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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987
Senate Report
No. 216
IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION
APPENDIX B, VOLUME 2
DEPOSITIONS
United States Congressional Serial Set
Serial Number 13743
United States Government Printing Office
Washington : 1989
Union Calendar No. 277
100th Congress, 1st Session
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
Iran-Contra Affair
Appendix B: Volume 2
Depositions
Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee
Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman,
House Select Committee
U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives
On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate
And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
November 13, 1987. - Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.
November 17, 1987. -Ordered to be printed.
Washington : 1988
Bnitd States Senate
; ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480
March 1, 1988
HonoreOjle John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the
Senate Select Conimittee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become
available.
ly,
Warren B. Rudman V^
Vice Chairman
III
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
UNITED STATES CAPITOL
WASHINGTON. DC 20516
(202) 225-7902
March 1, 1988
The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the House
U. S. Capitol
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session.
Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of
Appendix B have been declassified fo^-^elease to the public.
United States Senate
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition
Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman
George J. Mitchell, Maine
Sam Nunn, Georgia
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama
David L. Boren, Oklahoma
James A. McClure, Idaho
Orrin G. Hatch, Utah
William S. Cohen, Maine
Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia
Arthur L. Liman
Chief Counsel
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro
Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel
To the Chief Counsel
Mary Jane Checchi
Executive Director
Lance I. Morgan
Press Officer
VI
United States House of Representatives
Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms
Transactions with Iran
Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman
Thomas S. Foley, Washington
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey
Jack Brooks, Texas
Louis Stokes, Ohio
Les Aspin, Wisconsin
Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts
Ed Jenkins, Georgia
Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican
Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan
Henry J. Hyde, Illinois
Jim Courter, New Jersey
Bill McCollum, Florida
Michael DeWine, Ohio
John W. Nields, Jr.
Chief Counsel
W. Neil Eggleston
Deputy Chief Counsel
Kevin C. Miller
Staff Director
Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Director
George W. Van Cleve
Chief Minority Counsel
Richard J. Leon
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
VII
United States Senate
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition
Arthur L. Liman
Chief Counsel
Mark A. Belnick
Executive Assistant
to the Chief Counsel
Paul Barbadoro
Deputy Chief Counsel
Mary Jane Checchi
Executive Director
Lance I. Morgan
Press Officer
Associate Counsels
C. H. Albright, Jr.
Daniel Finn
C. H. Holmes
James E. Kaplan
Charles M. Kerr
Joel P. Lisker
W. T. McGough, Jr.
Richard D. Parry
John D. Saxon
Terry A. Smiljanich
Timothy C. Woodcock
Committee Staff
Assistant Counsels
Legal Counsel
Intelligence/Foreign
Policy Analysts
Investigators
Press Assistant
General Accounting
Office Detailees
Security Officer
Security Assistants
Chief Clerk
Deputy Chief Clerk
Steven D. Arkin*
Isabel K. McGinty
John R. Monsky
Victoria F. Nourse
Philip Bobbitt
Rand H. Fishbein
Thomas Polgar
Lawrence R.
Embrey, Sr.
David E. Faulkner
Henry J. Flynn
Samuel Hirsch
John J. Cronin
Olga E. Johnson
John C. Martin
Melinda Suddes*
Robert Wagner
Louis H. Zanardi
Benjamin C.
Marshall
Georgiana
Badovinac
David Carty
Kim Lasater
Scott R. Thompson
Judith M. Keating*
Scott R. Ferguson
Staff Assistants
Administrative Staff
Secretaries
Receptionist
Computer Center
Detailee
John K. Appleby
Ruth Balin
Robert E. Esler
Ken Foster*
Martin H. Garvey
Rachel D. Kaganoff*
Craig L. Keller
Hawley K.
Manwarring
Stephen G. Miller
Jennie L. Pickford*
Michael A. Raynor
Joseph D.
Smallwood*
Kristin K. Trenholm
Thomas E. Tremble
Bruce Vaughn
Laura J. Ison
Hilary Phillips
Winifred A. Williams*
Nancy S. Durflinger
Shari D. Jenifer
Kathryn A. Momot
Cindy Pearson
Debra S. Sheffield*
Ramona H. Green
Preston Sweet
VIII
Committee Members' Designated Liaison
Senator Inouye
Senator Rudman
Senator Mitchell
Senator Nunn
Senator Sarbanes
Senator Heflin
Peter Simons
William V. Cowan
Thomas C. Polgar
Richard H.
Arenberg
Eleanore Hill
Jeffrey H. Smith
Frederick Millhiser
Thomas J. Young
Senator Boren
Senator McClure
Senator Hatch
Senator Cohen
Senator Trible
Sven Holmes
Blythe Thomas
Jack Gerard
Dee V. Benson
James G. Phillips
James Dykstra
L. Britt Snider
Richard Cullen
Part Time*
Assistant Counsel
Hearings Coordinator
Staff Assistants
Interns
Peter V. Letsou
Joan M. Ansheles
Edward P.
Flaherty, Jr.
Barbara H. Hummell
David G. Wiencek
Nona Balaban
Edward E.
Eldridge, III
Elizabeth J. Glennie
Stephen A. Higginson
Laura T. Kunian
Julia F. Kogan
Catherine L. Udell
Document Analyst
Historian
Volunteers
Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt
Edward L. Keenan
Lewis Liman
Catherine Roe
Susan Walsh
*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during
the life of the Committee, provided services.
IX
United States House of Representatives
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
Majority Staff
John W. Nields, Jr.
Chief Counsel
W. Neil Eggleston
Deputy Chief Counsel
Kevin C. Miller
Staff Director
Special Deputy
Chief Counsel
Staff Counsels
Press Liaison
Chief Clerk
Assistant Clerk
Research Director
Research Assistants
Charles Tiefer
Kenneth M. Ballen
Patrick J. Carome
V. Thomas
Fryman, Jr.
Pamela J.
Naughton
Joseph P. Saba
Robert J. Havel
Ellen P. Rayner
Debra M. Cabral
Louis Fisher
Christine C.
Birmann
Julius M.
Genachowski
Ruth D. Harvey
James E. Rosenthal
Systems
Administrator
Systems
Programmer/
Analysts
Executive Assistant
Staff Assistants
Catherine L.
Zimmer
Charles G. Ratcliff
Stephen M.
Rosenthal
Elizabeth S. Wright
Bonnie J. Brown
Christina Kalbouss
Sandra L. Koehler
Jan L. Suter
Katherine E. Urban
Kristine Willie
Mary K. Yount
Minority Staff
Associate Minority
Counsel
Assistant Minority
Counsel
Minority Research
Director
Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Director
George W. Van Cleve
Chief Minority Counsel
Richard J. Leon
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
Robert W.
Genzman
Kenneth R. Buck
Bruce E. Fein
Minority Staff
Editor/Writer
Minority Executive
Assistant
Minority Staff
Assistant
Michael J. Malbin
Molly W. Tully
Margaret A.
Dillenburg
Committee Staff
Investigators
Director of Security
Robert A.
Bermingham
James J. Black
Thomas N.
CiehanskJ
William A. Davis,
III
Clark B. Hall
Allan E. Hobron
Roger L. Kreuzer
Donald Remstein
Jack W. Taylor
Timothy E. Traylor
Bobby E. Pope
Security Officers
Editor
Deputy Editor
Associate Editor
Production Editor
Hearing Editors
Printing Clerk
Rafael Luna, Jr.
Theresa M. Martin
Milagros Martinez
Clayton C. Miller
Angel R. Torres
Joseph Foote
Lisa L. Berger
Nina Graybill
Mary J. Scroggins
David L. White
Stephen G. Regan
OR. Beckett
Associate Staff
Representative
Hamilton
Representative
Fascell
Representative
Foley
Representative
Rodino
Representative
Brooks
Representative
Stokes
Representative
Aspin
Michael H.
Van Dusen
Christopher Kojm
R. Spencer Oliver
Bert D. Hammond
Victor Zangla
Heather S. Foley
Werner W. Brandt
M. Elaine Mielke
James J.
Schweitzer
William M. Jones
Michael J. O'Neil
Richard M. Giza
Richard E. Clark
Warren L. Nelson
Representative
Boland
Representative
Jenkins
Representative
Broomfield
Representative
Hyde
Representative
Courter
Representative
McCollum
Representative
DeWine
General Counsel to
the Clerk
Michael W. Sheehy
Robert H. Brink
Steven K. Berry
David S. Addington
Diane S. Doman
Dennis E. Teti
Tina L. Westby
Nicholas P. Wise
Steven R. Ross
XI
Contents
Volume 2
Prefoce XXI
Armitage, Richard 1
Artiano, Martin L 405
Associate DDO (CIA) 580
Baker, James A., Ill 671
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter 690
Barnett, Ana 736
Bartlett, Linda June 840
Bastian, James H 894
Brady, Nicholas F 1065
Brown, Arthur E., Jr 1077
Depositions
Volume 1
Airline Proprietary Project Officer.
Alvarez, Francisco J.
Allen, Charles.
Arcos, Cresencio.
Volume 2
Volume 3
Armitage, Richard.
Artiano, Martin L.
Associate DDO (CIA).
Baker, James A., III.
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter.
Harnett, Ana.
Bartlett, Linda June.
Bastian, James H.
Brady, Nicholas F.
Brown, Arthur E., Jr.
Byrne, Phyllis M.
Calero, Adolfo.
Castillo, Tomas ("W").
Cave, George W.
C/CATF.
Volume 4
Channell, Carl R.
Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer).
Chatham, Benjamin P.
CIA Air Branch Chief.
CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief.
CIA Air Branch Subordinate.
CIA Chief.
CIA Communicator.
CIA Identity "A".
XV
Volume 5
CIA Officer.
Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr.
Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink).
Clarke, George.
Clarridge, Dewey R.
Cline, Ray S.
C/NE.
Cohen, Harold G.
Volume 6
Collier, George E.
Cole, Gary.
Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA.
Conrad, Daniel L.
Volume 7
Cooper, Charles J.
Coors, Joseph.
Corbin, Joan.
Corr, Edwin G.
Coward, John C.
Coy, Craig R
Crawford, Iain T.R.
Crawford, Susan.
Crowe, Adm. William J.
Currier, Kevin W.
DCM, Country 15.
DEA Agent 1.
DEA Agent 2.
DEA Agent 3.
deGraffenreid, Kenneth,
de la Torre, Hugo.
Deputy Chief "DC".
Duemling, Robert W.
DIA Major.
Dietel, J. Edwin.
Dowling, Father Thomas.
Dutton, Robert C.
Earl, Robert.
Volume 8
Volume 9
XVI
Volume 10
Farber, Jacob.
Feldman, Jeffrey.
Fischer, David C.
Floor, Emanuel A.
Former CIA Officer.
Fraser, Donald.
Fraser, Edie.
Fuller, Craig L.
Volume 11
Furmark, Roy.
Gadd, Richard.
Gaffney, Henry.
Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd).
Galvin, Gen. John R.
Gantt, Florence.
Garwood, Ellen Clayton.
Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C.
Gates, Robert M.
Glanz, Anne.
Volume 12
George, Clair.
Godard, Ronald D.
Godson, Roy S.
Golden, William.
Gomez, Francis D.
Goodman, Adam.
Gorman, Paul F.
Graham, Daniel O.
Gregg, Donald P.
Gregorie, Richard D.
Guillen, Adriana.
Hakim, Albert.
Hall, Wilma.
Hasenfus, Eugene.
Hirtle, Jonathan J.
Hooper, Bruce.
Volume 13
Volume 14
XVII
Hunt, Nelson Bunker.
Ikle, Fred C.
Jensen, D. Lowell.
Juchniewicz, Edward S.
Kagan, Robert W.
Keel, Alton G.
Kellner, Leon B.
Kelly, John H.
Kiszynski, George.
Koch, Noel C.
Kuykendall, Dan H.
Langton, William G.
Lawn, John C.
Leachman, Chris J., Jr.
Ledeen, Michael A.
Leiwant, David O.
Lilac, Robert H.
Lincoln, Col. James B.
Littledale, Krishna S.
McDonald, John William.
McFarlane, Robert C.
McKay, Lt. Col. John C.
McLaughlin, Jane E.
McMahon, John N.
McMahon, Stephen.
McNeil, Frank.
Makowka, Bernard.
Marostica, Don.
Marsh, John.
Mason, Robert H.
Meese, Edwin IIL
Melton, Richard H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Meo, Philip H.
Miller, Arthur J.
Miller, Henry S.
Miller, Johnathan.
Volume 15
Volume 16
Volume 17
Volume 18
XVIII
Miller, Richard R.
Motley, Langhorne A.
Mulligan, David P.
Nagy, Alex G.
Napier, Shirley A.
Newington, Barbara.
North, Oliver L.
O'Boyle, William B.
Osborne, Duncan.
Owen, Robert W.
Pena, Richard.
Pickering, Thomas.
Poindexter, John M.
Posey, Thomas V.
Powell, Gen. Colin L.
Price, Charles H., II.
Proprietary Manager.
Proprietary Pilot.
Radzimski, James R.
Ramsey, John W.
Ransom, David M.
Volume 19
Volume 20
Volume 21
Volume 22
Raymond, Walter, Jr.
Regan, Donald T.
Reich, Otto J.
Revell, Oliver B.
Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman).
Reynolds, William B.
Volume 23
Richard, Mark M.
Richardson, John, Jr.
Robelo, Alfonso.
Robinette, Glenn A.
Rodriguez, Felix I.
Roseman, David.
XIX
Rosenblatt, William.
Royer, Larry.
Rudd, Glenn A.
Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney).
Rugg, John J.
Russo, Vincent M.
Sanchez, Nestor.
Scharf, Lawrence.
Schweitzer, Robert L.
Sciaroni, Bretton G.
Secord, Richard V.
Shackley, Theodore G.
Sigur, Gaston J.
Simpson, Major C.
Sinclair, Thomas C.
Singlaub, John K.
Slease, Clyde H., IIL
Smith, Clifton.
Sofaer, Abraham D.
Steele, Col. James J.
Taft, William H., IV.
Tashiro, Jack T.
Teicher, Howard.
Thompson, Paul.
Tillman, Jacqueline.
Volume 24
Volume 25
Volume 26
Volume 27
Thurman, Gen. Maxwell.
Trott, Stephen S.
Tull, James L.
Vessey, John.
Walker, William G.
Watson, Samuel J., IIL
Weinberger, Caspar.
Weld, William.
Wickham, John.
Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark).
XX
Preface
The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation.
The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings.
Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents.
Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc-
tions to the Select Committees.
At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals
retained their own counsel.
The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that,
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid
answering a question, his or her compelled responses -or leads or collateral
evidence based on those responses -could not be used in any subsequent criminal
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order.
An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House,
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons.
In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information
not considered germane to the investigation.
In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow-
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence- were developed by Select
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original
XXI
exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in-
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate.
The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages,
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order.
XXII
Publications of the Senate and House
Select Committees
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,
1 volume, 1987.
Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988.
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988.
Appendix C: Chronology of Events. I volume, 1988.
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988.
All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S.
Government Printing Office.
XXIII
mmm
1 DEPOSITION OF RICHARD ARMITAGE
2 Tuesday, May g^e , 1987
3 • United States Senate
4 Select Committee on Secret
5 Military Assistance to Iran
6 \ and the Nicaraguan Resistance
7 Washington, D.C.
8 Deposition of RICHARD ARMITAGE, a witness
9 herein, called for examination by counsel for the
10 Committee, pursuant to notice, the witness being duly
11 sworn by ANNE P. HOROWITZ, a Notary Public in and for the
12 District of Columbia, at 219 Hart Senate Office Building,
13 Washington, D.C, at 1:08 p.m. on Tuesday, May 26, 1987,
14 and the proceedings being taken down by Stenomask by ANNE
15 P. HOROWITZ and transcribed under her direction.
PwlUly Oadwificd/Released on ^/^^^ /'2 /f'^^
under provisions of LO. 12356
-hi D. Sirko, National Security Council
upk$sue
(1)
82-690 0-88-2
UNCUSSiES
1 APPEARANCES :
2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee:
3 " JOHN SAXON, Esq.
4 C. H, ALBRIGHT, JR., Esq.
5 Associate Counsel
6 On behalf of the House Select Committee on Covert
7 Arms Transactions with Iran:
8 JOE SABA, Esq.
9 ROGER KREUZER, Esq.
10 On behalf of the witness:
11 LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD, Esq.
12 Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
13 of Defense for ISA
14 EDWARD SHAPIRO, Esq.
15 Assistant Counsel, Department of Defense
UNClASSlEiED
uHcyissiFa
C 0
N T
E
N
T
S
Deoosition of
Examination by counse;
RICHARD ARMITAGE
By Mr. Saxon
4
By Mr. Saba
19
E X
H I
B
I
T
S
ARMITAGE EXHIBIT NUMBER
FOR
IDENTIFICATION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
20
13
uNimiffifl
ilNCUSSIRED
1 ^^ PROCEEDINGS
2 (Witness sworn.)
3 • Whereupon,
4 RICHARD ARMITAGE
5 was called as a witness by counsel for the Committees
6 and, having been first duly sworn, was examined and
7 testified as follows:
8 EXAMINATION
9 BY MR. SAXON:
10 Q Mr. Secretary, would you state your name for
11 the record?
12 A Yes, my name is Richard Lee Armitage.
13 Q What is your current position?
14 A I am currently the Assistant Secretary of
15 Defense for International Security Affairs.
16 With your permission, could we get on the
17 record the level, et cetera?
18 Q Yes. This deposition is cleared at the top
19 secret-Codeword level, and we do expect to have some
20 classified material as deposition exhibits and as topics
21 for discussion. And we will pursue the normal DOD
22 channels for the declassification issue if we choose to
23 use any of this. •**
24 A Thank you.
25 Q How long have you been in that position?
oodcr provisions cf CO. ir.
kjr 0. Mlo, National tecuv^/
mmm
UNCIASSIRED
1 A Since approximately May of 1983.
2 Q Let me ask now that the first deposition
3 ■ exhibit be marked, and that simply is a copy of what I
4 understand to be your most recent biographical sketch
5 provided by your office?
6 A This is correct.
7 (The document referred to was
8 marked for identification as
9 Armitage Exhibit No. 1.)
10 Q Would you state for us generally your duties
11 as Assistant Secretary?
12 A In general, I have the responsibility from the
13 Department of Defense for inter-agency coordination
14 between the Department of State, the National Security
15 Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, for policy
16 matters.
17 In addition, I have the responsibility to
18 advise the Secretary of Defense on policy matters
19 involving the Department of Defense for all countries of
20 the world outside of NATO Europe. I have additional
21 duties which I received approximately in May of 1986 in
22 the SOF, Special Operating Forces, and counter-terrorism
23 areas.
24 Q And you are responsible for the military
25 aspects of U.S. policy pertaining to all countries except
UNetASStflED
wsjssm
1 for NATO, is that correct?
2 A NATO Europe, right.
3 " Q You served, I believe, in Vietnam?
4 A I did.
5 Q What was the nature of that service?
6 A My first tour was as damage control assistant
7 on a destroyer off the coast of Vietnam. My second tour
8 was as an advisor to a coastal group, Vietnamese coastal
9 group, the ambush team advisor.
10 My next tour was senior advisor to River
11 Patrol Division 54 on the Vietnam-Cambodian border. My
12 third tour was as advisor to coastal group 21 in II
13 Corps.
14 Q In May of 1975, you returned to the Pentagon
15 as a consultant?
16 A Actually, in roughly April of 1975 I returned,
17 in the final days before the fall of Saigon. I was
18 invited to participate in those events.
19 Q And where principally were you located in your
20 consulting services?
21 A I served for the final week in Vietnam. I
22 then served in Washington from approximately the middle
23 of May until, asl remember it, the late fall. And I was
24 primarily engaged in the refugee resettlement projects.
25 And then in late fall through at least the
ONGtimED
mmm
1 first half of 1976, I was in and out of Teheran, serving
2 as a consultant to the defense representative, Teheran.
3 • Q In your current assignment, to whom do you
4 report?
5 A To the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
6 Dr. Fred Ikle, and through him to the Secretary.
7 Q Mr. Secretary, if you would walk us through
8 your involvement with the Iran initiative stage of the
9 Iran-contra affair, and that is, I principally have in
10 mind the draft NSDD that Mr. McFarlane sent to Secretary
11 Weinberger and to Secretary Shultz in mid-1985, your
12 role, et cetera.?
13 A As I recall, in approximately June of 1985 I
14 received a draft NSDD with a cover note from Mr.
15 McFarlane. The cover note was addressed to the Secretary
16 of State and the Secretary of Defense, and asked for
17 their comments on the draft NSDD. And the Secretary had
18 written his own remarks on a little buck slip.
19 This was forwarded upstairs to me, and I put
20 together a response to that draft NSDD, the thrust of
21 which, as I remember, was I don't disagree with the need
22 to develop a more congenial relationship with Iran, but
23 we did not believ'6 that arms sales by ourselves or
24 allowing third countries to engage in arms sales was the
25 way to do it, nor did the Secretary of Defense feel that
UNCttSSIRED
^mmm
X he could develop a more congenial relationship with the
2 present regime.
3 • That is, as long as Khomeini was alive the
4 Secretary didn't feel that there was much use in pursuing
5 this.
6 Q His handwritten note, I believe that's the
7 statement in which he said this is almost too absurd to
8 comment on, is that right?
9 A He said also that it's like asking Quadafi for
10 a cozy lunch, approximately those words.
11 Q My understanding is that in the course of
12 drafting a response to that draft, there was a
13 disagreement between you and Dr. Ikle over a couple of
14 points in terms of what should be in the Secretary's
15 response.
16 I'd like to have this marked as Deposition
17 Exhibit 2.
18 (The document referred to was
19 marked for identification as
20 Armitage Exhibit No. 2.)
21 Q This is a memorandum to the Under Secretary of
22 Defense for Policy, who I believe would be Dr. Ikle. It
23 is dated 13 July '1985. I believe it is from you.
24 I will give you a moment to take a look at it,
25 and I am principally concerned here about the first page
uiwtASsm
UNGIASSKKD
1 and principally —
2 A Just let me read it.
3 - (Pause.)
4 A Okay.
5 Q I am principally concerned about the point
6 that you make in the full paragraph that begins "Second,"
7 and you're telling Dr. Ikle: "I left in the
8 recommendation to keep pressure on our allies to cease
9 transferring military equipment to Iran. Although we
10 have had some successes to date, maintaining, if not
11 strengthening, our initiative is one of the few steps we
12 can take to try to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq War.
13 And if the war were to end, many of the pressures causing
14 Iran to seek assistance would cease.
15 "Therefore, I believe we should not omit this
16 initiative."
17 And then you go on to recommend which copies
18 should be forwarded to the Secretary, and that which
19 contained your language was in tab A, and the handwritten
20 note at the top indicates that Dr. Ikle forwarded the
21 version in tab B, which did not include this language.
22 Was there any oral discussion between you and
23 Dr. Ikle on this point?
24 A There may have been. I don't recall.
25 Q Do you know or recall what his reasons may
\mmm
10
uNcussmi
10
1 have been for not wanting to include this point?
2 A If 1 understand, if I remember correctly, th«
3 . only point of difference was whether it was post-Khomeini
4 or not. And I don't know — it strikes me that he had a
5 good understanding of the Secretary and did not want —
6 didn't think the Secretary would be interested in
7 anything with the present government. That's the only
8 thing I recall.
9 Q I believe the version which went forward also
10 left out the language about Operation Staunch and keeping
11 pressure on our allies not to ship arms to Iran?
12 A I'd have to check tab B.
13 (Pause.)
14 A Well, if this is tab B, it keeps in the point
15 about stopping arms.
16 Q Okay.
17 A I believe that was the only point of
18 difference there could have been, whether it was post-
19 Khomeini or present, not on the staunching of the arms,
20 as I remember.
21 Q If you would, then, continuing in a
22 chronological fashion, after the draft NSDD involvement
23 where you were mote or less staffing and transmitting,
24 what happened next in terms of your involvement?
25 A I don't recall any further discussion on this
mmm
11
UNGUOKD
11
1 subject. I never saw anything more of the NSDD, never
2 heard anything more of it. And roughly in November, I
3 returned from a trip to Pakistan and somewhere else, and
4 either the Secretary someone else had indicated to me
5 that they had a feeling there were some discussions going
6 on with Iran. And_ they wanted me to find out, If I
7 could, what was going on.
8 Q And this would have been when, as best you can
9 date it?
10 I A Late November. I got back 24th or 25th,
11 roughly, of November. It was approximately that time
12 frame that they mentioned this to me.
13 I nosed around as best I could, finally
14 decided to invite Ollie North for a luncheon in my
15 office. I have subsequently determined that the date of
16 that was 3 December.
17 I did have lunch with Ollie and asked him if
18 anyone had been meeting with the Iranians. And he told
19 me that he had. I made some comments about this to
20 Ollie, and then I reported this verbally to the
21 Secretary.
22 Q What can you tell us about the nature of the
23 comments you mad6~to Colonel North?
24 A As best I remember, I told him that I knew my
25 boss, I felt my boss, didn't know anything about it. I
mmm
12
uncussibedj
1 didn't think the Secretary of state knew anything about
2 it. I thought he was way out of line. I think I used
3 • the term that his ass was way out on a limb and that he
4 ought to get everyone together quickly to discuss this
5 problem.
6 Q Did you say something along the lines of, he
7 needed to get the »laiiiew%« together?
8 A That's a term I often use. That's basically
9 the recollection.
10 Q And that means the principals — Secretary
11 Weinberger, Secretary Shultz, the National Security
12 Advisor, et cetera?
13 A Yes, and the President.
14 Q Do you have any information which would lead
15 you to believe that the December 7 meeting among the
16 principals ojr the elephants was a result of this
17 recommendation to Colonel North?
18 A I can only state that Colonel North had a
19 great respect for Secretary Weinberger, and I can
20 remember that he was quite shocked at the strength of my
21 statement to him.
22 I can't say that the December 7 meeting was a
23 direct outcome of~this. It was just my recommendation to
24 him to get them together, the elephants together, as soon
25 as possible.
wmmm
13
13
1 . . Q What did he tell you was the reason for this
2 initiative or these discussions or the meetings that he
3 had had with the Iranians?
4 A I've thought about it a lot. I can't quite
5 remember what he told me the reason was.
6 Q Did he mention a broader strategic concern, or
7 was it more directly related to hostages, or both, or can
8 you recall?
9 AX can't recall, I just can't recall.
10 Q Did you make any notes of your meeting?
11 A No, I did not.
12 Q A memoranda for the record?
13 A No, I did not. I
14 Q Did you meet with Secretary Weinberger prior
15 to the December 7 meeting?
16 A Yes, I did.
17 Q And was anyone else present at that meeting?
18 General Powell?
19 A My recollection is that General Powell was
20 there. I don't think anyone else was there. I can't
21 even be sure about General Powell, but he was almost
22 always present.
23 Q And who initiated that meeting?
24 A I can only imagine that it was probably
25 General Powell, speaking for the Secretary.
mmma
14
UKGIASSIBED
14
1- „^ Q And what do you recall saying?
2 A I recall that prior to the meeting I had
3 " strategized, prior to meeting with the Secretary. But
4 after being informed that there was going to be some sort
5 of meeting that weekend, strategizing with my colleagues
6 at State how best to stop what we understood was going to
7 be an item for discussion, that is the provision of some
8 sort of arms to Iran.
9 Q And would that have been —
10 A Particularly with Mr. Raphel, Arnie Raphel,
11 who at that time was the principal deputy assistant
12 secretary for Near East, South Asia. And the thrust of
13 our discussions was that we felt it would be most
14 effective if Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of
15 Defense Weinberger could have a very united front on this
16 issue.
17 We felt quite secure in speaking for our
18 bosses because we both knew our bosses' minds on this
19 subject, and we wanted them to approach the President
20 with roughly the same arguments, hoping that there would
21 be some resonance.
22 Q And in those discussions with Mr. Raphel, was
23 it your impression he already knew about this initiative,
24 or did you have to bring him up to speed?
25 A I can't guite remember, but I know that when
wmm
15
UNCUSSIIKD
1 the Secretary or General Powell had asked me to see If I
2 could find out something about somebody talking to the
3 ■ Iranians I also checked in with Arnie Raphel, who is an
4 excellent bureaucrat and I figured he'd know everything.
5 He was getting vibes, but he, at least to me,
6 couldn't put his fj.nger on anybody. So I'm quite sure
7 after I spoke with Ollie that I also informed Arnie of
8 the fact that Ollie had been meeting with the Iranians.
9 Q So you talked with him regularly?
10 A Daily.
11 Q Going to the December 7 meeting —
12 A Even today.
13 Q — did you and General Powell meet to
14 strategize before that meeting with the Secretary?
15 A I don't recall meeting with him to strategize
16 before that.,
17 Q In that meeting, can you tell us what each
18 party said, what the nature of the discussion was?
19 A In general, I reminded, I guess is the proper
20 word, the Secretary of Defense of the down sides of this
21 initiative. I needed not remind him, because he was
22 quite vocal and outspoken on all of the reasons why this
23 would be bad.
24 I believe that I gave him a one or two page
25 sheet of information on the Arms Export Control Act, I
UNCbtSSiED
16
IWSSIEIED
16
1 think developed out of a conversation with Mr. Raphel and
2 myself. At least that information, if not the sheet
3 ' itself, was also going to be provided to George Shultz,
4 so they both would be acting on the same wavelength.
5 We talked about — and either I would make the
6 point or the Secretary would make the point, and we'd
7 develop it, provision of any arms to Iran could be seen
8 as bargaining for hostages; the fact that we had enormous
9 equities in the Gulf and that all of our other friends
10 would be terribly concerned with any opening to Iran that
11 hasn't been thought about and talked about with them.
12 And number three, that Operation Staunch was
13 something that both he and George Shultz had been very
14 outspoken about, and we were leaning on our allies all
15 over town and all over the world to stop sales of even
16 questionable^ systems to Iran. And here it would turn out
17 that we were engaged in the same thing, and we would look
18 awfully stupid.
19 The Secretary, to my remembrance, also
2 0 questioned whether it would be legal or not.
21 Q What can you recall about the nature of any
22 statement he made in that regard?
23 A I just"remember the discussion being about
24 legality. I can't remember any specific statement that
25 he made.
WUSSIEIED
17
lElASSiED
17
1 Q Was there any discussion about notification of
2 the Congress that we were to ship arms to Iran?
3 • A The sheet that I gave him, if I remember
4 correctly — I don't have it — had some of the facets
5 surrounding Hill notification. So if he didn't talk
6 about it, I believe something was contained in the sheet.
7 Q Would these have been dollar thresholds for
8 when notice was required?
9 A Dollar, there was a dollar ceiling on one
10 sale. I forget if it's $25 or $50 million limit of a
11 major defense sale, and then a one item limit. So there
12 were two aspects to it. They were both basically
13 dollars.
14 Q And they would have been $50 million in one
15 case and 14 inthe other?
16 A I think it was 50 and 14. I don't remember if
17 it was 25 and 14 or 50 and 14.
18 Q Was there any discussion of whether U.S.
19 approval before the fact needed to be given if any third
20 parties were involved in shipping arms, or were third
21 parties not discussed at that point?
22 A I can't recall that third parties were
23 discussed at that~meeting.
24 Q What would you have stated at that time as
25 your understandino of bothL U^-iiaiicy and U.S. law with
18
wmsuB
18
regard to arms sales to Iran? And I understand you're
2 no£ a' lawyer and I'm not asking you to make a legal
3 » judgment, but as a policymaker?
4 A I will tell you what I would have responded as
5 to policy. Our policy was to embargo all arms to Iran
6 and to try to force them and the Iraqis back to the
7 status quo ante of 1979, before the war started; and to
8 try to limit the export of Islamic fundamentalism from
9 Iran.
10 Q Regarding the law, if the U.S. were to sell
11 weapons to Iran, I would have said that this would not be
12 in consonance with our laws, as we had an embargo.
13 MR. SABA: Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a
14 moment the policy at the time of Operation Staunch. How
15 was this Operation Staunch communicated by the Department
16 of Defense to our friends, allies, world in general?
17 THE WITNESS: First of all, it was
18 coordinated, and there was actually a coordinator in the
19 Department of State. It was Dick Fairbanks when it first
20 started, and then Bill Schneider took it over, and they
21 had the lead for this.
22 We went out as a matter of State cables to all
2 3 of our posts arouftd the world to announce our policy in
24 Operation Staunch, and then members of the Administration
25 — the Secretary -Of JSefense,. the Secretary of State, or
wm%ii
19
\imssm
19
1 myself as a Defense person — in traveling, meeting with
2 foreigners, when the subject would either arise or we had
3 reason to believe somebody was engaged or about to engage
4 in an arms sale, we would preempt and put in front of
5 them our own policy, Operation Staunch, and tell them why
6 we thought this was the proper policy and try to persuade
7 them as best we could not to engage in arms sales.
8 This was also enunciated in a series of
9 speeches and referred to in speeches by Administration
10 officials for several years,
11 BY MR. SABA:
12 Q Do you recall when that policy began?
13 A Dick Fairbanks was in the job. It was right
14 after the Lebanon experience. I would say '83, '84,
15 probably '84.
16 Q Did you travel between that time and, let's
17 say, the end of 1985 to various countries explaining that
18 policy?
19 A Not specifically to explain that policy, but I
20 did travel to various countries. And for instance ,^^^^|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^Hor some country
22 be engaged in selling not just weapons, but dual use
23 items, jeeps or something — we would certainly, or I
24 would certainly, have put in front of them our policy.
25 ^H,t^ I^id jiQt^ci^a^jjarticular trip #to sell
0'
20
\imssM
20
1 that particular policy.
2 Q But during your trips, do you recall incident's
3 ' in which you did explain that policy to them?
4 A Yes, I do. And there were foreign visitors
5 into my office.
6 Q Do you recall what countries these were?
7 A Well, I can remember having discussions with
jjj^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H remember hearing
9 about it from other colleagues, discussions with the
10 European allies.
11 I remember -- in fact, we continue right now
12 to have these discussions with
13 Q Excuse me. Do you mean —
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H excuse
15 I think all of our Arab friends, whether I
16 visited there or they visited me in the Pentagon, were
17 interested in this. And I would absolutely have spoken
18 to them about it.
19 Q Do you recall in the period commencing at the
20 beginning of this policy but ending in 1985 visiting any
21 of the Arab capitals and in the course of those meetings
22 discussing it?
23 A I don''t remember it specifically, but I did
24 visit Arab countries and was in the capitals. But I
25 don't remember specifically talking this policy.
IINetAS«D
21
\immm
21
Q During 1985, particularly the last three
months, do you recall any conversations with friends,
allies, indicating to you personally that they had
knowledge of American arms shipments?
A Over the past several years, no, I can't
remember those thr_ee months specifically. But I had
f r o m H^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H A r a b
they felt that the Iranians were getting outside supplies
of weapons, and in general those countries were putting
the blame on Israel.
Q Did they indicate that these arms were
American arms, American origin arms?
A They indicated they were outside aj
They also, the Arabs in general, would speak
about the ability of the Iranians to keep their aircraft
in the air and think that these parts must have come from
the United States, but generally through Israel. But the
impact of what they were telling me was that Israel, they
felt, was doing this, not the United States.
Q Was th?re any discussion at that time
specifically of TOW or Hawk parts?
A Not that I remember.
UNeiit^m
22
UNCUiSW
22
1 . Q So you would say, then, that it was fair to
2 state that our public policy, as well as our internal
3 policy, was expressed in Operation Staunch?
4 A That's correct.
5 Q And was opposed to sales, whether by us
6 directly or by our allies?
7 A That's correct.
8 Q And it was correct that during that period,
9 had a nation which acquired arms from us, it would have
10 required our advance permission to transfer those arms to
11 any third party?
12 A That's my understanding. It's called a third
13 country transfer.
14 Q And had there been a request to make a
15 transfer to Iran, what would your position have been?
16 A The Secretary of Defense would have opposed
17 it, I would have too. The Department would have opposed
18 it.
19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
20 Q Whose permission is required?
21 A The Secretary of state has the cognizance of
22 those things. In general terms, it would be hard to
23 believe that the Secretary of State, over the strenuous
24 objection of the Secretary of Defense, would okay
25 something like that without presidential approval.
wtmim
UttGUSSIlD
23
X Q Am I correct in understanding that the statute
2 givss the authority to the President, but that by
3 executive order he has delegated it to the Secretary of
4 State?
5 A I would have to review that, but that is my
6 understanding, yes. But I don't know the mechanics.
7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
8 Q Did we communicate back to the American public
9 our policy? Was that part of your duty?
10 A Yes.
11 Q How was that done?
12 A Generally, in speeches, public discussions, Q
13 and A's, radio.
14 Q And these speeches were made inside the United
15 States?
16 A Yes.
17 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
18 Q Anything that you can tell us about your
19 discussions with Secretary Weinberger prior to the
20 December 7 meeting when you and General Powell met with
21 him to brief him?
22 A Well, I say I think General Powell was there.
2 3 I know I was there, but that's basically it, other than I
24 must say he totally and completely opposed the policy.
25 MR. KREUZER: Was Dr. Ikle there?
uttcranED
24
UNCLASIP
1 THE WITNESS: No.
2 * '* " MR. KREUZER: But he is the primary policy
3 » maker?
4 THE WITNESS: He is the Under Secretary for
5 Policy.
6 MR. KREUZER: So he was aware of all of this
7 and read into all of this?
8 THE WITNESS: I don't feel he was aware of all
9 of it. My understanding is that he was not aware of this
10 and the finding. None of us were until some time later.
11 I think that after he signed forward the answer to the
12 draft NSDD, that Dr. Ikle was not involved in this.
13 That's my remembrance, until late in '86.
14 I know I brought him into the loop.
15 MR. KREUZER: But normally, being a policy
16 question, wouldn't this go down to the special assistant
17 staff, who looks at policy questions, and be fed up to
18 the Under Secretary?
19 THE WITNESS: No, they don't do policy
20 questions. They do covert actions. You're talking about
21
22 BY MR. KREUZER: (Resuming)
23 Q Okay. -"But would it go down to Under Secretary
24 Alderman?
25 A Deputy Under Secretary Alderman, it could if
l)NttAS«D
25
UNCiissra
25
1 the Under Secretary designated it.
2 Q Then would it normally go to Dr. Ikle?
3 A That's right.
4 Q Well then, would this be a departure from
5 normal procedures? Would this amount to a departure from
6 normal procedures?
7 A It amounts to the Secretary of Defense telling
8 me to handle this with extraordinary sensitivity, and
9 that's what I did. If you say is that the way things are
10 normally handled, no, it is not. But they are normally
11 handled the way the Secretary of Defense wants.
12 Q So if it weren't what he regarded as an
13 extremely sensitive situation, then it might have gone to
14 Alderman?
15 A I would have assumed that would have been the
16 case.
17 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
18 Q Did Secretary Weinberger tell you this was an
19 especially sensitive matter, with close hold, et cetera?
20 A Yes.
21 Q In that session?
22 A Yes, either there or the time before, when he
23 asked me to nose -Iround to see if anybody was talking to
24 Iran. But he said, this is very sensitive.
25 Q After the December meeting at the White House,
mmm
26
lEliiSSIEliD
26
1 didr* Secretary Weinberger at some point upon returning
2k fill you in on what had transpired?
3 A He filled me in to the extent that he and
4 George, George Shultz, had made very strong
5 representations to the Secretary — excuse me, to the
6 President — and that he. Secretary Weinberger, felt that
7 the initiative was dead. I have used a term to describe
8 it that is a term of his. He said: We have strangled
9 the baby in its cradle.
10 Q No doubt in your mind, and apparently in the
11 Secretary's that at that point the initiative was dead?
12 A There was no doubt in my mind.
13 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
14 Q Did you have any knowledge at that point that
15 there had been transfers to Iran of American arms by the
16 Israelis?
17 A I don't recall any knowledge of that at all at
18 that time.
19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
20 Q Did anything transpire from that point on this
21 issue forward until January?
22 A Not that I recall.
23 Q Did yoQ report any of what Secretary
24 Weinberger told you to anyone else?
25 A In general terms, to Arnie Raphel. And I
mmmi
27
WMWi
27
1 think basically, and I don't remember at all ray words,
2 • but I think it would have been, I think we got past this
3 one.
4 Q And did he convey Secretary Shultz's
5 impression of the meeting?
6 A No, I don't remember him characterizing George
7 Shultz's impression, but he gave me the impression that
8 that's the way he felt. He Arnie gave me the impression
9 that that's the way he felt, that we were past this and
10 that it was behind us.
11 Q So what would you say would be the next point
12 that you would have any involvement at all in this?
13 A In January I was informed that the Secretary
14 was going to another meeting, another one of these
15 meetings to discuss the initiative, which I don't believe
16 we called the initiative. We just called it the Iran
17 deal or whatever.
18 I believe I checked with Colin Powell to see
19 if there was any need for me to do anything, and he said,
20 no, the Secretary was armed. I think we had a
21 conversation, but it was a rehash of our previous
22 conversation.
23 Q You said the Secretary was armed. With what?
24 A The knowledge that he had before, that it was
25 still good.
mmm
28
ut%y^(iB
28
1 Q And when the Secretary went to the January 7th
2 meeting, were you later filled in on what transpired?
3 A I don't remember being — well, I wasn't
4 filled in on what transpired at that meeting until much
5 later. But some time later that month or in early
6 February, I was informed that weapons were going to go to
7 Iran.
8 Q When was the first point at which you recall
9 having been informed that the weapons went pursuant to a
10 presidential finding?
11 A I don't remember hearing about the finding
12 until somewhat later. But some time — and my
13 recollection is in February — General Powell told me
14 about TOW'S going, and this was that the President had
15 decided. And so —
16 Q Are you able more precisely to date it?
17 A No, I am not. I attempted to get a lot
18 smarter when I was called upon to be the Department's
19 witness in the initial hearings around these events, back
20 when Mr. Casey first testified. And at that time I had
21 learned more about the dates things went forward, I mean
22 things actually moved from the Army to the CIA.
23 But since I wasn't in that loop, it really
24 didn't matter to me. I was informed in general terms
25 that another trenche was going each way through the year
IINettS«D
29
\^mssm
29
1 of '86 each time a trenche went.
2 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
3 • Q Excuse me. When you say another trenche, do
4 you mean you had been informed that one had gone?
5 A No, I was informed in February of a trenche,
6 and then some time later I was informed of another
7 trenche, and another trenche, and then finally I think
8 the last one was in November, the third or the fourth
9 trenche, the announcement that I knew about.
10 BY MR. KREUZER: (Resuming)
11 Q The second one went when, roughly?
12 A Well, I have given you all the documents I
13 have, but I just don't have the dates in my mind. I was
14 in general terms informed after they went.
15 MR. SAXON: Let me have you mark that as the
16 next exhibit.
17 (The document referred to was
18 marked for identification as
19 Armitage Exhibit No. 3.)
20 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
21 Q And what I am showing you, Mr. Secretary, is
22 an NSC document. Do you see on it the number in the
23 first page, N-303153? That is the Senate Select
24 Committee's.
25 A You have a different one. It's 9131. Do we
UNliti^Fe
udciASsn
1 have the same document.
2 (Pause.)
3 ■ A Ves, okay.
4 MR. SAXON: I'm sorry. Let's go off the
5 record for a second.
g (Discussion off the record.)
MR. SAXON: Back on the record.
This is a chronology prepared by the National
security Council. You see, I believe, at the top, it
says "Historical Chronology," and the date is 11/20/86.
j_j_ THE WITNESS: Correct.
■^2 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
j_3 ■ Q If you would, look to page 30371.
14 A All right.
15 Q And look at the last full paragraph and let me
Ig give you a moment to read that.
17 (Pause.)
Q I am not going to ask you to vouch for the
accuracy of that statement, but it says, in terms of
these transfers, the shipment of the Army TOW's from
to the CIA^^^^^^^ it
"Policy level coordination for these
arrangements was-iffected by NSC (North) with DOD
24 (Armitage) and CIA (Clair George)
5 Dof« this mean that you were involved in some
31
UNtlASSiED
31
1 coordination for the logistics of these shipments?
2 A No, it only means to me that if things are
3 ■ going to move 01 lie would tell me. I was involved in no
4 way with any of the coordination of the logistics.
5 Q Wouldn't it be your best judgment that this is
6 simply an incorrect and inaccurate statement?
7 A I don't know that it's so inaccurate. I was
8 the policy level guy who knew about this, but never
9 talked about logistics with our services or anybody else.
10 Policy level, yes, I was the policy guy in the
11 Pentagon who knew about it the program. But I had no
12 logistics activity whatever.
13 Q Let me say, in response to a question by Mr.
14 Shapiro, that this is not something the meeting prepared.
15 This Is an NSC chronology bearing the date of November
16 20, 1986.
17 Mr. Secretary, what would you say would be the
18 first time you learned about the issue of U.S.
19 replenishment of Israeli TOW's stocks?
20 A I have thought myself, I believe the first
21 time I learned about Israel providing weapons and we
22 repaying Israel was when Mr. Casey testified in November.
23 I think that's thi first time I really knew of it.
24 Q November of '86?
25 A That's right.
32
uNOuissra
32
1 Q ■ And there were no discussions at the Pentagon
2 » to which you were a party?
3 A Now, I have seen a paper in the documents we
4 turned over to you which discussed either Hawks or TOW's
5 for Iran, but I wasn't involved in the development of
6 that. I saw it some time later.
7 The first time I knew that I remember was when
8 Casey testified up here, I believe.
9 Q That would be the point paper, as it was
10 denominated, that Dr. Gaffney prepared at the request of
11 either Colin Powell or Noel Cook in '85?
12 A Yes, that's right. I saw that paper some time
13 later.
14 Q Dr. Gaffney did not make you aware of that?
15 A No, I don't think Dr. Gaffney made me aware of
16 it.
Q Mr. Rudd?
A I think some time later in the year Glenn made
me aware of the point paper. I think that's when I saw
it. I am not sure of the dates.
Q Did you meet on January 2nd of 1986 with Major
General Menachem Meron of Israel to discuss replacement
23 of Israeli TOW's By the United States?
24 A I don't remember. I might have met with him.
25 I don't remember^fe^iijg^njt^at^ubject,
TNffim
25
^mmm
1 Q So your best recollection would be that you
2 did not discuss that subject?
3 ■ A My best recollection is I did not, though I
4 could have met with Mendy, Mendy Meron.
5 Q Given your stated feelings fairly clearly
6 about the wisdom of U.S. policy in terms of arms to Iran,
7 direct or indirect, and your statements about Operation
8 Staunch, do you think that you would recall if you had
9 discussed with General Meron that issue?
10 A I think so.
11 Q And if it were his statement that you did have
12 such a discussion, that wouldn't change your
13 recollection?
14 A I would say that I don't remember it and I
15 don't recall it.
16 Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about the
17 readiness issue in terms of the provision of the TOW's to
18 Iran. I assume readiness is something the Pentagon is
19 fairly concerned about?
20 A Yes.
21 Q Has anyone given you a status report or made
22 you aware of whether Army funds have been replenished for
23 those sales which~went forward for the purchase of TOW's
24 to replenish DA stocks?
Wtmm
34
iitmsm
34
1 Q And what would be your understanding, that
2 those moneys have been made available?
3 A My understanding is that the great majority of
4 ' those moneys were made available. It appears that the
5 Army in some fashion undercharged to some degree, and my
6 understanding was that the Secretary of Defense had asked
7 that we recoup that shortfall.
8 Q I guess the question is this. Would it
9 surprise you, then, to find out today, more than a year
10 after the first shipment went forward, that there is
11 still $5.6 million that has not been made available to
12 the Army to buy TOW missiles with?
13 A If what you're saying is that the CIA still
14 owes 5.6, it would surprise me.
15 Q Ko, the CIA has provided funds and, in
16 whatever way they work their way down the channels in the
17 Pentagon or the DA, they have not been made available to
18 the people at Micom who actually purchase TOW missiles.
19 A It would seem to me that's a long time.
20 Q Did you have any involvement at all on the
21 Hawk repair parts issue?
22 A None that I recall.
2 3 Q Let me~go back to the issue of a presidential
24 finding and have you address your discussions at whatever
25 period you had them with Secretary Taft and Secretary
UNgkAtiMD
OiUS^ED
35
1 WelTiberger on the issue of presidential finding. I
2» believe you did have a discussion in April of '86 with
3 Mr. Taft?
4 A No, I didn't. But we, the Secretary of
5 Defense and I, were on a trip at that time in the
6 Pacific. Mr. Taft^was involved in calling forward, I
7 think, another trenche of weapons. He has, Mr. Taft has,
8 told me subsequently — and this was in the past several
9 months — that at that time he asked to see a
10 presidential finding and was shown what he was told was
11 one by John Poindexter.
12 Q Where was that?
13 A In John Poindexter 's office.
14 This was not communicated to me at the time,
15 in April. This was when I was preparing to come to the
16 Hill.
17 Q I understand. And your understanding of that,
18 does it extend to whether Secretary Taft informed
19 Secretary Weinberger that he had seen the finding?
20 A This is — again, I've been told this in the
21 past several months, that Mr. Taft said he had indicated
22 that to the Secretary during the phone call, the phone
23 conversation. But I don't think the Secretary recalls it
24 at all, and I was not privy to that conversation.
25 Q When would that have been dated, roughly?
^mssm
mmssm
1 A April.
2 Q Were you party to a discussion or conversation
3 * with Secretary Weinberger after these matters began to
4 become public over this issue of when the Secretary might
5 or might not have been made aware of the finding?
6 A Yes.
7 Q Tell us about that?
8 A The Secretary, as I recall, in November of '86
9 was called to the White House, and he had a finding read
10 to him. He specifically mentioned to me that it was read
11 to him, because he said he had not seen it, actually seen
12 it.
13 I think it was published in the New York Times
14 or somewhere, but it was read to him.
15 Q And this would have been when?
16 A November '86, to my memory.
17 Q As these matters were reaching a —
18 A While they were unfolding, but they hadn't
19 blossomed. I mean, the leaks were out there and
20 certainly there was a lot of scurrying around. We were
21 getting ready to go to the Hill and I was asking the
22 Secretary, do you know anything about a finding? And he
23 said: I've never^seen one.
24 And I asked: Did we participate in it, in the
25 formulation of it. And he said, not to his knowledge.
umssm
37
UNGIASSIFIED
37
1 That's also true of me. So that's basically what I
2 remember.
3 • Q Did you recall telling him at some point,
4 either in that session or shortly thereafter, what you
5 had learned from Secretary Taft about him having read the
6 finding?
7 A Yes, or Mr. Taft was there, one or the other.
8 Q And I believe you told —
9 A The Secretary can't remember that, as far as I
10 know. He just said, I don't remember that.
11 Q I'm not trying to put words in your mouth or
12 in his, but tell me if this is more or less what you
13 recall. You told us when we interviewed you something
14 along the lines of that Mr. Taft said to Secretary
15 Weinberger: But I read it back in April and informed you
16 about it. At which point the Secretary said, oh really?
17 Does that sound right?
18 A Yes. Whether it was "Oh really," I don't
19 remember that, whether it was Taft that told me. But
20 Taft might have been there, I think, at this discussion
21 with the Secretary when this came up.
22 Q Are there any other points on the arms to Iran
23 that you think we~need to cover that we have not done?
24 A I would be pleased to try to answer any points
25 that you have.
uNetAsstfe
38
\immm
38
1 MR. SABA: I have a few things.
2 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
3 " Q Okay. In a moment I want to walk through a
4 couple of points in the statement that you made to§ the
5 DAIG.
6 A To the who?
7 Q To the Department of the Army IG, on the
8 pricing issue.
9 Has there ever come a time when you talked
10 about the replenishment issue or the TOW's which Israel
11 transferred in 1985?
12 A I don't remember it. I don't recall it, I
13 don't recall knowing about it.
14 Q Would you have normally come to know about it
15 in the course of business?
16 A I would have hoped so.
17 Q Did you know anything about the 100 TOW's —
18 I'm sorry, the 100 Hawks, which were in the pipeline to
19 Israel and which were being shipped about November 20th,
20 1985?
21 A I knew about that in 1986, late '86, because I
22 think we asked, I asked, DSAA, what's our latest Hawk
23 deal, when's the last time we sold anything to Israel of
24 TOW magnitude or Hawk things. And I think I was told
25 there were some Hawk missiles, there was a normal
Mmm
\immm
39
1 transaction in '85, a normal notified transaction, et
2 cetsra, et cetera.
3 " But I didn't, to my recollection, know that
4 until some time as we were roughly either preparing for
5 the Hill testimony in late November of '86 or even later
6 than that.
7 Q When you learned of — when did you say you
8 learned of the '85 transfers?
9 A I didn't know about the Hawk. There was
10 something about when the Secretary asked me or Powell
11 asked me to go investigate, to see if I could find out if
12 someone was talking to the Iranians, there was also, it
13 seemed to me, some intel at the time that mentioned
14 missiles.
15 We didn't understand very much, but it was all
16 part and parcel of, we were trying to figure out who was
17 talking to the Iranians.
18 Q This was intel that you picked up from^^^^^
21 other.
22 Q Okay. I'd like to hear more about it.?
23 A Well,-^hen I say I knew something about
24 missiles, I didn't know what it was or what context or
25 whose they were.
mmm
40
UNtlASSiED
40
1 ^^ BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
2 Q When you had lunch with Colonel North on
3 December 3rd, 1985, he didn't tell you that the Israelis
4 had made some shipments to Iran?
5 A I don't recall him telling me that.
6 BY MR. _SABA: (Resuming)
7 Q So there came a time when you did know at
8 least of the TOW transfers in '85?
9 A No, I don't remember knowing of the TOW —
10 Q In '86?
11 A Yes, in '86, but not to Israel. To Israel,
12 the best of my recollection, I became aware of this when
13 Bill Casey testified and Mike Armacost and I were sitting
14 in with him. That's the first time I remember knowing
15 about it.
16 Q Just so I understand, the first time you
17 understood about the Israel transfers of TOW's was when
18 Bill Casey provided that information in his testimony?
19 A To the best of my recollection, that's right.
20 Q This strikes me as, it would have bothered me,
21 I think. In view of all of the public positions you had
22 taken in Operation Staunch in 1985, perhaps in early '86
2 3 and before that, what was your reaction to that?
24 A I hoped it was the same reaction as the
25 Secretary of Defense. We hated it. We hated the
: Defense. We hated it.
41
mmm
i provision of weapons. There was never a doubt in anybody
2 in Defense's mind that this was a bad policy.
3 * . Q Did it strike you as unusual that you didn't
4 know?
5 A After being in government a while, it strikes
6 me as less unusual. Yes, I would have hoped I would have
7 known about this going to Israel, but I can't recall it.
8 Q I am obviously trying to understand how the
9 Assistant Secretary views a policy, having publicly gone
10 to allies and friends and our own people and upheld one
11 policy, and having heard a year later that while you were
12 out talking about one policy the reverse was in fact
13 happening?
14 A Well, part of the time we knew the reverse was
15 happening, we were still talking about Operation Staunch.
16 In my case, from February of '86 we continued to talk
17 about Operation Staunch.
18 But each time I know for myself, or I can
19 imagine for the Secretary of Defense, we didn't like it
20 because we realized the other hand was providing some
21 quantities of weapons to Iran. So we thought it was very
22 hypocritical. We hated it.
23 The hope was, at least as the Secretary of
24 Defense has reconstructed this to me, that in some time
25 along the line of this policy — that is, as we were
Lne or tnis policy — rna
42
wmmm
1 providing these weapons the Secretary, as he stated it,
2 would find an opportunity to stop the policy of providing
3 weapons to Iran and we wouldn't have lost ground in
4 Operation Staunch in the meantime.
5 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, in your
6 conversations with Secretary Weinberger, do you ever
7 recall him saying words to the effect that the Israels
8 are sending lethal equipment or sending arms or equipment
9 to Iran and they've got to knock that stuff off?
10 Do you ever remember hearing anything like
11 that?
12 THE WITNESS: Well, I can recall not only the
13 Secretary of Defense, but the Secretary of the State in
14 the past having made what we call demarches to the
15 Israeli officials about provision of Israeli equipment to
16 the Iranians.
17 And we had made several representations to the
18 Israelis. The Secretary of Defense has made some, I have
19 made some, George Shultz had made some. And generally we
2 0 receive the same answer: governmental policy forbade
21 that.
22 MR. KREUZER: Would that be U.S. -made Israeli
23 equipment — in other words the equipment that we sold
24 them?
25 THE WITNESS: It was not specified. It was
UNGbtSSm
43
(iNtUSSIFe
43
1 the Israelis were selling equipment. It was never
2 specified that I know to be U.S. equipment. It was that
3 ■ the Israelis were engaged in airms sales.
4 MR. KREUZER: But the Secretary would mention
5 this from time to time?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. He'd mention it whenever
7 visitors came, Israeli visitors.
8 MR. KREUZER: Did he like talk about it in '85
9 or '84 or '86?
10 THE WITNESS: I'd like to say yes on all of
11 the above. I know that it was pretty much a regular
12 feature of many of his discussions with the Israelis.
13 You see, they had a different view of the Iran-Iraq war.
14 They generally held the view that if these two continued
15 banging away at each other that it was good for Israel.
16 We felt it was bad for the world because
17 things could happen like the Stark. Instability couldn't
18 be contained and the Secretary would make his point that .
19 we've got to all stop any dealings with Iran, whoever.
21 MR. KREUZER: So the Secretary then must have
22 felt very acutely about this whole business when he was
23 apparently at this meeting on the 7th — what was it, the
24 7th of January — and then there was one in December.
25 THE WITNESS: I am quite sure he did.
mmm
UNCussra
44
1 MR. KREUZER: But how did, like when the word
2 came through, I presume, from Admiral Poindexter — I'm
3 just guessing; correct me if I'm wrong — that the word
4 came through at some point and they said, okay, this
5 first shipment of TOWs are going to go to Iran, and this
6 is the order. How did that come through; do you know? I
7 mean, who talked to whom?
8 THE WITNESS: No. I have asked the Secretary
9 and I believe he told me that John Poindexter told him
10 the President has decided that he, the Secretary, inform
11 General Powell to get with the Army to have some TOWs
12 transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency.
13 MR. KREUZER: So did blow up then?
14 THE WITNESS: Well, I wasn't there.
15 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
16 Q That was approximately February 1986?
17 A I was told approximately February. I don't
18 know when.
19 Q But from that time forward, through '86,
20 Operation Staunch remained our publicly-stated position?
21 A Yes, it did.
22 Q Did you have occasion in 1986 to receive
23 information from foreign leaders that we were
24 transferring arms directly or indirectly to Iran,
25 complaints, information, inquiries?
