marvil  Elizabeth  Hinds  and  Barbara 
Jesstena  Hinds,  at  Cambridge,  on  April  9,  1915.  He  was 
arraigned  June  24,  1915,  and  pleaded  not  guilty.  William 
H.  Lewis,  Esq.,  and  Isidore  H.  Fox,  Esq.,  were  assigned  by 
the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  In  November,  1915, 
the  defendant  was  tried  by  a  jury  before  Raymond,  J.  The 
result  was  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. 
Two  motions  for  a  new  trial  filed  by  the  defendant  are 
now  pending.  The  case  is  in  charge  of  District  Attorney 
William  J.  Corcoran. 

Salvatore  Mazzaferro,  indicted  in  Plymouth  County, 
October,  1915,  for  the  murder  of  Pasquale  Femia,  at  Hing- 
ham,  on  Aug.  1,  1915.  He  was  arraigned  Oct.  27,  1915,  and 
pleaded  not  guilty.     John  E.  Crowley,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  xvii 

the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant.  Xo  further  action 
has  been  taken  in  this  case.  The  case  is  in  charge  of  District 
Attorney  Albert  F.  Barker. 

Julian  Olesiewski  and  Peter  Olesiewski,  indicted  in 
Hampshire  County,  October,  1915,  for  the  murder  of  Bolack 
Klmocy,  at  Easthampton,  on  July  27,  1915.  The  defendants 
were  arraigned  Oct.  27,  1915,  and  each  pleaded  not  guilty. 
N.  Seelye  Hitchcock,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court  as 
counsel  for  the  defendants.  No  further  action  has  been 
taken  in  these  cases.  The  cases  are  in  charge  of  District 
Attorney  John  H.  Schoonmaker. 

Domenico  Raia,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  September, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Guiseppe  Varano,  at  Boston,  on 
Aug.  3,  1915.  He  was  arraigned  Nov.  19,  1915,  and  pleaded 
not  guilty,  John  F.  McDonald,  Esq.,  and  F.  P.  Fralli,  Esq., 
were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant. 
No  further  action  has  been  taken  in  this  case.  The  case 
is  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Joseph  Rogers,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  June,  1915, 
for  the  murder  of  Samuel  Cohen,  at  Boston,  on  May  29, 
1915.  He  was  arraigned  June  21,  1915,  and  pleaded  not 
guilty.  R.  J.  Cotter,  Esq.,  was  assigned  by  the  court  as 
counsel  for  the  defendant.  No  further  action  has  been 
taken  in  this  case.  The  case  is  in  charge  of  District  Attor- 
ney Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Oscar  F.  Russ,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  September, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Emily  Russ,  at  Boston,  Aug.  23, 
1915.  He  was  arraigned  Oct.  8,  1915,  and  pleaded  not 
guilty.  Wendell  P.  Murray,  Esq.,  and  Morris  Katzeff,  Esq., 
were  assigned  by  the  court  as  counsel  for  the  defendant. 
No  further  action  has  been  taken  in  this  case.  The  case  is 
in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pelletier. 

Theodore  Semox,  indicted  in  Suffolk  County,  November, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Johanna  E.  Donovan,  at  Boston, 


xviii  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

on  Oct.  7,  1915.  The  defendant  has  not  yet  been  arraigned. 
The  case  is  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  C.  Pel- 
letier. 

Bow  Young,  indicted  in  Hampden  County,  September, 
1915,  for  the  murder  of  Ng  Hong,  at  Springfield,  on  Sept. 
12,  1915.  He  was  arraigned  Sept.  24,  1915,  and  pleaded 
not  guilty.  No  further  action  has  been  taken  in  this  case. 
The  case  is  in  charge  of  District  Attorney  Joseph  B.  Ely. 

Grade  Crossings. 

During  the  past  year  construction  necessary  to  complete 
the  work  at  Lynn,  Westfield  and  Clinton  has  been  in  prog- 
ress, and  eleven  hearings  before  commissioners  and  auditors 
have  been  attended  by  the  engineer  representing  the  Com- 
monwealth. 

Statements  of  expenditures  numbering  27,  amounting  to 
$969,997.22,  have  been  examined.  Objection  to  items, 
amounting  to  S340,217.96,  has  been  made,  $19,521.70  of 
which  has  been  withdrawn  or  disallowed,  and  decisions  as 
to  $318,721.99  are  pending.  Of  objections  made  in  previous 
years  items  amounting  to  $88,517.05  have  been  disallowed, 
withdrawn  or  transferred  to  later  statements. 

The  following  statements  show  in  detail  the  expenditures 
which  have  been  examined  from  Jan.  1,  1909,  to  date,  the 
amounts  objected  to  and  their  disposal :  — 


1916.J 


PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


XIX 


^§ 


1 

Pending 
Jan.  1,  1913. 

$292  81 
4,043  17 
88,267  18 
73,072  53 

1  i 

o  u  2 

ri 

IP. 

CD 
00 

0> 

si 

$292  81 

4,412  52 

157,362  69 

o 

CD 

u 

3   ■? 

O 
CO 

1 

ii 

S22 

CO 

OO 

It 

::^ 

I--  OO 

oco 
co'oT 

05 

5 

i 

i 

4 

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i 

IJ 

i 

i 

Objec- 
tions 
made  to 

Items 
amount- 
ing to  — 

$56,713  06 
86,906  61 
168.682  89 
86.230  78 
107.457  93 
197.095  32 
340.217  96 

CO* 

Total 
of  State- 
ments. 

.$2,324,575  12 
2,193,112  50 
2.182.670  51 
2,454,485  25 
1,440,708  73 
1,240,446  85 
969,997  22 

OO 

Num- 
ber of 
State- 
ments. 

OCOOOCO  — »ot^ 
U3  U5  -*<•>«•  't'  cc  IM 

< 

^^^.^!J" 

oSSSSSS 

1 

i 

CO 

- 

$6,055  76 

14,116  32 

51,270  65 

318,721  99 

i 

u 

$28,910  58 
29,882  97 
29,723  50 
19,521  70 

00 
CO 

i 

$34,966  34 
28,391  96 
81,174  64 

3 

Disallowed 

or 
withdrawn. 

$34  89 
3,935  44 
88,267  18 
29,961  34 
18,100  74 
68,762  91 

ii 

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$292  81 
4,043  17 
88.267  18 
65,053  22 
59.953  38 

5 
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86,906  61 
168,682  89 
86.230  78 
107,457  93 
197,095  32 
340,217  96 

CO* 

ill 

$2,324,575  12 
2,193,112  50 
2,182.670  51 
2,454,485  25 
1,440.708  73 
1.240.440  85 
969.997  22 

00 

ci" 

Nu  ra- 
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PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


XXI 


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xxii  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Opinions  of  Supreme  Judicial  Court. 
A  serious  problem  now  confronts  the  legal  profession  of 
the  country  growing  out  of  the  multiplication  of  law  reports. 
In  our  own  State  the  reports  of  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Court  of  the  Commonwealth  have  now  reached  the 
two  hundred  and  twenty-second  volume,  and  between  four 
and  five  volumes  are  being  added  annually.  In  many  of  the 
decisions  reported  in  these  volumes  the  court  is  merely  ap- 
plying well-settled  principles  of  law  to  the  special  facts  in- 
volved in  the  particular  case.  In  such  cases,  particularly 
when  the  action  of  the  court  below  is  affirmed,  a  published 
opinion  can  be  of  little  or  no  value  as  a  precedent.  Almost 
its  only  purpose  is  to  inform  the  parties  to  the  litigation  of 
the  reasons  for  the  decision  made  by  the  court.  In  my 
opinion,  and  in  that  of  many  members  of  the  bar,  no  useful 
purpose  is  served  by  the  writing  and  the  publishing  of 
opinions  in  cases  of  the  character  which  I  have  described. 
It  has,  however,  been  the  practice  of  the  court  for  many 
years  to  hand  down  opinions  in  all  cases  decided,  though 
they  are  not  required  by  law  to  do  so.  Revised  Laws,  chap- 
ter 156,  section  12,  requires  that  the  rescript  formally  stating 
the  court's  decision  shall  contain  a  brief  statement  of  the 
reasons  for  the  decision,  and  further  provides  for  the  pub- 
lishing of  the  rescript  in  the  event  that  no  opinion  is  written. 
As  rescripts  are  merely  formal  documents,  it  is  plainly  not 
desirable  to  have  them  published  in  any  substantial  num- 
bers, and  for  this  reason  opinions  are  not  infrequently  writ- 
ten which  might  be  omitted  if  the  requirement  that  the 
rescript  be  then  published  did  not  exist.  I  feel  that  the 
court  should  be  given  an  unlimited  opportunity  to  decide 
cases  without  opinion*  in  its  discretion  in  all  cases  where  it 
is  apparent  that  the  writing  of  an  opinion  would  serve  no 
substantial  public  purpose.  Accordingly,  I  recommend  that 
the  section  of  the  Revised  Laws  referred  to  be  amended  so 
as  to  provide  that  if  no  opinion  is  written  the  reporter  shall 
publish  only  a  brief  memorandum  of  the  decision.  I  have 
in  mind  in  making  this  suggestion  such  memoranda  of  deci- 
sions as  are  published  in  the  reports  of  the  decisions  of  the 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCmiENT  —  No.  12.  xxiii 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals  of  New  York.  If  some  such  amendment  is  adopted, 
it  will  be  an  indication  to  the  court  that  the  General  Court 
agrees  with  the  views  which  I  have  herein  expressed,  and 
will  enable  the  court  without  embarrassment  to  omit  opin- 
ions in  many  cases  where  it  now  feels  obliged  to  write  them. 
This  will  not  only  check  the  overgrowth  of  our  law  reports, 
but  will  remove  an  unnecessary  burden  from  the  judges  of 
this  court  and  give  them  more  time  to  devote  to  the  prepa- 
ration of  opinions  in  the  remaining  cases  and  to  their  other 
important  public  duties. 

Counsel  for  the  Public  Service  Commission. 

Under  the  provisions  of  section  1  of  chapter  7  of  the 
Revised  Laws  it  is  provided  that  the  Attorney-General  shall 
appear  for  the  Commonwealth,  the  Secretary,  the  Treasurer 
and  Receiver-General,  the  Auditor  of  Accounts  and  for  State 
boards  and  commissions  in  all  suits  and  other  civil  proceed- 
ings in  which  the  Commonwealth  is  a  party  or  interested, 
or  in  which  the  official  acts  and  doings  of  said  officers  are 
called  in  question,  in  all  the  courts  of  the  Commonwealth, 
and  that  such  suits  and  proceedings  shall  be  prosecuted  or 
defended  by  him  or  under  his  direction.  It  is  further  pro- 
vided that  all  legal  services  required  by  such  officers,  boards, 
commissions  and  commissioner  of  pilots  for  the  harbor  of 
Boston  in  matters  relating  to  their  official  duties  shall  be 
rendered  by  the  Attorney-General  or  under  his  direction. 
From  the  passage  of  St.  1896,  chapter  490,  to  the  passage 
of  St.  1913,  chapter  784,  providing  for  a  reorganization  of 
the  Board  of  Railroad  Commissioners  under  the  name  of 
the  Public  Service  Commission,  the  provisions  of  law  con- 
tained in  Revised  Laws,  chapter  7,  section  1,  applied  to  all 
State  boards  and  commissions,  except  that  in  a  few  instances 
State  boards,  in  their  character  local,  such  as  the  Police 
Commissioner  for  the  city  of  Boston,  the  Licensing  Board 
for  the  city  of  Boston  and  the  Finance  Commission  for  the 
city  of  Boston,  were  authorized  by  law  to  employ  counsel 
without  regard  to  the  Attorney-General. 

By  the  provisions  of  St.  1913,  chapter  784,  section  9,  the 


xxiv  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Public  Service  Commission  was  authorized  to  appoint  a 
counsel  to  the  commission  and  such  attorneys  as  they  deemed 
advisable,  for  such  term  of  office  or  employment  and  at  such 
salaries  as  they  deemed  proper.  It  was  provided,  however, 
that  in  the  conduct  of  litigation  and  court  proceedings  such 
counsel  and  attorneys  should  act  under  the  direction  of  the 
Attorney-General.  Under  the  provisions  of  section  28  of 
said  chapter  it  was  provided  that  the  commissioner  might 
direct  counsel  for  the  commission  to  begin  proceedings  in 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  for  the  enforcement  of  its  orders, 
subject  to  the  supervision  of  the  Attorney-General. 

The  result  of  this  provision  of  law  is  that  the  Attorney- 
General  has  no  supervision  or  control  over  the  advice  which 
may  be  given  the  Public  Service  Commission,  yet  under  the 
provisions  of  law  the  responsibility  is  placed  upon  him  to 
enforce  its  orders.  I  deem  it  desirable  that  the  entire  re- 
sponsibility for  advice  given  and  actions  taken  by  counsel 
outside  of  court,  as  well  as  proceedings  taken  in  court, 
should  be  lodged  either  in  counsel  who  act  free  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  Attorney-General  or  in  the  Attorney-General 
and  counsel  who  are  at  all  times  under  his  supervision  and 
control. 

I  therefore  recommend  legislation  to  accomplish  one  of 
these  results. 

Sentences  to  the  Massachusetts  Reformatory  and 
Reformatory  for  Women. 

Many  judges  have  construed  the  provisions  of  section  29 
of  chapter  220  of  the  Revised  Laws,  as  amended  by  chapter 
252  of  the  Acts  of  1907,  chapter  209  of  the  Acts  of  1903  and 
amendments  thereto,  and  chapters  347  and  356  of  the  Acts 
of  1910,  relating  to  the  Massachusetts  Reformatory  and  the 
Reformatory  for  Women,  as  creating  additional  or  alter- 
native punishments  for  all  misdemeanors,  or  at  least  all 
misdemeanors  punishable  by  imprisonment. 

If  this  construction  is  correct,  the  punishment  of  misde- 
meanors, the  maximum  penalty  for  which  was  limited  to 
days  or  a  few  months  in  the  statutes  creating  the  offences, 
has  been  automatically  increased  to  an  imprisonment  of  two 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  xxv 

years.  As  a  result  of  this  construction  sentences  have  been 
imposed  by  courts  for  offences  the  character  of  which  is  not 
such  as  in  the  opinion  of  the  Prison  Commissioners  should 
be  dealt  with  in  the  reformatories.  I  have  grave  doubts 
whether  this  construction  given  the  statutes  by  many  of 
the  judges  of  the  courts  is  correct.  I  think  it  would  cause 
some  astonishment  on  the  part  of  the  public  to  learn  that 
the  punishment  for  a  misdemeanor,  the  maximum  punish- 
ment for  which  was  defined  by  the  Legislature  in  the  act 
creating  it  to  be  not  more  than  a  month  in  the  house  of 
correction,  by  these  provisions  relative  to  the  reformatory 
prisons  has  been  increased  to  not  more  than  two  years. 

In  view  of  the  uncertainty  pertaining  to  these  statutes  1 
think  it  desirable  that  legislation  should  be  enacted  clearly 
defining  what  crimes  and  offences  may  be  punished  by  im- 
prisonment m  the  reformatory  prisons,  together  with  the 
limitation  of  punishment,  and  what  may  not,  and  so  recom- 
mend. 

Bonds  given  to  the  Commonwealth  by  Contractors. 
Bonds  or  other  security  are  in  all  cases  required  where 
contracts  are  made  on  behalf  of  the  Commonwealth  by 
public  officers  for  the  construction  or  repair  of  public  build- 
ings or  other  public  work  under  the  provisions  of  Revised 
Laws,  chapter  6,  section  77.  These  bonds  ordinarily  include 
a  stipulation  insuring  the  faithful  performance  of  the  work 
by  the  contractor.  It  has  been  customary  for  contractors 
to  secure  bonds  from  surety  companies.  As  the  arrange- 
ment between  the  surety  company  and  the  contractor  is  for 
the  payment  of  an  annual  premium  so  long  as  liability  re- 
mains on  the  bond,  contractors  have  often  been  very  much 
embarrassed  in  being  relieved  of  their  liability  to  the  insur- 
ance company  for  the  premiums,  as  there  is  no  way,  after 
the  contract  has  been  completed  and  sixty  days  have  expired 
under  the  provisions  of  law  for  the  filing  of  claims  by  sub- 
contractors and  others,  to  assure  the  insurance  company  that 
there  is  no  further  liability  to  them  by  reason  of  the  bond. 
Some  of  the  boards  and  commissions  have  attempted  at 
times  to  relieve  this  situation  by  passing  votes  attempting 


xxvi  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

to  discharge  or  release  the  sureties  from  their  obligation  on 
their  bonds.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  such  action  by  the 
boards  is  unauthorized  by  law  and  is  of  doubtful  effect. 

To  clear  up  the  uncertainty  and  to  provide  some  method 
of  definitely  determining  the  liability  of  the  surety  upon 
these  bonds  and  a  way  to  release  security  which  may  be 
deposited  with  the  Commonwealth  in  lieu  of  such  bonds,  I 
advocate  that  the  Governor  and  Council  be  authorized,  upon 
the  expiration  of  sixty-five  days  after  the  completion  of  the 
contract,  where  no  claims  under  the  provisions  of  said  sec- 
tion 77  are  pending,  to  release  and  discharge  the  sureties 
from  any  further  liability  upon  such  bond  and  to  release 
any  security  which  may  have  been  given  in  lieu  of  a  bond. 

Collections. 

The  collections  made  by  the  department  during  the  last 
fiscal  year  have  been  unusually  heavy,  amounting  to  $740,- 
620.55.  A  special  effort  has  been  made  to  collect  all  out- 
standing claims  due  to  the  Commonwealth  under  the  col- 
lateral legacy  tax  statute,  St.  1891,  chapter  425.  There  has 
been  collected  during  the  fiscal  year  $41,156.46  of  these 
taxes,  as  against  $16,116.06  during  the  preceding  year. 

Under  an  arrangement  made  by  my  predecessors  in  office 
with  the  Treasurer  and  Receiver-General  an  assistant  has 
been  designated  by  the  Attorney-General  to  take  charge  of 
these  collections,  and  his  office  has  been  in  the  Treasurer's 
department.  He  has  not  only  taken  care  of  collections 
which  properly  were  for  this  department  to  collect,  but  he 
has  in  addition  performed  a  large  amount  of  clerical  work 
in  estimating  taxes  due  and  sending  notices  in  relation  to 
the  same,  which  properly  falls  upon  the  Treasurer's  depart- 
ment to  handle.  There  will  of  necessity  be  considerable 
work  in  relation  to  these  taxes  for  some  years  to  come,  for 
the  reason  that  in  many  instances  the  tax  is  not  yet  due 
on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  inheritance  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  will  by  which  it  is  derived  is  postponed  to 
await  the  termination  of  some  life  or  some  contingency  or 
event. 

The  work  of  collection  has  now  been   so  well  advanced 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  xxvii 

that  there  is  no  further  occasion  for  an  assistant  of  this 
department  to  be  longer  located  in  the  Treasurer's  office, 
and  there  is  no  further  occasion  why  this  department  should 
be  burdened  with  work  properly  belonging  to  the  Treasurer 
and  Receiver-General.  The  number  of  collection  cases  which 
properly  are  ripe  to  be  handled  by  the  Attorney-General  does 
not  now  amount  to  more  than  100.  The  services  of  the  as- 
sistant designated  to  take  charge  of  this  work  would  have 
been  discontinued  before  this  but  that  the  Treasurer  had  no 
appropriation  to  employ  a  clerk  to  take  charge  of  the  clerical 
work  which  will  necessarily  be  thrown  upon  his  department 
upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  assistant. 

I  urge  that  a  sufficient  appropriation  be  given  the  Treasurer 
that  the  services  of  a  clerk  capable  of  taking  care  of  the 
work  may  be  secured. 

Interest  upon  Damages  for  the  Taking  or  Injury  to 
Real  Estate  by  the  Commonwealth. 

Under  the  provisions  of  chapter  148  of  the  Acts  of  1913 
interest  upon  the  damages  sustained  by  persons  whose  real 
estate  has  been  taken  or  injured  by  the  city  of  Boston  under 
authority  of  any  law  or  statute  is  limited  to  a  rate  of  4  per 
cent,  per  annum.  Under  the  provisions  of  chapter  525  of 
the  Acts  of  1913  interest  upon  damages  to  real  estate  taken 
or  injured  by  the  Metropolitan  Park  Commission  or  by  the 
Metropolitan  Water  and  Sewerage  Board  under  authority 
of  law  or  statute  was  limited  to  a  rate  of  5  per  cent,  per 
annum. 

I  can  see  no  reason  in  principle  why  the  Commonwealth 
should  be  made  liable  to  a  greater  rate  of  interest  upon 
damages  sustained  by  the  taking  or  injury  of  real  estate  by 
the  Commonwealth  than  is  the  city  of  Boston  under  a  like 
situation. 

I  recommend  that  in  all  cases  where  land  is  taken  or 
injured  by  the  Commonwealth,  acting  by  or  through  any 
officer,  board  or  commission,  interest  upon  the  damages 
sustained  shall  be  limited  to  4  per  cent.,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  city  of  Boston. 


xxviii  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Evasion  of  Inheritance  Tax  on  Property  of  a  De- 
ceased Person. 
It  has  been  called  to  my  attention  that  by  reason  of  the 
facility  with  which  stocks  and  bonds  can  be  transferred  from 
one  person  to  another  without  requiring  registration  of  trans- 
fer on  the  books  of  the  corporation,  the  presumption  being 
that  the  possessor  of  such  stocks  and  bonds  indorsed  in 
blank  is  the  real  owner,  it  is  a  matter  of  easy  accomplish- 
ment to  evade  the  payment  of  the  inheritance  tax  upon 
securities  of  this  kind.  With  a  friendly  executor  or  admin- 
istrator, or  one  who  is  interested  in  the  estate,  securities  of 
this  type  may  be  handed  over  to  the  heirs  of  a  deceased 
person,  with  the  State  having  no  knowledge  of  it.  I  suggest 
the  advisability  of  legislation  to  in  a  measure  prevent  such 
occurrences  by  the  passage  of  an  act  similar  in  character  to 
that  obtaining  in  the  State  of  New  York  where  property 
has  been  deposited  by  a  deceased  person  with  persons  or 
corporations  for  safe  keeping. 

Taxation  of  Life  Insurance  Policies. 

On  Nov.  15,  1915,  at  the  request  of  the  Tax  Commissioner, 
I  felt  it  my  duty  to  advise  him  that  he  should  take  the  atti- 
tude that  the  taking  out  of  a  life  insurance  policy  payable 
to  a  beneficiary  constituted  a  gift  of  the  beneficial  interest 
in  the  policy  made  or  intended  to  take  effect  in  possession 
or  enjoyment  after  the  death  of  the  insured,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  legacy  and  succession  tax  law,  and  that 
therefore  upon  the  death  of  the  insured  the  proceeds  of  such 
a  policy  were  taxable  to  the  beneficiary  under  this  law.  This 
advice  caused  considerable  discussion  among  members  of  the 
bar  and  persons  interested  in  insurance,  but  as  yet  no  pro- 
ceedings have  been  begun  to  test  the  matter  in  the  courts. 

In  view  of  the  doubt  as  to  what  extent,  if  at  all,  the 
statute  covers  such  cases,  I  recommend  the  consideration  of 
legislation  which  shall  definitely  determine  whether  such 
policies  are  to  be  taxable,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent,  with 
special  consideration  as  to  the  exemption  of  small  policies 
payable  to  w^idows  and  other  dependent  beneficiaries. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  xxix 

Party  Walls  on  Property  taken  by  the  Commonwealth 
ON  Beacon  Hill. 
At  the  time  of  the  acquisition  by  the  State  House  Building 
Commission  of  the  properties  on  Beacon  Hill,  to  be  used  in 
connection  with  the  new  west  wing  of  the  State  House,  and 
in  order  to  adjust  certain  elements  of  damage  to  adjacent 
property  owners  by  reason  of  the  taking  of  certain  party 
walls  and  the  extinguishment  of  the  rights  of  such  adjoining 
owners  therein,  an  agreement  was  made  by  this  office  with 
such  adjoining  owners  that  legislation  should  be  sought  at 
the  present  session  of  the  Legislature  to  enable  the  Com- 
monwealth to  grant  and  release  to  these  adjoining  owners 
the  rights  and  easements  in  such  party  walls,  w^hich  were  of 
no  value  to  the  Commonwealth  but  of  substantial  impor- 
tance to  the  proper  enjoyment  of  such  adjoining  properties. 
In  accordance  with  such  agreement  I  recommend  that  the 
State  House  Building  Commission  be  authorized  to  convey, 
on  behalf  of  the  Commonwealth,  its  right,  title  and  interest 
in  said  party  walls  and  the  land  thereunder  upon  such  terms 
as  they  shall  determine. 

Publication  of  the  Opinions  of  the  Attorneys-General. 
I  recommend  that  the  sum  of  $2,500  be  appropriated  for 
the  purpose  of  continuing  the  publication  of  the  opinions  of 
the  Attorneys-General,  there  now  being,  in  my  judgment,  a 
sufficient  number  of  public  interest  to  make  a  volume  of  the 
size  heretofore  published. 

Revision  of  the  Statutes. 
I    renew    the    recommendation    made    by    my    immediate 
predecessor   in   office,   the   Hon.   Thomas  J.   Boynton,   that 
measures  be  taken  to  provide  for  the  revision,  codification 
and  arrangement  of  the  statutes  of  the  Commonwealth. 

Attorney-General's  Report. 
Under  the   provisions   of  section   8   of  chapter  7   of  the 
Revised  Laws  the   Attorney-General  is   required  to  report 
to  the  General  Court  the  cases  tried,  argued  or  conducted 


XXX  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

by  him  during  the  preceding  year.  Apparently  under  this 
provision  it  has  been  held  by  my  predecessors  in  office  that 
lists  of  the  cases  in  which  the  Attorney-General  has  ap- 
peared should  be  attached  to  the  Attorney-General's  report. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  it  has  become  impracticable  to  include 
all  of  the  cases  and  as  a  result  a  practice  has  grown  up  of 
inserting  such  as  it  has  been  thought  might  be  of  some 
public  interest.  In  my  judgment  this  practice  of  attaching 
lists  of  these  cases  might  well  be  discontinued,  as  they  serve 
no  useful  purpose.  The  statute  should  be  amended  so  as 
to  require  the  Attorney-General  to  report  the  number  of 
cases  tried,  argued  or  conducted  by  him  during  the  pre- 
ceding year.  Information  in  relation  to  any  case  or  cases 
that  the  Legislature  may  at  any  time  be  interested  in  can 
from  time  to  time  be  required,  as  the  Legislature  or  any 
committee  thereof  may  deem  desirable.  In  this  way  much 
time  and  expense  would  be  saved  to  the  department  and 
the  Commonwealth. 

Department  of  the  Attorney-General. 

The  work  imposed  upon  this  department  during  the  fiscal 
year,  in  my  judgment,  has  not  been  unusual  in  amount  or 
character. 

Necessarily  there  is  some  increase  growing  out  of  the  in- 
creased governmental  functions.  The  number  of  cases  tried 
in  the  Probate  Court  was  13.  The  number  of  cases  tried  in 
the  Superior  Court  was  6,  1  being  before  a  jury.  Sixteen 
hearings  before  a  single  justice  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Court  have  been  attended.  There  have  been  16  cases  argued 
before  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court,  and  1  case  tried  before 
a  justice  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court.  Two  cases  have 
been  tried  and  argued  before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission at  Washington,  and  2  before  the  United  States  Dis- 
trict Court. 

The  number  of  official  opinions  rendered  by  the  depart- 
ment during  the  year,  up  to  Jan.  1,  1916,  was  209.  So 
far  as  possible  written  opinions  have  been  discouraged 
where  the  opinion  rendered  did  not  involve  a  useful  prece- 
dent as  a  guide  to  the  departments  to  be  followed  in  future 
actions. 


1916.J  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  xxxi 

It  seems  to  have  been  the  policy  of  the  department 
in  recent  years  in  cases  growing  out  of  petitions  for  the 
assessment  of  damages  for  land  taken  by  the  Common- 
wealth to  await  action  for  the  trial  of  these  cases  by  the 
petitioners.  This  year  all  petitions  for  the  assessment 
of  damages  for  land  taken,  unless  there  has  been  some 
extraordinary  reason  for  delay,  have  been  marked  by 
the  department  for  trial,  and  this  will  result  in  either  the 
trial  or  disposition  of  cases  which  have  for  a  long  time  been 
drawing  6  per  cent,  interest  against  the  Commonwealth  upon 
the  value  of  the  land  taken.  As  cases  ordinarily  must  be 
marked  for  trial  in  the  fall  to  insure  trial  during  the  year, 
there  has  been  but  1  case  tried  by  the  department  of  this 
character.  Many  cases,  however,  during  this  fiscal  year  will 
be  tried  or  disposed  of  by  reason  of  the  cases  being  marked 
for  trial  by  the  Commonwealth.  I  doubt  the  wisdom  of  a 
policy  which  allows  cases  of  this  character  to  drag  along, 
as  interest  is  constantly  running  against  the  Commonwealth. 
Furthermore,  the  public  improvement  usually  involved  in 
the  taking  of  land  by  the  Commonwealth  results  in  an  im- 
provement of  the  neighborhood,  and  juries  upon  a  view, 
made  several  years  later,  are  apt  to  get  a  wrong  impression 
of  the  value  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  the  taking. 

Annexed  to  this  report  are  such  of  the  opinions  rendered 
during  the  current  year  as  it  is  thought  are  of  interest  to  the 
public. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

HENRY  C.  ATTWILL, 

Attorney-Ge7ieral. 


OPINIONS. 


Directors    of   the    Port    of    Boston  —  Powers  —  Construction    of 

Dry  Dock. 

St.  1911,  c.  748,  §  5,  providing  that  the  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston  "may 
lay  out  and  build  .  .  .  such  piers,  wdth  buildings  and  appurtenances, 
docks,  highways,  waterways,  railroad  connections,  storage  yards 
and  pubHc  warehouses  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the  directors,  may  be  de- 
sirable," did  not  authorize  them  to  enter  into  contracts  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  dry  dock  substantially  as  described  in  the  report  of  the 
Directors  for  the  year  ending  Nov.  30,  1913,  the  final  decision  as  "to 
whether  such  a  dry  dock  should  be  built  having  been  reserved  to  itself 
by  the  General  Court. 

Jan.  28,  1915. 

Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston,  40  Central  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to 
"whether  or  not,  under  the  terms  of  chapter  748  of  the  Acts 
of  1911,  or  any  acts  in  amendment  thereof  or  in  addition 
thereto,  the  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston  are  authorized  to 
enter  into  contracts  for  the  construction  of  a  dry  dock  sub- 
stantially as  described  in  the  report  of  said  Directors  for  the 
year  ending  Nov.  30,  1913." 

None  of  the  acts  amendatory  of  chapter  748  of  the  Acts 
of  1911  have  increased  the  powers  of  the  Directors  of  the  Port 
in  that  respect. 

The  power  to  construct  a  dry  dock  like  that  described  must 
be  found,  if  at  all,  in  the  provisions  of  section  5  of  the  act 
of  1911,  the  pertinent  portions  of  which  are  as  follows:  — 

With  the  consent  of  the  governor  and  council,  the  directors  .  .  .  may 
lay  out  and  build  .  .  .  such  piers,  with  buildings  and  appurtenances, 
docks,  highwaj^s,  waterways,  railroad  connections,  storage  yards  and 
public  warehouses  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the  directors,  may  be  desir- 
able. .  .  . 

It  may  be  suggested  that  a  dry  dock  is  but  one  kind  of 
a  dock,  and  that  the  opinion  of  the  Directors  as  to  the  de- 
sirability of  that  particular  type  is  conclusive.     It  is  true  that 


2  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

in  some  cases  arising  under  different  circumstances  and  in 
different  localities  a  dry  dock  has  been  regarded  as  but  one  of 
many  types,  but  primarily,  in  this  country,  I  believe  it  has  a 
more  limited  sense. 

Bouvier  defines  "dock"  as  "the  space  between  two 
wharves." 

A  dock  is  defined  by  philologists,  according  to  the  American  use  of 
the  term,  to  be  "the  space  between  wharves."  City  of  Boston  v.  Lecraio, 
17  How.  at  434. 

In  Webster's  Dictionary  we  find  the  following :  — 

An  artificial  basin  or  inclosure  in  connection  wiih  a  harbor,  for  the 
reception  of  vessels;  the  slip  or  waterway'  extending  between  two  piers 
or  projecting  wharves  or  cut  into  the  land,  for  the  reception  of  ships. 

The  Century  Dictionary  says :  — 

An  inclosed  water-space  in  which  a  ship  floats  while  being  loaded  or 
unloaded,  as  the  space  between  two  wharves  or  piers;  by  extension, 
any  space  or  structure  in  or  upon  which  a  ship  maj^  be  berthed  or  held 
for  loading,  unloading,  repairing  or  safe-keeping. 

A  dry  dock  such  as  is  described  is  a  decided  extension  of 
the  idea  of  an  inclosed  water-space  in  which  a  ship  floats 
while  being  loaded  or  unloaded.  The  principal  use  of  a  dry 
dock  is  for  the  repairing  or  overhauling  of  ships,  for  the  effi- 
cient performance  of  which  "shops  and  other  buildings"  are 
"necessary."  If  the  difference  be  considered  as  one  of  degree, 
the  degree  of  difference  is  so  great  that,  in  my  opinion,  in 
this  country  it  has  become  one  of  kind,  and  a  dry  dock  is 
considered  more  as  a  repair  shop  than  as  a  dock,  in  its  pri- 
mary meaning. 

Under  the  provisions  of  section  5  the  Directors  of  the  Port 
are  restricted  in  the  acquiring  of  real  property,  and  rights 
and  easements  therein,  to  that  necessary  for  the  purpose  of 
constructing,  or  securing  the  constructing  or  utilizing  of,  piers 
and,  in  connection  therewith,  highways,  waterways,  railroad 
connections,  storage  yards  and  sites  for  warehouses  and  in- 
dustrial establishments.  The  main  object  of  the  first  part  of 
this  section  is  to  provide  for  the  securing  of  land  upon  which  to 
build  piers,  and  the  provisions  for  the  constructing  and  secur- 
ing the  constructing   or  utilization   of  highways,   waterways. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  —  No.  12.  3 

railroad  connections,  storage  yards  and  sites  for  warehouses 
and  industrial  establishments  are  incidental  to  the  main 
object,  and  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  piers  convenient 
and  available  for  use.  Docks  necessarily  would  be  created 
by  the  construction  of  piers. 

No  provision  is  made  for  the  taking  or  acquiring  of  land  or 
other  rights  for  docks.  If  the  Legislature  had  in  mind  the 
granting  of  the  right  to  build  a  structure  which  would  require 
about  one-third  of  the  total  appropriation  of  $9,000,000  for 
its  construction,  it  seems  probable  that  it  would  have  given 
as  wide  a  latitude  in  selecting  the  most  advantageous  site 
therefor  as  it  did  with  respect  to  piers. 

Moreover,  under  the  provisions  of  the  latter  part  of  section 
5  the  Directors  of  the  Port  are  authorized  to  lay  out  and 
build  such  piers  with  buildings  and  appurtenances  as  may  be 
desirable,  and  no  provision  is  made  for  appurtenances  in  con- 
nection with  docks.  A  dry  dock  without  appurtenances  for 
its  operation  is  useless. 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the  docks  referred  to  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  section  are  those  docks  only  that  are 
incident  to  or  connected  with  the  use  of  piers  or  like  struc- 
tures which  the  Directors  of  the  Port  are  authorized  to  con- 
struct. 

While  the  foregoing  furnish  reasons  for  doubting  whether 
in  using  the  word  "  docks"  the  Legislature  intended  to  include 
such  a  gigantic  construction  work  as  is  described,  section  12  of 
the  act  deals  particularly  with  the  matter  of  a  dry  dock.  It 
provides:  — 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  directors  f orth\\ath  to  make,  and,  so  far  as 
may  be  practicable,  to  put  into  execution,  comprehensive  plans  pro\ad- 
ing  on  the  lands  now  o^\Tied  or  hereafter  acquired  by  the  common- 
wealth in  the  area  described  in  section  four  of  this  act,  adequate  piers, 
capable  of  accommodating  the  largest  vessels,  and  in  coimection  Tvith 
such  piers  suitable  highways,  waterways,  railroad  connections  and 
storage  yards,  and  sites  for  warehouses  and  industrial  estabhshments. 
The  directors  shall  report  to  the  next  general  court,  on  or  before  the 
fifteenth  day  of  January,  nineteen  hundred  and  twelve,  all  necessary 
plans  and  estimates  of  cost  for  the  construction  of  a  drj-  dock  equipped 
with  modern  facihties  and  appliances,  sufficient  in  size  for  the  accom- 
modation of  any  modern  ocean  steamship. 

The  effect  to  be  given  to  this  section  must  be  determined 
with  reference  to  what  had  gone  before. 


4  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

In  the  report  of  the  Board  of  Harbor  and  Land  Commis- 
sioners for  the  year  1904  the  subject  of  dry  docks  was  exten- 
sively dealt  with  and  the  conclusion  reached  that  the  building 
of  one  was  not  advisable.  The  joint  commission  originally 
appointed  under  chapter  108  of  the  Resolves  of  1907  sub- 
mitted their  final  report  in  1911  to  the  Legislature  of  that 
year.  It  was  printed  as  House  Document  No.  1550.  On 
page  25  is  found  the  conclusion  of  this  commission:  — 

In  view  of  these  facts  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  would 
not  be  warranted  in  constructing,  owning  and  operating  a  dry  dock 
for  the  use  of  docking  merchant  ships;  to  do  so  would  be  a  waste  of  the 
public  funds  to  satisfy  a  mistaken  sentiment. 

It  therefore  appears  that  the  Legislature  of  1911,  when  con- 
sidering the  bill  which  ultimately  became  chapter  748  of  that 
year,  had  before  it  this  emphatic  condemnation  of  the  prop- 
osition of  building  a  dry  dock.  In  fact,  the  portions  of  this 
report  immediately  preceding  that  mentioned  were  referred  to 
the  same  committee  (metropolitan  affairs)  as  that  portion  of 
the  Governor's  address  concerning  transportation  which  re- 
lated to  the  development  of  the  port  of  Boston,  and  a  bill  for 
such  development.  It  was  as  a  result  of  the  reference  of  all 
three  of  these  matters  that  the  bill  "Relative  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  port  of  Boston"  was  reported. 

The  particular  portion  of  the  above-mentioned  report  of 
the  joint  commission  which  dealt  with  the  matter  of  a  dry 
dock  was  referred  to  the  committee  on  harbors  and  public 
lands,  which  reported  "no  legislation  necessary."  This  report 
was  accepted  by  both  branches  of  the  Legislature. 

While  the  question  is  not  free  from  doubt,  I  am  of  the 
opinion  that  the  events  preceding  the  passage  of  this  act, 
taken  in  connection  with  the  act  itself,  indicate  that  the 
Legislature  intended  to  reserve  to  itself  the  final  decision  as  to 
whether  there  should  be  built  a  dry  dock,  equipped  with 
modern  facilities  and  appliances,  such  as  is  described  in  the 
report  of  the  Directors  of  the  Port  for  the  year  ending  Nov. 
30,  1913;  and  that  without  further  authorization  by  the  Legis- 
lature the  Directors  of  the  Port  are  not  warranted  in  entering 
into  contracts  for  the  construction  of  such  a  dry  dock. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


1916.1  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


Pilots  —  Coastwise    Steam    Vessels  —  Requirement    of     Federal 
License  —  Effect  on  State  Statute. 

R.  L.,  c.  67,  §§25  and  28,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  coastwise  steam  vessels, 
are  inconsistent  with  and  annulled  by  U.  S.  Rev.  Stats.,  §§  8153  and 
8206,  and,  therefore,  a  Boston  pilot  must  in  addition  to  his  State  com- 
mission carry  a  Federal  Ucense  in  order  legally  to  pilot  coastwise 
steam  vessels  not  sailing  under  register. 

Feb.  11,  1915. 

Messrs.  Frederick  C.  Bailey  and  John  H.  Frost,  Pilot  Commissioners. 

Gentlemen:  —  Answering  your  favor  of  the  1st  inst.,  re- 
questing my  opinion  upon  the  question  ''whether  a  Boston 
pilot  should  in  addition  to  his  State  commission  carry  a  Fed- 
eral license,"  I  beg  to  advise  you  that  in  order  legally  to 
pilot  coastwise  steam  vessels  not  sailing  under  register  a  Bos- 
ton pilot  must  carry  a  Federal  license. 

You  state  that  by  the  terms  of  their  State  commissions 
Boston  pilots  are  required  to  serve  on  any  vessel  requiring 
their  services.  This  is  so  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  R.  L., 
c.  67,  §  25,  directing  a  pilot  "  to  take  charge,  within  the  limits 
of  his  commission,  of  any  vessels,  not  exempt  from  compul- 
sory pilotage  by  section  twenty-eight,  and  of  vessels  not 
bound  from  one  port  to  another  within  the  commonwealth, 
unless  they  are  in  the  completion  of  a  voyage  from  a  port 
out  of  the  commonwealth."  Among  the  exceptions  included 
in  section  28  are  "steam  vessels  regulated  by  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  and  carrying  a  pilot  commissioned  by  United 
States  commissioners"  and  "vessels  regularly  employed  in 
the  coasting  trade,"  but  as  to  these  exempted  vessels,  the 
pilot  is  required,  by  a  later  provision  of  section  28,  to  serve  if 
requested. 

The  Federal  statutes  material  to  this  opinion  are  United 
States  Compiled  Statutes  (1913),  sections  7981,  8153  and 
8206. 

Section  7981  (R.  S.  §  4235)  is  as  follows:  — 

Until  further  provision  is  made  by  Congress,  all  pilots  in  the  bays, 
inlets,  rivers,  harbors,  and  ports  of  the  United  States  shall  continue 
to  be  regulated  in  conformity  ■v\dth  the  existing  laws  of  the  States  re- 
spectively wherein  such  pilots  may  be,  or  with  such  laws  as  the  States 
may  respectively  enact  for  the  purpose.    (Act  Aug.  7,  1789,  c.  9.) 

Section  8153  (R.  S.  §  4401)  is  as  follows:  — 

All  coastwise  sea-going  vessels,  and  vessels  navigating  the  great 
lakes,  shaU  be  subject  to  the  navigation  laws  of  the  United  States, 


6  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

when  na^dgating  within  the  jurisdiction  thereof;  and  all  vessels,  pro- 
pelled in  whole  or  in  part  by  steam,  and  na^dgating  as  aforesaid,  shall 
be  subject  to  all  the  rules  and  regulations  established  in  pursuance 
of  law  for  the  government  of  steam-vessels  in  passing,  as  provided  by 
this  Title;  and  every  coastwise  sea-going  steam-vessel  subject  to  the 
navigation  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  to  the  rules  and  regulations 
aforesaid,  not  sailing  under  register,  shall,  when  under  way,  except  on 
the  high  seas,  be  under  the  control  and  direction  of  pilots  Hcensed  by 
the  inspectors  of  steamboats.    (Act  Feb.  28,  1871.) 

Section  8206  (R.  S.  §  4444)  is  as  follows:  — 

No  State  or  municipal  government  shall  impose  upon  pilots  of 
steam-vessels  any  obligation  to  procure  a  State  or  other  hcense  in 
addition  to  that  issued  by  the  United  States,  or  any  other  regulation 
which  will  impede  such  pilots  in  the  performance  of  the  duties  required 
by  this  Title;  nor  shaU  any  pilot-charges  be  levied  bj^  any  such  author- 
ity upon  any  steamer  piloted  as  provided  by  this  Title;  and  in  no  case 
shall  the  fees  charged  for  the  pilotage  of  any  steam-vessel  exceed  the 
customary  or  legall}^  established  rates  in  the  State  where  the  same  is 
performed.  Nothing  in  this  Title  shall  be  construed  to  annul  or  affect 
anj^  regulation  estabhshed  by  the  laws  of  any  State,  requiring  vessels 
entering  or  leaving  a  port  in  any  such  State,  other  than  coastwise 
steam-vessels,  to  take  a  pilot  dul}^  licensed  or  authorized  by  the  laws 
of  such  State  or  of  a  State  situate  upon  the  waters  of  such  State.  (Act 
Feb.  28,  1871.) 

Under  i^rticle  I.,  section  VIII.,  clause  3  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,  Congress  has  power  "to  regulate 
commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the  several  states, 
etc."  It  has  been  established  by  decisions  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  that  this  power  includes  the  regulation 
of  navigation,  including  the  regulation  of  the  qualifications  of 
pilots,  the  modes  and  times  of  offering  and  rendering  their 
services,  and  the  responsibilities  which  shall  rest  upon  them. 
Cooley  V.  Board  of  Wardens  of  Port  of  Philadelphia,  12  How. 
144. 

This  power  is  not  limited  to  navigation  on  the  high  seas,, 
but  extends  to  every  part  of  the  voyage  from  wharf  to  wharf. 
The  subject  covered  by  this  clause  of  the  Constitution  is  not 
one  the  exclusive  control  over  which  resides  in  Congress. 
It  is  the  exercise  of  its  power  to  regulate  commerce  among 
the  several  States  which  is  incompatible  with  the  exercise  of 
the  same  power  by  the  States.  In  the  absence,  therefore,  of 
congressional  regulation,  the  provisions  of  our  Revised  Laws,, 
chapter  67,  sections  25  and  28,  are  in  full  force  and  effect. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  7 

So  far,  therefore,  as  the  statutes  or  regulations  of  the  Com- 
monwealth conflict  with  the  acts  of  Congress  above*  quoted, 
they  are  null  and  void.  Section  8153  requires  that  pilots 
licensed  by  United  States  inspectors  of  steamboats  shall  con- 
trol every  coastwise  sea-going  steam  vessel  not  sailing  under 
register.  The  question  of  the  effect  of  this  regulation,  among 
others,  upon  existing  State  regulations  is  specifically  treated 
in  section  8206,  wherein  it  is  stated  that  "Nothing  in  this 
Title  shall  be  construed  to  annul  or  affect  any  regulation 
established  by  the  laws  of  any  State,  requiring  vessels  enter- 
ing or  leaving  a  port  in  any  such  State,  other  than  coastwise 
steam-vessels,  to  take  a  pilot  duly  licensed  or  authorized  by 
the  laws  of  such  State.  .  .  ."  As  to  coastwise  steam  vessels 
not  sailing  under  register,  therefore,  Congress  has  expressly 
said  that  it  annuls  any  State  regulation  requiring  pilot  service 
thereon.  It  follows  that  the  provisions  of  R.  L.,  c.  67,  §§  25 
and  28,  cannot  protect  a  pilot  serving  by  request  or  other- 
wise "coastwise  steam  vessels  not  sailing  under  register," 
and  in  order  legally  to  pilot  such  vessels  the  pilot  must  hold 
a  license  issued  by  the  United  States  inspectors  of  steam- 
boats. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company  —  Con- 
trol of  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  through  Boston  Railroad 
Holding  Company  —  Effect  of  Compliance  with  Decree  of 
United  States  District  Court  —  St.  1914,  c.  766,  not  ac- 
cepted. 

History  of  acquisition  of  control  of  the  Boston  &  Maine  RaUroad  by  the 
New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company  through  the 
formation  of  the  Boston  Raihoad  Holding  Company,  with  a  state- 
ment of  charter  powers  of  the  latter  corporation. 

St.  1914,  c.  766,  has  not  been  complied  with  by  the  New  York,  New  Haven 
&  Hartford  Railroad  Company  or  by  the  persons  named  as  liquida- 
tors in  Appendix  A  annexed  to  that  statute. 

The  terms  of  Appendix  A  to  St.  1914,  c.  766,  have  not  been  substantially 
incorporated  in  the  decree  entered  in  the  United  States  District  Court 
for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  on  Oct.  17,  1914,  by  consent 
of  the  parties,  in  the  suit  brought  by  the  United  States  against  the 
New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company,  the  Boston 
Railroad  Holding  Company  and  others,  alleging  an  illegal  combina- 
tion in  violation  of  the  Sherman  act. 


8  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

St.  1914,  c.  766,  §  1,  did  not  authorize  the  Governor  to  modify  the  provi- 
sions of  sections  3,  4  and  5  of  that  statute  creating  an  option  in  the 
Commonwealth  to  take  or  purchase  shares  of  stock  in  the  Boston  & 
Maine  Raihoad  owned  by  the  Boston  Raihoad  Holding  Company. 
Appendix  A  to  that  statute  could  not,  therefore,  be  modified  to  con- 
form to  this  decree. 

Unless  the  trustees  appointed  by  the  decree  referred  to  are  hereafter  di- 
rected by  the  United  States  District  Court  to  sell  the  shares  of  the 
Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  owned  by  the  Boston  Railroad  Holding 
Company,  subject  to  the  condition  stated  in  St.  1914,  c.  766,  a  com- 
pUance  with  that  act  is  inconsistent  with  a  compKance  with  the  decree. 

The  mere  transfer  by  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad 
Company  of  the  shares  of  the  Boston  Raihoad  Holding  Company 
owned  by  it  to  the  trustees  named  in  the  decree  referred  to  in  accord- 
ance with  the  order  of  the  court  was  not  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  this 
Commonwealth.  If  hereafter  this  stock  is  sold  by  these  trustees  by 
order  of  the  United  States  District  Court  without  the  consent  of  the 
General  Court,  and  the  purchaser  acquires  a  good  title,  the  terms  of 
the  act  creating  the  Boston  Railroad  Holding  Company  will  then  be 
violated. 

The  transfer  by  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Raihoad  Company 
of  the  shares  of  the  Boston  Raihoad  Holding  Company  owned  by  it 
to  the  trustees  named  in  the  decree  referred  to  by  order  of  the  United 
States  District  Court  was  not  an  acceptance  by  it  of  the  provisions  of 
St.  1914,  c.  766. 

Feb.  23,  1915. 

Hon.  Channing  H.  Cox,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Sir:  —  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  an 
order  passed  by  the  House  of  Representatives  on  February 
11  in  the  following  form:  — 

Ordered,  That  the  following  questions  of  law  be  submitted  to  the 
Attorney-General,  with  the  request  that  his  opinion  be  returned  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  at  his  earhest  convenience:  — 

1.  Whether  the  pro\dsions  of  chapter  766  of  the  Acts  of  the  year  1914, 
to  which  there  is  an  appendix  entitled  ''Appendix  A,"  have  been  com- 
plied with  by  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Com- 
pany and  the  persons  named  therein  as  Uquidators. 

2.  Whether  the  terms  of  said  Appendix  A  have  been  substantially 
incorporated  in  a  decree  of  the  United  States  District  Court  of  the 
Southern  District  of  New  York. 

3.  Whether  under  the  provisions  of  said  act  said  agreement  set 
forth  in  said  Appendix  A  could  have  been  modified  or  amended  so  as  to 
conform  in  all  respects  with  said  decree. 

4.  Whether  a  comphance  with  said  act  is  in  any  way  inconsistent 
with  comphance  with  said  decree. 

5.  Whether  the  transfer  of  the  shares  of  the  Boston  Railroad  Hold- 
ing Company  or  any  of  them  to  the  said  persons  named  as  liquidators 
in  a  manner  not  contemplated  in  said  act  and  without  the  execution  of 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  9 

the  agreement  set  forth  in  Appendix  A  or  any  amendment  thereof 
is  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  the  Commonwealth. 

6.  Whether  the  transfer  of  said  shares  to  said  persons,  though  not 
in  accordance  with  the  pro^dsions  of  said  act,  is  in  effect  an  acceptance 
of  all  the  pro\isions  of  said  act,  and  particularh^  of  section  3  of  said 
act,  or  whether  by  the  transfer  of  said  shares  in  a  manner  not  con- 
templated by  said  act  the  provisions  of  said  section  have  been  evaded. 

In  order  adequately  to  answer  these  inquiries  it  is  necessary 
to  recall  some  incidents  in  recent  railroad  history,  most  of 
them  matters  of  public  knowledge.  I  shall  refer  to  the  New" 
York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company  as  the  New 
Haven  Company,  to  the  Boston  Railroad  Holding  Company 
as  the  Holding  Company,  and  to  the  Boston  &  Maine  Rail- 
road as  the  Maine  Company. 

On  May  8,  1908,  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  decided  (At- 
torney-General V.  Neio  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad 
Company,  198  Mass.  413)  that  the  New  Haven  Company  was 
prohibited  by  the  statutes  of  this  Commonwealth  from  directly 
or  indirectly  subscribing  for,  taking  or  holding  the  stocks  or 
bonds  of  any  other  corporation  without  the  authority  of  the 
General  Court.  The  stocks  involved  in  that  decision  were 
shares  in  certain  street  railway  corporations  located  in  central 
and  western  Massachusetts.  The  decree  in  that  case  was 
finally  affirmed  on  March  1,  1909.  Prior  to  this  decision  the 
New  Haven  Company  had  acquired  and  was  holding  a  large 
number  of  shares  of  the  Maine  Company.  About  this  time, 
and  apparently  in  view  of  the  decision  just  referred  to,  these 
shares  were  transferred  by  the  New  Haven  Company  to  a  cor- 
poration formed  under  the  laws  of  another  State. 

On  April  20,  1909,  His  Excellency  Governor  Draper  called 
the  attention  of  the  General  Court  to  this  situation,  and  sug- 
gested to  it  the  advisability  of  creating  a  corporation  which, 
under  prescribed  limitations,  should  have  the  right  to  pur- 
chase and  hold  shares  of  stock  in  the  Maine  Company.  (See 
Acts  and  Resolves,  1909,  p.  965.)  The  result  was  the  statute 
of  1909,  chapter  519,  incorporating  the  Holding  Company. 

Section  1  of  that  act  defined  the  general  charter  powers  of 
that  corporation  in  the  follow^ing  language:  — 

.  .  .  for  the  sole  purpose  of  acquiring  and  holding  the  whole  or  any  part 
of  the  capital  stock,  bonds  and  other  evidences  of  indebtedness  of  the 
Boston  and  Maine  Railroad,  and  of  voting  upon  all  certificates  of  stock 
so  acquired  and  held,  and  of  recei\dng  and  collecting  dividends  and 
interest  upon  said  stock,  bonds  and  other  evidences  of  indebtedness. 


10  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Section  3  provided,  in  part:  — 

The  stock  of  the  Boston  and  Maine  Railroad  which  may  be  ac- 
quired by  said  Boston  Railroad  Holding  Company  shall  not  be  sold  by 
it  without  express  authority  from  the  legislature;  .  .  . 

Section  4  authorized  any  railroad  incorporated  at  that  date 
under  the  laws  of  the  Commonwealth  to  guarantee  dividends 
and  interest  upon  the  stocks  and  bonds  of  the  Holding  Com- 
pany, and  to  acquire  and  hold  such  stocks  and  bonds.  It 
further  provided :  — 

Any  railroad  corporation  acquiring  said  stock  as  hereinbefore  pro- 
^dded  shall  not  thereafter  sell  the  same  without  the  express  authority  of 
the  legislature.  The  commonwealth  may  at  any  time  by  act  of  the 
legislature,  upon  one  year's  notice,  take  or  acquire  by  purchase  or 
otherwise  the  stock,  bonds,  notes  and  other  evidences  of  indebtedness 
issued  by  the  said  Boston  Railroad  Holding  Company. 

The  section  then  went  on  to  provide  the  conditions  under 
which  this  taking  should  be  made,  and  the  manner  in  which 
compensation  for  the  property  taken  should  be  determined. 

The  Acts  of  1910,  chapter  639,  authorized  the  Holding 
Company  to  issue  preferred  stock  which  should  have  no  voting 
power.  It  expressly  made  this  preferred  stock  a  lien  upon  all 
the  stock  of  the  Maine  Company  at  any  time  held  by  the 
Holding  Company.  It  provided  that  any  railroad  owning 
common  stock  of  the  Holding  Company  might  acquire,  hold, 
own  and  sell  any  of  its  preferred  stock. 

Under  the  authority  of  these  statutes  the  Holding  Com- 
pany was  formed.  It  acquired  the  stock  of  the  Maine  Com- 
pany which  had  been  transferred  by  the  New  Haven  Company 
to  a  foreign  corporation  as  hereinbefore  stated,  and  also,  as 
I  am  informed,  certain  of  the  stock  of  the  Maine  Company 
held  by  various  individuals.  The  New  Haven  Company  ac- 
quired, and  up  to  the  date  of  the  decree  referred  to  in  your 
order  was  holding,  31,065  shares  of  the  common  stock  and 
244,939  shares  of  the  preferred  stock  of  the  Holding  Company. 
This  was  all  the  common  stock  and  all  but  approximately 
28,000  of  the  preferred  stock. 

Subsequent  to  the  perfection  of  this  arrangement  it  was 
claimed  by  the  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  that 
the  relations  between  the  New  Haven  Company  and  its  asso- 
ciated corporations,  including  the  Holding  Company,  were  a 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  11 

violation  of  the  Sherman  anti-trust  law.  It  was  expressly 
claimed  that  the  control  of  the  Maine  Company  by  the  New 
Haven  Company  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  Holding 
Company  was  a  part  of  an  illegal  combination  in  restraint  of 
trade  and  commerce  among  the  States.  The  New  Haven 
Company  denied  that  it  was  violating  the  law,  but,  owing  to 
its  financial  condition,  felt  that  it  was  unwise  for  it  to  engage 
in  a  long  and  expensive  contest  with  the  United  States. 
Accordingly,  numerous  conferences  were  held  between  the 
representatives  of  the  railroad  and  the  Attorney-General  of 
the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about,  by  agree- 
ment, a  dissolution  of  the  alleged  illegal  combinations.  When 
an  agreement  had  been  nearly,  if  not  quite,  reached,  though 
not  executed,  the  matter  was  called  to  the  attention  of  the 
General  Court  by  His  Excellency  Governor  Walsh,  and 
thereafter  chapter  766  of  the  Acts  of  1914  was  passed,  and 
approved  on  July  7,  1914. 

Thereafter,  as  I  am  informed,  the  directors  of  the  New 
Haven  Company  by  vote  expressly  declined  to  accept  the 
provisions  of  this  act.  So  far  as  I  am  informed  no  agreement 
in  the  form  of  Appendix  A,  annexed  thereto,  was  ever  exe- 
cuted by  the  New  Haven  Company. 

On  July  23,  1914,  a  bill  in  equity  was  brought  by  the  At- 
torney-General of  the  United  States  in  the  United  States  Dis- 
trict Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  in  the 
name  of  the  United  States,  against  the  New  Haven  Com- 
pany, the  Holding  Company  and  various  other  defendants, 
alleging  that  the  defendants  were  parties  to  combinations  in 
violation  of  the  Sherman  act,  and  seeking  a  dissolution  by 
decree  of  court  of  these  combinations.  Thereafter  further 
negotiations  were  held  between  the  parties,  and  finally,  on 
Oct.  17,  1914,  by  written  consent  of  the  defendants,  the 
decree  referred  to  in  your  order  was  entered  for  the  purpose 
of  bringing  about  a  dissolution  of  the  alleged  illegal  combina- 
tions. So  far  as  appears  from  the  records  of  that  court  this 
formal  assent  is  the  only  written  agreement  made  by  the 
parties  in  connection  with  the  entry  of  this  decree.  I  submit 
herewith  an  attested  copy  of  the  decree.  I  am  informed  that 
the  New  Haven  Company  has  duly  transferred  to  the  trustees 
named  in  the  first  section  of  the  decree  the  stock  of  the  Hold- 
ing Company  therein  described. 

Before  proceeding  to  answer  your  questions,  it  is  important 
to    note    an   essential    and    distinguishing   feature    of   chapter 


12  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

766  of  the  Acts  of  1914.  Section  3  provided  that  upon  the 
acceptance  of  that  act  the  Holding  Company  should  forth- 
with cause  to  be  printed  on  each  certificate  of  stock  of  the 
Maine  Company  held  by  it  the  words,  "This  stock  may  at 
any  time  be  taken  or  purchased  by  the  Commonwealth  of 
Massachusetts  at  the  fair  value  thereof  in  accordance  with 
law."  The  statute  directs  that  the  same  words  be  printed  on 
all  certificates  thereafter  issued  by  the  Maine  Company  to 
future  transferees  representing  any  stock  held  by  the  Holding 
Company,  and  also  upon  all  certificates  for  new  issues.  Sec- 
tion 5  then  provides  that  the  Commonwealth  may  at  any 
time  by  act  of  the  General  Court  take  or  acquire  any  or  all 
stock  of  the  Maine  Company  so  printed,  held  by  any  person. 
The  method  of  determining  the  compensation  to  be  paid  is  set 
forth.  The  obvious  effect  and  purpose  of  these  provisions  if 
accepted  and  complied  with  were  to  give  the  Commonwealth 
an  option  to  take  or  purchase  this  stock  at  any  time  from  any 
holder  of  it.  The  statute  authorized  (section  2)  the  Holding 
Company  to  sell  its  Boston  and  Maine  stock  only  upon  the 
condition  that  it  be  subject  to  this  option  to  the  Common- 
wealth to  acquire  it  from  the  purchasers  or  their  subsequent 
transferees. 

With  this  review  of  the  situation,  I  proceed  to  answer  your 
questions. 

1.  I  am  of  opinion  that  chapter  766  of  the  Acts  of  1914 
has  not  been  complied  with  by  the  New  Haven  Company  or 
by  the  persons  named  in  Appendix  A  as  liquidators. 

While  the  decree  entered  in  the  United  States  District  Court 
followed  in  most  respects  Appendix  A,  as  I  shall  later  point 
out,  there  are  certain  important  differences  between  the  decree 
and  Appendix  A.  Then,  the  decree  in  no  way  attempts  to 
preserve  or  create  any  option  to  the  Commonwealth  to  ac- 
quire the  Maine  Company  stock  owned  by  the  Holding  Com- 
pany from  subsequent  purchasers  in  the  event  that  a  sale  of 
it  by  the  trustees  is  thereafter  ordered  by  the  court.  Section 
7  of  chapter  766  provides  that  a  transfer  of  shares  of  the 
Holding  Company  by  the  New  Haven  Company,  to  be  held 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  Appendix  A,  shall  be  deemed 
an  acceptance  of  the  act  by  the  New  Haven  Company. 
Neither  Appendix  A  nor  any  similar  agreement  has  been 
executed  by  the  New  Haven  Company.  Though  the  general 
scheme  and  most  of  the  terms  of  Appendix  A  have  been  in- 
corporated in  the  decree  entered  by  agreement,  no  provision 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  13 

has  been  made  for  creating  or  enforcing  the  proposed  option 
to  the  Commonwealth,  which  was  the  distinguishing  feature 
of  chapter  766.  In  my  opinion  the  consent  of  the  New  Haven 
Company  and  the  liquidators  to  the  decree  was  not  intended 
to  be  and  did  not  in  fact  constitute  an  acceptance  by  them 
of  chapter  766  of  the  Acts  of  1914. 

2.  As  I  have  already  stated,  a  very  large  part  of  Appendix 
A  was  incorporated  in  the  decree.  I  have  carefully  com- 
pared the  terms  of  the  two  docum.ents.  While  there  are  some 
differences  of  order  and  phraseology,  for  the  most  part  made 
necessary  by  the  natural  differences  between  an  agreement 
and  a  decree,  I  find  but  two  substantial  differences. 

By  Section  First,  paragraph  F  of  the  decree,  the  trustees 
are  authorized  to  exchange  the  shares  of  the  Maine  Company 
held  by. the  Holding  Company  for  shares  or  securities  in  an- 
other corporation  in  case  "a  reorganization  of  the  Maine 
Company  with  or  unthout  its  leased  lines,  or  any  of  them,  shall 
be  proposed."  Paragraph  7  of  Appendix  A  gives  a  similar 
authority  to  exchange  only  in  case  *'a  reorganization  of  the 
Maine  Company  and  its  leased  limes  shall  be  proposed." 
Thus,  the  authority  to  exchange  in  case  of  reorganization  is 
considerably  broader  under  the  decree  than  that  contem- 
plated by  Appendix  A. 

The  main  point  of  difference,  however,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
provisions  for  the  sale  of  the  Maine  Company  stock  held  by 
the  Holding  Company.  Paragraph  2  of  Appendix  A  is  as  fol- 
lows: — 

As  early  as  may  be  the  liquidators  shall  make  proper  arrangements 
to  protect  the  rights  of  the  Holding  Company's  preferred  stockholders, 
and  after  such  arrangements  have  been  made  shall  exercise  their  powers 
so  that  there  shall  be  a  sale  at  such  time  or  times,  together  or  in  parcels, 
and  by  public  auction  or  by  private  contract,  of  all  the  shares  of  the 
Maine  Company  belonging  to  the  Holding  Company  free  from  the 
statutory  lien  of  the  preferred  shares  hereby  transferred,  and  of  any 
other  property  belonging  to  it  whenever  in  their  judgment  such  sale  or 
sales  can  be  made  to  the  best  advantage. 

The  counterpart  of  this  provision  in  the  decree  (paragraph 
B  of  Section  First)  is  as  follows:  — 

As  early  as  may  be  the  trustees  shall  make  proper  arrangements  to 
protect  the  rights  of  preferred  stockholders  of  the  Holding  Company, 
after  which,  but  not  until  further  order  of  the  court,  they  shall  exercise 
their  powers  so  that  there  shall  be  a  sale  or  sales,  together  or  in  parcels. 


14  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

by  public  auction  or  private  contract,  of  all  the  shares  of  the  Maine 
Company  owned  by  the  Holding  Company,  free  from  the  statutory 
lien  of  the  preferred  shares  of  the  Holding  Company  hereby  directed 
to  be  transferred;  and  also  a  sale  or  sales  of  any  other  property  owned 
by  the  Holding  Company,  whenever  in  their  judgment  that  can  be 
done  to  the  best  advantage. 

No  order  directing  the  sale  of  such  shares  of  the  Maine  Company  or 
any  portion  of  them  or  fixing  the  terms  or  conditions  thereof  shall  be 
made  by  the  court  until  after  July  1,  1915,  unless  the  New  Haven  Com- 
pany shall  in  writing  consent  thereto.  If  no  such  order  has  been  made 
before  July  1,  1915,  the  court  on  appHcation  of  any  party  and  after  a 
hearing  at  which  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  shall  be  in\dted 
to  appear,  shall  direct  the  sale  and  fix  the  terms  and  conditions  thereof. 

Thus  it  is  to  be  seen  that  while  Appendix  A  authorized  and 
directed  a  sale  of  the  Maine  Company  stock  by  the  liquida- 
tors without  further  authority,  the  decree  provides  merely 
that  the  trustees  shall  arrange  and  prepare  for  a  sale,  but  that 
this  sale  shall  not  be  held  "until  further  order  of  the  court." 
No  sale  is  to  be  ordered  before  July  1,  1915,  without  the 
written  consent  of  the  New  Haven  Company.  On  any  ap- 
plication for  authority  to  sell  after  that  date  the  Common- 
wealth is  to  be  given  an  opportunity  to  be  heard,  and  the 
court  is  then  to  direct  the  sale  upon  such  terms  and  condi- 
tions as  it  may  fix.  Thus  the  entire  matter  of  the  terms  and 
conditions  of  the  sale  of  the  Maine  Company  stock  is  reserved 
for  the  future  determination  of  the  court. 

As  I  view  it,  this  difference  in  the  power  of  sale  granted  by 
the  decree  from  that  stated  in  Appendix  A  is  a  substantial 
one.     I  must  answer  your  second  question  in  the  negative. 

3.  I  understand  your  third  question  to  refer  to  the  last 
clause  of  section  1  of  chapter  766,  namely,  "said  stock  to  be 
held  and  disposed  of  by  said  liquidators  in  accordance  with 
the  terms  of  such  written  instrument  or  any  written  modifica- 
tion thereof  hereafter  approved  by  the  attorney-general  of  the 
United  States  and  by  the  governor  of  the  commonwealth.'' 

I  interpret  this  clause  to  mean  that  after  the  New  Haven 
Company  has  transferred  the  stock  of  the  Holding  Company 
to  the  liquidators  under  a  written  instrument  in  the  form  of 
Appendix  A,  that  instrument  may  subsequently  be  modified, 
so  far  as  the  powers  of  the  liquidators  to  hold  and  dispose  of 
the  stock  are  concerned,  by  a  written  instrument  entered  into 
between  the  parties  and  approved  by  the  Attorney-General  of 
the  United  States  and  the  Governor  of  this  Commonwealth. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  15 

I  do  not  understand  that  this  clause  refers  to  substantial 
changes  in  Appendix  A  before  it  is  executed  and  the  statute 
thus  accepted  by  the  New  Haven  Company  and  the  Holding 
Company.  In  any  event,  I  am  of  opinion  that  chapter  766 
gave  no  authority  to  the  Governor  to  modify  the  conditions 
imposed  by  sections  3,  4  and  5  of  that  act  creating  an  option 
in  the  Commonwealth  as  already  described. 

4.  If,  on  an  application  made  under  paragraph  B  of  Section 
First  of  the  decree,  the  United  States  District  Court  should 
direct  the  trustees  to  sell  the  Maine  Company  stock  upon 
the  conditions  imposed  by  chapter  766,  a  compliance  with 
that  act  would  not  be  inconsistent  with  a  compliance  with  the 
decree.  Unless  thus  directed  by  future  orders  of  the  United 
States  District  Court,  the  trustees  cannot  comply  with  terms 
or  conditions  contained  in  chapter  766  or  the  appendix  thereto, 
and  not  expressly  made  a  part  of  the  decree. 

5.  Section  4  of  chapter  519  of  the  Acts  of  1909  provides:  — 

Any  railroad  corporation  acquiring  said  stock  as  hereinbefore  pro- 
vided shall  not  thereafter  sell  the  same  without  the  express  authority 
of  the  legislature. 

This  refers  only  to  the  common  stock.  Express  authority  is 
given  by  chapter  639  of  the  Acts  of  1910  to  a  railroad  owning 
preferred  stock  to  sell  the  same.  Your  fifth  question,  there- 
fore, can  relate  only  to  the  31,065  shares  of  common  stock 
transferred  under  the  decree. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  no  sale  of  this  common  stock  has 
taken  place,  and  that  none  is  contemplated  by  the  decree. 
The  legal  title  has  merely  been  transferred  to  trustees  to  hold 
for  the  ultimate  benefit  of  the  New  Haven  Company,  its 
owners.  The  trustees  are  to  liquidate  the  affairs  of  the  Hold- 
ing Company,  and  then  to  bring  about  its  dissolution  and  a 
distribution  of  its  assets. 

It  has  been  judicially  determined  by  this  decree  that  the 
holding  of  this  stock  by  the  New  Haven  Company,  and  the 
consequent  control  by  it  of  the  Maine  Company,  was  a  viola- 
tion of  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  This  determination  is 
binding  upon  the  New  Haven  Company,  though  not,  of 
course,  upon  the  Commonwealth.  In  order  to  dissolve  this 
combination  the  New  Haven  Company  has  been  in  effect 
ordered  to  liquidate  and  dissolve  the  Holding  Company.  This 
is  to  be  brought  about  by  independent  trustees  who  are  to  hold 
the  Holding  Company  stock  for  the  financial  benefit  of  the 


16  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

New   Haven   Company  as   its   owner,   but  in  such   a  manner 
that  the  laws  of  the  United  States  shall  not  be  violated. 

In  my  opinion  the  mere  transfer  by  the  New  Haven  Com- 
pan}^  of  the  shares  of  the  Holding  Company  to  the  trustees 
named  in  the  decree  in  accordance  with  the  order  of  the 
United  States  District  Court  was  not  a  violation  of  the  laws 
of  this  Commonwealth.  The  decree,  however,  plainly  con- 
templates a  sale  of  the  Maine  Company  stock  held  by  the 
Holding  Company  under  such  terms  and  conditions  as  the 
court  shall  hereafter  fix.  Ordinarily  it  would  not  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  United  States  District  Court  would  direct 
such  a  sale  to  be  made  in  any  manner  in  violation  of  the  laws 
of  this  Commonwealth.  But  the  execution  of  this  decree 
necessarily  involves  a  sale  upon  some  conditions  of  the  Maine 
Company  stock  now  owned  by  the  Holding  Company,  a  dis- 
tribution of  its  assets  and  a  dissolution  of  the  corporation. 
Chapter  519  of  the  Acts  of  1909  expressly  forbade  any  sale 
of  that  stock  "without  the  express  authority  of  the  legis- 
lature." That  statute  also  seems  to  contemplate  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  the  Holding  Company  as  an  instrumentality 
created  by  this  Commonwealth  for  the  better  supervision  by 
it  of  the  Maine  Company.  If,  under  these  circumstances,  as 
seems  to  be  contemplated  by  the  decree,  the  United  States 
District  Court  shall  hereafter,  without  the  consent  of  the 
Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  order  a  sale  of  this  stock,  and 
the  purchaser  at  such  sale  shall  thereby  acquire  a  good  title 
to  the  stock,  it  is  apparent  that  the  terms  of  the  act  creating 
the  Holding  Company  will  then  be  violated. 

The  provision  of  the  decree,  already  quoted,  seems  to  con- 
template that  an  order  directing  a  sale  of  the  Maine  Company 
stock  may  be  entered  at  any  time  before  July  1,  1915,  upon 
the  written  consent  of  the  New  Haven  Company,  without 
notice  of  any  sort  to  this  Commonwealth.  The  decree  recites 
that  upon  an  application  made  after  July  1,  1915,  after  a 
hearing  at  which  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  "shall 
be  invited  to  appear,"  the  court  shall  direct  the  sale  and  fix 
the  terms  and  conditions  thereof.  The  decree  is  silent  as  to 
the  purpose  of  this  invitation,  nor  does  it  suggest  what  would 
be  the  effect  of  its  acceptance  by  the  Commonwealth. 

An  examination  of  the  record  in  this  suit,  made  on  Febru- 
ary 19,  shows  that  there  have  been  no  proceedings  of  record 
since  the  entry  of  the  decree  on  Oct.  17,  1914.  That  such 
rights  as  the  Commonwealth  may  have  acquired  by  the  act 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.        ^  17 

creating  the  Holding  Company  be  not  prejudiced  by  any  sub- 
sequent proceedings  without  notice,  I  have  requested  the 
court  and  the  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  to  give 
me  notice  of  all  future  applications  made  to  the  court  in  this 
case  before  any  order  is  entered  thereon.  However,  there 
may  be  some  doubt  whether  the  Commonwealth  would  be 
permitted  to  intervene  in  this  suit.  For  that  reason,  and  in 
view  of  the  history  of  the  Holding  Company,  it  may  be  ap- 
propriate for  the  General  Court  to  consider  the  advisability 
of  taking  action  to  enable  the  Attorney-General  to  appear,  in 
the  present  suit  or  in  any  subsequent  proceeding,  in  behalf  of 
the  Holding  Company,  in  order  to  protect  whatever  interest 
the  Commonwealth  may  have  in  the  stock  of  the  Holding 
Company  or  in  the  Maine  Company  stock  held  by  the  Holding 
Company,  and  also  the  rights  of  the  Holding  Company  itself  as 
an  instrumentality  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts. 

6.  As  stated  in  my  answer  to  your  first  question,  a  transfer 
by  the  New  Haven  Copipany  of  -the  shares  of  the  Holding 
Company  in  accordance  with  the  decree  and  in  a  different 
manner  from  that  contemplated  by  chapter  766,  section  1, 
is  not  in  my  opinion  an  acceptance  of  the  provisions  of  that 
act.  Section  3  takes  effect  only  upon  such  acceptance  of  the 
act  by  the  transfer,  as  provided  in  sections  1  and  7.  In  my 
opinion  section  3  has  not  been  in  effect  accepted  by  this  trans- 
fer made  under  the  decree.  This  section  has  been  evaded 
only  in  the  sense  that  the  determination  of  the  terms  and 
conditions  under  which  the  Maine  Company  stock  is  to  be  sold 
has  been  postponed  by  the  court  for  future  adjudication, 
without  reference  to  said  section. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Towns  —  Firewards  —  Appointment  by  Selectmen. 

The  office  of  fireward  estabhshed  by  the  General  Court  of  the  Province  in 
1711  and  existing  under  R.  L.,  c.  32,  §  9,  was  not  abolished  by  St.  1907, 
c.  475,  §§5  and  10,  creating  forest  firewards;  firewards  may  still  be  ap- 
pointed by  selectmen  of  towns  when  there  is  no  organized  fire  depart- 
ment . 

March  1,  1915. 

Frank  W.  Rane,  Esq.,  State  Forester. 

Dear  Sir: — You  ask  if  the  selectmen  in  towns  ftiay  now 

appoint  firewards  under  R.   L.,   c.   32,    §  9,  or  if  the  office  of 

fireward  has  been  abolished  by  St.  1907,  c.  475,  §§5  and  10. 


18  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Firewards  have  been  recognized  by  law  in  this  Common- 
wealth for  more  than  two  hundred  years,  and  up  to  the  en- 
actment of  the  law  creating  forest  firewards  it  was  the  duty 
of  firewards  to  direct  the  work  of  fighting  forest  fires  as  well 
as   other  fires. 

The  earliest  law  providing  for  the  appointment  of  firewards, 
which  constituted  the  nucleus  of  the  first  official  fire  depart- 
ment in  the  Commonwealth,  was  passed  bj^  the  General 
Court  of  the  Province  of  Massachusetts  Bay  on  Oct.  31,  1711. 
The  first  section  of  the  act  provides :  — 

That  it  shall  and  may  be  la^^ul,  to  and  for  the  justices  of  the  peace 
and  selectmen  of  the  town  of  Boston,  from  time  to  time  to  appoint  such 
number  of  prudent  persons,  of  kno"v\Ti  fidelity,  not  exceeding  ten,  in  the 
several  parts  of  the  town,  as  they  may  think  fit,  who  shall  be  denomin- 
ated and  called  firewards,  and  have  a  proper  badge  assigned  to  dis- 
tinguish them  in  their  office:  \iz.,  a  staff  of  five  feet  in  length,  coloured 
red,  and  headed  with  a  bright  brass  spire  of  six  inches  long;  and  at 
times  of  the  breaking  forth  of  fire,  and  during  the  continuance  thereof, 
shall  and  herebj^  are  fully  authorized  and  impowered  to  command  and 
require  assistance  for  the  extinguishing  and  putting  out  the  fire,  and  for 
removing  of  household  stuff  and  furniture,  goods  and  merchandizes, 
out  of  any  dweUing-houses,  storehouses,  or  other  buildings  actually  on 
fire,  or  in  danger  thereof,  and  guards  to  secure  and  take  care  of  the 
same;  as,  also,  to  require  assistance  for  the  pulling  dowTi  or  blo^wdng  up 
of  any  houses,  or  any  other  service  relating  thereto,  by  the  direction  of 
two  or  three  of  the  chief  civil  or  militaiy  officers  of  the  town  (as  is  by 
law  pro\aded),  to  stop  and  prevent  the  further  spreading  of  the  fire, 
and  to  suppress  all  tumults  and  disorder. 

