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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX A, VOLUME 1 
SOURCE DOCUMENTS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13740 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix A: Volume 1 
Source Documents 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987.— Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnited States Senate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tenpore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix A to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




1 '^ 
Warren B. Rudman i 



Vice Chairman 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 205 1S 

(2021 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix A to the Report of the 
Conqressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix A consists of the Source Documents cited or 
referred to in the footnotes and other references of the 
Report . All contents of Appendix A have been declassified for 
release to the public. 

Synceirely yours. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence /Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Ray nor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, HI 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liasion 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



I 






Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

m 

Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courier 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



Contents 



Note to Reader: 

This volume contains certain source documents cited in the footnotes to the 
Report. These documents are grouped by chapter and labeled according to their 
chapter and footnote numbers. 

Source documents that are available in the Hearings and Deposition volumes, 
from public sources, still classified, or otherwise unavailable are not included. 

The Preface explaining the various types of documents in this volume begins 
on p. xiii. 



Il 



Preface 



This volume contains much of the documentary evidence — letters, memoran- 
dums, transcripts of telephone calls, and other materials— that underlies many 
of the factual statements made in the Report of the Congressional Committees 
Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. The Report is a joint publication of the 
House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and 
the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition. The complete database for all factual statements made 
in the Report and referenced in its footnotes consists of the following: 

• Source documents, contained in this volume. 

• Published sources, referenced in the footnotes of the Report but not reprinted 
by the two Select Committees. 

• Hearings before the two Select Committees, which are published separately 
in 1 1 volumes as the Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings of the House 
Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987). 

• Depositions taken by the two Select Committees, which are published as Report 
of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, Ap- 
pendix B: Depositions, H. Rept. No. 100-433, S. Rept. No. 100-216, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 

• Exhibits prepared by the Select Committees or by witnesses or other persons 
and submitted for the record. All exhibits mentioned in the Hearings and most 
of those referenced in the Depositions are contained in those respective 
volumes. 

Explanations follow of: source materials found in this volume; testimony; deposi- 
tions; exhibits; interviews; published sources; and abbreviations, acronyms, and 
initials 

Major Source Materials 



The Select Committees relied heavily on sworn testimony and documentary 

evidence in compiling their final Report. Brief descriptions of the major sources 

appear here, and more detailed descriptions of some of the sources follow later 

in this Preface. 

Testimony: Sworn testimony (testimony taken under oath) consisted of two kinds. 

Testimony taken in the joint hearings is referred to as "Test." in the footnotes, 

and testimony taken as depositions is referred to as "Dep." in the footnotes. Fuller 

explanations of these kinds of testimony appear below. 

Documents: In most cases, miscellaneous documents referred to in the footnotes 

are published in this volume. Usually a Bates identification number appears in 

the footnote, e.g., N 2816. The identification number will assist researchers 



who wish to find the complete original document in the Select Committees papers 
stored with the National Archives and Records Administration. Access to Select 
Committees papers is subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

Interviews: Select Committees' staff interviewed a number of people on an 
unsworn basis. Most interviews were summarized in memorandums. The 
memorandums of the interviews referred to in the footnotes of the Report are 
stored with the National Archives. 

PROF Note: These Notes were computerized interoffice messages carried over 
the White House's Professional Office Services system. National Security Council 
staff were provided with equipment to send and receive PROF Notes in their 
offices and in some cases in their homes. In many instances, messages sent over 
the PROF system were archived in White House computers and were retrieved 
by White House personnel and provided to the Select Committees. Footnote 
references to PROF Notes include the date and time (in military time) and the 
Bates document identification number. Most PROF Notes referred to in the foot- 
notes are published in this volume. 

KL-43 Messages: These messages were sent over telephone lines through 
use of a computerized instrument that encrypted the message at the sender's end 
and decoded it at the receiver's end. The system was portable and could be car- 
ried to remote locations. Most KL-43 messages referenced in the footnotes are 
published in this volume. 

Israeli Historical Chronology: The Iranian Transactions— A Historical 
Chronology. The Committees entered into an agreement with the State of Israel 
whereby Israel agreed to prepare and provide a historical chronology detailing 
the role of Israel and individual Israelis in the Iran initiative from 1985 through 
1986. Israel was unwilling to waive its privileges of State secrecy and sovereign 
immunity and permit its officials and citizens to be questioned by the Commit- 
tees. In lieu of interviews or testimony, and without waiver, Israel agreed to 
conduct interviews of Israeli nationals and reviewed certain documents. With 
the specific agreement of the Government of Israel, information from the Israeli 
chronologies is used in this Report. By agreement between the Committees and 
the Govenmient of Israel, the chronology remains classified. 

Part I covers Israeli shipments of arms to Iran from August 1985 through 
November 1985. Part n covers U.S. arms shipments and Israeli participation 
in the arms transaction from December 1985 to the time of disclosure in 
November 1986. The Select Committees received Part II in July 1987, after 
public hearings were under way. 

Israeli Financial Chronology: A Financial Chronology of the Iranian Trans- 
actions (April 26, 1987). At the request of the Select Committees, the Israeli 
Government also agreed to prepare from unsworn interviews of Israeli citizens 
a financial chronology. The document covers the money trail leading from the 
initial Israeli arms shipment to Iran in August 1985. By agreement, the docu- 
ment remains classified. 



Other Source Documents 

Tower Report: On December 1, 1986, President Reagan established the Presi- 
dent's Special Review Board to examine the role of the National Security Coun- 



cil staff in national security operations, including arms transfers to Iran. The 
Board consisted of John Tower, Chairman, Edmund Muskie, and Brent 
Scowcroft. The Board and staff interviewed numerous individuals in and out 
of the Federal Government, but did not have authority to issue subpoenas or 
compel testimony. The Board issued its report— an examination of NSC opera- 
tions, a narrative of the Iran-Contra Affair, and recommendations— 3 months 
later. The full title is Report of the President's Special Review Board, John Tower, 
Chairman (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 26, 1987). 

Tower Interviews (sometimes referred to as Tower Testimony): The Tower 
Board conducted unsworn interviews with 53 individuals. These people includ- 
ed former Assistants to the President for National Security, National Security 
Council Members, former Presidents, and Central Intelligence Agency em- 
ployees. Interviews cited in the Report but not appearing in the Source Documents 
volume are filed with the Committees' papers at the National Archives. 

Hearings 

The Select Committees held 44 days of joint hearings and questioned 28 wimesses 
publicly. Public hearings began May 5, 1987, and ended August 3, 1987. Four 
witnesses— Central Intelligence Agency employees— testified in executive ses- 
sion. House Reporters transcribed all proceedings and the Senate Recording 
Studio videotaped them. Two television networks. Cable News Network and 
C-SPAN, televised all the public hearings. Individual public television sta- 
tions, ABC, CBS, and NBC broadcast portions of the hearings. 

Every witness testified under oath either in response to a subpoena or an in- 
vitation or voluntarily. Legal counsel accompanied most witnesses. The enabl- 
ing legislation empowered the Select Committees to compel testimony over fifth 
amendment objections by granting use immunity. Once the Select Committees 
obtained a court order, they could immunize witnesses against the use of their 
testimony in criminal prosecutions. Thus, any statements or admissions made 
by witnesses granted use immunity could not be used in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or other- 
wise failing to comply with the court order. The Select Committees granted 
use immunity to about 20 witnesses. 

Committees Members, in consultation with Chief Counsels and staff, iden- 
tified and selected witnesses and then developed specific lines of inquiry. At 
the hearings, questioning was led by attorneys from either the House Select Com- 
mittee or the Senate Select Committee, depending on a prearranged division 
of witnesses. Both House and Senate Members pursued followup questions. 

Original, hand-corrected transcripts, from which the published Hearings 
volumes were produced, have been filed by the Committees in the National Ar- 
chives. 

Depositions 

The Select Committees, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 



The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
also received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written 
documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape record- 
ed and later transcribed and authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Conunittees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvi- 
ous typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary infor- 
mation not considered germane to the investigation. 

In the Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are followed 
by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 
exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents at the Na- 
tional Archives, and are available for public inspection subject to the respective 
rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions, totalling more than 30,000 pages, con- 
sist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts and 
declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



Exhibits 

Exhibits — personal papers, office memorandums, correspondence, corporate 
records, and miscellaneous documents — were an important source of informa- 
tion for the Select Committees. The Select Committees obtained some exhibits 
voluntarily, others through Committee-issued subpoenas. Primary sources for 
these exhibits were the White House, Department of State, Department of 
Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, other Federal 
Government offices, and private parties. 

During hearings, 1,092 exhibits were introduced, most often by the Select 
Committees. Occasionally, witnesses or deponents produced exhibits. 

Exhibits presented during hearings are reproduced at the back of the Hear- 
ings volumes. Selected exhibits appear in the Depositions volumes at the con- 
clusion of the relevant witness' statement. Some exhibits— extensive corporate 
records, for example— are not published in their entirety, but are stored in the 
Select Committees' records in the National Archives. 

Like the testimony and depositions they accompanied, exhibits had to be 
reviewed by the White House Declassification Committee. Some exhibits re- 
main classified and will not be published. 



Interviews 

Interviews were used to gather information, identify potential deponents and 
hearings witnesses, and explore new areas of investigation. Committee in- 
vestigators, working individually or in teams, conducted most of the interviews. 
Interviewees were not subpoenaed and many volunteered information. In- 
vestigators interviewed, rather than deposed, individuals who had limited in- 
formation or who were living in remote parts of the world. For instance, 
investigators conducted numerous telephone interviews with persons in Central 
America. In most cases, interviewees were not accompanied by counsel. 

Investigators took notes of or recorded interviews and later summarized them 
into report memorandums. Report memorandums are not published in this 
volume; they have been deposited in the National Archives. 



Published Sources 



The Select Committees drew on both unpublished and published sources in 
preparing their final Report. Published sources (magazines, newspapers, books, 
Federal Government publications, and law journals) are not included in the 
Source Documents volume because they are available at libraries. They are listed 
here to indicate to readers and researchers the scope of the Select Committees' 
source materials. These sources are cited in the Report footnotes according to 
A Uniform System of Citation (Harvard Law Review Association, 14th Edition). 



Magazines 

Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1984 

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 

Newsweek 

The New Republic 

The Public Interest 

The Washingtonian 

U.S. News and World Report 

Newspapers 

Associated Press 
Baltimore Sun 
Boston Globe 
Chicago Tribune 
Dallas Morning News 
Guardian (Manchester) 
Los Angeles Times 
Miami Herald 
San Diego Union 
The New York Times 
The Washington Post 
Wall Street Journal 
Washington Times 

Books 

Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) 

Cline, R.S., The CIA Under Reagan, Bush and Casey (1981) 

Colby, W.E., Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (1978) 

Corwin, E., The Constitution and What it Means Today (13th ed., 1975) 

Corwin, E., The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957 (No date) 

Crosskev, W., Politics and the Constitution (1953) 

Farrand, M., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1937) 

Federalist, The 

Hamilton, Alexander, Papers 

Jefferson, Thomas, Writings 

Kent, S., Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (1966) 

Kirkpatrick, L. B., TJie United States Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy 

and Domestic Activities (1973) 

Leary, W.M., ed.. The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents 

131-33 (1984) 

Maass, A., Congress and the Common Good (1983) 

Madison, James, Writings 

Meyer, C, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (1980) 

Moses, H., The Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency 3-4 

(1983) 

Pogue, F. C, George Marshall (1973) 

Powers, T.,The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (1979) 



Ranelagh, J., The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (1986) 

Sick, G., All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (1986) 

Sofaer, A., War, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 

Thach, Jr., C.C., The Creation of the Presidency (1923) 

Treverton, C. F., Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Post-War 

World (1987) 

White, L., The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History, 1 789- 1 801 

(1948) 

Wise, D., The American Police State (1976) 

Woodward, B., Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA: 1981-1987(1987) 

Wright, Q., The Control of American Foreign Relations (1922) 

Government Publications 

Annals of Congress 

Audit Report, Office of Inspector General, Department of State 
Congressional Record 
Congressional Research Service Report 
Constitution of the United States 

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs 

Hearings of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
Hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
House Permanent Select Committee on IntcUigence, Subcommittee on Legislation 
House Report 122, 98th Congress, 1st Session 
Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1984 
Public Law 97-377, Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1983 
Public Papers of the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter 
Public Papers of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan 
Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, Henry Kiss- 
inger, Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report No. 665, 98th Congress, 2nd 
Session 

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Final Report 
State Department Bulletin 

U.S. Departments of State and Defense, The Challenge To Democracy in Cen- 
tral America 

U.S. Government Accounting Office, Report of the Chairmen, Senate and House 
Select Committees Investigating Iran Arms Sales, "Iran Arms Sales: Depart- 
ment of Defense Transfer of Arms to the CIA" 
Weekly Presidential Documents 

Law Journals 

American Journal of Jurisprudence 

Publius 

Texas Law Review 

Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 

West Virginia Law Review 



Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initials 



Sources and footnotes in the Report of the Congressional Committees In- 
vestigating the Iran-Contra Affair often appear with the initials of individuals 
and acronyms and abbreviations of agencies, organizations, and other groups. 
The following list provides the full names for these shortened forms. 



AECA: 


Arms Export Control Act 


AET: 


A.M., Eastern Time 


AH: 


Albert Hakim 


BG: 


Code name for Oliver North 


BGS: 


Bretton G. Sciaroni 


B. Sun: 


Baltimore Sun 


C/CATF: 


Chief, Central American Task Force, Central Intelligence 




Agency 


C.F.R.: 


Code of Federal Regulations 


CO: 


Clair George 


CIA: 


Central Intelligence Agency 


CINN: 


CIA Document Control System 


CJC: 


Charles J. Cooper 


C/NE: 


Chief, Near East Division, Central Intelligence Agency 


Comp. Gen. 


: Comptroller General of the United States 


Cong. Rec: 


Congressional Record 


CSF: 


Compagnie de Services Fiduciaries 


CWW: 


Caspar W. Weinberger 


DCI: 


Director of Central Intelligence 


DCM: 


Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy 


DC/NE: 


Deputy Chief, Near East Division, Central Intelligence 




Agency 


DDCI: 


Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence 




Agency 


DDO: 


Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency 


DEA: 


Drug Enforcement Administration 


Dep.: 


Deposition taken by the Select Committees 


DIA: 


Defense Intelligence Agency 


DO A: 


Department of the Army 


DOD: 


Department of Defense 


DRC: 


Duane (Dewey) R. Clarridge 


DTR: 


Donald T. Regan 


EA: 


Elliott Abrams 


EATSCO: 


Egyptian American Transport Company 


EM: 


Edwin Meese, EH 


Fed. Reg.: 


Federal Register 


FH: 


Fawn Hall 


FIR: 


Felix I. Rodriguez 



FY: Fiscal Year 

GPO: Government Printing Office 

GPS: George P. Shultz 

HPSCI: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

H. Rep.: House of Representatives Report 

H. Res.: House Resolution 

Int. : Interview 

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JKS: John K. Singlaub 

JMP: John M. Poindexter 

KL-43 A device for sending secure telephone messages 

LAT: Lewis A. Tambs 

NHAO: Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office 

NSC: National Security Council 

NSDD: National Security Decision Directive 

NSPG: National Security Planning Group 

OEOB: Old Executive Office Building (also called BOB) 

OLN: Oliver L. North 

OSG: Operations Sub Group 

PROF: Professional Office Services. An interoffice computer 

message 

Pub. L.: Public Law 

RCD: Robert C. Dutton 

RCM: Robert C. McFarlane 

RIG: Restricted Inter-agency Group 

RVS: Richard V. Secord 

RWO: Robert W. Owen 

SAT: Southern Air Transport Company 

SIG: Special Interagency Working Group 

S/LPD: Office for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the 

Caribbean 

SNIE: Special National Intelligence Estimate 

S. Rep.: Senate Report 

S. Res.: Senate Resolution 

SS: Stanley Sporkin 

SSCI: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

STTGI: Stanford Technology Trading Group International 

TC: Tomas Castillo 

TCS: Thomas C. Sinclair 

Test.: Sworn testimony taken before the Select Committees in their 

joint hearings 

TIWG: Terrorist Incident Working Group 

U.S.C: United States Code 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 



All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: 

BACKGROUND ON U. S . -NICARAGUA RELATIONS 

THIS CHAPTER DOES NOT CONTAIN FOOTNOTES 



82-750 0-88-2 



CHAPTER 2. THE NSC STAFF TAKES CONTRA POLICY UNDERGROUND 



UNCWSSIflEO 



THE COUNSELOR 
DEPARTMENT Or STATE 

WASHINGTON 



r ^'; '-. v>t(, 



3323 



February 27, 1981 



SE€R£T - SENSITIVE 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY 

FROM: R. C. McFarlane<>^ 



a-/ 



SUBJECT: 



Covert Action Proposal for Central Ajnerica 



•>= e ^- 

■^ %^ -M 

CO ^y :_> 

~ -v az 



Last evening we received the attached CIA proposal 
for a very broad program of covert actions to counter 
Cuban subversion in Central .\merica. It will be con- 
siderated at the NSC meeting this afternoon. 

Two alternatives are presented in the paper -- a 
lar ge proBrain_and a small program. The 1; 




While both of these programs are hastily drawn, they 
are a good beginning. Jome of the more obvious problems 
include the inevitable le^c^t^^would accompany a sub- 
mission to the Hill of ^^|^P^^|^^|program and the 
absorptive capac it ies of ^oc^^^ Tsoi^ces . In addition. 
asyoi^<no^ w- n.;ivc hao offers j 

^^^H^^^^Bwhich should be taken into account in shaping 
^^^ow^^^ogram. But overall, this is a very worthwhile 
beginning which I recommend you welcome and support. 

The key point to be made now is that while we must 
move promptly, we must assure that our political, eco- 
nomic, diplomatic, propaganda, military, and covert 
actions are well coordinated. At this meeting, it is 
recommended that you 

state that you ha>*e already launched 
(2 weeks ago) a "comprehensive effort 
to develop quickly a strategy for deal- 
ing with Cuba and that this paper can 
and will be scrubbed and integrated 
into that effort. 




l\^5^ 



wmmm 






UNCUSSIFIED 



:o324 






"i 



1. BILL CASEY'S PAPER PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT COVERT DIMENSION 
TO WHAT ML'ST BE A PROMPT COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR DEALING 
WITH CUBA THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA. 

2. TWO WEEKS AGO, I INITIATED WITH CAP, A DISCRETE BUT 
THOROUGH STUDY AS A BASIS FOR SUCH A STRATEGY. 

3. TODAY I AM CIRCULATING A FIRST CUT TO CAP AND BILL 
SO THAT WE CAN TRANSLATE THE CONCEPT INTO ACTION. 

u. IN IT'S PRESENT F:RM, BILL'S PAPER HAS MANY UNKNOWNS 
WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGES. 

--WHERE WILL WE GET THE MONEY? 

--wcL'LD n:t 




INEVITABLY LEAK? 

■CANNOT SOME OF THE ITEMS BE FUNDED BY DEFENSE? 
■C.\}i WE NOT GET SOME KELP FRCMJ 

■I HAVE ALREADY HAD A TENTATIVE ZFFER 





--THEN TOO, WE NEED TO SET SOME PRIORITIES IN A 

PROGRAM AS '.J^RGE AS THIS SO THAT WE GET BUSY DOING 
THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS FIRST. 
5. I PROPOSE THJVT WE TAKE THIS EXCELLENT BEGINNING AND 
THAT BILL, CAP AND I HAVE OUR GUYS INTEGRATE IT AND CCME 
BACK WITH A REFINED PROPOSAL WITHIN A WEEK. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



ROUTING 



Toj' Name and Address ! Date llnitlalsl 


I 1 i 


2 1 { 


— 1 — i 
3 1 i 1 


A 1 1 ! i 


^ \ 1 ! : 


f> \ 1 1 


ACTION 


1 PILE i 


APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 


COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 


'concurrence 1 RECOMMENDATION 


1 DIRECT REPLY 1 i RETURN 


; DISPATCH 1 1 SIGNATURE 



REMARKS: 



SENSITIVE 



mmi^ 



2S. 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 



00530-A, #3 



HANDLE VIA 
THE NSC INTELLIGENCE CONTROL SYSTEM 

ONLY 



WHEN ACTION IS COMPLETED, PLEASE RETURN DIRECT TO: 



INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT CONTROL 

CHARLES W. CARR 

ROOM 383 



A 



Warning Notice 

S«nsitlv« Intalliganca SourcM and Mathodt involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthoratd Oitclesur* Subject to Criminal Sanction* 



mamm 



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 



UWiiS! 



; r~ /O 



:<o£26 



A, New Regicr.al rinding 
C. Froccsal 




«ys»fi 



^ClASSJFiED 



r ; _ J ; _ 


c Pursuant to Sec- 


ic- 


552 


of 


-.;- 


e 


"0 


r e 1 r n 




Ass is; 


ance Act of 1951, 


r.S 


.;.- e r. 


:e = 




zr. 


re 


rr. 1.-.: 




C=erai 


ions Undertaken =■- 


- - 


e C3 


".tral 


Zr. 


ta 


llicar. 


:e 


Agency 


m Foreign Countr 


les 


. Ot 


-ler 


T\~ 


an 


T 


-ose 




I-;er.c 


2d Solely for t.-.e 


?ur 


orse 


or 


:.- 


te 


-- 


-Terce 





-:327 



Coi .ection 



I hereby find that the follr-.vir.g operations m foreign 
countries (including all support necessary to such operations) 
are i.-porrant to the national security of the Vnited States, 
and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his 
designee, to report this Finding to the concerned cor.-.ittees 
of the Congress pursuant to lav, and to provide such briefings 
as necessary. 



The Cepart.-.ent of Defense is cir 
necessary assistance and support to t 
Agency m i.r.ple.r.entation of this Tind 



ected to provide all 
he Central rntellige: 



CE3C?:?TI0N 



Central Arrerica 







Directly or in cooperation with 
foreign governments, engage in 
a regional effort to expose and 
counter >".= rxist and Cuban- 
sponsored terrorist"., insurgency, 
and subversion in El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Guaterala, Honduras, 
and elsewhere in Central America , 




The '.s^hite House 




10 



a .r 



CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



11 






"^-(phlT. 



p^ 






/v/ 



yV<^^ 



^ Cvr^ 



^-d.^f:c,-:.)?c'£.j}. 12356 
V 3. r-;r, r:-;i:na! Sec;:rli. Cc:::-::; 




?'~ 'j*>1 



R,-^Jnr« 



12 



UNCIASSIHED 



't^ Q^-30 ^ ;?^ 



r^.e Bolar.d 



J 4o2^ 



The Intelligence Authorization Act for ?i 1983 Included a 
classified annex which expressed the "sense of the conferees" 
that no funds authorized by the act should be used "to 
overthrow the Government of Nicaragua or to provoke a military 
exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. ""i i was Informed by 
congressional staff sources (who asked that their Identities 
be protected) earlier this year that some members of the 
intelligence committees felt that this restriction (If a non- 
blndlng "sense of the conferees" provision can be so 
characterized''^) was not being observed. 

On December 8, 19B2, when the continuing resolution for.PY 1983 
was pending before the House, Congessman Harlcin introduced an 
amendment as follows: 

None of the funds provided In this Act may be 
used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the 
Department of Defense to furnish military equip- 
ment, military training or advice, or other 
support for military activities, to any group 
or individual, not part of a country's armed 
forces, for the purpose of assisting that group 
or Individual in carrying out military activities 
in or against Nicaragua. °3 

While this was being debated. House Intelligence committee 
chairman Boland made public the above mentioned classif led/^^ 
annex and proposed a substitute amendaent to the Harlcin '^^ 
amendment reading as follows: 

None of the funds provided In this Act may be 
used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the 
Department of Defense to furnish military equip- 
ment, military training or advice, or other 
support for military activities, to any group or 
Individual, not part of a country's armed forces, 
for the purpose of overthrowing the Governnment 
of Nicaragua or. provoking a military exchange 
between Nicaragua and Honduras. ° 

In return. Congressman Harkln offered a substitute to the 
Boland suostitute which read: 

None of the funds provided In tnls Act -ay be 
used by the Central Intelligence Agency or any 



I 



61. 12ri Cong. Hec . ImSS (dally ed. 

62. Here I am not suggesting that 1 
to 
saying 

63. 128 Cone:. Hec 

64. Ibid. , at H jl53 



Dec. 8, 1982), 

might be politically wise 



ignore the expressed opinion of the conferees--! am only 
ing that m tnls form the language Is not .egalxy b.n-.r.g. 
H91t8 (daily ed., Dec. 8, 1982). 



UNCtASSIFIED t£!if2 




13 




agency of tr.s Depart-er." of ZeTer.si to f-rr.is.'i 

military aqulpr.ent, .-lli:a.-y cral-1-5 or aivice J 4 32 4 

or other support for military activities, to 

any Individual or group which Is not part of a 

country'* armed forces and which Is already 

known by that agency to have the Intent of 

overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or of 

provoking a military conflict beween Nicaragua 

and Honduras. °5 

The Harkln substitute was defeated by a vote of 13 to 27 on a 
division of the House, °° and on a roll call vote the Boland 
substitute passed All to 0.°7 This language was subsequently 
accepted by the Senate In conference, and became law when the 
act was signed by the President. 

Most of the recent legal criticism of alleged U.S. covert 
activities in Central America centers around this law. In 
late March, 37 House members sent a letter to the President 
reportedly warning that CIA activities In Central America may 
be violating the law.O" Senator Moynlhan, the ranking Democrat 
on the Senate intelligence committee, has been quoted by the 
New York Times as saying that while the committee has not as 
yet reached a consensus on whether the Boland amendment has 
been breached, "A growing number of my colleagues question 
whether the C.I. A. Is complying with the law . . . ."©9 Shortly 
thereafter, the Washington Post quoted Moynlhan as saying 
that "a crisis of confidence" was building over this Issue 
between Congress and the intelligence agencies. "'It Is 
absolutely necessary that the administration obey the law,' 
said Moynlhan, who expressed the view that either the law or 
the operations must be changed because the current situation 
is untenable. "70 Senator Goldwater has also been quoted as 
believing that the CIA might be Involved In "plans to destabilize 
the Nlcaraguan government, "71 but an Inquiry to his office 
produced a denial that he had made any such statement. 72 

65. Ibid ., at H9159. 

66. Ibid . 

67. laid . 

68. Mew York Times . April 1. I783. 

69. iDld . 

70. Washington Post . April 3, 1983. 

71. Christian Science Monlto.- . March 29, 1983. 

72. On Karch 2y I telepnoned Denny Sharon, Senator Gcldwater's 
Armed Services Legislative Assistant (Hooo Simons, Goldwats.-'s 
man on the intelligence committee, was out of town). Zenr.y 
was unfamiliar with the yjonltor article, but copied dowr. t.-.e 
key language and said he would checK with the Senator ;who 
was out of town). On the morning of March 31, Denny 

called me back and said the Senator told him that he r.ad 
made no such statement concerning alleged U.S. Involve.T.er.t 
in Nicaragua and that he would send a conmunlcatlon to trie 
Monitor disavowing their account. 




14 



UNCl/tSSIFIED 



■ J 4 

The words "for the purpose of ... " are critical to under- 
standing the -Boland Amendment. Does tnls bar expenditure of 
funds by the"ClA only when the Agency' s purpose Is to overthrow 
the Nlcaraguan government or to provoke a confrontation with 
Honduras, or dibes it also bar funding of a paramilitary group 
when the Agency's purpose Is to pressure Nicaragua to cease 
Its aggression against El Salvador but when the recelplent 
group's objective Is to overthrow the Nlcaraguan government? 
The administration has taken the former view — that It la 
the CIA's "purpose" that Is controlling — while at least some 
congressional critics have suggested that If either the CIA 
or a group receiving CIA funds has the "purpose" of overthrowing 
the Governjnent of Nicaragua or provoking an exchange with 
Honduras the statute prohibits assistance to that group.. 
The Washington Post recently reported: 

Chairman Michael D. Barnes (D-Md.) of the 
House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Latin 
America, said CIA attorneys argue that 
continued spending Is legal because the 
"purpose" of the U.S. agencies supplying 
money and weapons to the Insurgents is not 
to overthrow the Nlcaraguan regime, even 
If the purpose of the guerrillas who receive 
the support Is to do so. "Not -a Jury in 
the country would accept this, and the 
House will not accept it," said Barnes. 73 

A similar Intepretation was given by New York Times columnist 
Torn Wicker, who wrote: 

Whether the goal is to overthrow the 
Sandlnists or merely make them more amenable 
to Reagan Administration pressures is not 
so clear. 

Either way, the C.I. A. operation appears to 
be violating the Boland Amendment, which 
prohibits support of paramilitary forces 
"with L»lc — should read "for"] the purpose" 
of ov^throwing the Nlcaraguan Government. 
PhillJ^^Taubman of the Times reports that 
C.I. A.' officials claim they aren't trying 
to overthrow tnat Government, hence are 
observing the letter of the Boland Amendment. 
That's like saying you're hitting a man 
with a haunmer but not trying to kill him; 
and it's the kind of sleazy, hair-splitting 
"denlabllity" that debases language and 
credibility alike.''* 



73. Wash. Post . April 3. 19S3. 
7H. New York Times. April 1, 1933. 



^* "\ 



miASSIFIED 



15 



UNCUmEf 



The distinction between the CIA's "purpose" and that of the 
Insurgents allegedly being financed and supplied Is an 
Important on«, because they don't appear to coincide. Consider 
this report by Washington Post writer Christopher Dickey, who 
recently apunV time with anti-government guerrillas In 
Nicaragua: 

"The United States Is helping us In a way we 
don't want. They are saying no, no, no to every- 
thing. Our men want to do spectacular things," 
complained one counterrevolutionary political 
leader outside Nicaragua who was instrumental 
in setting up our visit. "You have the momentum, 
and they stop you. It's like an invisible 
band holding strings." 

As did his men on the ground here, he dismissed 
the Reagan administration's assertion to 
Congress that Washington's support for the 
anti-Sandinistas is Intended essentially to 
cut the Nicaraguan government's arms supplies 
to insurgents in El Salvador. 

"The people who are fighting, they are not 
fighting to stop the weapons," the counter- 
revolutionary leader said "We are fighting to 
liberate Nicaragua." 

As [guerrilla leader] Suicide put it here In 
the middle of the war zone, "we're not going 
to stop the transport of arms and supplies to 
tne Salvadoran guerrillas or the Guatemalan 
guerrillas until we cut the head off the 
Sandlnist5."75 

Fortunately, the legislative language is less ambiguous than 
might at first glance appear to be the case. Particularly 
when read in context, it is in my view beyond reasonable 
doubt that Congress was referring to the "purpose" of the CIA 
and DoD, net the purpose of t^e individuals and groups 
receiving upalstance from the CIA. 

To begin wMh, the Amendment prohibits the use of certain 
funds "b;t *^* Central Intelligence Agency or the Departraent 
of Defense" to furnish certain specified assistance to any 
"group or individual" " for the purpose of overthrowing the 
Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange 
between Nicaragua and Honduras." [Emphasis added.] That is 
to say, the law prohibits the expenditure of funds "by" the CIA 
"for" the prohibited purpose. Had the Congress Intended to 



75. Washington Post . April 3, 1983. 




16 



ill!! hmm 



prohibit CIA assistance "to any Individual or ircu? wr-.lch Is "' 
not a part of ,a country's armed forces and which Is already 
known tjy that- agency to have the Intent of overthrowing the 
Government of Nicaragua op of provoking a military conflict 
between Nlc»r*«ua and Honduras," it would presumatJly have so 
stated. Indeed, Immediately before unanimously adopting the 
Boland Amendment, the House considered and overwhelmingly 
rejected the language I have Just quoted, which had been 
proposed by Congressman Tom Harkln as a substitute to the 
Boland Amendment. The key difference between the unanimously 
approved Boland Amendment and the Harkln substitute (which 
was defeated by a margin of greater than two to one) was 
that Boland restricted the CIA's "purpose," while Harkln was 
triggered by the CIA's knowledge of the "Intent" of a para- 
military group or Individual. 

Accepting this interpretation. It Is not legally relevant 
whether the Government of Nicaragua Is In fact eventually 
overthrown, or an exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras 
takes place. What matters Is the motive or purpose for which 
the assistance Is provided. Assistance provided to pressure 
Nicaragua to cease Its Intervention in El Salvador — even If 
it resulted In the fall of the present regime — would not be 
unlawful; while assistance given to overthrow that regime, 
even If totally Ineffective or actually counterproductive, 
would violate the law. 

Some congressional critics appear to acknowledge that the 
"letter" of the Boland Amendment has been followed, but charge 
tnat the CIA may be violating its "spirit" by falling to 
maintain adequate control over the paramilitary forces 
receiving assistance. 7° Congress may Indeed be concerned 
about the possible consequences of a successful paramilitary 
effort to overthrow the Sandinistas and the accompanying 
risks of a conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua — and from 
both a policy and a political standpoint these considerations 
may warrant careful attention by administration decision- 
makers— but as a matter of law it is inappropriate to attach 

7d. "Member* of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Including 
Democrarf* and Republicans, said tnis week that a majority 
of senaeors on the panel think that the C.I. A. has 
insufficient control over the paramilitary forces that it 
c,,o,,/^r.-= In t.h#. r(.<rion. . . . CThev] said that sentiment 



region. . . . [They] said 



?l-es. 



17 



M^ 



UNCUSSffi 



t^e terms of the rejected Harkln Amendment as baggage to the ^^^6 
Boland Amendment. The record shows that the House considered 
and rejected - language which would have prohibited assistance to 
paramilitary groups Intending to overthrow the Nlcaraguan govern- 
ment. To SQSfest that the Harkln Amendment was somehow 
incorporated Into the "spirit" of the Boland Amendment Is In my 
view simply unpersuaslve. 

Although not legally relevant. It Is perhaps worth noting that 
concerns that the paramilitary contras may succeed In overthrowing 
the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a conflict between that 
State and Honduras may be exaggerated. While there have been 
reports by Journalists who have travelled with the contras of 
significant peasant support for the guerrillas and resentment of 
tbe Nlcaraguan government, 77 there seems to be little reason 
to believe victory is In sight. Consider this assessment by a 
Washington Post reporter from Managua: 

The worries do not seem to be military for 
the most part. The several thousand counter- 
revolutionary guerrillas reported to be 
operating in various zones inside Nicaragua 
pose little serious challenge to the 
Sandinistas' 22,000-man conventional army, 
backed by more than 10,000 trained militia 
reserves and tens of thousands more volunteer 
militiamen with rudimentary drill under their 
belts. 

And despite several warnings that Honduras 
risks war by allowing the antigovernment 
Nlcaraguans to use its territory, Sandlnlsta 
officials and foreign diplomats say such a 
conflict is unlikely unless one side or the 
other makes a severe miscalculation. 7tt 

Despite the frequent allegations in the press and by some 
members of the Congress that the Boland Amendment is being 
violated, I have to date encountered no persuasive evidence 
that the CI4 or the Defense Department is providing assistance 
to any grMl^ for the purpose of overthrowing the Government 
of NicaradK or provoking a confrontation with Honduras. 
Until evlMBc* to that effect can be obtained, I am not 
prepared to conclude that either the letter or the "spirit" 
of the Boland Amendment is being violated. 



77. See. e.K .. Washington Post . April 5, 1983 ("In the six 
days another reporter and I spent traveling through this 
province with the U.S. -backed soldiers fighting to overthrow 
the leftist Sandlnlsta government we saw a pattern of support 
for the contras by people with many grievances against 
the revolutionary government In Managua.") 

7a. Washington Post . March 8, 1^83- 




18 



UNClASSro 



€onqxtii of tf)e Winitth %tatti 

lUfoim of Brprr«rntatibe< 

■bi^ington. 9.C. 20315 
March 24, 1983 



7 a -ay 



The President 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

We are writing to express our deep concern about pub- 
lished reports that ■-h'-.t^'saii'ls of heavily-armed in^^urgents 
have entered Nicaragua from Honduras. There have also been 
press reports of a bui Id-up of Ilonduran troops along the Nica- 
raguan border. r.eader? from bcth Nicararjua and Honduras, most 
recently during nn omrr-iftT-y meeting of the United Nations 
Security Council, have exchanged <-liarges that the other side 
is about to invade. The '-limnte of heightened tensions and 
escalating military activity inside Nicaragua raises, we be- 
lieve, the threat of direct conflict between Nicaragua and 
Honduras. 

Press reports over the past year and a half have suggested 
tliat the Central Intelligence Agency has engaged in covert 
ov-'erntions atiainst Ni c.Tra'i'i'i , and that these activities in- 
clude the support of ant i -Sand inista elements based in Hon- 
duras. We believe that i' . s . -supported ant i-Nicaraguan forces 
may be involved in the current hostilities. If this is the 
case, we believe this support is a violation of the Boland 
amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations bill 
adopted last December. 

As you may recall, the noland amendment specifically 
prohibits the funding by the CIA or the Department of Defense 
of any group or individiiol for Llio purpose of overthrowing 
the government of Nicaragua or of provoking a military ex- 
change between Honduras and Nicaragua. We believe that the 
current &kfcacks inside Nicaraiina .iro rrratim a climate in 
which opMlk^ hostilit ies botwoen Ni '.-araijua and Honduras are n 
distinctfli^sibil ity. 






We ur'je you to act in strict compliance with our domes- 
tic legal obligations as well as those embodied in the inter- 
national chartrrs of the Unitnl N.ii ions nnd the Orciani 7at i'>n 
of American States. 



■iSS- - 



n^^ 






UNCLASSIFIED 



(y*^ 



19 



The President 
March 24, 1983 
Page Two 



««W«n 



M' 



I >j 



We support a policy in Central America that seeks re- 
conciliation among opposing forces and minimizes the poten- 
tial for inter-state conflict. We believe that our national 
interests lie in promotinq peace in the region. 




SANDER 



M. C^IN, M 






fcA^wu. 



ISON, N.C. 



; 



ftj i 



■|U,Hi/// 



S inhere ly,~> 



W^LMAM CLAY, M.C. / 
'\LE E. KILDEBf K.C. 

fLEs 5CHUH E i r rH7 r: 



be.'. IL 



MARTIN (5lAv ^AB0TH:0y^ ' ■ '^'^ 



^-r 




B^/t^F. VENTU, n.C. 




JIM SLATTERY, M.C. 



/- 




TED WEISS, M.C 

4: 1 ' - 



- ^-v^/ 



PARREN J. MITCIiru., M.C. 



nARNFY FRANK, M.C. 



uNcussm 



20 



UNCUSSIFIEO '' "* 




JIM SHANNON, «.C. "'" "" 



GERRY IffUpBST H.C. ANTHONY C. B^LENSON, M.C 

PETE STARK, M.C. BARBARA A. MIKULSKl, M.C 

TOM DOWNEY, M.Cl NORMAN • DICKS , M.C. 

ROBERT J. MRAZfK, M.C< Te^ 



•^i/t 




PAT WILLIAMS, M.C. RONALD V. DELLUMS ,^-T(.C 

ED~MARKEy7~^ l J/BhN SEIBERLING, M.C. 



Uy\V u. 





JULIAN/C/ DTXON, "ff.C. 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



21 



UNCUSSIFIED 



t1^ l)r 



""^Jml— __ ^^e4^^j!^WQ 

TOM HARKIN, M.C. MICHAEL D/ BARNES , M.C. 

J^ES L. OBERSTAR, M.C. JlfT'^itACH, M.C. 



RICHARD OTTINGER, M.C. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



22 



y 




SYSTEM II 
90756 



e WHITC HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

July 1, 1983 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPG PRINCIPALS 
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy (Central America) 



'^^y^x*-^- 



P-38' 



I The Presid ent has underscored his conc ern that we m ust incr ea se 
ou r effo rts In the public diplomacy "field t o dee pe n~g n e unaer- 
s'tanding of and support for our policie s in Central JKjneric a . 
This effort must focus both' on the foreign and domestic audiences. 
To coordinate this program and to insure that the effort has the 
appropriate treatment of foreign policy issues, it is essential 
to designate an overall coordinator who will be responsible for 
the development and implementation of a public diplomacy strategy 
concerning Central America. 

Secretary Shultz and I have discussed this»at some length and 
have agreed to ask Otto Reich to assume this responsibility for 
the SPG. He will replace Senator Stone who has assumed other \ 
duties. Mr. Reich will focus not only on the developments in ' 
Central America but also on the impact that these activities 
have in Latin America as well as elsewhere overseas and in the 
United States. For this assignment he will function as the 
Secretary's advisor and as SPG Coordinator for Public Diplomacy 
for Central America/Caribbean. Mr. Reich will carry out his 
responsibilities in the context of the International Political 
Committee with substantive policy guidance to be provided by 
established policy making bodies in his field. The Public Affairs 
and International Information Coimnittees will also play key roles 
in this overall effort. 

Mr. Reich will need staff support, to include officers detailed 
from appropriate agencies and departjnents. His office will be 
established in the Department of State. The Department of State 
will provide Mr. Reich with appropriate office space, logistic 
support, operating budget and clerical support. 

Mr. Reich's activities should commence immediately. He should 
keep the SPG regularly informed and should attend all SPG meetings 
concerning Central America. 







wuissm 



UNCLASSIFIED 



23 



>,.,..t- j.A.:_ Jc.'iA.i Of 7C/ 



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24 



DNCUIiliintU 




25 



ar%v^""'s^ii- 



wmmm 



STATE -AiO - USIA 

NOmUnON FOR INCEMTIVE AWARD 
%kmif HI an arif inW an^ fi«« (3) cayiaa 



OO WOT \nt THIt t> AC! 



0*T( aico. tT *a*aotCO«atTTCI 



^AIT I - HOMMATIOM 



I, H*m Of MOWMf I (Lmi. '>•••. alMW lalMal) 

S«« attached list 



1. oac. STMML oa rosT 
S/LPD 



1. MIIUMT POSITION TITt.1 AND 6«A0C 



, TT^ OP *»*»0 atCOMMIwetD 



_P^ I. Ii»»itwl«»« Mm... t.«r^ 



C. 0-«»»9>>>>w4 I 



•• A»<M •« Hatvii 



0. hi«ww M«.« A.airi 



*. »A*ii >oa *«*»o 



mL^n 



I. IHTAMCiaLE ICMf PITS 



». KCOMMCHOeO AWA« 



' »ti»#*IM4Mf Mm < 



> »•»! •WW to M«ri >• «« 



For axcapcloaally oucscaadlag servica la davaloplng, praparlog, and 
laplaaanciog public dlplomacr programa la support of Uolced Stacas policy la 
Caacral Aaarlca fro* April 1984 to April 1986. 

Upon lea aacabllahaaat , cha Of flea of Public Olploaacr for Laela Aaarlca aad 
Cha Carlbbaaa (S/LFD) took a vlcal rola la shaplag tba dabata oo tha USG'a Ccatral 
Aaarlcae policy wlthla tba Oalced States and la tha late mat loaal araaa. S/LPD la 
an lataragancy office vhoaa parsoaaal are coatrlbutad b? OSC foreign affairs 
agencies, lacludlag Oepartmeat of State, Agency for lateroatlooal Davelopaeat, 
nnlted States Inforaatloa Agency, and the Departaeat of Defense. 

Public diplomacy Is a aew, aoa-tradltlonal activity for the United States 
Goveraaent. Thus, S/LFD's staff have been pioneers In forglog a aev tool for the 
lapleaantatloa of foreign policy. S/LFD has played a key role la setting out the 
paraaeters aad deflalag tha teraa of the public dlscussloa oa Central Aaerlca 
policy. Despite the efforts of the formidable and veil established 
Sovtet/Cubao/Nlcaraguaa propaganda apparatua, the achleveoeats of U.S. public 
diplomacy are clearly Tlslble. When S/LPD begaa to publicize the facts about the 
sltoatloo la Ceatral Aaerlca, the public debate was aarked by alaoat total 
Igaoraace. Much of tha Inforaatloa which was arallable was slaply false, and soae 
of this uDCma Information had eatered the debate through dlsloforaatloa 
operatloea. Qlfeltad States policy, based on a reasonable appreciation of the facts 
available to 4li goTeraaeat, was completely alsunderstood, slacc the public was 
working from •< entirely different vlevpolat that waa based on the Halted and 
Inaccurate Information available at the tloe. S/LPD contributed directly to 
laproveacat to the quality aad relevaace of the public debate by aaklag accurate 
laforaatloa available through prescatatloa of unclassified goveroaeat loforaacion, 
establlshaent of methods to declassify Intelligence Inforaatloo la a tlaely aauner, 
and aggressive seeking of latclllgence loforaatlon which could be declassified 
without daaaglng other national Interests, and dlssealnatlon of this aaterlal. A3 
a result of S/LPD's efforts, no longer do serious critics of U.S. policy deny ch^c 
the Sandinistas are providing arms, logistical support, traloiag caaps and 
propaganda support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and other subversive groups ia 
Central Aaerlca. The Sandlalscas defenders aad opponents of U.S. policy caa ao 
longer credibly present the Sandinistas or the Salvadoraa guerrillas as ^ ^,. -, 



wmsmi 



26 



oNcussm 



jliMOcriTl — "t erlaat«4 'teclal r«fer»ar«* •• th«7 did ealy two 7««r* ago. S/UO*« 
dotaa* of ^Jor. lad hnadrada of •laer publleotlena, huadrada of praaa aad aadta 
latarrlawo-. iMiAada of yablle apoocbaa. ua«ouatabla qulae b«Mad-th«-acaa«a work 
with oucald* anpfort |to«p«, aad lacalllgoat aalaecloa of art«aoata aad eha»aa for 
poblle doteta kava eoatrlbvtad to tba ebaaga^ Thaa* afforta bavo ehaagad eb« cataa 
of tha policy dabata. SAiPO baa eoacrlbutad eo tha uaabacUlag of tba public 
parcaptlea of policy from aytba aad eaat; public dabata oa Caatral Aaarlca now 
focuaaa oa how boat to aolva a problaa raeogiasad la Ita baale dlaaaaleaa by all 
raapooalbla partlaa. 

nia efflear paraoanal of S/lfQ contrlbutad by praparlog orlglaal publleatleaa 
aad earrylag out tha taak of dlatrlbutlag thaa via varloua aalllog llata to 
Jouroallata, lataraat greupa, saloctad U.S. Govansant efflclala, aaabara aad ataff 
of tba Coagraaa, aad to OSIA for OToriaas dlatrlbutloa. Dopaadlag upoa thalr 
oatura aad tha approprlata audlanca, dlatrlbutloa haa raogad frea 6,000 to 80,000 
ceplaa of ladlvldual publlcatlooa. Offleara praaaatad huadrada of oral brlafloga 
to tha praaa, Coograaa«ao and ataff, and apaachaa to public audlaocaa. ftiadrada of 
talking point papara vara prapared for high laval offlelala. Spaelal avaata, aueb 
aa praaantatloo of a dlaplay of capturad guarrllla waapooa aad decuaaata froa El 
Salvador to tha Praaldaat of tha Onltad Stataa bafora tha national aawa aadla, aad 
tha Vlca Praaldaatlal caraaoay coaaaaoratlag tha sacoad aoalvariary of tha Craaada 
raaeua, vara alao acceapllahad by S/LPO ataffara working with othar goranaaat 
agaaclaa. S/I.FD offleara eraatad, staffad, and axacutad eeaplax public dlploaaey 
plaaa to aeblllta and eoerdlaata cha public dlploaaey aetlTltlaa of tba aajor O.S. 
feralga affalra aganclaa. Thasa plana dlractad thaaa agaaclaa la latagratad public 
dlploaaey oparatloaa as S/LPO parforaed Ita aoat vital function, than totally naw 
to tha govaraaant, of eeordlnatlog tha oparatlona of aultlpla aganclaa la purault 
of daflnad public dlploaaey goala. K* a raault S/UO act oaly halpad crcata an 
acaosphara for workabla pollclaa, but also halpad to ioplaaant chata policies. 
S/LPD claarly davalopad aa antlrcly naw aathodelogy as It brought togathar 
oparatlona toraarly earrlad on laparataly. Aa a rasult of S/LPD's succasa la cha 
davalopaaot of tha nacaaaary nathodologlcs, slallar oparatlona hava baan Inltlatad 
for Southam Africa and for tarrorlsa Issuas. 

S/LPD'a sacratarlal ataff aada a eonatant and vital contribution to thla 
suecaas. Bacauaa of tha larga niabars of publlcatlona, laferaal papara, and othar 
docuaaacs dlasaalnatad to tha govamaant, prasa, and public, tba S/LPD sacratarlal 
ataff had tha oftaa gruallag taak of typing and putting In propar foraat tha drafta 
of hundrads of foraal Dapartaaat of Stata publleatlona, brlaflng papara, and 
Inforaal coaaualcatloaa. Tbasa docuaants fraquantly had to ba retypod tlaa aftar 
tlaa aa ravtaftufa, lacorporatloa of aultlpla agancy elaaranees, and polishing of 
drafta wara iMtoayllshad. Bacauaa of S/LPD's polley of raspoodlag laaadlataly to 
alslnforaael^Kad dlalaformatlon In tha public aadla, projacts with short 
daadllnaa va^cba rula. Cvaryona workad uodar intcasa prassure. Output vaa of 
high quality. Daaplta tha haavy sacratarlal workload, eonatant short-notlca 
ovartlaa, aad high prassura, aorala raaalnad high aad cha alsslon was . rs 
aecoBpllshad. Tha antlra staff of S/LPD haa aamad suparior rccMJ^^^tlsP Its 
dadlcatloa and outstanding accSapllshaants. -^ 



n. M0MINATIM6 AMD CLiASAMCt O^'ICULS 



*■ -trtrnt M*— 




John 0. Blackan 



Doputy 

Coordiaator 



S/LPD 



VV' 



'^ 



2. Otto J. Raleh 



Coordlaacor 



S/LPD 



ffliem 



^Jlsjfi 



27 



-IMASSra 

S/LPO Staff Znelud«a 
in 
. Superior P«reoraane« 
Naritorious Honor Award 



Janica Bacbiaci 
Elian Bock 
Gloria Bowaan 
Nary Catharina English 
Antonia M. Graansan 
Barbara K. Raabrick 
Staphan C. Johnson 
Margarita T. Labrada 
Lattica I. NcNail 
Shirlay T. Powall 
Branda Hatkins 
Jaai Ann Yacob 
Johnathan Millar 



gOCBA-'i''^ 



UNCUSSIHED 



28 



llftlAB 









I IB" 






I «- *.»< ■- •»— « 



J3 






J 3. ^1. ttcCi»t«Lf^ 



1. TTPIB N*<a 0» COmuTTH C»u.i««"" 



11. iiCMATuKt or coMti-rrti ch*i(m*n 



^aRT III ■ ACTION Taken tr chi'f or miuiom 



alCOMtlNO ThaT 7«( NOMINATION tl: I I A»»i»i.< I 1. •! ItAtKl 



i. TT^U nam! 0* CMItr 0* MlUION 



t. siSMATuKt 0' CHi:> 0' MISSION 



'ART IV . aSTIOo TAKtK f AjygA a»aR3S co^Mr:— «« 

;. THij co~«rrris «:o»»«i»OJ tmat mi nomination ii; i ^ i AM..~t ■.< -^ i.n~-ii» .-..^i" 



IO..«.».y^« 



S.x-tXKXa^ H«M> ••«•< I •"!! M>«»>-a>t i<»~ai 



I I. A>«>r !■> Hv»at 



I ^ amT. I(e:3«n£*0! 
I > 



SQO^*''® 







\'i7j/p^ 



. TT^lO >.A«l a' :0««lTT|I CnAI*>>Ak 

Mr. Richard B. 



29 



\. 1 MCftii^d* ''•^'^ '"* 






mssmi^ 




J. AMI. A^MOVCB i. «l"*«0 



U>a Tiiis &»•«• ^mf CMtmaMt** al Haait 



fifitAsstfe 



30 




Lnited States Department of State 
Wathtnpon. D.C. 20S20 

June 25, 1985 



MEMORAMDUM 

TOt S/S-EX - He. George P. Twohie 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: Current Program of S/LPD 



S/LPO - Frank Gatdnfir^y)-)^ 






As a supplement to my memorandum of June 21, this is 
additional information on some of the most notable 
accomplishments of S/LPD over the last twelve months: 

The Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and 
Caribbean (S/LPD) , headed by a Coordinator whose rank is 
equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary, published three 
major documents in conjunction with the Department of Defense 
in support of the President's program: 

A 600-page book entitled, 'Grenada Documents: An 
Overview and Selection;* 

A 45-page booklet entitled, 'The Soviet-Cuban Connection 
in Central America and the Caribbean;* 

A 40-page booklet entitled, 'The Sandinista Military 
Build-up.' 

S/LPD also published eight other documents on its own, most 
notable of which were: 

A 31-page booklet entitled, 'Broken Promises: Sandinista 
Repression of Human Rights in Nicaragua;* 

A 23-page pamphlet entitled, 'Misconceptions About U.S. 
Policy toward Nicaragua.* 



The vilifications averaged about 15,000 copies each and were 
disscaifi^Kl to persons interested in spreading the President's 
message OT^the public, the media, and cne Congress. 






"^ 




mio) 



31 



p-va 



DOCUMENT UNAVAILABLE. 



32 




<Joif^_II>^TtlUyEYES ONLY 



TO: 



United Statn D«p«rtn)«ni of Stai« 
fTasMmfton. D.C JOiJO 



Haceh 13, I98S 



Hr. Pat Buchanan 

Assistant to the Presldantj 

Olcvctoc oC Communications ek^osse Er.<§Ti:> ma.'k::.C3 □ 

The Whica House 



EN^rOSit t..r3.ij»-« MA.-.\...uo ; 

RSL2ASS orjiEoc: 
FROM: S/LPO - Johnathan S. Millek px or FOI EZiaPTlQMS 



VtfiSUZTt or STiTE i/CDC/lffi 
BEVIEWED BI ~>L,^.^J^ D^TB f v<- . 

ispo 
,q7T.. 



RDSpor KSCSXT. DATt 
*'i<'Ai;TH 



•.£A30:i[S) 



SUBJECT: 'White Propaganda* Operation 




Five illustrative examples of the Reich 'Whice 
Propaganda* operation: 

e Attached is a copy oC an ap-«d piece that ran two 
days ago in The Wall Stre.et Journal . Professor 
Gullmartin has been a consultant to our office and 
collaborated with our staff in the writing of this 
piece. It IS devastating in its analysis of the 
Nicaraguan arns build-up. Officially, this office 
had no role in its preparation. 

e In case you missed last night's NBC News with Tom 
Brokaw^ you might ask WHCA to call up the Fred 
Francis story on the *Contras.* This piece was _ 
prepared by Francis after he consulted two of our 
contractors who recently bad made a clindestine trip 
to the Creedoa fighter caap along the Nicaragua/ 
Honduras border (the purpose of this trip was to 
serve as a pre-advance for many selected journalists 
to visit the area and get a true flavor of what the 

teedoa fighters are doing; i.e., not baby killing). 
though Z wasn't wild about the cag line, it was a 
.(Mitive piece. 

• Two op-ed pieces, one for The Wasr. ington Post and one 
for The New York Times , are being prepared for the 
signatures^f opposition leaders Alphonso Rubello,J 



'^ 



^A\mmv 



UNCLASSIHED 



50094-18 



^1*^^^ 



►7' 



/ 7 



33 



leypiED 



Ai9lplio.Call«ro aad Axtueo Czu7. Thes* two op-«4 
pi«c«* ac« b«la9 pc«p«e«d by oa« ot our consultants 
«ad will •OCT* «s • reply to tb« outra^tous op-«d 
pioco by Maiol 0ct«9« ia today's Ww Tom Tt— . 

• Through s cut-out, w« «r« bsving tho opposition - 
loader Alptionso tubollo visit tbo following rsws 
or^aniiaeions wbil* h« is in Wasbington tbi.: w««k: 
Boar at Nawspapors, Hawswaok Haqazino . Scripps Howard 
Howspaparsr Tbo wasbin^ton Post (Edicocial Beard), 
and OSA Today^ In addicion, th«' CNN '-rtaaian 
Raport,* tho *McN«H-L«hror Raport," cr.a 'Today Show* 
and CBS Morning Naws hava baan contact*^ about tbo 
availability of Mr. Ruballo. 

o Attached is a copy of a cable that we received today 
Croffl Managua. The caale states that Congressaan 
Lagoaarsino took up Daniel Orcega's oC£ar to visit 
any place in Nicaragua. You nay reaer.=er tbat Ortega, 
received a good deal of publicicy on his 'peace* 
proposal when he stated that he welcoccd visits by 
Members oC Congress, stating that they would be free 
to go anywhere they wished. As the caale notes, the 
Congreman's request to visit an airfield was denied. 
Do not be surprised if this cable soaehow hits the 
evening news. 

I will not atteapt in the future co keep you posted 
on all activities since we have too aany balls in the air 
at any one tiae and since the work of our operation is 
ensured by out office's keeping a low :>rofile. * I aerely' 
wanted to give you a flavor of sooe of the ictivites that 
bit our offieo on any oo« day and ask that, as you 
foraulate ideas and plans of attack, you giva us a 
beads-up sinca out. office has been crafted eo handle the 
eoac«na tbat yoii have in getting cbe Presicent's prograo 
foe ^B freedoa fighters enacted. 






Attaehoants: 



1. Op-ed (ftece by Professor Guilmartin. 

2. 89 Managua 1S23. 






34 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Nicaragua Is Armed for Trouble 



Th« Wall Str««t Journal 

I4»zsh 11, 1915 

Editorial Section, Pa^* 2t 



9f 1mm r. 

a* aOnN Mt««ry i< MIC S«Mm » .tk- 
anew.* OHt II «w wiMh trt ma atai 

mn mil n Mini ilnwi m im f <>imi 
IB Mt %iii a tai. ■nawii nai mo- 
aflBi^ Jirf*af» Mlegpitf l«Bi*Vi 
eoaM da « la* annid tanm a Ctmnt 
AJBtna or «tat (Mr aniTiJ ailH fvprr 
M« !• :*nM of Saadtaoa smuo- 

Slwtiy Man laa U J. ttMaoM. ortU 
npMU syftKtrt of a Sp*M bv^inr 
bawd finm ifta BmA Sn avfe aewioof 
tafft bOBua (feu. i iii a i n a» b neooMa- 
MKt auUHii. iKMod (feawtf a type 
wad » «lp jatOtfiv aimaft. no^ IV 
para vtft oqiavuLii, eoMin oioMstad 
abaoi At euis aid Iti ftnnainiM n* 
OHB auiy eaadMUd wu aiptnooic Mie- 
ns: Wc»M c>a ol n ty wanuu Mb *«( 
off ■ UX am raooH. 

AS lit rtip Mond Nkanfu t Paoik 
pan of ConsM (and u (At UJ. tiaeooa 
■nrod) vteauaaa raa at lrr«r pack. 

nt boMi* of trwod ipaoiadoa bom 
auft u aadeflmacfle "pof " wtaa Saadb»- 
«u roMn Malsur Mlr«i 4'Kaeoia aa- 
aoMnd. la a aauiiMat mart or laa eao- 
flnHd by oOdai U J. t^trm. thai te 
cnia eoauaad aai lOGs. b« ottir aras 
OKiadkc bttseopun. Tbt mvi vis all tte 
■MR airitmsfne bacaat aa «rttr 
ttttmrnt al ScrM boBcopMri apporouly 
bad boa «B:aad<d. as b« lanflMftod. «i 
.'ncancMt Attuae caoa tta piiw— 
«•*. Tkt boaaopccn ««fi Ml-M -Hki*.' 
OM Mrtf s asB knttljr aiaaC w^mt- 
■ ■ttslyttt 

Tit eopitn rtcBvad 
as M OH poHiMltr liai at 

Rtofui 
nt7 Looked 



itarpMrtr aad raur biada of :UL Mt- 
■C bttteoattr opmaoM a oiar^Mi pra^ 
oniaa. pvOcBta/iy ■ aininwi. rorod b* 
IUbiM povtr ■ ay la« aio^ Tailtys. boa- 
caputs ai« vviatrabte it ffc-rw an 
tnta ibt ptafts aad ndftdaaa aao««. Af- 
(Aaniaua is nai a tair tea aar ibt tOad. 

8m a««f rotflac jua^t Hfna « tov al- 
atodo. tat Wad ■ la la otan^ la a» 
9rcaT« uadtr«a« ordaaaet la eaa carry 
la dcoB of UGi paiiadB of Saa rackaa. 
bomba aad pwraira tuahii aaotaat ^ 
alcsi aad la mpamriiail o uiauaaiaM d 
raary a.7aun |ai note « a Oeattt art 
cbaRMfWy eapoMt wMpaas lyaaa. ta 
arr«aaoal systa « balk «f»-i»—tn 
aad rriUMt. UaOkt Woura ffs^Upa. t 
eaa cany mm ai a ti(H mopa 

Pitted acaiBsi Uw fWblt or aoMxauai 
iiiiiaiicnA dtftnaei of tte aoa-eamauiBHi 
Cwtral Amtncaa potfx tbt Bad rrprw 

Tht media ' have fo- 
cused on the icing— ^he 
MiGs — and missed the fact 
that a Soviet-style offensive 
arms cake has been baked 
beneath our noses. 

ma aa avtMow eapabimy. vHi or waa- 
oMiof c0*tr ftoai lOCs. Flytac a* bt- 
araia da dua radar ntt -' ■ 



oU4r anacfid •tilcki ivtartoM 
amy ferr* dua ikot tf aqr of k 

ben. ainnwod br 



UMH radl.*-«i«etad S7-< 

itr-ii aohit zsu nm, lat >-f— -— ■ 
of jmr amvaj a Nlan(«a ai* atltm. 
W-j ttt dMiftry af bUfc-p u fc uaa aa 
MIG* ar tap rrn..- od tefTaiartaka 
■rjoL ifei eiasbc ^^M-aiya tKliiijiii 
PKtaft vd bt coopMo. 

:« *1 af aa. •• hsvt aaad ana^ 
*B?auaL B a la taat aeoipiaaet by at 
V-1 aodta. If aa tit Rotcaa iiln^in 
ata a at dMfory if Jotnaon aa« b* 
cooun a nonoa bai aiHIIH i • 
(ncoOM kr tat aibataaiat deliay «f 
lOCa not a TiM ao ar as II fota Tte 
na paa « laaati: Tkt UKk aM Ml- 
Ma paraeaUHy at iuar. itfNaai a 
aaior ami a at8M«iv«. S(Bad.aar 
vmi saa bt vttvtd as OB* aam laot 
«( • iraitr posit, ikt iaaaaaa fe C» 
tm >i n i rm ofacksaele»a t 'ay1t(aa- 



aiBatt: Tfet Setai doetnaal moM. 
•ted at Tianaaiii an eka/ly Wtov- 
at a l at if ao U y aflatht a oaaua. 

nt aidoi MC aaana* by U J. aM« 
ooit m mm. L Wi Nt*. It. tit «»—■■— 



itma, A tarn tim ism mufthiaiai 
anas aMi laipiaay. It eaa aaaea p 




aad bardir paas onti auiteal piveiaaa. 
foa( as dew at atctuary a do lAr jea. 
a lit deva aad dirty gamt of illppi^ 
anaa a bordtr. baaac a Hoaduna or 
SUvadona C-4T. aad ittppw* boet. ail «■ 
dnataa radar eovcrac* aad bnct oadt- 
locttC (la Ml-M woaia bt aipiant. Oa- 
laaeas an siort a Ctauai AaitTKa aad 



toM rtpoftan Us iii iiaaai's poaDa: 
(*•■ ■'WMcw ai aa ba«o IOCs-y«. 
raa. t lad tfoty MtMta of «*a«^ 
fBB* a aoB « I eortd-ar aaif-«a«aatt: 
f^» at aopndac armat of at ha 
pact rf lit poai aas aaaouaead. 

lattr. as «• *aa hr 
tit oua Aot a dn^ a« art ooBttosad 
^ a* Mtaat tf a laport ka *Hk by at 



aad-ia osaaoal eoroOaryTaot a a a- 



soo'^ 



^zo 



UNCLASSIFIED 



35 



a-yi" 



DOCUMENT UNAVAILABLE. 



36 




MmiED 



Comptroller General 
of the United States 
Washin^on. D.C. 20S48 



iTTjiig 



6t" 



B-229069 



V?^y7 



September 30, 1987 

The Honorable Jack Brooks 
Chairman, Committee on 

Government Operations 
House of Representatives 

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell 
Chairman, Committee on 

Foreign Affairs 
House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairmen: 

This responds to your joint letter of March 31, 1987, 
requesting this Office to conduct an investigation and 
render a legal opinion on the legality and propriety of . 
certain activities of the Office for Public Diplomacy for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD) of the Department of 
State. Subsequent discussion with your staff limited the 
scope of the legal opinion to the issues of alleged lobbying 
and the development and dissemination of propaganda from 
1984 to the present. 



We conducted a revi 
lobbying and propag 
views of knowledgea 
S/LPD files. As a 
S/LPD's activities 
tion of certain typ 
on the use of appro 
purposes not author 
however, that avail 
that the applicable 
We are presently co 
activities, and wil 
periodic basis. 



ew to develop the facts regarding the 
anda issues, which consisted of inter- 
ble individuals and a search of the 
result of our review, we conclude that 
involving the preparation and dissemina- 
es of information violated a restriction 
priated funds for publicity or propaganda 
ized by the Congress. We do not believe, 
able evidence will support a conclusion 
antilobbying statute has been violatea. 
ntinuing a review of certain other S/LPD 
1 keep you informed of our progress on a 



THE PROPAGANDA ISSUE 

According to Ambassador Otto J. Reich, who directed S/LPD 
from 1983 until 1986, the Office of Public Diplomacy for 
Latin America and the Caribbean was established within the 
Office of the Secretary of State in 1983 to engage in a 
campaign to influence the public and the Congress to support, 
increased funding for the Administration's Central American 
policy. In pursuit of its public diplomacy mission, S/LPD 
used its own staff, and let a number of contracts with 




HIS- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



37 



UNCliiSHD 



1 "1 ^ 



oatside writers, for articles, editorials and op-ed pieces 
• in 'support of the Administration's position. Generally, 
S/LPD employed direct and overt methods in using the media 
to favorably influence the public to support the Administra- 
tion's Central American Policy. However, information 
developed during the course of our investigation demon- 
strates that, on occasion, S/LPD also arranged for the 
publication of articles which purportedly had been prepared 
by, and reflected the views of, persons not associated with 
the government but which, in fact, had been prepared at the 
request of government officials and partially or wholly paid 
for with government funds. 

For example, S/LPD arranged for a university professor, who 
was also paid as a consultant to S/LPD, to write a news- 
paper article in support of the Administration's Central 
America policy without alerting readers or, apparently, the 
newspaper that the government was involved. S/LPD described 
this technique in a March 12, 1985, internal memorandum to 
another Department of State office. Attached to that 
memorandum was an op-ed article entitled "Nicaragua is 
Armed for Trouble," which was ostensibly written exclusively 
by Professor John Guilmartin of Rice University, and 
published in the March 11, 1985 issue of the Wall Street 
Journal . The memorandum states that "Professor Guilmartin, 
who is a consultant to our' of f ice, and the Public Diplomacy 
staff worked extensively on this piece." However, the 
published article lists the author solely as John F. 
Guilmartin, Jr. and describes him as follows: 

"Mr. Guilmartin is adjunct professor of history at 
Rice university in Houston. He was formerly a 
lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force and 
editor of the Air University Review." 

The Guilmartin article was one of five "white propaganda" 
operations described in a March 13, 1985, memorandum from 
S/LPD to the Assistant to the President and Director of 
Communications. The memorandum stated the following aoout 
the article: 

"Attached is a copy of an op-ed piece that ran two days 
ago in The Wall Street Journal . Professor Guilmartin 
has been a consultant' to our office and collaoorated 
with our staff in the writing of this piece. It is 
devastating m its analysis of the Nicaraguan arms 
build-up. Officially, this office had no role in its 
preparation." 



UNCLASSIFIED 



B-229063 



38 



UNCLASSIFIED 



S n 651 



The- memorandum also described as follows the use of- 
corraultants to write op-ed pieces for Nicaraguan opposition 
leaders: 

"Two op-ed pieces, one for The Washington Post and 
one for The New York Times , are being prepared for 
the signatures of opposition leaders Alphonso 
Rubello, Adolpho Callero and Arturo Cruz. These 
two op-ed pieces are being prepared by one of our 
consultants and will serve as a reply to the 
outrageous op-ed piece by Daniel Ortega in today's 
New Yorlc Times . " 

A third item in the memorandum describes the use of a 
"cut-out" to arrange visits to various news media by a 
Nicaraguan opposition leader. Although the term is not 
defined, it appears to reflect an intention to hide the fact 
that the opposition leader's visits were being arranged by 
the government. The closing paragraph of the memorandum 
explains that S/LPD will not communicate its activities on a 
regular basis to the Director of Communications in part 
because "the work of our operation is ensured by our 
office's keeping a low profile." 

The memorandum, which is enclosed with this opinion, was 
initially classified by the Department of State as "Confi- 
dential." Following our request, it was declassified by the 
Department on September 10, 1987. Three other documents 
similarly were declassified following our request. 

The use of appropriated funds by the Department of State for 
certain types of publicity and propaganda is prohibited. 
Section 501 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice and 
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-411, August 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 
1545, which provided fiscal year 1985 funding for the 
Department of State, reads as follows: 

"Sec. 501. No part of any appropriation contained 
in this Act shall be used for publicity or 
propaganda purposes not authorized by the 
Congress. " 

The legislative history of section 501 is silent as to the 
intended effect of the restriction. See H.R. Rep. No. 197, 
99th Cong. 1st Sess. 90 (1985). This Office has had 
numerous occasions in the past to interpret language similar 
to section 501. We- have held that such a provision 
prohibits the use of federal funds for two distinct types of 
publicity and propaganda activities. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



39 




S 11652 

First, it prohibits "self-aggrandizement" activities on the 
•pact of a federal agency, which have been described by our 
Office as publicity activities of a nature tending to 
emphasize the importance of the agency or activity in 
question. 31 Comp. Gen. 311, 313 (1952), B-212063, 
October 6, 1983. Self-aggrandizement is not an issue in 
the present situation. 

Second, we have construed the language of section 501 as 
prohibiting covert propaganda activities of an agency, which 
is the issue involved in the situations described above. 
In our decision B-223098, October 10, 1986, we held that 
editorials in support of a proposed reorganization of the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) prepared by SBA for 
publication as the ostensible editorial position of 
newspapers to which the editorials were submitted, were 
misleading as to their origin and reasonably constituted 
"propaganda" within the common understanding of that term. 

We conclude that the described activities are beyond the 
range of acceptable agency public information activities 
because the articles prepared in whole or pact by S/LPO 
staff as the ostensible position of persons not associated 
with the government and the media visits arranged by S/LPO 
were misleading as to their origin and reasonably 
constituted "propaganda* within the common understanding of 
that term. Therefore, under the rationale enunciated in 
B-223098, supra , these activities violated the "publicity 
and propaganda" prohibitation of section SOI. 

We have been unable to estimate the amount of effort and 
funds expended on covert propaganda operations. Materials 
contained in S/LPO files indicate that covert propaganda 
operations were conducted on several other occasions and 
were not separated from routine legitimate activities. In 
view of the difficulty in determining the exact amount 
expended illegally, as well as the identity of any partic- 
ular voucher involved, we conclude that it would not be 
appropriate in these circumstances to attempt recovery of 
the funds improperly expended. We recommend that the 
Department of State talce action to insure that violations of 
appropriations restrictions contained in section 501 do not 
oecur in the future. 

TBB LOBBYING ISSUE 

The S/LPO staff carried on many activities designed to 
influence the public and the Congress to support the 
Administration's Central American policy, in keeping with 
the purpose for which S/LPO was established. 
Ambassador Reich gave a briefing to the Secretary of State 



UNCLASSIFIED 



B-229069 



40 



UNCLASSIRED 



1 1 to 



in which he explained that S/LPD's ob]ective in attempting 
to Influence Congress was: 

"To gain sufficient bipartisan support in Congress 
to penriit approval of increased assistance, 
economic and military, to Central America and to 
preclude crippling restrictions on actions in 
support of U.S. policy objectives in the region." 

Sometime in 1983, S/LPD developed a close working relation- 
ship with a public interest group entitled "Citizens for 
America" (CFA). CFA is a nationwide grass roots organiza- 
tion engaged in lobbying and fund raising activities on 
behalf of Nicaraguan Contra causes. CFA has its head- 
quarters in Washington, D.C. and is organized into regions 
and local district committees throughout the country, which 
are staffed with volunteer workers. Volunteers receive 
periodic instructions from. CFA's Washington headquarters, 
when legislative action is scheduled in the Congress, to 
call and write raeraoers of Congress, to write letters-to-the- 
editor and op-ed pieces, and call in and appear on radio 
talk shows in support of the Administration's policy on 
Central America. 

On March 4, 1984, the Chairman of CFA wrote the Secretaty of 
State informing him of the details of his grass roots 
lobbying effort in support of the Administration's policy. 
Ambassador Reich, then head of S/LPD, prepared a draft 
response letter to the Chairman for the Secretary to sign. 
In the transmittal memo. Ambassador Reich described the 
close working relationship between CFA and S/LPD as follows: 

"Citizens for America has been carrying out a 
public education campaign on Central America. 

"Our office has a very good working relationship 
with Citizens for America and has provided CFA 
with a great deal of information. 

"A word of encouragement and appreciation from you 
would go a long way toward letting CFA know we 
recognize and value their efforts." 

Afain on July 3, 1984, the CFA Chairman wrote the Secretary 
of State making the following request: 

"We hope you will be able to contribute a one-page 
letter to our 'action kit' voicing your support 
for this vital aid and your feeling that Congress 
must address the issue this summer. 



KNMsm 



41 



UNCLASSIFIED 



S 1 1 ^ ^ 4 



"This request is urgent. Your contribution will 
- mean more op-ed pieces, letters to the editor, ■ 
" calls to Congressmen, and radio and television 

interviews -- the elements of grass-roots support 

so vital for effective political action. 

'Thanks so much for your help. Anne Barton will 
be in touch with a member of your staff today to 
provide any details you might need." 

Ambassador Reich prepared a draft response letter for the 
Secretary of State to sign. The draft letter was not used. 
Instead, the Office of the Secretary sent Ambassador Reich 
an extract from a statement by Secretary Shultz before the 
Subcommittee of Foreign Operations of the House Appropria- 
tions Committee on March 16, 1983, and instructed him to 
reply to the CFA Chairman. We could not locate a copy of 
Ambassador Reich's reply to CFA. 

The annual Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,V under 
which the Department of State receives its appropriations, 
does not contain a restriction on the use of such funds for 
lobbying. The only antilobbying legislation relevant to" 
these circumstances is 18 U.S.C. S 1913, which reads in part 
as follows: 

"No part of the money appropriated by any 
enactment of Congress shall, ia the absence of 
express authorization by Congress, be used 
directly or indirectly to pay far any personal 
service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, 
letter, printed or written matter, or other 
device, intended or designed to influence in any 
manner a Member of Congress, whether before or 
after the introduction of any bill or resolution 
proposing such legislation or appropriation; but 
this shall not prevent officers or employees of 
the United States or of its departments or 
agencies from communicating to Members of Congress 
on the request of any Memoer or to Congress, 
through the proper official channels, requests for 
legislation or appropriations wnich they deem 
necessary for the efficient conduct of the public 
business." 

Section 1913 further provides for penalties of a fine, 
imprisonment, and removal from federal service. 



1/ See, e.g.. Pub. L. No. 98-411, August 30, 1984, 
98 Stat. ll45. 



ONCUSSIFIED 



B-229069 



uNcussra 



S 1 1 655 



Because 18 U.S.C. $ 1913 provides for criminal penalties, 
its interpretation and enforcement is the responsibility of 
the Department of Justice. This Office may, however, refer 
appropriate cases of apparent violations of 18 U.S.C. S 1913 
to the Justice Department for prosecution. See , e.g. , 
8-212235(1), November 17, 1983 (Commerce Department 
publication favoring revision of Export Administration Act 
referred to Justice). To our Jtnowledge, there has never 
been a prosecution under this statute. B-217896, July 25, 
1985. In addition, only a few court decisions have cited 
the statute and generally they have not dealt with the 
question of a violation, but have been concerned with 
peripheral issues. See, e .g . , National Associ ation for 



Community Development v. Hodgson , 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 
1973); American Puolic Gas Association v. Federal Energy 
Administration , 408 F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1976). See 
B-214455, October 24, 1984. 

The Department of Justice interprets 18 U.S.C. S 1913 to 
apply only when funds are spent in a grass roots lobbying 
effort, where an attempt is made to induce members of the 
public to contact their representatives in Congress to 
persuade them to either support or oppose pending legisla- 
tion. B-216239, January 22, 1985; 63 Comp. Gen. 624, • 
625-226 (1984). 

We note that 18 U.S.C. S 1913 prohibits the use of 
appropriated funds for printed or written matter intended or 
designed to influence legislation pending before the 
Congress. If S/LPD expended any appropriated funds to • 
develop the information provided to CFA, such expenditure 
might constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1913. On the 
other hand, if the information provided CFA was readily 
available within the Department of State, the expenditure of 
funds would not have been necessary, and the statute would 
not have been violated. See B-129874, September 11, 1978. 
We have not found any evidence indicating that S/LPD 
expended appropriated funds for such information. The only 
document found during our investigation that was given to 
CFA by S/LPD was a copy of testimony presented by the 
Secretary of State at a congressional hearing and was 
readily available. Accordingly, we found no evidence that 
would lead us to conclude that S/LPD violated 18 U.S.C. 
S 1913 in its relationship with CFA. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

S/LPD engaged in prohibited, covert propaganda activities 
designed to influence the media and the public to support 
the Administration's Latin American policies. The use of 
appropriated funds for these activities constitutes a 



BNWflfJffl 



B-229069 



43 



UNCLASSIHEO 



^ 11^';; 



h 



violation of a restriction on the state Department annual 
appropriations prohibiting the use of federal f unds • for 
publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the 
Congress. 

S/LPD also developed a close mutually supportive relation- 
ship with CFA, a nationwide grass roots organization 
engaged in lobbying and fund raising activities on behalf of 
Nicaraguan Contra causes. S/LPD acknowledges giving CFA a 
great deal of information. However, we have not found any 
evidence that S/LPD officials violated the applicable 
antilobbying statute. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan 
no further distribution until 30 days from the date of this 
opinion. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
parties and make copies available to others on request. 

Sincerely yours. 



Comptraller General 
of the United States 

Enclosure 



UNCUISSiriED 



B-22906? 



44 






I'aitr^ Stat«s DcpartaKnt of Sute 



'>-^S-^'«^657 



lureb 13, 198S 



^O^lO^X^hr/ZltS ONLT 



TO: 



FROM: 

SUBJECT: 



H£. Pat Buchanan 
Aaslstanc to the Peesid«ne 
Olcectoc oC CoBununication 
The White House 



StPABTKCR or STATE i/CDC/MB 



"7" 



BDSHor IDSCEXT. DATE 

*ft^JTH. .^ ?.£AJ01t(3) 
EKDOSS 
Pi 



S/LPO 



HSL 
er PA 



EKD0S2E Er.KTipi UA?.k::!C3 I 
?iwlA£S:7ISD5rs:LEASA3L£a 



HSLEASE DEtlliDC: 
Johnachan S. Millek pa or FOI EZDCTIONS 



'White Propaganda* Operation 



Pive illustrative examples of the Reich 'White 
Propaganda' operation: 

e Attached is a copy oC an op-ed piece that ran two 
days ago in The Wall Street Journal . Professor 
Guiloartin has been a consultant to our office and 
collaborated with our staff in the writing of this 
piece. It IS devastating in its analysis of the 
Nicaraguan arcs build-up. Officially, this office 
had no role in its preparation. 

e In case you aissed last night's NBC News with Tom 
Brotcaw^ you night ask WHCA to call up the Fred 
Francis story on the 'Contras.' This piece was _ 
prepared by Francis after he consulted two cf our 
contractors who recently had aade a clindestine trip, 
to the freedoQ fighter caap along the Nicaragua/ 
Honduras border (the purpose of this trip was to 
serve as a pre-advance for many selected 30urnalists 
t* visit the area and get a true flavor of what the 
^■ttdoa fighters are doing; i.e., not baby killing). 
^^^EijBugh I wasn't wild about the tag line, it was a 
^Ptttive piece. 

e Two op-ed pieces, one for The Washington Post and one 
for The New York Times , are being prepared for the 
signatures of opposition leaders Alphonso Rubello, ^ 




"NfiWr/fj 



45 



\immB 



.2- ^ ^^^58 



Adolvho Call«ro and Artueo CxaT. Th«s« two ep-«4 
pi«c*« ar« b«ia9 pc«p«c«d by oa« of our coa«ultants 
•ad will socvo as a roply to tbo otitra^toua op-«d 
piaco by Oaaial Octa^a io today's Maw Tocii Tt— s . 

• Through a cut-out, wo ara bavin9 tha opposlttoa - 
laadar Alphooao luballo visit tha following raws 
organixaeions wbila ha is in Hasbingtoa ebi^ w««k: 
Basest Nawspapars, g«wsw««it Hagaiina . Scripts Bswacd 
Mcwspapacs, Tha Washington Post (Edicorial Bcacd), 
and OS A Today . In aacicion, ch«' CNN '-ceeaan 
Report,* tha •McNeil-lahctc Report," t.-« 'Today Show* 
and cas Morning Nevs have baan contact«^ about tha 
availability of Mr. Ruballo. 

a Attached is a copy of a cable that wa received today 
froo Managua. The caale states that Congressoan 
Lagooarsino took up Samel Ortega's offer to visit 
any place in Nicaragua. You nay refflesser that Ortega 
received a good deal of publicity on his 'peace* 
proposal when he stated that he welcoced visits by 
Members of Congress, stating that they would be free 
to go anywhere they wished. As the caale notes, the 
Congreman's request to visit an airfield was denied. 
Do not be surprised if this cable somehow hits the 
evening news. 

I will not attenpt in the future to keep you posted 
on all activities since we have too oany balls in the air 
at any one tioe and since the work of our operation is 
ensured by our office's keeping a low :>rof ile. > I aarely' 
wanted to give you a flavor of soae of the activites tha: 
hit our office on any one day and ask that, as you 
foraulate ideas and plans of attack, you give us a 
heads«a» since our office has been crafted to handle the 
coaef^B that you have in getting the President's program 
for i^rfreedoa fighters enacted. 



Attachaents: 



1. Op-ed piece by Professor Guilaartm. 

2. as Managua 1S23. 



mumm 



46 



mmvm. 



Kali StrMt Jevraal 
March 11, 1»IS 
Editorial S«etion« P«9« 2t 



Nicaragua Is Armed for Troutle^* 



at aBq«« *a«i(y if MC I 




«iiiinri m itiif rfcnr imni i m in mm 
■■ ■ i«mi of Saadbna sniffy. 

tvpnra awftnri if a 9prM ttmlHr 
boHri tarn ikt atadSM vaft a ario if 

aact t*'*"***" ""^^it"^ iftaac tf a lyp* 
«id e> ttiv jit a0lv atrenA. TlButfe rt- 



flaA 
ivat- 

carry 



abac a* evt» aart itt Nil ■■ Tht 

■MB Ittdy eudMau vaa Mpmdue Mie- 
ns: Hffriceaaaflocr wamc Mk •cat 
<« ■ UX afvs raoH. 

At tfet *p Mwcri Nleano*'* Paofk 
poR if ConMD (aod ai ita U.S. iUcDw 
tantt i^KaiaOm nm at trrv pack. 

nt bsMto if bt«rai ipKalaaoa bam 
*na aa asOeainaeae "Voy" vfea Saatti- 
■u fbrtvia iOaUut tOfMi d'SBoie *•■ 
■■■eid. ■ a saicoMM oi«t « laseo*- 
Omrt by ofDdal U^ lyntowiw. aai :te 
enuaeoMaaad aoilCGi. bat aftir araa 
itiiaofutx, Tkt ■*«■ va* aU (•■ 




Act Looked F« 



anuud paw a ay IM aiHf f^AtjFS. 
eopun ai« ««toaraait i» |lav>l 
titci a* prafea aari rMfrttaa tttm 
Itianmia va aoi a b» lai torika I 

Bui a««r im^t piMtfa tama « i 
otddta. a* itad • la « Hcbml I 
pnsa«« iinliiaat Tiiiari in eaa 
la cxeia of ZJDi peua* if a 
DBflstaa aao pcvoBn^^Qart a^Dbafi 
■ioi aad a spasaeatart tarm-aoa 
reunr ar-awi (w aala « a OBoMa 
tlMaii(Wy eapaait avapoaa 
flfv-^ncni systtBi ■ bodi 
tat rvOaMt. UaOka waara 
cap cajTy Inn sx la ii^a QoopL 

PlOcd icsiaai ite Itttkt or 
tfuaiicraA dtfRBi of tla 
Cncra) Anancaa pann. ite HM 



r^ rrw^ Adce fo- 
cused on the icmg — the 
MiGs — and missed the fact 
that a Soviet-style offensive 
arms cake has been baked 
beneath our noses. 



wm» aa i»i»ani capaMtty. waM m •sk- 
oal top co««r taai lOCa. Ftywe \am to- 
ana (ta daa radv tm. aad feacvaf at 
gmai& A caa s^ bbo an^paoRac coia 
9m vWi impiirj. B eaa aataa paBoH 
aaO bav^aif poata vsii avfical pmjiwa. 
■■af aa da* aa aacfsia/y ta 4» tka Jafe. 
laikadava aad (ttrcy faina if ittppac 
actoa a bvarr. Pauair * Haduna » 
SalT^Dna C-4T. aad lappuic aao. all <» 
dirantP radar ea««ncv aad tact lada- 
lacud. (Ac Mh24 •ould te atpnox. Oa- 
lancta tn itort ■ Cfocrai Amcnea aad 




SAM-ik. r^v^aoad ff-a 
hrjy aawa ZSJ »« At 
tf .;ar ainm a 
wj •■ d«l<«rr tf 
iBGt tr ap rr-: •■» 



'>aa«fim.attav« 
lapataaL B a aa Oat 
UA aadte. tf aa < 
0M.4aadMi«tnrrf)a 





aimal a— >a H i 'ai il m mm i 

of a jiaiii' paaa. a* knaika aCW' 

oal Aaaiea if a due Ss«M-aya oCto- 



aaotr na Sana daeonaai aoM. 
•tact tti ^adhiiaii aj« drany kOov- 
ar ■ laiiiiauj ataavt a aaara. 
Th( BKlai IOC tuamm. by U^ aMa 

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ilNClASSIFIED 



47 




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48 



Cl^'OfM.^ 2 , ^fbotrxAc So 





-18 JOINI StAtf 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR -BWT 9ffafU'm CW .j , 
Subject: DOD Support foe DCI (S) 



^'50 



1^: 



^^1= 



1. {T3) We have evaluated your request for^^BHH^HH^pneeded 
to support the Nicaraguan resistance effort as directed By the 
12 July 1983 Presidential Memorandum. Although DOD has the 
capability to provide this type support, there are still two 
major obstacles — legal authority and funding. 

2. (TS) The Office of the General Counsel, OSD, has advised that 
there is now insufficient legal authority for DOD to provide the 
requested support. However, they anticipate a new Presidential 
Finding, exoected to be issued in September, will provide 
necessary authority. We must wait until that Finding is issued * 
before we can proceed. 

3. (S) Funding is a separate problem the new Presidential Finding 
may not completely resolve. DOD must still comply with 
established statues pertaining to use of funds and reimbursement 
for support provided another agency of the government. Please 
provide us your funding proposal and any recommendations you may 
have on how to legally solve this problem. 

4. (S) Our people are working with yours to be operationally 
ready to implement the program immediately after the new 
Presidential Finding is issued. If we can get the funds issue 
resolved, we should be able to meet that goal. Vour expeditious 
response is required to prevent any further delay. 







^<^r=o^<i' 











49 




MCMAIIK* 

1. (TS) A 12 July 1983 Presidential Memorandum directed the Department of 
defense to provide maximum possible assistance to the Director of Central 
^^^^Uqenc^fo^lmprov^n^suopo^^t^th^jUcaraguan resistance forces. 

^HHUllH^BHH^^IHHMBPIHHHI^HH^^'-"'' subsequent 
llfe^ings and staffing better defined and retxne " 
for tha project is| 



led the list. JCS nickname 



2. (TS) A preliminary cost and readiness impact analysis was accomplished 
based on inputs from th e Services and Joint Staff. Total cost of DCI 



requested assistance is|_ 
_impact involves 
~ Sptjcific cost' 

contained^ i.i the enclosure 

support. 




The most serious 



readiness impact data Eoc eacTi item ar« 
Initial analysis indicates we can provide the 



3. (S) Two major issues, legal authority and funding, are not yet 
resolved. The Office of the General Counsel, DOD, has advised* there Is 
now insufficient legal authori'-.y for DOD to provide the requested support. 
However, they anticipate a new Presidential Finding, expected to be issued 
in September, will provide necessary authority. Although we may continue 
planning and coordination, the requested support cannot be provided until 
the new Findiiig is issued and policy approval is obtained. 

4. (TS) The funding problem must be attacked separately. We are working 
with your legal a:;sistant, DOD General Counsel, CIA lawyers and DUSD(P) to 
find a legal way for DOD to provide this support even if CIA cannot 
reimburse for it. The initial informal response indicates a legal method 
can probably be found based on wording in the new. presidential Finding. 



c-jse-- 



■u.der pro' 



'i^ 



CLASSIFIED BY Dir 
DECLA&SXFY ON OAD 




c oo>owMHO«i» jtf >wov«i, 




OATI 0» MVAII 

24 Aug 83 



iiifii af^i'^firir 



TOP SECRET 



:^riwmi^ 



% 



wvw u a amotm or ims roHM am imcimi. 



50 




KNcussm 



J 



5. (S) In the mesatime, we need to continue staffing and be ready to 
implement as soon as the new Presidential F^i^^^^^issued. We are 
continaing to work operational details <^i^^4|HH|^^nd the Services. We 
need a formal chop from each of the Service Lniets to insure we have th gjr 
support and a greement on a funding plan if DOD has to provideB 

The proposed memorandum contains details and our 
"reccmmendat ions . 

6. CJ) Request you sign the attached memorandum informing the Service 
Chiefs of our proposal and requesting their concurrence and comments. 

Reference: 

• Under Secretarv of Defense memo, 19 Aug 1983, "DoD Support for DCI (S) 




51 




ilNCUSSIEIED 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

/VASMIN&ION C iClOl 



^ f 



153:1 



6 Septe.-nber 1983 
SAD 330-83 



MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army 

Chief of Naval Operations 
Chief of Staff, US Air Force 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 

Subject; DOD Support for che OCX (S) 



1. (TS) A 12 July 1983 Presidential Memorandum directed the 
Department of Defense to provide maximum possible assistance to 
the Director of Central Intelligence in i:nproving support to the 
Nicaracjuan resistance forces. The Office of the General Counsel, 
DOD, ruled tnat sufficient legal authority for DOD to provide the 
support does not presently exist. However, they anticipate a new 
Presidential Finding, scheduled to be issued in mid-September, ■ 

all provide nece ssary autnority. Nickname for the project is 

2. (S) A summary of specific assistance requested by CIA is 
enclosed. The Service responsible for action to provide each 
individual item is indicated. Your staffs have been very 
responsive and are providing outstanding support. 

3. (TS) We do not anticipate any probl ems concerning the War 
Powers Resolution. CIA has assured asl 



'However, as detailed planning is completed, each 

activity will again be reviewed for compliance with legal 
requirements on a case by case basis. 

4. iTS) Preliminary estimates developed by our co jibined st affs 
:e the support requested by DCI will cost 

Initial costs will hav^; to jome from present 

funds, /pit will seek re imbursen ent through appropriate channels 
but proliirikility for success is questionaole. In either case 
legal f^iading restrictions will be met. 




Cr,A3SIFIED BY CJCS 
DECLASSIFY ON OADR 



vmssm ': 



52 



UNI!LA$SIFIED 




::2 



situation 



_ Most of tne Topport will be" ... 
ra£t v/tn work with yours to take advantage 
FY^^Hfunds as most appropriate in your present 
'plan to establish a separate account for this 
project with one Service designated as executive agent. Your 
funds can thenbe transferred into this account as need arises 
throughout FY^BH 

6. 'S) I solicit your personal support to be ready to implement 
actions immediately upon issue of the new Presidential Finding. 
Request your concur rence dnd commencs by 9 3eptem ber 1983. OJCS 

Doint of contact is P 

_ Because oT^TT 

requ est you^wor k it only in the 

l and on a strict need-to-^<nov^ 
basis. 



Y-t^'^'Yi 



Ji^.4j>i~<. 



t 



Attachment 
a/s 



JOHN W. VESSEY 
Gt-ncral, USA 
Chairman 



53 




TOP SECRET 



■^Hmsim 



SPECIFIC REQUESTS 



oO 



Thcse^^^^^^^Knd associated data summarize the status of the 
DCI reque^ttor DOD assistance. They are based on the original 
request as redefined and refined from input'3 and meetings with 
CIA and Service personnel. 

The tollowing guidelines and assumptions were used to evaluate 
costs, readiness iiipact and feasibility: 




UNCUSsm: 



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54 



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58 



UNCIASSIRED ^-^^ 



PiS'ZS'i — O/SzSS' 






ONttASSinED ''^^ 




59 



1 5 



ME.V JRAN3UM FOR THE RECORD 

SSo-'izl: CIA Requesc for DjD Su^joo. t C^j 



15 



J J o 



1. ;TS) a -citing to better define CIA nee ds tc 
Nicarsguan resistance efforts -^as ht 
Attendees : 




2. (J?) Eaon item of ti^t- CIA request was discussed. Current 
st-tus cf each is attoched'*. Re-ources are available to support 
most ot t.iis request. howev-.'r, costs and r'.ission iirpact must ie 
evali = ted for each line ite.n. 

3. (S) AJditionai perceptions and incociiat ion discussed included. 

a. (S) CIA is r.ot sure oi what their aoeds really are. They 
had to compile this reqjoot on '/ery short notice. 
Consequently, adjustments will be necessary. 




!t started t!ie CIA answer 

_^_^^^____^ A support 

ae developed when policy approvaT is obtained. 




.-^-^- 



.eaS2- 



CLASSIr'IED BV Dirl 
OECLASSIfY CN OAD* 



m 




(^^ 



^L*^if^ 



60 









UNCLASSIFIED 



61 



J~~Z' 



CJCS 



.ommm 



\\mi'^mm\ 



^RY SHEET# # 

KM UH ST OMatNATOir 



2-53 



\) 



\S3^^ 



ran UM av oojs omit 



X ATMIOVAl 



SUBJCCT: 

DOD Support for DCI (S) 



INFOWWATIOM 



1. (TS) A 12 July 1983 Presidential Memorandum directed the Department of 
Defense to provide maximum possible assistance to the Director of Central 
_Int_elli_acnce_for_im£royiiv3_sjoport to the Nicar.ag ^an resistance forces. 
B|^P^^H^H^mmPIB|BBI^^|^IH|HHHf rom Subsequent 
^S?^Kigsan^3taffxng better defined and refined this list. 



2. (TS) A preliminary cost and readiness impact analysis has been 
accomplished based on inputs from t j j ie Services a nd Joint Staff. Tot al 
cost of DCI requested assi_staxice-j 

serious readiness impact, Ir. volvesl 

[Specific cost ana readiness impact data tor 
each item is ccntainea m the enclosure. 




4. (S) More details involving scheduling, acquisition, training, transfer, 
funding, and legal issues will have to be worked as we proceed with the 
program. However, before proceeding any further we need. conceptual, 
policy and funding approval. 



5. (U) Request you sign tiie attached memorand'.im advising the Services of 
the DOD tasking and support recuirad from each. ^ 

Reference: 

* List of Sp^ific Requests 



mBj. 



^W 



CLASSIPIED-BY DIRECTOF 
DECLASSIFY ON OADR * 




COOaSMATWM/APm OVAl 



HUM * nJkTI 



\vavmom oma 



DAT1 Or^M^AMATIOM 

28 Jul 83 



mm^ 



DUSD(P)- 



LL 
ASST 



NAMi»aATI 



Jcs^.« 



l|MVIO«J« f lO-M Of TMM FOMM AM OMOiITI.V 



.*< W|>x^ -jt 



62 




C#C#SUMMARY SHEE> # 



CJCS 



=l(iW0P 



MM uaa av •moimatoii 



- - 1 - 



MM UM av OOja ONLT 



OjaM OAT« 



DJS 








X 


A^MMVAL 


auajicT 


for 


DC I 


(S) 


X 




DOD Support 




IMraHMATKMl 


1 



1. (TS) A 12 JjLy 1983 Pr'ss idenc lal Memorandum directed the Depac t.-nent at 
Defense to provide ■?a:< i-iu.t\ co.'SiDle assistance to the Director of Central 

en ce for ir.orov l-.r zizsoct to the liicara qoan resistance forces. 

_ rom DOD, Subsequent 

,gs ana staffing c.-ttcc defined and refined this list. 

2. (TS) A preliminary cost and readiness ir.pact analysis has been 
accomplished based on inpjti; from th^Se^^^ej^^^^J^u^^Sta^f . Total 

assistance ^H^^H^^^^^^^^|^|HH^HTheonly 
seriou^^^^^u^e^^i^^ioa^^i n V o 1 V e sl^^^^|^^^^^^^|^^^^^^^^^H|^^H^H| 
H^I^I^HHIHIBIiilHH Suecif i^co^^arv^^ea^uTes^impac^d^^^cor 
each iten is containe^ui the enclosure. 

(TS) Realizing D03 Tiy not be ^reimour-Jcc 



4. (S) Mc^ djt iil^^^ijivolving scheduling, acquisition, training, transfer 
*«+ f undin j'witr' haVe^co bo worked as we picjceed with the program. 
However, before proceeding any further we need conceptual, policy and 
funding approval. 

5. (U) fleqjest you sign the attached memorandum advising the Services cf 
the DOD tasking and support required from each. ^2''P*' 

Hefecence: V r^.!;.'. . "■"''. 

• List of Specific .Requests 




jCS 'O"* § 



vinxf loinONS Of Tmt f o«M AHt otsoirri. 



63 




mmmi i: 

.. 4-.M'NO'ON C <Ji., 



. J 1 5 3 4 4 



MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief ot Staff, US Ar;ny 

Ch-ef of Naval Opecacions 
Chief of Staff, US Aic Forcvi 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 



SdDJect: DOD Support for the DCI (S) 



1. (TS) A 12 July 19J3 Presidential MenoranJuin airected the 
Depart.T.ent of Defense to jjrovide naximum possible assistance to 
the Director of Central Intelligence in iir.proving support to the 
?Ucaraguan resistance forces. initial estimates developed by our 

L^ied staffs ^ndicate .t he support requested by DCI will cost 

| p 1 u 5 some additional .-nar.power and 

:rans7cr tation. 

2. (TS) We will seek re i.:>our se.iient n l funds through appropriate 
ciiannels. However, initial costs will have to come from present 
DOD fur.ds. To distribute tlie impa'ct of thi s unscheduled 
requirement ! 

^_^ My^^^ f will work with yours to" 

:ake advantage of using r'^^^^^r F^^^^p^unds as most appropriate 
in your present situation. 



3. (S) Polici 
assured usi 



sroval had oeen ootained frdn DUSD(P) . CIA has 



As detailed 

planning is compietea,^acTi~act ivi ty will be reviewed for 
compliance with legal requirements or. a case by case basis. 

4. (S) Specific details of the request are enclosed. I solicit 
your support in movi_ng rapidly to get the initia tives started^ 
Point of concact i: 




only in th.fl 
and on t strict need-to-know 



,k^ 



Attachnent 
a/- 




tWSH 




CLASSIFIED BY CJCS 
DECLASSIFY ON OADR 



J *jl 



■ tijTS^t^ • 



64 



OHCUSSIflED 



wiAssro 



65 










tm^5 



66 




.9 Ptc«rab«r 1966 



WORKING PAPER 
DESTROY WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED 



TOP SECRET 

(U) Background Paper for th« Director, 



13760 



.1. (U) projec 




II. (U) MAJOR POINTS 

A. (1'S)^HH|^|HHr^* ^^* ^^^ nicknAme for dOD 
aBiHtanc^c^tn^Dlrector Central Intelligence In improving 
support to the Nicaraguan Reatatance rorcea. 

- The authority for the program waa initially a 12 July 
1983 Praaidentlal Momorandum and later a 19 September 
1983 Preaidentlal Finding. 

- Chronology of Key eventa follows i 




•>— Support was r«qu«st«4 on • nen-raiaburaable 

Program briefed 

— 19 Ao^ust 83 OSO General Counsel ruled support as 
proposed was ill«9«l. Economy Act required reimburse- 
ment. 

— ( Septeaibcr 83 CJCS asked for concurrence and 
comaents from Service Chiefs. 




m5 



program was 



INTERNAL STAFF PAPER 
iS_£flyBREO BY 




CLASSIFIES 8) 
CSCLAS8IFY ON" 



TOP SECRBT 



• AflC«8f««5? 



67 



UN(i^WD 



TOP SECRET 



TOP SEC 




19 6«pt«Bbcr 83 Presidential Finding on Nicaragua 

Blgned. 

-- 22 September 83 DUSD(P) memo to CJC3. 

Sec Def directed military departments to 

provide the CIA with the maximum possible support 
In accordance with law and executive order. 

CIA will reiabucM DOD at th* lowest possible 

cats. 

— 27 Ssptsabsc 83 CJCS memo to Service Chiefs. 

— Conveyed guidance from DUSO(P). 

— - Provided Services with revised list of 
support items. (TAB B> 

— 12 Octobsc 83 CIA requested adjustments to the 
list. 





mama 



68 






UNttMSIflED 



TOP SECRtT 




— 1 October 84 Boland Amendm«nt cut off all funds of 
the CIA, DOD or any other US entity for aaeistance to 
the Contrae. 




TOP 8ECR1T 




^mmmti 



69 



uNcuno 



TOP SECRET 



D 13763 




Indlcat 
legal ipending limit on covtct operation!, 

D. To our knowledge, the only DOO eciuipme nt_ treneferred. 

and 




APPROVED BY 
Prepared byi 



Director I 




TOP SECRET 




nmmm 



70 



nssra 



^aJ/SD /a) 



UNCussm 



71 



JINCLASSI 



THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHI NGTON 






4; 



^'5S 



MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP 
DATE: Friday, September 16, 1983 

LOCATION: White House Situation Room 
TIME: I 2:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. 

FROM: WILLIW. P. CLARK 

I. PURPOSE ; To review the new Presidential Finding on 
Nicaragua with the NSPG prior to soliciting your approval. 

II. BACKGROUND ; The DCI will present a new Nicaragua fir.ding 
for consideration by the NSPG (Tab A) . This new finding has been 
extensively reviewed by Defense, State, and the NSC Staff and 
contains their recommendations. Director Casey has informally 
discussed the finding with Senator Goldwater and other key 
senators of the SSCI and language desired by the SSCI has been 
included. 

This new finding will replace the current Nicaraguan finding'^ 
■^ (Tab B) but will not affect our other Central American activities 
>Vj (Tab C) . It specifically includes "symmetry" language, which 
^ I provides for a cut-off of support for resistance force activities 
Aj only if the Nicaraguans meet three basic criteria: 

\: u: "5 — Cessation of Soviet/Cuban arms transits through 
^>:^ '^ Nicaragua; 

, V^ 3 — termination of training, command and control, and 
.fq •_ <"- logistic support for guerrillas m other Central 

■^ . "js American countries; and 

J r' 4 — amnesty and non-discriminatory participation by all 
S £ .J' Nicaraguans in the political process. 

"Si;'' If you approve the finding, either Friday or this weekend, it 
■^ ""' °^ will be briefed to the SSCI by the DCI and Secretary Shultz in a 
'§ ■^ closed session next Tuesday, September 20, 1983. 

^ The a9«a^ for the meeting -is at Tab D and talking points for 
your ufl4^«re provided at Tab E. 

III. PMfflCIPAWTS ; NSPG Members. 

IV. PRESS PLAN ; None. 

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS : See agenda at Tab D. 

cc; Vice President Bush 

James A. Baker, III 

Edwin Meese, III 

Michael K. Deaveri 

SECRET I JAI W- fl-\^ t. I m C n SENSITIVE 

lify on: OADR 



4M^ 




72 



UNCLPED 



MEMORANDUM 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



ACTION 



September 15, 1983 
SENSITIVE 

a-5? 



MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARJC 

KENNETH DeGRAf FENREID/W 
OLIVER L. NORTH ^ 



FROM: 
SUBJECT 



'J <^i55 



NSPG Meeting on Covert Action in Nicaragua 



ii:! - oci 



The President will chair an NSPG meeting tomorrow, Friday,- 
September 16, 1983, froo 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. The meeting is 
to review the new Nicaraguan Finding prior to submission to the 
President for approval. 

The proposed Finding (Tab A) replaces the current Finding of 
December 1, 1981 (Tab BJ and addresses only activities affe<;ting 
Nicaragua; not other Central A.Tierican actions contained m the 
Central American Finding of March 1981 (Tab C) . The proposed 
Finding has been thoroughly scrubbed by State, DOD, and NSC. 
Walt Raymond and Al Sapia-Bosch have provided input designed to 
improve its chances for Congressional support. 

The Finding specifically addresses the parameters for our support 
to the Nicaraguan resistance forces and contains "symmetry" 
language providing for a termination of support only if the 
Nicaraguan Government meets certain specific criteria: 

Cessation of Soviet/Cuban arms transits through 
Nicaragua; 

termination of training, command and control, and 
logistic support for guerrillas in other Central 
Aaarican countries; and 

•^ amnesty and non-discriminatory participation by all 
Nicaraguans in the political process. 

Because of specific Congressional constraints on DOD resources, 
000 and CIA lawyers removed language pertaining to support 
provided by DOD to CIA. They agree that this wil l in no was 

imoa i r POD ' a ability to provide reimbursable items 

|to the CIA. Justice Department staff is aware ot these 



Tahges. 



SEQRET 



BScTassify on: OADR 



^wmm 



SENSITIVE 




73 



SE 



\immm 



SENsirivr 



Following his Hill consultation, the DCl late today circulated 
revised language to the first page of the Finding. Because 
thia occurred less than 48 hours before the meeting, nspg 
members could complain on procedural grounds that they have 
not had sufficient time to study the new language. 

We concur with most of the fixes, but have serious difficulty 
with one key proposed adjustment. The point at issue is over 
the objective. We are working on more suitable language, 
which will follow in a separate memorandum. o-i--' 

Chrvsf.JLjjaimAn, Walt Raymond, Al Sapra-Bosch, and Paur Thompson 
concur. 

Recominendation 

That you initial the briefing paper to the President at Tab I. 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachments 



Tab II 



Judge Clark Briefing Paper to the President 

Tab A - Proposed New Nicaraguan Finding 

Tab B - Current Finding dtd December 1, 1981 

Tab C - Central America Finding dtd March 1981 

Tab D - Agenda for NSPG Meeting, September 16, 1983 

Tab E - Talking Points for NSPG Meeting 

NSPG Meeting Participants 



SENSITIVE 



mmm 



74 



H»ti 











«N(!USS/f/fD 



75 



I' 



NICARAGUA FINDING '* 6 783 



Th« Hndlng replace* the 1 Occeaber 1981 Flndln 




This Flndlog authorize* the provlaloo of material aupport 
and guidance to Nlcaraguan realatanc* groupa; It* goal 1* to Induce 

the Sandlnlsta goverruient In Nicaragua to enter Into meaningful 
negotiations with Its neighboring nations; and to Induce the 
Saadlnlataa and the Cubans and their allle* to ceaae their 
provision of arms, training, comaar 




S E C R E-T- 



UNCIASS'IO 



76 



S E C B g T • 



OfKiHoSIFIED 



finding Purtu4nt to Section 662 of 

Th« Fortlm A««l»t«nct Act of 1961 

A> A— Bd«d, Conctrnlng Op«r«tlon» 

UndTfkan by th« C€ntr«l Inf lllgtnct 

Agency In for«lgn Countrl»a. Othr th«n 

TTio«« Inf nd«d Sol«ly for th€ Piirpo«« 

of Into lllgonco CoHoctl«i 



N 67CC 



5-6y 



I hereby find that th« followty actlvltl** arc Important 
to the national aecurlty of the Unltw Statea, and direct th* 
Director of Central Intelligence, or hla dealgnee, \* report thla 
Flndtag to the Intelligence Coaaltteea of the Congreta puraoant 
to Section SOI of the Rational Security Aet of 1947» aa aaended,_ 
and to provide auch brief loga %• neceaaary. ^ 



SCOW ' 
NICAXAGOf 



POIPOSB 




^provide a i^o rt, 

Milpaent and trtffaing 
jRlatance to Nlcaraguan 
paraal lltary realatance 

groupj 



Eadially PeclaSifiedy.Released dn.^^^^AM^i]i3E7 
under previsions of E.0. 12356 ^ 
by B. Riger. National Security Council 
^ - J 



ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT 
ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET 

ICUSSiREO 



■ 3 E C R e 




77 



wmm^ 



N 6781 




-2- 



UNCLASSinED 



78 




N 6782 



Th* Whit* Heus* 
Hashlntton, D.C. 



Data: S«pt«ab«r 19, 1983 



Th« Director of Central 
Intalllganca la directed to 
enaure that thla prograa 
la contlnuoualy reviewed to 
aaaure that Ita objectlvea 
are balog cat and Ita 
raatrlctlona adhered to. 



('^<^'•J^ (^f^Y^ 



■ S t l H t-^— 



(JNCUSS!fi£D 



79 



('hfrfTc-TL ffL 

pi>a 7-»J*r/ fa C 






ONCLASSIFIEO 



80 



o I Ndme mci Add'ess 






■^'^V 



/^f>r — -1,^ 



^'ACTION 



S^j'f'*^ 



?^ 



^^.^^^ 



^Ap- 



♦/4i» 



.^/i/ 



% 



if 



COMMENT 



CONCURRENCE 



DIRECT REPLY 



DISPATCH 



INFORMATION 



PREPARE REPLY 



RECOMMENDATION 



SIGNATURE 



REMARKS 






litiffiii 



N 6786 



3-C7 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO ""W^/*^^ 

COPY NO / OF ^"^ 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 
Intelligence SourcM and Methods Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unjuthorued 0>uloiu't Sobjett to Criminal Sanctions 



M^B 



f. 



/ 




»m 



81 



The D.TCiOf oi ^.-nirj. mieliigerjnc/ic^ JHTWl | 



Maiiwiprinoc mm 



mmsim 



N 67S7 

27 September 1983 



MEMORANDUM FOR : (/Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs 
Deputy Secretary of State 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr., 
Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 



SUBJECT: 



Letter from Senator Barry Goldwater Regarding 
the Central America Finding 



I think th-'s lette- f-on Goldnater dese'ves an a"s«e'. Clea-ly, ne'^bers 
of tl-e Ccnp:ttee talked to fe ;-e5S afte' _ti"e ►■ea-'ng on this Finding. Ue 
know that the press knew the outcome within one-half hour after the hearing 
was closed and that during t^^e liea.-ing a member of the Comriittee predicted 
that it would. What is troublesome is an Administration official explaining 
"the p-og-iF »; cjtV'-r- "-.y f-. Casey and Mr. Shultz.' Later on, the same or . 
anothe' Ac " n : sL-a l" on jffic^al is said to have stressed that "this should 
end the ^rgjT^nt ever whether the Administration was violating its pledge 
by doirc -;-e fan just stopping the arms flow," etc. This has all the 
ei-r.arks cf a briefing by an Administration official. If we know of any 
such briefing, authorized or unauthorized. It should be reported to Goldwater, 
or if we know of no such authorized briefing and have no idea of whe-e the 
alleged Adminisfation staterrent came from, we should te'l him in our response. 



I would appreciate your help on this. 



Will am J. Casey 



Attachamt 



l/^, 



k'J^ 



UNCUSSIFIED 



CL BY 0008074 
RVW OADR 



82 




'jilfTcHeb -Sfalcs ^cna{c n~~~~^ — ~~| 



tCLCCT COMMITTCC OM INTCLLICCMCC 
WaIMINSTON. O.C. lOSIO 



Scpteaber 22, 1983 




The Honorable Ullllam J. Casey 
Director of Central Intelligence 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Washington, D.C. 20S0S 

Dear Bill: 

You will recall that during the hearing the other day I 
asked if we could downgrade the classification of the new 
Presidential Finding which we were discussing. 

It was not done and yet T he New York Tises published a- 
s-tory on the thing today. RcZcr.ber, till, the long talk 
we had about the Department of State leaking Top Secret 
material? Now when The N'gw York Tires can publish sozietlilag 
marked Secret, something has 'to be done. 



I don't care '-ha did it, ti 
gone too far. 



.-e should find out. 



This has 



Frankly, I think it was too highly classified to begin with, 
but It did have that classification and X want to hear from 
your office where that leak came from. I am getting fed up 
with leaks out of the Vhite House, your own Afency, or 
whe re ver . 




Enclosure 



mm\m 



83 



More Aid to Nicaragudn Kebels Backed 



K'ASHLNGTON. ScpCS— Tb« ftea. 
gu Ad=_-iJwaaa MMLlki Scaatt y^ 
icUlgcnc* Cc3U3ina« laday that It 
f^»^Siti 10 cccUnu* C0v«ft BSlUry aid 
to the Nicinr'Ui Icrafcaou uaUl th* 
S«.'i>l--jsii C-cv-msaent itcpp?^ (ivug 
ciil!*.iO' !-?;>'" '* ^' n'ifia In El Sal- 
I va^or, accor^-zj to partiapa^u la Uia 
meciinf. 

! VUba£3 J.Casey, DinatorofCeatTwl 
lateUiceace, and Scovtary of Staia 
Ceorf e P. ShxiJs met for leveral boun 
behind cloiad doors with th* comisit- 
lec. k'hlch !s beaded by Soiator Barry 
Coltf'sater. RepubUeaa ot . Ariana. 
Senior Cokfvatcr had raqvuitted • re- 
pur: oo p^a=s far ti>* Qscal yaar that b^ 
gissanOet.1. 

The Ad=!3istration b ebUgad to r»> 
pan to the ti^elligeae* ooisffllttes of 
both houtaa oa the goal* aod obJacHvaa 
€( any cover: aeilvliy. Tbe commlac* 
had dKlaretf la May that It would oA 
ctt tht aid t= the a T» ^>e » of ■ sew r»> 
por.^vS-r-M. 

V.:-r. c' •-? CO ''"'' "^^^"^ 

were tr?cr:eOy satisSed by the Ua^ 
ite e rjrji o: lb* Nieararviaa pr» 
c r»J:. Sc3e Utf b«-a rm-f.-ned b» 
^u»e Mr. Ca*ey bad icportadly sug. 

Qifh: dMlde to back th* Nicaraguaa 
"cDntras,** a< the iawixesls ai« 
knawn, with the aia of overthrowtag 
the Maragca Ccverssec;. which Is 
su;por.e< by Cv.t* a.->d other Coinau> 
Bill iiaies. ' 

•\>ry I=: rsaied With Sbultr* 

"Tbi ct=b^n wert v«ry lapreuod 
with Sh-— u.** o=s partidpaa: aaid. 
"Tbcy l^n£b:' the plaa was nioeh 
aore Mstl^'.t tbaa ia tb* pasL It 
1uc««< aj i; r. batf sfas cobsTtaee aad 
r.-i — u^-.-." 

Prcsidoi Ksagaa had said poblidy 
that th* Ustod States bad ae I 
c( o*trthrowi=g th* 1 
meat-A^n uiiuaila ai 
that th* m BdlUa* wMMittaM a^ 
prapriatad ia th* CMii^Bp] ywr for 
eovet aid was ealjr alKla F*wl 
anas froa KieanaM ■■ gatag to 
th* iasurgcaa ia Zl MKadv. 

Aa AdslaUtratfon eOdtf saM tbtt 
tbc prop^a ouUiaad by Mr. Cas*y aad 
Mr. Sbuie wcat beyoDd tb* <cop* a( tb* 
ciujeut piu^a a. B* nM It was imt 
H «n«d to tetr^jctiag aias. bat was 
more hreafflr tutad in tOKfil wmnow 
o( th* Kica.r T'7 "^Hl. -W« wot at 
ways bciag ^jestioa*^ aa otAdal 
■aid, "oa wbc^har w* w«n ; 

y«Ddaiirpi«£raiaoflat« 

How w* say. ' Yea, w* ar> luwonln g 
the rebels >ara~ttiia N»earamaas nap 



thetf iu5ver»»ao ia B«lf*'*~T£F 



HoDdoiu asd Costa 1Ue» Tnr1i«^ 
Oae panictpant said that the covert 
laid was to be snd. pot only until th* 
ISaodialstas stopped tupportlog Inair* 
I gents in EI Salvador, but ia Booduras 
I and Coxta Rica as welL 

The Admlnittntion cffidal strest^ 
that t h;» awroaeh should end the trp ^ 
ment over whethr r «h» A(i.t<tiii. tf^tio^ 
was viBlitlat Iti BJedK bT doine m w 
than iui.i nammr th> mni flow Tg" 
Official also said that ther* was ^ 
thought of th* > 



t -^e irtunents la trvins to overthrow 
the Saadinista Gevenunei^ '~ 

The Bouse earlier this jrear passed a 
bUl cutting off an covert aid to tb* 
NIcaiaguan Innogcnts for the US &»■ 
cal year, bta k Bood little chaoc* «< 
passag* by th* Seaatc. la th* abiaica 
of aaion by both boos** to oa oO tha 
aid. It coatiatiad. Today's '»— nftt* 
aaetiag seemsd to daar th* way tor 
Senat* approval tor th* UM tisal 
year, which begi=s Oct. L The Boum 
%-ij iiv* to dscie >iipi-!3- it w'ajra u> 
v'D'.e zr^^ to c.-t ott covot dd In ;h* 
aezt&scalyear. 

Th- Senate Icteijeaa Co=ialsae 
tas g-=s:aUy baa suppomv* of the 



N 6789 



Ai T-.-^-— •> »ct.=i b Ct::-_-aJ 

Aoenca. The chief o-.tlc of tbt .f d=ia- 
lsL-i-=s en the ccnsiir.ee ts S£=a-.or 
JosT/i ?_ E:i?=. Decacnt of DsU- 

Aesordlsg to partidpants ia th* •*•> 



»:oa, the Aii -'-'r r«ac3 ir',s>e»»ea pr*. 
•cntad a fencal flsdlag by Prall^ 
Reagaa that It would be ia th* aatloial 
security lata.-e*: te ooottirj* a pa.-v 
mflrtarv prograa dlreciad aga^j; th* 



It was a very poa lth>* s* «t»»«i» - 
;b* effSdal said, adding that ^'1 widud 
tb* press woe.' J have tnca sbl* tohear 




84 

if^.s WUiSSIflEii ^'^^^3 

A/- 52 3/0 '-Mru M'3z^/^ ^"^^^ 






ONCLASSIFO 



85 



mamm 



ivE fi 32316 




E. ^ Tustaining rtgional •cono«i««. Th« r«a«di«s outlined 4bovt 4r« 
aor« li)c*ly co succscd i£ sos* aaasur* of •conoaie itability 4nd 
growth c«n b« raturnad to Central Aacrica. Th« ragion continuaa to 
auffar froa tha ill affactt of low eoaaodity pricas, low 
productivity and aassiva disxnvastaant cauaad by ragional tansion 
and conflict. Tha acono^xaa of tha ragion hava baan u&abla to 
capitalize so far on tha U.S. racovary. In tha naar tara a 
substantial infusion of aconoaic assistance is naadad. Our ability 
to obtain this funding will ba affactad by tha Kissinoar Coaaissioa 
and tha tiaing of its report. We are consulting with tha Kissinger 
Coaaission to prepare a supplaaantal assistance effort for FY-d4 
which would neither preeapt the Coaaission nor allow the short term 
situation to deteriOi-ate further. 

ACTION PLAN 




UNCUSSU 



86 



BNCUSSIflFD 

3/7 .^^ M-^-^" 






UNtlMWO 



87 



United Sutes neoin-P^n: of f-ii'.''^^ 

SYSTEM II 91310 
l^athingun, B.C. 20520 
<i 7 n - ^ _ 



yiilASSIF.L 



December 20, 1S83 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE 
THE WHirr HOUSE 



SUBJECT: Next Steps m Central America 



1.1 response to your, request of November 21 for 
an in-depth review of cur current policy for Central 
America, an interagency tas)c force has prepared the 
the attached status report and action plan for the 
consideration of the National Security Policy Group. 



Charles Hill 
Executive Secretarv 



Attachment : 



Where Next in Central America 



2k 



iinsmifiBf^ 



4W 



88 



Copy of Copi««, S«ri«a 



wismm 



WHERE NEXT IW CEOTRAL AMERICA 



'2309 



w« hav*-madc substantial gains in Central Aacrica in th* 
past thr«« y«ars. Cuban/Sovi«t-suppert«d dastabilization has 
b««n bluntad. W« hava shown that, with our help, tha rast of 
Central Aaarica n««d not 90 tha way of Nicaragua. Nicaragua is 
increasingly isolated and, as a result, is attefflpting to appear 
aore reasonable and/or to signal a desire to reach soae fora of 
accoaaodatioQ. Deaocracy reaains strong in Costa Rica and has 
taken a fira hold in Honduras. Zaportant steps to achieve it 
have been taken in El Salvador. We have doubled eeonoaie aid 
while the CBI and anticipated Kissinger Coaaissioo 
recoaaendations lay the cornerstone for dealing with the 
region's aassive eeonoaie probleas over the longer tera. Our 
ailitary efforts hav* strengthened the resolve of Honduras, 
contributed to iaproved perforaance of the Salvadoran araed . 
forces and increasingly placed the Sandinista governaent on the 
defensive. In short, the overall strategy it in plaee. 

Despite these successes, we ha-ve reached a plateau in our 
policy. New initiatives and decisive and effective action are 
needed so that current opportunities will not be lost and 
necessary cooperation and support can be obtained froa friendly 
governaents and our own Congress. Specifically, this will 
require coaing to teras with the following: 




*'* CtUJSffe 




89 



i.i 



iimnmm 



J- 



■^ 



mmm 



Ul..«1 Suie* D«p«rwi«n^RtJt^ 
gaiAiA#to<i. DC. 20S20 




MEMORANDUM FOR: 



Subject: 



CIA - Mr. ThOB4> Corm«ck 
HSC - Mr. Rob«rt Kiaaltt 
WH - Mr. Kenneth M. Duberataln 
OOO - Col. John Stanford 
JCS - LTC. Dennis Stanley 

Legieletion on Hiceregue 



N 6883 



S-7V 



Mr. Daa, a« Chairaan o£ the SZG, has called a aeeting of 
the Special Interagency Working Group August 26 at 2:30 p. a. to 
consider che Adainistration' s strategy toward legislative 
efforts to prohibit or restrict covert assistance to 
Nicaragua. The attached aeaorandua outlines the present 
legislative situation and various scenarios we aay face. 
Ambassador Motley will chair a preliainary meeting on this 
subject on August 24 to which your representatives have been 
invited. 

The SIC Special Interagency Working Group will be 
responsible for ensuring the developaent of a plan of action 

for aeeting the various legislative contingencies, coordinating 
the Adainistration' s position on this issue and monitoring the 
situation as it evolves. 



(jf/ Charles Hill 
Executive Secretary 



Attachaenti 



Meaorandua 



ikf 



V- '-''•• 



'/, 





qMRS 




90 




OE^AHTMtNT OF STAT 



IIXMM* c seuo 



jJN^n 



S«nsiti.v« 




SUBJECT: 



Augy$t 19, 1983 



MEMORANDOH FOR HR. WILLIAM P. CLXRK 
TEE WBITE BOOSE 



Int«rtgtncy Coordination on L«gisl*tion to Prohibit 
Covert Assistance to Nicaragua 



This aevorandum dexeribes fie nunerous ways in which 

restrictive legislative proposals, seekir.s to deny authority c' 
funds for O.S. support of anti-Sandinista paramilitary groups, 
are likely to be raised when the Congress reconvenes in' 
September. It also outlines -the procedure that has been 
developed by a State-chaired- Interagency Group for opposing 
hamful legislation. 

The present legislative situation is very unsettled, 
presenting nuaerous opportunities for maneuvers designed to 
constrain the Administration's authority to conduct or support 
covert operations. Relevant Congressional actions include th« 
following: 

1. Separate Legislation 

The Boland-Zablocki bill (E.R. 276C} was passed by the 
Bouse on July 28. This bill would effectively prohibit covert 
assistance to the anti-Sandinistas for the remainder of FY 19i. 
and all of Tt 1984. Senate consideration of this bill has bei: 
d«f«rr«d, but Che situation must be monitored closely. 

2. FY 1984 Intelligence Authorization Bill 

The Bouse bill (B.R. 2968), as reported, contains a 
prohibition on the use of FY 1984 funds for the Nicaragua 
program. The Senate bill (S. 1230), as reported, contains no 
comparable limitation. Bowever, the classified report of the 
Senate 'Intelligence Committee calls for a new Presidential 
finding which must be approved by the Committee. (The 
Committee approval procedure is not legally binding, especiall: 
in light of the Supreme Court's decision on legislative vetoes 



ililfll^^CLI 



ii n •••■.. 1 



|[D 



91 




- 2 - 



N 



6885 

Hi th« Boust, an effort will probably b« nadt to add tht 
Bolaod-Zablocki language to tb« inttlligenct authorization 
bill. Depending on the rule that is adopted, there could be 
another general debate on covert assistance. However, the 
prospects are not good for obtaining a reversal in the Bouse of 
the recorded vote on B.R. 2760. 

There is also a possibility that the Boland-Zabloeki 
language will be offered in the Senate as an aaendnent to the 
FT 1984 intelligence authorization bill. We should be able to 
defeat such a Senate aaendaent, but the vote will be close. 

Whatever passes the Bouse and the Senate on the FY 1984 
intelligence authorization will have to be sorted out in 
conference 

3. FY 1984 ADDcooriations 

We may also face difficulty in the Bouse when it deals with 
the intelligence portion of the FY 1984 Defense appropriatibn 
bill. (Congressman Boland serves on the Appropriations 
Coaaittee and could introduce Boland-Zabloeki or other 
restrictive language in the aarkup of that bill.) 

Perhaps most important, we will face the possibility of 
inclusion of Boland-Zablocki restrictive language in the FY 
1984 continuing resolution. As in the case of the Defense 

appropriation bill, the Bouse Appropriations Committee will 
have initial jurisdiction over the continuing resolution. 

4. Other Considerations 

Meanwhile* negotiations continue on possible compromise 
foraulacions with moderates in the Congress. The latest 
pcoMMrl (froa Zabloeki) does not meet all the Administration's 
eeaflpiw but is far preferable to Boland-Zabloeki. 

S 4«clsion will be needed soon on whether to interject into 
tkla already complicated situation a new Presidential finding 
on the Micaraguan prograa. Such a finding would be required no 
later than September 30 under the teras of the Senate 
Intelligence Coaaittee report on the FY 1984 authorization 
bill.. There is soae concern that the new finding could 
undecaine our legislative strategy if not carefully worded and 
tla«d. 



S0^ 



92 




6886 



It should also b« nottd that in tb* oontbs ahead Congrtss 
will deal with a number of otbsr issuts affaeting 
Xd-ninistration policies and pcogcans and that these issues will 
become intecielated in the legislative process. This 
necessitates close coordination within the Executive Branch 
among all officials concerned with the affected policies and 
programs and with legislative strategy. 



Procedure 

It is imperative 
complex Congressiona 
effective and coordi 
an essential tool fo 
Central America. Ac 
3rujp has been estab 
Secretary of State, 
coordinate strategy 
matters. CIA, DOD, 
representatives. Re 
Assistant to the Pre 



that the Administration deal with this 
1 situation, in all its permutations, in an 
nated manner if we arc to avoid the loss of 
r achieving our policy objectives in 
cordingly, a Special Interagency Working 
lii,hed under th4 chairmanship of the Depu-y 
in his capacity as SIC chairman, to 
for dealing with the Congress on these 
and the NSC staff have agreed to provide' 
gular liaison will be maintained with the 
sident for Legislative Affairs. 



Charles Bill 
Executive Secretary 




93 







IVE 



rne WHITE MOUSE 



:--sc/i(Jt-at6c859 



MEETING WITH THE 



ATICNAL SEC U aiTY PLANNING GROL'P 
anuary 6, 1984 



i425S 



DATE: Fridjy, 

LOCATION: V."hite House Situation Room 

T:.\E: 1: 30 - 2: 30 p.m. 