Mmm
45
uimsm
45
1 A We continued to get complaints about — it was
2 generally focused as Israeli sales to Iran. At one time,
3 - in late ' 86, ^^^^^^^^^^^^H told me that he thought the
4 Iranian recent successes in the battlefield were not
5 attributed as much to weapons but to new training and
6 tactics, and I said, what does that mean. And he just
7 smiled and my impression was that he felt the Israelis
8 were involved in making the Iranians a little smarter on
9 the battlefield. But I have no knowledge that that was
10 the case.
11 So the answer is, I guess, yes, from time to
12 time we got indications that Arab countries felt that
13 Israel was continuing ta sell weapons. I can't remember
14 getting told that the. U.S. was doing this.
15 Q Did the Kuwaitis make any complaints; do you
16 recall?
17 A I can't recall.
18 Q Do you recall in '86 whether you or anyone at
19 your direction made any speeches in the United States
20 concerning Operation Staunch?
21 A Well, my deputies give speeches qui€e often,
22 and I do, too. And it oftentimes comes up in Q and Xs
23 and things of that nature. So I don't remember
24 specifically saying go out and hit Operation Staunch.
25 But it was a part of our policy and generally would come
46
imiinissra
1 up'trom tine to time.
2^ Q So you'd say even after February '86 it
3 remained the Department of Defense's public policy?
4 A It remained the Administration's public
5 policy.
6 Q To oppose transfers or sales to Iran?
7 A That's correct.
8 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
9 Q May I have that marked, please, as Exhibit
10 Number 4?
11 (The document referred to was
12 marked Armitage Exhibit
13 Number 4 for identification.)
14 This is a copy of your sworn testimony to the
15 Inspector General team for the Department of Army on 24
16 December 198$, provided to us by DOD. There are a couple
17 of questions I have just based on some things that you
18 stated. I want to make sure I understand what was meant,
19 or, in a couple of cases, to just see if in fact this is
20 how you still feel.
21 If you would look first on page 3 — and the
22 pages are numbered at the bottom — the portion that I
23 have marked, and I'll give you a second to read that.
24 (Pause.)
25 A
47
vmmm
47
1 ^^ . Q This simply has reference again, as we have
2 already talked about, to the draft NSDD from Mr.
3 McFarlane to the Secretary and has you telling the
4 investigators "I did have some comments for the
5 Secretary, the thrust of which was we would be willing to
6 enter a dialogue with Iran, number one, and under no
7 circumstance could we conceive of arms sold by the United
8 States or indeed lifting of our embargo."
9 As best as you can recall, that's a correct
10 statement?
11 A Yes.
12 Q And that's how you still feel?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Okay. Let me get you to look on page 4, eUaout
15 halfway down, through this full paragraph. There is a
16 sentence in which you said: "I know the Secretary of
17 Defense was very suspicious that this might not be
18 legal."
19 A Un-huh.
20 Q As best as you can recall, is that how you
21 felt? Is that what you understood to be the Secretary's
22 position?
23 A Yes. 'l thought that he did have strong
24 feelings about legality.
25 Q Let me get you to look, if you would, at the
UNWm
48
UdCUiSW
48
1 tojB^Qf page 5, your first full answer there. I'll give
2^ you a moment to read that paragraph, particularly the
3 last two-thirds of it.
4 (Pause.)
5 A Yes. All right.
6 Q Let me ask you, if you would, to expand on
7 that a bit. We know that you have already indicated that
8 you were either out of town or out of the country at one
9 point and General Powell needed some information, as you
10 say here, on HAWKs, and he went to individuals in DSAA,
11 either Dr. Gaffney —
12 A I think he went to Mr. Koch and then Koch to
13 Gaffney, but I have put that together subsequently.
14 Q All right. In your statement here it says:
15 "When I came back, DSAA had made me aware that they had
16 provided to General Powell some information on HAWK
17 missiles." Do you recall who would have told you that?
18 A No, I can't remember. Someone said Rudd here
19 today, and it could have been.
2 0 Q As you say there, "My best remembrance is
21 November-December '85 on that." So at some point in that
22 time frame you were apprised of what?
2 3 A That A~ point paper had been done on HAWK. I
24 actually frankly think it was later than November-
25 December. It was after I got back from Pakistan and
It was after I got iJaf JL 1
DNCkASSIFliS
1 somewhat after the paper had been provided to General
2 Powell.
3 Q Okay. If you would, look down to the next
4 full paragraph where you were responding to Colonel
5 Morton. Just take a moment and read that, if you would,
6 sir.
7 (Pause.)
8 A All right.
9 Q I believe we just addressed this a moment ago,
10 but let me see if I can get you to recall anything with
11 any greater clarity. I know we are asking you to look
12 back in time, but it was your judgment that Secretary
13 Weinberger said that he was made aware that the President
14 wanted this either by the President or by Admiral
15 Poindexter?
16 A That's correct. I am now more of the opinion
17 that it was John Poindexter who called the Secretary, but
18 if the Secretary could come in tomorrow and say it was
19 the President it would be the same to me. And the reason
20 that I say I'm somewhat more sure is because I obviously
21 in the last six or seven months have had many more
22 conversations with the Secretary on this subject, so I am
23 getting more sure?
24 Q And when approximately do you think that would
25 have been conveyed to you by Secretary Weinberger?
UNWStflED
50
UHliUSSIFJED
50
\ A That was after things started to become
2 palAic, and I was trying to in a hurry get smart so I
3* could come up here and be reasonable in front of the
4 Committee.
5 Q Okay. If you would, sir, look at the next
6 page, page 6. Youare asked a question here. If you
7 would look at your answer there (indicating) —
8 A Yes.
9 Q You state that "sporadically during the year I
10 heard either from vice Admiral Jones or Mr. Taft that
H there were other shipments." Now Vice Admiral Jones
12 would be Admiral Donald Jones who took General Powell's
13 place as the Secretary's military assistant?
14 A That's correct.
15 Q And Mr. Taft the Deputy Secretary. So is it
16 your sense from this statement that periodically from
17 time to time you would hear that other shipments had gone
18 forward?
19 A Yes, it is.
20 Q Would that have been limited to the TOWs or
21 would you have also been apprised about HAWKs?
22 A I don't remember specifically hearing about
23 the HAWKS. I think it was just shipments. From my point
24 of view, frankly, it didn't matter because I wasn't
25 involved in any of the arrangements.
51
UNcyssinEB
51
^ . Q I'd like for you to look at page 10. About
2 harfVay down the page there's a question that begins,
3 > "Sir, when we talked to General Powell," and goes on to
4 say "he thought". General Powell thought, "we should talk
5 to you and to Admiral Jones.
6 The investigator says: "Baaed on your
7 knowledge, sir, do you think it would be beneficial for
8 us to talk to Mr. Taft?" And you say that you think it
9 would. Is that your recollection?
10 A Yes.
^^ Q And as far as you know did they ever talk to
12 Mr. Taft?
13 A I can't say.
1* Q Would you tell us why you thought it would be
15 important that they might want to see Secretary Taft?
1^ A My understanding was — and again this was
17 after all the revelations were out and I was involved my
18 own self in trying to piece together what happened —
19 first of all he, Mr. Taft, played in this issue when the
20 rest of us were out of town, number one, so he had a
21 part, and, number two, that I either saw something, some
22 document or some note or something, memo, to the Deputy
23 Secretary or I waS informed that perhaps Mr. Marsh or
24 General Wickham had spoken to him — to him, Taft —
25 around the VfilA4in%Qe^od. So I thought it was
mmm
52
dNClASSiED
52
1 essential that they do see him to get a full picture.
2 Q Let me now ask you to take a look at
3 « Deposition Exhibit 5, which is a chronology supplied, as
4 you can see, by Ambassador-Designate Raphel on his
5 knowledge of the Iran arms transfer issue.
6 (The document referred to was
7 marked Armitage Exhibit
8 Number 5 for identification.)
9 I think this would be Arnie Raphel, who was at
10 State. Again, I'm not going to ask you to vouch for the
11 accuracy of anything that is in here, but I would like
12 you to look, if you would, at the page of the chronology
13 itself that is numbered page 2.
14 At the top you see November 24. You can see
15 that each date he has numbered in the various notes and
16 entries and so forth. If you would look at the December
17 3 entry, it says "Assistant Secretary Armitage told me
18 that Colonel North had said that he would be made the
19 scapegoat if the operation goes wrong, but that we have
20 lost little by trying."
21 Is that generally an accurate statement; do
22 you recall?
23 A I don't really recall that, but Arnie 's very
24 good. He's very precise.
25 Q Do you recall Colonel North telling you that?
mmm
muwm
53
■I A No, but I do recall Ollie being very shocked
2 when I said how much the Secretary would hate all this,
3 and in that context it makes sense to me, but I don't
4 remember that statement.
5 Q The next sentence, again from Mr. Raphel's
6 chronology, "Reportedly, Colonel North added that the
7 Iranians involved are disreputable." Do you recall him
8 making that statement to you,. Colonel North?
9 A I don't think he used that word. I think he
10 used somewhat more colorful language — some people think
11 they are dirtballs or something like that. But that's
12 Ollie.
13 Q Do you recall conveying that to Mr. Raphel?
14 A No, I do not recall it, but I'm sure I did
15 because I shared a lot with Arnie. He was my major
16 contact on Middle East issues.
17 Q Let's go off the record a second.
18 (A discussion was held off the record.)
19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
20 Q Mr. Secretary, if you would look again at page
21 2 of Mr. Raphel's chronology, he says: "On December 6 I
22 was told that the operation involved trading arms^^^H
23 ^^^^^^^H and '^hat there was a need to replace 3,300
24 I-TOWs in Israel." Now he states later that he cannot
25 recall whether you may have provided him that information
UNttiWED
54
UNOASSIBED
54
1 or the information in the next entry for December 6,
2 which is "my notes reflect that I was given information
3 on the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and how
4 they applied to arms transfers."
5 Would you have a judgment as to which of these
6 you might have talked to him about?
7 A I don't think I gave him thel
8 thing. On the AECA, the Arms Export Control Act,
9 provisions, I know I did discuss that with Arnie.
10 Q And would it have been about December 6?
11 A Oh, yeah. It was in preparation —
12 Q For the December 7 meeting?
13 A Yes. I remember having discussions on the
14 Arms Export Control Act with Ami*.
15 Q Let me ask you, if you would, to turn to the
16 top of the next page, page 3. There is a December 13
17 entry.
18 A Yes.
T/*e ComfrkTitz'^ NcrrE6 vWrfJCrf- !^;e^tpj a^f
19 g And in M% ne^ac, Tirhioh ni-o en ttm page
20 ^ numbered S-003494, if I could get you to look that over.
21 A I've got this, Raphel's notes. State.
22 Q Yes. And then *n^m a quotation. Ha says:
23 "Raphel thinks Armitage told him this." Let me get you
24 to look at both the December 13 entry and the one on page
25 - • ■ - ^- •
UNUttSMD
55
uNCmSSIPIED
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
whether you might have told him any of this.
A There is no December 13 on page 2. Page 3?
^ Yes, sir. ^-f^ connmvTTE e »-'O^H\}
A I don't think on page S-003494^that I am the
one who told Arnie Raphel at Ollie North hostage meeting
last night, because I was not a member of the OSG at that
time. So I don't believe that was me.
Q Okay. If you would look under the February 5
entry on page 3 still --
A Got it.
Q It says: "I was told that we were attempting
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^^^H" Then
you look to| tho came page, under February 5, it says:
"This information came from Armitage, according to
Raphel 's best guess, because Armitage 's initials appear
next to it. His note was that
A I would guess that's me. If you are
interested, we had had some trouble periodically with^H
on this Iranian
caper. At one time we felt at the Department of Defense
that we were cut off. State apparently was still cut
off. I was keeping Arnie informed. I don't remember
that conversation, but it would have been something I
would have shared with Arnie.
UNCI:AS«D
UNCIASSIEIED
56
Q I was going to ask you about that. Let me at
th\3 juncture do it. It was your statement, I believe, '■
was out^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^in terms
Iran at some point; is that correct?
A My understanding is that OSD was cut out, but
that Admiral Moreau of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for some
reason still got his copy and occasionally shared it with
Powell and the Secretary. And this was what I think had
tickled the Secretary's nose that there was something
going down with Iranians.
Q Do you have a sense as to how that came to be
or who was responsible for cutting all of OSD?
A I don't know who did it. I got a sense the
direction came from the NSC.
Q Do you have in mind who might have done that?
A No. Well, there are three or four suspects,
but I don't know.
Q Okay. Going back to Mr. Raphel's chronology,
on page 3 again, the February 12 entry, he says: "I was
told that David Kimche and the Israeli MFA was no longer
involved in the arms sales operation." ^On_i,
ha al^l!iirii.'W»Ks on the February 12 entry, -he sayfe; "This
information came either from Ken Quinn or Armitage", and
the notes simply say "Arms to Iran, Kimche out." Do you
know whether that i4iqh^«.ta.v/>aJy#ritf rom you?
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1 A I don't think it was me, and the reason I say
2 ■ that is because I knew David Kimche from the Lebanon days
3 and referred to him as the owl, and I'd have almost
4 certainly said something like that to Raphel. It's the
5 owl.
6 Q Let me ask you, if you would, to look at the
7 final entry on page 3 of July 24, where Mr. Raphel says:
8 "I was told that Mr. Ledeen contended he established the
9 original contacts with Israel to set up the arms
10 transfers and that this was done with Mr. McFarlane's
11 permission. The purpose to arrange for a more moderate
12 regime in Tehran and to do so while Khomeini was still
13 alive. The Iranian response was to ask for arms."
14 Now in hte efaSSCiiVtnn on July 24 it says
15 "Raphel thinks this came from Armitage, who got it from
16 Ledeen or North." Do you know whether you might have
17 been his source for that?
18 A June 24?
19 Q July 24.
20 A Excuse me, July. No. The reason I say I
21 don't think it was me, I dialed into Michael Ledeen
22 somewhat later in the year, so I don't think this came
23 from me. But that's consistent with what Ledeen told me
24 later in the year, I must say.
2 5 Q Okay. This completes my references ^o this
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1 dqcwment and I appreciate your helping us to try to make
2 sense of that.
3 ■ Mr. Secretary, let me ask you a bit about the
4 OSG. We've talked about it and you've made reference to
5 it. Exactly what was the OSG?
6 A The OSG was a small cell established in the
7 White House, the Operations Subgroup of the Terrorist
8 Incidents Working Group, the TIWG. It consisted of
9 membership in the Department of Defense, the FBI, CIA,
10 NSC, and the Department of State, and it was established
11 in the wake of the Holloway Report on Terrorism. It was
12 to be a mechanism that could reach to principals very
13 quickly, not having to go through all sorts of
14 bureaucratic machinations to get quick answers for c[uick-
15 developing situations.
16 Q Was there a point at which any of its
17 discussions focused on arms to Iran or arms for hostages,
18 as best you recall?
19 A As best I recall, in several of the meetings
20 there were inferences by one or another participant to
21 this, not directly. I don't remember it coming out as a
22 direct discussion in front of the OSG of this program.
23 But various members of the OSG had various parts of the
24 puzzle and either on the margins of an OSG meeting or in
25 a reference across the table at an OSG meeting there was
UNiiUiSSIFe
UNCUkSSIEe
59
! generally what I would call a disparaging remark asked
2 about the policy of providing arms to Iran.
3 > It was never a subject that I remember from my
4 participation in the OSG of an OSG meeting.
5 Q Do you recall who might have made that
6 disparaging remark?
7 A I remember making some. Bob Oakley had made a
8 couple. Later Jerry Bremmer made some remarks.
9 Q Who replaced Ambassador Oakley?
10 A Who replaced Ambassador Oakley. I don't
11 believe unless someone was witting of the whole program
12 that they were remarks that made sense to the whole
13 group .
14 Q But they were remarks along the line of why
15 are we saying this, given what we are doing?
16 A Or this sure is stupid to spend all this time
17 talking about how strict we are on our no-ransom, when on
18 the other hand we're doing something else. But a remark
19 and then gone.
20 Q Was there a time when General John Hollering,
21 the JCS representative, asked you what the heck everybody
22 was talking about?
23 A There Oas a meeting in the summer and, as I
24 remember, there was a little bit more chatter around the
25 table than usual. I felt somewhat bad, and I can't
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1 r<aaoinber if John asked me in the car going back or I felt
2 so bad I raised this to John Hollering, but I said there
3 are some things you ought to know, and I gave him a very
4 general outline, that we were indeed providing some
5 weapons to Iran.
6 Q This would have been approximately when —
7 late June or early July of '86?
8 A I would say it was July, but it was summer.
9 Q And what was General Hollering 's position?
10 A He was appalled.
11 Q I'm sorry, what was hit —
12 A He was Assistant to the Chairman.
13 Q Of the Joint Chiefs?
14 A Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
15 Q And as best you know that was his first
16 knowledge of this?
17 A Yes.
18 Q And was Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the
19 Joint Chiefs, knowledgeable at that time, as far as you
20 know?
21 A My understanding was that General Hollering
22 had returned and made him knowledgeable.
23 Q Now t6~the question you were about to answer.
e
24 What was General Hollering 's reaction when you informed
25 him of this?
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- • . A To the best of my recollection, he was
appalled or disbelieving.
Q Now how do you know that he informed his boss.
Admiral Crowe?
A In the workup again to testimony after the
program had been made public this came to light.
Q That he had told Admiral Crowe and it had also
come to light that Admiral Crowe had gone down to see, or
up, or wherever to see Secretary Weinberger?
A He went up to see the Secretary, and this also
came to light as we were preparing for testimony.
Q Before I ask you on the issue of readiness
about the TOWs, let me ask you a guestion or two about
the HAWKs. Have you been made aware at any point, either
at the time or subseguent to the shipment of the HAWK
repair parts, about the readiness impact data that was in
front of the Army policymakers when they were trying to
decide whether to meet the requirement to the CIA?
A No.
So you would not be aware,
1
2
3 »
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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12
13
14
15
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17
13
19
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A I was not aware.
Q And have you been made aware of this prior to
today?
A No.
Q Do you recall an OSG meeting in the afternoon
around the time of the Attorney General's press
conference, or shortly thereafter, in which a statement
was being prepared for President Reagan and it was
circulated in which President Reagan was going to comment
on and explain these matters, and it was circulated and
then there was apparently some reaction to it that was
fairly strong?
A Yes, I do.
Q Tell us about that meeting.
A It was in late afternoon, my recollection was
around 1600, as most of the OSGswere roughly that time.
A statement j«^ajs_being _prepared Xar—fehe President ._ I had
seen a copy which came over maybe an hour or two before
the meeting. I was annoyed and alarmed about it and
called it to Mike"Armacost ' s attention. I said this
looked like trouble to me. I think I used the term it
asks more que
wmm
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UNGUSSra
1 ^--i We then got into the OSG and various members
Z were asked to take a look at the statement and then take
3 " it back and make some comments, to provide comments later
4 to Ollie's office. But in the nature of bureaucracies
5 people started reading right away and people started
6 commenting right away. And to my recollection the JCS
7 representative, the OSD representative, the State
8 representative, and the FBI representative all had very
9 serious reservations about the statement.
10 Q Along what lines?
11 A Mine — that this looked like it asks more
12 questions than it answered. If the President doesn't
13 know any more about this, he ought to just say well, open
14 up. Once I get it, I'll make it all public. But this
15 looks kind of cooked. Now those are not quotes, but
16 that's the thrust.
17 General Hollering said something about I think
18 that I was around here during Watergate; this looks like
19 — you know, this not real. Buck Revell —
20 Q Of the FBI?
21 A Of the FBI had some comments. I just remember
22 they were along the lines, but I was subsequently told he
23 had fired over some comments to Ollie in the wake of that
24 meeting to try to bring the statement more in line with
25 what he knew to be the facts.
^mmm
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UNSiASSIRED
64
1 In general, all the people I mentioned bled on
2 that statement.
3 ^ Q And were you subsequently told by Craig Coy of
4 the NSC staff that this reaction was so strong that
5 Colonel North ran across the street to either see Pat
6 Buchanan or Don Regan to have the statement changed?
7 A Well, I think it was Craig who told me that
8 they were surprised at the strength of reaction and the
9 kind of unanimous opinion of the group, and that Ollie
10 and maybe someone else — I can't remember whether it was
11 Ollie alone — went across the street to either Pat
12 Buchanan or Regan's office to try to get it changed. I
13 think it was Craig who told me that.
14 Q Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, about some of
15 your discussions with Colonel North, and you've been
16 quite open previously with the Tower Commission and the
17 Senate Select Committee in characterizing several of
18 them, and I want to ask about two or three in particular.
19 You probably know which ones I'm talking about.
20 First, there was a statement sometime in 1986
21 in which Colonel North talked about General Secord and,
22 as I think you said, it was something along the lines of
23 Secord needs to ^et the Medal of Freedom.
24 A No. We said the President — well, he didn't
25 say "needs". He said Secord 's a national hero; the
\mmm
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1 Praaident ought to or will give him the Medal of Freedom.
2 Q Tell us more about that — when you think it
3 might have been said, what the context was, et cetera.
4 A The context. I had come to understand that
5 Dick Secord was involved in this Iranian affair, and in
6 one of my conversations with Ollie I expressed to him how
7 terrible it was, and I think I also said I was very
8 surprised that Dick Secord would be involved in this, and
9 he said that Dick Secord was basically a great American
10 and the President is going to give him the Medal of
11 Freedom. And I don't recall the time.
12 Q When were you made aware that General Secord
13 was involved in some way?
14 AX don't remember that either, but it had to be
15 after — sometime after February of 1986, that I recall.
16 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, in regard to
17 that, is that the kind of statement that if Ollie North
18 said that to you, would you say well, if Ollie says the
19 President's going to do that, then he's going to do it,
20 or was that just advertising?
21 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I can't answer
22 that question. This is what Ollie told me.
23 MR. KR£U2ER: The thrust of what I'm trying to
24 get at is can you comment on how close he is to the
25 President or was?
\immm
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UNCIASMD
66
1 - -' . THE WITNESS: I could have commented on that
2^ several months ago, but I can't comment on it now because
3 I don't know basically when I learned what. But at one
4 time it was pretty generally felt in the Administration
5 that Ollie was very close.
6 MR. KREUZER: That he could just walk in?
7 THE WITNESS: Well, that no one could just
8 walk in, but that he was able to get in to see the
9 President quite often. However, I have been informed
10 from newspaper stories and testimony throughout the past
11 many months that this wasn't the case. I'd have had a
12 lot easier time answering that seven months ago. I would
13 have answered more in the affirmative several months ago.
14 Right now I just don't know. But ha said it.
15 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
16 Q Do you know how you became aware or were
17 apprised that General Secord might have been involved in
18 this?
19 A No, I don't remember, and it could have been
20 either Ollie or it could have been the Israelis sometime
21 during '86, but I can't remember who it was. I know I
22 was surprised.
23 BY MR;"sabA: (Resuming)
24 Q Why were you surprised?
25 A Dick Secord is a man, in my view, of enormous
UNIWtFIED
67
iciissra
67
1 iivt«lligence, and I just couldn't believe that he was
2 involved in something that I personally felt was very
3 ■ silly.
4 Q When you learned he was involved, apart from
5 your view of him as an individual, were you also
6 surprised that the operation had gone private?
7 A I don't think I knew it as public or private.
8 From my point of view Ollie was involved and consequently
9 it wasn't a private operation. It was the government.
10 So I don't think I ever thought about it in terms of
11 private or public, and I didn't know what Dick was doing.
12 But as far as I knew Ollie was involved, and as far as I
13 was concerned this was a government thing.
14 After all, there had been discussions in the
15 National Security Council about it.
16 Q Is it correct to say that you had no knowledge
17 of Secord's involvement prior to the February 1986
18 transfers?
19 A To the best of my recollection, because I
20 hadn't seen Dick in some time. But I could have known.
21 I think it's February — to the best of my recollection,
22 sometime after February.
23 BY MR.'~SAXON: (Resuming)
24 Q Let me go back to your conversations with
25 Colonel North. I believe you testified that after the
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UNCbASSra
1 Iran initiative became public and the McFarlane trip to
2 Tehr*ri\ but before the Attorney General's press conference
3 ^ at which the diversion was talked about Colonel North
4 made the statement to you along the lines of well, that
5 this won't be so bad when people find out the Ayatollah
6 is helping us fund_ the contras.
7 What can you tell us about that statement —
8 exactly what you recall the statement being, the context,
9 et cetera?
10 A As I recall, I was again preparing to go
11 testify and I called Ollie on the black phone, the secure
12 phone, to find out what was going on, to fill in my
13 knowledge a little bit more. And I think — in the wake
14 of this I've thought a lot about it — that Ollie was
15 concerned that I was very upset about this project, and
16 he said basically. Rich, don't worry. It'll all be all
17 right when the Vice President goes to Riyadh to sit down
18 with the Iranians and they find out that our hostages
19 come home, and that the Ayatollah is either helping us in
20 Central America or the contras.
21 The impression that I got was that it was the
22 contras, but he could have said Central America. And I
23 said, Ollie, wow:** And then he and I stopped the phone
24 conversation. As I think I've told you and others
25 before, I then called Mike Armacost and just reported
UttGt^iSiftED
UNCLASKD
1 that I had what I considered to be a rather baffling
2 conversation with Ollie in which he talked about the Vice
3» President going to Riyadh, sitting down with the Iranians
4 to talk about peace in the Gulf, getting help in Central
5 America or the contras, and our hostages being freed.
6 And Mike, who shared the same anxiety I had
7 about having to come to testify not knowing much about
8 the program, just kind of said wow, but we didn't go into
9 it any more.
^° Q I realize that we have the benefit in asking
11 these questions of hindsight and knowing a whole lot more
12 than you knew at the time, but did you not inquire
13 further of Colonel North as to what he meant by that?
^* A I thought he was losing his grip at that time.
^5 I thought he was saying this to make me calm down, not
16 realizing it^had the opposite effect on me. I thought he
17 was losing the grip.
^^ Q Was there a point at which you connected the
19 Ayatollah and the contras in the sense of diversion as we
20 have come to know it?
21 A No. No. When the Attorney General mentioned
22 this, that was the first time I realized it.
23 Q Did ifclick, though, in terms of relating it
24 back to what Colonel North told you previously?
ut it didn't click in
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70
1 a major way. I just remember the conversation. It
2 wasn't too far afterward, too many days.
3 . Q Do you recall if you told anyone about that
4 conversation other than Secretary Armacost?
5 A I'm almost sure I have, and I can't remember
6 to whom I said it. I know I've told a lot of people
7 since.
8 Q But roughly in that time period did you tell
9 Mr. Raphel?
10 A Well, I might have told Raphel, but I can't
11 remember. I know I told Mike because he was having to
12 testify with me.
13 Q I believe there was a time when you asked
14 Colonel North if he was all right in terms of the press
15 stories that were beginning to be written sometime in
16 early '86 about NSC involvement in aiding the contras,
17 and he basically told you his hands were clean and so
18 forth. Can you recall anything about that conversation?
19 A Yes, and I can state that it was not just me
20 that asked basically that question. I, from time to
21 time, participated in something that was called the RIG,
22 the Restricted Interagency Group.
23 Q And this was the RIG chaired by Mr. Abrams?
24 A Chaired by Elliott Abrams. I came to
25 participate more in the RIG toward the end of '86 because
more in the rig towara t
iJNIMSSiriED
71
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71
1 Tny_ deputy, Mr. Sanchez, after six years was going to
2 retire and I had to pick up that slack a bit. And at
3 least one and, I think, several of those RIGs the story
4 kept cropping up. I think Senator Kerry had been
5 hounding Ollie and I made the general statement about
6 Ollie. All right, are you all straight on this. And he
7 assured me that he was, that it was absolutely legal, no
8 problem.
9 In a subsequent conversation either Elliott or
10 someone else at the RIG, probably Elliott, said, hey,
11 Ollie, this press stuff, is there anything to it. And
12 Ollie said he was absolutely straight — not a nickel,
13 not a penny or no money had touched his hands. I
14 remember two or more occasions when his colleagues
15 basically inquired after Ollie 's legal health.
16 Q As far as you know, were there any notes or
17 minutes of those meetings that would reflect this, or
18 memcons?
19 A No, I am unaware of any.
20 Q We covered before partially the question of
21 when you might have told Dr. Ikle about the arms to Iran.
22 What do you think is the time frame on that?
23 A The be'St I can remember it was late '86, and
24 if I had to pin down a date I'd say it was the beginning
25 of autumn but it was before it became public.
wtmm
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UNCUSSIQEO
1 Q Let me ask a little bit more bluntly the
2 question that Mr. Kreuzer asked earlier, and let me
3* , preface it this way — that Dr. Ikle was your boss and he
4 was the top Pentagon man for policy. I understand that
5 if the Secretary says something is a close hold that
6 means it's a pretty close hold. But did you not feel at
7 any point that you had an obligation to him to apprise
8 him of something which you thought was a major departure
9 from our stated policy vis-a-vis Iran?
10 A Well, I will remind you, first of all, that we
11 all work for the Secretary of Defense primarily. That's
12 our boss. Second of all, I obviously had qualms about
13 this. That's why I eventually let him know what I
14 figured he needed to know to conduct his business without
15 an embarrassment to him. But I didn't realize this was
16 going to become public in November. So I guess the
17 answer is yes to both.
18 But we both work for the Secretary primarily.
19 Q I'm not trying to pass judgment.
2 0 A No. It's very important because we are both
21 Presidential appointees. We both work for the Secretary
22 primarily. If the Secretary were to tell me to do
23 something legal and tell me not to tell X, Y or Z, I
24 would not tell X, Y or Z. He didn't specifically direct
2 5 me not to tell Fred, but he told me it was sensitive, to
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1 kee^ it quiet.
2 Q Did you ever discuss the Iranian arms
3 • initiative with Noel Koch prior to the matters becoming
4 public?
5 A Yes.
6 Q Do you recall when you might have had any
7 discussion with Mr. Koch?
8 A Sometime, I would say roughly January or
9 February. It might have been late December.
10 Q January or February of?
11 A '86. It might have been December '85.
12 Q And what do you think might have been the
13 reason for discussing it with him?
14 A It seems to me that he might have raised it
15 with me, but I remember having conversations with him on
16 it. I think he probably raised it with me. I remember
17 he knew about it.
18 Q Did anyone tell you that he was involved in
19 negotiation with the Israelis on the price that was to
20 govern the TOW shipments to Iran?
21 A No, they did not.
22 Q Have you been made aware of that prior to
23 today? ~
24 A This is the first I've heard of it.
25 MR. SABA: This ia.liie-rfirst?
74
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74
1 ^^ THE WITNESS: This is the first.
2 MR. SAXON: I would say it was a pretty close
3 hold, then.
4 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
5 Q Do you know a gentleman by the name of Ben
6 Joseph.
7 A Ben Joseph, Ibraham Ben Joseph, yes.
8 Q Ibraham?
9 A Ibraham Ben Joseph. He is the Israeli
10 procurement guy in New York.
11 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
12 Q Have you ever had any dealings with him?
13 A All the time.
14 Q Did he ever mention any dealings ha had with
15 Mr. Koch?
16 A No, but I know Ibraham was privy to this
17 operation.
18 Q How do you know that?
19 A I have been told that subsequently. I was
20 told sometime during '86 that arms were going through
21 Israel and that Ben Joseph knew about it.
22 Q Do you recall who told you that?
23 A No, I aon't.
24 Q Could General Meron have told you?
25 A Very possibly. Just for the record, Ben
UNWn
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UNGLASSffi
75
1 Joseph is our major interlocutor on all systems
2 , transactions or tech transfer or anything with the
3 Israelis. He works out of New York.
4 Q I want to go back to the TOW pricing question.
5 You told the Department of the Army Inspection General
6 team that as far as you knew there was no pressure that
7 the Pentagon put on the Army to keep the price of the TOW
8 missiles low; is that correct?
9 A That is correct.
10 Q Do you find it at all curious that the GAG
11 report that looked at the pricing found that several
12 discretionary items, that they all came out on the low
13 side — and that is particularly that the price the Army
14 charged on the I-TOW was too low, that the standard AMDF
15 price for the basic TOWs was too low, that the price for
16 the MOIC was too low, and that the Army underestimated
17 the charges for transportation?
18 A I don't find it so much curious as I found the
19 whole operation rather badly done. I concentrated more
20 on the final bottom line of the GO, which pleased me
21 quite a bit.
22 Q As you were looking back on all of this to try
23 to reconstruct whSt took place with the pricing in late
24 '86, after it became public, were you made aware of the
25 role that Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Schwimmer played in fixing
uNeusm
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76
1 tha> rirst price on the TOWs?
2 A No.
3 Q Let me ask you, changing gears now from the
4 Iranian side of these matters to the contra side, let me
5 ask you a few questions about the private supply
6 operation and private supply network. That's what I'll
7 call it. If you know it by some other term, that's fine.
8 I believe you told the Tower Commission that
9 you knew that some weapons were getting through somehow
10 because the contras continued to fight; is that correct?
11 A Yes.
12 Q What would be your sense of how those arms got
13 there?
14 A I assumed that — well, the conservatives were
15 providing money, and this money then purchased arms on
16 the grey armf market. I knew that some Americans had
17 been reported to be doing this — Jack Singlaub and
18 others. I also, I think I told the Tower guys and maybe
19 you, my understanding was that it was at least the
20 implicit, if not explicit, discussion of this in the Hill
21 testimony surrounding the provision of $27 million in
22 humanitarian assistance to the contras, basically to the
23 effect that well, '"weapons are coming from somewhere, so
24 we are only going to do humanitarian.
pcussions with General
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77
1 Sljvjlaub about his role in these matters?
2 A None that I recall.
3 " Q What do you know — what did you know during
4 or prior to these matters becoming public about the air
5 strip that existed in Costa Rica?
6 A I knew nothing.
7 Q You knew nothing?
8 A I knew nothing.
9 Q When did you first learn that it was being
10 used for air drops or resupply?
11 A When things became public.
12 Q Did you ever have any discussions with Colonel
13 North about use of this air strip prior to it becoming
14 public?
15 A Not that I recall, no.
16 Q Were you ever involved with Colonel North in
17 what could be called concocting a cover story for the air
18 strip if these matters ever became public?
19 A No.
20 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, was it your sense
21 — you mentioned a couple of minutes ago that you
22 understood that private benefactors may have been
23 contributing to tRe lethal, what you say was lethal
24 support.
25 THf. MTTHF.ty -gi^ J^ HfMJr ffc ^^ ^"^ money. They were
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1 giVthg money and then with the money my assumption was
2 ^ the contras could go purchase arms on the market.
3 MR. KREUZER: Did you ever ruminate on how
4 much of that effort would be covered by private
5 benefactor support?
6 THE WITNESS: None whatsoever. I never did.
7 MR. KREUZER: You never equated how much they
8 would be able to provide as opposed to, say — in other
9 words, did the question ever come into your mind about
10 whether they would be able to provide overall support to
11 a contra effort of maybe^^^^Has opposed to some other
12 source of support?
13 THE WITNESS: No, I never did. I must say
14 that ny own efforts on behalf of the contras, if I can be
15 allowed to say that, were somewhat periodic. As we
16 geared up for a fight, I'm sure you'll see the attendance
17 at different meetings in the White House and all would
18 reflect much more my attendance, because we would have to
19 lobby the Hill, we would have to work these things.
20 As we were not doing that, then I was a much
21 less frequent attendee at the normal meetings because I
22 felt 1 had a very good, and do feel that I had a very
23 good deputy in NeStor Sanchez, who knew these matters
24 very well and was perfectly competent. But as we got to
a crunch point ^and^I l^^t^tifffl4?A the artillery of my
25
79
10
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1 rank rather than my personal efforts, they needed an
2 ■ Assistant Secretary to come lobbying and this, that, and
3 whatnot. So I participated to a higher degree.
4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
5 Q I want to follow up on the Costa Rican air
6 strip and have you mark this as the next deposition
7 exhibit. I will give you a moment to look through this.
8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Armitage Exhibit
Number 6 for identification.)
11 A Do you want me to read it?
12 Q Sure.
13 (Pause.)
1* X All right. I have read it. I see what you
15 are getting at.
1® Q Mr. Secretary, this exhibit is a memorandum
17 from Colonel North to John Poindexter. It's dated
18 September 30, 1986. For the record, it's got the
19 initials JMP, which I guess suggests that Admiral
20 Poindexter had seen it, and it's with regard to the air
21 strip in Costa Rica to which I made reference a few
22 minutes ago, which we now know was used for air drops for
23 getting supplies; "including lethal supplies, to the
24 contras during the period when U.S. assistance was cut
25 off.
UNClASSra
80
wmmm
1 - ' . Let me direct your attention to a couple of
2^ paragraphs on page one of the memorandum. It starts off
3 in paragraph two saying "Request guidance at Tab 1 has
4 been coordinated with State, Mr. Abrams, Defense,
5 Armitage, and ^^^'^|^^Pf" Let me ask you first if you
6 have any recollection of Colonel North coordinating with
7 you anything in terms of how this issue of the use of the
8 air strip, its construction or anything else would be
9 portrayed in the press.
10 A I certainly don't remember this, and I knew
11 nothing about the air strip. It is possible that this
12 press guidance came through me from Nestor, but it
13 doesn't look to me — I mean, I wouldn't have known what
14 it was. I could have coordinated, but I certainly don't
15 remember it at all.
16 Q Okay. I can understand with the many issues
17 you have to deal with that you may not have total recall
18 of all of these.
19 A I say completely unabashedly that I have no
20 knowledge of this.
21 Q Okay. You'll understand if I have to ask a
22 few more questions.
2 3 A Please"
24 Q We are trying to piece all of this together
25 and we do know the air fitiijp^MF f%- we are fairly
lisMW
81
81
1 CQirfident of the uses to which it was put and what the
2 U.S. role was in that. Colonel North says in his memo to
3 " Admiral Poindexter that the damage done by this
4 revelation is considerable. He talks about the logistics
5 support provided by Project Democracy on the ability of
6 the resistance movement to sustain itself. He says the
7 air field at Santa Elena has been a vital element in
8 supporting the resistance and so forth, and talks further
9 through the memo about the strategic importance of the
10 air facility, et cetera.
11 Is it your statement that you had no knowledge
12 whatsoever prior to these matters becoming public that we
13 were using this air strip to supply the contras?
14 A This is my statement.
15 Q And you don't recall at all him, Colonel
16 North, talking to you or dealing with you to work at a
17 press statement which in effect was a cover that
18 disguised its purposes?
19 A No, I certainly don't remember it. I must say
20 that, having read this press guidance, this wouldn't
21 offend me, but I don't remember it at all.
22 Q I'm sorry. What do you mean?
23 A Well, the press guidance, as I read it, looks
24 fairly non-controversial and nothing to it. I myself did
25 not know th%tk a| Air ^1f%iA|MpA>g used for contra
wsussm
82
UN€LA$»
82
1 resupply. If someone had come to me and said, look,
2 these are the facts, we've got this, I would have okayed
3 ' . it. But I don't remember seeing this.
4 Q Okay. I understand the distinction.
5 A I don't remember seeing this.
6 Q Let me ask you a few questions about General
7 Secord, who we alluded to earlier. As best as you can
8 recall, when did you first meet him?
9 A 1 met Dick in Iran at his pinning of his
10 general officer stars, either at the last month of '75 or
11 the first month of '76. Whenever he pinned them on, I
12 was in that ceremony. That's the first time I met him.
13 Q And this was when you were a consultant to the
14 Pentagon?
15 A And, more particularly, to the defense
16 representative to Iran.
17 Q Have you had any ongoing or continuing
18 relationship with him since that time?
19 A Oh, yes. Well, when I left Iran and I did not
20 see Dick Secord, and I left in the middle of '76, nor
21 have any communication with him until 1981 in the advent
22 of this Administration.
23 Q When yOu both arrived at the Pentagon?
24 A Well, I arrived there. I think he was already
25 there. I can't j:^i^mbej^MhfM|haf|ras, but at any rate I
wmm'
mussra
83
1 have the highest regard for him personally. I had a high
2 regard them. I introduced him, as I remember, to Frank '.
3* . Carlucci as a job-seeker and |he got the Near East/South
4 Asia job as Deputy Assistant Secretary. He held that job
5 until roughly the end of April 1983, at which time he
6 retired.
7 From the end of April 1983 to now I've seen
8 him possibly three or four times and, to my recollection,
9 I haven't seen him or spoken to him in over a year and a
10 half or more now. I consider him a friend.
11 Q You say you don't think you've spoken to him
12 in about a year or a year and a half?
13 A The reason I dare say that is I have asked my
14 own staff, my secretary, in preparation for either a call
15 by you or the FBI when the last time Dick Secord was in
16 or around. They couldn't remember. They put it together
17 as a year and a half.
18 Q And a year and a half would include the period
19 in May of '86.
20 A It certainly would appear then.
21 Q Do you recall whether you talked to him in May
22 of 1986?
23 A I don't recall. It's possible, but I
24 certainly don't recall it, nor did my staff.
25 Q Would you recall ^^i^J^ you had spoken to him
9
84
OHCUiSSIEIED
84
1 aboyt the Iranian arms shipments?
2 A If I spoke to him, I would have spoken to him
3 about the Iranian arms shipments. There is no question —
4 no question.
5 Q If you had spoken to him, would it have been
6 captured in the record-keeping system you have in your
7 office?
8 A No. No, it wouldn't have been. I don't
9 generally make a memorandum of conversation afterward,
10 and I can't remember the last time I saw him. I'm
11 depending on my staff's advice, and I asked them when's
12 the last time I talked to him. But if I talked to him in
13 '86 after I knew he was involved, I can assure you I
14 would have talked about Iran.
15 Q For what it's worth, he, Richard Gadd, says
16 that at about the time of the second arms shipment, which
17 would be in May of '86, that General Secord told Mr. Gadd
18 about a conversation you and he had and, for what it's
19 worth, apparently you told General Secord this was not a
20 very bright idea. So if you did have that conversation,
21 it was a consistent statement. That's what Mr. Gadd
22 says.
23 A That's'* fine. I would have told Secord it was
24 a dumb idea. There is no record of his coming into my
25 office, I roust .s^vc,, and^QkDhapa,fiecord that anyone
wmm
mmm
1 remimbers.
2^ Q After General Secord left the Pentagon, was he
3 a consultant to ISA?
4 A He was initially a consultant to me.
5 Q And what was the nature of his duties?
6 A I don't remember ever having paid him to do
7 any, but it was going to be consulting on Near East/South
8 Asia. It could be that he did a little work for us, but
9 I don't believe much.
10 Q And was he later a member of the Special
11 Operations Advisory Group, the SOPAG?
12 A Well, he was dropped from my rolls ai a
13 consultant and he was picked up on the rolls of Mr. Koch
14 as a consultant to the SOPAG ~ special policy advisory
15 group.
16 Q And what do you know or understand to have
17 been the reasons for his being dropped from the SOPAG
18 rolls?
19 A My recollection is that — background. I took
20 over SOF in roughly May, late May of '86, the special
21 operating forces.
22 Q Upon the resignation of Mr. Koch?
23 A Upon tRe resignation of Mr. Koch. And I
24 brought on a fellow by the name of Mr. Larry Ropka.
25 Larry had reviewed the SPSCilliBBUcy Advisory Group, had
wmm
uMDUSSiED
86
1 niyt*d that Dick had not participated, and further, for .
2\ some time further noted that Dick had not turned in his
3 proper forms, and, as I remember, Larry said we ought to
4 drop him, and I said that's a good idea. I don't think
5 he was ever paid for anything he did for us.
6 Q So he was in essence terminated or allowed,
7 his membership allowed to lapse or whatever for failure
8 to fill out a financial disclosure form?
9 A Well, I think that was what allowed it to
10 happen. I think that Larry was recommending that Dick
11 was just too busy to participate. If we're going to have
12 the Policy Advisory Group, we've got to get guys who can
13 participate. So it was a little of both. We needed a
14 guy who could be there, and I think that his not filling
15 in the financial forms made it easy to drop a friend, if
16 you know what I mean.
17 Q Did you ever talk with General Secord about
18 this issue?
19 A I don't recall ever having talked to him.
20 Q Let me have you mark this as the next
21 deposition exhibit, Exhibit 7.
22 (The document referred to was
23 •** marked Armitage Exhibit
24 Number 7 for identification.)
25 Mr. Secretary, these are some questions and
mmma
87
OWLASSWiED
87
1 - answers that Secretary Weinberger provided to the House
2 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence last December,
3 and you don't have the full text of all of it, but the
4 relevant portions you do have, and that is on page one,
5 question four had asked about any consulting contract
6 General Secord had with the Department and basically he
7 said what you just told us.
8 Then, if you look on the next page, about a
9 third of the way down the page there is a sentence that
10 Secretary Weinberger provides his term on the SOPAG
11 expired effect 4 August 1986.
12 In question five, was General Secord dropped
13 from one of our committees for failing to execute a
14 financial statements, it states "Major General Secord
15 served on the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group,
16 SOPAG, from January 1984 to August 1986, although he last
17 participated in November 1985. Major General Secord' s
18 membership on the SOPAG was terminated effective 4 August
19 1986 based upon his failure to provide the Department
20 with financial information as required in Form SF-1555.
21 Amplifying information is enclosed in Tab C."
22 If you look toward the back, you will find Tab
23 C is on numbered page D-101, and simply contains a chart
24 showing the dates of service by General Secord as a
25 consultant. Is this essentially c:onsistent with what you
UNtLAMe
88
1 recall?
2 A I believe I provided this to you. Yes, this
3 ■ is basically it.
4 Q While we are looking at this document, let me
5 ask you an unrelated question, unrelated to General
6 Secord, simply because it is here in front ot us. If you
7 look at Question 6, which at the bottom of page two, it
8 says: "Have any FMS" — and that's foreign military
9 sales — "or other arms sales by the Department been made
10 to any agents or middlemen, as opposed to directly to a
H recipient country?" And the answer Secretary Weinberger
12 provided was: "No FMS or other arms sales to foreign
13 countries have been made by the Department through a
14 private agency or niddle nan. There la no legal
15 authority to sell under the Arms Export Control Act to
16 other than an eligible foreign country."
17 Would you agree with that statement?
18 A I would guess it was the case. It was
19 provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency, not
20 me, but that would be my journeyman understanding.
21 Q And would it have been your understanding in
22 late '85 or early '86 that Iran was ineligible as a
23 foreign country tO receive FMS sales?
24 A My understanding was it was because we had an
25 arms embargo <2il j-tw. ^U^Jk«%W^ft^rt° relationships with
UHtlASSlEP
89
1 IrW? and we have no embassy. We had no way to monitor
2* usage. So as a journeyman that's what I would have said,
3 that we couldn't sell.
4 Q I realize that's a bit out of sequence, but it
5 was there in the same document.
6 BY VSR. SABA: (Resuming)
7 Q With respect to General Secord's role as a
8 consultant to SOPAG what were the functions of SOPAG at
9 this time?
10 A The functions were we had been trying for some
11 time to rejuvenate, reenergize our special operations
12 policy and we thought that it would be wise to get some
13 of the old bulls, if you will, of the special operations
14 business together to see what their ideas were, and these
15 fellows met from time to time and gave their ideas to the
16 Department.
17 And Dick Secotd is known as having a
18 background in special ops. As you'll see from the other
19 listed members, these guys are all very deeply involved
20 in special operations and dedicated to it, and they were
21 to advise the Secretary of Defense on the development of
22 special operating policy and how do we apply special
2 3 operations.
24 You look quizzical and that's why I'm going on
25 to explain limMM aiEtfVA|1C|PI|P^^3^i"<? expertise to
imssiiiEr
90
UNCLASSra
90
1 low intensity conflict and things of that nature.
2> BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
3 Q In terms of our special operations policy,
4 what do you know or understand to have been the reasons
5 why Mr. Koch resigned and left the Pentagon?
6 A I think that he was upset because the
7 Secretary of Defense had made the decision to place
8 special operating forces, which were one of Noel Koch's
9 purviews, under me. It's a very difficult arrangement to
10 explain. Previously Noel Koch was the Principal Deputy
11 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
12 Affairs, and in that hat was my deputy. But for special
13 operating forces and counterterrorism he was not my
14 deputy. He reported directly through Ikle to Secretary
15 Weinberger.
16 Secretary Weinberger — and I really have to
17 ask him his reasons, but he decided he wanted to tidy up
18 this operation and consequently decided that for SOF Noel
19 Koch would remain as the Principal Deputy, but that too
20 would come under ISA, and I think this was a great
21 disappointment to Noel and he decided to take a walk. He
22 never said that in as many words to me, but I feel that's
2 3 the reason.
24 Q Before we go into a different subject, Mr.
25 Albright has a follow-up question on one of your
UNCtASStFlfll
91
Ultb
91
1 conversations with Colonel North.
2 MR. ALBRIGHT: Just one about Colonel North. '
3 ■ You said that people began to inquire at some point about
4 his legal health, if you would.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, in the RIG, because of the
6 press stories.
7 MR. ALBRIGHT: Was there any discussion within
8 the RIG or with anyone about any personal financial stake
9 he may have had in any of this?
10 THE WITNESS: I want to make sure I understand
11 you. I think the answer is no. Do you mean that he
12 might have been involved in donating money or getting
13 money? No.
14 MR. ALBRIGHT: Or receiving noney in any way?
15 THE WITNESS: No.
16 MR. ALBRIGHT: In any personal financial
17 setting?
18 THE WITNESS: Not that I remember.
19 MR. ALBRIGHT: Have you had any discussion
20 with anyone or has anyone had any discussion with you
21 about that?
22 THE WITNESS: No. I must say that even in the
23 wake of events frl^m November until now, continuously
24 through the Administration, guys with whom I talk
25 constantly say well, whatever Ollie might have done, he
Ul
92
25
UNCUSSimD
92
1 is personally honest. I mean, this is a steady theme.
2 V MR. ALBRIGHT: Thank you. That is all I have.
3 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
4 Q I have just one or two questions. Mr.
5 Secretary, I take it you were generally familiar with the
6 Peace Shield Program.
7 A Ves, which one?
8 Q This is the C3 program for Saudi Arabia, the
9 follow-up to AWACS.
10 A Yes, I am.
j^l Q Did you understand that in 1984-85 General
12 Secord was a consultant either directly to Boeing or to
13 Boeing's agent, the Mafouz family in Saudi Arabia?
14 A I did not know this.
j^5 Q Did you have any awareness of his business
16 relationships with the Alamoody family which obtained a
17 construction contract for that?
18 A The only thing I was aware that he was working
19 in the Middle East was a construction contract, I believe
20 for UAE, the United Arab Emirates, and it had to do, if I
21 remember correctly, with aircraft shelters, and he was
22 engaged in bidding with some other country in Europe, and
23 I think he was unsuccessful. And that's the only
24 business that I knew Dick had.
Q Were i'itt ^M^^/flMMI""^"^"^^""^ ^^ would
IWIREII
\mmm
93
1 have had then with Ambassador Bandar Bin-Sultan on Peace
2 Shield in •84-'85?
3 A No, I'm not.
4 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, would you tell us
5 what your personal relationship is with Mr. Koch? Did
6 you have a personal and professional relationship or just
7 professional?
8 THE WITNESS: I consider myself a very good
9 friend of his. I still consider myself a friend of his.
10 I think he does not consider himself a friend of mine any
11 longer.
12 MR, KREUZER: Can you clarify why you think
13 Mr. Koch would have resigned if you were to be taking
14 over?
15 THE WITNESS: I think he saw that as somewhat
16 of an affront to his authority. There had been a lot of
17 trouble in the Department, particularly public criticism
18 of various members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of
19 various Departments — Army, the Department of the Air
20 Force — of a lack of dedication to the SOF arena.
21 Secretary Weinberger had expressed to me in
22 the past a question in his mind as to what did Noel want.
2 3 Why did he feel ik. necessary to go public and blast these
24 guys? Why couldn't we work these issues out in-house?
25 He had had some meetigjgji Mi#ip»|If%nwhere at least the
Ifiy^HED
94
Mmssm
94
1 Sacretary claimed I don't really understand what he wants
2 other than to bang away at the services.
3 So I think that's why the Secretary, I think
4 he got tired of this. I mean, frankly, I was all for it,
5 moving it under me. I'm a bureaucrat. When the
6 Secretary said what do you think, I said I thought it was
7 the best idea I've heard — brilliant. But that's my
8 bureaucratic, in a sense, talking. I think Noel found
9 that as an affront to his own leadership.
10 My own view was this was going to allow his
11 leadership and my ability to get things done in the
12 building to bring home a success. Noel did not view it
13 in that way, I think.
14 MR. KREUZER: That would have brought hin
15 under your — you would become his direct supervisor.
16 THE WITNESS: I was in one-half of his job
17 already.
18 MR. KREUZER: But in his part now, where he
19 was reporting to Dr. Ikle, he would be reporting to you.
20 THE WITNESS: That's right — through me to
21 Ikle.
22 MR. KREUZER: So in addition to himself would
23 he be bringing anything else in from Dr. Ikle's
24 organization with him?
25 THE WITNESS: Well^ Jjj^would be bringing the
THE WITNESS: iiell^Jjy^W(
UNCUSW
u\€USSlfffl
95
1 special plans group, the special operating force boys who
2 ' worked for Noel. They would come with him.
3 MR. KREUZER: And no other assets than that?
4 THE WITNESS: I don't think he had any other
5 assets. The other assets belonged to me, if you will,
6 bureaucratically, anyway.
7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
8 Q Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry. I just have another
9 question on this Peace Shield. Are you aware of any
10 amendment to the Letter of Agreement between the United
11 States and Saudi Arabia on that program providing for a
12 sole source procurement for the contractor to build the
13 facilities in Arabia?
14 A This is something you must ask Lieutenant
15 General Phil Cast about that. The reason I say that is
16 because I can remember discussions with Phil on Peace
17 Shield. This belongs to him as far as the administration
18 of contracts and all that. I'm the policy guy. I decide
19 whether I think this is a good idea to have Peace Shield
20 in Saudi Arabia or not, but he's required to run this by
21 us. I don't remember per se, but I remember discussions
22 on Peace Shield, Peace Vector, a whole bunch of these
23 Peace series thirlgs.
24 Q But it's my understanding that it would be
25 Lieutenant General Gast who ji^Ul'^'^^iv® arranged, if there
Id "
96
mmm
96
1 was such an amendment, it would be his position to have '.
2 * approved it.
3 A He would know about it. He'd understand it.
4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
5 Q I mentioned earlier Richard Gadd. Do you know
6 Mr. Gadd?
7 A I had met Mr. Gadd, I believe, once when I
8 gave a speech down in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, in 1983.
9 Q And that was the only time?
10 A To the best of my recollection. I may have
11 seen him in the corridor from time to time, but at most I
12 might have seen him twice.
13 Q Have you ever had any dealings with him of any
14 sort?
15 A Other than that night at Walton Beach, we went
16 out and had a few beers and that was it.
17 Q Do you have any knowledge of any of the
18 companies he has been involved with, specifically Summit
19 Aviation. Have you had any dealings with Summit?
2 0 A Not that I remember. But I read about his
21 involvement with the different companies since this thing
22 went public.
2 3 Q SumercO?
24 A I don't know what that is.
25 Q Airmoc?
\immm
97
UlWSW
1
2 '
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
A No.
Q Shenandoah?
A These things might be somewhat familiar.
Maybe I've read about them, but I don't know about them.
Q Do you have any knowledge of any intention to,
efforts to or actual success at diverting any arms that
were intended for^^^^^^^^Hto the contras?
A I do not.
Q Let me ask you about something which is known
Do you recall that?
A Very well.
Q Okay. What can you tell us about that
operation?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas something
inherited when I came to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for l^nternational Security Affairs. I know that
we have provided you such documentation as we had, to
include what I believe to be the original document
requesting^^^^^^^^^^H and that was a letter from Mr.
Casey to Mr. Weinberger which basically requests DOD to
facilit
82-690 0-88-5
leUSSfflED
t[A\
ONCLASSIFIED
99
1
2,
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Q I want to ask you a few questions about the
activities of Colonel Jim Steele as head of the U.S. Mil
Group in El Salvador. First, do you know Colonel Steele?
A I have met him.
Q What was the nature of any relationship you've
had with him?
A I can remember meeting him when he — I think
it was him — brought General Vides Casanova to the
United States and General Vides was the Minister of
Defense of El Salvador.
Q So we can understand it, what is the reporting
or oversight or supervisory authority that you might
have, if at all, over any of the mil groups.
I have none oyer , Col on el Steele.
UNGkASM
He works for
100
wmm
100
1 DIA. What is he? Is he a mil group commander? He
2 worked for the JCS. Now I did get involved in that. I
3 set the policies. My office sets the policies in El
4 Salvador regarding whether or not a guy can carry weapons
5 — those kind of things.
6 Q And wha_t about in the security assistance
7 arena?
g A Phil Gast would have the day-to-day
cognizance. I just have — to be simple, I decide what
we're going to sell in general terms and notify the Hill
and set the parameters of the program — how much money
and all that — and Phil Gast and DSAA runs the program.
Q And is DSAA part of your bailiwick, under you?
A Well, only for policy. Colonel Steele would
15 report not only to the JCS but also to General Gast, and
16 would take his instruction, day-to-day, on running
17 programs from DSAA, not from policy.
j^a MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, getting back to
19 what we were discussing a little bit earlier —
20 MR. SAXON: Does this relate to Colonel
21 Steele, because I want to follow up on that.
22 MR. KREUZER: Okay. I will wait.
23 BY MR." SAXON: (Resuming)
24 Q Let me have this marked as the next deposition
25 exhibit.
UNcy^sw
101
mmm
101
1 •"* " (The document referred to was
2 ' . marked Armitage Exhibit
3 Number 8 for identification.)
4 And I will give you a chance to look at it.
5 (Pause.)
6 A I have_loo)ced at it.
7 Q First of all, let me ask you whether you have
8 seen any of these documents prior to today, sir.
9 A No, I have not.
10 Q Okay. The first is on U.S. Mil Group, El
11 Salvador letterhead and is dated 1 February '85. The
12 subject is Felix Rodriguez. It's through the Deputy
13 Chief of Mission and to Ambassador Pickering, and it's
14 from Colonel Steele. And for the record he has verified
15 that that is his signature.
16 It says: "Per your guidance, attached is a
17 draft back channel to General Gorman on our 'no pay'
18 mercenary." Let me ask first of all do you have any
19 familiarity with Felix Rodriguez?