The  extension  of  the  fireward  system  was  provided  for  in 
1744  by  chapter  30  of  the  acts  of  that  year,  section  1  of  which 
reads: — 

That  the  several  towns  within  this  province  may,  if  thej^  see  fit,  at 
their  anniversary  meeting  in  March,  annually  appoint  a  suitable  num- 
ber of  persons,  not  exceeding  ten,  who  shall  be  denominated  firewards, 
and  have  each,  for  a  distinguishing  badge  of  the  office,  a  staff  of  five  feet 
long,  painted  red,  and  headed  vdih.  a  bright  brass  spire  six  inches  long. 

Sections  9  and  10  of  chapter  32  of  the  Revised  Laws,  which 
is  the  last  enactment  on  the  subject,  are  as  follows:  — 

Section  9.  The  selectmen  of  a  town  may  annually,  in  March  or 
April,  appoint  firewards  and  forth^vith  give  them  notice  thereof.  Who- 
ever neglects,  within  seven  daj^s  after  such  notice,  to  file  ■with  the  town 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  19 

clerk  his  acceptance  or  refusal  of  the  office  shall,  unless  excused  by  the 
selectmen,  forfeit  ten  dollars. 

Section  10.  If  a  fire  breaks  out,  the  firewards  shall  immediately 
repair  thereto,  and  shall  carr}^  a  suitable  staff  or  badge  of  office. 

By  the  laws  of  1784,  chapter  64,  provision  was  made  for 
the  appointment  of  enginemen  in  towns,  and  chapter  42  of 
the  Acts  of  1785  provided  that  the  "said  enginemen  ap- 
pointed as  aforesaid  shall  be  held  and  obliged  to  go  forward 
either  by  night  or  by  day  under  the  direction  of  the  firewards 
in  the  same  town."  Laws  authorizing  the  organization  of 
fire  departments  were  later  enacted,  but  in  no  enactment  was 
the  fireward  law  repealed. 

The  office  of  for*est  fireward  was  created  by  St.  1886,  c.  296, 
which  provided  that  such  firewards  should,  in  respect  to  fires 
in  woodlands,  have  and  exercise  the  powers  and  duties  pre- 
scribed for  forest  fires.  This  law  was  amended  by  St.  1907, 
c.  475,  and  the  powers  and  duties  of  forest  firewards,  with  the 
change  of  name  to  forest  wardens,  were  more  clearly  defined. 
No  repeal  of  the  original  fireward  law  was  effected,  and  that 
law,  as  revised  and  codified  in  the  Revised  Laws,  still  stands. 

Firewards  may  be  appointed,  but  they  no  longer  have  juris- 
diction over  forest  fires,  and  in  towns  having  organized  fire 
departments  there  would  seem  to  be  no  reason  for  their  ex- 
istence. ^Yhere  there  is  no  fire  department  in  a  town,  engine- 
men  and  hosemen  are,  by  R.  L.,  c.  32,  §  28,  "under  the  direction 
of  the  firewards."  In  such  communities  the  historical  char- 
acter of  fireward  still  exists,  and  he  may  even  carry  a  badge 
or  staff  to  distinguish  him,  though  the  original  staff  five 
feet  in  length,  colored  red,  headed  with  a  bright  brass  spire 
six  inches  long,  is  not  now  required. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Executive  Council  —  Powers  —  Removal  of  Public  Officer  — 
No  Right  to  reconsider  Removal  after  Appointment  and 
Qualification  of  Successor. 

The  Executive  Council  has  no  power  on  its  own  initiative  to  reopen  or  in 
any  manner  revise  the  matter  of  the  removal  of  the  Commissioner  of 
Animal  Industry  by  the  Governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Council,  during  the  previous  political  year  and  after  the  appoint- 
ment and  quaUfication  of  his  successor,  assuming  that  removal  to  have 
been  legal. 


20  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

In  such  a  case  the  Executive  Council  cannot  properly,  on  petition  of  the 
person  thus  removed,  hear  or  consider  any  evidence  bearing  upon  the 
charges  made  against  him  at  the  time  of  his  removal,  whether  that 
evidence  was  then  heard  or  not. 

The  Executive  Council  has  no  power  to  reconsider  the  consent  given  by  it 
to  an  appointment  to  public  office  by  the  Governor  after  the  appointee 
has  duly  quahfied  as  such  public  officer,  whether  that  consent  was 
given  during  the  term  of  the  councillors  then  in  office  or  that  of  their 
predecessors. 

March  9,  1915. 

To  His  Excellency  the  Governor  and  the  Honorable  Council. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
communication  of  February  25,  in  which  you  ask  my  opinion 
upon  the  following  question:  — 

Has  the  Executive  Council  the  constitutional  power  to  reopen  on  its 
own  initiative  the  case  of  the  Commissioner  of  Animal  Industry,  who 
has  been  removed  from  office  during  the  preceding  political  year  by  the 
Governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Council? 

Also  the  communication  of  your  committee  appointed  by  His 
Excellency  "to  frame  such  other  questions  as  they  desire  in 
reference  to  the  petition  of  Mr.  Walker  to  the  Executive 
Council,  asking  to  have  his  case  reopened,"  dated  March  4, 
1915,  requesting  my  opinion  upon  the  following  questions:  — 

1.  Can  the  present  Executive  Council  hear  such  evidence  as  the 
petitioner  may  wish  to  present,  and  after  such  hearing  may  the  Council 
give  such  advice  to  the  Governor  as  the  facts  seem  to  them  to  war- 
rant? 

2.  Does  the  question  of  hearing  the  petitioner  come  under  the  pro- 
visions of  Article  I.,  section  III.,  chapter  II.  of  the  Constitution  of 
Massachusetts,  and  if  coming  under  said  provisions  is  the  Governor 
simpty  a  member  of  the  Council  vdih  one  vote? 

3.  If  a  public  official  has  been  removed  by  the  Governor  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Council,  can  that  Council,  or  its  successor  in 
office,  consider  evidence  which  such  official  desires  subsequently  to 
present  and  which  he  claims  was  not  formerly  heard,  to  determine 
whether  the  advice  given  to  the  Governor  was  warranted  in  view  of  the 
evidence  thus  brought  to  its  attention? 

I  shall  refer  to  the  question  contained  in  your  communication 
of  February  25  as  your  first  question,  and  I  shall  refer  to  the 
questions  contained  in  your  communication  of  March  4,  num- 
bered  1,  2  and  3,  as  your  second,  third  and  fourth  questions. 

Your  first  question,  I  take  it,  has  for  its  purpose  your  de- 
sire to  ascertain  whether  the  Council  can,  of  its  own  initiative, 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  21 

in  any  way  set  aside  or  alter  the  effect  of  the  action  of  the 
Governor  and  Council  of  the  political  year  ending  Jan.  7, 
1915,  in  removing  Fred  F.  Walker  from  the  office  of  Commis- 
sioner of  Animal  Industry.  It  assumes  that  his  removal  was 
lawful,  and  acting  upon  that  assumption  I  proceed  to  answer 
your  question. 

In  an  opinion  rendered  to  the  Governor  and  Council  on 
May  29,  1906  (190  Mass.  616),  it  was  said  by  the  justices  of 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  that  "where  the  Constitution 
declares  the  power  to  act  is  in  the  Governor,  or  that  the  act 
may  be  done  by  the  Governor,  'by  and  with  the  advice  of 
Council,'  or  *by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Council,'  "  they  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  only  connection 
that  the  Council  can  have  with  the  power  is  advisory,  and  that 
"  unless  the  Governor  first  determines  upon  the  act  there  is  no 
occasion  for  their  participation  by  way  of  advice  or  consent." 

While  the  appointment  of  the  Commissioner  of  Animal 
Industry  by  the  Governor,  w^ith  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Council,  is  not  made  by  virtue  of  the  Constitution  but  through 
authority  granted  by  the  General  Court  in  an  act  entitled  "  An 
Act  to  abolish  the  Cattle  Bureau  of  the  State  Board  of  Agri- 
culture and  to  create  a  Department  of  Animal  Industry," 
chapter  608  of  the  Acts  of  1912,  yet  the  principles  involved 
are  the  same,  and  the  reasoning  of  the  justices  of  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Court  in  the  opinion  referred  to  is  applicable  to  the 
question    presented. 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that,  assuming  the  removal  of 
Fred  F.  Walker  was  lawful,  the  Council  has  no  authority, 
of  its  own  initiative,  to  take  any  action  toward  the  reinstate- 
ment of  Mr.  Walker  to  the  position  of  Commissioner  of 
Animal  Industry.  Furthermore,  assuming  that  the  Council 
has  the  right  to  initiate  proceedings  looking  toward  his  rein- 
statement, it  is  apparent  that  any  action  it  may  at  this  time 
take  will  be  without  any  legal  effect  whatever.  The  records 
of  the  Governor  and  Council  for  the  political  year  ending 
Jan.  7,  1915,  disclose  that  on  the  first  day  of  January,  1915, 
the  Governor,  acting  by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Council, 
removed  Fred  F.  Walker  from  the  office  of  Commissioner  of 
Animal  Industry,  and  that  on  the  same  day  the  Governor, 
acting  by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Council,  appointed 
Lester  H.  Howard  Commissioner  of  Animal  Industry,  and 
that  on  the  second  day  of  January,  1915,  the  said  Lester  H. 
Howard  duly  qualified  as  such  commissioner. 


22  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Obviously,  the  present  Council  has  no  power  to  revise  the 
action  of  the  former  Council  in  its  confirmation  of  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  said  Lester  H.  Howard,  who  has  accepted  the 
appointment  of  Commissioner  of  Animal  Industry  and  duly 
qualified  therefor,  nor,  in  my  opinion,  could  the  former  Coun- 
cil vote  to  reconsider  its  advice  and  consent  to  his  appoint- 
ment after  he  had  duly  qualified  as  such  commissioner.  If 
the  law  were  otherwise  it  would  tend  to  chaos  in  government, 
as  it  would  follow  that  appointees,  iu'^luding  judges,  after  their 
appointment  and  confirmation,  and  after  they  had  duly  quali- 
fied and  entered  into  the  performance  of  their  duties,  could 
be  later  ousted  from  oflSce  by  a  reconsideration  by  the  Coun- 
cil of  its  advice  and  consent  to  the  appointment.  This  would 
result  in  the  acts  of  the  officials  ousted  being  put  in  question, 
if  not  made  null  and  void. 

The  Hon.  Dana  Malone,  a  predecessor  in  this  office,  on 
March  6,  1907,  rendered  an  opinion  to  His  Excellency  Gov- 
ernor Guild,  that  the  Council,  having  once  given  its  advice 
to  the  Governor  in  relation  to  an  appointment  to  or  removal 
from  office,  and  gone  upon  record,  could  not  initiate  of  them- 
selves further  discussion  of  the  matter. 

It  follows  that  in  my  opinion  the  answer  to  your  first  ques- 
tion must  be  in  the  negative. 

Your  second  question  asks  my  opinion  as  to  whether  the 
present  Council  can  hear  such  evidence  as  the  petitioner, 
Fred  F.  Walker,  desires  to  present  in  relation  to  a  petition 
filed  by  him  with  the  Governor  and  Council  on  the  twenty- 
sixth  day  of  January,  1915.  This  petition,  a  copy  of  which 
was  submitted  to  me  with  your  questions,  alleges  that  Mr. 
Walker's  removal  was  unlawful,  and  that  by  reason  of  his  re- 
moval being  unlawful  he  desires  a  hearing  upon  certain  charges 
contained  in  a  report  of  the  Commission  on  Economy  and  Ef- 
ficiency, in  order  that,  in  the  event  that  the  present  Council 
finds  the  charges  unfounded,  the  petitioner  may  be  reinstatecL 
You  ask  me  to  answer  your  question  upon  the  assumption 
that  his  removal  was  lawful. 

Assuming  that  the  removal  was  lawful,  the  Council,  in  n  y 
opinion,   has   no  jurisdiction   of   the  subject-matter   containei 
in  the  petition,  and  any  advice  given  or  any  action  taken  I  y 
it   upon   the   petition   would    be   without   an}^   force   or   efi'ect 
whatever. 

While  it  is  apparent  that  if  the  members  of  the  Council, 
notwithstanding   their   want   of   jurisdiction   in    the    pren  i^e.s. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  23 

desire  to  listen  to  such  evidence  as  Mr.  Walker  may  wish  to 
present,  they  may  do  so,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  they  can- 
not, as  the  Council,  properly  hear  or  consider  such  evidence, 
as  the  matter  to  which  the  evidence  relates  is  not  one  within 
its  province. 

In  reply  to  your  third  question,  assuming  that  the  removal 
of  Mr.  Walker  was  lawful,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  as  the 
Governor  and  Council  are  without  jurisdiction  of  the  subject- 
matter  contained  in  the  petition,  the  question  of  a  hearing 
upon  the  same  does  not  fall  within  the  provisions  of  Article 
I.  of  section  III.  of  chapter  II.  of  the  Constitution  of  Massa- 
chusetts. 

In  reply  to  your  fourth  question,  the  question  being  asked 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  removal  of  the  official  was 
lawful,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  Council  cannot  properly 
hear  evidence  of  the  character  stated  in  your  question.  Mani- 
festly, the  only  purpose  of  hearing  and  considering  such  evi- 
dence, where  an  official  has  been  legally  removed  from  office, 
would  be  to  pass  upon  the  wisdom  of  the  judgment  of  a 
former  Council.  The  duties  and  powers  of  the  Council,  except 
such  as  are  created  by  the  General  Court,  are  defined  in  the 
Constitution  of  Massachusetts.  I  know  of  no  act  of  the  Gen- 
eral Court  nor  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  warrants 
such  action  by  the  Council. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Constitutional  Law  —  Freedom  of  Contract  —  Police  Power  — 
Regulation  of  Sale  of  Newspapers  and  Periodicals  in  Com- 
bination. 

A  proposed  act  declaring  illegal  any  agreement  by  news  dealers,  news 
agents  and  publishers  which  provides  for  the  sale  of  two  or  more 
newspapers  or  periodicals  only  in  com.bination  with  each  other,  or 
unless  offered  separately  at  the  current  price,  would  be  unconstitutional 
if  enacted,  as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  law  in  violation  of 
the  Fom-teenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
and  as  not  being  a  reasonable  regulation  in  the  interests  of  the  public 
health,  safety,  morals  or  general  weKare  under  the  police  power. 

March  15,  1915. 
Hon.  Channing  H.  Cox,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Sik:  —  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  an  order, 
passed  by  the  House  of  Representatives  on  March  3,   1915, 


24  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

requesting  the  Attorney-General  to  inform  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives whether  or  not  in  his  opinion  the  bill  printed  as 
House  Bill  No.  437,  which  provides  for  the  regulation  of  the 
sale  of  newspapers  and  periodicals,  would  be  constitutional  if 
enacted. 

The  main  purpose  of  the  bill  seems  to  be  declared  in  sections 
2  and  3.^  These  sections  are  directed  solely  at  news  dealers, 
news  agents  and  publishers  of  newspapers  and  periodicals. 
Section  2  appears  to  make  illegal  any  agreement  by  persons 
engaged  in  such  business  which  provides  for  the  sale  of  two  or 
more  publications  only  in  combination  with  each  other.  Any 
such  agreement,  the  natural  effect  of  which  is  to  deprive  any 
person  within  the  Commonwealth  of  the  privilege  of  buying  any 
newspaper  or  periodical  separately  and  at  its  current  price, 
comes  within  the  prohibition  of  the  statute.  All  agreements 
to  sell  two  publications  only  at  a  single  price  are  rendered 
criminal,  even  though  the  price  set  for  the  combination  is 
substantially  less  than  the  sum  of  the  usual  prices  of  the  single 
publications  when  sold  separately.  Thus  many  agreements 
between  publishers  and  agents  which  are  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  so-called  club  rates,  often  most  advantageous  to 
the  public,  would  seem  to  be  rendered  illegal. 

Section  3  makes  it  unlawful  for  any  person  to  offer  for  sale 
any  combination  of  two  or  more  publications  at  any  price 
however  low  unless  each  publication  is  also  offered  for  sale 
separately  at  its  current  price.  Thus  dealers  in  one  kind  of 
property  are  forbidden  to  sell  their  wares  in  combination  when 
dealers  in  other  kinds  of  property  are  permitted  to  sell  their 
goods  as  they  please. 

Plainly,  these  sections,  if  enacted,  would  impair  the  freedom 
of  contract  and  deny  equal  protection  of  our  laws  to  certain 
of  our  citizens.  Therefore,  they  come  within  the  limitations  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  United  States  Constitu- 
tion and  the  Declaration   of    Rights    of    the    Constitution    of 

^  These  sections  are  as  follows:  — 

Section  2.  Every  newspaper  or  other  periodical  publication  offered  for  sale  in  this 
commonwealth  shall  be  offered  separately  at  the  current  price  for  such  pubUcation,  and  it 
shall  be  unlawful  for  any  newsdealer,  news  agent  or  publisher  of  any  newspaper  or  other 
periodical  to  enter  into  any  agreement,  compact  or  understanding  with  any  person,  firm 
or  corporation  in  this  commonwealth  with  the  intent  to  deprive  any  purchaser  of  the  priv- 
ilege of  buying  any  newspaper  or  periodical  singly  and  separately  at  the  current  price  of 
each  publication. 

Section  3.  It  shall  be  unlawful  to  insert  one  newspaper  within  another  newspaper  or 
periodical  issued  from  a  different  office  of  publication  or  to  offer  such  combination  or  pub- 
lications for  sale  without  affording  the  purchaser  the  opportunity  to  buy  either  newspaper 
or  publication  separately  if  he  so  desires  at  the  current  price  of  each  publication. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  25 

Massachusetts,  unless  they  can  be  supported  as  reasonable 
regulations  under  the  police  power.  This  power  is  defined  by. 
Part  II.,  chapter  I.,  section  I.,  Article  IV.  of  the  Constitution 
of  Massachusetts  as  the  power  "to  make,  ordain,  and  estab- 
lish, all  manner  of  wholesome  and  reasonable  orders,  laws, 
statutes,  and  ordinances,  directions  and  instructions,  either 
with  penalties  or  without;  so  as  the  same  be  not  repugnant 
or  contrary  to  this  constitution,  as  they  shall  judge  to  be  for 
the  good  and  welfare  of  this  commonwealth,  and  for  the  gov- 
ernment and  ordering  thereof,  and  of  the  subjects  of  the 
same.  .  .  ."  . 

Regulations  enacted  under  this  power,  particularly  those 
which  impose  burdens  upon  a  limited  class  of  our  citizens, 
must  be  reasonably  directed  toward  the  preservation  of  the 
public  health,  the  public  safety,  the  public  'morals,  and,  to  a 
more  limited  extent,  of  the  public  welfare.  Under  the  guise 
of  the  police  power  the  General  Court  cannot  impose  upon 
one  class  of  our  people  special  burdens  which,  when  tested  by 
sound  reason,  can  be  found  to  perform  no  reasonable  service 
in  advancing  those  fundamental  public  interests. 

The  publishing  and  the  selling  of  newspapers  and  periodi- 
cals are  not  public  callings.  Persons  engaged  in  those  callings 
have  the  right  to  sell  or  to  refuse  to  sell  to  whom  they  will. 
It  is  doubtful  if  the  General  Court  would  have  any  consti- 
tutional authority  to  regulate  the  prices  at  which  such  publi- 
cations should  be  sold.  They  are  not  necessaries  of  life,  and 
no  person  has  any  inherent  right  or  privilege  to  buj^  them 
at  any  price  singly  or  in  combination.  The  bill  discloses,  and 
I  am  able  to  perceive,  no  reasonable  basis  for  placing  persons 
engaged  in  this  business  in  a  class  by  themselves,  and  im- 
posing upon  them  special  burdens  not  imposed  upon  persons 
engaged  in  the  production,  distribution  and  sale  of  other 
commodities.  This  classification  seems  to  me  to  bear  no  rela- 
tion to  the  public  health,  safety,  morals  or  the  general  welfare 
within  the  meaning  of  the  police  power. 

I  therefore  reply  to  your  order  that  in  my  opinion,  for  the 
reasons   above   stated,   the   bill   printed   as   House  437   would 
be  unconstitutional  if  enacted. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


26  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Co-operative  Banks  —  Loans  to  Shareholders  —  Matured  Shares. 

A  co-operative  bank  is  not  authorized  to  execute  loans  to  shareholders  on 
matured  shares  held  in  accordance  with  St.  1912,  c.  625,  §  17,  as 
amended  by  St.  1914,  c.  643,  §  6. 

March  19,  1915. 
Hon.  Augustus  L.  Thorndike,  Bank  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to  whether 
a  co-operative  bank  is  authorized  to  execute  loans  on  matured 
shares  belonging  to  a  shareholder. 

The  provisions  of  law  relating  to  this  subject  are  found  in 
St.  1912,  c.  623,  §  17,  as  amended  by  St.  1914,  c.  643,  §  6,  and 
§§22  and  25,  which  are  as  follows:  — 

Section  17.  Whenever  shares  of  a  given  series  reach  the  value  of 
two  hundred  dollars,  either  by  the  pajTiient  of  dues,  the  addition  of  a 
regular  dividend  or  the  addition  of  interest  as  hereinafter  pro\aded, 
they  shall  be  deemed  matured  and  all  pajTnents  of  dues  thereon  shall 
cease,  and  the  ov»^ner  of  each  unpledged  share  shall  be  paid  out  of  the 
funds  of  the  corporation  the  matured  value  thereof;  or  if  he  shall  so 
elect,  and  at  the  option  of  the  directors,  there  may  be  entered  on  his 
pass  book  any  number  of  shares  that  have  matured,  not  exceeding  ten, 
and  such  shares  shall  continue  as  matured  shares  in  said  corporation, 
subject  to  be  "withdrawn  or  retired  as  provided  in  sections  fourteen  and 
sixteen  of  this  act,  but  at  no  time  shall  more  than  one  half  of  the  funds 
in  the  treasury  be  applicable  to  payment  of  shares,  either  matured  or 
unmatured  or  both,  without  the  consent  of  the  directors  and  except  as 
hereafter  provided  in  section  eighteen.  .  .  . 


Section  22.  A  borrowing  shareholder  shall,  in  addition  to  dues  on 
shares,  paj''  monthly  interest,  or  interest  and  premium,  on  his  loan  at 
the  determined  rate  until  his  shares  reach  their  matured  value,  or  the 
loan  has  been  repaid;  and  when  said  matured  value  is  reached,  the 
shares  shall  be  cancelled,  the  loan  discharged  and  the  balance,  if  any, 
due  upon  the  shares,  shall  be  paid  to  the  member. 


Section  25.  Loans  may  be  made  upon  unpledged  shares  to  an 
amount  not  exceeding  ninety-five  per  cent  of  their  withdrawal  value 
at  the  time  of  the  loan,  and  for  every  such  loan  a  note  shall  be  given, 
accompanied  by  a  transfer  and  pledge  of  the  shares  borrowed  upon. 

Co-operative  banks  are  not  ordinary  institutions  for  savings, 
and  are  not  intended  to  be  banks  where  money  may  remain 
on    deposit    indefinitely,    although,    under    certain    conditions, 


1916.J  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  .     27 

ten  shares  are  permitted  to  be  continued  in  the  corporation  as 
matured  shares. 

The  purpose  of  co-operative  banks  may  be  said  to  be  to 
effect  the  saving  of  money  by  a  compulsory  method  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  permissive  policy  maintained  by  other 
banks.  The  only  departure  from  this  purpose  is  the  provision 
in  the  statute  giving  the  right  to  hold  ten  matured  shares  as 
above  stated. 

The  statute  does  not  specifically  provide  for  loans  on  these 
matured  shares,  and  in  my  opinion  does  not  authorize  such 
loans  by  implication. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Hexry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Boards  of  Health    of    Cities    and    Towns  —  Power    to    Regulate 
Trade  —  Ice  Cream. 

Under  the  provisions  of  R.  L.,  c.  56,  §  70,  as  amended  by  St.  1912,  c.  448, 
boards  of  health  of  cities  and  towns  may,  subject  to  the  approval  of 
the  State  Department  of  Health,  make  and  enforce  rules  and  regula- 
tions governing  the  manufacture,  the  care  and  the  sale  of  ice  cream. 

March  22,  1915. 
Allan  J.  McLaughlin,  M.D.,  Commissioner  of  Health. 

Dear  Sir: — Your  request  for  an  interpretation  of  chapter 
448  of  the  Acts  of  1912,  as  relating  to  the  authority  of  local 
boards  of  health  over  the  manufacture,  sale  and  care  of  ice 
cream,  has  been  given  consideration. 

The  statute  referred  to  is  an  amendment  of  section  70  of 
chapter  56  of  the  Revised  Laws,  which  chapter  relates  to  the 
regulation  of  trade.  The  original  section  was  not  altered,  ex- 
cept by  adding  another  paragraph.  This  statute  as  amended 
is   as   follows :  — 

Boards  of  health  of  cities  and  towns,  by  themselves,  their  officers 
or  agents,  may  inspect  the  carcasses  of  all  slaughtered  animals  and 
all  meat,  fish,  vegetables,  produce,  fruit  or  provisions  of  any  kind 
found  in  their  cities  or  towns,  and  for  such  purpose  may  enter  any 
building,  enclosure  or  other  place  in  wliich  such  carcasses  or  articles 
are  stored,  kept  or  exposed  for  sale.  If,  on  such  inspection,  it  is  found 
that  such  carcasses  or  articles  are  tainted,  diseased,  corrupted,  decayed, 
unwholesome  or,  from  any  cause,  unfit  for  food,  the  board  of  health 
shall  seize  the  same  and  cause  it  or  them  to  be  destroyed  forthwith  or 
disposed  of  otherwise  than  for  food.    All  money  received  b}^  the  board 


28  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

of  health  for  property  disposed  of  as  aforesaid  shall,  after  deducting 
the  expenses  of  said  seizure,  be  paid  to  the  owner  of  such  property. 
If  the  board  of  heal1  h  seizes  or  condemns  any  such  carcass  or  meat  for 
the  reason  that  it  is  affected  -^dth  a  contagious  disease,  it  shall  imme- 
diately give  notice  to  the  board  of  cattle  commissioners  of  the  name 
of  the  owner  or  person  in  whose  possession  it  was  found,  the  nature 
of  the  disease  and  the  disposition  made  of  said  meat  or  carcass. 

Boards  of  health  of  cities  and  towns  may  make  and  enforce  reason- 
able rules  and  regulations,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  state  board 
of  health,  as  to  the  conditions  under  which  all  articles  of  food  may  be 
kept  for  sale,  or  exposed  for  sale,  in  order  to  prevent  contamination 
thereof  and  injury  to  the  public  health.  Before  the  board  oi  health 
of  any  city  or  town  submits  such  rules  and  regulations  to  the  state 
board  of  health  for  approval  it  shall  hold  a  pubhc  hearing  thereon, 
of  which  notice  shall  be  given  by  publication  for  two  successive  weeks, 
the  first  publication  to  be  at  least  fourteen  daj^s  prior  to  the  date  of 
the  hearing,  in  a  newspaper  published  in  such  cit}^  or  town,  or,  if 
none  is  so  published,  in  a  newspaper  pubhshed  in  the  county  in 
which  such  city  or  town  is  located.  Any  person  affected  by  such 
rules  and  regulations,  in  the  form  in  wliich  they  are  presented  to  the 
state  board  of  health  for  approval,  maj^  appeal  to  the  said  board  for 
a  further  hearing,  and  said  board  shall  not  grant  its  approval  to  rules 
and  regulations  concerning  which  such  an  appeal  has  been  taken  until 
it  has  held  a  public  hearing  thereon,  advertised  in  the  manner  specified 
above  in  this  section  with  reference  to  hearings  before  boards  of  health 
in  cities  and  towns. 

Naturally  the  question  arises  because  the  first  paragraph 
of  the  section  gives  authority  to  the  boards  of  health  to  in- 
spect slaughtered  animals,  meat,  fish,  vegetables,  produce, 
fruit  or  *'  provisions  of  any  kind,"  while  the  added  paragraph 
empowers  such  boards  to  make  and  enforce  regulations  as  to 
the  conditions  under  which  all  articles  of  food  may  be  kept 
ior  sale.  Do  the  specific  articles  mentioned  in  the  first  para- 
graph of  the  section  limit  the  words  "all  articles  of  food"  in 
the  last  paragraph? 

It  has  been  held  by  a  former  Attorney-General  that  these 
words  do  not  include  milk,  and  therefore  local  boards  of 
health  have  no  authority,  under  this  section,  to  make  regu- 
lations dealing  with  that  commodity.  Sections  51  to  67,  in- 
clusive, of  said  chapter  56  of  the  Revised  Laws  are  milk 
regulations,  and  the  former  Attorney-General  was  of  the 
opinion  that  these  sections  dealt  with  the  milk  question  so 
effectively  that  sections  70  to  76,  inclusive,  do  not  extend 
the   authority   of   boards   of  health   to   milk,   since   the   word 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  29 

''milk"  was  not  used  in  the  following  sections.     This  ruling, 
however,  was  limited  to  milk,  and  very  properly  so. 

Ice  cream  is  not  covered  by  the  statute  on  regulation  of 
trade,  unless  section  70,  as  amended,  applies  to  this  com- 
modity. Ice  cream  may  be  classified  under  the  head  of 
"provisions,"  and  it  also  comes  within  the  definition  of  a  food. 
Hence,  I  am  of  opinion  that  local  boards  of  health  may  make 
and  enforce  rules  and  regulations  governing  the  manufacture, 
the  care  and  the  sale  of  ice  cream,  subject  to  the  approval  of 
the  State  Department  of  Health. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Statutes  —  General  and  Special  —  Codification  —  Special  Stat- 
ute not  repealed  by  Codification  of  General  Statutes  — 
Boston  Consolidated  Gas  Company. 

St.  1906,  c.  422,  entitled  "An  Act  to  promote  the  reduction  of  the  price 
of  gas  in  the  city  of  Boston  and  its  vicinity,"  generally  known  as 
the  "sliding  scale  act,"  was  not  repealed  or  superseded  by  St.  1914,  c. 
742,  entitled  "An  Act  to  consolidate  the  laws  relative  to  the  manufac- 
ture, distribution  and  sale  of  gas  and  electricitj'." 

March  23,  1915. 
Hon.  Channing  H.  Cox,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Dear  Sir:  —  By  an  order  adopted  by  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  March  10,  1915,  my  opinion  was  requested  as  to 
whether  "  chapter  422  of  the  Acts  of  the  year  1906,  entitled 
'An  Act  to  promote  the  reduction  of  the  price  of  gas  in  the 
city  of  Boston  and  its  vicinity,'  and  especially  section  10  of 
said  chapter,  was  repealed  or  superseded  by  chapter  742  of  the 
Acts  of  the  year  1914,  entitled  'An  Act  to  consolidate  the 
laws  relative  to  the  manufacture,  distribution  and  sale  of  gas 
and  electricity. '  " 

The  1906  act,  generally  known  as  the  *'  sliding  scale  act," 
provided  a  method  of  fixing  the  price  of  gas  sold  by  the  Bos- 
ton Consolidated  Gas  Company,  and  of  the  dividends  to  be 
paid  by  that  company.  The  1914  act  is  a  consolidation  and 
revision  of  the  general  laws  relative  to  the  manufacture,  dis- 
tribution and  sale  of  gas  and  electricity.  Section  199  thereof 
repeals  by  express  mention  seventy-two  acts  and  sections  of 
acts.  It  is  significant  that  in  this  list  chapter  422  of  the  Acts 
of  1906  is  not  included. 


30  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  section  199  repeals  chapter  121 
of  the  Revised  Laws  "and  all  acts  in  amendment  thereof," 
and  that  section  10  of  chapter  422  of  the  Acts  of  1906  is  an 
amendment  of  that  chapter.  It  may  be  that  in  discussing  the 
meaning  of  the  word  "amendment,"  when  used  in  other  con- 
nections, courts  have  used  at  times  language  which  in  its 
broadest  sense  might  include  such  a  case  as  this. 

Bouvier  defines  "amendment"  as  an  alteration  or  change 
of  something  proposed  in  a  bill  or  established  as  law.  The 
Century  Dictionary  says:  — 

The  act  of  freeing  from  faults;  the  act  of  making  better,  or  of 
changing  for  the  better;  correction;  improvement;  reformation.  An 
alteration  of  a  legislative  or  deliberative  act  or  in  a  constitution;  a 
change  made  in  a  law  either  by  way  of  correction  or  addition. 

The  term  "amendment"  implies  such  an  addition  or  change  within 
the  lines  of  the  original  instrument  as  will  effect  an  improvement  or 
better  carry  out  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  framed.  Liver  more  v. 
Waite,  102  Cal.  113. 

Section  10  of  chapter  422  of  the  Acts  of  1906  hardly  comes 
within  such  definitions.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  expressly 
held  that  neither  extending  a  general  law  to  a  corporation 
not  included  within  it,  nor  exempting  a  particular  municipal 
corporation  from  the  terms  of  a  general  law,  is  an  amendment 
thereof.  Quinlan  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Tex.  356;  Barron 
V.  Smith,  108  Md.  317. 

I  am  of  the  opinion  that  section  10  of  chapter  422  of  the 
Acts  of  1906  was  not  an  amendment  of  R.  L.,  c.  121,  in  the 
sense  here  intended. 

Section  199  also  repeals  "all  other  acts  and  parts  of  acts 
inconsistent  herewith." 

Without  the  express  words  an  absolutely  inconsistent  or 
repugnant  provision  of  earlier  laws  would  be  superseded  or 
repealed,  although  such  repeal  by  implication  is  not  favored  by 
the  courts.  Copeland  v.  Springfield,  166  Mass.  at  504.  In- 
deed, it  has  been  said  that  the  insertion  of  a  clause  like  that 
quoted  above  adds  nothing  to  the  legal  effect  consequent  upon 
the  passage  of  the  new  act.  The  Hickory  Tree  Road,  43  Pa., 
139,  142. 

The  question  here  is  whether,  in  view  of  these  principles  and 
the  language  of  the  1914  act,  the  earlier  special  law  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  later  general  one,  and  therefore  repealed. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  31 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  a  special  law  as  to  one  locality 
or  corporation  is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  a  different 
rule  applicable  to  localities  or  corporations  generally.  Things 
are  consistent  which  can  stand  together  harmoniously  and 
are  not  contradictory.  If  there  had  been  included  in  the  1914 
act,  after  the  general  provisions  in  sections  43,  162  and  163, 
other  sections  such  as  are  found  in  the  1906  act,  it  could  not 
well  have  been  said  that  the  consolidated  act  was  inconsistent 
or  self -contradictory. 

Cases  may  be  found  which  hold  that  the  passage  of  a  gen- 
eral law  containing  such  a  repeal  clause  as  is  here  found 
operates  as  a  repeal  of  special  laws  upon  the  same  subject. 
The  cases  of  People  v.  Wenzel,  105  Mich.  70,  O'Malley  v. 
County,  3  Kulp  (Pa.),  41,  46,  and  Brown  v.  Mullica  Town- 
ship, 48  N.  J.  L.  447,  are  examples  of  this. 

Nevertheless,  the  general  rule  is  otherwise,  and  it  is  well 
stated  in  the  last-named  case,  as  follows:  — 

It  has  been  well  settled  in  this  State  that  a  general  law  on  a  subject- 
matter  which  has  been  provided  for  in  certain  localities  by  special 
laws  wdll  not,  although  it  contain  a  general  repealer  of  acts  inconsistent 
with,  it,  annul  or  alter  the  special  provisions  in  those  localities.  But  if 
the  general  law  expressly  repeals  the  special  laws,  or  shows  b}''  impli- 
cation a  manifest  intent  to  supersede  their  provisions,  the  latter  must 
jdeld. 

This  intention  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  language  of  the 
entire  act,  construed  in  the  light  of  its  history.  In  constru- 
ing an  act,  "the  title  of  the  act,  the  objects  to  be  accom- 
plished, the  other  provisions  found  in  connection  with  those 
under  especial  consideration,  the  provisions  and  arrangement 
of  the  statutes  which  were  amended,  the  mode  in  which  the 
embarrassing  words  were  introduced,  as  shown  by  the  journals 
and  records,  the  history  of  the  times,  and  especially  of  prior 
legislation  upon  the  same  general  subject,  may  all  be  con- 
sidered."    {Simpson  v.  Story,  145  Mass.  497,  498.) 

Where  a  general  law  is  passed  for  the  first  time  there  is 
much  more  reason  for  holding  that  prior  special  acts  are  re- 
pealed than  in  a  case  of  codification  and  revision.  In  the 
former  case  it  is  far  easier  to  discover  a  legislative  purpose  to 
repeal  special  provisions,  because  the  Legislature  is  then  for 
the  first  time  declaring  that  it  is  making  a  law  applicable  to 
all,  and  thus  it  may  more  naturally  be  construed  to  exclude 
the  idea  of  special  laws  continuing.     Where,  however,  a  gen- 


32  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan, 

eral  and  special  law  have  been  in  existence,  working  har- 
moniously side  by  side,  the  re-enactment  in  codification,  of 
the  general  law,  either  in  identical  terms  or  with  some  per- 
fecting amendments,  furnishes  little,  if  any,  ground  for  such 
argument. 

At  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  1906  act,  and  through- 
out the  time  of  its  operation,  there  were  in  force  and  effect 
general  laws  covering  the  same  subjects  as  those  portions  of 
the  codification  which  could  be  argued  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  1906  act,  and  for  large  part  in  the  same  language.  This 
is  especially  true  of  sections  162  and  163,  which  are  re-enact- 
ments of  R.  L.,  c.  121,  §§  34  and  35,  referred  to  in  section  10 
of  chapter  422  of  the  Acts  of  1906. 

Section  200  of  the  1914  act,  adopting  in  general  the  law  as 
laid  down  in  Wright  v.  Oakley,  5  Met.  400,  provides:  — 

The  provisions  of  this  act,  so  far  as  they  are  the  same  as  existing 
statutes,  shall  be  construed  as  a  continuation  thereof  and  not  as  new 
enactments,  and  a  reference  in  a  statute  which  has  not  been  repealed 
to  provisions  of  law  which  have  been  revised  and  re-enacted  herein, 
shall  be  construed  as  applying  to  such  provisions  as  so  incorporated 
in  this  act. 

This  section  makes  provision  whereby  both  acts  may  work 
in  harmony  with  each  other.  The  enactment  of  sections  162 
and  163  was  not  in  any  sense  the  making  of  a  new  law,  but 
merely  a  continuation  of  the  law  from  which  the  1906  act 
expressly  exempted  the  Boston  Consolidated  Gas  Company. 

The  history  of  the  1914  act  is  especially  enlightening.  In 
1912,  by  resolve,  chapter  51,  the  Legislature  directed  the 
Board  of  Gas  and  Electric  Light  Commissioners  *'to  revise, 
consolidate  and  arrange  the  general  laws  of  the  Common- 
wealth pertaining  to  the  manufacture,  transmission,  distribu- 
tion and  sale  of  gas  and  electricity,  and  to  corporations 
engaged  therein,  not  including  street  railway,  telephone  or 
telegraph  companies,  and  in  connection  therewith  to  consider 
the  expediency  of  additional  legislation  affecting  the  relation  of 
such  corporations  to  the  public  and  to  one  another,  and  of 
extending  the  provisions  of  law  for  supervision  and  regula- 
tion to  any  or  all  of  them."  In  1913  that  Board  reported, 
recommending  certain  extensions  and  changes  of  the  existing 
general  laws,  with  a  bill  codifying  those  laws  and  embodying 
therein  the  extensions  and  changes  recommended.  These  rec- 
ommendations did  not  mention  the  extension  of  the  general 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  33 

laws  to  the  Boston  Consolidated  Gas  Company  so  far  as  it 
was  exempted  by  the  1906  act.  The  bill  contained  a  repeal- 
ing section  substantially  in  the  same  words  that  now  appear. 
After  some  consideration  and  alterations  the  1913  Legislature 
referred  this  matter  to  the  next  General  Court. 

In  1914,  upon  motion,  it  was  taken  from  the  files  and  re- 
ferred to  the  committee  on  public  lighting.  This  committee 
inserted  the  word  "general"  in  section  199,  so  that  the  re- 
pealing clause  in  question  read,  "and  all  other  general  acts 
and  parts  of  general  acts."  Said  clause  remained  in  this  form 
throughout  its  consideration  in  the  Senate  and  until  referred 
to  the  House  committee  on  bills  in  the  third  reading,  in 
which  committee  the  word  "general"  was  stricken  out,  and 
the  committee  reported  to  the  House  without  specific  mention 
of  its  action  in  so  doing.  In  view  of  House  Rule  26  it  cannot 
be  that  the  committee  intended  to  make  *'  any  change  in  the 
sense  or  legal  effect,  or  any  material  change  in  construction" 
of  the  act.  Neither  can  it  be  thought  that  the  committee 
intended  to  exceed  its  powers;  and,  especially  in  a  bill  of  the 
length  of  this,  the  members  of  the  Legislature  undoubtedly 
acted  in  the  later  stages  of  the  passage  of  the  act  on  the  pre- 
sumption that  the  bill  was  the  same  in  effect  as  before  its  ref- 
erence to  the  House  committee  on  bills  in  the  third  reading. 

In  these  events  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  an  intention  to 
repeal  this  special  act,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  insertion  of 
the  word  "general"  by  the  committee  which  considered  the 
bill  on  its  merits,  and  the  presence  of  that  word  during  the 
passage  of  the  act  up  to  the  time  of  reference  to  the  House 
committee  on  bills  in  the  third  reading,  shows  a  clear  inten- 
tion not  to  do  so. 

I  am  of  opinion  that  the  legislative  purpose  was  clearly 
disclosed  by  the  resolve  authorizing  the  codification;  that  such 
act  directed  the  Board  to  deal  primarily  with  general  statutes; 
and  that  the  history  of  the  passage  of  the  codification,  taken 
together  with  its  phraseology,  indicates  no  intention  upon  the 
part  of  the  Legislature  to  repeal  the  provisions  of  chapter  422 
of  the  Acts  of  1906. 

Accordingly,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  chapter  422  of  the 
Acts   of   the   year    1906   was   not   repealed   or   superseded   by 
chapter  742  of  the  Acts  of  the  year  1914. 
Yours  respectfully, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


34  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORI.  [Jan. 


Fire  Protection  —  Storage  of  Inflammable  Fluids  —  Gasoline  in 
Automobile  Tanks  —  Storage  in  Bulk. 

Neither  St.  1911,  c.  477,  nor  any  other  statutes  then  in  force  concerning 
the  storage  of  inflammable  fluids  were  repealed  by  St.  1914,  c.  795, 
entitled  "An  Act  to  provide  for  the  better  prevention  of  fires  through- 
out the  metropolitan  district,"  and,  accordingly,  gasoline  may  st.'ll  be 
kept  in  the  tanks  of  automobiles  without  license  or  permit  in  those 
buildings  in  which  it  could  be  so  kept  prior  to  the  passage  of  the  last- 
mentioned  statute,  but  in  no  others. 

Inflammable  fluids  kept  in  unopened  original  receptacles,  other  than  bar- 
rels, no  one  of  which  contains  more  than  ten  gallons,  are  not  kept  in 
bulk  within  the  meaning  of  St.  1914,  c.  795,  §  6. 

Varnishes  and  shellacs  which  are  of  substantially  the  same  inflammable 
character  as  the  least  inflammable  article  enumerated  in  St.  1914,  c. 
795,  §  6,  come  within  the  provisions  of  that  section. 

March  29,  1915. 
John  A.  O'Keefe,  Esq.,  Fire  Prevention  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  In  your  letter  of  the  17th  inst.  you  request 
my  opinion  as  to  whether  the  provisions  of  section  6^  of 
chapter  795  of  the  Acts  of  1914  permit  gasoline  to  be  kept  in 
the  tank  of  an  automobile  without  regulation  by  the  Fire 
Prevention  Commissioner,  and  if  so,  do  the  provisions  of  said 
chapter  795  repeal  the  provisions  of  chapter  477  of  the  Acts 
of  1911;  and  also  my  opinion  as  to  whether  the  phrase  "in 
bulk,"  in  said  section  6,  includes  varnishes,  shellacs,  etc.,  in 
cans,  and  if  it  does,  is  the  size  of  the  can  a  material  element. 
In  order  properly  to  determine  the  questions  raised,  considera- 
tion must  be  given  to  the  state  of  the  law  in  relation  to  ex- 
plosives and  inflammable  fluids  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of 
chapter  795  of  the  Acts  of  1914  and  the  various  acts  estab- 
lishing the  law. 

By  chapter  370  of  the  Acts  of  1904  it  was  provided  that  no 
building  should  thereafter  be  erected  or  used  for  the  keeping, 
storage,  manufacture  or  sale  of  explosives  or  inflammable 
fluids  without  a  license  granted  by  the  mayor  and  aldermen 

1  Reads  as  follows:  — 

Section  6.  No  paint,  oil,  benzine,  naphtha,  or  other  inflammable  fluid  shall  be  kept 
stored  in  bulk  or  barrel  otherwise  than  in  the  tank  of  an  automobile  or  motor  boat  or  sta- 
tionary engine  in  total  quantity  exceeding  ten  gallons  in  any  part  of  any  building  used  for 
habitation,  or  within  fifty  feet  of  any  building  used  for  dwelling  purposes,  unless  such 
paint,  oil,  or  other  inflammable  fluid  is  enclosed  within  a  fireproof  room  or  structure,  con- 
structed and  arranged  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  commissioner,  and  no  paint,  oil,  benzine, 
naphtha,  or  other  inflammable  fluid,  except  for  domestic  purposes  shall  be  kept,  used, 
stored  or  sold  in  any  part  of  any  building  used  for  habitation,  unless  a  permit  therefor  has 
first  been  obtained  from  the  commissioner  under  such  terms  and  conditions  as  he  may 
prescribe. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  35 

or  selectmen  after  a  public  hearing  and  a  permit  granted  by 
the  fire  marshal's  department  of  the  District  Police.  The  act 
provided,  however,  that  any  building  lawfully  used  for  any  of 
said  purposes  at  the  time  of  its  passage  could  still  be  con- 
tinued in  such  use  without  a  license  or  permit,  but  it  should 
be  subject  to  the  regulations  for  protection  against  fire  or  ex- 
plosion of  the  fire  marshal's  department. 

By  chapter  502  of  the  Acts  of  1909  it  was  provided  that  any 
building  or  other  structure  once  used  lawfully  for  any  of  said 
purposes  could  be  continued  to  be  so  used  from  year  to  year 
if  the  owner  or  occupant  thereof  should,  while  such  use  con- 
tinued, annually  file  for  registration  a  certificate  reciting  such 
use  and  occupancy  with  the  city  or  town  clerk  of  the  city  or 
town  where  such  building  or  other  structure  was  situated,  and 
with  the  chief  of  the  District  Police  or  the  official  designated 
by  him  to  grant  permits  in  such  city  or  town. 

By  chapter  477  of  the  Acts  of  1911  it  was  provided  that 
gasoline  in  an  automobile  or  motor  vehicle  where  more  than 
two  such  vehicles  were  kept  should  be  deemed  to  be  a  keeping 
of  gasoline  in  a  building  under  the  provisions  of  chapter  370 
of  the  Acts  of  1904,  and  amendments  thereof;  provided,  how- 
ever, that  it  should  not  apply  where  not  more  than  two  au- 
tomobiles were  kept  in  a  building  erected  prior  to  the  enact- 
ment of  said  chapter,  i.e.,  May  26,  1911,  if  such  building  or 
any  part  thereof  was  not  used  either  for  human  habitation 
or  for  holding  gatherings  of,  or  giving  entertainments,  in- 
struction or  employment  to,  more  than  twenty  persons. 

By  chapter  223  of  the  Acts  of  1910  provision  was  made  that 
"the  detective  and  fire  inspection  department  of  the  district 
police  may  by  regulation  prescribe  the  amount  of  explosives, 
crude  petroleum  or  any  of  its  products,  or  any  other  inflammable 
fluid  or  compound,  that  may  be  kept  for  private  use  in  a  build- 
ing or  other  structure  without  a  license,  permit  or  registration." 

In  substance,  therefore,  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of 
chapter  795  of  the  Acts  of  1914  the  keeping,  storage,  manu- 
facture and  sale  of  explosives  or  inflammable  fluids  in  a  build- 
ing was  prohibited  unless  a  license  was  first  granted  by  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  or  selectmen  after  a  public  heaiing  and  a 
permit  was  granted  by  the  fire  marshal's  department  of  the 
District  Police,  except  that  no  permit  or  license  was  required 
for  the  keeping  of  explosives  or  inflammable  fluids  for  private 
use  in  a  building  or  other  structure  where  regulations  were 
established    by    the    District    Police    prescribing    the    amount 


36  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

thereof.  The  exceptions  to  this  general  law  were  the  keep- 
ing, storage,  manufacture  and  sale  of  explosives  and  inflam- 
mable fluids  in  buildings  that  were  lawfully  used  for  such 
purposes  prior  to  the  passage  of  chapter  370  of  the  Acts  of 
1904,  which  could  be  continued  to  be  used  under  the  pro- 
visions of  law,  and  the  keeping  of  not  more  than  two  auto- 
mobiles in  any  building  erected  prior  to  May  26,  1911.  Thus, 
at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  chapter  795  of  the  Acts  of  1914 
there  were  many  buildings  in  the  metropolitan  district  which 
were  being  lawfully  used  for  the  keeping,  storage,  manu- 
facture and  sale  of  explosives  and  inflammable  fluids;  and,  in 
buildings  in  which  automobiles  in  excess  of  two  were  kept  prior 
to  the  passage  of  chapter  370  of  the  Acts  of  1904,  more  than 
two  automobiles  could  still  be  continued  to  be  kept  without 
any  license  or  permit  therefor;  and  in  all  buildings  not  used 
either  for  human  habitation  or  for  holding  gatherings  of,  or 
giving  entertainments,  instruction  or  employment  to,  more 
than  twenty  persons,  erected  prior  to  May  26,  1911,  not  more 
than  two  automobiles  could  be  kept,  and  the  gasoline  in  their 
tanks  did  not  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  general  law. 

By  the  passage  of  chapter  795  of  the  Acts  of  1914  the  Leg- 
islature, in  my  judgment,  did  not  intend  to  allow  the  keep- 
ing of  automobiles  with  gasoline  in  their  tanks  in  greater 
numbers  and  in  buildings  other  than  those  in  which  they  could 
be  kept  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  act.  To  construe 
the  act  otherwise  would  be  to  interpret  an  intention  of  the 
Legislature  to  authorize  the  keeping  of  gasoline  in  automo- 
biles under  less  stringent  regulations  in  the  metropolitan  dis- 
trict, where  the  liability  of  fire  and  explosion  is  greater,  and 
more  stringent  regulations  are  needed  than  in  other  parts  of 
the  Commonwealth. 

It  is  my  opinion  that  the  Legislature,  by  the  passage  of 
said  chapter  795,  had  no  intention  to  repeal  the  existing  law 
applicable  to  the  metropolitan  district  in  relation  to  explosives 
and  inflammable  fluids,  but  intended  that  said  chapter  795 
should  be  in  addition  to  the  law  already  in  operation.  This 
view  is  given  additional  force  by  reason  of  the  provisions  of 
section  3  of  said  chapter  795, —  that  all  existing  powers,  in 
whatever  officers,  councils,  bodies,  boards  or  persons,  other  than 
the  General  Court  and  the  judicial  courts  of  the  Common- 
wealth, they  may  be  vested,  to  license  persons  or  premises, 
or  to  grant  permits  for  or  to  inspect  or  regulate  or  restrain 
the  keeping,  storage,   use,   manufacture  or  sale  of  explosives 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  37 

and  inflammable  fluids,  shall  be  transferred  to  and  vested  in 
the  Fire  Prevention  Commissioner. 

I  am  therefore  of  opinion  that  in  all  buildings  or  other 
structures  over  which  the  District  Police  had  the  power  of 
supervision  and  regulation  prior  to  the  passage  of  chapter  795 
of  the  Acts  of  1914,  the  Fire  Prevention  Commissioner  has 
now  the  same  power;  and  that  as  to  all  buildings,  including 
those  buildings  in  which  gasoline  and  explosives  could  be  kept 
without  a  permit  or  license  in  the  metropolitan  district  before 
the  passage  of  that  act,  no  paint,  oil,  benzine,  naphtha  or 
other  inflammable  fluid  shall  be  kept  or  stored  therein  in  bulk 
or  barrel,  otherwise  than  in  the  tank  of  an  automobile  or 
motor  boat  or  stationary  engine,  in  total  quantity  exceeding 
ten  gallons,  in  any  part  of  such  building  if  used  for  habitation, 
nor  within  fifty  feet  of  any  building  used  for  dwelling  pur- 
poses, unless  such  paint,  oil  or  other  inflammable  fluid  is  en- 
closed within  a  fireproof  room  or  structure  constructed  and 
arranged  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  commissioner;  and  that,  in 
any  building  used  for  habitation,  no  paint,  oil,  benzine, 
naphtha  or  other  inflammable  fluid,  except  for  domestic  pur- 
poses, shall  be  used,  stored  or  sold  in  any  part  thereof  without 
a  permit  from  the  commissioner. 

Accordingly,  I  am  of  opinion  that  chapter  477  of  the  Acts 
of  1911  was  not  repealed  by  the  provisions  of  chapter  795  of 
the  Acts  of  1914,  and  that  gasoline  may  still  be  kept  in  the 
tanks  of  automobiles,  without  license  or  permit,  in  those 
buildings  in  which  it  could  be  so  kept  prior  to  the  passage  of 
said  chapter  795,  but  in  no  others. 

As  to  an  interpretation  of  the  phrase  "in  bulk,"  I  am  of 
the  opinion  that  where  gasoline  or  other  inflammable  fluids 
are  kept  in  unopened  original  receptacles  other  than  barrels, 
no  one  of  which  contains  in  excess  of  ten  gallons,  the  inflam- 
mable fluids  are  not  being  kept  in  bulk,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  act,  and,  therefore,  that  the  size  of  the  can  or  receptacle 
in  which  the  inflammable  fluid  is  kept  is  a  material  element. 

As  to  whether  the  provisions  of  section  6  of  said  chapter  795 
include  varnishes,  shellacs,  etc.,  in  my  judgment  is  depend- 
ent upon  whether  they  are  of  substantially  the  same  inflam- 
mable character  as  the  least  inflammable  article  enumerated 
in  the  section.  If  they  are  of  such  inflammable  character 
they  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  act. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


38  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Insurance  —  Fraternal  Beneficiary  Insurance  —  Societies  limit- 
ing Membership  to  Certain  Classes  —  When  subject  to  In- 
surance Laws. 

A  domestic  fraternal  beneficiary  corporation  which  Hmits  its  membership 
to  certain  classes  of  persons,  as  provided  in  St.  1911,  c.  628,  §  12  h, 
and  pays  a  death  benefit  in  excess  of  $200,  does  not  come  within  the 
exemption  provided  by  section  29  h  of  that  statute,  and  must  conform 
to  the  insurance  laws  of  the  Commonwealth. 

April  5,  1915. 

Hon.  Frank  H.  Hardison,  Insurance  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to  whether 
a  fraternal  beneficiary  corporation,  referred  to  in  section  29  a 
of  chapter  628  of  the  Acts  of  1911,  which  pays  a  death  benefit 
of  $500,  is  exempted  under  the  provisions  of  section  29  b  of 
said  act  from  otherwise  conforming  to  the  provisions  of  the 
insurance  statutes. 

Section  29  b,  as  amended  by  section  5  of  chapter  617  of  the 
Acts  of  1913,  is  as  follows:  — 

A  domestic  fraternal  beneficiary  society,  as  defined  in  section  one 
of  this  act,  whether  incorporated  or  unincorporated,  which  limits, its 
membership  as  provided  in  division  b  of  section  twelve ;  or  which  Hmits 
its  membership  to  the  members  and  ex-members  of  any  social  organi- 
zation having  a  lodge  system  and  secret  form  of  work,  or  a  secret  order 
or  fraternity,  which  order  or  fraternity  operates  on  the  lodge  system 
with  a  representative  form  of  government  and  grants  insurance  bene- 
fits as  incidental  only  to  the  work  of  the  order  or  fraternity;  or  a 
purely  charitable  association  or  corporation  existing  on  the  twenty- 
third  day  of  May,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  any  one  of  which  pays 
a  death  or  funeral  benefit  limited  to  not  more  than  two  hundred  dol- 
lars, disability  benefits  not  exceeding  ten  dollars  per  week,  or  any  or 
all  of  such  benefits,  and  which  is  not  conducted  as  a  business  enter- 
prise or  for  profit,  .  .  .  may  transact  business  in  this  commonwealth 
without  conforming  to  the  provisions  of  this  act  or  other  acts  relating 
to  insurance  companies,  except  division  b  of  this  section;  .  .  . 

You  state  that  the  attorney  for  the  company  in  question 
argues  that  inasmuch  as  the  preliminary  clauses  of  section 
29  b  are  separated  by  semicolons,  the  words  "any  one  of 
which  pays  a  death  or  funeral  benefit  limited  to  not  more  than 
two  hundred  dollars,"  etc.,  merely  apply  to  "a  purely  chari- 
table association  or  corporation  existing  on  the  twenty-third 
day  of  May,  nineteen  hundred  and  one."  Such  a  construc- 
tion would  hardly  seem  reasonable  even  if  chapter  628  of  the 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUJVIENT  — No.  12.  39 

Acts  of  1911  were  the  first  legislation  on  this  subject,  as  the 
words  "any  one  of"  would  be  surplusage  if  the  interpretation 
contended  for  were  correct,  and  would  furnish  a  most  awk- 
ward mode  of  expression  for  that  thought. 

However,  the  1911  act  is  but  one  of  a  rather  lengthy  series 
of  enactments  on  this  subject.  The  words  in  question  seem 
first  to  appear  in  St.  1899,  c.  442,  §  17,  which  is  as  follows:  — 

Any  fraternal  beneficiary  corporation,  or  any  association  that  limits 
its  membership  to  a  particular  order,  class  or  fraternity,  or  to  the  em- 
ployees of  towns,  cities,  the  Commonwealth,  or  the  federal  government, 
or  of  a  designated  firm,  business  house  or  corporation,  or  any  secret 
fraternity  or  order,  or  any  existing  purely  charitable  association  or 
corporation,  any  one  of  which  pays  a  death  or  funeral  benefit  not 
exceeding  two  hundred  dollars,  .  .  . 

Under  this  clause  the  contention  made  is  clearly  untenable, 
and  the  limitation  of  ^200  applies  to  each  of  the  kinds  of  as- 
sociation mentioned.  This  interpretation  equally  is  required 
by  the  later  enactments.  See  St.  1901,  c.  422,  §  17;  R.  L.,  c. 
119,  §  12;    St.  1903,  c.  332. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  seems  entirely  plain  that  a 
domestic  fraternal  beneficiary  corporation ,  which  limits  its 
membership  as  provided  in  division  b  of  section  12  and  pays 
a  death  benefit  in  excess  of  $200,  does  not  come  within  the 
exemption  provided  for  by  said  section  29  b. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


State  Board  of  Health  —  Creation  —  Effect  on  Existing  Health 

Regulations. 

Rules  and  regulations  established  under  the  authority  of  R.  L.,  c.  75,  §  113, 
and  the  penalties  for  the  infringement  thereof  established  by  R.  L., 
c.  75,  §  122,  were  not  repealed  or  affected  by  St.  1914,  c.  792,  entitled 
"An  Act  to  create  a  State  Department  of  Health  and  to  amend  the 
public  health  laws." 

April  5,  1915. 

Mr.  X.  H.  GooDNOUGH,  Chief  Engineer,  State  Department  of  Health. 

Dear  Sir:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to  whether 
chapter  792  of  the  Acts  of  1914  in  effect  repealed  the  regula- 
tions made  under  section  113  of  chapter  75  of  the  Revised 
Laws,  or  takes  away  the  penalty  for  infringement  of  rules  and. 
regulations  made  under  said  section. 


40  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Chapter  792  of  the  Acts  of  1914,  entitled  "An  Act  to  create 
a  State  Department  of  Health  and  to  amend  the  public  Health 
laws,"  in  general  provides  for  a  State  Department  of  Health 
which  "shall  exercise  all  the  powers  and  perform  the  duties 
now  conferred  and  imposed  by  law  upon  the  state  board  of 
health,"  which  latter  Board  was  abolished  by  this  act.  Sec- 
tion 2  provides  for  the  appointment  of  a  Commissioner  of 
Health,  and  "his  powers  and  duties  shall  be  to  administer  the 
laws  relative  to  health  and  sanitation  and  the  regulations  of 
the  department;  ..."  Section  3  provides  for  a  public  health 
council  "to  make  and  promulgate  rules  and  regulations;  to 
take  evidence  in  appeals;  to  consider  plans  and  appointments 
required  by  law;  to  hold  hearings;  .  .  .  but  it  shall  have  no 
administrative  or  executive  functions."  Sections  4  and  5  pro- 
vide for  divisions  of  the  department  and  the  appointment  of 
directors  of  divisions  and  district  health  officers.  The  latter 
"  shall  have  all  the  powers  and  perform  the  duties  now  pro- 
vided by  law  for  inspectors  of  health  and  further  shall,  under 
the  direction  of  the  commissioner  of  health,  perform  such  duties 
as  may  be  prescribed  by,  and  shall  act  as  the  representative 
of  the  commissioner  of  health  and  under  his  directors  shall 
secure  the  enforcement  within  his  district  of  the  public  health 
laws  and  regulations." 

Section  8  repeals  sections  1,  2  and  3  of  chapter  75  of  the 
Revised  Laws  "and  all  other  acts  and  parts  of  acts  inconsist- 
ent herewith." 

The  sections  expressly  mentioned  related  solely  to  the  ap- 
pointment and  administration  of  the  State  Board  of  Health. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  new  act  is  in  all  essential  details 
an  administrative  provision.  There  are  no  sections  creating 
or  purporting  in  terms  to  change  the  public  health  laws,  as 
such.  If  there  had  been  any  intention  to  enact  such  a  radical 
provision  as  the  abolition  of  all  regulations  previously  made 
by  the  State  Board  of  Health,  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose 
explicit  language  to  that  effect  would  be  found. 

There  is  nothing  in  chapter  792  of  the  Acts  of  1914  incon- 
sistent with  allowing  valid  rules  and  regulations  previously 
made  by  the  State  Board  of  Health  to  continue  in  effect,  and 
the  express  provision  for  enforcement  by  the  new  officers  of 
the  public  health  laws  and  regulations  indicates  an  intention 
that  they  shall  continue. 

I  am  of  the  opinion  that  rules  and  regulations  established 
under  the  authority  of  section  113  of  chapter  75  of  the  Re- 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  41 

vised  Laws  are  not  affected  by  St.   1914,  c.   792,  nor  is  the 
penalty  for  infringement  of  such  rules  and  regulations  estab- 
lished by  R.  L.,  c.  75,  §  122,  affected  thereby. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Fire   Prevention  —  Storage  of  Petroleum  in   Building   or   Other 
Structure  —  Requirement  of  License. 

R.  L.,  c.  102,  §  113,  permitting  the  storage  of  crude  petroleum  or  any  of 
its  products  in  certain  buildiags  without  the  requirement  of  a  license, 
was  repealed  by  St.  1904,  c.  370. 

Apkil  8,  1915. 
John  A.  O'Keefe,  Esq.,  Fire  Prevention  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  You  have  requested  information  relative  to 
section  113  of  chapter  102  of  the  Revised  Laws,  and  whether 
the  same  has  been  repealed  by  subsequent  enactments. 

Said  section  113  provides  that  "crude  petroleum  or  any  of 
its  products  may  be  stored  ...  in  detached  and  properly 
ventilated  buildings,"  under  certain  restrictions,  and  no  pro- 
vision was  made  for  licensing  said  structures.  St.  1904,  c. 
370,  §  3,  apparently  repeals  said  section  113,  as  it  provides  that 
no  building  shall  be  erected  or  used  in  any  city  or  town  for 
the  keeping,  storage,  etc.,  of  inflammable  fluids  unless  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  or  selectmen  have  granted  a  license 
therefor  after  a  public  hearing.  St.  1904,  c.  370,  §  3,  was 
amended  by  chapter  502  of  the  Acts  of  1908  by  the  addition  of 
the  words  "or  other  structure,'^  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 
**  No  building  or  other  structure  shall  be  used  in  any  city  or 
town,"  etc. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  by  the  provisions  of  section  5  of 
chapter  370  of  the  Acts  of  1904  so  much  of  chapter  102  of 
the  Revised  Laws  as  was  inconsistent  with  said  chapter  370 
was  repealed. 

Accordingly,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  section  113  of  chapter 
102  of  the  Revised  Laws  was  repealed  by  the  provisions  of 
chapter    370   of   the    Acts    of    1904   and   acts    in    amendment 
thereof  and  in  addition  thereto. 
Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


42  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Registered  Osteopath  —  Death  Certificate. 

An  osteopath  registered  under  St.  1909,  c.  526,  may  not  legally  furnish 
the  death  certificate  required  to  be  furnished  by  physicians  under  R.  L., 
c.  29,  §§  10  and  12. 

April  8,  1915. 

Dr.  Walter  P.  Bowers,  Secretary,  Board  of  Registration  in  Medicine. 

Dear  Sir:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to  whether 
an  osteopath  registered  under  St.  1909,  c.  526,  may  legally 
furnish  the  death  certificate  required  of  physicians  under 
R.  L.,  c.  29,  §§  10  and  12. 

R.  L.,  c.  29,  §  12,  provides:  — 

Every  undertaker  or  other  person  who  has  charge  of  a  funeral 
shall  forthwith  obtain  the  physician's  certificate  required  by  section 
ten. 

Section  10  (as  amended  by  St.  1910,  c.  322,  §  2)  provides:  — 

A  physician  shall  forthwith,  after  the  death  of  a  person  whom  he 
has  attended  during  his  last  illness,  at  the  request  of  an  undertaker 
or  other  authorized  person  or  of  any  member  of  the  family  of  the  de- 
ceased, furnish  for  registration  a  standard  certificate  of  death,  stating 
to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  beUef  the  name  of  the  deceased,  his 
supposed  age,  the  disease  of  which  he  died,  defined  as  provided  in  sec- 
tion one  of  this  chapter,  where  contracted,  the  duration  of  his  last 
illness,  when  last  seen  alive  by  the  physician,  and  the  date  of  his 
death.  .  .  . 

R.  L.,  c.  78,  §  38,  provides  that  no  burial  of  a  human  body, 
or  removal  of  the  same,  shall  take  place  without  a  permit 
from  the  proper  authorities;  and  for  the  issuance  of  a  certifi- 
cate by  certain  officials  in  a  case  of  a  death  where  there  was 
no  attending  physician. 

St.  1909,  c.  526,  permits  of  registration  of  osteopaths.  Sec- 
tion 5  speaks  of  "the  registration  and  practice  of  osteopathic 
physicians;"  but  it  is  expressly"  provided  by  section  3  that 
persons  registered  under  that  act  shall  not  be  permitted  "to 
hold  themselves  out,  by  virtue  of  such  registration,  as  and  for 
other  than  osteopaths." 

I  am  aware  that  it  has  been  held  that  an  osteopath  is  a 
physician,  as  the  words  are  used  and  defined  in  certain  stat- 
utes {Bandel  v.  Department  of  Health  of  City  of  New  York,  127 
App.   Div.  382;     193  N.  Y.   133),  while,  under  different  stat- 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  43 

utes,   the   opposite  result   has   been  reached   {Nelson  v.    Staie 
Board  of  Health,  108  Ky.  769). 

Our  statutes  have  long  used  the  word  "physician,"  and 
for  many  years  a  physician,  in  order  lawfully  to  practice,  must 
have  been  duly  registered.  R.  L.,  c.  76,  §  3,  provides  that 
after  examination,  if  found  qualified,  an  applicant  "shall  be 
registered  as  a  qualified  physician." 

In  view  of  the  express  provision  of  section  3  of  St.  1909,  c. 
526,  that  an  osteopath  shall  not  hold  himself  out,  by  virtue  of 
his  registration,  as  and  for  other  than  an  osteopath,  it  would 
seem  that  he  is  prohibited  from  attempting  or  purporting  to 
act  as  a  physician  in  giving  the  death  certificates  required  by 
law. 

I    am   of   the   opinion   that    a   registered   osteopath   cannot 
legally  sign  such  a  death  certificate. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Constitutional  Law  —  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  — 
Locations  and  Right  to  maintai7i  Elevated  Structure  — 
Revocation  —  Regulation  of  Use  of  Highway. 

A  proposed  act  requiring  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  to  "re- 
move and  forever  discontinue  the  use  of  that  part  of  its  elevated  struc- 
ture which  extends  from  the  junction  of  Washington  and  Castle  streets 
to  the  entrance  of  the  old  Tremont  street  subway  in  the  city  of  Boston" 
at  its  own  expense  would  be  unconstitutional,  if  enacted. 

St.  1894,  c.  548,  incorporating  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  and 
authorizing  it  to  construct  and  operate  lines  of  elevated  railway  upon 
certain  specific  locations,  and  particularly  section  19  thereof,  provid- 
ing that  "the  locations  of  or  right  to  maintain  any  elevated  lines  or 
structures  of  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  shall  not  be 
subject  to  revocation  except"  as  prescribed  in  P.  S.,  c.  112,  §§7  and 
8,  constitutes  a  contract  between  that  company  and  the  Common- 
wealth that,  at  least  for  a  period  of  twenty-five  years,  these  locations 
and  the  right  to  maintain  elevated  lines  and  structures  thereon  shall 
not  be  revoked. 

So  much  of  such  proposed  act  as  applies  to  the  structure  located  across 
the  right  of  way  of  the  Boston  &  Albany  Railroad  and  the  New  York, 
New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company  would,  if  enacted,  be 
unconstitutional  as  taking  property  without  compensation. 

The  requirement  of  the  proposed  act,  that  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway 
Company  shall  remove  the  entire  structure  described  therein  at  its 
own  expense  and  without  compensation,  is  not  a  reasonable  police 
regulation  in  the  interest  of  the  public  health,  safety  or  morals. 


44  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

It  is  within  the  power  of  the  General  Court  to  determine  that  the  Boston 
Elevated  Railway  Company  has  discontinued  the  use  of  that  portion 
of  the  structure  described  in  the  proposed  act  which  is  within  the 
limits  of  public  ways;  that  it  unreasonably  interferes  with  the  use  of 
these  ways  by  the  public;  and  by  proper  legislation  to  require  that 
company  to  remove  it  at  its  own  expense  and  without  compensation. 

April  27,  1915. 
Hon.  Calvin  Coolidge,  President  oj  the  Senate. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  a 
copy  of  the  following  order  passed  by  the  honorable  Senate 
on  April  16:  — 

Ordered,  That  the  Attorney-General  be  required  to  furnish  to  the 
Senate  his  opinion  upon  the  following  important  question  of  law:  — 

Is  it  within  the  constitutional  power  of  the  General  Court  to  re- 
quire the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  to  remove,  at  its  own 
expense,  and  without  compensation,  and  forever  to  discontinue  a  part 
.of  the  elevated  structure  owned  by  it  in  the  city  of  Boston,  located  in 
part  upon  a  public  highway,  in  part  upon  the  right  of  way  of  a  rail- 
road corporation,  and  in  part  upon  private  land  owned  by  said  Boston 
Elevated  Railway  Company,  which  structure  is  not  now  used  by  said 
company  and  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  General  Court,  is  detrimental 
to  the  public  welfare? 

This  question  is  asked  in  reference  to  a  bill  pending  in  the  General 
Court,  being  "An  Act  relative  to  the  removal  of  certain  elevated  rail- 
way structures  in  the  city  of  Boston,"  printed  as  House  Document 
No.  1271,  a  copy  of  w^hich  is  forw^arded  herewith  for  the  information 
of  the  Attorney-General,  and  the  Senate  desires  an  opinion  upon  the 
constitutionality  of  said  bill. 

The  bill  referred  to  in  this  order  is  as  follows :  — 

Section  1.  The  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  shall,  in  or 
within  one  year  alter  the  passage  of  this  act,  remove  and  forever  dis- 
continue the  use  of  that  part  of  its  elevated  structure  which  extends 
from  the  junction  of  Washington  and  Castle  streets  to  the  entrance  of 
the  old  Tremont  street  subway  in  the  citj^  of  Boston. 

Section  2.  Said  structure  being  now  obsolete,  detrimental  to  the 
public  welfare  and  a  menace  to  public  health,  the  expense  in  connec- 
tion with  its  removal  shall  be  borne  by  said  company. 

The  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  was  incorporated 
and  authorized  to  construct  and  operate  lines  of  elevated  rail- 
way upon  certain  specific  locations  by  chapter  548  of  the  Acts 
of  1894.  Section  8  of  that  statute  provided  in  part  as 
follows :  — 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  45 

The  location,  construction,  maintenance  or  operation  of  said  lines 
of  railway  in  any  public  or  private  way  shall  be  deemed  an  additional 
servitude  and  entitle  lessees,  mortgagees  and  other  parties  having  an 
estate  in  such  way  or  in  premises  which  abut  thereon,  and  who  are 
damaged  by  reason  of  the  location,  construction,  maintenance  and 
operation  of  said  Unes  of  railway,  to  recover  reasonable  compensation 
in  the  manner  herein  provided.  .  .  . 

Before  any  work  of  construction  had  been  begun  under  this 
statute  it  was  amended  by  chapter  500  of  the  Acts  of  1897. 
By  section  3  of  the  last-mentioned  statute  certain  additional 
locations  \vere  granted  to  the  company,  including,  in  the 
paragraph  marked  Fourth,  the  location  involved  in  the  bill 
submitted  to  me.  Section  7  provides  for  the  payment  of 
damages  sustained  by  any  railroad  by  reason  of  the  con- 
struction and  operation  of  the  elevated  railway  across  the 
location  or  tracks  of  a  railroad  corporation. 

Section  10  authorizes  the  corporation  to  establish  a  fare 
not  to  exceed  5  cents  for  a  single  continuous  passage,  and 
provides  that  this  sum  shall  not  be  reduced  by  the  Legislature 
during  the  period  of  twenty-five  years  from  and  after  the 
passage  of  the  act.  It  further  provides  that  during  said 
period  of  tw^enty-five  years  no  taxes  or  excises  shall  be  im- 
posed upon  the  corporation  not  imposed  upon  street  rail- 
ways in  general,  and  then  provides  that  ''as  compensation 
for  the  privileges  herein  granted,  and  for  the  use  and  occu- 
pation of  the  public  streets,  squares  and  places,  by  the  lines 
of  elevated  and  surface  railroad  owned,  leased  and  operated 
by  it,"  the  corporation  shall  pay  a  special  franchise  tax  of  a 
fixed  percentage  of  its  gross  earnings. 

Section  19  is  as  follows:  — 

The  locations  of  or  right  to  maintain  any  elevated  lines  or  structures 
of  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  shall  not  be  subject  to  rev- 
ocation except  in  the  manner  and  on  the  terms  prescribed  in  sections 
seven  and  eight  of  chapter  one  hundred  and  twelve  of  the  Public 
Statutes:  provided,  however,  that  any  location  upon  which  said  cor- 
poration has  not  constructed  its  railroad  \\ithin  ten  j^ars  from  the 
passage  of  this  act  shall  be  subject  to  revocation  by  the  legislature; 
but  no  location  upon  which  said  corporation  has  begun  the  construc- 
tion of  its  railroad  within  said  period  shall  be  subject  to  revocation  if 
the  same  be  completed  within  three  years  thereafter. 

The  sections  of  the  Public  Statutes  referred  to  in  the  sec- 
tion just  quoted   merely  reserved  to   the   Commonwealth  the 


46  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

right  to  acquire  by  purchase  or  to  take  by  eminent  domain 
all  the  franchises  and  property  of  any  railroad  corporation. 
They  have  no  application  to  any  question  presented  by  the 
order. 

Section  21  of  the  Acts  of  1897  provides,  in  part,  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

.  .  .  the  provisions  of  chapter  one  hundred  and  thirteen  of  the  Pub- 
He  Statutes  or  other  general  laws  relating  to  the  alteration  or  revoca- 
tion of  the  locations  of  street  railway  companies,  shall  not  be  deemed 
applicable  to  the  locations  or  routes  for  elevated  raihoads  granted  to 
said  corporation.  .  .  . 

The  elevated  structure  described  in  the  bill  before  me  was 
erected  and  operated  under  these  statutes.  I  am  informed 
that  various  parties  having  estates  in  Castle  Street  and  other 
public  highways  in  which  this  structure  is  located,  or  in  prem- 
ises abutting  thereon,  have  been  paid  compensation  by  the 
Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  for  damages  suffered  by 
reason  of  the  location,  construction,  maintenance  and  opera- 
tion of  this  line  of  railway  in  those  streets,  and  that  the  Boston 
&  Albany  Railroad  and  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hart- 
ford Railroad  Company  have  been  paid  compensation  for  all 
damages  suffered  by  them  by  reason  of  the  construction  and 
operation  of  the  elevated  railway  across  their  locations  and 
tracks. 

By  chapter  534  of  the  Acts  of  1902  the  Legislature  au- 
thorized the  construction  of  the  Washington  Street  tunnel  and 
its  lease  to  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  for  the 
period  of  twenty-five  years.  By  section  11  that  company  was 
authorized  to  connect  this  tunnel  with  its  elevated  structure 
and  granted  a  location  from  the  southerly  end  of  the  tunnel 
to  its  existing  structure  at  the  corner  of  Washington  and 
Castle  streets.     Section  12  provided,  in  part,  as  follows:  — 

.  .  .  The  company,  upon  removal  of  its  elevated  trains  from  the 
existing  subway,  may  discontinue  the  use  of  its  elevated  structures 
and  locations  connecting  its  elevated  road  therewith,  and  may  sell 
any  lands  or  other  property  acquired  for  the  purposes  of  such  con- 
nection. .  .  . 

The  existing  subway  referred  to  is  the  Tremont  Street  sub- 
way. 

As  recited  in  the  order,  the  elevated  structure  referred  to  in 
the  bill  is  located  in  part  on  public  highways,  in  part  across 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  47 

the  right  of  way  of  certain  railroad  corporations,  and  in  part 
upon  private  land  of  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company. 
Thus  the  rights  of  the  company  vary  somewhat  with  these 
different   locations. 

