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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

Y l.l/2:SeriaI 13743 

100-1: United States Congr... 



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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 2 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13743 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 2 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. - Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. -Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnitd States Senate 



; ON SECRET MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

HonoreOjle John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Conimittee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



ly, 




Warren B. Rudman V^ 



Vice Chairman 



III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 20516 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fo^-^elease to the public. 




United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 



Mark A. Belnick 
Executive Assistant 
to the Chief Counsel 



Paul Barbadoro 
Deputy Chief Counsel 



Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Raynor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 



Senator Mitchell 
Senator Nunn 



Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 



Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 



Senator Cohen 



Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

CiehanskJ 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
OR. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 2 



Prefoce XXI 

Armitage, Richard 1 

Artiano, Martin L 405 

Associate DDO (CIA) 580 

Baker, James A., Ill 671 

Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter 690 

Barnett, Ana 736 

Bartlett, Linda June 840 

Bastian, James H 894 

Brady, Nicholas F 1065 

Brown, Arthur E., Jr 1077 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Harnett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd). 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward S. 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., Jr. 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 15 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhorne A. 
Mulligan, David P. 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 24 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses -or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses -could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence- were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events. I volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



mmm 



1 DEPOSITION OF RICHARD ARMITAGE 

2 Tuesday, May g^e , 1987 

3 • United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 \ and the Nicaraguan Resistance 

7 Washington, D.C. 

8 Deposition of RICHARD ARMITAGE, a witness 

9 herein, called for examination by counsel for the 

10 Committee, pursuant to notice, the witness being duly 

11 sworn by ANNE P. HOROWITZ, a Notary Public in and for the 

12 District of Columbia, at 219 Hart Senate Office Building, 

13 Washington, D.C, at 1:08 p.m. on Tuesday, May 26, 1987, 

14 and the proceedings being taken down by Stenomask by ANNE 

15 P. HOROWITZ and transcribed under her direction. 




PwlUly Oadwificd/Released on ^/^^^ /'2 /f'^^ 
under provisions of LO. 12356 
-hi D. Sirko, National Security Council 



upk$sue 



(1) 



82-690 0-88-2 



UNCUSSiES 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: 

3 " JOHN SAXON, Esq. 

4 C. H, ALBRIGHT, JR., Esq. 

5 Associate Counsel 

6 On behalf of the House Select Committee on Covert 

7 Arms Transactions with Iran: 

8 JOE SABA, Esq. 

9 ROGER KREUZER, Esq. 

10 On behalf of the witness: 

11 LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD, Esq. 

12 Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary 

13 of Defense for ISA 

14 EDWARD SHAPIRO, Esq. 

15 Assistant Counsel, Department of Defense 



UNClASSlEiED 



uHcyissiFa 







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N T 


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S 




Deoosition of 




Examination by counse; 




RICHARD ARMITAGE 
















By Mr. Saxon 












4 




By Mr. Saba 












19 






E X 


H I 


B 


I 


T 


S 




ARMITAGE EXHIBIT NUMBER 






FOR 


IDENTIFICATION 




1 
















2 
















3 
















4 
















5 
















6 
















7 
















8 
















9 
















10 
















11 
















12 














20 


13 















uNimiffifl 



ilNCUSSIRED 



1 ^^ PROCEEDINGS 

2 (Witness sworn.) 

3 • Whereupon, 

4 RICHARD ARMITAGE 

5 was called as a witness by counsel for the Committees 

6 and, having been first duly sworn, was examined and 

7 testified as follows: 

8 EXAMINATION 

9 BY MR. SAXON: 

10 Q Mr. Secretary, would you state your name for 

11 the record? 

12 A Yes, my name is Richard Lee Armitage. 

13 Q What is your current position? 

14 A I am currently the Assistant Secretary of 

15 Defense for International Security Affairs. 

16 With your permission, could we get on the 

17 record the level, et cetera? 

18 Q Yes. This deposition is cleared at the top 

19 secret-Codeword level, and we do expect to have some 

20 classified material as deposition exhibits and as topics 

21 for discussion. And we will pursue the normal DOD 

22 channels for the declassification issue if we choose to 

23 use any of this. •** 

24 A Thank you. 

25 Q How long have you been in that position? 



oodcr provisions cf CO. ir. 
kjr 0. Mlo, National tecuv^/ 



mmm 



UNCIASSIRED 



1 A Since approximately May of 1983. 

2 Q Let me ask now that the first deposition 

3 ■ exhibit be marked, and that simply is a copy of what I 

4 understand to be your most recent biographical sketch 

5 provided by your office? 

6 A This is correct. 

7 (The document referred to was 

8 marked for identification as 

9 Armitage Exhibit No. 1.) 

10 Q Would you state for us generally your duties 

11 as Assistant Secretary? 

12 A In general, I have the responsibility from the 

13 Department of Defense for inter-agency coordination 

14 between the Department of State, the National Security 

15 Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, for policy 

16 matters. 

17 In addition, I have the responsibility to 

18 advise the Secretary of Defense on policy matters 

19 involving the Department of Defense for all countries of 

20 the world outside of NATO Europe. I have additional 

21 duties which I received approximately in May of 1986 in 

22 the SOF, Special Operating Forces, and counter-terrorism 

23 areas. 

24 Q And you are responsible for the military 

25 aspects of U.S. policy pertaining to all countries except 



UNetASStflED 



wsjssm 



1 for NATO, is that correct? 

2 A NATO Europe, right. 

3 " Q You served, I believe, in Vietnam? 

4 A I did. 

5 Q What was the nature of that service? 

6 A My first tour was as damage control assistant 

7 on a destroyer off the coast of Vietnam. My second tour 

8 was as an advisor to a coastal group, Vietnamese coastal 

9 group, the ambush team advisor. 

10 My next tour was senior advisor to River 

11 Patrol Division 54 on the Vietnam-Cambodian border. My 

12 third tour was as advisor to coastal group 21 in II 

13 Corps. 

14 Q In May of 1975, you returned to the Pentagon 

15 as a consultant? 

16 A Actually, in roughly April of 1975 I returned, 

17 in the final days before the fall of Saigon. I was 

18 invited to participate in those events. 

19 Q And where principally were you located in your 

20 consulting services? 

21 A I served for the final week in Vietnam. I 

22 then served in Washington from approximately the middle 

23 of May until, asl remember it, the late fall. And I was 

24 primarily engaged in the refugee resettlement projects. 

25 And then in late fall through at least the 



ONGtimED 



mmm 



1 first half of 1976, I was in and out of Teheran, serving 

2 as a consultant to the defense representative, Teheran. 

3 • Q In your current assignment, to whom do you 

4 report? 

5 A To the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

6 Dr. Fred Ikle, and through him to the Secretary. 

7 Q Mr. Secretary, if you would walk us through 

8 your involvement with the Iran initiative stage of the 

9 Iran-contra affair, and that is, I principally have in 

10 mind the draft NSDD that Mr. McFarlane sent to Secretary 

11 Weinberger and to Secretary Shultz in mid-1985, your 

12 role, et cetera.? 

13 A As I recall, in approximately June of 1985 I 

14 received a draft NSDD with a cover note from Mr. 

15 McFarlane. The cover note was addressed to the Secretary 

16 of State and the Secretary of Defense, and asked for 

17 their comments on the draft NSDD. And the Secretary had 

18 written his own remarks on a little buck slip. 

19 This was forwarded upstairs to me, and I put 

20 together a response to that draft NSDD, the thrust of 

21 which, as I remember, was I don't disagree with the need 

22 to develop a more congenial relationship with Iran, but 

23 we did not believ'6 that arms sales by ourselves or 

24 allowing third countries to engage in arms sales was the 

25 way to do it, nor did the Secretary of Defense feel that 



UNCttSSIRED 



^mmm 



X he could develop a more congenial relationship with the 

2 present regime. 

3 • That is, as long as Khomeini was alive the 

4 Secretary didn't feel that there was much use in pursuing 

5 this. 

6 Q His handwritten note, I believe that's the 

7 statement in which he said this is almost too absurd to 

8 comment on, is that right? 

9 A He said also that it's like asking Quadafi for 

10 a cozy lunch, approximately those words. 

11 Q My understanding is that in the course of 

12 drafting a response to that draft, there was a 

13 disagreement between you and Dr. Ikle over a couple of 

14 points in terms of what should be in the Secretary's 

15 response. 

16 I'd like to have this marked as Deposition 

17 Exhibit 2. 

18 (The document referred to was 

19 marked for identification as 

20 Armitage Exhibit No. 2.) 

21 Q This is a memorandum to the Under Secretary of 

22 Defense for Policy, who I believe would be Dr. Ikle. It 

23 is dated 13 July '1985. I believe it is from you. 

24 I will give you a moment to take a look at it, 

25 and I am principally concerned here about the first page 



uiwtASsm 



UNGIASSKKD 



1 and principally — 

2 A Just let me read it. 

3 - (Pause.) 

4 A Okay. 

5 Q I am principally concerned about the point 

6 that you make in the full paragraph that begins "Second," 

7 and you're telling Dr. Ikle: "I left in the 

8 recommendation to keep pressure on our allies to cease 

9 transferring military equipment to Iran. Although we 

10 have had some successes to date, maintaining, if not 

11 strengthening, our initiative is one of the few steps we 

12 can take to try to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq War. 

13 And if the war were to end, many of the pressures causing 

14 Iran to seek assistance would cease. 

15 "Therefore, I believe we should not omit this 

16 initiative." 

17 And then you go on to recommend which copies 

18 should be forwarded to the Secretary, and that which 

19 contained your language was in tab A, and the handwritten 

20 note at the top indicates that Dr. Ikle forwarded the 

21 version in tab B, which did not include this language. 

22 Was there any oral discussion between you and 

23 Dr. Ikle on this point? 

24 A There may have been. I don't recall. 

25 Q Do you know or recall what his reasons may 



\mmm 



10 



uNcussmi 



10 



1 have been for not wanting to include this point? 

2 A If 1 understand, if I remember correctly, th« 

3 . only point of difference was whether it was post-Khomeini 

4 or not. And I don't know — it strikes me that he had a 

5 good understanding of the Secretary and did not want — 

6 didn't think the Secretary would be interested in 

7 anything with the present government. That's the only 

8 thing I recall. 

9 Q I believe the version which went forward also 

10 left out the language about Operation Staunch and keeping 

11 pressure on our allies not to ship arms to Iran? 

12 A I'd have to check tab B. 

13 (Pause.) 

14 A Well, if this is tab B, it keeps in the point 

15 about stopping arms. 

16 Q Okay. 

17 A I believe that was the only point of 

18 difference there could have been, whether it was post- 
19 Khomeini or present, not on the staunching of the arms, 

20 as I remember. 

21 Q If you would, then, continuing in a 

22 chronological fashion, after the draft NSDD involvement 

23 where you were mote or less staffing and transmitting, 

24 what happened next in terms of your involvement? 

25 A I don't recall any further discussion on this 



mmm 



11 



UNGUOKD 



11 



1 subject. I never saw anything more of the NSDD, never 

2 heard anything more of it. And roughly in November, I 

3 returned from a trip to Pakistan and somewhere else, and 

4 either the Secretary someone else had indicated to me 

5 that they had a feeling there were some discussions going 

6 on with Iran. And_ they wanted me to find out, If I 

7 could, what was going on. 

8 Q And this would have been when, as best you can 

9 date it? 

10 I A Late November. I got back 24th or 25th, 

11 roughly, of November. It was approximately that time 

12 frame that they mentioned this to me. 

13 I nosed around as best I could, finally 

14 decided to invite Ollie North for a luncheon in my 

15 office. I have subsequently determined that the date of 

16 that was 3 December. 

17 I did have lunch with Ollie and asked him if 

18 anyone had been meeting with the Iranians. And he told 

19 me that he had. I made some comments about this to 

20 Ollie, and then I reported this verbally to the 

21 Secretary. 

22 Q What can you tell us about the nature of the 

23 comments you mad6~to Colonel North? 

24 A As best I remember, I told him that I knew my 

25 boss, I felt my boss, didn't know anything about it. I 



mmm 



12 



uncussibedj 



1 didn't think the Secretary of state knew anything about 

2 it. I thought he was way out of line. I think I used 

3 • the term that his ass was way out on a limb and that he 

4 ought to get everyone together quickly to discuss this 

5 problem. 

6 Q Did you say something along the lines of, he 

7 needed to get the » l aiii ew% « together? 

8 A That's a term I often use. That's basically 

9 the recollection. 

10 Q And that means the principals — Secretary 

11 Weinberger, Secretary Shultz, the National Security 

12 Advisor, et cetera? 

13 A Yes, and the President. 

14 Q Do you have any information which would lead 

15 you to believe that the December 7 meeting among the 

16 principals ojr the elephants was a result of this 

17 recommendation to Colonel North? 

18 A I can only state that Colonel North had a 

19 great respect for Secretary Weinberger, and I can 

20 remember that he was quite shocked at the strength of my 

21 statement to him. 

22 I can't say that the December 7 meeting was a 

23 direct outcome of~this. It was just my recommendation to 

24 him to get them together, the elephants together, as soon 

25 as possible. 



wmmm 



13 




13 

1 . . Q What did he tell you was the reason for this 

2 initiative or these discussions or the meetings that he 

3 had had with the Iranians? 

4 A I've thought about it a lot. I can't quite 

5 remember what he told me the reason was. 

6 Q Did he mention a broader strategic concern, or 

7 was it more directly related to hostages, or both, or can 

8 you recall? 

9 AX can't recall, I just can't recall. 

10 Q Did you make any notes of your meeting? 

11 A No, I did not. 

12 Q A memoranda for the record? 

13 A No, I did not. I 

14 Q Did you meet with Secretary Weinberger prior 

15 to the December 7 meeting? 

16 A Yes, I did. 

17 Q And was anyone else present at that meeting? 

18 General Powell? 

19 A My recollection is that General Powell was 

20 there. I don't think anyone else was there. I can't 

21 even be sure about General Powell, but he was almost 

22 always present. 

23 Q And who initiated that meeting? 

24 A I can only imagine that it was probably 

25 General Powell, speaking for the Secretary. 



mmma 



14 



UKGIASSIBED 



14 



1- „^ Q And what do you recall saying? 

2 A I recall that prior to the meeting I had 

3 " strategized, prior to meeting with the Secretary. But 

4 after being informed that there was going to be some sort 

5 of meeting that weekend, strategizing with my colleagues 

6 at State how best to stop what we understood was going to 

7 be an item for discussion, that is the provision of some 

8 sort of arms to Iran. 

9 Q And would that have been — 

10 A Particularly with Mr. Raphel, Arnie Raphel, 

11 who at that time was the principal deputy assistant 

12 secretary for Near East, South Asia. And the thrust of 

13 our discussions was that we felt it would be most 

14 effective if Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of 

15 Defense Weinberger could have a very united front on this 

16 issue. 

17 We felt quite secure in speaking for our 

18 bosses because we both knew our bosses' minds on this 

19 subject, and we wanted them to approach the President 

20 with roughly the same arguments, hoping that there would 

21 be some resonance. 

22 Q And in those discussions with Mr. Raphel, was 

23 it your impression he already knew about this initiative, 

24 or did you have to bring him up to speed? 

25 A I can't guite remember, but I know that when 



wmm 



15 



UNCUSSIIKD 



1 the Secretary or General Powell had asked me to see If I 

2 could find out something about somebody talking to the 

3 ■ Iranians I also checked in with Arnie Raphel, who is an 

4 excellent bureaucrat and I figured he'd know everything. 

5 He was getting vibes, but he, at least to me, 

6 couldn't put his fj.nger on anybody. So I'm quite sure 

7 after I spoke with Ollie that I also informed Arnie of 

8 the fact that Ollie had been meeting with the Iranians. 

9 Q So you talked with him regularly? 

10 A Daily. 

11 Q Going to the December 7 meeting — 

12 A Even today. 

13 Q — did you and General Powell meet to 

14 strategize before that meeting with the Secretary? 

15 A I don't recall meeting with him to strategize 

16 before that., 

17 Q In that meeting, can you tell us what each 

18 party said, what the nature of the discussion was? 

19 A In general, I reminded, I guess is the proper 

20 word, the Secretary of Defense of the down sides of this 

21 initiative. I needed not remind him, because he was 

22 quite vocal and outspoken on all of the reasons why this 

23 would be bad. 

24 I believe that I gave him a one or two page 

25 sheet of information on the Arms Export Control Act, I 



UNCbtSSiED 



16 



IWSSIEIED 



16 



1 think developed out of a conversation with Mr. Raphel and 

2 myself. At least that information, if not the sheet 

3 ' itself, was also going to be provided to George Shultz, 

4 so they both would be acting on the same wavelength. 

5 We talked about — and either I would make the 

6 point or the Secretary would make the point, and we'd 

7 develop it, provision of any arms to Iran could be seen 

8 as bargaining for hostages; the fact that we had enormous 

9 equities in the Gulf and that all of our other friends 

10 would be terribly concerned with any opening to Iran that 

11 hasn't been thought about and talked about with them. 

12 And number three, that Operation Staunch was 

13 something that both he and George Shultz had been very 

14 outspoken about, and we were leaning on our allies all 

15 over town and all over the world to stop sales of even 

16 questionable^ systems to Iran. And here it would turn out 

17 that we were engaged in the same thing, and we would look 

18 awfully stupid. 

19 The Secretary, to my remembrance, also 
2 questioned whether it would be legal or not. 

21 Q What can you recall about the nature of any 

22 statement he made in that regard? 

23 A I just"remember the discussion being about 

24 legality. I can't remember any specific statement that 

25 he made. 



WUSSIEIED 



17 



lElASSiED 



17 



1 Q Was there any discussion about notification of 

2 the Congress that we were to ship arms to Iran? 

3 • A The sheet that I gave him, if I remember 

4 correctly — I don't have it — had some of the facets 

5 surrounding Hill notification. So if he didn't talk 

6 about it, I believe something was contained in the sheet. 

7 Q Would these have been dollar thresholds for 

8 when notice was required? 

9 A Dollar, there was a dollar ceiling on one 

10 sale. I forget if it's $25 or $50 million limit of a 

11 major defense sale, and then a one item limit. So there 

12 were two aspects to it. They were both basically 

13 dollars. 

14 Q And they would have been $50 million in one 

15 case and 14 inthe other? 

16 A I think it was 50 and 14. I don't remember if 

17 it was 25 and 14 or 50 and 14. 

18 Q Was there any discussion of whether U.S. 

19 approval before the fact needed to be given if any third 

20 parties were involved in shipping arms, or were third 

21 parties not discussed at that point? 

22 A I can't recall that third parties were 

23 discussed at that~meeting. 

24 Q What would you have stated at that time as 

25 your understandino of bothL U^-iiaiicy and U.S. law with 




18 



wmsuB 



18 



regard to arms sales to Iran? And I understand you're 

2 no£ a' lawyer and I'm not asking you to make a legal 

3 » judgment, but as a policymaker? 

4 A I will tell you what I would have responded as 

5 to policy. Our policy was to embargo all arms to Iran 

6 and to try to force them and the Iraqis back to the 

7 status quo ante of 1979, before the war started; and to 

8 try to limit the export of Islamic fundamentalism from 

9 Iran. 

10 Q Regarding the law, if the U.S. were to sell 

11 weapons to Iran, I would have said that this would not be 

12 in consonance with our laws, as we had an embargo. 

13 MR. SABA: Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a 

14 moment the policy at the time of Operation Staunch. How 

15 was this Operation Staunch communicated by the Department 

16 of Defense to our friends, allies, world in general? 

17 THE WITNESS: First of all, it was 

18 coordinated, and there was actually a coordinator in the 

19 Department of State. It was Dick Fairbanks when it first 

20 started, and then Bill Schneider took it over, and they 

21 had the lead for this. 

22 We went out as a matter of State cables to all 
2 3 of our posts arouftd the world to announce our policy in 

24 Operation Staunch, and then members of the Administration 

25 — the Secretary -Of JSefense,. the Secretary of State, or 



wm%ii 



19 



\imssm 



19 



1 myself as a Defense person — in traveling, meeting with 

2 foreigners, when the subject would either arise or we had 

3 reason to believe somebody was engaged or about to engage 

4 in an arms sale, we would preempt and put in front of 

5 them our own policy, Operation Staunch, and tell them why 

6 we thought this was the proper policy and try to persuade 

7 them as best we could not to engage in arms sales. 

8 This was also enunciated in a series of 

9 speeches and referred to in speeches by Administration 

10 officials for several years, 

11 BY MR. SABA: 

12 Q Do you recall when that policy began? 

13 A Dick Fairbanks was in the job. It was right 

14 after the Lebanon experience. I would say '83, '84, 

15 probably '84. 

16 Q Did you travel between that time and, let's 

17 say, the end of 1985 to various countries explaining that 

18 policy? 

19 A Not specifically to explain that policy, but I 

20 did travel to various countries. And for instance ,^^^^| 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^Hor some country 

22 be engaged in selling not just weapons, but dual use 

23 items, jeeps or something — we would certainly, or I 

24 would certainly, have put in front of them our policy. 

25 ^H,t^ I^id jiQt^ci^a^jjarticular trip #to sell 



0' 



20 



\imssM 



20 



1 that particular policy. 

2 Q But during your trips, do you recall incident's 

3 ' in which you did explain that policy to them? 

4 A Yes, I do. And there were foreign visitors 

5 into my office. 

6 Q Do you recall what countries these were? 

7 A Well, I can remember having discussions with 
jjj^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H remember hearing 

9 about it from other colleagues, discussions with the 

10 European allies. 

11 I remember -- in fact, we continue right now 

12 to have these discussions with 

13 Q Excuse me. Do you mean — 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H excuse 

15 I think all of our Arab friends, whether I 

16 visited there or they visited me in the Pentagon, were 

17 interested in this. And I would absolutely have spoken 

18 to them about it. 

19 Q Do you recall in the period commencing at the 

20 beginning of this policy but ending in 1985 visiting any 

21 of the Arab capitals and in the course of those meetings 

22 discussing it? 

23 A I don''t remember it specifically, but I did 

24 visit Arab countries and was in the capitals. But I 

25 don't remember specifically talking this policy. 



IINetAS«D 



21 



\immm 



21 



Q During 1985, particularly the last three 
months, do you recall any conversations with friends, 
allies, indicating to you personally that they had 
knowledge of American arms shipments? 

A Over the past several years, no, I can't 
remember those thr_ee mon ths specifically. But I had 

f r o m H^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H A r a b 
they felt that the Iranians were getting outside supplies 
of weapons, and in general those countries were putting 
the blame on Israel. 

Q Did they indicate that these arms were 
American arms, American origin arms? 

A They indicated they were outside aj 




They also, the Arabs in general, would speak 
about the ability of the Iranians to keep their aircraft 
in the air and think that these parts must have come from 
the United States, but generally through Israel. But the 
impact of what they were telling me was that Israel, they 
felt, was doing this, not the United States. 

Q Was th?re any discussion at that time 
specifically of TOW or Hawk parts? 

A Not that I remember. 



UNeiit^m 



22 



UNCUiSW 



22 



1 . Q So you would say, then, that it was fair to 

2 state that our public policy, as well as our internal 

3 policy, was expressed in Operation Staunch? 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q And was opposed to sales, whether by us 

6 directly or by our allies? 

7 A That's correct. 

8 Q And it was correct that during that period, 

9 had a nation which acquired arms from us, it would have 

10 required our advance permission to transfer those arms to 

11 any third party? 

12 A That's my understanding. It's called a third 

13 country transfer. 

14 Q And had there been a request to make a 

15 transfer to Iran, what would your position have been? 

16 A The Secretary of Defense would have opposed 

17 it, I would have too. The Department would have opposed 

18 it. 

19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

20 Q Whose permission is required? 

21 A The Secretary of state has the cognizance of 

22 those things. In general terms, it would be hard to 

23 believe that the Secretary of State, over the strenuous 

24 objection of the Secretary of Defense, would okay 

25 something like that without presidential approval. 



wtmim 



UttGUSSIlD 



23 



X Q Am I correct in understanding that the statute 

2 givss the authority to the President, but that by 

3 executive order he has delegated it to the Secretary of 

4 State? 

5 A I would have to review that, but that is my 

6 understanding, yes. But I don't know the mechanics. 

7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

8 Q Did we communicate back to the American public 

9 our policy? Was that part of your duty? 

10 A Yes. 

11 Q How was that done? 

12 A Generally, in speeches, public discussions, Q 

13 and A's, radio. 

14 Q And these speeches were made inside the United 

15 States? 

16 A Yes. 

17 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

18 Q Anything that you can tell us about your 

19 discussions with Secretary Weinberger prior to the 

20 December 7 meeting when you and General Powell met with 

21 him to brief him? 

22 A Well, I say I think General Powell was there. 

2 3 I know I was there, but that's basically it, other than I 

24 must say he totally and completely opposed the policy. 

25 MR. KREUZER: Was Dr. Ikle there? 



uttcranED 



24 



UNCLASIP 



1 THE WITNESS: No. 

2 * '* " MR. KREUZER: But he is the primary policy 

3 » maker? 

4 THE WITNESS: He is the Under Secretary for 

5 Policy. 

6 MR. KREUZER: So he was aware of all of this 

7 and read into all of this? 

8 THE WITNESS: I don't feel he was aware of all 

9 of it. My understanding is that he was not aware of this 

10 and the finding. None of us were until some time later. 

11 I think that after he signed forward the answer to the 

12 draft NSDD, that Dr. Ikle was not involved in this. 

13 That's my remembrance, until late in '86. 

14 I know I brought him into the loop. 

15 MR. KREUZER: But normally, being a policy 

16 question, wouldn't this go down to the special assistant 

17 staff, who looks at policy questions, and be fed up to 

18 the Under Secretary? 

19 THE WITNESS: No, they don't do policy 

20 questions. They do covert actions. You're talking about 
21 

22 BY MR. KREUZER: (Resuming) 

23 Q Okay. -"But would it go down to Under Secretary 

24 Alderman? 

25 A Deputy Under Secretary Alderman, it could if 



l)NttAS«D 



25 



UNCiissra 



25 



1 the Under Secretary designated it. 

2 Q Then would it normally go to Dr. Ikle? 

3 A That's right. 

4 Q Well then, would this be a departure from 

5 normal procedures? Would this amount to a departure from 

6 normal procedures? 

7 A It amounts to the Secretary of Defense telling 

8 me to handle this with extraordinary sensitivity, and 

9 that's what I did. If you say is that the way things are 

10 normally handled, no, it is not. But they are normally 

11 handled the way the Secretary of Defense wants. 

12 Q So if it weren't what he regarded as an 

13 extremely sensitive situation, then it might have gone to 

14 Alderman? 

15 A I would have assumed that would have been the 

16 case. 

17 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

18 Q Did Secretary Weinberger tell you this was an 

19 especially sensitive matter, with close hold, et cetera? 

20 A Yes. 

21 Q In that session? 

22 A Yes, either there or the time before, when he 

23 asked me to nose -Iround to see if anybody was talking to 

24 Iran. But he said, this is very sensitive. 

25 Q After the December meeting at the White House, 



mmm 



26 



lEliiSSIEliD 



26 



1 didr* Secretary Weinberger at some point upon returning 

2k fill you in on what had transpired? 

3 A He filled me in to the extent that he and 

4 George, George Shultz, had made very strong 

5 representations to the Secretary — excuse me, to the 

6 President — and that he. Secretary Weinberger, felt that 

7 the initiative was dead. I have used a term to describe 

8 it that is a term of his. He said: We have strangled 

9 the baby in its cradle. 

10 Q No doubt in your mind, and apparently in the 

11 Secretary's that at that point the initiative was dead? 

12 A There was no doubt in my mind. 

13 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

14 Q Did you have any knowledge at that point that 

15 there had been transfers to Iran of American arms by the 

16 Israelis? 

17 A I don't recall any knowledge of that at all at 

18 that time. 

19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

20 Q Did anything transpire from that point on this 

21 issue forward until January? 

22 A Not that I recall. 

23 Q Did yoQ report any of what Secretary 

24 Weinberger told you to anyone else? 

25 A In general terms, to Arnie Raphel. And I 



mmmi 



27 



WMWi 



27 



1 think basically, and I don't remember at all ray words, 

2 • but I think it would have been, I think we got past this 

3 one. 

4 Q And did he convey Secretary Shultz's 

5 impression of the meeting? 

6 A No, I don't remember him characterizing George 

7 Shultz's impression, but he gave me the impression that 

8 that's the way he felt. He Arnie gave me the impression 

9 that that's the way he felt, that we were past this and 

10 that it was behind us. 

11 Q So what would you say would be the next point 

12 that you would have any involvement at all in this? 

13 A In January I was informed that the Secretary 

14 was going to another meeting, another one of these 

15 meetings to discuss the initiative, which I don't believe 

16 we called the initiative. We just called it the Iran 

17 deal or whatever. 

18 I believe I checked with Colin Powell to see 

19 if there was any need for me to do anything, and he said, 

20 no, the Secretary was armed. I think we had a 

21 conversation, but it was a rehash of our previous 

22 conversation. 

23 Q You said the Secretary was armed. With what? 

24 A The knowledge that he had before, that it was 

25 still good. 



mmm 



28 



ut%y^(iB 



28 



1 Q And when the Secretary went to the January 7th 

2 meeting, were you later filled in on what transpired? 

3 A I don't remember being — well, I wasn't 

4 filled in on what transpired at that meeting until much 

5 later. But some time later that month or in early 

6 February, I was informed that weapons were going to go to 

7 Iran. 

8 Q When was the first point at which you recall 

9 having been informed that the weapons went pursuant to a 

10 presidential finding? 

11 A I don't remember hearing about the finding 

12 until somewhat later. But some time — and my 

13 recollection is in February — General Powell told me 

14 about TOW'S going, and this was that the President had 

15 decided. And so — 

16 Q Are you able more precisely to date it? 

17 A No, I am not. I attempted to get a lot 

18 smarter when I was called upon to be the Department's 

19 witness in the initial hearings around these events, back 

20 when Mr. Casey first testified. And at that time I had 

21 learned more about the dates things went forward, I mean 

22 things actually moved from the Army to the CIA. 

23 But since I wasn't in that loop, it really 

24 didn't matter to me. I was informed in general terms 

25 that another trenche was going each way through the year 



IINettS«D 



29 



\^mssm 



29 



1 of '86 each time a trenche went. 

2 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

3 • Q Excuse me. When you say another trenche, do 

4 you mean you had been informed that one had gone? 

5 A No, I was informed in February of a trenche, 

6 and then some time later I was informed of another 

7 trenche, and another trenche, and then finally I think 

8 the last one was in November, the third or the fourth 

9 trenche, the announcement that I knew about. 

10 BY MR. KREUZER: (Resuming) 

11 Q The second one went when, roughly? 

12 A Well, I have given you all the documents I 

13 have, but I just don't have the dates in my mind. I was 

14 in general terms informed after they went. 

15 MR. SAXON: Let me have you mark that as the 

16 next exhibit. 

17 (The document referred to was 

18 marked for identification as 

19 Armitage Exhibit No. 3.) 

20 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

21 Q And what I am showing you, Mr. Secretary, is 

22 an NSC document. Do you see on it the number in the 

23 first page, N-303153? That is the Senate Select 

24 Committee's. 

25 A You have a different one. It's 9131. Do we 



UNliti^Fe 



udciASsn 



1 have the same document. 

2 (Pause.) 

3 ■ A Ves, okay. 

4 MR. SAXON: I'm sorry. Let's go off the 

5 record for a second. 

g (Discussion off the record.) 

MR. SAXON: Back on the record. 
This is a chronology prepared by the National 
security Council. You see, I believe, at the top, it 
says "Historical Chronology," and the date is 11/20/86. 
j_j_ THE WITNESS: Correct. 

■^2 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

j_3 ■ Q If you would, look to page 30371. 

14 A All right. 

15 Q And look at the last full paragraph and let me 
Ig give you a moment to read that. 

17 (Pause.) 

Q I am not going to ask you to vouch for the 
accuracy of that statement, but it says, in terms of 
these transfers, the shipment of th e Army TOW's from 
to the CIA^^^^^^^ it 

"Policy level coordination for these 
arrangements was-iffected by NSC (North) with DOD 



24 (Armitage) and CIA (Clair George) 



5 Dof« this mean that you were involved in some 



31 



UNtlASSiED 



31 



1 coordination for the logistics of these shipments? 

2 A No, it only means to me that if things are 

3 ■ going to move 01 lie would tell me. I was involved in no 

4 way with any of the coordination of the logistics. 

5 Q Wouldn't it be your best judgment that this is 

6 simply an incorrect and inaccurate statement? 

7 A I don't know that it's so inaccurate. I was 

8 the policy level guy who knew about this, but never 

9 talked about logistics with our services or anybody else. 

10 Policy level, yes, I was the policy guy in the 

11 Pentagon who knew about it the program. But I had no 

12 logistics activity whatever. 

13 Q Let me say, in response to a question by Mr. 

14 Shapiro, that this is not something the meeting prepared. 

15 This Is an NSC chronology bearing the date of November 

16 20, 1986. 

17 Mr. Secretary, what would you say would be the 

18 first time you learned about the issue of U.S. 

19 replenishment of Israeli TOW's stocks? 

20 A I have thought myself, I believe the first 

21 time I learned about Israel providing weapons and we 

22 repaying Israel was when Mr. Casey testified in November. 

23 I think that's thi first time I really knew of it. 

24 Q November of '86? 

25 A That's right. 



32 



uNOuissra 



32 



1 Q ■ And there were no discussions at the Pentagon 

2 » to which you were a party? 

3 A Now, I have seen a paper in the documents we 

4 turned over to you which discussed either Hawks or TOW's 

5 for Iran, but I wasn't involved in the development of 

6 that. I saw it some time later. 

7 The first time I knew that I remember was when 

8 Casey testified up here, I believe. 

9 Q That would be the point paper, as it was 

10 denominated, that Dr. Gaffney prepared at the request of 

11 either Colin Powell or Noel Cook in '85? 

12 A Yes, that's right. I saw that paper some time 

13 later. 

14 Q Dr. Gaffney did not make you aware of that? 

15 A No, I don't think Dr. Gaffney made me aware of 

16 it. 
Q Mr. Rudd? 
A I think some time later in the year Glenn made 

me aware of the point paper. I think that's when I saw 
it. I am not sure of the dates. 

Q Did you meet on January 2nd of 1986 with Major 
General Menachem Meron of Israel to discuss replacement 

23 of Israeli TOW's By the United States? 

24 A I don't remember. I might have met with him. 

25 I don't remember^fe^iijg^njt^at^ubject, 



TNffim 



25 



^mmm 



1 Q So your best recollection would be that you 

2 did not discuss that subject? 

3 ■ A My best recollection is I did not, though I 

4 could have met with Mendy, Mendy Meron. 

5 Q Given your stated feelings fairly clearly 

6 about the wisdom of U.S. policy in terms of arms to Iran, 

7 direct or indirect, and your statements about Operation 

8 Staunch, do you think that you would recall if you had 

9 discussed with General Meron that issue? 

10 A I think so. 

11 Q And if it were his statement that you did have 

12 such a discussion, that wouldn't change your 

13 recollection? 

14 A I would say that I don't remember it and I 

15 don't recall it. 

16 Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about the 

17 readiness issue in terms of the provision of the TOW's to 

18 Iran. I assume readiness is something the Pentagon is 

19 fairly concerned about? 

20 A Yes. 

21 Q Has anyone given you a status report or made 

22 you aware of whether Army funds have been replenished for 

23 those sales which~went forward for the purchase of TOW's 

24 to replenish DA stocks? 



Wtmm 



34 



iitmsm 



34 



1 Q And what would be your understanding, that 

2 those moneys have been made available? 

3 A My understanding is that the great majority of 

4 ' those moneys were made available. It appears that the 

5 Army in some fashion undercharged to some degree, and my 

6 understanding was that the Secretary of Defense had asked 

7 that we recoup that shortfall. 

8 Q I guess the question is this. Would it 

9 surprise you, then, to find out today, more than a year 

10 after the first shipment went forward, that there is 

11 still $5.6 million that has not been made available to 

12 the Army to buy TOW missiles with? 

13 A If what you're saying is that the CIA still 

14 owes 5.6, it would surprise me. 

15 Q Ko, the CIA has provided funds and, in 

16 whatever way they work their way down the channels in the 

17 Pentagon or the DA, they have not been made available to 

18 the people at Micom who actually purchase TOW missiles. 

19 A It would seem to me that's a long time. 

20 Q Did you have any involvement at all on the 

21 Hawk repair parts issue? 

22 A None that I recall. 

2 3 Q Let me~go back to the issue of a presidential 

24 finding and have you address your discussions at whatever 

25 period you had them with Secretary Taft and Secretary 



UNgkAtiMD 



OiUS^ED 



35 



1 WelTiberger on the issue of presidential finding. I 

2» believe you did have a discussion in April of '86 with 

3 Mr. Taft? 

4 A No, I didn't. But we, the Secretary of 

5 Defense and I, were on a trip at that time in the 

6 Pacific. Mr. Taft^was involved in calling forward, I 

7 think, another trenche of weapons. He has, Mr. Taft has, 

8 told me subsequently — and this was in the past several 

9 months — that at that time he asked to see a 

10 presidential finding and was shown what he was told was 

11 one by John Poindexter. 

12 Q Where was that? 

13 A In John Poindexter 's office. 

14 This was not communicated to me at the time, 

15 in April. This was when I was preparing to come to the 

16 Hill. 

17 Q I understand. And your understanding of that, 

18 does it extend to whether Secretary Taft informed 

19 Secretary Weinberger that he had seen the finding? 

20 A This is — again, I've been told this in the 

21 past several months, that Mr. Taft said he had indicated 

22 that to the Secretary during the phone call, the phone 

23 conversation. But I don't think the Secretary recalls it 

24 at all, and I was not privy to that conversation. 

25 Q When would that have been dated, roughly? 



^mssm 



mmssm 



1 A April. 

2 Q Were you party to a discussion or conversation 

3 * with Secretary Weinberger after these matters began to 

4 become public over this issue of when the Secretary might 

5 or might not have been made aware of the finding? 

6 A Yes. 

7 Q Tell us about that? 

8 A The Secretary, as I recall, in November of '86 

9 was called to the White House, and he had a finding read 

10 to him. He specifically mentioned to me that it was read 

11 to him, because he said he had not seen it, actually seen 

12 it. 

13 I think it was published in the New York Times 

14 or somewhere, but it was read to him. 

15 Q And this would have been when? 

16 A November '86, to my memory. 

17 Q As these matters were reaching a — 

18 A While they were unfolding, but they hadn't 

19 blossomed. I mean, the leaks were out there and 

20 certainly there was a lot of scurrying around. We were 

21 getting ready to go to the Hill and I was asking the 

22 Secretary, do you know anything about a finding? And he 

23 said: I've never^seen one. 

24 And I asked: Did we participate in it, in the 

25 formulation of it. And he said, not to his knowledge. 



umssm 



37 



UNGIASSIFIED 



37 



1 That's also true of me. So that's basically what I 

2 remember. 

3 • Q Did you recall telling him at some point, 

4 either in that session or shortly thereafter, what you 

5 had learned from Secretary Taft about him having read the 

6 finding? 

7 A Yes, or Mr. Taft was there, one or the other. 

8 Q And I believe you told — 

9 A The Secretary can't remember that, as far as I 

10 know. He just said, I don't remember that. 

11 Q I'm not trying to put words in your mouth or 

12 in his, but tell me if this is more or less what you 

13 recall. You told us when we interviewed you something 

14 along the lines of that Mr. Taft said to Secretary 

15 Weinberger: But I read it back in April and informed you 

16 about it. At which point the Secretary said, oh really? 

17 Does that sound right? 

18 A Yes. Whether it was "Oh really," I don't 

19 remember that, whether it was Taft that told me. But 

20 Taft might have been there, I think, at this discussion 

21 with the Secretary when this came up. 

22 Q Are there any other points on the arms to Iran 

23 that you think we~need to cover that we have not done? 

24 A I would be pleased to try to answer any points 

25 that you have. 



uNetAsstfe 



38 



\immm 



38 



1 MR. SABA: I have a few things. 

2 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

3 " Q Okay. In a moment I want to walk through a 

4 couple of points in the statement that you made to§ the 

5 DAIG. 

6 A To the who? 

7 Q To the Department of the Army IG, on the 

8 pricing issue. 

9 Has there ever come a time when you talked 

10 about the replenishment issue or the TOW's which Israel 

11 transferred in 1985? 

12 A I don't remember it. I don't recall it, I 

13 don't recall knowing about it. 

14 Q Would you have normally come to know about it 

15 in the course of business? 

16 A I would have hoped so. 

17 Q Did you know anything about the 100 TOW's — 

18 I'm sorry, the 100 Hawks, which were in the pipeline to 

19 Israel and which were being shipped about November 20th, 

20 1985? 

21 A I knew about that in 1986, late '86, because I 

22 think we asked, I asked, DSAA, what's our latest Hawk 

23 deal, when's the last time we sold anything to Israel of 

24 TOW magnitude or Hawk things. And I think I was told 

25 there were some Hawk missiles, there was a normal 



Mmm 



\immm 



39 



1 transaction in '85, a normal notified transaction, et 

2 cetsra, et cetera. 

3 " But I didn't, to my recollection, know that 

4 until some time as we were roughly either preparing for 

5 the Hill testimony in late November of '86 or even later 

6 than that. 

7 Q When you learned of — when did you say you 

8 learned of the '85 transfers? 

9 A I didn't know about the Hawk. There was 

10 something about when the Secretary asked me or Powell 

11 asked me to go investigate, to see if I could find out if 

12 someone was talking to the Iranians, there was also, it 

13 seemed to me, some intel at the time that mentioned 

14 missiles. 

15 We didn't understand very much, but it was all 

16 part and parcel of, we were trying to figure out who was 

17 talking to the Iranians. 

18 Q This was intel that you picked up from^^^^^ 

21 other. 

22 Q Okay. I'd like to hear more about it.? 

23 A Well,-^hen I say I knew something about 

24 missiles, I didn't know what it was or what context or 

25 whose they were. 



mmm 



40 



UNtlASSiED 



40 



1 ^^ BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

2 Q When you had lunch with Colonel North on 

3 December 3rd, 1985, he didn't tell you that the Israelis 

4 had made some shipments to Iran? 

5 A I don't recall him telling me that. 

6 BY MR. _SABA: (Resuming) 

7 Q So there came a time when you did know at 

8 least of the TOW transfers in '85? 

9 A No, I don't remember knowing of the TOW — 

10 Q In '86? 

11 A Yes, in '86, but not to Israel. To Israel, 

12 the best of my recollection, I became aware of this when 

13 Bill Casey testified and Mike Armacost and I were sitting 

14 in with him. That's the first time I remember knowing 

15 about it. 

16 Q Just so I understand, the first time you 

17 understood about the Israel transfers of TOW's was when 

18 Bill Casey provided that information in his testimony? 

19 A To the best of my recollection, that's right. 

20 Q This strikes me as, it would have bothered me, 

21 I think. In view of all of the public positions you had 

22 taken in Operation Staunch in 1985, perhaps in early '86 
2 3 and before that, what was your reaction to that? 

24 A I hoped it was the same reaction as the 

25 Secretary of Defense. We hated it. We hated the 



: Defense. We hated it. 



41 



mmm 



i provision of weapons. There was never a doubt in anybody 

2 in Defense's mind that this was a bad policy. 

3 * . Q Did it strike you as unusual that you didn't 

4 know? 

5 A After being in government a while, it strikes 

6 me as less unusual. Yes, I would have hoped I would have 

7 known about this going to Israel, but I can't recall it. 

8 Q I am obviously trying to understand how the 

9 Assistant Secretary views a policy, having publicly gone 

10 to allies and friends and our own people and upheld one 

11 policy, and having heard a year later that while you were 

12 out talking about one policy the reverse was in fact 

13 happening? 

14 A Well, part of the time we knew the reverse was 

15 happening, we were still talking about Operation Staunch. 

16 In my case, from February of '86 we continued to talk 

17 about Operation Staunch. 

18 But each time I know for myself, or I can 

19 imagine for the Secretary of Defense, we didn't like it 

20 because we realized the other hand was providing some 

21 quantities of weapons to Iran. So we thought it was very 

22 hypocritical. We hated it. 

23 The hope was, at least as the Secretary of 

24 Defense has reconstructed this to me, that in some time 

25 along the line of this policy — that is, as we were 



Lne or tnis policy — rna 



42 



wmmm 



1 providing these weapons the Secretary, as he stated it, 

2 would find an opportunity to stop the policy of providing 

3 weapons to Iran and we wouldn't have lost ground in 

4 Operation Staunch in the meantime. 

5 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, in your 

6 conversations with Secretary Weinberger, do you ever 

7 recall him saying words to the effect that the Israels 

8 are sending lethal equipment or sending arms or equipment 

9 to Iran and they've got to knock that stuff off? 

10 Do you ever remember hearing anything like 

11 that? 

12 THE WITNESS: Well, I can recall not only the 

13 Secretary of Defense, but the Secretary of the State in 

14 the past having made what we call demarches to the 

15 Israeli officials about provision of Israeli equipment to 

16 the Iranians. 

17 And we had made several representations to the 

18 Israelis. The Secretary of Defense has made some, I have 

19 made some, George Shultz had made some. And generally we 
2 receive the same answer: governmental policy forbade 

21 that. 

22 MR. KREUZER: Would that be U.S. -made Israeli 

23 equipment — in other words the equipment that we sold 

24 them? 

25 THE WITNESS: It was not specified. It was 



UNGbtSSm 



43 



(iNtUSSIFe 



43 



1 the Israelis were selling equipment. It was never 

2 specified that I know to be U.S. equipment. It was that 

3 ■ the Israelis were engaged in airms sales. 

4 MR. KREUZER: But the Secretary would mention 

5 this from time to time? 

6 THE WITNESS: Yes. He'd mention it whenever 

7 visitors came, Israeli visitors. 

8 MR. KREUZER: Did he like talk about it in '85 

9 or '84 or '86? 

10 THE WITNESS: I'd like to say yes on all of 

11 the above. I know that it was pretty much a regular 

12 feature of many of his discussions with the Israelis. 

13 You see, they had a different view of the Iran-Iraq war. 

14 They generally held the view that if these two continued 

15 banging away at each other that it was good for Israel. 

16 We felt it was bad for the world because 

17 things could happen like the Stark. Instability couldn't 

18 be contained and the Secretary would make his point that . 

19 we've got to all stop any dealings with Iran, whoever. 

21 MR. KREUZER: So the Secretary then must have 

22 felt very acutely about this whole business when he was 

23 apparently at this meeting on the 7th — what was it, the 

24 7th of January — and then there was one in December. 

25 THE WITNESS: I am quite sure he did. 



mmm 



UNCussra 



44 



1 MR. KREUZER: But how did, like when the word 

2 came through, I presume, from Admiral Poindexter — I'm 

3 just guessing; correct me if I'm wrong — that the word 

4 came through at some point and they said, okay, this 

5 first shipment of TOWs are going to go to Iran, and this 

6 is the order. How did that come through; do you know? I 

7 mean, who talked to whom? 

8 THE WITNESS: No. I have asked the Secretary 

9 and I believe he told me that John Poindexter told him 

10 the President has decided that he, the Secretary, inform 

11 General Powell to get with the Army to have some TOWs 

12 transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency. 

13 MR. KREUZER: So did blow up then? 

14 THE WITNESS: Well, I wasn't there. 

15 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

16 Q That was approximately February 1986? 

17 A I was told approximately February. I don't 

18 know when. 

19 Q But from that time forward, through '86, 

20 Operation Staunch remained our publicly-stated position? 

21 A Yes, it did. 

22 Q Did you have occasion in 1986 to receive 

23 information from foreign leaders that we were 

24 transferring arms directly or indirectly to Iran, 

25 complaints, information, inquiries? 



Mmm 



45 



uimsm 



45 



1 A We continued to get complaints about — it was 

2 generally focused as Israeli sales to Iran. At one time, 

3 - in late ' 86, ^^^^^^^^^^^^H told me that he thought the 

4 Iranian recent successes in the battlefield were not 

5 attributed as much to weapons but to new training and 

6 tactics, and I said, what does that mean. And he just 

7 smiled and my impression was that he felt the Israelis 

8 were involved in making the Iranians a little smarter on 

9 the battlefield. But I have no knowledge that that was 

10 the case. 

11 So the answer is, I guess, yes, from time to 

12 time we got indications that Arab countries felt that 

13 Israel was continuing ta sell weapons. I can't remember 

14 getting told that the. U.S. was doing this. 

15 Q Did the Kuwaitis make any complaints; do you 

16 recall? 

17 A I can't recall. 

18 Q Do you recall in '86 whether you or anyone at 

19 your direction made any speeches in the United States 

20 concerning Operation Staunch? 

21 A Well, my deputies give speeches qui€e often, 

22 and I do, too. And it oftentimes comes up in Q and Xs 

23 and things of that nature. So I don't remember 

24 specifically saying go out and hit Operation Staunch. 

25 But it was a part of our policy and generally would come 



46 



imiinissra 



1 up'trom tine to time. 

2^ Q So you'd say even after February '86 it 

3 remained the Department of Defense's public policy? 

4 A It remained the Administration's public 

5 policy. 

6 Q To oppose transfers or sales to Iran? 

7 A That's correct. 

8 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

9 Q May I have that marked, please, as Exhibit 

10 Number 4? 

11 (The document referred to was 

12 marked Armitage Exhibit 

13 Number 4 for identification.) 

14 This is a copy of your sworn testimony to the 

15 Inspector General team for the Department of Army on 24 

16 December 198$, provided to us by DOD. There are a couple 

17 of questions I have just based on some things that you 

18 stated. I want to make sure I understand what was meant, 

19 or, in a couple of cases, to just see if in fact this is 

20 how you still feel. 

21 If you would look first on page 3 — and the 

22 pages are numbered at the bottom — the portion that I 

23 have marked, and I'll give you a second to read that. 

24 (Pause.) 

25 A 



47 



vmmm 



47 



1 ^^ . Q This simply has reference again, as we have 

2 already talked about, to the draft NSDD from Mr. 

3 McFarlane to the Secretary and has you telling the 

4 investigators "I did have some comments for the 

5 Secretary, the thrust of which was we would be willing to 

6 enter a dialogue with Iran, number one, and under no 

7 circumstance could we conceive of arms sold by the United 

8 States or indeed lifting of our embargo." 

9 As best as you can recall, that's a correct 

10 statement? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q And that's how you still feel? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Okay. Let me get you to look on page 4, eUaout 

15 halfway down, through this full paragraph. There is a 

16 sentence in which you said: "I know the Secretary of 

17 Defense was very suspicious that this might not be 

18 legal." 

19 A Un-huh. 

20 Q As best as you can recall, is that how you 

21 felt? Is that what you understood to be the Secretary's 

22 position? 

23 A Yes. 'l thought that he did have strong 

24 feelings about legality. 

25 Q Let me get you to look, if you would, at the 



UNWm 



48 



UdCUiSW 



48 



1 tojB^Qf page 5, your first full answer there. I'll give 

2^ you a moment to read that paragraph, particularly the 

3 last two-thirds of it. 

4 (Pause.) 

5 A Yes. All right. 

6 Q Let me ask you, if you would, to expand on 

7 that a bit. We know that you have already indicated that 

8 you were either out of town or out of the country at one 

9 point and General Powell needed some information, as you 

10 say here, on HAWKs, and he went to individuals in DSAA, 

11 either Dr. Gaffney — 

12 A I think he went to Mr. Koch and then Koch to 

13 Gaffney, but I have put that together subsequently. 

14 Q All right. In your statement here it says: 

15 "When I came back, DSAA had made me aware that they had 

16 provided to General Powell some information on HAWK 

17 missiles." Do you recall who would have told you that? 

18 A No, I can't remember. Someone said Rudd here 

19 today, and it could have been. 

2 Q As you say there, "My best remembrance is 

21 November-December '85 on that." So at some point in that 

22 time frame you were apprised of what? 

2 3 A That A~ point paper had been done on HAWK. I 

24 actually frankly think it was later than November- 

25 December. It was after I got back from Pakistan and 



It was after I got iJaf JL 1 



DNCkASSIFliS 



1 somewhat after the paper had been provided to General 

2 Powell. 

3 Q Okay. If you would, look down to the next 

4 full paragraph where you were responding to Colonel 

5 Morton. Just take a moment and read that, if you would, 

6 sir. 

7 (Pause.) 

8 A All right. 

9 Q I believe we just addressed this a moment ago, 

10 but let me see if I can get you to recall anything with 

11 any greater clarity. I know we are asking you to look 

12 back in time, but it was your judgment that Secretary 

13 Weinberger said that he was made aware that the President 

14 wanted this either by the President or by Admiral 

15 Poindexter? 

16 A That's correct. I am now more of the opinion 

17 that it was John Poindexter who called the Secretary, but 

18 if the Secretary could come in tomorrow and say it was 

19 the President it would be the same to me. And the reason 

20 that I say I'm somewhat more sure is because I obviously 

21 in the last six or seven months have had many more 

22 conversations with the Secretary on this subject, so I am 

23 getting more sure? 

24 Q And when approximately do you think that would 

25 have been conveyed to you by Secretary Weinberger? 



UNWStflED 



50 



UHliUSSIFJED 



50 



\ A That was after things started to become 

2 palAic, and I was trying to in a hurry get smart so I 

3* could come up here and be reasonable in front of the 

4 Committee. 

5 Q Okay. If you would, sir, look at the next 

6 page, page 6. Youare asked a question here. If you 

7 would look at your answer there (indicating) — 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q You state that "sporadically during the year I 
10 heard either from vice Admiral Jones or Mr. Taft that 

H there were other shipments." Now Vice Admiral Jones 

12 would be Admiral Donald Jones who took General Powell's 

13 place as the Secretary's military assistant? 

14 A That's correct. 

15 Q And Mr. Taft the Deputy Secretary. So is it 

16 your sense from this statement that periodically from 

17 time to time you would hear that other shipments had gone 

18 forward? 

19 A Yes, it is. 

20 Q Would that have been limited to the TOWs or 

21 would you have also been apprised about HAWKs? 

22 A I don't remember specifically hearing about 

23 the HAWKS. I think it was just shipments. From my point 

24 of view, frankly, it didn't matter because I wasn't 

25 involved in any of the arrangements. 




51 



UNcyssinEB 



51 



^ . Q I'd like for you to look at page 10. About 

2 harfVay down the page there's a question that begins, 

3 > "Sir, when we talked to General Powell," and goes on to 

4 say "he thought". General Powell thought, "we should talk 

5 to you and to Admiral Jones. 

6 The investigator says: "Baaed on your 

7 knowledge, sir, do you think it would be beneficial for 

8 us to talk to Mr. Taft?" And you say that you think it 

9 would. Is that your recollection? 
10 A Yes. 

^^ Q And as far as you know did they ever talk to 

12 Mr. Taft? 

13 A I can't say. 

1* Q Would you tell us why you thought it would be 

15 important that they might want to see Secretary Taft? 
1^ A My understanding was — and again this was 

17 after all the revelations were out and I was involved my 

18 own self in trying to piece together what happened — 

19 first of all he, Mr. Taft, played in this issue when the 

20 rest of us were out of town, number one, so he had a 

21 part, and, number two, that I either saw something, some 

22 document or some note or something, memo, to the Deputy 

23 Secretary or I waS informed that perhaps Mr. Marsh or 

24 General Wickham had spoken to him — to him, Taft — 

25 around the VfilA4in%Qe^od. So I thought it was 



mmm 



52 



dNClASSiED 



52 



1 essential that they do see him to get a full picture. 

2 Q Let me now ask you to take a look at 

3 « Deposition Exhibit 5, which is a chronology supplied, as 

4 you can see, by Ambassador-Designate Raphel on his 

5 knowledge of the Iran arms transfer issue. 

6 (The document referred to was 

7 marked Armitage Exhibit 

8 Number 5 for identification.) 

9 I think this would be Arnie Raphel, who was at 

10 State. Again, I'm not going to ask you to vouch for the 

11 accuracy of anything that is in here, but I would like 

12 you to look, if you would, at the page of the chronology 

13 itself that is numbered page 2. 

14 At the top you see November 24. You can see 

15 that each date he has numbered in the various notes and 

16 entries and so forth. If you would look at the December 

17 3 entry, it says "Assistant Secretary Armitage told me 

18 that Colonel North had said that he would be made the 

19 scapegoat if the operation goes wrong, but that we have 

20 lost little by trying." 

21 Is that generally an accurate statement; do 

22 you recall? 

23 A I don't really recall that, but Arnie 's very 

24 good. He's very precise. 

25 Q Do you recall Colonel North telling you that? 



mmm 



muwm 



53 



■I A No, but I do recall Ollie being very shocked 

2 when I said how much the Secretary would hate all this, 

3 and in that context it makes sense to me, but I don't 

4 remember that statement. 

5 Q The next sentence, again from Mr. Raphel's 

6 chronology, "Reportedly, Colonel North added that the 

7 Iranians involved are disreputable." Do you recall him 

8 making that statement to you,. Colonel North? 

9 A I don't think he used that word. I think he 

10 used somewhat more colorful language — some people think 

11 they are dirtballs or something like that. But that's 

12 Ollie. 

13 Q Do you recall conveying that to Mr. Raphel? 

14 A No, I do not recall it, but I'm sure I did 

15 because I shared a lot with Arnie. He was my major 

16 contact on Middle East issues. 

17 Q Let's go off the record a second. 

18 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

20 Q Mr. Secretary, if you would look again at page 

21 2 of Mr. Raphel's chronology, he says: "On Decemb er 6 I 

22 was told that the operation involved trading arms^^^H 

23 ^^^^^^^H and '^hat there was a need to replace 3,300 

24 I-TOWs in Israel." Now he states later that he cannot 

25 recall whether you may have provided him that information 



UNttiWED 



54 



UNOASSIBED 



54 



1 or the information in the next entry for December 6, 

2 which is "my notes reflect that I was given information 

3 on the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and how 

4 they applied to arms transfers." 

5 Would you have a judgment as to which of these 

6 you might have talked to him about? 

7 A I don't think I gave him thel 

8 thing. On the AECA, the Arms Export Control Act, 

9 provisions, I know I did discuss that with Arnie. 

10 Q And would it have been about December 6? 

11 A Oh, yeah. It was in preparation — 

12 Q For the December 7 meeting? 

13 A Yes. I remember having discussions on the 

14 Arms Export Control Act with Ami*. 

15 Q Let me ask you, if you would, to turn to the 

16 top of the next page, page 3. There is a December 13 

17 entry. 

18 A Yes. 

T/*e ComfrkTitz'^ NcrrE6 vWrfJCrf- !^;e^tpj a^f 

19 g And in M% ne^a c, T i rhioh ni-o en ttm page 

20 ^ numbered S-003494, if I could get you to look that over. 

21 A I've got this, Raphel's notes. State. 

22 Q Yes. And then *n^m a quotation. Ha says: 

23 "Raphel thinks Armitage told him this." Let me get you 

24 to look at both the December 13 entry and the one on page 

25 - • ■ - ^- • 



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whether you might have told him any of this. 

A There is no December 13 on page 2. Page 3? 

^ Yes, sir. ^-f^ connmvTTE e »-'O^H\} 

A I don't think on page S-003494^that I am the 
one who told Arnie Raphel at Ollie North hostage meeting 
last night, because I was not a member of the OSG at that 
time. So I don't believe that was me. 

Q Okay. If you would look under the February 5 
entry on page 3 still -- 

A Got it. 

Q It says: "I was told that we w ere attempting 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^^^H" Then 
you look to| tho came pa g e , under February 5, it says: 
"This information came from Armitage, according to 
Raphel 's best guess, because Armitage 's initials appear 
next to it. His note was that 



A I would guess that's me. If you are 
interested, we had had some trouble periodically with^H 

on this Iranian 
caper. At one time we felt at the Department of Defense 
that we were cut off. State apparently was still cut 
off. I was keeping Arnie informed. I don't remember 
that conversation, but it would have been something I 
would have shared with Arnie. 



UNCI:AS«D 



UNCIASSIEIED 



56 



Q I was going to ask you about that. Let me at 
th\3 juncture do it. It was your statement, I believe, '■ 

was out^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^in terms 
Iran at some point; is that correct? 

A My understanding is that OSD was cut out, but 
that Admiral Moreau of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for some 
reason still got his copy and occasionally shared it with 
Powell and the Secretary. And this was what I think had 
tickled the Secretary's nose that there was something 
going down with Iranians. 

Q Do you have a sense as to how that came to be 
or who was responsible for cutting all of OSD? 

A I don't know who did it. I got a sense the 
direction came from the NSC. 

Q Do you have in mind who might have done that? 

A No. Well, there are three or four suspects, 
but I don't know. 

Q Okay. Going back to Mr. Raphel's chronology, 
on page 3 again, the February 12 entry, he says: "I was 
told that David Kimche and the Israeli MFA was no longer 



involved in the arms sales operation." ^On_i, 
ha al^l!iirii.'W»Ks on the February 12 entry, -he sa y fe; "This 
information came either from Ken Quinn or Armitage", and 
the notes simply say "Arms to Iran, Kimche out." Do you 
know whether that i4iqh^«.ta.v/>aJy#ritf rom you? 



imM 



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UNtLASSra 



57 



1 A I don't think it was me, and the reason I say 

2 ■ that is because I knew David Kimche from the Lebanon days 

3 and referred to him as the owl, and I'd have almost 

4 certainly said something like that to Raphel. It's the 

5 owl. 

6 Q Let me ask you, if you would, to look at the 

7 final entry on page 3 of July 24, where Mr. Raphel says: 

8 "I was told that Mr. Ledeen contended he established the 

9 original contacts with Israel to set up the arms 

10 transfers and that this was done with Mr. McFarlane's 

11 permission. The purpose to arrange for a more moderate 

12 regime in Tehran and to do so while Khomeini was still 

13 alive. The Iranian response was to ask for arms." 

14 Now in ht e e f a S S Ci i Vtn n on July 24 it says 

15 "Raphel thinks this came from Armitage, who got it from 

16 Ledeen or North." Do you know whether you might have 

17 been his source for that? 

18 A June 24? 

19 Q July 24. 

20 A Excuse me, July. No. The reason I say I 

21 don't think it was me, I dialed into Michael Ledeen 

22 somewhat later in the year, so I don't think this came 

23 from me. But that's consistent with what Ledeen told me 

24 later in the year, I must say. 

2 5 Q Okay. This completes my references ^o this 



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liMASsra 



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1 dqcwment and I appreciate your helping us to try to make 

2 sense of that. 

3 ■ Mr. Secretary, let me ask you a bit about the 

4 OSG. We've talked about it and you've made reference to 

5 it. Exactly what was the OSG? 

6 A The OSG was a small cell established in the 

7 White House, the Operations Subgroup of the Terrorist 

8 Incidents Working Group, the TIWG. It consisted of 

9 membership in the Department of Defense, the FBI, CIA, 

10 NSC, and the Department of State, and it was established 

11 in the wake of the Holloway Report on Terrorism. It was 

12 to be a mechanism that could reach to principals very 

13 quickly, not having to go through all sorts of 

14 bureaucratic machinations to get quick answers for c[uick- 

15 developing situations. 

16 Q Was there a point at which any of its 

17 discussions focused on arms to Iran or arms for hostages, 

18 as best you recall? 

19 A As best I recall, in several of the meetings 

20 there were inferences by one or another participant to 

21 this, not directly. I don't remember it coming out as a 

22 direct discussion in front of the OSG of this program. 

23 But various members of the OSG had various parts of the 

24 puzzle and either on the margins of an OSG meeting or in 

25 a reference across the table at an OSG meeting there was 



UNiiUiSSIFe 



UNCUkSSIEe 



59 



! generally what I would call a disparaging remark asked 

2 about the policy of providing arms to Iran. 

3 > It was never a subject that I remember from my 

4 participation in the OSG of an OSG meeting. 

5 Q Do you recall who might have made that 

6 disparaging remark? 

7 A I remember making some. Bob Oakley had made a 

8 couple. Later Jerry Bremmer made some remarks. 

9 Q Who replaced Ambassador Oakley? 

10 A Who replaced Ambassador Oakley. I don't 

11 believe unless someone was witting of the whole program 

12 that they were remarks that made sense to the whole 

13 group . 

14 Q But they were remarks along the line of why 

15 are we saying this, given what we are doing? 

16 A Or this sure is stupid to spend all this time 

17 talking about how strict we are on our no-ransom, when on 

18 the other hand we're doing something else. But a remark 

19 and then gone. 

20 Q Was there a time when General John Hollering, 

21 the JCS representative, asked you what the heck everybody 

22 was talking about? 

23 A There Oas a meeting in the summer and, as I 

24 remember, there was a little bit more chatter around the 

25 table than usual. I felt somewhat bad, and I can't 



mmmi 



missm 



60 



1 r<aaoinber if John asked me in the car going back or I felt 

2 so bad I raised this to John Hollering, but I said there 

3 are some things you ought to know, and I gave him a very 

4 general outline, that we were indeed providing some 

5 weapons to Iran. 

6 Q This would have been approximately when — 

7 late June or early July of '86? 

8 A I would say it was July, but it was summer. 

9 Q And what was General Hollering 's position? 

10 A He was appalled. 

11 Q I'm sorry, what was hit — 

12 A He was Assistant to the Chairman. 

13 Q Of the Joint Chiefs? 

14 A Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

15 Q And as best you know that was his first 

16 knowledge of this? 

17 A Yes. 

18 Q And was Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the 

19 Joint Chiefs, knowledgeable at that time, as far as you 

20 know? 

21 A My understanding was that General Hollering 

22 had returned and made him knowledgeable. 

23 Q Now t6~the question you were about to answer. 

e 

24 What was General Hollering 's reaction when you informed 

25 him of this? 



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- • . A To the best of my recollection, he was 
appalled or disbelieving. 

Q Now how do you know that he informed his boss. 
Admiral Crowe? 

A In the workup again to testimony after the 
program had been made public this came to light. 

Q That he had told Admiral Crowe and it had also 
come to light that Admiral Crowe had gone down to see, or 
up, or wherever to see Secretary Weinberger? 

A He went up to see the Secretary, and this also 
came to light as we were preparing for testimony. 

Q Before I ask you on the issue of readiness 
about the TOWs, let me ask you a guestion or two about 
the HAWKs. Have you been made aware at any point, either 
at the time or subseguent to the shipment of the HAWK 
repair parts, about the readiness impact data that was in 
front of the Army policymakers when they were trying to 
decide whether to meet the requirement to the CIA? 

A No. 

So you would not be aware, 




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A I was not aware. 

Q And have you been made aware of this prior to 
today? 

A No. 

Q Do you recall an OSG meeting in the afternoon 
around the time of the Attorney General's press 
conference, or shortly thereafter, in which a statement 
was being prepared for President Reagan and it was 
circulated in which President Reagan was going to comment 
on and explain these matters, and it was circulated and 
then there was apparently some reaction to it that was 
fairly strong? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q Tell us about that meeting. 

A It was in late afternoon, my recollection was 
around 1600, as most of the OSGswere roughly that time. 
A statement j«^ajs_being _prepared Xar—fehe President ._ I had 
seen a copy which came over maybe an hour or two before 
the meeting. I was annoyed and alarmed about it and 
called it to Mike"Armacost ' s attention. I said this 
looked like trouble to me. I think I used the term it 



asks more que 



wmm 



63 



UNGUSSra 



1 ^--i We then got into the OSG and various members 

Z were asked to take a look at the statement and then take 

3 " it back and make some comments, to provide comments later 

4 to Ollie's office. But in the nature of bureaucracies 

5 people started reading right away and people started 

6 commenting right away. And to my recollection the JCS 

7 representative, the OSD representative, the State 

8 representative, and the FBI representative all had very 

9 serious reservations about the statement. 

10 Q Along what lines? 

11 A Mine — that this looked like it asks more 

12 questions than it answered. If the President doesn't 

13 know any more about this, he ought to just say well, open 

14 up. Once I get it, I'll make it all public. But this 

15 looks kind of cooked. Now those are not quotes, but 

16 that's the thrust. 

17 General Hollering said something about I think 

18 that I was around here during Watergate; this looks like 

19 — you know, this not real. Buck Revell — 

20 Q Of the FBI? 

21 A Of the FBI had some comments. I just remember 

22 they were along the lines, but I was subsequently told he 

23 had fired over some comments to Ollie in the wake of that 

24 meeting to try to bring the statement more in line with 

25 what he knew to be the facts. 



^mmm 



64 



UNSiASSIRED 



64 



1 In general, all the people I mentioned bled on 

2 that statement. 

3 ^ Q And were you subsequently told by Craig Coy of 

4 the NSC staff that this reaction was so strong that 

5 Colonel North ran across the street to either see Pat 

6 Buchanan or Don Regan to have the statement changed? 

7 A Well, I think it was Craig who told me that 

8 they were surprised at the strength of reaction and the 

9 kind of unanimous opinion of the group, and that Ollie 

10 and maybe someone else — I can't remember whether it was 

11 Ollie alone — went across the street to either Pat 

12 Buchanan or Regan's office to try to get it changed. I 

13 think it was Craig who told me that. 

14 Q Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, about some of 

15 your discussions with Colonel North, and you've been 

16 quite open previously with the Tower Commission and the 

17 Senate Select Committee in characterizing several of 

18 them, and I want to ask about two or three in particular. 

19 You probably know which ones I'm talking about. 

20 First, there was a statement sometime in 1986 

21 in which Colonel North talked about General Secord and, 

22 as I think you said, it was something along the lines of 

23 Secord needs to ^et the Medal of Freedom. 

24 A No. We said the President — well, he didn't 

25 say "needs". He said Secord 's a national hero; the 



\mmm 



65 



ONCLASSra 



65 



1 Praaident ought to or will give him the Medal of Freedom. 

2 Q Tell us more about that — when you think it 

3 might have been said, what the context was, et cetera. 

4 A The context. I had come to understand that 

5 Dick Secord was involved in this Iranian affair, and in 

6 one of my conversations with Ollie I expressed to him how 

7 terrible it was, and I think I also said I was very 

8 surprised that Dick Secord would be involved in this, and 

9 he said that Dick Secord was basically a great American 

10 and the President is going to give him the Medal of 

11 Freedom. And I don't recall the time. 

12 Q When were you made aware that General Secord 

13 was involved in some way? 

14 AX don't remember that either, but it had to be 

15 after — sometime after February of 1986, that I recall. 

16 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, in regard to 

17 that, is that the kind of statement that if Ollie North 

18 said that to you, would you say well, if Ollie says the 

19 President's going to do that, then he's going to do it, 

20 or was that just advertising? 

21 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I can't answer 

22 that question. This is what Ollie told me. 

23 MR. KR£U2ER: The thrust of what I'm trying to 

24 get at is can you comment on how close he is to the 

25 President or was? 



\immm 



66 



UNCIASMD 



66 



1 - -' . THE WITNESS: I could have commented on that 

2^ several months ago, but I can't comment on it now because 

3 I don't know basically when I learned what. But at one 

4 time it was pretty generally felt in the Administration 

5 that Ollie was very close. 

6 MR. KREUZER: That he could just walk in? 

7 THE WITNESS: Well, that no one could just 

8 walk in, but that he was able to get in to see the 

9 President quite often. However, I have been informed 

10 from newspaper stories and testimony throughout the past 

11 many months that this wasn't the case. I'd have had a 

12 lot easier time answering that seven months ago. I would 

13 have answered more in the affirmative several months ago. 

14 Right now I just don't know. But ha said it. 

15 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

16 Q Do you know how you became aware or were 

17 apprised that General Secord might have been involved in 

18 this? 

19 A No, I don't remember, and it could have been 

20 either Ollie or it could have been the Israelis sometime 

21 during '86, but I can't remember who it was. I know I 

22 was surprised. 

23 BY MR;"sabA: (Resuming) 

24 Q Why were you surprised? 

25 A Dick Secord is a man, in my view, of enormous 



UNIWtFIED 



67 



iciissra 



67 



1 iivt«lligence, and I just couldn't believe that he was 

2 involved in something that I personally felt was very 

3 ■ silly. 

4 Q When you learned he was involved, apart from 

5 your view of him as an individual, were you also 

6 surprised that the operation had gone private? 

7 A I don't think I knew it as public or private. 

8 From my point of view Ollie was involved and consequently 

9 it wasn't a private operation. It was the government. 

10 So I don't think I ever thought about it in terms of 

11 private or public, and I didn't know what Dick was doing. 

12 But as far as I knew Ollie was involved, and as far as I 

13 was concerned this was a government thing. 

14 After all, there had been discussions in the 

15 National Security Council about it. 

16 Q Is it correct to say that you had no knowledge 

17 of Secord's involvement prior to the February 1986 

18 transfers? 

19 A To the best of my recollection, because I 

20 hadn't seen Dick in some time. But I could have known. 

21 I think it's February — to the best of my recollection, 

22 sometime after February. 

23 BY MR.'~SAXON: (Resuming) 

24 Q Let me go back to your conversations with 

25 Colonel North. I believe you testified that after the 



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UNCbASSra 



1 Iran initiative became public and the McFarlane trip to 

2 Tehr*ri\ but before the Attorney General's press conference 

3 ^ at which the diversion was talked about Colonel North 

4 made the statement to you along the lines of well, that 

5 this won't be so bad when people find out the Ayatollah 

6 is helping us fund_ the contras. 

7 What can you tell us about that statement — 

8 exactly what you recall the statement being, the context, 

9 et cetera? 

10 A As I recall, I was again preparing to go 

11 testify and I called Ollie on the black phone, the secure 

12 phone, to find out what was going on, to fill in my 

13 knowledge a little bit more. And I think — in the wake 

14 of this I've thought a lot about it — that Ollie was 

15 concerned that I was very upset about this project, and 

16 he said basically. Rich, don't worry. It'll all be all 

17 right when the Vice President goes to Riyadh to sit down 

18 with the Iranians and they find out that our hostages 

19 come home, and that the Ayatollah is either helping us in 

20 Central America or the contras. 

21 The impression that I got was that it was the 

22 contras, but he could have said Central America. And I 

23 said, Ollie, wow:** And then he and I stopped the phone 

24 conversation. As I think I've told you and others 

25 before, I then called Mike Armacost and just reported 



UttGt^iSiftED 



UNCLASKD 



1 that I had what I considered to be a rather baffling 

2 conversation with Ollie in which he talked about the Vice 
3» President going to Riyadh, sitting down with the Iranians 

4 to talk about peace in the Gulf, getting help in Central 

5 America or the contras, and our hostages being freed. 

6 And Mike, who shared the same anxiety I had 

7 about having to come to testify not knowing much about 

8 the program, just kind of said wow, but we didn't go into 

9 it any more. 

^° Q I realize that we have the benefit in asking 

11 these questions of hindsight and knowing a whole lot more 

12 than you knew at the time, but did you not inquire 

13 further of Colonel North as to what he meant by that? 

^* A I thought he was losing his grip at that time. 

^5 I thought he was saying this to make me calm down, not 

16 realizing it^had the opposite effect on me. I thought he 

17 was losing the grip. 

^^ Q Was there a point at which you connected the 

19 Ayatollah and the contras in the sense of diversion as we 

20 have come to know it? 

21 A No. No. When the Attorney General mentioned 

22 this, that was the first time I realized it. 

23 Q Did ifclick, though, in terms of relating it 

24 back to what Colonel North told you previously? 

ut it didn't click in 



'mmm 



70 



uHCUSsra 



70 



1 a major way. I just remember the conversation. It 

2 wasn't too far afterward, too many days. 

3 . Q Do you recall if you told anyone about that 

4 conversation other than Secretary Armacost? 

5 A I'm almost sure I have, and I can't remember 

6 to whom I said it. I know I've told a lot of people 

7 since. 

8 Q But roughly in that time period did you tell 

9 Mr. Raphel? 

10 A Well, I might have told Raphel, but I can't 

11 remember. I know I told Mike because he was having to 

12 testify with me. 

13 Q I believe there was a time when you asked 

14 Colonel North if he was all right in terms of the press 

15 stories that were beginning to be written sometime in 

16 early '86 about NSC involvement in aiding the contras, 

17 and he basically told you his hands were clean and so 

18 forth. Can you recall anything about that conversation? 

19 A Yes, and I can state that it was not just me 

20 that asked basically that question. I, from time to 

21 time, participated in something that was called the RIG, 

22 the Restricted Interagency Group. 

23 Q And this was the RIG chaired by Mr. Abrams? 

24 A Chaired by Elliott Abrams. I came to 

25 participate more in the RIG toward the end of '86 because 



more in the rig towara t 

iJNIMSSiriED 



71 



UNGUSSKIED 



71 



1 Tny_ deputy, Mr. Sanchez, after six years was going to 

2 retire and I had to pick up that slack a bit. And at 

3 least one and, I think, several of those RIGs the story 

4 kept cropping up. I think Senator Kerry had been 

5 hounding Ollie and I made the general statement about 

6 Ollie. All right, are you all straight on this. And he 

7 assured me that he was, that it was absolutely legal, no 

8 problem. 

9 In a subsequent conversation either Elliott or 

10 someone else at the RIG, probably Elliott, said, hey, 

11 Ollie, this press stuff, is there anything to it. And 

12 Ollie said he was absolutely straight — not a nickel, 

13 not a penny or no money had touched his hands. I 

14 remember two or more occasions when his colleagues 

15 basically inquired after Ollie 's legal health. 

16 Q As far as you know, were there any notes or 

17 minutes of those meetings that would reflect this, or 

18 memcons? 

19 A No, I am unaware of any. 

20 Q We covered before partially the question of 

21 when you might have told Dr. Ikle about the arms to Iran. 

22 What do you think is the time frame on that? 

23 A The be'St I can remember it was late '86, and 

24 if I had to pin down a date I'd say it was the beginning 

25 of autumn but it was before it became public. 



wtmm 



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UNCUSSIQEO 



1 Q Let me ask a little bit more bluntly the 

2 question that Mr. Kreuzer asked earlier, and let me 

3* , preface it this way — that Dr. Ikle was your boss and he 

4 was the top Pentagon man for policy. I understand that 

5 if the Secretary says something is a close hold that 

6 means it's a pretty close hold. But did you not feel at 

7 any point that you had an obligation to him to apprise 

8 him of something which you thought was a major departure 

9 from our stated policy vis-a-vis Iran? 

10 A Well, I will remind you, first of all, that we 

11 all work for the Secretary of Defense primarily. That's 

12 our boss. Second of all, I obviously had qualms about 

13 this. That's why I eventually let him know what I 

14 figured he needed to know to conduct his business without 

15 an embarrassment to him. But I didn't realize this was 

16 going to become public in November. So I guess the 

17 answer is yes to both. 

18 But we both work for the Secretary primarily. 

19 Q I'm not trying to pass judgment. 

2 A No. It's very important because we are both 

21 Presidential appointees. We both work for the Secretary 

22 primarily. If the Secretary were to tell me to do 

23 something legal and tell me not to tell X, Y or Z, I 

24 would not tell X, Y or Z. He didn't specifically direct 
2 5 me not to tell Fred, but he told me it was sensitive, to 



wmmm 



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wsjssm 



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1 kee^ it quiet. 

2 Q Did you ever discuss the Iranian arms 

3 • initiative with Noel Koch prior to the matters becoming 

4 public? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q Do you recall when you might have had any 

7 discussion with Mr. Koch? 

8 A Sometime, I would say roughly January or 

9 February. It might have been late December. 

10 Q January or February of? 

11 A '86. It might have been December '85. 

12 Q And what do you think might have been the 

13 reason for discussing it with him? 

14 A It seems to me that he might have raised it 

15 with me, but I remember having conversations with him on 

16 it. I think he probably raised it with me. I remember 

17 he knew about it. 

18 Q Did anyone tell you that he was involved in 

19 negotiation with the Israelis on the price that was to 

20 govern the TOW shipments to Iran? 

21 A No, they did not. 

22 Q Have you been made aware of that prior to 

23 today? ~ 

24 A This is the first I've heard of it. 

25 MR. SABA: This ia.liie-rfirst? 




74 



wmmB 



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1 ^^ THE WITNESS: This is the first. 

2 MR. SAXON: I would say it was a pretty close 

3 hold, then. 

4 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

5 Q Do you know a gentleman by the name of Ben 

6 Joseph. 

7 A Ben Joseph, Ibraham Ben Joseph, yes. 

8 Q Ibraham? 

9 A Ibraham Ben Joseph. He is the Israeli 

10 procurement guy in New York. 

11 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

12 Q Have you ever had any dealings with him? 

13 A All the time. 

14 Q Did he ever mention any dealings ha had with 

15 Mr. Koch? 

16 A No, but I know Ibraham was privy to this 

17 operation. 

18 Q How do you know that? 

19 A I have been told that subsequently. I was 

20 told sometime during '86 that arms were going through 

21 Israel and that Ben Joseph knew about it. 

22 Q Do you recall who told you that? 

23 A No, I aon't. 

24 Q Could General Meron have told you? 

25 A Very possibly. Just for the record, Ben 



UNWn 



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UNGLASSffi 



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1 Joseph is our major interlocutor on all systems 

2 , transactions or tech transfer or anything with the 

3 Israelis. He works out of New York. 

4 Q I want to go back to the TOW pricing question. 

5 You told the Department of the Army Inspection General 

6 team that as far as you knew there was no pressure that 

7 the Pentagon put on the Army to keep the price of the TOW 

8 missiles low; is that correct? 

9 A That is correct. 

10 Q Do you find it at all curious that the GAG 

11 report that looked at the pricing found that several 

12 discretionary items, that they all came out on the low 

13 side — and that is particularly that the price the Army 

14 charged on the I-TOW was too low, that the standard AMDF 

15 price for the basic TOWs was too low, that the price for 

16 the MOIC was too low, and that the Army underestimated 

17 the charges for transportation? 

18 A I don't find it so much curious as I found the 

19 whole operation rather badly done. I concentrated more 

20 on the final bottom line of the GO, which pleased me 

21 quite a bit. 

22 Q As you were looking back on all of this to try 

23 to reconstruct whSt took place with the pricing in late 

24 '86, after it became public, were you made aware of the 

25 role that Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Schwimmer played in fixing 



uNeusm 



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1 tha> rirst price on the TOWs? 

2 A No. 

3 Q Let me ask you, changing gears now from the 

4 Iranian side of these matters to the contra side, let me 

5 ask you a few questions about the private supply 

6 operation and private supply network. That's what I'll 

7 call it. If you know it by some other term, that's fine. 

8 I believe you told the Tower Commission that 

9 you knew that some weapons were getting through somehow 

10 because the contras continued to fight; is that correct? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q What would be your sense of how those arms got 

13 there? 

14 A I assumed that — well, the conservatives were 

15 providing money, and this money then purchased arms on 

16 the grey armf market. I knew that some Americans had 

17 been reported to be doing this — Jack Singlaub and 

18 others. I also, I think I told the Tower guys and maybe 

19 you, my understanding was that it was at least the 

20 implicit, if not explicit, discussion of this in the Hill 

21 testimony surrounding the provision of $27 million in 

22 humanitarian assistance to the contras, basically to the 

23 effect that well, '"weapons are coming from somewhere, so 

24 we are only going to do humanitarian. 

pcussions with General 



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1 Sljvjlaub about his role in these matters? 

2 A None that I recall. 

3 " Q What do you know — what did you know during 

4 or prior to these matters becoming public about the air 

5 strip that existed in Costa Rica? 

6 A I knew nothing. 

7 Q You knew nothing? 

8 A I knew nothing. 

9 Q When did you first learn that it was being 

10 used for air drops or resupply? 

11 A When things became public. 

12 Q Did you ever have any discussions with Colonel 

13 North about use of this air strip prior to it becoming 

14 public? 

15 A Not that I recall, no. 

16 Q Were you ever involved with Colonel North in 

17 what could be called concocting a cover story for the air 

18 strip if these matters ever became public? 

19 A No. 

20 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, was it your sense 

21 — you mentioned a couple of minutes ago that you 

22 understood that private benefactors may have been 

23 contributing to tRe lethal, what you say was lethal 

24 support. 

25 THf. MTTHF.ty -gi^ J^ HfMJr ffc ^^ ^"^ money. They were 



wmm 



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1 giVthg money and then with the money my assumption was 

2 ^ the contras could go purchase arms on the market. 

3 MR. KREUZER: Did you ever ruminate on how 

4 much of that effort would be covered by private 

5 benefactor support? 

6 THE WITNESS: None whatsoever. I never did. 

7 MR. KREUZER: You never equated how much they 

8 would be able to provide as opposed to, say — in other 

9 words, did the question ever come into your mind about 

10 whether they would be able to provide overall support to 

11 a contra effort of maybe^^^^Has opposed to some other 

12 source of support? 

13 THE WITNESS: No, I never did. I must say 

14 that ny own efforts on behalf of the contras, if I can be 

15 allowed to say that, were somewhat periodic. As we 

16 geared up for a fight, I'm sure you'll see the attendance 

17 at different meetings in the White House and all would 

18 reflect much more my attendance, because we would have to 

19 lobby the Hill, we would have to work these things. 

20 As we were not doing that, then I was a much 

21 less frequent attendee at the normal meetings because I 

22 felt 1 had a very good, and do feel that I had a very 

23 good deputy in NeStor Sanchez, who knew these matters 

24 very well and was perfectly competent. But as we got to 
a crunch point ^and^I l^^t^tifffl4?A the artillery of my 



25 



79 



10 



immm 



79 



1 rank rather than my personal efforts, they needed an 

2 ■ Assistant Secretary to come lobbying and this, that, and 

3 whatnot. So I participated to a higher degree. 

4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

5 Q I want to follow up on the Costa Rican air 

6 strip and have you mark this as the next deposition 

7 exhibit. I will give you a moment to look through this. 

8 (The document referred to was 

9 marked Armitage Exhibit 

Number 6 for identification.) 

11 A Do you want me to read it? 

12 Q Sure. 

13 (Pause.) 

1* X All right. I have read it. I see what you 

15 are getting at. 

1® Q Mr. Secretary, this exhibit is a memorandum 

17 from Colonel North to John Poindexter. It's dated 

18 September 30, 1986. For the record, it's got the 

19 initials JMP, which I guess suggests that Admiral 

20 Poindexter had seen it, and it's with regard to the air 

21 strip in Costa Rica to which I made reference a few 

22 minutes ago, which we now know was used for air drops for 

23 getting supplies; "including lethal supplies, to the 

24 contras during the period when U.S. assistance was cut 

25 off. 



UNClASSra 



80 



wmmm 



1 - ' . Let me direct your attention to a couple of 

2^ paragraphs on page one of the memorandum. It starts off 

3 in paragraph two saying "Request guidance at Tab 1 has 

4 been coordinated with State, Mr. Abrams, Defense, 

5 Armitage, and ^^^'^|^^Pf" Let me ask you first if you 

6 have any recollection of Colonel North coordinating with 

7 you anything in terms of how this issue of the use of the 

8 air strip, its construction or anything else would be 

9 portrayed in the press. 

10 A I certainly don't remember this, and I knew 

11 nothing about the air strip. It is possible that this 

12 press guidance came through me from Nestor, but it 

13 doesn't look to me — I mean, I wouldn't have known what 

14 it was. I could have coordinated, but I certainly don't 

15 remember it at all. 

16 Q Okay. I can understand with the many issues 

17 you have to deal with that you may not have total recall 

18 of all of these. 

19 A I say completely unabashedly that I have no 

20 knowledge of this. 

21 Q Okay. You'll understand if I have to ask a 

22 few more questions. 
2 3 A Please" 

24 Q We are trying to piece all of this together 

25 and we do know the air fitiijp^MF f%- we are fairly 



lisMW 



81 



81 



1 CQirfident of the uses to which it was put and what the 

2 U.S. role was in that. Colonel North says in his memo to 

3 " Admiral Poindexter that the damage done by this 

4 revelation is considerable. He talks about the logistics 

5 support provided by Project Democracy on the ability of 

6 the resistance movement to sustain itself. He says the 

7 air field at Santa Elena has been a vital element in 

8 supporting the resistance and so forth, and talks further 

9 through the memo about the strategic importance of the 

10 air facility, et cetera. 

11 Is it your statement that you had no knowledge 

12 whatsoever prior to these matters becoming public that we 

13 were using this air strip to supply the contras? 

14 A This is my statement. 

15 Q And you don't recall at all him, Colonel 

16 North, talking to you or dealing with you to work at a 

17 press statement which in effect was a cover that 

18 disguised its purposes? 

19 A No, I certainly don't remember it. I must say 

20 that, having read this press guidance, this wouldn't 

21 offend me, but I don't remember it at all. 

22 Q I'm sorry. What do you mean? 

23 A Well, the press guidance, as I read it, looks 

24 fairly non-controversial and nothing to it. I myself did 

25 not know th%tk a| Air ^1f%iA|MpA>g used for contra 



wsussm 



82 



UN€LA$» 



82 



1 resupply. If someone had come to me and said, look, 

2 these are the facts, we've got this, I would have okayed 

3 ' . it. But I don't remember seeing this. 

4 Q Okay. I understand the distinction. 

5 A I don't remember seeing this. 

6 Q Let me ask you a few questions about General 

7 Secord, who we alluded to earlier. As best as you can 

8 recall, when did you first meet him? 

9 A 1 met Dick in Iran at his pinning of his 

10 general officer stars, either at the last month of '75 or 

11 the first month of '76. Whenever he pinned them on, I 

12 was in that ceremony. That's the first time I met him. 

13 Q And this was when you were a consultant to the 

14 Pentagon? 

15 A And, more particularly, to the defense 

16 representative to Iran. 

17 Q Have you had any ongoing or continuing 

18 relationship with him since that time? 

19 A Oh, yes. Well, when I left Iran and I did not 

20 see Dick Secord, and I left in the middle of '76, nor 

21 have any communication with him until 1981 in the advent 

22 of this Administration. 

23 Q When yOu both arrived at the Pentagon? 

24 A Well, I arrived there. I think he was already 

25 there. I can't j:^i^mbej^MhfM|haf|ras, but at any rate I 



wmm' 



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83 



1 have the highest regard for him personally. I had a high 

2 regard them. I introduced him, as I remember, to Frank '. 
3* . Carlucci as a job-seeker and |he got the Near East/South 

4 Asia job as Deputy Assistant Secretary. He held that job 

5 until roughly the end of April 1983, at which time he 

6 retired. 

7 From the end of April 1983 to now I've seen 

8 him possibly three or four times and, to my recollection, 

9 I haven't seen him or spoken to him in over a year and a 

10 half or more now. I consider him a friend. 

11 Q You say you don't think you've spoken to him 

12 in about a year or a year and a half? 

13 A The reason I dare say that is I have asked my 

14 own staff, my secretary, in preparation for either a call 

15 by you or the FBI when the last time Dick Secord was in 

16 or around. They couldn't remember. They put it together 

17 as a year and a half. 

18 Q And a year and a half would include the period 

19 in May of '86. 

20 A It certainly would appear then. 

21 Q Do you recall whether you talked to him in May 

22 of 1986? 

23 A I don't recall. It's possible, but I 

24 certainly don't recall it, nor did my staff. 

25 Q Would you recall ^^i^J^ you had spoken to him 




9 



84 



OHCUiSSIEIED 



84 



1 aboyt the Iranian arms shipments? 

2 A If I spoke to him, I would have spoken to him 

3 about the Iranian arms shipments. There is no question — 

4 no question. 

5 Q If you had spoken to him, would it have been 

6 captured in the record-keeping system you have in your 

7 office? 

8 A No. No, it wouldn't have been. I don't 

9 generally make a memorandum of conversation afterward, 

10 and I can't remember the last time I saw him. I'm 

11 depending on my staff's advice, and I asked them when's 

12 the last time I talked to him. But if I talked to him in 

13 '86 after I knew he was involved, I can assure you I 

14 would have talked about Iran. 

15 Q For what it's worth, he, Richard Gadd, says 

16 that at about the time of the second arms shipment, which 

17 would be in May of '86, that General Secord told Mr. Gadd 

18 about a conversation you and he had and, for what it's 

19 worth, apparently you told General Secord this was not a 

20 very bright idea. So if you did have that conversation, 

21 it was a consistent statement. That's what Mr. Gadd 

22 says. 

23 A That's'* fine. I would have told Secord it was 

24 a dumb idea. There is no record of his coming into my 

25 office, I roust .s^vc,, and^QkDhapa,fiecord that anyone 



wmm 



mmm 



1 remimbers. 

2^ Q After General Secord left the Pentagon, was he 

3 a consultant to ISA? 

4 A He was initially a consultant to me. 

5 Q And what was the nature of his duties? 

6 A I don't remember ever having paid him to do 

7 any, but it was going to be consulting on Near East/South 

8 Asia. It could be that he did a little work for us, but 

9 I don't believe much. 

10 Q And was he later a member of the Special 

11 Operations Advisory Group, the SOPAG? 

12 A Well, he was dropped from my rolls ai a 

13 consultant and he was picked up on the rolls of Mr. Koch 

14 as a consultant to the SOPAG ~ special policy advisory 

15 group. 

16 Q And what do you know or understand to have 

17 been the reasons for his being dropped from the SOPAG 

18 rolls? 

19 A My recollection is that — background. I took 

20 over SOF in roughly May, late May of '86, the special 

21 operating forces. 

22 Q Upon the resignation of Mr. Koch? 

23 A Upon tRe resignation of Mr. Koch. And I 

24 brought on a fellow by the name of Mr. Larry Ropka. 

25 Larry had reviewed the SPSCilliBBUcy Advisory Group, had 



wmm 



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86 



1 niyt*d that Dick had not participated, and further, for . 

2\ some time further noted that Dick had not turned in his 

3 proper forms, and, as I remember, Larry said we ought to 

4 drop him, and I said that's a good idea. I don't think 

5 he was ever paid for anything he did for us. 

6 Q So he was in essence terminated or allowed, 

7 his membership allowed to lapse or whatever for failure 

8 to fill out a financial disclosure form? 

9 A Well, I think that was what allowed it to 

10 happen. I think that Larry was recommending that Dick 

11 was just too busy to participate. If we're going to have 

12 the Policy Advisory Group, we've got to get guys who can 

13 participate. So it was a little of both. We needed a 

14 guy who could be there, and I think that his not filling 

15 in the financial forms made it easy to drop a friend, if 

16 you know what I mean. 

17 Q Did you ever talk with General Secord about 

18 this issue? 

19 A I don't recall ever having talked to him. 

20 Q Let me have you mark this as the next 

21 deposition exhibit, Exhibit 7. 

22 (The document referred to was 

23 •** marked Armitage Exhibit 

24 Number 7 for identification.) 

25 Mr. Secretary, these are some questions and 



mmma 



87 



OWLASSWiED 



87 



1 - answers that Secretary Weinberger provided to the House 

2 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence last December, 

3 and you don't have the full text of all of it, but the 

4 relevant portions you do have, and that is on page one, 

5 question four had asked about any consulting contract 

6 General Secord had with the Department and basically he 

7 said what you just told us. 

8 Then, if you look on the next page, about a 

9 third of the way down the page there is a sentence that 

10 Secretary Weinberger provides his term on the SOPAG 

11 expired effect 4 August 1986. 

12 In question five, was General Secord dropped 

13 from one of our committees for failing to execute a 

14 financial statements, it states "Major General Secord 

15 served on the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group, 

16 SOPAG, from January 1984 to August 1986, although he last 

17 participated in November 1985. Major General Secord' s 

18 membership on the SOPAG was terminated effective 4 August 

19 1986 based upon his failure to provide the Department 

20 with financial information as required in Form SF-1555. 

21 Amplifying information is enclosed in Tab C." 

22 If you look toward the back, you will find Tab 

23 C is on numbered page D-101, and simply contains a chart 

24 showing the dates of service by General Secord as a 

25 consultant. Is this essentially c:onsistent with what you 




UNtLAMe 



88 



1 recall? 

2 A I believe I provided this to you. Yes, this 

3 ■ is basically it. 

4 Q While we are looking at this document, let me 

5 ask you an unrelated question, unrelated to General 

6 Secord, simply because it is here in front ot us. If you 

7 look at Question 6, which at the bottom of page two, it 

8 says: "Have any FMS" — and that's foreign military 

9 sales — "or other arms sales by the Department been made 
10 to any agents or middlemen, as opposed to directly to a 
H recipient country?" And the answer Secretary Weinberger 

12 provided was: "No FMS or other arms sales to foreign 

13 countries have been made by the Department through a 

14 private agency or niddle nan. There la no legal 

15 authority to sell under the Arms Export Control Act to 

16 other than an eligible foreign country." 

17 Would you agree with that statement? 

18 A I would guess it was the case. It was 

19 provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency, not 

20 me, but that would be my journeyman understanding. 

21 Q And would it have been your understanding in 

22 late '85 or early '86 that Iran was ineligible as a 

23 foreign country tO receive FMS sales? 

24 A My understanding was it was because we had an 

25 arms embargo <2il j-tw. ^U^Jk«%W^ft^rt° relationships with 



UHtlASSlEP 



89 



1 IrW? and we have no embassy. We had no way to monitor 

2* usage. So as a journeyman that's what I would have said, 

3 that we couldn't sell. 

4 Q I realize that's a bit out of sequence, but it 

5 was there in the same document. 

6 BY VSR. SABA: (Resuming) 

7 Q With respect to General Secord's role as a 

8 consultant to SOPAG what were the functions of SOPAG at 

9 this time? 

10 A The functions were we had been trying for some 

11 time to rejuvenate, reenergize our special operations 

12 policy and we thought that it would be wise to get some 

13 of the old bulls, if you will, of the special operations 

14 business together to see what their ideas were, and these 

15 fellows met from time to time and gave their ideas to the 

16 Department. 

17 And Dick Secotd is known as having a 

18 background in special ops. As you'll see from the other 

19 listed members, these guys are all very deeply involved 

20 in special operations and dedicated to it, and they were 

21 to advise the Secretary of Defense on the development of 

22 special operating policy and how do we apply special 
2 3 operations. 

24 You look quizzical and that's why I'm going on 

25 to explain limMM aiEtfVA|1C|PI|P^^3^i"<? expertise to 



imssiiiEr 



90 



UNCLASSra 



90 



1 low intensity conflict and things of that nature. 
2> BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

3 Q In terms of our special operations policy, 

4 what do you know or understand to have been the reasons 

5 why Mr. Koch resigned and left the Pentagon? 

6 A I think that he was upset because the 

7 Secretary of Defense had made the decision to place 

8 special operating forces, which were one of Noel Koch's 

9 purviews, under me. It's a very difficult arrangement to 

10 explain. Previously Noel Koch was the Principal Deputy 

11 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

12 Affairs, and in that hat was my deputy. But for special 

13 operating forces and counterterrorism he was not my 

14 deputy. He reported directly through Ikle to Secretary 

15 Weinberger. 

16 Secretary Weinberger — and I really have to 

17 ask him his reasons, but he decided he wanted to tidy up 

18 this operation and consequently decided that for SOF Noel 

19 Koch would remain as the Principal Deputy, but that too 

20 would come under ISA, and I think this was a great 

21 disappointment to Noel and he decided to take a walk. He 

22 never said that in as many words to me, but I feel that's 
2 3 the reason. 

24 Q Before we go into a different subject, Mr. 

25 Albright has a follow-up question on one of your 



UNCtASStFlfll 



91 



Ultb 



91 



1 conversations with Colonel North. 

2 MR. ALBRIGHT: Just one about Colonel North. ' 

3 ■ You said that people began to inquire at some point about 

4 his legal health, if you would. 

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, in the RIG, because of the 

6 press stories. 

7 MR. ALBRIGHT: Was there any discussion within 

8 the RIG or with anyone about any personal financial stake 

9 he may have had in any of this? 

10 THE WITNESS: I want to make sure I understand 

11 you. I think the answer is no. Do you mean that he 

12 might have been involved in donating money or getting 

13 money? No. 

14 MR. ALBRIGHT: Or receiving noney in any way? 

15 THE WITNESS: No. 

16 MR. ALBRIGHT: In any personal financial 

17 setting? 

18 THE WITNESS: Not that I remember. 

19 MR. ALBRIGHT: Have you had any discussion 

20 with anyone or has anyone had any discussion with you 

21 about that? 

22 THE WITNESS: No. I must say that even in the 

23 wake of events frl^m November until now, continuously 

24 through the Administration, guys with whom I talk 

25 constantly say well, whatever Ollie might have done, he 



Ul 



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25 



UNCUSSimD 



92 



1 is personally honest. I mean, this is a steady theme. 

2 V MR. ALBRIGHT: Thank you. That is all I have. 

3 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

4 Q I have just one or two questions. Mr. 

5 Secretary, I take it you were generally familiar with the 

6 Peace Shield Program. 

7 A Ves, which one? 

8 Q This is the C3 program for Saudi Arabia, the 

9 follow-up to AWACS. 
10 A Yes, I am. 

j^l Q Did you understand that in 1984-85 General 

12 Secord was a consultant either directly to Boeing or to 

13 Boeing's agent, the Mafouz family in Saudi Arabia? 

14 A I did not know this. 

j^5 Q Did you have any awareness of his business 

16 relationships with the Alamoody family which obtained a 

17 construction contract for that? 

18 A The only thing I was aware that he was working 

19 in the Middle East was a construction contract, I believe 

20 for UAE, the United Arab Emirates, and it had to do, if I 

21 remember correctly, with aircraft shelters, and he was 

22 engaged in bidding with some other country in Europe, and 

23 I think he was unsuccessful. And that's the only 

24 business that I knew Dick had. 
Q Were i'itt ^M^^/flMMI""^"^"^^""^ ^^ would 



IWIREII 



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1 have had then with Ambassador Bandar Bin-Sultan on Peace 

2 Shield in •84-'85? 

3 A No, I'm not. 

4 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, would you tell us 

5 what your personal relationship is with Mr. Koch? Did 

6 you have a personal and professional relationship or just 

7 professional? 

8 THE WITNESS: I consider myself a very good 

9 friend of his. I still consider myself a friend of his. 

10 I think he does not consider himself a friend of mine any 

11 longer. 

12 MR, KREUZER: Can you clarify why you think 

13 Mr. Koch would have resigned if you were to be taking 

14 over? 

15 THE WITNESS: I think he saw that as somewhat 

16 of an affront to his authority. There had been a lot of 

17 trouble in the Department, particularly public criticism 

18 of various members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 

19 various Departments — Army, the Department of the Air 

20 Force — of a lack of dedication to the SOF arena. 

21 Secretary Weinberger had expressed to me in 

22 the past a question in his mind as to what did Noel want. 
2 3 Why did he feel ik. necessary to go public and blast these 

24 guys? Why couldn't we work these issues out in-house? 

25 He had had some meetigjgji Mi#ip»|If%nwhere at least the 



Ifiy^HED 



94 



Mmssm 



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1 Sacretary claimed I don't really understand what he wants 

2 other than to bang away at the services. 

3 So I think that's why the Secretary, I think 

4 he got tired of this. I mean, frankly, I was all for it, 

5 moving it under me. I'm a bureaucrat. When the 

6 Secretary said what do you think, I said I thought it was 

7 the best idea I've heard — brilliant. But that's my 

8 bureaucratic, in a sense, talking. I think Noel found 

9 that as an affront to his own leadership. 

10 My own view was this was going to allow his 

11 leadership and my ability to get things done in the 

12 building to bring home a success. Noel did not view it 

13 in that way, I think. 

14 MR. KREUZER: That would have brought hin 

15 under your — you would become his direct supervisor. 

16 THE WITNESS: I was in one-half of his job 

17 already. 

18 MR. KREUZER: But in his part now, where he 

19 was reporting to Dr. Ikle, he would be reporting to you. 

20 THE WITNESS: That's right — through me to 

21 Ikle. 

22 MR. KREUZER: So in addition to himself would 

23 he be bringing anything else in from Dr. Ikle's 

24 organization with him? 

25 THE WITNESS: Well^ Jjj^would be bringing the 



THE WITNESS: iiell^Jjy^W( 

UNCUSW 



u\€USSlfffl 



95 



1 special plans group, the special operating force boys who 

2 ' worked for Noel. They would come with him. 

3 MR. KREUZER: And no other assets than that? 

4 THE WITNESS: I don't think he had any other 

5 assets. The other assets belonged to me, if you will, 

6 bureaucratically, anyway. 

7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

8 Q Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry. I just have another 

9 question on this Peace Shield. Are you aware of any 

10 amendment to the Letter of Agreement between the United 

11 States and Saudi Arabia on that program providing for a 

12 sole source procurement for the contractor to build the 

13 facilities in Arabia? 

14 A This is something you must ask Lieutenant 

15 General Phil Cast about that. The reason I say that is 

16 because I can remember discussions with Phil on Peace 

17 Shield. This belongs to him as far as the administration 

18 of contracts and all that. I'm the policy guy. I decide 

19 whether I think this is a good idea to have Peace Shield 

20 in Saudi Arabia or not, but he's required to run this by 

21 us. I don't remember per se, but I remember discussions 

22 on Peace Shield, Peace Vector, a whole bunch of these 

23 Peace series thirlgs. 

24 Q But it's my understanding that it would be 

25 Lieutenant General Gast who ji^Ul'^'^^iv® arranged, if there 

Id " 




96 



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1 was such an amendment, it would be his position to have '. 

2 * approved it. 

3 A He would know about it. He'd understand it. 

4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

5 Q I mentioned earlier Richard Gadd. Do you know 

6 Mr. Gadd? 

7 A I had met Mr. Gadd, I believe, once when I 

8 gave a speech down in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, in 1983. 

9 Q And that was the only time? 

10 A To the best of my recollection. I may have 

11 seen him in the corridor from time to time, but at most I 

12 might have seen him twice. 

13 Q Have you ever had any dealings with him of any 

14 sort? 

15 A Other than that night at Walton Beach, we went 

16 out and had a few beers and that was it. 

17 Q Do you have any knowledge of any of the 

18 companies he has been involved with, specifically Summit 

19 Aviation. Have you had any dealings with Summit? 

2 A Not that I remember. But I read about his 

21 involvement with the different companies since this thing 

22 went public. 

2 3 Q SumercO? 

24 A I don't know what that is. 

25 Q Airmoc? 



\immm 



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1 

2 ' 

3 

4 

5 
6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



A No. 

Q Shenandoah? 

A These things might be somewhat familiar. 
Maybe I've read about them, but I don't know about them. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of any intention to, 
efforts to or actual success at diverting any arms that 
were intended for^^^^^^^^Hto the contras? 

A I do not. 

Q Let me ask you about something which is known 
Do you recall that? 

A Very well. 

Q Okay. What can you tell us about that 
operation? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas something 
inherited when I came to be Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for l^nternational Security Affairs. I know that 
we have provided you such documentation as we had, to 
include what I believe to be the original document 
requesting^^^^^^^^^^H and that was a letter from Mr. 
Casey to Mr. Weinberger which basically requests DOD to 
facilit 




82-690 0-88-5 



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ONCLASSIFIED 



99 



1 

2, 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q I want to ask you a few questions about the 
activities of Colonel Jim Steele as head of the U.S. Mil 
Group in El Salvador. First, do you know Colonel Steele? 

A I have met him. 

Q What was the nature of any relationship you've 
had with him? 

A I can remember meeting him when he — I think 
it was him — brought General Vides Casanova to the 
United States and General Vides was the Minister of 
Defense of El Salvador. 

Q So we can understand it, what is the reporting 
or oversight or supervisory authority that you might 
have, if at all, over any of the mil groups. 



I have none oyer , Col on el Steele. 

UNGkASM 



He works for 



100 



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1 DIA. What is he? Is he a mil group commander? He 

2 worked for the JCS. Now I did get involved in that. I 

3 set the policies. My office sets the policies in El 

4 Salvador regarding whether or not a guy can carry weapons 

5 — those kind of things. 

6 Q And wha_t about in the security assistance 

7 arena? 

g A Phil Gast would have the day-to-day 

cognizance. I just have — to be simple, I decide what 
we're going to sell in general terms and notify the Hill 
and set the parameters of the program — how much money 
and all that — and Phil Gast and DSAA runs the program. 

Q And is DSAA part of your bailiwick, under you? 

A Well, only for policy. Colonel Steele would 

15 report not only to the JCS but also to General Gast, and 

16 would take his instruction, day-to-day, on running 

17 programs from DSAA, not from policy. 

j^a MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, getting back to 

19 what we were discussing a little bit earlier — 

20 MR. SAXON: Does this relate to Colonel 

21 Steele, because I want to follow up on that. 

22 MR. KREUZER: Okay. I will wait. 

23 BY MR." SAXON: (Resuming) 

24 Q Let me have this marked as the next deposition 

25 exhibit. 



UNcy^sw 



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101 



1 •"* " (The document referred to was 

2 ' . marked Armitage Exhibit 

3 Number 8 for identification.) 

4 And I will give you a chance to look at it. 

5 (Pause.) 

6 A I have_loo)ced at it. 

7 Q First of all, let me ask you whether you have 

8 seen any of these documents prior to today, sir. 

9 A No, I have not. 

10 Q Okay. The first is on U.S. Mil Group, El 

11 Salvador letterhead and is dated 1 February '85. The 

12 subject is Felix Rodriguez. It's through the Deputy 

13 Chief of Mission and to Ambassador Pickering, and it's 

14 from Colonel Steele. And for the record he has verified 

15 that that is his signature. 

16 It says: "Per your guidance, attached is a 

17 draft back channel to General Gorman on our 'no pay' 

18 mercenary." Let me ask first of all do you have any 

19 familiarity with Felix Rodriguez? 

20 A No, I don't, but this is not the attachment I 

21 have. 

22 Q I understand that. 

23 A No, I'd© not. 

24 Q Do you know who Felix Rodriguez is? 

25 A From the news accounts, yes. 



mmm 



102 



\immiB 



]L ' Q Do you know him by the name Max Gomez? 

2 \ A No, other than by the news accounts. 

3 Q The next item in this exhibit is a 

4 confidential cable that is from General Gorman for 

5 Ambassador Pickering and Colonel Steele. Again, the 

6 subject is Felix Rodriguez. It says: "I have just met 

7 here with Felix Rodriguez.." The next paragraph: 

8 "Rodriguez's primary commitment to the region is in 

9 ' H^^fH where he wants to assist the FDN. I told him 

10 that the FDN deserved his priority." Numbered paragraph 

11 4: "My judgment is that his advice will reinforce ours 

12 and that we should put no obstacles in his way to 

13 consulting with Blandon or Bustillo unless and until we 

14 get counterindications. I recommend that Jim Steele meet 

15 with him." 
And then the next paragraph: "Assuming your 

approval" — meaning Ambassador Pickering — "I will send 
Rodriguez tc^^^l" Do you have any knowledge at all 
about the role General Gorman would have played, or 
colonel Steele would have played in getting Mr^. Rodriguez 

21 to El Salvador? 

22 A None. 

23 Q Let me" ask you to look at the next item, whiclt 

24 is the backchannel. These are out of sequence, but this 

25 is the backchannel, message^yjii^^lonel Steele references 



Lchannel messaae tha^Col 

tlNElASW 



I 



103 



mussm 



103 



on the first pagt It says: "Eyes only for Ambassador 
Motley. Mr. Johns le, and then Southcom for General 
Gorman." This is : a Ambassador Pickering. If you go 
through the text, i '.Iks about what the plan was in 
terms of using Mr. R guez in El Salvador. You get to 
paragraph number 3. ays: "Rodriguez will return in 
three or four weeks tc k with Bustillo and Steele 



still will monitor clc. 
Do you have 
Colonel Steele in monitc 

A No, I do not. 

Q When all of th 
some of the Mil Group comm. 
to meet, I think, either wi 

A He did not meet w. 

Q You did not meet w 

A No. 

Q You would have no in 
of these, if in fact he was enga 
with Mr. Rodriguez or helping sup 

A No, and Steele may have 
Nestor, but the only person I direc 
was our fellow in~ Costa Rica, when r 
become public — is anything going o; 
called him up and asked him are you i 



*M»D 



nc . Ladge of any activities of 
Ir. Rodriguez? 

t -rs became public and 
ard other people came up 
^nd/or Mr. Sanchez — 

msi Steele? 



t knowledge of any 
ny activities 
FDN? 

3k to meet with 
or to have of 
arted to 
^ere. N'xstor 
n anyth_.ig 



104 



2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



ONeUSHB 



104 



of assistance the contras in any way. And he told 
Nestor no, or s ^stor reported to me. I do not know 
about Steele itiee g with Nestor. 

I do, ever, know that we as a Department 
tried to make Stet available at some time. I did not 
talk to him when h-. me through. 

Q The last 3 of this exhibit, paragraph 4, 
says: "For ARA, pie orief Don Gregg in VP's office 
for me." And this is '.n from Ambassador Pickering. 
Have you ever had any '.ssions with Mr. Gregg about 
Colonel Steele or conti • any role that Felix 
Rodriguez might have hac upport of the FDN? 

A I never did u; on's name publicly became 



associated. I frankly ne\ 
Central American things, 
saw him in Asia. But I don 
of any of the discussions in 

Q Do you have any kn 
the Mil Group people inj 

^^Ito be in% 
user certificates? 



Don Gregg involved in 
■im in the Middle East. I 
mber him being a part 

cy. 

of the activities of 
letting the 
T issuing false end 



A 


I do not. 


Q 


In 1985? 


A 


I do not. 


Q 


Let me ask you a couple 



:ions about Mr. 



liiassfflffl 



105 



omssffl 



105 



i Sanchez, Nestor Sanchez. Tell us what his position was 

2 and the approximate dates. 

3 A Nestor was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

4 Defense for Inter-American Affairs from roughly late '81, 

5 maybe early '82, until December of 1986, when he retired. 

6 Q And what was his reporting relationship? 

7 A He reported through me, through Dr. Ikle, to 

8 the Secretary. 

9 Q And I believe you told us earlier that he sat 

10 in on one or more of the RIGs. 

11 A He sat in on the great majority of the RIGs 

12 and the IGs regarding Central America. 

13 Q We have asked you this before, but for the 

14 record do you have any knowledge of any trip that Mr. 

15 Sanchez may have taken roughly in the late November 1985 

16 time frame to Geneva, Switzerland? 

17 A I do not have any knowledge. 

18 Q And in fact you have asked him about that and 

19 he denies that he took such a trip; is that correct? 

20 A He took a trip, which I was well aware of, to 

21 go to a conference in South America. I believe it was 

22 Argentina. But he told me that's the only travel he had, 

23 and I believe hint*. 

24 Q What would have been the time frame on that 

25 trip? 



UNCLASSiED 



106 



MJSaEIED 



106 

1 X It was November, but I don't remember the 

2^ datAs. 

3 Q And do you know the nature of the business on 

4 which he was traveling? Was it official? 

5 K Ves, it was official. It was a conference, as 

6 I understand it. 

7 Q Do you know who the sponsor of the conference 

8 was? 

9 A I can find out, but I don't remember. 

10 Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about the 

11 nature of our security assistance program. As you 

12 probably know from statements you made or that were 

13 attributed to you in last week's New York Times about 

14 U.S. security assistanc* — 

15 A Elaine Sciolino's article. 

16 Q And any linkage between it and U.S. contra 

17 support policy, let me have this article marked as 

18 Deposition Exhibit 9. 

19 (The document referred to was 

20 marked Armitage Exhibit 

21 Number 9 for identification.) 

22 Z am referring to an article in the New York 

23 Times of Monday, Hay 18, written by Elaine Sciolino, with 

24 the heading "U.S. Said to Link Latin Aid to Support for 

25 Contras." Let me f irst 2is}t jmi^Jlr. Secretary, if the 



wmm 



107 



\immm 



107 



i statements that are attributed to you in here are more or 

2 less correct. 

3 A I believe there was only one. 

4 Q It is in this first column. 

5 A Yes, one statement. 

6 Q As far as you know, is that more or less 

7 accurate? 

8 A Yes. I'm sure it's an exact quotation. 

9 Q I am really basically through with this 

10 article. I wanted there to be something in the record 

11 that would cover what I am getting at on this issue. 

12 A I'd like to put something on the record. 

13 Q In quicker time than we can, but I certainly 

14 plan to let you say whatever you want on this issue. 

15 A Thank you. 

16 Q But let me ask you a question or two. Tell us 

17 how we do use security assistance at all as a broad 

18 instrument of foreign policy and national security 

19 policy. 

20 A First of all, we use security assistance as an 

21 ability or a measure to build a shield which we believe 

22 subsequently someday will keep us from having to devote 

23 U.S. forces to an"area. We find it an aid to stability 

24 and security, number one. Number two, we also find that 

25 in the provision of security assistance we develop a 



ilNftflSm 



108 



mmm 



108 



J. certain amount of influence with countries which we 

2 believes helps the west in general and certainly helps 

3 " ourselves. 