20 A No, I don't, but this is not the attachment I
21 have.
22 Q I understand that.
23 A No, I'd© not.
24 Q Do you know who Felix Rodriguez is?
25 A From the news accounts, yes.
mmm
102
\immiB
]L ' Q Do you know him by the name Max Gomez?
2 \ A No, other than by the news accounts.
3 Q The next item in this exhibit is a
4 confidential cable that is from General Gorman for
5 Ambassador Pickering and Colonel Steele. Again, the
6 subject is Felix Rodriguez. It says: "I have just met
7 here with Felix Rodriguez.." The next paragraph:
8 "Rodriguez's primary commitment to the region is in
9 ' H^^fH where he wants to assist the FDN. I told him
10 that the FDN deserved his priority." Numbered paragraph
11 4: "My judgment is that his advice will reinforce ours
12 and that we should put no obstacles in his way to
13 consulting with Blandon or Bustillo unless and until we
14 get counterindications. I recommend that Jim Steele meet
15 with him."
And then the next paragraph: "Assuming your
approval" — meaning Ambassador Pickering — "I will send
Rodriguez tc^^^l" Do you have any knowledge at all
about the role General Gorman would have played, or
colonel Steele would have played in getting Mr^. Rodriguez
21 to El Salvador?
22 A None.
23 Q Let me" ask you to look at the next item, whiclt
24 is the backchannel. These are out of sequence, but this
25 is the backchannel, message^yjii^^lonel Steele references
Lchannel messaae tha^Col
tlNElASW
I
103
mussm
103
on the first pagt It says: "Eyes only for Ambassador
Motley. Mr. Johns le, and then Southcom for General
Gorman." This is : a Ambassador Pickering. If you go
through the text, i '.Iks about what the plan was in
terms of using Mr. R guez in El Salvador. You get to
paragraph number 3. ays: "Rodriguez will return in
three or four weeks tc k with Bustillo and Steele
still will monitor clc.
Do you have
Colonel Steele in monitc
A No, I do not.
Q When all of th
some of the Mil Group comm.
to meet, I think, either wi
A He did not meet w.
Q You did not meet w
A No.
Q You would have no in
of these, if in fact he was enga
with Mr. Rodriguez or helping sup
A No, and Steele may have
Nestor, but the only person I direc
was our fellow in~ Costa Rica, when r
become public — is anything going o;
called him up and asked him are you i
*M»D
nc . Ladge of any activities of
Ir. Rodriguez?
t -rs became public and
ard other people came up
^nd/or Mr. Sanchez —
msi Steele?
t knowledge of any
ny activities
FDN?
3k to meet with
or to have of
arted to
^ere. N'xstor
n anyth_.ig
104
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ONeUSHB
104
of assistance the contras in any way. And he told
Nestor no, or s ^stor reported to me. I do not know
about Steele itiee g with Nestor.
I do, ever, know that we as a Department
tried to make Stet available at some time. I did not
talk to him when h-. me through.
Q The last 3 of this exhibit, paragraph 4,
says: "For ARA, pie orief Don Gregg in VP's office
for me." And this is '.n from Ambassador Pickering.
Have you ever had any '.ssions with Mr. Gregg about
Colonel Steele or conti • any role that Felix
Rodriguez might have hac upport of the FDN?
A I never did u; on's name publicly became
associated. I frankly ne\
Central American things,
saw him in Asia. But I don
of any of the discussions in
Q Do you have any kn
the Mil Group people inj
^^Ito be in%
user certificates?
Don Gregg involved in
■im in the Middle East. I
mber him being a part
cy.
of the activities of
letting the
T issuing false end
A
I do not.
Q
In 1985?
A
I do not.
Q
Let me ask you a couple
:ions about Mr.
liiassfflffl
105
omssffl
105
i Sanchez, Nestor Sanchez. Tell us what his position was
2 and the approximate dates.
3 A Nestor was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
4 Defense for Inter-American Affairs from roughly late '81,
5 maybe early '82, until December of 1986, when he retired.
6 Q And what was his reporting relationship?
7 A He reported through me, through Dr. Ikle, to
8 the Secretary.
9 Q And I believe you told us earlier that he sat
10 in on one or more of the RIGs.
11 A He sat in on the great majority of the RIGs
12 and the IGs regarding Central America.
13 Q We have asked you this before, but for the
14 record do you have any knowledge of any trip that Mr.
15 Sanchez may have taken roughly in the late November 1985
16 time frame to Geneva, Switzerland?
17 A I do not have any knowledge.
18 Q And in fact you have asked him about that and
19 he denies that he took such a trip; is that correct?
20 A He took a trip, which I was well aware of, to
21 go to a conference in South America. I believe it was
22 Argentina. But he told me that's the only travel he had,
23 and I believe hint*.
24 Q What would have been the time frame on that
25 trip?
UNCLASSiED
106
MJSaEIED
106
1 X It was November, but I don't remember the
2^ datAs.
3 Q And do you know the nature of the business on
4 which he was traveling? Was it official?
5 K Ves, it was official. It was a conference, as
6 I understand it.
7 Q Do you know who the sponsor of the conference
8 was?
9 A I can find out, but I don't remember.
10 Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about the
11 nature of our security assistance program. As you
12 probably know from statements you made or that were
13 attributed to you in last week's New York Times about
14 U.S. security assistanc* —
15 A Elaine Sciolino's article.
16 Q And any linkage between it and U.S. contra
17 support policy, let me have this article marked as
18 Deposition Exhibit 9.
19 (The document referred to was
20 marked Armitage Exhibit
21 Number 9 for identification.)
22 Z am referring to an article in the New York
23 Times of Monday, Hay 18, written by Elaine Sciolino, with
24 the heading "U.S. Said to Link Latin Aid to Support for
25 Contras." Let me f irst 2is}t jmi^Jlr. Secretary, if the
wmm
107
\immm
107
i statements that are attributed to you in here are more or
2 less correct.
3 A I believe there was only one.
4 Q It is in this first column.
5 A Yes, one statement.
6 Q As far as you know, is that more or less
7 accurate?
8 A Yes. I'm sure it's an exact quotation.
9 Q I am really basically through with this
10 article. I wanted there to be something in the record
11 that would cover what I am getting at on this issue.
12 A I'd like to put something on the record.
13 Q In quicker time than we can, but I certainly
14 plan to let you say whatever you want on this issue.
15 A Thank you.
16 Q But let me ask you a question or two. Tell us
17 how we do use security assistance at all as a broad
18 instrument of foreign policy and national security
19 policy.
20 A First of all, we use security assistance as an
21 ability or a measure to build a shield which we believe
22 subsequently someday will keep us from having to devote
23 U.S. forces to an"area. We find it an aid to stability
24 and security, number one. Number two, we also find that
25 in the provision of security assistance we develop a
ilNftflSm
108
mmm
108
J. certain amount of influence with countries which we
2 believes helps the west in general and certainly helps
3 " ourselves.
4 Number three, and particularly in relations
5 with host military we find that the identification with
6 U.S. forces, primarily in the third world, goes a long
7 way to fostering what we want in terms of professionalism
8 vice what is very often the case. We find a very
9 political military who is bent on fostering their own
10 personal power rather than the national power. So we
11 find security assistance a very helpful tool.
12 Q To your knowledge, have we ever linked or
13 coupled the provision of security assistance in Central
14 America or, for that matter, with any recipient country
15 to the issue of whether that recipient country has aided
16 the contras?
17 A No. I don't. And, if I may, I did have this
18 conversation with this reporter, who is an excellent
19 reporter. My statement or her story quoting me was not
20 in the Latin American context. It was security
21 assistance in general. I made the point that obviously
22 we don't give security assistance because we're just good
23 guys. It's in ou't interest. We don't do it because
24 people just need guns — or economic assistance, for that
25 matter.
■missM
109
UNGMRID
109
1 " We do it because it's in our interest, and by
2 ■ making people more stable, that's in our interest. And
3 she said do you get any influence? I said, you're
4 exactly right. Now when I used the object of Pakistan, I
5 said look at the case of Pakistan. We believe that the
6 provision of our security assistance in a large way and
7 in a great way retards the development of the Pakistani
8 nuclear program, which we find in everybody's best
9 interests.
10 So is there a linkage between the nuclear
11 program? You bet, and it's fostered by the Hill.
12 Q Let me ask you more in the Central American
13 context. Is there a linkage with regard to the decision
14 announced recently for us to provide fighter planes to
15 the Hondurans?
16 A Not to my knowledge. The Hondurans have been
17 after us for some time for this. We have been unable to
18 be successful in figuring out a replacement for the Super
19 Mysteres. We made the F-5 decision.
20 Q By whom was that decision made?
21 A It was an interagency one. No one person made
22 it. It had been discussed for months and months and
23 months.
24 Q Between State, Defense and —
25 A State, Defense and NSC, the CIA; military
UNetASSIflED
no
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
13
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
•^ -.lance in the region •.-•33 cart o: zhe decision.
Q v;hen Secretary Acramsj
^^|and a ccuple of other individuals -- I believe Ray
Burghardt in the NSC -- traveled to Central America in
late November or early December of 1936 after these
matters became public, they were there on a mission to
sell the Administration's Central America policy, and in
the course of doing that were informed that]
[would be receptive, but they wanted
something in return.
Ill
UNUSIHED
J.!
UNCLASSIFIED
Q Let me show you an additional deposition
exhibit, and ask that this be marked.
(The docuoient referred to was
marked Armitage Exhibit
Number 10 for identification.)
(Pause. ;
.A. I didn't go on this trip.
A!
113
'iwjssm
113
1 Q You did not go?
2 A I did not go, to the best of my knowledge. I
3 will check that, but I'm quite sure I did not go.
4 Q Let me give some lead-in, then, for the
5 record. The documents I have asked you to look at as
6 Deposition Exhibit 10, the cover is a National Security
7 Council memorandum from Oliver North to John Poindexter
8 and the subject was trip to the Central American region.
9 And then it lists a proposed itinerary. At page N-39901
10 it lists the participants and Mr. Richard Armitage is
11 listed as a proposed participant.
12 A Right.
13 Q And then further the trip is explained. You
14 are saying to the best of your recollection —
15 A I did not go on this.
16 Q Okay. Then let me show you Deposition Exhibit
17 11, the trip manifest from the NSC file.
18 (The document referred to was
19 marked Armitage Exhibit
20 Number 11 for identification.)
21 A 1 sure don't remember going. I don't think I
22 went on this trip, but it's easy to find out.
23 Q Okay. "For those of us who are uninitiated in
2 4 these things, the trip itinerary, as I understand it, the
25 manifest with the boxes checked indicating the
UKCUSSIFe
114
UNWSJflEB
114
1 individuals who did go on the trip and those portions of
2 ^ the trip they took.
3". A Yes, but, you know, 1 just can't remember this
4", trip with John Poindexter.. I just don't remember i^. I
5 ' don't" think I went, but I better check my file.
" 6," Q * Okay, if yoU would, sir, do check because the
7 NSC records indicate that you did go on the trip.
8 ■ A ^ Eleven to 12 December '85. Okay. I'll have
9 , to, check. I went to Central America in '83 with the
10 Secretary of Defense. I went to Brazil in '83. The only
11 other time I remember being down there was witJ
12 Elliott, Hollering and myself in September-October, so
A
13 I'll just Check it — of '86.
14 Q^ Yes, if you would, because this memorandum of.
15 record ofthe trip itinerary says, and I quote, "the
16 following individuals Were manifested aboard the
17 ' following aircraft," and then it lists the aircraft and
18 the dates.
19 A By the way, I think the word "manifested" is
20 different from "had gone", but It's easy enough^
21 Q For the record, let me indicate what this trip
22 was to consist of as far as Colonel. North saw it and
23 posted. If you w'duld look at page N-31907, under the
24 heading "Current Situation, Objectives for, Honduras" ,
25 this was to be a trip to Honduras by Admiral Poipdexter
5 be a trip to Honduras J
115
1
2^
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
uneussw
on the occasion c: his ceir.g -r.e r.e^- Na^icr.a. ^acurity
Advisor under the guise of going to oieet the U.S. Army
military officials.
In terms of the facts or the statements that
are made here, does any of this -- is any of this
something you are familiar with?
A No.
Q I wouiS ask, then, that you check if you took
that trip.
A I will check when I get back
wm^
116
25
UNGUiSSliP^
116
X Q Now let me show you and have this marked as
2 Deposition Exhibit 12 a series of PROF memos from Colonel
3 North. They have different addressees.
4 (The document referred to was
5 marked Armitage Exhibit
g Number 12 for identification.)
7 I will give you a moment to look, if you
8 would, at the one on the bottom of the first page, and
9 this is a note from Oliver North, Subject: Private Blank
10 Check.
11 < (Pause.)
12 A All right.
13 Q As I read this PROF memo, and it pertains, by
14 the way —
15 A What's the date on this thing, by the way? Do
16 we know?
17 Q Yes. It's right at the bottom. If you flip
18 over before the next PROF memo you will see.
19 A 8/31?
20 Q Well, no.
21 A 12/04 — December 4, 1985.
22 ■ Q It was the week prior to this trip that we
23 were just talking~about. And it pertains to that same
24 trip. As I read this, Colonel North is suggesting that
you have lndic^tfd.|h^t|V«|MM]|*flp willing to go to
wmmi
117
\immm
117
1 Honduras and Panama in the event that Admiral Poindexter
2^ couldn't make the trip. Do you recall any discussion
3 " with Colonel North about that?
4 A No. I recall roughly the trip and I recall
5 not going on it. But this — I don't take exception to
6 what he says in here, frankly.
7 Q You agree, then, with this statement that you
8 agree with Ray — I assume that's Burghardt — Don — I
9 assume that Don F. is Fortier — Walker — I guess that's
10 Bob Walker — and I, Colonel North, that White House
11 visibility is essential to the mission.
12 Do you recall what mission they were talking
13 about?
14 A I recall very roughly that the mission was to
15 show t:-.a Hondurans that we were steadfast in our policy,
16 and that's the context in which it says White House vis
17 is more important. I can go down there anytime, but, as
18 I say, I'm quite sure I didn't go.
19 Q Let me ask you to flip over to what is
20 numbered as page 27 in the PROFs. You will see in the
21 middle of that page a little chart of sorts. This is
22 again in a PROF memo from Colonel North to Admiral
23 Poindexter. Let Ble just ask you if before today you've
24 ever seen these equations of how many hostages equate to
25 how many vee
mmm
118
Ihh
EWORD 118
1 .A I believe I've seen references in the press
2^ only. I don't think I had a direct chart or anything.
3 Q Now let me as)c you to turn to the next page.
4 This is the same PROF.
5 A Twenty-eight?
6 Q Yes. Colonel North was apparently quite
7 productive when he sat at the computer.
8 A I'm glad I never learned to type.
9 Q And this is page 28, page 028.
10 A I've got it.
11 Q If you will read that first full paragraph at
12 the top —
13 (Pause.)
14 A Okay. I've read it.
15 Q Where he says: "The last op sec concerned
16 that of replenishing Israeli stocks is the most delicate.
17 Meron and I" — and I guess that would be General Meron.
18 A Mindy Meron, I'm sure.
19 Q "Are working with the Israeli purchasing
20 office in New York City". Is that when Ben Joseph works?
21 A That's right.
22 Q "On the replenishment issue, to be
23 accomplished as qQickly after December 12 as possible."
24 As far as you're concerned, you knew nothing about this
25 Issue?
tmssm
119
mmsn
119
1 . A As far as I remember, I did not.
2, Q Finally let me ask you to flip over to page 30
3 in these PROFs.
4 A I've got it.
5 Q This is also to — I believe this is to
6 Admiral Poindexter from Colonel North.
7 A All right.
8 Q Subject: Private Blank Check again. He is
9 proposing to Admiral Poindexter — this is again in
10 relation to this upcoming trip - he says: "In each
11 location you would meet with the U.S. Ambassador and be
12 accompanied by General Jack Galvin, the senior U.S.
13 military representative. This approach will provide a
14 plausible cover for delivery of the messages we need sent
to^^^^^^^^^^^^H both whom to
16 congratulate you on your post."
17 Now in terms of your recollection of that
18 trip, whether you did or didn't take it, tell me in your
19 best recollection what the purpose of that trip was to
20 be.
21 A I must state again I'm quite sure I didn't
22 take it, and it was just that. The new National Security
23 Advisor was comin*^ on and that we wanted to show
24 steadfastness with our policy in the region.
25 Q And as far as you can recall there was no
ytmsffi
120
ilNCySHD
120
1 intent that that be cover and that the real purpose was ■
2* . for --
3 A As far as I can recall, that was the only
4 reason for the trip.
5 Q Okay. I only have a couple more.
6 A I owe you after putting you off twice.
7 Q Let me get the last exhibit out of the way.
8 Let me have you mark this as 13. I know 13 is an unlucky
9 number, but we'll just have to end on that one.
10 (The document referred to was
11 marked Armitage Exhibit
12 Number 13 for identification.)
13 This is a PROF memo from Bob Pearson, subject,
14 Meeting on Contra Aid. I will let you read that.
15 A All right. What's the date? 1/24/86.
16 Q Yes.
17 (Pause.)
18 A All right.
19 Q And, if you would, look at the bottom note
20 from Donald Fortier.
21 A All right.
22 Q Is this the kind of session you made reference
23 to earlier when you were talking about putting together
24 the contra aid package to go to the Hill?
25 A Yes. I don't remember it, but that's exactly
md&Mt
121
umssffl
121
1 rigjit.
2^ Q As far as I know, you have not seen these
3 communications?
4 A I have not seen these communications.
5 Q They are talking about you, but it's not
6 necessarily that you were involved. As best you know, do
7 you recall this event they are talking about?
g A No, but me — registering a protest for me not
9 being invited to a meeting is a normal bureaucratic
10 business. All of us do it from time to time. I can't
11 quarrel with this at all.
^2 Q But your recollection would be that that would
13 have dealt with the legislative package?
j^4 X How we're going to approach the Hill and all.
15 Absolutely right.
j^g Q Finally, I want to ask you about a couple of
17 individuals and just see if you can tell us what your
13 relationship is, if any, with these people. First, do
19 you know Ted Shackley?
20 A Yes, I do.
21 Q What's the nature of that relationship?
22 A I met him once in 1975. I had returned after
23 the fall of Saigtfh and my boss, Eric von Marbad, had sent
24 me out to the CIA to talk with Ted Shackley about what
25 had gone on in Vietnam, what l had seen - I was there
ii^m
122
UNCLASSiED
122
1 the final day — what was going on with the refugees.
2^ That was my one and only meeting with the man, to my
3 recollection, and the only communication I ever had with
4 him.
5 Q So as far as you know you've never had any
6 dealings with him?
7 A I would not recognize him, I don't think.
8 Q The same question with regard to Thomas
9 Clines.
10 A I met Thomas Clines in I want to say 1982 or
11 1983. Dick Secord asked me to stop and have a drink with
12 him and he introduced me to Tom Clines. I remember it
13 very well because the two of them spent a good bit of the
14 evening in a very congenial way talking about their time
15 together at the Naval War College. It was
16 extraordinarily entertaining. I remsmber it quite well.
17 Q Since that time have you had any dealing with
18 him?
19 A Never seen him or talked to him, to the best
20 of my knowledge
21 Q Finally, Mike Ledeen. Tell us about your
22 relationship with him.
23 A I have" met Michael through originally the
24 bureaucracy. Later he used to work in the State
25 Department and I'd come upon him from time to time.
ind I'd come upon him frc
UNGUSM
123
UNCLASSra
i Later he became a consultant to Noel Koch in Noel's SOFCT
2 role. When Noel left I inherited Michael. I did not use
3 ' him in that I didn't use him for any money. He came —
4 didn't pay him any money and didn't ask him to do
5 anything for me.
6 He would call from time to time and just say
7 hey, this event, some terrorist event in Pakistan and so
8 and so was a bad deal, are you guys thinking of all these
9 angles, something like that. But he came in to see me I
10 want to say September, and it could have been October,
11 but it was late in '86, and he told me of his involvement
12 in the Iranian affair, and he told me that he thought the
13 affair, which had in his mind or as he sketched it out,
14 started as a strategic opening had turned into nothing
15 but an arms for hostages deal, and that he thought this
16 was terribly wrongheaded, and that the policy was on its
17 head.
18 I was very interested to find someone who had
19 been at the beginning. I was unaware that Mike was at
20 the beginning of this adventure with Iran. I checked to
21 see if the Secretary's calendar was clear and took
22 Michael down, where Michael basically repeated the same
23 story for the Secretary of Defense, and the three of us
24 sat around and talked about it was terrible to have our
25 policy on its hea
wmmm
124
uNiwsra
124
1 . Q Did he tell you in terms of his role that he
2^ had been involved in negotiating the price with the
3 Israelis for the TOW missiles?
4 A No, he didn't.
5 Q Did he tell you that he had been taken off of
6 this project because he negotiated the price too low or
7 in some way Colonel North was dissatisfied with his
8 participation?
9 A No. He told me he was asked out of it, but he
10 didn't tell me why. I don't remember that he told me
11 why.
12 Q Did you ever ask Colonel North about Mike
13 Ledeen's role in the Iran part of things?
14 A I don't recall asking him.
15 Q Did Colonel North ever tell you — did Colonel
16 North ever discuss Mike Ledeen in the context of the Iran
17 arms initiative?
18 A I can't recall that he did.
19 Q Did he ever tell you he, North, thought Ledeen
20 was skimming money from the operation?
21 A He never told me that. That I would have
22 remembered.
23 Q Did Colonel North ever tell you that with
24 regard to Al Schwimmer?
25 A I had never heard of Al Schwimmer and don't
I had never heard of AIS
125
UNClASSiiH
125
1 recollect Ollie ever saying the name.
2 Q Did Ledeen ever mention Schwimmer's name in
3 this context?
4 A I think Ledeen mentioned Schwimmer in passing
5 when he was talking about his own involvement the day he
6 came in to tell me how the policy was on its head, but
7 not in any way that meant anything to me or that rang any
8 bells.
9 Q Did Ledeen mention Ben Joseph?
10 A No, he did not, to my recollection.
11 Q And, finally, did Ledeen mention Noel Koch in
12 the context of his, Ledeen 's —
13 A No, I don't think he did. I think Michael
14 would have mentioned that, because Noel had left the
15 Department by then, but I don't recall it. I mean, if he
16 had mentioned it, he would have made a big thing about
17 it.
13 Q And finally for the record, a different
19 subject I just forgot to ask. When were you first made
20 aware that any monies may have been diverted from the
21 arms sales to Iran to the contras?
22 A If you don't count the conversation I had with
23 Ollie, when the A'ttorney General said something.
24 Q And that's the conversation —
25 A The conversation _on tlje black phone where he
126
ONGUSSm
126
said they're helping us in Central America.
2 ~ ' MR. SAXON: That's all I've got.
3 • BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
4 Q I have a few more on the Ledeen matter. Do
5 you recall exactly when that meeting took place?
6 A I will try to reconstruct it. It's September-
7 October, to my remembrance.
8 Q Of '86?
9 A Of '86, right.
10 Q Was it your understanding that Mr. Ledeen had
11 not previously spoken to Mr. Weinberger on this subject?
12 A I don't think he had, because nothing of the
13 conversation with the Secretary indicated that he had.
14 He went right through the recitation again in very guic]c
15 fashion with the Secretary and never indicated that he
16 spoke with the Secretary previously.
17 Q Do you recall Mr. Ledeen 's recitation?
18 A In general terms, yes.
19 Q And in revealing his role in the natter there
20 was nothing discussed concerning price; correct?
21 A To the best of my recollection, his thrust to
22 me and again to the Secretary was in here is something
23 that's good for tTie country, a strategic opening to Iran,
24 and yet we've become hostage to hostages. That's
25 terrible. The policy's UDside-dpun. And that's what I
127
mmm
1 r«aeinb«r oo«t keenly about Michael's discussion.
2. Q Did he mention anything about HAWKs?
3 AX can't remember him mentioning anything other
4 than weapons for hostages per se, weapons in general.
5 Q I'm trying to understand what Ledeen was
6 getting at, what the purpose of this was.
7 A When he came in to me it was to sound off on
8 what a terrible thing this was, and that's exactly what
9 h« told ma.
10 Q What specifically did he find to be terrible?
11 A Arms for hostages rather than a strategic
12 opening to Iran.
13 Q Did he have any proposals for a different
14 eeurs* of action?
15 A Hot that I recall.
16 Q Did he propose anything?
17 A He did state that previously he had talked
18 about supporting one small element in Iran who wanted a
19 small supply of either communications gear and things of
20 that nature and they would be more or less our guys
21 inside, but he made a big distinction between that and
22 the provision of weapons to Iran.
23 Q Could these have been HAWK radars?
24 A No. The implication clearly was like radios,
25 small items, just to prove the bona fides of this group.
UNCttSSIflfD
128
uNcussn
12i
1 Q Were these objects to be sold by Israel?
2 A No. That wasn't even discussed. It was the
3 provision of those items. The manner of providing them
4 was not discussed. And this was just in passing in
5 Michael's discussion with us. As I say, his primary
6 thrust was we are being hostage to the hostages by
7 selling weapons to Iran. We should be developing a
8 strategic dialogue and we're squandering that. That was
9 his thrust with us.
10 Q Did he mention by name any particular factions
11 in Iran?
12 A He may have. I can't remember.
13 Q Did he propose that a continued dialogue be
14 direct or through Israel?
15 A He didn't propose to me. He indicated that it
16 was Israel who originally set him up in the discussions
17 in Iran in some manner, either introduced him to Iranian
18 people or got him out on the track to start talking about
19 a strategic dialogue. But that's it.
20 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
21 Q Let me ask one follow-up to that. To your
22 knowledge, did anything in his background prepare him to
23 make judgments ab^ut the prices that should be charged
24 for TOW missiles?
25 A No.
UNW^D
129
^mmm
129
i. BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
2 Q On a different subject, I want to understand
3 ' something. Eric von Marbad you mentioned was your boss.
4 A That's right.
5 Q Referring to what period?
6 A He was my boss from roughly April 24, 1975,
7 until mid-1976 intermittently because I didn't get paid
8 when I didn't work and I was paid when I worked, and I
9 was back and forth. I had a home in San Diego. I didn't
10 stay out of the country.
11 Q So you were a consultant in that time?
12 A Yes, I was a consultant to the Pentagon, and I
13 got paid when I worked and I worked for Eric von Marbad.
14 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
15 Q What was his position then?
16 A He at the time was the Principal Deputy
17 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, until summer
18 of '75, at which time he took the job in Iran as the
19 Defense Representative and I went over there and handled
20 primarily naval programs for him.
21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
22 Q Let me understand. You handled naval programs
2 3 for Mr. von Marbad?
24 A That's correct. I can remember two
25 specifically — the Charbahar base development and the
littCttSWH)
130
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^ 993 destroyer program.
2 ""* Q Did you become aware at that time or later of
3 ■ programming in which the Portuguese would be involved in
4 rehabilitation of the Iranian navy?
5 A I don't know anything about it.
6 Q Did you have any further business with Mr. von
7 Marbad following his departure from U. S. Government
8 service?
9 A No. He was the Director of the Defense
10 Security Assistance Agency and he left and I've sent him
11 Christmas cards each Christmas. I generally get a card
12 from Eric and Lola back, and that's it. I may have had
13 one conversation with him, but he doesn't want to see
14 anybody in the building.
15 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
16 Q Did you have any involvement with the IBEX
17 project?
18 A I did not. I am familiar with it because
19 press inquiries have driven me to find out what it was,
2 0 but I did not.
21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
22 Q Do you have any acquaintance with Mr. Willard
2 3 tucker?
24 A I do not know him by that name or probably any
25 other.
ieytSSIHED
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1 --» ■ Q Do you know of a company called Companie
2'. Service Fiduciare, a Swiss Company?
3 A No. I've seen that in the press, but I don't
4 know it.
5 MR. SABA: I don't have anything further.
6 MR. KREUZER: Mr. Secretary, does Mr. Ledeen,
7 is he still associated with the Department of Defense in
8 any capacity?
9 THE WITNESS: No. I terminated his
10 consultancy. I want to stress that we didn't pay him to
11 do anything that I am aware of. Roughly in January, when
12 I saw his name become very prominent in this whole
13 affair, I didn't feel the Department needed it and I
14 teminated his consultancy.
15 MR. KREUZER: Would you say your association
16 with him was strictly business, professional or was it a
17 personal association?
IS THE WITNESS: No, it was business. On two or
19 three occasions he asked me to come out with my children
20 and meet his wife and so on, and I refused to do so.
21 MR. KREUZER: Do you know Mr. Richard Gadd?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I met him on at least one
23 occasion, possibl? twice.
24 MR. KREUZER: So that is the extent of that?
25 THE WITNESS: No personal association at all
UNfMlflED
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1 with him.
2 MR. KREUZER: One final question. We were
3 ■ talking earlier about the transfer of responsibility, the
4 possible transfer of responsibility to you for special
5 plans that are under Dr. Ikle. Is the special —
6 THE WITNESS: No. Let me be clear. When Noel
7 Koch had his duties brought under me — that is, the SOF
8 and counterterrorism duties — you asked did he bring any
9 assets with him, and he did. He brought with him a small
10 cell we call special plans, SP. Special Plans is the SOF
11 cell — four or five guys. But they were always under
12 Noel and they are not part of Craig Alderman's shop —
13 just to be clear.
14 MR. KREUZER: The organization that I an
15 interested in is the Defense Security Assistance Agency.
16 Does that come under Dr. Ikle?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, it does.
18 MR. KREUZER: Would it in this changeover
19 still come under him?
20 THE WITNESS: It has no bearing at all. This
21 changeover affected DSAA not a whit.
22 MR. KREUZER: So DSAA is still under Dr. Ikle?
23 THE WITNESS: Would it help if I drew a
24 diagram to explain it just so you see the charts?
25 MR. SAXON: Sure.
ItNetASStFKD
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133
1 (Pause.)
2 THE WITNESS: You have IJcle and then you have
3 ' ASD/ISA, and ASD/ISP as the two Assistant Secretaries.
4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
5 Q ISP is International Security Policy with Mr.
6 Perle previously?
7 A Right, Mr. Perle previously. Over here you've
8 got DSAA, but in their duties both Mr. Perle and myself
9 have a policy voice in DSAA. We don't have a program
10 voice. I don't tell General Cast how to run a program,
11 how to administer a program. I tell him what the size of
12 the program is going to be. I tell him sometimes when we
13 want to make a point, can't we speed up the delivery of
14 an item to tha|^^^^^| and push someona else baclc in
15 the queue, if there is a policy reason — that kind of
16 thing.
17 We oversee in terms of policy any
18 international agreements that DSAA gets into, but program
19 implementation is all under General Gast, but all of it
20 is under Ikle.
21 Q And General Gast would report directly to Dr.
22 Ikle?
23 A He would.
24 _^^_^^_MR. SABA: (Resuming)
134
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8
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BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
Q Let me ask you about a topic that we've
overlooked, and that is any knowledge you had prior to
these matters becoming public that
government was aiding the contras.
A I had none
WSSPO
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1 , V Q ^ou had none?
2 A I had none.
3 ■ Q You knew nothing about the payments of $1
4 million a month?
5 A I knew nothing.
6 Q And then it doubled into $2 million a month.
7 A I'm not sure that's the fact today.
8 MR. SAXON: Off the record.
9 (A discussion was held off the record.)
10 MR. SAXON: On the record.
11 THE WITNESS: I will provide, if it meets your
12 pleasure, a wiring diagram of the reporting
13 responsibilities in the policy cluster.
14 MR. SAXON: Would you address the issue we
15 discussed of DSAA and Dr. Ikle?
16 THE WITNESS: DSAA's relationship with the
17 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
18 relationship with the two Assistant Secretaries in the
19 policy cluster.
20 MR. SAXON: Let me just say, Mr. Secretary,
21 that we appreciate your being with us this afternoon. We
22 are sorry we have taken so much of your time, but we
23 thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: And I apologize to you for
25 rescheduling several times.
umij^sM
5
139
ummED
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1 _ ,, MR. SAXON: On behalf of the Committees, thank
2 you very much.
3 (Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the taking of the
4 instant deposition ceased.)
6 Signature of the Witness
7 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
8 , 1987.
9
10 Notary Public
11 My commission expires:
UNCUssm
140
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1 . CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
2
3
I. ANNE PELLECCHIA HOROWITZ, the officer
before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby
certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the
foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the
testimony was taken by me by Stenomask and thereafter
reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am
neither counsel for. related to, nor employed by any of
the parties to the action in which this deposition was
taken; and further, that I am not a relative or employee
of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties
thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in
the outcome of the action.
li^^
.^X
TJ
Notary Public in and for the
^8 State of Maryland.
19
20 ny Commission expires J^-~
21
22
UNCLASSIFIEO
ALOCMOH REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
XI P ST- N.W, WASHINQTON. O.C. 20001 (S02) 8S8-9300
141
TOil«IB*iSIFttfc»«» """^'"
Stenographic Transcript of
HEARINGS
Before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
UNITED STATES SENATE
CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
^ Wednesday, July 22, 1987
Washington. D.C
TOpllitllMSSIPI»»
imder provisions of E.0. 1235^\LDBnSON F£=Cfi^NG J^ j^
^ , by D. Slrko, National Security Councfl 3^*7 £—
142
UNeune
1 CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
2 Wednesday, July 22, 1987
3 United States Senate
4 Select Committee on Secret
5 Military Assistance to Iran
g and the Nicaraguan Opposition
7 Washington, D. C.
8 Continued deposition of RICHARD L. ARMITAGE,
9 called as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee,
10 at the offices of the Witness, The Pentagon, Washington,
11 D. C, commencing at 4:05 p.m., the witness having been
12 previously duly sworn by ANNE P. HOROWITZ, a Notary
13 Public in and for the State of Maryland, and the
14 testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN
15 SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction.
16
UNeUSSffi
143
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141
X APPEARANCES :
2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret
3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
4 Opposition:
5 JOHN SAXON, ESQ.
6 On behalf of the House Select Committee to
7 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran:
8 JOSEPH SABA, ESQ.
9 ROGER KREUZER
10 ROBERT GENZMAN
11 RICHARD CLARK
12 On behalf of the Department of Defense:
13 ED SHAPIRO, ESQ.
14 Office of General Counsel
15 LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD
UNEUWEft
144
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1 CONTENTS
2 . . EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF
3 WITNESS SENATE HOUSE
4 Richard L. Armitage - Resumed
5 By Mr. Saba 143
6 By Mr. Saxon 159
7 EXHIBITS
8 ARMITAGE EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION
9 14 180
10 15 184
11 16 184
12 17 189
13 18 193
14 19 218
15 20 221
16 21 224
17 22 227
18 23 227
19 24 228
20 25 236
21 26 243
22 27 244
vmmm
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UNeUSHD
143
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 MR. SAXON: Let me say, Mr. Secretary, that
3 this is a continuation of your deposition of May 26,
4 1987, that it is likewise classified at the Top
5 Secret/Codeword level, and you remain under oath.
6 Mr, Saba will begin.
7 Whereupon ,
8 RICHARD L. ARMITAGE,
9 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate
10 Select Committee and having been previously duly sworn,
11 was further examined and testified as follows:
12 EXAMINATION
13 BY MR. SABA:
14 Q Good afternoon, sir. Mr. Secretary, do you
15 recall what you knew about the circumstances of the
16 release of the Reverend Benjamin Heir?
17 A Can you refresh me when what was?
18 Q Yea. Benjamin Weir was released roughly
19 September 1986, and I would add for refreshment purposes
20
21
22
23
24
25
A
'86?
Q
I'm sorry, '85.
A
It was Jacobson who was September or October
86.
Q
That's correct. And I would add that
Pailialy OKhnlfled/Releaaed on
under provisions of E.0. 12
c l>y D. Sirico. National Security Council
wm
146
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144
1 Ambassador Oakley, at that time the Department of State
2 Director of the Office of Terrorism, was informed by and
3 has provided us with information that he was informed by
4 Oliver North shortly after the release with the
5 information that the release was a result of an Israeli
6 shipment of TOWs to Iran.
7 My question to you is whether you discussed
8 that fact of the Israeli shipment of the TOWs with
9 anyone, whether you knew about it.
10 A I don't remember discussing it. I don't
11 remember knowing about it. I remember Weir coming out.
12 I was not a member of the OSG at the time, but it could
13 be that I was informed that it was an Israeli transfer
14 that got him out. I just don't recall it.
15 Q Do you recall if Ambassador Oakley discussed
16 the matter with you after the release?
17 A He could very well have. I just can't recall
18 it. I can't remember having that much communication with
19 Bob until more along the time that Noel Koch was about to
20 leave or was thinking about leaving, and I got involved
21 in the OSG. But it could very well be that I spoke with
22 Oakley.
23 Q Would you have spoken with Arnie Raphel at the
24 time?
25 A If I knew anything, I spoke to Arnie Raphel.
DNCnSSIFIED
147
IINftl^lflED
145
1 Q And would he have spoken to you?
2 A I would hope that he would have spoken to me.
3 Q Do you recall if you and he had a conversation
4 on the matter?
5 A I don't, but I would have talked to Arnie if I
6 knew anything.
7 Q Would it have been your business at that time
8 to know whether or not Reverend Weir's release was in
9 connection with the shipment of Israeli TOWs?
10 A I wouldn't say it would be my direct business,
11 but, as you may have learned in your discussions, I am
12 pretty nosy and frankly think I've learned the lesson in
13 a bureaucracy that the more you know, the more you can
14 put things together. So I'm pretty nosy. I don't think
15 it was my business to know at the time, but I would have
16 been sure curious and wanted to know and would have tried
17 to find out. I don't remember attempting to do it at
18 this time, but I would have tried.
19 Q Is it your testimony that you don't recall
20 whether you knew at the time that his release was in
21 connection with the Israeli shipment of TOWs?
22 A That is my testimony. I don't recall it. I
23 could have been told this, but I don't recall being told
24 it.
25 Q Focusing on the period of the fall of 1985, I
UNCIJtSSIfe
148
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146
1 want to ask you if you knew four people and, if you did,
2 what your relationship with them was. The first one is
3 Amiram Nir.
4 A I did not meet Mr. Nir, to my recollection,
5 until later in the year. It was after I joined the
6 operational subgroup and I met him at one time in Ollie
7 North's office. I think I've also testified to the fact
8 that I saw him coming out of Mike Armacost's office one
9 day and accused him of dressing like Columbo, but I think
10 those are the two occasions I have met with Mr. Nir.
11 Q When did you first meet him?
12 A This would have been mid to late *86.
13 Q '86?
14 A '86. That's when I remember meeting him. And
15 I remember it because the primary discussions that I had
ce
16 in Ollie's presenA with Nir concerned, I believe it was,
17 a T-72 tank, the provision of a T-72 tank to the United
18 States, were we interested. And I can remember several
19 phone calls from Ollie about whether we should do this or
20 not.
21 Q Did you meet him prior to February 1, '86?
22 A I could have. I don't remember it.
23 Q Mr. Schwimmer?
24 A I don't think I've ever met him. I wouldn't
25 know if I fell over him.
mmm
149
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147
1 Q Mr. Nimrodi?
2 A I don't think I've met him and I wouldn't know
3 him if I fell over him.
4 Q Menachem Meron?
5 A I know him very well.
6 Q When did you meet him?
7 A I met him when he was the DAT here.
8 Q For the record, the DAT is?
9 A The Defense Attache from Israel. And that
10 must have been early '83 because I began actively in this
11 job roughly May or June of '83, but I was sitting in
12 awaiting confirmation and doing all the things an Acting
13 can do prior to that, so it would have been early '83.
14 Q I believe you've testified that in mid-
15 November 1985 you were on a trip and, as I recall your
16 testimony, you think you returned on or about the 23rd or
17 the 24th of Kovember.
18 AX should have been smarter when X saw you guys
19 and prepared a little bit for this. Here's when I
20 traveled, according to my records. I haven't memorized,
21 so give it back to me and I'll let you have it for the
22 record.
23 Q All right.
24 A The answer to your question was I was out of
25 town from 15 to 23 November in Germany, Bahrain and
wstrnm
150
UNWn
1 Pakistan, and I was out on the 28th of November, which
2 was ahanksgiving.
3 MR. SAXON: Is this '85 or '86?
4 THE WITNESS: '85.
5 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
6 Q And what was the basis for your preparing
7 that?
8 A Because you guys asked me questions about
9 travel dates and I didn't have a damn idea in the world,
10 and I was offended by it because I hadn't been told to
11 prepare for this. So this time I'm not going to make the
12 same mistake.
13 Q Did you prepare that document from your
14 calendars and records?
15 A Calendars and my secretary's recollection.
16 Q So you returned, then, on November 23 from
17 Pakistan.
18 A Yeah. I don't know what day of the week.
19 That might have been a weekend or might not. I just
20 don't remember when my schedule has me landing in
21 Washington.
22 Q And on your return from that trip did you
23 learn that Mr. Gaffney and Mr. Koch were providing
24 information to Colin Powell and the Secretary of Defense
25 concerning a proposal to send HAWK missiles to Iran?
UNCtJtSStFIED
151
UNCmflEO
149
1 - A I don't think I knew Noel was — now I know a
2 i lolb^ore about Noel since I've seen his testimony or at
3 V, least read the newspaper transcripts of it. I was
4 traveling. X now have seen that I talked to Dr. Gaffney
5 on the 6th of December, I believe in preparation to brief
6 the Secretary for a 7 December meeting.
7 Q But I'm looking back a little bit before that.
8 A I can understand. I'm trying to work sy way
9 back. I'm trying to recollect it. I don't remember
10 talking to Hank Gaffney before that. It seems to me,
11 though, that we had seen in intelligence some references
12 to HAWK missiles going to or coming back from Israel. I
13 think I have testified to that.
14 And I think that's what I knew, but I don't
15 remember. I just don't think Nosl told me at the time
16 anything about this. I don't think Hank would, as a
17 matter of course.
You ^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^H
19 When did you learn that?
sure was^^^^^^^^^^^H^^I It
21 might have been an IR intelligence report. I can't say
22 it was^^^^^lat all, but it was an IR or something
23 about an allegation or something of HAWK missiles going.
24 I think it's either hearsay from my colleagues and I'm
25 sure 1 talked to Amie about this. Or it might have
UimStFIED
152
tlNfiU$«D
X*^ '§*iginated with me hearing it somewhere else, that there
2 was « Star of David on these things and that they went
3 ^rom Israel to Iran and they were sent back.
4 But that's kind of my recollection.
5 Q Do you recall when you learned that
6 intelligence?
7 A No, I'm sorry, I don't. It would have been
8 prior to my lunch with Ollie North on 3 December. But I
9 don't know when prior to that. My feeling is probably
10 after I came back from this trip to Pakistan, but I can't
11 say that with 100 percent assurance.
12 Q Your prior testimony was that the Secretary
13 had received the intelligence information and requested
14 you to find out what you could about it.
15 A Yeah, that's right. Either the Secretary
16 himself or through Colin, but it was clear that it came
17 from the Secretary — Colin Powell.
18 Q Did you have access to the hard copy of the
19 intelligence information?
20 A I seen to remember that I saw an IR, which is
21 a message. It's not|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■l saw when the Secretary or
23 when General Powell thought that it was interesting for
24 me to see it. As you will remember, sometime we
25 apparently felt we were cut off from^^^^^^^^Hbut, as
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153
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151
1 it turned out, Art Moreau was not. He was the Assistant
2 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he, I
3 since found out, has been giving to Colin Powell or the
4 Secretary interesting things that we weren't seeing in
5 OSD.
6 Some of those X was allowed to see by General
7 Powell. And this continued, I might add, somewhat during
8 the year of '86.
9 Q Do you recall if the intelligence indicated
10 how many weapons had gone?
11 A I do not.
12 Q Do you recall if it indicated how the weapons
13 had gone?
14 A By aircraft. That's my recollection.
15 Q Do you recall specifically what the request
16 was to you? That is, you were to verify the accuracy of
17 this?
18 A No. It wasn't directly concerning the HAWK
19 missiles. The request that was passed to me was to find
20 out is someone talking to the Iranians. I mean, what do
21 you know? Can you find out anything? Can you find out
22 anything about it? That was basically the request. Are
23 we dealing with the Iranians?
24 Q So there was information about shipments of
25 HAWKS by Israel to Iran?
l)NI!tJtS«D
154
UNtymED
^ A I'm not sure that it said by Israel. I said I
vaguely remember that they had a Star of David and all on
1%, but I can't remember if that came in the IR which I
thinlc I saw or not.
Q Who asked you to find out whether we were
talking to ~
A Either the Secretary or Colin, one or the
other. Those would be the only two.
Q What did you understand to be the basis of the
request?
A That they were interested. It appeared from
i^^^^Bthat there was somebody talking to the Iranians
and they wanted to find out who the hell it was.
Q Was the substance of the^^HJ^r the actual
copy provided to you?
A Yes. In some cases it was, but it didn't mean
seemed to be of some concern to the
Secretary and/or Colin Powell. ^^^^^
MR. KREUZER: This information or this^^^H
was coming from Admiral Moreau to you?
THE WITNESS: I think it was not coming to me.
It was going to Powell and the Secretary, and they would
let me see these things. They didn't come up here to me.
msmm
155
^^^ ^I had to go down there when they called me down there.
2 '^ ^ MR. KREUZER: For some reason it wasn't coming
3 " Vin here.
* THE WITNESS: Yea. Wait a minute. Let -s be
5 clear, it wasn't coming into the Office of the Secretary
6 of Defense.
7 MR. KREUZER: It was going to the JCS?
8 THE WITNESS! The Assistant to the Chairman,
9 yes.
*®- KREUZER: Admiral Moreau was getting the
11 information and a^i^jould get certain bits, interesting
12 bit. and Pieces, l^^he would bring th«. up here
13 and show thea.
^* THE WITNESS: No.
" *®- KREUZER: He would take thea to Secretary
18 Weinberger —
" THE WITNESS: To General Powell.
^' *®- KREUZER: Show then to General Powell, who
19 would show thea to Secretary Weinberger?
" ™* WITNESS: I aasuae, yeah. I don't know
21 that. But I don't know that he brought every piece up
22 eithwr. I saw what I saw.
" *®- KREUZER: But this went on for a period of
24 time?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, it did.
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156
UNDUSSra
*^ «^ MR. KREUZER: In '86. So like maybe it went
2 otf f<?r 30 days?
3 %f THE WITNESS: Well, it was either '85 or '86;
4 I can't remember.
5 ' MR. KREUZER: Could it have been '85 and '86?
6 THE WITNESS: It could have been for a little
7 while, but I know once Powell determined and the
8 Secretary determined that we were cut off. I think the
9 Secretary took steps to put us back on. Nov whether th«
10 Secretary called^^^^^^^^^Hor whether Colin Powell
11 called^^^^^^^^^Vlcan't say, but all of a sudden the
12 Secretary of Defense was put back on the distribution.
13 MR. KREUZER: But was the Secretary of Defense
14 aware that his was coming from Admiral Moreau?
15 THE WITNESS: You've got to ask him. I wasn't
16 aware of this until later.
17 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
18 Q Do you recall when the Secretary spoke to you
19 about this?
20 A I do not.
21 Q Could it have been Tuesday, November 26?
22 A I don't remember. It could have been.
23 Q I raise that date because you are on the
24 Secretary's calendar that morning.
25 A Yeeih. But I must say that I slip into the
mtmam
157
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1 Secjii^ary an awful lot without being on his calendar. I
2 . wouldn~*t be surprised if that particular date had to do
3 with the debrief of my trip, frankly. I don't think that
4 this is something that he called me down and had me
5 appear on the schedule for, but it could have been.
6 Q In connection —
7 A I very often, by the way, go in to see the
8 Secretary either before a staff meeting, before everybody
9 walks in, when everybody is gathered out in the anteroom,
10 or lata in the night.
11 Q In connection with the information, your
12 understanding was that there had been information that
13 certain Americans were in discussions with Iranians?
14 A More indications that certain official
15 Americana were in discussions with the Iranians.
16 Q There was a reference to|
18 A That's my remembrance of what triggered me.
19 You may have a different one.
20 Q And at the same time you had an intelligence
21 report indicating that HAWK missiles bearing the Star of
22 David had gone to Iran?
23 A I vaguely remember an IR talking about HAWK
24 missile deliveries to Iran. The Star of David aspect of
25 it is something that either I developed in talking with
UNHbtSStflfD
158
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156
1 my friends or Arnie or somebody told me. I don't
2 remember that, the Star of David being in the IR.
3 Q So the Secretary, this meeting was with the
4 Secretary when he asked you to find out what was going
5 on?
6 A It was either the Secretary or Colin Powell
7 who said, is someone meeting with the Iranians. There is
8 something going on; find out what you can.
9 Q Did that person tell you what he thought was
10 going on?
11 A No, other than that it was clear there was a
12 suspicion someone was meeting with the Iranians.
13 Q Was there a reference to the HAWK missiles?
14 A There could have been, but I don't remember it
15 in the Secretary's comments at all, or Colin Powell's. I
16 just don't remember that.
17 Q Was there a reference to information provided
18 by Mr. McFarlane?
19 A Not to my remembrance. Listen, I've testified
20 to you before that we had a real problem with Mr.
21 McFarlane 's NSC, not personally with him, but we found it
22 difficult to deal with the McFarlane NSC. We found that
23 we weren't getting what we felt was a sufficient flow of
24 information and we found it much more collegial under
25 Admiral Poindexter. We found that at least people
UNttitssn
159
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157
1 listened to us.
2 So I don't believe that the McFarlane
3 reference would have come up. From my point of view we
4 didn't learn very much from them at all.
5 Q Mr. McFarlane has testified both privately and
6 now in public that at the time of the HAWK shipment from
7 Israel to Iran and at some time during the Geneva summit
8 in fact he seems to recall that he told not only
9 Secretary Shultz, of which we have written confirmation,
10 but also Secretary Weinberger, about the fact of the
11 shipment to Iran.
12 A I've seen that.
13 Q So obviously it seems logical to me that on
14 your return from a trip following the day that McFarlane
15 indicates he has provided the information that you would
16 be requested by either the Secretary or possibly Colin
17 Powell to get more information about it.
18 A I'd love to help you. I just can't say that
19 he brought up HAWKs with me at all. I don't think he
20 did.
21 Q Focusing on really the same time period that
22 Ambassador Oakley or Mr. Raphel or both of them, or
23 either of them, tell you about the weapons that went to
24 Iran, if it helps you —
25 A I'm just going to try to give it to you. My
IINCttSSIFIED
160
l^^^t- T*iB«nbranca is that we didn't know clearly that weapons
2 ^ went'^to Iran.
3 ^-- MR. SHAPIRO: Can counsel please let him
4 finish?
5 THE WITNESS: Say what you will, please.
6 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
7 Q I wanted to try to help. He have testimony
8 and interview information that North had told Oakley
9 during the period sometime after the 17th of November
10 but, say, before the 25th, had told Oakley what was going
11 on because ha needed help getting the landing permits in
12 ^^^^^^H and he told Oakley what was going on, and we
13 know that Oakley provided information both up and down
14 the ladder in the State Department on the matter.
15 And, of course, we know that in Geneva at that
16 moment the matter had come to the attention of McFarlane
17 and, in a casual way perhaps, to Secretary Shultz, but
18 certainly by Monday, the 25th of November, which would
19 have been your first workday back, Oakley and Raphel,
20 according to McFarlane, the Secretary knew that Israeli
21 HANKS had gone and they had an idea that some people from
22 the White House were talking to Iranians. That would
23 have been your state of knowledge as a minimum?
24 A That's pretty close to my state of knowledge,
25 except I can't say with assurance that they told me about
UNCUSSIFIED
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159
1 weapons going from Israel with any degree of assurance or
2 knowledge. I'm sure that any intelligence that I found I
3 talked to Raphel about it. I would hope he talked to me
4 about it. I just don't have a clear recollection.
5 I'll tell you why. This may sound baffling to
6 you, but it's not to me if you sat in this job. Whether
7 it's an M-16 or a HAWK missile to me was the problem
8 because it was the policy. It wasn't a matter of what
9 was or wasn't going. It was the policy that we didn't
10 like. I mean, I'm not a technician. I told you guys
11 that. It's the policy that bothered me, whether it was
12 M-16S or HAWKS. So I'm not sure, if they told me, that
13 HAWKS would have meant anything more to me than a TOW,
14 would have meant anything more than an M-16. We didn't
15 like it as a Department.
16 BY MR. SAXON:
17 Q In that time freune do you know if Amie Raphel
18 told you that he had learned that McFarlane told
19 Secretary Weinberger in Geneva that the Iranians wanted
20 120 HAWKS?
21 A He may have told me that. I just don't recall
22 it. I trust that he would have shared with me, like I
23 tried to share with him.
24 Q Let me refer to something that's an exhibit in
25 the earlier deposition. I'll give you the number, but
inmstFHD
1^
UNCtASStFe
160
1 let me give you for your reference a copy. These are the
2 notes of Amie Raphel that were prepared by him on March
3 31, 1987. I ask, Mr. Secretary, that you look at what is
4 page four, at the November 25 entry.
5 It states, and this is Raphel: "My notes
6 state that Bud McFarlane had met Secretary Weinberger in
7 Geneva. Mr. McFarlane had asked for 120 HAWKs for Iran,
8 noting that 100 had been delivered to Israel. My notes
9 further state that Secretary Weinberger responded he was
10 opposed to such an operation."
11 Does this in any way ring a ball with you?
12 A No. But if November 25 is that Monday and the
13 Secretary just returned from Geneva and I had just
14 returned, I tell you frankly I don't think I would have
15 talked with the Secretary yet. So I don't think that's
16 mine. But it could be. I don't think that's my note or
17 my information to Raphel.
18 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
19 Q All right. But, in any event, what I'm just
20 trying to establish is, whether they were HAWKs or TOWs
21 or bullets and M-Ss, whatever it is, your position was
22 that our policy was contrary to making such transfers.
23 A Absolutely, yes.
24 Q And that you had come to know that transfers
25 had occurred.
BWfiGsm
163
UNIIASSffi
■^ A Ko. We had suspicions for some time that
i^
2 Isri^pl had been involved in transfers to Iran of we
3 -didn't know what, and frankly I used the Tataran firm
4 because we've seen pictures of radios that are being
5 captured, allegedly captured by the Iraqis on the Iran-
6 Iraq battlefield, and this was one of the reasons that
7 we, along with others, in our administration directed the
8 attention of Israeli visitors to what we thought was a
9 foolish policy of selling any equipment to Iran.
10 I must say I don't think we thought it was
11 U.S. equipment, but it was not a big surprise to us that
12 Israel would be providing equipment to Iran. I would say
13 to me it is a surprise, was a surprise to find it was
14 U.S. equipment.
15 Q It would have been a surprise if you had
16 learned that in connection with that there were people
17 from the White House also talking with Iranians?
18 A Hell, yeth, that would have been a further
19 surprise, but we had suspicions that people were talking
20 froB the White House because of some of the^^^^Hthat
21 we were seeing, and I was trying to figure out who it
22 was.
23 Q Just so I can get your testimony correct, it's
24 your testimony that you had intelligence information
25 about a transfer of weapons to Iran.
ONCtKSSIFIED
164
mmm
A
By Israel.
Q
By Israel.
A
By Israel over time, yea.
Q
I don't particularly mean over time.
because
2 ^
,v
4
5 that's vague. I'm looking very specifically at TOWs or
6 HAWKS in 1985.
7 A My recollection is that I saw, and I have a
8 vague recollection of seeing hard copy IR of a HAWK
9 transfer to Iran by aircraft. Now whether it came from
10 Israel I can't remember if that was on the IR. That I
11 have a vague recollection of. That became — it was
12 obvious to us for some time that Israel had been selling
13 some weapons and equipment to Iran and this was the
14 reason that over time in a series of meetings for a
15 couple of years at least we had been raising with the
16 Israeli officials our point of view that Operation
17 Staunch was the right way to go with Iran.
18 That's my testimony.
19 Q And in addition you receive^^^^^^H
20 A Yes. ^^^^
21 g Did the^^^H indicate or refer to an actual
22 transfer of weapons?
23 A ^^^^H and I can't remember when and I don't
24 know how much I saw — I saw what I saw — and I had to
25 go do%mstairs to see it — sometimes indicated — there
IWWmD
165
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163
I thinJc eventually it talked about
%.what kind, but my recollection is that that was sometime
in '86. I do not recollect seeing specific weapons
mentioned ^^^^^^Hin
Q But the reference was to the fact that there
were people from the White House engaged in conversations
with Iranians about weapons?
A I can't say it was about weapons — that they
were engaged with Iranians. Eventually it cause to be
weapons. I don't remember that when the Secretary
grzibbed me he said people from the white House are
talking about weapons. It was that people from the White
House apparently were talking about — talking with
Iranians. What the hell's going on? What is this?
Because he was indicating to me, and it could have been
through General Powell, that he didn't know about this.
MR. SHAPIRO: In that connection, could I ask
lestion just to clarify this? Are you talking about
We're talking about ^^^^H and I'm
not sure that we're all talking about the
MR. SABA: Ed, the likelihood is you know more
than I do. I mean, how do I know?
MR. SHAPIRO: I'm just asking to clarify your
UNetiWED
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
^Rk, question, Counsel. That's all.
\^ MR. SABA: I haven't seen it. You saw it, so
•S-I'm asking what you saw.
MR. SHAPIRO: I'm just asking to clarify your
question.
THE WITNESS: I understand you are at a
disadvantage in this, and that's unfair. But somebody
have seen that^^^^H My understanding wa^^^H
made it available to you guys. I hope someone's seen it.
were^^^^^^mmHl^nd they came up to me or
I went down to see them in a red and white folder that
said SecDef on it or something like that^^
And they were in the ^^^^^^^^^H
I think, and over time and starting late in '85 — and 1
can't tell you when ~ and through a good period of '86
periodically, aa you know, I do travel and when I
traveled I didn't see things and they didn't particularly
keep these, to my knowledge, in a desk drawer waiting for
me, which they could have done, but I think they just
hemded them back to the guy who carries the
aroxind.
So over time there were references to money in
lat I remember. I can't
the
figures, but it was apparent to me, reading it and what I
knew , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
nun
167
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
MR. KREUZER: Mr. Annitage, ware those the
reports that you vent down to see, were those the ones
that Admiral Moreau picked out?
THE WITNESS; Well, some of them were, but
later — and I'm now in '86 — they were apparently onea
that were now being delivered to the Secretary of
Defense's office. So I'm sure some of the early ones
were ones that Admiral Moreau let us see, and the later
ones were, as far as I know, ones that came right to the
Secretary.