It  is  well  settled  in  this  Commonwealth  that  locations  in 
public  highways  granted  to  ordinary  street  railways  are 
licenses  only;  that  they  are  revocable  at  any  time  without 
the  payment  of  compensation  therefor.  It  is  also  clear  that 
such  locations  do  not  impose  additional  servitudes  upon  high- 
ways, and  that  persons  owning  estates  in  a  highway  or  in 
premises  abutting  thereon  are  not  entitled  to  compensation  by 
reason  of  such  locations. 

The  statutes  under  consideration,  however,  expressly  de- 
clared that  the  location,  construction,  maintenance  and 
operation  of  the  lines  of  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Com- 
pany shall  be  deemed  as  imposing  an  additional  servitude 
upon  the  highways  in  which  they  are  situated.  Accordingly, 
the  company  has  been  required  to  compensate  all  persons 
whose  property  abuts  upon  such  highways.  It  follows  that 
the  company  has  thus  acquired  as  against  these  abutters 
perpetual  easements  in  the  adjoining  highway  to  maintain 
and  operate  its  elevated  structures.  Whether,  in  the  absence 
of  other  provisions,  it  would  have  also  obtained  a  similar 
right  against  the  public  need  not  now  be  determined.  There 
is  a  strong  probability  that  in  such  a  case  the  locations  of 
this  company  in  public  highways,  like  those  of  ordinary 
street  railways,  would  be  held  to  be  mere  licenses  revocable 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  Legislature. 

In  view  of  the  large  expense  involved  in  the  erection  of  an 
elevated  structure,  this  matter  appears  to  have  been  given 
special  consideration  by  the  Legislature  in  framing  chapter 
500  of  the  Acts  of  1897.  Section  10,  after  declaring  that  for 
a  period  of  twenty-five  years  the  Legislature  should  not  reduce 
fares  upon  the  lines  of  the  company  below  5  cents,  or  impose 
special  taxes  upon  it  not  imposed  upon  other  street  railways, 
provided  for  the  annual  payment  by  it  to  the  Commonwealth, 
for  a  period  of  twenty-five  years,  of  a  special  franchise  tax  in 
addition  to  the  tax  imposed  upon  street  railways  in  general. 
It  is  expressly  declared  that  this  special  tax  is  to  be  paid  "  as 
compensation  for  the  privileges  herein  granted,  and  for  the 
use  and  occupation  of  the  public  streets,  squares  and  places, 
by  the  lines  of  elevated  and  surface  railroad  owned,  leased 
and  operated  by  it."    This  tax  is  to  be  distributed  among  the 


48  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

different  cities  and  towns  where  the  company  is  operating 
upon  a  mileage  basis.  Then  follows  the  provision  of  section 
19,  that  the  locations  of  the  company  and  its  right  to  main- 
tain its  elevated  structme  "shall  not  be  subject  to  revocation" 
except  under  the  general  right  of  the  Commonwealth  to  pur- 
chase or  to  take  by  right  of  eminent  domain.  Only  locations 
not  built  upon  within  ten  years  are  excepted  from  this  en- 
actment. Subsequently,  in  section  21,  it  is  enacted  that  the 
general  laws  concerning  revocation  of  street  railway  locations 
shall  not  apply  to  this  company. 

In  my  opinion  these  provisions  were  intended  to  and  did 
in  fact  create  a  contract  between  the  Commonwealth  and  the 
Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company.  By  accepting  the  pro- 
visions of  this  statute  and  acting  thereon  the  company  con- 
tracted to  pay,  for  a  period  of  twenty-five  years,  a  special 
franchise  tax  in  addition  to  the  burdens  imposed  upon  other 
railways  occupying  public  highways,  and  this  payment  was 
expressly  declared  to  be  compensation  "for  the  use  and  occu- 
pation of  the  public  streets,  squares  and  places."  The  Com- 
monwealth, on  its  part,  expressly  obligated  itself  to  exempt 
the  company  from  the  general  laws  relating  to  the  alteration 
and  revocation  of  locations  of  street  railways,  and  formally 
covenanted  that  "the  locations  of  or  right  to  maintain  any 
elevated  lines  or  structures  of  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway 
Company  shall  not  be  subject  to  revocation."  The  only  right 
expressly  reserved  by  the  Commonwealth  was  its  right  under 
the  general  railroad  laws  then  in  force  to  purchase  or  to  take 
by  eminent  domain  for  fair  compensation  all  the  franchises 
and  property  of  any  railroad.  I  am  confirmed  in  my  conclu- 
sion that  these  provisions  gave  rise  to  a  contract  by  an  opin- 
ion rendered  by  my  predecessor,  Hon.  Dana  Malone,  on  Dec. 
6,  1909,  and  printed  as  a  part  of  House  Document  No.  2116 
for  the  year  1914.  Other  aspects  of  section  10,  already  re- 
ferred to,  have  several  times  been  held  to  constitute  a  con- 
tract between  this  company  and  the  Commonwealth  by  former 
Attorneys-General.  II.  Op.  Atty.-Gen.  261;  II.  Op.  Atty.- 
Gen.  426;    III.  Op.  Atty.-Gen.  400. 

Whether  this  contract  of  the  Commonwealth  not  to  revoke 
these  locations  and  rights  is  to  be  regarded  as  limited  to  a 
period  of  twenty-five  years  from  June  10,  1897,  the  date  of  the 
approval  of  the  act  of  1897,  need  not  now  be  considered.  At 
least  for  that  period  of  time  the  Commonwealth  has  made  a 
binding  contract  not  to  revoke  the  locations   of  the  Boston 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  49 

Elevated  Railway  Company  or  its  right  to  maintain  any 
elevated  lines  or  structures  authorized  by  that  act. 

The  erection  of  the  elevated  structure  across  the  locations 
of  the  Boston  &  Albany  Railroad  Company  and  the  New 
York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company,  under  the 
authority  of  the  act  of  1897,  and  the  payment  to  them  of 
compensation  as  required  by  section  7  for  the  right  to  main- 
tain and  operate  it,  in  my  opinion  created  in  the  Boston 
Elevated  Railway  Company  an  easement,  or  a  right  in  the 
nature  of  an  easement,  in  the  property  of  the  railroads.  This 
right  is  property  of  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company, 
and  it  cannot  be  deprived  of  that  property  by  the  Common- 
wealth without  compensation.  In  my  opinion  the  proposed 
bill,  if  enacted,  would  be  unconstitutional  upon  this  ground, 
so  far  as  it  applies  to  the  structure  of  the  company  located 
across  the  rights  of  way  of  these  two  railroads. 

So  far  as  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  is  main- 
taining any  part  of  this  structure  on  its  own  private  land,  it 
stands  in  the  same  position  as  any  other  landowner.  It  may 
use  its  own  property  and  erect  such  structures  thereon  as  it 
pleases,  free  from  any  interference  by  the  Commonwealth 
except  under  the  police  power  for  the  preservation  of  the 
public  health,  safety  or  morals. 

There  remains  the  question  applicable  to  all  portions  of 
the  structure  described  in  the  bill,  whether,  notwithstanding 
the  foregoing  considerations,  the  General  Court  may  order 
it  removed  without  compensation  under  the  police  power. 
Under  that  power  the  Legislature  may  impose  any  reasonable 
restraint  upon  the  use  of  property  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
tecting the  public  health,  safety  or  morals.  The  Legislature 
cannot  contract  away  its  right  to  exercise  this  power,  and  in 
my  opinion  it  has  not  attempted  to  do  so  in  this  instance. 
Under  the  guisfc  of  exercising  the  police  power  it  cannot  dis- 
regard its  contract  nor  recall  its  grant  of  a  right  to  maintain 
elevated  structures  on  these  authorized  locations.  Yet  it  is 
within  its  power,  notwithstanding  its  contract  with  this  com- 
pany, to  enact  such  laws  w^ith  reference  to  any  part  of  the 
elevated  structure  of  this  corporation,  particularly  those  por- 
tions of  it  located  in  public  highways,  as  shall  be  reasonably 
adapted  to  the  preservation  of  the  public  health  and  safety, 
and  as  shall  insure  the  maintenance  and  operation  of  this 
railway  system  without  risk  of  injury  to  the  public.  Such 
legislation  is  in  no  proper  sense  a  revocation  of  the  location. 


50  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

This  bill,  however,  does  not  purport  to  be  in  the  interest 
of  the  public  safety.  Apparently  the  structure  is  declared 
by  the  bill  to  be  obsolete  only  in  the  sense  that  it  is  no  longer 
used.  There  is  no  suggestion  that  it  is  dangerous  or  out  of 
repair,  and  I  do  not  understand  that  any  such  suggestion  can 
be  fairly  made.  The  general  statement  that  it  is  detrimental 
to  the  public  welfare  is  too  vague  and  indefinite  a  recital  to 
warrant  the  taking  of  the  property  of  this  corporation  with- 
out compensation.  If  the  police  power  can  ever  be  exercised 
solely  in  the  interest  of  the  public  welfare  it  must  be  in  some 
restricted  meaning  of  that  term  closely  related  to  the  public 
health,  safety  or  morals.  Property  cannot  be  taken  without 
compensation  merely  in  the  interest  of  the  artistic  or  aesthetic 
sense  of  the  community.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Boston  Adver- 
tising Co.,  188  Mass.  348. 

The  bill  also  recites  that  this  structure  is  a  menace  to  the 
public  health.  It  must  be  assumed  that  this  statement  is 
made  in  good  faith,  yet  to  sustain  the  bill  as  an  exercise  of 
the  police  power  on  this  ground  it  must  appear  to  be  reason- 
ably directed  toward  that  end.  In  the  first  instance  the 
General  Court  is  to  be  the  judge  of  what  is  reasonable,  but  its 
action  is  reviewable  by  the  courts,  and  if  they  determine  that 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  relation  between  a  given  enact- 
ment and  the  protection  of  the  public  health,  they  will  not 
sustain  the  law.  I  am  unable  to  perceive  how  the  mere  main- 
tenance of  that  portion  of  the  structure  in  question  which  is 
not  located  in  public  highways  can  be  a  menace  to  the  public 
health.  The  fact  that  this  structure  is  not  now  in  use  appears 
to  render  its  maintenance  upon  private  land,  if  anything,  less 
dangerous  to  the  public  health  rather  than  more  so.  So  far  as 
it  is  so  located  it  is  largely  at  or  below  the  level  of  the  ground, 
and  thus  there  is  provided  in  a  tenement-house  district  an 
open  space  which  might  otherwise  be  covered  by  buildings.  I 
am  unable  to  perceive  any  real  connection  between  the  preser- 
vation of  the  public  health  and  the  requirement  that  the 
Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  remove  this  entire  struc- 
ture. 

For  the  foregoing  reasons  it  is  my  duty  to  advise  the  Senate 
that  the  bill  printed  as  House  Document  No.  1271,  if  enacted, 
would  be  unconstitutional. 

The  question  addressed  to  me  by  the  order  of  the  honorable 
Senate  appears  to  be  broader  in  its  scope  than  the  proposed 
bill.     Accordingly,   I  deem  it  my  duty  in  answering  the  in- 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  51 

quiry  to  make  some  further  suggestions  as  to  the  power  of  the 
General  Court  to  deal  with  a  portion  of  the  elevated  structure 
of  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  described  in  the 
order. 

Public  highways  are  created  and  maintained  for  public 
purposes.  Ordinarily  it  is  not  within  the  power  of  the  Legis- 
lature, so  long  as  they  are  maintained  as  highways,  to  devote 
them  to  private  uses  which  interfere  with  the  rights  of  the 
pubHc.  Thus,  the  justification  for  the  grant  to  a  railway  cor- 
poration of  locations  in  public  highways,  whether  revocable 
or  irrevocable,  is  that  these  locations  are  to  be  used  in  the 
public  interest.  The  locations  granted  to  the  Boston  Ele- 
vated Railway  Company  in  public  highways,  and  the  right  to 
maintain  elevated  structures  therein,  were  granted  to  it  solely 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  public  service  corporation,  and 
that  it  was  to  use  those  locations  and  rights  primarily  in  the 
public  interest  as  an  instrumentality  of  the  public  service. 
These  grants  were,  therefore,  charged  with  a  trust.  The  loca- 
tions and  the  right  to  maintain  and  operate  structures  thereon 
were  subject  to  an  implied  limitation  that  they  were  to  be 
used  in  the  public  service.  The  contract  not  to  revoke  them 
was  subject  to  an  implied  condition  or  agreement  that  the 
company  should  continue  to  use  them  solely  for  the  purposes 
for  which  they  were  granted. 

Furthermore,  as  I  have  already  suggested,  the  Boston 
Elevated  Railway  Company  holds  its  locations  and  the  rights 
granted  to  it  by  its  contract  with  the  Commonwealth  subject 
to  the  exercise  of  the  police  power.  In  my  opinion  no  Legis- 
lature, under  the  guise  of  entering  into  a  contract,  can  tie  the 
hands  of  its  successors  so  as  to  prevent  the  exercise  of  this 
power  to  its  fullest  extent. 

I  am  informed  that  the  Washington  Street  tunnel  was 
opened  in  November,  1908,  and  that  since  that  time,  or  for 
nearly  six  and  one-half  years,  the  elevated  structure  referred 
to  in  the  order  has  not  been  used  by  this  company.  It  no 
longer  has  any  physical  connection  with  the  Tremont  Street 
subway,  and  since  the  widening  of  Pleasant  Street  it  would  be 
necessary  to  excavate  a  tunnel  under  that  street  in  order 
again  to  connect  this  structure  with  the  Tremont  Street  sub- 
way. I  am  informed  that  no  plan  is  now  under  consideration 
or  in  contemplation  which  involves  again  using  the  Tremont 
Street  subw^ay  for  elevated  trains,  or  the  use  of  any  part  of 
the  elevated  structure  in  question  as  a  part  of  any  scheme 


52  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

of  rapid  transit.  So  far  as  I  am  informed,  no  definite  future 
use  of  this  structure  has  ever  been  suggested.  Though  it  has 
been  unused  for  nearly  six  and  one-half  years,  so  far  as  I  am 
informed  the  Boston  Elevated  Railway  Company  has  made  no 
suggestion  to  the  General  Court  or  to  the  Boston  Transit 
Commission  involving  its  use  at  any  time  in  the  future  as  a 
part  of  its  elevated  railway  system.  Apparently  no  practical 
use  of  this  unused  structure  can  be  made  without  the  grant 
of  further  locations  by  the  General  Court  to  be  used  in  con- 
nection   with   it. 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  nature  of 
the  rights  of  this  company  in  public  highways,  I  am  of  opin- 
ion that  it  is  within  the  constitutional  power  of  the  General 
Court,  upon  consideration  of  such  facts  as  I  have  suggested, 
and  any  other  facts  bearing  upon  the  matter  that  may  be 
brought  to  its  attention,  to  conclude  that  the  Boston  Ele- 
vated Railway  Company  has  discontinued  or  abandoned  the 
use  of  that  portion  of  its  structure  under  consideration  which 
is  within  the  limits  of  public  ways;  that  this  structure  is  and 
can  be  of  no  further  public  usefulness;  that  it  unreasonably 
interferes  with  enjoyment  and  use  of  the  public  ways  by  the 
public  to  the  detriment  of  the  public  health  and  safety;  and 
by  appropriate  legislation  to  require  that  company,  at  its  own 
expense  and  without  compensation,  to  remove  such  structure. 
Such  an  enactment  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  a  valid  regula- 
tion of  the  use  of  these  public  highways  in  the  interest  of 
the  public  health  and  the  public  safety  under  the  police  power. 
Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Constitutional  Law  —  Religious  Belief  of  Public  School  Teachers 
—  Bill  Forbidding  Inquiry  by  School  Officials. 

A  provision  of  a  proposed  act  making  it  "unlawful  for  any  public  school 
committee  or  superintendent  or  supervisor  of  public  schools  to  require 
or  solicit  from  an  applicant  for  a  position  in  the  public  schools  any 
information  as  to  the  religious  belief  or  practices  of  the  applicant"  is 
not  unconstitutional  as  inconsistent  with  Article  II.  of  the  Declaration 
of  Rights,  declaring  "it  is  the  right  as  well  as  the  duty  of  all  men  in 
society,  pubhcly,  and  at  stated  seasons,  to  worship  the  Supreme 
Being  the  great  Creator  and  Preserver  of  the  universe,"  as  that 
declaration  is  merely  a  precept  for  the  guidance  of  the  people  and 
their  legislators  in  the  performance  of  their  public  duties,  and  not  a 
limitation  on  the  power  of  the  General  Court. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  53 

A  provision  of  a  proposed  act  making  it  "unlawful  for  any  public  school 
committee  or  superintendent  or  supervisor  of  public  schools  ...  to 
furnish  any  information  as  to  the  religious  belief  or  practice  of  any 
applicant  for  a  position  in  any  public  school"  would  be  unconstitu- 
tional if  enacted,  as  it  covers  statements  made  outside  of  official  duties, 
and  thus  denies  to  the  officers  referred  to  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws. 

If  from  this  proposed  act  the  words  "or  to  furnish  any  information  as  to 
the  religious  belief  or  practice  of  any  applicant  for  a  position  in  any 
public  school"  be  struck  out,  and  the  words  "and  no  appointment  to 
such  position  shall  be  affected  by  political  or  religious  opinions  or 
affiliations"  inserted,  as  thus  amended  it  is  not  beyond  the  constitu- 
tional power  of  the  General  Court. 

May  3,  1915. 

Hon.  Channing  H.  Cox,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  an  order  from  the  House  of  Representatives  dated  April 
27,  1915,  in  the  following  form:  — 

Ordered,  That  the  Attorney-General  be  requested  to  inform  the 
House  of  Representatives  whether,  in  his  opinion,  House  Document 
No.  1962,  now  pending,  being  a  bill  relative  to  apphcants  for  posi- 
tions in  the  public  schools,  would  be  constitutional  if  amended,  in 
section  1,  by  striking  out,  in  fines  5,  6  and  7,  the  words  "or  to  furnish 
any  information  as  to  the  refigious  befief  or  practice  of  any  appficant 
for  a  position  in  any  pubfic  school,"  and  inserting  in  place  thereof  the 
words  "and  no  appointment  to  such  a  position  shall  be  affected  by 
political  or  refigious  opinions  or  affifiations." 

Ordered,  That  a  copy  of  House  No.  1962,  together  with  a  copy  of 
the  amendment,  be  transmitted  to  the  Attorney-General  for  his  in- 
formation. 

Section  1  of  the  proposed  bill,  unamended,  is  as  follows:  — 

It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  pubfic  school  committee  or  superin- 
tendent or  supervisor  of  pubfic  schools  to  require  or  soficit  from  an 
appficant  for  a  position  in  the  pubfic  schools  any  information  as  to  the 
refigious  befief  or  practice  of  the  appficant,  or  to  furnish  any  informa- 
tion as  to  the  refigious  befief  or  practice  of  any  appficant  for  a  position 
in  any  public  school. 

On  April  12,  at  the  request  of  J.  Weston  Allen,  Esq.,  chair- 
man of  the  committee  on  bills  in  the  third  reading  of  the 
House,  I  addressed  to  him  a  communication  concerning  House 
Bill  No.  1962,  a  copy  of  which  communication  is  as  follows:  — 

I  have  your  letter  of  April  1  requesting  me  to  inform  your  committee 
if  in  my  opinion  House  Bifi  No.  1962,  relative  to  apphcants  for  posi- 
tions in  pubfic  schools,  would  be  constitutional  if  enacted  into  law. 


54  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

When  this  bill  in  its  original  form  was  considered  by  me  at  the  re- 
quest of  your  committee,  it  contained  a  provision  making  it  apphcable 
to  any  person,  firm  or  corporation  conducting  a  teacher's  agency. 
That  provision,  in  my  opinion,  rendered  the  bill  unconstitutional,  and 
I  so  informed  your  committee.  I  then  had  no  occasion  to  consider  any 
other  phase  ol  the  bill. 

Article  II.  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
Commonwealth  declares  — 

It  is  the  right  as  well  as  the  dutj^  of  all  men  in  society,  publicly,  and  at  stated 
seasons,  to  worship  the  Supreme  Being,  the  great  Creator  and  Preserver  of 
the  universe.  And  no  subject  shall  be  hurt,  molested,  or  restrained,  in  his  per- 
son, liberty,  or  estate,  for  worshipping  God  in  the  manner  and  season  most 
agreeable  to  the  dictates  of  his  own  conscience;  or  for  his  religious  profession 
of  sentiments;  provided  he  doth  not  disturb  the  public  peace,  or  obstruct  others 
in  their  religious  worship. 

When  reUgious  tests  as  quahfication  for  office  were  removed  from 
our  Constitution  at  an  esLvly  date  (see  Amendments,  Article  VII., 
adopted  April  9,  1821),  this  declaration  was  left  unmodified.  It  has 
long  been  a  guiding  principle  in  our  school  laws.  R.  L.,  c.  42,  pro- 
vides:— 

Section  18,  The  president,  professors  and  tutors  of  the  university  at  Cam- 
bridge and  of  the  several  colleges,  all  preceptors  and  teachers  of  academies  and 
all  other  instructors  of  youth  shall  exert  their  best  endeavors  to  impress  on  the 
minds  of  children  and  youth  committed  to  their  care  and  instruction  the  prin- 
ciples of  piety  and  justice  and  a  sacred  regard  for  truth,  love  of  their  country, 
humanity  and  universal  benevolence,  sobriety,  industry  and  frugality,  chastity, 
moderation  and  temperance,  and  those  other  virtues  which  are  the  ornament  of 
human  society  and  the  basis  upon  which  a  republican  constitution  is  founded; 
and  they  shall  endeavor  to  lead  their  pupils,  as  their  ages  and  capacities  will 
admit,  into  a  clear  understanding  of  the  tendency  of  the  above-mentioned  vir- 
tues to  preserve  and  perfect  a  republican  constitution  and  secure  the  blessings 
of  liberty  as  well  as  to  promote  their  future  happiness,  and  also  to  point  out  to 
them  the  evil  tendency  of  the  opposite  vices. 

Section  19.  A  portion  of  the  Bible  shall  be  read  daily  in  the  public  schools, 
without  written  note  or  oral  comment;  but  a  pupil  whose  parent  or  guardian 
informs  the  teacher  in  writing  that  he  has  conscientious  scruples  against  it, 
shall  not  be  required  to  read  from  any  particular  version,  or  to  take  any  personal 
part  in  the  reading.  The  school  committee  shall  not  purchase  or  use  school 
books  in  the  public  schools  calculated  to  favor  the  tenets  of  any  particular 
religious  sect. 

The  bill  before  me,  if  enacted  into  law,  would  make  it  a  criminal 
act  for  the  officials  in  charge  of  our  public  schools  to  seek  from  any 
applicant  for  a  position  as  teacher  any  information  whatever  as  to  his 
refigious  belief  or  practice.  It  would  thus  be  a  misdemeanor  for  any 
such  official  to  inquire  of  an  appficant  whether  he  beheves  in  or  wor- 
ships the  Supreme  Being,  or  to  ask  him  whether  or  not  he  is  an  atheist. 
Undoubtedly  the  Legislature  has  ample  power  to  prevent  and  to  punish 
discrimination  in  any  form  against  any  person  on  account  of  the  man- 
ner of  his  worship  or  the  form  of  his  religious  professions.    It  is  con- 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  55 

ceded  that  many  restraints  may  be  imposed  upon  public  officers  in  the 
performance  of  their  pubhc  duties  which  may  not  be  imposed  upon 
citizens  in  general.  Yet  it  is  suggested  that  the  positive  declaration 
of  the  first  sentence  of  Article  II.  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  that  it  is  a  duty 
of  all  men  to  worship  the  Supreme  Being,  cannot  be  disregarded.  It  is, 
therefore,  urged  that  the  General  Court  has  no  power  to  denj^  to  school 
authorities  the  right  to  inquire  from  apphcants  for  positions  as  teachers 
in  public  schools  whether  or  not  they  perform  the  fundamental  re- 
ligious duty  thus  recognized  and  emphasized  by  the  Declaration  of 
Rights. 

The  question  as  to  what  effect  is  to  be  given  to  this  clause  of  the 
Constitution  and  to  other  similar  provisions  (see  Part  I.,  Article  XVIIL; 
Amendments,  Article  XI.)  is  by  no  means  free  from  doubt.  The  judges 
of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  have  recently  declared  — 

The  Constitution  of  the  Commonwealth  in  several  clauses  inculcates  the 
practice  of  religion  and  urges  the  public  worship  of  God,  as  essential  means  for 
the  perpetuation  of  republican  institutions.  Opinion  of  the  Justices,  214  Mass. 
599,  601. 

It  may  be  argued  with  considerable  force  that  it  is  beyond  the  power 
of  the  General  Court  to  enact  laws  which  are  at  variance  with  the  prin- 
ciples declared  by  the  Constitution  to  he  at  the  foundation  of  our  in- 
stitutions. On  the  other  hand,  however,  it  can  be  argued  with  equal 
force  that  such  declarations  as  that  under  consideration  were  intended 
not  as  limitations  on  the  power  of  the  Legislature,  but  rather  as  pre- 
cepts set  before  our  people  and  their  legislators  as  guides  in  the  per- 
formance of  their  pubhc  duties;  that  these  precepts  are  directory  and 
not  mandatory,  and  that  thus  the  General  Court  is  the  sole  judge  as 
to  how  far  it  may  properly  enact  legislation  not  in  conformity  with 
them.  On  the  whole,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  there  are  no  express 
words  of  prohibition  upon  the  power  of  the  Legislature  in  this  regard, 
I  am  inclined  to  this  latter  view.  It  follows,  in  my  opinion,  that  the 
only  express  hmitation  upon  legislative  power  is  that  contained  in 
Article  II.  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights,  forbidding  discrimination  on 
the  ground  of  religious  behefs  or  practices.  I  do  not  feel  warranted  in 
advising  you  that  the  bill  in  question,  if  deemed  expedient,  would  be 
nullified  by  this  clause  of  the  Constitution. 

Another  feature  of  the  bill  must  be  considered.  If  enacted  it  would 
make  it  a  misdemeanor,  punishable  by  fine,  for  the  school  officers 
mentioned  'Ho  furnish  any  information  as  to  the  religious  belief  or 
practice  of  any  applicant  for  a  position  in  any  public  school."  This 
clause  seems  to  be  broad  enough  to  include  any  statement,  made  in 
ordinary  private  conversation,  of  any  fact,  whether  learned  officially 
or  otherwise,  connected  with  the  religious  beUef  or  practice  of  any 
such  applicant,  however  harmless  or  innocent  such  statement  might 
be  or  whatever  might  be  the  purpose  of  making  it.  This  seems  to  me 
to  be  something  quite  different  from  prescribing  the  manner  in  which 


56  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

these  public  officers  shall  perform  their  public  duties.  In  my  opinion 
this  provision,  if  enacted,  would  deny  to  these  officers  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  our  laws  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  For  this  reason  House  Bill 
No.  1962  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  unconstitutional  if  enacted  into 
law. 

The  proposed  amendment  set  forth  in  the  order  removes 
from  the  bill  the  clause  which,  in  my  opinion,  would  render 
it  unconstitutional  if  enacted  without  amendment.  The  pro- 
vision substituted  by  the  proposed  amendment  does  not  appear 
to  me  to  be  subject  to  criticism  upon  constitutional  grounds. 

I  fully  stated  my  views  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  the  re- 
maining provisions  of  the  bill  in  the  opinion  which  I  have 
quoted.  Those  views  I  still  retain.  Article  II.  of  the  Dec- 
laration of  Rights  has  firmly  established  in  our  fundamental 
law  the  principle  that  no  discrimination  based  upon  leligious 
beliefs  or  practices  shall  be  permitted.  The  proposed  bill,  if 
amended  as  suggested  in  the  order,  affirms  that  piinciple 
and  extends  its  application  to  persons  having  no  religious 
beliefs.  For  the  reasons  stated  in  the  opinion  rendered  by  me 
to  the  committee  on  bills  in  the  third  reading  the  enactment 
of  such  a  bill,  if  deemed  expedient,  is  not,  in  my  opinion, 
beyond  the  constitutional  power  of  the  General  Court. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Constiiutional   Law  —  Regulation   of  Motor  Vehicles  —  Classifi- 
cation —  Requirement  of  a  Bond. 

A  proposed  act  requiring  every  person,  firm  or  corporation  engaging  in  the 
business  of  carrying  or  transporting  passengers  for  hire  in  any  motor 
vehicle  to  obtain  a  license  from  municipal  authorities,  and  to  give  a 
bond  conditioned  to  pay  any  judgment  obtained  against  the  licensee 
for  injury  to  person  or  property  by  reason  of  acts  of  the  licensee  in 
the  conduct  of  such  business,  and  then  exempting  from  the  provisions 
of  such  act  persons  operating  motor  taxicabs,  motor  vehicles  rented 
by  the  day  or  hour  and  also  any  person,  firm  or  corporation  engaged 
principally  in  the  hotel  business  who  operate  motor  vehicles  to  trans- 
port guests  to  and  from  railroad  stations,  would  be  unconstitutional 
if  enacted. 

May  4,  1915. 

Hon.  Channing  H.  Cox,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Dear  Sir:  —  The  House  of  Representatives  has  requested 
my  opinion  as  to  whether  "the  provisions  of  House  Bill  No. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  57 

2042/  now  pending,  relative  to  the  use  of  certain  motor 
vehicles  for  the  transportation  of  passengers,  are  constitu- 
tional and  legal,  having  special  reference  to  the  provision  in 
the  first  section  requiring  the  furnishing  of  a  bond  as  a  con- 
dition of  receiving  a  license  to  operate  certain  motor  vehicles, 
and  also  having  special  reference  to  the  provisions  in  the 
fourth  section  which  discriminate  for  the  purposes  of  the  bill 
between  different  classes  of  motor  vehicles,  or  between  motor 
vehicles  used  for  different  purposes,  and  between  different 
classes  of  common  carriers  of  passengers." 

The  provisions  of  the  act  requiring  the  licensing  of  motor 
vehicles  used  for  the  transportation  of  passengers  for  hire 
would  seem  to  be  well  within  the  police  power.  Laws  re- 
quiring licenses  before  engaging  in  certain  businesses  especially 
affecting  public  interests  are  so  numerous  that  discussion 
of  this  point  appears  unnecessary.  The  fact  that  motor 
vehicles  and  the  operators  thereof  are  already  under  the 
necessity  of  obtaining  licenses  does  not  prevent  the  Legisla- 
ture from  requiring  other  and  special  licenses  for  their  use  in 
such  a  public  business  as  transporting  passengers  for  hire. 
Commonwealth  v.  McGann,  213  Mass.  215. 

'  The  important  sections  of  the  proposed  act  are  as  follows:  — 

Section  1.  Every  person,  firm  or  corporation  engaging  in  the  business  of  carrying  or 
transporting  passengers  for  hire  in  any  motor  vehicle,  as  defined  in  chapter  five  hundred 
and  thirty-four  of  the  acts  of  the  year  nineteen  hundred  and  nine,  shall,  before  engaging 
in  such  business,  make  appUcation  to  the  board  of  aldermen  in  a  city,  or,  in  cities  having 
no  board  of  aldermen,  to  such  city  authority  as  may  exercise  the  functions  of  such  board, 
and  to  the  selectmen  in  a  town,  and  in  the  city  of  Boston  to  the  board  of  street  commissioners, 
for  a  permit  to  conduct  such  business.  No  permit  for  the  conduct  of  such  business  shall  be 
issued  until  the  appUcant  has  filed  with  the  clerk  of  the  city  or  town  where  it  is  proposed 
to  engage  in  such  business,  or,  if  the  business  is  to  be  conducted  in  more  than  one  city  or 
town,  then  with  the  clerk  of  one  of  such  cities  or  towns,  a  bond  running  to  the  common- 
wealth of  Massachusetts,  in  such  penal  sum,  not  less  than  two  thousand  dollars  for  each 
motor  vehicle  operated  as  said  aldermen  or  corresponding  board  of  selectmen  shall  require, 
with  such  surety  company,  licensed  to  do  business  in  this  commonwealth,  or  with  such 
other  sureties  as  said  aldermen  or  corresponding  board  of  selectmen  may  approve,  condi- 
tioned to  pay  any  judgment  obtained  against  the  principal  named  in  said  bond  for  any  in- 
jury to  person  or  property  by  reason  of  any  careless,  negUgent  or  unlawful  act  on  the  part 
of  the  principal  named  in  said  bond,  his  agents  or  employees,  or  the  driver  of  such  motor 
vehicle,  in  the  conduct  of  said  business  or  in  the  operation  of  such  vehicle:  provided,  however, 
that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  deprive  the  defendants  in  any  such  action  of  the  right, 
given  by  chapter  five  hundred  and  fifty-three  of  the  acts  of  the  year  nineteen  hundred  and 
fourteen,  to  set  up  and  prove  the  affirmative  defense  of  contributory  neghgence  on  the  part 
of  the  person  injured  or  killed. 

Section  4.  This  act  shall  take  effect  on  the  first  day  of  July  next,  but  shall  not  apply 
to  owners  or  drivers  of  motor  taxicabs,  so  called,  or  to  motor  vehicles  rented  by  the  day  or 
hour,  with  or  without  a  driver,  to  an  individual  or  party  of  individuals  for  a  special  occa- 
sion, or  to  motor  vehicles  performing  a  service  similar  to  that  formerly  performed  by  horse- 
drawn  pubHc  cabs  and  hackney  coaches,  nor  to  any  person,  firm  or  corporation  engaged 
principally  in  the  hotel  business,  who  operates  motor  vehicles  to  transfer  guests  to  and 
from  the  railroad  station." 


58  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

The  requirement  that  a  bond  shall  be  filed  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  issuance  of  a  license  is  also  a  common  re- 
quirement, the  constitutionality  of  which  would  hardly  now 
be  questioned.  Similar  provisions  will  be  found  on  the  stat- 
ute books  already  as  to  liquor  dealers  (R.  L.,  c.  100,  §  42), 
money  lenders  (R.  L.,  c.  102,  §  59),  ferrymen  (R.  L.,  c.  55,  §  1), 
pawnbrokers  (R.  L.,  c.  102,  §  40),  private  detectives  (R.  L., 
c.  108,  §  36)  and  auctioneers  (R.  L.,  c.  64,  §  30). 

The  mere  fact  that  the  provisions  of  the  act  apply  to  com- 
mon carriers  of  passengers  by  motor  vehicles  and  not  to 
common  carriers  operating  by  other  means,  in  my  judgment, 
does  not  render  the  provisions  of  section  1  of  the  act  un- 
constitutional. 

The  question  then  remains  as  to  whether  any  of  the  ex- 
ceptions contained  in  section  4  of  the  proposed  act  are  such 
as  to  render  it,  as  a  whole,  unconstitutional  as  class  legisla- 
tion, or,  in  other  words,  as  denying  to  all  persons  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws. 

Even  before  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  it  was  a 
settled  principle  of  constitutional  law  that  statutes  in  regard  to  the 
transaction  of  business  must  operate  equally  upon  all  citizens  who 
desire  to  engage  in  the  business,  and  that  there  shall  be  no  arbitrary 
discrimination  between  different  classes  of  citizens.  Commonwealth  v. 
Hana,  195  Mass.  262,  266. 

The  basis  upon  which  classification  is  admissible  is  well 
stated  by  Harlan,  J.,  in  Connolly  v.  Union  Sewer  Pipe  Co., 
184  U.  S.  540,  560:  — 

The  difficulty  is  not  met  by  saying  that,  generally  speaking,  the 
State  when  enacting  laws  may,  in  its  discretion,  make  a  classification 
of  persons,  firms,  corporations  and  associations,  in  order  to  subserve 
public  objects.  For  this  court  has  held  that  classification  "must 
always  rest  upon  some  difference  which  bears  a  reasonable  and  just 
relation  to  the  act  in  respect  to  wliich  the  classification  is  proposed, 
and  can  never  be  made  arbitrarily  and  without  any  such  basis.  .  .  . 
But  arbitrary  selection  can  never  be  justified  by  calling  it  classifica- 
tion. The  equal  protection  demanded  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
forbids  this.  ...  No  duty  rests  more  imperatively  upon  the  courts 
than  the  enforcement  of  those  constitutional  provisions  intended  to 
secure  that  equality  of  rights  which  is  the  foundation  of  free  govern- 
ment. ...  It  is  apparent  that  the  mere  fact  of  classification  is  not 
sufficient  to  relieve  a  statute  from  the  reach  of  the  equality  clause  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  and  that  in  all  cases  it  must  appear  not 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  59 

only  that  a  classification  has  been  made,  but  also  that  it  is  one  based 
upon  some  reasonable  ground,  —  some  difference  which  bears  a  just 
and  proper  relation  to  the  attempted  classification,  —  and  is  not  a 
mere  arbitrary  selection." 

While  the  class  which  is  to  be  regulated  may  properly  be 
defined  by  describing  a  larger  group  and  then  excepting 
therefrom  certain  distinct  classes,  provided  there  is  a  reason- 
able ground  for  the  exceptions,  the  fact  that  ready  language 
has  not  suggested  itself  for  defining  such  class  by  itself  in  such 
a  way  as  to  make  exception  unnecessary  naturally  raises  a 
doubt  as  to  whether  in  reality  a  reasonable  distinction  exists. 
In  other  words,  if  a  reasonable  ground  for  creation  of  a  class 
exists,  it  seems  to  follow  that  that  class  could  be  clearly  and 
directly  described,  without  the  indirect  definition  of  the  class 
by  means  of  exceptions. 

As  stated  in  the  language  quoted  above,  the  distinction 
must  be  with  reference  to  the  purposes  of  the  act.  The  re- 
quirement in  House  Bill  No.  2042,  of  filing  a  bond,  has  for  its 
object  the  assurance  of  financial  ability  to  respond  in  damages 
for  injuries  for  which  the  owner  is  liable,  and  a  distinction, 
to  be  valid,  must  have  some  relation  to  the  danger  or  risk. 
So  far  as  the  act  exempts  persons,  firms  or  corporations 
"engaged  principally  in  the  hotel  business,  who  operate  motor 
vehicles  to  transfer  guests  to  and  from  the  railroad  station,'' 
there  is,  in  my  opinion,  no  reasonable  ground  of  distinction. 

The  act  would  penalize  a  hotel  keeper  who  operated  such  a 
vehicle  to  and  from  a  steamboat  wharf  or  other  place,  while 
exempting  a  person  in  exactly  the  same  situation  who  oper- 
ated one  to  and  from  a  railroad  station.  Furthermore,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  the  operation  of  such  a  motor  vehicle 
between  a  hotel  and  a  railroad  station  would  be  any  less 
dangerous  to  the  public  or  to  the  passengers  if  operated  by  or 
under  the  direction  of  a  person  engaged  principally  in  the 
hotel  business  than  the  same  vehicle  operated  in  the  same 
manner  by  a  person  whose  principal  business  was  that  of 
banking  or  anything  else,  but  who  also  was  engaged  in  the 
conduct  of  a  hotel. 

It  is  true  that  some  courts,  in  their  desire  to  uphold  the 
constitutionality  of  acts  of  Legislatures,  have  gone  to  extraor- 
dinary lengths,  and  have  found  distinctions  justifying  classi- 
fications which  are  not  apparent  to  the  average  citizen,  but 
I  cannot  believe  that  in  Massachusetts  the  Supreme  Judicial 


60  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Court  will  ever  go  to  such  lengths  as  to  uphold  a  classifica- 
tion such  as  this. 

In  my  opinion  the  provision  of  the  Constitution,  that  no 
State  shall  "deny  to  any  person  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,"  is  one  the  firm  adherence  to  which  is  most  necessary 
to  the  foundations  and  preservation  of  a  republican  form  of 
government;  and  no  discrimination  should  be  supported  be- 
tween different  citizens  unless  in  fact  a  substantial  ground 
therefor  can  be  stated  without  resort  to  fanciful  arguments 
or  attenuated  distinctions. 

Undoubtedly,  the  Legislature  may  draw  lines  which  relate 
to  the  liability  of  accident.  If  the  classification  proposed 
were  along  the  line  of  the  number  of  passengers  carried,  the 
size  or  power  of  the  vehicle,  the  rate  of  speed  at  which  it  may 
be  opprated  or  the  skill  of  the  person  operating  it,  the  nature 
of  the  district  through  which  it  operates,  the  control  of  the 
operator  by  the  passenger,  or  related  to  common  carriers  of 
passengers  by  motor  vehicles,  of  whom  the  degree  of  care  re- 
quired could  be  said  to  be  greater  than  of  others,  the  dis- 
tinction could  well  be  supported.  But,  in  my  opinion,  unless 
some  reason  along  lines  similar  to  those  suggested  exists,  an 
exception  from  such  a  class  as  is  defined  in  section  1  of  this 
act  is  not  warranted. 

Accordingly,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  provisions  of  House 
Bill  No.  2042,  if  enacted  into  law,  would  be  unconstitutional. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Fire   Prevention  —  Storage  of  Inflammable  Fluids  —  Structures. 

A  can  is  not  a  structure  within  the  meaning  of  St.  1904,  c.  370,  §  3,  as 
amended  by  St.  1913,  c.  452,  providing  that  ''no  building  or  other 
structure  shall  be  used  in  any  city  or  towm"  for  the  storage  of  inflam- 
mable fluids  without  a  license. 

May  6,  1915. 

Mr.  John  A.  O'Keefe,  Fire  Prevention  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  "Is  a  can  a  structure  under  the  provisions  of 
St.  1904,  c.  370,  §  3,  as  amended  by  St.  1913,  c.  452?"  Such 
is  the  question  submitted  by  you  for  my  opinion. 

The  law  referred  to,  briefly  stated,  is,  "  No  building  or 
other  structure  shall  be  used  in  any  city  or  town  for  the 
keeping,  storage,  etc.,  of  any  articles  named  in  section  two 
(including  gasoline),  unless"  a  license  is  granted,  etc. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  —  No.  12.  61 

A  "structure"  is  defined  to  be  ''a  building  of  any  kind,  but  chiefly 
a  building  of  some  size  and  magnificence;  an  edifice."  .  .  .  While  the 
word  "structure"  msiy  cover  a  great  variety  of  form  and  construction, 
yet,  when  used  in  connection  with  the  words  "house"  and  "building," 
it  is  evidently  intended  to  simply  describe  a  varietj^  of  building.  Con- 
ley  V.  Lackawanna  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  125. 

The  above  definition  seems  to  be  the  construction  adopted  in 
most  jurisdictions.  While  it  is  not  necessary  to  go  to  that 
length  in  the  determination  of  this  question,  it  is  my  opin- 
ion that  a  can  is  not  a  stiucture  within  the  meaning  of  the 
act. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Firemen's  Relief  Fund  —  Personal    hijuries  —  Effect   of  Expo- 
sure in  Course  of  Duty. 

A  fireman  disabled  by  congestion  of  the  kidneys,  which  is  caused  by  expo- 
sure to  cold  and  stormy  weather  encountered  in  the  performance  of  his 
duties  at  a  fire,  is  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  R.  L.,  c.  32,  §  73,  provid- 
ing that  the  firemen's  reUef  fund  "shall  be  used  for  the  refief  of  fire- 
men .  .  .  who  may  be  injured  in  the  performance  of  their  duty  at 
a  fire  or  in  going  to  or  returning  from  the  same." 

May  6,  1915. 

Board  of  Commissioners  of  the  Firemen^ s  Relief  Fund,  Taunton,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  am  requested  to  review  an  opinion  given 
by  a  former  Attorney-General  in  answer  to  the  following  in- 
quiry presented  by  your  board:  — 

Is  a  fireman  entitled  to  a  benefit  under  chapter  32,  sections  71-77, 
who  can  reasonably  prove  that  he  was  in  practically  perfect  health  up 
to  the  time  of  responding  at  about  midnight  to  a  third  or  fourth  alarm 
fii'e,  the  night  in  question  being  verj^  cold  and  sleety,  and  it  being  the 
kind  of  a  fire  that  entailed  much  standing  around  and  but  httle  work, 
and  under  these  conditions  the  kidneys  became  congested,  wdth  the 
result  that  the  man  was  laid  up  for  several  months,  and  may  not  ever 
become  quite  well  again.  Is  this  fireman  ehgible  to  benefits  under  the 
chapter  and  specifications  above  mentioned? 

The  law  which  applies  to  such  cases  is  R.  L.,  c.  32,  §  73,  as 
amended  by  St.  1903,  c.  253,  §  1,  which  is  as  follows:  — 

Section  73.  Such  fund  shall  be  used  for  the  relief  of  firemen, 
whether  members  of  said  association  or  not,  who  may  be  injured  in 


62  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

the  performance  of  their  duty  at  a  fire  or  in  going  to  or  returning  from 
the  same,  and  for  the  reUef  of  the  widows  and  children  of  firemen  killed 
in  the  performance  of  such  duty,  in  the  manner  and  to  the  amount  de- 
termined by  a  board  of  five  persons,  of  whom  three,  not  members  of 
said  association,  shall  be  appointed  by  the  governor  in  July  of  the 
year  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  to  serve,  one  for  three  years,  one  for 
two  years,  etc. 

The  opinion  referred  to  was  to  the  effect  that  the  firemen's 
relief  fund  should  be  used  only  in  cases  of  injuries  received 
by  some  form  of  external  violence,  and  the  above  inquiry 
was  answered  in  the  negative.  Since  this  opinion  was  ren- 
dered similar  questions  have  arisen  under  the  workmen's  com- 
pensation act,  and  the  construction  of  that  act  by  various 
tribunals  and  courts  would  seem  to  have  a  strong  bearing  on 
the  question  presented  by  your  board.  The  similarity  in  the 
wording  of  the  law  governing  the  distribution  of  the  fund  in 
your  hands  and  the  compensation  act  above  referred  to  will 
be  seen  at  a  glance. 

Section  1  of  Part  II.  of  the  workmen's  compensation  act 
reads,  in  part,  as  follows:  — 

If  an  employee  .  .  .  receives  a  personal  injury  arising  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  his  employment,  he  shall  be  paid  compensation  by  the 
association  as  hereinafter  provided.  .  .  . 

The  Industrial  Accident  Board  has  defined  "personal  in- 
jury," as  used  in  the  workmen's  compensation  act,  to  be 
"any  injury  or  damage  or  harm  or  disease  which  arises  out 
of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment  which  causes  incapac- 
ity for  work  and  takes  from  the  employee  his  ability  to  earn 
wages." 

Among  the  many  cases  arising  under  the  act  referred  to, 
which  have  been  decided  in  favor  of  the  employee,  are  the 
following:  Stone  v.  Travelers  Insurance  Co.,  where  an  em- 
ployee got  his  feet  wet  in  a  leaky  boat  which  was  furnished 
by  his  employer,  and  pneumonia  developed  as  an  after-effect 
of  the  injury;  Milliken  v.  Travelers  Insurance  Co.,  where  an 
employee  contracted  pneumonia  following  cold  and  exposure. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  this  Commonwealth,  in  the  case  of 
Brightman  v.  JEtna  Insurance  Co.,  220  Mass.  17,  upheld  a  decree 
in  favor  of  the  widow  of  an  employee  who  died  of  heart  disease 
which  was  accelerated  by  the  excitement  attending  the  sinking 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  63 

of  a  vessel  on  which  said  employee  was  cook,  and  from  which 
he  made  his  escape  and  died  soon  after  reaching  the  shore. 

In  none  of  these  cases,  it  will  be  observed,  was  there  "ex- 
ternal violence"  in  the  ordinary  use  of  the  term,  and  yet  in 
each  instance  it  was  held  that  there  had  been  personal  injury. 
In  view  of  these  cases,  and  similar  cases  in  other  jurisdictions, 
nearly  all  of  them  having  been  decided  since  your  inquiry 
was  first  raised,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  if  the  injury  to 
which  your  communication  refers  was  in  fact  really  caused 
by  exposure  while  the  fireman  was  actually  in  the  performance 
of  his  duties  he  is  etnitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  act. 

I  feel,  therefore,  obliged  to  modify  the  ruling  previously 
made  by  this  department,  and  inform  you  that  in  my  opinion 
the  funds  of  your  association  may  properly  be  devoted  to 
the  relief  of  firemen  who  may  be  injured  in  the  performance 
of  their  duties  at  a  fire  or  in  going  to  or  returning  from  the 
same,  whether  the  injuries  are  caused  by  "external  violence," 
from  smoke  or  fire  inhaled,  from  exposure,  or  from  any  dis- 
ease directly  resulting  from  the  performance  of  their  duties. 

In  your  letter  of  April  28  you  also  ask  whether  firemen 
injured  in  fire  service  who  are  receiving  benefits  from  the 
workmen's  compensation  act  have  a  right  to  receive  a  benefit 
under  R.  L.,  c.  32,  §§  71-77.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the 
question  should  be  answered  in  the  negative.  St.  1913,  c.  807, 
§  5,  in  my  judgment,  clearly  prohibits  any  such  payment. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Intoxicating  Liquors  —  Transportation  into   No-license  Munici- 
palities —  Time  for  granting  Permits. 

St.  1906,  c.  421,  §  2,  as  amended  by  St.  1911,  c.  423,  does  not  limit  to  the 
month  of  April  the  time  in  which  municipal  authorities  may  grant 
permits  for  the  transportation  of  intoxicating  liquors  into  no-license 
cities  and  towns,  and  they  have  the  power  in  their  discretion  to  grant 
such  permits  throughout  the  year. 

May  11,  1915. 

Hon.  William  J.  Corcoran,  District  Attorney  for  the  Northern  District, 
Cambridge,  Mass. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
letter  of  the  6th  inst.  in  which  you  request  my  interpretation 
of  the  meaning  of  the  provisions  of  chapter  423  of  the  Acts  of 


64  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

1911.  You  ask  me  to  inform  you  "whether  or  not  the  mayor 
and  board  of  aldermen  may  grant  permits  referred  to  by  the 
law  in  any  other  month  except  the  month  of  April  referred 
to  in  the  statute." 

The  provisions  of  chapter  423  of  the  Acts  of  1911  amend 
section  2  of  chapter  421  of  the  Acts  of  1906,  so  as  to  read  as 
follows:  — 

The  mayor  and  aldermen  in  cities  and  the  selectmen  in  towns  in 
which  said  licenses  of  the  first  five  classes  are  not  granted  shall  annu- 
ally in  the  month  of  April,  grant  and  issue  one  or  more  permits  under 
the  provisions  of  this  act,  to  become  effective  on  the  first  day  of  May 
follo"wdng,  and  to  be  granted  only  to  a  person,  firm  or  corporation 
regularly  and  la\\^ully  conducting  a  general  express  business  and  to 
no  other  person,  firm  or  corporation,  and  every  such  permit  shall 
specify  the  residence  by  street  and  number  (if  any)  of  the  holder,  and 
shall  be  subject  to  all  laws  now  or  hereafter  in  force  relative  to  the 
transportation  of  such  Uquors. 

Section  1  of  said  chapter  421  is  as  follows:  — 

No  person  or  corporation,  except  a  railroad  or  street  railway  cor- 
poration, shall,  for  hire  or  reward,  transport  spirituous  or  intoxicating 
liquors  into  or  in  a  city  or  town  in  which  licenses  of  the  first  five  classes 
for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  are  not  granted,  without  first  being 
granted  a  permit  so  to  do  as  hereinafter  provided. 

Prior  to  the  passage  of  this  statute  there  were  no  restric- 
tions placed  upon  the  transportation  of  intoxicating  liquors 
into  no-license  communities  other  than  those  imposed  by  sec- 
tions 48  to  51  of  chapter  100  of  the  Revised  Laws. 

The  provisions  of  chapter  421  were  enacted  for  the  purpose 
of  regulating  the  transportation  for  hire  or  reward  of  in- 
toxicating liquors  into  no-license  communities,  and  to  require 
a  permit  by  the  mayor  and  aldermen  or  the  selectmen  to  the 
person  so  transporting.  The  act  imposes  a  limitation  upon 
the  right  of  citizens  to  engage  in  a  business  which  they  for- 
merly could  lawfully  engage  in,  and  therefore  the  limitations 
contained  therein  should  be  construed  with  strictness.  The 
provisions  of  section  2  were  enacted  for  the  purpose  of  insur- 
ing to  the  inhabitants  of  the  no-license  community  that  there 
should  be  at  least  one  person  or  corporation  authorized  under 
the  act  to  transport  such  liquors  into  the  no-license  com- 
munity.    Rea  V.  Aldermen  of  Everett,  217  Mass.  427. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  65 

After  the  passage  of  chapter  421  of  the  xVcts  of  1906  there 
were  many  boards  of  mayor  and  aldermen  and  boards  of 
selectmen  which  took  the  attitude  that  the  word  "shall,"  in 
section  2  of  said  chapter  421,  should  be  read  as  "may,"  and 
therefore  it  was  discretionary  with  them  whether  to  grant  one 
or  more  permits,  and  also  that  as  section  2  did  not  provide  the 
time  when  the  permit  should  be  granted,  it  was  discretionary 
with  them  as  to  the  time  the  permit  should  be  granted,  even 
if  the  provisions  of  said  section  2  required  them  to  grant  at 
least  one  such  permit.  The  provisions  of  chapter  423  of  the 
Acts  of  1911  were  passed,  in  my  opinion,  to  give  further 
force  and  effect  to  section  2  of  chapter  421  of  the  Acts  of 
1906,  so  as  to  require  the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  a  city  and 
the  selectmen  of  a  town  to  grant  at  least  one  permit  during 
the  month  of  April. 

I  am  of  the  opinion  that  outside  of  the  mandatory  pro- 
vision in  section  2,  which  directs  the  mayor  and  aldermen  in 
cities  and  the  selectmen  in  towns  to  grant  and  issue  at  least 
one  permit  in  the  month  of  April,  and  the  provision  therein 
that  the  permits  shall  be  granted  only  to  a  person,  firm  or 
corporation  regularly  and  lawfully  conducting  a  general  ex- 
press business,  the  provisions  of  the  act  in  no  way  limit  or 
control  the  discretionary  powers  vested  in  the  mayor  and 
aldermen  or  the  selectmen,  and  that  they  therefore  have  the 
power  at  any  time  during  the  year  to  grant  additional  permits 
to  those  granted  during  the  month  of  April. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  a  construction  that  the  mayor  and 
aldermen  in  cities  and  selectmen  in  towns  were  limited  to 
granting  permits  in  the  month  of  April  only  might  lead,  in 
view  of  the  decision  in  Rea  v.  Aldermen  of  Everett,  to  absurd 
results,  as  the  mayor  and  aldermen  or  selectmen  could  not  be 
compelled  to  grant  a  permit  until  the  expiration  of  the  month 
of  April,  and  after  its  expiration  they  would  have  no  authority 
to  grant  such  permit. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attv^ill,  Attorney-General. 


66  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Registered  Physicians  —  Application  of  Statute  Requirement  to 
State  Institutions  —  Assistants  to  Superintendents. 

Assistants  to  superintendents  in  State  institutions,  if  practicing  or  attempt- 
ing to  practice  medicine  in  any  of  its  branches,  must  be  duly  registered 
in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  R.  L.,  c.  76,  §§  1-9. 

May  13,  1915. 
Board  of  Registration  in  Medicine,  1  Beacon  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to 
whether  physicians  practicing  medicine  in  State  institutions, 
as  assistants  to  the  superintendents  thereof,  are  required  to  be 
registered  under  the  Massachusetts  laws;  or,  in  other  words, 
whether  an  unregistered  person  so  practicing  is  acting  con- 
trary to  the  statutes. 

R.  L.,  c.  76,  §§  8  and  9,  provide:  — 

Section  8.  Whoever,  not  being  la^\^ully  authorized  to  practice 
medicine  within  this  commonwealth  and  registered  as  aforesaid,  holds 
himself  out  as  a  practitioner  of  medicine,  or  practices  or  attempts  to 
practice  medicine  in  any  of  its  branches,  .  .  .  shall,  for  each  offence, 
be  punished  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  one  hundred  nor  more  than  five 
hundred  dollars  or  by  imprisonment  for  three  months,  or  by  both  such 
fine  and  imprisonment.  In  a  case  in  which  a  provision  of  this  or  the 
preceding  section  has  been  violated,  the  person  who  committed  the 
violation  shall  not  recover  compensation  for  services  rendered. 

Section  9.  The  provisions  of  the  eight  preceding  sections  shall  not 
be  held  to  discriminate  against  any  particular  school  or  system  of 
medicine,  to  prohibit  medical  or  surgical  service  in  a  case  of  emergency, 
or  to  prohibit  the  domestic  administration  of  family  remedies.  They 
shall  not  apply  to  a  commissioned  medical  officer  of  the  United  States 
army,  navy  or  marine  hospital  service  in  the  performance  of  his  official 
duty;  to  a  ph3^sician  or  surgeon  from  another  state  who  is  a  legal  prac- 
titioner in  the  state  in  wliich  he  resides,  when  in  actual  consultation 
with  a  legal  practitioner  of  this  commonwealth;  to  a  physician  or  sur- 
geon residing  in  another  state  and  legally  qualified  to  practice  therein, 
whose  general  practice  extends  into  the  border  towns  of  this  common- 
wealth, if  such  physician  does  not  open  an  office  or  designate  a  place  in 
such  toTVTis  where  he  may  meet  patients  or  receive  calls;  to  a  physician 
authorized  to  practice  medicine  in  another  state,  when  he  is  called  as 
the  family  physician  to  attend  a  person  temporarily  abiding  in  tliis 
commonwealth;  nor  to  registered  pharmacists  in  prescribing  gratui- 
tously, osteopathists,  pharmacists,  clairvoyants,  or  persons  practicing 
hypnotism,  magnetic  healing,  mind  cure,  massage,  Christian  science 
or  cosmopathic  method  of  healing,  if  they  do  not  violate  an}-  of  the 
provisions  of  section  eight. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCimiENT  —  No.  12.  67 

Section  8  imposes  a  penalty  upon  any  person  who  practices 
or  attempts  to  practice  medicine  without  being  registered. 
It  is  frequently  stated  as  a  maxim  of  the  law  that  statutes 
do  not  apply  to  the  State  or  sovereign  unless  it  is  expressly 
mentioned.  There  are,  however,  many  exceptions  to  this 
rule,  and  these  exceptions  have  often  been  grouped  under  a 
general  statement  such  as  appears  in  Bacon's  Abridgment 
(title  "Prerogative,"  3-5),  where  it  is  said:  — 

The  general  rule  is,  that  where  an  act  of  parliament  is  made  for  the 
pubhc  good,  the  advancement  of  religion  and  justice,  and  to  prevent 
injury  and  wrong,  the  king  shall  be  bound  by  such  act,  though  not 
particularly  named  therein.  But  where  a  statute  is  general,  and 
thereby  any  prerogative,  right,  title,  or  interest  is  devested,  or  taken 
from  the  king,  in  such  case  he  shall  not  be  bound;  unless  the  statute 
is  made  by  express  words  to  extend  to  him.  Quoted  in  United  States 
V.  Knight,  14  Pet.  315. 

In  Endlich  on  Interpretation  of  Statutes  (§  167)  it  is  said:  — 

The  test,  therefore,  in  every  case  in  which  the  question  whether  or 
not  the  government  is  included  in  the  language  of  a  statute  has  to  be 
met  and  determined,  cannot  be  a  mere  general  rule,  either  one  wa}'  or 
another,  arbitrarily  applied,  but  must  be  the  object  of  the  enactment, 
the  purposes  it  is  to  serve,  the  mischiefs  it  is  to  remedy,  and  the  con- 
sequences that  are  to  follow,  —  starting  with  the  fair  and  natural  pre- 
sumption that,  primarily,  the  Legislature  intended  to  legislate  upon 
the  rights  and  affairs  of  individuals  only.  This  is  the  only  proper 
extent  and  apphcation  of  the  rule  against  inclusion  of  government. 

The  statute  as  to  registration  of  physicians  does  not  in 
terms  impose  any  penalty  or  obligation  upon  the  employer, 
but  applies  rather  to  the  person  who  attempts  to  practice 
medicine.  Any  effect  upon  the  State  by  its  general  enforce- 
ment in  all  cases,  including  employees  in  public  institutions, 
would  be  merely  an  indirect  result  of  such  enforcement. 

The  object  of  these  statutes  is,  of  course,  the  promotion  of 
the  public  good  and  the  protection  of  the  citizens  against  the 
evils  naturally  resulting  from  the  attempts  of  unskilled  per- 
sons to  practice  medicine.  No  good  reason  suggests  itself  why 
the  protection  thus  afforded  should  be  less  to  those  citizens  who 
are  cared  for  in  State  institutions  than  to  those  who  are  not. 

I  am  of  the  opinion  that  R.  L.,  c.  76,  §  8,  is  general  in 
its  application,  and  applies  to  all  persons  without  regard  to 
whether  they  are  employed  in  State  institutions  or  elsewhere. 


68  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

The  question,  of  course,  will  arise  in  each  particular  case 
as  to  whether  the  individual  in  question  is  or  is  not  holding 
himself  out  as  a  practitioner  of  medicine  or  practicing  or 
attempting  to  practice  medicine  in  any  of  its  branches.  Many 
doubtful  cases  may  occur,  and  no  hard  and  fast  rule  for  their 
decision  can  be  laid  down.  The  mere  question  of  whether 
or  not  the  person  prescribes  drugs  does  not  furnish  a  con- 
clusive test,  as  one  may  practice  medicine  without  so  doing. 
Commonwealth  v.  Jewelle,  199  Mass.  558.  The  diagnosis  or 
attempt  at  diagnosis  and  decision  that  no  drugs  are  necessary 
may  be  as  dangerous  to  the  patient  as  an  unwise  prescription. 

As  was  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  Commonwealth  v. 
Porn,  195  Mass.  443,  446,  where  a  midwife  was  charged  with 
violating  this  statute,  it  would  "ordinarily  be  a  question  of 
fact"  whether  the  ministrations  are  those  "of  a  physician  or 
whether  of  an  attendant  nurse  and  helper." 

Doubtless  many  assistants  are  assigned  and  perform  duties 
which  do  not  require  or  cause  them  to  practice  medicine, 
while  others  may  be  found  who  are  so  practicing.  The  de- 
cision as  to  each  case  must  be  arrived  at  with  a  knowledge  of 
all  the  facts  and  a  wise  judgment  as  to  whether  a  person  is 
practicing  or  attempting  to  practice  medicine. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Civil  Service  —  Grade  of  Stenographers  and  Clerks  —  Promotions 
—  Increase  of  Salaries. 

Under  St.  1914,  c.  605,  entitled  "An  Act  to  establish  grades  for  the  salaries 
of  clerks  and  stenographers  employed  in  the  departments  of  the  Com- 
monwealth," a  head  of  a  department  may  promote  a  clerk  or  a  sten- 
ographer for  positive  merit  from  a  lower  grade  to  a  higher  grade  with- 
out limitation. 

When  a  clerk  or  a  stenographer  is  assigned  to  a  grade  by  promotion  or  origi- 
nal appointment,  by  section  3  of  this  statute  he  or  she  may  be  put, 
by  the  head  of  the  department,  in  exceptional  cases,  at  the  second  or 
third  years  of  the  grade;  but  within  the  grades  estabhshed  by  this 
statute  the  salary  of  a  clerk  or  a  stenographer  cannot  be  increased  by 
more  than  an  annual  increment  of  $50  without  the  approval  of  the 
Governor  and  Council,  as  provided  in  section  5. 

May  14,  1915. 

Hon.  Alonzo  B.  Cook,  Auditor  of  the  Commonwealth. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  May  13, 
requesting  my  opinion  in  regard  to  certain  questions  which 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  69 

have  arisen  as  to  when  and  by  what  processes  heads  of  de- 
partments may  in  special  cases  increase  the  salaries  of  clerks 
and  stenographers  by  larger  yearly  increments  than  $50. 

Chapter  605  of  the  Acts  of  1914  established  grades  for 
salaries  of  clerks  and  stenographers  employed  in  the  depart- 
ments of  the  Commonwealth,  and  provided  that  thereafter 
appointments  and  increases  in  salary  should  be  made  only  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  that  act.  Section  9  pro- 
vided that  heads  of  departments  should,  before  Dec.  1,  1914, 
grade  stenographers  and  clerks  in  their  employ  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  that  act. 

In  my  opinion  this  last-mentioned  section  contemplated 
that  before  the  date  mentioned  all  clerks  and  stenographers 
should  be  placed  by  heads  of  departments  in  one  of  the  three 
grades  established  by  the  act,  and  with  such  position  within 
the  grade  as  he  might  determine.  If  no  such  grades  were  ex- 
pressly established,  in  my  opinion  these  employees  at  that 
date  automatically  went  into  the  grades  which  the  salaries 
then  being  paid  to  them  indicated.  At  that  time  the  status 
of  the  clerks  and  stenographers  then  in  the  employ  of  the 
departments  was  definitely  settled.  Thereafter  they  are  to  be 
treated  as  if  they  had  worked  their  way  to  those  positions 
under  the  act,  and  their  salaries  are  not  to  be  increased  within 
the  grade  except  as  provided  in  sections  1,  2  and  5  of  chap- 
ter 605. 

Section  6  by  plain  implication  authorizes  promotions  from 
a  lower  grade  to  a  higher  one  for  positive  merit  and  upon  the 
filing  of  a  certificate  of  the  nature  described  in  the  section. 
There  is  no  limitation  upon  this  right  of  promotion  from  one 
grade  to  another,  and  I  therefore  see  no  reason  why  a  head 
of  a  department  may  not  make  such  a  promotion  from  any 
step  in  the  lower  grade  to  the  higher  grade.  When  such  a 
promotion  has  been  made  section  3  then,  in  my  opinion,  be- 
comes effective,  and  the  stenographer  or  clerk,  on  being  as- 
signed to  the  higher  grade  to  which  he  or  she  is  promoted, 
may  be  "put,"  as  a  matter  of  course,  at  the  first  step  in  the 
grade,  or,  in  exceptional  cases,  at  the  second  or  third  steps. 

In  my  opinion  section  3,  since  Dec.  1,  1914,  applies  only 
to  new  appointments  and  to  promotions  from  one  grade  to  a 
higher  one.  It  authorizes  a  head  of  a  department,  when  a 
clerk  or  stenographer  is  first  assigned  either  by  appointment 
or  promotion  to  a  particular  grade,  to  place  him  or  her,  in 
special  cases,   at   the  second  or  third  step   within  the   grade 


70  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

instead  of  at  the  first  step.  It  does  not,  in  my  opinion,  au- 
thorize increases  of  salaries  within  the  grade  in  a  manner  not 
provided  in  section  5. 

It  follows  from  the  foregoing  conclusions  that  except  by  a 
promotion  to  a  higher  grade  the  salary  of  a  clerk  or  stenog- 
rapher cannot  be  increased  by  more  than  an  annual  incre- 
ment of  S50  without  the  approval  of  the  Governor  and  Coun- 
cil as  provided  in  section  5. 

Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Savings  Banks  —  Form  of  Deposits  —  Accou7its  Payable  07ily  to 
Persons  Other  than  Depositor. 

A  savings  bank  is  not  authorized  to  receive  deposits  subject  to  the  control 
and  withdrawal  only  of  a  person  other  than  the  depositor. 

June  11,  1915. 
Hon.  Augustus  L.  Thorndike,  Bank  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  The  question  raised  by  your  letter  of  April  27, 
relative  to  deposits  in  savings  banks,  concisely  stated  is  this: 
"Is  it  permissible  for  A,  B,  C  and  D  to  make  deposits  in  a 
savings  bank  subject  to  the  control  and  withdrawal  only  by 
E,  if  the  aggregate  deposits  exceed  $2,000?" 

The  statute  provides  for  deposits  in  savings  banks  by  in- 
dividuals, by  persons  jointly,  and  by  administrators,  executors 
and  trustees.  In  case  of  the  death  of  the  trustee  the  trust 
fund  may  be  paid  over  to  th^  person  for  whom  the  deposit 
was  made,  and  such  payment  relieves  the  bank  from  liability, 
even  though  as  between  the  parties  the  trustee  is  the  true 
owner.  The  statute  makes  no  provision  for  the  deposit  of 
funds  in  the  name  of  A  with  the  right  of  withdrawal  by  B. 
Even  though  the  result  might  be  the  same  if  a  depositor  as- 
signs his  deposit  to  another,  this  fact  does  not  enlarge  the 
statutory  authority. 

The  legislature  has  seen  fit  to  place  a  limit  on  deposits  in 
savings  banks.  One  of  the  purposes  of  such  a  limitation  is 
obviously  for  the  protection  of  institutions  designed  to  be  for 
the  use  and  benefit  of  depositors  of  comparatively  small 
amounts.  The  law  has  made  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  for 
any  person  to  have  the  right  of  withdrawal  of  large  sums  of 
money,  which  in  times  of  stress  might  cripple  or  impair  a 
bank.     Even   though  a  person  may  make  deposits  as  admin- 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  71 

istrator,  executor  and  trustee  in  any  number  of  cases,  and 
thus  withdraw  such  deposits  on  a  given  date,  and  even  though 
this  might  perhaps  be  accomplished  by  a  deposit  b}^  X  in  the 
names  of  a  number  of  other  persons,  such  persons  immedi- 
ately thereafter  assigning  their  deposits  to  X,  the  risk  in- 
volved by  the  owner  of  such  deposits  has  evidently  been 
considered  such  a  restraining  influence  as  to  make  further 
legislation  unnecessary.  The  method  suggested  in  your 
letter,  however,  would  remove  even  the  element  of  lisk,  and 
would  result  in  making  the  law  of  limitation  of  deposits  of  no 
practical  effect. 

I  am  therefore  obliged  to  advise  you  that  such  deposits  are 
not  authorized  or  contemplated  by  the  statute. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Aiforney-General. 


Extradition  —  Governor  —  Power   to    revoke   Executive    Warrant. 

It  is  within  the  power  of  Governor  to  revoke  an  executive  warrant  issued 
in  the  matter  of  interstate  rendition  at  any  time  before  fugitive  has 
actually  been  removed  from  the  limits  of  the  Commonwealth. 

June  16,  191.5. 
His  Excellency  David  I.  Walsh,  Governor  of  the  Commonwealth. 

Sir:  —  Answering  your  request  of  June  1,  1915,  requesting 
that  I  advise  you  "  what  the  power  of  the  executive  might  be  re- 
garding the  recall  of  an  executive  warrant  on  which  a  fugitive 
from  justice  has  been  arrested,"  I  have  the  honor  to  advise 
you   as   follows:  — 

In  my  opinion  you  have  the  right  to  revoke  an  executive 
warrant  issued  in  a  matter  of  interstate  rendition  at  any  time 
before  the  actual  removal  of  the  fugitive  from  the  limits  of 
the  Commonwealth,  and  this  is  true  even  after  the  surrender 
of  the  fugitive  to  the  agent  of  the  demanding  State.  Work  v, 
Corrington,  34  Ohio  State,  64. 

The  powder  of  revocation,  however,  so  far  as  the  question  of 
legal  or  moral  duty  is  concerned,  is  commensurate  with  the 
power  to  issue  the  warrant,  and  its  exercise  should  be  deter- 
mined upon  the  same  considerations  as  would  justify  the  ex- 
ercise or  the  refusal  to  exercise  the  power  to  issue.  Ordi- 
narily a  court  which  has  the  power  to  issue  process  inherently 
possesses  the  power  to  quash  or  revoke  such  process. 

While  the  statutes  of  the  United  States  are  mandatory  in 


72  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

form  in  requiring  the  executive  authority  of  the  asylum  State 
to  deliver  the  fugitive  to  the  agent  of  the  demanding  State, 
upon  the  presentation  of  papers  properly  certified  as  au- 
thentic, and  in  other  respects  complying  with  the  conditions 
prescribed  by  Congress,  there  is  no  power  in  any  Federal  court 
which  can  compel  the  issuance  of  such  a  warrant,  and,  from 
the  same  reasoning,  no  power  exists  to  restrain  the  executive 
authority  from  revoking  a  warrant  once  issued. 

United  States  Compiled  Statutes,  1913,  §  10126,  formerly 
Rev.  Sts.,  §  5278,  which  provides  for  the  enforcement  of 
Article  IV.,  section  II.  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  creating  the  right  of  interstate  rendition,  is  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

Whenever  the  executive  authority  of  any  State  or  territory  demands 
any  person  as  a  fugitive  from  justice,  of  the  executive  authority  of  any 
State  or  territory"  to  which  such  person  has  fled,  and  produces  a  copj^ 
of  an  indictment  found  or  an  affidavit  made  before  a  magistrate  of  an}- 
State  or  territory,  charging  the  person  demanded  with  having  com- 
mitted treason,  felony  or  other  crime,  certified  as  authentic  by  the 
Governor  or  Chief  Magistrate  of  the  State  or  territory  from  which  the 
person  so  charged  has  fled,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  executive  author- 
ity of  the  State  or  territorj^  to  which  such  person  has  fled  to  cause  him 
to  be  arrested  and  secured,  and  to  cause  notice  of  the  arrest  to  be  given 
to  the  executive  authority  making  such  demand,  or  to  the  agent  of 
such  authority  appointed  to  receive  the  fugitive,  and  to  cause  the 
fugitive  to  be  delivered  to  such  agent  when  he  shall  appear.  If  no 
such  agent  appears  within  six  months  of  the  time  of  the  arrest,  the 
prisoner  may  be  discharged.  All  costs  or  expenses  incurred  in  the  ap- 
prehending, securing  and  transmitting  such  fugitive  to  the  State  or 
territory  making  such  demand,  shall  be  paid  by  such  State  or  ter- 
ritory. 

It  has  been  established  by  numerous  judicial  decisions, 
and  the  executive  authority  of  this  Commonwealth  has  at 
different  times  been  advised  by  the  Attorney-General,  that 
when  a  case  is  presented  which  is  clearly  one  contemplated 
by  the  Federal  Constitution  the  Governor  has  no  discretion, 
but  it  is  his  imperative  duty  to  issue  the  warrant.  11.  Op. 
Atty.-Gen.,  368;  III.  Op.  Atty.-Gen.,  432;  Kentucky  v. 
Dennison,  24  Howard,  66. 

But  to  adopt  the  language  of  the  court  in  Nishett  v.  Toole, 
69  Minn.,  104,  "  that  duty,  however,  is  one  of  imperfect 
obligation,  for  if  a  Governor  refuses  to  perform  it  we  know 
of  no  power,  State  or  Federal,  to  compel  him  to  do  so." 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  73 

In  discussing  this  act  in  Kentucky  v.  Dennison,  supra,  the 
court  says :  — 

The  words  "it  shall  be  the  duty,"  in  ordinary  legislation,  imply  the 
assertion  of  the  power  to  command  and  to  coerce  obedience.  But, 
looking  to  the  subject-matter  of  this  law  and  the  relations  which  the 
United  States  and  the  several  States  bear  to  each  other,  the  court  is 
of  the  opinion  the  words  "it  shall  be  the  duty  "  were  not  used  as  man- 
datory and  compulsory,  but  as  declaratory  of  the  moral  duty  which 
this  compact  (the  Constitution)  created  when  Congress  had  provided 
the  mode  ot  carrying  it  into  execution.  The  act  does  not  provide  any 
methods  to  compel  the  execution  of  this  duty  nor  inflict  any  punish- 
ment for  neglect  or  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Executive  of  the  State; 
nor  is  there  any  clause  or  provision  in  the  Constitution  which  arms  the 
government  of  the  United  States  with  such  power. 

The  first  and  only  judicial  consideration  in  this  Common- 
wealth of  the  power  of  the  Executive  to  revoke  his  warrant 
is  in  the  case  of  W^yeth  v.  Richardson,  10  Gray,  240,  decided 
in  1837.  In  this  case  the  petitioner  was  arrested  under  a 
warrant  issued  against  him  by  the  Governor  of  Massachusetts 
on  the  requisition  of  the  Governor  of  Iowa.  After  the  issuing 
of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  the  Governor  revoked  his  war- 
rant and  the  prisoner  demanded  his  discharge.  The  respond- 
ent contended  the  Governor  had  no  power  to  revoke  such  a 
warrant  once  issued,  but  Bigelow,  J.,  ruled  otherwise,  and 
discharged  the  prisoner.  On  exceptions  to  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Court  the  question  of  the  power  to  revoke  an  execu- 
tive warrant  was  not  considered,  the  case  being  decided  upon 
the  ground  that  exceptions  do  not  lie  in  habeas  corpus  pro- 
ceedings. Judge  Bigelow's  action,  however,  in  this  case  has 
been  cited  as  authority  for  the  existence  of  the  power  of 
revocation.     Nishett  v.  Toole,  69  Minn.  104. 

In  further  discussing  this  power  in  the  case  last  cited  the 
court  goes  on  to  say:  — 

We  are  not  prepared  to  assent  to  the  proposition  that  in  determin- 
ing whether  a  case  contemplated  by  the  Constitution  is  presented,  the 
Governor  on  whom  the  demand  is  made  is  vested  with  no  discretion, 
even  where  the  papers  upon  their  lace  are  sufficient  and  in  due  form. 
We  all  know,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  governors  do  exercise  a  discre- 
tion in  such  cases,  and  if  they  are  satisfied  that  the  demand  is  made 
for  some  ulterior  and  improper  purpose,  as,  for  example,  the  collection 
of  a  private  debt,  they  refuse  to  issue  a  warrant.  If  a  Governor  may 
exercise  such  a  discretion  in  regard  to  issuing  such  a  warrant,  we  do 


74  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

not  see  why  he  may  not  exercise  the  same  discretion  in  regard  to  re- 
voking it,  and  if  he  does  revoke  it  his  reasons  for  so  doing  can  no  more 
be  inquired  into  than  his  reasons  for  retusing  to  issue  it  in  the  first 
instance.  The  existence  of  the  power  to  revoke  would  seem  necessary 
in  order  to  prevent  great  abuses  and  wrongs.  A  warrant  is,  of  neces- 
sity, almost  always  issued  ex  parte,  and  the  Governor  is  Uable  to  be 
imposed  upon  by  those  demanding  it,  or,  for  some  other  cause,  to  issue 
it  improvidently.  It  would  seem  that  in  such  cases  the  same  officer 
who  had  the  power  to  issue  the  warrant  should  have  the  power  to 
remedj^  the  -wi'ong  by  revoking  it. 

Within  a  very  few  days  the  Acting  Governor  of  New  Jersey 
has  refused  the  application  of  the  Acting  Governor  of  this 
Commonwealth  for  one  Merrill,  for  reasons,  it  is  true,  which 
this  department  cannot  acknowledge  to  be  sound;  but, 
nevertheless,  in  the  assumption  of  a  discretion,  with  the 
exercise  of  which  no  power  in  this  Commonwealth  can  inter- 
fere. 