4 Number three, and particularly in relations 

5 with host military we find that the identification with 

6 U.S. forces, primarily in the third world, goes a long 

7 way to fostering what we want in terms of professionalism 

8 vice what is very often the case. We find a very 

9 political military who is bent on fostering their own 

10 personal power rather than the national power. So we 

11 find security assistance a very helpful tool. 

12 Q To your knowledge, have we ever linked or 

13 coupled the provision of security assistance in Central 

14 America or, for that matter, with any recipient country 

15 to the issue of whether that recipient country has aided 

16 the contras? 

17 A No. I don't. And, if I may, I did have this 

18 conversation with this reporter, who is an excellent 

19 reporter. My statement or her story quoting me was not 

20 in the Latin American context. It was security 

21 assistance in general. I made the point that obviously 

22 we don't give security assistance because we're just good 

23 guys. It's in ou't interest. We don't do it because 

24 people just need guns — or economic assistance, for that 



25 matter. 



■missM 



109 



UNGMRID 



109 



1 " We do it because it's in our interest, and by 

2 ■ making people more stable, that's in our interest. And 

3 she said do you get any influence? I said, you're 

4 exactly right. Now when I used the object of Pakistan, I 

5 said look at the case of Pakistan. We believe that the 

6 provision of our security assistance in a large way and 

7 in a great way retards the development of the Pakistani 

8 nuclear program, which we find in everybody's best 

9 interests. 

10 So is there a linkage between the nuclear 

11 program? You bet, and it's fostered by the Hill. 

12 Q Let me ask you more in the Central American 

13 context. Is there a linkage with regard to the decision 

14 announced recently for us to provide fighter planes to 

15 the Hondurans? 

16 A Not to my knowledge. The Hondurans have been 

17 after us for some time for this. We have been unable to 

18 be successful in figuring out a replacement for the Super 

19 Mysteres. We made the F-5 decision. 

20 Q By whom was that decision made? 

21 A It was an interagency one. No one person made 

22 it. It had been discussed for months and months and 

23 months. 

24 Q Between State, Defense and — 

25 A State, Defense and NSC, the CIA; military 



UNetASSIflED 



no 



6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 

24 

25 



•^ -.lance in the region •.-•33 cart o: zhe decision. 

Q v;hen Secretary Acramsj 
^^|and a ccuple of other individuals -- I believe Ray 
Burghardt in the NSC -- traveled to Central America in 
late November or early December of 1936 after these 
matters became public, they were there on a mission to 
sell the Administration's Central America policy, and in 
the course of doing that were informed that] 

[would be receptive, but they wanted 
something in return. 




Ill 



UNUSIHED 

J.! 



UNCLASSIFIED 




Q Let me show you an additional deposition 
exhibit, and ask that this be marked. 

(The docuoient referred to was 
marked Armitage Exhibit 
Number 10 for identification.) 
(Pause. ; 
.A. I didn't go on this trip. 

A! 



113 



'iwjssm 



113 



1 Q You did not go? 

2 A I did not go, to the best of my knowledge. I 

3 will check that, but I'm quite sure I did not go. 

4 Q Let me give some lead-in, then, for the 

5 record. The documents I have asked you to look at as 

6 Deposition Exhibit 10, the cover is a National Security 

7 Council memorandum from Oliver North to John Poindexter 

8 and the subject was trip to the Central American region. 

9 And then it lists a proposed itinerary. At page N-39901 

10 it lists the participants and Mr. Richard Armitage is 

11 listed as a proposed participant. 

12 A Right. 

13 Q And then further the trip is explained. You 

14 are saying to the best of your recollection — 

15 A I did not go on this. 

16 Q Okay. Then let me show you Deposition Exhibit 

17 11, the trip manifest from the NSC file. 

18 (The document referred to was 

19 marked Armitage Exhibit 

20 Number 11 for identification.) 

21 A 1 sure don't remember going. I don't think I 

22 went on this trip, but it's easy to find out. 

23 Q Okay. "For those of us who are uninitiated in 
2 4 these things, the trip itinerary, as I understand it, the 
25 manifest with the boxes checked indicating the 



UKCUSSIFe 



114 



UNWSJflEB 



114 



1 individuals who did go on the trip and those portions of 

2 ^ the trip they took. 

3". A Yes, but, you know, 1 just can't remember this 

4", trip with John Poindexter.. I just don't remember i^. I 

5 ' don't" think I went, but I better check my file. 

" 6," Q * Okay, if yoU would, sir, do check because the 

7 NSC records indicate that you did go on the trip. 

8 ■ A ^ Eleven to 12 December '85. Okay. I'll have 

9 , to, check. I went to Central America in '83 with the 

10 Secretary of Defense. I went to Brazil in '83. The only 

11 other time I remember being down there was witJ 

12 Elliott, Hollering and myself in September-October, so 

A 

13 I'll just Check it — of '86. 

14 Q^ Yes, if you would, because this memorandum of. 

15 record ofthe trip itinerary says, and I quote, "the 

16 following individuals Were manifested aboard the 

17 ' following aircraft," and then it lists the aircraft and 

18 the dates. 

19 A By the way, I think the word "manifested" is 

20 different from "had gone", but It's easy enough^ 

21 Q For the record, let me indicate what this trip 

22 was to consist of as far as Colonel. North saw it and 

23 posted. If you w'duld look at page N-31907, under the 

24 heading "Current Situation, Objectives for, Honduras" , 

25 this was to be a trip to Honduras by Admiral Poipdexter 



5 be a trip to Honduras J 



115 



1 

2^ 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 

25 



uneussw 



on the occasion c: his ceir.g -r.e r.e^- Na^icr.a. ^acurity 
Advisor under the guise of going to oieet the U.S. Army 
military officials. 




In terms of the facts or the statements that 
are made here, does any of this -- is any of this 
something you are familiar with? 

A No. 

Q I wouiS ask, then, that you check if you took 



that trip. 



A I will check when I get back 



wm^ 



116 



25 



UNGUiSSliP^ 



116 



X Q Now let me show you and have this marked as 

2 Deposition Exhibit 12 a series of PROF memos from Colonel 

3 North. They have different addressees. 

4 (The document referred to was 

5 marked Armitage Exhibit 

g Number 12 for identification.) 

7 I will give you a moment to look, if you 

8 would, at the one on the bottom of the first page, and 

9 this is a note from Oliver North, Subject: Private Blank 

10 Check. 

11 < (Pause.) 

12 A All right. 

13 Q As I read this PROF memo, and it pertains, by 

14 the way — 

15 A What's the date on this thing, by the way? Do 

16 we know? 

17 Q Yes. It's right at the bottom. If you flip 

18 over before the next PROF memo you will see. 

19 A 8/31? 

20 Q Well, no. 

21 A 12/04 — December 4, 1985. 

22 ■ Q It was the week prior to this trip that we 

23 were just talking~about. And it pertains to that same 

24 trip. As I read this, Colonel North is suggesting that 



you have lndic^tfd.|h^t|V«|MM]|*flp willing to go to 



wmmi 



117 



\immm 



117 



1 Honduras and Panama in the event that Admiral Poindexter 

2^ couldn't make the trip. Do you recall any discussion 

3 " with Colonel North about that? 

4 A No. I recall roughly the trip and I recall 

5 not going on it. But this — I don't take exception to 

6 what he says in here, frankly. 

7 Q You agree, then, with this statement that you 

8 agree with Ray — I assume that's Burghardt — Don — I 

9 assume that Don F. is Fortier — Walker — I guess that's 

10 Bob Walker — and I, Colonel North, that White House 

11 visibility is essential to the mission. 

12 Do you recall what mission they were talking 

13 about? 

14 A I recall very roughly that the mission was to 

15 show t:-.a Hondurans that we were steadfast in our policy, 

16 and that's the context in which it says White House vis 

17 is more important. I can go down there anytime, but, as 

18 I say, I'm quite sure I didn't go. 

19 Q Let me ask you to flip over to what is 

20 numbered as page 27 in the PROFs. You will see in the 

21 middle of that page a little chart of sorts. This is 

22 again in a PROF memo from Colonel North to Admiral 

23 Poindexter. Let Ble just ask you if before today you've 

24 ever seen these equations of how many hostages equate to 

25 how many vee 



mmm 



118 



Ihh 



EWORD 118 

1 .A I believe I've seen references in the press 

2^ only. I don't think I had a direct chart or anything. 

3 Q Now let me as)c you to turn to the next page. 

4 This is the same PROF. 

5 A Twenty-eight? 

6 Q Yes. Colonel North was apparently quite 

7 productive when he sat at the computer. 

8 A I'm glad I never learned to type. 

9 Q And this is page 28, page 028. 

10 A I've got it. 

11 Q If you will read that first full paragraph at 

12 the top — 

13 (Pause.) 

14 A Okay. I've read it. 

15 Q Where he says: "The last op sec concerned 

16 that of replenishing Israeli stocks is the most delicate. 

17 Meron and I" — and I guess that would be General Meron. 

18 A Mindy Meron, I'm sure. 

19 Q "Are working with the Israeli purchasing 

20 office in New York City". Is that when Ben Joseph works? 

21 A That's right. 

22 Q "On the replenishment issue, to be 

23 accomplished as qQickly after December 12 as possible." 

24 As far as you're concerned, you knew nothing about this 

25 Issue? 



tmssm 



119 



mmsn 



119 



1 . A As far as I remember, I did not. 

2, Q Finally let me ask you to flip over to page 30 

3 in these PROFs. 

4 A I've got it. 

5 Q This is also to — I believe this is to 

6 Admiral Poindexter from Colonel North. 

7 A All right. 

8 Q Subject: Private Blank Check again. He is 

9 proposing to Admiral Poindexter — this is again in 

10 relation to this upcoming trip - he says: "In each 

11 location you would meet with the U.S. Ambassador and be 

12 accompanied by General Jack Galvin, the senior U.S. 

13 military representative. This approach will provide a 

14 plausible cover for delivery of the messages we need sent 
to^^^^^^^^^^^^H both whom to 

16 congratulate you on your post." 

17 Now in terms of your recollection of that 

18 trip, whether you did or didn't take it, tell me in your 

19 best recollection what the purpose of that trip was to 

20 be. 

21 A I must state again I'm quite sure I didn't 

22 take it, and it was just that. The new National Security 

23 Advisor was comin*^ on and that we wanted to show 

24 steadfastness with our policy in the region. 

25 Q And as far as you can recall there was no 



ytmsffi 



120 



ilNCySHD 



120 



1 intent that that be cover and that the real purpose was ■ 

2* . for -- 

3 A As far as I can recall, that was the only 

4 reason for the trip. 

5 Q Okay. I only have a couple more. 

6 A I owe you after putting you off twice. 

7 Q Let me get the last exhibit out of the way. 

8 Let me have you mark this as 13. I know 13 is an unlucky 

9 number, but we'll just have to end on that one. 

10 (The document referred to was 

11 marked Armitage Exhibit 

12 Number 13 for identification.) 

13 This is a PROF memo from Bob Pearson, subject, 

14 Meeting on Contra Aid. I will let you read that. 

15 A All right. What's the date? 1/24/86. 

16 Q Yes. 

17 (Pause.) 

18 A All right. 

19 Q And, if you would, look at the bottom note 

20 from Donald Fortier. 

21 A All right. 

22 Q Is this the kind of session you made reference 

23 to earlier when you were talking about putting together 

24 the contra aid package to go to the Hill? 

25 A Yes. I don't remember it, but that's exactly 



md&Mt 



121 



umssffl 



121 



1 rigjit. 

2^ Q As far as I know, you have not seen these 

3 communications? 

4 A I have not seen these communications. 

5 Q They are talking about you, but it's not 

6 necessarily that you were involved. As best you know, do 



7 you recall this event they are talking about? 

g A No, but me — registering a protest for me not 

9 being invited to a meeting is a normal bureaucratic 

10 business. All of us do it from time to time. I can't 

11 quarrel with this at all. 

^2 Q But your recollection would be that that would 

13 have dealt with the legislative package? 

j^4 X How we're going to approach the Hill and all. 

15 Absolutely right. 

j^g Q Finally, I want to ask you about a couple of 

17 individuals and just see if you can tell us what your 

13 relationship is, if any, with these people. First, do 

19 you know Ted Shackley? 

20 A Yes, I do. 

21 Q What's the nature of that relationship? 

22 A I met him once in 1975. I had returned after 

23 the fall of Saigtfh and my boss, Eric von Marbad, had sent 

24 me out to the CIA to talk with Ted Shackley about what 

25 had gone on in Vietnam, what l had seen - I was there 



ii^m 



122 



UNCLASSiED 



122 



1 the final day — what was going on with the refugees. 

2^ That was my one and only meeting with the man, to my 

3 recollection, and the only communication I ever had with 

4 him. 

5 Q So as far as you know you've never had any 

6 dealings with him? 

7 A I would not recognize him, I don't think. 

8 Q The same question with regard to Thomas 

9 Clines. 

10 A I met Thomas Clines in I want to say 1982 or 

11 1983. Dick Secord asked me to stop and have a drink with 

12 him and he introduced me to Tom Clines. I remember it 

13 very well because the two of them spent a good bit of the 

14 evening in a very congenial way talking about their time 

15 together at the Naval War College. It was 

16 extraordinarily entertaining. I remsmber it quite well. 

17 Q Since that time have you had any dealing with 

18 him? 

19 A Never seen him or talked to him, to the best 

20 of my knowledge 

21 Q Finally, Mike Ledeen. Tell us about your 

22 relationship with him. 

23 A I have" met Michael through originally the 

24 bureaucracy. Later he used to work in the State 

25 Department and I'd come upon him from time to time. 



ind I'd come upon him frc 

UNGUSM 



123 



UNCLASSra 



i Later he became a consultant to Noel Koch in Noel's SOFCT 

2 role. When Noel left I inherited Michael. I did not use 

3 ' him in that I didn't use him for any money. He came — 

4 didn't pay him any money and didn't ask him to do 

5 anything for me. 

6 He would call from time to time and just say 

7 hey, this event, some terrorist event in Pakistan and so 

8 and so was a bad deal, are you guys thinking of all these 

9 angles, something like that. But he came in to see me I 

10 want to say September, and it could have been October, 

11 but it was late in '86, and he told me of his involvement 

12 in the Iranian affair, and he told me that he thought the 

13 affair, which had in his mind or as he sketched it out, 

14 started as a strategic opening had turned into nothing 

15 but an arms for hostages deal, and that he thought this 

16 was terribly wrongheaded, and that the policy was on its 

17 head. 

18 I was very interested to find someone who had 

19 been at the beginning. I was unaware that Mike was at 

20 the beginning of this adventure with Iran. I checked to 

21 see if the Secretary's calendar was clear and took 

22 Michael down, where Michael basically repeated the same 

23 story for the Secretary of Defense, and the three of us 

24 sat around and talked about it was terrible to have our 

25 policy on its hea 



wmmm 



124 



uNiwsra 



124 



1 . Q Did he tell you in terms of his role that he 

2^ had been involved in negotiating the price with the 

3 Israelis for the TOW missiles? 

4 A No, he didn't. 

5 Q Did he tell you that he had been taken off of 

6 this project because he negotiated the price too low or 

7 in some way Colonel North was dissatisfied with his 

8 participation? 

9 A No. He told me he was asked out of it, but he 

10 didn't tell me why. I don't remember that he told me 

11 why. 

12 Q Did you ever ask Colonel North about Mike 

13 Ledeen's role in the Iran part of things? 

14 A I don't recall asking him. 

15 Q Did Colonel North ever tell you — did Colonel 

16 North ever discuss Mike Ledeen in the context of the Iran 

17 arms initiative? 

18 A I can't recall that he did. 

19 Q Did he ever tell you he, North, thought Ledeen 

20 was skimming money from the operation? 

21 A He never told me that. That I would have 

22 remembered. 

23 Q Did Colonel North ever tell you that with 

24 regard to Al Schwimmer? 

25 A I had never heard of Al Schwimmer and don't 



I had never heard of AIS 



125 



UNClASSiiH 



125 



1 recollect Ollie ever saying the name. 

2 Q Did Ledeen ever mention Schwimmer's name in 

3 this context? 

4 A I think Ledeen mentioned Schwimmer in passing 

5 when he was talking about his own involvement the day he 

6 came in to tell me how the policy was on its head, but 

7 not in any way that meant anything to me or that rang any 

8 bells. 

9 Q Did Ledeen mention Ben Joseph? 

10 A No, he did not, to my recollection. 

11 Q And, finally, did Ledeen mention Noel Koch in 

12 the context of his, Ledeen 's — 

13 A No, I don't think he did. I think Michael 

14 would have mentioned that, because Noel had left the 

15 Department by then, but I don't recall it. I mean, if he 

16 had mentioned it, he would have made a big thing about 

17 it. 

13 Q And finally for the record, a different 

19 subject I just forgot to ask. When were you first made 

20 aware that any monies may have been diverted from the 

21 arms sales to Iran to the contras? 

22 A If you don't count the conversation I had with 

23 Ollie, when the A'ttorney General said something. 

24 Q And that's the conversation — 

25 A The conversation _on tlje black phone where he 




126 



ONGUSSm 



126 



said they're helping us in Central America. 

2 ~ ' MR. SAXON: That's all I've got. 

3 • BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

4 Q I have a few more on the Ledeen matter. Do 

5 you recall exactly when that meeting took place? 

6 A I will try to reconstruct it. It's September- 

7 October, to my remembrance. 

8 Q Of '86? 

9 A Of '86, right. 

10 Q Was it your understanding that Mr. Ledeen had 

11 not previously spoken to Mr. Weinberger on this subject? 

12 A I don't think he had, because nothing of the 

13 conversation with the Secretary indicated that he had. 

14 He went right through the recitation again in very guic]c 

15 fashion with the Secretary and never indicated that he 

16 spoke with the Secretary previously. 

17 Q Do you recall Mr. Ledeen 's recitation? 

18 A In general terms, yes. 

19 Q And in revealing his role in the natter there 

20 was nothing discussed concerning price; correct? 

21 A To the best of my recollection, his thrust to 

22 me and again to the Secretary was in here is something 

23 that's good for tTie country, a strategic opening to Iran, 

24 and yet we've become hostage to hostages. That's 

25 terrible. The policy's UDside-dpun. And that's what I 




127 



mmm 



1 r«aeinb«r oo«t keenly about Michael's discussion. 
2. Q Did he mention anything about HAWKs? 

3 AX can't remember him mentioning anything other 

4 than weapons for hostages per se, weapons in general. 

5 Q I'm trying to understand what Ledeen was 

6 getting at, what the purpose of this was. 

7 A When he came in to me it was to sound off on 

8 what a terrible thing this was, and that's exactly what 

9 h« told ma. 

10 Q What specifically did he find to be terrible? 

11 A Arms for hostages rather than a strategic 

12 opening to Iran. 

13 Q Did he have any proposals for a different 

14 eeurs* of action? 

15 A Hot that I recall. 

16 Q Did he propose anything? 

17 A He did state that previously he had talked 

18 about supporting one small element in Iran who wanted a 

19 small supply of either communications gear and things of 

20 that nature and they would be more or less our guys 

21 inside, but he made a big distinction between that and 

22 the provision of weapons to Iran. 

23 Q Could these have been HAWK radars? 

24 A No. The implication clearly was like radios, 

25 small items, just to prove the bona fides of this group. 



UNCttSSIflfD 



128 



uNcussn 



12i 



1 Q Were these objects to be sold by Israel? 

2 A No. That wasn't even discussed. It was the 

3 provision of those items. The manner of providing them 

4 was not discussed. And this was just in passing in 

5 Michael's discussion with us. As I say, his primary 

6 thrust was we are being hostage to the hostages by 

7 selling weapons to Iran. We should be developing a 

8 strategic dialogue and we're squandering that. That was 

9 his thrust with us. 

10 Q Did he mention by name any particular factions 

11 in Iran? 

12 A He may have. I can't remember. 

13 Q Did he propose that a continued dialogue be 

14 direct or through Israel? 

15 A He didn't propose to me. He indicated that it 

16 was Israel who originally set him up in the discussions 

17 in Iran in some manner, either introduced him to Iranian 

18 people or got him out on the track to start talking about 

19 a strategic dialogue. But that's it. 

20 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

21 Q Let me ask one follow-up to that. To your 

22 knowledge, did anything in his background prepare him to 

23 make judgments ab^ut the prices that should be charged 

24 for TOW missiles? 

25 A No. 



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129 



i. BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

2 Q On a different subject, I want to understand 

3 ' something. Eric von Marbad you mentioned was your boss. 

4 A That's right. 

5 Q Referring to what period? 

6 A He was my boss from roughly April 24, 1975, 

7 until mid-1976 intermittently because I didn't get paid 

8 when I didn't work and I was paid when I worked, and I 

9 was back and forth. I had a home in San Diego. I didn't 

10 stay out of the country. 

11 Q So you were a consultant in that time? 

12 A Yes, I was a consultant to the Pentagon, and I 

13 got paid when I worked and I worked for Eric von Marbad. 

14 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

15 Q What was his position then? 

16 A He at the time was the Principal Deputy 

17 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, until summer 

18 of '75, at which time he took the job in Iran as the 

19 Defense Representative and I went over there and handled 

20 primarily naval programs for him. 

21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

22 Q Let me understand. You handled naval programs 
2 3 for Mr. von Marbad? 

24 A That's correct. I can remember two 

25 specifically — the Charbahar base development and the 



littCttSWH) 



130 



limmm 



130 



^ 993 destroyer program. 

2 ""* Q Did you become aware at that time or later of 

3 ■ programming in which the Portuguese would be involved in 

4 rehabilitation of the Iranian navy? 

5 A I don't know anything about it. 

6 Q Did you have any further business with Mr. von 

7 Marbad following his departure from U. S. Government 

8 service? 

9 A No. He was the Director of the Defense 

10 Security Assistance Agency and he left and I've sent him 

11 Christmas cards each Christmas. I generally get a card 

12 from Eric and Lola back, and that's it. I may have had 

13 one conversation with him, but he doesn't want to see 

14 anybody in the building. 

15 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

16 Q Did you have any involvement with the IBEX 

17 project? 

18 A I did not. I am familiar with it because 

19 press inquiries have driven me to find out what it was, 
2 but I did not. 

21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

22 Q Do you have any acquaintance with Mr. Willard 
2 3 tucker? 

24 A I do not know him by that name or probably any 

25 other. 



ieytSSIHED 



131 



umssiED 



131 



1 --» ■ Q Do you know of a company called Companie 

2'. Service Fiduciare, a Swiss Company? 

3 A No. I've seen that in the press, but I don't 

4 know it. 

5 MR. SABA: I don't have anything further. 

6 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, does Mr. Ledeen, 

7 is he still associated with the Department of Defense in 

8 any capacity? 

9 THE WITNESS: No. I terminated his 

10 consultancy. I want to stress that we didn't pay him to 

11 do anything that I am aware of. Roughly in January, when 

12 I saw his name become very prominent in this whole 

13 affair, I didn't feel the Department needed it and I 

14 teminated his consultancy. 

15 MR. KREUZER: Would you say your association 

16 with him was strictly business, professional or was it a 

17 personal association? 

IS THE WITNESS: No, it was business. On two or 

19 three occasions he asked me to come out with my children 

20 and meet his wife and so on, and I refused to do so. 

21 MR. KREUZER: Do you know Mr. Richard Gadd? 

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I met him on at least one 

23 occasion, possibl? twice. 

24 MR. KREUZER: So that is the extent of that? 

25 THE WITNESS: No personal association at all 



UNfMlflED 



132 



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132 



1 with him. 

2 MR. KREUZER: One final question. We were 

3 ■ talking earlier about the transfer of responsibility, the 

4 possible transfer of responsibility to you for special 

5 plans that are under Dr. Ikle. Is the special — 

6 THE WITNESS: No. Let me be clear. When Noel 

7 Koch had his duties brought under me — that is, the SOF 

8 and counterterrorism duties — you asked did he bring any 

9 assets with him, and he did. He brought with him a small 

10 cell we call special plans, SP. Special Plans is the SOF 

11 cell — four or five guys. But they were always under 

12 Noel and they are not part of Craig Alderman's shop — 

13 just to be clear. 

14 MR. KREUZER: The organization that I an 

15 interested in is the Defense Security Assistance Agency. 

16 Does that come under Dr. Ikle? 

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, it does. 

18 MR. KREUZER: Would it in this changeover 

19 still come under him? 

20 THE WITNESS: It has no bearing at all. This 

21 changeover affected DSAA not a whit. 

22 MR. KREUZER: So DSAA is still under Dr. Ikle? 

23 THE WITNESS: Would it help if I drew a 

24 diagram to explain it just so you see the charts? 

25 MR. SAXON: Sure. 



ItNetASStFKD 



133 



UNCUSSIHED 



133 



1 (Pause.) 

2 THE WITNESS: You have IJcle and then you have 

3 ' ASD/ISA, and ASD/ISP as the two Assistant Secretaries. 

4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

5 Q ISP is International Security Policy with Mr. 

6 Perle previously? 

7 A Right, Mr. Perle previously. Over here you've 

8 got DSAA, but in their duties both Mr. Perle and myself 

9 have a policy voice in DSAA. We don't have a program 

10 voice. I don't tell General Cast how to run a program, 

11 how to administer a program. I tell him what the size of 

12 the program is going to be. I tell him sometimes when we 

13 want to make a point, can't we speed up the delivery of 

14 an item to tha|^^^^^| and push someona else baclc in 

15 the queue, if there is a policy reason — that kind of 

16 thing. 

17 We oversee in terms of policy any 

18 international agreements that DSAA gets into, but program 

19 implementation is all under General Gast, but all of it 

20 is under Ikle. 

21 Q And General Gast would report directly to Dr. 

22 Ikle? 

23 A He would. 

24 _^^_^^_MR. SABA: (Resuming) 



134 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



+^SQa, :135 



T~ f ' ■ 



UNCLASSinED 



136 



ONCUSSIFIED 

ID 



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1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

Q Let me ask you about a topic that we've 
overlooked, and that is any knowledge you had prior to 
these matters becoming public that 
government was aiding the contras. 

A I had none 



WSSPO 



138 



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1 , V Q ^ou had none? 

2 A I had none. 

3 ■ Q You knew nothing about the payments of $1 

4 million a month? 

5 A I knew nothing. 

6 Q And then it doubled into $2 million a month. 

7 A I'm not sure that's the fact today. 

8 MR. SAXON: Off the record. 

9 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

10 MR. SAXON: On the record. 

11 THE WITNESS: I will provide, if it meets your 

12 pleasure, a wiring diagram of the reporting 

13 responsibilities in the policy cluster. 

14 MR. SAXON: Would you address the issue we 

15 discussed of DSAA and Dr. Ikle? 

16 THE WITNESS: DSAA's relationship with the 

17 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the 

18 relationship with the two Assistant Secretaries in the 

19 policy cluster. 

20 MR. SAXON: Let me just say, Mr. Secretary, 

21 that we appreciate your being with us this afternoon. We 

22 are sorry we have taken so much of your time, but we 

23 thank you. 

24 THE WITNESS: And I apologize to you for 

25 rescheduling several times. 



umij^sM 



5 



139 



ummED 



139 



1 _ ,, MR. SAXON: On behalf of the Committees, thank 

2 you very much. 

3 (Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the taking of the 

4 instant deposition ceased.) 



6 Signature of the Witness 

7 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 

8 , 1987. 

9 



10 Notary Public 

11 My commission expires: 



UNCUssm 



140 



mmM 



1 . CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC 

2 

3 



I. ANNE PELLECCHIA HOROWITZ, the officer 
before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby 
certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the 
foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the 
testimony was taken by me by Stenomask and thereafter 
reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am 
neither counsel for. related to, nor employed by any of 
the parties to the action in which this deposition was 
taken; and further, that I am not a relative or employee 
of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties 
thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in 
the outcome of the action. 



li^^ 



.^X 



TJ 



Notary Public in and for the 
^8 State of Maryland. 



19 

20 ny Commission expires J^-~ 

21 

22 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



ALOCMOH REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 
XI P ST- N.W, WASH INQTON. O.C. 20001 (S02) 8S8-9300 



141 



TOil«IB*iSIFttfc»«» """^'" 

Stenographic Transcript of 
HEARINGS 
Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE 
^ Wednesday, July 22, 1987 




Washington. D.C 

TOpllitllMSSIPI»» 



imder provisions of E.0. 1235^\LDBnSON F£=Cfi^NG J^ j^ 

^ , by D. Slrko, National Security Councfl 3^*7 £— 



142 



UNeune 



1 CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE 

2 Wednesday, July 22, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

g and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Continued deposition of RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, 

9 called as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, 

10 at the offices of the Witness, The Pentagon, Washington, 

11 D. C, commencing at 4:05 p.m., the witness having been 

12 previously duly sworn by ANNE P. HOROWITZ, a Notary 

13 Public in and for the State of Maryland, and the 

14 testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN 

15 SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction. 
16 



UNeUSSffi 



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141 



X APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 JOHN SAXON, ESQ. 

6 On behalf of the House Select Committee to 

7 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

8 JOSEPH SABA, ESQ. 

9 ROGER KREUZER 

10 ROBERT GENZMAN 

11 RICHARD CLARK 

12 On behalf of the Department of Defense: 

13 ED SHAPIRO, ESQ. 

14 Office of General Counsel 

15 LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD 



UNEUWEft 



144 



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142 



1 CONTENTS 

2 . . EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 

3 WITNESS SENATE HOUSE 

4 Richard L. Armitage - Resumed 

5 By Mr. Saba 143 

6 By Mr. Saxon 159 

7 EXHIBITS 

8 ARMITAGE EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

9 14 180 

10 15 184 

11 16 184 

12 17 189 

13 18 193 

14 19 218 

15 20 221 

16 21 224 

17 22 227 

18 23 227 

19 24 228 

20 25 236 

21 26 243 

22 27 244 



vmmm 



145 



UNeUSHD 



143 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 MR. SAXON: Let me say, Mr. Secretary, that 

3 this is a continuation of your deposition of May 26, 

4 1987, that it is likewise classified at the Top 

5 Secret/Codeword level, and you remain under oath. 

6 Mr, Saba will begin. 

7 Whereupon , 

8 RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, 

9 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

10 Select Committee and having been previously duly sworn, 

11 was further examined and testified as follows: 

12 EXAMINATION 

13 BY MR. SABA: 

14 Q Good afternoon, sir. Mr. Secretary, do you 

15 recall what you knew about the circumstances of the 

16 release of the Reverend Benjamin Heir? 

17 A Can you refresh me when what was? 

18 Q Yea. Benjamin Weir was released roughly 

19 September 1986, and I would add for refreshment purposes 
20 

21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



A 


'86? 


Q 


I'm sorry, '85. 


A 


It was Jacobson who was September or October 


86. 




Q 


That's correct. And I would add that 



Pailialy OKhnlfled/Releaaed on 

under provisions of E.0. 12 
c l>y D. Sirico. National Security Council 



wm 



146 



wmm 



144 



1 Ambassador Oakley, at that time the Department of State 

2 Director of the Office of Terrorism, was informed by and 

3 has provided us with information that he was informed by 

4 Oliver North shortly after the release with the 

5 information that the release was a result of an Israeli 

6 shipment of TOWs to Iran. 

7 My question to you is whether you discussed 

8 that fact of the Israeli shipment of the TOWs with 

9 anyone, whether you knew about it. 

10 A I don't remember discussing it. I don't 

11 remember knowing about it. I remember Weir coming out. 

12 I was not a member of the OSG at the time, but it could 

13 be that I was informed that it was an Israeli transfer 

14 that got him out. I just don't recall it. 

15 Q Do you recall if Ambassador Oakley discussed 

16 the matter with you after the release? 

17 A He could very well have. I just can't recall 

18 it. I can't remember having that much communication with 

19 Bob until more along the time that Noel Koch was about to 

20 leave or was thinking about leaving, and I got involved 

21 in the OSG. But it could very well be that I spoke with 

22 Oakley. 

23 Q Would you have spoken with Arnie Raphel at the 

24 time? 

25 A If I knew anything, I spoke to Arnie Raphel. 



DNCnSSIFIED 



147 



IINftl^lflED 



145 



1 Q And would he have spoken to you? 

2 A I would hope that he would have spoken to me. 

3 Q Do you recall if you and he had a conversation 

4 on the matter? 

5 A I don't, but I would have talked to Arnie if I 

6 knew anything. 

7 Q Would it have been your business at that time 

8 to know whether or not Reverend Weir's release was in 

9 connection with the shipment of Israeli TOWs? 

10 A I wouldn't say it would be my direct business, 

11 but, as you may have learned in your discussions, I am 

12 pretty nosy and frankly think I've learned the lesson in 

13 a bureaucracy that the more you know, the more you can 

14 put things together. So I'm pretty nosy. I don't think 

15 it was my business to know at the time, but I would have 

16 been sure curious and wanted to know and would have tried 

17 to find out. I don't remember attempting to do it at 

18 this time, but I would have tried. 

19 Q Is it your testimony that you don't recall 

20 whether you knew at the time that his release was in 

21 connection with the Israeli shipment of TOWs? 

22 A That is my testimony. I don't recall it. I 

23 could have been told this, but I don't recall being told 

24 it. 

25 Q Focusing on the period of the fall of 1985, I 



UNCIJtSSIfe 



148 



uimsm 



146 



1 want to ask you if you knew four people and, if you did, 

2 what your relationship with them was. The first one is 

3 Amiram Nir. 

4 A I did not meet Mr. Nir, to my recollection, 

5 until later in the year. It was after I joined the 

6 operational subgroup and I met him at one time in Ollie 

7 North's office. I think I've also testified to the fact 

8 that I saw him coming out of Mike Armacost's office one 

9 day and accused him of dressing like Columbo, but I think 

10 those are the two occasions I have met with Mr. Nir. 

11 Q When did you first meet him? 

12 A This would have been mid to late *86. 

13 Q '86? 

14 A '86. That's when I remember meeting him. And 

15 I remember it because the primary discussions that I had 

ce 

16 in Ollie's presenA with Nir concerned, I believe it was, 

17 a T-72 tank, the provision of a T-72 tank to the United 

18 States, were we interested. And I can remember several 

19 phone calls from Ollie about whether we should do this or 

20 not. 

21 Q Did you meet him prior to February 1, '86? 

22 A I could have. I don't remember it. 

23 Q Mr. Schwimmer? 

24 A I don't think I've ever met him. I wouldn't 

25 know if I fell over him. 



mmm 



149 



uimffiD 



147 



1 Q Mr. Nimrodi? 

2 A I don't think I've met him and I wouldn't know 

3 him if I fell over him. 

4 Q Menachem Meron? 

5 A I know him very well. 

6 Q When did you meet him? 

7 A I met him when he was the DAT here. 

8 Q For the record, the DAT is? 

9 A The Defense Attache from Israel. And that 

10 must have been early '83 because I began actively in this 

11 job roughly May or June of '83, but I was sitting in 

12 awaiting confirmation and doing all the things an Acting 

13 can do prior to that, so it would have been early '83. 

14 Q I believe you've testified that in mid- 
15 November 1985 you were on a trip and, as I recall your 

16 testimony, you think you returned on or about the 23rd or 

17 the 24th of Kovember. 

18 AX should have been smarter when X saw you guys 

19 and prepared a little bit for this. Here's when I 

20 traveled, according to my records. I haven't memorized, 

21 so give it back to me and I'll let you have it for the 

22 record. 

23 Q All right. 

24 A The answer to your question was I was out of 

25 town from 15 to 23 November in Germany, Bahrain and 



wstrnm 



150 



UNWn 



1 Pakistan, and I was out on the 28th of November, which 

2 was ahanksgiving. 

3 MR. SAXON: Is this '85 or '86? 

4 THE WITNESS: '85. 

5 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

6 Q And what was the basis for your preparing 

7 that? 

8 A Because you guys asked me questions about 

9 travel dates and I didn't have a damn idea in the world, 

10 and I was offended by it because I hadn't been told to 

11 prepare for this. So this time I'm not going to make the 

12 same mistake. 

13 Q Did you prepare that document from your 

14 calendars and records? 

15 A Calendars and my secretary's recollection. 

16 Q So you returned, then, on November 23 from 

17 Pakistan. 

18 A Yeah. I don't know what day of the week. 

19 That might have been a weekend or might not. I just 

20 don't remember when my schedule has me landing in 

21 Washington. 

22 Q And on your return from that trip did you 

23 learn that Mr. Gaffney and Mr. Koch were providing 

24 information to Colin Powell and the Secretary of Defense 

25 concerning a proposal to send HAWK missiles to Iran? 



UNCtJtSStFIED 



151 



UNCmflEO 



149 



1 - A I don't think I knew Noel was — now I know a 

2 i lolb^ore about Noel since I've seen his testimony or at 

3 V, least read the newspaper transcripts of it. I was 

4 traveling. X now have seen that I talked to Dr. Gaffney 

5 on the 6th of December, I believe in preparation to brief 

6 the Secretary for a 7 December meeting. 

7 Q But I'm looking back a little bit before that. 

8 A I can understand. I'm trying to work sy way 

9 back. I'm trying to recollect it. I don't remember 

10 talking to Hank Gaffney before that. It seems to me, 

11 though, that we had seen in intelligence some references 

12 to HAWK missiles going to or coming back from Israel. I 

13 think I have testified to that. 

14 And I think that's what I knew, but I don't 

15 remember. I just don't think Nosl told me at the time 

16 anything about this. I don't think Hank would, as a 

17 matter of course. 

You ^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^H 

19 When did you learn that? 

sure was^^^^^^^^^^^H^^I It 

21 might have been an IR intelligence report. I can't say 

22 it was^^^^^lat all, but it was an IR or something 

23 about an allegation or something of HAWK missiles going. 

24 I think it's either hearsay from my colleagues and I'm 

25 sure 1 talked to Amie about this. Or it might have 



UimStFIED 



152 



tlNfiU$«D 

X*^ '§*iginated with me hearing it somewhere else, that there 

2 was « Star of David on these things and that they went 

3 ^rom Israel to Iran and they were sent back. 

4 But that's kind of my recollection. 

5 Q Do you recall when you learned that 

6 intelligence? 

7 A No, I'm sorry, I don't. It would have been 

8 prior to my lunch with Ollie North on 3 December. But I 

9 don't know when prior to that. My feeling is probably 

10 after I came back from this trip to Pakistan, but I can't 

11 say that with 100 percent assurance. 

12 Q Your prior testimony was that the Secretary 

13 had received the intelligence information and requested 

14 you to find out what you could about it. 

15 A Yeah, that's right. Either the Secretary 

16 himself or through Colin, but it was clear that it came 

17 from the Secretary — Colin Powell. 

18 Q Did you have access to the hard copy of the 

19 intelligence information? 

20 A I seen to remember that I saw an IR, which is 

21 a message. It 's not| 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■l saw when the Secretary or 

23 when General Powell thought that it was interesting for 

24 me to see it. As you will remember, sometime we 

25 apparently felt we were cut off from^^^^^^^^Hbut, as 




mmm 



153 



}immm 



151 



1 it turned out, Art Moreau was not. He was the Assistant 

2 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he, I 

3 since found out, has been giving to Colin Powell or the 

4 Secretary interesting things that we weren't seeing in 

5 OSD. 

6 Some of those X was allowed to see by General 

7 Powell. And this continued, I might add, somewhat during 

8 the year of '86. 

9 Q Do you recall if the intelligence indicated 

10 how many weapons had gone? 

11 A I do not. 

12 Q Do you recall if it indicated how the weapons 

13 had gone? 

14 A By aircraft. That's my recollection. 

15 Q Do you recall specifically what the request 

16 was to you? That is, you were to verify the accuracy of 

17 this? 

18 A No. It wasn't directly concerning the HAWK 

19 missiles. The request that was passed to me was to find 

20 out is someone talking to the Iranians. I mean, what do 

21 you know? Can you find out anything? Can you find out 

22 anything about it? That was basically the request. Are 

23 we dealing with the Iranians? 

24 Q So there was information about shipments of 

25 HAWKS by Israel to Iran? 



l)NI!tJtS«D 



154 



UNtymED 



^ A I'm not sure that it said by Israel. I said I 
vaguely remember that they had a Star of David and all on 
1%, but I can't remember if that came in the IR which I 
thinlc I saw or not. 

Q Who asked you to find out whether we were 
talking to ~ 

A Either the Secretary or Colin, one or the 
other. Those would be the only two. 

Q What did you understand to be the basis of the 
request? 

A That they were interested. It appeared from 
i^^^^Bthat there was somebody talking to the Iranians 
and they wanted to find out who the hell it was. 

Q Was the substance of the^^HJ^r the actual 
copy provided to you? 

A Yes. In some cases it was, but it didn't mean 




seemed to be of some concern to the 
Secretary and/or Colin Powell. ^^^^^ 

MR. KREUZER: This information or this^^^H 
was coming from Admiral Moreau to you? 

THE WITNESS: I think it was not coming to me. 
It was going to Powell and the Secretary, and they would 
let me see these things. They didn't come up here to me. 



msmm 



155 



^^^ ^I had to go down there when they called me down there. 

2 '^ ^ MR. KREUZER: For some reason it wasn't coming 

3 " Vin here. 

* THE WITNESS: Yea. Wait a minute. Let -s be 

5 clear, it wasn't coming into the Office of the Secretary 

6 of Defense. 

7 MR. KREUZER: It was going to the JCS? 

8 THE WITNESS! The Assistant to the Chairman, 

9 yes. 



*®- KREUZER: Admiral Moreau was getting the 

11 information and a^i^jould get certain bits, interesting 

12 bit. and Pieces, l^^he would bring th«. up here 

13 and show thea. 

^* THE WITNESS: No. 

" *®- KREUZER: He would take thea to Secretary 

18 Weinberger — 

" THE WITNESS: To General Powell. 

^' *®- KREUZER: Show then to General Powell, who 

19 would show thea to Secretary Weinberger? 

" ™* WITNESS: I aasuae, yeah. I don't know 

21 that. But I don't know that he brought every piece up 

22 eithwr. I saw what I saw. 

" *®- KREUZER: But this went on for a period of 

24 time? 

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, it did. 



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UNDUSSra 



*^ «^ MR. KREUZER: In '86. So like maybe it went 

2 otf f<?r 30 days? 

3 %f THE WITNESS: Well, it was either '85 or '86; 

4 I can't remember. 

5 ' MR. KREUZER: Could it have been '85 and '86? 

6 THE WITNESS: It could have been for a little 

7 while, but I know once Powell determined and the 

8 Secretary determined that we were cut off. I think the 

9 Secretary took steps to put us back on. Nov whether th« 

10 Secretary called^^^^^^^^^Hor whether Colin Powell 

11 called^^^^^^^^^Vlcan't say, but all of a sudden the 

12 Secretary of Defense was put back on the distribution. 

13 MR. KREUZER: But was the Secretary of Defense 

14 aware that his was coming from Admiral Moreau? 

15 THE WITNESS: You've got to ask him. I wasn't 

16 aware of this until later. 

17 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

18 Q Do you recall when the Secretary spoke to you 

19 about this? 

20 A I do not. 

21 Q Could it have been Tuesday, November 26? 

22 A I don't remember. It could have been. 

23 Q I raise that date because you are on the 

24 Secretary's calendar that morning. 

25 A Yeeih. But I must say that I slip into the 



mtmam 



157 



mmm 



1 Secjii^ary an awful lot without being on his calendar. I 

2 . wouldn~*t be surprised if that particular date had to do 

3 with the debrief of my trip, frankly. I don't think that 

4 this is something that he called me down and had me 

5 appear on the schedule for, but it could have been. 

6 Q In connection — 

7 A I very often, by the way, go in to see the 

8 Secretary either before a staff meeting, before everybody 

9 walks in, when everybody is gathered out in the anteroom, 

10 or lata in the night. 

11 Q In connection with the information, your 

12 understanding was that there had been information that 

13 certain Americans were in discussions with Iranians? 

14 A More indications that certain official 

15 Americana were in discussions with the Iranians. 

16 Q There was a reference to| 

18 A That's my remembrance of what triggered me. 

19 You may have a different one. 

20 Q And at the same time you had an intelligence 

21 report indicating that HAWK missiles bearing the Star of 

22 David had gone to Iran? 

23 A I vaguely remember an IR talking about HAWK 

24 missile deliveries to Iran. The Star of David aspect of 

25 it is something that either I developed in talking with 



UNHbtSStflfD 



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wmmm 



156 



1 my friends or Arnie or somebody told me. I don't 

2 remember that, the Star of David being in the IR. 

3 Q So the Secretary, this meeting was with the 

4 Secretary when he asked you to find out what was going 

5 on? 

6 A It was either the Secretary or Colin Powell 

7 who said, is someone meeting with the Iranians. There is 

8 something going on; find out what you can. 

9 Q Did that person tell you what he thought was 

10 going on? 

11 A No, other than that it was clear there was a 

12 suspicion someone was meeting with the Iranians. 

13 Q Was there a reference to the HAWK missiles? 

14 A There could have been, but I don't remember it 

15 in the Secretary's comments at all, or Colin Powell's. I 

16 just don't remember that. 

17 Q Was there a reference to information provided 

18 by Mr. McFarlane? 

19 A Not to my remembrance. Listen, I've testified 

20 to you before that we had a real problem with Mr. 

21 McFarlane 's NSC, not personally with him, but we found it 

22 difficult to deal with the McFarlane NSC. We found that 

23 we weren't getting what we felt was a sufficient flow of 

24 information and we found it much more collegial under 

25 Admiral Poindexter. We found that at least people 



UNttitssn 



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1 listened to us. 

2 So I don't believe that the McFarlane 

3 reference would have come up. From my point of view we 

4 didn't learn very much from them at all. 

5 Q Mr. McFarlane has testified both privately and 

6 now in public that at the time of the HAWK shipment from 

7 Israel to Iran and at some time during the Geneva summit 

8 in fact he seems to recall that he told not only 

9 Secretary Shultz, of which we have written confirmation, 

10 but also Secretary Weinberger, about the fact of the 

11 shipment to Iran. 

12 A I've seen that. 

13 Q So obviously it seems logical to me that on 

14 your return from a trip following the day that McFarlane 

15 indicates he has provided the information that you would 

16 be requested by either the Secretary or possibly Colin 

17 Powell to get more information about it. 

18 A I'd love to help you. I just can't say that 

19 he brought up HAWKs with me at all. I don't think he 

20 did. 

21 Q Focusing on really the same time period that 

22 Ambassador Oakley or Mr. Raphel or both of them, or 

23 either of them, tell you about the weapons that went to 

24 Iran, if it helps you — 

25 A I'm just going to try to give it to you. My 



IINCttSSIFIED 



160 



l^^^t- T*iB«nbranca is that we didn't know clearly that weapons 

2 ^ went'^to Iran. 

3 ^-- MR. SHAPIRO: Can counsel please let him 

4 finish? 

5 THE WITNESS: Say what you will, please. 

6 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

7 Q I wanted to try to help. He have testimony 

8 and interview information that North had told Oakley 

9 during the period sometime after the 17th of November 

10 but, say, before the 25th, had told Oakley what was going 

11 on because ha needed help getting the landing permits in 

12 ^^^^^^H and he told Oakley what was going on, and we 

13 know that Oakley provided information both up and down 

14 the ladder in the State Department on the matter. 

15 And, of course, we know that in Geneva at that 

16 moment the matter had come to the attention of McFarlane 

17 and, in a casual way perhaps, to Secretary Shultz, but 

18 certainly by Monday, the 25th of November, which would 

19 have been your first workday back, Oakley and Raphel, 

20 according to McFarlane, the Secretary knew that Israeli 

21 HANKS had gone and they had an idea that some people from 

22 the White House were talking to Iranians. That would 

23 have been your state of knowledge as a minimum? 

24 A That's pretty close to my state of knowledge, 

25 except I can't say with assurance that they told me about 



UNCUSSIFIED 



161 



vmmmn 



159 



1 weapons going from Israel with any degree of assurance or 

2 knowledge. I'm sure that any intelligence that I found I 

3 talked to Raphel about it. I would hope he talked to me 

4 about it. I just don't have a clear recollection. 

5 I'll tell you why. This may sound baffling to 

6 you, but it's not to me if you sat in this job. Whether 

7 it's an M-16 or a HAWK missile to me was the problem 

8 because it was the policy. It wasn't a matter of what 

9 was or wasn't going. It was the policy that we didn't 

10 like. I mean, I'm not a technician. I told you guys 

11 that. It's the policy that bothered me, whether it was 

12 M-16S or HAWKS. So I'm not sure, if they told me, that 

13 HAWKS would have meant anything more to me than a TOW, 

14 would have meant anything more than an M-16. We didn't 

15 like it as a Department. 

16 BY MR. SAXON: 

17 Q In that time freune do you know if Amie Raphel 

18 told you that he had learned that McFarlane told 

19 Secretary Weinberger in Geneva that the Iranians wanted 

20 120 HAWKS? 

21 A He may have told me that. I just don't recall 

22 it. I trust that he would have shared with me, like I 

23 tried to share with him. 

24 Q Let me refer to something that's an exhibit in 

25 the earlier deposition. I'll give you the number, but 



inmstFHD 



1^ 



UNCtASStFe 



160 



1 let me give you for your reference a copy. These are the 

2 notes of Amie Raphel that were prepared by him on March 

3 31, 1987. I ask, Mr. Secretary, that you look at what is 

4 page four, at the November 25 entry. 

5 It states, and this is Raphel: "My notes 

6 state that Bud McFarlane had met Secretary Weinberger in 

7 Geneva. Mr. McFarlane had asked for 120 HAWKs for Iran, 

8 noting that 100 had been delivered to Israel. My notes 

9 further state that Secretary Weinberger responded he was 

10 opposed to such an operation." 

11 Does this in any way ring a ball with you? 

12 A No. But if November 25 is that Monday and the 

13 Secretary just returned from Geneva and I had just 

14 returned, I tell you frankly I don't think I would have 

15 talked with the Secretary yet. So I don't think that's 

16 mine. But it could be. I don't think that's my note or 

17 my information to Raphel. 

18 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

19 Q All right. But, in any event, what I'm just 

20 trying to establish is, whether they were HAWKs or TOWs 

21 or bullets and M-Ss, whatever it is, your position was 

22 that our policy was contrary to making such transfers. 

23 A Absolutely, yes. 

24 Q And that you had come to know that transfers 

25 had occurred. 



BWfiGsm 



163 



UNIIASSffi 



■^ A Ko. We had suspicions for some time that 



i^ 



2 Isri^pl had been involved in transfers to Iran of we 

3 -didn't know what, and frankly I used the Tataran firm 

4 because we've seen pictures of radios that are being 

5 captured, allegedly captured by the Iraqis on the Iran- 

6 Iraq battlefield, and this was one of the reasons that 

7 we, along with others, in our administration directed the 

8 attention of Israeli visitors to what we thought was a 

9 foolish policy of selling any equipment to Iran. 

10 I must say I don't think we thought it was 

11 U.S. equipment, but it was not a big surprise to us that 

12 Israel would be providing equipment to Iran. I would say 

13 to me it is a surprise, was a surprise to find it was 

14 U.S. equipment. 

15 Q It would have been a surprise if you had 

16 learned that in connection with that there were people 

17 from the White House also talking with Iranians? 

18 A Hell, yeth, that would have been a further 

19 surprise, but we had suspicions that people were talking 

20 froB the White House because of some of the^^^^Hthat 

21 we were seeing, and I was trying to figure out who it 

22 was. 

23 Q Just so I can get your testimony correct, it's 

24 your testimony that you had intelligence information 

25 about a transfer of weapons to Iran. 



ONCtKSSIFIED 



164 



mmm 



A 


By Israel. 




Q 


By Israel. 




A 


By Israel over time, yea. 




Q 


I don't particularly mean over time. 


because 



2 ^ 

,v 

4 

5 that's vague. I'm looking very specifically at TOWs or 

6 HAWKS in 1985. 

7 A My recollection is that I saw, and I have a 

8 vague recollection of seeing hard copy IR of a HAWK 

9 transfer to Iran by aircraft. Now whether it came from 

10 Israel I can't remember if that was on the IR. That I 

11 have a vague recollection of. That became — it was 

12 obvious to us for some time that Israel had been selling 

13 some weapons and equipment to Iran and this was the 

14 reason that over time in a series of meetings for a 

15 couple of years at least we had been raising with the 

16 Israeli officials our point of view that Operation 

17 Staunch was the right way to go with Iran. 

18 That's my testimony. 

19 Q And in addition you receive^^^^^^H 

20 A Yes. ^^^^ 

21 g Did the^^^H indicate or refer to an actual 

22 transfer o f weapons ? 

23 A ^^^^H and I can't remember when and I don't 

24 know how much I saw — I saw what I saw — and I had to 

25 go do%mstairs to see it — sometimes indicated — there 



IWWmD 



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163 




I thinJc eventually it talked about 
%.what kind, but my recollection is that that was sometime 
in '86. I do not re collect seeing specific weapons 
mentioned ^^^^^^Hin 

Q But the reference was to the fact that there 
were people from the White House engaged in conversations 
with Iranians about weapons? 

A I can't say it was about weapons — that they 
were engaged with Iranians. Eventually it cause to be 
weapons. I don't remember that when the Secretary 
grzibbed me he said people from the white House are 
talking about weapons. It was that people from the White 
House apparently were talking about — talking with 
Iranians. What the hell's going on? What is this? 
Because he was indicating to me, and it could have been 
through General Powell, that he didn't know about this. 
MR. SHAPIRO: In that connection, could I ask 
lestion just to cla rify this? Are you talking about 
We're talking about ^^^^H and I'm 
not sure that we're all talking about the 



MR. SABA: Ed, the likelihood is you know more 
than I do. I mean, how do I know? 

MR. SHAPIRO: I'm just asking to clarify your 




UNetiWED 



166 



mmm 



164 



2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 



^Rk, question, Counsel. That's all. 

\^ MR. SABA: I haven't seen it. You saw it, so 
•S-I'm asking what you saw. 

MR. SHAPIRO: I'm just asking to clarify your 
question. 

THE WITNESS: I understand you are at a 
disadvantage in thi s, and tha t's unfair. But somebody 

have seen that^^^^H My understanding wa^^^H 
made it a vailable to you guys. I hope someone's seen it. 
were^^^^^^mmHl^nd they came up to me or 
I went down to see them in a red and white folder that 

said SecDef on it or something like that^^ 

And they were in the ^^^^^^^^^H 
I think, and over time and starting late in '85 — and 1 
can't tell you when ~ and through a good period of '86 
periodically, aa you know, I do travel and when I 
traveled I didn't see things and they didn't particularly 
keep these, to my knowledge, in a desk drawer waiting for 
me, which they could have done, but I think they just 
hemded them back to the guy who carries the 
aroxind. 

So over time there were references to money in 



lat I remember. I can't 



the 



figu res, but it was apparent to me, reading it and what I 
knew , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

nun 



167 



mmm 



2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




MR. KREUZER: Mr. Annitage, ware those the 
reports that you vent down to see, were those the ones 
that Admiral Moreau picked out? 

THE WITNESS; Well, some of them were, but 
later — and I'm now in '86 — they were apparently onea 
that were now being delivered to the Secretary of 
Defense's office. So I'm sure some of the early ones 
were ones that Admiral Moreau let us see, and the later 
ones were, as far as I know, ones that came right to the 
Secretary. 

MR. KREUZER: Did yoj^iav^t^g^down to a 
certain place to see of the^^^^^^^^^^H^ 

THE WITNESS: General Powell's office. There 
may have been one or two occasions when one would be 
carried up to ma, and, as a matter of fact, now they are 
carried up to me. But in general I went down there to 
read them. 

MR. KREUZER: So the ones that Admiral Moreau 
picked out for you to read he would give to General 
Powell? 

THE WITNESS: He did not pick out anything for 



mmm 



168 



iiNeumED 



166 



1 me to read, and I don't know that he )cnows I was reading 

2 them. 

3 MR. KREUZER: Let's say the ones that Admiral 

4 Moreau selected would end up with General Powell. 

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's my understanding. 

6 MR. KREUZER: And then you would read those in 

7 General Powell's office? 

8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

9 MR. KREUZER: And then at some point in time 

10 Secretary Weinberger said wait a minute, we are supposed 

11 to be on distribution for this. 

12 THE WITNESS: That is my understanding. 

13 MR. KREUZER: But you weren't able to 

14 distinguish, were you, or were you, one from the other? 

15 THE WITNESS: No. It was a matter of no 

16 moment to me. I only subsequently learned that there was 

17 a time that we were cut off, and I talked to Amie Raphel 

18 and found he was getting none of this, for instance. 

19 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

20 Q So what happened was that the Secretary asked 

21 you to find out what was going on. 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q And in that request to you was there any 

24 mention of the existence of a recent transfer, whether of 

25 HAWKS or TOWS? 



mmm 



169 



\immm 



167 



1 A No, sir, I don't believe there was. 

2 Q So the only basis that you knew it or that you 

3 recall you knew at that time would be an IR report? 

4 A I could have had subsequent conversations with 

5 friends. I don't remember that. I don't recall that. 

6 Q And you received that request to find 

7 information. 

8 A That's right. 

9 Q And who did you speak to? 

10 A I probably spoke to Bob Oakley, but I can't 

11 say with a certainty. I know I had spoken to Arnie. Now 

12 Arnie was on the trip with me — this one to Pakistan — 

13 as he had an inkling he was going to be the Ambassador to 

14 Pakistan and wanted to go out and measure for the drapes, 

15 and when we came back we were both engaged, as we would 

16 have been, in a discussion, telephone, what's going on in 

17 your building since you've been gone, and I'd tell him 

18 what's been going on in my building since we were gone. 

19 I know that when the Secretary told me that 

20 something was going on I kind of figured Ollie would know 

21 something eUsout it because he was a very active fellow 

22 and very involved with hostages. I could see myself no 

23 reason to talk to the Iranians that didn't involve 

24 hostages, none, and I think the combination of all of 

25 those and maybe rumors from the interagency community led 



msmm 



170 



Wbissfe 



1 me to ask Ollie to lunch. 

2 Q Did you have a conversation with Ambassador 

3 Oakley prior to that lunch with Ollie? 

4 A I don't remember. I may have. 

5 Q And in that conversation by any chance do you 

6 recall the topic of a talking paper or points involving 

7 the Arms Export Control Act arising? 

8 A My remembrance — I have been wrong — was 

9 that this arrived after I had my lunch with Ollie, and 

10 before the meeting, what I think was the first meeting, 

11 as far as I know, with the President in early December, 

12 and I think I had that discussion with Amie Raphel. 

13 Q With Amie? 

14 A Yes, that's my recollection. I could have 

15 also had one with Bob, but I'm quite sure I had a 

16 discussion with Amie Raphel on this. 

17 Q What was the timing on that? 

18 A It would have been, I'm sure, immediately 

19 after having lunch here on 3 December with Ollie and 

20 prior to the 6 or 7 December, whichever date that meeting 

21 was. I'm absolutely certain I discussed this with Amie 

22 Raphel . 

23 Q Do you recall, just to leave that alone for a 

24 moment because in the same time frame there were joint 

25 U.S. -Israeli talks going on. 



ONCDtsamn 



171 



wMsm 



169 



1 A JPMG — the Joint Military Planning. 

2 Q Do you recall having a conversation that weelc 

3 with Mindy Meron? He was to help you, staying in Chevy 

4 Chase? 

5 A I'm sure I did. If we had it at that time, I 

6 would have had it here. He would have come in to see me. 

7 Q Do you recall the substance of that 

8 conversation? 

9 A I do not. The only noteworthy conversation 

10 that I remember with Mindy on this whole subject — and I 

11 can't give you a date, but my feeling is that it was 

12 later in the spring of '86 prior to when Mindy was going 

13 to leave his job as Director General of the Defense 

14 Agency — he got a call. He was in my office. He got a 

15 call from Ollie, who wanted to talk secure, so I let 

16 Mindy go out to my outer office to use the secure phone. 

17 When he came back I don't remember him telling 

18 me the subject of the conversation, but I said to Mindy, 

19 you know, you guys are involved with some real sleaze 

20 balls. I think I used that exact expression, or 

21 scumballs, because Mindy gave me — he was standing — I 

22 remember he had just come back in my office and he was 

2 3 standing over by the corner of my desk, and he gave me — 

24 he's got a very charming smile. He gave me this kind of 

25 quizzical smile which I read as, you play the hand you 



wmssm 



172 



UNCutssm 



170 



1 are dealt. He didn't say that at all. He kind of gave 

2 me one of those. 

3 That's the only conversation I remember with 

4 Mindy on this. 

5 Q Continuing to focus on the joint U.S. -Israeli 

6 talks in that period of time, did you see Defense 

7 Minister Rabin at the same time? 

8 A If he was in town I would have probably seen 

9 him, but I would not have seen Rabin without the 

10 Secretary. I mean, I did not see Rabin other than at a 

11 major meeting. But Rabin doesn't come to JPMGs. As a 

12 rule this is not his level of meetings. It is down a 

13 bit. 

14 Q I understand. It was at the Heron level? 

15 A That's right. He led their team with their 

16 Ambassador. 

17 Q We have Mr. McFarlane's testimony and Mr. 

18 North's testimony that Minister Rabin in New York first 

19 met with McFarlane on the 15th and raised an issue. 

20 A Of — 

21 Q November, and raised an issue of replenishment 

22 for Israeli weapons shipped and to be shipped to Iran. 

23 When McFarlane was in Geneva Rabin again calls McFarlane. 

24 McFarlame in turn calls — tells Rabin to see Oliver 

25 North. Oliver North's testimony was that at that time he 



w&mm 



173 



uNCti^m 



171 



sought to determine legalities and modalities, I believe 
was his testimony in public, as to the means of transfer 
of a large number of HAWK missiles. 

A So Ollie was looking for the legalities of 
doing this? 

Q And, if you recall, w« have the testimony that 
John and I did with Mr. Koch and Mr. Gaffney because ve 
eventually came to produce the week of the 17th to the 
21st the Gaffney memorandum which discussed — 

A Thank God Z was gone, and that's why Noel was 
in on it. 

Q Which discussed 500 or 600 HAHKs and then 
eventually that number beczune 120. But the testimony is 
that that paper was in some way connected with that line 
of inquiry. 



A Oh, I'm sure. 

Q And if that helps you, my question then is at 
this time, and we'll look at the period right after your 



na we'll look at tne perj 

UNIiUmD 



174 



IWClASSiED 

return and we'll take it up to December 7, to stretch it 

2 a few more days past Ollie North's lunch, did you have 

3 discussions with Minister Rabin as to replenishment 

4 issues? 

5 A I don't remember Rabin, but I would not have 

6 met with Rabin, me, without being with the Secretary if 

7 he were in town. That is dead sure. That's number one. 

8 Q Mindy Meron? 

9 A If Mindy was in town at the time, I met with 
him and I would have met with him here. I don't remember 
talking about it, but I must say I don't know why Mindy- 
I mean, other than to talk about a project they wanted- 
would come to me for replenishment, because I don't have 

14 the power to replenish. I can't just order DSAA to 
replenish. He has to submit an LOA, which has to go 
through a normal process, which is something I can't 



15 

16 

17 order 

18 

19 

20 



He may have; I don't know. I'm not sure I 
knew or would know if it was in the context of 
replenishment for Israeli weapons which were already 
21 delivered. 

^^ Q I think I understand, but correct me if I'm 

2 3 wrong. Is it your testimony that in this time period you 

24 did not discuss with Mindy Meron questions of 

25 replenishment of Israeli weapons to Iran, whether 

mmsm 



175 



(/NJMSJW 



1 retroactively or prospectively? 

2 A Well, I can't say. You guys, when I saw you 

3 the last time, used the date 2 January with Mindy Meron, 

4 which caused me to go back and look at my calendar. I 

5 didn't see him, but I didn't remember then and I don't 

6 remember now. Kow retrogressive replenishment of Israel, 

7 I just don't remember it. Prospective is a possibility, 

8 but I am not sure in the context of they were going to be 

9 giving stuff to Iran, because 2 December was prior to 

10 having had the meeting with the President. It was prior 

11 also to my positively getting Ollie to tell me that he 

12 and others had been meeting with the Iranians. 

13 So it's very possible I could have talked 

14 about replenishment in general because that is one of the 

15 subjects, weapons sales in general, that Mindy talks 

16 about with me and with Phil Cast of DSAA. But I've got 

17 to say I don't remember it being related to this specific 

18 case at all. 

19 Q All right. Let's go to the lunch. Did North 

20 tell you that he had a long conversation about 11:00 that 

21 day with Ambassador Oakley on this point? 

22 A I don't believe he did. 

23 Q Just to help, I am looking at Ollie North's 

24 calendar for December 3. It simply notes that around 

25 11:00 a.m. he had a call to Oakley. They discussed 



.m. he had a call to Oaklev. 



176 



uNcyism 



174 



X certain talking points. There's a reference to hostages 

2 and Ambassador Oakley has told us that Issues of the 

3 transfer were discussed and that North was concerned, but 

4 you don't recall it? 

5 A I sure don't. 

6 Q Did Oakley tell you about this conversation? 

7 A I don't recall Oakley telling me. 

8 Q Do you remember if Oakley or Raphel discussed 

9 that with you toward developing talking points or a legal 

10 piece for either or both of your Secretaries? 

11 A No. My recollection goes a little the other 

12 way. My recollection is Ollie sat right where you are 

13 sitting and I sat right where you are sitting and we had 

14 this lunch, and after we finished it I talked about Iran 

15 and he said yeah, he'd been meeting and doing this stuff, 

16 and Z was kind of shocked and said what I told you Z said 

17 to hin and told him I thought the Secretary would be 

18 appalled and all this had an effect, Z thought, on ollie 

19 physically because he thought so much of Weinberger. 

20 But after he left my office Z know that Z 

21 would have informed General Powell and Amie Raphel that 

22 Ollie was meeting with Iranians. So my recollection 

23 would be a little different. Though Z don't have a clear 

24 recollection, Z'm quite sure Z called Amie Raphel, 

25 second probably only to Colin Powell. 



ly only to Colin Powell. 

MA»tu 



177 



mmm 



175 




1 Q What did North tell you in that conversation? 

2 A Wall, what I remamber most clearly is he was 

3 me eting wit h the Iranians.* 
4 

^^^^^^^■^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■~~But was the whole 

6 thrust that he and others had been meeting with Iranians. 

7 He may even have mentioned Dick Secord at that meeting, 

8 though I can't be clear. 

9 For me, on the one hand, I was excited at 

10 having what I thought solved a mystery, and on the other 

11 I was appalled at what I saw was something that my boss 

12 was clearly not up to speed on going on, euid that's what 

13 struck me and that's my overwhelming remembrance of the 

14 conversation. 

15 Q What was your report about that conversation? 

16 A That Ollie North is doing this and that 

17 apparently it's sanctioned by his boss, by Bud. And I'm 

18 sure that's the extent of that. 

19 g Did you do a written report? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Did North inform you of the success of the 

22 August-September TOW transfer and Reverend Weir? 

23 A Now that you ask me, that sounds a little more 

24 familiar, that Heir came out as a basis of these 

25 discussions or this was a result. That's not really what 



uim«D 



178 



mmm 



176 



1 stood, out in my mind, frankly. When you say it there, 

2 that sounds familiar, but I don't have a clear 

3 recollection of it. 

4 Q But he talked about the whole mission? 

5 A No, you are saying that. He talked about the 

6 discussion with Iran and how far he thought they were 

7 going to go and all this and that it was hostage-related. 

8 Kow that you mention Weir in that connection, I think 

9 that's familiar to me. I can't center on it, whether he 

10 talked about HAWKs or TOWs. For me again I've got to say 

11 that's not what made the impression on me. 

12 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

13 Q Do you recall saying anything to him along the 

14 lines of but this sounds like trading arms for hostages 

15 and we don't do that? 

16 A No, that's not the way I talk. That's not 

17 what I would have said. This is really crap. How can we 

18 do this? I would have said that. I don't know that I 

19 did, but that's the way I would have put it to him. He 

20 and I ware friends and I wouldn't have been mincing 

21 around it. 

22 Q Let me ask you one other question. 

23 A I would have hit it hard. 

24 Q That's a little broader and in a way an even 

25 more philosophical question. 



)phlcal question. 

HASHED 



179 



ammm 



177 



1 A Get me on my weak point. 

2 Q At any point in this time period did anybody 

3 step back here in the Pentagon, as far as you know, and 

4 look at the pattern of what was happening, of some things 

5 going on with arms to Iran. We've been cut out of ^^^B 

8 You had had these problems that you described dealing 

9 with the McFarlane NSC. 

10 Did anybody — you. Secretary Weinberger, 

11 General Powell, somebody — step back and say something's 

12 going on here that we don't like, we don't know eibout, we 

13 need to raise or discuss? 

14 A This is the answer, yes or no — yes, in that 

15 something was going on that we didn't know and that 

16 caused us all to want to have a meeting with the 

17 President to kind of lay this out in front of everybody 

18 and get all the guys that had the concern together to 

19 give the President his information. I was less shocked 

20 about, personally was less shocked at finding that we had 

21 been cut out of some bureaucratic action because, 

22 frankly, at that time with the NSC and since, as I 

23 testified to before, the Lebanon experience, we had a 

24 great deal of trouble with the NSC. 

25 So Z was less shocked at being found to be cut 



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UNdASSffl 



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1 out of some bureaucratic action than I was about what was 

2 going on. So the answer is we didn't stand back and take 

3 a long look at a great conspiracy or something like that, 

4 but we did say hey, there's a problem here and we have 

5 got to get a handle on it so we can try to fix it. 

6 Q And the way that in a sense manifested itself 

7 was when you told Colonel North we've got to get the 

8 elephants together? 

9 A No. I think it manifested itself when the 

10 Secretary indicated, either himself or through Powell, 

11 that he wanted someone to see what the hell was going on 

12 so we could try to find out what was going on, where do 

13 we go from here. That would be the manifestation to me, 

14 and my comment to Ollie was a private remark based on, 

15 certainly, my understanding that Secretary Weinberger 

16 wasn't very clued in on this stuff and, number two, what 

17 I felt was the case from my constant conversation with 

18 Amie Raphel that there's something going on and we're 

19 not being plugged in. 

20 And that's why I ever dared raise George 

21 Shultz' name with Ollie, because I had talked with Arnie. 

22 Q Did you get a sense in the December 3 lunch 

23 that Colonel North was hearing for the first time that 

24 Secretary Weinberger was opposed to what was happening or 

25 wouldn't look favorably on it? 



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1 A I must say, now that you say it like that, I'd 

2 have to answer yes, because I said, when I told him the 

3 Secretary would have thought he was out of his mind with 

4 this, Ollie looked shocked to me, and I think he looked 

5 shocked because he respected Secretary Weinberger. 

6 MR. KREUZER: That lunch occurred on what day? 

7 THE WITNESS: December 3, whatever day ot the 

8 week that was. 

9 MR. KREUZER: That was the third of December 

10 of '85? 

11 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

12 MR. KREUZER: Four days before the meeting for 

13 the Secretary? 

14 THE WITNESS: I don't want to claim credit for 

15 having brought about a meeting with the President. I 

16 mean, that was my recommendation to Ollie. I'm sure it 

17 was also other people's recommendation as soon as I 

18 finished that lunch with Ollie, because I know I told 

19 Amie what I had discovered. 

20 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

21 Q Have you seen the paper Dr. Gaffney prepared 

22 the week of November 18? 

23 A Let me see it. It's probably out of my safe. 

24 I probably gave it to you. 

25 Q aJW lWf^9l'A<y4l4^fr*M?*^ ^^ might as well make 



ff 



182 



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1 it an exhibit. 

2 (The document referred to was 

3 marked Armitage Exhibit Nximber 14 

4 for identification.) 

5 A Did this come out of my safe? I think this is 

6 HAWK missiles for Iran. I have seen it. There was one 

7 about the possibility of leaks. 

8 Q That will come. 

9 A This one I have seen, but I don't remember 

10 when I saw it. 

11 Q Do you remember when you first saw it? 

12 A No, I don't. But I have seen it. 

13 Q Do you recall whether in asking you to find 

14 more information about what's going on any reference was 

15 made to this paper or the fact of its existence? This 

16 had already been provided. Your testimony is it's been 

17 provided the Secretary a week before you engage in this 

18 inquiry. 

19 A Whether provided by me, I was unaware of it. 

20 Q I understand that it was provided, we have 

21 testimony, to Powell and the Secretary, so they had 

22 knowledge of this paper when they spoke to you, and it 

23 just seems unusual to me that having this amount of 

24 knowledge about an I iii I I i1 which is substantial they 

25 might not have mentioned that to you. 



mmm 



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1 . A I don't believe they did. Now Gaffney may 

2 have mentioned it. As I say, I now )cnow I met with him 

3 in preparation for the 7 December meeting, when I was 

4 getting smarter for the Secretary. I know I met with 

5 Hank, so he may have mentioned it then. But I've seen 

6 that paper. 

7 Q Z want to continue with the lunch with Ollie. 

8 I'm trying to understand the gist of the conversation in 

9 the context of what's going on. Ha told you there was an 

10 initiative, told you that he had had a discussion with 

11 certain Iranians. 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q He mentioned that this was in connection with 

14 hostages? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q Did he mention weapons? 

17 A I don't recall. Ha may have, but that didn't 

18 stick in ay mind. And he may have mentioned Secord, 

19 which does now strike a mora resonant tone because I knew 

20 Dick quit* vail at that time, at that lunch. 

21 Q Do you remember the context in which ha 

22 mentioned Dick Secord? 

23 A No, I don't. I just say that's familiar. I 

24 think that might have happened. 

25 Q Did Ollie mention that the status at that 



UflCbARIl^Fe 



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1 point of the initiative involved a proposal for 3,300 

2 T0W3? 

3 A I don't recall it. 

4 Q i-TOWs? 

5 A I don't recall it. He may have. He may have 

6 done that, or he may have - you know, the number. I've 

7 seen it on a piece of paper, but I don't remember Ollie 

8 doing it, but it may have been Ollie that brought it up, 

9 and I don't know if it was at that lunch or some 

10 subsequent conversation. Weapons are not what stands out 

11 about that lunch. As I say, what stood out was the fact 

12 that we were dealing with the Iranians and the Department 

13 of Defense was cut out of it. He may have told me about 

14 weapons, but I don't recall it. 

j^5 Q so you had the lunch and you made an oral 

16 report to whom? 

17 A To Colin. 

j^a Q To Colin Powell? 

19 A Yes. 

20 Q And did you provide him any information in 

21 regards to weapons or hostages? 

22 A I told him whatever I knew at the time. I 

23 would have told him as much that struck me out of that 

24 conversation. 

25 Q M^a^^4 yPHt i?f Si^gf Si°" °* ''^^^ happened 





185 



\immm 



nex^s 

A Well, I remember my most vivid recollection is 
some frantic working with Arnie Raphel to try to make 
sure our bosses were basically singing from the same 
hymnal. That I know because I have talked to Arnie 
several times on that. That's my most vivid 
recollection. But you've got to remember — and I don't 
mean this facetiously — my business continues and I was 
about to go off, and I had all kinds of things going on 
and in between this my most vivid remembrance is working 
with Arnie Raphel to be sure our bosses could be 
together, feeling that this would kill the program. 

Q When did you speak to Glenn Rudd about the 
matter? 

A I would be guided by whatever Glenn said to 
you guys. I didn't remember speaking to hin, but he now 
— I think he and Gaf fney came in to see me on 6 
December, but I'm not clear on that. Z am not sure. 

Q Did you request Glenn Rudd to prepare a 
document? 

21 A Very possibly. I'm sure if I was in town I 

22 would be the guy rec[uesting. But let's see the document. 

23 Q Let me show you the testimony as the next 

24 exhibit. I have the entire deposition. Actually it was 

25 a continuing d%BPf^ion of both Mr. Gaffney and Glenn 




186 



uNeiASsra 



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1 Rudd taken Monday, June 22, '87. 

2 I direct your attention to page three and I'll 

3 show you the deposition, which will become our next 

4 exhibit. 

5 (The document referred to was 

6 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 15 

7 for identification.) 

8 I would then show you, which will become our 

9 next exhibit, the paper to which you referred and 

10 identified in that deposition. 

11 (The document referred to was 

12 marked Armitage Exhibit Kumber 16 

13 for identification.) 

14 You might want to take a look at his testimony 

15 to refresh your recollection as well as the paper. And I 

16 direct your attention in particular to the number 3,300 

17 that's referenced for TOWs. 

18 A Got it. Yes, I've got it. 

19 Q I guess what I'm trying to understand is how 

20 that happened and what was it that caused you — 

21 A I don't remember. My feeling is it must have 

22 been in a phone call in preparing for this, but I just am 

23 not clear on it. 

24 Q Mr. Rudd testified that you came to him and 

25 asked for the paper. He did not have this information of 



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UNCiissffe 



1 his own knowledge, nor did he get those numbers from 

2 anyone but yourself, and there had to be a basis on which 

3 you went to him and said I need information about such 

4 and such and such, and it's very specific information. 

5 My question to you is, who asked for the 

6 paper. Was this on your own initiative? 

7 A No. I at my own initiative would not have 

8 thought up those numbers. I can assure you of that. It 

9 was clearly or my remembrance — and 1 can't remember 

10 who; it must have been from a phone call, and I can't 

11 remember if it was Ollie, if it ceune from the bottom 

12 floor, from Colin Powell or from whom. I have no 

13 remembrance of that. 

14 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

15 Q What's the bottom floor? 

16 A I meant the third deck, the Secretary's 

17 office. Or Ollie or any of these guys. I just don't 

18 remember. 

19 MR. KREUZER: It could be maybe Ollie North? 

20 It could be? 

21 THE WITNESS: It could be anybody. You could 

22 name them all. 

23 MR. KREUZER: Could it have been the 

24 Secretary? 

25 THE WITNESS: I don't think it would have been 



m 



188 



wmm 



186 



1 the Secretary. It could have been Colin. I can't 

2 imagine the Secretary dealing in 3,300s. But I can't say 

3 with any assurance that it was at all. 

4 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

5 Q Are you suggesting the number did not come 

6 from Oliver North on the third of December? 

7 A I'm only suggesting I can't remember where it 

8 came from. It could have certainly come from Ollie on 

9 the third or in a subsequent conversation. I don't 

10 remember where it came from and I don't remember who told 

11 me. Clearly I wouldn't have asked for a paper to be 

12 prepared if it didn't have some bearing on the meeting we 

13 were about to go to. I just don't do stupid things. 

14 Q Mr. Rudd testified that this was done at great 

15 urgency. This was kept close is what he was informed. 

16 DSAA General Counsel was not involved. This was a most 

17 unusual exercise, done in a very short period of time. 

18 A For all of us. 

19 Q Not in the usual course of business. 

20 A I agree. 

21 Q I must confess it's difficult to, in the 

22 context of all that you have said about policy and the 

23 opposition of the Department to the policy, that you 

24 would have requested such a document with such specific 

25 facts and not have aoy^aCQtLfQtifin ot why you requested 



Him 



189 



md^B 



187 



1 it. .. > 

2 A Well, I can speculate, but I can only do that. 

3 I can't remember directly. I would speculate that I was 

4 preparing this because it was going to come up the next 

5 day. That's the only thing I could speculate. I just 

6 don't remember it and I don't remember who told me, but 

7 it was clear — anybody who told me a number would be 

8 somebody who I would have regarded as requesting 

9 information that needed to be answered. I mean, I just 

10 wouldn't ask Glenn Rudd or any of those guys to do 

11 something stupid, and I just can't remember who it was. 

12 And it was extraordinary, and it was very 

13 close hold. All that I agree with. 

14 Q What did you do with the paper? 

15 A Well, I'm sure I provided it to the Secretary 

16 for that meeting, but that's my best recollection. 

17 Q For what meeting? 

18 A For the next day's meeting. 

19 Q So you knew there would be a meeting on the 

20 7th of December? 

21 A Yes, I knew by 6 December there was, sure. 

22 Q How did you know that? 

23 A You got me. Either Ollie called and told me 

24 that or Amie called and told me that, or the Secretary's 

25 office called. Somebody told me they were going to have 



Bd. Somebody told me the 



190 



^mmm 



188 



1 the meeting. 

2 Q Who did you give the paper to? 

3 A Well, I'm sure I would have provided it to 

4 Colin, but I don't remember giving it to him. But that's 

5 the way I did things. 

6 Q Isn't it likely, then, that Colin would have 

7 told you of the occurrence of the meeting and the need 

8 for the paper? 

9 A It's possible. I don't like your words, 

10 because I can't stand behind them. It's possible that he 

11 could have. 

12 MR. SAXON: I don't mean to be glib. If you 

13 don't like ours, just provide your own. 

14 THE WITNESS: I say it's likely, it's 

15 possible, but it's equally possible that Ollie said one 

16 of the things that's going to be discussed is 3,300 TOWs. 

17 It's equally possible Arnie said to me hey, I hear 3,300 

18 TOWs are the number and we better find out what the deal 

19 is and get all the information. This is all possible, 

20 but you got me. 

21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

22 Q Let me show you another document which I 

23 perhaps may have shown to you before and it may be an 

24 exhibit, but I will show it to you now. It's a PROFs 

25 note written on December 4 by Oliver North. There's a 



UNmssm 



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UNmssm 



189 



1 very long summary of the entire initiative to that point, 

2 and ho gives, on the third page of this, a formula and 

3 this was also used in the testimony of Mr. Gaffney and 

4 Mr. Koch. I'm showing you an unredacted version. 

5 A I've got a clearance. 

6 Q I just mention it because it's also a public 

7 exhibit. 

8 (The document referred to was 

9 marked Amitage Exhibit Number 17 

10 for identification.) 

11 This would have been prepared the day after 

12 your lunch with Mr. North. 

13 A Do you want me to read the whole thing? I see 

14 this is what you are interested in. 

15 Q I direct your attention to the number in the 

16 entire initiative and perhaps that helps you to remember 

17 what Ollie might have talked about the day before. 

18 A I see it says 3,300 basic TOWs, but it 

19 doesn't. And, as I say, it could have been Ollie, but 

20 that's not what struck me. You know, I don't think Ollie 

21 would have told me about this 3 December, because I don't 

22 believe I'd have waited to 6 December for information. 

23 I'm not at putter-offer. 

24 MR. KREUZER: But on 3 December you imparted 

25 some very unnerving news to Ollie, and he was visibly 



\mmm 



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UHGMfiD 



190 



1 upset. 

2 THE WITNESS: That was my view. 

3 MR. KREUZER: It was your view that you were 

4 out on a limb because the Secretary doesn't know about 

5 this, and you are way out on a limb. 

6 THE WITNESS: I told him that. 

7 MR. KREUZER: So he had to be unnerved and he 

8 left here, but within three days somebody came back with 

9 a task here for point papers on I-TOWs, I-HAWKs, and a 

10 Possibility for Leaks, which is a legal opinion paper by 

11 a man who isn't an attorney. 

12 THE WITNESS: A Possibility for Leaks I 

13 believe was probably done between me and Raphel and with 

14 some help from DSAA, not legal counsel. But I don't 

15 know. You're saying that that was all one tasker and you 

16 are a better witness than I am. I don't know that at 

17 all. I think The Possibility for Leaks is me and Arnie. 

18 This is my remembrance, and it wasn't a tasker, I don't 

19 think. I think it was us. I just don't remember, and I 

20 don't remember how the tasker got here. 

21 MR. KREUZER: So, let's see. The I-TOW and 

22 the I -HAWK paper, would that have come from, say, either 

23 Colin Powell or Ollie North, the request for that? 

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, but it could have come from 

25 Arnie. It wouldn't have been a request. It would have 



UNCbmtHED 



193 



UNGUSSra 



191 



1 been more along the lines of this is what's going to be 

2 discussed, but I doubt that it came from Arnie, but it 

3 could have. I just don't remember who gave me this 

4 information. I would say Ollie was the most probable. 

5 But I don't thinlc he would have done it 3 December 

6 because I don't think I'd have waited until 6 December to 

7 ask Glenn Rudd to do it for me. That's just my own 

8 habit. 

9 MR. KREUZER: So that would have come maybe 

10 the 4th or the 5th or maybe even the 6th? 

11 THE WITNESS: Possibly. I can only tell you 

12 my habit is not to sit on things. So I don't sit on 

13 things. 

14 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

15 Q Mr. Secretary, let me focus on one different 

16 issue for a second and ask you since we've been talking 

17 about 3,300 I-TOWs Exhibit 16, which is what we call the 

18 TOW paper, has a little bit about HAWKs, but also some 

19 about TOWS. And Mr. Rudd testified that he was involved 

20 in putting this together for you, and it went to you. 

21 The statement is contained in it, and I quote: 

22 "Based on the numbers, the impact on Army of shipping 

23 3,300 I-TOWs immediately would be serious but not 

24 intolerable." Do you recall taking note of that sentence 

25 in this, and do you recall any discussion about the 




82-690 0-88-8 



194 



mmwiBi 



1 readiness impact? 

2 A with the Secretary or with anybody? 

3 Q With anybody. 

4 AX don't remember it with anybody outside the 

5 Secretary. I don't remeatoer it directly, but I've got a 

6 hazy recollection that the Secretary had a concern for 

7 readiness, U.S. readiness. 

8 Q On the issue of 3,300 I-TOWs? 

9 A Whether it was on I-TOWs or HAWK spare parts, 

10 I don't know. I can't remember. But I mean this is 

11 something he gives some weight to. But whether the paper 

12 had the information or whether we discussed it across a 

13 table I can't recall. 

14 Q Well, the HAWK spare parts didn't come until 

15 April '86. 

16 A Well, then it might have been the TOWs. I 

17 just can't remember that it was TOWs, but I've got a 

18 vague recollection of the Secretary being concerned with 

19 readiness as a general proposition, yes. But I can't be 

20 more precise. 

21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

22 Q Did you provide the information in this 

23 exhibit or any part of it to Oliver North? 

24 A I may very well have. If he asked for it, I 

25 would have provided it to him as well. 



mmsm 



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mmmm 



193 



1 Q On the 6th of December? 

2 A Whenever. Whenever they gave it to me. 

3 Q I notice that in the notebooks of Mr. North on 

4 the 6th of December there is considerable information 

5 about TOWS, including the same formula which I showed you 

6 in the PROFs notes and reference to the 3,300 TOWs and 

7 very much the same information. 

8 A I might have called it to him. I don't know 

9 that I sent the paper. But it could very well have been. 

10 Q I want to enter another exhibit, and the 

11 second document is called "Possibility for Leaks". 

12 A Yes. This did come out of my safe. 

13 (The document referred to was 

14 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 18 

15 for identification.) 

16 Q I'd ask you to take your time and take a look 

17 at it and tell us what you know about it, and feel free 

18 to look at the deposition of Mr. Rudd and Gaffney. 

19 A You want me to recall first and then look at 

20 tha deposition? 

21 Q As you like. I want you to feel comfortable 

22 with your testimony. 

23 A I'm telling you the truth as I know it, so I'm 

24 comfortable without looking at their deposition. This 

25 looks to me like something I would have asked them for — 



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UNCOSSIflED 



194 



1 the legality surrounding this problem. I mean, that's 

2 my remsmbrance. I remember very clearly discussing with 

3 Arnie Raphel kind of the legal problems. 

4 Now the reason that you made a comment about 

5 you're discussing things with people that aren't lawyers, 

6 I will recall for you that at least two buildings were 

7 appalled at this — this and the State Department — and 

8 that, number two, that it was our fervent hope that this 

9 thing was going to be killed. Number three, Arnie Raphel 

10 had worked in PM. He had been the Deputy Director of PM, 

11 Political-military bureau at State. As such, he had the 

12 arms transfer policy hat for the State Department, who 

13 has the lead in this issue. 

14 We're technicians here in the Defense 

15 Department. He was very well versed on the intricacies 

16 of the Arms Export Control Act of necessity. He had held 

17 the job. 

18 Q Mr. Raphel? 

19 A Raphel. So I can remember vividly talking 

20 with him the ins and outs. I probably even read him this 

21 pap«r, and I'm sure — I have a very vivid memory that he 

22 gave me some knowledge of what was legal and illegal. 

23 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

24 Q Are you able to characterize the discussion? 

25 A Did you want me to look at Rudd'a testimony? 



UNtUtSStFe 



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195 



1 MR. SABA: No. We'll turn to some more 

2 specifics, but go ahead, Mr. Saxon. 

3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

4 Q Let me just see if you can characterize your 

5 discussion with Arnie Raphel and I'm going to give you 

6 some choices, and if none of them apply, that's fine. 

7 A Thanks. I'm comfortable. 

8 Q Do you recall what I'll call the legal 

9 discussion where you were talking about the Arms Export 

10 Control Act, the provision and so forth? 

11 A Ves. 

12 Q Being in the context of what are the 

13 provisions that apply and that govern so we can brief our 

14 principals so they'll know, or what are the impediments 

15 to this, since your boss and my boss don't want it to 

16 happen and go forward, so we can help them shoot it down? 

17 A I frankly think we saw them both as the same 

18 thing. I mean, the legalities would be impediments. So 

19 I don't know that we would have used the word how do we 

20 block this. There was no question at the staff level the 

21 advice to the principals was going to be this is a bad 

22 deal. 

23 So we wouldn't have used the term 

24 "impediments'*. What are the legalities surrounding arms 

25 transfers? what are the parameters that the bosses have 



\immm 



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iiNemn 



196 



1 to take into consideration? That I remember. I don't 

2 remember using the word "impediments", but it was clear 

3 this is what our whole focus was — my whole focus, and I 

4 believe Arnie shared that. 

5 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

6 Q In the Possibility for Leaks the very title of 

7 the document might suggest certain things. What did you 

8 understand to be the purpose of the paper? 

9 A I think I was looking for what were th« ways 

10 to do this quietly. I don't know whether I would have 

11 used the term "Possibility of Leaks" as the heading. I 

12 possibly did, but I don't think so. I think I would say, 

13 listen, if this wants to be done, how can it be done 

14 legally? What are the legal parameters? 

15 Quietly. I mean, obviously it would have to 

16 be c[ulet. 

17 Q Why? 

18 A Well, because we thought selling weapons to 

19 Iran was a violation of everything from operations talks 

20 to hostages. We didn't think we'd ever be able to 

21 explain it to our modern Arab friends. We thought it 

22 would make us look like idiots in Europe, where we had 

23 finally made some progress on terrorism, et cetera, et 

24 cetera. 
Why wasn't the question put to Jerry Silber? 



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1 A I may have said don't let anybody else see 

2 this. I'm sure I would have said to either Hank or to 

3 Glenn. Just use your collective )cnowledge because we 

4 want as few people to know about this as possible. 

5 Q Who is "we"? 

6 A Me and the Secretary. The Secretary said this 

7 is a very close hold. 

8 Q So it was the Secretary who asked you to do 

9 it? 

10 A No. It was the Secretary who asked me to find 

11 out, but when I told him or told Colin what it was, I 

12 then had to staff him up and told Colin that I would 

13 staff the Secretary. The Secretary wants to keep this 

14 very quiet. I mean, it was our hope to just kill it and 

15 it would go away and we would never see it again. 

16 So I would have, as a matter of course, 

17 cautioned Glenn and Hank do it yourself. You guys have 

18 been in this business for 20-odd years. You know the 

19 stuff. Give me what I need. 

20 MR. KREUZER: The Secretary asked you to find 

21 out about this thing that's called Possibility for Leaks? 

22 THE WITNESS: No. The Secretary asked me to 

23 find out if anyone was talking to Iran. Eventually we 

24 got word that there was going to be a meeting of the 

25 elephants, as I called them. 1, then reported I will 



as I called them. I,±h€ 

yNEt«!HtB 



200 



UN8UWW 



198 



1 staf ^ the Secretary up to Colin. Colin reported back to 

2 me that's fine, but keep it quiet, which I would have 

3 done without any caution from the Secretary of Defense. 

4 And I'm sure that I would have fully told Hank 

5 and Glenn don't let this get out of your sight. It stops 

6 with you. It is not unusual in this business for the 

7 Secretary to turn to me or one of my colleagues and say I 

8 need your advice on X. I don't want it staffed by 

9 anybody; I want your advice. Give me what you've got 

10 now. 

11 I've had occasion to go in and see him on some 

12 subject matter and he'd say, look, I need to know about Y 

13 and I don't want to ask officially. Can you tell me what 

14 you know about it? And I'll give him as much opinion as 

15 fact. So that in itself, I mean, a request to keep 

16 things quiet is not totally unusual. But this whole 

17 program was bizarre. 

18 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

19 Q And in your request to Mr. Rudd you also asked 

20 about price and readiness issues? 

21 A I guess I did. 

22 Q And I take it you instructed him to draft — 

23 A I would bet price was what somebody had asked 

24 me, and I would bet that readiness was probaOsly something 

25 that I put cy^fi^ J|^t-tbe^DUi^QP-±hemselves, because 



D 



1 



201 



\immm 

they would have to take these stocks from the Army and, 
aa-. matter of course, we were interested any time we ' 
draw down our Army stocks what the readiness is. So they 
may have added it of their own free will, i u^e to 
5 think that I brought it up. 

Q Who do you think "they" would be? 
A "They", Hank and Glenn, the DSAA body as a 
8 whole. They do have to consider readiness. 
^ BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

" ° ^^'°" "« 5«t °« Of a point you made a moment 

11 ago, you said that this was very close hold. 
^^ A Yes, sir. 

Q Why would this document, the one Possibility 
for Leaks, and the TOW paper and the HAWK paper - i 
think they are all classified at the Secret level, is 
that unusual, given how sensitive this was? 

A No. I think that's what the boys felt, i 
didn't Classify it. I think other, did. But I don't 
taow. Whether it's Secret or Top Secret, if you give it 
to the press you are still in violation, as far as I'm 
concerned, with all of the statutes. They classified it; 



13 

14 

15 

16 

17 
18 
19 
20 
21 

22 I didn't. 

23 

24 

25 



BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 
Q Who's "they"? 

mmmw 



202 



UNfibwe 



200 



1 MR. KREUZER: But you know Or. Gaffney and Mr. 

2 Rudd. Do you know the General Counsel very well, Mr. 

3 Silber? 

4 THE WITNESS: I work with him on a regular 

5 basis, yes. 

6 MR. KREUZER: So it was just your choice to 

7 limit it to Gaffney and Rudd? 

8 THE WITNESS: That's correct. I would have 

9 limited it to Gast, had he been around, and I'm sure he 

10 wasn't in town or I would have had him — General Gast. 

11 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

12 Q I take it that the paper was prepared with a 

13 contemplation of the possibility that a third country 

14 would be involved in the transfer to Iran. 

15 A Well, apparently that must have been the 

16 instructions I was working under. I don't quite remember 

17 it that way. 

18 Q Referring specifically, there's a reference to 

19 the legalities of third country transfer provisions of 
2 the Arms Export Control Act. 

21 A That also could refer to Iran. Iran we'd have 

22 problems because we could not guarantee the third country 

23 transfer from Iran. I mean, they might give it to I 

24 don't know who — Libya — and we couldn't guarantee 

25 that, so I don't know what that particularly refers to. 



mmmB 



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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



\m6usss® 



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in the questioning in Mr. Rudd's deposition 

»- 17 "IS it safe to say that 
Mr. Saxon asked him, on page 17, Is « s 

the paragraph on page two is written in contemplation 

that Israel would transfer the missiles to Iran?" 

Witness Rudd: "Ves." And the testimony goes on. 

we questioned Mr. Rudd on this and it was his 

contemplation that one possibility for transfer - 

. That's fine. I don't argue that. That's 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 fine. 
^^ Q would you say also that the two documents, 

12 



.a..n to,.».r, also aa.r... .h. l.sue o. r.pl.nl.^.nt 

13 of Israeli — 

;, X.a have to see them again. I don't )cnow that 

15 they did that. 

^. SHAPIRO: Which document are you referring 

17 to. Counsel? 

«,. SABA: Both of them. I split them, and 

19 they are two. 

THE WITHESS: W.U. I ..on't !a,ow ho. you com. 



„ th« c=„=lu.lo„. .ut your provlou. point ..out th. 
X„t p«.,r.pn o„ p.,. t.o o. t.. P.p.r. t.. Po..iMUty 
.or L..«.. couW .. int.rpr.t.* .. h.vln, I.r..l in .in.. 
thU «.it.,. Exhibit i., .na I aon.t ^o. .h.r. I.ra.l 
i. in h.r.. I aon.t ... any r...r.nc. to third oountry 



iimssra 



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1 transfers. 

2 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

3 Q But I was asking you If that was what was 

4 contemplated. 

5 A You know, I think It could have been, but I 

6 don't remember It clearly. To me just doing it was the 

7 bad thing, not how it was done, other than trying to make 

8 it legal. The prospects for leakage of shipment of I- 

9 HAWK looks to me like this is in response to a direct 

10 question if we wanted I-HAWKs immediately where we would 

11 get them and where we would take them, and I-TOWs 

12 immediately where would we get them and where would we 

13 take them. 

14 I'm not sure that this particular paper would 

15 have necessarily been explained as going to Iran. I'm 

16 not saying that we didn't say that or I didn't say it to 

17 Glenn or something, but I'm just saying that it's not 

18 necessarily indicated here. I would like to think, 

19 frankly, that I gave them a degree of protection from 

20 this thing by just asking the specific question I needed 

21 an answer to rather than how it would be done. In 

22 combination of discussions with me and Mr. Koch, who I 

23 have subsequently learned was involved in this, too, we 

24 could have mentioned Israel. 

25 Q Bu%^--Rudd and Gaffney have both testified, 



i%^(r.^udd and Gaffney h 

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and the testimony is also here that was not made public, 
that th»y understood from you that Israel was involved. 

A No problem. I don't argue with it. I would 
have told them whatever I thought. 

Q But it's your testimony that you don't have 
any recollection where the numbers came from? 

A No. I can't recall who, but I would say that, 
one, I would not have pulled it out of thin air, and, 
two, it would have to be somebody who had some authority 
or I wouldn't have tasked the OSAA to do something like 
this. 

Q And who would have greater authority here than 
yourself? 

A Well, not greater authority. Look, we've 
already seen, I think it's become painfully clear to most 
of your bosses and painfully clear, embarrassingly clear 
to the rest of us, that the National Security Council, 
when a staff officer asks, whether it's Ollie or anybody, 
generally you respond. They ask for information all the 
time, m fact, ISA is correctly the point that all the 
other agencies are supposed to come to when they want to 
talk to different parts of this building. We are the 
liaison between all the agencies. 

So, as a matter of fact, we would respond to a 
query from an NSC staff officer even if he wasn't Ollie. 



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:ret/ 



TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 204 

1 Q But these papers were provided, you said, to 

2 either General Powell directly or to the Secretary. 

3 A Yeah. I'm quite sure I would have given then 

4 to Powell and not to the Secretary. 

5 Q So if Ollie North requested them, you might 

6 have given the information to Ollie North? 

7 A I'm sure I would have. 

8 Q But that wouldn't have caused you to give 

9 those same papers to the Secretary in preparation? 

10 A I don't think so. 

11 Q Or was it your understanding Ollia asked you 

12 to do this to give to the Secretary in preparation for 

13 the meeting? 

14 A My understanding is I don't remember who asked 

15 me, but clearly it was in preparation for the meeting. 

16 The timing suggests that. 

17 Number two, I would have had no reason to 

18 withhold that information from Ollie North. 

19 MR. SAXON: Do you recall if this was 

20 distributed at the December 7 meeting? 

21 THE WITNESS: I don't remember if I knew it 

22 was or not. 

23 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

24 Q Do you recall any discussions at that time of 

25 a draft Finding, a Finding which had been drafted in the 



UNctiBsifinr 



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UNCUSW 



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l«ait w««k or two of November and which came to be signed 
on December S? 

A I have no ]cnowledge of It. 

Q Authorizing? 

A No. 

Q Did you have any discussions about these 
matters with anyone at that time, the time being the last 
week or two of November, the first two wee]cs of December, 
with anyone at the CIA? 

A I sure don't recall it. I'm trying to think 
who was DDO then. Who was DDO then? Was it Clair George 
then or was was^^^^^^^^H 

Q ^^^^^H Clair 

A I don't have any recollection at all. I was 
just trying to think of something that could jar me. ^^M 
^^^^^Hwould have been — 

Q McMtdion was aware. 

A McMahon was the Deputy. 

Q Yes. McM2ihon was aware of the matter at the 

20 time. 

21 A Deputy until Bob Gates, who is a much closer 

22 friend and colleague of mine. I didn't talk to the 

23 Director or the Deputy Director that often. It wae a 

24 matter of some moment when they called me. But the guys 

25 from the different regions and the DDO and the DDI, they 



W^SJfFffO 



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UNCLASSm 



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1 talked to me quite often, but I don't recall talking to 

2 an^^of them on this. I mean, I know John McMahon did not 

3 talk to me about this. I would remember that. 

4 MR. SAXON: Do you recall talking ^o^^H 

5 ^^^^^^Habout any of these matters? 

6 THE WITNESS: Z don't recall it. I wouldn't 

7 be surprised if later in the year of '86 I took a few 

8 shots at^^H I remember talking to Charlie Allen on the 

9 outskirts of our 0S6 meetings about this. 

10 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

11 Q In any event, it's your recollection, then, 

12 that you provided these papers to Colin Powell or the 

13 Secretary. 

14 A It's a general recollection that I would have 

15 provided to Colin. I would not have walked in to the 

16 Secretary with these papers. I just wouldn't have done 

17 it. 

18 Q Do you recall having a discussion prior to 

19 that meeting on the 7th with the Secretary about the 

20 matter? 

21 A I do. 

22 Q All right. Can you recall when that meeting 

23 was? 

24 A Gosh, I've thought a lot about it. It was 

25 either late on the 6th or early morning on the 7th. The 



uNtossra 



209 



UIWSIEIED 



207 



1 Secretary was leaving town. I like to think it was early 

2 morning on the 7th, if that's a Saturday. 

3 Q Yes, that's correct. 

4 A As I seem to recall,.! was in gym gear, which 

5 is what I wear around here on Saturdays, but I recall 

6 very clearly having a discussion with the Secretary in 

7 preparation for this meeting. 

8 Q And can you tell me about that discussion? 

9 A Yes, I can say that I started to go through my 

10 litany and the Secretary would finish sentences for me, 

11 and that I indicated my understanding from staff was that 

12 Mr. Shultz would be with him on this and that ought to 

13 have a salutary effect. And the Secretary went through, 

14 I remember very clearly, all the arguments that I had 

15 laid out, plus the legal argiiments which I had mentioned 

16 in passing, and that he had absorbed. 

17 I have never been more comfortable briefing my 

18 boss in my life. 

19 Q Did he indicate to you what he knew about the 

20 matter? 

21 A He did not. 

22 Q Did he indicate to you what he expected would 

23 happen that day? 

24 A No. His whole discussion with me was what a 

25 terrible and stupid affair tilj^^ifi^ld be- 



d stupid affair thj^^^^ 



210 




1 

2 that had occurred prior to that day? 

3 A Not to my recollection. 

4 Q Did you discuss your. lunch with Ollie North? 

5 A I think I had done that previously to Colin. 

6 1 don't remember discussing it again. 

7 Q Did you discuss with him a wrap-up of 

8 intelligence information that you had earlier discussed? 

9 A- No, I don't recall that. 

10 Q Did you discuss with him your discussions with 

11 the people at the Department of State? 

12 A I'm sure I did, because I have a clear 

13 remembrance of saying Mr. Shultz, I was told by staff, is 

14 going to be with you on this and that ought to have a 

15 good effect or salutary effect and that it ought to get a 

16 change and getting a smile from him. So in that context, 

17 and I'm sure I mentioned Arnle's name, because he knew 

18 that Amle and I were dealing. 

19 Q Did you provide the Secretary with any 

20 information that was provided you by Arnie? 

21 A I'm sure I did. Whether I said this is what 

22 Amia says or this is staff view or my view, I can't say. 

23 I would have probably taken credit for it. 

24 Q Assuming that Amia would state that ha had 

25 told you about the HAWK shipments — 



wmmm 



211 



UNOtftSffifi 



209 



1 „ ,. A Assuming that Arnie would state that ha told 

2 me about the HAWK shipments? 

3 Q Would you have a recollection of telling that 

4 to the Secretary? 

5 A No. 

6 Q That you had information about the fact that 

7 there had been a HAWK shipment? 

8 A No. Why would I assume that Arnie told me? I 

9 mean he either told me or he didn't. I don't remember 

10 it, but I remember having a discussion about the intel 

11 with Arnie and what is this and what do we know and all 

12 this. 

13 Q Let me ask you more direct. Did you tell 

14 Secretary Weinberger that you had information from the 

15 State Department that there had been a HAWK transfer? 

16 A I don't think so, and I don't think I had that 

17 inforBation. That is not something I think I knew. 

18 HR. KREUZER: But you got information from 

19 Colonel North on the third, when you had lunch, that he 

20 gave you. 

21 THE WITNESS: That's what you're telling me. 

22 I'm saying he could have; I don't remember it. 

23 MR. KREUZER: You don't remember getting that 

24 information? 

25 THE WITNESS: No, I don't at all. 



mmm 



212 



mmsm 



RD 210 

1 ^ BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

2 Q Did the Secretary then brief you about the 

3 events that occurred at the meeting at the White House on 

4 the 7th? 

5 A He either did that day, but I rather think he 

6 might have done it Monday or so, but it could have been 

7 Sunday. But yes, he did. 

8 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

9 Q Before we go to the meeting itself, let me ask 

10 one more question. In your pre-December 7 briefing of 

11 the Secretary, whenever that was — late on the 6th or 

12 early on the 7th — apart from the question of to whom 

13 you gave the briefing paper which we have discussed you 

14 indicate you are not sure if you gave it to him directly 

15 or General Powell, and that's fine. 

16 A I don't think I would have given it to him 

17 directly. 

18 Q Do you recall if he had it in hand and did 

19 either of you have paper which you looked at or referred 

20 to or talked about? 

21 A I have a recollection that one paper I had in 

22 hand talked about the Arms Export Control Act, and I 

23 think I probably had jotted down as a memory aid my own 

24 views in detriment to allies. 
And do you recall 



iimsstro 



213 



wmn 



1 A It was not a staff paper. It was typed; I 

2 know that. 

3 Q Do you recall if he had any paper in hand that 

4 he intended to take with him and that he might have 

5 referred to? 

6 A No, I don't. 

7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

8 Q I am about to leave these papers. 

9 A Are you going to leave them with us? 

10 Q Well, that's my last set of questions. Why 

11 didn't we see these until we had a more extensive 

12 examination? We had made several documentary requests. 

13 A Whoa. 

14 MR. SHAPIRO: Counsel, any such question is 

15 properly directed to me at another time. 

16 MR. SABA: No. I think it's a valid question. 

17 THE WITNESS: I'd like to get on the record on 

18 this and let Ed answer the question. You know the 

19 answer. You can take care of that. But I, when we 

20 received documents searches, specifically ruled myself 

21 out of my own documents and did not review the documents 

22 and would not, and assigned someone else to do it because 

23 I 'could smell a rat coming and I wanted to make sure that 

24 I was above-board in terms of cooperation. 

25 And I asked Line Bloomfield to review all of 



umiDssro 



214 



UNELASSMO 



212 



1 my files and anything that was in my files came forward, 

2 I think through you, to them in as timely a fashion as we 

3 could find them. So I feel, frankly, as John Poindexter 

4 says, no regrets for that because I didn't review them, 

5 because I wanted to keep clean on this and, number two, 

6 gave access to everything to someone else so we could 

7 make sure that nobody could level a charge that we 

8 weren't fully cooperating and someone who didn't have a 

9 vested Interest in the document search. 

10 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

11 Q Where were the documents? 

12 MR. SHAPIRO: Which document, Counsel? 

13 MR. SABA: These two exhibits. 

14 MR. SHAPIRO: Would you identify them, please? 

15 MR. SABA: Which exhibit numbers are these? 

16 Exhibit 16 and 18. 

17 MR. SHAPIRO: If you know. 

18 THE WITNESS: Well, I assume they came out of 

19 my safe. I don't )cnow where they came from. I assume I 

20 gave everything I had. 

21 MR. SHAPIRO: In fact. Secretary Armitage just 

22 told you that he did not personally participate in the 

23 search. 

24 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

25 Q Do you know the circumstances whereby they 



mssmm 



215 



mmmm 



1 were provided to us? 

2 ""* A I don't. 

3 Q Did you discuss them with Mr. Rudd in June of 

4 this year? 

5 A Yes. I asked him after my testimony what was 

6 going on, what went on. 

7 Q And how did that ~ 

8 A Well, I remember him having a different 

9 opinion about whether he talked to me or Noel on one 
meeting, and I can't remember which one it was, and I 
pointed out, gee, I couldn't have talked to you then, 
Glenn, I was out of town. He said, oh, yeah, I must have 
talked to Noel. That's my clearest remembrance. 

^* Q Do you recall Mr. Rudd coming to you on 

15 approximately the 15th of June and discussing these 

16 papers with you. Exhibits 16 and 18? 

■'■'' A I'm sure I would have asked him what went on, 

18 what's your remembrance. 

^® MR. SHAPIRO: You mean the papers specifically 

20 or the substance of the papers or the substance of the 

21 deposition or testimony. Counsel? 

^2 MR. SABA: The whereabouts of the papers. 

^^ MR. SHAPIRO: The whereabouts of the papers at 

24 what time? 

^^ MR. SABA: Approximately the middle of June. 



mssm 



216 



UNCLASSKe 



214 



1 THE WITNESS: I think I may have asked Glenn 

2 down after talking with you guys, saying, Glenn, these 

3 fellows asked me some questions about meetings with you 

4 that I couldn't recall. And he said whatever he said 

5 about, yeah, I told them I met with you at such and such. 

6 And I remember saying that I was out of town at that 

7 time, and then he or Hank — it was one of them; it might 

8 have been Hank — said yeah, maybe it was Noel Koch that 

9 I met with, yeah, that's right — something like that, 

10 which was a relief to me, and I'm sure I said what's your 

11 remembrance, because I didn't remember it at all. 

12 And prodded by 'that discussion with either 

13 Hank or Rudd I found out that I did meet with these guys 

14 on 6 December. 

15 MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record a second. 

16 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

17 MR. SABA: We'll go back on the record. 

18 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

19 Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, to the best of 

20 your recollection, when you first provided Exhibits 16 

21 and 18 to counsel in connection with this investigation? 

22 A To the best of my knowledge it was provided at 

23 the earliest possible moment following counsel's request 

24 for all relevant dociiments. I'd like to further state 

25 that I wanted to assure that all documents were given 
iSI 



217 



l/NfiUSSfflffl 



215 



1 over without any hesitation, and that's why I myself 

2 ruled myself out from document searches and had a third 

3 party do the search, so there would be no subsequent 

4 suggestion that perhaps something hadn't been turned over 

5 that was in my files. 

6 To the best of my knowledge everything was 

7 turned over as soon as possible upon notification of your 

8 request. 

9 Q Thank you. I want to move to another area. 

10 Perhaps if someone else has questions about these 

11 exhibits, let me give you an opportunity. 

12 MR. SAXON: No. We've got little time left. 

13 THE WITNESS: Well, we can stretch you a 

14 while. You guys accommodated me and Z can accommodate 

15 you. 

16 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

17 Q I'd like to move on, Mr. Secretary. After the 

18 7th you were debriefed. Between the 7th of December and 

19 the end of the year, did you have any additional activity 

20 in connection with what we call the Iran initiative? 

21 A Well, other than I'm sure I wrapped up with 

22 Arnie Raphel after I was informed by the Secretary that 

23 he thought the outcome of the meeting, and I believe I 

24 kind of thought things were dead, and that's what the 

25 Secretary's impression was. But I would have had a 



uNcutssra 



218 



UNCUsstfe 



216 



1 •- conv«rsation with Arnie particularly about a debrief of 

2 her«'« how my boss saw the meeting. How did your boss 

3 see it? 

4 Q Do you recall a January 2 meeting with Oliver 

5 North? 

6 A I've got my January 2 calendar here, because 

7 that was the date you asked me about. 

8 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

9 Q Before we go on, let me aslc you one queetion. 

10 in the debrief with Secretary Weinberger of the December 

11 7 meeting, whenever that debrief took place, did he tell 

12 you that he had proposed to the President that the better 

13 way to get the hostages back than selling arms to Iran 
was^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

15 A I don't know that he told me that. That was 

16 always his view and he expressed it on occasion. I had 

17 everX reason to believe he would have. 

j^8 Q And just let me ask the further question, 

19 although I think it's answered by that answer. Did he 

20 say anything to you that would indicate that in the 

21 Dsceaber 7 meeting he put forward that the better route 



22 to go wasi 
23 



A I don't remember that specific. 
24 Q And that President Reagan said words to the 

25 



effect in response, yeah, that's the way I want to go? 

umra 



219 



\immmi 

A Well, it would have been consistent for him to 
do so, but r don't remember him telling me that portion, 
nor do I remember him telling me directly what the 
President said. Secretary Weinberger does not generally 
debrief on what the President said. He'll tell you what 
he said, what Mr. Shultz said, and what the decision was, 
but, as you know by now, it's difficult to get a debrief 
from Secretary Weinberger, and it's only on those things. 

I mean, there's a high degree of immediate 
interest that I go down and park in his office. There 
are plenty of ways, not the least of which is to find out 
from the notetaker at the NSC what went on. 
But January 2 — 

^* BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

^5 Q January 2. 

^* A I not only don't recall a meeting, it's not 

17 listed on my calendar. 

^® Q If I can help perhaps, i have a listing on 

19 that morning at 8:30 at the Hay Adams. 

^° ^ At 8:30 I was in the SecDef's staff meeting 

21 here. 

^^ Q All right. Do you recall a meeting with North 

23 that day? 

^* ^ No, I do not. I can't tell you. I wouldn't 

know the Hay Adams if I fell over it, frankly. I don't 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 



25 



untsfm 



220 



UNKASSIHID 



218 



1 remember having been in there. I guess I was in for some 

2 visiting dignitary, but I do not remember being there 

3 that day, and I'm specifically shown as in the staff 

4 meeting and walking back to my office with Fred Ikle. 

5 Q Do you recall a meeting on that day with 

6 Menachem Heron? 

7 A I do not show one, and I had a very full day. 

8 Q Let me show you a page six, which will become 

9 the next exhibit. It's page six of information provided 

10 to us by the government of Israel, and if you haven't 

11 seen it please take whatever time you need. 

12 (The document referred to was 

13 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 19 

14 for identification.) 

15 A I have just got to tell you that I did not see 

16 Mindy, according to this calendar, that day, and I do net 

17 recall that meeting. And the reason I have this calendar 

18 is because you asked me about it previously and I didn't 

19 remember it. And the next day I left for Hanoi. 

20 Q Did you have any activity — 

21 A I might say you might want to ask Mindy what 

22 time of day that was, because I mean she's good and I was 

23 in the office all day and Mindy didn't come in and she 

24 wouldn't have let a visitor as noteworthy as Mindy come 

25 in without making a note of it. So I don't recall that 



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219 



1 at all. 

2 -'•* BV MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

3 Q I guess the more important question, though, 

4 would not be what time of day it was or whether it was on 

5 your calendar, although I know that helps, and not even 

6 January 2, because this is the report the Israelis have 

7 provided after a lot of checking, and they indicate they 

8 could have something wrong here and there. 

9 But the report states: "Menachem Meron met on 

10 2 January 1986 with U.S. Assistant SEcretary of Defense 

11 Armltage and sought to conclude an agreement regarding 

12 the replacement missiles, including their price." So, 

13 more important, do you recall at any time in that time 

14 frame meeting with General Meron and discussing those 

15 topics? 

16 A I not only do not recall it, I'm not the guy 

17 to talk price. Talk general systems and all of that, 

18 fine, but I'm not a price guy, so I don't have any 

19 recollection, and please let the record show that my 

20 calendar shows no meeting with Mindy in or out of the 

21 office. 

22 Having said that, he's a great guy. 

23 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

24 Q Did you have any discussion after December 7 

25 of '85 and before January 17, '86, with any official of 
LSI 




222 



("VCUSKO 



220 



1 the government of Israel on the issues of the Iran 

2 initiative? 