MR. KREUZER: Did yoj^iav^t^g^down to a
certain place to see of the^^^^^^^^^^H^
THE WITNESS: General Powell's office. There
may have been one or two occasions when one would be
carried up to ma, and, as a matter of fact, now they are
carried up to me. But in general I went down there to
read them.
MR. KREUZER: So the ones that Admiral Moreau
picked out for you to read he would give to General
Powell?
THE WITNESS: He did not pick out anything for
mmm
168
iiNeumED
166
1 me to read, and I don't know that he )cnows I was reading
2 them.
3 MR. KREUZER: Let's say the ones that Admiral
4 Moreau selected would end up with General Powell.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's my understanding.
6 MR. KREUZER: And then you would read those in
7 General Powell's office?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes.
9 MR. KREUZER: And then at some point in time
10 Secretary Weinberger said wait a minute, we are supposed
11 to be on distribution for this.
12 THE WITNESS: That is my understanding.
13 MR. KREUZER: But you weren't able to
14 distinguish, were you, or were you, one from the other?
15 THE WITNESS: No. It was a matter of no
16 moment to me. I only subsequently learned that there was
17 a time that we were cut off, and I talked to Amie Raphel
18 and found he was getting none of this, for instance.
19 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
20 Q So what happened was that the Secretary asked
21 you to find out what was going on.
22 A Yes.
23 Q And in that request to you was there any
24 mention of the existence of a recent transfer, whether of
25 HAWKS or TOWS?
mmm
169
\immm
167
1 A No, sir, I don't believe there was.
2 Q So the only basis that you knew it or that you
3 recall you knew at that time would be an IR report?
4 A I could have had subsequent conversations with
5 friends. I don't remember that. I don't recall that.
6 Q And you received that request to find
7 information.
8 A That's right.
9 Q And who did you speak to?
10 A I probably spoke to Bob Oakley, but I can't
11 say with a certainty. I know I had spoken to Arnie. Now
12 Arnie was on the trip with me — this one to Pakistan —
13 as he had an inkling he was going to be the Ambassador to
14 Pakistan and wanted to go out and measure for the drapes,
15 and when we came back we were both engaged, as we would
16 have been, in a discussion, telephone, what's going on in
17 your building since you've been gone, and I'd tell him
18 what's been going on in my building since we were gone.
19 I know that when the Secretary told me that
20 something was going on I kind of figured Ollie would know
21 something eUsout it because he was a very active fellow
22 and very involved with hostages. I could see myself no
23 reason to talk to the Iranians that didn't involve
24 hostages, none, and I think the combination of all of
25 those and maybe rumors from the interagency community led
msmm
170
Wbissfe
1 me to ask Ollie to lunch.
2 Q Did you have a conversation with Ambassador
3 Oakley prior to that lunch with Ollie?
4 A I don't remember. I may have.
5 Q And in that conversation by any chance do you
6 recall the topic of a talking paper or points involving
7 the Arms Export Control Act arising?
8 A My remembrance — I have been wrong — was
9 that this arrived after I had my lunch with Ollie, and
10 before the meeting, what I think was the first meeting,
11 as far as I know, with the President in early December,
12 and I think I had that discussion with Amie Raphel.
13 Q With Amie?
14 A Yes, that's my recollection. I could have
15 also had one with Bob, but I'm quite sure I had a
16 discussion with Amie Raphel on this.
17 Q What was the timing on that?
18 A It would have been, I'm sure, immediately
19 after having lunch here on 3 December with Ollie and
20 prior to the 6 or 7 December, whichever date that meeting
21 was. I'm absolutely certain I discussed this with Amie
22 Raphel .
23 Q Do you recall, just to leave that alone for a
24 moment because in the same time frame there were joint
25 U.S. -Israeli talks going on.
ONCDtsamn
171
wMsm
169
1 A JPMG — the Joint Military Planning.
2 Q Do you recall having a conversation that weelc
3 with Mindy Meron? He was to help you, staying in Chevy
4 Chase?
5 A I'm sure I did. If we had it at that time, I
6 would have had it here. He would have come in to see me.
7 Q Do you recall the substance of that
8 conversation?
9 A I do not. The only noteworthy conversation
10 that I remember with Mindy on this whole subject — and I
11 can't give you a date, but my feeling is that it was
12 later in the spring of '86 prior to when Mindy was going
13 to leave his job as Director General of the Defense
14 Agency — he got a call. He was in my office. He got a
15 call from Ollie, who wanted to talk secure, so I let
16 Mindy go out to my outer office to use the secure phone.
17 When he came back I don't remember him telling
18 me the subject of the conversation, but I said to Mindy,
19 you know, you guys are involved with some real sleaze
20 balls. I think I used that exact expression, or
21 scumballs, because Mindy gave me — he was standing — I
22 remember he had just come back in my office and he was
2 3 standing over by the corner of my desk, and he gave me —
24 he's got a very charming smile. He gave me this kind of
25 quizzical smile which I read as, you play the hand you
wmssm
172
UNCutssm
170
1 are dealt. He didn't say that at all. He kind of gave
2 me one of those.
3 That's the only conversation I remember with
4 Mindy on this.
5 Q Continuing to focus on the joint U.S. -Israeli
6 talks in that period of time, did you see Defense
7 Minister Rabin at the same time?
8 A If he was in town I would have probably seen
9 him, but I would not have seen Rabin without the
10 Secretary. I mean, I did not see Rabin other than at a
11 major meeting. But Rabin doesn't come to JPMGs. As a
12 rule this is not his level of meetings. It is down a
13 bit.
14 Q I understand. It was at the Heron level?
15 A That's right. He led their team with their
16 Ambassador.
17 Q We have Mr. McFarlane's testimony and Mr.
18 North's testimony that Minister Rabin in New York first
19 met with McFarlane on the 15th and raised an issue.
20 A Of —
21 Q November, and raised an issue of replenishment
22 for Israeli weapons shipped and to be shipped to Iran.
23 When McFarlane was in Geneva Rabin again calls McFarlane.
24 McFarlame in turn calls — tells Rabin to see Oliver
25 North. Oliver North's testimony was that at that time he
w&mm
173
uNCti^m
171
sought to determine legalities and modalities, I believe
was his testimony in public, as to the means of transfer
of a large number of HAWK missiles.
A So Ollie was looking for the legalities of
doing this?
Q And, if you recall, w« have the testimony that
John and I did with Mr. Koch and Mr. Gaffney because ve
eventually came to produce the week of the 17th to the
21st the Gaffney memorandum which discussed —
A Thank God Z was gone, and that's why Noel was
in on it.
Q Which discussed 500 or 600 HAHKs and then
eventually that number beczune 120. But the testimony is
that that paper was in some way connected with that line
of inquiry.
A Oh, I'm sure.
Q And if that helps you, my question then is at
this time, and we'll look at the period right after your
na we'll look at tne perj
UNIiUmD
174
IWClASSiED
return and we'll take it up to December 7, to stretch it
2 a few more days past Ollie North's lunch, did you have
3 discussions with Minister Rabin as to replenishment
4 issues?
5 A I don't remember Rabin, but I would not have
6 met with Rabin, me, without being with the Secretary if
7 he were in town. That is dead sure. That's number one.
8 Q Mindy Meron?
9 A If Mindy was in town at the time, I met with
him and I would have met with him here. I don't remember
talking about it, but I must say I don't know why Mindy-
I mean, other than to talk about a project they wanted-
would come to me for replenishment, because I don't have
14 the power to replenish. I can't just order DSAA to
replenish. He has to submit an LOA, which has to go
through a normal process, which is something I can't
15
16
17 order
18
19
20
He may have; I don't know. I'm not sure I
knew or would know if it was in the context of
replenishment for Israeli weapons which were already
21 delivered.
^^ Q I think I understand, but correct me if I'm
2 3 wrong. Is it your testimony that in this time period you
24 did not discuss with Mindy Meron questions of
25 replenishment of Israeli weapons to Iran, whether
mmsm
175
(/NJMSJW
1 retroactively or prospectively?
2 A Well, I can't say. You guys, when I saw you
3 the last time, used the date 2 January with Mindy Meron,
4 which caused me to go back and look at my calendar. I
5 didn't see him, but I didn't remember then and I don't
6 remember now. Kow retrogressive replenishment of Israel,
7 I just don't remember it. Prospective is a possibility,
8 but I am not sure in the context of they were going to be
9 giving stuff to Iran, because 2 December was prior to
10 having had the meeting with the President. It was prior
11 also to my positively getting Ollie to tell me that he
12 and others had been meeting with the Iranians.
13 So it's very possible I could have talked
14 about replenishment in general because that is one of the
15 subjects, weapons sales in general, that Mindy talks
16 about with me and with Phil Cast of DSAA. But I've got
17 to say I don't remember it being related to this specific
18 case at all.
19 Q All right. Let's go to the lunch. Did North
20 tell you that he had a long conversation about 11:00 that
21 day with Ambassador Oakley on this point?
22 A I don't believe he did.
23 Q Just to help, I am looking at Ollie North's
24 calendar for December 3. It simply notes that around
25 11:00 a.m. he had a call to Oakley. They discussed
.m. he had a call to Oaklev.
176
uNcyism
174
X certain talking points. There's a reference to hostages
2 and Ambassador Oakley has told us that Issues of the
3 transfer were discussed and that North was concerned, but
4 you don't recall it?
5 A I sure don't.
6 Q Did Oakley tell you about this conversation?
7 A I don't recall Oakley telling me.
8 Q Do you remember if Oakley or Raphel discussed
9 that with you toward developing talking points or a legal
10 piece for either or both of your Secretaries?
11 A No. My recollection goes a little the other
12 way. My recollection is Ollie sat right where you are
13 sitting and I sat right where you are sitting and we had
14 this lunch, and after we finished it I talked about Iran
15 and he said yeah, he'd been meeting and doing this stuff,
16 and Z was kind of shocked and said what I told you Z said
17 to hin and told him I thought the Secretary would be
18 appalled and all this had an effect, Z thought, on ollie
19 physically because he thought so much of Weinberger.
20 But after he left my office Z know that Z
21 would have informed General Powell and Amie Raphel that
22 Ollie was meeting with Iranians. So my recollection
23 would be a little different. Though Z don't have a clear
24 recollection, Z'm quite sure Z called Amie Raphel,
25 second probably only to Colin Powell.
ly only to Colin Powell.
MA»tu
177
mmm
175
1 Q What did North tell you in that conversation?
2 A Wall, what I remamber most clearly is he was
3 meeting with the Iranians.*
4
^^^^^^^■^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■~~But was the whole
6 thrust that he and others had been meeting with Iranians.
7 He may even have mentioned Dick Secord at that meeting,
8 though I can't be clear.
9 For me, on the one hand, I was excited at
10 having what I thought solved a mystery, and on the other
11 I was appalled at what I saw was something that my boss
12 was clearly not up to speed on going on, euid that's what
13 struck me and that's my overwhelming remembrance of the
14 conversation.
15 Q What was your report about that conversation?
16 A That Ollie North is doing this and that
17 apparently it's sanctioned by his boss, by Bud. And I'm
18 sure that's the extent of that.
19 g Did you do a written report?
20 A No.
21 Q Did North inform you of the success of the
22 August-September TOW transfer and Reverend Weir?
23 A Now that you ask me, that sounds a little more
24 familiar, that Heir came out as a basis of these
25 discussions or this was a result. That's not really what
uim«D
178
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176
1 stood, out in my mind, frankly. When you say it there,
2 that sounds familiar, but I don't have a clear
3 recollection of it.
4 Q But he talked about the whole mission?
5 A No, you are saying that. He talked about the
6 discussion with Iran and how far he thought they were
7 going to go and all this and that it was hostage-related.
8 Kow that you mention Weir in that connection, I think
9 that's familiar to me. I can't center on it, whether he
10 talked about HAWKs or TOWs. For me again I've got to say
11 that's not what made the impression on me.
12 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
13 Q Do you recall saying anything to him along the
14 lines of but this sounds like trading arms for hostages
15 and we don't do that?
16 A No, that's not the way I talk. That's not
17 what I would have said. This is really crap. How can we
18 do this? I would have said that. I don't know that I
19 did, but that's the way I would have put it to him. He
20 and I ware friends and I wouldn't have been mincing
21 around it.
22 Q Let me ask you one other question.
23 A I would have hit it hard.
24 Q That's a little broader and in a way an even
25 more philosophical question.
)phlcal question.
HASHED
179
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177
1 A Get me on my weak point.
2 Q At any point in this time period did anybody
3 step back here in the Pentagon, as far as you know, and
4 look at the pattern of what was happening, of some things
5 going on with arms to Iran. We've been cut out of ^^^B
8 You had had these problems that you described dealing
9 with the McFarlane NSC.
10 Did anybody — you. Secretary Weinberger,
11 General Powell, somebody — step back and say something's
12 going on here that we don't like, we don't know eibout, we
13 need to raise or discuss?
14 A This is the answer, yes or no — yes, in that
15 something was going on that we didn't know and that
16 caused us all to want to have a meeting with the
17 President to kind of lay this out in front of everybody
18 and get all the guys that had the concern together to
19 give the President his information. I was less shocked
20 about, personally was less shocked at finding that we had
21 been cut out of some bureaucratic action because,
22 frankly, at that time with the NSC and since, as I
23 testified to before, the Lebanon experience, we had a
24 great deal of trouble with the NSC.
25 So Z was less shocked at being found to be cut
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180
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178
1 out of some bureaucratic action than I was about what was
2 going on. So the answer is we didn't stand back and take
3 a long look at a great conspiracy or something like that,
4 but we did say hey, there's a problem here and we have
5 got to get a handle on it so we can try to fix it.
6 Q And the way that in a sense manifested itself
7 was when you told Colonel North we've got to get the
8 elephants together?
9 A No. I think it manifested itself when the
10 Secretary indicated, either himself or through Powell,
11 that he wanted someone to see what the hell was going on
12 so we could try to find out what was going on, where do
13 we go from here. That would be the manifestation to me,
14 and my comment to Ollie was a private remark based on,
15 certainly, my understanding that Secretary Weinberger
16 wasn't very clued in on this stuff and, number two, what
17 I felt was the case from my constant conversation with
18 Amie Raphel that there's something going on and we're
19 not being plugged in.
20 And that's why I ever dared raise George
21 Shultz' name with Ollie, because I had talked with Arnie.
22 Q Did you get a sense in the December 3 lunch
23 that Colonel North was hearing for the first time that
24 Secretary Weinberger was opposed to what was happening or
25 wouldn't look favorably on it?
mmmi
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UNfimHED
179
1 A I must say, now that you say it like that, I'd
2 have to answer yes, because I said, when I told him the
3 Secretary would have thought he was out of his mind with
4 this, Ollie looked shocked to me, and I think he looked
5 shocked because he respected Secretary Weinberger.
6 MR. KREUZER: That lunch occurred on what day?
7 THE WITNESS: December 3, whatever day ot the
8 week that was.
9 MR. KREUZER: That was the third of December
10 of '85?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 MR. KREUZER: Four days before the meeting for
13 the Secretary?
14 THE WITNESS: I don't want to claim credit for
15 having brought about a meeting with the President. I
16 mean, that was my recommendation to Ollie. I'm sure it
17 was also other people's recommendation as soon as I
18 finished that lunch with Ollie, because I know I told
19 Amie what I had discovered.
20 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
21 Q Have you seen the paper Dr. Gaffney prepared
22 the week of November 18?
23 A Let me see it. It's probably out of my safe.
24 I probably gave it to you.
25 Q aJW lWf^9l'A<y4l4^fr*M?*^ ^^ might as well make
ff
182
mmm
1 it an exhibit.
2 (The document referred to was
3 marked Armitage Exhibit Nximber 14
4 for identification.)
5 A Did this come out of my safe? I think this is
6 HAWK missiles for Iran. I have seen it. There was one
7 about the possibility of leaks.
8 Q That will come.
9 A This one I have seen, but I don't remember
10 when I saw it.
11 Q Do you remember when you first saw it?
12 A No, I don't. But I have seen it.
13 Q Do you recall whether in asking you to find
14 more information about what's going on any reference was
15 made to this paper or the fact of its existence? This
16 had already been provided. Your testimony is it's been
17 provided the Secretary a week before you engage in this
18 inquiry.
19 A Whether provided by me, I was unaware of it.
20 Q I understand that it was provided, we have
21 testimony, to Powell and the Secretary, so they had
22 knowledge of this paper when they spoke to you, and it
23 just seems unusual to me that having this amount of
24 knowledge about an I iii I I i1 which is substantial they
25 might not have mentioned that to you.
mmm
183
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181
1 . A I don't believe they did. Now Gaffney may
2 have mentioned it. As I say, I now )cnow I met with him
3 in preparation for the 7 December meeting, when I was
4 getting smarter for the Secretary. I know I met with
5 Hank, so he may have mentioned it then. But I've seen
6 that paper.
7 Q Z want to continue with the lunch with Ollie.
8 I'm trying to understand the gist of the conversation in
9 the context of what's going on. Ha told you there was an
10 initiative, told you that he had had a discussion with
11 certain Iranians.
12 A Yes.
13 Q He mentioned that this was in connection with
14 hostages?
15 A Yes.
16 Q Did he mention weapons?
17 A I don't recall. Ha may have, but that didn't
18 stick in ay mind. And he may have mentioned Secord,
19 which does now strike a mora resonant tone because I knew
20 Dick quit* vail at that time, at that lunch.
21 Q Do you remember the context in which ha
22 mentioned Dick Secord?
23 A No, I don't. I just say that's familiar. I
24 think that might have happened.
25 Q Did Ollie mention that the status at that
UflCbARIl^Fe
184
1 point of the initiative involved a proposal for 3,300
2 T0W3?
3 A I don't recall it.
4 Q i-TOWs?
5 A I don't recall it. He may have. He may have
6 done that, or he may have - you know, the number. I've
7 seen it on a piece of paper, but I don't remember Ollie
8 doing it, but it may have been Ollie that brought it up,
9 and I don't know if it was at that lunch or some
10 subsequent conversation. Weapons are not what stands out
11 about that lunch. As I say, what stood out was the fact
12 that we were dealing with the Iranians and the Department
13 of Defense was cut out of it. He may have told me about
14 weapons, but I don't recall it.
j^5 Q so you had the lunch and you made an oral
16 report to whom?
17 A To Colin.
j^a Q To Colin Powell?
19 A Yes.
20 Q And did you provide him any information in
21 regards to weapons or hostages?
22 A I told him whatever I knew at the time. I
23 would have told him as much that struck me out of that
24 conversation.
25 Q M^a^^4 yPHt i?f Si^gf Si°" °* ''^^^ happened
185
\immm
nex^s
A Well, I remember my most vivid recollection is
some frantic working with Arnie Raphel to try to make
sure our bosses were basically singing from the same
hymnal. That I know because I have talked to Arnie
several times on that. That's my most vivid
recollection. But you've got to remember — and I don't
mean this facetiously — my business continues and I was
about to go off, and I had all kinds of things going on
and in between this my most vivid remembrance is working
with Arnie Raphel to be sure our bosses could be
together, feeling that this would kill the program.
Q When did you speak to Glenn Rudd about the
matter?
A I would be guided by whatever Glenn said to
you guys. I didn't remember speaking to hin, but he now
— I think he and Gaf fney came in to see me on 6
December, but I'm not clear on that. Z am not sure.
Q Did you request Glenn Rudd to prepare a
document?
21 A Very possibly. I'm sure if I was in town I
22 would be the guy rec[uesting. But let's see the document.
23 Q Let me show you the testimony as the next
24 exhibit. I have the entire deposition. Actually it was
25 a continuing d%BPf^ion of both Mr. Gaffney and Glenn
186
uNeiASsra
184
1 Rudd taken Monday, June 22, '87.
2 I direct your attention to page three and I'll
3 show you the deposition, which will become our next
4 exhibit.
5 (The document referred to was
6 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 15
7 for identification.)
8 I would then show you, which will become our
9 next exhibit, the paper to which you referred and
10 identified in that deposition.
11 (The document referred to was
12 marked Armitage Exhibit Kumber 16
13 for identification.)
14 You might want to take a look at his testimony
15 to refresh your recollection as well as the paper. And I
16 direct your attention in particular to the number 3,300
17 that's referenced for TOWs.
18 A Got it. Yes, I've got it.
19 Q I guess what I'm trying to understand is how
20 that happened and what was it that caused you —
21 A I don't remember. My feeling is it must have
22 been in a phone call in preparing for this, but I just am
23 not clear on it.
24 Q Mr. Rudd testified that you came to him and
25 asked for the paper. He did not have this information of
mmm
187
UNCiissffe
1 his own knowledge, nor did he get those numbers from
2 anyone but yourself, and there had to be a basis on which
3 you went to him and said I need information about such
4 and such and such, and it's very specific information.
5 My question to you is, who asked for the
6 paper. Was this on your own initiative?
7 A No. I at my own initiative would not have
8 thought up those numbers. I can assure you of that. It
9 was clearly or my remembrance — and 1 can't remember
10 who; it must have been from a phone call, and I can't
11 remember if it was Ollie, if it ceune from the bottom
12 floor, from Colin Powell or from whom. I have no
13 remembrance of that.
14 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
15 Q What's the bottom floor?
16 A I meant the third deck, the Secretary's
17 office. Or Ollie or any of these guys. I just don't
18 remember.
19 MR. KREUZER: It could be maybe Ollie North?
20 It could be?
21 THE WITNESS: It could be anybody. You could
22 name them all.
23 MR. KREUZER: Could it have been the
24 Secretary?
25 THE WITNESS: I don't think it would have been
m
188
wmm
186
1 the Secretary. It could have been Colin. I can't
2 imagine the Secretary dealing in 3,300s. But I can't say
3 with any assurance that it was at all.
4 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
5 Q Are you suggesting the number did not come
6 from Oliver North on the third of December?
7 A I'm only suggesting I can't remember where it
8 came from. It could have certainly come from Ollie on
9 the third or in a subsequent conversation. I don't
10 remember where it came from and I don't remember who told
11 me. Clearly I wouldn't have asked for a paper to be
12 prepared if it didn't have some bearing on the meeting we
13 were about to go to. I just don't do stupid things.
14 Q Mr. Rudd testified that this was done at great
15 urgency. This was kept close is what he was informed.
16 DSAA General Counsel was not involved. This was a most
17 unusual exercise, done in a very short period of time.
18 A For all of us.
19 Q Not in the usual course of business.
20 A I agree.
21 Q I must confess it's difficult to, in the
22 context of all that you have said about policy and the
23 opposition of the Department to the policy, that you
24 would have requested such a document with such specific
25 facts and not have aoy^aCQtLfQtifin ot why you requested
Him
189
md^B
187
1 it. .. >
2 A Well, I can speculate, but I can only do that.
3 I can't remember directly. I would speculate that I was
4 preparing this because it was going to come up the next
5 day. That's the only thing I could speculate. I just
6 don't remember it and I don't remember who told me, but
7 it was clear — anybody who told me a number would be
8 somebody who I would have regarded as requesting
9 information that needed to be answered. I mean, I just
10 wouldn't ask Glenn Rudd or any of those guys to do
11 something stupid, and I just can't remember who it was.
12 And it was extraordinary, and it was very
13 close hold. All that I agree with.
14 Q What did you do with the paper?
15 A Well, I'm sure I provided it to the Secretary
16 for that meeting, but that's my best recollection.
17 Q For what meeting?
18 A For the next day's meeting.
19 Q So you knew there would be a meeting on the
20 7th of December?
21 A Yes, I knew by 6 December there was, sure.
22 Q How did you know that?
23 A You got me. Either Ollie called and told me
24 that or Amie called and told me that, or the Secretary's
25 office called. Somebody told me they were going to have
Bd. Somebody told me the
190
^mmm
188
1 the meeting.
2 Q Who did you give the paper to?
3 A Well, I'm sure I would have provided it to
4 Colin, but I don't remember giving it to him. But that's
5 the way I did things.
6 Q Isn't it likely, then, that Colin would have
7 told you of the occurrence of the meeting and the need
8 for the paper?
9 A It's possible. I don't like your words,
10 because I can't stand behind them. It's possible that he
11 could have.
12 MR. SAXON: I don't mean to be glib. If you
13 don't like ours, just provide your own.
14 THE WITNESS: I say it's likely, it's
15 possible, but it's equally possible that Ollie said one
16 of the things that's going to be discussed is 3,300 TOWs.
17 It's equally possible Arnie said to me hey, I hear 3,300
18 TOWs are the number and we better find out what the deal
19 is and get all the information. This is all possible,
20 but you got me.
21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
22 Q Let me show you another document which I
23 perhaps may have shown to you before and it may be an
24 exhibit, but I will show it to you now. It's a PROFs
25 note written on December 4 by Oliver North. There's a
UNmssm
191
UNmssm
189
1 very long summary of the entire initiative to that point,
2 and ho gives, on the third page of this, a formula and
3 this was also used in the testimony of Mr. Gaffney and
4 Mr. Koch. I'm showing you an unredacted version.
5 A I've got a clearance.
6 Q I just mention it because it's also a public
7 exhibit.
8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Amitage Exhibit Number 17
10 for identification.)
11 This would have been prepared the day after
12 your lunch with Mr. North.
13 A Do you want me to read the whole thing? I see
14 this is what you are interested in.
15 Q I direct your attention to the number in the
16 entire initiative and perhaps that helps you to remember
17 what Ollie might have talked about the day before.
18 A I see it says 3,300 basic TOWs, but it
19 doesn't. And, as I say, it could have been Ollie, but
20 that's not what struck me. You know, I don't think Ollie
21 would have told me about this 3 December, because I don't
22 believe I'd have waited to 6 December for information.
23 I'm not at putter-offer.
24 MR. KREUZER: But on 3 December you imparted
25 some very unnerving news to Ollie, and he was visibly
\mmm
192
UHGMfiD
190
1 upset.
2 THE WITNESS: That was my view.
3 MR. KREUZER: It was your view that you were
4 out on a limb because the Secretary doesn't know about
5 this, and you are way out on a limb.
6 THE WITNESS: I told him that.
7 MR. KREUZER: So he had to be unnerved and he
8 left here, but within three days somebody came back with
9 a task here for point papers on I-TOWs, I-HAWKs, and a
10 Possibility for Leaks, which is a legal opinion paper by
11 a man who isn't an attorney.
12 THE WITNESS: A Possibility for Leaks I
13 believe was probably done between me and Raphel and with
14 some help from DSAA, not legal counsel. But I don't
15 know. You're saying that that was all one tasker and you
16 are a better witness than I am. I don't know that at
17 all. I think The Possibility for Leaks is me and Arnie.
18 This is my remembrance, and it wasn't a tasker, I don't
19 think. I think it was us. I just don't remember, and I
20 don't remember how the tasker got here.
21 MR. KREUZER: So, let's see. The I-TOW and
22 the I -HAWK paper, would that have come from, say, either
23 Colin Powell or Ollie North, the request for that?
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, but it could have come from
25 Arnie. It wouldn't have been a request. It would have
UNCbmtHED
193
UNGUSSra
191
1 been more along the lines of this is what's going to be
2 discussed, but I doubt that it came from Arnie, but it
3 could have. I just don't remember who gave me this
4 information. I would say Ollie was the most probable.
5 But I don't thinlc he would have done it 3 December
6 because I don't think I'd have waited until 6 December to
7 ask Glenn Rudd to do it for me. That's just my own
8 habit.
9 MR. KREUZER: So that would have come maybe
10 the 4th or the 5th or maybe even the 6th?
11 THE WITNESS: Possibly. I can only tell you
12 my habit is not to sit on things. So I don't sit on
13 things.
14 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
15 Q Mr. Secretary, let me focus on one different
16 issue for a second and ask you since we've been talking
17 about 3,300 I-TOWs Exhibit 16, which is what we call the
18 TOW paper, has a little bit about HAWKs, but also some
19 about TOWS. And Mr. Rudd testified that he was involved
20 in putting this together for you, and it went to you.
21 The statement is contained in it, and I quote:
22 "Based on the numbers, the impact on Army of shipping
23 3,300 I-TOWs immediately would be serious but not
24 intolerable." Do you recall taking note of that sentence
25 in this, and do you recall any discussion about the
82-690 0-88-8
194
mmwiBi
1 readiness impact?
2 A with the Secretary or with anybody?
3 Q With anybody.
4 AX don't remember it with anybody outside the
5 Secretary. I don't remeatoer it directly, but I've got a
6 hazy recollection that the Secretary had a concern for
7 readiness, U.S. readiness.
8 Q On the issue of 3,300 I-TOWs?
9 A Whether it was on I-TOWs or HAWK spare parts,
10 I don't know. I can't remember. But I mean this is
11 something he gives some weight to. But whether the paper
12 had the information or whether we discussed it across a
13 table I can't recall.
14 Q Well, the HAWK spare parts didn't come until
15 April '86.
16 A Well, then it might have been the TOWs. I
17 just can't remember that it was TOWs, but I've got a
18 vague recollection of the Secretary being concerned with
19 readiness as a general proposition, yes. But I can't be
20 more precise.
21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
22 Q Did you provide the information in this
23 exhibit or any part of it to Oliver North?
24 A I may very well have. If he asked for it, I
25 would have provided it to him as well.
mmsm
195
mmmm
193
1 Q On the 6th of December?
2 A Whenever. Whenever they gave it to me.
3 Q I notice that in the notebooks of Mr. North on
4 the 6th of December there is considerable information
5 about TOWS, including the same formula which I showed you
6 in the PROFs notes and reference to the 3,300 TOWs and
7 very much the same information.
8 A I might have called it to him. I don't know
9 that I sent the paper. But it could very well have been.
10 Q I want to enter another exhibit, and the
11 second document is called "Possibility for Leaks".
12 A Yes. This did come out of my safe.
13 (The document referred to was
14 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 18
15 for identification.)
16 Q I'd ask you to take your time and take a look
17 at it and tell us what you know about it, and feel free
18 to look at the deposition of Mr. Rudd and Gaffney.
19 A You want me to recall first and then look at
20 tha deposition?
21 Q As you like. I want you to feel comfortable
22 with your testimony.
23 A I'm telling you the truth as I know it, so I'm
24 comfortable without looking at their deposition. This
25 looks to me like something I would have asked them for —
IINJMSSm
196
UNCOSSIflED
194
1 the legality surrounding this problem. I mean, that's
2 my remsmbrance. I remember very clearly discussing with
3 Arnie Raphel kind of the legal problems.
4 Now the reason that you made a comment about
5 you're discussing things with people that aren't lawyers,
6 I will recall for you that at least two buildings were
7 appalled at this — this and the State Department — and
8 that, number two, that it was our fervent hope that this
9 thing was going to be killed. Number three, Arnie Raphel
10 had worked in PM. He had been the Deputy Director of PM,
11 Political-military bureau at State. As such, he had the
12 arms transfer policy hat for the State Department, who
13 has the lead in this issue.
14 We're technicians here in the Defense
15 Department. He was very well versed on the intricacies
16 of the Arms Export Control Act of necessity. He had held
17 the job.
18 Q Mr. Raphel?
19 A Raphel. So I can remember vividly talking
20 with him the ins and outs. I probably even read him this
21 pap«r, and I'm sure — I have a very vivid memory that he
22 gave me some knowledge of what was legal and illegal.
23 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
24 Q Are you able to characterize the discussion?
25 A Did you want me to look at Rudd'a testimony?
UNtUtSStFe
197
mmssm
195
1 MR. SABA: No. We'll turn to some more
2 specifics, but go ahead, Mr. Saxon.
3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
4 Q Let me just see if you can characterize your
5 discussion with Arnie Raphel and I'm going to give you
6 some choices, and if none of them apply, that's fine.
7 A Thanks. I'm comfortable.
8 Q Do you recall what I'll call the legal
9 discussion where you were talking about the Arms Export
10 Control Act, the provision and so forth?
11 A Ves.
12 Q Being in the context of what are the
13 provisions that apply and that govern so we can brief our
14 principals so they'll know, or what are the impediments
15 to this, since your boss and my boss don't want it to
16 happen and go forward, so we can help them shoot it down?
17 A I frankly think we saw them both as the same
18 thing. I mean, the legalities would be impediments. So
19 I don't know that we would have used the word how do we
20 block this. There was no question at the staff level the
21 advice to the principals was going to be this is a bad
22 deal.
23 So we wouldn't have used the term
24 "impediments'*. What are the legalities surrounding arms
25 transfers? what are the parameters that the bosses have
\immm
198
iiNemn
196
1 to take into consideration? That I remember. I don't
2 remember using the word "impediments", but it was clear
3 this is what our whole focus was — my whole focus, and I
4 believe Arnie shared that.
5 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
6 Q In the Possibility for Leaks the very title of
7 the document might suggest certain things. What did you
8 understand to be the purpose of the paper?
9 A I think I was looking for what were th« ways
10 to do this quietly. I don't know whether I would have
11 used the term "Possibility of Leaks" as the heading. I
12 possibly did, but I don't think so. I think I would say,
13 listen, if this wants to be done, how can it be done
14 legally? What are the legal parameters?
15 Quietly. I mean, obviously it would have to
16 be c[ulet.
17 Q Why?
18 A Well, because we thought selling weapons to
19 Iran was a violation of everything from operations talks
20 to hostages. We didn't think we'd ever be able to
21 explain it to our modern Arab friends. We thought it
22 would make us look like idiots in Europe, where we had
23 finally made some progress on terrorism, et cetera, et
24 cetera.
Why wasn't the question put to Jerry Silber?
wmmm
199
ymsstfe
1 A I may have said don't let anybody else see
2 this. I'm sure I would have said to either Hank or to
3 Glenn. Just use your collective )cnowledge because we
4 want as few people to know about this as possible.
5 Q Who is "we"?
6 A Me and the Secretary. The Secretary said this
7 is a very close hold.
8 Q So it was the Secretary who asked you to do
9 it?
10 A No. It was the Secretary who asked me to find
11 out, but when I told him or told Colin what it was, I
12 then had to staff him up and told Colin that I would
13 staff the Secretary. The Secretary wants to keep this
14 very quiet. I mean, it was our hope to just kill it and
15 it would go away and we would never see it again.
16 So I would have, as a matter of course,
17 cautioned Glenn and Hank do it yourself. You guys have
18 been in this business for 20-odd years. You know the
19 stuff. Give me what I need.
20 MR. KREUZER: The Secretary asked you to find
21 out about this thing that's called Possibility for Leaks?
22 THE WITNESS: No. The Secretary asked me to
23 find out if anyone was talking to Iran. Eventually we
24 got word that there was going to be a meeting of the
25 elephants, as I called them. 1, then reported I will
as I called them. I,±h€
yNEt«!HtB
200
UN8UWW
198
1 staf ^ the Secretary up to Colin. Colin reported back to
2 me that's fine, but keep it quiet, which I would have
3 done without any caution from the Secretary of Defense.
4 And I'm sure that I would have fully told Hank
5 and Glenn don't let this get out of your sight. It stops
6 with you. It is not unusual in this business for the
7 Secretary to turn to me or one of my colleagues and say I
8 need your advice on X. I don't want it staffed by
9 anybody; I want your advice. Give me what you've got
10 now.
11 I've had occasion to go in and see him on some
12 subject matter and he'd say, look, I need to know about Y
13 and I don't want to ask officially. Can you tell me what
14 you know about it? And I'll give him as much opinion as
15 fact. So that in itself, I mean, a request to keep
16 things quiet is not totally unusual. But this whole
17 program was bizarre.
18 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
19 Q And in your request to Mr. Rudd you also asked
20 about price and readiness issues?
21 A I guess I did.
22 Q And I take it you instructed him to draft —
23 A I would bet price was what somebody had asked
24 me, and I would bet that readiness was probaOsly something
25 that I put cy^fi^ J|^t-tbe^DUi^QP-±hemselves, because
D
1
201
\immm
they would have to take these stocks from the Army and,
aa-. matter of course, we were interested any time we '
draw down our Army stocks what the readiness is. So they
may have added it of their own free will, i u^e to
5 think that I brought it up.
Q Who do you think "they" would be?
A "They", Hank and Glenn, the DSAA body as a
8 whole. They do have to consider readiness.
^ BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
" ° ^^'°" "« 5«t °« Of a point you made a moment
11 ago, you said that this was very close hold.
^^ A Yes, sir.
Q Why would this document, the one Possibility
for Leaks, and the TOW paper and the HAWK paper - i
think they are all classified at the Secret level, is
that unusual, given how sensitive this was?
A No. I think that's what the boys felt, i
didn't Classify it. I think other, did. But I don't
taow. Whether it's Secret or Top Secret, if you give it
to the press you are still in violation, as far as I'm
concerned, with all of the statutes. They classified it;
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 I didn't.
23
24
25
BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
Q Who's "they"?
mmmw
202
UNfibwe
200
1 MR. KREUZER: But you know Or. Gaffney and Mr.
2 Rudd. Do you know the General Counsel very well, Mr.
3 Silber?
4 THE WITNESS: I work with him on a regular
5 basis, yes.
6 MR. KREUZER: So it was just your choice to
7 limit it to Gaffney and Rudd?
8 THE WITNESS: That's correct. I would have
9 limited it to Gast, had he been around, and I'm sure he
10 wasn't in town or I would have had him — General Gast.
11 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
12 Q I take it that the paper was prepared with a
13 contemplation of the possibility that a third country
14 would be involved in the transfer to Iran.
15 A Well, apparently that must have been the
16 instructions I was working under. I don't quite remember
17 it that way.
18 Q Referring specifically, there's a reference to
19 the legalities of third country transfer provisions of
2 0 the Arms Export Control Act.
21 A That also could refer to Iran. Iran we'd have
22 problems because we could not guarantee the third country
23 transfer from Iran. I mean, they might give it to I
24 don't know who — Libya — and we couldn't guarantee
25 that, so I don't know what that particularly refers to.
mmmB
203
20
21
22
23
24
25
\m6usss®
201
in the questioning in Mr. Rudd's deposition
»- 17 "IS it safe to say that
Mr. Saxon asked him, on page 17, Is « s
the paragraph on page two is written in contemplation
that Israel would transfer the missiles to Iran?"
Witness Rudd: "Ves." And the testimony goes on.
we questioned Mr. Rudd on this and it was his
contemplation that one possibility for transfer -
. That's fine. I don't argue that. That's
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 fine.
^^ Q would you say also that the two documents,
12
.a..n to,.».r, also aa.r... .h. l.sue o. r.pl.nl.^.nt
13 of Israeli —
;, X.a have to see them again. I don't )cnow that
15 they did that.
^. SHAPIRO: Which document are you referring
17 to. Counsel?
«,. SABA: Both of them. I split them, and
19 they are two.
THE WITHESS: W.U. I ..on't !a,ow ho. you com.
„ th« c=„=lu.lo„. .ut your provlou. point ..out th.
X„t p«.,r.pn o„ p.,. t.o o. t.. P.p.r. t.. Po..iMUty
.or L..«.. couW .. int.rpr.t.* .. h.vln, I.r..l in .in..
thU «.it.,. Exhibit i., .na I aon.t ^o. .h.r. I.ra.l
i. in h.r.. I aon.t ... any r...r.nc. to third oountry
iimssra
204
mmms
202
1 transfers.
2 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
3 Q But I was asking you If that was what was
4 contemplated.
5 A You know, I think It could have been, but I
6 don't remember It clearly. To me just doing it was the
7 bad thing, not how it was done, other than trying to make
8 it legal. The prospects for leakage of shipment of I-
9 HAWK looks to me like this is in response to a direct
10 question if we wanted I-HAWKs immediately where we would
11 get them and where we would take them, and I-TOWs
12 immediately where would we get them and where would we
13 take them.
14 I'm not sure that this particular paper would
15 have necessarily been explained as going to Iran. I'm
16 not saying that we didn't say that or I didn't say it to
17 Glenn or something, but I'm just saying that it's not
18 necessarily indicated here. I would like to think,
19 frankly, that I gave them a degree of protection from
20 this thing by just asking the specific question I needed
21 an answer to rather than how it would be done. In
22 combination of discussions with me and Mr. Koch, who I
23 have subsequently learned was involved in this, too, we
24 could have mentioned Israel.
25 Q Bu%^--Rudd and Gaffney have both testified,
i%^(r.^udd and Gaffney h
iWsfFe
205
wiusn
203
and the testimony is also here that was not made public,
that th»y understood from you that Israel was involved.
A No problem. I don't argue with it. I would
have told them whatever I thought.
Q But it's your testimony that you don't have
any recollection where the numbers came from?
A No. I can't recall who, but I would say that,
one, I would not have pulled it out of thin air, and,
two, it would have to be somebody who had some authority
or I wouldn't have tasked the OSAA to do something like
this.
Q And who would have greater authority here than
yourself?
A Well, not greater authority. Look, we've
already seen, I think it's become painfully clear to most
of your bosses and painfully clear, embarrassingly clear
to the rest of us, that the National Security Council,
when a staff officer asks, whether it's Ollie or anybody,
generally you respond. They ask for information all the
time, m fact, ISA is correctly the point that all the
other agencies are supposed to come to when they want to
talk to different parts of this building. We are the
liaison between all the agencies.
So, as a matter of fact, we would respond to a
query from an NSC staff officer even if he wasn't Ollie.
mmm
206
:ret/
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 204
1 Q But these papers were provided, you said, to
2 either General Powell directly or to the Secretary.
3 A Yeah. I'm quite sure I would have given then
4 to Powell and not to the Secretary.
5 Q So if Ollie North requested them, you might
6 have given the information to Ollie North?
7 A I'm sure I would have.
8 Q But that wouldn't have caused you to give
9 those same papers to the Secretary in preparation?
10 A I don't think so.
11 Q Or was it your understanding Ollia asked you
12 to do this to give to the Secretary in preparation for
13 the meeting?
14 A My understanding is I don't remember who asked
15 me, but clearly it was in preparation for the meeting.
16 The timing suggests that.
17 Number two, I would have had no reason to
18 withhold that information from Ollie North.
19 MR. SAXON: Do you recall if this was
20 distributed at the December 7 meeting?
21 THE WITNESS: I don't remember if I knew it
22 was or not.
23 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
24 Q Do you recall any discussions at that time of
25 a draft Finding, a Finding which had been drafted in the
UNctiBsifinr
207
UNCUSW
205
l«ait w««k or two of November and which came to be signed
on December S?
A I have no ]cnowledge of It.
Q Authorizing?
A No.
Q Did you have any discussions about these
matters with anyone at that time, the time being the last
week or two of November, the first two wee]cs of December,
with anyone at the CIA?
A I sure don't recall it. I'm trying to think
who was DDO then. Who was DDO then? Was it Clair George
then or was was^^^^^^^^H
Q ^^^^^H Clair
A I don't have any recollection at all. I was
just trying to think of something that could jar me. ^^M
^^^^^Hwould have been —
Q McMtdion was aware.
A McMahon was the Deputy.
Q Yes. McM2ihon was aware of the matter at the
20 time.
21 A Deputy until Bob Gates, who is a much closer
22 friend and colleague of mine. I didn't talk to the
23 Director or the Deputy Director that often. It wae a
24 matter of some moment when they called me. But the guys
25 from the different regions and the DDO and the DDI, they
W^SJfFffO
208
UNCLASSm
206
1 talked to me quite often, but I don't recall talking to
2 an^^of them on this. I mean, I know John McMahon did not
3 talk to me about this. I would remember that.
4 MR. SAXON: Do you recall talking ^o^^H
5 ^^^^^^Habout any of these matters?
6 THE WITNESS: Z don't recall it. I wouldn't
7 be surprised if later in the year of '86 I took a few
8 shots at^^H I remember talking to Charlie Allen on the
9 outskirts of our 0S6 meetings about this.
10 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
11 Q In any event, it's your recollection, then,
12 that you provided these papers to Colin Powell or the
13 Secretary.
14 A It's a general recollection that I would have
15 provided to Colin. I would not have walked in to the
16 Secretary with these papers. I just wouldn't have done
17 it.
18 Q Do you recall having a discussion prior to
19 that meeting on the 7th with the Secretary about the
20 matter?
21 A I do.
22 Q All right. Can you recall when that meeting
23 was?
24 A Gosh, I've thought a lot about it. It was
25 either late on the 6th or early morning on the 7th. The
uNtossra
209
UIWSIEIED
207
1 Secretary was leaving town. I like to think it was early
2 morning on the 7th, if that's a Saturday.
3 Q Yes, that's correct.
4 A As I seem to recall,.! was in gym gear, which
5 is what I wear around here on Saturdays, but I recall
6 very clearly having a discussion with the Secretary in
7 preparation for this meeting.
8 Q And can you tell me about that discussion?
9 A Yes, I can say that I started to go through my
10 litany and the Secretary would finish sentences for me,
11 and that I indicated my understanding from staff was that
12 Mr. Shultz would be with him on this and that ought to
13 have a salutary effect. And the Secretary went through,
14 I remember very clearly, all the arguments that I had
15 laid out, plus the legal argiiments which I had mentioned
16 in passing, and that he had absorbed.
17 I have never been more comfortable briefing my
18 boss in my life.
19 Q Did he indicate to you what he knew about the
20 matter?
21 A He did not.
22 Q Did he indicate to you what he expected would
23 happen that day?
24 A No. His whole discussion with me was what a
25 terrible and stupid affair tilj^^ifi^ld be-
d stupid affair thj^^^^
210
1
2 that had occurred prior to that day?
3 A Not to my recollection.
4 Q Did you discuss your. lunch with Ollie North?
5 A I think I had done that previously to Colin.
6 1 don't remember discussing it again.
7 Q Did you discuss with him a wrap-up of
8 intelligence information that you had earlier discussed?
9 A- No, I don't recall that.
10 Q Did you discuss with him your discussions with
11 the people at the Department of State?
12 A I'm sure I did, because I have a clear
13 remembrance of saying Mr. Shultz, I was told by staff, is
14 going to be with you on this and that ought to have a
15 good effect or salutary effect and that it ought to get a
16 change and getting a smile from him. So in that context,
17 and I'm sure I mentioned Arnle's name, because he knew
18 that Amle and I were dealing.
19 Q Did you provide the Secretary with any
20 information that was provided you by Arnie?
21 A I'm sure I did. Whether I said this is what
22 Amia says or this is staff view or my view, I can't say.
23 I would have probably taken credit for it.
24 Q Assuming that Amia would state that ha had
25 told you about the HAWK shipments —
wmmm
211
UNOtftSffifi
209
1 „ ,. A Assuming that Arnie would state that ha told
2 me about the HAWK shipments?
3 Q Would you have a recollection of telling that
4 to the Secretary?
5 A No.
6 Q That you had information about the fact that
7 there had been a HAWK shipment?
8 A No. Why would I assume that Arnie told me? I
9 mean he either told me or he didn't. I don't remember
10 it, but I remember having a discussion about the intel
11 with Arnie and what is this and what do we know and all
12 this.
13 Q Let me ask you more direct. Did you tell
14 Secretary Weinberger that you had information from the
15 State Department that there had been a HAWK transfer?
16 A I don't think so, and I don't think I had that
17 inforBation. That is not something I think I knew.
18 HR. KREUZER: But you got information from
19 Colonel North on the third, when you had lunch, that he
20 gave you.
21 THE WITNESS: That's what you're telling me.
22 I'm saying he could have; I don't remember it.
23 MR. KREUZER: You don't remember getting that
24 information?
25 THE WITNESS: No, I don't at all.
mmm
212
mmsm
RD 210
1 ^ BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
2 Q Did the Secretary then brief you about the
3 events that occurred at the meeting at the White House on
4 the 7th?
5 A He either did that day, but I rather think he
6 might have done it Monday or so, but it could have been
7 Sunday. But yes, he did.
8 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
9 Q Before we go to the meeting itself, let me ask
10 one more question. In your pre-December 7 briefing of
11 the Secretary, whenever that was — late on the 6th or
12 early on the 7th — apart from the question of to whom
13 you gave the briefing paper which we have discussed you
14 indicate you are not sure if you gave it to him directly
15 or General Powell, and that's fine.
16 A I don't think I would have given it to him
17 directly.
18 Q Do you recall if he had it in hand and did
19 either of you have paper which you looked at or referred
20 to or talked about?
21 A I have a recollection that one paper I had in
22 hand talked about the Arms Export Control Act, and I
23 think I probably had jotted down as a memory aid my own
24 views in detriment to allies.
And do you recall
iimsstro
213
wmn
1 A It was not a staff paper. It was typed; I
2 know that.
3 Q Do you recall if he had any paper in hand that
4 he intended to take with him and that he might have
5 referred to?
6 A No, I don't.
7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
8 Q I am about to leave these papers.
9 A Are you going to leave them with us?
10 Q Well, that's my last set of questions. Why
11 didn't we see these until we had a more extensive
12 examination? We had made several documentary requests.
13 A Whoa.
14 MR. SHAPIRO: Counsel, any such question is
15 properly directed to me at another time.
16 MR. SABA: No. I think it's a valid question.
17 THE WITNESS: I'd like to get on the record on
18 this and let Ed answer the question. You know the
19 answer. You can take care of that. But I, when we
20 received documents searches, specifically ruled myself
21 out of my own documents and did not review the documents
22 and would not, and assigned someone else to do it because
23 I 'could smell a rat coming and I wanted to make sure that
24 I was above-board in terms of cooperation.
25 And I asked Line Bloomfield to review all of
umiDssro
214
UNELASSMO
212
1 my files and anything that was in my files came forward,
2 I think through you, to them in as timely a fashion as we
3 could find them. So I feel, frankly, as John Poindexter
4 says, no regrets for that because I didn't review them,
5 because I wanted to keep clean on this and, number two,
6 gave access to everything to someone else so we could
7 make sure that nobody could level a charge that we
8 weren't fully cooperating and someone who didn't have a
9 vested Interest in the document search.
10 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
11 Q Where were the documents?
12 MR. SHAPIRO: Which document, Counsel?
13 MR. SABA: These two exhibits.
14 MR. SHAPIRO: Would you identify them, please?
15 MR. SABA: Which exhibit numbers are these?
16 Exhibit 16 and 18.
17 MR. SHAPIRO: If you know.
18 THE WITNESS: Well, I assume they came out of
19 my safe. I don't )cnow where they came from. I assume I
20 gave everything I had.
21 MR. SHAPIRO: In fact. Secretary Armitage just
22 told you that he did not personally participate in the
23 search.
24 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
25 Q Do you know the circumstances whereby they
mssmm
215
mmmm
1 were provided to us?
2 ""* A I don't.
3 Q Did you discuss them with Mr. Rudd in June of
4 this year?
5 A Yes. I asked him after my testimony what was
6 going on, what went on.
7 Q And how did that ~
8 A Well, I remember him having a different
9 opinion about whether he talked to me or Noel on one
meeting, and I can't remember which one it was, and I
pointed out, gee, I couldn't have talked to you then,
Glenn, I was out of town. He said, oh, yeah, I must have
talked to Noel. That's my clearest remembrance.
^* Q Do you recall Mr. Rudd coming to you on
15 approximately the 15th of June and discussing these
16 papers with you. Exhibits 16 and 18?
■'■'' A I'm sure I would have asked him what went on,
18 what's your remembrance.
^® MR. SHAPIRO: You mean the papers specifically
20 or the substance of the papers or the substance of the
21 deposition or testimony. Counsel?
^2 MR. SABA: The whereabouts of the papers.
^^ MR. SHAPIRO: The whereabouts of the papers at
24 what time?
^^ MR. SABA: Approximately the middle of June.
mssm
216
UNCLASSKe
214
1 THE WITNESS: I think I may have asked Glenn
2 down after talking with you guys, saying, Glenn, these
3 fellows asked me some questions about meetings with you
4 that I couldn't recall. And he said whatever he said
5 about, yeah, I told them I met with you at such and such.
6 And I remember saying that I was out of town at that
7 time, and then he or Hank — it was one of them; it might
8 have been Hank — said yeah, maybe it was Noel Koch that
9 I met with, yeah, that's right — something like that,
10 which was a relief to me, and I'm sure I said what's your
11 remembrance, because I didn't remember it at all.
12 And prodded by 'that discussion with either
13 Hank or Rudd I found out that I did meet with these guys
14 on 6 December.
15 MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record a second.
16 (A discussion was held off the record.)
17 MR. SABA: We'll go back on the record.
18 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
19 Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, to the best of
20 your recollection, when you first provided Exhibits 16
21 and 18 to counsel in connection with this investigation?
22 A To the best of my knowledge it was provided at
23 the earliest possible moment following counsel's request
24 for all relevant dociiments. I'd like to further state
25 that I wanted to assure that all documents were given
iSI
217
l/NfiUSSfflffl
215
1 over without any hesitation, and that's why I myself
2 ruled myself out from document searches and had a third
3 party do the search, so there would be no subsequent
4 suggestion that perhaps something hadn't been turned over
5 that was in my files.
6 To the best of my knowledge everything was
7 turned over as soon as possible upon notification of your
8 request.
9 Q Thank you. I want to move to another area.
10 Perhaps if someone else has questions about these
11 exhibits, let me give you an opportunity.
12 MR. SAXON: No. We've got little time left.
13 THE WITNESS: Well, we can stretch you a
14 while. You guys accommodated me and Z can accommodate
15 you.
16 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
17 Q I'd like to move on, Mr. Secretary. After the
18 7th you were debriefed. Between the 7th of December and
19 the end of the year, did you have any additional activity
20 in connection with what we call the Iran initiative?
21 A Well, other than I'm sure I wrapped up with
22 Arnie Raphel after I was informed by the Secretary that
23 he thought the outcome of the meeting, and I believe I
24 kind of thought things were dead, and that's what the
25 Secretary's impression was. But I would have had a
uNcutssra
218
UNCUsstfe
216
1 •- conv«rsation with Arnie particularly about a debrief of
2 her«'« how my boss saw the meeting. How did your boss
3 see it?
4 Q Do you recall a January 2 meeting with Oliver
5 North?
6 A I've got my January 2 calendar here, because
7 that was the date you asked me about.
8 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
9 Q Before we go on, let me aslc you one queetion.
10 in the debrief with Secretary Weinberger of the December
11 7 meeting, whenever that debrief took place, did he tell
12 you that he had proposed to the President that the better
13 way to get the hostages back than selling arms to Iran
was^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
15 A I don't know that he told me that. That was
16 always his view and he expressed it on occasion. I had
17 everX reason to believe he would have.
j^8 Q And just let me ask the further question,
19 although I think it's answered by that answer. Did he
20 say anything to you that would indicate that in the
21 Dsceaber 7 meeting he put forward that the better route
22 to go wasi
23
A I don't remember that specific.
24 Q And that President Reagan said words to the
25
effect in response, yeah, that's the way I want to go?
umra
219
\immmi
A Well, it would have been consistent for him to
do so, but r don't remember him telling me that portion,
nor do I remember him telling me directly what the
President said. Secretary Weinberger does not generally
debrief on what the President said. He'll tell you what
he said, what Mr. Shultz said, and what the decision was,
but, as you know by now, it's difficult to get a debrief
from Secretary Weinberger, and it's only on those things.
I mean, there's a high degree of immediate
interest that I go down and park in his office. There
are plenty of ways, not the least of which is to find out
from the notetaker at the NSC what went on.
But January 2 —
^* BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
^5 Q January 2.
^* A I not only don't recall a meeting, it's not
17 listed on my calendar.
^® Q If I can help perhaps, i have a listing on
19 that morning at 8:30 at the Hay Adams.
^° ^ At 8:30 I was in the SecDef's staff meeting
21 here.
^^ Q All right. Do you recall a meeting with North
23 that day?
^* ^ No, I do not. I can't tell you. I wouldn't
know the Hay Adams if I fell over it, frankly. I don't
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
25
untsfm
220
UNKASSIHID
218
1 remember having been in there. I guess I was in for some
2 visiting dignitary, but I do not remember being there
3 that day, and I'm specifically shown as in the staff
4 meeting and walking back to my office with Fred Ikle.
5 Q Do you recall a meeting on that day with
6 Menachem Heron?
7 A I do not show one, and I had a very full day.
8 Q Let me show you a page six, which will become
9 the next exhibit. It's page six of information provided
10 to us by the government of Israel, and if you haven't
11 seen it please take whatever time you need.
12 (The document referred to was
13 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 19
14 for identification.)
15 A I have just got to tell you that I did not see
16 Mindy, according to this calendar, that day, and I do net
17 recall that meeting. And the reason I have this calendar
18 is because you asked me about it previously and I didn't
19 remember it. And the next day I left for Hanoi.
20 Q Did you have any activity —
21 A I might say you might want to ask Mindy what
22 time of day that was, because I mean she's good and I was
23 in the office all day and Mindy didn't come in and she
24 wouldn't have let a visitor as noteworthy as Mindy come
25 in without making a note of it. So I don't recall that
vmmm
221
OMjutsstfe
219
1 at all.
2 -'•* BV MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
3 Q I guess the more important question, though,
4 would not be what time of day it was or whether it was on
5 your calendar, although I know that helps, and not even
6 January 2, because this is the report the Israelis have
7 provided after a lot of checking, and they indicate they
8 could have something wrong here and there.
9 But the report states: "Menachem Meron met on
10 2 January 1986 with U.S. Assistant SEcretary of Defense
11 Armltage and sought to conclude an agreement regarding
12 the replacement missiles, including their price." So,
13 more important, do you recall at any time in that time
14 frame meeting with General Meron and discussing those
15 topics?
16 A I not only do not recall it, I'm not the guy
17 to talk price. Talk general systems and all of that,
18 fine, but I'm not a price guy, so I don't have any
19 recollection, and please let the record show that my
20 calendar shows no meeting with Mindy in or out of the
21 office.
22 Having said that, he's a great guy.
23 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
24 Q Did you have any discussion after December 7
25 of '85 and before January 17, '86, with any official of
LSI
222
("VCUSKO
220
1 the government of Israel on the issues of the Iran
2 initiative?
3 A I can only state that from 3 January to 10
4 January 86 X was out of town, and then again from 14 to
5 18. I was in Bangkok, Hanoi and Hong Kong between 3 and
6 10 January. And then on 14 to 18 January I was at the
7 Security Subcommittee meeting in Honolulu. So I don't
8 remember it, and I think it's kind of unlikely. I mean,
9 I was just traveling a lot.
10 Q Did you have any conversations, perhaps in
11 December, with Ben Yusef?
12 A If Mindy came in, I'm sure Abraham Ben Yusef
13 would have come with him. They generally are a matching
14 set, because the purchasing agent is Mr. Ben Yusef. But
15 I don't recall, frankly, talking about weapons. We've
16 talked previously today about the possibility of talking
17 retroactive or prospective weapons. I just don't recall
18 it.