In  the  case  of  In  re  James  Carroll,  11  Chic.  Leg.  News,  14, 
arising  out  of  a  revocation  by  the  Governor  of  Illinois  of  his 
executive  warrant,  in  discussing  the  contention  that  the  action 
of  the  Governor  in  issuing  such  warrant  was  merely  miris- 
terial,  and  the  warrant  once  issued  cannot  be  recalled,  the 
court  says:  — 

In  one  sense  it  is  ministerial,  —  the  issuing  of  a  warrant  under  the 
express  requirements  of  a  statute  of  the  United  States  and  of  a  State; 
yet  that  warrant  can  only  be  issued,  as  we  have  seen,  upon  the  exami- 
nation of  papers  required  to  be  submitted  to  him,  and  upon  the  exer- 
cise of  his  judgment  as  to  its  sufficiency  and  legalit\^  He  must  deter- 
mine the  facts  and  he  must  exercise  discretion  and  judgment.  If  he 
errs,  and,  after  issuing  the  warrant  finds  it  out,  then  it  would  seem  to 
be  consonant  with  right  and  justice  that  he  retrace  his  steps  by  recall- 
ing it.  A  case  might  arise  in  which  a  Governor  might  be  grossly  im- 
posed upon,  as  by  the  presentation  of  forged  documents  or  requisitions 
in  due  legal  form;  or  might  have  been  presented  in  bad  faith,  with  no 
object  or  intention  of  having  a  man  tried  upon  the  charge  contamed 
in  an  indictment  or  warrant,  but  with  an  ulterior  design,  under  the 
form  of  extradition  papers  against  a  man  innocent  of  the  specific 
charges,  but  wanted  for  other  purposes.  In  such  cases  the  Governor 
would  not  be  obhged  to  issue  his  warrant,  and  would  be  justified  in  re- 
fusing, or  if  he  had  issued  it,  to  annul  and  revoke  it. 

The  warrant  is  a  process  ministerial  and  quasi  judicial,  and  I  see 
no  reason  why  the  Executive  who  issues  it  may  not  in  his  discretion 
and  the  exercise  of  a  sound  judgment,  on  a  review  of  the  facts,  annul 
and  revoke  it  if  done  in  time  to  be  effectual. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No. 

12  77 

The   only   case   which   has   come   to  my  'dtte^' 

the  power  to  revoke  such  a  warrant  has  been  den.    . 

V.  Lovelan,  19  Barbour  (N.  Y.),  HI-     This  case  wi*        : 

for  libel   founded   upon   an   allegation   that   an   affic 

sented  to  the  Governor  of  New  York,  on  an  applies 

O-f  T-p       Q 

the  revocation  of  an  executive  warrant  in  extradition  P  *    „    , 
contained    libelous    matter.      The    defendant    contended 
matter  was  privileged,  but  the  court  held  otherwise,   on 
ground  that  in  order  to  be  privileged  the  tribunal  to  whiv,.' 
the  affidavit  was  presented  must  have  been  vested  with  au 
thority    to    render   judgment    in    the    proceeding,    whereas    in " 
the  case   at  bar   "the   Governor  had  no   power  whatever  to 
entertain  an  application  to  recall,  revoke  or  modify  the  war- 
rant which  he  had  issued  for  the  apprehension  of  True." 

While  papers  for  interstate  rendition  uniformly  contain 
representations  to  the  effect  that  "the  demand  for  the  fugi- 
tive is  made  in  good  faith,  with  the  sole  intent  to  prosecute 
and  punish  him  for  said  crime  and  not  to  secure  his  return  .  .  . 
to  afford  opportunity  to  serve  him  with  civil  process,  nor  for 
the  purpose  of  collecting  a  debt,  nor  for  any  private  purpose 
whatsoever;  and  that  if  the  requisition  applied  for  be  granted, 
a  criminal  proceeding  shall  not  be  used  for  any  of  said  ob- 
jects," etc.,  these  assertions  have  the  force  of  prima  facie 
evidence  only.  These  matters  and  others  affecting  the  good 
faith  of  the  prosecution  are  properly  open  to  review  by  the 
Governor  of  the  asylum  State  in  determining  whether  or  not  he 
will  honor  the  demand. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  the  legal  right  of  revocation  exists, 
the  weight  of  authority  appears  to  be  in  favor  of  the  right  to 
revoke  upon  a  consideration  of  the  same  matters  which 
would  justify  a  refusal  to  issue  the  warrant  in  the  first  ir- 
stance. 

From  an  examination  of  the  authorities  it  appears  that  the 
power  not  only  to  exercise  a  discretion  in  the  issuance  of  such 
process  in  the  first  instance,  but  to  revoke  the  warrants  once 
issued,  has  not  infrequently  been  exercised. 
■  Very  respectfully, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


76  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Hours    of    Labor  —  Employees  for    or    upon    Public    Works  — 

Definition. 

St.  1911,  c.  494,  §  1,  establishing  eight  hours  as  a  day's  work  for  "all 
laborers,  workmen  and  mechanics  now  or  hereafter  employed  .  .  , 
by  any  contractor  or  subcontractor  for  or  upon  any  pubhc  works" 
apphes  to  all  laborers,  workmen  and  mechanics  employed  by  any 
person  contracting,  directly  or  by  subcontract,  for  the  performance  of 
any  portion  of  a  pubhc  work,  whether  the  work  is  performed  upon  the 
pubhc  works  or  at  any  other  place  within  the  Commonwealth,  but  it 
does  not  apply  to  employees  of  persons  merely  selhng  materials  and 
suppHes  to  such  contractors. 

June  21,  1915. 

To  the  State  Board  of  Labor  and  Industries,  1  Beacon  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  leave  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  a 
letter  addressed  to  me  by  Edward  F.  Wallace,  counsel  for  your 
Board,  requesting  my  opinion  on  the  interpretation  of  chapter 
494  of  the  Acts  of  1911,  as  "to  what  class  of  employees  do 
the  words  'for  or  upon  any  public  works'  apply." 

Section  1  of  said  chapter  494  appears  to  apply  not  only  to 
laborers,  workmen  and  mechanics  employed  by  the  Common- 
wealth, but  also  to  laborers,  workmen  and  mechanics  em- 
ployed by  contractors  or  subcontractors  for  or  upon  public 
works.  In  my  opinion  a  contractor  or  subcontractor  for 
public  works  is  distinguished  from  a  contractor  or  subcon- 
tractor upon  public  works  in  that  a  contractor  or  subcon- 
tractor for  public  works  is  one  who  is  performing  some  portion 
of  the  work  required  by  the  contract  for  such  public  works 
where  such  portion  of  the  work  is  not  performed  upon  the 
public  works  themselves  or  the  premises  upon  which  the  pub- 
lic works  are  being  constructed,  while  a  contractor  or  sub- 
contractor upon  public  works  is  one  who  is  performing  his 
portion  of  the  contract  upon  the  public  works  themselves  or 
on  the  premises  or  so  near  thereto  that  in  contemplation  of 
law  the  work  can  be  said  to  be  performed  upon  the  public 
works. 

The  result  is  that  one  who  takes  a  contract  for  the  per- 
formance of  a  portion  of  the  work  required  in  the  construction 
of  public  works  is  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  act,  whether 
the  work  performed  by  him  under  the  contract  is  upon  the 
public  works  themselves  or  at  any  other  place  within  the 
Commonwealth. 

In  my  opinion  the  test  will  always  be  whether  the  de- 
fendant is  in  fact  a  subcontractor  of  a  portion  of  the  contract, 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  —  No.  12.  77 

agreeing  with  the  contractor  to  perform  a  certain  specified 
part  of  the  contract,  or  is  merely  a  seller  of  materials  and 
supplies  to  the  contractor.  If  he  is  in  fact  such  a  subcon- 
tractor, then  he  comes  within  the  provisions  of  the  act.  If  a 
mere  seller  of  materials  and  supplies,  then  the  provisions  of  the 
act  do  not  apply. 

In  my  judgment  the  act  applies  only  to  such  laborers, 
workmen  and  mechanics  as  are  employed  for  or  upon  public 
works,  so  that  to  constitute  a  violation  of  the  act  it  must 
appear  that  the  laborer,  workman  or  mechanic  has  in  fact 
worked  more  than  eight  hours  a  day  for  his  employer  upon 
work  done  in  the  performance  of  the  contiact. 

I  have  given  careful  consideration  to  the  views  expressed 
in  briefs  filed  with  me  by  counsel  for  Coleman  Brothers,  who, 
I  understand,  are  particularly  interested  in  the  construction 
of  this  statute,  and  by  counsel  for  the  Massachusetts  State 
Branch  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  and  for  the 
General  Contractors'  Association.  It  is  contended  by  all  of 
the  counsel  that  the  proper  construction  of  the  provisions  of 
the  act  limits  their  application  to  laborers,  workmen  and 
mechanics  who  are  employed  upon  the  public  works  them- 
selves, or  at  least  at  the  site  of  the  public  works.  I  am  unable 
to  agree  with  this  construction.  Counsel  base  their  conten- 
tion upon  the  following  decisions  in  the  State  of  New  York 
with  relation  to  the  construction  of  a  similar  statute  in  New 
York.  Downey  v.  Bender,  57  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  310,  Bohnen 
V.  Metz,  126  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  807,  affirmed  193  N.  Y.  676; 
Ewen  V.  Thompson  Starrett  Co.,  208  N.  Y.  245. 

The  phraseology  of  that  part  of  the  New  York  statute 
which  relates  to  the  hours  of  labor  that  laborers,  workmen 
and  mechanics  may  be  employed  is  somewhat  different  from 
the  phraseology  of  the  Massachusetts  statute  relating  to  such 
hours  of  labor,  and  that  part  of  the  New  York  statute  must 
be  read  in  connection  with  other  provisions  of  the  act,  par- 
ticularly those  contained  in  the  same  section.  In  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  intention  of  the  New  York  Legislature  the 
courts  of  New  York  have  given  consideration  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  entire  act,  and  in  this  consideration  have  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Legislature 
of  New  York  to  restrict  the  application  of  the  statute  to 
laborers,  workmen  and  mechanics  employed  "on,  about  or 
upon  public  work." 

Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  a  dissenting  opinion 


78  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S    REPORT.  [Jan. 

in  Ewen  v.  Thorny  son-Star  rett  Co.  two  of  the  justices  of  the 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  while  concurring  in  the  result  of 
the  decision,  held  that  a  construction  of  the  New  York  stat- 
ute which  limited  its  application  to  laborers,  workmen  and 
mechanics  employed  "on,  about  or  upon  such  public  work" 
nullified  the  provisions  of  the  statute  to  a  great  extent,  and 
that  such  a  construction  was  unnecessary  to  the  determination 
of  the  case. 

It  follows,  therefore,  in  my  opinion,  that  in  the  case  you 
have  cited,  if  the  workmen  are  in  fact  employed  for  more 
than  eight  hours  a  day  upon  work  performed  in  the  further- 
ance of  a  contract  with  the  Commonwealth,  the  contractor 
is  subject  to  the  penalties  prescribed  in  the  statute. 
Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Taxation  —  Bond   of    Tax    Collector  —  Right    to    discharge    and 
accept  New  Bond. 

There  is  no  provision  of  law  authorizing  the  surrender  and  cancellation  of 
a  bond  given  by  a  tax  collector  under  the  provisions  of  R.  L.,  c.  25, 
§  77,  before  its  condition  is  fully  performed,  and  the  acceptance  of  a 
new  bond  for  a  lesser  amount  in  place  thereof. 

June  22,  1915. 

Hon.  William  D.  T.  Trefry,  Tax  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  inquiry  whether, 
in  my  opinion,  the  bond  required  to  be  given  by  the  collector 
of  taxes  of  a  town  may  be  legally  surrendered  and  cancelled 
before  its  condition  is  fully  performed  and  a  new  bond  for  a 
lesser  amount  accepted  in  place  thereof;  if  so,  you  ask  by 
whom  this  may  be  done. 

R.  L.,  c.  25,  §  77,  provides:  — 

The  collector  of  taxes  shall  give  bond  to  the  town  for  the  faithful 
performance  of  his  duties,  in  a  sum  and  ^dth  sureties  approved  by 
the  selectmen. 

The  only  discretion  given  by  this  section  to  the  selectmen 
concerns  the  approval  of  the  penal  sum  of  the  bond  and  the 
sureties  who  execute  it.  If  a  satisfactory  bond  is  not  given 
by  the  collector  within  ten  days  after  his  election  they  may  de- 
clare the  office  vacant  and  appoint  another  in  his  place.  St. 
1913,  c.  835,  §  427.  It  plainly  is  their  duty  to  do  so  if  a  satis- 
factory bond  is  not  promptly  given. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  79 

When  such  a  bond  has  been  given  and  approved  it  becomes 
a  contract  between  the  collector  and  his  sureties,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  town  upon  the  other.  It  cannot  be  discharged 
by  the  collector  except  by  the  faithful  performance  of  the 
duties  imposed  upon  him  by  the  statutes,  namely,  by  collect- 
ing and  paying  over  to  the  treasurer  of  the  town  the  full 
amount  committed  to  him  by  the  warrant,  or  by  discharging 
himself  from  liability  for  the  taxes  thus  committed  to  him 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  statutes.  Even  though  not 
re-elected  it  is  his  duty  to  complete  the  collection  of  the  taxes 
committed  to  him  unless  his  tax  list  is  transferred  to  his 
successor  (St.  1909,  c.  490,  Part  I.,  §  13). 

I  find  no  provision  in  the  statutes  authorizing  the  select- 
men of  the  town  to  discharge  a  tax  collector  or  the  sureties 
upon  his  bond  from  their  obligation  to  the  town  under  the 
bond  and  to  accept  a  new  bond  for  a  lesser  amount  in  sub- 
stitution therefor.  In  my  opinion  they  have  no  authority  to 
do  so.  I  find  no  provision  of  law  giving  such  authority  to  the 
town  itself,  acting  through  a  legally  called  town  meeting.  I 
have  very  grave  doubt  if  it  exists  even  there  without  express 
legislative  action. 

It  is  plain  that  after  a  substantial  part  of  the  taxes  assessed 
for  any  particular  year  has  been  collected  and  paid  over  to 
the  treasurer  of  the  town,  the  extent  of  the  liability  of  the 
sureties  is  very  much  reduced.  Their  outstanding  liability 
upon  the  bond  for  that  year  is  measured  by  the  amount  of 
taxes  then  remaining  uncollected  or  unaccounted  for.  \Yith 
this  reduction  in  the  risk  of  liability  a  surety  company  which 
has  executed  such  a  bond  should  in  fairness  reduce  the  amount 
of  future  premiums  to  be  paid  to  it  for  the  execution  of  the 
bond.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  burden  of  accumulating 
premiums  upon  these  bonds  should  be  reduced  in  this  manner, 
and  not  by  an  attempt  to  discharge  the  obligation  required 
by  the  statute  or  to  substitute  a  lesser  obligation  therefor. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General . 


80  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Minimum   Wage  Commission  —  Authority  to  establish  a   Wage 
Board  —  Effect  of  Change  in  Statutory  Method  of  Selection. 

A  wage  board  not  completely  established  by  the  Minimum  Wage  Commis- 
sion until  after  the  enactment  of  St.  1914,  c.  368,  providing  a  new 
method  for  the  selection  of  representatives  on  such  board,  can  be 
legally  established  only  by  the  selection  of  all  its  representatives  as 
provided  in  that  statute. 

June  30,  1915. 

Miss  Amy  Hew^es,  Secretary,  Minimum  Wage  Commission. 

Dear  Madam:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  June 
14  inquiring  in  substance  whether,  in  my  opinion,  the  w^age 
board  established  by  your  commission  to  determine  the 
minimum  wages  to  be  paid  to  candy  makers  was  established 
in  accordance  with  law. 

Your  authority  to  establish  this  board  is  granted  to  you  by 
section  4  of  chapter  706  of  the  Acts  of  1912,  as  amended  by 
chapter  368  of  the  Acts  of  1914.  Until  this  amendment, 
which  became  effective  on  April  17,  1914,  your  commission 
was  authorized  to  appoint  not  less  than  six  representatives,  of 
its  own  selection,  on  behalf  of  employers,  and  an  equal  num- 
ber of  persons  to  represent  the  employees,  and  in  addition 
one  or  more  disinterested  persons,  not  to  exceed  one-half  of  the 
number  of  representatives  of  either  of  the  other  parties,  to 
represent  the  public.  As  I  understand  it,  your  commission 
voted  on  Dec.  9,  1913,  to  establish  a  w^age  board  to  deter- 
mine the  minimum  wages  to  be  paid  candy  makeis;  that  six 
representatives  of  employers  were  appointed  by  the  commis- 
sion on  April  14,  1914;  that  the  chairman,  a  disinterested  per- 
son, was  appointed  on  April  7;  that  two  other  members  to 
represent  the  public  w^ere  appointed  on  April  17;  that  six 
members  representing  employees  were  appointed  on  May  9 
and  May  19,  respectively;  and  that  the  representatives  of 
both  employers  and  employees  were  appointed  by  your  com- 
mission   without    receiving    nominations    from    either    party. 

On  April  17,  1914,  chapter  368  of  the  acts  of  that  year  be- 
came effective.  By  section  1  of  that  chapter,  section  4  of 
chapter  706  of  the  x\cts  of  1912  w^as  so  amended  as  to  require 
the  representatives  of  employers  and  employees  to  be  selected 
by  your  commission  from  nominations  made  to  it  by  the 
respective  parties,  provided  those  nominations  w^ere  made 
wdthin  ten  days  after  the  request  of  your  commission.  When 
this  statute  became  effective  your  commission  had  not  finally 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCOIEXT  — No.  12.  81 

established  the  wage  board  in  question.  Merely  the  represent- 
atives of  the  employers  and  one  of  the  representatives  of  the 
public  were  appointed  before  that  date.  After  that  date  the 
only  law  in  effect  authorizing  you  to  establish  a  wage  board 
is  that  contained  in  section  4  of  chapter  706  of  the  Acts  of 
1912,  as  amended  by  section  1  of  chapter  368  of  the  Acts  of  1914. 
In  my  opinion  a  wage  board  cannot  be  regarded  as  established 
until  all  its  members  have  been  finally  determined  and  ap- 
pointed by  your  commission.  In  the  case  under  consideration 
this  was  not  until  May  19,  1914,  when  the  last  appointments 
were  made.  At  that  time  your  only  authority  to  establish 
a  wage  board  was  to  be  found  in  the  amended  statute.  By 
that  statute  you  are  authorized  to  make  appointments  only 
after  receiving  nominations  from  both  employers  and  em- 
ployees, unless  the  parties  fail  to  make  such  nominations 
within  ten  days  after  notice  from  your  commission.  As  the 
wage  board  in  question  had  not  been  finally  established 
before  April  17,  1914,  in  my  opinion  the  only  course  open  to 
your  commission  on  that  date  was  to  then  begin  anew,  and 
to  establish  the  board,  as  to  its  representatives  from  all 
parties,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  amendment 
which  became  effective  on  that  date.  It  follows  that  in  my 
opinion  the  board  to  which  you  refer  was  not  established  in 
accordance  w^ith  law. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Directors   of   Port   of   Boston — JJ^ecks  —  Authority    to    remove. 

The  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston,  within  the  territory  entrusted  to 
their  charge,  have  the  powers  granted  to  the  Board  of  Harbor  and 
Land  Commissioners  by  R.  L.,  c.  97,  §§  15-23,  inclusive,  concerning 
the  removal  of  wrecks,  and  are  authorized  to  expend  such  sums  as 
are  reasonably  necessary  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  that  statute. 

July  16,  1915. 
Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston,  J^O  Central  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to  the 
authority  of  your  Board  with  reference  to  the  removal  of 
wrecks  and  obstructions  in  Boston  Harbor. 

R.  L.,  c.  97,  §§  15-23,  inclusive,  deals  with  this  matter, 
granting  authority  throughout  the  Commonwealth  to  the 
Board  of  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners. 


82  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Section  15  provides:  — 

If  a  wrecked,  sunken  or  abandoned  vessel,  or  any  unlaurful  or  un- 
authorized structure  or  thing,  is  deposited  in  the  tide  waters  of  this 
commonwealth,  or  is  suffered  to  remain  therein,  and  in  the  judgment 
of  the  board  of  harbor  and  land  commissioners  it  is,  or  is  hable  to 
cause  or  become,  an  obstruction  to  the  safe  and  convenient  navigation 
or  other  lawful  use  of  such  waters,  said  board  shall  remove  it  or  cause 
it  to  be  removed. 

Section  16  provides  for  notice  by  the  Board  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  the  owner  to  remove  the  vessel  or  obstruction,  speci- 
fying some  definite  date  reasonably  far  a(5vanced  in  the  future 
to  permit  of  compliance  with  the  notice.  Section  17  pro- 
vides that  if  the  notice  is  not  complied  with  the  Board  shall 
cause  or  complete  the  removal,  and  the  expenses  thereof, 
when  certified  by  the  Board  and  approved  bj^  the  Governor 
and  Council,  shall  be  paid  by  the  Commonwealth.  Section 
18  provides  for  liability  over  to  the  Commonwealth  on  the 
part  of  the  owner  for  the  expense  so  incurred.  Section  19 
provides  for  the  sale  of  materials  recovered  in  the  course  of 
removal,  if  the  expense  of  the  lemoval  is  not  paid  by  the 
owners  within  ten  days. 

It  would  be  well  for  your  Board  to  read  the  exact  provisions 
of  this  chapter  so  as  to  have  them  freshly  in  mind  w^hen  tak- 
ing any  action. 

St.  1911,  c.  748,  §  4,  provides:  — 

All  the  rights,  powers  and  duties  now  pertaining  to  the  board  of 
harbor  and  land  commissioners  in  respect  to  such  lands,  rights  in 
lands,  flats,  shores,  waters  and  rights  belonging  to  the  commonwealth 
in  tidewaters  and  land  under  water  as  constitute  that  part  of  Boston 
harbor  Mng  v/esterly  and  inside  of  a  line  drawn  between  Point  AUerton 
on  the  south  and  the  southerly  end  of  Point  Shirley  on  the  north,  or  as 
adjoin  the  same  or  are  connected  therewith,  and  any  other  rights  and 
powers  heretofore  vested  by  the  laws  of  the  commonwealth  in  the 
board  of  harbor  and  land  commissioners  in  respect  to  any  part  of  said 
area,  are  hereby  transferred  to  and  hereafter  shall  be  vested  in  and 
exercised  by  said  directors.  .  .  . 

Accordingly,  it  would  seem  to  be  clear  that  the  authority 
granted  to  the  Board  of  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners 
under  the  provisions  of  chapter  97  of  the  Revised  Laws,  men- 
tioned above,  is  now  vested  in  your  Board  with  reference  to 
the  territorv  described. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  83 

St.  1911,  c.  748,  §  17,  provides:  — 

To  meet  expenses  that  may  be  incurred  under  the  provisions  of  this 
act  the  treasurer  and  receiver  general  is  hereby  authorized,  with  the 
approval  of  the  governor  and  council,  to  issue  bonds,  scrip,  or  certifi- 
cates of  indebtedness  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  nine  milHon  dollars, 
...  to  be  issued  in  such  amounts,  from  time  t6  time,  as  the  treasurer 
and  receiver  general,  with  the  approval  of  the  governor  and  council, 
shall  determine. 

Expenses  incurred  in  removal  of  obstructions  in  the  waters 
over  which  jurisdiction  has  been  conferred  upon  you  would 
certainly  be  an  expense  incurred  under  the  provisions  of  this 
act.  While  doubtless  a  special  appropriation  for  this  purpose, 
as  requested  in  your  report  for  the  year  ending  Nov.  30,  1914, 
might  be  desirable,  so  that  the  original  appropriation  could  be 
more  exclusively  devoted  to  permanent  improvements,  it  does 
not  seem  to  be  necessary  that  such  appropriation  should  be 
made  in  order  for  you  legally  to  carry  out  the  requirements  of 
chapter  97. 

Accordingly,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  your  Board  has  the 
powers  granted  to  the  Board  of  Harbor  and  Land  Commis- 
sioners under  the  provisions  of  R.  L.,  c.  97,  §§  15-23,  inclu- 
sive, over  the  territory  entrusted  to  your  charge,  and  ife 
authorized  to  expend  from  amounts  secured  by  the  issuance 
of  bonds,  etc.,  approved  by  the  Governor  and  Council,  under 
the  provisions  of  St.  1911,  c.  748,  §  17,  amounts  reasonably 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  requirements  thereof. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Boston  Finance  Commission  —  Duty  of  Attorney-General  to 
advise  —  Powers  —  Witnesses  —  Necessity  of  Summons  — 
Right  to  Counsel  and  Stenographer  —  Powers  of  Mayor  — 
Rules  of  Commission. 

The  Boston  Finance  Commission  has  no  power  to  require  officials  and  em- 
p  oyees  of  the  city  of  Boston  or  of  the  county  of  Suffolk  to  come  before 
it  except  by  summons,  though  such  officers  and  employees  may  indi- 
vidually waive  summons  at  any  time,  except  that  they  may  be  re- 
quired not  to  do  so  by  a  superior  officer  as  to  the  hours  when  they  are 
actually  employed. 

Such  witnesses  are  entitled  to  be  represented  by  counsel,  but  they  are  not 
entitled  to  have  a  stenographer  present,  and  a  rule  of  the  Boston 
Finance  Commission  limiting  this  right  to  be  represented  by  counsel 
s  not  within  the  authoritv  of  the  commission. 


84  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

The  mayor  of  the  city  of  Boston  has  no  authority  in  any  manner  to  Hmit 
the  powers  of  the  Boston  Finance  Commission. 

If  an  assistant  corporation  counsel  of  the  city  of  Boston  appears  before  the 
Boston  F  nance  Commission  as  counsel  of  a  person  summoned  before 
it  at  his  request,  the  commission  has  no  right  to  object. 

July  21,  1915. 
Boston  Finance  Commission,  4iO  Tremont  Building,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  leave  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  communication  of  the  13th  inst.,  requesting  my 
opinion  upon  the  following  questions:  — 

1.  Has  the  Finance  Commission  power  to  have  officials  and  emplo}'- 
ees  of  the  city  of  Boston  and  the  county  of  Suffolk  come  before  it  on 
request,  without  summons?  If  a  summons  is  necessary,  have  said  em- 
ployees the  individual  right  to  waive  said  summons?  Has  a  superior 
officer  the  power  or  right  to  order  them  not  to  waive  said  summons? 

2.  If  a  city  employee  is  required  b}^  law  to  be  legall}'  summoned  to 
the  office  of  the  commission,  is  it  not  within  the  power  of  the  commis- 
sion, under  section  2,  chapter  562  of  the  Acts  of  1908,  to  refuse  to 
allow  the  person  summoned  to  be  present  with  counsel  and  with  a  sten- 
ographer? 

3.  Has  any  direction  or  order  of  the  maj^'or  to  any  employee  or  to 
the  commission  itself  any  effect  upon  its  powers,  and  does  the  at- 
tached copy  of  the  order  of  the  mayor  of  June  18,  1915,  addressed  to 
the  heads  of  departments  and  members  of  boards  and  commissions 
of  the  city  of  Boston,  infringe  the  rights  and  powers  of  the  Finance 
Commission  as  defined  in  chapter  486  of  the  Acts  of  1909? 

4.  Are  the  following  rules  and  regulations  for  the  conduct  of  hear- 
ings and  the  giving  of  testimonj^  reasonable  and  in  conformity  with 
section  2  of  chapter  562  oi  the  Acts  of  1908  and  section  21  of  chapter 
486of  the  Acts  of  1909:  — 

(a)  A  witness  summoned  before  the  commission  may  be  represented  by  coun- 
sel who  may  cross-examine  the  witness  for  w^hom  he  appears  for  not  more  than 
ten  minutes  during  his  examination.  This  rule  permitting  counsel  to  be  present 
is  to  be  regarded  not  as  creating  a  right  but  as  extending  a  privilege,  and  the 
commission  reserves  the  right  to  withdraw  the  same  at  any  time. 

(6)  The  commission  will  permit  any  person  retained  in  the  interest  of  a  wit- 
ness to  submit  to  the  commission  in  writing  any  questions  which  he  thinks 
ought  to  be  put  to  the  witness,  and  such  questions  will  be  put  by  the  chairman 
if  pertinent  and  proper.  Every  witness  will  also  be  allowed,  under  advice  of 
counsel  or  by  his  own  motion,  to  decline  to  answer  questions  which  may  tend  to 
incriminate  him. 

(c)  The  witness  will  also  be  allowed  to  make  any  pertinent  statement  either 
at  the  beginning  or  the  end  of  his  examination.  Such  statement  may  be  pre- 
pared under  advice  of  counsel. 

(d)  At  public  hearings  held  by  the  commission  counsel  for  any  witness  maj- 
ask  him  any  pertinent  question  and  may  offer  pertinent  evidence  through  other 
witnesses  subject  to  cross-examination  by  the  commission  and  its  counsel. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  85 

(e)  The  commission  will  receive  from  any  person  not  called  as  a  witness, 
who  desires  to  volunteer  at  public  hearings  information  or  testimony  relative 
to  the  work  of  the  commission,  a  request  in  writing  addressed  to  the  commission 
and  stating  in  brief  the  matters  upon  which  the  writer  desires  to  be  heard.  If 
the  commission  deems  such  information  or  testimony  relevant  and  helpful,  a 
time  and  place  will  be  designated  at  which  the  same  will  be  publicly  given. 

5.  Has  the  mayor,  under  the  revised  ordinances,  power  to  order  the 
law  department  to  assign  one  of  its  assistant  corporation  counsels  to 
attend  as  counsel  for  city  employees  when  the  latter  are  summoned 
before  the  Finance  Commission?  (See  revised  ordinances,  1914,  chap- 
ters 3  and  20.) 

There  is  some  question  as  to  whether  your  commission  is  a 
State  board  or  commission,  within  the  meaning  of  section  1 
of  chapter  7  of  the  Revised  Laws,  for  which  the  Attorney- 
General  is  required  to  render  legal  services.  Although  you  are 
appointed  by  the  Governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Council,  and  required  to  report  to  the  General  Court  each 
year,  nevertheless,  your  jurisdiction  is  confined  to  the  city  of 
Boston  and  the  county  of  Suffolk.  Furthermore,  you  are  au- 
thorized to  employ  counsel. 

Officers  and  boards  in  a  like  situation  have  requested  opin- 
ions of  my  predecessors  in  office,  and  they  have  apparently 
entertained  different  view^s  as  to  w^hether  they  were  required 
to  give  opinions  to  such  officers  and  boards. 

On  Dec.  22,  1905,  the  Hon.  Herbert  Parker  rendered  an 
opinion  to  the  chairman  of  the  Police  Commission  of  Boston, 
expressing  some  doubt  at  the  time  as  to  whether  that  board 
had  authority  to  take  the  opinion  of  the  Attorney-General. 

On  Dec.  8,  1910,  the  Hon.  Dana  Malone  rendered  an 
opinion  to  the  Police  Commissioner  of  the  city  of  Boston. 

On  July  6,  1911,  the  Hon.  James  M.  Swift  declined  to  ex- 
press an  opinion  upon  questions  submitted  to  him  by  the 
Police  Commissioner  of  the  city  of  Boston,  on  the  ground 
that  the  Police  Commissioner  was  not  a  State  officer,  within 
the  meaning  of  section  1  of  chapter  7  of  the  Revised  Laws. 
Mr.  Swift  took  the  same  attitude  on  March  3,  1911,  in  rela- 
tion to  a  request  for  his  opinion  by  the  Boston  Finance  Com- 
mission, and  on  Feb.  19,  1913,  took  the  same  attitude  in  re- 
lation to  a  communication  from  the  Licensing  Board  of  the 
city  of  Boston. 

While  I  have  some  doubt  as  to  whether  I  am  required  to 
advise  your  commission,  I  prefer  to  give  an  opinion  upon  the 
questions  propounded,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  a  construction 


86  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

of  the  statutes  creating  and  governing  your  commission,  in 
order  that  I  may  be  sure,  in  a  situation  of  doubt,  to  perform 
my  full   duty. 

The  first  question  upon  which  you  request  my  opinion  in- 
cludes three  questions:  — 

First,  has  the  Finance  Commission  power  to  have  officials 
and  employees  of  the  city  of  Boston  and  the  county  of  Suffolk 
come  before  it  on  request  without  summons? 

Second,  if  a  summons  is  necessary,  have  said  employees  the 
individual  right  to  waive  said  summons? 

Third,  has  a  superior  officer  the  power  or  right  to  order 
them  not  to  waive  said  summons? 

As  to  the  first  inquiry,  I  think  it  clear  that  as  the  power 
of  your  commission  is  derived  solely  from  chapter  562  of  the 
Acts  of  1908  and  chapter  486  of  the  Acts  of  1909,  the  only 
power  given  to  the  commission  to  require  officials  and  em- 
ployees of  the  city  of  Boston  and  the  county  of  Suffolk  to 
come  before  it  is  upon  a  summons. 

As  to  the  second  inquiry,  I  think  it  equally  clear  that  such 
officials  and  employees  have  the  individual  right  to  waive 
such  summons. 

As  to  the  third  inquir^^,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  a  superior 
officer  has  the  right  to  require  that  employees  under  his  di- 
rection shall  not  leave  their  employment  during  the  hours 
when  they  are  at  work  for  the  city  of  Boston  or  the  county 
of  Suffolk  unless  they  are  required  by  law  to  so  leave  such 
employment.  It  follows  that,  as  to  the  hours  when  the  em- 
ployees are  employed  for  the  city  of  Boston  or  the  county  of 
Suffolk,  the  superior  officer  has  the  right  to  order  them  not 
to  waive  the  necessity  of  such  summons.  As  to  the  hours 
when  they  are  not  employed  or  on  duty,  I  am  of  opinion  that 
they  may  waive  the  summons  and  appear  voluntarily  before 
the  commission  and  give  such  testimony  under  oath  as  the 
commission  may  properly  require,  notwithstanding  any  order 
or  direction  by  a  superior  officer  to  the  contrary. 

Your  second  question  is  as  follows:  — 

If  a  city  employee  is  required  by  law  to  be  legally  summoned  to  the 
office  of  the  commission,  is  it  not  within  the  power  of  the  commission, 
under  section  2,  chapter  562  of  the  Acts  of  1908,  to  refuse  to  allow  the 
person  summoned  to  be  present  with  counsel  and  with  a  stenographer? 

Section  27  of  chapter  562  of  the  Acts  of  1908  expressly 
provides  that  witnesses  before  your  commission  may  be  rep- 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  87 

resented  by  counsel,  who  may  cross-examine  such  witnesses 
for  not  more  than  ten  minutes  during  their  examination.  It 
is  apparent,  therefore,  that  your  commission  has  no  authority 
to  refuse  to  allow  the  person  summoned  to  be  represented 
by  counsel.  I  can  find  no  provision  in  the  acts  under  which 
you  derive  your  authority  making  provision  for  stenographers 
for  witnesses.  Consequently,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the 
commission,  if  it  is  found  expedient,  may  deny  to  the  witness 
the  privilege  of  h-aving  a  stenographer  of  the  witness's  selec- 
tion   present. 

Your  third  question  is  as  follows:  — 

Has  any  direction  or  order  of  the  maj^or  to  anj"  employee  or  to  the 
commission  itself  smy  effect  upon  its  powers,  and  does  the  attached 
copy  of  the  order  of  the  mayor  of  June  18,  1915,  addressed  to  the  heads 
of  departments  and  members  of  boards  and  commissions  of  the  city 
of  Boston,  infringe  the  rights  and  powers  of  the  Finance  Commission 
as  defined  in  chapter  486  of  the  Acts  of  1909? 

Your  commission  is  appointed,  as  I  have  before  stated,  by 
the  Governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Council,  to 
inquire  into  certain  matters  relating  to  the  city  of  Boston 
and  the  county  of  Suffolk.  Its  functions,  in  my  opinion,  are 
entirely  independent  of  the  city  government  of  the  city  of 
Boston;  it  is  subject  in  no  way  to  any  control  by  the  mayor 
or  council  of  the  city  of  Boston;  and  it  follows  that  any  di- 
rection or  order  of  the  mayor  to  any  employee  of  the  city  of 
Boston  or  to  the  commission  itself  can  have  no  effect  what- 
ever upon  its  legal  powers. 

This  answers  your  inquiry  in  relation  to  the  attached  copy 
of  the  order  of  the  mayor  of  June  18,  1915,  so  far  as  it  in 
any  way  seeks  to  infringe  the  rights  and  powers  conferred  upon 
the  Finance  Commission.  I  think  it  unnecessary  for  me  to 
determine  whether  any  direction  contained  in  the  order  is  in 
effect  a  direction  to  officials  and  employees  of  the  city  of 
Boston  to  resist  or  interfere  with  your  commission  in  the 
proper  exercise  of  its  functions,  nor  do  I  think  I  am  called 
upon  to  express  any  comments  as  to  the  propriety  of  the 
order. 

Your  fourth  question  requests  my  opinion  as  to  whether 
certain  rules  and  regulations  of  the  commission  are  reasonable 
and  in  conformity  with  section  2  of  chapter  562  of  the  Acts 
of  1908  and  section  21  of  chapter  486  of  the  Acts  of  1909.  The 
first  rule  in  question  is  as  follows:  — 


88  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

(a)  A  witness  summoned  before  the  commission  may  be  represented 
by  counsel  who  may  cross-examine  the  witness  for  whom  he  appears 
for  not  more  than  ten  minutes  during  his  examination.  This  rule  per- 
mitting counsel  to  be  present  is  to  be  regarded  not  as  creating  a  right 
but  as  extending  a  privilege,  and  the  commission  reserves  the  right  to 
withdraw  the  same  at  any  time. 

The  last  sentence  of  said  rule,  I  am  of  the  opinion,  is  not  in 
conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  statutes  above  cited. 
The  provisions  of  the  statutes  create  a  right  in  the  witness  to 
be  represented  by  counsel,  and  it  is  obvious  that  the  com- 
mission has  no  power  to  withdraw  this  right.  As  section  21  of 
chapter  486  of  the  Acts  of  1909  provides  that  ''  counsel  for  any 
witness  at  any  public  hearing  may  ask  him  any  pertinent 
question  and  may  offer  pertinent  evidence  through  other 
witnesses,  subject  to  cross-examination  by  the  commission 
and  its  counsel,"  it  would  seem  desirable  that  the  rule  should 
so  provide. 

As  to  the  remaining  rules  submitted  to  me,  I  am  of  the 
opinion  that  they  are  reasonable  and  free  from  objection. 

xA.s  to  your  fifth  question  — ''  Has  the  mayor,  under  the 
revised  ordinances,  power  to  order  the  law  department  to 
assign  one  of  its  assistant  corporation  counsels  to  attend  as 
counsel  for  city  employees  when  the  latter  are  summoned 
before  the  Finance  Commission?" — I  feel  that  I  have  done 
all  that  is  required  of  me  when  I  answer  it  so  far  as  it  may 
affect  the  powers  of  your  commission.  The  question  whether 
the  mayor  has  such  power  affects  your  commission  only  in  so 
far  as  it  relates  to  the  obligation  of  the  commission  to  recog- 
nize the  corporation  counsel  or  one  of  his  assistants  as  counsel 
for  the  witness.  The  provision  of  the  statutes  authorizing 
witnesses  to  be  represented  b}'  counsel,  is,  in  my  judgment, 
for  the  protection  of  witnesses  who  may,  as  a  result  of  the 
investigation  of  the  commission,  be  charged  with  inefficiency, 
official  misconduct  or  crime.  Obviously,  the  selection  of 
counsel  nnust  be  left  to  the  witness  himself.  If  he  sees  fit 
to  request  a  member  of  the  legal  department  of  the  city  to 
represent  him  as  counsel,  and  such  member  of  the  legal  de- 
partment appears  for  him,  the  commission  has  no  power  to 
exclude  such  counsel  from  being  present  while  the  witness  is 
testifying.  If  there  is  any  impropriety  in  members  of  the 
legal  department  of  the  city  of  Boston  appearing  for  wit- 
nesses who  may  be  later  charged,  as  a  result  of  the  investi- 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  —  Xo.  12.  89 

gation,  with  inefficiency,  misconduct  or  crime,  the  .commis- 
sion, in  my  opinion,  is  without  power  at  present  to  prevent  it. 
It  follows  that  the  mayor  has  no  power  to  direct  who  shall 
appear  as  counsel  for  the  witness,  and  no  official  or  employee 
is  in  any  way  bound  by  such  a  direction.  As  counsel  for  the 
city,  the  corporation  counsel  and  his  assistants  have  no  stand- 
ing in  your  hearing  other  than  such  as  you,  in  your  discretion, 
may  see  fit  to  give  them. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attw^ill,  Aitorncy-General. 


Constitutional  Law  —  Members  of  the   General  Court  —  Masters 

in  Chancery. 

A  master  in  chancery  is  not  "a  judge  of  any  court  of  this  commonwealth" 
within  the  meaning  of  Article  VIII.  of  the  Amendments  to  the  Con- 
stitution, and  there  is  no  constitutional  objection  to  the  appointment 
of  a  member  of  the  General  Court  to  that  office. 

July  21,  1915. 

His  Excellency  David  I.  Walsh,  Governor  of  the  CommonweaUh. 

Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  request  for  my  opinion  as 
to  whether  or  not  a  member  of  the  Legislature  can  be  ap- 
pointed a  master  in  chancery. 

The  only  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Common- 
wealth which  has  any  beaming  upon  this  matter  is  Article  VIII. 
of  the  Amendments,  which  is  as  follows:  — 

Xo  judge  of  any  court  of  this  commonwealth  (except  the  court  of 
sessions),  and  no  person  holding  anj^  office  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States  (postmasters  excepted)  shall,  at  the  same  time,  hold  the 
office  of  governor,  lieutenant-governor,  or  councillor,  or  have  a  seat 
in  the  senate  or  house  of  representatives  of  this  commonwealth;  and 
no  judge  of  any  court  in  this  Commonwealth  (except  the  court  of 
sessions),  nor  the  attorney-general,  soHcitor-general,  county  attor- 
ney, clerk  of  any  court,  sheriff,  treasurer,  and  receiver-general,  reg- 
ister of  probate,  nor  register  of  deeds,  shall  continue  to  hold  his 
said  office  after  being  elected  a  member  of  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  and  accepting  that  trust;  but  the  acceptance  of  such 
trust,  by  any  of  the  officers  aforesaid,  shall  be  deemed  and  taken  to 
be  a  resignation  of  his  said  office;  and  judges  of  the  courts  of  common 
pleas  shall  hold  no  other  office  under  the  government  of  this  common- 
wealth, the  office  of  justice  of  the  peace  and  militia  offices  excepted. 

In  my  opinion  a  master  in  chancery  is  not  a  ''judge  of  any 
court  of  this  commonwealth,"  within  the  meaning  of  the  fore- 


90  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

going  a»ticle.  His  duties  are  to  a  large  extent  administrative 
rather  than  judicial;  they  are  more  closel}^  analogous  to  those 
performed  by  justices  of  the  peace  and  notaries  public  than  to 
judicial  duties.  In  my  opinion,  even  to  the  extent  that  a 
master  in  chancery  exercises  judicial  functions,  he  is  not  act- 
ing as  a  judge  of  a  court  within  the  meaning  of  the  Consti- 
tution. I  see,  therefore,  no  constitutional  objection  to  the 
appointment  of  a  member  of  the  Legislature  to  the  office  of 
master  in  chancery. 

Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Cape  Cod  Canal  —  Contract  for  Construction  —  Tidal   Gates  — 
Extra  Work  —  Powers  of  Joint  Board. 

If  the  Joint  Board  created  by  St.  1899,  c.  448,  §  6,  requires  the  construc- 
tion of  tidal  gates  or  locks  in  the  Cape  Cod  Canal,  as  authorized  by 
the  contract  between  the  Boston,  Cape  Cod  &  New  York  Canal  Com- 
pany and  the  Cape  Cod  Construction  Company,  the  latter  is  required 
to  construct  the  same  as  additional  work  not  covered  by  the  price 
named  in  the  contract,  and  is  entitled  to  be  paid  therefor  as  additional 
work  in  accordance  with  the  contract. 

The  approval  by  the  Joint  Board  of  a  contract  between  the  Boston,  Cape 
Cod  &  New  York  Canal  Company  and  the  Cape  Cod  Construction 
Company  for  the  construction  of  the  Cape  Cod  Canal,  by  which  the 
former  agreed  to  pay  the  latter  for  such  work  substantially  aU  the 
shares  of  stock  and  bonds  which  it  was  authorized  to  issue,  was  -wathin 
the  authority  granted  to  the  Board  by  St.  1909,  c.  476,  §  1. 

The  Joint  Board  has  authority,  notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  the 
contract  between  these  companies  for  the  construction  of  tidal  gates, 
to  approve  and  certify  the  issue  by  the  Canal  Company  of  capital 
stock  of  the  par  value  of  $5,990,000  and  first  mortgage  bonds  of  the 
par  value  of  $6,000,000,  —  substantially  the  entire  amount  of  stock  and 
bonds  which  the  company  is  now  authorized  to  issue,  —  for  work 
which  does  not  include  the  construction  of  such  tidal  gates  or  other 
similar  devices. 

July  22,  1915. 

Hon.  William  S.  McNary,  Chairman,  Joint  Board  consisting  of  the  Public 
Service  Commissioners  and  the  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  request  of  the 
Joint  Board  for  my  opinion  concerning  certain  questions 
which  have  arisen  concerning  the  completion  of  the  Cape 
Cod  Canal. 

The  Boston,  Cape  Cod  &  New  Y^ork  Canal  Company  was 
incorporated  by  chapter  448  of  the  Acts  of  1899,  with  an  au- 
thorized capital  stock  of  $6,000,000.     It  was   empowered   to 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  91 

issue  bonds  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  the  amount  of  its 
paid-in  capital  stock.  Section  2  of  that  chapter  provides,  in 
part,   as  follows:  — 

Said  corporation  may  issue  stock  and  bonds  in  payment  for  labor 
performed  and  material  furnished  in  the  construction  of  a  canal  as 
hereinafter  provided,  and  in  payment  for  property  acquired  for  that 
purpose. 

As  amended  by  section  1  of  chapter  476  of  the  Acts  of  1900 
this  section  contains  the  followihg  requirement:  — 

All  issues  of  stock  and  bonds  under  the  provisions  of  this  act  shall 
be  subject  to  the  approval  and  certification  of  the  joint  board  provided 
for  in  section  six  of  this  act,  in  the  manner  provided  in  chapter  four 
hundred  and  sixty-two  of  the  acts  of  the  year  eighteen  hundred  and 
ninety-four,  relative  to  the  issue  of  stock  and  bonds  by  railroad  and 
street  railway  companies;  except  that,  if  a  contract  or  contracts  shall 
be  entered  into  bj^  said  corporation,  by  the  terms  of  which  capital 
stock  and  bonds  are  to  be  issued  by  said  corporation  in  payment  for 
labor  to  be  performed  or  materials  to  be  furnished  in  the  construction 
and  equipment  of  said  canal,  in  accordance  with  the  plans  as  approved 
by  the  board  of  harbor  and  land  commissioners  as  provided  in  this 
act,  and  such  contract  or  contracts  be  approved  by  said  joint  board, 
after  such  advertisement  for  bids  thereunder  as  shall  be  satisfactory 
to  said  joint  board  and  provided  such  contract  shall  be  awarded  to  the 
lowest  bidder,  satisfactory  to  said  joint  board  who  gives  bonds  to  the 
satisfaction  of  said  canal  company,  said  corporation  maj^  issue  its  cap- 
ital stock  and  bonds  from  time  to  time,  pro  rata  to  the  labor  performed 
and  the  materials  furnished  on  the  certification  by  said  joint  board 
that  such  work  has  been  done  or  such  materials  furnished  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  terms  of  any  such  contract. 

Section  4  required  that  the  Canal  Company  should  file  with 
the  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners  plans  of  the  proposed 
location  and  construction  of  the  canal,  and  imposed  upon  that 
commission  the  duty  of  approving,  disapproving  or  modifying 
such  plans.     It  then  declared:  — 

The  plans  so  approved  or  modified,  being  accepted  by  said  com- 
pany, shall  be  deemed  to  be  the  plans  of  the  location  and  construction 
of  said  canal,  and  said  companj'  shall  be  authorized  to  construct  its 
canal  in  accordance  therewith. 

Section  6  created  a  Joint  Board,  consisting  of  the  Railroad 
Commissioners,  now  the  Public  Service  Commissioners,  and 
the  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners,  and  imposed  upon  that 


92  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Joint  Board  the  duty  of  determining  at  what  point  or  points 
the  Old  Colony  Railroad  should  cross  the  canal  by  bridges 
or  by  tunnels.  This  is  the  only  question  of  construction  re- 
ferred to  the  Joint  Board.  It  may  pass  upon  other  matters  of 
construction  only  as  they  may  be  found  to  be  incidental  to 
this  single  question.  See  opinion  of  Attorney-General  Knowl- 
ton  to  the  Joint  Board,  dated  April  6,  1901,  II.  Op.  Atty.-Gen. 
257. 

On  May  8,  1907,  the  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners  ap- 
proved the  plans  for  the  location  and  construction  of  the 
canal.  These  plans  did  not  show  any  lock,  tidal  gate  or  other 
device  for  controlling  the  current  in  the  canal.  On  June  3, 
1907,  the  Joint  Board  approved  a  contract  between  the  Bos- 
ton, Cape  Cod  &  New  York  Canal  Company  and  the  Cape 
Cod  Construction  Company  for  the  construction  of  a  canal 
in  accordance  with  the  plans  approved  by  the  Harbor  and 
Land  Commissioners.  This  contract  provided  that  the  Canal 
Company  should  pay  the  contractor  for  the  performance  of 
the  contract  the  sum  of  $11,990,000,  payable  as  to  $5,990,000 
in  the  stock  of  the  Canal  Company,  and  $6,000,000  in  the 
bonds  of  the  company;  and  that  "payments  shall  be  made  by 
the  Canal  Company  upon  written  requisitions  approved  by 
the  chief  engineer  as  the  work  proceeds  from  time  to  time 
yro  rata  to  the  labor  performed  and  the  material  furnished 
and  on  the  certification  by  the  Joint  Board  that  such  work 
has  been  done  and  such  materials  furnished  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  of  this  contract." 

Paragraph  5  of  this  contract  gave  to  the  Canal  Company 
the  right  to  require  work  to  be  done  or  material  to  be  fur- 
nished in  addition  to  that  specified,  upon  the  following  condi- 
tion: — 

Provided,  however,  that  if  any  such  additional  work  to  be  done  or 
materials  to  be  furnished  shall  in  the  judgment  of  the  chief  engineer 
materially  increase  the  cost  of  the  whole  to  the  Contractor,  additional 
payments  shall  be  made  to  the  Contractor  therefor  with  the  addition 
of  10  per  cent,  for  the  Contractor's  profit  in  cash  or  in  shares  of  stock 
or  bonds  of  the  Canal  Company  at  par,  as  the  Canal  Company  shall 
determine. 

The  specifications  contained  the  following  provision:  — 

If  at  the  expiration  of  one  year  after  the  canal  is  opened  to  public 
use  it  shall  have  been  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Joint  Board 
that  a  lock,  tidal  gates  or  some  other  device  for  controlling  the  current 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  .         93 

in  the  canal  should  be  constructed  in  order  to  provide  for  the  safe  and 
suitable  use  of  the  canal  by  the  public,  then  the  Contractor  shall  con- 
struct such  lock,  tidal  gates  or  other  device  satisfactory  to  the  Joint 
Board.  And  the  same  shall  be  considered  as  additional  work  and  be 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  fifth  paragraph  of  the  contract  as  re- 
gards paj^ment  therefor. 

I  understand  that  the  canal  has  been  constructed  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  specifications,  and  that  the  Joint  Board  has 
already  approved  requisitions  for  the  issue  of  stock  and  bonds 
under  the  contract  to  the  amount  of  $5,232,000  of  stock  and 
$5,240,000  of  bonds,  and  that  requisitions  based  upon  work 
actually  done  by  the  contractor  under  the  contract,  and  cover- 
ing all  the  remaining  stock  and  bonds  which  the  Canal  Com- 
pany is  authorized  by  law  to  issue,  are  now  before  the  Joint 
Board  for  action. 

A  serious  question  having  arisen  whether  some  device  for 
controlling  the  current  in  the  canal  is  not  necessary  for  the 
safe  and  suitable  use  of  the  canal  by  the  public,  the  Joint 
Board  asks  my  opinion  upon  the  following  specific  ques- 
tions :  — 

If  the  Joint  Board  should  decide,  under  the  provisions  of  the  para- 
graph relative  to  locks  or  tidal  gates  on  page  30  of  said  contract  be- 
tween the  Canal  Company  and  the  Construction  Compam^,  that  a 
lock,  tidal  gates  or  some  other  device  for  controlling  the  current  in 
the  canal  should  be  constructed  in  order  to  provide  for  the  safe  and 
suitable  use  of  the  canal  by  the  pubhc :  — 

1.  Would  such  construction,  under  the  terms  of  said  contract,  be  a 
part  of  the  work  for  which  said  Canal  Company  has  contracted  to  paj^ 
$11,990,000  in  stock  and  bonds  to  said  Construction  Company,  or 
would  such  construction  be  additional  work,  as  defined  in  paragraph 
5  of  said  contract,  to  be  paid  for  in  accordance  •v\dth  the  provisions  of 
said  paragraph  ''in  cash  or  in  shares  of  stock  or  bonds  of  the  Canal 
Companj^  at  par,  as  the  Canal  Company  shall  determine?" 

2.  If  such  construction,  under  the  terms  of  said  contract,  would  be 
additional  work  as  defined  in  said  paragraph  5,  has  the  Joint  Board 
authority,  under  the  provisions  of  the  acts  of  the  General  Court  rela- 
tive to  said  Canal  Companj^,  notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  said 
contract,  to  approve  and  certif}^  the  issue  b}'  said  Canal  Company  of 
capital  stock  to  the  par  value  of  $5,990,000  and  first  mortgage  bonds 
to  the  par  value  of  $6,000,000  (or  substantially  the  entire  amount  of 
stock  and  bonds  which  said  company  is  authorized  by  its  charter  to 
issue),  for  work  which  does  not  include  such  construction? 

3.  If  such  construction,  under  the  terms  of  said  contract,  would  be 
a  part  of  the  work  for  which  said  Canal  Company'  has  contracted  to 


94  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

pay  $11,990,000  in  stock  and  bonds  to  said  Construction  Company, 
can  the  Joint  Board  legally  withhold  its  approval  and  certification  of 
an  issue  or  issues  of  stock  and  bonds  by  said  Canal  Company  to  an 
amount  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Joint  Board,  will  be  necessary  tor 
the  purpose  of  paying  for  such  construction  and  which,  with  previous 
issues  of  stock  and  bonds  already  approved  and  certified  by  the  Joint 
Board,  shall  not  exceed  the  contract  price  of  $11,990,000? 

1.  The  answer  to  your  first  question  is  plain.  The  provi- 
sion of  the  specifications  already  quoted  submits  to  the  Joint 
Board  the  determination  of  the  necessity  of  the  construction 
of  locks  or  tidal  gates  after  a  year's  trial  of  the  canal  without 
such  devices.  If  the  Board  requires,  the  contractor  shall  then 
construct  them,  "and  the  same  shall  be  considered  as  addi- 
tional work  and  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  fifth  para- 
graph of  the  contract  as  regards  payment  therefor."  This 
is  a  plain  and  definite  statement  that  the  construction  of  such 
locks  or  gates  is  not  a  part  of  the  work  covered  by  the  con- 
tract for  which  the  Canal  Companj^  has  contracted  to  pay 
$11,990,000.  The  same  statement  in  negative  form  is  made 
by  the  last  sentence  of  paragraph  13  of  the  contract,  which,  if 
properly  punctuated  in  accordance  with  its  obvious  intent, 
would  read  as  follow\s:  — 

And  it  is  expressly  agreed  that  the  price  to  be  paid  the  Contractor 
as  herein  prescribed  includes  full  compensation  for  every  such  detail 
matter  and  thing,  except  as  herein  otherwise  provided  in  respect  of 
payments  for  additional  work  and  materials  including  any  lock,  tidal 
gate  or  other  device  that  may  be  called  for  as  provided  in  the  specifi- 
cations. 

Accordingly,  in  answer  to  your  first  question  I  reply  that  in 
my  opinion  such  construction  of  locks,  tidal  gates  or  other 
devices  for  controlling  the  current  in  the  canal  would  not 
be  a  part  of  the  work  for  which  the  Canal  Company  has  con- 
tracted to  pay  $11,990,000  in  stock  and  bonds,  but  would  be 
additional  work  as  defined  by  paragraph  5  of  the  contract,  to 
be  paid  for  as  therein  provided. 

2.  Your  second  question  involves  the  further  question  of 
the  legality  of  the  approval  of  this  contract  by  the  Joint 
Board.  If  that  approval  was  valid  it  is  now  not  only  the  right 
but  the  duty  of  the  Joint  Board,  on  being  satisfied  that  the 
labor  and  materials  covered  by  the  specifications,  excluding 
locks  and  tidal  gates,  have  been  performed  and  furnished,  to 
issue  its  certificate  to  that  effect,  and  thus  to  permit  the  re- 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  95 

maining  stock  and  bonds  specified  in  the  contract  to  be 
issued  in  accordance  with  its  terms.  Its  only  duty  is  to 
certify  that  the  work  covered  by  the  requisitions  before  it  has 
been  done.  It  has  no  power  to  modify  in  any  respect  the 
terms  of  the  contract  which  it  approved. 

In  my  opinion  the  approval  of  this  contract  by  the  Joint 
Board  was  a  valid  exercise  of  th«  authority  granted  to  it  by 
section  1  of  chapter  476  of  the  Acts  of  1900.  By  section  4 
of  chapter  448  of  the  Acts  of  1899  the  Canal  Company  was 
required  to  file  with  the  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners 
plans  for  the  proposed  location  and  construction  of  the  canal. 
These  plans,  when  approved  by  that  Board,  "shall  be  deemed 
to  be  the  plans  of  the  location  and  construction  of  said  canal, 
and  said  company  shall  be  authorized  to  construct  its  canal 
in  accordance  therewith."  The  only  authority  granted  to  the 
Joint  Board  concerning  the  construction  of  the  canal  is  to  be 
found  in  section  6.  That  authority  concerns  only  the  deter- 
mination as  to  the  points  at  which  the  Old  Colony  Railroad 
shall  cross  the  canal,  and  such  matters  of  construction  of  the 
canal  as  are  incidental  to  that  matter.  The  Harbor  and 
Land  Commissioners  appear  to  have  considered  the  question 
of  tidal  locks,  but  they  finally  approved  plans  which  con- 
tained no  provision  therefor.  Upon  this  approval,  in  the 
language  of  the  statute,  the  Canal  Company  was  "authorized 
to  construct  its  canal  in  accordance  therewith,"  namely,  with- 
out tidal  locks  or  gates.  It  follows  that  if  the  Canal  Company 
had  first  obtained  the  approval  of  the  Joint  Board  of  the  issue 
of  its  stock  and  bonds  for  cash,  and  then  had  entered  into  a 
contract  for  the  construction  of  the  canal  for  a  price  to  be 
paid  in  cash,  the  question  which  you  now  ask  could  not  have 
arisen.  The  Joint  Board  would  then  have  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  performance  of  the  contract  by  the  Construction 
Company. 

Section  1  of  chapter  476  of  the  Acts  of  1900,  however,  gave 
the  Canal  Company  the  privilege  of  contracting  to  pay  for 
the  construction  of  the  canal  by  issuing  its  stock  and  bonds  to 
the  contractor,  provided  the  advertisement  for  bids,  the  con- 
tractor and  the  contract  itself  were  approved  by  the  Joint 
Board.  These  provisions  gave  the  Board  no  control  whatever 
over  the  plans  for  constructing  the  canal.  That  was  to  be 
done,  as  this  section  expressly  recites,  "in  accordance  with  the 
plans  as  approved  by  the  Board  of  Harbor  and  Land  Com- 
missioners, as  provided  in  this  act."     The  approval  of  the  con- 


96  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

tract  by  the  Joint  Board  was  required  because  of  the  right 
of  supervision  given  to  it  over  the  issue  of  stock  and  bonds 
by  this  corporation.  For  that  reason  it  was  required  to  ap- 
prove such  matters  as  the  method  of  obtaining  bids,  the 
selection  of  the  contractor,  the  form  of  the  contract  and  par- 
ticularly the  price  to  be  paid.  Being  satisfied  upon  these 
matters  the  Board  properly  approved  the  contract.  It  would 
have  had  no  authority  to  require  that  the  contract  cover  the 
installation  of  tidal  gates  in  addition  to  the  work  required  by 
the  plans  approved  by  the  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners. 
On  matters  of  general  construction  it  was  bound  by  the  action 
of  that  Board  in  approving  the  plans  filed  with  it. 

It  is  true  that  by  the  paragraph  in  the  specifications  hereto- 
fore quoted  the  parties  have  chosen  to  contract  for  the  erec- 
tion of  tidal  gates  or  other  similar  devices  if  the  Joint  Board 
shall  deem  them  necessary.  Doubtless  by  approving  the 
contract  the  Joint  Board  has  accepted  this  duty.  At  any 
rate,  it  is  proper  for  it  to  undertake  its  performance,  in  the 
public  interest.  If  it  shall  determine  that  such  locks,  gates  or 
devices  shall  be  erected,  it  will  become  the  duty  of  the  Con- 
struction Company  to  erect  them  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
Board.  For  this  work  it  will  be  entitled  to  receive  from  the 
Canal  Company  actual  cost  plus  a  10  per  cent,  profit  *'in 
cash  or  shares  of  stock  or  bonds  of  the  Canal  Company  at  par, 
as  the  Canal  Company  shall  determine."  (Contract,  par.  5.) 
The  burden  will  then  be  upon  that  company  to  raise  the 
necessary  cash  or  to  obtain  legislative  authority  to  issue 
additional  shares  of  stock  or  bonds. 

Accordingly,  my  answer  to  j'our  second  question  is  that  the 
Joint  Board  has  authority,  under  the  provisions  of  the  acts  of 
the  General  Court  relative  to  the  Canal  Company,  notwith- 
standing the  provisions  of  the  contract,  to  approve  and  certify 
the  issue  by  the  Canal  Company  of  capital  stock  to  the  par 
value  of  $5,990,000,  and  first  mortgage  bonds  to  the  par  value 
of  $6,000,000  (being  substantially  the  entire  amount  of  stock 
and  bonds  which  the  company  is  now  authorized  to  issue),  for 
work  which  does  not  include  the  construction  of  locks,  tidal 
gates  or  other  similar  devices. 

3.  The  answer  given  to  the  first  and  second  questions  sub- 
mitted b}^  you  makes  it  unnecessary  to  discuss  the  third  ques- 
tion. 

Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  97 


Corporations  —  Business  Corporations  —  Operation  of  Trackless 

Trolleys. 

Locations  to  maintain  poles  in  public  ways  to  be  used  in  connection  with 
the  operation  of  a  trackless  trolley  Une  cannot  be  granted  by  municipal 
authorities  to  a  corporation  formed  under  St.  1903,  c.  437,  commonly 
known  as  the  business  corporation  act. 

July  22,  1915. 

Public  Service  Commission,  1  Beacon  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  favor  of  July  2, 
1915,  in  which  you  ask  my  opinion  as  to  the  rights  of  munic- 
ipalities to  grant  locations  for  trackless  trolleys,  so  called, 
their  operation  involving  the  use  of  poles  and  wires  but  no 
tracks   or  rails. 

I  have  conferred  with  the  officers  and  counsel  of  the  Mas- 
sachusetts Highway  Service  Company  and  find  that  the 
method  of  operating  its  vehicles  is  by  powder  from  electric 
wires  attached  to  poles  in  the  highway.  The  type  of  trolley 
allows  the  vehicles  to  move  fifteen  feet  on  either  side  of  the 
wire.  It  is  thus  apparent  that  the  cars  cannot  be  operated 
without  the  use  of  poles  in  the  highw^ay  sustaining  the  wires. 

The  Massachusetts  Highway  Service  Company  is  incor- 
porated under  the  provisions  of  St.  1903,  c.  437,  as  amended 
by  St.  1910,  c.  385,  an  act  known  as  the  business  corporation 
law.  Paragraph  (c)  of  section  1  of  this  act  provides,  in  part, 
as  follows:  — 

This  act  shall  not  apply  to  any  corporations  which  now  have  or  may 
hereafter  have  the  right  to  exercise  franchises  in  pubHc  ways  granted 
by  the  commonwealth  or  any  county,  city  or  town. 

In  my  judgment  the  word  "franchise,"  as  used  in  this 
section,  includes  permits  to  maintain  poles  in  public  ways. 
Consequently,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  selectmen  of 
Sandwich  are  not  authorized  to  grant  locations  for  poles  in  its 
highway  to  the  Massachusetts  Highway  Service  Company. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Public   Warehouses  —  Storage  of  Second-hand  Goods  and  Fur- 
niture. 

R.  L.,  c.  69,  as  amended  by  Gen.  St.  1915,  c.  98,  applies  to  buildings  or  parts 
of  buildings  used  for  the  storage  of  second-hand  goods  or  furniture. 

July  27,  1915. 
Mr.  George  C.  Neal,  Deputy  Chief,  Acting  Chief  of  the  District  Police. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  July  22 
requesting  my  opinion  whether  the  provisions  of  chapter  69 
of  the  Revised  Laws,  as  amended  by  chapter  98  of  the  Gen- 
eral Acts  of  1915,  apply  to  buildings  used  for  the  storage  of 
second-hand  furniture  or  goods. 

Chapter  69  of  the  Revised  Laws  deals  with  the  regulation 
and  licensing  of  public  warehouses.  Section  18,  added  to 
that  chapter  by  amendment  by  chapter  98  of  the  General 
Acts  of  1915,  declares:  — 

The  words  "public  warehouse,"  as  used  in  this  act,  shall  mean  any 
building,  or  part  of  a  building,  kept  and  maintained  for  the  storage  of 
goods,  wares  and  merchandise  as  a  business;  —  ... 

In  my  opinion  second-hand  furniture  or  goods  come  within 
the  class  "goods,  wares  and  merchandise."  It  is  therefore  my 
opinion  that  the  statute  in  question  applies  to  buildings  or 
parts  of  buildings  used  for  the  storage  of  such  goods  as  a  busi- 
ness. 

Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Insane    Persons  —  Temporary    Treatment  —  Request    by    Police 
Officer  —  Probation  Officer. 

A  probation  officer  is  not  a  police  oflBcer  within  the  meaning  of  St.  1911, 
c.  395,  as  amended  by  Gen.  St.  1915,  c.  174,  providing  for  the  receiv- 
ing of  persons  for  temporary  care  and  treatment  in  hospitals  for  the 
insane  upon  the  request  of  certain  officers  or  individuals. 

Aug.  2,  1915. 
State  Board  of  Insanity,  State  House. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  request  of  July 
26  for  my  opinion  as  to  whether  probation  officers  are  police 
officers  within  the  meaning  of  chapter  395  of  the  Acts  of  1911, 
as  amended  by  chapter  174  of  the  General  Acts  of  1915. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  99 

That  statute  provides,  in  part,  as  follows:  — 

The  superintendent  or  manager  of  any  hospital  for  the  insane,  pub- 
lic or  private,  may,  when  requested  by  a  physician,  by  a  member  of 
the  board  of  health  or  a  pohce  officer  of  a  city  or  town,  by  an  agent  of 
the  institutions  registration  department  of  the  city  of  Boston,  or  by  a 
member  of  the  district  pohce,  receive  and  care  for  in  such  hospital  as 
a  patient,  for  a  period  not  exceeding  ten  days,  any  person  who  needs 
immediate  care  and  treatment  because  of  mental  derangement  other 
than  dehrium  tremens  or  drunkenness. 

The  provisions  for  the  appointment  of  probation  officers 
are  to  be  found  in  chapter  217  of  the  Revised  Laws.  Section 
83  of  that  chapter  provides,  in  part,  as  follows :  — 

Said  probation  officers  shall  not  be  active  members  of  the  regular 
pohce  force,  but  so  far  as  necessar}''  in  the  performance  of  their  official 
duties  shall  have  aU  the  powers  of  pohce  officers,  and  if  appointed  by 
the  superior  court  may,  by  its  direction,  act  in  any  part  of  the  com- 
monwealth and  shall  report  to  the  court. 

While  by  the  section  just  quoted  probation  officers  are 
given  all  the  powers  of  police  officers  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
sary in  the  performance  of  their  duties,  yet,  in  my  opinion,  a 
probation  officer  cannot  be  fairly  said  to  be  a  police  officer  of 
a  city  or  town.  The  duties  of  probation  officers  are  not  re- 
stricted to  particular  municipalities.  The  territory  within 
which  they  act  is  limited  only  by  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
which  appoints  them.  In  my  opinion  they  are  not,  therefore, 
police  officers  of  a  city  or  town  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute  under  consideration.  It  follows  that  that  statute 
does  not  authorize  the  receiving  and  caring  for  patients  at 
their  request.  I  suggest,  however,  that  it  would  be  a  very 
simple  matter,  in  any  case  where  a  probation  officer  has  in 
charge  a  person  whom  he  desires  to  have  received  at  a  hos- 
pital for  the  insane  under  this  statute,  for  him  to  arrange  with 
a  police  officer  of  the  particular  city  or  town  where  the  person 
in  question  is  a  resident,  to  make  the  formal  request  required 
by  the  statute. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


100  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Cities  —  Wards  —  Division  into  Precincts.  —  Time  for  Action. 

Under  St.  1913,  c.  217,  a  city  may  not,  after  the  first  Monday  of  July  in 
any  year,  make  a  division  of  any  ward  into  precincts  which  shall 
become  effective  dm-ing  that  calendar  year, 

Aug.  5,  1915. 

Hon.  Albert  P.  Langtry,  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  request  of  July 
29  for  my  opinion  whether  a  division  of  Ward  2  of  the  city 
of  Revere  into  two  precincts,  made  by  vote  of  the  municipal 
council  of  Revere  on  July  26,  1915,  should  be  recognized  by 
you  as  legal. 

Section  217  of  chapter  835  of  the  Acts  of  1913,  in  provid- 
ing for  the  division  of  wards  of  a  city  into  two  or  more  voting 
precincts,  makes  the  following  enactment:  — 

If  a  ward  constituting  one  precinct  contains  less  than  one  thousand 
voters,  according  to  the  registration  of  voters  at  the  preceding  annual 
city  election,  the  aldermen  may,  and  if  it  contains  more  than  one 
thousand  voters,  shall,  on  or  before  the  first  Monday  of  July,  divide 
it  into  two  or  more  voting  precincts.  If  a  voting  precinct  shall,  in 
any  year,  according  to  such  registration,  contain  more  than  one  thou- 
sand voters,  the  aldermen  shall  in  hke  manner  either  divide  such  pre- 
cinct into  two  or  more  voting  precincts  or  shall  make  a  new  division 
of  the  ward  into  voting  precincts;  so  that  no  precinct  shall  contain 
more  than  one  thousand  voters. 

Your  request  raises  the  question  whether  the  requirement 
that  this  division  be  made  "on  or  before  the  first  Monday  of 
July"  is  to  be  regarded  as  mandatory  or  merely  directory. 
This  question  is  to  be  answered  in  the  light  of  the  apparent 
purpose  of  this  provision  when  read  in  connection  with  the 
remaining  sections  of  this  chapter  relating  to  primaries,  cau- 
cuses and  elections.  The  primaries  required  by  this  statute 
are  held  in  September.  Before  that  time  substantial  prepara- 
tions must  be  made,  such  as  preparing  separate  ballots  and 
lists  of  voters  for  each  of  the  more  than  1,100  voting  pre- 
cincts in  the  State.  I  understand  that  your  work  of  pre- 
paring these  ballots  and  the  actual  printing  of  the  ballots 
must,  as  a  practical  matter,  be  begun  soon  after  July  1.  An 
opportunity  must  also  be  given  for  ample  public  notice  to 
voters  of  the  establishment  of  precincts,  so  that  they  may  be 
informed  of  the  place  where  they  are  to  cast  their  ballots. 
For  such  reasons  it  seems  plain  that  it  is  absolutely  essential 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  101 

to  the  proper  working  of  our  present  system  of  election  laws 
that  the  division  of  wards  into  precincts,  if  made,  should  be- 
come effective  a  substantial  length  of  time  before  the  time 
for  the  holding  of  the  primaries. 

The  Supreme  Judicial  Court  in  the  case  of  Fitzgerald  v. 
Mayor  of  Boston,  220  Mass.  503,  in  passing  upon  chapter  630 
of  the  Acts  of  1914,  referred  to  its  provision,  that  "the  city 
council  of  the  city  of  Boston  shall,  before  the  first  day  of 
January  in  the  year  nineteen  hundred  and  fifteen,  make  a 
new  division  of  the  territory  of  the  city  of  Boston,"  as  con- 
taining "the  positive  command  that  the  division  must  be  com- 
pleted before  Jan.  1,  1915."  This  language  applies  with  equal 
force  to  the  statute  under  consideration. 

Accordingly,  reading  this  provision  of  section  217  in  connec- 
tion with  the  system  of  which  it  is  a  part,  it  seems  to  me  ap- 
parent that  the  Legislature  intended  to  impose  a  mandatory 
requirement  that,  for  any  division  of  a  ward  into  precincts  to 
become  effective  in  the  year  in  which  it  is  made,  that  divi- 
sion rriust  be  made  before  the  first  Monday  of  July.  Any 
other  interpretation  would  seriously  interfere  with  the  proper 
operation  of  our  election  laws. 

It  follows  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  vote  of  the  municipal 
council  of  the  city  of  Revere,  to  divide  Ward  2  into  two 
precincts,  passed  on  July  26  last,  should  not  be  recognized  by 
you  as  effective  during  the  present  calendar  year.  I  under- 
stand that  this  ward  had  substantially  more  than  1,000  reg- 
istered voters  at  the  municipal  election  in  December  last. 
It  was,  therefore,  the  plain  duty  of  the  municipal  council, 
under  the  statute  which  we  are  considering,  to  divide  that 
ward  into  ^-t  least  two  precincts  before  the  first  Monday 
of  July  last.  As  it  failed  to  comply  with  the  statute  there 
rests  upon  it  a  duty  to  correct  this  error  at  the  earliest  op- 
portunity, so  that  the  voters  of  this  ward  may  suffer  as  little 
inconvenience  as  possible.  I  see  no  reason  why,  if  the  munic- 
ipal council  of  Revere  so  desires,  the  vote  of  July  26  may  not 
be  permitted  to  become  effective  at  any  time  in  the  year  1916 
prior  to  the  first  Monday  of  July  that  the  municipal  council 
may  determine. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


102  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Misuse  of  Flag  —  Pictures  of  Flag  —  Use  on  Covers  of  Papers 
ajid  Magazines. 

R.  L.,  c.  20,  §  5,  as  amended  by  St.  1913,  c.  464,  and  St.  1914,  c.  570,  for- 
bidding the  use  or  possession  of  "any  article  or  substance,  being  an 
article  of  merchandise  or  a  receptacle  of  merchandise  or  articles  upon 
which  shall  be  attached  through  wTapping  or  otherwise,  engraved  or 
printed  in  any  manner,  a  representation  of  the  United  States  flag," 
merely  forbids  the  engraving  or  printing  of  the  flag,  whether  for  ad- 
vertising or  decorative  purposes,  upon  wrappers  or  receptacles,  or 
upon  articles  which  are  themselves  complete  articles  of  merchandise 
aside  from  the  presence  of  the  flag  upon  them;  and  articles  of  which 
the  representation  of  the  flag  is  an  inherent  part,  and  to  which  the 
representation  of  the  flag  is  not  a  mere  ornamental  and  unessential 
addition,  do  not  come  within  the  prohibition  of  the  statute. 

A  picture  of  the  flag  alone  or  a  picture  containing  it  as  a  bona  fide  part  of 
the  picture  is  not  a  violation  of  this  statute  when  engraved  or  printed 
on  a  card  or  in  or  upon  a  book,  paper  or  magazine,  provided  it  is  not 
used  in  any  manner  for  advertising  purposes. 

The  use  of  a  picture  of  the  flag  or  one  containing  a  representation  of  it 
upon  the  cover  of  a  book,  paper  or  magazine  for  artistic  or  ornamental 
purposes  is  not  a  violation  of  the  statute,  unless  some  part  of  the  use 
or  purpose  of  such  cover  is  to  attract  attention  to  and  advertise  the 
pubhcation  or  its  contents. 

Red  and  white  stripes,  with  no  field  of  blue  or  stars,  do  not  constitute  a 
representation  of  the  flag  when  it  is  not  obvious  that  it  was  intended 
to  depict  thereby  a  portion  of  the  flag. 

Aug.  6,  1915. 

Mr.  George  C.  Neal,  Acting  Chief,  District  Police. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  July  16, 
1915,  requesting  my  opinion  whether  certain  pictures  sub- 
mitted to  me  by  you  are  in  violation  of  R.  L.,  c.  206,  §  5,  as 
amended  by  St.  1913,  c.  464,  and  St.  1914,  c.  570.  That  stat- 
ute is  as  follows:  — 

Whoever  pubHcly  mutilates,  tramples  upon,  defaces  or  treats  con- 
temptuously the  flag  of  the  United  States  or  of  Massachusetts,  whether 
such  flag  is  public  or  private  property,  or  whoever  displays  such  flag 
or  any  representation  thereof  upon  which  are  words,  figures,  advertise- 
ments or  designs,  or  who  shaU  in  this  commonwealth  expose  to  public 
view,  manufacture,  sell,  expose  for  sale,  give  away  or  have  in  posses- 
sion for  sale  or  to  give  aw^ay  or  for  use  for  any  purpose,  any  article  or 
substance,  being  an  article  of  merchandise  or  a  receptacle  of  merchan- 
dise or  articles  upon  which  shall  be  attached  through  a  wrapping  or 
otherwise  engraved  or  printed  in  any  manner,  a  representation  of  the 
United  States  flag,  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  ten  nor 
more  than  one  hundred  dollars;  but  a  flag  which  belongs  to  a  grand 
army  post,  to  a  camp  of  the  legion  of  Spanish  war  veterans  or  which 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  103 

is  the  property  of  or  is  used  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  or  of 
this  commonwealth  may  have  the  names  of  battles  and  the  name  and 
number  of  the  organization  to  which  such  flag  belongs  inscribed  thereon. 
Words,  figures,  advertisements  or  designs  attached  to,  or  directly  or 
indirectly  connected  with,  the  flag  or  any  representation  thereof  in 
such  manner  that  the  flag  or  its  representation  is  used  to  attract  atten- 
tion to  or  advertise  such  words,  figures,  advertisements  or  designs,  shall 
for  the  purposes  of  this  act  be  deemed  to  be  upon  the  flag. 