3 A I can only state that from 3 January to 10 

4 January 86 X was out of town, and then again from 14 to 

5 18. I was in Bangkok, Hanoi and Hong Kong between 3 and 

6 10 January. And then on 14 to 18 January I was at the 

7 Security Subcommittee meeting in Honolulu. So I don't 

8 remember it, and I think it's kind of unlikely. I mean, 

9 I was just traveling a lot. 

10 Q Did you have any conversations, perhaps in 

11 December, with Ben Yusef? 

12 A If Mindy came in, I'm sure Abraham Ben Yusef 

13 would have come with him. They generally are a matching 

14 set, because the purchasing agent is Mr. Ben Yusef. But 

15 I don't recall, frankly, talking about weapons. We've 

16 talked previously today about the possibility of talking 

17 retroactive or prospective weapons. I just don't recall 

18 it. 

19 Q Did you have any knowledge prior to January 17 

20 of '86 about the issue of replenishment of Israeli 

21 weapons that had gone? 

22 A I've told you my recollection. I'm not being 

23 testy. I just don't have anything to add to it. And I 

24 just say that I was gone a lot of that period. 

25 Q Let me show you what will be the next exhibit. 



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1 which is from the testimony of General Colin Powell and 

2 I'll provide three pages of that testimony, page 80, 81 

3 and 82. 

4 (The document referred to was 

5 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 20 

6 for identification.) 

7 Vou might want to look at the sequence of 

8 questions. This is the Exhibit. 

9 (Pause.) 

10 A What's the date General Powell is talking 

11 about on here? He's talking about sometime over the next 

12 week, I can't recall how, either the Secretary or my NSC 

13 interlocutors, the number changed to 4,508. 

14 Q The reference is to — 

15 A I'm trying to understand where the extra 508 

16 came from. 

17 Q The reference is to the period. He says it's 

18 roughly the week after the 17th of January. 

19 A It's the week after the 17th? Well, I would 

20 have been back in town. 

21 Q The week after the 17th. 

22 A I certainly don't remember telling Colin. 

23 Q Just to make it clear, on page 80, line 14, I 

24 asked how the number changed to 4,508. At line 15 it 

25 says: Sometime over the next week. And the reference 



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1 t^rior to that was the 17th of January. And we had other 

2 testimony as to the period we're talking about. 

3 A No. I don't remember telling Colin anything 

4 about a previous shipment of weapons. And I think that 

5 it was sometime — and I can't say what "sometime" means; 

6 more than a day or two — after the 17th that I found out 

7 things were in train for a transfer. And after the 

8 decision was made on the 17th of January I never dialed 

9 in. I never got involved other than to be informed that 

10 something was going on. 

11 Now any information that I found out about any 

12 aspect of the program I would have shared with Colin 

13 Powell, but I do not recall helping him at all with 508 

14 or the increase from 4,508. I'm sure that I did not tell 

15 him that the number should increase to 4,508 TOWs. I'm 

16 dead certain of that. 

17 Q All right. There is perhaps one reading of 

18 the testimony could be that he came to realize that there 

19 was a replenishment and he came to realize that one or 

20 more persons had known prior to that date of a shipment, 

21 and that this number was a replenishment. 

22 A I read that in there. 

23 Q He mentions your name twice. So it wasn't 

24 necessarily that week that you knew of it. 

25 A Previously. 



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UNMffi) 



1 Q But some point prior? 

2 A Yeah. I understand what you're saying, and I 

3 don't think I knew that. But if I had known I would have 

4 told Colin. But I just don't recollect at all telling 

5 him that. I just don't think I knew it. 

6 Q My question is, did you know it? 

7 A No. I don't remember knowing. I don't know 

8 how to answer it. I don't recall knowing it. I think 

9 I've testified that it wasn't until around November of 

10 '86 I found out things had actually happened, that Israel 

11 had transferred things without our knowing about it. 

12 I was never actually sure during all of '86 

13 how the transfers were made after our weapons went to the 

14 CIA. As I say, this was absolutely not a matter of 

15 moment with me. It was the policy that concerned me. 

16 Q So your testimony then is that you simply did 

17 not know even as late as roughly the 20th? 

18 A Well, my testimony, I think I've got 

19 carefuller, is I don't recall knowing about this. I hate 

20 to be that way, but it's bad times, fellows. 

21 MR. SHAPIRO: It's perfectly within your 

22 rights. 

23 THE WITNESS: Of course it's within my rights, 

24 but these are bad times and I certainly don't remember 

25 knowing this. 



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1 MR. SABA: I think Mr. Saxon is about to feel 

2 a question coming on. 

3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

4 Q Let me introduce another exhibit, give you 

5 this, and give you a moment to read it. 

6 (The document referred to was 

7 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 21 

8 for identification.) 

9 This is from the testimony of Colonel Nozrth at 

10 our hearings on the afternoon of July 7, and I ask you to 

11 just take a minute and read these two pages I've given 

12 you. 

13 (Pause.) 

14 A Okay. I've got it. 

15 Q At line 1486 Mr. Nislds says: Colonel North, 

16 I asked you before we broke about a number of particular 

17 individuals emd whether they were aware of the HAWK 

18 shipment in November of 1985. Dropping down: Mr. 

19 Nields: Were any officials at the Department of Defense 

20 aware that 18 HAWK missiles or some number of HAWK 

21 missiles had actually been shipped by Israel to Iran? 

22 Mr. North: I believe they may well have been 

23 because I think I made several efforts to coordinate with 

24 them the replenishment of the HAWKs, I think, if I 

25 remember properly, with DOD officials about both HAWKs 



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1 and TOWS. I wouldn't be asking them about HAWKs if they 

2 hadn't already been ordered up as a need for 

3 replenishing. 

-* Then you get to the bottom of page 68, line 

5 1519. Mr. Nields: I just want to make sure. My 

question simply is who in the Department of Defense was 
told that there had actually been a shipment, if anybody. 
Mr. North: An unfreshed long time ago memory would tell 
me that I probably talked about that delivery with Mr. 
Koch, possibly with General Powell, possibly with Mr. 
Armitage , 

Now Colonel North indicates his memory is 
unrefreshed and he uses the word "possibly", so his 
testimony does not stand for the proposition you were 



15 told. I would simply ask you, since he says he might 

16 have talked with you about it, do you recall Colonel 



North ever telling you at the time or roughly at the time 
of the shipments? 

A I do not recall that. And I also recall that 
in a previous part of OUie North's testimony he said 
that he dealt with others and latterly me. So I don't 
think he did tell me - others first, and then latterly 
23 me. 



BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 
Q Mr. Secretary, would you have any objection to 



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i, \ putting the calendar that you prepared in as an exhibit? 

2 1 thinlc it's helpful to the testimony and a better 

3 knowledge for those who read the record. 

4 A You'll get to look at, in case we want to move 

5 somebody off who shouldn't have been seeing me. 

6 Q You had a typewritten onV 

7 A This is where I was. You guys are welcome to 

8 that. I just would like to take some time before it goes 

9 out to make sure 

11 like to keep it in case there are other questions. 

12 MR. SAXON: I think it would be helpful to 

13 make that a formal exhibit to the deposition unless again 

14 there is somewhere on there — 

15 MR. SABA: I think it would be helpful. 

16 THE WITNESS: I just want to stress for the 

17 record that I prepared this based on the questions you 

18 asked me last time and my inability to say that Z was 

19 traveling and where. 

20 MR. SAXON: And by asking for it I'm not 

21 suggesting that there is anything wrong or improper about 

22 having a calendar to refresh you, because when we say 

23 where you were on the day of such and such, who knows 

24 where they were without something in front of 

25 . you. 



UNMSIFIED 



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^ (The documents referred to were 

2 marked Armitage Exhibit Numbers 22 

^ and 23 for identification.) 

4 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

5 Q Mr. Secretary, do you recall if in January you 

6 provided any other legal or other memoranda to anyone in 

7 connection with the Iran initiative? 

8 A I don't recall. 

9 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

^° Q ^®t "8 ask the same question in a slightly 

11 different way. There is testimony, sworn public 

12 testimony, from Judge Sporkin, who testified on June 24 
of this year at our hearings in his capacity as having 
been General Counsel at the CIA that on January 16, 1986, 
the day before the Finding was signed on the 17th , there 
was a meeting at the White House at which Admiral 
Poindexter was in attendance, Mr. Sporkin, and Secretary 
Weinberger, among others. 

And his testimony was the meeting ended with 
Secretary Weinberger making a statement that he would 

21 like to take it ~ and we're not sure whether "it" 

22 literally referred to the Finding, a draft of the 

23 Finding, a piece of paper or simply the concept that they 

24 were about to formalize — would like to take it back and 

25 let my lawyers look at it. And Secretary Weinberger, in 

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1 his deposition to our two Committees, when presented with 

2 this is what Judge Sporkin will testify to soon, said 

3 that's sounds about right. 

4 We have this afternoon been told more or less 

5 by Mr. Garrett that there is no record that any lawyers 

6 ever formally looked at the January 17 Finding on the 

7 16th or the 17th. Our question to you is, were you asked 

8 by the Secretary about that time to respond in any way 

9 that we could call a legal response to either the Finding 

10 specifically or the concept of going forward that was 

11 expressed in the Finding? 

12 A The answer is no. I was traveling at the time 

13 as well, I wouldn't know Stanley Sporkin if I fell over 

14 him. 

15 MR. SABA: I have just a last line of 

16 questioning at another time period on another subject. 

17 MR. SAXON: I don't have much. 

18 MR. SABA: I want to go to the November '86 

19 period. 

20 MR. SAXON: That's fine. I'm sorry, before 

21 you jump to that, let me formally introduce as an 

22 exhibit, if you kept it, the handwritten note that Mr. 

23 Koch prepared. 

24 (The document referred to was 

25 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 24 



uitetASim 



231 



1 



10 



mmmi 



for identification.) 

2 THE WITNESS: Yes. You can read it? 

3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 
* Q I can read it. 

5 A He's been a friend of mine for years, and I 

6 can't read it. 

7 Q I had to help Mr. Koch read this when he 

8 testified to refresh his recollection as to what his 

9 handwriting said. 
He says in Item 1 that the TOW discussed 

11 separately with Rudd and Gaffney in December. And that 

12 we )cnow more or less to be the case. 

^^ Ite» 4, "TOW paper locked in RLA safe. 

14 Wouldn't let Rudd keep copy." He indicates that RLA is 

15 Richard L. Armitage. 

^* A That's right. 

^^ Q Would that be consistent with your 

18 understanding that you took the TOW paper that Mr. Rudd 

19 prepared and put it in your safe? 
2° A Perfectly reasonable. 

^^ Q And for that matter, since this was a close 

22 hold, that you told Mr. Rudd that you didn't want him to 

23 keep a copy? 

^* A I'm sure that's the case. 

^^ Q And, for the record, at the time that paper 



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1 was prepared or the HAWK paper, either of them, do you 

2 recall telling Mr. Rudd or Dr. Gaffney to destroy all 

3 notes, all working documents, et cetera? 

4 A I'm sure I did. I didn't recall it, but when 

5 they said it in their testimony I agree completely that I 

6 would have done so. 

7 Q And to make sure the record is clear that 

8 would have been contemporaneous with their preparing it, 

9 which would be in keeping with this being a close hold, 

10 no notes kind of thing? 

11 A Yes, sir. 

12 Q And not in any way after the fact, trying to 

13 destroy the record? 

14 A Thank you. 

15 Q Mow one other thing 1 wanted to go to in this 

16 document. If you drop down several lines, you see the 

17 first word that looks like Cast. It says: "Cast said 

18 best possibility of cover", and then the next word I 

19 can't read, but the last words are "do it black". 

20 A "Hust do in black", "must do this black". 

21 Q Mr. Koch testified in his two depositions and 

22 publicly in his sworn testimony that if not from Gast — 

23 he thinks it might have been from General Gast — but 

24 also it could have been from Mr. Rudd he got the clear 

25 understanding that if you were looking at the numbers of 



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■■ TOW missiles involved, knowing the prices we )cnew at the 

2 time, you do the arithmetic and it would have been at a 

3 dollar figure in excess of $14 million, which means if 

4 you were going to go forward through white world FMS 

5 sales you would have to tell the Congress. 

6 A Correct. 

7 Q The understanding was that we didn't want to 

8 do that, and, of course, the Finding said Congress was 

9 not to be notified, so they concluded that the best way 

10 to go about it, if the transaction was to go forward, 

11 would be to make it an Economy Act transfer to the CIA, 

12 make it an intelligence activity and go covert, which he 

13 says do it black means. 

1* My question to you simply is were you part of 

15 any of this decisionmaking process? 

16 A I don't think so. 

17 Q Or any discussions in which this result was 

18 reached? 

19 A No, 1 wasn't. To my recollection I was not. 

20 MR. SAXON: That's all I've got on that 

21 exhibit. 

22 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

23 Q Mr. Secretary, I have just a few questions by 

24 way of information. You told us before that in 

25 preparation for the Attorney General's press conference a 



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1 statement was being prepared for President Reagan. 

2 A Well, okay. Yeah. I don't think it was in 

3 preparation for the Attorney General's conference. It 

4 was a statement the President was going to make, a 

5 statement the President was going to make, not in 

6 preparation for the Attorney General. 

7 Q Let me show you the transcript, and we don't 

8 have to make this an exhibit, but just if I could get 

9 some help here. I'm showing the Secretary the transcript 

10 of his deposition May 26, 1987, at page 62. I just want 

11 to see if I can get some more information and maybe get 

12 this right a little bit. 

13 It's a bit confusing in light of what we know 

14 now. 

15 A All I can tell you is this. Around the time 

16 of the Attorney General's press conference is where I 

17 have a remembrance of the following — that we had an OSG 

18 meeting in which a statement for the President was shown 

19 around. This was, in my memory, prior to the Attorney 

20 General's press conference and not related to the 

21 Attorney General's press conference — to clarify that. 

22 The speech or text of this paper concerned the 

23 Iran initiative and, as I recall, did not concern itself 

24 with the Attorney General's press conference or the 

25 President's response to that. 



UimSStFIED 



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233 



1 Q Do you recall the date offhand? There were 

2 several OSG meetings. If it helps you, the revelations — 

3 A You know, I'll tell you, I think it was the 

4 day the President made the speech. 

5 Q The 19th? He had a press conference on the 

6 19th. 

7 A Then that may have been it. 

8 Q He gave a speech on the 13th. 

9 A Well, it was in preparation for a speech, to 

10 the best of my knowledge, and I rememiser very clearly 

11 that everyone at that meeting had negative things to say 

12 about the statement. I've already testified to that. 

13 Q So you think it was a draft statement? 

14 A That was the way it was presented to us. 

15 Q Do you recall specifically what your objection 

16 to it was? 

17 A Well, I recall making the comment that this 

18 asked more questions than it answered. It's better just 

19 to say I'll get the facts and give them to you. Jerry 

20 Bremer, John Moellering, Buck Revell — I mean, it was a 

21 cacophony of sounds, people saying this is crazy. It 

22 does not jibe with the facts, et cetera, et cetera. And 

23 Ollie, who I think was a little surprised, and his 

24 colleagues said well, send in your comments. 

25 And my comment I think I phoned in later said, 



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UNtASSm 



234 



i we can't go forward with this paper. And John Moellering 

2 said, fellows, I was around during Watergate and this is 

3 a bad deal. 

4 Q So this was a draft which was circulated to a 

5 group? 

6 A That's correct. 

7 Q Do you recall was any other draft of any other 

8 statement provided to you for comment? 

9 A Not that I recall. 

10 Q Do you recall if you were provided with any 

11 draft chronologies of the events? 

12 A No, I was not. 

13 Q For comment? 

14 A No, I was not. 

15 Q So to your recollection there was only one 

16 doc\unent which was circulated for the group and you had 

17 coiunents on it? 

18 A Ye«, that's correct. 

19 Q Do you recall if in your comments to Mr. 

20 North, Colonel North, you indicated that you had more 

21 specific knowledge of the facts — that is, the number of 

22 shipments and the size of the shipments? 

23 A Well, I don't know that it got down into line 

24 by line this is wrong, that's wrong. No, I don't 

25 remember that. But. I^arngBiif^t^at the general tone and 



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J. thrust was not, as I understood the project — and I 

2 didn't pretend to understand it in depth — but Jerry 

3 Bremmer, who sat next to me, I remember very well, I 

4 said, Jerry, what is this and he was raising hell about 

5 it. John Moellering, who was around the corner — my 

6 remembrances of those days are clearer because they are 

7 so much closer — but I don't remember that we went line 

8 by line specifically tearing it apart. It was just a 

9 general belief that this is terrible and we can't allow 

10 the President to do this. 

11 Q Did you provide any written comments? 

12 A No. I can remember calling in. I think my 

13 comment was the President ought to stand up and say I'll 

14 get to the bottom of it; I'll give you the facts, et 

15 cetera. Now I've been told subsequently Buck Revell sent 

16 written comments, things of that nature. 

17 Q Were you provided comments by anyone else in 

18 writing? 

19 A No. I wasn't. I don't think I showed anybody 

20 else in the Department. 

21 MR. SAXON: Who told you Mr. Revell sent in 

22 comments? 

23 THE WITNESS: I think subsequently in talking 

24 with my colleagues we heard this. You know, did you send 

25 anything over. I just bleated about and said they 



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238 



IINBt«SStf1!D 



236 



■• couldn't go with it, that kind of thing. Buck may have 

2 told me he sent it, actually. 

3 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

4 Q Did you have occasion to discuss that 

5 statement with anyone here? 

6 A Not that I recall. 

7 Q Specifically the Secretary or General Powell? 

8 A No. Powell was gone then, and Admiral Jones 

9 was here. But I don't recall it. 

10 MR. SABA: I don't have any further questions. 

11 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

12 Q Mr. Secretary, I've got what I hope will be a 

13 quick line of inquiry along three lines. The first has 

14 to do with the contra resupply operation. 

15 A Good. 

16 Q And Colonel North's public testimony. 

17 A I have it right here. 

18 Q Let me have this marked as the next exhibit 

19 and show you the pages — 

20 A I trust they are the same pages. 

21 Q It's not the sane pages they gave you. 

22 A I trust they are the same pages I got. 

23 (The document referred to was 

24 narked Armitage Exhibit Number 

25 25 for identification.) 



UNCUSSIFIED' 



239 



10 



nmmm 



237 



1 Q This is his testimony from the afternoon of 

2 Jul\^7, 1987. 

3 A I've got it. 

4 Q Do you need a moment to read this? 

5 A No, I do not. I just want to make sure. 

6 Q Are we like Shultz and Weinberger? Are we 

7 reading off the same hymnal now? 

8 A Yes, we are reading off the same hymnal. 

9 Q Mr. Secretary, let me direct your attention to 
page 107 of this transcript at line 2418. Mr. Nields ~ 

11 let me back up. He had asked Colonel North what various 

12 individuals knew about your activities in the contra 

13 resupply effort. 

14 A That's right. 

1^ Q Mr. Nields: "How about the chief of the 

16 Central American task force?" He's going through and 

17 asking about particular individuals. 

1^ Mr. North: "Oh, I'm sure that he had a 

19 detailed grasp of — " 

20 Further down: Mr. Nields: "And what is your 

21 basis for that belief?" 

22 Mr. North — and this is the part relevant to 

23 you and I am quoting: "We used to have meetings with the 

24 Restricted Interagency Group. We used to have secure 

25 conference calls. And on one occasion I can recall 



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UNCUSmiiD 



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1 laying out forth* group — In fact I thinJc it was after 

2 the $100 million had been voted by both Houses, hadn't 

3 been sent forward to the President — I can recall a 

4 meeting in an office in the Pentagon where I went down 

5 item by item by item the things that Z was doing and 

6 asked them point blank whether or not Z had to continue 

7 to do them to keep the resistance alive, because even 

8 though the money had been authorized and both bills had 

9 been passed, we couldn't get it forwarded to the 

10 President. 

11 "And we went down item by item by item on my 

12 checklist of what I was having directed out each month or 

13 each quarter or each week to support the resistance, and 

14 I asked then point blank whether this should continue. 

15 "Mr. Mields: Who was there?" 

16 A I've read it. 

17 Q For the record, in line 2443: ^^^^^^Hwas 

18 there, Kr. Abrama was there, Mr. Araitag* was there, I 

19 think Mr. Michael was there, I think General Noellering 

20 was there. 

21 "Mr. Mields: Would you go through them for 

22 us, please, item by item, what it was yout told this 

23 assembled group you were doing?" 

24 Line 2459, Colonel North says: "These people 

25 knew what I was doing. They knew that it was a covert 



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operation being conducted by this government to support 
the Nicaraguan resistance." 

Page 110, line 2472: "Mr. Nields: Did you 
discuss the resupply operation? 

"Mr. North: I think so. 

"Mr. Nields: Did you discuss efforts to 
obtain armzunents? 

"Mr. North: Probably. 

"Mr. Nields: Including munitions? 

"Mr. North: I am not absolutely sure it says 
munitions." He mentions logistics and air support. 

Let me just simply ask you first if you recall 
a meeting of the RIG at which something like that or 
close to it took place? 

A There were two meetings held in my office, one 
on Aucfust 28, one on September 19. They were breakfast 
meetings. 

Q I'm sorry. The dates again? 

A August 28 and September 19. They were 

20 breakfast meetings. 

21 Q This is '86? 

22 A That's '86. And I paid, and the reason we 

23 hosted them here was because we felt in the Department 

24 that we weren't up to speed and we wanted to know what 

25 was going on in central^ Am&ciA^aJ^umber two — and 



Tl 



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\ that's tha reason ws hosted it here and I took the 
Tnltiatlve, and Z remember that very clearly. 

Number two, we wanted — the reasons for the 
discussion of the group were we were preparing to have a 
passage of the bill by the Congress. We'd have some 
money and we wanted to determine clearly what each 
department would do, what would be tha responsibilities. 
And we wanted to start working on tha NSDO which was 
going to be signed out for the President, and 
subsequently was who would have tha lead 
responsibilities, which agencies would support in what 
manner. 

Attendance at tha first meeting on August 28 
had, as Z recall, John Moellering, myself, Nestor 

Jim Ollie NorthHj^^H^^H Z do 
not believe Elliott Abrams was there. Zn fact, my 
record, which Z will give you, does not indicate he was 
there. 

The second meeting, September 19, did have 
those same gentlemen and, in addition, included Elliott 
Abrama.^ My recollection and as reported by a memo that Z 

22 asked Nestor Sanchez to draft up for ma to send to the 

23 Secretary reporting on this event can be entered in the 

24 record. Z don't need to go a ll through it. But its 
primary thrust has to do with ^^^^^^^^^^^^f^^^^H 



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243 

UNcussm 

4 And my final paragraph to the S«cretary says: 

5 Th« group I chaired this morning plans to continue 

6 masting on a weekly or biweekly basis so that we can keep 

7 ourselves collectively Informed on all developments and 

8 be ablm to provide timely policy guidance to the program. 

9 We'll keep you Informed and request your guidance or 

10 approval as required. 

11 That was for the August 28 meeting. I do not 

12 recall Ollle bringing this other stuff up. At a 

13 subsequent meeting Z have a vague recollection of Ollle 

14 talking about humanitarian assistance. 

15 Q By "subsequent" you mean the September 19? 

16 A The September 19. Hximanltarlan assistance emd 

17 not an Itea-by-ltea list of what Ollle was doing or not 

18 doing — just a general discussion of humanitarian 

19 assistance. Z would note, however, that my remembrance 

20 Is the majority and the great bulk of the meeting was 

21 taken up on those Items Z mentioned earlier — that Is, 

22 what each department was going to do once we got this 

23 money and how would the NSOD be developed. And that's 

24 that. 

25 Q Mr. Secretary, Z'm not going to try to change 

lUP biLUU.'i'>(.UUiNOKl> 



UNCUSSIFIED 



244 




242 

1 or tailor Colonel North's teslTfllldl^ to fit the facts so 

2 he comes out being right. 

3 A Well, I'm sure he remembers what he remembers. 

4 Q But let me simply say that given people go to 

5 lots of meetings and maybe some may go to the Pentagon 

6 and some elsewhere, and some people in this group and 

7 some not, let me just back up and ask the question a 

8 little more broadly. 

9 Do you recall, regardless of what dates, 

10 regardless of where it was, regardless of whether it had 

11 exactly the players he said — because he could have 

12 gotten all that wrong — do you recall any meeting at 

13 which he did anything close to what his testimony 

14 suggests? 

15 A I do not. 

16 MR. SHAPIRO: Counsel, could we have this 

17 entered as an Exhibit? Why don't you state for the 

18 record what it is? 

19 MR. SAXON: For the record, this is the 

20 memorandum to which the Secretary just made reference, 

21 and that is a cover note from Nestor Sanchez. 

22 THE WITNESS: To me. 

23 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

24 Q To you. I'm not sure what the date is. 

25 A It talks about it in the body of the memo. 



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1 Q And than in the body of the memo which follows 

2 th*>«over note it i> to Secretary Weinberger through Or. 

3 Zkle from Nestor Sanchez. 

4 A It was from me. That was the copy we got from 

5 Sanchez in our sweep-up. He has a very clear remembrance 

6 of it. 

7 Q And it references the 28 August breakfast 

8 meeting to which you just made reference. 

9 A And noted Elliott Abreuas was not in 

10 attendance . 

11 Q We'll make that the next exhibit. 

12 (The document referred to was 

13 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 26 

14 for identification.) 

15 The second matter I want to ask you about has 

16 to do with third country solicitation. Do you have any 
knowledge ofj^^f^^^^^^^^^^Hbeing for 

18 contributions to the contras during the time the Boland 

19 Amendment was in effect that cut off U.S. Government 

20 funding? 

21 A No, only what I've read in the papers 

22 subsequent to the revelations. 

23 g Were you ever asked by anyone to do any 

24 soliciting ofj 

25 A No, I was not. 



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1 . , Q And did you ever do any soliciting? 

2 "^ A I never did any. 

3 Q Do you recall ever hearing Secretary 

4 Weinberger state at any time, but particularly in the 

5 spring of '85 time frame, saying to you or saying in your 

6 presence that he had learned that^^^^^^^^were going 

7 to be giving a size203le amount of money? 

8 A Absolutely not. 

9 Q Do you recall ever telling hla that^^^^^^H 

10 were going to be giving — 

11 A Absolutely not. 

12 Q Let me introduce the next exhibit and tell you 

13 what it is you are looking at. You are looking at a 

14 memorandxim for record that John McMeihon, the Deputy 

15 Director of the CIA, provided after they had had one of 

16 their regular breakfast meetings with Director Casey and 

17 himself and Secretary Weinberger and Mr. Taft, and it's 

18 dated 15 March 1985. 

19 (The document referred to was 

20 marked Armltage Exhibit Number 27 

21 for identification.) 

22 A I've read it. 

23 Q Specifically with reference to Mr. McMahon's 

24 last sentence, which states: "In closing, the Secretary" 

25 — meaning from the context Secretary Weinberger — 



wmm 



247 



livmm 




245 



1 .. "8tat«d that he had heard that 

^^m^^^^B had earmarked $25 million for the contras 

3 in $5 million increments." 

4 Let me ask the questions again with reference 

5 to this specifically. Did you ever hear Secretary 

6 Weinberger say he had learned that^^^^^^^^Hvere 

7 providing $25 million? 

8 A Z never did. 

9 Q And you never told hia that? 
10 A Z never told him that. 

Q Old ^^^^^^^^H ever tell you anything to 

12 this effect? 

13 A He did not. 

14 Q And you never solicited hia or anyone ih^^^| 
||Bm^|^H|[for 

16 A or anyone else, for that matter. 

17 Q And until these matters broke on or about the 

18 time of the Attorney General's press conference in 

19 November of *86 and subsequent news accounts were done 

20 you never knev anything along these lines? 

21 A I don't think I did. I don't recall ever 

22 having kno%m it. 

23 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

24 Q Mr. Secretary, had you seen that memo prior to 
25 



today? 



mmm 



248 



nmmm 



A No. I had heard about It after you guya 
taHt^d to the Secretary > but Z hadn't seen it. I am not 
briefed and do not get briefed as a matter of course on 
OCX breakfasts. 

Q You are not shown as an addressee on the memo. 
A We don't keep a record, and I don't recall 
ever having been debriefed on a DCI breakfast by the 
Secretary . 

Q Let me ask in the course of your travels in 
^^^^^^^^^Hdid the subject of the^^^Haid for the 
contras ever arise? 

A Not to my knowledge. 

MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record a second. 
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 
Q Mr. Secretary, it has not been docxunented with 
regard to the Richard Secord legal defense fund what the 
L8 source of the contributions were to which Noel Koch 
L9 testified on June 23 and which came from Swiss bank wire 

20 transfers in the eunount of $500,000. I will say that Mr. 

21 Martin, the trustee, remaining trustee of that fund, has 

22 indicated there is some suggestion at least that these 

23 are funds from foreign governments. 

24 Let me simply ask you, number one, whether you 

25 have ever made any solicitation on behalf of this fund of 
TOP SECRET/ 




249 



2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

8 

9 



14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 



government . 
have not. 

- L .:: Tzr "^ °' -"- ""="—' - 



,.^^.. -- MM 247 

any foreign government. 

A^^ I have not. 



legal defense fund. 
A I do not 



Q And I guess flnallv <•«*. ^w 

•—.-....-...., ...'~~rr.ir 

10 

MR. SAXON: Mr Sar^-^^4. 

" OZX... ""• ""'"' ''°" "" '""- "> — .r , «„ 
23 

THE WITNESS: yes 

iir 




250 



\mmm 



1 THE WITNESS: No, no. That's not what I told 

2 him. 

3 MR. KREU2ER: What did you tell him? 

4 THE WITNESS: As I remember, I told him his 

5 ass was way out on a limb because I didn't feel that my 

6 boss knew this and that George Shultz knew it, and that I 

7 thought he was operating solo and that my boss personally 

8 was going to hate this, this project talking with the 

9 Iranians first and then anything with hostages and Iran. 

10 My boss is just totally opposed to any 

11 dealings. Telling him that Weinberger personally would 

12 think he was crazy for being involved in this seemed to 

13 have the greatest effect on Ollie. 

14 MR. KREUZER: Did Ollie say anything about 

15 weapons transfers from Israel in '85? 

16 THE WITNESS: I don't remember him talking 

17 about that. I don't recall that. 

18 MR. KREUZER: Thanks very much. 

19 MR. SABA: The House thanks you very much, Mr. 

20 Secretary. We have no further questions. 

21 MR. SAXON: Let me say for the record we 

22 appreciate this because you have spent two sessions with 

23 us in deposition now and a fairly lengthy interview 

24 session. We know your time is at a premium. We thank 

25 you. It has been very helpful. 



wmssm 



251 



mmm 



249 



1 THE WITNESS: I'll say on the record the 

2 Secretary of Defense set the tone because he said we were 

3 going to be cooperative from day one, and I hope you have 

4 found that. 

5 (Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the taking of the 

6 instant deposition ceased.) 

7 

8 Signature of the Witness 

9 Subscribed and svom to before me this day of 

10 , 1987. 

11 



12 Notary Public 

13 My Commission Expires: 



252 



UNCLASSIRED 

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 



I, MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, the officer before whom the foregoing 
deposition was taken, to hereby certify that the witness 
whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly 
sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by 
me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to 
typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a 
true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am 
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the 
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and 
further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney 
or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 



Notary Public 
in and for the District of Columbia 



My Commission Expires: February 28, 1990 



UNCUSSiFIED 



253 



UNCLASSIHED 



II C^ec^Cr 



DEFENSE SECO?tTY ASSISTANCE AGENCY 



^-Tt>^R^ 



Memo ForjSSS2£2k 

AoHn3T)»racrW;l>5CV^, On or 
gco;i Oari. Colin Pi?vo<Ji CJW^ 
-bate -b Gen. (Po^l 




■l*tf-DeclassifiedyReleasetl on_ 
under provisions of E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Secunty Council 



015 




'or foreicr. sale 
- "" intended fc 
tended fcr test: 



: apiece. . ^ : 
could cost a- 




be S36-32.3 rill:—., 
added (NRC cost . 
charges, ^\us 

be replaced, so 

idable difficulties: 

sales, including 
ec. 3 of the AECA. 

es of $1* million 

or indirect to a 
nclassified (except 
ot take place until 
ys can be waived for 
transfer has no such 
given in any case. 

dered through Israel 



ken into 3 or 



I against splitting 
, the spirit and the 
and all Administrat lo: 



-- It is conceivable that, upon satisfactory =0"*"^"^^°"/^^:' 

packages. 

The customer countries CUAE and Korea) ^fl^'^'^l.Wll l^H T' 
their deliveries had been ^'^chedu ed but ve vould no 
tell ther. v«hy. We would not want to chari,e tne... nore . 
deliveries. 



mmm 



254 



UNimpD 



u. .,^u suitable for fcreij" sale. 
Hiss.le. areaya.Ub e l\^ll,-l\^.,\^illl\W . " .ntlnded for 
There a r.° . - -^^ ^^^s^ ^^ leven of these are intended for tests. 



J A E i~i 



but the tsfti ;>-^= fot.sor.e. 

.. -,i =..»- irser.al cast ;j"0.c:? ari«=« '"-' ;•' 

L!^V., t,tll MU fov no -'^le. ...l^ 
I5rr;;l;r:?ni'fhi'r,e^%nktn. and transport cnat,,s . pU, 

•;Su'^u^°t.:"on.^to^-.u^i^5^""''"''^="'^^ 

. T^, .o.aUtt« fot ,ax. to .tan pr.s.nt for.i.aM. .t»UuIt... 

••..„5-jtr/asTt:rtr=r.;i^tj^^rsro'"=-oJ"'i^^.t".?.«. 

third country. ^« ^f '.fj "Hu cannot take place until 
for some details), "f ^*** ^J'jq days can be waived for 
50 days_ after the "0^^":^ country transfer has no such 
^^^^"'"^Ad^'notice mi t still be given in any case, 
provision, and notice mu»«. 



,, ... .i„ue. ».r. laundT.d through Israel. 

•■ ?or.;.n':oiu'!;:vr?'o'i. n.tia.d. 

w ,),. sal. could b« l"»>'en Into = or 
'lci:Un';Mn"ori:rro%5a'd."con,r».tonal notice . 

.. «,IU .h.r. 1. no .xpucl, Uiuncuon ^1^^^% 
Z\..^ . !•;: 'r..'tr.,.ln5rth.t!'and all Ad.inistrat.or. 

ra;ris:«v.rthU .crupSiou.!,-. 

.. u 1, conc.lv.». tK.t upon ,.ti.f.ctorv^c.nsul.ati.;^^^^; 

" ' INCIJSSM 



deliveries 



255 



nnmim 



i: iraq ever found o 
T-?:r sccrce? of 
Iran's, however. 
respect . 



Ir3.«backs are e:jall. for-.idable- 

^ °:;' '^^'' ^'°"^- ^f sreatlv irritate^ 
supple are rore readilv access ;b le hi- 
so tnere would be no effect ;n that 

'"xta^^fl^d'^JaJSlc^^'" Culf. States would also be 

hf lil^l\ "*■'" "^*"^ ^- *^* laundering countrv thev uo.,i ^ 

e^pi^rjJeirj:;:^^'^ " =°"^^""' -'^-^ to fri:;!\n°i; 

fltl^o.lii:n^-^l--\l^l^^y ^^"l>. rest;aJi;d 



UNGUSSIHED 



256 

UMPUCCinrn 






DCrENSC SCCUmTY ASSISTANCE AGENCY 



Memo For. 







gvS'^ V<i>^ O^W^ COXT^I*/ 

d^. /^f Ao>^*. wV»Jr 34 ^i ^ 



257 



^ 

•O'*, 



UNCUSSIRED 



4s A^<«pLQA 



IINCUSSIFIED 



82 680 



257 



82-690 O-88-10 



258 



^mim 



St„C 



s 



^ 



I 










^ 




re 



i 



UNCLASSIFIED 



if 



259 



.3- r:.':'K5 



ItMt/CCtM>Ofi 



^ 











3^ 



iifimim 



260 



Not for QnototioB or - / 3 

DnpUc»ttai ^ 



STENOGRAPHIC IflNUTBS 
TJni«TlMd and Unadlted 



P_^ «usw 



See ^^s,U ^ ^-J '^^^^ "^"'^ 

,2^ <^A,,, ////^ A^ />■ ^--?^- 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Committee Hearings 
UA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



UNCI^IFiED 



OFFICI OP THK CLKKK 
Oflk* of Offldal R^ortm 



Partially Deciassitieomeleassd on Vj»«-»^ 8 

under provisions ol E 12356 

by K Johnson. NaOon* Sscunly Council 




Hlxc 



I 



261 






^ 
^ 



^' 



t^mmm ,„M 



no*9wcn Pot znmmuti ux»ia«r or x-imb m4 x-tqi, ^^^ 



l*Uiid«4 e*r OM Md 14 fof Utt, TIM alMiUs SlJt^r^* 
bMii l^t M««»t«M« t«ct«4. tat u«r« i« • vary l«« ti!?^ '•« 
f«it«r«. fto •IstilM will ta at M livM Mtil^^!^^«( 
lfl< for tMtlH* ^* *»»il 

- Tb«r« wmU »• M la^et oa tlM OAI if «t ablp ttai* «. 
■itatlM. Tba »ro«r«a hat alipp«« la atlMr aara. aS L!V 
ac co — odata4 wltiia tha aeraal pro4aetiaa laa4 tiaa f.!** ^ 
■aat aiaallaa. '•» 'tpUca- 

- Beraa «oal4 hava ta ba eaaaalta4 ta aaeartaia tha la^^^ 
thair profraa, if it ia aaeaaaary u aliif aay alaaliM IT^.^ 
tiaa ta Ua 7S aaatiaaa^ atova. »racar«aat laaA ti!! il *^^' 
loraa'a aiaailaa «oal4 ba abaat 33 aeatlM. ^ ^* rapUe* 

- T» Ua baat af aor k»a«la4fa* all of O.t. Any X-iam. . 
vith aaita aa4 ahaaU aot ba eaaai4ara4 froB divaraiaaT 

• Oait rapl ac Maat priea af tUK aiaailaa ia abaat I417 ?• 
I total oaekafa prioa for SO woaU appraaiaata Isa.SN. «!, ,h 
abaat MSN. raaka«a prieaa laelaOa ffM aarebartaa. ^"' 




Aray baa «ba«t^H^lQ«a (iaaloilof ^WSUsSOV) a* 1 
aiaat a AiatviMRaSravairaMat af •^MtHHT^L??.* 
fM X-fO> aiaailao ara availabU io OonnafSotaaba 



aa tba aaiftara, tba iaaaet at Ai«y af obiffiat S.soa 
■aiiataly «aal4 ba aarlaaa bat aot iotalarabla. iT 
_ owiM baaa ta ba tabaa fraa traapa. laaai aa tba 
Hmmm of tba ra^alrvaat, aa4 baapiap ia aiai tbattba arav 
M raaalaa Km-ll raplaeoMat oiMilaay it i« likaly tba! tba 
ATM «a«i« raltataatly aaftiaoea u iMoiiata obii^aat aCtba 
aotira ^aaatity. 



- oait pciaa a« tba raalacaMat fa^S> ■^Mila ioabaat tu.aoot 
total poabapa priao «aal4 appraaiaata MSI. alU IHi aarabarioo. 

- Oallaary fraa pca4aatiaa af f9hlt pay baafc aiaailaa u tba 
Ar«y aoaM aaaar abaat tba bapiaaiap af Cf f**** If aaaaaaary— 
tbaofb tbia ia aat taeoaai Bl aO-aaproaiaataly l,HO tfcallacatU 

woi fMfL.H*' *• *«T 4t Meoaa 



262 




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9» -^ mm a a C*« 



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e^aa-auea jib~M — 

««ua.ade vaMKaou aaaa 

aa»ba«« »a«aIE.. ««a^ 

S-t23S2 SuJS-laiSSSR 



eaki «aa^ft. 

BK* jiauM*'*' 

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:.**"8;822S2- 
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r-8;8 2-"'Ss*. 
k'ssa.t^ti:?: 

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a« M aaa«>ao u 
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6602L N 




267 



UNGIMIED 

POSSIBILITY FOR UEAXS 




There is no good way to keep this project froa ultlaately 
beinq Bade public. Following are three legal aethoda together 
with a brief discuasion on the poasibility of coaproaise. 

> - The President can aake a deteraination, Section 614 ot te 
the Foreign Assistance Act, which would waive the statute which 
requires the normal Congressional notification under Section 
36(b) of the Araa Export Control Act (ABCA). _ 

- President aust notify the Speaker of the House and the 
Chairaan of the Foreign Relations Coaaittee, provide a written 
justification, and consult with both the Chairaan of the Foreign 
Relations Coovmittee and the Chairaan of the Foreign Affairs 
Coovaittee. This could be done in a classified, close-hold aannei 
and is the best prospect for eliainating leaks froa Congressional 
sources. However, the problem would coae with actually executinc 
a Letter of Offer (LOA) for the aaterial without disclosing to 
the entire Security Assistance Cooaunity that the President had 
waived the need for Section 36(b) notification (Headquarters 
Aray, USASAC, and NICOM, all are aware of the legal requirement 
not to process the LOAs without the 36(b) notification process). 

- The OSO General Counsel should be asked personally to confira 
that Section 614 is legal under these circuastances, since this 
authority never has been exercised in this way. 

- The President could sign an eaergency notification under 
Section 36(b), waiving the formal 30-day notification period. 
This requires a certification that an eaergency exists, and the 
reasons therefor. Mhile this notification would be classified, 
the distribution of the Sactioa 36(b) notice is auch broader that 
would be true for the Section 614 deteraination aentioned above. 
Additionally, the Security A«sistance Coaaunity would have to be 
inforaed that the President had aade th« eaergency deteraination 
and waived Section 3<(b) before the LOA eoald ba prepared and 
issued. There would ba no good explanatioa aa to why an 
eaergency would exist for this country's parchasing the aissiles. 

- Tha last option, if tiaa paraits, woold ba to treat the sale 
a« • routine unclassified action under Section 36(b). This would 
require the full SO-day notification period (including the 20-day 
inforaal notice) for Coaqreasiooal review. Both systeas are in 
the inventory of tha country involved, and It la possible that 
the notification would flow through without question. This 
alaoet certainly would ba true for I-BAns la the quantity 
conteaplated) the I-TOW quantities aight or alght not cause 
speculation. 

IfDeclassified/ReieaseO nn <0 PC^ Sfe 
under ptovisions ot EO 12356 
K Johnson. National Security Council 



268 



UNCLASSIFIED 



UNClASSinED 



269 



RICHARD LEE ARMITAGE . ^'**', 




IIMPJ A^SlFlFfts - -?^cretVkv o^ rA./.> -T^^l. 

UllULI^O^I" 'Ml^ international security affairs c»fUr^*u^ 

Richard L. Armitage was sworn in as the 
Assisttnt S.cr.t.ry of Defense ^o- I^^"'^*" 
t"nal security Affairs on 9 June 1983. 

Mr Armitage represents the Department 
of Defe;seTn formulating and developing the 
poUtico-military relationship, ^-^ween the 
united States and other countries of the 
world, excluding NATO-member =0"n"ies. As 
such? he is responsible for the "^Ij^^^Y 
«pects of U.S. policy pertaxnxng to these 
coCntrtes. Among his many duties «•«"?"- 
vT^ing DoD'e security *"^-^*"^- P^°^^n;w 
oversight of DoD activities relating to law 
of the sea and oversight of PO^i"-/°"""; 
?ng uTs. special operating force, and counter 
terrorism. 

Born in 1945 in Boston Mr Arndtage attended high^chool^in 
Atlanta and graduated in ^^67 from the U.S^ Naval J "^^^^^^ 
h. received a =°"^"tan«d'to a des trover ^hich was illationed on 
S:Tnirne^ofrvirtni^"fonruc:irg'rari gunfire support opera- 
tions. 

Representative, I"";^^^^°^9il^\i°becam; Administrative Assistant ^ 

Asian affairs. -' 3 

„r. Armitage worXed J Vi^d'tKirwa^'iSLd"!" memb« of I ^ 
Reagan presidential campaign and later was namea advisor | I 
the National security Transition Team. H'^^'-^^^^^ ^ith pre- ^ ^ 
to the Interim Foreign Policy advisory ooaru ^ which would 
paring the President-elect for "«30^ P°JJ|y i"it a«uSng his 

confront the new *<3'»i"i»^"^i°"- /^°" ty is-i'^*"*"*""""^ °^ 
ref:re,^?n^:^na;i"o^ali:c;rny^rff:!?rLJ"ast Asia and Pacific 

Affairs. 

„r. Armitage is a member of the Association of Asian Studies 
and the World Affairs Council. 



He lives in Fairfax. Virginia, with his wife Laura., four 
daughters. Elizabeth. Lee. Jenny and Alice and two sons. Paul 

uNWSsife 



and Chris. 

"""' 15 May 1986 




270 



I U'^^ ey 



STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES 
UnreyiMd mod Unedited 
Not for Quotatioa or 
DapUcadon 



mmm 



HSITS-2£lZ-/87 




DEPOSITION OF GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL 
Friday, June 19, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee on Investigate Covert 
Arms Transactions with Iran, 



Partially Declassified/Released on 1/ f^fg S'g) 
under provisionr, o< E 12356 
by K Joh.-scn. Nal.cnal Secunly Council 



Committee Hearinsrs 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



I OF THE 



(^^ 



OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Offlcaofj 



HO. 



^ ^ 3 cones 



271 



cwassw 



:AS-16 1 he was giving me. And I don ' t sense that he gave me much 

2 more — or recall that he gave me much more guidance than that. 

3 I didn't need much more. 
Q And the reference to the Economy Act is the question 

of, I take it, of the pricing of the missiles and the — 

A It was more than that. It was an indication that 
we were providing a service to the Cenwral Intelligence 
Agency. 
9 MR. LIMAN: I am correct that the only way you can 

10 sell to the CIA is under the Economy Act; 

11 THE WITNESS: That is my understanding, but I 

12 would need to get a lawyer 

13 BY MR. SABA: 

14 Q How did the number change to 4,508? 

15 A Some time over the next week — and I can't quite 

16 recall how — either from the Secretary or one of my 

17 NSC interlocutors. It might have been Admiral Poindexter or 

18 Colonel North, I really don't recall. Or it might have been 

19 that the CIA told the Army, once I put them in touch with 

20 each other, that the number was up to 4,500, and I became 

21 aware of it, it czme back to me, and I confirmed it with 

22 the — let the Secretary know about it, and there was no 

23 objection, and it was at that point that I realized that 

24 well, I have answered your question. 

25 Q I am trying to understand wHere~the extra 5( 



272 



CAS- 17 1 



came^Jrom. 



'Wf^Sffl^ 



25 



A The number that was given to me was 4,000, and 

was increased to 4,500. And whether it was 4,508 or not, I 
don-t know. I just recall it being 4,500. 

Q But you wouldn't have increased that on your own? 
A On my own? Oh, no. 

MR. LIMAN: He said that it came from either the 
Secretary or from the NSC. 
BY MR. SABA: 
Q And you don't know. 

MR. LIMAN: And you understood that it might have 
come — 

THE WITNESS: As a matter of information, once I 
talked to General Thurmond, and he put me in touch with 
the logistics people in the Army, General Russo, at that 
point I put General Russo in touch with the CIA and from then 
on in I was in nothing but a mongering role. 

MR. LIMAN: Is this when you learned that the 500 
were to be used to replace earlier shipments to Israel? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. It was at that point that 
things clicked, and I said - I started to find out about 
the other 500. I just realized at that point that a 
transfer must have taken place and this is the replenishment 
of some kind. 



wmmL 



273 



^nmm 



BY MR. SABA: 
Q Did you share your view on these 500 with anyone? 
A I can't specifically state, ;but I would be willing 
to speculate that Mr. Armitage's testimony and the Secretary's 
would also recognize and corroborate that, too. And we all at 
that point realized -- I might have learned it from 
Armitage. i just don't recall. 

Q Did you have any instruction or any understanding 
that this -- the filling of the order should bypass their 
system? 
A No. The^^^^^^^^^H system was not something 
the Secretary would have recognized as a system. And lots 
has been made of bypassing of ^^^^^^^^^^^H system, but I 
don't think I bypassed the ^^^^^^^^H system. I took it to 
the top of the^^^^^^^^^Hsystem. General Thurmond sits in the 
Army at the top of theH^^^H^^H system. And when I 
go to General Thurmond as a tasking, I did not in any way 
restrict how he accomplished it other than to tell him that 
it should be kept to the smallest number of peoplf possible. 

My understanding is that he then turned to 
Colonel ^^^^^HB who was hi^^^^^^^^Hof fleer , if I am 
correct, and so I ciCMrW t^ins/s^liait-we _bypassed the 
^^^H system. 

It wasn't used, but it wasn't bypassed in any 
deliberate, in any conscious kind of way. 




274 



nfmsm 



nsj^^'^ 



[2 Hrrnitine. 



JOINT HEARINGS ON THE 
ERANCONTRA INVESTIGATION 



Continued Testimony of Oliver L. North 

Tuesday. July 7, 1987 
Afternoon Session 

House Select CoBmittc* to Invcstigatt 

Covert Amu Transactioiis with Iru 

and 

Scute Select Committee on Secret Military Asdstuce 

to Iru ud tiie NicaraguB Opposition 

WtuhiHtUHt. DjC. 



UU^Declassitied/Released on_[l5j5f 7~S8 
under provisions ot E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 



fo^ 



UNtlASSIHED 



275 



liNCUSSIFIED 



MABE: IP18800PK 

1482 irinutes. __ 
m83 [Becess.l 

m8« Chalriran inouye. The hearing Hill please come tc order, 
mes ?'r. Nields. 

11486 Kr. NIELD";. ThanK ycu, Hr. Chairman. 

1U87 Colonel yorth, I asked yot before we broke about a number 

1U88 cf particular individuals and whether they were aware of the 

iue9 Hank shipment in November cf 1985. Are there any other 

11*90 officials cf the United states Government who were aware of 

mgi the Hawk shipment m Novemher cf 1985? 

1492 wr. NORTH. I think I have given ycu the list that l 

1493 believe tc have beer aware. 

1094 "^r. NIFLP?. were any officials at the Department of 

1495 Defense aware that i8 Hawk missiles or some number cf Hawk 

1496 missiles had actually been shipped by Israel to Iran? 

1497 "r. KCRTH. Anair, I believe that they may have — excuse re, 

1498 I ^plieve they may well have been, because I think I made 

1499 sever?! efforts to coordinate with them the replenishment cf 

1500 the Hawifs. I think I had a discussion, if I remember 

1501 prcpFPly, with DCD cfficials about both Hawks and TOWs. I 

1502 wouldn't be asking them abcut Hawks if they hadn't already 

1503 teen ordered up as a need for replenishing. 

1504 You know, I am a little concerned I am leaving the wrong 

1505 impression, because I honestly think that all of us who were 

1506 engaged in this activity were looking for the right way of 



UNGUSSIFIEO 



276 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAKE: IP18800PW '"• • ^"^ IWVII ■ tU PAGE 68 

1507 dclng things, that there was nc intent to avoid, to in any 

508 way violate the Artrs Expert control Act, ana that if there 

1509 was confusion within the COD over how I was going atcut it, 

15 10 it was because of try cwn ignorance In not Knowing the right 

1511 way to start, and I want to coire bacK to the finding issue 

15 12 as tc why we arrived at using the Economy Act procedures for 

1513 that whole business. 
15 iu t»uch cf the confusion that may exist out there n«ay have 

1515 simply been because when this Kid was told to find a way to 

1516 replenish things, i didn't know how to go about doing it, 

1517 anf, in fact, it wasn't until the latter part of January 

1518 that a real methodclogy was proposed. 

1519 fr. NIELDS. I just want to maKe sure. Hy question simply 

1520 i«: vho in the Department of Defense was told that there 

1521 had actually been a shipment, if anybody? 

1522 f.r. NCRTw. An unrefreshed, long-tia.e-ago memory would 

1523 tell me that I probably talKed about that delivery with Br. 
1521* Koch, possibly with General Powell, possibly with «r. 

1525 AriTitage. 



UNCLASSra 



277 



/ jRy-j ^(^ 







278 




279 



r».t^y-.\cg-t.tifty^ 



^^'?'^m 



VVftVv7 







^u 3 .: r/ZJZyL ^7i.c^ 



3--/0 



^rv^'(^ 



^W<rC^_ 




^ 



280 



UNCUSSmED 



A'.- u c 




Monday, 11 Nov 198 5 
15-23 November 1985 
Thursday, 28 Nov 1985 
Monday, 16 Dec 1985 

Tuesday, 24 Dec 1985 
Wednesday, 25 Dec 1985 
Tuesday, 31 December 1985 
Wednesday, 1 January 1986 
Friday, 3 Jan - Fri, 10 Jan 86 
14-18 January 1986 
Monday, 20 January 1986 
Sun, 9 Feb - Mon , 17 Feb 1986 
31 Mar - 13 Apr 1986 



Holiday 

Germany, Bahrain, Pakistan 

Thanksgiving 

1440 Departed for Dover, Ceremony 
for airplane crash victims 

Departed at 1300 

Holiday 

1000 Departed 

Holiday 

Bangkok, Hanoi, Hong Kong 

Japanese SSC, Honolulu 

Holiday 

Mid East (Cairo, Jordan, Israel) 

Korea, Japan, Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia, Honolulu 



**l^ Declassified/Released on > 0/'6ft 88 

undei provisions of E 12356 
by K Johnson, National Secunty Council 




UNOASSra 



281 



UNtUSSIFIED 



^o Dctc 



2lS<»^ 



OFFICe OF THE ASSISTANT SECRCTAXY OF OEFENSE 
iMTinwA'POWAt MOiwrY krtkxm 

FMCAMOIOM 




penally Oeclassrfied/Released on H)ff69i 



Johnson, Nat,onal Secur.iy Counc.l 



t-.' • 

''H.*'' 






»;•. - • ». 






:fe>;ir 










«?*!V^-fi'^, 



'9^:^ 



282 



UNCLASSIHED 

JOUST HEARINGS ON THE 
IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 



Continued Testimony of diver L. North 



Tuesday. July 7. 1987 
Afternoon Session 



House Select Committee to InvcstigaU 
Covert Anns Traasactioiis witli Iran 



Senate Select Committee od Secret Military Assistance 

to Iraii and t)ie Nicaragnan Opposition 

WatJuMgioH, DX:. 



9 JJ^^9 






ii«*r Oeclas?i(ied/Rel';ased on 1 1 F^B Rg 
undei pruvisc.ns ot E i:!3S6 
by K Johnson. National Secumy Council 




UNtlASSIHED 



283 



mmm.\i 



NAME: IF18800FI1 "^"■■**l#il ltl/ P'-^E 107 

2m0 KncMletige -cf rr,y day-to-day activities liKe rry superiors did, 

^«11 but certainly they knew that I was the guy that was getting 

2U12 things done. 

2013 That's Why they called me up, that's why there is a note 

2um to the effect that, hey, Ollle, you know, here these guys 

2U15 from Country whatever It Is are talking about S2 million, 

2U16 why dor 't you go over and put the smile on them, maybe 

2m7 they'll kick In. 

2018 wr. NIELDS. HOW about the chief of the central American 

21119 task force? 

2U20 "^r. NORTH. Oh, I'm sure that he had a detailed grasp 

2U21 cf— well, I say a detailed grasp — I'm sure that he had an 

2422 adequate sense of what I was dcing. 

2U23 Mr. NIELDS. And what is your basis for that belief? 
202U ir. N05TH. We used to have meetings with the Restricted 

21(25 Interagercy Group, we used to have secure conference calls, 

2U26 ?nd on one occasion T can recall laying cut for the group— in 

2427 fact, I think It was after the S100 million had been voted 

2428 ty both Houses, hadn't been sert forward to the President — I 
2tt29 can recall a meeting in an office in the Pentagon where I 
2«30 went down item by item ty item the things that I was doing 
2U31 and asked them point blank whether or not I had tc continue 
2U32 to r'o them to keep the resistance alive, because even though 
2U33 the money had been authorized and both tills had been 

2«3i* passed, we couldn't get it forwarded to the President. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



284 



nHmsim 



2tt35 And wewent down item by item by item on my checKlist of 

U36 what I was having directed cut each month or each quarter or 

2U37 each weeic to support the resistance, and I asKed them point 

2'*38 blank whether this should continue. 
2U39 rr. NIELDS. whc was there? 

201*0 nr. NORTH, well, i would have to look at my 

2041 contemporaneous note at the tirre, but I think there is a 

2UU2 note Id one of the notebooks I gave you to that effect. 
2U43 Hr. Flers was there, cr. Abrams was there, ar. Armita^e 

2iitii was there, I think r.c. Hichael was there, I think General 

2UU5 foellering wa? there. 

24U6 Tr. NIELDS. wculd ycu go through them for us, please, 

2U07 item by item, what it was you told this assembled group you 

2i««8 were doing? 
2049 «r. NORTH. What I'm saying is I didn't say, look, on a 

2450 given day I'm Qoing to walk out and go talk tc so and so 

2451 about so much money, vhat they knew is that I was the 

2452 person whc was causing these things tc happen. There was no 

2453 doubt in their mind. 

2454 That is why, when an airplane goes down in Honouras, they 

2455 call me to get the bodies home and to pay the ccsts. That's 

2456 why, Hben somebody needs scmething done, in the case of this 

2457 contact right here you pcirted out as part of Exhibit No. 

2458 79, they called me. 

2459 These people knew what I was doing. They knew that it was 



mmm 



285 



UNCLMooirlED 



HAHE: IP18B00FI' ^^^*- ^'^ 

2tt6« a ccvert cjeration telng ccnciucted by this Government to 
.U61 succort the Nicaraguan resistance. 



UNCIASSIHED 



286 



UNCIASSIHED 



NAHE: IB18800P?! |||l||| Hniliril II PAGE 
~U62 PPTS DOTSON _- 
. J DC>!M GLASSMAP 
2U6U 

21*65 Hr. NIELDS. Hy question Is, you Indicated tr.st during 
2tt66 this meetlno at the Department of Defense, at the Pentagon, 
2«67 you went down item ty Iterr. would you qq down for us item 
21*68 hy Item what It is you told them? 

2<*69 Hr. NORTH. I don't have the list tetore me. I gave 

2tt70 cc?ies of that to you. It 1? in the stuff that I gave to 

2U71 you, sever binders full. 

^''■'S Br. NIELES. Did you discuss the re-supply operation? 
2U73 nr. voRTH. I think so. 
2U7U nr. NIELDS. Cid you discuss efforts to obtain armaments? 

■^5 wr. NCRTH. Probably, i am talking about aid to the 

1 .6 internal cppcsition, food, medical supplies, et cetera. I 

2U77 thinU it was all on that list, tick, tick, tick, tick, tick. 
2'*78 Kr. NIELDS. Including munitions? 

2U79 Hr. NORTH. I am not absolutely sure it says munitions, it 

2U80 might have 3ust said logistics, air support, it might have 

2U81 just said certain things about the internal activities. You 

21482 have get it, along with the list of names of people that 

2U83 were there at the ireetlng. 

2«8tt Hr. WIELDS. IS there anything else you can recall ticking 

2(485 off during this meeting? 
2U86 Hr. NORTH. NO, but you have the note, and I arr sure you 



iwssro 



287 




WASHINGTON O C :030I-2J 



r\IC t«ic 



(iNCIiSIFIED 

5FFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEPEWSfe^' * *^\M 



In reply refer to: 
1-24078/86 






MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY AFFAIRS 

SUBJECT: Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Aid Package (S) 



(S) Attached per your request is a memorandum for the Secretary 
on this -norning's breakfast. 



^ 



Nestor D. Sanchez 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Inter-American Affairs 



Attachment 
a/s 




Partially Declassified/Released on /QptfB fljg 

under provisions of E 0, 12356 
by K Johnson, National Security Council 



Dir, I A Region 



UNCUiSSra 



288 




V5HINGTQN D 



Ir. reply re: 
1-24079/86 



;'.E.".ORANDL.'M FOF TH.F. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

THRU THE UN'DER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

SUBJECT: Nicaraquan Democratic Resistance Aid Program (S) 
-- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 



(S) I chaired a breakfast meeting this morning, 28 August, of a select 
interagency group which will oversee the implementation of the SlOO mil- 
lion program to support the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. At^^^^^ 
th^meeting were James Michel, State, representing Elliott Abrams J^^^^l^ 
SKtt^ CIA, Oliver North, NSC, LtGen John Moellering, OCJCS, and Nestor 
S^^Wez. 




BHOHSSW 



289 



wmmB 



NSITIVE 



(S) The group I chaired this morning plans to continue meeting on a 
weekly or biweekly basis so that we can keep ourselves collectively 
informed on all developments and be able to provide timely policy 
guidance to the program. We will keep you informed and request your 
guidance or approval, as required. 



Prepared by: Nestor D. Sanchez 
DASD(ISA)IA/75884 



M^EP 



82-690 0-88-11 



290 



[T 



Hffim 



C 2709 



\ f\nTiitcMe 

1 ^/aa/gl rrtctc: 



5?? 



SI 



"flOef provisions of e.O 12356 
VJWMwn.NafonaiSeeurtylouncil 




UNCLASSIFIED 



291 



jr 



IINCUSSfflED ti-Tz 

C 2710 



15 March 1985 



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Breakfast with Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. 15 March 1905 



Partially Declassified/Released on 10^63 S8 
under provisions of E 12356 
by K Johnson, National Sscuniy Council 




vHwrnm 



13^3 



292 




C 2711 



7. Question of the support to the Contras cane up. The Director 
noted that we should have another meeting on it but following last week's 
meeting of the LSG we tended to be leaning towards non-lethal aid. I 
described the assignment given to Motley to develop different options 
which could be packaged and tnen played against Senators Lugar and 
Ourenberger to see what conbination of options in a single package night 
be acceptable to Congress. But I noted at the meeting that there was no 
agreement that we would be limited to non-lethal aid. The Director said 
that McFarlane was to meet with Lugar and O urenberger today. In closino 
th^ecretary stated that he had heard that ! 
I^^^Vhad earmarked S25 million for the Contras 
increments 



^ ■ yohn N. McMahon 



DUI 

000 
-£A/ODCI 

EA/DCI 

Exec. Sec. 
Exec. Registry 



UNCUSSIFIED 



-v^S-iX^ 






293 



/3J-^LSrC 




WASHINOTOH. O C 20SOM4OO sj^^>d< ^•^ '^ <{''*■•( 



IIJUL 

,„««T. 0. POIIC TO...- .... <•) ^^^^^^ 



D 576 



u„"„*.b!r.i. 9ood ""'"".'js-iSiS ir;»t to |iv. o.. 

,a... Th.r.for.. I b^li. ^ _ 



to and 
d 



^Xd ca... Th.r.ror.. ^ ^^,,„au.. A. T.b 
.1— ^AM not specify PO** "^PT „-«-nd»tion to 



you forward Tab A. j,j„^(3jj|3j5,,,ga/Reieasedon_L!iiBS8 
undfif provisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson, National Secunty Council 



( V-^ ' -' t" 







fc. C^^*^^ , t^-"- // 



uNf^sm 






294 






295 



UNCUiSsra 



D 578 



UNCUSSIFIED 



296 




mmm 



THE sec 

__ WASMINCTOW. 



TMC OltTIWCT or COL\J*m*A 



579 



SUBJBCTi us policy Toward Ir»n (•) 

^ ^^ .M.1V vAouAflt for coBBcnta on 
(T8) Thi. ««-or«ndu. '-P^^SaS ^liri^9r«« with -any of 
th. diaft WOD o« 0»:i'"i"r"iUi?S*of^ipropc..O •ction. ..« 
tho Mjor point, in th. p.p.r. ••JJ^iiy aif«i«xt to con«id«r an 

b« i«»u«d in tho propcd form. 

•hort-t«r> ch.lX.ng. -i-t b. *» "^J-J^*3 cour... thi. will put 
Jovi.t in«l"-nc.-- J< -• «;/,«nTloi;.?-tir« ^i of h.^ing .t 
u. in . to.tt.r pcition to ^••"" * tr>j'l,.n. ond.r no circus 
Swt n.utr.l/non-ho.til. r.ljtio2 with J^J^iction on .r» ..!.. to 
.t.nc... ho»#.v.r. .hould ** »»^^Ji;j'r««tning n.utr.l on ..1.. 
lr«. Ktf^tims to cut ^f JJ-^J^'Ji; ^.y, w. h.v. to profct our 
to .ith.r b.lligor«nt ^» <»?r?*.j5J ;S i,;,. K policy r.v.rm.l 
long.r-r.ng. ^"^•[••i-.t" StJ^li^LtSt.nt by thoH n.tioo. who. w. 
would b. ...n "^^""Pii""^.; Hlii. •««» vbuld lik.ly l"d to 
h.v. urg.d to «-««"^° *'?r-l 2d • Si«tblo .It.r.tion of th. 

U;rro-!i5nriS-.ic.'*Tt :Sul5"av.«.ly .ff.ct our nowly -rging 
r.l.tion.hip with lr.q. ,^y^^ 

^. «- >.»«>v*r aoa. of Which *r. i^liwi 
(TS) Th.r. .r. oth.r •f^f5"t^,;*^S^^id.r our curr.nt policy 
in thv^iraft «^J- ^t^^^JTiS jSt.nnS^u.nc. .nd to l..d toward 

to tr^tO pr.V.nt an incraa.. *» Pamally Declass,fied/Release<J on_lL^cS88 

« BOr. •Od.rat. p0.t-KnO«.Xn* **•» under provisions of E,0 12356 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 
Int.lliq.nc. 

°a colLcting infonnation o n_tti*^^^ ^^^^^^^ 
wSSI^^SSf^^ on ii.nt Hying k.y 

nr^Si-DOll!Sl""na who «ay b. »or. favorably 

5i;j:r.d^;o^;lScrr5: in th. r.gion. 



ClASSIPXED BY 



UNCLASSinED 



297 



mmm 



580 



ei*«n b«tt«r infonatlon froa u 
^^J»t«bll«h^conf cf with 

tiol 
~- Through contact* vith alilaa »w^ « < ^ 

pot.nti.Hy r.c.ptiv. Ir.S« i;rL^'^*'L'*^**^«» *«» 
rwunci.tion of •!• t.-ij^^^.a Jj™?^*^.^'* *^*A' 
n... to ..^ik . n.90ti.t.5 .itJl.i!Br^ f; *^*^*" *'iliin9- 
th.ir non-int.rf.;.nc. in SS.r^t-I? *}• J'*«-Ir.q w.r. 



er.uin9 PoUtic.l-mlUt.r^^«^- ?.**• f*»^^^ct .nd in- 
•tion council countSi.! ^ coop.r.tion with Ooif Cocp.r- 



can.rci.1 £ir» ^d Ir.ni.B arJLf^ ^' *'^"* ^t*'««n 
th. pr...ur. on our .luS^^JiffSif J J* 'k??^** l=cr.M. 
•nd posaibl. .Motion.. con.id.ring public .tatnant. 



Public Dip if 



gconoaie 



r«9iiD.. In ton., our oublle^Tr? *^* ««"»» Iranian 
Iran a. a countr^ Til SS JraS!Zi*B!Lr" !5^" *-t^°9 ' 
-11 a. Shia I,IJ.. a.^. .;i!° S^?'^: "^ cultur., a. 
opposition to th. ^lici.r It^L * ■»>o«l<» •ii«>ha.iz. 
«dth. corrupt ~KiJ;'ri?J.'5;/j:::;!J'"^*» 90v.rn«.„t 
■•nt. .hould aia to .ncouraa. *>«--' T"^"*' ®"' 'tat.- 
<Jl..gr.. or oppo-rrl^SJ^uSS? '^•^^^ ^n Iran who 



iO£t_cggtrol« ar. air.«<( 




r.aa.M. 

curbing all but .trictly 



UllilAEI! 



prM.nt control. 
rt.. 



298 



581 



— Za eeajanetion with dl«cr««t political contacts propoaad 
•bow, w« coald au^gaat to tha Zraaians that corraet ra- 
lationa would Includa ralazatlon of currant 08 trada 
rastrlctloaa and noraal trada ralatlons with an Iranian 
govarnaant that la not hostlla to 08 lataraata. 

(T8) Z concur with tha balanea of tha raccaaiandatlena In tha 
draft B8DD In ao far as thay support currant 08 policy. My racoa- 
■andatlons raf lact ay vary atrong vlsw that 08 policy auat raaaln 
ataadf aat In tha faca of Intamational lawlaaanass pazpatratad by 
tha Iranian raglaa. Changaa In policy and In conduct, tharafora, 
■ust ba Inltlatad by tha Iranian govarnnant. By ranalnlng flmly 
oppoaad to currant Iranian govarnaant pollelaa and actlona< yat 
aupportlva of nodaratlon and a longar tara laprovaaant In ralatlons, 
w« can avoid tha futura analty of tha Iranian paopla and davalqp tha 
lavaraga nacassary to countar a poaalbly vary dangarous Incraasa In 
8ovlat Influanca. In particular, wa naad to ba praparad for a 
peaalbla parlod of turaoll aa tha raglna baglna to changa. by 
building up affactlva instruaanta of influanca and accaaa to paopla 
and organizations within Iran, ao aa to countar a Soviat attaint to 
proaota a pro-Sov'lat auccaasor raglna. 



ect Saeratary Shults 



wmifiJHED 



299 



UNCUSSIFIED 



UHdASSra 



D 582 y^. 

J.- V.J 



ili 



300 




UNpssm- 

WASMINeTON. TMC OlSTRICT Of OOLU* 



583 



oiSTmcr Of ooluawa 



T^ 



iMC 



NEMORAHOUH POR THE AS8ZSTJUIT TO THB PRKSIOEHT FOR lATZOHAX. 

sBcmuTT APnaM 

tUBJXCTt Ut Policy Toward Jrun (8) 

(T8) This ■•■orandua respond* to yoar r«qu««t for eoBB«nts on 
th« draft BSDD on US-Iranlan relations. Nhil* X a^ra* with aany of 
tha aajor points in tha papar, aavaral of tha propoaad actioiM aaaa 
quastionabla. Moraovar, it is axtraaaly difficult to considar an 
asp licit ravision of our policy toward Xran as 10119 •• va contlnua 
to racaiva avidanca of Iranian co^licity in terrorist actions and 
planning against us. I do not baliava, tharafgra, an aSDD should 
ba issuad in tha propoaad forB. 

(T8) Z fully support tha policy objactlva that *onr priaary 
short-tara ehallanga auat ba to block Moscow's afforts to Incraasa 
8oviat influanca." If wa ara succaasful, of ceursa, this will put 
us in a battar poaition to raalisa a longar-tara 9oal of having at 
laast nautral/non-hoatila relations with ^ost QlMllnl Tnn Ondar 
no cireuastancas, howavar, should wa now aasa our rastrictlon on aras 
salaa to Iran. Attaapting to cut off ams whila raaainlng nautral 
on aalas to aithar balligarant is ona of tha faw «rays wa hava to 
protect our longer-range intereats in both Iran and Iraq. A policy 
reversal would be seen as inexplicably inconsistent by those nations 
whoa we hava urged to refrain froa such sales, and would likely 
lead to increased aras salaa by thea and a poaaibla alteration of 
tha atratagic balance in favor of Iran whila Rhcaainl is still the 
controlling influence. It would adversely affect our newly cswrging 
relationship with Iraq. 

(T8) There ara other actions, h^raver. acas of which ara iJ^lied 
in the draft HSDO, that wa could take now under our current policy 
-to tr^to prevent an Increase in Soviet influence and to lead towanl 
a aora aoderata p^fF'Iflg**"*^ Irant 

Intelliqenca 

.. Improve US intelligence gathering capabilities in the areas 
of weakness identified in the S WIB, especially with regard 
to collecting inforaatio^^J 

[B^hasis should be on identifying key 
players in the political arena t^o aay be aore favorably 
disposed to US concerns in the region. 

Partially Declassilied/Released on.| lrc6e »e> 
under provisions ol E 123')5 



CXAS8ZFIED lY 
DECLASSIFY OS OADR 



uNty^ffii^ 



___ of ___ copies 



301 



w&mm 



584 



— Oivao b«tt«r infonatlon froa inf lllq>nc« •ourc»«. ■««!» 

m^plZ^lj^ortla^rola^iB th« adainiatratiOB of Xal^Se 
ml* but who alao favor polielaa aor* f •▼orabX* to Ot 
•Dd w««t*m IntarMta, and davalep tactics for proTidlii9 
political and/or financial support to tho«« alaaanta 
oppoaad to Xhoaaini and tha radical*. 



Political 

— Through contacts with allias and frianda. «• should dis- 
craatly conmnicata our daaira for corraet ralations to 
potantially racaptiva Iranian laadars baa ad on thalr 
ranunciation of stata-aupportad tarrorisa* thair wlXling- 
nass to •mtlk. a nagotiatad sattlaaant to tha Iran-Iraq war, 
thair non-intarfaranca in othar atatas' affairs, and thair 
cooparation in sattling OS-Iranian claias in tha Bagua 
Tribunal . 

— Maintain our nautrality in tha Iran-Iraq v«r whila ancour- 
aqinq third party initiativas to and tha conflict and in- 
craasinq political-ailitary cooparation with Gulf Coopar- 
ation Council countrias. 

Public Diploaacy 

— ter public atataaanta on Iran ahould bring praaaura to 
baar aquaraly whara it ia naadad— on tha currant Iranian 
raqiao. In tons, our public position sunt avoid castinq 
Iran aa a country and tha Iranian pacpla and cultura, as 
wall as Shia Islaa, aa tha anaay, but should ai^hasisa 
oppoaition to tha polieiaa of tha prasant Iranian qovamaant 
and tha corrupt aallahs insida tha qovamaant. Our atata- 
aanta ahould aia to ancouraqa thosa alaaants in Iran who 
disaqra* or opposa raqiaa polieiaa. 



Bconoaic 



— A full ranqs of US axport controls ara alraady in affact. 




raaaaaaa tha affactivanaaa of prasant controla 
eurbinq all but strictly civilian 



In conjunction with discraat political contacts propoaad 
abova, wa could suqqaat to tha Iraniana that corraet ra- 
latlona %rauld includa ralaxation of currant US trada 
raatrictiona and noraal trada ralations with a poat- 
Khcnaini Iran that is not hoatila to 08 intaraata. 



IMUSSIFIED 



302 



\mmm 



D 585 



(W) -T'eoMar with th« balase* of 






th. Iranian rSI-i! cSfniS ™iiS!i iSfT"-! '•'^"tS^S 
«•! b« lnltl«t«d by •TnS^riSlS^-^SL^ cooAict. th«r«forSf 
<9PO««4 to currant IranlM SJJrJLH ^ffT?** ^ raialala, flJiiy 
•upportlT. of ■odaratlon^nTI^SSSSi Hii^f** "^ •etIoM. yat ^ 
onca tha ra^iaa haa chSoS? Ja S Ivi?5"*i^J'T*~"* *» ral.Jlon. 
Iranian paepla and dmyrmi^lJ^', "void tha fatura analty of t^ 

uiar, wa naad to ba Brl«.,l!i - »ovlat Influaaea. in oartle. 

CuJttT 

BCi Sacratary Shults 



UNDUSSIBED 



303 



UNCllSMIEt 



11/20/86 zGOO 
(Historical Chror.ology) 

of^^^--^ N 30363 
/IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES 



From the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in 
Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official 
contact with that government in order to discuss strategic 
developments in this critical part of the world and reconstruct a 
working relationship. Even before President Reagan came to 
office the U.S. Government agreed to try to expand security, 
economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace 
acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, the U.S. undertook 
three secret missions to Tehran: 



September 1979 - 
request of the Iranians 



t secretly with Bazargan at the 




^ I 

!li 
ill 

ill 
lit 

s .^ = 
% \(^ 



October-November 1979 _ 
normalization of relation 

When these meetings and the secret November 1, 1979 meeting in 
Algiers, between Brzezinslci .and Prime Minister Bazargan, became 
public in Iran, they helped precipitate the takeover of the U.S. 
Embassy by radical elements and led to the resignation of the 
Bazargan government. These events have adversely influenced 
Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact 
with the USG. 

Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal 
relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate 
persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it 
is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations 
with Iran — Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and 
the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic 
relations with Iran. 

Iran is the key to a region of vital importance to the West, yet 
it is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power 
and political influence along its borders and inside its 
territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets 
and their surrogates have moved actively to gain greater 
influence in the Gulf: 

The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have 
an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a 
government in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests 



in the area. 



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UNGIJ^m 



Cononuaist nations have become the principal arms suppliers 
to Iran — making Iran dependent on this source of supply in 
contending with an increasingly strengthened Iraq. This 
leads US to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be 
attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is, 
by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could 
well encourage a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that 
would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran, 
leaving a power vacuum which the Soviets could exploit. 
Specifically, the indicators of Communist. influence in Iran 
are: 




The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq 
war has exacerbated Iran's vulnerability to Soviet influence. 
Moreover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan, 
and actual crossborder strikes in Iran from Afghanistan have made 
reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important. 



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In short, tha Soviets wars far battar positionad to improva 
significantly thair influanca in tha ragion in 1985 vhan wa vara 
prasantad with an opportunity to opan a dialogua with Iran, in 
dacidin? to axploit this opaning, wa avaluatad pravious af forts 
through mora convantional channals which had not succaadad. 

About two years ago, senior Iranian officials apparently decided 
that soma accononodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1983, 
various countries have been engaged in overtures to the O.S. and 
Iran in ai^ffor^t^stimulat^d^jac^eontac^batweei^h^tw^^ r/ 
countries^^^^H^I^^H^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^HHHj^H L^ 

Io»#aver, internal splits and debates maHei^diffioilt 
!b? Uie Iranians to respond to these overtures. 

Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted | 
to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran 
or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of 
he Id hostage in Lebanon. T 



In the spring of 1985, a private American citizen (Michael 
Ledeen) learned from an Israeli government official (David 
Kimche) that the Israelis had established a liaison relationship 
with an Iranian expatriate (Manuchehr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who 
sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Govern- 
ment. In acknowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of 
the Iranian officials involved, he (Ghorbanifar) indicated that 
his 'sponsors' in Tehran could also help to resolve the American 
hostage situation in Beirut. 

In June of 1985, in the midst of the TWA-847 hijacking, the 
Israeli officials in direct contact with the Iranian expatriate 
asked him to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to 
obtain the release of the hijacked passengers. Two days after 
this approach, four Americans held separately from the rest of 
the hijacked sasseng ers were freed and turned over to Syr ian 
authorities. pi|^|^0BVHHBMIi^V^^^^BBBBAMaj lis 
Speaker RafsaiT^ani, who was travelling in the mid-east it the 
time, and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati both intervened with 
the captors. Rafsanjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for 
the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter. 



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On July 3, 1985, during a visit to Washington, an Israeli 
official (Kimche) advised National Security Advisor, Robert 
McFarlane, that Israel had established a channel of communication 
with authoritative elements in Iran who were interested in 
determining whether the United States was open to a discreet, 
high-level dialogue. The Iranians were described as comprising 
the principal figures of the government (i.e.. Speaker of the 
Majlis Rafsanjani, Prime Minister Musavi, and Khomeini's 
heir-apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri) and as being devoted to a 
reorientation of Iranian policy. 

At this first meeting, McFarlane went to great length to draw out 
the Israeli as to why he found the Iranian proposal credible, 
given the events of the past six years. The Israeli replied that 
their exhaustive analysis had gone beyond the surface logic 
deriving from the chaos and decline within Iran and the 
degenerative effects of the war, to more concrete tests of the 
willingness of the Iranians to take personal risks. He noted 
that the Iranians had exposed themselves to possible compromise 
by meeting with Israelis and by passing extremely sensitive 
intelligence on the situation (and political line-up) within Iran 
— information which was proven valid. 

The Israeli asked for our position on opening such a dialogue. 
No mention was made of any pre-conditions or Iranian priorities. 
McFarlane conveyed this proposal to the President (in the 
presence of the Chief of Staff) . The President said that he 
believed such a dialogue would be worthwhile at least to the 
point of determining the validity of the interlocutors. This 
decision was passed to the Israeli diplomat by telephone on 
July 30. 

On August 2, 1985, the Israeli called again on McFarlane. At 
this meeting, he stated that he had conveyed our position to the 
Iranian intermediary and that the Iranians had responded that 
they recognized the need for both sides to have tangible evidence 
of the bona fides of the other and that they believed they could 
affect the release of the Americans held hostage in Lebanon. 

According to the Israeli, the Iranians separately stated that 
they were vulnerable as a group and before having any prospect of 
being able to affect change within Iran they would need to be 
substantially strengthened. To do- so, they would need to secure 
the cooperation of military and/or Revolutionary Guard leaders. 
Toward this end, they e.xpressed the view that the most credible 
demonstration of their influence and abilities would be to secure 
limited amounts of U.S. equipment. The Israeli asked for our 
position on such actions. 



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N 30367 

Mr. McFarrafle elevated this proposition to the President at a 
meeting within days that included the Secretaries of State and 
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President 
stated that, while he could understand that assuming the 
legitimacy of the interlocutors, they would be quite vulnerable 
and ultimately might deserve our support to include tangible 
material; at the time, without any first hand experience in 
dealing with them, he could not authorize any transfers of 
military material. This was conveyed to the Israeli. 

'a_ 
On August 22, 1985, the Israeli diplomat called once more to 
report that the message had been conveyed and that an impasse of 
confidence existed. He asked what the position of the U.S. 
Government would be to an Israeli transfer of modest quantities 
of defensive military materiel. McFarlane replied that to him, 
such an action would represent a distinction without a difference. 
The Israeli diplomat explained at great length that Israel had 
its own policy interests that would be served by fostering such a 
dialogue in behalf of the U.S., but that a problem would arise 
when ultimately they needed to replace items shipped. He asked 
whether Israel would b« able to purchase replacements for items 
they chose to ship. McFarlane stated that the issue was not the 
ability of Israel to purchase military equipment from the U.S. — 
they had done so for a generation and would do so in the future 
— but rather the issue was whether it was U.S. policy to ship or 
allow others to ship military equipment to Iran. The Israeli 
asked for a position from our government. McFarlane elevated the 
question to the President (and to the Secretaries of State and 
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence) . T>e President 
stated that, while he could envision providing materv?! support 
to moderate elements in Iran if all the Western hostages we£e 
freed, he could not approve any transfer of military materi^'l at 
that time. This position was conveyed to the Israeli diplomat. 

On September 14, 1985, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in 
Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization. This release was 
preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Terry Waite, the 
Special Emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury. To this date, 
Mr. Waite remains the only Western er to eve 
the Lebanese kidnappers,. ' 



iy 



In late September, we learned that the Israelis had transferred 
508 TOW missiles to Iran and that this shipment had taken place 
in late August. The Israelis told us that they undertook the 
action, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in 
their strategic interests. The Israelis managed this entire 
operation, to include delivery arrangements, funding, and 
transportation. After discussing this matter with the President, 
it was decided not to expose this Israeli delivery because we 



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N 30368 

wanted to retain ^he option of exploiting the existing Israeli 
channel with Tehran in our own effort to establish a strategic 
dialogue with the Iranian government. The total value of the 508 
TOWs shipped by Israel was estimated to be less than S2 million. 

On October 4, 1985, Islamic Jihad announced that it had "executed" 
Beirut Station Chief William Bucicley in retaliation for the 
October 1 Israeli air raid on PLO installations in Tunis. This 
announcement led to a series of meetings in Europe among the U.S. 
(CIA and NSC), Israeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In these 
meetings, the Iranians indicated that, while their ability to 
influence the Hizballah was waning, the Hizballah had not killed 
Buckley; he had in fact died several months earlier 
causes. We have since substantiated this informatior 



iJce symptoms. 



Buckley probably died on June 3, 1985 of pneumonia-iike sym^ 

In mid-November, the Israelis, through a senior officer in the 
Foreign Minister's office (Kimche) , indicated that the Government 
of Israel was convinced that they were nearing a breakthrough 
with Iran on a high-level dialogue. The Israeli contacted a U.S. 
official (North) and asked for the name of a European-based 
airline which could discreetly transit to Iran for the purpose of 
delivering passengers and cargo. He specifically noted that 
neither a U.S. carrier nor an Israeli affiliated carrier could be 
used. We were assured, at the tine, that the Israelis were going 
to "try oil drilling parts as an incentive," since we had 
expressed so much displeasur^ove^th^earlier TOW shipment. The 
name the proprietaryH^^^H|||^^^^HHBwas passed to the 
Israeli, who subsequentl^nl^^^^^^^^^^^^hartered through 
normal commercial contract for a flight from Tel Aviv to Tabriz, 
Iran, on November 25, 1985. The Israelis were unwitting of the 
CIA's involvement in the airline and the airline was paid at the 
normal commercial charter rate (approximately S127,700). The 
airline personel were also unwitting of the cargo they carried. 

In January, we learned that the Israelis, responding to urgent 
entreaties from the Iranians, ha^ used the proprietary aircraft 
to transport 18 HAWK missiles to Iran in an effort to improve the 
static air defenses around Tehran. Our belated awareness that 
the Israeli's had delivered HAWK missiles raised serious U.S. 
concerns that these deliveries were jeopardizing our objective of 
arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian officials. As 
a consequence of U.S. initiative and by mutual agreement of all 
three parties, these missiles were returned to Israel in Februarv 
1986. 

On December 7, the President convened a meeting in the White 
House (residence) to discuss next steps in our efforts to 
establish direct contact with the Iranians. Attending the 



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UNGUkSSinED 



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N 30369 

meeting were the Chief of Staff, Secretaries of State and 
Defense, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his 
Deputy. Immediately after the meeting, Mr. McFarlane departed 
for London to meet with the Israeli official and the Iranian 
contact to make clear the nature of our interest in a dialogue 
with Iran. At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane, as instructed by the 
President, stated that: 

the U.S. was open to a political dialogue with Iran, but 
that no such dialogue could make progress for as long as 
groups seen as dominated by Iran held U.S. hostages; and 

the U.S. could under no circumstances transfer arms to Iran 
in exchange for hostages. 

These points were made directly to the Iranian interlocutor. The 
Iranian replied that, unless his associates in Tehran were 
strengthened, they could not risk going ahead with the dialogue. 
Mr. McFarlane acknowledged the position but stated we could not 
change our position. In a separate meeting with the Israeli 
official, Mr. McFarlane made clear our strong objections to 
Israeli weapons shipments to Iran. Following these meetings, 
Mr. McFarlane returned to Washington and shortly thereafter left 
active government service. 

On January 2, the Prime Minister of Israel dispatched a special 
emissary to the U.S. (Amiram Nir) to review proposals for next 
steps in dealing with Iran. The Israelis urged that we reconsider 
the issue of providing limited defensive arms to those attempting 
to take power in Tehran, since all other incentives (economic 
assistance, medical supplies, machine parts) were of no value in 
shoring-up those who wanted an opening to the West. Admiral 
Poindexter noted our stringent objections to the HAWK missile 
shipments in November and noted that the U.S. would have to act 
to have them returned (a step undertaken in February, when all 
18 missiles were returned to Israel) . In that any implementation 
of the Israeli proposals would require the active participation 
of the intelligence community, the NSC Staff (North) was tasked 
to prepare a covert action finding. Work on this Presidential 
finding commenced on January 4. 

On January 6, the President, the Vice President, the Chief of 
Staff, and the National Security Advisor and his assistant 
reviewed the first draft of the Finding and the recommendations 
made by the Prime Minister of Israel through his special 
emissary. 

On January 7, the President met in the Oval Office with the Vice 
President, the Chief of Staff, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, 
Attorney General Meese, Director Cjisey^ ^d the National Security 

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UNCLASSIFIED 



N 30370 

Advisor to discuss the overall situation in Iran and prospects 
for a strategic dialogue. It was again noted that Mr. McFarlane, 
on retum-£^rom his trip to London, had recommended that no 
further action be taken unless a mechanism could be established 
by which the U.S. could exert better control over events. He 
agreed, in principle, with Director Casey that providing limited 
quantities of defensive arms after the hostages were released 
still had merit. Both Secr*tary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger 
objected to any provision of arms, citing that we could not be 
sure that these would really help moderate elements and that, if 
exposed, the project would not be understood by moderate Arabs 
and would be seen as contravening our policy of not dealing with 
states that support terrorism. The President decided that we 
should attempt to )ceep the Israeli channel active as long as it 
offered possibilities for meetings with high-level Iranian 
officials and left open the issue of providing defensive arms to 
Iran if all the hostages were released. 

It was further determined by the President that any dialogue with 
the Iranians must be aimed at achieving the following goals: 

Devising a formula for re-establishing a strategic 
relationship with Tehran. 

Ending the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms. 

Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and 
radical subversion. 

Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and 
coordinating ways in which we might counter Soviet 
activities in the region. 

The President made clear that a Western dialogue with Iran would 
be precluded unless Iran were willing to use its influence to 
achieve the release of Western hostages in Beirut. He also made 
clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms for 
hostages. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger retained their 
original position on providing any arars to Iran, but Attorney 
General Meese and Director Casey both supported the concept as a 
valid means of opening the dialogue. Attorney General Meese 
noted a 1981 determination by then Attorney General French Smith 
that transferring small quantities of arms through third 
countries under a Covert Action Finding was not illegal. 



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N 30371 



On January 16, a meeting was held in the National Security 
Advisor's office with Secretary Weinberger, Attorney General 
Meese, Director Casey, and CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin. 
At this meeting, the final draft of the Covert Action Finding was 
reviewed and was forwarded to the President with Secretary 
Weinberger dissenting. 

On January 17, 1986, the President approved a Covert Action 
Finding (Tab A) directing that the intelligence community proceed 
with special activities aimed at accomplishing the goals set 
forth above. The President futher determined that the activities 
authorized by the Finding justified withholding prior Congressional 
notification due to the extreme sensitivity of the dialogue being 
established. He further noted that public knowledge of the 
program would place the Americiui hostages in Lebanon at greater 
risk. Noting his concern for the lives of those carrying out the 
operation (both U.S. and foreign), he directed that the Director 
of Central Intelligence refrain from reporting the Finding to the 
appropriate committees of the Congress until reasonably sure that 
those involved would no longer be in jeopardy. 

On February 5-7, U.S. officials (NSC and ClA 
representative of the Israeli Prime Minist i 
senior-level Iranian official! 




I met in London. At this meeting, tn« Iranians agrc 
:he USG would provide defensive weapons (TOWs) to Iran, 
they would, in turn, provide same to the Afghan Mujahideen. The 
U.S. side agreed to explore this possibility and, working with 
the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of 
the weapons: 

The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit funds 
in an Israeli account. 

The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.- 
controlled account in an overseas bank. 

Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain materiel 
authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and 
transport this to Israel for onward movement to Iran. 

Using the procedures stipulated above, S3. 7 million was deposited 
in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on 
February 14, 1,000 TOWs were transported to Israel for pre-position- 
ing. These TOWs were transferred by CIA from DOG (U, 
jton, Alabama) and transoorte^throug^ 
[using standard CIA-OOD IHIHHP logistics 
ffangements";" Policy-level coordination for these arrangements 
was effected by NSC (North) with DOD (Armitage) and CIA (Clair 
George). The TOWs were placed in a covert Israeli facility 
awaiting onward shipment. 

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n 30372 



On r«bru»ry^ 19-21, U.S. (NSC and CIA), Israeli and Iranian 
officials mat in G«nnany to discuss problems in arranging a 
meeting among high er2igaftI_of f icials . At ..this_.meet_ing..__thii 

^BB^HiHBlHIBHH^HHHH^'^^^^°^*^^uthorTzation 

'wa.a receivea rrom wasnington, cne u.s. side agreed to provide 
1,000 TOWS to Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This 
delivery was conanenced on the morning of February 20 and completed 
in two transits to Tehran on February 21. Transportation from 
Israel to Iran was aboard a false flag Israeli aircraft. On ••'• - 
return flight from Iran, these aircraft carried the 18 HAWIc 
missiles which Israel had sent to Tehran in November 1985 wit 
USG aforeknow ledge. 




On February 24, U.S. (CIA and NSC) officials met again in 
Frankfurt with the Israeli and Iranian officials to discuss n 
steps. At this meeting, the U.S. side urged that the Iranian 
expedite a meeting among higher-level officials on both sides 

On February 28, the Prime Minister of Israel wrote to Preside 
Reagan (Tab B) urging continued efforts to achieve a strategi 
breakthrough with Iran, but asking consideration for the safe 
of recently seized Israeli hostages. 

On March 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives me 
with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether a 
further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level 
meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, 
the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation 
in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military 
effectiveness. 

The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 
strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the 
Iranians urged the intermediary (Ghorbanifar) to accelerate the 
effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate 
advised us through the Israeli point-of-contact that the 
leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue 



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kiNCtASSIFIEU 



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' '" "" ■ ■" 30373 



r 



with th« -6nit«d States along the lines of our established goals. 



— U ~ 
On May 6, 7, 1986, U.S. and Israeli officers met in London with 
the Iranian intennediary in which he urged that we take ismediat 
steps to arrange for a high-level U.S. /Iranian meeting in Tehran 
During the London meeting, the Iranian urged that we (O.S. and 
Israel) act urgently to help with Iranian air defense. He 
emphasized that the Iraqi Air Force was increasingly effective c 
late and that the Iranians were desperate to stop attacks on 
population centers. The Israelis also used this opportunity to 
privately ask the U.S. to replace the 508 TOWs which they had 
sent to Iran in August, 1985. 

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face witl 
top-level Iranian officials, on May 15, the President author ize< 
a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor 
McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, CIA communicators, 
members of the NSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocu- 
tors. The Israelis were informed via coded message on Hay 15 
that the U.S. had agreed to the Iranian request for limited 
anti-air defense equipment and to replenish the 508 TOWs sent by 
Israel. 



On May 16, the Iranians, through the Israelis provided S6.5M for 
deposit in the CIA secure funding mechanism. The funds were used 
to acquire 508 TOW missiles (for replenishing the TOWs Israel 
shipped in September 1985) and acquiring HAWK missile^^^ctronic 

Warts. This material was subsequently moved ta|^^m|||| 
repackaged and shipped to Kelly AFB for onward movement to 
'on May 22. As in the February shipment, the CIA provided 
logistics support for the movement of this materiel to Israel. 

In order to ensure operational security, the McFarlane trip was 
made from Israel, coincident with the delivery of a pallet of 
spare parts for Iranian defensive weapon_s _3vs^tems (HAWK spare 

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li 30374 

electronic parts) . At the SDaaificrequest of th- Tr. • 

alias foreign documentation ■■■■■■L\;^Z • ^^ Iranians, 

was used. C?A alS proviJSd^iPt^anscortatifr" '^* "^ " 

CONUS to Israel for ?he McFarU^r^rty?'^?he groSp'w^^" '"°"' 

transported from Israel to Tah.-«n Tk^^Ij ^ "S^^oup was 

with false flag mar"ngs? ""^ *" ^""^^ ^^^ ^°^« "O^ 

In the course of the four-rfau «M>ir ?« ■>a\ ■ -^ 

Sg^Jh^-s-^^^^^^^ 

" fr?^ ^Se'SdSrEas'ir ^P^^""^ ^'^^^ '"-^^ to expel us 

that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism; 
"" reverse -J^^^^^^ '^^^^ revolution and did not seek to 

poUcrL''ti ;""*Lfhf„nn''*M-^'"'"*'"*"^^ involving regional 
policies (I.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but micht also 

c'f^ t"" °^ =°'™°n interest (i.e., Afghanistan !nd ?he 
Soviet threat to the Gulf) through dialogue. 

During these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail 
the obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between 
5clarI!ne°eSo^as!;.d'^^,*'"''r'°" "? the%oints noted abo':? Mr 
involvement in ^h!h«^^* political problems caused by Iranian 
[j^r »™hT!^ „^ hostage issue. The Iranians obiected to the 

cont!Sed'?SG"b?oc);ina'o5'T^ '"^P''" ""''^'"^ P^^^ ^°^ P^- ^^- 
concinuea LSG bloclcing of Iranian assets in the U.S., even aft^r 

U.S. courts had ruled in their favor. During the cour« of ^n!L 
T^Vt^V'.^''^ '"""" Officials admitted tia? tSey "oJld not w!n 
"S^.Tt^; ^"^ ""! ^" * dilemma in Tehran over how-to end t°l 
^nnfi K ^'^^? 5^^ "^^'^ to present an Iranian "victory" before it 
laSdL Hu^^'^'''^^*'- l""^^ emphasized that the origlSIl aggresJor! 
Saddam Hussein, must be removed from power in order for the wir 



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to end. Mr. McFarlane concluded the visit by summarizing that 
notwithstanding Iranian interest in carrying on with the dialogue, 
we could not proceed with further discussions in light of their 
unwillingness to exert the full weight of their influence to 
cause the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon. 

On June 10, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made 
guarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with 
the U.S. On July 26, Father Lawrence Jenco was released in the 
Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint. 

On August 3, the remaining three pallets (less than \ planeload) 
of electronic parts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses (HAWK 
missile sub-components) arrived in Tehran. As in all flights 
to/ from Iran this delivery was made with an Israeli Air Force 
aircraft (707) using false flag markings. Timing of the delivery 
was based on coordination among U.S., Israeli and Iranian 
officials. 

In early August 1986, the contact with the Iranian expatriate 
began to focus exclusively on the willingness of the USG to 
provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for hostages and 
we sought to establish different channels of communication which 
would lead us more directly to pragmatic and moderate elements in 
the Iranian hierarachy. In mid-August, a private American 
citizen (MGEN Richard Secord, USAF [Ret.]) acting within the 
purview of 
Europe with 
senior Irani 
CIA, this Iranian ^ 
detailed discussions 



ict in 

:of a 

Snjani) . with the assistance of the 
fwas brought covertly to Washington for 
We judged this effort to be useful in 
establishing contact with a close confidant of the man judged to 
be the most influential and pragmatic political figure in Iran 
(Rafsanjani). These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives 
of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. We also 
provided assessments designed to discourage an Iranian offensive 
and contribute to am Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the 
war. The assessments also detailed the Soviet threat to Iran. 

Through August, September, and October 1986, numerous additional 
meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the 
new Iranian contacts. During the October 26, 1986 meeting in 
Frankfurt, Germany, the U.S. side, as in the past, insisted that 
the release of the hostages was a pre-requisite to any progress. 
The Iranian , 'HiH^^^B^^ urged th at we take a moi 
resii 





316 



•TOP SECRET 



DKOUSSIfe 



iJ 30376 



Th« Iranian* also proff«r|^^n^th«U . S . accepted, the offer of 
a Soviet T-72 tanJc^|m|^|HIHH||^^ The have also 

offered to provide a copy ortne*OT^lge interrogation of Beirut 
Station Chief William Buckley. At this meeting, Ali stated that 
there was a "very good chance that another American or two would 
be freed soon." On October 29, with U.S. acquiscence, Israel 
provided Iran with an additional increment of defensive weapons 
(500 TOW missiles) . 

Late on 31,|^^^m^H^^^^called the 
(HaJcim) tasked to maintain contact and advised that Iran had 
"exercised its influence with the Lebanese" in order to obtain 
the release of an American — David Jacobsen — and an uncertain 
number of French hostages. Re further noted that this would be 
part of the purpose of the Iranian Foreign Minister's vi«it_ 
Syria — an event we became aware of on November 1, 1986. 
stated that the situation in Tehran, »• f n »« Tr^^j^ <»i 
ovet Hizballah we re b oth deteriorating 



iXl^Rce 




ravi 

2, David Jacobsen was released by his captors near "Eha old 
American Embassy compound in West Beirut. The U.S. Onbassy in 
East Beirut immediately dispatched an embassy officer to West 
Beirut to pick up Mr. Jacobsen. 

It is now apparent that persistent U.S. efforts to establish 
contact with Iran and subsequent public speculation regarding 
these contacts have probably exacerbated the power struggle in 
Iran between pragmatic elements (led by Rafsanjani) and more 
radical factions (under the overall sponsorship of Ayatollah 
Montazeri) . In late October, radical supporters (of Montazeri) 
revealed the (Rafsanjani) contact with the USG and the terms of 
the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of 
colluding with the USG and to preserve a degree of latitude for 
both parties, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani provided a purposely 
distorted version of the May 1986 McFarlane mission in his 
November 4 address to the masses. Moderate Iranian political 
leaders apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal 
political problems before proceeding with the U.S. relationship. 
The revelations in Tehran regarding the McFarlane mission are 
demonstrable evidence of the internal power struggle. The 
October 1986 arrest of radical leader Mehdi Hashemi, a close 
confidant and son in-law of Ayatollah Montezari, for acts of 
terrorism and treason has caused further internal conflict. 

Resolution of the Lebanon hostage situation is also complicated 
by waning Iranian influence in Lebanon due in part to financial 
constraints and the fact that the Libyans are expanding their 



TOP SECRET 



UNCUWED 



TOP SECRET 



JL30377 



On November 7, the day after a meeting with U.S. officials, 
Iranian government authorities arrested six other individuals 
involved in radical activities. Among the two were senior 
military officers and a Majlis deputy (Ahmad Kashani) , the 
grandson of Ayatollah Kashani, a conspirator in the 1949 attempt 
against the Shah. 

Despite these internal difficulties and attendant publicity in 
the Western media, the Iranians continue to maintain direct 
contact with the USG and met again iii_2sneya on Nov« 




statement" will be 



made m the near future by Rafsanjani. 



Bo tA^HH|m^^^^have warned' that furtTTer 
disclosures could ha^^tne^personally and the longer-term 
interests of the two countries. 

It is important to note that since the initiation of the USG 
contact with Iran there has been no evidence of Iranian govern- 
ment complicity in acts of terrorism against the U.S. We do not 
know who seized the last three American hostages in Beirut 
(Messrs. Reed, Cicippio, and Tracy). The Islamic Jihad 
Organization (IJO) has 



:t is possible that these three 

Americans were kidnapped at the direction of Iranian radicals 



TOP SECRET 



\iHa»ssw 



318 



. TOP SECRET 

M 30378 

loyal to the now imprisoned Mehdi Hashemi. If so, this could be 
an effort to undermine the nascent U.S. -Iranian strategic 
dialogue and exacerbate the internal Iranian power struggle 
against the pragmatic faction with which we have been in contact. 

Throughout this process, the USG has acted within the limits of 
established policy and in compliance with all U.S. law. The 
shipment of 2,008 U.S. TOWs and 235 HAWK missile electronic spare 
parts was undertaken within the provisions of a Covert Action 
Finding. 

During the course of this operation — and before — the U.S. was 
cognizant of only three shipments from Israel to Iran. 
Specifically: 

The Israelis acknowledged the August 1985 shipment of 508 
TOWs after it had taken place. Until we were advised by the 
Israelis, and had the information subsequently confirmed by 
Iraniem authorities, we were unaware of the composition of 
the shipment. We subsequently agreed to replace these TOWs 
in May of 1986. 

The November 1985 shipment of 18 Israeli HAWK missiles was : 
not an authorized exception to policy. This shipment was 
retrieved in February 1986 as a consequence of U.S. 
intervention. 

The October 1986 shipment of 500 TOWs from Israel to Iran 
was undertaken with U.S. acquiescence. These TOWs were 
replaced on November 7. 

In support of this Finding and at the direction of the President, 
the CIA provided the following operational assistance: 

CIA communications officers and an annuitant to assist in 
various phases of the operation. 

Sterile overseas bank accounts for financial transactions. 

A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S. 
military items from the U.S. 

Transhipment of military items from the U.S. to Israel. 

Communications and intelligence support for the meetings 
with Iranian officials and the McFarlane trip to Tehran in 
May. 



TOP SECRET 



uNcussra 



319 



UNCLASSIFIED 



TOP SECRET 



Cleared meeting sites in Europe for meetings with VTi^m79 
officials. 

Fabricated and alias documentation for U.S. and foreign 
officials for meetings in Europe and Tehran. 

The weapons and materLrfl provided under this program were judged 
to be inadequate to aiter either the balance of military power or 
the outcome of the war with Iraq. They have, however, demonstrated 
the U.S. commitment to Iranian territorial integrity and served 
to support those in Iran interested in opening a strategic 
relationship with the U.S. U.S. efforts over the last 18 months 
have had tangible results on Iranian policy: 

— ^The Rafs anjani/ Velayati i ntervention on behalf of the TWA 
#847 pa«engeis IJune l!*a5) . 

Iranian direction that the hijacked Pan Am #73 would not be 
received in Iranian territory if it left Karachi. 




The release of three 
hostages. 



at least two French 



The initiation of an Iranian dialogue with their regional 
neighbors. 

Continued delay in the Iranian "final offensive." 

Finally, it mu«t al«o be noted that the U.S. arms embargo 
notwithstanding. West European nations have provided $500 million 
a year in military equipment to Iran. Most of these transfers 
were accomplished with government Icnowledge and/or acquiescence. 

All appropriate Cabinet Officers have been apprised throughout. 
The Congress was not briefed on the covert action Finding due to 
the extraordinary sensitivity of our Iranian contacts and the 
potential consequences for our strategic position in Sout.hwest 
Asia. Finally, our efforts to achieve the release of the 
hostages in Lebanon must continue to rely on discreet contacts 
and intermediaries who cannot perform if they are revealed. 



TOP SECRET 



UNCLASSIFIED 



320 



yNCLASSIFII 



Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of 
The Foreign Asaiatance Act at 1961 
^_ A3 Amended, Concerning Operations 
Undertaken by the Central Intelligence , , 
Agency in Foreign Countries. Other Than '• -J 3 8 
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose 
of Intelligence Collection 

I hereby find that the follov.'ing operation in a foreign 
country (including all support necessary to such operation) is 
important to the national security of the United States, and due 
to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is 
essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of 
Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to 
the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security 
Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct. 

SCOPE DESCRIPTION 

Iran Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services, 
third countries and third parties which have 
established relationships with Iranian elements, 
groups, and individuals sympathetic to O.S. Government 
interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist 
actions directed against U.S. persons, property or 
interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more 
moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them 
significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to 
determine the current Iranian Government's intentions 
with respect to its neighbors and with respect to 
terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the 
American hostages held in Beirut and preventing 
additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide 
funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training, 
guidance and communications and other necessary 
assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, 
liaison services and third countries in support of 
these activities. 

The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties 
and third countries to establish contact with moderate 
elements within and outside the Government of Iran by 
providing these elements with arms, equipment and 
related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of 
these elements in their effort to achieve a more 
pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their 
ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their 
country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet 
Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. 
Government learns that these elements have abandoned 
their goals of moderating their government and 
appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that 
provided by tj^is Finding ._ 

The White House -- ,1 OGCR TS 0801-86 

Washington, D.C. X.'---^V. '■ ' ;j^>^^^^opy 1 

■■■ " ■■' iteifiE 




321 



N 3038/ - 
A/26S82 

ENTIReTH 



82-690 0-88-12 



322 






3 9971 



Testimony of Mr. Richard L. Armltage, 

fv«l IV, Social Security Number 

Assistant Secretary of Defense 

[nternatlonal Security Affairs), Office of the 
Sec retary of D efense. Washington, DC 20310, 
Ph: ^■■■mtaken at Room «E808. Pentagon, 
on zH becenber 1986 from 0937 to 1016, by 
COL Ned Bacheldor and COL Janes Morton. 




Partially Oeclassilied/Relessed on 11^6^8 % 

_^« ^ .««* undei provisions oi E 1'3-i6 

COL MORTON: It Is now 0937. 2« December 1986. by K Johnson, National Secmc/ Co.nc,i 

The persons present are: 

The witness, Mr. Artnltage; the Investigating officers. 
Colonel Morton and Colonel Bacheldor. 

We are located In room OESOS In the Pentagon. 

This Is an official Investigation concerning the sale and/or 
transfer of missiles, spare parts and other related equipment to 
selected Middle Eastern countries. It Is being conducted at the 
direction of The Secretary of the Army. 

Sir our report will be classified Secret] 

MR. ARMITACE: I understand. 

COL MORTON: I want to explain to you a unique aspect of 
Inspector General activities. An Inspector General is a 
confidential investigator and fact finder for the commander 
Information obtained in a report prepared by the Inspector 
General »rt for the use of the directing authority or hlghe 
authority as they deem appropriate. Testimony which you gl 
be used In the Department of the Army for official purposes 
is Department of the Army policy to keep such Information a 
reports on a closely held basis. However, In some Instance 
there may be public disclosure of Inspector General materia 
required by law and regulations. Normally, however any rel 
outside the Department of the Array requires the approval of 
Inspector General and In such cases release when unavoldabl 
be kept to the minimum necessary. 

Upon completion of the Interview I will ask you whether you 
consent to the release of your testimony to requests from members 
of the public. Your lack of consent does not mean that your 
testimony will not be released If it Is required by law. 
However, no release will be made until the office of The 



ve can 

. It 
nd 



1 as 
ease 
The 
e win 



Exhibit 17 



iwsm' 



(ARMITACE) 



323 



■*4ssfe 



IREO 

testimony to determine 



Inspector General has reviewed yoi 
release Is required. 

Any questions sir? 

COL MORTON: Shaking head no. 

MR. ARMITAGE: No. 

COL MORTON: During the course of this Interview you will be 
asked to furnish personal Information. The Privacy Act since 
1971 requires that when you are asked to furnish personal 
information you be Informed of the authority for that and other 
required Information. The statement I handed you earlier serves 
that purpose. Sir, have you read and do you understand the 
Privacy Act of ^9T^^ 

MR. ARMITAGE: I understand It, and I have read It. 

COL MORTON: Very good. Tour testlaony will be recorded and may 
b-« transcribed so that an accurate record can be made available 
to the directing authority. 

You are not suspected of any offense under federal code, nor 
are you the subject of any prejudicial Information, nor an 
offense under local law. However, I am not advising you of the 
rights of which such a person Is entitled. If you do become a 
suspect for any reason during our Interview, I will tell that you 
are a suspect and infora you of your rights. However, I would 
like to advise that you do not have to answer any questions, the 
answer to which may tend to Incriminate you. Any questions, sir? 

HR. ARMITAGE: I have no questions. 

COL MORTON: Would you please rise so I aay swear you in? 

(The witness, Mr. Richard L. Armitage, was duly sworn.) 

COL MORTON: Please be stated. 

BT COL MORTON: 

Q. Sir, please state your full name and grade. 

A. Richard Lee Armitage, Executive Level Four, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. 



9972 



And Social Security Number? 



Blf COL BACHELDOR: 



Exhibit 17 



IWSlASSffi- 



(ARMITAGE ) 



324 



BNCMSStfe 



9973 



Q. Sir, could you start by giving us a general description 
of what you know about the Incident on the missile transfer or 
Hawk repair parts transfer? 




COL MORTON: Back on tape, sir. 
went back in the July time frain< 



You were talking about the reply 



MR. ARMITACE: Yea, yea. Roughly July 
Mr. McFarlane over the Secretary's slgnatur 
uh, about this until late November. I was 
Middle East, Pakistan I believe. Came back 
discussions with ny State friends. We were 
transfers to--to uh, Iran, possibly from Is 
no confirmed Intelligence, but speculation 
believe that the Secretary of Defense had 1 
(portion of text deleted) tha 

that some people In the White House had bee 
Iranians. Armed with that suspicion of the 
around the admlnlstriitlon and finally got t 
Ollle North, and asked him If he knew anyth 
admitted to me that'he had been meeting wit 
I expressed to him my surprise at this, and 
boss, the Secretary, would be horrified at 
personal view that Ollle was way out on a 1 
get uh. all the urn uh President's advisors 
figure out who's doing what to whom. I don 
an eventual meeting In December or not, but 
around December 7th, Saturday December 7th, 



sent the reply back to 
e and heard no more., 
on travel In the 
and I had several 
seeing rumors of arms 
rael. I say rumors, 
on It. Also, I 
ndlcated that 
t he was suspicious 
n dealing with 

Secretary, I nosed 
o Lieutenant Colonel 
Ing about It, and he 
h Iranians In Europe. 

said to hla that my 
this news, and my own 
irab and we'd better 
In the same room and 
't know If that caused 
for whatever reason 
there was a meeting 



Exhibit 17 



flNWSIflEIT' 



(ARMITACE) 



325 



WMSSIflEfl 



D 9974 



held with the President and I know for sure that my boss and 
Secpetary Shulti were there and I can't say 0*ef Inl 1 1 vely who else 
was there. But at that time aras for Iran were discussed. The 
Secretary caa« back and basically Indicated that he thought that 
the baby had been strangled In the cradle. In other words this 
idea was goinc nowhere. I heard nothing until Dec - January. In 
•arly January, again approximately the 7th of January, there was 
another aeetlng-- with the President. The Secretary of State and 
the -Secretary of Defense were there. The uh Attorney General was 
there, I believe the Vice President was there and Mr. Polndexter 
was there. I can't say who else. In which the arms to Iran Idea 
was discussed ags n, and Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger were 
adamantly opposed, and I can only assume were eloquent in their 
opposition for all sorts of reasons, to Include legalities. I 
know the Secretary of Defense waa very suspicious that this alght 
not be legal. Uh, he came back from the meeting and did not 
Indicate, the Secretary came back from the meeting and did not 
Indicate that any decision had been made. I believe It's correct 
to say that he came away from that meeting thinking no decision 
had been reached. ..Some time in approximately late January, 
.'.Colin Powell, however. Informed me that he had been instructed 
by the Secretary to move, ..have the Army move, weapons under an 
Economy Act transfer, to the CIA, so it was clear to me at that 
time that a decision had been reached sometime after the January 
7th meeting and that it had gone against the Defense Department's 
point of view. And that is we were now to supply these weapons. 
All General Powell told me, as I remember, is that he was doing 
this as a courtesy and because he had the Secretary's permission 
to let me know that basically our policy advice had been 
overridden. And he informed ne the Secretary told him to prepare 
the Basic TOWs, have the Army prepare Basic TOWs for shipment to 
the CIA, and his, the only two points he made to me about It was 
that he did talk to General Thurman ..and that he uh, the 
Secretary uh, was not, was very unhappy, ..with this development, 
but the Secretary had said that an Economy Act transferred to the 
CIA, and, my words, but the thrust was that the department was to 
lose no money on the sale, that's my words. 

COL MORTON: Did he give you numbers sir? 

MR. ARMITACE: I know the numbers now. I can't remember that he 
gave me the numbers. Uh , I can't remember that, but I know he 
told me weapons. And I can't remember If he said radars or not. 
I know now (COL MORTON: Sure.) uh, I must say just for the 
record, some of these events are over a year and half old so my 
memory is a little hazy, and then in preparation for testimony 
over the last four or five weeks I've become a lot smarter on 
this issue than I ever thought, so occasionally my remembrance 
might run together with what 1 know, you know after the public uh 
announcement . 



COL BACHELDOR: It was alleged in the, In 
discussed numbers of weapons, of monies a\ 
throughout the fall 



imm: 



falls, that NSC had 
allable possibly uh 
forth. 



(AR.MITAGE ) 



■IINMlflEff- 



i3 9975 



MR. ARHITACEr I have-- 

COL BACHELOOR: Were you aware of any of that sir? 

HR. ARHITAGE: Well I aa from subsequent discussions that General 
Powell said he had discussions about numbers and weapons to ae, 
and !'■ aware of this subsequent to public revelations. I wasn't 
awa'ce of it at the tiae. There was one discussion — and I want 
to say Noveaber or Deceaber, but I was gone and General Powell 
had to get soae pricing infornation fron DSAA and I think was the 
HAWK aisslles and the Defense Security Assistance Agency gave hln 
the inforaation on HAWK aissiles, and when I cane back DSAA had 
made ne aware that they had provided to General Powell soae 
inforaation on HAWK aissiles. My best remembrance is 
Noveaber/Deceaber 85 on that. 

COL MORTON: Earlier sir, I believe you said the COL, General 
Powell said the Secretary directed hia to ship Basic TOWa. 

MR. ARMITACE: That's what I said. 



COL MORTON: Okay, 
of TOW then. 



It was the Secretary's decision on the type 



HR. ARMITAGE: Uh--well that's how I remember it (COL HORTON- 
right sir) that the Secretary said we're going to go Basic TOWs 
whether he said vanilla TOWs or Basic TOWs, I don't know. The 
Secretary told ae now subsequent to all this, in the last several 
aonths, he told ae that, when I asked hia in preparation for 
testimony, who told hia to do it, he said well it was the 
President. Whether It was the President through Poindexter, or 
the President himself, I don't know, but that's what the 
Secretary told me. Uh , whether General Powell said to me TOWs or 
basic TOWs— it wouldn't have nade any difference to me (COL 
MORTON-yes Sir) because any weapons was, you know we lost our 
virginity, I was appalled at It all. 