19 Q Did you have any knowledge prior to January 17
20 of '86 about the issue of replenishment of Israeli
21 weapons that had gone?
22 A I've told you my recollection. I'm not being
23 testy. I just don't have anything to add to it. And I
24 just say that I was gone a lot of that period.
25 Q Let me show you what will be the next exhibit.
UNttltSSIFfED
223
uNcussm
221
1 which is from the testimony of General Colin Powell and
2 I'll provide three pages of that testimony, page 80, 81
3 and 82.
4 (The document referred to was
5 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 20
6 for identification.)
7 Vou might want to look at the sequence of
8 questions. This is the Exhibit.
9 (Pause.)
10 A What's the date General Powell is talking
11 about on here? He's talking about sometime over the next
12 week, I can't recall how, either the Secretary or my NSC
13 interlocutors, the number changed to 4,508.
14 Q The reference is to —
15 A I'm trying to understand where the extra 508
16 came from.
17 Q The reference is to the period. He says it's
18 roughly the week after the 17th of January.
19 A It's the week after the 17th? Well, I would
20 have been back in town.
21 Q The week after the 17th.
22 A I certainly don't remember telling Colin.
23 Q Just to make it clear, on page 80, line 14, I
24 asked how the number changed to 4,508. At line 15 it
25 says: Sometime over the next week. And the reference
mmsm
224
uNeUiSsm
222
1 t^rior to that was the 17th of January. And we had other
2 testimony as to the period we're talking about.
3 A No. I don't remember telling Colin anything
4 about a previous shipment of weapons. And I think that
5 it was sometime — and I can't say what "sometime" means;
6 more than a day or two — after the 17th that I found out
7 things were in train for a transfer. And after the
8 decision was made on the 17th of January I never dialed
9 in. I never got involved other than to be informed that
10 something was going on.
11 Now any information that I found out about any
12 aspect of the program I would have shared with Colin
13 Powell, but I do not recall helping him at all with 508
14 or the increase from 4,508. I'm sure that I did not tell
15 him that the number should increase to 4,508 TOWs. I'm
16 dead certain of that.
17 Q All right. There is perhaps one reading of
18 the testimony could be that he came to realize that there
19 was a replenishment and he came to realize that one or
20 more persons had known prior to that date of a shipment,
21 and that this number was a replenishment.
22 A I read that in there.
23 Q He mentions your name twice. So it wasn't
24 necessarily that week that you knew of it.
25 A Previously.
UNimSIFIED
225
UNMffi)
1 Q But some point prior?
2 A Yeah. I understand what you're saying, and I
3 don't think I knew that. But if I had known I would have
4 told Colin. But I just don't recollect at all telling
5 him that. I just don't think I knew it.
6 Q My question is, did you know it?
7 A No. I don't remember knowing. I don't know
8 how to answer it. I don't recall knowing it. I think
9 I've testified that it wasn't until around November of
10 '86 I found out things had actually happened, that Israel
11 had transferred things without our knowing about it.
12 I was never actually sure during all of '86
13 how the transfers were made after our weapons went to the
14 CIA. As I say, this was absolutely not a matter of
15 moment with me. It was the policy that concerned me.
16 Q So your testimony then is that you simply did
17 not know even as late as roughly the 20th?
18 A Well, my testimony, I think I've got
19 carefuller, is I don't recall knowing about this. I hate
20 to be that way, but it's bad times, fellows.
21 MR. SHAPIRO: It's perfectly within your
22 rights.
23 THE WITNESS: Of course it's within my rights,
24 but these are bad times and I certainly don't remember
25 knowing this.
rnmms
226
UNtU^JEO
224
1 MR. SABA: I think Mr. Saxon is about to feel
2 a question coming on.
3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
4 Q Let me introduce another exhibit, give you
5 this, and give you a moment to read it.
6 (The document referred to was
7 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 21
8 for identification.)
9 This is from the testimony of Colonel Nozrth at
10 our hearings on the afternoon of July 7, and I ask you to
11 just take a minute and read these two pages I've given
12 you.
13 (Pause.)
14 A Okay. I've got it.
15 Q At line 1486 Mr. Nislds says: Colonel North,
16 I asked you before we broke about a number of particular
17 individuals emd whether they were aware of the HAWK
18 shipment in November of 1985. Dropping down: Mr.
19 Nields: Were any officials at the Department of Defense
20 aware that 18 HAWK missiles or some number of HAWK
21 missiles had actually been shipped by Israel to Iran?
22 Mr. North: I believe they may well have been
23 because I think I made several efforts to coordinate with
24 them the replenishment of the HAWKs, I think, if I
25 remember properly, with DOD officials about both HAWKs
UNcussra
227
UNCLASSm
225
1 and TOWS. I wouldn't be asking them about HAWKs if they
2 hadn't already been ordered up as a need for
3 replenishing.
-* Then you get to the bottom of page 68, line
5 1519. Mr. Nields: I just want to make sure. My
question simply is who in the Department of Defense was
told that there had actually been a shipment, if anybody.
Mr. North: An unfreshed long time ago memory would tell
me that I probably talked about that delivery with Mr.
Koch, possibly with General Powell, possibly with Mr.
Armitage ,
Now Colonel North indicates his memory is
unrefreshed and he uses the word "possibly", so his
testimony does not stand for the proposition you were
15 told. I would simply ask you, since he says he might
16 have talked with you about it, do you recall Colonel
North ever telling you at the time or roughly at the time
of the shipments?
A I do not recall that. And I also recall that
in a previous part of OUie North's testimony he said
that he dealt with others and latterly me. So I don't
think he did tell me - others first, and then latterly
23 me.
BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
Q Mr. Secretary, would you have any objection to
IIMCttSSinED
228
UNCbmi
226
i, \ putting the calendar that you prepared in as an exhibit?
2 1 thinlc it's helpful to the testimony and a better
3 knowledge for those who read the record.
4 A You'll get to look at, in case we want to move
5 somebody off who shouldn't have been seeing me.
6 Q You had a typewritten onV
7 A This is where I was. You guys are welcome to
8 that. I just would like to take some time before it goes
9 out to make sure
11 like to keep it in case there are other questions.
12 MR. SAXON: I think it would be helpful to
13 make that a formal exhibit to the deposition unless again
14 there is somewhere on there —
15 MR. SABA: I think it would be helpful.
16 THE WITNESS: I just want to stress for the
17 record that I prepared this based on the questions you
18 asked me last time and my inability to say that Z was
19 traveling and where.
20 MR. SAXON: And by asking for it I'm not
21 suggesting that there is anything wrong or improper about
22 having a calendar to refresh you, because when we say
23 where you were on the day of such and such, who knows
24 where they were without something in front of
25 . you.
UNMSIFIED
UNeii^n
227
^ (The documents referred to were
2 marked Armitage Exhibit Numbers 22
^ and 23 for identification.)
4 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
5 Q Mr. Secretary, do you recall if in January you
6 provided any other legal or other memoranda to anyone in
7 connection with the Iran initiative?
8 A I don't recall.
9 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
^° Q ^®t "8 ask the same question in a slightly
11 different way. There is testimony, sworn public
12 testimony, from Judge Sporkin, who testified on June 24
of this year at our hearings in his capacity as having
been General Counsel at the CIA that on January 16, 1986,
the day before the Finding was signed on the 17th , there
was a meeting at the White House at which Admiral
Poindexter was in attendance, Mr. Sporkin, and Secretary
Weinberger, among others.
And his testimony was the meeting ended with
Secretary Weinberger making a statement that he would
21 like to take it ~ and we're not sure whether "it"
22 literally referred to the Finding, a draft of the
23 Finding, a piece of paper or simply the concept that they
24 were about to formalize — would like to take it back and
25 let my lawyers look at it. And Secretary Weinberger, in
mmsm
UNClASSm
228
1 his deposition to our two Committees, when presented with
2 this is what Judge Sporkin will testify to soon, said
3 that's sounds about right.
4 We have this afternoon been told more or less
5 by Mr. Garrett that there is no record that any lawyers
6 ever formally looked at the January 17 Finding on the
7 16th or the 17th. Our question to you is, were you asked
8 by the Secretary about that time to respond in any way
9 that we could call a legal response to either the Finding
10 specifically or the concept of going forward that was
11 expressed in the Finding?
12 A The answer is no. I was traveling at the time
13 as well, I wouldn't know Stanley Sporkin if I fell over
14 him.
15 MR. SABA: I have just a last line of
16 questioning at another time period on another subject.
17 MR. SAXON: I don't have much.
18 MR. SABA: I want to go to the November '86
19 period.
20 MR. SAXON: That's fine. I'm sorry, before
21 you jump to that, let me formally introduce as an
22 exhibit, if you kept it, the handwritten note that Mr.
23 Koch prepared.
24 (The document referred to was
25 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 24
uitetASim
231
1
10
mmmi
for identification.)
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. You can read it?
3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
* Q I can read it.
5 A He's been a friend of mine for years, and I
6 can't read it.
7 Q I had to help Mr. Koch read this when he
8 testified to refresh his recollection as to what his
9 handwriting said.
He says in Item 1 that the TOW discussed
11 separately with Rudd and Gaffney in December. And that
12 we )cnow more or less to be the case.
^^ Ite» 4, "TOW paper locked in RLA safe.
14 Wouldn't let Rudd keep copy." He indicates that RLA is
15 Richard L. Armitage.
^* A That's right.
^^ Q Would that be consistent with your
18 understanding that you took the TOW paper that Mr. Rudd
19 prepared and put it in your safe?
2° A Perfectly reasonable.
^^ Q And for that matter, since this was a close
22 hold, that you told Mr. Rudd that you didn't want him to
23 keep a copy?
^* A I'm sure that's the case.
^^ Q And, for the record, at the time that paper
UNCIMfe
232
vmmm
230
1 was prepared or the HAWK paper, either of them, do you
2 recall telling Mr. Rudd or Dr. Gaffney to destroy all
3 notes, all working documents, et cetera?
4 A I'm sure I did. I didn't recall it, but when
5 they said it in their testimony I agree completely that I
6 would have done so.
7 Q And to make sure the record is clear that
8 would have been contemporaneous with their preparing it,
9 which would be in keeping with this being a close hold,
10 no notes kind of thing?
11 A Yes, sir.
12 Q And not in any way after the fact, trying to
13 destroy the record?
14 A Thank you.
15 Q Mow one other thing 1 wanted to go to in this
16 document. If you drop down several lines, you see the
17 first word that looks like Cast. It says: "Cast said
18 best possibility of cover", and then the next word I
19 can't read, but the last words are "do it black".
20 A "Hust do in black", "must do this black".
21 Q Mr. Koch testified in his two depositions and
22 publicly in his sworn testimony that if not from Gast —
23 he thinks it might have been from General Gast — but
24 also it could have been from Mr. Rudd he got the clear
25 understanding that if you were looking at the numbers of
OimSMD
233
iiNwstfe
231
■■ TOW missiles involved, knowing the prices we )cnew at the
2 time, you do the arithmetic and it would have been at a
3 dollar figure in excess of $14 million, which means if
4 you were going to go forward through white world FMS
5 sales you would have to tell the Congress.
6 A Correct.
7 Q The understanding was that we didn't want to
8 do that, and, of course, the Finding said Congress was
9 not to be notified, so they concluded that the best way
10 to go about it, if the transaction was to go forward,
11 would be to make it an Economy Act transfer to the CIA,
12 make it an intelligence activity and go covert, which he
13 says do it black means.
1* My question to you simply is were you part of
15 any of this decisionmaking process?
16 A I don't think so.
17 Q Or any discussions in which this result was
18 reached?
19 A No, 1 wasn't. To my recollection I was not.
20 MR. SAXON: That's all I've got on that
21 exhibit.
22 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
23 Q Mr. Secretary, I have just a few questions by
24 way of information. You told us before that in
25 preparation for the Attorney General's press conference a
wmmm
UNttASSiFtED
232
1 statement was being prepared for President Reagan.
2 A Well, okay. Yeah. I don't think it was in
3 preparation for the Attorney General's conference. It
4 was a statement the President was going to make, a
5 statement the President was going to make, not in
6 preparation for the Attorney General.
7 Q Let me show you the transcript, and we don't
8 have to make this an exhibit, but just if I could get
9 some help here. I'm showing the Secretary the transcript
10 of his deposition May 26, 1987, at page 62. I just want
11 to see if I can get some more information and maybe get
12 this right a little bit.
13 It's a bit confusing in light of what we know
14 now.
15 A All I can tell you is this. Around the time
16 of the Attorney General's press conference is where I
17 have a remembrance of the following — that we had an OSG
18 meeting in which a statement for the President was shown
19 around. This was, in my memory, prior to the Attorney
20 General's press conference and not related to the
21 Attorney General's press conference — to clarify that.
22 The speech or text of this paper concerned the
23 Iran initiative and, as I recall, did not concern itself
24 with the Attorney General's press conference or the
25 President's response to that.
UimSStFIED
235
mmmm
233
1 Q Do you recall the date offhand? There were
2 several OSG meetings. If it helps you, the revelations —
3 A You know, I'll tell you, I think it was the
4 day the President made the speech.
5 Q The 19th? He had a press conference on the
6 19th.
7 A Then that may have been it.
8 Q He gave a speech on the 13th.
9 A Well, it was in preparation for a speech, to
10 the best of my knowledge, and I rememiser very clearly
11 that everyone at that meeting had negative things to say
12 about the statement. I've already testified to that.
13 Q So you think it was a draft statement?
14 A That was the way it was presented to us.
15 Q Do you recall specifically what your objection
16 to it was?
17 A Well, I recall making the comment that this
18 asked more questions than it answered. It's better just
19 to say I'll get the facts and give them to you. Jerry
20 Bremer, John Moellering, Buck Revell — I mean, it was a
21 cacophony of sounds, people saying this is crazy. It
22 does not jibe with the facts, et cetera, et cetera. And
23 Ollie, who I think was a little surprised, and his
24 colleagues said well, send in your comments.
25 And my comment I think I phoned in later said,
UNtU^IFIfS
236
UNtASSm
234
i we can't go forward with this paper. And John Moellering
2 said, fellows, I was around during Watergate and this is
3 a bad deal.
4 Q So this was a draft which was circulated to a
5 group?
6 A That's correct.
7 Q Do you recall was any other draft of any other
8 statement provided to you for comment?
9 A Not that I recall.
10 Q Do you recall if you were provided with any
11 draft chronologies of the events?
12 A No, I was not.
13 Q For comment?
14 A No, I was not.
15 Q So to your recollection there was only one
16 doc\unent which was circulated for the group and you had
17 coiunents on it?
18 A Ye«, that's correct.
19 Q Do you recall if in your comments to Mr.
20 North, Colonel North, you indicated that you had more
21 specific knowledge of the facts — that is, the number of
22 shipments and the size of the shipments?
23 A Well, I don't know that it got down into line
24 by line this is wrong, that's wrong. No, I don't
25 remember that. But. I^arngBiif^t^at the general tone and
mmm'
237
UNeussm
235
J. thrust was not, as I understood the project — and I
2 didn't pretend to understand it in depth — but Jerry
3 Bremmer, who sat next to me, I remember very well, I
4 said, Jerry, what is this and he was raising hell about
5 it. John Moellering, who was around the corner — my
6 remembrances of those days are clearer because they are
7 so much closer — but I don't remember that we went line
8 by line specifically tearing it apart. It was just a
9 general belief that this is terrible and we can't allow
10 the President to do this.
11 Q Did you provide any written comments?
12 A No. I can remember calling in. I think my
13 comment was the President ought to stand up and say I'll
14 get to the bottom of it; I'll give you the facts, et
15 cetera. Now I've been told subsequently Buck Revell sent
16 written comments, things of that nature.
17 Q Were you provided comments by anyone else in
18 writing?
19 A No. I wasn't. I don't think I showed anybody
20 else in the Department.
21 MR. SAXON: Who told you Mr. Revell sent in
22 comments?
23 THE WITNESS: I think subsequently in talking
24 with my colleagues we heard this. You know, did you send
25 anything over. I just bleated about and said they
wmsssm
238
IINBt«SStf1!D
236
■• couldn't go with it, that kind of thing. Buck may have
2 told me he sent it, actually.
3 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
4 Q Did you have occasion to discuss that
5 statement with anyone here?
6 A Not that I recall.
7 Q Specifically the Secretary or General Powell?
8 A No. Powell was gone then, and Admiral Jones
9 was here. But I don't recall it.
10 MR. SABA: I don't have any further questions.
11 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
12 Q Mr. Secretary, I've got what I hope will be a
13 quick line of inquiry along three lines. The first has
14 to do with the contra resupply operation.
15 A Good.
16 Q And Colonel North's public testimony.
17 A I have it right here.
18 Q Let me have this marked as the next exhibit
19 and show you the pages —
20 A I trust they are the same pages.
21 Q It's not the sane pages they gave you.
22 A I trust they are the same pages I got.
23 (The document referred to was
24 narked Armitage Exhibit Number
25 25 for identification.)
UNCUSSIFIED'
239
10
nmmm
237
1 Q This is his testimony from the afternoon of
2 Jul\^7, 1987.
3 A I've got it.
4 Q Do you need a moment to read this?
5 A No, I do not. I just want to make sure.
6 Q Are we like Shultz and Weinberger? Are we
7 reading off the same hymnal now?
8 A Yes, we are reading off the same hymnal.
9 Q Mr. Secretary, let me direct your attention to
page 107 of this transcript at line 2418. Mr. Nields ~
11 let me back up. He had asked Colonel North what various
12 individuals knew about your activities in the contra
13 resupply effort.
14 A That's right.
1^ Q Mr. Nields: "How about the chief of the
16 Central American task force?" He's going through and
17 asking about particular individuals.
1^ Mr. North: "Oh, I'm sure that he had a
19 detailed grasp of — "
20 Further down: Mr. Nields: "And what is your
21 basis for that belief?"
22 Mr. North — and this is the part relevant to
23 you and I am quoting: "We used to have meetings with the
24 Restricted Interagency Group. We used to have secure
25 conference calls. And on one occasion I can recall
UNetASSIFIEf)
240
UNCUSmiiD
238
1 laying out forth* group — In fact I thinJc it was after
2 the $100 million had been voted by both Houses, hadn't
3 been sent forward to the President — I can recall a
4 meeting in an office in the Pentagon where I went down
5 item by item by item the things that Z was doing and
6 asked them point blank whether or not Z had to continue
7 to do them to keep the resistance alive, because even
8 though the money had been authorized and both bills had
9 been passed, we couldn't get it forwarded to the
10 President.
11 "And we went down item by item by item on my
12 checklist of what I was having directed out each month or
13 each quarter or each week to support the resistance, and
14 I asked then point blank whether this should continue.
15 "Mr. Mields: Who was there?"
16 A I've read it.
17 Q For the record, in line 2443: ^^^^^^Hwas
18 there, Kr. Abrama was there, Mr. Araitag* was there, I
19 think Mr. Michael was there, I think General Noellering
20 was there.
21 "Mr. Mields: Would you go through them for
22 us, please, item by item, what it was yout told this
23 assembled group you were doing?"
24 Line 2459, Colonel North says: "These people
25 knew what I was doing. They knew that it was a covert
siHItiWtfii
241
MmMn
239
operation being conducted by this government to support
the Nicaraguan resistance."
Page 110, line 2472: "Mr. Nields: Did you
discuss the resupply operation?
"Mr. North: I think so.
"Mr. Nields: Did you discuss efforts to
obtain armzunents?
"Mr. North: Probably.
"Mr. Nields: Including munitions?
"Mr. North: I am not absolutely sure it says
munitions." He mentions logistics and air support.
Let me just simply ask you first if you recall
a meeting of the RIG at which something like that or
close to it took place?
A There were two meetings held in my office, one
on Aucfust 28, one on September 19. They were breakfast
meetings.
Q I'm sorry. The dates again?
A August 28 and September 19. They were
20 breakfast meetings.
21 Q This is '86?
22 A That's '86. And I paid, and the reason we
23 hosted them here was because we felt in the Department
24 that we weren't up to speed and we wanted to know what
25 was going on in central^ Am&ciA^aJ^umber two — and
Tl
242
wmmm
\ that's tha reason ws hosted it here and I took the
Tnltiatlve, and Z remember that very clearly.
Number two, we wanted — the reasons for the
discussion of the group were we were preparing to have a
passage of the bill by the Congress. We'd have some
money and we wanted to determine clearly what each
department would do, what would be tha responsibilities.
And we wanted to start working on tha NSDO which was
going to be signed out for the President, and
subsequently was who would have tha lead
responsibilities, which agencies would support in what
manner.
Attendance at tha first meeting on August 28
had, as Z recall, John Moellering, myself, Nestor
Jim Ollie NorthHj^^H^^H Z do
not believe Elliott Abrams was there. Zn fact, my
record, which Z will give you, does not indicate he was
there.
The second meeting, September 19, did have
those same gentlemen and, in addition, included Elliott
Abrama.^ My recollection and as reported by a memo that Z
22 asked Nestor Sanchez to draft up for ma to send to the
23 Secretary reporting on this event can be entered in the
24 record. Z don't need to go all through it. But its
primary thrust has to do with ^^^^^^^^^^^^f^^^^H
uNcraiii
243
UNcussm
4 And my final paragraph to the S«cretary says:
5 Th« group I chaired this morning plans to continue
6 masting on a weekly or biweekly basis so that we can keep
7 ourselves collectively Informed on all developments and
8 be ablm to provide timely policy guidance to the program.
9 We'll keep you Informed and request your guidance or
10 approval as required.
11 That was for the August 28 meeting. I do not
12 recall Ollle bringing this other stuff up. At a
13 subsequent meeting Z have a vague recollection of Ollle
14 talking about humanitarian assistance.
15 Q By "subsequent" you mean the September 19?
16 A The September 19. Hximanltarlan assistance emd
17 not an Itea-by-ltea list of what Ollle was doing or not
18 doing — just a general discussion of humanitarian
19 assistance. Z would note, however, that my remembrance
20 Is the majority and the great bulk of the meeting was
21 taken up on those Items Z mentioned earlier — that Is,
22 what each department was going to do once we got this
23 money and how would the NSOD be developed. And that's
24 that.
25 Q Mr. Secretary, Z'm not going to try to change
lUP biLUU.'i'>(.UUiNOKl>
UNCUSSIFIED
244
242
1 or tailor Colonel North's teslTfllldl^ to fit the facts so
2 he comes out being right.
3 A Well, I'm sure he remembers what he remembers.
4 Q But let me simply say that given people go to
5 lots of meetings and maybe some may go to the Pentagon
6 and some elsewhere, and some people in this group and
7 some not, let me just back up and ask the question a
8 little more broadly.
9 Do you recall, regardless of what dates,
10 regardless of where it was, regardless of whether it had
11 exactly the players he said — because he could have
12 gotten all that wrong — do you recall any meeting at
13 which he did anything close to what his testimony
14 suggests?
15 A I do not.
16 MR. SHAPIRO: Counsel, could we have this
17 entered as an Exhibit? Why don't you state for the
18 record what it is?
19 MR. SAXON: For the record, this is the
20 memorandum to which the Secretary just made reference,
21 and that is a cover note from Nestor Sanchez.
22 THE WITNESS: To me.
23 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
24 Q To you. I'm not sure what the date is.
25 A It talks about it in the body of the memo.
mmm
245
UNCbtSSffl
243
1 Q And than in the body of the memo which follows
2 th*>«over note it i> to Secretary Weinberger through Or.
3 Zkle from Nestor Sanchez.
4 A It was from me. That was the copy we got from
5 Sanchez in our sweep-up. He has a very clear remembrance
6 of it.
7 Q And it references the 28 August breakfast
8 meeting to which you just made reference.
9 A And noted Elliott Abreuas was not in
10 attendance .
11 Q We'll make that the next exhibit.
12 (The document referred to was
13 marked Armitage Exhibit Number 26
14 for identification.)
15 The second matter I want to ask you about has
16 to do with third country solicitation. Do you have any
knowledge ofj^^f^^^^^^^^^^Hbeing for
18 contributions to the contras during the time the Boland
19 Amendment was in effect that cut off U.S. Government
20 funding?
21 A No, only what I've read in the papers
22 subsequent to the revelations.
23 g Were you ever asked by anyone to do any
24 soliciting ofj
25 A No, I was not.
UNCtftSno
246
ONJwssffe
1 . , Q And did you ever do any soliciting?
2 "^ A I never did any.
3 Q Do you recall ever hearing Secretary
4 Weinberger state at any time, but particularly in the
5 spring of '85 time frame, saying to you or saying in your
6 presence that he had learned that^^^^^^^^were going
7 to be giving a size203le amount of money?
8 A Absolutely not.
9 Q Do you recall ever telling hla that^^^^^^H
10 were going to be giving —
11 A Absolutely not.
12 Q Let me introduce the next exhibit and tell you
13 what it is you are looking at. You are looking at a
14 memorandxim for record that John McMeihon, the Deputy
15 Director of the CIA, provided after they had had one of
16 their regular breakfast meetings with Director Casey and
17 himself and Secretary Weinberger and Mr. Taft, and it's
18 dated 15 March 1985.
19 (The document referred to was
20 marked Armltage Exhibit Number 27
21 for identification.)
22 A I've read it.
23 Q Specifically with reference to Mr. McMahon's
24 last sentence, which states: "In closing, the Secretary"
25 — meaning from the context Secretary Weinberger —
wmm
247
livmm
245
1 .. "8tat«d that he had heard that
^^m^^^^B had earmarked $25 million for the contras
3 in $5 million increments."
4 Let me ask the questions again with reference
5 to this specifically. Did you ever hear Secretary
6 Weinberger say he had learned that^^^^^^^^Hvere
7 providing $25 million?
8 A Z never did.
9 Q And you never told hia that?
10 A Z never told him that.
Q Old ^^^^^^^^H ever tell you anything to
12 this effect?
13 A He did not.
14 Q And you never solicited hia or anyone ih^^^|
||Bm^|^H|[for
16 A or anyone else, for that matter.
17 Q And until these matters broke on or about the
18 time of the Attorney General's press conference in
19 November of *86 and subsequent news accounts were done
20 you never knev anything along these lines?
21 A I don't think I did. I don't recall ever
22 having kno%m it.
23 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
24 Q Mr. Secretary, had you seen that memo prior to
25
today?
mmm
248
nmmm
A No. I had heard about It after you guya
taHt^d to the Secretary > but Z hadn't seen it. I am not
briefed and do not get briefed as a matter of course on
OCX breakfasts.
Q You are not shown as an addressee on the memo.
A We don't keep a record, and I don't recall
ever having been debriefed on a DCI breakfast by the
Secretary .
Q Let me ask in the course of your travels in
^^^^^^^^^Hdid the subject of the^^^Haid for the
contras ever arise?
A Not to my knowledge.
MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record a second.
(A discussion was held off the record.)
BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
Q Mr. Secretary, it has not been docxunented with
regard to the Richard Secord legal defense fund what the
L8 source of the contributions were to which Noel Koch
L9 testified on June 23 and which came from Swiss bank wire
20 transfers in the eunount of $500,000. I will say that Mr.
21 Martin, the trustee, remaining trustee of that fund, has
22 indicated there is some suggestion at least that these
23 are funds from foreign governments.
24 Let me simply ask you, number one, whether you
25 have ever made any solicitation on behalf of this fund of
TOP SECRET/
249
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
government .
have not.
- L .:: Tzr "^ °' -"- ""="—' -
,.^^.. -- MM 247
any foreign government.
A^^ I have not.
legal defense fund.
A I do not
Q And I guess flnallv <•«*. ^w
•—.-....-...., ...'~~rr.ir
10
MR. SAXON: Mr Sar^-^^4.
" OZX... ""• ""'"' ''°" "" '""- "> — .r , «„
23
THE WITNESS: yes
iir
250
\mmm
1 THE WITNESS: No, no. That's not what I told
2 him.
3 MR. KREU2ER: What did you tell him?
4 THE WITNESS: As I remember, I told him his
5 ass was way out on a limb because I didn't feel that my
6 boss knew this and that George Shultz knew it, and that I
7 thought he was operating solo and that my boss personally
8 was going to hate this, this project talking with the
9 Iranians first and then anything with hostages and Iran.
10 My boss is just totally opposed to any
11 dealings. Telling him that Weinberger personally would
12 think he was crazy for being involved in this seemed to
13 have the greatest effect on Ollie.
14 MR. KREUZER: Did Ollie say anything about
15 weapons transfers from Israel in '85?
16 THE WITNESS: I don't remember him talking
17 about that. I don't recall that.
18 MR. KREUZER: Thanks very much.
19 MR. SABA: The House thanks you very much, Mr.
20 Secretary. We have no further questions.
21 MR. SAXON: Let me say for the record we
22 appreciate this because you have spent two sessions with
23 us in deposition now and a fairly lengthy interview
24 session. We know your time is at a premium. We thank
25 you. It has been very helpful.
wmssm
251
mmm
249
1 THE WITNESS: I'll say on the record the
2 Secretary of Defense set the tone because he said we were
3 going to be cooperative from day one, and I hope you have
4 found that.
5 (Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the taking of the
6 instant deposition ceased.)
7
8 Signature of the Witness
9 Subscribed and svom to before me this day of
10 , 1987.
11
12 Notary Public
13 My Commission Expires:
252
UNCLASSIRED
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
I, MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, the officer before whom the foregoing
deposition was taken, to hereby certify that the witness
whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly
sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by
me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to
typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a
true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and
further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney
or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.
Notary Public
in and for the District of Columbia
My Commission Expires: February 28, 1990
UNCUSSiFIED
253
UNCLASSIHED
II C^ec^Cr
DEFENSE SECO?tTY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
^-Tt>^R^
Memo ForjSSS2£2k
AoHn3T)»racrW;l>5CV^, On or
gco;i Oari. Colin Pi?vo<Ji CJW^
-bate -b Gen. (Po^l
■l*tf-DeclassifiedyReleasetl on_
under provisions of E 0 12356
by K Johnson. National Secunty Council
015
'or foreicr. sale
- "" intended fc
tended fcr test:
: apiece. . ^ :
could cost a-
be S36-32.3 rill:—.,
added (NRC cost .
charges, ^\us
be replaced, so
idable difficulties:
sales, including
ec. 3 of the AECA.
es of $1* million
or indirect to a
nclassified (except
ot take place until
ys can be waived for
transfer has no such
given in any case.
dered through Israel
ken into 3 or
I against splitting
, the spirit and the
and all Administrat lo:
-- It is conceivable that, upon satisfactory =0"*"^"^^°"/^^:'
packages.
The customer countries CUAE and Korea) ^fl^'^'^l.Wll l^H T'
their deliveries had been ^'^chedu ed but ve vould no
tell ther. v«hy. We would not want to chari,e tne... nore .
deliveries.
mmm
254
UNimpD
u. .,^u suitable for fcreij" sale.
Hiss.le. areaya.Ub e l\^ll,-l\^.,\^illl\W . " .ntlnded for
There a r.° . - -^^ ^^^s^ ^^ leven of these are intended for tests.
J A E i~i
but the tsfti ;>-^= fot.sor.e.
.. -,i =..»- irser.al cast ;j"0.c:? ari«=« '"-' ;•'
L!^V., t,tll MU fov no -'^le. ...l^
I5rr;;l;r:?ni'fhi'r,e^%nktn. and transport cnat,,s . pU,
•;Su'^u^°t.:"on.^to^-.u^i^5^""''"''^="'^^
. T^, .o.aUtt« fot ,ax. to .tan pr.s.nt for.i.aM. .t»UuIt...
••..„5-jtr/asTt:rtr=r.;i^tj^^rsro'"=-oJ"'i^^.t".?.«.
third country. ^« ^f '.fj "Hu cannot take place until
for some details), "f ^*** ^J'jq days can be waived for
50 days_ after the "0^^":^ country transfer has no such
^^^^"'"^Ad^'notice mi t still be given in any case,
provision, and notice mu»«.
,, ... .i„ue. ».r. laundT.d through Israel.
•■ ?or.;.n':oiu'!;:vr?'o'i. n.tia.d.
w ,),. sal. could b« l"»>'en Into = or
'lci:Un';Mn"ori:rro%5a'd."con,r».tonal notice .
.. «,IU .h.r. 1. no .xpucl, Uiuncuon ^1^^^%
Z\..^ . !•;: 'r..'tr.,.ln5rth.t!'and all Ad.inistrat.or.
ra;ris:«v.rthU .crupSiou.!,-.
.. u 1, conc.lv.». tK.t upon ,.ti.f.ctorv^c.nsul.ati.;^^^^;
" ' INCIJSSM
deliveries
255
nnmim
i: iraq ever found o
T-?:r sccrce? of
Iran's, however.
respect .
Ir3.«backs are e:jall. for-.idable-
^ °:;' '^^'' ^'°"^- ^f sreatlv irritate^
supple are rore readilv access ;b le hi-
so tnere would be no effect ;n that
'"xta^^fl^d'^JaJSlc^^'" Culf. States would also be
hf lil^l\ "*■'" "^*"^ ^- *^* laundering countrv thev uo.,i ^
e^pi^rjJeirj:;:^^'^ " =°"^^""' -'^-^ to fri:;!\n°i;
fltl^o.lii:n^-^l--\l^l^^y ^^"l>. rest;aJi;d
UNGUSSIHED
256
UMPUCCinrn
DCrENSC SCCUmTY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
Memo For.
gvS'^ V<i>^ O^W^ COXT^I*/
d^. /^f Ao>^*. wV»Jr 34 ^i ^
257
^
•O'*,
UNCUSSIRED
4s A^<«pLQA
IINCUSSIFIED
82 680
257
82-690 O-88-10
258
^mim
St„C
s
^
I
^
re
i
UNCLASSIFIED
if
259
.3- r:.':'K5
ItMt/CCtM>Ofi
^
3^
iifimim
260
Not for QnototioB or - / 3
DnpUc»ttai ^
STENOGRAPHIC IflNUTBS
TJni«TlMd and Unadlted
P_^ «usw
See ^^s,U ^ ^-J '^^^^ "^"'^
,2^ <^A,,, ////^ A^ />■ ^--?^-
UNCUSSIFIED
Committee Hearings
UA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
UNCI^IFiED
OFFICI OP THK CLKKK
Oflk* of Offldal R^ortm
Partially Deciassitieomeleassd on Vj»«-»^ 8
under provisions ol E 0 12356
by K Johnson. NaOon* Sscunly Council
Hlxc
I
261
^
^
^'
t^mmm ,„M
no*9wcn Pot znmmuti ux»ia«r or x-imb m4 x-tqi, ^^^
l*Uiid«4 e*r OM Md 14 fof Utt, TIM alMiUs SlJt^r^*
bMii l^t M««»t«M« t«ct«4. tat u«r« i« • vary l«« ti!?^ '•«
f«it«r«. fto •IstilM will ta at M livM Mtil^^!^^«(
lfl< for tMtlH* ^* *»»il
- Tb«r« wmU »• M la^et oa tlM OAI if «t ablp ttai* «.
■itatlM. Tba »ro«r«a hat alipp«« la atlMr aara. aS L!V
acco— odata4 wltiia tha aeraal pro4aetiaa laa4 tiaa f.!** ^
■aat aiaallaa. '•» 'tpUca-
- Beraa «oal4 hava ta ba eaaaalta4 ta aaeartaia tha la^^^
thair profraa, if it ia aaeaaaary u aliif aay alaaliM IT^.^
tiaa ta Ua 7S aaatiaaa^ atova. »racar«aat laaA ti!! il *^^'
loraa'a aiaailaa «oal4 ba abaat 33 aeatlM. ^ ^* rapUe*
- T» Ua baat af aor k»a«la4fa* all of O.t. Any X-iam. .
vith aaita aa4 ahaaU aot ba eaaai4ara4 froB divaraiaaT
• Oait raplacMaat priea af tUK aiaailaa ia abaat I417 ?•
I total oaekafa prioa for SO woaU appraaiaata Isa.SN. «!, ,h
abaat MSN. raaka«a prieaa laelaOa ffM aarebartaa. ^"'
Aray baa «ba«t^H^lQ«a (iaaloilof ^WSUsSOV) a* 1
aiaat a AiatviMRaSravairaMat af •^MtHHT^L??.*
fM X-fO> aiaailao ara availabU io OonnafSotaaba
aa tba aaiftara, tba iaaaet at Ai«y af obiffiat S.soa
■aiiataly «aal4 ba aarlaaa bat aot iotalarabla. iT
_ owiM baaa ta ba tabaa fraa traapa. laaai aa tba
Hmmm of tba ra^alrvaat, aa4 baapiap ia aiai tbattba arav
M raaalaa Km-ll raplaeoMat oiMilaay it i« likaly tba! tba
ATM «a«i« raltataatly aaftiaoea u iMoiiata obii^aat aCtba
aotira ^aaatity.
- oait pciaa a« tba raalacaMat fa^S> ■^Mila ioabaat tu.aoot
total poabapa priao «aal4 appraaiaata MSI. alU IHi aarabarioo.
- Oallaary fraa pca4aatiaa af f9hlt pay baafc aiaailaa u tba
Ar«y aoaM aaaar abaat tba bapiaaiap af Cf f**** If aaaaaaary—
tbaofb tbia ia aat taeoaaiBlaO-aaproaiaataly l,HO tfcallacatU
woi fMfL.H*' *• *«T 4t Meoaa
262
III
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r u e ' ■ • I
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- 55Tt. ^1. t>**""» "• " " *«•••¥ aaaao «
laiabaaa ^M-«a<<ac
'"aaao
■ >■ u .. . iaaiBZSr a u S.? i« • i " • ^ £• • a - « a a ---_»- a
■03 L N
263
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264
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.»:3-- i:*i--'2i-2 rsu age -- r
1
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m» m MM m v m m
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a a • »d « ■ <•«•■> itooa eo
e aaai •■• aw ••e»e
i"?".?- •:■ st8-:'C^x
9» -^ mm a a C*«
t-is?.
a I
e^aa-auea jib~M —
««ua.ade vaMKaou aaaa
aa»ba«« »a«aIE.. ««a^
S-t23S2 SuJS-laiSSSR
eaki «aa^ft.
BK* jiauM*'*'
S£«8|
.?J?822V:21S
»aM Mva^oov o
•(••a^oaiauoaxaa
is8:5«K?2i:2
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aa-SS-J' ^«^3
83?s-2u8j;s;-
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ava u«>>«uo«>a
'aa>aa*oava«a&
M aaaa aa»«ae
aav vauuaaua
«*— f m • u M -
aa aaaa 1 M-) 9 m
51'. Js2-r2S2
o »a a a a e a a
:.**"8;822S2-
32Tfri — 8-523
r-8;8 2-"'Ss*.
k'ssa.t^ti:?:
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a« M aaa«>ao u
*aa vlaaa r>i;
''-•aaajiuuaaaea
• a a &• a i JJ »^ «a
i£2,:-22,is|j
JS?f38St;2!2i«:
2u:a*si:Sa--iTs
- 5s!i
a t a a
82
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Zm a u a
a •• a « a u
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a a u ■ »'«
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8"3S8«
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mm
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28128^
822882
M o a ax
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265
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266
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zl
y-
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6602L N
267
UNGIMIED
POSSIBILITY FOR UEAXS
There is no good way to keep this project froa ultlaately
beinq Bade public. Following are three legal aethoda together
with a brief discuasion on the poasibility of coaproaise.
> - The President can aake a deteraination, Section 614 ot te
the Foreign Assistance Act, which would waive the statute which
requires the normal Congressional notification under Section
36(b) of the Araa Export Control Act (ABCA). _
- President aust notify the Speaker of the House and the
Chairaan of the Foreign Relations Coaaittee, provide a written
justification, and consult with both the Chairaan of the Foreign
Relations Coovmittee and the Chairaan of the Foreign Affairs
Coovaittee. This could be done in a classified, close-hold aannei
and is the best prospect for eliainating leaks froa Congressional
sources. However, the problem would coae with actually executinc
a Letter of Offer (LOA) for the aaterial without disclosing to
the entire Security Assistance Cooaunity that the President had
waived the need for Section 36(b) notification (Headquarters
Aray, USASAC, and NICOM, all are aware of the legal requirement
not to process the LOAs without the 36(b) notification process).
- The OSO General Counsel should be asked personally to confira
that Section 614 is legal under these circuastances, since this
authority never has been exercised in this way.
- The President could sign an eaergency notification under
Section 36(b), waiving the formal 30-day notification period.
This requires a certification that an eaergency exists, and the
reasons therefor. Mhile this notification would be classified,
the distribution of the Sactioa 36(b) notice is auch broader that
would be true for the Section 614 deteraination aentioned above.
Additionally, the Security A«sistance Coaaunity would have to be
inforaed that the President had aade th« eaergency deteraination
and waived Section 3<(b) before the LOA eoald ba prepared and
issued. There would ba no good explanatioa aa to why an
eaergency would exist for this country's parchasing the aissiles.
- Tha last option, if tiaa paraits, woold ba to treat the sale
a« • routine unclassified action under Section 36(b). This would
require the full SO-day notification period (including the 20-day
inforaal notice) for Coaqreasiooal review. Both systeas are in
the inventory of tha country involved, and It la possible that
the notification would flow through without question. This
alaoet certainly would ba true for I-BAns la the quantity
conteaplated) the I-TOW quantities aight or alght not cause
speculation.
IfDeclassified/ReieaseO nn <0 PC^Sfe
under ptovisions ot EO 12356
K Johnson. National Security Council
268
UNCLASSIFIED
UNClASSinED
269
RICHARD LEE ARMITAGE . ^'**',
IIMPJ A^SlFlFfts - -?^cretVkv o^ rA./.> -T^^l.
UllULI^O^I" 'Ml^ international security affairs c»fUr^*u^
Richard L. Armitage was sworn in as the
Assisttnt S.cr.t.ry of Defense ^o- I^^"'^*"
t"nal security Affairs on 9 June 1983.
Mr Armitage represents the Department
of Defe;seTn formulating and developing the
poUtico-military relationship, ^-^ween the
united States and other countries of the
world, excluding NATO-member =0"n"ies. As
such? he is responsible for the "^Ij^^^Y
«pects of U.S. policy pertaxnxng to these
coCntrtes. Among his many duties «•«"?"-
vT^ing DoD'e security *"^-^*"^- P^°^^n;w
oversight of DoD activities relating to law
of the sea and oversight of PO^i"-/°""";
?ng uTs. special operating force, and counter
terrorism.
Born in 1945 in Boston Mr Arndtage attended high^chool^in
Atlanta and graduated in ^^67 from the U.S^ Naval J "^^^^^^
h. received a =°"^"tan«d'to a des trover ^hich was illationed on
S:Tnirne^ofrvirtni^"fonruc:irg'rari gunfire support opera-
tions.
Representative, I"";^^^^°^9il^\i°becam; Administrative Assistant ^
Asian affairs. -' 3
„r. Armitage worXed J Vi^d'tKirwa^'iSLd"!" memb« of I ^
Reagan presidential campaign and later was namea advisor | I
the National security Transition Team. H'^^'-^^^^^ ^ith pre- ^ ^
to the Interim Foreign Policy advisory ooaru ^ which would
paring the President-elect for "«30^ P°JJ|y i"it a«uSng his
confront the new *<3'»i"i»^"^i°"- /^°" ty is-i'^*"*"*""""^ °^
ref:re,^?n^:^na;i"o^ali:c;rny^rff:!?rLJ"ast Asia and Pacific
Affairs.
„r. Armitage is a member of the Association of Asian Studies
and the World Affairs Council.
He lives in Fairfax. Virginia, with his wife Laura., four
daughters. Elizabeth. Lee. Jenny and Alice and two sons. Paul
uNWSsife
and Chris.
"""' 15 May 1986
270
I U'^^ ey
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES
UnreyiMd mod Unedited
Not for Quotatioa or
DapUcadon
mmm
HSITS-2£lZ-/87
DEPOSITION OF GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL
Friday, June 19, 1987
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran,
Partially Declassified/Released on 1/ f^fgS'g)
under provisionr, o< E 0 12356
by K Joh.-scn. Nal.cnal Secunly Council
Committee Hearinsrs
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
I OF THE
(^^
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Offlcaofj
HO.
^ ^ 3 cones
271
cwassw
:AS-16 1 he was giving me. And I don ' t sense that he gave me much
2 more — or recall that he gave me much more guidance than that.
3 I didn't need much more.
Q And the reference to the Economy Act is the question
of, I take it, of the pricing of the missiles and the —
A It was more than that. It was an indication that
we were providing a service to the Cenwral Intelligence
Agency.
9 MR. LIMAN: I am correct that the only way you can
10 sell to the CIA is under the Economy Act;
11 THE WITNESS: That is my understanding, but I
12 would need to get a lawyer
13 BY MR. SABA:
14 Q How did the number change to 4,508?
15 A Some time over the next week — and I can't quite
16 recall how — either from the Secretary or one of my
17 NSC interlocutors. It might have been Admiral Poindexter or
18 Colonel North, I really don't recall. Or it might have been
19 that the CIA told the Army, once I put them in touch with
20 each other, that the number was up to 4,500, and I became
21 aware of it, it czme back to me, and I confirmed it with
22 the — let the Secretary know about it, and there was no
23 objection, and it was at that point that I realized that
24 well, I have answered your question.
25 Q I am trying to understand wHere~the extra 5(
272
CAS- 17 1
came^Jrom.
'Wf^Sffl^
25
A The number that was given to me was 4,000, and
was increased to 4,500. And whether it was 4,508 or not, I
don-t know. I just recall it being 4,500.
Q But you wouldn't have increased that on your own?
A On my own? Oh, no.
MR. LIMAN: He said that it came from either the
Secretary or from the NSC.
BY MR. SABA:
Q And you don't know.
MR. LIMAN: And you understood that it might have
come —
THE WITNESS: As a matter of information, once I
talked to General Thurmond, and he put me in touch with
the logistics people in the Army, General Russo, at that
point I put General Russo in touch with the CIA and from then
on in I was in nothing but a mongering role.
MR. LIMAN: Is this when you learned that the 500
were to be used to replace earlier shipments to Israel?
THE WITNESS: Yes. It was at that point that
things clicked, and I said - I started to find out about
the other 500. I just realized at that point that a
transfer must have taken place and this is the replenishment
of some kind.
wmmL
273
^nmm
BY MR. SABA:
Q Did you share your view on these 500 with anyone?
A I can't specifically state, ;but I would be willing
to speculate that Mr. Armitage's testimony and the Secretary's
would also recognize and corroborate that, too. And we all at
that point realized -- I might have learned it from
Armitage. i just don't recall.
Q Did you have any instruction or any understanding
that this -- the filling of the order should bypass their
system?
A No. The^^^^^^^^^H system was not something
the Secretary would have recognized as a system. And lots
has been made of bypassing of ^^^^^^^^^^^H system, but I
don't think I bypassed the ^^^^^^^^H system. I took it to
the top of the^^^^^^^^^Hsystem. General Thurmond sits in the
Army at the top of theH^^^H^^H system. And when I
go to General Thurmond as a tasking, I did not in any way
restrict how he accomplished it other than to tell him that
it should be kept to the smallest number of peoplf possible.
My understanding is that he then turned to
Colonel ^^^^^HB who was hi^^^^^^^^Hof fleer , if I am
correct, and so I ciCMrW t^ins/s^liait-we _bypassed the
^^^H system.
It wasn't used, but it wasn't bypassed in any
deliberate, in any conscious kind of way.
274
nfmsm
nsj^^'^
[2 Hrrnitine.
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE
ERANCONTRA INVESTIGATION
Continued Testimony of Oliver L. North
Tuesday. July 7, 1987
Afternoon Session
House Select CoBmittc* to Invcstigatt
Covert Amu Transactioiis with Iru
and
Scute Select Committee on Secret Military Asdstuce
to Iru ud tiie NicaraguB Opposition
WtuhiHtUHt. DjC.
UU^Declassitied/Released on_[l5j5f 7~S8
under provisions ot E 0 12356
by K Johnson. National Security Council
fo^
UNtlASSIHED
275
liNCUSSIFIED
MABE: IP18800PK
1482 irinutes. __
m83 [Becess.l
m8« Chalriran inouye. The hearing Hill please come tc order,
mes ?'r. Nields.
11486 Kr. NIELD";. ThanK ycu, Hr. Chairman.
1U87 Colonel yorth, I asked yot before we broke about a number
1U88 cf particular individuals and whether they were aware of the
iue9 Hank shipment in November cf 1985. Are there any other
11*90 officials cf the United states Government who were aware of
mgi the Hawk shipment m Novemher cf 1985?
1492 wr. NORTH. I think I have given ycu the list that l
1493 believe tc have beer aware.
1094 "^r. NIFLP?. were any officials at the Department of
1495 Defense aware that i8 Hawk missiles or some number cf Hawk
1496 missiles had actually been shipped by Israel to Iran?
1497 "r. KCRTH. Anair, I believe that they may have — excuse re,
1498 I ^plieve they may well have been, because I think I made
1499 sever?! efforts to coordinate with them the replenishment cf
1500 the Hawifs. I think I had a discussion, if I remember
1501 prcpFPly, with DCD cfficials about both Hawks and TOWs. I
1502 wouldn't be asking them abcut Hawks if they hadn't already
1503 teen ordered up as a need for replenishing.
1504 You know, I am a little concerned I am leaving the wrong
1505 impression, because I honestly think that all of us who were
1506 engaged in this activity were looking for the right way of
UNGUSSIFIEO
276
UNCUSSIFIED
NAKE: IP18800PW '"• • ^"^ IWVII ■ tU PAGE 68
1507 dclng things, that there was nc intent to avoid, to in any
508 way violate the Artrs Expert control Act, ana that if there
1509 was confusion within the COD over how I was going atcut it,
15 10 it was because of try cwn ignorance In not Knowing the right
1511 way to start, and I want to coire bacK to the finding issue
15 12 as tc why we arrived at using the Economy Act procedures for
1513 that whole business.
15 iu t»uch cf the confusion that may exist out there n«ay have
1515 simply been because when this Kid was told to find a way to
1516 replenish things, i didn't know how to go about doing it,
1517 anf, in fact, it wasn't until the latter part of January
1518 that a real methodclogy was proposed.
1519 fr. NIELDS. I just want to maKe sure. Hy question simply
1520 i«: vho in the Department of Defense was told that there
1521 had actually been a shipment, if anybody?
1522 f.r. NCRTw. An unrefreshed, long-tia.e-ago memory would
1523 tell me that I probably talKed about that delivery with Br.
1521* Koch, possibly with General Powell, possibly with «r.
1525 AriTitage.
UNCLASSra
277
/ jRy-j ^(^
278
279
r».t^y-.\cg-t.tifty^
^^'?'^m
VVftVv7
^u 3 .: r/ZJZyL ^7i.c^
3--/0
^rv^'(^
^W<rC^_
^
280
UNCUSSmED
A'.- u c
Monday, 11 Nov 198 5
15-23 November 1985
Thursday, 28 Nov 1985
Monday, 16 Dec 1985
Tuesday, 24 Dec 1985
Wednesday, 25 Dec 1985
Tuesday, 31 December 1985
Wednesday, 1 January 1986
Friday, 3 Jan - Fri, 10 Jan 86
14-18 January 1986
Monday, 20 January 1986
Sun, 9 Feb - Mon , 17 Feb 1986
31 Mar - 13 Apr 1986
Holiday
Germany, Bahrain, Pakistan
Thanksgiving
1440 Departed for Dover, Ceremony
for airplane crash victims
Departed at 1300
Holiday
1000 Departed
Holiday
Bangkok, Hanoi, Hong Kong
Japanese SSC, Honolulu
Holiday
Mid East (Cairo, Jordan, Israel)
Korea, Japan, Philippines,
Thailand, Australia, Honolulu
**l^ Declassified/Released on >0/'6ft 88
undei provisions of E 0 12356
by K Johnson, National Secunty Council
UNOASSra
281
UNtUSSIFIED
^o Dctc
0 2lS<»^
OFFICe OF THE ASSISTANT SECRCTAXY OF OEFENSE
iMTinwA'POWAt MOiwrY krtkxm
FMCAMOIOM
penally Oeclassrfied/Released on H)ff69i
Johnson, Nat,onal Secur.iy Counc.l
t-.' •
''H.*''
»;•. - • ».
:fe>;ir
«?*!V^-fi'^,
'9^:^
282
UNCLASSIHED
JOUST HEARINGS ON THE
IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION
Continued Testimony of diver L. North
Tuesday. July 7. 1987
Afternoon Session
House Select Committee to InvcstigaU
Covert Anns Traasactioiis witli Iran
Senate Select Committee od Secret Military Assistance
to Iraii and t)ie Nicaragnan Opposition
WatJuMgioH, DX:.
9 JJ^^9
ii«*r Oeclas?i(ied/Rel';ased on 1 1 F^B Rg
undei pruvisc.ns ot E 0 i:!3S6
by K Johnson. National Secumy Council
UNtlASSIHED
283
mmm.\i
NAME: IF18800FI1 "^"■■**l#il ltl/ P'-^E 107
2m0 KncMletige -cf rr,y day-to-day activities liKe rry superiors did,
^«11 but certainly they knew that I was the guy that was getting
2U12 things done.
2013 That's Why they called me up, that's why there is a note
2um to the effect that, hey, Ollle, you know, here these guys
2U15 from Country whatever It Is are talking about S2 million,
2U16 why dor 't you go over and put the smile on them, maybe
2m7 they'll kick In.
2018 wr. NIELDS. HOW about the chief of the central American
21119 task force?
2U20 "^r. NORTH. Oh, I'm sure that he had a detailed grasp
2U21 cf— well, I say a detailed grasp — I'm sure that he had an
2422 adequate sense of what I was dcing.
2U23 Mr. NIELDS. And what is your basis for that belief?
202U ir. N05TH. We used to have meetings with the Restricted
21(25 Interagercy Group, we used to have secure conference calls,
2U26 ?nd on one occasion T can recall laying cut for the group— in
2427 fact, I think It was after the S100 million had been voted
2428 ty both Houses, hadn't been sert forward to the President — I
2tt29 can recall a meeting in an office in the Pentagon where I
2«30 went down item by item ty item the things that I was doing
2U31 and asked them point blank whether or not I had tc continue
2U32 to r'o them to keep the resistance alive, because even though
2U33 the money had been authorized and both tills had been
2«3i* passed, we couldn't get it forwarded to the President.
UNCLASSIFIED
284
nHmsim
2tt35 And wewent down item by item by item on my checKlist of
U36 what I was having directed cut each month or each quarter or
2U37 each weeic to support the resistance, and I asKed them point
2'*38 blank whether this should continue.
2U39 rr. NIELDS. whc was there?
201*0 nr. NORTH, well, i would have to look at my
2041 contemporaneous note at the tirre, but I think there is a
2UU2 note Id one of the notebooks I gave you to that effect.
2U43 Hr. Flers was there, cr. Abrams was there, ar. Armita^e
2iitii was there, I think r.c. Hichael was there, I think General
2UU5 foellering wa? there.
24U6 Tr. NIELDS. wculd ycu go through them for us, please,
2U07 item by item, what it was you told this assembled group you
2i««8 were doing?
2049 «r. NORTH. What I'm saying is I didn't say, look, on a
2450 given day I'm Qoing to walk out and go talk tc so and so
2451 about so much money, vhat they knew is that I was the
2452 person whc was causing these things tc happen. There was no
2453 doubt in their mind.
2454 That is why, when an airplane goes down in Honouras, they
2455 call me to get the bodies home and to pay the ccsts. That's
2456 why, Hben somebody needs scmething done, in the case of this
2457 contact right here you pcirted out as part of Exhibit No.
2458 79, they called me.
2459 These people knew what I was doing. They knew that it was
mmm
285
UNCLMooirlED
HAHE: IP18B00FI' ^^^*- ^'^
2tt6« a ccvert cjeration telng ccnciucted by this Government to
.U61 succort the Nicaraguan resistance.
UNCIASSIHED
286
UNCIASSIHED
NAHE: IB18800P?! |||l||| Hniliril II PAGE
~U62 PPTS DOTSON _-
. J DC>!M GLASSMAP
2U6U
21*65 Hr. NIELDS. Hy question Is, you Indicated tr.st during
2tt66 this meetlno at the Department of Defense, at the Pentagon,
2«67 you went down item ty Iterr. would you qq down for us item
21*68 hy Item what It is you told them?
2<*69 Hr. NORTH. I don't have the list tetore me. I gave
2tt70 cc?ies of that to you. It 1? in the stuff that I gave to
2U71 you, sever binders full.
^''■'S Br. NIELES. Did you discuss the re-supply operation?
2U73 nr. voRTH. I think so.
2U7U nr. NIELDS. Cid you discuss efforts to obtain armaments?
■^5 wr. NCRTH. Probably, i am talking about aid to the
1 .6 internal cppcsition, food, medical supplies, et cetera. I
2U77 thinU it was all on that list, tick, tick, tick, tick, tick.
2'*78 Kr. NIELDS. Including munitions?
2U79 Hr. NORTH. I am not absolutely sure it says munitions, it
2U80 might have 3ust said logistics, air support, it might have
2U81 just said certain things about the internal activities. You
21482 have get it, along with the list of names of people that
2U83 were there at the ireetlng.
2«8tt Hr. WIELDS. IS there anything else you can recall ticking
2(485 off during this meeting?
2U86 Hr. NORTH. NO, but you have the note, and I arr sure you
iwssro
287
WASHINGTON O C :030I-2J
r\IC t«ic
(iNCIiSIFIED
5FFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEPEWSfe^' * *^\M
In reply refer to:
1-24078/86
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Aid Package (S)
(S) Attached per your request is a memorandum for the Secretary
on this -norning's breakfast.
^
Nestor D. Sanchez
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Inter-American Affairs
Attachment
a/s
Partially Declassified/Released on /QptfBfljg
under provisions of E 0, 12356
by K Johnson, National Security Council
Dir, I A Region
UNCUiSSra
288
V5HINGTQN D
Ir. reply re:
1-24079/86
;'.E.".ORANDL.'M FOF TH.F. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU THE UN'DER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
SUBJECT: Nicaraquan Democratic Resistance Aid Program (S)
-- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
(S) I chaired a breakfast meeting this morning, 28 August, of a select
interagency group which will oversee the implementation of the SlOO mil-
lion program to support the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. At^^^^^
th^meeting were James Michel, State, representing Elliott Abrams J^^^^l^
SKtt^ CIA, Oliver North, NSC, LtGen John Moellering, OCJCS, and Nestor
S^^Wez.