The  purpose  of  this  statute,  as  declared  in  the  title  of  the 
act  of  1913,  is  "to  prohibit  the  misuse  of  the  national  and 
the  state  flags."  It  should  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  this 
purpose  with  a  view  to  increase  respect  for  our  flags  and,  if 
possible,  not  in  such  a  manner  as  to  restrict  the  proper  use  of 
the  flags  or  to  reduce  the  statute  to  an  absurdity.  It  appar- 
ently seeks  to  prohibit  three  things,  namely,  first,  insults  to 
the  flags;  second,  their  use  as  a  part  of  any  form  of  advertis- 
ing; and  third,  the  engraving  or  printing  of  a  representation 
of  the  United  States  flag  upon  any  article  of  merchandise  or 
any  wrapper  or  receptacle  of  articles. 

Acts  coming  within  the  first  prohibition  are  readily  rec- 
ognized. The  extent  of  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  the  flags 
for  advertising  purposes  is  indicated  with  reasonable  plain- 
ness by  the  last  sentence  of  the  statute,  added  by  the  amend- 
ment of  1914.  The  chief  diflSculty  comes  in  applying  the 
third  prohibition.  It  forbids  the  exhibition,  manufacture,  sale, 
exposure  for  sale,  gift  or  possession  for  any  purpose  of  "any 
article  or  substance,  being  an  article  of  merchandise  or  a 
receptacle  of  merchandise  or  articles  upon  which  shall  be  at- 
tached through  a  wrapping  or  otherwise,  engraved  or  printed 
in  any  manner,  a  representation  of  the  United  States  flag." 
The  broad  term  "any  article  or  substance"  is  somewhat 
limited  by  the  words  immediately  following,  "being  an  article 
of  merchandise  or  a  receptacle  of  merchandise  or  articles." 
In  a  broad  sense,  however,  a  card  or  a  sheet  of  paper  upon 
which  a  picture  of  a  flag  has  been  printed,  or  a  piece  of  cloth 
upon  which  the  colors  constituting  it  have  been  stamped,  is  an 
article  of  merchandise.  Obviously,  it  would  seem  that  the 
Legislature  never  intended  to  use  the  language  of  this  statute 
in  any  such  broad  sense.  Such  an  interpretation  would  make 
it  a  criminal  offence  to  possess  or  to  display  not  only  any 
picture  of  the  flag  whatever,  but  even  the  flag  itself  in  many 
of  its  cheaper  and  more  common  forms.  Such  an  interpre- 
tation would  prohibit  the  use,  not  merely  the  misuse,  of  the 


104  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

flag,  and  would  reduce  the  statute  to  a  manifest  absurdity. 
Thus  interpreted  the  statute  would  probably  be  void  as  an 
unreasonable  police  regulation. 

In  my  opinion  the  clause  under  discussion  must  be  read 
together  with  the  preceding  clause  forbidding  the  use  of  the 
flag  for  advertising  purposes,  and  is  to  be  considered  merely 
as  an  extension  of  that  prohibition.  It  should  be  interpreted 
merely  as  forbidding  the  engraving  or  printing  of  the  flag, 
whether  for  advertising  or  decorative  purposes,  upon  wrappers 
or  receptacles,  or  upon  articles  which  are  themselves  complete 
articles  of  merchandise  aside  from  the  presence  of  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  flag  upon  them.  Thus  an  article  of  which  the 
representation  of  the  flag  is  an  inherent  part,  which  could  not 
be  the  complete  article  intended  without  the  representation 
of  the  flag,  and  to  which  the  representation  of  the  flag  is  not  a 
mere  ornamental  and  unessential  addition,  does  not,  in  my 
opinion,  come  within  the  prohibition  of  the  statute.  Unless 
such  an  article  violates  some  other  portion  of  the  statute  its 
possession  or  use  is  not  forbidden. 

It  follows  that  a  picture  or  printed  representation  of  the 
flag  alone,  or  a  picture  containing  it  as  a  bona  fide  part  of 
the  picture,  as,  for  example,  displayed  upon  a  building,  is  not 
a  violation  of  this  statute  when  engraved  or  printed  upon  a 
card  or  in  or  upon  a  book,  paper  or  magazine,  provided  such 
picture  is  not  used  or  intended  to  attract  attention  to  or 
advertise  such  book,  paper,  magazine  or  card  or  its  contents, 
or  any  other  thing  or  matter.  Accordingly,  I  advise  you  that 
the  picture  postcards  submitted  by  you  to  me,  one  bearing 
merely  a  representation  of  the  flag  entitled  "Old  Glory,"  and 
the  others  being  pictures  of  actual  buildings  upon  which  one 
or  more  flags  are  displayed,  as  they  do  not  appear  to  be  used 
for  any  advertising  purpose,  are  not  in  violation  of  law. 

The  use  of  pictures  containing  representations  of  the  flag 
upon  the  covers  of  books,  papers  or  magazines  will  often  pre- 
sent a  question  of  some  difficulty.  Such  pictures,  so  used,  do 
not  necessarily  come  within  the  third  prohibition  of  the  statute 
as  interpreted  by  me.  Thus  they  do  not  violate  its  terms 
unless  they  are  used  or  intended  for  advertising  as  defined  in 
the  statute.  If  such  a  picture  is  used  or  m tended  solely  for 
artistic  or  ornamental  purposes,  and  is  in  no  way  used  or  in- 
tended to  attract  attention  to  the  book,  paper  or  magazine 
or  its  contents  as  it  is  offered  for  sale,  there  is,  in  my  opinion, 
no  violation  of  the  law.     If,  however,  any  part  of  the  use  or 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  105 

purpose  of  such  a  coyer  is  to  attract  attention  to  and  ads^er- 
tise  the  publication  or  its  contents,  the  second  prohibition  of 
the  statute  has  been  violated.  Each  case  must  stand  by 
itself. 

With  reference  to  the  cover  of  the  Boston  Sunday  Post 
Magazine  of  July  4,  1915,  submitted  to  me,  it  is  my  opinion 
that  it  was  not  a  violation  of  law.  Though  its  date  indi- 
cates that  it  was  intended  to  give  a  patriotic  flavor  to  the 
publication,  there  is,  in  fact,  no  representation  of  the  United 
States  flag  printed  upon  it.  Red  and  white  stripes  with  no 
field  of  blue  or  stars  cannot  be  said  to  be  such  a  representation 
when  it  is  not  obvious  that  it  is  intended  to  depict  a  portion 
of  the  flag.  The  cap  represented  on  this  cover  may  have  been 
made  of  any  piece  of  goods  colored  as  indicated.  It  is  the 
flag  itself,  not  the  colors  that  compose  it,  that  the  statute  is 
devised  to  protect. 

Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  AUorney-General. 


Boards  of  Health  —  Persons  suffering  with  Dangerous  Diseases 
—  Notice  to  Commonwealth  in  Cases  of  Persons  ivithout 
Settlements. 

Under  St.  1902,  c.  213,  as  amended  by  St.  1909,  c.  380,  if  a  person  afflicted 
with  tuberculosis  goes  to  a  State  sanatorium  for  treatment  after  the 
notices  required  by  these  statutes  have  been  given  to  the  State  De- 
partment of  Health  and  the  State  Board  of  Charity,  and  then  sub- 
sequently is  discharged  and  returns  to  his  place  of  domicile,  the  local 
board  of  health  is  not  required  to  give  further  notice  to  the  State  De- 
partment of  Health,  unless  the  patient  has  been  discharged  as  cm-ed 
or  in  such  a  condition  that  at  the  time  of  his  discharge  he  is  not  a 
source  of  contagion  or  infection. 

After  a  physician  has  once  reported  a  case  of  tuberculosis  to  the  local 
board  of  health,  in  the  event  that  the  patient  leaves  the  city  or  town 
temporarily,  he  is  not  obhged  under  the  provisions  of  law,  when  the 
patient  returns,  to  report  the  case  again  to  the  local  board  of  health, 
nor  is  the  latter  obhged  so  to  report  it  to  the  State  Department  of 
Health. 

Aug.  12,  1915. 

Allan  J.  McLaughlin,  M.D.,  Commissioner  of  Health. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
letter  in  which  you  submit  to  me  the  following  questions  for 
my  opinion :  — 


106  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

1.  Whether  cases  of  tuberculosis  recognized  as  "continuing  cases," 
once  reported  to  the  local  board  of  health  and  by  the  local  board  of 
health  immediately  to  the  State  Board  of  Health,  are  required  to  be 
reported  a  second  time  in  the  event  of  their  recei\nng  treatment  in  a 
State  sanatorium;  in  other  words,  whether  the  original  notice  to  the 
local  board  of  health  and  by  the  local  board  of  health  to  the  State 
Board  of  Health  is  sufficient  for  the  compliance  of  the  laws  so  far  as 
the  notification  requirement  to  the  State  Board  of  Health  is  concerned. 

2.  Whether  a  physician  after  once  reporting  a  case  of  tuberculosis 
to  the  board  of  health  of  the  town  of  which  the  patient  is  resident, 
in  the  event  of  the  patient  leaving  the  town  for  awhile,  is  obfiged 
under  the  provisions  of  law  when  the  patient  returns  to  the  town,  pro- 
vided the  patient  continues  under  the  care  of  the  same  physician,  to 
report  the  case  again  to  the  local  board  of  health,  and  the  said  local 
board  again  obfiged  to  report  the  case  to  the  State  Board  of  Health. 

R.  L.,  c.  75,  §  57,  which  is  referred  to  in  your  communi- 
cation, was  repealed  by  St.  1902,  c.  213,  and  St.  1902,  c.  213, 
was  amended  by  St.  1907,  c.  386,  and  further  amended  by  St. 
1909,  c.  380,  w^hich  states  the  law  as  it  at  present  exists.  St. 
1909,  c.  380,  amends  St.  1902,  c.  213,  §  1,  so  as  to  read  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

Reasonable  expenses  incurred  by  the  board  of  health  of  a  city  or 
town  or  by  the  commonwealth  in  making  the  provision  required  by 
law  for  persons  infected  with  smaUpox  or  other  disease  dangerous  to 
the  pubfic  health  shaU  be  paid  by  such  person  or  his  parents  if  he  or 
they  be  able  to  pay,  otherwise  by  the  city  or  town  in  which  he  has  a 
legal  settlement,  upon  the  approval  of  the  bill  by  the  board  of  health 
of  such  city  or  town  or  by  the  state  board  of  charity;  and  such  settle- 
ments shall  be  determined  by  the  overseers  of  the  poor,  and  by  the 
state  board  of  charity  in  cases  cared  for  by  the  commonwealth.  If 
the  person  has  no  settlement,  such  expense  shaU  be  paid  by  the  com- 
monwealth, upon  the  approval  of  bills  therefor  by  the  state  board  of 
charity.  In  all  cases  of  persons  having  settlements,  a  written  notice 
sent  within  the  time  required  in  the  case  of  aid  given  to  paupers,  shaU 
be  sent  by  the  board  of  health,  or  by  the  officer  or  board  having  the 
powers  of  a  board  of  health  in  the  citj"  or  town  where  the  person  is 
sick,  to  the  board  of  health,  or  to  the  officer  or  board  having  the 
powers  of  a  board  of  health  in  the  city  or  towTi  in  which  such  person 
has  a  settlement,  who  shaU  forth-with  transmit  a  copy  thereof  to  the 
overseers  of  the  poor  of  the  place  of  settlement.  In  case  the  person 
has  no  settlement,  such  notice  shall  be  given  to  the  state  board  of 
health,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  section  fifty-two  of  chap- 
ter seventy-five  of  the  Revised  Laws,  and  also  in  any  case  fiable  to  be 
maintained  by  the  commonwealth  when  public  aid  has  been  rendered 
to  such  sick  person,  a  written  notice  shall  be  sent  to  the  State  board 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCmiENT  —  No.  12.  107 

of  charity,  containing  such  information  as  T\all  show  that  the  person 
named  therein  is  a  proper  charge  to  the  cbmmonwealth,  and  reim- 
bursement shall  be  made  for  the  reasonable  expenses  incurred  within 
five  daj'S  next  before  such  notice  is  mailed,  and  thereafter  until  such 
sick  person  is  removed  under  the  provisions  of  chapter  three  hundred 
and  ninet3^-five  of  the  acts  of  the  year  nineteen  hundred  and  four,  or 
is  able  to  be  so  removed  without  endangering  his  or  the  public  health. 

I  assume  that  tuberculosis  is  a  disease  dangerous  to  the 
public  health  within  the  meaning  of  R.  L.,  c.  75,  §  52,  and 
St.  1909,  c.  380.  Said  chapter  380  makes  it  clear  that  the 
Commonwealth  is  to  reimburse  the  cities  and  towns  until  the 
sick  person  is  removed,  under  the  provisions  of  St.  1904,  or 
"is  able  to  be  so  removed  without  endangering  his  or  the 
public  health." 

St.  1904,  c.  395,  was  amended  by  St.  1909,  c.  391,  so  as  to 
read  as  follows:  — 

The  state  board  of  charity  may,  if  found  expedient,  remove  any 
person  who  is  infected  with  a  disease  dangerous  to  the  pubhc  health, 
and  w^ho  is  maintained  or  liable  to  be  maintained  by  the  commonwealth, 
to  any  hospital  provided  for  state  paupers,  or  may  provide  such  place 
of  reception  for  such  person  as  is  judged  best  for  his  accommodation 
and  the  safety  of  the  pubhc,  which  place  shall  be  subject  to  the  regu- 
lations of  the  board,  and  shall  have  the  same  authority  to  remove 
such  persons  thereto  as  is  conferred  upon  boards  of  health  by  the  pro- 
visions of  section  tliirty-six  of  chapter  seventy-five  of  the  Revised 
Laws,  as  amended  by  chapter  three  hundred  and  sixty-five  of  the 
acts  of  the  year  nineteen  hundred  and  six. 

St.  1909,  c.  380,  is  very  clear  with  the  exception  of  the  pro- 
vision, "or  is  able  to  be  so  removed  without  endangering 
his  or  the  public  health."  Obviously,  it  was  not  the  intent  of 
the  Legislature  by  this  provision  that  the  State  Board  of 
Charity  should  elect  whether  to  remove  the  patient,  under 
the  provisions  of  St.  1909,  c.  391,  and  thereby  determine  the 
liability  of  the  Commonwealth.  It  cannot  be  that  because 
the  State  Board  of  Charity  finds  a  patient  in  a  condition 
that  prohibits  his  removal,  and  later  neglects  to  remove  the 
patient  when  his  condition  permits,  the  liability  of  the  Com- 
monwealth to  reimburse  the  city  or  town  terminates  with  its 
neglect.  It  is  my  view  that  the  provision,  "  or  is  able  to  be  so 
removed  without  endangering  his  or  the  public  health," 
refers  to  the  condition  of  the  sick  person  at  the  time  when 
the  danger  of  infection  or  contagion  is  at  an  end.     The  result 


108  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

is,  in  my  opinion,  that  after  the  proper  notices  have  been 
sent  to  the  State  Department  of  Health  and  State  Board  of 
Charity,  the  Commonwealth  is  liable  to  reimburse  the  city 
or  town  for  the  reasonable  expenses  incurred  by  the  board  of 
health  of  the  city  or  town  in  making  the  provision  required 
by  law  for  persons  infected  with  diseases  dangerous  to  the 
public  health,  until  the  sick  person  is  removed  under  the 
provisions  of  said  St.  1909,  c.  391,  or  the  danger  of  infection 
or  contagion  is  at  an  end. 

Where  a  person  afflicted  with  the  disease  of  tuberculosis 
goes  to  a  State  sanatorium  for  treatment,  after  the  proper 
notices  have  been  given  to  the  State  Department  of  Health 
and  the  State  Board  of  Charity,  and  then  subsequently  is 
discharged  from  the  State  sanatorium  and  returns  to  his 
place  of  domicile,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  local  board 
of  health  is  not  required  to  give  further  notice  to  the  State 
Department  of  Health,  unless  the  patient  has  been  discharged 
as  cured  or  in  such  a  condition  that  at  the  time  of  his  dis- 
charge he  was  not  a  source  of  contagion  or  infection.  Where 
a  person  leaves  the  place  of  his  domicile  temporarily  for  busi- 
ness, pleasure  or  health  he  does  not  lose  his  domicile  in  such 
place;  and  it  would  follow  that  ordinarily  in  cases  of  the 
kind  that  you  refer  to,  the  patient  in  the  State  sanatorium 
still  retains  his  domicile  in  the  city  or  town  where  he  had  his 
abode  at  the  time  he  entered  the  State  sanatorium,  and  there 
is  no  more  necessity,  in  my  judgment,  of  a  notice  to  the 
State  Department  of  Health  upon  his  return  from  the  State 
sanatorium  than  upon  his  return  from  a  week's  absence  from 
the  place  of  his  abode  on  businesfe  or  pleasure. 

My  reasons  for  the  answer  given  to  your  first  question  apply 
to  the  second  question,  and,  in  my  judgment,  the  question 
must  be  answered  in  the  negative.  There  appears  to  be  no 
reason  why  the  physician  must  notify  the  local  board  of 
health  in  a  case  such  as  you  describe,  any  more  than  there 
would  be  to  require  a  physician  to  notify  the  local  board  of 
health  of  finding  a  case  of  tuberculosis  on  each  visit  to  his 
patient. 

I  am  aware  that  the  Hon.  Dana  Malone,  a  predecessor  in 
this  office,  on  Jan.  8,  1910,  rendered  an  opinion  to  the  super- 
intendent of  the  State  Adult  Poor  that,  where  a  patient  in- 
fected with  tuberculosis  absconded  from  the  State  Infirmary 
and  returned  to  the  place  from  which  he  had  been  sent  to 
the  State  Infirmary,  the  Commonwealth  was  not  responsible 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  109 

unless  a  new  notice  was  sent  to  the  State  Board  of  Charity. 
The  facts  in  th-at  case  were  substantially  different  from  the 
facts  stated  in  your  request  for  an  opinion,  and  I  do  not  in- 
tend by  this  opinion  to  intimate  in  any  way  that  my  view 
of  the  law  upon  the  facts  upon  which  Mr.  Malone  rendered 
his  opinion  would  be  other  than  he  there  expressed. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Public  Service  Commission  —  Commonwealth  Pier  —  Intra- 
state Shipments  —  Alleged  Discrimination  in  Rates  hy 
Railroad. 

The  shipment  of  imported  merchandise  to  the  Commonwealth  Pier,  con- 
signed by  the  carrying  steamer  to  Boston  business  houses  and  shipped 
bj^  them  in  whole  or  in  part  from  the  pier  to  points  within  the  State, 
does  not  constitute  an  intrastate  shipment  unless  the  Commonwealth 
Pier  was  intended  to  be  the  ultimate  destination,  and  a  reshipment 
of  the  goods  from  the  pier  to  an  intrastate  point  was  determined  upon 
only  after  the  arrival  of  the  goods  in  port. 

The  Attorney-General  dechnes  to  advise  the  Public  Service  Commission 
upon  an  assumption  inconsistent  with  the  contention  being  made  by 
him  before  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  and  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission. 

Aug.  .30,  1915. 

Public  Service  Commission,  1  Bea,con  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  leave  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your 
communication  requesting  my  opinion  upon  certain  questions 
in  relation  to  an  order  made  by  your  commission  on  March 
29,  1915,  to  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad,  and  the  action  of 
the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  in  response  to  said  order.  Said 
order,  as  appears  by  your  letter,  is  as  follows:  — 

Ordered,  That  the  respondent,  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad,  be 
directed  co  file  wdth  this  commission  within  thirty  days  from  the  date 
hereof,  tariffs  to  become  effective  thirty  days  after  fihng,  unless  other- 
wise ordered  by  the  commission,  which  will  discontinue  the  unjust  dis- 
crimination which  the  commission  in  these  proceedings  has  found  to 
exist,  in  so  far  as  such  discrimination  arises  from  the  rates  charged  by 
the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  on  intrastate  movements  of  freight  to 
and  from  the  premises  of  the  petitioner  from  and  to  points  on  the  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  Railroad  in  Massachusetts,  as  compared  with  the  rates 
on  hke  traffic  between  the  Commonwealth  Pier  in  South  Boston  and 
the  same  points. 


no  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

As  stated  in  your  letter,  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad,  in 
response  to  said  order,  under  date  of  May  14,  1915,  effective 
May  17,  1915,  issued  a  new  tariff,  designated  Supplement  A, 
to  the  Massachusetts  Public  Service  Commission  No.  1063, 
which  provided  that  "rates  made  in  this  tariff  will  not  apply 
on  intrastate  traffic  to  or  from  points  in  Massachusetts." 

Under  date  of  May  19,  1915,  effective  June  20,  1915,  the 
Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  also  issued  Supplement  I.  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  No.  426,  Massachusetts 
Public  Service  Commission  No.  1063.  This  latter  supplement 
provided  in  effect  that  both  interstate  and  intrastate  move- 
ments of  traffic  to  or  from  the  Commonwealth  Pier  should 
thereafter  be  subject  to  the  customary  switching  charges. 
Thereafter,  as  will  appear  later  in  this  letter,  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Court  of  this  Commonwealth  issued  a  temporary  in- 
junction restraining  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  from 
putting  these  tariffs  into  effect. 

Your  questions  are  as  follows:  — 

1.  If  imported  merchandise  shipped  to  the  Commonwealth  Pier  is 
consigned  by  the  carrying  steamer  to  Boston  business  houses,  and 
shipped  by  them,  in  whole  or  in  part,  from  the  Commonwealth  Pier 
to  Boston  &  Maine  points  in  Massachusetts,  does  this  transaction  in- 
volve "an  intrastate  movement  of  freight"  within  the  meaning-of  the 
commission's  order  of  March  29,  1915? 

2.  Has  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad,  by  filing  the  tariff  supple- 
ments hereinbefore  referred  to,  adequately  compfied  with  the  said 
order  of  the  commission? 

3.  If  the  answer  to  question  No.  2  is  "No,"  has  the  commission  the 
authority  to  order  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  to  file  a  new  tariff 
providing,  in  effect,  for  the  absorption  of  switching  charges  on  intra- 
state movements  of  import  and  export  traffic  to  and  from  the  docks 
of  the  National  Dock  and  Storage  Warehouse  Company,  (a)  if  the  rates 
proAdded  for  in  such  new  tariff,  eUminating  the  question  of  discrimina- 
tion, are  othermse  reasonable,  and  (6)  if  such  ra  es,  eliminating  the 
question  of  discrimination,  are  otherwise  unreasonable? 

The  answer  to  your  first  question  is  dependent  upon  the 
facts  of  each  particular  shipment. 

When  freight  actually  starts  in  the  course  of  transportation  from 
one  State  to  another  it  becomes  a  part  of  interstate  conmaerce.  The 
essential  nature  of  the  movement  and  not  the  form  of  the  bill  of  lading 
determines  the  character  of  the  commerce  involved.  And  generally 
when  this  interstate  character  has  been  acquired  it  continues  at  least 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCraiENT  — No.  12.  Ill 

until  the  load  reaches  the  point  where  the  parties  originally  intended 
that  the  movement  should  finally  end.  Ilh  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  La.  R.  R. 
Coin.,  236  U.  S.  157,  at  163. 

And  again,  in  Texas  &  N.  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sabine  Tram  Co., 
227  U.  S.  Ill,  at  126,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
said:  — 

The  determining  circumstance  is  that  the  shipment  of  the  lumber 
to  Sabine  was  but  a  step  in  its  transportation  to  its  real  and  ultimate 
destination  in  foreign  countries.  In  other  words,  the  essential  char- 
acter of  the  commerce,  not  its  mere  accidents,  should  determine.  It 
was  to  supply  the  demand  of  foreign  countries  that  the  lumber  was 
purchased,  manufactured  and  shipped,  and  to  give  it  a  various  char- 
acter by  the  steps  in  its  transportation  would  be  extremely  artificial. 
Once  admit  the  principle,  and  means  ■\\'ill  be  afforded  of  evading  the 
national  control  of  foreign  commerce  from  points  in  the  interior  of  a 
State.  There  must  be  transshipment  at  the  seaboard,  and  if  that  may 
be  made  the  point  of  ultimate  destination  by  the  device  of  separate, 
bills  of  lading,  the  conmaerce  •will  be  given  local  character  though  it 
be  essentially  foreign. 

It  is  thus  clear  that  neither  the  form  of  the  bill  of  lading 
nor  incidental  delays  are  determinative  of  this  question,  but 
that  it  depends  upon  the  real  and  essential  nature  of  the 
movement.  See  also  So.  Pac.  Term.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  219  U.  S.  498,  and  Ohio  Ry.  Commission 
V.  Worthington,  225  U.  S.  101. 

The  nature  of  the  movement  involved  in  this  particular  case 
depends  upon  whether  the  shipment  from  the  Commonwealth 
Pier  to  intrastate  points  is  fairly  separable  from  the  ship- 
ment of  the  goods  from  abroad  to  the  pier,  having  in  mind 
the  substance  and  not  the  formalities  of  the  transaction. 

In  my  opinion,  if,  before  the  arrival  in  port  of  goods  shipped 
from  abroad  to  the  Commonwealth  Pier,  the  intention  or 
understanding  of  the  parties  is  that  their  ultimate  destination 
is  to  be  another  Intrastate  point,  a  shipment  in  pursuance  of 
such  intention  is  to  be  considered  as  a  part  or  a  continuation 
of  a  foreign  shipment,  and  does  not  constitute  an  intrastate 
movement. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Commonwealth  Pier  was  in- 
tended to  be  the  ultimate  destination,  and  a  reshipment  of 
the  goods  from  the  pier  to  an  intrastate  point  was  deter- 
mined upon  only  after  the  arrival  of  the  goods  in  port,  I  am 
of  the  opinion  that  the  shipment  from  the  pier  to  such  intra- 


112  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

state  point  is  intrastate  in  its  character  within  the  meaning  of 
your  order  of  March  29,  1915,  and  it  is  immaterial  that  the 
goods  came  originally  from  outside  the  Commonwealth. 

But,  from  the  nature  of  things.  Commonwealth  Pier  itself 
cannot,  in  the  vast  majority  of  instances,  be  intended  as  the 
ultimate  destination.  The  buyer  does  not,  ordinarily,  come 
into  possession  or  control  of  the  goods  until  they  reach  some 
other  point.  And  as  it  appears  that  there  are  no  storage 
facilities,  properly  so-called  at  the  pier,  and  that  goods  re- 
ceived from  abroad  can  remain  there  only  a  short  time,  it 
would  seem  that,  generally  speaking,  some  other  destination 
must  have  been  in  the  contemplation  of  the  parties  before  the 
arrival  of  the  goods  in  port. 

Applying  the  above  principles  to  this  particular  case,  the 
practical  result  is  that,  as  a  general  rule,  at  least,  such  ship- 
ments from  the  pier  to  intrastate  points  retain  their  foreign 
character  and  are,  therefore,  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
your  commission,  although  there  may  be  isolated  cases,  as 
above  indicated,  where  it  would  be  otherwise. 

An  answer  to  your  second  and  third  questions  involves  some 
embarrassment. 

The  Commonwealth  has  brought  a  bill  in  equity  in  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Court,  seeking  to  compel  the  Boston  & 
Maine  Railroad  and  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  a  certain 
contract  dated  July  1,  1912,  in  which  suit  the  Commonwealth 
contends  that  the  railroads  agreed  that  the  flat  Boston  rates 
of  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  should  apply  to  goods  shipped 
to  and  from  Commonwealth  Pier. 

One  of  the  contentions  of  the  Commonwealth  in  this  suit  is 
that  no  unlawful  discrimination  was  created  by  this  contract, 
and  on  application  by  the  Commonwealth  a  preliminary  in- 
junction has  been  issued  enjoining  the  Boston  &  Maine  Rail- 
road from  putting  into  effect  tariffs  which,  if  they  had  been 
permitted  to  become  effective,  would  have  removed  any  pos- 
sible claim  of  discrimination. 

Furthermore,  at  the  request  of  the  Directors  of  the  Port  of 
Boston  and  of  His  Excellency  the  Governor,  the  Commonwealth, 
through  the  Attorney-General,  has  intervened  in  a  petition 
brought  by  the  National  Dock  and  Storage  Warehouse  Company 
before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  praying  for  the 
discontinuance  of  an  alleged  discrimination  which  they  contend 
is  imposed  upon  them  by  reason  of  the  absorption  by  the  Boston 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCimiENT  —  No.  12.  113 

&  Maine  Railroad  of  switching  charges  between  the  Common- 
wealth Pier  and  the  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  in  Boston. 

The  position  of  the  Commonwealth  in  these  proceedings  is 
that  no  unlawful  discrimination  was  created  by  said  contract 
and  the  acts  of  the  railroad  in  pursuance  thereof. 

Since  an  answer  to  your  remaining  questions  would  involve 
an  assumption  that  an  unlawful  discrimination  in  fact  does 
exist,  I  do  not  deem  it  appropriate  for  me  to  advise  you 
thereon  at  the  very  moment  when,  in  the  interest  of  the 
Commonwealth,  I  am  contending  before  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  that  that  assumption  is  contrary  to  fact, 
and  especially  at  a  time  when  it  might  be  claimed  that  the  in- 
junction issued  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  was  in  part 
based  upon  a  determination  contrary  to  such  assumption. 

I  am  strengthened  in  this  view  for  the  reason  that  but  few 
shipments  would  be  in  any  event  involved  in  any  further 
order  made  by  your  commission.  As  indicated  in  my  answer 
to  the  first  question,  substantially  all  the  shipments  to  the 
National  Dock  and  Storage  Warehouse  Company  Pier  must 
necessarily  be  destined  for  water  transportation  and  conse- 
quently interstate  or  foreign  movements,  and  relatively  few 
from  said  pier  would  be  intrastate.  See  So.  Pac.  Term.  Co.  v. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  219  U.  S.  498,  and  0.  Ry. 
Commission  v.  Worthington,  225  U.  S.  101. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Constitutional    Law  —  Taxation  —  Public    Purpose  —  Construc- 
tion of  Dry  Dock. 

The  construction  and  operation  of  a  drj^  dock  in  Boston  Harbor  by  the 
Commonwealth  in  accordance  with  St.  1911,  c.  748,  and  Spec.  Acts, 
1915,  c.  335,  is  a  public  purpose  for  which  money  may  be  raised  by 
taxation,  and  is  not  in  violation  of  Ai-ticie  X.  of  the  Declaration  of 
Rights. 

Sept.  Id,  1915. 
His  Excellency  the  Governor  and  the  Honorable  Council. 

Gentlemen:  —  Under  date  of  Aug.  20,  1915,  you  have 
asked  my  opinion  upon  the  following  question:  — 

Whether  or  not  there  is  any  constitutional  objection  to  the  con- 
struction and  operation  by  the  State  of  a  dry  dock  for  repairing  and 
overhauling  vessels  ouTied  by  persons  and  corporations  other  than  the 
State,  who  shall  paj''  the  State  compensation  therefor. 


114  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

I  understand  that  the  "operation"  of  the  dry  dock  con- 
templated by  your  question  consists  of  the  cradling  of  the 
vessels  preparatory  to  the  work  of  repairing  and  overhauling 
by  the  owners  or  persons  to  be  employed  by  them. 

A  consideration  of  your  question  must  be  based  upon  the 
fact  that  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  chapter  335  of  the 
Special  Acts  of  1915,  and  chapter  748  of  the  Acts  of  1911, 
the  Legislature  has  authorized  the  construction  of  a  dry  dock 
and  the  expenditure  of  the  public  moneys  therefor.  Further- 
more, it  must  be  based  upon  the  definite  proposition  now 
before  you  for  approval,  namely,  the  construction  of  a  dry 
dock  "equipped  with  modern  facilities  and  appliances  suffi- 
cient in  size  for  the  accommodation  of  any  modern  steam- 
ship." I  do  not  understand  that  up  to  the  present  time 
private  enterprise  has  constructed  and  equipped,  nor  that 
there  is  any  reasonable  expectation  that  it  will  construct  and 
equip,  in  Boston  Harbor,  a  dock  possessing  the  magnitude 
and  affording  the  facilities  which  the  Legislature  believes 
necessary  to  the  development  of  the  resources  of  the  Com- 
monwealth and  the  preservation  of  her  industrial  and  com- 
mercial prosperity.  The  proposition,  therefore,  is  this:  Do 
the  acts  of  the  Legislature,  above  referred  to,  authorizing  the 
expenditure  of  the  State's  moneys  raised  by  taxation  for  the 
construction  and  operation  of  such  a  dry  dock  in  Boston 
Harbor,  constitute  a  violation  of  Article  X.  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Rights,  providing  that  "no  part  of  the  property  of  any 
individual  can,  with  justice,  be  taken  from  him,  or  applied 
to  public  uses,  without  his  own  consent  or  that  of  the  repre- 
sentative body  of  the  people?"  This  provision  has  been  held 
to  mean  that  the  property  of  the  individual  can  be  taken  only 
for  a  public  purpose.  Talbot  v.  Hudson,  16  Gray,  417.  "This 
is  equally  true  whether  the  property  is  a  dwelling  house  taken 
by  right  of  eminent  domain,  or  money  demanded  by  the  tax 
collector."     Opinion  of  the  Justices,  182  Mass.  606. 

The  legislative  adjudication  of  the  wisdom  of  constructing 
a  dry  dock  carries  with  it  a  presumption  in  favor  of  its  con- 
stitutionality, which  can  be  overthrown  only  upon  the  clear- 
est proof.  "Courts  are  bound  to  presume  the  existence  of 
those  circumstances  which  will  support  it  and  give  it  valid- 
ity." Wellington,  Petr.,  16  Pick.  96;  Opinion  of  the  Justices, 
8  Gray,  21;  Talbot  v.  Hudson,  16  Gray,  417.  "The  purposes 
of  the  act  as  declared  therein,  its  general  structure,  the 
nature  of  its  provisions,  its  probable  operation  and  effect  are 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  115 

all  to  be  considered  In  determining  whether  it  is  a  lawful 
exercise  of  legislative  power." 

To  apply  these  principles  of  interpretation  to  the  question 
before  us,  what  are  the  declared  purposes  of  the  legislative 
act?  They  are  expressed  in  the  title  to  chapter  748  of  the 
Acts  of  1911,  "An  Act  relative  to  the  development  of  the  port 
of  Boston."  They  are  expressed  in  section  2,  providing  that 
"the  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston  shall  be  the  administra- 
tive officers  of  the  port,  shall  cause  to  be  made  all  necessary 
plans  for  the  comprehensive  development  of  the  harbor,"  etc. 
They  are  expressed  in  section  12,  which  makes  it  one  of  the 
duties  of  the  Directors  forthwith  "to  make,  and,  so  far  as 
may  be  practicable,  to  put  into  execution,  comprehensive 
plans  providing  on  the  lands  now  owned  or  hereafter  acquired 
by  the  Commonwealth  in  the  area  described  in  section  four 
of  this  act,  adequate  piers,  capable  of  accommodating  the 
largest  vessels,  and  in  connection  with  such  piers  suitable 
highways,  waterways,  railroad  connections  and  storage  yards, 
and  sites  .for  warehouses  and  industrial  establishments,"  and 
requires  a  report  of  "all  necessary  plans  and  estimates  of 
cost  for  the  construction  of  a  dry  dock  equipped  with  modern 
facilities  and  appliances,  sufficient  in  size  for  the  accommo- 
dation of  any  modern  ocean  steamship."  They  are  expressed 
in  section  5  which,  by  the  act  first  referred  to,  includes  a  dry 
dock  providing  for  "the  constructing,  or  securing  the  con- 
structing or  utilizing  of,  piers  and,  in  connection  therewith, 
highways,  waterways,  railroad  connections,  storage  yards 
and  sites  for  warehouses  and  industrial  establishments,"  etc. 
In  short,  the  purposes  of  the  legislative  acts  include  the  com- 
prehensive development  and  improvement  of  the  principal 
harbor  of  the  Commonwealth  as  a  gateway  through  which 
the  products  of  Massachusetts  industry,  and  the  articles  of  her 
commerce,  may  come  and  go  to  the  greatest  advantage  of 
her  citizens.  They  include  the  improvement  of  that  system  of 
transportation,  both  by  water  and  land,  for  those  products  and 
those  articles  upon  which  the  prosperity  of  our  citizens  depends. 

The  improvement  of  Boston  Harbor  is  no  new  field  for  the 
legitimate  expenditure  of  public  money.  In  the  case  of  Moore 
V.  Sanford,  reported  in  151  Mass.  285,  in  passing  upon  the 
constitutionality  of  an  act  providing  for  the  condemnation  of 
flats  in  Boston  Harbor,  and  the  filling,  improving  and  ulti- 
mate sale  of  them,  —  a  purpose  which  inevitably  to  some  extent 
entered  the  field  of  private  enterprise,  —  the  Supreme  Court 


116  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

said  the  act  "was  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  improving  the 
harbor  of  Boston  and  also  of  providing  better  and  more 
accommodations  for  the  railroad  and  commercial  interests  of 
the  city  by  the  solid  land  which  would  take  the  place  of  the 
flats  over  which  the  tide  ebbed  and  flowed;"  and  further, 
"that  the  improvement  of  Boston  Harbor  is  an  object  of  a 
public  nature,  and  thus  that  lands  taken  for  this  purpose  are 
taken  for  a  public  use  can  hardly  be  controverted." 

In  commenting  upon  this  case  in  Opinion  of  the  Justices, 
204  Mass.  207,  the  same  court  refers  to  it  as  a  case  which 
"rests  upon  the  ground  that  the  work  done  was  in  a  true 
sense  for  the  promotion  of  commerce,  through  its  direct  and 
close  relatio.n  to  the  improvement  of  Boston  Harbor  in  mak- 
ing connections  between  the  great  highways  used  for  inter- 
state commerce  and  the  numerous  ships  that  are  passing 
back  and  forth  between  Boston  and  foreign  ports.  All  that 
was  done  was  held  to  be  fairly  incidental  to  the  main  pur- 
pose of  promoting  commerce  between  the  United  States  and 
distant  countries.  The  improvement  of  harbors  and  the  con- 
struction of  public  docks,  wharves,  and  possibly  of  ware- 
houses, to  be  used  under  governmental  authority  as  a  part  of 
the  facilities  for  the  transportation  of  merchandise  in  com- 
mercial enterprises,  and  the  building  of  railroads  to  be  used 
for  the  same  object,  may  all  affect  the  public  so  directly  as  to 
constitute  a  public  purpose  for  which  money  raised  by  taxa- 
tion may  be  expended." 

In  my  judgment  the  development  and  improvement  of  the 
port  of  Boston  is  a  purpose  for  which  the  Legislature  may 
constitutionally  authorize  the  use  of  the  public  moneys.  The 
advisability  or  wisdom  of  appropriating  them  to  such  a  use 
are  matters  entirely  within  the  discretion  of  that  body.  It 
is  within  the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  determine  further 
that  a  dry  dock  may  be  an  essential  part  of  the  improvement 
of  the  harbor,  and  even  necessary  to  its  full  development. 
But  whether  the  benefits  hoped  for  justify  the  expenditure 
of  any  of  the  moneys  so  appropriated  for  the  particular  dry 
dock  now  in  question  before  the  Governor  and  Council,  as  an 
essential  part  of  such  development  and  improvement,  is  a 
question  the  responsibility  for  answering  which  the  Legisla- 
ture has  placed  upon  the  Directors  of  the  Port  and  your- 
selves. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  117 


Directors   of   the    Port   of   Boston  —  Powers  —  License   to    build 
Structure  in  Tide  Waters  —  City  of  Boston. 

The  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston  have  authority,  with  the  approval  of 
the  Governor  and  Council,  under  R.  L.,  c.  96,  as  amended  by  St. 
1911,  c.  748,  §  4,  to  Ucense  the  building  by  the  city  of  Boston  of  a 
structure  within  the  boundary  of  the  property  granted  to  it  by  Spec. 
Acts,  1915,  c.  326. 

Sept.  17,  1915. 

Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston,  40  Central  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  Under  date  of  Sept.  3,  1915,  you  have 
called  my  attention  to  chapter  326  of  the  Special  Acts  of  1915, 
whereby  the  harbor  line  in  Boston  Harbor  at  Fort  Point 
Channel  is  changed  by  advancing  it  approximately  50  feet 
southeasterly  from  Dorchester  Avenue  for  a  distance  of  1,500 
feet,  and  the  city  of  Boston  is  authorized  to  build  a  sea  wall 
on  the  new  line  "and  to  fill  solid,  without  payment  of  com- 
pensation for  land  of  the  commonwealth  or  for  the  displace- 
ment of  tide  water,  the  area  enclosed  by  said  sea  wall  for  the 
purpose  of  constructing  a  high  pressure  fire  pumping  station;" 
and  the  city  is  further  authorized  "to  hold,  lease,  sell  or 
use  ...  so  much  of  said  area  as  is  not  appropriated"  to  this 
purpose;  and  to  the  further  fact  that  the  city  of  Boston  has 
applied  to  your  Board  for  a  permit  to  build  a  structure  60  by 
200  feet  at  the  corner  of  Dorchester  Avenue  and  Summer 
Street.  This  application,  therefore,  requests  a  permit  to 
build  10  feet  outside  of  the  harbor  line  as  established  by  said  act. 

You  have  since  informed  me,  however,  that  the  city  of 
Boston  has  withdrawn  its  request  as  to  this  10  feet,  and  is 
now  applying  for  a  license  only  as  to  territory  within  the  new 
harbor  hue. 

On  this  state  of  facts  you  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to 
whether  your  Board  has  authority  to  grant  a  permit  for  a 
location  within  the  boundary  of  the  property  granted  by  the 
Legislature  to  the  city  of  Boston. 

St.  1911,  c.  748,  §  4,  confers  upon  your  Board  all  the  rights, 
powers  and  duties  pertaining  to  the  Board  of  Harbor  and 
Land  Commissioners,  in  general,  with  respect  to  the  port  of 
Boston.  Under  section  2  of  said  act  your  Board  is  given 
immediate  charge  of  the  lands  now  or  hereafter  owned  by  the 
Commonwealth  upon  or  adjacent  to  the  harbor  front,  with 
certain  exceptions,  "and  of  the  construction  of  piers  and 
other  public  works  therein." 


118  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

The  powers  of  the  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners  perti- 
nent to  the  question  raised  by  you  are  set  forth  in  R.  L.,  c. 
96,  §§  14,  16  and  17.  Section  14  provides,  in  part,  that  if 
harbor  lines  are  established  by  the  General  Court  *'no  wharf, 
pier  or  other  structure  shall  thereafter  be  extended  into  said 
harbor  beyond  such  lines."     Section  17  provides:  — 

Said  board  may  license  and  prescribe  the  terms  for  the  construction 
or  extension  of  a  wharf,  pier,  dam,  sea  wall,  road,  bridge  or  other 
structure,  or  for  the  filhng  of  land  or  flats,  or  the  driving  of  piles  in 
tide  water  below  high  water  mark,  but  not,  except  as  to  a  structure 
authorized  by  law,  beyond  any  established  harbor  line,  nor  unless 
wdth  the  approval  of  the  governor  and  council,  beyond  the  Hne  of 
riparian  ownership. 

Accordingly,  it  would  seem  to  be  clear  that  your  Board  has 
authority  to  grant  a  petition  to  build  any  structure  within 
the  established  harbor  lines. 

Your  doubt  apparently  arises  from  the  fact  that  section  2 
of  chapter  326  of  the  Special  Acts  of  1915  directly  authorizes 
the  city  to  build  a  sea  wall  and  fill  solid  the  area  for  the 
purpose  stated. 

While  it  is  undoubtedly  open  to  the  city  to  proceed  under 
this  statute,  with  the  approval  of  your  Board  under  R.  L., 
c.  96,  §  16,  if  the  city  of  Boston  wishes  to  go  further,  and, 
disregarding  the  authority  granted  to  it  by  the  special  act  of 
1915,  seeks  a  license  from  your  Board  under  R.  L.,  c.  96,  §  17, 
such  course  would  seem  to  be  open,  subject  to  the  limitation 
against  any  structure  "beyond  any  established  harbor  line." 
I  cannot  believe  that  in  enacting  the  aforesaid  special  act  of 
1915  there  was  any  intention  on  the  part  of  the  Legislature 
of  abrogating  or  limiting  the  powers  conferred  by  R.  L.,  c.  96, 
§  17.  A  special  act  such  as  this  would  not  by  implication 
repeal  a  general  law  unless  there  was  an  absolute  inconsist- 
ency. There  seems  to  be  nothing  inconsistent  in  your  Board 
granting  a  license  to  do  something  which  the  Legislature  has 
approved,  nor  in  the  city  of  Boston  taking  the  position  that  it 
does  not  choose  to  accept  the  special  grant  of  the  Legislature, 
but  to  proceed  under  the  general  laws. 

If  the  city  elects  to  follow  this  course  there  may  be  con- 
siderable doubt  as  to  whether  it  is  not  thereby  debarred  from 
accepting  the  privileges  conferred  by  the  1915  act;  but  upon 
that  point  no  opinion  at  present  seems  required. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  119 

In  dealing  with  such  a  petition,  however,  your  Board  is  not 
acting  under  the  special  act  of  1915,  since  no  powers  are  con- 
ferred upon  you  thereby;  but  under  the  provisions  of  R.  L., 
c.  96,  section  23  of  that  chapter  provides:  — 

The  amount  of  tide  water  which  is  displaced  by  any  structure  below 
high  water  mark,  or  by  any  filhng  of  flats,  shall  be  ascertained  by  the 
board,  which  shall  require  the  persons  who  cause  such  displacement 
to  make  compensation  therefor  by  excavating,  under  its  direction,  be- 
tween high  and  low  water  mark  in  some  part  of  the  same  harbor  a 
basin  for  a  quantity  of  water  equal  to  that  displaced;  or  by  pajdng  in 
Ueu  of  such  excavation  an  amount  assessed  by  said  board,  not  exceed- 
ing thirty-seven  and  one-haK  cents  per  cubic  yard  of  water  displaced; 
or  by  improving  the  harbor  in  any  other  manner  satisfactory  to  the 
board;  and  the  money  shall  be  paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  common- 
wealth, and  be  reserved  as  a  compensation  fund  for  such  harbor.  The 
income  thereof  may  be  used  under  the  direction  of  the  board  for  the 
improvement  of  the  harbor.  An  assessment  for  tide  water  wliich  has 
been  displaced  may  be  recovered  in  an  action  of  contract  in  the  name 
of  the  treasurer  and  receiver-general. 

As  I  understand  that  the  city  does  not  have  title  to  the 
territory  in  question,  such  license  can  only  be  granted  with 
the  approval  of  the  Governor  and  Council. 

It  will  also  be  necessary  for  the  city  to  comply  with  the  re- 
quirements of  section  24,  providing  that  in  addition  to  such 
compensation  for  displacement  of  tide  water  as  may  be  fixed 
by  your  Board,  compensation  for  rights  granted  in  land  the 
title  to  which  is  in  the  Commonwealth  shall  be  paid  in  such 
sum  as  may  be  determined  by  the  Governor  and  Council. 

Answering  specifically  the  question  put,  I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  the  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston  have  authority  to 
license  the  building  of  a  structure,  as  described,  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  property  referred  to  in  chapter  326  of  the 
Special  Acts  of  1915. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General, 


120  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


Prison  Commission  —  Male  Laborers  —  Wages. 

St.  1914,  c.  458,  providing  that  ''the  wages  paid  by  the  board  of  prison 
commissioners  to  male  laborers  directly  employed  by  it  shall  not  be 
less  than  two  dollars  and  a  haK  a  day,"  apphes  to  all  male  laborers 
employed  at  the  Reformatory  for  Women. 

Sept.  20,  1915. 

J.  Warren  Bailey,  Esq.,  Secretary,  Prison  Commisdoners. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  Septem- 
ber 11  requesting  my  opinion  in  behalf  of  the  Prison  Com- 
missioners as  to  whether  chapter  458  of  the  Acts  of  1914  ap- 
plies to  male  employees  employed  at  the  Reformatory  for 
Women. 

Section  1  of  this  statute  is  as  follows:  — 

The  wages  paid  by  the  board  of  prison  commissioners  to  male  la- 
borers directly  employed  by  it  shall  be  not  less  than  two  dollars  and 
a  half  a  day. 

You  call  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  under  section  30  of 
chapter  223  of  the  Revised  Laws  the  superintendent  of  this 
institution  alone  is  appointed  by  the  Prison  Commissioners. 
All  other  officers  and  employees  are  appointed  by  the  super- 
intendent and  hold  their  offices  during  her  pleasure.  This  is 
the  same  rule  w^hich  is  in  force  in  all  the  other  institutions 
under  the  control  of  your  Board.  It  is  true,  therefore,  that, 
strictly,  the  laborers  in  question  are  not  hired  or  appointed 
by  your  Board  but  by  a  public  officer  appointed  by  you  and 
removable  at  your  pleasure.  Yet  these  laborers  are  in  the 
service  of  the  Commonw^ealth  in  an  institution  under  the 
control  of  your  Board.  If  they  are  not  to  be  considered  as 
employed  by  j^ou,  Avithin  the  meaning  of  this  statute,  then  the 
statute  has  no  effect  w^hatever,  since  in  that  case  it  would 
apply  to  no  one.  It  must  be  interpreted  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  give  to  it  a  reasonable  effect,  and  to  carry  out  what  was 
apparently  the  intention  of  the  Legislature.  In  my  opinion 
the  w^ord  "directly"  was  used  to  indicate  persons  directly  in 
the  service  of  the  institutions  under  your  control,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  persons  in  the  service  of  contractors  per- 
forming work  under  contracts  with  your  Board.  On  the 
whole,  it  is  my  opinion  that  this  statute  applies  to  the  laborers 
in  question. 

Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


1916.1  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  121 


Civil    Service  —  Conviction    of   Crime    against    Laws    of   Com- 
monwealth —  Violation  of  Traffic  Regulations. 

A  person  convicted  of  allowing  his  automobile  to  remain  standing  on  a 
pubKc  highway  in  Boston  for  more  than  twenty  minutes  in  violation 
of  a  traffic  regulation  established  by  the  board  of  street  commissioners 
of  that  city  has  not  been  convicted  of  a  crime  against  the  laws  of  the 
Commonwealth  within  the  meaning  of  R.  L.,  c,  19,  §  17. 

Sept.  24,  1915. 

Civil  Service  Commission,  Rooms  151-152,  State  House,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen: — You  have  requested  the  opinion  of  this 
department  upon  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  convic- 
tion of  a  person  for  allowing  his  automobile  to  remain  stand- 
ing on  Tremont  Street,  Boston,  over  twenty  minutes  is  the 
conviction  of  a  crime  within  the  meaning  of  section  17  of 
chapter  19  of  the  Revised  Laws  and  Civil  Service  Rule  8. 

R.  L.,  c.  19,  §  17,  provides  as  follows:  — 

No  person  shall  be  appointed  to  or  employed  in  any  office  to  which 
the  provisions  of  this  chapter  apply  within  one  year  after  his  convic- 
tion of  anj^  crime  against  the  laws  of  this  commonwealth. 

Civil  Service  Rule  8  is  as  follows:  — 

No  apphcation  for  appointment  -will  be  accepted  from  .  .  .  any 
person  who  within  the  year  preceding  his  apphcation  has  been  con- 
victed of  any  crime  against  the  laws  of  this  commonwealth;  and  the 
name  of  any  such  person  may  be  removed  from  any  eligible  fist. 

The  act  of  w^hich  this  applicant  was  found  guilty  was  not  in 
violation  of  any  statute  of  this  Commonwealth  nor  of  any 
ordinance  passed  by  the  city  council  of  the  city  of  Boston, 
but  was  in  violation  of  section  11  of  Article  V.  of  the  street 
traffic  regulations  promulgated  by  the  board  of  street  com- 
missioners of  the  city  of  Boston.  Such  a  rule  can  stand  in  no 
more  favorable  position  than  an  ordinance  itself. 

The  question  as  to  how  far  and  to  what  extent  proceedings 
for  violations  of  the  ordinances  of  municipal  corporations  are 
to  be  regarded  as  prosecutions  for  crime  presents  a  question 
of  considerable  nicety.  In  many  States  they  are  held  to  be 
civil  or  penal  actions,  —  State  v.  Robitshek,  60  Minn.  123; 
Greeley  v.  Hamman,  12  Colo.  99;  and  People  v.  Jackson,  8 
Mich.     110, — although     in     this     Commonwealth     they     are 


122  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

treated  for  some  purposes  as  criminal  in  their  nature.     In  re 
Goddard,  16  Pick.  504;    Com.  v.  Worcester,  3  Pick.  462,  474. 

The  issue  here,  however,  is  not  whether  the  violation  of  such 
an  ordinance  or  by-law  is  essentially  a  public  wrong,  but  is 
whether  such  violations  were  intended  to  be  included  in  the 
disqualifying  provisions  above  quoted. 

In  many  jurisdictions,  although  not  in  Massachusetts,  the 
question  has  arisen  as  to  whether  under  a  statute  such  as  our 
R.  L.,  c.  175,  §  21,  which  provides  that  the  conviction  of  a 
witness  of  a  crime  may  be  shown  to  affect  his  credibility,  the 
conviction  of  a  person  for  a  violation  of  a  municipal  ordinance 
may  be  shown,  and  the  courts  have  uniformly  held  that  it 
cannot.  State  v.  Crawford,  58  Ore.  116;  Coble  v.  State,  31  Oh. 
St.  100;  Koch  v.  State,  126  Wis.  470,  478;  People  v.  Manistee 
Co.,  26  Mich.  422;    Gillman  v.  State,  165  Ala.  135. 

The  question  here  is  further  simplified  because  the  term 
used  is  not  "crime,"  but  is  "crime  against  the  laics  of  the 
Commonwealth."  The  laws  of  the  Commonwealth  consist  of 
its  Constitution,  statutes  and  common  law.  There  is  an 
obvious  difference  between  such  general  laws  and  an  ordi- 
nance or  by-law  of  a  municipal  corporation.  The  latter  is 
strictly  local  in  its  operation,  and  does  not  constitute  a  part 
of  the  law  of  the  land.  For  example,  although  a  court  is 
bound  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  public  laws  of  the  State, 
it  will  not  judicially  notice  a  municipal  ordinance  or  by-law. 
O'Brien  v.  City  of  Woburn,  184  Mass.  598;  Attorney-General  v. 
McCabe,  172  Mass.  417;    Mahar  v.  Steuer,  170  Mass.  454. 

For  the  above  reasons  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  a  violation 
of  the  regulations  of  the  board  of  street  commissioners  does 
not  come  within  the  purview  of  the  acts  above  quoted,  and 
that  the  applicant  in  question  is  not  thereby  disqualified. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Registered  Pharmacist  —  Ownership  of  Stock  in   Corporation  — 
Payment  by  Promissory  Note. 

The  fact  that  a  registered  pharmacist  holds  a  certificate  of  stock  in  a 
corporation  formed  to  carry  on  a  drug  business,  for  which  he  has  paid 
by  giving  to  the  corporation  his  personal  note,  does  not  necessarily 
make  him  an  owner  of  such  stock  within  the  meaning  of  R.  L.,  c.  100, 
§  22,  as  amended  by  St.  1913,  c.  410.  The  question  of  bona  fide  owner- 
ship must  be  determined  on  the  facts  of  each  case. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  123 

If  stock  held  by  a  registered  pharmacist  in  such  a  corporation  is  mort- 
gaged or  pledged  he  is  not  an  owner  of  it  within  the  meaning  of  this 
statute. 

Oct.  5,  1915. 

Mr.  Albert  J.  Brunelle,  Secretary,  Board  of  Registration  in  Pharmacy. 

Dear  Sir:  —  You  ask  for  an  opinion  as  to  whether  a  license 
may  be  granted  to  a  registered  pharmacist  under  R.  L.,  c. 
100,  §  22,  as  amended  by  St.  1913,  c.  410,  if  said  registered 
pharmacist  submits  a  certificate  of  stock  of  the  value  of  S500, 
and  states  under  oath  that  he  has  paid  for  the  same  by  his 
personal  note  to  the  company.  , 

The  material  portion  of  the  statute  referred  to  is  as  fol- 
lows: — 

A  registered  pharmacist  who  owns  stock  of  the  actual  value  of  at 
least  five  hundred  dollars  in  a  corporation  which  has  been  incorporated 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  the  drug  business,  and  who  conducts  in 
person  the  business  of  a  store  of  such  corporation,  shall  be  considered 
as  actively  engaged  in  business  on  his  own  account,  and  as  qualified  to 
receive  a  license  for  such  store. 

In  my  judgment  a  Massachusetts  corporation  has  no  au- 
thority to  issue  stock  in  consideration  of  promissory  notes 
made  to  it  by  the  person  to  whom  the  stock  is  issued.  Unless 
there  is  specific  statutory  authority  to  the  contrary,  the  same 
holds  true  as  to  a  foreign  corporation.  The  burden  is  on  any 
foreign  corporation  asserting  such  authority  to  satisfy  your 
Board  of  the  truth  of  the  claim. 

The  legislative  intent  is  clear,  that  a  recipient  of  a  license 
under  this  act  must  be  a  bona  fide  owner  of  stock  to  the  value 
of    $500. 

If  a  registered  pharmacist  actually  owns  such  stock  by  a 
purchase  in  good  faith,  and  holds  it  in  his  own  name,  and 
neither  mortgages  nor  pledges  the  same,  he  is  the  owner  of 
the  stock,  and  is  qualified  to  receive  a  license  under  the 
statute. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  stock  is  mortgaged  he  is  not  the 
owner  but  merely  has  an  equit}^  and  the  mortgagee  is  the 
holder  of  the  legal  title.  If  the  stock  is  pledged  the  pledgee 
has  a  lien  on  the  property.  Thompson  v.  Dolliver,  132  Mass. 
103.  In  neither  case  can  the  mortgagor  or  pledgor  be  said 
to  own  the  stock  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.  Even 
the  colorable  transfer  of  the  stock  upon  the  books  of  the  cor- 
poration to  the  pledgor  or  mortgagor  will  not  qualify  him  as  a 


124  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

licensee  under  the  law.  See  Baker's  Appeal,  108  Pa.  St.  510, 
re  Argus  Printing  Company,  1  N.  D.  434,  and  cases  cited. 
It  is  my  opinion  that  it  is  the  duty  of  your  Board  to  require 
from  each  applicant  for  a  license  under  the  provisions  of  this 
statute  satisfactory  evidence  that  such  applicant  is  in  fact 
the  true  owner  of  stock  in  the  corporation  to  the  value  of  $500. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Minimum  Wage  Commission  —  Minimum  Wage  —  Fiiies  — 
Payments  to  cover  Sick  Benefits  —  Vacancies  in  Wage 
Boards. 

The  payment  by  an  employer  of  an  amount  less  than  the  minimum  wage 
prescribed  by  a  decree  of  the  Minimum  Wage  Commission  constitutes 
a  violation  of  that  decree,  and  it  may  not  be  excused  by  showing  that 
the  prescribed  sum  has  been  reduced  because  of  fines  for  misconduct 
or  tardiness,  or  because  of  deductions  on  account  of  benefits  to  accrue 
to  the  employee  in  case  of  sickness. 

It  is  doubtful  if  the  Minimum  Wage  Commission  has  the  power  to  fill  a 
vacancy  in  a  wage  board  arising  after  that  board  has  been  fully  estab- 
lished and  organized. 

Oct.  5,  1915. 

Minimum  Wage  Commission,  1  Beacon  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

Gentlemen:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  upon  the 
following  question:  —  "If  any  employer,  who  previous  to  com- 
plying with  the  decree  of  the  Minimum  Wage  Commission 
recommending  a  minimum  wage  for  women  in  his  employ, 
deducts  from  the  recommended  minimum  wage  payable  to 
a  female  employee,  fines  for  misconduct  or  tardiness,  or 
sums  due  on  account  of  expected  benefits  to  accrue  in  case 
of  sickness,  are  such  deductions  violations  of  the  decree?" 

Under  St.  1912,  c.  706,  as  amended  by  St.  1913,  c.  330  and 
c.  673,  and  St.  1914,  c.  368,  your  Board  is  officially  entitled 
the  "Minimum  Wage  Commission,"  and  its  purpose,  as 
stated  in  the  title  of  the  act,  is  "  to  provide  for  the  deter- 
mination of  minimum  wages  for  women  and  minors." 

The  purpose  delineated  in  the  title  is  borne  out  by  the 
enactments  of  the  law.  The  wage  boards  established  "shall 
endeavor  to  determine  the  minimum  wage,  whether  by  time 
rate  or  piece  rate,  suitable  for  a  female  employee  of  ordinary 
ability,  .  .  .  and  also  suitable  minimum  wages  for  learners," 
etc.  (  section  5).     The  entire  act  shows  an  intention  that  the 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  125 

wages  to  be  determined  are  the  minimum  wages  for  the 
occupation  in  question.  It  is  only  when  the  wages  paid  are 
inadequate  "to  supply  the  necessary  cost  of  living  and  to 
maintain  the  worker  in  health"  that  the  investigations  of 
your  Board  become  operative  (sections  3,  4). 

If  the  wages  decreed  by  your  Board  may  be  diminished  by 
reason  of  fine  or  other  excuse,  the  purpose  of  the  act  is  de- 
feated to  a  considerable  extent. 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  primary  minimum  wage  is  for 
a  female  employee  of  "ordinary  ability."  Such  an  employee 
is  not  of  the  highest  skill,  and  may  be  expected  naturally  to 
make  some  mistakes,  allowance  for  which  must  be  presumed 
to  have  been  made  in  determining  the  wage  for  that  grade  of 
ability.  To  reduce  the  wage  fixed  by  deductions  under  what- 
ever name  is  reducing  the  compensation  below  the  sum  fixed 
as  a  minimum. 

The  foregoing  line  of  argument  does  not  require  that  the 
employer  pay  the  minimum  wage  fixed  on  the  time  basis  for 
less  time  than  the  full  period  for  which  the  rate  is  fixed.  If 
an  employee  for  whom  a  minimum  wage  has  been  determined 
on  the  basis  of  an  eight-hour  day  should  work  but  seven 
hours,  she,  of  course,  is  entitled  to  pay  for  only  the  seven 
hours'  work.  I  understand  your  question,  however,  to  refer 
to  an  arbitrary  amount  above  a  pro  rata  deduction  for  the 
time  lost  imposed  as  a  penalty  or  fine,  and  such  action  seems 
to  be  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  terms  of  the  act.  Accord- 
ingly, I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  payment  of  an  amount 
less  than  the  minimum  wage  prescribed  by  a  decree  of  your 
commission  constitutes  a  violation  of  the  decree,  and  may 
not  be  excused  by  a  claim  that  the  sum  has  been  reduced 
because  of  fines  for  misconduct  or  tardiness,  or  of  deductions 
on  account  of  expected  benefits  to  accrue  in  case  of  sickness. 

You  have  also  requested  my  opinion  as  to  the  proper  pro- 
cedure for  filling  a  vacancy  in  the  representation  of  employees 
in  any  industry  upon  a  duly  organized  wage  board. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  act  giving  specific  authority  to 
your  commission  to  fill  vacancies  upon  a  wage  board.  Until 
a  wage  board  has  been  organized  I  am  of  opinion  that  you 
may  make  appointments  to  take  the  places  of  persons  ap- 
pointed who  may  decline  appointment,  as  this  is  simply  an 
act  incidental  to  creating  the  board.  Where,  however,  the 
board  has  been  organized  and  a  vacancy  occurs,  I  think  it  ex- 
tremely   doubtful    if   your    commission    has    such    power.      In 


126  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

view  of  the  fact  that  your  authority  to  publish  names  of  em- 
ployers who  do  not  comply  with  the  recommendations  of  a 
wage  board  as  confirmed  by  your  commission  is  dependent 
upon  your  compliance  with  the  statute,  I  think  it  unwise  for 
your  commission  to  attempt  to  fill  vacancies  until  such  time  as 
you  may  receive  further  legislative  authority.  No  permanent 
injury  can  come  to  the  interests  of  the  employees  by  reason 
of  such  a  vacancy,  since  it  is  in  the  discretion  of  your  com- 
mission, under  the  provisions  of  section  6,  to  disapprove  any 
or  all  recommendations  made  by  such  a  board  and  to  recom- 
mit the  subject  to  a  new  wage  board. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General 


Licensed  Electricians  —  Licensed  Journeymen  —  Right  to  do 
Contract  Work  —  Employment  of  Learners  or  Appren- 
tices. 

A  journeyman  electrician  duly  licensed  under  Gen.  Acts,  1915,  c.  296,  has 
the  right,  by  contract  or  otherwise,  to  do  the  same  class  of  work  as  is 
done  by  master  electricians,  provided  that  he  does  the  work  himself 
with  his  own  hands  and  does  not  employ  any  journeyman  to  assist 
him,  and  he  may  in  such  work  employ  learners  or  apprentices  working 
with  him  and  under  his  direct  personal  supervision, 

Oct.  6,  1915. 

State  Examiners  of  Electricians,  State  House. 

Gentlemen: — You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to  the 
interpretation  to  be  placed  upon  chapter  296  of  the  General 
Acts  of  1915,  as  set  forth  in  the  following  questions:  — • 

Can  a  journeyman  who  is  licensed  under  the  provisions  of  chapter 
296  of  the  General  Acts  of  1915,  by  virtue  of  such  Hcense,  agree  to 
perform  and  do  contract  work  in  the  installation  of  "wires,  conduits, 
fixtures  or  other  appliances  for  carrjdng  or  using  electricity  for  fight, 
heat  or  power  purposes,"  provided  that  he  does  the  work  himself,  'vvdth 
his  own  hands,  and  does  not  employ  any  journe3maen  to  assist  him? 

Can  a  journeyman  ficensed  under  the  provisions  of  chapter  296  of 
the  General  Acts  of  1915  agree  to  perform  and  perform  the  same  class 
of  work,  by  contract  or  otherwise,  as  is  completed  and  performed  by 
the  master  electricians,  provided  he  does  the  work  with  his  own  hands 
and  does  not  employ  any  journeymen  electricians  to  aid  or  assist  him 
in  the  work? 

Has  a  ficensed  journeyman  electrician,  under  the  provisions  of  chap- 
ter 296  of  the  General  Acts  of  1915,  the  right  to  perform  and  do  work 
by  contract  or  otherwise  in  the  installation  of  "wires,  conduits,  fix- 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  —  No.  12.  127 

tures  or  other  appliances  for  carrj'ing  or  using  electricity  for  light, 
heat  or  power  purposes,"  provided  that  he  does  the  same  with  his  own 
hands;  and  has  he  the  further  right  to  employ  learners  or  apprentices 
working  T\dth  and  under  his  direct  personal  supervision  in  the  doing 
of  such  work? 

The  statute  in  question  nowhere  in  express  terms  forbids  a 
journeyman  from  making  a  contract  to  do,  and,  in  fact,  per- 
sonally doing,  the  work  in  the  installation  of  wires,  conduits, 
fixtures  or  other  appliances. 

The  restrictive  provisions  of  the  act  are  merely  that  "no 
person  .  .  .  shall  engage  in  or  work  at.  the  business  of  install- 
ing wires,  conduits,  etc.,  .  .  .  either  as  a  master  or  employing 
electrician  or  as  a  journeyman  electrician,  unless  such  per- 
son .  .  .  shall  have  received  a  license." 

The  words  "master  or  employing  electrician"  as  used  in 
this  act  "shall  mean  a  corporation,  firm  or  person,  having  a 
regular  place  of  business,  who,  hy  the  employ me7it  of  journey- 
men, performs  the  work  of  installing  wires,"  etc. 

The  word  "journeyman"  as  used  in  this  act  "shall  mean 
a  person  who  does  any  work  of  installing  wires,  conduits, 
apparatus,  fixtures  and  other  appliances  for  hire."  (Gen. 
Acts,  1915,  c.  296,  §  1.) 

It  is  expressly  provided  that  a  master's  certificate  "shall 
not  entitle  the  holder  individually  to  engage  in  or  perform  the 
actual  work  of  installing,  .  .  .  but  shall  entitle  him  to  conduct 
business  as  an  employing  or  master  electrician." 

A  journeyman's  certificate  authorizes  the  person  named  "to 
enter  upon  or  engage  in  the  occupation  of  journeyman  elec- 
trician," or  in  other  words,  adopting  the  definition  of  section 
1,  to  engage  in  "any  work  of  installing  wdres,  etc.,  .  .  .  for 
hire." 

A  provision  that  a  man  licensed  and  certified  to  be  com- 
petent to  do  the  work  in  question  could  not  lawfully  do  such 
work  unless  he  were  also  licensed  to  employ  others  to  do  it,  or 
without  letting  his  services  out  to  a  licensed  master  electri- 
cian, would  be  such  a  limitation  upon  what  have  generally 
been  recognized  as  fundamental  rights  of  a  citizen  of  this 
Commonwealth  and  country  that  it  should  not  be  read  into  a 
statute  unless  clearly  called  for.  The  present  statute,  so  far 
from  containing  such  clear  language,  seems  rather  to  counte- 
nance the  opposite  view,  and  accordingly  I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  all  of  your  questions  should  be  answered  in  the  affirma- 
tive. 


128  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Your  third  question  raises  the  inquiry  as  to  whether  a 
journeyman  electrician  contracting  and  doing  the  work  of  in- 
stallation with  his  own  hands  and  without  employing  other 
journeymen  has  *'the  further  right  to  employ  learners  or 
apprentices  working  with  and  under  his  direct  personal  super- 
vision in  the  doing  of  such  work."  Apart  from  the  provisions 
of  section  8  of  the  act  it  might  be  argued  that  such  course  of 
conduct  on  his  part  would  make  him  a  "master  or  employing 
electrician,"  for  which  a  master's  certificate  would  be  re- 
quired. 

Section  8,  however,  provides:  — 

Nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  construed  as  forbidding  the  emplojmient 
of  learners  or  apprentices  working  with  and  under  the  direct  personal 
supervision  of  journeymen  electricians  duly  certified  as  provided  in 
this  act. 

This  language  is  sweeping  in  its  terms,  and  so  long  as  its 
provisions  are  carefully  complied  with  I  am  of  the  opinion  that 
such  employment  by  a  journeyman  would  not  subject  him  to 
the  penalty  provided. 

The  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  Burke  v. 
Holyoke  Board  of  Health,  219  Mass.  219,  to  which  you  have 
referred,  is  a  decision  to  the  same  effect  as  that  given  above 
upon  a  set  of  statutes  somewhat  analogous. 

As  stated  above,  accordingly,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  all 
of  your  questions  are  to  be  answered  in  the  affirmative. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attor^iey -General. 


Taxation  —  Income    from     Annuity  —  Contract     issued     by     a 
Savings  Bank. 

The  income  from  an  annuity  contract  issued  by  a  savings  bank  under  St. 
1907,  c.  561,  is  exempt  from  local  taxation  by  the  provision  of  section 
24  of  that  statute,  that  "all  insurance  policies  and  annuity  contracts 
issued  by  such  banks  shall  otherwise  be  exempt  from  taxation." 

Oct.  11,  1915. 
Hon.  WiLLiAAi  D.  T.  Trefry,  Tax  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  request  for  an 
opinion  as  to  whether  the  income  from  an  annuity  contract 
issued  by  a  savings  bank  under  the  authority  of  St.  1907,  c. 
561,  is  taxable  locally  under  the  provisions  of  St.  1909,  c.  490, 
Part  I.,  §  4,  cl.  4. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  129 

The  last-mentioned  clause  is  as  follows:  — 

The  income  from  an  annuity,  and  the  excess  above  two  thousand 
dollars  of  the  income  from  a  profession,  trade  or  employment  accruing 
to  the  person  to  be  taxed  during  the  j^ear  ending  on  the  first  day  of 
April  of  the  year  in  which  the  tax  is  assessed.  Incomes  derived  from 
property  subject  to  taxation  shall  not  be  taxed. 

I  know  of  no  provision  of  law  exempting  from  taxation  the 
income  from  an  annuity  contract  issued  by  an  ordinary  insur- 
ance company.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  the  income  from 
such  an  annuity  is  taxable  under  this  clause;  and  it  is  plain 
from  an  examination  of  this  clause  in  its  present  form,  and 
particularly  from  an  examination  of  it  as  it  appeared  in  R.  L., 
c.  12,  §  4,  that  the  exemption  of  $2,000  made  in  cases  of  in- 
come from  a  profession,  trade  or  employment  does  not  apply 
to  such  an  annuity.  The  annuity  is  taxable  for  its  full 
amount. 

By  St.  1907,  c.  561,  savings  banks  were  authorized  under 
certain  conditions  and  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the  in- 
surance department  to  establish  insurance  departments  and 
to  issue  from  those  departments  life  insurance  contracts  to 
an  amount  not  exceeding  $500  and  annuity  contracts  calling 
for  a  payment  of  not  more  than  $200  annually.  The  limita- 
tion upon  the  amount  of  a  life  insurance  policy  which  such  a 
department  might  issue  was  subsequently  increased  to  $1,000. 
(St.  1915,  c.  32.) 

St.  1907,  c.  561,  §  24,  provided  that  savings  banks  should 
pay  a  tax  upon  funds  held  in  or  in  connection  with  their  in- 
surance departments  "to  the  same  extent  and  in  the  same 
manner  as  taxes  are  now  payable  on  deposits  held  by  the 
savings  department."  It  provided  that  they  should  not  be 
taxed  otherwise,  and  then  enacted,  "All  insurance  policies  and 
annuity  contracts  issued  by  such  banks  shall  otherwise  be 
exempt  from  taxation." 

The  real  question,  then,  is  whether  this  provision  last 
quoted  is  sufficiently  broad  to  exclude  the  income  of  annuity 
contracts  issued  by  savings  banks  under  this  statute.  Ob- 
viously there  is  a  distinction  between  the  present  value  of  an 
annuity  contract  and  the  income  payable  annually  to  the 
holder  of  such  a  contract.  If  the  language  of  section  24  is 
construed  strictly  it  exempts  from  taxation  only  the  former 
and  not  the  latter. 

It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  in  view  of  the  apparent  pur- 


130  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

pose  of  St.  1907,  c.  561,  this  provision  should  be  given  a 
broad  construction.  Without  going  into  the  details  of  the 
system  of  insurance  created  by  that  chapter  it  seems  to  have 
been  plainly  intended  to  establish  an  agency  for  issuing  small 
life  insurance  policies  and  annuity  contracts  to  citizens  of  this 
Commonwealth  at  a  low  cost  and  upon  a  sound  financial 
basis.  The  statute  provides  that  the  Commonwealth  itself, 
through  furnishing  the  services  of  a  State  actuary  and  a  State 
medical  director  and  in  other  ways,  shall  bear  a  substantial 
portion  of  the  expense  of  operating  these  agencies.  Certain  of 
the  funds  established  for  the  foundation  of  these  departments 
are  held  by  trustees  appointed  by  the  Governor  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Council.  Though  the  Common- 
wealth is  not  strictly,  through  this  means,  engaging  in  the 
insurance  business,  it  is  aiding  to  a  very  substantial  extent 
these  agencies  established  by  it  for  the  purpose  of  providing 
sound  insurance  to  people  of  small  means  at  a  low  cost. 

In  view  of  these  considerations  and  the  small  amount  of 
income  that  can  be  paid  under  such  annuity  contracts,  it  does 
not  seem  to  me  reasonable  that  the  Legislature  intended  that 
the  contracts  themselves  should  be  exempt  from  taxation, 
while  the  chief  incident  of  such  contracts,  namely,  the  annual 
annuity  paid  on  account  of  them  to  their  holders,  should  be 
subject  to  taxation.  Accordingly,  in  answer  to  your  inquiry 
I  state  it  to  be  my  opinion  that  the  income  from  such  an 
annuity  is  not  taxable  locally  under  the  provision  of  law  to 
which  you  refer. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney -General. 


Taxation  —  Corporation  Franchise  Tax  —  Merchandise  —  Tan- 
gible Property  held  in  Pledge. 

Tangible  personal  property  held  by  a  Massachusetts  corporation  in  pledge 
as  security  for  money  loaned  by  it  is  to  be  treated  in  determining  its 
franchise  tax  as  merchandise  of  the  corporation,  within  the  meaning  of 
St.  1909,  c.  490,  Part  III.,  §  43. 

Dec.  4,  1915. 
Board  of  Appeal,  State  House. 

Gentlemen:  —  I  beg  to  acknowledge  your  request  for  my 
opinion  upon  the  question  whether  articles  of  personal  prop- 
erty left  in  pledge  at  a  collateral  loan  company's  or  pawn- 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  —  No.  12.  •  131 

broker's  shop  should  be  treated  as  merchandise  or  as  bills 
receivable  in  assessing  the  corporate  franchise  tax.  I  under- 
stand that  the  question  arises  with  reference  to  the  assess- 
ment of  the  tax  upon  the  Boston  Loan  Company  for  the  year 
1915;  that  their  tax  return  shows  an  item  of  "accounts  re- 
ceivable, $89,908.14,"  and  that  the  Tax  Commissioner  treated 
this  item  as  representing  merchandise  pledged  for  loans;  and 
that  in  computing  the  tax  under  the  maximum  clause  he  used 
this  item  as  the  value  of  merchandise  of  the  corporation. 

As  I  understand  it,  this  corporation  loans  money  to  its 
customers  upon  personal  property  pledged  by  them  to  it  as 
security,  and  no  notes  are  taken  from  the  customers,  the  obli- 
gation to  repay  being  treated  merely  as  an  ordinary  item  of 
bills  receivable.  The  corporation  issues  at  the  time  of  the 
loan  to  the  customer  an  ordinary  certificate  or  ticket  showing 
the  amount  and  terms  of  the  loan  and  the  description  of  the 
property  pledged. 

Apparently  no  question  is  raised  but  that  the  personal 
property  in  question  is  merchandise  within  the  meaning  of  St. 
1909,  c.  490,  Part  III.,  §  43.  It  is  suggested,  however,  that 
this  property  is  owned  by  the  pledgors  and  not  by  this  cor- 
poration, which  has  merely  a  special  property  in  it  as  pledgee. 
This  is  undoubtedly  true;  but  St.  1909,  c.  490,  Part  L,  §  26, 
as  amended,  in  dealing  with  the  local  taxation  of  such  prop- 
erty provides:  — 

Personal  property  mortgaged  or  pledged  shall,  for  the  purpose  of 
taxation,  be  deemed  the  property  of  the  party  in  possession  thereof  on 
the  first  day  of  April.  .  .  . 

It  is  well  settled  that  this  section  applies  to  tangible  personal 
property  only.  Waltham  Bank  v.  Waltham,  10  Met.  334; 
Chase  v.  Boston,  193  Mass.  522,  527.  The  property  in  ques- 
tion, therefore,  if  held  upon  the  same  terms  and  under  the 
same  circumstances  by  an  individual  engaged  in  the  same 
business  as  this  corporation,  or  by  a  foreign  corporation  (see 
Boston  Loan  Co.  v.  Boston,  137  Mass.  332),  would  be  subject 
to  a  general  property  tax. 