COL MORTON: But to your best recollections you knew of no 
specific number nor a dollar amount available. 

MR. ARMITAGE: No. My, I know I — I have a specific 
recollection of item. 1 know nothing about dollar amounts. And 
I don't think that I know specific amounts of missiles though 
General Powell might have told me. He's a very thorough man. He 
probably did, but it didn't mean anything. 

COL BACHELDOR; Based on your current position or any position 
you've her, held sir, would you have any idea what a TOW would 
cost or aight cost. 



MR. ARHITAGE: I know what a TOW is and I've seen ' ea in combat, 
uh so I know exactly what it is. I have no idea what it costs. 
In fact, had never had a discussion of money involving this issue 



■mmm 



(ARMITAGE) 



327 



JNCLASSIFIEO.. 



D 9976 

nyseir. Involving this Issue, other than the discussions I had 
with people lUe LTC Arobrlght and all »a I prepared for 
testimony and I had to learn what we paid. 

0, General Powell mentioned uh that he In fact tasked the 
Army, and aa you stated to talk to General Thurnan. Old he at 
any tine talk about any other tasking or any other discussions 
with you--agaln I can give you a name. General Russo was the Aray 
point of contact. 

A. He, yes, he told me, now this Is after the fact, he's 
told ne that he's had many discussions with General Russo about 
uh the TOW shipments. He said he had many many conversations 
with Russo. Now I learned that subsequent. 



COL MORTOH: 
subject. 



Was the subject the price sir or do you know the 



A. I, I can't say the subject. It was about the shipment 
and about the transfer but whether it was price, he has told now. 
General Powell told me more recently in the last month or so that 
he was quite sure that General Russo would have a clear 
remembrance that Powell had said don't lose any money on the 
deal. Uh, now that, but I've learned all that in the last month 
or so. Month and a half. 

COL BACHELDOR: In any of your discussions with General Powell 

would you have, uh, determined the feeling that the Army was 

having difficulty tstabliahing a price or maybe being inept. Or 
have you. . ? 

A. No, I, I got none of that. It was never Indicated to me. 
And other than the conversation along the lines that basically 
the policy decision went against us and uh, we're gonna provide 
these weapons to the CIA and eventually In some manner they're 
gonna go to Iran. Uh , I wasn't involved. And sporadically 
during the year I heard either from Vice Admiral Jones or Mr. 
Taft that there were other shipments. But I think this Is 
probably the only discussion I had with General Powell. 

Q. You mentioned one discussion with uh. Colonel North. 
Did you ever again discuss this issue with Colonel North. 

A. I discussed this Issue with Colonel North on numerable 
occasions, in that, when I say this situation, or discuss this 
issue, arms to Iran and hostages. I felt that it was Impossible 
to distinguish to the public, or indeed in my mind where we were 
selling arms to Iran for strategic dialogue or for hostages. I 
thought it was anathema, and I told Ollie every time that I had 
an opportunity privately, that I thought that this was a bad bad 
policy and It was bad business and we ought to be out of It. 
(COL BACHELDOR-Alrlght sir.) I never did talk to Ollie, in my 
recollection about pricing or anything, and I know that I never 
had a conversation with anyone in the Army about this until I 



Exhibit 17 



■Mommi- 



(ARMITACE ) 



328 



started talking w 
for my testimony, 




Lieutenant Co lonel~intibr Igh t , 
ice things were made public. 



9977 



In preparation 



Q. Sir, what do you know, in general, about the requirement 
Tor a government agency to notify Congress if the aroa are 
provided to — in the intelligence arena. 

A. My understanding was that the receiving agency had to 
notify and that's all I know. I know what would happen under the 
Aras Export Control Act if we made a foreign military sale. And 
those notifications, uh I was concerned about an arms embargo to 
Iran, uh, I expressed those concerns to the Secretary and indeed 
I'm under the impression that he expressed those concerns to the 
President. But regarding an intelligence transfer, I was under 
the impression that any notifications had to come from the 
receiving U.S. government agency. Because they were the ones 
that ultimately would make the transfer. 

Q. Were you aware at the time of a dollar threshold? 

A. No. Uh, though I am aware of a dollar threshold on the 
Arms Export Control Act. regarding Foreign Military Sales. I was 
not and am not now aware of a dollar threshold of a for a covert 
program. 



Q. What Is the arms uh what is the dollar threshol 
roughly sir? 



d for 



A. I think Its roughly fourteen ■lllion for a 
Itea or fifty million per sale. A bunch. 



ijor enc 



Q. Are you aware of any discussion of between the Army and 
DOD reference notification of Congress. And more specifically, 
I'll tell you there is (MR. ARMITAGE - Yes.) a one million dollar 
notification requirement. 

A. Fine, one million? (COL BACHELDOR - Yes sir) I was not 
aware of that, but I have in conversations with General Powell... 
subsequent to this thing becoming public, plus ray own preparation 
and looking at Army materials, aware that the General Counsel of 
the Array had some reservations. And had expressed these. 
General Powell, in Frankfurt, one of my trips to Frankfurt, when 
we were discussing this issue recently, told me that he remembers 
receiving from the Army, and he wasn't sure who, the memo that 
had some concerns, and that he fired that over to John 
Poindexter. And this is what General Powell told me probably six 
weeks ago. I, in going through Army material, reviewed a Susan 
Crawford memo, it was a one page memo I think to the Secretary of 
the Army, and I had that sent down to General Powell in General 
Doctor's office the other day. I said is this the one (COL 
MORTOM - Yes sir, we got that) -- Is that the one by the way? 

COL BACHELDOR: No sir it is not. According to General Powell. 
I've talked to General Brown and he is again looking uh and 



Exhibit 17 



Mmm» 



(ARMITAGE) 



"l/NWSIflED" 



D 997 



General Powell has said (MR. ARMITAGE - I can't believe the Army 
doesn't have a copy somewhere. I know the U.S. Array.) Hell 
we're at a loss too sir. Uh and we're looking hard. General 
Powell Is going to try to help us after the thirty-first (MR. 
ARMITAGE - Oh, I'm sure he will). Sir, urn did you talk to anyone 
In the CIA reference this matter? 



■IBS to 


ling 


Sub- 


ire 


id 


he 


were 


lade. . ) 


. of 



MR. ARMITAGE: Reference arns (COL BACHELDOR - Reference ar 
IrM, sir) I talked uh, no prior, prior to the decision be 
made. In the Terrorist Incident Working Croup, Operational 
group, that's called the OSG of the T-WIG, which I sit, the 
have been general discussions with Dewey Clarldge. I've ha 
general discussions about how we, the Department, meaning t 
Secretary did not like this policy of arms to Iran. Those 
the only. ..(COL MORTOM - That was before the decision was m 
Mo after. (COL MORTOM - Mr. Clarldge) Yea, Dewey Clarldge 
the CIA. Generally the only, the topic was only that the 
Department didn't like this, thought It was bad business. 

COL BACHELDOR: Tou mentioned that in the suaaer/fall of 85 you 
lieard rumors, maybe even later than fall, but you heard some 
rumors of possible transfers to Iran (HR. ARMITAGE - teal). Were 
you ever able to substantiate those rumors? 

MR. ARMITAGE: Well we were hearing from Arab countries a lot. 
Saying that Israel's selling all kinds of things to Iran. Uh, 
we'd see some intelligence about reports of Israeli shipments. I 
hadn't substantiated It, however in my testimonies recently I 
have had occasion to testify with Mr. Casey and others, and I've 
learned a hell of a lot that we didn't know then, and among the 
things that I've learned Is that apparently TOWs were shipped 
from Israel, as well as HAWK missiles from Israel, to Iran. And 
it is alleged that someone In the U.S. government gave permission 
for these third country transfers. And the Secretary of Defense 
didn't know about it and his Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
ISA didn't know about It and I can assure you the Secretary of 
Defense would have opposeJ it. 



Q. It appears obvious based on your comments, 
didn't know It before, but now do you know what Irar 
for the shipment of TOWs? The first shipment. 



sir, that yoi 
paid Israel 



A. 1 don't know what Iran paid Israel, yet I know what the 
CIA was charged by the Army. This Is what I do know. I do not 
know what Iran actually paid Israel, or If they paid Israel. (COL 
MORTON - The Army ' s ..)( COL BACHELDOR - Sir, I'm referring to..) 

COL BACHELDOR: To set the record straight I'm referring to the 
potential shipment that we're talking about In the fall of 85. 



HR. ARMITAGE: Yea, you're talking about the 508 TOW missiles. I 
heard in testimony on the Hill, I believe Mr. Casey, he indicated 
that there was a shipment In August or September of 85 of 506 TOW 
missiles from Israel. It's the first I've heard of It. I have 
no, I have no knowledc 



Exhibit 



'-teASStflEt' 



RED 



(ARMITAGE ) 



330 




979 



COL BACHELOOflj Our souret sir, for IRft " AT Wr nation Is the, 
the Washlngron Post, but that la the source that I was talking 
about. I Mas talking about that aource, that shipment and any 
possible prlelng. 

Nl. AIMITACE: I learned about that In ay Hill testlaony. Mr. 
Casex. said that, I believe It waa Casey, that there was a 
ah-tpaent... In August or September, September strikes me aa the 
date, of TOW missiles. 

Q. In all of this discussion, preferably prior, but any 
discussion was there any talk about the ultimate recipient, we 
know Iran now, but the ultimate recipient having trouble paying 
for anything that they would get? 

MR. ARHITAGE: I didn't have any discussions like that, and I 
didn't hear it. Occasionally 

(portion of text deleted) 

I'd sec references to uh bitching about money, payments. But, 
and I didn't understand .. the context, and in many cases didn't 
understand (portion of because there were different 
names used text deleted) Things of that nature. 
So, I think I am content to aay I had no idea what was being 
charged for the weapons to Iran, how the procedures of payments 
were being handled, and even the existence of Swiss bank 
acoouots. 

COL HORTON: Tou mentioned earlier sir, you didn't know a 
specific price that we were charging the agency, but did you know 
that there was . . . 

MR. ARMITACE: Mo, I know now of the specific price. Of course I 
did not at the time. 

COL MORTON: But previously? But was there any pressure to keep 
the price down .. that you know of? 



MR. ARMITACE: Not by me. 

Q. Did you know of any such 



■essure : 



A. I didn't know of any. Uh, and I know I was asked on the 
Hill .. was there any pressure from OSD, and I could only repeat 
what I've been told by General Powell and by the Secretary 
subsequently, that is the instructions were Economy Act and don't 
lose money. To the CIA only. Don't have anything to do with 
transferring to another country or another uh middle man or 
agency other than the CIA. 

COL BACHELDOR: Do you have any idea sir, if the Amy knew the 
ultimate destination for the equipment? 



Exhibit 17 



BNCtttlED" 



(ARMITACE) 



331 



WAssm 



DiviJ:' 



HR. AHMITAGE: I am under the very strong Impression that they 
did not know. Impression. Whether the Chief of Staff of the 
Arny, Cenexal Wlckhan, might have eventually known because of a 
discussion he had with Mr. Taft In the April/May time frame I 
can't speak, but the Army as far as the guys who were making the 
• rrangenents , !'■ under the lopresslon they had no Idea where it 
was going. 

•. ■ 0. Did you get Involved at all In the transfer of the, or 
correction, the request for HAWK missile parts. Mr. Taft handled 
that through General Wickham. were you involved at all sir? 

A. No, I was travelling with the Secretary of Defense in 
Asia, and we were Informed about it subsequently. I only found 
out much more recently that Mr. Taft had spoken to General 
Wickham about it. As we were trying to. In a discussion I had 
with Mr. Taft, to determine who knew what in the building, and 
he, Mr, Taft Indicated that he had had a discussion with General 
Wlckhan, so General Wickham knew sonethlng. How much I can't 
say. 

Q. Sir, when we talked to General Powell he specifically 
Indicated, based on his knowledge and timing when he left, that 
it would be important for us, or thought it would be Important 
for us to talk to you and, uh, Admiral Jones. Based on your 
knowledge sir do you think It would b« beneficial for us to talk 
to Mr. Taft. 

A. Tea. uh, I think this is Aray and the Chief of Staff 
apparently had a conversation with Mr. Taft and I think you 
should . 

COL BACHELOOR: Jim I have no other questions. 

COL MORTON: Okay there was one thing....: think we had a glitch 
on these numbers and dates here. 

COL BACHELDOR: Uh , no Jim, I can answer that question. Mr. 
Aroitage and I were discussing missiles shipped from Iran to 
Israel in the fall of 85 (MR. ARMITAGE - no from Israel to Iran) 
(COL MORTON - Israel to Iran) I'm sorry Israel to Iran in fall of 
85. 

COL MORTON: Is it coincidental that the five oh elght(508) is 
the sane number? 

COL BACHELOOR: 'It may be coincidental. 

MR. ARMITAGE: Come on guys. Look., .take Casey testified, I 
can't remember which area I've had so many, that a shipment went 
in the fall, and I or summer, and I think September, of five 
hundred and eight TOW missiles,., from Israel to Iran. I would 
maintain that the Department of Defense at least, one didn't know 
about that shipment and number two the Secretary of Defense would 



Exhibit 17 



UNCL-ASSm' 



(ARMITAGE) 



iiNimsm' 



9981 



if he were asked, he would not have given permission for it. I 
know th«t_. But Israel did It. And there Is an open discussion 
whether the President did nod and say Israel could do it or not. 
In my preparations for ny hearings I had to become aware of what 
the numbers of missiles and spare parts and all were. Five 
hundred and eight seemed like a strange shipment to me (COL 
MORTON - Tes sir.). I didn't know why It was sent either. Why 
would five hundred and eight basic TOW missiles be called for, 
why not five hundred or six hundred or five ten(510). It became 
apparent to me, however, based on what I heard Casey say, that 
that five hundred and eight number went to Israel and not to 
Iran, to repay five hundred and eight which previously had gone 
from Israel to Iran. Do I make sense? 

COL BACHELDOR: Well, no sir. Now you... I understand exactly 
what you said (HR. ARHITAGE - That's my Impression). Let me, let 
ne restructure the Array's Involvement as we know It. The Army's 
Involvement, as we know it, started in January of 1986, and we 
shipped initially a thousand, later five hundred and eight, and 
then the last shipment of five hundred (MR. ARMITAGE: Right). 
Are you now saying that the middle shipment of five hundred and 
eight went to Israel for repayment or are you saying there Is 
another five hundred and eight shipment. 

MR. ARMITAGE: I'm speculating that that's what happened. That 
that five hundred and eight, the coincidence Is so great, It 
seems to lae that there's a very high probability that that five 
hundred and eight, whichever shipment It was, that the Army 
transferred to the CIA, eventually ended up In Israel (COL 
MORTON - For repayment?). For replay, or replenish Israeli 
stocks for five hundred and eight that they sold previously. I 
don't know that. But the numbers... 

COL BACHELDOR: And no one has said that. 

MR. ARMITAGE: Pardon me? 

COL BACHELDOR: You have drawn that conclusion... 

MR. ARMITAGE: I draw that conclusion because the numbers sure 
look kind of striking. 

COL MORTON: That's why I asked. Is it coincidental, but there's 
a reason? 

MR. ARMITAGE: j[t seems to me. but I don't think the Army would 
know that at alY. And there's no reason the Army should know it. 

COL BACHELDOR: That would help, if that were true though sir 
because we have the same question. Why five hundred and eight? 

MR. ARMITAGE: The same .. I never .. I had the same question, 
but It doesn't seem to me from your guys point of view to make a 
tinkers damn difference. You were doing what you were told under 



Exhibit 17 



mmm' 



(ARMITAGE) 



UNcussffe-- 



9982 



Econony Act provision to the CIA, The CIA waa the ones who knew 
tht ultimate (Usposltlon. I can't say and 1 couldn't testify 
(COL MORTON - Sure.) that I know those five hundred and eight 
ended up In Israel, But I'd have to say that It seeas Blghty 
suspicious that the numbers (COL MORTON - Yes sir.) are the same. 
If you see what I mean? But for the Army's purposes, I can't 
laaglne that haa any real relevance to the Army .. itself. You 
war* transferring to the CIA which you were beln« paid .. over. 

COL BACHELDOR: It gives us one more alternative to provide to 
Hr. Marsh as to why the number five oh eight (508 ).. . 

MR. ARMITAGE: Yea Indeed, and that's the only thing I can 
offer.. . 

COL BACHELDOR: And we've been searching for that, and In that 
context sir your comments are very helpful because we did not 
have that information. 

MR. ARMITAGE: Now that's .. I would not and could not swear that 
Israel made the shipment, but Mr. Casey thinks they did. Made a 
shipment prior. In the summer. 

COL BACHELDOR: See we've heard pallet loads, plane loads uh all 
kind of reasons for five hundred and eight, so It again one more 
piece of the puzzle. 

MR. ARMITAGE: Well I think that, I hope that's helpful, but 
that, !'■ under that inpression that Israel was repaid by the CIA 
for a prior shipment. Impression. 

COL BACHELDOR: Mo further questions. 

COL MORTON: Sir you mentioned the need for a higher 
classification . . . 

MR. ARMITAGE: Well I'm talking about (portion of text deleted) 

COL BACHELDOR: I know what the classification Is. 

COL MORTON: (portion of text deleted) covers it? 

COL BACHELDOR: (portion of text deleted) 

COL MORTON: Okay, you can read me on. 

MR. ARMITAGE: Now .'; are we 

COL BACHELDOR: He has. . . 

MR. ARMITAGE: And then I want a question for you and you may 
want to turn the ralkes back on. 



Exhibit 17 



wimm 



(ARMITAGE) 



334 



.OtKUSSIUUI. 



?o5 



Sir do you have any further Information, 
:o present concerning the matters under 



COL MORTOM: Okay sir. 
statements or j|_yl<lence 
Investigation. 

MR. ARHITAGE: Una... 

COL HORTON: That would be beneficial to us. 

MR. iRMiTAGE: Well I've tried to think. In the t est Inonles , Ir 
the give and take and the questions froa the Hill, you learn a 
lot. Huh, I'm trying to think of the Aray's Involvement... 

COL BACHELOOR: I do have a question for you. 



MR. ARMITAGE: I don't know of anything... 
following then I'll be glad to answer. I 
that might be relevant to the Aray, I have 
revelations, becoae a lot saarter of what 
adalnlstratlon were doing to Include slttl 
soae of our senior officials, closed testl 
aore about the Issue, but I don't know of 
would have relevance to the Aray. And I c 
things that have rel evance to the transfer 
these things to ^^^HH^^^^ ay under 
000 transferred thea to the CIA, title and 
we got out of the business. Uh, there are 
of Inforaatlon and policy discussions that 
aa aware of, and If it were appropriate wo 
It. I don't think they have any relevance 



let ae complete the 
don't know of anything 
, subsequent to public 
various parts of the 
ng In on testlaony by 
aonies, so I know a lot 
things that I think 
ertalnly don't know 

Uh, other than once 
standing is we that Is 
everything, and then 
plenty of other bits 
surrounded this that I 
uld nake you aware of 
to the Aray. 



COL BACHELOOR; Mrs. Crawford, the Aray General Counsel, shared 
with me a comment uh that was attributed to you that you had 
heard In testimony soaeplace, that there either was or may have 
been some pressure applied to the Aray. Is It iaportant to 
discuss that sir? 



MR. ARMITAGE: Yeah I, yeah I don't know. I'll tell you what I 
heard. I gave a testlaony In front of the SSCI and It was over 
and I stood up. And It was over. And we were walking out, and 
soae of the staff aeabers said oh thanks alot you were very 
helpful. And I said well I hope so and I hope all the DOO 
witnesses are helpful. I said, "I must say that I'a not a 
technician..." and I did say this for the record, "...and I 
strongly urge you guys in your Investigation to talk to our Army 
fellows who aade the transfers, they know this Issue, I'm not a 
technician. I was engaged In the policy end of it, so please talk 
to then." They sald'yeah, the only possible question for 000, 
they said. Is the pricing question. And I said, uh, excuse ae, 
•r* you indicating by that statement that there is soae Inference 
that someone in the Secretary's office was leaning on the Amy to 
lower the price. And they said absolutely not, we have no 
indication of that. We have no understanding that its other than 
Just what you told us. Basically the Secretary didn't like it. 
He followed the President's orders though and did It, and said do 



Exhibit 17 



UNOASSn. 



(ARMITAGE) 



335 



UNOi^m 



D 9984 



It undtr an Econooy Act and don't lose noney. But he said that 
there aay have been a conversation that OUle North had with one 
of the Aray ftilowa involved. And I said I don't know anything 
about it. And that was the eoiament and I passed It on I think to 
Susan. That was it. 

COL BACHELDOR: Yes sir. she shared that with us. 

COL MORTON: Do you know who North might have talked to? 

MR. ARMITACE; No I don't know, .. they didn't say it happened 
either (COL MORTON - If?). They said there aay have been(COL 
MORTON - Yes. sir). And I said, basically I was trying to find 
out if DOD, are we out of this now. And they gave us a pretty 
good clean bill of health, except Tor that Issue. The pricing 
issue, there's still sone questions. And that caused ae to ask, 
certainly no questions that what I told you is not true because 
it is ay understanding that OSD did not get into the pricing 
problea. Didn't lean on the Aray. That's ay understanding. He 
said no we don't have any Indication to the contrary to that. 
TJiere aay be, it aay be that North talked to one of the, one of 
the officers. 1 said, well you'll find that out froa the 
officers. They can tell you that. 

COL MORTON: Sir other than those you've already aentloned, do 
you know anyone else who could provide further Inforaatlon on the 
aattcr. 

HR. ARMITACE: Let ■•, let ae recap. As far as I know in the 
Departaent, the Secretary, now LTG Powell, General Thuraan 
because of his discussion with General Powell, General Russo 
because of the discussion that Thurman had with him, ae, Mr. 
Taft, Vice Adairal Jones, and probably the Chief of Staff of the 
Aray. After that I have to drop down to LTC Arabrlght who's the 
neit person I ever talked to about this. And through Arabrlght I 
talked to Mic Kickllghter and Indeed the Secretary of the Aray 
saying I need the Inforaatlon to get ready for a hearing, lets 
get going. Uh, what's the story here. Give ae the answer. And 
I said I'a not prejudicing the answer, I Just need an answer. 
Uh, so I think those are the only ones that had info raat 
far I'a concerned. Obviously there are people who d 
transfers, who know how to work these and I've seen d 
names on differe at pltcta ^t_2»2±L—£Jl^ •' *•• P"* together the 
chronologies for mH^^mH|^|H as sure 
all those... (COL~ BAC HELDOR - Ye^sff we do.). Uh , other than 
that, Ollle North. but^^HHl don't think Ollle's talking. 

COL NORTON: Kind of hard to get answers... 

MR. ARMITACE: Yea. that's what I understand. 

COL BACHELDOR: Adairal Poindexter, sir. 



UNtUp^- 



(ARMITACE) 



UNCIASSIRII' 



9985 



MR. ARMITACE: Yea, or Polndexter I guess, but my own belief Is 
that General Powell, and you've spoken to hln. Is probably, first 
of all he's Ut* aost honorable nan I've ever net and even If his 
recollection was at direct odds with nine I'd have to say that 
I'd so with hln. Because he Is a very honorable and very snart 
■ an. (COL MORTON - Alris.ht sir) That's who seens to be the key 
guy. Hake sure you check hln. It could be that .. well you can 
do that with Charlie Brown or sonethlng If you did It. Check In 
with' OSAA If you need any pricing Infornation. Charlie will get 
the answers for you (COL MORTON - Alright sir.). What we're 
charging these days for HAWKs and TOWs and things of that nature. 

COL MORTON: Sir, this Is an official investigation. It Is 
privileged in the sense that the report of 1 nve»t igation will be 
■ade to the directing authority for such use as deened 
appropriate. You are requested not to divulge the nature of the 
investigation or questions answered or discussions included In 
this interview with anyone except your counsel if you have some, 
have one. 

MH. ARMITACE: I already have to the Secretary of Defense. 

COL MORTON: Yes sir. No I'm talking future. And the sole 
purpose of that and its uh... 

MR. ARMITAGE: I do not have counsel and hop* further that 
there's no need for one. 

COL NORTON: This is standard to prevent witnesses ooalng to the 
attention... not Intended to reflect on you. 

MR. ARMITACE: Well I wish you luck on the investigation. I'll 
be interested .. I assune, well I know I'll get it. The results 
of it. The Secretary's pronised it to the Hill. 

COL MORTON: One final thing sir, uh you're renlnded that your 
testiBony we've taken here is classified as will the report be. 
Your testimony nay be nade part of an official IG record. 
Individuals who do not have an official need to know aay request 
a copy of this record, to include your testinony. If there is 
such a request do you consent to the release of your testinony 
outside official channels. 

MR. ARMITAGE: No I don't. 

COL MORTON: Alright sir. Do you have any questions sir? 

MR. ARMITAGE: No I don't. 



mmm 



(ARMITACE) 



337 



-UNClASSIFe' 



D 9986 



COL NORTON: The time Is since 1016, the Interview is concluded. 

(Tht for«(olnt testliiony of Hr. Richard L. Arnltagt was 
recorded on ■agnetlc tape, transcribed by CPT Daniel C. Daley, 
and verified by LTC Thomas R. Prlckett, Intelligence Oversight 
Division, U.S. Army Inspector General Agency, the Pentagon, 
Washington, D.C. 20310-1700) 



MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
SUBJECT: Deletion of Text (U) 



2H January 1987 



Portions of the text of Mr. Armltage's testimony marked "(portion 
of text deleted)" were deleted in order to prevent the report 
froa being over classified. This sanltlzatlon does not detract 
froa the content of the testimony. 




Exhibit 17 



mms&m 



(ARMITACE) 



338 



*5; 12R3S 

CsCJ0348t»-SO®34<?7") 




339 



Ij2 



wiMsm 



-0 S'P^ 

Non-Log 



NATIONAL SICUWTV COUNCU. (p^^.lo.h it (y CU^-^^J^^ 

Sept«mb«r 30, 1986 ,^e!-<i«***-^ c^efelO 



TOP SECRgT >i' 

ACTION '^ -^^^o2 

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTE* 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH!-' 

SUBJECT: Press Guidance r« Costa Rican Airstrip 

Attached at Tab I is draft press guidance regarding the airstrip 
at Santa Elena, Costa Rica, which was divulged by the Costa Rican 
Security Minister at a press conference on Friday, September 26. 
This story has now been picked up by the New Yorlc Times (Tab II) 
and is generating press questions at State and Defense. 

The press guidance at Tab I has been coordinated with State 
(Abrams) , Defense (Armitage) , and CIAI^HHH Due to the 
extreme sensitivity of the issue, your apPHvai is requested 
before the guidance is used in responding to queries. 

The damage done by this revelation is considerable. As indicated 
in the CIA report at Tab III, the logistics support provided by 
Project Democracy has had a profound impac^^h^^ilitj^^h^ 
resistance to sustain itself in the fiel ^ 



The airfield at Santa Elena has been a vital element in supporting 
the resistance. Built by a Project D«"»«="=y P"P"5"fY JSttlillv 
Corporation, S.A. — a Panamanian company), the field was initially 
s I used for direct reiupply efforts (July 1985 - February 1986). 

-.* Since early this year, the field has served as a primary abort 
11? base for aircraft damaged by Sandinista anti-axrcraft fire. The 
III photographs at Tab IV show the field in June 1986 *"«* /^f»"»9ed 

^ft Project Dwoocracy /C-M/^ which made an emergency landing on the 
|i| field early this ifcnth.'^ 

Is| The Arias Administration revelations regarding this J*=i;jl;J^y . J*^* 
liif caused Project Democracy to permanently close Udall Corporation 

ost and dispose of its capital assets. It has also resulted m the 



loss of a facility important to keeping the resistance supplied 
and in the field against the Sandinistas. 



^^i^... 0.. UNOWSHSKB^ v:o2 




340 



mmm 



TOP SECRET 



/V ? 



0933 




prove his goodwi ll for our polj 

ther^are important reaaon a to recei v both< r^"^~' 
I^^^Hin the Ova^Offica. mH^UBphould be invited in 
■P^Bbecause^m^^^lis increasingly supportive 
Nicaragua proqr^^^^^BJ|wil^b^ir^h^J^ . f^"" 

possible to have a "3-minute p hoto opportunity" with the Presiden t 
in order to presjuit h.ijj» 




tmg IS highly appropriate. 



RECOMMENDATIONS 



1. That you approve /the press guidance at Tab I and authorize us 
to pass it to Dan Ito^krd/Paul Hanley for their use if asked. 



Approve 



Jc- 



Disapprove 



jt you approve a brief photo op session with! 

_^ luring your NSC briefing time in the October 17-21 

timeframe. If you approve, an appropriate memorandum will be 
prepared. 



Approve 



Disapprove 



Attachments 
Tab I 
Tab II 
Tab III 

Tab IV 






Press Guidance 

NYT Article by James Lemoyne of September 29, 1986 

CIA Special Analysis, 'Nicaragua: Rebel Resupply 

Increasing," TCS 2922/86 of September 23, 1986 

Photographs 



TOP SECRET 



wmsB 



A K VJ G 2 I 3 2' 



(jh.f 



341 



UNCLASSIFIED— "-' 



PRESS GUIDANCE R£ AIRSTRIP IN COSTA RICA 

DID U.S. PERSONNEL SUPERVISE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AIRSTRIP IN 
NORTHERN COSTA RICA? N 3 934 

"The U.S. Embassy in San Jose, Costa Rica, has reported that 
during the Administration of Former President Monge the Ministry 
of Public Security was offered the use of a site on the Santa 
Elena Peninsula which could be used as an extension of the civil 
guard training center at Murcielago. The site included a 
serviceable airstrip which could have supplemented the small one 
which is located near the training center. The offer was 
reportedly made by the owners of the property who had apparently 
decided to abandon plans for a tourism project. The Embassy has 
no information on the Ministry's decision concerning the offer. 
No U.S. Government funds were allocated or used in connection 
with this site nor were any U.S. Government personnel involved in 

its construction. Any further inquiries should be referred to 

the Government of Costa Rica." 



WAS THE AIRSTRIP INTENDED FOR USE BY THE CONTRAST 

The Government of Costa Rica has made clear its position that 
it will not permit the use of its territory for military action 
against neighboring states. The U.S. Government respects that 



UNGlASSra 



position. 



342 



THE NEW YORK TIM&S. a.v..aAV, SBPTSMflS/? « . »»« 



coafUence, 
Pmnielady. 



Americans Reportedly Supervised 
- Airstrip Project Near Nicaragua 



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PROJECT DEMOCRACY AIR FACILITY 

Santa Elena, Costa Rica 

June 10, 1986 



30990 




DAMAGED PROJECT DEMOCRACY -RC-vi^ 

After Landing at Santa Elena Facility 

September 12, 1986 



UNGlASSm 



AKW002I39 



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345 



uzmsi- Nsefis'i 



EufiPtty 



346 






83 



III 
III 



SUBJECT t Ou«atlona and Anawars for tha Racord from Sacratary 
of Oafanaa Taatimony Bafora tha Houaa Pamanant 
Salact Conmlttaa on Intalllganca, 18 Dacambar 1986 (U) 

1. Tha CoBunlttaa raquaata a copy of tha Army Inapactor Ganaral/ 
Ganaral Counaal raport on thalr invaatigation of tha prtcing of 
TOW mlaailaa tranafarrad to tha CIA. 

Aj (U) Upon complation of tha raport, a copy will ba provided 

to tha Committaa. 

2. Tha Committaa raquaata a copy of tha Sacratary of Dafenae 
mamorandum and marginal notaa on tha Draft NSOO of Juna 1985 

A< (U) Thaaa ara provided at TAB A. 

3. Waa tha baaic TOW aold to any othar country in tha laat 
two or thr aa yaara? 

Ai (C) Yaa. From FY 1983 to FY 1986, baaic TOW waa aold to 

tha following countriaa (quantitiaa in paranthaaaa) r( 

^^^^H Kenya ^^^| Korea ^^^| Morocco i^^^H< Somalia 

and Thailand 

4. Did Ganaral Sacord have any kind of Conaultant contract, 
or othar ralationahip or poat, with tha Department of Defenaa 
after hia retirement? 

At (U) Yes. Following hia retirement on 1 May 1983, MG 

Sacord waa approved aa a conaultant appointee for the 

Office of the Aasiatant Secretary of Defenaa (International 

Security Affaire), specifically for tha Near Eaatern and 

South Asian Affaire Region. Effective 11 July 1983, MG 

Secord waa authorized 130 daya at a rate of $242.00 per 

day, but he did not aerve any daya in a pay atatua. On 11 

July 1984, MG Secord waa again approved aa a conaultant 

appointee and authorized 90 days at a rate of $242.00 per 

day, but he did not aerve any daya in a pay atatus. MG 





UNe 




347 



um 



D 84 



S«cord'«~^^ppolntin«nt was tarmlnatad on 10 July 198S. On S 

August 1985 MG Sscord was appointsd as a consultant without 

coB^«nsation for up to tan days. This appolntoMnt was 

tarminatad on 4 August 1986, and tha Dapartmant has no 

racord of his having b«an on a duty status on this appointmant, 

with tha following azception. On 5 August 1985, MO Sacord 

was appointad as a consultant, without conpansation, to 

tha Spacial Oparations Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG). His 

tarn on tha SOPAG azpirad aff active 4 August 1986. During 

this one-yaar term, MG Sacord participated in ona maating 

of tha SOPAG, on 15 November 1985. Ha has not participated - 

since, and this is the last consulting activity in which 

he participated, according to Department records. Pertinent 

documentation is enclosed at TAB B. 

5. Was General Sacord dropped from one of our committees for 
failing to execute a financial statement? 

At (U) MG Secord served on the Special Operations Policy 

Advisory Group (SOPAG) from January 1984 to August 1986, 

although he last participated in November 1985. MG Secord 's 

membership on the SOPAG was terminated, effective 4 August 

1986, based upon his failure to provide the Department 

with financial information (as required in form SP 1555). 

Amplifying information is enclosed at TAB C. 

6. Have any TMS or other arms sales by the Department been 
made to any 'agents or middlemen' as opposed directly to a 
recipient country? 

At (U) No FMS or other arms sales to foreign countries 

have been made by the Department through a private agent 



yNGlASli 



348 



wmm 



D 85 



or middlanan. Th«r« la no legal authority to aall under 

tha Arma Export Control Act to othar than an aliglbla 

foreign country, except for aalea to U.S. contractora 

under Section 30 of the Act for Incorporation into end 

itema and aubaequent export. The Department haa aold 

itema to other agenciea of the federal government in 

accordance with the Economy Act. 

7. Did any DoD intelligence peraonnel Vnow anything about 
furniahing any intelligence to Iran co vering auch mattera 
aa battle plana, reaulta of ABBHHUgathering of the 
Iran-Iraq front line, etc.? xrff^Tommlttee made reference 
to a measage to Congreaaman Kaatenmeier from the Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McMahon. ) 




349 




8. Did Colonel Jim Steel* in El Salvador have any relationship 
with anyone who was selling arms to the Contras during the time 
when such sales were prohibited? 



350 



WUSMO 



87 



UNCLASSIFIED 



351 



Vi'UVUU • 




D 88 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO TH2 PRESZOEOT FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY AFFAIRS 

SUBJECT J US Policy Toward Iran (S) 

(TS) This memorandum rasponda to your raquaat for coiunants on 
tha draft. NSDO on US-Iranian relations . Whila I agraa with many of 
tha major points in tha papar, savaral of tha proposed actions seem 
questionable. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to consider an 
explicit revision of our policy toward Iran as long as we continue 
to receive evidence of Iranian eon^licity in terrorist actions and 
planning against us. I do not believe, therefore, an NSDO should 
b« issued in the proposed form. 

(TS) I fully support the policy objective that 'our prinary 
short-tena challenge must be to block Moscow's efforts to increase 
Soviet influence." If we are successful, of course, this will put 
ua in a batter position to realize a longer-tara goal of having at 
laast neutral/non-hostile relations with Iran. Under no circum- 
stances, however, should we now ease our restriction on arms sales to 
Iran. Attan^ting to cut off arms whila remaining neutral on sales 
to either belligerent is one of the few ways wa have to protect our 
loagar-range interests in both Iran and Iraq. A policy ravaraal 
would be seen as inexplicably inconsistent by those nations whoa we 
hava urged to refrain froa such sales, and %«ould likely lead to 
increased ams sales by thaa and a poasibla altaration of tha 
strategic balance in favor of Iran whila Khoaaini is still tha 
eont.rolling Influence. It would adversely affect our nawly aowrglng 
ralationshlp with Iraq. 

(TS) There are other actions, however, soow of which are in^lied 
la th^^<'*'t NSDO, that we could take now under our current policy . 
to trf'to prevent an Increase in Soviet influence and to lead toward 
a aore ooderata post-Khomalal Iran* Pamaiiy Oeciassined/Reieasea no 1 1 f€fS e a 

under provisions of e.O )23')5 
Intelligenca ""^ '^ Johnson. National Secui.iy Council 

— Improve US intelligence gathering capabllltlaa in the areas 
of weakness identified in tha SMI E, aspacl.al ly with regard 
eollectino information on th< 




^^^_^^_^___ Cs^hasls should D« on identity ing key 
lyers in the political arena who may be more favorably 
■disposed to US concerns in the region. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



352 



ornct or tmcscch 

TMC MIUITAdY ASS-fTAurr 







nf, \ 



i 



SEC DEF C 

HAS SEEN 

JUN 18 198S 

'''•—' 



O. 



^<^ 



'ffi/ 



f=^.r<^ 



J. 



y*u 



^ 



■^^\ 



At/C^ ^^^^^ AGTO^r^rx..^^ 






under p,ov,s,n„s Of E liSfi^ -^ 







353 



EYISOtllY UMILittl 

. ofrci Of TMi »icRnAiiY or difinm 

NOTE PO U6D(P) 

YOurs far action. Sm ay r*oomn»K]«tion 
and S«cDef's oamncnt on tht attadwd. 
8«cOtf 's ODiKnants rtad as follows: 

*Diis is aljiost too absurd to cotncnt 
on. By all aeans pass it to Rich, but 

th* assunption h«r« is: 1) that Iran is 
about to fall, and 2) w« cw dbal with 
that on a rational basis. MOeiiJc* 
asking Qadhafi to NashiMgton for a 



coxy chat.' 



i^, 



<^^ 



"^lassitied/Releasert on lifCsG^ Col in L. • 9^*1 1 

E' ..-r,v,s,Gns 01 £ 1235B Kijoc General , OSA 

Senior Military Assistant 
to the Secretary of Defense 



Nalional Secunty Council 



cc: DesSecDef 




82-690 0-88-13 



354 



mmmm 

TMC WMITC HOUSC 

WAftMINOTOM 



Jun* 17. ItIS 






91 






SECRET/WITH 

TO? SECRET ATTACHMPCT 

I . 

KEMOW-NDcM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE ?. SHULT8 
Th« Secretary of Statt 

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W, WEINBERGER 
Th« Secretary of Defense 

SU2JECT: U.S. Policy Toward Iran (S) 

li*.?:!*^-"^ *' Central Intelligenct has j«$t distributed an s»-r 
or. .ran: Prospects for Near-Tera Instability", which ihi^- 
rave received. This SNIE r.akes clear that instib^litC in t?!.^^ 
!f!!i;;*'^"^ "^-^- potentially momentous cons.ou..;cis' fj" 5 S 
strateeic inter sts. It seeas sensible to ash whether ou^ 

S;''IJr-^^'^" ^^■•'•' ''*" ^* adequate to .chiev;*;5riS;«e.'s 
Ky staff has prepared a dr.ft NSOO (Tab A) which can si^I Jo 
•tiaulate our thinking on O.S. policy toward Iran, i I^Ta 
appreciate your reviewing the dieft on an eye. only be^J «d 
provxdmq ae with your cooMats end sueeestior.. t I- i ^ 

about the possibiiSy of ieajca5.*So;?r::'j:jjde Jortrss^;:^ 

this c-h«.-.ge in policy with the Fzesidut. If you feel ?hJ? !i 
S1C(..?) in preper.tion for an IISPG Meting «ith SI pJSIIdint 




mm Dcciassihed/Rsi-ased on ' I Kr'S& fc 
under orovisicns of E 12356 
by K. Johnson, National Secunly Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SEC.-ET.-.^:-ai 

Tc: ir:.- ;T attac-j.me?:'! 

-ir:is3-:v C-: C;^^' 



355 



ill 
ill 



TOP SSCBTT 



ONKASSIFIED 

DRAFT 

D 92 



_ «C/1C» 403010 

TMC WMITC HOUSC 



WATIOMAl SECUaiTjf PIC7S10II 
PI«ECT1V£ 

O.S. Policy Tow«rd Iran 

Dyr.«r.ic political •volution' is taking place inside Iran. 
Instability caused by the pressures of the Iraq- i ran var, 
economic deterioration and re9ine infi^htin; create the' potential 
for r.ajor changes in Iran. The Soviet Union is better positioned 
than the U.S. to exploit and benefit from any power strugele that 
results in changes in the Iranian rceiae, as veil as increasing 
socio-political pressures. In this environnent, the eaergence of 
• regune mere compatible with American and Western interests is 
unlikely. Soviet success in taking advantaoe of the ener^in^ 

power s^rvJS5le to insinuate it»*^^_in_^ra£_ '-* -' 

:e< 




^ While we pursue a r.u.riber of broad, 

inc-terx coals, our prieary «hort-ter:a challence must be to 
block Kcsccv's effcrts to increase Soviet i.rfl-jcnce (.-.ov «nd 
after the death of Khoaeini) . This will require ar. active and 
sustained prccras to build both our leverags a.nd our 
understanding of the internal situation so as to er^able us to 
•xert a creater and mczm constructive influence over Iranian 
polities. We oust iaprov* ear ability to protect our interests 
during the struggle for suceessioo. 

C.S. Interests and Co«l« 

The nost iantediate O.S. interests include: 

(1) Preventing the disintegration of Iran and preserving it as 
an i:adependent strategic buffer which separates th« Soviet 
Onion froa the Persian Gulf; 

(3) Lir.iting the scope and opportunity for Soviet actions in 

Ira.°i, while positioning ourselves to cope with the changing 
Iranian intemel situation; 

(3) Maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil and. ensuring 
unimpeded transit of the Strait of Bomuz; and 

(4) An end to the Iranian governsMnt's spcr.sorship of terrorise, 
*nd its atteapts to destabilize the ecvernne.'^ts of other 
raeicr.al states. 



•c? Si:?.r: 



UNCLASSIEIED 



356 



UNOtASSWED ,,^^^ 



TOP SECurr 

. D 93 

W« also tttk ethcz bro«d and iaportant, if Itss iisn«di«ttly 
urgent, goals. 

U) Iran's rtsuaption of a aodaratt and constructiva rola as a 
■ambar rtspactivaly of tha non-comunist political 
coMsunity, of its ragioa, and of tha world potrolaua 
•conony; 

(2) eontinuad Iranian rtsi-stancc to tha axpansion of Soviet 
powar in 9an«r«l, and to tha Soviat occupation of 
Afghanistan in particular; 

(3) an aarly and to tha Iran-Iraq war which is not mediated by 
tha Soviat Union and which does not fundar.antally altar tha 
balanca of power in the region; 

(4) elioination of Iran's flagrant abusas of human rights; 

(5) n»over>ent toward eventual normalization of U.S. -Iranian 
diplonatic consular and cultural ralations, and bilateral 
tract/coiainercial activities; 

(6) resolution of Anerican legal and financial clains through 
the Hague l.'ibunal; and 

(7) Iranian aoderation on 0?EC pricing policy. 

Kany of our isterasts will be difficult to achieve. But given 
the rapidity with which events are aoving, and the magnitude of 
the stakes, it is clear that urgent new efforts are required. Ii 
■oving forward, we aust be especially careful to balance our 
evolving relationship with Iraq ia a aanner that does not danage 
the longer tera prospects for Iran. 

>resent Iranian yplitical Cnvironient 

-^^— .-^.-^ii^— — ^-^^^^^^^^— ^^■^^— — ^■^^— ^ • 

The Iranian leadership faces its aost difficult challenges since 
19tl. The ragiae's popularity has declined significantly in the 
past six aonths, priaarily because of intensified disillusionsen* 
with a saaaingly unending war, the continued iapositioa of 
Islaaic social policies on a population increasingly reluctant ti 
accept such harsh aeasures, and a faltering econoay brought on 
priaarily by declining oil revenues. The iapaet of these 
probleas is intensified by the realisation that Ayatollah 
Xhdheini's mental and physical health is fragile, which in turn 
casts a pall of uncertainty over the daily decision-making 
process. 



?0? S£C?J 



c BNCUJSIflEO 



357 



UNCLASSIFIED 



DRAFT 



T<» »"=«" • ' ■ D 94 

Unless th« acctlcrstion of tdvtrs* ailitary, political «nd 
•conosic d«v«lopn«nts is r«v«rs«d, th« XhOMini rs^in* will 2se« 
serious instability (i.*. r*p«attd anti-r«9i»« danonstrations, 
•trikas, assassination attaapts, sabotage and othar dastafcilixina 
activities throughout, increasingly involving the low«r classes). 
This condition vill sap officials' energies and governiMnt 
resources, intensifying differences aaong Iranian leaders as the 
government tries to avoid mistaXes that would provoke popular 
upheaval and threaten continued control. 

While it is impossible to predict the course of the emerging 
power struggle, it is possible to discern several trends which 
^.must be accounted for by U.S. policy. As domestic pressures 
C aount, decision-making is likely to be monopolized by individuals 
\ representing the same unstable mix of radical, conservative ar.d 
J ultra-conservative factions that now control the Iranian 
] government. The longer Khomeini lingers ia power, the more 
/ likely the power struggle will intensify, and the greater the 
/ r.u.TJer of potential leaders who might affect the outcome of the 
^struggle. 

The ultieate strength of various clerical groups and the power 
coalitions they may form are not known. Ecwever, the weaknesses 
of various oppcsition groups — inside Iran and abroad — are 
evident, especially the lack of a leader with sufficient stature 
(* to rival Khomeini and his ideas. The most likely faction in a 
y power struggle to shift Iranian policy in directions more 
\ acceptable to Um Vest — should their influence increase — are 
/ conservatives working txcm within the govemaent against the 
' radicals. Radicals within the regime, and the leftist 
I opposition, are the groeps aost likely to influence the course of 
^vents in ways inimical to Western interests. 

The Iranian re^lar arved forces represent a potential source of 
both power and iaelinetioa to move Iran back into a more 
pro-Vestern position. Bepresentatives of every faction inside 
and OQtside the regiae recognise the potential importance of the 
military and are cultivating contacts with these forces. 
However, as long as the Arvy remains coaaaitted in the war with 
Iraq it will not be in a position to intervene in Tehran. 

The other instrusent of state power, the Revolutionary Cuard, is 
becoedng increasingly fractured. It will probably come apart 
following Khomeini's death, and adght even engage in a major 
power struggle before then. In any scenario, the Guard will be 
at the center of the power struggle. 



TOP StcagT 



UNCussra 



358 



UNCLASSiFtED 



T0> StCHIT 



DRAFT 



95 



Th« Soviets Art w«ll aw«rt of the tvelvina davAlA-y.^.^ , 
Thoy will continu. to .pply c«rrot*IJd-.Jiek i;:!!?^'^^* ^« ^••"• 
in th« hop« of brinqin, Tohrlin MjJc^'i i.i^ ;ir*" !** ^'^ 
bil4tor«l rtl.tion.hip'th^t coulS wJJr.I I blJlI ?/" ^fP"^** 
growth in Sovitt infloonco ia Xx*n?^,!L vij? !if!','*'^«' 

Oospito strong clorical antip«thy to Koftcev ana r ru L... , I 

ivi.:'i%'' ^" -"^^ i.v.r.,.":j.ri:ji:r.r\i: :i:erconr,;.t 




political opportunitio. prosontod th^sSvIJ? iiilI%Ji|Si would 
prob*bly not act iJi a aaaacr that sovorolv di«ri»*i i».^fY ^?^* 

fereo. o^ip^t. Noseo* po.s«..«s einoidorlblo rooS fSrSS.«v.r 

9ev«riiMat ia Tohxan as loo« as thoy fair savora roprisal. JnJ 
ia tho araa. of Iraa adjacHt to\2 Sovi.J^JL" STU^i.S 

Tha 0.8. positioa ia Tahra a is onlikalv ta < «p^ «,« with«»» , 

petr-RMUlai pari^ Cill ba savara. Aay s^ccassor raiiil lili 
probably sal.a po-r is tho na»a of X.lai and tlTfainSon iid 



TC? sccy.2T 



IINCUSSIFIED 



UNdUSSlHll) DRAFl 



T0> tECMT 



can btt 



96 



can o« axpactad to hav« a built-in anti-Aaarican bias, a «»> ^ 

rnnit— i*i-Tt r-rilma, ■rtil Ttliwlr. ■igrit ^*«««* >v^ ■■nfmii i 
•~fav_olutioo anA_taxgori< » ai i < - c oold-«ov-caatiou>ix-t»ard a ae] 
-corract r alationahip with tha D.a On th« othar bandTTnicar 
—tox<wfvlli try to axaeafbata antl-Aaariean faaliA9a to 

•tzan^than thair ofwa positieaa at tha axpanM of tba 

eonaarvativas. 



Our lavaraga with Irun is sharply raduead by tha currant daaraa 
of hostility that springs frc« tha idaoloqy of tha radical 
elar^y, sspacially «s it sarvss thair foraisa poliev aosls 
Moraovcr, tha aodarata and consarvativa alaatnts of'ths clarov 
may also shara the radicals' baliaf that w* ara invttaratalv 
hostila to tha Islamic 9ov«rnMnt, making aeco«»odation with tha 
U.S. iwpossibla. Tha clerical ragina contianas to bali«v« that 
tha O.S. has not accepted the revolution and intends to reverse 
tha course of events and install a puppet fovarnsent. This 
perception has been reinforced by our restoration of diploaatic 
relations with Iraq, efforts to cut tha flow of eras to Iran, and 
direct threats of military action in retaliation for 
Iranian-inspired anti-O.S. terrorise. 

U.S. Policy 

The dynanic political situation in Iran and the consequences for 
U.S. interests of 9rowin9 Soviet and radical influence, eonpal 
tha U.S. undertake a ran^a of abort- and loaq-tara initiatives 
that will enhance our lavaxa^a ia Tehran, aad, if peaalbla 
■iaiaiaa that of tha Seviats. Vartievlar attantiea aast ba paid 
to avoiding situations which coapal tha Xraaiaas to tura to tha 
Soviets. Short- tans aaasuras should be undertaken ia a manner 
that forestalls Soviet prospects ird enhances our ability, 
directly arc in«?i -•?■♦■ ly, 'c bui : r j.S. ar.d Wist<»r- influence in 
Iran to tha Baxinua extent possible in the ;\:tu:e. rlanninc for 
tha following laitiativas should therefore proceed oa a fast and 
loasaz-tcz» track. Tba ccmpooanta of O.S. policy will ba to: 

(1) Sncoura^a Waatara allies and friaads to help Xraa meat its a 
import requirements so as to reduce the attraetivaaass of n 
Soviet assistance aad trade offers, while damoaatxatias thai 
value of correct relatioas with tha Wast. This iaclndas 1 
provision of selected military equipment a a datazmiaad on a 
casa-by-cas« basis. 




T0> S£CMT 



(3) 



^ 



(4) 






<7) 



(S) 



(S) 



^ 



teDt«et« Vith a 




-«• 




DRAFl 



97 



boDtaett Vith allict «n4 fritad* »^^^^^^ 

■■■ ■■J on th» •volutioa of tJM IrwilaiTTitSitl^TL 

^iirore-jSTn. tot iaflMDciaf tb« diitction of eJiJ2 JL 
*>• '"^y ^ft^ccwauaiea f wit h IXMl th»wnh th<f ©T^' 



T«k« aevantag* of qxo»M9 political fra^Mntatioa by: 

diacraatly eonnunicatin^ our dasira for eorroct 

ralationa to potantially racaptiva Iranian l«adj 



® 




"' JJriJdilau!**'* *® -l-^nt. oppcsad to Khcaim and 

Avoid actions which could alianata sroops potaatiallv 
racaptiva to ifiprovad U.S. -Iranian ralationa. ^ 

aospond to Iranian-stipportad tarroriaa with military ae*'o« 
against tarrorist infrastnictura. ' •«— on 



Snhanca ou. affort to discredit Moscow's Islamic cradan*i«ll 
with a »ora vigorous MOK affort targatad on Iran. 

D«v«iop ^^^*«ti«» Pl«» ia sivport of tho basic policv I 
cb:.activa, both for noar-tora eontiagoaeias <o.g. diath o^ 
Xnocaini) as woll as tho leng-tara rastoratiea of O.S « 

influonca ia Tahraa. 

With raspact to tba Coif wax: 

— Coatiaoa to ancooraga third party iaitiativos to &«ak 
aa oad to the wax; ^ 

Xacraasa ailitary cooparatioa vith Gulf Cooperation 
Ceaneil countries, aad bolster O.S. Bilitary 
capabilities ia the Calf area to enable CatTCON to be 
fully capeble of caxryiag oot its aissioa; aad 

Seek to curb Iraa's eollaboxatioa with its radical w 
allies (i.e. Syxia aad Ubya). ^ 



rc? S£C?J8> 



UNCLASSIFIED 



361 



msmmi 



98 




Political 



— Through contacts with allies and friands, w* should dis- 
craatly communicata our dasira for corract ralations to 
potentially racaptiva Iranian laadars basad on thair 
renunciation of stata-support«d tarrorism. thair willinq- 
nass to saaX a negotiated settlement to the Iran-Iraq war 
their non-interference in other states' affairs, and their 
cooperation in settling US-Iranian claim in the Haoue 
Tribunal. 

— Maintain our neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war while encour- 
aging third party initiatives to end the conflict and in- 
creasing political-military cooperation with Gulf Cooper- 
ation Coui.jil countries. 

— In light of recent evidence that our allies continue to 
permit sporadic transfers of Militarily useful equipment 
to Iran and that negotiations may b« taking place between 
co"«»«'cial firaa and Iranian officials, wa should increase 
the pressure on oar allies by considering public statesMnts 
and possible sanetieos. 

Public Diplomacy 

— Our public statements on Iran should bring pressure to 
bear squarely where it is needed — on the current Iranian 

•• regime. In tone, our public position ajst avoid casting ' 
Iran as a country and the Iraniaa paople and culture, as 
vail as Shia Islam, as the enemy, but should esyhasixa 
(Vpoeition to the policies of the present Iranian governjnent 
and the corrupt mullahs inside the government. Our state- 
ments should aim to encourage those elements in Iran who 
disagree or oppose regime policies. 

Economic 




should reassess 
curbing all but 



cne ezrec'ci.veness or p 



resent control 
rts. . 



362 



Mmmn 



D 99 



iLv!^^ ^^^r."^*** di.cr.tt politic. 1 contact. propo..d 
•bev«, V. could .uggast to th. Ir.ni.n. th.t cori.ci rl- 

Ution. would includ. r.l.x.tion of curr.nt OS trIS 
rMtriction. .nd noriMl tr.d. r.l.tion. with u» Ir.ni.a 
govariUMnt th.t i. net hostil. to OS int.rMt.. *""*^*" 

^^.#* '«L f *=<»"^' ^i*l» th. b.l.nc. of th. r.comm.nd.tion. in th. 
dr.ft SSDD in .o f.r .. th.y support curr.nt OS policy. My "c«! 

n^fsJir^in'Ji**'^ "^ "rT '"^""^ vi.w th.t US piiic/-u.7r^j; 

•t.«df.«t in th. f.c. of int.rnation.1 l«wl.ssn.si p.rp.tr.tld bv 
Oi. Iranian r.gim.. Chang., in policy and in conduct, th.r.f or? 
^^.!2 J"^^"**^ ^X "^^r ^""^" gov.rn«.nt. By r.mainin; firaW 
!S^ ^^*' ^Vl^^ Iranian gov.r™«.nt polici.s ind action?, y™^ 
•upportiv. of Bod.ration and a long.r t.ra in,,rov.n.nt ir^lltion. 
l!v^r2o!''*'" ''^* '""'• '"^^y «' ^*»« IraniaiTpaopl. and %".!« S; 
J!»?f!^? n.c...ary to count.r a poa.ibly vary dang.rou. incrlaS in 
Sovi.t influ.nc.. In particular, w. n.id to b. pr.p.r.d f or T 
poa.ibl. p.riod of tunnoil a. th. r.gim. b.gin. to chang.. by 
building up .ff.ctiv. instruin.nt. of influ.nc. and accM.trp.opl. 
andorganixatxon. within Iran, .o as to count.r a Sovi.t attaSpTto 
pronot. a pro-Sovi.t .ucc.s.or r.gin.. ^ 



cet S.cr.tary Shultz 



UNCIMP 



UNCUSMB , 



00 



UNCUSSIRED 



WCHA«0 V. SECORO CONSULTANT HISTORY OSO - POUCY 



-- 


iCLASS 


HED 


D 101 


Datt of Appointment 


Office 


Days 


Salary 
per Day 


Initial Appt -07-11 -13 


ISA/10/NESA 


130 




Rtnewal«ff-.07.11-«4 


ISA/IO/NESA 


90 


$242.00 


Tarmination tff -07-10-SS 


ISA/lO/NESA 






Appt to SOPAG* aff -8-S-85 


ISA/SP 


10 


woe 


Appointment expired S-4-86 ~ 
Request to renew app fwded 
to Personnel 9- 11 -86 








Termination S2 fwded to 
Personnel 10-23-86 
w/requested eff date of ft-S- 
S6. based on Secprds refusal 
to provide SF15SS 









*$pe<ial Operations Policy Advisory Group 



'/.■ 



^ ^ 






►OeclassifieOyReleasaJ onJl£^*§8 
under provisions ot E 0. 12356 
Johnson, Nalional Security Council 



UNCUSSIFIED 



365 




^Y HISTORY OSO- POLICY 

D 102 





Offict 


OutyTIti* 


13 April 1M1 


ISA/NESA 


Director. Ntar East South Asia Region 


UhilylMI 


ISAfl^ESA 


Deputy Assistant Saactary of Defense. NESA 


1M«y19t3 


N/A 


Retired from USAF 



My Declassified/Released on JiE^^* 

under provisions of E 12356 
ly K Johnson, National Security Council 



UNCUSSinED 



366 



muSSIFIED 



D 103 



UNCLASSIFIED 



367 



SPECIAL OPERATIONS POLICY AOwIfBl? «ROUP 



0- 



■H^ 



Tht Sp.ciil Optrttlon. P.llcy A4yi««ry Croup w»» ror.,d in 
Dtctabtr ~19«3 un4tr tht tuthorlty sr>nt«4 In PL 92-463 Ftdiral 
Advisory Coaaltttt Act to tdvitt tht Stcrtttry of Otftntt on lity 
policy Ittuts rtlattd to tht dtvtiopatnt tnd atinttnanct of 
tfftctivt tptclil optrationt forctt. Tht S0PA6 at^tt on an 
irrtaular batit to ditcutt , for txaaplt, or jan i zat i on , forct 
ttructurt, aanpowtr and ptrtonnti, rtadinttt, and tqulpatnt. Thty 
■ttt in clottd tttslon a« claivifitd aattrial aay bt prtttnttd. 

Tht S0PA6 activititt rtlatt only to policy and do not 
involvt oDtrational aatttrt. 

Mtabtri of tht S0PA6 art appointtd for ent-ytar ttrat in 
Aujutt tach ytar. Thty ttrvt at DoO contultantt, without 
coaptntat i on, units* othtrwist taploytd by DoD. Thtrt is no stt 
nuabtr of atabtrs, but atabtrsh i p Ibas ranstd frea 9 to It atabart. 
Noraally atabtrs havt bttn invittd to rtntw thtir atabtrship 
annually unltss thtrt it toat indication or dttirt not to ttrvt. 
Currtnt atabtrs of tht S0PA6 artt 

Lawrtnct Ropka, Jr., P0AS0/I8A, Chairaan 

Haj. 6tn. Thoaas Ktlly, USA, Dirtcter JSOA 

B6 Donald Blackburn, USA (Rtt) 

6EN Robtrt Kinsston, USA, (Rtt) 

LT6 Ltroyn Manor, USAF, (Rtt) 

6EN Edward Ntytr, USA, (Rtt) 

Or< Richard Shultz 

6EN Richard Stilwtll, USA, (Rit) 

LTS SaautI Milton, USA, (Rtt) 

LTe Milliaa YarborousHi USA, (Rtt) 



I 

til 



.§ 

f^ 



UNCDBWD 



«m«« 



I OS 



1. D«t«« and attend*** of ALL Sp«el*l Op«r*tlon* Volley Adviaorv 
Group (80PAG) m**tln9*. "uvi.ory 



Lynn Ryland*r 



10 Jan 1984 

LTO Wll*on 
Lt G*n Manor 
Maj G«n S*cord 
Chaired by Mr. 

29 March 1984 

LTG Wilaon 
Lt G*n Ahnann 
Maj G*n Saeord 
BG Blackburn 
Mr. Rylandcr 
Maj G«n Rie* 
LTC G«iabara 
Chairad by Hr. K 

15 January 1985 



LTG Wilaon 

Lt G«n Manor 

Naj G«n S*cord 

Maj G«n Ric* 

Mr. Kylandar 

LTC G«abara 

Oiairad by Mr. lioal Koch 

• Jun* 1985 

OEH M«y*r 

Lt 6«n Manor 

LTG Yarborouqh 

Lt Q«n Pustay 

Naj 0«n Sacord 

Maj G«a Rie* 

•O Blaekburn 

Mr. Rylandar 

Hr. F*u*rv*rg*r 

CAPT Lyon 

LTC G«U>ara 

Lt Col Davidaon 

Mr. Anatag* 

Mr. RoaMr 

Chairad by Mr. Hoal Koch 



mmsw 



18 July 85 

BO Blackburn 

G*n Stilwall 

Lt G«n Manor 

LTG Vaught 

LTG Yarborough 

Maj G*n Ric* 

Maj 6*n S*cord 

Mr. Rylandar 

CAPT Lyon 

LTC GaiA>ara 

Lt Col Davidaon 

Chairad by Mr. Ho*l KOch 



15 



1985 



GEM Stilwoll 
Lt G*n Manor 
Lt G«a Puatay 
LTG Vaught 
Maj G*n Ric* 
Maj Gan Sacord 
BG Blackburn 
Mr. Bylandar 
COL Cos 
CAPT Lyon 

Mr. Probst 
Mr. Araitag* 
Chair*d by Mr. Koch 

8 October 1986 

BG Blackburn 
OBH Kingston 
Lt G«B Manor 



Profasaor Shults 
GBI Btilwsll 
LTO Wilaon 
LTG Ttoborough 
MajGan Rally 
Mr. ftlbot 
Mr. Rylandar 
LTC Tkrborough 
Chairad by Mr 



369 
,..r: •• ""••*• 



,.„. „. n '"" '""* """ ■• 

N«v«a»tr 1999. 



DNWSSIfiEO 



370 




UNCLASSIFIED ^'^^^ 



p; 



U.S. .MIL1T.\RY CROUP EL SALVADOR 

APO MI.\MI 31023 1 FEB 8 5 



SUBJECT Felix Rodriguez 

THRU: DCM 

TO: AMB PICKERING 



Per your guidance, attached is a draft 
backchannel to Gen Gorman on our 



no pay" mercenary. 



unaer provisions of E )2-i55 
byK Johnson, National SecaiiiyCcuncil 




UNCLASSIFIED 



'^y'^':^$^i^:vm 




371 



SJ InTnUi^Zi .4.2257 
.. 2NT MMNSH 

i^M^^THA 00 ZTH 
FK USSC 

TC 

^ CONFIDENTIAL 
QQQQ 



WASns 



/i(-fii8i 



i£) 




PNA-04a9-14-FEB-e5 
LES ONLY// 



L^ EYiS ONLT//EYES ONLT//ETES ONLT/^ 

'■^ MACT IMMEDIATED ^ ^ ^ 

yoH AMBASSADOR -PICiERINC ^D COL STEELEJFROM OEN GORMAN 
.-^ SUiJJiCT: FELIX HODRIOaEZ n>4- 

'—' 1. (C) I HAVE JUST MET HERE WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ| 
fciUlT^nM WTJMT. HOBW TM r.lIBA. A VETERAN OF CUERR] 




_ HE IS 

CPiRAIINC AS A PRIVATE CITUEN, BOT HIS ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITH 1H£ V? 
IS R-AL aNOUGH, GOING BACa. TO LATTFR'S DATS AS DCI 
2. (C) RODRIGUEZ' PRIMARTJOMMITMZNT TO THE REGION IS| 
AHtf.i HE WANTS TC ASSISI TEH FLU. I TOLD HIM TSAT~THE FDK CEStRVIi: 
-IS -•'RIORITT. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT TOUR WORa WITH THE PRAL WAS 
ALVANCING WELL, AND THAT WE HAD MADE PROGRESS WITH TRAINING OTHI?. 
?>ia3'. FOHCiS. I WARNED HIM THAT WHATEVER SIS CONSULTING ROLE U' ll 
U!|-i: /""C'JNiED TO, HI COULD NOT iECOr^I 7ISI3LF TO THE PRESS IN Ml 
--.•iS- ilTiOUT DAMAGING OUR CAUSi THEHt. I ALSO CAUTIONED THAT FL 
:,-L i J A ViRY MUCH ^'0R£ DELICATE ENVIRONMNT WITH RISPECT TO CIVIL- 
ILITAhY RELATIONS AND RESPECT FOR HUr'AN RIGHTS THAN ANT HE HAD 

::-.:.KArEL in before. 

;. (C) HE WILL WANT TO iLY WITH THE LSAF TO ESTABLISH HIS 
Ln-:.:ibILITY, BUT TEAT iJiT OF MACHI-SMO SEF^S TO Mi BOTH UNNECESSARY 
A:.J v'f.«ISE. 
1. (vj) MT J'Ji;GMENT IS TH/IT HIS ADVICE ♦ILL REINFORCE OURS, AND 

--"• f.E SHO:)LE PUT NO OBSTACLES IN HIS WAT TO CONSULTING *ITE 
"■"i^lUN OR sUSTILLO UNLESS AND UNTIL »E GETCOUNTERINCICATIONS . I 
.•.UOI'CEND TEAT JIM STEELE MEET WITH HImHH^HBHH AND AMiJASSALOR 
tlil'^i 4LS0 WA'JT 10. INTERVIEW HIM, BUT OJR MAIN IMEREST IS, AS I S^I 
:T, TO INSURi Wi; \NOW WHAT HE IS TILLING 5LANDCN AND 3USTILL0 Vn 
:-.--~AIIF AND OJT-BRIEF. ^^^^^^n 

(C) ASSUMING TOUH APPROVAL, I WILL SEND RODRIGUEZ TO^^^HHBI 
■C1.F.-C*, it FIB, ON ONE 01 MY C-12S. HE WILL ARRIVE AROUN: U«,c 
LCJAL. HE IS A LONG-TIKE FRIEND OF LOU RODRIGUEZ AND, IF AVAILAJLI, 
tO'JLC APPRiCIATE IT I? LOU COtllD BE HIS CONTACT POINT. I ANTICIPa:I 
;-.I WILL WANT TO DEPART FOR MIAMI ON SATURDAY. 
CiClAS OACR 

SSO NOTE: DILIVIR IMMIDIATZLT. Cr^joa 

r i- 22 o Partially Declassified/Released on /O rgS OP 

unoer previsions of E.O i2356 



■ SNN 



by K Johnson. Nalional Security Council 



wuissn 



.i 3 



372 



BACK CHANNEL 



WASSiH^ 



f"', 



^ 






TION: STATE RCI, IMMEDIATE 
USSOUTHCOM, iriMEOIATE 



EYES ONLY rC a:a f-'OTLEY AND JOHNSTONE; SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL 

GO? -a:; Fscr. Pickering 

Partially Declassified/Released on MfS^ ^h 
under provisions of E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 



J? J 



r-'EETING U'lTH FELIX RODRIGUEZ 



1. I HAD A VALUABLE MEETING WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ FEBRUARY 15. 

2. h£ HAS CUTLINED A TACTIC WHICH I BELIEVE HAS MERIT AND SHOULD 




OBVIOUSLY OTHER VARIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO . 

INTEGRATE^^^^^HH|H^^|lSSUE AND 

BEFORE IF IT IS TO WORK, SOMETHING I AGREE WITH ON ITS OWN. 



3. RODRIGUEZ WILL RETURN IN 3-4 WEEKS TO WORK WITH BUSTILLO 
(FAS) AND STEELE. STEELE WILL MONITOR CLOSELY. RODRIGUEZ UNDER- 
STANDS MY GENERAL RULES -- NO CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND HE IS NOT 
TO ACCOMPANY FAS ON COMBAT MISSJ Oil i^iJlllJULREES . WE WILL START 



irate 



373 



uHcuissn 



SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY TO SEE WHAT APPROACH CAN PRODUCE. HE WILL 
TAKE ON HIGHER P R I R I T Y^^Bm I S S I ON FIRST. 

t,. FOR ARA: PLEASE BRIEF DON GREGG IN VP ' S OFFICE FOR ME. 



UNClASSinED 



374 






mmm 

NATIONAL SECtWrrV COUNCIL 
WAS>»)aTON OC 2090* 



SYSTEM III 
91229 ^ 
Add-on 



'SECRET ^ December 10, 1985 

ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTfeR ^ 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTHt/ 

SUBJECT: Trip to the Central America Region 



31B^9 



Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet for a 
proposed trip to the Central American region headed by VADM 
Poindexter on December 11-12, 1985. 



Participants : 

VADM John M. Poindexter 

Asst Sec of State Elliott Abrams 

Dep A^^ See of Sf«fi» William Walker 

Mr. 



LTCOL Oliver North 
G. Philip Hughes 



General Itinerary: 






^1 I 



|3| 



i 



Depart 
Arrive 

Depart 

Arrive 
Depart 
Arrive 
Depart 
Arrive 
Depart 
Arrive 

Depart 
Arrive 



6:30 p.m.. Wed, Dec 11 Andrews AFB 
11:00 p.m. Howard AFB, Panama 

(Remain Overnight) 

9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 12 Howard AFB, Panama 
(save one hour enroute - change of time zone) 



9:00 
10:30 
11:40 

1:00 



p.m. 



1: 30 p.m. 



3:30 
5:15 



(gain one hour enroute 
6:30 p.m. 
12:00 midnight 



San Jose, Costa Rica 
San Jose, Costa Rica 
Ilopongo AB, El Salvador 
Ilopongo AB, El Salvador 
Palmerola AB, Honduras 
Palmerola AB, Honduras 
La Aurora AB, Guatemala City 
change of time zone) 

La Aurora AB, Guatemala City 
Andrews AFB 




NSC will defray expenses for North and Hughes' travel. Travel will h 
by military aircraft. Trip has been verbally approved by Poindexter 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you authorize Ric)c Benner to cut the appropriate travel orders 
for both North and Hughes. ic-i 

Approve Disapprove 

Attachment 

Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Authorization She 



SECRET 
Declassify: OADR 



UWWSfflffD 




375 



1. TRAVELES'S NAME: LTCOL Oliver North anS^ ■ Philip Hughes 

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(SI; '^° accompany VADM Poindexter on 

brief, low-profile trip to Central American region to confer with 
too ranking U.S. officials and to reinforce the continuity of U.S. 
policy in the region. (see cover memo for itinerary) 

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary) ; see cover mer. 

DEPARTURE DATE Wed, Dec 11 RETURN DATE Thurs, Dec 12 
TIME 6 = 30 p.m. TIME ^2t00 midnight 

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION: ... 
GOV AI R XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHE R 

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES: - ."....■ . 
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM xx OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST • ' " 

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC XX . OTHER 

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS; N/A - 



8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO xx 

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, 
Describe Source and Arrajigements ) : N/A 



10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: 



11. RE-MARKS (Use This' Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would 
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders) : 



12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: J/JAAM^ HoJ^ -fyT 

13. APPROVALS: _ 

DHCDBSIFIEr 



376 



UMOUfflED 

NATIONAL SECURrTY COUNCIL 
wasmvmton c zosoe 

December 2, 1985 
SECRET 

ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER 
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH >/ 

SUBJECT: Trip to Panama and Honduras 



^ 



SYSTEM I 
91229 






Based on your 
ttwj 



# 



idance, arrangements hav 



MHlip 

stance of yc 



cor vQu to 



T^^^ 



)ec 5) . The itinerary and substance of your meet' 

have Deen discussed with State (DASS Bill Walker) and SOUTHCOM 
(General Galvin) . 

Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet for a 
proposed trip to Panama and Honduras on December 4-5, 1985. 

Participants : 

ADM John M. Poindexter 

Mr. Richard Armitage 

Mr - W^i^l lam WalWc r 

Mr. 



LTCOL Oliver North 
Mr. Raymond Burghardt 



General Itinerary (details at Tabs III and IV) ; 

Depart 2:30 p.m.. Wed, Dec 4 Andrews AFB 

Arrive 7:35 p.m. Howard AFB, Panama 

(Remain Overnight) 

Depart 9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 5 Howard AFB, Panama 

Arrive 9:50 a.m. Palmerola AB, Honduras 

Depart 2:00 p.m., Thurs, Dec 5 Palmerola AB, Honduras 

Arrive 7:10 p.m. Andrews AFB 

NSC will defray expenses for North and Burghardt' s travel. 

Attached at Tab II is a memo from you to Don Regan requesting 
a Special Air Mission (SAM) support for this trip. 

Tabs III and IV provide an overview of the situation and the 
objectives we hope to achieve in Panama and Honduras, 
respectively. Detailed talJcing points for your use during the 
trip will be provided separately. 

State (Wallcer) , Defense (Armitage), CIA^^^^^ and Raf '^*''^''<^ *- 
Burghardt concur. 



Declassify: OADR 



ims^ED 



377 



SECRET 



RECOMMENDATIONS 



uNoranED 

2 



1. That you authorize Rick Benner to cut the appropriate travel 
orders for North and Burghardt. 

Approve Disapprove 

2. That you initial and forward the memo at Tab II to Don Regan 
requesting SAM support for the trip. 

Approve Disapprove 

3. That you review Tabs III and IV prior to the trip. 

Approve Disapprove 



cc: Rick Benner (w/o Tabs II, III, and IV) 



Attachments 

Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet 

Tab II - Poindexter Memo to Regan 

Tab III - Current Situation and our Objectives for Panama 

Tab IV - Current Situation and our Objectives for Honduras 



UNttASSIFED 



378 



nciifflQi: 



1- TRAVELER'S NAMZ:_ 

2. PURPOSECS), EVENTCS), DATE(SI: For official meetxnos ,n Panama 
and Honduras DP^^m har .-" i^g s. 



^^213: 



3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): see 



SYSTEM II 912: 



DEPARTURE DATE Wed, Dec 4 RETURN DATE Thurs, Dec 5 
TIME 2:30 p.m. yi^E "^-^0 P-"- - 

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION: . .'. " 
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHE R 

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES: . - ^ _.-... . 
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM XX OTHER , TOTAL TRIP COST $252 .-0^ °' 

6. WHO PA/S EXPENSES: NSC XX . OTHER 

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: ^^^ " 



8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO XX 



'• llsl°A.7i:ill '^l ^i^JS^^ff. '" ^"-!; "" '■" '^ ^— ^" - 



10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: $ q.qq 

^^' ^^l in^!.?^*"!^*^* ^° Indicate Any Additional Items You Would 
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders) : 



THAVZLER'S SIGNATURE: <^ 00^^ UoAt - JP(]Jt^ 

DiraSSlFIET 



12. 

13. APPROVALS: 



379 




SYSTEM i: 
91229 



CONFIDENTIAL 



^;90^ 



MEMORANUUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN 

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER 

SUBJECT: Special Air Miasion (SAM) Support 



It is requested that a SAM C-20 aircraft be provided for a 
proposed trip to Panama and Honduras on December 4-5, 1985. The 
purpose of the trip is to review the current situation in Central 
America with key government officials in these two countries. 
The itinerary for the trip is indicated below: 

Proposed Itinerary 



Depart 


2:30 p.m. , 


, Wed, Dec 4 


Andrews AFB — 


Arrive 


7:35 p.m. 




Howard AFB, Panama 
(Remain Overnight) 


Depart 


9:00 a.m., 


, Thurs, Dec 5 


Howard AFB, Panama 


Arrive 


9:50 a.m. 




Palmerola AB, Honduras 


Depart 


2:00 p.m., 


, Thurs, Dec 5 


Palroerola AB, Honduras 


Arrive 


7:10 p.m. 




Andrews AFB 



The Honorable Richard P. Riley 
Assistant to the President and 

Director of Special Support Services 



CONFIDENTIAL 
Declassify: OADR 



mmm 






m^ 



Y/zr/?7 



"i^mim 



381 

numiED 



Based on discuisions with Walker at State and General Galvin, the 
following detailed itineary has been proposed for Panama: 

"Wednesday, December 4, 1985 ; 

1935: Arrive Howard AFB, Panama; proceed to USAP Hdqtrs 

1940 - 2010: 30 minute briefing w/General Galvin at USAF Hdqtrs 

2010 - 2030: ^Procee^jl^l|SOUTHCOM auto to SOUTHCOM Hdqtrs^H 




- 2100: ^H^^HHII^^^^^B attendees: 
GaTvin^waTxer 

2115 - 2200: Recap briefing at CG, USSOUTHCOM residence w/O.S. 
team and General Galvin 

2200 - morn: Poindexter RON at Qtrs 1 w/General Galv-iti; 
remainder of U.S. team RON at Casa Carribe 

Thursday, December 5, 1985 

0700 - 0730: Breakfast (Qtrs 1 and Casa Carribe) 

0730 - 0745: Proceed to USSOUTHCOM Op Ctr 

0745 - 0845: USSOUTHCOM regional security briefing 

0845 -0900: Proceed to Howard AFB, Panama 

0905 - 0950: Enroute to Honduras via C-20 



wmm 



382 



ISbBSr/f// 



51907 



CURRENT SITUATION/OBJECTIVES FOR HONDURAS 




Thursday, December 5, 1985 



0950 



lOOO - 1215; 



1215 - 1315! 



1315 - 14001 



1400 - 1910: 



Arrive Palmcrola Air Base, Honduras (save one 
hour enroute — 1 hour and 50 minute flight) 



attendees: 
Ferch 



Discussions with 
Poindexter, U.S. teaST 

Working lunch at CTF Bravo (U.S. military exercise 
hdqtrs) 

Op tio ns; 

A 

B - (.ountry team orieiTing by AmEmb Tegucigalpa 
Enroute from Palmerola Air Base to Andrews AFB 




SECRET 
Declassify; OADR 



mmm 



UNE»SglFIED 



SYSTEM :: 

91229 

NATIONAL SECURfTY COUNCI- 
WASMWGTON C SOSOc 



December 10, 1985 /^.,'^^t6'6^.'«^J«w 
SECRET 

ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. P0INDEXT4p. 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTI^ 

SUBJECT: Cable to Posts Advising of Your Trip to the 
Central America Region 

The cable attached at Tab I has been coordinated directly with 
Elliott Abrams, Amb John Ferch, and General Galvin. Please note 
once we arrive in Panama aboard C-20 we will be using General 
Galvin 's C-9 in-theater. This will allow sufficient rest for 
your aircrew and provide more space for traveling team 
in-theater. Paul Thompson has coordinated aircraft support and 
exchange of aircraft. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you auth oyr^ ?6i d ispatch of the cable at Tab I 
(Op Immed via|HB^hannel) . 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachment 

Tab I - Poindexter Cable to Central American Posts 



cc: Paul Thompson 
Philip Hughes 



Declassify: OADR 



UNHftSStHED 



384 



WHITE HOUSE 






TO: AM EMB PANAMA CITY, PANAMA 
AM EMB SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA 
AM EMB SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR 
AM EMB TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS 
AM EMB GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA 
USCINCSO, QUARRY HTS , PANAMA 

INFO: SEC STATE, WASH, D.C. 
SEC DEF, WASH, D.C. 
DIR. CIA, WASH, D.C. 
CHMN. JCS, WASH, D.C. 

SECRET //EYES ONLY 

SUBJ: VISIT TO CENTRAL AMERICA BY ASST. TO PRESIDENT FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DESIG. JOHN M. POINDEXTER (C) 

1. SECRET—ENTIRE TEXT. 

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, 
VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER, TO MAKE A HASTY, LOW-PROFILE TRIP TO 
CENTRAL AMERICA TO CONFER WITH TOP RANKING U.S. OFFICIALS AND TO 
REINFORCE THE CONTINUITY OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION. IN EACH 



mtisma 



385 



SECRi 



rtM 



B 



LOCATION THE NATIONA^£^TT^nviSOR WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH 
U.S: AMBASSADOR, m^HHH^ AND SENIOR MILITARY 

REPRESENTATIVES. INVITATION OF CINC U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, 
GENERAL GALVIN , FOR USE OF HIS AIRCRAFT IN-THEATER IS qjt^PEnJLLY 
ACCEPTED. WASHINGTON BASED C-20 WILL PROCEED TO cftvTEMALA TO 
RENDEZVOUS WITH WASHINGTON PARTY. 

3. PURPOSE OF THE TRIP IS TO MEET WITH U.S. OFFICIALS NOT REPEAT 
NOT WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. PLEASE EMPHASIZE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS 
THAT NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR INTENDS THAT THIS BRIEF, INFORMAL 
FAMILIARIZATION TRIP WILL BE FOLLOWED AT A FUTURE DATE BY A 
LONGER VISIT WHICH WILL ALLOW MEETINGS WITH REGIONAL HEADS OF 
STATE AND ADDITIONAL HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMBASSADORS 
SHOULD STRESS THAT THIS SECOND VISIT WILL PROBABLY OCCUR AFTER 
INSTALLATION /INAUGURATION OF NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENTS IN COSTA 
RICA, HONDURAS, AND GUATEMALA. 

4. WASHINGTON PARTY WILL ARRIVE VIA SAM C-20 AND CONSIST OF: 

VADM JOHN P0IND3XTER, DESIG. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO PRES 

ASST SEC OF STATE ELLIOTT ABRAMS 

PEP ASST SEC OF STATB WILLIAM WALKER 

MR. 

LTCOL OLIVER NORTH, NSC STAFF 

G. PHILIP HUGHES, NSC STAFF 

CDR PAUL THOMPSON, MIL ASST TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 

2 WHCA COMMUNICATORS 



msmut 



82-690 0-88-14 



386 



secre: 



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5. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY VISIT HOST 
NATION AND U.S. MILITARY UNITS IN THE REGION AND INFORMALLY MEET 
WITH CERTAIN KEY OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN AIDING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION AS INDICATED BELOW. WASHINGTON 
PARTY WILL BE INFORMALLY ATTIRED SINCE MOST STOPS WILL OCCUR AT 
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. ITINERARY IS PLANNED AS FOLLOWS: 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1985 
18 30 DEPART ANDREWS AFB 
2300 ARRIVE HOWARD AFB PANAMA 

(RON QTRS 1 U.S. CINCSO, GEN GALVIN) 



THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1985 
0730 BREAKFAST AT QTRS 1 
0800 DEPART FOR VIP LOUNGE, HOWARD AFB 

0830-0900 WD LIKE TO MEET PRIVATELY IN VIP LOUNGE AT HOWARD AFB 
■^^^^^^^HaMB BRZGGS, gen GALVIN, ASST SEC ABRAMS 
IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. 
0900 WHEELS UP FOR SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA 

(SAVE ONE HOUR ENROUTE - CHANGE OF TIME ZONE) 
0900-1030 WD PREFER MTG AT CARIARI HOTEL OR AIRPORT W/AMB TAMBS , 
JEN GALVIN, AND REMAINDER OF U.S. TEAM FOLLOWED BY 




mmmm 



387 



SECRE': 



wsmm 



^a9A2 



THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 198 5 (CONT'D...) 
1030 WHEELS UP FOR ILOPONGO AB EL SALVAADOR 

1140-1300 MTG AT ILOPONGO W/AMBE^ORR, GEN GALVIN, COL STEELE, 
AND MILGP CHIEF, AND^^BfD LIKE TO MEET BRIEFLY W/DEF 
MIN VIDES AND GEN BLANDON AND BRIEFLY INSPECT AIR 
FORCE/COUNTER-INSURGENCY ASSETS. BRIEF RE CURRENT 
OPERATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM 
WD BE HELPFUL. 
1300 VraEELS UP FOR PALMEROLA AB HONDURAS _ 

1330-1530 MTG AT PALMEROLA W/AMB JOHN FERCH , ^^^GEH GALVIN AT 
CTF BRAVO. WD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY FqR_ 
^EAT PRIVATE Ml 

1530 WHEELS UP FOR LA AURORA AB GUATEMALA CITY 

(GAIN ONE HOUR - CHANGE OF TIME ZONE) 
1715-1820 MTG AT LA A URORA A B GUATEMALA CITY W/AMB PIEDRA, 

GEN GALVIN , ^^HpOLCONS , AND REMAINDER OF U.S. T EAM; 

WD LIKE TO MEET BRIEFLY] 





DISCUSSION OF 
COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM WD ALSO BE HELPFUL. 
WHEELS UP FOR ANDREWS AFB 
ARRIVE ANDREWS AFB 



UKtIigSIHED 



388 



UWSmED 



S19'^^ 



6. WASHINGTON PARTY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE RE VISAS AND CUSTOMS 
CLEARANCE IN THAT TIME HAS NOT PERMITTED NORMAL VISA PROCESSING, 
REGARDS, POINDEXTER. 



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RICHARD AR«ITAGE 


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ELLIOTT ABRAMS 


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y,SG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA Ae^'Vw^ 01/24/86 10:56:23 
To: NSWGH --CPUA ^ , J- 

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON N I U I U C 

Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid 

FYI in case question comes up or Arraitage should call. Thanks. 
••• Forwarding note from NSRFB — CPUA 01/24/86 09:59 ••• 
To: NSWFM —CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP 



NOTE FROM: Raymond Burghardt 
SUBJECT: Meeting on Contra Aid 



DNCUSSIflfO 



I just got a call from Rich Armitage, who was politely registering 
a protest that he was not invited to the meeting this afternoon. 
He said he was in the meeting on Tuesday and had 'left his 
calendar cleared" in expectation of a meeting today, but never 
got a call. He was aware that you had convened a session for this 
afternoon. I just said that when I got back from my trip i found 
a meeting was scheduled but didn't know much about it and thought 
it was only you, Elliott and myself. I recommend we leave the 
composition unchanged, because it would be impossible to discuss 
diplomatic initiatives with Defense there. 

CC: NSOLN —CPUA P'^ally Oeciassified/Released onl!t^8S 

^^ nIfEG .-CPUA K ""O^^O'Ov.s.onsotEO 12356 

CC : NSFEG - -CPUA by K Johnson. National Secunty Council 




MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA 01/24/86 11:32:34 

To: NSRFB —CPUA 

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON 

Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid 

From Fortier. 

•*• Forwarding note from NSDRF --CPUA 01/24/86 11:26 ••• 

To: NSWRP —CPUA I 

Reply to note of 01/24/86 10:55 ^ -^ V 1 ^ 






NOTE FROM: DONAU) R. FORTIER ' 

Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid 

RAY, RICH WAS THERE LAST WEEK WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR A 
DIPLOMATIC COMPONENT. HE KNOWS ELLIOTT WAS TASKED TO PRODUCE A 
PAPER FOR TODAY. HIS NOT GETTING AN INVITATION WAS AN OVERSIGHT. 
I TAKE YOUR POINT, BUT THINK WE NEED TO INCLUDE HIM. WE DISCUSSED 
WITH ABRAMS AND MICHEL THE COMPOSITION OF THE POLICY GROUP, AND 
THEY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD INCLUDE RICH BUT NOT JCS OR NESTOR. I 
THINK THEN THAT WE HAD BETTER ACKNOWLEDGE THE OVERSIGHT AND 
INVITE RICH. IF WE HAVE TO HAVE A MORE PRIVATE SESSION LATER WE 
CAN. BUT WE HAVE A LOT OP WORK TO DO TODAY - THAT CAN'T WAIT - 
ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PACKAGE, ROLE OF DEFENSE IN TRAINING, 
ETC. 



VNCUSSIFIED 



400 



MSG FROM: NSWGH — CPUA 01/24/86 12:15:28 

To: NSOLN —CPUA NSRKS --CPUAi iriinQ 

NSRFB --CPUA n I U I Ui> 




— SECRET — 

NOTE FROM: WILMA HALL 

SUBJECT: Today's 4:00 pm Mtg 

Don Fortier has decided he is going to need more time with the 
just the participants of the 3:00 pm group to discuss Contra Aid 
Issue. Therefore, he has aslted me to reschedule the 4:00 pm mtg 
re legis strategy of Contra Aid Issue to 10:00 am, Mon, Jan 27 -- 
sane participants as 3:00 pm group plus legis types. This note 
is your notification of change -- all others have already been 
informed by me via phone. 



NSJLC —CPUA 
NSWRP — CPUA 



NSFH 


—CPUA 


NSJMH 


— CPUA 


NSCEC 


—CPUA 



,.*<- 



Partially Oeciassified/Released oni_LH€*3S > '//. ' 

under provisions of E 12356 ^ "^ Ji/^ 

"- " Johnson, National Security Council L^ "l^ I t 



i^Ui 



^v/^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



401 



Kfimim 



N 10110 



THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 



C^^ .^X^ /^^"^ 
Q\oo "TU^^s- «j/njw^ "t— 

Par«aflyDec(3ss,WReleasedon_£rFe«<gft /(/' ^3*^ . i^. Ui ^ ^^ ^^"^ 

by K Johnson Na.ona,Secun,yCo.nc,l ^^ ^ , jL.,3^ JU^J^ J /^>^>w i^*^^^ 



"Ncuss/fe 



402 



— -.. lINCLASJvlFIFfl 



MSG FROM: NSWRP — CPUA |||V||"| A V V I LI L II ^ ^4 / 86 10:56:23 

N 10111 



NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON 

Subject: jleeting on Contra Aid 

FYI in case question comes up or Armitage should call. Thanks. 

••• Forwarding note from NSRFB --CPUA 01/24/86 09:59 ••• 

To: NSWFM —CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP 

NOTE FROM: Raymond Burghardt 
SUBJECT: Meeting on Contra Aid 

I just got a call from Rich Armitage, who was politely registering 
a protest that he was not invited to the meeting this afternoon. 
He said he was in the meeting on Tuesday and had "l«ft his 
calendar cleared" in expectation of a meeting today, but never 
got a call. He was aware that you had convened a session for this 
afternoon. I just said that when I got back from my trip I found 
a meeting was scheduled but didn't know much about it and thought 
it was only you, Elliott and myself. I recommend we leave the 
composition unchanged, because it would be impossible to discuss 
diplomatic initiatives with Defense there. 



cc: NSOLN — CPUA 
cc: NSFEG --CPUA 



Partially Declassified/Released nn lll'£3 g.8 
undet provisions o( E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Secunty Council 



UNCLASSIRED 



403 




MSG FROM: NSWRP — CPU, 
To: NSRFB — CPUA 

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON 

Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid 

From Fortier. 

*•• Forwarding note from NSDRF — CPUA 

To: NSWRP --CPUA 

**• Reply to note of 01/24/86 10:55 

— SECRET — 

NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER 

Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid 



01/24/86 11:32:34 

N 10112 
01/24/86 11:26 *•• 



RAY, RICH WAS THERE LAST WEEK WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR A 
DIPLOMATIC COMPONENT. HE KNOWS ELLIOTT WAS TASKED TO PRODUCE A 
PAPER FOR TODAY. HIS NOT GETTING AN INVITATION WAS AN OVERSIGHT. 
I TAKE YOUR POINT, BUT THINK WE NEED TO INCLUDE HIM. WE DISCUSSED 
WITH ABRAMS AND MICHEL THE COMPOSITION OF THE POLICY GROUP, AND 
THEY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD INCLUDE RICH BUT NOT JCS OR NESTOR. I 
THINK THEN THAT WE HAD BETTER ACKNOWLEDGE THE OVERSIGHT AND 
INVITE RICH. IF WE HAVE TO HAVE A MORE PRIVATE SESSION LATER WE 
CAN. BUT WE HAVE ?. ICT OF WORK TO DC TODAY - THAT CAN'T V.'AIT - 
ON THK COMPOSITION OF THE PACKAGE, ROLE OF DEFENSE IN TRAINING, 
ETC. 



Partiaily Declassified/Released on l\\'63 S^ 
under pravisions ot E 12355 
by K Johnson, National SeCLrMy Council 



UNCUSSIFIED 



404 



405 



HAHE: HIR212002 



UNClASSlFe .. 



RP^S HAZUR 



DCnX DOMOCK 



GE 1 




DEPOSITIOH or MARTIN L. ARTIAKO 

Friday, July 31 , 1987 

House of Repzasentatives , 
Select Conmittea on Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 
Washington, O.C. 



The select comiittee mat, pursuant to call, at 10=00 a.m., 
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Oiilca Building, Thomas Fryman 
(Staff Counsel to the Housa Select Committee] presiding. 

On behalf of the Housa Select Committee: Thomas Fryman, 
Staff Counsel; Spencer Oliver and Bert Hammond, Associate 
Staff Counsel: and Kenneth R. Buck, Assistant Minority 
Counsel . 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee = James E. Kaplan 
and Thomas HcGough, Associate Counsel. 

On behalf of the Witness: Thomas P. Heehan, Attorney at 
Law, Sherman, Haahan C Curtin, P.C. 



Partialir OedniflRt^Reie^ 

by D. Sirko, NaUonal Security Council 



■ provisions cf LO. 12355 



UNCUSSIHEO 



406 



KAME' HIR212002 



UNCIASSIBEO 



PAGE 



MR. FRYHAH: Okay, shall ue swear the witness? 
NOTARY: Hi. Hy name is Charlie Vallen. I am from 
the Sergeant at Arms Office. I ara a notary for the District 
of Columbia. 
Whereupon , 

MARTIN L. ARTIAHO 
was called for as a witness and, after being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 Will you state your full name for the record? 
A Martin L. Artiano. A-r-t-i-a-n-o . 
2 Mr. Artiano, you are appearing today pursuant to 
subpoena, are you not? 
A Yes, sir. 

2 And you are represented by Thomas P. Meehan as your 
counsel ? 

A That is correct. 

MR. FRYMAN: For the record, I just want to state 
that prior to the deposition, Mr. Meehan has received copies 
of the resolution establishing the House Connittee, House 
Rasolution Ho. 12, as well as a copy of the rules governing 
the operation of the House Committee. 
MR. MEEHAH: Yes, I have. 
BY MR. FRYMAN :_• ^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



407 



NAME: 
49 
50 
5' 
52 
53 
5U 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
6U 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 



HIR2 12002 



yNCLASSHO ,... 



2 Mr. Artiano, what is your occupation? 
A I an an attorney. 

2 Where do you uork? 

A I am a partner at the law firm of Anderson, Hiebl--H- 
e-b-1, Nauheim--N-a-u-h-e-i-ra, and Blair--B-l-a-i-r . 

2 That located here m Washington, D.C.? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 How long have you been a partner in that firm? 

A I have been a partner, I believe, for four years. 

2 That would be since 19837 

A Yes, sir, I think that is correct. 

2 And were you employed by that firm before then? 

A I was . 

2 In the position of an associate? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 And for how long were you an associate there? 

A I believe for two years. 

2 Is there any particular area of legal practice in 
which you specialize? 

A I guess I specialize in adninistrative law. My 
focus over the last several years has been in real estate 
transactions . 

2 You are a member oi the District of Columbia Bar? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 When were you Jtdtaitted? 



UNCUSSIFlEi 



408 



NAME ■■ 
7U 
75 
76 
77 
li 
79 



HIR2 12002 



ONClASSIfiEO „ 



GE 



A Well--I guess '82 or "83; I uas a member of the 
California Bar prior thereto, and I believe a year or two 
after I arrived, I became a member of the D.C. Bar. 

S When were you admitted to the California Bar? 
A 1975. 

2 Are you a member of the Bar of any other 
ur isdictions ? 
A No, Sir. 

e Where did you receive your undergraduate degree? 
A New York University. 
2 What year? 
A 1970 or '71, I am not certain. 

MR. FRYMAN: Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.] 

MR. FRYMAN: Okay. Back on the record. 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 You received your undergraduate degree in 197 1 fr 
NYU? 

A I believe it was. 
2 And youz major was what? 

A I think I had a combined major, political 
science/philosophy major. 

a And when did you graduate from law school? 

A 1975. 

2 And what was tha^ law school 



UNCLASSIFiE 



409 



NAME: 


HIR2 12002 


99 


A 


100 


2 


101 


A 


102 


e 


103 


A 


ion 


2 


10S 


A 


106 


York Uni 


107 


2 


108 


A 



UNCLASSlfiEO 



'AGE 



California Western. 

Where is that located? 

San Diego. 

Were you enrolled in law school for four years? 

No. 

Did you'uork for a year between? 

No, I attended the Masters in Finance Program at New 

vetsity for a year. 

And did you receive a degree iron HYU? 

No, I left--ray Master's Degree? I left to begin law 
school prior to completing the master's program. 

Q You received your law degree in 1975, and you began 
work at your present firm in Washington in approximately 
1981-- 

A That is correct. 

2 --as I understand it. 

Would you identify chronologically the jobs that you 
held between law school and between the time you began with 
your present firm? 

A Well, through 1976, I was a staff assistant to Mr. 
Reagan in his bid for the nomination, which was as we all 
know unsuccessful. After returning to San Diego, I can't 
tell you exactly how months after returning I became a 
partner in the law firm of Hasserman--H-a-s-s-e-r-m-a-n, 
Geile--G-e-i-l-e , and_*itiano. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



410 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 V ■ 1 Vial ■%# W • ■ tMm** PAGE 6 

1214 In 1979, I guess, or late '79, early '80, I can't 

125 recall exactly when, I became involved in Mr. Reagan's '80 

126 campaign, and stayed through--through the general election. 

127 Thereafter served--! served on the transition team, 

128 served briefly as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

129 State, served briefly as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 

130 for the Bureau of International Organizations and left 

131 approximately-left State approximately May or June of '81 to 

132 begin work with Anderson-Hiebl . 

133 2 Prior to your work with Ronald Reagan in 1975 and 
1314 1976. had you worked with him in any capacity? 

135 A No, sir. 

136 2 How did you obtain the job in 1975? 

13? . A I was clerking for a law firm in San Diego and one 

138 of the clients of that law firm was a gentleman who was--I 

139 guess a friend of ex-Governor Reagan's, knew of his 

mo intention to declare for the nomination, and I was asked by 

111 the--one of the attorneys for whom I worked at the time to 

1142 take a trip to Lafayette, Louisiana, and did so with Mr. 

1143 Reagan--did so. 

luu Spent a week, and at the end of che week was invited 

1145 by Hr . Reagan and his immediate staff then to stay on board 

IKb throughout the campaign. 

1ii7 2 Uhat were your responsibilities during the period in 

148 1975 and 1976? ^'^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



411 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 UllUUIIWWil l^-V pACE 7 

149 A I was doing advance operations — I guess is the best 

150 way to describe it. 

15 1 . 2 Can you elaborate on uhat that involved? 

152 A That involved preceding the candidate to this 

153 intended destination and making arrangements for hira and for 
15>4 his party while he was there, for arranging whatever 

155 speaking or meeting agenda items were to take place. 

156 At that stage of his run for the nomination, there 

157 were very few of us, so our responsibilities occasionally 

158 spilled over into other areas. 

159 Ue would collect information where it was feasible 

160 or felt it might be interesting to one of the advisors to 

161 Mr. Reagan, and served in some capacities as a quasi- 

162 personal aide when he arrived--f rom the time he arrived until 

163 the time he departed, and supervised to the extent that this 

164 was the case, other advance people who were on ground 

165 working that site and worked closely with the Secret Service 

166 to ensure the security of the candidate. 

167 2 To whom did you report in this job? 

168 A I reported principally to Chuck Tyson. 

169 . 2 And what was his position? 

170 A You know, I can't remember titles. Ha may have been 
17 1 Director of the Advance Operations--! guess it would 

172 be--fairly accurate description of his role. 

173 2 Did you have iH Hhis job daily contact with Ronald 



ONClASSIFItO 



412 



UNCIASSIRE 



NAME: HIR212002 

174 Reagan? 

175 A No. To the eKtent that I uas on the ground and he 

176 uas there from the time he arrived until he left, yes, I had 

177 daily contact uith him. 

178 2 Did you first meet him in connection with this trip 

179 to Louisiana that you described? 

180 A Yes, sir. 

181 e And hou many raonths--let me rephrase the question. 

182 You say this job extended from 1975 to 1976. How many 

183 months did this involve? Was this six months or eight 
ISU months? 

185 A I couldn't be precise in ray answer to that. It uas 

186 probably around six to nine months, although I am not 

187 certain. 

188 2 Okay. 

189 And during this period of time, is it correct to say 

190 that normally, you would have personal contact with Ronald 
19 1 Reagan at least every week? 

192 . A I guess that is probably a fair estimation. 

193 2 And there was some periods of time when you would 

194 have daily contact with him? 

195 A Yes, sir. 

196 2 And some periods when you would not meet with him 

197 personally for several days, I take it? 

198 A That IS correct! I think for purposes of 



wmi\m 



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UNCUSSiriED 



NAME' HIR212002 ^ | 1 Vbl l^' ^^ ■ " ■ ■— — ' PkGZ 9 

199 clarification, I was not an advisor to Mr. Reagan at the 

200 tine, so ray contact was in the form of advance man's 

201 contact. It uas not the kind of contact where we would sit 

202 down and chat or where he would discuss issues with me. 

203 2 Did he call you by your first name? 

204 A I think after a while, he probably did. I guess I 

205 he did. 

206 2 Did you call him by his first nana? 

207 A No. 

208 fi What did you call him? 

209 A I called him Governor. 

2 10 . 2 You say there were a number of advance men doing 

2 11 this type of job. ApproKimately how many were there during 

212 this period? 

213 A I think back in '76, I would guess there were full- 
2 1U time somewhere between seven and 10 of us in the country. 
215 There were just very few. 

2 16 2 And you understood that you reported to Chuck Tyson. 

217 A That is correct. 

2 18 . 2 Now, what was the chain of command above Tyson, as 

2 19 you understood it? 

220 A Well, certainly Hr . Deaver was almost always with 

22 1 NX. Reagan in those days, and final decisions to the extent 

222 that I uas certainly aware of them or advised of them were 

223 in Mike's hands, in tejnJs of the nature of operations that I 



UNCLASSiFiEO 



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XAPIE^ HIR2120I 

224 uas involved in. 

225 Mr, Heese uas not at that point--in my recollection, 

226 Mr. Meese uas not always present on these trips uith Mr. 

227 Reagan, but he uas certainly there a significant amount of 

228 the time. 

229 Mr. Nofziger was the Press Secretary I believe then, 

230 and other than those three people, I had no 

231 contact--vir tually no contact uith John Sears, who was our 

232 Campaign Manager then, and that was pretty much the circle 

233 of people that I dealt with on a regular basis. 

234 2 Were you on a first-name basis uith Mr. Deaver? 

235 A Yes. 

236 2 Hou frequently did you speak uith him and conf«r 

237 with him, on the average? 

238 A Well, any time I uas on the ground at a location at 

239 the same time the Governor uas there, I saw Hike regularly. 

240 2 So it uould be more than once a week? 

241 A Probably. 

242 2 And sometimes maybe periods of every day? 

243 A Sure. 

244 2 Were you on a first-name basis uith Hr . Meese? 

245 A Yes. 

246 & How frequently did you hav« contact uith him or meet 

247 with him? 

248 A Mot often. W%.- <iidn' t— I frankly think at that stage. 



UNCLASSiFIE 



415 



UNCLASSIFIE 



NAnE- HIR212002 llllLll_riWII • =- »^ PAGE tl 

249 wouldn't characterize our contact as meetings, I guess. I 

250 didn't sit in on any of the policy meetings. It uas 

251 certainly several times a month. 

252 It's hard to go back and estimate. I may have seen 

253 him more than that if he were traveling a lot around-- 

254 e Is It fair to say you would see him m a room from 

255 time to time, and he would speak to you and you would speak 

256 to him? 

257 A Sure. You have to put this in perspective. My 

258 principal responsibility was to create events essentially, 

259 and make sure they ran smoothly, and when Meese was 

260 traveling with then-Governor Reagan, he uas there, and while 

261 the Governor was speaking, for example, during a dinner, the 

262 staff would huddle at a table in the back of the room, if it 

263 was a dinner or a speech and talk, and evenings ue would 

264 occasionally get together. 

265 S Were you on a first-name basis with Hr . Nofziger? 

266 A Yes. 

267 2 How frequently during this period did you see Mr. 

268 Nofziger? 

269 A I would guess about the same number of times I saw 

270 nx . Meese, because Mr. Kofziger also traveled, I believe, 
27 1 pretty much and stayed with Governor Reagan. 

272 e The campaign came to an end, and you got a ]ob with 

273 the firm in San Diego that you identified, the Hasserman 



UNCUSSIFiE!) 



416 



UNCLASSIFIfD 



NAME HIR212002 |||\|1.| ii.\Ainrfii PAGE 12 

27U firm. 

275 A Yes. not immediately after I returned. It was 

276 probably six to nine months after I returned. I am guessing 

277 at a stretch of time here. 

278 e Were you taking a sabbatical for a while? 

279 A No . I uas--I uas doing a couple of things. I had a 

280 friend uho I had graduated law school with who was then 

281 representing some artist in Los Ang«les, and he involved me 

282 in that briefly, and I looked at a couple of other things. 

283 I uas looking around, and trying to make some 

284 decisions. 

285 2 And then you found this opening with the Wasseman 

286 firm? 

287 A Yes. I had graduated with Hr . Gaile. Mr. Uasserman 

288 uas about 20 to 25 years older than ua were. 

289 2 And joined that firm as a partner. 

290 A Yes. 

29 1 Q And you worked there for approximately four years? 

292 A Three, three and a half years — I guess until I 

293 started with--until I rejoined th« Reagan campaign in 1979. 

294 2 During this period, did you continue to have contact 

295 with Mr. Deavar? 

296 A No. I received--wa exchanged letters on a couple of 

297 occasions. I believe I saw Mr. Oeavar certainly a few times 

298 during a stretch. Tho^c^ ware occasions when Governor Reagan 



UNCmSSIFlEO 



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would be in San Diego, for example, to speak to a group or 
attend a dinner, and I uould get a call and assist in the 
advance work. 

2 During this period, did you--did you meet with 
Governor Reagan at any time? 

A Had no private meetings with Governor Reagan. I was 
with him at at least one event I can clearly recall, but had 
very little contact with him. riayba on one or two 
occasions . 

2 Did you continue on speaking terms uith him? He 
uould speak to you and you would speak to him. He uould 
call you Marty and you would call him Governor? 

A I think after the passaga of about a year, I am sure 
someone rafreshad his memory as to names before we saw each 
other. Ue didn't have any in-depth or extensive 
conversations . 

I think the longest stretch of time I ever spent 
individually speaking to Kx . Reagan, and was waiting in the 
back of a limousine, because ue were early for an event, and 
It uas delightful. 

2 But Hx . Deaver would look to you for — 

A Ha would look first, I think, to Hr . Tyson. Hx . 
Tyson would than call ma and paxhaps ona ox two other 
people, depending on the nature of tha event. 

2 And again, Mr.^T*yson was your supaxiox in the 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



82-690 0-88-15 



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HIR212002 



iiNWssra 



>AGE 14 



campaign. Chuck Tyson? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 And was he located in San Diego also? 

A Yes, he was. 

e Was he a lawyer in San Diego? 

A No. 

2 Did you specialize in any particular area of 
practice when you were at the Wasserman iirn? 

A We had a pretty general practice. There were only 
the three oi us in that firm. I think for a period of about 
a year, we had one associate and perhaps had sone clerks 
working for us throughout. 

2 During this period, we talked about your dealings 
with Mr. Deaver. Did you have any contacts during this 
period with Hr . Meese? 

A I may have seen hin a couple of times. Again, in 
the same circumstances when Governor Reagan was around, but 
we didn't get together by ourselves. 

2 Did you have any contacts with Mr. Kofziger? 

A I guess the sane answer, sane kind of scenario. 

2 You testified that you later becane involved in the 
1980 campaign on behalf of Ronald Reagan? 

A That is correct. 

2 How did you get a job in the 1980 campaign? 

A Well, I was caJ.ied by--I don't recall whether the 



iiNcwssife 



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HIR2 12002 



\1NWSSW ,.„ 



NAHE: 

349 telephone call came from Chuck Tyson or Ed Meesa, but I was 

350 aakftd to come up to Los Angeles initially for a couple of 

35 1 H*«ks to help them organize a national advance 

352 opeiation--scheduling an advance operation. 

353 2 Approximately when was this call? 

35U A I couldn't tell you. I honestly don't recall what 

355 month it came in. If we track back to the beginning of the 

356 '80 campaign, it would be right about then. 

357 C Would it have been in 1980? 

358 A You know, I don't know. I don't know whether we 

359 started it in 1980 or whether we got started in '79. I 

360 honestly couldn't tell you. 

36 1 . S And did you, in response to this call, go to Los 

362 Angeles for two weeks to help organize? 

363 A I did. I didn't stay there. I flew up every 

364 morning and flew back every night for a couple of weeks. 

365 2 Who were you reporting to in this capacity? 

366 A I was working again with Hr . Tyson principally. 

367 2 Did you have contact with Mr. Deaver? 

368 A Yes. 

369 2 Daily contact? 

370 ^. A I don't know. All of us were in the office m Los 

37 1 Mil lies — within the Deaver-Hannaf ord office. That is were we 

372 were putting this together. Deaver — H-a-n-n-a-f-o-r-d . They 

373 have a public relations ^irm in Los Angeles, and Governor 



UNClASSiFe 



420 



mussifit 



NAME: HIR212002 i llllJL.rtW V > ■ • ** " PAGE 16 



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Reagan's office was in there as well, so although I don't 
havA any specific lecollection, I an sure I saw Mike quite 
frequently then. 

e What uas the frequency of your contact, if there uas 
any. with Mr. Heese during this period? 

A Well, I guess Mr. Keese and I saw each other very 
regularly, because ue uould occasionally be taking the sane 
flight up in the norning. He also was returning to San 
Diego in the evenings, taking a 6=30 PSA shuttle up and an 
8:30 shuttle back, and we would often to that together. 

Q You would sit next to each other on the plane? 

A Sonetinas . 

2 Uas rir . Tyson also connutlng from San Diego? 

A Occasionally he was flying back and forth. Ue would 
sonetines take a roon--there were two hotels innediately 
across the street fron the building — depending on the 
workload . 

If it got too late, we would overnight in Los 
Angeles . 

2 What was Hi. Reese's role in this two-week 
organizing effort? 

,^ A Hell, I wasn't — I don't know exactly what Hr . Meese 
Mi» doing. I was not working with Mr. Reese during those 
two weeks. He saw each other connutlng, I an sure, 
occasionally talked to^ekch other in the office, but I 



UNCLASSIFIED 



421 



smussro 



NAME HIR212002 ' y ^ ULiri*^ ^ " > ■" "^ pjqe 17 

399 couldn't tell you what Hr . Mttase was doing. 

400 fi Did you have contact with «t . Noizigar in this 
<40 1 p«xiod ? 

402 A You know, I don't leraember a lot of contact with Mr. 

403 Nofziger. As a matter of fact, I ai» not sure that Hr . 

404 Nofziger was then working with the canpaign at the very 

405 beginning. I think he rejoined us maybe a month later or 

406 so, although--those dates may not be exactly accurate. 

407 2 You indicated that Governor Reagan or then-Governor 

408 Reagan had an office in this sane group of offices where you 

409 were working. 

410 A That is correct. 

411 2 Did you have contact with him during this period? 

412 A Probably not. I don't remember. I have have seen 

413 him. He wasn't spending all day in the office. He would 

4 14 occasionally come to the office and spend some time or have 

4 15 meetings, but not with me. 

416 2 Hho was in charge of the campaign efforts at this 

417 point? 

4 18 A Hell. Z think by that tiaa, as far as I was 

4 19 concerned, anyway, Ed Reese was in charge of the campaign 

420 t^^ozt. I believe John Sears was already out of the picture 

42 1 tt* that point. 

422 fi Did Hllliam Casey have any role in the campaign at 

423 this point? -^ 



ICLASSIflED 



422 



•iHMSsife 



MAHE- HIR212002 k.^? « ^ \||«r»M V • ■ " *« ^ page ig 

U2U A No. At that point, I didn't even know who Mr. Casey 

U2 5 was. 

U26 2 So, your initial involvement in the 1980 campaign 

M27 came through the request that you come up and work in this 

U28 tuo-ueek organizing effort, and you responded affirmatively 

429 to the request? 

U30 A That is correct. 

43 1 . 2 Now, what happened after that that led to your 

432 longer-tern involvement in the campaign? 

433 A I got caught up in it once again. He scheduled--the 

434 Convention was scheduled for Detroit. I was named head of 

435 logistics for that, head of operations. I guess, for that 

436 Convention. 

437 Although, as it turned out, I shared that role with 

438 a couple of people once we got to Detroit who had a lot more 

439 experience than I did in doing that type of thing, and 

440 subsequent to the convention was invited to come back to 

441 Washington, D.C., where we were opening our office for the 

442 general campaign, and did. 

443 2 You say got caught up In it aitez this two-week 

444 period. By that, do you mean that you were continuously 

445 ttvolved in the campaign in one way or another after this 

446 ikltlal two-week organizing period? 

447 A Yes. sit. 

448 2 When was the Cj>iA/ention In Detroit? 



UNCLASSiFIE 



ii 



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HIR2 12002 



mmm 



PAGE 19 



Either July of August. 



NAME^ 

450 2 Of 1980? 
US1 A 1980, yeah. 

452 2 Is it correct that you worked for several months in 

453 the campaign in advance of the Convention? 

454 A I couldn't tell you exactly how long a period it 

455 was. It was probably s«m weeks, two months, in that 

456 vicinity. Maybe more. 

457 2 Here you based in Detroit during this period? 

458 A No, I was based in Los Angeles. I stayed in 

459 Detroit--! probably arrived in Detroit 10 days to two weeks 

460 prior to the Convention, by ray best recollection. And then 

46 1 stayed through the OTVaHBOTHM** and than left imnediately 

462 after the ^Hfe^antaMaM*. 

463 2 Who was your superior during this period? 

464 A Chuck Tyson. 

465 2 Tyson again. 

466 What was the frequency of your contact with then- 

467 Governor Reagan? 

468 A During which period? 

469 2 From the initial organization meeting that you 

470 described, the two-week organization period, up through the 

47 1 «i^^^Ute«Ma« 

472 A It was infrequent. There were one or two occasions 

473 where I was asked to g« ^out on an emergency to a site that 



UNCLASSIRE 



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uNMSsro 



PAGE 20 



he was planning to visit, so I would assume then--a quasi- 
advance role and have some contact with him in that sense. 
Didn't spend much time with him duting the 4w*m(^ 
MMMWi pexiod when he was in Detroit. 

e What was the frequency during this period that we 
have just described oi your contact with Hr . Deaver? 

A I guess I saw Hike or spoke to him fairly regularly. 
I don't know if that is every day, twice a day, every other 
day, but-- 



On the average, several times a week? 

I am sure several times a week. 

Would the same have been true with respect to Hi. 



C 
A 

e 

Meese? 

A No. 

2 How often would you-- 

A Less frequently with Mr. neese. I had no specific 
reason to have--been having discussions with Mr. Heese . He 
were friends, so when he was there, I would chat, socially, 
or principally we talked about some event I had done or he 
had a comment on. We had no regular contact. 

e Is it correct that during this period, you work 
rasponsibilities did not involve Hr . Meese? 

A That is correct. 

2 Did your work responsibilities involve Mr. Deaver? 

A Yes. . i 



yNCUSSife 



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HIR2 12002 



UMMSSiFlffl 



PAGE 21 



In what way] 



A Well. Mr. Deaver uas--I don't know how to describe 
it. He uas an advisor to the President--to Hr . Reagan then, 
and all scheduling and advance operations ultimately were 
cleared through Mr. Deaver, so I had reason to have contact 
with him--occasionally alone, more frequently with Hr . Tyson 
and Mr. Deaver when we would review something. 

They weren't typically extensive contacts or 
meetings . 