FROM: Robert C. Mc~arlar,e-r'"'> 

I. Pf RPOSE ; To review Intctaconcy rocc": ondat ions on Cintril 
Anerica and rrake cc-cisicns :"cr our strategy in 19S4._ 

II. BACKGROUND : Our last NSC lovel neeting on the C.:-'. ral 
Anerican situation was on Septe-ier 23, 1983. In lato "^.z -ir, 
we requested a review of our Central Ajr.erica strategy r.-.d isNed 
for Interagency recc.-jrendations for actions that will carry us 
through 1984. The result is the Central Ai-erica strategy paper 
attached at Tab I. 

The document at Tab I was prepared by the Restricted Interaosficy 
Group and reviewed and approved by Ken Dam's Foreign Policy SIG 
(SIG/FP) . It provides detailed actions to irprove our chances 
for success in the region which are corpatible with the brcader 
reco.-.-endations of the National Bipartisan Corjnissicn on Central' 
Anerica (N3CCA) . Although the Cc--iissicr -.sill not present its 
final report to you until V.'edr.escay , January 11, 1984, we ne;i -: 
r.ovG early next week on key rescurcc issues which r.ust be 
forwarded with your FY-85 budget subriissicn . An agenda for the 
ir.eetxng is attached at Tab II and proposed talking points are at 
Tab III. 



-;^p -ajnr qiraTrttnt-g of the Strategy paper at Tab I include 
recor-.endations on overall ooals . resources , dioloratic strategy , 
covert operation s , militarv activitie s, and leoislative/pua; ic 



affairs. Briefly su.rjTiarized, the SIG is in agreer.ent with 




94 



liNCUSPtO mitmd 



N 46540 



s".::3:tive 



• Our dinlonatie strgfogy in, the region should proceed as 
follows: 




95 






? SEC:^ET 



N 46541 



SENSITIVE 



Public diolcracv ar.d legislative strate<^y ; State 
o.-e person avaiiabla to work Latin Ax.erican issues 
Congress, Further, too few resources are dvailabl 
international persuasion on these issues. The Sov 
Cuban and Communist guerrilla prcpaganda apparatus 
and is working hsrd to bripg about a cutoff of all 
aid to the target countr^s, in Central A.-.orica. T 
urgent np(><i t-o autho r izaWBBstaf_ f pcsitiors srd 
for the State Oeoai-t-en t Ufforoer to permit us t 
results on the Hill and present our C>jntral Areric 
mor e effectively. 



new h 

with 

e for 

iet 3 



as ©r^C/ 





The agenda at Tab II is designed ^o allow discussion of each of 
these critical issues. Your talki.-.g points at Tab III are 
structured to er.phasize those areas which ^re most important to 
the ir;plerr.entation of a winning strategy, the t«S?G principals 
need your direction on these issues, 

III. PARTICIPANTS : 

The National Security Planning Group 
Director Stockr.an 
Oliver North 
Constantine Menges 

??iSS PLAN: None 



SF.QBS>«CE OF EVENTS; See agenda at Tab III 



IV, 



Attaehmcats 

Tab Z - Strategy Paper, w/Tabs A thru 

Tab II - Agenda 

Tab III - Talking Points 




"Mil tBsnw 



mmm 



Prepared by: 
Oliver !torth 
Corstartine : 



SENS it:-. 



96 




2 ^7'a-%4??; 
N 44121 



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97 



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98 



UNCLASSIFIED 




Ocument 







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'^ *^ ^ ■- .. ;!u..-:| ?^^.ri^y Cr-.-.-ij 



(j^m) UNClASSIFiED 



99 



/*Dor> 



>_P 



MtMORA>a}UM 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-400064 
Fol low-on 






NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



1/ 



ACTION 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTHp 



February 3, 1984 



SUBJECT: 



Attacic on Guerrilla Command and Control Centers in 
Nicaragua 



At dusk on February 2, five Cessaa 0-2 aircraft armed with 2.75 
inch rockets attacked the ERP command and control center, 
training camp, an d lo gi stics facilities at Volcan Casita (1 
Poir 




>ing (February 

I attacked the FSLN communications 

navai arms depot at Aposeutillo. As in the raid the previous 
night, there were secondary explosions and minimial return fire. 
None of the aircraft were damaged. 

Since the two attacks, radio Managua has claimed that three EPS 

soldiers were killed by A«37 aircraft attacking from Honduras, 

^nd.that a 'Ministry of Agriculture radio antenna was damaged.' 

I confirms that radio Veneremosjthe propaganda voice of the_ 




Sigflilieaatiy tn« grN, which has been down playing CONTRA 
activity in recent weeks, has protested loudly over these 
attacks. Newspaper accounts in Managua today have variously 
tccused ARDE. FDN. the U.S.. and Honduras for the attack. 




Declassify: OADR 







100 



UHClll!JSB 



"^4832 



Aa a related issue, we made a conscious decision not to invite 
the Nicaraguan ambassador to today's ceremony in the East Room. 
The State Department or OPL did, however, invite Adolf o Colero, 
the political head oC the FDN Colero. This may come to light 
publicly and we have asked State to provide some press guidance 
in the event the media here noticed. Colero has already been 
interviewed by several members of the Latin press. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you brief the President using the points above. 
/ 
Approve L^^ Disapprove 



cc: Constantine .Menges 



Attachment 

Tab A - Subject Map 






.r?''^ 



101 



9'dO 



See Hearing Exhibit OLN-177 



102 



^-gra 



See Hearing Exhibit DRC-23 



103 






n-'-- 



fS^ ' 



Q-33 



This material has been reviewed by the 
Executive Branch Inter-Agency 
Declassification Review Committee and found 
to contain no classified information. While 
the Declassification Review Committee has 
attempted to protect privacy interests where 
possible in transcripts or footnote source 
documents, the Declassification Review 
Committee cannot accept responsibility for 
protecting privacy concerns in these 
exhibits. 



EXHIBIT CLIlftpl^ 2. Foo-^Mo-f€ %3 



The above defined exhibit appears to contain 
private, personal, or proprietary 
information obtained by the Select 
Committees of Congress that the Executive 
Branch would not necessarily release. 
Release determination is the Select 
Committees' responsibility. 



wi 




lASsro 



104 



This material has been reviewed by the 
Executive Branch Inter-Agency 
Declassification Review Committee and found 
to contain no classified information. While 
the Declassification Review Committee has 
attempted to protect privacy interests where 
possible in transcripts or footnote source 
documents, the Declassification Review 
Committee cannot accept responsibility for 
protecting privacy concerns in these 
exhibits. 



EXHIBIT 






^^^^^^^Tty-j^ — ^ 







The above defined exhibit appears to contain 
private, personal, or proprietary 
information obtained by the Select 
Committees of Congress that the Executive 
Branch would not necessarily release. 
Release determination is the Select 
Committees' responsibility. 



105 



-^-^Ijr; 




106 



a-^i' 



CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



107 



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CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



108 



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ONCUSSIHED 



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5-S? 



a? 



.■V 



,-^^\l November 7, 1933. 

; ^^_3^ • N 7460 

I Dear Rob Oweni 

Just a note to let you know we are all alive and well and 
working. 

I wonder what B.Cs outlook will be with Clark out and Mc 
I Farlane the new chief. Hopefuly B.G. will be more powerful as we need ' 
I more like him. 

Also if you are talking to Kirkpatricks aid pass the word 
that there are alot of little people like myself, lost in the boondocks 
that think she is one of the best and we don t give a damm what Schultz 
the press or anyone else think hang in there and hang tough. 

Its to bad you are not 'here at the moment. I m on the north 
porch and their is a great bright rainbow in the sky with a nice tropi- 
cal breeze. Birds are all over the place, fish jumping in the river and 
the sound of laughter of the children claying soccer sets the whole thing 
off. Don t you think I should start looking for a Costa Rican bride to 
^ put hybred vigor into to Owens clan ? 

Last week we had a 2** hours meeting here with the hero, Ro- 
bi,lo and the chiefs of the Indians from the North plus their sub chiefs 
body guards etc. over 20 in all. Margarita and the maid had a 2W hour 
cookethon and from h.r I was able to know the opinions of all the diffe- 
\ rent factions and still stay completty out of the deal. It was pretty 
>:> obvious ffOjLtt^* 8t*rt that it ^s doomed to faliure as the hero is to 
proud, and^'fb stubborn to agree to unite and fight with the F.D.N. 

I understand some might join with Roger, reorganize and 
combine forces, I hope. 

The last two weeks I have spent a lot of time over on the 
Pacific fixing an old cabin cruiser boat we are putting in a diesel motor. 

The large land owners there are organizing into vigilante 
bands and we were able to cache about thirty rifles and several thousand 
rounds of-amo at various farms. Also located several places that ranchers 
are now fixing that can be used as clandestine airports if needed in the 
future . 

Here in San Carlos we have permission to set up and arm a 

200 man civil defense unit and a co-"''- of we«ks \zo T w.r«^ w< *k -v^ •, . . 



109 






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157 




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182 



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193 



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82-750 196 



197 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 400796 



H. 



ACTIOM 



November 4, 1983 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE '^ 4GC79 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH V-^ 

CONSTANT INE MENGES 

SUBJECT: Support for Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition 

Ambassador Negroponte's cable at Tab A suggests anincrease 

our self-imposed limit on arms for the FDN fromflH^||tofl ^ 

weapons. He notes that there are currently more "ralliers* than' 
there are arms to equip them. 



Tha current Nicaraguan Finding (Tab B) imposes no limits og^^hj 
numbers of weapons we provide. To date, we have providedj^^ 
weapons to the FDN andV^l^to the ARDE forces in the soul ^ 
Director Casey has, afcerthe fact, briefed the Select Comnfttees 
on how many weapons we have provided each time we have increased 
the number. 



Q^th^_ 



State (Michel), Defense (Ikle), and CIA (Casey) agree with 
Ambassador Negroponte's request and believe that the weapons can 
and should be provided soon. The President and the Vice 
President have been asked to concur on these increases in each 
previous case. On one occasion the matter was brought before the 
NSPG. Given the urgency of the situation and the President's 
imminent departure, we do not believe that an NSPG needs to be 
called on this issue at this time. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you initial the memo to the President at Tab I (please note 
the distribution) . 



prove Disapprove 




cc: K«mteGraffenreid 
Don Gregg 

Attachments 

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President 

s /Tab A - Negroponte's Bac)cchannel Cable of Nov. 
^v.Yj l^ab B - Current Nicaraguan Finding 



iiHm^^^ \i»mwm 



M500. 



198 



UNBLAHiitHED 

THC WHITC HOUSC 

WASHINOrON 

November 7, 1983 



smtM IV 

40079« 



lr4!I^U'i" 



N 40C31 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 



ROBERT C. MCFARLAN^VTO 

Support for the Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition 



Ambassador John Negroponte in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, has 
> recommended tha^w^increas^^he number of weapons issued to the 
FDN forces fromUHI^IH^^HB H* cites the increased number 
of "ralliers* to the anti-Sandinista cause and the momentum that 
the Democratic Resistance Forces currently maintain. 

The current Finding establishes no limits on the number of 
weapons we can provide. We have a self-imposed ceiling of J 
FDN weapons that has been in effec^since September 1983. we 
have also issued approximate ly|mmweapons to the ARDE units in 
the south. 

The Departments of State and Defense and the DCI concur in 
Ambassador Negroponte 's recommendation regarding the FDN. If you 
agree, the DCI, in accord with established procedures, will 
advise the Select Committees of the Congress during his next 
routine briefing. 

RECOMMENDATION 



Ye« 

Y2. 



No 



I 



1. That you authorize 3,000 additional 
weapons to be issued to~the FDN forces, 
bringing the total numb er of weapons issued 
to the ^DN tol 



cc: The Vice President 





199 



MMUO%Atft>VU 





SYSTEM tV 
NSC/ XCS- 400064 
rollow-on 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



ACTION 



MEMORANDUM fOR ROBERT C. NCFARLANE 

FROM I OLIVER L. NORTH ^ 

SUBJECTS Attack on Guarrilla Coa 
Nicaragua 



February 3, 1984 



lA' 



83] 



ind and Control Cantars in 



At duak on February 2, fiva CaasMa 0-2 aircraft amad with 3.75 
inch rockata attacked tha ERP cononand and control center, 
training eanp, an d logiatica faeilitiea at Volean Caaita (aee 
Poir 




Jing (February ____^ 

I attacked the FSLN eonununicationa an< 

naval arma depotTat Apoaeutillo. Aa in the raid the previoua 
night, there were aeeondary explosiona and minimial return fire. 
None of the aircraft were damaged. 

Since the two attacka, radio Managua haa clainad that three EPS 
aoldiers were killed by A«37 aircraft attacking from Honduraa, 
and.that a 'Miniatry of Agriculture radio antenna waa damaged.* 
I jonfirma that radio Veneremoa (the propaganda voice of th4 




Si^lZidAatiy Ihm CM, which haa been aown playing 
activity la recent weeka, haa proteated loudly over theae 
attacka. Hewapaper accounta in Managua today have varioualy 
rcuaed AROI. FDW. the U.S.. and Honduraa for the attack. 




200 



unclIII??ed 



^4832 



A« a rel«t«d issue, w« iud« a conscious decision not to invit* 
th« Nicara^uan ambassador to today's caramony in tha East Room. 
Tha Stata Oapartnant or OPL did, howaver, invita Adolf o Colero, 
tha political haad of tha FON Colaro. This may come to light 
publicly and we have asked State to provide some press guidance 
in the event the media here noticed. Colaro has already been 
interviewed by several members of the Latin press. 

RECOMMENPATIOM 

That you brief the President using the points above. 

Approve u Disapprove 



cc: Constantine Manges 



Attachment 

Tab A - Subject Map 



LS -^1 






201 



f^ 



■' ^ ^.NATIONAL SECURITY COLNCIL 



MEMORANDUM 



NSC/lCS-400064 



ACTION 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 



ry 23, 1984 

SENSITIVE 

N 4485/ 



FROM: 
SUBJECT: 



iJ 



OLIVER L. NORTHt 
CONSTANTINE MENGES 

Targetting Guerrilla Command and Control Centers 
in Nicaragua 



This is in response to your coitunent at this morning's director's 
meeting: 




That you brief the President on the points above. 
Approve ^■yd^'t^ Disapprove 



'1=7 



Attachment -OcVj. . W^'i / ti 

Tab A - Subject Ma*. '' ^J 




SENSITIVE 



202 



^-96 



See Hearing Exhibit DRC-23 



203 




2 -^1 Q-%3L 

N 44121 



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205 



i 



i 



, '0 i Na'^e 3ra 


icc--?s 


> Da'e - • J s 


' ' The President i 


, 2 . f 


3 1 


4 1 


5 1 




i 


6 i 


yj AC'ION 




PILE 


'approval 




INFORMATION 


COMMENT 




PREPARE ^E'L^ ' 


CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENOA'iONi 


DIRECT REPLV 


i 


RE'f'URN i 


j DISPATCH 


i 


Signature ' 


REMARKS ', 

cc: Oliver North (#2 i3) 
Jim Radzinski (#4) 
Constantine Menges (?5) j 
Don Fortier (<»6) 

i 



Oioohiod, 



SECRET S£N3:t:vi 



•„-jj:n 



'i 16S90 

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO ^^0122 



COPY NO OF. 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



r^ 






Warning Notice 

intelligence Soufces and Methods involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized OiKlotureSuDiect to Criminal Sanctions 





'OP SECRET SENSITIVE 



206 



National Security Council 
The White House 



VHsimim 



.^ 



Package <^^(^ ^ P .1 ,'i^- 16 3 91 
SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION 



Bob Kimmitt 




( 


John Pomdextar 






WilmaHall 






Bud McFarlan* 
Bob Kimmin 




2- 


NSC Secretariat 




^k) 


/ 


Situation Room 


\\( 


/^ 


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\^ 


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L- 



IL 



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I I a inforn 



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ll»t«in • Oi«0«tcn N a No furttMr Anion 



cc: VP Meese Baker Oeaver Other 

COMMENTS Should be teen by: 



UNClASSIFIfD 



207 



MEMORANDUM 
TOP SECR£T 



uMTOS^Mcii 



N3c/:cs-4cc ::: 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



ryl,, .,.. ■* '<5 5 92 



ACTION February 

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE ^^^ 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH 

CONSTANTINE C. MENGES 
KENNETH DEGRAFFENREItX-i'^ 

SUBJECT: Central America Legislative Strategy — 

The o'ackson Plan and Additional Resources for 
Our Anti-Sandinista Program 

Based on your guidance after the NSPG meeting this morning, we 
have prepared a memo from you to the President (Tab I) askir.g him 
to send a memo (Tab A) to the NSPG members on support for the 
S14M in additional resources. Both memos refer to this morning's 
meeting and the necessity for a concerted effort to obtain the 
requisite funds — in conjunction with consultations on the 
Jackson Plan. 

The memo from the President at Tab A does not mention the issue 
of a Congressional confrontation over winning or getting out. Al 
Keel and others advise that the lealc potential would increase 
significantly if this dimension were to be included. 

Please note that the President's nemo at Tab A should be dated 
February 17, regardless of when it is signed. 

Recommendation 

That you initial and forward your memo to the President at Tab I. 

Approve ^ Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab I McFarlane/ President 

Tab A Presidential memo to State, OSD, CIA, CJCS 



TOP SECRET 

Declassify: OADR 



wdmm 



208 



mimm 



N 16693 



ME^466R?OJD^'\l 



SVSTE.v ;•. 

NSC/ICS-4C::;; 



209 



THE U HITE HOLSE 
February 21, L984 

.V 16Q94 

TOP SECREr SENSITIVE 

ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANSi^'i^ 

SUBJECT: Central America Legislative Strategy - Additional 
Funding for the Anti-Sandmista Forces 

Issue : How can we best obtain additional resources for 
continuing this program? 

Facts : As you were briefed at this morning's NSPG meeting, the 
FY-84 Defense Appropriation and Intelligence Authorization Acts 
limit funding for our operations in support of the Nicaraguan 
opposition forces to S24M. Unless an additional SUM is made 
available, the program will have to be drastically curtailed by 
May or June of this year. The Intelligence Authoriration Act 
also as)cs for a Presidential report by March 15, on steps taker. 
and recommendations for further action to achieve a negotiated 
settlement in Central America. 

Discussion : Operations by the FDN, ARDE, and MISURA Indian 
opposition groups are the only significant pressure being applied 
against the regime in Managua. Should these efforts have to be 
terminated for lack of resources, we will have lost our principal 
instrument for restraining the Sandinistas from exporting their 
revolution and, in fact, for facilitating a negotiated end to the 
regional conflict. The international repercussions of this 
failure in American policy will affect friends and adversaries 
alike. We must avoid precipitating perceptions of a second "Bay 
of Pigs" or creating an environment conducive to the collapse cf 
El Salvador or increasing the threat to Honduras. 

The NSPG principals are in agreement that the only practical 
alternative is to approach the Congress with a concerted effort 
to obtain additional funding for this program, despite the 
anticipated strong resistance we expect. The memo at Tab A frcr. 
you to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of 
Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will 
serve to initiate such action. Copies are also provided to each 
of the NSPG members. 



TOP SECRET SENSIT: 

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UNGLMSIFIED 



210 



TCP secre: 



Ullrili^^voi !..... 



SENSITIVE 



N 16895 

The NSPG principals also agreed that this effort must be undertake: 
in concert with our strategy to obtain approval for legislation 
to implement the NBCCA report. Our spokesmen defending this 
legislative proposal must be prepared to defend our Nicaraguan 
program as vigorously as the other economic, humanitarian, and 
security assistance elements of the plan. We can also use the 
report required by the Intelligence Authorization Act as an 
opportunity to further this goal. 

Recommendation : 



OK 



No 



^^ 



That you sign the memo at Tab A. 



Attachment 

Tab A - Memo to Shultz/Weinberger/Casey/Vessey 



Prepared by: 
Oliver L. North 



cc: Vice Preside: 



TOP SECRET 



nmm 



SENSITIVE 



211 



ONClASS! 



ii 



^ U896 



t 



212 



--— NSC, ;cs-400i:; 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON ,*J 16897 

February 21, 1984 
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULT2 
The Secretary of State 

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 
The Secretary of Defense 

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY 

The Director of Central Intelligence 

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

SUBJECT: Central America Legislative Strategy — Additional 
Funding for Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition 
Forces (TS/S) 

This afternoon I forv/arded to the Congress our legislation to 
implement the recommendations of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America (NBCCA) . I have also reviewed and 
endorse the legislative and public diplomacy strategy for 
acheiving Congressional approval. (C) 

Pursuant to our discussion at this morning's NSPG meeting, our 
approach to the Congress on the NBCCA legislation must also focus 
on obtaining sufficient funding to carry on our Nicaraguan 
democratic opposition program throughout FY-84. Not only is this 
course of action specified in NSDD-124, it is imperative if our 
increased assistance is to have a positive impact when it is 
available. We must make this a matter of highest priority as we 
consult with Congress in building support for the Jackson Plan. 
Increased resources of S14M for this endeavor are essential to 
continue these activities and prevent a ma3or foreign policy 
reversal. I am determined that this program should continue. 
(TS/S) 

Secretary Shultz and Director Casey should take the lead in 
presenting our case to the relevant Congressional members and 
committees on this issue. A concerted effort must be made by all 
Administration spokesman to explain the necessity of this program 
and Its value m achieving our objectives — not only in the 
region, but worldwide as well. 



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mm& 



213 



1 W I w ^ y I k » < 

TOP SECRET 2 SENSITIVE 

N 16898 

The Legislative Strategy Group under Jim Baker should deterroine 
the proper .legislative instrument for obtaining these funds. The 
State Department should incorporate this effort within our 
overall strategy to obtain approval for legislation implementing 
the NBCCA recommendations. Secretary Shultz should draft, by 
March 8, 1984, a report responsive to Section 109 of the FY-84 
Intelligence Authorization Act. The report should emphasize the 
necessity of this progreun m achieving a negotiated settlement in 
the region. All our efforts in the weeks ahead must make it 
clear that the Jackson Plan legislation and the resistance 
program are essential to U.S. national interests. (TS) 



<l^r..*aJ.'J^^3-^'^f*^ 



CC: The Vice President 

William French Smith 
Edwin Meese III 
David Stockman 
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 
James A. Baker III 
Robert C. McFarlane 



TOP SECRET llftlAI «A/\l*>lv-n. SENSIT 



\imim\ii 



214 



'o 


■ \ir'e arc 


Ac: 


isi ja-? - • 3 1, 


' 'JAMES A. 


3AK 


ER, III 


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3 


1 


4 




5 


I 


6 




ACTION 




IFILE 


APPROVAL 




X| INFORMATION 


(COMMENT 




: PREPARE REPLV j 


1 CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENOATiONi 


DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 1 


DISPATCH 




jSiGNATuRE 1 


REMARKS 1 

i 



liMitfO 



N 16t99 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 



400122 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 

intelligence Sources and Methods involved 

NATIONALSECURITY INFORMATION 

Unauthorized Disclosure SuOiect to Crirnmal Sanct ons 




nmoEo 



215 



• «» • w «. y <^ ^ * 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASH I NGTON 

February 21, 1984 



NSC, :cs-4oci2; 
■J U90Q 



TOP SECRET 



SENSITIVE 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ 
The Secretary of State 

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 
The Secretary of Defense 

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY 

The Director of Central Intelligence 

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

SUBJECT: Central America Legislative Strategy — Additional 
Funding for Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition 
Forces (TS/S) 

This afternoon I forwarded to the Congress our legislation to 
implement the recommendations of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America (NBCCA) . I have also reviewed and 
endorse the legislative and public diplomacy strategy for 
acheiving Congressional approval. (C) 

Pursuant to our discussion at this morning's NSPG meeting, our 
approach to the Congress on the NBCCA legislation must also focus 
on obtaining sufficient funding to carry on our Nicaraguan 
democratic opposition program throughout FY-84. Not only is this 
course of action specified in NSDD-124, it is imperative if our 
increased assistance is to have a positive impact when it is 
available. We must ma)ce this a matter of highest priority as we 
consult with Congress in building support for the Jackson Plan. 
Increased resources of $14M for this endeavor are essential to 
continue these activities and prevent a major foreign policy 
reversal. Z am determined that this program should continue. 
(TS/S) • 

Secretary Shultz and Director Casey should talce the lead in 
presenting our case to the relevant Congressional members and 
committees on this issue. A concerted effort must be made by all 
Administration spokesman to explain the necessity of this program 
and its value in achieving our objectives — not only in the 
region, but worldwide as well. 



TOP SECRET 
Declassify; 



OAOR 



vmsMB 



SENSITIVE 



216 



^ NATTONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



I 



TOP SECRET 



February U, 1984 



SENSITIVE 



.MEMO FOR ROBERT C. MCFAJ^LANE 
FROM: OLIVER NORTH W 



^ ^6901 



Per our phone call this morning, this 
package is forwarded for you to transmit 
to the President. Both the memo at Tab I 
to the President and the Tab A memo from 
the President leave the issue of where 
the money comes from open. We may want 
to take It from the reserve or request 
a supplemental for the intelligence program. 
What is .most i.-nportant, however, is that 
we obtain relief from the S24M ceiling. 
The President's memo at Tab A notes that 
this is our objective and makes it clear 
that Shultz and Casey must defend our 
Nicaraguan program as essential to a 
negotiated settle.ment in the region and 
our national interests. State, CIA, NSC, 
and 0MB are m agreement with this approach. 




Attachment 

Package SYSTEM IV NSC/ ICS-4 30 1 22 
dtd Feb. 7, 1984 



TOP SECRET 



UNOl^^l 



cn 




217 



I 



tiNaAiiiitit'j 

National Security Council 
The White House 



Syuem 



qei 



■^ 



Package # HOP l?^'3^ 



■:02 



Bill Martin 
Bob Kimmm 
John ^oindaittr 
Wilma Hall 
Bud McFarlan* 
Bob Kimmitt 
NSC Sacratariat 
Situation Room 



Mo^VU. 



SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN OISPOSITION 

_^ r_ 



"S 






I • m«on»Mi«> ». Action ••llttam OaOit»ttcM H « No »wrTh«r »ctio« 



c: VF Macs* Sakar Ocavtr Othar 

COMMENTS Should ba taan by : 



I 



DNCUSSIfif.') 



218 




'6^ 



The White House 



■ ine ¥WmiC nuuac 

Package H<^C 'Z2^ 



Bill Martin 
Bob Kimmitt 
John Poindtxttr 
WilmaHaii 
Bud McFarlant 
BobKimmm 
NSC Sacretanat 
Situation Room 



SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION 

I 7^ 



^^^' 



A 



■^ 



I a infotmitien '*aA<iion ynm^ttun OsOisp«l<>i N • Mo 'untwr Amen 



cc: VP M«««a Baktr Oeaver Othar 



COMMENTS Should ba saan by: 



I 






UNCUSS^n 



!| 



219 




nr 



/ 




UNClilSSIRED 



220 



uiaaiii: 



TOP SECRET 
attached 



February 10, 1984 



SENSITIVE 



MEMCR-^NDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCrARI,;yJE 



FROM: 



S'JBJECT: 



OLIVER L. NORTH' 

Additional Funding for 
N'icaraguan Democratic 
Opposition Forces (TS/S) 



"' '690, 



Per you note attached^Tab A to this 
package has been revised. The changes 
:nade are indicated on the mar)ced-up 
copy which is attached. 



,,,JU^:^ (/JCu^ V*^ 








221 



National Security Council 
The White House- 



SytteiT) # 
■ Ptckage * 



\yv-A 



:2 ^_T6906 



Bill Martin 
Bob Kimmitt 
John Poindixttr 
Wiima Hall 
Bud McFarlanc 
Bob Kimmitt 
NSC Se<rttariat 
Situation Koom 



SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN OISPO^ITIOK 

> 1^^ _ 



I a intormtiien / >" *ci<on 




cc: VP Mccst Bakar Otavtr Othtr 
COMMENTS Should I 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



222 



'o I Naf^e ara Ace-ess ^a'.e " • jiSi 



I ACTION 



' !r. C. McFarlane 2/21 



in 



FILE 



)(Xl INfORMAriON 



j CONCURRENCE 



I DIRECT REPLY 



DISPATCH 



PREPARE REPL> 



iRECOMMENOATiONl 



SlGNATUHE 






Clffl 



r*"* 



'^ U907 



NSOICS CONTROL NO ^°°^^^ 

COPY NO _1 OF 11 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 




A 



Warning Notice 
intelligence Sources and Met^oas fvoived 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 

Unauthorized Disclosure SuDiect to Cfrnmai Sanci ons 



iiFu.ssifieo 

■ I- ^I'^uCl 



\^' *>' 



223 



IINTO51H:!! 



MEMORANDUM 

NATIONAL SECLRITY COLNCIL 



NSC/ICS-40012: 



' .'f,508 



FPbruary 7, :9( 

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 

ACTION 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH**^ 

ALTON KEEL 



(S> 



SUBJECT: Additional Resources for our Anti-Sandinista 
Program 

Based on your guidance at our meeting this morning, we have 
prepared a memo from you to the President (Tab I) asking him to 
send a memo (T^lb A) to those most concerned with this issue. 
Your memo provides straightforward background on the resource 
requirements and cites the need for a concerted effort in order 
to achieve success. 

Today's events regarding the situation in Lebanon make the points 
in your memo — and subsequent action— even more imperative. If 
this progreun founders for lack of funds, we may very likely 
suffer a ma]or foreign polic y^^eversaL-w ith repercussions well 
beyond Central America. ThejHHJHBH already concerned about 
our continued trade with Niciraguaana lack of response to the 
killing of Warrant Officer Schwab, could soon have to contend 
with 10,000-12,000 armed and very unhappy, unpaid resistance 
fighters. 

Please note that Dr. Kissinger, in private meetings today with 
Speaker O'Neill and HPSCI Chairman Boland, defended this program 
most eloquently. He believes that with a well led and 
cooperative effort we can carry the day on this issue. He has 
not yet been made aware of the magnitude of our shortfall. 

Congressional resistance on this issue is formidible to the 
degree that prospects for success are bleak even with a concerted 
effort. At some point, we may have to reassess our prospects and 
decide whether prudence requires that we somehow stretch cut 
FY-84 effort to avoid running out of funds. 



TOP SECRET • i » • vk«_ a. SENSI TIVE 

Declassify: OAOR 



UWUSmFlEO 



224 



TOP SECRET 



mm\m 



SENSITIVE 



Because the President's memo cites the NSDD which ue have ^ust 
forwarded for transmission to the coast, we should ensure that 
Tab I and Tab A are held until the NSDD is received. ''Thl^aVsa 
increases the urger.cy for getting a signed NSDD distributed co^ 
the principals. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you initial and 3AC0M your memo to the President with Tab A 
attached. 



Approve 



Disapprove 



Attachments 
Tab I - 



McFarlane Memo to the President 

Tab A - Presidential Memo to State, OSD, CIA, 



:cs 



TOP SECRET 




SENSITIVE 



225 



TOP SECHBT 

ACTION 



WASHINGTON 

February 16, 1984 



NSC/:CS-400122 



'V 1 



^9lQ 



SENSITIVE 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE5^C>7 

SUBJECT: Support for the Anti-Sandinista Forces 

Issue : How can we best obtain additional resources for 
continuing this program? 

Facts ; The FY-84 Defense Appropriation and Intelligence 
Authorization Acts limit funding for our operations in support o£ 
the Nicaraguan opposition forces to S24M. Unless an additional 
$12-$14M is made available, the program will have to be 
drastically curtailed by May or June of this year. The 
Intelligence Authorization Act also as)(s for a Presidential 
report by March 15, on steps taken and recommendations for 
further action to achieve a negotiated settlement in Central 
America. 

Discussion ; In accord with your Finding of Septenj 
we cui 




^__ significant pressure 

being applied against the regime in Managua. Should this effort 
collapse for lack of resources, we will have lost our principle 
instrument for restraining the Sandinistas from exporting their 
revolution and, in fact, for facilitating a negotiated end to the 
regional conflict. The international repercussions of this 
failure in American policy will affect friends and adversaries 
alike. We must avoid precipitating perceptions of a second "Bay 
of Pigs" or creating an environment conducive to the collapse of 
El Salvador or increasing threats to Honduras. 

Our only practical alternative is to approach the Congress with a 
concerted effort to obtain additional funding for this program, 
despite the anticipated strong resistance we expect. The memo at 
Tab A from you to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the 
Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of thf> Joint 
Chiefs will serve to initiate such action. 



TOP SECRET 
Declassifyt 



OAOR 




SENSITIVE 



226 



5§MJ 



THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-400i;2 



-V 7 



69] 



x^wV«\ 



MEMORANDUM -FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P . SHULTZ 
The Secretary of State 

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 
The Secretary of Defense 

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY 

The Director of Central Intelligence 

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

SUBJECT: Additional Funding for Nicaraguan Democratic 
Opposition Forces (TS/S) 

The recent National Security Decision Directive on promoting 
democracy, economic improvement, and peace in Central America 
calls for immediate efforts to obtain sufficient funding to carry 
on our Nicaraguan democratic opposition program throughout 1984. 
This must be a matter of highest priority as we proceed to build 
support for our Legislation to implement the recommendations of 
the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (NBCCA) . 
Incr eased resources of S12-S14M for this endeavor are essential 
to d»**WMie these activities and prevent a major foreign policy 
reversal. I am determined that this program should continue. 
(TS/S) 

Secretary Shultz and Director Casey should take the lead in ;V?o*^— 
presenting our case to IH* relevant Congressional members and ^"^ 
commit tee s.QMdlMrt^"'******. A concerted effort must be made by all 
Administration spokesmen to explain the necessity of this procran 
and its value in achieving our objectives — not only in the 
region, but worldwide as well. -Wi^^^hnn }fi h n a part of our 
overall strategy to obtain approval tor legislation implementing 
the NBCCA recommendations. Secretary Shultz shouldylraf t , by 
March 8, 1984, a report responsive t 
Intelligence Authorization Act. The 
necessity of th is pro gram in achievin 
the region. WeC must^allj ^make it clea 
essential to U.S. national interests. 



Section 109 ofl the FY-84 
report should emphasize the 
a negotiated settlenent 
that this pr9igram is 
(TS/S) 






-3^v> 



Vw^ -,fi,„^^ w«J»<^ ACs 



mmmii 



SENSITIVE 



227 

TOP SECRET 



mtASSIFIED 



SENSITIVE 



(/. 



_T^t ^■W^*^**'1y * Strategy Gfov r ^jiAmr .Tiin Rfl}ri»y: should determine 
'the proper'Ieqislative instrumen t for obtaining these funds. The 
State Department snouid incorporate this effort within our 
overall strategy to obtain approval for legislation implementing 
" / the NBCCA recommendations. Secretary Shultz should draft, by 
I |6**^ March 8, 1984, a report responsive to Section 109 of the FY-84 
i^ Intelligence Authorization Act. The report should emphasize the 
Jb^ f- necessity of this progreun in achieving a negotiated settlement in 
I J y^^ ^*** region. All our efforts in the weeks ahead must make it 
^ r^ clear that the Jackson Plan legislation and the resistance 
1^ program are essential to U.S. national interests. (TS) 

CC: The Vice President 

William French Smith 
Edwin Mcese III 
David Stockman 
Jean* J. Kirkpatrick 
James A. Baker III 
Robert C. McFarlan* 



anaKsifiED — ^ 

TOP SECRET 



228 



National Sec 
The White 



■r UNCLASSIrl 



69^ 



SEQUENCE TO HAS .. 




^^^ 



I a lnfo<m«ion A s Action R a Rciain a OiSMIck N a No furthtr A<ii( 



cc: VP Mctse 8aktr Otavcr Othtr 

COMMENTS Should b« stcn by: 



x-^- 



DNCUSSIflfO 



229 



UNCLASSIFIED a/o.- 




OCU/neryf" 







•-■■-Jc'tO. IKTo 



•^^ UNCIASS!F!EB 



lEWiKISB^ 



3-/0? 



mmm 



THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASH I N OTO N 

April 5, 1984 



N4340(b 



SENSITIVE 



a 



fx 



Dear Senator Baker: 

In his letter to you last evening, the President indicated that 
we do not seek to destabilize or overthrow the Government of 
Nicaragua; nor to impose or compel any particular form of 
government there." He also noted that "we are trying, amonq 
other things, to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful 
negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreements with their 
neighbors on peace in the region." The phrase "among other 
things in the President's letter refers to activities authorized 
by the Finding of September 19, 1983. (S) 

It is important to note that all our support for the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Resistance Forces is carried out in accord with this 
Finding. Equally significant is the fact that this same Findina 
also clearly states that we will provide support, equipment, and 
training to the Nicaraguan Opposition Forces in order to: (S) 

induce the Sandinistas, Cubans, and their allies to cease 
their support for insurgencies in the region; (S) 

hamper Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; and (S) 

divert Nicaragua's resources and energies from support to 
Central American guerrilla movements. (S) 

Finally, the Finding clearly states that we will cease our 
support for the resistance movement when it is verified that: 

the Soviets/Cubans/Sandinistas cease providing— through 
Nic«j|*gua — arras, training, command and control, and other 
support for guerrillas operating in or against other 
countries in Central America; and (S) 

the Sandinistas demonstrate a commitment to amnesty and 
non-discriminatory participation for all Nicaraguans in 
their political process. <S) 



JUMsifi^ 



CRET 




SENSITIVE 'C qC 



231 






CRET 



N 43 4 07 



SENSITIVE 



This program is essential if friendly Central American nations 
are to strengthen their democratic, political institutions and 
achieve economic and social development-- free from Soviet, Cuban, 
and Sandinista interference. It is, in the opinion of the 
democratic leaders in the region who have communicated with the 
President on this matter, critical to achieving a negotiated 
political resolution of international tensions in Central 
America. This view was reflected in the report of the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central America. (S) 

The Commission accurately noted that the opposition forces 
represent the only real pressure being brought to bear on the 
Sandinista regime. Perhaps most importantly, the resistance 
forces offer the only real hope to the people of Nicaragua that 
the promises made by the Sandinistas to the OAS in July 1979 will 
ever be met. (S) 

Please be assured that we have not deviated from the strictest 
interpretation of this Finding. .(U) 



) Robert C. McFXS^ane 



The Honorable Howard Saker 
Majority Leader 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 



-fiNfiUSSl^RET 



SENSITI'vT 



232 



'^lj^/:e. z 



\\~ 



uNCUSsro 



Q'llHkHf ^ 7US 

N 43393 

National Security Council 
The White House 



^ = / 






SEQUENCE TO 



System # — LL_ i 

HAS SEEN DISPOSITION 





«: VP Mt«, 8«lc.r Dwv.r Oth.r 

COMMENTS cu„. ,. ^ 

Should be 5t«n by 



liNCUSSIflfD 



M5:H 



I 






233 




MEMORANDUM 

t-UtJt'lD'tlSTntL .■— NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



90047 

N 43394 




ACTION 



January 13, 1984 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE 



FROM: 
SUBJECT: 



CONSTANTINE MANGES 
OLIVER NORTH J 



(.'C^^ 



Central Ainerica - Draft NSDD to Implement 
NSPG Decisions of January 6, 1984 



At Tab I, we have attached a draft NSDD to implement the decisions of 
the January 6, 1984 NSPG. 

Two items might be controversial: 

Our citing of the specific budget- amounts for the FY'S* 

supplemental; all agenclcs-'excspfc: aH& ar*- willing to go with 

these amounts and they agreaTT^*' ta±-(>«z£i.san. commission 
amounts. '"' ' 

The last paragraph on possible economic sanctions against 
Nicaragua uses wording suggested by Roger Robinson, who also 
prepared the memorandum on this topic at Tab II. Roger's 
view is that you can fairly use the secrecy rationale for 
keeping this issue within the NSPG context, rather than 
having the SIG-IEP do the analysis which in his view makes 
any action less likely and risks immediate public dis- 
closure. 

RECOMMENDATION 



That you approve the NSDD so that we may submit it to each of the 
principals for their review, with your final approval to be giv^n ^ 



with your final approval to be gi\ 
early next weak in th« event major changes are suggested. 



Approve 



Attachments 

Tab I - Draft NSDD 

Tab II - Roger Robinson Memo 



Disapprove 



W^Wy yklJUi'l* ATTACHMENT 
Declassify on: OADR 



@ 



82-750 233 



UNCtftSMB^ 




TOP SECRET - 



234 



lui' OLUfvLl 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINOrON 




Si. .A a 

90047 

N 43395 

SENSITIVE 



CENTRAL AMERICA: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, 
ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT, AND PEACE {ST~ 



At the conclusion of an Executive Branch strategy review and 
taking account of the recommendations of the Bipartisan Conunis- 
sion on Central America, we remain committed to the four elements 
of our policy: support for the implementation of democracy; 
efforts to raise living standards; dialogue for the resolution of 
internal disputes through democratic elections and international 
conflicts through verified agreements; and, security assistance 
to governments threatened by communist subversion and guerrilla 
warfare. (S) 

The Bipartisan Commission report agree*. imititTouc'^vlaw that the.. 
United States must provide levels of assis^um «dilck are 
adequate to help friendly governments and denwaf i atxc groups 
succeed because the alternative could be__iiifi_d£itaililization,of 

jthe 





The Director of 0MB together with the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Defense will coordinate to 
obtain substantially increased economic and security 
assistance resources for the countries in the region: 
an FY 84 supplemental budget request in the range of 
$e69M ($410M economic and $259M security assistance) 
and an increase in FY 85 funding of approximately S750M 
_($500M economic and S250M security assistance). (S) 

^Th« Secretary of State in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 
Intelligence will implement the following diplomatic 
strategy: (S) 

In Nicaragua ; our botftmm tinp obj ective for the 
'Nicaraguan government must include 




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democratic cottonitments. T h > g « i > iU h » inunedlaf 
-•fforti^o obtain additional funding of 510-15 million S-o 
ffg O M foi a i^n aj d a w imi'' ^w w nf W te wali a ' j p gor » >« «5^ <^ 
g | g> that th e cuiiewt 624 milli e n ut- i pj-U tJ i- i-JLiuu "lU^ 
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(tCMARKS: 

ee: Oliver North (#2 and 3) 
K«n d«Gr«ff«nr«id (•4) 
Jin Radziaski (tS) 




N 6447 

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inttti)««nct Sewrc«> and M«tn««« involvM 

NATIONAL SECURITY INK)«W ATION 
Unautfteritatf 0<Kioiwr«$ub|t<t to Cnmin^i Sanctiom 




247 



MENfORANDLM 

T OP o ee ww < 

ACTION 



NAriONAl. •^ECLKITV COLNCIL 



9-/?^ 



October 9, 1984 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-4009Q7 



« 



N 644C 

SEtJSITIVE 



^4EM0RAM0UH FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH 

SUBJECT r 



Partially Declassified/fieleased on/JltL®: ' 
under provisions of E 12356 
^ ^ ^>' 3. Reger, f;:tio::a! Sec.ntv Council 



Draft National Security Decision Directive (NSOO) 
on Arms Interdiction in Central America (TS) 



Attached at Tab I is a draft NSDO which intplenents the decisions 
taJcen during- and since the NSPG meeting held on Septeaber 11, 
1984. The NSDD calls for the CIA to provid* assistance to the 
Nicaraguan Resistance F orces in interdi ct ing Soviyt arms bov 
JN in Managua.! 




The CIA has quietly- aslced for this NSDD as « qlsnft^f - „ 
implementing those issues deliberated, at the Ssptenber 11, 1934 
NSPG meeting (Tab II) . In a private flMtins witlr'Calero today, 
he raised this issue as important to the m%Btery credibility of 
the FDM. 




y^r''jBwm»'i.' 
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OADR 



yNsmnED 




248 



Olif^afSFJED 



N 6449 



SENSTIVE 




the NSOO %fould be carried out. under the provisions 4tf the 
September 19, 1984 Presidential Finding (Tab III). 



'P M 



RECOMMENDATION 



That you authorize circulation of the dsSt NSI^ (Tab I) to^ 
State (Motley), CIA (C. George), 2tnd -tfCS^ore^) for their 
concurrence. ' 



Oisa^rove 



Approve 



Ken deGraf fenreid 



Attachments 

Tab I - Draft NSDD .^ 

Tab II - Minutes of NSPG Meeting on September 1 1 , 1984 -s" 

Tab III - Presidential Finding of September 19, 1984 






TftB SFTBIX^ 



l»I^JagS£iF:ED 



249 



ORAFT 



u»^t^t^^j£D 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-400907 



N 6450 



National Security 
Oeci.si.an Directive 



Anns Interdiction in Central America 



Soviet bloc ams of increasing technical sophistication and 
firepower continuft to be delivered to the FSUt in Nicaragua at an 
unprecedented, rate. The shipment of this military materiel poses 
a growing threat to our own security interests and to the 
democratic governments and the peoples of Costa Rica, 
EL Salvador, and Honduras. At the very lease, this extraordinary 
Nicaraguan military build-up is intimidating to those in the 
region intent, on achieving an enforceable multi-lateral agreement 
for peace, stability, economic recovery and democracy in the 
region. (S) 



[Provision of sucrt support would be 
conducive to restoring influence over resistance activities which 
has diminished, as • consequence of no U.S. funding. (S) 

FSLM covert support for the Salvadoran. guerrilla forces is also a 
persistent problem. Munitions from Nicaragua continue to be an 
essential element in ^e ability of the FMLN to conduct 
operations against, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) 



250 



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A«- Agend»g, Crnccrr.:n{ Operatior' 

lindfrfker. b> t fn Central lnt»llif enct 

At«ncv ir. Fcrt'lpr Countrifi, Other than 

Those lfft»ndeg Sole]^ <or the Purpoft 

of Intelligenct Coll»gtior. 



N 6461 



] Wr«br Mnd that the following actlvltlef *r* iBport»nt" 
tc the nation*! security of the Uttltcd States, *ai direct the 
Director of Central Intelligence, or his deslgncW, to report tM^ 
rindinc to the Intclllgeoce Coosittees of the Con|»a» pursuant 

1*^ '^s aacnded. 



to Section 501 of the Ketlonal Security Act-'^T 
and to provide luch briefings as necessary 



^•^ 



KICAXACOA 



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cooperatloa with other 
govcmacatSt jarovide mw^pcrti^ 
equlpacot inaZtxa ' 
asslstaaee 
paiot lltary 
troups, 



ML PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT 
ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET 




253 



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VashingtoB, D.C. 



Data: September 19, 1983 



N 6453 

Tfit Director of Central 
InicllifCBce i» dlrecte^to 
ensure th»t thl> progra*^ ^ 

1« cpntlniiously reviewed to 
assure th*t. Its obfectlves 
are being set and its 
rcstricrionr adheWd to. 



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I or CIA ACTIVITIES 
L'r.T)& THI KICAJvACJA FINDING 




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\im^ ire Aaa'tM Date 



The President 



2 Robert C. McFarlane 



J I Oliver L. North 



ACTION 



APPROVAL 



COMMENT 



CONCURRENCE 



DIRECT REPLY 



DISPATCH 



REMARKS: 



FILE 



INFORMATION 



PREPARE REPLY 



RECOMMENDATION 



RETURN 



SIGNATURE 






CL 




:£^ 



N 7200 



NSGKS CONTROL NO IY__i012TO____ 
COPY NO. 1 OF L 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



ui_ Lcb.- 



A 



'-nder provi-.ns d E.J. I235S 



■•=JSr, ,,::;^;j| ^....^i,^ (,^|j^^.| 



12356 : 



Warning Notice 
intelligcnceSourcn and Methods Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 

Unauthoriied Oi*<lo*ur« Sub|*ct to Criminal Sanctions 



j%a 1 A'Ainrn 



i';[;!tT.-.f7iii 



4^\ 



265 



MEMORANPLM 



NATIONAL SECLRITV COLNCIL 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ res 4 0L27a 



1 



December 20, L984 H 7201 



ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANB 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH 

SUBJECT: 



SENSITIVE 




Several weeks ago, David Walker, a former SAS officer, now a 
reputable British Security Specialist, indicated a willingness to 



T O P oe e riBB ^ 

Declassify on: OADR 



IWH^iSiED 



SENSITIVE 



266 



Ul 



^i^iMstntftu, 



N 7202 



- TOP 9G0nGT . 



SENSITIVE 



assist in special mission planning and training- for the 
Nicaraguan resistance. This approach was reported in a. separate 
memorandum. Walker also ^^on^^that BLOWPIPE surface- to-air 
missiles may be availableUHPfim for use by the FON in dealing 
with the HIND helicopters ^^Tl^^inforTnation was passed through 
an appropriate secure and sourc^orotected means to Adolfo Calero 
who proceeded immediately to U^^^^B Yesterd ay, Calero, having 
returned fromH^^K^ advised tna^|^|taHI|^^B have possession of 
large quantities of BLOWPIPE missiTe^an^^Hr they are willing 
to make 49 missiles and five to eighe launchers availabl e to the 
FDH. There would be no charge for th^missiles^butl 
did ask S15IC each for the launchers. ^f^^B|^HBH note<! 
however, that they would need to obtaTnj^H^^^ppennission for 
the transfer. Training on the weapons sySte^was also offered 
for up to ten three-man teams from th^FDN on s no-cost basis. 
Calero will dispatch the trainee^toflH^^Bo^December 23. 
According to Calero, no one in ^H^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^H i s aware 




Vour memo to the President at Tab I brings these issues to his 
attention and asks that he discus^th^natte^o^the Nicaraguan 
resist anc e very privatelywith^^B^^^^H||^H|H||^B You will 

of 



lis may be the 
such support for the 
resistance. Given recent actions in Nicaragua, we may not have 
another chance if we wait. 



jportunity we have to 



RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. That you initial and forward the meno at Tab I. 

Approve Disapprove 

2. That you release the cable at Tab 11. 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachments 

Cab I - McFarlane memo to the President 




SENSirrvB 



267 



iCUSSIflED 



K 7203 



mm i^oiricn 



268 



^fl^trtMfflED 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS 4012-0 

N 7204 



•TOP SBCREI 
ACTION 



SENSITIVE 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 
FROMt ROBERT C. MCFARUVNE 

SUBJECT: 




^__^ pportunity to 

on steps they could taJce to assist the Nicaraguan 
hrough in termediaries, w* have been apprised that 

is prepared to provide up to 48 BLOWPIPE 

surface-to-air missiles to the freedom fighters. 



sound out 
listanceT 



; TOP ODGRgg - 
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'^mmm 



SENSITIVE 



269 



"At; in- 



■ TOP SE C nST 




{Mil i] 



SENSITIVr 



_|indicate tha t the \ 

thes e missile^ __^ 

These weapons, or something similar 
(e.g.r SA-7S) , are essential if the resistance is to stay in the 
fight now that the Sandinistas are employing their Soviet- 
provided Mr-24 HJND-D helicopters. 

Discussion ^ 7205 




On the matter of supporting the Nicaraguan resj 
very privately express approbation for ar 



we should 




Recommendation 



OK 



No 



lat YOU discuss the matters indicated above! 



- rvv itt\.m^ 

Declassify on: OADR 



H ^?^i 




Prepared by: 
Oliver L. North 

SENSITIVE 



270 



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UNCLASPD 

THE SECRETARY OF I 



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 


90012 


WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 






N 64 

3 JAN 1S85 




o -^•i/ 



MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY AFFAIRS 

SOBJECT: O.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua (U) 

tjgy I baliava it urgent that w« update our policy toward 
Nicaragua. In particular, tfhan Congrasi raturns, we will have 
to address the problem of funding for the Freedom Fighters. 

t^l So far as I know, your four objectives for Nicaragua 
(established by NSDO 124) are still fully^ valid: 

- genuine iaplementation of democracy; 

- verified end to export of subversion; ;' 

- verified removal of Cuban'/ Soviet bloc personnel; and - 



-<^1 n 



verified reduction of Nicaraguan military forces to 
regional parity. 



There seems to be no prospect of accomplishing these 
^., objectives without improved assistance to the Freedom 

^ Fighters. This calls for planning to generate the requisite 
Congressional approval. We may wish to consider m'xtures of 
support: overt and "covert"; direct and indirect through 
third countries, for example); political, humanita ian, and 
military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff share my view that our 
support for the resistance to the Sandinistas must continue 
and also that we must bring our political, diplomatic, and 
economic strength to bear. 

V^ ^f^Hp***^ that yott have an NS9G meeting scheduled, 
as aol^^^Hbaslble in January, to develop an updated approach 
towar^^^Hiagua, with particular focus on an effective ap- 
proacll^lKon9r«s«. " ) 



i 



cc: Chairman, JCS ^ ^i^^ ^^'' 

CtASSiriED BTt OIR,IA RGR (jl v' IJ ^ft' /* 



DECLASSIFY ON: 0< 



ICl^fO 



X^l^QQ 



291 



«NCUS»0 



Hon ReleNJ3nt 



UNCLASSIHED 



292 



LiMi^^i ? -Vci-trKJee 



27l 




r^ 









Q-a?/ 



OPTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY FOR RENEWIN G 
AID TO THE NICARAGL'AN RESISTANCE 



N 4508b 



Current Situation 



So 



if.- 



Section 8066 of the FY 1985 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 93-473) 
specifically prohibits until February 28, 1985, the use of any 
CIA, 000, or other intellioence agency's funds for the purpose or 
which would have the effect of supporting directly or indirectly 
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. After 
February 28, 1985, this funding prohibition ceases to apply, hut 
only if two conditions are met: 

the President transmits to Congress a report describing 
Nicaraguan government support for guerrillas in other 
Central American countries, justifying amounts and types of 
assistance proposed and how such assistance would further 
U.S. policy goals in Central America; 

Congress ?dopts a ]oint resolution expressly approving the 
use of funds for supporting military or paramilitary 
operations in Nicaragua. 

If both these criteria obtain, the Continuing Resolution permits 
up to $14 million in appropriated funds to be used for the 
^^esistATce program. The law states that expedited procedures 
will apply for considering a joint resolution authorizing the 
expenditure. Such a joint resolution would be initially referred 
to th^ Appropriations Committees. 

Because of the expedited procedures and the jurisdictional is^ue 
of an intelligence issue being moved quic)(ly through the 
Appropriations Committees, we should carefully consider the 
timing of a report to the Congress. In short, w« should seek to 
work out our best options before submitting the report required 
by Section 8066. 

Since the Continuing Resolution requires, in effect, that 
Congress pass a new law in order to permit use of the 
appropriated FY 1985 monies, that new law need not conform 
precisely to the terms of the Continuing Resolution. Congress 
could, in enacting this new legislation, add any number of 
limitations or conditions and then make clear that the new 
legislation was intended to satisfy (or to supersede) the 
requirements of the Continuing Resolution. We could, in effect, 
create a "Clark Amendment" for Central America, if we do not 
handle the legislative relationship very carefully in consulting 
on our options. 



TCE^'Tte^ET"^ 








293 







N 45087 



Solicitation of Third Country Support 



Although th* Continuing Resolution addresses only the use at 
appropriated funds, CIA has interpreted the st«tutory language 
against "indirect" support as prohibiting contact with third 
countries v;hich might be willing to fund/assist resistance 
activities. The CIA has, therefore, forbidden their employees 
from soliciting/requesting third country support, 9ince it could 
be argued that funds appropriated for CIA salaries were being 
used in a manner that would have the effect of indirectly 
supporting paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. The CIA's 
concern is heightened by two considerations: 

First, the Intelligence Committees were iniTormed, after U.S. 
funding was exhausted last June, that as a matter of policy 
the Agency w^s not soliciting third country funding. 
State has responded to similar queries from the Foreign 
Affairs/ Relations Committees than the Department has made no 
such overtures. 

Second, Executive Order 12333 on intelligence activities 
provides that "no agency of the Intelligence Community shall 
request any person to undertaJte activities forbidden by this 
Order." while it is anomalous to read this prohibition so 
literally that it prevents the Agency from requesting third 
countries to undertake activities not addressed in the 
Executive Order, but otherwise forbidden to the CIA, this 
constraint none the less prevails. 

It is very possible that this problem could be overcome by a 
careful record of consultation with the concerned committees of 
Congress (Intelligence and Appropriations). No new legislation 
or formal amendment to the Executive Order would be required. It 
should also be noted that the existing Presidential Finding 
(under which the U.S. program operated until FY 1994 funding was 
exhausted) specifically provided that our support to resistance 
groups would be provided both unilaterally "and in cooperation 
with other governments." Congress never objected to this aspect 
of the program. 

The single greatest drawbaclc to this option is that a "third- 
country" support program for the resistance leaves us with almost 
no leverage over resistance activities or an ability to assure 

the humane prosecution of the war. It may also perpetuate 
problems ||^ii^^Hi ^' ^^*^ perceive that we have "walked away 
from the problem. ^ . , .. '.' 

TqjL-SfCR^?^ . - • • - - * 



294 



r 




N 45088 

B- S«atore the Original Coirprghermv Program 

Under this option, we would subn.it a report seeking to 
justify the removal of the prohibitions ir Section 3066 of the 
Continuing Resolution and restoration of the program that existed 
up until last year's funds were exhausted. This would allow us 
to provide arms and munitions, as well as training and advice, by 
U.S. Citizens who would be forbidden to enter Nicaragua. in 
order to achieve Congressional approval for this option, we could 
agree to a number of specific constraints on the level and type 
of operational involvement for CIA personnel/employees. W e 
could, for instance, accept prohibitions on the use of CIA fl|^| 
assets (aircraft, boats, etc.); restrictions on numbers ot^^K 
perscnnel; or limits on training/operational guidance or 
technical assistance we could provide to the fighters. This 
alternative has the advantage of raximum flexibility, program 
effectiveness, and control over resistance activities. The 
disadvantace is that this would require direct reversal of a 
series of House votes m which the program has been rejected by 
decisive majorities. 

C . Limited "Non-Letha] * 'J.S-t- Support with Third Country 
As«istar.ce 

This alternative calls for us to submit a report justifying 
a "new" program excluding the most controversial aspects of the 
original progr?m--direct support by U.S. nationals and lethal 
military equipment and supplies. "Lethal* assistance (munitions, 
ordnance, etc.) would, in this case, be provided by third 
countries. In its simplest form, U.S. support could be limited 
to cash grants which would be used only for specified "non-lethal" 
purposes, fuch as public affairs/political action, travel and 
transportation, food, clothing, shelter, etc., with provision for 
periodic audit. While it would be preferable to have authority 
for the U.S. to provide advice, training, management assistance, 
and irtellicerce , we could indeed le»ve these to third countries, 
with the understanding that the USG would coordinate with these 
countries as under the present Finding. A new Presidential 
Finding should be developed in that it will be tactically useful 
m building support with members of Congress. 

The advantage of this option is that it could be presented as a 
new approach, not requiring opponents of the old program to 
reverse their previous votes. Cash transfers could be publicly 
ac)cnowledged or executed covertly. While a legislated mandate to 
limit us to overt "humanitarian* assistance (e.g., aid to 
refugees) would not affect the basic legislative approach,^ny 
publicly ac)cnowledged program will have an adverse impact^^M 



295 



r 






■SQg— & g Cffgf 



N 4508y 



D. D«ftr Itqialation and seek cnly clarification o* 
authority to Tcourage third-country support 

In this option, we would postpone a definitive vote by 
Congress on whether or not the USG can provide support to the 
Nicaraguan resistance. Instead of an "up or down' vote on the 
program, we would see)( to namtain the viability of the 
Nicaraguan resistance by encouraging only third country support. 
This would require careful consultation with Congress to assure 
that we would not be subject to charges of circumventing or 
violating the statutory prohibition, we would, thereby, leave 
open the possibiltiy of a new funding request until later in 
FY 1985--perhaps even waiting until the current prohibitions in 
Section 8066 of the Continuing Resolution expire on October 1, 
1985. The ma]or drawbaclts for this option are lac)« of credi- 
bility in influencmq S?ndinista behavior through pressure and 
the uncertainity of continued support to the resistance from 
current sources until the end of the fiscal year. 




296 



r 



y 






JOP grz-Df! 



N 45090 



F. Providt Funding through a 'Colleetivt SacuntN 
Organization 



ll21 



In this case, funds to support r«sistanca activities could 
b« appropriated by the Congress for disbursement through in 
already existing or newly created international organization. 
CONDECA, the collective security organization of the Central 
American states, could serve as such a body. U.S. monies could 
be given directly to CONDECA (or li)te entity) , as in the case of 
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OCCS) , or funds 
provided to participating countries could be «»annar)ced for use 
only with CONDECA-authorized activities. 

In order for this to work as a funding mechanism for the 
resistance, there wou ld have to be unanimous acreement among the 

partic ipating states 

[ that a certain portion of the 

funds made available to CONDECA would be transferred (either as 
financial aid or in materiel) to the freedm fighters. This 
agreement and the transfer could be either overt or covert. It 
would seem that the Congress or at least certain members would 
have to be witting of the internal CONDECA arrangement. 

The advantage of this proposal lies in the attractiveness of 
"collective security" type arrangements within the Congress. 
They may be more willing to view funding through an international 
organization, such as CONDECA, as an acceptable "overt" 
mechanism for supporting the resistance. The principal 
disadvantages of this proposal are in the length of time it would 
tatce to establish such a program and the lacic of control over c.^e 
international body in their support to the resistance. Any 
public confirmation that CONDECA w as providing such support would 
undoubtedly ma)(e the ^<3^ flK^^H^HHU^HHV*^*'^ 

more difficult than it already is. It would, therefore, be best 
to try such an option with CIA funding rather than through the 
security assistance process. 

Timing 



Although the law specifies that the President can submit a report 
at the end of February f.nd thereby trigger the expedited procedures 
for a vote by both houses , we should weigh the advantages of 
delayed action. The Congress will also be considering several 






297 



fT 



VafflDL^ulJai 



6 

N 45091 



oth«r issues of •xtraordinary import to th« Administration in th. 
months ahead: 

-«a^« Tiir.t frame 

MX March 

Saudi-Pak Arms Packaqes and May-June 

Overall Security Assistance 

President's Budget May-June 

Federal Deficit June-July 

Arms Control Debate July-August 

Past experience has shown that opponents of the resistance 
program are liJcely to use the simultaneous presentation of two 
important legislative issues to their advantage. We, therefore, 
need to deny then an opportunity to "trade" the resistance 
program for MX or some other vital Administration initiative. 
Given the crowded legislative calendar we should probably seek to 
forward a report to the Congress at the end of March, seeking a 
vote by both houses during April. This timing will also track 
well with ma]or political action and public-diplomacy initiatives 
which will peak in mid-March. 

Identification of the Threat 

Past focus and the current Finding identify at the Sandinistas as 
the principal threat to regional stability. We have likewise 
proclaimed FSLN internal repression within Nicaragua as an 
important reason for funding the resistance. Despite the 
accuracy of this rationale, we have: 

failed to make the case that the Sandnistas are indeed a 
sufficient threat to our national security that justifies a 
ma]or covert action/paramilitary program; and 

created anxieties in the Congress that in order to redress 
internal repression through resistance pressure, we, in 
fact, are attempting the overthrow of the current Nicaraguan 
government. Since this it specifically forbidden by law, we 
have actually lost ground in the Congress by emphasizing the 
"democratization* /OAS promises issue. 



isnmm" ;-'OrSZCRZT 



298 



1 



"ISgZ ^CBE'a t 




45092 



|w« would find b«tt«r support for th« NicT^quTn 

resiitancs, if w« idantify th« Soviets, Cubans, Bulgarians, East 
G«rmans, and North Koreans — and thair intarvantion in this 
haraisphara — as th« principal problem in Central America, rather 
than the Sandinistas. In order to focus on the threat posed by 
the Soviets and their surrogates, a major effort must be launched 
to collect and disseminate infrmation regarding this ^r.tra-hems- 
pheric involvement in Nicaragua. By so doing, we would re-orie.-.t 
the thinking in Cengress and m the American body politic that 
support for the resistance is essential to preventing a Soviet 
client stAte on the mainland of this hemisphere. 

Funding Level Pequested 

Previous requests for fun ding have b een limited) 

u^^in and of itself, tends 

to create a mind set in the congress that the threat to our 
security is not as great as we have articulated. In 1982, we 
spent less than S13M on the Nicaraguan resistance program. The 
1983 level of $24M was duplicated m our FY 1984 request. For 
1985, we limited the request to S14M, thinking that this amount 
would be more palatable to the Congress. 

If indeed our re-oriented threat is to be credible, we should 
consider a significant increase in the amount being requested for 
the program. A figure closer to SIOOM would indicate to the 
Congress the urgency of the situation and our concerted belief 
that an adequately funded resistance force could provide 
sufficient pressure to deter further Soviet/surrogate encroach- 
nent in the region. 

Suirjp.ary 

Informal liaison among State, OSD, CIA, JCS, and NSC indicates 

that we should pursue the following course of action: 

We should move immediately to re-orient the perceived threat 
from the Sandinistas to focus on risks posed to U.S. 
security by the active involvement of the Soviet Union and 
its surrogates in establishing a client state in Nicaragua. 

We should press for Option C (non-lethal U.S. support with 
third country assistance) . In so doing, we should seek 
authority to have the U.S. provide intelligence, training 




assistance and direct provision of arms and ammunition. 



299 



Tr>f^- 3FLRE T 



N 45095 



w« would agr«« that no U.S. personnel could b« di rtctlv 
involved in operation! or parapilitary activlti««. 




The report required by Section 8066 of the Continuing 
Resolution should be submitted at the end of March (after 
the MX vote) . 

A White House legislative coordinator (similar to the AWACS 
effort for Saudi Arabia) should be appointed and charged 
with the sole responsibility for managing the Congressional 
presentation on this issue. 



300 



mhlmiim 



IV.ljr.CT: T«rs««i»« 



I^BMVtvItt** < (HMftit 6«»ri«l ttitf «Ml4 N Hit •• a Mttar af cMria) 



19784 



•a a rirat ftftitf. t'4m'i tlil«k thta la aaaaMUta 
iMlaaia m atfftlita« ""^ 



Alia, t 4a«'t Ma 



It wanU aaaa ta aa t>>« cavaraa aaamm a tnawl4 %• (allaM«a. tattt 

iM ^IB^g^jilB^HmiBfg^gp vh«t 4avi«a «mU yav 
lUa ua t* aaa t« gat «raatar clarity aa thisf AUa, tha S<it4t ana kIm 
itaua vaa tvyfaaa^ly 4iacuata4 a« a* LM last «a«k. 0* y«a kflow what* thia 
•t<a<ar It tha aast atap that af t^ %p*tkint ta lan^ar? 



»Se nOH: NSORf • 

T*: Nsim ••cruA 



•CMA 



TO: NSRCH 



•CPUA 



01/22/IS 12:27::i 



jicm«« 



KOTT rtOH: OONAU I. rORTISI 
mJlCT: Cantra Prajact 

out* Jvat 4akrlafa4 m aa ya<ir trl^. Aaa I aaat witk Maailtaa aa4 
faycall (whiah Nlll k« latar thla waak, ualait yav taa a raaaaa far aa 
ta ^atpana) I wauU Hka ta ka|in ky aaylnc yaa waata4 aa ta glva tkaa 
tha banaflt af eartala akaarvatiana yav 4rav aa tha kaala af yaut raaaat 
talka la tha raglaa. Thaa t waul4 atraaa tha aaaalalty af «!•« •• tka 
grMlac San41nlata challangai tha akaptialia avar laeetaaful aatatlatiaa 
iA t&a akaaaea af praaaura; tka wiUtasnats af satlan*! la«4ar«ta kafla 
fravi4ia( ^uiat tvf^rt far t^a Caatraa; aa4 tka avatvhalalag kallaf tkat 
la aa«a way tka US ka« ta g** 'ack i* tk« «•••• layeA^ tkat, I viU far aaw 
ataf ly aaafiaa ayaalf ta taklag aawa^laga (fallavlag tha awtllaa I gava yaa 
af ay talka vttk Dwraakargar). At teaa ^iAt aaaa, kawavar, wa aaa4 ta 
4aal4a aara alaarlywkat aa4 raaalt aa vaat ta ataar tha caa aaltatiaaa ta;»ar4 
X atill_Llka_tha^B^Haatla«^^taa«kaaa4^^jofk, 

Ollla kaliavaa «a aaa4 t« fttf tka ^aalkla aftlaa af a ftaiUg^ar 

■Ittlag aa ta aaak tklr4 aaaatry aay^rt. Jaka Mi t ara katk uaaaay akaat 
ralalAg tkla. riaally. at tka right aaaaat. It will ka la aartawt 

aa«a aackaalaa far krUgiM ^^T 'lU laatfara tagttkar vltk 

raglaeal laaiara ta kaar flrat kaa4 «kat valklag may fraa tka Caatraa 
vawU aaaa. Vkaa I ka4 laaak witk lagar'a aklaf af ataff tka atkar 4ay 
aa tka atniatura af tka laaata haarlagt. ka ial4 tkla waul4 ka tha aiagla 
•aat affactlva aattaMa aawl4 taka.Ut aa kaaa If tkla isjMt haw yaa 
waat aa ta yr**aa4. > 



aa> N4JT9 



••OUA 



5)1.8. Rtjjj, t*»^v j^'ih .Jovpcil 






6> 





r^eXic 



Si 1.90 



as 



rriOo 



301 



MEMORANDLM 



ACTION 



^-a7a 



T^^:^TDHd 272 



.ATIONAL SECVRITY COLNCIl. 



January IS, 1985 



SYSTEM 17 

NSC/ICS-400053 



N 45Q25 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLA 

FF.OM: 

SUBJECT: 



.RLAKE 



OLIVER L. >JORTHf^ 
Nicaragua Options 







Attached at Tab I is a pap«r which proCftrs policy options for 
Nicaragua. The basic paper and its attachments (Tabs A thru H) 
provide a detailed assessment of the current situation and 
various alternatives which we can pursue during the second 
Adninistration. In short, the paper concludes that the most 
prudent course of action, given the threat we face from the 
Soviets «p.d their surrogates m Central America, is to seek 
Congressional approval for resuming our support to the Nicaraguan 
resistance. 

Tats A thru D describe the growing Soviet bloc relationship with 
the FSi:i and its increasing status as a y.arxist-Leninist client 
state. Tabs E and F provide a detailed a-alysis of the 
resistflr.ce movement and options for restcrir.g U.S. assistance. 
Tabs G and H outlm* additional activities (economic sanctions 
zr.d political action) which could supplemer.t a revitalized 
resistance -rogram. 

One of the r.ost important issues on this trip is to determine 
what type o* support to the resistance is most palatable to cur 
friends" m t.'-.e region. Don Fortier is pursuing the same strategy 
with tr.e leac'orship in Congress. Thus, Tab F (Options and 
Legislative Strategy) is particularly important as background fsr 
vour meetings with Heads of State in the region. You should be 
aware that there is growing sentiment in the Congress for some 
type of "overt" support to the resistance — an alternative th at i s 
undoubtedly most unpalatable toj 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you skin the attached notebook and review in detail Tab F, 
using the options provided in your discussions with Heads of 
State. 



Approve 



•^1 



Disapprove 



Attachment 

Tab I - Nicaragua Options Notebook 
Tabs A thri^^. 

t\)P ^^tCRW 




UNCl^iED 



302 



ONCUSSiER 






r^ 



3 ••a -i.. . . 

NSC/ICS-40Q053 

POLICY CPTIONS FOR NICARAGUA 

Background N 4 5 027 

In 1979, th« S«ndinist« Revolutionary Lifc«r«tcn Front (FSLN) , in 
allianca with modarata non-Marxist opposition groups, capitalized 
on lagitimat* popular distant to ovarthrow tha Somoza oovtrnnent. 
In the fiva years since the revolution, the moderate allies of 
the FSLN have been expelled from the governnent and the FSLN has 
established effective control of the media, educational systen, 
military, and security apparatus. In fact, the Nicaraguan 
revolution has moved steadily through most of the successive 
steps nf a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary as taught at the Soviet 
Union's Higher Comaomul School for the Training of Non-Bloc 
Communists Cadre (Tab A) . 

The Sardinitas have created Marxist labor organizations and an 
alternative "popular* church. Fraudulent elections, accompanied 
by massive international propaganda, were engineered to validate 
FSLN hegemony as the "vanguard' party over the internal political 
process. A massive Soviet bloc military fruild-up is underway 
(Tab B) and repression of the remaining* internal opposition has 
recently increased. Thus, most of the steps in establishing a 
Marxist-Leninist state have been Accomplished.. 

The final cor.solidation of the FSLN as the state party in a 
Marxist-Leninist society is in process (Tab C) . Once this 
consolidation has been completed, thos# antagonistic to U.S. 
security goals, particularly the Soviet Un:.on and Cuba, will have 
a secure base on the mainland of the Americas from which to 



(s\ "^promote subversion of neighboring states, a sine aua non of all 

^ Marxist-Leririst states. Tha successful spread o£ Marxist-Lenmist 






V = 



governments m Central Anariea, allied with adversaries of the 
United States, represents a genuine long-term threat to political 

"{go stability m the Americas, and over time poses a strategic threat 

c3 ''^ to the United States. 

2| 



Options : 

•^ ^. ^ Given the premise outlined above, there appear to be three policy 
^^i^-J options open to tha U.S. Government: 

^ K £ A. A negotiated solution which acquiesces to the existence 

4I ^ ^ of a Marxist-Leninist Nicaraguan state in return for assurances 

^ ^ "^ that that state would not pursue a policy of exporting 

jt) "2, revolution. 

1 B. A resumption of U.S. support to the Nicaraguan 

'^ opposition--both armed and unarmad--in order to prevent the 

.J consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist state allied with the USSR 
and to establish in its stead a truly Democratic and pluralistic^ 

government. ^^ 



ADR 



wmim 




303 



wmm 



^ZCSXT 



C. Th« ua« o£ ailttary fore* by th« Unit«d St«t«^ taj 5 Q 9 fl 

Niraraqu* «nd r«pl«c« it with a pluralistic damocratic 
govcrmnant . 



Analysis of Options ; 




304 




305 




'^ 45C30 




Conclusions. 



Th« rSLN regima in Kanispaa is M«rxist-L«ninist in character 
and IS in the lattar stages of consolidating absolute 
control in Nicaragua. Tho Sandmista leadership is allied 
with the foreign policy cb] actives of the Soviet Union and 
Cuba and is increasingly supported by the Soviet Union in a 
bloc/ciient relationship. 

The presence of a Marxist-Leninist state in Central America 
IS an unacceptable threat to regional stability and long 
term U.S. strategic interests. 

If the consolidation of a Soviet client stare is to be 
prevented, decisive action must be initiated within the next 
few months. The weight of the evidence argues ctrongly in 
favor of a major campaign to restore support for the 
democratic resistance forces. Their military operations 
must be designed to prevent the consolidation of a 
Marxist-Leninist FSLN government in Nicaragua. Since the 
process of consolidation is in the advanced stages, 
arresting and reversing that process will be difficult. The 
longer a delay in initiation of such an effort, the less 
lilcely is success and the more costly the consequences. 



""^tOtf""^ 




306 



imSSIFlEO 



a-Q.^^ 



Z74 



SENSITIVE 



N 450 3 5 



1935 - 1986 



In less than three years ( 1982-Prese^^^the Nicaraguar 

resistance has grown from less than Hjjl^^to more than 

While this growth would probably not have been accomplished 
without U.S. support and advice, it is important to note that tr.e 
Nicaraouan Frgorlnm F'fTht-g'-g ^-P not a creation nf this Administrg-i 




rerpstimated, to an extent, the degree of popular acceptance 
'the FDN would enjoy in its operating areas. While this popular 
support developed slowly and was undoubtedly enhanced by FSLN 
mistakes and repressive policies, it has become an important 
factor in the ability of the FDN to continue to operate following 
the June 1984 cut-off of CIA funding. For example, since USG 
fundswe^e exhausted, FDN' troop strength has increased by more 
thanj(^^( combatants . Indeed, ralliers to the FDN continue tb 
surp ass the capability to provide arms, provisionSj_ and trainir 




The cut-off m U.S. funding has, to date, had little effect on 
the determination of the FDN to continue its struggle against t^ 
FSLN. It is obvious from discussions with resistance leadersH| 
supportive government officials m El Salvador, Honduras, and^* 
VH^^^HH that an expectation of resumed U.S. funding is an 
importar^ factor in their will to continue the armed struggle. 
It also appears that resources available to the resistance frcm 
sympathetic government (s) and/or individuals will permit current 
small-scale operations to continue for at least another 6 to 3 
months. A resumption of USG funding or additional alternative 
resource* would be essential m order to bring the scale of 
activity to that which existed in the Spring of 1984 and, over 
time, to prevent an erosion of the will and determination of the 
FDN combatants. (S) 

We are, at this point, at an important benchmark in our efforts 
to achieve the goals outlined in the San Jose Accord and the 
Contadora 21 Objectives. There is now a solid framework which 
could lead to peace in Central America and the dismantlin g of ^a 
potential Soviet/Cuban base on the hemispheric mainland. f^R^H 




'r 



5 •T^i 



;>y 




307 



iinmim 



SENSITIVE 



N 4 5u: 




uHwra 



SENSITI" 



308 



MEMORANDCM 



UlMSfflFD 



71') SYSTEM II 

90081 
NATIONAL SECCRITY COCNCIL /; , R«-do 



liNCUllHED 



ACTION 



MEMORANDOM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER 
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTI 

SUBJECT: Nicaraguan SNIE 



^%J 



I 



January 28, 1985 ChdyVet 2. 



'^■'S^^S 



ft 



Attached at Tab I is a purlloned copy of a portion of th« IMR 
input to CIA for the forthcoming SNIE on Nicaragua. Please 
protect that we have a copy in that only intelligence analysts 
have the draft inputs available. 




In response to your questions on the note at Tab II, additional 
points are preferred for your use. The following comments 
pertain to the marginal notations on the State draft at Tab I: 

Note 




•\l~%' 



e|V0i^X^ '''^IM«^ 



\lN6tfcSSfte 







tSI 



309 



Uiii, 



„ 1IW8IPED 




NoteE: Much depends in this comment on the definition of "short 
term. " Those knowledgeable of current resistance activities and 
operations believe that with aden^ate support the resistance 
could be in Managua by the end of 198S. The paper at Tab C 
applies. ' . p 

Sf- 

RECOMMEWDATION * 

That you discuss the attached draft ZMR input with Bud and as)c 
him to determine, with Secretary Shultz, the rationale for State 
Department's views. 



Approve 



Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab I - IHR draft input for forthcoming Nicaragua SNIE 
Tab II - Poindexter Note to North of January 26, 1985 
- FSLN Background Piecj 




« 



t^0**-%C«li*8 



310 



i • \ . «ou^ 


l^C 




A 


To 


N^Tf 4nd AdOrttt 0^X9 jln.tilj 




' Poirert McFarlane ^li'^ ■ V^ 






■ " 1 1 










N 




1 ■ I 












N 




1 




k 


XX 


ACTION 




FILE 






APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 


'. 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 


• 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


1 


REMARKS 

cc: Oliver North (»2 and 3) 
Jim Radzimski (14) 



oJNCUSSlflfB 





SECRET EYES ONLY 



SECRET 

N 712 9 

NSC/(l(!^ CONTROL NO 4 2 58 



COPY NO 



.OF. 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONL> 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 






A 



.iJ-'jn 







Warning Notice 
Intalligcnct Sourcn and Methods Involvvd 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthoriztd OivcloturtSubjca to Crirnmal Sanaiom 



llffiEMEU 



82-750 310 SECRET EYES ONLY 



311 



lEBWltD 



No. 



COPY. 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

COUNCIL 

INFORMATION 



DATE 



Notice 



Th« «it»cn«<l aocum«nt conmns ciaasifitd N«iion«l Security Council 
IntOfmtlion. II >t to B« rMd and ancui»«a only By p«flon» authonzM Oy 

law. 

Your signatura acknowiadgaa you ara juch a parson and you promisa you 
will Show o' diacuaa information eontamad m tha documaol only m\n 
oarsons WHO ara authomad By 'aw to naya accaaa to tnia documani. 

Parsons Handling this documant acKnowladga na or sna Know* and 
unoarstanda tna security law raiating inarato and will eooparata tuiiy wiin 
any lawful mvaatigaiion 6y tna Unitad Stataa Govarniflani inio any 
unautnonzad diacioaura of ciasaitiad information eoniainad naram. 



Access List 

NAME DATE NAME 



yNCBiSSife 



\lENfORANDL\l 



ACTION 



312 



ywiftSWD 



NATIONAL SECLklTV COUNCIL 



M«rch IS, 1985 



SYSTEM IV 

NSC/ICS-400258 



N 7127 



EYES ONLY 



MEMOFANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARIJillE 
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH^ 

SUBJECT: MMtin^ with Arturo Crui 



In accord with your instruction! relayed through VADM Poindexter, 
I m«t with Arturo Cru» on the aff moon of March 12, to di»c uii 
his fundinc 



Be apecifically asked JLf there was| 

which would provide funds eoanensurate with his earning capabiliti^ 
were he not engaged in the resistance effort. Re noted that his 
annua l salary prior this invclvenent was in exce ss of $7,500 per 
monthP 




Declaasifyt OADR 



wsmm 



EYES ONLY \ 



313 



wmmiB 



EYES ONLY 



N 7123 



Unless otherwise directed, I will proceed «• follows: 

Adolfo Calero will deposit $6,250 per month in Cruz' 
checking account .without Cruz' knowledge. Calero will be 
aware that he is funding Crut. The CIA will not be told of 
the new source for Cruz' funds. 

Contact will be established with a legitimate publisher or 
foundation to assume Calero' s role as soon as possible. 
Cruz will be asked to sign a nomal business contract with 
this publisher or foundation. 

RECOMMENDATIOH 

That you authorize me to proceed as indicated above. 

Approve'- ar/^O^S ? Disapprove 



/ 



^wwr» i lAitvt nfiLMtTfTIi eyes only 



^nmsm 



314 



2 



iifimim 



j>m 



£S 






^aJ/BV /^ 



To /^L- 



Q-a^/ 



UNCIASSIFI 



mso. 



315 



;4 



• Ou""NC 



J 



I 

-4 



To 1 N*T9 ar<a Addrttt 04tt llnitill 


' Potert McFarlan* ^ hi ' V^ 




' '^1 I 




; 1 




! - -! 












i 1 




X^ 


ACTION 




FILE 




APPHOVAL 




INFOKMATION 




COMMENT 




PKEPARE KEPLV 




CONCUNRENCE 




HECOWMENOATION 




OIHECT HEPLY 




METUKN 




OlVATCM 




SiGNATudE 


AEMARKS 

cc: Oliver North (#2 and 3) 
Jim Radzimski (14) 



dJNCLAOT^^ 










SECRET EYES ONL'. 
CONTROL NO 



N 7129 

400258 



COPY NO 



.OF. 



a- 99a 

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONL^ 



(l<iO 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 
inttllig«nct Sourctt and M«tbodi Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Uoauthoriztd OiKloturt Sub|«ct to Criminal Sanoiom 



llffiENEIl 



SECRET EYES ONLY 



iJ-'jn 



316 



iiHD 



No. _ 
COPY. 



NATIONAL SECURITY 

COUNCIL 

INFORMATION 



Notice 



The attacnM docutn«f<t contain* ciatiiliM National Saeurlty Council 
inlormaiion ii i« to ot r«ad and dltcustao only Oy pariona auihofizad By 



Vour signalura aclinowiaOgat you ara such a oarson and you promisa you 
will snow or Oiseuta mforfnalion contamad m tna doeumani only wiin 
pafsons WHO ara autnonzad By law to nava accaaa to tnia Oocumant. 

Parsons Handling tnis documont acknowladga »» or sna knows and 
unoarstanda tna sacunty law raiaiing tnarato and will cooparata luiiy witn 
any lawful mvoatigation oy tna Unitad Stataa Govarnmant into any 
unauinoniao discioaura of ciassiliad information containad narain. 



Access List 



DATE NAME DATE NAME 



mmsxs 



MENrORANDLM 



ACTION 



317 



UWKimED 

NATIONAL SECLRITV COtNCIL 
M«rch IS, 198S 



MCMORANDOM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARU^ie 
FROMi OLIVER L. NORTHp 

SUBJECT! H««tin9 with Arturo Crut 



SYSTEM IV 

NSC/lCS-400258 



N 7127 



EYES ONLY 



In accord with your instructions r«lay«d through VADM Poindcxtcr, 
I mat with Arturo Crui on th« «ff rnocn of March 12, to di»c u»« 
his fundinc 




Ha spacitically askad-i^ thara was| 

which would prtfVIda funds e oaisnsurata with his aaminq capabiliti< 
wara ha not angagad io tha rasistanca affort. Ha notad that his 
annua l salary p rior this involva aant was in a xcass of >7,S00 p ar 
>nthr 




Declassify t OADR 



wmm 



EYES ONLY \ 



318 



UNmssife 



EYES ONLY 



N 7123 



Unless otherwise directed, I will proceed es follows: 

Adolfo Calero will deposit $6,250 per month in Cruz' 
checking account .without Cruz' knowledge. Celero will be 
aware that he is funding Cruz. The CIA will not be told of 
the new source for Cruz' funds. 

Contact will be established with a legitimate publisher or 
foundation to assune Calero's role as soon as possible. 
Cruz will be asked to sign a nomal business contract with 
thik publisher or foundation. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you authorize me to proceed as indicated above. 

Approve"^^^^ Disapprove 



/ 



^nsmm 



EYES ONLY 



319 



2 



inmim 



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UNCUSSIRED 



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H^Tt «nd Adarttt Oltt ln>til 



Potert McFarlani. 



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Warning Notict 
lnt«lli9«fKt SourcM »ni Mtthodi Invetvtd 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unawthorizcd DiKloturt Sub(*ct te Criminal Sanaiom 



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NATIONAL SECURITY 

COUNCIL 

INFORMATION 



Th« attacnM aocumtnt contain* ciatsitiad National Saeurity Council 
Information il it to B« r«aa ana Oltcusiad only By paftont aulhontad By 

law. 

Your signature aciinowiaOgai you ara Juen a garson and you pfomua you 
will snow 0' aiscuaa information containad m ma aoeumant only witfi 
parsons «no ara authonzao By law to nava accaa* to tnia aoeumant. 

Parsons nanoiing this aoeumant acKnowladga na or sna knows ana 
unoarstanaa tna sacunty taw raiatmg inarato ana will cooparata fully witn 
any lawful mvaatigation By tna Unitad Statat Govarnmant inio any 
unauttiorizao oiseiosura of ciaasifiad information containad narain. 



r 

i 


Access List 

DATE NAME DATE NAME 












i - 


— 




V 






IINCBBStFIET 



322 



MEMORANDUM 



umftS^D 



NATIONAL SECLRITV COLNCIL 



M«rch IS, 198S 



ACTION 



SYSTEM IV 

NSC/ICS-400258 



N 7127 



EYES ONLY 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLAiE 
FROM J OLIVER L. NORTHr^ 

SUBJECT! M««tin9 with Arturo Cnii 



In accord with your instructions relayed through VADM Poindexter 
I met with Artuxfl_£ca»^ on the aff rnoen of March 12. to discuii 



hie fundin 




He specif leelly asked UJ there was| 

which would provide funds ccsBensurate with his eaminf capabiliti< 
were he not engaged in the resistance effort. Re noted that his 
annua l salary prior this involveaent was in excess of 17, SCO per 
thi 




Declassify! OADIl 



mmmi 



EYES ONLY \ 



323 



UimSSiFtfD 



EYES ONLY 



N 7128 



Unless otherwise directed, I will proceed at follows: 

Adolfo Calero will deposit $6,250 per month in Cruz' 
checking account .without Cruz' knowledge. Calero will be 
aware that he is funding Cruz. The CIA will not be told of 
the new source for Cruz' funds. 

Contact will be established with a legitimate publisher or 
foundation to assune Calero' s role as soon as possible. 
Cruz will be asked to sign a normal business contract with 
this publisher or foundation. 

RECOMMEND AT I OW 

That you authorize me to proceed as indicated above. 

Approva^ ^^O/ y; Disapprove 



mmsm 



siiMi T* isAmflTiEMcrrrh g^^s ^^^^^ 



324 







Outside Support to the FDN 



^kLpl-e.' 2 , koh^cte 3o2 



ince the cutoff of official funds to the £ 247(1 

ini«tas in May 1984 they have been able to field a - " 
uerri 11a fighting force, have increased their numbers, 
ctical efficiency. It is estinated that 

of activity that they have it would cost 
one half to two million dollars per 
ever, no intelligence on the source of 
that it comes from private groups, and 
siness corporations. ^ o-.^ 



3-user 
certificates for soae U.S. SIO million in ordnance. It is not 
clear, >»owev«^^jhether the ordnance has already been purchased 
or if ^^HBHHHH ^^v made these certificates available 
for us^whsnneeae^^and when funds are available. For soae 



tine a Cuban/ Aaerican group ha| 
activities (telethons in Miamij 
is not known if any of this 
Cuban Aaerican doctors from Mi 
services on weekends to tend 

3 In addition to the abo 
assistance from the Civilian 
Alabama, consisting of webb-g 
and training. A helicopter w 
September 1984. 

SUPPORT BY COUNTRY 




n involved in fund-raising 
the FRS in the south. It 

akes its way to the FDM. 

ave volunteered their 
FDN wounded. 

FDN has received periodic 
ry Assistance Group (CflA) i 
niforms, canteens, tents, 
CMA pilot was shot down in 




-user certificates: 



End-user certificates for U.S. ilO aillion in 




'Blowpipe" missies 
Alleged sale of weapons to FRS: not 



conf irned 

4. We have no information on the sour 
by the FDN to acquire arms or munitions. W 
FDN is inclined to hold this information clo 
leaders fear that, if the information should 
^qurce of the .funds would dry up. 




the 









ONClASSiFIEB ^m 



325 




UNeU£Si(D' 



March 2(H A95S'"-Q 



a-3o> 



CHRONOTOGICAL EVENT CHECKLIST 



February 21-28, 1985 (completed) 



Event 

Send resource boolc on the Contadora process 
process to congressmen, media outlets, private 
organizations and individuals interested in 
Nicaragua. 

FDN to select articulate freedom fighters with 
proven combat records and to make them available 
for contact with U.S. media representatives. 

Assign U.S. intelligence agencies to research, 
report, and clear for public release Sandinista 
military actions violating Geneva Convention/ 
civilized standards of warfare. 

Prepare themes for approaches to Congressmen 
based on overall listed perceptions which will 
directly attack the objections listed above. 

Encourage U.S. media reporters to meet 
individual FDN fighters with proven combat 
records and media appeal. 

Contact internal eyewitnesses/victims to 
testify before Congress about their abortive 
atteapt»_to deal with the FSLN (deadline 
March 



Responsibility 

State/LPD 
(Miller) 



NSC (Norths 



NSC (North! 
(Raymond) 



NSC (North) 



NSC (North) 

State/LPO 

(Gomez) 

NSC (North) 



f 



.... .uj, 



prf' 



■-:uf.ty l.'c 




^0> mmM 




326 



March 1-a^ .1985 

Evnt 

Pr«p«r« list- of publicly and privately 
expressed Congressional objections to aiding 
resistance and voting record on the issue. 

Provide State/H with a list of Nicaraguan 
emigres and freedom fighters to serve as 
potential witnesses to testify before 
hearings on aid to Nicaraguan freedom fighters 
(due March IS) . 

Nicaraguan internal opposition and resistance 
announce unity on goals and principals 
(March 2, San Jose) (completed). 

Request that Zbigniew Brzezinslci write a 
geopolitical paper which points out 
geopoliticalconsequences of Communist 
domination of Nicaragua (paper due March 20) . 

Briefings on Nicaragua for Icey Congressional 
members and staffers. North on W aggression 
and external involvement, Burghardt on 
diplomatic situation. 

Supervise preparation and assignment of 
articles directed to special interest groups at 
rate of one per wee)c beginning March 18 (examples: 
article on Nicaraguan educational system for NEA, 
article by retired military for Retired Officers 
Association, etc.). 

Assign agencies to draft one op-ed piece per 
weelc for signature by Administration officials. 
Specify themes for the op-eds and retain final 
editorial rights. 

lie opinion poll of America 

ard Sandinistas, freedom fighters. 




N 40321 



Responsibility 

WH/LA 
State/R 



NSC (North) 
State/ARA 

(Michel) 
State /LPD 

(Reich) 

State/LPD 
(Miller) 
NSC (North) 

NSC (Menges) 



NSC (Northl' 

(Burghardt) 



State/LPD 



NSC (Menges) 



WH (Rollins) 



Natioal^Hlkass Club news conference for FDN 
comsMaJMra Bermudez, Tigrillo, Mi)ce Lima 
(March S) (follow-on Congressional visits 
(March 6) (completed) . 

Martha Lida Murillo (9 yr old atrocity 
victim) visit to Washington — media interviews. 
Congressional visits, possible photo-op 
with First Lady (March 6-8) (completed) . 



State/LPD 

(Gomez) 

(Kuylcendall) 



State/LPD 
(Gomez) 
(Kuy)(endall) 
(WH/OPL) 



"muissm 



IDENTIAL 



327 



^^^m>:''^ 



M*reh »>-15. 1985 

Evnt 

WH/Legislative Affairs, State/H and ARA 
complete list of key Congressmen interested 
in Nicaragua. 



N 40322 



Responsibility 

State/H (Ball/Fox) 
WH/LA 
State/ARA 
(Michel/Holwill) 



Intelligence briefing for White House 
Administration and senior staff by CIA 
(Vickers, Room 208, OEOB, 30 minutes). 

Brief Presidential meeting with Lew Lehrman 
and other leaders of the influence groups 
working on MX and resistance funding. 

State/LPD and WH Media Relations prepare a 
list of key mediaoutlets interested in 
Central American issues, including newspapers, 
radio, and TV stations (including SIN). Where 
possible identify specific editors, commentators, 
tallc shows, and columnists. 

NSC update tal)cing points on aid to Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters. 

Briefings in OEOB for members /Senators: 
Shultz, McFarlane, Gorman, and Shlaudeman to 
brief Lehman (requires General Gorman to be 
placed on contract) . 

Call/visit newspaper editorial boards and 
give them baclcground on the Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters. 

Brief OAS members in Washington and 
abroad MU second term goals in Central 
Amerld^^ Explore possible OAS action 



road Ml- Si 
irldA Ej 
ila^Blej 

at Vtol] 



VP at iPCcllian inauguration. Discuss 
possible OAS initiative on Nicaragua with 
Core Four, Colombia, Brazil, and Uruguay 
(March IS and 16) . 

Prepare a "Dear Colleagues" Itr for signature 
by a responsible Democrat which counsels 
against "negotiating" with the FSLN. 



NSC (North) 



NSC (Raymond) 
(North) 



NSC (North) 
State /LPO 

(Miller) 



NSC (North) 



NSC (North) 
(Lehman) 



State/LPD (Reich) 
WH/PA 
NSC (North) 

OAS(Middendorf) 
NSC (Menges) 
State/LPD (Reich) 



VP (Hughes) 



NSC (Lehman) 



"""^UiSSlFigi 



DENTIAL 



328 




March 



^»» 



19»5 



N 40323 



Evnt 

Results du« on public opinion survay to s«« 
what turns Aswrieans against Sandinistas 
(March 20) . 

Joachia Haitra — Congressional meetings, 
speeches, and op-ed pieces. 

Review and restate themes based on results of 
public opinion poll. 



Presidential drop-by at briefing for American 
evangelicals on MX and Nicaraguan resistance. 

Congressional hearings (Foreign' Relations/ 
Affairs) and testimony by Nicaraguan emigres 
and atrocity victims. 

Prepare document on Nicaraguan narcotics 
involvement. 

SSCI CODBI. Boren^Rockcfeller, McConnell, 
and Wils^n^HHHHHfor meetings with 
resistance ~lMarch 15-17) . 

VP in Honduras; meeting with Pres Suazo 
(March 16) . 

Argentine state visit; President emphasize 
nmmA-JttidQkt case (March 19) . 




Calero meeting with 

1 Bispanic Caucus (Jorge Has) 



Production and distribution of La Prensa 
chronology of FSLN harassment. 



Responsibility 
NSC (Hinckley) 



State/LPO 
(Kuylccndall) 

State/LPO 
(Reich) 
NSC (North) 
(Raymond) 

tra/OPL (Ittilly) 
NSC (Mort^) 

WH/LA 

NSC (North) 

(Lehman) 

Justice 
(Mullen) 

NSC (North) 
(Lehman) 



VP (Hughes) 
WH (Elliott) 



State/LPO 

(Reich) 



CONFIDENTi 





ENTIAL 



329 




iDENllwL 



March 23-31, 1985 

Evnt 

Rev. Vallardo Antonio Santellz (Pentecostal 
Minister atrocity victim) — Congressional/ 
media ■•etings (March 22-23) . 

McFarlane, Friedersdorf meeting with Icey 
Congressional leadership (Rn 208 or vniSR) to 
brief situation and proposed course of 
action (March 23-25) . 

Presidential brea)cfasts, lunches, and WHSR 
meetings with )cey Congressional leaders 
(March 24 through vote) . 

Pedro Juaquin Chamorro (Editor La Prensa ) 
U.S. media/ spea)cing tour (March 2S-April 3) 

President to meet in Room 450 w/ "Spirit of 
Freedom," concerned citizens for Democracy. 
Representatives from 8 countries (180) 
(March 25) . 

Release of DOO/State paper on Soviet/Cuban/ 
Nicaraguan intentions in the Caribbean; 
possible WH bac)cgrounder. 

Distribute Bernard Nietschmann paper on 
suppression of Indians by FSLN. 

Antonio Farach (Former FSLN Intelligence 
Officer) — media and Congressional meetings 
regarding Sandinista espionage, intelligence 
activities. 

Invitc<C£r9sident's Duarte, Monge, Suazo, 
and Barletta to a very private meeting in 
Texas with )c«y Congressional leaders so that 
CODBL c«ii haar unvarnished concerns re 
Sandlj^^l^a and Democratic leaders' support 
for 



Re la 




N 40324 



Responsibility 

State/LPD 

(Kuyliendall) 

(Gomez) 



WH/LA 

NSC (Lehman) 
(North) 



State/LPD 
(Miller/Gomez) 



State/LPD (Reich) 
WH/PA (Sims) 



State/LPD 



Republican 

Study 

Committee 



(Kuy)cendall) 
NSC (North) 



r on Nicaraguan media manipulation. State/LPD 



Publish and distribute as State Department 
document Nicaragua's Development as Marxist- 
Leninist State by Linn Poulsen. 

Declassify Nicaragua's Development as a 
Marxist-Leninist State by Linn Jacobowitz 
Poulsen for publication as State Department 
document (clearance request w/Casey) 
CONFIDE 



State/LPD 
(Reich) 



State/LPD 
(Blac)(en) 




330 




HTIAL^ 



April 1-7. 1915 

R«q«*HBbni»rd Ni«tschB«nn to update prior 
p«p«r drnpprcsalon of Indians by FSUf (to 
b« pubHahcd and dlatributad by April 1) . 

AEZi Sponsor madia avants w/print and 
talavision madia for Cantral AiMrica 
raaiatanca laadars (April 1-7) . 

Europaan Parlimantary dalagation to 
maat with Prasidant Raagan (April 2) . 



Visit by Colombian Prasidant Batancur 
(April 3-4) ; possible Joint Session speech 
by Batancur. 

Propoaad Presidential television addraaa 
on Nicaragua (April 4) . 



Second round of SFRC hearinga on Soviet 
build-up in region (Helms) (priot to recess) . 

COOBL visits during recess (April 4-14) . 
Hicaraguan refugee campa in Honduras and 
Coata Rica (include vi si.t to freedom fighter 
base camp and hospitalf^ 



J 40325 



Reaponsibility 

Stata/LPD 
(Blacken) 



State /LPO 

(Reich) 

NH/OPL (Reilly) 

National Porum 
Foundation 
WH/OPL (Reilly) 



WBSpeeehwr iters 
(Elliott) 
NSC (North) 

State /H " 



NSC (North) 
(Lehman) 



CODEL visit during recess (April 4-14) with NSC (North) 
regional leaders of Central America. Regional (Lehman) 
leaders convey importance of resistance fighters 
in NU. 



Administration and prominent non-DSG 
spo)cesman on networ)c shows regarding Soviet, 
Cuban, East Carman, and Libyan, Iranian 
eomMam^yitli Sandinistas. 

VMhi^^^Mktmd 'Green hookt' distribute 
p«a4^^^^Vfco Congressmen, media outlata, 
prl^|^HH|aai sat ions, and individuals 
IntMM^M in Nicaragua. Paaa to Lew 
L«hrman and other interested groups. 

Distribute paper on geopolitical consequences 
of Connunist domination of Nicaragua. 

Release paper on Nicaraguan drug 
involvement. 



CONFIDE 



mmii 



trjM'a 



•Llf 



lAL 



WH/PA (Sims) 
WH (Buchanan) 
State /LPD 



Stata/LPD (Reich) 
HR/LA 
State/H (Fox) 



Stata/LPD 



Stata/LPD 
(Blac)cen) 
NSC (North) 



mji^w 



331 

lUtNllAL 



M 40326 

CONFf 



April »»I4. 1985 (During receas) 



Event Responsibility 

25 Central American spokesmen arrive in Miami CFA (Abramoff) 

for briefing before departing to visit 

Congressional districts. Along with national 

television commercial campaign in 45 media 

markets. 

Targeted telephone campaign begins in 120 CFA (Abramoff) 
Congressional districts. CITIZENS FOR AMERICA 
district activists organize phone-tree to targeted 
Congressional offices encouraging them to vote for 
aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. 

Lew Lehrman speaking tour of major U.S. cities. CFA 

Telephone campaign. 

Central American spokesmen conduct rallies CFA 
throughout the country in conjunction with 
CITIZENS FOR AMERICA activists (starting 
April 12) . 

Nationally coordinated sermons about aid to 
the freedom fighters are conducted (April 14) . 

Naval Institute Seminar in Newport, RI 
(Lugar, McFarlane [April 12]). 



i 



CONFID 



WlASHbim 



332 



jwaiSw 




Mill 



April 



198S 



N 40327 



Event 



Nicaraguan Refugee Fund (NRF) dinner, 
Washington, DC; President as Guest of 
Honor (April 15) . 

Presidential report to Congress on reasons 
for releasing funds to freedom fighters 
(April 15) . 

AAA available to Washington press. 



Central American spokesmen visit Congressional 
offices on Capitol Hill (April 16) . 

SFRC Nicaraguan issues, open hearing 
(April 16-17) . 

Washington conference 'Central America: 
Resistance or Surrender* (Presidential 
drop-by?) (April 17) . 

Barnes' subcommittee hearing on Nicaragua; 
Motley, public witnesses (April 18) 
(2170 Rayburn, 2:00 p.m.). 

Presidential Radio Address (April 20) . 



Responsibility 



State/LPD 

(Miller) 
NSC (Raymond) 

NSC 
State 



State /LP^ 
(Gomez) 



Abramof f 



NSC 

Abramof f 



WH (Elliott) 




-UNftASSIFIEONFMAL 



CONFI 



April 22-29, 1985 



333 




k^lDEJ^TIAL 



N 40328 



Event 



Rgsponsibility 



House Appropriations (Obey subcommittee) 
intelligence brief on Central America/ 
Latin America (April 23) . 

Obey subcommittee (panel on Central America) , 
public witnesses (a.m.) /Administration 
witnesses (p.m.) (April 24). 

Major rally in the Orange Bowl in Miami, 
Florida, attended by President Reagan and 
important Administration figures 
(April 28) . 



Presidential calls to key members. 



Cuban American 
National t 
Foundation 
State/LPO 

(Reich) 

WH (Friedersdorf) 
NSC (Lehman) 




-MlASSIBiDENm 



334 




9J 



-Mjjytgf™'*^ 



CONFIIMMSaI .rW ^ 10 



April 39. »85 

Evnt Raiponiibility 

Vot* In th« O.S. Congrssa on aid to the HH(Friederidorf ) 

Nicaraguan fraedom fighters (April 30) . NSC (Lehnan) 

President leaves for Europe. 



# 



-MASSIW™* 



335 



...JICLASSIFIIBf'DtNiiAL 



March 20, 1985 



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS N 40330 
REGARDING NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE 



Evnt *• 

March lii>>22. 1985 

Argantim stat* visit; President amphasiz* 
n««d for OAS case (March 19) . 

March 23-31. 1985 

Presidential breakfasts, lunches, and HHSR 
meetings with key Congressional leaders 
(March 24 through vote) . 

President to meet in Room 450 w/ 'Spirit of 
Freedom,' concerned citizens for Democracy. 
Representatives from 8 countries (180) 
(March 25) . 

April 1-7, 1985 

Visit by various members of European 
parliments who support the President's 
policies in Central America (April 2) . 

Visit by Colombian President Betancur 
(April 3-4); possible Joint Session speech. 

Presidential television address on budget 
(April 4). 

Presidential meeting with AAA. 

April 15-21, 1985 

Conference on religious freedom; 
Presidential drop-by in Rb 450, OEOB. 

Nicaraguan Refugee Fund (NRF) dinner, 
Washiaf|iA« DC} President as Guest of 
Honesii^Bl IS). 



Pre 
for 
(Apri 



•rll'Tfl . 



1 report to Congress on reasons 
ing funds to freedom fighters 



Possible Presidential meeting with AAA. 

Possible Presidential visit with former 
Central American Presidents, Foreign 
Ministers, and Presidential candidates. 

Presidential Radio Address (April 20) . 
CONFIDEy ft|A^ 



Responsibility 



MH (Elliott) 



NSC ( Raymond} 
HH/OPL (Really) 



WHSpeechwr iters 
(Elliott) 

NSC (North) 



NSC (Raymond) 



State/LPD 

(Miller) 
NSC (Raymond) 

NSC 
State 



NSC (North) 



NSC (North) 
S/LPD (Reich) 



WH (Elliott) 



336 



\\MV.\ [Ibbu KB "*"""'■ 


N 4C331 


co»rilMluLnO«» '*■ , 




BVSBt 


Responsibility 


Aoril 22-29, 1985 




Proposed visit to Washington by 
Presidents Honge, Duarte, and Suazo. 


NSC (North) 
S/ARA (Michel) 


Presidential calls to key members. 


WH (Friedersdorf) 
NSC (Lehman) 


Major rally in the Orange Bowl in Miami, 
Florida, attended by President Reagan and 
important Administration figures 
(April 28). 


Cuban American 

National 

Foundation 


April 30, 1985 




Proposed Congressional vote; President 
leaves for Europe. 


V 




JSttUSXIHfflOENTlAL 



337 



fTT 


Nam« and Address 


Date 


ln,t,al4 


' 


Robert McParlane 






2 








































X 


ACTION 




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APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




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SIGNATURE 


REMARKS: >^ 
cc: Oliver North /#2 And 3) 
.Jim Radzimski|j>*) 
Don Fortier (#5) 



a -3// 




Q^jMr^J-i^ 



N 40316 

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 400300 Re-do 
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HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



'arninq Noiii 



Warning Notice 
Intelligence Sourcei and Methods Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized Oistloiure Subject to Criminal Saoctiont 





W 



^ 



\ 
7 



,^^ 



Qg /\ 



^ 4' k) 



338 



UiOtOKt^l^y 



MEMORANDUM 

ACTIOW 

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARIANE 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
March 22, 19eS 



SYSTEM ZV 

NSC/XCS-400300 
R«-do 

* 

N 40317 



FROMt 



SUBJECT! 



OLIVER L. NORTHK 
OONALO R. FORTZER 

Timing and the Nlcaraguan Resistance Vote 



Based on the advice from ADM Poindcxter that we are proceeding 
with a vote before the President's departure for the European 
Summit, the schedule of events to support an affirmative vote on 
the resistance program has been revised. The most recent version 
of the chronology of events is attached at Tab A. 

in order to reduce the eimount of Presidential time allocated to 
this issue, the new schedule omits several of the events we had 
originally planned in the four communications/media meetings we 
have had with Pat Buchanan's ad hoc working group. Per ADM 
Poindexter's guidance the schedule continues to focus oa a vote 
at the end of April, triggered by submission of the required 
report on or about April 15. A very rough draft of the report is 
attached at Tab B. 

Zn addition to the events depicted on the internal chronology at 
Tab A, other activities in the region will continue, including 
military operations and political action. Like the chronology, 
these events are also timed to a vote at the end of April: 

planned travel by Calero, Crux, and Robelo; 

various efforts designed to support significantly increased 
military operations immediately after the vote (we expect 
major Sandij^tacrossbordei^attacks ^^^^^^^m«frame--today ' s 
res upply t<^ ^BBB^^^BB^^^^^fj^m^^^^^^^BBwent well); 
and] 

special operations against highly visible military targets 
in Nicaragua. 

Some of these efforts are already well underway. For example, 
yesterday* Bernardario Larios, former Sandinista Defense Minister, 
defected to Costa Rica and is now in Panama (you were briefed on 
this operation during the trip) . Others, however, including 
actions by U.S. interests groups, are very sensitive to the 
timing. Next week the networks auction their air time for 15, 
30, and 60 second commercials during prime viewing hours. Based 
on the decision to proceed with a vote at the end of April, these 
groups will commit nearly $2M for comnercial air time and the 
production of various advertising media. 



SECRET 
Declassify t OADR 




339 



11, ,S.E45B€iIu 



p0gHpT. 



Based on th« input from AOM Polndexter, th« groups hav* been told 
to cast their advertising and public contacts in a general 
campaign focused on 'support for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters.* 
The ads, mailings, and telephone contacts will be structured in 
such a way that they will not define the nature of "support." 
Thus, if we decide to request only non-lethal funding from the 
Congress, the political action campaign will still be relevant. 

Before Senator Durenburger delivers his planned speech on this 
issue at the National Press Club next Tuesday, March 26, we 
should give him a sense for where we are headed before he speaks. 
In this regard, the draft at Tab B needs to be refined — particularly 
the portion from pages 21-25. As you know, we have constructed 
(and have tacit interagency approval for) a baseline formula 
which does not include lethal assistance. We now need to decide 
what form our opening request should take: 

-•• covert and lethal assistance with the new restrictions; or 

non-lethal aid to the resistance; or 

a request which is non-specific on lethal/non- lethal support. 

It now appears that the best we can hope for is a Lifting of th« 
8066 restrictions and the expenditure of funds provided therein 
for non-lethal (or humanitarian) purposes. It is possible, 
however, that our public education campaign between now and when 
the report would be submitted could change a number of votes--thu8, 
affecting the final form of our request. Since we will not know 
this for certain until late in the Congressional recess, we 
proposed that we proceed as follows: 

Between now and April 12 ; refine the report and the three 
forms of the Presidential Determination (pages 21-25) as 
indicated above. 

On the morning of April 15 ; meet with 8-10 key Congressional 
leaders from both Houses and both parties to the White House 
for • two-hour briefing hosted by you. Secretary Shultz, and 
WH Chief of Staff Regan. At this meeting, the senators/ 
members, would be provided with the Gates/Gorman briefing 
(one hour) which covers pages 1-20 of the report. They 
would then be asked to read each of the three funding 
options (pages 21-25) . Based on their input (we believe 
they will recommend the second alternative — non-lethal) , we 
will append the appropriate version to the report. 

In the early afternoon of April IS ; the President should 
meet with Crux, Calero, and Robe lo who, if necessary, will 
endorse the non-lethal option on the grounds that it will 
preserve the credibility of their March 1 San Jose Peace 
Offer. 
•6BG9MX 



llteECRElD 



340 



N 40319 

rrrnrf 5 ii -r w ^ 

On the evening of April IS t in his address to the Nicaraguan 
Refugee Fund ainner, the President will announce that he has 
forwarded « report to the Congress asking for renewed 
support to the Nicaraguan Democratic opposition, if the 
report is being forwarded requesting non-lethal aid, his 
remarks will note that the report excludes military assistance 
in response to the plea of the resistance leaders so that 
their peace overture will have a chance to work. The 
remarks should also include (as would this version of the 
report) that "other forms of support will be provided if the 
peace proposal is rejected.* This will cover us for the 
resumption of CIA support once the restrictions in Section 
8066 are lifted. 

We believe that this scenario is workable and will result in 
significant Congressional support for our proposal on the 
Hill — with a minimum of Presidential involvement. The events 
outlined for April 15 are important in that they will provide a 
public endorsement for less than we had originally hoped for and 
at the same time give the Congressional leadeship a sense of 
having participated in the formulation. It is imperative that 
the plan outlined above be kept very closehold since any leak 
could seriously compromise the effort. Thus, the President's 
remarks at the NRP dinner on April 15 should be .prepared by Ben 
Elliott in a manner similar to that in which we prepared the 
Grenada announcements. The rest of the action plan at Tab A is 
designed to support the proposal above and needs your approval 
for implementation by the Buchanan ad hoc working group. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. That you review the chronology at Tab A and approve these 
events for implementation. 

Approve Disapprove 



2. That you approve the concept outlined above for events on 
April 15 (these are not included in the checklist at Tab A) . 

Approve Disapprove 



3. That you review the draft report at Tab B and approve the 
formulation of non-lethal and non-specific versions of the 
President's determination (pages 21-25). 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab A - Chronological Event Checklist (dtd March 20, 1985) 
Tab B - Draft Report 



-eeeftss- 



Hl^GRSli) 



341 



mm^ 



■» 



A ,'} N 18 765 

A' 



{)' 



April ;, 198S 



FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 
DON FORTIER 
Contra Vot« -- Delay to May 



Q-3i;iL 



In following up on your m««iinq witn smci9\.mM.j -.—*..», -^ ..».» 
discussed the implications of a delay in the Congressional vote 
on contra aid until May. Obviously a number of adjustments in 
our approach will be necessary as a result of this slippage. 
These should be understood by Administration principals as soon 
as possible, so as to keep policy more or less coordinated. 

We have considered the impact of a delay until May on the 
following dimensions of our policy: 

1 Public perceptions of indecision . It is essential that^rom 
the beginning this delay be brieted as a response to the l*!*" 
lative calendar and the wishes of the Congressional leader«ip — 
not because the votes aren't there or because we can't decwe 
what to do. We have to underscore that we are going forward, and 
if anything, in the intervening period, we may want to turn the 
rhetorical heat u£. 

2. Announcement of request . Under our previous plan the content 
of the request would not have been announced until the same day 
the report was filed. But the two don't have to go together, and 
we'll have to look at this issue again. (The President, or 
Shultz, could announce what we'll ask for around the middle of 
the month.) By announcing the contents of the request earlier, 
we would have more time to rally support before actually filing. 

3. San Juan offer T'This will now expire before the Congressional 
debate even b«9ins. Extending it can no longer be a surprise 
Qlfi pUrfc^ It ia not quite clear why it has to expire at all, of 

^ linee 

Songe^eadership by asking the«, publicly and 
dirdlHPto extend. (The obvious rlskt compounding the impres- 
sion^Theeitation on our part.) If • long extension i» "•«•- 
■ary (e.g. 60 days) we'll have to think about how to contain the 
adverse iffects of that. In general, as the offer "cedes in 
time we m^y have to rely more on the mere fact of unity between 
the civilian and the armed opposition, and le*s on their 
proposal. ' 






rf 



0<tf -CcMM-**:*!:* 



M53: 






^ 

^ 




342 



4. Conttnt of r«qu«it . If th» San Juan offer 1« dtla^td^ fbt ^^ 
longer p«riod, w* should consider.. off«rin9 assurances that, the 
release of funds would be phased -- c.9.. if the overall requrst 
is for non-lethal aid, then humanitarian aid could be permitted 
immediately; li the request is for lethal, then non-lethal would 
90 ri9Mr#w«y. 

vs. non-lethal . It had seemed advantageous to have th« 
r non-lethal aid only come from the contras . We should 
its question too, particularly if we're asking them for 
a lon^tfif extension tha.n they'll like. Such a request may look a 
little phony. We may benefit, moreover, by being able to tell 
Congress that the contras want -- and need -- more than we're 
asking. This lays the basis for a larger request later. 

6. Regional repercussions . Your Inauguration week trip to the 
area was crucial in sustaining the patience of our friends. 
Since we will seem to be backing off at the last ainute, one 
(there are probably others) step to reassure them would be 
another quick tour explaining our approach. 

7. Contadora . A delay will also create more opportunities for 
the revival of regional diplomacy. If the Core Four doubt our 
resolve, they will likely weaken on the terms of a Contadora 
pact. We have to consider how to keep then wedded them te the 
San Juan offer as an integral part of Contadora. 

* 

8. Privately-funded P.B. Media buys have already been madepsn 
the assumption that April would be the month of the contra .4^ 
debate. It may still be, but ttre media blitz will peter ou€- 
longer before the vote. We have to make clear to our private 
supporters that we are not abandoning them, and that they play a 
crucial role in putting the heat on Congress earlier. Note: If 
we go public with our request early, we gain the advantage that 
this media campaign can be specific, not just generic. 




WKSIFIEO 



343 



To 


Name and Add 


«$t 


Oat« 


in.dais 




Robert McFarlane 














































}^ 


ACTION 




FILE 




APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS: ^^ 
cc: Oliver North /#2 ind 3) 
.Jim Radzimski^J^) 
Don Fortier (#5) 



a-313 




(P^J^ 



i-;io 

N 40316 . ' 

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 400300 Re-do 
COPY NO ^ OF ^ 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 




W 



arninq Noil 



Warning Notice 
Inttlligerx* Sources and Methods involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized Oiitlosure Sub|e<t to Criminal Sanctions 



aa y^iw 



r 



\ 

7 



344 



M£MORANDUKf 
ACTION 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
»Urch 22, 198S 



SYSTEM IV 

NSC/ICS-400300 
Ra-do 

* 

N 40317 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLfiNE 

OLIVER L. NORTHK 
DONALD R. FORTIER 



FROMt 



SUBJECT] 



Timing and th« Nlcaraguan Resistance Vote 



Based on the advice from ADM Poindexter that we are proceeding 
with a vote before the President's departure for the European 
Summit, the schedule of events to support an affirmative vote on 
the resistance program has been revised. The most recent version 
of the chronology of events is attached at Tab A. 

In order to reduce the amount of Presidential time allocated to 
this issue, the new schedule omits several of the events we had 
originally planned in the four communications/media meetings we 
have had with Pat Buchanan's ad hoc working group. Per ADM 
Poindexter 's guidance the schedule continues to focus on a vote 
at the end of April, triggered by submission of the required 
report on or about April IS. A very rough draft of the report is 
attached at Tab B. 

In addition to the events depicted on the internal chronology at 
Tab A, other activities in the region will continue, including 
military operations and political action. Like the chronology, 
these events are also timed to a vote at the end of April: 

planned travel by Calero, Cruz, and Robelo; 

various efforts designed to support significantly increased 
military operations immediately after the vote (we expect 
major SandJ^iatacrossborde^attacks ^^^h^^^^mefrane--today' s 
resupp^y_t^^BHI^^^IIIHI^^flo>!<^^^^^^^Hr>'ent 
and I 

special operations against highly visible military targets 
in Nicaragua. 

Some of these efforts are already well underway. For example, 
yesterday- Bernardario Larios, former Sandinlsta Defense Minister, 
defected to Costa Rica and is now in Panama (you were briefed on 
this operation during the trip) . Others, however, including 
actions by U.S. interests groups, are very sensitive to the 
timing. Next week the net%rarks auction their air time for IS, 
30, and 60 second commercials during prime viewing hours. Based 
on the decision to proceed with a vote at the end of April, these 
groups will commit nearly $2M for commercial air time and the 
production of various advertising media. 



SECRET 
Declassifyt 



OAOR 



IfefcKEP'ED 



345 



tlaSE^SBfity 



flw^Hg^ 



Based on th« input fro« ADM Poindcxter, th« groups hav* been told 
to cast their advertising and public contacts in a general 
campaign focused on "support for the Nlcaraguan freedom fighters.* 
The ads, mailings, and telephone contacts will be structured in 
such a way that they will not define the nature of 'support.* 
Thus, if we decide to request only non-lethal funding from the 
Congress, the political action campaign will still be relevant. 

Before Senator Durenburger delivers his planned speech on this 
issue at the National Press Club next Tuesday, March 26, we 
should give him a sense for where we are headed before he speaks. 
In this regard, the draft at Tab B needs to be refined — particularly 
the portion from pages 21-25. As you know, we have constructed 
(and have tacit interagency approval for) a baseline formula 
which does not include lethal assistance. We now need to decide 
what fona our opening request should take: 

— covert and lethal assistance with the new restrictions; or 

non-lethal aid to the resistance; or 

a request which is non-specific on lethal/non-lethal support. 

It now appears that the best we can hope for is a lifting of the 
8066 restrictions and the expenditure of funds provided therein 
for non-lethal (or humanitarian) purposes. It is possible, 
however, that our public education campaign between now and when 
the report would be submitted could change a number of votes--thus, 
affecting the final form of our request. Since we will not know 
this for certain until late in the Congressional recess, we 
proposed that we proceed as follows: 

Between now and April 12 : refine the report and the three 
forms of the Presidential Determination (pages 21-25) as 
indicated above. 

On the morning of April 15 ; meet with 8-10 key Congressional 
leaders from both Houses and both parties to the white House 
for • two-hour briefing hosted by you. Secretary Shultz, and 
WH Chief of Staff Regan. At this meeting, the senators/ 
meiBb«r«. would be provided with the Gates/Goman briefing 
(one hour) which covers pages 1-20 of the report. They 
would then be asked to read each of the three funding 
options (pages 21-25) . Based on their input (we believe 
they will recommend the second alternative — non-lethal) , we 
will append the appropriate version to the report. 

In the early afternoon of April 15 ; the President should 
meet with Cruz, Calero, and Robe lo who, if necessary, will 
endorse the non-lethal option on the grounds that it will 
preserve the credibility of their March 1 San Jose Peace 
Offer. 




346 



CBCnPT 



N 4031!^ 



On th« •vnino of April 15 » in his address to the Nicaraguan 
R«fU9«« Fund oinner, the President will announce that he has 
forwarded a report to the Congress asking for renewed 
support to the Nicaraguan Deaiocratic opposition, if the 
report is being forwarded requeeting non-lethal aid, his 
remarks will note that the report excludes military assistance 
in response to the plea of the resistance leaders so that 
their peace overture will have a chance to work. The 
remarks should also include (as would this version of the 
report) that 'other fonss of support will be provided if the 
peace proposal is rejected." This will cover us for the 
resumption of CIA support once the restrictions in Section 
8066 are lifted. 

We believe that this scenario is workable and will result in 
significant Congressional support for our proposal on the 
Hill — with a minimum of Presidential involvement. The events 
outlined for April IS are important in that they will provide a 
public endorsement for less than we had originally hoped for and 
at the same time give the Congressional leadeship a sense of 
having participated in the fomulation. It is imperative that 
the plan outlined above be kept very closehold since any leak 
could seriously compromise the effort. Thus, the President's 
remarks at the NRF dinner on April 15 should be .prepared by Ben 
Elliott in a manner similar to that in which we prepared the 
Grenada announcements. The rest of the action plan at Tab A is 
designed to support the proposal above and needs your approval 
for implementation by the Buchanan ad hoc working group. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. That you review the chronology at Tab A and approve these 
events for implementation. 

Approve Disapprove 



2. That you approve the concept outlined above for events on 
April 15 (these are not included in the checklist at Tab A) . 

Approve Disapprove 



3. That you review the draft report at Tab B and approve the 
formulation of non-lethal and non-specific versions of the 
President's determination (pages 21-25). 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab A - Chronological Event Checklist (dtd March 20, 1985) 
Tab B - Draft Report 



«e€ftS» 



liteCRfflffl 



347 



a -3a/ 



See Hearing Exhibit RCM-37 



348 




349 



a-&y 



See Hearing Exhibit C/CATF-43-7 



350 




351 




352 




353 




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CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



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367 



CHAPTER 3. THE ENTERPRISE ASSUMES CONTROL OF CONTRA SUPPORT 



368 



"^- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



3-/ 



^^oihfyok. 




The following information was provided to the Conmittee by 
General Richard V. Secord on August 18, 1987t 

1. By the time of the meeting on or about July 1, 1985, at the 
Miami Airport Hotel, LtC North had repeatedly informed Secord 
that North was concerned that the Contras had not formed an 
effective air resupply program. North also stated that the FDN 
had a large surplus of arms and that the primary need was 
delivering the arms to the troops inside Nicaragua. North also 
told Secord that aerial resupply_wa s the^ aJje qua non for the 
exis tenc e of a Sou thern Force, 

' _ forth explained that a 

SOUtliern Force could not exist withovIT^erial resupply. and that 
the FDN did not have the capability to undertake it. Hence, 
during the July 1 meeting, the need for an airlift was the top 
priority and the establishment of a Southern Front coincident 
with such an airlift was also stressed. 

2. In the summer of 1985, Secord agreed, following North's 
request, to create the airlift for both the FDN and the 
Southern Front. In the beginning of August, Secord held a 
series of planning sessions with North and others to determine 
how to conduct the resupply progreua. There were three steps 
necessary to establish an effective operation. First, a 
logistic organization consisting of aircraft, spare parts, 
maintenance, communications and trained personnel had to be set 
up. For that, Secord turned to Richard Gadd. The second task 
was to obtain a secure operating base from which the aircraft 
could launch their missions. For this, Quinte rqj, on Secordls_^ 
instructions, consulted with_-tl? e Contra leaders. <fl|l|||H||H|BB 

■l^^^mmUHIHHHHiH^HI w^* initially conTidered t o be 
the first s}>oice. However, Operating a major air resupplyHH 
Kould prove difficult at best. The runway, wnlle 
Long enougi), was rough, undulating and poorly maintained, and 
auf fie lent fue l on site w as not available. Quintero s uggested 

a suitable alternative and Secord and North concurred. Eastly, 
Secord concluded that in order to establish a sustained air 
resupply ov^^'tion on the Southern Front, an emergency airstrip 
stocked j£^ a small amount of fuel was necessary as an abort 
base. fl^^S^ envisioned early on the possible use of C-7 and 
C-12 3 QgWoiilar airc raft, and particularly if these aircraft 
flew BHUmBflH where a flight could be as long as nine 
hours7Secordfel€ that some kind of abort base had to be set 
up to handle in-flight emergencies or damage from enemy action. 
And for the Southern Front, Costa Rica was the. only location 
possible for this emergency landing field. When Secord dis- 
cussed with North the idea of an emergency field. North imme- 
diately suggested S^nta Elena in the northwest corner of Costa 
Rica, which had apparently been considered before by the United 
States Government for such an airstrip. North also thought 
that more than an emergency airfield could be established at 
Santa Elena and that Secord should aim to set up a secondary 
operating base for resupply to.(^. SOtfttjieMi^rOD^asaff course. 



liffMlFII 



v/ 



369 



- 2 



mssim 



the antir* project had to remain officially secret, 



3. In or about November, 1985, Richard Gadd had_ located three 
C-123's belonging ^^^!l^J||||^^|Bi^HHHHHH| for possible 
purchase. However, MjHIH^^IHVwouldnot seD. the aircraft 
without some sign o^orrlcial approval from the United States 
Government. Col. North told Secord that he had asked both 
Robert McFarlane and the State Department for assistance. 
Secord believes that North said tha^NortJ^ha^ta^jed to 
Elliott Abrams about informing the B^HIBmH^^IBft that 
the United States Government supported the sal^^ofthese 
aircraft to ACE. The deal was never ultimately consummated 
because final approval was not received from the 



4. From the conception of the air resupply operation in July, 
1985, through January 1986, Col. North impressed upon Secord 
the fact that they were operating with donated funds that were 
strictly limited. Similarly, from February 1986 to October 
1986 when some funding was derived from the Iranian operations, 
funds for the Contra program were limited since the Iranian 
operation had increasing financial obligations. Due to the 
limited nature of funds available, the criteria Secord imposed 
on the purchase of aircraft and other equipment was to purchase 
the least expensive available that could adequately perform the 
task. Secord informed his subordinates of this need for strict 
economy, including Richard Gadd and, after May 1, 1986, Robert 
Dutton. Secord and North both discussed the limited availa- 
bility of funds. The L-lOO and Casa 212 turbo jet propeller 
driven aircraft were discussed by North emd Secord during the 
sunmer and fall of 1985 as more desirable aircraft for the 
resupply operation but were rejected because of their high 
cost. By the fall of 1985, the estimate Secord had made to 
Col. North of what it would cost to run the air resupply 
operation until siimmer 1986 was approximately $4 million. 