The  word  "merchandise,"  as  used  in  section  43,  includes 
all  merchandise  of  a  domestic  corporation,  whether  taxable  if 
owned  by  a  natural  person  or  not.  Farr  Alpaca  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 212  Mass.  156.  But  this  section  must,  in  my 
opinion,  be  interpreted  with  reference  to  section  26  of  Part 


132  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

I.,  quoted  above,  and  therefore  it  should  be  held  that  all  mer- 
chandise which  is  to  be  treated  as  the  merchandise  of  a 
natural  person  for  the  purposes  of  local  taxation,  is,  when 
held  by  a  corporation  under  the  same  conditions,  to  be  treated 
as  merchandise  of  the  corporation  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining the  corporate  franchise  tax.  It  follows,  therefore,  that, 
in  my  opinion,  the  personal  property  held  by  this  corporation 
as  pledgee  was  properly  treated  by  the  Tax  Commissioner 
as  merchandise  within  the  meaning  of  section  43.  It  is  to  be 
noted,  however,  that  such  merchandise  should  be  taxed  at  its 
actual  value  as  determined  by  the  Tax  Commissioner,  and  not 
necessarily  at  the  amount  of  the  bills  receivable  which  it  is 
held  to  secure.  The  Tax  Commissioner  and  your  Board  may 
properly  take  into  consideration  this  item  of  bills  receivable  in 
determining  the  value  of  the  property,  but  you  may  also  con- 
sider other  evidence  upon  that  issue  and  fix  the  value  of  the 
property  at  an  amount  greater  or  less  than  the  total  of  bills 
receivable,  as  the  evidence  may  warrant. 
Yours  very  truly, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


Insurance  —  Stock  Insurance   Companies  —  Participating   Poli- 
cies —  Restriction  to  One  Class  of  Insurance. 

A  stock  insurance  company,  other  than  a  life  insurance  company,  which  is 
transacting,  as  permitted  by  law,  several  classes  of  insurance,  may 
issue  policies  in  one  class  which  provide  for  a  participation  in  the 
profits  in  that  class  by  the  holders  of  such  policies,  although  at  the 
same  time  it  is  issuing  nonparticipating  policies  in  other  classes  of 
insurance. 

Dec.  9,  1915. 
Hon.  Frank  H.  Harbison,  Insurance  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  You  have  requested  my  opinion  as  to  whether 
a  stock  insurance  company  other  than  life,  transacting  as 
permitted  by  law  several  classes  of  insurance,  may  issue 
policies  in  one  class  or  line,  such  as  workmen's  compensation, 
which  provide  for  distribution  of  part  of  the  profits  in  that 
class  among  those  who  have  been  holders  of  like  policies 
while  the  profits  were  being  earned.  In  other  words,  may 
such  a  company  issue  participating  policies  and  confine  their 
issue  to  one  class  of  insurance. 

There    seems    to    be    no    provision    of    the    statutes    directly 


1916.J  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  133 

limiting  the  powers  of  such  companies  in  such  way  as  to  pre- 
vent the  issuance  of  the  type  of  policy  described. 

It  has  been  argued,  however,  that  such  policy  would  violate 
the  provisions  of  St.  1912,  c.  401,  entitled,  "An  Act  to  pro- 
hibit discrimination  or  rebates  of  premiums  for  policies  issued 
by  insurance  companies  other  than  life."  This  act  is  a  re- 
vision of  St.  1908,  c.  511,  w^hich  is  similarly  entitled. 

Section  i  of  the  1912  act  provides:  — 

No  insurance  company  .  .  .  shall  pay  or  offer  to  pay  or  allow  in 
connection  with  placing  or  attempting  to  place  insurance  any  valu- 
able consideration  or  inducement  not  specified  in  the  policy  contract 
of  insurance,  or  any  rebate  of  premium  payable  on  a  poHcy,  or  any 
special  favor  or  advantage  in  the  dividends  or  other  benefits  to  accrue 
thereon;  or  give,  sell  or  purchase  or  offer  to  give,  sell  or  purchase  in 
connection  with  placing  or  attempting  to  place  insurance  anything  of 
value  whatsoever  not  specified  in  the  policy. 

There  can  be  no  contention  that  the  action  proposed  would 
constitute  giving  a  valuable  consideration  not  specified  in  the 
policy  or  a  rebate  of  premium.  It  is  suggested,  however,  that 
if  a  company  issuing  several  lines  of  policies  permits  a  partic- 
ipation in  the  profits  as  to  one  line,  it  does  thereby  give  a 
special  favor  or  advantage  in  the  dividends  to  accrue  thereon. 

On  the  supposition  of  facts  made  it  would  seem  to  be  im- 
possible to  decide  whether,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  policy 
containing  the  dividend  provision  does  grant  any  advantage 
over  the  other  line,  since  the  premium  in  the  nonparticipating 
policy  may  be  so  low  that  no  profits  are  or  can  be  made 
thereon,  while  the  premium  on  the  participating  policy  may 
be  made  unnecessarily  high,  and  the  net  result  from  the 
dividend  provision  be  only  the  loss  of  use  by  the  policy- 
holder of  the  extra  amount  of  the  premium  which  he  may 
later  get  back  in  dividends. 

However  that  may  be,  the  argument  presented  disregards 
the  language  of  the  phrase,  and  particularly  the  use  of  the 
word  "special."  It  does  not  seem  to  have  been  the  intent 
of  the  Legislature  to  prevent  the  issuance  of  participating 
policies.  On  the  contrary,  the  language  appears  to  contem- 
plate that  there  may  be  provisions  calling  for  the  payment  of 
dividends,  and  it  therefore  prohibits  the  granting  of  any 
special  favor  or  advantage  therein.  It  is  not  dividends  that 
are  prohibited,  but  special  favors  in  the  dividends  that  are  to 


134  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

accrue.  In  this  connection  "special"  seems  to  be  used  in  the 
sense  of  "peculiar  or  distinct  of  the  kind;  of  exceptional  char- 
acter, amount,  degree,  or  the  like;  especially  distinguished; 
express;    particular."      (Century  Dictionary.) 

This  clause  must  be  read  in  connection  with  the  title  of 
the  act  and  the  other  prohibitions,  in  order  to  arrive  at  its 
true  meaning;  and  so  read  it  must  be  some  special  favor  or 
advantage  in  the  dividends,  of  a  character  similar  to  or  like 
the  granting  of  rebates  or  payment  of  considerations  not 
specified  in  the  policy.  The  determination  of  a  stock  com- 
pany to  conduct  its  business  of  workmen's  compensation  in- 
surance on  a  participating  basis,  and  its  general  liability  on  a 
nonparticipating  basis,  partakes  of  none  of  these  features. 
The  evil  sought  to  be  eliminated  is  discrimination  between 
individuals  properly  members  of  the  same  class,  rather  than 
difference  between  properly  separated  classes.  So  long  as  a 
class  is  selected  upon  a  reasonable  basis  I  find  nothing  in  this 
act  which,  in  my  opinion,  prevents  its  being  treated  as  such, 
and  the  function  of  the  act  is  fulfilled  in  preventing  discrimina- 
tion between  the  members  of  such  class. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  St.  1912,  c.  401,  and  St.  1908,  c. 
511,  are  in  the  main  but  extensions  to  the  remaining  kinds  of 
insurance  companies  of  requirements  long  applicable  to  life 
insurance,  and  that  the  phrase  in  question  has  appeared  in 
the  statutes  with  reference  to  life  insurance  since  1887  (St. 
1887,  c.  214,  §  68;  St.  1907,  c.  576,  §  69).  Yet  down  to  1908 
it  apparently  was  considered  lawful  for  a  stock  company  to 
issue  life  insurance  policies  on  either  or  both  a  participating 
and  nonparticipating  basis  (see  St.  1907,  c.  576,  §§  76,  81). 

Accordingly,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  lawful  for  a 
stock  insurance  company  other  than  life,  which  is  transacting 
as  permitted  by  law  several  classes  of  insurance,  to  issue 
policies  in  one  class  or  line  which  provide  for  a  participation 
in  the  profits  in  that  class  by  the  holders  of  such  policies, 
although  at  the  same  time  issuing  nonparticipating  policies  in 
other  classes  of  insurance. 

Very  truly  yours, 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  135 


Insurance  —  Life    Insurance  —  Accident    Insurance  —  Two 
Classes  in  One  Policy. 

A  life  insurance  policy  containing  all  the  standard  provisions  required  for 
such  insurance,  and  also  containing  a  provision  for  the  payment  of 
double  the  regular  amount  of  the  policy  if  death  results  from  accident 
while  the  insured  is  travehng  as  a  passenger  on  a  pubHc  conveyance, 
is  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  St.  1907,  c.  576,  §  34,  prov^iding  that 
pohcies  for  different  classes  of  insurance  shall  be  in  separate  and  dis- 
tinct poUcies,  and  also  is  in  violation  of  St.  1910,  c.  493,  requiring  cer- 
tain standard  provisions  in  accident  pohcies. 

The  provision  in  such  a  policy  for  the  payment  of  an  additional  amount 
in  case  of  death  b}^  accident  constitutes  accident  insurance. 

Dec.  11,  1915. 
Hon.  Frank  H.  Harbison,  Insurance  Commissioner. 

Dear  Sir:  —  An  insurance  policy  has  been  submitted  for 
your  approval  which  in  general  provides  for  life  insurance  and 
contains  all  the  standard  pro vi  ions  required  for  such  insur- 
ance, but  also  contains  a  further  provision  for  payment  of 
double  the  regular  amount  of  the  policy  if  death  results  from 
accident  while  the  insured  is  traveling  as  a  passenger  on  a 
public  conveyance. 

The  question  therefore  arises  whether  such  a  policy  is  con- 
trary to  the  provisions  of  St.  1907,  c.  576,  §  34  — 

Contracts  of  insurance  for  each  of  the  classes  specified  in  section 
thirty-two  shall  be  in  separate  and  distinct  poUcies  notwithstanding 
any  provision  of  this  act  which  permits  a  company  to  transact  more 
than  one  of  said  classes  of  insurance  — 

or  falls  within  St.  1910,  c.  493,  requiring  certain  standard 
provisions  in  accident  and  health  policies. 

This  latter  act  provides  that  "  no  policy  of  insurance  against 
loss  or  damage  from  disease  or  by  the  bodily  injury  or  death 
by  accident  of  the  assured  shall  be  issued  or  delivered  in  this 
commonwealth"  until  certain  conditions  are  complied  with 
and  unless  certain  provisions  are  therein  contained. 

It  is  earnestly  argued  that  the  policy  in  question  is  strictly 
a  policy  of  life  insurance,  and  it  may  well  be  admitted  that  such 
is  the  case.  The  question  still  remains,  however,  as  to  whether 
it  is  not  also  accident  insurance  and  within  the  requirements 
of  the  statutes  quoted  above. 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  in  denominating  a  certain  policy  as 


136  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

life  insurance  one  may  proceed  upon  a  different  basis  of  clas- 
sification from  that  adopted  in  section  32  of  the  insurance 
law  (St.  1907,  c.  576),  since  the  classification  made  therein  in 
general  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  hazard  or  mis- 
chance protected  against,  while  in  life  insurance,  as  the  term 
is  frequently  used,  it  is  the  interest  of  the  assured,  to  wit,  his 
life,  which  furnishes  the  class.  Naturally,  under  such  circum- 
stances the  terms  used  may  overlap,  yet  in  most  instances  it 
will  be  clear  that  one  line  predominates  and  the  other  is  but 
an  incident. 

As  said  by  the  court  in  Metropolitan  Life  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Insurance  Commissioner,  208  Mass.  386,  389:  — 

An  ordinary  life  insurance  policy  includes  the  occurrence  of  death 
by  accident  as  one  of  the  conditions  which  call  for  a  payment  by  the 
company,  as  well  as  death  from  any  other  cause,  and  ordinary  acci- 
dent policies  include  injuries  by  accident  causing  death,  and  to  that 
extent  they  provide  insurance  of  life.  Yet  neither  of  these  two  classes 
of  policies  is,  for  that  reason,  brought  within  the  other  class  also. 

If  we  assume  the  simple  case  of  a  policy  covering  death  by 
accident  and  nothing  more,  it  may  well  be  said  in  a  certain 
sense  to  be  a  contract  of  life  insurance  (see  Logan  v.  Fidelity 
a7id  Casualty  Co.,  146  Mo.  114),  but  it  is  just  as  certain,  under 
the  terms  of  our  statute,  a  contract  of  accident  insurance. 

The  classification  found  in  section  32  does  not  include  life 
insurance,  and  nowhere  in  the  statute  is  there  to  be  found  a 
categorical  definition  of  that  term.  Section  66  defines  what 
is  to  be  treated  as  a  life  insurance  company,  but  includes 
companies  issuing  contracts  which  cannot  be  regarded  as  life 
insurance,  such,  for  example,  as  pure  endowments  and  annui- 
ties. So  far  as  the  section  relates  to  insurance  the  pertinent 
description  is  of  a  company  doing  business  which  involves 
"the  payment  of  money  .  .  .  conditioned  upon  the  continu- 
ance or  cessation  of  human  life."  In  other  words,  in  this 
definition  the  hazard  or  contingency  insured  against  is  loss  of 
life.  In  the  accident  policy  it  is  the  accident  which  furnishes 
the  hazard,  while  the  disability,  loss  of  limb  or  loss  of  life  fol- 
lowing thereafter  furnishes,  not  the  condition  upon  which 
payment  is  to  be  made,  but  determines  the  amount  of  damage 
or  loss  which  has  been  suffered,  and  is  to  be  compensated  for 
by  reason  of  the  happening  of  the  condition  insured  against, 
to  wit,  the  accident.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  in  the 
simple  case  suggested,  of  a  policy  merely  covering  death  by 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUIVIENT  —  No.  12.  137 

accident,  it  should  be  treated  primarily  as  an  accident  policy 
within  the  provisions  of  the  statutes  mentioned. 

St.  1907,  c.  576,  §  32,  cl.  5,  permits  companies  to  be  or- 
ganized "to  insure  any  person  against  bodily  injury  or  death 
by  accident."  In  my  opinion  the  simple  form  of  policy  sup- 
posed exactly  comes  within  the  language  just  quoted.  It 
would  seem  to  follow,  applying  the  words  of  section  34,  that 
contracts  for  such  insurance  (being  one  of  the  classes  specified 
in  section  32)  must  "be  in  separate  and  distinct  policies." 

Similarly,  such  a  policy  seems  included  in  the  terms  of  St. 
1910,  c.  493,  §  1,  which,  leaving  out  phrases  not  pertinent, 
would  read:  "No  policy  of  insurance  against  loss  or  damage 
.  .  .  by  .  .  .  death  by  accident  of  the  assured  shall  be  issued" 
unless  the  conditions  therein  set  forth  are  complied  with. 
Stated  in  this  short  form  the  simple  case  of  a  policy  covering 
death  by  accident  is  exactly  what  is  described  by  the  statute. 

While  the  policy  now  under  consideration  does  not  in  terms 
provide  in  one  clause  for  $1,000  straight  life  insurance,  and  in 
another  clause  for  a  further  insurance  of  $1,000  for  death  by 
accident,  neither  the  limitation  upon  the  kind  of  accident  in- 
sured against  nor  the  fact  that  the  amount  is  expressed  as  a 
double  payment  in  case  death  occurs  in  the  manner  specified 
seems  to  me  to  change  the  situation.  The  effect  in  either  case 
is  the  same. 

The  reasoning  of  the  opinion  in  the  case  of  Metropolitaii 
Life  Insurance  Co.  v.  Insurance  Commissioner,  supra,  appears 
to  support  this  conclusion.  While  the  decision  in  that  case 
was  to  the  effect  that  the  policy  then  under  consideration 
(which  provided  for  only  a  fractional  amount  of  the  face  value 
if  death  occurred  within  certain  limited  periods,  but  for  the 
full  amount  if  such  death  were  by  accident)  did  not  involve 
any  element  of  accident  insurance,  it  was  based  upon  a  care- 
ful analysis  of  the  policy,  and  a  conclusion  that  the  effect  was 
"as  if  the  limitation  upon  payments  for  deaths  occurring 
within  six  months  were  expressed  as  applying  to  such  deaths 
occurring  from  causes  other  than  accidents."  "It  is  not  the 
giving  of  direct  affirmative  benefits  of  a  special  kind  on  ac- 
count of  the  accident." 

The  present  policy  is  precisely  what  the  policy  in  that  case 
was  thus  stated  not  to  be. 

In  the  able  and  exhaustive  argument  in  behalf  of  the  in- 
surance company  it  is  pointed  out  that  some  of  the  provisions 
required  by  the   1910  act  to  be  inserted  in  accident  policies 


138  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan.  ] 

are  most  inapt  as  applied  to  the  policy  in  question.     This,  | 

however,  would  seem  rather  to  demonstrate  the  wisdom  of  the  ■ 

requirement   of   section   34,    that   policies   of   different   classes  ' 

shall  be  separate  and  distinct,  than  to  lead  to  a  conclusion 

that   the   feature   of   double   indemnity   is   not   in   its   essence  ' 

accident  insurance   as   to   the   extra  payment  offered  in  case 

death  results  from  accident  in  the  manner  specified.  ; 

In  my  opinion  you  are  justified  in  refusing  to  approve  the  j 

form  of  policy  submitted,  both  by  the  provisions  of  St.  1907,  \ 

c.  576,  §  34,  and  St.  1910,  c.  493.  \ 

Very  truly  yours,  \ 

Henry  C.  Attwill,  Attorney-General.  \ 


1916.1  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  139 


INDEX  TO  OPINIONS. 


PAGE 

Banks,  co-operative,  power  to  loan  on  matured  shares,   .  .  .  .26 

Boston    Elevated    Railway    Company,    locations    of;     revocability    and 

abandonment  of,    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .43 

Boston    Finance    Commission,    whether    State    Board    or    Commission; 
powers  of;   witnesses;   necessity  for  summons;   procedure;   rules 
of;  powers  of  mayor,      ........       83 

Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  Company,  history  of  acquisition  of  control  by 

New  York.  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company,     .  .         7 

Cape  Cod  Canal,  interpretation  of  contract  for  construction  of;    extra 

work,  powers  of  joint  board,   .......       90 

Cities,  wards,  divi?ioD  into  precincts,  time  for  action,      ....     100 

Civil  service,  grades  of  stenographers  and  clerks;    promotions;    increase 

of  salary,       ..........       68 

Violation  of  traflBc  regulation  not  a  crime  against  laws  of  Common- 
wealth, ..........     121 

Constitutional  law,  equal  protection  of  the  law,  discrimination,        .  52,  56 

Police  power,  freedom  to  contract,  .....  23,  43 

Taxation,  dry  dock  in  Boston  Harbor  a  public  purpose,    .  .  .113 

Corporations,  attempted  incorporation  of  company  to  use  franchise  in 

public  way  under  business  corporation  act,  trackless  trolley,       .       97 
Crime,  violation  of  city  traffic  regulation,  not  a,     .  .  .  .  .     121 

Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston,  authority  to  construct  dry  dock,     .  .         1 

Authority  to  remove  wrecks,  .......       81 

Power  to  license  erection  by  city  of  Boston  on  area  granted  to  it  by 

Sp.  St.  1915,  c.  326 117 

Dry  dock,  authority  of  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston  to  construct,       .         1 
A  public  purpose,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .113 

Electricians,  journeymen,  license  of;   right  to  do  contract  work,  employ- 
ment of  apprentices,       ........     126 

Executive  Council,  no  jurisdiction  to  reconsider  removal  of  public  officer 

after  appointment  of  successor,         ......       19 

Extradition,  power  of  Governor  to  revoke  executive  warrant,  .  .       71 

Firemen's  relief  fund,  nature  of  injury  entitling  firemen  to  benefit  of,       .       61 
Firewards,  office  of,  not  abolished  by  St.  1907,  c.  475;    appointment  by 

selectmen;  jurisdiction  of,        .......       17 

Flag,  misuse  of,  interpretation  of  statutes  relating  to,      .  .  .  .     102 

Gasoline,  when  permit  not  needed  to  keep,    ......       34 

Health,  boards  of,  of  cities  and  towns,  jurisdiction  of,  manufacture  and 

sale  of  ice-cream,  .........       27 

Boards  of,  reports  to,  of  tuberculosis  patients  receiving  treatment  in 

State  sanatorium,  ........     105 

State  Department  of,  prior  regulations  of,  not  revoked  by  St.  1914, 

c.  792, 39 

Insane  persons,  temporary  treatment  by  insane  hospitals  not  authorized 

at  request  of  probation  officer,  ......       98 

Insurance,  fraternal  orders,  when  not  subject  to  insurance  laws,       .  .       38 

Life  insurance,  accident  insurance,  two  classes  in  one  policy,     .  .     135 

Stock  companies,  participating  policies,  restriction  to  one  class  of 

insurance,      ........••     132 


140 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL^S  REPORT.   [Jan.  1916. 


Interstate  Commerce,  what  is;  discrimination,       .  .  ,  .  , 

Intoxicating  liquors,  transportation  of,  into  no  license  towns,  permits  for, 
Labor,  hours  of,  for  employees  for  or  upon  public  works. 
Master  in  chancery,  member  of  Legislature  may  be  appointed  a, 
Mayor  of  city  of  Boston,  authority  to  limit  powers  of  Boston  Finance 

Commission,  ......... 

Minimum  Wage  Commission,  authority  of,  to  establish  wage  board;  effect 

of  change  of  statutory  method  of  selection,        .... 
Motor  vehicles,   carrying  passengers,   constitutionality  of  bill  requiring 

bond  for,       .......... 

Newspapers,  statute  regulating  sale  of,  unconstitutional, 
New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company,  history  of  acqui- 
sition of  control  of  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  Company,     . 
Osteopath,  no  authority  to  issue  physician's  death  certificate, 
Petroleum,  license  for  storage  of,  required,     ...... 

Pharmacist,  registered,  who  may  be  licensed  as;    ownership  of  stock  in 

corporation,  ......... 

Physicians,  applicability  of  statutes  requiring  registration  to  persons  em- 
ployed in  State  institutions,    ....... 

Pilots,  federal  license  required,  when,    ....... 

Probation  officer,  not'a  police  officer  within  St.  1911,  c.  395,  as  amended 

by  Gen.  St.  1915,  c.  174, 

Public  officer,  when  removed,  Executive  Council  cannot  take  initiative  to 

reinstate,       .......... 

Public  warehouse,  place  of  storage  of  second-hand  goods  or  furniture  in,  . 
Savings  bank,  deposits  in,  payable  to  person  other  than  depositor,  . 
School  teachers,  constitutionality  of  bill  to  prevent  inquiry  into  religion  of, 
Statutes,  general  and  special,  latter  not  repealed  by  codification  of  general 

statutes;  Boston  Consolidated  Gas  Company, 
Tax  collector,  bond  of,  right  of  town  to  discharge. 
Taxation;  income  from  annuity;   contract  issued  by  savings  bank,  . 

Corporation  franchise  tax;    merchandise;    tangible  property  held  in 

pledge,  ......... 

Tuberculosis  cases,  report  of,  to  State  Board  of  Health, 

United  States  District  Court,  decree  of,  effect  of  compliance  with  as  viola^ 

tion  of  the  laws  of  the  Commonwealth,     .... 

Wage  boards,  vacancies  in,  how  filled,  ...... 

Wages,  may  not  be  reduced  below  minimum  by  fines  or  payments  to  cover 

sick  benefits,  ........ 

Of  employees  at  the  Reformatory  for  Women, 
Wrecks  or  obstructions  in  Boston  Harbor,  authority  of  Directors  of  the 

Port  of  Boston  to  remove,       ....... 


PAGE 

109 
63 
76 
89 

83 

80 

56 
23 

7 
42 
41 

122 

66 
5 

98 

19 
98 
70 
52 

29 

78 

128 

130 
105 

7 
124 

124 
120 

81 


Words  and  phrases:  — 

"Amendment,"        ..........  29 

"Dock," 1 

"For  or  upon  public  works,"     ........  76 

"Goods,  wares  and  merchandise,"     .......  98 

"In  bulk," 34 

"Laws  of  the  Commonwealth,"          .......  121 

"Merchandise,"       ..........  130 

"Osteopath,"            ..........  42 

"Personal  injury,"             .........  61 

"Physician,"             ..........  42 

"Provisions,"           ..........  27 

"Structure,"            ..........  60 


LIST  OF  CASES 


IN  WHICH  THE 


ATTORISrEY-GENERAL 


HAS   APPEARED 


During  the  Yeae  1915. 


GRADE  CROSSINGS. 


Notices  have  been  served  upon  this  department  of  the  filing 
of  the  following  petitions  for  the  appointment  of  special  com- 
missioners for  the  abolition  of  grade  crossings:  — 

Berkshire  County. 

Lanesborough,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  Valley  Road  and  Glen  Road  crossings.  Railroad  Com- 
missioners appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  re- 
port filed.  Frank  H.  Cande  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's 
third  report  filed.     Pending. 

North  Adams,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition 
for  abolition  of  State  Street  and  Furnace  Street  crossings. 
Edmund  K.  Turner,  David  F.  Slade  and  William  G. 
McKechnie  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  re- 
port filed.     Pending. 

Pittsfield,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Merrill  crossing  in  Pittsfield.  Thomas  W. 
Kennefick,  Frederick  L.  Green  and  Edmund  K.  Turner 
appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 

Stockbridge,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  South  Street  crossing.  Railroad  Commissioners  ap- 
pointed commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
A.  W.  DeGoosh  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  first  report 
filed.     Pending. 

Stockbridge.  Berkshire  Railroad,  petitioner.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Glendale  station   crossing.     Pending. 

West  Stockbridge,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  grade  crossing  at  Albany  Street.  James  D. 
Cote,  Charles  W.  Bosworth  and  James  L.  Tighe  appointed 
commissioners.     Pending. 

Bristol  County. 
Mansfield.     Directors  of  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  petitioners.     Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  North  Main,  Chauncey,  Central,  West, 


144  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

School  and  Elm  streets  in  Mansfield.  Samuel  L.  Powers, 
Stephen  S.  Taft  and  Wm.  Jackson  appointed  commis- 
sioners. George  F.  Swain  appointed  commissioner  in  place 
of  Wm.  Jackson,  deceased.     Pending. 

Somerset.  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Com- 
pany, petitioner.  Petition  for  abolition  of  grade  crossing 
at  Wilbur  Avenue.  James  D.  Colt,  Henry  H.  Baker  and 
Louis  Perry  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  re- 
port filed.  Edward  A.  Thurston  appointed  auditor. 
Auditor's  first  report  filed.     Pending. 

Swansea,  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Com- 
pany, petitioner.  Petition  for  abolition  of  grade  crossing 
at  River  Road.  James  D.  Colt,  Henry  H.  Baker  and 
Louis  Perry  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners* 
report  filed.  Edward  A.  Thurston  appointed  auditor. 
Auditor's  first  report  filed.     Pending. 

Taunton,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  grade  crossings  at  Danforth  and  other  streets 
in  Taunton.  Thomas  M.  Babson,  George  F.  Swain  and 
Edwin  U.  Curtis  appointed  commissioners.  Charles  H. 
Beckwith  appointed  commissioner  in  place  of  Thomas  M. 
Babson,  deceased.  Commissioners'  report  filed.  James 
A.  Stiles  appointed  auditor.     Pending. 

Essex  County. 

Gloucester.  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad,  petitioner.  Petition 
for  abolition  of  crossings  at  Magnolia  Avenue  and  Brays 
crossing.  Arthur  Lord,  Moody  Kimball  and  P.  H.  Cooney 
appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
A.  W.  DeGoosh  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  third  re- 
port filed.     Pending. 

Gloucester.  Directors  of  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad,  peti- 
tioners. Petition  for  abolition  of  grade  crossing  between 
Washington  Street  and  tracks  of  Boston  &  Maine  Rail- 
road.    Pending. 

Haverhill,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Washington  Street  and  other  crossings  in 
Haverhill.  George  W.  Wiggin,  William  B.  French  and 
Edmund  K.  Turner  appointed  commissioners.  Commis- 
sioners' report  filed.  Fred  E.  Jones  appointed  auditor. 
E.  A.  McLaughlin  appointed  auditor  in  place  of  Fred  E. 
Jones,  deceased.  Auditor's  sixteenth  report  filed.  Pend- 
ing. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  145 

Ipswich,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
High  Street  and  Locust  Street  crossings.  Geo.  W.  Wiggin, 
Edmund  K.  Turner  and  William  F.  Dana  appointed  com- 
missioners. Commissioners'  report  filed.  Fred  E.  Jones 
appointed  auditor.  E.  A.  McLaughlin  appointed  auditor 
in  place  of  Fred  E.  Jones,  deceased.  Auditor's  fourth  re- 
port filed.     Pending. 

Lawrence,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  crossing  at  Merrimac  and  other  streets  in 
Lawrence.  Robert  O.  Harris,  Edmund  K.  Turner  and 
Henry  V.  Cunningham  appointed  commissioners.  Pend- 
ing. 

Lynn,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  aboli- 
tion of  Summer  Street  and  other  crossings  on  Saugus 
branch  of  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  and  Market  Street 
and  other  crossings  on  main  line.  George  W.  Wiggin, 
Edgar  R.  Champlin  and  Edmund  K.  Turner  appointed 
commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed.  Edward  A. 
McLaughlin  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  sixth  report 
filed.     Pending. 

Lynn,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  aboli- 
tion of  grade  crossings  at  Pleasant  and  Shepard  streets, 
Gas  W^harf  Road  and  Commercial  Street,  on  the  Boston, 
Revere  Beach  &  Lynn  Railroad.     Pending. 

Salem.     Directors  of  Boston   &  Maine  Railroad,  petitioners. 

.     Petition  for  the   abolition  of  grade  crossings   at  Bridge, 

Washington,    Mill,    North,    Flint    and    Grove    streets    in 

Salem.    Patrick  H.  Cooney,  George  F.  Swain  and  William 

A.   Dana  appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 

Salem,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Lafayette  Street  crossing  in  Salem.     Pending. 

Franklin  County. 

Deerfield,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
** Upper  Wisdom  Road"  crossing.  Edmund  K.  Turner, 
Calvin  Coolidge  and  Hugh  P.  Drysdale  appointed  com- 
missioners. Commissioners'  report  filed.  L^man  W. 
Griswold  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  first  report  filed. 
Pending. 

Erving,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  on  the  road  leading  from  Millers  Falls  to 
Northfield.  Samuel  D.  Conant,  Arthur  H.  Beers  and 
Charles  C.  Dyer  appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 


146  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Greenfield,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abolition 
of  Allen  and  Russell  streets  crossings  in  Greenfield.  Ed- 
mund K.  Turner,  Walter  P.  Hall  and  Fred  D.  Stanley 
appointed  commissioners.  Stephen  S.  Taft  appointed  au- 
ditor.    Auditor's  first  report  filed.     Disposed  of. 

Greenfield,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  Silver  Street.  Stephen  S.  Taft,  Henry 
P.  Field  and  Thomas  J.  O'Connor  appointed  commis- 
sioners. Commissioners'  report  filed.  Stephen  S.  Taft, 
Jr.,  appointed  commissioner  in  place  of  Stephen  S.  Taft 
resigned.     Pending. 

Northfield,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
crossing  on  road  to  South  Vernon.  Edmund  K.  Turner, 
Charles  W.  Hazelton  and  Charles  H.  Innes  appointed 
commissioners.  Commissioners*  report  filed.  James  J. 
Irwin  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  first  report  filed. 
Pending. 

Hampden  County. 

Palmer,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Burley's  crossing  in  Palmer.     Pending. 

Russell,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Montgomery  Road  crossing.  Railroad  Commissioners 
appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Thomas  W.  Kennefick  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's 
third  report  filed.     Pending. 

Westfield,  Attorney-General,  petitioner.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  grade  crossings  at  Lane's  and  Lee's  crossings  in  West- 
field.  Patrick  H.  Cooney,  Richard  W.  Irwin  and  Franklin 
T.  Hammond  appointed  commissioners.  Chas.  E.  Hib- 
bard  appointed  commissioner  in  place  of  Richard  W. 
Irwin,  resigned.  Commissioners'  report  filed.  Walter  F. 
Frederick  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  second  report  filed. 
Pending. 

Hampshire  County. 

Amherst,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossings  at  Whitney,  High  and  Main  streets.  Rail- 
road  Commissioners  appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 

Belchertown,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  aboli- 
tion of  crossing  of  road  from  Belchertown  to  Three  Rivers 
and  road  from  Bondville  to  Ludlow.  Edmund  K.  Turner, 
F.  G.  Wooden  and  George  P.  O'Donnell  appointed  com- 
missioners. Commissioners'  report  filed.  Wm.  H.  Feiker 
appointed  auditor.     Auditor's  first  report  filed.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  14^ 


Middlesex  County. 

Actoa,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Great  Road  crossing  in  Acton.  Benj.  W.  Wells,  George 
D.  Burrage  and  William  B.  Sullivan  appointed  commis- 
sioners. Commissioners'  report  filed.  Fred  Joy  ap- 
pointed auditor.     Pending. 

Belmont,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
crossings  at  Waverley  station.  Thomas  W.  Proctor,  Pat- 
rick H.  Cooney  and  Desmond  FitzGerald  appointed  com- 
missioners.    Pending. 

Chelmsford,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  grade  crossing  at  Middlesex  Street.     Pending. 

Framingham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abo- 
lition of  Marble  Street  crossing.     Pending. 

Framingham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abo- 
lition of  Concord  Street  crossing.     Pending. 

Framingham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abo- 
lition of  Waverly  Street  crossing.     Pending. 

Framingham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abo- 
lition of  Bishop  Street  crossing.     Pending. 

Framingham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abo- 
lition of  Hollis  and  Waushakum  streets  crossings.    Pending. 

Framingham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abo- 
lition of  Claflin  Street  crossing.     Pending. 

Framingham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  grade  crossing  at  Willis  Crossing.     Pending. 

Lowell,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Middlesex  and  Thorndike  streets  crossings. 
George  F.  Swain,  Patrick  H.  Cooney  and  Nelson  P.  Brown 
appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 

Lowell,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Boston  Road  or  Plain  Street,  School,  Walker 
and  Lincoln  streets  crossings.  Arthur  Lord,  David  F. 
Slade  and  Henry  A.  Wyman  appointed  commissioners. 
Commissioners'  report  filed.  A.  W.  DeGoosh  appointed 
auditor.     Auditor's  ninth  report  filed.     Pending. 

Lowell,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  crossing  at  Western  Avenue  and  Fletcher 
Street.     Pending. 

Maiden,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Pleasant  and  Winter  streets  crossing  in 
Maiden.      George    W.    Wiggin,    Edmund   K.    Turner   and 


148  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Fred  Joy  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  re- 
port filed.  Winfield  S.  Slocum  appointed  auditor.  Au- 
ditor's seventh  report  filed.     Pending. 

Marlborough,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition 
for  abolition  of  Hudson  Street  crossing  in  Marlborough. 
Walter  Adams,  Charles  A.  iYllen  and  Alpheus  Sanford  ap- 
pointed commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Pending. 

Newton,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
the  abolition  of  Concord  Street  and  Pine  Grove  Avenue 
crossings  in  Newton.  George  W.  Wiggin,  T.  C.  Menden- 
hall  and  Edmund  K.  Turner  appointed  commissioners. 
Pending. 

North  Reading,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  aboli- 
tion of  Main  Street  crossing  in  North  Reading.  Alpheus 
Sanford,  George  N.  Poor  and  Louis  M.  Clark  appointed 
commissioners.  Report  of  commissioners  filed.  Thomas 
W.  Proctor  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  first  report 
filed.     Pending. 

Somerville,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Park  Street,  Dane  Street  and  Medford  Street 
crossings  in  Somerville.  George  W.  Wiggin,  George  F. 
Swain  and  James  D.  Colt  appointed  commissioners. 
Commissioners'  report  filed.  Patrick  H.  Cooney  ap- 
pointed auditor.  Auditor's  eleventh  report  filed.  Pend- 
ing. 

Somerville,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Somerville  Avenue  crossing  in  Somerville. 
George  W.  Wiggin,  George  F.  Swain  and  James  D.  Colt 
appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Patrick  H.  Cooney  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  ninth 
report  filed.     Pending. 

Wakefield,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Hanson  Street  crossing  in  Wakefield.     Pending. 

Waltham,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
aboHtion  of  South  Street  crossing  in  Waltham.  Geo.  F. 
Swain, and  Geo.  A.  Sanderson  appointed  com- 
missioners.    Pending. 

Waltham,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Moody  Street,  Main  Street,  Elm  Street,  River 
Street,  Pine  Street,  Newton  Street  and  Calvary  Street 
crossings  in  Waltham.  Arthur  Lord,  Patrick  H.  Cooney 
and  George  F.  Swain  appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUlViENT  —  No.  12.  149 

Watertown,  Selectmen  of,  petitiotiers.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  grade  crossings  at  Cottage,  Arlington,  School,  Irving 
and  other  streets  in  Watertown.     Pending. 

Wayland,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  State  Road.  George  F.  Swain,  Harvey 
E.  Shepherd  and  Arthur  W.  DeGoosh  appointed  commis- 
sioners.    Pending. 

Weston,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossings  at  Central  Avenue,  Conant  Road,  Church 
and  Viles  streets.  P.  H.  Cooney,  Louis  A.  Frothing- 
ham  and  Andrew  M.  Lovis  appointed  commissioners. 
Pending. 

Winchester,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  aboli- 
tion of  crossing  at  Winchester  station  square.  George  W. 
W^iggin,  George  F.  Swain  and  Arthur  Lord  appointed  com- 
missioners. Commissioners*  report  filed  and  recommitted. 
Pending. 

Norfolk  County. 

Braintree,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abolition 
of  the  Pearl  Street  crossing  at  South  Braintree.  Patrick 
H.  Cooney,  Frank  N.  Nay  and  George  F.  Swain  ap- 
pointed commissioners.     Pending. 

Braintree.  Directors  of  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  School,  Elm,  River  and  Union  streets  in 
Braintree.  John  L.  Bates,  Winfield  S.  Slocum  and  Arthur 
H.  Wellman  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners' 
report  filed.     Pending. 

Canton.  Directors  of  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Dedham  Road  crossing  in  Canton.  Samuel  L.  Powers, 
Stephen  S.  Taft  and  Wm.  Jackson  appointed  commis- 
sioners. Commissioners  report  filed.  Recommitted. 
Pending. 

Dedham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the  abolition 
of  Eastern  Avenue  and  Dwight  Street  crossings  in  Ded- 
ham. Alpheus  Sanford,  Charles  Mills  and  J.  Henry  Reed 
appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Fred  E.  Jones  appointed  auditor.     Pending. 

Dover,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  Springdale  Avenue  and  Dedham  and 
Haven  streets.  Public  Service  Commission  appointed 
commissioners.     Pending. 


150  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Foxborough.  Directors  of  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  Cohasset  and  Summer  streets  in  Fox- 
borough.  Samuel  L.  Powers,  Stephen  S.  Taft  and  Wm. 
Jackson  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report 
filed.     Recommitted.     Pending. 

Hyde  Park,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  Fairmount  Avenue  and  Bridge  Street  crossings  in  Hyde 
Park.  Boyd  B.  Jones,  Edmund  K.  Turner  and  Fred  Joy 
appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Thomas  W.  Proctor  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  third 
report  filed.     Pending. 

Needham,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Charles  River  Street  crossing  in  Needham.     Pending. 

Quincy.  Directors  of  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Saville  and  Water  streets  crossings  in  Quincy.  John  L. 
Bates,  Winfield  S.  Slocum  and  Arthur  H.  Wellman  ap- 
pointed commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Pending. 

Sharon.  Directors  of  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  Depot,  Garden  and  Mohawk  streets  in 
Sharon.  Samuel  L.  Powers,  Stephen  S.  Taft  and  Wm. 
Jackson  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report 
filed.     Recommitted.     Pending. 

Westwood.  Directors  of  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Green  Lodge  Street  crossing  in  Westwood.  Samuel  L. 
Powers,  Stephen  S.  Taft  and  Wm.  Jackson  appointed 
commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed.  Recom- 
mitted.    Pending. 

Plymouth  County. 

Rockland,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossings  at  Union  and  other  streets  in  Rockland. 
Pending. 

Suffolk  County. 

Boston,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abo- 
lition of  Dudley  Street  crossing  in  Dorchester.  Thomas 
Post,  Fred  Joy  and  Edmund  K.  Turner  appointed  com- 
missioners. Commissioners'  report  filed.  James  D.  Colt 
appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  tenth  report  filed.  Pend- 
ing. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  151 

Boston.  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Com- 
pany, petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of  Neponset  and 
Granite  avenues  crossings  in  Dorchester.     Pending. 

Boston,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Freeport,  Adams,  Park,  Mill  and  Walnut 
streets  and  Dorchester  Avenue  crossings.  James  R. 
Dunbar,  Samuel  L.  Powers  and  Thomas  W.  Proctor  ap- 
pointed commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Arthur  H.  Wellman  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  twenty- 
first  report  filed.     P^ding. 

Boston,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  the 
abolition  of  the  Essex  Street  crossing  in  Brighton.  George 
W.  Wiggin,  William  B.  French  and  Winfield  S.  Slocum 
appointed   commissioners.      Pending. 

Boston,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Blue  Hill  Avenue  and  Oakland  Street  cross- 
ings in  Boston.  William  B.  French,  Arthur  H.  Wellman 
and  George  A.  Kimball  appointed  commissioners.  Com- 
missioners' report  filed.  Fred  E.  Jones  appointed  auditor. 
Auditor's  twenty-first  report  filed.     Pending. 

Boston,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  all  crossings  in  East  Boston.  George  W. 
Wiggin,  William  B.  French  and  Edward  B.  Bishop  ap- 
pointed commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Winfield  S.  Slocum  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  seven- 
teenth report  filed.     Pending. 

Boston,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  crossings  at  Saratoga,  Maverick  and  Marginal 
streets  in  East  Boston.  Railroad  Commissioners  ap- 
pointed commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed. 
Robert  O.  Harris  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  second 
report  filed.     Pending. 

Revere,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Winthrop  Avenue  crossing  in  Revere  of  the  Boston^ 
Revere  Beach  &  Lynn  Railroad.     Pending. 

Worcester  County. 
Clinton,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Sterling,  Water,  Main,  High  and  Woodlawn  streets  cross- 
ings. George  W.  Wiggin,  William  E.  McClintock  and 
James  A.  Stiles  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners' 
report  filed.  David  F.  Slade  appointed  auditor.  Frederic 
B.  Greenhalge  appointed  auditor  in  place  of  David  F. 
Slade  deceased.     Auditor's  ninth  report  filed.     Pending. 


152  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Harvard.  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad,  petitioner.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  a  grade  crossing  near  Harvard  station.    Pending. 

Holden,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Dawson's  crossing  and  Cedar  Swamp  crossing  in  Holden. 
Charles  A.  Allen,  Arthur  P.  Rugg  and  Henry  G.  Taft  ap- 
pointed commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed.  H. 
L.  Parker  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  second  report 
filed.     Disposed  of. 

Hubbardston,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  Depot  Road  crossing  in  HubKardston.     Pending. 

Leominster,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
Water,  Summer,  Mechanic  and  Main  streets  crossings. 
George  W.  Wiggin,  George  F.  Swain  and  Charles  D. 
Barnes  appointed  commissioners.  Commissioners'  report 
filed.     Recommitted.     Pending. 

Southborough,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  aboli- 
tion of  crossing  on  road  from  Southborough  to  Framing- 
ham.  Samuel  W.  McCall,  Louis  A.  Frothingham  and 
Eugene  C.  Hultman  appointed  commissioners.  Com- 
missioners' report  filed  and  recommitted.     Pending. 

Southborough,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  aboli- 
tion of  Main  Street  crossing  at  Fayville  in  Southborough. 
Pending. 

Southbridge,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition 
of  grade  crossings  at  Foster,  Central  and  Hook  streets. 
George  F.  Swain,  P.  H.  Cooney  and  William  F.  Garcelon 
appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 

Webster,  Selectmen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abolition  of 
grade  crossing  at  Main  Street.     Pending. 

West  Boylston.  Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  Company,  peti- 
tioners. Petition  for  abolition  of  Prescott  Street  cross- 
ing.    Pending. 

Worcester,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  crossings  at  Exchange,  Central  and  Thomas 
and  other  streets.  Arthur  Lord,  George  F.  Swain  and 
Fred  Joy  appointed  commissioners.     Pending. 

W^orcester,  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
abolition  of  Grafton  Street  crossing  and  eight  other  cross- 
ings, including  alterations  of  Union  Station.  James  R. 
Dunbar,  James  H.  Flint  and  George  F.  Swain  appointed 
commissioners.  Commissioners'  report  filed.  James  A. 
Stiles  appointed  auditor.  Auditor's  seventieth  report 
filed.     Pending. 


1916.1  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  153 


CASES  ARISING  IN  THE  COUETS 

UNDER  THE 

Acts  relative  to  Inheritance  and  Succession  Taxes. 


Petitions  for  Instructions. 
Barnstable  County. 
Dyer,  Henry  K.,  estate  of.     James  P.  Warbasse  et  al.,  execu- 
tors,  petitioners.     Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance 
tax.     Decree. 

Berkshire  County. 
Barnard,  Anna  Eliza,  estate  of.     Joseph  R.  Walker,  adminis- 
trator c.  t.  a.,  petitioner.     Decree. 

Bristol  County. 

Borden,  Matthew  C.  D.,  estate  of.  Bertram  H.  Borden  et  als., 
executors,  petitioners.     Rescript. 

Holmes,  Albert  W.,  estate  of.  Elizabeth  R.  Holmes,  execu- 
trix, petitioner.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance 
tax.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Tappan,  Fannie  M.,  estate  of.  Charles  R.  Cummings,  admin- 
istrator c.  t.  a.,  petitioner.     Pending. 

Essex  County. 

Clines,  Mary  G.,  estate  of.  Catherine  A.  Laycock,  administra- 
trix, petitioner.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance 
tax.     Rescript. 

Hoyt,  William  R.,  estate  of.  Charles  Neal  Barney,  executor, 
petitioner.     Decree. 

Meserve,  Chastina  S.,  estate  of.  James  W.  Leitch,  executor, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Nichols,  Mary  C,  estate  of.  Frank  O.  Woods,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Pending. 

Sears,  Eleonora  R.,  estate  of.  Francis  C.  Welch  et  al.,  ad- 
ministrators, petitioners.  Petition  for  abatement  of  in- 
heritance tax.     Pending. 


154  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Hampden  County. 

Bellamy,  Charles  J.,  estate  of.  Asher  Allen,  administrator 
c.  t.  a.,  petitioner.     Decree. 

George,  Julinah  R.  C,  estate  of.  Allen  Webster,  executor, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Gordon,  Rebecca  A.,  estate  of.  Jennie  Gordon  Ireland,  ex- 
ecutrix, petitioner.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Spencer,  Lucy  Whitehead,  estate  of.  Clarence  G.  Spencer, 
petitioner.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Whiting,  Elizabeth  E.,  estate  of.  Frank  A.  Whiting,  admin- 
istrator, petitioner.     Pending. 

Hampshire  County. 
Welton,  Walter  B.,  estate  of.     Henry  W.  Kidder,  administra- 
tor, petitioner.     Pending. 

Middlesex  County. 

Beebe,  Emily  Appleton,  estate  of.  William  S.  Hall  et  al., 
administrators  d.  b.  n.,  petitioners.     Pending. 

Cronin,  William  P.,  estate  of.  Hannah  J.  Thomassin,  execu- 
tor, petitioner.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Hawkridge,  Edwin,  estate  of.  Ella  M.  Hawkridge  et  al., 
executors,    petitioners.      Pending. 

Kemo,  Horace  G.,  estate  of.  Edythe  M.  Kemp  et  al.,  execu- 
tors, petitioners.     Pending. 

Langdell,  Margaret  E.,  estate  of.  Joseph  H.  Beale  et  al., 
executors,  petitioners.  Attorney-General  waived  right 
to  be  heard. 

Lawrence,  Samuel  C,  estate  of.  Carrie  R.  Lawrence  et  als., 
executrices,  petitioners.     Decree. 

Palmer,  Edward  H.,  estate  of.  Emily  M.  Palmer  et  als.,  exec- 
utors, petitioners.     Decree. 

Perry,  Emery  B.,  estate  of.  Thomas  Weston,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Pending. 

Scott,  Julia  A.,  estate  of.  Emma  E.  Doty,  executrix,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance  tax.  Pend- 
ing. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCmiENT  — No.  12.  155 

Slater,  Andrew  C,  estate  of.  Joseph  T.  Brown  d  al.,  execu- 
tors, petitioners.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Wheeler,  Jeness  B.,  estate  of.  Mabel  R.  Wheeler  et  at.,  peti- 
tioners.    Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Norfolk  County. 

Cabot,  Arthar  T.,  estate  of.  Charles  Almy  et  als.,  executors, 
petitioners.     Decree. 

Nichols,  Lucy,  estate  of.  Edward  H.  Nichols  et  al.,  admin- 
istrators, petitioners.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Tobin,  Ellen  A.,  estate  of.  W^illiam  Sullivan,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Pending. 

Tobin,  Lawrence,  absentee,  estate  of.  Howard  A.  Wilson,  re- 
ceiver, petitioner.     Pending. 

Plymouth  County. 

Blenkinsop,  James  S.,  estate  of.  John  R.  Mills,  administrator, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Peirce,  Harriot  O.,  estate  of.  Osgood  Putnam,  executor,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  abatement  of  inheritance  tax.  Pend- 
ing. 

Suffolk  County. 

Bliss,  Cornelius  N.,  estate  of.  Cornelius  N.  Bliss,  Jr.,  et  als., 
executors,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Bliss,  Cornelius  N.,  estate  of.  Cornelius  N.  Bliss,  Jr.,  et  als., 
executors,  petitioners.     Rescript. 

Butler,  Joanna  C,  estate  of.  Wilfred  Bolster,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Decree. 

Emery,  Frederic  W.,  estate  of.  Francis  R.  Hart,  executor, 
petitioner.     Submitted  to  determination  of  the  court. 

Sampson,  Rebecca  F.,  estate  of.  William  E.  Murdock  et  al., 
executors,  petitioners.     Pending. 

Skinner,  Eliza  B.,  estate  of.  George  A.  Gardner  et  al.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.     Decree. 

Tucker,  Lawrence,  estate  of.  Robert  H.  Gardiner  ef  al., 
executors,  petitioners.  Petition  for  abatement  of  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 


156  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Worcester  County. 

Buss,  Ellen  M.,  estate  of.  Joseph  A.  Lovering,  trustee,  peti- 
tioner.    Pending. 

Forrest,  William  A.,  estate  of.  Thomas  F.  Hisky,  adminis- 
trator, petitioner.     Pending. 

Inventoeies. 
Berkshire  County. 
Daley,    Eliza,    estate    of.      Edward    A.    Fisher,    administrator. 
Pending. 

Essex  Coimty. 

Magner,  Matthew  J.,  estate  of.  Annie  T.  Magner,  adminis- 
tratrix.    Pending. 

Hampden  County. 
Melaszansky,  Joseph,  estate  of.     Ursula  J.  Melaszansky,  ad- 
ministratrix.    Pending. 

Suffolk  County. 

Baxter,  Albert,  estate  of.  Elizabeth  A.  Baxter,  administra- 
trix.    Pending. 

Blodgett,  Minnie  L.,  estate  of.  Clement  B.  Blodgett,  admin- 
istrator.    Pending. 

Dorini,  Celestina,  estate  of.  Antonio  Dorini,  administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Shea,  Mary  A.,  estate  of.  John  F.  Shea,  administrator. 
Dismissed. 


1916.1  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  157 


PUBLIC  CHARITABLE  TRUSTS. 


Berkshire  County. 
Drury  Academy  v.  Attorney-General  et  als.     Petition  for  au- 
thority to  administer  trust  under  the  doctrine  of  cy  pres. 
Submitted  to  the  determination  of  the  court. 

Bristol  County. 

North  Baptist  Church  of  New  Bedford,  petitioner.  Petition 
to  have  legal  title  to  certain  premises  conveyed  to  it. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Oldfield,  Charles  T.,  et  at.  z.  Attorney-General.  Petition  for 
instructions.     Rescript. 

Parker,  Helen  M.,  estate  of.  Charles  M.  Holmes,  adminis- 
trator, petitioner.     Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

White,  John,  estate  of.  Iram  N.  Smith,  executor,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Essex  County. 

Atwood,  Margaret,  estate  of.  Henry  B.  Little  et  als.,  peti- 
tioners. Petition  for  appointment  of  petitioners  as  trus- 
tees.    Dismissed. 

Beach,  Persis  A.,  estate  of.  Edward  F.  Childs  et  als.,  formerly 
trustees  of  the  First  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  of  Law- 
rence, petitioners.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Cliftondale  Chapel  Association.  J.  Arthur  Raddin,  trustee, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real  estate.  At- 
torney-General waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Cliftondale  Chapel  Association.  J.  Arthur  Raddin,  trustee, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real  estate. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Garden  Street  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  trustees,  peti- 
tioners. Petition  for  instructions.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Gile,  David,  estate  of.  Charles  E.  Sawyer,  administrator, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  authority  to  adjust  claims  against 
estate  by  compromise.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to 
be  heard. 


158  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Haskins,  Leander  M.,  estate  of.  Grafton  Butman,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  appointment  of  trustee.     Dismissed. 

Hawks,  Esther  H.,  estate  of.  Hannah  T.  Garret  et  al.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  seventh  ac- 
count.    Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Healy,  Jeremiah  J.,  estate  of.  Dennis  Healy,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Hill,  Robert  W.,  et  als.  v.  John  F.  Moors  et  als.  Petition  to 
confirm  conve3^ance  of  titles.  Submitted  to  determina- 
tion of  the  court. 

Little,  Adeline  A.,  v.  Attorney-General.  Petition  for  instruc- 
tions.    Submitted  to  determination  of  the  court. 

Moore,  Martha,  estate  of.  Mary  Barker,  executrix,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Moseley,  Julia  M.,  estate  of.  Oliver  H.  Perry  et  al.,  executors, 
petitioners.     Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  Trustees  of  Donations  to  the, 
V.  Attorney-General  et  al.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell 
real  estate.     Submitted  to  the  determination  of  the  court. 

Sawyer,  Samuel  E.,  estate  of.  John  Pickering  Putnam  et  al., 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  ninth  to 
nineteenth   accounts,   inclusive.     Pending. 

Smith,  Joseph  N.,  estate  of.  Henry  B.  Sprague  et  al.,  execu- 
tors, petitioners.  Petition  for  instructions.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Smith,  Joseph  N.,  estate  of.  Henry  B.  Sprague  et  al.,  exec- 
utors, petitioners.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Smith,  Joseph  N.,  estate  of.  Sarah  Fuller  Smith  et  al.,  execu- 
tors, petitioners.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Warren,  Betsey  K.,  estate  of.  Isaac  D.  Pope  et  al.,  peti- 
tioners. Petition  for  appointment  as  trustees.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Welch,  Annie  C.,  estate  of.  John  D.  Dewhurst  el  al.,  peti- 
tioners. Petition  for  appointment  as  trustees.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Franklin  County. 

Butterfield,  Permelia  A.,  estate  of.  Rufus  T.  Shumway,  ad- 
ministrator, petitioner.  Petition  for  instructions.  Pend- 
ing. 

Field,  Simeon  A.,  estate  of.  Henry  W.  Montague,  trustee, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  allowance  of  third  account. 
Pending. 


1916.J  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  159 

Stratton,  Abigail,  estate  of.  Frank  H.  Montague  et  al.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  tenth  account. 
Pending. 

Williams,  Philomena  A.,  estate  of.  Edward  H.  Shephard, 
executor,  petitioner.  Petition  for  instructions.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Hampden  County. 

Chapin,  Emily  J.,  estate  of.  Carlos  M.  Gage,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Conner,  Lydia  T.,  estate  of.  James  C.  S.  Taber,  executor, 
petitioner.     Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Derby,  Pardon  H.,  estate  of.  Ellen  B.  Derby  et  al.,  executors, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  instructions.  Submitted  to  the 
determination  of  the  court. 

Frary,  Obadiah,  estate  of.  Joseph  C.  Booth,  administrator 
c.  t.  a.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  approval  of  agreement  of 
compromise.     Attorney-General  w^aived  right  to  be  heard. 

Marsh,  Catherine  E.,  estate  of.  Fred  F.  Partridge,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  appointment  as  trustee.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard.    • 

Morgan,  Francis  C,  estate  of.  Alonzo  B.  Root,  executor, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  instructions.  Submitted  to  the 
determination  of  the  court. 

Moseley,  Jane  A.,  estate  of.  Peter  King,  petitioner.  Petition 
for  instructions.     Decree. 

Noyes,  Emily  C,  estate  of.  George  E.  Clough,  executor,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  authority  to  adjust  by  compromise 
controversy  in  regard  to  will.  Attorney-General  waived 
right  to  be  heard. 

Porter,  Sherman  D.,  estate  of.     Edwin  D.  Lyford,  executor, 
.  petitioner.     Petition  for  instructions.     Submitted  to  de- 
termination of  the  court. 

Winter,  Sarah  J.,  estate  of.  Wesson  Memorial  Hospital,  trus- 
tee, petitioner.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real  estate. 
Decree. 

Hampshire  County. 

Curtis,  Herbert  F.,  et  al.  v.  Belchertow^n  Baptist  Religious 
Society  et  als.  Petition  for  authority  to  convey  real 
estate.     Submitted  to  the  determination  of  the  court. 

Russell  Church  in  Hadley.  Francis  S.  Reynolds,  trustee. 
Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 


160  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Tuckerman,  Edward,  estate  of.  Charles  E.  Cotting  et  aL, 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  twelfth 
account.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Middlesex  County. 

Blood,  Benjamin  F.,  estate  of.  George  G.  Waite  et  als.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  second  ac- 
count.    Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Bull,  Sara  C.,  estate  of.  Joseph  G.  Thorp  et  at.  v.  John  Lund 
et  at.     Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Carpenter,  Harriet  E.,  estate  of.  Wilbur  B.  Parshley  et  aL, 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real 
estate.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Choate,  Charles  G.,  estate  of.  John  M.  Harlow  et  als.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  third  account. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Copeland,  Sarah  E.,  estate  of.  Alba  A.  Giles,  executor,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  allowance  of  second  account.  Pend- 
ing. 

Dimock,  Dwight  L.,  estate  of.  Marilla  M.  Haley,  trustee, 
petitioner.     Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Eddy,  Mary  Baker  G.,  estate  of.  First  Church  of  Christ, 
Scientist,  in  Boston,  trustee,  petitioner.  Petition  for 
authority  to  transfer  real  estate.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Fellows,  James  K.,  estate  of.  Winthrop  P.  Buttrick  et  aL, 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  instructions.  Pend- 
ing. 

Fletcher,  Joel  Emery,  estate  of.  Frank  A.  Patch,  executor. 
Petition  for  approval  of  agreement  of  compromise.  At- 
torney-General waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Hammond,  George  P.,  estate  of.  Elizabeth  F.  Johnson,  execu- 
trix, petitioner.     Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Harvard  College,  President  and  Fellows  of,  v.  Attorney-Gen- 
eral. Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real  estate.  At- 
torney-General waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Martin,  Webster  Warner,  estate  of.  Wesley  T.  Lee  et  aL, 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  eleventh 
account.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Mellen,  William  H.,  estate  of.  Town  of  Framingham,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real  estate.  Pend- 
ing. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  161 

Morss,  George  H.,  estate  of.  Henry  L.  Newhall,  executor, 
petitioner.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

O'Brien,  Bartholomew,  estate  of.  Thomas  J.  CoJHns,  admin- 
istrator c.  t.  a.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  instructions. 
Pending. 

Parkhurst,  Emeline  K.,  estate  of.  Arthur  F.  Pinkham  et  al., 
executors,  petitioners.  Petition  for  instructions.  Pend- 
ing. 

Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  Trustees  of  Donations  to  the,  v. 
The  Parish  of  the  House  of  Prayer.  Petition  for  author- 
ity to  sell  real  estate.  Submitted  to  the  determination  of 
the  court. 

Roberts,  James  H.,  estate  of.  Horace  M.  Bickford  et  als., 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  first  and 
final  account.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be 
heard. 

Roby,  Christopher,  estate  of.  George  V.  Herrig  et  al.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  seventeenth 
account.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Smith,  George  O.,  estate  of.  Albert  S.  Parsons  et  als.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real 
estate.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Smith,  George  O.,  estate  of.  Frank  D.  Peirce  et  als.,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real  estate. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Southwick,  Thirza  W.,  estate  of.  Harry  H.  Ham,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  appointment  as  trustee.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Talbot,  Isabella  W.,  estate  of.  Adelbert  L.  Wait  et  al.,  peti- 
tioners.    Petition  for  appointment  of  trustees.     Pending. 

Warner,  Isaac,  estate  of.  Massachusetts  Baptist  Missionary 
Society,  petitioner.  Petition  for  appointment  of  trustee. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

White,  Daniel,  estate  of.  Winslow  Warren  et  al.,  trustees,  peti- 
tionees. Petition  for  allowance  of  sixteenth,  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  accounts.     Pending. 

Whitney,  Caroline  A.  R.,  estate  of.  Charles  A.  Stone,  trus- 
tee, petitioner.  Petition  for  allowance  of  first,  second 
and  final  accounts.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be 
heard. 

Whitney,  Edward,  estate  of.  Charles  A.  Stone  et  al.,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  sale  of  real  estate.  Assented  to 
petition. 


162  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Whitney,  Edward,  estate  of.  Charles  A.  Stone  et  al.,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  first  account. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Wright,  Hapgood,  estate  of.  Frank  E.  Dunbar,  trustee,  peti- 
tioner.    Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Norfolk  County. 

Brigham,  Elizabeth  F.,  estate  of.  New  England  Trust  Com- 
pany et  al.,  trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance 
of  third  and  fourth  accounts.  Attorney-General  waived 
right  to  be  heard. 

Dyer,  Benjamin  F.,  et  al.  v.  Attorney-General.  Petition  for 
instructions.     Submitted  to  the  determination  of  the  court. 

Jones,  Edwin  A.,  estate  of.  Henry  S.  Jones  et  als.,  trustees, 
petitioners.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Lee,  Henry,  estate  of.  Schuyler  S.  Bartlett,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Mann,  Jonathan,  estate  of.  Carrie  S.  Leeds,  petitioner.  Peti- 
tion for  removal  of  trustee.     Pending. 

Quincy,  City  of,  v.  James  M.  Swift,  Attorney-General,  et  als. 
Petition  for  authority  to  sell  land  held  in  trust  and  rein- 
vest proceeds.     Pending. 

Thing,  Samuel  B.,  estate  of.  Fred  S.  Sawyer  et  als.,  trustees, 
petitioners.       Petition  for  instructions.       Pending. 

Plymouth  County, 
Perritt,    Dora,    estate   of.      Henry   W.    Barnes,    administrator 
c.  t.  a.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Suffolk  County. 

Amory,  Francis  L,  et  al.  v.  Trustees  of  Amherst  College  et  al. 
Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Bird,  John  H.,  estate  of.  Charles  T.  Gallagher  et  al.,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  allow^ance  of  fortieth  account. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Bird,  John  H.,  estate  of.  Charles  T.  Gallagher  et  al.,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  forty-first  account. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Brigham,  Robert  B.,  estate  of.  New  England  Trust  Com- 
pany, trustee,  petitioner.  Petition  for  allowance  of 
fourth,  fifth  and  sixth  accounts.  Attorney-General  waived 
■    right  to  be  heard. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  163 

Bryant,  John  D.,  estate  of.  Arthur  L.  Howard  el  al.,  execu- 
tors, petitioners.     Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Children's  Hospital  v.  iVttorne^^-General  et  als.  Petition  for 
authority  to  sell  real  estate.  Submitted  to  the  deter- 
mination of  the  court. 

Cushing,  Emeline,  estate  of.  xlrchibald  H.  Grimke  et  al., 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  first, 
second,  third,  fourth  and  fifth  accounts.  Attorney-Gen- 
eral wai\ed  right  to  be  heard. 

Eckley,  Frances  A.,  estate  of.  Francis  R.  Bangs,  trustee, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  allowance  of  third  to  sixteenth 
accounts,  inclusive.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be 
heard. 

Gwynne  Temporary  Home  for  Children  v.  Attorney-General 
et  als.  Petition  for  authority  to  transfer  property,  and 
petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Hall,  Conray  P.,  et  al.,  trustees,  v.  Attorney-General.  Petition 
for  instructions.     Decree. 

Hanson,  Lydia  M.,  estate  of.  William  A.  Robinson,  executor, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  instructions.  iVttorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Harris,  Mary,  estate  of.  Elizabeth  L.  Bond,  trustee,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  allowance  of  first  account.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Harvard  College,  President  and  Fellows  of,  v.  Attorney-Gen- 
eral.    Petition  for  instructions.     Pending. 

Kimball  Union  Academy,  Trustees  of,  v.  Arthur  L.  Howard 
et  als.  Petition  to  compel  trustees  to  carry  out  the  terms 
of  the  will  of  John  D.  Bryant.     Pending. 

Liversidge,  Thomas,  estate  of.  Clift  Rogers  Clapp  et  als., 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real 
estate.     Decree. 

Locke,  Elbridge  W.,  estate  of.  Otis  Merriam  et  al.,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  eleventh  and  twelfth 
accounts.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Locke,  Elbridge  W.,  estate  of.  Otis  Merriam  et  al,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  thirteenth  account. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Locke,  Elbridge  W.,  estate  of.  Prescott  Chamberlain  et  al., 
trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  authority  to  sell  real 
estate.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Lowe,  Janet  M.,  et  al.  v.  Leopold  Morse  Home  for  Infirm  He- 
brews et  al.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 


164  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Mabie,  William  L,  et  al.  v.  Edwin  S.  Gardner  and  the  At- 
torney-General. Petition  for  instructions  regarding  a 
public  charitable  trust  under  will  of  Mary  Redding. 
Pending. 

Massachusetts  Babies'  Hospital  v.  Attorney-General  et  als. 
Petition  for  authority  to  administer  fund  cy  pres.  Sub- 
mitted to  determination  of  court. 

Massachusetts  Baptist  Missionary  Society,  trustee.  Petition 
for  authority  to  sell  real  estate.  Attorney-General  as- 
sented to  petition. 

Massachusetts  General  Hospital  v.  Attorney-General.  Peti- 
tion for  authority  to  sell  real  estate.     Decree. 

Newcomb,  Helen  D.,  estate  of.  Alice  E.  Stedman,  adminis- 
tratrix, petitioner.     Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Pierce,  Katharine  C.,  estate  of.  Frank  S.  White  et  al.,  execu- 
tors and  trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of 
first  and  final  account  of  executors  and  first  account  of 
trustees.     Pending. 

Pratt,  Sarah  E.,  estate  of.  Laurence  Minot,  executor,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  authority  to  pay  legacy.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Ranlett,  Leonard  B.,  estate  of.  Dana  D.  Holbrook,  executor, 
petitioner.    -Petition  for  instructions.    Decree. 

Smith,  James,  estate  of.  Clarence  W.  Dealtry,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  appointment  as  trustee.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Warren  Avenue  Baptist  Church  v.  Attorney-General.  Petition 
for  authority  to  use  a  certain  trust  fund.     Decree. 

Whitney,  Mary  D.,  estate  of.  George  E.  Bullard  et  al.,  trus- 
tees, petitioners.  Petition  for  instructions.  Submitted  to 
the  determination  of  the  court. 

Withee,  Josiah  E.,  estate  of.  Daniel  S.  Davis,  executor,  peti- 
tioner.    Petition  for  instructions.     Decree. 

Woman's  Seaman's  Friend  Society  v.  Attorney-General.  Peti- 
tion for  authority  to  sell  real  estate.     Decree. 

Worcester  County. 

Barton,  Clara,  estate  of.  Stephen  E.  Barton,  executor,  peti- 
tioner. Petition  for  authority  to  transfer  trust  fund. 
Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Barton,  Clara,  estate  of.  Stephen  E.  Barton,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  appointment  as  trustee.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  165 

Dudley,  Elizabeth  M.,  estate  of.  Orthodox  Congregational 
Church  of  Petersham,  petitioner.  Petition  for  partial 
distribution  under  will.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to 
be  heard. 

Grout,  Eliza  P.,  estate  of.  Robert  L,  Carter  ct  als.,  trustees, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  allowance  of  tenth  account. 
x\ttorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Potter,  Elizabeth  A.,  estate  of.  Arthur  B.  Chapin,  executor, 
petitioner.  Petition  for  instructions.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Robinson,  Charlotte  R.,  estate  of.  Charles  F.  Choate  et  at., 
petitioners.  Petition  for  appointment  of  trustees.  At- 
torney-General waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Wellesley  College  v.  Attorney-General.  Petition  for  modifica- 
tion of  charitable  bequest.  Submitted  to  the  determina- 
tion of  the  court. 


166  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


SUITS  CONDUCTED  BY  THE  ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 

In  Behalf  of  State  Boards  and  Commissions. 


The  following  cases  have  been  reported  to  this  department 
by  State  boards  and  commissions,  to  be  conducted  by  the 
Attorney-General,  or  under  his  direction:  — 

1.     Metropolitan  Water  and  Sewerage  Board. 
Petition  to  the  Superior  Court  for  assessment  of  damages 
alleged  to   have   been  sustained   by  the   taking  of   land,  and 
rights  and  easements  in  land,  by  said  board. 

Middlesex  County. 
Stoneham,  Town  of,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 
Ward,  George  A.,  et  als.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 

2.     Metropolitan  Park  Commission.         / 
Petitions  to  the  Superior  Court  for  assessment  of  damages 
alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  taking  of  land  by  said 
commissioners. 

Middlesex  County. 
Shea,  William  P.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 

Suffolk  County. 
Hamlin,  Edward,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 
Hurley,  Margaret,  et  als.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 

3.  Massachusetts  Highway  Commission. 
Petitions  to  the  Superior  Court  for  a  jury  to  assess  damages 
alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  taking  of  land,  or  injury 
to  land,  by  said  commission.  Under  agreement  with  this 
Commonwealth  most  of  these  cases  are  defended  by  the 
various  towns  in  which  the  land  is  situated. 


1916.1  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  167 


Barnstable  County. 
Gibbs,  E.  Porter,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled.  i 

Wagner,  Jeanette,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 

Berkshire  County.  '• 

Connelly,  William  H.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled.  > 

Rogerson,  Sophia,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Stevens,  John  A.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 

Hampshire  County.  ' 

Flagg,  Lucretia  Taft,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  . 

Taft,  Kate  P.,  «.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  , 

Middlesex  County. 
Hogan,  James  J.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Howe,  Louis  P.,  n.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Huntington,  Herbert  R.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
McGee,  John  P.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ,1 

Nourse,  Joseph  P.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled.  j 


Norfolk  County. 
Ireson,  Jennie  E.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 
Jordan,  S.  Annie,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 
Kneisel,  Joseph,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 
York,  Addie  A.,  et  al.  '.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 

Plymouth  County.  \ 

Lynch,  Jennie  M.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 

Suffolk  County. 
Jones,  Lizzie  E.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Jones,  Lizzie  E.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Williams,  William,  et  al.  i\  Commonwealth.     Settled. 

Worcester  County,  i 

Haven,  Herbert  J.,  et  al.  ?;.  Commonwealth.     Settled.  ^ 

Ray,  Foster  S.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  j 


168  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


4.     Board  of  Harbor  and  Land  Commissioners. 

Petitions  to  the  Superior  Court  for  assessment  of  damages  \ 

alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  taking  of  land  by  said  i 
commissioners. 

Suffolk  County.  j 

Butler,  Philip  H.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  .• 

East  Boston  Company  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  1 

Lamb,  George,  et  at.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ■ 
Lamb,  George,  et  al.  i.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 

5.     Charles  River  Basin  Commissioners. 
Petitions  to  the  Superior  Court  for  assessment  of  damages 

alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  taking  of  land  by  said  j 
commissioners. 

Suffolk  County. 

Apthorp,  Octave  L.,  i.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  \ 

Barstow,  Catherine  A.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ] 

Brown,  Rebecca  W.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  J 

Cotting,  Charles  E.,  et  al.,  trustees,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pend-  j 

ing.  1 

Edmands,  Katherine  B.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  I 

Fields,  Annie,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ] 

Hooper,  James  R.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ! 

Hooper,  Robert  C,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ' 

Inches,  Louise  P.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  j 

Jewell,  Edward,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ^ 
Niles,  Sarah  F.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending, 

Parker,  George  W.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  i 

Pierce,  Katherine  C,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ' 

Prince,  Fannie  L.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  , 

Prince,  Lillian  C,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ; 
Sears,  Mary  C,  i.  Comrdonwealth.     Pending. 
Sears,  Richard  D.,  v.  Commonwealth.       Pending. 

Shaw,  Francis,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ' 

Tarbell,  Arthur  P.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  •, 

Taylor,  Georgianna  O.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  { 

Taylor,  Mary  M.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  i 

Whitney,  Christiana  S.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending.  ; 
Williams,  John  D.,  trustee,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCraiENT  — No.  12.  169 

6.     Armory  Commissioners. 
Petitions  to  the  Superior  Court  for  assessment  of  damages 
alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  taking  of  land  by  the 
said  board. 

Berkshire  County. 
Pittsfield   &  North  Adams  Railroad  et  at.  v.  Commonwealth. 
Settled. 

Essex  County. 
Griffin,  Henry,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 

Worcester  County. 
Palmer,  Joseph  W.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 

7.     State  Board  of  Insanity. 
Petitions  to  the  Superior  Court  for  assessment  of  damages 
alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  taking  of  land  by  the 
said  board. 

Suffolk  County. 
Beatty,  John  F.,  t.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Callahan,  George  A.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Flint,  James  H.,  et  al.,  trustees,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Holbrook,  Wellington,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Kiley,  Daniel  J.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 
Shea,  Julia  A.,  et  als.,  trustees,  x.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 

8.     Mount  Everett  Reservation  Commission. 
Petition  to  the  Supreme  Judicial  and  Superior  Courts  for 
assessment  of  damages  alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the 
taking   of   land,    and   rights    and   easements   in  land,  by  said 
board. 

Berkshire  County. 
Macnaughton,  Elizabeth  P.,  «.  Commonwealth.     Settled. 

9.     Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston. 
Petitions  to  the  Superior  Court  for  assessment  of  damages 
alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  taking  of  land  by  said 
board. 


170  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Suffolk  Comity. 
Boston  V.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 
Codman,    Edmund    D.,    et    at.,    trustees,    v.    Commonwealth. 

Pending. 
Fitzpatrick,  George  C,  v.  Commonwealth.     Pending. 
Haskins,    Elizabeth    S.,    et    ah,    trustees,    v.    Commonwealth. 

Settled. 

10.     Miscellaneous  Cases  from  Above  Commissions. 
Essex  County. 
Reed,  William  H.,  v.  Commonwealth.     Claim  for  damages  on 
account  of  injury' to  horse  on  State  highway  in  Gloucester. 
Pending. 
Tremblay,  Paul,  v.  Commonwealth.     Action  of  tort  for  injuries 
caused  by  defect  in  State  highway  in  East  Boston.    Pend- 
ing. 

Hampden  County. 
Ranger,    Joseph   F.,   x.    Commonwealth.      Claim  for  damages 
on  account  of  injury  to  automobile,  caused  by  defect  in 
State  highway.     Pending. 

Middlesex  County. 
International  Automobile  and  Vehicle  Tire  Company  v.  Com- 
monwealth.     Petition   for   damages   to   petitioner's   prop- 
erty caused  by  change  of  east  branch  of  Charles  River 
by  Park  Commission.     Pending. 

Suffolk  County. 

Blaw  Steel  Construction  Company  v.  Commonwealth  et  at. 
Claim  for  money  due  for  use  of  steel  forms  in  construc- 
tion of  a  section  of  the  metropolitan  sewer.     Pending. 

Boudreau,  William,  i.  Commonwealth.  Action  of  tort  to  re- 
cover for  personal  injuries  caused  by  defect  in  a  State 
highway.     Pending. 

Davis,  James  A.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth  et  at.  Petition  to  re- 
cover for  labor  and  materials  used  in  construction  of 
sewer.     Pending. 

De  las  Casas,  William  B.,  et  al.  v.  Sewer  Commissioners  of 
Revere.  Petition  for  injunction  to  restrain  town  from 
obstructing  sewer  built  by  the  Park  Commission  for  bath- 
house.    Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCmiENT  — No.  12.  171 

Dicke}^  Lero}^  W.,  v.  Commonwealth  et  al.  Claim  for  money 
due  the  petitioner  for  materials  furnished  Joseph  Wagen- 
bach  &  Son  in  the  construction  of  a  section  of  State  high- 
way in  Dracut.     Pending. 

Doherty,  James,  v.  Edward  W.  Everson  ei  al.  and  Metropoli- 
tan Water  and  Sewerage  Board.  Action  of  tort.  Dam- 
ages caused  b}^  blasting.     Pending. 

Doherty,  James,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  assessment  of 
damages  caused  by  blasting  for  metropolitan  sewer. 
Pending. 

Ellinwood,  Ralph  R.,  Commonwealth  v.  Petition  to  restrain 
respondent  from  infringing  park  regulations  on  Revere 
boulevard.     Pending. 

Gibbons,  William  H.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Damage  caused  by 
blasting  in  construction  of  metropolitan  sewer.     Pending. 

H.  B.  Smith  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  money 
due  under  contract  for  Boston  State  Hospital.     Pending. 

Hildreth  Granite  Company  v.  Commonwealth  et  al.  Claim  for 
money  due  the  petitioner  for  materials  furnished  P. 
Rosetti  &  Sons  in  the  construction  of  a  section  of  State 
highway  in  Revere.     Pending. 

Laffie,  Martin  C,  v.  Commonwealth.  Action  of  tort  to  re- 
cover for  personal  injuries  caused  by  defect  in  a  State 
highway.     Pending. 

Laffie,  Ralph  T.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  damage  to 
property  caused  by  defect  in  a  State  highway.     Pending. 

Lake,  Alexander  G.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Action  of  tort  to  re- 
cover for  injuries  caused  by  defect  in  State  highway  in 
Natick.     Pending. 

McDonough,  Michael,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  money 
due  under  contract  and  for  extra  work  in  constructing 
section  of  State  highway.     Pending. 

McGinniss,  Margaret  T.,  Commonwealth  v.  Bill  in  equity  to 
restrain  defendant  from  encroaching  on  land  of  the  Com- 
monwealth.    Pending. 

National  Contracting  Company  et  al.,  Commonwealth  v.  Ac- 
tion of  contract  to  recover  on  bond.     Pending. 

Niland,  Michael,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  assessment  of 
damages  caused  by  blasting  for  metropolitan  sewer. 
Pending. 