2 Did you understand that Hr . Tyson reported to Hr . 
Deaver, m effect? 

A Yes. 

2 Was Mr. Hofziger involved in the campaign by this 
point? 

A Yes. 

2 How frequent were your contacts with him, if any? 

A I would probably describe that the same way I 
described my relationship with my contact with Hr . Heese, 
although Hr . Nofziger and I were friendlier and closer than 
I think I was to Hr . Heese. 

So, wa might occasionally in Detroit, for example, 
go out and have a cup of coffee at the end of the day, or we 
want down and got ice cream at a shop a couple of times. I 
didn't do that with Hr . Heese. 

2 Your job responsibilities did not involve any 



UNCUSSIFIED 



426 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 UllULinUUII ll-M PAGE 22 

52U reporting to or association with Hr . Nofziger; is that 

525 correct? 

526 A That is generally correct, although clearly in terns 

527 of the press aspect of an advance operation, Kr . Nofziger 

528 has some play in that, and I knou that Hr . Nofziger worked 

529 uith Hr . Deaver and Hr . Heese in terms of making ultimate 

530 scheduling and appearance decisions. 

53 1 2 Who was the Campaign Director during this period 

532 prior to the •w*Ml«*-4t*wMi 7 

533 A It is a good question. I think--I am not exactly 
53U sure whether Hr . Sears was permanently out of the picture 

535 and whether Hr . Heese assumed that role until such time as 

536 Hr . Casey was run on board. I can't give you precise dates. 

537 fi Did you have any contact with Hr . Casey during this 

538 period prior to the ^mmmtttmHKmt^t 

539 A No. 

5U0 Q When did you first meet Hr . Casey? 

541 A After I had returned to Washington, D.C. post- 

5142 »«4w«ie4>^t«wM( , so it would be August, September, the 

5143 earliest. 

54U 2 In some of your prior answers, Hr . Artiano, you have 

5145 given some description of your work during this period prior 

5146 to the «HiMH|MMaM>> after the two-week organizational 

547 period, but I think it would be helpful for the record if 

548 you could just specif icsilly summarize exactly the type of 



UNCLASSIFItO 



427 



yUWSSlFlEB 



NAME: HIR2I2002 

549 uoik you were doing m this period and uhat your 

550 responsibilities were? 

551 A Ue are talking about prior to and during 

553 2 Yes. 

554 A Prior to the O i i ii ni M » i.lli , ua uare attempting to 

555 set up a network of advance people around the country, and 

556 that took up a great deal odE my time contacting these 

557 people, interviewing them, finding out uhat kind of 

558 experience they had — ue had people out already at that point, 

559 advance people, m the field who were calling in because 

560 they were looking at potential sites for visitation. 

56 1 . Ue were discussing the 4«*wMitoNtowMt and working on 

Convt if^ot*^ 

562 plans for the ■liiiiai ll ui t h during that stint in Los Angeles 

563 and that is the--the detailing of that, as you can imagine, 

564 is unbelievable, and I uorked to a great extent uith United 

565 Airlines. Ue were chartering several jets from United 

566 Airlines, and in fact, ue ueze reconfiguring them, and I did 

567 some uork on that during this period of time. 

568 Ua had meetings in Los Angelas where ua uould call 

569 in people who had experience in Presidential campaigns, and 

570 h»va lengthy meetings with them, just seeking advice and 

57 1 raooamandations about people, about procedures, about the 

572 wammmm^'m^mm. about that sort of thing. 

573 And frankly, <y» Sty own initiative, I started looking 



mmim 



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HIR212002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 24 



into the debates which I was anticipating, and in that 
connection, fleu a gentleman out fron Virginia who had some 
logistical expertise in setting up these debates. 

He recommended, sensing ray interest, that I collect 
certain data that he recommended to rae , certain books and 
brieiing materials that were available to the public, and 
also--also highly recommended a gentleman who is a debate 
consultant with whom I met after I returned to Washington, 
and indeed, consulted to the regular organization 
subsequently. 

e Were you involved in fund-raisings at all? 
A I really wasn't. I set up certainly as an advance 
man several fund-raisers in terms of just finding a location 
for it. I had a number of conversations during the course 
of ray advance — advancing with fund-raisers, people who were 
setting these things up, but I wasn't collecting or 
soliciting any money. 

KR. FRYMAK: Off the record a second. 

(Discussion off the record.] 

HR. FRYHAK: OKay . 

BY MR. FRYMAM: 

Hr. Artiano, is it your best recollection that Hr . 
Casey was not involved in the canpaign prior to the «**««ivt 
■ ■ ■> 

From my perspept>lve in the Biii i i ei ■<*—*)», he wasn't. 



UNClASSiFlEO 



429 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME HIR212002 UMULriUVll ■ L. M PAGE 25 

599 I hadn't met Hr . Casey. I don't reraeraber when the first 

600 tin* I heaid his name uas , whether it was p r e - »w*m««^-Mw«*( 
60 1 or during the ^^kw****-^^*** . But I had no interaction with 

602 him at all, so I would know whether he was or was not 

603 involved. 

6014 2 An I correct that you were involved in the Reagan 

605 campaign in 1980 after the •mimmm^i^tmmi^-'. 

606 A Yes, sir. 

607 2 What led to your continued involvement after the 
6 08 g i iu i iLl II UL ^ h ? 

609 A I was asked to continue and wanted to continue. 

610 S Mho asked you? 

611 A I don't recall whether it was Hr . Tyson or Mr. 

612 Deavet, but Z think we all understood we were all going to 
6 13 continue. 

6 114 2 Did this same team generally stay together after the 

6 15 ■■ i iii i.l l li i t li ? 

6 16 A Well, I think the sane players remained involved, 

6 17 but ue were split up significantly. Some of us were there 

6 18 on the road all the time, some oi us were in Washington all 

6 19 the time, and there were a host oi new players added 

620 immediately upon our arriving in Washington. 

62 1 . S The period of your involvement in the campaign after 

622 the »*ii«<M^^te*Mi was approximately July of 1980 through the 

623 beginning of November j»^ 1980; is that correct? 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



430 



UNCIASSIHED 



NAME: HIR212002 lJ|l^LriVWll ■I-*' PAGE 26 

624 A Of the campaign, that is correct, through November 

625 4th. 

626 Q How would you describe your responsibilities during 

627 this period? 

628 A Well, I believe my title was Deputy Director of 

629 Scheduling Advance Operations. Hr . Tyson was Director of 

630 the Scheduling Advance Operations. We put together a group 

631 of perhaps as many as 70 people in the Washington office, 

632 directly involved in reporting through myself and Hr . Tyson 

633 and scheduling advance — 

634 MR. FRYMAH: Off the record. Wait until this thing 

635 is over. 

636 (Discussion off the record.] 

637 BY HR. FRYHAM: 

638 2 Please continue. 

639 A --operations, and had somewhere between, I would 

640 guess, 50 and 130 people in the field who were also 

641 reporting into that office. 

642 e And you continued to report to Hr . Tyson; is that 

643 correct? 

644 A That is correct. 

645 fi What did you understand was the line of authority 

646 above Hr . Tyson — after the »w*««Ni*B4i«^!4p? 

647 A Was never perfectly clear to me, but there were--it 

648 was easier for me to i>eSitify the people who axe higher up 



mm\m 



431 



NAME^ HIR212002 



6M< 



UNCUSSIFIED 



'AGE 27 



the ladder than I was. Mr. Casey clearly was the Campaign 

650 Director. Jim Baker was brought on board, and Has--very 

651 active and influential in terras of canpaign decisions made 

652 during the general election. 

653 Bill Tiraraonds had also joined that senior group of 

654 people. Bob Gray, with whom I rarely interfaced, also had 

655 come on board, as well as a number of purely political 

656 consultants, people like Paul Hanefort. 

657 You Know, I can't tell you whether Charlie Black was 

658 involved with us then or not? I could recall soma names, 

659 but there were lots of new faces then. 

660 2 Let's start with Mr. Casey. You indicated earlier 

66 1 that the first time you recall meeting Hr . Casey was in 

662 August or September of 1980, I believe? 

663 A That is correct. 

664 2 Is that correct? 

665 Could you describe your first meeting with Hr . 

666 Casey? 

667 A Hell, I can't tell you precisely when we were 

668 introduced, for example. I don't have any recollection of 

669 it. The only — wall, let ma backtrack for second, if I may. 

670 Ha had at some point, we began having 7:30 meetings 

67 1 batHaen--among senior people and the campaign, and I was 

672 invited to sit in on those meetings. Ue had them in a 

673 conference room in our_e4action headquarters. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



432 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 W • 1 W*»l l^^ V • ■ ■■••*■ p^^g 38 



67U 
675 
676 
677 
678 
679 
680 
681 
682 
683 
68U 
685 
686 
687 
688 



691 
692 
693 
694 
695 
696 
697 
698 



2 Is this 7:30 a.m.? 

A 7:30 a.m., virtually every day. Mr. Casey was in 
attendance in many, ii not all, of those meetings. 

2 How large a group was in attendance at these? 

A Perhaps eight to 12 people. 

2 Can you identify those individuals? 

A Mr. Casey, Mr. Heese, Mr. Deaver and Mr. Nofziger 
when they were in town. Ht . Timmonds. Mr. Baker, a lady 
whose name X cannot recall who stayed with us during the 
campaign and then returned to California. Mr. Tyson. At 
some point, Ron Walker, who was brought in during the 
general to assist us in the advance scheduling operations; 
Bob Gray, I believe, sat in at least some of those meetings, 
and there were people who I remember being at some of the 
meetings, but don't know if they were regulars there, people 
like Rich Williamson and Paul Manefort and Kenny K-1-i-n-g. 

2 I want to come back to — you were answering the 
question about Mr. Casey. But just continuing on with this, 
these meetings were held at 7=30 every morning, and 
approximately what period of time did these meetings 
occur-'duxing what months or what weeks? 

A During most of the general election period. 

fi That would be July through October? 

A Ho, I would say it was probably August--started 
sometime in August, I tJ^ink, or early September, and lasted 



UNCLASSJFIEO 



433 



UNCmSSlFlfD 



NAHE- HIR212002 

699 through the balance of the general election. 

700 2 Did Mr. Reagan ever attend these meetings? 

701 A I don't recall him ever being at one of these 

702 meetings, no, sir. 

703 e Returning to the subject that we were discussing, 

704 specifically Mr. Casey and your meeting with Mr. Casey, if 

705 you would continue your answer with respect to that. 

706 A I can recall only one or two times where I had an 

707 individual meeting with Mr. Casey that was on a matter of 

708 substance. The most vivid in my mind was ona that concerned 

709 the debates. 

710 I had, by this time, compiled a significant amount 

711 of information in terms of briefing books and logistical 

712 information about debates, and I was concerned that I didn't 
7 13 see any activity and felt that it was — we should get a head 
71U start on preparing Hz. Reagan for the debates, and as such, 

7 15 went to Bill Timmonds and Stu Spencer, who was then 

716 assisting as well, and made a pitch to them, and essentially 

7 17 recommended that they use theiz office to spur some activity 

7 18 in this regard, and advise them that I would be quite 

7 19 interested to the extent that I could. 

720 Very shortly after that meeting, they agreed. Very 

72 1 shortly after that meeting, I got a call from Hr . Casey and 

722 went to his office, and he asked me what I had done and what 

723 I had--and I told him^- 4nd he said, ''Well, bring that all up 



ONCLASSIFIEO 



434 



NAME ■■ 
7214 
725 
726 
111 
728 
729 
730 
731 
732 
733 
734 
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736 
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738 
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746 
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HIR2 12002 



llNMSSiFIED 



PAGE 30 



to ray office. I am going to take charge of this,'' and I 
did. 

I had another meeting with Mr. Casey, and I will 
tell you quite frankly, I had been speculating about the 
nature of it. Ue had some confusion about planes or people 
to be transferred from one place to another, and frankly, he 
was the person I needed to speak to at that time. 

Other than those two occasions, I don't remember 
having a one-on-one with Mr. Casey. 

2 You had frequent contact with him in these 7:30 
morning meetings that you described? 

A Well, I was sitting--! sat in those meetings. I will 
tell you that I wasn't a major contributor at those 
meetings. I was for tha most part auditing those meetings. 
When matters of scheduling and advance came up, if Mr. Tyson 
didn't have the answer and I did, I would be called upon, 
and if Mr. Tyson was not available, a matter along those 
lines cantt up, questions or requests were directed to me. 

2 Were you on a first-name basis with Hr . Casey? 

A Ho, sir. 

2 You called him Hr . Casey? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 Did he call you Mr. Artiano? 

A I doubt that Mr. Casey ever knew my name for more 
than 10 minutes at a tiie . 



UNCUSSiFiED 



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UfiCUSSIFlEO 



NAME: HIR212002 Ij I 1 ULfl V U I ■ I ^ L' PAGE 31 

749 2 Were you involved in preparation for the debates in 

750 th« 1980 campaign other than what you hava dasciibed? 

751 A Ho, no. 

752 e You did not work directly with Ronald Keagan? 

753 A Ho, sir. I didn't. My only additional involvement, 
75(4 as I recall now, was urging successfully that a gentleman by 

755 the name of Miles nartel, who was a debate expert, be 

756 brought in as a consultant, and he was. 

757 Q Your work on the campaign continued until the 

758 beginning of November 1980? 

759 A That is correct. 

760 S Uhat did you do after the campaign or after Ronald 

76 1 Reagan was elected? 

762 A I had--between Election Day and Mr. Reagan moving 

763 into the White House and the Inauguration, I had a dual 
76(4 role. I continued to serve in a — much reduced at that 

765 point--scheduling and advance operation with Mr. Tyson, did 

766 some coordinating with the Inaugural team under Mr. Gray 

767 that was putting together the Inaugural ceremonies and also 

768 served on the transition team. 

769 Generally, I guess that was the State Department 

770 transition team under Mr. Fuller and Mr. Frank Shakespeare. 

77 1 My responsibilities were fairly limited in that regard. I 

772 did a transition report on the Overseas Private Investment 

773 Corporation, and also >t^ended some of the transition 



UNCUSSIFIED 



436 



NAME: 

774 

775 

776 

111 

118 

779 

780 

781 

782 

783 

784 

785 

786 

787 

788 

789 

790 

791 

792 

793 

794 

795 

79 

797 

7 



— UNCLASSIFIED ^.o. . 

meetings at the Department of State, and AID. 

.2 By what organization were you paid during the period 

between the election and the Inauguration? 

A I don't know. It was--Me all were paid by the 
s ame-- through the same vehicle and I am not sure at what 
point It stopped being the Reagan ior President Campaign and 
what point it was transition funds. 

Ue all received the same checks, late. 

Q Were these government checks or were these private 
checks? 

A You know, I don't recall. I do not recall. 

2 Did you continue to be paid at the same amount? 

A I believe so. 

2 Do you know how you were selected to be involved in 
the State Department transition team? 

A I don't know how the selection process was worked. 
I requested some--that I be given some area in the transition 
team because it was quite interesting to me, and I wanted to 
participated in it. 

2 Did you request State? 

A I don't know. I honestly don't know. 

2 Had you previously known Dr. Fuller? 

A No, sir. 

2 Had you previously known Ambassador Shakespeare? 

A Mo, sir . . i 



UNCLASSIFIED 



437 



NAME ■■ 
799 



)02 



HIR212002 



UNCUSSIFIED , 



AGE 33 



803 
80<4 
805 
806 
807 
808 
809 
810 
81 1 
812 
813 
81<4 
815 
816 
817 
818 
819 
820 
821 
822 
823 



2 During the period from the election until the 
Inauguration, how frequent was your contact with Ronald 
Reagan, x£ any? 

A If any, it was minimal. 

2 Do you recall any occasion when you spoke with hira 
during this period? 

A No. I recall occasions being in the same room with 
hira on a number of occasions, but not having a conversation 
with him. 

2 How frequent was your contact with Hr . Oeaver, if 
any? 

A There was contact, but it was probably relatively 
infrequent. 

2 Did the--was the contact related to your 
responsibilities during this period? 

A Yes. 

2 How frequent, if any, was your contact with Hr . 
Keese? 

A I,imited--inf requent. 

2 And the same question with respect to Hr . Nofziger. 

A I think infrequent. I don't remember spending time 
during that transition period with any of them. I certainly 
a> them, but I don't remember having any discussions with 
them or-- 

2 The transition. i*eriod covered approximately three 



UNCUSSIFIED 



438 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAHE: HIR212002 vllUkriUUII I L> W PAGE 314 

824 months, is that correct--tuo and a half itonths? 

825 A Two and a half months. 

826 fi And I think you have described three general areas 

827 of responsibility during this period: One. the State 

828 Department transition team; tuo . work in connection with the 

829 Inauguration: and, three, continued work with respect to 

830 scheduling or advance work. 

831 Is that a fair description of your areas? 

832 A Generally, that is probably pretty accurate. 

833 2 Which of these areas did you devote most of your 
831* time to during this period? 

835 A Well, I think the most intense application of 

836 efforts was in connection with the transition report. I had 

837 never done anything like and it was brand new to me, and I 

838 was concerned about doing that--a reasonable job. 

839 e I take it from your comments that prior to the work 
8t«0 on the transition team, you had not had any prior experience 
8m in dealing with the Department of State? 

842 A That is correct. 

843 e Or the Agency for International Development? 

844 A That is correct. 

845 Q You described a report which you prepared concerning 

846 overseas private investment? 

847 A Yes, sir. 

848 2 How did you hafpVn to prepare that report on that 



UNCLASSIFIED 



439 



IIR2 12002 



UNMSSIfO 



PAGE 



3S 



NAME: 

8U9 subject? Was that assigned to you by soiieona? 

850 A Yes, it was. It was assigned by Mr. Fuller or Mr. 

SSI Shakespeare at one of the meetings that we had. 

852 2 Hou many people were involved in this transition 

853 team? 

SSM A Total number of people on the transition? 

855 2 Hell, let's start with that, yes. 

856 A I have no idea. I would guess — I have no idea. 

857 Hundreds probably. 

858 2 Was there a smaller group that you dealt with on a 

859 periodic basis? 

860 A Yes, sir. 

861 . fi What was the size of that group? 

862 A 12 people, perhaps. 

863 C And did you have periodic meetings, or what was the 

864 nature of your contact with the others in this group of 12? 

865 A We had several meetings — I don't know, two, three 

866 meetings perhaps at the Heritage Foundation. The meetings 

867 were either chaired by Hr . Fuller or by Hr . Shakespeare if 

868 he here there. 

869 2 Was Hr . Fuller the person generally in charge of the 

870 organization of the transition team as you understood it? 
87 1 . A Of the State Department transition? 

872 2 Yes. 

873 A Yes. • ^ 



UNCUSSiFlEO 



440 



UKCUSSiHED 



NAME: HIR212002 ^ . • w — -'-- -.^ - - pjGg 35 

8714 MR. HEEHAN: So, it is clear when you say transition 

875 tea™, in the hundreds he is referring to the overall 

876 transition and the team he worked on was the State 

877 Department transition. 

878 MR. FRYMAN: Well, let's focus on the group of 

879 approximately 12 that you have described who were involved 

880 in the State Department transition. 

881 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

882 2 Now, was the larger group of hundreds involved in 

883 the transition--does that pertain also to the State 
8814 Department or is that to the entire Executive Branch? 

885 A That--to the entire Executive Branch, not to the 

886 State Department. 

887 2 So that particular State Department group was 

888 limited to this group that you met with from time to 

889 time--insof ar as you know? 

890 A So far as I know, yes. sir. 

89 1 . 2 And that was organized by Mr. Fuller. 

892 A Mr. Fuller and Mr. Shakespeare. 

893 2 Mho were the other members who you recall that were 

894 in this group? 

895 A The only two members I can recall were Elliott 

896 Abrams and I believe Henry Nau, H-a-u. 

897 2 What was Mr. Nau's position other than being a 

898 member of the transitXPi^ team? 



UNaA55iritil 



441 



NAHE: HIR2I2002 



ONGUSSIflED 



PAGE 37 



899 
900 



A I believe Mr. Mau was a ptofassot at the college or 
graduate level at a university here in Washington, D.C. at 

90 1 the time. I am not certain of that, but I believe that uas 

902 his position. 

903 2 Other than your work on the report concerning 

904 overseas private investment and your attendance at the 

905 periodic meetings of the group, what else did you do in 

906 connection with this work? 

907 A With the transition-- 

908 2 Uith the transition. 

909 A I attended several meetings at the Department of 

910 State. One such meeting was a meeting, I believe, of all 

911 the Assistant Secretaries at the Department of State. That 

912 is my recollection. I had another--! have another 

913 recollection of a smaller meeting that I attended, and I 

914 will be perfectly frank with you: 

915 . I can't tell you who was at the meeting with rae . 
9 16 There was at least one person from the--ona Assistant 

9 17 Secretary or two Assistant Secretaries from the State 

9 18 Department and one or two members from our group of 12. I 

919 don't recall whether that uas Hr . Fuller. Mr. Abrams, Mr. 

920 Hau or someone else. I don't know who it was with at the 
92 1 tiaa. 

922 2 Did you work with other people in the preparation of 

923 this report, or did you ^basically write the report by 






442 



flNCIiSSIflEti 



NAME: HIR212002 1 1 1 1 ULrtU U I t 1 V» fl^ PAGE 38 

9214 yourself? 

925 A I worked with one other gentleman. His first name 

926 uas Roy, and his last name I cannot recall, who was a 

927 financial consultant to the campaign. I worked under Bay 

928 Buchanan. And I asked for his assistance, because in 

929 par t--obviously part of my reporting on the Overseas Private 

930 Investment Corporation involved reviewing their financial 

931 statements to make sure that I was accurately interpreting 

932 that data. 

933 2 Now. you mentioned that Hr . Abrams was a member of 
93<4 the team. Had you met Mr. Abrams before your work with him 

935 on the team? 

936 A I don't think so. I will quality that by saying we 

937 may have met once before. I may have been introduced to him 

938 by Bill Tiraraonds . Somehow, I seem to have a recollection of 

939 that, but I am not certain that is the case. I can't tell 

940 you when that would have happened. 

9m . It would have happened probably immediately prior to 

942 the transition, and my first recollections of Elliott Abrams 

9U3 are during that transition period. 
9UU 2 What was Mr. Abrams' position during this period, 

945 other than being a member of the transition team? 

946 A I am not certain. I can't tell you what he was 

947 doing. 

9(t8 2 Was he living J.ii Washington? 



j; f^ (-^ f_ fT»? ip. ^^ 



443 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 -^ -w^-- . _ »- PAGE 39 

9'<9 A Yes, sir--r think ha was living in Washington. 

950 2 HoH frequent was your contact with Hr . Abrams during 

951 this Hovember to January period? 

952 A Not very frequent. It was infrequent. I sau hira 

953 when ue had the meeting at the Heritage roundation--didn ' t 

954 see hira m the regular course of my transition 

955 responsibilities, because he wasn't involved Kith the 

956 Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 

957 I frankly can't tell you what Elliott's specific 

958 responsibilities were during--on behalf of the transition 

959 team other than knowing that he was involved in a State 

960 Department transition. 

96 1 . 2 What did you do after the Inauguration? 

962 A Well, at some point after the Inauguration, I 

963 accepted a position under Mr. Abrams who had then been named 
96'* Assistant Secretary for International Organizations as an 

965 Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary in that agency under 

966 Elliott. 

967 2 When you say at some point, approKimately when was 

968 this? 

969 A You know, I would guess sonetiae in February, 

970 although I can't assure you that that is accurate. 

97 1 .» 2 Do you know what led to the Administration offering 

972 you this position? 

973 A I had gotten W know Elliott Abrams during the 



UNCUSSiFIED 



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NAME 
974 
975 
97t 
977 
978 
979 
980 
981 
982 
983 
98U 
985 
986 
987 
988 
989 
99C 
991 
992 
993 
991. 
995 
996 
997 



IIR2 12002 



yNWSSlFIED 



PAGE 40 



course of the months preceding that, and at some point, 
either late in the transition period or post-transition, I 
had raet Elliott's uife--I don't even think their iirst child 
was born yet at that point--hard to reiiiember--but I started 
establishing a friendship with hiii outside of the political 
arena--and with Elliott's wife, Rachel. 

2 Is it your understanding that Hr . Abrams nade the 
decision to offer you this position? 

A I believe so. He's--I got the telephone call fron 
Mr. Abrams, and he asked me if I would be interested, and I 
said I would be, and I went over to chat with him about it. 
He was already in. I don't know that he was confirmed at 
that point, but he was already Acting Assistant Secretary. 

2 How long did you continue in this spot? 

A Only for a feu months perhaps, three months. I 
don't remember the exact amount of time. I left to join the 
law firm, and I believe I--I believe I started with the law 
firm either at the end of Hay of 1981 or the beginning of 
June of 1981 . 

C When you started this job in February, had you 
intended to stay for such a brief period? 

A I don't think I had — I was kind of up in the air at 
that point, frankly, about what I wanted to do. I had a 
strong desire to go back to California at that stage of the 
game. Frankly, worki»^^for the United States Government is 



UNGUSSiHED 



445 



999 
1000 
100 1 
1002 
1003 
1004 
1005 
1006 
1007 
1008 
1009 
1010 
1011 
1012 
1013 

lom 

1015 
1016 
1017 
1018 
1019 
1020 
1021 
1022 
1023 



HIR2 12002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 



not an appealing prospect to me. 

2 Why was that? 

A I just didn't feel comiortabla in a bureaucratic 
situation, which is why I never went to work for a large law 
firm, and the State Department was clearly quite 
bureaucratized . 

e Did you have daily contact with Mr. Abrans during 
this February to approximately Hay period when you were 
working-- 

A Unless he was traveling. I am sure I did. 

2 And in addition to your professional association 
with him, you indicated you had become personal friends--and 
with his family. 

A That is correct. 

2 And you saw them socially as wall? 

A Yes. 

2 Here you married at this point? 

A No, I was not. 

2 Then, as I understood your answer, when you took 
this job in February, you took it with the intention of 
staying fox a short period of time? 

A I am not sure I could say that in all honesty. I 
can tell you very honestly that I didn't know whether I 
wanted to stay in Washington oz go back to California, and I 
had frequent discussion^ about that with friends of mine and 



ihdmt 



446 



UNCUSSIHED 



NAME: HIR212002 UI«UL.nUUll I &> ft/ PAGE ^2 

102U uith my father, for eKaraple, and with friends in California. 

1025 I was kind of town between going back to California 

1026 and staying in Washington. 

1027 2 Did you tell Mr. Abraras when you took the job you 

1028 weren't sure how long you would be able to remain in that 

1029 position? 

1030 A I don't remember specific conversations, but I am 

1031 sure I was quite upfront with llr . Abrams because we were 

1032 friends. 

1033 2 What led you to quit in approximately Hay of 1986? 
103U A I was unhappy at the Department of State, and I was 

1035 offered a job at the law firm that was vary attractive to 

1036 me . 

1037 2 What was attractive about it? 

1038 A I liked the people. It was a new firm. It was 

1039 headed by Mr. Stan Anderson. Mr. Anderson and I had gotten 
10M0 to know each other and become friends during the campaign. 
lom Mr. Anderson was a — I don't know what his title was. He was 
1042 a consultant to Hr . Timmonds during the campaign, and we had 
10>43 established a nice relationship. 

lOUU He had worked for a larger law firm and had left 

ions with three of his partners and they were starting a new 

1046 vanture and had very exciting plans with the venture. And I 

lOU? was very impressed with the people, and it looked like a 

1048 terrific opportunity, j£i*ankly, and I was delighted with the 



UNCLASSIFIED 



447 



NAME: 
1049 
10SO 
10S1 
1052 
1053 
10SU 
1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1059 
1060 
1061 
1062 
1063 
106H 
1065 
1066 
1067 
106{ 
106< 
1070 
1071 
1072 
1073 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 43 



offer, and I accepted it. 

2 And you joined the firm as an associate in May of 
1981 ? 

A That is correct. 

2 And you became a partner two years later in 1983? 

A Two years or less--raay have been less than two years. 

2 Mr. Artiano, we have talked about a number of 
individuals that you have known and you have worked with in 
the campaign and in other capacities. I want to now turn to 
a few additional individuals that we have not discussed. 

First, David Fischer, F-i-s-c-h-e-r . I take it you 
know David Fischer? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 When did you first meet David Fischer? 

A Either in late 1975 or early 1976 would be ray best 
guess . 

2 That was during the period right after your 
graduation from law school and while you were working as an 
Executive Assistant to Ronald Reagan: is that correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 What was Hr . Fischer doing then? 

A He was doing advance work. 

2 For whom? 

A For rtr . Reagan, as I was. 

2 Had he at that.' ^oint been working for Ronald Reagan 



UNCLASSiFIEG 



448 



HIR212002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE UU 



NAME 

1074 for a period of time? 

1075 A No. sir. My best recollection is that Dave came on 

1076 after I did. 

1077 2 Did he report to you? 

1078 A No. 

1079 2 You uete at th« same level, would you say? 

1080 A Ue were doing essentially the sane things. I think 

1081 I probably had started a feu months before Mr. Fischeri and 

1082 so, I would guess, did mora of that type of uork during 1976 

1083 than Mr. Fischer did. 

lOSM 2 What was the period of time that you worked with him 

1085 doing this advance work--approximately six months or four 

1086 months? 

1087 A I am guessing. I will guess four months. Somewhere 

1088 in that vicinity. 

1089 2 And I take it you had frequent contact with him 

1090 during this period? 

109 1 A We had--ue had contact. I am not sure I would 

1092 categorize it as frequent, because advance men were being 

1093 sent to different places all the time, so we would 
109M occasionally bump into each other. 

1095 I really cemented a friendship with Hr . Fischer 

1096 during the «w*«ft*^>M«wMi and I am trying to remember now 

1097 where our "-' " ^-— ^-.- j^J^ ^975 — Atlanta perhaps, or 

1098 wherever it was — Nashvilie. Mr. Fischer and I — all of the 



UNOLASSIFIEO 



449 



NAME ■ 
1099 
1 100 
110 1 
1 102 
1 103 
1 104 
1 105 
1 106 
1 107 
1 108 
1 109 
1110 
1111 
1112 
1113 
1114 
1 1 IS 
1116 
1 1 17 
1 1 18 
1119 
1 120 
1 12 
1 122 
1 123 



HIR212002 



ICUSSIHED 



PAGE 45 



advance men were teamed up. We had--there were two of us 
working together--all the time, and Mr. Fischer and I were 
working together during that »w*MMr^i4t«wMi / and obviously 
spent day and night together at that point, and got to know 
each other very well, and established a very close 
friendship . 

2 Ronald Reagan, as we know, was unsuccessful in that 
e*^MM«4-iMMiMr, and aiter that •wA«M«^iJi««Mt , you returned to 
San Diego and eventually began work with the law firm in San 
Diego. What did Hr . Fischer do after the ««4«M«^i4»«wMr? 

A Mr. Fischer stayed on as — I believe as an eitployee of 
Deaver and Hannaford and served in the role oi personal aide 
and Chief of Advance Operations for Governor Reagan, who was 
then continuing to nake speeches around the country and had 
a host of activities that Hr . Fischer assisted him with. 

2 Now, you have testified that you became involved in 
the 1980 campaign with this organizational meeting, which 
was either in late 1979 or early 1980. Prior to your 
involvement in the 1980 campaign, did you continue to have 
contact with Mr. Fischer from 1976 to 1980? 

A I did — you know, my best recollection is I probably 
didn't see him for a period of about two and a half years. 
We talked on the phone a few times, and the frequency with 
which we spoke on the phone increased as 1980 approached, 
and Mr. Reagan's bid if>i the Presidency was getting started 



mmm 



82-690 0-88-16 



450 



UNCLASSIFIED .... ■• 



NAME: HIR212002 

112U again. 

1125 fi Did his role with respect to Hr . Reagan change as 

1126 the 1980 campaign began, or did he continue to do basically 

1127 the same sort of work he had been doing for the preceding 

1128 several years with Hr . Reagan? 

1129 A I think it changed in the sense that he became more 

1130 purely a personal aide to Mr. Reagan, as opposed to going 

1131 out to the field in advance of Mr. Reagan. We, at that 

1132 point, had--we very quickly put together a host of advance 

1133 men who were doing that. 

1134 . Hr . Fischer would occasionally--any time he chose, 

1135 frankly, would go out and investigate a site or an 

1136 opportunity and use his own judgnent and so advise the 

1 137 advance men. 

1138 2 Uhen you say he became purely a personal aide, what 

1139 do you mean by that? 

1 mo A X mean, he stayed with Mr. Reagan, he traveled with 

imi Mr. Reagan and was not detached from Hr . Reagan and his 

11(42 immediate group for any extended periods of time. 
11M3 The difference is where an advance man is given a 

liui* site, might have a meeting with Hr . Deaver or Hr . Tyson or 

1145 ma at that stage of the game and be given general parameters 

1146 for a series of events in Florida, and that advance men 

1147 armed with that information would then go to the field alone 

1148 or in conjunction witb-'^one other folks, meet with some 



UNCLASSIFIED 



451 



y^CUSSIFIED 



Hknt- HIR212002 VIlUL-rlUUII IL.U I'AGE M? 

11U9 Secret Service people and begin putting this series of 

1150 events together and pick up a phone and call one of us in 

115 1 the office for guidance, and ue would ultimately have a 

1152 typed, printed schedule for that series of events, which 

1153 that advance man was responsible for. 

115U . Mr. Fischer, uho was doing both that for Ht . Reagan 

1155 and serving I guess in a quasi-personal aide function prior 

1156 to--betueen 1976 and 1979, by 1979 had evolved into what I 

1157 would describe as purely a personal aide, and he stayed with 

1158 Mr. Reagan all the time. 

1159 When he was on the ground, when the plane would 

1160 arrive with a party that traveled with Mr. Reagan. Mr. 

116 1 Fischer would precede Mr. Reagan off the plane. He had 

1162 almost always been in intimate contact with the advance man 

1163 on the ground before that time. 

1164 He knew pretty much exactly what was going to happen 

1165 step by step, from a logistical perspective. If there were 

1166 any changes to be made, if he disliked something, he would 

1167 instruct the advance men to change or otherwise alter it or 

1168 cancel it. or whatever needed to be dona. 

1169 The word came through Dave; occasionally came 

1170 through Mike Deaver, but for purely logistical things, it 

117 1 caae from Dave frequently. 

1172 2 Who frequently was your contact with Mr. Fischer 

1173 during the 1980 campai_jrf? 



452 



ONCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 VllvL-rlvlVli IkM PAGE U8 
117M A Well, I wasn't traveling and He. Fischet was. When 

1175 I say I wasn't traveling, that is in geneEal--stateraent . I 

1176 saw Mr. Fischer quite a bit in Detroit. I saw him obviously 

1177 quite a bit in Los Angeles when--beiore we got to Detroit. 

1178 By the time we got--we left Detroit, I saw him less 

1179 and less because he was always on the road with tlr . Reagan 

1180 and I was virtually always, with perhaps two or three 

1181 exceptions, in problem areas at the office in Washington, 

1182 and ue talked probably every day on the phone. 

1183 Those conversations were a function of both our 
118U responsibilities, my responsibility being one of the things 

1185 he was interested in in terms of his performance and the 

1186 fact that we were close friends and would chat during the 

1187 day or at the end of each evening. 

1188 Q So, to summarize, you consider that you had 

1189 established a close friendship in 1976, you had intermittent 

1190 contact with him during the next three years, and then you 
119 1 begin to work together very closely during the campaign and 

1192 had almost daily contact at least by telephone. 

1193 A It seems to me that we had--probably had daily 
119<4 contact. Otherwise, as you probably Know in a situation 

1195 like that, you spend 12 hours a day on the telephone, so I 

1196 couldn't tell you that was exactly true, but sometimes to me 

1197 it was virtually on a daily basis. 

1198 2 Hr. Fischer, following the campaign and Mr. Reagan's 



JNCLASSIFIED 



453 



NAME ■■ 
1 199 
1200 
120 1 
1202 
1203 
1204 
120S 
1206 
1207 
1208 
1209 
1210 
1211 
1212 
1213 
12 14 
1215 
1216 
1217 
1218 
1219 
1220 
1221 
1222 
1223 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR2t2002 Itllil.l LR.\.\fil 18 Si PAGE 49 
election iiTigSO continued to serve as his personal aide; is 
that correct? 

A That IS correct. 

2 What was his title after the Inauguration? 

A I couldn't tell you precisely. I would guess it was 
Special Assistant to the President--would be my best guess. 

e And what did you understand his responsibilities 
were in the White House? Was it basically the same sort of 
thing or did his responsibilities change? 

A You know, it is difficult for ma to say, because I 
wasn't in the White House during this period of time. I 
think that, clearly, he continued to stay with the President 
through every day and indeed every weekend, he would travel 
to Camp David, for exampl*, and if the Presidant took a trip 
out of tha country, Dave obviously accompanied him on this 
trips . 

Dave had a very small office immediately off the 
Oval Office in the White House, and I think to the extent--! 
guess he generally did have the same type of role. He made 
sure that things worked in a timely and orderly fashion, 
there were no surprises, and when Mr. Reagan was moving, 
literally moving, going somewhere or worrying about a 
calendar or timetable, Dave is tha person ha looked to, not 
advance man or men who happened to be on the assignment. 

Dave was alway:S his target, so Dave would work with 



ONCUSSIflEO 



454 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 V I ^ V&-I «Vr W ■ « - — — pAGE 50 

122<4 uhomever. He made sure that calendar flowed in an orderly 

1225 fashion. 

1226 2 What was the frequency of your contact with Hr . 

1227 Fischer after the Inauguration? 

1228 A You know, we were very close friends. I would guess 

1229 that during the first six months after the Inauguration, 

1230 both Mr. Fischer and I were so busy and were then working xn 

1231 different places, that we probably didn't see each other a 

1232 whole lot during that time period. 

1233 I would go over to the White House and visit, we 
123U would have lunch somewhere, we .would get together for dinner 

1235 if time permitted. His schedule was virtually impossible 

1236 and didn't lend itself to a great social life. As time went 

1237 on, however, and I settled in with the law firm and he 

1238 settled in in his job, we talked on the phone regularly, you 

1239 know, several times a week, tried to get together at least a 
12140 couple of time a month to have lunch or have dinner or just 
12(4 1 take a walk. 

12(42 He would have two hours when the President would be 

12(43 tied up in a meeting and he would call me and see if I can 

12(4(4 break free and ue would get together and see a movie. 



UNCIASSIFIED 



455 



NAME : 
12U5 
12U6 
124' 
124£ 
1249 
1250 
1251 
1252 
1253 
1254 
1255 
1256 
1257 
1258 
1259 
1260 
126 1 
1262 
1263 
1261 
1265 
1266 
1267 
1268 
1269 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR2 12002 
RPTS CANTOR 
DCMN GLASSNAP 
M 1 ^ US a.m. 1 

2 Did you consider hin one of your closest friends? 

A Yes. 

2 At what point did he resign froii his position in 
the White House? 

A I don't know the exact date. I think it is 1985, 
early 1985. I am not sure, or late ' BH . 

e And he moved to Utah? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 So the nature of the contact that you have been 
describing of talking to him several times during the week 
and seeing him as time permitted, that contact, that type of 
contact, I gather continued from approximately mid 1981, 
when matters settled down in your respective jobs, until he 
left his position in the White House in early 1985? 

A That is correct. 

2 What was the nature of your contact with him during 
the period that he lived in Utah? Did you have direct phone 
contact with him? 

A Yes. 

2 I take it you didn't see him as frequently, because 
he was in Utah and youi' liere here? 



ONCLASSIFIEO 



456 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 52 



MAME 

1270 A Mo, I didn't. He got back here a couple of times 

1271 on business ioi the company he was working for in Utah, and 

1272 obviously when he was back, we managed to get a lunch or a 

1273 dinner or a novie , or something, and got a chance to talk. 

1274 Ue talked on the phone fairly regularly, and I, in fact, 

1275 have a client in Utah, and I think at least once during the 

1276 year in Utah managed to get out and sea a client, so I saw 

1277 Dave, spent a couple of nights at his house. 

1278 8 Was it his practice to stay at your house when he 

1279 was in Washington? 

1280 A Not at that point. 

1281 e Not while he was working in Utah? 

1282 A No, while he was working in Utah, ha would fly back 

1283 here on business for the company, and I believe he stayed at 
12814 the Marriott typically. 

1285 (Discussion off the record.) 

1286 BY HR. FRYMAN: 

1287 e Mr. Artiano, do you know Richard Miller? 

1288 A Yes, X do. 

1289 2 What do you understand to be the present position 

1290 or occupation of Mr. Miller? 

129 1 A President of International Business Communications, 

1292 which is a public relations firm. 

1293 2 When did you first meet Mr. Miller? 

1294 A In 1980. -^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



457 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAHE: HIR212002 I i I '9 LI E_IPt\J| |^ | g | La i<* PAGE 53 

1295 2 In uhat uay? 

1296 A He uas not sure if he was working for our campaign 
129"^ here in Washington or uas a volunteer for the campaign, but 

1298 he uas here, and ue met while he uas lending his services to 

1299 the campaign for Mr. Reagan. 

1300 2 Did he work for you? 

1301 A No. 

1302 2 Approximately at uhat point in the campaign did you 

1303 meet him? I take it this was after the convention. 

13014 A Ves It uas after the convention. I an not exactly 

1305 sure uhen I first met Mr. Miller. My earliest raenories of 

1306 having the types of conversations you uould relate to having 

1307 uith friends probably occurred during the transition. 

1308 2 What was his role during the transition? 

1309 A I am not exactly sure. I know one of his roles uas 

1310 he uas responsible for transportation for I guess everyone 

1311 in the transition. Ue had a large motor pool, and I believe 

1312 that Mr. Miller uas running the motor pool at that point. I 

1313 think he may have had other responsibilities, but I can't 
13 114 tell you uhat they were. 

1315 S Prior to the transition, had your contacts uith him 

1316 been infrequent? Would you characterize them as infrequent? 

1317 A Yes. I can't frankly renenber exactly when I met 

1318 him. It couldn't have been more than a month or tuo before 
13 19 the transition at best^- ' 



ONCLASSIFIEO 



458 



ONCLASSIFIEB .. 



NAME: HIR212002 UllVa-riUUtS iVmlJ P*°^ ^U 

1320 2 And prior to the election you say you met hire, so 

132 1 uould you describe him as an acquaintance as opposed to a 

1322 personal friend? 

1323 A A very difficult line to draw. Our friendship grew 

1324 as ue got to know each other during the transition. 

1325 2 How frequent was your contact with him during the 

1326 transition? 

1327 A Fairly frequent. 

1328 2 Daily? 

1329 A I don't know. I don't know if it was that 

1330 frequent. I had cause to need transportation for myself or 

1331 for someone else that I was arranging transportation for, 

1332 and Mr. Miller was the guy I dealt with. 

1333 2 Was this contact both in your professional work and 

1334 socially during this period? 

1335 A You know, I don't know whether Rich and I 

1336 socialized a great deal during the transition period. It 

1337 was a pretty hectic period. 

1338 2 Throughout the transition period, you understood he 

1339 was responsible for transportation. 

1340 A Yes. 

134 1 2 What did he do after the transition period? 

1342 A I believe he first served in the Public Affairs or 

1343 Public Relations Office of the Department of Transportation 

1344 when Drew Lewis was tb* 'Secretary of Transportation. 



DNWSSiFiEO 



459 



NAME: 

13U5 
13U6 
1314- 
1348 
1349 
1350 
1351 
1352 
1353 
135M 
1355 
1356 
1357 
1358 
1359 
1360 
136 1 
1362 
1363 
1361- 
1365 
1 366 
136' 
1368 
1369 



mmwa 



How long did this last? 

I couldn't tell you. I would guess at least a 



year . 



2 Did you have contact with him during that period? 

A Yes. I think we had contact. 

2 Social? 

A I don't remember when we started having a lot of 
social contact. It is quite possible during that period of 
time that I had some social contact with him, but I don't 
frankly recall. 

2 During that period, do you recall having 
professional contact with him? 

A I seem to remember seeing him a couple of times at 
the Department of Transportation, but I can't tell you in 
connection with that or whether I just was there for another 
reason and went in and said hi to Rich. 

2 What do you recall that he did after the Department 
of Transportation? 

A To the best of my recollection, I believe he went 
directly from the Department of Transportation to the Agency 
for International Development and served as either a 
Director or Deputy Director of Public Affairs. 

2 What is your recollection about the length of time 
he served in that position? 

A I am guessing,! '* I would guess a year to two years. 



mm\m 



460 



•iiKilLASSifiED 



NAME: HIR212002 V •«**•-» '"^ "^ ' ■ PAGE 56 

1370 2 Did you have contact with hira when he was in that 

1371 position? 

1372 A Yes. 

1373 2 Both professional and social? 

1374 A I don't know that I had any proiessional contact 

1375 with hira either at the Department of Transportation or AID, 

1376 but I ara sure at that point we had already started having 

1377 social contact. 

1378 2 At least by this point you considered him a 

1379 personal friend of yours? 

1380 A Yes. 

138 1 2 And what is your understanding about what he did 

1382 after he left AID? 

1383 A I again believe that he entered into a partnership 
138U with Hr. Frank Gomez, and they opened up International 

1385 Business Communications, which is a public relations firm. 

1386 2 Do you know Hr . Gomez? 

1387 A I know Mr. Gomez, yes. 

1388 2 When did you first meet him? 

1389 A Rich introduced me to Hr . Gomez. I would guess it 

1390 uas--I can't tell you--'8i4. 

139 1 2 Has that after Hr . Hiller joined with Hr . Gomez to 
392 start their company or before? 

1393 A After. 

139U 2 After? ■/' 



mmwm 



461 



NAME 

1395 
1396 
139' 
1398 
1 399 
H400 
mo 1 
1402 
m03 

mou 
mos 
moe 

1407 

mo£ 
mo9 
mio 
mil 

14 12 
1413 
14 14 
1415 
14 16 
141' 
14 18 
1419 



ONCLASSiFiEO ^. 



HIR2 12002 

A Yes, sir. 

2 What has been the frequency of your contact with 
Mr. Gomez since your first meeting with hira? 

A Not too frequent. During the period from late 
November. 1985 until perhaps March or April of '86, I saw 
Mr. Gomez once or twice a ueeK perhaps at a maximum. 

2 That is in connection with your work for IBC? 

A That IS correct. 

2 We will get into that later. Apart from that 
association, what contact have you had with Mr. Gomez? 

A None. 

2 Would you characterize Mr. lliller as a close 
friend ? 

A Yes. 

2 And am I correct that you have considered hira a 
close friend since at least 1982 or 1983? 

A He has been a good friend, yes, probably since 
about that time. 

2 Do you recall Oliver North? 

A I was introduced once to Hr . North. He shook 
hands, and that is ray sole contact with Mr. North. 

2 You have never spoken with him on the phone? 

A No, sir. 

2 Do you know John Roberts? 

A No, sir. •. '• 



iieUSSiFIEB 



462 



mM,i\m 



NAHE: HIR212002 1 3 I V 1 1 t_nLJ 1^ i I 1 4_ W PAGE 58 

1U20 e Do you know Jonathan Miller? 

mzi A No. I would like to just state ior the record that 

1422 It IS possible I was introduced to these people at some 

11423 point and shook hands, but I don't know there. 

114214 2 You have no recollection of any meeting with 

mas Jonathan Miller? 

1426 A I don't. Honestly I have not. 

1U27 . 2 I take it then you did not consider Jonathan Miller 

1128 to be a friend of yours? 

1429 A That is correct. 

1430 2 Mr. Artiano, you entered into a business 

1431 relationship with Mr. Miller's corepany. International 

1432 Business Communications, did you not? 

1433 A Yes, sir. 

1434 2 And did that business relationship also involved 

1435 Mr. Fischer? 

1436 A Yes, sir. 

1437 8 Would you describe the origin of that business 

1438 relationship and how it cane about? 

1439 A In late Movember or early Decembaz of 1985, I 

1440 received a telephone call from Mr. Miller where Mr. Miller 
144 1 told ne that in order to increase the services he was 

1442 rendering to existing clients, to attract additional 

1443 business to IBC, and to generally improve the services he 

1444 was holding out to exi^t^ng and prospective clients, that he 



mmtim 



463 



HIR2 12002 



yilASSlFlEO 



NAME 

1445 uas looking for someone uho had sorae Washington experience 

lUUb at a relatively senior level, uho uas of good reputation, 

114147 had good common sense and judgment, and might entertain the 

li4<48 prospect of entering into a relationship with his firm. 
114149 2 What did you do in response to this call? 
11450 A At sorae point shortly after I received that phone 

lUSl call, I talked to Mr. Dave Fischer about his interest, if 

1US2 any, in ray pursuing this conversation with Mr. Miller on his 

mS3 behalf. 

1454 2 What uas Mr. Fischer doing at this point? 

1455 A Mr. Fischer had been for the preceding 10 months, I 

1456 uould guess, been working as Vice President for 

1457 Administrative Affairs I believe for Huntsman Chemical 

1458 Corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah and had been expressing 

1459 to me over the preceding three months his general 

1460 dissatisfaction with that job and his desire to return to 
146 1 Washington and do consulting work for clients in Washington. 

1462 2 Had he explained to you the basis for his 

1463 dissatisfaction? 

1464 A I think it was, to the best of my recollection, 

1465 merely a case of the job not involving the types of things 

1466 he anticipated it would, and it just wasn't very rewarding 

1467 or challenging to him, I guess. He was not particularly 

1468 happy with it. 

1469 2 Did he indicate dissatisfaction with the 



UNOLASSiHED 



464 



NAME 

1470 

1471 

1472 

1473 

1474 

1475 

1476 

1477 

1478 

1479 

1480 

1481 

1482 

1483 

1484 

1485 

1486 

1487 

1488 

1489 

1490 

149 

1492 

1493 

1494 



:::::;:,.JilliSSlFiEB 



A No . 

e Do you know if at the time of your call from 
Richard Miller whether he had at that point ever met Mr. 
Fischer ? 

A I don't think so. I don't know that for a fact. 
They may have at some point or another been introduced, but 
they didn't know each other. 

Q So the origin is Mr. Miller calls you and says he 
is looking for someone. You over the preceding few months 
had been hearing from Mr. Fischer that he might be ready to 
come back to Washington and try something different, and 
then you spoke to Mr. Fischer and explained the approach to 
Mr. Miller, is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

2 And did Mr. Fischer ask you to express an interest 
on his behalf with Mr. Miller? 

A Mr. Fischer's response, to the best of my 
recollection, his initial response to that information, was 
a request that I further investigate it by way of having 
more extensive discussion with Mr. Miller about what he 
wanted, what he was looking for. and who his clients were. 

He made it clear to me during the initial 
conversation that while he was interested in returning to 
Washington and acting _as a consultant, he didn't want to 



IWSSlflE 



465 



HAHE: 

1U9S 
1496 
1497 
1498 
1499 
1500 
ISO' 
1502 
1503 
1504 
1505 
1506 
1507 
1508 
1509 
1S10 
151 ■ 
1512 
1513 
1514 
ISIS 
1S16 
1517 
1518 
1519 



ISUSSIFIEO 



align himself exclusively with anyone, so that even li this 
were something that would be of interest to hiii, it would be 
a nonexclusive attangement . He wanted to do soma checking 
himself into Mr. Miller and IBC generally with people in the 
administration, I guess, to see what kind of response he 
would get. 

Q In your initial discussion with Mr. Fischer, was 
there any consideration of your involvement in a 
relationship between Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller? 

A That happened very quickly. I don't know whether 
that topic was discussed during the first conversation I had 
with Mr. Fischer, the second conversation, but over the 
course of probably the first week, if not the first couple 
of conversations we had, that was something that was raised 
and discussed, yes. 

S Was that raised by Mr. Fischer? 

A I think so, although I honestly couldn't tell you. 

2 Uhat did you understand that you were to add to the 
relationship that was being contemplated possibly between 
Mr. Miller and Mr. Fischer? 

A I think you have to put that question in a 
timeframe for me, if you would. 

2 Let's talk about the beginning, when you were 
having these initial discussions and it was raised either by 
you or Mr. Fischer injr^UE conversation with him that you 



Murnm 



466 



UNCUSSIFiED 



NAHE: HIR212002 4| § ^ ^l^flU W* 1 3 18-lW PAGE 62 

1520 would have some involvement in this. 

1521 A One oi the very early conversations I had with Mr. 

1522 niller, I don't know ii it was the first conversation or the 

1523 second conversation, in response to I an sure a question by 

1524 me in connection with what types oi services he was looking 

1525 ior on the part of a consultant, I an sure at this point I 

1526 had raised Hr . Fischer's name. 

1527 He gave, to the best of my recollection, both a 

1528 general and a specific response. Mr. Miller's general 

1529 response was that he was looking at a nunber of projects for 

1530 existing clients that hadn't yet taken shape, that he was 

1531 about to embark on a najor business development aspect of 

1532 his business, that he was looking for someone who could help 

1533 him m his evaluation of projects I have just mentioned, 

1534 help hira to formulate a strategy in connection with business 

1535 development, help hire service his clients across the board 

1536 in the form of advice and judgment from a public relations 

1537 perspective, public relations in Washington. 

1538 The more specific request was he indicated one of 

1539 his most significant clients was a gentleman by the name of 

1540 Mr. Channall who had several organizations that were raising 

1541 money for programs that supported the President's position 

1542 in different areas, and that in connection with one, I don't 

1543 know frankly at that point if ha even named the National 

1544 Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, that that 



UNEUSSiFiEO 



467 



yNClASSIfltS 



NAME^ HIR212002 I J 1 3 <L! JL.II'U' *»^ B 5 !»-«•' PAGE 63 

1S4S particular client had asked for meetings with Don Regan, who 

1SM6 uas then Chief of Staff, with Senator Paul Laxalt, and with 

15147 Assistant Secretary Elliott Abraras. 

ISua He advised roe early on that this client was a 

ISug client that had had regular contact with the administration 

1550 for quite a while and was highly regarded by the 

1551 administration. I recall that because it was the first 

1552 specific request where he identified a service that was made 

1553 in the course of these early conversations. 

155(4 8 And specifically, the service was what again? Was 

1555 this to arrange the meetings? 

1556 A No. Let me backtrack a second. He explained 

1557 generally what type of services ha was looking for from a 

1558 consultant on behalf of IBC, and again I an trying to 

1559 reconstruct, doing the best that I can. I suppose, in 

1560 response to a question such as, well, is there anything you 
156 1 have on the burner right now that needs attention, his 

1562 response was, ''Yes. For example, this guy, Hr . Channell, 

1563 is one of my principal clients, and he just recently called 
15614 in over the past few days I guess and asked for me to line 

1565 up meetings with the following three people'*, and that was 

1566 the first specific thing that was ever discussed with Hr . 

1567 Miller and I in connection with services. 

1568 2 Going back. Mr. Artiano, the initial call from Mr. 

1569 Miller where he explaijv^d to you he was looking for someone. 



yNCUSSIFItO 



468 



.....UriMSSIFiEO 



NAME: HIR2 12002 %/B «\P!ir.3 «»^** '■ « « *«= iw PAGE 64 

1570 am I correct that you did not mention Mr. Fischer's name in 

1571 that conversation? 

1572 A I don't think I did. I think I opted at that point 

1573 to chat with Mr. Fischer before I even raised his name. 
157U 2 And then after chatting with Mr. Fischer, you had 

1575 further conversations with Mr. Miller where Mr. Fischer's 

1576 name was mentioned? 

1577 A That IS correct. 

1578 2 At what point was it discussed that you would be 

1579 involved in this arrangement as well as Mr. Fischer? 

1580 A Very early on. 

1581 2 In the early phone conversations? 

1582 A Yes. I am sure the early phone conversations. 

1583 £ And who suggested that? 

1584 A I don't know. I honestly don't remember. 

1585 2 The services that were being sought by Mr. Miller, 

1586 would you describe them as generally public relations 

1587 consulting services? 

1588 A Public relations, business development, political 

1589 type consulting in terms of evaluating a project or a media 

1590 campaign. 

159 1 2 How soon was there a faca-to-face meeting between 

1592 you, Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller? 

1593 A Again, I can't tell you a specific date. I would 

1594 guess it was within tujO 'weeks of the first telephone call. 



mmis 



469 



yiLASSihtu 



NAME: HIR212002 V ■ « W K.1 SW W < •• * t^V PAGE 65 

1595 2 After that meeting at some point, the three of you 

1596 reach an understanding about a working relationship and 

1597 compensation arrangement, is that correct? 

1598 A That is correct. 

1599 2 Did it take several meetings to reach agreement on 

1600 those matters? 

1601 A Yes. 

1602 2 Approximately how many meetings and over what 

1603 period of time? 

16014 A I can't be specific because I just don't have the 

1605 recollection. I uould guess that ua had three or four 

1606 meetings at least. They probably went over a couple of 

1607 weeks, three weeks. I am guessing. 

1608 2 Prior to the first meeting > had thexa been any 

1609 discussion among the three of you about the terms of a 

1610 relationship, or were there phone conversations just looking 

1611 toward setting up a meeting for a more specific discussion 

1612 of terms? 

16 13 A I had had conversations. I had discussed 

16 1<4 compensation with Dave over the phone, and I had passed 

1615 along what Dave and I had discussed to Mr. Hiller. I 

1616 believe, prior to our first face-to-face with Hr . Hiller. 

16 17 S What was the conpensation which was discussed with 

1618 Dave? 

16 19 A There are sev^^al aspects to those conversations. 



ONCUSSiFlEO 



470 



yHyiHddinty 



NAME: HIR212002 

1620 I don't think anything was said in concrete that early m 

1621 the first week or tuo, but generally Hr . Fischer advised rae 

1622 that. A, It needed to be made perfectly clear to Mr. Miller 

1623 that there was going to be no exclusive agreement for 

162U services, that he intended to develop a host of clients here 

1625 that he would like to consult with: B, that ha felt he could 

1626 lend a great deal of value to a host of clients, including 

1627 IBC, and that he expected to be compensated accordingly. 

1628 Uhen we talked about numbers, wa talked about a 

1629 retainer of «20,000 a month for the consulting services to 

1630 be rendered, and Mr. Fischer told me that one of the things 

1631 he absolutely did not want to do was get involved in the 

1632 representation of a client which was going to be 30-day. 60- 

1633 day, 90-day projects. He didn't want to do that. He wanted 
163U a long-term relationship, and he asked me to explore with 

1635 Mr. Miller early on whether Mr. Miller would be prepared to 

1636 enter into a long-term, 24 months say, two-year agreement 

1637 for services. 

1638 He further advised me that, Mr. Fischer advised me, 

1639 that prior to accepting a consulting agreement either with 
16U0 IBC or anyone else, he would have to be real comfortable 
16U1 with them as a client, and from Hx . Fischer's perspective 
16U2 that meant reviewing them to the extent that ha could with 
16143 his friends in the administration and whoever else he opted 
1644 to check them out with, Ho make sure that they were people 



mm 






471 



NAME: 

16U5 

16(46 

16U7 

16U8 

16149 

1650 

165 

1652 

1653 

1654 

1655 

1656 

1657 

1658 

1659 

1660 

1661 

1662 

1663 

166(4 

1665 

1666 

1667 

1668 

1669 



HIR212002 



yriOUSSIFlEP 



PAGE 



67 



he wanted to be associated with. 

e Were the terras that Hr . Fischer initially described 
to you, that you have described, were these basically the 
terms that were eventually agreed upon, that is a retainer 
of »20.000 a month for a period of 24 months? 

A Generally, yes. I would say that was essentially 
the relationship that was established. The other factor, as 
I mentioned also, which were components of that agreement, 
which were that Mr. Fischer was not an exclusive consultant 
to IBC and could go about developing his own business and 
that he would not be a full-time consultant with IBC. It 
was the beginning of a new relationship. 

2 But am I correct that at the end of this period of 
negotiation, Mr. Miller basically agreed to the terms that 
Mr. Fischer had laid out for you at the beginning, that is 
*20,000 a month as a retainer for 24 months, and that was to 
be a nonexclusive arrangement? 
A That is correct. 

2 What was the subject that was covered in these 
three or four meetings where you had negotiations? Had Hr . 
Miller been resisting this arrangement? 

^^r A No. I think we were discussing a host of things, 
M I recollect them. For example, while Mr. Miller had no 
problem with Mr. Fischer representing other clients, he was 
not comfortable with tAe^ prospects of Mr. Fischer 



OlUSSiflEO 



472 



1IR212002 



mmm 



PAGE 



68 



NAME: 

1670 representing another public relations firm. That was of 

1671 soA« concern to hire. He wanted to know if Mr. Fischer's 

1672 other intended representations called for hiii to be out of 

1673 the country for long periods of time, for eKanple, a 

1674 question which obviously Mr. Fischer didn't have an answer 

1675 to. 

1676 Wanted to know if Mr. rischer--Fischer still lived 

1677 in Utah at the time and did for another 1 U months 

1678 thereaf ter--uhether Mr. Fischer would still b« available, and 

1679 if so, how many days a week, to come in to Washington. D.C. 

1680 to render these services. I can't recall all of the things 

1681 that were discussed, but we also spent a great deal of time 

1682 allowing Mr. Miller to describe what his company did and 

1683 getting to know Mr. Gomez a little bit. getting to see some 
168<4 of the presentations he had made to clients, finding out 

1685 what he had done, what he intended to do, who he was 

1686 interested in securing as a client, further defining the 

1687 types of services he was looking for. 

1688 S Did these negotiations lead to a written agreement 

1689 between Mr. Fischer. Mr. Miller and yourself? 

1690 A Ko, sir. 

169 1 S In these negotiations, were you acting as a 

1692 txlncipal on your own behalf rather than as attorney for Mr. 

1693 Fischer? 

169U A That is corracli. X was not at any tine acting as 



loussife 



473 



Hknt- HIR212002 
1695 
1696 
1697 
1698 
1699 
1700 



jrjLm^SJSk »^.l^ PAGE 69 

an attorney for nr . Fischer or anyone else in this natter. 

S And this agreed-upon retainer for 24 nonths in th 
aaount of «20,000 a month contemplated services by you as 
well as Hr. Fischer, is that correct? 

A Initially, that is correct. 
[Recess . ] 



UNCLASSIFIED 



474 



NAME- HIR212002 



1701 
1702 
1703 
170M 
1705 
1706 
1707 
1708 
1709 
1710 
171 1 
1712 
1713 
1714 
1715 
17 16 
1717 
1718 
1719 
1720 
1721 
1722 
1723 
17214 
1725 



la^ssiFO - " 



RPTS CANTOR 
DCMN GLASSNAP 
[ 1 ^25 p.m. 1 



Whereupon , 

MARTIH ARTIANO, 
resumed the witness stand, and having been previously sworn, 
was examined and testified further as follows: 
BY MR. FRYHAN: 

2 Mr. Artiano. when we broke for lunch, we were 
discussing the consulting agreement that you, Mr. Fischer 
and Mr. Richard Miller had reached in lata 1985, and on* 
aspect of that agreement is that there was to be a monthly 
retainer of «20,000 a month. At the time that agreement was 
reached, was there an understanding between you and Mr. 
Fischer that you would receive half of the monthly retainer 
of «20,000? 

A Yes. 

e What was the origin of that agreement or rationale 
for that agreement? 

A It was contemplated that Dave and I would jointly 
ba in a position to render the types of consulting services 
to IBC that they had articulated to us. 

2 Did Hr . Fischer at some point tell you that because 
of your assistance in getting up this arrangement, he wanted 



ONCLASSiFIES 



475 



yNCLASSIFItO 



NAME: HIR212002 fj | H Vkl O^' ^^ " * - — — - pjQj 7, 

1726 you to have half the money? 

1727 A As I just indicated, we both intended to provide 

1728 consulting services to IBC . I don't know what effect the 

1729 fact that I had introduced Hr . Fischer to Hr . Miller in this 

1730 connection, how great a part that played in Hr . Fischer's 

1731 mind in terms of agreeing to split the fees. 

1732 2 What did Hr . Fischer say to you about this? I 

1733 mean, the original proposal, I take it. that he made in the 
173U first conversation that you had with him about this is that 

1735 he wanted a retainer of «20,000 a month for himself, is that 

1736 correc ;? 

1737 A Ue discussed the «20 , 000-a-month retainer. X don't 

1738 know whether it was the second conversation or the third 

1739 conversation when we discussed sharing our retainer. 

17U0 2 Did he raise the subject of sharing the retainer, 

174 1 or did you? 

17142 A I don't recall. 

1743 e Was it made known to Hr . Miller from the beginning 

17Ut4 of your meetings with Hr . Miller that the monthly retainer 

1745 would be split between the two of you? 

1746 A I believe that was made clear to him fairly early 
17U7 on. 

17<48 2 By fairly early on. does that mean before you 

1749 reached an agreement about the consulting arrangement? 

1750 A I guess that^ii probably right. 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



476 



UNCLASSIFIED 



KAME: HIR212002 UH^LinUWII Ih-I^ PAGE 72 

1751 2 But you are not sure? 

1752 A I am not positive whether ue discussed it before 

1753 the first check was cut or at the time the first check uas 
17SU cut. 

1755 e Is that the latest time that you discussed it uas 

1756 when the first check was cut? 

1757 A Yes. I am reconstructing now. 

1758 MR. HEEHAN: The latest time you first discussed 

1759 you mean? 

1760 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

1761 2 Yes. 

1762 A Yes, it had been discussed by the time the first 

1763 check uas cut. 

176U 2 As we discussed this morning, this consulting 

1765 agreement uas basically for public relations services, is 

1766 that correct? 

1767 A I guess I will fall back on the description I gave 

1768 it this morning. I think that is probably generally 

1769 accurate. There were a range of services that Mr. Miller 

1770 discussed with Mr. Fischer and I that he was going to look 
177 1 to us for, and that the entirety of those services 

1772 constituted what we were going to do on behalf of IBC. 

1773 2 There were a number of specifics that I understand 
177M came under the general category of public relations 

1775 services. If there are Mother types of services that do not 



UNCLASSIFIED 



477 



iiHCUSSife 



NAME: HIR212002 11 M ULiriU V ■ ■ ■ •• •^ PAGE 73 

1776 fit under that general category, I think you should identify 

1777 those now. 

1778 A I think, unless something cones to mind with a more 

1779 specific question, what I described earlier today in terms 

1780 of the services Hr . Hiller was looking for were the types of 

1781 services we rendered. 

1782 2 Once again, public relations is a particular area, 

1783 and I think you have identified other specific categories of 
178>4 public relations services, but is there anything that falls 

1785 outside the general description of public relations services 

1786 that you were to perform? 

1787 MR. nEEHAN: Hy problem with tha question is that 

1788 he has defined the services. If you want to say that is 

1789 what public relations means, some oi it was client 

1790 development, some of it was specific services, some of it 
179 1 was generalized advice and programs. Whether client 

1792 development is public relations or whether it is 

1793 professional development, business development, I guess it 
179>4 depends upon how you define public relations. And I think 

1795 that his answers describe the services. 

1796 And If you want to say let's call them, for 

1797 purposes of future purposes, public relations, we are 

1798 prepared to deal with it that way. 

1799 BY HR. FRYHAH! 

1800 2 Just so there-i?s no confusion. Mr. Artlano, I don't 



UNCLASSIRED 



478 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HAHI HIR212002 Jj |\HjLHOO 8 I 5 LU "°' '' 

1801 want to take a lot of time on this, but speciiy again as 

1802 briefly as possible the areas of services you contemplated 

1803 uere to be performed under this agreement. 

ISOU A To review strategies and advise IBC in connection 

1805 uith the existing clients, projects that were underway in 

1806 behalf of those existing clients, contemplated projects by 

1807 those existing clients, presentation for representation to 

1808 prospective clients, targat clients of IBC, the compilation 

1809 of a brochure that IBC could distribute for purposes of 

1810 business development, and I guess the type of general advice 

1811 that Mr. Fischer and I were in position to render. 

1812 2 And what areas were you to render general advice? 

1813 A I guess in connection with all of the things I 

1814 mentioned, and I think, as is probably the case in all new 

1815 relationships, things that we couldn't contemplate at the 

1816 time and we didn't, not that I have anything specific in 

1817 mind . 

1818 2 Mr. Fischer had a background in public relations 

1819 going back to his work for the Deaver firm, did he not? 

1820 A That is correct. 

182 1 e And he had been working in the public relations 

1822 area with Huntsman Chemical in Utah? 

1823 A I probably shouldn't answer that question, because 
182U I an not exactly sure what the scope of his responsibilities 
1825 uere . ■ ^ 



UNCIJISSiriED 



479 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HAKE: HIR212002 lEillll ffilBliSl I L IJ PAGE 75 



1826 
1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 
1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 
1838 
1839 
18140 
1811 
18(42 
18(43 
18(4(4 
18(45 
18>46 
18(*7 
18(48 
18(49 
1850 



2 You ate not certain what ha did? 

A Yes. 

2 Your background is that of a lawyer, and you have, 
as you described this morning, done extensive uork in the 
logistics area in political canpaigns. 

A That is correct. 

e What expertise did you bring to this arrangement 
that was being entered into that you understood met the 
needs that Hr . Miller wanted met by this agreement? 

A I think the amount of tine and the level of my 
prior experience with Presidential campaigns was something 
he wanted to take advantage of, my experience in business 
development, areas of business development, my ability to 
evaluate prospective business opportunities that might arise 
that IBC might be able to take advantage of, my assistance 
in the presentation, or at least the compilation of 
materials for presentation to prospective clients; my 
experience in Washington vis-a-vis representing clients in 
terms of strategies for a public relations firm to the 
extent that those were translatable. Those are among the 
services that Hr . Miller thought he could take advantage of. 

e Your prior experience in Presidential campaigns was 
basically in logistics, as I understand what you testified 
to this morning. 

A That is correct. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



480 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAnE^ HIR212002 UllULanVWll SktV PAGE 76 



1851 
1852 
1853 
18SU 
1855 
1856 
1857 
1858 
1859 
1860 
1861 
1862 
1863 
18614 
1865 
1866 
1867 
1868 
1869 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 



2 Hou would that experience useiully translate to the 
services you were to perform for IBC? 

A Uell. perhaps I should elaborate a bit on what that 
kind of logistical experience is. Essentially when you 
prepare an event for a Presidential candidate, you are a 
quasi-public relations man. You attempt to present the 
candidate in the most positive light, both in terras of what 
you personally do prior to his arrival and during his stay, 
and in terras of your decisions about how and where he is 
going to be making public appearances. 

I was, if not a principal player, certainly a part 
of the group that made decisions throughout both of those 
campaigns, made decisions about all aspects of the campaign 
even if my role were primarily that of an auditor in those 
meetings, and as such I had accumulated and believe I still 
have a great deal of experience that lends itself directly 
to public relations. 

In addition, I think my experience with the law 
firm in representation of clients here and my time in 
Washington essentially was appropriately thought by him to 
be something that he could take advantage of. 

2 Did you understand that the contacts and people you 
knew were important? 

A At the outset of this relationship, the only 
meetings, for example ,. ttith people that I mentioned were the 



UNCLASSIFIED 



481 



NAME 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
188M 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
If 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 



HIR2 12002 



yNCUSSlFIED . 



'AGE 77 

three I mentioned earlier. I an not exactly sure how you 
can separate, when you are looking at someone's experience, 
how you can separate and pazse out that particular aspect. 
I think Rich knew certainly that I had been involved with 
the Reagan Administration in a couple of different 
capacities for a long tine, that I had a nunber of 
relationships that were solid relationships, and I frankly 
don't know to what extent that impacted his evaluation of 
what I could lend to IBC. 

2 You and Hr . Fischer ended up splitting the retainer 
50/50. You took «10,000, and he took ♦10,000 of the «20,000 
monthly retainer, is that correct? I mean that was th« 
agreement you reached between the two of you. 

A That was the agreement, that is correct. 
2 Going back to your discussions with him about 
reaching this agreement, was that 50/50 split agreed to 
because you contemplated contributing equal amounts of time 
to this arrangement? 

A I think initially that is true. 
2 That was the rationale? 
A Yes. 

fi Was it contemplated at the beginning that you and 
Hr. Fischer would devote a substantial amount of your time 
under this arrangement to work for Hr . Channell's 



organizations ■ 



UUSSIFIEO 



82-690 0-88-17 



482 



UNCLASSIHED 



NAKE' HIR212002 UlvUbrlUUII I L. U Pl^OZ 78 

190 1 A I think It became clear by the latest early January 

1902 that at the outset, there were some pressing things that 

1903 needed to be done on behalf of that client of IBC, and that 
19014 uas uhat the principal focus was at the onset. 

1905 S You and Mr. Fischer were paid, however, by IBC, is 

1906 that correct? 

1907 A That is correct, our arrangement was with IBC. 

1908 2 You were not paid by Mr. Channell directly? 

1909 A No, sir. 

1910 2 Did you later enter intca supplemental arrangement 
19 11 with Mr. Miller and IBC? 

1912 A Yes. 

19 13 S Uhat uas the origin of that? 

19 1U A I think there are two components to the answer. 

1915 Let me see if I can do it as clear as possible. Over the 

19 16 first two months of the relationship, January-February, if 

19 17 that long, frankly I think it was even shorter, three weeks 

19 18 to a month into this relationship, it became quite clear to 

1919 everybody concerned, Mr. Miller. Mr. Fischer and myself, 

1920 that the amount of time that uas being asked for and the 
192 1 devotion of timtt to this endeavor was so much greater than 

1922 had been initially contemplated by anyone at the outset, 

1923 that we all understood that there uas going to be an 
19214 adjustment in compensation. 

1925 I can't tell .y4u at uhat precise point ue had that 



UNCLASSiFiEO 



483 



NAOE : 
1926 
1927 
192£ 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
194' 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
19SC 



HIR2 12002 



yNCUSSlFIEB 



PAGE 79 



specific discussi< 



but I can tell you that it was quite 



cleai to all of us at the time and that we had some 
discussion about it, that the services being rendered m 
terms of time and to call upon both Oave and myself to be in 
attendance at meetings and review data that was being 
produced, and advice on campaign strategies and make 
arrangements on behalf of Mr. Killer's clients, in 
particular Mr. Channell, was far in excess of what we had 
originally anticipated and that, therefore, there would be 
an adjustment upward in the original negotiated price. 

To move to a second of what I guess would be three 
points, both Mr. Fischer and I expressed to tlr . Miller the 
desire to accelerate the already negotiated payments, 
because we felt we were getting way ahead of the curve, in 
light of the amount of time we were spending, and to some 
extent in light of the fact that Hz. Fischer found himself 
almost unable to go out and develop other clients. He did a 
little of that. 

As a third point, down the road, if you would like 
me to jump there chronologically, at some point I guess in 
the spring or early summer, I can't pinpoint the exact time, 
it became clear that Hr . Fischer was indeed spending, as 
both of us had been spending, an inordinate amount of time 
on this, virtually all his time in Washington, D.C. when he 
returned from Utah, and^that he was developing a very nice 



sife 



484 



UNCUSSIFIED .:. 



NA«E HIR212002 I I M I ll H.ll .^ T 1 1 1 1 PAGE 80 



1951 
1952 
1953 
195U 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 
1973 
197U 
1975 



relationship with Hr . Hiller, and that he foresaw the growth 
oi that company and was thinking about getting nore 
involved, and at that stage Hr . Fischer and I had a 
conversation. 

Hr . Fischer made clear that he was talking to Rich 
or would be talking to Rich, and perhaps might even be 
talking to Kr . Channell. which continued to consume a good 
deal of time, about a different financial relationship, and 
that he would work that out. 

I was at that point, by the early summer, at any 
rate, less of a hands-on person in terms of attending 
meetings during the day, for example, continued to advise 
both Dave personally throughout the year and IBC from time 
to time . 

Dave indicated that he would attempt to compensate 
me at or near the amount that had initially been 
contemplated in the first discussion, which was a two-year 
contract for *20,000. and an amount that would have been 
about 50 percent of that. 

The agreement was never concrete, was in a state of 
flux almost from the word ''go*'. I don't know much about 
the financial agreements after late spring-early summer 
between Hz. Fischer, Mr. Miller, Mr. Channell, and Hz. 
Fischer and Hr . Channell, and it started out and continued, 
as far as I was concerned, as a good-faith arrangement. I 



yNCLASSIFlEi) 



485 



NAHE- HIR212002 



1977 

1978 

1979 

1980 

1981 

1982 

1983 

1984 

198S 

1986 

1987 

1988 

1989 

1990 

1991 

1992 

1993 

1994 

199S 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 



mimm 



PAGE 81 



1976 uas friends with both Mr. Mill 



«r and Mr. Fischar, alloued it 



to develop. 

2 Focusing on your own arrangements, did you enter 
into a supplemental arrangement with Mr, Miller where you 
had an additional monthly retainer? 
A Yes. 

2 When was that? 

A I would guess it was in Jun« or July. 
2 Of 1986? 
A Of 1986, yes, sir. 

2 And what uas the reason for that? 

A As I indicated a few moments ago. I had becoma less 
active hands on, and Mr. Fischer had commenced certainly by 
that tima his own discussions about payments and 
relationships with both Mr. Miller and Mr. Channell, and I 
think that Rich Miller, because he is a good friend of mine, 
felt kind of concerned about ma. I think he was worried 
that this change in direction, that Dave's increased 
devotion to this firm might have caused soma degree of a 
problem batuaan Dave and I personally, and ha also wanted me 
to stay available to IBC, and as a consequence called me and 
said that he wanted to enter — that is Mr. Millar — he wanted to 
enter into a separata agreement with ma, through which I 
would remain available to IBC for soma of the things I had 
discussed earlier, f or . avaluation of business opportunities 



UNCLASSIFIED 



486 



UNCLASSIFIED 



KAME: HIR212002 U I 1 ULMOlJ 1 1 I L I J ^'^°^ °^ 

200 1 that they had and for business development and to continue 

2002 to review the materials they sent out to prospective 

2003 clients, and asked me to write a letter to him. 

200M I, again, during the course of those discussions 

2005 told Mr. riiller that I would be happy to do that, but that I 

2006 was constrained, as I had been irom the start, in terms of 

2007 what I could do, and it was important that he understand 

2008 that. That amount of time that had been devoted early on 

2009 was more than I could possibly devote in the future to this, 

2010 that I certainly couldn't do any legal work as I had from 

2011 the start, that if these clients he was hoping to develop 
20 12 conflicted with any of the clients that my law firm 

2013 represented, I would not be in a position to do it. 

2014 I don't have a copy of that letter. I believe Mr. 

2015 Miller still has a copy of it. and if under those 

20 16 circumstances that was a relationship ha wanted, that X was 

20 17 delighted and happy to go forward with it, wrote him that 

20 18 letter, and he agreed to it, and that relationship stayed in 

2019 effect I believe for about a period of five or six months, I 

2020 am not exactly sure. 

2021 Q So this letter was in effect a retainer agreement 

2022 that you drafted and sent to Mr. Miller? 

2023 A It was a consulting agreement. It was a letter 
20214 back to Mr. Miller. I wrote it a long time ago, but it said 
2025 essentially ''Rich, you^asked me if I would remain available 



UNCLASSIFIED 



487 



"'" "" "° IINCUSSIFIEO "" " 

2026 to oonsulf'Ji^Ir TK: oh th« follouing matters'" or I 

2027 dascribftd somsthing in genaral tarns. ''I advlsttd you of 

2028 th« following constraints'', which I just exprassad. I 

2029 don't renanbar then all. ''If under these circunstances IBC 

2030 IS still interastad in having na availabla as a public 

2031 relations consultant, I would ba happy to go forward.'' 

2032 e And did the letter specify «5,000 a nonth? 

2033 A I don't know. That was certainly what we had 
203<4 discussed. I don't know whether it was in the latter. 

2035 2 You don't know whether it was in the latter. 

2036 A I don't have a copy of the latter. 

2037 2 Why didn't you keep a copy? 

2038 A I thought I had, frankly, and looked for it and 

2039 couldn't find it. 

2040 2 What nakes you think that Hr . Miller still has a 

2041 copy? 

20U2 A I an not certain that he does. 

2043 2 Have you spoken with hin about it? 

2044 A I don't think I have ever asked. I have certainly 

2045 spoken to Hr . Miller, but I don't know whether X asked hin 

2046 whether ha had a copy of that latter or not. 

2047 2 You indicated a ninute ago that you thought that he 

2048 still had a copy, and I was just wondering what your basis 

2049 for that belief was. 

2050 A I an not sura.i He nay not have a copy. 



^nmm 



488 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAHE: HrR212002 --w^-. .^^ pj^j. g^ 

2051 2 So you don't know one way or the other? 

2052 A I am not sure if he does. 

2053 2 Was there any tine period specified in this letter? 
20SU A I don't remember. 

2055 2 And pursuant to this agreement that you reached 

2056 with Mr. Miller, you received a number of payments of *5,000 

2057 a month, in addition to the amounts that you were sharing 

2058 with Mr. Fischer? 

2059 A That is correct. 

2060 2 A little later we will get into some specific 

2061 checks from IBC, but let me ask you, what is your 

2062 recollection, based on your review of your records, of the 

2063 total amount of money you received from IBC pursuant to both 
206U the original agreement with Mr. Fischer, as well as the 

2065 supplemental? 

2066 A I don't know specif ically ► exactly, but I think it 

2067 was in the vicinity of about ♦200,000. 

2068 2 Did you on some occasions receive funds from IBC 

2069 and then you paid a portion of the funds to Mr. Fischer? 

2070 A Yes. 

2071 2 The *200,000 that you mentioned, is that after the 

2072 deduction of the amount that you paid to Mr. Fischer? 

2073 A Yes. 

207U 2 So you believe you retained something in the area 

2075 of «200,000? • ^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



489 



NAME 
2076 
2077 
207 
2079 
2080 
2081 
2082 
2083 
208(4 
2085 
2086 
2087 
2088 
2089 
2090 
209 
2092 
2093 
2094 
2095 
2096 
2097 
2098 
2099 
2100 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED. 



AGE 85 



A That is correct. 

2 And those services were periomed beginning in 
December oi 1985? 

A That is correct. 

2 And they continued through the end of 1986? 
A That IS correct. 

2 Did you perform any services in 1987? 
A I don't think so. I don't have any specific 
recollection. I might have gotten together with Rich on a 
matter in January. If I did, I don't remember it, but that 
certainly would have been the last time. 

2 So basically the period of time is 12 to 13 months. 

A That is correct. 

e And you were paid *200,000? 

A That is correct. 

MR. HEEHAN: Approximately «200,000. 
THE WITNESS: That is correct. 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 
S ApproKimately 4200.00, yes. 

Rather than looking forward, as we have been doing, 
talking about the negotiation of the contract and what was 
oentemplated that you would do, at this point I would like 
to look backward and get your description of the services 
that you actually performed for these funds in this 12 to 13 
months. Hhat did you db? 



UMWSSife 



490 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 -ww.. . « b^ PkGZ 

2101 A We spent, and most of this is in the context, the 

2102 initial part of my explanation will be in the context of 

2 103 what was done in meetings which were attended for the most 

210U part by Mr. Miller, Mr. Fischer and Mr. Gomez, and on 

2105 occasion by Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad. 

2106 2 In your answer, Mr. Artiano, you are certainly free 

2107 to bring in contributions of other persons, but I want to 

2 108 focus on what you as an individual did for the compensation 

2109 in the area of «200,000, so if you could keep that in mind 

2110 in your answer. 

2111 A I advised IBC on an overall strategy for growth of 

2112 that company. Ue had lengthy continuing conversations about 

2113 the types of clientele IBC should ba serving, about thtt 
21 m resources IBC would have to marshal in terms of personnel 

2115 and expertise to properly serve those clients, that we work 

2116 together on the preparation of materials for presentation to 

2117 prospective clients and on an evaluation of the needs of 

2 118 those prospective clients and how IBC could best offer up 

2119 its services to those clients. 

2120 Ua worked, from my perspective, we had again 

2 12 1 continuing lengthy meetings and conversations in connection 

2 122 with a number of projects that Mr. Channel! either had 

2 123 ongoing or was contemplating, tha first of which was 

2 12U National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty. Others 

2 125 included tha Space Dafenpa Initiative, Constitutional 



ONWSSIFIEB 



491 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 1 1 1 V lJt_ril.ll^ 1 I ll-K^ PAGE 87 

2126 minutes, a film that he was attempting to raise money to 

2 127 produce and get clearance to produce about CIA activities, 

2128 an end of the century foundation, which uas going to raise 

2 129 money and gather a host of people to go to Rome in the year 

2130 2000, an endowment which he hoped would raise approKimately 

2131 »20 million, the purpose of which was to fund activities by 

2132 President Reagan after his second term, in terms of speaking 

2133 and maintaining communication and being a voice for the 
213M Republican Party. 

2 135 In many of those instances we prepared Mr. Miller's 

2 136 firm with guidance and advice from me, for this 

2137 conversation, prepared lots of brochures and just general 

2138 paper on all of these projects, in addition to reviewing 
2 139 them, in some instances ad nauseua, in meetings. 

2 1^0 We prepared, and this was quite an extensive 

2141 project, a brochure for IBC. which I unfortunately don't 

2142 have a copy of it with me, but it was a fairly extensive 

2143 brochure, and I think fairly well done. A gentleman was 

2144 called in at my recommendation to do some of the drafting. 

2 145 Ue all discussed again at length what should be included in 

2 146 that brochure and how it should be prepared, to whom it 

2147 should go. 

2 148 We talked about, in connection with the projects I 

2 149 discussed above, media campaigns, did cost breakdowns of 

2150 those, talked about the Apolitical strategy that would best 



KIASSIFIED 



492 



UNCLASSIFIED ~ 



NAME: HIR212002 ililllll nilllil II IJ PAGE 88 



2151 
2152 
2153 
2 154 
2155 
2156 
2157 
2158 
2159 
2160 
2161 
2162 
2163 
2164 
2165 
2166 
2167 
2168 
2169 
2170 
2171 
2172 
2173 
2 17U 
2175 



apply in each instance. I virtually on a nightly basis, 
when Mr. Fischer was in Washington, he stayed at ny home 
three to iour nights a week ior the course of the year, and 
evenings I would estimate we spent an average of three hours 
a night, just the two of us, going over all of these natters 
that I have just described. I don't think that is 
comprehensive, but that gives you a sense of the types of 
things we were working on. 

e During 1986, you were a member of your law firm. 

A That is correct. 

2 And you had been a member of that firm in 1985? 

A That is correct. 

S Here your billable hours to your law firm 
substantially less in 1986 than in 1985? 

A I don't believe so. 

2 So this work for IBC did not cut into the time that 
you devoted to your law practice? 

A Ho, sir. 

2 Did you keep any records of the time that you spent 
for IBC? 

A I don't believe that I did. I think my calendar, 
as I know I sent over a redacted calendar--there were just a 
handful of entries in that calendar. Typically during the 
day, for example, when Mr. Miller and Dave and I met, Dave 
and I would drive down, irom my house, for example, early in 



HHCLASSIHEB 



493 



yNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 IIIISII ntlUll ILU PAGE 89 

2176 the morning and hava a breakfast, have a couple of hours in 

2177 the morning. That wouldn't appear on my calendar. 

2178 Ue might have lunch, which w« did, until about the 

2179 summer, on a regular basis, get together for lunch. I would 

2180 find a slot in my day, if there was a reason for us to get 

2181 together during the day, when I would just have an hour or 

2182 hour-and-a-hali, and Rich's office is fairly close to mine. 
2 183 I would go over to the office and join them in a meeting, 

2 18i| and did to a large extent a lot oi this work in the evenings 

2 185 at home with Dave. 

2 186 Q So you were able to fit this work in without 

2187 cutting into your law firm hours. 

2188 A I think that is true. I was feeling a little 

2 189 pressured for the first few months, because the load was 

2190 much more than I had anticipated it would be, but I don't 

2 19 1 think I was feeling quite as pressured after the first four 

2192 or five months of 1986. 

2193 Q You mentioned you spent a substantial amount of 
2 19U time on the IBC work in the evenings with Mr. Fischer at 

2195 your house discussing these matters. 

2196 A That is correct. 

2 197 2 And you would spend additional time driving to work 

2 198 with him in the morning and at breakfast meetings with Mr. 

2199 Miller, is that correct? 

2200 A Hell, I drive. 4o work in the morning anyway. Dave 



wmm 



494 



UNCLASSIFiED 



NAME' HIR212002 U I 1 ULfllJlJ 1 1 ll.U ff^OZ 90 



2201 
2202 
2203 
2204 
2205 
2206 
2207 
2208 
2209 
2210 
221 1 
2212 
2213 
2214 
221S 
2216 
2217 
2218 
2219 
2220 
2221 
2222 
2223 
2224 
2225 



and I would drive m together. Dave didn't have a car for 
most of that time, and I would drop Dave off typically at 
rtr . Miller's office or wherever his first meeting was, and 
to the extent that we needed to meet in the mornings, early 
in the mornings, we would do that, park and have a meeting 
at Mr. Miller's office, and then I would go to work from 
there. 

e Did you draw more money from your law firm in 1986 
than in 1985? 

A I think so. 

e Did that reflect additional hours that you devoted 
to your law practice in 1986? 

A Hours are one component of a formula, a very loose 
formula . 

MR. MEEHAN: Answer. Did it reflect more hours? 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
BY MR. FRYMAH: 

2 Did you bill more hours to your law firm in 1986 
than in 1985? 

A I don't know. 

C Did Mr. Fischer live at your house most of 1986? 

A He was at my house, I would estimate, three to foui 
days a week for almost all of 1986. and into January of 
1987. 

2 He continued ,t» maintain a home in Utah? 



mmwE 



495 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAHE: HIR212002 vllVtaflwwII IL.1/ PAGE 91 

2226 A Yes. His wifa and children were at his Utah hona , 

2227 and ha started building a hone hare in Vienna sonetine in 

2228 the fall, I think, oi 1986. 

2229 2 I asked about time records of your work ior IBC, 

2230 and you indicated you have no tine records. 

2231 A That is correct. 

2232 2 Hhat documents do you have that reflect work that 

2233 you performed for IBC? 

2234 A Probably none. To the extent that I had-- 

2235 MR. MEEHAH: It will go quicker if you just answer 

2236 his questions. 

2237 BY HR. FRYMAN: 

2238 2 Do you have evidence of anything that you wrote in 

2239 connection with this consulting agreement? 
22U0 A Kot in my possession. 

224 1 2 Hhat is there that is other than in your possession 

22U2 that you know about? 

22tt3 A Hell. I think if I had an opportunity to review 

22<4i4 IBC's files and materials that they produce, I could find a 

22M5 host of things that Z contributed to. 

22(46 2 Hhat do you recall now? 

22M7 A As I indicated a few minutes ago, we could start 

22M8 with the brochure that IBC developed. 

22149 2 This was the brochure that was written by the 

2250 consultant that you b&bught in to draft it? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



496 



HIR212002 



UNCIASSIHED 



PAGE 92 



NAME 

2251 . A He was one of the participants, that is correct, in 

2252 the preparation of the brochure. 

2253 2 And what was the subject of this brochure? 
225U A IBC. 

2255 2 Was this brochure published? 

2256 A Yes. 

2257 2 And distributed to potential clients? 

2258 A Yes. 

2259 8 When was it published, if you recall? 

2260 A I don't. I would be guessing. 

226 1 2 Describe the appearance of the brochure. 

2262 A I am not great at size. It is probably eight-by-12 

2263 or lU-by-IO, or something like that. 

226M 2 Larger than regular letter-sized paper? 

2265 A Oh, yes. 

2266 2 Is it in color? 

2267 A Yes. it is. It is slick. It is a very slick, high- 

2268 gloss finish. It has got individual cards in it not only on 

2269 the individuals who are the principals of the IBC, but also 

2270 on the range of services that are provided by IBC. There 

227 1 are about seven or eight different areas of expertise that 

2272 IBC, wrote statements about it, it discussed work that IBC 

2273 had done without breaching any confidential relationships 
227U with clients that they had had in the past. It was, I 
2275 think, a very good product. 



iiNcussife 



497 



UNCLASSIHEO 



NArtE: HIR212002 V I 1 liLtrlU il 1 1 II.U PAGE 93 



2276 

2277 

2278 

2279 

2280 

2281 

2282 

2283 

22814 

2285 

2286 

2287 

2288 

2289 

2290 

2291 

2292 

2293 

229U 

2295 

2296 

2297 

2298 

229 

2300 



Q Did it hava pictur«s? 

A I am trying to raii«mb«r if it had pictutas. I 
think it night hava, but I haven't saan it now for a uhila. 

2 How many pagas? 

A It wasn't really in page format. It is a fold-out, 
and it has kind of a jacket inside of it for inserts. I 
don't know if there were eight pages in it, 12 pages in it. 
It had things about that length, cards, hard cards or a 
little wider, that slipped in and out. It was made 
obviously for subsequent adaptation, and spent quite a bit 
of time developing it. 

2 But in terms of equivalent pages of text. Hr . 
Artiano, I mean we are talking about five to ten pages of 
tent? 

A I am guessing at text. I would guess It is longer 
than 10 pages of text, but I would have to look at it again 
now to tell you exactly what the quantity of it was. 

e Between 10 and 20 pages of text, such as you would 
generate in your law practice, in terms of number of words 
per page? 

A I don't know. Perhaps between 10 and 20 pages of 
tttxt as I would generate, but it was a totally different 
type of product. 

2 And this was a brochure you worked on with a number 
of other people? '•' 



UNCUSSiRED 



498 



UNCLASSIRED 



KAHE: HIR212002 U I lULllUU I ■ ILU ^^'^^ 'M 

2301 . A That is correct. 

2302 2 You talked with others about it? 

2303 A That is correct. 

2304 2 You didn't write it? 

2305 A No > although I reviewed it after each section was 

2306 written, may have made some contributions. 

2307 2 You may have edited it? 

2308 A That is correct. 

2309 2 What, other than this brochure, did you participate 

2310 in generating in terms of written product? 

2311 A Material that was put out, some material I believe 

2312 on HEPL, some material on the Space Defensive Initiative 

2313 program, material on constitutional minutes, some proposals 
231'4 that were sent to specific clients, although frankly outside 

2315 of I believe Panama I can't give you the names of those 

2316 clients. 

2317 I attended-- 

23 18 MR. MEEHAN: He just asked you about written 

2319 materials. 

2320 BY HR. FRYMAM: 

232 1 fi Here these materials you have just described apart 

2322 izoa the proposals to clients, were they in the nature of 

2323 brochures also? 

2324 A They were in the nature of — no, they weren't. I am 

2325 trying to remember th»' format they were in. Z think they 



UNCIASSIRED 



499 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HAnZ- HIR212002 U I * UI-MUU 1 1 whmiJ PACE 95 

2326 were typically in a jackat, a regular typawrittan, sangla or 

2327 doubla-spacad pages in a jacket as thay were sent out to the 

2328 prospective clients. 

2329 2 You nentioned HEPL and SDI and constitutional 

2330 minutes. Hou nany itens do you recall, or to the best of 
233 1 your recollection, do you believe were generated in terns of 

2332 products for these entities? Are we talking about more than 

2333 10? 

233U A Oh. much more than ten. 

2335 2 More than 100? 

2336 A Perhaps, perhaps. There were endless drafts and 

2337 letters and promotional pieces, the range of services in 

2338 public relations, media evaluations, demographic studies. 

2339 the types of things you would expect a public relations firm 
23U0 to put together. 

23>41 2 So you think there may have been more than 100? 

231(2 A Ky guess would be yes. there were probably well 

23<43 over 100 in the course of a year. 

23(«U 2 So we are talking about generating one on the 

23U5 average of every three to four days? 

23U6 A Haybe more. Again, I don't have possession of 

2347 these files. I have never counted them. I am just giving 

23U8 you my sense, impression, that there was a tremendous amount 

23M9 of paper generated by IBC and by the clients of IBC that IBC 

2350 was reviewing. 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



500 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 UltvLnUUsI I Li &^ PAGE 96 

2351 . 2 And to generalize, what was your role in the 

2352 generation of this paper, these apptoximatelv' 100 brochures? 

2353 A I might take exception to the word ''brochures''. 
23SU They weren't all brochures. 

2355 2 Or items. 

2356 A These items. 

2357 e Information items. Did you draft them? 

2358 A No. 

2359 e You didn't write them? 

2360 A In some instances I participated in the drafting of 

236 1 them or edited them. I sat through meetings, strategy 

2362 meetings prior to drafting, in which we came up with 

2363 conceptual notions about how we wanted to approach 

2364 something, about what items should be included in the final 

2365 product, about identifying the proper people to whom they 

2366 should be sent, working out a review process in each case 

2367 prior to publication, talking about costs to the business. 

2368 2 These strategy meetings, were these generally the 

2369 meetings with Mr. Fischer in the evening that you have 

2370 described or the meetings early in the morning with Mr. 

237 1 Fischer and Hr . Miller? I mean, were those a substantial 

2372 number of this type of strategy meeting? 

2373 A They were, yes. The answer is yes in both 

2374 instances. 

2375 Q You also ment'ioned proposals to clients. How many 



UNCLASSIFIED 



501 



UNCLASSIFIED 



KAHEt HIR212002 UllULriUUII lL«U '''^^E 97 

2376 proposals do you recall you participatad m? 

2377 A I think ue had discussions. I think wa had 

2378 discussions about probably a dozen prospective country 

2379 clients that IBC was interested in securing as clients oi 

2380 IBC, most of them in Central America, a couple of Asian 

2381 countries, and some Arabic countries. 

2382 2 I thought you indicated you participated m the 

2383 preparation of some written proposals to clients. 
23814 A That is correct. 

2385 2 Hou many of such written proposals? 

2386 A As many as either Ht . niller or Hz. Fischer raised 

2387 with me. As the business was developing, they would decide 

2388 to target. They would get some information that would cause 

2389 them to target a particular country, whether the country be 

2390 Panama, Morocco or Brunei, whatever they happened to be. Ue 
239 1 would sit down and talk if Fit. Miller decided that was an 

2392 appropriate target, or Mr. Fischer did. we would sit down 

2393 and figure out how to best go about doing it. 
239(4 2 Did you write any of these proposals? 

2395 A I wasn't the exclusive author of any of these 

2396 proposals, but I participated in the manner I described a 

2397 few moments ago in the preparation of most of this material. 

2398 fi That is you talked about then before they were 

2399 written. 

2>400 A He talked aboju^ them before they were written. 



iiNcussro 



502 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 V I « Vkl l^' ^^ B I t^m*^ pjQg 93 

2U01 2 And you read then after they were written. 
21402 A Sometimes Mr. Fischer would cone back with an 

2403 outline in the evenings. We would go over it, try to flesh 

24014 it out, decide what needed to be included, what probably 

2<405 should be excluded, and how best to make that presentation, 

2406 to whom it should be directed, hou the prospective services 

214O7 should be described, what that would mean to IBC in terms of 

2408 time and personnel. Those were regular, virtually nightly 

2M09 conversations we had. 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



503 



NAME ■ 
21410 
2m 1 
2M12 
2M13 
2414 
21415 
2t4l6 
21417 
2m8 
2(419 
2<420 
2(421 
2U22 
2<423 
2U2(4 
21425 
2(426 
2(427 
2(428 
2M29 
2(430 
2(431 
2U32 
2(433 
2(43(4 



tPTS MAZUR 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



DCMN DOKOCK 
2 15 p.m. 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 

2 Right. You mentioned a minute ago your calendars, 
which you have produced, and we will get to those in a few 
minutes . 

Apart from the meetings in the evening with Mr. 
Fischer and in the early morning with He. Fischer and in 
some cases Mr. Miller and the othttr tine you were able to 
make available at odd periods for then, do your calendars 
that you have produced reflect all of the meetings that you 
participated in in connection with this IBC arrangement that 
occurred during your regular working hours? 

A Mo. 

2 Uhy not? 

A X would guess not. 

e Hhy not? 

A As I indicated earlier, if I had an hour, hour and a 
half during the course of a day free, and it had been 
requested that I go over to Rich's office, I very well may 
not have entered it at all on my calendar. 

It wasn't a law firm matter. I keep that calendar 
for purposes of time for the law firm. There are instances 
where I will put othe»-' things on it clearly, but certainly 



UNCLASSIFIED 



504 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 WiWW»»»»wv.. » »- — - ^^^^ ^^^ 

2435 not all the time, as opposed to representation oi a client, 

21436 where I will typically enter all of the time I spent. 
2H37 2 Does your law firi» have the practice oi all of the 

2438 attorneys preparing daily time cards for billing purposes? 
2U39 A Ue all have call cards. He Keep then in different 

2'4<40 ways, and at the end of the month, each attorney subnits a 

2'4'41 tiree sheet through his secretary, which is, you know, 

2'4<42 computerized. 

2UU3 C Summarizes hourly charges by client. 
214(4(4 A Yes, sir. 

214(45 Q Now, just to wind up the types of written uoik that 

2U146 you participated in for IBC . We have talked about th« ZBC 

2>4(47 brochure, we have talked about the various information items 

2(4148 that were generated for NZPL and SOI and others, and we have 

2(4(49 talked about proposal to prospective clients. 
2(450 What else in the nature of written materials were 

2(451 you involved in? 

2(«52 A X can't--there may have been other things. I can't 

2(453 recall them at the moment. 
2(4514 S Here those the major items? 

2(455 I I think so. You know, Mr. rischex would come--in 

2(456 addition to telephone conversations I had during the course 

2(457 of the day, which were frequent--! guess that is--that is at 

2(458 least what I can recall as I sit here, having reviewed or 

2U59 discussed the one--for one purpose ox another duzlng the 



ilNCLASSIFIED 



505 



MAHE- HIR212002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



'AGE 101 



aueo course of the relationship, 

2»«61 fi Well, as of today, looking back on this period of a 

21462 year which ended seven or eight months ago, the types of 

2<463 written materials that you have identified are the ones that 

2M6I4 you recall today? 

2M6S A That is correct. 

2466 fi Kow, did you understand that part of your 

2467 compensation was for arranging meetings? 

2'*i8 A I think I understood from the beginning of the 

2U69 relationship that there would be occasions where Dave and I 

2U70 or one of us would be asked for one of various reasons to 

2471 assist IBC on behalf of its clients in arranging a meeting. 

2M72 2 And did you do that? 

2473 A On several occasions, yes. 

24714 2 What were the occasions? 

2475 A At my invitation. Elliott Abrans attended a 

2476 luncheon. Either occasion. Elliott Abrams--! scheduled a 

2477 visit with Elliott Abxams at his office at the State 

2478 Department. '■ 

2479 2 Anything else? 

2480 A Ko. Nothing that comes to mind immediately. 

2481 2 Well, take a minute or two to reflect. 

2482 A I am not recalling anything at the moment other than 

2483 those two meetings that I on my own set up. 

2484 2 Well, did you-assist in setting up any others? 



UNCIASSIHED 



506 



UNCUSSIFED , 



HAKE: HIR212002 vIlULrlvUii E L. Bt' ^'^^^ ^02 

21485 A Well, I thmK in every--in most instances anyuay, 

2486 certainly in many instances when Dave was asked to set up a 

21487 meeting, Dave and I discussed it before it happened. I may, 

2"488 by the way, set up a meeting m the Vice President's ofiice 

21489 uith--I may have set up a meeting with one oi the Vice 

21490 President's staii. 

2149 1 I know we had a meeting over there. I am not sure 

2492 if I or Dave did that, but on any occasion when Mr. Fischer 

21493 uas asked to arrange a meeting, he and I reviewed it. 

214914 Typically, he was the one that made the telephone call, not 

2U95 me. 

21496 2 So, in terms of making the telephone call, you did 

2U97 It for the two meetings with Abrams. 

21498 A Yes. 

2499 2 And one in the--one meeting with a member of the Vice 

2500 President's staff. 

2501 A I think that is correct. 

2502 2 Uho uas the member? 

2503 A I don't recall. I know a lot of people--! don't know 

2504 if Craig Fuller was in that meeting or if Lee Atwater uas at 

2505 that meeting. I just don't recall who was there when ue had 

2506 the meeting. 

2507 2 Uhen was the lunch with Hr . Abrams? 

2508 A I am sorry. I don't recall the date of the lunch. 

2509 2 What was the mdn'th? 



UNCLASSiFiEG 



507 



NAME 
2510 
251 1 
2512 
2513 
2514 
2515 
2516 
2517 
2518 
2519 
2520 
2521 
2522 
2523 
252U 
2525 
2526 
2527 
2528 
2529 
2530 
2531 
2532 
2533 
25314 



HIR2 12002 



UNOUSSIFIEB .... 



103 



A I can't tell you. 

2 Was it m early 1986? 

A I believe it was prior to the sumner oi 1986. It 
uas probably in the spring, but I don't recall the specific 
date . 

e Who attended? 

A Mr. Abrams and myself, Mr. Fischsr, Hr . Hiller, ftr . 
Gomez and Mr. Channel, C-h-a-n-n-e-1 . 

Q Two Ls . 

Who asked you to arrange that meeting? 

A Mr. Miller. 

2 But Mr. Hiller did not attend? 

A He did. 

2 But--I missed that. So it uas Abrams. you, Fischer, 
Miller, Gomez and Channell. 

A That is correct. 

2 Did Conrad attend? 

A I don't believe so. 

2 And Miller requested the meeting? 

A I believe so. 

2 Do you know if Channell requested Miller to set up 
the meeting? 

A Yes. 

2 That is your understanding? 

A Yes. 



UNCLASSiRED 



508 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 lllllimil&EI! I! 3^ PAGE ^0^ 

2535 . 2 Then Channell basically asked for the meeting? 

2536 A Yes, but I got the request through Rich. 

2537 2 Through Miller. 

2538 A But I believe it was on behali of Mr. Channell. 

2539 That is why he was at the meeting. 

25U0 2 Uhy did you understanding this meeting had been 

2541 requested? 

2542 A nr . Channell had never met Mr. Abrams , I don't 

2543 believe--prior to that time, and I think for obvious reasons, 

2544 Mr. Abrams is--uas Assistant Secretary for Inter- American 

2545 Affairs, and was senior spokesman for the United States in 

2546 matters concerning Central America, and Mr. Channell had an 

2547 organization that was supportive of the President's position 

2548 on the contras . and it was for purposes of an exchange of 

2549 information. 

2550 I think Mr. Channell wanted to communicate to Mr. 
255 1 Abrams what he was doing and see what Mr. Abrams' thoughts 

2552 on the matter were. 

2553 2 What happened at the lunch? 

2554 A Mr. Channell--to the best of my recollection, most of 

2555 the luncheon was dominated by Mr. Channell. He told Mr. 

2556 Abzans about all of the things he was doing, not only NEPL, 

2557 but his other projects, some of which I have touched upon 

2558 here, and talked about how he was hoping that he would be 

2559 successful in supporting the President's platform on this. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



509 



yNCLASSIFiED 



HAKE: HIR212002 KllfSISB FllSLllH IIL.&^ PAGE 105 

2560 and appreciate the fact that Ke . Abrans was such a great 

2561 spokesman for the Administration. 

2562 That was that type of luncheon. 

2563 e Did Mr. Channell show Mr. Abrans any written 

2564 material? 

2565 A I don't recall. He may have brought material to the 

2566 meeting with him--to the luncheon with him to shou Mr. 

2567 Abrams. I think we talked about the commercials that Hr . 

2568 Channell's organizations had produced. 

2569 I think he asked Mr. Abrams if he had ever seen any 

2570 of the commercials. I don't recall whether Hr . Abrams had 
257 1 or had not. It is very possible he brought information or 

2572 literature with him, but I don't recall if he did or didn't. 

2573 S At this point, you and Hr . Abrams were very close 

2574 friends. 

2575 A That is correct. 

2576 2 Is that correct? 

2577 Old you talk to Mr. Abrams afterwards about this 

2578 luncheon? 

2579 A I mean. I certainly talked to him afterwards. I 

2580 don't recall that we specifically talked about the luncheon. 

2581 He may have, but it was--if wa did, I guess it was 

2582 inconsequential, because I don't recall his comments post 

2583 that luncheon, about it. 

2584 2 How, you said^you arranged a second meeting with Mr. 



UNCUSSiFIEG 



510 



UNCUSSiFIED . 



Hknz HIR212002 IJ I Y Ui_niJLl i S II !.J P'^''^ 1°^ 

2585 Abraras. 

2586 A That iS correct. 

2587 2 When was that? 

2588 A I don't recall exactly, but it was subsequent to 

2589 that, the luncheon. 

2590 2 And who was In that neeting? 

2591 A nr.--it was in Hr . Abrams' office, and Mr. Fischer 

2592 and Kr . Channell and I were there. 

2593 2 What happened at that meeting? 

259U A nr . Channell had requested the meeting because he 

2595 was at that point--! am sorry, I don't recall the 

2596 date--concerned that the President was about to withdraw his 

2597 support from the contras m one form or another, and was 

2598 hoping to get some assurance from Hi. Abrams if that is the 

2599 case. 

2600 The three of us went into Mr. Abrams' office. Mr. 

2601 Channell's sort of talking. He got very excited because Mr. 

2602 Abrams was telling him that at the minimum the President was 

2603 firm in his support and really wasn't saying much more, and 
26014 Mr. Channell started giving a speech and Hr . Abrams after--! 

2605 don't know exactly how long the meeting went; certainly 

2606 couldn't have been more than 10 minutes, as ! remember it. 

2607 Mr. Abrams finally just got up and said, 

2608 ''Gentlemen, you will have to excuse me. ! have another 

2609 meeting.'' We all goC up and walked out of the room, and 



UNClASSIfiE 



511 



UNCUSSIHED .. 



NAME' HIR212002 UllULrlUVll I L. 1/ P>^^^ ^01 

2610 clearly. Mr. Abrams was upset by fir. Channell's demeanor. 

2611 2 Did you discuss this afterwards with Hr . Abraras^ 

2612 A I apologized to Mr. Abraras by telephone afterwards. 

2613 e What did he say? 

2614 A He said it happens. You know, ''I an not 
26 1 5 offended . ' ' 

2616 2 And you recollection about a meeting with someone on 

2617 the Vice President's staff is very imprecise? 

2618 A Very imprecise. This, by the way. is another 

2619 project being worked on and talked about that never came to 

2620 fruition. Mr. Channell was attempting to put together a 

2621 project which involved a series of speaking engagements to 

2622 small groups of conservatives around the country, and was 

2623 hoping to get the Vice President to commit to a number of 
26214 those, to appear at a number of those engagements. 

2625 This was--I guess another fund-raising vehicle for 

2626 Hr . Channell's organizations. Several letters, as I 

2627 recollect, uere--that X know I saw and may indeed have had a 

2628 hand in drafting were sent back and forth between Mr. Miller 

2629 and the Vice President's office. 

2630 At first, it appeared that the Vice President was 

2631 going to commit. I believe that commitment was later 

2632 withdrawn. X don't think it ever happened. 

2633 2 All right. 

263U A And my recoll»<jtion is that is what that meeting was 



iSifitO 



512 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 108 



NAME ■ 

2635 about, although I tell you I--the meeting is kind of a fog tc 

2636 me. I don't have any specific recollection of it at all. 

2637 2 Now. you have indicated that you considered--one of 

2638 the contributions that you were making pursuant to this 

2639 arrangement with IBC was to arrange for these particular 

2640 meetings . 

2641 A I think the way I stated it was that--I think I 

2642 understood right from the outset that part of the services 

2643 would be that there would occasionally be a request on Dave 

2644 or on me or on both of us to assist IBC on behalf of one of 

2645 their clients to set up a meeting with somebody in the 

2646 Administration. 

2647 fi And these are the ones you arranged particularly? 

2648 A Those two, I did on my own, yes. sir. 

2649 2 And I think you used the phrase you made the 

2650 telephone call? 

2651 A That is correct. 

2652 2 And part of your compensation was for making the 

2653 telephone call? 

2654 A I would hardly describe it that way, but part of my 

2655 compensation was for rendering services. Included in those 

2656 services was assistance in connection with giving or getting 

2657 information from the Administration, and in that respect, I 

2658 agreed to help set up those meetings, and did. 

2659 2 You said that ^a's contemplated from the beginning 



513 



NAHE 
266( 
266 
2662 
2663 
26( 
2665 
2666 
2667 
2668 
2669 
2670 
2671 
2672 
2673 
267U 
2675 
2676 
2677 
2678 
2679 
2680 
2681 
2682 
2683 
26814 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE lOS 



that you would assist setting up such raaeting, and that was 
to be coveted by the compensation of-- 
A That as correct. 

2 Now, the telephone calls for the other meetings you 
said were made by Mr. Fischer and not by you? 

A They were not always in the form of telephone calls. 
Some were in the form of letters requesting meetings. That 
we would draft joint or someone would do a rough cut of it, 
and we would all look at — and had it sent out. 

2 And you were aware that Hr . Fisher was making a 
request m one form or another for these other meetings? 
A Yes, sir, I was. 

2 And did these include meetings with the President? 
A Yes, sir. 

2 And Attorney General Heese? 
A Yes, sir. 
2 Mho else? 

A Charles Wick--the meeting, for example, at the White 
House in January, the briefing in the Cabinet Room that was 
arranged with the help of Ht . Fischer in January of 1986 
included Colonel Horth, Assistant Secretary Abrams, Don 
Regan and the President. 
S Okay. 

KoH, going back to your original series of meeting 
with Mr. Miller about -this consulting arrangement, from the 



UNCLASSiFIE 



514 



NAME: 
2685 
2686 
2687 
2688 
2689 
2690 
2691 
2692 
2693 
26914 
269S 
2696 
2697 
2698 
2699 
2700 
2701 
2702 
2703 
27014 
2705 
2706 
2707 
2708 
2709 



SSIFIEO .. ,. 



HIR2 12002 

earliest discussions it was understood, was it not, that one 
of Mr. Miller's objectives from you and Mr. Fischer was 
setting up meetings with President Reagan? 

A That is not correct. 

2 When did that cone up? 

A The first tine that came up uas . as I recall it. was 
in January of 1986. 

2 What were the circumstances? 

A I am testing my recollection her*, but to the best 
of my knowledge, it came up at a meeting at IBC which was 
attended by Mr. Miller and Mr. Fischer, myself, Mr. Channell 
and Mr. Conrad. Either prior to that meeting or at that 
meeting for perhaps the second or third time, we were 
reviewing a file that had been given to David and myself by 
either Mr. Miller or Mr. Channell, which included a stack of 
letters from Mr. Meese — I believe Mr. Regan and the President 
and perhaps the Vice President commending Mr. Channell for 
his efforts and making reference to meetings that Mr. 
Channell had already had at the White House, and the 
different agencies of the Executive Branch, and we were 
discussing at that meeting his current strategy for HEPL and 
media campaign they were planning to mount, things of that 
nature . 

I don't have--a crystal clear recollection of this 
meeting. It was--a possibility of a briefing for a group of 



lltCU 



515 



NAME: HIR212002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 1 1 1 



2710 donors to NEPL at the Uhita House--as far as I can r«call was 

2711 raised in that meeting for the first time, and I can't tell 

2712 you uho raised it, who raised that possibility, because none 

2713 of us had thought about it. 

2714 I certainly hadn't thought about it, nor Hr . Fischer 
27 15 before that time, but it sounded like a terrific idea, and 
27 16 we went about seeing if we can raake it happen. 

2717 2 So, going back to the original discussions, which 

2718 you believe occurred in probably Oacember of 1985, it was 
27 19 contemplated iron the beginning that one of the 

2720 contributions that would be made by you and Hr . Fischer 

272 1 would be to arrange meetings in general, but the President 

2722 had not been specifically identified in that original series 

2723 of discussions or negotiations. 

2724 A That is generally accurate. 

2725 2 Well, in what relationship is it not accurate? 

2726 A Well, I guess we keep attempting here to define what 

2727 services that were contemplated initially were. I have done 

2728 my best thus far to give you my understanding of the range 

2729 of those services as were discussed initially. 

2730 2 Right. 

273 1 A As I indicated, one of many things mentioned in 

2732 those — that first series of conversations and in the early 

2733 negotiation with Mr. Miller were at three meetings that I 

2734 references with Mr. Rtfjran and Hr . Abrams and Hr . Laxalt on 



\mmm 



516 



UNCLASSIFIED ,. 



NAME^ HIR212002 V I 1 Wkl l^' ^^ ■ ■ ■ 1- »* PAGE 112 

2735 behali of NEPL for purposes oi exanination of information 

2736 and perhaps getting some--getting additional support from 

2737 those people for the types of programs that NEPL uas 

2738 undertaking. 