5. In the spring and early summer of 1985, North had decided 
to furnish the FNI with arms and air support directly, rather 
than th« funds needed to secure these goods and services. As a 
result of an agreement that was reached with Calero and 
Bermudes In July 1985 at Miami, air resupply was the highest 
priority. It was further understood that any arms furnished 
directly to FDN custody would also be made available to non-FDN 
Contra units fighting in the South. In December 1985 and in 
February 1986, two plane loads of arms were delivered to the 
FDN by North and Secord. However, the FDN only reluctantly 
made those and other arms available for air drop to the 
Southern insurgents. As a result, Secord decided (North was 
informed) that sufficientarms and other supplies for air drop 
would be storedfl|^HI^H^Mand dropped directly to the South. 



;i e 



LASSIFIED 



370 



- 3 



NCUSSIFIED 



6. 



During a meatlng held on April 20, 1986, at ^ 

^^^J both Seco rd and North reiterated to Enrique Bemudez, 
^^^■^BHB^of the FON the importance of the Southern Front 
andthe aizficulty of getting stocks out of the FDN, thus 
preparing the PDl^for^th^future storage of Southern Front 
supplies ^i-^^^^^^yWttBjBl^m "^^^ ^^^ leaders expressed their 
dissatisfaction withtn^c^/ aircraft. Secord told them they 
were suitable aircraft and that the FDN had to have pilots 
trained to fly at night. There was some misunderstanding as to 
whether the FDN were the legal owners of the aircraft but North 
and Secord said the aircraft belonged to a private company 
dedicated to support all the Contras, both the FDN and the 
Southern Front. Also discussed at the meeting was the possible 
purchase for the FDN of B lowplip e surface-to-air missiles. 
During the ApriX 20 meeting 




7. In early June 1986 Secord decided to purchase an additional 
$3-*- million in arms for the FDN. in-e decision to purchase an 
additional shipload of arms for the FDN was taken after 
Quintero relayed information from the FDN that their stocks 
were getting low. Payments for hundreds of tons of East 
European weapons were made in three installments from June 20 
to July 16, 1986. North was informed, and he agreed with this 
decision. 

8. In late 1985 through the summer of 1986, Secord arranged, 
after coordination with Col. North and the Contra leadership 
for the purchase and delivery of the arms shipments described 
in this paragraph. In December 1985 a load of 85,000 pounds of 
arms that the FDN had earlier paid Energy Resources arrived in 
Central America for the FON. This was the last delivery of 
arms that the Contras paid for. The remaining arms deliveries 
were all donated free of charge. 

In January and February 1986, after Rafael Quintero had 
consulted with Enrique Bermudez and various individuals 
connected with the Southern Front, Secord arranged for a 
delivery to Central Aaerica on a 707 aircraft of approximately 
90,000 poonda of arms (worth $504,000) to the FDN. The arms 
were destiaed for both the FDN and the Southern Forces. In 
late April and again in late May, over $1.3 million worth of 
arms were pr ocured and donated by__ Secord. These arms were 
delivered to flH||iH^HmiH 'o' "'* ^y ^^* 
Front Forces. 

This memorandum accurately sets forth the facts I relayed to 
the staff of the Comnittee on August 18, 1987, and is a true 
and complete statement of facts. 



UNCLASSIFIED 




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SECIUET 



.N4AT10NAL SeCURTTV COUNOL 
WASMNOTOM. c 3oao« 

Dacenib«r 2, 198S 




N 49169 



ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTEF 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH ^ 

SUBJECT: Trip to Panama and Honduras 



3-S(^ 






Based on .youg_quida_ngfi.._arranqements have been made for you to 

TneetwitflBHHmHB^BHHH^HiHIHHiHH^IH^^^^IH 

■^■^^HfiDec 5) . The itinerary and substance of you^Seetlngs 
haT^^nir discussed with State IDASS Bill Walker) and SOOTHCOM 
(General Galvin) . 



Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet for a 
proposed trip to Panama and Honduras on December 4-5, 1985. 



Participants : 
AOH John M. Poindexter 
Mr. Richard Annitage 
Ir. William Walker 



LTCOL Oliver North 
Mr. Raymond Burghardt 



General Itinerary (details at Tabs III and IV) : 
Depart 2:30 p.m.. Wed, Dec 4 Andrews ATB 
7:35 p.m. 



Arrive 

Depart 
Arrive 
Depart 
Arrive 



9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 5 

9:50 a.m. 

2:00 p.m., Thurs, Dec 5 

7:10 p.m. 



Howard AFB, Panama 
(Remain Overnight) 
Howard AFB, Panama 
Palmerola AB, Honduras 
Palmerola AB, Honduras 
Andrews AFB 



NSC will defray expenses for North and Burghardt' s travel. 

Attached at Tab II is a memo from you to Don Regan requesting 
a Special Air Mission (SAM) support for this trip. 

Tabs III and IV provide an overview of the situation and the 
objectives we hope to achieve in Panama and Honduras, 
respectively. Detailed talking points for your use during the 
trip will be provided separately. 



State (Vlalker) , Defense (Armitage),, 
Burghardt concur. 



and Ra 



ruir avatlablc 

ay 



SECRET 
Declassify: OADR 



UNtBtSSH! 



(@) 



404 



Udlfyi^ttU 



SECRET 2 N 4 9 1 ^^ 



RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. That you authorize Rick Benner to cut the appropriate travel 
orders for North and Burghardt. 

Approve ^ • " Disapprove 

2. That you initial and forward the memo at Tab II to Don Regan 
requesting SAM support for the trip. 

Approve Disapprove — 



3. That you review Tabs III and IV prior to the trip. 
Approve Disapprove - 

cc: Rick Benner (w/o Tabs II, III, and IV) 



Attachments 

Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet 

Tab II - Poindexter Memo to Regan 

Tab III - Current Situation and our Objectives for Pa.iama 

Tab IV - Current Situation and our Objectives for Honduras 



SECRET 



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UNCUSSIFIEO ^''^''' ^ ^^"-^ '' 



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N 16885 



NSCICS CONTROL NO ^°^^^* 



COPY NO. 



/ 



.OF. 



J 

S 



ee: Oliver North (fS and 3) 
x«n d«Craffi«nr«ld (X) 
Jia Radxifflskl OS) 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONL 

3-r?- 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



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.^^i^^ NATIONAL SECU^r.-Y INFORMATION 





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441 



UNCLASSIFIED 






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D«CMlb«r 4, 1914 



N 1 6 8 8 7 

MCMOltMIOUH FOR ROBCKT C. MCrXUAMC 

yHOM: OLIVtH L. NOMH ^ 

SUBJECT: A««lit«nc« tor th« Nic«ra9«*n R««i.ttanc. 

in .ccord With pr.iif una.r»X.ndin,. ^--J.^ll^lll^rttlci;; . r:^„.y 
Novanbtf 21. -ith ^^^^^ ^^^^^ »rr.nq.d th« 

!unSl<W «..tin, 4t th. Co.«o. dubjnd_w.. pr.s.nt throughout. 
, _-j .. " «ur purpc«« in th« 

i dienioi. not to pto«..4 »ttl> th. <:«n?If'-"i'J:"!j.™ 

XM. otf.c o« p»ro»«. '«=iK"*-i'^-;,«i;:iit.i!Ttr.I>.in, 

^Init, and 10 tr«clcii»g unitr. 

^ " prof«*i«d to b« un.v«« of th. Canadian transaction. 

I advisad hr« IhU th. purcha.. wa. not r.ally ^"""f«t.J« "• 
w *- - but rathar tor tha Micaraguan Rasntanca 

-♦'•'-"» " "-'^•;:/is"::n.J"t.: ™ i^j • E-r 

r 1,„ (.itnor .d.l«d tUM Mono C.i.to,J»J.».J.d o< 

l>l«niira«.lr. of •»«••« «»S!3-tM."t51"torSU 'hit t«. 

5Rir.ir:Si5i;"J5"'^".i^« s:ui.rM..d%» »u.t.^. ..^ 

not faal th. t«M w*y. 



Oaeiaatitys OAD» 



m^js:^- 



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443 



UIIULHOOiriLU 



Uttr th«t Afternoon, MGtN Jack Slnglaub (U.S. Any, R«tirtdi 
viaittd to 4dvii« of two awatinqs h« had h«ld early in th« day 
r«9«rdia9 auppert for th« Msistane*. SinoUuto pa«a«d on th« 
fell0wia« points i 

M2S£iS2LvithJ^ '7 N 1 6 3 8 8 

Th« rON i« in urgent n««d of anti-aircraft w«apona and oth.r 
crav-sarvad w««pon8 anaunition (particularly 60 and Slfflm 
mortar rounda) . Unita in tha field are alao in need at 
large quantitiea of boota and clothing amce the numtar of 
ralliers haa axeaeded axpectationa by 2,000. 

The Reatatance Foreea are alao in urgent need of axpartise 

in maritiffle operationa. 

The use ia unaware of the Singlauto miaaion_and ha ia makina 
thia recueat baaed on hia long friendahip^^ ^^^— ^ 

/ Beeauae of the lav restricting USB~involv5entTno 
use ofTicial can solicit on behalf the Resistance Forces. 

I' I ^ ^like to help, Singlauto can arrange a meeting^ 
witlTAdolfo Calero. If it ia neeeaaary for a USC official 
to verify Calaro'a bona fidea . thia can be arranged. 

Meeting withi 



m. 



.99 49reefflea£«wi'--h Calero, Singlaub advisedt ' sines 
j, had turned down the earlier FDN requas't for 
assistancav, Jthe Reaistance 

novastent had approached] f 

The Reaistance atill is in reed of financial aupport, 
munitiona, and training assistance. 

i ^*hls was a "considerably different 

situation' than that which he had been aware of earlier. 
While not eaanitting to aupport, he noted to_S,inglaub that 
this new ia£ersatien alght make a difference, ' 




iiWfUOTW 



444 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



This w««)c«nd, at the raquast oi S«e. John Lahaan, i mat W^$^ 
Oavtd waXkat. a foraar Srttiah SAS officar who nov haada two 
companiaa (KMS and SAUOJXN) which provida profaatxonal sacurity 
a«rvicaa to foraign <}ovarnnanta. Walkat had baan approachad 
savaral months ago, prior to initiating tha currant Sinancval 
arrangamant for tha rON. in addition to tha taeurity larvieas 
providad by KMS. this offshora IJarsay Islands) company also has 
profassional military 'trainars* availabla. walkar tuqqastad 
that ha would ba mtaraatad in astablishing an arranqamant w;.th 
tha rON for cartain ipaeial oparations axpartisa aimad 
particularly at dastroying HIND halieoptars. Walkar quita 
aceurataly points out that tha halieaot aga ara^mor a aasily 
dastrovad on tha around than m tha air. I 



Unlass otharvisa diraetad, Walkar will ba introduea« to caiato 
and af forts will ba mada to dafray tha cost of Walkar 's 
oparations fros othar than Calaro's lisitad assats. 





m^s^ni^ 



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SCHWtinWSCMt KREOI'ANS^ 



1211 CEfJEVE EAUX-VIVES ^ 

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25 JuS »6 ZA 0625-qaVo-lS3| 



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TOYCO SA 



49S 



OEblT ADVICE 



HE HAVE DEBITED THE ACCOUNT ON THE RIGHT 
AS PER ORDER OF 25 JUN 86 



CURRENT ACCOUIiT 



CHARGES 



USS 
USS 



50 0,000.00 h ^-"-.••'--«-- - •"-• --' * - 
e.OC ATTN OC MR MARIANO 



VAL 27 JUN 86 USJ Son, 008.02 



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OAriCO CC wiLOAO 
HA9CCLLA SPAIN TX. 77209 



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CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



456 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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3-/3a 



~«i-.--*:^i-.- --•;.-. ■ ■. fi 3^ 




4 



(ROBINSON) JUNE 10, 1986 

DfiOPBY CSIS BRIEFING 

THANK YOU AND GOOD EVENING. IT'S AN 
HONOR TO SPEAK TODAY BEFORE THE MEMBERS AND 
GUESTS OF THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER 
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES - 
AN INSTITUTION WHOSE WORK SO DIRECTLY 
AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION. I WANT 
TO COMMEND YOUR FOUNDERS, ADMIRAL (aRE-LEE) " 
BURKE AND AMBASSADOR DAVID ABSHIRE, AND YOUR 
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 
JOE JORDAN, FOR ALL THEY HAVE DONE TO MAKE 
THIS INSTITUTION SO WORTHY OF RESPECT. 
j^' PERMIT ME TO COMMEND. AS WELL, THOSE OF YOU 

V^., c PRESENT TODAY FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR. 

u - IN SUPPORTING C.S.I.S., YOU DO YOURSELVES 

AND OUR NATION A SERVICE. 



UNCLASSIFIED 




m 






457 



UNCLASSIFIED 

N Z7Z9 
• 2 - 

GREETINGS TO BUD WcFARLANE, 
JIM SCHLESINGER. AND ZB16 BRZEZINSKI - 
MEN WHO DEMONSTRATE THAT. IN ITS ESSENTIALS. 
OUR FOREIGN POLICY CAN INDEED REMAIN 
BIPARTISAN. BY THE WAY. BUD. THANKS FOR 
THE INVITATION. AND. OF COURSE. WARM 
REGARDS TO YOUR HONOREE. ANNE ARMSTRONG. 
COUNSELOR TO TWO PRESIDENTS. AMBASSADOR' 
TO GREAT BRITAIN. CHAIRMAN OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY 
BOARD -- NO ONE HAS SET A HIGHER STANDARD 
OF SERVICE TO OUR NATION THAN ANNE. 
CONGRATULATIONS. MY FRIEND. 

THIS EVENING I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK 
BRIEFLY ON A MATTER OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION AND 
HEMISPHERE. BUT A MAHER. ABOVE ALL. 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE CAUSE OF HUMAN 
LIBERTY. I REFER TO AID FOR THE DEMOCRATIC 
RESISTANCE FORCES OF NICARAGUA. 



UMCUSStfltO 



458 



UNplftSSIFlED . „„ 

- 3 - 

NOW. I KNOM THAT EACH OF YOU IS A 
FOREIGN POLICY EXPERT AND THAT YOU HAVE 
STUDIED THIS ISSUE, EACH OF YOU. IN DETAIL: 
I VALUE THAT. BUT IN THE COMPLEX OF 
POLITICS - IN THE MIDST OF ALL THE 
TX I STINGS AND TURNINGS - ONE CAN SOMETIMES 
DISCERN A MOMENT OF IMPENDING DECISION. 
A MOMENT TO REDUCE THE ISSUE AT HAND TO 
THE PLAIN FACTS AND SUBMIT, IF YOU WILL. 
THE CLOSING ARGUMENT. WITH YOUR PERMISSION; 
I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT THAT ARGUMENT THIS 
EVENING, BEFORE YOU AND THE NATION. 

AFTER THE NEARLY 7 YEARS DURING WHICH 
THE NICARA6UAN COMMUNISTS HAVE HELD POWER, 
THERE CAN NO LONGER BE ANY LEGITIMATE DOUBT 
ABOUT THE NATURE OF THEIR REGIME. THERE IS 
A BRAVE MAN IN NICARAGUA. A MAN WHO 
COURAGEOUSLY OPPOSED THE SOMOZA 
DICTATORSHIP. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



459 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 3741 



4 - 



LISTEN FOR A MOMENT TO THAT MAN. TO THE 
WORDS OF CARDINAL OBANDO Y BRAVO. ARCHBISHOP 
OF MANAGUA. AS THEY RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE 
u^^HiU QTQN POST ; TO CONSIDER THE SANDINISTA 
REGIME DEMOCRATIC IS. CARDINAL OBANDO 
Y BRAVO ASSERTS. '...TO IGNORE THE MASS 
EXODUS OF THE MI SKI TO INDIANS. WHO, - 
ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. FLED IN THE 
THOUSANDS.... IT IS ALSO TO IGNORE THE 
DEPARTURE OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF NICARAGUAN 
MEN AND WOMEN OF EVERY AGE. PROFESSION. 
ECONOMIC STATUS. AND POLITICAL PERSUASION. 
IT IS TO IGNORE THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO 
ARE LEADERS OR PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION WERE ONCE LEADERS OR 
MEMBERS OF THE SANDINISTA FRONT OR WERE 
MINISTERS IN THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT. 

-IT IS TO IGNORE THE LACK OF ANY 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MOST TERRIBLE 
VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND OF 
SPEECH IN THE HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY. 



UMCLASSIFIED 



460 



UJiCLASSIFe , 3,^^ 

- 5 - 

IT IS TO IGNORE THE PROGRESSIVE AND 
SUFFOaTING RESTRICTION OF PUBLIC LIBERTIES, 
UNDER THE COVER OF AN INTERMINABLE NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY IM AND THE CONTINUAL VIOLATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS. IT IS TO IGNORE THE EXPULSION 
OF PRIESTS AND THE MASS EXODUS OF YOUNG 
PEOPLE ELIGIBLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE..... 
NONE OF THIS IS TRUE OF A GOVERNMENT THAT 
HAS THE SYMPATHY AND GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE 
PEOPLE.' I MIGHT ADD THAT NOT LONG AFTER 
CARDINAL OBANDO Y BRAVO WROTE THAT STATEMENT 
FOR THE WASHINGTON POST . THE SANDINISTA 
REGIME CUT OFF ELECTRICITY TO HIS OFFICE - 
ONE MORE ACT OF HARASSMENT AMONG MANY SCORES 
OF SUCH ACTS VISITED UPON HIM. 

YET DESPITE THE BRUTAL AND TOTALITARIAN 
NATURE OF THE SANDINISTA REGIME. THE 
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM INSIDE NICARAGUA 
CONTINUES) BY THE THOUSANDS, MEN AND WOMEN 
HAVE MOVED INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE AND TAKEN UP 
ARMS. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



461 




2743 



6 - 



INDEED. TODAY THESE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE 
FORCES NUMBER SOME 20.000 - FOUR TIMES THE 
NUMBER OF TROOPS THE SANDINISTAS HAD IN THE 
FIELD WHEN THEY THEMSELVES SEIZED POWER. 
IN FULL KNOWLEDGE. THE MEMBERS OF THE 
RESISTANCE HAVE CHOSEN TO SEPARATE 
THEMSELVES FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND HOMES". 
TO LIVE IN CONDITIONS OF IMMENSE HARDSHIP, 
OFTEN WITH SCANT WATER AND FOOD. AND TO 
EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO THE DANGERS OF BAHLE. 
THEY FIGHT TO LIBERATE THEIR COUNTRY FROM 
A REGIME LOYAL ONLY TO COMMUNIST POWERS. 
THEY FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. 

JUST AS THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE 
RESISTANCE HAVE DECIDED WHAT THEY MUST DO, 
SO. TOO. HAVE GORBACHEV. CASTRO. ARAFAT, 
AND QADHAFI. SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS 
IN NICARAGUA NUMBER IN THE HUNDREDS. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



462 




tiB-t. 
- 7 - 



..U 



3744 



THE SANDINISTAS POSSESS AT LEAST SIX 
SOVIET-BUILT HIND AHACK HELICOPTERS — 
HELICOPTERS THAT REPRESENT, IN EFFECT. 
FLYING TANKS. CUBAN TROOPS SWARM THE 
STREETS OF MANAGUA BY THE SCORES. AND THE 
P.L.O. HAS ESTABLISHED AN EMBASSY THERE. 
LINKS BETWEEN THE SANDINISTAS. THE P.L.O. . 
THE LIBYANS. AND OTHERS ARE EXTENSIVE. 
AND LET NO ONE FORGET THE PHOTOGRAPH OF 
LIBYA'S QADHAFI AND THE SANDINISTAS' 
ORTEGA - THERE THEY STAND. THEIR FISTS 
CLENCHED IN A SALUTE OF SOLIDARITY. 
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MADE THEIR 
DECISION; THE RESISTANCE HAS MADE ITS 
DECISION. NOW WE MUST MAKE OURS. THE 
CHOICE IS STARK) THE CHOICE IS UNAVOIDABLE. 
WE CAN HELP OUR NEIGHBORS IN THEIR STRUGGLE 
FOR FREEDOM. OR. BY DOING NOTHING. WE CAN 
ABANDON THEM TO A COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



463 



OMCiaSSlFe . 3..3 



- 8 - 

OVER 3 MONTHS AGO, I SUBMIHED TO THE 
CONGRESS A PLAN TO PROVIDE THE RESISTANCE 
FORCES OF NICARAGUA WITH $100 MILLION IN 
URGENTLY NEEDED SUPPORT. MORE THAN 2 MONTHS 
AGO. THE SENATE APPROVED THE PLAN. 
NOW AT LAST A NEW VOTE IN THE HOUSE IS • 
SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE. I WANT THE 
HOUSE - I WANT THE COUNTRY - TO KNOW HOW 
MUCH IS RIDING ON THIS DECISION. 

IF THE HOUSE CHOOSES TO DENY TO THE 
NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE THE HELP IT NEEDS 
AND DESERVES, THIS WILL IN EFFECT GRANT 
PERMISSION TO THE SANDINISTAS TO IGNORE ANY 
NEGOTIATED SEHLEMENT AND PURSUE A MILITARY 
VICTORY INSTEAD. 

THE FINAL OUTCOME IS ONLY TOO 
PREDICTABLE. BACKED BY A STEADY SUPPLY 
OF ARMS FROM THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS, 
THE SANDINISTAS WILL BE ABLE TO PIN DOWN 
THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS, SURROUND THEM, AND, 
IN TIME, CRUSH THEM. 



L^NCUSSIF'ED 



464 



imCLASSlFIED 



"■ N 3746 
- 9 - 

NHATEVER IS LEFT OF FREE INSTITUTIONS IN 
NICARAGUA WILL BE UTTERLY DESTROYED. AND 
UPON THE RUINS OF NICARAGUA'S BEST YEARNINGS 
AND ASPIRATIONS, UPON THE MUTIUTED HOPES OF 
HER PEOPLE. A SECOND CUBA - INDEED A SECOND 
LIBYA — WILL HAVE BEEN RUTHLESSLY BUILT. 
WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT TENS OF THOUSANDS OF 
NICARAGUAN REFUGEES WILL SEEK TO INUNDATE 
OUR SOUTHERN STATES. MORE THAN A QUARTER OF 
A MILLION NICARA6UANS - NEARLY 10 PERCENT • 
OF THE ENTIRE POPULATION — HAVE ALREADY 
FLED THE COUNTRY. 

BUT NONE OF THIS NEED TAKE PLACE. 
IF THE HOUSE VOTES TO GIVE THE NICARAGUAN 
RESISTANCE THE SUPPORT WE HAVE PROPOSED. 
DEMOCRACY IN THAT NATION CAN BE GIVEN 
A CHANCE. AGAIN AND AGAIN. THE FREEDOM 
FIGHTERS HAVE PROVEN THEIR COMMITMENT TO 
JUST THIS HOPE. LAST MONTH THEY TOOK STEPS 
TO BROADEN THEIR POLITICAL BASE AND INCREASE 
THEIR SUPPORT AMONG THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE. 



IJNCLASSIF!ED 



465 



«RCUSSintD 



3747 



10 



WITH ADEQUATE TRAINING AND SUPPLIES. 
THEY COULD MOBILIZE THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE OF 
THEIR COUNTRY AND WIN UNTOLD NEW RECRUITS - 
IF ONLY THE HOUSE VOTES -YES.* 

OUR GOAL IS NOT, REPEAT NOT. A MILITARY 
SOLUTION. INSTEAD. WE SEEK TO HaP THE 
FREEDOM FIGHTERS ACHIEVE ONLY THE LEVERAGE 
THEY NEED TO BRING THE COMMUNISTS TO THE 
TABLE AND NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL - 
AND DEMOCRATIC - SOLUTION. THREE TIMES. 
THE RESISTANCE HAS ALREADY OFFERED TO PUT 
DOWN ITS ARMS AND GO TO THE TABLE. 
THREE TIMES. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE SAID 'NO.' 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NICARAGUA SUPPORTS 
AN INTERNAL RECONCILIATION AIMED AT 
ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE 
REJECTED THIS PLAN. THE CONTADORA NATIONS 
HAVE BACKED A NEGOTIATED PEACE. BASED. 
AGAIN. UPON INTERNAL RECONCILIATION AND 
DEMOCRACY. 



UHCUSSIFlEtt 



466 



^ 3748 
- 11 - 

THE SANDINISTAS HAVE REFUSED TO GRANT THESE 
PROPOSALS SERIOUS CONSIDERijTION. 

THE COmUNISTS ARE INTRANSIGENT 
BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN AFFORD TO BE. 
EACH DAY THE MILITARY SITUATION IN NICARAGUA 
TVISTS ANOTHER DANGEROUS DEGREE IN FAVOR OF 
THE COMMUNISTS. IN THE MONTHS SINCE WE MADE 
OUR INITIAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, 
SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONS IN NICARAGUA HAVE 
MOUNTED. CENSORSHIP AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS HAVE INCREASED, AND HUMAN 
SUFFERING HAS GROWN. NOW. THOSE WHO OPPOSE 
AID MUST ASK SEARCHING AND PAINFUL 
QUESTIONS. CAN WE BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
SUCH ANGUISH? CAN WE PERMIT OURSELVES TO 
ACQUIESCE IN THE SANDINISTA TACTIC OF DELAY, 
DELAY, DELAY? 

AGAIN I MUST REPEAT: THERE IS HOPE. 
JUST 10 YEARS AGO, LESS THAN ONE-THIRD OF 
THE PEOPLE OF LATIN AMERICA LIVED IN 
DEMOCRACIES. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



467 



UHttASSlFP . ,,,, 

- 12 - 

TODAY THAT FIGURE IS 90 PERCENT. MANY HAD 
NRIHEN OFF EL SALVADOR. OTHERS CLAIMED 
THERE WAS NO HOPE IN HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA. 
TODAY, THOSE NATIONS HAVE THEIR FREEDOM - 
TODAY DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA CONSTITUTES 
A SWELLING AND LIFE-GIVING TIDE. IT CAN 
STILL FLOOD ITS POWERFUL. CLEANSING WAY INTO 
NICARAGUA - THE COMMUNIST WALL AGAINST IT 
IS HIGH. BUT NOT YET TOO HIGH - IF ONLY THE 
HOUSE TAKES ACTION. 

I APPEAL HERE TO DEMOCRATS AND 
REPUBLICANS ALIKE; THE ISSUE IS HUMAN 
FREEDOM - IT TOWERS ABOVE ALL PARTISAN 
CONCERNS. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



468 



N 375-0 I 
- 13 - 

WHAT IT COMES OOMN TO IN THE END IS THE 
HAHER OF WITNESS - OF CHOOSING WHETHER 
TO BELIEVE THOSE WHOM WE KNOW TO BE 
PROVIDING US WITH ACCURATE REPORTS ABOUT 
NICARAGUA OR TO LISTEN INSTEAD TO THE 
WHISPERING VOICES WITHIN OUR OWN MINDS THAT 
SAY THERE IS NO TROUBLE THERE, NOT BECAUSE 
THAT IS THE TRUTH, BUT BECAUSE WE DO NOT 
CARE TO BE INCONVENIENCED BY THE NEED TO 
RISK ACTION. 

ONCE AGAIN THAT GOOD MAN CARDINAL 
OBANDO Y BRAVO -- THAT FOE OF TYRANNY, 
WHETHER SOMOZA's OR THE SANDINISTAS' - 
HAS PUT THE CASE BEFORE US. HE WRITES TO 
THE EDITOR OF THE WASHINGTON POST : 

•YOUR MESSAGE ASKING ME FOR AN ARTICLE 
ARRIVED ON SUNDAY. . .JUST AS I FINISHED 
CELEBRATING MASS. . . . DURING THE MASS, 
I READ THE PASTORAL LEHER WHICH WE. 
THE BISHOPS OF NICARAGUA, HAD WRIHEN FOR 
HOLY WEEK. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



469 



UNCLASSIFIED 



37S1 



- Id . 



THE PULPIT HAS NOM OUR ONLY MEANS OF 
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION, BECAUSE THE 
LEHER HAS TOTALLY CENSORED AND PULLED 
FROM THE PAGES OF THE NEWSPAPER LA PRENSA . 
THE ONLY PRIVATE NEWSPAPER IN THE 
COUNTRY....' 

THE CARDINAL GOES ON TO RELATE THAT 
CHURCH OFFICES HAD BEEN APPROPRIATED BY 
GOVERNMENT ORDER. THAT A CHURCH PRINTING 
PRESS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED BY THE STATE 
SECURITY POLICE. THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD 
SHUT DOWN -RADIO CATOLICA,' THE ONLY 
CATHOLIC RADIO STATION. AND THAT EVEN THE 
SUNDAY BULLETIN. WITH THE PRAYERS AND TEXTS 
FOR THE DAY. HAD BEEN CONFISCATED. 

•IT WAS AT THIS POINT.' THE CARDINAL 
WRITES. 'WHEN THE CHURCH WAS GAGGED AND 
BOUND. THAT YOUR REQUEST ARRIVED. THE 
READING FOR THE DAY.. .PRICKED MY CONSCIENCE. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



470 



UNCLASSIFIED 

N 3752 
- 15 - 

THE SANHEDRIM SENT FOR PETER AND JOHN, 
INTENDING TO FORCE THEM INTO SILENCE. 
'BUT PETER AND JOHN SAID TO THEM IN REPLY: 
IS IT RIGHT IN GOD'S EYES FOR US TO OBEY YOU 
RATHER THAN GOD? JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES. 
WE CANNOT POSSIBLY GIVE UP SPEAKING OF 
THINGS HE HAVE SEEN AND HEARD.'" 

MY FRIENDS. LET US GIVE HEED TO 
THOSE IN NICARAGUA WHO, LIKE CARDINAL 
OBANDO Y BRAVO AND SO MANY OTHERS. SPEAK 
TO US OF THINGS THEY HAVE SEEN AND HEARD. 
AND LET US. PRAY GOD. MOVE TO HELP THEM. 

THANK YOU. AND GOD BLESS YOU. 

it » M 



UNCLASSIFIED 



471 



JJ^aJ/bV /J 



#\j&^^^^^ 




q^5 



472 



UNCLASSIFIED 






: :• --^i'. • •* V«i •'• ••■ 



3 -/ay 




I 



(ROBINSON) JUNE 10, 1986 

DROPBY CSIS BRIEFING 

THANK YOU AND 600D EVENING. IT'S AN 
HONOR TO SPEAK TODAY BEFORE THE MEMBERS AND 
GUESTS OF THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER 
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES -- 
AN INSTITUTION WHOSE WORK SO DIRECTLY 
AFFECTS THE SECURITT OF OUR NATION. I WANT 
TO COMMEND YOUR FOUNDERS. ADMIRAL CaRE-LEE) ' 
BURKE AND AMBASSADOR DAVID ABSHIRE, AND YOUR 
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 
JOE JORDAN. FOR ALL THEY HAVE DONE TO MAKE 
THIS INSTITUTION SO WORTHY OF RESPECT. 
PERMIT ME TO COMMEND. AS WELL. THOSE OF YOU 
PRESENT TODAY FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR. 
IN SUPPORTING C.S.I.S.. YOU DO YOURSELVES 
AND OUR NATION A SERVICE. 



UNCLASSIFIED 







473 




" 5739 
- 2 - 

GREETINGS TO BUD HcFARLANE, 
Jin SCHLESINGER, AND ZBIG BR2EZINSKI - 
MEN WHO DEMONSTRATE THAT, IN ITS ESSENTIALS. 
OUR FOREIGN PaiCY CAN INDEED REMAIN 
BIPARTISAN. BY THE WAY, BUD, THANKS FOR 
THE INVITATION. AND, OF COURSE, MARK 
REGARDS TO YOUR HONOREE, ANNE ARMSTRONG. 
COUNSELOR TO TWO PRESIDENTS, AMBASSADOR' 
TO GREAT BRITAIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY 
BOARD -- NO ONE HAS SET A HIGHER STANDARD 
OF SERVICE TO OUR NATION THAN ANNE. 
CONGRATULATIONS, MY FRIEND. 

THIS EVENING I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK 
BRIEFLY ON A MATTER OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION AND 
HEMISPHERE. BUT A MAHER. ABOVE ALL, 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE CAUSE OF HUMAN 
LIBERTY. I REFER TO AID FOR THE DEMOCRATIC 
RESISTANCE FORCES OF NICARAGUA. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



474 




N 3740 



- 3 



NOW. I KNOW THAT EACH OF YOU IS A 
FOREIGN POLICY EXPERT AND THAT YOU HAVE 
STUDIED THIS ISSUE. EACH OF YOU. IH DETAIL: 
I VALUE THAT. BUT IN THE COMPLEX OF 
POLITICS - IN THE MIDST OF ALL THE 
TWISTIN6S AND TURNINGS - ONE CAN SOMETIMES 
DISCERN A MOMENT OF IMPENDING DECISION. 
A MOMENT TO REDUCE THE ISSUE AT HAND TO 
THE PLAIN FACTS AND SUBMIT. IF YOU WILL. 
THE CLOSING ARGUMENT. WITH YOUR PERMISSION; 
I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT THAT ARGUMENT THIS 
EVENING. BEFORE YOU AND THE NATION. 

AFTER THE NEARLY 7 YEARS DURING WHICH 
THE NICARAGUAN COMMUNISTS HAVE HELD POWER, 
THERE CAN NO LONGER BE ANY LEGITIMATE DOUBT 
ABOUT THE NATURE OF THEIR REGIME. THERE IS 
A BRAVE MAN IN NICARAGUA. A MAN WHO 
COURAGEOUSLY OPPOSED THE SOMOZA 
DICTATORSHIP. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



475 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 3741 



- U - 



LISTEN FOR A HOMEHT TO THAT NAN. TO THE 
WORDS OF CARDINAL OBANDO Y BRAVO. ARCHBISHOP 
OF HANA6UA. AS THEY RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE 
u^^m fffiTQN POST ; TO CONSIDER THE SANDINISTA 
REGIME DEMOCRATIC IS. CARDINAL OBANDO 
Y BRAVO ASSERTS. '...TO IGNORE THE NASS 
EXODUS OF THE MISKITO INDIANS. WHO. • 
ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. FLED IN THE 
THOUSANDS.... IT IS ALSO TO IGNORE THE 
DEPARTURE OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF NICARAGUAN 
MEN AND WOMEN OF EVERY AGE. PROFESSION. 
ECONOMIC STATUS. AND POLITICAL PERSUASION. 
IT IS TO IGNORE THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO 
ARE LEADERS OR PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION WERE ONCE LEADERS OR 
MEMBERS OF THE SANDINISTA FRONT OR WERE 
MINISTERS IN THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT. 

•IT IS TO IGNORE THE LACK OF ANY 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MOST TERRIBLE 
VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND OF 
SPEECH IN THE HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY. 

UMCLASSIFIED 



476 



UNCLASSIFSED , ,^^^ 

- 5 - 

IT IS TO IGNORE THE PROGRESSIVE AND 
SUFFOCATING RESTRICTION OF PUBLIC LIBERTIES. 
UNDER THE COVER OF AN INTERMINABLE NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY LAW AND THE CONTINUAL VIOLATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS. IT IS TO IGNORE THE EXPULSION 
OF PRIESTS AND THE MASS EXODUS OF YOUNG 

PEOPLE ELIGIBLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE 

NONE OF THIS IS TRUE OF A GOVERNMENT THAT 
HAS THE SYMPATHY AND GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE 
PEOPLE.' I MIGHT ADD THAT NOT LONG AFTER 
CARDINAL OBANDO Y BRAVO WROTE THAT STATEMENT 
FOR THE WASHINGTON POST . THE SANDINISTA 
REGIME CUT OFF ELECTRICITY TO HIS OFFICE - 
ONE MORE ACT OF HARASSMENT AMONG MANY SCORES 
OF SUCH ACTS VISITED UPON HIM. 

YET DESPITE THE BRUTAL AND TOTALITARIAN 
NATURE OF THE SANDINISTA REGIME. THE 
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM INSIDE NICARAGUA 
CONTINUES) BY THE THOUSANDS. MEN AND WOMEN 
HAVE MOVED INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE AND TAKEN UP 
ARMS. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



477 




374^ 



- 6 - 

INDEED. TODAY THESE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE 
FORCES NUMBER SOME 20.000 - FOUR TIMES THE 
NUMBER OF TROOPS THE SANDINISTAS HAD IN THE 
FIELD WHEN THEY THEMSELVES SEIZED POWER. 
IN FULL KNOWLEDGE. THE MEMBERS OF THE 
RESISTANCE HAVE CHOSEN TO SEPARATE 
THEMSELVES FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND HOMES'. 
TO LIVE IN CONDITIONS OF IMMENSE HARDSHIP, 
OFTEN WITH SCANT WATER AND FOOD. AND TO 
EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO THE DANGERS OF BAHLE. 
THEY FIGHT TO LIBERATE THEIR COUNTRY FROM 
A REGIME LOYAL ONLY TO COMMUNIST POWERS. 
THEY FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. 

JUST AS THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE 
RESISTANCE HAVE DECIDED WHAT THEY MUST DO. 
SO. TOO. HAVE GORBACHEV. CASTRO. ARAFAT. 
AND QADHAFI. SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS 
IN NICARAGUA NUMBER IN THE HUNDREDS. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



478 



WWCIASSIFI 



3744 



- 7 - 



THE SANDINISTAS POSSESS AT LEAST SIX 
SOVIET-BUILT HIND AHACK HELICOPTERS — 
HELICOPTERS THAT REPRESENT, IN EFFECT. 
FLYING TANKS. CUBAN TROOPS SWARM THE 
STREETS OF MANAGUA BY THE SCORES, AND THE 
P.L.O. HAS ESTABLISHED AN EMBASSY THERE. 
LINKS BETWEEN THE SANDINISTAS. THE P.L.O. . 
THE LIBYANS. AND OTHERS ARE EXTENSIVE. 
AND LET NO ONE FORGET THE PHOTOGRAPH OF 
LIBYA'S QADHAFI AND THE SANDINISTAS' 
ORTEGA - THERE THEY STAND. THEIR FISTS 
CLENCHED IN A SALUTE OF SOLIDARITY. 
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MADE THEIR 
DECISION; THE RESISTANCE HAS MADE ITS 
DECISION. NOW WE MUST MAKE OURS. THE 
CHOICE IS STARK) THE CHOICE IS UNAVOIDABLE. 
WE CAN HELP OUR NEIGHBORS IN THEIR STRUGGLE 
FOR FREEDOM. OR. BY DOING NOTHING. WE CAN 
ABANDON THEM TO A COWUNIST DICTATORSHIP. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



479 



«M€lflSSlFlE» « 3..S 



- 8 - 

OVER 3 MONTHS AGO, I SUBHIHED TO THE 
CONGRESS A PLAN TO PROVIDE THE RESISTANCE 
FORCES OF NICARAGUA WITH 1100 HILLION IN 
URGENTLY NEEDED SUPPORT. HORE THAN 2 MONTHS 
AGO. THE SENATE APPROVED THE PLAN. 
NOW AT LAST A NEW VOTE IN THE HOUSE IS • 
SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE. I WANT THE 
HOUSE - 1 WANT THE COUNTRY - TO KNOW HOW 
MUCH IS RIDING ON THIS DECISION. 

IF THE HOUSE CHOOSES TO DENY TO THE 
NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE THE HELP IT NEEDS 
AND DESERVES. THIS WILL IN EFFECT GRANT 
PERMISSION TO THE SANDINISTAS TO IGNORE ANY 
NEGOTIATED SEHLEMENT AND PURSUE A MILITARY 
VICTORY INSTEAD. 

THE FINAL OUTCOME IS ONLY TOO 
PREDICTABLE. BACKED BY A STEADY SUPPLY 
OF ARMS FROM THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. 
THE SANDINISTAS WILL BE ABLE TO PIN DOWN 
THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. SURROUND THEM. AND, 
IN TIME. CRUSH THEM. 



ONfil«S!F"ED 



480 



(UNCLASSIFIED 



■W 3746 
- 9 - 

WHATEVER IS LEFT OF FREE INSTITUTIONS IN 
NICARAGUA HILL BE UHERLY DESTROYED. AND 
UPON THE RUINS OF NICARAGUA'S BEST YEARNINGS 
AND ASPIRATIONS, UPON THE MUTILATED HOPES OF 
HER PEOPLE. A SECOND CUBA - INDEED A SECOND 
LIBYA - WILL HAVE BEEN RUTHLESSLY BUILT. 
WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT TENS OF THOUSANDS OF 
NICARA6UAN REFUGEES WILL SEEK TO INUNDATE 
OUR SOUTHERN STATES. MORE THAN A QUARTER OF 
A MILLION NICARAGUANS - NEARLY 10 PERCENT 
OF THE ENTIRE POPULATION — HAVE ALREADY 
FLED THE COUNTRY. 

BUT NONE OF THIS NEED TAKE PLACE. 
IF THE HOUSE VOTES TO GIVE THE NICARA6UAN 
RESISTANCE THE SUPPORT WE HAVE PROPOSED. 
DEMOCRACY IN THAT NATION CAN BE GIVEN 
A CHANCE. AGAIN AND AGAIN. THE FREEDOM 
FIGHTERS HAVE PROVEN THEIR COMMITMENT TO 
JUST THIS HOPE. LAST MONTH THEY TOOK STEPS 
TO BROADEN THEIR POLITICAL BASE AND INCREASE 
THEIR SUPPORT AMONG THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE. 



I/NCUSSIFIED 



481 



aitussin® 



^747 



- 10 



WITH ADEQUATE TRAINING AND SUPPLIES. 
THEY COULD MOBILIZE THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE OF 
THEIR COUNTRY AND WIN UNTOLD NEV RECRUITS » 
IF ONLY THE HOUSE VOTES 'YES.' 

OUR GOAL IS NOT. REPEAT NOT. A MILITARY 
SOLUTION. INSTEAD. HE SEEK TO HaP THE 
FREEDOM FIGHTERS ACHIEVE ONLY THE LEVERAGE 
THEY NEED TO BRING THE COMMUNISTS TO THE 
TABLE AND NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL - 
AND DEMOCRATIC - SOLUTION. THREE TIMES. 
THE RESISTANCE HAS ALREADY OFFERED TO PUT 
DOWN ITS ARMS AND GO TO THE TABLE. 
THREE TIMES. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE SAID "NO." 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NICARAGUA SUPPORTS 
AN INTERNAL RECONCILIATION AIMED AT 
ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE 
REJECTED THIS PLAN. THE CONTADORA NATIONS 
HAVE BACKED A NEGOTIATED PEACE. BASED. 
AGAIN, UPON INTERNAL RECONCILIATION AND 
DEMOCRACY. 



UHCUSS\F»ttt 



482 



UMCUlSSlfttB 

- 11 - 

THE SANDINISTAS HAVE REFUSED TO GRANT THESE 
PROPOSALS SERIOUS CONSIDERi^TION. 

THE COmJNISTS ARE INTRANSIGENT 
BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN AFFORD TO BE. 
EACH DAY THE MILITARY SITUATION IN NICARAGUA 
'HEISTS ANOTHER DANGEROUS DEGREE IN FAVOR OF 
THE COMMUNISTS. IN THE MONTHS SINCE WE MADE 
OUR INITIAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, 
SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONS IN NICARAGUA HAVE 
MOUNTED. CENSORSHIP AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS HAVE INCREASED, AND HUMAN 
SUFFERING HAS GROWN. NOW. THOSE WHO OPPOSE 
AID MUST ASK SEARCHING AND PAINFUL 
QUESTIONS. CAN WE BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
SUCH ANGUISH? CAN WE PERMIT OURSELVES TO 
ACQUIESCE IN THE SANDINISTA TACTIC OF DELAY. 
DELAY, DELAY? 

AGAIN I MUST REPEAT: THERE IS HOPE. 
JUST 10 YEARS AGO. LESS THAN ONE-THIRD OF 
THE PEOPLE OF LATIN AMERICA LIVED IN 
DEMOCRACIES. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



483 



UHfiLASSlFlED 

- 12 - 

TODAY THAT FIGURE IS 90 PERCENT. MANY HAD 
WRIHEN OFF EL SALVADOR. OTHERS CLAIHED 
THERE MAS NO HOPE IN HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA. 
TODAY. THOSE NATIONS HAVE THEIR FREEDOM -- 
TODAY DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA CONSTITUTES 
A SWELLING AND LIFE-GIVING TIDE. IT CAN 
STILL FLOOD ITS POWERFUL, CLEANSING WAY INTO 
NICARAGUA -- THE COMMUNIST WALL AGAINST IT 
IS HIGH, BUT NOT YET TOO HIGH - IF ONLY THE 
HOUSE TAKES ACTION. 

I APPEAL HERE TO DEMOCRATS AND 
REPUBLICANS ALIKE) THE ISSUE IS HUMAN 
FREEDOM - IT TOWERS ABOVE ALL PARTISAN 
CONCERNS. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



484 



uHCUsa»t'» 



^ 3 75-0 
- 13 - 

WHAT IT COICS OOMN TO IN THE END IS THE 
NATTER OF WITNESS •• OF CHOOSING WHETHER 
TO BELIEVE THOSE WHOM NE KNOW TO BE 
PROVIDING US WITH ACCURATE REPORTS ABOUT 
NICARAGUA OR TO LISTEN INSTEAD TO THE 
WHISPERING VOICES WITHIN OUR OWN MINOS THAT 
SAY THERE IS NO TROUBLE THERE* NOT BECAUSE 
THAT IS THE TRUTH. BUT BECAUSE WE DO NOT 
CARE TO BE INCONVENIENCED BY THE NEED TO 
RISK ACTION. 

ONCE AGAIN THAT GOOD HAN CARDINAL 
OBANDO Y BRAVO -- THAT FOE OF TYRANNY, 
WHETHER SOnOZA's OR THE SANDINISTAS' - 
HAS PUT THE CASE BEFORE US. HE WRITES TO 
THE EDITOR OF THE WASHINGTON POST: 

'YOUR MESSAGE ASKING NE FOR AN ARTICLE 
ARRIVED ON SUNDAY... JUST AS I FINISHED 
CELEBRATING NASS. . . . DURING THE NASS. 
I READ THE PASTORAL LETTER WHICH WE, 
THE BISHOPS OF NICARAGUA, HAD WRIHEN FOR 
HOLY WEEK. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



485 



UNCLASSIFIED 

" 37S, 



■-V ■•'•••i .M." 



- m - 

THE PULPIT WAS NOW OUR ONLY MEANS OF 
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION, BECAUSE THE 
LEHER WAS TOTALLY CENSORED AND PULLED 
FROM THE PAGES OF THE NEWSPAPER LLffiEMSA. 
THE ONLY PRIVATE NEWSPAPER IN THE 
COUNTRY...." 

THE CARDINAL GOES ON TO RELATE THAT 
CHURCH OFFICES HAD BEEN APPROPRIATED BY 
GOVERNMENT ORDER. THAT A CHURCH PRINTING 
PRESS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED BY THE STATE 
SECURITY POLICE. THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD 
SHUT DOWN 'RADIO CATOLICA.' THE ONLY 
CATHOLIC RADIO STATION, AND THAT EVEN THE 
SUNDAY BULLETIN. WITH THE PRAYERS AND TEXTS 
FOR THE DAY. HAD BEEN CONFISCATED. 

•IT WAS AT THIS POINT.' THE CARDINAL 
WRITES. 'WHEN THE CHURCH WAS GAGGED AND 
BOUND. THAT YOUR REQUEST ARRIVED. THE 
READING FOR THE DAY. . .PRICKED MY CONSCIENCE. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



486 



UNCLASSIFIED 

N 3752 
- 15 - 

THE SANHEDRIN SENT FOR PETER AND JOHN. 
INTENDING TO FORCE THEH INTO SILENCE. 
'BUT PETER AND JOHN SAID TO THEH IN REPLY: 
IS IT RIGHT IN GOD'S EYES FOR US TO OBEY YOU 
RATHER THAN GOD? JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES. 
WE CANNOT POSSIBLY GIVE UP SPEAKING OF 
THINGS HE HAVE SEEN AND HEARD." 

MY FRIENDS. LET US GIVE HEED TO 
THOSE IN NICARAGUA WHO. LIKE CARDINAL 
OBANDO Y BRAVO AND SO MANY OTHERS. SPEAK 
TO US OF THINGS THEY HAVE SEEN AND HEARD. 
AND LET US. PRAY GOD. MOVE TO HELP THEM. 

THANK YOU. AND GOO BLESS YOU. 

# # # 



UNCLASSIFIED 



487 



JJ^aJ/£D /J 






\-Li\ 



^^ 




4^5 



488 




Z'l^ 



'N 18096 




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C^3^/VY 






orncc or tmc vice pbesiocnt 

WAS- I saTON 



H ^'^^^ J 



/V H^3'3^X. 



May 14, 1987 



TO »fHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 



The schedule proposal of April 16, 1986 and the briefing 
aenorandun of April 30, 1986, both relate to a IS-ainute 
■eeting held on May 1, 1986 with the Vice President. Four 
points should be made about these documents: 

1. I had nothing to do with their preparation and did 
not see them until a document search was initiated 
in December, 1986. 

2. I cannot account for the fact that the purpose of 
this meeting, according to these documents, was to 
discuss resupply of the Contras in addition to the 
war in El Salvador. 

3. The subject of resupply of the Contras was not, 
repeat not, mentioned at all by anyone in the 
meeting with the Vice President on May 1, nor had 
there been any intention to discuss that subject. 

4. Since I realized these documents were anomalous, I 
highlighted their existence in an interview with the 
staff of the House Permanent Select Comaittee on 
Intelligence held on December 17, 1986. Mike 
O'Neill was one of the staffers present. 






r 



ii 






^O.N.^.So.X.^' 



reggOT^ 



Donald P. Gi 

Assistant to the Vice President 
for National Security Affairs 




490 



OPFICCOP THE Vice fRCSIOCNT 

A" 



wA.H.H«roN '■-,L^:xZ 



\i^^ ' '^o'ui\\l 



April 30. 1916 



BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOI'. THE VICE PRESIDENT 

Event: Meeting with Felix Rodriguez 

Date: Thursday, May 1, 1916 

Tiae: 11:30-11:4$ a. a. - West Wing 



Froa: Don Gregg 
I. PURPOSE 



^ 



i Felij' Rodriguez, a counterinsurgency expert who is 

visiting froa El Salvador, will provide a briefing 

! on the status of the war ia El Salvador and 

resupply of the Contras. 

III. PARTICIPANTS 

The Vice President Felix Rodriguet 
Craig Fuller 
Don Gregg 
Saa Watson 

IV. MEDIA COVERAGE 
Staff photographer 



M? .; 






491 



IV' '. . ^1.-11 WASHINGTON 



PWKl or TMI VKI DISJOINT 
. O.C 



</28/86 



MEMORANDUM 

TOi 

PROMi 

BVBJXCTi 

KVEHTi 

DATIi 
TIMBi 

LOCATION: 

ATTENDANCKi 
REMARKS REQUIREOi 
PRESS COVERAGE: 



Don Cr«9g 



E P^ftESIDEf 



DEBBIE HUTTONy 

APPROVED V TCE PTtESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY 

Meeting with Felix Rodriguex 

Thursday, May 1, 1986 
11:30 a.m. -11:45 a.m. 

WW 



None required 

Staff Photographer only 



MRS. BUSH PARTICLATIONt ^^ 

Buiineis Suit 



DRESSi 
COMMENTSt 



GENTLEMEN! 



LADIES* 



CONTACT(«)i (1) Don Gregg 



MC" 



11 



C.PVLLKB 

r.KHCOOCBI 

O.GRUS 

a.CKAT 

J.McZNTII 

J.rTTZCCKAU) 



iLnrrwATiB 

•.r.Roa 

T.COlXAMOftX 
aRTDEK 

O.VAL0U 



4213 



An«C«d« 

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r.mr 

M-Mc t 

o. t> a» 

•.MOC . 
O.Ct'CUILMINO 

vtsact «•*<••) 



T.McBRJDC 

iLBAR>rrr 

ILUWU 
B.COHAVAT 

p.aaADT 

O.^VICHO 



492 



A» . • ^x 



l'^'-.' 



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OPriCEOrTHCVICCPRISiOCNT 
II r- «e •'*«'""«^*"' 



April 16. 1916 



S CHEDULE mOPOSAL 

10: 

FROM: 

REQUEST: 

PURPOSE: 

BACKGROUND: 



DATE: 
DURATION: 
LOCATION: 
PARTICIPANTS: 

REMARKS REQUIRED: 
MEDIA COVERAGE: 
CONTACT: 
RECOMMENDED BY: 



"m 



DEBBIE HUTTON 

DON GRECG^ 

V? Meeting with Ftlix Rodriguez, a 
counterinsurgencx expert visiting 
froa El Salvador. 

To brief the Vice President en the status 
of the war in El Salvador and resupplx 
of the Contras. 

The Vice President has aet previously 
with Mr. Rodriguet during his visits to 
Washington and will be interested ia 
the current inforaation he will be able 
to provide. 

Anytiae on April - 38 ef Ih -. 

IS ainutes 

OEOB 



The Vice President 
Craig Fuller 
Don Gregg 

None required. 

Staff photographer 

Don Gregg, 4213 

Don Gregg 



Felix Rodriguez 



^/^s/»/^>-*-^J 



5 



-/l-^^ 



.^^^ 



493 



UNCLASSIFIED 






^ i^^ 


WHITE 


HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM 


3'/5"a 


n*T«. 6/25/86 


ACnON^ONCUMfNCS/COf 

S: Victory of Contr 


MMfMTDUflV: ASAP 








MiajfCT- STATEMENT 


a Aid Leaislatioa 








Defeat of 


Contra 


Aid Legislation 








ACTION FYI 




ACnON FYI 




VICE PRESIDENT 


a 


a 


MILLER • ADMIN. 


D 


□ 




REGAN 


a 


D^ 


POINOEXTER 


^ 


a 




MILLER -QMS 


a 


a 


RYAN 


a 


° ! 




RAIL 


^==-fV' 


a 
a 


SPEAKES 

SPRINKEL 


a 
a 


n 




BARBOUR 


a 




BUCHANAN 


Q^ 


a 


SVAHN 


a 


Q 




CHEW 


DP 


QSt 


THOMAS 


^ 


C' 




DANIELS 


Q/ 


a 


TUTTLE 


u 


2 




HENKEL 


a 


a 


WALUSON 


a 


;3 




KING 
KINGON 


a 
a 


a 
a 


DOLAN 


a 

G 


^ 








MASENG 


a 


a 




iZ! 


- 









^ REMARKS: Attached are the proposed contra vote result inserts to the 

^ Santini remarlcs. From these inserts, short paragraphs can 

v^ be drafted for a written statement. Please let Tony Dolan 

Ny"^ " have your comments ASAP, with an info copy to my off 

^ Thanks . 



y uoian ^^ ^^ 





UNCLASSIFIED 



Oavid L. C"e«. 

StaH 5«<rt'*fv 

E«t. 2701 



494 



UNCLASSIFIED 



(Gild«r) 
June 25, 1986 
11:30 a. a. 



PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: VICTORY OF CONTRA AID LEGISLATION 

WEDNESDAY, JTHfE 25, 1986 

The vote today in the House of Representatives signals a new 
era of bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy. I want 
to congratulate all those who voted to restore this spirit of 
bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy issues, a spirit that 
has served America so well through the perils of the postwar era. 
Once again, members of both parties stand united in resisting 
totalitarian expansionism and promoting the cause of democracy. 

As we approach the celebrations of our own Independence Day, 
we can be proud that we as a people have embraced the struggle of 
the freedom fighters of Nicaragua. Today, their cause is our 
cause. With our help, the people of Nicaragua will win their 
struggle to bring democracy to their land, remove the threat to 
Mexico and our own southern borders and restore again the 
prospects of peace — and the chance for a better future — to 
our hemisphere. 

The cause is freedom, the cause is just, the cause will 
triumph. 

Again ay thanJcs to all those who labored so hard on this 
legislation. 



UWCUSS/f/EO 



495 



t^NCLASSrFIED 



(Glldar/AAD) 
Jun« 2S, 1986 
10:45 a.B. 



PRESZOOTIAL STATSMKMT: DEFEAT OF CONTRA AID LEGISLATION 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 1986 

Th« vot* today In th« Houa* la a sathack for paaca and 
democracy in Cantral Aaarlca. Aa I said yaatarday in my spaach 
to tha Maabara of tha Houaa and tha Aaarican paopla, dalay ia 
axcaadingly coatly. Mtila wa stand lockad in dabata, hopa for 
fraadoa and daaocracy in Nicaragua is jaopardizad, and tha 
Soviats pursua thair strategy to turn that country into a staging 
baaa for Coomunist terror and subversion throughout tha Aaericaa. 

I want to eophasiza to our supporters in tha Houaa, and in 
the Senate, and to the freedom fighters most of all: This 
setback is only a setback, this is not tha end. We will never 
stop, never slacken in our support of the freedom fighters, until 
daaocracy triumphs in Nicaragua, and peace comes to Central 
America. I am confident of freedom's final victory in Nicaragua. 

We must not deceive ourselves: the danger to our south will 
not vanish if we cloaa our eyes; it will only get worse, much 
worse. Nicaragua is another Cuba on the American mainland, the 
leading wedge in an effort to destabilize our democratic friends 
and neighbors. 

I hope that as this bill proceeds to conference, the House 
conferees will keep one thing foremost in their minds — the 
grave threat posed by the Sandinista regime to the case of human 
rights, economic development, and peace in Central America. As 
we enter the conference, we must leave our partisan differences 
outside the door. On this issue we must not be Democrats or 



UNCLASSIFSED 



496 



Pa9« 2 



MCkft§?!nEO 



RapubllcmnT, just Aa«rrcAJhT unlcad in our coHBitaant to frecdoa 
«nd oar OT«rridin9 concern for th« national security of tha 
Onltad States. 

I call on Oaaocrata and Rapublicana alika to join in tha 
aupport of freedom and peace in Central Aaerica, to coae together 
to re-eatablish the bipartisan consensus in Aaerican foreign 
policy — a consensus that has served us so well in this post-war 
era. 

The cause is freedom. The cause is just. The cause will 
triumph. 



UNCLASSIFlliD 



497 




^ O 



15331 N 







498 



WIASSIHED 



, (^u 1 • ■ w . 






ibO 




1'l(t?0 



lOQOOHAS LocalHB^^^^H(}7-ll-86. 
j^v.,NVG t«st«d and work better one we used. 

Crlbu NRl prop tool, did not arrive 7/10 but .hould be here 
5 Monday. AC ,y.t one pha.e failed. Lot. of improper wiring. Need 
AC for in.tru»ents for run. Need zone 1 fire warning. ETIC depend, 
on WX, further prob. with wiring, work needed on NR2. 

3. Pio reconaend fly to MIA or Dothan for Conn/Nav and Iran. 

4. Drop. 1313N 8440W containing 3 pallet, boot.. 3 pallet. 81MM 
»orter. and a«»o plu. ««aii an»o, 5 pall.t. .•did, clothing and .mall 
«»^We put it right on the light, and DZ reception confir«Kl. 

^^HH//////// 

— From Max — 

1. If you want, to know why we run out of «n.y, l.t ^ ju.t tell you. 
The telephone bill of only one hou.e, the on. fro- the So. African., 
cloee to 2,000 OSD with call, to England, Germany, Kuwait, South Africa, 
Jjj^ther.. There i. one call to England for 55 .inute. coating 1,375.0. 

We have not receive yet the bill, from the other hou.e.. 
PI. send more money. • 

PIN 




'■'^■'■^''///.c/a. 



silk 






UNCUSSffl 



00374 



499 



lEUSSiriED 




|07-ll-86. 
trorklng on planning for drop requested by^^^j 
Estlaated date and tlae will be Sunday 0445HRS 
local, refueling At^H^^^Hat 054SHItS local. 

2. In order to fulfill^^^Hrequeet we need anti-biotio/wouad-related, 
anti-aalaria, aati-aaoeba/paraaite , vitasiae, ayrlagea, aoequito 
repele^^a/sticlu, aoxe on«-aaBr-p«ck/«Di£oa|p, aa^one, cordobas, 
parachutej . 

3. First drop will be done with aaao. and uniforms only, because 
nothing else available but inform Goode that the items in Ho. 2 
as im portant as a— o. for ground forces. 

4. ^^^^^^^^^Vmad at ua for long over due delivery bis repea 
^^^^^^Mok specs with him over 4S dayp ago. 

S.^^^H^^Hwas informed negotiation for^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vdid not 

go through. Request original end-user 

BT 



I 




\ 




5^ 



//■ 



^d^y 



UNCLASSIFIED 



00371 



500 



UNCtASSIHEO 



( 
L«kHHi know ho« 



(rorlcs ouc. Also ho 



how construction 



know how money 






Prom Bob 
112000ZJUI.86 

1. Pis 1 
project i 

2. I will i&rk the repeater problen here 

3. I will get wi Goode eeap on me dici ne. 

4. Pis check with 
which is supposed to be an acceptable substitute for other Mount Lep 
medicine. 



I 



for medicine called Greisenfulvin^ 



5. Inform So. Afca^^ that they are responsible for this phone bill. If 
they don't pay we most remove the phone and advise 

6. Will work on end-user document asap. 
7. 






I am still not clear on where the rest of our 109 parachutes | are. 

Did we ever get them? I need aa accounting as to where we use tlsm. 

s^ lUDe«*eJ;u* u<JA W aJl<.&i)4. 
This important for future reference. * ^^ 

8. Pleased with outcome of North missions. 

9. For So. misns. we must be careful about flying back into the same 
drop area as before. If we are not we will be met by enemy ground or 
air. .Hind. .reception party. Pis give me a difinitive sched. when 
available. tjXiii)i^J4A^ft||lii<i»<^''"« 

9. Get no. 1 Bo flying then we can discuss lAether or idien to get 
other work Ami. If «• get Toad back to you Tues. we will have more 
options. ^^^B have some flying capability now. 
Bob 
BT 







UNCUSSIHED 



00370 



501 



UNcMsra 



1000 hra ll|K2T^3-M. I.-HAVI EQOIP TO JURT RIO OfLIOn HORB DROT PROM^H 
REED OMB^^kn 30 MLLETS, 180 t.7« STRAPS. IZOTOlBnT, 1 ROU 80L8 COTTol 
TAPE, 5 BO^HrilRCR BARDS, 36 1 KOOR CHQLUIES, 6 ROOS 2 INCHES TAPE. 

ditto; por^Kmbx bot vzth ro chotes-MIB ///next///i.-c.7 rstoried v 

rROH 0P«. 2VWm STRO WC HEAP WIRDS. ARR lWrpTTiaaz. NO aCHT PATTER!/ ^*<, 

DAY-UG8T/. DROr HUC^mHHHHV THIS IS 1 ) HItXS W PROM ORIGUAL DZ, *rj^'<. 
PEOPLE WERE SEER IR A/0 APPROACHIRG BORDLES, ORIGIHAL OZPARTIAUT POPUUTCO . 






3. -CREW REPORTED LOOSING OIL PRESSURE BR HAT IR. DEUT ■■■■■BDUB LOW ^^\y^\ 
OIL COROITIOR. C-7 BEIRO CHECK, 4.-D0RIRG OPR, RO COMti'HITB A/C SIIKE C-7 Hr,r*V^ 
RADIO ROT WOHCRC. flR ^•^" 

1600HRS UXkL 07-13-B6. I.-RRI ERGXRI OR RR2 C-7 OSB) 19 GAL OIL IR 7 HRS 20 MIR 
PLT OmOQ SAT HITC OPR. LARDED PUTBIRID MIOC DOI LOH/10 ^. OIL PIBS?IIRD 
HIGH TEMT. SERVICED WITB 14 GAL A» WntmW/^ HSIB 5 nOtt RBOOZIB). 
MACRO MRAUALLOr/AT EKISSXVB RATsjmiP ADVISES HZS OKRXOR AT LUST ORB 
PZSTOi PAILXRO ARD OIL STSIBl COatAMXUTD. 
BRGIRB URSAfB FOR FLT. I AGRSI. PLS ADVI 




i 






UNCUiSSIFIED 



502 



UNCUSSIHED 




RIG CfVton MC 
30 PALLETS, 180 A-7A STRAfS, 120;aSOTty, 1 ROU 80L8 
'AIRER BANDS. 36 1 HOUR CHCMOTES, 6 ROLLS 2 INCHES TAPE. 
MEEK BUT WITH 70 CHUTES.|H|H[ ///NEXT///1 .-C-7 RETURREir 
3TH0HG HEAD WINDS. ARR IVED D2 1132Z. NO UOTT PATTERN/ 



1 COTTOB 



DAY-LIGHT/. DROP MADG(||^^HHBV THIS IS 1 i MILES NU rROM ORIGINAL DZ, 
PEOPLE WERE SEEN IN A/0 APPROACHING BUNDLES, ORIGINAL DZ PARTIALLY POPUUTED, -^ .^^o 
3. -CREW REPORTED LOOSING OIL PRESSUKE «M WAY IN. DEUYPIVHKDUE LOW V'^^V 
OIL CONDITION. C-7 BEING CHECK. 4. -DURING OPN, NO CC 
RADIO NOT WORKING. FIN 



WITH A/C SINCE C-7 HF „-^^ ^K 



1600HRS LOCAL 07-13-d6. 1.-NB1 ENGINE ON NU C-7 USED 19 GAL OIL IN 7 HRS 20 MIN 
FLT DURING SAT HITS OPN. LANDED FEATHERID MtOC DUI LOW/10 fo. OIL P8BSS?AND 
HIGH TEMP. SERVICED WITH U GAL AND mmwaW/j^ \Um 5 HONE REQUIRED. 
HAKING hCTAL/ALLOT/AT EXCESSIVE RATE^^^^^P ADVISES HIS OPINION AT LEAST ONE 
PISTON FAILING AND OIL SYSTEM CORAMINATED. PBWtlO BORE-SCOPE EXAM HE CCNSIOENS 



I 



ENGINE UNSAFE FOR FLT. I AGREE. PLS AOVISI 



§ 



559^ 



'■'^'0 bcr.k 






''£Udty,j, 



UNGUSSIHED 



00369 



503 



^^.ICUSSinED 



1120HX8 boeal^pHH^p 07-14-86. 

1. At this mom» n t th« ■•chanlcs «r« checking ont A/oil leak. 
3/prop l«v«x »|^Boroscoplng th« cngln* for aluainum contaDlnation of 
oil syatem. ^^m. 

2. Z b«li«v«^Bit prbp lavar and oil ayataa can b« corrected quickly, 
but contamination is queationable until boroacoping performed. Thia for 
MR2 Caribu. Shutt adviaea that with parte, tmi Caribu operational within 
four day a. Sorry late. 

81 

Buss notet 

We just learned, there is no bore-scope at the airbase. Buss request you 

aend a bore-acope on "-•'•*'* ^»if irt'tfgl T*r; Mi^'ufifr nun 

rza. 







?5te 



~L^^ 



tlliiSSlHEO 



00368 



504 



UNCLASSIFIED 




07-15-86. 

55 gals, drums 120 oil non-detargent for C-7. 
available for us. We must purchase comercially at 
each. ^H^Hhas cash to buy only one unless he uses 



construction money. 

2. Reuqest you send as many as possible on C-123 and he will buy one 
cooMrcially. 

3. Pis send more cash for rest of month expenses. 

4. For your info, balance fuel acct with Air Force is 16,088.00 dollars HJ** ''I 
as of today. lUrf . f — ^i .e^s hml TKcixf JnAnt^ >....])^^ ««— ■..■Ti.» . 

FIH 



• 



i'>4j/ 




aussw 



505 



IKCffilflED 



Good MorniBg— rtl— 

1. A/C a|^flft»-lUul«-BP-821-Number 1 BOO-aP-822-Numb«r two 
800-HF-82^^^^r 1 C«ntruy-HP-824-Nviinb«r Two C«ntury-HP-82S. 
jijB aw«mi» tail numb«ra. . . 

2. BP-824 work proeasdlng on achadula-Eng R/0 Sunday???? 

3. DOO and DOM In placa Sunday for R/U-A/C will dapart Monday If OK.. 

4. HP-824 will ba walghad-WT raductlon atlll In prograaa-our machanlc- 
no additional coat. 

5. If no hitch-Mgr-N« will ba in Tucaon Sunday with ■achanic-CpJ^^H 
will naat ua thara. 

6. Inauranca info coaing-mi an^^^^^^^B-SAT acct-naad to know who 
will provida funda for purchaaa-hara or yoor araa7777 { 

7. Ragiatration apparantly oa track... US H<74JX-8oath-HP-82S. ilia 

la juat a trial axarciaa to datazmlna if X aa qualifiad to oparata thia 
OMchina no caananta plaaaa oth«r than poaitiva.. 




''ziM 



3 

wmsra 



00376 



506 



UiiiSSIFlEO 



a 



0700HRS Local ^rXy96. 

1. So. Afrlei^HConfronted with t«l. bill, did not pay but sent letter 
to you. Clai^Psoa* calls war* not thalra. Our experience, tel. bills 
are very accurate here. 

2. Our budget for July US $19,479.00 as follows i 
A/ Rent house 1 US 700.00 
B/ Rent house 2 US 500.00 
C/ Rent house 3 US 800.00 

0/ Rent house 4 partial official use -June- US 500.00 
B/ Rental 3 vehicles US 400.00 each total US 1,200.00 
F/ Gasoline, repairs for cars US 1,800.00 

G/ Warehouse salaries US 900.00 i 

B/ Pood all houses personnel 08 3,500.00 

'/ Telephone houses -average- OS 1,500.00 
J/ Electric power US 150.00 

K/ Salaries drivers, aalds US -9- US 1,200.00 
Sub Total US 12, 750.00 

Travel expense for^^^^^^^Bbs 
M/ Travel Bxpwise Max to D.C. OS 242.00 
N/ Airfare MajJHp^Nia-OC OS iSO.OO 
0/ Misc op^^^^Hft esp*!!*** 08 1,000.00 
P/ Unezpectj^^HMLll hooae 2 US 1,837.00 
R/ Special ^K^Kk vntOBfefi US 2,000.00 
Grand Total US 19,470.00 

At this timej^^^Bhas around US 500 .DO left on regular aonth budget. 
3. besides this budget we aust keep in hand an eaergency contingency fund 

*. US 10,000.00 for following emergencies and will not be used unless 
thorized by you. IIIVII"! AVVILILIl 00372 






S^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



507 







^pl. tor ho.pit.l 



ot. 



mssm 



Lcl«»' 






up. 



l«nt 



.utho^^^**^ 



to bsi»« ^'^ 





H5?-) 



'4 



^- 



mz\ 






003' 



508 



UmSSIFIED 

1 

Ln Wia 



,500 Hours J'^^^ 

1. Tomorrow^^Blanncd drop cancelled although A/C crew wanted to repeat 
it with C7 m tnbdition* It If and at daylight. 

2. For refueling stop^^H requests aircraft crew wear Nomex light suits, 
no insignias needed. Carry only side azas, oo N-lfiS. Take enough money 
to pay for fuel, as last time, and reinburse for 18 gallons oil purchased 



9' 




last Sunday. 

3. Text of ^^^H message j^n Plantation^ Please, repeat, please, do not 

allow euiy activity on Elena. 

is not theirs. They are sending you a letter. I 

5 . Lef t^Hflmoney to pay for construction aad infrared lights, to be 
purchased for ground forces in South. I paid for last Sunday refuel. 
.oney^^^^^^H requesting is for ne«r future operational expenses. 



(y 



informs me^ South Africans-nfuse to pay telephone bill, claim 







1^ 



UNMSSra 



00367 



509 



100 hour*, 24 July L - 
•11 p«r«eiiiMl froa our 
prof«ss 
r«vi«w 



prof«ss^g^ 
r«vi«w ^^06 

Ha ai^B^ 

and his JB« 



UNSUSSIFIEO 

•quires froa now on that 
• • personal d^ta f««a ui-**- 
qualific«tlon, duties h^r^ •tc.H^ will personally 
casa to authoriz* bas« ID. 



notifisd wh«n individual is no longer working hare 
10 r^turn^d. 



He must be infornad on arrivals and departures of personnel. 




4. He was concerned with professionalisa on the pilots when he asked 
at SAT if C123 was tested and air worthiness of the AC certifi ed. 

he was told the test fUght will be perfoned in routefl|BHwith 
plane fulllJ loaded, OBl A/C had undergd^xtensive aaintenance. 
Result it returned because of engine failure and we ware told one 
awre week to repair. 

5 . Max and SteA OMt with group down there and explained the 
iituation^Max waiting for Cooper to get there so ha can aaetwith 



6. Max says froa now on ha will only be liason and not problaa 
solver. 



• 



45^^ 



1*1-.' 



•ii 



UNCLASSIHED 



00445 



510 




FIED 



with exception of 3 
Began Monday last. 
Max meeting someone. 



(SBCMT) 

Part I oi 2. 

FYI all personnel barred from s itejj 

mechi- 1 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

2 .Maule-^^^^woute^^^^l Max , unkno«m,( 

3. ^^^^^^^Hrequlred all personnel to fill In a questlonalre-ln 
Spanish - plus a photo. All have complied with requirement. 

4. ^^^^^^^B declared PNG by virtue of his refusal to have photo 
taken. Erroneuously Informed that photo was for an ID. In fact for 
it«n 3 a misunderstanding. Left my location this AM. 

5. All 3 Britts-X repeat all 3 are PMG period. Behaviour during early 
hours of the AM apparent reason. Personal effect stored house 2. 
Suggest you enquire dispo. Number 2 now occupied by our personnel. 

6. In my judgeoMnt reason for current probli 

7. Max was rebuffed recently when in your location. Resents si 




Creata probleas. Ignores needs 
of clients. Real or otherwise. Has been coapletely aisinfomed by 
someone regarding parts supply, aost everything. This confirmed by 
Seession Friday eve day of my return. . 



EB 







^^ 



t(; 



■n 



UNCLASSIFIED 



00444 



511 



"NMxm 



r 



" ■'"■•"> 1 . -FOLLOW I N,3, li ,j,_|p 

-• . -.lu -r, r,r:.ENi3A.3E FORM 
" ' -' •■ -■•-:-.._-: TODAY AND INFORM 
• -■••! =•>- Tfli L c TODAY 7n_MBTo 

''■-'■^^■J^Basap and 

_ ^01 NT rs, DUE TO 
— • .W,E. OP..AT.||^p MAXS 

--^-.- A.n rM.,Ar..: ^^e resulted in the 

' "'^" "^ ■^^'^ --OP*SH I P oec I D I NG TO 

""""""'* AUlAL INCLUDES ALL 
■■-"iNANi.E^ 

N-^.v-.rcArt WITH^Mf^g 

•iUiiiaEST CIA 
^ .:...N.,..NCTtON WITH DEA. 

""-jMr^''^^" '^ NECESSARY TO 
"*'^^B*. .'*^«-'- 'JSe SAT TO HELP 
^^PtS. 2. ALTERNATIVE WOOLO 

^I^^^BIJT IT 

'" ..p:ap. ,. ;,. ,i .,, ., . 

■ J '-MLtPO ATTITUDE AND 

•"-•■ •■''■■- ■•tAkg.OKN. .JACK. HEINE. 



">•■■- ^ui 



HAVt ro WORK OUT 






i 







UNcussm 






512 



UNCIiSSIflE 



.<■■.! u. r-i lai^OUP THAT 
^'.'^^■- . -'■-:• ADVIiE 
'•■M'^ n : -.v„p. K13D-I-. DICK BT. 




UNCUSSIFIED 



003^1 



513 



lifjClASSIfiED 



/nrifi oc3l,z- 




4ti?D 



UNCLASSIFIED 



514 



■ ■' ■' - ~ ^JIL^H.''E^■i"' ^UAN I ij HULO BOTH 

:^- 

-' '•'t«iS. T. TORY l-z, Wt ARE 
■•,-, ^.-.K AfjiRIVflL OF riEDiCINE iHIPMENT 
. . ., ;,^ jt- -^ ,,, ;v,u- ^ ,; :.nijrH. LANliTON 

■■ :•'! ^^^ ^^,Fi^ PKE-=.eNi:& AT SAT BECAUSE 

^H , - . ^HMt-ER .<(>J0 ft- PREPIN6 THE A/C 
.-,-.». -,-,•-. rnirf. iHOULD BUY US THE TIME 
!■■ •■■,>-■- 'u-f rv,.;OP PLAyfe^S BACK IN 
.-II- I ■ --.rj ANH P!(;r«i i.ip WHAT EVER NEXT STEP 
fMP. ujr:M r.j TAKF. RALPH WILL MAKE 
I 'iNrAi:THH|^|HANO IS AVAILABLE TO YOU 
c.iK nrMFR AC r I ON. WHEN EVER YOU THINK 
£.,:p=;,-,P(;TaTe, RALPH CAN BRIEF LANGTON ON 
ptVii -ri-iRV AND WHAT TO EXPECT NEXT. OR. 
TC- y.-ii ij«iwT TO WATT t CAN DO THE 

i4^l_PH ^^^^^VtALK 
-. .,:.,-,F-r «Ai.ew 13O TO MIAMI TO TALK WITH 
•iA« ^t.\: :;ir Tij tUPPURT OUR STORY .1 
• .i.i :.iiP>;nR-- yiju FROM THERE. BOB BT . 



Kmsim 




UNCiASSire 






(^^ 



003''J 



515 



n*; 




•- --:i>NED HtPE 
■'•■■> -<i"KL'.ENT SHAPE. 3. 
, ,-i:r.iii..£0 ,1.1 DEPART MI AMI ON 

,.. r,,^t.-:^^----- *. A/C WAS PLACED 

.,. ., ,. -;„-«f;Hi. -.j-.TENSIBLY WAITIN6 

•'-■■■'• -.1. -I i^'^i- ■ =i. "5. MAX WAS IN 
1, ...i.- .,Mt,. v'/tp RtAi.ijN AND REQUESTED. 
rt. ^,;, ,_,M vc. 6. iUNDAY AFTERNOON 

, -;i. i.-'j .4Nri '.NFOftMED ME THAT WE 
. -„.= ^> _ac T.^? RLe5'=;iNi3 OF THE US 

. ,n ^M, M .-, E.>-; Hi.iWN MONDAY TO CLOSE 
■--. - r oiIm • J^i kPi-iAin MIAMI. 7. 

■e^.-,,;i(vj > mko»«MED^^^HtHE 
Lc- -^-^ -M--P -i:i* AN 11 AM DEP M0N.8. 
......w.r,r , Hi.LKED OUT PLUS TWO-dAX 

.M 1,?-. CARiM MOSTLY FOR US .9. 
- I "£N/L 1 iSAPHAEL ACCUSED MAX OF 

^C. DID NOT COME MY LOC.IO. 
[myself hac I wo MEETINGS 
--. fwtt: evto.'-'S , Miin ASKED FOR A 

- j,r '•.i iii.iiLiNE THE NEED FOR 
~ ■- - . A>.. A laRU'JP-ALL AGREED 

- • I -1^. . . ij'.LU . 11. 023 MADE 




.1 



(} 

\l 
■i 



@) 



UNCIASSIHED 



003' 



516 



KF*. ^^^H ,£?. < -iwNKFijL FOR OR 

. '2. wA-5»-.!-i:Mjst I'N PHiooei'S of 

, i_ ^-, j,w ■ ,.:.F_ . I ^ . p-rtMP AREA 
.. r„ ,._„..,-„_, .-p 10DAY-^"HAS A 
^ 1--^. «»?-.Mf ^.^| FSONT OF 
.t-WM-. -LAi.^r.i Tu^RE BY MISTAKE. 



!)NCUlSS!Fe 



/ ;, 



H' 




0035G 



517 



"^j^^ Afc-^Jiv^ I5)'00,b<lu^8(, 



mmsm 



I) 



- - t-' (.- v-1-..iiv -> PHi.iNP CALL FROM 

- .5;, ■,-■„. uit^M ...uiD I HAT -MAX- WAS IN 
■1 ._■■, _r',- j.'.Vt T St 0*^D'-:» TO MOVE THE 

■ii---i "i . !:■:!_. -■•^P'."-..f'J'i.uN HAD BEEN TOLD 
r.M..T :,., I"".'.- rnc AC WITHOUT PERMISSION 
^. ,': Mh uK-^r.-p VTA C'JOP OR MYSELF 
Mt rcil n -lA* WF WERE WAITINii FOR MEDICINE 
:^m' IJA-. Til BE READY MON/TUES MAX SAID 
THi£ A I- ij'.x VITAL A'r.AP AAND THE MEDICINE 
■^■.■\'\ n (>jii: Hh RtADY mnT[L WED AND THAT 
ri-R A/r M^n ^r, movf . oTEVENSON THEN 
..„,..,• :ip r, K r_itRK';''i;ON. I WAS UNABLE TO 
■-.i,-' ..^J■, i.'jt F--1.1M YOUR OFFICE AND THUS 

-; v--.:-::! -IE .:^ i; WITM THE THOUGHT THAT 
UP .-,,. •- r Ml': rr CROM OftRATING UNTIL 
|. .. .„-!, ,, »^,_£^w,(j (T, ALSO X HAD BEEN 
'-mSmED t^HiyilEEK THAT THERE WAS >30INia 

tell with both the a/c 
.'Jk<='>(1^^^Knce toad two would not 

►■-1 ►■■ f FELT iXE WAS BETTER THAN 

I .• -'.J MK OUR CONVERSATION THIS 
, -^..i-.sh -T WE e-lNij THE TiDAD BACK 

: ^ iL.^ M_r, ;. :-4e -'<JD THEN HOLD IT 






? 



ONCUSSIFIED 



.4W 



003'3 



518 



UNCLASSIFIED 



■-■"'- .-■■I-'JN ' t. -jri: HERE NOW TO 
'^A:- ON BOARD OR 
-■£ AFlPf* THE A/C LEFT 
MijwtD UK AND we HAD 
■^iji^-:-M „ r^^,:^L FOK HEM SINCE WE DID 

•h,iM ~^_ ij„- iE,rii'4ii AND SINCE we 
:c . .^Mc ^pr.tiLEMS i_A-.T TIME HE WAS IN 
■ r (.vr,..,!- w>ir;r Tij i.m? IT AijAIN. 
Ml- ':,:i4 '_c YOl' WANT A jTATEMENT FROM 

■i-rjc.iirj kT 



WVK^^W^^ 



0033'; 



519 



*^^>s^ 16^ tetw» ■■<*«■ '^1)^0°*^ OOP/ 



Pvl. 1. THE PQLLOW INQ NUMBERS, 

r 




INBOUND-RECEZVG 
CROSSING A ROAD. 



rwo DROPS.. ^D 
SPORADIC 37M« AAA 
31 

3. ALL DROPS HIT 

Dr AND RECEIPT OP CARGO CONFIRMED BY 
e-'^MO. 4. HAVE LOCATED A POSSIBLE 
="*CILITY IN -^CALLEN. r< FOR CARIBOU. 
tOTHIN. ALA. HAYES AVIATION ONLY 
•SERVICED THE C123KS. NOW....ONi:E AGAIN 
ME HAVE BEEN DENIED AirCESS TO THE 
ai?;PQRT-Pl LOTS AN D MECHANICS 
LAST^NIGHTHIJHJ INFORMED ME THATi 

1 pi.iT T"6 AIRPORT OFF LIMIT, 

.'RTHER NOTICE. 7. T HIS MORNI 
MAS ASK ED '^v MEET WlTH^IfHH^B AN! 
'ECeiVE SOME PAPERS AND POSSIBLY SOMC 
INFORMATION REGARDING THE ORDER. S. 

'•-T-. AF~ERNOCN ^— Wand i will have a 
;u,:pt meeting wiTv^^h^HBB. max is 

r-iOTICSABLY ABSENT IN PASSING ON INFO TO 
><£. ^HH^' "^"^ "•■"£ MOUTHPIECE ^^^^ 
.:.PPAPENT^ 9. FQOM BOt. . SUSPCCTHHi 

<-as barred vs from basc to keep assets 
•'•-epe. told coop to teu. him his only 
:nterest for near future zs to assure a 
;ts:ong capabiuxtv to support the 

•^IJSICN. THIS RiaUZRSS us TO Rm.>RN THE 
:-U3 TO P/U SOMI ■AM.V NODED MEDICINE 
A.-.;r IS BEING DOM AT THK DIRECTION OP 
THE CMNERS AND DCTtCTQR S. THIS SHOLiUD 
BE Cr^NFIRMED 8Y|BB ALSO HE IS 
"^ETIJRNING THE C-7 BECAUSE IN HIS 
PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT THE A/C IS NOT 
3AFE FOR CROSS BORDER WHICH IS WHAT HE 
IS THERE FOR. HE WILL. IF ALLLOWEDT^^ 
jPEAK . SAY THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THA<mH 
^^M HAS EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN IN THE 
P6?T ABOUT THE PROFESSIONALISM OF OUR- '^ 
=SOPLS AND T"IS ACTION SHOULD SATISFY 




IS'^- 




Partially Declassified/Released nn liMlHf} 

under provisions of LO. 12356 

by 3. Reger, National Security Council 



003r;o 



520 



J1>!HJH«^ 



'';d 



-:•" '-.A- '^E fC HAVjt CREAT CONCERN F0« 
--C T-;.^E'v cc i.-iT'P CnmtS^ AND" EOUI^MEI***- 
("T-, sHOUL:- TiSJ-E PLAC? in ABOtJT r jliii f 
WILL ■-£"' you > N QM JrtMAT CQmES"i9»jr: 
y\A-- ^ANT TO •.lETlHHi '3^^ "^ 

A-r .:■:■:?£« in case he sits in ow ^a* -Stv.j,, 

MCr ARVS.. APPROJI. ITl'J^f'.WIL.U.PtCK 
'^l" iJ^f ME "1AY WANr'S «Ta-i 

'-■i~E», -3C5 3r.'' 



llNeiK3if!ED 



003Ci 



521 



Emmii 



'Z "■-111. 



.-£!■ 



.1(^1 



__ jE;TTTHr;T i,p~fAw:-.£yF..-~':> E-e 

-•-."c -:■': ;-ALi='-i T'l i.iET TOWN T-_Er,-E rr. r^j. c 
..rr-iR^T-.j,- "--.(P^* RALPH WAh '=.lJF='0'f£D TO 

-i-'"_'Ts:. ;-. iNY '^E'iPCN'f E ■■ BT 



(uncla;) 

irUi'uC'Z AiJi."^. ^^^HW ^- "l"^^ POLKS 
P.ALPH HAD CEArr WITH WHO HAV E CUS TODIAL 
PESP0N9IBILITIES ARE CALLINCimi BUT 
^IfCAN.T HELP. THIS CONCERNS AN ADMIN 
ASPECT THAT WAS LEFT PENDING. WHICH 
RALPH WAS SUPPOSED TO RESOLVE THIS WEEK. 
THE FOLK_SFEE^JHEY.PE BEING LEFT HIGH 
ANt' I'R'r'. HH^H^^^I-'^ IT is a SMALL 
"^ASSAGINrrEFFO^^THAT IS REQUIRED. THAT 
r^KZ ;'.uy COULD BE IN AND OUT IN THE SAME 
I'Af -■: ACCOMPLISH IT. K . SEPARATE SUBJ. 
,iN| O'JT^-ANtlN:" BILL OF LESS THAN It'O 
r'C_^.ARS IS NOW IN OFFICIAL CHANNELS AND 
NSEI'S TO BE RESOLVED. BT 



wumm 



(@) 



on3i(i 



522 



"^A^j^ SUk , uk^Uf^iiil t SiJ vficu^ cAoc 



;E':p:ei 




1 'W VERY CONrERNEr ABOOT THE MIS'flON 
JCi-EI'L-'LEI' FOP TOMAP.ROW. A ['ROP IN THE 
■'"i.TH A-r "1IDI>AY INCREASES THE 
PO=.f IBILITV OF BEINCi SHOT DOWN BY SAM7 
OR INTERCEP'^r' BY T35, TO MAKE THINiSS 
WOROE I BELIEVE THIS OPERATION HAS BEEN 
MrCiJ'ffEI' OVER THE TELEPHONE. RECOMMENt' 
IT BE RESCHEDULED A3 A NIGHT MISSION. I 
HAVE BEEN APFROAi^HEt^^jEMBERS OF THE 
OR'.iANITATION ANDHmHHB'^VE^ HIRING 
AND FIRING PRACTICES PRESENTL,Y 
ONGOING. WHILE I WILL NOT TRY TO 
MICPOMANAGE YOUR ORGANIZATION. I WILL 
MA^E YOU AWARE OF THE PROBLEM. TWO 
HIGHLY RESPECTED MEMBERS OF THE TEAM 
HAV^jEENFIREpBY COOPER RECENTLY, 
■^HmHHHI|THI3 IS 
'P'ROBLEMSp^^imHI^AND OTHER MEMBERS 
OF THE ORGANIZATION. RECOMMEND 
CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO RETAINING 
THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS. END TEXT. FRM 
MAC. I TALKED TO COOPER LAST NIGHT, THE 
MISSION IS CNX. FOR TODAY. WE WILL LOOK 
AT A NIGH T MISSION AFTE R I GET MORE 
DETAILS. BHHHHB through RALPH, 13 
REQUESTING THE DROF^. '_I WIL L TALK TO 
RALPH AND GET INFO ON (JH^POSITION AND 
I'ETIALS OF I'ROP. REF . PCRSONNEL 
CONCERNS.. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH STEELE 
AND WILL WORK WITH COOPER TO GET THINGS 
CALMED DOWN. IT MAY BE TIME TO GET 
COOPER UP HERE AND FILL HIM IN ON THE 
DETAILS OF A DRAW DOWN 50 WE ARE ALL 
WORKING OFF THE SAME MUSIC. HE IS STILL 
LOOKING AT THIS AS A LONG TERM PROJECT. 
DISCUSS WI GOODE AND ADVISE. BOB BT. 
THC 



INCIASSIFIEO 




%07 



003i:j 



523 



COfYUNCLASSSFtED 

:r?':«'9ii;N w: m:k la-jt •n-s. :■; ■".• "-;.r 

■r-^ STIfLS (.A5T WEEK, t »£•-•"€ j: 

-£ «A|ir TVIt ■SITUATION ::lEAR _ 

-=• TO T--f OWNSMHIF OP "HE Alf^ ii*£TS 

-fit ^sJ'XiATSD e.jij:?. he ua>; to inform 

,-:r r-'AT .JHILE "^wE assets wepe maC'E fl n a ,^ 

■V.AV.^i^Z '■:■ TwE •rAij'JE. THEV BELONLiEt- TO ^OO 

A .I-NA.^IA S-Jc:' COMPANY AND THAT 'JPON 
-■rMPwETION OP TWEIP SUPPORT WORK HERE 
--•SY ;-ESE TO SE PETMRNEO TO "^HAT 'rOMPAN/ 
-Oe PvT'.PE MiPOSITION. STEELE PELT 
r>HA^j^jCiJLI HAVE TROUBLE '.iETTINia 
H^I^P'O ACCEPT TMIS UNTIL HE COULD 
'■E£ MHffT -YPE OP SUPPORT WAS COINING IN 
"0 =E?uAC£ US. T:-tI5 MATCHES WHAT C-ICK 
rAir TO ^U ABOUT CiETTINO A PIRM PLAN 
<re,-,M THE CIA AS TO THEIR PROijRAM POR AIR 
Ji.PPOPT. 'HIS UE MtJST GET ASAP AND PASS 
"0 JTSELE TO PAVE THE WAV POR OUR 
C'EPARTURE. IP Wf DONT i3BT IT. OUR 
WITHC'RAWU COULD BE A ,MESSY APPAXR. 
JU'KiEST /OU TALK TO STEELE AND CONPIRM 
THAT WE ARE CiOINQ APTER THE CIA PLAN AND 
WILL ADVISE HIM ASAP. BOB BT. 



L 



_ Q fli Mni iMhi^. laria^ >i_ 



J 



I GNClASSiFSED 




00310 



524 



^Ci*ta^ 



cwss/fe 



2ii':o^:zAix-,r<K i, have impo tnat -iepe waj 

c:£:".'e;te::> for the tOuthep:n area ; tavj 
^nl' jhat rep'jrter'l :' our people at 
TuRNEr IT t'OWN. !»iuc:h about 

THI5 RE^i^RT DOES NOT MAKE 5EN4E AND I 
-AVE TOLD iUFERIOR-? THAT I PON T BELIE VE 
I'r TRUE. IT I-; POSSIBLE THATMH^BoR 
HIS EOUIVELENT.HAS CiOTTEN IN THEA^TlN 
OUR NAME. REiJARDLESS. PLS GET DETAILS 
OF THE REQUEST AND IF IT FITS OUR RULES 
OF SAFETY. WE GO. PLS ADVISE. l.REF 
MONEY REQUIREMENTS. RALPH IS INBOUND 
WITH iZK FOR YOUR ADMIN AND SUPPORT 
REQUIREMENTS. ADDITIONALLY STEVENSON 
WILL BRING 30K FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. 
THIS IS ALL WE COULD PUT TOGETHER ON 
SHORT NOTICE. I WANT A COMPLETE 
ACCOUNTING OF WHAT THIS MONEY IS NEEDED 
FOR AND HOW IT IS ACTUALLY SPENT. OUR 
OPERATIONAL FUND NEEDS TO BE CONTROLLED 
VERY RPT VERY CAREFULLY AND ME ARE NOT 
TO SPEND 1 DOLLAR MORE THAN NECESSARY. 
DO WE OWE ANY MONEY TO ANY OF THE 
TROOPS? WE MUST TAKE CARE OF THEM 
FIRST. 3. HOW IS PERSONNEL SITUATION? 
WHAT IS rOUR SCHEDULE. THOUGHT YOU WERE 
COMING HERE.S.KEEP GOOD CONTACT WITH 
STEELE AND BE VERY CAREFUL OF WHAT IS 
BEING SAII' OVER PHONE AND RADIO. BIG RED 
IS COPYING US VERY WELL. BOB BT. 



■SECRET! 

FY I.. 1 . REQ FOR DROP CAME TH ROUQtJ. 
IBB^C^A HAD RETURNEDD FROM|Hp^WITH 
4000 LBS TO BE ADDED TO 7000^SFROM 
PREVIOUS LOAD TO BE DROPPED SOUTH. 2. WE 
^AVE RECEIVED SAME REQUEST THIS MORNING. 
J. HAVE TENTATIVELY SET UP DEP TO ARRIVE 
tC AFTER DARK-OUR ATTITUDE REMAINS THE 
SAME. 4. TIME OF E:^ERCISE-6 HOURS PLUS ? 
MINUTES;?^^^^^^^ ^^^^ 

CREwlHHII^^IHH^HASENFUSflHS ^- 
NO C!?NFUSIO^?ER^!ioiJT ORIGINAL ~~ 

REQUEST. . 7. INCENTIVE MONIES OWED 
TROOPS. S. NEED TO RECRUIT ADDITIONAL 
PILOT STAFF. PLUS 1 LOAD MASTER FOR A 
■^C'TAL OF 4 L0ADMA5TERS OR KICKERS. ;■. 



,4405 



NCUSSIFIED 



0033' 



525 



lJL4:-iOZAlJG36 FRM MAC TO PALFh.,:. F^i 
rROVir^E details' OF P.EOUErTEI' I'POF-. VERY 
CONCERNED ABOUT DAVLI'.iHT OFh. ESPECIALLY 
WiW, IF EQUIP 19 REQUIRED ASAP WE WILL 
;ET i.P a nITE MliSION. ARE TROOPS 
CAPABLE OF MARK INi.1 A DROP Z0N^^2^HCIW 
■^UCH LONLiER ARE ('OU NEEDED AT^Bl^f 
PLACE"- IS THE MONTERO PROBLEM TAKEN 
CARE OF'' I NEED FOR YOU TO COBEBACK TO 
MIA AND DELIVER SOME MONEY TO jBBlMI 
STEELE IS TRYING TO HELP BUT WE HAVE 
SOME BILLS THAT MUST BE PAID NOW. PLS 
ADVISE OF SCHEDULE, BOB BT, 



WWSSIFIEO 




Q^OT 




0031 



526 




.f^iJ'^*' 



= =.::•: EMjRES-? WHAT -ATSRHL .;P£ .'01.1 

[rop?i>,;:j' UNO HAS COOP.: iM-THr 'NE r-p.op-- 

.-.'AT :s E^^C?*V SITi.iATION TM :r ^PEA- hAs 
■'TJELE BEEN INFORMED OP .iIIvJlON" HA'5 ;-.£ 

"'OVirS:' .4NY SIJPPr-pRT- ;. WANT VOU TO 
■:-".;TACT fTtli-c -nC- E: PlAI.^ what HAPPEiviEt' 
:•■; TH6 Ml JINPORMATION C'jNCcRMlNli THE 
PP£VrOU«L(' CA.-jCELEC' DPOP. IMPORTANT 

'MAT ; :.';:■ OP' BAv cpEis NOT i:,eT pa-j-sed 

-".POUriD , AC'VI^E .IE WHEN •jTEELE I* 
rNrORMED AND HIS REACTION. ALSO HE 
•JmOULI' 5E awake op your O^RRENT MI'SSION 
-f-iD JHOULD PROVIDE w::. INTEL. ET.:. PR.-.is 
TO DEPARTLiPE. 3. i JLAD TQ fE E YOUR 
PE'.ATIONSHI.':' MITH^^lmi TtPROVINCi. 
rOMTINl.'E Trt ■jiCF}' OLO-iELf WITH HlW. WE 
NSED HIS ■SUPPORT. BOB BT, 






r 



JL_D 000388 



O.Mto - itoaib '*IlH 




UNCUSSIFIED 



<ff0334 



.'^^^'SY 



527 



(SECRET) 




C DORM MATES _ 

*F = S:OACH SOUTH TO NORTH r^ZBONFIRE 
IMVERTE::' L COMMUNICATIONS (HHIIlALL 
I-ICnNS A/C MEDICO GROUND LArSaRTOTrOP 

TIME -::<4r; l^mt 25 auij. route of flI'Sht 

ACRO:-:. ?u MLES OFF COAST TO JUST SOUTH 
OP PLANTATION EAST TO SOUTH OF V2 DIRECT 

TO rc 



(^w5) 



UNCLASSIFIED 



OG:>:::^/j 



528 



llNCUSSIflED 

'rECRET) 

1. TRIP •SOUTH ABORTED 30 MINUTES FROM [C 
DUE SEVERE THUNI'ERSTORMS. ;. RELIABILITY 
OF OMEGA IN THAT AREA IS SUSPECT-AS IS 
LORAN. BOTH NAV AIDS WORK FINE OUR 
AREA. DETER IORATION QUITE NQ TICEABLg 
APRROACHINGi^^HHBBHV>Z AREA. 
RELIABILITY OF OMEGA IN 323 OPERATING 
OUT OFflj^KFOLLOMS SAME PATTERN WHEN 
NEARING D2 INSIDE NICAGUARA. 4^^^^ 
REGARD ING YOUR OUESTION ABOUT ^H 
■■■ HE HAS TO DATE -BEEN QUITE 
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT OUR PARTICIPATION IN 
THEIR PROGRAM. HAS DONE NOTHING TO OUR 
K'NOWLEDGE TO HINDER S APIE. ?. AS 
AS IDE -THE SOUTH ASKED ||B|BVrOR 
HELP-POSSIBLY A BREAKTHROUGH IN 
COOPERATION. 6. WITH REGARD TO 
SOUTH -BASED ON A SEEMING LACK OF REAL 
COORDINATION-GUIDANCE IF YOU WILL-WE 
WOULD FEEL BETTER IF WE SET tIME OF 
ARRIVAL OVER D2-NITE OR 
DAY-CONSIDERATIONGIVEN TO WX AND 
POLITICSUHHIB CREWS HAVE NO 
COMPUNCTION ABOUT WORKING DAYTIME. 7. 
REGAWDINfi CA NCELLATION OF PREVIOUS 
TRIP-miAT ■■■■I INDICATED THAT 
THEY WERE INFORMED WE HAD NO CREW OR NO 
A/C AVAIL. OR BOTH. HE WAS SOMEWHAT 
DISTURBED THAT NOTHING WAS FURTHER FROM 
THE TRUTH. HE PASSED ON TO HIS PEOPLE 
THAT THEY HAD BEEN BADLY MISINFORMED. 8. 
NEW SUBJECT -ALL E:'<PENDITlgESARE 
ACCOL'NTED FOR IN DETAIL ^HH^GIVES ME 
HIS REQUIREMENTS BY MEMO-ANY FUNDS HE 
RECEIVES ARE DOCUMENTED BY RECEIPTS. 9. 
OP. E::P. -HOUSINa-22-23/M0. FUEL-LOCAi 
TRNG--WH6N ALL0WED--/8 TRIPS 
SOUTH/MO-EQUATES JTO 3W/TRI P PLUS 
INCENTIVES-TRII»SHH|^HhALLA/C ARE 
FULL WHEN DCP. ■VBBHHHBI A 
PLUS FOR US. TOTAL B<PENDI TURE^^ 
40-45M/MO. lO.^MOFNOkfljHBlS MY 
CONNECTION WITHfl||mm|Kl!EARE ABLE 
TO COMMUNICATE OlJR REQUESTS' WITH NO 
PROBLEM-ARE SOMEWHAT CIRCUMNAVIGATINQ 
HIS IRON FIST BY EXPRESSINQ THE NEED FOR 

■iiHH^HH^HBHS^HBH0As 

THE REOUIREMENT SURFACES. IN DIRECT 
CONVERSATION WITH YOU-A COMPLETE RUNDOWN 
OF EVENTS WILL BRING YOU HP TO SPEED. AS 

CHAPLAIN AND 'S.COTMSAYER THE ATMOSPHERE 0033l> 

HERE HAS CHANGED CONMDERABLY WITH THE 

FEW CHANGES. IN PERSONNEL THAT HAVE BEEN 

MAI/E. YC 




UNCUSSIFIED 



529 



te 



7>- 



:.E.:=ET) 



„c 



'HI 



^^ 



^1/ 



^/ 



aC 



[ _L i.i I <>£ ^^H :-i;i . ij :5 TOI'A V . 
JAD MAV B^^EAt'-/ ON T^iE i?TH BijT 
t "HI.Ni I WILL BE CLC'='ER TO TKE '^~> I'S. 
wi£ HAVE TWO ENGINES PLUS 90ME NECESSARY 
r-ARTj -^HAT WT'.L TOTAL OVER JO.OOO lBS 
T-ilr PEOUIPE- THE L-lOO SINCE THE TOAD 
WILL ONLV CAnPr T. 00 ON THE TRIP DOWN. 
I WOiJLD SUCtGEST WE SEND THE L-lOO ON 

•^ONDAr •"'UESr'AV. NEW SUBJECT WOULDNT 

IT BE OMART OF THE ACENCY TO BUY THE 
ASSETS 'EMPLOY SOME OF THE PEOPLE RATHER 
THAN START OVER "■"•"■ IF THEY i50 OUT AND 
START BUYING OTHER EQUIPMENT IT JUST 
SEEMS LIKE A WASTE OF GOOD MONEY. THAT3 
A PERSONAL OBSERVATION ONLY. BT 



lASSIFIED 



(SECRET) 



^^M-h 



M*i: 



WE HAVE ON OUR BOARD OF DIRECTORS A 
VERY ElsPERIENCED INDIVIDUAL BY THE NAME 
OF HUGH GRUNDY // H^ WAS^ PRESIDEN T OF 
FULL USEFUL LIFE 




BUT I HAVE 

BEEN TOLIT BY HlH TMAT IF I WANTED HE 
WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ADVI«E// I WOULD 
RECOMMEND HIS WISDOM BE LISTENED TO AND 
ALSO IF I CAN BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE I 
WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS THE 
PROJECT/// THIS IS FROM AND OPERATORS 
VIEW NOT A POLITICAL VIEW BT 



tern 



wiASsra 



00: 



530 



OHCLASSIFIED 



/^-^w/i^/1 



JECRET) 



Fvl. 



-fTOCKROOM-WOP.t- 'sHOP- FIMJHEr' 'MlVr' 
LAVING OF CCiNCRETE 'sLAB. BULTj^^PAII' 
="0=:-^iO TITILE ,BUT FRE^UM'tMeKB^HI WILL 
NOT EVICT. I-. A/C PARKED ON OUR ^lE'E 
AI'.TACENT TO BLrC. 5. NOW ALMOST SE LF 
■fUPF ORT-ONLV OCASJIONAL ASSISTANCeBHI 
^tf 4. WILL TAf E PICTURES TO DOCUMENT 
EFFOFTS OF TEAM. 5. 321 -MAULE-SHOULD BE 
DONATED TO CHARITY-FLYABLE. d22-C7A-WITH 
ARRIVAL OF 325 ALL PARTS REOUIRED ARE ON 
POARD. WILL TEST FLY ASAP. IF YOUR 
INTENTION TO FINE TUNE 322-ADKINS AVIA. 
MC ALLEN. TX STIL^^OMP^ITIVE-OUALITY 
AND PRICE. 7.i^llHBH|LAST WEEK 3 
OUT OF 4 D ROPS SUCcIsS FULT WX REASON FOR 
NO DROP. ^^-IBHB^fr'^'-"^ '^^^ DISCOVERED 
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AVIONICS INSTALLATION 
BY SAT -SUB -CONTRACTOR. HAVE RESOLVED 
ALL -REQUIRE OMESA CIU UNIT AND VHF TX. 

WILL i-H Prk OUT flNi ) T esT p y^ asap engines 

IN. LANGTi^JQ NOT QUALIFIED -WOULD NOT KNOW 
SCREWDRIVER FROM HAMMER. DONT YOU DARE 
TELL HIM I SAID THAT. 10. REF^COBMENTS 
FROmIHB REGARDING OUR TEAM.I^H^'^^ 
AN INDIVIDUAL FROM THE AGENCY- KNEW HIM 
IN LAOS -BOTH COMMENTED VERY FAVORABLY ON 
ATTITUDE AND MORE IMPOORTA^O^ 
PERFORMANCE OF TEAM. BlBH^B^'^^OED 
SAME. U. WITH WAX NO LONGERI^^^^^— 
•='ICTURE-I ASSUME HE IS N0TH|^|^^B| 
BECOME A VERY ENTHUSIASTIC PARTER. 12. I 
PRESUME ALL GUIDANCE REGARDING RESUPPLY 
AND POSSIBLE PILOT TRNQ FOR FDN MILL 
COME DI RECT FROM YOU OR IN CONCERTY WITH 
^^^B TOUGH TO CATCH AT THE EMBASSY. 13. 
CONCLUSION. .ALTHOUGH FEW MINOR PROBLEMS 
REMAIN PARTS ETC. WE HAVE BASICALLY 
ARRIVED AND ARE OPERATIONAL NORTH AND 
SOUTH. I FEEL THAT YOUR PREVIOUS 
oUGftESTION OF MOVING TO A MORE 
COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY LOCATION WOULD 
hBE BENEFICIAL TO ALL. SORRY ABOUT 
BEING LW. THIS WAS PUT TOGETHER 2 DAYS 
A'iO PRIOP TO SOME APPARENT CHANGES. COOP 





S^ 



00363 



531 



s^. taj^ 



c©?v UNCLASSIFIED 

DNCIASSIF'EO 



■:uf:£.B.i APS JTTEr-PTlNia '^O ''.'.'T AND PIJN. 

• VW "'-lAT TMgy.y^g HCAftT' ':iA I ?N . T TA». ING 

•ve.e Tuff r pec AT ION. Hg rAy'r^BHBls R D 4 U '/ 5 

nct PSL£A9iN.-."i 'se A.-c eecAK-JS he ■iLAiit-s 

-uff, .■•;'sg rvN'P A A-L. ■^■i'A.iLL ':lc;e 
: Ci^'M HHHV ^''* ''rcNTPA anC' <;'; 

i^T'TTV- :T --•£ It^i.'E IJN.T ^EsOLVEr. 
■•"•-'SR --riEA'!'? INitLUCE CHAftiiXNG .LANMNiS 

■^Eij. :f •f-;"""' '.'■?:■• e::c-o«ins 'hc whole 
•;?s=at:::n. etc. -. pE'-iasmng the 
i?EC :="!': CMAPCiE OP AIF. PIPACY. PELi:: 
■:lAI.V'5 TuaT he -"AD CLEAPSD THE FLI'JHT 
•Jl'^H «AT. -HAT IT MAs AH ACPEACV 

•jchec'vlet' 3'jt po«tponcr- plight op 
we:I;::ne5 donated bv the mavor op wxahi. 

;. Vel::: 5AVS That BeRwi.'tE3 HAD 
PE-.">UE;TEt' THE :-AYCR OP «IA(*I TO COWS 
C'CUN. 4. SOTTOn LINE I? THAT HI^^ 
XANTS THE 3 A.r -0 rTAV IN BUSINESS 
.•r:. '■■■ZPL^Cll 3' A'SEMCY mEANS. ?. I,LL 
w-S rEElNiS OULIE T:!<lOftROW. FLEA«iE '.ilVE 
■■'E VOVR ?:S ACTION TO ALL T'JIS AND 
ANN--:N<i ELJE V •:•.'. D LIKE MC TO PA$S TO 

Ir'y. ST. 






fc-^**»««'<'6a. 12356 



UNCLASSiFBED 

mssra „,^ 




532 



UNCLASSIFIED 



?^YI. 1. THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS ARE THE 




_^ fTuin DROPS.. 2ND 

r-ftOP INBOUND -RECEIVED SPORADIC 37MM AAA 
WHEN CRCSSINSAROAD. 3 1 

-TULvll^Hm^BiHI. ALL DROPS HIT 
VZ AND RECEIPT OF CARGO CONFIRMED BY 
RADIO. 4. HAVE LOCATED A POSSIBLE 
FACILITY IN MCALLEN, TX FOR CARIBOU. 
DOTHIN. ALA. HAYES AVIATION ONLY 

SERVICED THE CliSKS. NOW ONCE AGAIN 

WE HAVE BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO THE 
AIRPORT-PI LOTS AN D MECHANICS. 6. LATE 
,_^5^JIGHT|^M^ INFORMED ME THATl 
IH^^B PUr^THgAIRPORT OFF LIMITS/ UNTIL 
FURTHER NOTICE. 7. T HIS MORN INgT 
WAS ASKED TO MEET WITH^IBHIH^AND 
RECEIVE SOME PAPERS ANp_POSSIBLY"sbME 
INFORMATION REGARDING BiVlgHl g 
THIS AFTERNOON|fcHi|ANDlWI^HAVE A 
SHORT MEETING WITH^H|^HHHB max IS 
iOTICEABn^BSENT TK PASSING ON INFO TO 
'^^' jHHV^^ I^OW THE MOUTHPIECE 
APPARENTLY. 9. DISNEYLAND HAS NOTHING 

THAT ARE POPPING UP HERE. 
iO. HAVE DISCOVERRED A POSSIBLE SOURCE 
OF TH^EASON^OR OUR PROBLEMS.. SEEMS 
'''"^'''^^■■^^^■iS BAD MOUTHING ALL 
PERSONNEL CONCERNED AND MYSELF IN 
PARTICULAR. HE GENERALLY CONTRIBUTES 
NOTHING IN THE WAY OF TEAM EFFORT. IT 
IS MY INCLINATION TO TERMINATE HIM A9 
SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE HAVE ENOUGH TO DO 
IN SOLVING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THOSE 
IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA... 



VNCtilSSIfe 




00366 



533 



iKissm 



■:'-?iti;i^-'"ai..'g;» -km w: allIjTep.. have 

.ruST rOMPLETED LONG DISTANCE MSCiJSSION 
VIZ OWNER* AND HAVE CONVINCED TWEM TO 
LEAVE C-1I3 AT YOUR LOCATION AS ^hERE 
l^AY BE MORE WORN THAN EXPECTED 

ESF-eriALUY ZF WE HAVE TO P^^: the no. i 

C-y. IT IS EVERYONES INTENT TO CONTINUE 
SUPPORT rOR THE EFFORT. MAX IS CENTRAL 
PPOBLEM. HE CLAIMS A/C ARE CONTRA NOT 
INDEPENDENT COMPANYS. MAX CLAIMS WE ARE 
'RYINQ TO CUT AND RUN WITH CONTRA A/C. 
THIS IS NOT TRUE. WE ARC NOT RUNNING 
AND A/C TITLED TO COMPANY OWNED IN 
PANAMA- -NOT CONTRAS. MAX 13 TRYING TO 
gLACKMAi. US BY THREATENING THAT 

kwiLL REVEAL THE OPPEATION, WILL 

ThARST'^O.OOO dollars LANDING FEES, ETC. 
r«AX HAS BEEN AND CONTIN«jES TO BE BIG 
^^SCURITY -THREAT, WC MUST 9E VERY SMART 
ABOUT OUR PROCEDURES AS WE TPANSITION TO 
CIA Si.PPORTiD OPERATIONS. SURE PRESS 
AND OTHERS WILL BE WATCHING AND WC DONT 

WISH TO e::r:osE now usg efforts, i am 

TOLI' YO'.: AND AMBASSADOR WILL BE HERE. 
-iAiH r.C. MONDAY. I WILL BE GLAD TO 
■^EcT YCU ON ARRIVAL OR AT ANY TIMC AFTER 
'CR MSCUSSIONS. IF I CAN ASSCST WITH 
PEJERVATIONS ETC. PLEASC ADVISC. BOB BT. 








^^as/ 



003" i 



534 



^^mmm 



j^ 



..■JE'' "5 "^E WiREt' RCC"JT"ED A^O'JNr 7:^;; 
riwe A<.ii?. rNLY RCM. PROBLEM i^S'!' -Ij 

rriiN' :^ VIEW 13 wssieiLiTY op 

^OUATTEFj. PVT..we HAVE AGREEt' t;- pijt 
^•JLi. T''E l^AN IN RANCH HOf-rE TO INJURE 
NO JC^^AT'ERS. .WHILE we Ar.PEE WE THAT 
'rOijATTER* CO'JLC' BE A PROBLEM WE ONLY 
:ON-rir'£R THIS PART OP 

-ARGER^^EAL. .PROBLEM. OUR CONCERN 15 
UHAT^^^AND AMBASSADOR ARE i-iOINta TO DO 
REP T"g" PROPER TV ITSELP SINCE APTER MUCH 
E::PSNCe AND EPPORT WE NOW HAVE NO ACCESS 
AND T'-^EY rCNT SEEM TO BE ABLE TO HELP. 
SUGGEST YOU P'^S^OueSTION ALONG THESE 

LINES ba<:k to ^^ saying that wc are 

ALSO CONCERNED^SouT SOUATTERS but inORB 
CONCERNED AS TO WHAT THCY ARE GOING TO 
DO ABOUT TWE MORE IMP ORTANT PROBLEM. 
MOREOVER. AmB AND ^^ NEED TO THINK 
ABOUT WHAT HAPPEN^!pteR CIA GOES BACK 
INTO PIELD. DO WE CiIVB THE PROPERTY 
BACK OR WILL CIA WANT TO USE IT"> BOB 
BT. 



R 000403 



( 




UNClASSiFIED 



UOJ-IN 



535 



UNCLASSSrSED 



^> t 



•^tCACL IWCtlATfLV. BRING THf 
lAlNTI-iANCt AWC AI»CRCW9 'X'' OF rH6=?l 
OUISTLC »OT OUtOL^. LCAVf ACL ThC 

eiX'iPwsMT. iKtuC'iNa airplancs. bpinij 

BAt:> ONLV Pf»»«ONAL S'XiIP. :. CCSTROV 
Rf'SXiTRATION PUATC* ON A/C IF PQi 
fDN.T tAWAr,e TH6 A/C. J. al 

jeoB. BAiiON. ANO <xi^TeAr *>*?«. 

iceTHER. 'HC AIRFIELD REVSRT'S TO 
BAiTON.* CONTROL. 4. Cff fgtg I« 
REC0NSi:eRlN(3 MEETINQ W/ YiXi AN» MAY 
CALL YO'J. ?. IF MC HELF4 RERHAFS THIS 
TMlNia CAN BE PATCHED BACK TOCiETHCR FOR 
THE TRANSITION. BUT FOR THE WOMSNT THE 
FEOFLE nuST BE CiOTTEN 0»JT OF THERE. BT 






B7 ' i^WT 

>044IBLE. 
•WWLD 



« 4671 



t3l349:AUG3« I. THERE IB «0R1 THAW I 

.LAR9 WO RTH OF ECHJiFWgNT. SRAREt, 
■located ATHHH I FRESUMK VOUM MBQ 
f5ULT« FROM TELECOW WITH iXLIl. I^ 90 
I MUST REMIND YO«J THAT THESE ABSETB ARE 
OWNED BV UC'ALL RESEARCH CORF AND THERE 
19 NO INTENTION OF ABANDONINO THCM. 2. I 
IN9Iit ON IMMEDIATE MEETING KTWCCN BOB 
AND'SxSfiLB OR I WILL 9CEK OUT THI 
AMBASSAC-OR AND RE90UN/C TH« XttUC. DZCK 



1 . !"y REAO^p Xt IT RCSULZf ^RQELISUP 
BEFORT LM-ri^SHT THAT ^H ANOM^I HAD 
BEEN MRECTED hANDB CFFiV DCI. COMBINED 
WITH MY REFCRT THAT JIM DIDN. T WANT TO 
MEET WITH YO«.t, SijFFOSEPCY AT DIRECTION 
OF THE AMBA99A&<DA^2^rHE THREAT OF A 
LAW SiJiT ACiAINSt|^^^HF0R AIR FIRACV 
HAS AFFARENTLY FEAlT^CISOKED TH« 
ATMOSPHERE FCR -^ZS: AND FOR r>iE 
A.tf i :• jA(.OF AB»>jT -^t-E '.OOD INTENTIONS OF 
THE CvMFANV. BT. 




UNCLASSiPiED 



j4«» 



•'-:^i^*-f 






003 



536 



ONCLASSir'ED 




:■ ;.«. T7T-_i6 - 

^^^ ^i:i:-::y.z. if wc 

■:":f.!i ;-'T A!>«?n<s i*y ene'^tss ^vc view i"e 
■■&r.''-':_r ~: '•a I'ict mi-uuns ^rcm the. 

■:-."rA;. PC.'i -ASTIN. CARL JENUN*. r«A:^, 
f-!'ir'-"AM. ANC' "^OST OF or-ER-i wI'.L 
TiMEr lATEL*' .".r's IN ANf '•ORE BAD PRESS 
-S'iUL^';. iJVALL ANt T-tE OTHER COMPANIES 
^PE PSSP^-TLV LESAL IN TKEIR ACTIVITIES 
*^NC' : WILL MAKE TMIS A MAJOR ISSUE IF 
ArfiAAjATO^AN^STEELE VO NOT RECTIFY 
> ATT--::|H^m^^|H|. I RREMIT 

y.A.: T-:. TEAR iJS UP. '2. TMIS IS NO SMALL 
MATTE'^-. WE MUST OPERATE AS TH0IJ6H WE 
HAVE SOME SENSE. MCK BT. 



^at 



^ UNCLASSIFIED 



i 






537 



UN3LA3S.71ED r-v-^/ 



PYi. MEETI^4a MITH RAPHAEL HAS MSCLOSED 
A "AroR C'EFICIENCV IN THE OVERALL 
.-■■•ORMNATION or DROPS TO THE SOUTH. I. 
TSANSmrSSION OP REQUIREMENTS. 
COORD INATE? ETC. PASSES THROUGH THREE 
■jTArrONS BErOP.E SEACHINtS US. THIS HAS 
CAUSED US TO A5K POR CONFIRMATION OP 
TTME5 OVER D2 ETC. NUMBERS HAVE BEEN 
CHANGED IN RETRANSMISSION. THIS WAS 
irONPIRMED BY RAPHAEL WITH HIS COPIES OF 
T'MS DISPATCHES. 2. WE HAVE TE NTATI VELY 
S'E^OLVED "XE PROBLEM BY HAVING ■■ PASS 
THE ^EOUIREMENT TO FDN HQS AND TflfR TO 
US. 3. WE STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT WE 
HANDLE THE REQUIREMENT IN THE FOLLOWING 
MANNER. 4. OUR ARRIVAL OVER THE 02 -THE 
INITIAL DROP-SHOULD BE JUST AT 
DUSK -DARKNESS OCCURS ABOUT I 745- THIS 
ALLOWS A I300D VISUAL SIGHTING OF DZ. IF 
THE DROP rONE IS SECURE-SUBSEQUENT DROPS 
WOULD BE MADE SPORADICALLY WITHOUT 
FANFARE. I.E. NO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN 
A/C AND GROUND. DURING THE TIME IN THE 
AREA. THIS METHOD PROVED SATI SFAC TORY 
WITH THE PREVIOUS BOO DROPS. 
INDICATES HIS PEOPLE AGREE-THRC 
RAPHAEL -PREVIOUS DROPS HAVE IN THIS 
:^ANNER RESULTED ONLY IN THE LOSS OF ONE 
SUMtLE. THIS RANDOM METHOD WOULD 
C'JNTtNi.iE AS LONG A* THE DZ IS SECURE OR 
"-Zy -AVE MOVED TO ANOTHER LOCATION. 5. 
AFTERNOON ARRIVAL ALLOWS LOW LEVEL 
FLYING FOR RADAR AVOIDANCE AND ENTRY 
INTO DZ AREA Wi^tJLD RESULT IN MINIMUM 
ScACTION TIME IF ANY. «. RAPHAEL 
C^e-^iERALLY AGREES WITH PftOCEDORE. BT. 
FROM MAC.. X WILL GO BACK TO COOP AND 
REO. DZ COOMM, AQAXN. IJNLESS I KNOW 
~wSaE THEY MKMOnKZNQ X CANT MAKE A 
VEPv -.COD JI^ImMT A8 TO T>j^^fi^OSED 
<:=0>:EDURE. ^PhJ. ALSO GETf|^^H| TO 
^V^L'.'ATE THX9r>flOPOSAL. BOS ST^^ 




Partially Declassified /Released oaLuiuJSii' 

under provisions of LO. 123S6 

by B. Refer, National $ecunty Cound 

LNCLASSIFSED uojh 



538 



mmtm 



li:<iir-ZAU<i>26 P:E':i:VEt- NEW y-jizAurz 
■"jsr.ijCH CM)eM FRO« WIS SOS?. -aE APE -" 
■-.iY IN njfcX OPERATION •fUFPORTINCi TmE 
:e(CPi ijNTIl. i OCT. AT ThAT TIME NiiC 
iAv>j, TWAT CM WILL "AVE BEEN IN 
•PET^TT^V APP»0:-: '. WONT H. THE CIA WILL 

'WAT THEY. THE CIA. ARE NOW IN CONTROL 
AMr THEY C'OnT want OUR A4'?.ET5 TO REMAIN 
TN ' -.£ AREA AND CONFUSE THE I5'=.IJE..AT 
^HICH TIME WE WILL TCiTALLY WITHt'RAW ANb 
EITHER r ISR0-5E OF THE ASSETS OR SEND 
TWEM ELSEWHERE. THIS IS CURRENT FLAN 
ONLY TO BE CHANCiEI' SV THE NE! T PLAN. BOB 
ST. 



JPY 



" ° QQQ389 



I 



W.^ 



-6V 



I 



s: '•' 



4«X«.' 



,j.vj. 



UNCLASSra 



0033; 



539 



'^.L»«>'UAilAul'>*...n^nbi^i^L»JiXV2ioo-c Au^yt» 



:mtinued involvment. beuin 



UNCLilSSIHED 



WEI 



■^e::t. .Z'Z-ic':-^-^eZ' operational problems 

WITH JOHN "HI-; A.r. CONCUR THAT MISSION 
= LhNNINi^ I; NOT TAHNCi INTO ACCOUNT CREW 
INPUT. PARTICULARLV A-; IT RELATE'i TO 
WEATHER AND TERRAIN. ALL THINGS 
CONSIDEREI' I ACiREE THAT A t'USK t'ROP 
MAf ES SENSE AS LONG A3 WE DONT SET A 
PATTERN. ALL NIGHT DROPS WLL INVOLVE IR 
DEACON OR PARACHUTE FLARES BY GROUND 
PERSONNEL THERE IS WAY TOO MUCH USE OF 
THE RADIO, I ALSO PREFER TO HAVE CREW 
SELECT DZ WHENEVER FEASIBLE AS WELL AS 
TIME AND THEN NOTIFY GROUND ELEMENTS AT 
THE LAST MOMENT OR AFTER THE FACT. THIS 
PRESUMES THAT WE HNOW THE GENERAL AREA 
THAT THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS CONTROL ON THE 
GROUND. FLYING VERY LOW AT NIGHT GIVEN 
THE TERRAIN. WEATHER AND AIRCRAFT 
LIMITATIONS APPEARS HIGH RISK. THEREFORE 
MGHT DROPS SHOULD BE DONE AT A HIGHER 
ALTITUDE. THIS SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM WITH 
IR STROBE OR FLARES. PLAN TO INCLUDE 
THESE ITEMS IN THE NEXT DROP, JIM. 



X 




4{<I5 



mmm 



QQo2[> 



540 






rSCac-' 



UNCUSSIFIED 



;-l'^:<0ZAi.ii."iS6 l.YC'U NEEI' TO PA'JS All INFO 
PE'" TA'S rIN'J PROBL EMS Id STEELE. HE li 
r.vM t'ieH|HB|'-''^<^ REPPE'SENTATIVE MITH 
INTEREiT^IM OUR~tiPERATIOKlS.] I WANT HIM 
T-:> BE KEPT UP TC< SPEED ON ALL OUR 
EFrOPT'j Awr PROBLEMS. ;. I CANT MAKE ANY 
.njrr,EMENT5 AS TO rOUR PROPOSED 
PROCEM.iRES WITHOUT SOME IDEA OF WHERE 
vOU WILL BE WORKING. WHAT ARE THE 
COORDINATES" WHAT 13 YOUR PROPOSED 
ROUTINi-,-- THERE ARE OTHER QUESTIONS I 
PUT IN THE PREVIOUS MSG. THAT YOU HAVE 
NOT ANSWE RED. 3 . STEELE MAY BE ABLE TO 
HELP WITHlpmREOUESTS AND 
CLARIFICATIONS OF MISSION 
PARAMETERS. .USE HIM. .HE IS A FRIEND. 
AWAITING YOUR ANSWERS. BOB BT. FOR 
STEELE FROM MC ALLISTER. . COOP HAS 
OUTLINED SOME MISSION PROCEDURES THAT 
THE 15UYS HAVE WORKED OUT WITH THE 
CUSTOMER. BASICALLY THEY ARE TO PLAN TO 
ARRIVE OVER THE D2 JUST AT DUSK APPROX, 
1745 WHICH ALLOWS GOOD VISUAL SIGHTING 
OF VZ. IF D2 SECURE. SUBSEQUENT DROPS 
WOULD BE MADE SPORADICALLY WITHOUT COMM 
WITH THE GROUND. THIS HAS BEEN USED ON 
NORTHERN MISSIONS QUITE SUCCESFULLY. 
THEY THEN PROPOSE THAT SUBSEQUENT DROPS 
COULD BE MADE TO THE SAME D2 AT RANDOM 
TIMES SINCE THE C REW WOULD BE FAMILIAR 

PLs ^PHHHHHIHI^Ili 

CiIVE ME YOUR ASSESMENT OF THE PROPOSALT 
SOB BT. 



y^ 



wiASsm 




Hoilp 



i)03::u 



541 



WUSSIflED 



- ^AlW.TijR DEririENCV IN TIHE OVE^'ALL 

::c=:riNA''iON of [•r:of->=. to the jouth. i. 

T-^N-^MUf ION OF REQUIREMENTS. 
MOPT'I'IATI-? ETC. f=-A5=.E'=. THROUl'.H THREE 
■r"^ATTON-r 5EF0RE REACHING Uf. THIS HAS 
CAi.'SEC' US r-j -^rt- FOR 'TONFIRMATIuN OF 
TTI^ES OVE.'^- tC ETC. NUrlBERS HAVE BEEN 
C^hANGEI' IN RETRANSMISSION, THIS WAS 
CONFIRMED BY RAPHAEL WITH HIS COPIES OF 
■^HE CISPATCHES. 2. WE HAVE TENTATIVELY 
RFSOLVED THE PROBLEM BV HAVING ■■■pASS 
"'-lE =.EOlJl.';:EMENT TO FDN HOS AND^^Sl TO 
IJ--:-. :<. WE STRONGLY SUCiGEST THAT WE 

hant'le the requirement in the following 

banner. 4. our arrival over the d2-the 

initial drop-should be just at 

i'usk -darkness occurs about 1745-thls 

allows a good visual sighting of d2. if 

the drop rone is secure -subsequent drops 

wouli' be made sporadic all v without 

fanfare. i.e. no communication between 

a'c and ground. during the time in the 

area. this method proved sa"^3fa^cjry 

with the previous boo drops. {bii^hl 

indicates his people agree-through 

raphael-previous drops have in this 

manner mm resulted onlv in the loss of 

one bundle. this random method would ^s 

cori-inue as long as the d2 is secure or 

t-iev have moved to another location. 5. 

at afternoon arrival allows low level 

flying for radar avoidance and entry 

into dz area would result in minimum 

-■eai.-tion time i~ any. 6. raphael 

generall/ agrees with procedure. 7. for 

-^y imfo-what part does steel play in 

This scenario, yc.c 






@ 



wmsffl 



003:::: 



542 



m^y. ..:•. 



ilU 



-i" '^a I'-i^ •'' igi. c*: ": 4*i;_i. -£ :: 

'■ 'S > E'T ijP TO -SPESr ■'•! ~LL :•.": 
I~'^*P"'J AMD PWiCEM"?. ^.I CAM" "Ar S AN/ 
'■, r-'iEMEM'? *■?■ TO YOUP PPC'POiSt' 

"-':■:: ■rr'i.PEr witmoij"' ?owe icea "p where 

.."■:• MLL 5Z •JO'- :'i.:i. WHAT AP:E "'^S. 