BHOHSSW
289
wmmB
NSITIVE
(S) The group I chaired this morning plans to continue meeting on a
weekly or biweekly basis so that we can keep ourselves collectively
informed on all developments and be able to provide timely policy
guidance to the program. We will keep you informed and request your
guidance or approval, as required.
Prepared by: Nestor D. Sanchez
DASD(ISA)IA/75884
M^EP
82-690 0-88-11
290
[T
Hffim
C 2709
\ f\nTiitcMe
1 ^/aa/gl rrtctc:
5??
SI
"flOef provisions of e.O 12356
VJWMwn.NafonaiSeeurtylouncil
UNCLASSIFIED
291
jr
IINCUSSfflED ti-Tz
C 2710
15 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense. 15 March 1905
Partially Declassified/Released on 10^63 S8
under provisions of E 0 12356
by K Johnson, National Sscuniy Council
vHwrnm
13^3
292
C 2711
7. Question of the support to the Contras cane up. The Director
noted that we should have another meeting on it but following last week's
meeting of the LSG we tended to be leaning towards non-lethal aid. I
described the assignment given to Motley to develop different options
which could be packaged and tnen played against Senators Lugar and
Ourenberger to see what conbination of options in a single package night
be acceptable to Congress. But I noted at the meeting that there was no
agreement that we would be limited to non-lethal aid. The Director said
that McFarlane was to meet with Lugar and Ourenberger today. In closino
th^ecretary stated that he had heard that!
I^^^Vhad earmarked S25 million for the Contras
increments
^ ■ yohn N. McMahon
DUI
000
-£A/ODCI
EA/DCI
Exec. Sec.
Exec. Registry
UNCUSSIFIED
-v^S-iX^
293
/3J-^LSrC
WASHINOTOH. O C 20SOM4OO sj^^>d< ^•^ '^ <{''*■•(
IIJUL
,„««T. 0. POIIC TO...- .... <•) ^^^^^^
D 576
u„"„*.b!r.i. 9ood ""'"".'js-iSiS ir;»t to |iv. o..
,a... Th.r.for.. I b^li. ^ _
to and
d
^Xd ca... Th.r.ror.. ^ ^^,,„au.. A. T.b
.1— ^AM not specify PO** "^PT „-«-nd»tion to
you forward Tab A. j,j„^(3jj|3j5,,,ga/Reieasedon_L!iiBS8
undfif provisions ol E 0 12356
by K Johnson, National Secunty Council
( V-^ ' -' t"
fc. C^^*^^ , t^-"- //
uNf^sm
294
295
UNCUiSsra
D 578
UNCUSSIFIED
296
mmm
THE sec
__ WASMINCTOW.
TMC OltTIWCT or COL\J*m*A
579
SUBJBCTi us policy Toward Ir»n (•)
^ ^^ .M.1V vAouAflt for coBBcnta on
(T8) Thi. ««-or«ndu. '-P^^SaS ^liri^9r«« with -any of
th. diaft WOD o« 0»:i'"i"r"iUi?S*of^ipropc..O •ction. ..«
tho Mjor point, in th. p.p.r. ••JJ^iiy aif«i«xt to con«id«r an
b« i«»u«d in tho propcd form.
•hort-t«r> ch.lX.ng. -i-t b. *» "^J-J^*3 cour... thi. will put
Jovi.t in«l"-nc.-- J< -• «;/,«nTloi;.?-tir« ^i of h.^ing .t
u. in . to.tt.r pcition to ^••"" * tr>j'l,.n. ond.r no circus
Swt n.utr.l/non-ho.til. r.ljtio2 with J^J^iction on .r» ..!.. to
.t.nc... ho»#.v.r. .hould ** »»^^Ji;j'r««tning n.utr.l on ..1..
lr«. Ktf^tims to cut ^f JJ-^J^'Ji; ^.y, w. h.v. to profct our
to .ith.r b.lligor«nt ^» <»?r?*.j5J ;S i,;,. K policy r.v.rm.l
long.r-r.ng. ^"^•[••i-.t" StJ^li^LtSt.nt by thoH n.tioo. who. w.
would b. ...n "^^""Pii""^.; Hlii. •««» vbuld lik.ly l"d to
h.v. urg.d to «-««"^° *'?r-l 2d • Si«tblo .It.r.tion of th.
U;rro-!i5nriS-.ic.'*Tt :Sul5"av.«.ly .ff.ct our nowly -rging
r.l.tion.hip with lr.q. ,^y^^
^. «- >.»«>v*r aoa. of Which *r. i^liwi
(TS) Th.r. .r. oth.r •f^f5"t^,;*^S^^id.r our curr.nt policy
in thv^iraft «^J- ^t^^^JTiS jSt.nnS^u.nc. .nd to l..d toward
to tr^tO pr.V.nt an incraa.. *» Pamally Declass,fied/Release<J on_lL^cS88
« BOr. •Od.rat. p0.t-KnO«.Xn* **•» under provisions of E,0 12356
by K Johnson. National Security Council
Int.lliq.nc.
°a colLcting infonnation on_tti*^^^^^^^^^^
wSSI^^SSf^^ on ii.nt Hying k.y
nr^Si-DOll!Sl""na who «ay b. »or. favorably
5i;j:r.d^;o^;lScrr5: in th. r.gion.
ClASSIPXED BY
UNCLASSinED
297
mmm
580
ei*«n b«tt«r infonatlon froa u
^^J»t«bll«h^conf cf with
tiol
~- Through contact* vith alilaa »w^ « < ^
pot.nti.Hy r.c.ptiv. Ir.S« i;rL^'^*'L'*^**^«» *«»
rwunci.tion of •!• t.-ij^^^.a Jj™?^*^.^'* *^*A'
n... to ..^ik . n.90ti.t.5 .itJl.i!Br^ f; *^*^*" *'iliin9-
th.ir non-int.rf.;.nc. in SS.r^t-I? *}• J'*«-Ir.q w.r.
er.uin9 PoUtic.l-mlUt.r^^«^- ?.**• f*»^^^ct .nd in-
•tion council countSi.! ^ coop.r.tion with Ooif Cocp.r-
can.rci.1 £ir» ^d Ir.ni.B arJLf^ ^' *'^"* ^t*'««n
th. pr...ur. on our .luS^^JiffSif J J* 'k??^** l=cr.M.
•nd posaibl. .Motion.. con.id.ring public .tatnant.
Public Dipif
gconoaie
r«9iiD.. In ton., our oublle^Tr? *^* ««"»» Iranian
Iran a. a countr^ Til SS JraS!Zi*B!Lr" !5^" *-t^°9 '
-11 a. Shia I,IJ.. a.^. .;i!° S^?'^: "^ cultur., a.
opposition to th. ^lici.r It^L * ■»>o«l<» •ii«>ha.iz.
«dth. corrupt ~KiJ;'ri?J.'5;/j:::;!J'"^*» 90v.rn«.„t
■•nt. .hould aia to .ncouraa. *>«--' T"^"*' ®"' 'tat.-
<Jl..gr.. or oppo-rrl^SJ^uSS? '^•^^^ ^n Iran who
iO£t_cggtrol« ar. air.«<(
r.aa.M.
curbing all but .trictly
UllilAEI!
prM.nt control.
rt..
298
581
— Za eeajanetion with dl«cr««t political contacts propoaad
•bow, w« coald au^gaat to tha Zraaians that corraet ra-
lationa would Includa ralazatlon of currant 08 trada
rastrlctloaa and noraal trada ralatlons with an Iranian
govarnaant that la not hostlla to 08 lataraata.
(T8) Z concur with tha balanea of tha raccaaiandatlena In tha
draft B8DD In ao far as thay support currant 08 policy. My racoa-
■andatlons raf lact ay vary atrong vlsw that 08 policy auat raaaln
ataadf aat In tha faca of Intamational lawlaaanass pazpatratad by
tha Iranian raglaa. Changaa In policy and In conduct, tharafora,
■ust ba Inltlatad by tha Iranian govarnnant. By ranalnlng flmly
oppoaad to currant Iranian govarnaant pollelaa and actlona< yat
aupportlva of nodaratlon and a longar tara laprovaaant In ralatlons,
w« can avoid tha futura analty of tha Iranian paopla and davalqp tha
lavaraga nacassary to countar a poaalbly vary dangarous Incraasa In
8ovlat Influanca. In particular, wa naad to ba praparad for a
peaalbla parlod of turaoll aa tha raglna baglna to changa. by
building up affactlva instruaanta of influanca and accaaa to paopla
and organizations within Iran, ao aa to countar a Soviat attaint to
proaota a pro-Sov'lat auccaasor raglna.
ect Saeratary Shults
wmifiJHED
299
UNCUSSIFIED
UHdASSra
D 582 y^.
J.- V.J
ili
300
UNpssm-
WASMINeTON. TMC OlSTRICT Of OOLU*
583
oiSTmcr Of ooluawa
T^
iMC
NEMORAHOUH POR THE AS8ZSTJUIT TO THB PRKSIOEHT FOR lATZOHAX.
sBcmuTT APnaM
tUBJXCTt Ut Policy Toward Jrun (8)
(T8) This ■•■orandua respond* to yoar r«qu««t for eoBB«nts on
th« draft BSDD on US-Iranlan relations. Nhil* X a^ra* with aany of
tha aajor points in tha papar, aavaral of tha propoaad actioiM aaaa
quastionabla. Moraovar, it is axtraaaly difficult to considar an
asp licit ravision of our policy toward Xran as 10119 •• va contlnua
to racaiva avidanca of Iranian co^licity in terrorist actions and
planning against us. I do not baliava, tharafgra, an aSDD should
ba issuad in tha propoaad forB.
(T8) Z fully support tha policy objactlva that *onr priaary
short-tara ehallanga auat ba to block Moscow's afforts to Incraasa
8oviat influanca." If wa ara succaasful, of ceursa, this will put
us in a battar poaition to raalisa a longar-tara 9oal of having at
laast nautral/non-hoatila relations with ^ost QlMllnl Tnn Ondar
no cireuastancas, howavar, should wa now aasa our rastrictlon on aras
salaa to Iran. Attaapting to cut off ams whila raaainlng nautral
on aalas to aithar balligarant is ona of tha faw «rays wa hava to
protect our longer-range intereats in both Iran and Iraq. A policy
reversal would be seen as inexplicably inconsistent by those nations
whoa we hava urged to refrain froa such sales, and would likely
lead to increased aras salaa by thea and a poaaibla alteration of
tha atratagic balance in favor of Iran whila Rhcaainl is still the
controlling influence. It would adversely affect our newly cswrging
relationship with Iraq.
(T8) There ara other actions, h^raver. acas of which ara iJ^lied
in the draft HSDO, that wa could take now under our current policy
-to tr^to prevent an Increase in Soviet influence and to lead towanl
a aora aoderata p^fF'Iflg**"*^ Irant
Intelliqenca
.. Improve US intelligence gathering capabilities in the areas
of weakness identified in the SWIB, especially with regard
to collecting inforaatio^^J
[B^hasis should be on identifying key
players in the political arena t^o aay be aore favorably
disposed to US concerns in the region.
Partially Declassilied/Released on.|lrc6e»e>
under provisions ol E 0 123')5
CXAS8ZFIED lY
DECLASSIFY OS OADR
uNty^ffii^
___ of ___ copies
301
w&mm
584
— Oivao b«tt«r infonatlon froa inf lllq>nc« •ourc»«. ■««!»
m^plZ^lj^ortla^rola^iB th« adainiatratiOB of Xal^Se
ml* but who alao favor polielaa aor* f •▼orabX* to Ot
•Dd w««t*m IntarMta, and davalep tactics for proTidlii9
political and/or financial support to tho«« alaaanta
oppoaad to Xhoaaini and tha radical*.
Political
— Through contacts with allias and frianda. «• should dis-
craatly conmnicata our daaira for corraet ralations to
potantially racaptiva Iranian laadars baa ad on thalr
ranunciation of stata-aupportad tarrorisa* thair wlXling-
nass to •mtlk. a nagotiatad sattlaaant to tha Iran-Iraq war,
thair non-intarfaranca in othar atatas' affairs, and thair
cooparation in sattling OS-Iranian claias in tha Bagua
Tribunal .
— Maintain our nautrality in tha Iran-Iraq v«r whila ancour-
aqinq third party initiativas to and tha conflict and in-
craasinq political-ailitary cooparation with Gulf Coopar-
ation Council countrias.
Public Diploaacy
— ter public atataaanta on Iran ahould bring praaaura to
baar aquaraly whara it ia naadad— on tha currant Iranian
raqiao. In tons, our public position sunt avoid castinq
Iran aa a country and tha Iranian pacpla and cultura, as
wall as Shia Islaa, aa tha anaay, but should ai^hasisa
oppoaition to tha polieiaa of tha prasant Iranian qovamaant
and tha corrupt aallahs insida tha qovamaant. Our atata-
aanta ahould aia to ancouraqa thosa alaaants in Iran who
disaqra* or opposa raqiaa polieiaa.
Bconoaic
— A full ranqs of US axport controls ara alraady in affact.
raaaaaaa tha affactivanaaa of prasant controla
eurbinq all but strictly civilian
In conjunction with discraat political contacts propoaad
abova, wa could suqqaat to tha Iraniana that corraet ra-
latlona %rauld includa ralaxation of currant US trada
raatrictiona and noraal trada ralations with a poat-
Khcnaini Iran that is not hoatila to 08 intaraata.
IMUSSIFIED
302
\mmm
D 585
(W) -T'eoMar with th« balase* of
th. Iranian rSI-i! cSfniS ™iiS!i iSfT"-! '•'^"tS^S
«•! b« lnltl«t«d by •TnS^riSlS^-^SL^ cooAict. th«r«forSf
<9PO««4 to currant IranlM SJJrJLH ^ffT?** ^ raialala, flJiiy
•upportlT. of ■odaratlon^nTI^SSSSi Hii^f** "^ •etIoM. yat ^
onca tha ra^iaa haa chSoS? Ja S Ivi?5"*i^J'T*~"* *» ral.Jlon.
Iranian paepla and dmyrmi^lJ^', "void tha fatura analty of t^
uiar, wa naad to ba Brl«.,l!i - »ovlat Influaaea. in oartle.
CuJttT
BCi Sacratary Shults
UNDUSSIBED
303
UNCllSMIEt
11/20/86 zGOO
(Historical Chror.ology)
of^^^--^ N 30363
/IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES
From the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in
Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official
contact with that government in order to discuss strategic
developments in this critical part of the world and reconstruct a
working relationship. Even before President Reagan came to
office the U.S. Government agreed to try to expand security,
economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace
acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, the U.S. undertook
three secret missions to Tehran:
September 1979 -
request of the Iranians
t secretly with Bazargan at the
^ I
!li
ill
ill
lit
s .^ =
% \(^
October-November 1979 _
normalization of relation
When these meetings and the secret November 1, 1979 meeting in
Algiers, between Brzezinslci .and Prime Minister Bazargan, became
public in Iran, they helped precipitate the takeover of the U.S.
Embassy by radical elements and led to the resignation of the
Bazargan government. These events have adversely influenced
Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact
with the USG.
Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal
relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate
persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it
is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations
with Iran — Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and
the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic
relations with Iran.
Iran is the key to a region of vital importance to the West, yet
it is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power
and political influence along its borders and inside its
territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets
and their surrogates have moved actively to gain greater
influence in the Gulf:
The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have
an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a
government in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests
in the area.
TOP SECRET
Declassifv:
uNctj^ra
UNGIJ^m
Cononuaist nations have become the principal arms suppliers
to Iran — making Iran dependent on this source of supply in
contending with an increasingly strengthened Iraq. This
leads US to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be
attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is,
by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could
well encourage a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that
would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran,
leaving a power vacuum which the Soviets could exploit.
Specifically, the indicators of Communist. influence in Iran
are:
The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq
war has exacerbated Iran's vulnerability to Soviet influence.
Moreover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan,
and actual crossborder strikes in Iran from Afghanistan have made
reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important.
TOP SECRET
UNGUSSm
305
TOP SECR£T
UNCIASSIFIED
N 30365
In short, tha Soviets wars far battar positionad to improva
significantly thair influanca in tha ragion in 1985 vhan wa vara
prasantad with an opportunity to opan a dialogua with Iran, in
dacidin? to axploit this opaning, wa avaluatad pravious af forts
through mora convantional channals which had not succaadad.
About two years ago, senior Iranian officials apparently decided
that soma accononodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1983,
various countries have been engaged in overtures to the O.S. and
Iran in ai^ffor^t^stimulat^d^jac^eontac^batweei^h^tw^^ r/
countries^^^^H^I^^H^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^HHHj^H L^
Io»#aver, internal splits and debates maHei^diffioilt
!b? Uie Iranians to respond to these overtures.
Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted |
to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran
or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of
he Id hostage in Lebanon. T
In the spring of 1985, a private American citizen (Michael
Ledeen) learned from an Israeli government official (David
Kimche) that the Israelis had established a liaison relationship
with an Iranian expatriate (Manuchehr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who
sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Govern-
ment. In acknowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of
the Iranian officials involved, he (Ghorbanifar) indicated that
his 'sponsors' in Tehran could also help to resolve the American
hostage situation in Beirut.
In June of 1985, in the midst of the TWA-847 hijacking, the
Israeli officials in direct contact with the Iranian expatriate
asked him to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to
obtain the release of the hijacked passengers. Two days after
this approach, four Americans held separately from the rest of
the hijacked sassengers were freed and turned over to Syrian
authorities. pi|^|^0BVHHBMIi^V^^^^BBBBAMaj lis
Speaker RafsaiT^ani, who was travelling in the mid-east it the
time, and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati both intervened with
the captors. Rafsanjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for
the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter.
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On July 3, 1985, during a visit to Washington, an Israeli
official (Kimche) advised National Security Advisor, Robert
McFarlane, that Israel had established a channel of communication
with authoritative elements in Iran who were interested in
determining whether the United States was open to a discreet,
high-level dialogue. The Iranians were described as comprising
the principal figures of the government (i.e.. Speaker of the
Majlis Rafsanjani, Prime Minister Musavi, and Khomeini's
heir-apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri) and as being devoted to a
reorientation of Iranian policy.
At this first meeting, McFarlane went to great length to draw out
the Israeli as to why he found the Iranian proposal credible,
given the events of the past six years. The Israeli replied that
their exhaustive analysis had gone beyond the surface logic
deriving from the chaos and decline within Iran and the
degenerative effects of the war, to more concrete tests of the
willingness of the Iranians to take personal risks. He noted
that the Iranians had exposed themselves to possible compromise
by meeting with Israelis and by passing extremely sensitive
intelligence on the situation (and political line-up) within Iran
— information which was proven valid.
The Israeli asked for our position on opening such a dialogue.
No mention was made of any pre-conditions or Iranian priorities.
McFarlane conveyed this proposal to the President (in the
presence of the Chief of Staff) . The President said that he
believed such a dialogue would be worthwhile at least to the
point of determining the validity of the interlocutors. This
decision was passed to the Israeli diplomat by telephone on
July 30.
On August 2, 1985, the Israeli called again on McFarlane. At
this meeting, he stated that he had conveyed our position to the
Iranian intermediary and that the Iranians had responded that
they recognized the need for both sides to have tangible evidence
of the bona fides of the other and that they believed they could
affect the release of the Americans held hostage in Lebanon.
According to the Israeli, the Iranians separately stated that
they were vulnerable as a group and before having any prospect of
being able to affect change within Iran they would need to be
substantially strengthened. To do- so, they would need to secure
the cooperation of military and/or Revolutionary Guard leaders.
Toward this end, they e.xpressed the view that the most credible
demonstration of their influence and abilities would be to secure
limited amounts of U.S. equipment. The Israeli asked for our
position on such actions.
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Mr. McFarrafle elevated this proposition to the President at a
meeting within days that included the Secretaries of State and
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President
stated that, while he could understand that assuming the
legitimacy of the interlocutors, they would be quite vulnerable
and ultimately might deserve our support to include tangible
material; at the time, without any first hand experience in
dealing with them, he could not authorize any transfers of
military material. This was conveyed to the Israeli.
'a_
On August 22, 1985, the Israeli diplomat called once more to
report that the message had been conveyed and that an impasse of
confidence existed. He asked what the position of the U.S.
Government would be to an Israeli transfer of modest quantities
of defensive military materiel. McFarlane replied that to him,
such an action would represent a distinction without a difference.
The Israeli diplomat explained at great length that Israel had
its own policy interests that would be served by fostering such a
dialogue in behalf of the U.S., but that a problem would arise
when ultimately they needed to replace items shipped. He asked
whether Israel would b« able to purchase replacements for items
they chose to ship. McFarlane stated that the issue was not the
ability of Israel to purchase military equipment from the U.S. —
they had done so for a generation and would do so in the future
— but rather the issue was whether it was U.S. policy to ship or
allow others to ship military equipment to Iran. The Israeli
asked for a position from our government. McFarlane elevated the
question to the President (and to the Secretaries of State and
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence) . T>e President
stated that, while he could envision providing materv?! support
to moderate elements in Iran if all the Western hostages we£e
freed, he could not approve any transfer of military materi^'l at
that time. This position was conveyed to the Israeli diplomat.
On September 14, 1985, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in
Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization. This release was
preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Terry Waite, the
Special Emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury. To this date,
Mr. Waite remains the only Westerner to eve
the Lebanese kidnappers,. '
iy
In late September, we learned that the Israelis had transferred
508 TOW missiles to Iran and that this shipment had taken place
in late August. The Israelis told us that they undertook the
action, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in
their strategic interests. The Israelis managed this entire
operation, to include delivery arrangements, funding, and
transportation. After discussing this matter with the President,
it was decided not to expose this Israeli delivery because we
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wanted to retain ^he option of exploiting the existing Israeli
channel with Tehran in our own effort to establish a strategic
dialogue with the Iranian government. The total value of the 508
TOWs shipped by Israel was estimated to be less than S2 million.
On October 4, 1985, Islamic Jihad announced that it had "executed"
Beirut Station Chief William Bucicley in retaliation for the
October 1 Israeli air raid on PLO installations in Tunis. This
announcement led to a series of meetings in Europe among the U.S.
(CIA and NSC), Israeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In these
meetings, the Iranians indicated that, while their ability to
influence the Hizballah was waning, the Hizballah had not killed
Buckley; he had in fact died several months earlier
causes. We have since substantiated this informatior
iJce symptoms.
Buckley probably died on June 3, 1985 of pneumonia-iike sym^
In mid-November, the Israelis, through a senior officer in the
Foreign Minister's office (Kimche) , indicated that the Government
of Israel was convinced that they were nearing a breakthrough
with Iran on a high-level dialogue. The Israeli contacted a U.S.
official (North) and asked for the name of a European-based
airline which could discreetly transit to Iran for the purpose of
delivering passengers and cargo. He specifically noted that
neither a U.S. carrier nor an Israeli affiliated carrier could be
used. We were assured, at the tine, that the Israelis were going
to "try oil drilling parts as an incentive," since we had
expressed so much displeasur^ove^th^earlier TOW shipment. The
name the proprietaryH^^^H|||^^^^HHBwas passed to the
Israeli, who subsequentl^nl^^^^^^^^^^^^hartered through
normal commercial contract for a flight from Tel Aviv to Tabriz,
Iran, on November 25, 1985. The Israelis were unwitting of the
CIA's involvement in the airline and the airline was paid at the
normal commercial charter rate (approximately S127,700). The
airline personel were also unwitting of the cargo they carried.
In January, we learned that the Israelis, responding to urgent
entreaties from the Iranians, ha^ used the proprietary aircraft
to transport 18 HAWK missiles to Iran in an effort to improve the
static air defenses around Tehran. Our belated awareness that
the Israeli's had delivered HAWK missiles raised serious U.S.
concerns that these deliveries were jeopardizing our objective of
arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian officials. As
a consequence of U.S. initiative and by mutual agreement of all
three parties, these missiles were returned to Israel in Februarv
1986.
On December 7, the President convened a meeting in the White
House (residence) to discuss next steps in our efforts to
establish direct contact with the Iranians. Attending the
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meeting were the Chief of Staff, Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his
Deputy. Immediately after the meeting, Mr. McFarlane departed
for London to meet with the Israeli official and the Iranian
contact to make clear the nature of our interest in a dialogue
with Iran. At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane, as instructed by the
President, stated that:
the U.S. was open to a political dialogue with Iran, but
that no such dialogue could make progress for as long as
groups seen as dominated by Iran held U.S. hostages; and
the U.S. could under no circumstances transfer arms to Iran
in exchange for hostages.
These points were made directly to the Iranian interlocutor. The
Iranian replied that, unless his associates in Tehran were
strengthened, they could not risk going ahead with the dialogue.
Mr. McFarlane acknowledged the position but stated we could not
change our position. In a separate meeting with the Israeli
official, Mr. McFarlane made clear our strong objections to
Israeli weapons shipments to Iran. Following these meetings,
Mr. McFarlane returned to Washington and shortly thereafter left
active government service.
On January 2, the Prime Minister of Israel dispatched a special
emissary to the U.S. (Amiram Nir) to review proposals for next
steps in dealing with Iran. The Israelis urged that we reconsider
the issue of providing limited defensive arms to those attempting
to take power in Tehran, since all other incentives (economic
assistance, medical supplies, machine parts) were of no value in
shoring-up those who wanted an opening to the West. Admiral
Poindexter noted our stringent objections to the HAWK missile
shipments in November and noted that the U.S. would have to act
to have them returned (a step undertaken in February, when all
18 missiles were returned to Israel) . In that any implementation
of the Israeli proposals would require the active participation
of the intelligence community, the NSC Staff (North) was tasked
to prepare a covert action finding. Work on this Presidential
finding commenced on January 4.
On January 6, the President, the Vice President, the Chief of
Staff, and the National Security Advisor and his assistant
reviewed the first draft of the Finding and the recommendations
made by the Prime Minister of Israel through his special
emissary.
On January 7, the President met in the Oval Office with the Vice
President, the Chief of Staff, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger,
Attorney General Meese, Director Cjisey^ ^d the National Security
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Advisor to discuss the overall situation in Iran and prospects
for a strategic dialogue. It was again noted that Mr. McFarlane,
on retum-£^rom his trip to London, had recommended that no
further action be taken unless a mechanism could be established
by which the U.S. could exert better control over events. He
agreed, in principle, with Director Casey that providing limited
quantities of defensive arms after the hostages were released
still had merit. Both Secr*tary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger
objected to any provision of arms, citing that we could not be
sure that these would really help moderate elements and that, if
exposed, the project would not be understood by moderate Arabs
and would be seen as contravening our policy of not dealing with
states that support terrorism. The President decided that we
should attempt to )ceep the Israeli channel active as long as it
offered possibilities for meetings with high-level Iranian
officials and left open the issue of providing defensive arms to
Iran if all the hostages were released.
It was further determined by the President that any dialogue with
the Iranians must be aimed at achieving the following goals:
Devising a formula for re-establishing a strategic
relationship with Tehran.
Ending the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms.
Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and
radical subversion.
Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and
coordinating ways in which we might counter Soviet
activities in the region.
The President made clear that a Western dialogue with Iran would
be precluded unless Iran were willing to use its influence to
achieve the release of Western hostages in Beirut. He also made
clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms for
hostages. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger retained their
original position on providing any arars to Iran, but Attorney
General Meese and Director Casey both supported the concept as a
valid means of opening the dialogue. Attorney General Meese
noted a 1981 determination by then Attorney General French Smith
that transferring small quantities of arms through third
countries under a Covert Action Finding was not illegal.
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On January 16, a meeting was held in the National Security
Advisor's office with Secretary Weinberger, Attorney General
Meese, Director Casey, and CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin.
At this meeting, the final draft of the Covert Action Finding was
reviewed and was forwarded to the President with Secretary
Weinberger dissenting.
On January 17, 1986, the President approved a Covert Action
Finding (Tab A) directing that the intelligence community proceed
with special activities aimed at accomplishing the goals set
forth above. The President futher determined that the activities
authorized by the Finding justified withholding prior Congressional
notification due to the extreme sensitivity of the dialogue being
established. He further noted that public knowledge of the
program would place the Americiui hostages in Lebanon at greater
risk. Noting his concern for the lives of those carrying out the
operation (both U.S. and foreign), he directed that the Director
of Central Intelligence refrain from reporting the Finding to the
appropriate committees of the Congress until reasonably sure that
those involved would no longer be in jeopardy.
On February 5-7, U.S. officials (NSC and ClA
representative of the Israeli Prime Ministi
senior-level Iranian official!
I met in London. At this meeting, tn« Iranians agrc
:he USG would provide defensive weapons (TOWs) to Iran,
they would, in turn, provide same to the Afghan Mujahideen. The
U.S. side agreed to explore this possibility and, working with
the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of
the weapons:
The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit funds
in an Israeli account.
The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.-
controlled account in an overseas bank.
Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain materiel
authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and
transport this to Israel for onward movement to Iran.
Using the procedures stipulated above, S3. 7 million was deposited
in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on
February 14, 1,000 TOWs were transported to Israel for pre-position-
ing. These TOWs were transferred by CIA from DOG (U,
jton, Alabama) and transoorte^throug^
[using standard CIA-OOD IHIHHP logistics
ffangements";" Policy-level coordination for these arrangements
was effected by NSC (North) with DOD (Armitage) and CIA (Clair
George). The TOWs were placed in a covert Israeli facility
awaiting onward shipment.
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On r«bru»ry^ 19-21, U.S. (NSC and CIA), Israeli and Iranian
officials mat in G«nnany to discuss problems in arranging a
meeting among higher2igaftI_of f icials . At ..this_.meet_ing..__thii
^BB^HiHBlHIBHH^HHHH^'^^^^°^*^^uthorTzation
'wa.a receivea rrom wasnington, cne u.s. side agreed to provide
1,000 TOWS to Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This
delivery was conanenced on the morning of February 20 and completed
in two transits to Tehran on February 21. Transportation from
Israel to Iran was aboard a false flag Israeli aircraft. On ••'• -
return flight from Iran, these aircraft carried the 18 HAWIc
missiles which Israel had sent to Tehran in November 1985 wit
USG aforeknow ledge.
On February 24, U.S. (CIA and NSC) officials met again in
Frankfurt with the Israeli and Iranian officials to discuss n
steps. At this meeting, the U.S. side urged that the Iranian
expedite a meeting among higher-level officials on both sides
On February 28, the Prime Minister of Israel wrote to Preside
Reagan (Tab B) urging continued efforts to achieve a strategi
breakthrough with Iran, but asking consideration for the safe
of recently seized Israeli hostages.
On March 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives me
with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether a
further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level
meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings,
the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation
in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military
effectiveness.
The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14
strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the
Iranians urged the intermediary (Ghorbanifar) to accelerate the
effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate
advised us through the Israeli point-of-contact that the
leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue
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kiNCtASSIFIEU
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r
with th« -6nit«d States along the lines of our established goals.
— U ~
On May 6, 7, 1986, U.S. and Israeli officers met in London with
the Iranian intennediary in which he urged that we take ismediat
steps to arrange for a high-level U.S. /Iranian meeting in Tehran
During the London meeting, the Iranian urged that we (O.S. and
Israel) act urgently to help with Iranian air defense. He
emphasized that the Iraqi Air Force was increasingly effective c
late and that the Iranians were desperate to stop attacks on
population centers. The Israelis also used this opportunity to
privately ask the U.S. to replace the 508 TOWs which they had
sent to Iran in August, 1985.
Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face witl
top-level Iranian officials, on May 15, the President author ize<
a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor
McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, CIA communicators,
members of the NSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocu-
tors. The Israelis were informed via coded message on Hay 15
that the U.S. had agreed to the Iranian request for limited
anti-air defense equipment and to replenish the 508 TOWs sent by
Israel.
On May 16, the Iranians, through the Israelis provided S6.5M for
deposit in the CIA secure funding mechanism. The funds were used
to acquire 508 TOW missiles (for replenishing the TOWs Israel
shipped in September 1985) and acquiring HAWK missile^^^ctronic
Warts. This material was subsequently moved ta|^^m||||
repackaged and shipped to Kelly AFB for onward movement to
'on May 22. As in the February shipment, the CIA provided
logistics support for the movement of this materiel to Israel.
In order to ensure operational security, the McFarlane trip was
made from Israel, coincident with the delivery of a pallet of
spare parts for Iranian defensive weapon_s _3vs^tems (HAWK spare
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KNJOUSte
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li 30374
electronic parts) . At the SDaaificrequest of th- Tr. •
alias foreign documentation ■■■■■■L\;^Z • ^^ Iranians,
was used. C?A alS proviJSd^iPt^anscortatifr" '^* "^ "
CONUS to Israel for ?he McFarU^r^rty?'^?he groSp'w^^" '"°"'
transported from Israel to Tah.-«n Tk^^Ij ^ "S^^oup was
with false flag mar"ngs? ""^ *" ^""^^ ^^^ ^°^« "O^
In the course of the four-rfau «M>ir ?« ■>a\ ■ -^
Sg^Jh^-s-^^^^^^^
" fr?^ ^Se'SdSrEas'ir ^P^^""^ ^'^^^ '"-^^ to expel us
that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism;
"" reverse -J^^^^^^ '^^^^ revolution and did not seek to
poUcrL''ti ;""*Lfhf„nn''*M-^'"'"*'"*"^^ involving regional
policies (I.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but micht also
c'f^ t"" °^ =°'™°n interest (i.e., Afghanistan !nd ?he
Soviet threat to the Gulf) through dialogue.
During these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail
the obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between
5clarI!ne°eSo^as!;.d'^^,*'"''r'°" "? the%oints noted abo':? Mr
involvement in ^h!h«^^* political problems caused by Iranian
[j^r »™hT!^ „^ hostage issue. The Iranians obiected to the
cont!Sed'?SG"b?oc);ina'o5'T^ '"^P''" ""''^'"^ P^^^ ^°^ P^- ^^-
concinuea LSG bloclcing of Iranian assets in the U.S., even aft^r
U.S. courts had ruled in their favor. During the cour« of ^n!L
T^Vt^V'.^''^ '"""" Officials admitted tia? tSey "oJld not w!n
"S^.Tt^; ^"^ ""! ^" * dilemma in Tehran over how-to end t°l
^nnfi K ^'^^? 5^^ "^^'^ to present an Iranian "victory" before it
laSdL Hu^^'^'''^^*'- l""^^ emphasized that the origlSIl aggresJor!
Saddam Hussein, must be removed from power in order for the wir
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to end. Mr. McFarlane concluded the visit by summarizing that
notwithstanding Iranian interest in carrying on with the dialogue,
we could not proceed with further discussions in light of their
unwillingness to exert the full weight of their influence to
cause the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon.
On June 10, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made
guarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with
the U.S. On July 26, Father Lawrence Jenco was released in the
Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint.
On August 3, the remaining three pallets (less than \ planeload)
of electronic parts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses (HAWK
missile sub-components) arrived in Tehran. As in all flights
to/ from Iran this delivery was made with an Israeli Air Force
aircraft (707) using false flag markings. Timing of the delivery
was based on coordination among U.S., Israeli and Iranian
officials.
In early August 1986, the contact with the Iranian expatriate
began to focus exclusively on the willingness of the USG to
provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for hostages and
we sought to establish different channels of communication which
would lead us more directly to pragmatic and moderate elements in
the Iranian hierarachy. In mid-August, a private American
citizen (MGEN Richard Secord, USAF [Ret.]) acting within the
purview of
Europe with
senior Irani
CIA, this Iranian ^
detailed discussions
ict in
:of a
Snjani) . with the assistance of the
fwas brought covertly to Washington for
We judged this effort to be useful in
establishing contact with a close confidant of the man judged to
be the most influential and pragmatic political figure in Iran
(Rafsanjani). These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives
of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. We also
provided assessments designed to discourage an Iranian offensive
and contribute to am Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the
war. The assessments also detailed the Soviet threat to Iran.
Through August, September, and October 1986, numerous additional
meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the
new Iranian contacts. During the October 26, 1986 meeting in
Frankfurt, Germany, the U.S. side, as in the past, insisted that
the release of the hostages was a pre-requisite to any progress.
The Iranian , 'HiH^^^B^^ urged that we take a moi
resii
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iJ 30376
Th« Iranian* also proff«r|^^n^th«U . S . accepted, the offer of
a Soviet T-72 tanJc^|m|^|HIHH||^^ The have also
offered to provide a copy ortne*OT^lge interrogation of Beirut
Station Chief William Buckley. At this meeting, Ali stated that
there was a "very good chance that another American or two would
be freed soon." On October 29, with U.S. acquiscence, Israel
provided Iran with an additional increment of defensive weapons
(500 TOW missiles) .
Late on 31,|^^^m^H^^^^called the
(HaJcim) tasked to maintain contact and advised that Iran had
"exercised its influence with the Lebanese" in order to obtain
the release of an American — David Jacobsen — and an uncertain
number of French hostages. Re further noted that this would be
part of the purpose of the Iranian Foreign Minister's vi«it_
Syria — an event we became aware of on November 1, 1986.
stated that the situation in Tehran, »• f n »« Tr^^j^ <»i
ovet Hizballah were both deteriorating
iXl^Rce
ravi
2, David Jacobsen was released by his captors near "Eha old
American Embassy compound in West Beirut. The U.S. Onbassy in
East Beirut immediately dispatched an embassy officer to West
Beirut to pick up Mr. Jacobsen.
It is now apparent that persistent U.S. efforts to establish
contact with Iran and subsequent public speculation regarding
these contacts have probably exacerbated the power struggle in
Iran between pragmatic elements (led by Rafsanjani) and more
radical factions (under the overall sponsorship of Ayatollah
Montazeri) . In late October, radical supporters (of Montazeri)
revealed the (Rafsanjani) contact with the USG and the terms of
the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of
colluding with the USG and to preserve a degree of latitude for
both parties, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani provided a purposely
distorted version of the May 1986 McFarlane mission in his
November 4 address to the masses. Moderate Iranian political
leaders apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal
political problems before proceeding with the U.S. relationship.
The revelations in Tehran regarding the McFarlane mission are
demonstrable evidence of the internal power struggle. The
October 1986 arrest of radical leader Mehdi Hashemi, a close
confidant and son in-law of Ayatollah Montezari, for acts of
terrorism and treason has caused further internal conflict.
Resolution of the Lebanon hostage situation is also complicated
by waning Iranian influence in Lebanon due in part to financial
constraints and the fact that the Libyans are expanding their
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On November 7, the day after a meeting with U.S. officials,
Iranian government authorities arrested six other individuals
involved in radical activities. Among the two were senior
military officers and a Majlis deputy (Ahmad Kashani) , the
grandson of Ayatollah Kashani, a conspirator in the 1949 attempt
against the Shah.
Despite these internal difficulties and attendant publicity in
the Western media, the Iranians continue to maintain direct
contact with the USG and met again iii_2sneya on Nov«
statement" will be
made m the near future by Rafsanjani.
Bo tA^HH|m^^^^have warned' that furtTTer
disclosures could ha^^tne^personally and the longer-term
interests of the two countries.
It is important to note that since the initiation of the USG
contact with Iran there has been no evidence of Iranian govern-
ment complicity in acts of terrorism against the U.S. We do not
know who seized the last three American hostages in Beirut
(Messrs. Reed, Cicippio, and Tracy). The Islamic Jihad
Organization (IJO) has
:t is possible that these three
Americans were kidnapped at the direction of Iranian radicals
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loyal to the now imprisoned Mehdi Hashemi. If so, this could be
an effort to undermine the nascent U.S. -Iranian strategic
dialogue and exacerbate the internal Iranian power struggle
against the pragmatic faction with which we have been in contact.
Throughout this process, the USG has acted within the limits of
established policy and in compliance with all U.S. law. The
shipment of 2,008 U.S. TOWs and 235 HAWK missile electronic spare
parts was undertaken within the provisions of a Covert Action
Finding.
During the course of this operation — and before — the U.S. was
cognizant of only three shipments from Israel to Iran.
Specifically:
The Israelis acknowledged the August 1985 shipment of 508
TOWs after it had taken place. Until we were advised by the
Israelis, and had the information subsequently confirmed by
Iraniem authorities, we were unaware of the composition of
the shipment. We subsequently agreed to replace these TOWs
in May of 1986.
The November 1985 shipment of 18 Israeli HAWK missiles was :
not an authorized exception to policy. This shipment was
retrieved in February 1986 as a consequence of U.S.
intervention.
The October 1986 shipment of 500 TOWs from Israel to Iran
was undertaken with U.S. acquiescence. These TOWs were
replaced on November 7.
In support of this Finding and at the direction of the President,
the CIA provided the following operational assistance:
CIA communications officers and an annuitant to assist in
various phases of the operation.
Sterile overseas bank accounts for financial transactions.
A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S.
military items from the U.S.
Transhipment of military items from the U.S. to Israel.
Communications and intelligence support for the meetings
with Iranian officials and the McFarlane trip to Tehran in
May.
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
Cleared meeting sites in Europe for meetings with VTi^m79
officials.
Fabricated and alias documentation for U.S. and foreign
officials for meetings in Europe and Tehran.
The weapons and materLrfl provided under this program were judged
to be inadequate to aiter either the balance of military power or
the outcome of the war with Iraq. They have, however, demonstrated
the U.S. commitment to Iranian territorial integrity and served
to support those in Iran interested in opening a strategic
relationship with the U.S. U.S. efforts over the last 18 months
have had tangible results on Iranian policy:
— ^The Rafsanjani/Velayati intervention on behalf of the TWA
#847 pa«engeis IJune l!*a5) .
Iranian direction that the hijacked Pan Am #73 would not be
received in Iranian territory if it left Karachi.
The release of three
hostages.
at least two French
The initiation of an Iranian dialogue with their regional
neighbors.
Continued delay in the Iranian "final offensive."
Finally, it mu«t al«o be noted that the U.S. arms embargo
notwithstanding. West European nations have provided $500 million
a year in military equipment to Iran. Most of these transfers
were accomplished with government Icnowledge and/or acquiescence.
All appropriate Cabinet Officers have been apprised throughout.
The Congress was not briefed on the covert action Finding due to
the extraordinary sensitivity of our Iranian contacts and the
potential consequences for our strategic position in Sout.hwest
Asia. Finally, our efforts to achieve the release of the
hostages in Lebanon must continue to rely on discreet contacts
and intermediaries who cannot perform if they are revealed.
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
320
yNCLASSIFII
Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of
The Foreign Asaiatance Act at 1961
^_ A3 Amended, Concerning Operations
Undertaken by the Central Intelligence , ,
Agency in Foreign Countries. Other Than '• -J 0 3 8 0
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose
of Intelligence Collection
I hereby find that the follov.'ing operation in a foreign
country (including all support necessary to such operation) is
important to the national security of the United States, and due
to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is
essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of
Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to
the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.
SCOPE DESCRIPTION
Iran Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services,
third countries and third parties which have
established relationships with Iranian elements,
groups, and individuals sympathetic to O.S. Government
interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist
actions directed against U.S. persons, property or
interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more
moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them
significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to
determine the current Iranian Government's intentions
with respect to its neighbors and with respect to
terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the
American hostages held in Beirut and preventing
additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide
funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training,
guidance and communications and other necessary
assistance to these elements, groups, individuals,
liaison services and third countries in support of
these activities.
The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties
and third countries to establish contact with moderate
elements within and outside the Government of Iran by
providing these elements with arms, equipment and
related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of
these elements in their effort to achieve a more
pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their
ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their
country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet
Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S.
Government learns that these elements have abandoned
their goals of moderating their government and
appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that
provided by tj^is Finding ._
The White House -- ,1 OGCR TS 0801-86
Washington, D.C. X.'---^V. '■ ' ;j^>^^^^opy 1
■■■ " ■■' iteifiE
321
N 3038/ -
A/26S82
ENTIReTH
82-690 0-88-12
322
3 9971
Testimony of Mr. Richard L. Armltage,
fv«l IV, Social Security Number
Assistant Secretary of Defense
[nternatlonal Security Affairs), Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Washington, DC 20310,
Ph: ^■■■mtaken at Room «E808. Pentagon,
on zH becenber 1986 from 0937 to 1016, by
COL Ned Bacheldor and COL Janes 0 Morton.
Partially Oeclassilied/Relessed on 11^6^8%
_^« ^ .««* undei provisions oi E 0 1'3-i6
COL MORTON: It Is now 0937. 2« December 1986. by K Johnson, National Secmc/ Co.nc,i
The persons present are:
The witness, Mr. Artnltage; the Investigating officers.
Colonel Morton and Colonel Bacheldor.
We are located In room OESOS In the Pentagon.
This Is an official Investigation concerning the sale and/or
transfer of missiles, spare parts and other related equipment to
selected Middle Eastern countries. It Is being conducted at the
direction of The Secretary of the Army.
Sir our report will be classified Secret]
MR. ARMITACE: I understand.
COL MORTON: I want to explain to you a unique aspect of
Inspector General activities. An Inspector General is a
confidential investigator and fact finder for the commander
Information obtained in a report prepared by the Inspector
General »rt for the use of the directing authority or hlghe
authority as they deem appropriate. Testimony which you gl
be used In the Department of the Army for official purposes
is Department of the Army policy to keep such Information a
reports on a closely held basis. However, In some Instance
there may be public disclosure of Inspector General materia
required by law and regulations. Normally, however any rel
outside the Department of the Array requires the approval of
Inspector General and In such cases release when unavoldabl
be kept to the minimum necessary.
Upon completion of the Interview I will ask you whether you
consent to the release of your testimony to requests from members
of the public. Your lack of consent does not mean that your
testimony will not be released If it Is required by law.
However, no release will be made until the office of The
ve can
. It
nd
1 as
ease
The
e win
Exhibit 17
iwsm'
(ARMITACE)
323
■*4ssfe
IREO
testimony to determine
Inspector General has reviewed yoi
release Is required.
Any questions sir?
COL MORTON: Shaking head no.
MR. ARMITAGE: No.
COL MORTON: During the course of this Interview you will be
asked to furnish personal Information. The Privacy Act since
1971 requires that when you are asked to furnish personal
information you be Informed of the authority for that and other
required Information. The statement I handed you earlier serves
that purpose. Sir, have you read and do you understand the
Privacy Act of ^9T^^
MR. ARMITAGE: I understand It, and I have read It.
COL MORTON: Very good. Tour testlaony will be recorded and may
b-« transcribed so that an accurate record can be made available
to the directing authority.
You are not suspected of any offense under federal code, nor
are you the subject of any prejudicial Information, nor an
offense under local law. However, I am not advising you of the
rights of which such a person Is entitled. If you do become a
suspect for any reason during our Interview, I will tell that you
are a suspect and infora you of your rights. However, I would
like to advise that you do not have to answer any questions, the
answer to which may tend to Incriminate you. Any questions, sir?
HR. ARMITAGE: I have no questions.
COL MORTON: Would you please rise so I aay swear you in?
(The witness, Mr. Richard L. Armitage, was duly sworn.)
COL MORTON: Please be stated.
BT COL MORTON:
Q. Sir, please state your full name and grade.
A. Richard Lee Armitage, Executive Level Four, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.
9972
And Social Security Number?
Blf COL BACHELDOR:
Exhibit 17
IWSlASSffi-
(ARMITAGE )
324
BNCMSStfe
0 9973
Q. Sir, could you start by giving us a general description
of what you know about the Incident on the missile transfer or
Hawk repair parts transfer?
COL MORTON: Back on tape, sir.
went back in the July time frain<
You were talking about the reply
MR. ARMITACE: Yea, yea. Roughly July
Mr. McFarlane over the Secretary's slgnatur
uh, about this until late November. I was
Middle East, Pakistan I believe. Came back
discussions with ny State friends. We were
transfers to--to uh, Iran, possibly from Is
no confirmed Intelligence, but speculation
believe that the Secretary of Defense had 1
(portion of text deleted) tha
that some people In the White House had bee
Iranians. Armed with that suspicion of the
around the admlnlstriitlon and finally got t
Ollle North, and asked him If he knew anyth
admitted to me that'he had been meeting wit
I expressed to him my surprise at this, and
boss, the Secretary, would be horrified at
personal view that Ollle was way out on a 1
get uh. all the urn uh President's advisors
figure out who's doing what to whom. I don
an eventual meeting In December or not, but
around December 7th, Saturday December 7th,
sent the reply back to
e and heard no more.,
on travel In the
and I had several
seeing rumors of arms
rael. I say rumors,
on It. Also, I
ndlcated that
t he was suspicious
n dealing with
Secretary, I nosed
o Lieutenant Colonel
Ing about It, and he
h Iranians In Europe.
said to hla that my
this news, and my own
irab and we'd better
In the same room and
't know If that caused
for whatever reason
there was a meeting
Exhibit 17
flNWSIflEIT'
(ARMITACE)
325
WMSSIflEfl
D 9974
held with the President and I know for sure that my boss and
Secpetary Shulti were there and I can't say 0*ef Inl 1 1 vely who else
was there. But at that time aras for Iran were discussed. The
Secretary caa« back and basically Indicated that he thought that
the baby had been strangled In the cradle. In other words this
idea was goinc nowhere. I heard nothing until Dec - January. In
•arly January, again approximately the 7th of January, there was
another aeetlng-- with the President. The Secretary of State and
the -Secretary of Defense were there. The uh Attorney General was
there, I believe the Vice President was there and Mr. Polndexter
was there. I can't say who else. In which the arms to Iran Idea
was discussed ags n, and Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger were
adamantly opposed, and I can only assume were eloquent in their
opposition for all sorts of reasons, to Include legalities. I
know the Secretary of Defense waa very suspicious that this alght
not be legal. Uh, he came back from the meeting and did not
Indicate, the Secretary came back from the meeting and did not
Indicate that any decision had been made. I believe It's correct
to say that he came away from that meeting thinking no decision
had been reached. ..Some time in approximately late January,
.'.Colin Powell, however. Informed me that he had been instructed
by the Secretary to move, ..have the Army move, weapons under an
Economy Act transfer, to the CIA, so it was clear to me at that
time that a decision had been reached sometime after the January
7th meeting and that it had gone against the Defense Department's
point of view. And that is we were now to supply these weapons.
All General Powell told me, as I remember, is that he was doing
this as a courtesy and because he had the Secretary's permission
to let me know that basically our policy advice had been
overridden. And he informed ne the Secretary told him to prepare
the Basic TOWs, have the Army prepare Basic TOWs for shipment to
the CIA, and his, the only two points he made to me about It was
that he did talk to General Thurman ..and that he uh, the
Secretary uh, was not, was very unhappy, ..with this development,
but the Secretary had said that an Economy Act transferred to the
CIA, and, my words, but the thrust was that the department was to
lose no money on the sale, that's my words.
COL MORTON: Did he give you numbers sir?
MR. ARMITACE: I know the numbers now. I can't remember that he
gave me the numbers. Uh , I can't remember that, but I know he
told me weapons. And I can't remember If he said radars or not.
I know now (COL MORTON: Sure.) uh, I must say just for the
record, some of these events are over a year and half old so my
memory is a little hazy, and then in preparation for testimony
over the last four or five weeks I've become a lot smarter on
this issue than I ever thought, so occasionally my remembrance
might run together with what 1 know, you know after the public uh
announcement .
COL BACHELDOR: It was alleged in the, In
discussed numbers of weapons, of monies a\
throughout the fall
imm:
falls, that NSC had
allable possibly uh
forth.
(AR.MITAGE )
■IINMlflEff-
i3 9975
MR. ARHITACEr I have--
COL BACHELOOR: Were you aware of any of that sir?
HR. ARHITAGE: Well I aa from subsequent discussions that General
Powell said he had discussions about numbers and weapons to ae,
and !'■ aware of this subsequent to public revelations. I wasn't
awa'ce of it at the tiae. There was one discussion — and I want
to say Noveaber or Deceaber, but I was gone and General Powell
had to get soae pricing infornation fron DSAA and I think was the
HAWK aisslles and the Defense Security Assistance Agency gave hln
the inforaation on HAWK aissiles, and when I cane back DSAA had
made ne aware that they had provided to General Powell soae
inforaation on HAWK aissiles. My best remembrance is
Noveaber/Deceaber 85 on that.
COL MORTON: Earlier sir, I believe you said the COL, General
Powell said the Secretary directed hia to ship Basic TOWa.
MR. ARMITACE: That's what I said.
COL MORTON: Okay,
of TOW then.
It was the Secretary's decision on the type
HR. ARMITAGE: Uh--well that's how I remember it (COL HORTON-
right sir) that the Secretary said we're going to go Basic TOWs
whether he said vanilla TOWs or Basic TOWs, I don't know. The
Secretary told ae now subsequent to all this, in the last several
aonths, he told ae that, when I asked hia in preparation for
testimony, who told hia to do it, he said well it was the
President. Whether It was the President through Poindexter, or
the President himself, I don't know, but that's what the
Secretary told me. Uh , whether General Powell said to me TOWs or
basic TOWs— it wouldn't have nade any difference to me (COL
MORTON-yes Sir) because any weapons was, you know we lost our
virginity, I was appalled at It all.
COL MORTON: But to your best recollections you knew of no
specific number nor a dollar amount available.
MR. ARMITAGE: No. My, I know I — I have a specific
recollection of item. 1 know nothing about dollar amounts. And
I don't think that I know specific amounts of missiles though
General Powell might have told me. He's a very thorough man. He
probably did, but it didn't mean anything.
COL BACHELDOR; Based on your current position or any position
you've her, held sir, would you have any idea what a TOW would
cost or aight cost.
MR. ARHITAGE: I know what a TOW is and I've seen ' ea in combat,
uh so I know exactly what it is. I have no idea what it costs.
In fact, had never had a discussion of money involving this issue
■mmm
(ARMITAGE)
327
JNCLASSIFIEO..
D 9976
nyseir. Involving this Issue, other than the discussions I had
with people lUe LTC Arobrlght and all »a I prepared for
testimony and I had to learn what we paid.
0, General Powell mentioned uh that he In fact tasked the
Army, and aa you stated to talk to General Thurnan. Old he at
any tine talk about any other tasking or any other discussions
with you--agaln I can give you a name. General Russo was the Aray
point of contact.
A. He, yes, he told me, now this Is after the fact, he's
told ne that he's had many discussions with General Russo about
uh the TOW shipments. He said he had many many conversations
with Russo. Now I learned that subsequent.
COL MORTOH:
subject.
Was the subject the price sir or do you know the
A. I, I can't say the subject. It was about the shipment
and about the transfer but whether it was price, he has told now.
General Powell told me more recently in the last month or so that
he was quite sure that General Russo would have a clear
remembrance that Powell had said don't lose any money on the
deal. Uh, now that, but I've learned all that in the last month
or so. Month and a half.
COL BACHELDOR: In any of your discussions with General Powell
would you have, uh, determined the feeling that the Army was
having difficulty tstabliahing a price or maybe being inept. Or
have you. . ?
A. No, I, I got none of that. It was never Indicated to me.
And other than the conversation along the lines that basically
the policy decision went against us and uh, we're gonna provide
these weapons to the CIA and eventually In some manner they're
gonna go to Iran. Uh , I wasn't involved. And sporadically
during the year I heard either from Vice Admiral Jones or Mr.
Taft that there were other shipments. But I think this Is
probably the only discussion I had with General Powell.
Q. You mentioned one discussion with uh. Colonel North.
Did you ever again discuss this issue with Colonel North.
A. I discussed this Issue with Colonel North on numerable
occasions, in that, when I say this situation, or discuss this
issue, arms to Iran and hostages. I felt that it was Impossible
to distinguish to the public, or indeed in my mind where we were
selling arms to Iran for strategic dialogue or for hostages. I
thought it was anathema, and I told Ollie every time that I had
an opportunity privately, that I thought that this was a bad bad
policy and It was bad business and we ought to be out of It.
(COL BACHELDOR-Alrlght sir.) I never did talk to Ollie, in my
recollection about pricing or anything, and I know that I never
had a conversation with anyone in the Army about this until I
Exhibit 17
■Mommi-
(ARMITACE )
328
started talking w
for my testimony,
Lieutenant Co lonel~intibr Igh t ,
ice things were made public.
9977
In preparation
Q. Sir, what do you know, in general, about the requirement
Tor a government agency to notify Congress if the aroa are
provided to — in the intelligence arena.
A. My understanding was that the receiving agency had to
notify and that's all I know. I know what would happen under the
Aras Export Control Act if we made a foreign military sale. And
those notifications, uh I was concerned about an arms embargo to
Iran, uh, I expressed those concerns to the Secretary and indeed
I'm under the impression that he expressed those concerns to the
President. But regarding an intelligence transfer, I was under
the impression that any notifications had to come from the
receiving U.S. government agency. Because they were the ones
that ultimately would make the transfer.
Q. Were you aware at the time of a dollar threshold?
A. No. Uh, though I am aware of a dollar threshold on the
Arms Export Control Act. regarding Foreign Military Sales. I was
not and am not now aware of a dollar threshold of a for a covert
program.
Q. What Is the arms uh what is the dollar threshol
roughly sir?
d for
A. I think Its roughly fourteen ■lllion for a
Itea or fifty million per sale. A bunch.
ijor enc
Q. Are you aware of any discussion of between the Army and
DOD reference notification of Congress. And more specifically,
I'll tell you there is (MR. ARMITAGE - Yes.) a one million dollar
notification requirement.
A. Fine, one million? (COL BACHELDOR - Yes sir) I was not
aware of that, but I have in conversations with General Powell...
subsequent to this thing becoming public, plus ray own preparation
and looking at Army materials, aware that the General Counsel of
the Array had some reservations. And had expressed these.
General Powell, in Frankfurt, one of my trips to Frankfurt, when
we were discussing this issue recently, told me that he remembers
receiving from the Army, and he wasn't sure who, the memo that
had some concerns, and that he fired that over to John
Poindexter. And this is what General Powell told me probably six
weeks ago. I, in going through Army material, reviewed a Susan
Crawford memo, it was a one page memo I think to the Secretary of
the Army, and I had that sent down to General Powell in General
Doctor's office the other day. I said is this the one (COL
MORTOM - Yes sir, we got that) -- Is that the one by the way?
COL BACHELDOR: No sir it is not. According to General Powell.
I've talked to General Brown and he is again looking uh and
Exhibit 17
Mmm»
(ARMITAGE)
"l/NWSIflED"
D 997
General Powell has said (MR. ARMITAGE - I can't believe the Army
doesn't have a copy somewhere. I know the U.S. Array.) Hell
we're at a loss too sir. Uh and we're looking hard. General
Powell Is going to try to help us after the thirty-first (MR.
ARMITAGE - Oh, I'm sure he will). Sir, urn did you talk to anyone
In the CIA reference this matter?