2739 To the extent the meetings uere discussed, that is 
27U0 it. This subsequent January conversation. I have ^ust 
27U1 described to you, uas indeed something absolutely new m 
27>42 terms of the shape of this relationship, and the services to 
27143 be rendered. It uas not something that had been 

271414 contemplated initially. 

27»»5 e Okay. 

271(6 Hou many meetings did you and/or Fir. Fischer arrange 

27M7 uith President Reagan and on behalf of an individual or a 

27148 group associated uith Mr. Channell? 

2749 A I can't give you a specific ansuer to that question. 

2750 because I didn't arrange those meetings myself and didn't 
275 1 attend any. but one of them, and the one I attended uas not 

2752 uith an individual. It uas the one I just described. It 

2753 uas uith a group of probably 30 people--35 people in the 
275U Cabinet Room. 

2755 I would be guessing--six . 

2756 S You uere auare, uere you not, of Hr . Fischer's 

2757 efforts to arrange such meetings? 

2758 A Yes, sir. 

2759 e But he made th* 'phone call, not you — I think to use 



UNCLASSIFIED 



517 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 

2760 the phiasai 

2761 A Figurativaly , yeah, he nade the arrangements. 

2762 2 Now, did you become ware at some point in 1986 that 

2763 Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad had the understanding that they 

2764 uere paying you and Mr. Fischer »S0,000 for each meeting 

2765 with Mr. Reagan? 

2766 A At some point in 1986, early in 1986, although I 

2767 can't again tell you the date, both Mr. Fischer and I, 

2768 through a vehicle I can't recall now or I would share it 

2769 with you, became aware oi the fact that either Mr. Conrad or 

2770 Mr. Channell or both of them felt that they had made a 
277 1 payment for arranging a meeting. 

2772 2 This was told to you, I take it, by someone? 

2773 A Yeah. I mean, it was either a comment that was made 
27714 to Dave or in somebody's presence, but we became aware of 

2775 it, and were very concerned about it. 

2776 2 Why were you concerned? 

2777 A Because that was not--it was inaccurate. That was 

2778 not the relationship ue had then. It was not the 

2779 relationship we anticipated, it was not one we would have 

2780 entered into and it was inaccurate and we wanted to correct 

2781 it. 

2782 e What did you do? 

2783 A We had a meeting — called a meeting. 
278'* 2 When was this meeting? 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



518 



UNCUSSIFIED 



KAME: HIR212002 11 1 « 11^1100 ■ ■ CL.t/ PAGE 1 m 

2785 . A I don't recall the date of the meeting, but it was 

2786 imnediately after this became known to us and we were 

2787 concerned about it, and we telephoned Mr. niller and said, 

2788 ''Ue would like to have a meeting.'* 

2789 Q Where was the meeting? 

2790 A It was IBC's offices. 

2791 2 Who attended? 

2792 A Mr. Hiller, fir. Gomez, Hr . Fischer, Hr . Channell, 

2793 nr . Conrad and myself. 

279(« Q What was said at this meeting? 

2795 A We addressed the issue I just discussed. Said, ''It 

2796 has come to our attention you may feel* '--this was addressed 

2797 to nr . Conrad and Mr. Channell — ''or that somebody may have 

2798 mentioned or indicated that we have been paid for meetings 

2799 or retained by one of your organizations, and that is wholly 

2800 inaccurate, and we have called this meeting to make sure 
280 1 that everybody understands that we have a continuing 

2802 retaining relationship with IBC, we are available to IBC for 

2803 all of the reasons — all the prefaces I have discussed with 
280U you already here earlier today.*' and that ''we would 

2805 appreciate It if no one ever made that kind of inaccurate 

2806 remark again. ' ' and there was complete concurrence around 

2807 the table as to all points. 

2808 2 Had you received a payment of •50,000 from IBC after 

. 1 

2809 the January meeting w£\h President Reagan? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



519 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 WllVbflWil I L. U PAGE 115 

2810 A Ue received--best oi my recollection--! don't have the 

2811 schedule in front of rae--received a »S0,000 payment either in 

2812 late January or early February. 

2813 e And the retainer agreement that you have described 

2814 provided for «20,000 a month? 

2815 A That is correct. 

2816 2 What was the reason for the «50,000 payment entered 

2817 late January or early February? 

2818 A There were two reasons for it. The first reason 

2819 was, as I indicate now and on several occasions, is that 

2820 between the commencement of this relationship in December 

282 1 and mid-January, or by the second week in January, it became 

2822 very clear to us--it certainly had by the end of January--that 

2823 the amount of tine that both Hz. Fischer and I, perhaps at 
282>4 that point more so Kr . Fischer, had been called upon to 

2825 dedicate to this, was grossly in excess of what had 

2826 initially been contemplated. 

2827 Therefore, we asked Mr. Hiller, and he obliged us to 

2828 accelerate payments, and I think as early as that date, we 

2829 were discussing or at least thinking about increasing the 

2830 initial financial remuneration in the anticipation that this 

283 1 increased call on time and resources was going to continue 

2832 and thereby preclude Mr. Fischer for one from developing a 

2833 broad-based consulting operation. 

283M He also, I win add — Oave and I both had some concern 



UNCIASSIHEQ 



520 



UNCLASSiFIED .... 



KAME: HIR212002 

2835 over being paid at all. I think that is aluays--always in 

2836 the back of your mind in one oi these relationships, and ue 

2837 felt a lot more comfortable being ahead of the game at that 

2838 point, just on the basis of the initial agreement than 

2839 behind the eight ball, and we are both as I indicated a 
28140 moment ago, talking about the fact that there would have to 
28U1 be an adjustment in the compensation if this amount of time 
28'42 and effort were going to be dedicated on a regular basis. 
28U3 C Do you recall that the original «50,000 check was 
2844 returned for insufficient funds? 

ZBtS A I think that happened — I don't recall that 

2846 specifically, but I think that happened on mora than one 

2847 occasion during the course of this relationship. ^ 

\ 

2848 8 When you had this meeting with Hz. Channell and Mr. 

2849 Conrad, did they tell you that they had understood they were 
— ^850 paying $50,000 per meeting with President Reagan? 

2851 A Ho, sir. 

2852 2 Well, did they deny that was their understanding? 

2853 A The--my recollection of that meeting, there was 

2854 absolute unanimity among all of us in connection with what 

2855 the relationship between Mr. Fischer and I and IBC was. 

2856 There was absolutely no remark that I can recall in that 

2857 meeting challenging that or disputing it in any sense. 

2858 He didn't hold that meeting to create any animosity. 

2859 Ue held it to make sure' that they understood that, and to 



UNCUSSIHEO 



521 



NAME 
2860 
2861 
2862 
2863 
2864 
2865 
2866 
2867 
2868 
2869 
2870 
287 1 
2872 
2873 
28711 
2875 
2876 
2877 
2878 
287' 
2880 
2881 
2882 
2883 
288U 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



'AGE 117 



the extent that somebody had made a lamaik along those 
lines, that wouldn't happen. 

2 Dad you ever become aware that subsequent to that 
meeting, fir. Conrad said they paid you »50,000 per meeting 
with President Reagan? 

A Subsequent to that meeting? 

Q Yeah. 

A Mo. 

2 Did you ever arrang* meetings with Administration 
officials, for anybody else, under any other consulting 
arrangement other than the ones you described today? 

A Consulting arrangement other than IBC? 

2 Yes . 

A And outside of the law firm? 

e Yes . 

A Yes . 

2 What? 

A I consulted to--in connection with several other 
people--Hicro-Gravity Research Associates, which is a high- 
tech organization that manufactures a type of crystal. A 
meeting was set up--two meetings were set up on their 
behalf--one with Mr. Keyworth, who was the present--since 
advisor, and I believe one was an official at the Department 
of Transportation, although I didn't attend that meeting. 
And in other rnstances--and I an now going back to 



vHmms 



522 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAHE: HIR212002 w . . .»« ^s i w Vf 1 1 I h. t^ PAGE llj 

2885 19814, perhaps, as early as 198i4, naybe •8S--there was a 

2886 project that was presented to ne by sone folks in Nan York 

2887 who owned an advertising barter company, and they had access 

2888 to both nuraerous--by numerous, I mean tens of thousands or 

2889 airline tickets they had gotten control o£ in a transaction 

2890 with one of the airlines, and I don't remember which one, 

289 1 and discount hotel rooms, and they ware interested in 

2892 selling those to the United States Government, and they were 

2893 being sold at a rate cheaper than the best government rate, 
289>4 and asked me to set up meetings, which I did, with the folks 

2895 responsible for those types of decisions, and three or four 

2896 different agencies. 

2897 I don't recall the precise people with whom I set 

2898 the meetings up, but yeah. I did that. sure. 

2899 2 In response to my original question, you made the 

2900 remark other than through your law firm. Is that a part of 

290 1 your law practice, to arrange meetings with Administration 
2902 officials? 



mmm 



523 



,. wifcssm 



NAME: HIR212002 ||tft,U'l IlVXIrlrll PAGE 119 

2903 RPIS nAZUl 

290U DCKM BAKNAN 

2905 A No. The only meAtings w« had uara--I was just 

2906 trying to dafina your quastion. 

2907 2 Why did you think you naadad to axcluda your law 

2908 firm? 

2909 A Wall, thara hava bean tinas in the last fiva years 
29 10 when I hava had reason to sit down with somaona in the 

29 11 Administration on behalf of a client that I hava, because it 

29 12 is a matter pending before that agency or under that 

2913 person's jurisdiction for advice or whatever. 

29 1(4 2 But that is a meeting that you yourself have-- 

2915 A Yes, sir. 

29 16 2 — rather than arranging an introduction for someone 

2917 else? 

2918 A Yes, sir. 

29 19 KR. FRYnAN: Ask the reporter to mark as Artiano 

2920 Deposition Exhibit 1 for Identification a subpoena duces 

2921 tecum addressed to Hartin L. Artiano, June 3rd--dated June 

2922 18, 1987. 

2923 (Artiano Exhibit No. 1 was marked for 
292U Identification. 1 

2925 [Discussion off the record] 

2926 BY HR. rRYHAN: 

. i 

2927 2 Hr. Artiano, T show you Exhibit 1 for 



mmsim 



524 



NAME 
2928 
2929 
2930 
293 1 
2932 
2933 
2934 
2935 
2936 
2937 
2938 
2939 
2940 
2941 
.^; 2 914 2 
"^ 2943 
294U 
2945 
2946 
2947 
2948 
2949 
2950 
2951 
2952 



HIR2 12002 



ICLASSIFiED 



PAGE 120 



<J^ 



Identification and just ask you to confirm that's a copy of 
th« subpoena duces tecum that was setvad I guess on your 
counsel on behalf of you. 
A Yes. 

MR. FRYHAN: Ask the reporter to mark this volume 
as Artiano Deposition 2 for Identification, which contains 
the records produced by Mr. Artiano's counsel relating to an 
account at the American Security Bank, account number 



[Artiano Exhibit Ko . 2 was marked for 
identification . 1 

MR. FRYMAN: Ask the reporter to mark as Artiano 
Deposition Exhibit No. 3 for Identification documents that 
have been produced by Mr. Artiano's counsel relating to a 
checking acc ount at the American Security Bank, account 
nurabe r^^ 

[Artiano Exhibit Ko . 3 was marked foe 
identification. 1 

MR. FRYMAN: i ask the reporter to mark as Artiano 
Deposition Exhibit 4 for Identification documents that have 
been produced by Mr. Artiano's counsel relating to the 
following accounts at the American S ecurity BanK^ account 
nusber^^^^^^^^^^^^i nunber^^^^^^^^^^^B 




OlUSSlFiEO 



525 



OfffiLASSIflEO " 



NANE HIR212002 

2953 idantif ication. ) 

295U BY HR FRYMAN: 

2955 2 Now. Hr . Aitiano, Exhibits 2, 3 and M-- 

2956 MR. HEEHAN: Exhibit 2 appeals to ba your PC 

2957 account, check register and bank statements with checks. 

2958 Are the checks included here? I haven't had a chance--yes 

2959 they are--and also statements from--sorae statements from youi 

2960 accounting firm summarizing some of the bank statements, and 
296 1 these were produced in response to the subpoena that was 

2962 served on you by me and ueie obtained by me from the 

2963 accounting firm-- Anthony C Williams is the name of the 

2964 accounting firm. 

2965 MR. FRYKAK: And Exhibit 3 is the materials that 

2966 you have produced relating to the personal account, account 

2967 795-- 

2968 MR. MEEHAN: These are documents many of which carae 

2969 from Mr. Artiano's office, because some of these personal 

2970 accounts were kept there and ate the bank statements with 

2971 checks. The check registers are in here also. I believe. 

2972 This account number did change on its first two 

2973 nuabers, becameHHr ather than^H 

297U . There is another personal account. Is that marked 

2975 as Kuaber U? 

2976 MR. FRYMAN: Hell, if you will look in Exhibit U. 

2977 there are three accounts in there. The last digits are 



yiiissifiEo 



526 



MAHE 

297 

2979 

2980 

2981 

2982 

2983 

298U 

298S 

298 

2987 

2988 

2989 

2990 

299 1 
2992 
2993 
299U 
2995 
2996 
2997 
2998 
2999 
3000 

300 1 
3002 



HIR2 12002 



mmmm - 



MR riEEHAN: Which appears to be a money market 
account at the American Security Bank. 

MR. rRYHAN: And flj^. 

MR. MEEHAN: Which appears to have been opened in 
early 1986. 

The account ending in nurabei^^^Happears to be a 
personal account uhich had, I believe, its only actual 
transactions in and out in Decenber '85 or early 1986, and 
account number ending with^^^His a premier credit line 
statement with the American Security Bank beginning--it 
appears in the summer of 1986--the first statement appaars to 
be September 1986 and continues to April of 1987. 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 Now, subparagraph A of the schedule attached to the 
subpoena. Mr. Artiano. calls for you to produce for the 
period July 1, 1985, to the present, all records relating to 
bank accounts over which the respondent had any authority to 
uithdrau funds, and then it describes particular types of 
documents relating to those accounts. 

Now I will direct this question both to you and 
your counsel^ Is it your belief that Exhibits 2, 3 and M 
constitute all of the documents that aza responsive to that 
paragraph of that subpoena? 
A Yes . _ ' 



Mumm 



527 



MAME ■ 
3003 
3004 
300S 
3006 
3007 
3008 
3009 
3010 
301 
3012 
3013 
30m 
3015 
3016 
3017 
3018 
3019 
3020 
3021 
3022 
3023 
302' 
3025 
302f 
3027 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED „, 



HR. MEEHAN: I believe it does. Ue supplemented 



Apparently ue might have had some statements in the original 
response and since then supplemented it, so-- 
BY HR. FRYMAN: 
e And are those accounts that have been identified, 
ftr . Artiano, the only bank accounts during that period over 
which you had any authority to withdraw iunds? 
A Yes, sir. 

MR. FRYMAN: Ask the reporter to mark this document 
as Artiano Exhibit 5 ior Identification. 

[Artiano Exhibit No. 5 was marked for 
Identification. 1 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 Mr. Artiano. Exhibit 5 is a 1985 Federal Income tax 
return and there also are some materials relating to a 
Virginia return included in that. 

Are those the only materials that you have that are 
responsive to subparagraph B of the schedule attached to the 
subpoena, which calls for 1985 and 1986 tax returns? 

MR. HEEHAN: I think ue submitted the extension 
certificate for the 1986 tax return. 

MR. FRYMAN: All right. There was not a 1986 tax 
return? 

MR. MEEHAN: No. But there was an extension and 
certificate that was i^led with the Internal Revenue 



UNCIiSSlFIE 



528 



NAME- 
3028 
3029 
3030 
3031 
3032 
3033 
3034 
3035 
3036 
3037 
3038 
3039 
30140 
30U1 
30M2 
3043 
30MU 
3045 
30U6 
30M7 
30>48 
3049 
3050 
305 
3052 



HIR212002 



wiftssiFe 



PAGE 124 



HR. FRYHAN: And that is also includftd in Exhibit 
5. 

Mr. Heahan, it is my baliei that Exhibit 5 is all 
of the tax materials that you have submitted, and if you 
would just look through that land confirm that is the case. 

MR. KEEHAK' He have a separate document form 4868, 
but that is the '86 extension notification to the Internal 
Revenue Service, as well as a copy to the State of Virginia. 

HR. FRYHAH: And those are the materials that Mr. 
Artiano has which are responsive to subparagraph B; is that 
correct? 

MR. MEEHAK: Yes. 

HR. FRYHAH: Finally, I would ask the reporter to 
mark as Artiano Exhibit 6 for Identification a group of 
calendars or redacted calendars which have been produced. 

[Artiano Exhibit Ko . 6 was marked for 
identification. 1 

MR. FRYHAK: Mr. neehan, if you and Mr. Artiano 

will look at Exhibit 6 and confirm those are the calendars 

that you have produced. 

THI HITNESS= That's the redacted calendar for the 

period of 1985 through July 1987— or to July 1987. 

HR. FRYHAM: And were those calendars produced in 
. -i 
response to the request in subparagraph C of the schedule 



UNCUSSIFIED 



529 



UNClASSIFIEn 



NAHE: HIR212002 V » 1 VIUI •'W « » nh-"' ^^^^ ^^^ 



3053 

30SU 

3055 

3056 

3057 

3058 

3059 

3060 

306 

3062 

3063 

306U 

3065 

3066 

3067 

3068 

3069 

3070 

3071 

3072 

3073 

30714 

307S 

3076 

3077 



attachad to the subpoena? 

THE UITNESS: Yas . 

MR. MEEHAM: Also in xasponsa, in fact, to 
subparagraph E in part, as wall as soma of tha bank 
statements, are in response to C as wall as A, as you would 
know. Ha related to David Fischaz--soiia of tha portions of 
the calendars relate to meetings with Hr . Fischer, and Hr . 
Miller obviously is covered by C. 

HR. FRYMAN: All right. 

Now, do the documents that have been marked as 
Artiano Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 constitute all of the 
documents in Mr. Artiano's possession which are responsive 
to subparagraphs A, B, C, D and E of tha subpoena? 

MR. MEEHAN- I believe they do. 

MR. FRYMAN: All right. 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 Just a few brief questions, Hr . Artiano, with 
respect to Exhibit 6, tha calendars. 

These calendars, I take it, are the only references 
to work performed pursuant to tha consulting agreement with 
IBC? 

A Yas. sir. 

fi Is that correct? 

If you would look at tha calendar entry for 
February 25, it is a »«ierence to a breakfast meeting at 



UNCLASSIFIED 



530 



UNSUSSIFiEB . 



NAME^ HIR212002 ■»•-—— pjQj ,36 

3078 Dupont Plaza and the initials appear to be DF, RM and SC . 

3079 Mho do they represent? 

3080 A Dave Fischer, Richard Miller and Spitz Channell. 

3081 S There is another reference on a page that has 13, 

3082 and I can't tell the month. And there is an entry at 11^30, 

3083 it appears, for a White House lunch, or HH lunch, which I 
30814 take \t is White House lunch. 

3085 A That's correct. 

3086 HR. HEEHAN: The next page is March of '86. 

3087 BY MR. FRYMAM: 

3088 e What does that entry relate to? 

3089 A I don't know. I pulled it because I suspected it 

3090 may have been something that needed to be supplied pursuant 
309 1 to the subpoena. 

3092 I had a lunch at the White House with Dave Fischer 

3093 and the Warns, I believe their names were. They were 

3094 contributors, donors, to Mr. Channell's foundation, I think 

3095 to MEPL. Dave had invited them to lunch at the White House 

3096 and had invited me to come along, and I didn't know if that 

3097 was the reference to that, because I had lunch at the White 

3098 House other times clearly. 

3099 fi Who else attended this luncheon at the White House 

3100 with the Warms? 

3101 A Myself and David Fischer. 

. ■I 

3102 2 Now, at this time Mr. Fischer was not a White House 



UNCUSSifiEB 



531 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME HIR212002 IJIlULflUwII **»*' PAGE 127 

3103 employee? 

3104 A That's correct. 

3105 fi Uas there any White House employee who attended? 

3106 A It's possible that Jim Kuhn or someone uas there 

3107 when ue arrived and sat us down at our table, but from ray 

3108 recollection only four of us sat through the whole lunch 

3109 uith nr . Fischer and myself and Hr . and Hrs . Warm. 

3110 2 Was this luncheon in what is knoun as the White 

3111 House ness? 

3112 A Yes. sir. 

3113 8 Did Mr. Fischer retain privileges at the White 
31 m House Kess after he resigned? 

31 IS A I don't know. That's a good question. I don't 

3116 know whether Hr . Fischer retained those privileges or not. 

3117 e But you have no specific recollection of anyone 

3118 from the White House being a participant in this lunch? 

3119 A No. The only four people I remember being at the 

3120 lunch are the people I mentioned. I don't know whether 
312 1 someone came in and sat us down at the table and then left. 

3122 S li you would-- 

3123 HR. HcGOUGH: Do you know if Hr . Fischer retained 
312U his White House pass after — 

3125 THE WITNESS: I believe he did. 

3126 HR. HcGOUGH-' Did he use the White House pass to 

3127 gain entry to the Whife House Hess? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



532 



NAUE HIR212002 i1 ULHuU 1 1 I LU PAGE 128 

3128 ^ THE WITNESS: I don't think so. You know, when you 

3129 go into the White House, you have to clear a security on the 
3 130 outside. Typically you do that by calling in to whenever is 

3131 going to clear you. You give your name, you're cleared at 

3132 the gate and, when you go in, you present some kind of 

3133 picture identification at the gate. 

313U I have no idea what he submits at the gate when he 

3135 goes in. Once you're in the White House, you're typically 

3136 met by somebody or you go into somebody's office and then 

3137 proceed from there. But I never saw someone show a pass to 

3138 get into the White House Hess. 

3139 To get into the White House you just need to be 
3 1140 cleared by anyone inside the White House. 

3im HR. HcGOUGH: Did you ever see Hr . Fischer display 

31 142 his pass during the meeting with the Harms or during the day 

31>43 with the Warms? 

3141* THE WITNESS: Ho. 

3145 HR. ncGOUGH: Just a White House pass? 

31(46 THE WITNESS: I don't think I've ever seen his 

3147 White House pass, as a matter of fact. 

SIMS HR. OLIVER: Isn't it true when you go to the White 

31149 Muse Hess, you're given a badge? 

3150 THE WITNESS: Similar to what you've got around 

3151 your neck. 

3152 HR. OLIVER: i>id Hi. Flschez wear a visitor's 



ONCUSSiRED 



533 



UNtliSSlFlEO 



NAME: HIR212002 lllllll HlllJll 11.1/ PAGE 129 

3153 badge? 

3154 THE WITHESS: I hav« no idea. I have no 

3155 racollection. 

3156 BY MR. FRYMAH: 

3157 2 Turning to tha antry on March 19th, thara's a 

3158 rafarenca to a naating with Hr . Luss. 

3159 Hho is Hr. Luss? 

3160 A Mr. Luss is chaiznan of San Diago Fadaral. That 

3161 uas--that maating is totally unralatad to tha subjact ua'ra 

3162 discussing, but it was an antry on ny calandar that showad 

3 163 Dava Fischar and I includad it to arr on tha slda oi caution 

316<4 in terns oi responding to tha subpoena. 

3165 fi I show you the entry on March 13th, 1986. Could 

3166 you read that entry ior the record. 

3167 A Yes. Keed to firm up proposal with Conrad. 

3168 2 What does that refer to? 

3169 A I have no idea. I'a sorry. 

3170 2 There is an entry on April 9, 1986, to a dinner at 
317 1 Kaison Blanche. Do those initials indicate Mr. Channell and 

3172 Mr. Fischer? 

3173 A Looks to ae like SC and DP, although — I guess I 
31714 {gfought it was, which is why I pulled It out of here. But 
3175 it's not real clear to ne from that, but it could very well 
3 176 be Mr. Channell and Hr . Fischer at the Halson Blanche. 
3177 2 Finally, there is an entry on July 21, 1986, a 



wtmmi 



534 



yNCUSSIFiEB 



NAME: HIR212002 «,> 3 i] U«U9 %«^ Vf 1 ■ « B« »»' p^gj ,3^ 

3178 U:00 White House lunch or HH lunch which, I take it, neans 

3179 Hhlte House lunch. 

3180 A Correct. 

3181 2 What does that refer to? 

3182 A I don't know. 

3183 Let me tell you what I did when I uas redacting, to 
31814 share the process with you. 

3185 Typically when I had a White House lunch, I put 

3186 something next to it. In other words. I identified who I 
3 187 was going with. On the two occasions that appear in the 

3188 redacted calendars, there was nothing next to the White 

3189 House lunch and I knew that I had gone at least once with 

3190 Mr. Fischer and the Harms to lunch. I didn't know if that 
319 1 related to this matter so I included it anyway. 

3192 S All right. 

3193 A I wish I could tell you more on that. 

319U HR. FRYHAK: Why don't we take a break for less 

3 195 than five minutes. 

3196 [Recess] 



ONCLASSiFiE 



535 



mkmw 




mfimm 



536 



PliiliB 






WiSSiREO 



537 



NAME 
3722 
3723 
372U 
3725 
3726 
3727 
3728 
3729 
3730 
3731 
3732 
3733 
3731 
3735 
3736 
3737 
3738 
3739 
3740 
3741 
3742 
3743 
3744 
3745 
37U6 




P»GE 152 

Discussion off th« racord 1 

OR. (1EEHAH; U« hav« gon« through a lot of personal 
financial transactions with Hr . Artiano which ar« unralatad 
raally to your investigation. 

I undarstand why you had to asK than and I'm not 
sura what is going to happan with tha transcript, but I 
would request that staff 30in with ma, if tha transcript is 
to be released, requesting that this portion ba redacted so 
that It not ba any part of tha public record at any time. 

KR. FRYHAN: Your request is noted and we will 
attempt to comply with that request. 

riK. HEEHAK: On that line, obviously, we are 
concerned about the Kew York Times article yesterday in 
which It appears that the day before ha comas up here to 
testify, the article ran and that somehow inf ormation--it 
certainly did not come from us or from anyone connected with 
nr . Artiano--with respect to the fact that he would be coming 
up here . 

And so we are concerned about material leaking out 

ky accident or for any reason, and this material, which is 

M«lly totally unrelated to the investigation, it seems to 

«• should not come out in any event, and ue request that as 

the time and the report is prepared--! don't know that other 
. \ 

people have had to turn over documents relating to their 



mmwm 



538 



NAME^ 
37U7 
3748 
37149 
3750 
3751 
3752 
3753 
3754 
3755 
3756 
3757 
3758 
3759 
3760 
3761 
3762 
3763 
376U 
3765 
3766 
3767 
3768 
3769 
3770 
3771 



HIR212002 yiiC^l^&i^^^--' 



PAGE 153 

(divorce in situations lika that, but to tha extant that in 
his casa i£ a portion oi this is going to ba mada public, it 
ba linitad to that uhich relates to the investigation. 

MR. FRYMAM: As I say, your request is noted, and I 
think it's a reasonable request, and ua uill attempt to 
comply with that. 

I would also just like to note that you and I, 
prior to the commencement oi tha deposition, discussed the 
Keu York Times article and I expressed to you my concern 
about that article and I stated to you that tha first time I 
had any inkling that tha article was coming was when I read 
it in tha paper yesterday. If you have any Indication of 
tha source of that article, I would Ilka to know about it. 

I have discussed it with tha Chief Counsel of the 
House Committee and I have expressed my concern to him about 
that article. It is a discussion we had yesterday, and I'm 
sure he would equally like to know tha source of that 
article, and if you get any information I would appreciate 
it. 

HK. n£EHAN= Ue knew a day in advance because Hr . 
B«xke was trying to reach Hr . Artiano — the man whose byline 
la on the article. But certainly tha source or the idea of 
tha article did not come from us. though Hr . Hibey did speak 

with him when he reached him on the phone, though ha didn't 

. i, 

know when he answered" the call that that is what it was 



m 



SjtS (Is 



^t. 



539 



fe^fiiJiiJu. /PAGE 154 



MAHE: HIR212002 

3772 abdut. But sons of tha mat*iial andad up in tha articla but 

3773 wa don't know whaca or how it cana about. 

37714 HR. FRYMAH: As I say, I shara your concarn. 

3775 BY MR. FRYHAM^ 

3776 fi Lat ma just ask a faw concluding, ganaral 

3777 quastions, Hr . Artiano. 

3778 You hava indicatad that you racaivad approximately 

3779 «200,000 from Intarnational Business Communications; soma of 

3780 the monies that you racaivad, you relayed to Hr . Fischer 

3781 pursuant to your understanding with him, and that some of 

3782 the monthly checks were made payable to you and you then 

3783 paid him a portion of it. 

3781 Other than the monies that you relayed to Hr . 

3785 Fischer, did you transfer to anyone else any portion of the 

3786 monies you received from IBC? 

3787 A Ho, other than the things we hava just gone over. 

3788 I commingled that money with my personal money, with my PC 

3789 money, and than spent it, as you can see. 

3790 fi But other than that commingling, was there any 
379 1 sharing of the proceeds — 

3792 A Absolutely not. 

3793 fi — from tha IBC contract with anyone other than Dave 

3794 Fischer? 

3795 A Absolutely none. 

3796 HR. FRYHAH: Hr . Heehan, as I indicated, I will 



?iC'^-SI 



T? 



540 



KAME: 
3797 
3798 
3799 
3800 

380 1 
3802 
3803 
380U 
3805 
3806 
3807 
3808 
3809 
3810 

381 1 
3812 
38 13 
38m 
38 15 
38 

3817 
3818 
3819 
3820 
382 



UNCL^SS./, 



HIR212002 unUL^a^^^j^::,,;:. '*" '" 

follow up with you with some writtan questions about sone of 
the othei materials and the bank records. 

I an hopeful that we can resolve those questions m 
writing . 

I have no further questions at this time. 

In the event that we are unable to resolve them, it 
may be necessary to resume the deposition at some point. 
But It is my hope and expectation at this point that we can 
avoid that. 

MR. MEEHAN: Fine. Ue will attempt to respond 
promptly to your request. 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 
2 Mr. Artiano. we spoke before, I believe, at the 
interview . 

When did you first inform your law firm of your 
activities with or on behalf of IBC? 

A I advised all of my partners of my participation 
with Mr. Fischer on behalf of IBC early in 1987. I believe 
It was January or early February of 1987. 

2 So that would have been really a year or thirteen 
months after you first entered into this arrangement with 
Kx. Fischer; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 

S There was a period of time, was there not, when Hr . 
Fischer was actually doi^g business from your office? 



yi^SLASSiHS 



541 



KAHE 
3822 
3823 
382 
3825 
3826 
3827 
3828 
3829 
3830 
3831 
3832 
3833 
38314 
3835 
3836 
3837 
3838 
3839 
38M0 
38M1 
3842 
3843 
3844 
38US 
38U6 



JhW^ik^ki i; >.-.,■ PAGE 1S« 



HIR212002 w.« w«i« a'<to'^>6«i i;*.^, pjge isg 

A Theia was a period of tina uhan Mr. fischtti was 
coming into Hashangton, using tha IBC oificas, and 
occasionally coming by ray ofiica and using a sacond phona I 
have in my office, which is on the opposite end of the room 
from my desk. 

He would come in for half an hour, 45 minutes, make 
a few calls and leave. 

2 Did you explain to your law partners who ha was and 
what he was doing? 

A ny law partners know Hr . Fischer. 

2 Here they aware that you had any kind of business 
relationship with Mr. Fischer at the tima ha was coming in 
and using your ofiica? 

A Probably not. 

2 Can you tall ma. give ma an estimate of the number 
of billable hours you reported to your firm in 1986. 
calendar 1986? 

A Ho. 

2 Was it over 2,000? 

A I doubt it. but it was probably around there. Ky 
billable hours have been pretty consistent. 

2 In the neighborhood of 2.000 hours? 

A I think so. but I would have to go back and take a 

look. 

. \ 

2 During the first quarter of 1986, whan I believe 



0^CLS3S^^"?tJ 



542 



name: HIR2,2002 U Nd ASS ^ H^ ^ P»" '57 

38U7 iLou said your activity on bahali oi Mr. Channall's 

38148 organization was most intansa--it would b« January. February, 

3849 Harch of 1986 — did tha billabla tina you wera reporting to 

3850 your firm drop at all? 

385 1 A I don't baliava so. I would naed to go chack thosa 

3852 records to give you a specific answer, but I was spending 

3853 most evenings working on this with Hr . Fischer, and I was 

3854 spending weekend tine working on it, and as I described in 

3855 the answer to Mr. Fryman's questions, I was doing my best. 

3856 I believe I accomplished the end, the goal, of not having it 

3857 interfere with my activities on behalf of the law firm. 

3858 e Did you have any other business ventures during 

3859 that first quarter of 1986 that required any of your time? 

3860 A nicrogravity may have been active fox me at the 

3861 beginning of 1986, but I don't remember. That is a 

3862 possibility, as well as Combs, which were both separate 

3863 ventures. I didn't spend an extraordinary amount of time on 
386'4 either of those matters. 

3865 Those are the only two business matters I can think 

3866 of. 

3867 fi Can you tell me what your approximate gross 

3868 receipts were from the Hicrogravity project? 

3869 A ny personal receipts from that were about 46,000. 

3870 Q And as far as Combs is concerned? 
387 1 A About 5,000-6,000 approximately. 






543 



3872 
3873 
38714 
3875 
3876 
3877 
3878 
3879 
3880 
3881 
3882 
3883 
388U 
3885 
3886 
3887 
3888 
3889 
3890 
389 1 
3892 
3893 
389^ 
3895 
3896 






HIR212002 Wll Vlt>ir^'^'«^E2 t'^^'ijl PAGE 158 

Q What col*, if any, did you hava in setting up 
itaatings ioc Ms. Channall and/or his contcibutocs at tha 
Uhita Housa? 

A I knau that thay uaza intandad . I discussad than 
with Mr. Fischar, with Ht . Hillac, occasionally with Mr. 
Channell, and pachaps He. Conzad. Ha talkad about all oi. 
tha things you would ocdinacily talk about in satting up 
thosa typas oi naatings, about tilling, about claacanca 
pcoceducas, about datas, thosa typas oi things. I had no 
dicact contact with tha Hhita Housa. 

S That was going to ba ay naxt quastlon. 

Did you spaaK with oc communicata with anyona at 
tha Whita Housa dizactly? 

A Ko, sic. 

Q He. Fischac handlad that and of it? 

A Yas, sir. 

2 Tha scheduling . 

Did you assist in pcapazing any wcittan 
descriptions oi He. Channall 's ocganizatlons oc his 
contcibutocs ior submission to tha Hhite House? 

A I believe I worked with He. Fischec in the 
preparation of a itaaocandum ha sent to Chief of Staff Regan. 

2 And that namocanduB desccibed. did it not, NEPL and 



tha Amecican Consecvative Trust and their actlvitia! 



IS 



. \ 



that fair to say] 



UNCLASSiFiES 



544 



UNCLAS 



513"^^.'^ 



NAHE: HIR212002 

3897 -. A I have not saan that maaoEandum pcobably for ovat a 

3898 yaaz, but I would guass that that's probably what was in tha 

3899 mano. 

3900 e In January of 1986 uara you awara that Hr . Channall 
390 1 and his organizations wara raising nonay for diract 

3902 assistance to tha contras, that is. monay to ba givan or 

3903 passad along through intaritadiarias to tha contras? 
39014 A Ho. 

3905 C What did you understand? 

3906 A Wa understood their role to ba a aadla-oriented 

3907 role. Ha knew they were doing coaaercials. They were 

3908 planning to do mora conmarcials . They were supporting the 

3909 Administration policies in that respect. That is a fairly 

3910 expansive way to go. 

3911 I also — although I never was franKly real familiar 

3912 with exactly how this was done. I knew that they were 

39 13 providing humanitarian aid, or believed they were, for tha 

39 1(4 Hicaraguans. 

3915 e Can you elaborate on how you knew they ware 

39 16 providing humanitarian aid? 

39 17 A I read the formal packages that had been prepared 

39 18 on behalf of NZPL prior to Hr . Fischer and I beginning our 

39 19 consulting relationship with Hz. Miller. 

3920 I was certainly present at meetings where NEPL was 

3921 discussed, and these programs were discussed. 



!^5 "SSIkO 



545 



NAME: 
3922 
3923 
392U 
3925 
3926 
3927 
3928 
3929 
3930 
3931 
3932 
3933 
393<4 



HIR212002 



UNCLASSi^'^ 



i-^^J 



PAGE 160 



As I say, I don't hav« a spaclflc t«coll«ction of 
any discussion of humanitarian aid. All of my lacollactions 
go to madia campaigns. That was tha principal part of tha 
conversation . 

2 But you war* awara at laast on* facat of thair 
activities was raising monay for tha supply of humanitarian 
aid to tha contras? 

A I beliava so. Had I baan askad at that tima, X 
probably would hava raspondad that way. 

e Do you racall whathar tha mamorandum you halpad 
prapara for submission to Ht . Ragan includad any rafaranca 
to that aspact of HCPL's activitiai? 

A I don't. I'm soxzy. 






■:^vJ 



82-690 0-88-19 



546 



HKnZ HIR212002 

393S 

3936 

3937 

3938 

3939 

3940 

39(41 

39142 

39143 

391414 

3945 

39U6 

3947 

39M8 

39149 
3950 
3951 
39S2 
3953 
39SU 
3955 
3956 
3957 
3958 
3959 



PAGE 161 
WIS HAZUR 
DCMN BANNAK 
14: IS 

BY HR. ncGOUGH: 
2 Do you recall anyone aver making a conscious 
decision not to mention that appearance of HEPl's activity 
at the White House? 
A Ko. 

2 Were you at all — involved at all in setting up 
meetings with Charles Wick? 
A Mo. 

e How about with Attorney General Heese? 
A In setting up that meeting. 

2 In setting up the meeting. I know we won't go to 
attending it. 
A Mo. 

2 You weren't the contactor involved in that? 
A No. I don't believe so. 

2 You were present, however, at a meeting with 
Attorney General Meesej is that correct? 
A That is correct. 

e Can you describe what that meeting was about? 
A That was a meeting attended by Dave Fischer, 
Richard niller. Frank Gomez--I believe Frank Gomez was 
there--flr. Channell and Hr . Conrad. 



mwm 



547 



3960 

3961 

3962 

3963 

3964 

3965 

3966 

3967 

396 

3969 

3970 

397' 

3972 

3973 

39714 

3975 

3976 

3977 

3978 

397< 

3980 

3981 

3982 

3983 

398>4 



HIR212002 ^'^^^Iti^i^^ij'f^'g^j "GE 162 

This was m connection with the Constitutional 
Minutes program. They were trying to get organized. They 
had already done some preliminary — produced some preliminary 
paperwork on, I believe — certainly in the form of a 
description--a proposal for it. 

They were interested in advising the Attorney 
General and his staff that they were planning to do this, 
and the purpose of the meeting was to let them Know that and 
to seek any kind of guidance or help that the Justice 
Department might be able to lend in terms of recommending 
constitutional scholars that might help draft these 
television spots and that sort of thing. 

fi Do you recall who set that meeting up? 
A I believe Hr . Fischer set it up. 

2 Let's jump, if we could, to January of '86, where 
in the discussions about the upcoming briefing at the White 
House for HEPL contributors, I believe you said that in 
discussions--whethet late in '85 or early •86--someone brought 
up the possibility oi such a brieiing and it sounded like a 
terrific idea, and you and Hx . Fischer pitched in to help it 
happen. 

Is that a fair summary of what — 
A That's correct. 

2 During those discussions was there mention — did 
anyone mention to you'that there had been earlier briefings 



mmi 



• ™ lo F-; «si 



548 



SS^FE9'- '" 



NAHE: HIR212002 

3985 at the White House? 

3986 A As I indicated eailiez, X saw a — a folder. 

3987 e Yes. 

3988 A And in that folder, which had been provided to ma 

3989 through Mr. Miller, he had received it iron Mr. Channell, 

3990 I'm sure, or had prepared it for Hr . Channell with a stack 

399 1 of letters, and the letters referenced meetings. 

3992 There were letters commending Mr. Channell and his 

3993 organization--meetings in the White House, and I had been 
3991* advised either by Mr. Channell or by Mr. Miller, as I did 

3995 Fischer, that they had had a series of meetings in the White 

3996 House and that from this recollection that was substantiated 

3997 in this packet of letters. 

3998 S So is it fair to say when the idea of a briefing 

3999 was discussed in late '85 or early '86, it wasn't a new 
14000 idea; it was a variation on something they had done before? 

400 1 Is that fair to say? 
4002 A That's correct. 

ii003 2 And what did you and Mr. Fischer bring to the 

UOOU January briefing that was different in any way from what 

4005 they had done before? 

U006 A Hell, I don't know this for a fact, but I don't 

U007 believe they had ever had a Cabinet Room briefing. Those 

4008 are obviously difficult ,to arrange for a host of reasons. 

4009 We discussed — precisely that, frankly, at the meeting, how 



UNCLASSiF^ED 



549 



NAME: HIR212002 U 11 V i-WVl^':^ 2 J » iK; f V pj^j ,^4 

4010 diificult that is to do, you knou, uhat would ba involvad, 

40 11 uhat steps needed to be taken, the fact that we would need 

40 12 to advise--iranediately advise the Chief of Staff and perhaps 

4013 some people at the Kational Security Council--! don't 

4014 remember who. 

4015 But Dave and I, during the course of that meeting 

4016 and afterwards at length f or--probably twenty occasions-- 
40 17 discussed it, and Dave went forward and we prepared the 
40 18 memorandum to Hr . Regan. 

4019 I know Dave spoke to Hr . Regan about this prior to 

4020 that briefing and probably spoke to other people, although 

4021 you have to ask him with who he spoke, and managed to get it 

4022 approved and put on the schedule. 

4023 2 You either stated or implied, I think, that it was 

4024 in the course of discussing that Hhite House briefing that 

4025 the idea of an appearance or meeting with President Reagan 

4026 was first broached to you. 

4027 Is that — am I correct or did I draw that correctly? 

4028 A Ko, you're correct. That was the first time anyone 

4029 had raised any kind of meeting or making the President 

4030 available for any purpose. 

403 1 fi Mhose idea was that? Do you recall? 

4032 A You know, I don't. I don't remember who initiated 

4033 it. We were kind of having a strategy session around the 

4034 table and talking about the future of NEPL and what Hr . 



UNCLASSIFSB 



550 



NAME : 
U03S 
M036 
M037 
4038 
4039 
4040 
4041 
4042 
4043 
4044 
404S 
4046 
4047 
4048 
4049 
4050 
4051 
4052 
4053 
4054 
4055 
4056 
4057 
4058 
4059 



HCLASSIBEB »=. ■» 



HIR212002 

Channell hoped to acconplish. you know, getting soneone from 
the Administration to voice directly to the donors that--you 
know, this was a real important policy for the 
Administration. 

2 And I guess whenever it was voiced, everyone agreed 
that would be a good idea, to have the President-- 

A Correct. 

2 By that time you and Ht . Fischer had been on a 
$20,000 a month retainer for a couple of months; is that 
fair to say? 

A For two weeks . 

2 Two weeks . 

A I believe. Approximately two weeks. 

2 There came a point, did there not, when I think you 
said the deal was renegotiated and--there was an agreement to 
accelerate payments; is that fair to say? 

A That's correct. 

2 Can you be a little more specific about what the 
payments--the new payment structure was to be? 

A Hell, I can--the best I can tell you is this. The 
payment structure--af ter the first arrangement which set 
forth the »20,000 a month, «20,000 a month payment stayed in 
a state of flux for as long as I was a direct participant in 

any of those discussions. 

. -i 

By mid to the third week oi January it was clear 



UNCLASSIFlED 



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J^t ?! JS ri ^ 



NAME 
14060 
U06 1 
4062 
4063 
140614 
14065 
14066 
4067 
4068 
4069 
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407 1 
4072 
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HIR212002 UllljI_*Br;a^5g^-'.^^j- PAGE 166 
that Dave Fischer was spending virtually full tine on behalf 
of IBC. X was spending a lot more time than I ever dreaned 
I would be spending on it, and Dave and I--to each other, and 
I'm sure to Rich Miller--indicated this uas not anticipated, 
that the fee structure would have to change and it would 
have to be increased and indeed, as I've expressed earlier, 
that both Dave and I were concerned about the fact this 
would just stop as suddenly as it started, so we thought it 
was wise to get an advance payment so we were not behind a 
curve . 

Q Do you recall striking an agreement at that time to 
accelerate payments so that *280,000 would be paid over the 
course of the next four months? 

A No. 

2 Uas there ever any agreement to that •ffect--I'm not 
saying that was what the payment stxuctuze uas. but do you 
ever recall striking that agreement? 

A No, I don't. 

2 Do you ever recall--do you recall what the 
accelerated payment schedule was to be? 

A Z don't think there was ever a specific agreement 
about it. I— I know that Mr. Millar , at least at the 
beginning, although I--at some point was not again directly 
involved in these conversations--Has very amenable to the 
re<iuest for acceleration of payments. 






552 



NAME 
408S 
4086 
4087 
U0£ 
i40e 
4090 
4091 
4092 
4093 
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4100 
410 1 
4102 
4103 
4104 
4105 
4106 
4107 
4108 
4109 



k^l^ita^i^^iiLi'aiLi^ pjoE ,67 

2 But let's get a little bit mora specific. Hhat 
were you asking for as far as--I nean acceleration can mean a 
lot of things. Hhat uas your proposal to remake the 
contract ? 

You had an oral agreement to take «20,000 a month 
over 24 months. Uhat did you propose as an alternative in 
January of '86? 

A Two things happened at that point. One was first 
the acceleration, and the number that Dave and I came up 
with was »50,000 in terms of give us an accelerated payment 
at the end of January or February, get ahead of us a little 
bit, give us a check for 450,000. 

S One S50,000 accelerated payment? 

A Yeah. I don't remember if there was another check 
during the course of the year for 450,000. 

e I'm just talking about the proposal at this point. 
I understand the deal continued to evolve as time went on, 
but what I'm trying to do is get a snapshot of what the deal 
was in January of '86. 

A You've got the snapshot. 

2 And what is that? 

A The snapshot is that we asked for an accelerated 
payment, an accelerated payment In the form of an amount 
over and above the «20,q00 to be paid at the end of January, 
the beginning of February, and advised Rich Miller that to 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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NAME: HIR212002 



UNCLASSlnE 



M>*GE 16£ 



4 111 
4 112 



4 115 
41 16 
41 17 
41 18 
4 119 
4 120 
412 1 
4122 
4123 
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4125 
4126 
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4129 
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4133 
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the extent that the dedication of tim« was going to even 
approximate what had happened m the first month of this 
agreement, that--nurabe r s will have to be renegotiated out. 
e I understand that. 

Now, the payment that you wanted at the end of 
January or early February was »50,000; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 

e Did you discuss any future--any other acceleration 
at that time? Did you look beyond--for accelerated payments 
beyond late January or early February? 

A I don't believe ue did. If we did, I certainly 
don't recall the conversation along those lines. 

2 So you don't recall agreeing to essentially 
compress the «280,000 over a four-month period? 
A Mo. 

2 Do you recall Hr . Hiller or--do you recall either 
hearing from Hr . Channell or Hr . Hiller relaying to you any 
requests by Hr . Channel! for — or any conditions by Hr . 
Channell on that acceleration, anything you would have to do 
for him? 

A I'm not sure I understand your question. 
2 Did Hr. Channell ask for anything in addition 
to--anything in exchange for the accelerated payment? 

A Ho. First of all, the question is not really 
answerable because Hr . Channell was not the person with whom 



UNCLASSil-?© 



554 



UNCLA3Sy';ED 



MAKE: HIR212002 «J IV «# kri«^«#' M M ■ Aa W pAGC 169 

4 135 vre had the financial atrangenent . It was Ht . Hillet. 

4136 2 I understand that. But it is answerable in the 

4137 sense that did Mr. Channell express to you, either directly 

4138 or through Mr. Miller, a desire for anything in exchange for 

4139 agreeing to concur in acceleration of payment? 

4 140 A By concurring you nean that he was--he was making 

4141 payment to Mr. Miller? 

4 142 Q That's the explicit assumption, that Mr. Miller was 

4 143 not the one bearing the payments. 

4144 A I guess the answer is I don't Know if there were 

4145 any conditions put forward. 

4 146 I know that Mr. Channell certainly for the fir«t 

4 147 several months and I believe thereafter was delighted with 

4 148 the services he was getting, both from IBC and from the 

4149 additional input of Mr. Fischer and myself, and I believe 

4 150 was getting what he wanted from IBC. 

4 15 1 fi Did Mr. Miller ever coma back to you and ask for 

4 152 any additional effort or any additional commitments in 

4153 exchange for the accelerated payment of «50,000? 

4154 A Well. I'll be perfectly honest with you--and I'm not 

4155 trying to not answer this question; I just don't understand 
4 156 it. Mr. Hiller--the reason the accelerated payment came up 
4 157 in the first place was because Mr. Miller kept asking for 

4 158 more and more and more and more in terms of time and energy 

4 159 and devotion to his business, and as a consequence of that 



Q^^-r'p.r"'"^ 



555 



HIR212002 



m^mm 



JJ PAGE 170 



NAME 

UUO ue said hey, why don't you guys get ahead of us on this and 

U161 why don't you rethink these numbers because it's not going 

14162 to uoik at 420.000 a month. I said this isn't the deal ue 

U163 cut. this isn't the way we uant to proceed. 
4164 Mr. Miller continued to ask ior lots and lots of 

>4165 things over the course of the entire relationship. That's 

14166 the best ansuer I can give you. 
U167 2 Did you discuss scheduling presidential meetings 

14168 with Mr. Miller? 

14169 A Yes. 

14170 fi Your ability to do that? 

14171 A Our efforts to do that, sure. 
4172 2 Or efforts to do that. 

14173 Did you discuss the scheduling of those meetings in 

141714 conjunction with the acceleration of payments? 

14175 A No. 

14 176 2 Old Mr. Miller ever come back to you and ask you 

m?? prior--strike that; start again. 

14178 Prior to agreeing to accelezata payments, did Mr. 

m79 Miller come back to you and inquire as to youz ability to 

U180 schedule four presidential meetings over the next four 

14181 months? 

m82 A You know, I don't even think I oan answer the 

14183 question, and I'll tell you why. Hhen we sat down at a 

UISM table with Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller and perhaps Frank 



UNCLASS^P^B 



556 



4185 
4186 
4187 



4 190 
4 19 1 
4 192 
4193 
4 194 
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4196 
4197 
4 198 
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4200 
4201 
4202 
4203 
4204 
4205 
4206 
4207 
4208 
4209 



HIR212002 UlQSj'L«%l^2/aik»E>PAGE 171 
&«mez and myself, and we're going ovec all oi these things, 
ue may have covered five or six subjects at the same 
meeting. In other words, Mr. Miller may have come to us and 
said, you know, gee, can we do this three or four more 
times, and that would be one segment of a conversation, and 
also can ue do this, this, this, and that would be another 
subject, and ue may have raised payments at the same meeting 
in the course of the same two or three hours or the same 
breakfast. 

You know, in my mind certainly those things were 
never tied together. They uere all components of the 
relationship . 

C But they uere certainly all discussed in the same 
time frame? 

A I'm sure that they were all discussed in the same 
time frame, yeah. 

2 And presidential meetings never even was raised as 
a subject until January of 1986; is that right? 

A That's the best of ay recollection. That's the 
first time that surfaced. 

2 And it was also January of 1986 when you and Mr. 
Fischer requested an acceleration of your payments; is that 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

2 And the amount of acceleration requested was an 



mam 



557 



NAME^ 
U210 
421 1 
U2 12 
1*2 13 
U2 m 
14215 
LI216 
42 17 
4218 
42 19 
4220 
4221 
4222 
4223 
4224 
4225 
4226 
4227 
4228 
4229 
4230 
4231 
4232 
4233 
4234 



ONCLASl'.iiiiiJ 



HIR212002 fcflPMII'II SJ»"V.--. ■ ! • . , ,^ fxGt 172 
additional fSCOOO payment for th« month of January; is that 
correct? 

A Yeah. I need to looK at the records. I don't knov 
whether they paid us 20 plus 50 or whether they paid us 50 
instead of 20. I don't know. 

2 Do you recall which it was? 

A I don't. I can look at the records and tell you. 

2 Why don't you do that. Has it 20 plus 50 or was xi 



50- 



jounced . 



MR. FRYMAN: This appears to be the check that 



BY MR. McGOUGH: 

2 So it appears to be the 20 plus 50? 

A Yes. The 50 was an accelerated payment. 

2 Let me put this as directly as I can, and I realize 
we are talking about conversations that Here all occurring 
at or about the same time. 

Did Mr. Miller, in substance, ever come back to you 
and say before I accelerate or agree to accelerate your 
payments, Mr. Channell needs to know whether you and Mr. 
Fischer feel that you can schedule four presidential 
meetings over the course of the next four months? 

A I honestly do not remember ever hearing that from 
Mr. Miller. 

2 Or anything to that effect? 



ONCLflSSifED 



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NAME 
14235 
<4236 
4237 
14238 
4239 
4240 
4241 
4242 
4243 
4244 
4245 
4246 
4247 
4248 
4249 
4250 
4251 
4252 
4253 
4254 
4255 
4256 
4257 
4258 
4259 



UNCLASSieED- 



HIR212002 IBBWH.I M '^ "^ ,^ fii Li '-« '. -^p AGE 173 

- A No. He had endless requests, endless requests from 
Mr. Miller for the type of briefing ue set up and Hr . 
Fischer set up in January, for more of those. And obviously 
any time they can get the President at a function, what a 
plus for Mr. Miller and for his client. 

I don't--those were common conversations that ue had 
regularly all of the time. 

2 Do you ever recall him presenting it as four 
presidential meetings in the space of four months? 

A I don't remember. I mean, we talked about 
different numbers of presidential meetings. 

2 What numbers did you talk about? 

A I have no idea. I don't recall whether we talked 
about it--can we do two meetings in February, is it possible 
to do three meetings the same month, you know, how far ahead 
can ue schedule a meeting like this, how much notice do we 
need to give somebody if we want to get them into 
town--typical types of logistical questions and scheduling 
questions you would ask ii you were undertaking that kind of 
an assignment. 

fi And these conversations — an I inferring correctly, 
these conversations took place at or about the same time you 
were discussing acceleration of your fee? 

A He discussed t]>e acceleration of the fee in 
January. If you're asking me whether we would call a 



0NCLASS!F'^h9 



559 



NAHE: HIR212002 U PJ i* LHS^' '^ 3^ " ^^ PAGE 171* 

4260 meeting and say tha sole purpose of this nesting is to 

4261 discuss this-- 

4262 e No. I understand that. I'm not that naive. 

4263 A --that wasn't the case. 

"^264 e Hy question is, were these matters being discussed 

4265 in or around the same time frame? And the matters are, one, 

4266 scheduling presidential meetings and in particular hou many 

4267 presidential meetings can be discussed, and. number two, 

4268 acceleration of payments under the consulting agreement. 

4269 A I can tell you that--both of those things, both 

4270 acceleration of payments and presidential meetings, were 
427 1 discussed in our meetings. 

4272 I would be misrepresenting the truth if I told you 

4273 I had a specific recollection about both of those things 

4274 being mentioned within the scope of a single meeting or 

4275 within the scope of two hours. 

4276 2 But they were both mentioned in January 1986? 

4277 A Unquestionably. 

4278 2 To your knowledge, does Hr . Fischer know Ron 

4279 Piccini? 

4280 A I have introduced them. sure. 

4281 2 And on how many occasions? Are they^ just passing 

4282 acquaintances or-- 

4283 A Just passing acquaintances. nz . Fischer probably 

4284 met Hr . Piccini at my house on a weekend. 



MCLASS§FED 



560 






NAHE^ HIR212002 

4285 -. MR. McGOUGH: I think that is all I have. 

4286 HR. OLIVER: I will try to be brief. I just wanted 

4287 to ask a feu questions relating to some of the answers you 
1288 gave to Mr. Fryman, to clarify soite matters. 

M289 BY MR. OLIVER: 

4290 • 2 You said that you gave political advice to IBC, as 

1*29 1 well as business advice and advice on projects and that sort 

U292 of thing; is that correct? 

4293 A That's generally correct. 

42914 2 Is your political experience limited to the two 

■4295 Reagan campaigns for president? 

4296 A Hy--in terms of my acting in a full-time capacity, 

4297 yes. * 

4298 2 Were you considered an insider in the Reagan 

U299 campaign because of your early activities and your longevity 

14300 with the campaign? 

430 1 A An insider meaning what? I'm not sure. 

4302 2 I mean someone who is on the inner circle of the 

•4303 campaign. You mentioned there were 7 = 30 meetings and you 

43014 were one of the people who attended those meetings on a 

M305 regular basis. 

4306 A I certainly had relationships with several senior 

4307 people around Mr. Reagan, had bean around myself since 1976 

4308 and was fortunate enougl) to have been included in those 7:30 

4309 meetings. So if that's the definition of an insider. 



lillOLASSiiS 



561 



UNCLASSiFiED -- ' 



NAHE: HIR212002 

4310 somebody in an inside circle. I uas that. 

4311 2 You've indicated that you uere ask*d by Hr . Tyson 

4312 or nr . Meese to come up from San Diego to set up a national 

4313 advance organization; is that correct? 

4314 A Right. 

4315 2 Was that at the beginning of the 1980 campaign? 

4316 A Yes. 

4317 2 So that really would have been in 1979. 

4318 A I'm not sure of the date. Could have been '79. 

4319 2 Well, it uas before Hr . Reagan announced for 

4320 president; is that correct? I aean. there would have been 

4321 an exploratory period and a lot of things building up to the 

4322 announcement of his campaign. 

4323 A I tell you. I don't know the date. I don't know--it 

4324 uas very early on. We did not have a national advance team 

4325 put together. 

4326 2 Did you travel on some of these advanced activities 

4327 yourself? 

4328 A I think only on one or tuo until a pre-conwention . 

4329 I remember one trip to Denver. 

4330 2 Did you ever go to Iowa? 

4331 A This is in 1979. '80? 

4332 2 1980 Iowa caucus would have been held. 

4333 A I don't think so. 

4334 2 But you remember the Iowa caucus in which Hr . Bush 



UNCLASSlf'D 



562 



UNCLASSIFIED - 



AGE 177 



NAME: HIR212002 

M335 defeated Mr. Reagan. That was a traumatic moment for the 

U336 campaign. 

4337 A Yes. 

14338 I don't believe I Was there. 

14339 2 But you were full time on the campaign at that 
143140 point? 

>43U1 A I believe so, but I need to check the dates here to 

'43'42 make sure I'm right about this, because I might have-- 

i43<43 2 Did you ever go to New Hampshire? 

4344 A Mo. 

4345 2 You uere full time in the campaign by the time of 

4346 the New Hampshire primary, when Hr . Reagan won that primary? 

4347 A I believe so. 

4348 2 Isn't it the case that right about the time in the 

4349 New Hampshire primary that Mr. Sears was fired and Hr . Casey 

4350 was named as campaign raanager-- 

4351 A That's correct. 

4352 2 So that would have been Hatch of 1980. Then full 

4353 time m the campaign from then until November 4th; is that 

4354 correct? 

4355 A That's correct. 

4356 2 When you came to Washington in--after the convention 

4357 in Detroit, you indicated that you were the deputy director 

4358 for logistics and scheduling: is that correct? 

4359 -A I think my title was deputy director in scheduling 



ONCLASSfP^f} 



563 



UNCLAS3iP»tD 



NAME: HIR212002 V II V kFl^^^' ■ ■ UP-*-' PAGE 17£ 

14360 advance operations. 

14361 Q Who asked you to take over that job? 
4362 A Mr. Tyson. 

(4363 e Mas It also Mc . Tyson who asked you to be the head 

U36U of logistics for the convention in Detroit? 

4365 A Yes. 

4366 e You also indicated that you had brought a debate 

4367 consultant from Virginia into the caapaign; is that correct? 

4368 A Although I'm not sure that Hr . Miles Hartel uas 

4369 from Virginia. I'm not sure where he was from. 

4370 2 Why were you bringing a debate consultant into the 

4371 campaign? 

4372 A I was just--was a matter of interest to me. I was 

4373 concerned that we get an early start, a head start on the 

4374 debates, and everybody was real busy and didn't have tine to 

4375 focus on it, and I took it on myself to start looking into 

4376 it and had an opportunity to have discussions with some 

4377 people I consider to be knowledgeable and they, among other 

4378 things, recommended Hr . Hartel, and I then looked into his 

4379 credentials and was impressed and made the recommendation. 

4380 It was out of my role. 

4381 2 And you said you went to Bill Timmonds and Stu 

4382 Spencer regarding that debate? 

4383 A That's correct, 

4384 e And the purpose oi that was to persuade them that 



UNGLASSi?:D 



564 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME- HIR212002 ~ - ^ b^ VXGt 17< 

4385 something needed to be done about debate prepaiat ion? 
U386 A They had two purposes. One was I wanted to get a 

4387 response from Bill Tiramonds and Mr. Spencer to see if they 

4388 agree with my assessment that this was a good time to get 

4389 started. 

4390 I wanted to let them know what I had collected and 

439 1 got done already and was trying to enlist them to spearhead 

4392 this, because I alone couldn't havai catalyzed an early 

4393 operation, debate operation, and I think I was partially 

4394 successful. 

4395 2 And you said earlier you remember two important 

4396 meetings with Bill Casey, one of which he called you and 

4397 asked you to come up and talk about the debate. 

4398 A They were important to me because I remember them. 

4399 The first meeting was one in which I guess after 

4400 either Bill Timmonds or Stu Spencer called Hr . Casey and 

440 1 told him that--discussed the debates and said Marty Artiano 

4402 has collected all this stuff and he's interested, and Mr. 

4403 Casey called me up to his office to eKplote it with ma, aird 

4404 he said who have you spoken to and all, and I shared it with 

4405 him, and, okay, okay, fine, I'll address this meeting, and 

4406 so it was immediately out of my hands. 

4407 It became a meeting that Mr. Casey and Jim Bakar-- 

4408 2 What were thos* matetials you collected? 

4409 A Materials of public record, briefing books that had 



UNCLASSIFIED 



565 



UNCLASSIFiED 



NAME: HIR212002 —-- — —--— p^j.^. ,gg 

Umo been prepared, for example, for President Ford that are now 

414 11 at the library. I believe I even had sons from Mr. Carter's 

UU12 campaign in '76. Different periodicals that I had 

UU13 researched. 

4414 e Did you have any briefing material that was 

4415 prepared for Mr. Carter's 1980 campaign? 

4416 A No. 

4417 2 Were you aware of the briefing materials from Mr. 

4418 Carter's campaign that came into the possession of Mr. 

4419 Casey? 

4420 A No. 

4421 B You didn't read about that? 

4422 A Well, I mean I was aware after the fact. 

4423 e But you didn't know anything about it at that time? 

4424 A No. 

4425 2 You said that Bill Timmonds had introduced you to 

4426 Elliott Abrams, to your recollection? 

4427 A I think that's possible, yeah. 

4428 Q That was during the campaign? 

4429 A I think so. 

4430 2 Has Kr . Abrams involved in the campaign? 

443 1 A You know, I haven't spoken a lot to Mr. Abrams 

4432 about that, ironically. I think that — I believe he was 

4433 helping us in one of the campaign areas at the time, and I 

4434 can't even remember what> whether he was working on the 



UNCUSSlF'tD 



566 



UNCLASSiFBED 



NAME: HIR212002 w ■■ w —■■■«»■ ^^ ■ ■ ■ ■■ air pjcg ,3, 

MUaS Jewish vote or what exactly he was doing. But I know that 

U1436 he had volunteered his services and was doing everything he 

41437 could, and Hr . Timmonds thought highly of him. 

uuas e He was a Democrat at that time, wasn't ha? 

41439 A This was after his change of heart. 

MUUO 2 You couldn't remember all of the names of the 

UUUl people who were on the transition team Ed Folder and Frank 

U14U2 Shakespeare headed. Uas Ken Adleman on that team? 

'4'4'43 A Mr. Adleman might have been but I don't recall. 

uyuM I should, :ust for purposes of putting this in 

MMMS perspective, let you know when I got to Washington I 

UUUS couldn't find my way from election headquarters to the White 

(4(41(7 House. These names didn't mean much to me and I was kind of 

1414148 scrambling around on my own. 

1414149 2 You said that in late November or early December 
MMSO 1985 you got a call from Rich Killer indicating that he 
141451 needed some help with his organization and that they wanted 
UUS2 a high-level fellow with Washington experience. 

141453 Would you consider yourself someone with Washington 

144514 experience of the kind that he needed at that point? 

141455 A I think I probably--i£ you evaluate my experience 

14456 and credentials, they fit soma of the criteria that he was 

4457 looking for. 

4458 2 And had Dave Fj.sch«t had any Washington experience 

4459 before he came to the White House to work as a personal 



UNCLASSIFIED 



567 



unclassif:cD 



KAHE: HIR212002 »» - - w — p^^j ,33 

UI460 assistant to the President? 

446 1 A Not to ny knowledge. 

4462 2 Had he been involved in any Washington activities 

UU&B oc politics or Governnent besides that job? 

MMSM A He had been involved, I believe, with Senator Hatch 

141465 prior to--I believe with Hr . Hatch, but I'm not sure. He had 

141466 some political experience prior to 197S, prior to l975--prior 

141467 to hooking on with Mr. Reagan, or between '76 and '79, 

141468 although I think the former is correct. 

141469 2 So you felt that the experience that you and Dave 

141470 Fischer had had in Washington fit the bill for what Rich 

141471 Hanna wanted? 

41472 A I think the cumulation of our exper ience--you know, 

141473 when you're handling scheduling in advance for the President 

144714 of the United States, you're an image-maker. 

141475 The answer is yes. 

141476 S Did you--how soon after you talked to Mr. niller did 
141*77 you and Hr . Fischer meet with Hr . Channell and Mr. Conrad 
14478 and Hr . Miller? 

4479 A I can't tell you exactly. It was shortly 

4480 thereafter, within a couple of weeks, I would guess. 

4481 2 So it was in December of 1985? 

4482 A Yes, I believe it was in December of 1985. 

4483 2 And at that meeting did you discuss the 

4484 arrangements for you services? 



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NAHE 

MM85 
UU86 
4487 



14U90 
l4U9 1 
UU92 
4493 
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4496 
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4501 
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4509 



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UNCLASSIHt.},.. , 



83 



A At a meeting uith Mr. Fischer present and Mr. 
Channell present? 

2 Yes. 

A I don't recall. Wouldn't surprise me if we did. 
Our negotiations were with Mr. Miller. 

Q They were not with Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad 
present at a meeting? 

A No. As I said, they may very well have been 
present at those initial discussions. 

2 And did you discuss directly uith Channell and 
Conrad what the arrangements would be, what services you 
were going to provide? 

A Uell, you know, the services we were going to 
provide were as I've described them. There was never any 
question in anybody's raind , from start to finish, that Mr. 
Fischer and I were going to be working for IBC. 

We also were made aware very early on that Mr. 
Channell's organizations were a big client of IBC and the 
thing needed the first thrust h«ie. 

2 Well, isn't it a fact, Mr. Artiano, that the exact 
amounts of money that were paid to you by IBC were paid to 
them by Spitz Channell? 

A I will give you a specific answer to that question. 
Answer number Qne , I have no idea, none, how much 
money was paid from Mr. Channell or any of his organizations 



liNCLASSIFJB 



569 



UNCLASSIFSED. 



NAME^ HIR212002 w ■ ■ w ■■■ B^r %# ■ ■ Mkb/pAGE ISU 

4510 or anybody elsa, or any other client, to IBC. I have never 

USll looked or had access to any of the books of all those 

4512 organizations. 

^SIS Huraber two, wouldn't surprise me at all if Hr . 

MS14 Miller, to fund this obligation to Mr. Fischer and I which 

■45 15 he had undertaken and which w« pzoc««d«d on in good faith 

4516 without a written agreement, was funded in large part--and 

4517 perhaps getting into a hole--by Mr. Channell . I don't know 

4518 that to be a fact; I was not present in those discussions. 

4519 2 Well, the reason I was asking questions about 

4520 whether Mr. Channell and Hz. Conrad were present with you 
452 1 and Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller when you were discussing your 

4522 services would be to--if your contract was with IBC, why 

4523 would Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad be present at those 

4524 negotiations? 

4525 A If Mr. Miller chose to discuss that matter in front 

4526 of one of his clients, it frankly didn't concern Mr. Fischer 

4527 and I. 

4528 2 You ware not aware that ISC was billing Mr. 

4529 Channell for the fees, exact amounts of fees that you and 

4530 Dave Fischer were receiving? 

4531 A Ho. 

4532 Q You were never made aware of that? 

4533 A No. But as I have indicat«d--no . 

4534 S And you had nothing in writing with IBC, no 



UNCLASSIFSED 



570 



UNCLASSIFSED.. ,. 



NAME: HIR212002 

U53S contract, no letters of agreement of any kind. 

M536 MR. riEEHAN: Describe that. August, June or July 

U537 letter of 1976. 

H538 MR. OLIVER: I'm talking about prior to that time, 

U539 December, January, February period. 

US40 THE UITNESS: Ho, sir. 

45141 BY MR. OLIVER: 

45142 2 Did It concern you or Hr . Fischer that you didn't 

4543 have some kind of an agreement because you wanted a long- 

4544 term arrangement, not 3ust something that would be cut off? 

4545 Did you ever ask for something in writing? 

4546 A No, sir. 

45"7 2 Was the lunch that you arranged with Elliott 

4548 Abrams--did that take place on or about January 6, 1986? 

4549 A I don't know, and I'd be surprised if it occurred 

4550 that early, but it may have. 

4551 MR. MEEHAN: Is it on the calendar? 

4552 MR. OLIVER: i don't know if it is on his calendar 

4553 or not. 

4554 BY MR. OLIVER: 

4555 2 Here you aware at tha tine of the luncheon that Mr. 

4556 Fischer had begun to tzy to mak« arrangements with the White 

4557 House for a briefing for Spitz Channell's organizations? 

4558 A I don't remember the time frame so I can't give you 

4559 an answer to that question. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



571 



UNCLASSiFlLD 



NAME HIR212002 UllVkn^^ll B k 1^ PAGE 18( 

I4S60 ". I think I was auar«--uhenever Mr. Fischer had 

4561 started that, attempting to get that accomplished, I uas 

U562 aware of it. 

US63 e Was there a discussion at that luncheon of the 

MSe^ Central American Freedom Program? 

MS6S A Of NEPL's program. 

14566 2 Essentially what they call tha Central American 

4567 Freedom Program. 

US68 A As I indicated, Hr . Channell went through all of 

M569 his organizations and activities. 

11570 2 Did they shou story boards of the ads to Hr . Abrams 

457 1 at that luncheon with text and so on? 

4572 A You know, I don't recall. I honestly don't recall 

4573 the luncheon that uell . I mean, I recall being there and I 

4574 recall Mr. Channell did most of the talking, and it's 

4575 possible that they had some paperwork or story boards, but I 

4576 don't remember it. I'm sorry. 

4577 2 Were you aware that one of Hr . Channell's projects, 

4578 the one that I described as Central American Freedom 

4579 Program, was directed toward influencing the congressional 

4580 vote on aid to the contras? 

4581 A My understanding of what Hr . Channell was trying to 

4582 do was to raise grassroots support for the President's 

4583 program through his med^a campaign. 

4584 2 Was there ever any discussion in your presence of 



UNCLASSIFIED 



572 



NAHE 
4585 
4586 
4587 
4588 
14589 
14590 
<4591 
4592 
U593 
1459U 
"4595 
(4596 
M597 
4598 
4599 
4600 
4601 
4602 
4603 
4604 
4605 
4606 
4607 
4608 
4609 



HIR2 12002 



UNCLASSIFIED. 



GE 187 



itinning those ads in particular congrassional districts? 

k I renenber being around, although I didn't--! 
rereeraber discussions about where certain ads should run anc 
about demographics. That uas less my area oi expertise, s< 
I don't have real strong recollection about any of that. 

S Do you know a woman named Eddie Frazier? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did you ever meet her? 

A li I did, didn't strike me, I guess, because I 
don't remember the name. 

2 Jack Lichtenstein? 



Drawing a blank. 



Bruce Camran? 

Ho, sir. 

Penn Kimble? 

I don't believe so. 

Did you ever attend any meetings in Rich Miller's 
office to discuss strategy on the vote that was to take 
place in the Congress on contra aid? 

A To discuss strategy on the vote? I don't--! don't 
know. ! mean, we talked about the vote all the time. While 
it was immediately before the vote, it was a matter of 
concern to us, obviously. We were hoping that it was going 
to go forward and ! don't remember having a strategy meeting 
about it. 



UNCLASSfF'ED 



573 



UNCLASSJFE3,.. 



HAHE^ HIR212002 '^ ■ ■ W fcf-l^#%Jf § fl lik,L>pAGE 188 



14610 
161 1 
M6 12 
U613 

uem 

4615 
U616 
46 17 
4618 
4619 
4620 
4621 
4622 
4623 
4624 
462S 
4626 
4627 
4628 
4629 
4630 
4631 
4632 
4633 
4634 



e Who did you discuss that uxth? 

A Oh, with Dave, with Rich. It was obviously a 
matter that ue were interested m. 

2 Do you know Dan Kuykendall? 

A I don't. I don't think I know hin . I know the 
name but I don't think I know hin. 

2 These papers and brochures that you said you 
reviewed or helped prepare for IBC, did you retain any 
copies of those? 

A Ho . I had--the answer is no. I had--what I had at 
i»y house--when Dave moved out of my house into his house, 
kind of packed up everything, and I would guess that what 
wasn't packed up I tossed. 

2 When was that? Whan did Dave — 

A January. 

2 January of this year? 

A December or January, yeah. December of '86 or 
January of '87 — yeah. 

2 That's your recollection, you threw those materials 
away? 

A I don't have any recollection. If there was 
anything left after Dave moved out, it is not there now, 
because I've taken a look. 

2 Did you say that Hr . Fischer came to Washington 
every week during 1987? 



UNCLASSfF^Ef) 



574 



UNCLASSIFSEa. 



HAHE: HIR212002 '^ ■ ■ W fcrM^#%#i i I^^^AGE 189 

i«635 ~. A I would guess 95 peicant of tha tin*. 

14636 e Has h« still enployed in Utah at that tin*? 

4637 A No. Ha had soma kind of axrangamant, but ha was 

K638 not enployad with Hudson Chemical at that point. He may 

(4639 have had soma continuing relationship aitaiwaids . 

146U0 e Hhy was — at tha meeting which you attangad in 

U6>41 Elliott Abzams' office, why was Elliott Abrams upset with 

U6(42 Spitz Channall? 

i<6'43 A You Know, because he was very excited and wouldn't 

(46t4i4 let anybody else gat a word in edgewise and was kind of not 

M6M5 listening to an attempt to answer him. It was-- 

i46<46 fi Has there a discussion at tha luncheon which took 

>46<47 place in January of--of tha arrangements for a meeting in th< 

<46<48 White House later on that month, the meeting with Abrams and 

146U9 Fischer and you and Killer and Channall? 

(4650 A Could you repeat tha question? I'm sorry. 

(465 1 2 You arranged a lunchaon with Elliott Abrams for 

(4652 Spitz Channell attended by you and David Fischer, Elliott 

M653 Abrams. Rich Hiller. 

1465(4 Has there a discussion at that luncheon about the 

U655 pzospectiva Hhlta House meeting? 

(4656 A I have no recollection. I'm sorry. 

(4657 Q Has there a discussion there about Hr . Abrams' 

(4658 participation in such a White House briefing? 

(4659 A I also don't recall that. 



UNCLASS!F:E3 



575 



H»«E: HIR212002 



OHOLASS^FiED . 



GE 190 



•4660 2 Did you have any discussion with Rich Wilier or 

U66 1 Spitz Channell in December or January this year about your 

4662 arrangements with them during the prior year for financial 

4663 payments to you and Fischer? 

•^een A I'm sorry, repeat the question. 

"^665 . . 2 Did you have any discussions with Spitz Channell or 

•4666 Rich Miller in December of 1986 or January of 1987 about the 

•4667 financial arrangements which had been made for you and David 

U668 Fischer with them during 1986? 

■♦669 A Well, unless I*m--unless I've blocked something out 

'4670 of ray mind, I haven't seen — didn't see Mr. Channell at all in 

4671 that time period. 

4672 2 What about Rich Miller? 

^673 A I don't know. I certainly must have spoken to hire 

46714 during that time period. I don't know — that I had any 

4675 specific discussion about the financial arrangement? 

4676 2 Yes. 

4677 A Between IBC and Fischer and myself? 

'*678 2 Yes. Were you aware that Rich Miller had been 

4679 asked by Spitz Channell to reconstruct the relationship 

4680 between IBC and Spitz Channell's organization in relation to 

4681 what the money they had given them had been spent for? 

4682 A Mo. 

■^SSa 2 Did you have a,^ discussion with Rich Miller about 

4684 the payments to you from IBC in January of 1987, about the 



UNClflsqjrTn 



576 



UNCLASSIFIED 



KAME: HIR212002 UllwLtfwwII IkWpAGE 191 



U68S 
4686 
M687 
>«688 
>4689 
U690 
1*691 
14692 
U693 
46914 
14695 
U696 
14697 
(4698 
14699 
4700 
14701 
14702 
14703 
I470U 
14705 
U706 
4707 
14708 
14709 



previous payitants? 

A I guess ray best ansuer to that is I certainly spoke 
to Rich--I'ii sure I spoke to Rich during that period of tme . 
I don't even know if that uas the subject of the 
conversation. If it was, I don't recall it. 

MR. OLIVER: Thank you very nuch. I have no 
further questions. 

MR. BUCK: I have a few short questions for you, 
Mr. Artiano. 

BY MR. BUCK: 

fi To the best of your knowledge, did anyone in the 
Uhite House, any employees in the White House, including the 
President himself, receive any money from Mr. Miller's 
organizations--Mr . Miller or his organizations, Mr. Channell 
or his organizations, yourself and Mr. rischer--for the 
meetings that were set up with these private contributors? 

A Absolutely not. 

fi Do you know any reason why Hr . Channell would 
believe that he was paying Hr . Hlllaz «50,000 for you or Hr . 
Fischer or Hz. Hlller to set up meetings within the White 
House? 

A As I Indicated, I don't — I don't have any--never had 
any access to their books and didn't know what their 
financial relationship i^as . But, you know, it would not 
surprise ■• if Hz. Millez weze Baking requests so that he 



UNCLASSIFED 



577 



MAKE: 
4710 
471 1 
47 12 
47 13 
47 14 
4715 
47 16 
4717 
4718 
47 19 
4720 
4721 
4722 
4723 
4724 
4725 
4726 
4727 
4728 
4729 
4730 
4731 
4732 
4733 
4734 



HIR212002 



UNCLASS1F!ED.„ 



192 



eould get funded at IBC to honor his obligations to Mr. 
rischar and to ma . 

2 Did you considar Mr. Channall poiitically naiva 
when you--b«ior« that January naating uhan you had to discuss 
with hin tha fact that you uara not arranging naatings with 
tha President ior a sat anount oi money? 

A Restate the question. I'm sorry. 

MR. MEEHAN: I think tha meeting was not in 
January, but if you just refer to • • the meeting'* without a 
time frame-- 

HR. BUCK: Okay. 
BY MR. BUCK: 

2 I guess what I am trying to understand is why Mr. 
Channell had this belief that you had to dispel at the 
meeting, and if it wasn't anything you told him or anything 
that Mr. Fischer told him or that you knew that Mr. Fischer 
told him, was it just because he didn't understand how 
things worked? 

A I suppose it was a misunderstanding of the 
relationship. As has been indicated, the relationship was 
n*ver formalized in terms of putting it in writing. It was 
oonstantly in a state of flux. There were continued 
discussions and negotiations about it, the timing of 
payment, amount of payment, and I guess it was--the generous 
explanation is that there was just misunderstanding. But 



UNCLASSIF"P3 



82-690 O-88-20 



578 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR212002 Vll VLfl V Vl I I LL7 '^^^ ^'^ 

*473S th*ra was no misundatstanding by myself or Hr . rischar, and 

4736 I trust not by Mr. KilKr •itK«r. 

14737 2 Okay. 

4738 Did you raad a Kaw York Tinas articla on July 30th,^ 

4739 1987, on paga 10 of tha Kau York Tinas, writtan by Richard 

4740 L. Barka? 

4741 A I'm sorry to say that I did. 

4742 e Tha sourcas idantifiad in this articla ara your 

4743 lauyar and othar officials, and I baliava uhan it rafars to 

4744 your lauyar. it is actually rafarring to a law partnar of 

4745 yours. 

4746 A That's corract. 

4747 e And I'd lika to raad a statamant hara and gat youc 

4748 raaction to it. 

4749 Hidway down tha first column it says. Hr . Artiano 

4750 and Hr . Fischar aach racaivad about «300.000 last yaar for 

4751 arranging maatlngs batMaan tha Prasidant and waalthy 

4752 consarvativa donors, tha officials said. 

4753 first of all, lat ■• ask you. is that statamant 

4754 corxact? 

4755 A Ko. 

4756 a Saoond of all, did you tall Hr . Barka anything that 

4757 would laad him — that would giva him information to writa 

4758 that? ^ 

4759 A No. Z rafusad to spaak to Ht. Barka whan ha triad 



UNCIASSIREO 



579 



NAME: 
4760 
476 
4762 
4763 
4764 
476S 
4766 
4767 
476 
4769 
4770 
477 1 
4772 
4773 
4774 
4775 
4776 
4777 
4778 
4779 
4780 
4781 
4782 



HIR212002 



to reach na . 



UNCLASSIFSED 



PAGE 194 



2 Hava you talked to yovi law vartimi thai did spaak 
to him on this subject? 
A Yas, I hava. 

2 Is it your undatstanding that your law partnat gava 
Mr. Barka any inioraatlon that would allow him to writa 
something lika this? 

A Absolutely not. 

2 Do you hava any suspicions as to where that 
information may have come from, if you or your law partner 
did not tell this reporter that information? 

A I have--! don't have a firm enough idea of where it 
came from to want to accuse somebody of doing something like 
that. We regret it and, as nr . Heehan indicated, I hope it 
doesn't happen again. 

MR. BUCK: X have no more questions. 
HR. MEEHAK: He did get through. 
NX. FXYMAN: Yes. 

He will conclude the deposition at this point, in 
accordance with the understanding that was stated earlier 
katween Hz. Heehan and me. 

(Hheraupon. at 5:<tO p.m. the deposition was 
concluded. ] 



UNCLASSIFSED 



580 



TORlaSEORET 



HSITfi I ^ 1- 



/87 



THIS IS A COVER SHEET 



FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 

ALL INDIVIDW^fflWDUN^^^^^^I^^P^^^^B«D TO PROTECT 
IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED 
DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE 
ORDER(S). STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS. 

Partially Oeclassified/Reteased nn /<kj»i88 

unOer grovisions of E 12356 

Oy K Johnson. Nalional Security Council 




TOKiflifiBiT 

, ,„. Pr.jcriwa By 



ARO FORM 703 ( 

By GSA/ISOO 



581 



#^' 



^0ifmim> 



EXAMINATION 



BY MR. KERR: 
Q Would you state your full name for the record, please. 



Q What position do you hold with the Central intelligence 
Agency at the present time? 

:!> 

A The Associate Deputy Director for Operations. 

A 
Q You joined the Central intelligence Agency when? 



Q would you trace chronologically your career with the Central 
ntei I igence Agency? 




ONCIASSIBB 



Partially Declassified/Released nn 'uvJ i^n SB 
under provisions o( E 12356 
by K Johnson, National Security Council 



582 




A That's correct. And then I moved up to the Assoclatt 

Deouty Director for Operations Job. 

At that time you would have taken what had been Mr. 

Juchniewicz's position? 

A That Is correct 




583 



liNClASSlfe 



^i^c^3 



To 77^1^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



584 




Q Anc^^^^^^^^^Hremalned In the Deputy position until 

he succeeded you in April of 1986. 

A That's right. The first of May. actually, end of April. 

That ' s correct . 

with regard to the way you handled duties as between 

yourself and your Deputy, can you give me kind of an overview 

of the allocation of responsibilities between yourself and 

your Deputy? 

A well, I have always taken the approach that the Deputy 

has to be one's alter ego as far as being made aware of, 

(XfvcK 
being brought in, pr totally Interchangeable sort of duties. 



In the press of work, part 



and South A; 



n an area like the Near East 




585 



UNCLASSIFIED 




If, you know, if you're off for a weekend, or you're on the 
seventh floor, or yourgout down here In a hearing and something 
comes up, and the Deputy begins to handle it, then perhaps he 
remains more or less the expert on It because he talked to the 
people first, ilir; there Is no sharp division, though, unless 
It was something that — for Jnstance,] 




jrobably carried 90* of 
the load on that Issue, which was one of our largest and 
required a lot of effort and decisions and a lot of hearings 
down here on the him. So i suppose i sort of specialized 
Other than that, s i ncel 




suppose I tended to push things having to do with the Arabs, 
particularly those [ i na wdlfcie^ a little bit more his way. 



But basically there was a fairly even distribution. 

Q During the course of your tenure as Chief of Division, 

were there any projects as to which you compartmented out 

mean, you can compartment 



UNCIASSIFO 



oHCUssim 



things for security, and you do a lot of that, but you don't 



comoartment your Oeouty out, unless It's maybe a personnel 
matter that might come ud briefly that needs to be resolved 
and can't be spread around. 

Q But you do not recall any projects that you were engaged 
In as Chief of the Near East Division when, for security 

you kep^^^^^^^^^^^out 
A No, I do not recall any. 

Q ^^^^^^^^Hhas indicated that, for Intents purposes 
he kept himself informed of the same matters that you would 
be keeping yourself Informed of. Is that essentially the way? 
A Essentially, yes. That's right. Not perhaps in as much 
detail, since if you don't speak the language, maybe you don't 
deal withi 




inquiry, can you tell me when you first came to meet Col 
North? 

A Probably, i don't remember exactly, but It would have been 
sometlKM, I think a couple of months after I was on the Job. 
So sometime in October, late October maybe, 1984. Because i 
remember we had a problem dealing with terrorism in Lebanon, 
and he took a great interest In the terrorist issue, and i 
believe that was my first encounter with him. 
Q Now that would have been on a working basis? 



IINClftSSIRFn 



587 



^ 



UNCUSSIREO 



A On a working basis, having to do with a possible activity, 
uh. counter-terrorist activity. f 



4 for lack of a better expression, operational activity? 

5 A Not In the Intelligence and security sense. I was aware, 

6 of course that he had played a role In the Grenada operation and 

7 that sort of thing, but, 

8 Q No, I'm thinking of operations In the classic sense. 

9 A No. 
-K) Q When did that first come to your attention that Coir North 

11 was going to play or was playing an operational role with regard 

12 to intelligence matters? 

13 A wei I , let me think. l suppose it would probably have been 

14 around the time of the Achllle Lauro incident. 

15 Q That would have been early October 1988. 

16 A That's right, I suppose, i wasn't In the country then, but 

17 when I got back, I heard, you know, what the dealings were with 

18 the Israelis, and how the matter had been handled out of the 

19 White House rather than out of State or the Agency, and that. 

20 Q ill come back to that in a moment. Were you aware prior 

21 to that time of an operational role that CoC^North had with 

22 regard to Nicaragua-Contra related activities? 

23 A What I was aware of, and what generally sort of seeped 



• icTNortr 

UNCUSSIHFn 



588 



ONCUSSIFIED 



1 around town, I suppose. Is that the whole private benefactor 

2 activity and private Amerian, private money, volunteers, i don • t 

3 know what. Whoever had things to do with helping the Contras 

4 when we were not , ^(r that 01 lie was certainly one of the lead i ng 

5 persons In the White House Involved In encouraging, going around 

6 making speeches, basically encouraging, I suppose, people to make 

7 contributions to support the Contras during that period. 

8 Q What was the source of your knowledge about that. is that 

9 basically read the newspapers? 

10 A Sort of osmosis and read the newspapers, and then l remember 

11 at one point, well, the committee staffers would make remarks 

12 about this or ask a question, or, and I know It got things 

13 raised to the point that I believe Bud McFartane came down 

14 and talked to one or both the Oversight Comnlttees. l don't 

15 know that, I remember that happening. So It was sort of the 

16 general knowledge around town that this was going on and that 

17 there w«re other people involved In It with him, perhaps more 

18 directly. 

19 Q Old you ever have occasion to talk with Col. North 

20 directly about his activities relating to the Nicararaguan 

21 Contras, or Indirectly, in passing, any conversation? 

22 A Only Indirectly In the sense that I remember a 

23 couple of times a terrorist incident would come up in the 



589 



UNCUSSIFIED 



1 Middle East and there would be, you know, perhaps something 

2 going to happen over a weekend, and I suppose the first direct 

3 sort of knowledge was when he told me, 'You can reach me on the 

4 Mhite House number and they will know where I am and I'M ca ii 

5 you, but I'm going to be down South,' and down South' obviously 

6 In the context he said it didn't mean down in North Carolina or 

7 South Carolina. And, in fact, as i recall, there was something 

8 that came up and I called, and he called me either from the Miami 

9 or the Atlanta airport. Apparen^^\ he had called the White 
^...■"fO House and they would say^^^^^^^^Be^i-ed and said can him at 

11 home. So I knew that he was travelling down there, but 1 did not 

12 have — I don't ever recall any direct knowledge of any particular 

13 activity, or him describing It to me, or ever having knowledge 

14 of It. 

15 Q This telephone exchange relating to him being down South,' 

16 approximately when In time did that take place? 

17 A Mel I , there was always something happening in Beirut on the 
13 weekend. it would have been sometime in probably that winter of 

^ 1-9 ■ 84 or '86. I don't have good, ^i D\jt l know that he took more 

20 than one tr ip, ^'cause a lot of times something would come up--a 



21 terrorist Incident — he usually came and sat on this working 

22 group, and he wouldn't be there, and someone would say, "Well, 

23 he's off on a trip and he'll be back. He was always on the go, 



m%\mm 



590 



UNCUSSIFIED 



and a lot of it. to the South. 



•9 I n Col'fNorth ' s 



Q Your phone number appears In Col'^ Norths collection of 
telephone numbers-. Indicating that he must have called you or 
spoken with you with some regularity. How frequently were you 
In touch with Co I'-fT^iorth In the '84 - '85 period, before the 
time he left ae i uh i ^-^y 

A It moved In spurts. I'd say In the summer of '85 at the 
time of the TWA highjacking probably there were a lot of calls 
over a weekend. 




three or four calls on a weekend, but I might not deal with 
01 I le for a month or two months or even three months, other 
than bump Into him at some meeting. So it was very much a 
function of the activity that might come up. 
Q As between yourself anc^^^^^^^^^^H was there any 



distinction drawn between you 
care of CorNorth? 



terms of who would be taking 



A No, I'd say not until the finding of January of last 
year, when we began to work more Intimately on vn^ specific 
project, namely, this arms^-e>^ — — 



That would be the January 



I98S memo. 



A That 's r Ight . 



ONCLIlSSinEO 



591 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q And at that point, uh, was tnere an allocation of roles 



2 assigned between you 

3 A Well, by virtue of the--l need to tell you what haooened , 
the way it worked. I was th ere as Division C hief. I left on 
tr ipi 




^and when i got back 
n the office, and i had had foreknowledge 
before l left that there was something cooking in terms of the 
White House NSC trying to work out a deal with the Israelis 
and Involving some other people, but i didn't know there was 
going to be a finding. And when I got back, I was told the 
finding had been signed and that Cla I rdTand^^Bhad gone down 
to read It, that our role was one of logistics, financial. 
sort of Intelligence support, and that things had moved to the 
point that, you know, we were deal I ng with the ml i itary about 
some weapons and so forth. Slnce^^Hwas so deeply involved 
In this at that point, that largely became his baby. m fact, 
the last, I suppose, three months of my tenure in NE Division, 
that's when the balance shifted perhaps, and I suppose. ^^^H 



UNCIASSIFIEO 



592 



■«msff® 



1 spent, ah well, he still certainly performed his role as 



2 Deputy, but I suppose he spent, gee whiz, some weeks a hundred 

3 percent of his time on this, and other times, I don't know, 

4 fifty-sixty percent. So. In that sense, there was a role 

5 division the last three, three-and-a-half months. 

6 Q Your Involvement from that point on would have been 

7 nominal, relatively nominal. You were keeping posted. What 

8 would you describe It... 

9 A Keeping posted. ^^^Hcame to me at times and said, 

10 "Look, there are going to be a lot of details here that i, 

11 ^^^^Bcan't handle because It's homework. It's calling the 

12 military trying to figure out which serial numbers match 

13 what, and what Is it these people are talking about because 

14 It gets one list or request and then you get a nother one." 

br I ng^^^^^^^^Hi n 

16 So, s I nce^^^^Bhad been peripherally In on It Interviewing 

17 this fellow Qhorbanlfar earlier. And so we got^^^Vin on 

18 It. I think maybe he brought someone else on i t at some 

13 point, but t was aware of that, but I was generally briefed 

20 on I t . That's right. 

21 I did encounter Oi I le after that — Oliver North on other 

22 Issues. 

23 Q I'll return to that in more detail a little later, with 



UNCLASSIFIED 



593 



mism 



egard to your trip o« 



you were on 



a trip with Director Casey? 

A Part of the time. l rendezvoused with Director Casey in 
^^^^^^^^^Hcame back^^^^^^^^^^^^Hw I th 

Q III return to that in chronological sequence. with regard 
to Director Casey, can you tell tne when you first came to meet or 
know Director Casey. 

A We I I , I met him when he took over from Stan Turner in I98i . 
I was still at HeadquartersI 
Q You did not know him before he became Director. 

A [P»u«« No aud m I fr nnt*"*' . ] 

Q Can you describe your relationship with the Director 
prior to the time that you became Chief of the Near East 
Division, In terms of the working relationship. how often 
you dealt with hlw, those klnds^of things? 




muivm 



594 



ONCLASSIFIED 



O After you took over as Chief of the Near East Division. 
can you describe for me the extent to which you would have 
been in contact directly with Casey? 
A well, It varied. On^^^ 

Ich he took an Intense Interest, 
there would be a tremendous burst of activity. You'd be 
getting ready to flo on a trip. In fact, we went on a trip 





and I suppose that s when i really got 
to know him, travelling on an airplane with him, and i0^ 
dealing with him on that Issue sort of non-stop, pressure 
cooker, which was his approach to things.„-i^» for__three, 
four days. And so I got to know him pretty wellT'^He was 




It, a Division Chief, I mean. In the Near 
East being a very active area, he was always calling witr 
questions. So i suppose I saw him — It was rare that I 
didn't see him once or twice a week. 

During the course of that experience, on that or any 
other time, did you get any sense of his relationship 



IJNCIiSSIFIEfl 



595 



j_ 



wmi\m 



tn Col . North? 



A well. I knew he talked to him on the phone. I didnt 
get any sense of any personal relationship. He admired Oi tie's 
can do' attitude. I'd say that. A proactive approach to life, 
which Is exactly what SMI Casey had. 

Q Did you have any sense of the frequency with which North 
and Casey were meeting. 
A No. 

Q You were or were not aware that they would meet for 
breakfast on weekends and that sort of thing? 
A I was not aware of that. Usually when I heard about it 
was when Bill had gone down to the White House to see 
Polndexter or somebody, and he would say, 'While I was down 
there, I saw 01 Me and this happened or that happened.' 
On how many occasions did you travel 
wi th the 01 rect 




596 



UNCLASSIFIED 




Q With regard to^^^^^^^^^^^^^Htr I p, who accompanied 
8 you and Director Casey on that trip? Who else was with you? 
9 
10 




16 Q Old you have any knowledge of discussions that Case> 

17 or anyone else in the group had witr 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■about contributing money for 

19 the benefit of the Nicaraguan Contras. 

20 A No. 

21 O So there were no meetings that you attended on that trip 

22 [ in auJ I U te]. '^ i<^c/^ r«dO( r 

23 A That's correct. 



-? 



well, that's one of the toolcs I wanted to touch on with 
you. There is a reference in a McMahon note to what may be 
a suggestion that Casey was going! 

^^^Hto ask^^^^^^^a contribution to the Nicaraguan-contras . 
Were you aware of any such? 
A No. 
Q You're not. 

A No. 

w h e n^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l y o u 
were not privy to any conversations in which contributions by 

■to the Nicaraguan Contras was discussed? 
A That's correct. 

Q on the^^^^^^^^^Htr ip, any 

^^^^Hcontr ibut ions to Nicaraguan Contras? 



ICIASSIFIED 



598 



yilASSlFIEfl 



1 A No. 

2 Q And you didn't hear any discussions taking place on 

3 that trip? 

4 A That • s r I ght . 

5 Q And on the^^^^^^^^f tr I p , any such discussions? 

6 A No. 

7 Old you ever acquire knowledge that Director Casey 

8 solicited funds from! 
^^^^^^^^^Hto the Nicaraguan Contras? 

10 A No . 

11 Q And you never discussed this matter with Mr. McMahon? 
.J^ A J^ nuse. — Ua au d t bi e Tesponae ri — 

13 Q What was your relationship with McMahon? McMahon had 

14 been with the Agency for quite soma tlme--had you had a 

15 chance to work with him? 

16 A I had worked with him when he was Deputy Director 

17 for OD«rations. That's the first l ever heard of him 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I n He 

19 made 000 sometime earlier that year, and so the first 

20 time I ever even met McMahon wa: 

21 ^^^^l^h or about July 1978. i think I had a good working 

22 relationship with him. I admired him. And we travelled 
23 



together on a couple of occasions. 



liCIASfJIFirn 



599 



lUSSinED 




'But I never had any 
Intimate, personal, family relationship. 
Q So he was not a social acquaintance. it was a 
professional relationship. Alright, now let me turn to 
another interesting gentleman — Manucher Ghorbanlfar was 
the subject of concern in the Near East Division in 1984. 
Much of the concern would be generated shortly before you 
became Chief of the Division. Can you tell me the extent 
to which you were familiar with Manucher Ghorbanlfar and 
the matters which caused the Agency to put out a burn 
notice on him in 19847 

A I think that burn notice was put out In August or 
so , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B I seeing 

the burn notice at that time, when t was briefed 
generally, well. I was briefed specifically on the 

land so forth as part of my Division, 
[operations and threats and that 
sort of thing. You know. I suppose In that briefing 
probably there were half a dozen or more dirt balls 
of the fabricator variety that would pop up. And i 
had been dealing wl th^^^^^^^^^Hj^Hf or 
years, and his name may have been mentioned at that 
time, because I do recall that it was somewhat familiar 
the following summer when It first popped up on the 




•%*a 



MWIFirn 



600 



liiussra 



screen. And then sofnebody said, "Oh, he was a guy 
that, you know, he said there was a threat against the 
President and this and that. And so, I remember at that 



time It clicked. Of course, it may have been a generic 

thing, '^ause there are lots of Iranians. But I was not 

familiar with those aoecific events, but i did hear about 

them later, the things that had caused the burn notice to 

be Issued. 

Q Just so I'm clear. The decision to put out the 

burn notice and the Inquiry that gave rise to it all preceded 



your taking the position? 
A ■t*tj\. I 



woudn't make the decision on the burn notice 
anyway. I mean, that wouldn't be approved by me. 
Q That Is a question I want to raise with you. I'm not 
quite sure how one gets a burn notice approved. What is 
the process on that? 




CLASSIFIED 



601 



liNWSsra 




Q That's right. As to Ghoreani 

category he fit In In late-19847 

A I didn't know at the time. No. But it's when i read 

the burn notice — It's pretty clear. The following summer. 

or whenever I read it, it's pretty clear that that was ♦*« 

MtAe-r "• 

Q Give me your best recollection of how you would 
characterize him at that point. 1 read that burn notice, 
and I'm not as familiar with what you guys were looking for 



\m m\B 



602 



ONCUSSIFIED 



1 as you are. So what would that have told you about 

2 Ghorbahlfar? Simply that he was a Mar. or that he was 

3 a Mar with a motlv^e? 

4 A A I lar with a profit motive, proBaBiy. Although, 

5 sometimes it's not clear. i mean, I've run into dozens of 

6 fabricators, and some Me for the sake of lying; some lie 

7 for purposes of feathering their own nests and working out-- 
— 8 they're con men. "»n>-4frid occasionally, there may be some 

9 Idc^aloglcai motivation. But, that's very rare. But he's 

10 Jusc, he's not an atypical Iranian bum who, you know, made 

11 his living as a police Informant. Savak Informant. Israelis. 

12 I'm sure he worked with the Israeli shipping companies. 

13 I recall back In the revolution days, and probably been 

A 

M associated with the Israelis since that time. 

15 Q Let me take you into the summer of 1985. At that 

16 point, June of 1989, you apparently were advised by 

17 Director Casey that he had been called by a gentleman 

18 named John Shaheen, who had that story to tell about 

19 Cyrus Hashemi and a program Hashemi had for releasing 

20 the hostages and releasing himself from prosecution. Oo ' 

21 you reca I I that? 

22 A Yeah, I recall that. ^^ ^^, | f p^^^o o^oc.w..^^ T^ ^ ^c^^c^ 
J.2 Q Can you tell me. and y e u'Fe f r e e to [ I nn ii ri i b i w) -r-~ 



yHCLASSIFIED 



603 



mmmis 



1 but give me your best recollection of how this matter came to 

2 your attention in the summer of 1985? 

3 A Shaheen , John Shaheen called Casey, which was not unusual. 

4 Shaheen was always calling Casey. They're old, they were old 

5 OSS buddies or something. Shaheen was born In the same town 

6 that Ronald Reagan was born In, I think. He's a very patriotic 

7 American. tHiiThad a lot of contacts. He was always giving 

8 Bill Casey hot tlos on this or that. And he'd call Casey, 
.^-'^''^ yt 

9 and then Casey sent me a note, as I recall, and It was well 

^^0 knowAwhat sort of fellow Hashemi was and what h l^s motivation was, 

/^^l and I think he had been cut off once before aaf [y on with some 

^,->«^ scheme, talking about ransom for the hostages T^Th i s time he 



scheme, talking about ransom for the hostages. 

13 claimed to have the contacts with the Iranians at some fairly 

14 high level, and I w«nt to State. i told Casey, I said, "We 

15 won't approve this one this way dealing with this guy. if he's 
18 really In touch with someone who represents the Iranian 

17 Qovernnant or who's in the Iranian Qovernment, then they ought 

18 to be, and they want to talk, then we ought to get State in on 

Q 
..i^— It and find out, you know, how we ought to handle it. i went 

20 to see either Dick Murphy or Arnie Raphael. i think i tried to 

21 see Dick Murphy, and then I may have seen his Deputy, A rh ie 

22 Raphael. And we worked out, they worked out, we talked about 



yNGiASsra 



604 



UNCLASSIFIED 



It. They also knew about Cyrus Hashemi. i mean they had. you 
know, the burn notice I think had been run on him. I'm not 
sure of that. But, at least, somehow he'd come to their notice 
on one of these previous schemes. Maybe about the thing he'd 
been prosecuted for/y^ i guess illegal export, or something or 
other. And so, what they worked was through our Embassy^^^^^f 

»here he claimed to be able to — of course, these guys, 
"fabricators or con men like Hashemi or Shorbanifar, they always 
want to. they gotta do something right nowjy'" The moment you 
hear, the guy's coming on Wednesday. So he claimed that he 
could produce an Iranian, very senior level importance, and 
Join with me very quickly. So, State's position was, "We're 
always ready to liste n, but we are not sure we want to go 
this guy . "^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H because 
the mention of the Red Cross had been made since it involved 
hostages . 

^^^^ig^^t^^S^^rTToS^^Msten to what 
this sanlor Iranian has to say about iran-U.S. relations 
and what influence they might bring to bear to get the 
hostages re I eased .^^ So that was set up, and a phone number 
was given i think to Hashemi to call and, of course, 
nothing ever happened. I mean, nobody ever showed up. 
However, his lawyer, who was Eiiiot Richardson, did call 




UNCLASSihED 



605 



BNCUSSIfe 



^ 



^^^^B- 1 don't remember whether I went oot of town, had gone 
on leave, or wa3--somehow or othcr--oh, i know what haooened . 
In order to get the details of this after Casey sent me the 
note, and I talked In general principles to either Dick Murohy 
and/or Arnie Rapl^ae I .^^^Bthen went up to New York and talked 
to Shaheen to get the details, to get names an so forth. And 

the name o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bwho 
In later events of course, and the name Manucher . and that's 
a fairly common name, as I recall. I'm not 100% sure, but 
we fairly quickly established it was Manucher Ghorbanifar. 
Or likely to be him. Or maybe even Shaheen said, had his 
full name. But whatever it was, we talked with State, and 
the deal was set up that i f^^^^^^^H who was identified by us 
as a bona fide Iranian official at some level. i don't remember 
exactly the level, but fairly senior. If he showed up. the 

would be happy to talk with him 
and listen to what he had to say about iran-U-S. relations 
and th« hostages, but that they would not se« this guy. 
Manucher Qhorbanlfar if he alone came along with Hashemi. 
And then, as I recall, s i nce^^Hhad met Shaheen, that was 
probably why Elliot Richardson had caiie(^^^K>n the phone 
one day and said he represented Cyrus Hashemi and he understood 
that something was being worked out with regard to nolle pros 



yNCL/l<:.^lF!Pn 



606 



12 



mmm 



on this case against him. an<f^fended it off at arms 

2 length and said he would have to talk with somebody else. 

3 no^e. It was obvious that Shaheen had given Hashemi 
^ ^^^■chone number, or he had given it to Elliot 

5 Richardson or somehow Elliot Richardson had gotten It. 

S Q I want to go back on a couple of things and show 

7 you some documents. With regard toKls initial contact^^-^S^ 

8 did you have a meeting with Casey? Casey brought you in 

9 and told you John Shaheen has told me x. Y. and Z. that 

kind of thing, or did he Just send you a memo? 

1 A As I recall, he sent me a memo, and he may have 
been going someplace or. you know, he went out of town 

13 for the weekend a lot of times. l don't remember. He 

M sent me a note, though. i remember that. 

15 You had had other notes come from Casey by way 

16 of Shaheen, from Shaheen by way of Casey? 

17 A I don't recall having any other notes. i recall 

18 Shaheen coming up with this or that or some other 

19 possible lead into information about the hostages. 

20 etc. . etc. 

21 O were you aware of Shaheen's relationship to a 

22 gentleman named Roy Furmark at that time? 

23 A No. 

24 Q You were not aware In the summer of 1985 that 



607 



UNCUSSinED 



1 Furmark was a business associate of Shaheens. 

2 A I never heard of Furmark until It was In the 

y newspaoers when I deer hunting Xrrf end of November^^ u<-/'^^ 

,-¥ The first time I ever heard of Furmark. 

5 Q Similarly, you were not aware that Furmark, 

6 Mr. Shaheens business associate, was a partner of 

7 Manucher Qhorbani f ar , Adnan Khashoggi and Mr. Hashemi 

8 in a venture to sell materials to Iran In the period 

9 January through August I9B17 

10 A No . 

11 Q During the course of these discussions, Ghorbani far ' s 

12 business relationship with Furmark — the one with Hashemi 

13 and those people — it was not discussed at allT 

14 A In the course of which discussions? 

15 Q The discussions relating to what Casey told you in 

18 the June, July. August period. Let me give you a better 

17 question. in that period of time, June, July, August, was 

18 It brought to your attention that Ghorbanifar had a business 

19 relationship with Hashemi or Adnan Khashoggi? 

20 A Not with Adnan Khashoggi. but since, no, but he had some 

21 sort of legitimate or otherwise business relationship, but 

22 an association was established, because Hashemi said this 

23 fei low^^^^^^Hwas coming, and the .other guys name was 

24 Manucher. And we checked that, as l recall, so obviously 



l!Nf!IAJ;.<JIFIFn 



608 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 there was a hook up tjetweeh Hashemi and Manucher . which ought 

2 to b9 not surprising since they're both Iranian. 

3 Q Was It ever explained to you how Shaheen came to come 

4 by this knowledge that Hashemi was Interested In putting this 

5 deal together? 

6 A Hashemi had told him this. 

^7 Q Did he tell you how It was that Shaheen would be in contact <^^ 

8 Hashemi . 

^9 A . ih the spot oil market or some other shady international 

10 bus I ness deal . But 1 1 didn' t come to my at tent Ion sped f leal ly . 
Q was you to but^^^^^^^^^B 

12 A That's correct. He went up to New York and got the details 

13 of this thing, as I recall, and I talked to State, and again. 

14 I think I went out of town, because l th l nk^^^Btalked with Arnle 

15 Raphael or maybe with Dick Murphy — they were our counterparts 

16 at State — and confirmed that, okay, if there's some. If the 

17 people had something to say. And I talked with Casey once 

18 more about It at some point by saying, "BIN, this Is the 

19 way to handle It. we don't want to get into all this 'Who shot 
_20 John?' » n ^ d ea l ">< th these guys. If they come forward and have 

21^ something I eg 1 1 imate. ^and this guy^^^^^^^^' ^ou see, the 

22 thing about Shaheen and other guys — they have a lot of contacts — 

23 and they come up and It would be a tantalizing sort of thing. 



UNCLASSIFIFn 



ymssiFe 



1 I mean, the Idea was the guy has access here, and that would turn 

2 out to be true, and you needed, you had to explore, but you nad 
3^ to exDiore It. but you had to be very careful -t-f' you did if, or 

A you'd get involved with another fabricator or swindler, you know. 

5 Because the further you unravelled the thing the wormier it 

6 became. But. once In a while we'd have a contact that would 

7 make sense. 

8 Q Did It come to your attention during this period of time 

9 that Mr. Ghorbanlfar, as reported In his 201 file, once said that 

10 ^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas Involved in the kidnapping of Mr. Buckley? 

1 1 A I don't recal I that . 

12 Q 1 d^^^^^^^^^Hcomm 1 1 to writing what he learned in his 

13 Interview with Mr. Shaheen? , , 

14 A He committed to wr 1 1 1 ng--;>*n, I don't know whether or not - 
15^ ^^"^1 remember him later committing to writing sort of how the 

16 thing was being handled, and what, you know, once we talked 

17 with State and had the deal laid on that State would talk with 

18 ^^^^B I remember^^^Kirr 1 1 1 ng something saying, 'I called Shaheen 

19 and told him this, -«aL thatHasheml Is serious and he can 
-20 really produce these people, **»* he should i >fct -ni c call this 

21 number, and they'll be met." And he also told Shaheen that. 

aprr about the dea I ,HH^H^H|^H f i ne, 

23 because he had been proven to be a bad character and not 



cn 



82-690 0-88-21 



610 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 worth deal Ing with. Ahd so I remember t h a f he wrote that dowr 

2 Q Do you recall aporislng Mr. Casey of the fact that 

3 Manucher Qhorbanlfar was indeed someone that Operations 

4 preferred not to deal with? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q And you would have told him that approximately when, 

7 sometime In the June or July period? 



a A Yeah. 
9 



Jtk^Q 



10 A I don't recall. It might have been on the phone. 

11 It would have been sort of, "Hey, Bill, we have traces on 

12 this guy. He's a bum." That sort of thing. 

13 Q Do you recall anybody else that would have been 

14 present when you related this to Mr. Casey? 

15 A No, I don't recall relating It to him face to 

16 face. 

17 Q I see. You do think It was conveyed to him? 

18 A Oh, y«s, because If Bill Casey got a lead on something 

19 from John Shaheen or anybody else, he didn't let go of it, 

20 and you didn't Just forget about It. You responded and you 

21 explained to him the why and wherefore, and in this case, 

22 why it would have been a dumb Idea to have done It otherwise. 

23 Q Let me show you a memorandum dated June 17. 1985 from 



mw 



611 



ssro 



31 

1 Mr. Casey, aooarentiy to yourself which would be Exhibit i 

2 of your deposition. Would you review Exhibit I and ten me 

3 first If you recognize that document? 

4 A I was talking about-- 

5 Q This would have been the initial memorandum from Casey 

6 to you relating his conversation with Shaheen . 

7 A Shaheen. that's right. That's right. 

8 Q And does this review of that document given you any 

9 further recollection on this Initial phase of this that 

10 you haven't testified to. 

11 A No, as I say. there was ne'^er any, you know, sort of 
follow up. At least not as far as 

know. I talked to State and It was a question of allegedly 

14 talking about a change In policy here, and the usual boiler 

15 plate of, you know, release the prisoners and provide weapons. 

16 They were always--the Iranians were always looking for weapons. 

17 It doesn't raise any additional Inferences. 

18 Okay. Now. In terms of following this along. This document 

19 Is dated June 17, 1985. We have a document we have obtained 

20 from the State Department dated June 22, 1985, and I want to 

21 apologize for the wretched quality of the copy. State's copy 

22 machines aren't nearly as goo d as^ uh- 
. — 23 A Is this a telegrami 

^--24 Q MJiu^he first Is a memorandum from Mr. Murphy to Mr. 

gob s 

_25- Armacost. The second Is a cable to V au g h n ( ep Z ^- -^ 

— ?«■' A That would have been in i-i-m^rr&fWTeT'- 



ilNCLASSIRED 



612 



UNCLASSiFiED 



1 What I'd like you to do is take a look at what 

2 would be Exhibit 2 and do the beat you can to read 

3 the wretched quality and we'll see where that takes 

4 us Just In terms of chronology. 

5 A orelimlnary question will be whether or not 

6 you have seen this document before. 

7 A I do not recall having seen it, but I recall 

Is. 

S. the details of % *>• * W , what said In It. And I 

9 recall specifically that Mike Armacost approved 

10 this because i remember I made reference earlier 
to a note tha^^^^^^^^^^had written 

12 summing up where we were going pn this, and In that, 

13 I remember him saying that It had been Mike Armacost 

14 who had approved It, and they were sending another 
T5 cable ^^^^^^^^fcer fol low 

16 Q Murphy Indicates In this memo that he, as he 

17 says, consulted urgently wlth^ Justice on June 20 
'T8 «*r'to learn Justice's reaction to the Hashemi 

19 proposal. Did you have any Involvement in that 

20 meeting with Justice? 

21 A No. 

22 Q Old you have any knowledge of it. 

23 A I had knowledge of it, but I recall that he 

24 did talk with him. 

25 Q Do you know of anything In writing generated 

26 by Justice regarding the Hashemi proposal.? 






mwB 



613 



UNCLASSIFIED 



2 

3 

4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 

21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 




A I wouldn't think there would have been because 
nobody was wl l l ing to offer a no I le oros on the basis 
of a promise i^'i a guy I Ike Hashemi . 

Q Being It a habit of government agencies to block things 
out that I want to know about, I want to ask you about a 
block. They say. we suggested that we could ask the blank 
to send a professional to llste_frto the Iranian representative 
|next week. Do you have any Idea who It was suggested 
should go^^^^^Hto listen to the Iranian official? 
A I don't recall whether we offered, uh--lt may well 
be ClA,y^ 9 iw ee he woXjid speak Pars I. and he would-- 
Q That would be my guess, and so I'm asking. 
A I don't know for sure. It could well be because we 
probably would have offered that as long as State had 
approved I t . 
Q Al I r I ght . 

A It's Just that we wouldn't have wanted to go out on 
a limb dealing directly with these guys. 
Q -t^nrtthere's a reference in the. last paragraph that 
I want to oursye. It says, 'finally, Bill Casey is 
anxious to move ahead on this proposal. I suggest you ca i 
him to say we are urgently, l think it's considering or 
working on the issue, and we'll be back to him as soon 
as possible, we have passed the same message to and the 
reference appears to be to you. So you were in touch witr 



State on this matter 



Mmm 



614 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A With Murphy and/or Raphael. I don't recall. They 
were very careful. Yes. l remember. 'Cause I out a fair 
amount of, you know, Casey got the tlo from Shaheen, and he's 
talking, and he runs Into] 



ind you know, he goes to Long island for the 



weekend and see I4 more people, and you want to get this 

r 

thing under control and In the right channel before, you know, 

there's some other angle that we have to send somebody out to 

ibout something that's 

probably not going to amount to anything. So, i probably said 

"Bill's persona My Interested." But he may have ca I I ed, we i I 

he to^^^^^^^^Hso maybe^^^^Hta Iked 

Q Old you perceive Casey to be very anxious or particularly 

Interested In this suggestion by Shaheen? 
so Wl> o"^ 
A No more so than other similar hot lee^ds that he'd come 

In on Monday morning and start - { tw aud lB le > out people to 

follow up on. I mean, yes, he was interested and, it had to 

do with the hostages. ^Jft»/2t that point, we did not know 

Bill Buckley was dead, and In fact, we thought he was still 




■again through one of 
these contacts that Casey makes that leads to something. 