" :':=:M~'«T=:--- •..;mat tr c'ji.'P PPOP'*"re:' 
■y.~zt4i:r- •^■-lePE ape ithep ouE's'iON'r i 

S'jT IM Ti-iE PPEV lOU-i ""-riS. THAT i OU HAVE 

■•or A,--i-fw£ gE:. :■ . sTsele may be able to 

!£ur' WITrifl^MpPEC'ljEsT': ANC' 
•_AR:PICATT?fl?: C'P *IS-tION 
■iP;AwE"EP^. .'J^S Htw..Me 1-5 A J^ftlSNl'. . 
ii'lAITINi'i YOIJR ANSUER-s. BOB BT. 



rV 







.'^n 









UilASSIRED 



■c 



'«^^>Vi-^'J^ '/ 



00:^:3 



543 



Mimm 



■> 



i^iff^ i^^ fT*'*^ .f 




H#'ANtW*6 AMB APE CCNCSRNE:' 
■•^fiE—f'ED JACK MA'S M;rtI*TEr> 

iL i-e< £:^pl;/ee-5. the property 

T^e=.E rA raOT rE'ruBE. A0UATTER5 MAY 
r:--:iPy. ;. i^P. BACON HASN.T PECC' 
■iv/MCNT IN Ai-CORC'ANCE WITH Ai-,P,EEM6NT 
WT-r:-;riE-i^YE ANC- -^ME CORPORATION. ?. 
-1-i t; -pEATINii A FLAP. ANt- TWE 
^MBAViAroP.? IREI'IBILITY IS ON TM6 LINE. 
,-AVlNi'^ -<At'E A PER:-0NAL REPRESENTATION SE 
■^-lE Ta'JSTWORTHlNESS OF THE PEOPLE 
INVOLVE!'. 4.^fc;UGaC5TS SENDING 
.-;nE-EYE BA.-^ dSB^W/ full AUTHCRI2ATI0N 
fi-i RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. ?. ^B AND A«B 
CESIRE to know ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO 
SOLVE THIS. BT 



R D 000404 



• 




sumim 



002:a 



544 



Z'/GS. 



See Hearing Exhibit GPS-78 



»^rv*«*:s'i« 






545 






~n-<» -. jj ^ - ii t . 'i ,Mi| F -H(t.' Mi ' j M (nu i <L W ^ '»ir- ^ i j f ^uM ■ »»■ I ' > tff^ff*tn T *3xm>n m ' 



..,'\iy'/<ti£^^''rJ^^^^ 





^Sl^S^ Q 2333 
4- - ■ I ' 



















• . . ii*! I - i' r II -•••-' rrir»lir''iiifi 4>-iMflr" -|TH)— - I ^n MJ-Jl'Ji'ilx' i ' i ' ' i -'s.. ': ..\.... 



,tv,ur A'.:^ ■' rrir»irr''iiifi irt'lMMr' -Till)—- I ~\ 






UNCLASS.. . 









^ ^ '^>..Q., 




jweusatiFn 



fcr. 

^ • 



V.r: :'■ 



I 







547 




548 










549 



UNCLASSIFIED 







3-/66 



UNCLASSIFIED 



V • ••• 

■ ..t*" *'- -^ -3 V 






550 



1-JI-^ 



t:^^N -11:0 



;4:oz-'i: 



■-.^ niA.: 



r "ii'P 
r PE'! 

"HE - 



'EJTEr 




■■•■iTH STEELE LAST WEEH . 
"E MAKE THE SITIJATICN . 
- =• TO THE OWNERSHIP r F 

am:- associated eoui?. 

,-:m r-lAT UIHTLE THE ASSETS wEPE «A[*E 
AVAlLA&Lt "O THE ':A:.fe. ThEv BELONi.iEr^ f.:. 
A PANAMA &ASE:> lOMPANV ANt^ THAT JP ON 
vOMP-LETIOM OF THEIR SUPPORT u-ORt- hEPE 
T-JEY WEPE TO &E RETMRNEC, to 'hAT ■rOMFANV 
t^OR FUTMRE MSF-OSITION. STEELE FELT 
^H^^H^WCULt' HAVE TCOUBLE '.iETTINii 
m^BH^V''-' "'^'-^^'^ THIS ON TIL HE OOOLI' 
--EE WHAT TYPE OF SOPFORT wAS '.'OMINi.-i IN 
'0 =EPLAOE OS. THIf mATThES WHAT MCk 
SAir TO VOU ABOUT CiETTlNli A FIRM PLAN 
FCjM THE CIA AS TO THEIR FROC.RAM FOR AIR 
SOPPORT. -^HIS WE MUST ..^ET ASAP AND PASS 
'0 STEELE TO PAVE THE WAV F.jR jUR 
DEPARTURE. IF WE DONT CET IT. OUR 
WITHDRAWL COULD BE A MESS/ AFFAIR. 
SU.SCiEST you TALK TO STEELE AND CONFIRM 
THAT WE ARE COINC, AFTER ThE CIA PLAN AND 
WILL ADVISE HIM ASAP. BOB BT. 



3-1^0 



^ D 000394 






D 






iii •- ' 



003 10 



551 

^NCLASS.'rlED 



; : ; 4 :-orAi;-*vi«:. p^.-i ma.: . . 'e* . 

•.:"M jTSELg i.A'JT wEE^ . t ?£■•"€?_; 
•£ «A».e 'ne SITUATICN Ci-EAft 
-J TO r-£ OWNCPcmP CF -HE -rs. -T-^ETi 
-r.:r a; JOCIATSD E'l.'!'. ^E wA-r TO iNP'-P-i 

-:(- f-'ir -.JHILE "WE ACSET-9 wEPE MACE R / - ^ 

.%-.Ar.-A&v.£ '■■ '^E 'rA^'iS.- T^-Ev fELCNt.iEt' rr. ^00 

A fi^NAM;; &A=.£:- iICMPANV ANt' ''MAT jFON 
.■'rwPLETION OP TMEIP. •ji.iFFOftT wOR^ -ESE 
--iSY :-£=£ TO &E fieTMRNED '0 -HAT ':OmFAn< 
r.-c- F'.JTLFE C'l f PO-ilTION. -jTEELE PEi-T 

H|||||HHb':i accept tmi-; i.<ntil he coulC' 

^E^Jh^T -YPE OF •il.lPPOftT -Ai ■:0'"lNli IN - 
"•:■ =E.-l.A':£ >J^. T'-iI? MATtHEi. wgHAT MCK 

=-Air' TO ^ou AeC'UT CiEttinij a fis.-h plan 

ccow THE CIA A'S -0 THEIR PfiOCiRAW Puft AIR 
jf.ppOP.T. 'Hi; UE WIJJT -.CT ASAP ANC PAS* 
~:i JTEELE TCi PAVE THE WAV FOR JUR 
r'EPARTMRE. IF WE CONT C.ET IT. OUR 
WI'HCPAWL CO'JLr &E A >iE'3'S/ AFFAIR. 
iV'.ViE'jT /O'J TALK TO STEELE AND CONFIRM 
THAT Me ARE CiOINCi AFTER THE CIA PLAN AND 
WILL AI'Vl-sE Him AsAP. BOB BT. 






nNCLa3S':?5EO 



82-750 551 



a 



^T^ 



552 



I'i^m^tAimJ 






B 



RECALL iMPEr-IATEL/. BPlNtS THE 

iain'~";ancs and aiscrews oir op THe=;E 

OUIETLr. BUT OUIC^LV. LEAVE ACL THE 
eOUlP-^SMT. INCL'JMNQ AIRPLANES. BPINi3 
BA)> rcjL/ PERSONAL SOU IP. :;. CESTROV 
RE'JISTPATXON PLATES ON A/C IF POSSIBLE. 
fZiN.T :aMAr-,Z THE A/C. 3. AlBlill 
I BOB. BACON. ANO OLmSTEAD Sw!dl& 
XiETHER. 'HE AIRFIELC REVERTS TO 
BACON. S CONTROL. *. C^T E'gCB ' IS 
RECONSIIERlNij MEETINQ W/ Y.X AND MAY 
CALL YOU. ?. IF HE HELPS PERHAPS THIS 
THiNia CAN BE PATCHED BACK TOGETHER FOR 
THE TRANSITION. BUT FOR THE MOMENT THE 
PEOPLE MUST BE I30TTEN OUT OF THERE. BT 









I 

13I345CAUG.S6 1. THERE IS MORE THAN 1 

COLLARS WOATJ^riF EQUIPMENT. SPARES, 

|LOCATED AtH|H| I PRESUI* YOUR MSQ 

RESULTS FROM TELECON WITH OLLIE. IF SO 
I MUiST REMIND YCHJ THAT THESE ASSETS ARE 
OWNED BY UtALL RESEARCH CORP AND THERE 
IS NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING THEM. 2. I 
INSrjT ON IMMELIATE MEETINQ BETWEEN BOB 
AND '».tF£L'g OR I WILL SEEK OUT THC 
AMBASSADOR AND RESOLVE THC ISSUE. DICK 



1. -Y READING IS IT RE SULTS FR OM YOUR 
i^EPORT LAST NIGHT THATHI ANDflHM HAD 
BEEN DIRECTED HANDS OFF BY DCI^?0MBINED 
WITH MY REPORT THAT Jim DIIN, T WANT TO 
MEET WITH YOU. SUPPOSEDLY AT DIRECTION 
OF THE AMBASSADO R. -::. ^ ue THREAT OF A 
LAW SUIT AL^AlNST^^^VpoR AIR PIRACY 
HAS APPARENTLY PeAlL / ^litSONED THE 
ATMOSrHEPE FCR.,II« AND POR THE 
A.-'BiC-rADOR AP.JUT 'Hg '.COD INTENTIONS OF 
THE COMPANY. BT. 




UNCLA3Sii^2£D 



-walk, ^^lirtk^'"^' 



OOJtj 



553 



3-/70 



See Hearing Exhibit RCD-4 



554 



3-/7^ 



See Hearing Exhibit OLN-100 



555 



3-/?0 



see Hearing Exhibit Secord-3 



556 



aiousihc^n^ 




557 









.-.:.c) 









i;y^.ir^^ 




,,'.-^i-y<^y V'-Vj-* ■ 










568 




559 



3V?g- 



See Hearing Exhibit C/CATF 43-29 



560 



'!, 



i-i 



A ^ f^. 1 j^ 



\f 



-■:av. rsLivssEr 4t. -^-.-t. •■••. -.c- 

^. -;■ '['f ^^^BBI -WAT ;ir,r:5 -.GTTTMi'/.'.F 

-->-£ ■rrrOPC'S or theis po';:ti.:ns ani wru 

-•r'.K A.-^erNST FlJ'TjRe TCS. FARM rLAr^l* 

■.. ^'jeL. .lerrriNe op PAPACrfj-^B-s thiJ 

■••r-L BE rOMET'-rNiJ RALPH WILL HAVE TO 
■.lOF^ u6pr,, J., r.i_.3 fELIVERED 10k ON 0" 
'IC I -CrAV. yx TERRIBLE BUT iJOT GOOD 
-C'OK AT fROP AREA. NO PIPES 
?I-tHTED.. AGAIN. MIL L GET CONFIRMATION 
'-'f PE'-ilPT PROM IBI ALL TROOP* SHOULLD 
•i'.U HAVE EOi.'IF. WILL BRING T0TAL3 HOME 
:*:TH me. 3. OUR FIGURES SHOW 167000 LBS 
MOW LEFT IN WEARHOUSe. JOOOLBS ALREADY 
=-E-^ FJP C'ROP. WILLSET UP SECOND LOAD 
_yia:FROW AND STAND BV FOR C IRCeTIOIT FROM 

HE ALREADY TOLD US TO PLEASE NOT 
fNTANY .-nCRE TO ■■■■^^ FOR AWHILE. 
•-EVER THOUGHT WE LJOct USAfe THAT. SEE 

vot.i T'jmcprow. bob bt. 



r 11 Lufa^ ^/ -tWw^ 



»i 



UNCLASSIFIED 



',* 



% 



%jpQ-, 




00123 

UNCLASSIFIED 



561 



3-/B3. 



DOCUMENT UNAVAILABLE. 



562 



3-/^6 



See Hearing Exhibits OLN-161 and JMP-60 



563 



3'/?/ 



See Hearing Exhibit GPS-78 



564 



3-/fy 



See Hearing Exhibit OLN-203 



565 



^'if6' 



See Hearing Exhibit OLN-204 



566 



3-/9^ 



See Hearing Exhibit C/CATF-36 



567 




3-/?? 



568 





\ 


CS) 




VO 


% 


CM 





5>a- 



2: 

% 







b m 

■ 10 



I 



• « 

M • 

o e 



569 



sm 



See Hearing Exhibit C/CATF-36 



82-750 569 



570-^^^^^^ 



571 



CHAPTER 4. PRIVATE FUNDRAISING: THE CHANNELL-MILLER OPERATION 







Attaetiaant 1 
Application to, ..eo,„ujoj of t,«ptlo. . ,,„ i,,, 

P«ft n^ . |>^ ^ 

Th. .poelfle potpo.. for .hleh ..tlon.l ««*,«.„ ,„ 
g^ th. »r...r..tlo« Of tlborty ... ,«.«, ,. ,„ ^^,^, ,^^^^ ^^ 

,- th. ,«„.! p„Mle on »..,lc«, polltle.l .„t«. «,, «,c,«.i 
l~tlt«tlo„.. Thl. ^rpo.. 1. to b. .eo,.,xuh.d th,o„h 

*"•'' '"*' •"* '— •"" ""«» »•- M..orle.l *,.1,^„, «^ 

• volution of Aaoriun pellttcl lytM. mt tiM 
.yt«. h... h.d on «,el.t.l ln,tlt.tlon. In th. o,.t.< st.t"!. 
in furth.,«e, of thl. ^rpo... ».tlon.l ,nao««,t fo. th. 
»r«.r,.t.on of H6.rtr -.11 coU.t. „d «..-u... ,„,or..t.on 
on *«rle.n politic.! .y.t«. In ,.„.t.l, „« ,h, ,„„. 

t.l.tlon.hlp b.t eh ,y,t«, „a ,ocl.t.l ln.tltutlon.. 

Or,.nU.a in th. b.U.f th.t . b.tt.r »d.,.t«,d,^ .„a 
.ppr.cl.tlon Of th. lnt.rr.l.tlol«.hlp b.t...n »..mc« politic! 
.y.t«. «,d ln.tltutlon. ,11! „.„» ,„ p,^,„i^ ,,„^ ^^ 
d.,.lo^.nt. in ..ch Of th„. .,..,, «.t,o„., „^^.„, ,„ ^^, 
P'...ry.tlon of iibrty .11! ..». „.a.b!, »«.r.t«,d.bl. .nd 
infor-.tl.. ..t.rl.l d..i,„., .„ .,„„,. ^.,,.,^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^^^_ 
Id a,„lop.«t. „d .volution Of .uch .y.t«. „d ln.tltu- 
tlon.. Thl. ,.u 0. don. thro lnt.rdl.clpu„.„ .ppro.ch 

by t....rch „d .tudy into .uch dl.clplln.. „ M.tory, .oc.olo,y 




c-^- H nn447 



7 ^ 




•nd pDlttlea. aatlanal tnaMmant for tha rrM«t*attaa of Lltarty 

vUl (oeuo pattleulw attantlen on tha Intairalatlowmp o( 

Aaaf lean political ayataaa and aoclatal InatitatlMM by aaalrtlaf 

tba avolatlon and davale^anta e( aaeh and tha tadoaieo or 
affaet aueh d«*alopaanta ha*a had upon tha othar, tt la Intandad 
that thla taaaatch ahall raaalt In a battar imdaratandlaf and 
apptaelatlon (oc tha tntatralattonahlp batvaan aueb ayataaa Mid 
Inatltutlona and ba of aaalatatica to thoaa •ho avalaata oc 
foracaat tcanda and davalopaanta In thaa« araaa. 

In tha acoa of obtaining tnfotaatlon, latlonal 
tndsmant toe tba VraaatTatlon of Llbacty vlll ravia* and eatalof 
apaacba. beeka, attlcla», publleatlona and othac vittlnfa In tha 
fanacal araa of Ikaatlean political ayataaa and ioetatal lnatlti»- 
tlona and apacifle aapaeta vlthln that aphara that fecua on ttia 
intorralatlonahlp batvaan tha t«o. Additionally, national 
Indeaaant tot tha fraaacvatlon of Ltbarty will solicit opinions, 
Infecnatlon end posltlona (coa polltlclana, scbolaca, oolunnlata, 
political aettvttta and ethar lnta;aatad pacaona on tha avolu- 
tlon, da*alo(Bant and tranda althln our political ayataaa. Pcoa 
tlaa to tlaa. National lndo«aant tor tha Praaat*atlen of llbarty 
will aaalat financially In tha publication of boeka, artlelas, 
atudlaa and othat aataclala by raapaetad authoca and orgaalia- 
tlons Intacaatad In political thaocy. National Sndowaant tot tha 
?casat*atlon of Llbacty will oooparata and eootdlnata Its 
actlvltlas with 9coupa having alallat ebjactlvas and land its 



iCLASSIFIED 



C H 



004478 




t..euco.. me f.eUUlM to Int. (Mt.d .etolu.. polltlo.! 
th*orUu M4 othar 1ii«1t14»«u oeacMnX .ith ta.rl.M paluu.i 
■ irataa* aid societal inatltuttana. 

national SnAMaant tot tba »ra.at»atlo« of Libartr 
rasaateh and Intacpcatatlons .m ba OMidoctad by aipacta In 
thalr caapactlva flalda. Coordination (or Taclew ptojwrta, 
Including tha dlaaaalnatlon of Infotaatlon, will ba handlad 
through • profaa.lonal ataff In tha offlea of tha Corporation. 
All Inforaatlon gatharad by lattonal Bndooaant (or tha 
Praaarvatlon of Llbarty, aueh aa raaaareh data, book ta*la«a. 
artlelaa, »rltln9c and publications, »lll ba aada avatlabla (or 
public ra«la*. Tha Corporation will rafularly aali na«sl.tt.rs, 
studlaa, aublleatlena, raaaareh and data to eolla«as, gnt*ar- 
sltlas and othar adueatlenal Inatttutlons In an •((ort to 
Incr.asa tha public Intarast In and tppraelation of Aaarlean 
political systaas and societal institutions. Oltloattly, tha 
Corpoi%tlon plans to publish a sarlas o( boeklats on v.rlous 
subjects o( Aaarlcan history and * paaphlat en n» political 
thought, »hlch .111 ba aada available to tha general public and 
contain articles and othar Inforaatlon and aaterials relevint to 
Its purposes. 

The Corporation Hill also actively solicit Invitations 
(torn tiperts and •pekeaaan to address gatherings, conventions, 
colleges, universities and other Intereated groups. The Cotpor.- 
tlon will recruit, advertise and schedule its ipoktntn, t1u$ 



ICLASSIFIEO 



-C H 



004479 



.,*s-gVili.'U.iB^i. 



•nablln« tha otiulutlen to pta*ta* latallltMt, irttevlat* 
■pekaaim to any Intataatad (reap. Oltlaataly, latienal 
tndonBant fee tha rtaaac*atlon ot Llbartr plana to ODadoet a 
aatlaa o( aralnata dlaeiiaaln« qaaatloaa of leii«-tan Intareat to 
kaacleana, aaalnar aubjaeta currantly ondac ooaaiaacatloa by tko 
Corpetatton aia tha political and aoelatal Inatltatleaa la tha 
SOTlat Onion and tha raepla'a »apublie ot China In esaparlaen to 
auch Aaatlean ayatMa and Inatltytlona, wd a aaalnK davetad to 
nao political curranta in fcaarlca. 

Mhatavar tha oontanta e( any publ (cation, artiela or 
«cittn9 eonalata of. It ia aubalttad that tha oontant vlll ba 
odueatlenal. kn analyaia o( tha avelation and davolofBanta oC 
Aaatlean political ayatau and aoelatal Inatitutioaa, eai boat bo 
achla*ad thtough tha vtittan weed, pco*idinf tha caadac >lth an 
oppectanity of atudytng tha various thaorias at laiaora. 

Tha aatariala to ba publlahad »111 ba ptaparad by 
lndl*lduala who aca aiparlancad and knevladfaabla in tha par- 
ticular aapact of political ayataaa and tha laauaa batnf 
addraaaad thataln. Aa auch, tha Infotaation eontainad tharain 
will ba raadabla and articulate. Tha Corporation will aaaura 
papara, ptaparad by raaponalbla aducatora. acholat* and other 
Intataatad pataona will ba publiahad la aubalttad to Rational 
Cndowaant for tha fraaatvatlon of Llbatty and without aditotial 
ooaaant. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



C H 0044S0 




TIM Corpeittlen will 41»ttibat« tta pablleatlona tcM 
of etauf* to ••l*et*4 •eheel>, eell*9««, onlvcrcletn n< otbar 
•dueatlonal InatltatM. Tha aitant of lucB (r** dUtrlbatl«a 
vlll b* 9o««cn«d by the tinanelal eaaoatea* of the Corporetlan. 
fublleattona alee will be aada available in teaponae to caqaeata 
(rea Indlvlduala and ethaca at a prtea eslealate I to ralaberaa 
the Cocpetatlon foe the ooat e( publication. The Cerpafatlon 
tntanda to eoprcl9ht Ita pablleatlona, but elll peralt repco- 
auetloa vlthout pcloc paralaalon ao lonf aa ptepet attrlbatlen la 
flean. 



jiLli -»- ^ " 004481 




OWrtet 



»* OCC 1 2 Bt4 



► /%*r,»^ 



^ 










Bmt tmlitaat: 



C H 004437 



"- "*"^ '"- *« -»« «'" «»^'r;f"t^*^:.:;iTir^- 2:."^ 

•rgulutini t.i.rlkM Id itttlw^ -M^^M^^^ '^^Lp^JS'^S^Il'' •■»»•«.< 

nnltM ia rwr 1... I, ..„,.. 2|L'"^ "• "- "« "• '"I"" t. mi Uat 

tMi th. l,t.r«i «.„„,. ,,„,„ had .r^„,,., .w *"!"• •'"'«»"< »»«1.«,. 
.'la.tlfl..M«i a. a .,.„.. ^ "riiLJ" r-.««_^ 



*' '♦«^*« '*». *l«*aa«. MD I1»i 



'/V/r 




•♦*" '•*•'« «—.. .!«.; {i.*s 5i;.^ *"'"— •»-» -»^iiss.rr 

■M»«itf. 1*CM1M j^iir. . «• »wi •« »mt«a« 1, ,„,,^ ._ 



If 



" nm tin ^ «M«tiMa .1. 




tlmtnif j„t„^ 



CC4<:9 



"^^"^^^^i^^.^ 






Otttplat m..^. 



Otttrltt Olrvtur 

C H 00443) 






579 





lumssm 



Y^-y^ 



ComptroUer General 
of the United States 
Wisliiiiaun. O.C. 20S48 



6fi' U 



V-a/ 



B-229069 

September 30, 1987 

The Honorable Jack Brooks 
Chairman, Committee on 

Government Operations 
House of Representatives 

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell 
Chairman, Committee on 

Foreign Affairs 
House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairmen: 

This responds to your joint letter of March 31, 198''' 
requesting this Office to conduct an investigation and 
render a legal opinion on the legality and propriety of . 
cirtain activities of the Office for Public Diplomacy for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD) of the Department of 
State. Subsequent discussion with your staff limited the 
scope of the legal opinion to the issues of alleged loboying 
and the development and dissemination of propaganda from 
1984 to the present. 

we conducted a review to develop the facts regarding the 
lobbying and propaganda issues, which consisted of inter- 
views of Knowledgeable individuals and a search of the 
S/LPD files. As a result of our review, we conclude tna . 
S/LPD- s activities involving the preparation and dissemina- 
tion of certain types of information violated a restric ion 
on the use of aporooriated funds for publicity or propaganda 
purposes not authorized by the Congress. We do not believe, 
however, that available evidence will support a conclusion 
that the apolicable antilobbying statute nas been violacea. 
W« are presently continuing a review of certain other S/LPD 
activ!tie" and will keep you informed of our progress on a 
periodic basis. 

THE PROPAGANDA ISSUE 

According to Ambassador Otto J. Reich, who directed S,L?D 
from 1983 until 1986, the Office of Public Diplomacy for 
Latin America and the Caribbean was estaoUshea witnin he 
Office of the secretary of State in 1983 to engage in a 
ci^patgn'to !nf!uence ^he public and ^'^^.Cong-ss to suppor. 
increased funding for the Administration's Central American 
policy. in pursuit of its puolic diplomacy mission, S. .?D 
lied its own staff, and let a number of contracts witr. 




una- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



580 



UNClASSra 



J ; ; o 



cO 



outside writers, for articles, editorials and op-ed pieces 
• in.'support of the Administration's position. Generally, 
S/LPD employed direct and overt methods in using the media 
to favorably influence the public to support the Administra- 
tion's Central American Policy. However, information 
developed during the course of our investigation demon- 
strates that, on occasion, S/LPD also arranged for the 
publication of articles which purportedly had been prepared 
by, and reflected the views of, persons not associated with 
the government but which, in fact, had been prepared at the 
request of government officials and partially or wholly paid 
for with government funds. 

For example, S/LPD arranged for a university professor, who 
was also paid as a consultant to S/LPD, to write a news- 
paper article in support of the Administration's Central 
America policy without alerting readers or, apparently, the 
newspaper that the government was involved. S/LPD described 
this technique in a March 12, 1985, internal memorandum to ^ 
another Department of State office. Attached to that ' 9 
memorandum was an op-ed article entitled "Nicaragua is 
Armed for Trouble," which was ostensibly written exclusively 
by Professor John Guilmartin of Rice University, and 
published in the March 11, 1985 issue of the Wall Street 
Journal . The memorandum states that "Professor Guilmartin, 
who is a consultant to our' office, and the Public Diplomacy 
staff worked extensively on this piece." However, the 
published article lists the author solely as John F. 
Guilmartin, Jr. and describes him as follows: 

"Mr. Guilmartin is adjunct professor of history at 
Rice University in Houston. He was formerly a 
lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force and 
editor of the Air University Review." 

The Guilmartin article was one of five "white propaganda" 
operations described in a March 13, 1985, memorandum from 
S/LPD to the Assistant to the President and Director of 
Communications. The memorandum stated the following aoout 
the article: 

"Attached is a copy of an op-ed piece that ran two days 
ago in The wall Street Journal . Professor Guilmartin 
has been a consultant' to our office and collaoorated 
with our staff in the writing of this piece. It is 
devastating in its analysis of the Nicaraguan arms 
build-up. Officially, this office had no role in its 
preparation." 



UNCLASSIFIED 



B-229069 



581 



UNCLASSIFIED 



S n 651 



The- memorandum also described as follows the use of- 
'consultants to write op-ed pieces for Nicaraguan opposition 
leaders: 

"Two op-ed pieces, one for The Washington Post and 
one for The New York Times , are being prepared for 
the signatures ot' opposition leaders Alphonso 
Rubello, Adolpho Callero and Arturo Cruz. These 
two op-ed pieces are being prepared by one of our 
consultants and will serve as a reply to the 
outrageous op-ed piece by Daniel Ortega in today's 
New Yor)c Times ." 

A third item in the memorandum describes the use of a 
"cut-out" to arrange visits to various news media by a 
Nicaraguan opposition leader. Although the term is not 
defined, it appears to reflect an intention to hide the fact 
that the opposition leader's visits were being arranged by 
the government. The closing paragraph of the memorandum 
explains that S/LPD will not communicate its activities on a 
regular basis to the Director of Communications in part 
because "the worX of our operation is ensured by our 
office's Iteeping a low profile." 

The memorandum, which is enclosed with this opinion, was 
initially classified by the Department of State as Confi- 
dential." Following our request, it was declassified by the 
Department on September 10, 1987. Three other documents 
similarly were declassified following our request. 

The use of appropriated funds by the Department of State for 
certain types of publicity and propaganda is prohibited. 
Section 501 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice and 
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1985, Pub. L. NO. 98-411, August 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 
1545, which provided fiscal year 1985 funding for the 
Department of State, reads as follows: 

"Sec. 501. No part of any appropriation contained 
in this Act shall be used for publicity or 
propaganda purposes not authorized by the 
Congress." 

Th« legislative history of 'section 501 ^^ silent as to the 
intended effect of the restriction. See H.R. Rep. No. 19/, 
99th Cong. Ist Sess. 90 (1985). This office has had 
numerous occasions in the past to interpret language similar 
to section 501. We- have held that such a provision 
prohibits the use of federal funds for two distinct types ot 
publicity and propaganda activities. 



UNCIASSIHED 



B-229C69 



582 




S 116 52 

First, it prohibits "self-aggrandizement" activities on the 
-pact of a federal agency, which have been described by our 
Otfict as publicity activities of a nature tending to 
emphasize the importance of the agency or activity in 
question. 31 Comp. Gen. 311, 313 (1952), B-212069, 
October 6, 1983. Self-aggrandizement is not an issue in 
the present situation. 

Second, we have construed the language of section 501 as 
prohibiting covert propaganda activities of an agency, which 
is the issue involved in the situations described above. 
In our decision B-223098, October 10, 1986, we held that 
editorials in support of a proposed reorganization of the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) prepared by SBA for 
publication as the ostensible editorial position of 
newspapers to which the editorials were submitted, were 
misleading as to their origin and reasonably constituted 
"propaganda' within the common understanding of that term. 

We conclude that the described activities are beyond the 
range of acceptable agency public information activities 
because the articles prepared in whole or part by S/LPO 
staff as the ostensible position of persons not associated 
with the government and the media visits arranged by S/LPO 
were misleading as to their origin and reasonably 
constituted "propaganda" within the common understanding of 
that term. Therefore, under the rationale enunciated in 
B-223098, supra , these activities violated the "publicity 
and propaganda" prohibitation of section 501. 

We have been unable to estimate the amount of effort and 
funds expended on covert propaganda operations. Materials 
contained in S/LPD files indicate that covert propaganda 
operations were conducted on several other occasions and 
were not separated from routine legitimate activities. In 
view of the difficulty in determining the exact amount 
expended illegally, as well as the identity of any partic- 
ular voucher involved, we conclude that it would not be 
appropriate in these circumstances to attempt recovery of 
the funds improperly expended. We recommend that the 
Department of State take action to insure that violations of 
a^ropriations restrictions contained in section 501 do not 
oecur in the future. 

THE LOBBYING ISSUE) 

The S/LPD staff carried on many activities designed to , 
influence the public and the Congress to support the 
Administration's Central American policy, in keeping with 
the purpose for which S/LPD was established. 
Ambassador Reich gave a briefing to the Secretary of State 



UNCLASSIFIED 



B-229069 



583 



UNCLASSIRED 



S 1 1 CO 



in which he explained that S/LPD's objective in attempting 
to Influence Congress was: 

"To gain sufficient bipartisan support in Congress 
to permit approval of increased assistance, 
economic and military, to Central America and to 
preclude crippling restrictions on actions in 
support of U.S. policy objectives in the region." 

Sometime in 1983, S/LPD developed a close worlcing relation- 
ship with a public interest group entitled "Citizens for 
America" (CFA) . CFA is a nationwide grass roots organiza- 
tion engaged in lobbying and fund raising activities on 
behalf of Nicaraguan Contra causes. CFA has its head- 
quarters in Washington, D.C. and is organized into regions 
and local district committees throughout the country, which 
are staffed with volunteer woricers. Volunteers receive 
periodic instructions from CFA's Washington headquarters, 
when legislative action is scheduled in the Congress, to 
call and write memoers of Congress, to write letters-to-the- 
editor and op-ed pieces, and call in and appear on radio 
talk shows in support of the Administration's policy on 
Central America. 

On March 4, 1984, the Chairman of CFA wrote the Secretary of 
State informing him of the details of his grass roots 
lobbying effort in support of the Administration's policy. 
Ambassador Reich, then head of S/LPD, prepared a draft 
response letter to the Chairman for the Secretary to sign. 
In the transmittal memo. Ambassador Reich described the 
close worlcing relationship between CFA and S/LPO as follows: 

"Citizens for America has been carrying out a 
public education campaign on Central America. 

"Our office has a very good working relationship 
with Citizens for America and has provided CFA 
with a great deal of information. 

"A word of encouragement and appreciation from you 
would go a long way toward letting CFA know we 
recognize and value their efforts." 

A^ain on July 3, 1984, the CFA Chairman wrote the Secretary 
of State making the following request: 

"We hope you will be able to contribute a one-page 
letter to our 'action kit' voicing your support 
for this vital aid and your feeling that Congress 
must address the issue this summer. 



DNCUSSIflfD 



B-229069 



584 



UNCLASSIFIED 



S 1 1 (^ n 4 



"This request is urgent. Your contribution will 
- mean more op-ed pieces, letters to the editor,' 
" calls to Congressmen, and radio and television 

interviews -- the elements of grass-roots support 

so vital for effective political action. 

■Thanks so much for your help. Anne Barton will 
be in touch with a member of your staff today to 
provide any details you might need." 

Ambassador Reich prepared a draft response letter for the 
Secretary of State to sign. The draft letter was not used. 
Instead, the Office of the Secretary sent Ambassador Reich 
an extract from a statement by Secretary Shultz before the 
Subcommittee of Foreign Operations of the House Appropria- 
tions Committee on March 16, 1983, and instructed him to 
reply to the CFA Chairman. We could not locate a copy of 
Ambassador Reich's reply to CFA. 

The annual Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,!^/ under 
which the Department of State receives its appropriations, 
does not contain a restriction on the use of such funds for 
lobbying. The only antilobbying legislation relevant to" 
these circumstances is 18 U.S.C. S 1913, which reads irv part 
as follows: 

"No part of the money appropriated by any 
enactment of Congress shall, i.n the absence of 
express authorization by Congress, be used 
directly or indirectly to pay for any personal 
service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, 
letter, printed or written matter, or other 
device, intended or designed to influence in any 
manner a Member of Congress, whether before or 
after the introduction of any bill or resolution 
proposing such legislation or appropriation; but 
this shall not prevent officers or employees of 
the United States or of its departments or 
agencies from communicating to Members of Congress 
on the request of any Memoer or to Congress, 
through the proper official channels, requests for 
legislation or appropriations wnich they deem 
necessary for the efficient conduct of the public 
business." 

Section 1913 further provides for penalties of a fine, 
imprisonment, and removal from federal service. 



i 



1/ See, e.g .. Pub. L. No. 98-411, August 30, 1984, 
98 Stat. 1545. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



B-229G69 



585 



UNCUSSIFIED 



S 1 1 655 



■Because 18 O.S.C. S 1913 provides for criminal penalties, 
its interpretation and enforcement is the responsibility of 
the Department of Justice. This Office may, however, refer 
appropriate cases of apparent violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1913 
to the Justice Department for prosecution. See , e.g. , 
8-212235(1), November 17, 1983 (Commerce Department 
publication favoring revision of Export Administration Act 
referred to Justice). To our )«nowledge, there has never 
been a prosecution under this statute. B-217896, July 25, 
1985. In addition, only a few court decisions have cited 
the statute and generally they have not dealt with the 
question of a violation, but have been concerned with 
peripheral issues. See , e.g. , National Association for 
Community Development v. HodgsoTn 356 F. Supp. 1399 ( D.O.C. 
1973); American Puolic Gas Association v. Federal Energy 
Administration , 408 F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1976). See 
B-214455, October 24, 1984. 

The Department of Justice interprets 18 U.S.C. s 1913 to 
apply only when funds are spent in a grass roots lobbying 
effort, where an attempt is made to induce members of the 
public to contact their representatives in Congress to 
persuade them to either support or oppose pending legisla- . 
tion. B-216239, January 22, 1985; 63 Comp. Gen. 624, • 
625-226 (1984). 

We note that 18 U.S.C. S 1913 prohibits the use of 
appropriated funds for printed or written matter intended or 
designed to influence legislation pending before the 
Congress. If S/L?D expended any appropriated funds to • 
develop the information provided to CFA, such expenditure 
might constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1913. On the 
other hand, if the information provided CFA was readily 
available within the Department of State, the expenditure of 
funds would not have been necessary, and the statute would 
not have been violated. See B-129874, September 11, 1973. 
We have not found any evidence indicating that S/LPD 
expended appropriated funds for such information. The only 
document found during our investigation that was given to 
CFA by S/LPD was a copy of testimony presented by the 
Secretary of State at a congressional hearing and was 
readily available. Accordingly, we found no evidence that 
would lead us to conclude that S/LPD violated 13 U.S.C. 
S 1913 in its relationship with CFA. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

S/LPD engaged in prohibited, covert propaganda activities 
designed to influence the media and ta» public to support 
the Administration's Latin American policies. The use of 
appropriated funds for these activities constitutes a 



"Ncussm 



B-229C69 



586 



UNCLASSIFIED 



•^ 1 1 /^ ' ,< 



violation of a restriction on the State Department annual 
appropriations prohibiting the use of federal fundsfor 
publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the 
Congress. 

S/LPD also developed a close mutually supportive relation- 
ship with CFA, a nationwide grass roots organization 
engaged in lobbying and fund raising activities on behalf of 
Nicaraguan Contra causes. S/LPD acknowledges giving CFA a 
great deal of information. However, we have not found any 
evidence that S/LPD officials violated the applicaole 
antilobbying statute. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan 
no further distribution until 30 days from the date of triis 
opinion. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
parties and make copies available to others on request. 

Sincerely yours. 



y^v Comptroller General 
' of the United States 

Enclosure 



UNCUSSIFIED 



3-22906? 



587 






.■Ene-'.osure 

l'aitr4 Stat«s Dcp«rtm«nl of S«ie 



^•^S-^'^657 



Mreb 13, I9IS 



TO: Hr . Pat Buchanan 

Assistant to tb« Pcosidont 
Oictctor of Cosununicationj 
Tbo Whiet Bouso 

FROM: S/L?0 - Johnathan S. Hill< 



VDtxnart or statz a/csc/kb 

miEflD BT ">Z^ r^J tlTt ^-/^ . 



ROSpor XESCEXT. DATI 

^ft^wTH. ^ f.£AJ01KS) 

EKDossE ET.KTiM «a?.k::;cs a 

PI or rOI EHJffTIOMS 



SUBJECT: 'White Propaganda* Opocation 



Plv« illustrativo cxanplcs of th« Hoich *Whitt 
Propaganda* operation: 

• Attached is a copy of ^n op-«d piece that ran two 
days ago in The Wall Street Journal . Professor 
Guiimartin has been a consultant to our office and 
collaborated with our staff in the writing of this 
piece. It IS devastating in its analysis of the 
Nicaraguan aces build-up. Officially, this office 
had no role in its preparation. 

e In case you aissed last night's NBC News with Ton 
Broicaw7 you aight ask WBCA to call up the Fred 
Francis story on the *Contras.* This piece was _ 
prepared by Francis after he consulted two of our 
contractors who recently had aade a elindestine trip 
to the freedoa fighter caap along the Nicaragua/ 
Honduras border (the purpose of this trip was to 
serve as a pre-advance for aany selected journalists 

•visit the area and get a true flavor of what the 
pdoa fighters are doing; i.e., not baby killing). 
ifough I wasn't wild about the tag line, it was a 
Stive piece. 

e Two op-ed pieces, one for The Washington Post and one 
for The New York Times , are being prepared for the 
Signatures of opposition leaders Alphonso Rubello, "? 




"NS^/fj 



588 



\imsmB 



.2. ^ ^^^58 



Mvlylio call«r« asd Artuco Qcu7. Tbcsc two ep-«4 
pt«c«« ar« bcla^ pctp4C«4 by ea« of our coaauieaats 
aad will a«cv« a« a roply to tha outr«9«eaa op-«4 
pi a<a by Oaaial Octaqa ia today* a waw Tocii Tl— a . 

a Tbrouqh a eiat-out, «• ara bavta^ tba oppealttoa - 
laadar Alpfaoaao luballo vlait tba Collowlag raws 
orgaaisaetona wbila ba la la Haablaqtoa ebi^ w««k: 
Baaeat Nawapapara, Mwawaafc Hagailna . Scripts Bswacd 
wwao^oara. Tba W«sbinqtoo Po«t (Editorial Bcacd), 
and OSA Today . In aodicion, cbo' CNN 'Jeaaoan 
Rapoct,' tha •NcNail-Lahcac Raporc,* eia "Today Show* 
*n^ CBS Horning Naws bav* baan coneacs«i about tba 
availability of Mr. Ruballo. 

a Attached ia a copy oC a cabla that w« racaivad today 
froa Managua. Tha caala stataa that Congrasaaan 
Lagonarsino took up 3anial Ortaga'a offar to visit 
any placa in Nicaragua. You aay raaacsar tbat Ortag* 
racaivad a good daal oC publicity on bis *paaca* 
proposal whan ba statad that ha wolcoctd visits by 
Naabars oC Congrtss, stating that thay would ba Craa 
to go anywhara thay wisnad. As tha casla notaa, tha 
Congraaan's raquast to visit an airClald was daniad. 
Do not ba surprised if this cabla soaahow hits tha 
avaning naws. 

I will not attaapt in tha Cutura to ka«p you postad 
on all activitiaa ainca w« hava too aany balla in tba air 
at any ona tioa and sinca tha work oC our oparatioa la 
anaurad by our oCf Ica'a kaaping a low ^roCila. > I aaraly' 
wantad to givo you a flavor of soaa oC tha activitaa that 
hit our ofCica on aay oaa day and ask tbat, as you 
foraulata Idaaa and plana oC attacn, you gi/a us a 
haada^M alnca our off ica has baan craCtad to handla tha 
cooMfl^P tbat you hava in getting tha Prasisant's prograo 
Cor^^rfraadoa fighters enacted. 



Attachaonta: 

1. Op-ad piece by Professor Cuilfflarti.i. 

2. as Managua 1S23. 



msmm 



589 




'* 



Vail StrMt Jounal 
Marcto 11, 19IS 
Idlterial s«etioa, tsf* 2t 



C 1 

Nicaragua Is Armed for Trouble^ ^ 




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UNCUSSm 



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D 



591 




Minerathi Frase 




fi^ Y 



N 6298 



v-a? 



Puhlu- Affiiiri. hu. 



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 



D«c«mber 28, 1984 



Mr. Ollvar L. North 
Deputy Director 
Politlc«l-Mlllt«ry Affclrt 
National Security Council 
Old Exacutlv* Office Building 
17th 6 Penney Ivania Avenue, N. W. 
Rooa 392 
Washington, D. C. 20506 

Dear Ollit: . ^ 

In addition to the mcmorandun updating you on several items regarding the 
Nicaraguan Refugee Fund, I felt it Important to give you the background of the 
Sultan. Since much of the title was spelled over the phone, let me try by 
listing the following: 

HIS MAJESTY THE SULTAN YANG DIPERTUAN NEGABA 
Brunei, Darussalam Istana 
Unral Iman 

Sir Hassanal Bollkah Bandar Seri Begawan 
His Majesty, Sir MUDA HASSANAL BOLIKAH 
Mu'Izzaddan WADDAUl>H 
The :9th Sultar, 38 years old 

Background: We checked with the First Lady's assistant, .Elaine Crlspen. \nj ra: 
Indeed, this SULTAN gave a half million dollars to the National >; ^ 
Federation for Parents for the Drug Abuse Program. Apparently he e^ 
gave another half imlllion dollars to UNXCEF. Naturally, it has 
been recoiaanded that he might kick in a million dollars of that' g >X co 
for tha Rafugaea for Central Aaarica. This is important as it - * — 
must ba a clear opportunity for this country to endorse that 
inciaclva and thank the Sultan. It would appear to ma that if 
the Nancy Reagan Drug accepted his generous contribution, we 
could, alto. 

Thank you vary much. Sorry for all the long names. I think you understand. 

Sincerely, 

Edle Fraser ^ "' "^ 

ILMSIFIFD @'/;>\ 

JOK WnwjnT^NW VjJw^lon. DC 200C6 (202)371-1515 cS ./ \, ' 



^ ^■^' 



592 




FUER2A DEMOCRATICA NICARAGUENSE 
April 10, 198S 



7-33' 



>3ao^^ 



Mr. Carl Russell Chaniel 
305 Fourth Street, N.5. 
Washington, D.C. 20002 



Dear Spiti, 

I am vrriting to enlist your help in the cause of democracy and freedom 
for Nicaragua. 

We, members of the Nicaraguan Den»cratic Resistance, seek freedom and 
human rights in Nicaragua. We fight and die each day to bring this 
dream to our country. 

Our ranks have swelled to more than. IS, 000. Yet, this is just the tip 
of the iceberg. Thovisands of Nicaraguans stand ready to aid our struggle 
but lack the means to do so. The resources we seek will bring thousands 
of people to us who have been standing idle, waiting for material support. 

Please h-lp us to achieve our dream, a free and demo c ratic Nicaragua, 
not tied to a hostile Soviet threat but to a peaceful denocratic 
American tradition. 

.\11 resources you can raise will be appreciated. We can put all of than 
to good purposes. 

Richard Miller and Frank Gomez can keep you informed of our progress 
and serve as our contact point in the United States. 

God speed and good wishes. 



— V-- 



Adolfo Calero 



UNCIASSIHED 




593 



U>4v^AOu)|IlU 



'l-c-c^VC. <^ , (CX5^ i-c. M\ 



IC* ch« largatt b«st org«nlt«d and mote afftc^lv* and ic'i chc one 



th«c has chc U.S. support for chc longest period of diM. 

We're helping them now to coordinate their Washington activities. 
We've established an office for them. We've found people to do their congressional 
affairs for them on a gratis basis. 

We're doing the media coordination for them and also the coordination 
of meetings as the circle goes out beyond just media & Congressional relations. 
Now into fund raising & administrative & Logistical things. 

Who pays? 

They do. And it's precious money to them when they're late on expenses 
as difficult as it may be you have to remind yourself that somebody died down there 
today. You can't really get mad. 

Once they've left the country like chat aren't they totally dependent 
on donations of one kind or anocher? 

No, they really haven't left the country, the in a pockecl 




Th^y go on missions chat last 6 to 9 months. 

Several of Che fighters Impressed upon me how much more comfortable 
they are in the field fighcing. They siad chey eac better, they sleep better. 
Their with their people. They're being given food & intelligence and a place to 
sleep and so on. chey actually prefer to be in the field to the camp. 

Although they have to go back to the camp for orientation, tor instruct i 
f or R 4 H. A - •' ~'^~ ' ' 

Do these people all have redios, so thev know uhai ' s fioinc o 



IHiPJRSIFIFii @ ) 



594 






UNCUSSiFiEO 



^6 92 J 



Thtrt art^^kaglonal eenmands with from anywl^r« fioi 
fflcn. Each of chosa conmandt Is in radio contact with haadquartari . 
Ii that conmand moving too? 

Yts. Thay'ra moving also. 

Wc figure now as many as^^^^^young men, and in some cases, older 
men, across the border, inside Nicaragua, waiting to come over, but there aren't 
weapons and boots for them. 

The main thing I wanted to find out is what his needs really are, how 
his weapons arc. 

The second point is that the people in the camps are primarily there 
for R & R and for re-supply, the war is not a set-piece battle. It is an insurgency. 
And, in fact, they have abouc^^^^^lnsurgents whereas the Sandanistas, when they 
won, only had about 3,500. 

So even though they're so out-gunned, in term* of technology and weaponry, 
^in a country of 2.S million is a hell of a big insurgency. 

The^^^^Hcan tie up a 100,000 man army. 

The Nicaraguan amy is 100,000. There are nearly as many Cubans in 
Nicaragua as there are freedom fighters. 

They need the Cubans and their tanks to keep their own people around. 

If freedom is alive and well in Nicaragua, they don't need 100,000 
people to try to snuff ouC^^^^^Kguerillas. Originally, during the opposition 
to Somoya, the people did have shotguns and pistols. Because the struggle against 
Somoya had been going on for several years, as a matter of fact, at the time Cosca 
Rica was a conduit for arms to the Sandanista forces and o provide the popular uprising 
and that is eventually what happened. 

So the poeple are armed. In view of this, the Sandanistas have even 
cleared the militia, which is part of that 100,000 men under arms. And they're 
not feartui ot providing arms to people, but they keep them under control through 
various survellanrc techniques, such as what Cubans call Sandanista Defense Conniitcres 
Hlotk Commirtec«i. 



UNClASSinED 



A o<:> 



595 




>( Un* is Infori 



^Si^§Z 



^2 



Anybody who avcn bagin* co look Hk« Chay'r* gactlng out of 

And chat's a cough apparatus co flghc today In Nicaragua. 

But, w« hav« bacn In couch, bccaus* of our cxparlancc, wich ch* antlrc 
range of tha armad andcha political apposition co chc Concras and when Rich was 
talking about the^^^^^ftarms , ha's not referring co che Mosquicas . There's 2 Hosquic 
groups. There's the Misura Brooklyn Rivera and Sceadman Fagoth and Mtsurasata and 

Chen chere is Misurasaca , which is a combinacion of Sumu, Rama and indians 

which has aobuc anocher^^^^^Lnen under arms, plus chc^^^^B under AROE, che chmg 
cchac grew ouc of ic, which is che Oamocracic Revoludonary Alliance, which has 
many arms righc abouc^^^^^^ Buc was in^^^^^^^^Kn March and 

chere was one guerilla leader who cold me chcy had^^^^^^^H ready co flghc, buc 
Chey needed conmunicacions, books, weapons and leadership. They're ready co fighc, 
buc they needed connunciat Ions, We sent down a military expert to judge 

the viability. So that when he came back, he could be part of the Congressional 
debate. Becuase one of the dlslnformaclon pieces chey used agalnsc che freedom 
fighcers is that they're not militarily viable. 

So we sent him down to look at it . Ha's a former Colonel in che Canadian 
Air Force. And he's a professor of International Relations at Boston University. 
He flew in Vietnam. His nan* is Yorkanatre. A real dynamic fellow. 

But when he was do«m there, in fact NBC goc ic on film, chey send an 
600 man force agalnsc a 2,000 man contingent of artillery and infantry and rouced 
them. They were geccing ready to attack the camps. They took 13 casualties. 3 
died. They killed 280. And rouced che force encirely. 

Thay took 180 AK<i7s. They took mortars, hand grenades. 

See, what happens is, chey gee a loc of ches weapons back. And chey 
don'c have aimunicion for chem. They gee AK<»7s and they don'c have the amnunition 
for chem. 

Whac they do wich their young recruics is chey give them an old Spanish 
ball rifle, the FAL, the (old) bolt acrion. roll o one rifle , and his job : s co 
go out wich his rifle, and after he's h.id his tr.iininj; - you know thcv do civo ;hr- 
t r.i 1 n 1 n(i. 



HNOASSra 



596 



UNCIASSIHED 



H 



^^J 



Tliey give them formation training and they give them liSve ammunication trCl^f 
It's very professionally done. 

And his job is to come back with his FAL and an AK47 . 

And chey all do it. 

And then they turn their FALs back in. It goes to the next recruit. 

It's like the gun we made in World War II for $2.50. It would shoot 
just one time. You use that to get a real gun. We dropped them by air in France. 

The best I can tell, a shotgun is the best thing to use in jungle warfare. 

On a very rapid fire machine gun. That's why the AK47s and the M16s 
are the best weapons. 

The M16 fires a 22.5 caliber bullet. 

I bee I could gee 10,000 people to give their old shotgun to this. 

Only one problem. You can't export guns for military use from the 
U.S. 

One reason Rich and I almost feel excited about this , is 

because, on March 1, for the first time, the various opposition forces got together. 
They signed a document. 

They've come to the realization chat the opposition to the Sandaniscas 
now is as broad, if not broader, than chat which was there for Somoya. 

The Miami Herald has turned around. The Washington Post has turned 
around. 

Frank and I s«c up the editorial board for Arcuro Crug and Alfonso 
Robello and w« wcnc over and it came out about the San Jose document in the headline 
of the lead editorial was "A Fair Offer to the Sandanistas." 

J28 million is totally inadequate. (Alfonso Robello says) $14 million 
is doubly totally inadequate. A Hind helicopter costs well over $23 mil lion and 
there's 12 of them and they're coming. 



BHOussra 



597 



UNCLASSIFIED 



f « 



as said publlcally, so chac the Sandaniscas(2^iXcl(>v&a{ 
secret radio cotimunicac ions in the field saying we have red-eves. 



Its a big lie. 

They're playing a psychological war against the Sandanistas. 

The more sophisticated of the shoulder-held missies, the red-eyes. 
There's 2 different kinds. One that's a little less expensive and there's one that's 
$8,000. It can take it out. 

And there was a scare about 315 weeks ago. They called in the crews . 

Texans are the most patriotic. 

There really hasn't been a vehicle, almost before tonight, for a direct 
mechanism to them. Because it's been such delicate territory that nobody's really 
worked out the details on it. 

I don't think that anybody who's sat with somebody at a table like 
this yet, it's going right there. It's buying these rounds. And its buying that 
missle. It's buying that boot. 

Yes, this is the first. 

They have lost a large portion, just because they've had to go through 
middle men. 

There's nothing I hate worse than getting screwed. I'm scared to death 
any money I give to this thing is going to end up in somebodies pocket. 

There Isn't on* dlna chat Isn't going right into Adolfo Calero' s hands. 
Not one dime. 

I h«v« known Adolfo Calero for roughly 2 years going on 3 years. He 
was jailed by th« Sandnitca*. He lead strikes against Somoya. He encouraged his 
own employees to go out on strike against Somoya. 

Adolfo Calero was jailed by Somoya. But Adolfo Calerois a conservative. 

Cruz IS a social Democrat. He believes in a free economy but he believe^ 
in government support for a free economy which will never work. I used to work 
.ic AID dnd I've seen these kind. 



mmm 



598 



UNCLASSIFIED 



But cht point 1* chat ch« •nclra spaceerum nowMs In opposicion co 

• M ,,, 

cha Sandaniscat. Tha aneira speccrum. ^ -5 f\ Q /^ 

^ 
Thay Jallad n<> Social Christians a month age. It causad tham incradible 

harm hcra in Washington. 

But Adolfo Calaro is a consarvatia. tic nevar gava in. Ha navar gava 
In to tha temptation of trying to negotiate with the Sandanlstas. 

After the elections, after the plans for the revolution, the state 
of Nicaragua, tell January, 1983, 2^ years after the time for revolution, he came 
to Washington to lobby for aid to the Sandanlsta government. 

Since thn I have seen him on countless occasions, he has been so tired 
from working on behalf of his men and this causa. 

As long as wa stay on top, as long as we stay in the offensive position, 
they will be on the way out. 

those guys are down there. They've got 2,000 Soviets. 
They've got 6,000 Cubans. There's 2,000 . 

It's not a set piece battle. The thing that has changed the equation 
are the Russian tanks, the Russian artillery and the Russian Hind helicopters. 

How long do your boots last? Maximum 3 months. Why is that? 

The humid. It's wet. And because they do a lot of walking. They' re 
not riding i n truc ks, there are no trucks. Thay walk. And over pretty rough terrain 

They have dona a pretty good Job of getting their wounded cared for » 
Because, psychologically, you've got to have that. 




These are Soviet-made land mines. They have been uncovered by the 
guerillas, disarmed, and brought back to camp. And they're going to re-arm them 
and place them again against the Sandanlstas. 

They don't even have their own mines. 

Th;its similar to a claymore. 




\m 



A 0,; 



:^i 



599 



UNCLASSIFIED 



These are raw recruits. Look at the tin can 



of a conteen. 



r 

this guy Ms. Inwead 



^C 



There's a lot of heavy terrain. They do a lot of ambushing. 

When 1 was there, I asked why there were so many men in the camp, 
i want to know how many men you have her. 

He said, "5,000." 

I said, "How many do you have in the field''" 

"Some for medical care; some for R i R; some to be re-supplied, refitted. 
But most of them because we don't have even a pack for them to carry their ammunition. 
They don't have boots. 

What's happened is, the Sandanistas started cheir drive for military 
conscription. And they thought they would get support. 

Instead, they got insurrection. In several of the major cities. Major 
insurrections. Coordinated insurrections. 

And these boys came across the border. And their mothers and fathers 
sent them. They said, "If you're going to fight, fighc for Che side that will give 
you a choice. And that's why they fight. 

That boy could have gone to Costa Rica. But they sent him to Honduras 
to fight instead. 

He could have gone to Costa Rica and just cooled out. They sent him 
to Honduras to fighc. 

the reality Is we're on the side of the angels with all this., 

Th« nlracle chat I know about is that these people that we were just 
talking about have ch« highest morale. It brings tears to your eyes to see these 
people . 

Having surrived and even grown since last may when the aid was cue 
off . 

And they are having to tell people. "I'm sorry you cannot join us, 
vou cannot fight, because wc cannot give you i wpapon to tight uuti. >.'<> rnnot i.vr 
voii boots so that you can go fight. 



vKcussm 



600 



UNCIASSIHED 



"%: 



Th«u_|r* 12 h«llcep£cr»r^And if char* wat on* ready for *aeh ona 

C u 
of u*. wa'r* talking about $96,000. '' , > ■> ^ 

Half Cha forces now who ara In opposition to ch* Sandanlstas would 
turn th* ochar way If Anarlcans went to fig^c, and wc don't ne*d Americans. 

I understand there are a bunch of Anierlcans down there. 

Yes, but they're volunteer trainers. There just doing training. They't 
in and out. 

There are no Americans. 

But you don't need them. 

A^^^^H^man insurgency against 40,000 full time rank and file milicary. 
60,000 are militia. So ^^^^B It's th* technology thats throwing the whole thing 
out of klltar. 

It's technology of Hind helicopters, Sovlac tanks and th* Sovlac rapid 
fir* assault rifles that everybody on cha ocher slda has. Thac ' s whac's chrowing 
LC out. 

If they had enough anmninltion for the AK47s and they had enough red 
eyes to scraceglcally place cheniselves. 

How can you g*c the >€3^^e^^«7 Arc thay readily available? 

Yeah. 

They're getting arms on th* international market. From everybody. 



But by cha tloM you go through 2 or 3 wholesalers, aren't you paying 
10 timas ch«'prlc«? 

Thay pay vary carefully. They've got pretty good credit right now 
with the wholesalers. But it doesn't extend far enough to get the AK47 rounds chev 
need on the red eye missies. 

1 would think they would be the first ones to stare manufacturing ak^7s. 

No but they get them f rom ^^^^^^^^^^ They can get the rifles, buc 
they can't carry off the ammunition to supply the riffles. 

And, there other supp!ier<t. 



yfiCiASSinH 



601 



UNCLASSra 



H 



03692 



8 



I'a noc fur* paopl* nctd aucomadc weapons. 

Th« ln*urg«ncy has to llv« off cha comnodlclcs available through success. 

W« can gee you a briefing on exactly what their allltary needs are. 

Calero wants those red eye wissj es. He wfnts boo em. H e wants back 
packs. He wants AK47 rounds which you can get on the International market. He 
wants comnunications equipment. 

But $14 million could be spent in 2 months without batting an eye. 

Reagan ought to forget the $14 million and start asking for a whole 
lot more. 

The $14 million has already been appropriated by Congress. And it 
can be released under certain conditions stepulated by the Congress. So that's 
what we're stuck with. 

The only reason they've succeeded so far is because of people like 



yourself who have provided the material support for them to keep going. And U ' s"^ 
not just Americans. 

There '^'^^^^^^^^K^^^^^K^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^KK ^^"'^ 
are Central Americans who are baclng this effort. 

The^^^^^^^^Hhave been backing this. Until it began co look like 
the United States might noc really bother at the right time when they needed chem. 

Vic* President Bush went to Honduras 2 weeks ago on his way back from 
Brazil wh«r« h« accendad Ch« Inaguration of the new president. 



the same kind of Issues. They're going to go with 
Che winner. And yet they're hearing multiple voices out of this country. Not this 
administration, but this country. 

They're hearing the President saying that these are Freedom Fi^ihters. 



thdi they're our brothers and so on 



\smsra 



602 



wmm 



And they're hearing someone like Michael Barnes In the Congress racing, 
now waic. We're noc ouc to topple governments. 

It bolls down to that. 

The military aid, its surprising, boils down to back packs and boots. 
You'd think weapons would be the most important thing on the list. 

If you were about to set out anywhere from 3 to 9 months walking deep 
into territory, jungle, roads, mountains, rain, and so on, and you knew that you 
were going to gone for a long time, you would want to have a good pair of shoes, 
wouldn't you? 

Do they have much trouble with disease in that area? 

They do all right. 

We were going to rendevous with some reporters who were coming to look 
at the bases and son. 

I had to travel with Calero and a couple of the members of the directorate 
of the FDN plus a Mosquito fighter who had been in training there and a few others. 

And we loaded up in the two vehicles. 

Where were you? In Nicaragua. 

Yes, in the disputed territory in Nicaragua. 

And, by the way, they control an enormous amount of territory there. 
They are supreme there. You drive down the road and you're out of the base camp 
and you've been going on the road for a half an hour and you see these guys walking 
along the road, and they're Contra. And you wave to them. 

Th«aa guy* look good. 

In any case, we're going up these mountain roads and I am just about 
fit to be tied. Because, in a jeep, 4 wheel drive, with about 6 people, even chough 
it's a mountain road, you feel that you ought to be able to at least go prectv well 
forward, right? 

We were going like this. 

Over the side, heavy of a load and I van on the side nnd I w<is look in,; 




603 



w 




i' > down there and it's about WO feet straight dotm. p 

This was about 4,000 or 5,000 feet altitude. '^ ^ 9 ^ Q 

Jungle. 

Temperature. It's warm maybe 75-80 degrees. 

This is in good weather, this is dry reason. But it rains a little 
bit and the roads are pretty bad. 

In fact, some strategist think the best thing we could do for those 
people would be to get them a bulldozer so they could help maintain those roads. 

In any case, we were going like this, and I literally six inches from 
going over. Six inches. Somebody was with us. 

We stopped and I got out. And I looked at the tires on that jeep. 
It was a Toyota. And they were literally bald. Nothing there. 
And that's what they're surving with. 
And I said, "why haven't you got tires?" 

And they said, "Because back packes and boots are more Important than 
tires." 

We sent Nighcline's crew there and they did a very positive story. 
We worked very hard with them to make sure we had journalists were sympathetic. 
And I got this call from this producer when she came back. 
I said, "Hew was it?" 

She said, "It was fine. Except the part where we were going down the 
hill sideways." 

TlMy war* in the same jeep that he was in. They hadn't changed the 
tires yet b«cau*« ch«y didn't have money to change them. 

There is an entire group right now of Nicarguan exiles who've been 
involved in the fighting themselves. One guy who's involved is setting up the ant i 
Pope demonstrations where they spit on the Pope and all that stuff. And we have 
these guys, in Washington, and in other areas, right now, sitting on their hands, 

Because there hasn't been the money to pay for their airplane tickets and ochri 
chinxs to Ret them out to the districts, like Jim Wright's district, and havr fhr... 
speak up . 



JllAMlOi 



604 



ynCLASSIHED 



I (Consre,ssmen .and Senators 

^ H J36931 



Can you imagine what the reaction would be If the people in Jim Wright's 
district knew what they did to the Pope down there? 

How about the Baptists they hand-grenaded? We have some of those. 
We have sorm Evangelicals who where hand-grenaded. 
Lac's show those on the tape. 
W« have been waiting for literally months. We have these people SLtting, 

waiting, ready to go. And they could have been going earlier, but a couple people 

got cold feet about spending money for then to go out and do these things. 

And it's a shame. Because they could have had major impact on the 
debate. Particlarly back in the home districts of these | 
that we're voting for. 

The beauty this time is that we are on the side of the insurgency which 
is the first time, except Afghanistan, but we can't get close enough to see it. 

But we are on the side of the insurgency. 

And if we can continue, as we've been working so hard to do, to turn 
Che media around, they will start to romanticise about these guys who are the Democratic 
gueril las. 

We going to call it the Shotgun Drive. And we're going to get Remington 

CO put up the amo. Dupont owns Remington. 

I 
We're going to start on CBs. We're not even going to Involve Che electronic 

media until we gee supporc or we have abouc 3 semis going norch on Tobacco Road 

ouc of Norch Carolina full. 

And chey keep calling on anocher semi. 

"U« goc an ctspcy semi ouc chere? Somebody goc an 18-wheeler empty 
can come on down and help liberate Central America?" 

But Che organlzacion who was in charge of pucdng ic cogecher utilized 
a Sandanisca office in Managua to puc cogecher che reporc . 

And we broughc up chif guy for a news conference and we had it last 
week and Time and Newsweek and AP and everybody reported on it. You look at Time 
magazine. This week's Times you'll see a little thing about a PR firm. That's 
us . 

The point here is tins U.S. Congressman stood up with people. Ho cou'.dn'-. 



UNClASSra 



605 



UNClASSra 



be chat naive. He had to know who these people were. 

He stood up »ith them. He had a news conference with them. And he 
sponsored their report. Which was clearly bought and paid for by a coimunist governmenc 
in Managua. 

Now that will scare the hill out of people. 

The guy that did that Human Rights Study is a member of the National 
Lawyers Guild, which is a Communist front. '' tl J369?9 

It's paid for by the Soviet Union. Literally. 

I don't see how anybody in thise country could rationally be a Coimunisc. 

There are rational Comnunists. 

The reality is that they profess views which are very left. Socialists. 
And yet they're very willing to accept a Communist government. 

ron Oelluiu was a perfect example. He knew exactly what was going 
on in Grenada. Ic was fine wlch hln. 

The reality Is you have the right to be concerned and you have the 
duty to be suspicious. 

Because anybody you'd elect to chac position and would even do it out 
of naivete, shouldn't be there. 

They shouldn't be ch«r«. 

Calero was so tired, he couldn't even keep his eyes open when we were 
speaking with hla on sosm very important Issues. 

WItist I aaan CO Imply by describing him in that way is that this man 
is coomlced. ■• deas net have to undergo what ha is undergoing now. 

On*. If ha did not believe in it. Or two, if he were using what resources 
he is receiving for personal gain. 

He would not suffer that much. 

We're going to see to it that man doesn't havet to come up here and 
beg anymore to be able to fight for freedom. 

That's what we're going to do with you is 

Where is his tamily^? In Miami. 



# 



S!3S^«^^^ 



606 



yNClASSIFIED 



They're scared In Miami, frankly. 

Everycime we call chere, we gee a call from somebody else said "why 
did you call?" 

It's a very difficulty mentality. 

Well, Alfonse Robello, one of the 3 guys who met with Reagan, was hand 
grenaded in San Jose in November. He heard a crash. He was driving a little Renault. 
He was with his fiance. He heard a crash. Renault. He was with his fiance. He 
stopped the car. Put it in neutral. Opened the door and turned around like that 
and the grenade went off. 

And it blew out both his eardrums and peppered him. Bloaw out his 
fiancs back. C |{ J35933 

Talk about terrorism. 

They have had two attempts on Alfonse Robello. Two attempts on Eden 
Pastore. Two attempts on Anturo Cruz. And nobody has every tried to kill Daniel 
Ortega. 

Nobody has ever tried to kill Byardo Arsis. 

If you really want to know who has a policy of systematic violence, 
look to the Sandanistas. 

Starlite scope . You can sec at nice. Good for hundreds of yards. 
Made in Alabama. 

This Is Nlcaraguans for Nicaragua. We have an indigenous, tiny force 
that grew up on let own accord, that matured of its own accord, and is only now. 

Tb* r«al raason we're here Is a matter of personal conviction. There 
isnothing in it for us personally. 

We are serving the larger and more mobile cause. That is the casue 
of freedom and democracy. Which we see threatened by the continuation of the Sandanisca 
regime in Nicaragua. 

It would be a shame If they won by default. If they won because thev 
were willing to put in the money that gave them the technology to succeed whcrr 



IINCLJiiiSm 



607 



\)' \-^ 



UNClASSinED 



where sheer numbers and sheer political force wouldn't. Thacs what's so disturbing 
to me about it . 

What bothers me is what happens after they've won. Look at all these 
soldiers that have to go back to being peasant farmers. 

Look at what's happened in Guatemala. Look at what happened in EI 
Salvador. 

The military held that news conference in El Salvador and they said, 
"We in tend to back this government and the results from this Aection." 

And that ended the argument. ^ <J i? 3 4 

Because heretofore they'd been the final arbitrator and here they were 
the preliminary arbitrator and they said, "This is fine," and that's the end of 
the argument. 

And they put democracy on a sound footing in El Salvador. 
And the same guys that are fighting now for the FDN, that's what they 
fought for, they're the same people who fought against Somoga! They were fighting 
for the same thing against Somoza that they're fighting for now. And it's democracy. 

For m«, the bottom line is, these are people who are willing to fight 
for their freedom and for democracy. So that we won't have to fight ourselves. 
LULAC 

People like Mario Obledo from the LULAC based in Texas, an Hispanic 
organization. Saw him on tv in Houston yesterday. He was going "Oh, no. we're 
hightenlng tantlens and I'm afraid that our boys are going to have to go down there 
and fight." 

Well, they damn well will fight unless we get behind the right side 
right now. 

There are more Hispanic Medal of Honor winners than any other nationality 
in the United State*. 

They're ready to go. They're ready to fight. 
AKS& sounds are a little less than $1 a round. 



UNCUSSffl 



608 

,r. UNCUSSIHED 

.,^-vT \ Between now and May 1, the red eye missies could be the entire key. 

Because if they succeed at this point In launching an offensive Including 
tanks and the HI24 helicopters into that region and go for the cans... 

There's 2 different kinds of red eye missies. There's one that's very 
unsophisticated which Is Just a direct shot missle. And then there's one that's 
able to take on the Hind because the Hind has major decoy devices, has heavy armannent 
and it has these fflus on the back of the exhausts from the jets - the expulsion 

c , 

from the engine - that mask the heat. ff 

So you have to have the $8,000 red eye to make it work. '^ O 0> 

They have flare system on the MI24s and they drop the flares out. 

For one thing, there's a trade off. 

If you provide money for ammunition, the money they've set aside for 
ammunition can go to boots. 

On the other hand, if you provide money for boots, what they've sat 
aside for boots can to aminunltion. 

Whatever you do in regard to that list (of Calero's needs), I think 
you can be proud of what service you provide for democracy. I think ultimately 
you can be proud to stand that day in Managua when there's a free country inaguraced 
down there. 

I'd encourage you to participate now while you can still make a difference. 

That'll make a lot of difference to a lot of huys down there. I'm 
serious about that. 

W« haven't heard from you yet. 

Please respond to the President's request for aid to the Nlcaraguan 
refugees . 

You tax-deductible check of $330 or more will be a miracle gift. The 
Nlcaraguan refugees are homeless, impoverished and wounded fighters for freedom. 

Once you gift arrives, your name will be Innediately added to the President 
Honor Roll of Concerned Americans. We are presenting the Honor Roll to the President 
on the 15th of May. 



ONCLASSIHED 



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1. Th* UM at tlM Capwiy II -I.e. IRC." 

2. Th« ««t«t«r«l Offlo» of UM C<»p«iy wUl b« »lHj«t» tt tH* orfie«» 
of e»Tlu«M CM«anc* l«r>lM> Llalt«4, (vttt teak telKlac. r«rl 

(trMC. CMrgl T*«l. f.O.lM »04J. em< e«7»"> fyn UU«4.. Irltl.l 

Vktt Ta4l». 

3. Th« oDJaeu for i«lch «• C<apuir li ••UblUho* «■••• 

(I) To ■cQuU-o mat *ur«*, ttoelu, ioDonturoo, 4«b«ntur« itock, 

bonds, BortcM**' BotM, bukors' aee«pt«io«>, e61l«itloM and 
othor MCurttlw IMiMd by Mtf o«ap*nr> oor»or»tlon ot 
undoruKlnc of vbatonr utur* asd »B«r«M«T«r eeucltutod or 
Itmfi or (lurantMd bf u>7 foxnaatt, lenroitn ml or, 
eo^saunon, truat autborttr or olhar body of KBataTar natura, 
by orlslnal aubaertptloo, aysdleata parttctpatlon, tandar 
purebua, aubaiwa or oUarvUa and to auftacrlba for cha mm 
•Ithar eondttlenaXly or othanrtaa and to »uaraBtaa tna 
aubacrlptloD taaraof. 
(11) to buy. Mil and daal In all eo«odltlaa and eoModity futurts, 
ineludlnc alHar and to buy aall and daal In bullion and apacit, 
to raealTa aoo^ and nluablaa for aafa euatody or othamlsa 
otnar tnan on dapealt ravayabla by ebadua or ordar, to esllact 
and traoalt aoa^r and aaourltlaa, to grant and laaua lattari ol 
eradlt, circular Beta* and to aanac* and adrta* on tba 
■aiiaiaaant of aaourltlas and InToataanta. 
cm) To carry on bualnaaa aa capltallata, flnanolara, 

oeoe*aaloaalr«, brokara and aarcBanta and to undartaka and 
earry ob and ancuta all ktada of flnanetal, ocaBarclal and 
tradln* oparatloaa, ataapt bankln* and truat oparatlona and to 
carry on any otnar bualnaaa wtaleh my aaa to ba ^pabl^ of 



iiHtUiSsro 






612 



^ 
#" 



^ 



\,\ '1 ' / 



baing sonv*nl«ntly etrrlad an la eeuMttan vltn tar of tb«*t 
objaets or aaloul4t*4 dlr«et;r or Indlractlf to Mhano* tn« 
nliM of, rteilttat* th* rMiiHtion of, or raidor proflttblt 
any of UM Coapany'j propartjr or rlchta. 

(It) To provtda or preaura aaoacaaant, Includlnc tha aanaga'ant of 
Invaataanta and outar proparty, adalnlatratm, lalaa and 
taohnleal aaalatanea. sanrioa and adrloa on a oontraet, loan, 
aaeonteant, aaploy«ant or ouiar baais and to provlda oooaultanta 
ataff and aaployaaa nha will (l*a aanacaaant, aMlnlatratlra, 
aalaa, ■arkatinc and taohnleal aaalatanoa, aanrlea and advic* to 
any paraon or eoapany anyvhara In tha world on any aattar or any 
typa of buamaaa whataoavar and to aot aa aanagara, raflatrara, 
atelniatratora, aacratariaa, auditora, aocountanta of bodloa 
corporata or unlncorporata In any part of tha world , for tha 
CoBpany'a aooount or for third partlaa. 
(v) To buy, aall, daal in, trada, tranaaet, laaaa, hold, laprova, 
aub-dl*lda. or davalop raal aatata, and tha flzturaa and 
paraoaal proparty Ineldantal tharato or eonnaatad tharawitn and 
to ae^ulra by purohaaa, laaaa, hlra or otharwtaa, landa and all 
foraa of bulldlnfa or oonatruetlona or any Intaraat tharaln and 
to laprova tha aaaa (aoarally to hold, aanaca. daal with and 
iaprova tha proparty of tha Coapany, and to aall, laaaa, 
aortca«a, pladga or otharwiia dlapoaa of tha landa, buildlncs 
and eonatructiona or othar proparty of tha Coapany. 

(vl) To carry on tha bualnaaa of faralnc m all Ita branchai, 

includlRC without prajudloa to tha foracotnc fanarallty arabla 
and fruit faraari, dairy and poultry faraara, lln atoek 
braadara of avary variaty of anlaal whathar brad of padlcraa 
atock or otharwiaa, and alao fiaharaan. 
(Til) To eontraot for public or prlTata loana and to nafctlata, 
undarwrita and laaua ttia aaaa; without prajudloa to tha 
foragoinc sanarallty with r9t%r*nc* to ocaaodity, ooaaodity 
futuraa, or foreign axohanga contraota to antar Into conditional 
or forward oontracta for tha ao^ulaitloa or dlapoaal of any jucn 
aaaata. 



Ml^ssw 



dull 




#> 



-<^" 



613 



M 01 138 

- 3 - 
(Till) To c»rry on bu»lB«»3 a* »»B«r»l tfinta, fictort, laportori, 
proeossor*. CMn«r», f»okMt»ra, bottltrt, «nuf ictur«r» , 
rauiltn, dtitrlbutori, and unoltMlara or fooda and 
■arehandlaa. •anufacturad artlclaa and parta tharaof and raw 
■atarlala and (anaraily to carry on tha bualnaaa of laportars 
and axportan and aa wbolasala and ratall aarcnanca and daalara 
In fooda and producta of all klnda. 



,-VT-S(^? (1,) To uodaruka and oarry on all or any of tha bualnaaa or 



■^;jy» bualnaaaaa of rral«nt oootrmotora, earriara by land, watar and 

air of oarfo, looda and pasaancara, tranaport and haul»«a. 

tanarsl eontractora, barfa ownara and oparatora, anflnaars, 

rafrKarator atora kaapara, ataradoraa, narabouaa ownara, and 

varabouaaMo. aalnfa oparatora and a<anta, ahlp bulldara, anip 

rapalrara, drydocK bulldara. and oparatora, auparlntandanta, 

inapaeccra, atoraaaapara , aachanioal and civil anglnaara, 

plannara, arehitacta, daal»iara, lanaral and aub-contractora, 

cuatoaa, tourlat and trmval a#anta, and offloaa. and (anarally 

to carry on tha aald bualnaaa or bualnaaaaa In all tbalr 

branebaa, and to carry on tba aald bualnaaaaa altnar aa 

prlnclpaU, a«anta or othanrtaa and to undartaka and aaacutt 

acanclaa and eoaOsaloaa of all klnda, altnar for tha ooapany s 

account or for third partlaa. 

(a) To purebaaa, a«ll. axohanga, ohartar, nira, build, oonatruct , or 

otharviaa aequlra and to own, vork, awiaca and to daal In and 

trada ulth ataia. dlaaal, turblna. aotor, aallln* and othar 

ahlpa, lankara, traulara, drlftara, tu«a. llchtara, barfaa, 

nuali and aotor or otnar vahlclaa and othar aaana of 

c«B*ayanoa with all naoaaaary and coniranlant aduipaant, anfinaa, 

taoKla. faar, fumltura, atei'aa, aparaa, or any Intaraat m 

ahlpa, vaaaala, aotor and otMr aaana of eonnyanca, and to 

aatntala, rapair, fit out. iaproTa, Inaura, altar and raaodal. 

aall, aiebai«a, or let out oa hlra, ehartar. laaaa, 

laaaa/purehaaa, or etbamlaa daal with and dUpoaa of any of tha 

anipa, tankara, aaaaaU and aahlolaa, or any of tha aaclnaa, 

tackle, caar. fumltura, aqulpsant and atoraa of tba oottp^cy. 

/ 
for tha Coapaay'a aeeount or for third partlaa. ,7- 






£US^«® 






614 






M 01 139 



(xl) To carry on tn* Ouilnua of ownvs of, bur<ri u4 ••lltrj of, 
■uufacturtrs of, dMltri In, Klrari, rapalrars, claanara, 
storara, and mranouiars of aaroplanaa and honrcraft and 
■aeninas of all kinds oapabla of batnc floon u tna air and uaad 
on land or jaa and vtiatnar aucn aaelilnaa ara adaptad for tnt 
oarrlaca of fooda or paasancari or both, and vbatairar povar sucn 
■acninaa ara aovad by or of aachlnaa not aoTad by ■•ehamcal or 
ouwr liallar povar and to own, buy, aall, aanuractura, daal In, 
hlra, stora and warabouaa, all anflnaa, ■■aninary, iaplaanti 
utanalla, appllanoaa, apparatus, lubricants, oaaanta, solutions, 
anaaals, paints and all thlnfs oapabla of balnc uaad in 
oonnaetion with tIM foragolnf aaohlnas wbathar in ooonaetion 
with tna aanufactura, repair, a^iitananoa or workinf tharaof. 
(xii) To carry on businass as Mnuf acturars , aasaablars, faotory and 

plant oparators, and to ■anufaotura, in ohola or in part, aodify 
assaabla or any coabination tharaof raw aatarlals wCwlly or 
partly aanufacturad itaas, aatarlals, goods, aaronandlso, 
aactunary and aquipaant of all kinds. 
(ilii) To purchasa, soquira, rant, build, ooastnict, aquip, aucuta, 

carry out, iaprova, work, davalop, adalnistar, aaintain, aana<t 
or control works and oooTaniancaa of all kinds, wbathar for tna 
purposas of tha Coapany or for sala or bira to or in roturn for 
any oonsidaration froa any othar Coapany or parsons, and to 
contributa to or assist in tiM oarrrlnt out of astablisnaant , 
construction, aaintananca, iaproTaaant, aanacaaant, worklnc, 
control, or suparintandanea tharaof raapaetivaly. 
(xlv) To aoquira, own, laaaa, rant, proapaot for, opan, asplora, 

survay, davalop, work, iaprova, aaintain, and aanaca. aithar for 
tha Caapany's own aooeunt or for third partias, alaas, oil and 
natural gt» walla, paraits. eoooassloos, rasanrationa, lands and 
propartiaa, tarntorial righta whathar on land or at aaa 
baliavad to oontain or to ba oapabla of containln4 and producini 
ainarala, oil, natural (aa, coal or othar hydroearbooa , altnar 
for tha Caapany's own aeeount or for third partias; and to drill 
for, saareh for, win, fat, piap, aaaay, raflna, diatill, 
analyaa, aanufactura, bland, als, traat and prapara for aarut. 



«lfcSSW 



615 



- 5 



M 01 140 






•Iter In mr form or ri«Moo, >tar«, trmaaport, pip*, or 
otlarvlj* connr or traaaalt, buy, Mil, trMo, •xeb>^> aad 
otttarwlM dwl and partlolpat* la mlnormlj, orudt oU, 
patrolMB, or p*troelMalaal preduot* tat natural ^« and th* 
oeapoaanta, dartntl?** and 6j-produeca tbaraof, aitMr for cha 
Ccapanj'i aoeount or for third partlaa. 
(XV) To purchaaa, aequlrt, build, eoaatruot, tqulp, aneuta, oarnr 
out, iaprova, danlop, a^lalatar, aalatatn, ■Bna«i, or eontrol 
rartaarlaa, ptpallnaa, tank atonaa faoilltlaa, aanaa Jattlaa, 
and taralnala, ofr-abor* drilliac rKa, and platferaa, 
wrahouaaa bulldlnfa and all aaoiUarr oorka, a^uipaaBt, 
funualilnci and oeoTColaaoaa tbarato, vOatbar for tba imi man 
or turn Crm fa ti f er for aala or Ura to or In ratum for any 
eooaldaratlon Troa any othar f*iT«pany or paraona, and to 
contrlbuta to or aaalat In th* oarfTlot out or aatabllacaaot, 
conatnictlon, aalntanano*, lAprov*a*at, aanacaaaat, werklnc, 
oontrol or auparlntandanoa, tharaof raapaettvaly. 
(>vl) To apply for, purchaaa, or othamla* aoqulra and protaet, and 
raoaw In any part of tha Morld, pataata, pataat rlfbta, br*i«t 
d'tnnntlon, tradaaarlia, oepyrl«Ma, i1*algia, lioaaoaa, (ranta, 
oonoaiaiona aad th* Ilia, oaofarrlac any aaalualf* or 
aon-«xelualTC or llalt*d rlcbt to their ua* of aay aaorat or 
othar infoivatioa a« to any pataat, daal^, eeaoaaatea or 
lleanc* or Innatloa, wnieh aa^ oapabla of baln< ua*d for aay 
of u* purpoaaa of tha Caapaay or tb* aequlaltlea of uhloh aay 
Mm ealculatad dlraotly or ladlraotly to banaflt tha Coapany, 
aad to uaa, axarela*, davalop. or (rant lioanooa la raapaot or, 
or othanda* turn to aeoouat tha proparty rlcbta or laToraatlon 
ao aaqutrad aad to azpaad aeaay la asparlaaatlnc or axplortac 
upea, t«aun( or laprovlac aay auah pataata, daai^ia, 
eonoaaalona. lloaaeaat or rl^hta* 
(mi) To raoaiva aoaay ee loan aad borro* or rala* aoeay la aueb 

aanaar aa tha Caapaay ahall think rit and la partloular by th* 
laaua or beoda, d*a*ntur*a, dabaatur* atoek (p*rp*tual or 
otharwtaa) and to aaeura tha ravayaant or aay aeaay borrwad, 
ralaad or ewlnc by aert«aaa. charta or llaa upon all or any or 



'^\%^^ 



%m 



616 



# 



A 

■s 



^ 



M 01141 



^ 



tM pr«p*rt)p or UMt* of tlw Ctapanjr (beta t f iat ui4 rutur*) 
taoludlac It* unetllcd a«pital, tnd tlao by t ttatiar •Drtfici, 
ebarai er Ilea to »»c\r» tat fuaruit*« ttM parforauK* ty tb* 
Caapuir or any otAar paraoa or ooapany of aojr oblijatloa 
uB4artakaa by tba Caapany or any otaar paraoa or oeapaay a* tha 
a«a« Bay ba. 

(mil) To draa, waka, aeoapt, aaderaa, 41aoeuot, na(otlata, laaua and 
aaouta and to buy, aall and daal with bllla of asobanca, 
proBlaaory netaa or otaar aacotlabla or tranafarabla 
Inatnaaata. 
(Ui) To iT-l|r~*' or aatar Into partnarahlp, Joint vaatura or any 
Joint puraa or preflt-aaarliw arraataaaat wltb and to oo- 
oparata la aoy nay »ltb er aaatat er-aufealdlaa aaj oeapaay, rira 
or paraoa, aad to purebaaa or etaarvlaa aequlra and uadartaka 
all er any part of ta* bualnaaa, property aad llabllltiea or any 
paraoa, body or ooapany earrylac oa aay bualaaaa abloa tnis 
Ceapaay la autaerlaad to oarry sa or poa a aa a ad of any property 
aultabla for taa purpoaea of tae Caapany. 
(m) To preaeta or ooaeur In the preaetlea of aay oeapaay, taa 

preaetloa of aaioh aball ba oeaaldared dealrabla. 
(sal) To lead aoa^r to aad (uaraatea taa perforaaaea of taa eontraeta 
or eblUatlooa of any eoapany, ftra er paraoa, and taa payaent 
aad rapa y aaat of taa eapltal aad prlaelpal of, aad dlrldanda, 
lateraat or prailia payable on any atoek, aBarea aad aeeurltlaa 
of aay nnapany iibethar bavlac objaet* alallar to taeae of tnia 
Ceapaay er net, aad to (Ira all klada of ladaaaltle*. 
(nit) Te preeura taa radatratloa or Ineerperatlee ef taa Caapany in 
er laidar tba Lam of aay plaea eutalda taa Cayaaa lalaada. 

(sUU) Te aall. laaaa. mtritamt great lleaaea*, eaaaaaata aad etaar 
rlfbta ever aad la aay etaer aaaaer deal vita or dlapoae of tba 
uadartaklac, property, aaaata, n«at* aad effeota of taa Caapany 
er aay part taeraaf for auob eeaeldaratleo *a any be tae<i«Bt 
fit, aad Mtasut llaltl^ taa •aaarallty ef taa ferefelM for 
ataeka, abarae, er aeeurltlee of aay etaar oeapaay, abataer 
fully er partly paid a*. 



liNClASSIRED 




617 



M 01 1 42 

- 7 . 
(xiiv) To tubHrib* or (u«r«nt*« •omy for »n7 MtloMl. lnt«m«tlon»l, 
oli«rlt»bl«. 6»ntY0l«nt. public, dMlnblo, t»n«™i or ujoful 
objaeta or for uiy oihlbltlon for tor purpoM Klileh h; b« 
coMldortd llttly airoctly or Indlroctly to furtnor tho objoetj 
of tM Coapany or tha Intaraata of Ita aaabars. 
(mt) To «rant paoilona or jratultlaa to any aaployaaa or «i- 

aaployaaa and to offloari or ai-offloara (Includlnt Dlraetors 
and ai-Dlractora) of tfta Coapany or Ita pradaoaasorj In 
bualnaaa, or tha ralatloaa, oonnactlooa, or dapandanta of any 
-.^^_ suoh paraona and to aatabllah or aupport aaaoclatlona, 

«r'^«d Inatltutlona, eluba and fuada and tnuta. vhloh aay ba 

C' *■ --_ oonaldarad caleulatad to banaf It any auch paraona or othamlst 

''^»>aj advanoa tha Intarvta of tha Coapany or of Lti aaabara, and to 

aatabllah and eontrlButa to any aehaaa for tha purohaaa of 
sharaa In tha Coapany on bahalf of or for tha Coapany's 
aaployaaa, and to land aonay to tha Coapany' a aaployaaa to 
anabla thaa to purohaaa aharaa of tha Coapany and to foraulata 
and carry Into affact any aehaaa for aharln* tha profits of tha 
Coapany, irttn Ita aaployaaa or any of thaa. 
(izvl) To craata, aitabllah, build up and aalnUln a ■arkatlnc. aallln« 
and dlatrlbutlnf or(anlaatlon for tha proaotlon, aala, 
advartiaaaant, distribution or introduction of all typas of 
looda, aarehandlaa, aachlnary, lanufacturad artlclaa and 
aqulpaant and all aatarlal parts and ancillary aqulpaant 
ralatlnc tharato and to handla on ooaalaalon or othandsa daal 
in, contract for or otBarvlaa acquire, advartlsa, prcaota, 
Intreduoa, dlstrlbuta, Buy, aall or othanrtaa dlspoaa of for 
Itaair or for any otBar or othara any of tha aforaaald. 
(aiTll) To dlatrlbuta aaonc tha aaabara In apaela aay proparty of tha 

Coapany, or any prooaada of aala, or dlapeaal of any proparty of 
tha Coapany, but ao that no distribution aaountlnt to a 
reduction of capital ba aada auapt ulth tha sanction. If any, 
for tha tlaa baln« raqulrad by U», 



ywssro 



618 



9^ 

.7J 



M 01 143 



- 8 - 

Dnrlll) To 40 all or any of ttm things nd aattArs aror«Mld In tnr pert 
of trw world, and althar as principals, ac«nts, oontraetors, or 
otharvisa, and by or throufh acants, or otharwlsa and sUhar 
alona or In conjunction vlth othars. 
(zxlx) To do all such things as aay ba conaldarad to ba Incldantal or 
oonduclva to tha abova objacts or any of thai. 
AND IT IS HOEBT DECUPtCD that tha objacts of tha Coapany as 
spaclfiad In aach of tha fara(olnc paragrapfts of thU clauaa (ticapt 
only In ao far aa otharwlsa aipraasad In any sueh paragraph) shall be 
saparata, distinct and Indapandant objacts of tha Coopany and shall 
not ba In anyviaa llaltad by rafaranca to or infaranca froa any other 
paragraph or tha order In wTileh tha saaa shall occur or tha naac of 
tha Coapany. 

AND IT IS PORTHEK HOEBT DECLARED that tha Coopany vlll not trade tn 
tha Cayman Islands with any parson, flrv, or oorporatlon aseapt in 
furtherance of tha business of tha Coapany oarrlad on outside the 
Islands: RroTidad that nothing in this aactlcn shall be construed as 
to prevent the Coapany effecting and concluding contracts In the 
Islands, and eiarclslng in tha Zalanda all of Its powers necessary 
for tha carrying on of Its business outside tha Islands. 
The liability of tha aaabars U Ualtad. 
The capital of tha Coapany Is UlltOO. 000,00 divided Into 
«)0.000 shares of a noainal or par valua of USIl.OO eackpravtdcd 

aliaya that subject to tha provisions of tha Ccapanles Law, Cap. 22. 
as aaandad and Its Articles of Aaaoolatloi, the Coapany ahall have 
powar to redeea any or all of suoh shares and to sub-divide or 
oonaolldate the aald shares or any of thai and to Issue all or any 
part of Its capital wbathar original, redeaaad, Increased or reduced 
with or without any prafaranea. priority or apaclal privilege or 
subjaet to any poatponaaant of rights or to any oondltlons or 
raatrletlons whatsoever and ao that tsilass tha oondltisis of issue 
ahall otherwise eiprassly provide every laaua of shares whether 
stated to be Ordinary, Fraference or otherwise shall be sub.iect to 
tha powers on tha part of tha Coapany harelnbafcre provided. 




m 



&UM 



619 



^ 
^ 



01 144 



W«, int 9«vtral p«rson3 whoit naoti, addr«ij«s 4nd dtscrlpttonj trt 
suDseribtd art desirous of btin^ ror««d into » Company in pursuanca of 
tnvs Maaorandufl of Association, and wa rsspactivtiv agraa to tak* tna 
numbar of sharaa In tha capital of tha Company s«t opposlta our raspaet 



MUMBER OF SHAR&S 

TAKEN BT EACH 

SUBSCRIBER 





CArH«VEJI CO»PO«»TE SEKVICK LIMITED 

P.O.Boi 10143, 

Ctorge Town, 

Grind Cayun Pti 


On* Snara 

r: (Sgd.) David G. Bird 
David C. Bird - Dlractor 




DIVIO C. BIRO 
P. 0.301 26;, 
C«org« Town. 
Or«nj Ciyun 


Ont snart 

(Sid.) David C. Bird 
Attornay-at-Law • 




alas: AH J.N. LOUDON 
P.0.8o« 265, 
Ctorge Town, 
Cr«n4 Ciyoan 


Ona Snara 

(Sid.) Alaatalr J.H. Loudon 
Atternay-at-Law 




tifl April 25, 1985 






(Scd.) C. KIPLINC 





Mltnasi 10 tna abova al(naturaa:Cnrlatlana (Iplln* 
Addraas: P.O.Bof 265, Grand Cayaan 
Occupation: Sacratary 

I, 01. ^ 

■•llatrar er Coapanlaa In and for tha Cayaah I/ti^da 00 HCREBT CEKTIFT 

that tnia is a trua copy or tna naaorandua pf/la/ociatlon of *I.C. INC. 

Dittd tnts 5v*naay of v»f 5.M.. 1985 




wmm 






620 



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(um S04 
aoia u iTMCT M w 
tAM um Qyom. D-C. aoos* 



Tapia a BxjrnNOTON 



R M 01514. 
-H — Q0D217 



ATTOAMCTS t 



February 10, 1984 



■aoti a*«-*i I, 



V-6? 



Mr. Frank D. Gomez 

Senior Associate 

International Business Communications 

1607 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. 

Suite 300 

Washington, D.C. 20009 

Dear Frank: 

Enclosed is a copy of the Certificate of Incorporation of the 
Institute On North-South Issues, Inc. issued by the District of 
Columbia. 

Also enclosed is my statement for services rendered with 
regard to the incorporation. 

Of course, if you have questions, please call me. 



Sincerel 




Enclosures 




wussw 




cs-i^ 



sas^ 



621 



R M 015142 

'^lUI.I U ^ mirir II TaPIA <fe BUFTINGTON 






ATTOaWSTS At LAW 



•WTf S04 (201I ]•••! 

20JJ U STIICT N W 

WA«MIMOTO«. DC 20O9« 



February 10, 1984 

STATEMENT 



Mr. Frank D. Gomez 

Senior Associate 

International Business Communications 

1607 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. 

Suite 300 

Washington, D.C. 20009 



Legal services provided for incorporation of 

Institute On North-South Issues, Inc $ 600.00 

Disbursements : 

Filing fee. District of Columbia 12. 00 

$ 612.00 



^^"^"^ 



622 






H-73 



wussimtt 



October 3, 1969 



C H 035141 




.,.^^' 



Thank you very D\ich for your intereat in and lupport of democracy in 
Nicaragua throu4h your participation In the "Prlenda of Freedoa* project 
aponeored by the NATIONAL EKCOVHENT FOR THB PRESERVATION Of LIBERTY. 

I appreciated very Bucb your time by phone late yeaterday afternoon. 
You are one of a email group of dedicated Americana vho haa atood by 
Prealdent Reagan time and time again In aupport of hla agenda. Aa you well 
know, thla laaue of the eurvival of freedom in our healapbere la one of if 
not the cloaeat to hia heart. 

It will be a pleaaure to meet you In Vaahlngton on October 17 when you 
attend our epeclal aecurlty briefing followed by a working dinner. It 
promleea to be quite an exciting aa well aa educational evening. 

Pleaae be reminded that your accomaodatlona at the Hay-Adama Hotel 
are taken care of and there la no expenae to you. You will need to 
settled In your room no later than 5:3* p.m. that day. 

I will be In touch within several daya to secure additional 
Information needed for your security clearance. Should you wish to contact 
me my number la: (202) 943-607. 

Alao, It la my auggeatlon that you review the enclosed documenta 
before attaadloc the meeting. Theae documenta will aerve aa briefing 
materiala. PleaM be familiar with them. 

Thank you again, ^^^^^|^| I will be more than happy to pick you up 
at the airport ahould^ro^needma to do ao. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



CLirr SMITH 



FCS/aJd 




82-750 622 



A 00-3428 




mV§. 



623 



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NATIONAL ENDOWMENT 

FOR THE 

PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY^ 



ONCLASSIFIfO 



309 rOUNTH ST N ( 
SUITC lOOO 
WASHINOTON c aooo2 



February 7, 1986 



c H ors'j"^ 




f?-3 a great^leasure^o^paaj^ a«aln^ 

X , rf f or t^t^ • gK^^^^^^^^^^^y ^-^^'^^ ^^« 

^ first FutuW Ui ll'oudom 1 ul uui 

kick off this effort for George. 
With continued best wishes. 



Cliff *^lth 
Project Director 
National Endowment for tne 
Preservation of Liberty 



Su 



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UNCUSSIFiED 



631 

THE WHITE HOUSE // 



22? 



WASHINGTON ' 7^ 

MEETING WITH 



v-/a? 



NATIONAL E^1D0W^^J:NT FOR PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY 

January 30, 1986 

Roosevelt Room 

3:0 p.m. 

FROM: Linda Chavez />^*-^ 

I. PURPOSE 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of Libertv 
(NEPL) , a special program of The American Conservative Trust 
(ACT) , has sponsored several programs in support of your 
defense and foreign policies. This briefing is for the 
principal financial contributors whose patriotism and 
generosity have made these public education programs so 
successful and influential. 

II. BACKGROUND 

In 1985, ACT and NEPL spent in excess of $3 million 
supporting the President's programs through public awareness 
using television and newspaper messages. Their Central 
American Program was initiated last June. They produced and 
aired a television spot supporting your position on arms 
control. A post-Geneva tribute to your success at the 
summit was also aired on all network affiliates. 

ACT/NEPL will raise S3 million for educating public opinion 
on the issue of -aid to the democratic resistance over the 
next six weeks. The purpose of this briefing is to: (1) 
provide current status report on the situation in Nicaragua; 
(2) recognize and express gratitude for their efforts in 
supporting the President; (3) encourage continuance of their 
generosity in funding these worthwhile projects. 

Your participation will be preceded by briefings by Asst. 
Secretary Elliott Abrams (State) , Oliver North (NSC) and 
Linda Chavez. 

III. PARTICIPANTS 

34 supporters and four staff members of ACT and NEPL. 

IV. PRESS PLAN : White House photographer only 

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 

You enter Roosevelt Room, make brief remarks (per talking 
points) , greet the guests and depart. 



Attachment: Talking Points 
Coordination: NSC (0. North) 



UNCUSSlf lED ^ 



632 



yNCUSSIFIED 



Cv^ap-te 



btitagc ^oundathri 



A lai-«fempl pwbJir poJiqr reactrch instHuic 



H-IH9- 



» 0: 



\^n 



72 n 



October 13, 1985 



Mr. Richard R. Miller 

Treasurer 

Institute for North>South Issues 

1323 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Suite 200 

Washington, O.C. 20036 

Dear Mr. Miller: 

Thank you for your letter of September 12, 1983. 

My colleagues and I have discussed your proposal in sonte detail, and are 
pleased to re^ond in a positive way to it. Therefore, I am enclosing a check 
from The Heritage Foundation in the amount of $100,000 as you requested in 
your letter. 

We would appreciate receiving reports from you as to the uses to which 
these funds have been put, and would also like to have a copy of your tax- 
exempt letter for our files. 

It is our assumption, of course, that all of these funds will be used in 
accordance with the stated purposes of your 301(cX3) organization. 

Best wishes to you in you* endeavors. 







Edwin J. Fewner, Jr., Ph.D. 
President 



EJF/kr 
Enclosure 



H«rten S. itrlMOTii. Vin 

Cordon S J«m«. Vin 

i«noii Yak PtoM. Vk* ^mdm 



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riotan H bioWt. Pk . Vkt 
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Uota 1 PMnor. jr 

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Ptwr ■ S P<»tr. Vm ,^^■<^ n l 

Joha A Vo« KoniM*. Vic* fr t rndi*! 

■mnofri Lomo*. Caummtar 



Hon. CUrt SeeatM Luc* 

Richofd M ScoM* 

Ho* WilliMi ( Sino* 

Ankw i p u mt 



ZU MMMChuiMU A»<fi<M. N I. • Woihinglmi. DC. MOU • (202) S4«-«400 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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1985/86 Summary of 






National Endowment for the 






Preservation of Liberty 






Program Expenditures 







International Business Communications 

1912 Sunderland Place N.W. • Washington D.C. 20036 



wmsMi 



^^^S5 




634 



MSSW 



MEMORANDUM 



OGO 002 



linUIUTIOIUl lUSINEU COHMUNIUrCNS 

*«»«■?( :: .T» so 



TO: Carl Russell Channell 
President 

National Endowment Cor the 
Preservation of Liberty 

FROM: Richard R. Miller 
Senior Partner 

DATE: February 16, 1987 

SUBJECT: 1985/86 summary of NEPL program expenditures 

This memorandum and the materials attached to it constitute the 
report you requested on the application of the funds provided to 
IBC by NEPL in 1985 and 1986 in connection with the Central 
American Freedom Plan (CAFP) , other NEPL programs and for the 
purpose of providing humanitarian aid in Central America. We 
have prepared or collected the following materials based on a 
thorough review of our records: 

1. An executive summary of 1985 and 1986 expenditures 
which includes both the program costs of CAFP, other 
NEPL programs and the amount of humanitarian aid given 
by NEPL through IBC. 

2. A comprehensive, chronological list of all NEPL depo- 
sits to our accounts and IBC expenditures in the execu- 
tion of your programs for each year. 

3. Documentation provided by the managing directors of 
Intel-Cooperation Inc. (originally I.e. Inc.) , inclu- 
ding a copy of the Memorandum of Association (corporate 
charter) filed with the government of the Cayman 
Islands and a schedule of the receipts and disburse- 
ments of that company for 1985 and 1986. 

4. Copies of the retainer letter between NEPL and IBC and 
our program spending document that includes planning 
for the January 1986 Winter Meeting. 

5. Copies of the wire transfers and bank orders used by 
IBC to distribute the humanitarian aid funds listed in 
section 2 and summarized in section 1. 



UHCtASSIHED 



635 



litiCUSSIFlEO 

ir witn o'jr efforts in connect 



.ou are familiar witTi ovjr efforts in connection with the CAFP. 
In addition, the funds NEPL provided for humanitarian assistance 
have been applied to particularly worthy purposes. For example, 
your generosity has saved the arm of a little girl who was shot 
by the Sandinistas and paid for the reconstructive surgery in the 
United States that repaired the faces and limbs of young freedom 
fighters. You have also supported some of the best scholarly 
work by Nicaraguans and helped to support education efforts by 
exiles who wanted to bring their story to America. 

Adolfo Calero has personally thanked you and me and has written 
to you thanking you for the help we provided to the Nicaraguan 
Development Council. Another major recipient is the Unified 
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), the political umbrella organization 
of the Nicaraguan Oenocratic Resistance. As your representative we 
have heard from other officials of the movement, and they have 
gratefully acknowledged the direct assistance we sent on to them. 



IBC also distributed funds through Intel Co-operation Inc. to 
several organizations exempt from American taxation under sec- 
tion 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. They are: 

Gulf and Caribbean Foundation 

Friends for the Americas 

Nicaraguan Development Council 

Latin American Strategic Studies Institute 

Institute on Terrorism and Subnational Conflict 

All of these recipients have pledged that their donations were 
used solely for humanitarian purposes and, given the nature of 
their organizations, we are confident that such is the case, 
since it is consistent with their programs in the region. 

Some of the funds, as shown in the attached materials, were 
deposited to the account of Lake Resources, Inc., at Credit Swiss 
Bank in Geneva at the request of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North. At 
the present time we are unable to obtain from him any information 
concerning the application of those funds after deposit to the 
Lake Resources account. However, we were assured by him at the 
time that tb« funds were to be applied solely for humanitarian 
assistance. 

If you have any questions about this report, we would be happy to 
discuss then with you. 



ONClliSSIHED 



636 



R M UG0vjQ4 



yiicussinED 



SECTION 1 



laftssra 



637 



\iHtmsro 



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 

IBC RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES FOR 

NEPL FUNDS IN 1985 AND 1986 



n I'l 'J ij u 



1985 Total Deposits SI. 497,222 .00 

PROGRAM COSTS 

Professional Fees S351/397.15 

(1986 Payments on 

CAFP made in Dec) +140,000.00 

1985 Pro. Fee payments 491,397.15 
Program Expenses 104,119.85 

HUMANITARIAN AID 901,705.00 

1986 Deposits 3,433,098.79 
PROGRAM COSTS 

Professional fees 786,204.00 
(Prepaid in 1985) <140,000.00> 

1986 Pro. Fees payment 652,311.36 
Program Expenses 388,743.33 

HUMANITARIAN AID 2,392,044.10 

1985/1986 Huaanitarian aid breakdown 

85 Direct assistance 

payments 81,705.00 

85 Payments via 

Intel Cooperation 390,000.00 

85 Payments via 

Lake Resources 430,000.00 

TOTAL 1985 901,705.00 

86 Direct assistance 

payments 42,044.10 

86 Payments via 

Intel Cooperation 2,350,000.00 

TOTAL 1986 - 2,392,044.10 

GRAND TOTAL $3,293,749.10 



UNCLASSIFIED 



638 



^ I 'I OCOJO 



IIHEIASSW 



SECTION 2 



'N. 



639 



ONCUSSIflEO 



R M U00J07 



ACCOUNT REVIEW 1985 

National Endowment foe the Preservation of Liberty 
American Conservative Trust 



The following account review uses two designations for trans- 
actions; Debit, for any expenditure undertaken for NEPL or 
ACT; Deposit, for all checks and wire transfers written to 
IBC. 









DEBIT 




DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 


AMOUNT 




AMOUNT 


5/13 


Deposit 


NEPL 




5, 


,000.00 


5/22 


Debit 


Stamps 


44.00 






5/23 


Debit 


Office Supplies 


571.89 






5/24 


Debit 


Color Photos 


263.94 






5/29 


Debit 


FARA Books 


11.00 






6/5 


Debit 


Office Supplies 


226.52 






6/5 


Debit 


Couriers 


745.95 






6/3 


Deposit 


NEPL 




5, 


,000.00 


6/6 


Debit 


Copying Press Release 


95.40 






6/6 


Debit 


Hill Deliveries 


235.40 






6/7 


Debit 


Photocopying 


458.60 






6/7 


Debit 


Copying Press Release 


26.50 






6/11 


Deposit 


NEPL 




5, 


,000.00 


6/19 


Debit 


Travel Expenses 2 


,200.00 






6/20 


Debit 


Cash for Travelers 
Checks 3 


,500.00 






6/20 


Debit 


Postage 


40.00 






6/25 


Debit 


Hill Delivery 


26.75 






6/25 


Deposit 


NEPL 




5. 


,000.00 


7/3 


Depos i t 


NEPL 




5, 


,000.00 


7/15 


Deposit 


NEPL/CAFP 




130, 


,000.00 


7/15 


Debit 


Friends of^reed^ 
Comme r c i a 1 H^^^l 


,000.00 






7/15 


Debit 


Messenger s^^^^^ 


549.80 






7/15 


Mbit 


Photocopying 


227.40 






7/15 


Mbit 


Travel 


820.28 






7/17 


Deposit 


NEPL 




5, 


,000.00 


7/17 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 




25, 


,000.00 


7/18 


Debit 


Subcontractor 
-Schwatrx 2 


,000.00 






7/19 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 




80 


,000.00 


7/22 


Debit 


Avcom 


81.94 






7/22 


Debit 


Directories 


308.00 






7/22 


Debit 


Radio/TV Monitoring 


45.98 






7/22 


Debit 


VCR 


350.00 






7/22 


Debit 


Photos 


210.94 






7/22 


Debit 


News conference Trans- 
lations 


500.00 






7/22 


Debit 


Maps 


100.00 








640 




U G G 3 











DEBIT 




DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 




AMOUNT 


7/22 


Debit 


Daily Newspapers 
Mailing 




135.00 








7/22 


Debit 


Radio/TV Monitoring 




116.38 








7/22 


Debit 


Reprints-U.S. Strat 
egic Review 


■ 


197.34 








7/22 


Debit 


Photocopying 




368.30 








7/22 


Debit 


Federal Express 




930.55 








7/22 


Debit 


Office Supplies 




531.36 








7/2 3 


Debit 


NPR Tape 




20.00 








7/23 


Debit 


Telephones 




,100.00 








7/23 


Debit 


Pyramid Videos 




497.52 








7/24 


Debit 


IDU Conference 
Ticket 




,000.00 








7/25 


Debit 


Miami Car 




82.58 








7/26 


Debit 


May to June Travel 




,235.66 








8/12 


Debit 


Travel-Wesley Smith 




,500.00 








8/12 


Debit 


Postage 




100.00 








8/15 


Debit 


National Journal 




5.00 








8/15 


Debit 


FPA Books 




8.50 








8/15 


Debit 


Cinema East 




,295.00 








8/23 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 






80 


000 


00 


8/23 


Debit 


Wesley Smith-travel 




,121.00 








9/3 


Deposit 


NEPL 






10 


000 


00 


9/3 


Debit 


Newspapers 




159.00 








9/4 


Debit 


Newsweek 




26.87 








9/4 


Debit 


Telephones 




226.78 








9/5 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 






21 


000 


00 


9/5 


Debit 


Fre^di of Freedom 


30 


000.00 








9/11 


Debit 


Camera Crew 


7 


550.00 








9/11 


Debit 


Wesley Smith 




500.00 








9/12 


Debit 


Couriers 




689.00 








9/12 


Debit 


Writers Subcontract 


10 


005.00 








9/12 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAPP 






26 


300 


00 


9/12 


Debit 


Film Producer 


3 


000.00 








9/13 


Debit 


Film Crew Expenses 


1 


000.00 








9/13 


Debit 


Film Crew Fees 




850.00 








9/16 


-Debit 


Ad com 




8.99 








9/16 


Oabit 


Dubbing 




30.00 








9/17 


Mbit 


Telephone 




100.00 








9/16 


D«bit 


U.S. News Reprints 




60.00 








9/17 


Debit 


Video Rental 




232.00 








9/17 


Debit 


Film Crew Travel 




410.00 








9/17 


Debit 


Casual Labor 




70.00 








9/18 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 






10 


000 


00 


9/18 


Debit 


Translations 




398.00 








9/20 


Deposit 


NEPL 






132 


000 


00 


9/20 


Debit 


Friends of Freedom 130 


000.00 








9/20 


Deposit 


NEPL 






100 


000 


00 


9/24 


Debit 


Postage 




70.07 








9/24 


Debit 


Travel 


1 


256.00 








9/26 


Debit 


Friends of Freedom 
















-I.e. Inc. 100 


000.00 








9/26 


Debit 


Film Crew Fees 




231.00 








9/26 


Deposit 




h 


FIED 


5 


000 


00 



641 



llNtlASSlflB) 



ft t'i U u 'J 9 











DEBIT 




DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 




AMOUNT 


9/26 


Debit 


Journal of Amer. Pol. 


392.20 








9/30 


Debit 


U.S. News Reprints 




60.00 








10/3 


Debit 


Sprint on tapes 




47.50 








10/3 


Debit 


Travel 


1 


,452.00 








10/4 


Debit 


Travel-Refugee 




218.00 








10/7 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 






10, 


,000. 


,00 


10/7 


Debit 


Postage 




26.40 








10/8 


Debit 


TV Tape Dubbing 




248.00 








10/8 


Debit 


TV Tape Dubbing 




68.00 








10/8 


Debit 


Heritage Publications 


8.95 








10/11 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 






10, 


,000. 


,00 


10/11 


Debit 


Postage 




98.34 








10/15 


Debit 


Presentation Boxes 




84.59 








10/15 


Debit 


S. Christian Books 




211.47 








10/16 


Debit 


Telephones 


3 


,081.28 








10/16 


Debit 


Video Equipment 




196.50 








10/16 


Deposit 


NEPL 






10, 


,000. 


,00 


10/16 


Debit 


Presentation Boxes 




83.79 








10/17 


Debit 


Trevor Books 




380.65 








10/18 


Debit 


Filiti Crew 


10 


,000.00 








10/18 


Deposit 


NEPL 






270, 


,000. 


.00 


10/21 


Debit 


Postage 




200.00 








10/22 


Debit 


Travel 


3 


,616.00 








10/23 


Debit 


Film Crew Expenses 




4.90 








10/23 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 






10, 


,522. 


,00 


10/25 


Debit 


Film Crew Fees 


1 


,101.36 








10/25 


Debit 


Gomez Expenses 


4 


,181.00 








10/25 


Debit 


Friends of Freedom 
-I.e. Inc. 


250 


,000.00 








10/28 


Debit 


Couriers 




987.00 








10/28 


Debit 


Press Club Room 




154.90 








10/28 


Debit 


Videotaping 




49.82 








10/30 


Deposit 


NEPL 






63, 


,000. 


.00 


10/30 


Deposit 


ACT 






9, 


,500. 


.00 


10/30 


Debit 


Forbes 




4.00 








11/6 


Debit 


Video Editing 




330.00 








11/4 


Debit 


Floces Expenses 




37.78 








11/4 


Debit 


Flores Labor 




204.25 








11/7 


D«bit 


Video Transmission 




400.00 








11/8 


Debit 


Friends of Freedom 
-I.e. Inc. 


40 


,000.00 








11/8 


Debit 


Mailgrams 




1405.00 








11/8 


Debit 


Photographs 




165.63 








11/8 


Debit 


Postage 




82.80 








11/14 


Debit 


Hotel for Producer 




102.66 








11/15 


Debit 


Travel for Flores 




1010.00 








11/15 


Debit 


Postage 




112.00 








11/17 


Debit 


Travel-CAFP 


2 


,973.00 








11/19 


Deposit 


NEPL-CAFP 






10 


,000 


.00 


11/19 


Debit 


Expenses-CAFP 
Producer 


1 


,357.32 








11/19 


Debit 


CAFP Travel 


2 


,088.50 








11/19 


Debit 


CDS-Photocopying 




20.36 








11/20 


Debit 


Miami Trip demons 




550.00 










642 



UNSlASSra 



R M uaoo^J 











DEBIT 




DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 




AMOUNT 


11/20 


Debit 


CDS- ACT Copying 




108.44 






11/20 


Debit 


Postage 




100.00 






11/27 


Debit 


Photocopying 




27.35 






11/27 


Debit 


Keffer Expenses 




35.86 






12/3 


Debit 


Speech UNO travel 
to D.C. 


6, 


,000.00 






12/4 


Debit 


Expenses, Freedom 
House 




7.50 






12/6 


Deposit 


NEPL 






400, 


,000.00 


12/6 


Depos i t 


NEPL 






7, 


,500.00 


12/10 


Debit 


Photocopying 




7.28 






12/11 


Deposit 


NEPL 






7, 


,400.00 


12/11 


Debit 


Telephone 


3, 


,700.00 






12/11 


Debit 


Newspaper 




1.30 






12/11 


Debit 


Travel-CAFP 


4, 


,161.00 






12/12 


Debit 


Producer Fees- 
CAFP 


10: 


,000.00 






12/12 


Debit 


Radio Tape 




50.00 






12/13 


Debit 


Flores Travel 




60.00 






12/16 


Debit 


Tape of TV 




16.96 






12/16 


Debit 


Friends of Freedom 


300; 


,000.00 






12/16 


Depos i t 


NEPL 






20 


,000.00 


12/18 


Debit 


Postage 




124.00 






12/20 


Debit 


USSR-FARA Reg. 




13.50 






12/20 


Debit 


Travel 




334.08 






12/20 


Deposit 


NEPL 






20, 


,000.00 


12/24 


Debit 


Gomez Expenses 




51.00 






12/29 


Debit 


Books 




40.54 






12/30 


Debit 


Couriers 




777.45 






12/30 


Debit 


Travel 


2 


,655.45 








Total Debits 1, 


,00S 


,824.85 








Total Deposits 




1 


,497 


,222.00 



\iHaifis» 



643 



ttUtUSSW 



R U C I 1 



ACCOUNT REVIEW 1986 

National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty 
American Conservative Trust 



The following account review uses two designations for trans- 
actions; Debit, for any expenditure undertaken for NEPL, ACT 
or Sentinel; Deposit, for all checks and wire transfers 
written to IBC. 



ITEM 



DESCRIPTION 



DEBIT 
AMOUNT 



DEPOSIT 
AMOUNT 



1/2 Debit Photocopying 

1/2 Deposit NEPL 

1/2 Deposit NEPL 

1/2 Debit VCR-TV 

1/3 Debit ZGS-Dubbing 

1/3 Debit ZGS-Dubbing 

1/3 Debit Air Courier 

1/3 Debit FEDEX 

1/3 Debit Newsletter 

1/3 Debit Saxi tone-Tape Recorder 

1/3 Debit FEDEX 

1/7 Debit Travel-CAFP 5 

1/7 Debit PBS Terrorism Film 

1/7 Debit U.S. News and W.R. 

1/7 Debit Couriers 

1/7 Debit Supplies 1 

1/7 Debit Film Crew 10 

1/8 Deposit NEPL 

1/9 Debit Cable-TV Guide 

1/9 Debit Travel-CAFP Film 

Crew 

1/10 Debit Travel-CAFP Film 

Crew 1, 

1/10 Debit Tape Dubs 

1/10 Debit Courier 

1/13 Debit FEDEX 

1/13 Debit Postage 

1/13 Debit Friends of Freedom 

-I.e. Inc. 360, 

1/14 Debit TV Guidebook 

1/17 Debit Copying 

1/17 Debit Copying 

1/17 Debit Copying 

1/17 Debit FEDEX 1 

1/17 Debit FEDEX 

1/17 Debit FEDEX 

1/17 Debit FEDEX 

1/17 Debit Copying 



200.00 



753.00 

114.00 

138.00 

66.00 

861.00 

91.20 

427.09 

24.00 

,128.77 

356.50 

58.24 

143.15 

,362.42 

,000.00 

79.50 

1,010.00 

1,515.00 
45.58 
51.45 
27.50 
22.00 

000.00 

246.50 
54.55 

414.34 
22.05 

006.00 
16.50 
25.50 
16.50 
89.04 



UNCLASSIHED 



20,000.00 
10,000.00 



400,000.00 



644 




fi ;.i U 1 2 











DEBIT 


DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 


AMOUNT 


1/17 


Debit 


Videotape 




SIOO.OO 






1/20 


Debit 


Letter Copying 




118.04 






1/20 


Deposit 


NEPL 






$5,000. 


.00 


1/20 


Deposit 


NEPL 






20,000. 


.00 


1/24 


Debit 


Traveler's Checks- 


CAFP 


404.00 






1/28 


Debit 


Caneron Analysis 


10, 


,000.00 






1/28 


Debit 


Copying 




8S.33 






1/28 


Debit 


Traveler's Checks 
Wesley Saith 


for 
3 


,605.70 






1/29 


Debit 


DHL Couriers 




993.00 






1/29 


Debit 


Postage 




132.00 






1/30 


Debit 


Radio Shack 




62.68 






1/30 


Debit 


Western Union 




402.60 






1/30 


Debit 


Telephone 


2 


,007.90 






1/31 


Deposit 


NEPL 






50,000. 


.00 


2/3 


Debit 


Dubbing 




45.58 






2/7 


Debit 


Travel CAFP 


2 


,885.68 






2/5 


Debit 


Traveler's Checks- 


CAFP 


505.00 






2/5 


Depos i t 


NEPL 






20,000. 


.00 


2/5 


Depos i t 


NEPL 






756. 


.84 


2/5 


Debit 


Tape Dubbing 




34.05 






2/6 


Debit 


Tape Stock 




235.00 






2/7 


Debit 


VRS Dubbing 




20.00 






2/7 


Debit 


Copying 




31.87 






2/7 


Debit 


CAFP-Schwart8 
Subcontractor 




900.00 






2/10 


Debit 


Traveler's Checks- 


CAFP 


202.00 






2/10 


Depos i t 


NEPL 






100,000. 


.00 


2/10 


Debit 


Smith Report Grant 


3 


,307.00 






2/10 


Debit 


Book 




17.97 






2/12 


Debit 


Traveler's Checks- 
CAFP 


1 


,212.00 






2/13 


Debit 


Tape Recorder 




107.05 






2/13 


Debit 


Films 


2 


,338.00 






2/13 


Debit 


News Tapes 




105.00 






2/13 


Debit 


Translators 




236.25 






2/13 


Debit 


Tapes-Goodman 




408.16 






2/13 


Debit 


Tape-Dubs 




298.00 






2/13 


Debit 


Tape-Dubs 




112.00 






2/13 


Debit 


Taping -News 




200.00 






2/13 


Debit 


Photography 




756.84 






2/13 


Debit 


Javelin Press 




112.50 






2/13 


Debit 


Public Brod. Dubs 




26.52 






2/13 


Debit 


Flores-Auto CAFP 




47.90 






2/13 


Debit 


Presentation Mater 
ials 


1 


,778.11 






2/14 


Debit 


VCR-Rental 




91.40 






2/13 


Debit 


TELEX 




65.43 







ISUSSiRf-D 



645 




R M oooors 



DATE ITEM 







DEBIT 


DEPOSIT 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 


AMOUNT 


Photo Publishers 




79.50 






Supplies for Presen- 










tations 




138.71 






Terrorism Film Dub 




495.00 






Telephone 




380.60 






Wire to Speaker-CAFP 




900.00 






Tape Dubbing 




190.00 






Computer for Smith 










Report 


1, 


,000.00 






CAFP Subcontract- 










Schwartz 




750.00 






Travel Expenses- 










Schwartz 




60.50 






Traveler's Checks- 










CAFP 


1, 


,010.00 






CAFP Travel-Flores 


2, 


,031.59 






Sandwiches-CAFP 










meeting 




60.80 






Tape Dubs-Smith 




249.00 






FEDEX 




84.00 






Supplies for Speaker 










Program 


1, 


,139.67 






TELEX 




95.18 






Couriers 




362.40 






Copying 


1, 


,265.29 






Travel-CAFP 


2. 


,701.11 






TV/Market Guide 




60.00 






Reimb. CAFP Expenses 




126.88 






Postage 




176.00 






PR Aids-Press 










Release 


1, 


,100.00 






Radio/TV Monitoring 




127.20 






Traveler's Checks- 










CAFP 


1 


,010.00 






Travel Expenses 




72.00 






Tape Recorders 




347.15 






Wesley Smith 










Expenses 


1 


,254.34 






NEPL 






28,750. 


.00 


VEPL 






7,000. 


.00 


NDC-Donation 


25 


,000.00 






LASSI-Brief ing Book : 


25 


,000.00 






NEPL 






65,000. 


.00 


CAFP-Traveler's Checl 


<s 




1,100. 


.00 


CAFP Exps-Schwartz 




505.00 






Traveler checks-CAFP 




505.00 






Traveler checks-CAFP 




141.35 






Travel Reimb. -CAFP 


6 


,740.69 






Photo' s-Wesley Smith 




23.10 






Traveler checks-CAFP 




808.00 






Translations- Smith 










Report 


2 


,028.00 







2/13 
2/13 

2/13 
2/13 
2/13 
2/13 
2/14 

2/14 

2/14 

2/14 

2/14 
2/17 

2/18 
2/18 
2/18 

2/18 
2/18 
2/18 
2/18 
2/18 
2/18 
2/18 
2/18 

2/19 
2/19 

2/19 
2/19 
3/4 

3/4 

3/3 

3/6 

3/7 

3/7 

3/7 

3/8 

3/10 

3/11 

3/11 

3/11 

3/12 

3/12 



Debit 
Debit 

Debit 
Debit 
Debit 
Debit 
Debit 

Debit 

Debit 

Debit 

Debit 
Debit 

Debit 
Debit 
Debit 

Debit 
Debit 
Debit 
Debit 
Debit 
Debit 
Debit 
Debit 

Debit 
Debit 

Debit 
Debit 
Debit 

Deposit 

D«po8 i t 

D«bit 

Debit 

Deposit 

Deposit 

Debit 

Debit 

Debit 

Debit 

Debit 

Debit 

Debit 



OIWSSIHED 



646 





misit 


lOOiriLu 




R 
DEBIT 


M 0000 i 

DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 


AMOUNT 


3/12 


Debit 


Smith Report 












Printing 


1, 


,580.78 




3/14 


Debit 


Postage 




110.00 




3/14 


Debit 


Traveler checks-CAFP 




808.00 




3/14 


Debit 


Traveler checks-CAFP 




505.00 




3/10 


Debit 


Furniture for Office 


2, 


,544.10 




3/14 


Debit 


CAFP Subcontractor- 












Schwartz 


2, 


,100.00 




3/17 


Debit 


KMOL-TV Tape 




52.81 




3/17 


Deposit 


NEPL 






263,000.00 


3/17 


Debit 


WCJB Tape 




50.00 




3/19 


Debit 


Printing 


1, 


,625.47 




3/20 


Debit 


Traveler checks-CAFP 


1, 


,010.00 




3/21 


Debit 


Expenses-CAFP Speaker 


200.00 




3/21 


Debit 


Travel-CAFP 


4, 


,590.00 




3/21 


Debit 


CAFP Subcontract- 












Semilla 


1, 


,714.34 




3/21 


Debit 


Expense Reimb. -Smith 


1, 


,437.72 




3/21 


Debit 


Videotape Production 












Crew 


6, 


,206.85 




3/24 


Debit 


Office Rent 


4, 


,500.00 




3/24 


Debit 


Computer Rental-Smith 


270.06 




3/24 


Debit 


Traveler checks-CAFP 




404.00 




3/25 


Debit 


UPS 




7.49 




3/25 


Debit 


Subcontractor- Smith 


2, 


,520.00 




3/26 


Debit 


Smith News Conference 










Room Rental 




399.74 




3/26 


Debit 


Audio Dubbing 




25.00 




3/28 


Debit 


CAFP Subcontractor- 












Caste llanos 


1, 


,500.00 




3/28 


Debit 


CAFP Subcontractor- 












Schwartz 


1, 


,650.00 




3/26 


Deposit 


NEPL 






724,990.00 


3/26 


Debit 


CAFP BillS-AMEX 


8, 


,838.96 




3/31 


Debit 


Press Conference 

Releases 




43.64 




4/1 


Debit 


CAFP-Videotape Dubs 




132.50 




4/1 


Debit 


WCLF-TV Videotape 




56.25 




4/1 


Debit 


Naps-SDI 




21.09 




4/2 


Debit 


Smith Expenses 


1. 


,312.84 




4/2 


Debit 


Smith UPS 




10.81 




4/2 


Debit 


Smith Report 












Supplies 


2 


,385.15 




4/7 


Debit 


Couriers 


1 


,772.15 




4/7 


Debit 


FEDEX 




40.00 




4/7 


Debit 


FEDEX 


13 


,678.50 




4/7 


Debit 


Telephone 




535.00 





UNCLASSiRED 



647 



uNtufisro 



R M G00 01S 











DEBIT 


DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 


AMOUNT 


4/7 


Debit 


IRD-Speaker CAFP 




300.00 




4/8 


Debit 


Bumper Stickers 


1, 


953.00 




4/9 


Debit 


Telephone 


4, 


885.30 




4/9 


Debit 


Freinds of Freedom 












-I.e. Inc. 740, 


000.00 




4/8 


Debit 


Translator CAFP 


1, 


799.00 




4/14 


Deposit 


NEPL 






100,650.00 


4/14 


Debit 


Cong. Quarterly Maps 




42.18 




4/15 


Debit 


CAFP Subcontractor- 
Castellanos 




196.00 




4/16 


Debit 


Congressional Direct. 