Niland,  Michael,  v.  Edward  W.  Everson  et  al.  and  Metropoli- 
tan Water  and  Sewerage  Board.  Action  of  tort.  Dam- 
ages caused  by  blasting.     Pending. 


172  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Normile,  Francis,  v.  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  et  al. 
Petition  for  a  jury  to  assess  damages  caused  by  construc- 
tion of  sewer  in  Roxbury.     Pending. 

Normile,  Francis,  v.  Edward  W.  Everson  &  Co.  and  Henry  H. 
Sprague  et  al.     Action  of  tort.     Pending. 

O'Connell,  Dennis  F.,  v.  Michael  J.  McGawley  et  als.  Bill  of 
complaint  to  restrain  the  respondent  McGawle}^  from  as- 
signing his  interest  in  a  contract  entered  into  with  the 
MetropoHtan  Park  Commission.     Pending. 

Old  Colony  Construction  Company,  Commonwealth  v.  Action 
of  contract  to  recover  on  bond.     Pending. 

Pacific  Surety  Company  v.  Commonwealth  et  al.  Petition  to 
recover  from  McBride  &  Co.  certain  sums  expended  by 
petitioner.     Pending. 

Pitts,  Lemuel,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  arrears  of  pay 
due  from  Metropolitan  Water  and  Sewerage  Board. 
Pending. 

Smith,  Frederick  W.,  et  al.  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for 
money  due  under  contract  for  Boston  State  Hospital. 
Dismissed. 

Waterproof  Leatherboard  Company,  Henry  H.  Sprague  et  als., 
Metropolitan  Water  and  Sewerage  Board,  v.  Bill  of  com- 
plaint to  restrain  respondent  from  discharging  factory 
wastes  into  Beaver  Dam  Brook.     Pending. 

Waterproofing  Company,  The,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for 
money  due  for  labor  performed  on  Psychopathic  Hospital. 
Pending. 

11.     State  Boards  of  Charity  and  Insanity. 
Actions  of  contract  pending  in  the  Superior  Court  to  re- 
cover charges  for  the  support  of  persons  in  State  hospitals. 

Suffolk  County. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Boxborough,  town  of.     Pending. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Ellen  M.  Chatham,  guardian.     Settled. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Chelsea,  city  of.     Pending. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Chelsea,  city  of.     Pending. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  James  E.  Dunham,  guardian.     Settled. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Lizzie  Hennessey.     Pending. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Bertha  Levovsky.     Pending. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  John  McColgan.     Pending. 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Lena  Morin.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  173  ^ 


Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Peabody,  town  of.     Settled.  j 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Jacob  I.  Rosenberg.     Settled.  ; 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Rutland,  town  of.     Settled.  \ 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Elizabeth  M.  Taylor  et  al.     Pending.  { 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  John  Tobin.     Pending.  ; 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  Ware,  town  of.     Settled.  ! 

Burrill,  Treasurer,  v.  AYayland,  town  of.     Settled.  i 

Mansfield,  Treasurer,  v.  Brookline  Friendly  Society.     Pending. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Warren  M.  Andrews.     Settled.  i 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Franklin    Balch,    administrator    of    the  J 

estate  of  Benjamin  H.  Potter.     Settled.  1 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Boston,  city  of.     Settled.  ' 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Boston,  city  of.  Settled. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Boston,  city  of.  Settled. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Boston,  city  of.     Settled. 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Charles  F.  Bushby.     Settled.  i 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Caroline  R.  Clasby.     Pending. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Caroline  R.  Clasby.     Pending.  : 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Mary  E.  Clasby.     Pending.  , 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Joseph  C.  CoUigan.     Pending. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  John    J.    Cronin,    administrator    of   the 

estate  of  Mary  Murphy.     Pending. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Fall  River,  city  of.     Settled. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  John  Grieneeks.     Pending. 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Lowell,  city  of.     Pending.  \ 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  New  Bedford,  city  of.     Settled.  1 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Emma  C.  Russell,  guardian.     Pending. 
Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Rutland,  town  of.     Settled.  : 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Josiah  Ryder.     Settled. 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Thomas  J.   Sexton,   guardian.     Settled.  | 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Julia  Tully.     Settled.  \ 

Stevens,  Treasurer,  v.  Louise  C.  Westcott.     Settled. 


174  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


MISCELLANEOUS  CASES. 


A.  J.  Tower  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  abate- 
ment of  franchise  tax  for  the  year  1914.     Pending. 

Abbott,  Lillian,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Eunice  M.  Ab- 
bott, Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inher- 
itance tax.     Decree. 

Acme  White  Lead  and  Color  Works  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Adams,  Fannie  A.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Billerica.     Pending. 

Ahearn,  Sarah  A.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  James  McGee, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Ahmeek  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Ahmeek  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Ahmeek  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Aldrich,  Frank  E.,  petitioner.  Petition  to  register  title  to  land 
in  Northfield.     Pending. 

Algomah  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Algomah  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Allouez  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  175 

Allouez  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Amalgamated  Nevada  Mines  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

x\malgamated  Nevada  Mines  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Agricultural  Chemical  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Agricultural  Chemical  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Agricultural  Chemical  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Axe  and  Tool  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

American  Axe  and  Tool  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

American  Can  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

American  Can  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

American  Can  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

American  Can  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

American  Chicle  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

American  Chicle  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 


176  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

American  Dyewood  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

American  Dyewood  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

American  Hide  and  Leather  Company  x.  Commonwealth.  Pe- 
tition to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  for- 
eign corporation.     Pending. 

American  Hide  and  Leather  Companj^  x.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Investment  Securities  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Investment  Securities  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign    corporation.     Pending. 

American  Investment  Securities  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Mutual  Liability  Insurance  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  for  abatement  of  franchise  tax  for  the 
year  1914.     Pending. 

American  Piano  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

American  Pneumatic  Service  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Pneumatic  Service  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

American  Steel  and  Wire  Company  of  New  Jersey  v.  Com- 
monwealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year 
1915  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Ames  Shovel  and  Tool  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Ames  Shovel  and  Tool  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  177 

x\mes  Shovel  and  Tool  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Amoskeag  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth,  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Amoskeag  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Anderson,  Mary  J.,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Elizabeth 
P.  Anderson,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Annable,  Charles  H.,  et  ah,  executors  of  the  will  of  Mary  E. 
Annable,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Arizona  Commercial  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign    corporation.     Pending. 

Armstrong  Cork  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Armstrong  Cork  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Armstrong  Cork  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Arvedson,  George  C,  et  als.  v.  Commonwealth.  Bill  in  equity 
to  enjoin  the  transfer  of  funds  in  the  hands  of  the  re- 
ceivers in  bankruptcy  of  the  American  Service  Union. 
Pending. 

Asbestos  Protected  Metal  Company  v.  Common,wealth.  Peti- 
tion for  abatement  of  franchise  tax.     Final  decree. 

Ashland  Emery  and  Corundum  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Ashland  Emery  and  Corundum  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Ashland  Emery  and  Corundum  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 


178  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Atlas  Tack  Company  i\  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Atlas  Tack  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

B.  F.  Goodrich  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1915  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

B.  T.  Babbitt  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise  tax 
for  the  year  1914  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Bailen,  Samuel  L.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Georgie  M.  Harris, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Baird,  Hattie  B.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Julian  W.  Baird, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Baker,  George  A.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  James  T. 
Baker,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Ball,  Ellen,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Michael  J.  Ball,  Attorney- 
General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Dismissed. 

Baltic  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Baltic  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Barrett,  Josephine,  et  aL,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Dennis.     Pending. 

Bates  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Bates  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Belding  Brothers  &  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Belding  Brothers  &  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  179 

Bellows  Falls  Power  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  franchise  tax.     Rescript. 

Benson,  Francis  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Winchester.  Attorney-General  waived 
right  to  be  heard. 

Bentley,  Alice  L.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Eli  E.  Bentley,  Attor- 
ney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Berry  Brothers,  Ltd.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Berry  Brothers,  Ltd.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Bingham  Mines  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Bishop,  Elias  B.,  et  al.,  trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
registration  of  title  to  land  in  Newton.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Blair,  Frank  W.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Mary  F.  Blair, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Blake  &  Knowles  Steam  Pump  Works  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign    corporation.     Pending. 

Bohemia  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Bond,  Lawrence,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Arthur  S. 
Eddy,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Decree. 

Boston  &  Corbin  Copper  and  Silver  Mining  Company  v.  Com- 
monwealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year 
1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Boston  &  Maine  Railroad  et  als.,  Commonwealth  v.  Bill  in 
equity  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  a  contract  with  said 
railroad  companies  in  reference  to  switching  charges. 
Pending. 

Boston  &  Northern  Street  Railway  Company.  Claim  for 
amount  expended  in  relaying  water  pipes  in  Washington 
Street,  Lynn,  destroyed  by  electric  currents.     Pending. 


ISO  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Boston  &  Roxbury  Mill  Corporation,  petitioner  for  dissolution. 
Petition  of  the  Commonwealth  for  leave  to  intervene. 
Pending. 

Boston  &  Worcester  Street  Railway  Company  t\  Board  of 
Railroad  Commissioners.  Petition  for  modification  of 
ruhng  by  Railroad  Commissioners.     Pending. 

Boston  Bedding  Supply  Company  v.  Commonwealth  et  al. 
Petition  for  assessment  of  damages  alleged  to  have  been 
caused  by  the  passage  of  legislation  restricting  the  right 
to  draw  water  from  the  Charles  River  during  certain  sea- 
sons.    Pending. 

Boston  Fish  Market  Corporation  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
for  abatement  of  franchise  tax  for  the  year  1915.     Pending. 

Boston,  Revere  Beach  &  Lynn  Railroad  Company,  Attorney- 
General  V.  Information  to  enjoin  respondent  from  driving 
piles  in  and  making  any  erections  over  tidewater  at 
Point  Shirley.     Pending. 

Boston  Rubber  Shoe  Company,  Attorney-General  c.v  rel.  v. 
Information  at  the  relation  of  the  Treasurer  and  Re- 
ceiver-General for  the  collection  of  corporation  tax. 
Pending. 

Boston  Rubber  Shoe  Company  v.  William  D.  T.  Trefry  et  als. 
Petition  to  restrain  and  enjoin  defendants  from  collecting 
franchise  tax.     Decree. 

Boston  Safe  Deposit  and  Trust  Company,  executor  of  the  will 
of  Louise  W.  Rogers,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Boston  Securities  Company  v.  Commonw^ealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Boston  Securities  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Bosworth,  Charles  O.,  executor  of  the  will  of  John  P.  Campion, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Boulevard  Trust  Company  v.  Comm.onwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Bourne,  Inhabitants  of,  v.  Public  Service  Commission  et  ciL 
Petition  for  writ  of  certiorari.     Pending. 

Bowles,  George  W.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Watertown.    Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  181 

Bowman,  Joseph  W.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  writ  of 
error.     Pending. 

Boyden,  Benjamin  F.,  et  al,  administrators  of  the  estate  of 
Sarah  T.  Cart,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to 
recover  inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Brackett,  Arthur  L.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  assess- 
ment of  damages  caused  by  the  erection  of  the  Anderson 
Bridge.  Charles  K.  Darling,  John  T.  Swift  and  Joseph  A. 
Conry   appointed   commissioners.     Pending. 

Branigan,  Edward  B.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Edward 
W.  Branigan,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Breakwater  Company  t\  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
•  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Breakwater  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Briggs,  Benjamin  F.,  v.  Elmer  A.  Stevens,  Treasurer  and  Re- 
ceiver-General. Appeal  from  decree  of  Land  Court. 
Pending. 

Bristol  County  Mutual  Fire  Insurance  Company,  Attorney- 
General  ex  rel.  v.  Information  at  the  relation  of  the  In- 
surance Commissioner  for  violation  of  insurance  laws. 
Injunction  issued. 

Brookside  Mills  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation.  Pend- 
ing. 

Brookside  Mills  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Brookside  Mine  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation.  Pend- 
ing. 

Brown,  George  E.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Walpole.     Decree. 

Browning,  King  &  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Bruce,  George  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Winthrop.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to 
be  heard. 

Bryne,  Andrew  W.,  et  als.  v.  Commonwealth  et  al.  Petition  to 
recover  money  in  hands  of  Commonwealth.     Pending. 


182  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Buckner,  Helen  Frances,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Franklin.    Pending. 

Bullard,  John  C,  executor  of  the  will  of  Justina  Dennison, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Bullard,  John  D.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Hyde  Park.       Pending. 

Bunzel,  Gustave,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Bill  in  equity  to 
restrain  the  respondent  from  conducting  the  business  of 
slaughtering  in  Lexington.     Decree. 

Burke,  Edmund,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  John  Kelley, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  x.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Burkhardt,  Mary  A.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Maria  Shanley, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Burrage,  Clarence  V.,  et  al.,  trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for 
registration  of  title  to  land  in  Marshfield.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Burroughs,  George,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  reimburse- 
ment for  damage  caused  by  fire  set  by  emplo^'ces  of 
State  Forester.     Pending. 

Butchers'  Slaughtering  and  Melting  Association  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  for  assessment  of  damages  caused  by  the 
erection  of  the  Anderson  Bridge.  Charles  K.  Darling, 
John  T.  Swift  and  Joseph  A.  Conry  appointed  commis- 
sioners.    Pending. 

Butler,  Robert,  v.  Edward  F.  McSweeney  et  als.,  Directors  of 
the  Port  of  Boston.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus  to 
compel  reinstatement  of  petitioner  in  the  position  of 
mechanical  foreman.     Pending. 

Calumet  &  Hecla  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Calumet  &  Hecla  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  for- 
eign corporation.     Pending. 

Campbell,  Francis  A.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Jane 
McLaughlin,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to 
recover  inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Campbell,  Louise  H.,  et  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registra- 
tion of  title  to  land  in  Wareham.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  —  Xo.  12.  183 

Campbell,  Louise  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Wareham.     Pending. 

Carey,  William  H.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Annie  Mitchell, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Carnegie  Steel  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1915  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Casey,  Mary  N.,  et  al.,  trustees,  petitioners.  Petition  for  regis- 
tration of  title  to  land  in  Billerica.     Pending. 

Cates,  Abbie  Holder,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Pembroke.  Attorney-General  waived  right 
to  be  heard. 

Centennial  Copper  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Centennial  Copper  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  b}'  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Champion  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  })y  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Champion  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for. the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Champion  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Charlestown  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Cheney  Brothers  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Cheney  Brothers  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Chicopee,  city  of,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  difference  in 
amount  of  money  allowed  by  the  State  Board  of  Charit}' 
and  amount  expended  by  the  town  in  treatment  of 
typhoid  patients.     Disposed  of. 

Childs'  Dining  Hall  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 


184  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Childs'  Dining  Hall  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Clark,  Mary  M.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Elizabeth  N.  Clark, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Rescript. 

Clark,  T.  Frank,  ct  al.,  administrators  of  the  estate  of  George 
E.  Clark,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Clements,  Lydia  R.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Harwich.     Pending. 

Columbian  National  Life  Insurance  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petitions  for  abatement  of  franchise  tax  paid  in 
1903,  1904,  1905,  1906  and  1907.     Pending. 

Commonwealth  v.  Worcester.  To  recover  for  land  taken  from 
the  Commonw^ealth.     Pending. 

Connolly,  Arthur  T.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Elizabeth  Ward, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Continental  Gin  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Continental  Gin  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Continental  Gin  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Continental  Mills  r.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation.  Pend- 
ing. 

Copper  Range  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Copper  Range  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Copper  Range  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Copper  Range  Consolidated  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 


1916.J  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  185 

Copper  Range  Consolidated  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Copper  Range  Consolidated  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Corrigan,  James,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Honora  Lane- 
gran,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Decree. 

Cosmopolitan  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Costello,  Dennis  J.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  North  Andover.     Pending. 

Costello,  Francis  M.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Julia  L.  Manuel, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Coughlan,  William  J.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Rhoda  B.  Ellis, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Crane,  Charles  T.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Bridget  O'Connor, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  i\  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Creaden,  William  T.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Nellie 
Reardon,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  r.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending.. 

Critcherson,  William  R.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Lucy  D. 
Monroe,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Crossett,  Lewis  A.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Coha'sset.     Pending. 

Cudahy  Packing  Company  v.  Commonw^ealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

CuUiton,  Edward  J.,  et  ah,  executors  of  the  will  of  Lucy  D. 
Culliton,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Culver,  Maude  M.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  James  Chauncey 
Smith,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Cunningham,  Henry  V.,  et  al.,  executors  of  the  will  of  Ellen  L. 
Conway,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 


186  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Curtis,  Caroline  G.,  et  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  regis- 
tration of  title  to  land  in  Swampscott.     Pending. 

Daley,  Ellen,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to 
land  in  North  Andover.     Pending. 

Dal}^,  John  F.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Margaret  Finn, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Dana,  Harold  W.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Marblehead.     Pending. 

Daniels,  Leon,  executor  of  the  will  of  Susan  Moore,  Attorney- 
General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Decree. 

Davis  Sewing  Machine  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Davis  Sewing  Machine  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Dean,  John  J.,  ct  al.,  executors  of  the  will  of  Thomas  H.  Buck- 
ley, Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inher- 
itance tax.     Pending. 

Decrow,  John  W.,  ei  al.,  executors  of  the  will  of  Ellen  A. 
Denver,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Final  decree. 

De  las  Casas,  William  B.,  et  al..  Metropolitan  Park  Commission, 
petitioners.  Petition  for  appointment  of  commissioners 
to  apportion  payments  from  the  cities  and  towns  in  the 
metropolitan  parks  district.  Decree  appointing  Robert  O. 
Harris,  George  S.  Taft  and  J.  H.  P.  Dyer  as  commissioners. 

Dewey,  Henry  S.,  v.  State  Officers.  Actions  to  replevy  copies 
of  notes  of  proceedings  in  the  case  of  Dewey  v.  Good  Gov- 
ernment Association.     Pending. 

Dickinson,  Albert  L.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Frank  H. 
O'Keeffe,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Dineen,  Timothy,  executor  of  the  will  of  Julia  Dineen,  Attor- 
ney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

di  Pesa,  Alfred,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to 
land.     Pending. 

Dogherty,  Charles  M.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Caroline  A. 
Gillmore,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  187 

Doherty,  Owen  J.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Maria 
Doherty,  iVttorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Dolan,  Bridget,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Mary  McKiernan, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Donahue,  Abbie  A.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Abbie  McDonald, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Donnelly,  Amy  F.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Charles  F.  Don- 
nelly, Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Decree. 

Dorchester  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Drew,  George  A.,  et  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land.     Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Drohan,  John,  executor  of  the  will  of  Anastasia  Clapp,  Attor- 
ney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Decree. 

Duddy,  Joseph  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  writ  of  habeas 
corpus.     Rescript. 

Duffin,  Simon  E.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Julia  A.  C. 
Holden,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Duffy,  Elizabeth,  executrix  of  the  will  of  John  Finnerty, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Dumas,  Alfred  J.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Salem.     Pending. 

Dunham,  Hervey,  executor  of  the  will  of  Sarah  E.  Lane,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Dismissed. 

Dunmore,  Robert  F.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Francis 
E.  B.  Lewis,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover  inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Eagleston,  Allen  P.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Gay  Head.     Pending. 

East  Boston  Company  v.  Directors  of  the  Port  of  Boston. 
Writ  of  entry.     Pending. 

East  Butte  Copper  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 


188  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

East  Butte  Copper  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

East  Butte  Copper  Mining  Company  i\  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Eastman,  Charles  Albert,  v.  Board  of  Registration  in  Medicine. 
Bill  in  equity  to  enjoin  Board  from  revoking  certificate. 
Pending. 

Edgerly,  Frank  H.,  et  al.  v.  Cattle  Bureau.  Bill  to  recover  for 
horse  killed  by  order  of  Cattle  Commissioner  under  R.  L., 
c.  90.     Pending. 

Edwards  Manufacturing  Company'  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Edwards  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Elm  River  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Ely,  John  S.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to  land 
in  Scituate.      Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Ennis,  John  D.,  et  al.,  administrators  of  the  estate  of  Edmund 
Walsh,  Attorney-General  e.x  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Pending. 

Enright,  Thomas  N.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Patrick 
O'Brien,  Attorney-General  (\v  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Everton,  Elfonso  I.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Charles  H. 
Dimond,  Attorney-General  c.v  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Ewart,  James  B.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  North  Andover.     Pending. 

E.  Blumenthal  Company  r.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Fairbanks  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Fairbanks  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — Xo.  12.  189 

Fallon,  John,  executor  of  the  will  of  Kate  Fallon,  iVttorney- 
General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Decree. 

Farr  Alpaca  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  abate- 
ment of  franchise  tax  for  the  year  1912.     Final  decree. 

Fenno,  Ellen  M.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Falmouth.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to 
be  heard. 

Fidelity  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Field,  John  Q.  A.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Caroline  Wood,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  V.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Decree. 

Field,  Lizzie  K.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Bourne.     Pending. 

Fields,  Annie,  v.  Charles  River  Basin  Commission.  Bill  to 
enjoin  Commonwealth  from  interfering  with  riparian 
rights  on  Charles  River.     Pending. 

Fishley,  Cora  O.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Edward  E.  Fishley, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Fitzgerald,  Francis  B.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Kate  Howlett, 
Attorne\'-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Fleming,  Henry  E.,  r.  State  Board  of  Health.  Appeal  from 
an  order  of  the  State  Board  of  Health  in  regard  to  the 
use  of  ice  cut  from  Flax  Pond.     Pending. 

Fleming,  Peter,  executor  of  the  w^ill  of  Margaret  Fleming, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Foley,  Hannah,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Honora  Foley, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Foss-Hughes  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  abate- 
ment of  franchise  tax.     Pending. 

Fowler,  Charles  F.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Eliza  E.  Crocker, 
Attornej— General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Framingham  Trust  Company  i\  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 


190  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Franklin  County  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
for  abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Franklin  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Franklin  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Frontenac  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Frontenac  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Fuller,  Edgar  S.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Falmouth.     Pending. 

Gadsby,  John  F.,  ct  cd.  v.  David  Snedden,  Commissioner  of 
Education.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus  to  compel 
the  Commissioner  of  Education  to  require  the  school 
committee  of  Cambridge  for  the  year  1914-15  to  print 
and  distribute  the  annual  report  of  the  committee  for  the 
year  1913-14.     Petition  dismissed. 

Gaffey,  John  B.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Mary  J. 
Gaffey,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  r.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Galena  Signal  Oil  Company  r.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Galena  Signal  Oil  Company  i'.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Gamash,  David,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to 
land  in  Ludlow.     Pending. 

Gamewell  Fire  Alarm  Telegraph  Company  r.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Gamewell  Fire  Alarm  Telegraph  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Gardener,  William  R.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Pittsfield.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  191 

General  Electric  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1915  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Georgia  Home  Insurance  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Action  to  compel  Treasurer  and  Receiver-General  to 
return  bond  deposited  with  him  b}'  said  company. 
Pending. 

Gillingham,  James  L.,  administrator  c.  t.  a.  of  the  estate  of 
Ann  E.  Mitchell,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  i\  Petition 
to  recover  inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Glendon,  John,  petitioner.  Petition  for  writ  of  habeas  corpus. 
Pending. 

Goodale,  David,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Hudson.     Pending. 

Gorton-Pew^  Fisheries  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Gorton-Pew  Fisheries  Company  r.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Grant,  Robert,  Judge  of  Probate,  r.  William  W.  Risk  et  ah 
Contract  on  bond  as  public  administrator.     Pending. 

Gratiot  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Gratiot  Mining  Company-  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Gratiot  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Graves,  Esther  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Marblehead.     Pending. 

Great  Atlantic  &  Pacific  Tea  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Great  Atlantic  &  Pacific  Tea  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  b\' 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Great  ^Yestern  Cereal  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 


192  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Greenwood,  Elizabeth  C;  executrix  of  the  will  of  Bridget 
Tannahan,  Attorney-General  ex  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Griffin,  James  E.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Gloucester.     Pending. 

Gutta-Percha  and  Rubber  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Com- 
monwealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year 
1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

H.  H.  Mawhinney  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  franchise  tax  for  the  year  1914.     Final  decree. 

Hale,  Josiah  L.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Pauline  H.  Patterson, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Hall,  Irving  G.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Mary  Ann  Cushing, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Hamlin,  Katharine  B.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Marion.     Pending. 

Harmon,  Rollin  H.,  Judge  of  Probate,  v.  Samuel  D.  Hildreth 
et  al.  Action  to  recover  on  administrators'  bond.  Pend- 
ing. 

Harrington,  Charles  C,  executor  of  the  will  of  Elizabeth  A. 
Harrington,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance   tax.        Pending. 

Hascy,  Harvey  W.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Hingham.     Pending. 

Hatch,  Elizabeth  M.,  ct  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registra- 
tion of  title  to  land  in  Bourne.       Pending. 

Hays,  Martin,  et  al.  v.  American  Service  Union.  Bill  of  com- 
plaint to  enjoin  the  transfer  of  funds  in  the  hands  of  the 
receivers  in  bankruptcy  of  the  respondent.     Pending. 

Healy,  Mary,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Patrick  Healy,  Attorney- 
General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell  Milling  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Pe- 
tition to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  for- 
eign corporation.     Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jew^ell  Milling  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Pe- 
tition to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  for- 
eign corporation.     Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell  Milling  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Pe- 
tition to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  for- 
eign corporation.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  193 

Henry  K.  Wampole  &  Co.,  Inc.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Hill,  Annie  Leslie,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Webster.     Pending. 

Hill,  Benjamin  T.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Sarah  Weiss,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Decree. 

Hill,  Charles  S.,  ct  ah.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Lynn.  Attorney-General  waived  right 
to  be  heard. 

Hobart,  George  A.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Myron  L. 
Hobart,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance   tax.     Decree. 

Hobart,  Lillian  M.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Hull.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to 
be  heard. 

Holden,  Nicholas  F.,  v.  Civil  Service  Commission.  Petition  for 
writ  of  mandamus  to  compel  the  respondents  to  authorize 
the  reinstatement  of  the  petitioner  as  a  member  of  the 
police  department  of  Worcester.     Pending. 

Holland,  Jeremiah  S.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  John 
W.  Holland,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Holmes,  Thankful  A.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  James  Churchill, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Holyoke,  Eliza  J.,  et  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Pepperell.  Attorney-General  waived 
right  to  be  heard. 

Homer,  Henry  G.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Mary  E.  Homer, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Honors,  John  R.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Benjamin  O. 
Honors,  AttorneyTGeneral  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Honors,  John  R.,  v.  A.  H.  McDonald,  building  inspector. 
Petition  for  an  order  of  court  restraining  enforcement  of  an 
order  issued  by  the  respondent  as  building  inspector. 
Pending. 

Houghton  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  jear  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 


194  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Houghton  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Houghton,  Neidhard  H.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Julius 
H.  Houghton,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Dismissed. 

Howland,  John  W.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Westport.  iVttorney-General  waived  right 
to  be  heard. 

Hoyt,  Grover  C,  v.  Alfred  W.  Donovan  et  als.  Petition  for 
writ  of  mandamus  to  compel  the  State  Board  of  Labor 
and  Industries  to  reinstate  the  petitioner  as  its  secretary. 
Disposed  of. 

Hunt,  Guy  H.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Edwin  Hunt,  Attorney- 
General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Decree. 

Hurd,  Roger  H.,  et  ah.,  executors  of  the  will  of  Theodore  C. 
Hurd,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Dismissed. 

Hurd,  William  M.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Myra  W.  Hurd, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Decree. 

International  Paper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

International  Paper  Company  t.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1915  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Isle  Royale  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  b}'  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Isle  Royale  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Jackson  Company  r.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  ex- 
cise tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Jackson  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  ex- 
cise tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Jacob  Dold  Packing  Company  r.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration".    Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  195 

James  Cunningham  Son  &  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

James  Cunningham  Son  &  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Jenkins,  Alexander  C,  trustee  under  the  will  of  Alexander  C. 
Adams,  Attorney-General  ex  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Disposed  of. 

Jenney,  E.  C,  executor  of  the  will  of  Maria  P.  Stark,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Jennings,  Malachi  L.,  administrator  of  estate  of  Mary  McGee- 
han,  Attorney-General  ex  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Decree. 

John  L.  Whiting-J.  J.  Adams  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

John  L.  Whiting-J.  J.  Adams  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Kattler,  Gertrude  M.,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Elias  M. 
Dustin,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  r.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Keady,  Edward  J.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Mary  A.  Keady, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Kearns,  Thomas  F.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Mary 
Galligan,  iVttorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Keefe.  Mary  E.,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Kate  Dawson, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Ke'iher,  William  J.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  writ  of  habeas 
corpus.     Pending. 

Kennedy,  Ellen  F.,  t.  W.  A.  Penniman,  State  inspector  of 
buildings.  Petition  for  injunction  to  restrain  inspector 
from  enforcing  building  laws.     Decree. 

Kennelly,  James,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  North  Andover.     Pending. 

Kernwood  Country  Club,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Salem.     Pending. 


196  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Keymes.  William,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  James  Keymes, 
V.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  bank  deposit  in 
the  hands  of  the  Treasurer.     Pending. 

Kiernan,  James  F.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Patrick  F. 
McKenna,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

King,  George  A.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  bank 
deposit  in  hands  of  Treasurer.    Decree. 

King  Philip  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

King,  Walter  C,  et  al.,  administrators  of  the  estate  of  Albert 
Dodge,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Kingman,  Morton  A.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Fidelia  H.  Wil- 
bar,  Attornej'-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Decree. 

Knight,  Austin  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land.     Pending. 

Lafayette  Savings  Bank,  Augustus  L.  Thorndike,  Bank 
Commissioner,  v.  Information  to  restrain  the  respondent 
from  further  prosecution  of  its  business.  Injunction 
issued. 

Lake  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Lake  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Lake  Milling,  Smelting  and  Refining  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Lake  Milling,  Smelting  and  Refining  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Lake  Superior  Smelting  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Lamont-Corliss  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Lamont-Corliss  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  197 

Lamson  Consolidated  Store  Service  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Lanagan.  Frank  E.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Nancy  L.  Lanagan^ 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Lanston  Monotype  Machine  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Lanston  Monotype  Machine  Company  %\  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Lanston  Monotype  Machine  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.,    Pending. 

Lanston  Monotype  Machine  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Larkin,  P.  O'Neill,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
bank  deposit  in  hands  of  Treasurer.     Decree. 

LaSalle  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

LaSalle  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

LaSalle  Copper  Company  t.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

LaSalle  Copper  Company  i\  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Laurium  Mining  Company  x.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Laurium  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Lawrence  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Leonard,  Fred  M.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Duxbury.  iVttorney-General  waived  right  to  be 
heard. 


198  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Leonard,  Sarah  E.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Otis  L.  Leonard, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Lever  Brothers  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending. 

Lever  Brothers  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending. 

Libby,  George  W.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Oliver  Libby, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  t.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Linehan,  Daniel  J.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Isabella  McGean, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Liquid  Carbonic  Company,  The,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Liquid  Carbonic  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending. 

Liquid  Carbonic  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending. 

Locomobile  Company  of  America  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Locomobile  Company  of  America  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Locomobile  Company  of  America  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Long,  John  D.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to 
land  in  Hingham.     Pending. 

Low,  Isabella  B.,  et  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Peabody.     Pending. 

Macurdar,  William  E.,  et  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  regis- 
tration of  title  to  land.  Attorney-General  waived  right 
to  be  heard. 

Maguire,  James  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Nantucket.     Pending. 


1916.]  PLTBLIC   DOCUMEXT  — Xo.  12.  199 

Mahar,  Joseph  P.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Thomas  J.  Rehill, 
Attorney-General  ex  rcJ.  r.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Manchester,  Abraham,  executor  of  the  will  of  Abraham  E. 
Manchester,  Attorney-General  ex  rcl.  t-.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Manitou  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Manitou  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Mann,  Edwin  M.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be 
heard. 

Manning,  John  P.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Rose  Ann  Leach, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Mansfield,  Henry  K.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Anna  A.  Dean, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  r.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Marconi  Wireless  Telegraph  Company  of  America,  petitioner. 
Petition  for  registration  of  title  to  land.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Massachusetts  Consolidated  Mining  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Massachusetts  Consolidated  Mining  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Massachusetts  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
for  abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Mayflower  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Mayflower  Mining  Company'  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

McCallum,  Xellie,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Ellen  Beggs,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  r.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Dismissed. 


200  ArTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

McCann,  Charles  J.,  et  al.  v.  Charles  Warren  et  als.,  Civil  Serv- 
ice Commissioners.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus  to 
compel  certification  of  the  petitioners'  names  by  the  Civil 
Service  Commissioners.  Decree.  Appeal  by  petitioners. 
Waiver  of  appeal  filed. 

McCaule}^,  George  D.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Springfield.     Decree. 

McCormick,  Thomas,  executor  of  the  will  of  Annie  M. 
McCormick,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

McCullough,  Annie  N.,  t.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover unclaimed  bank  deposit  in  the  hands  of  the  Treas- 
urer.    Pending. 

McDermott,  Patrick  H.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Daniel 
J.  Crowley,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  re- 
cover inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

McDonald,  Theodore  H.,  Insurance  Commissioner  of  Connect- 
icut, V.  The  ^Etna  Indemnity  Company.  Intervening 
petition  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts.     Pending. 

McGee,  Patrick  S.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Attleboro.     Pending. 

McGuirk,  Ann,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Terrence  Farley,  Attor- 
ney-General ^.i-  rel.  V.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Mclnerney,  Michael,  executor  of  the  will  of  James  Mclnerney, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Mclntire,  Charles  H.,  trustee  under  the  will  of  Maria  T.  Clark, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  t.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

McQuaid,  John,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Pittsfield.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to 
be  heard. 

Medford  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

Melanson,  Jude  S.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land.     Pending. 

Merrill,  Charles  E.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Clara  F. 
W^ebster,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Metropolitan  Life  Insurance  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  taxes  for  the  years  1909  and 
1910  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 


191G.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  201 

Metropolitan  Life  Insurance  Company  v.  Frank  H.  Hardison, 
Insurance  Commissioner.  Petition  for  review.  Reserved 
for  full  court.     Rescript. 

^Michigan  Smelting  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

]\Iidvale  Steel  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

INIidvale  Steel  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Midvale  Steel  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1915  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Miller,  William  A.,  executor  of  the  will  of  John  Miller,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  V.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Decree. 

Moore,  William  H.,  d  aL,  executors  of  the  will  of  Edward  W. 
Murray,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Morrill,  Mary  E.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Frank  E.  Duncan, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Morrison,  Willard  N.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Alice  el.  Holder, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Moses,  Kalman,  Commonwealth  v.  Suit  for  goods  furnished 
by  Massachusetts  State  Prison.     Settled. 

IMurphy,  Mary  E.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Delia  Martin,  Attor- 
ney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance  tax. 
Pending. 

Murphy,  Michael,  v.  Harrie  W.  Pierce,  Agent  of  the  Commis- 
sioner of  Animal  Industry.  Claim  for  damages  for  death 
of  horse.     Pending. 

Murray,  James  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Salisbur}^  Attorney-General  waived  right  to 
be  heard. 

Nantucket  Cranberr}^  Company,  petitioner.  Six  petitions  for 
registration  of  title  to  land  in  Nantucket.  Disposed 
of. 

Nashua  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 


202  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Nashua  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

National  Casket  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

National  Casket  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

National  Contracting  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  under  R.  L.,  c.  201.     Pending. 

National  Dock  and  Storage  Warehouse  Company  v.  Boston 
&  Maine  Railroad.  (Interstate  Commerce  Conjmission.) 
Petition  of  the  Commonwealth  to  intervene.     Pending. 

National  Dock  and  Storage  Warehouse  Company  v.  Frederick 
J.  MacLeod  ct  als.,  Public  Service  Commission.  Petition 
for  writ  of  mandamus  to  compel  the  Commission  to  en- 
force compliance  with  an  order  entered  by  it.     Pending. 

Needham,  Rubina,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Bridget  Harran, 
Attorney-General  ex  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Tax  abated. 

New  England  Maple  Syrup  Company  v.  Henry  P.  Walcott 
et  als.     Bill  in  eguity  for  an  injunction.     Pending. 

Newell,  Edward  J.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Mary  Jackson, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Newport  Fisheries,  Ice  and  Cold  Storage  Company  v.  Com- 
monwealth. Petition  for  abatement  of  franchise  tax  for 
the  year  1912.     Pending. 

Newton,  Frank  B.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for  assess- 
ment of  damages  alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  reason 
of  the  erection  of  a  bridge  across  the  Neponset  River. 
Pending. 

Nickerson,  Horace  W.,  et  ciL,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registra- 
tion of  title  to  land  in  Barnstable.     Pending. 

Niles,  Elizabeth  W.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land.  Attorney-General  waived  right  to  be 
heard. 

Noonan,  John  G.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Patrick 
Noonan,  Attorney-General  ex  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Northwestern  Consolidated  Milling  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  203 

Northwestern  Consolidated  Milling  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Northwestern  Consolidated  Milling  Company  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Noyes,  George  E.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Swampscott.     Pending. 

Nye,  Esther  F.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land.     Pending. 

O'Donohue,  Lillie  B.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Joseph  J.  O'Dono- 
hue,  Attorney-General  ex  rcl.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Pending. 

O'Gorman,  John  P.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  in  behalf  of  Margaret  O'Gorman.     Disposed  of. 

O'Hearn,  James  T.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Patrick  H.  Madden, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Old  Colony  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Old  Colony  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Old  Colony  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Old  Colony  Trust  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  for 
abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  department  of 
trust  company.     Disposed  of. 

O'Leary,  Honora,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  North  Andover.     Pending. 

Oliver  Typewriter  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Oliver  Typewriter  Company  i\  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Oliver  Typewriter  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Oliver  Typewriter  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 


204  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Osceola    Consolidated    Mining    Company    v.    Commonwealth. 

Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 

foreign  corporation.     Pending. 
Osceola    Consolidated    Mining    Company    v.    Commonwealth. 

Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 

foreign    corporation.     Pending. 
Osceola    Consolidated    Mining    Company'    i\    Commonwealth. 

Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 

foreign   corporation.      Pending. 
O'Shea,   William,   executor   of  the  will   of   Walter   I.    Tapley, 

Attorney-General   e.v   rel.   v.      Petition   to   recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 
Oxman,  Maurice,  Commonwealth  v.      Suit  for  goods  furnished 

by  Massachusetts  Commission  for  the  Blind.     Settled. 
Packard,  Frank  E.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Mary  K. 

Keith,    Attorney-General   ex   rel.    v.      Petition   to   recover 

inheritance  tax.     Pending. 
Paddock,   Jay  J.,   administratrix  of   the   estate   of   Marion   L. 

Pierce,    Attorney-General   ex   rel.    v.      Petition   to   recover 

inheritance  tax.     Pending. 
Page,  Mary  B.,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Lucinda  Carter, 

Attorney-General  ex  rel.  i\     Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 
Paige,    Maurice   H.,   administrator   of  the   estate   of  Jane   G. 

Paige,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.     Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Decree. 
Parker,  Galen  A.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Martha  R.  Temple, 

Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.     Petition  to  recover  inheritance 

tax.     Pending. 
Patten,  Ina  F.,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Carrie  M.  Fitz, 

Attorney-General  ex  rel.  i\     Petition  to  recover  inheritance 

tax.     Pending. 
Perkins,   Charles   A.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Alice  M. 

Field,    Attorney-General    ex    rel.    v.      Petition    to    recover 

inheritance  tax.     Decree. 
Pickthall,    Richard   E.,   executor   of   the   will   of   Elizabeth   A. 

Pickthall,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.     Petition  to  recover 

inheritance  tax.     Decree. 
Pierce,  George  H.,  et  ah,  petitioners.     Petition  for  registration 

of  title  to  land  in  Manomet.     Disposed  of. 
Pillsbury  Flour  Mills  Company  li.  Commonwealth.    Petition  to 

recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 


1916.]  .  PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  —  Xo.  12.  205 

Pillsbuiy  Flour  Mills  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  b^"  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Pillsbury  Flour  Mills  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Piper,  Edith  B.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Frederick  B.  Fanning,. 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  t.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Plymouth  County  Trust  Company  v.  Commonw^ealth.  Peti- 
tion for  abatement  of  tax  on  deposits  in  savings  depart- 
ment of  trust  compan3^     Disposed  of. 

Poole,  Clara  I.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to 
land  in   Weymouth.     Pending. 

Pope  Manufacturing  Company,  The,  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Pratt,  Eliza  Groves,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Eliza  Groves, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Preston,  Frederic  G.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Francis  L.  Sears, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Priest,  Charles  H.,  executor  of  the  will  of  John  B.  Kennedy, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Pullman  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1915  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Pullman  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  sur- 
tax for  the  year  1915  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Purinton,  Charles  S.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Plymouth.     Disposed  of. 

Putnam  Machine  Company,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registra- 
tion of  title  to  land  in  Fitchburg.     Pending. 

Quaker  Oats  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Quaker  Oats  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  3'ear  1913  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 


206  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Quirk,  Charles  L,  executor  of  the  will  of  William  Byrne,  At- 
torney-General e.v  reh  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Decree. 

Ranlett,  Orrin  B.,  2d,  executor  of  the  will  of  Hannah  F. 
Clark,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  t.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Dismissed. 

Read,  J.  Bertram,  et  al.  v.  John  A.  Keliher  et  als.,  State  House 
Building  Commission.  Bill  in  equity  to  restrain  defend- 
ants from  obstructing  and  interfering  with  the  use  of  Han- 
cock Avenue.     Pending. 

Reardon,  Michael  J.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Michael  Reardon, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Redfern,  Mary  E.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Swampscott.     Pending. 

Regal  Shoe  Company  r.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Regal  Shoe  Company  i\  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Reilley,  William  J.,  et  al,  executors  of  the  will  of  Charles  A. 
Goessman,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  r.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Decree. 

Rice  &  Hutchins,  Incorporated,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Rice  &  Hutchins,  Incorporated,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Richards,  Fred  J.,  et  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Springfield.     Pending. 

Richardson  Silk  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Richardson  Silk  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Richardson  Silk  Company  i\  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending, 

Ritchie,  Christina,  v.  Treasurer  and  Receiver-General.  Action 
of  contract  under  R.  L.,  c.  128,  §  96.     Disposed  of. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  207 

Robinson,  Charles  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Nantucket.  Attorney-General  waived 
right  to  be  heard. 

Roche,  Teresa  G.,  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Mary  A. 
Roche,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Final  decree. 

Rockland-Rockport  Lime  Companj^  v.  Commonwealth.  Pe- 
tition to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Ross,  John  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to 
land  in   Hingham.     Pending. 

Roundry,  George  H.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Mary  E. 
Wigley,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Dismissed. 

RusseU-Miller  Milling  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Russell-Miller  Milling  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Sanford,  Alpheus,  executor  of  the  will  of  Lemuel  C.  Stowell, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Schaaf,  John  L.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Nicholas  A. 
Schaaf,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Dismissed. 

Schaefer,  Gustav,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Billerica.     Pending. 

Scott,  Joseph  R.,  et  al.,  administrators  of  the  estate  of  Robert 
W.  Scott,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Seager  Engine  Works  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Sealshipt  Oyster  System  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Sealshipt  Oyster  System  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Seneca  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 


208  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORP.  [Jan. 

Senior,  Mary  E.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Medway.     Pending. 

Sexton,  Clara  E.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  un- 
claimed bank  deposit  in  the  hands  of  the  Treasurer. 
Pending. 

Sexton,  William  H.,  ct  al.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Billerica.     Pending. 

Shannon  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Shannon  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Shapleigh,  Samuel  B.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Ellen  L.  Shap- 
leigh,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Pending. 

Silver,  Clara  J.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Manuel  de  Oliveira, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Simonds,  Nathan,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Halifax.     Pending. 

Simons,  Charles  L.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  reward 
offered  by  Commonwealth  for  apprehension  of  the  murderer 
of  Martha  B.  Blackstone.     Pending. 

Simpson,  Esther  P.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Chelmsford.  Attorney-General  waived 
right  to  be  heard. 

Skehill,  Patrick  J.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  John  E.  Ske- 
hill,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Rescripts 

Sloan,  Benjamin  B.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Mary  J.  Wheelock, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Smith  &  Dove  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Decree. 

Smith,  Amoz,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Edgartown.     Pending. 

Smith,  Curtis  Nye,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Edgartown.     Pending. 

Somerville,  City  of,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  for 
aid  furnished  indigent  persons.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  209 

South  Lake  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

South  Lake  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Springfield  Breweries  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Springfield  Breweries  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

St.  Mary's  Mineral  Land  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

St.  Mary's  Mineral  Land  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Stafford  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Stafford  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corporation.    Pending. 

Standard  Plunger  Elevator  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Starkey,  Peter,  executor  of  the  will  of  Jesse  Thomas  Paine, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Stirlith,  Annie,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Deborah  Quigley, 
Attornej^-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Stoughton  Mills,  Incorporated,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v. 
Bill  in  equity  to  enjoin  defendant  from  discharging  waste 
into  Neponset  River.     Pending. 

Strauss,  Leon,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Marblehead.      Pending. 

Submarine  Signal  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Submarine  Signal  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending:. 


210  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Sugden  Press  Bagging  Company,  petitioner.  Petition  for  regis- 
tration of  title  to  land  in  West  Chelmsford.  Attorney- 
General  waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Sullivan,  Florence,  Trustees  of  Massachusetts  Training  Schools 
V.  Claim  for  wages  due  Mary  Lynch,  State  ward.  Pend- 
ing. 

Sullivan,  Jeremiah,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  William 
Pearson,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Sullivan,  John  H.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Johanna  Sullivan, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Sullivan,  Mary,  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  bank 
deposit  in  hands  of  Treasurer.     Pending. 

Superior  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Superior  Copper  Compan}^  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Swampscott,  Town  of,  v.  Richard  L.  Beyer.  Appeal  from 
order  of  inspector  of  factories  and  public  buildings. 
Pending. 

Swift,  Lindsay,  executor  of  the  will  of  Sarah  Allen  Swift, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Symmes,  Arthur  P.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Am.os  W.  Trow, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance.    Pending. 

Symonds,  Samuel  L.,  executor  of  the  will  of  John  O.  Page, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Tamarack  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Tamarack  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Taylor,  Henry  W.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Plymouth.  Attorney-General  waived  right 
to  be  heard. 

Taylor,  Violet  I.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title 
to  land  in  Brewster.       Pending. 


1916.J  PUBLIC   DOCraiENT  —  No.  12.  211 

Tiffany,  Henry  L.,  et  at.,  petitioners.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Dartmouth.       Pending. 

Trimountain  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Trimountain  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  b}'^  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

True,  Jabez,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Thomas  C.  DeCar- 
taret,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Decree. 

Turley,  Thomas  J.,  et  al.,  administrators  of  the  estate  of  Mary 
Benson,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Pending. 

Tuttle,  Horace  F.,  petitioner  on  behalf  of  Isabella  M.  Brooks. 
Petition  for  discharge  from  Westborough  State  Hospital. 
Pending. 

Tyndale,  Theodore  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Mashpee.     Pending. 

Underwood,  Henry  O.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Nantucket.     Pending. 

Union  Copper  Land  and  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Union  Copper  Land  and  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Union  Copper  Land  and  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth. 
Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by 
foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Union  News  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Union  News  Company-  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Union  Welting  Company,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  East  Boston.       Pending. 

United  States  Volunteer  Life  Saving  Corps  of  Volunteer  Life 
Savers,  Attorney-General  v.  Information  in  the  nature  of 
quo  ivarranto  to  annul  the  charter  of  the  respondent  be- 
cause of  misuse  of  its  charter  privileges  and  franchises. 
Decree. 


212  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

United  States  Worsted  Company,  Attorney-General  v.  Action 
of  contract  to  compel  payment  of  filing  fee.  Disposed 
of. 

Upham,  George  F.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  North  Brookfield.  Attorney-General 
waived  right  to  be  heard. 

Vahey,  James  H.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Maria  M. 
French,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 

Valvoline  Oil  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Valvoline  Oil  Company  v.  Ccmmonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Vanderpoel,  Emily  M.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Dartmouth.     Pending. 

Van  Greenberg,  Frank  J.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Lowell.  Attorney-General  waived  right 
to  be  heard. 

Victoria  Copper  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Victoria  Copper  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Victoria  Copper  Mining  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign 
corporation.     Pending. 

Vining,  Floretta,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Elizabeth  Jacobs,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

W.  D.  Quimby  &  Co.,  Inc.,  v.  Robert  S.  Bisbee  et  als.,  Mini- 
mum Wage  Commission.  Bill  of  complaint  to  enjoin 
commission  from  appointing  a  wage  board  for  candy- 
makers.     Pending. 

W.  L.  Douglas  Shoe  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending. 

Walen,  William  W.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Almira  C. 
Walen,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  in- 
heritance tax.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  213 

Walpole  Rubber  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Walpole  Rubber  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Walsh,  Joseph,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Matthew  Merry, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Decree. 

Ward  Baking  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover 
excise  tax  for  the  year  1914  paid  by  foreign  corporation. 
Pending. 

Watt,  William  D.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Mary  J.  Pierson,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Webber,  Elizabeth  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Needham,    Pending. 

Webster,  Anna  C.  M.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Beverly.     Pending. 

Weeks,  Harriet  M.,  executrix  of  the  will  of  James  Weeks,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Decree. 

Welch,  Mary  Ann,  executrix  of  the  will  of  Thomas  W^elch,  At- 
torney-General ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Welch,  William  J.,  v.  Hosea  M.  Quimby,  superintendent.  Ac- 
tion of  tort.     Pending. 

Welsbach  Street  Lighting  Company  of  America  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Welsbach  Street  Lighting  Company  of  America  v.  Common- 
wealth. Petition  to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912 
paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

Wentworth,  William  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Chatham.  Attorney-General  waived 
right  to   be  heard. 

Western  Union  Telegraph  Company  ct  al.  v.  Calvin  H.  Foster. 
Petition  for  review  of  order  of  the  Public  Service  Com- 
mission.    Pending. 

Western  Union  Telegraph  Company  et  al.,  Frederick  J. 
Macleod  et  ah.,  Public  Service  Commission,  v.  Bill  of 
complaint  to  compel  compliance  with  the  terms  of  an 
order  of  the  Public  Service  Commission.     Pending. 


214  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Westinghouse,  Church,  Kerr  &  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  for- 
eign corporation.     Pending. 

Westinghouse,  Church,  Kerr  &  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  Peti- 
tion to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  for- 
eign corporation.     Pending. 

Wheelock,  Charles  B.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Marblehead.    Pending. 

Whitaker,  Elbridge  J.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Oliver  Everett, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inheritance 
tax.     Pending. 

Whitall-Tatum  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Whitall-Tatum  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

White,  Agnes  A.,  et  ah,  Attorney-General  v.  Petition  for  use 
of  the  Attorney-General's  name  in  an  information  in 
equity  to  restrain  the  defendants  from  erecting  a  build- 
ing on  certain  land  in  Medford.     Use  of  name  allowed. 

White  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corporation.    Pending. 

White  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corporation.     Pending. 

W^hite  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  recover  excise 
tax  for  the  year  1913  paid  by  foreign  corporation.  Pend- 
ing. 

White  Pine  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

White  Pine  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

White  Sewing  Machine  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

White  Sewing  Machine  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition 
to  recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  cor- 
poration.    Pending. 

Whitford,  Edward  D.,  trustee,  petitioner.  Petition  for  regis- 
tration of  title  to  land  in  Marblehead.     Pending. 


1916.]  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12.  215 

Whittemore,  Charles,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Wareham.     Pending. 

Whittemore,  Charles,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Falmouth.     Pending. 

Wholey,  William  L.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Lawrence  Cough- 
lin,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Wier,  Charles  J.,  v.  Commonwealth.  Claim  for  arrears  in 
salary  alleged  to  be  due  petitioner.     Pending. 

Willard,  George  B.,  v.  Frederick  J.  Macleod  et  als.,  Public 
Service  Commission.  Petition  for  modification  of  order 
of  Public  Service  Commission.     Pending. 

Willett,  Lewis,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of  title  to 
land  in  Newburyport.     Pending. 

Williams,  Charles  H.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration  of 
title  to  land  in  Billerica.     Pending. 

Wilson,  John  D.,  executor  of  the  will  of  John  E.  Jacobs, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Dismissed. 

Winona  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Winona  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1912  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

Winslow  Brothers  &  Smith  Company,  Attorne^^-General  ex  rel. 
V.  Bill  in  equity  to  restrain  defendant  from  discharging 
waste  into  Neponset  River.     Pending. 

Wolley,  William  T.,  executor  of  the  will  of  Susan  C.  Smith, 
Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover  inherit- 
ance tax.     Pending. 

Woodbridge,  Charles  G.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  registration 
of  title  to  land  in  Lynn.    Pending. 

Wyandot  Copper  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to  re- 
cover excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpora- 
tion.    Pending. 

York  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1910  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending. 

York  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Commonwealth.  Petition  to 
recover  excise  tax  for  the  year  1911  paid  by  foreign  corpo- 
ration.    Pending. 


216  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 

Young,  August,  Commonwealth  v.  Action  of  contract  to  re- 
cover for  garbage  sold  by  State  Prison.     Pending. 

Young,  Edward  P.,  petitioner.  Petition  for  writ  of  habeas 
corpus.     Pending. 

Young,  George  C.,  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Helen  C. 
Young,  Attorney-General  ex  rel.  v.  Petition  to  recover 
inheritance  tax.     Pending. 


1916.1 


PUBLIC  DOCUIMENT  —  No.  12. 


217 


COLLECTIONS. 


Collections  have  been  made  by  this  department  as  follows :  — 

Corporation  taxes  for  the  year  1914,  overdue  and  referred 
by  the  Treasurer  of  the  Commonwealth  to  the  Attorney- 
General  for  collection, $442,099  83 

Interest, 5,050  85 

Costs, 2,713  72 

MisceUaneous, 186,038  96 

Total, $635,903  36 


The  following  table  shows  a  detailed  statement  of  the  Cor- 
poration Taxes :  — 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

A.  A.  Brunell  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

$103  11 

$0  52 

$103  63 

A.  C.  Jonev  Co.,      .... 

36  18 

1  54 

37  72 

A.  Dickey  Co.,         .... 

36  03 

06 

36  09 

A.  Dodge  &  Son  Corpn., 

99  37 

- 

99  37 

A.  E.  Lvon  Co.,       .... 

86  83 

36 

87  19 

A.  H.  Atkinson  Co., 

30  75 

40 

31  15 

A.  Himmel  Co.,        .... 

75  97 

78 

76  75 

A.  I.  Asher  Pants  Co.,    . 

151  95 

1  37 

153  32 

A.  McArthur  Co.,    . 

1,175  85 

7  05 

1,182  90 

A.  R.  Andrews  Co., 

122  10 

1  09 

123  19 

A.  S.  Belcher,  Inc., 

6  72 

28 

7  00 

A.  S.  Brock  Rubber  Co., 

96  00 

38 

96  38 

A.  S.  CampbeU  Co., 

215  52 

1  94 

217  46 

A.  S.  Dorfman  Cigar  Co., 

72  36 

4  32 

76  68 

A.  S.  Tucker  Co.,     .        .        .        . 

8  53 

12 

8  65 

A.  W.  Emmons  Co., 

288  89 

2  51 

291  40 

Abegweit  Silver  Black  Fox  Co.,    . 

11  70 

10 

11  80 

Acme  Register  Co., 

86  83 

2  02 

88  85 

Adams  Pharmacy,  Inc.,  . 

72  36 

67 

73  03 

Adams  Square  Co., 

94  97 

78 

95  75 

AeoUan  Macaroni  Co.,    . 

50  65 

49 

51  14 

Aichess  Petticoat  Co.,     . 

23  51 

20 

23  71 

Albany  Supply  and  Chemical  Co., 

9  22 

08 

9  30 

Alden  Bros.  Co.,       .... 

107  81 

99 

108  80 

218 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 

of  Corporation 

Tax  for  1914. 


Interest. 


Totals. 


Alden  Sheet  Metal  Working  and 

Plumbing  Co., 
Aldrich-Chipman  Co.,  . 
Alger  Paper  Box  Co., 
Allen  &  Fox  Express  Co., 
Allen,  Doane  &  Co.,  Inc., 
American  Banner  Co.,  . 
American    Belting    and   Tanning 

Co.,        .... 
American  Cloak  Co., 
American    Coke     and    Charcoal 

Co.,  .... 
American    Color    and    Chemical 

Co.,  .... 
American  Cork  Co.,  Inc., 
American    Cultivator    Pubhshing 

Co.,        .       .        .       .       . 
American  DeHvery  Co., 
^American     Fancier     and     Stock 

keeper  Co.,    .... 
American  Fireworks  Co., 
American  Grocery  Co.,   . 
American  Iron  and  Metal  Co., 
American  Silver  Black  Fox  Co., 
American  Specialty  Co., 
American  Stay  Co., 
American     Steam     Gauge 

Valve  Manufacturing  Co., 
American  Watch  Tool  Co., 
Ames  Plow  Co., 
Anchor  Laundry  Co., 
Anderson  &  Co.,  Inc., 
Angus  Morrison  Co., 
Appleton  Brass  Co., 
Apsley  Rubber  Co., 
Archibald  Wheel  Co.,      . 
Armory  Garage,  Inc., 
Armour's  Pattern  Shop  Co., 
Aroostook  Farming  and  Lumber 

Co.,        .... 
Arrah  Wanna  Moccasin  Co., 
Arthur  C.  Harvey  Co.,    . 
Arthur  W.  Pope  Co., 
Ashoyton  Knitting  Co., 
Associated  Trust,  Inc.,    . 
Atlantic  Printing  Co.,     . 
Atlantic  Rope  and  Line  Co., 
Atlantic  Rubber  Co., 
Attleboro  Botthng  Co.,  . 
Auburn  Last  Co.,     . 


and 


.$90  45 
135  67 

1,025  46 
289  44 

141  10 
21  70 

407  02 

142  91 

73  26 

10  00 
191  19 

43  41 
85  12 

58  61 
167  00 
945  20 

50  05 

200  00 

226  12 

1,085  40 

3,499  25 

128  43 

289  44 

123  01 

12  44 

14  52 

25  32 

8,713  64 

3,909  82 

27  13 

25  32 

27  02 

67  83 

2,405  97 

511  91 
36  18 
29  60 

638  46 
95  04 

276  55 
32  74 

126  44 


$0  75 
61 

5  13 
1  24 
1  42 

16 

3  46 

6  14 

40 


1  67 

60 
37 


54 
37 

80 
40 
00 
96 
95 


30  91 

64 

2  60 

1  09 

12 

24 

203  31 

15  50 

12 


18 

52 

146  82 

4  26 

33 

26  17 

36 

1  29 

16 

94 


$91  20 
139  28 
1,030  59 
290  68 
142  52 
21  86 

410  48 
149  05 

73  66 

10  00 

192  86 

44  01 
65  49 

59  15 
169  37 
960  00 

51  05 

201  00 

228  08 

1,095  35 


3,530  16 

129  07 

292  04 

124  10 

12  56 

14  52 

25  56 

8,916  95 

3,925  32 

27  25 

25  32 

27  20 

68  35 

2,552  79 

516  17 

36  51 

29  60 

664  63 

95  40 

277  84 

32  90 

127  38 

1916. 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


219 


Collected  on 



Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

August  W.  Dodge,  Inc., 

$58   61 

$0  54 

$59  15 

Austral    Window    Co.    of    New 

England, 

7  23 

2  10 

9  33 

Auto  Renting  Co.,   . 

45  22 

2  71 

47  93 

Auto  Sales  Co.,        .... 

36  18 

33 

36  51 

Autocraft  Co., 

106  55 

96 

107  51 

Autogenous   Welding  Equipment 

Co., 

9  04 

04 

9  08 

Automatic  Air  Brake  Co.,      . 

54  27 

65 

54  92 

Automatic  Appliance  Co., 

285  46 

2  85 

288  31 

B.  &  B.  Bed  Co.,     .... 

57  88 

1  73 

59  61 

B.  &  B.  Rubber  Co.,       . 

4,713  20 

37  71 

4,750  91 

B.  F.  Smith  Construction  Co., 

727  48 

- 

727  48 

B.  F.  Sturtevant  Co.,      . 

19,415  88 

132  67 

19,548  55 

B.  Feinberg  Sons  Co.,     . 

215  72 

1  08 

216  80 

B.  Greenwald  Co.,   .... 

272  67 

2  21 

274  88 

B.  J.  Baker  &  Co.,  Inc., 

512  63 

6  32 

518  95 

B.  L.  Tim  Lumber  Co.,  . 

379  89 

1  13 

381  02 

Babson-Dow  Manufacturing  Co., . 

732  64 

5  11 

737  75 

Back  Bay  Auto  Supply  Co.,  Inc., 

30  39 

09 

30  48 

Back  Bay  Electrotype  Co.,    . 

108  54 

98 

109  52 

Bacon-Farnum  Co., 

130  24 

1  30 

131  54 

Baldwin  Chain  and  Manufactur- 

ing Co.,          .        . 

884  60 

7  08 

891  68 

Bangs  &  Ramsey  Express  Co., 

54  27 

43 

54  70 

Barney  Leavitt  Co., 

30  93 

20 

31  13 

Bartlett  Box  and  Lumber  Co., 

235  17 

2  04 

237  21 

Bash  Marble  and  Slate  Co.,  . 

90  46 

81 

91  27 

Bates  Piano  Co.,      .... 

158  50 

4  33 

162  83 

Baush  Machine  Tool  Co., 

3,613  83 

30  72 

3,644  55 

Bay  State  Automobile  Co.,    . 

6  33 

03 

6  36 

Bay  State  Fuel  Co., 

1,590  11 

6  36 

1,596  47 

Bay  State  Hosiery  Co.,  Inc., 

30  86 

31 

31  17 

Bay  State  Packing  Co.,  . 

90  45 

80 

91  25 

Bay  State  Silver  Co., 

9  04 

07 

9  11 

Bay  State  Storage  and  Warehouse 

Co., 

3,002  94 

15  01 

3,017  95 

Bay  State  Thread  Works,      . 

575  80 

5  18 

580  98 

Bay  State  Tool  Handle  Co.,  . 

18  99 

19 

19  18 

Beacon,  Inc.,  The,   .... 

217  44 

3  00 

220  44 

Beaconsfield  Pharmacy,  Inc., 

43  41 

39 

43  80 

Beauvais  Water  Heater  Co., 

194  88 

89 

195  77 

Beckwith  Bros.  Co., 

108  54 

72 

109  26 

Bedford  Coal  and  Grain  Co., 

169  14 

1  51 

170  65 

Belle  Vue  Mills,       .        .        .        . 

767  19 

6  90 

774  09 

Behnont  Baking  Co., 

81  40 

69 

82  09 

Belmont  Spring  Water  Co.,    . 

138  46 

3  23 

141  69 

Benj.  N.  Moore  &  Sons  Co., 

1,752  92 

16  07 

1,768  99 

Bennett  Manufacturing  Co., 

12  66 

10 

12  76 

Bennett's  Inc.,         .        .        .        . 

108  54 

1  00 

109  54 

220 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Berkshire  Cannong  Co., 

$31  47 

$0  15 

$31  62 

Berkshire   Manufacturing    Co.   of 

Pittsfield, 

837  83 

7  54 

845  37 

Berkshire  Retail  Grocery   Co.  of 

West  Stockbridge,  Mass.,   . 

27  13 

- 

27  13 

Bernard  Millinery  Co.,    . 

5  42 

07 

5  49 

Bethel  Chrome  Tanning  Co., 

60  00 

51 

60  51 

Beverly    Chemical    and    Supply 

Co., 

7  48 

21 

7  69 

Beverly  Mattress  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

53  18 

1  59 

54  77 

Bilhngs  Dental  Co., 

31  47 

31 

31  78 

Blanoliard  &  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

147  81 

1  62 

149  43 

Bon-Ton  Millinery  Co.,  . 

58  79 

65 

59  44 

Bong  Binder  Co.,     . 

8  23 

- 

8  23 

Bonny  Brook  Farm  Co., 

84  44 

90 

85  34 

Borden,  Guiney  &  Kendall  Co.,    . 

357  72 

1  31 

359  03 

Boston  Automatic  Machine  Co.,  . 

10  00 

- 

10  00 

Boston  Baking  Powder  Co.,  . 

16  46 

- 

16  46 

Boston  Bedding  Supply  Co., 

112  15 

1  00 

113  15 

Boston  Blower  Co., 

18  09 

13 

18  22 

Boston  Bolt  and  Iron  Co.,     . 

312  95 

- 

312  95 

Boston  Brass  Andiron  Co.,    . 

86  83 

99 

87  82 

Boston  Chicle  Co.,  .... 

21  70 

22 

21  92 

Boston  Commercial  Co., 

312  30 

16  18 

328  48 

Boston  Drug  Co.,     .... 

149  78 

1  05 

150  83 

Boston  Foundry  Co., 

95  87 

48 

96  35 

Boston  French  Range  Co.,     . 

18  09 

- 

18  09 

Boston  Hat  and  Bonnet  Frame 

Co., 

81  78 

74 

82  52 

Boston  House  Wrecking  Co., 

53  18 

43 

53  61 

Boston  Interior  Finish  Co.,    . 

9  04 

09 

9  13 

Boston    Market    Reporter    Pub- 

hshing  Co., 

50  00 

2  00 

52  00 

Boston  Milling  Co., 

97  32 

87 

98  19 

Boston  Mortgage  Trust,  Inc., 

17  36 

- 

17  36 

Boston  Optical  Co., 

1,183  33 

10  65 

1,193  98 

Boston  Pencil  Pointer  Co.,     . 

452  43 

4  07 

456  50 

Boston,  Providence  and  Fall  River 

Express  Co.,          .... 

73  80 

30 

74  10 

Boston  Sash  Weight  Co., 

25  32 

23 

25  55 

Boston  Self-Locking  Block  Co.,     . 

6  00 

-""^^ 

6  00 

Boston  Specialty  Stores  Co., 

130  24 

1  25 

131  49 

Boston  Stitching  and  Plaiting  Co., 

50  65 

53 

51  18 

Boston     Tenninal     Refrigerating 

Co., 

354  56 

1  42 

355  98 

Boulevard  Pharmacy,     . 

72  36 

1  68 

74  04 

Boutwell  Bros.,  Inc., 

1,074  54 

4  30 

1,078  84 

Boyd  Motor  Co.,     . 

18  09 

- 

18  09 

Boyden  &  Co.,  Inc., 

23  87 

24 

24  11 

Boylston  Teaming  Co.,  . 

36  18 

3  07 

39  25 

1916. 


PUBLIC  DOCUIVIENT  —  No.  12. 


221 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Bovnton  Coal  Co.,  Inc., 

$107    74 

$0  97 

$108  71 

Bradlec  &  Chatman  Co., 

212  91 

1  01 

213  92 

Braintree  Rubber  Cement  Co.,     . 

461  29 

12  44 

473  73 

Breton  Coal  Co.,      . 

25  00 

33 

25  33 

Bristol  Motor  Car  Co.,  . 

53  18 

47 

53  65 

Broadwaj^  Garage,  Inc., 

5  42 

- 

5  42 

Brockton  Drug  Co., 

90  45 

82 

91  27 

Brockton  Ice  and  Coal  Co.,   . 

707  39 

6  37 

713  76 

Brookline  Press,       .... 

17  36 

52 

17  88 

Brooks  Construction  and  Lumber 

Co.,        .... 

75  97 

62 

76  59 

Brooks  Manufacturing  Co.,   . 

231  26 

1  08 

232  34 

BrowTi  Credit  Co.,   .... 

65  12 

23 

65  35 

BrowTi  Engine  Co., 

493  71 

2  14 

495  85 

Brown-Howland  Co., 

371  93 

3  03 

374  96 

Brown-^Yales  Co.,    . 

401  59 

2  74 

404  33 

Brown's  Enamel  Works,  Inc., 

35  47 

20 

35  67 

Builders  and    Buyers    Mortgage 

Co., 

226  12 

2  04 

228  16 

Builders'  Iron  and  Steel  Co., 

295  69 

15  60 

311  29 

Bunldo  Matsuki  Corpn., 

34  82 

31 

35  13 

Bunting  Stevens  Co., 

181  80 

3  94 

185  74 

Burdett  College,       .        .        .        . 

430  10 

1  94 

432  04 

Burleigh  &  Martin,  Inc., 

45  22 

23 

45  45 

Burt  Furniture  Co., 

198  99 

1  50 

200  49 

Butler  Furniture  Co., 

452  25 

4  07 

456  32 

Butman  &  Cressey  Co.,  . 

394  36 

3  62 

397  98 

C.A.Cook  Co.,       .       .       .       . 

427  90 

1  71 

429  61 

C.  C.  Blanev  Co.,    .        .        .       . 

119  39 

1  07 

120  46 

C.    C.    CoghHn-Wilson    Electric 

Co., 

173  66 

1  56 

175  22 

CD.  Lyons  Co.,       .        .        .        . 

90  45 

95 

91  40 

CD.  Wright  Co.,     .        .        .        . 

108  54 

- 

108  54 

C  E.  Trimibull  Co., 

108  54 

90 

109  44 

C  F.  Tompkins  Co., 

298  73 

2  69 

301  42 

C      F.      Trask     Manufacturing 

Co., 

44  00 

29 

44  29 

C  G.  Howes  Co 

217  08 

1  98 

219  06 

C  J.  Peters  &  Son  Co.,  . 

370  91 

2  04 

372  95 

C  L.  Chase  &  Son,  Inc., 

22  97 

10 

23  07 

C  P.  Lovering  Co., 

248  73 

1  97 

250  70 

C  P.  Thompson  Co.,  Inc.,     . 

596  97 

6  06 

603  03 

C  Sargent  Bird,  Inc.,      . 

49  74 

1  72 

51  46 

Cadem  Plastering  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

10  85 

1  00 

11  85 

Cahill  Manufacturing  Co.,     . 

27  13 

- 

27  13 

Cambridge  Brass  Co.,     . 

65  12 

84 

65  96 

Cambridge  Garage  Co.,  . 

17  36 

41 

17  77 

Campbell  Electric  Co.,    . 

153  76 

1  05 

1.54  81 

Canton  Ice  Co.,        .... 

20  26 

20 

20  46 

Cape  Cod  Products  Co., 

300  29 

6  45 

306  74 

222 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Cape  Cod  Specialty  Co.,        .        . 

U2  51 

$0  37 

$42  88 

Carder  Wood  Working  Co.,   . 

81  40 

75 

82  15 

Carroll  Co.,       ... 

6  78 

02 

6  80 

Carter,  Carter  &  Meigs  Co.,  . 

2,674  42 

24  07 

2,698  49 

Carver  Cranberry  Co.,    . 

419  12 

3  84 

422  96 

Cattaraugus  Tanning  Co., 

375  00 

1  88 

376  88 

Celcro  Drug  Co.,      .        .        .        . 

5  42 

03 

5  45 

Centra]  Biscuit  Co., 

81  40 

1  90 

83  30 

Central  O'J  and  Gas  Stove  Co.,   . 

1,494  77 

11  96 

1,506  73 

Chamberlain  Huntress  Co.,    . 

452  25 

1  96 

454  21 

Champion-Draper  Co.,    . 

18  09 

- 

18  09 

Champion  Spark  Plug  Co.,    . 

36  CO 

18 

36  18 

Champlain  A'alley  Lime  Co.,  . 

12  00 

06 

12  06 

Chapel  Mills  Manufacturing  Co., 

945  40 

8  51 

953  91 

Charles  A.  Bald^vdn  Co., 

683  71 

4  90 

688  61 

Charles  A.  Jackson  Co., 

45  22 

37 

45  59 

Charles  E.  Holske  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

73  59 

50 

74  09 

Charles  Emmel  &  Rose  Co.,  . 

265  92 

4  50 

270  42 

Charles  Mav  &  Son  Co., 

303  91 

3  54 

307  45 

Chas.  P.  Whittle  Mfg.  Co.,    .        . 

178  63 

6  07 

184  70 

Charles  S.  Sexton  Co 

104  01 

90 

104  91 

Charles  W.  Blake  Co.,    . 

54  27 

54 

54  81 

Charm  P^lectric  Co., 

48  98 

32 

49  30 

Chattel  Loan  Co.,    . 

846  41 

50  77 

897  18 

Chelsea  Bag  and  Burlap  Co., 

26  04 

12 

26  16 

Church    Hydroplane    Boat    and 

Motor  Co., 

5  48 

02 

5  50 

Clark  &  Dupre  Mfg.  Co., 

158  70 

1  44 

160  14 

Clark,  Coggin  &  Johnson  Co., 

335  28 

2  85 

338  13 

Clark  Remedies  Co., 

10  31 

10 

10  41 

Clearing   House   Parcel   Deliverv 

Co., \ 

601  49 

23  26 

624  75 

Cleghorn  Clothing  Co.,  . 

122  10 

61 

122  71 

Clement  Co., 

217  OS 

1  89 

218  97 

Cleveland-Cheever  Co.,  . 

790  53 

6  85 

797  38 

Clifton  Electro  Chemical  Co.. 

36  IS 

72 

36  90 

Clinton  E.  Hobbs  Co.,    . 

137  48 

69 

138  17 

Coates     Clipper     Manufacturing 

Co., 

90  45 

81 

91  26 

Cochrane  Manufacturing  Co., 

4,260  14 

142  00 

4,402  14 

Codman  &  Co.,  Inc., 

379  89 

3  03 

382  92 

Coh  asset  Hotel  Co 

5  37 

32 

5  69 

Cold  Blast  Market  Co.,    *      . 

26  04 

— 

26  04 

CoUins,  Pratt  &  Graves  Co., 

143  77 

1  33 

145  10 

Colonial  Counter  Co.,     . 

37  06 

34 

37  40 

Colonial  Cranberry  Co., 

40  88 

1  22 

42  10 

Colonial  Engraving  Co., 

36  18 

33 

30  51 

Colonial  Match  Co., 

55  17 

1  55 

56  72 

Columbia     Manufacturing     Co., 

Inc., 

36  18 

1  96 

38  14 

1916.]             PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 

223 

Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Colurabian  Amusement  Co.,  . 

$117    58 

$0  77 

$118  35 

Columbian  Corpn., 

2,443  36 

150  07 

2,593  43 

Commercial  Credit  Co., 

18  09 

15 

18  24 

Commercial  Hotel  Co.,   . 

72  36 

58 

72  94 

Commercial  Investment  Co., 

5  42 

- 

5  42 

Commonwealth  Clothing  Co., 

94  97 

1  78 

96  75 

Commomvealth  Laundry  Co., 

54  27 

41 

54  68 

Commonwealth       Manufacturing 

Co., 

674  86 

1  80 

676  66 

Connecticut   VaUey   Street    Rail- 

way Co., 

2,953  78 

20  17 

2,973  95 

Converse  Rubber  Shoe  Co.,   . 

4,373  47 

39  36 

4,412  83 

Cooper  &  Cooper  Co.,     . 

31  11 

14 

31  25 

Copecut  Cranberry  Co., 

25  88 

21 

26  09 

Corner  Drug  Store,  Inc., 

43  41 

12 

43  53 

Corrugated  Culvert  Co.   of   New 

England, 

15  75 

17 

15  92 

Corset  H.  Co.,        .... 

1,049  22 

5  94 

1,055  16 

CosmopoKtan  Rubber  Co.,     . 

85  02 

43 

85  45 

Cote  Piano  Manufactming  Co.,     . 

3,885  73 

161  78 

4,047  51 

Cotuit  Oyster  Co.,  .... 

408  72 

3  55 

412  27 

Coughlan  &  Shells  Co.,  . 

90  45 

72 

91  17 

Coveney  Building  Co.,    . 

36  18 

2  26 

38  44 

Covich  Finkelstein  Co.,  Inc., 

163  58 

1  47 

165  05 

Crawford-Plummer  Company, 

442  86 

- 

442  86 

Cressey  Park  Co.,    . 

54  27 

2  33 

56  60 

Crocker  Drug  Co.,  .... 

22  61 

23 

22  84 

Cross  Coal  Co.,        .... 

312  05 

2  50 

314  55 

Crown  Packing  Co., 

124  06 

1  03 

125  09 

Crystal  Drug  Co.,    .... 

90  45 

4  07 

94  52 

Cullen  Brothers  Co., 

192  47 

1  73 

194  20 

Cummings  &  Pearson,  Inc.,   . 

31  53 

25 

31  78 

CummJngs  Fish  Co., 

16  28 

15 

16  43 

Cummings  Machine  Works,  . 

109  31 

47 

109  78 

Curtis  &  Cameron,  Inc., 

108  54 

1  00 

109  54 

Curtis  Drug  Co.,      .... 

14  47 

08 

14  55 

Curtis  Provision  Co., 

18  45 

20 

18  65 

Cushing  Medical  Supply  Co., 

615  78 

36  94 

652  72 

Cutter  &  Smith  Co.,  inc.. 

596  97 

5  38 

602  35 

D.  Doherty  Co.,       . 

417  24 

3  75 

420  99 

D.  L.  Rand  Co.,      .... 

7  23 

04 

7  27 

D.  W.  Mellen  Co.,  .... 

234  44 

1  87 

236  31 

DadmunCo., 

90  45 

3  88 

94  33 

Daggett  &  Curry  Co.,     . 

119  39 

2  78 

122  17 

Dalton-IngersoU  Mfg.  Co.,     . 

1,649  71 

14  30 

1,664  01 

Daly  Music  PubHsher,  Inc.,  . 

85  80 

40 

86  20 

Dana  Hardware  Co., 

2,083  11 

18  75 

2,101  86 

Daniel  E.  Walsh  Co.,      . 

218  23 

- 

218  23 

Daniel     Russell     Boiler     Works, 

Inc., 

27  13 

09 

27  22 

224 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

1 

Account 
of  Corporation 

! 

j     Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

1 

Danvers  Laundry  Co.,    .' 

S42  33 

$0  34 

$42  67 

Dart  Motor  Truck  Co.  of  Mass.,  . 

10  85 

10 

10  95 

David  Irving  Co.,    .        .        .        . 

271  35 

2  44 

273  79 

David  J.  Ingraham,  Inc., 

54  27 

25 

54  52 

David  M.  Connell  Co.,  . 

60  99 

26 

61  25 

Davies,  Rose  &  Co.,  Ltd.,      . 

291  24 

1  35 

292  59 

Davis    Hardware    Manufacturing 

Co., 

59  69 

45 

60  14 

Da\is-Watson  Manufacturing  Co., 

48  11 

24 

48  35 

Da\nson  Co., 

361  80 

21  70 

383  50 

Decatur-Caddick  Lumber  Co.,      . 

45  22 

41 

45  63 

DeLuxe  Corpn.,       .... 