Q In any event, as of late June 1985, you had not reached 
the conclusion that Buckley was dead. 
A Absolutely not. That's right. . , 

Q And It was your perception t.h«» 4hen the Agency, at the 
too levels where you were, that that perception also was not 
the official perception. Is that right? You thought Buckley 
m I ght still be a I I ve7 
A At that point, yes. 




Q Yes. Do you have any recollection of any discussions 

with Charles Allen during this period of time, June 1985, 

regarding whether or not Buckley was dead or alive? 

A No. I don't recal i it. 

Q You don't have a recollection of his view about whether 

or not Buckley was dead or alive as of June of 1985. 

A No . No I don ' t . 

Q Let me show you a couple more documents. These are 



UNCLASSIFIED 



616 



mimm 



1 documents that came from Ghorban l f ar ■ s 201 file. They are 

2 documents from the Central intelligence Agency, and they 

3 are documents for which I have great hopes of someday 

4 being able to read the entire text. Let me show you a 

5 cable dated July 9. 1985. which had previously been marked 

6 as Allen Exhibit 3, a typewritten message to Arnle from 

7 Peter, dated July 11. 1985, which is Allen Exhibit 4, 

8 A To Arnle from Peter? 

9 Yes sir. And a cable dated July 12, 1985, which Is 

10 Allen Exhibit 5. What I would like you to do is read 

11 these documents and tell me first if you recall having 

12 seen them at or about the time of their date. First, with 

13 regard to these documents, would you have seen them at or 

14 about the time of their date? 

15 A Not necessarily. Something like this would probably 

16 have been brought to my attention. I don't recall having 

17 seen-- I don't know what this document Is. 

18 1 was hoping you would be able to help me out with 

19 that .^^^l^^^^l Do you know an Arnle or a 

20 A I know Arnle Raphael. And since they have — uh . Peter. 

21 Peter. Peter, Peter, Peter D o i l e ' ^( j^r) from the State 

22 Department? l wonder, did this come from us or from 

23 State? 

24 Q It came from CIA. 

? 

-25 A It was In Qhorbani far 's file. 



-20\ 



26 Q It was In Ghorbani far 's file. [■saiu s iiiiu I laneous i ywTEh 

A 






617 



UNCLASSIFIED 



,W^ c^^f'^''^ 




that we use 



A And somebody's written 

for him, but uh — 

Q By that you mean it 

A Yes. Update on the Hashemi as of last night Deputy 

Chief CIA was still negative about the two names offered. 

This sounds as if It was written outside of CIA. in other 

words, we were closely in touch . ^^^^^^^^Hor the PMs 

office and Manucher Intel i Office. It turns out he was a 

fabricator with detailed knowledge of^^^^^^^^Hour only 

knowledge o f^^^^^^^^f i n the biographic files, see that's 

State phraseology. That's not Agency. i can swear to 

that. it sounds like they're referring to their own 

report I ng . 

Q Right. That's very possible. 

A The other cables may or may not have come to my 

attention. Probably the fact of their existence would 

have been gotten to my attention. 

Q Exhibit was issued by thc^^^^^^^^ 1 1 that 

ghat's right, yeah. 
Q ^^^^^^^^^^H I s 
A it's somebody on the] 





some--that's a person who read the cable. it may have been 

an Intel i assistant or whatever. 

Q Okay. The authority for the cable would be yourself. 



iiNWSsiFirn 



618 



2 

3 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

'1 1 

^2 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

-25 

26 



Correct? 



OlUSSIflED 



A R I ght . 

O Would that mean that you would have read it? 
_NflX n ee^ea a ri l y? 

A Not necessarily. Cables can be released down at tt 
^^^^^^leve 

Q All right. The cable Is being sent to^^^^^H to tt 
Ithat handled terrorists? 

A No. this" Is tr 




Q All right. And essentially what the cable, which Is 
Allen Exhibit 3. Is asking for Is additional Information 

land Ghorbanlfar. Is that correct? Or Manucher . 
A Yeah. FY! Headquarters suspects that Manucher is 
Identical with Ghorbanlfar. we note that he had contacts with 



Indicated by this Exhibit, they think It's probably the same 
guy. And he Is the fabricator, and circulated the burn notice 
Q Okay. All right. So essentially, as of July 9, operation; 
Near East Division Is trying to develop Information on who 
ind Manucher Ghorbanlfar are. is that right? 

Is that what you're doing as of that time? 

A They're trying to develop further informat ion <>• te 



lINCUiSSIflEO 



619 



iiK-mim 




The other lead Is from, 
to Casey to me. but this came i 




Q well, then, help me understand what this imoMes. This 
suggests that whatever Qhorbanlfar and^^^^^^^Hwere doing 
vis-a-vis Mr. Hashemi and Mr. Shaheen, they had made another 
aooroach to the United States by way of| 
IS that right? 

A Well, they made an approach to] 

^^^^^|had told us about It. Whether they had — and it's 
not unusual for people doing something like this, particularly 
a guy like Hashemi or Ghorbanlfar to cast that net and you 
see which, you know, where you get your nibble. And If you 
have a message or something you're trying to promote then / 
you go through numerous channels to try to do it. 

Q All right. The Exhibit S cable talking about the 

meeting. That would have been the! 




620 



JllASSIFIED 



think so. It's not too clear 
Q They sort of black It out. 

A There are two ref erences-^^^^^Band Director 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^nd him as lows 

don't remember ever seeing this cable. . I don't understand j 
exact I y, wh a t — [ I o au d I b I e -- a g a I ii i eaa I i^ij aioua f r om tt>g" document ] 

A ^ wrong assumpt I on->H think this Is following up on the 

other lead. 

Q On the Shaheen lead? 

A' »e*h, because an intermediary has advised us — that would 

be Hashemi — that we can confirm the full identity of the latter 

this Manucher (S^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B And probably 
what ' s blacked out 




Q That would be. my guess. I look forward to «A^-Ht9 that 
24 someday. 
"^5 A No. I think It's following up on the other. T Uun'-i — 



28 



:s--i somehow had rememberedl 



yiLASSIREO 



got Into It, 



621 



i ^ ,' \e 




but I thought It was b«causa. uh, that they had heard about 

Q Oo you have any further recollection or knowledge of 
what haopened^^^^^^^^nd elsewhere with this overture from 
Ghorbanifar and — 

A So far as I recall It Just petered out because they 
did not show up^^^^^^H I mean, he did not call. Shaheen 
was going to pass this message to him with the thing that 
^^^^^^^^H-you asked he wrote something up about 
we were gonna do. Shaheen was gonna call Hashemi In Geneva 
— these guys were always floating around Qeneva. He was 
gonna call him and say okay, if you've got something to say, 
go here or call this number. And as far as I know, nothing 
ever happened on that. 

Q Oo you recall telling officials at State on the even 1 1 
of July 10th tha t you were, you yourself or 
were negative on^^^^^^^land Manucher Qhorbanlfar? 
A I don't recall specifically, but It's certainly In 
the context of what I believed and thought at the time. 
But the guy was only trying to get this nolle pros', and 
that he would Just come up with another cockamamie story. 
But, sine* It possibly involved hostages, and maybe 
Improved relations, from State's perspective, you had 
to listen to him. I personally didn't think he'd show up. 
Q This document dated January 11th refers to OC/NE. 
beH|^^^^^^^ correct? Deputy Chief? 

mmim 



622 



WUSS/fffi) 



1 A That'* right. 

2 Q The rnomo also makes reference to the Issue coming 

3 up at 3 p.m. meeting C/NE. Is that you. 

4 A That's me. That would have been me. l normally 

5 had meetings once a week with Oick Murphy or Arnle. 

6 That's why It makes me- think that that's Arnle Raphael 

7 up there. 

8 Q This memo also makes reference to the point I made 

9 a little bit earlier, which says that our only knowledge 

10 of^^^^^^^Hin the biographic file Is the report on 

11 Manucher , who claimed, among other things, that] 

12 "was the Individual responsible for the kidnapping of 

,13 William Buck I ey . ■ V^That give you any further recollection 

14 of what you a I I knew about) 

15 A No. I don't. That doesn't refresh my recollection 
18 at all. 

17 Q Oo you have any recollection at all of what impact 

18 ^^^^^^^^Hrol* on the kidnapping of Buckley had on your 

19 eval uation of whether or not you should be doing business 

witt^^mijHv 

21 A Well, If It cones from Manucher Qhorbanlfar, I would ^ 

22 put about as much credence In that as anything else he 

23 says. So. It wouldn't have had any Impact whatsoever. 

24 Q with regard to a meeting In early July with State, 

25 discussing these matters, do you have any further 
26 



recollection of what was discussed? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



623 



mn 



mm 



1 A No. I mad* th« arrangement. They said they would 

2 send a cab le^^^^^^^^Band I think maybe another cable 

3 had already been sent. And it was agreed that at some 

4 point that, no, they did not need our officer to sit In, 
that ^^^^^^^^^wou Id be hapoy to do for them, 

8 that was — and that's all i recall on that, it was Just 

7 left at that. 

8 Q During this same period of time, June or July, we 

9 now know It from the Tower Commission Report, that there 

10 were a variety of meetings between Michael Ledeen and 

11 Ghorbanlfar, Bud Mcrarlane and people speaking on behalf 

12 of Qhorbanlfar. Were you aware In the June-July time period 

13 that Qhorbanlfar was making an effort to reach the United 

14 States by way of the National Security Council? 

15 A No. 

18 Q At no time, to your knowledge, did Mr. Shaheen apprise 

17 the Director of an effort to reach the United States by 

18 way of the NSC. 

19 A No. Not to my knowledge. It seems to me that had he, 

20 I would have thought he would have mentioned something to 

21 ^^^H" *°"^* context, because he was a very open sort of 

22 guy onc«, you know, he got one of these leads and you 

23 talked to him, he'd sort of tell you everything he knew about 

24 It. But, he seemed to accept the fact that our records showed 

25 that this guy, Qhorbanlfar, was not the sort of fellow we 
28 wanted to deal, but, that if he could lead tol 



.:"J 



624 




1 mayb* h« was worth It. 

2 Q In terms of Shaheen, though, you did not develop the 

3 impreaelon that Shaheen had a profit motive In trying to 

4 put this relationship together. 

5 A No. 

6 Q And It Is your that^^^^^^^^^Bwou I d 

7 have gone to New York and actually interviewed Shaheen. 

8 Is that correct? 

9 A That Is my recollection. 

10 Q Do you recall anyone else being present at that 

1 1 I ntervlew? 

12 A No . 

13 Q If you were to try to give me an estimate of when 

14 this aspect petered out, came to an end. would It have 

15 been in mid-July or at a later time. 

18 A Well, It was Just left hanging. We sort of had It all 

17 In place by the, I don't know, the 10th or 12th of July, 

18 and then It Just sort of — we were waiting and, no call. 

19 Q Old you ever determine why there was no call? 

20 A NO. My assumption was that it was, that he Just 

21 couldn't come through, when he was pinned down and we 

22 didn't want to talk about arms or about ransom or something, 

23 that, In other words, that he had to appear and state his 

24 case on the merits as to what the Government of Iran 
29 wanted to say to the U.S. Government, what they might 
28 do to effect the release of the hostages In return for 



UNCUSSIFIED 



625 



iiflLSSSIFIED 



better relations or something, that that wasn't the 
game that he was capable of playing. Either] 
or whoever^^^^m^^Hcontacts he In 

[IniMtf ihie] ■ <2.?^^ {^^<A . 

Q It did not come to your attention that this 
Initiative had died because In mid-August 1985, 
Ghorbanifar and^^^^^^^f succeeded In getting the 
United States' agreement to have Israel ship TOM 
ml ss I les to I ran . 



;Kt?^ 



.t*/u< 



A It did not come to my attent Ion -♦+-> long after' 
Q Was there merely one Interview of Shaheen by 
^^^^^^^to the best of your knowledge? 
A As far as I know. He may have met him on another 
occasion, but that's the only one that I recall. 
Q Where would the Central Intelligence Agency 
have kept Its records of matters relating to this 
Incident? 

A Matters relating to — 

To this Incident, the Hashemi ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
Qhorbanlfar connection in June-Ju ly-August , 1989. 
A Weil, the cables were sent, i don't know 
whether they have a file number. 
we have a 201 f I le. 

A Yeah. And this Is out of QhorbanI far ' s 2017 
Q Yeah. 
A Probably after he was identified, I mean that 



IJNCLASSIRED 



626 



roswssw 



1 Manuchcr was him. It would have bean put in there, 

2 and there was a file on Hashemi, too, i think. So, 

3 It would have been in one of those files, they're 

4 probably In both of those fUes. 

5 Q Have you had occasion to review the Hashemi 

6 file related to this matter. 

7 A No. 

8 Q Have you had occasion to discuss this matter or 

9 Incident wlthl 

10 A Over what period? 

11 Q within the last month or so. 

~^2 A We have talked about, «W not In the detail we have 

13 talked here today, about Hashemi and Shaheen and all that. 

14 We have talked about Qhorbanlfar. 

15 Q Well, let me come at It a little later. Oldl 

16 ^^^^^Hadvise you that he had been asked questions . 

17 about this Hasheml-Shaheen-Qhorbani far matter during 

18 the course of his deposition? 

19 A No . 

20 Q So you have not had the benefit off 

21 recollections to refresh your own? 

22 A No. 

23 Q According to the Tower Coflimlsslon Report and the 

24 other documents that you've now seen In the period 

25 June 1985, there were efforts underway to ransome 

26 two hostages. Including Mr. Buckley, being supervised 

27 by Col. North and being done In conjunction with two 



UNCLASSIFIED 



627 



liNCUSSIRED 






agents from the OEA. Were you aware of such effort! 

In June 1988. 

A June of 1985. I don't recall any. I recall 

that periodically ther e were leads that came up. 

DEA , you knov 

and they were informants, not agents. But. no, i don't 

recal l . 

Q Do you recall it coming to your attention during 

your tenure as Chief of the Near East Division, of 

plans or a program to ransom one or mora American 

hostages? 

A Our pol Icy on that was. no. 




spring of last year^ ■wu.ijgaaane. what was the guy's name« 
\i\e was later determined to bo. well, ha was later killed, 
but first everyone thought he was dead, one of the 
hostages, t can't recall now, and then we got Information 
through a source that he was ai Ive and wa got pretty good 
proof that ha was alive, and the guy, thay claimed they 
wanted something like a million dol lara.-or so to let him 
loose. We obviously didn't pay ransom /^We talked to the 
White House about that, specifically Oil le North^woj uii - 
Ijfie talked to him about It. and he said there was private 



iCLASSlFIED 



628 



mmwE 



1 money available to pay for this sort of thing. But that 

2 one never worked out. The guy was killed. 

3 Q Let me focus you back In June. Were you aware of 

■4 a prooosal In June of 1985 to pay several million dollars 

5 in ransom for hostages and to utilize monies which Col. 

6 North characterized as monies generated in his Nicaraguan 

7 project to pay that ransom? 

8 A No. 

9 Q with regard to the matters we were discussing before, 

the Shaheen-HashemI initiative relating to Ghorbanlfar and 
to your knowledge, did the conclusions that you 

12 all reached, the suggestions that you all made about not 

13 dealing with Ghorbanlfar get related to the National 
M Security Council? 

15 A At that stage? 

18 Q Yes sir. 

17 A I 'm not sure. I don't have any recollection that they 

18 were communicated to the National Security Council. 

19 They were certainly communicated to Casey. State knew about 

20 It at the Armacost level. 

21 Secretary of State Siihultz has testified, as you know, 

22 that as of mid-July, about July I6th, he had seen intelligen< 

23 reports on Ghorbanlfar, I believe they related to this 

24 Incident, that he was aware of Qhorban I far 's track record 

25 and how he was perceived by the Central Intelligence Agency. 

26 A Yeah, I suppose that's probably right. 



''iiiissiFe 



629 



'^MmiEij 



1 Q Oo you have any knowledge of a similar conveyance 

2 of Information to Bud McFarlane during this period of 

3 time? 

4 A No. 

5 O Do you specifically have any knowledge of this 

6 Information being passed to Col. North during this period 

7 of time? 

8 A No. 

9 Q Given Col. North's position relating to the hostages, 

10 Is It likely or unlikely that the Central Intelligence 

11 Agency and State would have apprised him of this Shaheen- 

12 Hashemi Initiative during the June and July period of time? 

13 A It's probably likely that It would have come to his 
_J-4 attention In some of the,-yi.iu lillUl^i, i\m periodic meetings 

15 on the hostage situation." Although, at that time, this 

16 hostage- locat I ng task force had not been formally established. 

17 Q No, I'm familiar with that, but it was Col. North's 

18 turf, so to speak, to deal with hostages in June and July 

19 of 1985. Isn't that right? 

20 A Yeah, yeah. l mean, he was dealing with It. I don't 

21 know that It was, if turf Is exactly the right word. It 

22 wasn't exclusively his turf. 

23 Q I m not suggesting that. But that certainly — 

24 A Yes, It's quite likely it could have come to h I s 

25 attention, but I have no knowledge whether It did or did 

26 not. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



630 



«.'iff/fe 



50 



1 Q You, yourself, did not, you don't recall having had 

2 such discussions. 

3 A I don't recall having said. I might have said something 

4 like, you know, we've got a lead, or Casey might have said 

5 something to him about John Shaheen's given us a hot lead, 

6 and then, he might have asked me, and i might have said, 

7 well, yeah, it turned out to be a bummer, or something. 

8 But, I don't recall. That would n't be Impos sible. 

9 Q Do you have any knowledge of^^^^^^^^^Bcommun Icat I ng 

10 with Col. North about this matter in the June-July-August 

11 period? 

12 A No . 

13 O Let me move you into the fall of 1985. Did you become 

14 aware in the period of late August-September that Col. North 

15 was involved In an Initiative with certain Iranian expatriates 
18 and others? 

17 A No. i think my first knowledge that something was going 

18 on. Well, of course, Meir was released, and It was after then. 

19 That was, as I recall. In September. After that, there was 

20 it may have been early October, oh, I guess the first thing 

21 that alerted me, it was about the time Weir was to be released. 

22 Q Weir was released on the I8th of September. 

23 A Okay, that's right. Somebody said. I don't know If it 

24 was over a weekend or what, that Weir Is about to be released, 

25 and, I don't know, Claire Qeorge may have said that, or John 
28 McMahon may have said it, that they're expecting to get Weir 



-mmm 



631 



m 



mssim 



51 



out, and wh«th«r that means, you kno>», th« Church or State, 
or the Iranians, or 01 lie North,, or whatever, but that there 
was anticipation at the White House that Weir was going to" 
be released. And, Bingo, he was re I easedTt <And then I gradual 
became aware that some credit was being claimed for this in a 
satisfied way, by the White House. That they had worked with 
somebody and had gotten him out. Now whether, what It was, 
I didn't knov/r-H^Then, In early October, John McMahon and 

were on a tr l p^^^^^^^^^^^^^^and during 
that trip, during which the Achllle Lauro thing took place, 
John and I were sitting around having drinks somepi 




he said something 
about, gee, I hope they know what they're doing. I hope this 
all works out about the Iranians and the hostages. And that's 
all he said. The unstated thing was that it was, you know, 
the White House was working somehow with somebody In touch 
with the Iranians. I did not know of the Israeli end of It. 
Q Let me focus you on a couple of events and see what 
you can tell me about them. Mr. Allen places It at September 
9; contemporaneous records place it more like September 12. 
In any event, during that period of time. Col. North asked 
Charles Allen to lncreas< 

[efforts on what we now know to be Manucher Qhorbanifar 
Did you know that that asking as you like to 
t had been placed on Mr. Allen at that time. 




mmm 



632 



1?^?;?) 



'amssim 



1 A NO, I did not know at that tlm«. 

2 Q Director Casey didn't have any discussions with you in that 

3 oerlod of time about Mr. Allen's activities? 

4 A No. 

5 Q Do you have any knowledge of a request coming In from Mr. 

6 Allen's office relating to Manucher Qhorbanlfar, relating to an 

7 alias name - Ashgar I , relating to^^^^^^^^Hask i ng you to 

8 tell them what was In your file on those people? 

9 A It's quite possible he did, i don't specifically recall it. 

10 It wouldn't necessarily come up to me, or even to^^^H but it 

11 probably would have been brought to my attention, but i Just 

12 don't recall whether it was or not. 

13 Q Just In terms of dates, the first Israeli shipment of a 

14 hundred TOWs was August 30, then 408 TOWs went out on September 

15 14. Your testimony Is that you had no knowledge of those. 

16 A That Is correct. 

17 Q We do have a memorandum that was done In 1987, suggesting 

18 that you all had cable traffic on the September 14 flight, at 

19 least the fact that It went Into Tabriz, that sort of thing. Do 

20 you recall what you all knew at that point about Israeli flights 

21 Into lr«n? 

22 A I raoall about some reporting but l thought that was later. 

23 In September? 

24 Q Yes sir. 

29 A Was this the flight that came back out to Israel and then 

28 there was something In the paper about that. I thought that was 

27 later. 



-mim 



633 



\iiwssw 



1 

2 

, s 

6 
7 
8 

9 
10 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 



Q Tn«r« WAS also, in Octobar. thara, thara, a raoort about 
tha, tha planf stopping and going to Africa. 



A ^3*. "at-V 



someth I ng, 



\S 



■amambar. and I ramambar tnara was 

somebody raportad. 



"Hey. hereH something^ happened." They didn't have any 
knowledge of what it was. And I think that's probably what, that 
contributed to my overall Impression that something was going on. 
Weir was out, the White House was happy, McMahon later, i think 

In October, said something to me, and It may have been this 

plane. It was pretty obvious that something was going on. 

Q You also apparently learned or your division did that there 

had been a suppraaslon of a story in Israel about a Klmcha- 

McFarlana meeting and Its reaulta and how it related to the 

release of Weir, any recollections... 

A I don't have any recollections. 

Q According to Mr . Allen, he and director Casey met on 

September 16, two days after or a day after Weir was released to 

discuss the wair release and during the eoursa of the 

conversation Casey indicated what ha knew about the American roie 

in th%,tfan Initiative. Old you attend that meeting? 

A Pin. 

Old you have any knowledge of that meeting? 

A No. I know Charlie waa Involved and everyone was trying to 

get In on^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m and 

Charlie In terms of who would go down^^^^^^^^^^^Rnd so 



forth. 



yNOlASSIRED 



634 



antmsro 



Q Who from your office of anybody dealt with that 
A I think It probably had 




can't think of the name 
ight now at the time. And"would have coordinated with the 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^H^^^^Hi 
the guy. 

Q Was Col . North in evidence to you In those September M, is, 
16 period, trying to set up or establlshJ 

and the other accoutrements that go with the release of the 
hostages? 




635 



ii'MSsm 




A I don't recall anything specific. No. 
-^ Q Do yoLrTD-ecol lect whether or not you had concluded that 

19 Mr. Buckley was or was not dead at that point? 

20 A I think we'd pretty much concluded by that point that he was 

bcTT 
^1 dead. ■^T he ug h we weren't going to publicly confirm it. 

22 Q I understand, I understand. im going to show you what's 

23 previously been marked as Allen exhibit number 7, l doubt that 

24 you've seen it be^re, but perhaps you could look at it and ten 

25 me I f you have. There's one point of reference that I wanted to 

26 mention to you. On the second page of Mr . Allen's memo he 



mimm 



636 



winssffl 



56 



Indicates that as of th« data of that memo, which i believe is 
October 7th, the Central intelligence Agency, he says, has strong 
evidence that Mr. Buckley is dead. Do you know what the strong 
evidence was, that Mr. Allen's referring to on October 7th7 
A It seems to me that there were bits and pieces reporting 

dead, ^^^^^^^^^1 didn't have anything offerred 
any hope. There 'd been something about people being moved and 
Buckley hadn't been with them. But I don't recall any strong you 
know, single piece of evidence or even, that stood out from the 
others. It was. you know, that we hadn't heard from him. The 
reporting about the hostages and we had I think by ther 




Q Did It come to your attention during this period of time 

that Mr. Ghorbanlfar had made an Inquiry as to the condition as 

to Mr. Buckley and had advised US representatives as of this 

period of time, 7-8 October, that Mr. Buckley was dead? 

A No, It did not come to my attention that Qhorbanlfar had 

done that. It may «4-. that Intelligence may ef^ been passed to me 

in some form that, you know, that somebody said this, but i don't 

recall his name coming up again until sometime later. 

Q While we're In this period of time I'd like to show you one 

other document that was generated by Mr. Allen for Col. North on 

the 19th of September, relating to Iranian arms deals. Allen 

exhibit 8, ask If you saw that document at or about the time it 



OILASSIFIED 



637 






57 



states. 

A Market arms scams things, rings a bell, but I don't recall 
the covering on It. I certal n ly . . .Char I le Allen to Oliver North, 
I don't really recall this one. i remember the basic document. 
Q Do you recall knowing that Col. North was being given this 
Information by Mr. Allen at this time. 
A No. 
Q Or why It was being given to Col. North. 

A No. 

Sorry to Jump around. I missed one other thought. At the 
October 6-7-8 period, when Qhorbanlfar was In town, that Is the 
same time as the Achllle Lauro Incident, were you Involved In the 
CIA's efforts to follow and be of assistance In the Achllle Lauro 

matter? 

A John McMahon 




^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ We heard about It 
there. 

Q In terms of the way you all operate, when you are away, when 
you are on the road like that t take It that operational 
responsibility would Me with your deputy back at headquarters, 
is that the way It works? 
A Yea . 

Q Sc^^^^^^^^Bwou I d have had is comes 

down to . 
A Yea, that's right he would have been in charge of any, had 






f •«IP-e% 



638 



DNWSsro 



58 



soRiethlng serious come up he would send me a cable. 

Q Were you aware that Mr. Ledeen was playing a role in the 

Achi I le Lauro matter? 

A No. 

Q Old you know Michael Ledeen at that time? Have you ever met 

Michael Ledeen? 

A I've never met Michael Ledeen. I've seen him in the 

distance. I'd never heard of him until... I've heard of him of 

course, he has written things about Iran. But, I mean heard of 

him In our circle, until December of 1989. 

Q 857 

A December of 1985, that's right. 

Q And you would have heard of him in that context because of 

the Ghorbanifar memo? 

A That's right. When that came out. 

Q in mid November 198S, Mr. McFariane Is said to have had a 

conversation with Mr. Casey and Mr. McMahon, relating that the 

Israeli's were giving arms to Tehran. Old you have any knowledge 

of that discussion, that conversation had with Casey? 

A No. 

Q Col. North at that same time, mid-November 1985 was In 

London meet i n( 

Manucher Ghorbanifar. Did y^u have any knowledge 





ad no knowledge of him meeting with 



HaKSiFlfn 



Ghorban I far 



Q Your relationship with Dewey Claij^ldge, at that time was 

what? You knew each other professionally, I assume. 

A Hhm? 

You knew each other professionally? 

A Oh, yea, yea, I've known him for years. He's the first real 

^e CIA case officer I met^^^^^^^^^^^ 

^^^^^^^^^|and somebody said that's 

a Case officer headed for somewhere. He wasl 

it that point. 

r 
Q Had you had occasion to work with Mr. Ciarldge on any of 

your assignments? 

A In the old days ^^^^^^^^^^^^pwe' ve never served 

overseas together 





I guess. That's the only time 
with h 



ve ever worked In the same unit 




ii.^.siFiFn 



640 



mmsim 




Q With regard to events of November 22, 23, 24, 198S, were you 

M In the country at that point? 

15 A I was In the country at that point. 

16 Q with regard to the flight ultimately made by the CIA 

17 proprietary airline Into Tehran, were you aware of matters 

18 relating to that flight while they were going on? 

19 A No, no I was not. I didn't hear about that flight until, uh 

20 It must have been early December .. .could have been the very end 

21 of November, but I think It was, sort of the week or next week 

22 after It. maybe ten days or two weeks. 

23 Q You were or were not aware that Colonel North was at the CiA 

24 the weekend of the 22nd7 

25 A I was not aware of that. 

26 Q Mr . Clarridge at no time talked to you about the events as 



WUSSIFIffl 



641 



UNCLASSIFIED 



thay w«r« going on? 

A NO. Absolutely not. 

Q with that also be true of your personnel.! 

A I'm sure It Is, because i remenber when we learned about it, 

I don't remember I f^^^Bheard about 1 1 or I heard about it... one 

or the other... then we sat down and discussed It... what went 

on... and there was apparently a flight. 

And then I think there had been 
a news story there about an airplane going to Tabriz and all 
that, so I obviously knew something was going on but it didn't 
enter my mind that it was one of our aircraft. it entered my 
mind In a pure speculation — I wonder what this has to do with 
the deal that may be going on, so I assumed It might be some 
airplane that might be Involved with Secord or somebody that had 
some Central American connection. But It didn't occur to me that 
we had. . . 

Q When did it actually come to your attention that the CiA 
proprietary had been used? 

A I think It was a weak or tan days after, maybe early 
December I think It was. 

Q Whan did you learn the cargo of the flight that was made by 
the proorlatary? 

A I learned, I think, when I learned about the flight I 
learned that there was a concern to the point that John McMahon 
had raised hell and said... that the concerns based on the fact 
that there may have been military supplies, I didn't have any 



iwssm 



82-690 0-88-22 



642 



UarOTEO 



62 



1 specific knowledge. .. there had been a flight and It obviously had 

2 been some sort of deal with Iran, and that military supplies had 

3 been involved, and whether It had been Hawks or TOWs or anything 

4 like that I didn't learn until later. 

5 Q Has It ever come to your attention that a cable was sent 

6 ^^^^^^^^^|^° ^'^ Headquarters on the 23 of November relating a 

meeting between the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band 
Secord. . .that Mr. Copp Identified tothe^^^^^^^^^^H that 

9 the cargo was In fact Hawk missiles? 

10 A I think that only came up, or came to my attention within 

11 the last couple months, since I've been A.D.O.Oed. . . I n the course 

12 of the Investigation and the Independent counsel and all that. 

13 Q Have you ever seen that cable? 

14 A No. I have not seen that cable, l have heard talk about it, 

15 and I may have seen some of the I .0. notes on the Interview 
I nvol vl n^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hbut the cable 

17 know. 

18 Q Do you have any knowledge that the cable does or does not 

19 exist somewhere In the records of the CIA at the present time? 

20 A No, I do not. I know there was cable traffic... I am not sure 

21 what you mean by THE cable. 

22 There Is A cable that weVe looking for Were you aware in 

23 late November that Mr. McMahon felt a finding was required 

24 because of this flight... a presidential finding? 

25 A Either late November or early December, simultaneously with 
28 the fact of the flight... in fact It came to my attention because 



MOTHED 



643 



Mmim 



63 

1 John McMahon had said, "Be careful... no airplanes, no nothing 

2 unless we have a f l nd l ng . " . . . that context... he didn't say that to 

3 me, but I believe he said that. 

4 Q Do you have any knowledge of who McMahon assigned the task 

5 of checking with the White House periodically to determine if a 

6 finding had been assigned? 

7 A No I do not . 

8 Q And you don't know what If any responsibilities either 

9 Charles Allen or Dewey Clarridge had In that regard? 

10 A No . 

11 Q Let me show you a memorandum dated November 26, 1985 from 

12 Mr. Casey to Vice Admiral Polndexter, enclosing a proposed 

13 finding which approves of the Marcus Allen exhibit 10. i ask 

14 that you look at that and tell me If you have ever seen that 

15 document before. 

16 A No . 

17 Q YOU have therefore had no role In drafting the language or 

18 suggesting the language to be used for this finding... the concept 

19 behind i t . . . the rest of It was not your bailiwick? 

20 A Absolutely not. 

2 1 Q Do you remember attending a meeting I n Mr . McMahon 's office 

22 on the 5th of December in which among other things the Iran 

23 initiative was outlined and the November flight was discssed? 

24 A I don't recall that. It's possible. As I say I learned 

25 about the flight in very late November or early December, it is 

26 convelvable that I could have attended the meeting, because i 



ONCLASSm 



644 



>^ 



2 

3 

4 

3 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

1 1 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

2S 

26 



' mm\m 



64 



would h«v« understood the context of It. 

Q Let's see if i can refresh your recollection. Let me show 
you a memorandum that was done November 28, 1986 byl 
reconstructing notes that Mr. McMahon made of a December 5, 1985 
meeting held at his office amongst yourself, Mr. Qates, Mr. 
McMahon ,^^^^^^^^^HMr . Juchnlewicz and^^^^^^^^^^H Let me 
have this document marked as exhibit 3, Is that where we are? 
I'd like you to take a few minutes to read It, because I'd like 
to see If It would refresh your recollection at all on what 
happened at that meet i ng . 




.Paul several things, I've been reflecting back on the 
situation and I was thinking a little later than this, I knew i 
heard about the flight, then I knew that John talked to us, 
talked to me, about the meeting that was taking place at the 
White House on the question of the Initiative with the Israeli's 
and the Iranians and I... ^oo soft to make out] . . . i have 
difficulty In recalling this specific meeting but all of the 
facts that are mentioned, most of the facts that are mentioned in 
there I recall. But I don't remember this about the President 
signing a Finding. 

Q Well, that was question number one on the list. You don't 
recal I that being discussed? 
A No. 

Q You don't recall who discussed It. I guess Is even more 
Important, who raised the point? 



ONCLASSIRED 



645 



w&jmm 



65 

1 A I sure don't, i Know the whole context was that if we were 

2 to play any role and do something, there would have to be a 

3 Finding, but I don't remember anything about a Finding 

4 authorizing us to do th I ngs . . . they talk here about Oliver North 

5 arranging five plane loads and a lot of this meeting was to get 

6 Intelligence, i think so John would be prepared when he went to 

7 the meeting on the 7th and you know, with facts. So that claims 

8 by the Israeli's or others might be met with facts. But I do not 

9 recal I that bit about the Finding. 

10 Q Now, I m going to show you this document In a moment. On 

11 December 7th, 1985, Mr. McMahon wrote another memo, a memo for 

12 the record, and he said that "after repeated calls to NSC 

13 personei on 27 November, and during the week of 2 December, 

14 continuously receiving reassurances of the President's Intent to 

15 sign the Finding, we were notified on 5 December that indeed the 

16 Finding was signed. The President directed us not to inform 

17 Congress for reasons of the safety and secure release of the 

18 hostages until he so directed." December 7, 1985. Have you any 

19 further recollection of what you all knew about a Finding you 

20 sent to the President? 

21 A I didn't know anything about a Finding. The first I heard 

22 about a Finding was later In January. The first time I recall 

23 hearing about a Finding. 

24 Q At no time since these events have you or Mr. McMahon had 

25 occaislon to discuss what caused him to believe a Finding had 

26 been signed In December. 



Mmsim 



646 



sn himji c 



1 A John had gone to Lt. Aidrldge, I've seen himp couoie of 

2 times you know, we've been back to testify in town, but I've 

3 never talked with him. 

4 Q Okay. If I could borrow that memo back. I'd like to ask a 

5 couple of questions. What took place at this December 5, 1985 

6 meeting. The second bullet Indicates that Mr. McMahon said that 

7 he was going to be attending a meeting on 7 December, with the 

8 President discussing the Israeli / i ranlan initiative. He says 

9 that a new "Private Interlocutor was working with Israeli foreign 

10 Ministry official David Kimche." Do you recall who the Identity 

11 of that private Interlocutor was? 

12 A No. I could make an assumption based on what i learned 

13 later. 

14 Q I understand that. Do you recall Manucher Qhorban I f ar ' s 

15 name coming up In the context of this meeting, In early December? 

16 ^^^^^^npparent ly shakes head. No.) Old not come up? 

17 A I don't recall It coming up. 

16 Q Do you recall Ledeen ' s name coming up at this meeting? 

19 A No, No. 

20 Q Were you aware that the day before, December 4, Dewey 

r 

21 Clarldga and Charles Allen, met with Mr. Ledeen at length to go 

22 through the Qhorbanlfar Initiative? 

23 A No. The first I heard of Ledeen was a little bit later when 

24 he came up with some terrorist Information and other Information 

25 and we got into It In the N.E. division. 

26 Q Mr. Allen and Clarldge did not keep you apprised that they 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



647 



iClASSIFIED 



67 

1 met with Ledeen In late November, met again with him on December 

2 4, to discuss Ghorbanifar. 

3 A No, absolutely not. 

4 Q Do you recall^^^^^^^^^Hdo you recall him apprising you 

5 all of what the cargo of the plane was that had flown on November 

6 23rd? 

A 7 I remember him mentioning something but, you know, I don't think 

8 I focused that much. I knew it was weapons, or you know, 

9 military goods, but I don't remember specifically what he said. 

10 Q Well, let me just pursue that a tad further. Apparently 

11 there was discussion at this meeting of North's plan to send 

12 perhaps as many as five more plane loads including 747 's with 

13 weapons to Tehran. Do you recall that discussion at all, what 

14 the program was? 

15 Q No. I don't. I mean it may well have been that. I mean it 

16 was sort of at times Col. North tended to over dramatize if not 

17 exaggerate things sort of, "get all this done and we're gonna 

18 send five airplanes and get out seven hostages," and that sort of 

19 thing. So I'm not sure I would have accepted at its face value 

20 that yea, that's really going to happen in the next couple of 

21 weeks even had ^^^^^^^Hs a id it having heard it from the White 

22 House. 

23 Q The reason I'm focusing on it, is because insofar as you all 

24 were going to be backing up Col. North on that progreun given 

25 McMahon's position that you all knew the Presidential Finding, 

26 suggests to me that there mu|9 Ji»Mf been some discussion with the 






648 



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K*^-^^ 



.*''5%. 



^- ^c^^ 



^JLillUWi 



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68 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 



Finding in place at this time, otherwise McMahon wouldn't have 

had you all helping out Col. North. 

A Well as I tell you my recollection at this meeting is that 

it is primarily for John to get himself up to speed; we had the 

DI people involved in this and Bob Gates and his deputy for the 

Near East area ,^^^^^^^H myself ; that it was to get himself 

armed with facts, facts and figures to go to this meeting to talk 

about what ever was going to be done, but I do not recall him 

mentioning a Finding or a specific role of CIA. The reference 

there is right I think ^h*4|^H°^ somebody said well if Ollie's 

going to get these airplanes then — 

Q Let me add one other fact to the mix — we know from cables 

that we reviewed that there was a lot of cable traffic during 

this period of time trying to arrange for overflights in various 

countries, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and the like — 

A You mean through our channels? 

Q Yes. Through the CIA. Seems to have been done primarily 

out of Clarridge's shop. I'm just curious why you all weren't 

playing a role, if you weren't. 

A Well I've always, I mean I've reflected on that since the 

time. It started out there was a flight to go from^^^^^^nd 

there was a question getting clearances and that's! 

[didn't really impact on the Middle East 
and sort of started out from there and why it continued that way, 
I don't know. 
Q Coming at it from another angle, were you aware that of the 




\\Mm 



i .-S 



■;iD 



649 




69 

1 fact that the CIA was Indeed trying to obtain clearances for 

2 these succeeding flights In early December? 

3 A I don't recall being aware of that, no. 

4 Q I'm trying to stir recollections which would suggest that 

5 you would have known the Finding. But no such — 

going^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^that cover any 

7 anyway, so — 

8 Q I understand- - 

9 A There's no reason for me to be aware of that. 

10 Q It was landing in Tehran though, it's under your turf, isn't 

11 that right? 

12 A It does, but it gets on to my turf, but I wouldn't be 

13 involved the clearances of the flight clearances. 

14 Q Okay. Alright. There is a reference in this collection 

15 notes again going to the interlocutor that I have trouble with, 

16 its key players were Rimche and the private U.S. citizen 

17 interlocutor. Any further recollection of who that might be? 

18 A Other than my later assumption; this would have been Ledeen. 

19 Q Yes. But in terms of a specific recall of him being 

20 discussed? 

21 A No, not then. The first time I heard Ledeen' s name was 

22 later. It up around the 20th or 21st of December, as I recall. 

23 Q Do you recollect what assignment, if any, any division was 

24 given to get McMahon up to speed for this meeting with the 

25 President? 

26 A I think it was sort tracks on the Iranian political 



UNCLASSIFIED 



650 




70 

1 situation, you know the moderates, the Mullahs, the middle-of- 

2 the-roaders, identities of the people in the hierarchy who had 

3 political clout, etc., etc., that sort of thing. And we would 

4 have worked witn^^^^^^^H and his people on that, and if we had 

5 something to add, you know from the intelligence hierarchy or 

6 some reporting that fleshed out with the DI might , we 

7 probably would put it together and given it to him. I don't 

8 recall the product. 

9 Q Do you recall McMahon expressing anything about his view of 

10 the merit of this initiative, at this meeting prior to meeting 

11 with the President? 

12 A I recall, I don't recall when he expressed it; I think I 

13 know what his attitude was, and I know what my attitude was at 

14 the time, and I think he thought it was sort of a cockamamie 

1 5 scheme . 

16 Q Was that a view that you shared? 

17 A Yeah. Well I thought, I began to think that it was really 

18 cockamamie when I got Ghorbanifar's circus from Ledeen, and all 

19 this stuff. Before that, when I heard this Israelis and, I mean 

20 I thought it was you know not my bailiwick, political-diplomatic 

21 decisions, but that it was a politically, you know when you've 

22 been very careful walking a careful trail not to pay ramsom, not 

23 to deal with terrorists, even though you weren't dealing with the 

24 terrorists, you were dealing with the Iranians, and it was a 

25 politically-charged dynamite, but you know I said something to 

26 Bill Casey is this really what people want to do? And— 



UNCUSSIFIED 



651 





B= 



71 

1 Q Wh«n would you have had that conversation, roughly. 

2 A Roughly in December or January, I suppose. 

3 Q Was this a one on one session, or in passing along the hall, 

4 or what? 

5 A It was probably at the co nclusio n of one of the meetings 

6 that I had with him when we sen^^H^HHto talk with Ledeen. 

7 I don't remember exactly. But on the other hand, if it were 

8 something that could be done quickly and really have an impact on 

9 U.S. - Iranian relations and get the hostages out, may be, cause 

10 the results of the potential for them may be ... . . ._ 

11 Q Were you aware that Charlie Allen was preparing a memorandum 

12 on the political situation in Iran at the same time? 

13 A I don't recall. 

14 You don't remember McMahon saying to Charlie Allen you've 

15 need to give me a briefing on Iranian politics? 

16 A No, I don't recall that. 

17 Q You don't recall anybody saying why Charlie Allen, NIO 

18 Counterterrorisra wa s doing this a s opposed to the NIO for Near 

South-Asia orj^^^^^^Hoffice? 

20 A Well Charlie Allen's a man who fills a vacuum... I mean he 

21 was still in terrorism quite legitimately and ...terrorism, Iran 

22 was certainly a country that had been involved in state-supported 

23 terrorism, and so I wouldn't have found it unnatural that Charlie 

24 was sort of in his way dug up a lot of facts about Iran or 

25 in the process of preparing 

26 Q Clarridge was out of the country on the 5th of December 



652 



yNCUSSIFIEIl 



72 

1 which Is why his deputy attended this meeting. So was Mr. Casey. 

2 Do you know If they were out of the country at the same location? 

3 A No, I don't recall 

4 Q Mr. McFarlane and Colonel North met with Mr. Ghorbanlfar In 

5 London Immediately after the meeting of December 7th. Did you 

6 know that was taking place at the time It took place? 

7 A Not at the time It took place. 

8 Q When would you have learned that? 

9 A I think I heard about that, I learned, in fact I learned 

10 more about what had gone on from Michael Ledeen's revelations to 

11 ^^^^^^^^^V-'^ their first meeting that I had known. I mean that 

12 provided then a very good framework for all these facts. I 

13 learned it all from Ledeen. Ledeen told^^^ftll that 3 or 4 

14 days before Christmas, including the fact that he had been in 

15 touch with Ghorbanlfar and Ledeen was the promoter for 

16 Ghorbanlfar. 

17 Now let roe show you Mr. Allen's memo dated December 18, 

18 1986, of his meeting with Mr. Ledeen on December 4. Did I say 

19 December 18, 1986? December 18, 1985, of his meeting on 

20 December 4, 1985 with Mr. Ledeen. Ask you to look at It and tell 

21 me if you've ever seen that meroorandun before. 

22 A Probably did see this. I can't say for sure, but I think it 

23 was you know when Ledeen had proposed the day they had this scam 

24 it might work against Khadd afl, and which was a cockamamle sort 

thing, a sting operatlon^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand 

26 lOiaddafi, and even Khaddafl isn't dumb enough to fall for It a 



UNCUSSIFIED 



653 




^^■:^ 



73 

1 second, well he might, but not a bird (laughter) so I heard about 

2 that and it was about this time that either Claire or Clair* and 

3 Casey, or maybe just Casey, I don't remember talking to us about 

4 taking a look at this guy Ghorbanifar 's information well first 

5 talking to Ledeen and leaving Ghorbanifar. Because we had bad 

6 experiences with us; he sure had and so I may have in the course 

7 of being briefed on here's the situation, I may have been handed 

8 this memo. I don't recall it. But I'm certainly fauniliar with 

9 most of the facts in this. Yeah. Either out of here or from 

10 Ledeen 's conversation with 

11 Q Has that document been marked? I don't think so. Let's 

12 have it back and mark it. 

13 A (Mumbling, typist can't distinguislij 

14 Q Memorandum does make reference to a 1984 effort by Ledeen to 

15 get McFarlane to open up contact with Iran. Did you have any 

16 knowledge of the 1984 effort that McFarlane made to open contact 

17 with Iran? 

18 A No. 

19 Q Did you ever explore that point either with Mr. Allen, Mr. 

20 Clarridge, or someone else who had talked with Mr. Ledeen? 

21 A No, no I don't think I did. 

22 Q Reference to that memorandum to one of the schemes, which is 

23 a suggestion by Ledeen as we read etbout Mr. Allen. That had been 

24 discussed with Colonel North. Did you have occasion to discuss 

25 these matters with Colonel North in the early December period 

26 times? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



654 



UNCLASSIFIED 



74 



1 A No, No. 

2 Q Indicated in terms of Mr. Ghorbanifar, as I understood your 

3 testimony, you knew of the situation that occurred in June/July 

4 when the initiative came in You became aware 

5 of Ghorbanifar again in December I take it. 

6 A I think before then. 
7 




655 



UNClASSIFiED 



lElASSM 



656 



^■'^^^^c^ 




Q Let me stop you. Were you told that your White House 

contact was to be Colonel North? How'd you know that North was 

the guy tc 

A I think the requirement came from North. 

Q From North? 

A Yes, I think so. 

Q Did you actually meet with North on this requirement? 

A I don't rem«nber whether I did not. 

Q Did you pass this assignment to^^^^^^o carry out? Is 

that the way it 




USSIFJED 



657 



K?W^ ]¥ 



HEOv^r mfrn^f^ 




Do you recall any direction being given to^^^^^^^^or 

anybody else to commuicate this information back to Colonel 

North? 

A About what? 

Q That Nanucher Ghorbanifar had been subject to a burn notice 

and was known to the CIA as a fabricator? A fabricator? 



OllASSIFlEO 



658 



UNCLASSIFIED 



78 

1 A I don't recall that. I don't recall that. 

2 Q Do you recall this matter coming to the attention of 

3 Mr. Juchniewlcz? 

4 A No. 

5 Q Do you have any recollection of Juchniewicz callin'3 

6 in and giving^^^^^Bthe assignment of advising Colonel North as 

7 to the background of Manucher Ghorbanifar? 

8 A No, it's quite possible. 

9 Q Do you know if^^^^^Hever did that when he carried out the 

10 assignment, told Colonel North about the background of Manucher 

11 Ghorbanifar? 

12 A Right at this time, I don't know. I know that Colonel North 

13 by mid-December certainly knew the background of Manucher 

14 Ghorbanifar; no question about that. 

15 Q How about in early November? 

16 A I don't know, I don't recall that. It's possible, but I 

17 don't recall that. The trace or check on Ghorbanifar would turn 

18 up the burn notice, and would have earlier. 

19 Q One of the concerns I have is Mr. McFarlane, as you probably 

20 know, from the Tower Report, professes not to have known Manucher 

21 Ghorbanifar from an Edsel, so sometime in December 1985; do you 

22 know of this information being passed on to the NSC, to McFarlane 

23 before December 1985? 

24 A I don't know. As you mentioned earlier in the preceding 

25 summer when Hashemi came up with^^^^^^^HManucher thing. I 

26 think its quite possible that North was told about it, but I 



ICII^^SIFIEO 



659 



ddinlu 



1 don't know the specifics. 

2 The deposition adjourned at 12:45 p.m. 



iinmim 



Q 



660 



A^sociAit DDO 



' •■ \:fr.." ■' 17 June 1985 'f '•:'■: • 



MEMORANDUM FOR: "Chief. Nev East Division, 00 
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence 

SUBJECT:- Release of Hostages 



2. Shaheen received a call from a Or. Cyrus Hashemi who 1$ currently 
in Hamburg at the Hilton Hotel in Room 703. Hashemi has tried to get In 
touch with us before offering to put us in touch with leading figures In 

the Iranian Government. When we learned that Hashemi is under investigation 
for violations of export control laws, we pulled away. 

3. His recent call to Shahaen offered a change in Iranian policy (or 
infqrmation about a change in policy) "that he could provide J^ the 
American Government would be able to get him a nolle prosequi -- in short, 
if we are able to take the pending indictment for conviction off his back. 
Shaheen said that he had no power to do that but then asked whether Hasheni's 
contacts with the Iranian government were good enough to spring the hostages 
if he could be gotten off the hook. Shaheen did this knowing that there 
have been occasions where nolle prosequis had been arranged for high 
national security considerations. What he was doing was feeling out 
Hashemi to see what kind of a reaction he would get. Hashemi said he would 
call bacl^n^i^tw^^^r^^ja^back on the phone having, he said, lalked 

.Xo_th^H|HIH^HBH^^|^H He came back for the release of 

the DAWA hostages, plus TOW weapons, plus his nolle prosequi. Shaheen 
dismissed this saying no weapons, no DAWA prisoners. Then again, to feel 
him out, said, although I can't speak for the US Government, I understand 
that it will not negotiate with terrorists, and vou mioht 
j1 ies or soffethinq like 
Again /j/asneai saio ne would check ar 
thin a^ Cupie or nours claim ing that he had talked aoain to^ ^ 
ind that they weren't interested in Itanirt TOdltJl suppT 
representative from Tehran! 




■■i Fw-»i.» t .H.''-W B lWAaJ.U ' l ' lJJB 



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fier>H fl_t Mn jaihea Shekeleh (no further id*nt1f1c*t1on) to conUct 
thelraniansbn tfm. Shaheen claims that he has nadt It clear that he 
can't do It for anything, tha^h^J^QX4rm|fl^oew»o^eal with terrorists! 

there a ''i^^t ^ "9lH^^H|mHHHHHHa0th i ng at 
could be agreed upon in advan^^^^^ff ^«o<n^D^T^t^tn^Tranians to 

thedHIB*'^^^ ^'^ offtr whic^^^HBB|^i[^HI||^^H|inight 
be able to work out. 



-? 



6. This should probably be taken up witi] 
it is ready under the circumstances to see^ 

^^ would be willing t^^sten to whatever proposition tne Iranians aiign 

III iiiliiil III liii|liii|^^Mfrr a ta hStfefl^ o wnaWii' surrounding information 
might be a'TaTTacT?^^^ T: 

7. I ran into Rick Burt last night and discuss this with him. He 
thought that it was interesting and indicated that there had been recent 
knowledge that a nolle prosequi had been arranged and said he would talk 
to Dick Hurphv about it. I think jjt might touch base with the Assistant 
secretary or ^tate tor international. Organizations ^s well as with Kurohy and 
in doing so t ell Dick about Burt's reaction . I suggest that he raignt want to 
check with Burt. "~ 



William J. Casey 



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. aftian fe« aatasa tta «.*») ■■* wm 4m wa «aM %m tato a^r 
i*iA al^« fg^imiim Ma«lM'» aaM a«alMt kirn. 



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CIIN N C-_11^ TITLE J ohn Mc'lalion's note pad Reference fo.J^ember_ 5._lQa:._ 

approval o": Findiag' related to ".SC nroiect. 



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; rece.T-er 19£; "^"- "■"'iii,^"--- ^°^'^ ^' HcMahcn's Cffice with then Dc:, 3ob 



rhe CDCI requested tacts on t^.e following by the next day: 




-Was It tru« that Iran ^o trying t 
to '<noclc Otftr Soviet t8««^fttlfftr»tt 

--The status of the Iran/Iraq war, i.-.cludinq a prognosis 
of whit «3<;}5 might do and a table reflecting an order of 
battle for each side. 



ODCI noted that he vould be attending a iieeting at 10:00 AM on 
•atjrday, 7 ^ece.Tber, with t'e President recarding the expansion of the 
nfcf.Tial lirA bet-een the Iranians and the Isnslis; 

--He noted that a new 'private interlocutor' was worVing 
with Israeli Foreign Ministry Official David Kimche; 

^ --Koted that Iran wanted to get closer to the United States 

and wondered (CDCI) whether this could be a ruse to get 
Hawk xissiles. 



° DDCI noted that Saturday's .-neeting would take stock of the two-t:ack 
rcgra.-n new uncer-ay: one to free th« J)^jt0ges «i)d^ t^ oihec to »x?ar.d our 
ies wich Iran. Xeetirigs were planned In ■Geneva bet^^^fl h\* Uniteid States a 

ran in the short ter-. ■* ' "^ '' ' fi----'- 



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""^■"* ri**« lo*d ^ad i..n s«nt to iht Irann.-u on "" 

--r-:v«t Sctth was to ^*t to Icr.con -,^.4t .^sKtnd 
■ if i:ic-j$iic-s; :^» follc-irj wte< ;-.» vai 

e:t*r,ci.-.g jp to f;v« rli,-.e loads, inclj.ii.ig 
747»; 



--?resii»nt sig.-.ed the finding; C 1- o.vm. ->o-V o,«>*»<»^>» -'^» 

Clivsr r:cc:?i vas lining jp th« planes; -e don't 
■«ncw how. 

In response to a .question aicutaclsarance foe t;-.« landing 
rights, soxecne noted ^^'^':ESHHH|B''er« standing by; 

A question was raised regarding a plane goi ng to Iran froia 

Jerusalex ar.d oossiblv stooping in Texa s : 




iev oi t»:*nt Iranian reporting noted the foUcwingi 

--No real opposition that we could capitalize on; 

--Khon^^jini s«e-ed to ;e in better health; 

--The econcnic situation was deteriorating; 

--The possibility of a new .T.ajot offensive could 
stimulate opposition within Iran; 

— Key players were Xi.nche and the private J.S. citize 
intetlocjtor. 




estedany intelliaence coverac 



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670 



lizt iss .•.^::T: * "hjs I i«i .ro.-.«y i;»r.i to continue 
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ORIGINAL 

Stenographic Transcript of 
HL^NGS 



Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILI^Y ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE MICARAGUAN^PPOSlflON 



UNITED STATES SENATE 

DEPOSITION OF JA>fES A. BAKER, III 

Monday, June 22, 1987 ^ 



j^niierp:Ovis::n<! of E.U. !2^5o 
^y 9K ■'^ai'Qilii of curit; Council 



i 1 W^ii 



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(202) 623-9300 
20 F STREET, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 200 01 






672 



UNWSIFe 



1 DEPOSITION OF JAMES A. BAKER, III 

2 Monday, June 22, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Deposition of JAMES A. BAKER, III, called as a 

9 witness by counsel for the Select Committee, at the 

10 offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate 

11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 9:31 

12 a.m., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN 

13 SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of 

14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask 

15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her 

16 direction. 
17 



UNGUSSIFIED 



673 



*-©//?£// 



1 


appeara::ces: 


2 


On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 


3 


Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 


4 


Opposition: 


5 


TERRY SMILJANICH. ESQ. 


6 


On behalf of the witness: 


7 


C. DEAN MC GRATH, ESQ. 


8 


Associate Counsel to the President 


9 


ED WILSON 


10 
11 


MICHAEL SMITH 



UNCLASSIFIED 



82-690 0-88-23 



674 



IINCUSSIflEO 



^ CONTENTS 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 
"^"^"^ SENATE 

4 James A. Baker, III 

5 By Mr. Smiljanich 4 
^ EXHIBITS 

7 BAKER EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

8 1 

11 

9 



UNfiUSSIFiED 



675 



UNCUSSIHED 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 JAMES A. BAKER, III, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE 

8 BV MR. SMILJANICH: 

9 Q Mr. Secretary, you are currently the Secretary 

10 of the Treasury; is that correct? 

11 A • Right. 

12 Q And you have served as Secretary of the 

13 Treasury since when? 

14 A Since roughly February 3, 1985. 

15 Q And prior to that you served as Chief of Staff 

16 to the President? 

17 A That's correct, from January 20, 1981. 

18 Q Up to the time you were confirmed as Secretary 

19 of the Treasury? 

20 A Up to the February 3 date, if I'm not 

21 mistaken. It may have been February 1, but I think it 

22 was February 3. 

23 Q During the late summer of 1981 when you were 

24 serving as Chief of Staff did you become aware of a 

25 specific program^ whij^h was^j 

IsilKkr^ 




676 




A I don't have any specific recollection of 
that, although it might well have come up in connection 
with a meeting I attended, but I don't specifically 
recall it today. 

Q Putting aside the name of the operation for a 
minute, -do you recall any such activity at that time or 
discussions concerning the possibility °^^^^^^^^^^^| 



A I don't have a specific recollection of any 
such discussions. 

Q Pursuant to that program sometime in either 
late 1983 or early 1984 ti 




Did you have any knowledge 
of those matters? 

A As we sit here today I don't have any specific 
recollection of that, but, as I said, I attended most NSC 
meetings and of course I attended morning briefings with 



yiffiussifo 



677 



mmmiB 



1 the President, and I can't tell you that the matter was 

2 not discussed in a meeting that I attended. I don't 

3 recall it. 

4 Q In the summer of 1984 there is some indication 

5 that there was an NSPG meeting at which the possibility 

6 of third country solicitation was discussed in connection 

7 with the Nicaraguan resistance. Do you recall an NSPG 

8 meeting at or about that time in which that topic was 

9 discussed? 

10 A I recall an NSPG meeting which I thought was 

11 in the fall of '84, which was held before the Boland 

12 Amendment became effective to discuss the possibility of 

13 third country funding for the contras. 

14 Q And who do you recall being present 

15 specifically at that meeting? 

16 A Well, I specifically recall that Mr. McFarlane 

17 chaired the meeting as the National Security Advisor. 

18 The President was in attendance. The Secretary of State 

19 was there. And those are the only people that I 

20 specifically recall being there, although — well, those 

21 are the only people I specifically recall being there. 

22 Q Do you recall that the possibility of third 

23 country funding was the primary focus on that NSPG 

24 meeting? 

25 A As I recall it, it was. 



UNCIJSSSIFIED 



678 



UNWSIFIED 



1 Q This was a full-fledged NSPG meeting and 

2 discussion of the matter? 

3 A Yes, it was. 

4 Q Do you recall whether or not any action was 

5 taken pursuant to that discussion? 

6 A I do not believe any action was taken. 

7 Q Do you recall the question of the legality of 

8 such third country solicitation being discussed? 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q What was your position at that time with 

11 regard to the legality of the matter? 

12 A My view was that we should take a very close 

13 look at that question and I so stated in the meeting. 

14 And it was my view that we could not do indirectly what 

15 we could not do directly. My recollection is that a 

16 similar reservation was expressed by Secretary Shultz, 

17 that the meeting generally concluded with a decision to 

18 take a hard look at the legality of third country 

19 solicitations. ;jg^ . 

20 Q Do you recall what the position of Mr. 

21 McFarlane was? 

22 A Well^^p&infc-^^^c^r*^n^^rfic«ted at^ one 
2 3 point that tffft'^C^g^nsie^Fsd t^fe^rgucR^^.j M pj p '^'i 

24 were le'ga\ but , :^^ rei^^l^^^<aS9<I^^^^B»w ;^ *hat 

25 before ther«Pwa*'^^^«(^t5^i*ct ion there should be 



UNCOSSIFIED 



679 



UNCLIiSSIFe 



1 another scrub on that qviesfeiSs. "■- ^- -. 

2 Q. ^iUiM it daffided thatj^e Attorn^Tfisn^^l ^=;._~ 
specifically should take a ^^^''^^^'^fth'T**'*^**^ ^»"*»««- 



3 

4 matter? 



5 A I can't ■?Wa 11 that^«nd f rankty^ I don'tjgp» ^~ 

6 recall whether the SCtorney General was in attendance at -^ 

7 this particulir^jaeetiBg. J^ ^ 

8 Q Do you.xecall whether »j r ' jwjt th» cldlwr^ook 

9 at the Sltua^en was going tcr jep-^one by tit* i^orney 

10 Genera%^8 of fice as of^sed to NSC^L^^L^bulWiJ^I^- T^w J 

11 r* • ^f-: really don >^^ncatl^ut-_it would h^^ ij»>»T- i 

12 guess that it wSE^ pi^^bly hajlfm 1 liJj^^^OJpMj JiT)' "^ 

13 Gener^j^ sinc^j^Ui^tsly «h»^to]^ij|^lfeiq^l^^twi to 

14 pass on thoat^K^rot aStl^m^B. ^W^ - -1 .--- .^ 36 

15 Q I had- indicated to yod^irt^e ago thaS^the ' aa 

16 notes of Chai9.^-Hill, i^o wdgsecr»€arj^a|gij^8 jaecial 

17 assis^n^aj^^aatbiVe^^PisttfBr, ^Af a a tji that in^ -r--^-' r 

18 discussion he had with Secretary Shultz on June 28, 1984, 

19 Secretary Shultz told him that at a recent NSPG meeting 

20 he had had some reservations about the legalities of 

21 third country solicitation and stated that your position 

22 at the time was "Jim Baker thinks it's an impeachable 

23 offense." 

24 Do you recall having any specific opinion like 

25 that or such as that' 



imSSIFIED 



680 



uiM^ro 



1 A No, I don't recall using that language or 

2 having a specific opinion such as that, although I do, as 

3 I have stated, recall feeling that we should take a very 

4 close look at the question of legality and feeling that 

5 we could not do indirectly what we couldn't do directly. 

6 Q Would it be fair to say that your position at 

7 that time was that there was, in your opinion, a very 

8 good chance that such activity would be illegal under the 

9 current state of the law? 

10 A Well, I hadn't examined the law and I was not 

11 in a position to pass judgment on it, but I felt that it 

12 was important that it be looked at carefully and that it 

13 was important, quite frankly, from a political standpoint 

14 as well in terms of public support and that sort of 

15 thing. 

16 Q Did you have, at that time — let me just ask 

17 you what was your position with regard to the policy of 

18 third country solicitation, putting aside the legality of 

19 it for a moment? Did you have an opinion? 

20 A Well, I strongly supported the contra — did 

21 and do strongly support the contra effort. I did not 

22 really have a specific opinion with respect to the 

23 question of third country solicitation as long as there 

24 was no question of illegality apart from the public 

25 relations and public support and Congressional support 



UNCLASSIFIED 



681 



imanssw 



10 



1 aspect. 

2 Q Do you recall whether or not the President had 

3 or expressed an opinion at that meeting about either the 

4 policy or the legality of third country solicitation? 

5 A I don't recall whether the President expressed 

6 an opinion, but the meeting, as I indicated earlier, I 

7 think ended in a decision to take a close look at the 

8 question of the legality of third country solicitations. 

9 Q I've shown you earlier minutes of an NSPG 

10 meeting for May 16, 1986, during which time the subject 

11 was again discussed. Do you recall that particular NSPG 

12 meeting at which you were in attendance? 

13 A Well, I do now that I've seen the minutes. 

14 Q And at that meeting some further discussion 

15 was held about the possibility of approaching third 

16 countries for support for the contras; is that correct? 

17 A That's correct. 

18 Q At that point there was a change in the law 

19 with regard to whether or not such activity was 

20 specifically addressed as being appropriate or not by 

21 Congress; is that correct? 

22 A That's correct. Evidently Congress 

23 specifically provided for third country solicitation for 

24 humanitarian assistance. 

25 Q Having read the minutes, did you recall 



mtmmw 



682 



UNCUSSIFIED 



11 



1 anything beyond what's contained in the minutes with 

2 regard to the positions of the various people in 

3 attendance on that issue? 

4 A No. 

5 Q What was your position on that matter at that 

6 time? 

7 A Well, to be very honest with you, I'd have to 

8 reconstruct my position from the minutes, and my position 

9 was that it was important that we do what we could to 

10 sustain the contras as a viable force during the 

11 implementation of any Contadora agreement, and I see here 

12 where I said that it would appear that Congress had 

13 changed the law with respect to the question of our 

14 approaching other governments for assistance. 

15 MR. MC GRATH: At this point it might be 

16 appropriate to mark the minutes as an Exhibit. 

17 MR. SMILJANICH: Sure, why don't we do that? 

18 (The document referred to was 

19 marked Baker Exhibit Number 1 

20 for identification.) 

21 BY MR. SMILJANICH: (Resuming) 

22 Q Mr. Secretary, Assistant Secretary Elliott 

23 Abrams has referred to this whole subject of third 

24 country solicitation as "tin cup diplomacy", and I 

25 believe Secretary Shultz has also expressed a general 



UNMSIFIED 



683 



UNfliSSIFIED 



12 



dislike Cor this as a policy matter. Did you have any 
opinions one way or another with regard to the overall 
policy concerning third country solicitation? 

A No. I suppose my view would comport with 
theirs, that it would be far better for the policy to be 
supported by the legislative branch of government and for 
the funding to come from appropriations. 

Q Did you have or do you have at this time an 
opinion with regard to whether or not third country 
solicitations will always give rise to a question of quid 
pro quos.in connection with any contributions? 

A I didn't have an opinion then. I was not 
really involved in the business of third country 
solicitations. That wasn't my responsibility, and I 
didn't do any of it. 

Q Okay. In the summer of 1984 the evidence is • 
that money began to arrive on behalf of the contras from 
^^^^1 sources . Did you have any knowledge, starting in 
the summer of 1984, that^^^^^^^^were making any 
contributions directly for the contra effort? 

A None that I can recall. 




684 



9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q When the matter of third country solicitation 
was discussed in either the summer or fall of 1984 do you 
recall or were you aware of any other planning to prepare 
for the impending cutoff of aid for the contras via the 
Boland II amendment? 

A I don't recall being aware of any. I just 
simply don't recall it. I can't tell you that there were 
not discussions involving private assistance and that 



yWtSSSIFIED 



685 



mumm 



14 



1 sort of thing, but I don't recall those and I didn't, the 

2 best I recollect, attend any meetings called for that 

3 purpose. 

4 Q Do you recall any discussions concerning the 

5 involvement of the National Security Council staff on 

6 behalf of the contras to fill the breach created by the 

7 cutoff of funds to the CIA and Department of Defense? 

8 A No. The only thing I recall involving the 

9 National Security Council staff would be the public 

10 liaison activities where we would have briefings in the 

11 Executive Office Building designed to build public 

12 support for the contra policy. Those went back to, I 

13 would imagine, the end of '82, start of '83. And those 

14 were held by the public liaison people in the White 

15 House, not the National Security Council, but they would 

16 have National Security Council staffers brief 

17 occasionally the diplomatic and military situation. 

18 Q But this was all in connection with a public 

19 diplomacy — 

20 A Public diplomacy effort. It was basically run 

21 by Faith Whittlesey's shop in the White House. 

22 Q Okay, one last area. .-"Were you aware during 

23 your tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, starting in the 

24 spring or summer of 1985, up- through November of 1986, of 

25 any activities on behalf of the United States which have 



ummiED 



686 



UNCUSSIFIED 



15 



1 come to be Jcnown as the Iran initiative — in other 

2 words, the whole matter involving trading of TOW missiles 

3 or HAWK spare parts to Iran in an attempt to get our 

4 hostages in Lebanon released? 

5 A No. 

6 Q Anything with regard to our cooperation with 

7 the government of Israel in connection with this 

8 provision of military supplies or equipment to Iran in 

9 connection with getting our hostages released in Lebanon? 

10 A During 1985 and '86? 

11 Q • In '85 and '86 specifically. 

12 A Not that I recall, no. 

13 Q You had no knowledge or awareness of the 

14 matters which have come to be known as the Iran arms-for- 

15 hostage deal? You had no knowledge of it at the time? 

16 A I had no knowledge. I had no knowledge of any 

17 dealing with Iran of arms for the release of our 

18 hostages, no. 

19 Q What about dealing in arms with Iran in 

20 connection with the opening up of a new strategic 

21 relationship with Iran? 

22 A No. 

23 Q You were not aware of Mr. McFarlane's visit to 

24 Tehran in May of 1986? 

25 A No, I was not. 



OttCtJtSSIFlEO 



687 



UNCLASSIFIED 



16 



1 MR. SMILJANICH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

2 That's all the questions I have. 

3 MR. MC GRATH: I would just like to let the 

4 record reflect that the Secretary appeared here 

5 voluntarily today to cooperate with the Committee and its 

6 investigation and that these proceedings will be 

7 classified at a rainimum of the Top Secret level. We 

8 appreciate the Committee's assistance. 

9 MR. SMILJANICH: And we appreciate the 

10 Secretary's cooperation in this matter. 

11 (Whereupon, at 9:50 a.m., the taking of the 

12 instant deposition ceased.) 
13 



14 Signature of the witness 

15 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 

16 , 1987. 

17 



18 Notary Public 

19 My Commission Expires: 



mmim 



688 



UNCUSSIFIEO 

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ippears in "ha rsregomg .epos: 



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ca.cen by ae ro :he best of my ability ana charea: 
mdar ny iireccion; thac said deposition is a true ra:or: 
givsn Dv said witness; thac I aa neither counsel :or, r. 
eoiploved by any of the parties to the action in wnich th: 
was ta*en, and further that I am not a relative or anplo; 



witness ■-■ a 3 

ced to ::'?e-. 
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ateu to, -. 0: 
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. oami ss ion exp ir 



NOTARY ?':3LIC [ 



es:_9^jSl± 



UNCLASSIFIED 



689 










f|05 



690 



TRANSCRIPT ""^-^^e; 
OF PKQCEEDCJJGS 




UNITED STATES SENATE 
SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

DEPOSITION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BARBULE5 



■^^^cuss/n© 



Partially Declassified/Released on 1-4-^' 
under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by N. Wenan. National Security Council 



Washington, D.C. 
Tuesday, September 22, 1987 



UNCLASSIFIED ~ 



Ace-Federal R eport ers, Lnc. 

SftfTKjfypf Wtpfwtfn 



■m North C^tol Street 

Washington, D.C. 20001 

(202) 347-37D0 



IStalioawidtCovci^i 
WaI* jJO" oo4o _ 

SECREtr "«'«:=^^-^^«-^ 



691 



TRANSCRIPT 
OF PRQaEEDINGS 




UNITED STATES SENATE 
SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

DEPOSITION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BARBULES 



Washington, D.C. 
Tuesday, September 22, 1987 



Partially Declassified/Released on 



under provisions of E 0. 12356 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



Ace-Federal Reporters, Lnic. 

Sifftotypt /vportprs 
444 North CapitDl Serm 
Washington. D.C. 20001 

(202) 347-3700 
Nation wi«k Cowiagc 

800-336-6646 

Miy^iiFipn 



692 

UNULAbbiritU 

SECRET 

UNITED STATES SENATE 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



DEPOSITION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BURBULES 



Washington, D.C. 

Tuesday, September 22, 1987 

Deposition of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BURBULES, 

called for examination at the offices of the Senate Select 

Committee, Suite 901, the Hart Senate Office Building, at 

9:45 a.m., before LOUIS P. WAIBEL, a Notary Public within 

and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf 

of the respective parties: 

JOHN SAXON, Esq. 
Associate Counsel 
United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret 

Military Assistance to Iran 

and the Nicaraguan Opposition. 

ROBERT W, GENZMAN, Esq. 
Associate Minority Counsel 
ROGER LEE KREUZER, 
Investigator 

United States House of 

Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 



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UNGUtSSIHtD 



12356 
3tional Security Council 



j/Released on 
'3v::ions of E.O. 12356 



693 



uNci^sm 



COLONEL JOHN K. WALLACE, 
Office of the Secretary 
Headquarters, 
Department of the Army 



III, Esq. 



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CONTENT 



Lieutenant General Peter G. Burbules 
By Mr. Saxon 



EXAMINATION 





EXHIBITS 




BURBULES EXHIBITS 




IDENTIFIED 


Exhibit 1 




12 


Exhibit 2 




15 


Exhibit 3 




17 


Exhibit 4 




17 


Exhibit 5 




2C 



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UlU^ffiED 



PROCEEDINGS 

li Whereupon, 

i' 

PETER G. BURBULES 

was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 

was examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Will you state your name for the record, please, 
sir. 

A Peter George Burbules, Lieutenant General, 
United States Army. 

Q And what is your current position. General 
Burbules? 

A Deputy Comaanding General for Material Readiness, 
United States Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia. 

Q And when did you assume your position at the 
Army Materiel Command? 

A I assumed my position, I believe, on the 1st of 
June 1985. 

Q *86? 

A Yes, '86. Yes, you're right. 

Q And prior to that, sir, what was your position? 



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A I was Commanding General, Missile Command, 
Huntsville, Alabama, Redstone Arsenal. 

Q And what were your dates of service at MICOM, 
if you recall? 

A It's approximately from May of '85 to late May 
1986. 

Q Sir, as you know, the area of our inquiry that 
concerns you has to do with the shipments to TOW missiles 
that took place from Anniston Army Depot through MICOM in 
1986. There were three shipments. The first shipment took 
place in February, while you were still at MICOM; the second 
shipment was taking place about the time you were leaving, 
and the third shipment took place in November, after you 
were in your current position at AMC. 

Then the HAWK shipment tasking caune down in 
early April and was being worked through the month of April 
of 1986. 

Those will be the two things we will focus on. 
In a previous meeting with you on June 2, 1987, 
Roger Kreuzer, a House Staff Investigator, and I met with 
you. We covered a fair amount of ground which we have put 
in an interview memorandum which is available for subsequent 



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readers of this deposition, so I'm not going to take the 
time to cover all of the material in that memorandum, and 
that was the subject of our earlier discussion, where you 
were, on what day and who said what to whom. 

In terms of the general picture, what we want 
to do, specifically, is to focus on the pricing questions 
which attended the first TOW shipment and then some questions 
about the HAWKS. 

Let me ask you, sir, when you became aware that 
there was a tasking to MICOM to ship TOW missiles to, at 
the time its customer was CIA. 

A As I mentioned to you before, I became aware when 
colonel Jim Lincoln, Project Manager for the TOW missile 
system, came in my office and told me that there was a 
classified movement under way and that he had concerns about 
the price that was to be charged on it. He felt that the 
Army was going to charge too low of a price, and I believe 
he asked my advice and asked for my support. 

Q All right. Let me fill in one or two things, 
sir. 

When he came to you, this was after he had 
already received the requirement and had begun work; is that 



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correct? 

A Apparently so. How long after, I don't know. 

Q And in fact. Colonel Lincoln had been told by 
his point of contact here in Washington, at DA Headquarters, 
that he should not inform you; is that correct, sir? 

A I found that out very late. As a matter of fact, 
earlier this year, 1987. 

Q So, while in a technical sense. Colonel Lincoln 
may have been countermanding the instructions he was given, 
he had some concerns and, as his commanding officer, he 
went to you with those concerns? 

A Yes. Apparently that's why I ws brought into 
it so late, because of that caution not to, you know, it 
was highly classified, not to tell anybody, which I have 
learned since. 

Q All right, sir. 

When he came to you, did Colonel Lincoln give 
you the specifics of the price question that he was concerned 
about? 

A No. Only words to the effect that they're asking 
us to charge the older price for the missile, whereas the 
cost to replacing them currently with new missiles would be 



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much more, and the Army would end up with fewer missiles in 
the stockpile. 

Q So as best as you recall it, the entire subject 
for your discussion with Colonel Lincoln had to do with 
replacement price? 

A Right. 

Q And for the record, the Army sold to the CIA and 
subsequently to the Iranians, basic TOW missiles, which were 
entered in the Army Master Data File or AMDF, at a price 
of $3169. They had to have safety modifications, the 
missile ordnance inhibitor circuit or MOIC — M-0 I C — ' 
in order to bring them up to the condition code alpha, which 
had been specified by the CIA. 

Unbeknownst to certain parties involving these 
transactions, when the Army realized, in the early '80s, 
that certain of its basic TOWs had to have the safety 
modification, MICOM officials created a new national stock 
number and a new price for the basic TOW that went into the 
AMDF, which had a MOIC 

Rather than taking $3169 and adding $300 and getting 
$3469, which seeins logical to do, the decision was made, as 
we have subsequently learned, to add to the entry price of 



UNEUISSIFIED 



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- It 



S3169, some inflation in the price for the subsequent 
purchase of basic TOWS, along with one other factor, having 
jl an eye to the cost of conversion, the cost of the MOIC, in 
order to create a higher price for the basic TOW with MOIC 
of $8435. And the price of $8435 is separate and distinct 
from the replacement cost of selling a basic TOW and 
replacing it with, say, TOW-II, at a price of $11,000. 

So if you will follow that analysis, let me ask 
this question: 

When Colonel Lincoln came to you, as I understand 
your testimony, he was saying, we're selling basic TOWS. 
We're getting" — he may not have said $3469 or $3500 -- but 
"we're getting a price in the low range. We're going to have 
to replace them with I-TOW or TOW-II, and that costs a lot 
more . " 

Is that the way he put it to you? 
A Yes. Did not discuss any specific dollars. 
Didn't get into those details. Just the basic concept of 
original acquisition costs versus replacement costs. 

Q Just to make sure, then, that we understand 
your testimony for the record, he did not talk about the 
fact that there had been a discovery of a second price for 



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the basic TOW with MOIC? 

A No, he did not. 

Q All right, sir. 

And if I understand your testimony, at no time 
when Colonel Lincoln came to you in his discussion, were 
specific price amounts discussed. 
Is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Did you have a general knowledge at the time of 
these transactions and at the time you had a discussion with 
Colonel Lincoln, that when the Army took a basic TOW and put 
the MOIC on it, that that changed its national stock number 
and gave it a new and higher price? 

A No, I did not know that. Nor, as I testified to 
you before, did I know anything about a MOIC, in that I'm not 
a missile expert. I was sent down there to assist in their 
procurement programs, and I did not know the details of those 
missile systems. 

Q All right, sir. 

I want to ask you. for an opinion, and I clearly 
denominate this question as an opinion question. 

In your opinion, from the time you spent at MICOM 



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jl and the many years of service in the Army, should someone who 

i! 

, was in a position of being the Project Manager for the TOW 

■Office have been familiar with the details of pricing of the 
missiles under his control, or are those the kind of details 

I that people working for him would better be expected to know? 

|| A People working for him better understand that, 
because you have to understand the Project Manager as generally 
a very small office, and he is supported more or less by the 
large Commodity Command, the major support command, and all 
the staff. there, and they're the ones that provide the 
expertise. 

For example, he does not have item managers under 
his control. They work for the Material Management 
Directorate. He doesn't have any lawyers under his control. 
They work with the Legal Department. He doesn't have quality 
assurance specialists, except maybe just one representative. 
Those work for the Quality Assurance Directorate. So he 
draws his support fran the major Support Command and deals 
mainly with programmatic issues, you know, costs, scheduling, 
and technical performance in a broader sense, leaving the 
details to experts in that area. And it's a very complex 
business, as you found out, and just think, it would be 



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|i unreasonable to expect the Project Manager to know the details 
^ of the individual costs of individual parts of his weapons. 
|, Q What I would like to do now. General, is to show 
jjyou a few of the documents that create a paper trail on the 
TOW transfers. I have no reason, necessarily, to expect that 
you have ever seen these and, in fact, if you haven't, that 
would not only not surprise us, but probably, given your level, 
would make perfectly good sense that you have never seen them. 

What I would like to do is have marked as 
Deposition Exhibit 1, and give that to you and give you a 
chance to look at it, but before you do, let me tell you what 
you're looking at. You are looking at the Material Release 
Order or MRO, as it's called, which is a standard MICOM form, 
that was prepared for each of the three coshipments, and I'll 
give you a moment to glance at that. 

(Burbules Deposition Exhibit 1 
identified.) 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I think I can answer your 
question now. I did not see these while I was at the Missile 
Command. I did not see them in any aspect of my involvement 
in this affair. I think I saw them when Mr. Mike Sandusky, 
of our headquarters, was doing his investigation, his 



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after-the-fact inves\:.i.gation. He tried to assist the 
Department of Army Inspector General and ourselves in 
reconstructing the cost history. I think he may have flashed 
these by me in showing me how he was reconstructing the price 
history. This is all after-the-fact. 

Q What I would like you do is take a look at, while 
some of this material is second and third and fourth 
generation copies and some things are blurred, if you would 
look at the quantity block of the 1000 that lets us know we're 
looking at the first shipment. 

If you look at the National Stock Number block, 
the last four digits which are 1512, your specialist at MICOM 
will tell you that 1512 — that's how they refer to it — is 
the shorthand form for the basic TOW with the MOIC. Then if 
you look at the unit price that's been entered at $8435, this 
is the first document that was created when the tasking came 
down from Washington to MICOM. This document was the basic 
release order in order for Anniston Army Depot to begin work, 
and the information on it was flown down from Redstone to 
Anniston Army Depot, and I understand a hard copy followed. 

If you turn the page to the second copy, this is 
dated 16 May, for the second shipment of 508 TOWS, and 



UNE»SSinED 



705 



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I likewise, the S8435 price appears therein. 



The last page is for the third shipment of 500 
TOWS, and it has a price of $8164, which is different from the 
$8435, because of the I-TOW conversion that was done, and that 
shipment took place after you were gone. But the point from 
these documents is that someone at MICOM, working in the TOW 
Project Office, who prepared this Material Release Order 
clearly knew that a basic TOW with MOIC cost $8435. 

I take it from you saying you haven't seen this, 
you also were never made aware that that was the price put in 
the basic work documents at MICOM. 

A No, I was not. And I can't even read the 
signatures, but I see Mr. John Finafrak's name here, and he 
doesn't work for the Project Manager. He was in the Materiel 
Management Directorate, as I mentioned to you before. What 
I'm saying is, that possibly this document was prepared in 
the Material Management Directorate, not in the TOW Project 
Office. 

Q All right, sir. Let me ask you to look at the 
second exhibit and ask that be marked. 

This was prepared at Anniston Army Depot and, again, 
there's no reason to believe you would have seen this document, 



\lWILfSS4WtB 



82-690 0-88-24 



706 



uNcussm 



|| but it is the Ammunition Planning Work Sheet. 
jj Let me simply ask you first if you have ever 

I' seen, generically, an Ammunition Planning Work Sheet or are 
familiar with its use. 



(Burbules Deposition Exhibit 2 
identified. ) 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Sir, if you would look in the quantity block here, 
you see quantity of 1000. This is for the first shipment of 
TOWS. The stock number shows the 1512, which means it's a 
basic TOW with MOIC, and the unit price — this is all 1000, 
so you if you do some quick division and drop the zeros, you 
see the unit price is $8435. 

A That tracks back to the $8435 that was on the 
Material Release Order. 
Q Yes, sir. 

Now, as the folks at Anniston Army Depot then began 
to work the requirement, they generate the next document in 
the trail, and that is a standard transfer document which is 
on DD Form 1348. I'll give you that. 

A 21 January or February? I can't read that. 



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Q January. 

A January. Okay. 

Q This is a copy — and I ask that be marked as 

Exhibit 3 — of the first iteration of DD Form 1348, which, as 
you see, is from Anniston Army Depot to Redstone, and if you 
look in the quantity block, you see we've got 1000 missiles, 
j and the stock nuinber again is the 1512 or basic TOW with 
MOIC, and the unit price in the upper right-hand corner is 
$8435. 

. So again, the people at Anniston who were working 
this apparently knew that a basic TOW with MOIC had that price 
or had simply taken that price that came down from the MRO. 

A I don't know where they get the price, nor do I 
really know where the people at MICOM got the price, nor do 
I know that that price is necessarily correct. 

Q Well, after the fact, a number of people have 
concluded that the price is not correct in terms of how it 
went into the A^EF. At the time, it was the correct price, 
according to the Army Master Data File for basic TOW MOIC, 
and having interviewed and deposed the person who prepared 
that Material Release Order, he said he took that figure not 
so much from the AMDF. but from his head, because he worked 



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with the TOWS all the time and knew that the basic TOW with 

! MOIC had the price of $8435. 

ji A Again, you say "the correct price," but I believe 

i 

I you're saying it was the correct price, because it was in the 

!| AMDF. But because it was in the AMDF does not necessarily 

mean that it's the correct price. Errors are made. 

Q Yes, sir. But my understanding is that no one 

knew that errors had been made in entering that price and that 

was the price people worked with. 

A Presumed to be the correct price. 

Q Yes. I think that's a better way to put it. It's 

the presumed correct price at the time. 

Let me have you look now at the next exhibit and 

ask that this be marked as Exhibit 4. 

(Burbules Deposition Exhibits 3 and 

4 identified.) 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q This is a series of the same document, and the 

reason it's a series is, this is for the first shipment of 

1000, but each document represents a breakdown of a certain 

portion of lot of that 1000, and this was signed at MICOM 

by Mr. Chris Leachman, who at the time was the head of 



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logistics for the TOW Project Office. He is now the TOW 

il Project Deputy. And if you look at the unit price block and 
II 
r 
track that all the way through on all of them, you will see 

that -- 

A I don't see a unit price on the top one. 

Q That has been left blank, yes, sir. 

I A I see. What are the dates of these, relative to 

the dates of the first ones we saw? This is 29 January. 

Q Yes, sir; that's correct. 

A And the other one is 21 January? 

COL WALLACE: Yes, sir. 

THE WITNESS: Have you looked into the possibility 

that the folks may have started to move out on this, because 

it was a rush shipment, started to move out, assigning prices, 

and have you looked into the possibility that disputes over 

prices occurred after these documents had been cut? 

MR. SAXON: We have looked into just about every 

possibility, aaid I don't mean to be glib about it sir, but 

to ascertain when the prices entered into the document, when 

a price disappeared from the documents. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q I guess the thing that strikes us at least curious 



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is that in Exhibit 4, we have no price. Not that it isn't 
S8435, but that it isn't even $3469, which is a price that 
everyone at MICOM says they were working with, in terms of 
hipment. 

I| A I think it's a reasonable observation, and you 
[ probably have asked why was the price omitted. 

I don't know why the price is omitted on this 
document. 

Q And I take it that this would be the first time 
you have been made aware that when the transfer document gets 
to MICOM, and Leachman, on behalf of MICOM signs for the TOW, 
that there is no price in the unit price block? 
A No, I'm not aware of those details. 
Q All right, sir. The final document is to show 
you what happens when individuals from the Department of Army 
Logistics Office, and in particular. Major Chris Simpson, who 
is the Action Office for this, working under General Russo, 
Simpson arrives on the scene at Redstone to physically take 
possession of the missiles for the Army and then transfer them 
to the CIA. 

I'd ask you to take a look at this document and 
have that marked as Exhibit 5. 



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Q 



(Burbules Deposition Exhibit 5 
identified.) 
BY MR. SAXON: 

If you notice a signature at the bottom of Major 
Chris Simpson - and all of these documents have been 
declassified in this redacted form, and we have blacked out 
that particular name, but underneath has been put the letters 
"CIA," and the particular individual who signed on behalf of 
the CI, and then the price reappears in the price block, and 
it's $3469. 

Let me just ask, for the record, if you have ever 
seen this document before. 

A No, I have not. 

Q And have you had any awareness of the fact that 
that particular price was entered? 

A No. Again, I had no involvement in those times 
with the detail prices, other than the initial acquisition 
cost and replacement value on those. 

Q Now when the issue of replacement cost was 
flagged for you by Colonel Lincoln, what action did you take? 
Did you, in fact, have a phone conversation with General 
Russo? 



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A I believe I did and expressed our concerns, and, 
as I mentioned to you last time, General Russo noted my 
concerns, and he said he'd look into it. And again, reaching 
back in memory, I don't know how I found out, whether he 
called me back or whether a message was sent out or whether 
Colonel Lincoln came back in and told me that Department of 
the Army had decided to go with the lower price, the original 
acquisition cost. And I accepted that as a decision by my 
higher headquarters, a decision by competent authority and 
dropped the matter. 

Q And was it your understanding that the issue of 
replacement cost in whatever way it was done up here had been 
considered, but basically rejected? 

A Yes. 

Q When you talked with General Russo, did he tell 
you anything about the nature of the consideration that would 
be given, by whom it would be considered? 

A Nothing. I knew of this only as Operation 
Snowball, didn't know anything about the CIA's involvement. 
Frankly, I thought it was a classified FMS sale directly to 
a foreign government. 

Q Well, we certainly know it was classified and it 



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was directed to a foreign government. 

A No, directly, directly to a foreign government. 
Not directed. 

Q Did General Russo indicate to you anything about a 
ceiling, which the customer had to operate with or for which 
reason it might be difficult to get a replacement cost? 

A No. 

Q Did he indicate to you that the issue of a 
replacement cost had already been pressed forward by the Army 
and been rejected? 

A NO. 

Q None of that? 

A No. Merely that he would look into it, as I 
recollect. 

Q Did you mention to General Russo at that time what 
any of the replacement cost would be? 

A No. Because I didn't know uhat the replacement cost 
would be. Just that it probably would have been substantially 
higher. 

Q And he didn't ask what the specifics would be, 
in terms of replacement cost? 

A No, not to my recollection, anyway. 



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Q I'm ready to move off the TOW subject. 

Is there anything else that you think we should 



know, sir? 

A No, I can't think of anything that I can add. 

MR. SAXON: Bob? Roger? 

MR. GENZMAN: Nothing. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q What I'd like to do now, briefly. General, is go 
to the subject of the HAWK missile repair parts. Let me 
simply ask you for the record when you first became aware 
that MICOM was involved in what we now know was a follow on 
to the TOW requirement, with the same intermediate customer 
being the CIA and the same ultimate customer being Iran. 

When were you first made aware that there was a 
HAWK requirement? 

A This year, after I had come up to this headquarters 
and when the situation broke and the investigations were 
begun. Only then. And frankly, I learned about it, I guess, 
on the television when there were allegations about — 
actually, as I learned it first, they were HAWK missiles, I 
think was what the TV program said. And I knew nothing about 
that. 



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Q In fact, as we now know, there were actually HAWK 
missiles shipped from Israel to Iran in November of 1985 in 
a quantity of 18, 17 of which were returned to Israel, and 
there were ultimately to have been 120 shipped, but in terms 
of our particular focus with you, it's the HAWK equipment 
repair parts that MICOM was tasked with providing on April 10, 
1986. 

A The HAWK Project Man§ger did not inform me while 
I was down there that this was going on. I can't speculate 
why. Perhaps he was under the saune cautions of secrecy. 
In any event, I was in the process of departing the Command. 
I had been selected for promotion, and I was in the process 
in early or mid-May of departing Missile Command. 

Q For the record, do you recall who the Project 
Manager was at the time? 

A Yes. Colonel Sam Liberatori — L-i-b-e-r-a-t-o-r-i. 

Q I take that from your testimony then, not only 
did you not know that a requirement had been passed down by 
headquarters of the Department of the Army to the HAWK 
Project Office on ground equipment repair parts, but that no 
one in the time you were there, admittedly, as you were 
transiting to your new assignment, no one ever brought to your 



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attention the fact that there might be some readiness impact 
from the provision of these repair parts? 

A No. 

Q Let me walk you through what we now understand 
to be some of the facts of the transaction and see if you 
could render us a judgment from the roughly two years you 
spent as MICOM Commander. 

A I was only there about eight or nine months. 

Q ,1 see. That's correct. From August 9, 1985, to 
May of "8.6. 

When the requirement was imposed on MICOM on 
April 10, a list was transmitted, fax'd from AMC, which had 
gotten a list from Major Simpson, who had gotten it from his 
CIA counterpart, who had gotten it from Colonel North, who 
had gotten it from Mr. Ghorbanifahr , who gave it to North 
in Paris in March of 1986. And in fact, Ghorbanifahr got it 
directly from the Iranians. So that's the trail of this list 
of HAHC r^air parts. It gets down to MICOM, and as best we 
can determine, the officials in the HAWK Project Office did 
a terrific job, one heck of a job, on short notice, and with 
a lot of pressure, to cast about and see where these parts 
were, the location, the availability, the quantities in 



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26 



I which they were available and any possible readiness impact, 

.i if they were provided in full in those quantities. 

ji The same day, or later in the evening, that 

information was fax'd from Redstone Arsenal up to Department 

! of the Army, at which time it was determined -- the Iranians 
had asked for 234 line items of HAWK repair parts. It was 
determined that if they met all of the quantities requested 
on the ones that they could locate — and only 221 repair 
parts could, be located — that there would be a potential 
readiness. impact on either 46 or 47 of the items. 

The actual list provided us by MICOM said 47; the 
DA IG said 46. The breakdown on those numbers comes from the 
DAI IG. I don't have the additional item, I think the 
number is 47, The DA IG breaks down to 46, as follows: 

On 15 of the items, it would deplete our inventories 
100 percent, if we met all of the requirements on requested 
quantities. On 11 of the items, it would deplete them in 
excess of 50 percent, and on 20 of the items, it would be less 
than 50 percent, but still significant depletion. 

That information was provided to the Department of 
the Army, As MICOM then worked with Simpson, over the matter 
of a few days, they argued about various quantities. The 



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numbers as to quantity were actually reduced, so the impact 
was not only with reqard to the 46th or 47th items, because 
all of those materials were not provided. 

Let me stop at this juncture and ask you, for the 
record. I assume you were never made aware of any of this 
information? 

A No, I was not. 

Q All right, sir. 

What happens next is that Major Simpson is told 
by John Chapman and Billy Reyer, as MICOM, that with regard 
to the quantities that he says they should provide, that 
there would be significant depletion as to 10 or 12 items, 
and in fact, 100 percent depletion as to 10 or 12 items, which 
they thought would have an adverse impact on readiness. 

Major Simpson discusses that with General Russo. 
There's some back and forth between Simpson and his CIA 
counterparts and, in essence, the CIA says that you must 
ship all of the quantities requested. Simpson then, on 
April 23rd, prepares a "must ship" list that is fax'd down 
to MICOM, and they realize that they have to provide the 
quantities that are requested. 

The ultimate conclusion that has been presented 



:E-riKaiu. •imTus. 



Mmmn 



719 



WOFIED 



28 



us by appropriate officials at MICOM who work with the HAWK, 
and then the supervisors of those individuals, was that we 
did actually provide 10 to 12 items that totally depleted 
our inventories, and there was a readiness impact on some of 
those items, that, in particular, where there was a serious 
readiness impact on one of the items, that they put it in a 




The Iranians had asked fc^^Hbf these items. We 
only had^^^^^^^^^^H in our inventory. The MICOM officials 
with whom we spoke protested and did not want to provide those. 

In essence, the CIA overruled the Army an<^^^| 
^^^|had to be provided. 

The make whole date that MICOM has give, if we 
accelerate the procurement pipeline from the vendor which, in 
this case is the Varian — V-a-r-i-a-n — Corporation and 
accelerate those that are down for maintenance and repair, 



ONEI^SSIfii 



a 



720 



^amms 



is not until 1989. 

I would simply ask for the record, if any of this 
was ever brought to your attention? 
A No. 

Q Let me ask you now for an opinion, so I clearly 
denominate that. 

If anyone had come to you in this time period, 
whether you were exiting or not, if, as MICOM Commander, this 
had been brought to your attention - and we clearly understand 
it wasn't - would it have given you any pause, and would. you 
have taken any action if your specialist told you it would 
deplete your inventory as to this one part being a high risk 
category, and we wouldn't have 



A You bet. I'd have gotten on the phone, just as I 
did in the other case, and voiced my objections; however, 1 
understand that there are national policy objectives that may 
have equal important considerations, such as in 1973, in the 
Israeli-Eqyption War. We drew down a lot of our stocks in 
support of the Israelis. 

Yes, that too hurt our readiness, but the idea is, 
you know, meet the national policy objectives, and the whole 



ONCEilSSIFfED 



721 



mumm 



matter of defense is one of calculated risk with respect to 

investments and how much you buy and how many days' supply 
II 
'^ you have on hand and where to position it, and so forth. 

Those risks have to be weighed along with 
side by side our national policy objectives, and I can only 
trust that somebody who is a patriot and interested in the 
national defense and interested in the survival of this 
nation appropriately considered this at the appropriate level 
and made the decision that the national policy objectives 
were worth the risk of a temporary drawdown of readiness. 

Q So, if I understand your testimony, it's not 
simply a matter of saying readiness might be impacted; we 
have to look at the broader national policy objectives. 
But you also seem to be saying that you hope that that would 
be a deliberative process and that the people making that 
decision are clearly aware of the alternatives when they do 
so. 

A Precisely. 

MR. SAXON: I think that's all I've got on the 
HAWK repair parts. 

Any further questions? 

(No response.) 



icraiTus INC 



^mmm 



722 



mmmi 



MR. SAXON: General, let me say, for the record, 
you have been very helpful today and very helpful when we 



i; saw you in June . 

You would probably have been more helpful if 
:i anyone had thought to share any of this with you at the time, 
ji but that's not of your doing. 

We appreciate your testimony and on behalf of 
both committees, let me simply thank you. 
XHE WITNESS Thank you. 
• And I stand ready to assist in any way you may 
request in the future. 

(Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m., the taking of the 
deposition was concluded.) 



CE-fEKIAI. lEfOaTtHS. INC 



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Deposition of: Ana Parnett 
Bxecutive Assistant United 
States Attorney. 



Friday, July 17, 1987 



^fs-X 



U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee to 
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D . C . 



Partially Declassified/Released on /-4 -S"^ 

under provisions of E.O. 12356 

by N. Menan, Natioiul Security Council 



Appearances 



H. Thomas McGough, Jr., 
Associate Cousel, Senate 
Select Committee. 

\ Robert W. Genzman, 

Associate Minority Counsel 

Jack Perk ins , 
Department oC Justice, 
Legislative Affairs. 



mu^® 



JACK BESONER S, ASSOCIATES, INC. 
172 West Flagl er Stre et. Mia mi. FL 3313 (305) 371-IS37 



737 



mmim 



MR. MCGOUGH: Good morning. My name is 
Tom McGough. I am associate counsel with the 
Senate Select Committee on the Iran-Contra « 
matter. 

MR. GENZMAN: Robert W. Genzman, 
Associate Minority Counsel with the House 
Committee. 

MR. PERKINS: Jack Perkins. I'm with 
the Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of 
Justice . 
BY MR. MCGOUGH: 

Q. Would you please state your name. 

A. Ana, A-n-a, Barnett, B-a - r - n- e - t - t . 

Q. And what is your title here at the U.S. 
Attorney's Office? 

A. Executive Assistant United States 
Attorney . 

Q. What does-- what are the duties of the 
Executive Assistant United States Attorney? 

A. On paper, in the organizational chart, 
I have supervisory responsibilities over the civil 
section of the office, the appellate section of 
the office, and the adn i nis t ra t i ve side of the 
office, and I report directly to the United States 

JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INCT 



82-690 0-88-25 



738 



wmM 



1 As a practical matter, the lines aren't 

2 that rigid. 

3 Dick Gregorie lives in a parallel * 

4 world, where he has supervisory responsibility 

5 over a]l of the criainal side of the office, but 

6 essentially, we are acting U.S. Attorneys, when 

7 the U.S. Attorney is not here. 

8 Matters that cowe up-- we just deal 

9 with then on an ad hoc basis, and try to solve the 

10 problems as they arise. 

11 I also speak for the office. We have a 

12 press policy where line AOSA's do not speak 

13 directly to the press, or answer inquiries. 

14 That's done by ayself or Dick Gregorie. 

15 Mostly, I do it. 

16 Just other things, as they come up. 

17 It's very hard to say. 

18 Q. Let ae see if I can get a picture oE 

19 the organization of the office. 

20 Leon Kellner is United States 

21 Attorney. 

22 Is there a first Assistant U.S. 

23 Attorney? 

24 A. Well, Dick and I are essentially the 

25 firstass is tants 



yNClASSIFiED 

JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC. 



739 



mmm 



When the ofCice got to be beyond a 
certain number of AUSA's, that position got split. 

For example, in the Southern District, 
of Florida, they have three, instead of just two. 
They have an associate-- a term of art. 
I guess we're the first assistant. 
Q. So then as an organizational chart 
matter, you would be supervising the civil and 
appellate and administrative, and Mr. Gregorie 
would be supervising the criminal side? 
A . Yes . 

Q. Where does Mr. Scharf fit into the 
organization? 

What is his title? 
A. Special Counsel, and if I might, I can 
clear it up, if I can draw the little 
organizational chart here (indicating). 
Q. Sure. 

A. I sometimes do things in the criminal 
domain, and Dick, sometimes in the civil domain, 
depending on who is here and what comes up. 

Larry is over here (indicating). Then 
we have the others (indicating). 

Larry doesn't report to anyone but the 
U.S. Attorney, and has tasks as assigned.,' 



neu^sL 



ES, INC. 



740 



UNCLASSinED 



If I had to describe him most commonly, 
he is the office oracle. 

He's brilliant, and has many, many, , 
many years of prosecutorial experience, and as a 
result, he handles the extremely complex ca3(?s or 
novel cases that arise, that are usually given to 
him for review to deal with in the office. 

Q. In your position as Executive Assistant 
United States Attorney, do you still maintain a 
case load of your own at all, or do you deal with 
cases, solely fro* the supervisory standpoint? 

A. Fro« a supervisory standpoint, except 
as things cone up. 

I have-- as a request of a judge, I 
have a case before that particular judge to try, 
but I don't ordinarily have a case load in this 
pos ition. 

Q. Is that a civil or criminal matter? 

A. A civil matter, a class action filed by 
Haitian refugees that were retained. 

Q. I would like to get a little bit of 
your background, if I could, starting with law 
school . 

When did you graduate, and from where? 

A. Okay. I graduated from law school-- lot 



iwssira 



JACK 



, INC. 
■» ■> 1 1 n I yn^ 



741 



KASSm 



me start with undergraduate school, because I'm a 
late bloomer. 

Actually, I went to law school latr. I 
just didn't-- why did you go to law school so 
late, right? 

I graduated with a 8A from 
undergraduate school in '68 from the University of 
Florida . 

I have a Masters Degree from Florida 
State University. 

Q. What is that in, the Masters Degree? 
A. In psyche, in 1970. 

Then I did real work for a few years. 

I taught at Miami-Dade Community 
College and was a counselor there, and then I 
started law school in '73, so I graduated from law 
school in '76 from the University of Miami. 

Right out of law school, immediately 
out of law school, I went to work for the State 
Attorney, which is what we call the District 
Attorney here in Florida, here in Miami. 

I was there until 1978, when I came to 
work here. 

Q. Here you doing criminal trial work in 

"' "'" ' uNCUssm 

JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC. 



742 



ONCIASSIF I ED 



A. Yes, I did, criminal, and when I came 
here, I started in the civil division and stayed 
there. , 

Q. So in 1979,. you cane in as an Assistant 
United States Attorney? 

A. No. Actually, it was aid '78. 
Q. And how long were you, if I could say, 
a trial attorney in the civil division? 

Is that a Cairly accurate description 
of the position you filled? 
A. Yes. 

I tried more cases than any other civil 
attorney has ever done in this office. 

I did all of the swine flu litigation. 

I was there until Stanley Marcus became 
U.S. attorney, which I think is was '82. 

MR. GGNZMAN: It was '82. 

THE WITNESS: When he became the U.S. 
Attorney, he appointed Leon Kellner chjejijf of th^i 
civil division . 

He brought him in from private practice 
in New York, and appointed me to be the deputy 
chWiV of the civil division, and I did maintain a 
case load, but a more limited case load that was 
just limited to larger cases, or things a{ssigned 



UNCLASSIFB 



ATES, INC, 



743 



the U.S. Attorney . 



wmms 



Then some time, a year or so after that 
time, Leon Kellner became the Executive Assistant, 
and Stanley Marcus made me the chief of the civil 
division. 

I'm a little fuzzy on those dates. 
Then he was appointed judge, and I have 
lost track of when that was, but some time in-- I 
left the office in early '85 to private practice. 
I thought that would be a good time to 
try it, and then in October, late October of '86-- 
no. Excuse me. Late October of '85, I came back. 
I didn't stay very long-- to this position. 

Q. What did you to in private practice? 

A. Civil litigation with a civil firm. 

Q. What is your co««ercial telephone 
number here? 

A. CoBBercial telephone number is area 
code 305-536-5242. 

Q. Is that the saae as your FTS number? 

A. No. The prefix is gp . 

Q. And the saae four digits? 

A. Right. 

Q. Do you know Leon Kellncr's-- what is 
his-- does he have a direct dial number or direct 



■> West Flaaler Str 




S|>tJVrES, INC. 
Miami . FT. "^ "^ 1 T f 305^ ■> 7 i 



744 



f^r^.^^^'rn 



exchange number?' ''V-^u- 

A. 5401 is his last four digits, and the 
same thing, the 536 or the 0^ exchange. » 

Q. And what's the general office number 
here? 

A . I do n ' t k now i t . 

Q. Now, obviously we're here to discuss 
primarily an investigation that's gone by a number 
of names . 

We have called it the Garcia case, the 
Cuervo case, the Costa case. 

Does it have a name that everyone would 
recognize it by in this office? 

A. Costa, but-- although no matter what 
you use, we all recognize it. 

Q. Okay. Let's keep the terminology 
straight. Let's call it the Costa case. 

What was your first contact with the 
Costa case? 

A. Well, there's really two ways of 
answering that. 

My first official contact with this is 
today, and I have to refer to this chronology that 
Jeff Feldman prepared, because he's the only 
compulsive person that kept^J^tes and tim'es of 



.MWtUSSMtn... ,. 



745 



wmm 



things, and none of us did. 

Q. That's fine. You'll provide us with a 
copyof — ^ 

A. Certainly, although you have these 
her e . 

Q. Are those your notes? 
A . Yes . 

Q. We would like to see all documents 
tha t-- 

MR. PERKINS: Let Be just give it to you 
through channels, so we can keep track. 

MR. MCGOUGH: I prefer to/^have it 
today, really even before we adjourn the 
depcs i tion . 

I will be glad to look at the documents 
and see if there are any questions we have on the 
documents before we go back. 

MR. PERKINS: He don't want to get into 
the business of handing over the-- handing over 
documents every time a witness goes to be 
interviewed . 

MR. MCGOUGH: I understand that, but if 
a witness uses a document to refresh their 
recollection during the course of a deposition, we 

" " " °^ ° "° " pussiREa 

JACK BESONER i A S S C lAT E S , I N C . 
172 West Flagler Street, Miami, PL 33130 (305) 371-1537 



746 



«ussiam 



1 I thinlc it's pretty clear, and we'd* 

2 like to see it during the deposition. 

3 I guess to put it bluntly, if the /> 

4 witness refers to the document-- we'll take it 

5 through the noraal channels, but if she does, we 

6 would like to refer to it before the end of the 

7 deposition, in case there are any questions off of' 

8 it, then we can take notice of that without 

9 reconvening the deposition. 

10 BY MR. MCGOUGH: 

11 Q. You said you had two ways of answering 

12 the question-- going back to the question. 

13 A. Officially, on March I4th of '86 when 

14 Jeff Feldnan came into my office with, according 

15 to this-- with Kevin Courier, an FBI agent. 

16 Q. Now, do you-- on the chronology, do you 

17 recall that Meeting? 

18 A. I recall the meeting very vividly. 

19 I just don't recall the day it took 

20 place, the timing of it. 

21 Q. Can you tell me-- you said that was 

22 your first official contact. 

23 A. Yes. 

24 Q. Did you have unofficial contact that 

25 Bight have predated that? |||LlA| AOOI^''' T 

UWbLAooir.^J 

JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC. 



747 



WASS» 



1 2 



k. Yes . 

I only realize that in retrospect. 

Toward the end of '85, soon after I < 
returned to the office in this position and 
started getting-- well, the first thing I got is-- 
the clerk of the court called me up. That's one 
of the things I do when problems come up. I handle 
those problems . 

He said, "He have a letter here. We 
don't know what to do with it. Should we file it 
as a case? It involves--" and I said "Send me a 
copy and if it's--" 

As it turned out, it was a letter 
written by Mrs. Garcia, you know, protesting the 
treatment of her husband in the course of his 
trial . 

I basically thought another pro se 
defendant. He have hundreds of these. Pile it in 
the crank file. That's that. 

It was only in retrospect, as things 
are developing-- I said "Oh, I think I have seen 
these letters . " 

These letters, throughout the next few 
weeks, I guess they were mailed to lots of people 
all over. I don't know who all got them» 



JA 



ES, INC, 



748 



MNClASSiHty 



1 I know the 11th Circuit got them, and 

2 they started sending us copies and we started 

3 getting copies o£ these letters back Crom various 

4 people, additional people that got them. 

5 Q. When you say they were sent-- not by 

6 thi s of f ice? 

7 A. Oh, no. 

8 I have to assume it's Mrs. Garcia that 

9 sent out a nailing oC these letters. 

10 Q. Did you do anything with that letter, 

11 other than put it in what you-- I think you 

12 referred as a crank letter file? 

13 A. The first one, no. 

14 We had one that was referred by the 

15 11th Circuit, and they decided to deal with it as 

16 though it were a habeas corpus, you know, because B 

17 it was a pro se filing, and I think it was passed 

18 along to the civil division, but I'm pretty sure 

19 nothing ever became of it, because it was a 

20 petition filed on behalf of someone, rather than 

21 by the prisoner himself. 

22 It was dismissed. I think the 11th 

23 Circuit decided to dispose of it in some fashion. 

24 I didn't follow-up on it. 

25 Q. So you didn't pass it on to Mrj. Kellner 



m 



S, INC, 



749 



iiHtftssro 



or Main Justice, anything like that? 

A. No. 

He, I think, got a letter, also, and . 
then passed it on to me. 

I said, "Yes, I think I have seen it 
before. It's an ongoing case, an active case," 
and I think eventually we passed it off to Jeff, 
who had the underlying case, once we figured out 
it was something that involved something that was 
ongoing and pending. 

Q. Do you recall what the allegation in 
the letter was? 

A. That the judge had been extremely 
unfair by keeping out evidence-- I guess there had 
been a supression hearing of some kind, and that, 
you know, her husband was innocent, and he had 
been-- he hadn't been allowed to prove his case. 

It was a funny allegation. He said his 
attorney was in cahoots with the government and 
conspiring to convict him, and that's why he 
wasn't able to put in all of the evidence that he 
needed to put in to prove this case. 

You know, allegations-- that's very 
broad. That's not the details of it, but that's 
the general nature of it, as I remember. .' 

— .^H^HSgD... .c 



750 



m^ 



Ooai li-u 



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1 
2 
3 
4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q. Between these letters, all of this, you 
really didn't take any affirmative steps? 

A . Right. , 

Q. Did you have any contact with the Costa 
case prior to March 14th? 

A. From time to time, and I really can't 
remember now if it was really before or after-- 
you know, there started slowly to be from time to 
time, a call from a newspaper or somebody, saying, 
you know, "There's a man named Jesus Garcia--" 
there seemed to be interest in him, and it seemed 
unusual for a gun case, but that's the only thing. 

Q. And did those press inquiries predati^ 
the March 14th meeting, as best you can recollect? 

A. I'm really fuzzy on that. 
I really can't tell you. 
I have to suspect-- I have to think 
that it probably did, because a lot of them had 
questions about-- not a lot, but-- a lot, a few, 
two, three, questions about Garcia, about who he 
was . 

I know we mailed out-- people asked for 
copies of the indictment. 

An L.A. paper stands out in my mind as 
asking for copies of the indictment, and. M anted 



JAC 



ymASSL. 



NC, 



751 



wmm 



copies of pleadings. 

I said, "We send out copies of 
indictments, because they are public," but 
pleadings, it gets into too much trouble to send 
ou t . 

Things like that. Nothing that really 
seemed out of the ordinary. Only in retrospect it 
does. At the time, it didn't. 

Q. Let's go to March 14, 1984. 

What do you recall about that meeting? 
A. That Jeff and the FBI agent caae in 
very excited, that they had, you know, heard about 
the plot to assassinate a U.S. Ambassador and blow 
up embassies, I believe it was in Costa Rica. 

At that time, I think they camo into my 
office, because the U.S. Attorney may have been in 
a conference or had people in this office and his 
door was shut . 

I thought, oh, my God, this is really 
serious stuff. We have got to, you know, do 
something about this, and look into this right 
away . 

What really stands out in my mind, as 
we're talking about this, it's being relayed in a 
very excited manner 



JACK BESONER 



m 



752 



KASsra 



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Leon walks in, opens the door in my 
office, and says-- Leon comes into my office and 
says, "I have got to see you. Something has com^e 
up. " 

I said, "I have got to see you, too. 
This is very important. They have got to convoy 
something about a plot to kill an ambassador." 

He said, "That's what I have to see you 
about," so at some point-- I'm not quite clear how 
it merged. He got the information from a 
different source, I think, from Washington, as 
they were telling me, so we moved into his office. 
Q. Let me stop you there for a second. 

In the course of laying out these 
allegations, did Mr. Feldman or the FBI agent/- 
mention any allegations about gun running? 

A. I can't remember, because that's-- that 
was, like, the most exciting part of it, the very 
idea there were people planning to kill a U.S. 
Aabassador and blow up U.S. embassies. That's what 
really stands out in my mind. 

They may have, but I just don't 
recollect that. 

Q. Do you recall any mention of any public 
firms or government employees being invol'ved in 



mmM. 



ATES, INC 



753 



— mmm . 

the plan, the conspiracy that they were 
describing? 

A. No. , 

I-- there were naHes that didn't mean 
any th i ng . 

Q. But they didn't specifically-- you 
don't have a recollection oC any specific 
reference to the NSC, for exaaple? 

h. No. Not at that point, no. 

Q. Hho in Washington made the call? 

Did Mr. Kellner indicate who nade the 
call to hi«? 

A. At that tiae, I don't think he did. 

Let ae see. I think I asked about it. 
No. I don't think I did ask, but I think it uas-- 
I think it was a call and it aay have been, 
because at soae point, there was talk about it. 

It aay have been generated because of a 
letter. It could have been another one of Mrs. 
G«rcia'9 letters. 

She was becoaing a regular letter 
writer after a while. 

Q. When Leon came into your office, did he 
seea to know about an alleged plot to assassinate 



Ambassador Taaas? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC. 



754 



vmmm 



A . Tha t • 3 who it was . 

Q. Were those allegations included in Mrs. 
Garcia's letters? , 

A. The letters I read-- I don't remember 
reading tha t . 

My only recollection of the thing, that 
it could have been generated by a letter, and that 
was a later conversation we had, just basically 
saying, how we did find out about this thing, and 
that was thrown out-- it's really speculative. 

I'M really Euzzy about how Leon case to 
find out about it . 

Q. You don't recall if Mr. Kellner 
Mentioned specifically who in Washington called 
him and-- 

A. No. 

Q. What happened after you went in his 
office? 

A. They went in and they told the story 
again. 

Probably they told it in great detail, 
if you have ever spoken to JefC. 

I guess at that point, probably 
discussions about, you know, what to do next, 
maybe get on it, go down tQ^^osta Rica, tja 1 k to 



"" West F1»r,l-- 



on it, go down to^^o 



ATES, INC. 



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people, things like that, because I know that 
after that point-- see, we're at a point it was 
where Gramn-Rudman-- Cor soae reason, our travel » 
money was very tight. That was another thing that 
stands out in my mind. 

There was always going back and forth 
conversation about, can we afford a trip to Costa 
Rica, this and that, and that was a discussion 
that was happening, the travel budget was running 
low. 

I don't know if it was at that very 
meeting or soon thereafter-- "Yes. Absolutely, do 
whatever you have to do to get to Costa Rica and 
talk to these people." 