26.00 




4/18 


Debit 


Printing -CAFP 




216.00 




4/18 


Debit 


Telephone 


1, 


,934.31 




4/18 


Deposit 


NEPL 






29,977.00 


4/21 


Deposit 


NEPL 






170,000.00 


4/21 


Debit 


Flores Expenses-CAFP 




83.09 




4/21 


Debit 


Telephone 




800.00 




4/21 


Debit 


AMEX 


42, 


,960.00 




4/18 


Debit 


Telephone 




966.09 




4/21 


Debit 


Photographer 




305.00 




4/21 


Debit 


CAFP Expen. -Caste 1- 
lanos 




301.19 




4/28 


Debit 


Postage 




110.00 




5/5 


Debit 


Tape Stock 




280.37 




5/2 


Debit 


National Review Reprint 1.00 




5/5 


Debit 


Congressional Record 




218.00 




5/5 


Debit 


Photo Reproduction 




222.87 




5/7 


Debit 


NEPL Printing 




447.56 




5/5 


Debit 


U.S. Documents 




5.00 




5/8 


Deposit 


NEPL 




1 


,250,000.00 


5/8 


Debit 


ACYPL Dinner 


1 


,000.00 




5/9 


Debit 


Postage 




16.41 




5/14 


Debit 


Nightline Transcript 




2.00 




5/14 


Debit 


Friends of Freedom 












-I.e. Inc. 1,250 


,000.00 




5/15 


Debit 


Supplies 




805.66 




5/15 


D*bit 


Copying 




398.60 




5/15 


D«bit 


NPC Room Rental 




355.86 


^M^^ 


5/15 


Debit 


Interpass 


1 


,100.00 


■ ^^^i 


5/15 


Debit 


WETA Tapes 




25.00 


LOmJ 


5/15 


0«bit 


WETA Transcripts 




130.00 


L^ 


5/15 


Debit 


Translations 


2 


,300.00 


5/15 


Debit 


Couriers 


1 


,487.57 


55 


5/15 


Debit 


SDI Brochure Design 


2 


,019.57 


5/15 


Debit 


Videotape Dub 




25.00 


c-o 


5/15 


Debit 


WTLV Tape 




100.00 




5/16 


Debit 


Expenses-CAFP 




5.10 


5/21 


Debit 


Postage 




110.00 


5/23 


Debit 


AMEX 


11 


,585.66 


^^i«0 


5/29 


Debit 


Couriers 




235.25 


5^ 


5/29 


Debit 


Telephone 


1 


,312.53 


6/1 


Debit 


Audio tape Dub 




40.00 


w>«a9 


6/3 


Debit 


Maps-CAFP 




5.30 





648 



BNClllSSlFiH 



R M 000016 











DEBIT 


DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITEM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOUNT 


AMOUNT 




6/3 


Mbit 


Video Production 




761.00 






6/9 


Debit 


Portfolios-CAFP 




74.40 






6/11 


Debit 


SDI Briefing Books 




669.04 






6/13 


Debit 


Copying 


2 


,022.29 






6/13 


Debit 


NEPL Maps 




39.08 






6/16 


Debit 


NEPL Maps 




150.00 






6/16 


Deposit 


NEPL 






72,929.00 




6/19 


Debit 


AMEX 


4 


,799.12 






6/19 


Debit 


Telephone 


1 


,137.26 






6/19 


Debit 


Couriers 




248.00 






6/19 


Debit 


Photography 




414.00 






6/19 


Debit 


Radio/TV Monitoring 




442.66 






6/19 


Debit 


Supplies 




965.53 






6/19 


Debit 


Nova Tapes 




4.00 






6/19 


Debit 


FEDEX 


1 


,580.50 






6/19 


Debit 


FEDEX 




574.85 






6/19 


Debit 


FARA Registrations 




2.40 






6/19 


Debit 


NEPL Haps 




150.00 






6/23 


Debit 


National Journal 




93.28 






6/23 


Debit 


Eason Associates-SDI 
Brochure 


12 


,000.00 






6/27 


Debit 


NEPL Tape Dubs 




40.00 






6/27 


Debit 


NEPL Tape Dubs 




175.00 






7/1 


Debit 


Postage 




110.00 






7/10 


Debit 


Translations 




697.00 






7/10 


Debit 


Couriers 




272.25 






7/10 


Debit 


Telephone 




306.47 




jC^ 


7/10 


Debit 


FEDEX 




333.25 




7/10 


Debit 


Supplies 




813.67 




btd 


7/10 


Debit 


Photography 




58.30 




Li^ 


7/10 


Debit 


Lion Recording 




11.13 




7/10 


Debit 


Smith final Expenses 




600.00 




CX!> 


7/16 


Debit 


Forbes Reprint 




6.50 




7/17 


Deposit 


NEPL 






46,193.00 


c<5 


7/21 


Debit 


Travel-CAFP 


3, 


,000.00 






7/21 


Debit 


Traveler Checks-CAFP 




606.00 




r 


7/24 


Debit 


Traveler Checks-CAFP 


1, 


,111.00 




^mmmJ: 


7/24 


Debit 


Flores Expenses 




51.13 




CmJ:^ 


7/24 


Mbit 


FEDEX 




255.75 




Z^^ 


7/24 


Mbit 


Graphics-SDI 




212.00 




^KJ^^ 


7/24 


Mbit 


Printing 




126.66 






7/24 


Mbit 


Radio/TV Monitoring 




152.64 






7/24 


Debit 


TV Production 




566.04 






7/24 


Debit 


AMEX 


5, 


,036.85 






7/24 


Debit 


Telephone 




200.00 






7/24 


Debit 


FEDEX 




21.50 






7/29 


Debit 


Catterton Printing 




315.50 






7/31 


Debit 


NEPL Expenses 




42.10 






7/31 


Deposit 


NEPL 






6,100.00 




8/4 


Debit 


SDI Graphics 


2, 


,500.00 







649 



I; VI 




blilUi 




R M 

DEBIT 


000017 

DEPOSIT 


DATE 


ITBM 


DESCRIPTION 




AMOONT 


AMOUNT 


8/12 


Mbit 


Recording Services 




126.60 




8/12 


Debit 


Expenses-CAFP 




40.44 




8/18 


Deposit 


NEPL-SDI 






14,000.00 


8/18 


Debit 


SDI Subcontractors 


5, 


,000.00 




8/21 


Debit 


Couriers 




234.50 




8/21 


Debit 


Telephones 




200.00 




8/21 


Debit 


Nexis Searches 


2, 


,847.10 




9/15 


Debit 


Wesley Smith Final 
Expenses 




296.70 




9/15 


Debit 


AMEX 


15, 


,062.01 




9/18 


Debit 


Caqle and Associates 


1- 










NEPL-SDI 


2. 


,403.33 




9/18 


Debit 


Couriers 




533.75 




10/9 


Debit 


Couriers 




272.25 




10/14 


Deposit 


NEPt 






20,000.00 


10/22 


Debit 


AMEX 


41 


,768.13 




10/22 


Deposit 


NEPL 






7,652.95 


10/30 


Debit 


SDI-Writer Subcon- 












tract 


7 


,600.00 




10/30 


Debit 


NEPL-SDI Supplies 




119.85 




10/30 


Debit 


NEPL-SDI News Con- 
ference 




597.57 




10/30 


Debit 


NEPL-SDI Defense News 


65.00 




10/30 


Debit 


Radio/TV Monitoring 




322.74 




10/30 


Debit 


Photos-NEPL 




159.00 




10/30 


Debit 


NEPL-Tape Dubs 




164.30 




10/30 


Debit 


NEPL Books 




50.00 




10/30 


Debit 


FEDEX 


1 


,263.00 




10/30 


Debit 


FEDEX 




266.00 




10/30 


Debit 


FEDEX 




171.75 




10/30 


Debit 


Copying 




652.41 




10/30 


Debit 


Guillen Expenses 




17.60 




10/30 


Debit 


TELEX 




229.24 




10/30 


Debit 


Lawyer Fees 


12 


,658.62 




10/30 


Debit 


Nexim 


1 


,293.67 




11/3 


Debit 


^^■^^^^H 


10 


,000.00 





Total Debits 2,780,787.43 

Total Deposits 3,433,098.79 



wifcssro 



650 



R M OGOjts 



ONCLASSIFIED 



SECTION 3 



UHClASSra 



651 



rm '.■xii-iiis UK 



..•^" 



^ 



# 



# 




KtxoRuofc Of isi«i"<iK) 019 



1. TM mm at Vb» Couftaj It -t.e. INC.* 

t. TM Bttlttw-M Offte* (f tM Ccatmar >tU «• (itiMU tt tb« offtM* 
«r CayMMM e«rporat« l«rvtcM llaltM, Sotn Mnk »ull«tn«, fort 
StrMt, e—rg» Towi, r.O. (a> IMJ, Srmd C*yMn, Cayvan I«l>fi«a, IrlttaK 

i 

3. Tta* o»>«u for vkiok Um C oa n ay U uU»lUb*4 *rt: | 

(i> T* «t*trt»uu tat kwiTClMt o«alrlbullou aX* kr feuaocloaa, . 

prlTtU ar(talutleu tat la<l*l«uaU M otter aortUt twMTolant 

•rtaalMtioM M« Hlltloal Mtltlaa r«»r«Mai<a« auob 

•rsulMtlMU. 

(11) T* M4ulr« tat (Mnt, (tecks, ittaaturM, 4«»Mtar* ttocK, 

»(>n«i. ■nrtni'ii wt**! kukart' tntfUactt, e*U4*tlau tut , 

ethar M«iirltlM iwuM *f ttf iQn m , aarpantua <r 

laMaruklw of vkaUiar aatora tM nbaraMaiw Moatltuva* «r' 

taauaa ar (uanataaa kr •« ttnrmtax, (aTar«l4B ralar, 

aaMlaalMoart, tnut taUmritl ar ataar badr •' nbaUvar 

aatora, *r vl«la*l •akaarlpdaa, «7a«ldata »artlal»attaa. 

taaaar furabaaa, tubaef ar auaralaa aaa to •ubaarlba far cht 

•aw altMr aaaattlaeaUj ar ataanrtaa tM to (uaraataa U)a 

(ukaarlptlaa tbaraaf. 

" ' * 'I 

(Ul) Ta *^: *aU ta« «aal la aU aaaMltlaa an* iDMtlltf futyrat, 

laaliKti^ alKar tmt t» tat —11 aa* «aaX U kalUaa aaa (paaUi 

U raaalTC anay mt nluakUa far aafa auata«j *r atbanrlaa 

auar Itea •• aapaalt r«Hf«kU ky alMvaa ar ar«*r, U aallaat jj 

aM traaaUk man aa* aaaurittaa. M paat aaa Ua«a latura a^ 

araalt, almlar aataa •■4 «• aaaaca •>« a«*laa «(g(aa 

aaiiinwal at aaaarlllaa aa« lavaataaata. I ^ 

(1*) Ta aarrr aa kualaaaa aa aapiuilau, nnaaatara 

aaMaaalaMlraa, kratwra aa* aarakaau aaa u 

aarrr «■ aat azaaau all klaaa at flaaaalal, 

tra«li« aparattaoa. ataapt kaaklac an* tniat 




OHCIASSIFIED 



652 



.# 



# 







// '^ ' I W W ij W . ij 

wrrr ta anf •taar »u<imu aMea Mr *na u m c«^«»i« tr 
k«ta( MamatMtlf Mrrl«4 <• In a«a«M(tM vttk cr/ of tMM 
MJMU ar MlwUtM «lrMtlr ar la«UMUy u tettaet tM 
ralM •t, fMlllut* «M rMllMtlM (f, tr nilii |r«nu»te 

(«) T» K**U* tr >r««ii f « i MU 'i*. lMla<U( tki -irimwii af 
iMMtaMW IM MMr K«»«fty. a^Matatnu**, a*lM h« 
tMtalal intitwM. mttim lat MtM* m • «atn««, !«••, 
m Mfi*. M»ti | — >i w MMr MaU m« u K««t«* MMuluau 
Mafr «ai wpUtm* t^ MU st*« aH«aaM*. MMaiMratl**, 
nlM. TlnHn •■* U*iml uaUtUM, MrrlM mt Urim w 



*n» tt »ii»lM«» »>■>»■« i«r H« «• Mt M MMcara, r««i«tr«r*, 
MaUtotraUr*. MwMarlM. M«iMr*. MMaataau cf tMt M 
Mryarau «r iiliiirtMiU la «av PM^ af UM mtU, ttr Ua 
CMpaar'a aaaaaai «r far iaif« partlaa. 

(*1) Ta t«, mU. Mai lat traaa. traaaaat, Uaaa. taU; Imm. 
M»<-41*1M, ar M*al«* rial aaUta, ia« tka rutana ia< 
l iraMa l tn pt n f laatMa H I ttaivta ar MMa m i tkaraatU aat 
ta aaaalM ky yarakaaa, taaM. ktra ar atfearwlaa, Ua4a aai all 
farai af talUlna ar aMatwatlMa ar aar UU raat ilMrala ta« 
u tatrita tka aaaa gaaaraUf ta aaU, aaaaaa, Mai «ttt aaa 
ta»rata taa i r a>art| af UM Caapaw, aa< ta mUi 1mm, 
aart«a(a, flaaga ar aitaanlM aUaaM af tka laaaa, kullaiata 
aaa iwiinatlMa ar atfear praaartf af laa Caaaaar«> 

(tU) ta aanr m taa taalMM af faraUf U all lu tr a a a w aa, 

lMla«la» attkaat »r«Ja*lM w tka rarafaUf | aaa r a H ty*af«»la 
aa« rralt farawa. Miry aa« yaaltry fiiwra. U*a ataak 
t r iaiara af aaary farlatf af aalaal »> n >ir traa af pa41crw 



(TlU) t» aMtraat far n»U» ar Kl<aU laaaa aa« u aacatlau 

uaMnrlta aaa laaaa laa aaaai altaavt M«)a*lM u 
far««ala( laaaraUtf alia rafarMM u aaaaaaitr 
rutoTM, ar r*ral<a a««kaa«a aaatraau U Mtar lata 
ar rarMT* aMtraau far IM aaaa l at t lM ar «li |H il m 




mmtm 



653 



# 



^ 









U9 It U nwPiM* aun b^i.*-— ' 

. _ ^,.M np» or oor»or»tlo«i «oo»t U 

,a,U>.r«.. of «. »«"— •' «- =-^' ""'•" " ~"'* "" 

u ,.«.. u. co-«, .rr-". - -^-^- •-""•"" '" 
:.u-.. -- M.r.^'* - ^ "^— •" •' "• '^" °^"^ I 

.- « oriM W.li-0. mui** »• I.l««»- 

for »• o«TTl"« «• M *" •"* 

«. -Pita Of .- ec^ uu-.ce.ooo.oo ««.- uu «..«« 
_. Of .-.-»-»- — •'-'- - -'^*- "-'• •"' 
..,.,. - ». K.-.0- .. - co^" - =- « " "--•• 

^ «. »,U.U. Of i—mio. U- C^ -" — -' - 

i^tf uay or .11 or mvna ••»< 

Ml* «»"• or M» Of tM« »« «• "*- 

._..„..f.ro.,...l Ul .1.1... ...-»>.- 

.. .«. a<Mi«lllou or rt."l"*l°" 
^ M*tf«M«et .f rlJBM or to wr ooi-l"o« ^ 

*.t*-.»*r «. « t-t -l*- »»• — """ •' " 

_ l-u. of -»P.. HMtSW »Ut^ t. »• 

Or«latfT. tnttrw or o«~" 



owt..J^•:=.>^ - 




rinsantP 



654 






tf*, tn« stv«raL ptrionj wnosa (ia««a. addrtsjts «nd Jtaeriptions art 
subacriMd ar« dttlroua of bains Toraad Into a Coapany in puraaanca of 
ihls Maaorandua of ftaaoelation, and «• raapaettvtlr M<*«* to taka tha 
nusbar of aharaa in tha capital of tha Coapaay a«t oppoalta oyr raapaetlv 



Hues, toDiessis uo ecsctimoM 

or SUBSOIMU 




auwti or sHAHu 

T>m IT UCH 

suuciiau 


CATHtvai conrouri suvicis 
r.o.asx 10*3. 

Ztartt Ta»n, 
Grand Cayaftn 


LIHITtg 


: (SM.) 
Da<ld C 


On* 

taTtd C. aird 
. Bird - Dtraecor 


Snara 


»?io c. aiu 
r.o.aei 26S, 

C*ar(« Tam, 
Cnnd Cayau 






(3cd.) D»t4 0. 


Ob* 
aird 


Sliara 


tLASTill J.I. lOaMi 
P. 0.(01 265, 
C«or«a Towa, 
Grand CaySAJl 






(Scd.) tlaiUlr 
itcara«y-al-L«« 


Oaa Shara 
J.I. Loudon 


Datad a»rll Zi, 14SJ 














(S«d.) e. HMiO 















lltnaa ta tte ako** al«iatur«a:Clirtatt*M Ciiliac 
IMraaa: F.O.Bm M, Oraad C«r«a 
OooupBilon: S«cr«tarT 

1. OEU.';oo. sc'.:- 3N ^^ 

la«lacrar of Coa»arvla« la aadTor tna Caraal) l^Mta DO HCMaT Ctmri 
Mat tnia la a tnM oo»r of tna Haaoraadua ^r/>aybelatlaa of 'I.e. INC. 

Oatad tola ikHHdar of i^98.\^~ I9M 




UNCUSSIFIED 





655 



yNCLASSIRED 



r-. i'i '-■ u 'J 'J ^ !) 

CEBTIFIED SPECIAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE SHABEHOLDEBS 

or 

I.e. INC. 



"RESOLVED that th* amended M*norandun of Association b« and is 
h«reby adcptad in plac* of and to th« antlre axeluslon of th« 
•xistlng Mamerandum of Association." 



"RESOLVED that the nama of the Company b« changed to INTEL 
CO-OPERATION INC." 



WE HERESY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ARE TRUE COPIES OF RESOLUTIONS OK THE SHARE- 
HOLDERS OP THE COMPANY VHICH WERE ADOPTED ON 9TH KAY, 1986. 



CAYHAVEN CORPORATE SERVICES LIMITED 




13th Kay, 19M 



ELussro 



'Or--.-.-- — ^W. 



«n« *tp«n««lt «»n«y *od ••ouriti**, vq »!•«..—« . — 



656 



;,«,mS.^\VS5 



H UU0 02 4 



INTEL CO-OPEaATION INC. 



Schadula of R«e>lpt» 



April 25, 1963 (d«f of Incorporation) 
to D«c«mb«r 31. 1985 i 



S«pt. 27. 1905 
Oct. 29. 1985 
Nov. 13, 1985 
Nov. 13, 1985 
Nov. 27, 1985 



I. B.C.. . 




100.000.00 


I. B.C. 




250,000.00 


I. B.C. 




80.000.00 


I. B.C. 




«,000.00 


Bank. draft 


- Continental Bank 


5,000.00 






475,000.00 



January 1, 198C 

to Dacember 31, 19661 



Vw/ 



Jan. 


1, 


1986 


I.B.C. 


360,000.00 


Apr. 


4, 


1966 


I. B.C. 


7«0,000,00 


May 


15 


, 1966 


I.B.C. 


1,250,000.00 


Aug. 


7, 


1966 


Nat. endowment for 
Preaarvation Liberty 


100,000.00 


Oct. 


2. 


1966 


Nat. Endowment for 
Preaarvation Liberty 


200,000.00 


Oct. 


8> 


1986 


Nat. Endowment for 
Preservation Liberty 


100,000.00 


Oct. 


21 


. 1986 


Nat. Endownont for 
Preaarvation Liberty 


50,000.00 



V-x 



2,800,000.00 



iiwssm 



657 



V 



Hsmsw 



INTEL CO-OPERATION INC. 



Schcdul* of Di«tribut'iona 



f-i U00U25 



April 3S, 198S (data of Incorporation) 
to Dacembar 31, 1993i 



Oct. 8, 19«S 

Nov. 1, 198S 

Nov. 1, 198S 

Nov. 14, 1985 



Laka Kaseurcaa Inc. 
Laka Raaourcaa Inc. 



Laka Rasourcaa Inc. 



100,000.00 

150,000.00 

100.000.00 

«8,000.00 

398,000.00 



V-/ 



January 1, 1988 

to Dacambar 31, 19861 

Jan. 2, 1986 
Jan. 21, 1986 
Jan. 21, 1986 
March 17, 1986 
Apr. 11, 1986 
Apr. 21, 1986 
^4ay 5, 1986 
May 9, 1987 

May 1«, 1986 
May 16, 1986 
Juna i, 1986 
Juna 13. 1966 
Juna 13, 1986 
Juna 13. 1986 

Juna 13,. 1986 

Juna IS. 1986 
July 3, 1986 
July 14, 1986 
July 20, 1986 
July 28, 1966 

July 28, 1986 

July 28, 1986 
July 28, 1986 
July 29. 1986 



Barclays Bank, Miami 
Barclays Bank, Mlaai 
Laka Rasourcas Inc. 
Riggs Nat. Bank - Katyal 
Laka Rasourcas Inc. 
Gulf 6 Caribbaan Foundation 
1st American Bank - Carlos Ul«t 
Barclays Bank, Miani, 
Oanlsa Ponca 

Ncrld Affairs Cazmlcra Ihc. (HO) 
JKACI 




Latin AiRsrican Stratagle 
Studies Instltuta 
Instituta on Terror Isn & 
Subnstlonal Conflict 
Intareontinantal Bank, Miami 
Friands of tha Anaricas 
jtACI 



Latin Anarican Financial 

Services 

Latin American Strategic Studi« 

Institute 

Barclays Bank, Mlani 

Gulf 6 Caribbean Foundation 

WACI ;.:-.. 

Carried forward 



40,000.00 
20,000.00 

360.000.00 
15.000.00 

650,000.00 
14,254.00 
10,000.00 

11,000.00 
10,000.00 

123,000.00 
15,000.00 

500,000.00 
7,000.00 

5,000.00 

75,000.00 

10,000.00 

125,000.00 

38,000.00 

7.000.00 

55,700.00 
■ 

5,000.00 
10,000.00 

6,928.00 
10. 000. 00 



2,124,862.00 



'lussm 



658 



"Xs 



yiwsra 



R M Gu;}026 



Brought forward 



Vw^' 



August M. laae 


S«pt 


. 19, isee 


S«p« 


. 19, 1966 


S«pt 


. 19, 1989 


Sept 


. 2«, 199« 


Oct. 


2, 1980 


Oct. 


2. 1986 


Oct. 


7, 1986 


Oct. 


8, 1966 


Oct. 


21, 1966 


Oct. 


21, 1986 


Oct. 


21, 1986 


Nov. 


12. 1986 


Nov. 


12, 1986 


Nov. 


26, 1986 


Nov. 


26, 1986 


D«c. 


18. 1986 


Dec. 


18, 1986 



KACZ . . 

Latin Anarlean Strategic 

Studlaa Inatltuta 




Agro Bank - Pol 

Latin Anorican Strategic 
Studies Institute 
WACI 



Latin American Strategic Studies 
Institute 



2,12i,862.00 

10,000.00 

20,000.00 
7,000.00 

5,000.00 

100,000.00 

150,000.00 

20,000.00 

^9,000.00 

10,000.00 

5,000.00 

10,000.00 

23,000.00 

10,000.00 

5,000.00 

65,000.00 

75,000.00 

100,000.00 

10,000.00 
2,900,882.00 



\^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



659 



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SECTION 4 



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UNCUkSSIHED 



U o w 2 3 



NATIONAL ENDOWMENT 

FOR THE 

PRESERVATION OP LIBERTY 

August 1, 1985 



30S FOUKTM ST N e 
SUITE lOOO 
WASHINGTON O C 20002 



Mr. Richard R. Miller 

Presldenc 

International Business Comaunicatlons 

1523 New Haopshlre Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20009 

Dear Mr. Miller: 

This letter is a formal retainer agreement between International 
Business Conmunlcations and the National Endowment for the 
Preservation of Liberty. While we have engaged I. B.C. for work on 
programs of the Endowment and the political action committee. The 
American Conservative Trust, at a fluctuating monthly fee we would 
like to undertake a more formal arrangment. 

The present agreement made verbally by you, me and Daniel L. Conrad, 
NEPL Executive Director, called for a monthly retainer of fifteen 
thousand dollars plus expenses. This agreement was made before the 
proliferation of our public education and political programs. With 
this in mind we agree to begin paying I. B.C. a monthly retainer of 
forty thousand dollars and we understand that I. B.C. reserves the 
right to Increase the charges to the Endowment to meet increases In 
costs such as personnel and operating expenses. At the time of 
billing and throughout the month I. B.C. will try to apprise us of 
potential extraodinary costs. 

As you spend money collected from us to pay for programs you manage 
for us we will meet occassionally to discuss Immediate and near-future 
expense needs. Since our programs are fast developing and can take on 
urgency not normally encountered In the public relations field, we 
understand that you may make occassional demands for cash deposits to 
cover major expenditarcs. 

For the next few months you should be reviewing the cost of this 
arrangmmmt to International Business Communications. Should we 
determla* that these agreed upon operating standards do not work, we 
reserve the right to renegotiate the retainer arrangement. You will 
provide Mr. Conrad with written or oral cost analysis at the time of 
submission of your expenses aad time and 'billing records. 

If this agreement la acceptable please countersign this letter and 
return it to us. / 



SiiydereljL, y'l 

^ 7 // 

'^ Carl Russell Channell 

VNCUSSm 




President 



Richard R. Miller 
President 



661 



ft M 000029 

UNClASSra 

Jmattmtr 20, 1986 

Mr. Carl Sussall Chaoacll 

Pr«si4«at 

Natioasl Ba4o«ra«at for tha 

Praaarvatloa of Llbartj 
30S fourtli Straat, N.B. 
Waahlagtoa, O.C. 20002 

Oaar Mr. Chaaaall; 

Thaak fou for iaclttdiag aa la foar wlater aaatlag la Pala Baach, 
Florida thla aoath. Tha chaaca Co halp plaa tha azacucloa of 
prograaa by tha Ifatloaal Endowaaat for tha Praaarvatloa of 
Libartf, tha Aaarlcaa CoaaarTatlra Truat vara vary naaful In 
plaaalag tha I. B.C. laval of affort aaadad to carry oat oar 
raapoaalbllltiaa to /oa. 

Tha agaada of tha Eadowaaat aad Ita ralatad orgaalzatloaa la vary 
aabltloua aad will taka aa aztraordlaarf aaoaat of talaat, 
aaapowar aad creatlra effort. I. B.C. la praparod to uadartalct 
thla affort. Wa will howavar aaad to ravaap oar financial 
arraagaaata with you. 

Rare-to-data wa hava coacaatratad oa tha Nlcaragnaa public 
•ducatloa affort aad apacial prograaa dealgaad to aupport tha 
Praaldant la obtalalag hla goala la Caatral Aaarica. Now wa ara 
to undataka a aaaaouth prograa to aducata tha Aaarlcaa Public, 
saalor govarnaaat offlclala aad lafluaacial Aaarlcaaa. Thla 
prograa will raqaira aajor outlaya of paraoaaal aad will raqulra 
In aad of Itaalf tha aaa of aavaral aaaior laval conaaltanta. 
Tha aonthlf faaa for thia prograa alona will ba forty thouaand 
dollara plua aspaaaaa. 

In your outliaa of tha tha 1986 prograaa. yoa hara alao dlracted 
that I. B.C. daalga aad laplaaaat a prograa to proaota the 
public'* aapport of Praaldant Raagan'a Strategic Defenae 
Inltlatfva. Thla prograa will require the developaeat of a aaJor 
brieflas book for policyaakera and SDI chaaplona, Che direction 
of a apeakara Coar and coaaulCacioa wich your advercialng 
agenciea on adrerciaiag caapaigaa. Thia efforc will be 
undercaken for a aonchly fee of CwenCy Choaaand dollara and 
ezpenaea. I. B.C. will ba raapoaaible for all addiCional 
conuaulcaac feea neceaaary Co raa chia prograa. 

Tha third prograa that you haTo aaked ua to conaider working on 
are the Future of Freedoa Seainar Seriea. Thaaa prograaa would 
undertaken by The Aaerican ConaerTative Truat and funded funded 



IWUSSIRED 



662 



uNCUissra 



R W 003 



by contrlbucors under an arrangnent to be designated bj jo\i ac a 
later time. However, we will Incur expenses In the developoent 



of these prograas and nay 
consulting organizations to 
additional consultants will 
through r»iBburse««nt to us. 
without fOOT verbal approval. 



need additional consultants and 
be Involved In the effort. Such 
be your financial responalblllty 

Wa will not undertake such efforts 



Tour terrorisa flla and conference ideas ara not jet aasigned to 
I. B.C. but we understand that aay change at a later date. 

Also, wa understand that your Constitutional Minutca Project nay 
also be aasigned to us as a 1986 prograa but tliat foraal 
agree«ent on this will wait until a later data. 

Finally, one aspect of our financial arrangnents needs to be 
clarified going Into this year. We are not in a position to know 
the final purpose and use of all the services you request of us. 
As the "TO-DO" list reaches thirty and forty iteaa at a given 
tine, we siaply execute the tasks you aaaign us as wa can. In 
this operational node it is Inpossibla for us to Independently 
bill your various organizations for specific work hours. 
Therefore it will be your responsibility to internally identify 
the end user of our billed services. Wa trust that this is an 
area that you and your lawyers ara quite capable of handling 
yourselves. 

The inpact of your efforts on behalf of the President have been 
najor and unique. Wa look forward to serving you in your efforts 
in 1986. 

If this letter represents your understanding of our relationship, 
please countersign to letter and return it to ne. 



Sincerely, 



Richard R. Millar 



President 
I. B.C. . 




uNCUssra 



663 



h li 000031 



uHomsw 



CENTRAL AMXRICAN 
FREEDOM PROGRAM 



W 



m^^ 



664 



iJCLASSIFIEB ' " """ 

CENTRAL AMERICAN FREEDOM PROGRAM 



Introduction 

1986 Is destined to be a landmark year In the 
advancement of freedom throughout the world. After a 
generation of Increasing tyranny and authoritarianism, the 
winds of change are rising. These winds are carrying 
freedom movements on four continents toward a victory over 
communist domination. 

And Ronald Reagan, leading a rejuvenated America, has 
caught these winds of change. He Is dramatically aligning 
American policy, resources, and moral support with the 
force of that gathering storm. 

President Reagan's policy, when fully developed, is 
destined to trigger the overthrow of cooununlst tyranny. 
This will happen around the world, in Afghanistan, Angola. 
Mozambique, Kampuchea and, most Important, Nicaragua. 

America's relationship with coamiunist Nicaragua 
experienced an absolute moral and political reversal when 
Ronald Reagan became President of the United States. 

The Carter Administration, like millions of 
Nicaraguans, had been fooled by the communists who 
captured the leadership of the anti-Somoza revolution in 
1979. Once in power, the communist Junta began 
systematically lying to the world about the true policies 
and purposes of their revolutionary government. 

But Ronald Reagan was not fooled. So, moved by new 
leadership, American policy toward Nicaragua's communist 
government changed sharply in 1981. Then the U.S. 
declarsd support for the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. 

Since 1981, opposition to the communist-controlled 
Nlcara^uam regime has gradually become: a very powerful 
Internal democratic movemen;t. tt claims the support of 
over 29,000 well armpd Nicaraguans and literally hundreds 
of thousands of ordinary Nicaraguans. Nearly 400,000 (one 
out of every six Nicaraguans) lives iinder Freedom Fighter 
protection. 

The democratic forces have endured years of conflict 
with a communist army easily six times their number. More 
remarkably, they have steadily Increased their ranks In 
the midst of the struggle. These democratic forces 



OKSlASSinEfl 



665 



UNCLASSIFIED 



continued to gain strength even during the year and a hal'^ 
that United States aid was suspended. 

1986 finds the democratic forces stronger than ever. 
But so 1* their communist enemy. Ronald Reagan has 
offered decisive assistance to the democratic forces. 
And. if this assistance is fully endorsed by the Congress, 
It could. In fact, carry them to victory over communism In 
Nicaragua this year. 

When victory occurs, it will have historic and 
political significance throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
Its Impact vill be felt by every Freedom Fighter in the 
world. Its possibility will haunt e'^ery communist 
dictator. 

Finally, Ronald Reagan's actions will herald a new 
dynamic American policy. It is a policy of materially 
supporting freedom movements struggling to overthrow 
communist regimes. Freedom is on the offensive. 



Description of the Problem 

If Ronald Reagan is to succeed in meeting the needs 
of Freedom Fighter movements for years to come, it will be 
necessary to create a deep reservoir of public support for 
Freedom Fighters and the President's policy. 

Such public support will come only if the American 
people truly understand the stakes and the opportxinitles 
the Reaigan policies embody. 

The memories of Vietnam, however inapplicable, remain 
fresh, as does the urge to have America fight for clearly 
recognizable Just causes. So President Reagan, if he is 
to be successful, must carry into this foreign policy 
arena the unified support of the American people. 

In spite of the headlines and the debates during the 
last five years, the American public remains woefully 
ignorant, about Nicaragua. They don't understand the clear 
threat it poses to vital American security interests. 

A 1989 public opinion poll showed more than one-third 
of thoa« surveyed did not know which side the United 
States supports. Twenty percent thought we support the 
(communist) government! 

A later poll found that among those aware of U.S. 
policy, 5&% said we should not be giving aid to the 
Democratic Opposition. 

It is tragic, but not surprising that so many people 
are ill-informed, and that so many oppose our policies. 
It's not surprising because the American public is 
the victim of an Intense, sophisticated multi-million 
dollar disinformation campaign. It is being conducted by 



UNCIASSIHED 



666 



UNCLASSIFIED 

opponents of the President. 't '' 'JUOuo4 

The Sandinistas abuse the freedoms in the U.S. that 
they deny to their own people. They do this by hiring a 
Washington law firm and two public relations firms under 
contract to spread disinformation. 

They are aided by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The 
Soviets and Cubans already spend tens of millions of 
dollars to shape public policy In America. Their actions 
are supported by a vast network of communist and leftist 
activist sympathizers. Soviet spokesmen regularly seek tv 
time. Phil Donahue gave Nlcaraguan dictator Ortega an 
hour In October. 

These people operate at the grass-roots level and In 
Washington. They use the media and all the tools at their 
disposal to undermine the policies of pur elected 
government . 

This Is why President Reagan needs the support and 
cooperation of clear-tblnklng, patriotic Americans. We 
must counter the disinformation program of the 
Sandinistas. We must educate the public on the policies, 
the players, the dangers and the realities. 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty Is helping the President do Just that. 



Solution 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty has undertaken a nationwide program of Indefinite 
duration known as the CENTRAL AMERICAN FREEDOM PROGRAM. 

The overriding goal of this program Is to educate the 
American people. It will show the realities of communism 
In Nicaragua. It will show the threat to U.S. national 
security. 

We have chosen television as the major vehicle. We 
bellev* It Is the most successful to carry our educational 
and laformative messages to the public. 

thm CENTRAL AMERICAN FREEDOM PROGRAM will require the 
National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty to 
spend $2,000,000 In the next 90 days. 

This Is over $160,000 every week for public education 
and Information on the Issue of Nicaragua. A longer. $3 
million program is under consideration and will be Implemented 
if required to fully educate the American public. 

When our program achieves Its public awareness goals. 
It will become a useful model for similar activities by 
other in the future. Our program Is truly unique. It has 
become the pioneering effort In this area. 



llNCUSSIflEi 



667 



BNElASSre 



Pi M U U iJ J 5 

Central American Freedom Program 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty 1« focusing Its education program on seven 
Issues. They are: 

1 ) Nlcaraguan communist persecution of 
Its citizens; 

2) Denial of religious and political 
rights; 

3) The creation of an aggressive armed 
Soviet satellite on the North American 
continent; 

4) The creation of Cuban bases Inside 
Nicaragua: 

5) The threat Nicaragua now poses to Its 
neighbors both through state terrorism 
and outright aggression; 

6) Support for revolution In El Salvador; 

7) Betrayal of the true antl-Somoza democratic 
revolution by the Nlcaraguan communists. 

The Issues listed above represent the principal 
points our programs will make In the minds of Americans. 
We are also emphasizing other Issues such as the origin, 
nature, organization and ob;}ectlves of the Freedom 
Fighters. 

We are developing the Images of the UNO leadership. 
We are graphically showing the situation facing over 
400,000 Nlcaraguan refugees. And we are presenting the 
political and human rights goals of the Freedom Fighters 
themselves. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



668 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Public Affairs Components 



,"l ^ 



n I'l U u J J J 'J 

Central American Freedom Program 

The Sandinistas have two public relations firms and 
two law firms either registered as foreign agents or 
working sub rosa in the United States. 

They have a combined budget of $2 million. They are 
using this war chest to concentrate on the districts of 
Congressmen who have opposed aid to the Freedom Fighters. 

They have also stepped up the use of Op-Eds and 
articles In national newspapers written by sympathetic 
Americans. They have planted disinformation, too. like 
the recent articles accusing the FDK of drug trafficking. 

An ignorant and misinformed public is one of the 
principal objectives of the communists. They recognize 
that ignorance and apathy in local communities across 
America leaves the doors wide open to the opponents of 
Administration policy. 

And given the activism of those opponents, they are the 
ones who are often visible to members of Congress. A 
legislator who only hears from the critics can Ignore logic and 
danger. He can vote to deny U.S. assistance to those on the 
front lines In the battle against communism in our hemisphere. 
So, the public must be better Informed. 

The public is quite unaware of the true nature of the 
Sandinistas as well as the existence of a viable 
democratic alternative. They do not support efforts to 
overthrow any government and fear U.S. involvement in 
another Vietnam. 

This Ignorance and the isolation it produces have 
been the Sandinista's principal advantages in the debate. 
We intend to evaporate those advantages through the use of 
truth. 



Oblectlves 

As Congressional debate heats up on this issue, we 
should expect the Sandinistas, their foreign agents and 
liberal sympathizers to give it all they have. 

We are In the last weeks of a national campaign to be 
decided by the American public. If the public remains 
apathetic, the President's democratic Initiative will be 
defeated. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



669 



uNtussra 



w -J 'J w U 



If we are successful. America win have a policy that 
sounds the death knell of America's post-vietnam feeling 
of lapotency. It will end America's retreat from her 
responsibilities a,s the leader of the free world. 

To accoBplish this, tbs Kational Endowment for ths 
Preservation of Liberty is addressing four audiences using 
specifically targeted coamunications stratecies: 

The public - Through ths use of strong negative 
images of ths Sandinistas recently reported in 
ths media. 

Policymakers - Democratic leadership issues 

provide the groundwork for more challenging arguments that 

can influence liberals and moderates. 

Congress - Through Issues now associated with 
Americans leadership role in supporting democracy in the 
region against the developing communist threat. NEPL, as 
an educational organization, is not permitted to engage in 
lobbying activities. Our co-sponsor. Sentinel, Is 
permitted to engage in lobbying activities and will 
undertake the responsibility of bringing this important 
issue to ths attention of members of Congress. 

Freedom Fiirhter Leadership - Without a sound 
belief in the capabilities of the resistance's 
leadership, no policy can succeed in Congress. 



Program Elements 

Time is short and we are fighting for public support 
over a wide geographic area. So, we are treating this 
like a national educational campaign, with March 15 as our 
target. 

We are using the methodology of national political 
campaigns. Ve are seeking to emphasize the disturbing 
truth about ths commiuist control over Nicaragua. Ve 
are debating ths unolaimed Issues to our advantage. 
And ws are reinforcing our positive public perceptions 
to educate and inform. 

Ws are using advertising and public affairs programs 
for each of the four program objectives listed above. 
They are being handled as follows: 

The Public - The public has been exposed 
recently to several negative Images of the Sandinistas. 
We use these images to reinforce the public perception 
that the Sandinistas are communists and tyrannical 
dictators. We employ the following techniques: 

Television advertising - We have analyzed 
Congressional action on the last aid package. Based 
on this research, we are producing materials for 



UNCLASSIHED 




670 



television spots which focus on: 

1) Daniel Ortega's trip to Moscow and the 
$220 Dilllon comaiitment he received from 
the Soviets for offensive military weaponry. 

2) The recent crackdown on human rights 
directed against the entire Nicaraguan 
population. 

3) Ortega's purchase of $3,500 in designer 
eyeglasses while his people starve. 

4) The communists militarization of Micaragua 
throxigh Soviet. Libyan, East German. Cuban 
and other advisors, and the use of Nicaragua 
as a command center for subversion of her 
democratic neighbors. 

5} That Cubans are now proved to be actively 
involved in combat. 

6) That Kicaragua has become a lair and a 
refuge. 

7) The humiliation of Pope John II when he was 
spat upon and heckled when he tried to 
conduct Mass in Managua. 

Spokesman program - using the prototype program 
already underway, we are placing speakers in 50 
markets between now and March 15. 1986. 

These speakers are booked into a civic club or 
professional organization in a market. Then 
they are scheduled for television, radio and 
newspaper interview*. 

The speakers come from the ranks of the United 
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) leadership. They can 
defend all UNO participants. 

They focus on Sandinista excesses and UNO as the 
democratic alternative. The principal concentration 
for these speakers are the southern and western 
•tatea. 

Battlefield Videotape - Sandinista state security 
a<«nts rigidly control the movements of foreign 
correspondents, especially television Journalists in 
or visiting Nicaragua. That control is exercised 
through: 

1) Escort "guides" and Interpreters: 

2) Denial of access to selected parts of the 
country; 

3) Imposition of "taboo" themes; 



UNClASSira 



671 



UNCUSSIHED 



rt ,'i U u o w c :^ 

4.) Screening and censorship of footage for export; 

5) Monitoring of telephones and telex; 

6) Expulsion or denial of entry to any offenders. 

At the sajne time, coverage from the northern border 
is extremely arduous and far from the areas where the 
Resistance is operating. 

The result is timid, selective, highly censored and 
heavily biased television coverage. Battle zones are 
only presented from the Sandinista perspective. 

We are providing major media outlets and local 
television stations with videotape from the field. 
It shows scenes never seen before in the U.S. 

It Includes combat footage and evidence of Sandinista 
atrocities. Ve are also providing footage and 
commentary on events inside Managua and other major 
population centers. 

This footage will be used in three ways: 

1 ) An experienced advertising agency is producing 
advertising for distribution in as many ais SO 
selected markets across the United States. 

2) A satellite feed will be edited and fed each 
time new footage is obtained. These feeds will 
reach approximately 200 television stations in 
the U.S. Usa^e reports will be received daily. 

3) A new documentary on the face of communism in 
Nicaragua and the use of internal repression 
will be produced. This theme will be countered 
with a segment showing the Freedom Fighters as 
the logical outgrowth of Sandinista tyranny. 

Policymakers 

Given the compressed time frame, policymakers can be best 
reached throufh an effort that is visible in Washington 
and the national media. The issues used to reach Congress 
should be centered on Aaerica's leadership responsibilities 
in thla hemisphere. 

The primary effort is focused in specially selected 
areas of the country, but we are reinforcing this 
effort with a public affairs and education program 
including: 

A. Articles and Op-Eds written by prominent American 
leaders on Nicaragua as a center of terrorism. 
Ve will use recent revelations of Mlcara«uan arms 
being used in the Colombian Supreme Court 
assaults. 

Ve will cite evidence of Libyan, PLO and Iranian 



- UNtussra 



672 



UNCLASSIFIED 



terrorists working In Nicaragua. From these 
facts, we will produce articles for paid 
distribution, single placement In national 
newspapers and general media distribution. 

B. Religious persecution of all faiths can be used 
to touch and educate the public, producing a 
positive effect on the policymakers. 

Jewish, Catholic and Protestant organization 
publications are being approached to interview 
defectors and religious figures who know the 
persecution firsthand. 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty is arranging a series of meetings with 
religious leaders and Journalists. We will also 
help to produce an article by a prominent 
American religious figure for paid distribution. 

C. Another Cuba on the North American Continent is 
unacceptable to almost all Americans. If the 
issue is picked up by constituents it would be a 
strong message for policymakers. 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty Is utilizing these argximents in the 
speakers program already underway. An American 
exiled Cuban has been commissioned to write an 
article for paid distribution throughout the 
U.S. 

A Cuban exile leader has been added to the 
spokesman program. 

D. Drugs and politics are a bad mix. Nicaragua's 
support for and role in narcotics trafficking are 
Issues with which no one can publicly disagree. 

We will ask Don Johnson of MIAMI VICE, or a 
strong anti-drug figure such as Rosle Oreer, to 
give a briefing on the drug trafficking evidence 
. the Administration has on the Sandinistas. 

He will be asked to write an Op-Ed piece for 
national distribution through paid and direct 
placements . 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of 

Liberty would seek to get this super-spokesman on 

major television shows such as TODAY and GOOD 
MORNINO AMERICA. 

We would also produce a news spot for satellite 
distribution. 

E. The Sandinistas are violating human rights 

at an unprecedented level In this hemisphere. 










673 



The National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty Is providing radio, television and 
newspaper interviews with two researchers who 
have compiled a report on Sajidlnlsta human rights 
violations. 

They are being commissioned to do an update on 
their report with a trip to Honduras and Costa 
Rica. On their return they will bold a 
Washington news confarenca and issue a report to 
Congress through a respected Senator or 
Congressman. 

F. The Revolution of 1979 has been betrayed by the 
Sandinistas. The National Endowment for the 
Preservation of Liberty will produce a news spot 
for satellite distribution on the lives of three 
former Sandinistas who now fight with the 
FDM/UNO. 

Congress 

Va expect to reach Congress primarily through the 
media wa will be using for the policymakers. However, special 
briefings will also ba used to educate specific target 
audiences within this group. 

These briefings will be arremged by our co-sponsor. 
Sentinel. Briefings may feature drug enforcement experts or 
political scientists who have studied Cuban expansionism. 

Freedom Fighter Leadership 

The National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty has begun to provide spokesmen training for the 
leadership and provide information feedback to reinforce 
that training. We will provide DNO leaders with public 
opinion analyses. 

When possible, wa are incorporating the UNO 
leadership in events and briefings that further their 
Image of unity. 

Conclusion 

Without an opportunity to sea the truth about the 
Sandinistas, the American public will defeat democracy In 
Nicaragua. 

Through its public education program, the National 
Endowment for the Preset vation of Liberty will give the 
President a chance to free this continent of communism. 
We will strike a decisive blow for democracy. 



ONcussra 



10 



674 



UNClASSlfltD 



0G004? 



CENTRAL AMERICAK FREEDOM PROGRAM BUDGET 



Television field projects 
Personnel 

- field producer 

- camera man 

- sound man 

- correspondent 

Equipment 

- six cameras ^ 

- sound package 

- editing machine 

- character generators 

Transportation 

- airfares 

- ground transportation 

- local travel 

Travel expenses 

- In-country expenses 

- U.S. travel for editing 

Studio time 

- In-country studio for editing 

- U.S. production facilities 

Tapes supplies 

- tape stock 

- battery packs 

- lights and reflectors 

($60,000 per month for 5 months) $ 300,000 

Marketing of field TV programs 

(5 projects at $24,000 per) 120.000 



„ namsim 



675 




R M 000043 



Tour to Include: 

- speaklnc enga^^ements 

- editorial board neetlngs 

- television Interviews 

- radio Ifftervlews 

- newspaper Interviews 

- briefings for church, business, 
labor, political, and collets 
organization leaders 

Costr for^ tours 

(January to March 19, 19«6) 

Travel 

(7 weeks. 2 speakers, 
each week $8,700) $121,800 

Per diem for speakers 

($220 per day, 5 days per 
trip, 7 weeks for 2 
speakers per week) 19.400 

Expenses 

(ground transportation, phones, 
tips. $800 per trip, for 14 
one week schedules) 1 1 .200 



SUBTOTAL 148.400 



Supplementary services, including: 

- postage 

- telephones 

- telex 

- couriers 

- translations 



($4,700 per month for 5 nonths) 27,750 

5. Administration/Coordination, Including: 

Professional staff: 

- 2 senior partners 

- 1 local coordinator 

- 1 Program Coordinator 

- 1 Senior Writer 

- 2 Account Executives 

- 1 Media Coordinator 

Verification of Placement 

- clipping retrieval 

- polling data assembling 

- monitoring network feedback 

($53,500 for 2 months, January 
to March 15) 107.000 



12 



UNClASSinED 



676 



mSSIHED 



Advertising and paid media 

Television advertising: 

Production of 4 TV messages $ 80,000 
D.C. media buys 225.000 

Nationwide market buys 750 . 000 

SUBTOTAL 1.055,000 

National Media Placement 

- Network and syndicated T7 and Radio 

- National newspapers 

- National periodicals 

158.850 

Polling and research 

- national 

- local 

83 . OOP 



GRANS TOTAL $2,000,000 



mussw 



13 



677 



« 



00^"^ 




/ 



1986 



/ 



^ytn ft^i^ SivW 



#) 



ts,#» 



//,. 



678 



ptmsra 



'I J o o o 4 



ACTION PLAN FOR 1986 PROGRAHS OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE TRUST 
AND 
TBB NITIORAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE PRESERVATION OP LIBERTY 



Introduction - This action plan Is divided Into flvo spoclflcallj 
focusad prograaa aa dlractad bj Mr. Channall. In aach casa cha 
contractor and subcontractor designations ara Indicated. The 
progress ara as follovs: 

FRIENDS OF FREEDOM PROGRAM - This prograa Is an effort 
to directly support the President's Initiatives In 
Central Aaarlca and Nicaragua through political and 
educational Institutions In the region. Thla prograa Is 
based on direct granta to religious, political, acadaalc 
and professional organizations In Latin and Central 
Aaerica. 

CENTRAL AMERICAN FREEDOM PROGRAM - This prograa In an 
effort to educate the Aaerlcan public, policy aakers and 
the aedia on the Issues surrounding Nicaragua and tha 
President's policy toward It. It Incorporataa a wida 
variety of public education tools including talevisioa. 
productions, spokesaan tours, Op-Ed articlea, 
coaaissioned Journalistic docuaantaries and television 
advertising. The prograa goal is to eatabllsh a 
national consensus that will allow official Aaerlcan 
support for deaocracy as a policy. 



SDI SUPPORT PROGRAM - This pro 
support tha President's Stratagi 
through a public education progr 
based on the political aaaaasaant 
seek to uaderalaa tha Preside 
consensus ha now enjoys oa SDI. 
focused ia tha Congress and aad 
aontha, throagh two Congressional 
Soviets sat np their aislnforaat 
SDI. ' Tha NBPL prograa is deaign 
paklie iaforaatioa prograaa in 
thraagh talavised aessages, feat 
prliA advartising in tha nationall 
prograa will also provide aedia, 
orgaalzatlona with apeakera or gue 
develop aupport for the President. 



graa is designed to 
Defense Initiative 
aa. This prograa is 
that the Sovleta will 
at and tha national 
This issue will be 
ia for the nest 21 
funding cycles, aa the 
ion prograa to coabat 
ad to provide strong 
the national aedia, 
ure productions, and 
y read newapapera. The 
acadeaic and political 
at Journaliat works to 



FUTURE OF FREEDOM SEMINAR SERIES - This prograa is a 
series of briefings for high level conservative 
activists on critical foreign policy, aonetary and 
national lasuas. The ACT will seek to boat a sarlea of 
foraal aaetlnga with a aenior govarnaant official to 
brief senior ACT end NEPL contributors on current 
critical iasuaa dealing with tha national security. 



UNCLASSIRED 



679 



wussra 



ft 



U G 4 7 



1 ►.rrorlam.. regional conflict resolution, 
lat.rn.tional "^'^J^JjJ;./ Sonetary poller, do.eatlc 
as w.ll as ^°""", c-r the .oat part these events 
"*:?"?* "it.lV 'pi 'it. [It^.^nll hoSted br ACT and 
nilurJ:, ' i inSflar b', . semor ...b.r of the 
Adainlstratlon. 

TPRRORISM- A US RESPONSE - This progra. Is an 

! rHonil effort directed to-erds increasing public 

educational effort Qx ,,.tween terroris. against 

our allies In conbatting terroriSB. 

AAm,,.m»mi this action plan outlines the key 

program's objectives. 



ONGLASSinED 



680 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



^ ''' 000043 ^ p 




Central Aaarlcsa Fraadoa Prograa 



Introduction 

1986 is destiaad to ba a landaark year la tha advanceaent of 
freadoa throughout tha world. Aftar a genaratloa of increasing 
tjrmanj and authoritarlanlsai tha wlnda of change are riaing. 
These wlnda are carrying freedoa aoveaents on four continents 
toward a victory over vcoaauniat doainatlon. And Ronald Reagan, 
leading a rajuvenatt*^ Aaerlca, haa caught these winds of change 
and is draaaticallf aligning Aaerican policy, resources, and 
moral support with the force of that gathering stora which is 
destined to overthrow coaaunist tyranny in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Mozaablque, Caapuchea and, aost iaportant, Nicaragua. 

Aaarica's relatlonahlp with coaauniat Nicaragua experienced 
an abaoluta aoral and political reversal when Ronald Reagan 
becaaa President of the United Stataa. 

The Carter Adainistratioa, like aillioas of Nlcaraguans, 
had been fooled by the coaaunists who captured the leadership of 
the anti-Soaoza revolution in 1979. Once in power, the coaaunist 
Junta began ayateaatically lying to tha world about the true 
policies and purposes of their revolutionary governaent. 

But Ronald Reagan was not fooled. So, aoved by new 
leadership, Aaerican policy toward Nicaragua's coaaunist 
governaent radically changed la 1981 and declared support for the 
Nicaraguan Freedoa Fighters began. 

Since 1961, oppoaltioa to the coaaaniat-controlled 
Nicaraguan govarnaaat haa gradually becoaa a very powerful 
internal deaocratie aovaaaat. It clalas tha support of over 
25,000 well araad NicaraguaDS and literally hundrada of thousands 
of ordinary Nicaragaaaa. Tha deaocratie forcea have not only 
endured yeara of coafllct with a coaauniat aray eaaily sis tiaes 
their aitabar. bat have ataadily incraaaad thair ranks in the 
aidst of tha atroggla. These deaocratie forcea continued to gain 
strengtb avea daring the year that United Stataa aid was cut off. 



1986 finds tha deaocratie foreaa stronger than ever. But so 
is their coaaunist eaeay. Ronald Reagan, however, is preparing 
to offer decisive aasistanes to tha deaoeratlc forcea which, if 
fully endorsed by tha Congraas, could in fact carry to thea to 
victory over eoaaunisa in Nicaragua thla year. When victory does 
la fact occur, it will have historic and political significance 
throughout tha western Heaiaphere. Its lapact will be felt by 
every Freedoa Fighter la tha world. Ita possibility will haunt 
every coaaunist dictator. Finally, Ronald Reagan's actions will 
herald a new dynaaic Aaerican policy of aaterially supporting 
freedoa aoveaenta struggling to overthrow coaaunist regiaes. 



Mm I 



vMim 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Description of the Problea 



681 



If Roaald Reagan is to succeed in aeeting the needs of the iuaamav 
Freedoa Fighter aoveaents for years to coae, it will be aecesaary ^ ilili^- 
to create a deep reservoir of support for the Freedoa Fighters ^TZ^T.. 
and the President's policy. Such public support will coae only -^^fy*'''^ 
if the Aaerican people truly understand the stakes and the {iLv^ 
opportunities the Reagan policies eabody. The aeaorles of |> u^ 
Vietnaa, however Inapplicable, reaain fresh, as does the urge to^^/v^ 
have Aaerica fight for clearly recognizable Juat causes. So >^ctM 
President Reagan, if he is to be successful, aust carry into this 
foreign policy arena the unified support of the Aaerican people. 



The National Endowoent for the Preservation of Liberty 
helping the President do Just that. 



Solution 

The National Endowaent for the Preservation of Liberty has 
undertaken a nationwide prograa of indefinite duration known as 
The Central Aaerican Freedoa Prograa. The overriding goal o f. 
t his if rPf'B 1» to educate the Aaerican peop le and poiitlctl 
elites about the nature of coaaunisa in Nicai^A{UA and the threet 
to U.S. national security. 

We have chosen television as the najor vehicle we believe 
will be aost successful in carrying our educational and 
Inforaative aessages to the public. 1^ 

The Central Aaerican Freedoa Prograa n ma iuu t i e n a t^ ' — -Hv« 
National Endowaent for the Preservation of Liberty to spend over 
one aillion, four hundred thousand dollars in the nest ninety 
days. This aeana allocation of over one hundred thousand dollars 
every week for public education and inforaation on the issua of . l> 
Nicaragua. ^H^/l^ylrvilu**- JitiU^, kA><AA>»v (^ aIm-iu^ \>- (kjOCffAL in ^^ . 

If our prograa achieves its public awareness goals, it *^St /^ 

becoae a useful aodel for siailar actlvitiea by others in the \UfA/^ 

future. .Oar prograa la truly unique. It has becoae the -' v^ 



pioneerlag effort la this area. 



Central Aaerican Freedoa Proeraa 



The National Endowaent for the Preservation of Liberty has 
decided to focus its education prograa on seven issuee. They 
are: 

1) Nicaraguaa coaaunlat persacutloa of its citlzeos; 

2) Denial of religious end polltlcel rights; 



iimssinEo 



682 



UNCLASSIFIED 



UGO 



3) The creation of ao aggressive araad Soviet satellite 
on the North AoMrlcan continent; 

4) The creation of Cuban bases Inside Nicaragua; 

5) The threat Nicaragua nov poses to Its neighbors both 
through state terrorlsa and outright aggression; 

6} Support for revolution In El Salvador; 

7) Betrayal of the true antl-Soaoza deaocratlc 
revolution by the Nlcaraguan coaaunlsts. 

The Issues listed above represent the points our programs 
want to oaka In the alnds of Aaerlcans. We will also discuss 
other Issues such as who the Freedoa Fighters are. We will 
develop the laages of the UNO leadership. We will graphically 
show the situation facing over three hundred thousand Nlcaraguan 
refugees. And we will discuss the political and huaan rights 
goals of the freedoa fighters theaselves. 



vitmsim 



683 



m 



cussro 



fi M 51 



Public Affairs Caaponenta of Central Aaericaa Freedoa Prograa 

Tht Sandlaistat hava two public ralatloos flma and two law 
flraa althar raglatarad as foralgn aganta or working subrosa In 
the Ualtad Statea. Thaj tiava a coablnad budget of two allllon 
dollars and are concentrating on the dlatrlcta of Congreaaaea who 
have opposed aid to the Fraedoa Fightara. They have also stepped 
up the use of Op-Eds and articles in national aewapapera written 
by srapathetic Aaerlcans, aa well aa the planting of 
dlslnforaatlon such aa recent artlclaa accusing the FDN of drug 
trafficking. 

The public is quite unaware of the true nature of the 
Sandinistas aa well as the existence of a viable deaocratlc 
alternatire. They do not support efforts to overthrow any 
governaent and fear U.S. Involveaent in another Vletnaa. This 
ignorance and the isolationisa it produces have been the 
Sandinista's principal advantages in the debate. We intend to 
evaporate those advantages through the use of truth. 



Oblectivea 

With the Congressional debate heating up on this issue, we 
should expect the Sandinistas, their foreign aganta and liberal 
syapathizers to give it all they have. We are in the last weeks 
of a national caapalgn to be decided by the Aaerlcan public. If 
the public stays apathetic Congresa will defeat the President's 
deaocratlc initiative. If we are successful, Aaerlca will have 

Itw^*; Tle baL B d auiJ Lheaga i h ; ami than d e b ated a a i t aJt anged ba a k , a 

policy that sounds the death kjneJ.1 of Aaeelca's posc-Vietnaa 
feeling of imvot*ncj »ixd^ JoXKttL' jSv\f*^ \jUiXAJijL^ J\M^rK^^ 

To accoapllsh this we aust addreaa four audiencea using 
spacifically targeted coaaunicatlona atrataglea: 

The public - Through the use of strong negative laages 
of the Sandialstaa recently reported in the aedla. 

The CoBgreas - Through Isauea now associated with 
Aaerica's leadarahlp role la supporting deaocracy in the 
reglea. 

Polleyaakara - Deaocratlc leadership issues provide the 
groaadwork for aore challenging arguaents that can 
infloeace Liberals and aoderatea. 

Freedoa Fighter Leaderahlp - Without a aound belief In 
the capabllltiea of the realstance'a leadership, no 
policy can aucceed la Congraaa. 



wujsife 



684 



SiSUSSW 



UilvlWny'J"'*-*' R M 0G0052 

Program Elements 

«• propose to approach thl« prograa with tha undarstandlng 
that ¥• arc uadar conaldarable tlaa conatralota and ara fighting 
for public support In areas widely dispersed ecroas the United 
States. Therefore, we propose to treat this as a national 
political caapaiga. with March 15 as our target. Using the 
nethodology of national political caapalgna, we will seek to 
utilize our opponenta negatives, debate the unclalaed issues to 
our advantage and reinforce our positive public perceptions. 

We will use advertising and public affairs prograas for each 
of the four prograa objectives listed above. Thev will be 
handled as follows: 

The Public - The public has been exposed recently to several 
negative inages or iapresslons of the Sandinistas. We will use 
these laages to reinforce the public perception that the 
Sandinistas are coaauaists and tyrannical dictators. Ve should 
eaploy the following techniques; 

Television advertising - following research into the 
Congressional votes caat on the laat aid package, we 
will produce aaterials that VMW' ba ua e^ — b^y Brbert 
' ■ r w end Ajjeciat ss »s focus on - 

1) Daniel Ortega's trip to Moscow snd the 
$220 allllon coaaitaen,t he received froa 
the Soviets A^ KiuJl JUrtvfcL VVVAla»A^ KMfJf-o*^^ 

2) The recent crackdown on huaan ,r 



wn pn huaan .rlghta »ln L-^ 



Nicaragua A4Ltuj%4^'\Ju> 

3) Ortega's purchase of $3,300 in designer 
eyeglasses while his people starve. 

4) Theyyailitarlzatlon of Nicaragua through jvj"r- Z^t*i/^ 
Soviet and Cuban advisors sad the use of ' Q 
Nicaragua as a coaaand center for 
aubversloa of her deaocratic neighbors. 

5) The incident when Pope John II was spat 
upon and heckled whe^ he tried to say Mass y^ 
io MlcaraguaAAOWoUA^^euK t'Lft, tll>i*JhrWUb aUAjUa*M*>^ 

6) That Cubans are now proved to be actively 
involved In coabat. 

Spokesaaa prograa - ualag the prototype apeakers prograa 
begun by I. B.C., NEPL will place speakers la SO aarkets 

between now and March IS, 1986. Theae speakera will be 






685 



MNEUSSra 



^ M UGO 



o' J. 5 



booktd Into a civic club or professional organization In 
a aarkat and than scheduled for television, radio and 
newspaper Intervlewa. The spokeapeople coae froa the 
ranks of the UNO leadership and are capable of defending 
all UNO participants. 

These speakers will focua oa Sandlnlsta excesses and UNO 
as the deaocratlc alternative. The principal 
concentration for these speakera will be the southern 
and westero states. 



Battlefield Videotape - There are two battleflelda In 
Nicaragua, one lasida the principal cities and one in 
the countryside. Ve intend to provide aajor aedia 
outlets and local telcvisloa stationa with never-seen- 
before videotape froa the field, including coabat 
footage and evidence of Sandinista atrocities. Ve will 
also provide footage aad coaaentary on events inside 
Managua and other aaJor population centers. 

This footage will be used in three waya: 

1) l > < b a n g eedaaa g iad fc3j e e.lata.» will produce 
advertising for distribution in , selected 



aavarciaing lor aistrinucioD in . seieccea ^^ 
■arketa acroaa the United States. V^^a. ^MW A^ O^ 



2) 



A satellite feed will be edited and fed 
each tlaa new footaga la obtained. These 
feeds will reach approsiaa(el7 , 200 
television statloaa in the U.S 



3) I . B . C . » hll eeaa t eataa 



aately . 2 



i.u.i.. ■ >** eeaaaeataarm .Tocuaentary oa the i 

face of coaanaiaa in Ni6^aragua and the use , JiL Ll tJi ^JjuuOA, 

of internal auBsraaaion .. .This theae will J M**^ r^ 

be countered with a segaent showing the 

FreedoB Fighters as the logical outgrowth 

of Saadlalata oppraaaion. 

Congreas - Glvaa tha coapressad tlaa fraaa, Congreaa will be best 
reached tbroati> *» effort that la viaible in Waabiagtoa and the 
national aadia. The issuaa used to reach Congreas should be 
Centered oa Aaarlca'a leaderahlp reeponsibilities In this 
heaisp'havfe. The prlaarj effort will be centered in Congressional 
dlstrlctSt bat wa should reinforce this effort with a public 
af faiijh^prograa including: 

A. Articles and Op-Eds written by proainant Aaerican 
leaders on Nicaragua aa a canter of tarroriaa. Using 
recent revelatlona of Nicaraguan araa being used in 
the Coloablaa Supreae Court assaults and Libyan, PLO 
and Iranian terrorists working in Nicaragua, we will 
produce articles for paid distribution, single 
placeaent in national newspapers and general aedla 
distribution. ~ 



icussw 



686 



'<r^y^:/f 



R M 0G00 54 



B«ll|loua 



ptrsecutloa 
pi i hlti 



all faltha caa 



Cachollc and Procaatanc 

\ should ba approachad eo 

<^ rallgloua flguraa who know 

V 4-. B . C . rt^vb arrangan^ a 

V raliglous laadara and Journallaca. I.B.C 

halp CO prodaca an artlcla by a proalnanc 

rellgloua t'. ' - ■ 



organisation publicaciona 

Intarvlow dafactora and 

tha paraecutlott firsthand. 

sarlaa of aaatlngs with 

will also 

Aaarican 



usad tojyV^V^J: A 






and tha chanca to 

on* caa publicly 

Wa propoaa to ask 

or a atroag anti 

ba givan a brlofing 

tha Adalniatration 



igura for paid diatributi 

Anothar Cuba on th^aainland la unacccptabla to /aoat 
Amaricana. If tha Issua is pickad up by conatituants 
It would ba a strong aassaga for Congraaa. 'frtre. 
>pr« I, utilize thase arguaants in tha spaakara prograa 
thay hava ba^un. An Aaarlcan azllad Cuban •*« — bv 
coaaissionad to writa an artlcla for paid 
distribution throughout tha U.S. A Cuban axlla 
laader Ii411Jh» addad to tha spokasaan prograa. 

0. Drugs and politics ara a bad alz 
hava a slngla isaua which no 
disagraa with is irraslstabla. 
that Don Johnson of "Miaai Vlca", 
drug figura such as Boala Grear, 
on the drug trafficking avidanca 

haa on tha Sandinistaa. That parson would ba askad 
to writa an Op-Ed piaca for national distribution 
through paid and diract placaaants. V^t ^H^ would 
seak to gat this supar-spokesaan on aajor television 
shows such as TODAY and GOOD MOBKING AMEBICA. K4«i<. 
would also cut a newa apot for aatallite 
distribution. 

E. Tha Sandlnlata ara violating huaan righta at an 
unpracedancad level in thla healaphera. V^|e|«^ <r»«.\4, 
provide radio, televlaion and nevapaper intarviewa 
with two reaearchera who have coapiled a report on 
Sandlnlata hnaaa righta vlolatloaa. Thay could be 
coaalaaloned to do an update on their report with a 
trip to Hottduraa and Coata Bica. On their return 
thay could hold a Waahington newa conference and 
laaaa a report to Congress through a respected 
Saaator or Congressaan. 

F. The Revolution of 1979 hea been betrayed by the 
Sandinistaa. I.B.C. would produce a newa apot for 
satellite distribution on the Uvea of three foraer 
Sandinistaa who now fight with tha FDN/UNO. 

PolicTBakera - Wa expect to reach thla group prlaarlly through 
the aedia we will be uaing for Congraaa. However, special 
briefings, either set up by I.B.C. or arranged through a grant to 
another organization, will be used to educate specific target 
audiences within this group. Briefings aay feature drug 




UNCLASSIRED 



687 



UNCLASSIFIED 



R M U u 5 5 



enforceaaoc exptrta 
Cuban •xpaatlonliB. 



or political sclenclsta who have studied 



Fraedoa Flihtar Leadership - I. B.C. will provide spokeeaen 
tralnlni for the leadership and provide Inforaatloo feedback to 
reinforce that trainlat. UNO flgurea will be provided with 
aoalrses that can help shape their public pronounceaents . When 
possible, NEPL will Incorporete the UNO leaderahlp In events and 
briefings that will further their laage of unity. I. B.C. will 
weave this these of unity Into all advertising, Op-Ed ertlcles 
and paid distributions. 

Conclusion - Without an opportunity to see the truth about the 
Sandinistas, the American public and Its elected representatives 
will defeat democracy in Nicaragua. Through Its public education 
prograa, NEPL will give the President a chance to free this 
continent of coaaunisa and strike a decisive blow for deaocracy. 



BNCLASSIfliiiJ 



688 






CO 



UNCUSSIFIE 



f< M UOO 



d b 



BUDGET 



Television Field Projects ($20,000 per monih for^mo.) 



c^; 



siao.ooo 



Personnel 



Equipoent rentals 



Transportation 

Per diea expenses 

Representations 
Studio tiae 

Tapes and Supplies 



-field producer 
-sound aan 
-caaera aan 
-correspondent 

-caaera 

-sound package 
-editing aachines 
-character generators 

-airfares 

-ground transportation 

-local travel 

-itt-countrjr expenses 
-U.S. travel for editing 

-local gratuities 

-in-country studio editing 
-U.S. production facilities 

-tape stock 
-battery packs 
-lights and reflectors 



Marketing of field TV Prograas (ffpr,o jects "i 
Speaking Tour Prograr: ■ — ^ '^tiX- 



$ •»».ooo 



Tour will include: 






-speaking engageaents 
-editorial board aeatings 
-ttlevislon Interviews 
-radio iatarviaws , 



Costs for tours: 

January Co March IS, 1986 

Traval (7 waaks, for 2 speakers, each week $5,750} 

Per diaa for speakers ($150 per day. 5 days per crip, 
7 waaks foe 2 speakers per weak) 

Expenses (ground Cransportaclon , phones, tips, etc., 
$S00 per trip, for lA one week schedules) 

January Lo March Total ($7,C90 average per Lrip) 

fffir II \'\\ 



\ 80.500 
$ 10,500 

$ z^^ooo 




li aua ry te S ep ta a be r T a>al 



^0^ 



'■^ as^ 'V 



K^l 



689 



UNCIASSIFIED 



J~^' 



l\Ji\Mrx^ 






Suppleaencarjr Services, including: 

-postage 

-telephone 

-telex 

-couriers 3 

-translations ($3,000 per aonch, forX>onths) 







Adainist rat ion/Coord inat ion , i ncJud ina :/' Tyvj^^ ^i 

Professional staff tlae of - 2 senior partners I » t)^ )j M 

- 1 senior staff writer \ hr Yy j)^ 

Laceaent - clipping retrieval tr t^ \Jr 

- polling data asseabling 



Verifications of pl« 



Total 



TOTAL BUDGET FOR ^at^nVtrfM^ 



a 



aonitoring network feedback 
($10.900 fui ■yatUj) J \ <k 




.^ 








fr S? - ?.oo y 
















^ ^ '^' r, *"' 






690 



itmsw 



'i 00005 



Str«ta|le Dcftnit Xaitlttlvt 



Introduction 



Pres 

■est slg 
Soviet r 
Soviet U 
•ohance 
super pow 
The Congr 
Inherent 
about 60 
research 
prograa a 
drawn out 
deploy t 
developae 
while the 



Ident 
nlflc 
elatl 
nlon. 
Aaerl 
era a 
esa. 

In 
per 

and 
t cur 
T 

heir 
nt o 

Unit 



Reagan's 
ant strat 
ona since 
If all 
ca's secu 
draaatlc 
however, 
a fully f 
cent of 
developae 
rent fund 
lalng Is 
own progr 
f new o 
ed Statea 



Strag 

eglc d 
the a 
owed t 
rlty. 
oppor 
has 
unded 
the Pr 
nt In 
Ing le 
laport 
aa and 
ffenal 
laga 



eglc Defense Initiative 
evelopaent In the hlstor 
cqulsltloa of the atoalc 
o be fully deployed It w 
As laportant. It will 
tunlty to establish a la 
been slow to realize the 
on-tlae SDI. It haa on 
esldent's funding reque 
the past three years. 
vels will be consciously 
ant. The Sovleta are d 

are proceeding with an 
ve and defensive strate 



(SDI) Is the 
y of U.S.- 

boab by the 

111 greatly 

offer the 

sting peace. 

opportunity 

ly provided 

St for SDI 

Thus, the 

delayed and 
eteralned to 

accelerated 
glc systems 



/fjL,A^^ 



<ZeU*^^U/yr\i'^ 



The obvious enhanceaent of Aaerlcan defenaes accomplished 
under the Reagan Adalnlstratloas and the proalse of a strategic 
defense prograa are prlaarlly responsible for having brought the 
Soviets to the Geneva suaait. vO Lagging In technology, economic 
vitality, and sophistication,'^ and presaed to commit resources 
elsewhere, the Soviet Union fears the American SDI, because such 
a system and Its foreign policy power implications will be able 
to neutralize the threat of the maaaiva Soviet nuclear arsenal. 
The Inability to maintain the credible deatructiva capability 
threat of that arsenal nacaasarily waakans the Soviet 
power/intimidation position via-a-via the United States and with 
regard to the rest of the world. 

It 1* m common threat of Soviet foreign policy to threaten 
to raia 4owm awaaomm nnclaar destruction on nationa the Soviets 
wish to inflnaaca through naked nuclear intimidation. Every 
Soviet lmm4mr raises the threat. Gorbachev used it Just la 
month im m latter to the greater London City Council. Thlsy(ls of 
special an4 importaat relevance to^oviet ralation^w^th^hlna, 
Vaatern Europe, Cuba and Japan. Tt* fully daployVd" Strategic 
Defense will confront the Soviets with a new reality, one which 
will require a more credible and neeeaaarily more peaceful 
behavior in the world arena j-*^ Jaa ^ U*^ gt. o^rtu.^ 

The Soviet Union failed to win concessions on SDI In Geneva. 
But it expended tens of millions of dollara in the months leading 
up to Geneva in atteaptlng y> ^Ai».P» European and American public 
against SDI. So ^ QiY t W e' is SDI's failure 






opinion 
strategy 



that the Ruasiana have continued to use 

DHCIASSIFIFO 



Soviet 
their vast 



691 



UNCUssra 



R M U0 59 



resources la • pro 
ReagsQ Adalnlstrat 
have b««a glvta. t 
June suaalt la Che 
■ore clae for the! 
ther Bay aCtaapC t 

The SoTlet Cai 
7^ 



pagaoda and dlsinforaatloa struggle against the 
loo's proposed systea. Although other ressons 
he Soviet delay until Septeaber of the proposed 
United States Is designed to give the Russians 
r efforts to weaken the President's SDI. Also, 
o aake it an election Issue this fall. 



ipalgn to Capture Aaerlcan Public Support 



Make no alst 
Aaerlcan Strategic 
territorial safety 
ability to use ch 
and blackaall ot 
Soviet supreaacy. 



ake about It. The Sovleta genuinely fear a^ 

Defense. But that fear does not concern their 

Rather, that fear concerns their continued 

e threat of nuclear annihilation to Intimidate 

her nations Into subaisslon or admission of 






With draaatlc full-page advertlseaents In aajor newspapers, 
scores of television Interviews, books, articles, front 
organizations and genuine governaental propaganda efforts, the 
Soviets are apendlag allllons of dollars to prevent SDI froa 
going forward as the President desires. Hever have the Soviets 
wanted so desperately to block an Aaerlcan defense proaraa. They 
understand well the power of Aaerlcan public opinion on 
governaent policy. 

Although recent surveys Indicate that Aaericans favor a 
workable alternative to autual assured destruction (MAD), ancl- 
nuclear Interest groups have largely fraaed the SDI debate and 
succeeded in distorting public perceptions of what has laaentably 
becoae well known as "star wars". Here the l B pl<{Latltf i» is on war 
to the delight of the Soviets. 



bolstered in their efforts by those In 
key arguaents: 



# W»*— ^^tiygytTrr* sever 
'T>xa^ v|)A.«A^Mlrv. uA14, 



The Soviets ere 
Aaerica who oppoae SDI 

«H{^ will never work; 

--^ aeans tha allltarixatioa of outer space; 

•:^4« escalates tha eras race; 

•o-Cka research could go on indefinitely; 

-^fe* coats too auch; 

-*^ la aaclear; 

• g^ violates the SALT II agreeaents. 

These arguaents. coablned with public end legislative 
concern about balancing the budget, resulted in Congressional 
funding of only 60 percent of what the President requested for 
the first stsges of SDI research and developaent. The Spring 
Isgislstive calendar will provide a window to secure full funding 
for the President's package and bring the prograa's tlaetable. up 
to date. V^ aust use this window of opportunity i^ A.5u/i^xDu\. civiUJU.t(^: 






ONOLASSIFIED 



692 



mmm 



^ '^ uaoo<o 



Ob1«ctlv«s 



6lT«a th« hl|h aoral lapcratir* of Straoglc Dafcnac for our 

loag tar* aacarlty aad posalbla paaca, tha National Endowaant for 

tha Praaarvatloa of Llbarty baliavaa that tha currant prograa for 

Strataglc Dafanaa ause ba raallsad. Tha aeonar tha battar. To 
halp aducata and lafora Aaaricana about 



e> ^ . n « - "*• natura of th« 

Strataglc Dafanaa concapt. tha Endowaant la conducting a aultt- 
facatad public aducatlon and Inforaatioo prograa ualng a 
coablnatlon of aadia aad praaa actlvltlaa la ordar to: 

1) ravaal aad countar Sorlat dlalnforaatlon and otbar 
untruthful Inforaatlon; 

2) aducata tha public about tha trua algnlflcanca and 
rola of SDI to Aaarlca'a ailltary and allianca 
aacurlty: 

3) aaaaura, daacriba and publiclza public attltudaa on 
tha SDI; 

4) atudf and raport tha lapact of tha publie'a viawa on 
SDI in aalaetad araaa around tha country. 

Proaraa 

NEPL will bagin Ita prograa oa March 13 and contlnua it 
through Octobar of thla yaar. In thla aannar. tha prograa can 
fully oparata daring tha fraaing of tha dabata in tha priaary 
alaction cycla la tha Spring. Ita tiaing will aaslaiza its 
aducational possibilitiaa. At tha saaa tiaa. it will bring 
public attltudaa to baar oa tha caatar of tha dabata. tha U.S. 
Coagraaa. Tha prograa will includa tha fellowiag activitiaa: 



^^ 



Praaidaatial Maaa^a - A .hort »idao-tapar"aWi?iiaaV'by 'W^J^ * 
tha Praaidaat which caa ba ahowa to orgaaizatioaa around " "'"^"'^^^ 
tha country, •• wall aa to participating groapa la tha " 6*V*~y . 
prograa. It'a affactivaaaaa will dapaad oa tha uaa of *'*'*T\^^ 
tha Praaidaat'a eeaaidarabla coaanaication akilla to aat A^,«rvi*— ^ 
oat Cka aiiaiflcaaea and iaaortaaca of SDI to tha world vTi,*ui-»r 
aad tha aaxt gaaaratioa. (Ji^^ wu,^ J^ ju^^iiUE^^ ^Ji/u..,^!^^ 
TalaTiatoa Edaeation - Fl/toaa and 



d 

d 

in othar iaaua dabataa la tha paat, 

tha prograa. ($800,000.00) 



will ba tha haart of 



gaaaratioa. QS^Jlv wu-^ J*. ju^i^^Ji^i.'N 

ttcatioB - Flftoaa and thirty aacond ' 4/f6iA*, .* i^ 

tala»iaioB aaaaagaa placad in earafnlly aalaetad aarkata 5 * y 

during critical atagaa la tha prograa aad la tha public *^ C****^^ 
f*^*5V T**^* •^«5«tioaal activity, pro?aa ao auccaaaful fLuvoMnC^ 

^^ 



Wawapaoar Inforaatioa - Full paga aaaaagaa (aavaral 
theaaand worda in tha Naw Tork Tlaaa, tha Waahlngton 
Post, USA Today and in at laaat 20 aajor nawapapara In 
kay aarkets acroaa tha country. Thasa will lay 
aapocta of SDI in data^l . ($283,000.00) 



UNCLASSIHED 



693 






■mm 



Talk Showi/Inttrvlewt - Proaotlon of appearances by SDI 
expert* oa oatioaal end local televlsioa public affalra 
prograaSi talk shows sad InterTiev progress where 
dlacussloo of SDI will take place. ($60,000.00) 

Op-Ed Articles - Vritlag sad plsceaenc of Op-Ed erticles 
in nstlonsl, regloasl and local aewsspers. The 
educetloasl srtlcles will be both ghost-written for the 
signeture of notsble public figures, and will be written 
bj soae of the figures theaselves. ($10,000.00) 

Tel elision/ Video Prosrea - Production of a 10-15 ainute 
video feature auaaariting the key issues surrounding the 
SDI debate and atating clearly the consequences of a 
fully-funded SDI for Aaerica'a increased security and 
the cause of s Just peace. ($100,000.00) 

Coalition Buildlna - Tha National Endowaent for the 
Preservatioa of Liberty is convinced thst the SDI is a 
highly significant crucially iaportant prograa which all 
Aaericans have a aoral and patriotic obligation to 
understand and Judge. Therefore, NBPL will aggreasively 
incresse the poesible lapact of its progrsa by asking 
its inforaatioa available to as asny individusls | and 
groups ss possible. Support of the President aust) be 
broad based. ^ ^■v'jit/j 




tis 



rrv 






UNCUSSIFIED 



694 



t^j&#^ 



IV 



^ 



^ 



.^"^ 



CO 



; 



BUDGET - SDI PROGXiN ' 

I. B.C. aoathlr f«« Oia.ZOO r^ aoatha) 

I. B.C. Ovarhtad - 20X 
Production of TV Spots 
Media Buys - Placasaat of Spota 
Newspaper Ads - One tine only 

New York Tlaes 

Washington Post 

USA TodsT 

Approxiaately 20 local aarkets 9 $10,000 
TV Prograa - Production 
Honoraria for Op-Ed Articles 

(S articles at $2,500) 




10.000 



Total 






r 










^^.^^ ) ^.<u^ 










695 



ySCLASSlHED 



fi I'i L' 6 3 



THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FORUMS 



Th« SELECT 500 
corroboraelog lar 
Republicans for V 
in 1988. Tht 
adairabl* sarvic 
powerful and wa 
Ceorge Bush Is 
Individuals. To 
■otlvacioo of the 
Many of chese h 
would rather be 
ruin Cha long ter 



of the Aneric 
ga oplnioQ sur 
ice President 
overriding co 
a In the cou 
11 funded act! 

currently vcr 
write off 
se people Is t 
ighly charged 
right than vie 
■ iapact of Ro 



an Conserv 
veys indlc 
Bush as a 
Bponent of 
rse of R 
vlsts have 
J unpopula 
or underes 
o court di 
individual 
torious. 
nald Reaga 



ative Tr 
ate stron 
candidate 

his popu 
onald Re 

yet to b 
r anong 
tlnate t 
saster In 
s love a 

Such a ra 
n's achie 



ust and o 
g support a 

for Presi 
larlty is 
agan. Kow 
e heard f 
nany of t 
he eo^rgy 

the prinar 
gut fight 
entality c 
veaents. 



ther 
Dong 
den^ 

his 
ever 
roo. 
hese 

and 
les . 

and 
ould 



The Vice President needs a 
the high dollar donors in 
perceive hia as a liber 
without deteralnation to 
donors know too little of 
and policies. The Vlce=Pr 
as Much headway as possible 
ignorance. Se needs to r 
support for hla opposltlo 
aiisglvings these people hav 
and other issues crucla-1 
articulating a strong forei 
issues as needed, he can nu 
these people maintain. H 
these people leave their t 
policy expertise and ain 
politics have baaa wroog. 



vehicle vhlch he can 
the conservative rank 
al Repd'bllcaa unsure 
lead in tough circu 
the Vice President's 
esident's opposition 

by playing on such a 
each then in order to 
n. He also has to c 
e about his resolve o 
to activist conservat 
gn policy and reinfor 
lllfy the negative pc 
e Bust coaaunicatc In 
lae with hla confldeo 
dful that paat percap 



utilize to 
s. These 

of hiasel 
astances. 

record, b 
Is going to 
Islnfornatl 

head of^ 
orrect lln 
n foreign 
ive issues 
clng the do 
rceptlons a 

such a way 
t In his f 
tlons abou 



reach 
donors 
f and 

These 

ellefs 

sake 

on and 

oa jor 
gering 
policy 
In 
nestle 
any of 
that 
oreign 
t his 



We recoaaend that wa a 
aoath coaaanclng In la 
Invite 30 to SO of tha 
Vice President coal4 
such as Caatral Aaa 
eleaanti) aa~ tha focna 
use these opportualtla 
would ba r«ealTa4 wall 
a carefolly acrlptad a 
intarchaagaabl* eleae 
quastlons. 



aak to hold 
ta January 1 
SELECT 500 
ba requested 
rica or Aras 

eleaent of 
• to eitrapo 

by this unl 
vent, using 
nta and well 



at le 

986. 

" con 

to s 

Cont 

the p 

late 

que a 

a pra 

prep 



aat 

Fo 
trlb 
peak 
rol 
rogr 
on a 
udic 
ctlc 
ared 



one dlnne 

r each ev 

utors and 

on a par 

(Sac at 

aa. Howe 

11 the is 

nee. This 

ed speech 

answers 



r aeeti 
ent we 

others 
tlcular 
tached 
ver, he 
sues he 
will r 
with s 
to fol 



ng per 

could 

. The 

issue 

focus 

might 

felt 

equire 

everal 

low-up 



WHT "Tha Future of Freedoa Foruas"- 



Wlthout soao fora of ongoing prograa, this will be viewed as an 
atteapt to uaa tha foundation to further George Bash's caapaign 
strategy. We aust ba conacious of the need to preserve the 
Foundation's Independence of action, nonpartisan focus and not 



BNCl/ISSinEO 



696 



ONCLASSIRED 



R M C' 6 4 



to confuse a progran to develop a truly Aoerican foreign ^nd 
fflonetary policy with an totalembrace of the Vice President's 
candidacy. ' 

PURPOSE- 

Th« coostrvatlT* political leaders to be effective in 1988, auat 
■ove now to shape foreign and nonetary policy before the campaign 
shapes it for them. With a thorough program designed to develop 
the policies that will govern us into the nezt four to eight 
years, we can be assured that the historic gains nade by 
President Reagao from 1980 to 1988 are not Just held, . but 
strengthened and fulfilled. 



MECHANISM - 

We recoaaend that we 
dollar activist cont 
Leon Hess, Sandra 
Conservative Trust's 
the Vice President' 
These gatherings wo 
FORUMS.'' Each potent 
opportunity to hear a 
foreign policy. Th 
perpetuate the Reag 
They would be told 
series to establish 
United States. The 
appreciated and is 
with Ronsld Reagan's 



hos 
ribu 

di 

sen 
s o 
uld 
ial 
nd s 
•T 

an a 
that 

pol 
Ir 

vita 
firs 



t saa 
tors , 

Port 
lor c 
rgani 

be e 
parti 
peak 
would 
ccomp 

this 
icy g 
help 
1 to 
t ter 



11 neet 

such 
Inova 
ontribu 
zation 
vehts o 
cipant 
directl 
be en 
llshaen 

■eetin 
oals fo 

and d 
preserv 



Ings 
as Pa 

using 
tor 1 
or a 
f th 
would 
y wit 
coura 
ts an 
g ts 
r the 
Irect 
e the 



of invited 

tty Beck, 

either 

1st, nane 

coabinati 
e "FUTURE 

be told t 
h the Vice 
ged to att 
d agenda 
part of a 

next Pres 
ion would 

gains aa 



senl 
Bunk 

the 

s sup 

00 o 

OF 

hat h 

Pres 

end 

af te 

non 

idcnt 

be 
de b 



or high 

er Hunt, 

Aaerlcan 

piled by 

f both. 

FREEDOM 

e has an 

Ident on 

to help 

r 1988. 

partisan 

of the 

greatly 

eglnning 



We recoaaend that we aeet and discuss a schedule at the earliest 
possible aoaent with the Fund staff. 









697 



UNCUSSIHEG 



We reco==end che following focus elecents: 
Central America 



"' ^t.o.,-; 



This regiOD la growlag at an Isaut for Aaarlcans. Uof ortunately the 
political laadablp la this couatry haa not factd up to tha realicv 
that wa arc faca-to-faca with a Soviat clleat atata oo our aalnland. 
With tha azcaptioQ of prasidaot Raagao. Aaarlcaa polltlciana have ooc 
lead tha vaj to ridding tha contlnant of thla threat. 

Tha Strategic Defanse Initiatira 

Tha concapt of a unltad fraa world la worth protactlag. And a defense 

atratagy that protecta tha fraa world without killing people la worth 

protecting through Ita Infant staga. No ona in their right nind wants 

tha U.S. to fund a prograa of lasara or othar high-tach space defense 

systeas if it can not work. But, wa auat not lat pasa an opportuaitf 
to aaka it work. nor tha proapacts that auch success would hold for 
tha childran of tha free world. 

SoTlat Eipanaioniaa 

Tha Soviata occupy aora countriaa throughout tha world than any other 
nation. Including thoaa nations sobjugated in Eastern Europe we have 
a frightening pictura. But thara ara algns of straaa and fatigue in 
tha "Iron Curtain." Wa, tha deaocratic world, auat find avery way 
possible to aaaura that tha next generation of Russiana are oore aware 
of the world as it really is rather than tha world according to TASS. 

Deaocratic Elections 

Deaocratic elections ara wall overdua in the Phillipines and would 
saaa to ba a auccaas in Guataaala. Countriaa that are voting 
deaocracles dasarya all tha help Aaarlca can lend. We should serve to 
strangtban our coaaittaant to Daaocracy through our foreign aid 
prograa and trada policias. 

Fraa Prasa 

Tha right of deaocratic people to hear the troth is paraaounc. Any 
country that abridgea freedoa of the praaa ahould ba reainded that our 
help is f-ivea flrat to thoae that adhere to all deaocratic principles 
and not Juat tha few a goTernaent finda uaaful. We should actively 
support efforts to pat third world nationa in touch with space age 
inforaatioo technology. 

Terroriaa 

Terror aa a weapon in nationalistic and international comoumst 

aovaaanta aust be stopped cold. Those who use terror to intimidate 

deaocratic nationa should pay a high and swift price for their 

actiona. The President and tha executive branch should begin an 

effort to coordinate with our alllea to ataap out terrorist cells 

rcgardleaa if they have acted in proven efforta or not. We should 



support ailitary operations that answer terrorists. 



We ha ve much t< 



llNClASSro 



698 



ONCLASSinED 



fi M 'J 00 66 

contribute to such actions and any A.Tierican would be proud to say - .s 
nation had helped to crush terrorism. 

South Africa 

This adaialatratloa atteapta to pit dcaocracj agalnat raclsa la a test 
of our ability to changa govtroaeats without reaoring thea. la tha 
world thara will alwaja ba aoral laauaa that wa caa aot changa, this 
la not ooa of thaa. If wa can continue to reatrlct our Inyolvement 
with tha South African govarnaant whlla aeeklag to up lift tha South 
African peopla, wa will achlava changa. Aa a balllgarent outaldar w« 
can hopa to accoapllah nothing. 

Mlddlc-eaat polltlca 

Va did not stand bahlnd Israal In har threa wara for Independence to 
give her up now. She la tha syabol and hopa of an entire people. As 
the partlea to a peace aettleaent aove cloaer together, we oust be 
prepared to uae all our national raaolva to force thea to aucceed. If 
wa auat put peace above frlendahlp, tha world will be the greater 
loser. Any peace auat ba Inclualve and peraaneat. 

The Third World 

The Sovleta have aucceeded In Inatalllng far too aaay Marxist 
governaents In areaa where they provide no buaaaltarlaa assistance at 
all. We aust start putting a price on our help. . .deaocratlzatlon. If 
we are to lead tha world to a freer ezlatenca thea wa auat free those 
that Buffer froa abject poverty aa we work. But, the goveroaents of 
theae people aust understand that support for deaocratlc government 
and the econoalc freedoaa that entails are the surest road to our 
help. 

Dnlted Watlona ^ 

Tha UN la a good forua for our vlewa, but It haa becoae the Soviet's 
favorite weapon to aabarraas oa. Aab. Clrkpatrlck ahowad the world 
that aueh a body woald aot ba takaa lightly by tha US aay longer. Ue 
aust use tha UN aa a forua to challenge tyraaay and to realnd those 
that seek our help la private and acorn ua In public, that there is a 
price for auch actioa. 

Nuclear Bulldap 

The Reagaa Adalnstratlon la proud that It created a nuclear arsenal 
that la aacond to none. Afterall, to be aecond to a nation that has 
Invaded Its aalghbora and projected allltary alght Into conflicts on 
other coatlnaata would ba foollah. The reapoaalbla leadership of this 
nation knowa that wa anat reduce the world'a aaclear arsenala but not 
at the price of aggraasloa by tha Sovleta. VHiatavar wa agree to with 
tha Soviet Union auat ba fully verifiable and alaad at the total 
ellalnatlon of nuclear weapona. 



ONmm^n 



699 



UNCUSSIFIED 



International Environaent fj; [^j Q Q Q 6 7 

The United States has been a leader on international eovxronoenta ; 
issue*. Whila our governoeat never seeas to aove fast enough for the 
eavironaental actlTiats, wa aoTa wall ahead of ochera oo this issue. 
Our baa oo whallag ia coapleta and wa have Inatltutad a 200 alle llait 
for fishing to aroid tha overfishing so coaaoa to the Asian basin. 



ONCmSSIRED 



700 



R 



000068 



NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY 
TERRORISM: A U.S. RESPONSE 



INTRODUCTIOH ^^ 

Tcrrorlsa is th« scourge of civillzsd a«tlons--and It Is 
growing aor* prsvslcat. Thsrs wars tn sstlastsd 3,000 docuasottd 
terrorist Incldsnts throughout ths world la 198S, of which about 
ons-thlrd wsra dirsctsd at buslnass and Industry. Vcstara 
daaocratlc nations, whsra a»aj of tha terrorist Incldaots occur, 
appear powerless to contain It— auch less to bring It to an end. 

To Increasing degrees, terrorlaa prevents the freedoa of 
Boveaent, Inhibits tourlsa, discourages Investaeat and haras free 
trade. The verj liberty tha United States cherishes Is 
threatened. — ~^ ^ 



ISSUE 

Except for sporadic actions carried out by Israel, the use 
of terror to achiera political ends appears to go on virtually 
unchecked. In Great Britain, following tha killing by Libyan 
agents of a policawoaan on the streets of Loadan, dlplooatlc 
relationa were broken with Libf«. But trade was unaffected. 
More recently, Italy end Geraany^ h»ve been reluctant to iapose 
any sanction» on Libya, the assuaed lair or sponsor of 
terrorists, because of dependence on Libyan oil and to protect 
tha current voluaa of trade. 

What is eaerging, it Is clear. Is the supplanting of 
diploaacy by tarroriaa as a kef deteratner ef actlona of states. 
Whan England, It*ly, Franc* sad Garaany fall to take action, when 
Yugoslavia glvaa rafugc to tha aasteralnd of the Achille Lauro 
hijacking, they laTlta further actloaa. Aad leaser statea are 
cowed into slleaca aad iaactloa. 

The Salted States hss placed counter-terrorlsa aaong ics 
forelga policy priorities every year for aearly a decade (the 
State Dapartaant a counter-terrorlsa office was established In 
1977). Bat beyond solaan pronounceaents and routine 
coadeanatioas, we have done little to counter this scourge. 

Nuaeroua axguaants are oftea cited as reasons for not taking 
consistent, direct actioa: 

--we have no Interaatlenal support 

--we are not tha world^s pollceaea 

— it would engender retallatloa aad coatlaue the cycle 

— it aakea ua aa bad aa the terrorists 

--we doB^t know precisely who end where the- terrorists are 

--counter-terrorlsa does not address the "root causesT ~ 



UNdASSIFIED 



701 



UNCLASSIFIED 



R M IJ 00 069 

--we lack the resources to be effective. 

Such arguacnca pal* la ch« fact of dictator Chaddafl's 
rccaoC Chrtat to briog torrorlsa to aalnatreat USA. Tha tragic 
daatructloa of aa Intaroatlonal alrllna flight ao routa froa 
Canada to Englaod ahowa how aaallj It can ba dona. A larga boab 
la tha U.S. Capitol 00I7 a faw aoatha ago ahova Juat how 
vulaarabla wa ara. Fldal Caatro uaaa Intarnatlonal narcotlca 
trafficking aa a aaana to flaaaca hla tarror natwork. 

Today thara ara aa aaay aa all alllloa illegal allana In 
tha Ooltad Stataa. Our bordara and our airporta ara poroua. Aa a 
frea. opan aoclaty, wa ara aora vulaarabla than aoat. Tat, we see 
tha baglaaing of raatrlctlooa on our llbartlaa whan tha White 
Houaa. tha U.S. Capitol. tha Departaaot of State and other key 
bulldlnga raaaabla araad fortreaaaa. 

Unfortunately, too aany pollcy-aakara ballera that all we 
have to do la hire aora guarda, build aora barrlcadaa and use 
aora aatal datactora. Whan Innocent children ara atruck down In 
airporta, no one can ba safe. Tha aolution ia not to convert our 
public placaa and laatitutlona Into fortreaaaa. Tha aolution la 
to counter tarrorlaa in a concerted, direct and cohaalva faahlon 
at tha Intarnatlonal level. To do ao, howavar, wa auat begin at 
hoaa by developing a national policy conaaaaua for actioa. 



OBJECTIVES 

Tha National Endowaaat for tha Praaarvation of Liberty is 
uadertaking production of a televlaion prograa on tarrorlaa aa it 
ezlata today. Ita objective la to produce raaoluta, flra action 
on tha part of tha U.S., leading to intarnational agraeaenta and 
cooperation. Specifically, NEPL aaaka to obtain: 

— a Praaidaatial declaration of national raaolva; 

— a broad coaaanaua for a new national policy; 

— a Congraaaioaal raaolution aapowering tha Adainlatratlon 

to puraaa iatarnatioaal objactlvea; 
— aa' lataraatioaal conference bringing together other key 

Vaatara daaocraclaa; 
—lataraatioaal agreeaant on Joint actiona; concerted 

aaactloaat and aaalatanca to alliaa auffaring econoaic 

hardahlp bacanaa of the aanctioaa; 
—a flra, blading aultilateral treaty. 

Given thaaa objactlvea, NEPL'a nationwide caapaign la 
daaigned to educate tha public on tha iaauaa and deaonatrata that 
aolutloaa ara withla reach. It will aotlvata laadara to act; and 
Indicate tha appropriate couraa of actioa to achieve eatabllahed 
goala. 



Mm\m 



702 



1 

I 



UNCLASSIFe < 



SECTION S 




703 



UNCLASSIFIED 



= 81 T >.:..p 4Cc:jN:r i.- ■ >- t-ic POLLCKif.; 

SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS SlMtO eELQW 

l> l-i U 'J J ij / 



OATE 
07/15/85 



ACCOUNT NO 
1 230 67 



DESCRIPTION 
OEBIT/FEOERAL RESERVE WIRE 
IREF ) IF 61201 



INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CONMUNICATIO 
1607 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE NW STE 300 
MASHINCTON DC. 20009 



I30t000.0( 



ALL ITEMS ARE RECEIVED SUBJECT TO THE TERNS ANO CONDITIONS 
OF THE DEPOSITOR S AGREEMENT AS PRINTED ON THE SIGNATURE 
CARDS CURRENTLY USED BY THIS BANK 




07151504 



*Mw/flfi/ 



704 



'f>f 



-m//: 



OATE 
''9/05/85 



'■H2 N&IIONAL BAN(C Of KAihjNCIUN 
we OCBIT YOUR ACCOUNT WITH THE fOLLOHJNC 
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS STATED BELOW 




'AC 



ACCOUNT NO 
1 230 67 



DESCRIPTION 
DEBIT/FEDERAL RESERVE MIRE 
(REF:) (F llin 



ft M UaOJ7;^ 



INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CONMUNiCATIO 
1607 NEM HAMPSHIRE AVE NU STE 300 
WASHINGTON DC. 20009 



S30f000.00*« 



ALL ITEMS ARE RECEIVED SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
OF THE DEPOSITOR S AGREEMENT AS PRINTED ON THE SIGNATURE 
CARDS CURRENTLY USED BY THIS BANK 




I A •'. M««I«IH <CIUtOMJ0aiH*<T 



wmmm 



705 



UNCLASSIFIED 



K i'i b v.. J J / 5 



!^st ^^t ' V\.\s rjt./t 



^ms^m^m 



mfm 



iiwssife 



706 






A 



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i V / LI / 4 / ■: with b k 

i '.'■-' /C'^n .customer 

: /'l<A/ch*t 9«s 

! /.: /Of- to fci- mt 



,.'<.' S*P 1 ■-":-:• 

1 .-(I I, (.U.K.). (.11.) 

1 N I L Ifl >■■■ I Nt- •, (. unnUN 1 1. M I i UM':. 
1 NfciW'.i's .-! .-! 

national t^ank ot luashinston. th< 
ti/ashins> ton. >i c 

i.KtUI r •rWli.o 
ijtNtVA iWll ZbKLHNLi 

LAKb KtiUUKLtb. INI. 

bbN 

HI 1 N S .JAi. i.'b iltOtK 



OHCUSSIHED 



707 



wmsm 



0' u U J / 



E NATIONAL BANH OF WASHINGTON 
WE 0E9IT rOUR ACCOUNT WITH THE FOLLOWING 
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS STATED BELOW 



DATE 
09/26/85 



ACCOUNT NO 
1 230 67 



DESCRIPTION 
DEBIT/FEDERAL RESERVE WIRE 
(REF:| (F '►298) 



INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COHHUNICATIO 
1607 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE NM STE 300 
MASHING TON OC. 20009 



SIOO.OOO.OO* 



ALL ITEMS ARE RECEIVED SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
OF THE DEPOSITOR S AGREEMENT AS PRINTED ON THE SIGNATURE 
CARDS CURRENTLY USEO Bf THIS BANK 



.^■?i^':f. 



■ »u.i wnwNi 



^^ ■ m »|g j y 



02600257«] 240. 



054000072 



'Mm THE NAT10^4AL BANI 
mW, OF WASHINGTON 

"Jr» a ,.^ '•'^^- OUTGOING "^^ 



'i298H- »100.QQa:.D0inD ' 



OMOWMO lAMK AMO AILATtO QATA 

NATL BK UASH/ORU" JEFFREY II KEFFER 






BARCLAYS PLC/CTR/BBK-FOR TRANSFER TO BARCLA ■ 
Y BK, GRAND CAYnANBR.OEOROETOUN.ORANCrCAYnA 




H ISLAN0S/BNF-i:C. INC//18e8AS» 




•" •^•^."•v^"'-t»t!'»:.if?^ 



.ACCOUNT NUUtlM v-^r. „.- ' . 

/'j;V.-fc''->^^; , ■ ' '■'■ ■■^- ■ 

OUPONT '^y v=^V • , . -^ ; 



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wmAOl ACKNOWLIOOCUINT 



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09261339 E15A4 0036««0926133^tElW31'0Ma^i^i> >='-'-%'•■•'• 







lil T.iii f-^TIONAL BANK 

Sfofwashincton 



708 



WIRE TRANSFER FORM > . N? 056800 




ADDRESS 1S23 New 



•-#■ 



ACCpUlNfT » 
WIRE TO: 



Himshlre Avenue, N.iW»y'»200/T<iMhlngton, D.C»*'^3003<^^ ' -- 



BANK Barclay's Bank -'Grind Cayaan Branch 

CITY, STATE. COUNTRY ' " ----j - 

BENEnCIARY '^ " ^" 



I.e. Inc. 



rAMoiJNT <ioo.ooo.oo ^ 

Georgetown,- Grind Cayman lalawls .f!^'.^*'^- - v*^.*'- / - ■ 



#; 



BENEFICIARY'S ACCOUhTT i 1888659 



iii^^^^f^^^^^^^^^W^^- 



BY ORDER OF Jeffiw M. Keffer ''"" ' 1^ '^^^^^•^' ^•' " 



INFORMA TION AN D/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS " 



^Sf»' 



The undersigned agrees th»t the National Bank of Washington ("NBW") shall not be Uable in any manner what- 
soever for any miscarriage, mistake, delay, misfeasaoi^ or non-feasance on the part of any agent or agency seleaed 
by NBW, and further releases NBW from any and aU Uability for any loss or damage caused or occasioned by any 
aa or thing beyond the immediate direa control of NBW. and NayCshall not be liable or accounuble for any ac- 
tion taken or omitted by i( in good faith in accordance, with the instructions contained herein. . • ^'\:'- \^ ■ ■ i 



CUSTOMER'S SIGNATURE 




'm 



?rv :''»^i^. 



_ FOR BANK USE '•^— '"^ 

"• t ACCOUNT CREDITED 



—. :; LlMilt' BRANCH/DEPT. 

.■■-■'■■ ■- -- »., • •■- ■ ■^t^*Z' ' 

ACCOUNT DEBITED \' 9-liO'^^ (^ '^ ' 



V^?MvTt>rf ACCEPTED/CONFIRMED T.T ' 



> FEE COLLECTED _ 
DWC 



— — *— *r'^ 



WHITE -W1R£ TRANSFER DETT. 
CANARY -CUSTOMER COTY , 

nrac-aRANCH copy 




709 






WIRE TRANSFER FORM 




j,n?,'V!! >! 



DATE: 



TO BE COMPLETED BV CUSTOMER: ' . " _ 

ADDRESS |.< ^^■^M^,.^iJaA ^^>^■cr ll>yr^uc. N.^l). , (A )rt , 5H ( *rnTrO .7)-^ .. ?m? ^ 
ACCOUNT »J^^2.QiflJ2^2 TELEPHONE I i ;? , P ^ ).'?87-r?DQ^ 

WIRE TO: 

BANK 



-R^^^.^s^^-Rf ^AV P(r>— AMOUNT ^gjTO.QOO-QD 



CITY, STATE. -"■rTpv fnrr^^p-^^'^'^i^*?'^'^ ^'^^^'^' - ^ ^ ■ '' ' ^'^^'^ > R(>.)>T . 

BENEFICIARY 1 . ' W-i ' NC t ^ t- 



BENEFICIAR^S ACCOUNT » 1 nOO Cits'? 

BY ORDER OF 



INFORMATION AND/OR. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ?> g#>ftl. NnTfPir ftl< /}1f^i m, ml^^< , 



LIABILITY 



The undersigned agree* th.t the National Bank of Wash.ngionV'NBW) shall not be liable m any manner what- 
ever fo^^m.LImage. mUtake. delay, m.sfeasance or non-feasance on the par. of any , gen. or a^-cv "l.aed 
b^NSW and further rdeai« NBW from any and all liability for any loss or damage caused or occasioned by any 
a« ofL'JeS ^« imm«li«e direct control of NBW. and NBW shall not be l.able or accountable for any ac 
t.on taken or omitted by it in good faith in accordance with the .nsirucionj contained heretn. 



CUSTOMERS SIGNATVRf"^ 



srp."T:?^tA7r(^7Zi" 



FOR.4NKl.SE ACCEmD/CO«.V.ED 

ACCOUNT CREDITED . ■, — BRAI^CH/DEPT 

ACCOUNT DEBITED / P ^<7 <^ ^(^ AUTH. SIG 

FEE COLLECTED r?- C>^ 




DWC 







710 



iFOF WASHINGTON *~-.S.^i-^-^^^ 



•Uc^bi^bi- 




. The undersigned agrees that ihe National Bank of Washington. ("NflW.!') shall not be liable in any manner what- s. 
soever for any miscarnage, mistake, delay, misfeuance or non-feasancfeon the part of any agent or agency- selected < *"• 
by NBW. and further releases NEW. from any and all liability for any loss or damage caused or occasioned by any-^-. 
act or thing beyond the immediate direct control of NBW, and NBW shall not be liable or accountable for any ac- ^ • 
tion taken or omitted by it. in good faith in accordance^UwheinstrucHons' contained hereiii. <■ .^"rr-v vT./^i ? -, 




WNrrC-WIRE TRANSFER OEPT. 
CANAR V-CUSTOMER COPY 
PINK-IRANCH COTY 



711 



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-l^t-v! '.>¥ nov y? time: It^^O 



cuEt'?iT>«r t^r 



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L'AVllr.s HF i.AYHAVh.N 1. URP ;:.E»'VI' tr 










Lilr (•-•i.wi vj'-'-^.oa/i 







THE NATIONAL BANK OF HASHINGTON 
HE DEBIT YOUR ACCOUNT WITH THE FGLLOMINC 
SUBJECT TO ' CONDITIONS STATED BELOW 



DATE 
11/08/83 



ACCOUNT NO 
1 230 67 



DESCRIPTION 
DEBIT/OUTGOING BANKWIRE 
(REF:) (BSW 06S9) 



INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMON ICAT 10 
1607 NEW HAMFSHIRE AVE NW STE 300 
WASHINGTON DC. 20009 



$40tOOO.OO«* 



ALL ITEMS ARE RECEIVED SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
OF THE DEPOSITOR S AGREEMENT AS PRINTED ON THE SIGNATURE 
CARDS CURRENTLY USED BY THIS BANK 



mmm 



712 



^a^OFWASHINGTC 






TO BE COMPLETED , 



^^096Gai- 




LIABILITY 



if 



1 



-;3 ... . > -The undeisijned aerees that the National Bank ot Waihington ("JMBW_") $haU not bcliable in any manner what 
■- -■!> -.-.J **^" "f°'. ""y ™*carTiage. miJt«ke.;del«y, miifeasancrof non-fesMnce on the part of any agent or agency sele«ed 
, . '-by NBW. and funher relsasa NBJT. fwmanjsaad aOJiatuUty for any loss or damage caiued or occasioned by any 
. act or thing beyond the inunediate,dif«j>j}impt oW3]g£Afiad NBW jhaU no« be liable or accountable for any acw-j 
-"^ v-^on lakm^at (>,T^teA^^ ,n^,A^^^^^j^ jJ^I ^SSiii^ ^ instnigiooa contained herdn.f'^^jUjj^^^^^'t**--' 

CUSTOMERS SIGNATUB»^ \^ 7^{1^ (.^KYli^J^ | 



FOR BANK 



ACCOUNT DEBITED 
FEE COLLECTED _ 







DWG 






"^ WHrrE-W!R£ TRANSFER DETT. 
. CANARr-CUCTOMER COfY 
PINK-IRAMK COPY 






n* 002. V 



713 




;<.!r?r"" unuu?»ni 



OUTGQJiKa 



■vTl 



,\ 



^A/^ DECiei985 

PA06 »1574 . ' ' 



s«nt to I 






UBSWCHZH 

union b*nk of .i-itxorlMd * ' "' ^ ' " - ^ ' 100 01 

Zurich-'"'^ ■. . -. . .. -la.- 



cuttoMor tfr 



d«toi 16 d«c 85 . ""'^^li^ 

T^r/t7n"'"~'''' ^ 8S12i6079lR.v. r .... ;— r" , ■ _■ 

.S2A/V.IU. ' 16 <*•« ^'^^ 

- curr.ncY cod . . USD... _ -goo.OOO.OO -- 

-Amount- '• -^^■- -=a«a.^™-^,«. ,.3...,.., ,r ..,--.-. ...^ 

ISO /ord cutto««r 1 ***'* ,^ 

.52A/ord.rin. bk « ;;;;'J^J? ^^nl. of -a.hin.ton. th. 

» ■ .-> • •>- f w*»hin»tont4 ^.i^i.-.- - spx-io r • i •. 1. n... 

• S7D/%/c -1th b»« -« i^.?",^£®LS56<^^ '■'*'" ''"^^^ i .. •'- 

.„ ,>.. «...-.. .,yc^»^««3^.,^...,. 

■■:5r^5i:*"*«.i.f:V?^»H«??Jsi^^±t;-;;::;;. : 

-AUT/224S 

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•" ••; ! ... _.- »HANtM Dirr. " . . 

-:■::■. •. • . \UTM. Mv- . 



')1!M^!F!ED 



I'i U u 



714 



Sf OF WASHINGTON -->. 



itcy^KI 



^^.;*fV^- ' 09569S 

. WIRE TRANSFER FORM '"'^^^^^^^ 



ftlwi^' 




TO BE COMPLETED BY CUSTOiMER: ■ ,-,- 
ACCOUNT #1£ 



WIRE TO: -*Vf 

, ; BANK J2a^ 

CITY. STATE. COUNTRY 
BENEFICIARY ^ -^Cjb^^ 



. BENEFICIAIO^'S /ACCOUNT «/ l^ff^i^ 



BY ORDER OF . 






INFORMATION ANn/n» ^griAt. instbi ifrriQNS_W.r^i^« k| fr-n r y lYStf (H ii / /^/M a^ ""-r.^ 



UABIUTY 






'"'v'S?' 



The undcnicned acrees that the Nuionai Bank of Waihincioa (*NBW") shall not be liable in any manner what- 
r' soever for any miscarnafc^niistake, detey.mis(f)t>f> or-jioa-fcas«nce.oa the pan of.any ageni or.aicncy telccfed -^ 
* by NBW, and funher releases NBW froaa aay>aad ail liability for any Ion or damase caused or occasioned by any- 
act or thing beyond the immwliatf direa control of NBW.-and J4BW shall not be liable or accounubic for any ac-^ 
lion taken or omined by it in good faith in acoordaace with thc-iastractions contained herein. -. -•'•^°- - " ^■-•~' ; •^'i^-' 



CUSTOMER'S SIGNA 



•'■f -r -••'^•ar''^- K^^A '■ 




wHirE-wiRE -num. 

CANAIlY-OJSTOMEIt GpTY 

nNi^utANCH corv 



715 



ill THE ^4AriQfi^ BAiii 
i3r OF viASHINGTON ^ 







. The uQdi6ii|ncd'i(rea that tltt Natioiul Bank of Waahioctoa (^'XBW;*). thali sm b« llablt in any manner wbat- it; : 
' Y 'ocyc ^^ ipy niicarriaie, iniMakc, dcUy, misfcksaae^or Doo-feuaaoa oa th« part of any accnt or agcocy teteaed-'.? 
- . v: by NBV, and fuithar cdcaica NBW frooaay aod all tiai)yity~far'aay Iom or damage caused or occasioned by any C-^ ' 
'. ■, > '' *A Of thine bcyood the immwtim dirccLcomrol of NBW, and^BW. shall oot be liable or acoounublcfor any ac- f^i' 





WHm-WIRE TKANSFER DEfT. 
CANAJir-ajTTOMEIl COfY j,rvi-\- ^J^ 
riNK-BIUhai COf Y «*-.^ '( *tl'^'' 



716 



P| THE MATIONAL BANK n-^-rno 

■I OF WASHINGTON OSbQI 2 

^. .MAir*im WIRE TRANSFER FORM 



TQ BE COMPLETCO •¥ CUSTOMER: 

ADDRESS I9f;? 5vi>jr>F^J ;-<],>>/ 7> Pu»tnc^ AJ.U.^ l{J^^Lj,^fjrr(^. i 7:>C. '^r^^^ 
ACCXJUNT • / -r>fl y .nr\ ~ ^ : TELEPHONE f < g.QZ. ).-?P?- .Tt^^n-y 



I 



■AKK nflST.t avX Dftf^K KL.Q- AMouwT ■■*: 1 ^ p. <-^j ^^^->. ^y? 

CITY. STATE. COUMTRY (^sz-^rs^ T?^...,>t , /pw asi)> Qf^ym^sf /g/ji..^^ p, ZtJ 7" 

UNEHCIARY Xv TIT/. — CorCJ^fl^ ti^TjfQA^ /»/fl . 

BENEFICIARY'S ACCOUhJT « j ftft P/^-5"9 "' _! 

BY ORDER OF 

INFORMATION AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS "Ptf^jtg ^r^-rfsy /.^^ 73«->/p 

UABOJTY 

Tlw undcniincd atrcc* that ihc National Bank of Washintioa (^NBW") diall not be liable in any manner what- 
sorv«r for any mitcarnatc. mistake, delay, misfeasance or non-reasance on the pan of any agent or agency selecied 
by NBW, and further rdcascs NBW from any and all liability for any loa or damage caused or occasioned by any 
aa or thing beyond the immediate dirca control of NBW. and NBW shall not be liable or accountable for any ac- 
^ tioajtakcn or omiucd by it in good faith ia accordance with the instractions contained herein. 



CUSTOMClt'S SIGNATVU 



'^ <^^ 'p7 :r^:p^ n W : 



FOS BANK USE ACCEPTED/CONFIRMED 

ACCOUNT CREDITED 



ACCOUNT DEBITED. 
FEE COLLECTED __ 
DWC 



wMm-wiM THANsmi oerr. 

CANAAY-CUSTOMEIt COTY 

moc-WAicHcorv 



UNCUSSIHED 




717 



,'l ' '- '^ : I ■! i L S 4 N K OF H 4 5 K I N C. ' 

we oeatT you«» account wuh the following 

SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS STATED 8EL0W 

DATE ACCOUNT NO * OESCRIPTION 

)5/l3/S6 1 007 00 2 OEBIT/FEOERAL RESERVE WIRE 

(REF:l IF 0013) 







INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNICATIO il. 250. 000 0Q«« 

1912 SUNOERLANO PL NW w.«w«.«u 

MASHINCTON 00. 20036 r 

" f'i 00 08 5 

ALL ITEMS ARE RECEFVEO SUBJECT TO TH6 TERMS AND CONOITICNS 
OF THE DEPOSITOR S AGREEMENT AS PRINTED ON THE SIGNATURE 
CARDS CURRENTLY USED 8V THIS BANK 



FT*t1U FT OUTCOINC H8C 

•94MM72 MIS «t ,2S*. ••«.•• 

NATL BK HASH /ORC-INTL BUSINESS COHmmiCATIONS 

"BARCLAYS PLC /CTR/XBK-BNF-INTEL CO OPERATION INC//ACCT 18B8659//PLeASE 

NOTIFY m DAVID PIESINC - eB9/949-S444 



UNCUSSIFIED 



est 3 EtQ(SA2V t3 0S13122B FTSt EINSVPC 



718 



n THE NATIONAL BANK 

y OF WASHINGTON 095699 

uNliLAoolrltU ,.^ ^,/,^ 

TO BE COMPtXTEO BY CUSTOMEK: 

ADDRESS /^/^ ^tif^-srr , >i,u7> Ti^r N.n).^ (a >/l.^^yj,^^., - n .r. a^ ,^ 

ACCOUNT # /0P,700Z^ ■— TELEPHONE I t^Qg, > :^ A 'T^ "^^^ j p , 

WIRE TO: 

■^«" Bflgr t -rtv^ I^ftft/H: PLC AMOUNT ^ r.vo,r>/^/N ao 

CITY, STATE. COUNTRYGco.tftr -m..^^ , Ao«m7> r'flw>r>>^Ai l< i.a^jTs; R fp. T 

BCNEFICIAitY X . (2. Xrac. - 

BENEnClARY*S ACCOUNT i \ fKPiRrj,/r9 . . . .■ 

BY ORDER OF : ^ 

INFORMATION AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Plir^*. ^ ^-,-.,^ /Vt^ /yi^.n..^ 

UABIUTr — ' • — ■- 

■*■ 
The uadmigned urea thu th« Natioiial Buk of WathinatM ("NBW") stwO mx be liable in uy manner »hai. 
SO.W for any miioniitc. miMkc^ delay, misfeasance or noo-feasance oo the pan of «py atcni or M««cy .elected 
by NBW. and funher retries NBW fron any and a|l UabiHiy for any lou or damatc causot or occasioned by any 
M or thin* beyoAd the imnNdiaie direct coocnH of NBW. and NBW shafl «« be llabie or accountable for wy ac- 
tkM takca or omittol by it la food fakk in accardun with the iaitnactioai coMained herda. 

FOR BANK use ACCEPTED/CONFIRMED ^ 

ACCOUNT CREDITED ^ BRANCH/DEI7 O ^//M^7>: ^ 

ACCOUNT DEBITED /^Oc/^Q^ AUTH. SIC. \J kA4[ ^. )^^^ ' 

FEECOLLECTEO \ \//l,/^O^^y^^//)^\ 

DWC C/^''^^^^ t^ 



719 




V^^P 




# 



OUTGOING 
APR09BK 



s«nt to i 
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IREFt) (BSW 4293) 



INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNICATIO S740.000.00** 

1912 SUNOERLANO PL NW 
WASHINGTON DC. 20036 



ALL ITEHS ARE RECCIVED SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
UF THE DEPOSITOR S AGREEMENT AS PRINTED ON THE SIGNATURE 
CARDS CURRENTLY USED BY THIS BANR 



iNClASSinED 



721 



iiNCUSSIFlEO 

,tn o'jr efforts in connect 



!'• I-I U J'J u u 

You are familiar witli our efforts in'connect ion with the CAFP. 
In addition, the funds NEPL provided for humanitarian assistance 
have been applied to particularly worthy purposes. For example, 
your generosity has saved the arm of a little girl who was shot 
by the Sandinistas and paid for the reconstructive surgery in the 
united States that repaired the faces and limbs of young freedom 
fighters. You have also supported some of the best scholarly 
work by Nicaraguans and helped to support education efforts by 
exiles who wanted to being their story to America. 



V-/63 



Adolfo Calero has personally thanked you and me and has written 
to you thanking you for the help we provided to the Nicaraguan 
Development Council. Another major recipient is the Unified 
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) , the political umbrella organization 
of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. As your representative we 
have heard from other officials of the movement, and they have 
gratefully acknowledged the direct assistance we sent on to them. 



IBC also distributed funds through Intel Co-operation Inc. to 
several organizations exempt from American taxation under sec- 
tion S01(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. They are: 

Gulf and Caribbean Foundation 

Friends for the Americas 

Nicaraguan Development Council 

Latin American Strategic Studies Institute 

Institute on Terrorism and Subnational Conflict 

All of these recipients have pledged that their donations were 
used solely for humanitarian purposes and, given the nature of 
their organizations, we are confident that such is the case, 
since it is consistent with their programs in the region. 

Some of the funds, as shown in the attached materials, were 
deposited to the account of Lake Resources, Inc., at Credit Swiss 
Bank in Geneva at the request of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North. At 
the present time we ace unable to obtain from him any information 
concerning the application of those funds after deposit to the 
Lake Resources account. However, we were assured by him at the 
time that the funds were to be applied solely for humanitarian 
assistance. 

If you have any questions about this report, we would be happy to 
discuss them with you. 



BNCUSSIFIED 



722 



723 



CHAPTER 5. NSC STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 



724 



y^c(p^ 



MEMORANDUJf TO FILE 



FROM: BRIAN M. BRUH 



SUBJECT: Iran/Contra Matter 







'zZ- i.^o'^^ ' 



vi 



On Feburacy 11, 19S7, I went to the office of U.S. Customs 
Service which was previously arranged with their General Counsel, 
Michael Schmit^ in order to interview Willian von Raab, 
Commissioner, U.S. Customs. Betty Anderson telephoned me earlier in 
the morning to say that they had scheduled a conference and she 
would call me when he was available to speak with me. Later in the 
morning I received a telephone call from Betty Anderson who told me 
that the Commissioner was available to speak to me. I went over to 
their office and there was a conference call with the Commissioner. 
Present were Betty Anderson, Michael Schmitz, and William Rosenblatt 
of U.S. Customs. I told Commissioner Von Raab both my name and t.^.e 
fact that I was an investigator with the President's Special Review 
Board. He said he would be happy to cooperate. 



Von Raab said that in August 1986 he was over at the white 
House, in Carlton Turner's office, when Ollie North, who he had 
known, approached him and asked to speak to him privately. He said 
that he learned that North had called his office and learned that 
he. Von Raab, was over in Turner's office. North told him "Oar guys 
(U.S. Customs) were giving this man Maule, or company named Maale, a 



hard time. 



*a?s/fe 



Ao<:iii.i_jt 




725 



UNCIASSIFIED 



36:39 



North said that Maule had shipped airplanes Ii)(tt "pipec cubs" down 
south. He said that Maule was "a close friend of the President." 

The Commissioner said that he never discussed the matter with 
North after that or to his recollection with anyone else in the 
National Security Council. He told North he would look into it. 
North did not tell him that the matter was a national security issue 
and he. Von Raab, regarded it as a typical request that he gets from 
a Congressman where the Congressman writes that somebody is treating 
his constituent unnecessarily rough. Von Raab said that sometime 
after the meeting with North, perhaps even a week later, (he doesn't 
recall that he made a special effort to contact Rosenblatt 
immediately), he spokcf with him and told him of North's concern. He 
asked Rosenblatt to give North a call. 

Von Raab then recalls that the next time he had a conversation 
with Rosenblatt was at his farm sometime later. At the 
Commissioner's farm he said that Rosenblatt approached him and told 
him that North had complained also about a customs investigation 
into Southern Air Transport. He further said that Rosenblatt said 
that North expressed a concern that the agents were "excessive in 
their zeal". He said that Rosenblatt had told him that the case nad 
acquired characterstics that made him, (Rosenblatt) nervous, and 
that was the hostage issue. Rosenblatt had said that it was no 
longer just a matter involving a typical investigation or how to 
conduct an investigation in a proper way but it involved national 
security issues. Von Raab he said that their position had been to 
continue conducting the investigations. 

- 2 



icussiBe 



726 



Kussm 



'' -oC-JO 



When asktd if ha avtr rectivtd any other requests Ccoib anyone in 
the National Security Council regarding arms or weapons systems or 
munitions going south. Von Robb answered "yes" one other time. Von 
Robb said a few months before the Maule conversation he had with 
North he received a telephone call from Jack Singlaub whom he only 
knew from television. Singlaub said that U.S. Customs had stopped a 
helicopter from being shipped^^^^^^^^^^ The helicopter had a 
name which U.S. Customs uses to refer to the investigation as LAOV 
ELLEN. Von Robb said that the helicopter was named after the lady 
who donated the helicopter. Von Robb. said that Jack Sing],ip(i^ did 
not represent himself as a government person but rather as someone 
who is representing a private organization. Singlaub had 
recommended that Von R*fb call Colonel North. 

Von jmSto said that Singlaub did not ask that anything i.-nproper 
be done, he merely inquired why the helicopter was being held ap and 
when he found out it was due to a license he indicated that he would 
get such a license. He, Singlaub, recommended that the Commissioner 
call LtCol North in case he had any concerns. Von Robb said he 
called North which to the best of his recollection was the first 
contact he ever had with him. North indicated that the individuals 
involved "good guys." However they are shipping a helicopter that 
is not worth sending tO them. The Commissioner said subsequently 
the paperwork, meaning the license from the State Department, was 
issued. 



Mmsim 



- 3 



727 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



>* ^oC41 



When asked if he received any other calls with regard to this 
helicopter the Commissioner said that he recollects that he got a 
call "from a Senate staffer." The staffer asked the reason why thi» 
U.S. Customs held up the helicopter. The Commissioner said that he 
does not remember who the Senate staffer was and said that his 
secretary keeps no record of his calls more than just for a day. He 
was no further help in trying to identify the Senate staffer and 
said that there was no other information with regard to weapons or 
munitions going to Central America. 

Betty Anderson and Mike Schmi.tz said that they were present with 
the Commissioner when he was interviewed by two FBI agents from the 
Office of Independent Counsel and he related this story about the 
LADV ELI.cn investigation to the FBI agents except for one detail and 
that is he had not said before that a Senate staffer had called 
him. They doubt, therefore, that such a call was made. They 
indicated that they thought that Commissioner Von Raab's memory may 
be faulty in this area. 



J^'^/^ 




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- 4 



728 




729 







730 



JDF:tJnb 
Ki,SP13 



UNCUSSiFIEB 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUThERJi DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 



CASE NO. 85-644-Cr-ATAlNS 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Piaintift, 



JESUS GARCIA, 



Defandant. 



MOTION FOR CONTINUANClt ^r '■- 

ttm Onited Statas, by and through' tha vinaarsignad Assistant 
Onitad Statas Attornay, raspactfuliy raquaats this court to 
continua santancing in this causa for approxiaately 30 days. In 
support of its raquast, tha govarnaant allagast 

1. Tha dafandant is schadulad to ba santancad on March 18, 
1986. 

2. On March 17, 1986 at approxiaataly 4:30 P.M., the United 
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of 
Florida was requested by the Departaent of Justice to 
seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing in this 
cause . 