■IBS to
ling
Sub-
ire
id
he
were
lade. . )
. of
MR. ARMITAGE: Reference arns (COL BACHELDOR - Reference ar
IrM, sir) I talked uh, no prior, prior to the decision be
made. In the Terrorist Incident Working Croup, Operational
group, that's called the OSG of the T-WIG, which I sit, the
have been general discussions with Dewey Clarldge. I've ha
general discussions about how we, the Department, meaning t
Secretary did not like this policy of arms to Iran. Those
the only. ..(COL MORTOM - That was before the decision was m
Mo after. (COL MORTOM - Mr. Clarldge) Yea, Dewey Clarldge
the CIA. Generally the only, the topic was only that the
Department didn't like this, thought It was bad business.
COL BACHELDOR: Tou mentioned that in the suaaer/fall of 85 you
lieard rumors, maybe even later than fall, but you heard some
rumors of possible transfers to Iran (HR. ARMITAGE - teal). Were
you ever able to substantiate those rumors?
MR. ARMITAGE: Well we were hearing from Arab countries a lot.
Saying that Israel's selling all kinds of things to Iran. Uh,
we'd see some intelligence about reports of Israeli shipments. I
hadn't substantiated It, however in my testimonies recently I
have had occasion to testify with Mr. Casey and others, and I've
learned a hell of a lot that we didn't know then, and among the
things that I've learned Is that apparently TOWs were shipped
from Israel, as well as HAWK missiles from Israel, to Iran. And
it is alleged that someone In the U.S. government gave permission
for these third country transfers. And the Secretary of Defense
didn't know about it and his Assistant Secretary of Defense for
ISA didn't know about It and I can assure you the Secretary of
Defense would have opposeJ it.
Q. It appears obvious based on your comments,
didn't know It before, but now do you know what Irar
for the shipment of TOWs? The first shipment.
sir, that yoi
paid Israel
A. 1 don't know what Iran paid Israel, yet I know what the
CIA was charged by the Army. This Is what I do know. I do not
know what Iran actually paid Israel, or If they paid Israel. (COL
MORTON - The Army ' s ..)( COL BACHELDOR - Sir, I'm referring to..)
COL BACHELDOR: To set the record straight I'm referring to the
potential shipment that we're talking about In the fall of 85.
HR. ARMITAGE: Yea, you're talking about the 508 TOW missiles. I
heard in testimony on the Hill, I believe Mr. Casey, he indicated
that there was a shipment In August or September of 85 of 506 TOW
missiles from Israel. It's the first I've heard of It. I have
no, I have no knowledc
Exhibit
'-teASStflEt'
RED
(ARMITAGE )
330
979
COL BACHELOOflj Our souret sir, for IRft " AT Wr nation Is the,
the Washlngron Post, but that la the source that I was talking
about. I Mas talking about that aource, that shipment and any
possible prlelng.
Nl. AIMITACE: I learned about that In ay Hill testlaony. Mr.
Casex. said that, I believe It waa Casey, that there was a
ah-tpaent... In August or September, September strikes me aa the
date, of TOW missiles.
Q. In all of this discussion, preferably prior, but any
discussion was there any talk about the ultimate recipient, we
know Iran now, but the ultimate recipient having trouble paying
for anything that they would get?
MR. ARHITAGE: I didn't have any discussions like that, and I
didn't hear it. Occasionally
(portion of text deleted)
I'd sec references to uh bitching about money, payments. But,
and I didn't understand .. the context, and in many cases didn't
understand (portion of because there were different
names used text deleted) Things of that nature.
So, I think I am content to aay I had no idea what was being
charged for the weapons to Iran, how the procedures of payments
were being handled, and even the existence of Swiss bank
acoouots.
COL HORTON: Tou mentioned earlier sir, you didn't know a
specific price that we were charging the agency, but did you know
that there was . . .
MR. ARMITACE: Mo, I know now of the specific price. Of course I
did not at the time.
COL MORTON: But previously? But was there any pressure to keep
the price down .. that you know of?
MR. ARMITACE: Not by me.
Q. Did you know of any such
■essure :
A. I didn't know of any. Uh, and I know I was asked on the
Hill .. was there any pressure from OSD, and I could only repeat
what I've been told by General Powell and by the Secretary
subsequently, that is the instructions were Economy Act and don't
lose money. To the CIA only. Don't have anything to do with
transferring to another country or another uh middle man or
agency other than the CIA.
COL BACHELDOR: Do you have any idea sir, if the Amy knew the
ultimate destination for the equipment?
Exhibit 17
BNCtttlED"
(ARMITACE)
331
WAssm
DiviJ:'
HR. AHMITAGE: I am under the very strong Impression that they
did not know. Impression. Whether the Chief of Staff of the
Arny, Cenexal Wlckhan, might have eventually known because of a
discussion he had with Mr. Taft In the April/May time frame I
can't speak, but the Army as far as the guys who were making the
• rrangenents , !'■ under the lopresslon they had no Idea where it
was going.
•. ■ 0. Did you get Involved at all In the transfer of the, or
correction, the request for HAWK missile parts. Mr. Taft handled
that through General Wickham. were you involved at all sir?
A. No, I was travelling with the Secretary of Defense in
Asia, and we were Informed about it subsequently. I only found
out much more recently that Mr. Taft had spoken to General
Wickham about it. As we were trying to. In a discussion I had
with Mr. Taft, to determine who knew what in the building, and
he, Mr, Taft Indicated that he had had a discussion with General
Wlckhan, so General Wickham knew sonethlng. How much I can't
say.
Q. Sir, when we talked to General Powell he specifically
Indicated, based on his knowledge and timing when he left, that
it would be important for us, or thought it would be Important
for us to talk to you and, uh, Admiral Jones. Based on your
knowledge sir do you think It would b« beneficial for us to talk
to Mr. Taft.
A. Tea. uh, I think this is Aray and the Chief of Staff
apparently had a conversation with Mr. Taft and I think you
should .
COL BACHELOOR: Jim I have no other questions.
COL MORTON: Okay there was one thing....: think we had a glitch
on these numbers and dates here.
COL BACHELDOR: Uh , no Jim, I can answer that question. Mr.
Aroitage and I were discussing missiles shipped from Iran to
Israel in the fall of 85 (MR. ARMITAGE - no from Israel to Iran)
(COL MORTON - Israel to Iran) I'm sorry Israel to Iran in fall of
85.
COL MORTON: Is it coincidental that the five oh elght(508) is
the sane number?
COL BACHELOOR: 'It may be coincidental.
MR. ARMITAGE: Come on guys. Look., .take Casey testified, I
can't remember which area I've had so many, that a shipment went
in the fall, and I or summer, and I think September, of five
hundred and eight TOW missiles,., from Israel to Iran. I would
maintain that the Department of Defense at least, one didn't know
about that shipment and number two the Secretary of Defense would
Exhibit 17
UNCL-ASSm'
(ARMITAGE)
iiNimsm'
9981
if he were asked, he would not have given permission for it. I
know th«t_. But Israel did It. And there Is an open discussion
whether the President did nod and say Israel could do it or not.
In my preparations for ny hearings I had to become aware of what
the numbers of missiles and spare parts and all were. Five
hundred and eight seemed like a strange shipment to me (COL
MORTON - Tes sir.). I didn't know why It was sent either. Why
would five hundred and eight basic TOW missiles be called for,
why not five hundred or six hundred or five ten(510). It became
apparent to me, however, based on what I heard Casey say, that
that five hundred and eight number went to Israel and not to
Iran, to repay five hundred and eight which previously had gone
from Israel to Iran. Do I make sense?
COL BACHELDOR: Well, no sir. Now you... I understand exactly
what you said (HR. ARHITAGE - That's my Impression). Let me, let
ne restructure the Array's Involvement as we know It. The Army's
Involvement, as we know it, started in January of 1986, and we
shipped initially a thousand, later five hundred and eight, and
then the last shipment of five hundred (MR. ARMITAGE: Right).
Are you now saying that the middle shipment of five hundred and
eight went to Israel for repayment or are you saying there Is
another five hundred and eight shipment.
MR. ARMITAGE: I'm speculating that that's what happened. That
that five hundred and eight, the coincidence Is so great, It
seems to lae that there's a very high probability that that five
hundred and eight, whichever shipment It was, that the Army
transferred to the CIA, eventually ended up In Israel (COL
MORTON - For repayment?). For replay, or replenish Israeli
stocks for five hundred and eight that they sold previously. I
don't know that. But the numbers...
COL BACHELDOR: And no one has said that.
MR. ARMITAGE: Pardon me?
COL BACHELDOR: You have drawn that conclusion...
MR. ARMITAGE: I draw that conclusion because the numbers sure
look kind of striking.
COL MORTON: That's why I asked. Is it coincidental, but there's
a reason?
MR. ARMITAGE: j[t seems to me. but I don't think the Army would
know that at alY. And there's no reason the Army should know it.
COL BACHELDOR: That would help, if that were true though sir
because we have the same question. Why five hundred and eight?
MR. ARMITAGE: The same .. I never .. I had the same question,
but It doesn't seem to me from your guys point of view to make a
tinkers damn difference. You were doing what you were told under
Exhibit 17
mmm'
(ARMITAGE)
UNcussffe--
9982
Econony Act provision to the CIA, The CIA waa the ones who knew
tht ultimate (Usposltlon. I can't say and 1 couldn't testify
(COL MORTON - Sure.) that I know those five hundred and eight
ended up In Israel, But I'd have to say that It seeas Blghty
suspicious that the numbers (COL MORTON - Yes sir.) are the same.
If you see what I mean? But for the Army's purposes, I can't
laaglne that haa any real relevance to the Army .. itself. You
war* transferring to the CIA which you were beln« paid .. over.
COL BACHELDOR: It gives us one more alternative to provide to
Hr. Marsh as to why the number five oh eight (508 ).. .
MR. ARMITAGE: Yea Indeed, and that's the only thing I can
offer.. .
COL BACHELDOR: And we've been searching for that, and In that
context sir your comments are very helpful because we did not
have that information.
MR. ARMITAGE: Now that's .. I would not and could not swear that
Israel made the shipment, but Mr. Casey thinks they did. Made a
shipment prior. In the summer.
COL BACHELDOR: See we've heard pallet loads, plane loads uh all
kind of reasons for five hundred and eight, so It again one more
piece of the puzzle.
MR. ARMITAGE: Well I think that, I hope that's helpful, but
that, !'■ under that inpression that Israel was repaid by the CIA
for a prior shipment. Impression.
COL BACHELDOR: Mo further questions.
COL MORTON: Sir you mentioned the need for a higher
classification . . .
MR. ARMITAGE: Well I'm talking about (portion of text deleted)
COL BACHELDOR: I know what the classification Is.
COL MORTON: (portion of text deleted) covers it?
COL BACHELDOR: (portion of text deleted)
COL MORTON: Okay, you can read me on.
MR. ARMITAGE: Now .'; are we
COL BACHELDOR: He has. . .
MR. ARMITAGE: And then I want a question for you and you may
want to turn the ralkes back on.
Exhibit 17
wimm
(ARMITAGE)
334
.OtKUSSIUUI.
?o5
Sir do you have any further Information,
:o present concerning the matters under
COL MORTOM: Okay sir.
statements or j|_yl<lence
Investigation.
MR. ARHITAGE: Una...
COL HORTON: That would be beneficial to us.
MR. iRMiTAGE: Well I've tried to think. In the t est Inonles , Ir
the give and take and the questions froa the Hill, you learn a
lot. Huh, I'm trying to think of the Aray's Involvement...
COL BACHELOOR: I do have a question for you.
MR. ARMITAGE: I don't know of anything...
following then I'll be glad to answer. I
that might be relevant to the Aray, I have
revelations, becoae a lot saarter of what
adalnlstratlon were doing to Include slttl
soae of our senior officials, closed testl
aore about the Issue, but I don't know of
would have relevance to the Aray. And I c
things that have relevance to the transfer
these things to ^^^HH^^^^ ay under
000 transferred thea to the CIA, title and
we got out of the business. Uh, there are
of Inforaatlon and policy discussions that
aa aware of, and If it were appropriate wo
It. I don't think they have any relevance
let ae complete the
don't know of anything
, subsequent to public
various parts of the
ng In on testlaony by
aonies, so I know a lot
things that I think
ertalnly don't know
Uh, other than once
standing is we that Is
everything, and then
plenty of other bits
surrounded this that I
uld nake you aware of
to the Aray.
COL BACHELOOR; Mrs. Crawford, the Aray General Counsel, shared
with me a comment uh that was attributed to you that you had
heard In testimony soaeplace, that there either was or may have
been some pressure applied to the Aray. Is It iaportant to
discuss that sir?
MR. ARMITAGE: Yeah I, yeah I don't know. I'll tell you what I
heard. I gave a testlaony In front of the SSCI and It was over
and I stood up. And It was over. And we were walking out, and
soae of the staff aeabers said oh thanks alot you were very
helpful. And I said well I hope so and I hope all the DOO
witnesses are helpful. I said, "I must say that I'a not a
technician..." and I did say this for the record, "...and I
strongly urge you guys in your Investigation to talk to our Army
fellows who aade the transfers, they know this Issue, I'm not a
technician. I was engaged In the policy end of it, so please talk
to then." They sald'yeah, the only possible question for 000,
they said. Is the pricing question. And I said, uh, excuse ae,
•r* you indicating by that statement that there is soae Inference
that someone in the Secretary's office was leaning on the Amy to
lower the price. And they said absolutely not, we have no
indication of that. We have no understanding that its other than
Just what you told us. Basically the Secretary didn't like it.
He followed the President's orders though and did It, and said do
Exhibit 17
UNOASSn.
(ARMITAGE)
335
UNOi^m
D 9984
It undtr an Econooy Act and don't lose noney. But he said that
there aay have been a conversation that OUle North had with one
of the Aray ftilowa involved. And I said I don't know anything
about it. And that was the eoiament and I passed It on I think to
Susan. That was it.
COL BACHELDOR: Yes sir. she shared that with us.
COL MORTON: Do you know who North might have talked to?
MR. ARMITACE; No I don't know, .. they didn't say it happened
either (COL MORTON - If?). They said there aay have been(COL
MORTON - Yes. sir). And I said, basically I was trying to find
out if DOD, are we out of this now. And they gave us a pretty
good clean bill of health, except Tor that Issue. The pricing
issue, there's still sone questions. And that caused ae to ask,
certainly no questions that what I told you is not true because
it is ay understanding that OSD did not get into the pricing
problea. Didn't lean on the Aray. That's ay understanding. He
said no we don't have any Indication to the contrary to that.
TJiere aay be, it aay be that North talked to one of the, one of
the officers. 1 said, well you'll find that out froa the
officers. They can tell you that.
COL MORTON: Sir other than those you've already aentloned, do
you know anyone else who could provide further Inforaatlon on the
aattcr.
HR. ARMITACE: Let ■•, let ae recap. As far as I know in the
Departaent, the Secretary, now LTG Powell, General Thuraan
because of his discussion with General Powell, General Russo
because of the discussion that Thurman had with him, ae, Mr.
Taft, Vice Adairal Jones, and probably the Chief of Staff of the
Aray. After that I have to drop down to LTC Arabrlght who's the
neit person I ever talked to about this. And through Arabrlght I
talked to Mic Kickllghter and Indeed the Secretary of the Aray
saying I need the Inforaatlon to get ready for a hearing, lets
get going. Uh, what's the story here. Give ae the answer. And
I said I'a not prejudicing the answer, I Just need an answer.
Uh, so I think those are the only ones that had inforaat
far I'a concerned. Obviously there are people who d
transfers, who know how to work these and I've seen d
names on differeat pltcta ^t_2»2±L—£Jl^ •' *•• P"* together the
chronologies for mH^^mH|^|H as sure
all those... (COL~ BACHELDOR - Ye^sff we do.). Uh , other than
that, Ollle North. but^^HHl don't think Ollle's talking.
COL NORTON: Kind of hard to get answers...
MR. ARMITACE: Yea. that's what I understand.
COL BACHELDOR: Adairal Poindexter, sir.
UNtUp^-
(ARMITACE)
UNCIASSIRII'
9985
MR. ARMITACE: Yea, or Polndexter I guess, but my own belief Is
that General Powell, and you've spoken to hln. Is probably, first
of all he's Ut* aost honorable nan I've ever net and even If his
recollection was at direct odds with nine I'd have to say that
I'd so with hln. Because he Is a very honorable and very snart
■ an. (COL MORTON - Alris.ht sir) That's who seens to be the key
guy. Hake sure you check hln. It could be that .. well you can
do that with Charlie Brown or sonethlng If you did It. Check In
with' OSAA If you need any pricing Infornation. Charlie will get
the answers for you (COL MORTON - Alright sir.). What we're
charging these days for HAWKs and TOWs and things of that nature.
COL MORTON: Sir, this Is an official investigation. It Is
privileged in the sense that the report of 1 nve»t igation will be
■ade to the directing authority for such use as deened
appropriate. You are requested not to divulge the nature of the
investigation or questions answered or discussions included In
this interview with anyone except your counsel if you have some,
have one.
MH. ARMITACE: I already have to the Secretary of Defense.
COL MORTON: Yes sir. No I'm talking future. And the sole
purpose of that and its uh...
MR. ARMITAGE: I do not have counsel and hop* further that
there's no need for one.
COL NORTON: This is standard to prevent witnesses ooalng to the
attention... not Intended to reflect on you.
MR. ARMITACE: Well I wish you luck on the investigation. I'll
be interested .. I assune, well I know I'll get it. The results
of it. The Secretary's pronised it to the Hill.
COL MORTON: One final thing sir, uh you're renlnded that your
testiBony we've taken here is classified as will the report be.
Your testimony nay be nade part of an official IG record.
Individuals who do not have an official need to know aay request
a copy of this record, to include your testinony. If there is
such a request do you consent to the release of your testinony
outside official channels.
MR. ARMITAGE: No I don't.
COL MORTON: Alright sir. Do you have any questions sir?
MR. ARMITAGE: No I don't.
mmm
(ARMITACE)
337
-UNClASSIFe'
D 9986
COL NORTON: The time Is since 1016, the Interview is concluded.
(Tht for«(olnt testliiony of Hr. Richard L. Arnltagt was
recorded on ■agnetlc tape, transcribed by CPT Daniel C. Daley,
and verified by LTC Thomas R. Prlckett, Intelligence Oversight
Division, U.S. Army Inspector General Agency, the Pentagon,
Washington, D.C. 20310-1700)
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Deletion of Text (U)
2H January 1987
Portions of the text of Mr. Armltage's testimony marked "(portion
of text deleted)" were deleted in order to prevent the report
froa being over classified. This sanltlzatlon does not detract
froa the content of the testimony.
Exhibit 17
mms&m
(ARMITACE)
338
*5; 12R3S
CsCJ0348t»-SO®34<?7")
339
Ij2
wiMsm
-0 S'P^
Non-Log
NATIONAL SICUWTV COUNCU. (p^^.lo.h it (y CU^-^^J^^
Sept«mb«r 30, 1986 ,^e!-<i«***-^ c^efelO
TOP SECRgT >i'
ACTION '^ -^^^o2
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTE*
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH!-'
SUBJECT: Press Guidance r« Costa Rican Airstrip
Attached at Tab I is draft press guidance regarding the airstrip
at Santa Elena, Costa Rica, which was divulged by the Costa Rican
Security Minister at a press conference on Friday, September 26.
This story has now been picked up by the New Yorlc Times (Tab II)
and is generating press questions at State and Defense.
The press guidance at Tab I has been coordinated with State
(Abrams) , Defense (Armitage) , and CIAI^HHH Due to the
extreme sensitivity of the issue, your apPHvai is requested
before the guidance is used in responding to queries.
The damage done by this revelation is considerable. As indicated
in the CIA report at Tab III, the logistics support provided by
Project Democracy has had a profound impac^^h^^ilitj^^h^
resistance to sustain itself in the fiel ^
The airfield at Santa Elena has been a vital element in supporting
the resistance. Built by a Project D«"»«="=y P"P"5"fY JSttlillv
Corporation, S.A. — a Panamanian company), the field was initially
s I used for direct reiupply efforts (July 1985 - February 1986).
-.* Since early this year, the field has served as a primary abort
11? base for aircraft damaged by Sandinista anti-axrcraft fire. The
III photographs at Tab IV show the field in June 1986 *"«* /^f»"»9ed
^ft Project Dwoocracy /C-M/^ which made an emergency landing on the
|i| field early this ifcnth.'^
Is| The Arias Administration revelations regarding this J*=i;jl;J^y . J*^*
liif caused Project Democracy to permanently close Udall Corporation
ost and dispose of its capital assets. It has also resulted m the
loss of a facility important to keeping the resistance supplied
and in the field against the Sandinistas.
^^i^... 0.. UNOWSHSKB^ v:o2
340
mmm
TOP SECRET
/V ?
0933
prove his goodwill for our polj
ther^are important reaaona to receiv both<r^"^~'
I^^^Hin the Ova^Offica. mH^UBphould be invited in
■P^Bbecause^m^^^lis increasingly supportive
Nicaragua proqr^^^^^BJ|wil^b^ir^h^J^ . f^""
possible to have a "3-minute photo opportunity" with the President
in order to presjuit h.ijj»
tmg IS highly appropriate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That you approve /the press guidance at Tab I and authorize us
to pass it to Dan Ito^krd/Paul Hanley for their use if asked.
Approve
Jc-
Disapprove
jt you approve a brief photo op session with!
_^ luring your NSC briefing time in the October 17-21
timeframe. If you approve, an appropriate memorandum will be
prepared.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Tab II
Tab III
Tab IV
Press Guidance
NYT Article by James Lemoyne of September 29, 1986
CIA Special Analysis, 'Nicaragua: Rebel Resupply
Increasing," TCS 2922/86 of September 23, 1986
Photographs
TOP SECRET
wmsB
A K VJ G 0 2 I 3 2'
(jh.f
341
UNCLASSIFIED— "-'
PRESS GUIDANCE R£ AIRSTRIP IN COSTA RICA
DID U.S. PERSONNEL SUPERVISE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AIRSTRIP IN
NORTHERN COSTA RICA? N 3 0 934
"The U.S. Embassy in San Jose, Costa Rica, has reported that
during the Administration of Former President Monge the Ministry
of Public Security was offered the use of a site on the Santa
Elena Peninsula which could be used as an extension of the civil
guard training center at Murcielago. The site included a
serviceable airstrip which could have supplemented the small one
which is located near the training center. The offer was
reportedly made by the owners of the property who had apparently
decided to abandon plans for a tourism project. The Embassy has
no information on the Ministry's decision concerning the offer.
No U.S. Government funds were allocated or used in connection
with this site nor were any U.S. Government personnel involved in
its construction. Any further inquiries should be referred to
the Government of Costa Rica."
WAS THE AIRSTRIP INTENDED FOR USE BY THE CONTRAST
The Government of Costa Rica has made clear its position that
it will not permit the use of its territory for military action
against neighboring states. The U.S. Government respects that
UNGlASSra
position.
342
THE NEW YORK TIM&S. a.v..aAV, SBPTSMflS/? « . »»«
coafUence,
Pmnielady.
Americans Reportedly Supervised
- Airstrip Project Near Nicaragua
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343
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'^ 30986
MCAMAOUA:
lta»«l RMuppty iKrcatlQe
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344
LAddiriLU
PROJECT DEMOCRACY AIR FACILITY
Santa Elena, Costa Rica
June 10, 1986
30990
DAMAGED PROJECT DEMOCRACY -RC-vi^
After Landing at Santa Elena Facility
September 12, 1986
UNGlASSm
AKW002I39
0/b
345
uzmsi- Nsefis'i
EufiPtty
346
83
III
III
SUBJECT t Ou«atlona and Anawars for tha Racord from Sacratary
of Oafanaa Taatimony Bafora tha Houaa Pamanant
Salact Conmlttaa on Intalllganca, 18 Dacambar 1986 (U)
1. Tha CoBunlttaa raquaata a copy of tha Army Inapactor Ganaral/
Ganaral Counaal raport on thalr invaatigation of tha prtcing of
TOW mlaailaa tranafarrad to tha CIA.
Aj (U) Upon complation of tha raport, a copy will ba provided
to tha Committaa.
2. Tha Committaa raquaata a copy of tha Sacratary of Dafenae
mamorandum and marginal notaa on tha Draft NSOO of Juna 1985
A< (U) Thaaa ara provided at TAB A.
3. Waa tha baaic TOW aold to any othar country in tha laat
two or thr aa yaara?
Ai (C) Yaa. From FY 1983 to FY 1986, baaic TOW waa aold to
tha following countriaa (quantitiaa in paranthaaaa) r(
^^^^H Kenya ^^^| Korea ^^^| Morocco i^^^H< Somalia
and Thailand
4. Did Ganaral Sacord have any kind of Conaultant contract,
or othar ralationahip or poat, with tha Department of Defenaa
after hia retirement?
At (U) Yes. Following hia retirement on 1 May 1983, MG
Sacord waa approved aa a conaultant appointee for the
Office of the Aasiatant Secretary of Defenaa (International
Security Affaire), specifically for tha Near Eaatern and
South Asian Affaire Region. Effective 11 July 1983, MG
Secord waa authorized 130 daya at a rate of $242.00 per
day, but he did not aerve any daya in a pay atatua. On 11
July 1984, MG Secord waa again approved aa a conaultant
appointee and authorized 90 days at a rate of $242.00 per
day, but he did not aerve any daya in a pay atatus. MG
UNe
347
um
D 84
S«cord'«~^^ppolntin«nt was tarmlnatad on 10 July 198S. On S
August 1985 MG Sscord was appointsd as a consultant without
coB^«nsation for up to tan days. This appolntoMnt was
tarminatad on 4 August 1986, and tha Dapartmant has no
racord of his having b«an on a duty status on this appointmant,
with tha following azception. On 5 August 1985, MO Sacord
was appointad as a consultant, without conpansation, to
tha Spacial Oparations Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG). His
tarn on tha SOPAG azpirad aff active 4 August 1986. During
this one-yaar term, MG Sacord participated in ona maating
of tha SOPAG, on 15 November 1985. Ha has not participated -
since, and this is the last consulting activity in which
he participated, according to Department records. Pertinent
documentation is enclosed at TAB B.
5. Was General Sacord dropped from one of our committees for
failing to execute a financial statement?
At (U) MG Secord served on the Special Operations Policy
Advisory Group (SOPAG) from January 1984 to August 1986,
although he last participated in November 1985. MG Secord 's
membership on the SOPAG was terminated, effective 4 August
1986, based upon his failure to provide the Department
with financial information (as required in form SP 1555).
Amplifying information is enclosed at TAB C.
6. Have any TMS or other arms sales by the Department been
made to any 'agents or middlemen' as opposed directly to a
recipient country?
At (U) No FMS or other arms sales to foreign countries
have been made by the Department through a private agent
yNGlASli
348
wmm
D 85
or middlanan. Th«r« la no legal authority to aall under
tha Arma Export Control Act to othar than an aliglbla
foreign country, except for aalea to U.S. contractora
under Section 30 of the Act for Incorporation into end
itema and aubaequent export. The Department haa aold
itema to other agenciea of the federal government in
accordance with the Economy Act.
7. Did any DoD intelligence peraonnel Vnow anything about
furniahing any intelligence to Iran covering auch mattera
aa battle plana, reaulta of ABBHHUgathering of the
Iran-Iraq front line, etc.? xrff^Tommlttee made reference
to a measage to Congreaaman Kaatenmeier from the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McMahon. )
349
8. Did Colonel Jim Steel* in El Salvador have any relationship
with anyone who was selling arms to the Contras during the time
when such sales were prohibited?
350
WUSMO
87
UNCLASSIFIED
351
Vi'UVUU •
D 88
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO TH2 PRESZOEOT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT J US Policy Toward Iran (S)
(TS) This memorandum rasponda to your raquaat for coiunants on
tha draft. NSDO on US-Iranian relations . Whila I agraa with many of
tha major points in tha papar, savaral of tha proposed actions seem
questionable. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to consider an
explicit revision of our policy toward Iran as long as we continue
to receive evidence of Iranian eon^licity in terrorist actions and
planning against us. I do not believe, therefore, an NSDO should
b« issued in the proposed form.
(TS) I fully support the policy objective that 'our prinary
short-tena challenge must be to block Moscow's efforts to increase
Soviet influence." If we are successful, of course, this will put
ua in a batter position to realize a longer-tara goal of having at
laast neutral/non-hostile relations with Iran. Under no circum-
stances, however, should we now ease our restriction on arms sales to
Iran. Attan^ting to cut off arms whila remaining neutral on sales
to either belligerent is one of the few ways wa have to protect our
loagar-range interests in both Iran and Iraq. A policy ravaraal
would be seen as inexplicably inconsistent by those nations whoa we
hava urged to refrain froa such sales, and %«ould likely lead to
increased ams sales by thaa and a poasibla altaration of tha
strategic balance in favor of Iran whila Khoaaini is still tha
eont.rolling Influence. It would adversely affect our nawly aowrglng
ralationshlp with Iraq.
(TS) There are other actions, however, soow of which are in^lied
la th^^<'*'t NSDO, that we could take now under our current policy .
to trf'to prevent an Increase in Soviet influence and to lead toward
a aore ooderata post-Khomalal Iran* Pamaiiy Oeciassined/Reieasea no 1 1 f€fS ea
under provisions of e.O )23')5
Intelligenca ""^ '^ Johnson. National Secui.iy Council
— Improve US intelligence gathering capabllltlaa in the areas
of weakness identified in tha SMIE, aspacl.ally with regard
eollectino information on th<
^^^_^^_^___ Cs^hasls should D« on identity ing key
lyers in the political arena who may be more favorably
■disposed to US concerns in the region.
UNCLASSIFIED
352
ornct or tmcscch
TMC MIUITAdY ASS-fTAurr
nf, \
i
SEC DEF C
HAS SEEN
JUN 18 198S
'''•—'
O.
^<^
'ffi/
f=^.r<^
J.
y*u
^
■^^\
At/C^ ^^^^^ AGTO^r^rx..^^
under p,ov,s,n„s Of E 0 liSfi^ -^
353
EYISOtllY UMILittl
. ofrci Of TMi »icRnAiiY or difinm
NOTE PO U6D(P)
YOurs far action. Sm ay r*oomn»K]«tion
and S«cDef's oamncnt on tht attadwd.
8«cOtf 's ODiKnants rtad as follows:
*Diis is aljiost too absurd to cotncnt
on. By all aeans pass it to Rich, but
th* assunption h«r« is: 1) that Iran is
about to fall, and 2) w« cw dbal with
that on a rational basis. MOeiiJc*
asking Qadhafi to NashiMgton for a
coxy chat.'
i^,
<^^
"^lassitied/Releasert on lifCsG^ Col in L. • 9^*1 1
E' ..-r,v,s,Gns 01 £ 0 1235B Kijoc General , OSA
Senior Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense
Nalional Secunty Council
cc: DesSecDef
82-690 0-88-13
354
mmmm
TMC WMITC HOUSC
WAftMINOTOM
Jun* 17. ItIS
91
SECRET/WITH
TO? SECRET ATTACHMPCT
I .
KEMOW-NDcM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE ?. SHULT8
Th« Secretary of Statt
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W, WEINBERGER
Th« Secretary of Defense
SU2JECT: U.S. Policy Toward Iran (S)
li*.?:!*^-"^ *' Central Intelligenct has j«$t distributed an s»-r
or. .ran: Prospects for Near-Tera Instability", which ihi^-
rave received. This SNIE r.akes clear that instib^litC in t?!.^^
!f!!i;;*'^"^ "^-^- potentially momentous cons.ou..;cis' fj" 5 S
strateeic inter sts. It seeas sensible to ash whether ou^
S;''IJr-^^'^" ^^■•'•' ''*" ^* adequate to .chiev;*;5riS;«e.'s
Ky staff has prepared a dr.ft NSOO (Tab A) which can si^I Jo
•tiaulate our thinking on O.S. policy toward Iran, i I^Ta
appreciate your reviewing the dieft on an eye. only be^J «d
provxdmq ae with your cooMats end sueeestior.. t I- i ^
about the possibiiSy of ieajca5.*So;?r::'j:jjde Jortrss^;:^
this c-h«.-.ge in policy with the Fzesidut. If you feel ?hJ? !i
S1C(..?) in preper.tion for an IISPG Meting «ith SI pJSIIdint
mm Dcciassihed/Rsi-ased on ' I Kr'S&fc
under orovisicns of E 0 12356
by K. Johnson, National Secunly Council
UNCLASSIFIED
SEC.-ET.-.^:-ai
Tc: ir:.-;T attac-j.me?:'!
-ir:is3-:v C-: C;^^'
355
ill
ill
TOP SSCBTT
ONKASSIFIED
DRAFT
D 92
_ «C/1C» 403010
TMC WMITC HOUSC
WATIOMAl SECUaiTjf PIC7S10II
PI«ECT1V£
O.S. Policy Tow«rd Iran
Dyr.«r.ic political •volution' is taking place inside Iran.
Instability caused by the pressures of the Iraq- i ran var,
economic deterioration and re9ine infi^htin; create the' potential
for r.ajor changes in Iran. The Soviet Union is better positioned
than the U.S. to exploit and benefit from any power strugele that
results in changes in the Iranian rceiae, as veil as increasing
socio-political pressures. In this environnent, the eaergence of
• regune mere compatible with American and Western interests is
unlikely. Soviet success in taking advantaoe of the ener^in^
power s^rvJS5le to insinuate it»*^^_in_^ra£_ '-* -'
:e<
^ While we pursue a r.u.riber of broad,
inc-terx coals, our prieary «hort-ter:a challence must be to
block Kcsccv's effcrts to increase Soviet i.rfl-jcnce (.-.ov «nd
after the death of Khoaeini) . This will require ar. active and
sustained prccras to build both our leverags a.nd our
understanding of the internal situation so as to er^able us to
•xert a creater and mczm constructive influence over Iranian
polities. We oust iaprov* ear ability to protect our interests
during the struggle for suceessioo.
C.S. Interests and Co«l«
The nost iantediate O.S. interests include:
(1) Preventing the disintegration of Iran and preserving it as
an i:adependent strategic buffer which separates th« Soviet
Onion froa the Persian Gulf;
(3) Lir.iting the scope and opportunity for Soviet actions in
Ira.°i, while positioning ourselves to cope with the changing
Iranian intemel situation;
(3) Maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil and. ensuring
unimpeded transit of the Strait of Bomuz; and
(4) An end to the Iranian governsMnt's spcr.sorship of terrorise,
*nd its atteapts to destabilize the ecvernne.'^ts of other
raeicr.al states.
•c? Si:?.r:
UNCLASSIEIED
356
UNOtASSWED ,,^^^
TOP SECurr
. D 93
W« also tttk ethcz bro«d and iaportant, if Itss iisn«di«ttly
urgent, goals.
U) Iran's rtsuaption of a aodaratt and constructiva rola as a
■ambar rtspactivaly of tha non-comunist political
coMsunity, of its ragioa, and of tha world potrolaua
•conony;
(2) eontinuad Iranian rtsi-stancc to tha axpansion of Soviet
powar in 9an«r«l, and to tha Soviat occupation of
Afghanistan in particular;
(3) an aarly and to tha Iran-Iraq war which is not mediated by
tha Soviat Union and which does not fundar.antally altar tha
balanca of power in the region;
(4) elioination of Iran's flagrant abusas of human rights;
(5) n»over>ent toward eventual normalization of U.S. -Iranian
diplonatic consular and cultural ralations, and bilateral
tract/coiainercial activities;
(6) resolution of Anerican legal and financial clains through
the Hague l.'ibunal; and
(7) Iranian aoderation on 0?EC pricing policy.
Kany of our isterasts will be difficult to achieve. But given
the rapidity with which events are aoving, and the magnitude of
the stakes, it is clear that urgent new efforts are required. Ii
■oving forward, we aust be especially careful to balance our
evolving relationship with Iraq ia a aanner that does not danage
the longer tera prospects for Iran.
>resent Iranian yplitical Cnvironient
-^^— .-^.-^ii^— — ^-^^^^^^^^— ^^■^^— — ^■^^— ^ •
The Iranian leadership faces its aost difficult challenges since
19tl. The ragiae's popularity has declined significantly in the
past six aonths, priaarily because of intensified disillusionsen*
with a saaaingly unending war, the continued iapositioa of
Islaaic social policies on a population increasingly reluctant ti
accept such harsh aeasures, and a faltering econoay brought on
priaarily by declining oil revenues. The iapaet of these
probleas is intensified by the realisation that Ayatollah
Xhdheini's mental and physical health is fragile, which in turn
casts a pall of uncertainty over the daily decision-making
process.
?0? S£C?J
c BNCUJSIflEO
357
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
T<» »"=«" • ' ■ D 94
Unless th« acctlcrstion of tdvtrs* ailitary, political «nd
•conosic d«v«lopn«nts is r«v«rs«d, th« XhOMini rs^in* will 2se«
serious instability (i.*. r*p«attd anti-r«9i»« danonstrations,
•trikas, assassination attaapts, sabotage and othar dastafcilixina
activities throughout, increasingly involving the low«r classes).
This condition vill sap officials' energies and governiMnt
resources, intensifying differences aaong Iranian leaders as the
government tries to avoid mistaXes that would provoke popular
upheaval and threaten continued control.
While it is impossible to predict the course of the emerging
power struggle, it is possible to discern several trends which
^.must be accounted for by U.S. policy. As domestic pressures
C aount, decision-making is likely to be monopolized by individuals
\ representing the same unstable mix of radical, conservative ar.d
J ultra-conservative factions that now control the Iranian
] government. The longer Khomeini lingers ia power, the more
/ likely the power struggle will intensify, and the greater the
/ r.u.TJer of potential leaders who might affect the outcome of the
^struggle.
The ultieate strength of various clerical groups and the power
coalitions they may form are not known. Ecwever, the weaknesses
of various oppcsition groups — inside Iran and abroad — are
evident, especially the lack of a leader with sufficient stature
(* to rival Khomeini and his ideas. The most likely faction in a
y power struggle to shift Iranian policy in directions more
\ acceptable to Um Vest — should their influence increase — are
/ conservatives working txcm within the govemaent against the
' radicals. Radicals within the regime, and the leftist
I opposition, are the groeps aost likely to influence the course of
^vents in ways inimical to Western interests.
The Iranian re^lar arved forces represent a potential source of
both power and iaelinetioa to move Iran back into a more
pro-Vestern position. Bepresentatives of every faction inside
and OQtside the regiae recognise the potential importance of the
military and are cultivating contacts with these forces.
However, as long as the Arvy remains coaaaitted in the war with
Iraq it will not be in a position to intervene in Tehran.
The other instrusent of state power, the Revolutionary Cuard, is
becoedng increasingly fractured. It will probably come apart
following Khomeini's death, and adght even engage in a major
power struggle before then. In any scenario, the Guard will be
at the center of the power struggle.
TOP StcagT
UNCussra
358
UNCLASSiFtED
T0> StCHIT
DRAFT
95
Th« Soviets Art w«ll aw«rt of the tvelvina davAlA-y.^.^ ,
Thoy will continu. to .pply c«rrot*IJd-.Jiek i;:!!?^'^^* ^« ^••"•
in th« hop« of brinqin, Tohrlin MjJc^'i i.i^ ;ir*" !** ^'^
bil4tor«l rtl.tion.hip'th^t coulS wJJr.I I blJlI ?/" ^fP"^**
growth in Sovitt infloonco ia Xx*n?^,!L vij? !if!','*'^«'
Oospito strong clorical antip«thy to Koftcev ana rruL... , I
ivi.:'i%'' ^" -"^^ i.v.r.,.":j.ri:ji:r.r\i: :i:erconr,;.t
political opportunitio. prosontod th^sSvIJ? iiilI%Ji|Si would
prob*bly not act iJi a aaaacr that sovorolv di«ri»*i i».^fY ^?^*
fereo. o^ip^t. Noseo* po.s«..«s einoidorlblo rooS fSrSS.«v.r
9ev«riiMat ia Tohxan as loo« as thoy fair savora roprisal. JnJ
ia tho araa. of Iraa adjacHt to\2 Sovi.J^JL" STU^i.S
Tha 0.8. positioa ia Tahraa is onlikalv ta <«p^«,« with«»» ,
petr-RMUlai pari^ Cill ba savara. Aay s^ccassor raiiil lili
probably sal.a po-r is tho na»a of X.lai and tlTfainSon iid
TC? sccy.2T
IINCUSSIFIED
UNdUSSlHll) DRAFl
T0> tECMT
can btt
96
can o« axpactad to hav« a built-in anti-Aaarican bias, a «»>^
rnnit— i*i-Tt r-rilma, ■rtil Ttliwlr. ■igrit ^*«««* >v^ ■■nfmii i
•~fav_olutioo anA_taxgori<» aii<-coold-«ov-caatiou>ix-t»ard a ae]
-corract ralationahip with tha D.a On th« othar bandTTnicar
—tox<wfvlli try to axaeafbata antl-Aaariean faaliA9a to
•tzan^than thair ofwa positieaa at tha axpanM of tba
eonaarvativas.
Our lavaraga with Irun is sharply raduead by tha currant daaraa
of hostility that springs frc« tha idaoloqy of tha radical
elar^y, sspacially «s it sarvss thair foraisa poliev aosls
Moraovcr, tha aodarata and consarvativa alaatnts of'ths clarov
may also shara the radicals' baliaf that w* ara invttaratalv
hostila to tha Islamic 9ov«rnMnt, making aeco«»odation with tha
U.S. iwpossibla. Tha clerical ragina contianas to bali«v« that
tha O.S. has not accepted the revolution and intends to reverse
tha course of events and install a puppet fovarnsent. This
perception has been reinforced by our restoration of diploaatic
relations with Iraq, efforts to cut tha flow of eras to Iran, and
direct threats of military action in retaliation for
Iranian-inspired anti-O.S. terrorise.
U.S. Policy
The dynanic political situation in Iran and the consequences for
U.S. interests of 9rowin9 Soviet and radical influence, eonpal
tha U.S. undertake a ran^a of abort- and loaq-tara initiatives
that will enhance our lavaxa^a ia Tehran, aad, if peaalbla
■iaiaiaa that of tha Seviats. Vartievlar attantiea aast ba paid
to avoiding situations which coapal tha Xraaiaas to tura to tha
Soviets. Short- tans aaasuras should be undertaken ia a manner
that forestalls Soviet prospects ird enhances our ability,
directly arc in«?i -•?■♦■ ly, 'c bui : r j.S. ar.d Wist<»r- influence in
Iran to tha Baxinua extent possible in the ;\:tu:e. rlanninc for
tha following laitiativas should therefore proceed oa a fast and
loasaz-tcz» track. Tba ccmpooanta of O.S. policy will ba to:
(1) Sncoura^a Waatara allies and friaads to help Xraa meat its a
import requirements so as to reduce the attraetivaaass of n
Soviet assistance aad trade offers, while damoaatxatias thai
value of correct relatioas with tha Wast. This iaclndas 1
provision of selected military equipment a a datazmiaad on a
casa-by-cas« basis.
T0> S£CMT
(3)
^
(4)
<7)
(S)
(S)
^
teDt«et« Vith a
-«•
DRAFl
97
boDtaett Vith allict «n4 fritad* »^^^^^^
■■■ ■■J on th» •volutioa of tJM IrwilaiTTitSitl^TL
^iirore-jSTn. tot iaflMDciaf tb« diitction of eJiJ2 JL
*>• '"^y ^ft^ccwauaieaf with IXMl th»wnh th<f ©T^'
T«k« aevantag* of qxo»M9 political fra^Mntatioa by:
diacraatly eonnunicatin^ our dasira for eorroct
ralationa to potantially racaptiva Iranian l«adj
®
"' JJriJdilau!**'* *® -l-^nt. oppcsad to Khcaim and
Avoid actions which could alianata sroops potaatiallv
racaptiva to ifiprovad U.S. -Iranian ralationa. ^
aospond to Iranian-stipportad tarroriaa with military ae*'o«
against tarrorist infrastnictura. ' •«— on
Snhanca ou. affort to discredit Moscow's Islamic cradan*i«ll
with a »ora vigorous MOK affort targatad on Iran.
D«v«iop ^^^*«ti«» Pl«» ia sivport of tho basic policv I
cb:.activa, both for noar-tora eontiagoaeias <o.g. diath o^
Xnocaini) as woll as tho leng-tara rastoratiea of O.S «
influonca ia Tahraa.
With raspact to tba Coif wax:
— Coatiaoa to ancooraga third party iaitiativos to &«ak
aa oad to the wax; ^
Xacraasa ailitary cooparatioa vith Gulf Cooperation
Ceaneil countries, aad bolster O.S. Bilitary
capabilities ia the Calf area to enable CatTCON to be
fully capeble of caxryiag oot its aissioa; aad
Seek to curb Iraa's eollaboxatioa with its radical w
allies (i.e. Syxia aad Ubya). ^
rc? S£C?J8>
UNCLASSIFIED
361
msmmi
98
Political
— Through contacts with allies and friands, w* should dis-
craatly communicata our dasira for corract ralations to
potentially racaptiva Iranian laadars basad on thair
renunciation of stata-support«d tarrorism. thair willinq-
nass to saaX a negotiated settlement to the Iran-Iraq war
their non-interference in other states' affairs, and their
cooperation in settling US-Iranian claim in the Haoue
Tribunal.
— Maintain our neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war while encour-
aging third party initiatives to end the conflict and in-
creasing political-military cooperation with Gulf Cooper-
ation Coui.jil countries.
— In light of recent evidence that our allies continue to
permit sporadic transfers of Militarily useful equipment
to Iran and that negotiations may b« taking place between
co"«»«'cial firaa and Iranian officials, wa should increase
the pressure on oar allies by considering public statesMnts
and possible sanetieos.
Public Diplomacy
— Our public statements on Iran should bring pressure to
bear squarely where it is needed — on the current Iranian
•• regime. In tone, our public position ajst avoid casting '
Iran as a country and the Iraniaa paople and culture, as
vail as Shia Islam, as the enemy, but should esyhasixa
(Vpoeition to the policies of the present Iranian governjnent
and the corrupt mullahs inside the government. Our state-
ments should aim to encourage those elements in Iran who
disagree or oppose regime policies.
Economic
should reassess
curbing all but
cne ezrec'ci.veness or p
resent control
rts. .
362
Mmmn
D 99
iLv!^^ ^^^r."^*** di.cr.tt politic. 1 contact. propo..d
•bev«, V. could .uggast to th. Ir.ni.n. th.t cori.ci rl-
Ution. would includ. r.l.x.tion of curr.nt OS trIS
rMtriction. .nd noriMl tr.d. r.l.tion. with u» Ir.ni.a
govariUMnt th.t i. net hostil. to OS int.rMt.. *""*^*"
^^.#* '«L f *=<»"^' ^i*l» th. b.l.nc. of th. r.comm.nd.tion. in th.
dr.ft SSDD in .o f.r .. th.y support curr.nt OS policy. My "c«!
n^fsJir^in'Ji**'^ "^ "rT '"^""^ vi.w th.t US piiic/-u.7r^j;
•t.«df.«t in th. f.c. of int.rnation.1 l«wl.ssn.si p.rp.tr.tld bv
Oi. Iranian r.gim.. Chang., in policy and in conduct, th.r.f or?
^^.!2 J"^^"**^ ^X "^^r ^""^" gov.rn«.nt. By r.mainin; firaW
!S^ ^^*' ^Vl^^ Iranian gov.r™«.nt polici.s ind action?, y™^
•upportiv. of Bod.ration and a long.r t.ra in,,rov.n.nt ir^lltion.
l!v^r2o!''*'" ''^* '""'• '"^^y «' ^*»« IraniaiTpaopl. and %".!« S;
J!»?f!^? n.c...ary to count.r a poa.ibly vary dang.rou. incrlaS in
Sovi.t influ.nc.. In particular, w. n.id to b. pr.p.r.d f or T
poa.ibl. p.riod of tunnoil a. th. r.gim. b.gin. to chang.. by
building up .ff.ctiv. instruin.nt. of influ.nc. and accM.trp.opl.
andorganixatxon. within Iran, .o as to count.r a Sovi.t attaSpTto
pronot. a pro-Sovi.t .ucc.s.or r.gin.. ^
cet S.cr.tary Shultz
UNCIMP
UNCUSMB ,
00
UNCUSSIRED
WCHA«0 V. SECORO CONSULTANT HISTORY OSO - POUCY
--
iCLASS
HED
D 101
Datt of Appointment
Office
Days
Salary
per Day
Initial Appt -07-11 -13
ISA/10/NESA
130
Rtnewal«ff-.07.11-«4
ISA/IO/NESA
90
$242.00
Tarmination tff -07-10-SS
ISA/lO/NESA
Appt to SOPAG* aff -8-S-85
ISA/SP
10
woe
Appointment expired S-4-86 ~
Request to renew app fwded
to Personnel 9- 11 -86
Termination S2 fwded to
Personnel 10-23-86
w/requested eff date of ft-S-
S6. based on Secprds refusal
to provide SF15SS
*$pe<ial Operations Policy Advisory Group
'/.■
^ ^
►OeclassifieOyReleasaJ onJl£^*§8
under provisions ot E 0. 12356
Johnson, Nalional Security Council
UNCUSSIFIED
365
^Y HISTORY OSO- POLICY
D 102
Offict
OutyTIti*
13 April 1M1
ISA/NESA
Director. Ntar East South Asia Region
UhilylMI
ISAfl^ESA
Deputy Assistant Saactary of Defense. NESA
1M«y19t3
N/A
Retired from USAF
My Declassified/Released on JiE^^*
under provisions of E 0 12356
ly K Johnson, National Security Council
UNCUSSinED
366
muSSIFIED
D 103
UNCLASSIFIED
367
SPECIAL OPERATIONS POLICY AOwIfBl? «ROUP
0-
■H^
Tht Sp.ciil Optrttlon. P.llcy A4yi««ry Croup w»» ror.,d in
Dtctabtr ~19«3 un4tr tht tuthorlty sr>nt«4 In PL 92-463 Ftdiral
Advisory Coaaltttt Act to tdvitt tht Stcrtttry of Otftntt on lity
policy Ittuts rtlattd to tht dtvtiopatnt tnd atinttnanct of
tfftctivt tptclil optrationt forctt. Tht S0PA6 at^tt on an
irrtaular batit to ditcutt , for txaaplt, or jan i zat i on , forct
ttructurt, aanpowtr and ptrtonnti, rtadinttt, and tqulpatnt. Thty
■ttt in clottd tttslon a« claivifitd aattrial aay bt prtttnttd.
Tht S0PA6 activititt rtlatt only to policy and do not
involvt oDtrational aatttrt.
Mtabtri of tht S0PA6 art appointtd for ent-ytar ttrat in
Aujutt tach ytar. Thty ttrvt at DoO contultantt, without
coaptntat i on, units* othtrwist taploytd by DoD. Thtrt is no stt
nuabtr of atabtrs, but atabtrsh i p Ibas ranstd frea 9 to It atabart.
Noraally atabtrs havt bttn invittd to rtntw thtir atabtrship
annually unltss thtrt it toat indication or dttirt not to ttrvt.
Currtnt atabtrs of tht S0PA6 artt
Lawrtnct Ropka, Jr., P0AS0/I8A, Chairaan
Haj. 6tn. Thoaas Ktlly, USA, Dirtcter JSOA
B6 Donald Blackburn, USA (Rtt)
6EN Robtrt Kinsston, USA, (Rtt)
LT6 Ltroyn Manor, USAF, (Rtt)
6EN Edward Ntytr, USA, (Rtt)
Or< Richard Shultz
6EN Richard Stilwtll, USA, (Rit)
LTS SaautI Milton, USA, (Rtt)
LTe Milliaa YarborousHi USA, (Rtt)
I
til
.§
f^
UNCDBWD
«m««
0 I OS
1. D«t«« and attend*** of ALL Sp«el*l Op«r*tlon* Volley Adviaorv
Group (80PAG) m**tln9*. "uvi.ory
Lynn Ryland*r
10 Jan 1984
LTO Wll*on
Lt G*n Manor
Maj G«n S*cord
Chaired by Mr.
29 March 1984
LTG Wilaon
Lt G*n Ahnann
Maj G*n Saeord
BG Blackburn
Mr. Rylandcr
Maj G«n Rie*
LTC G«iabara
Chairad by Hr. K
15 January 1985
LTG Wilaon
Lt G«n Manor
Naj G«n S*cord
Maj G«n Ric*
Mr. Kylandar
LTC G«abara
Oiairad by Mr. lioal Koch
• Jun* 1985
OEH M«y*r
Lt 6«n Manor
LTG Yarborouqh
Lt Q«n Pustay
Naj 0«n Sacord
Maj G«a Rie*
•O Blaekburn
Mr. Rylandar
Hr. F*u*rv*rg*r
CAPT Lyon
LTC G«U>ara
Lt Col Davidaon
Mr. Anatag*
Mr. RoaMr
Chairad by Mr. Hoal Koch
mmsw
18 July 85
BO Blackburn
G*n Stilwall
Lt G«n Manor
LTG Vaught
LTG Yarborough
Maj G*n Ric*
Maj 6*n S*cord
Mr. Rylandar
CAPT Lyon
LTC GaiA>ara
Lt Col Davidaon
Chairad by Mr. Ho*l KOch
15
1985
GEM Stilwoll
Lt G*n Manor
Lt G«a Puatay
LTG Vaught
Maj G*n Ric*
Maj Gan Sacord
BG Blackburn
Mr. Bylandar
COL Cos
CAPT Lyon
Mr. Probst
Mr. Araitag*
Chair*d by Mr. Koch
8 October 1986
BG Blackburn
OBH Kingston
Lt G«B Manor
Profasaor Shults
GBI Btilwsll
LTO Wilaon
LTG Ttoborough
MajGan Rally
Mr. ftlbot
Mr. Rylandar
LTC Tkrborough
Chairad by Mr
369
,..r: •• ""••*•
,.„. „. n '"" '""* """ ■•
N«v«a»tr 1999.
DNWSSIfiEO
370
UNCLASSIFIED ^'^^^
p;
U.S. .MIL1T.\RY CROUP EL SALVADOR
APO MI.\MI 31023 1 FEB 8 5
SUBJECT Felix Rodriguez
THRU: DCM
TO: AMB PICKERING
Per your guidance, attached is a draft
backchannel to Gen Gorman on our
no pay" mercenary.
unaer provisions of E 0 )2-i55
byK Johnson, National SecaiiiyCcuncil
UNCLASSIFIED
'^y'^':^$^i^:vm
371
SJ InTnUi^Zi .4.2257
.. 2NT MMNSH
0 i^M^^THA 00 ZTH
FK USSC
TC
^ CONFIDENTIAL
QQQQ
WASns
/i(-fii8i
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PNA-04a9-14-FEB-e5
LES ONLY//
L^ EYiS ONLT//EYES ONLT//ETES ONLT/^
'■^ MACT IMMEDIATED ^ ^ ^
yoH AMBASSADOR -PICiERINC ^D COL STEELEJFROM OEN GORMAN
.-^ SUiJJiCT: FELIX HODRIOaEZ n>4-
'—' 1. (C) I HAVE JUST MET HERE WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ|
fciUlT^nM WTJMT. HOBW TM r.lIBA. A VETERAN OF CUERR]
_ HE IS
CPiRAIINC AS A PRIVATE CITUEN, BOT HIS ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITH 1H£ V?
IS R-AL aNOUGH, GOING BACa. TO LATTFR'S DATS AS DCI
2. (C) RODRIGUEZ' PRIMARTJOMMITMZNT TO THE REGION IS|
AHtf.i HE WANTS TC ASSISI TEH FLU. I TOLD HIM TSAT~THE FDK CEStRVIi:
-IS -•'RIORITT. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT TOUR WORa WITH THE PRAL WAS
ALVANCING WELL, AND THAT WE HAD MADE PROGRESS WITH TRAINING OTHI?.
?>ia3'. FOHCiS. I WARNED HIM THAT WHATEVER SIS CONSULTING ROLE U' ll
U!|-i: /""C'JNiED TO, HI COULD NOT iECOr^I 7ISI3LF TO THE PRESS IN Ml
--.•iS- ilTiOUT DAMAGING OUR CAUSi THEHt. I ALSO CAUTIONED THAT FL
:,-L i J A ViRY MUCH ^'0R£ DELICATE ENVIRONMNT WITH RISPECT TO CIVIL-
ILITAhY RELATIONS AND RESPECT FOR HUr'AN RIGHTS THAN ANT HE HAD
::-.:.KArEL in before.
;. (C) HE WILL WANT TO iLY WITH THE LSAF TO ESTABLISH HIS
Ln-:.:ibILITY, BUT TEAT iJiT OF MACHI-SMO SEF^S TO Mi BOTH UNNECESSARY
A:.J v'f.«ISE.
1. (vj) MT J'Ji;GMENT IS TH/IT HIS ADVICE ♦ILL REINFORCE OURS, AND
--"• f.E SHO:)LE PUT NO OBSTACLES IN HIS WAT TO CONSULTING *ITE
"■"i^lUN OR sUSTILLO UNLESS AND UNTIL »E GETCOUNTERINCICATIONS . I
.•.UOI'CEND TEAT JIM STEELE MEET WITH HImHH^HBHH AND AMiJASSALOR
tlil'^i 4LS0 WA'JT 10. INTERVIEW HIM, BUT OJR MAIN IMEREST IS, AS I S^I
:T, TO INSURi Wi; \NOW WHAT HE IS TILLING 5LANDCN AND 3USTILL0 Vn
:-.--~AIIF AND OJT-BRIEF. ^^^^^^n
(C) ASSUMING TOUH APPROVAL, I WILL SEND RODRIGUEZ TO^^^HHBI
■C1.F.-C*, it FIB, ON ONE 01 MY C-12S. HE WILL ARRIVE AROUN: U«,c
LCJAL. HE IS A LONG-TIKE FRIEND OF LOU RODRIGUEZ AND, IF AVAILAJLI,
tO'JLC APPRiCIATE IT I? LOU COtllD BE HIS CONTACT POINT. I ANTICIPa:I
;-.I WILL WANT TO DEPART FOR MIAMI ON SATURDAY.