9  04 

07 

9  11 

Deming  Park  Realty  Co., 

33  46 

17 

33  63 

Dewey  &  Co.,  Inc., 

144  72 

2  03 

146  75 

Dewey  Square  Alleys,  Inc.,    . 

79  59 

44 

80  03 

Dine  Bros.  Co.,        .... 

369  03 

3  32 

372  35 

Dine  Manufacturing  Co., 

12  66 

13 

12  79 

Direct  Hosiery  Co., 

32  59 

29 

32  88 

Dolls'  Hospital,  Inc., 

21  25 

10 

21  35 

Dorchester  Ice  Co., 

618  13 

35  22 

653  35 

Dove  Machine  Co.,  Inc., 

94  06 

2  65 

96  71 

Dr.  Hallock  Drug  Co.,    . 

45  22 

41 

45  63 

Dr.  Swett  Root  Beer  Co.,      . 

173  89 

1  13 

175  02 

Drake  &  Hersey  Co.,      . 

271  35 

2  44 

273  79 

Dreayer  Manufacturing  Co., 

222  63 

1  54 

224  17 

Druggists'  Manufacturing  Assn.,  . 

154  99 

- 

154  99 

Dukelow  &  Walker  Co., 

43  41 

1  42 

44  83 

Dummerston  Granite  Co.,      . 

60  30 

51 

60  81 

Dunning  &  Martin  Co., 

26  55 

26  55 

Durand  Co., 

217  08 

2  00 

219  08 

Duren  &  Co.,  Inc.,  .... 

27  13 

27  13 

Durgin  Shoe  Co.,     .... 

420  59 

1  89 

422  48 

Dyar  Supply  Co.,     .... 

231  49 

1  00 

232  49 

E.   &   R.   Cleansing   and  Dyeing 

Co., 

244  21 

2  03 

246  24 

E.  &  R.  Laundry  Co.,     . 

585  75 

4  88 

590  63 

E.  A.  King  Co.,        .... 

139  29 

1  26 

140  55 

E.  B.  Badger  &  Sons  Co.,      .        . 

2,948  34 

22  11 

2,970  45 

E.  C.  Bo\\Tnan  &  Son  Co.,     . 

35  54 

28 

35  82 

E.  C.  Howard  Co.,  .... 

38  98 

34 

39  32 

E.  D.  Brooks  &  Co.,  Inc.,      . 

253  26 

1  77 

255  03 

E.  E.  Cole  Silver  Co 

14  03 

11 

14  14 

E.  E.  Lincoln  Shoe  Co., 

72  36 

60 

72  96 

E.  G.  Tutein  &  Co.,  Inc.,       . 

50  65 

2  18 

52  83 

E.  H.  Allen  Co.,       .        .        .        . 

72  36 

24 

72  60 

E.  H.  Ravner  Fur  Co.,   . 

75  00 

49 

75  49 

E.  H.  Severy,  Inc.,  .... 

81  76 

41 

82  17 

E.  N.  Jackson  Co.,  .... 

47  48 

95 

48  43 

E.  0.  Lake  Lumber  Co., 

43  41 

2  17 

45  58 

E.  0.  Proctor  Co.,   .... 

168  68 

1  21 

169  89 

1916. 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  —  x\o.  12. 


225 


Collected  on 

Account 

of  Corporation 

Tax  for  1914. 

1 

Interest. 

$25  21 

$0  25 

8  14 

- 

3,618  00 
807  71 

12  66 

7  40 

25  95 

23 

8  14 

- 

24  56 

1  10 

6  51 

19 

70  55 

3  11 

36  18 

30 

11  52 

28 

280  39 

1  31 

52  28 

50 

45  22 

41 

47  48 

4  74 

45  22 

17 

133  70 

8  02 

9  04 

07 

6  51 

05 

17  96 

93 

38  85 

30 

25  77 

23 

226  12 

1  04 

180  90 

6  80 

130  24 

65 

74  16 

27 

45  22 

20 

18  09 

46 

452  25 

1  81 

90  45 

- 

1,854  76 
1,207  50 

9  27 

8  05 

434  16 

3  90 

63  31 

54 

1,145  82 
18  09 

9  93 
16 

5  42 

02 

90  45 

81 

132  41 

4  77 

147  25 

1  03 

18  09 

- 

46  85 

37 

246  02 

5  11 

99  49 

3  76 

12  66 

13 

1,400  00 

16  10 

12  12 

17 

Totals. 


E,  R.  Brown  Beer  Pmnp  Co., 
E.  R.  C.  Manufacturing  Co., 
E.  T.  Sla.ttery  Co.,  . 

E.  W.  Ham  Electric  Co., 
Earle  Pro\ision  Co., 

East  Douglas  Clothing  Co.,   . 

Eastburn  Press,  Inc., 

Eastern  Athletic  Association,  Inc. 

Eastern  Avenue  Garage,  Inc., 

Eastern  Fountain  Co.,    . 

Eastern  Furniture  Co.,   . 

Eastern  Grain  Co.,  . 

Eastern  Handle  Co., 

Eastern  Showcase  Co.,    . 

Eastern  Skirt  Manufacturing  Co. 

Economic  Steel  Rack  Co., 

Economy  Toggle  Co., 

Edgewood  Garage  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

Edward  DriscoU  Co., 

Egremont  Co-operative  Creamery- 
Co.,        

Electric  Maintenance  Co., 

Electro  Service  Press, 

Elite  Manufacturing  Co., 

Elliot  &  Douglas  Manufacturing 
Co., 

Ellis,  Eddy  Co., 

Ellis    Financial    Reporting    Sys 
tern,  Inc.,       .... 

Ehn  HiU  Provision  Co.,  . 

Elmwood  Poultry  Farm,  Inc., 

Elson  Art  Pubhcation  Co.,     . 

Emergency  Trunk  and  Bag  Co., 

Emerson  Shoe  Co.,  . 

Emil  Weissbrod  &  Sons,  Inc., 

Empire  Grocery  Co., 

Empire  Ring  Traveler  Co.,    . 

Ensign  Manufacturing  Co.,    . 

Equity  Lunch  Co.,  . 

Ernest  J.  Porter,  Inc.,     . 

Essex  Investment  Co.,    . 

Essex  Waste  Co.,     . 

Eureka  Syrup  Co.,  . 

Eureka  Valve  Co.,   . 

Everett  Drug  Co.,   . 

Everett  Shoe  and  Leather  Co., 

Everson  Manufacturing  Co., 

Ewell-Cooper  Co.,    . 

Export  Phosphate  Co.,   . 

F.  A.  Basford  Co 


$25  46 

8  14 

3,630  66 

815  11 

26  18 

8  14 

25  66 
6  70 

73  66 
36  48 

11  80 
281  70' 

52  78 
45  63 
52  22 
45  39 
141  72 

9  11 
6  56 

18  89 
39  15 

26  00 
227  16 

187  70 
130  89 

74  43 
45  42 
18  55 

454  06 

90  45 
1,864  03 
1,215  55 

438  06 

63  85 

1,155  75 

18  25 

5  44 

91  26 
137  18 
148  28 

18  09 

47  22 

251  13 

103  25 

12  79 
1,416  10 

12  29 


226 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


F.  B.  Rogers  Silver  Co., 
F.  B.  Taylor  &  Son,  Inc., 
F.  E.  Atteaux  &  Co.,  Inc., 
F.  H.  Day  Co., 
F.  H.  Lane  Co., 
F.  H.  Putnam  Co 
F.  H.  Thomas  Co 
F.  J.  Ross  Co., 
F.  L.  Goldsmith,  Inc., 
F.  M.  Harris  Co.,     . 
F.  S.  Carr  Rubber  Co. 
F.  S.  McDermott  Co., 
F.  T.  Morcombe,  White  Co., 
F.  T.  Mussey  Towel  Supply  Co. 
F.  W.  Freeman  Co., 
F.  W.  Lombard, 
Fall  Brook  Cranberrj^  Co.,     . 
Fall  River  Daily  Herald  Publish- 
ing Co.,  .        .        . 
Fall  River  Taxicab  Co., 
Farmer's  Shoe  Shop,  Inc.,      . 
Fashion,  Inc.,   .... 
Federal    Paper    Box    Machinery 

Fells  Ice  Co.,    .... 
Felton-TuT-ner  Heating  Co.,  . 
Ferd  F.  French  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  . 
Ferrar  &  Hutchinson,  Inc.,    . 
Fifth  Oakland  Sj^ndicate,  Inc., 
Finance  Club,  Inc., 
Fiske  &  Lane  Co.,    . 
Fitchburg  Drug  Co., 
Fitchburg  Machine  Works,    . 
Fitchburg  Real  Estate  and  Loan 

Co., 

Fitchburg  Steam  Engine  Co., 

Fleming  Foundry  Co.,    . 

Fletcher  Lumber  Corpn., 

Floyd-Scott  Co.,      . 

Foan  Brothers  Co., 

Foley's  Clothing  Store,  Inc.,  . 

Folster  Dry  Goods  Co., 

Forde  &  Nott  Co.,  . 

Foster  Company,  Inc.,    . 

Fourth  Oakland  Syndicate,  Inc. 

Fox,  Fultz  &  Co.,  Inc.,   . 

Frank    E.    Fitts    Manufacturing 

and  Supply  Co.,   . 
Frank  L.  Roberts  Co.,    . 
Frank  P.  Bennett  &  Co.,  Inc., 


Collected  on 

Account 

of  Corporation 

Tax  for  1914. 


Interest. 


$379  89 

$1  64 

416  07 

3  60 

1,197  17 

4  39 

130  24 

39 

318  38 

2  65 

108  54 

1  09 

1,281  65 

10  25 

58  01 

3  65 

10  22 

05 

86  83 

77 

58  79 

34 

90  45 

45 

48  40 

43 

83  21 

79 

45  22 

40 

75  07 

67 

16  64 

13 

440  49 

3  82 

90  45 

91 

36  18 

1  95 

452  25 

5  91 

166  42 

1  42 

271  35 

6  29 

191  03 

50 

158  28 

1  43 

6  33 

- 

24  80 

- 

123  73 

2  81 

607  82 

17  09 

226  12 

2  25 

770  63 

6  55 

106  80 

7  12 

232  45 

1  05 

36  27 

25 

668  42 

5  35 

12  50 

- 

21  70 

15 

90  45 

69 

86  83 

79 

75  97 

70 

144  72 

6  53 

13  90 

- 

192  20 

1  70 

222  94 

99 

18  56 

- 

145  44 

8  72 

Totals'. 


$381  53 

419  67 

1,201  56 

130  63 

321  03 

109  63 

1,291  90 

61  66 

10  27 

87  60 

59  13 

90  90 
48  83 
84  00 
45  62 

75  74 
16  77 

444  31 

91  36 
38  13 

458  16 

167  84 
277  64 
191  53 
159  71 
6  33 
24  80 
126  54 
624  91 
228  37 
777  18 

113  92 

233  50 

36  52 

673  77 

12  50 
21  85 
91  14 
87  62 

76  67 
151  25 

13  90 
193  90 

223  93 

18  56 

154  16 


1916.1 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


227 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Frank  P.  Brown  Co.,      . 

$36   90 

$1  55 

$38  45 

Frank  Ridlon  Co.,   .        .        .        . 

807  71 

8  62 

816  33 

Franklin  Clothing  Co.,    . 

90  45 

45 

90  90 

Franklin  Construction  Co.,    . 

90  45 

1  20 

91  65 

Franklin  Mills  Corporation,  . 

167  33 

75 

168  08 

Franklin  Park  Lumber  Co.,   . 

225  87 

2  03 

227  90 

Fred  A.  Houdlette  &  Son,  Inc.,     . 

242  15 

1  09 

243  24 

Frost  &  Adams  Co., 

904  50 

7  16 

911  66 

Frye  &  Crawford  Drug  Co.,  . 

9  04 

09 

9  13 

Fuller  Whitney  Surveys  Corpn.,  . 

54  27 

40 

54  67 

G.  A.  Monroe  Co.,  .... 

54  27 

25 

54  52 

G.  A.  Reidpath  Co., 

50  65 

- 

50  65 

G.  B.  Lawrence  Co., 

100  11 

86 

100  97 

G.  E.  Leadbctter  &  Sons,  Inc.,     . 

15  91 

09 

16  00 

G.  G.  Roberts  Corpn.,    . 

404  78 

2  75 

407  53 

G.  H.  PoUey  Co.,     .       .       .       . 

18  99 

68 

19  67 

G.  H.  Pulsifer,  Inc.,        .       .       . 

36  18 

12 

36  30 

G.  M.  Smith  Optical  Co.,      . 

61  05 

1  72 

62  77 

G.  W.  Lord  Co.,      .       .       .       . 

180  90 

1  80 

182  70 

G.  W.  Peterson  Co., 

9  04 

07 

9  11 

G.  W.  Sammet  &  Son  Co.,     . 

663  90 

3  31 

667  21 

G.  Wildes  Smith  Co.,      . 

19  89 

10 

19  99 

Galassi  Mosaic  and  Tile  Co., 

30  39 

10 

30  49 

Gale-Sawyer  Co.,     . 

139  88 

1  19 

141  07 

Gem  Stamped-Steel  Co., 

239  14 

2  15 

241  29 

George  A.  Goodridge  Co., 

227  93 

13  90 

241  83 

George  A.  Littlefield  Co.,       . 

271  35 

2  44 

273  79 

Geo.    C.    Moore   Wool   Scouring 

Mills, 

253  26 

2  09 

255  35 

George  Dietz  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

12  66 

07 

12  73 

Geo.  F.  Daniels  Corpn., 

1,024  97 

7  68 

1,032  65 

George  H.  Sallaway  Co., 

261  67 

2  28 

263  95 

George  H.  Sherbert,  Inc., 

39  79 

1  71 

41  50 

George  H.  Snow  Co., 

4,150  47 

20  75 

4,171  22 

George  J.  Tarr  Co., 

629  53 

5  77 

635  30 

George  S.  Stevens  Co.,    . 

36  18 

30 

36  48 

George  T.  Horan,  Inc.,   . 

334  08 

20  00 

354  08 

George  T.  Hoyt  Co.,       . 

180  90 

99 

181  89 

George  W.  Gale  Lumber  Co., 

610  53 

5  60 

616  13 

Georgetown  Gas  Co., 

6  33 

- 

6  33 

Gibbons  Contracting  Co., 

86  83 

1  12 

87  95 

Ghdden  Brick  Co.,  .... 

82  45 

41 

82  86 

Globe  Counter  Co., 

155  57 

1  56 

157  13 

Globe  Ear-Phone  Co.,     . 

180  90 

69 

181  59 

Gloucester  Basket  Ball  Assn., 

7  00 

7  00 

Gloucester  Gill-Net  Fisheries  Co., 

Inc., 

134  04 

44 

134  48 

Gloucester  Hospital,  Inc., 

90  45 

64 

91  09 

Gloucester  Loan  Co.,     . 

130  24 

4  00 

134  24 

Golden  Manufacturing  Co.,   . 

6  00 

03 

6  03 

228 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Goose-Broidy  Co.,   . 

$92  72 

$0  43 

$93  15 

Gordon  &  Sparrow  Co., 

244  21 

2  65 

246  86 

Gordon-Hittl  Co.,    . 

87  97 

88 

88  85 

Gorham  Drug  Store,  Inc., 

54  27 

55 

54  82 

Gorham  Press, 

180  90 

1  45 

182  35 

Coward's  Market  Co.,    . 

45  22 

43 

45  65 

Graham  Co.,     . 

54  27 

1  51 

55  78 

Great  Ceylon  Tea  Co.,  Inc., 

180  90 

1  45 

182  35 

Great  Eastern  Amusement  C 

0.,    .           361  80 

12  67 

374  47 

Greater     Plymouth     Newsj 

Daper 

Co.,        .... 

6  51 

06 

6  57 

Grossman    Cap     Manufact 

uring 

Co.,        .... 

6  87 

06 

6  93 

Guilford,     Kendrick     &     I 

^add. 

Inc.,       .... 

385  31 

6  97 

392  28 

H.  A.  Cook  Dairy  Products 

Co., 

Inc.,       .... 

67  51 

2  32 

69  83 

H.  A.  Knowles  &  Co.,  Inc., 

24  98 

- 

24  98 

H.  B.  Keen,  Inc.,     .       . 

38  54 

35 

38  89 

H.  C.  Girard  Co.,    .       . 

164  61 

83 

165  44 

H.  C.  H.  Pant  Co., 

114  87 

1  04 

115  91 

H.  D.  Smith  Co.,     .       . 

361  80 

- 

361  80 

H.  DangelCo., 

246  02 

10  82 

256  84 

H.  E.  Lindbladh  Co.,      .       . 

27  13 

24 

27  37 

H.  H.  Brown  Co.,    . 

1,201  10 

6  61 

1,207  71 

H.  L.  Handy  Co.,    .       . 

3,078  32 

10  26 

3,088  58 

H.  M.  Downs  Printing  Co., 

29  12 

08 

29  20 

H.  M.  Hansen  Shoe  Co., 

68  12 

68 

68  80 

H.  M.  Kinports  Co.,       . 

79  05 

4  82 

83  87 

H.  Newton  Marshall  Co., 

140  68 

68 

141  36 

H.  Ross  Maddocks  Co.,  Inc., 

213  11 

99 

214  10 

H.  T.  Schaefer,  Inc.,       . 

235  17 

1  17 

236  34 

Hackett  Brothers  Co.,    . 

45  06 

52 

45  58 

HaUfax  Flower  Co., 

22  61 

11 

22  72 

Hall  Paint  and  Hardware  Co 

,      .           271  35 

2  44 

273  79 

Hailstone  Electric  Co.,   . 

17  63 

18 

17  81 

Hamer  Improved  Washer  Co 

22  61 

15 

22  76 

Hampden  Knitting  Co., 

399  78 

3  46 

403  24 

Hanlon  Thornton  Co.,    . 

133  86 

1  23 

135  09 

Hanover  Amusement  Co., 

32  56 

1  43 

33  99 

Hanover  Rubber  Co.,     . 

90  45 

11 

90  56 

Harrigan  Press,  Inc., 

100  21 

2  67 

102  88 

Harrington  Manufacturing  C 

0.,    .           448  97 

4  04 

453  01 

Harrington  Press,    . 

10  85 

- 

10  85 

Hart  Foundry  Co.,  . 

5  42 

03 

5  45 

Hart  Private  Hospital,  Inc.,  . 

43  41 

1  82 

45  23 

Harvard   Grocery  and  Prov 

ision 

Co., 

63  31 

1  89 

65  20 

Harvard  Trust  Co.,         .  '    . 

781  25 

3  91 

785  16 

Hatchard  Ice  Co.,    .       . 

18  09 

10 

18  19 

1916. 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


229 


— 

Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Hava  Lunch,  Inc.,   .... 

$113   96 

$0  93 

$114  89 

Haverhill  Cement  Stone  Co., 

98  77 

49 

99  26 

Haverhill  Construction  Co.,  . 

128  43 

89 

129  32 

HaverhiU  Steamship  Co., 

11  43 

05 

11  48 

Haynes  Construction  Co., 

361  80 

3  32 

365  12 

Henderson  &  Johnson,  Inc.,  . 

48  24 

44 

48  68 

Henry  F.  Farrow  Co.,     . 

165  08 

1  55 

166  63 

Henry  F.  Miller  &  Sons  Piano  Co., 

2,824  24 

55  07 

2,879  31 

Henry  Gray  Co.,      .... 

30  39 

28 

30  67 

Henry  J.  Tracy  Co., 

54  27 

1  63 

55  90 

Henry  T.  Bulman,  Corpn.,    . 

14  58 

10 

14  68 

Hermann  Lucke  Co., 

144  72 

76 

145  48 

Herrick  Aiken  Co.,  .... 

88  64 

4  00 

92  64 

Hibernian  Publishing  Co., 

43  41 

26 

43  67 

Hickman  &  Doucette,  Inc.,   . 

34  37 

85 

35  22 

Higgins  Fraze  Co.,  .... 

542  70 

5  42 

548  12 

Highland    Drug    and    Chemical 

Corpn., 

38  04 

28 

38  32 

Highland  Machine  Co.,  . 

49  92 

23 

50  15 

Highland  Paint  and  Wall  Paper 

Co., 

361  80 

2  59 

364  39 

Hill  Dryer  Co.,        .        .        .        . 

361  80 

1  81 

363  61 

Hilton  Express  Co., 

40  70 

1  15 

41  85 

Himmel  Drug  Co.,  .... 

108  54 

1  06 

109  60 

Hinds'  Hand  Laundry  Co.,    . 

97  68 

88 

98  56 

Hjorth  Lathe  and  Tool  Co.,  . 

126  63 

63 

127  26 

Hodgson  Kennard  &  Co.,  Inc.,     . 

1,083  59 

11  35 

1,094  94 

Hoffecker  Co., 

121  81 

5  09 

126  90 

Holbrook  Manufacturing  Co., 

88  56 

88 

89  44 

Holhngs  Co., 

97  68 

80 

98  48 

Holyoke  Photo  Engraving  Co.,     . 

18  09 

16 

18  25 

Homer  Foot  &  Co.,  Inc., 

361  80 

3  32 

365  12 

Hooper  Printing  Co., 

83  21 

30 

83  51 

Horse  Whip  Co.,      .       .       .       . 

622  92 

5  60 

628  52 

Hotel  Empire,  Inc., 

86  83 

2  93 

89  76 

Howard  Dustless-Duster  Co., 

178  65 

1  60 

180  25 

Howard,  Inc., 

54  01 

- 

54  01 

Howe    Stove    and   Furniture  Ex- 

change, Inc.,         .... 

14  36 

10 

14  46 

Howes  Brick  Co.,     .... 

117  58 

58 

118  16 

Hub    Cornice    and    Sky    Light 

Co., 

17  36 

- 

17  36 

Hub  Mattress  Co.,  . 

27  13 

27 

27  40 

Hudson  Printing  Co., 

81  40 

81 

82  21 

Hunter  Stationery  Co.,  . 

54  27 

49 

54  76 

Huntt's  Lunch  Co., 

94  15 

3  86 

98  01 

Hurlburt,  Johnson  Co.,  . 

65  59 

46 

66  05 

Huss  Baking  Co.,     .... 

90  45 

8  41 

98  86 

I.  M.  George  Co.,    .... 

5  42 

- 

5  42 

I.  Shactman  Leather  Co., 

9  04 

01 

9  05 

230 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

I.  Wolper  Co., 

$171    63 

$1  49 

$173  12 

Ideal  Can  Co.,          .        .        .        . 

104  46 

52 

104  98 

Ideal  Dental  Laboratory,  Inc., 

33  91 

30 

34  21 

Ideal  Hat  Co.,         .        .        .        . 

80  53 

72 

81  25 

Imperial  Cloak  and  Suit  Co., 

260  62 

2  20 

262  82 

Imperial  Motor  Car  Co., 

36  18 

29 

36  47 

Imperial     Photographic     Studio, 

Inc., 

203  51 

1  62 

205  13 

Imperial  Upholstering  Co.,    . 

135  67 

1  24 

136  91 

Importers  Branch,  Ltd., 

238  78 

10  00 

248  78 

Independent     Button     Fastener 

Machine  Co.,        .... 

427  21 

15  80 

443  01 

Innovation  Publishing  Co.,    . 

5  42 

- 

5  42 

Interior  Building  Finish  Co., 

20  62 

15 

20  77 

International      Mercantile      and 

Bond  Co.  of  Mass.,      . 

36  18 

25 

36  43 

International  Shade  Co., 

61  19 

51 

61  70 

International  Whip  Co., 

50  00 

25 

50  25 

Interstate  Manufacturing  Co., 

27  64 

- 

27  64 

Interstate  Pubhshing  Co., 

21  70 

- 

21  70 

Ira  J.  Webster  Co., 

3  33 

02 

3  35 

J.  A.  Brenner  &  Co.,  Inc., 

274  96 

2  47 

277  43 

J.  A.  Laraway  Co., 

90  45 

65 

91  10 

J.  E.  Paris  Co.,        .... 

146  52 

1  32 

147  84 

J.  G.  GaUishaw  Co., 

39  07 

1  48 

40  55 

J.  G.  Walker  &  Son  Corpn.,  . 

67  83 

32 

68  15 

J.  H.  Farris  Corporation, 

160  33 

4  81 

165  14 

J.  H.  Franklin  Co., 

50  81 

20 

51  01 

J.  H.  Gerlach  Co.,   .        .        .       . 

56  63 

21 

56  84 

J.  H.  Green  Co.,      .... 

72  36 

65 

73  01 

J.  H.  MiUer  Co.,  Inc.,     .        .        . 

397  98 

2  86 

400  84 

J.  H.  Robinson  Co., 

71  27 

64 

71  91 

J.  H.  White  Co.,      .       .        .        . 

157  38 

1  42 

158  80 

J.  Lipsitz  Co., 

299  38 

2  55 

301  93 

J.  NardiCo., 

45  22 

2  71 

47  93 

J.  S.  Delaney  Co.,   .... 

143  81 

3  35 

147  16 

J.  S.  Meacom  Co.,   .... 

54  27 

48 

54  75 

J.  T.  Meader  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

480  85 

1  44 

482  29 

J.  T.  Wilson  &  Son,  Inc., 

1,242  78 

3  73 

1,246  51 

J.  W.  Shaw  Co.,       .... 

117  58 

37 

117  95 

Jacobs,  Whitcomb  Co.,  . 

348  77 

1  80 

350  57 

James      Barrett     Manufacturing 

Co., 

542  70 

4  88 

547  58 

James  H.  Malone,  Inc.,  . 

171  49 

7  36 

178  85 

James  H.  Tarr  Co., 

92  51 

57 

93  08 

James  M.  White  Bottle  Co.,  . 

32  77 

15 

32  92 

James  Miles  &  Son  Co., 

218  88 

2  19 

221  07 

James  W.  Poole,  Inc.,     . 

185  60 

1  05 

186  65 

James  Wilkinson  Co., 

112  88 

1  01 

113  89 

Jerome  Manufacturing  Co.,   . 

72  36 

— 

72  36 

1916. 


PUBLIC  DOCUiVIENT  —  No.  12. 


231 


Collected  on 

Account 

of  Corporation 

Tax  for  1914. 


Interest. 


Totals. 


Joe  Cotter,  Inc., 

John  A.  Dunn  Co., 

John  A.  Frj^e  Shoe  Co.,  . 

John  A.  Lowell  Bank  Note  Co 

John  Babcock  &  Co.,  Inc., 

John  Cavanagh  &  Son  Building 

Mo\dng  Co., 
John  Chmiell  Co.,    . 
John  E.  Lynch  Hardware  Co., 
John  E.  O'Neil,  Inc., 
John  F.  Johnston  Co., 
John  J.  Cluin  Co.,   . 
John  L.  Kelly  Contracting  Co., 
John  Maloney  Grocery  Co.,  . 
John  Quin  &  Son  Co.,     . 
John  T.  Robinson  Co.,    . 
John  W.  Barlow  Co., 
Johnson  Educator  Food  Co., 
Jones  Peterson  &  Newhall  Co., 
Kakas  Bros.,  Inc.,    . 
Karl  Andren  Co.,     . 
Kasino  Co., 
Kempton  Co.,  . 
Kendall  Drug  Co.,  . 
Keniston  Engineering  Co., 
Kenney  Brothers  Co., 
Kenny  Clark  Co.,    . 
Keystone  Job  Print, 
Kiley  Hardware  Co., 
King  Mining  Co.,    . 
King  Philip  Tavern  Co 
Kinney     Heating     and     Supply 

Co.,        .... 
Kinney  Manufacturing  Co., 
Kittredge  Lunch  Co., 
Klein  Manufacturing  Co., 
Kleno  Manufacturing  Co., 
Knowlton  Iron  "Works  Co., 
Koonz  Manufacturing  Co., 
Korn  Leather  Co.,   . 
Kraft,  Bates  &  Spencer,  Inc. 
L.  &  P.  Co.,      . 
L.  B.  Dow,  Inc., 
L.  Dimond  &  Sons,  Inc 
L.  E.  Freeman  Co., 
L.  E.  Sanborn  Co., 
L.  G.  Fisk-Mooers  Co., 
L.  K.  Husted  Co.,  luc, 
L.  M.  Koritz  Co.,    . 
L.  Nickerson  Co.,  Inc., 


$121  56 

$0  73 

2,872  78 

1  66 

4,496  63 

22  48 

126  63 

1  15 

89  56 

70 

252  19 

4  00 

153  76 

77 

72  36 

34 

26  04 

26 

253  26 

1  39 

18  09 

18 

54  27 

49 

180  90 

1  80 

198  99 

4  64 

153  76 

1  44 

81  40 

24 

1,590  45 

81  57 

638  21 

4  68 

859  27 

7  73 

623  48 

2  92 

18  09 

11 

226  12 

78 

99  49 

81 

126  63 

1  24 

152  22 

1  37 

130  24 

6  46 

23  51 

23 

238  78 

2  85 

21  25 

19 

59  69 

2  40 

35  85 

32 

1,736  27 

13  89 

66  57 

2  66 

21  70 

18 

14  29 

28 

68  74 

55 

34  37 

13 

27  13 

- 

500  00 

- 

90  45 

3  05 

43  41 

21 

1,480  41 

11  84 

397  98 

1  99 

72  .36 

55 

235  17 

4  31 

48  84 

49 

15  32 

- 

45  22 

42 

$122  29 

2,874  44 

4,519  11 

127  78 

90  26 

256  19 

154  53 
72  70 

26  30 
254  65 

18  27 

54  76 

182  70 

203  63 

155  20 
81  64 

1,672  02 
642  89 
867  00 
626  40 

18  20 
226  90 
100  30 
127  87 
153  59 
136  70 

23  74 
241  63 

21  44 

62  09 

36  17 

1,750  16 

69  23 

21  88 

14  57 
69  29 
34  50 

27  13 
500  00 

93  50 

43  62 

1,492  25 

399  97 

72  91 
239  48 

49  33 

15  32 
45  64 


232 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

L.  P.  Soule  &  Son  Co.,   .       .       . 

$313  77 

$1  78 

$315  55 

L.  Speidel  &  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

705  51 

6  35 

711  86 

L.  W.  &  H.  F.  Morse  Co.,     .        . 

71  45 

36 

71  81 

L.  W.  Anthony  Co., 

284  91 

2  52 

287  43 

La-Lo  Co., 

30  39 

46 

30  85 

Lace  Shop,  Inc.,      .... 

180  90 

1  54 

182  44 

Lambert  &  Turner  Co.,  . 

5  42 

- 

5  42 

Lamere  &  Robinson  Co., 

13  02 

48 

13  50 

Lane-Libby  Fisheries  Co., 

286  25 

2  58 

288  83 

Lang  &  Jacobs  Co., 

94  97 

85 

95  82 

Laurel  Lake  Mills,  .... 

1,052  38 

3  33 

1,055  71 

Lawrence  B.  Smith  Co., 

562  59 

3  64 

566  23 

Lawrence  Baseball  Ass'n, 

32  56 

1  10 

33  66 

Lawrence  Development  Corpn.,    . 

9  97 

05 

10  02 

Lawrence  Produce  Co.,  . 

161  94 

1  61 

163  55 

Leavitt     &     Rubenstein    Press, 

Inc., 

6  47 

03 

6  50 

Leavitt's  Scotch  Polish  Co.,  . 

27  35 

05 

27  40 

L'Echo  Pubhshing  Co.,  . 

334  66 

3  34 

338  00 

Leslie  Dry  Goods  Co.,    . 

766  19 

6  17 

772  36 

Levy  Bros.,  Inc.,      .... 

92  25 

4  87 

97  12 

Lewis  A.  Brown  &  Co.,  Inc., 

27  13 

24 

27  37 

Lewis  F.  Small,  Inc., 

7  23 

07 

7  30 

Lewis  J.  Bird  Co.,    .... 

45  22 

15 

45  37 

Libbie  Printing  Co., 

90  45 

32 

90  77 

Lincoln  Lunch  Co.,  Inc., 

99  35 

60 

99  95 

Linscott  Motor  Co., 

405  48 

4  05 

409  53 

Linscott  Supply  Co., 

337  77 

3  10 

340  87 

Litchfield  Shuttle  Co.,    . 

2,086  30 

14  60 

2,100  90 

Lloyd  Coal  Co.,       .... 

105  82 

40 

106  22 

Locke  Coal  Co.,       .... 

1,146  00 

5  73 

1,151  73 

London  Harness  Co., 

814  05 

6  92 

820  97 

London  Raincoat  Co.,     . 

48  84 

43 

49  27 

Loring  Avenue  Garage  Co.,   . 

48  84 

49 

49  33 

Loring-Axtell  Co.,    .... 

479  38 

13  11 

492  49 

Louis  Cohen  Shirt  Co.,  . 

48  11 

- 

48  11 

Louis  Dejonge  Co.,          ... 

1,641  66 

10  94 

1,652  60 

Louis  G.  Destremps  &  Sons,  Inc.,  . 

32  56 

29 

32  85 

Louis  H.  Ross  Music  Pubhshing 

Co., 

6  33 

07 

6  40 

Lovejoy-McGrail  Co.,     . 

143  77 

1  08 

144  85 

Lovell  and  Covel  Co.,     . 

515  56 

4  38 

519  94 

Lovells,  Inc., 

72  36 

32 

72  68 

Lowell  Paper  Tube  Corpn.,    . 

95  87 

54 

96  41 

Lunt  Moss  Co.,        .... 

863  34 

28  90 

892  24 

Lyn  Home  Co.,        .... 

26  04 

22 

26  26 

Lynch  Heel  Co., 

81  40 

75 

82  15 

Lynn  Rubber  Manufacturing  Co., 

231  58 

6  25 

237  83 

Lyon  Carpet  Co.,     .... 

425  11 

3  15 

428  26 

Lyon  Co., 

215  27 

2  15 

217  42 

1916.] 


PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


233 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Lyon  Manufacturing  Co., 

$74    16 

$0  30 

$74  46 

Lyons  Hotel  Co.  of  Mass.,     . 

54  27 

20 

54  47 

M.  &  C.  Hat  Co.,    .... 

50  65 

3  03 

53  68 

M.  &  C.  Skirt  Co.,  .... 

618  00 

4  33 

622  33 

M.  Connell  Co.,  Inc.,      . 

99  49 

2  79 

102  28 

M.  J.  Crowley  Co.,          .        . 

54  27 

1  42 

55.  69 

M.  Marks  Co.,         .... 

64  21 

53 

64  74 

M.  T.  Coffey  Co.,    .       .       .       . 

84  66 

2  97 

87  63 

Macdonald  &  Evans,  Inc.,     . 

20  35 

20 

20  55 

Macey-Stetson-Morris  Co.,    . 

202  60 

1  33 

203  93 

Majestic  Company, 

217  08 

1  95 

219  03 

Maiden  China  Co.,  Inc., 

25  32 

23 

25  55 

Maiden  Commercial  School,  . 

18  09 

08 

18  17 

Maiden  Leather  Goods  Co.,  . 

112  15 

1  03 

113  18 

Maiden  Mail  Co.,    .... 

11  25 

- 

11  25 

Manhattan  Collar  Co.,   . 

90  45 

83 

91  28 

Manhattan   Grocery   and   Pro\'i- 

sion  Co., 

830  69 

7  48 

838  17 

Manning's  Inc.,        .... 

21  49 

- 

21  49 

Mansfield  Drug  Co., 

45  22 

45 

45  67 

Mansfield  MiUing  Co.,    . 

465  81 

3  26 

469  07 

Maple  Farm  Milk  Co.,   . 

27  13 

41 

27  54 

Marlborough  Drug  Co., 

45  22 

18 

45  40 

Marlborough    Times    Publishing 

Co., 

5  42 

- 

5  42 

Marshall  &  May  Co., 

85  92 

82 

86  74 

Martin  Tractor  Co., 

98  13 

29 

98  42 

Marvello  Co., 

46  12 

12 

46  24 

Mass.  Builders'  Finish  Co.,    . 

162  81 

1  59 

164  40 

Mass.  Investment  and  Loan  Co., 

26  86 

14 

27  00 

Mass.  Iron  and  Metal  Co.,     . 

19  98 

15 

20  13 

Mass.  Metal  Pohsh  Co., 

20  58 

1  03 

21  61 

Mass.     Mortgage     and     Realty 

Corpn., 

8  68 

09 

8  77 

Massasoit  Co.,         .... 

481  91 

7  22 

489  13 

Massasoit  Manufacturing  Co., 

3,443  55 

16  07 

3,459  62 

Mattapoisett  Cranberry  Co., 

38  67 

20 

38  87 

Matthew  F.  Sheehan  Co., 

506  52 

4  67 

511  19 

Mayflower  Laundry  Co., 

158  28 

5  68 

163  96 

Maykel  Automobile  Co., 

36  18 

33 

36  51 

Maynard  Rubber  Corporation,     . 

231  55 

1  99 

233  54 

McAuhffe    Non    Siphoning   Trap 

Co., 

43  41 

39 

43  80 

McCarthur  Bros.  Co.,     . 

9  04 

02 

9  06 

McHeffey  Express  Co.,  . 

36  18 

17 

36  35 

McLean  &  Cousens  Co., 

10  85 

59 

11  44 

McLean  Black  &  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

1,176  57 

10  59 

1,187  16 

McNeil  Corporation, 

259  59 

2  33 

261  92 

MelHsh  &  Byfield  Manufacturing 

Co., 

173  66 

1  56 

175  22 

234 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Merchant    Box    and    Cooperage 

Co., 

$528  22 

$2  38 

$530  60 

Merchants    Co-operative    Adver- 

tising Co., 

36  18 

20 

36  38 

Merchants  Delivery  Co., 

90  45 

75 

91  20 

Merchants  Trading  Stamp  Co.,    . 

52  09 

39 

52  48 

Meredith  Linen  Mills,     . 

136  60 

64 

137  24 

Merrill    Chair    and    Manufactur- 

ing Co.,          

31  60 

28 

31  88 

Merrimac  Valley  Mills,  . 

203  51 

6  74 

210  25 

Methuen  Granite  Co.,     . 

29  67 

1  19 

30  86 

Metropohtan  Laundry  Co.,    . 

578  88 

29  11 

607  99 

Metropohtan      Lithograph      and 

PubUshing  Co.,     . 

90  90 

- 

90  90 

Middleby  Criterion  Oven  Co., 

28  22 

20 

28  42 

Middlesex  Investment  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

142  44 

1  26 

143  70 

Milk  Package  Exchange,  Inc., 

62  37 

30 

62  67 

Millbury  Steel  Foundry  Co., 

200  97 

1  81 

202  78 

Miller  Brothers,  Inc., 

276  59 

2  18 

278  77 

Millers  River  Box  Co.,    . 

88  64 

79 

89  43 

Millers  River  Power  Co., 

25  50 

14 

25  64 

Milton  Laundry,      .... 

22  25 

22 

22  47 

Minot  Drug  Co.,      . 

8  48 

35 

8  83 

Miscoe  Spring  Water  Co., 

37  98 

35 

38  33 

Mitchell  Press,         .... 

13  02 

78 

13  80 

Mitchell  Wing  Co., 

644  05 

5  37 

649  42 

Moiling  &  Berry  Co., 

26  04 

73 

26  77 

Moody  Bridge  Garage  Co.,    . 

7  77 

21 

7  98 

Moquin  &  Fontaine  Co., 

565  31 

5  02 

570  33 

Morse  McDonald  Co.,    . 

141  10 

1  27 

142  37 

Motor   Car   Service   Co.    of  Bos- 

ton,         

54  27 

49 

54  76 

Motor  Sales  Co.,      . 

126  63 

1  14 

127  77 

Motor  Specialties  Co.,     . 

90  45 

90 

91  35 

Muir's  Laundry,  Inc.,     . 

74  16 

58 

74  74 

Murphy  Coal  and  Wood  Co., 

269  75 

2  47 

272  22 

Murray  Tanning  Co., 

180  90 

90 

181  80 

Myer  Abrams  Co.,  . 

271  35 

2  32 

273  67 

N.  W.  Brown  Piano  Co., 

90  45 

44 

90  89 

National  Crash  Mfg.  Co., 

50  19 

45 

50  64 

National  Druggists  Supply  Co.,    . 

371  46 

22  26 

393  72 

National  Knitting  Co.,  Inc., 

180  90 

1  50 

182  40 

National  Manufacturing  Co., 

319  19 

2  92 

322  11 

National  Matzo  Co.  of  Boston,     . 

13  02 

- 

13  02 

National  MetaUic  Bed  Co.,    . 

762  71 

3  06 

765  77 

National  Parlor  Furniture  Co., 

16  28 

- 

16  28 

National  Pubhshing  and  Trading 

Co., 

36  18 

19 

36  37 

National  Scale  Co.,  .        .        .        . 

629  53 

5  67 

635  20 

National  Tack  Co.,  Inc., 

140  64 

9  84 

150  48 

1916.] 


PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


235 


Collected  on 

Account 

of  Corporation 

Tax  for  1914. 


Interest. 


Totals. 


Suit 


Neapolitan  Ice  Cream  Co., 
Nelson  Color  Co.,     . 
New  Can  Co.,  . 
New  England  Biscuit  Co., 
New    England    Cloak    and 

Co., 

New  England  Cold  Storage  Co., 
New  England  Converting  Co., 
New    England    Co-operative    So 

ciety,      .        .        . 
New  England  Directory  Co., 
New  England  Drug  Co., 
New  England  Nurseries  Co., 
New  England  Publishing  Co., 
New  England  Reed  Co., 
New  Home  Sewing  Machine  Co., 
New  Method  Laundry  Co.,    . 
New  Public  Market,  Inc., 
New  York  Bargain  House,  Inc., 
New  York  Egg  and  Fruit  Co., 
Newark  Lunch  Co., 
News  Publishing  Co.  of  New  Bed- 
ford,         

Nicholas  M .  Williams  Co . , 
Nobscot  Mountain  Spring  Co., 
Norcross  Brothers  Co.,    . 
Norfolk  Granite  Co., 
Norfolk  Iron  Co.,     . 
North  American  Fruit  Co.,    . 
North  Shore  Creamery  Co.,   . 
North  Somerville  Coal  Co.,    . 
Northeastern  Lunch  Co., 
Northern  Construction  Co.,   . 
Northern    Massachusetts    Street 

Railway  Co., 
Norton  Water  Co.,  . 
Noshake  Grate  and  Heating  Co., 
Notilt  Manufacturing  Co.,     . 
0.  L.  Lorentzen  Co., 
Oakes  Knitting  Mills  Co., 
Office  Specialty  Co., 
Old    Colony    Cut    Glass    Works 

Inc., 

Old  Colony  Piano  Co.,    . 

Old  Colony  Press,     . 

Old  Corner  Drug  Store,  Inc., 

Oleic  Co.,  Inc., 

Omiros  Cigarette  Co.,  Inc., 

Oran  McCormick  Publishing  Co., 

Orent  &  Ca,  Inc.,  .   .   .   . 


$31  65 

$0  16 

95  87 

81 

235  17 

2  12 

256  87 

2  35 

213  46 

78 

1,958  60 

83  05 

36  18 

36 

203  47 

1  73 

14  76 

50 

9  33 

- 

267  73 

2  62 

361  80 

3  25 

389  91 

3  30 

14,385  04 

122  27 

22  61 

17 

40  81 

19 

152  20 

9  13 

9  76 

10 

60  00 

39 

22  61 

20 

63  31 

3  15 

188  13 

1  65 

2,152  47 

18  66 

21  70 

20 

106  27 

35 

77  30 

71 

184  51 

5  53 

75  34 

68 

72  00 

50 

81  40 

38 

3,806  40 

26  00 

112  15 

36 

8  77 

- 

8  41 

04 

32  56 

32 

481  19 

4  33 

20  07 

18 

75  97 

63 

313  40 

2  77 

13  38 

06 

22  61 

12 

54  37 

43 

123  91 

3  31 

32  56 

1  88 

343  71 

2  63 

$31  81 

96  68 

237  29 

259  22 

214  24 

2,041  65 

36  54 

205  20 

15  26 

9  33 

270  35 

365  05 

393  21 

14,507  31 

22  78 

41  00 

161  33 

9  86 

60  39 

22  81 
66  46 

189  78 
2,171  13 

21  90 
106  62 

78  01 

190  04 
76  02 
72  50 
81  78 

3,832  40 
112  51 

8  77 
8  45 

32  88 
485  52 

20  25 

76  60 

316  17 

13  44 

22  73 
54  80 

127  22 

34  44 

346  34 


236 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


. 

Collected  on 



Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Oriental  Garment  Co.,    . 

$119  55 

$0  95 

$120  50 

Orona  Manufacturing  Co.,     . 

73  69 

59 

74  28 

Orpheum  Amusement  Co.,     . 

6  51 

26 

6  77 

Orpheum  Theatre,  Inc., 

14  47 

14 

14  61 

Oscar  T.  Gove  Co.,  Inc., 

129  34 

1  16 

130  50 

Oxidite  Manufacturing  Co.,  . 

32  56 

27 

32  83 

P.  F.  Wood  Boiler  Works,  Inc.,     . 

90  45 

82 

91  27 

Pach  Bros.,  Inc.,      . 

5  00 

05 

5  05 

Package  Confectionery  Co.,  . 

4,263  10 

130  73 

4,393  83 

Palmer  Hunter  Lumber  Co., 

497  47 

4  48 

501  95 

Palmer  Renting  Co., 

11  75 

15 

11  90 

Pamott  Mines  Co., 

80  00 

- 

80  00 

Panther    Rubber    Manufacturing 

Co., 

278  58 

2  63 

281  21 

Paris  Cloak  Co., 

128  07 

82 

128  89 

Parker  &  Page  Co., 

931  63 

8  38 

940  01 

Parker  Brothers  Iron  Co., 

86  83 

70 

87  53 

Parker-Hammerton    Manufactur- 

ing Co., 

165  14 

1  49 

166  63 

Parker  Supply  Co., 

88  15 

81 

88  96 

Parker  Wire  Goods  Co., 

790  53 

6  60 

797  13 

Parsons  Manufacturing  Co., 

470  34 

28  22 

498  56 

Patterson  Rubber  Co.,    . 

113  96 

89 

114  85 

Peabody  Square  Garage  Co., 

72  36 

2  99 

75  35 

Pean  Medical  Co.,   . 

22  61 

23 

22  84 

Pennsylvania  Textile  Co., 

2,592  71 

12  96 

2,605  67 

People's  Express,  Inc.,    . 

27  13 

09 

27  22 

Perkins  &  Co.,  Inc., 

108  54 

- 

108  54 

Perlmutter  Bros.  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

36  18 

32 

36  50 

Perry  Mason  Co.,    . 

6,869  22 

34  35 

6,903  57 

Peter  Cooper's  Glue  Factory  of 

Mass., 

15  37 

08 

15  45 

Philip  Slater  Co.,      .       .       .        . 

24  02 

82 

24  84 

Pico  Cranberry  Co., 

14  32 

— 

14  32 

Picture  Shop,  Inc.,  .... 

48  84 

15 

48  99 

Pierson  Pharmacy  Co.,   . 

144  72 

1  30 

146  02 

Pine  Croft  Orchard  Co., 

12  27 

06 

12  33 

Pine  Grove  Floral  Corp'n,      . 

14  47 

13 

14  60 

Pinkham  Press,        .... 

164  29 

1  50 

165  79 

Pittsfield  Auto  Garage  Co.,    . 

81  40 

64 

82  04 

Pittsfield  Contracting  Co.,     . 

18  09 

14 

18  23 

Pittsfield  Journal  Co.,     . 

231  55 

1  98 

233  53 

Place  Bros.,  Inc.,      .... 

18  46 

18 

18  64 

Plymouth     &     Sandwich     Street 

Railway  Co., 

1,441  32 

- 

1,441  32 

Plymouth  Manufacturing  Co., 

45  22 

41 

45  63 

Plymouth  Rubber  Co., 

10,358  51 

93  23 

10,451  74 

Polish  Industrial  Ass'n,  . 

43  41 

46 

43  87 

Pope-Hartford  Co.  of  Boston, 

381  86 

15  35 

397  21 

Pope-Sisson  Lumber  Co., 

723  60 

5  07 

728  67 

1916." 


PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


23' 


' 

Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Portland  Sales  Co., 

S54  27 

SO  50 

$54  77 

Post  Office  Pharmacy,  Inc.,   . 

58  61 

53 

59  14 

Potter  Knitting  Co., 

777  87 

6  74 

784  61 

Power    Heating    and   Ventilating 

Co., 

85  52 

74 

86  26 

Power  Numbering  Machine  Co.,    . 

126  01 

81 

126  82 

Presbrey-Field  Co., 

361  80 

3  92 

365  72 

Presbrey  Stove  Lining  Co.,    . 

877  36 

5  85 

883  21 

Pressed  Aluminum  Co., 

65  57 

2  00 

67  57 

Prevost  Realty  Co., 

37  44 

17 

37  61 

Prior  &  Mahoney  Co.,     . 

43  41 

22 

43  63 

Progressive  Co-operative  Ass'n,    . 

98  91 

5  93 

104  84 

Protective  Loan  Co., 

22  84 

20 

23  04 

Pure  Food  Package  Co., 

90  45 

68 

91  13 

Puritan  Fish  Freezing  Co.,     . 

47  03 

18 

47  21 

Puritan  Motor  Supply  Co.,    . 

63  31 

59 

63  90 

Purity  Confectionery  Co., 

85  92 

3  60 

89  52 

Pyro-Febrin  Co.,      . 

10  85 

10 

10  95 

Q-P  Signal  Co.,        .        .        .        . 

45  22 

25 

45  47 

Queen  Manufacturing  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

95  87 

2  85 

98  72 

Quigley    Furnace    and    Foundry 

Co., 

3,577  15 

32  93 

3,610  08 

Quinn  Lunch  Co.,     . 

9  04 

21 

9  25 

R.  &  R.  System  Clothes,  Inc., 

10  05 

10 

10  15 

R.  B.  Gage  Co.,       .... 

7  05 

05 

7  10 

R.  C.  Goudey  Co., 

78  51 

44 

78  95 

R.  D.  Lidstone  Co.,  Inc., 

208  03 

76 

208  79 

R.  Holman  Co 

50  65 

55 

51  20 

R.  T.  Sullivan  Co.,          .       .       . 

143  36 

72 

144  08 

R.  W.  Armstrong  Co.,     . 

37  17 

22 

37  39 

Ravine  House  Co.  (Inc.), 

22  50 

25 

22  75 

Rayolite  Co., 

39  79 

4  78 

44  57 

Reading  Custom  Laundry,  Inc.,    . 

66  93 

1  56 

68  49 

Recorder  Publishing  Co., 

25  32 

28 

25  60 

Reed  &  Barton  Corp'n,  . 

6,099  73 

40  66 

6,140  39 

Regal  Cloak  Co.,      .       .       .        . 

228  83 

2  06 

230  89 

Rejane  Co., 

18  45 

13 

18  58 

Remington-Urquhart  Press,  Inc.,  . 

51  91 

25 

52  16 

Revere  Distilling  Co., 

1,266  30 

10  13 

1,276  43 

Revere  Drop  Forge  Co., . 

162  79 

90 

163  69 

Rex  Wrench  Co.,      .        .     *  . 

60  14 

82 

60  96 

Rice  Valentine  Co., 

180  90 

60 

181  50 

Richard  Briggs  Co., 

2,170  80 

19  90 

2,190  70 

Richard  H.  Booth  Co.,  . 

466  72 

17  10 

483  82 

Richards  Manufacturing  Co., 

542  70 

3  62 

546  32 

Riley  Pebbles  Shoe  Co., 

217  08 

1  09 

218  17 

Riverside  Mills,        .... 

520  99 

2  60 

523  59 

Roackdale  Woollen  Co., 

19  24 

14 

19  38 

Robert  Wilson  Co., 

33  46 

- 

33  46 

Robinson  Bramley  Co.,  Inc., 

9  04 

— 

9  04 

238 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Robinson-Brockway  Mfg.  Co., 

$118    61 

$1  18 

$119  79 

Roblin-Schiller  Co., 

65  12 

52 

65  64 

Rockwood  Chemical  Co., 

7  19 

06 

7  25 

Rockwood,  Mclntyre  Co., 

452  25 

4  07 

456  32 

Rogers  Isinglass  and  Glue  Co.,      . 

107  72 

1  04 

108  76 

Rosengard  Furniture  Co., 

170  04 

1  56 

171  60 

Roxbury  Distilling  Co.,  . 

66  80 

35 

67  15 

Roxbury  Theatre  Co.,     . 

10  85 

10 

10  95 

Royal  Furniture  Co., 

233  07 

- 

233  07 

Royal  Laundry  Co., 

119  39 

5  00 

124  39 

Royal  Shoe  Co.,       .        .        .        . 

235  17 

2  16 

237  33 

Royal  Silver  Black  Fox  Co., 

12  73 

13 

12  86 

Russian  Importing  Co.,  . 

8  68 

- 

8  68 

Ryan  &  Duffee,  Inc., 

108  54 

98 

109  52 

''S.  &A."Mfg.  Co.,       .        .       . 

20  56 

10 

20  66 

S.  Bloom,  Inc.,         .... 

117  58 

94 

118  52 

S.  D.  Cohen  Co.,      .... 

89  54 

- 

89  54 

S.  D.  Grossman  Co., 

180  90 

1  63 

182  53 

S.  H.  Couch  Co.,  Inc.,    .       .        . 

215  27 

1  43 

216  70 

S.  L.  Gabriel  Co.,     .... 

30  75 

28 

31  03 

S.  M.  Howes  Co.,     .... 

2,161  03 

19  81 

2,180  84 

S.  M.  Stevens  Co.,  .... 

56  98 

45 

57  43 

St.  Louis  Rubber  Co.,     . 

198  99 

1  55 

200  54 

Salem  Bay  Line  Transfer  Co., 

37  98 

1  64 

39  62 

Salem  Press  Co., 

63  31 

44 

63  75 

Sally's   Embroidery   and   Cleans- 

ing Co.,          

31  45 

28 

31  73 

Sampo  Granite  Co., 

29  07 

20 

29  27 

Samuel  Cohen  &  Levitt  Co., 

253  26 

- 

253  26 

Samuel  Ward  Mfg.  Co., 

1,908  49 

16  85 

1,925  34 

Samuel  ZoU  Co.,       . 

176  37 

1  63 

178  00 

Santa  Barbara  Fruit  Co., 

5  80 

05 

5  85 

Sawyer  Drug  Co.,    . 

91  17 

64 

91  81 

Saxwood  Mfg.  Co., 

126  63 

1  08 

127  71 

Say  lor  &  Stewart  Co.,     . 

9  04 

08 

9  12 

Scandinavian    Co-operative    Gro- 

cery Union, 

63  45 

57 

64  02 

Schiff  Bros.,  Inc.,      .        .        .        . 

6  69 

03 

6  72 

School  Arts  Publishing  Co.,    . 

140  36 

1  47 

141  83 

School  Street  Piano  Storage  Co.,    . 

180  90 

1  80 

182  70 

Sears-Cook  Corp'n, 

244  21 

2  32 

246  53 

Sears-Sprague  Co.,  . 

54  27 

51 

54  78 

Second  Oakland  Sj^ndicate,  Inc.,  . 

36  83 

17 

37  00 

Selfeedo  Brush  Co., 

26  95 

1  62 

28  57 

Service  Specialty  Co., 

15  00 

- 

15  00 

Shack  &  Fine  Co.,    .        .        .        . 

7  99 

04 

8  03 

Shaddock  &  Normandin  Co., 

123  13 

1  02 

124  15 

Shafine  System,  Inc., 

36  18 

25 

36  43 

Shawmut  Iron  and  Wire  Works, 

Inc.,               

123  01 

1  23 

124  24 

1916.] 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  —  Xo.  12. 


239 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Shawmut  Raincoat  Co.,  Inc., 

$45  22 

$0  36 

$45  58 

Shawmut  Waxed  Paper  Co., 

76  43 

76 

77  19 

Shepard  Mfg.  Co.  (Melrose), 

1,535  38 

13  59 

1,548  97 

Shepard  Norwell  Co.,      . 

13,115  25 

102  74 

13,217  99 

Shoe  City  Coat  Co.,  Inc., 

14  11 

- 

14  11 

Shortstory  Publishing  Co., 

108  54 

98 

109  52 

Show  Card  Shop,  Inc.,    . 

7  59 

- 

7  59 

Shultz-Goodwin  Co., 

610  08 

4  57 

614  65 

Silas  Peirce  &  Co.,  Ltd., 

2,446  79 

21  59 

2,468  38 

Silloway  &  Vine  Shoe  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

90  45 

91 

91  36 

Silver  Baking  Co.,    . 

92  20 

46 

92  66 

Silver    Queen    and    Ruby    Silver 

Mines  Co., 

40  00 

26 

40  26 

Singer  &  Snow  Co., 

397  98 

1  45 

399  43 

Sippican  Cranberry  Co., 

24  81 

15 

24  96 

Sisson  Co., 

113  06 

1  41 

114  47 

Small  Maynard  &  Co.  (Inc.), 

1,401  97 

58  88 

1,460  85 

Smalley  White  &  Hobbs,  Inc., 

^1  33 

75 

.   92  08 

Smith  &  Perkins,  Inc.,    . 

46  78 

1  40 

48  18 

Smith  Paper  Co., 

3,392  27 

16  96 

3,409  23 

Smith  Tablet  Co.,  Inc.,  . 

226  12 

2  07 

228  19 

Smith-Wallace  Corp'n,    . 

338  73 

7  90 

346  63 

Smithmade  Suspender  Co., 

72  36 

65 

73  01 

Somerset  Coal  Co., 

17  69 

36 

18  05 

Somerset  Investment  Co., 

81  40 

40 

81  80 

Somerville  Mfg.  Co., 

61  28 

36 

61  64 

Somerville    Pubhshing    Co.,  Inc., 

7  23 

_ 

7  23 

South    Barre    and    District    Co- 

operative Assn.,    .... 

75  97 

2  51 

78  48 

South    Bay    Storage    Warehouse 

Co., 

90  45 

90 

91  35 

South  End  Lumber  Co., 

18  09 

16 

18  25 

Southgate  Press  — T.  W.  Ripley 

Co., 

168  68 

84 

169  52 

Specialty  Shop,        .... 

180  90 

1  63 

182  53 

Spring  Water  Distributing  Co., 

10  85 

45 

11  30 

Springfield  Homestead  Newspaper 

Co., 

84  11 

26 

84  37 

Springfield  Ice  and  Coal  Co., 

2,696  13 

52  69 

2,748  82 

Springfield  Leather  Co., 

125  72 

86 

126  58 

Springfield  Wholesale  Grocery  Co., 

86  83 

47 

87  30 

Standard  Co., 

16  28 

14 

16  42 

Standard  Motor  Car  Co., 

75  97 

3  04 

79  01 

Standard  Pocahontas  Coal  Co.,     . 

31  36 

16 

31  52 

Standard  Supply  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

95  51 

78 

96  29 

Standard  Upholstering  Co.,    . 

65  93 

44 

66  37 

Star  Laundry  Co.,    . 

9  04 

09 

9  13 

Stearns  &  Waterman  Co., 

21  70 

30 

22  00 

Steel  Specialties  Co., 

10  85 

37 

11  22 

Sterling  Shoe  Co.,    . 

37  98 

97 

38  95 

240 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 

of  Corporation 

Tax  for  1914. 


Interest. 


Totals. 


Stetson  Coal  Co.  of  Boston, 

Stewart,  Skinner  Co., 

Stickney  &  Poor  Spice  Co., 

Stoddard  Union  Co., 

Stone  &  Forsyth  Co., 

Stone  Leather  Co.,  . 

Stone's  Express,  Inc., 

Store  of  QuaUty,  Inc., 

Storer  &  Celotte  Co., 

Stover  &  Bean  Co., 

Stratton  Automobile  Co 

Structural  Granite  Co., 

Sturtevane  &  Haley  Beef  and  Sup- 
ply Co.,         .... 

Sturtevant  &  Hook  Corpn.,   . 

Stutz  Motor  Car  Co.  of  Boston, 

Stutz  Motor  Car  Co.  of  New 
Haven, 

Sub-Target  Gun  Co.,      . 

Suffolk  Assn.,  Inc.,  . 

Suffolk  Furniture  Co.,     . 

Sullivan  Colpitts  Co.,  Inc.,    . 

SuUivan  Sample  Shoe  Store,  Inc 

Summit  Thread  Co., 

Superior  Overall  Co., 

Swain  Construction  Co., 

Swift  Contracting  Co.,    . 

Swift  River  Co., 

Sylvester  Bros.  Co., 

Sylvester  Towxr  Co., 

T.  E.  Chase  &  Son  Co., 

T.  H.  O'Donnell  &  Co.,  Inc., 

T.  W.  Brooks  Lobster  Co.,  Inc., 

T.  W.  Norman  Co., 

Taunton  Evening  News, 

Taunton  Planing  Mill  Co.,     . 

Taunton  Spindle  Co., 

Taunton  Wholesale  Millinery 
Co., 

Taxi  Service  Co., 

Taylor  &  Barker  Co.,      . 

Taylor  Brothers  Laundry,  Inc., 

Taylor  Chemical  Co., 

Teel  Motor  Co., 

Tennessee  Valley  Light  and  Power 
Co., 

Thayer  Co.,       .... 

Thermolac  Manufacturing  Co., 

Thompson  Construction  Co., 

Thos.  D.  Gard  Co.,  Inc., 


$801  38 

$4  00 

265  01 

2  96 

1,344  08 

6  72 

36  25 

37 

2,568  78 

17  98 

153  76 

86 

271  35 

2  40 

138  18 

1  21 

73  60 

48 

651  24 

3  25 

7  23 

08 

184  51 

5  00 

1,718  55 

5  15 

96  23 

65 

189  94 

1  71 

8  00 

_ 

264  11 

2  16 

28  94 

94 

90  45 

30 

10  85 

07 

90  45 

72 

166  17 

83 

37  98 

22 

9  04 

- 

33  75 

20 

634  95 

7  55 

7  23 

60 

1,479  76 

13  31 

84  76 

42 

108  54 

2  53 

18  09 

10 

229  74 

2  05 

108  54 

1  36 

40  15 

19 

9  04 

07 

28  94 

87 

1,032  30 

5  16 

969  17 

8  88 

430  54 

2  15 

536  20 

6  70 

138  08 

1  24 

705  69 

6  35 

16  28 

19 

42  98 

36 

23  87 

22 

97  68 

44 

$805  38 

267  97 

1,350  80 

36  62 

2,586  76 

154  62 

273  75 

139  39 

74  08 

654  49 

7  31 
189  51 

1,723  70 

96  88 
191  65 

8  00 
266  27 

29  88 

90  75 
10  92 

91  17 
167  00 

38  20 

9  04 
33  95 

642  50 

7  83 

1,493  07 

85  18 

111  07 

18  19 

231  79 

109  90 

40  34 

9  11 

29  81 
1,037  46 
978  05 
432  69 
542  90 
139  32 


712  04 
16  47 
43  34 
24  09 
98  12 


1916.1 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


241 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

Thos.  H.  Logan  Co., 

.      $1,031  13 

$4  46 

$1,035  59 

Thos.  J.  Hind,  Inc., 

27  13 

25 

27  38 

Thos.  J.  Shea  Co.,    . 

43  77 

39 

44  16 

Three  Millers  Co.,    . 

1,763  77 

15  86 

1,779  63 

Tichnor  Bros.,  Inc., 

293  02 

2  49 

295  51 

Totem  Mfg.  Co., 

39  79 

36 

40  15 

Towne  &  Melzard,  Inc., 

20  00 

54 

20  54 

Tremont  Stores,  Inc., 

2,713  50 

24  87 

2,738  37 

Triumph  Couch  Bed  Co., 

269  54 

2  00 

271  54 

Trombly  Jewelry  Co.,     . 

103  25 

- 

103  25 

Trowbridge  Piano  Co.,    . 

88  09 

79 

88  88 

Troy  Cereal  Co.,      . 

81  40 

65 

82  05 

Tudor  Press,  Inc.,    . 

144  72 

1  69 

146  41 

Turner-Brown  Co., 

27  13 

27 

27  40 

Twin  Cities  Ice  Co., 

5  42 

05 

5  47 

Tyson,  Weare  &  Marshall  Co 

.,      .             72  36 

82 

73  18 

Union  Cahper  Co.,  . 

558  98 

2  24 

561  22 

Union  Furniture  Co., 

343  80 

4  07 

347  87 

Union  Seal  Co., 

112  15 

_ 

112  15 

Union  Square  Olympia  Co., 

90  45 

90 

91  35 

Union  Trading  Stamp  Co., 

6  51 

03 

6  54 

United    Building    and    Con 

imer- 

cial  Co., 

80  95 

5  00 

85  95 

United      Dress      Manufact 

uring 

Co.,        .... 

124  82 

5  24 

130  06 

United  Electric  Apparatus.  Cc 

).,     .           474  21 

3  56 

477  77 

United  States  Column  Co., 

271  11 

1  35 

272  46 

United  States  Light  and  He 

ating 

Co.,        .... 

253  26 

1  77 

255  03 

United    States    Metal    Pro( 

iucts 

Co.,        .... 

2,750  00 

95  38 

2,845  38 

United  States  Snuff  Co., 

23  80 

- 

23  80 

United  States  Transfer  Adv 

ertis- 

ingCo., 

11  30 

- 

11  30 

United     States     Tropical 

Food 

Co.,        .... 

16  37 

38 

16  75 

United  States  Worsted  Co., 

.      26,505  95 

185  55 

26,691  50 

Universal  Trolley  Wheel  Co., 

40  01 

29 

40  30 

Uricsol    Chemical    Co.    of 

Bos- 

ton,        .... 

162  81 

6  83 

169  64 

V-S  Undermushn  Co.,     . 

30  75 

- 

30  75 

Vacuum  Glass  Co., 

45  00 

31 

45  31 

Van  Tassel  Leather  Co., 

10  00 

- 

10  00 

Vesu\do  Drug  Co.,  . 

47  75 

43 

48  18 

Victor,  Inc., 

24  42 

84 

25  26 

Victor  Shoe  Machinery  Co., 

227  93 

3  07 

231  00 

Vodon-Curtiss  Co., 

23  15 

23 

23  38 

W.  &  S.  Blackinton  Co., 

534  95 

1  87 

536  82 

W.  A.  HiUiard  Co., 

35  22 

38 

35  60 

W.  A.  Norton  Co.,  . 

43  41 

47 

43  88 

242 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT. 


[Jan. 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

W.  C.  Edson  Co.;    .       .       .       . 

$133  03 

%0  67 

$133  70 

W.  H.  I.  Hayes  Co.,       .       .       . 

126  63 

1  26 

127  89 

W.  H.  Marble  Automobile  Co.,     . 

104  01 

95 

104  96 

W.  H.  Virgie  Co.,    .       .       .       . 

386  94 

1  74 

388  68 

W.J.  Ham  Co.,       .       .       .       . 

238  71 

2  05 

240  76 

W.  M.  Young  Regalia  Co.,    . 

47  03 

47 

47  50 

W.  P.  B.  Brooks  &  Co.,  Inc., 

277  53 

12  50 

290  03 

W.  P.  Goode  Brush  Co., 

132  06 

1  32 

133  38 

W.  S.  Lee  Co.,         .... 

36  18 

22 

36  40 

W.  T.  Shackley  &  Son  Co.,    . 

126  63 

1  00 

127  63 

Wacco  Supply  Co., 

158  28 

94 

159  22 

Wagner  Spring  Bed  Mfg.  Co., 

200  79 

1  74 

202  53 

Walen  Drug  Co.,     .... 

18  09 

16 

18  25 

Walsh  Drug  Co.,      .        .        .        . 

151  95 

1  37 

153  32 

Walsh  Roofing  Co., 

27  46 

- 

27  46 

Walter  B.  Hennigan  Co., 

58  79 

64 

59  43 

Walter  Coburn  Co., 

178  18 

1  51 

179  69 

Waltham  Bag  and  Paper  Co., 

124  27 

93 

125  20 

Waltham  Emery  Wheel  Co., 

534  55 

4  70 

539  25 

Walworth-Enghsh-Flett  Co., 

649  84 

5  85 

655  69 

Walworth  Mfg.  Co., 

2,466  57 

11  10 

2,477  67 

Warner's      Features,      Inc.,      of 

Mass., 

58  61 

- 

58  61 

Warren- Allen  Carpet  Co., 

217  08 

97 

218  05 

Warren  F.  Eraser  Co.,    . 

45  22 

30 

45  52 

Washbiu-n  Cranberry  Bog  Co., 

344  99 

2  87 

347  86 

Washburn  Realty  Trust, ^Ltd.,      . 

219  06 

66 

219  72 

Washburn  Jewelry  Co.,  . 

45  2'2 

2  05 

47  27 

Waterhouse  Welding  Co., 

80  15 

70 

80  85 

Watson-Blood  Co.,  .... 

362  90 

20  00 

382  90 

Watts  &  Cook,  Inc.,       . 

198  53 

92 

199  45 

Wayland  Inn  Hotel  Co., 

33  91 

34 

34  25 

Welhngton  Rubber  Co., 

45  22 

— 

45  22 

Wenham  Lake  Ice  Co.,  . 

278  22 

1  65 

279  87 

Werner-Pazolt  Co., 

678  37 

9  38 

687  75 

Wesner  Drop-Arm  Hanger  Co.,    . 

9  04 

09 

9  13 

Westfield  Brick  Co., 

1,004  42 

- 

1,004  42 

Whitaker-Cushing  Co.,  . 

51  55 

34 

51  89 

Whitcomb-Blaisdell  Machine  Tool 

Co., 

879  17 

6  16 

885  33 

White  Automobile  Co.,   . 

63  31 

57 

63  88 

White  Paper  Box  Co.,     . 

104  01 

89 

104  90 

Whittier  Woodenware  Co.,    . 

542  70 

4  97 

547  67 

Wickstead  Mfg.  Co., 

48  84 

23 

49  07 

Wilham  A.  Davis  Co.,    . 

61  50 

55 

62  05 

WiUiam  Allen  Son's  Co., 

329  23 

1  43 

330  66 

Wilham  C.  Norcross  Co., 

418  09 

3  83 

421  92 

WiUiam  E.  Bent  Co.,      . 

244  21 

14  98 

259  19 

Wilham  I.  Siff  Co.,  Inc.,        .       . 

9  04 

- 

9  04 

Wilham  J.  McCarthy  Co.,     . 

50  65 

25 

50  90 

1916. 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


243 


Collected  on 

Account 
of  Corporation 

Interest. 

Totals. 

Tax  for  1914. 

William  L.  Brown  Electric  Co.,    . 

$123  77 

$1  04 

$124  81 

William  N.  Flynt  Granite  Co.,      . 

431  80 

3  88 

435  68 

William  Porter  &  Son,  Inc.,  . 

50  00 

- 

50  00 

Williams  Book  Store  Co., 

18  09 

15 

18  24 

Williamstown  Glass  Sales  Co., 

404  40 

5  86 

410  26 

Williston  H.  Collins  Co., 

162  81 

1  49 

164  30 

Wobm-n  Journal  Co., 

7  59 

06 

7  65 

Woburn  Machine  Co.,    . 

918  79 

6  43 

925  22 

Woman's  Quality  Shop,  Inc., 

144  72 

1  44 

146  16 

Woman's  Shop,  Inc., 

515  56 

2  58 

518  14 

Woodman  Lumber  Co., 

9  04 

08 

9  12 

Woodward-Peopell  Co., 

48  84 

1  42 

50  26 

Woonsocket  Machine  and  Press 

Co.,        ...... 

600  00 

3  30 

603  30 

Worcester  Automobile  Co.,    . 

135  67 

2  03 

137  70 

Worcester  Paper  Box  Co.,     . 

145  17 

1  31 

146  48 

Woronoco    Heating    and    Phimb- 

ingCo., 

9  04 

24 

9  28 

Wright  Cutter  Co., 

625  60 

5  84 

631  44 

Young  Men's  Corporation,  Inc.,  . 

35  98 

16 

36  14 

Zariffe  Cigarette  Co.,      .       .       . 

9  04 

- 

9  04 

$442,099  83 

$5,050  85 

$447,15068 

244 


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1916.] 


PUBLIC   DOCUMENT  — No.  12. 


251 


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Rape, 

Abandoning  minor  child, 

Cheating  by  false  pretences, 

Larceny 

Desertion, 

Larceny, ' 

Edward  Hitchcock,            .... 

Edward  Angier 

Eddie  Cemean 

Man  Sperhng,  alias, 

Fanny  Epstein, 

ThomasF.  Maloney,  Jr.,    .         ."       . 
Daniel  Hagopian, 

Michigan,    . 
New  York, 
Vermont,    . 
Maine, 
Illinois, 
New  Jersey, 
California, 

June      23 
July       14 
Oct.         7 

s  s  «>  s 

1 1"  1 1 

252  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.  [Jan. 


KULES  OF  PRACTICE 

In  Interstate  Rendition. 


Every  application  to  the  Governor  for  a  requisition  upon  the 
executive  authority  of  any  other  State  or  Territory,  for  the  de- 
livery up  and  return  of  any  offender  who  has  fled  from  the 
justice  of  this  Commonwealth,  must  be  made  by  the  district  or 
prosecuting  attorney  for  the  county  or  district  in  which  the 
offence  was  committed,  and  must  be  in  duplicate  original 
papers,  or  certified  copies  thereof. 

The  following  must  appear  by  the  certificate  of  the  district 
or  prosecuting  attorney:  — 

(a)  The  full  name  of  the  person  for  whom  extradition  is 
asked,  together  with  the  name  of  the  agent  proposed,  to  be 
properly  spelled. 

(6)  That,  in  his  opinion,  the  ends  of  public  justice  require 
that  the  alleged  criminal  be  brought  to  this  Commonwealth 
for  trial,  at  the  public  expense. 

(c)  That  he  believes  he  has  sufficient  evidence  to  secure  the 
conviction  of  the  fugitive. 

{d)  That  the  person  named  as  agent  is  a  proper  person,  and 
that  he  has  no  private  interest  in  the  arrest  of  the  fugitive. 

(e)  If  theie  has  been  any  former  application  for  a  requisi- 
tion for  the  same  person  growing  out  of  the  same  transaction, 
it  must  be  so  stated,  with  an  explanation  of  the  reasons  for  a 
second  request,  together  with  the  date  of  such  application,  as 
near  as  may  be. 

(/)  If  the  fugitive  is  known  to  be  under  either  civil  or  crim- 
inal arrest  in  the  State  or  Territory  to  which  he  is  alleged  to 
have  fled,  the  fact  of  such  arrest  and  the  nature  of  the  pro- 
ceedings on  which  it  is  based  must  be  stated. 

(g)  That  the  application  is  not  made  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
forcing the  collection  of  a  debt,  or  for  any  private  purpose 
whatever;  and  that,  if  the  requisition  applied  for  be  granted, 
the  criminal  proceedings  shall  not  be  used  for  any  of  said 
objects. 


1916.]  PUBLIC   DOCUMENr  — No.  12.  253 

(h)  The  nature  of  the  crime  charged,  with  a  reference,  when 
practicable,  to  the  particular  statute  defining  and  punishing 
the  same. 

(i)  If  the  offence  charged  is  not  of  recent  occurrence,  a  satis- 
factory reason  must  be  given  for  the  delay  in  making  the  ap- 
plication. 

1.  In  all  cases  of  fraud,  false  pretences,  embezzlement  or 
forgery,  when  made  a  crime  by  the  common  law,  or  any  penal 
code  or  statute,  the  affidavit  of  the  principal  complaining  wit- 
ness or  informant  that  the  application  is  made  in  good  faith, 
for  the  sole  purpose  of  punishing  the  accused,  and  that  he  does 
not  desire  or  expect  to  use  the  prosecution  for  the  purpose  of 
collecting  a  debt,  or  for  any  private  purpose,  and  will  not  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  use  the  same  for  any  of  said  purposes,  shall 
be  required,  or  a  sufficient  reason  given  for  the  absence  of  such 
affidavit. 

2.  Proof  by  affidavit  of  facts  and  circumstances  satisfying 
the  Executive  that  the  alleged  criminal  has  fled  from  the  jus- 
tice of  the  State,  and  is  in  the  State  on  whose  Executive  the 
demand  is  requested  to  be  made,  must  be  given.  The  fact 
that  the  alleged  criminal  was  in  the  State  where  the  alleged 
crime  was  committed  at  the  time  of  the  commission  thereof, 
and  is  found  in  the  State  upon  which  the  requisition  was 
made,  shall  be  sufficient  evidence,  in  the  absence  of  other 
proof,  that  he  is  a  fugitive  from  justice. 

3.  If  an  indictment  has  been  found,  certified  copies,  in  dupli- 
cate, must  accompany  the  application. 

4.  If  an  indictment  has  not  been  found  by  a  grand  jury,  the 
facts  and  circumstances  showing  the  commission  of  the  crime 
charged,  and  that  the  accused  perpetrated  the  same,  must  be 
shown  by  afl^davits  taken  before  a  magistrate.  (A  notary 
public  is  not  a  magistrate  within  the  meaning  of  the  statutes.) 
It  must  also  be  shown  that  a  complaint  has  been  made,  copies 
of  which  must  accompany  the  requisition,  such  complaint  to 
be  accompanied  by  affidavits  to  the  facts  constituting  the 
offence  charged  by  persons  having  actual  knowledge  thereof, 
and  that  a  warrant  has  been  issued,  and  duplicate  certified 
copies  of  the  same,  together  with  the  returns  thereto,  if  any, 
must  be  furnished  upon  an  application. 

5.  The  official  character  of  the  officer  taking  the  affidavits 
or  depositions,  and  of  the  officer  who  issued  the  warrant,  must 
be  duly  certified. 


254  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S  REPORT.    [Jan.  1916. 

6.  Upon  the  renewal  of  an  application,  —  for  example,  on 
the  ground  that  the  fugitive  has  fled  to  another  State/ not 
having  been  found  in  the  State  on  which  the  first  was  granted, 
—  new  or  certified  copies  of  papers,  in  conformity  with  the 
above  rules,  must  be  furnished. 

7.  In  the  case  of  any  person  who  has  been  convicted  of  any 
crime,  and  escapes  after  conviction,  or  while  serving  his  sen- 
tence, the  application  may  be  made  by  the  jailer,  sheriff,  or 
other  ofiicer  having  him  in  custody,  and  shall  be  accompanied 
by  certified  copies  of  the  indictment  or  information,  record  of 
conviction  and  sentence  upon  which  the  person  is  held,  with 
the  affidavit  of  such  person  having  him  in  custody,  showing 
such  escape,  with  the  circumstances  attending  the  same. 

8.  No  requisition  will  be  made  for  the  extradition  of  any 
fugitive  except  in  compliance  with  these  rules.