Q. Was there any discussion about getting 
to Mr. Terrell in New Orleans, T-e-r-r-e- 1 - 1 ? 

A. Jeff told ae so, but I don't recall it. 

Q. You aean at a subsequent time, Jeff 
told you he had spoken with Mr. Terrell at that 
■eeting on March 14th or-- 

A. I don't reaeaber any of the names that 
were mentioned at the March I4th meeting. 

What Jeff told ae was that after that 
time, he went to New Orleans to interview Jack 



Terrell about this 



o Jack^Tgrrell must Kave had 



bout this, so Jack Tgrrell m 



756 



fffitftSSW 



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some kind of knowledge about this. 

Q. You don't recall any discussion, even 
in the context, say, oE the travel budget, oC , 
going to New Orleans or not going to New Orleans? 

A. No. That we didn't-- was out of the 
country travel probably, and I nay have my dates 
confused . 

We may not have discussed the travel to 
Costa Rica until after the New Orleans trip, when 
he came back with more information after talking 
to Terrell. 

It was something like that. 
Now, the dates kind of merge together. 
Jeff is the one that is real, real 
clear and certain on what happened that day. 

Q. Do you recall any discussion of an 
impending sentencing proceeding with Mr. Garcia? 

A, I don't have any independent 
recollection of that. I don't have any independent 
recollection of that, but I have been told that 
that was discussed. 

Q, By whom? Who told you that? 

A. Jeff. Jeff did, that that was 
discussed when he explained how he got, you know, 
ahold of this, and how he got involved i it this, 



JA 




ES, INC, 



757 



mstmm 



that it was really as a result of having 
prosecuted this gun case. 

Went back to the beginning and told t+ie 
whole 3 tory . 

Q. Do you recall any discussions of a 
grand jury at that Meeting? 

A. Oh, no. Not at all. 

Q. Do you recall anything else about the 
meeting that aight have been touched on? 

A. Other than, you know, it dealt with, 
you know, a very pressing and exciting natter, and 
that stands out, but other than that, no, nothing 
else really does stand out. 

Q. Do you reaeaber anyone else's 
participation in that aeeting with yourself, Mr. 
Kellner and the FBI agent? 

A. No. I don't reaeaber who else was in 
the aeeting. 

It would be very possible that or more 
than likely that either Dick or Larry would have 
gone in there or both, or one or the other of 
thea, just siaply because we don't have a lot of 
foraalities in the oCfice, and the way just things 
generally operate, we, you know-- it's pretty 
loose, and it's very likely whatever nceb'ing Leon 



177 u <t« 



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1 was having before, you know, when that broke in, 

2 either Larry or Dick were in it, and when we just 

3 moved into there, they just stayed. , 

4 Q. Now, we have learned that after the 

5 meeting or that Mr. Garcia's sentencing was 

6 originally set for March i9th, and there was an 

7 effort made to postpone that sentencing. 

8 Do you have any recollection of being 

9 involved in that at all? 

10 A. No. 

11 I aean, in-- again, in-- that's one of 

12 those recollections only in retrospect that it 

13 happened, and, you know, Jeff tried to put it in 

14 context for me, saying that was right, because we 

15 were trying to verify these plots were real, and 

16 if we thought it was true, we would speak up at 

17 the sentencing, you know, it would have some 

18 impact. 

19 Q. Do you recall any inquiry or 

20 instructions from Main Justice about postponing 

21 the sentencing procedure? 

22 A. No. I don't personally remember that. 

23 That's again one of those things that 

24 Jeff has it on his chronology, and it probably had 

25 a much greater impact on him, that he wov|ld have 



.^ u-.t P1,nl^VlWh'MfiTr?;.'KL 33 130 f305> 371-1S37 



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read it, but I really didn't reaember. 

At that tiae, I still was really fuzzy 
about Garcia, and, you know-- as far as I could « 
see it, it was just another gun case, and we 
literally have hundreds o£ gun cases, guns and 
drugs. That's what we have hundreds of in this 
district. 

Q. What is the next event of which you 
have an independent recollection regarding the 
case? 

A. Running into Jeff when he was returning 
f roa Cos ta Rica . 

Q. So that would have been early April, 
April 3rd, April 4th, soaething like that? 

A . Apri 1 4th, yes . 

Q. Uhat do you recall about that? 

A. I waa coaing back tron lunch, and, you 
know, the little guard station downstairs, going 

e. 

through the aagn^toaeter, and running into Jeff, 
who was also coaing in, and said-- had his 
suitcase with hia. 

He said, 'I just got back Croa Costa 
Rica. I have got to talk to everybody. It's just 
real iapor tant . " 

I said, -We're around," and latter that 



JACK 



INC, 



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afternoon, we sat around and Jeff came in and told 
about the-- all the events that developed when he 
was down there, and all the interviews. ■* 

Q. Prior to the larger meeting later that 
day, did you have any one-on-one conversations 
with Jeff about what he had found in Costa Rica? 
A . I might have . 

I don't remember, but-- Jeff might have 
stopped in and told us something, but he is such a 
detailed person and so full of the names, so used 
to throwing the names around, and when you don't 
know the names, it really doesn't mean a whole 
lot. 

I do Icnow that when I ran into him, he 
was really excited, you know-- "This is really 
excitiing stuff. I have got to tell somebody." 
It's just look a kid bursting to tell the news. 

Q. So there was a meeting later that day? 
A. Yes. 

Q. Has it in Mr. Kellner's office? 
A. Hell, before you leave, you can see 
what his office looks like. 

His desk is over on one end, and at the 
other end of the room, there's a smaller 



CO 



nference table, but nevertheless, a rel'atively 



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large table, and usually most of the meetings 
about cases and things, take place there. 

We all sat around there and had JeEe . 
tell what he knew. 

Q- fan you remember what time of day that 
meeting took place, approximately? 

*• It had to be after lunch. That's my 
recol lection. 

Q- Do you remember who was there? 

K. Well-- 

Q- Who do you recall being there? 

A- Okay. That's one of those other 
a n 3 we r s . 

Now I recall Leon, Dick, Larry, Jeff, 
and myself. 

It wasn't till-- I a«-- it wasn't till 
recently that I realized that David Leiwant came 
in toward the end of the meeting. 

Q. Do you have any independent 

recollection of Mr. Leiwant being in the room 

during that meeting? 

I 
A . Yes . Now, yes . I 

Once he cane and told us that he was 

there, I remembered him, because, in fact, it was i 

Iwhohadcausedhimtobethere. ,' | 

'in 



-iiNiMssira 



ES, INC. 



762 



wttssm 



We were discussing-- generally, we were 
discussing-- 

Q. Let me interrupt for a second. Let's 
start at the beginning oC the meeting, and tell me 
what happened, really, is the question. 

A. Okay. Well, Jeff started telling the 
story about why he was down there, and the things 
he had found out . 

It was so full of odd names, like, 
Tegucigalpa, Quinta, you know, just names, odds 
things and jumbled together. 

It was mostly he was interrupted by-- 
"Go back to the beginning. How did you get there? 
Who is this person? " It was that kind of meeting. 

It wasn't like a smooth story. He 
didn't say, "I arrived on the plane and proceeded 
to do this, that and the other," whatever. 

He was jumping around a lot. What 
would have ordinarily probably should have taken 
an hour, really dragged out. 

It was just getting dragged out. I do 
remember that. 

Different people were trying to parse 
out the facts, you know, who said what to whom, 
and how did they know it, and what does i^t mean. 



JA 
172 West Flag 



wmm. 



||I||'ES, INC. 
iVmi, FL 33130 (305) 371-1537 



763 



mmm 



28 



At some point-- and if you ask me right 
now, as many times as we have gone over this, i 
couldn't tell you what all he told others, and • 
certain things stay in my mind. 

He talked about John Hull, how he had 
an appointment with Hull, and Hull cancelled the 
appointment, and he ended up sitting on the same 
plane as him, a few seats behind him. 

Told about the meeting, the two 
prisoners down in Costa Rica, and I'm not even 
surewhat-- 

Q. Do you recall any mention of the 
National Security Council? 

A. I don't know if it was the National 
Security Council, but I think at that time Jeff 
started mentioning Robert Owen, and again, it was 
like a name that, you know, didn't mean anything, 
and he probably did mention that he thought 
somehow he was associated with the National 
Security Council, although it didn't just stand 
out . 

Q. Do you remember what he said about 
Owen? 

A. Something in connection with Hull, and 
again, I didn't-- I didn't take notes or-f- 



7 2 West Eli 



UMife 



INC. 



764 



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Q. Do you recall any reference to Oliver 
north? 

A. I don't know if the reference to Oliver 
North was then or at a later tiae. 

I aean, at some point, his name did ' 
coBe up, and at that point he was all-- who is 
Oliver North then. He wasn't faaous then. 

I don't recall if it was at that 
■etting or at a later Meeting on this case 

Q. Do you recall any aentioi 

A. Yet. 

Q. In what context? 

A. I reaeaber specifically, because Jeff 
said he had talked to soaeone who Identified 
hiaself as 




sn't they supposed to be 

discreet?- 

I reaeaber asking that, because it just 
seeaed so-- it didn't fit in with ay idea of the 
way the peopl^^^^^^^^^Hare to 

Q. Do you recall Mr. Feldaan describing 

b 

his aeeting with Aabassador Taaas, in which he 

outlined his investigation? .' 



..jHa^^iEi^ ^ 



, INC. 



765 



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A. I know he talked about hia meeting with 

h 

Ambassador Tanas. 

Now, when he told us that he showed , 
TamJ^s this diagram o£ his, you know, his theory oE 
the case or not-- I'm not sure if that happened 
then or at a later time. 

It could have happened then, but he did 
talk about it, and he put a diagram-- I'm not sure 
we're still talking about the same diagram. 

I know at this meeting, he had diagrams 
with him, lots of diagrams, or at least more than 
one, as I recall, and he had made copies of them. 

He laid them out on the table, and wc 
were having trouble explaining how, you know, box 
number one over here connected to box number two, 
and I just remembered, you know-- writing or 
doodling on these different graphs that he had. 
Q. Did you see this-- 
A. I didn't, but Jeff did. 
Q. You didn't save the ones that you 
wrote, did you? 

A. I think he saved all the ones that 
people wrote on, because I know that at some later 
point when this all came out, we said, "Yes, I 
remember--" just going back to talking ar{d 



JACK] 
172 West Flaglei 



766 



IJNMSm 



31 



discussing, and I said, "Yes, but I think some of 
that stuff was just doodled on," and he said "Yes, 
I think I saved them all." 

Q. Did you take any notes on a piece of 
paper or-- 

A. Not in the sense-- I would jot down a 
name, and kind of go like that and-- 

Q. Cross it out? 

A. Or actually make little drawings around 
it, something like that, but it wasn't notes, 
extensive notes on the meetings, though. 

One of the other people, though, I 
think was taking notes. 

I started to, but frankly, it was so 
hard to follow what Jeff is-- maybe I was being 
remarkably dense, but it was so hard to follow the 
story, and I kind of sat there. 

Q. Did you save what you took? 

A, No. I think I left and left the pad 
there. 

Q. You say one other person was taking 
notes . 

Uho was that? 

A. By process of elimination, it must have 
been Larry. I know that Dick never writer anything 



S 



JAcijii9|yM^in^o|Utg^s , INC. 

72 West Flaqler Street. Miami. FL 33130 (305^ 371-1537 



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during any meeting. 

I know he retains it all. 
Larry was writing notes. He may have , 
had a pad in front of him, or doodling. 

Q. Why do you remember someone taking 
notes , wi thout-- 

A. I don't remember-- that's another one 
of those retrospective recollections, only because 
we had a discussion about that after all of this 
became-- came to the light of day. 

Saying, "Did you take notes? No. No. 
No. " 

Larry said, "I think I took notes," and 
I'm not sure if it was that meeting or another 
one . 

I don't really have an independent 
recollection . 

You have to understand, it's a table 
considerably smaller than this, and he brought in 
ail of these files, and he had color photographs 
he had out, and all these pieces of paper spread 
around on the table, and newspaper clippings and 
things, and it was just full, so, you know, a-- 
lot of stuff spread out. 

Q- Do you recall any discussion aft that 

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■eeting about the use of a grand jury? 

A. No. 

My most vivid recollection of that , 
meeting is that Jeff-- we were asking after a 
while, talking to Jeff, saying, "What do you think 
you have in terms of the law," and he was talking 
about Neutrality Act violations and he kept 
mentioning the Boland Aaendaent, and Dick and I, 
embarrassing enough to say, we had no idea what 
the Boland Amendment was. 

We hadn't followed that and weren't 
aware of it, and we said, "What's the Boland 
Amendment," and Jeff described it, and I said, 
"Shouldn't we look it up to see what it says, you 
know, just to make sure," that kind of 
discussion. 

The legal aspects of what it was, did 
it have a criminal penalty, what did the 
Neutrality Act mean. We spent a lot of time going 
back and forth on the elements, you know, of the 
Neutrality Act violation. 

Q. When the discussion of the Boland 
Amendment came up, was it you who went and got Mr. 
Leiwant? 

A. Inaway,yes. ; 



JA 
r 1 » /T 



ES, INC. 
t ni-»n (■\c\^\ ■> 7 1 - 1 e ; T • 



769 



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We couldn't find it in the books. Leon 
has the USCA in his office, and we couldn't find 
it, so I volunteered to get it out of Juris, whiph 
is the computer-- I said that it must be in Juris, 
which is the computer, and I went to Juris, and 
when I went to the Juris terninal, David was 
already sitting at the machine on line researching 
something, and I said, "I need to get something," 
and he offered to get it, and frankly, his 
reputation in the appellate section, he is very 
handy with the computer, and what would have taken 
me a long time to get out, he got it in a few 
moments, and I said, "Dave, I'm looking for 
something called the Boland Amendment. I don't 
know when it was. I know that it deals with the 
Contras," and I said, "Please bring it to Leon's 
office," and I came back, and a little bit after 
that, David came in with a printout. 

Q. When Mr. Leiwant came in with a 
printout, do you recall who was at that meeting at 
that time? 

A. The same people. 

Q. To the best of your recollection, were 
all of the people there, present throughout the 
mee t i ng? 



m 



TAd^^rtVHTR-r ireTOCIATES, INC. 
172 West Flagler Street, Miami, FL 33130 (305) 371-1537 



82-690 0-88-26 



770 



mtftssm 



35 



A. I think so. 

There might have been phone calls and 
things, and people walked in and out, because my4 
recollection is that it was just very, very long. 

I know that I get very restless, you 
know, si-tting for long, long periods of times, and 
it seemed like it was dragging on and on and on, 
and I suspect people got up and left and got 
coffee and came back, something like that. 

Q. In the context of discussing the Boland 
Amendment, as you may now know or knew then, the 
Boland Amendment deals with government aid to the 
resistance forces. 

In the context of discussing the Boland 
Amendment, do you recall what form the government 
aid-- the allegations of government aid took, how 
the governaent was supposedly involved with this, 
with this group of people who were allegedly 
assisting the Contras? 

A. Not specifically, except in the 
beginning, when Jeff was describing what he had 
found out till then. 

There was a section when he was 
describing these telethons that had been conducted 
in the Miami area over the Latin radio stations. 



.....JMiart.,: 



NC. 

(30 5 ) 371-15 3 7 



771 



WASsn 



36 



you know, fund raising telethons, and he mentioned 
some group that met out in the Everglades and gave 
training and gave some guns that went on to Eigh^ 
in Costa Rica. 

As it turned out, it was some six or 
seven AR-15's, something like that. 

I think it was in the context of money 
raised locally by this Cuban- Amer i can 
organizations here. 

Q. And possible government involvement 
with that fund raising? 

A. No. At least I don't recall that being 
how-- that was the context of the money part of 
it . 

There was also a discussion of a Howard 
Johnsons-- that's kind of coming back to me-- this 
meeting at a Howard Johnsons, and I remember that, 
because it was so bizarre. 

There was a meeting at a Howard 
Johnsons here in Miami, where all these people 
had, like, a little mini -convention , I guess, and 
they sat around and planned when they were going 
to land, what they were going to do, and all of 
this kind of thing, and I think there were people 
there talking about raising money, but it* just 



7? u»»t Flan 



mmm 



TES, INC. 
ILL lajLiO /■»n^^ T7i_it;-> 



772 



iiiwsro 



seemed- 



the only thing that sticks in ray mind is 



the recollection of the telethons, because I 
thought who would have thought that would have , 
been a way to raise money like you do for cerebral 
palsy. 

Q. Just my question is really directed as 
to why there were thoughts that the Boland 
Amendment might be implicated. 

The Boland Amendment speaks to 
government assistance, and so forth. This sounds 
like private efforts. 

A. See, I don't know. That's why we 
wanted a copy of it. 

None of us were sure what it said. 

Jeff kept throwing Boland Amendment 
around, and I said, "You know, do you know 
precisely what it says," and it seemed to me he 
was very vague on it. 

He said, "It just prevents aid to the 
Contras," and that was his initial position, and 
then we got the printout. 

i don't think it was being looked at 
from the perspective that the Boland said it was 
limited to the types of people who could give aid, 
because we didn't know what the Boland Anfendment 



--JlittliSSW-. f. 



C 1 > .^ 1 •< 



773 



said at that point, or we didn't have it in front 
of us to tell. 

Q. Do you recall any telephone , 

conversations in the context of that meeting, that 
related to the case? 

A. No. I don't-- you can't say that no 
phone calls occurred during the course at that 
meeting. 

It was long, and, you know, Leon's 
secretary buzzes him, this, that or the other, but 
I don't recall-- I certainly don't recall any 
phone calls that were significant enough for it 
to-- the U.S. Attorney to turn around and relate 
it to us, so in that context, I don't remember, 
you know, any phone calls. 

Hell, it could have been or could have 
not been . 

I do not know, and this is disputed 
again, we go back and discuss what happened at 
that aeeting-- I do recall being present in the 
rooa when there was a conversation regarding the 
Neutrality Act with Mark Richard, and it was 
sonething to the effect of, you know, what are the 
elements of the Neutrality Act, and ny impression 



was that we had calle 



we had ca 1 1 ed MajLl^Uchard , sim 

.HM EH^ML 



Riy 



172 West Flagler Street. Mia ai. FL 33130 (305) 371-1537 



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1 because he supervises that section that deals with 

2 Neutrality Act violations, in the hopes they had 

3 already briefed this issue in the past, because * 

4 there have been Neutrality Act violations brought 

5 probably in the mid '60's or so, and hoping they 

6 had some briefs and memoranda prepared on the 

7 elements of the Neutrality Act, and could send 

8 those to us and save all of us some work on that. 

9 Q. Has that in the context of the April 

10 4th meeting? 

11 A. To my recollection, I thought it was, 

12 but I only think of it as being then, because I 

13 have a vivid recollection of really-- of talking 

14 about the Neutrality Act at length during that 

1 5 meeting . 

16 I know that I was the one who 

17 personally owned that book, and we were 

18 discussing, what does it mean. 

19 To set foot from, that sticks out in my 

20 Bind, because I said that, "Set foot from". 

21 I know we discussed the Neutrality Act 

22 and the eleaents of it at that meeting, is why I 

23 believe that's when the, you know-- we called Mark 

24 Richard to find out if they had the briefs on it. 

25 The Mark Richard call-- it could have 



JACI 



S, INC. 



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miASSifita 



40 



been some other time, but it just seems to me that 
must have been. 

That's the only call that I remember,* 
you know, actually having a conversation relayed 
back to us, saying, yes, they do, but they have 
got these briefs and it has been done before, and 
don't re-invent the wheel, wait to get it. 

Q. Does this office, by the way, maintain 
any phone records, toll records? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Would those be helpful in determining 
whether FTS calls took place during that meeting? 

A. Yes. I would imagine. 

Q. Have they been maintained for-- 

A. Well, FTS toll records-- I don't know 
who keeps FTS toll records. 

It's either the administrative 
department or us, but I imagine they are kept. 

I know that we have whatever telephone 
toll records we have, were sent to-- on a written 
request by letter from the independent counsel. It 
was sent. 

Q- Do you send originals or copies? 

A . Copies . 

Q. Could we at some point, look alt the 



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originals for, it would be March and April ot 



16? 



A. They should be here upstairs in-- 

Q. Let's see if we can straighten that o«t 
before the end of the day. 

If you would look at that-- 

*• Yes. When we finish, I can call the 
admin people and have them bring the originals to 
the room so you can look at them. 

Q- In the course of that meeting, do you 
recall any discussion at all indicating that Main 
Justice or anyone, for that matter, wanted the 
case to proceed slowly? 

A. No . 

Q. Do you recall anyone at that meeting, 
instructing anyone else to handle the case in a 
slow or dilatory fashion? 

A. No . 

That has been the-- has been the most 
perplexing part of this whole case, when the 
allegations first arose, where they have come 
from, and we speculated a million things, and this 
was the last thing that we could have imagined 
when we did find out what it was. 

Q. Do you recall any discussion at that 
meeting of Steve Trotter or Jensen? .' 



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TES, INC. 



777 



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No . 



Q. Do you recall any discussion of the 
Attorney General? 4 

A . No . 

The only name that I recall coining up 
was Mark Richard, as a department person. 

Q. This is at any meeting? 

A. That's what-- well. Trotter and Jensen 
wouldn't stand out, but I know the Attorney 
General's name would, and that was an important 
person . 

Q. Do you recall anything else about that 
meeting on April 4th? 

A. That when it broke up, I don't think 
anything had really been resolved, other than JeEC 
was asked to put the facts down in writing, that 
maybe by articulating the* in a written form, you 
know, he aight be able to sort it out better so it 
would be aore understandable, and that's how he 
left it, is put it in a Heao, you know, to 
organize the case, so aaybe we can get a focus. 

It just seeaed to be all over the case, 
the gun case, the Neutrality Act, whatever. 

Q. And again, you don't recall the 
discussion about whether the case was reafdy to go 



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A. 


I don • t 


recall 


that being discussed at 


that 


point . 










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There was a 


point 


where 


- - a meeting 


where we 


discussed 


and 


ma 


de suggestions of things 


to d 


be 


fore going 


to 


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, like, getting 


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so 


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because you 


don't want to 


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who- 


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t to be more 


focused 


and organized. 


bu 


t I 


don * t 


think it was at 


that 


meeting. 
















My impression 


was 


that 


it was at a 


late 


r meet ing . 














Q. 


Do you reca 


11 


any 


discussion at that 


meet 


ing. 


of potential 


Con 


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siona 


1 votes on the 


Cont 


ra aid issue? 














A. 


I don't 


recall 


it. 


but 


Jeff said that 


he mentioned it. 














Q. 


At that 


mee 


tin 


g on 


the 


4th? 




A. 


Yes . 
















I think 


he 


says that he 


mentioned that. 




Q. 


That there 


was 


an 


impen 


ding vote? 




A. 


Yes . 














Q. 


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A . Not really, I don • t . 

If it was mentioned, you know, I jcist-- 
it didn't leave an impression. I don't remember^ 
it . 

Q. And you don't reaenber any response or 
any discussion Eroa that-- at that point? 

A. No. 

You have to reaeaber, you were at the 
point where two of the people in the rooa, Dick 
and I, had never even heard of the Boland 
Aaendment. I know it sounds odd living down here, 
but-- 

MR. GENZMAN: Let ae interject. 
BY MR. GENZMAN: 

Q. Uhat did Jeff recall about mention of 
the Contra aid vote? 

A. I recall Jeff saying that he-- you 
know, this is a very hot topic, you know, this is 
a hot topic in Washington, a lot of controversy. 

I think he expressed it like that. He 
did aention it, and this is in a aceting that we 
have had, to see what happened at that aeeting, 
that we don't reaeaber. 

He said "Yes, I just mentioned it in 
passing, and you and Dick were oblivious,;" and we 

ja|JT||||^ 

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1 went on to something else. 

2 Q. Did Feldman mention uhere he had 

3 obtained his information about the Contra aid voV:e 
4 ■ i n Washi ngton? 

5 A. No, but I suspect that he was really 

6 probably reading the papers more avidly, and 

7 having-- following that portion of the case, may 

8 have been following news reports in the news, you 

9 know, and things relating to Nicaragua, you know, 

10 more closely than the rest of us. 

11 Q. You didn't get the impression he had 

12 been relating this to his trip in-- 

13 A. Oh, no . 

14 I remember at the meeting he had 

15 newspaper articles, photographs, and that wasn't 

16 only fro« local papers. 

17 He had gotten clippings from things 

18 about that, but my impression was that he got it, 

19 juat siaply because he was interested and he was 

20 Collowing the developments. 

21 MR. GENZMAN: Thank you. 

22 BY MR. MCGOUGH: 

23 Q. We understand that there was another 

24 meeting on this matter on April 11th, which was 

25 the day of the FBI shooting down here. At; least we 

172 west Fla^ ^l^BpMliljJ'T"L"3 13r'(3 05 ) 37 1-1! 



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have been informed that there was a meeting that 
day . 

Do you recall a meeting on that day? , 
A . No . 

Well, what I recall that day, is-- in 
Eact, I was the acting U.S. Attorney that day, 
because Leon was away and he was due to arrive 
back some time that afternoon from-- I think he 
was in Great Britain, and then the shooting thing 
developed during the course the day, and it became 
very, very hectic around here, and that was also 
the day when-- 

What I recall that relates to this 
case, was that-- and I don't know who told me 
this. It may have been Jeff. Probably is, because 
Jeff would come in to see me a lot, tell me this 
is going to happen and that's going to happen, 
that there was supposed to be an AP article coming 
out about his case, and I said, "Fine, because we 
can't deal with all of this. This is really a 
horrendous thing happening." 

He had the FBI pick Mb up at the 
airport and bring hia right into the office, and I 
couldn't-- you know, we were trying to deal with 
things, how did the shooting occur, and pending 

iii^ini Aooinri 



JACK 
72 West Flagl_e 



MfliSMm^ 



, INC. 

'2 2 1 30 (305^ 371-153 7, 



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ausa' 3 



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out to the scene, because we didn't want 



the locals questioning the agents, you know, and 
it was just a very intense day, and I just don't* 
think that would have been it. 

Q. Up to that point, up to the point o£ 
the FBI shooting, do you recall any discussion of 
the potential political impact o£ Jeff's case on 
what was then Mr. Kellner's pending-- I don't know 
that he had been foraally nominated then, but he 
was acting U.S. Attorney at that time? 

A. Yes. I think he was acting at that 
time, and he had been nominated. 

Q. Do you recall any discussion at any 
point, the potential impact of the-- Mr. Feldman's 
case on Mr. Kellner's nomination? 

A. No, I don't, but because this has come 
up before, Jeff tells me that he did say that to 
me, and, you know, he says he said it. 
He says he said it. 

I don't recall the discussion, and he 
may have said it and my comment, "So what," 
because there was no other nominee, and nobody 
else who wanted the job. He was the only one. 

It was inconsequential, from the day 
that Stanley left to be a federal judge, :and-- he 



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17? Hp«t Flflnipr^Tr^rr Mi^.i ft. ^^nn r^ns^ iTi-is-* 



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48 



says he nentioned it and he thought that, you 
know, that was something relevant to bring up, 
but, you know, I just-- he may have brought it up 
tome. 

I know I didn't remember it, and I 
don't remember it coming Cro« me. 

Q. And you don't recall discussing it with 
anyone else in the context oE this case? 

A. In the context of this case, no, except 
about being asked about this, by other people, as 
a result of, you know, the different 
investigations . 
BY MR. GENZMAN: 

Q. If I can interject-- can you give your 
best recall of what exactly Feldnan said about 
this issue? 

A . I really can ' t . 

I have to just totally rely on Jeff's 
recollection of it, and I'm relying on him, simply 
because he's the most compulsive human being I 
have met. He's so certain about everything, and 
I'm just fuzzy, so I have to assume he did tell 
me, if he said he did. 

Q. What did he say he had told you? 

A. That he said-- he had asked me; if Leon 



784 



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49 



had been, you know, finally appointed-- 
Q. Confirmed? 

A. Yes, as the U.S. Attorney, and I 
probably said, you know, no, that it's pending. 

I guess it was pending at that time. I 
don't know, it's pending before the House or 
before the Judiciary Committee, whatever, and, you 
know-- "Well, do you think they may be holding it 
up or something," and I said no. 

What I wish, and I haven't asked Jeff 
this and it just occurred to me, maybe the timing 
of it would have helped-- if it was maybe about 
the time-- there was a period of time when 
allegations started surfacing about JefC's case, 
and I don't know if it was in that period of time 
when it would have made sense to say it, because 
of the context. 

I don't remember the whole thing at 
all, period, let alone the context. 

Q. Has Feldman with his compulsive 
demeanor, able to pinpoint the time at which he 
had previously told you that? 

A. I don't remember if he did. 

I would have to ask him. 

We went over his chronology. .1 didn't 



JAC 
172 West Flagyl 



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have it in here, so I don't know. 

He may actually know. He may actually 
not much a recollection of when he said it, 

A 

either . 

I don't know that . 

Q. But you don't reaeaber that 
conversation? 

A . No, I don • t . 

There was a point, you know-- we met a 
lot. Not to put in the foraal sense of the word, 
but I have-- I guess it's part of my job 
description, whatever, !'■ just sort of there when 
somebody needs something, soaething comes up, you 
know, my doors are always open, and I guess my 
office is first before you get to Dick's, and 
people just come in. There was a period where he 
started stopping by more often. 

I don't know when or how often, or 
what, because it's not by appointaent or anything 
that would have recorded it. 

Q. If he had made such a statement, do you 
think he would have remembered it? 

A. I think so. I think so, although-- see, 
the problem is that then it wouldn't have meant 



anything, 



IINCLASSm 



JACK BESONER S. ASSOCIATES, INC. 
172 West Flagler Street, Miami, FL 33130 (305) 371-1' 



786 



UNEtrnFlffl 



It only becomes important now, you 
know, with this whole thing, and iC I had only 
known this was going to happen, I would have , 
remeinbered it then. 

I would have done a lot of things. I 
would have written it all down. 
BY MR. MCGOUGH: 

Q. Shortly after the FBI agents were shot, 
the Attorney General caae to Miami to visit the 
FBI . 

Do you recall that? 

A. I recall-- yes. I saw it on television. 

Q. Did you have any contact with the 
Attorney General during this visit here? 

A. No . 

Q. Did you discuss the Attorney General's 
visit with Mr. Kellner? 

A. Only because after they had run into 
each other at the hospital, Leon called me, and I 
I don't remember if it was the weekend, but he 
called me up and said, "Guess what. I was invited 
to be in the group of people that-- dignitaries 
that went with the Attorney General that went to 
visit the wounded agents. They drove ne out in a 
limo." He was very excited. 



set, Miami, FL 33130 ( 



JACK BESONI 
172 West Flagler Street .' 'Miami . FL 33130 (30 5) 37 1-153- 



787 



yN CUSSIFIED 



We see ourselves here, very remote from 
the department. 

If you ever have been a AUSA-- people* 
in Justice refer to us as the field. We're 
provincials, and the very fact we would get to rub 
shoulders with dignitaries-- 

Q. I was a AUSA in Pittsburgh, and that's 
even more of the field. 

MR. GENZMAN: I was in Orlando. 

MR. PERKINS: I was in San Francisco. 

THE WITNESS: But Main Justice refers to 
us as the field, and that's ny recollection of it, 
and the thing was, you know, "I got to be in the 
group that was there, and watch the news. I'm 
going to be on TV." 

I think the local news stations carried 
the visit, because it was so intense, the pulicity 
surrounding the shootings. 

The press followed everybody around, 
and I think they stood outside the door of one of 
the hospitals, and Leon was standing in the 
background, and the Attorney General said a few 
words about how brave they had been, and that kind 
of stuff. 

Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Kellnter, 



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, INC. 



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anything that he might have discussed with the 
Attorney General? 
A. No. 

In fact, I was really surprised to find 
out-- was only well after that, I found out during 
that visit, he had been asked about Jeff's case. 
Q. And when did you find that out? 
A. At soae point when all of these things 
started surfacing about the Meese call to go slow. 

At first we thought it was a joke. We 
all have a joke, "Well, because I wasn't there 
when Heese called". 

We just all called about it. We laughed 
about it, and said, "This will go away. It's a 
silly thing," and it never did. 

I don't reaeaber the timing of this, 
but we saw some article that quoted a Department 
of Justice person saying that yes, Meese had 
talked to the U.S. Attorney in Miami, but it, you 
know-- he had never said to do anything one way or 
the other about the investigation, but I know 
there was an article about it. 

I said Leon, "Look at this." I think 
it was a Wall Street Journal, but we called public 
affairs and said, "Who is saying this," a(nd as it 



172 west FlattPliltlJ9vlfffiVFr3313r(305) 371-1537 



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1 turned out, lota of calls back and forth, what 

2 they were referring to was the meeting that they 

3 had had while they visited the injured agent in , 

4 the hospital, and that's how it came up. 

5 Hesaid"Yes, that's theonly time, 

6 never on the phone," but the way the article had 

7 it printed, it made it sound like it had been a 

8 phone-- made a phone call, and I don't know the 

9 timing of that article, when it caae up, but it 

10 was another one of these days where he spends 

11 hours on the phone back and forth, until we were 

12 able to get the facts about what had happened. 

13 Q. Going back to the end of the April 4th 

14 meeting-- after that meeting was over, what is 

15 your next recollection of any contact with the 

16 Costa case? 

17 A. Probably-- the only thing I recollect 

18 offhand, is reviewing the meao, when he did 

19 soaething down on paper. 

20 Q. Would this have been the first draft of 

21 the aeHorandua? 

22 A. Probably. 

23 Q. Ue've been told that that acaorandum is 

24 dated April 28th, or thereabouts. 

25 Is that-- do you have any reason to-- 

I — imiis^i£ii»... ..c — 

172 West Flagler Street, Miaai, FL 33130 (305) 371-1537 



790 



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A. No. I don't have any reason to doubt 
it . 

Q. Put it at a different time? ^ 

A . No . 

I'm just relying on that. 

Q. What do you renember about that 
memorandum? 

A. Very little independently, other than I 
know I-- I saw some of the sentences were 
extremely long, and it was very long and 
confusing, and I probably made some editorial 
suggestions as to clarify who's talking or who is 
saying this, that type of thing. 

Q. To whom did you make those suggestions? 

A. To Jeff, I have to assume. 

I seem to recollect that we were back 
again in, you know, in the office, at the 
conference table, discussing the memo, and-- 
really, that's about all I recollect about the 
memo, itself . 

Q. Hhy would you review the memo? 

A. Probably because I had been there when 
he first raised the issue, and sometimes I'm used 
as the litmus test because of not having, you 
know, a^ deep a criminal background as th>e others, 

IT 



172 West F 



mmrn ^ 



M IISMpIATES, INC 
rTeT, Miami, FL 33130 (305) 371-1537 



791 



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56 



to 3ee if it is in plain enough English so i can 
follow who did what to whon and when. 

Q. Do you know i£ Mr. Feldman gave you t^e 
memo or merely Kellner gave it to you, or how it 
came to you? 

A. No, I don't think so. 

As far as I know, we were all given 
copies and sat there and went through it together. 

Although, you know, I may have had it 
before then, and it may have probably just sat on 
my desk . 

Q. Do you recall soae press reports-- I 
believe they were in May, but don't hold me to 
this-- that the Department of Justice had recorded 
there was no investigation? 

A. Oh, yes. I reaember that very well. 

Q. Can you tell me what happened there? 

A. Before that article came out, and-- 
and, in fact, I can even tell you what led up to 
that. 

Ever since Jeff got back from his trip, 
and back-- it started right after that AP article, 
that happened at about the tiae of the shooting, 
either the 12th or 11th, the very day of the 
shooting, about the gun running and flighfts out of 

MMs^ 



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Fort Lauderdale, we started getting on a regular 
basis, calls about the case, and about that time, 
also people-- and I mean, people calling, and 
saying, I think, this, that, or the other thing, 
you know, and I called public affairs and told 
them, you know, "Look, we have an investigation, 
and we're just getting drowned." 

It would seem to me-- "Drowned, getting 
at least two calls a day on the this thing, and 
I'm going to start referring them up there." 

They started getting calls, and-- they 
said, "What is the case about? Tell me something 
about it? Tell me what to say," and I said, "So 
far, this in the beginning. This is in the 
beginning stage, but it's an ongoing 
investigation. So far we don't have a lot to go 
on . " 

Q- Who are you talking to at DOJ? 

A. For sure, Pat Corton. 

Q. C-o-r-t-o-n? 

*• C, and it may be e-n at the end. I'm 
not positive how it's spelled. 

Possibly John Russell, but at any rate, 
they had-- they had an inquiry, because it's not 
unusual, public affairs gets inquiries atfout 



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.MJiSm... ;;,..„ ,.,.,.. ' 



793 



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58 



different offices, and they call and say, "Tell me 
what to say? What is the case about," and it's-- 
even today as we speak here, what we have got, , 
half a dozen AR-15'3 arrived, some hand grenades, 
a mortar, launcher, and an assortment of hand 
guns, hardly what you would have a war with. 

That's what's provable, and that's what 
we have to this date, and-- 

You know, the next thing I see — look 
at this, it looks-- what the New York Times did, 
called them up, and say-- the New York Times 
article, where they say it's about a half a dozen 
guns or so, which is true, but they characterized 
it as not being an investigation, but they 
characterized it-- I thought it was from the 
eupheaisB they used-- they said it was less than 
an investigation, but something like an inquiry, 
words like that . 

Q. They, being the article, or they, being 
the Departaent of Justice? 

A. Oh, no. Whoever was quoted in the 
article, in that New York Times article. 

Q. I guess that's ay point. 

Were they quoting somebody from the 
Department of Justice about that? ; 



WSLiSM 



7 7 u«.<,t Fla gler Street Miai 



ATES, INC. 

E_L 33130 f30■5^ I71-is^ 



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A. They said a Department of Justice 
official . 

I'm sure the article-- I don't know ii 
they named the article or not, but they quoted a 
Department of Justice thing. 

At that point, then everything took on 
a different meaning as far as we were concerned, 
but the way I saw that, I said, like, "This is 
terrible. They are making someone-- someone wants 
to make it sound like we don't have a case and 
we're not doing something--" this may seen very 
paranoid, but I said, "I don't like this, and we 
have to make it clear we do have a case," and I 
called public affairs and told them that yes, we 
do have a case, and, in fact, after that point, 
then we started talking about the case. 

Q. What did they say at public affairs 
when you called then? 

A. I don't remember. 

Q. Do you remember who you spoke to? 

A. I spoke with Pat Corton, but I don't 
remember . 

I'm sure it wasn't angry. I'm sure it 
was the kind of call, "Look, this is wrong. You 
have left the impression th^x^ i' "o case(. 



mm 

^ler Street , ! 



;ates, inc. 

172 West FJa'^re'r Street, Miami, FL 33130 (305) 371-1537 



795 



ONCUSSIFIED 



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There's an investigation, and it may not be grand 
jury yet, but an assistant is assigned to it, two 
agents, and interviewing people, and you shouldnit 
give that impression, it's less than what it is." 

Granted the a«ount of arms involved has 
always been small. The Miami Herald-- put this in 
context about the same time, something about six 
tons . 

All these publications are reporting 
tons . 

To date, as we speak today, we're 
nowhere near close to six tons, but about six 
guns, a mortar, a few grenades, a few hand guns, 
and maybe a sniper rifle, things like that, but 
not tons . 

He just aren't into tons, and, you 
know, I don't know-- it's very likely or most 
likely it was a misinterpretation, you know. I 
said, "It's just a few guns so far, so far no big 
deal," and that was interpreted to diminish what 
it was, that it wasn't tons. We are looking to 
make a great case. 

Q. Can you put a date on that? 

A. It had to be the day that the article 
came out. I think it was ii 



think it was in Hav. 

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I think I wrote down the date and time 
of the article when I was getting ready for this. 
I just wrote,, article. May of '86, New, 
York Times article. 

Q. Now-- 

*• Oh, the other thing I wanted to mention 
about that, is why it changed the character of 
things, was that after-- probability, I think 
Larry to-- anyway, at the time, just discussed the 
general facts, you know, "What is this? Why is 
this happening, when we do have facts, have 
this . " 

Then Jeff's aemo, which had originally 
been written down so we can understand the fact 
took on more significance. 

Now it became, "Write it down, because 
we want to have something deCintely in writing to 
show this is an investigation, that you did, in 
fact, talk to people, that we are, in fact, doing 
something . " 

Then the memo took on a different 
significance. 

Q. Do you recall receiving a second draft 
of that memo? 

A- No. I don't remember the difCerent 



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drafts, and there was a point that-- I really 
didn't contribute to the nemo. 

It was mostly, you know, others that , 
may have done editorial suggestions in the memo, 
because it was after that article in the New Ifork 
Times that the memo-- see, the memo was never 
intended to go anywhere. 

It was just for us, so we could 
understand the case. 

At that point, the nemo took on a 
character of, this memo is going to go to 
Washington, so the people in the department 
realize we have a case, and then it had to be 
looked at as other people were going to be reading 
it, and we had to make it very clear. 

After that point, I think it was looked 
at more carefully. 

Q. Do you recall seeing a draft of the 
■eao, and this would have been a draft which was 
approxiaately 22 pages in length-- in which Mr. 
Feldman felt it was appropriate to issue grand 
jury subpoenas? 

A. I always thought it was the first 
draft, but it ended up it wasn't. 

I was present when there was aj 



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1 discussion about the grand jury, whether to go to 

2 grand jury or not to. 

3 Idon'trecall thedateof themeetin^g, 

4 " but I was present during a discussion of the memo 

5 and that particular part of it, do we start a 

6 grand jury right now, or do we do, you know, what. 

7 Q. Going into that meeting, had you 

8 already read Jeff's memo? 

9 A. I'm pretty sure I had read it by then. 

10 Q. Going into the meeting, do you have an 

11 opinion as to whether the grand jury was 

12 appropriate or not? 

13 A. I don't recall-- what I thought going 

14 into the meeting, I don't recall, but I do know 

15 going into the meeting, as things developed-- this 

16 is-- granted my background for the past few years 

17 has been mostly civil and I'm learning a lot of 

18 criminal as things go along, but my limited 

19 knowledge of criminal cases, I felt that you still 

20 couldn't really understand the direction of the 

21 case from what was in the memo. 

22 That was my going into the meeting 

23 feeling. 

24 At the meeting, I know one of the 

25 things that I recall saying to Jeff, or, .'you know. 



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in the general back and forth of the different 
people who were there, is what did you plan to get 
out of the grand jury-- I mean, what were you • 
going to present to the grand jury, becau-se we 
couldn't overwhelm the grand jury with every 
single thing, you know, because we are-- and none 
of it nakes any sense to us, and it has to be more 
organized and thought through, or have a focus and 
direction, and then others had specific 
sugges t ions . 

Mine were aore broad. 
Q. Do you recall discussions of issuing 
subpoenas for records, bank records, gun sale 
records, that sort of thing, as opposed to witness 
subpoenas? 

Q. No. 

What I recall, I thought, was when we 
case up with certain naaes, that certain people 
hadn't even been interviewed yet, that that should 
be done first, and that I know bank records-- that 
decision was not nine. That was someone else, and 
about toll records, too. 

You also see toll records, to see if 
particular people were where they said they were 



at particular timeSc 



JACK BESONER 



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Q . Do you reca 1 1 -- 

A. All that had to be done. 

Q. Do you recall any discussion of the . 
down side or any argument against issuing bank 
record subpoenas, or telephone toll subpoenas? 

A._ Not specifically about this, but I 
imagine there must have been, because I have been 
in enough meetings on other cases, where I know 
there are certain downsides about them that are 
raised, especially in a case where we had no clear 
idea of what and whom was being targeted. 

Q. Do you recall who at the meeting, took 
what positions or-- as far as grand jury goes, or 
did people stake out a position? 

A. Nothing really stands out. 

I was probably less involved in that, 
because it's an area that I didn't feel very 
confident in, because I would suspect that Larry 
was the aost cautious, because Larry, by 
reputation in the office, he's knows as "Doctor 
No- . 

He's very conservative in terms of 
leaning into anything, and he's always-- turns 
out, he was generally right. 

His idea was, do your backgroifnd work. 



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investigative work, all this homework, and then 
you take it to the grand jury. 

He is a very detailed person, and thaX 
would probably be my guess. 

I don't know-- Dick, I don't-- I don't 
really have a particular recollection of what 
others were saying. 

Q. Oo you recall what position Mr. Feldman 
and Mr. Kellner took, Mr. Feldman and Mr. Kellner? 

A. Mo, I really don't. 

I know that Jeff, in spite of being 
very certain what to say-- very certain about 
things, like the facts of when things happened, 
and he also listened, and, you know, it wasn't 
like a heated discussion. I don't remember it 
being, like, somebody staking out a position, Jeff 
saying, "Yes. Yes. Yes. Go for it. Why are you 
holding me back," and others saying, "No. No. 
Me- 
lt wasn't just that acrimonious. I 
don't have that good of a recollection of it. 

Q. Has there a consensus come to at this 
meeting, regarding the grand jury? 

A. Well, my recollection is not that good, 
but my recollection is one of-- the agentfs were 



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supposed to go out an X, Y and Z people 
interviewed, and-- there were going to be some, I 
thought it was, airline records or something liW^ 
that, but-- maybe some toll records, that were 
going to be gotten, other things that were going 
to be gotten, and then sit down and re-visit the 
issue . 

Q. As you recall it, at least, there was 
supposed to be some sort o£ subpoena issued Cor 
some records? 

A. I think so. 

Q. At that stage of the investigation? 

A. I know there were going to be some kind 
of records maintained. 

I seem to recall airlines. Cor some 
reason, the airline records. 



Do you recall any ATF records? 

ATF records? 

Yes. 

No, but-- 

X don't mean ATP, I mean gun stores 
records that the ATF could obtain? 
A. That they could obtain? 

That doesn't stand out in my mind, but 
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Q. Let me make sure I have the people. 
There was Mr. Kellner, Mr. Feldman, Mr. Scharf 
and-- , 

A. Dick may have been there. 

Q. I understand, but we have Kellner, 
Feldman, Scharf and yourself? 

A. Uh-hu«. 

Q. And perhaps Mr. Gregorie? 

A. Right. 

Q. Anything else that you can recall, 
anybody else? 

A . No . 

Q. Is there anything else about that 
meeting you can recall? 

A. No . 

Q. What is your next contact with the 

case? 

A . Let ' s see . 

In By note on that Meeting, on May 
20th, Jeff recollects that-- now that I mentioned 
something about it, we were still unsure about 
what kind of case it was, whether it was focusing 
to be a gun case or Neutrality case, and we still 
needed to get better focused in on the law in that 
area to start developing those facts. ', 



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My next recollection-- I really didn't 
follow-up with the memo after that. 

I think I was shown the tnemo before ii 
went out. 

Q. Which memo were you shown? 

A. The final, you know, the ultimate memo 
that was sent out. 

Q. We understand that there was a draft 
that Mr. FeldBian did and subiiitted to Mr. Kellner, 
and then Mr. Kellner and Mr. Scharf or Mr. Scharf 
made some changes in that aeMO, and then it was 
the Scharf /Feldman meMO that went to Justice, and 
I did see the copy or-- 

A. I'm pretty sure I saw the ona that went 
to Justice, the old one that went out, without any 
cover on i t . 

Q. Do you recall anything about that 
nemoranduB? 

A. No, except that soon after it was sent, 
people knew about it. That was renarkable. 

Q. Have you any opinion as to how that 
memorandua found its way into the public domain? 

A. Did I have an opinion as opposed to 
facts? 

I have no facts that would leaJd me to 



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believe one way or the other, other than my 
cynicism of Washington, and that eventually 
everything that crosses the District of Columbia/" 
line, ends up somewhere in the public domain. 

Q. So it's your opinion that the memo was 
distributed out of Washington? 

A . Yes . 

Q. All right. 

A. And that's a strictly unfounded 
opinion, but based on personal prejudices. 

Q. The memo went to Washington, had an 
ultimate conclusion section, and that conclusion 
was that it was premature to involve a grand jury. 
Do recall that? 

A . Yes . 

Q. And it listed some reasons for being 

premature, and it said at one point, the grand 
jury at that stage, would be quote, a fishing 
expedition, close quote. 

Up until showing that reference in the 
memorandum, do you recall hearing discussion of 
the grand jury being a fishing expedition, and 
again, this may refer back to the meeting on May 
20th or at any other time? 

A. I don't remember that. ? 



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1 I do remember expressions of, you know, 

2 "You can't just let a grand jury run amock." 

3 You have got to have them focused, , 

4 things like that, uhich I guess amounts to the 

5 same thing, but just not in so many words. 

6 Q. Do you recall any reference to the harm 

7 that might befall innocent contributors to the 

8 accounts that might be subpoenaed in the event 

9 that subpoenas were issued? 

10 A. Yes. That was discussed at one of the 

11 meetings. 

12 Again, I'm not sure of which one, but 

13 there was a discussion-- you know, here's these 

14 people. They don't know what they are 

15 contributing to. 

16 They write out a check, and what is the 

17 result of this, what do we do with that, 

18 especially in this coB«unity, everybody-- I mean, 

19 one day it's earthquakes, and another day, mud 

20 slides in Coloiibia, or earthquakes in Honduras-- I 

21 mean, revolutions here and there. 

22 You go into little Havana on Southwest 

23 8th Street and walk into randomly nine 

24 restaurants, and where up north you see Jerry's 

25 Kids, and there you're going to have the JContras, 



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and then whatever the cause the people have there. 

This is an exile c omni un i t y . That's the 
uaytheydoit. » 

Q. Do you recall discussions of those 
facts in context of issuing grand jury subpoenas 
in this case? 

A. That you-- you know, it was discussed, 
the factors of the checks, as a result of the 
telethons, things like that, and we obviously 
couldn't be focusing on all those people, and what 
did we want out of it, and things like that, yes. 

Q. Did you have any input in the final-- 
this is after May 20th, up until the memo goes 
into the Department of Justice. 

Did you have any input suggestions or 
changes to that memo? 

A. No, not that I recall. 

Q. Now, the memo was sent to the 
Department of Justice on or about June 3rd. 

A. Yes. 

Q. At or after that time, what was your 
next contact with the Costa case? 

A. It was very really little, and then I 
went away, and people were on vacation. 

I returned^ mid August-- my neWt 

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1 chronology could have been at the very end of 

2 August, and Leon called me into his office and 

3 showed tne a mailing that he had received in a • 

4 large brown envelope, and he said, "Look at this. 

5 What do you think of this? You know, what do you 

6 make of this," and it was something from-- I think 

7 it was from Costa Rica, and it had affidavits in 

8 it of the people who had been imprisoned in Costa 

9 Rica, and it was juat very odd, you know, and it-- 

10 it just looked fishy to me. 

11 Infact, Isaid, "This isthekindof 

12 thing you kind of hate to have your fingerprints 

13 on. Who knows--" 

14 It was making allegations against John 

15 Kerry, allegations of improprieties, and purported 

16 to have sworn affidavits of these two guys that 

17 were down there, but all the facts we knew to date 

18 were totally contrary to some of the things that 

19 were stated in those affidavits. 

20 They could have been true for all we 

21 knew, but by now, you know, we were starting to 

22 focus on the case, you know. 

23 There was a lot nore public attention 

24 on it, and I said, "I just have a feeling-- I 

25 don't know-- for somewhere down the line,; we're 



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being set up by other people, but--" you know, "I | 

I 
suggest you immediately do not just hold this, but I 

passthislong." , 

Q. Old you discuss passing it along to 
whom? 

A. Yes, to submit that to Washington, you 
know, to make sure we-- make people aware we had 
gotten this packet. 

As it turned out, we learned we weren't 
the only people to get it. We just assumed we 
were singled out, and it turned out there was a 
mailing to other people, also. 

Q. Prior to late August, I believe the FBI 
gave a very thick prosecution memo to Mr. Feldman, 
and he passed it on to Mr. Kellner. 
Did you ever see that? 

A. No. It's not a prosecution memo, 
p-r-o-s, but after the last thing-- in the sense 
that we write prosecution nemos, before we 
initiate a RICO prosecution, something like this, 
but simply a compilation of all of the 302's, 
without characterization of inclusion, things like 
that . 

I was aware it existed, but I didn't-- 
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had gone on vacation, and I was getting ready to 
leave, so I was winding things up. 

I really didn't see that. » 

Q. You say you were aware of it. 

When did you become aware oE it? 

A. Soaetiae after that, that that had been 
prepared, and passed along. 

Q. Were you ever asked for any input on 
the decision, about what to do for the memo-- 

A. The prosecution aeno? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No. 

Q. After Mr. Kellner received-- after the 
episode in which he received the affidavits that 
you aentioned earlier in late August-- 

A. Uh-hua. 

Q. What was your next contact with the 
case? 

A. It was about that tiae when we started 
getting calls, saying, you know-- asking for 
coaaents on whether we were told to stop this 
case, you know, at the request of the Department 
of-- the request of the Attorney General, and, you 
know, froa there it just really snowballed, and 
the press saying-- I was sitting around laying 



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this is-- this was out of the blue. It's-- 

Q. You nean the press comments? 

A. Yes, the comments. , 

I mean, around here, it's often we're 
the last to know, and we usually get most of our 
information from the press, and that's how we 
first heard of this allegation. 

Q. When those allegation came in, did you 
go to Mr. Kellner or anyone else, to attempt to 
determine what the status of the case was? 

A . Oh , yes . 

Well, I discussed the allegations with 
Leon, and I imagine Jeff at some point. 

Q. What did they tell you? 

A. Starting in there, I really don't 
remember in terms of what the case-- we would have 
to see what Jeff was doing at that time. 

Garcia-- the Garcia sentencing on 
September 15th, seemed to be a landmark for the 
beginning of a lot of calls and things on this 
issue . 

Q. When you talked to Mr. Feldman, did he 
tell you that he had passed the prosecution memo 
on to Mr . Kel Iner? 

A. Hemayhave. ; 



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1 I was dealing from a very limited 

2 perspective of just dealing with little events as 

3 they cane up. < 

4 At that point, I really didn't see the 

5 day-to-day supervision of the case. 

6 The case now-- well, at some point, 

7 Jeff started working-- or one of the senior people 

8 started working with Jeff on the case. 

9 I don't know when that was. 

10 At that time, it was the person, Dick 

11 Gregorie's predecessor, Joe McSorley, and once 

12 Joe, you know, was assigned, to work on it with 

13 him, the rest of us kind of faded out. 

14 Q. Can you remember when the press 

15 inquiries about alleged pressure from Main Justice 

16 began to come in? 

17 A. The go slow calls? 

18 Q. Not the calls, themselves, but the 

19 ones-- 

20 A. I call them the go slow calls. 

21 It started with-- I know it started 

22 after I came back in August, you know, sometime, 

23 late September-- late August, September, they 

24 started. 

25 Q. Before the Garcia sentencing, Jhich was 



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in Septenber? 

I 
A. I think-- my recollection is that there | 

I 
was intense attention right around the time of the i 

Garcia sentencing, but even before that, there j 

was, just, like a call from here, a call from 

I 
there on this, so it was starting to maybe build 

momen tun . 

Q. Mr. Feldaan has told us that he passed 

along the prosecution meao to Mr. Kellner some 

tiBC in mid August or so, and ultimately, he got 

it back from Mr. Kellner in early November. 

If you were receiving press inquiries 
as early as the middle of September and taking 
them to Mr. Kellner at that time, was he giving 
you any indication as to what he was doing with 
the prosecution memo or with the case, in general? 
A. I don't recall any discussions in terms 
of the case, itself, but more discussion really 
Cocused on, you know, why is this happening. 

You know, it may be a very limited 
perspective to take, again, in retrospect, but 
that was it. It was very s i tuat ional ly oriented 
discussions . 

Q. I'll be frank here. 

The case from the time the prcfsecution 



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1 ■emo came in and went to Mr. Kellner, until it 

2 came out of his office on November 1st, very 

3 little, if anything, occurred in the case, and at« 

4 the same time, you were feeding press inquiries 

5 about this go slow allegation. 

6 Were you making an attempt to find out 

7 why the case seemed stuck in one place for the 

8 better part of three, four months? 

9 A. I imagine that 1 talked to Jeff from 
10 time to time about it, but I really didn't look 
XI beyond that, and, you know, I should have in 

12 retrospect, but I thought that, you know, things 

13 were just taking their course, and, you know, what 

14 was-- what was needed to be done, was being done. 

15 Q. Were you aware that Mr. Gregorie was 

16 reviewing the prosecution memo? 

17 A. No. 

18 !■■ trying to figure out at what point 

19 in time Joe left. 

20 I don't know if he started reviewing it 

21 when Joe left, or he just started reviewing it 

22 also at some point, but no. 

23 Q. you were not contemporaneously aware 

24 that Mr. Gregorie was reviewing-- 

25 A. No.Notreally,no. 

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I generally stayed out of the-- the 
specifics of the case at that point. 

I had very little contact with it. » 

To this day, I don't think I have seen 

the FBI pros nemo, the compilations of the 302's. 

Q. Do you recall when the C-123 in which 
Mr. Hasenfuss was riding, was shot down? 

A. Yes, I do. 

Q. How did you learn about that? 

A. Well, interesting enough, again, the 
press calls-- we had a very well known case, or 
famous, where Barry Scale was a prime witness. He 
returned the cartel indictment based on his 
testimony, and he flew a C-123 loaded with dope 
into Nicaragua, a trans-shipment point, and that 
was the basis for our cartel indictment. 

The immediate press reaction to that 
was that it was the same plane, and when Barry 
Seale had been assassinated in Baton Rouge, there 
was a lot of notoriety around it, and they had, 
like, a 20/20 show focused on Barry Seale, and all 
these things, so the initial calls we were gettin^j 
was, you know, was this the same C-123. 

There's just not that many of these 
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JACK BESO 



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Did you discu 



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down with anyone in relationship to Mr. Feldman's 
case? , 

A. To Jeff's case? 

At some time later, probably initially 
it was basically discussed in trying to find out 
if there was a connection with the-- the same 
C-123 that Seale had used at a later time. 

I mean, later could mean a day or two 
later, just not that same day. 

I know that I talked to Jeff about it, 
and/or Jeff came in, or I walked in where Jeff 
was, one of those things, and there was probably a 
general discussion about that in relation to this 
case, was there any indication this could have 
been something related to the people he was 
looking into, things like that. 

Just general-- I don't have specific 
recollections of what particular was discussed, 
other than, you know, yes, there probably was at 
some point, firm discussion-- got together and 
said, you know, "Do you think this relates to 
you . " 

Q. You say people got together. 

A. I wish I knew who, except, aga'in, I 



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would suspect it's Larry, Dick, and myself, and 
Jeff, and I'm not-- I don't have a fix on Larry 
and Dick, and also, that's not to mean-- there . 
were other meetings, you know, where Dick could 
have met with Jeff and Leon, and the rest of us 
not being there. 

I can tell you with certainly how 
much-- that as to David-- David's only contact 
with that case was with the printout on that 
particular date, contrary to the report. 
He did not work on the case. 

Q. Did you ever discuss-- 

A. Did not participate. 

Q. Did you ever discuss the Hasenfuss 
incident with Mr. Kellner? 

A. Probably. 

Q. Here you getting press inquiries at 
that ti«e, linking the go slow, the Costa case, 
with the Hasenfusi case? 

Is this-- the question is, is this the 
saae investigation? 

A. Yes. It was again about that file, 
when that was, again, cosing up again, and the 
other thing that had come up was Leon had given an 
interview, had talked to this man from- 



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Murray Wass-- I want to say New Republic. I can't 

remember now exactly what magazine it was, but 

I think that was, like, in September or so that , 
that happened, and that article came out around 
that time . 

That was, like, a retrospective of the 
Garcia and go slow, and that, I think, was in 
time-- happening about the same time as Hasenfuss. 

It all gets mixed together in my mind. 

I think it was all happening about the 
same period of time. 

Q. Getting back to that, do you remember 
having discussions with Mr. Kellner about 
Hasenfust and Costa? 
A. Yes. 

I just don't remember what we 
discussed . 

You know, can this be part of Jeff's 
case, what's going on, maybe it's more than six 
guns and a mortar, all of this-- maybe he's part 
of that? Is there any way to tell? 

Q. Do you recall discussing the correct 
status of the case with him at that point? 

A. I'm sure at that point it really got 
discussed in detail, having talked to-- who we 



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talked to, you know, the-- these people, what hav< 
they been telling you, that kind of thing. 

Q. Did you talk to Mr. Kellner about-- < 

A. What was Jeff doing? 

Q. What was Jeff doing and what was he 
doing about the case, where it was in the 
pipeline? 

A. I probably asked where it was and what 
wa sgoingon. 

Q. Do you recall what you were told at 
that time? 

A. No, I really don • t . 

I more vividly recall Jeff telling 
things, you know, than I do being told by Leon, 
what was going on. 

I'm sure we did have the discussions, 
you know, because it makes sense we would have. 

Q. Other than contact with the public 
information office, Pat Corton, did you have 
discussions with anyone at the Department of 
Justice on the Costa matter? 

A. No . 

Q. Are you aware, other than discussions 
with Mark Richard, of any communications between 
this office and Main Justice, on the Cost'a case? 



JKASSn. 






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A. No. 

Q. Do you recall any meetings or 
discussions-- ^ 

A. Wait a minute. I just want to clarify. 
I am not personally-- that's the only 
one I have a total independent recollection of. 

Now, since then I have heard Leon say 
he had discussed the case with others that-- 

Q. But at that time-- 

A. But at that time, I'm not aware of it, 
no . 

Q. How many trips did Hr . Feldman make to 
Central America? 

A. One. 

Q. Did you have any contact on the Costa 
case, with Mr. Mathis, Mr. Garcia's attorney? 

A. No, not directly, but that became a 
large part oC my life, when that thing came out, 
that article, the accusations against Jeff for-- 
that Jeff allegedly told Mathis to butt out or he 
was going to do it to him, something like that. 

By that time, because of the conduct-- 
a mother figure, whatever, but Jeff would come in, 
and he was down, would tell me, "I'm depressed," 
and I would boost him up, and when that happened-- 



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Jeff is very young, and he was absolutely 
des troyed . 

He was really beside himself. He « 
called me at home that night. Really didn't know 
what to do next, just really upset, something like 
this had never happened to him, and from that 
point on, it almost became my mission to keep Jeff 
boosted up and going on this thing, and him 
saying, "It looks like everything I do gets looked 
at wrong. How can they say this to me." 

That was a real important event in this 
whole scenario. 

Q. You never had any personal contact with 
Mr. Mathis? 

A. No. 

As a matter of fact, until this 
happened, I have no knowledge of who he was. 

Q. Up until, say, November of 1986, did 
you have any contact with any investigators from 
Senator Kerry's staff or any other Congressional 
investigators? 

A. I may have. 

You know, we got phone calls. May have 
gotten telephone inquiries. 

Q. Mere you ever interviewed by alnyone 



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froB those staffs, from the Congressional staffs? 

A. Over the phone or personally? 

Q. Personally. , 

A. Well, I don't recall, but there was a 
time we were being visited-- in that fall, we were 
visited by lots of people, and again, that's 
another one of those things where I wish I had 
kept logs, where I did have things of who it was, 
because it would have been nice to know who it was 
now, but I don't recall. 

I don't have any independent 
recollection of that. 

Q. Did you ever have any personal contact 
with Murray Haas? 

A. On the phone, and then I sat in on-- I 
think it was part of an interview he was having 
with Leon . 

Q. To the best of your recollection, did 
Mr. Kellner tell Mr. Uass anything that departed 
Cro« what you have related to us today? 

A. No. 

I thought-- what I was particularly 
angry at was because I think I was in the room for 
the part when he was asked, "Have you talked to 
the Attorney General 



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It wds a-- it was two distinct 
questions, which when he wrote the article, merged 



into one , 



The first part of the question was. 



"Did you talk to the Attorney General about the 
case," and Leon said, "No. No, except for that 
one event." 

He said, "No. I never got a phone call 
from him. Never talked to him about it." 
Q. All right . 

A. And the second part of the question, 
"Did you talk to the Attorney General at all," and 
he said, "Maybe half a dozen times in my life," 
and when he wrote the article, he put it in such a 
way that it made it sound like, although Kellner 
talked to him, the Attorney General-- he did at 
least speak to him half a dozen times about it. 

In the context of the way he put it, it 
was really pitiful the way he put it, and it 
bothered me that anybody would have done that. 

Let me say that was my first loss of 
virginity with the press, and I said, "This is the 
end of trus t now . " 

Q. Other than the pieces of correspondence 
or memoranda that we have discussed and t>he notes 



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you have-- said you saw, do you have any 
recollection of seek or having input any other 
correspondence, memoranda, anything like that? , 

A . Well -- 
BY MR. GENZMAN: 

Q. Any written products on the Costa case? 

A. No. No, because other than that memo, I 
don't really remember any other major written 
product on that case, involved in that case. 

Q. Let me ask the ultimate question. 

To your knowledge, did anyone in this 
office or in the Department of Justice, give or 
receive instructions or suggestions that the case 
should be handled in a dilatory fashion or someone 
should go slow or words to that effect? 

A. No, and you know what is really 
remarkable about this that really upset me to know 
end, if there was anything that we have after this 
whole thing came out, discussed, is how odd it was 
that nobody did anything or said anything, and 
that, you know, wonder-- maybe it was deliberately 
ignored or deliberately left alone, because 
somebody thought it might come back some day, 
but-- at the time it didn't seem to us it was 
going to be a highly charged case, just l;ike 



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another gun case in Miami, but nou, I really-- the 

fact nobody did anything is kind of interesting, 

I 
in itself. >. I 

Q. Since the time when Mr. Kellner and Mr. 
Feldman came to Washington to offer their 
depositions-- I think that was the end of April-- 

A . Yes . 

Q. Have you discussed with Mr. Kellner or 
Feldman, what occurred at those depositions? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And on how many occasions? 

A. When they came back, I was consumed 
with curiosity. 

Q. Did they tell you what questions were 
asked? 

A. Not specifically, other than the 
general topic matter was the go slow business, and 
then we know that, you know, Jeff was called back 
a second time, and he came back and he told me, 
"Ana, your name came up all of the time, you know, 
and now everybody wants to know if you said or did 
anything, to David," and I said, "Oh, great." 

Q. In the course of any of these 
discussions, be it the discussion on the 
chronology or the depositions, has anyonef ever 



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suggested to you or asked you to say anything that 
wasn-t truthful, or try to create a recollection 
you feel honestly you did not have? , 

A . No . 

Absolutely not, no. 

I'll tell you what-- this job just 
isn't worth it to have done it. 

Q. Have you had any discussions with Mr. 
Leiwant about this case, since the day he came 
apparently to you and told you that he had been 
the source of the story? 

A. Yes, and not of «y making, because I 
really-- from the day he went-- and it was to Dick 
and I-- Dick and I were talking, and he came in 
and told us, you know, "I have been so totally 
uncomfortable about it," and knowing, you know-- 
going back and saying, "Oh, my God, how did this 
thing come up," just trying to avoid any further 
thing, and immedia tely-- 

We're in the provinces, but we're not 
that stupid, realizing that the next step, 
anything we say beyond this would be interpreted 
badly, no matter what we did, so we specifically 
just tried to stay away. 

I made, you know-- David did c^sme in to 



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see me a couple of times, and it was about news, 
so on, and usually-- more mechanical questions. 

I think he was very upset when « 
different events happened. 

I recall a newspaper article the first 
time his name came out in the paper, he was very, 
you know, upset. 

You know, he came to see me, and said, 
"Do you know that my name is in the paper," and I 
said no, and it was-- he had a friend. It was a 
paper in another city, and he had a friend that-- 
who called him up and told him, and I think it was 
Boston. 

You know, it seems like it was Boston. 
I don't remember, and I said, you know, "Well, 
David, it's bound to happen." 

You know, "What can I tell you?" 

Then we had discussions about how he 
was going to go up there, I guess, when you guys 
talked to him the first time, the arrangements 
forjf the travel, and then when we heard that 
Hughes-- the Hughes Committee had voted to issue 
subpoenas and David was one of the people before-- 
he read it in the paper, and I went and told him 
that he would-- these things were going tio be 



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1 happening, and he was going to be, you know-- it 

2 was going to come out in the paper the next day. 

3 Q. Did you ever discuss your varying , 
4- recollections with Mr. Leiwant? 

5 A. Yes, on the day he walked in and told 

6 us . 

7 I think it was on a Monday, and it was 

8 in Dick's office, and I came in-- thought he was 

9 coming in to see Dick, and I was just leaving, and 

10 ^"^jK^said " No, Ana. I want to tell you something," 

11 and he told us this, and my thing was, how could 

12 you say this-- if I was supposed to have been 

13 there, I never-- I have never been in a room when 

14 Meese called about anything. 

15 BY MR. GENZMAN: 

16 Q. Can you remember, the best you can 

17 recall, what he told you and Mr. Gregorie on that 

18 day? 

19 A. I came in and he said he had been-- the 

20 reason he was coming forward, he had been called 

21 by Heydon Gregory and a reporter, and he felt it 

22 was going to come out eminently, and that he had 

23 to tell us that he had been in the room where-- at 

24 a meeting, although he doesn't remember Dick and 

25 Larry being there. 



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He just recalls it yas me, Jeff and 
Leon, and that he thought that Leon-- he was there 
and Leon was talking on the phone, and that he get 
the impression that he was talking to someone from 
the Justice Department, that he may have said a 
name, like. Trotter, Jensen at the time. I don't 
recall. 

When he got oft the phone, he said 
something to the effect that, "They want us to go 
slow," and said he grimaced and-- "I knew it was a 
joke," and that was that, and he went to Atlanta-- 
he's in the appellate section of the office, and 
he had gone to an appeal in Atlanta soon after 
that, and he ran into this good friend, John 
Mathis, and at some point had a couple of drinks 
with him, and said, "Guess what I saw or heard," 
whatever, and you know, I just remember after 
that, it all registered, because until that point, 
until thmt very minute, that was-- I had no idea. 

He were all running around, saying, "I 
know it's not me," and, you know, "It's you" and 
just all came together. 

I said, "But you were only at that 
meeting when you brought in the printout for a few 
minutes," you know. ^>«..^a»«»k •' 

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"Is that the meeting? Yes. That's the 
meeting . " 

I only remember-- just don't know ho**- 
you could remember that, and I was there, and the 
only call I ever heard was from Mark Richard, but 
at that point, some sort of happening, where you 
realize, this is the time to stop talking, don't 
want you to change your mind. If that's what you 
believe, fine, so be it, but our recollection is 
different. 

Q. What was Gregorie's response? 
A . Stunned . 

I don't think that Dick said anything, 
which is ironic. 

You know, this whole thing was over, 
and we sat down together over it. I said, "Dick, 
you're the great criminal advisor. He didn't ask 
how, when, where, what, how many people did you 
tell, and all of the relevant questions we are 
dying to know, because you just--" it could have 
blown us away. There was no way we could have 
ever thought that. 

Q. After that meeting, did you ever 
discuss the episode again with Mr. Leiwant, the 
different recollections? 



JACK BESONER 
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I asked you at the beginning, "Did you 
ever discuss it with him," and you said not of 
your own volition. , 

A. Yes, because after he was in 
Washington, he was deposed and he cane back, and-- 
I don't know the tiaing, but after he was deposed, 
and Larry Scharf was sitting there, and I just 
started spontaneously talking about-- he said, you 
know, "Well, I'« glad it's over." 

It was one of-- giving the impression 
it was all a big misunderstanding and it was kind 
oC resolved. 

He talked about it, and I don't really 
remember, because I know that Larry and I just 
kind oC sat there, surprised, you know, it was 
like a little recollection of what he had said, 
and I think he wanted to tell us, "Look, I took 
care of it all," or, "It's all straightened out." 

At least that's ay impression of the 
conversation, but we studiously avoided 
questioning hia, and saying although-- I think we 
did ask him, "You still don't even remember Larry 
being there," something like that, and I-- he 
probably said no. 

That was the other time when that was 



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discussed. 



Q. This is probably a hard question to 
answer, but I got to ask it anyway. , 

Do you know of any reason why Mr. 
Leiwant would say this? Do you have any 
explanation for it? 

A. For it? 

Q. Yes, just different recollections, any 
motivation Mr. Leiwant might have to-- 

A. To have done that? 

Q. To come up with this? 

A. I don't, and that has caused me no end 
of sleeplessness, simply because I always prided 
myself as having a lot of insight to people, and 
why people do things, or where people are coming 
from and why things happen, and this is just one 
of the most totally perplexing things I have ever 
been involved in. 

It's beyond me to understand it. 
Moreover, I'm still just amazed that 
David has no-- at least that I can perceive 
comprehension of what has happened as a result of 
this. 

I mean, he just doesn't appreciate-- he 
just thinks it's a slight mi sunders tandi n}g , and it 



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will go away . 

He had no understanding of the 
incredible hurt it has caused to people, and the* 
hurt it has caused him, which is kind of sad in 
another way, too. 

Q. Do you know of any political 
motivations or personal animosities, that you are 
aware of? 

A. No, simply because in the appellate 
section, I mean, it's a section in the office that 
just really isn't involved. 

He-- until then, he always enjoyed the 
confidence of the U.S. Attorney. 

I know he had been called in to work in 
special confidence, on projects and things, and 
the only thing that makes any sense, and it really 
could explain it, is simply that-- I don't say 
this happened for sure, but Mathis might have 
laid, 'I'm working on such and such a case," and 
he said, "I was there and they were discussing 
it," and talk, you know, exaggeration, you know-- 
I don't know, something to make yourself feel more 
important than you are, that you are in on 
something, and-- 

In fact, that doesn't really itfake 

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sense, but that's the only plausible explanation I 
could have for it. 

Then being caught in a situation, you, 
know, you're saying you never thought it would go 
beyond tha t . 

You know, the old story, you tell your 
kids even if you tell a little lie, at some point 
it becomes a big lie, and then you're almost 
commi tted to i t . 

I don't know if it was political. It 
would-- I never have just thought of anybody here 
as being political in any way. 

1 don't even know whether they are 
Democrats, Republicans or what. 

MR. MCGOUGH! I think those are the only 
questions that I have. 

Do you have any further questions? 
BY MR. GENZMAN: 

Q. Just a few. 

I heard you aentioned that Mr. Leiwant 
indicated it was just a misunderstanding. 

A. That was the iapression he gave me. 

He gave me that impression from his 
deposition in Washington that day, and it was 
almost as though-- and I find this remar Ifab le-- 




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almost as if he was making light of it. 

I guess it was to re-assure us, "Look, 
it's all solved, taken care of," almost a , 
childlike innocence about it. It was amazing. 

Q. Did he go into detail about the nature 
of the misunderstanding? 

A. No, because we didn't want to get 
really in it, but that was just the impression, it 
was, like, it was all taken care of, and he 
explained everything, and it was all, you know, 
done . 

I think it was, "Don't worry, guys. 
It's all resolved." 

Q. Has he ever expressed any occasions 
that he had been confused or had exaggerated the 
incident? 

A. Not to me. Not to me, but then, you 
know, maybe some day when this is over, I can say 
what did happen. 

1 just really would like to know what 
did happen. 

Q. But to your knowledge, he has always 
stuck by his account of what happened? 

A. I'm not really sure of what his account 
of what happened is, other than what he t:old us i 

.JMiiUSStt ' 

172 West F lagler Street, Miami, FL 33130 (30 "5) 3 7 i - i 5 3 7_ 



that day. 



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1 

2 I have to tell you, ny most vivid 

3 recollection is that I literally felt that I had* a 
*• lump in my throat, when I finally realized, 

5 "David, it's somebody here." 

6 You know, I think that's really what 

7 the overwhelming response was. 

8 He gave an explanation at that point. 

9 I don't remember it specifically, you know, what 

10 would have made him do that. 

11 Q. In conversations with you, his story 

12 has never been inconsistent, has it? 

13 A. No, but then I have never known the 

14 story, so that's one thing. 

15 Q. What I'm getting at, from what he has 

16 said on various occasions, have you found any 

17 inconsistencies or reservations or admissions of 

18 confusion or mistake? 

19 *• Only in that he's just remarkably 

20 vague. 

21 The story about the grimacing, because 

22 I know he didn't do anything, because-- "Leon 

23 went, who are they, and went ahead--" it's 

24 something that I don't even remember happening. 

25 That's the only thing-- that Ue 



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repeated again, when he came back, that little 
part of it. 

I re«e«ber that, so I guess he is , 
sticking with whatever he said. 

I would love to see what he said. 

I would like to see his deposition, but 
"^en we'll all know, because Hughes will have it 
and it will be on TV . 

MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing further. 

MR. MCGOUGH: Nothing further. Thank 
you . 

THE WITNESS: What I'« going to do is 
gratuitously add something, by the way. 

MR. GENZMAN: We ask you to do that. 
Tell us the answer to questions we should have 
asked. 

THE WITNESS: You mentioned I recall 
earlier something that triggered something that I 
recollected. 

You said how many times had Jeff 
Feldman gone to Costa Rica, and I recall seeing 
Ii iii i B Tam^s testify that there were two trips, and 
I came back to the office and I went to admin, and 
asked, "Did Jeff Feldman go to Costa Rica two 
times? Let me see his travel vouchers,", 'and there 



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was only one trip, so I went to Jeff and said, 
"You know, that wan said you were there two 
times," and then we started-- he was confused. . 

It was not Jeff Feldman. It was John 
Mathis, because he testified at some public trial, 
and for some reason, either-- I don't know, 
whatever. I'm not going to say he would 
misrepresent himself, but he got misrepresented as 
a U.S. Attorney, and that created some kind of 
inquiry to this office about unauthorized travel 
by a AUSA, and I said, "That's what that was 
about . " 

He had an inquiry about unauthorized 
travel at the time, and that's my gratuitous 
comment . 

MR. MCGOUGH: Okay. 
(Thereupon the deposition was concluded.) 



BIASSIFIED 



JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
"> U«a»- rixniAT- Qt-T-AAt- u;>»: or 1 1 i 1 n / 1 n c; \ 1 7 1 - 1 S '^ 



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CERTIFICATE 



STATE OF FLORIDA 
COUNTY OF DADE 



1, Stan Sep 
Shorthand Reporter and 
the State of Florida a 
that I reported in sho 
Barnett; that the depo 
that the foregoing pag 
103, inclusive, consti 
transcription of my sh 
depos i t ion . 

I further c 
counsel, 1 aa not rela 
attorney to this suit, 
outcome thereof. 

The foregoi 
apply to any reproduct 
any means unless under 
direction of the certi 

IN WITNESS 
affixed my hand this 2 



lin, being a Certified 

Notary Public in and for 
t Large, do hereby certify 
rthand the deposition of Ana 
nent was first duly sworn; 
es, numbered from 1 through 
tute a true and correct 
orthand notes of the 

ertify that I am not of 
ted to nor employed by an 
nor interested in the 

ng certification does not 
ion of this transcript by 

the direct control and/or 
fying shorthand reporter. 
WHEREOF I have hereunto 
2nd day <fi JmuA 1987 




Stan Sepp.i|n, CSR, NOTARY 
PUBLIC AT^LARGE. MY 
COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
12-25-89. 



yNClKSIFlEO 



JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC. 

177 M>« » P1anl».r StF-^^ Miam i. FI. mih M S ^ "( 7 1 - 1 ■? 1 7 



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i . . JIKDOTTIOJ "SITS J2J-^ m 

Scenographic Transcript of 
HEARINGS 
Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



DEPOSITJON OF LINDA JUNE BARTLETT 
Friday, June 12, 1987 



UNCLA$S!R[ 



Washington. D.C 



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1 DEPOSITION OF LINDA JUNE BARTLETT 

2 Friday, June 12, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Deposition of LINDA JUNE BARTLETT, called as a 

9 witness by counsel for the Select Committee, in the 

10 offices of the Senate Ethics Committee, Hart Senate 

11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 10:14 

12 a.m., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN 

13 SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of 

14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask 

15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her 

16 direction. 



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1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 VICTORIA NOURSE, ESQ. 

6 On behalf of the House Select Committee to 

7 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

8 JAMES BLACK, ESQ. 

9 On behalf of the White House: 

10 C, DEAN McGRATH, JR. 

11 Associate Counsel to the President 



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? 9 N T E N T S 

EXAMIffATIQN ON BEHAT.F nP 




Hl^i^S^ S£MIE HOUSE 
Linda June Bartlett 

By Ms. Nourse 4 
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1 

2 Whereupon, 

3 LINDA JUNE BARTLETT, 



4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 
^ EXAMINATION 

8 BY MS. NOURSE: 

9 Q Could you state your full name for the record, 
10 Ms. Bartlett? 

^^ A. Linda June Bartlett. 

^^ Q And sometime during 1981 you came to be 

13 employed at the National Security Council? 

^* A That's correct. 

^^ Q And at that time were you assigned to work 

16 with Ken deGraffenreid? 

^^ A yes, I was. 

^® Q And you left the NSC sometime during March of 

19 1987; is that correct? 

20 A That's correct. 

2^ Q And during that entire period you were 

22 assigned to Mr. deGraffenreid; is that correct? 

" ^ That's correct, except for a period of a month 

24 to a month and a half, two months. I was assigned to 

25 someone else. 

mmm 

under oro.icior ;f 5.0. 12356 

"^D. SirUo. .XJa'-cr I .urlty 



845 



UmSSiFIED 



1 Q Who was that? 

2 A Barry Kelly. 

3 Q Could you just give us a quick description of 

4 your duties on behalf of Mr. deGraf fenreid? 

5 A I was his secretary. I typed, took dictation, 

6 phones, filed — the usual. 

7 Q Let me ask you some questions about our 

8 favorite system. System IV, and System IV documents. I 

9 understand that System IV documents are those that relate 

10 to covert action or are highly sensitive; is that 

11 correct? 

12 A That's correct. 

13 Q And System IV documents are kept in a separate 

14 file room or safe that is taken care of by Jim Radzimski; 

15 is that correct? 

16 A He was in charge of those at one time. 

17 Q He was the security officer in charge of 

18 System IV documents up until November of 1986; is that 

19 right? 

20 A He left, yes, that fall. 

21 Q And Brian Merchant took over from Jim 

22 Radzimski as the security officer in charge of the files; 

23 is that right? 

24 A Yes. He took over temporarily, yes. 

25 Q To your knowledge, did Jim Radzimski and his 



UiUi^lFIED 



846 



y 



?, Of&grs 



1 successor, Brian Merchant, did they — how should I put 

2 this — let me ask this a different way. 

3 Did Mr. deGraffenreid, to your knowledge, 

4 supervise Mr. Radzimski and his procedures for taking 

5 care of the System IV documents? 

6 A Supervise in what way? 

7 Q Did Mr. deGraffenreid create the procedures to 

8 take care of those documents or did he approve the 

9 procedures that Mr. Radzimski would use to take care of 

10 the System IV documents? 

11 A I don't know how to answer that. 

12 Q If you don't know, you don't know. 

13 A Mr. deGraffenreid was head of the 

14 intelligence. 

15 Q And as head of intelligence he would have 

16 general responsibility for everything within the 

17 department, but you don't know specifically about the 

18 procedures; is that what you're trying to tell me? 

19 A Hell, since he was head of the intelligence 

20 directorate there and System IV documents were located 

21 there ~ 

22 Q Did he have overall responsibility to take 

23 care of the System IV documents? 

24 (Pause.) 

25 Let's move on for a minute. Let me ask the 



UNGtmiFIED 



847 



UNdlASSiFlED 



1 question in a more concrete fashion. Would Mr. 

2 deGraf fenreid and Jim Radzimski or, later, his successor 

3 have meetings, discussions about the System IV security 

4 procedures, to your )cnowledge? 

5 A I don't recall any specific meetings. I think 

6 over the years they must have. There would have been 

7 something there. 

8 Q On a day-to-day basis, if someone in the NSC 

9 wanted to see a System IV document would they go to Jim 

10 Radzimski? Would they go to Mr. deGraffenreid? Between 

11 those two, what would be the normal procedure? 

12 A If they requested a document, then they would 

13 go to Jim, or they may call through me. It would just 

14 depend. 

15 Q So you did get calls occasionally for System 

16 IV documents? 

17 A On occasion. 

18 Q They would call you and ask you to pass a 

19 message to Mr. deGraffenreid? 

20 A If Jim wasn't there, or I'd say well, you'd 

21 have to talk to Jim or something like that. 

22 Q Okay. Let me get this clear. If Jim 

23 Radzimski was not availzible for a System IV request, 

24 someone from the NSC might ask you to go look for the 

25 document, or would they ask you to. speak to Mr. 



ONWSiRED 



848 



10 



UNMSSFIED 



1 deGraffenreid about the document — just on a normal 

2 daily basis. I'm just talking generally. 

3 A If Jim wasn't there, then of course they would 

4 go through me to request the document. 

5 Q And was it your normal practice to then go to 

6 Mr. deGraffenreid and speak to him about getting the 

7 document, or would you go to the files and proceed to 

8 fill the request? 

9 A As a procedure, I would probably occasionally 
speak to Mr. deGraffenreid. It would just probably 

11 depend on — 

^^ Q So on some occasions you might speak to Mr. 

13 deGraffenreid — 

^* A And on some occasions I may just go directly 

15 to the files. 

^* Q By the way, did you know Mr. Radzimski? i 

17 mean, was he a part of sort of a team in the office, or 

18 was he off on his own doing his own job? Was he 

19 integrated into the whole intelligence directorate? 
2° A He was part of the office. He was working 

21 right in the office. He couldn't help but be part of the 

22 office. 

^' Q I» where he works just physically close to 

24 where you worked? I'm just curious. 

25 A Yes. 



UNKSSSIFe 



849 



uNciminEo 

Q Did he keep what you considered to be a very 
Close hold on the documents? Was he very protective of 
his domain, so to speak? 

Well, the documents were sensitive. 
Q was he generally considered a reliable person 
6 in the office? 
"^ A Yes. 



1 
2 
3 

4 A 

5 



Q 



He was a dedicated, reliable person. 
Let me ask you this, could you just tell us 
9 who had access to the System IV files? 
■"■^ A Physically? 

" ° Physically, the hard copy in the safe, who 

had the combination to the safe to have access to those 
13 documents? 

* ''*''' "-li-tically anyone in the office would 
have had access to the safes. 

Q Anyone in the intelligence directorate? 
A Yes. 

Q And could you just nam. for us those people in 
the office, to «a)ce sure we have a clear record? 

A At that time, of course, me, Mr. 
decraffenreid, Mr. Canistraro, Mr. Major. Who else was 
there at th. time? There was Jim, the secretaries there 



Q Kathy Gibbs? 

A Kathy Gibbs and Pat Rawson. And Colonel May. 

UNCI:^S$tflED 



850 



mms^m 



10 



1 Q He was in charge of space programs, as I 

2 remember, a highly relevant topic to this investigation. 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q Were the combinations in a separate location, 

5 a central location — the combinations to the safes — so 

6 that if someone wanted to have access to the safe they 

7 could go to a drawer and look at the combination? 

8 A Yes. The policy was to have them in one place 

9 and people would )tnow that one safe combination in case 

10 there was a necessity to pull it out. 

11 Q And everyone in the office knew where those 

12 were? 

13 A They were supposed to. I can't vouch for them 

14 all. 

15 Q Theoretically they knew. 

16 Now I understand Mr. Radzimski kept a computer 

17 record of his documents in the System IV files. Were you 

18 familiar with that computer system at all? 

19 A No. I never got involved with the computer 

20 aspect of it. 

21 Q Do you know if anyone else in the office was 

22 either involved with the computer aspect of it or knew 

23 how to run the computer? 

24 A That was brought up one time. I didn't have 

25 time to do it. Pat was trained on it briefly — Rawson. 



OiraiSSIflEB 



851 



mmmm 



11 



1 That must have been at least a couple of years ago — 

2 briefly. I'm not sure if she remembers how to do it. 

3 That was quite a while ago. 

4 Q Have you seen her actually using the computer 

5 ever? 

6 A Oh, at one time. As I said, this was probably 

7 at least two or three years ago. 

8 Q Were these occasions when you saw her using 

9 the computer two years ago, these are the times that you 

10 remember; or do you remember it occurring on and off? 

11 A No. We were severely understaffed. 

12 Q At the time? 

13 A At the time. 

14 Q So that when you saw her using the computer it 

15 was two or three years ago, or two years ago? 

16 A To the best of my recollection, yes. 

17 Q Was there anyone else in the office that was 

18 trained on the computer? 

19 A No, not to the best of my recollection. No 

20 one else was trained. 

21 Q Did Mr. deGraffenreid know how to use the 

22 computer, to your knowledge? 

23 A No, not to my knowledge. 

24 Q And you said that you yourself did not know 

25 how to use the computer; is that correct? 



UNCtASStflED 



852 



mmPB 



2 Q I take it as Mr. deGraf fenreid's secretary you 

3 had occasion to type in System IV documents; is that 

4 right — type for him? 

5 A Yes, that's correct. 

6 Q And you would get a number from Jim Radzimski 

7 for the document; is that right? 

8 A That's correct. 

9 Q Okay. Did you ever have occasion to type a 

10 document that did not have a number and was termed a non- 
11 log document? 

12 A When we submitted admin memos I don't believe 

13 we put them in the system. 

14 Q By admin memos do you mean memos dealing with 

15 administrative affairs? 

16 A Administrative matters. 

17 Q These memos did not include highly sensitive 

18 matter? 

19 A No. Those were usually unclassified. 

20 Q That's why they didn't get a system number, 

21 because — 

22 A Well, that was the procedure at NSC, whoever 

23 formulated the policy, but I'm not sure about that. 

24 Q These were day-to-day, normal affairs. Okay. 

25 Have you ever seen a non-log document? Did 



mwmm 



853 



wtmrn 



13 



1 you see a non-log document in the course of your duties 

2 as Mr. deGraffenreid's secretary? What I mean by that is 

3 a document that on the upper righthand corner, instead of 

4 the System IV number you will see the term "non-log". 

5 A I don't recall any specific particular 

6 documents. 

7 Q Let me as)c you again, to go back to the 

8 procedures for the System IV documents, if someone came 

9 to you and asked you for a System IV document, how would 

10 it be that that document would find its way back into the 

11 files? In other words, was there a procedure so that if 

12 an original was taken out of the files that it would go 

13 back in where it was found? 

14 Was there something that you did when these 

15 requests came to you? 

16 A Well, the person requesting the document would 

17 bring it back to the office. It would be logged back 

18 into the computer log, and then it would be filed back 

19 into the file itself, the hard copy. 

20 Q When you say logged back into the computer 

21 log, if an original were taken out, there would be a 

22 computer entry indicating that it would be taken out, to 

23 your knowledge? 

24 A That would be the procedure, yes. 

2 5 Q How many times would you say that requests 



mamm 



854 



ONCk^iFIED 



14 

1 came to you for System IV original documents? Was it a 

2 normal event — it happened every day ~ or was it once a 

3 month, twice? I'd just like to get some idea. 

4 A It's hard to say. It varied. There was no 

5 set pattern. 

6 Q Let me see if I can get you to be a little bit 

7 more specific on that. How many times during the course 

8 of your duties in a year would a request be made to you 

9 to pull a System IV original — ten times, 100 times? 
10 Can you give me any ballpark kind of figure? 

^^ A I really couldn't, because it varied — people 

12 requesting. 

^^ Q Would you consider it to be a normal request 

14 for a System IV document, or would it be unusual for 

15 someone to come to you for a System IV document? 

^* A It would be a routine request for somebody on 

17 the staff calling up for an intel report. 

^® Q And would these requests come to you generally 

19 when Jim Radzimski was unavailable or would people just 

20 talk to you? 

21 A It would depend. 

^2 Q Sometimes even if Jim might be available as 

23 well? 

^* A It would depend. Since, you know, they knew I 

25 worked in the intel office, it just would depend. 



mmim 



855 



25 



yNJiissifiED 



15 

1 Q What would you do when a request came in for a 

2 system IV original? You'd go to the hard copy, pull it? 

3 A I would ask the person handling the System iv, 

4 if Jim was there, if he could, if not, then I would try' 



5 to fill the rec[uest 

Q Okay, so normally if someone asked you for a 
system IV document you would go to Jim Radzimski and ask 

8 him to pull the document. He would do so. He would hand 
you the document, the original document. At that point 
would some entry be made somewhere to indicate that the 
document had been taken out of the System IV files? 



^^ ^ T^*^ "°"ld b« the correct procedure, yes. 

" Q would you make that entry somewhere? Would 

14 you make a written record? 

^^ ^ " *^" "^s "°t available, it should be on the 

15 computer, yes. 

^^ ° °^^y- I'» sorry to be so dense about this, 

18 but if w. can just back up a minute, if jia Radzimski 

19 were there and you had a request for a System IV 

20 original, you would bring it to him, he would pull the 

21 hard copy. He would make an entry on his computer; is 

22 that correct? 

^^ * '^*^*t would be the correct procedure, yes. 

^* Q A^l right. If Jia Radzimski were unavailable 

and there was no one tending the files that day and 



IINCtASSIFIED 



856 



iJNCJiSSiFIED 



16 



1 someone had brought you a request, you would go in and 

2 pull the hard copy and then would you make a notation 

3 somewhere, a note for Jim, or what would you do? 

4 A That would be the right way of doing it 

5 because I don't know how to work the computer — writing 

6 it down on paper. 

7 Q That's what I wanted to know. 

8 A I would write a note. 

9 Q You would write a note to Jim and say I took 

10 these documents at so-and-so's request — something along 

11 those lines? 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q Do you remember any specific request for 

14 System IV documents in the year 1986? 

15 A In 1986? 

16 Q First of all, tell me how many times you think 

17 people requested documents, if you can, during 1986. 

18 A It's hard to say. I don't know how many came 

19 directly to Jin. 

20 Q Well, no, only those requests that came to 

2 1 you . 

22 A Came through me? 

23 Q Yes. 

24 A I really don't recall. 

25 Q Do you remember requests from Lieutenant 



msimm 



857 



wmmm 



17 



1 Colon«l North during 1986 to pull a System IV original? 

2 Do you remember any such request? 

3 A No, I don't recall that at all. 

4 Q Do you remember any requests from Fawn Hall, 

5 his secretary? 

6 A To the best of my recollection, I don't recall 

7 anything. 

8 Q Perhaps earlier in date, covering 1985, do you 

9 remember any specific requests from Robert McFarlane for 

10 a System IV original document? 

11 A No, I do not recall that. 

12 Q How about from his secretary, Wilma Hall? 

13 A Mo, I don't recall that either. 

14 Q Back to 1986, do you remember any requests 

15 from Lieutenant Colonel Earl for a System IV original? 

16 A No, I don't. 

17 Q And Commander Coy for a System IV original? 

18 A No, I don't recall that either. 

19 Q Did Mr. deGraffenreid ever ask you to pull 

20 System IV originals for him? I imagine that during the 

21 course of hia work with these documents that he might 

22 have. 

23 A Well, it was Mr. deGraffenreid 'a habit, or he 

24 did like to work with original documents because of all 

25 the notes written on the original documents so that he 



UNeU^iFlEO 



858 



\\mmB 



18 



1 could see. That was something normal for him. 

2 Q The notes written on the originals, he wanted 

3 to see notes on the original documents, or the originals 

4 would be clean so that he wouldn't have to deal with 

5 notes on copies? Which one of those? 

6 Let me ask the question in a simpler fashion. 

7 He wanted to see the originals because of notes that were 

8 written on the originals? 

9 A Yes, any side margin comments or anything like 

10 that. 

11 Q Okay. And so it was his regular practice to 

12 ask you for a System IV original and you would go to 

13 either Jim or to the files and bring him back the 

14 original document; is that correct? 

15 A Yes, that's correct. 

16 Q Let's go to November 1986. Did Mr. 

17 deGraffenreid ask you during November 1986, do you 

18 remember any specifics about documents that he asked you 

19 for during that period? 

20 A I don't recall anything specific, no. 

21 Q Let me ask you a question that I'm curious 

22 about. You mentioned to me that Mr. deGraffenreid liked 

23 to work with originals because of marginalia on the 

24 original. Do you know how that marginalia would arrive 

25 on that document? 



isisssra 



UNiAS^RED 



19 



1 A When we create the System IV documents they 

2 are information or action memorandums. They do go across 

3 to the West Wing for whatever purpose, and then when they 

4 come back It would sometimes have comments or notes or 

5 something to that effect on them. 

6 Q So as a general matter it would likely be that 

7 the marginalia would be — 

8 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

9 MS. NOURSE: Back on the record. 

10 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming) 

11 Q I was in the middle of a question. The 

12 marginalia would generally be something someone had 

13 written in the West Wing, typically the National Security 

14 Advisor; is that right? 

15 A Yes, it would be, typically. 

16 Q Aside from that reason, do you know of any 

17 other reason why people would want to see the original as 

18 opposed to a copy? 

19 A I can't answer for other people; I don't know. 

20 Q Okay. It's just something I'm curious about. 

21 Generally when a System IV document would be requested, 

22 would you assume that the original was what the requester 

23 would want? Let me clarify that. 

24 If someone came to our security officer and 

25 said I want X document, he would hand me a copy of the 



UNMSSIFIFD 



860 



lIHiiilFlffl 



20 



1 document, not the original, and I'm just curious whether 

2 it was a standard practice to hand out the originals or 

3 whether you would make a copy if a request came to you 

4 for a document. 

5 A Could you repeat the question again, please? 

6 Q- Sure. Was it your normal practice to obtain 

7 the original from the System IV files upon a request for 

8 a particular document, or would you make a copy of that 

9 docviment and give it to the person who had requested it? 

10 (Pause.) 

11 Let me give you a hypothetical. Someone from 

12 the NSC calls up and says I want document 4002, and you 

13 say fine, hang up the phone. Jim Radzimski's not there. 

14 You are there. You go look for the hard copy of the 

15 file. Now you find 4002. Is it your assumption that the 

16 person wants the original at that point and you will hand 

17 him the original, making a note to Jim that you've done 

18 that? 

19 A It would not probably be my assumption. 

20 Q Would you ask the person in this case whether 

21 they wanted a copy or the original? 

22 A If I were processing the document, I would 

23 probably just — it would depend if they would want it as 

24 an add-on to their other package or, you know, the reason 

25 they want it. It would just depend. 



UNffOFe 



861 



UNfilWIEI) 



21 



1 Q What were the typical reasons that they would 

2 want — you mentioned something about an add-on to a 

3 package. 

4 A Yes. If there was a follow-on action or 

5 something to a package that was already initiated, yes. 

6 Q So I've never been very clear about add-ons, I 

7 have to confess. Could you explain for us simply what 

8 the add-on procedure was or what an add-on memo is? 

9 A Certainly. If the first docximent you 

10 initiated in System IV goes across the street and is 

11 acted upon by the Advisor or the Deputy, it comes back 

12 for further action. If it was necessary for you to 

13 resubmit another memo, you would probably usually do an 

14 add-on and retain the same original number, System IV 

15 number, so that it could be logged in together. It would 

16 be a good reference point. 

17 Q Would you need the original System IV document 

18 when you were creating the add-on? In other words, you 

19 had suggested earlier that one of the reasons why one 

20 might request a System IV original is for the purpose of 

21 creating an add-on memo. I'm just not quite sure how 

22 that works. 

23 A Hypothetically, if I was doing the package I 

24 would probably send over the original. It might be an 

25 attachment or something to the_add-jDn package, so that 



: something to the add-jsn 



862 



mmmm 



22 



1 the Advisor could see the original. 

2 Q I see. Aside from that reason, are there any 

3 other reasons you can think of why one might request the 

4 original System IV document? 

5 A I really do not know myself. 

6 Q Let's go back to the situation about the 

7 difference between originals and copies. If someone 

8 called you up and asked for a System IV document and Jim 

9 Radzimski was not there and you'd go in and try and 

10 process the request, if the individual requesting the 

11 document did not say one way or the other, would it be 

12 your standard practice to make a copy of the document 

13 that's in the files and give the copy to the person 

14 requesting the document? 

15 A I don't )cnow if you would really say a 

16 standard practice. I guess it would just depend, you 

17 know. 

18 Q But you did on occasion? On some of the 

19 requests you would make copies? 

20 A Make copies of the System IV? 

21 Q And keep the original System IV document in 

22 its file? 

23 A I may have on occasion done that. I don't 

24 recall any specifics. 

25 Q And on other occasions you would actually send 



UmSSIFI[D 



»NWf![!) 



23 



1 the original to the individual recjuesting the document? 

2 A I would send whatever, the System IV Intel doc 

3 or report to the person. 

4 Q You would send the original to the person? 

5 A The intel report itself, rather than Xeroxing 

6 it. 

7 Q Are these particularly long documents? 

8 A Some of the intel reports are. 

9 Q Let me go back again to how you would let Jim 

10 know that you had taken out an original or made a copy. 

11 It was your practice to leave him a note, is that 

12 correct, as to what action you had taken — whether you 

13 had made a copy or processed the document by sending the 

14 original on? You would tell him what you had done so 

15 that the file — 

16 A I would verbally tell him, if he were there, 

17 if he was going to be back, or I'd write a note or 

18 something if he was not there for a while. 

19 Q Okay. Was there any other system by which 

20 those documents were kept track of? 

21 A I don't understand. 

22 Q Was there a log in which you would write I 

23 signed this document out to Admiral Poindexter, for 

24 instance? 

25 A No, I'm not aware of any log. 



UimSSIFIED 



864 



llNSU^IflED 



24 



1 Q There was no other procedure aside from 

2 letting Jim Radzimski know by telling him orally or by 

3 writing him a note that you had taken the original and 

4 made a copy? 

5 A That's correct. 

6 Q Let me show you a note. I will mark this as 

7 Bartlett Exhibit 1. 

8 (The document referred to was 

9 marked Bartlett Exhibit Number 

10 1 for identification.) 

11 No doubt you have seen this note before, since 

12 it was blown up and shown on television recently. 

13 A So I understand, if this is the same one. 

14 Q Let me ask you this. Aside from the 

15 television blowup version of this document, which is a 

16 series of seven System IV numbers, did you see this 

17 document ever prior to November 1986? 

18 A No, I don't recall seeing this. 

19 Q Let me ask you, because the question is 

20 slightly unclear, did you see it during November 1986 at 

21 any time? 

22 A I don't recall seeing it during November. I 

23 was shown it later by the Independent Coxinsel, if this is 

24 the same one with my initials on it. 

25 Q We'll get to that in a minute, but you don't 



wmfmw 



865 



um^'Pfl 



25 



1 recall seeing the note in this form aside from 

2 Independent Counsel or what you might have seen on TV? 

3 A No, not to the best of my knowledge. 

4 Q Let me mark this as Bartlett Exhibit 2 . 

5 (The document referred to was 

6 marked Bartlett Exhibit Number 

7 2 for identification.) 

8 Let me ask you first to focus on the lower 

9 lefthand corner, to a note signed JB, which appears to 

10 read: signed out to Ollie North, with the initials JB, 

11 all in a circle. Is that your handwriting? 

12 A Yes. It's my handwriting. JB. 

13 Q And JB are obviously your initials. Do you 

14 remember ever seeing this document? 

15 MR. McGRATH: Let's go back and go slow. Is 

16 the handwriting, "signed out to Oliver North", is that 

17 your handwriting? 

18 THE WITNESS: Yes. It appears that it is my 

19 handwriting. 

20 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming) 

21 Q And the initials JB are your initials? 

22 A Yes, that's correct. 

23 Q All right. Do you recall seeing this 

24 document, which is another set of System IV numbers with 

25 a handwritten note above it? 



mms^m 



82-690 0-88-29 



866 



mmm^ 



26 



1 MR. McGRATH: Also we should reflect the fact 

2 that it is the same set of System IV numbers as Exhibit 

3 1. 

4 MS. NOURSE: That's right, Dean, the same set 

5 of System IV numbers, along with a handwritten note 

6 apparently signed Brian beneath those System IV numbers, 

7 and another handwritten note that we have just identified 

8 as being in the handwriting of Ms. Bartlett. 

9 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming) 

1° Q Do you remember ever seeing this document, 

11 aside from anything on television or before the 

12 Independent Counsel? 

13 A I really don't recall this. I see my 

14 handwriting here. It was a request I processed and I see 

15 a lot of documents I don't remember each specific 

16 document. 

17 Q Let me ask you the same question about the 

18 document without the note above the word Brian. This 

19 appears to be a note by Brian Merchant. Have you ever 
2 seen the document without that note on it? In other 

21 words, it would be a series of System IV numbers and 

22 simply your note about signed out to Ollie North. 
2 3 A Without the Brian note? 

2 4 Q Without the Brian note, yes. 

25 MR. McGRATH: With just the circled part? 



wmmm 



867 



\imissffl 



27 



1 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming) 

2 Q With just the circled part and the System IV 

3 numbers. 

4 A I don't recall it, no. 

5 Q The reason I ask that is that it appears that 

6 one may be superimposed on the other and I don't know how 

7 the original form of the note might have been. 

8 Let me ask you this. Could you identify what 

9 this reference here, which appears to be — 

10 A It's a scribble. 

11 Q It appears to be partly within the circle 

12 surrounding your note. 

13 A BM, Brian Merchant. 

14 Q I see. Do you ever remember seeing on another 

15 piece of paper, separated from the System IV set of 

16 nximbers, this note by Brian Merchant? 

17 A Separate from the numbers or what? 

18 Q Separate from the numbers, yes. Do you 

19 remember seeing a note not necessarily attached to the 

20 System IV numbers and not necessarily with this notation 

21 that you've identified to be in your handwriting, but 

22 just simply a note from Brian Merchant indicating — and 

23 I will read from the document — "all originals attached 

24 except 401214", et cetera? 

25 A No, I don't recall. 



mumw 



liill&SiFiEfl 



23 



1 Q Let me try and refresh your recollection about 

2 this. Do you remember at all an incident in November of 

3 1986 in which Ollie North asked you to obtain some System 

4 IV documents for him? 

5 A I don't recall any specifics like that, no. 

6 Q Do you remember any incident in November 198 6 

7 where Fawn Hall came to you on behalf of Ollie North and 

8 asked for System IV originals? 

9 A No. I don't recall that. 

10 Q Okay. Did you ever have a conversation with 

11 Mr. deGraffenreid during November 1986 in which he said 

12 Ollie North wants some System IV originals? 

13 A I don't recall anything like that, to the best 

14 of my recollection, no. 

15 Q So Mr. deGraffenreid never asked you to sign 

16 out originals to Ollie North, to the best of your 

17 recollection, during November of 1986? 

18 A To the best of my recollection. 

19 Q Do you know whose handwriting the System 

2 numbers are in? Would you recognize the handwriting, if 

21 given to you? 

22 A No. I do not know whose handwriting that is. 
2 3 Q It appears that there are notations on the 

24 side that may be in different handwriting than the System 

2 5 IV numbers themselves. Does that notation, which appears 



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1 to say "cover", do you know whose handwriting that might 

2 be? 

3 A No, I don't Jtnow. 

4 Q What about this reference to Yediot Aharonot? 

5 A I don't even know what that is or whose 

6 handwriting that is. 

7 Q Just for your information, it's an Israeli 

8 newspaper, so you get to learn something today. 

9 A Now I know. 

10 Q You know that that's an Israeli newspaper. 

11 Have you heard of this before? 

12 A Only on testimony. 

13 Q Testimony you've heard during the hearings? I 

14 see. Okay. 

15 A Or maybe on the news. I don't recall. 

16 Q So you don't know whose handwriting that is? 

17 A No. 

18 Q And this handwriting, "all originals attached 

19 except", signed Brian, would you recognize that as Brian 

20 Merchant's handwriting? 

21 A I don't know if I've actually seen him write 

22 out more than a word or two. I see the signature there. 

23 Q Based on that you would believe it would be 

24 his. 

25 Let's look at the dates on the document. 



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1 There's a November 21, 1986, stamp date, and there's also 

2 a November 25, 1986 stamp date. It's unclear to me which 

3 of these dates refers to which of the notes, but let me 

4 ask you this. 

5 During this period, November 21 to 25, 1986, 

6 there was a lot of — there were press conferences, et 

7 cetera, about the Iran initiative, particularly on 

8 November 25, when the Attorney General announced the 

9 existence of the diversion memo. This was a period in 

10 which I assume that a lot of attention was paid at the 

11 NSC to the disclosure of the Iran initiative. 

12 I am wondering if you can try and put yourself 

13 back in that period and remember anything that might have 

14 had to do with Ollie North and signing out original 

15 documents. 

16 A The 25th was a Tuesday; is that correct? 

17 Q That was Meese's press conference on that day. 

18 A No. 

19 Q You don't remember Ollie North coming to ask 
2 you for originals on that day? 

21 A No. 

22 Q Do you remember any other requests by anyone 

23 else on that day for a System IV original? 

24 A No, I do not recall anything. 

25 Q Do you remember on that day, November 25, 



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1 1986, did Mr. deGraffenreid ask you to pull a System IV 

2 original? 

3 A I'm sorry. On what day? 

4 Q November 25, 1986. This is the day of the 

5 press conference. 

6 A No, I don't recall anything specific. 

7 Q Do you remember any conversations on that day 

8 that Mr. deGraffenreid might have had with Oliver North? 

9 A I have no direct knowledge of that. 

10 Q By "direct knowledge", what precisely do you 

11 mean? Let me ask you another question. 

12 A I don't know if he saw him out in the hallway 

13 or said hello. I don't know. 

14 Q You did not overhear any conversations between 

15 Oliver North and Mr. deGraffenreid on that day? 

16 A No. 

17 Q Did Oliver North come to visit Mr. 

18 deGraffenreid that day, if you remember? That's the day 

19 of the press conference. 

20 A I don't recall seeing Ollie in the office that 

21 day, in our office. 

22 Q Do you recall seeing him in the office the 

23 previous Friday? 

24 A In our office? 

25 Q Which would be November 21. 



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1 A I can't remember what I did yesterday. 

2 Q I have the same problem, I assure you. 

3 A I don't recall if he was or not. 

4 Q Do you remember any unusual activity in the 

5 office during that period, that Friday, November 21, 

6 Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, when the press 

7 conference was held? 

8 A You say the weekend. I wasn't working on the 

9 weekend, I don't think. 

10 Q How about that Monday or Tuesday, the 24th and 

11 the 25th of November? 

12 A I don't recall anything. Monday I was working 

13 as usual. Tuesday, of course, was the press conference. 

14 Q Did you watch the press conference? 

15 AX watched a few minutes here and there, yes. 

16 Q Were you surprised at the revelations about 

17 the diversion? 

18 A I was surprised. 

19 Q Yes? 

20 A Yes. 

21 Q Let me ask you a final question on the note. 

2 2 To the best of your recollection, Mr. deGraf fenreid never 

2 3 handed you either Exhibit 1 or Exhibit lA and asked you 

24 to go look for originals? 
2 5 A I don't recall anything like that, to the best 



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1 of my recollection. 

2 Q To the best of your recollection, Oliver North 

3 never handed you either Exhibit 1 or lA and asked you to 

4 go get System IV originals? 

5 A No. To the best of my recollection, he did 

6 not. 

7 Q If you saw this note, would these documents 

8 mean anything to you? Would you associate anything with 

9 these particular numbers — a type of document? 

10 A Well, it would be a System IV number. Other 

11 than that ~ 

12 Q You wouldn't recognize those numbers as 

13 associating them with any particular content of a 

14 document? 

15 A No. 

16 Q Did you ever have a conversation with Brian 

17 Merchant about pulling System IV originals for Oliver 

18 North during this period, November of 1986? 

19 A I don't recall any specific conversation. 

20 Q Do you recall any general conversation? 

21 A I don't recall any, no. 

22 Q To your knowledge, had Brian Merchant taken 

23 over from Jim Radzimski at this time, November 21 through 

24 November 25, 1986? 

25 A Jim was not there. He hji^ already left. 



was not there . He haA i 

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1 Q He had already left at that time. 

2 Were your procedures with Brian for taking out 

3 an original System IV the same as with Jim? In other 

4 words, if you had taken out an original you would leave 

5 Brian a note, as you would for Jim? 

6 A The procedures were not changed from Jim to 

7 Brian. 

8 Q Okay. 

9 A To the best of my knowledge. 

10 Q To the best of your knowledge Brian didn't 

11 require you to do anything if you had processed a request 

12 in his absence? 

13 A No. 

14 Q Would it be correct to say that this note on 

15 the bottom of Exhibit 2 "signed out to Ollie North, JB" 

16 would be the standard kind of note you would leave for 

17 Jim or Brian if you had taken out an original document 

18 and given it to whoever had requested it? 

19 A If I had retrieved a document from System IV, 
2 that would have been the standard. 

21 Q By this you would tell him who had obtained 

22 the original documents? 

2 3 A Yes, because it needed to be accounted for. 

24 Q Would you follow up on original requests ever? 

25 Would you go back to the person and say, hey, where 's 



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35 



1 that original? 

2 A Things are hectic in the office. I would 

3 assume they would return it when they were finished with 

4 it. 

5 Q Was that basically Brian or Jim's job, to 

6 follow up on the original requests? 

7 A I would think that would be one of their — 

8 Q You yourself never called or had occasion to 

9 call someone and say bring that original back? 

10 A I don't ever remember doing that — an 

11 original intel doc or report or something back. 

12 Q It was not your standard practice to keep 

13 track of these documents? 

14 A No. I had too much other things to do. 

15 Q Let me ask you some general questions about 

16 your boss, Mr. deGraffenreid. What was his relationship 

17 like to Ollie North? Were they close friends? 

18 \ A I would say they were friends, as with the 

19 other staff members. 

20 Q Was Colonel North often in the office? 

21 A He came in the office occasionally, no set 

22 pattern. It wasn't every day. He did come in the office 

23 on occasion. 

24 Q Do you ever remember a time in 19.85, the 

25 summer of 198 5,. whVWViere^*r» v'i»SP>#*ies =»<='« ^V 



ttffiiffl 



876 



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36 



1 Congress about Colonel North? Do you remember that 

2 period of time at all? Do you remember the inquiries 

3 being made? 

4 A In 1985? 

5 Q Yes, just generally. 

6 A I don't recall anything. 

7 Q You don't recall that. Do you recall ever 

8 during the summer of 1985 — and this is when the 

9 inquiries were being made — that you had a request to 

10 pull System IV documents, a number of System IV 

11 documents? 

12 A In '85? 

13 Q Yes. 

14 A I don't recall. 

15 Q I know it's a long time ago. That's why I was 

16 asking you about the incpiiries about Colonel North, 

17 because I thought that might help you locate it in time. 

18 Q Do you remember ever hearing Colonel North and 

19 Mr. deGraffenreid discussing the issue of the inquiry 

20 about Colonel North and his activities with the contras? 

21 Do you remember overhearing any conversations about 

22 Congressional inquiries of Colonel North? 

23 A No, I do not. 

24 Q Let me tell you this. From what we know, we 

25 know that there were documents pulled during this period 



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37 



1 to respond to Congress' requests, and these were System 

2 IV documents, and Brenda Reger had various people working 

3 for her to determine what were the relevant documents, 

4 including Jim Radzimski. Do you remember that incident 

5 at all — Brenda Reger dealing with Jim Radzimski and 

6 pulling documents for Congress' inquiry? 

7 A Now what time? 

8 Q This is during the summer of 1985, August or 

9 September. 

10 A No, I don't recall that. 

11 Q Do you ever remember Jim Radzimski discussing 

12 with Mr. deGraffenreid during this period, Aucfust or 

13 September of 1984, the pulling of System IV documents? 

14 A In '85? 

15 Q This is in the summer of '85, whether there 

16 were any discussions between Mr. deGraffenreid and Jim 

17 Radzimski relating to pulling documents for the 

18 Congressional inquiries of North. 

19 A I don't recall any of that. 

20 Q Do you ever remember any conversations in 

21 which Mr. deGraffenreid asked Jim Radzimski to pull the 

22 documents that are identified in Exhibit 1? 

23 A No, I don't recall that. 

24 Q Do you remember Mr. deGraffenreid making a 

25 comment to Mr. Radzimski such as well, Jim, I asked you 



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UNCUSSIREO 



38 



1 to pull those System IV docvunents; where are they? Do 

2 you remember some sort of exchange about Jim failing to 

3 fulfill a request during the summer of 1985? 

4 A No. I don't recall that. 

5 Q Do you ever remember hearing, whether in 1985 

6 or 1986, of an occasion when Mr. Radzimski failed to 

7 fulfill a request for a document for an individual? 

8 A No, I don't. 

9 Q Let me ask you the basic question that we ask 

10 everyone around here, and that is when did you first 

11 learn of the Iran initiative? Was it when you heard 

12 about it in the press or had you heard about it earlier? 

13 A In the press, the news, media coverage. 

14 Q And by Iran initiative I meant the sale of 

15 weapons to Iran. 

16 A In the media coverage. 

17 Q Okay. Had you ever heard, p