3. Tha Govamaant in recent days has initiated an 
Invaatigatlon into natters which arise froa this case. 
Tha Cover IMS nt believes that it would ba in the besc 
iataraat of all parties that the sentencing in this 
■atter ba postponed until the Governaent has had eui 
onportonlty to explore certain allegations which eoula 
possibly affect the sentence iaposed on Jesus Garcia. 



jf^yP. 



^^'vaopw MOT pwvioa) 




731 



BNCLASSiRED 



WHEi<£fOR£» the Government respectfully requests 
postpone sentencing for approximacfeiy 30 aays. 

Respectrully submitted. 



By: 



thJs ^c^J)t4-?c 




ASSlSlJan UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certity that a copy of this pleading was mailed to 
John Maddes, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on this /^ day 
of March 1986. 





- 2 - 



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m«n naaad Bvang«lio fenjol told hin that th« plana carried many 
machin* 9on*> automatic riflea, saveral mortars and grenades. 
Mr. Ortega also stated that his brother had been wounded by a 
grenade during a November 1985 raid on Pueblo, Nicaragua. Mr. 
Ortega said that his brother died a short time later. 

At present, we have corroborated that Raul Ortega, Rene 
Corvo, and others flew ^(^ ^^^^|^^|p" June 13, 1985 aboard a 
private cargo aircraft. — ^ However, we have no independent 
evidence that something other than clothing was on board that 
flight. Me may be able to obtain some information in this 
respect from the members of the flight crew and Fanjol. we have 
yet to interview these individuals. 

C0HCL08IOM 

To data, the evidence gathered does not substantiate 
Garcia 's claim that Tom Posey and others conspired to assinate 
O.S. Ambassador Lewis Tambs. However, the evidence does suggest 
that in late 1934 and early 1985 the CNA and Rene Corvo actively 
recruited maxc«n«riee in the Onited State*. These men were later 
sent|^^|^^^^^H^^^^^^^^Bto train and/or anit- 

Sandiniatn contxaa. Tha evidence also suggaata that in 1981, 
Raul Axaaa abippad weapona to tha contraa from South Florida. 



— ^ S«a Appendix B. Xn addition to proving that Corvo and 
Ortega were on the flight, tha Cuatoma'a documents also prove 
that the June ahipment waa made with tha same plana aa the March 
shipment. Although tha pilot in June waa different, Daniel 
Vasques Jr. co-piloted both flights. Daniel Vaaques Jr. ia the 
son of Daniel Vasq>ies Sr., tha man who chartered the plane for 
Corvo in both March and June. 



UHOUSSiFe 






- 19 - 




6^' 



774 



MUSSffl 



J 15450 



However « their is insufficient proof at this time to conclude 
that weapons were iii£u?t aboard the March 6, 1985 and June 13, 
1985 flights. Further investigation may prove these allegations 
to be correct. 

The FBI has requested that we begin a grand jury 
investigation into the activity described in this memo. The 
Bureau believes that a grand jury is necessary for several 
reasons. First, it would dispell claims that the Department of 
Justice has not aggressively pursued this matter. Second, a 
grand jury would eliminate some of the deception they believe 
they have encountered during their interviews with Jesus Garcia, 
Daniel Vasquez Sr., Ronald Boy, and lUx Vargas. Finally, the ^^^ 
grand jury would give the Departaemt of Justice access to CostaV Cjky^ 
Gun Shop's business records and CAMAC's bank records. 

We hkve sufficient evidence to begin a grand jury 
inv^stigat^ion. X believe /^uit a grand jury/fhVystigation would' 
ult^iaately r/kvea^ /orlal^l' Mraivity inclivling (biu running and 
neft trail t^ ^iol«^one./ >* <j< | *■■■ >.riti |ii^^<,.«i «■«•»!■« nf 
tt 



'I 




not 



cceslfUlly yiuil 




such violations could be 
Ida. 







antmsm 



- 20 - 



775 



cmsro 



6-6? 



• • • i^*' 




776 



/ 



Memorandum 



^'^'^ S-JO 



'. no 



M 




J 4627 



Subject 

Requests by| 

for Leniency fori 



To 

William F. Weld 

Assistant Attorney General 

Criminal Division 



SEP 3 0.1986 

JLM : TEM : E JW : JCM : cmc 




John L. Martin, Chief 
Internal Security Section 
Criminal Division 



This memorandum is in response to your request that we 
determine whether any law enforcement or national security 
interests wQi^^J|^^urthere^b^th^earl^release, or outright 

o^HH|^^^^^HB||Hfl^H^^HH^HH^^who is 

to begin servin^|H^^HPmsentenc^^^H||H^H|Htl986 Our 
discussions of this matter with Roger xocnelsono^^^e ffffice of 

It U nited state s At torney 

^^^^.B^-^^ *^ well as 

ir iimrtea review of the file, indicate 

would obtain no benefits from an abbreviation ofl 

already lenient 8«at«nce. The facts are as follows. 





Our review indicat^Bthatth^GoverMaent has been very 
lenient^ln this case. BPHHH^HUHB^^^ allowed to plead 
guilty 'to two count^^^ereby avoiding almost certain conviction 
on th^entireflfli^lB^Bindictinent, which would have exposed him 
to|mi^mBH incarceration. In addition, the Government waived 
it^righ^to seek consecutive terms, paving the way for the even- 
tual sentence of two concurrent five-year terms. In view of the 
serious crimes involved, any further leniency would create a wide 
discrepancy between the nature of his of fense^an^Uie prescribed 
punishment. It should also be note^that^^^HI^^Mis not needed 
to testify in the prosecution of^mHBM^^HQ£^aQ)U that 

srosecution involve classified information whicr 

;ould threaten to disclose publicly diTring the trial. 



In sum, no law enforcement or national securit^interestB 
woi^dbeseryed by extending additional clemency to^^BBUB 
B^^BBBBmT o the contra ry, the law enforcement equities here 
strongly 




These political and foreign policy concerns 
are vague, ambiguous and not clearly articulated. In the absence 
of a coherent statement of the foreign policy stakes, we see no 
reason to reconmiend that you overrule the United States Attorney. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



^V-ci,>i<r. ^, i=TXjVr_+c *72x J 4617 

COHPHOMJIAL 

ilNCUSSIflEfl 

TfflS IS A COVER SHEET 

FOR 

INFORMATION SUBJECT TO 

Basic security requirements contained in Depamnent of Justice Regulations 
(28 CFR Part 17). 

The unauthorized disclosure of the information contained in the attached docu- 
inent(s) could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. 

Handling, storage, reproduction and disposition of the attached documenl(s) will 
be in accordance with policies and procedures set forth in regulations cited above. 



..'^ 



4' 







m 




COMillDEMTIAL 



POtM OOi ^t) 



779 



eisissiF^ 



^RAFT 



J 461 

.7213C 



T7aH/ab EXT. 

ARA:JHniCHEL 

ARA:|iICUAL<ER 
LSHKOZAK 
FBI:OBSEVELL 
p:yUOOD S/S! 




ARA/CEN:RHnELTON 

DOJ:STROTT 

NSC :ONORTH/R BURGH ART, 

S/S-O: ^^p 



EXDIS --^^^^■^■LEGAU attache 

E-0- 1235l>: DECL: OASR 

tags: ^R PRELi pins 

subject: background AND STATUS 0F| 

REF! 



t 



@) 



jHn 

SGU 

UGU 
RHH 



CONFIDENTIAL 



ENTIRE TEXT. 



.OldlN G REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
_ IIS PROVI D£D FOR YOUR INFORHATIO N AND TO 

>RAu UPON IN dT?cussions|H^^IHHH^|^Band others 

AS APPROPRIATE. 

A> IN 
SURREND 



ARRAIGNED^^^^^^B^gUNDER "HURDER FOR HI RE" STATUTES' 
UITH TOTAL PRISON EXPOSURE OfAIH^HHB HE FORMALLY 
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND WAS"RELEASED ON 
HIS OUN RECOGNIZANCE. 




B> IN 



nab. THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY INITIATED A 



mm^B 



780 




IPLEADED GUILTY TO TUO CHARGES OF 
IR HIRE STATUTES. SENTENCING 

ALL INDICATIONS POINTED TO A 
ro SECURE A niNinAL ALI^TENCE BY. 
;00D CHARACTER AND HIS, 



lUAS SENTENCED TO TIdO CONCURRENT 
LPI^ISON TERHS {STATE a33MQ0>. UE UNDERSTAND 
fHAT THE DEFENSE HADE A CONCERTED EFFORT DURING THE 
HEARING TO ALLEGE SIGNI FICANT. FAVORABLE USG INTEREST IN 
■■■and in the case. IHIlitAS SENTENCED UNDER A 
TROVTSION of the LAW THATALCTUED Hltl TO SEEK AN 
intlEDlATE PAROLE. THE JUDGE RECOflHENDED 
ALLOWED TO SERVE HIS SENTENCE AtF^ 

IN APPARENT RESgANSEJO THE DEFENCE'S FOCUS ON ALL EGED' 
USG INTEREST IN^HH THE JUDGE NOTED THAT ■■■ COULD 
CONTINUE TO SEEK EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTION -CE.G.-. PARDON OR 
PAROLE> IF HE SO DESIRED- {THE DEFENSE HAS DEPICTED THE 
JUDGE'S S LATErm T AS HIS ENDORSEHENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
ACTION. > IMfclAS ORDERE DJQ SURRCNDTJ TO PRISON 
AUTHORITIES NOTT.ATER THAN "nnhiiiri-t 



: l^^SURRCND^ ■ 




781 




DRAFf 



H> SINCE THE SENTE NCINg. THE DEFENS E ATTORNEY HAS 
ACTIVELY LOBBIED ' - f^^HHHIHHI N UASHINGTON -- FOR 
US6 INTERVENTION ON BI^^HbEHALFT" OPTIONS PROPOSED BY 
THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYINCUJDED EXECUTIVE CLEflENCY, A 
FINDING OF DIPLOHATIC innUNITY-, USC INTERVENTION TO 
ARRANGE IPItlEOIATE PAROLE'. AND FURLOUGH TO SERVE HlSTERn 
OUTSIDE A PRISON. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOULEDGE ^ #■■ 
HAS MADE NO EFFORT TO PURSUE AVAILABLE LEGAL REHETIES 
CE.G.i PETITIONING THE COURT FOR A REDUCTION OF SENTENCE 
OR INITIATING ACTION UITH THE BUREAU OF PRISONS TO OBTAIN 
A PAROLE>. 

J> THE BUREA U^F PRISONS INITIALLY INSTRUCTEDM 

SURRENDER A T vmHHIHBHHHHHH 

PRESUHABLY IN VIEU OF THE SERIOUS NATURE OF HIS CRIMES. 
{THE BUREAU OF PRISONS IS NOT BOUND BY THE JUDGE'S 
RZCOriMElN DATION REGARDING THE DETENTION FACILITY. > 
■■■IAlOSBYING efforts thereafter FOCUSSED ON AVOIDING 
DETENTION IN A CONVENTIONAL PRISON. ' 



J 4620 



3. STATUS: 



-- THE JUDGE 
DATE FORI 



AS AGREED TO DEFER UNTIL] 
TO BEGIN SERVING HIS SENTE 



THE 



-- THE DEPARTMENT OF JUST ICE HAS AGREED TO RECOfinFNO TO 
THE BUREAU OF PRISONS . THAT^||^g BE ALLOUEi TO SERVE HIS 
SENTENCE AX THE niNinUfl SECURITY FACILITY 



^^^ JaTTORNEY indicates that he NOU WILL ATTEMPT 
TO PEn?SLUDE THE PAROLE COnniSS IAN TO AGREE TO AN EARLY, 
RELEASE {"ZERO TO 




SUCH USG ACTION 

ONV^HBHaCHALF yOULD NOT BE CONSISTED UITH OUR 
OPfOSITION'-TO INTERNATIONAL TERROR ISM -CE-G., THE INTENDED 
ASSASSINATION pHBHHHHHm AND COULD COMPLICATE 
STILL-PENDING PROSECUTION OF OTHER DEFENDANTS IN THIS 
CASE. MOREOVER-. UE BELIEVE THAT U-S. CREDIBILITY WOULD 
BE P OORLY SERVED BY ANY AC TION UHICH MIGHT SUGGEST THATB 

■CAN VIOLATE THE LAW WITHOUT ^ 



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MJNCUSSIFIEO 




27 '^S 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 



9/12/85 

0*M of traKwrlpllen 



RZCHAIU) MILLER, Prcsidant, Int*rn«tlonal. Buslnesa 
Coaauni cat ions, 1525 Haw Baapshire Avanue, R.N., Waabington, O.C. 
(Mix;), talapbona (202) 387-3002, advlaad aa followai 

In April, 1985, Prince BBROBIM BXV ABOOL-AZXZ BIN 8A0D L- 
MA800DY (haraaftar tba Ptinca), a salf-clalaad aaabar of tba 
royal Saudi Caaily, aeaaingly varifiad by tba pablleatioa "Wbo'a 
Who in Saudi Arabia 1976-77," vas tba Viea Prasidant of tba Arab 
Rational Bank, Jlddab, Saudi Arabic. Through that position tba 
Prince told MILLER ba bad datarainad that MICHAEL ARHOOS and B.A. 
VAH BLOIK wara arranging placaaant of a 2.5 billion dollar latter 
of credit for Saudi King FAHD at various banks, including the 
Ifilliaa Penn Bank, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. MILLER 
character lied ARMOOS aa a foraar *gaa sl:ation owner* always 
trying to aake aoney in the eoaatoditlea aarket who waa certainly 
not sophisticated enough to handle aucb a tranaaction. VAN BLOIK 
is allegedly the Security Chief for Philipplna President 
PBROINANO MARCOS. 

Proa bis banking poaition, the Prince interceded in this 
transaction as it was Illegal for Islaaic and Saudi Arabian law 
for King PAHD to lend Saudi Arabian oil aoney at the agreed low 
rate of three percent and then aake a fortune on the apread 
between three percent and the prevailing aarket rate when the 
aoney was reinvested. These actioaa ultlaately placed the Prince 
afoul of King PABD and directly relate to current dlfficultiea 
between the Prince and the Nilllaa Penn Bank, according to the 
Prince* a account to NZLLEX. 

During initial knowledge of the King PAHD/Nllllaa Penn 
tranaaction, the Prince arranged, through ARBOOS, to aeet AMOREN 
PARNBSB, Preaident of Ifilliaa Penn Bank, in Spring, 1985. The 
Prince aalntalns to MILLER that PARMBSE aade the initial offer 
for the Prince to porchasa atoek in the bank and the offer was so 
foraalisad that attornies for the Prince were charged with 
foraulatlng aa opinion on the stock purchase. They advised the 
Prince that the stock offer was both Illegal and a bad 
Investaent. MILLER opined that it was highly laprobable that tba 
Prince would Initiate such a eoapllcated transaction as his 
knowledge of Bnglisb is Halted. 



lfi««sl(fBtlon on 



8/27/85 MashingtOB, O.C. VFO 29A-5S04 

— Fll« • 



8A JANES R. KRANARSIC/sat 



Thlt docum.«it conulm n«Hnw r.eoinn>«»d«f*o*» not 
It MM 111 centanti art not le M dMtrlDutM eutuo* yeui 




•n* m loWM« to voui 



793 

FO-3t)2i (3-8-83) f^ 

mm Aooinrn 

f B 2716 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Conanualian of lnt*rv««w o« . __^ p,., 

Tb« Frlae** appaxABtly at nuonsx's arfiog, did op«a aa 
•oooaat at ViUiaa r«iui aad sifiMd ot«c power of attoriMy to 
nutnn. rAnsn ana tb« vrlaca b«e«a* oloaa ftlonda altbo^b 
I TkMKUE did BOt kaov tb« VciBoa vaa workloq bahlod tha acanaa to 

atop tba pcopoaad Kiuq nED larastaaat. 

•y air wayblU datad April If, l«ts, JO. mASlT lUUOOS 

>TJ»wr.TJi aoat tka Prlaca a efoaok Cor 1250, MO to tiM Vrlnoo'a 
accooBt at ■llliaa Paaa Baak. Thla aoB^y vaa evod thm Vrlaea by 
J>TAM1i>MJI for a ooiaodltiaa traaaaotion. Tka Priaoa told NZLLm 
abeot tba cback aad tlMt WUmUMM had aaavxod tba Prlaca that tba 
i^aek vaa a eaahiara eboek. Baaad ea VkMMMMZ*m aaaaraaoaa, tha 
Prlaoa dlraotad that tha chaek procaada ba dlatribatad to aavaral 
paraoaa laoladla« bla attoraar* OAU BMSAUUtXil, tba trlaea'a 
vifa, NOnsBB nouL, aad $40,000 to PAMXSB'a aoa vbe allafadly 
baa eaaoar. Tbo Prlaca told NZUa that ba baa aavar aaaa thla 
obaek aad praataMa It vaa aadoraad and dapoaltad by roasss. 
Mlixnt oadarataada that thla cbaok eaaaot ba looatad at Wllliaa 
Paaa Bank. 

Shortly af tar Wllllaa Paaa Baak allafadly plaoad 
ALAEDAUl'a ebaefc for collect ioo, tha Vclaea told HlLLn that Xla« 
PAID fooad oat that tha Prlaee had blockad PMD'a l.S blllloo 
dollar traaaaetloo vhaa ALABOAlIJI'a ehc ^k at Wllllaa Paaa laak. 
■Xixn dalaa tha Prlaoa baa a alna ■lUloa dollar balaaea la 
that baak. Xa additioa to blooklag th« Prlooo'a baak aooeaat, 
PhED allafadly evt off all tba Prlaoa 'e ell eoatraeta aad 
pobliabad la Saadi brablaa aavspapara that tha Prlaca bad 
ao—itta4 eboek for9ary at tbe Wllllaa Paaa Baak. 

The PrUoa, as tha Vaubar Tve Xalaale leader la Baadl 
Arabia, baa tha power to jail or evea order tbe eaecatloa of aay 
Baodl Arablaa eitisaa. Based ea thla aatborlty, tbe Prlaee 
ordered tbe jailiaf of ALABOAZAa. ALABBAT.M vaa eveatoally able 
to faia release threat^ tbe iatoreeaaleo of FAID vbee AfABOAT.M 
voat before aa Xalaale jodge aad daaied forflaf thla ebeck. 

■acawaa tbe Prlaee ae loafer baa aoeaaa to bla iaodi 
Arablaa aaaoy aad eaa oaly ratara to Saadi Arabia aadar the 
threat a< )«lliaf or death, wnXBk has beaa assist iaf tha Prlaee 
vikh the WiUlaa Paaa Baak. OLLMM has oorraspoadeaee betveea 
hiaself aad tbe baak ia this afard, iacladiaf a l2S,00e vlre 
traasfer raeaipt represaatiaf peraeaal foada of WXIxn's plaoad 
as 9ood fslth to tbe baak ea tba Priae«*s behalf. 

DarlBf ■■aaar, IMS, tbe Vrlaea, with NXUn'a 
aaaistaaoa, has boea attaaptlaf to pat tofether a Borepaaa 
eeaaodities deal to ears aaaay aad pay off WiUlia Boaa Baak. 
Tbe Prlaee is aapp e a a d to ratara to tbe WDC area ia early 
Bepteabar, If OS. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



794 



FD-SD^ (3^a3) 



ConOnuatton of Intarvtaw a( 




2717 



Slae* tk« Vclae«*« probl«w «itb jllUiaa Vsaa Bu?, tb« 
Wtiuem hma r«e«lT«d naa*rea« calls ttom KMWim KATTKB •«ppo««dl7 
passing oa iasids IsCoraatloa KMm ebtalasd tzom a Haw Tork nx 
A««at aaaad "COOKU" or *C0C04." This laferaatlea allagadly 
pactalBS to tha faot tkat tba nx is raady to arraat tba rcioea 
If loeatad. NXLLBK tblaka BATTXB la aalag tbla iaforaatloa as a 
rasa to arranga oeaaBdlty daala vlth tha Vrlaoa. NXdUll. JUonos 
«as latrodaead to Wllllaa »«aa Bank by lATTKB. 

KATTa, a aaie-dascrlbaa 'soldlar of focta»a«* la 
allagadly tlad to a Wm Tork acaa daalar aaaad tOXXXVMl. UOTWM 
■ay also ba aapleyad as aa afaat for Blag rJUD aad aay ba tba 
eoBdalt batwaaa tba Vrlaea aad rBBD as to tba Vrinea'a blocking 
of FBID*8 pr^osad iavaataaat la O.B. banks. 

ABHOLO yJUOOBB told NZU.BB that ba had raoalvad tbraa 
talasaa ooaearalag MJ>BI»t.M'a cbaefc froa tba Baadl rraaeh Banki 
tba first talas eeaf Iraad tba lagltlaaey of tba aback and fall 
Saodl rraaeh Bank raapmslbllltyi tba aa eoad talaa oeaf Iraad tba 
eback bat aooaptod no raspoaslbllltyi aad tba third tolas aaat 
notloa tba cbaek «aa a f raodalaat traasaetloa. 

HILUB provldad tba foUoviag Zarosad Itaast 

" pagaa froa tha 197C-77 adltleo of nfto's Bbo la 
Baodl Arabia* provldlag rafaranoa to tba Brlaoa 

«> f analog leal chart for Tba Boasa of Saad 

- air waybiU traasfarrlag foads frca AL nABXF MABBOOB 

AMWTWt.TJi to BiUlM faaa Baak 



• latter dated April 1, 19iS aad tales dated 

April IC, IMS ellegadly pertaiaiag to pl a ceaaa t of 
foads at ViUisB Baaa Baak by Kiag FABD 



Its pertaiaiag feo tba offer to sell tba Briaea 
Mares of villiaa reaa Baak 

- fkoto of the Briaee. 



tinmm 



795 






.2718 



Alcccl 



UNCUSSIFIED 



10/31/83 



TO: SAC. PHILADELPHIA (29A-7374) 

PROM: SAC. WASHINGTON PIELO OPPICE (29A-SS04) (RUC) (C-S) 



WILLIAM PENH BANK. 

230 SOUTH BROAD STREET, 

PHILADELPHIA. PENNSYLVANIA; 

BP fc E (A) ; 

MP; PBW; 

(00:PH) 

MOUSALREZA EBRAHIM ZAOEH, ak« 

EC Al; 

BP k E; PBW; 

(00:SC) 



ff- 



1^- 



R«SCt«I CO WPO. 4ac«d 9/S/8S, sad WPO c«l«cyp« Co 
Bureau, daced 9/17/85. 

Enclosed for Philadelphia are Che original and one 
copy of an PD-302 regarding Washlngcon Pleld Office (WPO) 
incervlew of RICHARD MILLER, on 10/23/83. Encloaed for 
Sacraacnco la one copy of an PD-302 regarding che MILLER 
Incertrlew. 

Por Inforaaclon of Philadelphia and Sacraaenco, ou 
10/23/83, RICHARD MILLER advised Chac he has currenc concacc 
wlch MOUSALREZA EBRAHIM ZADEH. aka Ebrahla Al-Masoudy. The 
Prince, ec al. Although MILLER has been previously advised 
that ZAOEH is an Iranian con aan, MILLER Is not Cocally 
convinced ChaC ZAOKH la not actually a Saudi Arabian Prince. 
This is exeapllfled by Che fscc thsc, during che week of 
10/14/83. MILLER wired $2,000 to ZADEH in Swlcterland for 
"hocel expanses.'* However, MILLER ecsced he would coaplecely 

2-Phlladelphla (Bnc. 2) 
2-Sacraaenco (29A-2231) (Enc. 1) 
QJVTQ 

JRK:pag 

(3) 



r'"^ CNWss/fe A^fes 






10. 



796 

L 



IGL 



WFO 29A-5504 V"'-' p g 2719 



cooperate with the FBI to atteapt to lure ZADEH to the U.S., 
If e warrant were obtained for ZADEH'a arrest. 

Inaaauch as no investigation reaains at WFO, this 
case is being placed in an RUC status. 



ii^mm, 



as 



2« 



797 



ro-Mt (HCw >-io-ui 



mmmas 



F B 2720 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIQATION 



omm •( waMcriatiaa- 



10/31/85 



RICHARD MILLER, PrasldanC, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
COMMUNICATIONS. 1S2S N«w Haapshlra Av«au« . H.U.. UmahtagCoo. D.C. 
(WDC), calaphon* auabar 387-3002. advlaad aa followa: 



MONIBREH SHOKRI 
EBRAHIM AL-MASOUDT, who M 
Arabian Royal Paally. MI 
paraonal aad bualoaaa daa 
paaaed a fraudulanc $250. 
Paanaylvanla. MILLER haa 
Bank to arranga a pay out 
waa a raaulc of ctccuaaca 
clalaa to ba a ■ulcl-alll 
Arabia due to rcllgioua a 



-M, Sacraaanco, California, la cha wife of 
ILLER ballavaa la a Prlnca of cha Saudi 
LLER and AL-MASOUDY ara Involved In aeveral 
la. Including allagaclona thac AL-MASOUDY 
000 chack at Wllllaa Pann Bank, Philadelphia, 
aade contact with offlclala at Wllllaa Peon 
on the bad chack. which AL-MASOUDY clalaa 
ncaa beyond hla reaponalblllty . AL-MASOUDY 
lonalre, but whoa'a funda are blocked In Saudi 
nd other dlf f icultlca. 



Becauae AL-MASOUDY allegedly doea not have acceaa to hla 
aoney, AL-MASOUDY requeated MILLER wire $7,000 to SHOKRI-M for 
houaehold expenaea. MILLER coapllad and wired peraonal funda to 
SHOKRI-M, on July 30, 1985. froa the National Bank of Uaahlngcon, WDC. 
In addition, DAVID WILLIAMS, a childhood friend and financial parcuer 
of MILLER'a. wired $11,000 to SHOKRI-N, en Auguat 8. 1985. at HILLER'a 
requeat and for the aaac purpoae. 

MILLER acknowledged inforaatlon available to hla to Indicate 
AL-MASOUDY waa a fraud, but MILLER haa aoae confidence in AL-MASOUDY. 
to the extent Chat MILLER wired AL-MASOUDY, In Switxerland. $2,000 
during the week of October 14. 1985, at the requeat of AL-MASOUDY. 
AL-MASOUDY aald ha needed the aoney for hotel expenaea to continue 
working on ongoing projecta betweaa hiaaelf and MILLER. 




fNCLASSIRED 



10/23/8S 



Waahlngton. D.C. WPO 29A-5504 

rm m 



SA JAMBS R. KRAMARSIC:pag 



10/23/85 



_QM««cutaa. 



I M mim I* r* 



798 






FORMS. TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT 

INBOX. 5 (#711l") ^r-cn. 

TEXT: 

VZCZCWF0ai3 .p.... 

RR HQ 

DE'l^F 0013 1361744 

ZNY SSSSS 

,y'l61739Z MAY 86 

\l -^-M: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE 

TO: DIRECTO R, FBI ROUTINE 

ATTN: INTO 

BT 



UNClASSra 



•-3 





i(P) (CI-9) 




^f 



BWriJI; FCI-NU; 00:WFO 

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET." 
REFERENCE CONFERENCE BETWEEN WFO AGENTS AND DEPUTY 
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR PARKER AND UNIT CHIEF EGBERS ON MAY 9 AND 
MAY 12, 1986. THESE CONFERENCES CONCERN THE POSSIBILITY 
.OF AN tfTTVP MP&crippc Dpnffp>M URinn n^j^CTED AGAINST LtfUTtNANT 



)NEL OLIVER NORTH. 



RNC 



>•> 



OE-198 



.tfUTCNAN 

:atiiNG\ 



NORTH WAS CONTACTED BY WFO XBERfS ON 5/9/86 CONCEEt)] 
COMMENTS HE HAD HADE TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR REVELL. DURING 
THIS CONTACT NORTH PROVIDED BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND THE 
DATES OF INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST HIMSELF WHICH HAD TAKEN 



4 Ji' 



1 1 \ NOV 2 4 1986 
82-750 798 



UNCLASSIFIED ^ 



HSMO 



799 



EUSSIFO 



PAGE TWO DE WF #0013 

PLACE PRIOR TO CONTRA AID VOTES ON CAPITOL HILL. 

IN DETERMINING THE CORRELATION OP THESE INCIDENTS, WHO HAS 
TO DATE CONTACTED CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS FBIHQ (GARY 
BELAIR) FOR DATA ON CONTRA AID VOTES WHICH HAVE TAKEN ' ^ 
PLACE ON CAPITOL HILL SINCE JULY, 1985. WFO ALSO RECONTACTED 
NORTH, 14 MAY 86, FOR THE LICENSE NUMBERS OF THE RENTAL 
CARS WHICH 'north STATES WERE USED ON A SURVEILLANCE OF 
HIS ACTIVITIES DURING LATE APRIL, 1986. NORTH DID NOT HAVE 
THESE LICENSE NUMBERS AT THE TIME OF THE INTERVIEW ON 5/9/86. 
WFO HAS ALSO CONTACTED FAIRFAX CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION 
(CID) OFFICER LARRY OLIFF, WHO DEBRIEFED THE NORTH FAMILY AFTER 
THE ABU NIDAL THREAT WHICH WAS REPORTED BY CBS NEWS IN THE 
RECENT PAST. OLIFF STATED THAT NO FORMAL REPORT WAS MADE BY 
HIS OFFICE. WFO HAS ALSO CROSS CHECKED THE CONTACTS OF 
^^^^^H^^HH^^^^^^^HH|^H THROUGH WITH THE 
NAMES OP INDIVIDUALS PROVIDED BY NORTH. WFO HAS HAD NO 
POSITIVE RESULTS CONCERNING THESE CROSS CHECKS TO DATE. 

WFO ANTICIPATES CONDUCTING A CORRELATION OF INFORMATION 
PROIVEO BY HBOTH WITH THE DATES OF CONTRA VOTES PROVIDED 
BY CONGRBSSIOHAL AFFAIRS OFFICE FBIHQ. 



2984 



mssra 




800 



I 

PAGE THREE OB WF •0013 ^ SVcV 

WFO WILL CONTACT AT THAT TIME CIA ANAYLST^^HlCIA LANGLEY 
TO DETERMINE IP THE CIA CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
OR CORRELATION CONCERNING THE INCIDENTS INVOLVING NORTH AND 
AND THE CONTR AID VOTE DATES. 

WFO WILL CONTINUE TO CHECK NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED 
AGAINST IH^^BCONTACTS. WFO WILL ALSO CONTACT MIAMI DIVISION / 
FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON JACK TERRELL, AKA COLONEL oQl 

FLACO (CIVIL MILITARY ASSISTANCE) (CMA) ORGANIZATION. ' 

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU. 

FBIHQ IS REQUESTED TO APPROVE USE OF CODE-NAME 
RUFIJI. WFO INDICES NEGATIVE. 

THROUGH PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE FBIHQ REQUEST BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION ON DAVID HALEVY, A REPORTER FOR TIME MAGAZINE. 

THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE REQUEST INFORMATION 
ON SENATORS KERRY, HAMILTON, AND DURENBERGER, CONCERNING 
COMMITTEES THEY EITHER SIT ON OR HEAD, REGARDING ANY ASSOCIATION 
THEY MAY HAVE WITH THE CONTRA AID VOTE. 

REQUEST FBIHQ CHECK INDICES AND THROUGH CIA CONDUCT 
A NAME TRACE ON D ANIEI?NSHEEHAN. OF THE CRISTIC OaSJiTUTE, 

— «i^ ~ ^^M^W ■■— 111 II 

WASHINGTON, &.C. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



801 



ifflJSSW 



PAGE FOUR DE WF #0013 

WFO WILL KEEP FBIHQ APPRISED OF ANY ACTION T^^KEN BY 
WFO CONCERNING THIS CASE. 

C BY: 2327; DECL ON: OADR 
BT 

#0013 
NNNN 



\ 



29- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



802 



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carry) 
:, NASHIMGTOH FXBLD OFTZCB 
)ZRSCTOR, PBI ROOTINB 

^TTUt INTBLUGBNCB DXVZSZOII, SSA lARlUr OORDELL 
BT 



6/11/86 
(C) (Cl-9) 






NZCAStAGyANJICTZVB JfEASURBS 

r 






F 



2y 



0ZBSCT80 AGAIlSJt 



IStlirSMtMTCaaWth^OLl'VSB. NORn/NATZONAL 8BCpilZjnL£QqMCII.| 
OOiNTO 

AH. MARKZaCS, KOTATZOHS AMD ZTBMS OF ZII70RMATI0H COHTAZMED 
ZM TUZS OOMMUHZCATZOM ARE CZASSZFZEO "SBCRET" ONLBSS OTHERWISE 
HOTBO. 

RE HFOTSL TO FBZBQ, OATBO 5/26/86, CAPTXONBO "RUTZJZr 

rci-HU; ooiwro*. 

NPO BAB RBVZINBO THE 8TAT0S OF CAPTZOMBD ZWBSTZGATZOM 
AS NBU. AS AMAUUD THE ZVFORMATZOM PROVZOBO BT LZEUTBMAHT 
OOLOUL MORXB AMD IAS BOBSBQOBMTLT OORRBIATBO THE ZHFORMATZOM 
\Xy / SECRET 



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NFO 
Biuvaa 



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1 f^OEC 181985 




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803 



.yffiUSSiREC 



PAGii TWO OB WF 0028y|^|^|l^^^^|HLU ^ ^ '^^ ' 

AGAINST SPBCIFIC CONTRA VOTE DATES PROVIOBO BY FBIUQ 
CONGKESSIONAL LIAISON. TUROOGH WFO'S INVESTIGATION, IT HAS 
B£BM DETERMINED THAT THERE IS A DEFINITE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
THE DATES OF THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTES CM CONTRA AIDE TO THE 
NICARAGUAN REBELS AND THE 'ACTIVE MEASURES ' BEING DIRECTED 
AGAINST LIEUTENANT COLONEL NORTH. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 
WFO HAS OBTAINED A COPY OF A CIVIL COMPlAiNT TAKEN IN THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FILED ON MAY 29, 1986 AND ON 
REVIEW HAS DETERMINED THAT THE CIVIL COMPLAINT MAY BE YET 
ANOTHER ACTIVE MEASURES PROGRAM PRIOR TO THE JUNE 19, 1986 
CONTRA AIDE VOTE. AS IN THE PAST, THE ACTIVE MEASURES CIVIL 
SUIT IS DIRECTED AT NORTH, AND SPECIFIC CHARGES IN THE 
CIVIL COMPLAINT MAY BB DROPPED IF THE CONTRA VOTE FAILS IN 
THE 0.8. CONGRESS. THE CIVIL COMPLAINT NAMES NUMEROUS 
INDIVIDUALS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY AIDING THE CONTRA EFFORT 
UNDER COLONEL NORTH'S DIRBCTIOM. THE PURPOSE OF THE CIVIL 
COMPLAINT MAY BB TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY AMD METHODS, 
THROUGH nu USB OF THE U.S. COURT 8T8TBM, OP PKSSOHS 
IN SUPPORT OF THE CONTRA VOTE. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WITH 



ijffliirffl 



804 

PAGE THREE OE MP 0028 SU^^!|^^|M^ 0Q7 1 

RESPECT TO TBS CIVZI. SUIT IS AN OBSBRVXTIOH. 

OH JUNE 3, 1986, WFO NET WZTB COLONEL NORTH ZM ORDER 
TO OBTAIN AI>OITZONAL IIIFORMATKW WHICH MAT ASSIST IN ADDING 
MORE INFORMATION OP INVESTIGATIVE VALUE TO RBPERENCBD 
COMMUNICATION. AT THIS MEETING NORTH EXPRESSED GREAT 
COt4C£RM THAT INFORMATION HE HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED HAD NOT 
EBSN ACTED UPON BY WPO. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT 
HPO HAD NO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS OTHER THEN THOSE INSTRUCTIONS 
RECEIVED BY SA DAVID BEISNER IN A MEETING WITH DEPUTY 
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR PHIL PARKER AND UNIT CHIEF JIM BGBERS. 
IN THE ABOVE MEETING, MPO WAS TO TAKE NO SPBdPIC INVESTIGATIVE 
STEPS INTO ALLEGATIONS OP ACTIVE MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST 
NORTH. 

NORTH EXPRESSED SPBCXFIC CONCBRH A8 TO WHY 80 ACTION HAS 
BEEN TAXBM RBGARDUO WB POLLOWINGi 

1. MO IMTERVIEN OP^^^^^^^f CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY (CXA)« IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ANALYTICAL ASSISTANCE AND 
lUFORMATIOtl CdNCERHING ACTXVB MEASURES CAMPAIGN. 

2. LACE OP COHTACT MITB NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICER 
FRED OOLOOM FOR AMY INFORMATION CONCERNING DRUG CHARGES 








805 





PAOE roUR OB WF 0021 SBC 
LBVBI.BO AGAINST ■OMB. 

3. HO ZHTBKVZBW OP OAHZBZ. SHBEHAN OP 1GE 'CHRISTZB 
ZMSTZT0T8 COUCSKHZHG TUB SOORCB OP ALLBGATZOHS BX PROVZDBD 
AGAINST NORTH. 

4. NO CC»iTACT OR INTBKVIBW WITB Z.BONARD OOHNZNG OP 
THB HASaiNGTON POST COHCBRNZNG TURBATENXVG TBLBPHOMB 
CALU HB AU.8GBDI.T RBCBZVBO P80H UBOTBMAUT COIOMBL NORTH. 

5. HO RBVIBN OP AHT CHARGBS PUU30 BT SENATOR KERRY 
AGAINST NORTH, NOR ANY ATTXNPT TO OBTAIN THB INPOBMATION 
PRBS£NTUr AT THB DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE (OOJ) INVOLVING 
SKHATOR XERRT'S AU^GATIONS. 

6. NO INTBRVXBH OR OmiTACT OP 8BHAT0R OURENBBBGER AND 
HAMILTON COHCSRNING THB BOUBCB OP CBARSSS TBXY BROOGBT 
AGAINST COLOHBL HOKIH IB ADG06T« 198S. 

7. NO INVBSTIGATION BBZHG COUOOCTBO HITB THB 
MBTROPOLITAH POLICX OBPARTNBNT (NPD) IN ORDER TO CHECK TUB 
HUMBBR or VAHOAU8M IHCI0BHCB8 ON THE ELLIPSE IN WASHINGTON, 

o.c. o<mza6 waan abo sbptbmbbb, uts, hbxsbih hortb'b 

PBBSOHAL VBHICLB MAS VANOALZSBD. MO BPPOBT BAS BXEN 

SBCBBT 






<^#^ 



806 



(S^WS^*® 



PAGE FIVE OE WF 0028 S 

HADB TO OBTEBMItlE ZF NORTH'S VEHZCU NAS TUB SOI^ TARGET 

OF AtlY VAMOALS DURING TUAT PERIOD. F ^ 

AT TUB SAME MEETING, NOBTU EXPRESSED FURTHER CONCERN 
THAT as MAY BE TARGEaSO FOK ELIMINATION BY ORGANIZED CRIME 
DUE TO UlS AIJiEGED INVOLVEMENT IN DIIUG RUNNING IN VIEW OF 
THE MURDER ON FEBRUARY 17, 1986 OF A DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION (DBA) AGENT STEELE, ON THE DATE PRIOR TO 
STBBLE'S TESTIFYING AGAINST TUB SANOINISTA DRUG INVOLVEMEtlT. 

BASED ON THE ABOVE, AND THE RESTRAINTS PLACED ON WFO 
WITH RBSPBCT TO ANY FURTHEM INVESTIGATIOU , WFO IS PLACING 
THIS MATTER IN A CLOSED STATUS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 

ALTHOUGH THE ALLSGATZOUS MADB BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL 
NORTH MAY BS TUB RESULT OF AN ACTIVE MEASURES PROGRAM 
DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST TUB REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S 
EFFORT TO SBCUBB 100 MIIXZOU DOLLARS lU MILITARY AIDE TO THE 
CONTRA, AMD SPECIFICALLY OISBCTBD AGAINST LZBOTENAUT COLONEL 
NORTH, AS TUB ADMINISTRATION'S PRINCIPAL AGENT IN SUPPORT 
OF TBS OtXTTKA, «F0 IS OMABLB TO SBSOLVB THB IDBNTITT OF THE 
ORIGINATOR OF TUSSB ACTIYITY MSASURBS. FURTHER. WFO HAS NO 
PREDICATION INTO THIS INVESTIGATION. 




857 




PAGB 8XX MB W 002t S • V » • T 

IF FBIHQ MtOUlBBS ABY FORTHBR ACTIOB BT UFO, WFO IS 
«QUBSTUiG SPECIFICS BBGARDIHG AITf FURTHBR IMVBSTIGAIION 
AW> IS RBQOESTIM «AT WIS IMFOBMATIOB BY 8BT POBTH ALOHC 
WITH XPPROPRIATB IMVBSTIGATIVB ASSISTAMd. 
CIASSIFIBO BY» 23271 DBClASSIfTf OM. OADR 

BT 
•002t 

Hioni 



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1 

rCOCRAL MIREAU OP INVCSTIOATION 



S'llS'hflS'^,,,^ 



V28/86 




Special Agants C8A) FLOYD B. PLUMMER and GERALD 
D. PERALTA, JR., conductad • suxvaillanc* of Rooa S323 at 
th« MARRIOTT HOTEL locatad on I«J*un« Road, and conmancad 
thia aurvalllanca at 7i35 a. a. Tha aola occupant of «ha 
hotal room, JACK TERRELL, was obsarvad dapaztlag tha roen 
at 11:06 a.a., carrying a brown briafeaaa and aauill black • 
ovamight bag. Other Aganta located in the lobby of the 
hotel advised SA PLUMMER by radio that TERRELL was observed 
checking out of the hotel and then departing the hotel area 
in a courtesy bus, apparently traveling to MIAMI INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT. At 11:35 a.a., the regular MARRIOTT naid was observed 
entering Rooa 5323 in order to clean it. At this tiae SA 
PLUMMER also entered Rooa 5323 and conducted a search of the 
various trash receptacles located in the rooa. 

In addition to the various gua wrappers, cigarette 
butts, cigarette packages deposited in the trash container, 
a copy of the MIAMI HERALD, aoming extra copy, Thuraday, 
July 24, 19t6, was found la tha traah contaijMz«. A cursety 
reaearch of tha newspapar indicated that an artida -had 
been torn froa page ISA of the aain section of the newspaper. 
Another copy of the aaae adltion of this aawspapar was 
obtained and thia other copy indicated tha tern newspapar 
article dealt with aa opinion by Adairal JOBl POINDBKTER 
in which ha stated that tha ralatioaahip between the ,. 
Nicaraguan Centres and Colonel OLIVER MORTH did not violate 
a congreasional prohibition en Oaitad States involvaaent 
with the rebels. 

Two MARRIOTT note pads Where obaerved on a table 
ih the rooa and appeared to have indented writing upon thea. 
This indented writing appeared illegible to the naked eye. 
In addition to tha two note pads, four pages of MARRIOTT 
stationery where also obtained and, to tha naked eye, 
appeared to have no indented writing. 

The above newapaper, note pads, and stationery, where 
turned ever to the case Agents in this aattar. 



I coAiaHH rmrtnm fc*m w waait<m mm t m tn i tmimnt 



ONCtRSSlFIEDT' 



809 



NOD f?S riK ??'"»Z 
«»P HI 



WUSWfl 



F r? r-'-RFS 8h 



FT. 0-LEA\'S H^^^0(P} 

TO Dl'ECTC P=I0.= 1TY 

9T 






ATTZS71?K» S3A BILL HA^IT, CIT-S 
i::T£LLI?i:CI activities, it - PAK 

THIS ccr.r.L'r;iCATior is CLASSinir sicet it: its e»:ti=>ety. 

"I r.Ii- C?LEpr.S TELETYPE TO PPECTC.?, JAN. ?/ , IS 3*, E .^TTTLE? 
TEr.r.ILL, AKA TE^f'ELL t||^^HH||||^H COi 

r.iv 0'l£a:.'S. . 

FC' THE HJCr.nnllOii OF SSA BILL HA?T, THI A?CV£ P£^E?E^:CED 
TELETYPE COrTAlf.S A SUfl^lASY TPOATZ AtO •BACvcPOUIW IKFtei^ATICK 
'SECA^nriS JACK TEPHELL. IT IS REfftSTEr THAT A COPY OF R£ 
TELETYPE BE C?TAItti; IK O-^PEH THAT CID-fiVILL HAVE A MC'-E COMPLETE 

/ 

U?r£0STAf3I» OF THIS SITUATION, 




UNCLiiSSIFIE 



!• •^-^^wC/l 




810 



Wi^ss/f/ffl 



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I 

C-: re. 7, !»••, xs^iak ul 

cFLtAKS tinner er rtfc*' 
Nooc OS t H wr w ft w g w> 

IflVtSUAL, UMK 



■'a J 



^^^ 




^im* CP*TM£ 
r-VlFED TE»nr_L THAT KI 



vAS vnz^tsiixt iBwnw fapti for tks f-m aio r-i5 jet fishte»s. 

HE FlRTHE? STATED THAT HE VAS IKTEPESTED IH 9UYIW WBHEI 5PC»? 
CEFEfCE*) HELICOPCE^S. )E SPECIFIED THAT THESE WLICO?TE»S »rjST 
SE A^SED WTH MISSILES, MRTICULASLY AS BAlCY AKTI-TAWK MISSILES 
AS POSSISkE. TEORELL APVISEt THIS INDIVIDUAL HE W*p2A9LY COULD 




811 




FA?I lyPlZ *C' ^^^^m S £ t ? £ T 

CCr£ U? VITH THI A30Vi XZ.'.TIC-ID ?^r'CHA?.riSi , ?VT TK;T HZ Ti: fCT 

rvi" t:-;;,''h: ■■" vir'T? tc ni'. ""IHjHI 

AT Trr l-<..;iAr: E>iiA£SY. T£- = tLL /AF TCL? THAT HI '■•OjLr'. ?£ ^E- 
COKTACrrr TillPHOMCALLY !<: THI PjT'.'-t. 

• T£-'-£LL Pj^TKi.- ArVISiD THAT KE IS LEAVIJ': C.*. I'JiSTAY, 
FI3.il, lSf«, FOH CCSTA PICA A:C VILL P»05ABLY 31 5C?£ A LEEK 
TD TEK SAYS. ?€ ^CES f.ST KW" VHETHE? Hi V.'ILL SE KNTaCTE? VHILE 

}c IS ir rcsTA riCA es kdt. 

Tr»-ELL VAS ArviSEr IK TETAIL C? THE FACT THAT HE «AY TOT 
CP.'SIDE". WnSIir TP 9E E«?LOYEn BY e» CCtiSECTEP viTH THE ITITE!^ 
STATES POVE-?r«JEi»T IK ANY/AY AT THIS TWE; K VAS TOLD THAT THE 
ni VILL S.t KA?PY TO PECEIVE AMY IBFD^MATIPK -VKICH HE '•'ISKEf TO 
GIVE,?yT THAT HE WOULD EOT BE ISSl'tP AEY IRST'UCTIOKS 07 HAVE 
AKY •EPUI'^EKESTS LEVIED UP^^^HW ■ fUfS'FBI . 

F2IKS IS EXPiWTieUSLr JfEWESTED TO RUK A KA^E CHECK OK 

[VMKODQH CIA ATO PEIHC IMDICES* IT IS ?ECl!ESTED 
THAT CONSI0EHATIOK.be GIVEN TO COIHACTins LE?AT MEXICO CITY 
^£?ASPINB THIS ftATTES , 

C - Q-S, D • OADH 
ST 




812 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Th« following individuals w«r« in attendance at a 
masting hald in th« SAC's Offica, on 7/18/86 t 

SAC Dana Caro 

ASAC Dava Binnay 

ASAC Danny Coulson 

ASAC Jo* Johnson 

SSA Billy Spellings (TSS) 

SSA Al Witsgall (CI-16) 

SA Mika Bachaud (CZ-9 Primary Relief) 

SA Ellen Glasser (C-S) (Case Agent) 

SA Gary Barter (CI-16) 

SA Fred Vichich (SOG) 

AOSM Linda King 

Hs. Patti Gvozdich (ASAC-C Secretary) 



The following subjects were discussed at this meeting 



regarding 

Survillance 

It was discussed that we need full-tim^ 
Terrell. SOG and SSG will wnrk this together. 




rCN'i- 









UNCLASSIFIED 



n 




^30? 



.1^ 



V*: 



^ 



h5; 



euM nno vt\a 



813 



UNCLASSIFIED 



i 



SAC Caro tasked AOSM King with arranging for overtime 
for SSG. He wants no problems from FBIHQ regarding this matter 
and advised AOSM King to have FBIHQ contact him if there is 
aproblem with our receiving this overtime. 

Robinnette 

It was discussed that we are having problems with 
Robinnette being under surveillance. SA Glasser talked with him 
on the telephone, and he stated that he knew he was being 
Burveilled and questioned her as to whether he was being 
Burveilled by the "good guys or bad guys." He gave her tag 
numbers and car descriptions, and SA Glasser is checking this out 
with 90G. 

When EAO Buck Revell called North, it was apparent that 
Robinnette was theiie. 

SA Glasser stated that SA Ray Jechorek was pursuing 
checks on Robinnette (credit, criminal, agency, etc.) ASAC 
Binney suggested that a Dunn and Bradstreet check be done on 
Robinnette 's company. It was determined that an indices check 
had not been done on Robinnette. 

Saapson and Cordero 

SSG will cover Samp8on_and__Corderaj_^^B^^^^^B^^ 
^^^^^■^■^^■^^|^^|H|m^^Him^^5^Koyoal8tated 
mpsoi^^ive^ir^BetnesaaT^and he is unsure where Cordero 

Ollie North 



lives. 



SAC Caro inquired as to whether %ra have pictures of 
Ollie North. It vras determined that we do not have an actual 
file on North; therefore, no picture*. 



H ^liiimm 



- 2 - 



814 



Memorandum 



.aSSlh 




Sttbiwt : 



SAC, WFOg^gg (P) (C-6) 
SA STEPHEN A. MCCOY 



JACK REYNOLDS TERSELI., AKA 
COLONEL 



7/18/86 



' 0,-1. 



■/B. 






f."/^ 



'y c 



*P0 

This conununlcation is classified "Secret' in 
its entirety. 

On 7/18/86, SA STEPHEN A. MCCOY reviewed a CBS 
Evening News Broadcast tape, dated 7/14/86, which included 
a brief segment on OLIVER NORTH. NORTH was identified 
as a staff member with the National Security Council (NSC) 
and was further alleged to provide liaison between the 
White Rouse and the "Contras" fighting the Nicaraguan Government. 
Th« segnent on NORTH followed a CBS overview of: 




'Contras' 



1) The history of U.S. Government aid to the 



2) The suspension of U.S. aid to the "Contras" 
following disclosure of alleged CIA and "Contra" improprieties, 

3) The recent legislative aid package approved 
for the "Contras" and 

4) The pa/t efforts of intermediaries (both 
private and government) to funnel aid to the "Contras." 

Regarding the latter point, NORTH was alleged 
to have been involved in circumventing the previous congressional 
ban on aid to the "Contras." 

A "file film" picture of NORTH was shown during 
the broadcast, from which a "freeze frame" photograph was 
obtained. 

The CBS broadcast did not make mtt'i references 
to captioned subject or to any other Individuals known 
to be involved in captioned matter. 



Classified bys 
Declassify on: 



(2-WFO 
s334:cjc(^^ 



(2) 




815 



C.M.A: 

CivUian Military Assistance 
208 Lucillt Drive. S.W 
Occatur. Alabama 35603 



June 27, 1986 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Colonel OllTe Ror%h 
white House 
National Security Council 
'*ashington, D.C. 20301 

I/ear Sir: 

why was the idea of helping the Freedom Fighters by the private 
sector taking away from us? 

«s you know CKA started in 1983, with the first deliveries of 
humanitarian-aid to the FDN in January 1984. Up to-date we h.ive 
collected only from supporters 535,000.00, we have delivered over 
',4 million in supplies to the Freedom Fighters in the ICortR ana 
ooutfa of Nicaragua. 

~e have asked for assistance repeatedly from Gen. Singlab and one. 
other, but the only thing we have received are our phone bills, 
for our efforts. The rest of the monies for our expenses have corne 
out of our on pockets. 

nepeaSEdly, we asked, horse-traded, and begged for supplies for 
rreedom righters. •►e can not help but notice the ur.-lirriter. 
expense accounts and salaries for Johr^ny cone lately? v/ith. 
brown noses. 

nC, of Cfii, are not asking for nor or we begging, for a livinj 
just what is fair> 

Per Capitol dollar, what we have spend for supplies compared to 
others , we have streched that dollar so thin that it looks like a 
helmet-band 

..e have taken verbal abuse from news-media and co-hearts of other 
organizations for 2 reasons": 

1 . oe were KCO's 

2. Kot rich *• 






UNCLASSIFIED (^ 



816 



UNCLASSIFIED 



••e have been verbally abused but tock it, about things v/e haa nz 
control over nor initiated. v.e are not cry-babys. 

Ae have wwtched others collect hundreds of thousands, not one 
penny going to supplies. They get to see the President, v.e don't 
even get Thank You. ».'e have collected supplies and loaded some 
to go south that others took credit for to raise more money for 
themselves. 

A quick run down on what we have done for Freedom Fighters besiaes 
t4 million (wholesale) 

*e have developed personal relationships with FDiC leadership in 

the field-. 

'*e have loaded every plane out of New Orleauis (50+) 

we have traveled over 20C thousand miles, Logged in 3 years 50 

thousand man-hours, 

I, personally have spend over £50 thousand dollars. 

have lost 2 close friends. 

Have gained more self respect for myself and members. 

Have lost respect for some so-called leaders of democracy bec&u?. 

of attitade of "I want to be the boss". 

I realize this letter may fall on deaf ears or blind eyes, thir.r: 
of yourself as a Karine Corp Officer— Up-holding Kcrine Corp 
standards, of taking care of your irern. 



oincerely your friend in freedon;. 




Toa I-osey 

For««r U S Marina Corp Cox^l 

liirector of Ctln 



UNCLASSIHED 



817 







UNCLASSIFIED 



PMi tro ^^^^^(c-i) (P) 

TO: DXRECTOK, FBI (ATTN: CIO/TEJWORXSM UKZT, CZD/PERSOMAL 

CRIMES UNIT, CZ-2/niTELLZGENCE DZVZ8Z0N) ZMMEOIATE 
TBI, ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE 
FBI, BimiDGBAM IMMEDIATE 
FBI, HOUSTON ^^^^^B OOfEOIATX 
FBI, MOtPBIS IMMEDIATE 



IMMEDIATE 



^ FBI, NEK ORLEANS 
PT 

tJickE*-"''^ SECTION I or 3 

JACK RETNOLM 1BRRXLI., AXA COUMEL FtAOO, NEDTRALITT NATTER- 
POSSIBLE THREAT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, DATED 
7/lS/t«r OOi HPd 

RE WO TELCALLS TO tSA MK XLEZN BT 88A OONEAR, MFO l/ll/M; 
NFO MEETING WXTB JOHN SOIIEBER AT PBIBO, 7/17/t6f NFO TELCALLS 



(3)wo 



BCt 
(2) 



"i^ 



#\1S.^««-^ 




M3I0 







818 



UNCUSSIFIED 



»ASE TNO DE NP «0001 SECKET 

TO MIAMI, NEW ORLEANS, NDtPRIS, DATED t/n/Btt NO IZL TO 

" p:CTOIt, DATED 4/11/86. 



G 



AMD "JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL] 
00: NEN ORLEANS' 



^ 



BACIQBXOUND INPMiUKTIOII nSARDIM VRIOR COnACTS BT TERRELL 
WITH THB PBZ nOMOOl IBB MBZflO l/t4-4/S4 ARK ODTLZRED III 
DETAIL n MmnClD HBV OKLBAIW TELETTTE DATED 4/11/8C . 
TERRELL, A MaaB NBOm OT TB dVILIAM HILITART A8SI8TAIICE 
(a«A) , A« JWiMLJMI fffUUnZLXTARy OMOy, ntOVIDCD UWEIWHJ IOS 
WITH BCTEN8IVS BRA21XD XIVOMIATXOH RBSAM>IM| EVENTS OCCDRRING 
IN NICARAOOA IN 1984 AMD 198S,^TAn RECORDINOS OT CONVERSATIONS 



UNClASSra 



819 



PASE THREE OE HP •0001 



SECRET 



BETWEEN HIMSELF AND MEMBERS OP THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN 
MBCICO CITY AND THE NICARASUAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. D.C. 
AND A MANUSCRIPT OF A BIOGRAPHY HE HAS GHOST-WRITING. IT 
WAS LATER CONCLUDED THAT TERRELL'S IMPOBHATION MAS EITHER 
THB RESULT OT HEARSAY AND ASSOCIATION. OR FABRICATION. 
BECAUSE TERRELL DISPLAYED AN OUTSPOKBNIKSS Vn» ALL ABEKCIES 
HB BIIB BBH XM fWII I CI WR9, T.7. FBI, DEA, CIA, AMD WE 
MEDIA, NEW ORLEANS FELT MO CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP WITH TERRELL 
COUIO BE CARRIED ON IN CONFIDENCE AT THAT TIME. TERRELL 
LEFT THE NEW ORLEANS AREA IN APRIL, 1986, IN A MYSTERIOUS 
MANNER, WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN, AND BEFORE INSTANT DATE ALL 
INVESTIGATION WAS AT A STANDSTILL. 



HHtlHSSW 



820 



ONCUSSIFIED 



PAGE SIX DE IV #0001 SECRET 

SECJtET SERVICE MAS BRXETED AND ADVISED TBAT TBEY WCVLO 
COORDINATE AH INVESTIGATIOB ¥1TB FBI, KPO, REGARDING A THREAT 
TO PRESIDENT REASAM. SECRET SERVICE KAS ADVISED AND UNDERSTOOD 
THAT NPO'S SOURCES 8B0DL0 BE AFPORSCD TVE GREATEST SECDRXTY IN 
ORDER NOT TO CCMPROMISE THtM. 

SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS TOOK PLACE AT PBIHO ON 7/17/86 
INVOLVING WPO AND DIVISIW 5 AND 6 PERSONNEL IN WHICH A 
DECISION WAS REACHED THAT WPO WOULD OPEN THIS MATTFR AS A 
NEUTRALITY ACT CASE, WITH WPO AS OPTICE OP ORIGIN. liPO WILL 
COORDINATE ALL INVESTIGATION, KEEPING USSS AND PBIFQ'S 
DIVISION 5 AND 6 APPRISED AND SETTING OUT LEADS ACCORDINGLY. 

IN ATTOIPTS TO LOCATE JACK TERRELL, PBXBQ WA9 
ALERTED BT OFFICIALS WITHIH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COmSEL 
(NSC) THAT TFPPgy- WM ODMMMTLT XR TI!B WA9BXM3TOII HBTROPOLXTAN 
C BY G-3; D ON OADR 
BT 

• 0001 
NNNN 



mmxm 



821 



UNCUSsra 



FM: WrO ^^^|(C-t)(P) 

TOt DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: CID/TERRORISM UNIT, CID/PERSONAL 

CRIMES UNIT, CI-2/INTELLIGENCE DIVISKM) IMMEDIATE 
PBZ, BIRMINGHAM IMMEDIATE 

HOUSTON I^I^H IMMEDIATE 
FBI, MSMPHIS IMMEDIATE 



FBI, NEK ORLEANS ^^^^^^^^B IMMEDIATE 

BT 

SECRET SECTION 2 OT 3 

JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL, AXA COLONEL FLACO, NEUTRALITY MATTER- 

POSSIBLE THREAT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, DATED 

7/1S/86; 00: NFO 

AREA AMD HAD HAD CONTACTS WITH A (X) GLEN ROBINETTE. VHO THE NSC 

OFFICIALS A0VX8ED WOOLO K ee W tRA t WM lOTB THE FBI. ROBINETTE 

KA8 CONTACTED AND ZNTERVIENED EVEKXM OT 7/1 7/M AS FOLLOWS: 



■:r.der pro' r:c r £.0, 
'/ B- •-::■, I. stops' ■ jcurity C-'j 







822 



0?y 



\\4 




9fCE TWO DE NP #0002 SEC1t£T 

ItOBZNETTE,]^H^HH|^^H^^^^im MET 
TERRELL ON 7A1/86, MTER TRYING TO MAKE CONTACT KITH HIM FOR 
THREE NEEKS. ROBINETTE, BELIEVED TO BE WORXINC IN AN ~ 
UNSPECIFIEO 60VERIMENT CAPACITT, TOLD TERRELL HE WAS A NON- 
PRACTICING ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INVESTORS INTERESTED IN 
TERRELL COLLABORATING NITH OTHERS TO WRITE A BOOK, DO A TV 
SERIES, OR PRODUCE A MOVIE ABOUT BIS EXPERIENCES. WITH TERRELL'S 
BACKGROUND AND BCPERIENCE IN THE OlA AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES, 
ROBINETTE TOLD TERRELL THERE WAS A BIG AUDIENCE FOR A "RAMBO" 
TYPE FIGURE INVOLVED IN COUNTRY -CONFLICT ISSUES. 

ROBINETTE MET REGULARLY WITH TERRELL 7/11-14/86, AFTER 
TELEPHONING HIM AT 1711 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW, THE APARTMENT 
OF A MAL WARWICK. (RAINES CRISS-CROSS LISTS PHONE FOR WARWICK 
AS (67-1151.) WARWICK IS AFFILIATED WITH MAL WARWICK AND 
ASSOCIATES, INC., A CGNSULTIMS AND PRODUCTION FIRM FOR NUMEROUS 
NONPRCVIT PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS. ROBINETTE ALSO PHONED TERRELL 
AT 547-3I0*, THE CENTER FOR DE VELOPMHI T POLICY, 731 BTH STREET 
SE, WDC. •OBSBQDliJJMW J/14/B€, TERXBXX LEFT 
THE APARDUMV W IW WJILBU S ETTS XVENUE AND TOLD 



mB 



823 



\SHIiUSSW 



PAGE THREE OE WF #0002 SECRET 

ROBINETTE HE COULD BE REACHED AT AN ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 
TELEPHONE NUMBER, 524-6940. 

ROBINETTE ADVISED THAT TERRELL SPOKE OP DISILLUSIONMENT 
ON BOW THE NICARAGUAN ISSUE KAS BEING MISHANDLED BY THE 
REASAM AOMimSTRATIOM, BUT TERRELL WAS NOT SPECIFIC RSGABDING 
ANY ACTIONS, EITHER PRO-CONTRA OR PRO-SAMDINISTA PLANNED ON 
HIS PART. N« INDICATION WAS GIVEN AS TO liOW LONG TERRELL 
WOULD RBIAIN IN THE WASHINGTON AREA AND ROBINETTE ADVISED 
HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO CONTACT TERRELL ON THE MORNING OF 7/18/86 
TO CONTINUE HIS TALKS. ROBINETTE STATED HE WOULD ADVISE 
V.TO WHEN AND WHERE SUCH A MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE. 

ROBINETTE FURNISHED INTERVIEWERS WITH DOCUMENTS RELATING 
TO MAL WARWICK AND ASSOCIATES, EXCERPTS OP TERRELL'S BOOK, 
AND OUTLINES FOR PROPOSALS REGARDING HELICOPTER SERVICE 
AND AIR FREIGHT SERVICE COSTA RICA. WFO WILL REVIEW THESE 
DOCUMENTS FOR INFOFMATION RELATING TO CAPTIONED MATTER. 



« 



HHWsap 



824 



n h 




RbOliity 



PACE POUR DE MP 10002 



SECRET 



W 



+f 



NITH CONSIDERATION TO BE GIVEN 
TOWARD INTERVIEKIN6 TERRELL UNDER THE PRETEXT OP CONTINUING 

tro HILL MAINTAIN CONTACT KITE GLEN ROBIMETTE REGARDING THE 
CURRENT WHEREABOUTS OT TERRELL AMD BIS ACTIVITIES. 

FURTHER INVESTIGATION ON 7/18/86 PROVIDED BCACT SUBSCRIBER 
INPOFMATIOM AS MEW SERVICE CONNECTED INSTANT DATE, TO J. TERRELL, 

ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA. 



J^^ARTMENt 1 013^^1 



1 021 ARUMffW BOULEVARD X^ARTMENt 1 

WPO HAS ALSO OBTAINED IMPOBMATIOM XMDICATmG TEAT TERRELL'S 

DATTIME CONTACT MOMBEX Z8 202-547-3800, CZNTER DEVELOPMENT AND 



POLICT, 731 STB STREET, 8E, WASHINGTON, P-P- 



m^i^^ 



825 



MU.S»B 



PACE FIVE OE WP #0002 SECRET 

FULL DESCRIPTION FOR TERRELL IS AS FOLLOWS t 
NAME: JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL, W/M, DOB 4/13/41, POB 
BIRMINGBAH, ALABAMA, HEIGHT S'8 1/2*^-5*10", WEIGHT 165 
POUNDS, HAIR BROWN/GREY, EYES BLUE, 3/4** CUT SCAR ON BACK 
LEFT THUMB, SSAN 416-56-1245. 
REQUESTS or THE BUREAU t 

LOCATE AND REVIEW ^^^|^BHHfOR EACXGROUMO 
INFOmATIOM ON JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL. OBTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS OP 
TERRELL AS FURNISHED BY MIAMI AND/OR NEK ORLEANS (PER TELCALLS 
INSTANT DATE TO MI AND NO) CONDUCT IKDICES SEARCH FOR OTHER 
REFERENCES. 

2. EFFECT CHECK FOR JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL IK IDENTIFICATION/ 
CRIMINAL RECORDS,! 

3. CIMPMLJ cm «» BLlEJniHi IF WMILL TV OP OPUtAXIONAL 
90 TBXM. 

LEAMt 

WFO AT nkSBJMTQM, D.C.t 

1. COOnZKATB NITH FBIBQ REGARDING REVIEW OF ITS FILES 




ON TERRELL. 



KUSSffl 



826 



CL 




PAGE SIX DE MP #0002 SECRET 

2. MAINTAIN CONTACT KITE GLEN ROBINETTE REGARDING THE 
LOCATION OF TERRELL. 



^ 



4. CONTACT BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, M)C, 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER ATF HAS ANT CURRENT OR PAST INVESTIGATION 
INVOLVING TERRELL. 

5. MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH USSS. 



BIBMINGHAM DIVISION AT BIRMINGHAM: WILL REVIEW FILES 
REGARDING TERRELL AND PROVIDE ANY UPDATED INFORMATION AVAILABLE 
REGARDING TERRELL'S RECENT ACTIVITIES OR CMA ACTIVITIES THAT 
MAY BE DEEMED PERTINENT. CONTACT ATF REGARDING A POSSIBLE 1978 
CASE INVOLVING TERRELL AMD PROVIDE DETAILS. 
C BY G-3> D ON OAOR. 
BT 
«0002 



NNNN 



iwssra 



827 



yHCUSSIFiED 



FM: t«r0^mp(C-l)(P) 

TOi DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTK: CID/TERRORISM UNIT. CIO/PERSONAL 

CRIMES UNIT, CI-2/IKTELLIGEMCE DIVISION) 
PBI, BIFMIMG HAM PfflEDIA TE 
FBI , BOUSTON ^^^^^^H IMMEDIATE 
FBI, NBtPHIS IMMEDIATE 



IMMEDIATE 



FBI, vet: ORLEANS 
ET 

SECRET SECTION 3 OT 3 •• 

JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL, ARA COLONEL PLACO, NEUTRALITY MATTER- 
POSSIBLE THREAT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, DATED 
7/1S/86; 00: UFO 



fl 




cji 









828 



\11USSW 



«■ 



PAGE TWO DE KF 40003 



6ECBET 



& 



MEMPHIS AT NASHVILLE: CX>MTACT 0.8. CDSTCMS REGARDING 
INFORMATION ON A "REVERSE-STING" OPERATION IN KRICR TERRELL 
MAY BE OF OPERATKMAL INTEREST. REPORT FULLY ON ITS STATUS 
AND TERRELL'S TRAVELS PERTAINING TO ANY INVESTIGATION. 
[review its FILES ANI 

DETERMINE IF TERRELL IS SDBJECT OP OTHER FEDERAL INVESTIGATION 

« 

OR IS UNDER INDICTMENT^B^^PH^^H^IHHHII^I 




AT NEW ORLEANS: REVIEW ITS FILES AND PROVIDE STATUS 
UPDATE. 



n 



C BY G-3; D ON OADR 

BT 

«0003 

NNNN Mft^ftffel I 




829 







%% 



ONCUSSIFIED 



PD-302 



lEDERAL BOREAD OF ZNVESTIGATIGM 

Dat* of transcriptian 7/25/86 

1 SECRET 

mi* •ntlr* cooDRunicatlon Is clasaiflad "SECRET". 

■On thm ■ar idna of J\ily 16, 1986, GUNH A. RDBINETTE, 
t«l«phon«^BHBB waa Intaxviawad at tha Haadguartara of tha 
FEDERAL BOREAD OF mVESTIOATION (FBI) by Spaclal Aaant ELl£N 
GLASSER of tha Washington Fiald Offica. [)aputy Aaaistant 
Diractor, Criminal Invaatigativa Division, JOHN J. SCHREIBER, and 
unit Chiaf JAKES B. BSBERS. Spaclal Agant KEN OCMOHDE of tha 
UNITED STATES SECSET SERVICE, %fas prasant durlna tha intarviaw. 
Aftar balng appriaad of tha Intarvlawars ' idantitlaa and puxpoaa, 
ROBINETTE fumiahsd cartaln Infora ation as containad harain. 
Prior to tha intarviaw, ROBINETTE waa pickad up at tha 
Intarsaction of 17th Straat and Pannsylvania Avanua, N.W. , 
Waahington, D.C. 

ROBINETTE was not quariad ragarding background and 
aaployar. 

ROBINETTE adviaad that ha had baan attaaptlng to locata 
a JACK TERRELL for approxiaataly thraa waaks. ■• did aaat 
TERREU, for tha first tiaa on July 11, 1986, and haa had almoat 
dally contact with hia sinoa that da1». ROBlNffXTE approachad 
TERRELL undar tha prataxt that ha was a non-pr a ctici ng attomay 
rapraaanting a groi9 of invastors intarastad in 1XRRELL as A 
collaborator for bodies, talavlsien, show and aovias. ^a thama 
of thasa aadia foraa was to ba cantarad around oountzy conflicts 
with a "Raabo" typa lypaal. RO BINETTB statad it was his intent 
to laam inf oraatlon about TBOtSLb «bi^ would account for his 
attanpts to dlsersdit onitad Stata s aff orts ia Cantral Aaarlca. 
In hia contacts witb IBRRELL, M OBlWgfl 'B attachad a 75 paroant 
poaaibility for tha etianca that TBR RELL ballavad \dM atory. 

SECRET 

CLASSIFIED BYl G-3 

DECLASSIFY OHt QAER 




tha FBI. It is tha propi:^ of tha FBI and ia loanad to your 
agancy; it and its oomtants should not ba distributad outsida 
your agancy. 



mussro 




830 



mmm 



FI>-302a 

Continuation o f GLENN A. ROBIWETTE "SECRET" Pace 



While TERRELL does not volunteer information, ROBINETTE has 
obtained certain information on TERRELL which he compiled in a 
summary, dated July 15, 1986. Conversely, however, TERRELL has 
never asked ROBINETTE his last name or requested a telephone 
number. 

ROBINETTE furnished investigators with a three page 
summary, dated July 15, 1986, as well as other documents. 
ROBINETTE 's Statements to interviewers confixa the information 
contained in the attached summary. 

ROBnfETTE located TERREIX by naJcing inquiries through 
the CHRISTIC INSTITUTE, Washington, O.C. The Institute was 
described as a group of priests against "big brother cooqpanies 
and government". ROBINETTE contacted TERR ELL through telephone 
numbers *rtiich placed TERRELL at the CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY, 731 8th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., or at an 
apartment of a MAL WARWICK of HAL WARWICK AND ASSOCIATES, 
INCORPORATED, 1711 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. , Washington, D.C. 
ROBINETTE contacted him through both telephone numbers, visited 
the apartment and had contacts with TERRELL outside the Center. 

While ROBINETTE visited TERRELL at the apartment, 
ROBINETTE observed a copy of a civil suit filed by two Ajnerican 
reporters, TONY AVIRGAN and MARTH A HONE Y in Costa Rica against 
seven Cubans and five Americans. TERREIX advised that this suit 
alleged that the property of a JOHN HULL in Costa Ri ca wa s 
misused and showed an example of a misuse of funds. TERREU 
never committed himself to ROBINETTE on the Hicaraguan issua. He 
told nOBnfSTTB ttiat hm bad ^M»Ja Qtntral AMrica to f i^t for 
Nicaragua. R« fSt that CIA laMnhfJ*' HlMii wmim had b«ta 
misappropriated and gave the exaapla of lARIO CALZBO in Miaad.. 
TERRELL was bellevwl to have visited Costa Rica in Febmaty, 
1986, and Kay, 198<. 

TERRELL told ROBINETTE he was collaborating on a book 
with DAN GROTHADS, a reporter with the Houston Post . TERREIi 
furnished ROBINETTE with an excerpt of the book. TERRELL also 
furnished ROBINETTE with outlines of proposals for an air freight 
service emd helicopter service in Costa Rica. 

ROBINETTE had no indication from TERRELL of how long he 
had been in the Washington, D.C. area or what his travel plans in 
the future would be. ROBINETTE did not think TERRELL was armed 
with a weapon when in his conpany. TERRELL to^ ROBINETTE ha was 



SECRET 



tlNCmSSIFIED 



831 



-•'ffl 



n>-302a 

Contlntiation o f GLENN A. ROBINnTE "SECRET" Page -3*- 

svipportive of the Contra movement, but thoug ht th at the REAGA5 
Administration had mishzmdled the program. TERRELL told him he 
voted for REACAN and displayed no tendency towa rd co amiting a 
violent act against anyone in the futures ROBIMETTE remarked 
that this opinion was clouded somev^iat by the read ing of 
TERRELL'S book excerpt, in which, on page 13, TERRELL brutally 
describes killing of prisoners. ROBIMETTE stated he bad not 
really figured TERRELL out and could not assess the accuracy of 
TERRELL'S statements to him or the statements in the book. 

TERRELL apparently stayed at the apartment of MAL 
WARWICK until July 13, 1986, or July 14, 1986, when WARWICK, ^o 
had previously been out of town, returned to town. Subsequently, 
TERRELL gave ROBINETTE the following contact number, 524-6940, to 
reach him. 

TERRELL refused $100 offered as a l oan to him by 
ROBINnTE. RDBUiSTn oould TBt specul ate on TERRELL'S source of 
income. On one of their Bsctings, ROBmSTTB took TERRELL to the 
Center to meet a DAVID KacMICHAEL, s upp osed l y a fexMer Chief of 
Station, Honduras and Nicaragua (uncorroborated) . 

ROBINETTE advised he has not spoken to TERRELL since 
the previous Monday and would call him the next day to arrange a 
meeting. He advised he would forward this information to the 
FBI. 

ROBINETTE furnished, in addition to his summary of 
TERRELL, copies of the following documents with referenced 
source: 

(1) Outline, Helicopter Service, Costa Rica (provided 
by TERRELL) 

(2) Outline for: Air Freight Line, Costa Rica 
(provided by THtRELL) 

(3) "Dear Friend" Newsletter published by MAL WARWICK 
AND ASSOCIATES (apartment of MAL WARWICK) 



MJISSIREB 



832 








n^^' 




15 July '86 

Summary of Comments from Interviews -Jack Terrell 
( His statements /comments ) 

-Jack Reynolds Terrell . 45 years of age. bom In Alabama. 5 '10" 
165 lbs. slender build, brown/grey hair. 

-Ran away from home at 14 years of age, conflicts %rith family/ father, 
family well-off, father worked with Southern Railway. 

- Jack and 2 boys stole a Model A Ford, broke into a. gas station and 
took money for gas. He was 14 years of age, was sentenced to 18 year 
in prison. Spent 6 years in Alabama and was released. Never returned 
home. Hired by the Alabama prison system as to work with wayward 
teenagers . 

-Parents are now dead. Has 2 sisters - 1 in Alabama, 1 in Florida. 

-He married and divorced. Gave his wife substantial money at time of 
divorce as he was a millionaire by age 27. She is still unmarried 
and in Alabama. 

-He had 5 companies in the past. Has no income now. Gets no money 
from Christie Institute or news interviews. Lives off of friends 
such as the apartment in DC on Mass Ave. 

-Christie handles causes and eases for fights against "big brother 

companies and governments." Sheehan is brilliant. Davis is a Jesuit 
priest and la%»yer. Sheehan studied for the priesthood. Sheehan and 

M<f«» live in a house near the aqnitCAvy la DC owned by the Catholic 
Church . Thm^thxTch supports Christie financially. 

- Jack gets no moamj from Sen Kerry - either by check or cash. 

-Jack gets no aoney from anyone and la "hurting slightly." 

-JacK does not want to align himself %rith any poli^tleal group or 
cause. Mtll halp eoly if the cause is identifying with actions such 
as ilwii^iisi— siir siiil PTn which hurts or Is not helping the people 
(Indtiwt tn Wttearegue f Most all of the opnles brought in were 
actually skimned off by thii senior officers and very little ever 
got down to the people needing food, medicines, etc. 

-Hull is an agent for the CIA, has an 8(000 acre rasich with 5 air 
strips. Strips were used for landings apd transfer of military equi 
ment but also drugs. TV Hews shots actually show officials helping 
transfer boxes, etc. 



m UNCIASSIFIED 



833 



wmsw 



-Sen Kerry introduced/arranged a meeting with financial investors 
in the Boston area for the air services. They liked it and are 
awaiting Jack's return to the area for more talks. 

- Jack is a pilot of prop aircraft including choppers. Mo Jets. 

-Christie has a hundred witnesses and will win the suit now pend- 
ing in Florida. Jack will testify for Av^an /Honey. The Americans 
named in the suit are either emplyees of CIA or contract employees . 

-The Senate plans very strong effort's to defeat the funding. Peace 
groups plan large demonstrations throught the country. The approval 
will be defeated. Christie has about 12 attorneys supporting them. 

-Singlaub and North have provided secret funding in the past and it 
was not distributed fairly. 

-Jack h as very good contacts in Costa Rica . He was there in Febrxiary 
and May '86. He has a valid US passport which was once taken from 
him and stamped "Cancelled" by the US authorities when he was 
forcibly removed by gxinpoint from Nicaragua by direction of the CIA. 

- Jack as an IQ of 180 and total recall of names and numbers from 
many years ago. 

-On Sat evening 12 July '86, Jack received a call from an Anchorage | 
newspaper reporter who asked what ha knew about a local air company 
named MockAir (sp?). What Jack said to the reporter is not known yeti 
He did tell n* that "MockAir is owned by Zantoe in Chicago who is 
owned by Evergreen who is owned by Air America , the largest airline- 
in tha USA and has never carried a legitimate passenger. MockAir is 
owna4/connected with Maul Corporation, Maul trie. Georgia . They make 
STO^ aircraft. STOL aircraft were used by AF General Richard Secord 
in covert air oparations. Ha also uaa d PV-1 Nepttmes for the same 
purpose." "He run* a n'onder-airforea' for Morth/ V; -^ 

< iGeorge Dooley was the operator o f Air America .- and recently died. 

-News reporters B rian Barger, AP and Christopher Ptckey, Washington 
Post know a great deal about the Nicaraguan problem and have talked 
with people involved down there and her* in the US. 

-Jack , as a convicted felon cannot get a Job easily. He has limited 
employ's^ possiblities, not with Kerry or US Government . He must 

travel on his own, be independent, create his own successes. 




834 









u 



iiuissra 






r\' 



1. 



Jack T«rr«li loved his country and beli«v«d that America 
could do no wrong. He wanted to serve his country. America's 

enemies the Russians and all their puppet governments such 

as Poland, Cuba, Nicaragua were the bad guys. America's 

friends and public servants were the good folk in the white 
hats. That included the CIA. 

Now Jack Terrell is willing to die not for his country 
but for what he believes in ... and if ha testifies before the 
Senate and House Select Committees on Nicaragua, as he's been 
asked to do by Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts and 
Representative Mike Barnes of Maryland, the FBI has warned him 
it could happen. 

"But they can only kill you once'," Jack says. "The 
problem is getting hurt. They can do that to you often." 



In September 1984 when 42-year-old Jack Terrell conned 
his way into an Alabama-based mercenary group to join the 
fight against the Communists in Nicaragua, he didn't mention 
to them the CIA-sanctioned operation that was his real 
mission. And he didn't dream that before he left Nicaragua 
and Honduras before the CIA forced him to leave, at gun- 
point he would have his own personal and private reason for 

wanting to stay. 

Terrell then owned a condo service company; he had 
hardly any military experience. Today he appears as a soft- 
spoken, intelligent, articulate Southern businessman tall, 

slender, dark-haired and blue-eyed — -not a mercenary, not a 
gunslinger, and hardly a reflection of the kid in the black 
leather jacket and greased ducktail arrested by Alabama cops 
27 years ago. 

He grew up in Birmingham, Alabama; James Dean was his 
hero. At 15 he was caught joyriding in a stolen car, and 
spent rUs next six years in prison. Behind bars he learned 
the trieks of burglars, thieves and moonshiners, gave himself 
the equivalent of a college education, and laid the foundation 
for an expertise in military weapons and tactics. After his 
release he became the first ex-con in Alabama history to be 
hired by the prison system; he was the state's youngest and 
newest "dog warden," responsible for tracking down escaped 
prisoners. But publicity about his background as a former 
inmate forced the state to ask for his resignation. 

During the Viet Nam era he was classified 4-F because of 
his felony conviction. Terrell had few marketable skills, a 
wife, and a young daughter. Then his 3-month-old girl was in 
a car accideiit with his wife and parents; she died 33 days 
later, and Jack always felt her life would have been saved if 




mwm 



835 



WmSifSED 



she had had prompt energency care. It was stubborn grief ana 
a sense of waste that motivated Jack to call a friend in 
Washington D.C. The friend loaned him $2,000 to start an 
ambulance service in Montgomery, Alabama. 

A few years later Jack Terrell had made his first 
million. He had emergency ambulance contracts throughout 
Alabama and mssissippi, owned two airplanes and a ranch where 
he raised Palomino horses. But on the heels of a nasty 
divorce he managed to lose or sell off his business interests. 

In September 1984 he was ha} f-heartedly selling time- 
share condoE in Gulf Shores, Alabama, when he read about two 
Americans who had been shot down in a helicopter over Nicara- 
gua. They belonged to a group called Civilian Military 
Assistance (CMA), headquartered in nearby Decatur, Alabama. 

Jack was mildly interested. 

He became very interested when a week later he was 
contacted by an old friend in Washington, D.C. This man was 
.^n unofficial liaison for "the Company," the CIA. (For the 
moment, at least, he can't be named.) The Company for nearly 
a decaae had used his small cargo company to ship arms to 
countries around the world. 

The friend now suggested to Jack that, under the cover of 
the CMA from Alabama, he could organize a strike force of 
Americans and Contras to enter Managua, disrupt public util- 
ities through a series of bombings, and at the same time 
ar.sassinate the Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior, Tomis 
Eo-ge. This was the same Tomis Borge recently singled out by 
President Reagan in a Saturday morning mid-March radio address 
for having engaged "in a brutal campaign to bring the freedon 
fighters into discredit." 

"You see," Reagan said, "Borge's communist operatives 
dress in freedom fighter uniforms, go into the countryside and 
murder and mutilate ordinary citizens." 

Jack Terrell's assignment was to put together a CIA 
inf rastructup* irltHln Cft#, «f«f-ttwn- carry- oot CIA-directed 
st.-ikes. Th« f^rst or^e was: gat rid of TomAs Borge. The CIA 
would foot tha bill. They agreed formally to pay Jack a fe- 
of $5QyP0O to tf^ the job. Tha operation was to be code-named 

Peg i 

^or the CI* bafora. in Rhodesia in 1967 
and dtf^ing the investigation of Tong Sun Park m 197'>'>'>7. His 
service had been too brief, unsatisfactory. He had always 
felt unfulfilled. He was a romantic; he craved adventure and 
action. He viewed his last two decades as dull, a series of 
failures punctuated by minor tragedies.' He wasn't sorry for 
himsplf, he was just determined to get off hic ass and do 
something with his life. He truly believed that Communism war 
evil, and those who tried to force it oi*u illiterate Third 
World peasants deserved to be crushed, eliminated. What 
tetter course of action, what nobler cause, than to serve his 
country" 



lll^niMSMO 



836 



ONCUSSIFIED 



He agreed to launch Operation Pegasus , if he could 
convince the people at CMA. It was a challenge. The adrena- 
lin flowed. 

At first he couldn't find a telephone listing for CMA, so 
he tried another approach. He called the Decatur Police 
Department, told them that he was a state cop from Tennessee 
and had a warrant for a man allegedly associated with some 
group called CMA. The desk sergeant launched into a long 
diatribe against CMA's "f.bunder , Tom Posey, and bemoaned the 
recent death in Nicaragua of a former Huntsville cop who had 
joined up with CMA. "Yeah, I know where Posey is," the 
sergeant said. "But he and that gang aren't patriots or even 
real soldiers ... they're gun runners and dope smugglers." 

A few days later Jack sat in a Denny's Restaurant near 
the New Orleans airport. Across the table was Tom Posey, 
founder of the yeai — old mercenary group. Posey, in his 40s, 
was a tall, smiling country boy who wore old blue jeans and 
drugstore-cowboy boots. Having heard President Reagan open 
the floodgates to volunteerism by poblicly announcing that he 
backed the "freedom fighters and volunteers" all over Central 
America, and that if he was young enough he'd be down there 
too, Posey had raised the funds from right-wing Alabamans and 
formed CMA. 

His avowed purpose was to supply arms and men to the 
Nicaraguan Contras. To that effect he worked closely with 
Mario Calerc, the brother of Contra leader Adolf o Calero, and 
their current project was the formation of a new, small force 
of American volunteers who would fly down to Managua and join 
the battle. A CMA group had been to Central America already 
under the command of a man named Stedman Fagoth, but Fagoth 
had been booted out of Honduras after it was discovered that a 
part of the money made available to him had gone toward his 
personal needs in Miami'. But Fagoth's help was still needed; 
he had the necessary contacts among the Contras. 

Po?ey seldom checked credentials. Jack Terrell's propos- 
al to create "• special strike force" comprised of Spar.vsh- 
speaking Amarieans and English-speaking Contras was all he 
wanted to haan. He barely glanced at Jack's fabricated resume 
befor% xnvxtiny tnm to "join up." 

When Jack attached himself to CMA it was, in his words, 
"a loose-knit group of redneck flag-wavers of dubious intelli- 
gence" who had heard the call of destiny to tilt the balance 
of power in Central America toward democracy and the American 

way. Their ultimate goal and pleasure- — their mission was 

to kill Communists. They were like little boys on a Saturday 
afternoon who had just seen a John Wayne double feature. 

That he was similar to them was semething he could not 
yet 'see. > 

Jack received his code name later Ihat day at Mario 
Calero'e home in Kenner , a suburb of New Orleans. It was to 
be used in a letter of introduction to Supreme Commander 380, 
Enrique Bermudez , the Contra military chief in Honduras. 



iiNHi h^mm 



837 



UNCLASSIFIED 



"What should we call you?" Calero, pen in hand, asked 
Jack. He had already started to write the letter. "Because 
if we call you by your real name and this letter falls into 
the wrong hands, everybody's ass is on the chopping block ... 
especially yours." 

"I told him I hadn't brought a suitable code 
name with me. He got up and went into the kitchen 
for more coffee, and I heard him. talking to his 
wife. He came to the door wearing a big smile. 'My 
wife has named you,' he cried, with great enthusi- 
asm. 'She says you're too thin. So we'll call, you 
Flaco. Flaco! You like it? It means the thin 
one. ' " 

A few days after the meeting with n«r^ Calero, Jack 

Terrell met with • "blue suit" CI* slal^foi-* payoff Ben 

at New Orleans airport, and received an envelope containing 
$20,000 in cash. The reet of the eeney Mee t9- eo« e ^"^^t 
with a midway payment of another S20,000 and a completT^ 
"award" of the final $10,000. 

Six months later Jack Terrell, known by then as Colonel 
Flaco, was exorcised from Centre! America by the U.S. Stafe»K 
Departmenr. He was. deported under armed guard -for accomplish- 
ing what the CIA and the U.S. gov«-nment had not been able to 

accomplish the creation of an active force m the Contra 

sstup willing to go into combat on a daily basis with the 
Candinista army inside Nicaragua. But in the eyes of the CIA 
and a very particular Uncle Sam, Terrell had created his 
fighting force among the wrong Contrast 

During those six months. Jack Terrell's attitude hardened 
into one of "a plague on all your houses." He saw at first 
hanc the Sandinistas' thirst for bloody reprisal and disregard 
for human life; but he saw the same qualities, and more, in 
the U.S. -backed Fuerra Democratica Nacional (FDN) Contras and 
ever, in their Indio allies, the nisuras. He saw trat the FDN 
Contras had raised an army of 16,000 supposed figr.ting men, 
but were far more interested in public relatrons than in 
joining battle to win their oft-proclaimed democratic goals. 

Terrell, "the thin colonel," met during that period- with- 
wealthy Americans desirous of investing in trte Contras, as if 
the Contras were e stock on the Big Board, in return for what 
amounted to future ownerstiip of Central American natural 
resources. He was a participant in meetings in the United 
States between Contra leaders, American businessmen and CIA 
representatives; high on the agenda were plots for assassina ■ 
tions and terrorists attacks that were to be made to look like 
Sandinista acts. He was a willing participant, for a while. 

But the ultimate goal of the Contr*. Jack Terrell socn 
realired, was not victory on the battlefield* of Nicaragua--- 
it was direct United Stater irvilit.'H-y intervention as in Viet 
Nam . 



838 



I 



IINClASSlfiED 



2. 

Terrell, in his self-created role of Colonel Flaco, and 
five CMA American volunteers had just arrived at the FDN 
Contras' main camp across the border in Honduras. They were 
about to begin the training of their special unit when Terrell 
saw his first media event staged by an American television 
crew. ... 

"Adolfo Calero, the Centra's top man, had flown 
down from his comfortable home in Miami and invited 
an NPC-TV crew to tag alone. They were delighted. 
It hadn't been this exciting since Nam. Calero on 

this occasion in front of the camera, somewhere in 

the deep bush of Honduras was to give his troops a 

pep talk, and they would cheer and shout in order to 
impress the American audience on the 7 o'clock news 
with how badly the freedom fighters wanted to 
overthrow the Red bastards in Nicaragua. 

"I stayed in the bed of the Toyota truck with 
the cameraman. Adolfo assembled his troops on the 
seldOT-used parade grounds of their encampment. At 
one point the rJBC reporter, Fred Francis, interrupt, 
ed Adolfo's speech. The men were so thin in the 
ranks, he said. (The'-e weren't very many of them.) 
Couldn't they all bunch together? And he would 
narrow his camera angle, and the soldiers would look 
like a fighting force instead of a gang of 
stragglers. 

"Calero was happy to oblige. The rally began 
again. As he spoke the troops whoope-i and checked, 
n.'jt with much enthusiasm, but at least on cue. 

"I said something to the cameraman about 
'staging,' and asked if that wasn't dirty poo2 . He 
said, 'New York doesn't care. And what they don't 
know won't hurt them, amigo. Besides, if we give 
these guys a good image back home then our crew can 
fly down here anytime without having to go through 
all that red tape with their PR office.'" 

Meanwhile Jack was learning at first hand how the Contras 
operated. All Sandinista prisoners, heinoticed, were routine- 
ly killed. Supreme Conunander Enrique Bermude? told Jack, "The 
men are instructed to cut the prisoners*- throats. We ha.e a 
shortaqe of bullets." 

It was al^c- cc^rrcn practice for tho Ccntr.^r. to round up 
ycanr men in rural Nicaraguan borde'" villages and forrre them 



y!JClASSIFIEO 



839 



ioussm 



to join the Contra military force under threat of death. 
Those were the lucky young men. When the Contras entered 
Nicaragua from their sanctuary across the Coco River in 
Honduras, they searched through jungle villages and 'executed 
those suspected of being Sandinista sympathizers. 

Turnabout was fair play. To the east, in Nicaragua's 
Zelaya province, thousands of Moskito Indians were slaughtered 
by Sandinista soldiers and their Cuban advisers. The practice 
had begun in 1981 when the new Sandinista government began to 
move the Miskitia out of Zelaya; it was basically an effort to 
relocate and thus gain control of a fiercely independent, 
rebellious tribe. The rotting remains of those who refused to 
cooperate were left in plain view, as a warning to others. 

Terrell communicated on an almost daily basis with 
Tegucigalpa, using a powerful 1,000-watt Harris radio that had 
been given to the FLN Contras to the CIA. At his request, his 
messages were then relayed to Washington. 

In rjcverber 1984, stxll in Hendures, Terrell and his 
American force began training FDN Contra special troops for a 
new mission. Without bothering to explain that the ide* had 
been given to him by the CIA, Jack had proposed to CMA and ttie 
Contras that a terrorist slrike on Managua, the capital of 
Nicaragua, could turn th9 war around. While they were at it, 
they would assassinate To«As Borge. 

The Contras and CPIA both agreed. 

Sut then, in early December, a series of newspaper 
a-ticles was published in the Memphis Commercial Ap peal . The 
articler. written by a rerorter named Bill Thomas who had 
visited the Centra camp at Las Vegas, Honduras, exposed CMA's 
plan to use supposedly neutral Honduras as a staging are.-, for 
their clandestine penetrations into Nicaragua. Posey had 
talked. In his simpleminded way he thOLight it would gi'.e gcc3 
publicity to CMA and help them find more recruits. 

The publicity did net offer any details of Pegasus 
Itself, but :t did compromise the Las Vegas training site. 
And It anrjered the Hcnduran government in Teguci9Jilpa ac we. 1 
as those whi puJled the strings at Langlcy and in the White 
House. Under direct orders from Washington (tnrique Bermude: 
adr.itted this to Jack), the Tegucigalpa government deported 
Jack and his dozen American comrades who had been allowed into 
Honduras to participate in the training. 

The dczen Americans, discouraged by the setback and the 
slowness of the pace in Central America, returned to the 
States. 

But his FDN Centra pals convinced the thin Americsn 
"colonel" to stay. There was still work to be done. He had 
only to bide his tjme. They arranged for him to go under- 
ground in Honduras, putting him up in comfort at Cockson's 
Hole, a fishing resort on the Caribbean Island of Ro.itin. 
This was for his safekeeping, they said. Jack didn't object. 
He had things to do. 



iJfsCLASSIFlEO 



840 



ONCLSSSIflED 



During his stay on Roatin he began to write a journal 
about his Central flmerican experience. He kept that journal 
until his final exodus from Central America four months later. 

He was on Roatin for ten days, and then he left, flying 
from Tegucigalpa back to Miami. He was still a believer. It 
was time for him to reorganize his funding sources and march 
forward with his plan. 



3. 

In order to understand Jack Terrell's options and his 
ultimate decision, you need to knoK the players, in the Central 
American game. . . 

The so-called Contras contrary to the kind of over- 
simplifications offered in President Reagan's March 198C 

speech to the American nation are far from a homogenous and 

unjfied force. 

Of t^e three main Contra groups, only the FDN (the 
National Democratic Force) is groomed and completely funded b/ 
the CIA. 

Duane Clarridge, the CIA official in charge cf military 
and paraTii 1 1 tary activitier in Nicaragua from 1981 through 
19C4 , created the FDN with an initial $80 million in cove-t 
Ccrr.pany funds. Jack Terrell has recently seen secret U.S. 

gcvernment documents shown to him by the FBI and U.S. 

Attorneys from Miami, who are currently (April 1906) debrief- 
ing him in New Orleans which indicate the FDN car account 

for only 20% of the $100 million they have thus far received 
in U.S. aid. Federal agents now investigating the FDN/CIA wee 
tell- Terrell they suspect m'.ich of these covert funds have beei 
iauniere-; through U.S. banks and used to finance co-ainc 
traffic from Tegus (pronounced Tay-goose: the name used by old 
Central America hands for tongue-twisting Tegucigalpa) and 
Managua to Miami and Galveston, Texas. 

Clarridge, known to the Contras as "Dewey Moronj , " used 
blank check diplomacy to organize the FDN with a core group of 
200 former Somosita national guardsmen. 

The brutality of Scmosa's National Guard was the princi- 
pal reason that President Carter backed the Sandinista over- 
throw cf the dictator's government in 1979. 

Today President Reagan denies that Somosa's old National 
Guard gang is running the FDN Contras. /et FDN commanders ai^e 
named after their old National Guard sern^l numbers. Enriqi;e 
Bermudez, the FDN Supreme Military Commander, is called 
Coninander 380. 



841 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Eden Pastora is one of the men who fought for the Sandin- 
istas in the overthrow of Somosa . Later, after he saw Cuban 
and Soviet influence sweep in behind the new government of 
Nicaragua's new President Daniel Ortega, Pastora became 
disillusioned and organized a Contra force in neighboring 
Costa Rica. They are called the ARDE Contras. Pastora 
labeled himself "Commander Zero," as a tongue-in-cheek jab at 
the former National Guard serial- number commanders heading 
the FDN. 

The FDN consider Eden Pastora an enemy. The U.S. govern- 
ment grants him grudging approval ... and few other benefits. 

The third main Contra force are the Misura Indians. They 
are based roughly 100 miles east of the FDN force in a dry, 
scrubby borde- area of Honduras called the Rusrus. 

The Misura became an army through classic revolutionist 
means. At first they fought the Sandinistas with machetes, 
until they could capture enough rifles to arm a patrol, then a 
company, then a battalion. The Misura Contra amy was born 
from a rai-4 hatred for the new government for the old govern- 
ment, too. It should be noted and a simple struggle to 

survive. 

The Misura often called "the niggers of Niciragua" by 

both Sandinistas and FDN Contras have suffered centuries of 

mistreatment from whoever was in power. Now that they have 
weapons and some sense of order, their chief goal is indepen- 
dence from ar'y gcvernment in Managua. This makes ttiem, at 
best, an urccTif ortable ally for the FDN; at worst, a growin-; 
threat. 

In Washington it makes them an unknown quantity ... ard 
Washington does not like to deal with unknown quantities. 

It mado them mere than interesting to a man like Jack 
Terrell, who seemed to gravitate natural iy to the underdog. 
He came to know the Misura well. 

The entire time that Jack lived and plotted among the 
Contras. official American aid was illegal. Congress had said 
SC-. Yet military supplies from U . ? . sources constantly flowed 
ir.tj Hondur-ar.-- -at one time under the guise of state National 

Guard maneuvers during the Big Pine exercises earmarked for 

the Contras. Several U.S. guard units visited sites such as 
Palmerola and conveniently left behind trucks full of guns, 
ammunition and heavy equipment. 

What Jack Terrell found criminal, however, was the dis- 
parity in the distribution of those supplies. After Washing- 
ton allowed the Honduran government to skim its 30\ import 
duty off the top in exchange for having compromised its 
dubious neutrality, covert American aid was delivered only f. 
the FDN Contras. The FDN was then oblised to distribute 20*. 
of the aid package to the ARDE Contras in Costa Rica and 10^ 
to the neighboring Misura Contras. • 

The ARp'E got nothing. The Misura received barely enough 
to stay alivr. All of the 16,000 FDN trcops .und their 
familie: and girlfriends were fed and clothed yet no norc 



II 



WCUSSIFIEO 



842 



UNMSSra 



than 2,000 FDN troops have ever fought in combat at any given 
time. 

Five years have passed. The FDN still hangs out across 
the border in Honduras. They hold not a single square foot of 
Nicaraguan soil. 

After his stay on RoatAn, Jack Terrell traveled back and 
forth between Miami, New Orleans and Houston, hoping to gather 
funds for Operation Pegasus and find a new door into Nicara- 
gua. He was bombarded with so many propositions during his 
five days in the States that he scarcely had time_ to realize 
what he was involved in. He was stuck on a treadmill of his 
own choosing and never thought to get off. 

At different times during this brief odyssey he met with 
FDN leader Adolf o Calero (who spends a lot of time in Miami); 
a Texas oilman who wanted to buy Nicaraguan beans; Cuban 
emigr^ drug dealers who claimed that they wanted to bscome 
freedcn fighters; freedom fighters who wanted to become drug 
dealers; and a CIA operative from Costa Rica who helped the 
Cubans in both the drug trade and in their dream of freedom 
fighting. 

Jack was in daily contact with his CIA associate in 
Washington. He quickly discovered the price he would have tc 
pay if he wanted to make friends and influence people and get 
Operation Pejasus off the ground. In the course of one week 
he was asked to assassinate Eden Pastora, capture a Caribbean 
island for a syndicate of wealthy Texans, turn a blind eye on 
the flouri-ning drug trade condoned by the CIA, and help 
exploit the Misura, the only decent group of people he had met 
during his time in Honduras and Nicaragua. 

In Houston Jack was introduced to a man named Mace 
Stewart IIX». « plump SO-y««r-old alcoholic lawyer whose father 
had founded the Stewart Title Company with oil awnenk Aft«r 
Stewart II "s death in 1974, the Princeton-bred Maco III sold 
his interest in the title company for $4 million. He was o-ie 
of the original financial backers of CMA in Alabam;,. 

Mace knew Nicaragua and the Misura Indians. "I love the 
Misura." he said. "I want to help them." When he met Jack he 
was looking for a man he could trust to represent him in 
offerir>g the Misura S2 million in exchange for future rights 
to their bean, cocoa leaf and shrimp harvest in Zelaya 
province. 

"We were sitting in the restaurant on the top 
floor of the Warwick Hotel in Houston. We were by 
ourselves, the place was empty. Tbat surprised me, 
- and then Maco told me he had rente^ the entire 
restaurant so we could meet in private. I didn't 
believe it, it made no sense ... but no one else 
Showed up while we were there. During our talk he 
repeated an ocd phrase. 'If I waved my magic wane". 



mmmm 



843 



ti 



mv 



yt. 



SSSIflED 



could this happen? if i waved my magic want, could 
you do such-and-such for me'...' 

"One of his projects he called 'Freedom Fighter 
Beans.' He had worked out a marketing plan with 
some people on the faculty of Texas AiM. He wanted 
to buy the entire Misura bean crop for ten cents a 
pound, then sell it in health food stores for a 
dollar a pound. 

"His benevolence, I began to realize, was 
exceeded only by his greed." 

Maco then changed the subject and offered Jack $375,000 
in cash if he could organize his force to capture. or sink an 
old French battleship used by the Nicaraguan Navy to patrol 
their Atlantic coast. This was the- first step, he explained, 
toward the establishment of the small island of Cabeza in the 
Miskito Kays as "a businessman's island." 

Maco was raising money for the project by selling $50,000 
"war bonds" to old Ivy League pals. The bonds had even been 
approved, he claimed, by the SEC. 

The first $600,000 would go to Adolfo Calerc of the FTN. 
Calero hao promised Maco that after the Contras overthrew the 
Sandinistas, the new government would recognize the island of 
Cabeza a-r an independent country. The men who bought the k>.ar 
bonds would be rewarded with their own private Caribbean fief- 
dcm , ccr^plete with tax advantages, no import duties and diplo- 
matic statu*;. They could even join the U.N. or apply for u . 3 . 
foreign aid. 

Jack guardedly ag-eed to work with Maco, but decided tr.e 
relationship would last only as long as it seemed to serve trie 
interests of the Misura. He would exploit Maco's greed 
insofar as it could lead to the Misura agreeing to the uie of 
their territory for the launching of Pegasus . 

Jack had already decided that it was vital for the 
potential Misura fighting force of 5,000 men to get involved 
1.-1 the war. But what the Misura lacked were arms and ecuip- 
ment. The *ew Misura patrols coming back frorr missions inside 
Nicaragua would meet their replacements at the Coco River and 
turn over their boots and rifles to the new men. Maco 
Stewart's money might change all this. 

Th« n«xt day, at Adolfo Cal«ro'» home in Miami, Jack was 
pf-esen** whi le Calero, a young CIA agent named Rob Owens, and 
John H«>t, an American farmer living in Costa Rica, plotted 
the assassination of Fden Pastora, the Costa Rican Contra 
leader. Also present were Felipe Vidal Santiago, a Cuban Gift 
agent; Donald Lacey, a Costa Rican lawyer; and Aristidcs 
Sanchez, Secretary to the Directorate of the FDN Contras. 

Jack listened while the other men chscussed a previous 
attempt to kill Pastora during a May 198^ press conference in 
La Penca, Nicaragua. Pastora had escaped injury, but an 
exploding camera b^g killed three Cccts Rican journilistv and 
seriously in^urs--^ 10 otners, including two r.merican--. . 



ilNCiii^iFirn 



844 



UNCLASSIFIED 



No one had ever been arrested for that outrage, but there 
in Hiami Jack learned the name of the assassin: Amac Galil. a 
Libyan terrorist, hired for the job by the CIA and the FDN. 
Galil had posed as a free-lance photographer from Paris, 
mingling with journalists in Costa Rica for weeks before 
planting his bag of C-4 plastic explosive at the press confer- 
ence." 

Jack Terrell was asked at the Miami meeting to attempt 
the next assassination of Eden Pastora. The CIA agent, Rob 
Owens, spoke little. Adolfo Calero at one point leaned 
against a doorway, a cigarette hanging between his lips, and 
casually said, "I don't want to know how you do it, and I 
don't care. I just want that Costa Rican bastard dead. " Rob 
Owens nodded his approval. 

John Hull did most of the speechmaking. His 2,000-acre 
farm in Costa Rica on the Nicaragua border had been a staging 
area for CIA and Contra activity for five years. In return 
the CIA overlooked the Colombian and Cuban-American drug, 
traffic that passed through his property. 

Hull and Jack Terrell hammered -out a workable plan for 
the killing of Pastora. A hand-picked squad of American vol- 
unteers and Centres, dressed in Sandinista uniforms, would 
kionap Pastora, take him to a village in Nicaragua and hang 
him in the central plaza. The leader of the Costa Rican-based 
Misura, a man with the unlikely name of Brooklyn Rivera, would 
alro be assassinated if he didn't agree to cooperate with the 
CIA anc FDN. 

Jsck left the meeting a little stunned. He was unhappy 
with his participation and his decision. He had begun to 
realize that he was caught up in the tangled web of his self- 
created character and nom de guerre. Colonel Flaco. He didn't 
life these mea he was working with, and for the first time he 
began to seriously question their motives. For the first 
time, too, he began to doubt the validity of his own course cf 

action and within 24 hours he reached a decision to tip off 

Ecen Pastora before the attempt on his life. 

"During all this the Reagan administration was 
working overtime to persuade the American people 
that the FDN Centres were the good guys wearing the 
wMte hats, and the Sandinistas were unprincipled 
villains. The Company knew the truth, but they 
didn't care. They operated under the assumption 
that no one would talk about what really went on, 
and If anyone talked, no one whc mattered would 



" This information is corroborated by an investigation 
conducted by two journalists, Martha Hon^y and Tony Avirgan. 
then with ABC-TV, now with Independent Television Network in 
London and the London Times. Their La Penca Rep ort was 
putlisr.ed in December 1905. 




a 



UiKUJ 



845 



IINOUSSIFIEO 



believe it. The CIA-backed mining of the harbor at 
Puerto Corinto in Nicaragua, for eKample, came as a 
ehock to the American public. It was a clear act of 
war. That was Duane Clarridge's operation. He' had 
contracted the job through the Summa Corporation, a 
holding company set up by Howard Hughes. There was 
some bad publicity after the mining of the harbor 
was revealed. So Clarridge was reprimanded and 
transferred laterally to another post. Not busted, 
not even demoted." 

Another operation related to the Pastora plot (also 
sanctioned by the Company) called for the bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in San JosA, Costa Rica. This staged terrorist attack 
was meant to be carried out by American, Cuban and Colombian 
mercenaries, but the CIA would make sure that the Costa Rican 
government pointed the finger at the Sanainistas. Terrell 
later learned that the bomb's secondary target was the U.S. 
Ambassador to Costa Rica, Lewis TambS. Tambs had just arrived 
in San Josi after serving as Ambassador to Colombia, where his 
pressure on the drug trade had prompted a syndicate of Colom- 
bian cocaine dealers to place a- $1 million contract on his 
head. 

Both the Pastora and Tambs assassinations were designed 
to provoke and justify direct U.S. militery intervention 
against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. 



When Jack Terrell returned a second time to Hondurar he 
brought with him fifteen American volunteer mercenaries 
recruited by CMA in Alabama. Each man was assigned to a team 
of Misur.-s. Their first task was the reconstruction of the 
base camp called TCA, which had been overgrown by the 
surrounding forest. The TEA camp was actually a pleasant arc 
attractive place, dotted with tall pines that shaded the hut;; 
a fresh stream sliced through the 5— acre site and divided the 
crude bivouac area from the training ground. 

Maco Gtewart had given Jack $25,000 in cash to arrange 
for four American Indian chiefs from California, and their 
retinue, to meet with the Misura in Honduras and invest in 
their resistance effort. Jack knew that the expenses for tr.is 
pow-wow would be less than $10,000; he began to use the 
balance to bring in plane loads of rice.* sugar and flour from 
Tegus for his future army. , 

The Indians eventu.>lly Thcwed up, acrompinieo by the irrepres- 
sible Maco. 

Jaci<'s net step w.is more cctiP ] i c at ei . 






846 



iiNCUssm 



The Misura had accumulated a large cache of arms and 

munitions most of them brand new Russian AK-47s shipped from 

Bulgaria, still in their crates. The Misura had amassed this 
armory in a series of raids on unprotected government truck 
convoys traveling between the Atlantic coast and Managua. 
They had no boots, helmets or uniforms, but they had enough 
small arms for an army of 10,000 men. 

Jack managed to convince the FDN Contras that it was in 
their interest to trade some of their abundant field supplies 

sent from the U.S., of course for the Misura surplus 

weaponry. But it was more difficult to convince the Misura 
that the swap was a fair one. They had never had a fair deal 
from anyone. Everyone helping hand that ever been offered 
them had raised false hopes and been backed by lies. 

The so-called Flaco was becoming fond of the Misura. 
They were the underdogs here, and the only honest fighting 
force. All they wanted was their independence. He had 
provided them with food, money and know-how, even Yankee 
manpower ... tut they still didn't qu'ite trust him. Why 
should they turn over their precious stock of weapons to a 
gringo colonel? Jack understood. 

Finally, one steamy day when the sky was white from haze 
and heat, a group of Misura asked Jack to take a tour of some 
parts of the border he hadn't yet seen. 

Less than a mile from the camp the group came to a 
clearing. Jack noticed a small hut, actually a wooden cage. 
He peered closer. Sandinirta prisoners were cramped togethsr 
inside the hut, forced to live with their own waste. 

"They put seven prisoners on their knees next 
to a freshly-dug pit. Their hands were tied behind 
their backs. They were the ones they called the 
Pericuacos, the mad dcgs, and the Misura were going 
to kill them. They were viewed as nothing but meat. 

"The Sandinistas had been beaten, st.^rved, and 
atused. Th?y were ran.-id from their long stay in 
that hut, which war. barely five feet hig'i. 

"I was given the honor of killing these men. 
It was a test. 

"If I didn't do It, someone else would. I knew 
that right away. They were all eager. But I was 
chosen. 

"I walked over and pulled out my Browning 9 mm 
14-shot automatic. I looked down at the Sandin- 
istas no, I wasn't locking right at the.T, but 

actually past them; I didn't want tc see their eyes - 
--and I placed the barrel of mv pistol at the base 
■ o* the first man's reel-.. I pulled %f\e trigger. 
Parts of his bone and flesh kicked track on to my 
arm, but I didn't notice as I moved down the line, 
f 1 ri n? aqain and a^ain. I coolc feel tre bone chip- 
.-.nj t:c:t bleed hittir.o n,y chesks and forehead. It 




847 



DNCMfe 



felt as if someone was pouring warm water over me. 
I just kept moving and pulling the trigger. I 
killed all seven. I was shaking so badly I didn't 
know If I would be able to walk away, sit down,' or 
fall down. I was totally wrecked... 

"I didn't sleep that night. There was a stain 
on my mind and my soul that I knew I would newer 
wash out. I thought, is this what you wanted? Did 
you intend to come here and be used and become a 
butcher? I lay in a kind of daze in the jungle 
heat. I kept saying to myself, 'If you didn't do 
It, someone else would have...'" 

The Misura now saw him as not merely a dedicated ally but 
3 soldier. But today. Jack Terrell's voice still cracks and 
falters when questioned about this final test of his loyalty. 



The exchange of supplies and weapons took place. Over 
the next few weeks he and his group of American volunteers 
continued their training in the refurbished TEA base camp, 
nisura troop strength and discipline was growing daily. Jack 
had gone on a dozen brief combat missions deep inside Nicara- 
gua, and more were planned. Land mines were being placed on 
roads that the Sandinistas had always thought were safe. The 
Sinsin and Yulu bridges that connected the Atlantic coast with 
the western half of Nicaragua were being studied for demoli- 
tion. The MiEuras, as soldiers, proved to be clever and 
highly motivated. 

"I didn't want to be projected as a leader, 
dictator or king. I wanted to give back to these 
people the self-respect and dignity that had been 
taken from them throughout the last hundred years, 
but do it in a fashion that would make it seem as if 
they were in control of their own destiny." 

Jack's temporary strategic goal was to help the Misu.-a 
establish a base just inside Nicaraguli at the village of Asung 
on th« Coco River. That way, he and the Misura could operate 
on th« southern side of the border without pressure from the 
FDN, the Honduran army or the U.S. government. He also hoped 
that the presence of a bona fide Misura base inside Nicaragua 
would warrant the direct U.S. aid that, so far had eluded the 
Misura people. 

Scores of villages inside Nicaragua had been scenes of 
slaughter by Sanainista troops in tf.e farly 19e0s, and the 
village of Asung was one of them. Asung, in fact, had t<eccm-» 
something of a shrine, a holy burial piece worth preserving 
just as the Sandinistas had left it. That was a key reuse- 
for Jack's h.^ving selected it as the first Misura footholtf 
1 nt; I ae the country. 




848 




In 1981, under the eye of Cuban advisers, Sandinista 
soldiers entered Asung and the ordered the 450 villagers to 
collect their clothes and get in line. They were being 
relocated, they were told, to a protected government camp. 

The village huts of Asung, which stand in rows near an 
overgrown airstrip, are still charred from the fires set by 
their former conquerors. It is unknown exactly how many 
villagers actually fought back, how many merely refused to 
relocate, and how many-escaped, but the remains of 300 bodies 
were found scattered throughout the area. 

Jack Terrell now saw how the Misura chose to retaliate. 

"During one mission inside Nicaragua [with the 
Misura] we came across a tiny village of maybe eight 
huts. We heard what sounded like a party, men 
laughing and screaming. When we got into the 

village I saw a girl she was probably abojt twelve 

years old tied between two trees. 8y then she had 

ali-eady been raped several times, vaginally and 
anally. About thirty Misura soldiers stood around 
her. She choked to death when one of them shoved 
his penis inside her mouth. 

"There was nothing I could do. I found out 
later that the girl's father had been suspected of 
being the Sandinista or Communist committeeman for 
the village. He escaped before the Misura got 
there, and this girl was the only one in his family 
they could find. So they raped her, and killed her. 

"That was probably the worst thing I saw during 
my entire time down there. It ended my romance with 
the Misura. I couldn't say, 'Well, that's net 
typical, that's just an isolated instance, no matter 
how horrible it was.' Because it was not an isolat- 
ed instance. It was the way things were. There 
were no good guys left; The supply of white hats 
was finished . " 



Jack Terrell's final farewell to the Guatemala-Honduras 
border and his ultimate disillusion with the U.S. government 
began in Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton^'s office on Capitol 
Hill. JacK flew to Washington in March 1985. He met three 
timer, there with Senator Denton and Meg Hunt, the Senator's 
chief adviser on Central Air^rica, and Joel Lister of the ?ta' 
Depar tment . 



UNCLJiSSinED 



849 



^mssim 



The Misura leadership had drawn op a document giving Jack 
Terrell, a/k/a Colonel Flaco, authority to represent then with 
the U.S. government. Their new envoy was now requesting food 
and supplies for what he termed "the only real fighting force 
of Contras inside Nicaragua." 

But Senator Denton argued that the Boland Amendment 
precluded any direct aid to the Contras. Jack laughed. He 
knew better. 

What Denton and Lister wanted was Intelligence. Jack, 
while on patrol missions with the Misura, had stumbled upon a 
terrorist training base and a three separate Sandinista 
cocaine manufacturing plants in Nicaragua's Zelaya province. 
The training base was a mock-up of a Boeing 727 that sat in a 
desolate clearing in the jungle. Misuras told Jack that 
exercises by different groups of armed men took place at 
irregular intervals in and around the mock-up. Some of the 
groups spoke English; some spoke languages the Misura had 
never heard. 

Jack was unwilling to relinquish the details without more 
control of the eventual payoff to the Misura. 

At another meeting he discussed the stalemate with Lt. 
Col. Oliver North, an assistant to the White House Chief of 
Security. Actually, Jack talked to Joel Lister, who held the 
phone in Denton's office and relayed the conversations between 
Jack and Col. North so that no direct communication actually 
took place. "Lister didn't know of my original CIA assignment 
in Nicaragua," Jack says. "But North did." 

Senator Denton finally agreed to ship food ard supplies 
to the Misura in exchange for the exact coordinates of the 
drug factories and the terrorist training camp. In effect, 
Denton was willing to break the law. 

But when they began to discuss the details of the 
guarantees. Jack balked. If he released his information, he 
began to realize that Denton intended to use it primarily for 
ant 5 -Sandinista propaganda. He knew that the aid freeze 
hscin't stopped Washington from sending supplies to the TDN 
Contras. Why shouldn't the Misura Contras receive equal 
treatment? 

No deal was cut. Jack left Senator Denton's office empt/ 
hand««l, listening to Meg Hunt's final appeal to his "patriotic 
duty . " 

By the time he returned to Tegucigalpa, the U S. Embassy 
there had received a telex from the State Department demanding 
the exit from Honduras of all Americans. The Embassy was 
instructed to apply particular pressure on the Managua 
government to deport Colonel Place's volunteer American group. 

■ Teofilo Archibald, a Creole and th^.Misura political 
director, delivere-l that message to Jack' Terrell at his lent 
in the Tia camp. Jack asked Archibald to relay his mess.=iqe to 
Managua: he would resist de^crtatjon with force. H:» wanted to 
r-uy tire in order to dec.:3e ^ctat. his next move should be. 



y 



fmmn 



850 



wuss/fe 



But that night an Israeli cargo plane airlifted 40 
Honduran commandos into the RusRus airstrip and then to TEA. 
As soon as the commandos were positioned around the .tents of 
the Americans, a Honduran major woke Jack Terrell, instructing 
him that if he or any of his men stepped outside th^ir tents 
carrying arms, the commandos would open fire. The major told 

Jack that he had 24 hours to vacate the TEA camp then they 

would leave for Tegucigalpa and a final flight home to the 
United States. 

The next morning Misura general staff of f icers'stood with 
Jack at the small airfield as the Americans loaded their gear 
en the cargo plane. The 40 Honduran commandos stood with 
machine pistols at the ready. Archibald's second-in-command 
drew Jack to one side. 

He told Jack that the Honduran commandos were surrounded 
by 300 Hisura soldiers. All Jack and his men had tc do was 
hit the ground, and the Misura would open fire. 

Jack wisely declined. He had already agonized over the 
decision to leave, and he had realised that if he fought back 

even if he won he would create two additional enemies for 

the Misura: Honduras and the United States. He waved gocdbye 
and stepped aboard the plane. 

In Tegucigalpa he and the other CMA volunteers were kept 
on the C-47 for eight hours under the tropical sun. Several 
of the men were sick; they were forced to urinate and defecate 
in the plane's cockpit. After nightfall they were transpc-ted 
to the basement of the U.S. Embassy and held there for a 
further 12 hours. The next morning their passports were taken 
from them and they were put on a commercial plane for Miami. 

"I felt betrayed, and I felt the Misura Contras 
had been betrayed as well. I was later tcld by my 
CIA friend in Washington that it was believed I had 
get 'out of control', I wasn't following orders, and 
he advised me to keep a low profile. 

"What they do in such cases, literally, is 
stamp your jacket at Langley with the words: 'OUT OF 
CONTROL. * 

"At the end I did what I thought was right, not 
what I was ordered to do. That's certainly true. 
And since that day the Misura Contras have gone down 
the toilet, right where the FDN wants them, while 
the FDN sits comfortably on its tail waiting for 
U.S. intervention and a personal congratulatory 
visit from Ronald Reagan. He'll get a surprise when 
he sees his beloved 'freedom fighters.' They're 
thugs." * 

> 
Jack Terrell thought he was helping- his country contj* 
the threat of Communism spreading throughout Central America 
through Mexico to the borders of Texas an^ Californi'. (\t the 
tmie he ?et off for Nicaragua he didn't consider hi(r«-elt n.^jv? 



fc^CCtorr. 



851 



iCLASSIREO 



or Ideal lEtic. He knew he was an adventurer flying under 
false colors, but he thought he was adventuring and plotting 
for a just cause. 

"Since then," he says, "people have called me everything 
from a Eonofabitch to a nut, from a communist to a right-wing 
Reaganite. The labels don't bother me. I have to play a 
mental game of ping pong to understand what happened to me, 
the changes I went through. At times my feeling is one of 
total emptiness. I just want to come out of this, somehow, 
with my integrity intact." 



Jack Reynolds Terr«ll is currently cooperating here in 
the United States with the FBI, the DEA, Federal attorneys 
from Miami, and the Costa Rican government, all of whom are 
investigating a web of drug traffic, assassination attempts 
plotted in the United States with QIA approval, anti-neutral- 
ity violations, and stacks of conspiracy allegations involving 
the FDN Contras and their American supporters. 

On April 5, 1986, at the request and under the aegis of 
Senator Kerry of Maryland, he was escorted by armed guard to a 
safe house neai* Annapolis, where further debriefing will take 
place and a decision made as to his testimony. 

Terrell has been asked to appear on 60 Min utes. 20/20, 
and the Donahue S how , but so far he has turned them down. He 
has given in-depth interviews to the Boston Glp_fce^ and the 
Associated Press with the understanding that the mate'-ial will 
not be printed until he gives the gc-ahead sign. 

"When the right time comes, 1 want to tell the truth c* 
what happened down there in Central America. That's ths only 
way we can understand what's happening now ... and what mignt 
happen. " 



IS 



Dan Grothaus, a reporter with tha Houston Post, will be 

aiding Jack Terrell in the writing of his f i rst-perscn story. 
A rough draft manuscript of approximately 120,000 words exist: 
and i% being «|)|Lxt«d. The final text will be similar in 
lengttr: 

Grothaus will conduct further taped interviews w: th Jack 
Terrell in Maryland and/or New Orelans, and will soon take a 
leave of absence from the Post and travel to Honduras and 
Nicar-agua for additional research. 

A target date of September 1986 has been set for corr- 
pletion of the book. 



CNCUXSIflffl 



852 



r»Ml (MV. »-!♦«' 




.*■*. 



o^' 
^''- 



\^r x-^ 






"NCUJSfRffl 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

1 



7/25/86 

Mte ml trtMcrtnton 

t 10; SO a.m., ja.ENN A. ROBINETTE, 



On July . 24. 1 ■ — 

|HH^HHMH|||^mm^|^^BIi^P telephone 
^^^JJa^reTnterviewedat the Washington Field Office, 
TfiDERAL BUREAU OP INVESTIGATION (FBI), by Special Agent 
ELLEN GLASSER, Special Agent DAVID A. BEISNER, and UNITED 
STATES SECRET SERVICE Special Agent THOMAS A. PUSKAS: 

Before any questions were asked of GLENN ROBINETTE, 
he asked for "three minutes to speak out." Speaking very 
succinctly and repeatedly stating that he felt the interview 
was being taped, he alluded to the idea that the FBI had 
Srgeted hia as being a "plumber" for the WHITE HOUSE. He 
continued by saying he would not be a part of any such 
action and valued his professional and- personal character 
far too much to be associated with a "plumbers unit. He 
further indicated that he felt uneasy as to the FBI leaking 
information to the media about his contact with then. 
Be stated that he holds the FBI responsible for any leaks 
of information to the media concerning his ~»!f=*JL'^5il„,„ 
the FBI. ROBINETTE stated that he knows both OLIVER NORTH 
and RICHARD V. SECOPJ). He is currently working for RICHARD 
SECORD in regard to identifying the origin of the information 
which resulted in a pending civil suit against fECORD. 
When ROBINETTE was asked what his association with SECORD 
was, he replied that he had started working for SECORD 
a months ago. When he was asked if SECORD was P«yin| him, 
ROBINETTE replied by saying he was "working for SECORD. 
ROBINETTE stated he had not worked for SECORD prior to 
accepting this. case. 

In his contacts with JACK TERRELL, between July 11, 
1986, and July 17. 1986, ROBINETTE •<*vi««** .^^LJ??^ ROBINETTE 
was convincing and does not volunteer any information. ROBINETTE 
opined that "there is more to TERRELL than what meets the 
eye." ■• also stated that TERRELL showed little interest 
in wosMB i»hll« around him, and is surveillance conscious. 
AS for being a potentlAl danger to ''••i<*^^. ^5^p2fr 
other dooiestic officials, ROBINETTE stated that TERRELL 
did not appear to be a danger on the ■«'«<'•• „5?!'*)[!f: 
he believed that "There is something aboOt TERRELL that 
■carv." He did not see TERRELL as an explosive person 
«d indicated that, to his knowledge, TERRELL did not carry 



>us. 



-k^ 



Was 



iS 



lO 



7/24/86 



SAs DAVID A. BEISNER^ 



Washington, D. C. p,^ •. 



ELLEN GLA^I 
— C^ 



BGtmye 



7/25/86 




;TC* - 



853 



.nyM2iifimi. IMB-«3| 



UNCLASSIFIED 



ii 



CemnuMon of n>4oa of . 



GLENN A. ROBINETTE; 



a weapon. ROBINETTE further mentioned a comment made by 
TERRELL that appeared acary to ROBINETTE. Under a pretext 
conversation about weapons, ROBINETTE asked TERRELL about 
obtaining a weapon for his wife. In response, TERRELL 
offered a suggestion and stated, "This Is a rough world. 
There are times you need to protect yourself and your beliefs. 

ROBINETTE concluded about TERRELL that there 
was a deeper side to TERRELL that had not been revealed. 
He could not say whether or not TERRELL was a possible 
danger to any foreign officials. He believed that TERRELL 
was self-serving and out for his own personal well being 
rather than truly supporting any specific cause, political 
or otherwise. 

ROBINETTE ended the Interview by reaffirming 
his original statement about his concern of the FBI thinking 
of him as a plumber and leaking information to the media 
concerning his contact with them. 

ROBINETTE Stated he would advise the FBI in the 
event that he planned to continue his private investigation 
by recontacting TERRELL. 




854 



PO-M<|ll(V. »-<0-M) 






reOERAL tURCAU OP INVESnaATION 



On July 17 

GLENN A. ROBINBTTE, ^_,_^ 

^m^ft^ contacted th« undersigned Special Agent , FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) at the Washington Field Office 
and furnished the following information t 

ROBINETTB Stated he had completed a ItOO p.m. 
meeting in which he met JACK TERRELL outside 731 8th Street, 
S. E. , Washington, D. C, and ate lunch with him. He queried 
the undersigned Agent about whether he was being followed 
by surveillance units. 

ROBINBTTE Stated that he believed TERRELL did 
not present a threat to President RONALD REAGAN. TERRELL 
appeared to have no loyalties to any outside government, 
except that he is sympathetic to Nicaragua Issues. TERRELL 
reiterated, as in past meetings with ROBINETTE, that he 
was not opposed to United States policy per se, but was 
against the methods used to support the Contra program. 
TERRELL described MARIO CALERO as a "pin-stripe General.' 

TERRELL refused ROBINBTTE 's beeper number when 
offered. Re also told ROBINETTE he would be available 
at his telephone number, 966-5873, over the weekend. 

TERRELL and ROBINETTE conversed about weapons 
which ROBINETTE 's wife could use as self -protection. TERRELL 
recommended a .330 pistol or mace. 

ROBINETTB vas requested by the writer to abstain 
from making further contact with TERRELL untile further 
notice . 




TMK aMaMMM (aMMM KMUMr 



855 



PO-WK"*^ »"0^»' 



^■^^^J^ 




\V 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

1 



H^CiASM 



» 



0M» o< trantcriviisn. 



7/25/86 



On July 22, 1986, Lieutenant Colonel OLIVER L. 
NORTH, Director for Political-Military Affairs and the 
Counterterrorism and Low Intensity Warfare Group of the 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC), was Interviewed by the 
undersigned Special Agent and Assistant Special Agent in 
Charge of the FEDERAL BUREAU OP INVESTIGATION (FBI), Washington 
Field Office, at his office located in the Old Executive 
Office Building. After being apprised of the interviewers' 
identities and the purpose, NORTH furnished the following 
information: 

NORTH stated he has never personally met JACK 
REYNOLDS TERRELL, but has heard about him through numerous 
sources. Among these sources, NORTH enumerated the following: 

1) Approximately 18 months ago. Intelligence 
Officer for Nicaraguax^esistance, Northern Front, (First 
Name Unstated ) HpHjJI^B advised NORTH that TE 

t teflin^people he worked for NORTH. 

"tol d NORTH ghat TERRELL, known to him as "Colonel" FLACO, 
[ in a training capacity and was purported 
tal withth^troons. NORTH advised that he recommended 
[go tc^^^Bl^HHauthorities to throw TERRELL 
counfry. NORTH tsillieved that TERRELL was thrown 
[subsequent to this. 

2) When NORTH was in CentralAmerica^ie heard 
that FLACO was trying to bring guns v|||HHlHi^^^°'" 
Miami. Contacts advised NORTH that TERRELL was telling 
others he was retired from the UNITED STATES ARMY, Special 
Forces, and was formerly with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY (CIA). NORTH Stated he ran checks for both, which 
were negative. 

3) NORTH stated TERRELL is to be a star witness 
in a 1986 civil suit filed in the Southern District of 
Florida in which a group of United States citizens are 
named as defendants. 



■^ 7/22/86 



.^-. 



SA ELLEN GLAS^ ( 
ASAC DAVID G. BINNEY 



«)0 



Washington. D. C. 
EG:mye 







856 



n>^029(rWy. 11-1»«3) 



UNCLASSWe 



Csnarwawn at FD>3M a« . 



OLIVER L. NORTH; 



7/22/86 



4) NORTH Stated that TERRELL'S nam* had surfaced 
in connection with a staff investigation being conducted 

by Massachusetts Senator JOHN KERRY. 

5) While TERRELL'S nane has not come up, NORTH 
mentioned that in Harch, 1986, HjBhfiP<l< f°" PQ«t Managing 
Editor LEONARD DOWNEY received obscene calls at night in 
which the caller used NORTH'S name. DOWNEY 9rote NORTH 

a letter advising him that if the activity did not stop, 
he would prosecute. NORTH stated that he did not make 
the calls, wondered who did, and stated he had responded 
to DOWNEY'S letter with a letter offering assistance. 



6) 
interviews. 



TERRELL has used OLIVER NORTH'S nane on television 




NORTH Stated that he Is acquainted with both 
Retired Air Force Major General RICHARD V. SECORD and GLENN 
ROBINETTE. SECORD runs an import-export business, but 
is also a consultant to the DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE (DOD) 
as a member of the Special Operations Planning and Analysis 
Group. NORTH advised that SECORD is named in th e Florida 
civil suit, and another suit and hired ROBINETTE, a security 
investigator, to learn information about TERRELL, the key 
witness in both suits. NORTH stated that he was aware 
of ROBINETTB's investigation and has talked to both ROBINETTE 
and SECORD about it, but ha did not initiate the investigation. 
NORTH has dMiied swdla allegations that 8BC0R0 works for 
hin and reiterated this point during the interview. 



ONCUSWO 



857 



PD-303II (r«v. 11-lS-a3) 



vumms 



ConmmBnclFO-MZtfl. 



OLIVER L. NOTH; 



..On. 



7/22/86 



On the evening of July 17, 1986, ROBINETTE called 
NORTH who asked hira to do a favor. NORTH had been alerted 
by the FBI that the FBI sought to Immediately locate TERRELL 
and NORTH asked ROBINETTE to meet with the FBI that evening. 
Before meeting FBI Special Agents, ROBINETTE met with NORTH 
in his office, giving him copies of documents, which ROBINETTE 
later also furnished to the FBI. 

NORTH stated he has never met a DAVID MAC MICHAEL, 
whom he believed is associated with lobbying on Central 
America and has reported on "atrocities" in the last year. 
NORTH heard information through contacts that MAC MICHAEL 



NORTH advised that his NSC duties center around 
the coordination of interagency process within the NSC 
and carrying out policy. He has worked extensively in 
the area of Central American affairs and has played a large 
role in the "Nicaraguan Policy problem." NORTH stated 
that he strongly believes in a democratic resolution of 
Nicaraguan issues. He described himself as an "activist." 
He has a staff of four, two secretaries and two assistants. 

NORTH stated that neither he nor his staff are 
responsible for funding, arming, or administrating Contra 
programs. He stated that he is not involved with any covert 
operations being run in the United States. NORTH does 
travel extensively <md meets openly with foreign leaders, 
including Nicaraguan Embassy Ambassador CARLOS TUNNERMANN. 
Other than NSC employees operating within the realm of 
their assigned duties, he stated he had no subordinates 
currently operating in the United States and knew of no 
one on his staff, to include himself, who was operating 
outside th« scope of NORTH'S jurisdiction. 

On this date, NORTH furnished investigators with 
an original letter to him, dated June 27, 1986, from TOM 
POSEY, Head of the CMA. 




858 



FD 302 







:M v.* -'■ 



l"»WJ5Wfn 



FEDEKAL BUUAO OF IHVESTIGATIOI 



1 



Date of crantcrlpclon 7/23/86 



1986, Rtt lrtd Major General IICHARD V.^^^ 
Ic Lean, Virginia, telephone sHV 

waa interviewed at the WASHINGTON 

FIELD OFFICE oFThe FEDERAL SniEAU OF INVESTIGATION. After being 
apprised of the interviewing Agents identities and purpose, 
SECORD furnished the following inforaatlon: 




General SECORD stated he knew 
investigation concerning JACK TERRELL, 
knowledge of TERRELL steamed froa a civi 
General was one of approxlaately thirty 
case. The General stated the suit accus 
defendents of "wild activity" which was 
identified as- "AVIRGAN" and "HONEY". Ge 
DANIEL SHEEHAN. of the Christie lastltut 
representing AVIRGAN and HONEY. General 
business is one of a fifty percent partn 
which is identified as The Stanford Tech 
General SECORD described their business 
International security organization. 



of the ongoing 

General SECORD stated his 
1 suit in which the 
de'fendents in a RICO 
ed hla and his co- 
generated by Individuals 
aaral SECORD stated that 
• is the Attorney 

SECORD stated that his 
ershlp with ALBERT HAKIN, 
nology Trading Group, 
as a private 



General SECORD ststed that he is also a aeaber of the 
Special Operations and Policy Croup originating with the 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 



CttO 



Investigation on 



at Washington, D.C. File 





Date dictated 



This docuaeac contains neither recoaaendations nor conclusions of 
the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your 
agency; it and its ceacents are not to be distributed outside 
your agency. 




E 



859 



assussro 



FD 302a 



Continuation of Interview of General RICHARD V. SECORD . Page 2 



General SECORD stated that JACK TERRELL Is a central 
figure In the suit against hla and ALBERT HAKIN, et. al.and 
General SECORD described JACK TERRELL as the "star witness" In 
this suit. 

General SECORD stated he hired ROBINNETTE in May. 1986, 
to Investigate backgrounds and allegations in this suit against 
himself and the other defendants. General SECORD stated that 
ROBINNETTE Is on his (General SECORD's) payroll and SECORD 
believed ROBINNETTE had hired two retired FBI Agents to help la 
the investigation. 



General SECORD described the 
concerted effort by JACK TERRELL and se 
Identities of whoa could be provided by 
General SECORD named those people he co 
thought were in collusion with JACK TER 
identified a SERGIO BRULLE , a Cuban Aae 
business; a (FNU) GOMEZ, whoa he descrl 
involved with drug running, currently 1 
Republic; and a BILL KENNY, who is aakl 
SECORD's activities abroad. General SE 
ROBINNETTE could provide coaplete backg 
concerning his investigation to date. 



allegations as being a 
vera! other people, the 

ROBINNETTE. 
uld recall whoa he 
RELL. General SECORD 
rlcan, with a coaoerclal 
bed as a bad Cuban 
iving in the Dominican 
ng statements concerning 
CORD stated that 
round inforaation 



General SECORD reiterated the inforaation provided by a 
July 14, 1986, CBS news release concerning the "Maul" Aircraft 
(STOL aircraft which General SECORD is allegedly involved in 
selling to Contra groups at the behest of Lieutenant Colonel 
OLIVER NORTH). General SECORD also stated that there was a news 
conference held on Capitol Hill a couple of days after the suit 
was aade la Mlaai District Court, which was conducted by Fenton 
Coanunicatlena. 

General SECORD stated that his personal attorney is a 
TOM GREENE, 659-2400, 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 

SECORD stated that, according to ROBINNETTE, TERRELL is 
a "spooky character" and ROBINNETTE had conducted an "operation" 
at the behest of General SECORD atteaptlng to ingratiate himself 
with JACK TERRELL. ROBINNETTE ae t with hla fofr a personality 
assessment, on the pretext of working on a novel concerning JACK 
TERRELL. 



iiNWSsra 



860 



PD 302a 






Conclnuadon of Interview of C«n«r>l RICHARD V. SECORD , P«ge 3^ 

ROBINNETTE was actaaptlng also to gain background Infornatlon 
concerning AVIRGAN. HONEY and SHEEHAN. aantlonad abovt.. 
General SECORD stated that to the best of his knowledge 
ROBINNETTE set with JACK TERRELL three or four tlaes and talked 
CO hla on the phone several tlaes. 

During the course of the Interview General SECORD 
stated that he would aake ROBINNETTE available to the FBI to 
provide full disclosure concerning his "investigation" on JACK 
TERRELL. 



uNCUiSsm 



861 



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a UNCLASEFTO 
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m FBI CQHCBMIM ALLEGED ACTXVXTZE8 OP THE CXVZLXAM MZLXTART 
ASSISTAIII.P CCmi — UBIIM SIDGGLIIIG OP IBAPOHS, AMD MARCOTXCS. 
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(Tlma) 



Par 



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862 



. FD-Se (R*v S-M-a2) ' 

FBI 

TRANSMIT VIA: PRECEDENCE: CLASSIFICATION: 

a TMtyp* lmtn«dM« D TOP SECRET 

D F»c»imil« D Prtortty D SECRET 

D □ Routm* . _^ D CONFIDENTIAL 



B! 



luurt 




a UNCLASEFTO 
a UNCLAS 

Dito 



PACE THREE OE HP 0066 SECRET 

TERKELL ADVISED THESE PLAKS NEKE MADE TO IMPLICATE THE 

SANDINISTAS AND HE BAD OPPEltKED HIS SERVICES TO THE FBI 

TO INFILTRATE TEE SANDINISTAS. tt 8B00LD BE NOTED THAT TERRELL 

HAS MADE NUMEROOS STATEMENTS RSGARDING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCT (CIA) TIES TO PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE WA, AS WELL 

AS OTHER ALLEGATIONS* THAT lAVB HOT BEEN CORROBORATED. 

TERRELL HAS PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE 7/17/86 BT NFO AND 
LATER TRAVELLED ON 7/22/86 TO MIAMI, WHERE MIAMI DIVISION 
CURRENTLY HAS HIM UNDER SURVEILLANCE. 

POR INFORMATION OF MIAMI, WFO SUBSCRIBER CHECKS FOR 
CALLS PLACED FROM TERRELL'S HOTEL ROOM IN MIAMI ON THIS 
DATE ARE AS FOLLOWS t 202-547-3800-CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY, 731 STB STREET, N.W., WDC; 202 -224 -2742 -OFFICE Og^ 
SENTATOR JOHN KEXXY, WDC; AMD 202-662-0618-UNLISTEO. 

SUMMARY OF WFO ZMVXSTIGATIOH OH 7/24/86 FOLLOWS: 

A REVIEW WAS MADE OT TERRELL'S 4/86 TELEPHONE BILL 
(NUMBER S04-S22-6129) WHEN TERRELL WAS RE8IDINS AT 1350 
BOURBON tmST, NEW OlOEANS, LA. 

ON THIS DATE, DAVID C. HAOIICBAIL WAS UNDER SURVEILLANCE 

SECRET 



Approved: ___^_^^^^^^^^^^^_ TranwnMwJ * 

(Number) (TbiM) 



JiNCUSsm 



863 



n-M (n*v t-as-U) 



•mANSMIT VIA: 
D TMtyp* 
D ftctkrOf 

D 



PRECEDENCE: 
D Immcdiat* 
D Prtortty 
a Routm* 




CLASSIPICATION: 
D TOP SECRET 
D SECRET 
a CONPI0ENT1AL 

UNCLAS E F T 

UNCLAS 

0«t* 



PACE POUR OE NP 0066 8 K C 11 X T 
WHEKE HE WAS OBSEKVEO AT CENTER POR DEVELOPEMEMT POLICY, 
731 STB STREET, THE NATIONAL PRESS B0ILDIN6, NDC, AND THE 
NUEMB (DID NOT ENTER) . BE HAS BEEN IN TBE CmPANY OT AN 
UNID^ENTIPIED NBITE PEHALE, RITA CLARK, N/P BIPLOTEX OP TBE 
NDBIB, AND A W/N BELIEVED TO BE A WILLIAM B. NCOOT. 

ON TBIS DATE, WPO REINTEXVIENED GLEN V. ROBINETTE, 

MBO CONPrSMED TBAT BE HAD 
BEEN BIRED BT RETIRED AIR PORCE MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD V. 
8EC0RD TO' LOOK INTO TERRELL'S ACTIVITIES. TERRELL IS BELIEVED 
TO BE A STAR WITNESS IN A CIVIL SUIT NAMIN6 SECORD. ROBINETTE 
MENTIONED NUMEROUS TIMXS BE WAS HOT INVOLVED IN ANT KIND OT 
'PLUMBERS UNIT' AND SHOWED GREAT CONCERN TBAT INFORMATION 
NOT BE LEAKED TO TBE MEDIA. 

ALL OFFICES BE ADVISED TBAT IF SUBJECT TERRELL TRAVELS TO 
ANT DIVISION, SURVEILLANCE IS TO BE COHTINUODS AMD SUBJECT IS 
TO BE ACCOMPANIED TO ANT POINT NXTBIM TBE UNITED STATES. 
COORDINAfXOH BRNSBI DIVISIONS IS IMPERATIVB. 

TBMBU. XS OtSCRXBBD AS W/N, DOB 4/13/41, SOI 41C-56-124S, 
S'lO' - «*•", 1(5 • 17S LBS, BLUE XTES, BBOWH/SRATISB BAXR. 

. SECRET 



Approved: 



TnnenMlMQ 



(Nwnbar) (Tlnw) 



WUSSIflfD 



864 



«\>^^«\^^ 



PAGE TWO DE WF 0002 SECRET 

(NO COPY TO ATLANTA) » WASHINGTON FIELD FACSIMILE TO 

NEW ORLEANS. SA GARY JOHNSON, DATED JULY 22, 1986. 

WASHINGTON FIELD INVESTIGATION ON JULY 22, 1936, 
CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING! 

FOR INFORMATION OF ATLANTA, CAPTIONED MATTER INVOLVES 
INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT IN ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT 
PLOT ON THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN. . 

ON INSTANT DATE, WASHINGTON FIELD INTERVIEWED NATIONAL 
SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTOR OLIVER NORTH RfeOARDlNO MIS 
KNOWLEDGE OF TERRELL, OLENN ROBINETTE, AND THEIR ACTIVITIES. 
NORTH ADVISED THAT ROBINETTE MA9 HIRED AS A PRIVATE 
INVESTIGATOR FOR RETIRED AIR FORCE RAJOR GENERAL RICHARD SECORD, 
WHO IS NAMED IN A 1906 CIVIL SUIT FILED BY TONY AVIROAN AND 
MARTHA HONEY IN THE 80UTHEKN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA AGAINST 
30 INDIVIDUALS IN SUPPORT OP THE CONTRA PROGRAM. TERRELL 
IS BELIEVED TO BE A WITME6» M THE CA6E AND BECORD ALLEBEDLY 
HIRED ROBINCTTK Tft •»» T > — T AIN I N TO WWATION CM TCARELL. 
NORTH STATED TMO^MC PL ^»1 » WO PART IN INITIATING THIS CONTACT 
BUT WAS AUAR£ Q r .. J »l - N Q W TI I PW OM IOEB MFOMMTIOH TMAT ROBINETTE 
COULD ASSIST THE FCOCAAL BUAEAU OF IVEBTIBATISM iFBI IN 
SECRET 



^fimsim 







rV 



\^^ 



865 



ONClASSm 



PAGETHREE DE WF 0002 SECRET 

LOCATINC TERRELL WITHOUT HESITATION ON JULY 17. 1906, AND 
STATED THAT ROBINETTE HAD CONE TO HIS OFFICE BEFORE BEING 
INTERVIEWED BY THE FBI. WHEN OUERIEOREOARDINO DAVID 
MAC MICHAEL, NOTH ADVISED J 




SHURTLY AFTER lOlOO A.M., A WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE SPECIAL 
AGENT (SA), WHILE UNDER PRETEXT AT THE CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY. OVERHEARD A RECEPTIONIST SPEAK TO "JACK" WHO WAS CALLING 
FROM A METRO STOP. THE RECEPTIONIST IMMEDIATELY HEREAFTER 
TELEPONED SOMEONE TO ADVISE THAT JACK WAS AT THE METRO AND 
NEEDED TO BE MET IMMEDIATELY WITH THE MONEY PACKET. 

ON 12tl5 P.M.. TERRELL DEPARTED WASHINGTON NATIONAL 
AIRPORT ALONE VIA EASTERN AIRLINES, FLIGHT 179, ARRIVING 
MIAMI, FLORIDA, 2i23 P.M. TERRELL WAS FOLLOWED BY WASHINGTON 
FIELD SOO PERSONNEL AND MIAMI SO MET THE PLANE, SO THAT 
SURVEILLANCE CONTINUED WITHOUT BREAK. MIAMI REPORTED TO 
WASHINGTON FIELD CONTACT BY TERRELL IN MIAMI WITH A HILDA 
COUTIN. ALSO REPORTED WAS INFORMATION THAT TERRELL HAS PAID 
FOR FOUR DAYS LOOOINO AT HIAI AIRPOAT MARRIOTT HOTEL. 

WASHINGTON FIELD HAS FOCUSED ADDITIONAL ATTENTION TO 
SECRET 



UNCLASSIFIED 



836 



iciiSSiFe 



FACE FOUR DE WF 0002 SECRET 

DAVID C. MAC niCHAEL WHO MAS SEEN JULY 21, 1986, WITH TERRELL 
AND WHO VISITED THE NARAGUAN EMBASSY NUEHB) AFTER HIS 
CONTACTS WITH TERRELL. IDENTIFICATION IS TENTATIVE AND 
WASHINGTON FIELD HAS NOT LOCATED MAC MICHAEL WHO WILL, AT THAT 
TIME, erCOME A SURVEILLANCE TARGET. 




SURVEILLANCE ON SAMPSON AND CORDERO IS CONTINUING. 
AMPSON WAS OBSERVE THIS DATE GOING WITH HIS WIFE, MIDDAY, 
TO A BANK. HE EXITED THE BANK WITH A LARGE BROW BAG. 



T 



RECEIVING OFFICES ARE REQUESTED TO CHECK ALL REFERENCES 
FOR A DAVID C. MAC MICHAEL, DATE OF BIRTH, JUNE 29, 1927t AND 
DELPHI COMPANY, RIVERDALE. GEORGIA. 

LEAOSi WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISIONS AT WASHINGTON, D. Ci 
SECRET 



a 



NCLASSIFifO 



867 




PAGE FIVE DE WF 0002 SECRET 

HILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND IDENTIFY DAVID C. 
MAC MICHAEL AND PLACE HIM UNDER SURVEILLANCE. 

WILL INTERVIEW RICHARD SECORD REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE 
OF TERRELL. 

MILL RE INTERVIEW GLENN ROBINETTE REGARDING ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION ON TERRELL. 

WluL, AT NATIONAL AIRPORT, CONDUCT LOGICAL CHECKS TO 
DETERMINE IF DVID MAC MICHAEL TRAVELLED FROM 61OO P.M. ON 
JULY 17, 19S6, VIA ANY AIR TRAVEL ROUTE TO MIAMI. 

ATLANTA DIVISION! AT RIVERDALE, OEOROIAi 

ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY DELPHI COMPANY , R I VDALE , GEORGIA, 
THROUGH DIRECTORY, BUSINESS, AND OTHER LOGICAL SOURCES. 

AEXANDRIA DIVISIOj AT DULLES AIRPORTi 

CONDUCT LOGICAL CHECKS TO DETERMINE IF MC MICHAEL TRAVELLED 
SINCE 61OO P.M., JULY 21, 1986, TO PRESENT VIA ANY AIR TRAVEL 
ROUTE TO MIAMI (SA JESSE LOTTUS) (INFORMATION PROVIDED TELEPHONICALLY) . 

BALTIMORE DIVISIONi AT BWI AIRPORTi 

CONDUCT LOGICAL CHECKS TO DETERMINE IF MAC ICHAEL TRAVELLED 
SINCE 61 00 P.M., JULY 21, 1986, TO PRESENT VIA ANY AIR TRAVEL 
ROUTE TO MIAMI (INFORMATION PROVIDED TELEPHONICALLY). 
SECRET 



oNcusm 



868 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PACE SIX DE WF 0002 SECRET 



MIAMI DIVISION! AT MIAMI, FLORIDA: 

WILL CONTINUE ITS SURVEILLANCE ON SUBJECT, TERRELL, AND KEEP 
OFFICE OF ORIGIN FULLY APPRISED F HIS MOVEMENTS. PROVIDE LIAISON 
WITH WASHINGTON FIELD SOC IN MIAMI DIVISION, AS WELL AS WASHINGTON 
FIELD SSA CARSON DUNBAR AND USSS KEN DONOHUE ARRIVING MIAMI ' 
EVENING ON JULY 22, 1986. 

NLW ORLEANS DIVISION: AT NEW ORLEANS, LOU II ANA: -p 



F.R.C.? 



C BY G-3> DECLi OADR. 
BT 
#0002 



NNNN 




•* Vic ( 



869 



inmm 



PAGE TWO DE WF 0055 SECRET 

TO WFO DATED 7/23/86> NO AIRTEL DATE 7/ 19/36. 

THE FOLLOWINO INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED ON 7/23/86 AT WFOs 

RETIRED AIR FORCE MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD V. SECORD WAS 
INTERVIEWED THIS DATE AND HE ADVISED HE HAD HIRED GLENN ROBINETTE 
FOR PURPOSES OF GETTING INFORMATION REGARDING SUBJECT TERRELL. 
SECORD ADVISED HE BELEIVED ROBINETTE WAS WORKING WITH 2 RETIRED 
FBI AGENTS, IDENTITIES UNKNOWN TO HIM. TERRELL IS BELIEVED 
HY SECORD TO BE STAR WITNESS IN CIVIL SUIT DESCRIBED IN REFERENCED 
TELETYPE. 

WFO SOC RETURNED TO WFO THIS DATE. 

ON THIS DATE, MARY WILLIAMS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FARA 
SECTION, ADVISED THAT DO J HAS NO RECORD FOR THE CENTER FOR 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY OR INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR DEVELOPMET 
POLICY. WILLIAMS ADVISED THAT MENTIONED GROUP IS NOT CURRENTLY 
REGISTERED AS AN AGENT FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND HAS NEVER 
BEEN REGISTERED AS AN AGENT FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. A FARA 
RECORD CHECK FOR LINDSAY MATTISON (ASSOCIATE /EMPLOYER OF 
TERRELL) WAS ALSO NEGATIVE. 

WFO WILL RECONTACT PROFILE UNIT, QUANT I CO, AND PROVIDE 

UPDATED BACKGROUND ON TERRELL. < 

W 



SECRET 



r 



inmsim 



^^■J^ 



:^^ 







870 



WUSSIfiEO 



PAGE THREE DE WF 0055 SECRET 

UFO LOCATED AND PLACED DAVID C. MACMICHAEL UNDER SURVEILLANCE 
AT 1612 20TH STREET. N.W., WDC, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC 
AFFAIRS. MACMICHAEL ALSO OBSERVED AT 731 8TH STREET, S.E., 
WD, CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY MACMICHAEL AND A UNKNOWN 
ASSOCIATE NOTED TO BE EXTREMELY SURVEILLANCE CONSCIOUS. IN FACT 
MACMICHAEL USED EVASIVE TACTICS WHICH WERE SUCCESSFUL IN HIS 
ELUDING SURVEILLANCE ON 5:30 P.M. THIS DATE. i.ACMICHAEL 
IDENTIFIED AS W/M, DOB 6/5/27, SSN 148-20-1527, MAY RESIDE 
AT U442 ORCHARD LANE, RESTON, VA. , WITH A LORETTA RHODES, 
DOE 11/13/51. 

WFO CONDUCTING CIA CHECSK ON MACMICHAEL AS ARRANGED 
THROUGH 7/22/86 CONTACT WITH FBIHQ. 

NEW ORLEANS BE ADVISED THAT WFO IS IN RECEIPT THIS DATE 
OF TERRELL CASSETTE TAPE AND TRANSCRIPT DATED 3/11/86 OF 
CONVERSATION BETWEEN TERRELL AND MANUEL CORDERO. (AIRTEL) 

REQUEST OF FBIHQ 

CONDUCT INDICES SEARCHES FOR THE FOLLOW I NO i 1. JACK 
REYNOLDS TERRELL, DOB 4/ 13/41 i 2. WENDY LOU SCHAULL, DOB 
12/30/47» 3. GLENN A. ROBINETTE, DOB 8/21/211 4. LINDSAY MATTISON 

SECRET 



"Ncussife 



871 



%%/i5 



K? 



PAGE FOUR DE WF 0055 SECRET 

5. DAVID CHARLES MACMICHAEL, DOB 6/5/27» 6. CENTER FOR 

DEVELOPMENT POLICY, 781 8TH STREET, S.E., WDC, 418 lOTH STREET, 

S.E.. UDC. I 7. COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, 1612 20TH STREET, 

N.W.. WDCi 8. LORETTA RHODES, DOB 11/13/51. 

LEADS: ALEXANDRIA DIVISION! AT ALEXNADRIA, VIRGINIA 

CONDUCT INDICES SEARCHES FOR ALL REFERENCES AS OUTLINED 
ABOVE. 

ATLANTA DIVISION: AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA 

PER TELCAL, MAKE DIRECTORY CHECKS FOR SUBJECT'S SISTER 
BARBARA TERRELL, 7560-5 TAYLOR RD. , RIVERDALE, GA, TELEPHONE 
473-9795. ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHO RESIDES AT ADDRESS AND ANY 
BUSINESS LINK TO DELPHI, INCORPORATED. RIVERDALE, OA, AS 
PRINTED ON SUBJECT'S LUOGAOE. INFORMATION OBTAINED BY WFO 
CHECK OF 1984 PASSPORT APPLICATION FOR TERRELL. 

BALTIMORE DIVISION! AT COCKEYSVILLE, MARYLAND 

CONDUCT INDICES SEARCHES AS OUTLINED ABOVE. 
CLASSIFIED BY! G-3| DECLASSIFY ONt OADR 
BT 
•0055 



"NWSS/f/fD 



872 



IP* 



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D Ttl«typ« 
a F«c«imil« 

D 



FBI 



ft 



PRECEDENCE: 
a tonnwdM* 
D Prlortly 
a Routm* 


CLASSiFICA..ON: ytW 

D TOP SECRET 'fj 

a SECRET 

D CONR0ENT1AL 

D UNCLASEFTO 

D UNCLAS 


•^Si), 









PAGE TWO OE WF 0002 SECRET 

XNCZOEMT. TERRELL MAS SEEM IN THE COMPANY OP TMO UNKNOWN 

FEMALES, AS YET ZOENTZPXED. 

LEADS HAVE BEEN SET FOR ALEXANDRIA DIVISION 



USSS ADVISES THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN ATE LONCB AT THE HOME 
OF VICE PRESIDENT BOSH TODAY BOT OTHERWISE HAS BEEN IN THE 
WHITE HOOSE COMPLEX ALL WEEKEND AND PLANS TO REMAIN THERE 
THROUGH MONDAY. ^- — v 

WFO IS IN PROCESS OF RSVIEWING ELSUR AND GENERAL INDICES 
CHECKS. ALSO, INVESTIGATJ«r ARE REVIEWING BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
TO TRACE TERRELL'S MOVSIENTS SINCE BECOMING ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE CIVILIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE (CNA) IN 1984. AM 
INITIAL REVIEW OF MAJOR EVENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS, WITH SOURCE 
OF INFORMATION: 1984-TERRSLL TRAVELLED TO CENTRAL AMERICA; 
CONTACTED CMA DIRECtOt POSEY ^^^BHK PD-302) I 10/84 - 
ATTENDED FUNERAL OF TMO CMA MEMBERS; MET TOM POSEY AND 
RECEIVED CMA APPLICATIOH; MET MARIO CALBRO OP THE FRBNTE 
DEMOCRATICO MICARAGUEMSB (FDN) WITH MBOM HE DISCUSSED SHI 

8BCRST 




Approvad: 



UNCLASSIFIED 







873 




THANSMfT VIA: 

nT«l«typ« 

D 



FBI 

PRECEDENCE: 
D Umncdlat* 
D Prtortty 
a Routine 



CLAS8IFICAI1ON 
D TOP SECRET 
D SECRET 
D CONFIDENTIAL 
a UNCLASEFTO 
D UNCLAS 

D«t« 




PAGE THREE DE MP 0002 S B C K B T 

MILITARY GOODS |HH[|^HH||BHHB' 70-302) ; 
APPROXIMATELY 10/22/84 - TERRELL MET WITH MARIO C^LERO, TON 
POSEY, AMD OTHERS REGARDING CIA - FORMISHED PLAN FOR CMA 
WHICH INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS OP PROPOSED ASSASSINATIONS OT SEVERAL 
PEOPLE (302) ; LATE 10/t4 - TERRELL TRAVBLLEDN 
MET WITH FDN MEMBERS (302) ; 11/14 - TERRBLL TOLD POSEY TO 
RECRUIT CMA MEMBERS; T){AR£LL PAYS $10,000 -FOR LODGING OP OTHERS 
AND IS '.REIMBURSED BY CIA (102)^ 11/19/B.4 - TERRELL AMD FIVE 
OTHERS <mBl^mi? PRESS COVERAGE OF CMA ASSOCIATION 
WITH CONTRAS RESULTS^|||H[^|^ OFFICIALS ORDERING CMA OUT. 
(302) } 12/15/84 - TERRELL WAITS ^[m^HpOR WOROf m»t 
CMA (302) ; 12/16/84 - TERRELL GOES TO NEW ORLEANS WITH POSEY 
^(302); 12/16/84 - 12/17/84- TERRELL GOES TO MIAMI (302); 
12/22-23/84 - POSEY NET LARRY 8PIVBY, HOLLYWOOD PRODUCER, 
IN MIAMI; POSEY MEETS OLIVER NORTH (302)} 12/21/84 - ttmOJ. 
MEETS JOHN HULL THR006H ADOLFO CALERO; HULL DESCRIBED A *CIA 
CQMZACVNMI'.nBBTTiaO 810,000 PER MONTH FROM NSC; MEETS 

ROB OWENS WBO SAYS HB IS CIA; 1/1/8S • OWENS, BULL, TERRELL IN 
/ 

MIA15X^''(302) ; 1/4/8S - TERRELL AMD OTHERS AT MEETING AT 

8ECRKT 






Approved: 



TrmtmiltMl 



Pm 



(Number) (Tbn«) 




874 



FD-M(nM t-se-u) 



TRANSMIT VIA: 
D Tatotyp* 
a FKSimto 

D 



FBI 

PRECEDENCE: 

D fctwdlit* 
D Prtortty 
a Routlrw 



CLASSIFICATION 
D TOP SECRET 
D SECRET 
a CONRDENTIAL 
D UNCLASEFTO 
D UNCLAS 



PAGE FOOR OE WP 0002 8 B C It B T 

CALBRO'S RBSZDENCB WHERB ASSASSZHATZON OP EDBM PASTORA 
OZSCOSSBO (302); l/C/85 - TBRREU. AHD JOB AOAMS^H|^H|||| 
(302); 1/16/85 - TERRBU. RETURNS TO NIAHZ; HEBT8 POSBY 
AND DISCOSSZOM PASTORA ASSASSZHATZON ATTEMPT (302) ; 
1/20/85 • TERRBU. GOBS^^^^^Hn302) ; 2/25/85 - TERRELL 
GOES\^^^^^H|n(302) ; 3/15/85 - TERRELL TOLO TO LEAVE 
O.S. CbNSUL GENERAL; GOBS TO NIANZ (302); 





'3/24/86 - TERRELL MEETS REPORTERS ZN NASBZN6T0N 
OR NEW ORLEANS (302) ; 3/25/86 - TERRELL ZNTBRVZEWED BY PBZ 
ZN NEW ORLEANS (302) ;1i|^^^^^HHHHi^HHHH 



|^m||^^^|BHHHM||g^m0 7/11/86 - TERRELL MEETS 
GL8H ROBZMBTTB ZN NASIZNQTON (R(»INETTB) ;j 



ZT SHOULD BB NOttD THAT THE VAST NAJORZTT OT THZS ZNPORMATZON 
ZS DNCOMIU— yilill AID IS POK IHPORMATZOH W RP OSES OHLX. 



SBCHR 



Approvad: 



(Nunbar) (Tbiw) 




875 



TRANSMIT VIA: 
D T«i«yp« 
a Facsknto 
D 



\V 



FBI 

PRECEDENCE: 
a ImmcdM* - 
D Prtortly ■ 
D Routm* 



CLASSiFIC. M 
D TOP SECRET 
O SECRET 
D CONFIDENTIAL 
a UNCLASEFTO 
a UNCLAS 

Dtf 



% 



% 



PAGE FIVE OE flT 0002 



S B C It B T 



^ 



NPO CASE AGENT IS OP IHE OPINION THAT OLIVER NORTH, NATIONAL 
SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE 
OP SUBJECT. 

REQUEST OP PBIBQ 

CONTACT CIA POR ROBERT OWENS (NO IDENTIFIERS EXCEPT CMA 
ASSOCIATION) AND JOHN BULL (NO IDENTIFIERS EXCEPT CMA ASSOCIATION) 
TO LEARN IF THEY HAVE AN OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN EITHER. 

LEAD: 

ALEXANDRIA AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 

CONDUCT CIA TRACES POR ROBERT OWENS CCMA ASSOCIATION AND 
JOHN HULL (SANE) . 

CLASSIFIED BXt G-3> DECLASSIPT OB: OAOR. 
BT 
#0002 



Approved: 



TfmsinittMl 



P«r 



(Numbar) (Thnp) 




876 



N.-*' 



K T£X- 
(=NEXT TEXT) 

rr.^-i.TEXT HA!, i DOCUMENT 

N-xT Document (wioos) moved from inbox.i to desk. 4 

TEX-^: 
V2C2CWF0001 

PP HO AX^^NO 

DE WF 000 i 2021540 

ZNY S55SS 

P 210233Z JUL 86 

FROM: SAC, WASHINO-ON FIElO OFFICE 

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY 

ATTN: CID/TE^RORIS* UNIT 

CID/PERSONAL CRIMES UNIT 

CI -2 /INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 

Alexandria (info.) priority 



t " ^. ' * - 



'POirirr- 




l^.rJtZ 7^ 





JACK REYNO.DS TERRELL. AKA COLONEL F^LACO; ^^^^^ 00:UFO 

ALL MARKINGS. NOTATIONS, AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED 
IN This COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED "SECRET" UNLESS OTHERWISE 
NOTED. 

RE iJc-0 TEL TO FBIHQ DATED 7/19/86. 

SUMMARY OF WFO INVESTIGATION ON 7/19/86 FOLLOWS: 

SURVEILLANCE CJVERAGE FO^ SUBJECT TERRE 




UNCIASSIHED 



tELL, COaOE^ AND SAn?S"iN 




877 




-^,^• V. .rn uI"r>,juT InCIEEnT. \.0 MEETS Or SIC'M~ICANCE ARE TO EE 
REPOf\TE:' AND ATTEMPTS ARE BEINC. MADE TO IDENTIFY AN UNKNOWN FEMALE 
ACCOMPANYING "E^^ELL ON I nJSTAMT DATE. LOGS ARE BEING REVIEWED 
FOn DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER PERTINENT ASSOCIATIONS. 





878 



•'.I- t.:a 'f>Ev 1 -o-ti 



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 






F 



»T«n«.. °" July 22. IQflfi Tj '^'••'"•"Kfipiiw, 

Office Buuling ll^^^i'^^ l'=><='-'ted in ?J"oid ^^ ' ' Washington 
identities ^n^'^K ^^®^ ''ein? apprised «?^.?". ^^^'^"tive 

infor^a'trinf" ''" P«P°=-' ^^^^H^^'^^ilhed'^the'^firrjirnr ' 

REYNOLDS TeSt^^^^*** ^^ ^""^ "ever person, i, 

^°««s: Si ;k''"'^ ''^ heard abJu? Mm fJ^^ "^^ "^^CK 

was^^ii^^l^,f^RR^LL' known to him ^« .^7^"' IHHiH 



v.s^i.56 




MiSSIFIED 



879 



m403«(nnr. fi-it^d) 



CononuMon e( n>>302 ol . 



OLIVER L. NORTH; 




4) NORTH statvd that TERRELL'S name had surfaced 
In connection with a staff investigation being conducted 

by Massachusetts Senator JOHN KERRY. 

5) Vfhlle TERRELL'S name has not come up, NORTH 
mentioned that in March, 1986, Wajtlijj_q.ton P9 g^ Managing 
Editor LEONARD DOWNEY received obscene calls at night in 
which the caller used NORTH'S name. DOWNEY wrote NORTH 

a letter advising him that if the activity did not stop, 
he would prosecute. NORTH stated that he did not make 
the calls, wondered who did, and stated he had responded 
to DOWNEY'S letter with a letter offering assistance. 



6) 
interviews . 



TERRELL has used OLIVER NORTH'S name on television 




NORTH stated that he is acquainted with both 
Retired Air Force Major General RICHARD V. SECORD and GLENN 
ROBINETTE. SECORD runs an import-export business, but 
is also a consultant to the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 
as a member of the Special Operations Planning and Analysis 
Group. NORTH advised that SECORD is neuned in the Florida 
civil suit, and another suit and hired ROBINETTE, a security 
investigator, to learn information about TERRELL, the key 
witness in both suits. NORTH stated that he was aware 
of ROBINETTB's investigation and has talked to both ROBINETTE 
and SECORD about it, but he did not initiate the investigation. 
NORTH has denied media allegations that SECORD works for 
him and reiterated this point during the interview. 




880 



'?*"»<«*« 11-15^3, 



*'***■•*> «*TO-302o». 



UNCUSSIflED 



^onrn who aj.e'd^r^"^' °^ ^uiyTTT ^^"--^^^H^il^. 

Before me^ff^^^ "OBlNETTltf''^^ ^° i^iediaterv ?^®" -Verted 

iater also f;;nish'H' ''^"' coj.es^^ «°BInette "et witr^ni"'" 

urn.shed to the fa!! °^ <^ocu.ents, whrc'h'^JS^TTB 
"hom he belT''^ "^^^«d he has 

4.u_ NORTH =^..j ^ . 



' "•"" secretaries an^i T ^"ivist. 
"sponsiMe%\"« r-^e<^ that neithe / "^'"^"^ 

travj"e;?«^*^9 '"" " the nf f "°^ i"volvld'^""9 Contra 
Othei- *k' '**"=araguan EmKr openly with f«- • " ^oes 

"«TH s jurisdiction °Pe'ating 
' ■^*«»6» from TOM 



"NCliSSIFlEO 



881 



CHAPTER 6. KEEPING "USG FINGERPRINTS" OFF THE 
CONTRA OPERATION: 1984-1985 



882 



MMMO'a.UMMa« 

ttynoau mmimm n—t 
wnii*i« V. HOT*. *. o«. 



oerHuoKUMm, 



M.nm.'Kcm 



lanitd States Senate 

scucT coMMfrm on umuraiNCt 
wASHiMeroN. o.c. ]Mie 



C-G 



io 



OMir X (ownr. lamrr raw € 



April 9, 1984 



UNCLASSIFIED 



98u^dA!I!L 



The Honorable William J. Casey 
Director of Central Intelligence 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Washington, D. C. 20505 

Dear Bill: 



' ii;-M';sif'e-), 



■—".■- 01 E 12356 
"""■'"'•■ "'«<:mt/ Council 



All this past weekend, I've been crying to figure out how I can 
most easily tell you my feelings about the discovery of the 
President having approved mining some of the harbors of Central 
America. 

It gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off! 

I understand you had briefed the House on this matter. I've heard 
that. Now, during the important debate we had all last week and 
the week before, on whether we would Increase funds for the 
Nicaragua program, we were doing all right, until a Member of the 
Committee charged that the President had approved the mining. I 
strongly denied that because I had never heard of It. I found out 
the next day that the CIA had, with the written approval of the 
President, engaged In such mining, and the approval came in February! 

Bill, this is no way to run a railroad and I find myself in a hell 
of a quandary. I am forced to apologize to the Members of the 
Intelligence Committee because I did not know the facts on this. 
At the sane time, my counterpart in the House did know. 

The Presld«Bt has asked us to back his foreign policy. Bill, how 
can we back his foreign policy when we don't know what the hell he 
is doing? Lebanon, yes, we all knew that he sent troops over there. 
But mine the harbors in Nicaragua? This is an act violating 
international law. It is an act of war. For the life o-f me, I 
don't see how we are going to explain It. 




UNCLASSIFi'tD (H'^'o^ 



883 



l/NCLflSSIREO 



The Honorable William J. 
Page Two 
April 9, 1984 



Casey 



I don't like this. I don't like It one bit from th'e President or 

from you. X don't think we need a lot of lengthy explanations. 

The deed has been done and, in the future, if anything like this 

happens, I'm going to raise one hell of a lot of fuss about it 
in public. , 




UNCLASSIFIED 



884 








( the Frocedutefi 

their resP«|^^iV,y AcVof 1947. procedures 

National Secur ^^ t ^h* ^^ gnd 

, The committee and th/ f^^ aided the Co^n^^^^libiUties. 

The Cotnmittee anu ^^^o„j 

Procedures set forth -ctioVrSsOO 139. 

.. ,„ accordance «;^th^j;;t„i^s set fotth in^N^^ ^^ 
and coordination "^.t ^.^^ ^%fesi<Je"^^«^ .,, 

Findings, scope i^-r- 

ca*^^""- ,. iw take note of any 

'" • ".«5 or .l"'""^ °L5"uh c..tyl"8 <»" 

advisories wiii 

of such support. ^^^^ ^^^i^e 

- in any case J^ Which^^roiU) a^CB^ tU^visory 
provisions oy«fi^, ,e iff^i m ihl^ th. 

^»"°"i notification «^^V**Vlt l» e***"'!!^ 
or °"Ut has determined that it ^^^^ .ed 

President nas ^^g. ^^,,wr^ lituatlon, 

to U«lit Tv section 3010) CD C*^ pilyide<i,to 
tbat in any f^^^'fication «^^iJ'*f'^th« SSCl at 
substantive "O'^yice Chairman ot^n ^^^ 

the Chairman a^"/ ^icable ""O^^V assist to the 
the earliest prac ^^3. „ -^^^^ttating secure 
C^^airman and ^^^.^ities ,n JaciH 



.'^ . . ^^'^ J Cf^ 



V* • 




._:^/^ 



885 



UHWSSW 



C 0617 

2- 



.f^^.tion of the Majority ""^ "iX'beel"ttif ied . 
TlrsVZ. iC t^^ey Y^Y^l%][V.%r acccplish- 
-ni%rtre"t°e?.i«"-ti?ic3tion rests w.t. 

Executive Branch. procedures, 

ic is understood that par-graph 6 of t^ ,„^ 

to clvirt action operations. 

^ ""* .,^ effort to inform 

.K nri will make every '«"°"?^J,dines and signifi- 

Xn .s pr..tic.bl.. „„,^„r.., *. 

paramilitary ^.^^ operation 

includes the P^°;\^'°;ement, or entity ^^f^f.'Jioc. or training 



oveTtl_ 
component 



\SHWSW 




886 



la^s«B 



C 0618 



-3- 



5. Irie DCI understands chat the Coonittee wishes to be 
inforned if the President ever decides to waive, change, or 
rescind any Executive Order provision applicable to the conduct 
of covert action operations. 

6. The Committee and the DCI recognize that the under- 
standings and undertakings set forth in this document are 
subject to the possible exceptional circumstances contemplated 
in section SOI of the National Security Act. 

7. The Procedures Governing Reporting to the SSCI on 
covert action, as modified by this agreement, will remain In 
force until modified by mutual agreement. 




MlL^ 



Date 



rice Chairman, SSCI 




June S, 1986 
■Bate 




E«;:fe ?:;;;'> -75/ .2 



887 



wussw 



C 0619 



Ihii 4ecu»cnt ia tht ff^tij ol tb« knatc and rcsains 
unilcr it* control throiiittt (Kc Select CosMittcc on 
Int*ni%«ncc. It ii frevi4«4 (or liaitcd purpotct 
loll^jJlA. •• cen|rc*»ional ovtrciiiht of intcMincncc 

Ml condition that it will not kc rclcAtcd 
«crv»»« 4it*rBinat*d without ^raiaaion of the 
Comnittcc. fcfsiaaion ia (irantcd to provide it to 
the txccutivc Branett ^raonncl «A>oa« official 
dutica concern ita aubjcct aattcr, aubjcct to thca* 
rcatrictiona and controla. 



Proc'ejures -CoverninR Kepottlnn 
to the Senate Select Cocnlttee on Intellittence (SSCI) 
00 Covert Action 

The DC I and the SSCI agree that a planned Intelligence 
activity may constitute a "significant anticipated intelligence 
activity" under section 301 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (the "Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980") even if the 
planned activity is part of an ongoi-ng covert action 
operation within the scope of an existing Presidential 
Finding pursuant to the Hugbcs-Ryan Amendment (22 U.S.C. 
2A22). The DCI and the SSCI further agree that chey say 
better discharge their respceclvc responsibilities under 
the (K^ersight Act^y reaching a clearer tinder standing 
concerning reportiog of covert action activity. To this end 
the DCI and the SSCI sake the followii^ representations and 
tinder takings, subject to tb« posaiblc exceptional circmstances 
contemplated in the Intelligence Oversight Act; 

1. In addition to providing the SSCI with the text of 
new Presidential Findings concerning covert action, the DCI 
will provide the SSCI with the contents of the accompanying 
scope paper following approval of the Finding. The contents 
of the acope paper will be provided in writing unless the 
SSCI and the DCI agree that an oral presentation would be 
preferable. Any subsequent Bodification to the acope paper 
will be provided to the SSCI. 

2. The DCI also will inforsi the SSCI of any other 
planned covert action activities for which higher authority 
or Presidential approval has been provided, including, but 
not limited to, approvals of any activity which %ioula 
substantially change the scope of an ongoing covert action 
operation. 

^. Notification of the above decisions will be provided 
to the SSCI as soon as practicable and prior to inplemenCsC ion 
of the actual activity. ; 



\Ajf3 



wmmm 



U..c,'...::y,7S/3 



Kussro 



C 0620 



4. Th« OCI and Cha SSCI ctcofnlz* eh«c an accivlty 
planned to ba c art lad out In connacelon wtch an on|oln( 
covaygHttton epat acton say ba of auch a nacura thac eha 
Co«MH|'vill dasira nocificadon of eha acctvity prior Co 
iaptiintttioQ, avan if eha aecivicy doaa noc raouira 
•aparata hinhat auchoricy or Praaidancial approval. Tha 
SSCI vlll. in connaccion wich aach ongoing eovart ace ion 
oparacion, coamunieaca eo eha KI eha kinda of aceivictaa 
(ia addicion eo ehota dascribad in Paragrapha 1 and 2) chae 
It would conaidar eo fall in chia caeagory. Iha KI will 
Indapandancly caka scapa eo anaura chae eha SSCI ia alao 
advlaad of aceivicltt chae eha KI raaaonably baliavaa 
fall in thia eacaiory. 

i. Whan briaflnp eha SSCI on a naw Praaidancial 
Finding or on any aeeivicy daaeribad in parat^rapha 2 or 4, 
eha praaancacion should includa a diacussion of all iaporcane 
alamtncs of eht aeeivicy, including oparaeional and political 
riaks, posslbla rcocrcuationt undac craacy obligaciona or 
aara«Danea, and any tpacial isauaa raisad undar U.S. law. 

6. To kacp eht SSCI fully and currancly inforvad on 
eha orocraaa and scacua of oach covace accion oparaeion, eha 
KI will provida co eha SSCIt (A) a coffiorahanaiva annual 
briafing on all covcrc accion oparaeions -. and (B) ragular 
infomaeion on ioplamancacion of aach bneoing oparaeion, 
wich aaphasit on aspacca in which eha SSCI haa indicacad 
oarcicular inctratc. 

7. Tha KI and eha SSCI agraa Chae eha abova procaduraa 
raflaee eha face chae covarc accion accivicias ara of 
parcicular aanaicivicy, and it ia imparaciva chae avary 
afforc ba mada eo pravane chair unauchorizad discloaura. 

Tha SSCI will procace eha inforaacion providad purauanc eo 
chasa nocificacion procaduraa in accordanca wich eha procaduraa 
aac forch in S.Raa. 400. and wich apacial ragard for eha 
aicraaa aanaieivley of chaaa aceiviciaa. le ia furehar 
racognizad chae public rafaranca eo covarc accion aceiviciaa 
raiaaa sorioua problama for eha Unicad Scacaa abroad, and, 
charaCeto. ouch raftrancas by aichar eha Eiacuciva or 
Lagialaeiva Branches ara inappropr iaca. Ic ia alao tacofcnizad 
chae eha coaproalst of classifiad inforaacion eonearainit 
covarc accivicias doas noc aucosacically daclaaaifj such 
inforaacion. The appaaranca of rafarancas Co such accivicias 
in eha public eadia doas noc conscicuca auchorizaeion Co 
discuss such accivicias. Tha KI and chc SSCI racofoiza 
chae eha long ascablishad policy of eha U.S. GovarnBanc ia 
noc CO commanc publicly on classifiad inctlliganca accivicias. 



m&iB 



tu...d.iiia_Zi^ 



889 



UNCLASSIFIED - 

eurrtailg^^n^ •• provided by S!t2TTi^ J Jw'^Li" 'n*! 



^•ch«ntns Co ch« SSCl. 

r..p.cttv/t..p;:;ibiiijK.^''* co««tt., to fuifiuihiir 



At>^<^ t^TcT 




^-M^ 




A^ 



Vic« Chalraan. 5SCI 
Bit* 



MlHSSWtB 



{^^s^saj^sj^j^ 



890 






ROj' ^G 



To 


Name and Addre« Date in.tals 


1 


R. C. McFarlane 2/21 ]/^ 


2 




3 




i 


4 








5 








6 








ACTION 




RLE 




APPROVAL 


cx 


INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS 



wmsm- 



'V 16907 



NSGICS CONTROL NO ^°0122 



COPY NO _k OF 11 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 




NSC INTELLIGENCE 



DOCUMENT 



PSt 







A 






Cc^.'^'- 



Warning Notice 
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions aV 

- - / 



]y 



vmsssm 



^. 



891 



MEMORANDUM 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-400122 



ACTION 



February 7, 1984 ° 



SENSITIVE 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 



FROM: 



SUBJECT: 



OLIVER L. NORTH' 
ALTON KEEL 



(S> 



Additional Resources for our Anti-Sandinista 
Program 



•^ 
I 



jl 



llX ._ 001 

73 ■§ OS ■ 



Based on your guidance at our meeting this morning, we have 
prepared a memo from you to the President (Tab I) asking him to 
send a memo (Tab A) to those most concerned with this issue. 
Your memo provides straightforward background on the resource 
requirements and cites the need for a concerted effort in order 
to achieve success. 

Today's events regarding the situation in Lebanon make the points 
in your memo — and subsequent action — even more imperative. If 
this prograun founders for lack of funds, we may very likely 
suffer a major foreign p <pligv j-evt>raal with repercussions well 
beyond Central America, 




Please note that Dr. Kissinger, in private meetings today with 
Speaker-O'Neill and HPSCI Chairman Boland, defended this program 
most eloquently. He believes that with a well led and 
cooperative effort we can carry the day on this issue. He has 
not yet been made aware of the magnitude of our shortfall. 

Congresaional resistemce on this issue is formidible to the 
degree that prospects for success are bleak even with a concerted 
effort. At some point, we may have to reassess our prospects and 
decide whether prudence requires that we somehow stretch cut 
FY-84 effort to avoid running out of funds. 




'Declassify: OADR 



mwf(M 



SENSITIVE 



892 






TOP SfieRET 2 SENSITIVE 



Because the President's memo cites the NSDD which we have just 
forwarded for transmission to the coast, we should ensure that 
Tab I and Tab A are held until the NSDD is received. '»ThI^ 
increases the urgency for getting a signed NSDD distributed^ 
the principals. 

RECOMMENDATION 



;eVS^ 



That you initial and DACOM your memo to the President with Tab A 
attached. ^ 

/' 
Approve y Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President 

Tab A - Presidential Memo to State, DSD, CIA, JCS 



UNSlil^ltKD 



SENSITIVE 






« c c c <r j^ 

r O^' • ■ ; " I' r^' " "^'- -ff - ri V 1^ -^iJ'ystWfW^^ 



i.- fcT*;*»* i-\ 5LX>^*'- 



' '^J?''^ 










titeivriVfi 




894 



yOBS '-« p. AOOABBO 



2)69 RAvtuMt Home Orrici Bu>LOti 

W'SMtMeTDH O C. 20919 

(202)229-9UI 

ottraicT orncit 

tft-ll 10UT AVCMUC 

OiOMC P**K. Nrw rem* 114tt 



6-V? 



[ SCCLMCVCK 



Congress Of tlje©nitebg>tateg 
l^ouit of »cprc£{entatibc« 

lEaKtiiniiton, S.€. 20515 




December 11, 1984 



Honorable George P. Shultz 
Secretary of State 
Washington, D. C. 20520 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 






As you are aware, the recently enacted H.J. Res. 648, making 
continuing appropriations for fiscal year 1985, contains a prohibition 
regarding assistance to tne "contras" fighting in Nicaragua. Recent 
reports have indicated that other countries are furnishing aid to the 
"contra" forces in order to keep them a viable military force exerting 
pressure on the Sandinistas. Of the countries identified in these 
reports as furnishing such aid, several are Central American neighbors 
of Nicaragua and are themselves recipients of U.S. foreign assistance 
funding. For exanple. El Salvador has been the recipient of increased 
U.S. aid since the election of President Duarte, and is identified in the 
reports as being one of the countries aiding the "contras". If these 
reports are accurate, I am concerned that countries receiving U.S. 
foreign assistance aid may be utilizing a portion of such aid to assist 
the "contras" and, in so doing, effect a rather devious contravention of 
the law prohibiting such aid. 

I would apreciate receiving your thoughts on this issue as well as 
your assurance that no U.S. foreign assistance funding is being utilized 
to effect what amounts to "revolving door" aid to the "contras". 



With best wishes. 



'•V ?.. 




imvm 



,. 7 

pcer^ly. 



/ 



iseph^f. Addabbo 
ember of Congress 



Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger 
Secretary of Defense 

Honorable William J.Casey 
Director of Central Intelligence 




u,n^\ 



895 




United States Dcpartnicm of Siair 
JPashington, DC. 20520 



JAN 1 5 1985 



Dear Mr. Addabbo: 







I am pleased to have the opportunity to respond to your 
letter of December 11 to the Secretary in which you expressed 
your concern that U.S. foreign assistance to Central American 
countries is being used to aid the anti-Sandinista forces, 
thereby circumventing the prohibition conta.ined in the 
continuing resolution for FY 1985. 

Our foreign assistance funds to Central American 
countries, as elsewhere, are monitored very closely to ensure 
that they are used for the purpose intended. In El Salvador, 
the management of U.S. military assistance is performed by the 
U.S. Military Group while the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (AID) mission manages economic and developmental 
assistance. We cannot determine or dictate how a nation 
expends its own resources; however, disbursement of funds and 
delivery of equipment through U.S. foreign assistance programs 
are closely supervised. To our knowledge, no U.S. foreign 
assistance funding or equipment provided through the Foreign 
Assistance Act is being diverted to the anti-Sandinista forces 
or a third country. 

Sincerely, 



W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 

Assistant Secretary 

Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 






■0. J3*5^ 



The Honorable 

Joseph P. Addabbo, 

House of Representatives, 





896 



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON. THC DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



2 4 JAN 1985 



mm 



0fi iW 



Honorable Joseph P. Addabbo 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense 
Committee on Appropriations 
Bouse of Representatives 
Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Thank you for forwarding a copy of your letter to Secre- 
tary Shultz regarding the possibility that United States 
foreign assistance could be diverted to aid Anti-Sandinista 
forces constituting a circumvention of the prohibition of such 
aid contained in the Continuing Resolution of Fiscal Year 1985. ' 

United States military groups are charged with managing the 
military assistance programs in-country and the delivery of 
equipment resulting from these programs is closely monitored. 
While each nation's sovereign interests determine how they expend 
their own funds, to the best of our knowledge no U.S. equipment 
provided through the Foreign Assistance or Arms Export Control 
Acts is being diverted to Anti-Sandinista forces. 

Hopefully, this information meets your concerns in this 

matter. 



,eiy. 




yp. 







II 



897 



• ~^i :» •»»«c» 



Congress of tht Hnittd 3tatts 

ftoTUf of Krprtsniranou 
flOuhingron, Bc :o5i5 

Octater 21, 1983 



Mr. RDterc w. McFadan* 
^totlonal Security Ad</lMr 
^«ltlonftI Security Cooicil 
Whitt BOUM 
waahlngton, D.C. 20SOO 

Otar Mr. Ncfarlan*: 

I «a writing to inquire about r«o«nt news riport* depleting the 
A^ in let ration's involv^»nt in coordlnetinq private or9ani2ations' 
donations to the oontrae in Nlcaraqua during the period when Cenar«a 
teainated O.S. funding of the oontraa. 

I « particularly oonce m ed about two aspects of the reeent 
revelations. First, early White Bouae ra^cts about these activities 
insisted that the AAlnlstratlon 'neither enoourages nor dlsoourages* the 
private fvndralslng efforts. Bowerer, «• now have evidsnee that th«e 
early reports vere aialeading and that the AAlnlstratlon's imolvawt vas 
auch aore actenslva than prwioualy adatowledgsd. There hare been r«^rti 
that the Prealdant hlaaalf waa aHare <€ the alstanea of the plan to 
coordinate private denatlona within the J^lnlstratlon. 

Second, X as oonoemad that the AAlnlstration's Imolveawt 
e^^lcltly contradicted Congreas' Intent that 0.8. contributions to the 
coRtras cease In view of the O.S.' inmlvaaait in the aining of Nlcaraguan 
haibers. llMre is evldenoa that private oontrlbutlona, ceerdlMted by the 
Adilnlstration, allowed the oontraa to continue theit activities uMbated 
despite the congcaaaional Aaiding ban. 

In light of th«a r«v«lationa» Z nonld ippcaeiate m. aeooisiting fra 
the Mtlonal Sacorltgr CBoneil oC its Inralvaant in tha eraatm of this 
aid neCMock. flfrtffcallT» did yoor aetlvltiaa oonCllet with tba tecaa of 
the Boliod aaantant, which e^lieiUr prohibits O.I. oavact aetiena for 
the puipoas of ofaacthrawing tha SMdlnlsts ^pmammtM low eatenaiva was 



the J^iinlstration's involveHnt in eoardlmtina tha astaiock7 Also, are 
there aqr eCferts eurr«tly u nda n wy is tha AAinlstxatiaa to faeilltata 
the sending o< privata donations to tha cBOtzasr 



I look forward to raoaivlng yoor cwponsa to wi maattflna seen. 




OfT" 






898 



Fron: NSRCM --CPbA 
To: SSOLN --CPLA 



Date snd ti'.e 



ChojsTer- (p ToorooV^ -70? 



UNOySSlFltl) 



09/03/83 2i : 5'' :") 
JOHS M. POINDEXTEK 



\CTE FROM: r:S£-;T >:CFAKUNt 

SLBJECT: Reply to rfamilton on Ollie's Activities 



N 3265 



I have sent you both separately a draft letter I have composed to answer Lee 
Hjmilton's letter on Ollio's JctMities One or two an:iotat ions are 
ijiprcpr 1 a;<' - Th- rc:\rciic- tc " ::is-:-: '." ;-:..'r:- ■.;- tijrjiraph c-.< o-' p.ii;e :wo 
o: your j:jr'. ^»li<. .ns^rt ■;." ro:t;r.^ to the stco:.^^ pJrav;;jpi. or pJoC two. 
Please do not share eitlier this note or the separate draft with anyone. Wil 
will prepare a smooth version of it for me Wednesday morning Please bring me 
any edits you have. 01 lie, don't send me any PROFS notes about it. Many 
thanks . 



X H 



'>^<- 






.)•'• 



6-7-6 



wussro 








899 



mussra 



G-Si 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
WASHINGTON. O.C. lOSO* 

rnr )i np(ilubkif;j(VRfiJeased or\jJ&A^ 
Under provfslonj of 1.0. l7?^ 

■y 3. Reger. National Secuni; Cc^jncil 



N 29803 

411 



August 20, 1985 



ACTION 



A 



MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN |«l POINDEXTER 
FROM: BRENDA S. REGER 

SUBJECT: Barnes Request 



Before we can decide how to respond to Congressman Barnes' 
request for documents, we must determine whether any exist and 
are retrievable and, whether they are White House or NSC. 

In past instances of allegations of this kind (e.g. Billy Carter 
and Libya, Diclc Allen, etc.) we have treated the request as 
broadly based for all records whether NSC or White House but have 
maintained them as separate issues within the request. At the 
same time, the search should be as narrowly focused as was the 
request. In this case. Congressman Barnes has focused on 
"...documents, pertaining to any contact between Lt. Col. North 
and Nicaraguan rebel leaders as of .. .October, 1984." 

There is unlikely to be a great deal of documentation such as is 
described but we should search the files only on that basis. 
Fishing expeditions in all files relating to Central America 
and/or Nicaragua are NOT necessary to respond to the request. 

Secretariat usually does searches in response to Congressional 
requests, but in this case I can have Donna search NSC and 
Presidential Advisory files by computer here in my office and ask 
Intel and CMC to do the same in their files. I will brief Jim 
Radzinski and Rod's person on how to conduct the narrowly defined 
search in their files. 

Working files in staff member's offices are NOT subject to this 
or any other kind of searches since they are "convenience files" 
generally nade up of drafts, and/or copies of documentation in 
the institutional and Presidential Advisory files. I therefore 
see no need to search whatever "convenience files" Ollie may have 
in his office. 

Appointment logs and/or telephone logs however have become 
favorite targets of such inquiries (e.g. Zbig and staff in the 
Billy Carter thing, Wick, Ann Burford, etc.) and we must be 
prepared to deal with that issue. I wasn't involved in the 
handling of the issue for Zbig on Billy Carter but as I recall 
they "created" an excerpt listing of times and dates of telecons 
and meetings Brezinski and other staff had from their logs rather 
than provide the logs themselves. (We could check Kimmitt's 
files and/oi ask him or Brezinski if you like.) 



900 



« UNCUSSIRED 



1^ 2 9 804 



It may be in our interest to be terribly forthcoming and bury Mr. 
Barnes in logs of dates and/or names re meetings and telecons or 
perhaps to offer to do so putting him on notice that the logs 
give times and dates but no substance. 

Before we provide any response to Barnes, however, we need to 
know the scope of the documentation on contacts. Once we have 
that, the legal issues can be addressed. 

Recommendation A 

That you authorize me to start a search of the Secretariat, 
Intel, CMC files (both Presidential and NSC) as described above: 

Approve -* Disapprove 



Recommendation B 

That for now we limit the search on the appointment and telephone 
logs to Ollie sampling his telephone and appointment calendars to 
give us a sense of what they consist of and of the potential 
relevance to the request. 

Approve Disapprove 



sm^^ 



901 



J 

I 

S 





Nane and AdO'eii Oat« 'ininan 


Robert McFarlane 


: 








a 










4 










S 










6 










X 


ACTION 




FILE 




APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS 

cc: Oliver North (#2 and 3) 
Ken deGraffenreid (»4) 
Jim Radzimski (»5) 



C-VnOf t €j: ^£ |TTDc3<nr\erte. q^ 






N 16885 



NSGICS CONTROL NO. _i2iiil 
COPY NO / 



OF. 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



^ A 

(.-Ofl^ ^ Warning Not 






^>^^ ^ Warning Notice 

«^ ^S'' ^irn»lligtnctSoufCt**nd Mtthod» Involved 

kV^^T^^^^^ NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
As'^.t-t^ ,i/^ Unauthenttd QiKlotuft Sublet to Criminal 





902 



The White House 



Sytttm # IL 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SCQUf Na TO HAS SEEN CMSMSIT10N 



P%ui TUtHnpton 
•ob Kimmitt 
Jo^n Poindcatcf 
Tom Shull 
Wllnw Hall 
•ud McFarian* 
•eb Kimmitt 
NSC Sacretariat ' 
Situation Room 



^ 



K. - 



^ 



n 



.^ 7 



-.N 16oc6 



■e: 



laMonaitlen [AmAttitity R-MUin O-Od^Mdt N ■ Mo Iwttac Actlan 




cc: V^ Maata lakar Oaavar Other 

COMMENTS ' Should ba laan by: 



'MUmr. 



u 



903 




SVSTEM :v 
NSC/ICS-40i:i4 



December 4, 1984 



CroQuj/ 



ACTIOH 

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 

FROM: OLIVER L, NORTH 

SUBJECT: Assistance tor the Nicaraguan Resistance 






N 16887 



In accord with prior understand inq, I_met on Wednesday, 
Novembex, 28, with k Defense Attache, Embassy 

of the I J Gai^on Sigur arranged the 

eoTC meeting at the Cosmos clv; 



lunch 



meeting at the Cosmos Club and was present throughout. 



As agreed, I explained to >our purpose in the 

meeting was to clarify questions wlTich had jt een raised in Canada 
regarding an arms transaction destinedt ~^ 1 explained 

that an intermediary had advised that "apparently made 

a decision not to proceed with the Canadian-originated arms sale. 
This offer of purchase inc]^de4-v 10u,^-7 missile launchers 

^ ( 30 missiles, 1 training 

nit, and 10 tracking units'. 



^ 



professed to be unaware of the Canadian transaction. 
I adyised him that the purchase was not really intended for use 
by^ but rather for the Nicaraguan Resistance 

Forces. Further , "'the intermediary had .indicated that the problem 
appeared to be ttxe number i uailitary officers who are 

graduates of the(_ _ ) As a consequence of 

^he apparent reluctance to procee3">teff^the sale showing, _ 

I 'end user certificate, the Canadian arms dealer is 

^repajy.n£ to re-init^ate discussions for a similar delivery, _ 
(. was advised that the FDN would prefer to 

have the'^delivery XT' soon as possible, since the Soviet HIND-D 
helicopters were being assembled as we spoke. 

{ was further advised that Adolfo Caj.ero . the Head of 

the FDN, was~ willing to commit to a r^ognition ^ 'once 

the Resistance Forces had succeeded. Iin^c.2£<^ 

^und erstood the message and would confes.ji(ltH t^ie i ^ 
He observed, for the record, that _ _ — ' 
refused to become involved, in any way, iif the 
inrernai affairs of another country. I indicated that we fully 
appreciated this position and noted that it was too bad that the 
Soviets, Bulgarians, and East Germans involved in Nicaragua did 
not feel the sane way. 



tha 



Declassify: 



OAOR 






904 



XQ9- JCGffg r 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Later that afternoon, MGEM Jaclc Singlaub (U.S. Amy, Retired) 
visited to advise of two meetings he had held early in the day 
regarding support for the Resistance. Singlaub passed on the 
following points: 

Meetin3_withijB ' 7 ^ 16888 

The FDN is in urgent need of anti-aircraft weapons and other 
crew-served weapons ammunition (particularly 60 and 81iran 
mortar rounds) . Units in the field are also in need of 
large quantities of boots and clothing since the number of 
ralliers has exceeded expectations by 2,000. 

The Resistance Forces are also in urgent need of expertise 
in maritime operations. 

The use is unaware of the Singlaub mission_and he is malcing 
this request based on his long friendships^ ^^^^mm^ 

J Because of the law restricting UsC~ involvement, no 
use ofZicial can solicit on behalf the Resistance Forces. 

If I 'like to help, Singlaub can arrange a meeting 

witlT Adolf o Calero. If it is necessary for a USG official 
to verify Calero' s bona fides, this can be arranged. 



I SlI 



Meeting withi 

.9v 4greemeA£fl^ith Calero, Singlaub advised* _j since 
j_ had turned down the eATlier FDN request for 

assistances^ ^ he Resistance 

movement had approached] f 

The Resistance still is in reed of financial support, 
munitions, and training assistance. 

i ^ /this was a "considerably different 

situation" than that which he had been aware of earlier. 
While not connitting to support, he noted to_S_inglaub that 
this new information might ma)ce a difference, ' 




J O r OBCR BT 




82-750 9C4 



905 



/ 



.£fl^^6fi6Afi9 



c 



UNCLASSIFIED 



This wackand, at tha requast o* Sec. John Lehman, I mat wrtnOlc. 
David Wallcar, a former British SAS officer who now heads two 
companies (KMS and SALADIN) which provide professional security 
services to foreign governments. Wallcer had been approached 
several months ago, prior to initiating the current financial 
arrangement for the FDN. In addition to the security services 
provided by KMS, this offshore (Jersey Islands) company also has 
professional military "trainers' available, walker suggested 
that he would be interested in establishing an arrangement with 
the FDN for certain special operations expertise aimed 
particularly at destroying HIND helicopters. Wallcer quite 
accurately points out that the helicopt ers are, mor e easily 
destroyed on the around than in the air.1 



Unless otherwise directed. Walker will be introduced to caiero 
and efforts will be made to defray the cost of Walker's 
operations from other than Caiero 's limited assets. 





/ 



ii>^i«ssniii 



906 



MEMORANDUM 



SECRET 



mM^^ 



C,)na^C: (^ 'rcj^^.,y^^ iZ? 



S\oTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-400300 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



March 20, 1985 



ACTION 



4QS01 



6>-/Q3 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLMIE 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH^^ 

SUBJECT: Timing and the Nicaraguan Resistance Vote 



Attached at Tab A is the most recent version of the chronology of 
events aimed at securing Congressional approval for renewed 
support to the Nicaraguan Resistance Forces. This schedule 
results from the four communications/media meetings we have now 
had with Pat Buchanan's ad hoc working group. Please note that 
the schedule continues to focus on a vote at the end of April 
triggered by submission of the required report on or about 
April 15. 

In addition to the events depicted on the internal chronology at 

Tab A, other activities in the region continue as 

planned — including military operations and political action. 

Like the chronology, these events are also timed to influence the 

vote: 

planned travel by Calero, Cruz, and Robelo; 

various military resupply efforts timed to support 
significantly increased military operations immediately 
after the vote (we expect major Sandinista crossbordj 
attacks in thi s timeframe — today's resupply toj 
fromH|H|^HH|went and 

special operation* attacks against highly visible military 
targets in Nicaragua. 

Some of these efforts will proceed whether or not the vote occurs 
as planned at the end of April. For exjunple, today Bernardario 
Larios, fomer Sandinista Defense Minister, defected to Costa 
Rica and is now in Panama (you were briefed on this operation 
during the trip). Others, however, including actions by U.S., 
interests groups are very sensitive to the timing. Next week the 
networks auction their air time for 15, 30, and 60 second 
commercials during prime viewing hours. These groups are 
prepared to commit nearly $2M for commercial air time and the 



SECRET 
Declassify: 



OADR 



mdsm 



Par..: "y Declassified/ Released nn i J/A /^ 
f f\ under provrjlofl of EO. 1^ 

y 3. Reger, fhtiona! Sec!ir:t/ 2o:i-d] 



OMA 



907 




SECRET 2 '* 



production of various advertising media. If we are to retain 
their support, we must let them know by Friday whether or not 
they should procee3"I To the maximum extent we have tried to 
prevent the kinds of errors that will cost them financially or 
politically. Unfortunately, some, like the Young Republicans 
ad, get through — this has been fixed. 

It is important that a decision be taken no later than noon, 

Friday, March 22, if we are to proceed with the events in the 

checklist (Tab A) and those activities which support a vote at 
the end of April. 

Senator Durenburger plans to make a major speech on this issue at 
the National Press Club next Tuesday, March 26. We should at 
least give him a sense of what to expect before he speaks. 

You should also be aware that Director Casey has sent a personal 
note to Don Regan on the timing matter. We are attempting to 
obtain a copy for your use. 

Worthlind has apparently completed an analysis on some recent 
polling data. It reportedly does not look good for a vote at 
this time. 

Finally, Jim Michel reminds that in your meetings with the 
Central American Heads of State you told them that we would be 
quiescent during the early Spring, but that in April we would 
act. This description fits either scenario — going for the vote 
or a fallback option with sanctions. One way or the other, we 
need to have a decision. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you discuss this matter with Don Regan and urge that a 
decision be made on timing by noon on Friday, March 22. 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab A - Chronological Event Checklist (dtd March 20, 1985) 
Tab B - Young Republicans Ad 



SECRET 



UNG^I^SItlD 



908 



(o-IHO 



CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



909 









,♦» 




l'-^-' 






■ » ■ 

♦ • ■ 



iwnwoi j.i 



nmaai J. iMMT 



C^'^f' 



\-OvJ7t\ >^ C 



\59 

MiOUNlOiS 

%inittJ States Senate 

WMMMI6TOH. K 2M 10 




Saptmbar 9, 19SS 
Dear Fallow Varaentaii 

Tha Raagan Adnlniatration'a auppoit for tha contra 
inaurqanta aqainat Nicaragua contlnuaa to harn tha Intaraata 
of tha Onitad Stataa in Canttal Miarlca. Na ahould ba 
prcMOtinq paaca, political atabllity, acononic davalopaant, 
and the atrangthenlng of danocratie inatitutiona thara. 
Inataad, tha Adminlatrat ion raliea on outdated oligarchlaa, 
corrupt govarnnanta, unjuat aocial and political ayateaa, 
and military power aa tha toola of American policy. 

Laat year, thoae of ua concerned about thia policy 
finally persuaded Congteaa to atop any U.S. ailitary aaaia- 
tance to tha contraa. Unfortunately, Congreaa recently leat 
ita nerve and approved the Preaidant'a tequaat for (27 
•illion ao-called 'huaanitarian* aaaiatance to the rebela. 
This ia a anokascreen. tvery dollar the contraa do not have 
to epand on eubai stance, they can uae to buy aore araa and 
munitiona. Alao, no aattar how vigilant we are, the contraa 
probably will divert soae of the aid to ailitary purpoaas. 

tfhila the ban on U.S. assistance to the contraa was In 
affect, private groups and donora in this country gave aonay 
to support the insurgency. I waa disturbed by chargea aada 
in the preaa« and privately to ■•, that a ailitary officer 
on the National Security Council staff waa involved in 
channeling private funda to the contraa, and even in offer- 
ing then political and ailitary advice. In ay capacity asj. 
Vice Chairman of tha Intelligence Conaittee, I laeiedia«f Ifll 
wrote Senator Dave Durenbarger, tha Chalraan, that w« lt>ei|ld 
dateraina the facta of tha eaae to aee whether there hSI Q 
baan any violation of U.S. law. ^ ^ 

On Saptaabar 5, the Chalraan and I met with Rebet^ 
HcParlana, Preaidant Reagan' a National Security Advlso 
supervisor of tha NSC ataff paraon in queatlon. Ha aaTd 
had pursued these allagationa, and aaaurad ua that no la«fi 
had baan broken. Hr. HcParlana aaid that tha officer had^ 
fraquantly received calla froa persons wishing to donate 
funda, and that ha referred them to the contra leaders 
salvaa. He inaiatad that the officer never aolicitad 




> < ' ", '• - > e 



.• 



.•I 



mo 



^ f^unda, encouraged donatlona or initiated contacts with 
. "Mtantlal donora. He further denied that the officer, in 
^ tffMeral personal aaetings with contra laadere, both in £| ^|y %2 A ! 
^wa^ington and in Central Aaarlca, aver offered ailitary 
^jdvlce. The efficer'a authorised role, Hr. HcParlana aatd, 
Wa to aaaura the contraa during tha tiae of the congrea- 
aional aid cutoff of tha Preaidant'a eentinuad aeral aappatt 



4> ^ 



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»3! LV.<«C$TCN LOUISIANA 

•OS wsrwci. ONio 

T-iM».! «. UTIWS*. STAfP WMCTOII 

».« c^j.a .*. c ".t't- c- i» C3JKSU 

STTMS C ItKTr. ASSeCUTC COUKSIL 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEe 
ON INTELUGENCe 

WASHINGTON. OC 20515 



6 -/6a 



Septei7ii»r 18, 1885 






rionorsile Leon E. Panetta 

359 Car-ion House Office Building 

vrashincton, D.C. 20515 

Dear Leon: 

Thank you for yovir letter recaxding press reports that a r^Ti>er of the 
N'duional Security Council staff encaged in activities which night have bee.n in 
viola uion of the Eoland Arendment. 



r. 



The CoTTUttee locked into those allegations and set with K^r. McFarlar.e, 
the ^i^sistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Ke said that 
the President had nade clear that everyone Ln the Executive Branch had to 
cozply with the 3oland A.'nendjnent . 

b'X' McTarlane further stated that he had conducted a thorough 
investigation into the allegations made about the NSC staff. He believes, 
based on his investigation and his conversation with the I'SC staffer nsntioned 
in the press stories that the staffer had not: 

— given military advice of any kind to the contras; or 

— solicited, accepted, transmitted or in any other way been involved with 
funds for the contras. 



.JVt this time, the Comaittee does not have any infonnation to contradict 
1-lr. McFarlan* except several unsubstantiated news stories. The Comittee will 
continue to MBtor this situation and ta>:e such action as see.Tis warranted. 



With 




Z am 



- yUfziM - 



,^3r!)r^ r- ; E.O. 1235?' 
^y B. ::::-, ■-•or..' ^cj;i;y Cun il 



OH S 




Lee H. Hanilton 
Oiainnan 



(imSSIFifl 




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CONTRA OPERATION: 1986 



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♦^ R#?ly to not* of 06/27/86 11:12 
NCTt -ROM: OLIVER NORTH 
S.r;«ct: Question from CBS 
; r.jv* just had a chanca to watch th« W 57th pitca. As far as I am concarnad, 
i: :s tha singl* most distorted place of "raproting" I hjva aver seen. Hull 
izff -St allege that he knows me, does not confess to receiving money from me 
-r i.-vone else ai the NSC. The only charges made about the SSC are made by 
perrl* who are in jail, on their way to jail or just out of ja;l. If this is 
supposed to be credible, then I'll eat my shirt. I have never met ANY of the 
accuscrsor had anything to do with any of than. Obviously, I know and have oat 
savaral tinas with Edan Pastors. Ha does not allege any wrongdoing. I know 
Rob«rt Owan • ha was, up until the tiaa it went out of business • a consultant 
to :h« State Dapt. NHAO. He was not "paid off" $SOk, as alleged by an 
ancnoBous accuser, ha was paid a salary and expenses for services he provided" 
in delivering humanitarian aid for the USG on a State Dapt. contract. Finally, 
their main "witness," Mr. Terrell was not called to appaar before Sen. Kerry's 
inquisition - apparently because people have learned that Mr. Terrell was not, 
as ha claimed, a former Special Forces Officer, nor a CIA agent, nor a "contra 
combat leader. "In short, neither the witnesses nor the slanderous piece that 
CBS produced have any credibility whatsoever. 



?'30 



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_'.ic;;.-i S!?curiiy Coungil 






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921 




UNCLASSIFIED ?« -_. 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

nnuAsiHT stucT coMMnru 

ON INTtUJCINCf 
WASHINCTON. OC 20f1S 



,,«MiM..nfT^MCT« August 12/ 1986 



CH 7 



Honorable Ronald D. Coleman 
416 Cannon House Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20515 

Oeac Ron: 

As you are aware, there have been numerous stories published in the press 
during the last year alleging that members of the National Security Council 
violated t.'ie Bolai.d amenc.'ner.t pronibiting certain assistsjico to the contcu 
fighting the government of •Nicaragua. As a result of these allegations, you 
introduced a resolution of inquiry to conpel the National Security Council to 
provide certain information so the Congress oould make a determination as to 
whether or not the Soland amendment was violated during the time it was in 
effect. 

Because of the highly classified nature of the work of the National 
Security Council, the resolution of inquiry was referred to the House 
?er:^anent Select Comraittee on Intelligence. Members of the Cormuttee, 
including myself, went to the Mhite House to examine the issues raised 3y cne 
resolution with Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a member of the National 
Security Council staff and one of the principal subjects of the resolution; 
t.ne President's National Security Adviser; and other members of the NSC staff, 
including White House counsel. In addition, the Cocmittee also examined otr.er 
classified evidence concerning the resolution. 

Based on our discussions and review of the evidence provided, it is my 
belief that the published press allegations cannot b« proven. 

The resolution of inquiry was the proper vehicle by which to bring these 
.-natters to tn« attention of the Congress and to this Connittee, and we 
aopreciate your efforts to remove doubts about United States activities. 



With best wisties, I 



JNtUSSIRED 



Sincetily yours, 

Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 




922 



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RADIO - TV 

dlflHSl DIALOG 




Wed 



nesday, October 8. 1986 (Broadcasts of October 7. 19861 



«;t^M^RY OF uftmcrk news in this issue 7-9?^ JS 



pca.TP RPT^RSJ r-OVEN^EKTS o r T.S. AND NICARAGUA: ABC. JohnMcWethy 
Reported TeTct ion from Congress w as mixed; included statement, by Sen 
p!f!lck Leahy and Rep. Robert Michel. NBC. Fred Francis and Bob Kur 
!ncUded sta'tements'by the Secretary of State. Sec. Abrams. Sen. 
Leahy. 

PROTEST ON «;TEPS OF CAPITOL : NBC, Tom Brokaw reported that the plane 
fn^dent had focused new at tention on the four American veteran, who 
ae protesting US Involvement In Central America. 



.7 



ONCLASSIFiE 




Herbert J. Coleman. Chief. News Clipping I Analysis Service (SAf /AA) 695-2884 



' « 



926 




ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGKT 
ABC TV 7:00 p.m. 

Furious Debate 

MR. PETER JENNINGS: 
Good evening. There's a 
furious debate going on tonight 
between the governments of the 
United States and Nicaragua and 
it revolves on the question of 
whose cargo plane carrying 
ammunition to the 
an t i -gove r nmen t Contras was 
shot down inside Nicaragua 
yesterday and who were the 
Americans on board working for? 
They'd apparently flown from El 
Salvador. 

The Government of 
Nicaragua says it is proof of 
direct U.S. involvement in the 
war. The Reagan Administration 
says not t rue. 

Ou r first report Is 
from Nicaragua and here's ABC's 
Peter Col I ins. 

\R. PETER COLLINS: The 
Sandanistas say the aircraft 
that went down was a Korean War 
vintage C- 123. Informed 
sources close to the Contras 
confirm this and say they have 
been using these planes to drop 
ammunition and supplies by 
parachute to their men. 

They crashed in rough 
and rocky terrain deep inside 
Nicaragua that can be reached 
only by Sandanista Air Force 
forces. The Sandanistas claim 
that four Americans were aboard 
the plane. They say three were 
killed and one survived. He is 
identified as Eugene Hasenfus, 
a Marine Vietnam veteran from 



Marlnettk, Wisconsin. The 
Sandanistas quote him as saying 
that he is an American advisor 
based in EI Salvador. 

The Sandanistas also 
say the plane was carrying more 
than 50,000 rounds of small 
arms ammunition, rocket 
grenades, other weapons and 
boots. 

MR. ALEJANDRO BENDANA 
(Secretary General Nlcaraguan 
Foreign Ministry): I'm not 
saying that the U.S. Army is 
involved but this is obviously 
a CIA operation with CIA 
operatives. Whether they are 
U.S. Army personnel or not is 
almost beside the point. 

MR. COLLINS:, 
Newspapers here in Managua 
splashed huge headlines 
claiming the Sandanistas have 
kept one American advisor. The 
Sandanistas claim that a 
surfaced air missile of the 
Titan base series was used to 
shoot down the plane. 

While denying that the 
U.S. Government had anything to 
do with it, the American 
Embassy here today asked the 
Sandanistas for more details 
about it. The Embassy also 
asked permission for diplomats 
to see the captured crewman and 
for the return of the bodies of 
the mi ss Ing men. 

Peter Collins, ABC 
News, Managua. 

VR. JOHN McWETHY: This 
Is John McWethy in Washington. 
The Reagan Administration 
denied any connections to the 
downed aircraft. 

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The 
people involved were not from 



October 8, 1986 



ONClASSIFlEi 



927 



UNDLASSIFIEO 



our military, not from any U.S. 
Government agency, CIA 
included. 

MR. McWETHY: Reaction 
from Congress was mixed. 
Senator Patrick Leahy, a 
Democrat, Is on the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and 
expressed concern that the CIA, 
while not directly responsible, 
could have been Involved In 
other ways with the private 
group. 

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: 
What concerns me very much Is 
that they are connected with 
any of the adjunct soldier of 
fortune type operations, those 
which are sort of sent out 
there with a wink and a shrug 
as a way of going around our 
stated foreign policy. 

REP. ROBERT MICHEL: 
That doesn't worry me one 
tinker's damn. I think it's a 
big to-do about nothing and all 
the media does Is play it -- 
give them an opportunity to 
make their usual diatribe over 
I ssues. 

MR. McWETHY: Eugene 
Hasenfus, the lone survivor of 
the Irrash is shownhere in 
parachute gear with his brother 
15 years ago. Eugene is now 
45, according to the Pentagon. 
He was a Marine for 5 years in 
the early 1960s, was trained as 
a specialist In parachute 
rigging of air cargo in war 
zones. As a Marine, however, 
he never left the U.S. 

His brother Wi 1 I i am 
said Eugene, after working 
construction for years In 
Wisconsin, had this past summer 
switched Jobs moving to 



Florida. Nobody knew Eugene 
was flying in Central America. 

MR. WILLIAM HASENFUS: 
It come as a complete surprise 
because I Just thought he was 
down in Miami working for an 
air freight out f I t . 

MR. McWETHY: The CIA 
has long worked with the Contra 
rebels but has been barred from 
providing guns and equipment 
paid for by the U.S. 
Government. Soon, the U.S. 
will provide $100 million in 
aid to the rebels but even so, 
U.S. Government employees will 
be prohibited from operating 
ins ide Nicaragua. 

John McWethy, ABC News, 
the State Department. 

Military/Drug Smugglers 

MR. JENNINGS: There 
has been something of an 
agreement today between the 
Senate and the House of 
Representatives on the final 
form of an anti-drug bill. The 
House and Senate negotiators 
have agreed on the death 
penalty for drug related 
murders. They also agree the 
military should not be used to 
try to stop smugglers at the 
nation's borders and they also 
agree that the illegally seized 
evidence may not be used in 
trials. 



Please note: Due to technical 
difficulties, two tapes of CBS 
Evening news did not record; we 
are unable to provide 
coverage. 



October 8. 1986 



NCLASSIFIf 



fO 



928 



However, the program was 
monitored as It was broadcast: 
It covered essentially the same 
stories as those Included from 
ABC and NBC. 



NBC NIGHTLY NEWS 
NBC TV 6:30 P.M. 

The Plane 

IVR. BROKAW: The Reagan 
Administration denies a 
connection with that plane shot 
down in Nicaragua but 
many questions do remain 
tonight . 

Nicaragua continues to 
insist tonight that a 
cargo plane shot down In that 
country was on a CIA 
mission and that the lone 
American survivor. 
Secretary of State Shultz and 

the CIA however, say 

that is not true. But we do 

know tonight that the 

transport plane apparently 

loaded with combat gear 

was shot down Sunday In 

Southern Nicaragua. Not too 

far from the border of Costa 

Rica. it had talten off 

from El Sil vador . Three 

Americans were killed when 

the US built C-123 was shot 

down. 

The Sandanistas use a 

Soviet built portable 

missile. American cameras were 
taken to the crash 
site. They were shown the lone 
survivor who was 



Identified as Eugene Hasenfus, 

an ex-Marine who had 

worked for Florida air freight 

company. He talked 

about what happened. 

REPORTER: Can you tell us 
how you came to be 
hear In Nicaragua? 

MR. EUGENE HASENFUS: I 
was shot out of the sky. 

REPORTER: Where did you 
plane that you arriving 
at originate? 

MR . HASENFUS : E 1 

Salvador. 

REPORTER: And what was It 
carrying? 

MR. HASENFUS: We were 
carrying smal I arms. 

MR. BROKAW: The Reagan 
Administrat ion went to 
great lengths today to deny 
that the plane and the 
men In it were on an official 
mission for the US 
government. But NBC's Fred 
Francis, reports from the 
Pentagon now that government 
officials do know where 
the plane came from, who paid 
for It and where it was 

* SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ 

(Film) : The people 

Involved were not from our 

military, not from any US 

government agency, and ClA 

included. 

MR. FRED FRANCIS: The 
Secretary of State Is 
correct. But NBC News has 
learned from 

Administration and Contra 
officials that the White 
House has had full knowledge of 
this Contra cargo 
plane operation for more than a 



October 8. 1986 



Bumiu 



929 




year. Those sources 

tell NBC News that he plane 

downed in Nicaragua was 

based here In El Salvador El 

Pango Airport. That It 

was piloted by American 

mercenaries. And financed by 

a foreign government friendly 

to US interests. NBC 

News has learned from 

administration and Contra 

officials that the rebels had 

been using this 

Salvadoran base to store 

supplies and airplanes for 

more than 18 months. The 

sources told NBC News that 

the aircraft a C-7 cargo plane 

took off Sunday night 

from El Pango Airport, skirted 

Nicaragua's Pacific 

Coast, crossed into Costa Rican 

airspace, then turned 

north Into Nicaragua and 

dropped supplies to Contras 

near the town of Shauntlez 

before having engine 

t roubl e. 

Mo St of the Contra's 
suppi i es are in I arge 
warehouses like this throughout 
Central America. The 
sources say that El Salvador is 
used a refueling 
stop, for repairs and for 
storing sup :j lies, and a 
place for mercenaries to live. 

And according to a 
Pentagon source Salvadoran 
President Duarte had condoned 
the gun running 

operation, even the he has 
publicly complained that 
Nicaragua is trying to subvert 
his government in much 
the same say. The man In 
charge of Central American 



foreign policy, Elliott Abrams, 

today said, God Bless 

the person who survived because 

he is fighting for 

f reedom. 

MR. ELLIOTT ABRAMS 
(Assistant Secretary of 
State): What's kept the 
resistance alive really has 
been private citizens in this 
coun try and other 
countries who have contributed 
their time. And some 
very, very brave people who 
have been willing 
actually then bring this 
material Into Nicaragua. 

MR . FRANC IS: What 

Secretary Abrams did not say 
is that the Americans involved 
in the Sal vadoran 
cargo operation were fighting 
for a price. Each man 
received several thousand 
dol I ars per trip into 
Nicaragua and at least two 
flights were made per 
month from the Salvadoran base. 
All f I nanced by a 
friendly foreign government. 

Eugene Hasenfus the man 
captured by the 

Sandnistias is a 35 year old 
ex-Marine from Marinett, 
Wisconsin who apparently joined 
the mercenary 
operation this surrmer. 

MR. WILLIAM HASENFUS 
(Eugene's brother): He was 
a typical iron worker. Good 
old boy, had a few beers 
with the guys. He liked 
Jumping out of airplanes, 
you know that was about as 
radical as he would get. 

MR. FRANCIS: There are 
loopholes which allow 



October 8, 1986 




930 



ir^c 



yNWSSiHh 



Hasenfus and others to work as 
joldlers of fortune. 

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY 
(D-Vermont): What 
concerns me very much is that 
they are connected with 
any of the soldier of fortune 
type operations. Those 
which are sort of sent out 
there with a wink and 
shrug. As a way of going 
around our stated foreign 
pol icy . 

N«. FRANCIS: The Contras 
have 1 i ved off the 
fund raising efforts of men 
like retired General John 
Slnglaub, since CIA funds were 
cutoff In Ma y o f 
1984. And they have used the 
expert I se in 

connections of men like retired 
General Richard 

Secort. But Administration 
sources say, this Is the 
first time a foreign power has 
spent millions 

covertly to carry out the 
President's policies. Fred 
Francis, NBC News the Pentagon. 
• *«• 

MR. BROICAW: And today's 
developments focused 
fresh attention on a dramatic 
protest that has been 
underway against US policy in 
Central America for 
more than a month now. As 
NBC's Bob Kur reports 
tonight, four American Veterans 
are fasting and are 
spending part of each day on 
the Capi to 1 steps to 
make their point. 

MR. BOB KUR: For five 
weeks they have gathered 
on the Capitol steps each 



afternoon for a vigil at 

dusk. In that time Charles 

Liteky has consumed 

nothing but water and vitamins. 

A fast In hopes of 

stopping US aid to Contra 

rebels in Nicaragua. 

During the Vietnam War 
Liteky was known as the 
hero priest. He won the Medal 
of Honor for savi ng 
twenty men In a Jungle fire 
fight. But later he left 
the priesthood and turned 
against that War. And last 
July he left his medal at the 
V i e t n am Memo rial In 
Washington to protest US 
military involvement In 
Cent ral Amer lea 

Today Liteky and three 
other fasting Veterans, 
one from World War II, were 
Invited by some Senators 
and Congressmen to come Inside 
the Capi tol . And 
today for the first time they 
drew a lot of 
at tent Ion. 

SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL 
(D-Rhode Island): I 
recall the Vietnam War, but as 
the individual actions 
of protestors, people In 
Vietnam Itself, people who 
burnt themselves to death. 
Those are the things that 
turned around that policy in 
Vietnam. 

MR . KUR : The four 

Veterans warned that 
continued US military 
Involvement In Central America 
will mean another war like 
Vietnam, and they say they 
wl 1 1 fast unt 1 1 they die. 

MR. CHARLES LITEKY: And 



S2-750 930 



October 8, 1986 







931 



If 've c ^ r. n c t prevail 

jpv-.n your stite of reason, your 

^nsc of reason and 
morale resporislbillty about 
t'Tio war and Nicaragua, 
it >vill happen over our dead 
Lod ies. 

MR. KUR: Sons call It 
cr7:otionai bisckmaii and 
say the taciic won't work. 

MR. SAM MARULLO 
(Sociologist): I think the 
chance of them accomplishing 
their object ive of 
stopping US ruppor; for the 
Contras in Nicaragua is 
close to zero. 

MR. KUR : Even some of 
there supporters here are 
pleading -.vith the Veterans to 
stop the fast. The 
tell them that they have made 
their po i n t , that 
Congress is unlikely to vote on 

on t ra aide aga i n 
until next year. Bob Kur, NBC, 
News at the US 
Cap i to 1 . ♦♦♦* 



UNCLASSJ 



Jrn 



^mm 



October 8, 1986 



932 



CHAPTER 8. U.S. -IRAN RELATIONS AND THE HOSTAGES IN LEBANON 
THIS CHAPTER DOES NOT CONTAIN FOOTNOTES. 



933 



CHAPTER 9. THE IRAN ARMS SALES: THE BEGINNING 



934 




ONCUSSIFIED 1-1 



^ ^^ / 5-, 
146] 



'G 



M«nuch«kr6horb«nifir - aka Djafar Souzani, Ja'Far Suzani 
Manouc^^^^^^^Manuel Pereira, Manoucheer Korbanifar 



Isf 

oc 
01 
f 
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POB: 9 May 1945, Tehran, Iran; also 1942 
r _ ^^HE •"<! 1538. He is an Iranian citizen. His 
V? ^■f*/i"PO" businessman. For.erly a Managing 
of Isrtetl-connected Star Line Shipping, he is a 
Iranian Any Officer. He claias to have worked for 

odic contact with U.S. 



He is belli 



tence servLcel 



He«Xs a self-proclaiaed 



. ^- - ^ 20'_s. Speaks excellent 

"SI^^E^.^^. "• "* ^'^ ^*^ ■ Portuguese Passport in 
T*«* ''r'^S^'*"^" ^""•<1 on 3-October 1980 and valid until 
3 October 198], nu.ber 10596/80. jJreek Passport nu.ber X-10723 
in the naae of Nlkolaos Kralis isiLed 27 October 1981 in 
u"*K''*"'}?*c?^«n*!^** until 26 October 1986. Iranian Passport 
NuBber 11652209 in naoe of Ji' f ar-Suzani. As of 1982 was said 
to have an Iraqi passport in an A*ab naae. He claias to be in 
a position to produce genuine pawoorts of various 
nationalities. ^-. 

Prior to the Iranian RevoiuWon, Ghorbanifar had been an 
inforaant for Iranian Intel aa^^Ti-ed to hare access to many 
senior ranking officers in th» flfitary as well as access to ' 
Iranian underworld characters •* various illicit hues. As of 
late 1979 he was a nenber of TalMn Koaite and was able to 
travel freely between Europe M«Hran in connection with his 
import/export business, he aaA.Ms brothers All and Reza 
becane laplicated in abortive «|Hy of 9 July 1980 which 
resulted in curtailment of thl» trips to Iran. Since that tirae 
he has been located primarily i^.ffaris with his brother Ali but 
travels to Athens. Turkey and *»• for purpose of meeting with 
other exile leaders in support- aFBis "group" in Iran He 
claimed at one time to be closelySf filiated with Shahpour 
Bakhtiar but later said he and his "group" were monitorina 
Bakhtiar, Madani and other exile^^oups. 

"- n March 1984 Ghorbanif-fliSaet with a CIA officer^^ 
~l*°<^ volunteered informa^Xlon on the Beirut kidnapW 
of COS, Beirut and on a plot to *»sassinate presidential 
candidates; He said he had stopped dealing with CIA in 1981 
becfus* tttm U.S. Government was not going to act oa^i»*el he 
was siiiaa to bring down the Kho m^ni regimt ' 

^f'*''^"' P°ly8'"P*'«^BMHBBt^e5Sl«» the 
veracity of his information. He iaileJ tKe exai».«it«lt«l£icant 
issues of fabrication and he del-r^eraiely r"''i iltltf ilxLj-.f . 
on the Beirut kidnapping and assassination ploti-'^^Wk tl* 
request of U S. Secret Service he-was "' r " 1 J 11 r ■■■■i. mii 12 June 

1984 and again failed the exam, his rrirri iBifiTayU n i. 

practicing deception on all relevant question*, caitcemlnsrafeat 
to assassinate presidential candhfates. - "» r-» 

In 1985 Ghorbanifar was cited by Cyrus teahemi as on«-^1»e 
latter's influential contacts and. as an official of Iranian 
Intelligence who was interested in negotia^iia ^^^eiticMQt-of- 



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1. nANUCHEHR (XCORBANIFAR) ) . AKA QJAFARTSOUZAN! . JA'FAR 
SUZAKI. fUNOUCH SOUZANI. MNUEL PEREIRA. MAMOCHEER KORBANIFAR, 
NIKOLAOS KRALIS. OPOB: 9 fUT 19i.S. TniBMI -yiptl ALSO 19<i2 
ISFAHAN: CIRCA 19iili. 193B. CIT: IRAN. OCBMITION: EXPORT/IMPORT 
BUSINESSMAN. FORAERLY HANACINC DIRECTOR nUll I -CONNECTED STAR UNE 
SKIPPING. FORMER IRANIAN ARMY OFFICER. CUUMS TO HAVE WORKED FOR 
SAVAK, KUEVEy^yi^iRmDI^CONTA^^^^HTE^CENCE 

OFSrFJPTIOH^MEOI^^nCH^OyERwnCHTTBB-EYES^H^NINC DARK 
H1k<«. ROUND FACE. WELL-DRESSED. NO KNOWIT MilTH PROBLEMS. DOES NOT 
SMOKE. OERSONABLE. CONVINCING. FAST TALMfcl* 01 FF I CULT TO KEEP TO 
SUBJECT AT HAND. SELF-PROCLAIMED WHE£LEft*«UlER SINCE 
20'S. SPEAKS EXCELLENT AMERICAN-STYLE EMIilSI. FAM 
AFSHARI NOORI CITY. BROTHERS: (I) ALI OaMNIFAR 
BORN 21 JUNE I9S3. ALSO GIVEN AS 1952 ISFMUUC-AKA 
MAY TRAVEL ON CREEK PASSPORT; (2) REZA ( fCORBAN I F AR) ) 
INFORMATION. 2: 

2. PASSPORTS: *- 

A. PORTUGUESE PASSPORT NUMBER )0«SS/80 IN NAME OF MANUEL 
PEREIRA ISSUED CCVERNO CIVIL OE BRACA ON 3 TTCTDBER 1980, VALID UNTIL 
3 OCTOBER 1985. ^ 

B. CREEK PASSPORT NUMBER X-l0723nN NAME OF NIKOLAOS 
KRALIS ISSUED 27 GCTOIER 19BI IN STOCKHOLM. VALID UNTIL 26 OCTOBER 
1986. 

C. IMMAM lr>ASSPORT NUMBER 11652209 IN NAME OF JA'FAR 
SUZAHI. AS OF IMt SAID TO HAVE IRAQI PASSPORT IN ARAB NAME. 
CLAIMS TO BE IN POtlTION TO PRODUCE GENUINE PASSPORTS OF VARIOUS 
NATIONALITIES. ,r XXT^' 

3. ACTIVITIES: 

A. PRIOR TO IRANIAN REVOLUTION SUBJECT HAD BEEN AN 

IMFORMANT FOR IRANIAN INTEL AND CLAIMED TO HAVE ACCESS TO MANY 
SENIOR RANKING OFFICERS IN MILITARY AS WELL AS° ACCESS TO IRANIM 
UNDERWORLD CHARACTERS OF VARIOUS ILLICIT HUES. AS OF LATE 197* K- 
WAS MEMBER OF TEHRAN KOAITE AND WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL FREELY BETVm 
EUROPE AND IRAN IN CONNECTION WITH HIS IMPORmXPORT BUSINESS. "^THE 
HE AND HIS BROTHERS. ALI AND REZA GORBANIFAR. BECOME IMPLMATE»-IN 
ABORTIVE COUP OF 9 JULY 1980 WHICH RESULTED IN CURTAILMENT OF HIS 
TRIPS TO IRAN. SINCE THAT TIME HE HAS BEEN LOCATED PRIMARILY IN 
PARIS WITH^IS BROTHER ALI. BUT TRAVELS TO ATHENS. TURKEY AND IRAN 
fOR PURPOSE OF MEETING WITH OTHER EXILE LEADERS IN SUPPART OF HIS 
rCROUP'MN -IRAN. -NE CUIMEO AT ONE TIME TO BE CLOSELY rAFniUTED. 
r^- VITW SHAHPOUK BAPnTAK ll/T LATEK SAID 4iE AND HIS "CR0UP^V4(EIIE;.V. v 



|i^ 









u 

T 
G 




936 



W^.. 



UtiSySSIflED 



5-^ 



463 






>i^^i 



J JUL Ik 

AND OTHER exiLC CROUPS. 



DIRECTOR 0n0S6 






PERiOO Hf UASnfT ^_^^ 
I AND PROVIDED SOnE_USEFllL INfii^iigN oN 
_AU'ERSQNALITIES IN if 




^ ^ HISTORY Of^RToTl 

^ENEO AND WAT SEEN AS A RUrtORrtONCEITOf OCCASIONAL 
USEFULNESS. IN AOOITION. THE INfORMATION-fiflLLECTEO 8Y Hl« 
CONSISTENTLY LACKED SOURCINC AND DETAIL NOTWrTHSTANOINC HIS 
EXCLUSIVE INTEREST IN ■' -x-nuim. ni> 




YnTiB iN FORnAT 
«£T WITH AgBBMoEFICER~~~ 
ON THE BEIRUT KICnaPPINC orTOS 
-PRCSI0E1|TIAL CANDIDATES 

"in 1981 BECAUSE 

GIVING TD BRING 



ES . Hf SAin 
SEHMflBk 

ovjOMTSfiii 



ONLY: 0^ 17 «ARCH ISSh SUBJECT 

I AmTVolUT^TEEREO INFORnATlON 

BEIRUT ANIk^N A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE 
, HI HAD SMP-PED DEALING WITH 
jWAS WOT-Cnm G TO act ON IN TEL HE 

r ^ _ '* "^ai"" «^ HE 

_ _ , ^^^ OETER^rNE-VERACfTY OF HIS 

IMFORMTIOII. K F«ILEO EXAfl ON SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF fiBRICATlON 
155.C .2!^!ff»l"i^ PROVIDED F«'^r .urnnu BEIRUTVlUJTiS li?", 
ASSASSlNATIOil HOT. AT REQUEST OFlMBrHr-WASfllllliilfoN 12 '/-< 

PRAlT?c.*?°«??fi?.i;i');" "*"• «'^?*ct1ons iNflWfre^iAs ' 

ASSASSINATE PRCsIp^t"" *'■'• "^'•^^^''T QUESTLftHS CONCERNING PLOT Tflt. 




!£iW«i«ttfflacHi::i 



CATORtfV Ti^tD FO« SUtASI 



937 




cz/Voo^ 



938 










t-s 



C 1 



V 



24 January igg^ 



RECTORATE OF OPERATIONS 

spot'report 



SUBJECT: Army intelligence and Security Co<.m,r^ d 

Iraniin Terrorism '■"rit> Command Report on 





IIW h!!)*'' "°^*?, »»>'■'' tfrrorisi information!^ 
reporting has been. suspect . 

repori jj^'^^ °"^ concerns abouft 
cofflBent , I 



Pr 
h o 



Mceabc r 

the 
ether 




CI /AT/OOF 



939 







C 1 435 



Orig: 
Distribution: 

Orig ♦ 6 - Addee 



24 jan 84) 





Cjih^iooj 



%m^^ 



940 



uNiHtsii 



9 F/V'J 
C 150: 




OCCL OAOR-WV HUM ii-82 ALL SECRET. 



END or HESSACE 



Partially Declc.'sifii.,' e^se-. *J/^ 
".',.i'.' ?rn' 5': ' T 1.0. ^^ 
Py ?..■;;;:•, :..tions' 'jcirity C 



SECRET 






dif^io^-j rq^a: 






cT. : 




DO ."joson 

03 c sho 




£l£^ 



frva.Cs <;> A. 






^^■^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 




F' 




^^^^TOR: 2l|pBJnAR 8<. | 


l|y||M67 




S £ c " JTjjB 


ImR e»|STAF^^^^^^^^^^^ 







SUBJECT: 



3 ^^^^^^^^^^^^ REF A AND RELATED TRAFFIC 
DcpoDTEri^^^WSf^^BfflOrD VOLUNTEERED INFORKATION ABOUT 
POSSIBLEtWITTWi OnPToNAmD AHER 
BUCKLEY AND ABOUT AN ALLEGED IRANI AN 

^KJiK^liSMSTguJ^Si^Sl IVVni -LIMITED TinE ALLOWED 
TO SctUIIBP 6EF0REi|K)NWARD TRAVEL^|LSULTS SHOWED 
LCEPTION mmnz sr yiRTHrEY ELEMENTS Qfl^HlSTOR 



jpniWEO KM fiELlASe 



LUNTEERED INFORftATlON ABOUT/ M-T VV> 

I CAN OIPLOnAT WILLIAM / M5^ # ii C 

N PLOT TO ASSASSINATE U.S./ KQ .,,^5 

ESTED ONtY ON THE ' * 'l^* • - ' 



S97 




ICOWENT: RELAYED INF 



942 




«-»''*5 "ORN t»liS IN IRa'm. in rttAHEM, HE IS nARRIED 

FROM 197rTrr*RLY JOtY 1980 HE TRAVELED FREQUENTLY TO LONDON FROM 

IRAN AS AN EWLOYEE OF AN IRANIAN lASEO IHPORT/EXPORT FIRM MIOR 

TO THIS HE WAS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF STAR LINE sJilPP?ic CO^ wiliS 

?y^!lP?i$rL*u.^°i^«'5i''l**'^'"«>-l VENTURE" IN LATE )980: 

IN LATri97t m WAS iliJL TO IE A MEMBER Of-JTHL TEHRAN KOHITE". |BW|ȣ0 F 




SOURCEl 



'ill'.i^i«g:rt'W:1*l^j:M'ji.ii.tti!^lilt.«Jimi'ij.i;iai 



jSSErTJscT' 



JS THOSE 



TAVAK AND HE RETAINS «ANY'jCi«CTs' 

.„. - • *—_■—- ICATEO IN THE FAILED COUP OF t JB»H 

1980 AS WERE IOtOTTiiS YOUNGER BROTHERS (I DENS B ANO C) 1 tK^- 
^1 £°il'-5 **° '■'""'" TRAVEL TO IRAN BUT CONTINUED TO TRAVEL raHB€im.Y 
^P P*R'S. ATHENS. TURKEY AND IRAQ. HE CL*>*^£0 THIS WAS F«" 
-nS?$!i °^ «"TINC WITH OTHER EXILE LEADERS. MAKING OEALSfflT 
MONITARr AID IND PURCHASI NG SMALL WEAPONS Aff P EXPL " 
GROUP" IN IRAN. ~~|~~~^ 

HtR[ WERE INOICATI^ 
AND WELL CONNECTED. 




iiKtf)tiiSfii£im 




943 



^tsmfiB 



C 1 505 



rUR 8<« DIRECTOR 876b9i« 

UT IS NOT 




wlD foa n£UA££ 



944 



mam^ 



■ C 1506 




C//y /oyy. 






OQ .••JbSSO 



tINiWiEO 



03 



'■>^ 



945 



rUr±€-^ 9 f//^ 3^ i 




SJBJE 



DIRECTOR 875330 

1. rOLLOwINC IS lNrDR»*4TI0N QftTAI-WED Pggx l 
OJRINC FIRST 17 MARCH ME.ETISC ON *Lt£StF IRANI a'^L0T"T7 
ASS4SS1»<ATE U.S. fRES10E*iTU^ CASOipAirST", CJOTE : •£ PAINFULLY 
»*IARE "TmATJJANJ^JESTIONS ON BELO*( t«lfJWMAlJJ^ Rf»«AlN TO BE 
AMSMlRED.MHIMmILL COMCENTRATE On^HESE 3JE ST1DNS OJRINC 

Planned evemnc amo early <<or.ning ses5;ions kit. 







946 



TOR: IHS^Hmar 

J l^ ACCORDING TO^H( ARHAi^CEHE-^S FOR INflLTR4J.WN QF THF 
ftSSiSSIO KTD The U.?^T>E BEING MA^ Ill^lll , , Jj||||||||^jj|^j^ ^ 




(COMMENT; THlSttENENT- OF STO^Y BEAR^TRlKlNG 

>EHBLA*JCE TD SO^E PREVIOJS HEPORTIJJClNVOUVlNcMMJrOJNGER 
9«0TMER. BELIEVE IT LlKtLY TrtAT d»OJTiETr.lS STIll LURKING In 
THE BACK6RUUMD OF THIS n-IOlE tot^nnr ^ ^ 



5. ACCORDING TO INFO^-^tTIUN 
TARGETS OF ASSASSINATION OPERATIO 
REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANOI^ATE 
TO TAKE PLACE BEToEEN l AUGUST 19 
ASSASSINATION TEA", IS MADE JP OF 
TO This OPEKATION. INTE.>*TI0>4 IS 
BUT TO KILL AS M*NY SENIOR OFFICl 
PUBLIC) AS POSSIBLE. THE ACTUAL 
AS "CATASTROPHIC" AS POSSIBLE FOR 
OPERATIONS fiAS PICKED SPECIFICALL 
MORE PU3L1CLY EXPOSED, A^D ThEORE 
PJRING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. 



PROVIDED Br 
NS tfil BOTH OEM 
S.— 5kSSASSIxATT0N 
e«i AMD 6 NOVEMBER 
SUICIDE MEN. MHO 
NOT D^LY TO KILL 
ALS_AiJQ STAFF (AN 
OPERATIONS ARF IN 

AMERICA. TIME P 
Y BECAUSE CANOTOA 
T1CALJ.Y LESS WELL 



INTENDFO 
IC AND 

OPS PLANNFD 

19B<i. 
ARE COMMITTFD 
CANDIDATFS. 
GEMCRAL 
TENOEa-TO 8F 
ERIOa FOR 
TE8 4ILL BE 

PROIECTED. 



I b. (COMMENT: PLEASE NOTE PREVI-&ySLY REPORTED COMMENT Ht 
IthAT he "AS UNHAPPY aITh HIS RELAT I ONSHI BS >^TTH#B|^ 



UHtLA^n^D 



a/^v ipso 



Arc ^JSC 



947 







PACEftOX 
TOR; IT^^B MIR nu 



»ACE 001 

'.mm. 



S0a6 



tUECAUSE NEITHER GOVERNMENT EVER TOOK ACTION 
HlTlONj/ HIS STATED MOIrtl FOR PROVIDINC 
IMFORMtflOV IS TO AS&iST «IITH THE OOMafALL OF THE KHOMEINI 
RECIME.V mlOLl ABOVE XNfOR'IATION MUS4^E. AND IS BEING. TAKEN 
^^RTSERXWIStt* IT «NOULD BE EVALUaTLO AND ASSESSED IN LIGHT OF 
^^B MOTmTlOM.) 



FILE: DEFER. INDEX: 
DECL OAOH DHV HUM umfTt 



END OF MESSAGE 



SECRET 



/•• 




•^OH, 



Cjff^^OSO 



mmm 



KEVI/ 



948 




l^iFLUEMCE TO 



Dip- ^^G4<A45\& rr\f»R S4. 

UNCIASSWO 



CJIhf LOSi 



TEHRAH. TH 

DO :'Jj377 
113 01/5^ 



949 




CURREIvT 
<4AACH, Al 
•«OST LUC 
^ASSCNSE 
»«OVIPED 



^ W MOVE bJCKLEY nj TEHRAN- fl^rT^WPT^^JCKLEY WILL 
C»-M TaANSPAftUD VIA IRAN AIR-JN THE CAR60 H3lD_ O F A 
tSKRAFT^ 0m If AN IRAiM AIR-CSR60 AIRCRAFT, fll^^ 
"^T TltEjMQM^IJMaER AHO THE -RDOH NJ'^SER OF T HE HO TEL 
|«HEV£^^^^^^HanD_H.I S PARTY HAD_jTAXEDl 




{(.^^■PKESENTED ALIAS PASSPJRT ^ fP t N A. ON 4HICM HE IS 
T^AVELIVbTanO STATED THAT HIS TRUE I*A«1E IS IDEn B. HE CLAIMS 
THAT HE CHANGES IDENTITIES EVERY THRCfr MONTHS OR SO FOR 
SAFETY, HE CLAWED THAT nE IS'lNVOLVj^O IN AM UNNAME D IRA NIAN 
3RSANIZATI0N hHICH IS FUVDED BY AHMS SALES T3 IRAN. ^BBlSTATrO 
THAT HE IS OSINP IRAN'S '^ONEY TO BRINS ABOUT ITS 00*1^^. HE 
ADvISEd THAT THE ORGANIZATION IS NOT AFFILIATED *ITH kMy OF THE 
EXILE SROUPJ •> LEADERS 3ECAUSE THEY ARE TOO COMFORTABLE LX-VInC 
IN THE 4E5T lAe ARE NOT SERIOUS ABOUT— OUSTINS khOmEInI. 
DEALS D-^ILV flITH IRANIANS IN C0VER>^MENT AL POSITIONS In/TnI 
KHOMEINI REGIME "HO ARE ANTl-KHOMEni. -HE CLAIMS TO>l«rt 
PENETRATIONS OF THE MILITARY, THE RE.VOLUT I ONARY GUARD.- *l«0 THE 
I NTELLIglNLE ORGANIZATIONS. HE STATED- THAT HE CEASED BCALINS 
jlITilJ^^P^B I N MARCH 19B1 BECAUSE IT mAS APPARFNT /CM4T 
^/KKK^^mkS UQl GOING T3 ACT ON THE 1nTELL1:EnCE MC HA^ ' 
PROVIDING TO BRING DOnN KHOMEINI AND TRAT IT oAS C'lCA* IMIT A 



UNCLASMD 



C.//A/ /05/ 



/6c *ssc. 



950 



UNCUiSSIHED ' '=>. 




N^ TOR: ^^^^^^^^ ^^ 

0EC1S13HWIK1MA1_RLI»*!'D -t'D NOT YEr ^N mjj 



STAFF 



IN 



THIS IRRITATFU 

STATETJH^^lOaOOY'S MAN, ANO IS VDLUNTCEHIN5 TmE 

T^TTRmaTQON to j^^^^BBtCAJSE HE SEES THAT MOa OJ;) "BACK IS 
' A6A1NST ThE wAtT^fN^HAT PE»JHAPS M0« S0>1E ACTION »tlLL COME 
FaOM MIS COOPERATION,^ 



T HEADOKA^TERS TRACES-DnJ 



6. SEPARATE CABUE FOLLOWS OtToElllLS OF PLOT TO 
ASSASSINATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. 




END OF MESSAGE 



«Clf?T" 



CUN fOSi 



)m mm 



r'- 

i 

/. 



DO :L;bS7B 
08 Oi/jj 




S C C R 

ST*fi_ 



timirrr. 'nyirtTQp wnTirf - MAmirMrwB 

1. lUNUCHEHR (XCORBANIFAR)). «K* QJArAiTSOUZAN: . JA'FAR 
SUZANI. HANOUCM SOUZANI. MNUEL PERtlRA. fUMOCHEER KORBANIFAR. 
NIKOLAOS KRALIS. OPOI: 9 HAY 19<.5. TVT^M TTlfl ALSO 19ii2 
ISEAHAN; CIRCA l»l>«. 193R. CIT: IRAN. QBHITION: EXPORT/IMPORT 
BUSINESSMAN. FORMERLY HANACINC DIRECTOR ■UfC I -CONNECTED STAR LINE 
SHIPPING. FORMER IRANIAN ARMY OFFICER. CUUIU TO HAVE WORKED FOR 
SAVAR. ■ELIEVtB TQiE_m_PtRlQDIC CONTACTB^}. INTt^ QCFMrF 
SERVICEB|H|BiH|HHi^ '~~~ 
OF.'rF.iPTlON: HEDIOn HEIGHT. OVERWEIGHT. HH-EYES, THTMHINC DARK 
H%>». ROUND FACE. WELL-ORESSED . NO KNOWtraUITH PROBLEMS. DOES NOT 
SnOKE. "ERSONABLE. CONVINCING. FAST TALJIObTOI FF ICULT TO KEEP TO 
SUBJECT AT HAND. SELF-PROCLAinED WHEELER-fUiER SINCE HIS EARLY 
20'S. SPEAKS EXCELLENT AMERICAN-STYLE EMUSi. FAMi 
AFSHARI NOORI CITY. BROTHERS: (I) ALI OBIUll 
BORN :i JUNE I9S3. ALSO GIVEN AS 1952 ISHMMQ-AKt A' 
MAY TRAVEL ON CREEK PASSPORT; (2) REZA (fCORBANI FAR) ) 
INfORrtATION. *- . 

2. PASSPORTS: «- 

A. PORTUGUESE PASSPORT NUMBER lOMS/SO IN NAME OF MANUEL 
PEREIRA ISSUED CCVERNO CIVIL DE BRAGA ON 3 TJCTDBER 1980. VALID UNTIL 
i OCTOBER 19BS. - ^ 

B. CIICEK MSSPORT NUMBER X-10723'lN NAME OF NIKOLAOS 
KRALIS ISSUED 27 OCTOMR OBI IN STOCKHOLM. VALID UNTIL 26 OCTOBER 
I9S6. 

C. IMMM PASSPORT NUMBER 11652209 IN NAME OF Ji'FAR 
SUZANI. AS OF ISM SAIO TO HAVE IRAQI PASSPORT IN ARAB NAME. 
CLAinS TO BE IN POSITION TO PRODUCE GENUINE PASSPORTS OF VARIOUS 
NATIONALITIES. ,^ 

3. ACTIVITIES: ^- 

A. PRIOR TO IRANIAN REVOLUTION SUBJECT HAO BEEN AN 
IMFORFUNT FOR IRANIAN INTEL AND CLAIMED TO HAVE ACCESS TO MANY 
SENIOR RANKING OFFICERS IN MILITARY AS WELL AS° ACCESS TO IRANIAK 
UNDERWORLD CHARACTERS OF VARIOUS ILLICIT HUES. AS OF LATE IBTt ■ 
WAS AEflBER OF TCNRAN ROHITE AND WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL FREELY BETVHi 
EUROPE AND IRAN IN CONNECTION WITH HIS IMPORmXPORT BUSINESS. *^THE» 
HE AND HIS BROTHERS. ALI AND REZA CORBANIFAR. BECOME IMPLMRTIt. IN 
ABORTIVE COUP OF B JULY 19B0 WHICH RESULTED IN CURTAILMENT OF HIS 
TRIPS TO IRAN. SINCE THAT TIME HE HAS BEEN LOCATED PRIMARILY IN 
PARIS WITNJtlS BROTHER ALI. BUT TRAVELS TO ATHENS. TURKEY AND IRAN 
fOR PURPOSE OF flECTINC VITM OTHER CXILC LEADERS IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
^^'CROUr*. IN -IRAN. -HE CUIIttO AT ONETIflE TO BE CLOSELY rAFniaTEO. 
- WITH SHAHPOUR fAnn-IM BUT LATER SAID -NE AND HIS "CR0Uf^''4ARE;.V. . 



952 



^' 



ii;;sussiriED 



< ^ 



ij^^O) 



OIRECTOR 0n0S6 






AMO OTHtR tint caou ps. _ 

F0R/1ATI0M OMLT: " " 






l*NO PRovioEO sont.usertlL iNr6^TioN on 




, HISTORY Of PRTBTl 

PPEMtO ANO WAS" StEN AS A flUrtORMONCf r Of OCCASIONAL 
UStFUlNtSS. IN AOOITION. THt I Mf ORflATI OH-ttU.LtCTtO SY HIH 
CONSISTtNTLT lACKtO SOURCINC ANO OtTAIL NOTWITHSTANOINC HIS 
fXCLUSIVt INTEREST IN 




MYOlJR IN FORftATI 
OfFICtR 
iPPING 
parsinfMTiii CANOiOATtS 
^IN I3SI StCAUSt 
C I VI NC TO BR I NG 



NLY: OJI 17 flARCH I98<< SUBJECT 
_ AMTTTOLLIXTEERtO INFORMATION 

BEIRUT ANb^N A PIOT TO ASSASSINATE 

HE HAD S2CP-PE0 OEALINC WITH 
WAS NOT imjlC TOACT ON INTEL HE 

il-" ' • ";~ 

. 18 "TORCH B<i HE 

TO OETERWrNE-VEBACTTY OF HIS 
IHFOWUTIOII. IK FAILED tXAn ON SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF FABRICATIOK 
ANO HE OELlMtoTtLY PROVIOEO FALSE JJlfiJUl* BFIRU T tinuippiy r K>i>.-'.' 
ASSASSINATIOII KOT. AT RtQUEST OFH^BThE-WAS ■■■■■ ON 12 '.'-' 
JUNE Bli ANO tCAIN FAILEO EXArt. HirTtACTIONS INJICAteO HE WAS 
PRACTICING DECEPTION ON ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS CONCERNING PLOT TBL 
ASSASSINATE PRESIP""'-' -« ^ «.««<*. 




t«iti«fftttajflftt'nf* "!!'"""'' '"'^'/i;^: 



953 




0^ 

u 

T 

cr 
I 

N 



C1//V'0A3 










M 

G 


I 

^'• 
-& 

'i 

E 

S 

& 
G 
E 



9^si\lU 



954 




"" 9-60'7 



MEMO' 
PROM 



SUBJ 




19 Jun* 1904 







U7^- 






!•— MMMSn. Vfthln the past weak -It han r-oma •■.. _ 
<^r "'r^l^'^ dlff rent ch.nneirth.t ;;y|mmy|||n- 
int*r«st«<l rS «t«bll8hlng contact with the uiffSKHH^PW^' 
m«nt. Tvo of th« thra* sourcas of infornationVr. Si«h? ^o^^"- 
tlonabla. and th. third doas not baliaJr!. wul L iSw^.*'""- 
davalop furthar Information Iri tha na.r fuJura Si SJi?.^* . 
tha parion who wlahaa contact t,B^aiLil^"'^*-| ** t>«lfv that 
that- ha haa now ratnrnad to ii 




•SITIOtf: 



Juna 1IM4 Ham 



^.. »« wwnw «v«« Hanueheur < 

__^raa8tabliahad contact vithfliiJiBl 
^>^^» ^1 Juna 1984, ha .^iaaffWWi 



heur G horbanlfar 

During a convc— 
convincad 



lea.', 



rapracantati 

initially daacribad j 

'who had ba^ ^wUh tha othar thraa 

baing "wrad STTTTn^IintpHBlH^PS'Sltno*'!; 

to o scji^im . about .11 hi ki.sBnBfR'.^'ji;^^ jiii;/*^^ 

tarro^— ^f lllqaoca orga nizationa within it:., t, -!? '^** ' 



\» Ur 



WARNING NOTICE 
INTELIIGENCE SOURCES 
OR ilETHOOS IHVOIVH) 



[•xaaipstion: 
partalning tol 

UNCttiFiEIH 



Spa 



-^ J05;oi» 



955 



\. 



IINCUSSinEO 



22 Novtmb^- I9t* 



^'/O^/l 



AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN LEBANON 



N 7452 



BACKGROUND 

Th« former head of Savak's Department VIII, Countercspiona|t General 
Manucher Hashemi continues to monitor developments in Iran. His motivation for 
this effort is a desire to see Iran become a non-communist nation with an orderly 
and hist form of government when Ayatollah Khomeini passes from the scene and 
his revolution becomes a spent force. In pursuit of this objective, General Hashemi 
bolieves h« and other exiles, who have no political aspirations, can play a modest 
role in helping Iran to transition from its current chaos to a democratic society. 
He sees this happening via the process of exiles providing support, guidance and 
some coordination for "moderates" in Iran who have the courage. 




THE DIALOGUE TO DATE 



Th« ebb and flow of the Iran-Iraq war since September 1980 has been of 

vital interest to oil_companie^ The trends of tiiJL conflics_have, ttuxffore, (jcsp 

monitoreTby risk analysis firms such as ours in order that our clients could be well 
informed. In seeking factual data on the struggle, we have harnessed various 
sources including the maintaining of contact with knowledgeable Iranian exiles. 
General Hashemi has been one of our emigre conversation partners. In October 
1 98* our dialogue with him took on a new form and substance in that he offered to 
put us in touch with a number of interesting Iranians who would be traveling in 
Europe in November '.98(t. We accepted the offer on the oremise that it would help 
us to evaluate the quality of General Hashemi's future commentary as well as 
provide a first-hand assessment of what was likely to happen in the Iran-Iraq war 
which could impact on a volatile and oversold international oil market. 

HAMBURG MEETINGS 

In the period 19 - 21 November I98«, a number of meetings were held in 

. Hamburg, Germany with General Hashemi and Iranians that he introduced to us. 

This revealed that Manuchehr Ghorbanlfar, President of Byiex Trading Company, 

M Avenue Maroeau, 7)008 Paris, telephone 72080*1, telex 620927, was a major 




TW DATA FinWISHZO IM THIS PAPCt SHALL NOT BE 

DXSCLOSCD OVTSIOC THE UNITED STATES COVCIKMENT 
OR THEIR ACEMCIES, NOR BE OU?LICATED. USED OR 
DISCLOSED m WHOU OR IH PART FOR ANT PURPOSE 
OTHER THAU TO EVACVATE THE DATA PROVIDED. 



C 



Partially Declaaified /Released on^ILliivmi 

ondef pnnkim of E.0. 12356 

by B. Reger, National Security Council 















956 



UNbLKOOini.^ 



M 7453 



A ^ha General, l" **«*• 
^ «n. aroup o» contacts in »;;»Seorr.l Has^em. m Hambur» on 

-N^vrr '".ra^r/t .terestin, traveler Iro^ Iran. 

MORS ^N1E^ i.,,m Iran. Ghorbanilar wM 

where he pl»ye«» • j^^i^n 

»"PP''*"* • . ^« successlul but he wa3 ^'^j^^^ents « 

.... ...... Hashem. .... .....«end«nJl^»«» 




Ume ti-"** "^TS^dTo controU 
had alwaysb«en*J^J^JZJ^^ 










•/^ 



957 



' ■ N 7454 



would »u«ss Tehran wooldwjMjo ^ ^ .^ ,.^, *t2 ,^ tSt Vomment. As 
simpler *»y w P"^* J^l' !J^t that jufvctur. in '«'««"!• "o|th.conv«r«tioo. 
Amirlc*ns. ^o^^^"* *^''JjJ Urt*^ entered l^^^l';!.' 'f^^.onVJTLebanon, «h.t 
the d.y wore on, ^owev^. "M ^boo, ':*"k " v «r ^ dniooing American.. 

Mr. Chorbenifw was «!<«^J*Thi„- the American Embassy or *<'<»"*=? L. captured 

•-"—wing: 

.^„.„-..»«— ,::'j:::::..^«^ 



session, !<•« •• 
the loUowinj: 






' r 




958 



' N 7455 

_ u ^. .•eret. This meant that whatever 
e. The transaction had to be Wept »«^^' .^^^^ the media of how the 

final explanation was worked o*^^ " identify Ghorbamfar. Iranians 

release had been effected, it could not loe 

or anything but a private ransom deal. 
, Htnis deal interested us, we were to do the following: 

(1) provide the full names of the captured Americans; 

(2) indicate the date of ^^^^/^^^l^^u.^', father. 

(3) provide the given name of eacn capu 

w ^ *^ hi* ooints and would take appropriate 
Ghorbanilar was told we ►'•fV'^.^^lj'',' ^ o' »^i» decision-making process, 
soundings. When we indicated '"^P"** ** ^^'/''Jlw the ball was in our court. He 
^e laug*hed «,d said he -".*1 ^y;; 5,^"^ S had %« said we doubted that we 
wondered aloud il we could react »» <'^":p'J *! 
ISd! for we were both cautious and deliberate. 

COMMENT , \, ^ ■• 

. «- 71 November, General Hashemi 

m subsequent P^-ate discussions '*« ^^"^^^^..'^''^^This matter or how. He 
told us he did not know who Ghorban.far had """='*^,^,r in ten days time. This . 
sa d hi would attempt to find out and "^'fV,';*;*^^.^ would both be traveling as 
deUy w« <!«« to the fact t";** Gh<xban^«^ajd H^Ke-^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ,„^^ 

' SO ^es of t^ -^^s?-:^ ^^^^^ t:^^^^.^ -: 

rS^^tKi^lJ^^^--^ -----'- 

, ■ ♦ r.hl. Sews Network vv-ho *as kidnapoed on 7 Marcn 
a. Jeremy Levin ol Cable :News ^xeiwwi 

19S^; 

• .- »:«Nh«««v officer, who was kidnapped 
b William F. Buckley, an American Embassy oincer, 
on 16 March 19S»; 

date ol capture. 

^c^..o.TvFVALUAT10tS 

i.K„ H# travels on the basis ol his 

General Hashemi is -fP'^g;! ^ T^f he"re«ive* from a son-in-law who 
own funds plus discounted airlin. tickets that ne 



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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^'th any Western 

ransom, it »« .'."ki. for * discussion ol xne 
^e would be avaiUble lor 




paracrapt>*> 



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CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



961 




ii. 



1. SOMMAKTi On 22 April 19IC, tht Onitad Statat Cuatoas 
taiylca and ..tba^nLtad Stataa Attotnay'a Offica (or tha 
Southarn Dis.t'riet^f^Naw York announcad -tha Indietsant of 
aavantaan lndivtduaJ.V^on char9aa that thay wara partlclpanta 
an lllafaliSChaaiaXtorsBuggIa S2.S billion in Aaar lcan-«ada 
warplanaB,r*^*>^*> i^ndiothar waapona to Iran. Thia caaa haa 
racalTad'proainant pl«y in tha (oraiqn and doaaitie praaa (aat 
attacbaant) and haa baan of intaraat to tha lar aal i -qovar naant 
dua to tha involvaant of a ratlcad laraali ganaral. Tha bait 
in Cuatos'-ii ating oparation waa Cyrua Haahaai, a foraar Agtncy 
and Stata Dapartaant contact. Baahaal'' pravioua ralationahip 
with Onitad Stataa govarnaant aganciaa could ba an iaaua at 
trial. Tha caaa ia- tan tativaly aat to qo to trial in NovaaBar 
1986. ' '-^ 



°1-I2 



2. Cyrus Bashami ia wall and unfaxsrably know() to tha 
Dircctorata of Operations and tha Dap*«-taant of Stata. Tha 
following ia a auaaary of our involvB£.nt with Mr. Bashaai. 

A. In aarly 1980, during tha Iranian hoataga criaia, 
Rashaai aada r apr asantat iona to Stata- that ha eoul ji mtv «« 
channal for na< 




davclopad that Bashaai /dj d not hava tha ability to 
~aa projected and it was auapacted that his, offers were 
part ot a scaa. Tn-*-.--.-! 




C. In June 1984, the DCI learned from John Shaheen, a 
personal acquaintance of the DCI, that Hasheai had inforaation 
he wished to pass to the Agency. Because Bashemi waa a 
fugitive froa justice, Shaheen was inforaed by the DCI that the 
Agency had no interest in pursuing Hasheai's offer. 

D. During June - August 198S Shaheen and one o 
Hasheai's attorneys were in contact with the Agency jega 
Hasheai's alleged ability to intercede with Icanian-offi 
to secure the release of the hostages in Lebanon. Bashea 
sought to arrange for charges against^in to be'dropped 
return for his cooperation. Both the Agency and State 
investigated Hasheffli'a claims, with no^ positive results. 




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■ aahcBl waa to bt on* e( tht priaaty wltnaaaaa at trial, ivtn 
thoufh w««bad'«o7'par t in tht Cuatoaa atin9 optration, tha 
A9tncy aay- b* !bcoa9ht into the eaaa btcauaa tha dtfanat say 
■akt an is'aat''efXlaah«Bi 'a atttapta to contact tht Agency to 
aecura favorable " treata ent on bia 1914 indictaent. 

4.- Keprcaentativea (roa the Directorate of Operations end 
the office of General Counsel have aet with the Dep'artaent of 
Justice a_ttorney and-the local prosecutor to brief thea 
concerning, our equities in this case and to allow thea to 
review redacted veraions of Agency d7cuaents. They have been 
aadc aware that our^pr iaar v- concerns are to protect f r oa 

lise 1 o s ur e^ _^ 

the details of our 
involvaent witR iRi lltiibpt to arrange the hostsge release In 
198S« the identities of covert sourTJs, and the identities of 
covert CIA officers. As it now stands, we are anticipating 
that we will be compelled to acknowlTdge our relationship with 
Hasheai with a suaaary description of his post indictaent 
actiivttox* that arc relevant to an entrapaent defense. 



S. On 5 September 1986, w« were inforaed that one of the 
defense attorneys had indicated^to Ur . Basheai's attorney, 
Williaa B. Wachtel, interest in reviewing his file on Basheai 
and discussing with hia his knowledge of Basheai's activities. 
Mr. Wachtel is inclined to assert at-torney client privilege. 
Based on inforaation in our files, it is obvious -that Mr. 
Hatchel is fully inforaed on Basheai's dealings with various 
government agencies. OGC is currently discussing with Justice 
and State attorneys aeans to prevent the release of classified 
information by Mr. Wachtel. -' ■ ' ''■ 



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HBMORA|n>OM FORt 



ATTBNTXOHt.l 
PROM: 

SUBJECT: 
REFBREHCB: 







06C Nam* Trace Request 



A. 

B. 



Two-way Memo dated 13 Hay 1986 
^6-51313 dated 9 May 1986 



% 



2f 



/ 



1. The following is in reference to your request dated 13 
May 1986 for inforaation concerning referenced subjects. (O) 

2. IHi^HBH^BHHH Sfir faced on Cyrus Basheai-Naini , 
OPOB: 26Deceabcr 1939, Iran; Ttie following updates previous 
inforaation provided to the Office of- General Counsel on Bashemi 
and OGC-84-1472 of 7 February 1984 which details OGC's meeting 
with Hasheai's attorney. ; . 

A. On 17 May 1984, A federal arrest warrant was issued 
on Bashemi for arms export control violations. As of 25 May 
1984 , Hashemi was r< 



eai intermediary and 
one of his attorneys was in contact with the agency regarding 
Hashemi's alleged ability to intercede with Iranian officials to 
secure tha ralcase of the hostages in Lebanon. Much time and 
effort wa« spant in this endeavor which was fruitless. Hashemi 
sought to iKranga a nolle prosequi in return for his' 
cooperatie*. )jrr 

D. In Daceaber 1985, representatives of the Directorate 
of Operations and OGC aet with 0. S. Custoas officials to 
discuss their proposal t\3 use Hashemi. They were told in 
general terms of his background. They were also informed, that 
he was described in our files as a sleazy and slippery character 
who had previously been involved in nefarious activities. The 
Customs officials indicated that they would be in further 
contact with more specific requirements. The DDO was unaware of 
Customs* ongoing activities with Hashemi until charges were 
brought oi^^.J^ril 1986. [^ 





di^^ 37 




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MSG mOM: NSDRF --CPUA 
To: NSRCM --CPUA 



TO: NSRCM --CPUA 

-- sre«ET -- 



04/09/85 10:22:14 



*^0 



,< 



NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER 
SUBJECT: Ladaan and Iran 

Mika Ladaan c«aa to saa aa yatcarday. Ha had nat aarliar with Jock 
and Howard. Mika said ha had talkad to Wilna about ra-mitiating his trip 
to Itraal. Ha jot tha i«pra«iion that you wara praparad to »iva tha graan 
lijht subjact to a potitiva racomaandat ion froa Fortiar/Covay/Taichar. 

I don't know if tht» i» taally your viaw. Wa hava all discuisad thi$ 
aattar. Nona of ut faal Mika should ba our priaary channal for workinj tha 
Iran iisua with feralsn jovarnaants. and wa think you should probably should 
not provida a forMl lattar. At tha sam tiaa, wa think it would ba usaful 
to hava Mika c*rry two aaaaagas to Paras: I) tha Whita Housa faals it is 
assantial to bagln to davalop a oora sarioua and coordinatad stratagy for 
daaling with tha Iranian tuccassion crisis - • crisis that is alaost cartain 
to turn on outsida Involvaaant of ona kind or anothar; and 2) wa would Ilka 
his Idaas on how wa could cooparata aora affactlvaly. Tha last point Is a hard 
ona for us to ask our Intalllganca coMwnlty to coawinlcata, slnea wa suspact 
thay nay ba part of tha problaa. Wa don't think Mika should bo tha ona to 
ask Paras for datallad oparational InforMtlon; ha probably doasn t know, ana 
avan if ha did. this should ba rasarvad for official channals onea wa hava 
•rrlvad at idaas for rastorlng battar cooparation. 

I aat yastarday with Intarastad paopla hara to h»«in t<^ put "«•«•>•« 

an action plan for Iran siailar to what wa did on «• '•*^*'"° 

th. l.raall raqulraaant in tha eontaxt of thl. di.cuition and baliava it is 

conaruant.Wa naad a dialogua on thia aubjaet, but wara not far anoughlong 

.... .w.-v .. ..v »-- •-vtV-.rt too aueh mor« «o«cific; sioracvar wa 



® 



965 



p««c« process, etc 
ce: NSJMP --CPU 



Cil>^it3^_ 9 ^i \ M 



N 16391 









MSC rUOM: NSWtf --CPUA 
To: NSRCM --CPUA 



TO: SSRCM 



-CPt'A 



04/09/8S 11:41:22 



•- SEBMT 



^< 



NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER 

Subject: Reply to Not* 04/09/85 11:22 Ladaan and Iran 

Thank* for tha faadback Bud. Howard and I had talkad • subject to your 

tanaral ok - about his calllnt Niored Novak, both as a final sensitivity 

check and a* a way of flatting our interest without your havint to write 

a not* on Hike's behalf. The problea, and I'l* a little annoyed by this, 

is that Mike, on the strength apparently of his talk with Wilna, has |ona 

ahead and rascheduled his lunch with Peres for next Thursday. Should we 

siaply try to run the check and discuss with Shultz in the next day so that we 

can be done with this problao, or should I tell .Mike to foroally cancel again? 

The only other comment I would add is that Mike seens to be able to get on 

Peres calendar (unless he is oisleading us) rather easily, something that would 

seea to be oore difficult if he were out of favor. Thanks again for your 

advice. 

cc: NSJMP --CPUA 



» 



/ 






MSC FROM: SSDRT --CPCA 
To: NSJMP --CPL'A 



TO: NSJMP 



-CPUA 



04/09/85 12:28:10 



FORTIER 



NOTE FROM: DONALD R. 

SUBJECT: Rosen 

I have to confess to you that tha 

against Stave, the nadder I becaaa. 



-- SEbKT -- 



9re I thought about Vince's allegations 
I don't intend to let this surface, and 
will - a* your dutiful aarvant • try to aove forward the substance with a 
ainiaua of personal friction. Still, his remarks coae close to being personal 
slander of the worst aort. It aeeaa that the only shred of evidence on the 
Israeli connection la that Steve told Vlace he planned (but hasn't) to talk to 
a guy at the Eabaasy that several others had recoaaended to us as very know- 
ledgeable about Iran. We also checked back through our files and neacona 
and could (lad no single Inatance where we aaked the kind of question Vince 
profeasea to bo so coaeeme4_gbout, l,e. exposing agenta, actual plans etc. 
Our eafhasla throughout the exercise was: what are your criteria 

i»x •ueeest, are you eaphaslzing the right kinds of aunltlona, would aore 

help, are our collection priorities correct etc. In short, we asked 
the kind of questions soaeone should have aaked a long tiae ago. And that, 
I suapect, is the root of the problea. All of us here gave Vince th* benefit 
of the doubt when he caae on board. He should do the saae. 



@) 



Partially De<:laSif!4d;/r3lea&^ nn SK^Iir: 

i-ndfr provi:' :s cf £. ). 12356 

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966 




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MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA 
To: NSDRT --CPUA 



TO: NSDRF 



-CPUA 



04/09/85 11:22:47 

';\ 153C6 



-- STCRET — 
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARUNE \ 

Subject: Reply to Not* 04/09/85 10:22 Lcd««n and Iran 

y«s I think it is antiraly worthwhil* to cooparat* closaly with Iran in our 
planning for Iranian succession. My only concarn with rtgard to Mika is a hint 
I got tha last tioa ha was in that ha personally was out of favor with Paras 
but I stress that I have absolutely no hard basis for such a conclusion. It 
aight be useful however, for Howard to oake a discreet sensitivity check with 
one of his friends in the PM's office. As a separate matter I want to talk to 
Shuitz so that he is not blindsided when San Lewis reports-*as ha will surely 
find out-- about Mike's wanderings. So for tha moment let's hold on the Ledeen 
aspect. I will get back to you. I do consider planning for the succfession to 
be one of our greatest failures and vulnerabilities so I am very glad you are 
turning to it. 

cc: NSJMP --CPU 












MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPfA 
To: NSDRF --CPUA 



TO; NSDRF --CPUA 



04/09/85 12:45:22 



-- SESRET " 
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE \ 

Subject: Reply to Note 04/09/85 11:41 Ledeen and Iran 

Doe* Hike iaagine that he can hold his meeting without Sam tewis knowing about 
it? I really doubt that. Pleat* do try to run the Novick check. If it turns up 
negative, siaply call Hike that the aeeting is not sponsored by us and ha 
should not so rapraaant. 

04/09/85 



MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSDRF --CPUA 
To: NSRMX --CPUA BOB KIMMITT 






-- SE8RET — 
NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER \ 

SUBJECT: Master List of Activities on Contra Peace Issue 
I have asked Don to puU together through his task force a master list (less y- 
Presidenc) of events for the administration between now and 30 April. It is 



Partially CKIaSiffeirTaleaSfd onJSTHmAlSl 

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' N 1639 



SORET ,— 



NOTE FROM: DONALD «• FORTIER 
-SUBJECT: It«> 

DTmv. h.r. lookin, « th. """^ »P"' th.^'rirlu^n^c.. . I think 
„• ..y h.v. .ri.tn, °« « .*^' "^^j^^J w^ t^nd upTdr.ft for you .nd 
ua n««d •bout on« aof full d«y b«tor« w« i«no uj. Hr.ft SNIE. W« 

I alto think th« l%tfli option " "" i'b not »ur« though that 

.ay hav. to pay . c.rtain pric. ^" '»»• J-^P^^^J into ..now. Hi. ..ss.g. 
•" r* h'* li5!:\i":« r. uriant"; o' oUorlJ in hi: -..wand conv.r.ation 
illd'Jr.!:: r:i: JunrtUk::' WoLd appr-ciat, .uidanc. ^^ .ubstantiv 
faadback. Thankt. 



4 #32 

30 



NSJNP 



•CPUA 



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^i;;;!;;;;;;^ ^. — .****.,^***hhh^>*--««--^ 



MSC FROR: NSDRT -CWA 
To: NSRCH --CPUA 

*i^ Raply to nota of 05/2e/«5 14:17 



TO: NSRCN --CPUA 



OS/29/85 10:35:11 j 



i 



Jt^ 



^,<fi^'^t 



MOTE FROM: DONAIi) t. FORTIER ri.htara T 

Sublact: Pr..id«.ti.l M..».»» to f"«^!*,"f "^'fe. „ do nothing. At tba 

.«• tf. it i. . r.thar ""•^'Jf/^/'.^^^rpS.ntly «.. in tha avant It 
you a draft of tha thaw* «• J*\^!^* °''* "wiVutth Walt, howavar. to t- 
i, daeidad to to .h.«d. 1 ""•«»»"*• '!w„ „,"«•. anticip.tad (in which 
what Mta w. tao« •*«« th. •^•««= «• ^*j!v.""l t*** participant. i..ua 
ca... our .ilanca would '»«J«" ""''tt'':^l;H!ii «a woSld ««it to b. fully 
-o;ralU-:S)1t:^Si'wm i.r.Uaihin. to y:; l.t.c today. 

ce: NSJM? --CPUA 

Partialli' WEIa^fi^dVrjIcaS^^d cnJi'T^S^iJ!} 

trtder provii' .:% cf t. ). 12355 

•:■/ " R^er, j:- ;3! jsci, C' - I 




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National InwItiiMM Co«wfl 

(i^u^u^^r fru/~/ (Uh**^*» ^**2[^ 






{1 



NIC 02S4S-8S 

17 May 19«5 



• ■. *■ 
•'••■■ 

■.:3 



r 

MENOMNOUN FOK: 



FROM: 



SUBJECT: 



Olrtcter of Ctntral IitttlllMnet 
Deputy Oirtctor of Ctntrtl Inttlligonct 

6r«haii C. Fullir 

National Inttlllgtnct Offlctr for NESA 

Toward a Policy on Iran 












1. Tht US faces a grla situation In dcvtioping a new policy toward 
Iran. Events art novlng largtiy against our Inttrasts and wt havt ftw 
palatable alternatives. In bluntest fom, the Khomeini regloe Is 
faltering and may be moving toward a moment of truth; we will soon sec a 
struggle for succession. The US has almost no cards to play; the USSR 
has many. Iran has obviously concluded that whether they like Russia and 
Communism or not, the USSR Is the country to come to tents with: the 
USSR can both hurt and help Iran more than the US can. Our urgent need 
Is to develop a broad spectrum of policy moves designed to give us some 
leverage In the race for Influence In Tehran. 

The specter of the US and the USSR standing on the same side of 
a m^or International strategic conflict, like the Gulf war. Is 

raordlnary. It Is also an unstable situation and cannot 
persist for long. He are both on Iraq's side because we lack 
our preferred access to Iran. Whoever gets there first Is in a 
strong position to work towards the exclusion of the other. 




ontlnues to monitor Soviet progress toward 

oping sfgnlfleant leverage In Tehran, we must monitor that 
progress— but we also already know where Moscow wants to go and 
that It will devote major resources to claiming thU Important 
prize.' Even if Moscow's progress Is uneven, we need to develop 
« stratev In response. 






2. The Twin Pillars of US Policy. 
to two major ptners. 



US policy at present cones down 



we will respond with force directly If Iran 
another terrorist outrage against the US. 



Th\s MefTHa ClaieWUd ^ 
$ECHI/i«FORlh+*r Its ent4«ltaft,^^^_ 



48CttT* 



^7,10.) 




lOJ 



CL BY 13S401 
OEa 0AM 



969 



- uriMk to chok* off ill «ras suppHts to Tthrtn -«htrtv«r 
pesslbU. 

3. Ttrror1$t A tfck ; Wt can and must h«yt sent policy «aaln'st 
torror1$«. m mtst «iso rtcosnlio th«t this cannot rtoisont th* hulk •# 
our policy to..ar(l Iran. Fgrth«r«,r«. radical forlJ, l! tSJJ^ it"^* '' /,!><.. ,y 
gtleojj a direct confrontation with tht US-lncludlno US .lllti??^ ift?^OLW 

Ffrenrtlon-ln th« hopts of rtplaying Us MtraordlJaMl/succtisful 
gaoblt against tht US In tht 1979 hostagt crisis. •''cctssfui 

- During that crisis tht radicals galvanixtd tht Iranian 
ataosphtrt. polarlztd all views, rtndtrtd tht aodtratts 
Irrtltvant, and procttdtd to tllainatt tht* in tht suSrcharotd 
ataosphtrt of confrontation. »«'i»«rcnargta 



Thtst radicals aay sttk to do so again in tht txptctation of doing awav 
"l^ !!!' opportunity tht constrvatlvtsmay havt to rtieh i««SoS!ttI!y 







•^TonPrSTnTtoTTuncj^^^ "ijji 

against tht potential stakt in Iran. "^rrwrisi poncy 

r*^A\f?*t1^^^'^ *^ ^"PP^<««' Thtrt arc good reasons to SMk to 

^'**"'* ofT >ojj«-anns supplies to Iran. It aay be one way of brInaiM an A.^ 

end to tht war which only Iran sttks to PtrpttJatt. If St ailS ?! ,. ^ 

succtssful. howeyer. it could also have the effect of drlvlnoIrM into a // ^fvV 

corner where the Soviets will be tht only option left. // £w 

"* UMIkU.:*^*!".^*^* ^' •"""* *90.) this theoretical '"^'^"^ 

possibility of Soviet opportunity stSBSdng fro* tht US arm m 

A.-I f^Ji-go. Tht possibility is no longtr theoretical. Iran has j"'^' " * % 

ffS^S nc«"^: '^^^9tn aoving toward sene acconmodation with the ^T^ ^^ 






USSR. Meanwhile, tht USSR can afford to play it cool and stt *^ 
its own ttras. rtlatlvtly confidtnt that tht US cannot^al a 
■arch on it. 



*^ *'****-„ - .5*!! ^*? f"^"^ ^ ^ »9jJftn-'"'^'' *»«iblt whilt Iran was in a 
.* vacuiM and UKMtini was $tro««I-can no longtr strvt as tht orilarl 

^•^ !!2^i* '"• " P<»^<«V«??"« '••*«• »oth a!; tntlrilj negltiJiTnaturt 
«<i My 5oajMC2aLto_faenitatt Soviet mu retti aap, t hi: our own Sr 
•«$t develop a Mrt posItivrstt-orTTinsfnwfyllS a iSSrlSiS- 
sptctrw of eonsidtratiens and actions. •".•««■ 

** J! IL!!!{ ^J J'^^^e^" O"' P««t«t position, and I do not atan 
to suggtst that any tasy answers txist. It Is laptratlvt. 
however, that wt perhaps think In ttras of a bo1d«r~and perhaps 



I _ 




970 
-fiCca»/NOFORN D 572 



^Hgklly rlskltr policy which will at least tnsurt grtattr us 
volet la tht unfolding situation. Right now«-un1css no art vtry 
lucky indtt4—w« stand to gain nothing, and lost nort. In tht 
outcoat of dtvtlopoonts in Iran, which art all outsldt our 
control. f 

6. SOTt Broadtr Policy Consldtrations . Nobody has any brilliant 
Idtas about how to got us back into Tthran. Ntarly all ttntativt 
proposals rtquirt uncoafortablt choicts and c1tar«cut down sidts. 
Nontthtltss wt nttd to rtvltw a broad sptctrua of Idtas. I subalt btlow 
a rangt of thoughts, carrots and sticks, -'all of which art flawtd— but 
which sight assist In sparking bttttr and sort rtfintd positions to attt 
our nttds. 

a. Work with Iraq to brino Tthran to its knots . Mt could considtr 
moving auch ciostr to Iraq, to bring tht war to a quicktr tnd» | • • 
particularly b y way of tncoura qinq crippling attacks on Kharq *r'' » 
Island and ktv^riRTin ttwaiie rJdiHtlts. IMs wouH iervt to «*«i « C' 
put incoitrabit prtssurt upon tht rtglaw, ptrhaps damaging tht ««mJL£ 
hardlintrs, aaybt tvtn Itading toward tht collapst of tht <J^JkJ^ 
citrics. It would probably bring tht war to a dt facto n^ n-L ii 
conclusion. Oisadvantaqt ; Htjia.vt no knpwltdtt-ib out who would ' ^ H 
an#r9g v<( ;tftr4ftin from <urh < hainblMi It cOuTd wtU bt radical 
titntnts f 11 ltd with hatrtd of tht US. Tht radicals havt aost 
of tht guns. I t might tnsurt Tthr an's rapid accommod ation w ith 
Moscow. ——_...- -- - 

b. Ootn UP Iran to fritndly statt influtnct . Ut could toll all our 
Europtan alllts, as wtli as Israti, Turkty, Pakistan, China, 

C_nj|>--*^ Japan, Brazil and Argtntina that Wtsttra influtnct must dtvtlep 
^ • i V 1,1 \ "V a paramount position during this critical ptriod In Iran. Wt 
4^,/*-***'* I (I would rtmo?t all futy^ftim^^ ^n ^.i«*— «-»^|Hj^nn ■n4t«fw..tft 
^3t*^A>i^ r^/v ^ ip,n. ^f only proviso would bt tht rtqutst that truly 
"^VXlSU^ strattgic ittes which could iHstdiattly afftct tht conduct of 
*— **'^' (I tht war bt avoidtd. (In fact, in tht short ttrm, ftw ittn 

^ would rtally rtvtrst tht courst of tht war.) Such a. sttp would 
tfftctivtly prtcludt Iran turning to or nttding tht USSR. 
Irat't diainishtd isolation might tncourast tht tntrgtnct of 
Iraa's aedtratts into a grtattr policy rolt. Disadyantaqt aA 
^,>A.\aBMl>lt tncouragtmtnt for Iranian ptrpttuatitn of tht war. 

c. 6o afttr Iran's radical alllts. Wiilt dirtct US assault against 
Iran could bring about tht vtry thing wt wish to. avoid, l.t. 
Sovitt doainttion of Iran, dirtct attack on Iran's radical 
til its, Syria and Libya, would probably sobtr Iran and wtaktn 
its support froa thost qutrttrs. It would bt a cltar blow to 
tiM "radical tnttntt.* Qadhafi in particular Is a kty flguro. 






nm^is^ 



971 



I- 









575 - 



d. 



..H*-HtTt tv«ry rt«son In tht worl4 to tt«nt to sm Oadhafi 

el»1U1nfl tfftct on Irut and shakt Us confldtnct thatth! 
eorrtUtlon of ridical forcas was with tht*. (Prtssurt o« Sv..4. 
•oi»5d havo loss tfftct and could Idtally only eoJfral. ^ * 

t"t*h ."IJJSJ !• !h*r;'?/2f*''\«*«^ "* • eonf^tatloTtfth Syria 
at this point.) TTilt "indlrtct strattoy' would deionstrat. iS 
ptsolvt against radlcallsa without dIrStly pushlnolJan ll S. 
wrong dirtctlon. Unllkt Iran, wt havt notJlK "0^080 ?n Lihl! 
and tvtrythln, to gain. - ^,,^. UM, rf,? i^j!;;^^^^ 

Batttnino down tho hatches in Turkty and y.tut., %';;?!..- *"t^**.'*^ 

nttd to grtatly stop up our tits with Turkty and PakltuT ^ **-*^ 

Turkty is at tht htart of US atolllty to rtSond to ant%«^ 

JfjJjJJJJy^^^yyjMjjnjjurelMi^^ •* 

'SrtHWSfflklSSBSS^WtsSo tl«J**JiiSS «* ♦w. 
Bospnorws and contlguS^^JJSniU thrSv?rtO„?S!~}h2. ** 

";5o"ti;;:nV;rj;s£t'J2i/*,*^' ^••^^^ cS.mS-to'JSir 

support^vtn if wt cannot control a ntoatlvt courso of tvtnts in 






Iran. 



Sotting tht Ht««i 



aot Throuon 
titntnts iii 



to Tthran. 



f^Vlh^"^ «^ 



^>< <>. 



<• I 



f. 



n 



tnatjjari; •aTl';Wntr n r^ J c onv^arAt'*il';: 

;lf 2?rf??"*''*'*^'^^*"'*" UrrSn*. and th! wif tht US 

iJL, ?i ali.l2f '"^^•*! *" •*"^" -*•«»* 0' rteonci litlon^to 
Iran in gtntral. Thtrt is rooa for such broad, oublle ttatMMt 

opportunists— that wt art not dtdleatsd ta »ha ^ .-— ^ *... 

play against tht barragt of propaganda f roa th« ten iruti^ 
Itadtrshlp which wIshwTto pirtfaj tS irTs t!t lilJcrtS 
S2ii a^lS%i?r«Jj 1«/«r past and mV!/JSlca«^ib 
2^-^ Sl.**2"*''*5^"« '•'' *** ^•"w^*" P"«>11e than thty 
wtrt In tht htady days of tht ntw Rtpubllc. ' 

Mass1t»«.roassuranct to Irm of us int>fiti<w.€. N«rt words aay 
not ot tnough to changt iht tidt of adatratt oai«iIi\I2 k!?{w 

If ce(«1td with dawnstratloRS of goodwill throooh withdrawal ^* 

placing th« US anitary prtstnct ^n^h« 6ulf on vtry low 






ICLASSra 



^^mAS'iiS 



972 



4C«MT/N0F0RII 



i|%.^-«f j% D 574 



prof lit. MudvantMe t Mt alght p«r$u«d« Irani «n r«d1e«1s th«t 
Ht H«4 9lvtn up. or iftrt p«p«r tigers, or both. Our Ar«b tlllts 
■Igftt lest eonfldtnct. On tht othtr hAnd, such gtsturts could 
bt tulckljr rtvoktd If Irtn Itstlf wtrt not forthconlna or If tht 
; dtngtr Itvtl rost. In «ny c«st, thtrt «rt Mjor b«nifU| In 

. anklnq a strlis of posltlvt otsturts toward Iran Indicating 

is*^ <-*'*y'l*jrfrit<r goodwill— tvtn If not Imtdlatily rtclprocattd by Iran. 
^ ^^^"yU g xA^ Tht non-radicals will gtt th« — «saa«. 

g. Bargaining with tht USS* . Ut havt llttit Itvtragt htrt. 

Howtvtr, tht USSR in its public statcntnts constantly strtsst^ 
that tht US Is btnt on placing Ptrshing alssllts In Israti, 
Pakistan and Turkty. In theory thtst art bargaining chips which 
could bt 'givtn away* at no cost In txchangt for soat 
"undtrstandlng" ovtr Iran. Tht Min problta Is that wt can 
hardly warn tht Sovltts against establishing bttttr tits with 
Tehran, or even supplying ami to Tehran. These are net 
belligerent acts In and of themselves and our aajor problea In 
Iran Is not Soviet Invasion but rather support to radical forces 
who sight Bove the country closer to Moscow. 

7. On reflection I believe that tht option oost constructively 
oriented Is that o f Inserti ng Uatf m jIIU* an d friends Into Tehran 
quickly * '"^vqh ^*\t "** *"*" '* ^..i** — » wi»h k«%«ii «iint>A>t h« «ii 
if ihtt IM IS a 'positive" policy. The Arabs will be less 

"^ happy— especially Iraq. But most Gulf Arabs want a de-fan^ed Ir an and 

would not object to better Western ties In Tehran if It Uadsto ' 
noderatlon. 

The risk of perpetuating the war Is there. But the Western card 
Is easily undertaken and can be coupled with other US positive 
gestures discussed above. We need not rule out 
sticks— especially these against Iranian allies like Qadhafl. 
Olalnlshed political, econoalc, and allltary Isolation could 
have auch positive effect on a shaky Tehran reglne— especially 
If soM quid pro que was sought froa Iran by our alljes In 
aoving Into Iran In t big way. 

8. Our tilt to Iraq wu tiatly whtn Iraq was against tht repts and 
tht Islanic rtvolutlon was en a roll. Tht tiae aay now have coae to tilt 
beck— at least v4t«ur allies— to ensure tht Sovltts lost both attraction 
and potential access to tht eltrgy. 



;tU^«^(^ 



firahaa E. Fulltr 




973 

seeAer/NOFORN 



575 



VNIiSSIFe 



NIC 02S45-8S 

17 May 1$8S- 



MEHORANOUM FOR: Olrtctor of Central Inttlllstnca 

Deputy Olrtctor of Contral InttUlgenco 

SUSJECT: Toward a Policy on Iran 

NlC/NI0/NESA:6EFul1tr:Jcn 17 Hay 85 X61S2 

Distribution: 
1 • DCI 
1 . ODCI . " 
1 - SA/IA 
1 - ER 
1 - C/WC 
1 - VC/NIC 
1 - D/SOVA 
1 - D/NCSA 
1 - C/NE/000 
1 • SRP 

1 • NIG/USSR 

2 • NIO/NESA 

Outslda 

1 • Howard Ttlchcr. NSC 
1 - Jock Covay, NSC/HE 
A^' Richard M. Murphy, Asst. Sec. NEA 
1 • JaMS A. Placke. Deputy Asst. Sec. NEA i 

1 • Peter Rodaan, Director of Policy Planning, State ^ 



1*/ 



itr-tcr pfovisicns of tO. \r,1l 
by P Sj;7r. National Security Council 



SECRET 




974 




iicTAMT <rrBrTA>v or nrrcMcr , T ^ 



THE ASSISTANT SCCRCTARY OF OCFCNSC 
WASHINGTON. O C 20301-1400 



^Mf"' ■**'/ • 'i^P\ i* JUL 881 D 576 









NEHOMVCQN TO THS UHDBR SECRETAIty OF OSnafSS FOR POLICY 

SUBJECT I 08 Policy Toward Iran (t) 

(T8) X agra* with naarly all your ehangaa and hava ravlaad 
tha Bamorandtun f rca Sacratary Wainbargar to Bud NcParlana accord- 
ingly. Bovavar, X racoaoaand againat savaral of your changaa and 
would lika you to conaidar tha folloyingi 

— Pint, I agraa with you that what wa'r* raally looking 
at ia a "poat-Khooaini* Iran and thara ia vary littla chanca wa 
can aatabliah good ralationa with Iran aa long aa Khoaaini ia in 
control. At tha saaa tiaa, I don't think va want to giva tha i 
i^praaaion in this papar that wa ahould wait until Khoaaini paasaa I / / /_ 
froa tha acana bafora doing anything. It 'a poaaibla that Khomaini / / / *" 
aay liva for aavoral nora yaara but ba ia auch a aanila atata / I / 
that ha ia no longar in control (aiailar to tha lattar yaara of Maa 1/ 
Zadong). Ocdar auch eircumtancaa, wa aay ba abla to influanea I 
■odarata alaaanta of tha ragiaa and bagin to achiava aoaa of our 
long-ranga objactivas bafora Khoaaini diaa. 

— Sacond, ! laft in tha racoaaandatioa to kaap praaaura on 
our alliaa to eaaaa tranafarring military aquipaant to Iran. 
Although wa hava had aoac auccaaaaa to data, 'Maintaining (if not 
atrangthaning) our initiativa ia ona of tha faw actiona wa can taka 
to try to bring aa and to tha Iran'-Iraq war. And if tha war trara 
to and« aaay of tha praaauraa cauaing Iran to aaak Soviat aaaiatanca 
venld caaaa. Hiarafora, I baliava %#a should not oait thia initiativa. 

. .^TS) Attachad ara two varaiona of tha aaaorandua. At Tab A . 
tha aaaorandwa doaa not spacify "poat-Khoaaini* whan it rafara 
to racoaaandttd actiona and it eontaina tha racoaaandatioa to 
laan on oar alliaa to stop sailing aras to Iran. Tha aaaorandua 
at Tab B ia asactly tha way you aarkad up tha draft. BacB— isnd 
you forward Tab A. 

i /^^ 



v: *k u.-* 






UNClASSm wMfeffff 'i^-f 



975 



'?-a3 



CLASSIFIED AT TIME OF PUBLICATION. 



976 



ROUTING 






u 


N«(n»ar)#Addr«tt. 


0«t* 


Initiait 


I 


R. C. McFarlan* 






2 








3 


- 






4. 


- 






5 








n 






X 


ACnOM 




FILE 


X 


APMOVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




OMECr REPLY 


C 


R^URN 




OISMTCH 


C 


SIGNATURE 


REMARKS: 



J-29 






N 10501 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO ^°^°^° 

COPY NO ..i OF L 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



'amingNotK 



Warning Notice 
lnt«llig«fK* Sources and Ma t hod t involvvd 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthonz«10itdOfur»Sub)«ct to Criminal Sanctions 



tn:':r prcvi^'c-j of E.0. 123;5 
ly E. R;:';:; fic'Jcnsl ?c:L'riJy Council 




@> 




y||gIMIgiL 




MEMORANDUM 



977 

'i '. ;\^ Tqinr« dffrifftTS \ system n 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



SYSTEM IV 
Jun« 11, 1985 NSC/ICS 402010 



SECRET/WITH U 10 7 



?0B SECBBT ATTACHMENT 
ACTIOW 

MEMORANDOM FOR ROBERT C. HcFABLAME 

FROHi DON PORTIEl}^-»-^.^,._« 

HONARD R. rtXQSXti fj/^n^ 

SUBJECT: O.S. Policy Toward Iran 

Attachsd at Tab A for your raviaw is an NSC draftad NSOD on O.S. 
?ollcy Toward Iran. The NSDD is provocative. It basically calls 
fcr a v:.cTcrcus policy cesicr.ed to blpcr: S;viet acvarr-ii ir. r..fe 
short-cenn whila building our leverage in Iran and trying to 
restore the U.S. position which existed under the Shah ever the . 
longer-terci. This would require a sharp departure from ongoing 
3vert and covert measures, most notably the supply cf Western 
r.ilitary hardware, U.S. initiative to dialogue with Iranian 
leaders, and activist covert actions. 

Because of the political and bureaucratic sensitivities, we 
believe that it would be best for you to provide a copy of the 
NSDD draft only to Shultz and Weinberger (eyes only) for their 
roirirents. Whether to proceed with a restricted SIG, NSPG or 
=ther foruct would depend on their reactions. 

rZCOMMENDATIOK 

That you review tha NSOD at Tab A and si9n the maao at Tab I. 
Approva V\A Oiaapprova 



hL 



Attachaants 



Tab I Memo to Shultz and Nainbar^ar* 

Tab A Draft NSDD * •^ [. 



JIBCnBT/WITg 
IQg 6BCRBT ATTACHM ENT ^^ 'j <■ 






w=siefi5 



978 



UNCIASSIRED 



fi ^^ .j-^..> .:uwM.':l rcreri^ Ccscil 



.,si^i ^ r^r^^Jr^^r^ 



N 10303 



'XhZT 



979 



SYSTEM IV 
mc/ICS 402010 



THE WHITC HOUSE 

WASHINOTON 

N 10304 

Juii« 17, 1985 



SBGRBC^NITH 

^t flWntt-ATTACBMEWT 



HEMORANDOM FOR THE RONORABLS GEORGE P. SHULTZ 
The Secretary of State 

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 
The Secretary of Defense 

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Iran >S)i^ 

The Director of Central Intelligence has just distributed an SKZE 
on "Iran: Prospects for Near-Tent Instability*, which I hop* you 
have received. This SNIE laakes clear that instability in Iran ie 
accelerating, with potentially momentous consequences for U.S. 
strategic interests. It seems sensible to ask %^ether our 
current policy toward Iran is adequate to achieve our interests. 
My staff has prepared » draft NSDD (Tab A) vrttieh can serve to 
stimulate our thinking on U.S. policy toward Iran. I would 
appreci<&te your reviewing the draft on an eyes only basis and 
providing me with your comments and suggestions. I am concerned 
about the possibility of leakage should we decide not to pursue 
this change in policy with the President. If you feel that v 
should consider this change, then I would refer the paper to the 
SIG(FP) in preparation for an NSPG meeting with the President. 
(S) 




Robert C. NcFarlane 



tn.er provisions of LoTlSSS 
hf B. PvCger; National Security Council 



S £CR£ I / W 1TU - 
— TO P JDCRi yATTACHMENT 

Declassify on: OADR ''',«A? l ^f^-^r:T7^ 



wmm 



980 



l 

THC WHITC HOUSK 

SYSTEM II 
WASHIMOTOM 90656 

^'"•''' "" N 10305 ' ^ 



WITH 



MZMOSAMDCM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ 
Th* Sacretasy of State 

TBS HONORABI^B CASPAR W. NBIMBERGBR 
Th* S«cr«tazy of 0*f«nstt 



SUBJECT: O.S. Policy Toward Iraui 



X 



The Director of Central Intelligence has just distributed an SMIK 
on 'Iran: Prospects for Near-Tens Instability*.- which I hope you. 
have received. This SNIE nakes clear that instability in Iran is 
accelerating r with potentially nonentous consequences for tT.S> | 
strategic interests. It seeas sensible to ask whether our r 

current policy toward Iran is adequate to achieve our interests. ^ 
My staff has prepared a draft NSOO (Tab A) %rtiieh can serve to 
stimulate our thinking on a.S. policy toward Iran. I would 
appreciate your reviewing the draft on an eyes only basis and 
providing ne with your cosoDents and suggestions. I an concerned 
about the possibility of leakage should vm decide not to pursue 
this change in policy with th* President. If you feel that we 
should consider thi» change, then I would refer the paper to the 
SIG(FP) in preparation for aa NSPG aeetinq with the President. 

^V 

XRobert C. McParlane 



t?.i:T provisions oT £^1^3 ~ 
tjr P. P^^T; ?(2tIo.-!a( Secority Counciil 



*f\f «^***fflrATTACmffillT 
Declassify ont OADK 



-fe«QRH 



981 



HNCUSSIFIEO 



N 10306 









t!n:er provisions tf EO. 12353 
by B. Ressfi National SedarR^ CocnoII 



?^ •-. c «•• 1^ f«k 



Ti^e> P^ 



982 

' NSC/ICS 402010 



vmrnma 



TMC WHITE HO0»C 






NATIONAL SECURiry PECrSIOM N 10307 

OIRECTIVE 

D.ff» Policy Toward Iran 

Dynaaie political avolation is taking plae* iaaid* Iran. 
Inatabillty causad by tha praaauraa of tho Iraq-Iran vmr, 
aeonoaie datarioration and ragiaa infigltting craata tha potantial 
for major chanqas in Iran. Tha Soviat Union is battar positionad 
than tha O.S. to axploit and banafit from any powar stru??!* that 
rasults in changas in tha Iranian ra^ina, as well as incraasing 
socio-political prassuras. In this anvironaant, tha aaarganca of 
a ragina nora compatibla with Amarican and Nastam intarasts is 
unlikaly. Soviat succass in taking advantage of tha anarging 
power struggle to insinuate it self .in Iran would chan c 
strategic balance in the area. 

^^_ ,vniila wa pursue a nuabar of broa^ 
long-tars goals r our priaary short-tarm. challenge anst be to 
block. Moscow's efforts to increase Soviet influence (now and 
after the death of Khoneini) . This will require an active and 
sustained program to build both our leverage and our 
understanding of the internal situation so as to enable us to 
exert a greater and more constructive influence over Iranian 
politics. Wc ntust improve our ability to protect our interests 
durinq the struggle for succession. 

U.S. Interests and Goals 

The most iaaediate U.S. interests include; 

(1) Preventing the disintegration of Iran and preserving it as 
an independent strategic buffer which, separates the Soviet 
Union froa tha Persian Gulf; 

(2) Halting tha scopa and opportunity for Soviet actions in 
Iran, while poaitioning ourselves to cope with the changing 
Iranian internal aitnationi 

(3) Maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil and ensuring 
unimpeded transit of tha Strait of Boraus; and 

(4) An and to tha Iranian govamaent'a sponsorship of terrorism, 
and its attaapta to daatabilisa tha govamaents of other 
regional states. f[^ 

Declassify on: OADR ur/J ( pry/L-.-ins" il E.0. 12353. ' 




983 



mmm 

TMK WHITC HOUSC 



NArroMAL SKURiry vecistOH 
oizecTive 



SYSTm It 
90«5« 



DRAFT 



H 10308 



q.3> goltcy TOwrd Irm 

OyaaBie political «velatloi» 1ft taking plae* liwlte trmn, 
Ijwtablllty caa««d by tha prassor** of tha Iraq-Iran war, 
aeonoale datarloratloa and r>gt»a Infighting eraata tha potantlal 
for aajor chaagas in Iran. Tha Sovlat Onion la battar poaltlonad 
than tha U.&, to axplolt and banaflt fron any powar ttruggl* that 
reaults in changaa In tha Iranian ragiaa, aa wall aa Incraaslng 
soclo-polltlcal praaaoraa. In thla anvlron— nt» tha aaarganca of 
a raglaa aora coapatibla with Aoarican and Wastarn intaraata la 
unlDcaly. Soviat succasa in taking advantaga of tha amarglng^ 
powar struggla to inainuata it aalf m Iry.ir would ehar.ga tha 
«tratagic bala nc^in ^^*j';**j 

j whlla wa pttrau^^^uabar of broad». 
loag-tara goala, our priaar^short-tarm challanga mat ba to 
block Hoscow'a af forts to ineraasa Soviat Inflaanca (nov and 
aftar tha daath of Khovaini) . This will raqulra ar aetlva and 
auatalnad program to build both our lavaraga and our 
undaratanding of tha Intamal altoatlon so aa to anabla ua to 
axart a graatar end nor* conatroetlva Inf loanca ovar Iranian 
politics. Wa Bust iaprova our ability to protact ccr intarasts 
during eha struggla for succession. 

0«8. Intaraata and Coala 

Tha aost iaaadlata V.S. Intaraata laclodat 



(I) 

(2) 

(3) 
(4) 



Pravantlng tha dlalntagratloa of Iran and prasarvlng It aa 
an indapaadac t . atxatagle boffar which saparatas tha Soviat 
ObloB fzea. tha Paraian Galf » 

^'^HM^T tha aeopa and oppo rtun ity for Soviat aetlona In 
Iran«. whila poaltlealng^ enrsalvaa to copa «rlth tha changing 
Iraaiaa intarnal situatioai 

Malatalnlag a cca sa to laralaa Golf oil and ensuring 
unlapadad transit of tha Strait of Bozausr and 



Aa and to tha Iranian govamaaat'a m 
and Ita attaapta to daatabilisa 
ragioaal stataa. 



insorshlp of tarrorisa, 
ta of othar 



Daelasally oat OAMt 






::wJ:;:il!5aill351 

:-..; t.n. 12353 



984 




DRAFT 

TOP aiciag - -2 

I!™!** !!I!!^ °****' *•"*** *"'* iaportant, if !••• i«Bi«<li«ililyI 3 9 

(1) Iran's resumption of a moderata and constructive rola as a 

^S£^l*:"*^rtr*^^ °f ^* '»<»«-co««unist poliiical * 

cowinity, of its region, and of the world petrolat 



(2) 



econoay; ' . *nd of the world petroleum 

™i°?r*-^'*"^?° "!^***"*'* **» *^* •«P«n»io« of Soviet 
K^LtS.'*"?'*^' •?** }° **»• Soviet occupation of 
Azgnanistan in particular^ 



(3) an early end to the Iran-Iraq war which is not mediated by 

St Itl^*^^ ""^*"' f°** r'*^'=** •*°*« "°^ fundamentally alt" the 
balance of po%wr in the region; 

(4) elimination of Iran's flagrant abuses of human rights? 

(5) movement toward eventual normalization of D.S. -Iranian 

?rSd:%:i;erS;?';jtj;?ti:ir"' '^•^•*"-' "<* ^'^^^-^^ 
''' t"rH':jirT?fbS;";";d''^'' ^^^^ ''""='*^ =^*^* ^'^'-'^ 

(7) Iranian moderation on OPEC pricing policy. 
Many of our interests will be difficult to achieve. But given 
tSe ^tSi^^'-'i^^S "^^''^ !k*"''' *" '"°^^"9' "«i '^he magnitude of 
2vin«^«~.ii ^* ''^*" l^^ "'''•"^ "•*' •««orts are riquired. In 
moving forward, we must be especially careful to balance our 
evolving relationship with Iraq in a mwiner that doernot SLag. 
the longer ten prospects for Iran. oM«ge 

Present Iranian Political gnvi t-n^m^^o 

T5ai^'*5i!°,i!f*^"*^P '?*^* ^** """^ difficult challenge, since 
~!t*.i?t.JSi~«^l2S?J"i!y •*" dr}^«<» •ignlficntly iiv thl 
SiS r^L22?!i?i priMTily because of intensified dlsiHusion«entr 
riJl-f * *— j" ?^y unending war, the continued i^wsitioa of 
-!i!S;*.!!^ K^ Policle. oa a population increasingly reluctant to 

S?22ri?v Sv**SfS^;??'"*^?' "^ • '-l^-'in^ .conoiy brought on 
primarily by declining oil revenues. The impact of these 
P5°iif".i» intensified by the realization \h.rAy.tollS 
S2I^ l!i?^$*^ and physical health is fragile , ""which in turn 
li^lml uncertainty over the daily decision-making 



process 



W-SEeR£T - 



ir;::rp:.;v:;:-3 0.'£.0.12$Ctt 
?. l^--:r; r?:,:;::"l f;c:Drity Cassd: 



985 

-^° cro-i. 3 ^ 1Q310 

Onl«ss th* aecalaratlon of adv»rs« mllitaryr political and 
•conoaic d«v«Iopa«nts i» ravarsad, tha KhoiMini ragina will £aca 
sarious instability (i.a. rapaatad anti-ragiaa danonatrations, 
strikes, assassination attao^ts, sabotage and othar destabilizing 
activities throughout, increasingly involving tha lower classes) . 
This condition will sap officials' anargia* and gevamaiant 
resources, intensifying differences aaong Iranian leaders as ths 
govariuaent tries to avoid siatakas that would provoks popular 
upheaval and thzaataa continued control. 

Vhile it is iapossibla to predict the course of tha eawrging 
power struggle, it is possible to discern several trends which 
must be accounted for by U.S. policy. As domestic pressures 
mount, decision-making is likely to b* monopolized by individuals 
representing the saaw unstable mix of radical, conservative and 
ultra-conservativa factions that now control the Iranian 
government. The longer Khomeini lingers in power, the more 
likely che power struggle will intensify, and the greater the 
number of potential leaders who might effect the outcome of the 
struggle . 

The ultimate strength of various clerical groups and tha potrar 
coalitions they may form are not known. However, tha weaknesses 
of various opposition groups — inside Iran and abroad — are 
evident, especially tha lack of a laadar with sufficient stature 
to rival Khomeini and his ideas. Tha most likely faction in a 
power struggle to shift Iranian policy- in directions mora 
acceptable to the West — should their influence increase — are 
conservatives working from within the government against the 
radicals. Radicals within the regime, and ths leftist 
opposition, are the groups most likely to influence the courss of 
events in ways inimical to Western interests. 

The Iranian regular armed forces represent a potential source of 
both power and inclination to move Iran back into a mora 
pro-Wasteam position. Rspresentativss of every faction inside 
and outside tbs rsglae rscegnizs ths potential iaportance of the 
military and are coltivatlng contacts with thess forces. 
However, as long as th» Jkrmy reasins coonittsd in ths war with 
Iraq it will not b« in a position to intervene in T<shran. 

The other instrument of stata power, tha Revolutionary Guard, is 
becond.ng increasingly fractured. It will probably coaw apart 
following Khomeini's death, and might &ven engage in a major 
power struggls before then. In any scenario, ths Guard will be 
at the center of the power struggls. ■ 

I; ? i^-::i 'Ic'dz—l ^::m'cj Ccuncll 




986 



DRAFT 

!*• ftori«t» ar* wall aMBzw of tbm •volving d«v«lopa«nt» in lr«a. 
Th«7 will epatinu* to «pply earrot-and-stick inc«ativ«» to Iras 
in tfc* hop* o£ bringiag Tehran to Moccow^'a tazas for an isprovad 
bilataral ralationship that could sarva as a basis for major 
growth in Soviat inflaaactt in Iran. Moscow will elaarly rasist 
any trend toward tha raatoration of a pre<H«astam Iranian 
^var B— at. 

Oaspit* strong elarlesl antipathy to Moacow and cooBuaiaB, 
Tahraa'a laadarahip aoaao to hav« concluded that i^^rov«»ant of 
rolationo with th* Sewlot Qaion. is now assaatial to Iranian 
interest. Thay do not seas interested in iaproviag tiea with us. 
This Iranian aaaessmant ia probably based on Tehran 'a view of 
what Moscow can do fox — and againat - Iran rather than on an 
ideological prafarenco to eeaduct relations with. Moaeow. The 
038R already has sudt lovcrag* over Tehran ~> in stark eontraat 
to the O.S. 




cn return f Moacow is certain to offer acoaosic and 
technical assistance, and possibly even military equipeent. 
Khila they havo heratofor* balked at providing aajec weapon 
systaas, the Soviets might selas their embargo if the right 
political opportunities presented themselves. While Moscow would 
probably not act in a manner that sevaraly disrupts its relations 
with Baghdad, given Iraq's dependency on the I'fSR for ground 
forces equipment, Moscow possesses considerable room for maneuver 
if it sensss major oposiags in Tehran for the establishment of a 
positlOB of sigalfiesBt influenes. 

Moscow may also puxstto m strategy based on support of separatist 
aovemsnts. The Sovist Ottioa has had ample opportunity to 
c«ltlvsts the ethnic gre«^s that cut aeroaa the Soviet-Iraniaa 
border. Waat ethale gse«f>s ar« unlikely to challenge the central 
govsraam&t iB Tshrss •• long as thay fear ssvara reprisals. But 
is tbm arsm* of Iran sdjseeat to the Soviet border, the Soviets 
caa provlds a sscarity vabrolla to protect rebellious ethnie 
gxovpm frsA raprlsals. 

Th» O.S. poaition in TMhraa is unlikely to improve without a 
major change in t7.8. policy. The challenge to the 0.8. in the 
post-fhnmalnt period will bo sovor*. Any successor reglmo will 
probably ooise powsr ia the nsas of J^slaa and tho revolatioa and 



w^sEelte 



CRi-T prov;.:-:::: J LO. 123!5 ' 
by 3. r.>?;r, fl.Ji^a:! Sicjrity Gounoa 

J 



987 



<8^SBR6L 






DRAFT 



M 10312 



can b* •xpaetad to h«v« • bttilt-in •nti-Aa«ric«a bi«». * aor* 
eonsttrvativ* ragjjw, still Islaaie, sight l««s«a th« •■phasis on 
revolution and tarroria* and could aeva cautiously toward • sec^ 
correct relationship with the O.S. On ths other hand, radical 
forces will try t» exacerbats anti» to e r ican feslings to 
strengthen their own positions at ths expens* of th* 
conservatives . 

Oar leverag* with Iran is sharply reduced by ths current degree 
of hostility that springs froa the ideology of th* radical 
clergy, especially as it serves their foreign policy goals. 
Moreover, the nnderats and conservativs eleaents of ths clergy 
aiay also share the radicals' belief that we are icveterately 
hostile to the Zslanic govemaent, making accoaaodation with the 
O.S. iapossible. The clerical regiae continues to believs that 
the O.S. has not accepted the revolution and intends to reverse 
the course of events and install a puppet govemaent. This 
perception has been reinforced by our restoration of diplomatic 
relations with Iraq, efforts to cut the flow of arns to Iran, and 
direct threats of salitary action in retaliation for 
Iranian-inspired anti-U.S. terrorism. 

O.S. Policy 

The dynaaic political situation in Iran and the consequences for 
O.S. interests of growing Soviet and radical influencs, eoapel 
the O.S. undertake a range of short- and long-term initiatives 
that will enherce cur leverage in Tehran, and, if possible 
minimize that of the Soviets. Particular attention must be paid 
to avoiding situations «#hich coaxal the Iranians to turn to the 
Soviets. Short.-teni SMasures should b« undertaken in a aanner 
that forestalls Soviet prospects and enhances our ability, 
directly and indirectly, to build O.S. and Western influence in 
Iran to the maxiaua extent possible in the future. Planning for 
the following initiatives should therefore proceed on a fast and 
longer-tera track. Th* coaponents of O'.S. policy will bs toi 

(1) Encourage Western allies and friends to help Iran aeet its 
iaport rsgoireasnts so as to reduc* ths attractiveness of 
Soviet assistaaca and trade offers, whils deaonstrating the 
valua of cc r ra ct ralatioas with tha West. This includes 
provision of salected ailitary equipaent as deterained on a 
case-by-case basis. 




!. "T'T, I 



988 



^ Tpy Hicag 



(3) 




DRAFT 

H T03t3 



ttaets Id. tit allicft and fri«sda( 

>n th» •volutiOA of th* lraniSS~llCU*fclotr«nd 
peaaiBl* wmmxim for laflowieing thm dlr«ctiea of ehaa^*^ 'and 
b* r*«dy t Q^eoaaonlcaf w ith I ran through tho«» or oth ar 
eettntri«s> 




(4^ Ttif advantage oC 9xewin« political fca^Baatatlea byr 



•» disezaatly cr— iimiileating oar davlr* for eerroet 

r»lationa to potantially tacaptlv Iranian I«ad«rar 




-~- providing capport to ale 
cha radicals. 



ints opposed to Shonaitti and 



(5) Avoid actions which could alienata groups potantially 
racaptiva to ioprovad U.S. -Iranian relations. 

(€} Raspond to Iranian-supportad tarrorism vith military action 
against terrorist infrastnetura . 

(7) Bnhanca cur affort to diseradit Mescow*^s Islaaic cradantlals 
with a nor* 'vigorou* VOA effort targatod on Iran. 

(S) Develop action plan in support of the basic policy' 
objective, both for near-tars contingencies (e.g. death of 
Khomeini) a» well as the long-tarat restoration of U.S. 
influence in Tehran. 

(») With respect to th* Golf wart 

— Continu* to aneourage third party initiatives to seek 
mn end to tho warr 

— lacraaao military cooperation with. Golf Cooperation 
Council coiantrie«» uid bolster 0.5. mili tary 
capabilities in tho Golf are* to eaabl* CBRCCM to be 
folly capable of carrying out its mission; and 

— Seek to curb Iran's collaboration with its radical 
allie* (i.o. Syri» and Ufjti) . 



jpfr^i^n 



T"P BWCBC 



!;; - f:.^?rr; I-?::nj| Si-iri^y C:u::j:i 



'lOPtKRir 



i f 



989 



r7 


3 


Name and Aad'ess ■ Oaie 'init<ais 




•J. Fortier 1 7/22 1 




H. Teicher i 7/22' 




1 1 




1 




. '. ■ 1 




i 




XX 


ACTION 




FILE 




APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS 



N 7582 

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 402010 A ^0 

COPY NO 1 OF 2 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



EYES ONLY 

NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



^/y) \ Warning Notice 

" \ Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized Disclosure Subiect to Criminal Sanctions 



imEii 




990 



uNCiiiSsm 



Cruni iniciligctt -^J"? 




- "---i^^T- 



N 7583 



18 July 198S 



MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarl.ne 
Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs 



SOBJECT: 



Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran 



1. I strongly endorse the thrust of the draft MSDD on n « 
Poller Toward Iran, particularly Its emphasis on th. „.!/? ^^^^ 
concrete and tl.elv steps to enhance o!S."evep" e\r ord.//'"' 
ensure that the USSR is not the primary benefLifry of cJan.e , h 

for U.S policy Initiatives. Moreover. I believe that th.^Sson 




The Soviets recently withdrew between 1,000 and 1 500 
soviet economic advisers from Iran. 




TS 853513 

Copy _^ of / O 



CL BT SIGNER 
DECL OADR 



991 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SUBJECT: Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran 



N 7584 



-- Soy let-Iranian trade has declined significantly over the 
past year. 

-- The Soviets have resumed a hard-line stance in their 
propaganda on Iran. 

There are several oossible explanations Tor these Soviet 
actions. Moscow nay be questioning Tehran's sincerity In 
changing its antl-Sovlet posture during its recent approaches to 
Moscow. The Soviets also nay believe that the current Iranian 
regime has nowhere else to turn and that they may be able to 
wring real concessions from Iran bv tightening the pressure. 
Moscow also ay be trying to force Iran to end the war with Iraq. 

3. This downturn in Soviet-Iranian relations strengthens 
the casa made In the NSDD for our Allies filling the vacuum left 

by the withdrawal of S ovi£^__i£^jxomi.c advisers and the downturn I n 

Soviet-Iranian trade. |^^^^^|^^^HiHI^^HHI^^|^^HI^I^^^H 
are well positioned to help on the projects abandoned by the 
Soviets. Quick action could block a future return of the Soviets 
to these projects and remove a major source of Soviet influence . 
In Iran. 

1. On the question of the declining popularity of the 
regime, I would underline that the recent decline has largely 
occurred among that portion of the populace that is largely 
uncommitted and passive. The regime still retains steadfast 
adherents among the lower and peasant classes that are very 
active politically. At the same time, the NSDD could better 
reflect that we have seen evidence of a growing cleavage between 
those loy al to the regime and th ose opposed to it . U.S. 
actions-- 
can exploit this cleavage and activate the uncommltteT^ 

5. In fcrmulatlng U.S. policy, we need to keep in mind that 
Iranian policy actions do not spring from a single source. The 
NSDD th«r«ror« sight usefully highlight on page 3 that we might 
well witness a move toward moderation and accommodation on the 
part of tbo pragaatlsts while at the same time the radicals will 
b« seeking to undermine those policies and seek the Initiative 
through engaging in terrorist acts designed to radicalize the 
atmosphere and upstage the pragaatists. 



- 2 - 



UNCtASSiflEO 



TS 853513 



992 



ilNCmSSIFIED 



N 7585 



SUBJECT: Dptft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran 




igla* and the likely 
Revolutionary Guard In a future Iran, I believe the draft NSDD 
should include an explicit statement In poin t H. pate 5 that we 
seek to develop contacts with leaders In thel 



8. The following are comments or reconaenda t Ions on 
specific points In the NSDD: 




TS 853513 



993 



UNCLASSIHED 



SUBJECT: Ortft MSDD r« U.S. Policy Toward Iran 



N 7586 




The U.S also should find opportunities for public 
statements that stress that we have no antipathy towards 
Islaa and furtheraore that we view Islaa as a positive 
ooral force In the region In an age when oaterlallsa and 
athelSB are on the rise. We should also make clear our 
lack of hostility to an Islamic Pepubllc In Iran as long 
as International norms of terrorism and subversion are 
not violated . 

I agree strongly with points 3 and 5 on page 6 of the 
draft NSDO that we should seek to open lines of 
communications to the existing Iranian leadership and 
should avoid actions that could alienate Iranians 
potentially receptive to Improved relations with the 
U.S.. At the same time, if the US adopts po int 6 an d 
responds to Iranian-supported terrorism wlt> 





TS 853513 



994 



UNCussm 



SOBJECT: Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran N 7587 




wylliam J. Caflcy 
Director iff/ Central IVtelllgence 



All portions are classified t(ST^-&&CKZX^ — . 



TS 853513 



)A 



■\2 Hf 



I^HOv^" I 



SH[ 



995 






"t-.-'^'X- 



^ 



C 8365 



:. iiKf^i s?r'f!En:. 



17 June 1985 t-«- 






MEMORANDUH FOR: Chief. Nea^^East Olvision, DO 
FROM: T' Director of Central Intelligence 
SUBJECT: • -- Release of Hostages 



9-n 




2. Shaheen received a call from a Dr. Cyrus Hashemi who Is currently 
In Hamburg at the Hilton Hotel In Room 703. Hashemi has tried to get In 
touch with us before offering to put us In touch with leading figures in 
the Iranian Government. When we learned that Hashemi Is under Investigation 
for violations of export control laws, we pulled away. 

3. His recent call to Shaheen offered a change in Iranian policy (or 
infonrjation about a change in policy) "that he could provide Jf the 
American Government would be able to get hin a nolle prosequi — In short. 
If we are able to take the pending Indictment for conviction off his back. 
Shaheen said that he had no power to do that but then asked whether Hashemi's 
contacts with the Iranian government were good enough to spring the hostages 
if he could be gotten off the hook. Shaheen did this knowing that there 
have been occasions where nolle prosequis had been arranged for high 
national security considerations. What he was doing was feeling out 
Hashemi to see what kind of a reaction he would get. Hashemi said he would 
call bacj^n^^tw^^^^^^ja^back on the phone having, he said, la Iked 

.£o_thg|H|H^H|H^B^mB He came back for the release of 

.the OAWA hostages, plus TOW weapoifs, plus his nolle prosequi. Shaheen 
** dismissed this saying no weapons, no DAWA prisoners. Then again, to feel 
him out, said, although I can't speak for the US Goverranent, I understand 
that it will not negotiate with terrorists, and you "'"hi- k. >ki. ^a n.» 
jlies or something like t >^a 
Again jfesneai saio ne would 
witftfiri CT JTple of hours claim ing that he had talked again to^ ^^^ 

ind that they weren't interested in kaiiirt BftdidJPsuppne^^^^ 

representative f I i mi lihi »"BM|M 
s early is Wednp^day or inu^da^ ^ 



'KiMLLJlJ'indii ■'.'i44.i«i:nr?mi:BinT 






cu 



49o/ 

^H RVW 



SECRET 






DATE. 



996 




^ 



Dr. Hasheal clalhs t(t bt In touch w11 _ 

says- he knows ^^6out > recent attempt by Mor^e Bush's Orotner. 
ler'^TJtf L* Mj LJWtied Shekel eh (no further Identification) to contact 
the Iranlansbn tliTs. Shaheen claims that he has nade It clear that he 
can't do It for anything, tha^h^J^^Yecmen^fimo^eal with terrorists] 

there Is a ■>s*t^"9^^|^^^^HiHHHBHHr^^'^^"9 
, could be agreed upon In advaWf^Wl^^^^^^^^^^^^^^anlans to 
I tempt thep|H||^|w1th an offer wh1c)^H^H|^^|^mi^^H|n1ght 
be able to workout. 



6. This should probably be taken up wit] 

It Is ready under the circumstances to see_1 "*_ 

^ would be willin g to liste n to whatever proposi 

^ " rn min d i n lii i il n i^M 
mignt oe availa 



Hun 



whetht 



. . ion ine Iranians wignt^ave 
'and ta nstW^O wnatiVtiF jUrrounding information 



-? 



7. I ran into Rick Burt last night and discuss this with him. He 
thought that it was interesting and Indicated that there had been recent 
knowledge that a nolle prosequi had been arranged and sa'id he would talk 
to Dick Hurphy about It. I think ye mioht touch base with the Assistant 
:>ecretary ot btate ror international Oroanizatlons -as well as with Murphy and 
in doing so t ell Dick about Burt's reaction . I suggest that he might want to 
check with Burt. _. . "^ 



William J. Casey 



r '"'REO DO 49o70 

. 3 I ^4 



\)H S733 



■SECRET 






997 






vr 



1. SONMARTt On 23 April 19|«, tbt Onittd Statat Cuatoaa Q t/^ 

Sarylea and .tb*^ nit ad Stataa Attocnay'a Ofdea (or tha t'lO 

Soutbarn ofs.t'f iet^fOiaw York announcad -tha Indletaant of 

aavantaan indlvidaaLr^en charfaa that thay vara partlcipanta n. 

an llla9aIiaeliaaa'\to«aau99la |2.S billion in Aaar Ican-aada 

warplanaa>r*l**^aa'ikivdioth«r waapona to Iran. Tbla caaa haa 

racaiTad'~proalnant pl«y in tha foraign and doatatle praat (ttt 

attacbaant) and haa baan o( Intaraat to th« laraall -govarnatnt 

dua to tha. Invelvaa^ of a raticad laraall ganaral. Tha bait 

In Cuatoa'-a atlng oparation waa Cyrua Baahaal, a foraar Agancy 

and stata Oapartaant contact. Haahtal'a pravloua ralationship 

with onltad Stataa 90v«rnaant aganciaa could ba an laaua at 

trial. Tha caaa la- tantativtly sat to 90 to trial in MovaalStr 

19IC. ■ lii— ^ _ 

2. Cyrus Baahaal la wall and unfuurably know(} to tha 
Dlractorata of Oparationa and tha Dap*«4aant of stata. Tha 
following la a auaaary of our involvai.nt with Mr. Baahaal. 

A. In aarly 19t0 , during tha Iranian hoataga crlala. 
Baahaal aada r apraaantatlona to Stata- that ha coul< 
channal for 




It davalopad that BaahaaliTd^d not hava tha ability to 
ia projactad and it waa auapactad that hia offara wart 
part ol a acaa. "' ~' 



J 



B. During 1983 and aarly 1984', Bashcmi was undar 
invaatigation for araa asport control violations, in aaparatt 
aaatinga with tha Agancy and tha Da pa r fant of Stata, Bashaai's 
attornaya thraatanad to tall all if thair clitnt waa brought to 
trial. It waa tha DDCI'a daciaion that tha Agancy would hava 
no objaction to proaacution avan in light of Baahaai'a attaapta 
at grayaail. Stata waa aora raluctant bacauat of tha daaaga 
ravalations would hava on foralgn ralations. a fadaral arrast 
warrant was iaauad in May 1984 on Baahaal. Bis flight froa 
prosaction to Europa affactlvaly put'tha proaacution on tha 
ahalf. 

C. In Juna 1984, tha DCI Itarnad from John Shahaan, a 
paraonal acqaalntanca of tha DCI, that Baahaal had Inforaation 
ha wiahad to paaa to tha Agancy. Bacauaa Basheai was a 
fugitiva froa juatica, Shahaan waa Inforaad by tha DCI that tha 
Agtncy had no intaraat in purauing Hashaai ' s of f cr . 

0. During Juna - August 196S Shahaan and ona of 
Hashaai's attornaya wara in contact with tha Agency ragarding 
Hasheai's allagad ability to intarceda with Iranian-officials 
to sacura tha rtlaaaa of tha hoatagcs in Lebanon. Bashaai 
sought to arrange for charges againat^ia to be' dropped in 
return for hia cooperation. Both the Agency and Stata 
investigated Hasheai'a claima, with no^ positive results. 




d/z/v^ 



\^'^^' ^ ^H^i .;'> ^'" •»;.vltWbp FOR RELEA^ 



DO 



491; 



TfSC- 



3 



3^ 



998 



fiHsumm^:- "^o"'^''' 



Ontil his dtath of naturtl eaasts In 



of !»••, 



■ •■heal «•■ to bt on* of the priaaty witntsstt at trial, tvan 
thoufh w«4ba4'«e^par t in th* Custoaa atinf optration, th* 
A9tney say' bo.bcoaght into th* eaa* btcaua* th* d*t*na* aay 
■ak* an ia'au*"o(Xlaa'h*Bi ** attaapts to contact tht Agtncy to 
aacur* favotabl* "tr*ata*nt on hla 1)14 indlctaant. 



4. R* 

th* Offie* 
Juatic* aj 
concacning 
r tvi*w r*d 
aad* awar* 
llacloaur* 



pr*s*ntatlv*a (toa th* Oir*ctotat* of operation* and 
of c*n«tal Counaal hav* act with th* D*p'atta*nt of 
tornay and-th* local proaacutor to brief th*a 
, our *quiti*s in thia caa* and to allow thaa to 
actad varaiona of Agancy dVcuaanta. Th*y hav* b**n 
th*t our-^orlaarv conc*rna ara to protact froa 




involvaant 
198S, th* 
cov*rt CIA 
that w* wi 
Bashaai wi 
actiivi«j^ 



th* d*tall* of our 
with tnt IlKApt to ~arran9* th* ho*ta9* r*l*as* in 
id*ntiti*a of covart aourTJa, and th* id*ntiti*a of 
offie*ra. Aa it now atanda*^ wa ar* anticipatinq 
11 b* coBp*ll*d to acknowlTd9* our r*lationahip with 
th a auaaary daacription of hia poat indictaant 
a that ar* r*l*v*nt to an cntrapaant d*f*na*. 



S. On 5 S*pt«ab*r 19(6, w* w*r* infora*d that ona of th* 
d*f*na* attornays had indicatad^to Rr. Hashaai'a attornay, 
Williaa B. Machtal, int*r*st in'r*vi*win9 hia fila on laahaai 
and diacusainq with hia hia knowladf* of Haahaai'a activitias. 
Mr. Machtal is inclined to aaaart a-rtornay client pri«il*9*. 
Basad on inforaation in our filas« it is obvious -that Mr. 
Hatchal ia fully inforaed on Hashaai'a dealin9a with various 
90v*inncnt a9cnci*s. OGC is currsntly discus*ln9 with Juatic* 
and State attorney* aaans to prevent the release of clasaified 
inforaation by Mr. Wachtel. .' • ' ''■ 



3 

DO 



CJ//V 37<f^ 



vmmm 



I 3H 

4957.-' 






999 



/ 



MENORJUTDON FORs 

■ t .-• 
ATTBNTZOliiA 



FROM: 

SOBJBCTt 
REFBRSNCB: 







^ 



OGC Nam* Tract Request 



A. 

B. 



Two-Hay Meao dated 13 May 1986 
6-S1313 dated 9 Nay 1986 



</. 



^f 



1. The following ie in reference- to your request dated 13 
May 1986 for inforaation concerning referenced subjects. (D) 

2. ■■^■■■HHHIIH a#ir faced on Cyrus Basheai-Naini, 
OPOBi 26 Deceaber 1939. Iran; Tti* following updates previous 
inforaation provided to the Office of- General Counsel on aashemi 
and 0(;C-84-1472 of 7 February 1984 which details OGC's aeeting 
with Basheai's attorney. ' ; . 

A. On 17 May 1984, A federal arrest warrant was issued 
on Basheai for eras eiport control-violations. As of 25 May 
1984, BasheaJ 



eai inter aediary and 
one of his attorneys was in contact with the agency regarding 
Basheai's allegad ability to intercede with Iranian officials to 
secure tha ralease of the hostages in Lebanon. Much tiae and 
effort wa«L«p*Dt in this endeavor which was fruitless. Basheai 
sought to Hirrange a nolle prosequi in return for his' 
cooperatieSk >9f 

O. In Deceaber 1985. representatives of the' Directorate 
of Operations and OGC aet with o. S. Custoas officials to 
discuss their proposal t\9 use Basheai. They were told in 
general teras of his background. Ther-were also informed, that 
he was described in our files as a sleasy and slippery character 
who had previously been involved in nefarious activities. The 
Custoas officials indicated that they would be in further 
contact with aore specific requireaents. The ODO was unaware of 
Custoas* ongoing activities with Basheai until charges were 
brought or^^.J^P^il 1986. |»r 





Cf^^ 37 




3 



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4947 



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1000 







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liM* XnaUa Ontact ViA cyn* 
«1««MS "kM«»f«»* Mitt Ml 2«aaiaa •<fl«i«l^:..:^^.^;^tT,j^'i4w:^:3icaif.i 



w 



will fMsll Mr Mxll«r «S«eM«i«u •■ th« cyns 
•M«r ttMt. liiiife. BIi«e ll*«z4soa fe«4 «U«4 yoa» 
lhabaai» liw !• llvia* is «••» •Maanr*. 1m» aaw «««atM«A tkm -. 
I* Mi« 1M» •■■«•«%•« • ttimtM mt 1121 Cha«y*»« «i«r •» affar 



«• toiav temartf: •» Zraaiaa •Mi«<«X %• «lsc«a» "V.t- l««taf •«' 
ioc n<tiat ft V.«» iatictMst fftr 197*-tt axM 



'MMaper^ vftlali 



ifti Kfttas» 

— t«tan<t— • afala*^ Mahaai (••• atta*** CXA 

«air» ••)• Jtetlaft lua ■• lataraa« at 

ttift tiftft Ift raXaaatat liahaBi fsa» tfeft iatflataant UlOMa^ it 
«Ml« »• «lfliaalt tft aatn4ita kia aa4 \* aaaaot %• praaaaatad 
aalaaa la aaaara tta «.•»> aa* aa «• aat aaat ta taka aay 
aii* ai^t ftajaiiaa Matiaa'a 




'Tisii; tj'risrsificj/ •'-'••^Ji 
• Tr.;:j5f pfp' jic : { iU .If!??! 



1001 




•all teAtaf • «rl«i«» falfc tt*fc «» MolA f» aliaa* with th» 



Iwtalw ■» 

!•■£» JliBti— •!«• ttoa«» Ifea^ Cf «• — uH m^ iteatlfr • 
ttis* wuauj •« iciaX %• 4* tk* j«^ tta* «» «oaM ••&« • 0.#» 
•iUsaa*. ia«I«4ist pMsiMr • U* «■# loyMr fe«% iio«14 ycafsr «• 

••ft «• tesU •«•• iaiiM«tlr Witt. 
» MMsasataX •Mtiav ar* alj- — 
f» abaaA aaiav af 

k* fe» w«qr «!••« tkaft H^ 

^^■' aathMitr «• ••f^ti^t* a» Mhall •ft'Oi* Oft willk m* Zaaiaa. 
CTfaa«<atatl^ ••# awtl^ >a « iaan r >• ttay t» Utaa> Mm v# 
1M«« tt* naiat* 9^ tt* <la a« a afwr ^ «« ••» «a«ito 





v-<t^) 



ll^^'HED 



s/o/^ 



1002 









^^' 



iO 



/ / * 



«■<»/■«» 



imiTivy 










1003 



HNKftSSlHtU 






MEMORANDOM FOR THE -RECORD 



SUBJECT: 



John Shahaan to Pass to Hashami ra: 
Contact with Two Iranians 



1. I-phonaid Shahaan at 1800 hours on 12 July to giva him tha 
Stata Dapartmant approved plan. I q^^^ it to hin in two phasas. 
Th« gi^•^ was for his. information only, thatwahavaconfiriBed^^^ 



Us an important fifur 




^^^^^^^ \a sacond nama wa wara givan by Hashami has baan 
Ton^rmad to us to ba a fabricator and unraliabla. In fact wa 

hava had a pravious bad axparianca with hin on tha hostaga issua. 

I told Shahaan not to provida this information to Hashami. 

Hashemi is to ba givan tha followir 
a reoared to m eet at a time of the Iranian' 

He m ay bring MANOOCHEHR with him if he 

[will not repeat not meet with MAN0UCH6HR 
laheen replied that ha got tha point; it made sense to 
him; and he would send it promptly, to Has-.emi, who is probably in 
Geneva. ' 

3. Shaheen departs for Tokyo at 1100 hours on 13 July and 
will be at the Tokyo Imperial Hotel for about a week after Sunday 
noon. I have his phone number. 

4. The above plan was proposed by us to DAS Arnle Raphe 1 and 
approved by Mike Armacaat_fln_Etiday afternoon. They will send 
another interim <;jbl( 



,0« 



0i^ 







ifNCLASSiRED 



49877 



3 




1004 



lfNi;o\^:)in^u 



/S-: 




9 July 1985 



o _o 



_.ij:v Oeclassifierf/ Released on 19 fh/Q ^ '~j 
under provisions of tO. 12358 / 
' by 8. Reser, National SNurlty fniurl 

:t N*w Developments on t^ Shaheen-Hasheai Indirect 
\ Channel'' to Iran %^ J[' 



HBMORANDUM FOR THfi RECORD 

I 
SUBJECT 



1. j^m^Shaheen phoned late 
pel who are^wllltnq to meet^^ 
They " 



and 




b. Manouchehr (Inu), a ranking Intel Officer. 




fA 39 hostages 
(We know of 



basis for this c 




2. Hashemi claims that thalranians are more interested in a 
change of course than in any other^ quid pro quo . When asked to 
clarify whether that meant a US^change of policy or an Iranian 
change, Shaheen said he thought it meant both; i.e., a change in 
the course of US-Iranian relations. Hashemi claims that Syria 
will not be involved in the release of the seven remaining 
hostages because Hizballah deals directly with Iran. 

. 3. Shaheen said, 'We are not dealir^ with children; Hashemi 

now insists that it be made clear to the US Government that as 
^on as the seven hostages are sprung, he will get, his. nolle 
prosequi .* Hashemi asked for confirmation from Shaheen wnich 
government agency was involved. Shaheen told him on the 
international phone lines that it was the Bureau of Fisheries. 
Hashemi replied that whether it was Weinberger, Schultz, Casey, or 
the Bureau of Fisheries, his lawyer, Elliot Richardson, needs at 
this time to confine that the US Government acknowledges Hashemi's 
helpful role if the seven hostages^ are released. (I later phoned 
Shaheen back at his insistence to repeat th^ore^ou^tayOng 
late. ) 'Our ha\^^^m^^|^HHl 

[ meet with a confidential representative of Iran 
as an initial step does not mean any willingness on the US "^ 

Government's part a »lci«]M4irD#VAIVtt>^f^"^ <3< Justice, to take 



^/A/ 3So^ 




3 






4987(> 
\ 



'b^ 



1005 



TOLKOTitiu 



nr 



/5€> 



any judicial stap concarning Mr. Hashami. Tha possibility of any 
such stap^-^uld only b% addra« 3adj__if at all, attar tha US 
Govarruisntchisl^aarnad Croni ^^HHPHHH^HBB first 
maating^JliaHShahaan said ha did not thlnRtha^JouTd ba anough for 
Hashaai. 8a 'willjphona back on 9 July (possibly to tha DCI) to 
urgskthat somaonaiKin tha US Govarnnant confirm to Elliot 
Richardson that this is a lagitiinta US Govarnmant channal that 
Hashami is assisting. 

▼c'i'f. All o'fj^a abova has baan passad to Patar Wun^i/jK .» 
Vrha ,naxt'^stap is for Stata to confirm ^^I^^HHfe^H 
^thfatlthay' ara raady to maat with tha two Iranfffl^^iurin 
!• ltixt''waelc^^I will than phona that back to Shahaan and 
iia'ns*wlll adviss through Hashemi thair tima of arrival! 



i tha 




SiJ -I 



DO 



A'v' 



-'SS. 



4 98 75 



3 [u..-hH 



C,t/^f 3ZC>f 



UNClMfla '^^^^^ 



f sVi^WcU f OR RELEASE 



1006 



wiii_ lUITULXIUgil 




"njer provision. Of £.0 wssf^ ^ 
^^ 8. R.«.r, Nation. Secu.tKldl 



|»LC_CONT>CT WITH IMWUN COVERNHENT REPS 



SUIJECTi 
REFS:. 



rOLLOWs!-w?^ieE's^'lNWs?STE0'i?PiW|^fSS'"'?r"?'« 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COVERNHEMT OF l«rf**?yi«'n-I9 ""^ *"™ 
SAY THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO OBTaTh ISi LuISSTfnS^SJMJS^JI'^" 
AMERICAN HOSTAGES. THOUGH W? "rSKEm eit'"*?rgy 2 ir.lr'f-^" 
Tiute . B ^[^MM|^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Wt MUST F 

JeNCE OFFICER. *» -IITERAEftLlfiy tc .urnB.ri. 

AT WE C^N C9NFIRM THE IPFMTITY .if illJa ^"^ JUAJ f lHI IHFnPWED, 




03 



UJ159 



AHERICAN HOSTAGES. THOU 
, ^^JH^iPRI|ENTATlV£S 

RANKiM^nfflmnffl^^ffl 



<LJi 




1007 



CI476 




^JIT- thriMhlil ..ctp.d.. X. o^ l..t nljht.lM^ — 
.till .iatlv. .bout th. tvp n«.P^«"d -^ 



■I - 







that h« v»t 

eiA h.. b..n «o«« thu .». ""T^^^i^llgi^^u^.u-, 
\«, ... t. r.co-.n4 to ""^^ _^^ ^ ^_ ,,„, ,„,,„ 



^ word] 



,hl. l..u^^ CO.. up .t th. 3.00 p. 



° O 3 

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S _ OO 

5 ^» 

o 'a o= 






..•tin, .ithl^^ ^ ,..«„cted fro. hi. »!" 

our »un.ch.hr. th. on. St.v. Cn»«o 

.►i« (■■• »ttached TO. P*« ^^^i * 

If th., «. .«. th.t th ^^.^^ ^^ ^^„ ... 

■ L ..hxicto., «. h-v^not^X-^^^^^ 
V described ••^^^^^^^™^ 



y.rioo.ly dMcri^jd.* 




p^ 



•pt 



^ic' 



HFtES^^i^^ 



1008 







SUtJCCTt POSSIILE CONTACT WITH IRANIAN COVIRNHENT REPS 

I. THROUGH A COWLEX SERIES OF LEADS WE HAVE BEEN PRESENTED 
WITH AN ALLEGED OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH RtPRESEHTATIVES 0? THE 
IRANIAN GOVERNHENT. THESE REPRESENTATI VEfc^URPORTEDLV ARE CAPAILE 
or SECURING THE RELEASE orTHE SEVEN HOSJICES. WHILE WE ARE 
SKEPTICAL THAT THIS IS A BONA FIOE IHITI^nVE WE HUST FOLLOW-UP 
UNTIL WE ARE MRE CONFIDENT ABOUT WHAT Mt^flE DEALING 




END OF MESSAGE 



CJ/A/ I02H 




DO wU^lSS 




E 






1009 



UiiuLni'i'*^^^- 




23 July 1985 



MEMORANDOM FOR THE^^ECORD 

SUBJECT* ~ H«sh«mi Claims H« will S.t Up M««ting| 



kfttr All 



1 j^'shah..!! phoned me £rom Tokyo late Saturday evening, 
\' ►- .2C that Hashemi has been in touch, obviously via 
20 July to "y^2ni ?h!heen said since we will not meet with the 
i"':iri'llli;.rf nilot'StShrrd'son. as-Hashemi demanded, qaitlflP^ — 
Hashem i lawyer. El ^„^ ^tyettinq up^thejngltir 

I ^pre^s^^iTIj ^^WiSWffn^fThe only sho. 
Hashemi has to get his nolle prosequi . 



t step is tor Hashemi to advise the date of the 



m e e t i ng _^^^^^^_ 

-. «;haheen aaain apologized_£or the mistake of his 
^' fn ntvino Mr Elliot Richardson my office telephone 
"'b:r"^i slid i? Jlppenid because she was nc-witting of my 
i;;^ere;t.^and he was out'of touch in rural Japan. 

4. ' Arnie Raphel at State has been notified of the above. 



Partlilly Declassified /Released 
undtr provisions 
h B. Regw. Hatiomi Sccuiity 



of LO. 12356 / 




-S-^^s 



Cj/A/37^<i 



UNJUOTEB ^^^^^ 



^5'<^ 



1010 



UllbtH^ftHCU 



'°'°^£zad 




19 August 1985 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE* RECORD -^" 

SUBJECT: Statusof Jashemi-Elliot Richardson Contact 



io^lcW|||n phoned the OCI on 14 August to find o... 
"^V^^^^l<t'>« undersigned) worked fnp ?w °"^ ^^ 
mS^TS^SSTTbe arr*„aJ !" . -!°!.'^!*'.5°'.the OCI and 




1.-. Bliioi 
the illu'sive] 

to see if a meeting could be arranged to find'iJrthrAn^" °^^ 
intentions toward his client, Mr. Sashemi. At She oJl'^ ^ ' 
instruction. I telephoned Mr. Richar«son back to reML'.s. . 
of our relationship with Mr. Hashemi. f«P«at the status 

2. Mr. Richardson was informed that the ball r»m»t^. ■ 
Mr. Hashemi's court, as it was -the-lasJ timl we talked «^ t2 , , 
Mr. Richardson said that he understood thaJ Hashemi hfn^ " ^iJ^^' 
condition, i.e., that Hashemi wou!d do nSthi!? unUl tSe 5s''''*'' *" 

-^Government spoke to his lawyer. , ""-"^"^ uncii the US 

3. Mr. Richardson said that hf"ua« anvinn. >.. i.. 
Client would be treated fairlJ/LiSnsJr^e !uh ?he SJfort'hf -' 
making on our behalf, i had h'im hold on t^ JJone wh!ff ?/ T^ 
correct language in our file, then tmH h^^KK^ ? ^* ^ ^^"""^ '^^^ 
from State Ind'justice: ''W. po^ibmtj^ofi y'^C^^fa^ ^*"^^*^ 
consideration for Mr. Hashemi can oiHy be addressed afteJ th. nc 
Government has learned what the results of the"!rst mJetinS ,^ 
Europe IS Which Mr. Hashemi allegedly is setttng upS ^ '" 
At. Richardson tried to ask what -consideration' meant !,r.A ^« ., 
further our thinking on the nolle prosequi JreoeatL on, v.!'^'' 
there was nothing further we could say until \ m«ff^! ►^^^ ^^^"^ 
The ban has been in his client's coJrtfo so.; !eekl I'd*th.' '"' 
frankly his client does not have a good track record !nrhJ- 
matters. I also noted that Mr. Hashemi has an e«Ibl sheS c^.nn-- 
through a third party when he wishes to reach us SJchardso? 
'^VVlt k"" '• ^*"* attempted to reach that thi?d party fc &mtn 
{f.T* <;hah»»n« ^..f. was unsuccessful. P^f^y ■» •^•^illT 



Shaheen; 3u: 
3. Two problems occur: 



a^ 



,. .. ^' • *" "° longer sure that Mr. Shaheon win be avaiia- 
as an intermeoiary in the event that Mr. Hashemi talks to us aa^; 
rerhaps the DC! has more inf ormation'on Mr. Shaheen 



DO 



49900 



<li/V3fo: 



314? 



A R£VI6\V6D FOR RELEASE 




C-377 



1011 



UNUIHdOiriLU 



C" 9cr76 




_ H*a h«4b««n introduced? when h« i sTpr«suia!ffWf^!fi, i ^ 
t«i(«\oV(tr the RTchVlrdson connect ioti_«s well. -«uia 





5pn 

w 1 



m 



-i'v--^ * ^: 



-3- ( 34 



(LifN 3Sos>^ 






1012 



I 



wmj^^mw 



"n 



C ^077 



15 .July 1985 



9inmi 0#el«»<fi«rf/ Released oo^ 
wi»l provliwn* of t-0. T2!3t 



7 



MEMORANDUM FOR TUE-RECORO 



.by B. Rigw, N»«onal Swirity Cowjdl 



SUBJECT: il«sl»e«i Tries to Play Hard Ball 






1. At 0930 on Saturday, 13 Ju^y, Mr 
to say that Hashemi accepts our or ooasal th a 
must be present at the first meetir? 

Hashemi, however, added the condition that nothing Curtner would 
be done to set up this first meeting un til someone in the usr. 
CO his lawyer. Elliot Richardson 




home 





2. I repeated our previous position, -'^at no consideration 
would fte given to discussing Hashemi's legal roB'lem until after 
the first meeting took place. Therefore, we ronsider farther 
progress in this channel at an end until Has--;-ni withdraws his 
requirement that someone must speak <o Richa;'son. 

3. Shaheen agreed that this tactic made sense to him m 
view of the derogatory information we had on the other Iranian, 

- ^.S^t^^^^^*^- Shaheen was also at pains to say that he was anxious 
(?•'•' to be helpful to the DCI and was not in any sense a close friend 
of Hashemi, we agreed that in both the intelligence and oil 
businesses, not all deals pan out, and I gave him some profuse 
thanks for his efforts in this case.' 

4. The above was relayed to Peter Burleiqn of State on 
^^urday, 13 July, and State forwarded a status report 



CtfN 3^0^ 




UNCimif 



1013 



UNCUSSIFilD 

-^ CI 07^ -Cr^on^ 




UNCIASSIHED 



1014 



•™^O^^Hp- 4 • «■" 



:— SBCRCT 



JCT =— J- 



.1 



C 9073 ^^'^ 



On 17 May»l^M 4 federal Arrest Warrant wa 
Cyrus HASREHlfaa^is two brothers Jamshid and 
export^controljfcViolations. The warrant is bas 
proven iviolation«2^f 'arms embargo* ^*^^ *'as « 
York <in5May 1984 "and^is presently in jail, cy 
are living in London. Cyrus, born cTrca 1940 
citizen. i 

ff\ , 

inrani attempt^jtotobtain a nolle prosequi, 
via John." Shaheen,^is '"reportedly intermediary i 
change'fof Tpolicyivis-a-vis u. S.-Iran relation 
claims 'that* Syria^will not be involved in the 
seven ( July"*^1985 ) remaining hostages because H 
_H££ctlY_vath Iran. Two Iran ians are willing 
^^^^^B^^^Hf^^^HJUmiHa s an 
^I^H^^^HHBandManuchehr GORBAN>FAR 
fabricator who "has previ ously alleged he couTd 
contact 1 1 1 I 1 1 JJI^IIJJ III jiiii our interest, 
was able to produce 



issued for 
Reza for acns 
ed on several 
rrested in New 
rus and Jamshid 
in Iran, is u. S. 



Cyrus HASHEMI, 
n arranging a 
s. HASHEMI 
release of the 
izballah deals 
to meet with the 
they are 

- a known 

lace jis_ in 

never 



\P 



[579^ 



3...:/ 3V 

CO' ■ "49 



Ou 



Cy//V 3203 



■:Ji:^jyif^-4i-?.-^ 



StCRET 



Afer^^^ 



1015 



A. 



SECRjEJ r q^'tq 




23 July 1985 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: -. Ha s hen i Claims He will Set Up Meeting in 



After All 



1. John Shaheen phoned me from Tokyo late Saturday evening, 
20 July to say that Hashemi has been in touch, obviously via 
international phone. Shaheen said sJ.nce we will not meet with the 
Hashemi lawyer, Elliot Richardson, as Hashemi demanded, Hasheivi 
has ^decided to proceed anyway with setting up the mee^^^be twee n 
the|mmiB|BIMii^HHHHHP''"*^ ^^^ Iranian, jHHMJimHf when 
I expresseosurprise, Shaheen said^ it is the only sRo^that 
Hashemi has to get his nolle prosequ i. 



meeting 



The next step is for Hashemi to advise the date of the 



3. Shaheen again apologized' for the mistake of his 
secretary in giving Mr. Elliot Richardson my office telephone 
number. He said it happened because she was not witting of my 
interest? and he was out of touch • in rural Japan. 

4. Arnie Raphel at State has been notified of the above, 




limn ^"^^Tim 



CO 



3 



4986' 




3^ 



CnN^SOi 



SECRET 0;;r£_ l^s~yiA-i, rr-^ 



1016 



UNCUSSIRED 



22 Nov«mb*r t9t% 



f 



f-S? 



AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN LEBANON 

N 7452 

BArKr.ROUND 

Th« former head of 5«vik s °^*fj^*"; ' in utn. Hit motW»tion for 
M«,och.r H*.h.mi cootmue. «j;'«^^fj«;«„'2:jr„;i,!li,t nation with « ordorly 
this offort is a desiro to »e« Iran t^T^^^* ,• "r;.„einl MUts from th« scene and 
^ Just form oij9>'^J^;^*^^^'^^^^y^^^J^trx^,S^ General Hashemi 
his revolution becomes a spent force. J" P^ \^V asoira^Oons, can play a modest 
believes he and other exUes, who have ~ (^'J^J ,52^, toVdemooatlc society, 
role in helping Iran to transition from its ^. «"\^ir ,»ippoct, fuidance and 
He sees this happening via the process of exiles P'T. ""^LT^urMe. viiitti_iad 
v,m?1oSdinSton fo? -moderates" in Iran who have the coura< <> vH|m Ml 




THE DlALO< '-^^E TO DATE 



The ebb and flow of the Iran-Iraq war since September I Whju^nof 

vital ini^s't to oiLcompaniet The tlST-' of ^«n«.ci^^^^^^^ 

-l^itoriTby "* *"•'V'i.*'^'"!ia';f J^t^e sTru«k/we ^ive Srness various 

informed. In seeking '»<^^*^ <1»" '^"^^•"'"^h^n^lled.eable Iranian exUes. 

sources including the maintaining of con *ct !''j; J^^^^JJ^n^^ In October 

us to evaluate the quality of ^^l[,^*^l^^^^^t^n in the Iran-Iraq war 
orovide a first-hand assessment of what was liKeiy \« '"PP*., " ^-. 
JhTch ciw impact on a volatUe and oversold international od market. 

M A uftiiRr. MEETINGS 

Hamburj. C^cnaiy with O*"''!' "*^,'"' *2? '^^1 »,l»i Tr.«nf Ccirvm, 




^ DATA FITWISMO W THIS '^"J^^SmJJi 
OISCLOSM OUTSIOl TOT UNITH) STATM COVtlKfflWI 
Si SSlH ACENCIM. NOH Bt D"!"^«i f^^^ 
DISCLOSED IS UHOLg 0» W PAlT W*'^ '?"'''*■ 
^^y'L., ^ .v.rtUT» mt DATA PtOVlMO. 



fe\^(. 



Partially Declassified/Released nn AQtl«\>^ i^tl 

under provisions of E.0. 12356 

by B. Reger, National Security Council 






J 









^«! 



- f • 



1017 



ONbLHOOU luo 



N 745J 



^ .roup of conuct. .« »r.J »;;*., 'J'.sh.mi in H.mburs on 

wher« h« pl»y««* • ^„ Ir^niw 

juppli-f*- . juccesjlul but he *«« .''^loomenu in 

^nprotessionaU^^ ; ^^^.. .horb.n.l*r »«« '•^•'*; 

unreason*^'* »n° "" verili«<J »*^** ^^^ ..Lm >«hat he can 

«am« time, Hasbemi *« ^ ^^^^^ ^„^.ntW_J»»< 

!*.T.iwavsbeenhtfdtoconxro^^^^^^H indessadSBlllHh^t 




had always^eenw^^^^— 






1018 

IMIULHOOH iLU 

* : N 7454 



lin|T'TiSV'^'i^^^'^Q^ 20 November focused 

on three issues. Tljey *f ^ .^^^ ^„ ^d Kh*r| l''*";^",^ "„., «»s to oU 

p.rticul*rly MJJ« one Wne^jj;*; TOW missiles. He wm urge*, tfvreiore. ^ 

would guess TiJr»nwouW*jm^ ^ ^ .^ '**=:J^^ tJJt Vomment. As 

simpler way ^» P'T* „.S7t thet juncture m f«?P^~*"oith. conversation. 
America* ^^J^^^^l^t Lebanon entered '^V^l^l^^*^^^*^ "•^'^ 

The response wm he J^f ''"^J J^„ told th*t *ll C'^'""* S* "T^^ldbeen 
Americans w«e.hvj. C^><jt>jnU». .^ t«^« '*«,«i.!;riShorS.iSr could 
for their countrymen *«[* ' ^her unstable elements. «» '-™ humanitarian . 

captured by terrorists juerr 11^^^^^^ .^ '-*'»*r co^nT Gh^rb^uX^d he 

shed light on t>^« ,»J*!"'ri„ noted by those who <=o""*:^;„,. The answer was 

h. ••ncroos and ittnere w» • would be willing to ta^e »«m o 

our oil company cuenw an ^^^ afternoon 

the foUowingi 

* ^ .,„« ^ ~* .0. .-" '•■•»• -■"• •""'*" '"""'' 
-..M hm simale - money (or people. 






d. The cover lor the ^^•""^^ItJ.reToJjthat raised the tunds. 
out and resold them to a private group 







:7* 



1019 

N 7455 

w u-«f «»cret. This meant that whatever 
e. The transaction h«d to be kept '•f;" .^,,g the media ot how the 

final explanation was worked out to ^ Ghorbanilar, Iranians 

release had been effected, it could not lOenu y 

or anything but a private ransom deal. 
,. „ this deal interested us, we were to do the following: 

(1) provide the full names ol the captured Americans; 

(2) indicate the date ol ;;1«''\*P^'^ five's father. 

(3) provide the given name oJ eacn c«p" 

. ^ .^ hi< ooints and would take appropriate 
Ghorbanifar was told w. ^^^^'^.^'^.^''l] h'CTdecision-making process, 
soundings. When we indicated ^^^f^jy^*'^^ Se ball was in our court. H. 
he laughed and said he ;" *l*2rS Sly aS SVd. We said we doubted that we 
wondered aloud if we could ''••«J ,^ .*^^^J!,"e. 
could, for we were both cautious and deliberate. 

COMMENT ■ .. 

i,»- «n 53 November, General Hashemi 

m subsequent P''-»«,t'^""'f2^ harcontacted on this matter or how. He 

told us he did not know who Ghorban^".^*J ^^^^eVn" swer m ten days time. This 

la d he would attempt to find out »:^„"^'f * '^H^shemi would both be traveling as 

Slay was due to the fact ^^.^'^^''^^^X fS a number of days. We know 

• — • — ^ .^ , -K»r>on were discussed at any time 



a. 



^ ■ .- Pmh«««v officer, who was kidnapped 
William F. Buckley, an American Embassy oiiicer, 
on 16 ^Wch 19S»» 

date of capture. 

■jpz-MOiTyPVALUATlON 

own funds plus discounted airline tickets tnat 



. « ^. •• < 



M ?- " 



il 

.>;# 



:ji 



'fi*' 



1020 



yNRRiJisntu 



7456 



• ■ ^ 



Hashemi. 

rinrnr-^^"-^ 'UTERES! -,», G«ner»l Hwhemi, for h« J«« 

SSbanilT is • "rj^^w oiv^turev In »"'^„:';i*o:;o5 concern f or . M^ 
potenti.1 to «""'\^;;;^on unloKJed, «• have ^gSkSy waTVnown t^us trorn-Jb 
lrankn«* how ^♦^"IL^J^n,. -(COMMENT: Mr. B«kl«y ^.^.^^ ^^ „pect the 

1/t* we h*ve lormshed to w ^f.^'^' carried out '" * '^"T^i!' Put another 
i*u,t"nJS the v«"*ifrSh cl^iai nihemi and ^'^ ^^^r'^Vn-ininJ relation- 
preW«<»"''«'*l1"V^'';e and money into ^l^rf'^;;*,*;." preserve* them and 
^ay, we have '=^^«»*«^ V^re useluU As a resa::. *e **^- "^^^ honored »» thi« 

w« would be available lor • 
paragraphs. 



UHtUSSffl 



1021 



yi^yLModirltl^ 



.:iV: 



t 



Ca/^ ^T 



/V/as-7^ 



July 11, 19fl5 



'^-sr 



RCMt 



JMP talked with Michael Led««n this morning about an urgent 

message from Peres for McFarlane which Al Schwitraner, a 

Jewish-American who provides lots of money to Peres, wants to 
deliver to PCM. 

Tn the meantime, Schwimmer has flown down here and had lunch 
today with Michael Ledeen and tedeen has called back with the 
following: 

"It is indeed a message from Prime Minister of Israel; it is 
a follow-on to the private conversation he had last week when 
David Kimche was here. It is extremely urgent and extremely 
sensitive and it regards the matter he told David he was going to 
raise with the President. The situation has fundamentally 
changed for the better and that I must explain to him because it 
will affect his decision. It is very important. It won't keep 
more than a day or two but could keep until Saturday morning. 
This is the real thina and it is just wonderful news." 

Should I try to schedule Ledeen to see you? 



Yes, Friday afternoon 

Yes, on Saturday 

No, I don't want to see Ledeen 



Other; 




Wilms 



'^^ c~H- ni 



ij» f'" 



"""" under provisions ol LO. 12355 
by B. Rsgar-. Nal'C""! Security Ccundl 



^^;)r^ 



>^' 



t/j' 



^^yM^ifHQ 



y 



1022 



r 



il: *: 



t » * * • 
• • " -^ ? 



* • t 



• t 



cUf^ O} f/^^ ^y 




N 17790 






1 




c 






PI 



'^ 



• • • • 




1023 




r 






C^o.^a.q.'^r^P^ 




SECRET 

afESONLY 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 400993 
COPY NO 



OF. 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM .V CHANNEL 



ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



/^ 



^^ ^ ^ 



\«<t 



)ISPOSIT1( 



:5^ 



■ No*urth«f cni 



'arning^^i 



Warning Notice 
"'t-.i»„c.So«rc««H, wthod, involve 



;'v.i-f' 



?mj(--_ 




^^^^i @) 



y^A^ 



1024 






COMMENTS 






Bob Pearson 


^fiCS^ 


SEQUENCE TO 


HAS SEEN OISPOSIT 


William Martin 


/ 










Paul Thompson 
Wilma Hall 










Bud McFarlana 






William Martin 






NSC Sccrttariat 


V 


T^ 


Situation Room 






'^ 


-^ 


y^ 




1025 



N 641 

EYES ONLY 



MEMORANDUM 

.NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ^ 6412 



August 30, 198S 

sscas9 ~ 

ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLAIlE 
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH f^ 

SUBJECT: Passport 

Per our discussio^^^s^niqh^^ClairGeorg^raconmended 
contactingj^mfH^^mi^^l^l^milim^mi^HH for an 
alias passpo^an^oocumentsfortravels t^Europ^regarding 
counter-terrorism. The memorandum to State at Tab I confirms 
that these documents have been received by NSC. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you authorize Bill Martin to sign the memo to Platt at 
Tab I. 



Approve 6*^ Disapprove 



Attachment 

Tab I - Martin Memo to Platt 



SrWfen 



Ken deGi«Tfenreid concurs. 







Declassify: OADR 



wmmm 



1026 



WASHINGTON, o c. io>a« 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-40099 



fMECRBT — >« 



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT 
Executive Secretary 
Department of State 



SUBJECT: 



Passport (U) 



petween NSC and 

_ ^ I the NSC has 

"received a passport and associated documents for Williaa P. 

Goodc. These docunents will be retur^ed^o the Department 

State when r.o longer require i. (S) 



MIMOIUNOUM 
or CALL 

fSi 



*// 



\ 



^'«neu« (dltlaiw uaM* 



VOU WSMLCALl 



Oa^ 



(^^C. ' WW»€ VJpTlO SY- 



Of iOtitt»M»noA 






William F. Martin 
Executive Secretary 



I I R6TUHNE0 VOUP CALL 



I I IS WAITING TO see roo 

D WISweS AN AP^OINTVteNT 




\'^ 



■uiivui/ 



BWf- 



^' 



•Ml* MIM n4*«»4M-Mlt gTAMOAIIO rOMM M (MM. Ml) 

>«re : iMt • iti.iii (]to> ^*Mii (41 cr«) iei-i;i4 
Declassify: OADR 




1027 



►CM-0R4NDJM F0«: 



VIA: 



FROH: 



SUBJECT: 



uo 



"^'iid^ 




Office of General Counsel 
Central Intelligence Agency 

Charles E. Allen 

National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism 
and Narcotics 

Background on U.S. Initiative to Secure Release of 
Amrlcan Hostages 



SiXHiiir 



0644 




1. The following 1$ provided for your background on an extremely 
sensitive White House initiative to secure the release of the American 

Jjostages held by the Iranun-backed Hizballah organization In Lebanon. This 
Initiative has been underway for some months and 1$ being controlled directly 
by the National Security Council (NSC). I have served the NSC as the focal,.' 
point for coordinating Intelligence Cotimunity colection requirements to 
support the White House Initiative. 

2. On 12 September, I was requested by LTC O'-ver North, Deputy Director 
of Politica l/Milita'-y Affairs of the NSC, to beg^- Intelligence Cormanity 

^I^^I^BBagamst certain Iranians wno were involved with the White House and 

who were in contact with the Lebanese Hizballah.^Ove^th^iex^tw^daysI was 

^aM^t^secur^sufficient Information to identif^^^^mUHIHK^B) 

^I^^HHHI^I^HBB two Iranians who wer^ the it>v n^a^^r^1n tnp 

Hnii<!A initi<ti«» One of the Ir anians wasj 

he QthenJindli-LdLLi-— jtAS name^^^^^^^^fc.' Ose 

Trst naTte is u nttnown. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

jslf of the Iranian government 



[the White House was able to gain critical insights into the attitudes of 
these Iranians toward the release of the American hostages and the 
relationship and Influence that Iranian officials have over Hizballah 
personnel who are holding the hostages. The release of Rev. Benjan-.in Weir was 
effected by th^j^^ House working through intermediaries who we'-e in direct 
contact wit^^PHHr who In turj^a^deallng directly with ] 
Following the release of We1r,fl^|H^indicated, again through 
Intermediaries, to the White HgB^nat other America", hostages might be 



1028 



UilbLHOOintU 



3. 0-- 2^S|3te^e^^|a^nformed by the NSC (LTC No'-tnl to again 

co'.iection because the White House had received informalior. 'rrrat another 
hostage, probably Willian- Bjcitley. would be released ^nrr^cM ^ ""'^ifl"' '* " 1 
This increased coHect'ior, effort 



lid on 3 October that It 



;ernent 



amic 
ted a new 
* The White 
important that 



planned to execut 
dimension In the continuing contacts betw 
House through Intermediaries indicated tc 

he come to the US in order to determine -iieTne^otentiai still exists'to' 
secure the release of Buckley, assuming that he had not been killed or of 
remaining host"" "— '-* " '-^---" - -. ._ • 

Qrtnh 



the 




0645 



— - — — — — ~^-^— The Nit staieo mat Wis was pernaps our last 

opportunity to utilize this channel to determine whether Wllllaffl Buckley Is 
still alive (ve now have strong evidence that he 1- dead) and whether there ' 
- - - - artunitits remair'-- '- - ■■ - - 




4. From my persnj^jj* and based on the analysis o* the intelliaence 
collected thus far,^^^^"- ' 




1029 



ufii^LnuaiiiLU 




initiative a"i t-at ie too njs frrai-jl a'rjnge-ve'^ts w 

tneetinss t^i-. •:'■' OCC-r ti'S -ee- nr'c 11 oas^^ 1 ngton w. _ 

are considered pivotal By tne W'Mte nojse as to -Aether this ininaT 
be pursued further. The hostages oelieved to be held by Hizballah are as 
follc-s: Father Lawrence Jen:o. a Roran, Cathol ic pnest; Oavid Jacotsen, 
director of Beirut's American University Hospital; Thomas Sutherland. Oean of 
Agriculture at the American university; and Terry Anderson, chief AP 
correspondent in the Middle East. 




Lharles E. Allen 



064o 




1030 






I (D 



N 16502 





I . I: !M: - 

s2 : ».! =j ;i : 



1031 



j^A.Tr 



uiUbLftd^lMtU 







VIA: 



FROM: 



SUBJECT: 



Office of General Counsel 
Central Intelligence Agency 

Charles E. Allen 

National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorisn 
and Narcotics 

Background on U.S. Initiative to Secure Release of 
American Hostages 



IXHIIIT 



0644 



5^ 



1 






1. The following Is provided for your background on an extremely 
sensitive White Mouse initiative to secure the release of the American 

postages held by the Iranian-backed Hizballah organization in Lebanon. This 
Initiative has been underway for some months and is being controlled directly 
by the National Security Council (NSC). I have served the NSC as the focal _' 
point for coordinating Intelligence Connunity colection requirements to 
support the Uhite House initiative. 

2. On 12 Seotember, I was requested by LTC Oliver North, Deputy Director 
ofPolitical /Military Affairs of the NSC, to begi- Intelligence Community 

^^^^I^^Bagamst certain Iranians wno were involved with the White House and 

who were in contact with the Lebanese Hizballah. O ver the next two d avs I was 

abl^t^ecur^ijfficient infonnation to identifj 

^Bii^^HI^H^^^^Hi two Iranians who werf the kev nlav»r< i n th» 

Hni]«;> initi»»iu» fin e Of the Ir anians wasl 

the QtherL^itillkJ^lu^ljiAS naffiej^^^^^^l.' 0se 

rrst name is u nknown. ^^.^ ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^,^„..^^^^^^_— 

Ijlf of the Iranian government 



fthe White House was able to gain critical insights into the attitudes of 
these Iranians toward the release of the American hostages and the 
relationship and influence that Iranian officials have over Hizballah 
personnel who are holding the hostages. The release of Rev. Benjamin Weir was 
effected by th^j^^ House working through intermediaries who were in direct 
contact witi^l^Hv who in t urn was d ealing directly with| 



Following the release of Weir, 
intermediaries, to the White 



indicated, again through 
at other Ame rican hostages might be 



1032 



3, 



UilULHOOinCU 



^^^^ejfie^^a^nfcrmed by the NSC ( lTC Nprtm to again 

co'iiection because tne White House had received 1r\foTSa?ior 
hostage, probably w^illiafr Sjcklev. -ould be released 



another 




. , t«ecut« 

dimension in the continuing contacts bet«c 
House through Intermediaries indicated tcl 



amic 
ted a new 
The White 



he come to the US In order to det^^Tne -hlfB^te'lii; sITnlx^lu'tr*' 
secure the release of Buckley, assuming that he had not been killed or of th» 
remaining hostafleshald by Hiiballah. The Uhlf hou*. infnnn.H J ' ° "^ ^^^ 




join 

Israeli; 

dealing w1th!_ 

reportedly has 

Joint 

Iran 



064? 



'•^^i^^^Beiation^^^^M|| 
£^w1th^^HI|in obtaining wun^ffi 
M also wTTrbe staying at thi^BMl 



ne$ for Ihe Vfn 

.ly a former I 

and has bee 




opportunity to utilize this chann?;\rdeu™"eXt'J;;\n^rB;?:iril'" 




ny moi 
who assures iw that 



_)only comes from a White House official 
has been an Important Intermediary in this 



T O P si cn ci 



liNCLASmu 



1033 



UiiuLnuuiiiLU 




Initiative i'i i''i' •'e toe ^is frran-'ji a'r4nge-^o-».s ■' 

mee'.inqs fj; ••■ Ti o:c«r :i's ■se* '^i'e i'^ xas^ington ., 

are considered pivotal by tne wiile nojse as to whether tms mi 
be Pursued further. The hostages believed to be held by Hizballah are as 
follows: Father Lawrence Jei:o, a Soran. Cathol ic onest; David Jacotse", 
director of Beirut's American university Hospital; Thor.as Sutherlana, Dean of 
Agriculture at the A.-nerican university; a"d Terry Anderson, chief AP 
correspondent m the Middle East. 



tharles E. Allen 



6 4 .3 




1034 



1035 



CHAPTER 10. ARMS TO IRAN: A SHIPMENT OF HAWKS ENDS IN FAILURE 



1036 



\0'i 



ROBERT C. MCFAJU.ANE RECORD OF SCHEDULE 

Friday, November 8, L985 

7:25 Arrived Office 

7:30 ODSM 

8:00 DOM (8:28) /C / M- 

8:30 Dave Peterson - PDB (8:45) 

8:55 Adm John Poindexter (9:00) 

9:07 Treasury Secy James Baker called 

9:33 P/Mtg with GOP Congressional Leadership - list attached 

10:30 Photo op w/ President, Adm Poindexter, Amb Jack Matlock 
& Don Regan for NEWSWEEK 

10:35 P/NSB w/JMP 

10:40 Amb Winston Lord k Mrs. Bette Lord (photo op 

w/President (11:05) A; r 

11:07 Amb Winston Lord (11:17) '^'^^vj- 

11:10 Jim Kuhn called on PL (11:16) 

11:17 WH North Portico Marine Guards to extend Marine Corps 
Birthday wishes to RCM (photo op) (11:18) 

11:18 Sen Sam Nunn (D-GA) (12:00) 

12:08 Jim Ktihn called on PL 

12:15 P/Luncheon w/Religious Leaders in Cabinet Room - list 
attached (1:26) 

1:27 Navy CoBBiasion Ceranony for Denny Brisley - list 
attached (1:32) 

1;40 P/Mtg w/Secy Shultz « Adm Poindexter IMMEDIATELY 
FOLLOWED BY: 

Photo op w/President, RCM, Secy Shultz 6 Don Regan 
in Cabinet Room (2:05) 

2:05 Kama Small (2:12) 

2:30 Ollie North (2:35) 

2:35 David Kimche of the Israeli Government (3:25) 

(not shown on schedule) ^„._„„_^ 

Lcdc,:if!..; :.r: n /.^^- ;,V ^ ^^ 

':f.;?5r pro ":;c r ;.0. ^Z.'"- 
^y B. .■:;::', i.jtior:' \c:,i:7 C... .: 



MlMHaJ^ 



1037 




4:10 SACG in Sit Room - list attached (5:56) 

6:30 S«n Robert Dole (R-Ran) called 

7:00 Howard Teicher (7:11) 

8:04 To Adin Poindexter's Office (8:06) 

8:15 Adm Poindexter - joined by Ollie North (8:25) (8:35) 

9:15 Departed for the evening 



A; /.- 



'^Ocs 




1038 




t^ 



g> Ha-.f > »- l\'t ::^OAMA±\ 



^TTT 



'2L 



«j /<>> fn.c C» .( Z J I 






IJ i'A- Jflf t-^cfl 









>^ *.. .iiu ^» r T 3,rr 



:r 



^ V> 't^< a C C 'UX.,,.4. .g^ 



»«* /f >io-,fg^e& 



«4S 



pjirtiail/ [ifrla, rVifii 



t' V B . .'i; ! ;i ' :. I ' .Jli l i ii S^ 




rta.tDr' -.n ' ^L ; . 



:f.dif pro- cic , "f LOi t;35P 



.eu.Ky Qui. tl 



SUNOAY. NOVEMBER 17 



iiffi 



tfff* 



1039 




C 4509 



/O'// 



IS Novmber 1985 



HEMORANOUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: OCI/OOCI Mating with Assistant to the President 
for MnlofUl Security Affairs, 14 November \<i%i 

1. Adnfral Poindexter was also in attendance. 



'Off, 



under prowsions of Eo i?i« 



0.1/ 'V ir/o 



«Ncyi?§iii 



J« J n I M y i> 




j;>M 



CL BY nOS7/<f*f 



1040 



/ 



sfmm 



C , 4510 




Oistribution: 

Orig - in (Coopltte Copy neld in 0/OOCI 

1 - 001 

1 - 000 

1 - EA/OCI* 

1 - cA/OOCI 

1 - SA/DOCI 

1 - ZxStc 

I - 0/ExSec- 

Excracts provided EYES OMLT to: 

0/ICS - ?arj 9 
Ch/SECOM - Ptrt 4 



Jonn H. ."teManon 
perOOCI's instructions.) 



/ 



/ 



"NOT TO Be DISSEMINATED OUTSIJE THIS OFFICE PER DOCI'S l«TRUCTIONS 




1041 



CWv^i*- \0,Tbdnxj\es 25 -1^,^^^ 




"fi&issmB 




a/^A/¥p^<j 



""iiiiimiEi) 



REVIEWED FOR REL^ 



_,.•' -r-'i-.w .:■ 



1042 






3o 



KQIORAKSUM 



30118} 



Wmflflffl 



^■ai.|U.: Miction TLV/THR 



I. CHRONOLOGICAL UPORT 




/O -56^52( 



Contacc aiid Contrtcc 



riday afttrnoon 22 Nov flrit Info to ■•] 

chat I would b* contacttd -conc«rnln| an ur|«nc Tllglre and 

that ic was in our *'""""\f§\ vy' — '^** upcoalng fits. 

At a bout 20 00 Les^I t_t«r? vaa eontact arbv a cartain Mr. Richard 

Copp I ^1^ 

Ht asked ■« whathar I had^al raady batn Inforaad about a alssion. 

whtch I denied. Ma thenTf^alned tea* that there had to 



be 3 flights done_ 
froa Tel Avlv|^ 
we could do It 
of 60 000.00 USD pi 
Furthai it was agri 
on r aqua St should 
Ourttif ay subsequar 
CO ay MEMO 211115 
to a* and supposed 
Indicated. This was 



PHASE II - PositlOBi 




^ly as possible " Covernaent to Covernainc" 
a «hoK^^^£usslon m afreed that 
:.rafi cmsictfirily for^ flat fee 
lai>d|,ha«dlg had to be paid by Ma. 
kc satead B4Kn|^m«|»U b^-aade avatlaMc 
tear (tt ur|en^ ^^^^^^ 
M ct^versatloa'Te oui^^^^^^^Hl 
land" questioned the wa^T^wa^dls played 
this cargo was the saae as in ay aeao 

kd. 




had cht 

find an excuse^o^thecustoaer and depart 
fftcl ally for^HHM| Traffic right s for , 
i«re tentativITyapplied for byj 
acoao necessary. 

Our second Boeing was parked 1 
the airport opened the nest no 
At the tia^Jiad aade the agreeaenc 

The crewiHH|vhlclL_yas_su$BOsed to 






kthe aex< day 
~eirly departure 
■Ti ^ •"■; ^^ airport had opened 
">, ■ j' " this aircraft 



t 



fi v^ iW? 



i mforaed bv Copp tnat 




■^ ^ «» «■" 




trnxng 
he 
ling 
At about this clae I v as 
taken along. BMBRW* 
own pallets were stored in cfi« 



■'>V^. > 



1043 



p«it 2 of HDtt 3onas 



UNCUssm 



-;t';^jMagar.flH|PHil^^ Ou^^th^shorta|t of tlM w« dtcldtd to 
-'V^I«C^th« aircraft (lyflHHIiBco pick up th« p.allt ta tnataad 




It In cht 
le was wattloi for tba.. aircraft to 
arriva. Afcar th« aircraft -had arrivad cha pallats vara loaded and 
'tha aircraft continuad to fly to Tal Aviv aftar havtni rafuallad 
Itttla bacauia of tha axtra flviiiK tj 



■aantlaa "Capt i 
additional loadaastajrj 
^ara also on board 

lit arrivad I 

Dua to this dapartuf 
put tha sacond aicct 
urgancy of tha «iss^ 
Tharafora tha coda 
unload ini 

grantad in tha aaand 
on the 23 Hov in TLy 



>pno 

had arrivad (roa'Parls via train ind 

M aircraft de parted finally at about 
(23 Nov) 

■y, Copp had requested fro* ae to elso 
Dto this operation dua to the utaost 

^transaitted^Pm^BI^Kaad Jlc«r 
fuelle d and departed to TL I 

I The overflight r ithts had^ 
[landed 



PHASE III - Uading 



M"^- 



■)A 



^ I/// as 3a 



ifor^ 



iathough Richard Copp JHHH^HI had aaid to aa that the 
loading was plan ned to take 5 hours but would be speeded up tc 

i Incurs .JB BWPwhich had first arrived, had 
"piece ou^o^^S pieces in * hours. ThereJ 
concerned parties were concerned that tha 
long as possibly 2« hours. Therefc 
traffic rights had not been granted 
that now the load had to be transport* 
confir«ed ay initial suspicions and 
several things had to be chanf 
before 



_ IS inf^ 
that in TLV everyone knj 
turned down and that the real dest m) 



they 






1044 



«<L-.v J...: 85 



ONCLASSIHED 



_^»-y.*.rl w*f jlvtn th« eontict of Hr . A.Sihwlanir la TtV by Hr.Copp «ndjk^1^ 
■i-'i'r • J;'.*?'t«l'li«d to SchwlHBtr $«v«rjl cia«s on tht phon«. .^^^^^ 

[told>.hla thac wa ccoM not fly to THR 'ITh m.^Oay 1 i,tw"l^^l 1 1 1 1 i i 
hat w« t:.«rtfor« Md to unloadfl|Hn«(ain|HI| 
H« trl«a tavcral ti*«* to convToc* •• and «vn 
• rad to paint « 4i(ftrml *<Xl*t'Mlo<M:Aa tll;,ai«fl|fft Hm' 




..do soB« klii4 of CortetVii 

^ '* hon* eoav«rs«tl«i5 to lar 

wa wtrt * Boraal Air! 

tlaa to COM and chat 

It to do it . 'Thartfori 

tlon to that 1 axplaina 



^■XylOf into THk. Ka«ptflj| 




iB aln^that 
b« ilstana4 to, \ cold 
inrt«^«e t9«y la biaaikst^ 

y way to do It wat th « corrtc: 

VU unlSadad a(aA>. ' H«, VT 

!■ that wa atadad traffic righcs 

rvarflvj^^H^H which wa had appllad fortcatatlvaly tha aoaanc 
tha r<*l oas^^nafl T))"* out. but only forH^^R 
ivnd also wa astiaicrd that it wo^^^ak^^S^co gat thoaa ri|hcs. 
In addition 1 nae csnfarrad witl^^^^^Hand wat told that 
chosa traffic rignc; w:.,id.ba tuppo 
va could count ?■• t ;.<... 
1 V4» \T rr.ucr. •--. cr .1..T" 



hoaa and w* r>««oti 
ordar to go to th 
on it and tharafo 
not trust thaa th. 
up with 8000 USD 
in tna aaanciaa 



PHAS; 




tlcally and chat 



f-w all tha cla^n^/riliad all 
thaa. In fact ^BHp "*' ^^ Schwiaaars 
ata that wa naadadjO 000 USD ia 
inatlcn bacausa w« had not plannad 
anough cash with ua. Also wa did 
hing was paid in THI. Schwiasar caaa 
anghcy discussions bacausa ic was Sunday 
could aoc got aera aonay. 



parforaad 



•<K' 



1*1 



Ktz»mn% to t 
^^^bta^uaiea 

f**^B^5^Ron^ 




hwta^ar and 



caa aav aj-'- sasac bacwaai 

acaa asa:.= and daparca 

on a>.:.-.uay tita 24 Nov. 

id eh:* flight and took all axtra craw back axcapt 
^ond loadaastar bacausfi ic had bacoas obvious to us 
that cha TLV/THR rour.« -.ould ba flown by ona cra w dua to tha 
langhty loading .nd .: . ictad unloadg proc 
In cha aaancla^Sctovi^r confiraad chac 
ovarfll|MH|||^B|H[^^.^*B confiraad 
wl chHH|^^^q|^X iM|loadad 

chat CM a4rcraf( ah^ J» 

aqwiiHi adMtloni fuala 
•4 in n.V bae*u|^ t« would h^ 
•at VA to r|fl^ Jbls aiss 
. i.-- • '.•' «#•»-•.■ — •■ ♦ .onay but 
bcifiKix: ...... ..;r-i«^ Mncthar 2 

«6cu; .V - togm.nav >ith tha 




Ighcs for 
could go 

ur agraaaanc 
ing on to THR. 
to '^* 

dins 



CW 



C//va53"b' 



RCVIEWEB rOM KUEAtt 









1045 



»'««t 



of MEMO 301185 




riMlly v« lavt th«|rMn_U|tit for^^^to c.kt off «^ 

l.ft TLV vlcJ^BBBBBHonThHrHov 

• •s;^^"",'"^'"^ it h*d t.Ltn ki. .,.«tly 24 hour, for lo.din. 

••-l^^X"rl"I «n th, probl««^|^,» lo.dln, 

HH|P^B|^>«a n«v problau •• tho euttoB.r 
th. ■iUtfty la n.V b«d aoc obIy set tlv.o M. .- 
Ch. lo.d bui .1.0 h.d c.k.„ out Iv!" j;i :„c \"^h 
»jt«d tluc ch« .ircr.fc v«. la TLV. '" 

]ch«r«for« did aet yaat to rtlt... th« .irer.ft 
t« W«r. produc.d^d ch.r.for. rh. 1,... .j *^ 

■» H I 

which v.. .ee.pt.d aitheush It had no .taap of ch. 
. point and finally ha could ta lk hi. w.v m .r of thi, 
n. Finally ha th.r.fora l.fe «cMMB|dlr.ction 
a« plannad. _ ^^^ ^^^^ M 

Howavar. noehlng waa prapar.d for ov.rf llghfl^BB ..^ w. h,H 
a,ata to talk hi. way through. Sine, th.y r.TTSSffn^.t.d 
on a dlplo^tle xl.araaca nuab.r. h^ibada on. up which w« 
not acc.pc.d afi.r Ion, n.jo|i|tionaandth.n h. flUbu.t.r.d 
ona hour and 30 aln >il<^^t^l|HHHHi' u« in« diff.'." 
^Iclcudaa. p