CiClAS OACR
SSO NOTE: DILIVIR IMMIDIATZLT. Cr^joa
r i- 22 o Partially Declassified/Released on /O rgS OP
unoer previsions of E.O i2356
■ SNN
by K Johnson. Nalional Security Council
wuissn
.i 3
372
BACK CHANNEL
WASSiH^
f"',
^
TION: STATE RCI, IMMEDIATE
USSOUTHCOM, iriMEOIATE
EYES ONLY rC a:a f-'OTLEY AND JOHNSTONE; SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL
GO? -a:; Fscr. Pickering
Partially Declassified/Released on MfS^^h
under provisions of E 0 12356
by K Johnson. National Security Council
J? J
r-'EETING U'lTH FELIX RODRIGUEZ
1. I HAD A VALUABLE MEETING WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ FEBRUARY 15.
2. h£ HAS CUTLINED A TACTIC WHICH I BELIEVE HAS MERIT AND SHOULD
OBVIOUSLY OTHER VARIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO .
INTEGRATE^^^^^HH|H^^|lSSUE AND
BEFORE IF IT IS TO WORK, SOMETHING I AGREE WITH ON ITS OWN.
3. RODRIGUEZ WILL RETURN IN 3-4 WEEKS TO WORK WITH BUSTILLO
(FAS) AND STEELE. STEELE WILL MONITOR CLOSELY. RODRIGUEZ UNDER-
STANDS MY GENERAL RULES -- NO CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND HE IS NOT
TO ACCOMPANY FAS ON COMBAT MISSJ Oil i^iJlllJULREES . WE WILL START
irate
373
uHcuissn
SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY TO SEE WHAT APPROACH CAN PRODUCE. HE WILL
TAKE ON HIGHER P R I 0 R I T Y^^Bm I S S I ON FIRST.
t,. FOR ARA: PLEASE BRIEF DON GREGG IN VP ' S OFFICE FOR ME.
UNClASSinED
374
mmm
NATIONAL SECtWrrV COUNCIL
WAS>»)aTON OC 2090*
SYSTEM III
91229 ^
Add-on
'SECRET ^ December 10, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTfeR ^
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTHt/
SUBJECT: Trip to the Central America Region
31B^9
Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet for a
proposed trip to the Central American region headed by VADM
Poindexter on December 11-12, 1985.
Participants:
VADM John M. Poindexter
Asst Sec of State Elliott Abrams
Dep A^^ See of Sf«fi» William Walker
Mr.
LTCOL Oliver North
G. Philip Hughes
General Itinerary:
^1 I
|3|
i
Depart
Arrive
Depart
Arrive
Depart
Arrive
Depart
Arrive
Depart
Arrive
Depart
Arrive
6:30 p.m.. Wed, Dec 11 Andrews AFB
11:00 p.m. Howard AFB, Panama
(Remain Overnight)
9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 12 Howard AFB, Panama
(save one hour enroute - change of time zone)
9:00
10:30
11:40
1:00
p.m.
1: 30 p.m.
3:30
5:15
(gain one hour enroute
6:30 p.m.
12:00 midnight
San Jose, Costa Rica
San Jose, Costa Rica
Ilopongo AB, El Salvador
Ilopongo AB, El Salvador
Palmerola AB, Honduras
Palmerola AB, Honduras
La Aurora AB, Guatemala City
change of time zone)
La Aurora AB, Guatemala City
Andrews AFB
NSC will defray expenses for North and Hughes' travel. Travel will h
by military aircraft. Trip has been verbally approved by Poindexter
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Ric)c Benner to cut the appropriate travel orders
for both North and Hughes. ic-i
Approve Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Authorization She
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
UWWSfflffD
375
1. TRAVELES'S NAME: LTCOL Oliver North anS^ ■ Philip Hughes
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(SI; '^° accompany VADM Poindexter on
brief, low-profile trip to Central American region to confer with
too ranking U.S. officials and to reinforce the continuity of U.S.
policy in the region. (see cover memo for itinerary)
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary) ; see cover mer.
DEPARTURE DATE Wed, Dec 11 RETURN DATE Thurs, Dec 12
TIME 6 = 30 p.m. TIME ^2t00 midnight
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION: ...
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES: - ."....■ .
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM xx OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST • ' "
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC XX . OTHER
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS; N/A -
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO xx
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
Describe Source and Arrajigements ) : N/A
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED:
11. RE-MARKS (Use This' Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders) :
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: J/JAAM^ HoJ^ -fyT
13. APPROVALS: _
DHCDBSIFIEr
376
UMOUfflED
NATIONAL SECURrTY COUNCIL
wasmvmton 0 c zosoe
December 2, 1985
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH >/
SUBJECT: Trip to Panama and Honduras
^
SYSTEM I
91229
Based on your
ttwj
#
idance, arrangements hav
MHlip
stance of yc
cor vQu to
T^^^
)ec 5) . The itinerary and substance of your meet'
have Deen discussed with State (DASS Bill Walker) and SOUTHCOM
(General Galvin) .
Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet for a
proposed trip to Panama and Honduras on December 4-5, 1985.
Participants:
ADM John M. Poindexter
Mr. Richard Armitage
Mr - W^i^l lam WalWc r
Mr.
LTCOL Oliver North
Mr. Raymond Burghardt
General Itinerary (details at Tabs III and IV) ;
Depart 2:30 p.m.. Wed, Dec 4 Andrews AFB
Arrive 7:35 p.m. Howard AFB, Panama
(Remain Overnight)
Depart 9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 5 Howard AFB, Panama
Arrive 9:50 a.m. Palmerola AB, Honduras
Depart 2:00 p.m., Thurs, Dec 5 Palmerola AB, Honduras
Arrive 7:10 p.m. Andrews AFB
NSC will defray expenses for North and Burghardt' s travel.
Attached at Tab II is a memo from you to Don Regan requesting
a Special Air Mission (SAM) support for this trip.
Tabs III and IV provide an overview of the situation and the
objectives we hope to achieve in Panama and Honduras,
respectively. Detailed talJcing points for your use during the
trip will be provided separately.
State (Wallcer) , Defense (Armitage), CIA^^^^^ and Raf '^*''^''<^ *-
Burghardt concur.
Declassify: OADR
ims^ED
377
SECRET
RECOMMENDATIONS
uNoranED
2
1. That you authorize Rick Benner to cut the appropriate travel
orders for North and Burghardt.
Approve Disapprove
2. That you initial and forward the memo at Tab II to Don Regan
requesting SAM support for the trip.
Approve Disapprove
3. That you review Tabs III and IV prior to the trip.
Approve Disapprove
cc: Rick Benner (w/o Tabs II, III, and IV)
Attachments
Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet
Tab II - Poindexter Memo to Regan
Tab III - Current Situation and our Objectives for Panama
Tab IV - Current Situation and our Objectives for Honduras
UNttASSIFED
378
nciifflQi:
1- TRAVELER'S NAMZ:_
2. PURPOSECS), EVENTCS), DATE(SI: For official meetxnos ,n Panama
and Honduras DP^^mhar .-" i^gs.
^^213:
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): see
SYSTEM II 912:
DEPARTURE DATE Wed, Dec 4 RETURN DATE Thurs, Dec 5
TIME 2:30 p.m. yi^E "^-^0 P-"- -
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION: . .'. "
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES: . - ^ _.-... .
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM XX OTHER , TOTAL TRIP COST $252 .-0^ °'
6. WHO PA/S EXPENSES: NSC XX . OTHER
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: ^^^ "
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO XX
'• llsl°A.7i:ill '^l ^i^JS^^ff.'" ^"-!; "" '■" '^ ^— ^"-
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: $ q.qq
^^' ^^l in^!.?^*"!^*^* ^° Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders) :
THAVZLER'S SIGNATURE: <^ 00^^ UoAt - JP(]Jt^
DiraSSlFIET
12.
13. APPROVALS:
379
SYSTEM i:
91229
CONFIDENTIAL
^;90^
MEMORANUUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Special Air Miasion (SAM) Support
It is requested that a SAM C-20 aircraft be provided for a
proposed trip to Panama and Honduras on December 4-5, 1985. The
purpose of the trip is to review the current situation in Central
America with key government officials in these two countries.
The itinerary for the trip is indicated below:
Proposed Itinerary
Depart
2:30 p.m. ,
, Wed, Dec 4
Andrews AFB —
Arrive
7:35 p.m.
Howard AFB, Panama
(Remain Overnight)
Depart
9:00 a.m.,
, Thurs, Dec 5
Howard AFB, Panama
Arrive
9:50 a.m.
Palmerola AB, Honduras
Depart
2:00 p.m.,
, Thurs, Dec 5
Palroerola AB, Honduras
Arrive
7:10 p.m.
Andrews AFB
The Honorable Richard P. Riley
Assistant to the President and
Director of Special Support Services
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
mmm
m^
Y/zr/?7
"i^mim
381
numiED
Based on discuisions with Walker at State and General Galvin, the
following detailed itineary has been proposed for Panama:
"Wednesday, December 4, 1985;
1935: Arrive Howard AFB, Panama; proceed to USAP Hdqtrs
1940 - 2010: 30 minute briefing w/General Galvin at USAF Hdqtrs
2010 - 2030: ^Procee^jl^l|SOUTHCOM auto to SOUTHCOM Hdqtrs^H
- 2100: ^H^^HHII^^^^^B attendees:
GaTvin^waTxer
2115 - 2200: Recap briefing at CG, USSOUTHCOM residence w/O.S.
team and General Galvin
2200 - morn: Poindexter RON at Qtrs 1 w/General Galv-iti;
remainder of U.S. team RON at Casa Carribe
Thursday, December 5, 1985
0700 - 0730: Breakfast (Qtrs 1 and Casa Carribe)
0730 - 0745: Proceed to USSOUTHCOM Op Ctr
0745 - 0845: USSOUTHCOM regional security briefing
0845 -0900: Proceed to Howard AFB, Panama
0905 - 0950: Enroute to Honduras via C-20
wmm
382
ISbBSr/f//
51907
CURRENT SITUATION/OBJECTIVES FOR HONDURAS
Thursday, December 5, 1985
0950
lOOO - 1215;
1215 - 1315!
1315 - 14001
1400 - 1910:
Arrive Palmcrola Air Base, Honduras (save one
hour enroute — 1 hour and 50 minute flight)
attendees:
Ferch
Discussions with
Poindexter, U.S. teaST
Working lunch at CTF Bravo (U.S. military exercise
hdqtrs)
Options;
A
B - (.ountry team orieiTing by AmEmb Tegucigalpa
Enroute from Palmerola Air Base to Andrews AFB
SECRET
Declassify; OADR
mmm
UNE»SglFIED
SYSTEM ::
91229
NATIONAL SECURfTY COUNCI-
WASMWGTON 0 C SOSOc
December 10, 1985 /^.,'^^t6'6^.'«^J«w
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. P0INDEXT4p.
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTI^
SUBJECT: Cable to Posts Advising of Your Trip to the
Central America Region
The cable attached at Tab I has been coordinated directly with
Elliott Abrams, Amb John Ferch, and General Galvin. Please note
once we arrive in Panama aboard C-20 we will be using General
Galvin 's C-9 in-theater. This will allow sufficient rest for
your aircrew and provide more space for traveling team
in-theater. Paul Thompson has coordinated aircraft support and
exchange of aircraft.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authoyr^ ?6i dispatch of the cable at Tab I
(Op Immed via|HB^hannel) .
Approve Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I - Poindexter Cable to Central American Posts
cc: Paul Thompson
Philip Hughes
Declassify: OADR
UNHftSStHED
384
WHITE HOUSE
TO: AM EMB PANAMA CITY, PANAMA
AM EMB SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
AM EMB SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR
AM EMB TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS
AM EMB GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA
USCINCSO, QUARRY HTS , PANAMA
INFO: SEC STATE, WASH, D.C.
SEC DEF, WASH, D.C.
DIR. CIA, WASH, D.C.
CHMN. JCS, WASH, D.C.
SECRET //EYES ONLY
SUBJ: VISIT TO CENTRAL AMERICA BY ASST. TO PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DESIG. JOHN M. POINDEXTER (C)
1. SECRET—ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER, TO MAKE A HASTY, LOW-PROFILE TRIP TO
CENTRAL AMERICA TO CONFER WITH TOP RANKING U.S. OFFICIALS AND TO
REINFORCE THE CONTINUITY OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION. IN EACH
mtisma
385
SECRi
rtM
B
LOCATION THE NATIONA^£^TT^nviSOR WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH
U.S: AMBASSADOR, m^HHH^ AND SENIOR MILITARY
REPRESENTATIVES. INVITATION OF CINC U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND,
GENERAL GALVIN , FOR USE OF HIS AIRCRAFT IN-THEATER IS qjt^PEnJLLY
ACCEPTED. WASHINGTON BASED C-20 WILL PROCEED TO cftvTEMALA TO
RENDEZVOUS WITH WASHINGTON PARTY.
3. PURPOSE OF THE TRIP IS TO MEET WITH U.S. OFFICIALS NOT REPEAT
NOT WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. PLEASE EMPHASIZE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS
THAT NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR INTENDS THAT THIS BRIEF, INFORMAL
FAMILIARIZATION TRIP WILL BE FOLLOWED AT A FUTURE DATE BY A
LONGER VISIT WHICH WILL ALLOW MEETINGS WITH REGIONAL HEADS OF
STATE AND ADDITIONAL HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMBASSADORS
SHOULD STRESS THAT THIS SECOND VISIT WILL PROBABLY OCCUR AFTER
INSTALLATION /INAUGURATION OF NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENTS IN COSTA
RICA, HONDURAS, AND GUATEMALA.
4. WASHINGTON PARTY WILL ARRIVE VIA SAM C-20 AND CONSIST OF:
VADM JOHN P0IND3XTER, DESIG. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO PRES
ASST SEC OF STATE ELLIOTT ABRAMS
PEP ASST SEC OF STATB WILLIAM WALKER
MR.
LTCOL OLIVER NORTH, NSC STAFF
G. PHILIP HUGHES, NSC STAFF
CDR PAUL THOMPSON, MIL ASST TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
2 WHCA COMMUNICATORS
msmut
82-690 0-88-14
386
secre:
'mm'Si
i^^y"^
5. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY VISIT HOST
NATION AND U.S. MILITARY UNITS IN THE REGION AND INFORMALLY MEET
WITH CERTAIN KEY OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN AIDING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION AS INDICATED BELOW. WASHINGTON
PARTY WILL BE INFORMALLY ATTIRED SINCE MOST STOPS WILL OCCUR AT
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. ITINERARY IS PLANNED AS FOLLOWS:
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1985
18 30 DEPART ANDREWS AFB
2300 ARRIVE HOWARD AFB PANAMA
(RON QTRS 1 U.S. CINCSO, GEN GALVIN)
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1985
0730 BREAKFAST AT QTRS 1
0800 DEPART FOR VIP LOUNGE, HOWARD AFB
0830-0900 WD LIKE TO MEET PRIVATELY IN VIP LOUNGE AT HOWARD AFB
■^^^^^^^HaMB BRZGGS, gen GALVIN, ASST SEC ABRAMS
IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.
0900 WHEELS UP FOR SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
(SAVE ONE HOUR ENROUTE - CHANGE OF TIME ZONE)
0900-1030 WD PREFER MTG AT CARIARI HOTEL OR AIRPORT W/AMB TAMBS ,
JEN GALVIN, AND REMAINDER OF U.S. TEAM FOLLOWED BY
mmmm
387
SECRE':
wsmm
^a9A2
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 198 5 (CONT'D...)
1030 WHEELS UP FOR ILOPONGO AB EL SALVAADOR
1140-1300 MTG AT ILOPONGO W/AMBE^ORR, GEN GALVIN, COL STEELE,
AND MILGP CHIEF, AND^^BfD LIKE TO MEET BRIEFLY W/DEF
MIN VIDES AND GEN BLANDON AND BRIEFLY INSPECT AIR
FORCE/COUNTER-INSURGENCY ASSETS. BRIEF RE CURRENT
OPERATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM
WD BE HELPFUL.
1300 VraEELS UP FOR PALMEROLA AB HONDURAS _
1330-1530 MTG AT PALMEROLA W/AMB JOHN FERCH , ^^^GEH GALVIN AT
CTF BRAVO. WD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY FqR_
^EAT PRIVATE Ml
1530 WHEELS UP FOR LA AURORA AB GUATEMALA CITY
(GAIN ONE HOUR - CHANGE OF TIME ZONE)
1715-1820 MTG AT LA AURORA AB GUATEMALA CITY W/AMB PIEDRA,
GEN GALVIN , ^^HpOLCONS , AND REMAINDER OF U.S. TEAM;
WD LIKE TO MEET BRIEFLY]
DISCUSSION OF
COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM WD ALSO BE HELPFUL.
WHEELS UP FOR ANDREWS AFB
ARRIVE ANDREWS AFB
UKtIigSIHED
388
UWSmED
S19'^^
6. WASHINGTON PARTY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE RE VISAS AND CUSTOMS
CLEARANCE IN THAT TIME HAS NOT PERMITTED NORMAL VISA PROCESSING,
REGARDS, POINDEXTER.
wnsm
389
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=""-n°'-T/WEMBEP ;-5
NAME AND OFFICE
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ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER
^
^.
X
RICHARD AR«ITAGE
^
^
^
ELLIOTT ABRAMS
^
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^
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BIUTWALKER
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y,SG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA Ae^'Vw^ 01/24/86 10:56:23
To: NSWGH --CPUA ^ , J-
NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON N I U I U C
Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid
FYI in case question comes up or Arraitage should call. Thanks.
••• Forwarding note from NSRFB — CPUA 01/24/86 09:59 •••
To: NSWFM —CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP
NOTE FROM: Raymond Burghardt
SUBJECT: Meeting on Contra Aid
DNCUSSIflfO
I just got a call from Rich Armitage, who was politely registering
a protest that he was not invited to the meeting this afternoon.
He said he was in the meeting on Tuesday and had 'left his
calendar cleared" in expectation of a meeting today, but never
got a call. He was aware that you had convened a session for this
afternoon. I just said that when I got back from my trip i found
a meeting was scheduled but didn't know much about it and thought
it was only you, Elliott and myself. I recommend we leave the
composition unchanged, because it would be impossible to discuss
diplomatic initiatives with Defense there.
CC: NSOLN —CPUA P'^ally Oeciassified/Released onl!t^8S
^^ nIfEG .-CPUA K ""O^^O'Ov.s.onsotEO 12356
CC : NSFEG - -CPUA by K Johnson. National Secunty Council
MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA 01/24/86 11:32:34
To: NSRFB —CPUA
NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid
From Fortier.
•*• Forwarding note from NSDRF --CPUA 01/24/86 11:26 •••
To: NSWRP —CPUA I
Reply to note of 01/24/86 10:55 ^ -^ V 1 ^
NOTE FROM: DONAU) R. FORTIER '
Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid
RAY, RICH WAS THERE LAST WEEK WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR A
DIPLOMATIC COMPONENT. HE KNOWS ELLIOTT WAS TASKED TO PRODUCE A
PAPER FOR TODAY. HIS NOT GETTING AN INVITATION WAS AN OVERSIGHT.
I TAKE YOUR POINT, BUT THINK WE NEED TO INCLUDE HIM. WE DISCUSSED
WITH ABRAMS AND MICHEL THE COMPOSITION OF THE POLICY GROUP, AND
THEY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD INCLUDE RICH BUT NOT JCS OR NESTOR. I
THINK THEN THAT WE HAD BETTER ACKNOWLEDGE THE OVERSIGHT AND
INVITE RICH. IF WE HAVE TO HAVE A MORE PRIVATE SESSION LATER WE
CAN. BUT WE HAVE A LOT OP WORK TO DO TODAY - THAT CAN'T WAIT -
ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PACKAGE, ROLE OF DEFENSE IN TRAINING,
ETC.
VNCUSSIFIED
400
MSG FROM: NSWGH — CPUA 01/24/86 12:15:28
To: NSOLN —CPUA NSRKS --CPUAi iriinQ
NSRFB --CPUA n I U I Ui>
— SECRET —
NOTE FROM: WILMA HALL
SUBJECT: Today's 4:00 pm Mtg
Don Fortier has decided he is going to need more time with the
just the participants of the 3:00 pm group to discuss Contra Aid
Issue. Therefore, he has aslted me to reschedule the 4:00 pm mtg
re legis strategy of Contra Aid Issue to 10:00 am, Mon, Jan 27 --
sane participants as 3:00 pm group plus legis types. This note
is your notification of change -- all others have already been
informed by me via phone.
NSJLC —CPUA
NSWRP — CPUA
NSFH
—CPUA
NSJMH
— CPUA
NSCEC
—CPUA
,.*<-
Partially Oeciassified/Released oni_LH€*3S > '//. '
under provisions of E 0 12356 ^ "^ Ji/^
"- " Johnson, National Security Council L^ "l^ I t
i^Ui
^v/^
UNCLASSIFIED
401
Kfimim
N 10110
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
C^^ .^X^ /^^"^
Q\oo "TU^^s- «j/njw^ "t—
Par«aflyDec(3ss,WReleasedon_£rFe«<gft /(/' ^3*^ . i^. Ui ^ ^^ ^^"^
by K Johnson Na.ona,Secun,yCo.nc,l ^^ ^ , jL.,3^ JU^J^ J /^>^>w i^*^^^
"Ncuss/fe
402
— -.. lINCLASJvlFIFfl
MSG FROM: NSWRP — CPUA |||V||"| A V V I LI L II ^ ^4 / 86 10:56:23
N 10111
NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: jleeting on Contra Aid
FYI in case question comes up or Armitage should call. Thanks.
••• Forwarding note from NSRFB --CPUA 01/24/86 09:59 •••
To: NSWFM —CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP
NOTE FROM: Raymond Burghardt
SUBJECT: Meeting on Contra Aid
I just got a call from Rich Armitage, who was politely registering
a protest that he was not invited to the meeting this afternoon.
He said he was in the meeting on Tuesday and had "l«ft his
calendar cleared" in expectation of a meeting today, but never
got a call. He was aware that you had convened a session for this
afternoon. I just said that when I got back from my trip I found
a meeting was scheduled but didn't know much about it and thought
it was only you, Elliott and myself. I recommend we leave the
composition unchanged, because it would be impossible to discuss
diplomatic initiatives with Defense there.
cc: NSOLN — CPUA
cc: NSFEG --CPUA
Partially Declassified/Released nn lll'£3g.8
undet provisions o( E 0 12356
by K Johnson. National Secunty Council
UNCLASSIRED
403
MSG FROM: NSWRP — CPU,
To: NSRFB — CPUA
NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid
From Fortier.
*•• Forwarding note from NSDRF — CPUA
To: NSWRP --CPUA
**• Reply to note of 01/24/86 10:55
— SECRET —
NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER
Subject: Meeting on Contra Aid
01/24/86 11:32:34
N 10112
01/24/86 11:26 *••
RAY, RICH WAS THERE LAST WEEK WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR A
DIPLOMATIC COMPONENT. HE KNOWS ELLIOTT WAS TASKED TO PRODUCE A
PAPER FOR TODAY. HIS NOT GETTING AN INVITATION WAS AN OVERSIGHT.
I TAKE YOUR POINT, BUT THINK WE NEED TO INCLUDE HIM. WE DISCUSSED
WITH ABRAMS AND MICHEL THE COMPOSITION OF THE POLICY GROUP, AND
THEY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD INCLUDE RICH BUT NOT JCS OR NESTOR. I
THINK THEN THAT WE HAD BETTER ACKNOWLEDGE THE OVERSIGHT AND
INVITE RICH. IF WE HAVE TO HAVE A MORE PRIVATE SESSION LATER WE
CAN. BUT WE HAVE ?. ICT OF WORK TO DC TODAY - THAT CAN'T V.'AIT -
ON THK COMPOSITION OF THE PACKAGE, ROLE OF DEFENSE IN TRAINING,
ETC.
Partiaily Declassified/Released on l\\'63S^
under pravisions ot E 0 12355
by K Johnson, National SeCLrMy Council
UNCUSSIFIED
404
405
HAHE: HIR212002
UNClASSlFe ..
RP^S HAZUR
DCnX DOMOCK
GE 1
DEPOSITIOH or MARTIN L. ARTIAKO
Friday, July 31 , 1987
House of Repzasentatives ,
Select Conmittea on Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.
Washington, O.C.
The select comiittee mat, pursuant to call, at 10=00 a.m.,
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Oiilca Building, Thomas Fryman
(Staff Counsel to the Housa Select Committee] presiding.
On behalf of the Housa Select Committee: Thomas Fryman,
Staff Counsel; Spencer Oliver and Bert Hammond, Associate
Staff Counsel: and Kenneth R. Buck, Assistant Minority
Counsel .
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee = James E. Kaplan
and Thomas HcGough, Associate Counsel.
On behalf of the Witness: Thomas P. Heehan, Attorney at
Law, Sherman, Haahan C Curtin, P.C.
Partialir OedniflRt^Reie^
by D. Sirko, NaUonal Security Council
■ provisions cf LO. 12355
UNCUSSIHEO
406
KAME' HIR212002
UNCIASSIBEO
PAGE
MR. FRYHAH: Okay, shall ue swear the witness?
NOTARY: Hi. Hy name is Charlie Vallen. I am from
the Sergeant at Arms Office. I ara a notary for the District
of Columbia.
Whereupon ,
MARTIN L. ARTIAHO
was called for as a witness and, after being duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. FRYMAN:
2 Will you state your full name for the record?
A Martin L. Artiano. A-r-t-i-a-n-o .
2 Mr. Artiano, you are appearing today pursuant to
subpoena, are you not?
A Yes, sir.
2 And you are represented by Thomas P. Meehan as your
counsel ?
A That is correct.
MR. FRYMAN: For the record, I just want to state
that prior to the deposition, Mr. Meehan has received copies
of the resolution establishing the House Connittee, House
Rasolution Ho. 12, as well as a copy of the rules governing
the operation of the House Committee.
MR. MEEHAH: Yes, I have.
BY MR. FRYMAN :_• ^
UNCLASSIFIED
407
NAME:
49
50
5'
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6U
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HIR2 12002
yNCLASSHO ,...
2 Mr. Artiano, what is your occupation?
A I an an attorney.
2 Where do you uork?
A I am a partner at the law firm of Anderson, Hiebl--H-
e-b-1, Nauheim--N-a-u-h-e-i-ra, and Blair--B-l-a-i-r .
2 That located here m Washington, D.C.?
A Yes, sir.
2 How long have you been a partner in that firm?
A I have been a partner, I believe, for four years.
2 That would be since 19837
A Yes, sir, I think that is correct.
2 And were you employed by that firm before then?
A I was .
2 In the position of an associate?
A Yes, sir.
2 And for how long were you an associate there?
A I believe for two years.
2 Is there any particular area of legal practice in
which you specialize?
A I guess I specialize in adninistrative law. My
focus over the last several years has been in real estate
transactions .
2 You are a member oi the District of Columbia Bar?
A Yes, sir.
2 When were you Jtdtaitted?
UNCUSSIFlEi
408
NAME ■■
7U
75
76
77
li
79
HIR2 12002
ONClASSIfiEO „
GE
A Well--I guess '82 or "83; I uas a member of the
California Bar prior thereto, and I believe a year or two
after I arrived, I became a member of the D.C. Bar.
S When were you admitted to the California Bar?
A 1975.
2 Are you a member of the Bar of any other
ur isdictions ?
A No, Sir.
e Where did you receive your undergraduate degree?
A New York University.
2 What year?
A 1970 or '71, I am not certain.
MR. FRYMAN: Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.]
MR. FRYMAN: Okay. Back on the record.
BY MR. FRYMAN:
2 You received your undergraduate degree in 197 1 fr
NYU?
A I believe it was.
2 And youz major was what?
A I think I had a combined major, political
science/philosophy major.
a And when did you graduate from law school?
A 1975.
2 And what was tha^ law school
UNCLASSIFiE
409
NAME:
HIR2 12002
99
A
100
2
101
A
102
e
103
A
ion
2
10S
A
106
York Uni
107
2
108
A
UNCLASSlfiEO
'AGE
California Western.
Where is that located?
San Diego.
Were you enrolled in law school for four years?
No.
Did you'uork for a year between?
No, I attended the Masters in Finance Program at New
vetsity for a year.
And did you receive a degree iron HYU?
No, I left--ray Master's Degree? I left to begin law
school prior to completing the master's program.
Q You received your law degree in 1975, and you began
work at your present firm in Washington in approximately
1981--
A That is correct.
2 --as I understand it.
Would you identify chronologically the jobs that you
held between law school and between the time you began with
your present firm?
A Well, through 1976, I was a staff assistant to Mr.
Reagan in his bid for the nomination, which was as we all
know unsuccessful. After returning to San Diego, I can't
tell you exactly how months after returning I became a
partner in the law firm of Hasserman--H-a-s-s-e-r-m-a-n,
Geile--G-e-i-l-e , and_*itiano.
UNCLASSIFIED
410
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 V ■ 1 Vial ■%# W • ■ tMm** PAGE 6
1214 In 1979, I guess, or late '79, early '80, I can't
125 recall exactly when, I became involved in Mr. Reagan's '80
126 campaign, and stayed through--through the general election.
127 Thereafter served--! served on the transition team,
128 served briefly as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of
129 State, served briefly as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
130 for the Bureau of International Organizations and left
131 approximately-left State approximately May or June of '81 to
132 begin work with Anderson-Hiebl .
133 2 Prior to your work with Ronald Reagan in 1975 and
1314 1976. had you worked with him in any capacity?
135 A No, sir.
136 2 How did you obtain the job in 1975?
13? . A I was clerking for a law firm in San Diego and one
138 of the clients of that law firm was a gentleman who was--I
139 guess a friend of ex-Governor Reagan's, knew of his
mo intention to declare for the nomination, and I was asked by
111 the--one of the attorneys for whom I worked at the time to
1142 take a trip to Lafayette, Louisiana, and did so with Mr.
1143 Reagan--did so.
luu Spent a week, and at the end of che week was invited
1145 by Hr . Reagan and his immediate staff then to stay on board
IKb throughout the campaign.
1ii7 2 Uhat were your responsibilities during the period in
148 1975 and 1976? ^'^
UNCLASSIFIED
411
UNCUSSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 UllUUIIWWil l^-V pACE 7
149 A I was doing advance operations — I guess is the best
150 way to describe it.
15 1 . 2 Can you elaborate on uhat that involved?
152 A That involved preceding the candidate to this
153 intended destination and making arrangements for hira and for
15>4 his party while he was there, for arranging whatever
155 speaking or meeting agenda items were to take place.
156 At that stage of his run for the nomination, there
157 were very few of us, so our responsibilities occasionally
158 spilled over into other areas.
159 Ue would collect information where it was feasible
160 or felt it might be interesting to one of the advisors to
161 Mr. Reagan, and served in some capacities as a quasi-
162 personal aide when he arrived--f rom the time he arrived until
163 the time he departed, and supervised to the extent that this
164 was the case, other advance people who were on ground
165 working that site and worked closely with the Secret Service
166 to ensure the security of the candidate.
167 2 To whom did you report in this job?
168 A I reported principally to Chuck Tyson.
169 . 2 And what was his position?
170 A You know, I can't remember titles. Ha may have been
17 1 Director of the Advance Operations--! guess it would
172 be--fairly accurate description of his role.
173 2 Did you have iH Hhis job daily contact with Ronald
ONClASSIFItO
412
UNCIASSIRE
NAME: HIR212002
174 Reagan?
175 A No. To the eKtent that I uas on the ground and he
176 uas there from the time he arrived until he left, yes, I had
177 daily contact uith him.
178 2 Did you first meet him in connection with this trip
179 to Louisiana that you described?
180 A Yes, sir.
181 e And hou many raonths--let me rephrase the question.
182 You say this job extended from 1975 to 1976. How many
183 months did this involve? Was this six months or eight
ISU months?
185 A I couldn't be precise in ray answer to that. It uas
186 probably around six to nine months, although I am not
187 certain.
188 2 Okay.
189 And during this period of time, is it correct to say
190 that normally, you would have personal contact with Ronald
19 1 Reagan at least every week?
192 . A I guess that is probably a fair estimation.
193 2 And there was some periods of time when you would
194 have daily contact with him?
195 A Yes, sir.
196 2 And some periods when you would not meet with him
197 personally for several days, I take it?
198 A That IS correct! I think for purposes of
wmi\m
413
UNCUSSiriED
NAME' HIR212002 ^ | 1 Vbl l^' ^^ ■ " ■ ■— — ' PkGZ 9
199 clarification, I was not an advisor to Mr. Reagan at the
200 tine, so ray contact was in the form of advance man's
201 contact. It uas not the kind of contact where we would sit
202 down and chat or where he would discuss issues with me.
203 2 Did he call you by your first name?
204 A I think after a while, he probably did. I guess I
205 he did.
206 2 Did you call him by his first nana?
207 A No.
208 fi What did you call him?
209 A I called him Governor.
2 10 . 2 You say there were a number of advance men doing
2 11 this type of job. ApproKimately how many were there during
212 this period?
213 A I think back in '76, I would guess there were full-
2 1U time somewhere between seven and 10 of us in the country.
215 There were just very few.
2 16 2 And you understood that you reported to Chuck Tyson.
217 A That is correct.
2 18 . 2 Now, what was the chain of command above Tyson, as
2 19 you understood it?
220 A Well, certainly Hr . Deaver was almost always with
22 1 NX. Reagan in those days, and final decisions to the extent
222 that I uas certainly aware of them or advised of them were
223 in Mike's hands, in tejnJs of the nature of operations that I
UNCLASSiFiEO
414
UNCUSSlfiEB
XAPIE^ HIR2120I
224 uas involved in.
225 Mr, Heese uas not at that point--in my recollection,
226 Mr. Meese uas not always present on these trips uith Mr.
227 Reagan, but he uas certainly there a significant amount of
228 the time.
229 Mr. Nofziger was the Press Secretary I believe then,
230 and other than those three people, I had no
231 contact--vir tually no contact uith John Sears, who was our
232 Campaign Manager then, and that was pretty much the circle
233 of people that I dealt with on a regular basis.
234 2 Were you on a first-name basis uith Mr. Deaver?
235 A Yes.
236 2 Hou frequently did you speak uith him and conf«r
237 with him, on the average?
238 A Well, any time I uas on the ground at a location at
239 the same time the Governor uas there, I saw Hike regularly.
240 2 So it uould be more than once a week?
241 A Probably.
242 2 And sometimes maybe periods of every day?
243 A Sure.
244 2 Were you on a first-name basis uith Hr . Meese?
245 A Yes.
246 & How frequently did you hav« contact uith him or meet
247 with him?
248 A Mot often. W%.- <iidn' t— I frankly think at that stage.
UNCLASSiFIE
415
UNCLASSIFIE
NAnE- HIR212002 llllLll_riWII • =- »^ PAGE tl
249 wouldn't characterize our contact as meetings, I guess. I
250 didn't sit in on any of the policy meetings. It uas
251 certainly several times a month.
252 It's hard to go back and estimate. I may have seen
253 him more than that if he were traveling a lot around--
254 e Is It fair to say you would see him m a room from
255 time to time, and he would speak to you and you would speak
256 to him?
257 A Sure. You have to put this in perspective. My
258 principal responsibility was to create events essentially,
259 and make sure they ran smoothly, and when Meese was
260 traveling with then-Governor Reagan, he uas there, and while
261 the Governor was speaking, for example, during a dinner, the
262 staff would huddle at a table in the back of the room, if it
263 was a dinner or a speech and talk, and evenings ue would
264 occasionally get together.
265 S Were you on a first-name basis with Hr . Nofziger?
266 A Yes.
267 2 How frequently during this period did you see Mr.
268 Nofziger?
269 A I would guess about the same number of times I saw
270 nx . Meese, because Mr. Kofziger also traveled, I believe,
27 1 pretty much and stayed with Governor Reagan.
272 e The campaign came to an end, and you got a ]ob with
273 the firm in San Diego that you identified, the Hasserman
UNCUSSIFiE!)
416
UNCLASSIFIfD
NAME HIR212002 |||\|1.| ii.\Ainrfii PAGE 12
27U firm.
275 A Yes. not immediately after I returned. It was
276 probably six to nine months after I returned. I am guessing
277 at a stretch of time here.
278 e Were you taking a sabbatical for a while?
279 A No . I uas--I uas doing a couple of things. I had a
280 friend uho I had graduated law school with who was then
281 representing some artist in Los Ang«les, and he involved me
282 in that briefly, and I looked at a couple of other things.
283 I uas looking around, and trying to make some
284 decisions.
285 2 And then you found this opening with the Wasseman
286 firm?
287 A Yes. I had graduated with Hr . Gaile. Mr. Uasserman
288 uas about 20 to 25 years older than ua were.
289 2 And joined that firm as a partner.
290 A Yes.
29 1 Q And you worked there for approximately four years?
292 A Three, three and a half years — I guess until I
293 started with--until I rejoined th« Reagan campaign in 1979.
294 2 During this period, did you continue to have contact
295 with Mr. Deavar?
296 A No. I received--wa exchanged letters on a couple of
297 occasions. I believe I saw Mr. Oeavar certainly a few times
298 during a stretch. Tho^c^ ware occasions when Governor Reagan
UNCmSSIFlEO
417
HAME
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321
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HIR2 12002
DNMSSIfO
PAGE 13
would be in San Diego, for example, to speak to a group or
attend a dinner, and I uould get a call and assist in the
advance work.
2 During this period, did you--did you meet with
Governor Reagan at any time?
A Had no private meetings with Governor Reagan. I was
with him at at least one event I can clearly recall, but had
very little contact with him. riayba on one or two
occasions .
2 Did you continue on speaking terms uith him? He
uould speak to you and you would speak to him. He uould
call you Marty and you would call him Governor?
A I think after the passaga of about a year, I am sure
someone rafreshad his memory as to names before we saw each
other. Ue didn't have any in-depth or extensive
conversations .
I think the longest stretch of time I ever spent
individually speaking to Kx . Reagan, and was waiting in the
back of a limousine, because ue were early for an event, and
It uas delightful.
2 But Hx . Deaver would look to you for —
A Ha would look first, I think, to Hr . Tyson. Hx .
Tyson would than call ma and paxhaps ona ox two other
people, depending on the nature of tha event.
2 And again, Mr.^T*yson was your supaxiox in the
UNCUSSIFIEO
82-690 0-88-15
418
NAME :
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325
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331
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337
338
339
340
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HIR212002
iiNWssra
>AGE 14
campaign. Chuck Tyson?
A Yes, sir.
2 And was he located in San Diego also?
A Yes, he was.
e Was he a lawyer in San Diego?
A No.
2 Did you specialize in any particular area of
practice when you were at the Wasserman iirn?
A We had a pretty general practice. There were only
the three oi us in that firm. I think for a period of about
a year, we had one associate and perhaps had sone clerks
working for us throughout.
2 During this period, we talked about your dealings
with Mr. Deaver. Did you have any contacts during this
period with Hr . Meese?
A I may have seen hin a couple of times. Again, in
the same circumstances when Governor Reagan was around, but
we didn't get together by ourselves.
2 Did you have any contacts with Mr. Kofziger?
A I guess the sane answer, sane kind of scenario.
2 You testified that you later becane involved in the
1980 campaign on behalf of Ronald Reagan?
A That is correct.
2 How did you get a job in the 1980 campaign?
A Well, I was caJ.ied by--I don't recall whether the
iiNcwssife
419
HIR2 12002
\1NWSSW ,.„
NAHE:
349 telephone call came from Chuck Tyson or Ed Meesa, but I was
350 aakftd to come up to Los Angeles initially for a couple of
35 1 H*«ks to help them organize a national advance
352 opeiation--scheduling an advance operation.
353 2 Approximately when was this call?
35U A I couldn't tell you. I honestly don't recall what
355 month it came in. If we track back to the beginning of the
356 '80 campaign, it would be right about then.
357 C Would it have been in 1980?
358 A You know, I don't know. I don't know whether we
359 started it in 1980 or whether we got started in '79. I
360 honestly couldn't tell you.
36 1 . S And did you, in response to this call, go to Los
362 Angeles for two weeks to help organize?
363 A I did. I didn't stay there. I flew up every
364 morning and flew back every night for a couple of weeks.
365 2 Who were you reporting to in this capacity?
366 A I was working again with Hr . Tyson principally.
367 2 Did you have contact with Mr. Deaver?
368 A Yes.
369 2 Daily contact?
370 ^. A I don't know. All of us were in the office m Los
37 1 Millies — within the Deaver-Hannaf ord office. That is were we
372 were putting this together. Deaver — H-a-n-n-a-f-o-r-d . They
373 have a public relations ^irm in Los Angeles, and Governor
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Reagan's office was in there as well, so although I don't
havA any specific lecollection, I an sure I saw Mike quite
frequently then.
e What uas the frequency of your contact, if there uas
any. with Mr. Heese during this period?
A Well, I guess Mr. Keese and I saw each other very
regularly, because ue uould occasionally be taking the sane
flight up in the norning. He also was returning to San
Diego in the evenings, taking a 6=30 PSA shuttle up and an
8:30 shuttle back, and we would often to that together.
Q You would sit next to each other on the plane?
A Sonetinas .
2 Uas rir . Tyson also connutlng from San Diego?
A Occasionally he was flying back and forth. Ue would
sonetines take a roon--there were two hotels innediately
across the street fron the building — depending on the
workload .
If it got too late, we would overnight in Los
Angeles .
2 What was Hi. Reese's role in this two-week
organizing effort?
,^ A Hell, I wasn't — I don't know exactly what Hr . Meese
Mi» doing. I was not working with Mr. Reese during those
two weeks. He saw each other connutlng, I an sure,
occasionally talked to^ekch other in the office, but I
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399 couldn't tell you what Hr . Mttase was doing.
400 fi Did you have contact with «t . Noizigar in this
<40 1 p«xiod ?
402 A You know, I don't leraember a lot of contact with Mr.
403 Nofziger. As a matter of fact, I ai» not sure that Hr .
404 Nofziger was then working with the canpaign at the very
405 beginning. I think he rejoined us maybe a month later or
406 so, although--those dates may not be exactly accurate.
407 2 You indicated that Governor Reagan or then-Governor
408 Reagan had an office in this sane group of offices where you
409 were working.
410 A That is correct.
411 2 Did you have contact with him during this period?
412 A Probably not. I don't remember. I have have seen
413 him. He wasn't spending all day in the office. He would
4 14 occasionally come to the office and spend some time or have
4 15 meetings, but not with me.
416 2 Hho was in charge of the campaign efforts at this
417 point?
4 18 A Hell. Z think by that tiaa, as far as I was
4 19 concerned, anyway, Ed Reese was in charge of the campaign
420 t^^ozt. I believe John Sears was already out of the picture
42 1 tt* that point.
422 fi Did Hllliam Casey have any role in the campaign at
423 this point? -^
ICLASSIflED
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U2U A No. At that point, I didn't even know who Mr. Casey
U2 5 was.
U26 2 So, your initial involvement in the 1980 campaign
M27 came through the request that you come up and work in this
U28 tuo-ueek organizing effort, and you responded affirmatively
429 to the request?
U30 A That is correct.
43 1 . 2 Now, what happened after that that led to your
432 longer-tern involvement in the campaign?
433 A I got caught up in it once again. He scheduled--the
434 Convention was scheduled for Detroit. I was named head of
435 logistics for that, head of operations. I guess, for that
436 Convention.
437 Although, as it turned out, I shared that role with
438 a couple of people once we got to Detroit who had a lot more
439 experience than I did in doing that type of thing, and
440 subsequent to the convention was invited to come back to
441 Washington, D.C., where we were opening our office for the
442 general campaign, and did.
443 2 You say got caught up In it aitez this two-week
444 period. By that, do you mean that you were continuously
445 ttvolved in the campaign in one way or another after this
446 ikltlal two-week organizing period?
447 A Yes. sit.
448 2 When was the Cj>iA/ention In Detroit?
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Either July of August.
NAME^
450 2 Of 1980?
US1 A 1980, yeah.
452 2 Is it correct that you worked for several months in
453 the campaign in advance of the Convention?
454 A I couldn't tell you exactly how long a period it
455 was. It was probably s«m weeks, two months, in that
456 vicinity. Maybe more.
457 2 Here you based in Detroit during this period?
458 A No, I was based in Los Angeles. I stayed in
459 Detroit--! probably arrived in Detroit 10 days to two weeks
460 prior to the Convention, by ray best recollection. And then
46 1 stayed through the OTVaHBOTHM** and than left imnediately
462 after the ^Hfe^antaMaM*.
463 2 Who was your superior during this period?
464 A Chuck Tyson.
465 2 Tyson again.
466 What was the frequency of your contact with then-
467 Governor Reagan?
468 A During which period?
469 2 From the initial organization meeting that you
470 described, the two-week organization period, up through the
47 1 «i^^^Ute«Ma«
472 A It was infrequent. There were one or two occasions
473 where I was asked to g« ^out on an emergency to a site that
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he was planning to visit, so I would assume then--a quasi-
advance role and have some contact with him in that sense.
Didn't spend much time with him duting the 4w*m(^
MMMWi pexiod when he was in Detroit.
e What was the frequency during this period that we
have just described oi your contact with Hr . Deaver?
A I guess I saw Hike or spoke to him fairly regularly.
I don't know if that is every day, twice a day, every other
day, but--
On the average, several times a week?
I am sure several times a week.
Would the same have been true with respect to Hi.
C
A
e
Meese?
A No.
2 How often would you--
A Less frequently with Mr. neese. I had no specific
reason to have--been having discussions with Mr. Heese . He
were friends, so when he was there, I would chat, socially,
or principally we talked about some event I had done or he
had a comment on. We had no regular contact.
e Is it correct that during this period, you work
rasponsibilities did not involve Hr . Meese?
A That is correct.
2 Did your work responsibilities involve Mr. Deaver?
A Yes. . i
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In what way]
A Well. Mr. Deaver uas--I don't know how to describe
it. He uas an advisor to the President--to Hr . Reagan then,
and all scheduling and advance operations ultimately were
cleared through Mr. Deaver, so I had reason to have contact
with him--occasionally alone, more frequently with Hr . Tyson
and Mr. Deaver when we would review something.
They weren't typically extensive contacts or
meetings .
2 Did you understand that Hr . Tyson reported to Hr .
Deaver, m effect?
A Yes.
2 Was Mr. Hofziger involved in the campaign by this
point?
A Yes.
2 How frequent were your contacts with him, if any?
A I would probably describe that the same way I
described my relationship with my contact with Hr . Heese,
although Hr . Nofziger and I were friendlier and closer than
I think I was to Hr . Heese.
So, wa might occasionally in Detroit, for example,
go out and have a cup of coffee at the end of the day, or we
want down and got ice cream at a shop a couple of times. I
didn't do that with Hr . Heese.
2 Your job responsibilities did not involve any
UNCUSSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 UllULinUUII ll-M PAGE 22
52U reporting to or association with Hr . Nofziger; is that
525 correct?
526 A That is generally correct, although clearly in terns
527 of the press aspect of an advance operation, Kr . Nofziger
528 has some play in that, and I knou that Hr . Nofziger worked
529 uith Hr . Deaver and Hr . Heese in terms of making ultimate
530 scheduling and appearance decisions.
53 1 2 Who was the Campaign Director during this period
532 prior to the •w*Ml«*-4t*wMi 7
533 A It is a good question. I think--I am not exactly
53U sure whether Hr . Sears was permanently out of the picture
535 and whether Hr . Heese assumed that role until such time as
536 Hr . Casey was run on board. I can't give you precise dates.
537 fi Did you have any contact with Hr . Casey during this
538 period prior to the ^mmmtttmHKmt^t
539 A No.
5U0 Q When did you first meet Hr . Casey?
541 A After I had returned to Washington, D.C. post-
5142 »«4w«ie4>^t«wM( , so it would be August, September, the
5143 earliest.
54U 2 In some of your prior answers, Hr . Artiano, you have
5145 given some description of your work during this period prior
5146 to the «HiMH|MMaM>> after the two-week organizational
547 period, but I think it would be helpful for the record if
548 you could just specif icsilly summarize exactly the type of
UNCLASSIFItO
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yUWSSlFlEB
NAME: HIR2I2002
549 uoik you were doing m this period and uhat your
550 responsibilities were?
551 A Ue are talking about prior to and during
553 2 Yes.
554 A Prior to the Oiiiini M»i.lli, ua uare attempting to
555 set up a network of advance people around the country, and
556 that took up a great deal odE my time contacting these
557 people, interviewing them, finding out uhat kind of
558 experience they had — ue had people out already at that point,
559 advance people, m the field who were calling in because
560 they were looking at potential sites for visitation.
56 1 . Ue were discussing the 4«*wMitoNtowMt and working on
Convt if^ot*^
562 plans for the ■liiiiai lluith during that stint in Los Angeles
563 and that is the--the detailing of that, as you can imagine,
564 is unbelievable, and I uorked to a great extent uith United
565 Airlines. Ue were chartering several jets from United
566 Airlines, and in fact, ue ueze reconfiguring them, and I did
567 some uork on that during this period of time.
568 Ua had meetings in Los Angelas where ua uould call
569 in people who had experience in Presidential campaigns, and
570 h»va lengthy meetings with them, just seeking advice and
57 1 raooamandations about people, about procedures, about the
572 wammmm^'m^mm. about that sort of thing.
573 And frankly, <y» Sty own initiative, I started looking
mmim
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HIR212002
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 24
into the debates which I was anticipating, and in that
connection, fleu a gentleman out fron Virginia who had some
logistical expertise in setting up these debates.
He recommended, sensing ray interest, that I collect
certain data that he recommended to rae , certain books and
brieiing materials that were available to the public, and
also--also highly recommended a gentleman who is a debate
consultant with whom I met after I returned to Washington,
and indeed, consulted to the regular organization
subsequently.
e Were you involved in fund-raisings at all?
A I really wasn't. I set up certainly as an advance
man several fund-raisers in terms of just finding a location
for it. I had a number of conversations during the course
of ray advance — advancing with fund-raisers, people who were
setting these things up, but I wasn't collecting or
soliciting any money.
KR. FRYMAK: Off the record a second.
(Discussion off the record.]
HR. FRYHAK: OKay .
BY MR. FRYMAM:
Hr. Artiano, is it your best recollection that Hr .
Casey was not involved in the canpaign prior to the «**««ivt
■ ■ ■>
From my perspept>lve in the Biiiiiei ■<*—*)», he wasn't.
UNClASSiFlEO
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NAME HIR212002 UMULriUVll ■ L. M PAGE 25
599 I hadn't met Hr . Casey. I don't reraeraber when the first
600 tin* I heaid his name uas , whether it was p r e - »w*m««^-Mw«*(
60 1 or during the ^^kw****-^^*** . But I had no interaction with
602 him at all, so I would know whether he was or was not
603 involved.
6014 2 An I correct that you were involved in the Reagan
605 campaign in 1980 after the •mimmm^i^tmmi^-'.
606 A Yes, sir.
607 2 What led to your continued involvement after the
6 08 giiuiiLl IIUL^h?
609 A I was asked to continue and wanted to continue.
610 S Mho asked you?
611 A I don't recall whether it was Hr . Tyson or Mr.
612 Deavet, but Z think we all understood we were all going to
6 13 continue.
6 114 2 Did this same team generally stay together after the
6 15 ■■iiiii.l lliitli?
6 16 A Well, I think the sane players remained involved,
6 17 but ue were split up significantly. Some of us were there
6 18 on the road all the time, some oi us were in Washington all
6 19 the time, and there were a host oi new players added
620 immediately upon our arriving in Washington.
62 1 . S The period of your involvement in the campaign after
622 the »*ii«<M^^te*Mi was approximately July of 1980 through the
623 beginning of November j»^ 1980; is that correct?
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624 A Of the campaign, that is correct, through November
625 4th.
626 Q How would you describe your responsibilities during
627 this period?
628 A Well, I believe my title was Deputy Director of
629 Scheduling Advance Operations. Hr . Tyson was Director of
630 the Scheduling Advance Operations. We put together a group
631 of perhaps as many as 70 people in the Washington office,
632 directly involved in reporting through myself and Hr . Tyson
633 and scheduling advance —
634 MR. FRYMAH: Off the record. Wait until this thing
635 is over.
636 (Discussion off the record.]
637 BY HR. FRYHAM:
638 2 Please continue.
639 A --operations, and had somewhere between, I would
640 guess, 50 and 130 people in the field who were also
641 reporting into that office.
642 e And you continued to report to Hr . Tyson; is that
643 correct?
644 A That is correct.
645 fi What did you understand was the line of authority
646 above Hr . Tyson — after the »w*««Ni*B4i«^!4p?
647 A Was never perfectly clear to me, but there were--it
648 was easier for me to i>eSitify the people who axe higher up
mm\m
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UNCUSSIFIED
'AGE 27
the ladder than I was. Mr. Casey clearly was the Campaign
650 Director. Jim Baker was brought on board, and Has--very
651 active and influential in terras of canpaign decisions made
652 during the general election.
653 Bill Tiraraonds had also joined that senior group of
654 people. Bob Gray, with whom I rarely interfaced, also had
655 come on board, as well as a number of purely political
656 consultants, people like Paul Hanefort.
657 You Know, I can't tell you whether Charlie Black was
658 involved with us then or not? I could recall soma names,
659 but there were lots of new faces then.
660 2 Let's start with Mr. Casey. You indicated earlier
66 1 that the first time you recall meeting Hr . Casey was in
662 August or September of 1980, I believe?
663 A That is correct.
664 2 Is that correct?
665 Could you describe your first meeting with Hr .
666 Casey?
667 A Hell, I can't tell you precisely when we were
668 introduced, for example. I don't have any recollection of
669 it. The only — wall, let ma backtrack for second, if I may.
670 Ha had at some point, we began having 7:30 meetings
67 1 batHaen--among senior people and the campaign, and I was
672 invited to sit in on those meetings. Ue had them in a
673 conference room in our_e4action headquarters.
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2 Is this 7:30 a.m.?
A 7:30 a.m., virtually every day. Mr. Casey was in
attendance in many, ii not all, of those meetings.
2 How large a group was in attendance at these?
A Perhaps eight to 12 people.
2 Can you identify those individuals?
A Mr. Casey, Mr. Heese, Mr. Deaver and Mr. Nofziger
when they were in town. Ht . Timmonds. Mr. Baker, a lady
whose name X cannot recall who stayed with us during the
campaign and then returned to California. Mr. Tyson. At
some point, Ron Walker, who was brought in during the
general to assist us in the advance scheduling operations;
Bob Gray, I believe, sat in at least some of those meetings,
and there were people who I remember being at some of the
meetings, but don't know if they were regulars there, people
like Rich Williamson and Paul Manefort and Kenny K-1-i-n-g.
2 I want to come back to — you were answering the
question about Mr. Casey. But just continuing on with this,
these meetings were held at 7=30 every morning, and
approximately what period of time did these meetings
occur-'duxing what months or what weeks?
A During most of the general election period.
fi That would be July through October?
A Ho, I would say it was probably August--started
sometime in August, I tJ^ink, or early September, and lasted
UNCLASSJFIEO
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UNCmSSlFlfD
NAHE- HIR212002
699 through the balance of the general election.
700 2 Did Mr. Reagan ever attend these meetings?
701 A I don't recall him ever being at one of these
702 meetings, no, sir.
703 e Returning to the subject that we were discussing,
704 specifically Mr. Casey and your meeting with Mr. Casey, if
705 you would continue your answer with respect to that.
706 A I can recall only one or two times where I had an
707 individual meeting with Mr. Casey that was on a matter of
708 substance. The most vivid in my mind was ona that concerned
709 the debates.
710 I had, by this time, compiled a significant amount
711 of information in terms of briefing books and logistical
712 information about debates, and I was concerned that I didn't
7 13 see any activity and felt that it was — we should get a head
71U start on preparing Hz. Reagan for the debates, and as such,
7 15 went to Bill Timmonds and Stu Spencer, who was then
716 assisting as well, and made a pitch to them, and essentially
7 17 recommended that they use theiz office to spur some activity
7 18 in this regard, and advise them that I would be quite
7 19 interested to the extent that I could.
720 Very shortly after that meeting, they agreed. Very
72 1 shortly after that meeting, I got a call from Hr . Casey and
722 went to his office, and he asked me what I had done and what
723 I had--and I told him^- 4nd he said, ''Well, bring that all up
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HIR2 12002
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PAGE 30
to ray office. I am going to take charge of this,'' and I
did.
I had another meeting with Mr. Casey, and I will
tell you quite frankly, I had been speculating about the
nature of it. Ue had some confusion about planes or people
to be transferred from one place to another, and frankly, he
was the person I needed to speak to at that time.
Other than those two occasions, I don't remember
having a one-on-one with Mr. Casey.
2 You had frequent contact with him in these 7:30
morning meetings that you described?
A Well, I was sitting--! sat in those meetings. I will
tell you that I wasn't a major contributor at those
meetings. I was for tha most part auditing those meetings.
When matters of scheduling and advance came up, if Mr. Tyson
didn't have the answer and I did, I would be called upon,
and if Mr. Tyson was not available, a matter along those
lines cantt up, questions or requests were directed to me.
2 Were you on a first-name basis with Hr . Casey?
A Ho, sir.
2 You called him Hr . Casey?
A Yes, sir.
2 Did he call you Mr. Artiano?
A I doubt that Mr. Casey ever knew my name for more
than 10 minutes at a tiie .
UNCUSSiFiED
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749 2 Were you involved in preparation for the debates in
750 th« 1980 campaign other than what you hava dasciibed?
751 A Ho, no.
752 e You did not work directly with Ronald Keagan?
753 A Ho, sir. I didn't. My only additional involvement,
75(4 as I recall now, was urging successfully that a gentleman by
755 the name of Miles nartel, who was a debate expert, be
756 brought in as a consultant, and he was.
757 Q Your work on the campaign continued until the
758 beginning of November 1980?
759 A That is correct.
760 S Uhat did you do after the campaign or after Ronald
76 1 Reagan was elected?
762 A I had--between Election Day and Mr. Reagan moving
763 into the White House and the Inauguration, I had a dual
76(4 role. I continued to serve in a — much reduced at that
765 point--scheduling and advance operation with Mr. Tyson, did
766 some coordinating with the Inaugural team under Mr. Gray
767 that was putting together the Inaugural ceremonies and also
768 served on the transition team.
769 Generally, I guess that was the State Department
770 transition team under Mr. Fuller and Mr. Frank Shakespeare.
77 1 My responsibilities were fairly limited in that regard. I
772 did a transition report on the Overseas Private Investment
773 Corporation, and also >t^ended some of the transition
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— UNCLASSIFIED ^.o. .
meetings at the Department of State, and AID.
.2 By what organization were you paid during the period
between the election and the Inauguration?
A I don't know. It was--Me all were paid by the
s ame-- through the same vehicle and I am not sure at what
point It stopped being the Reagan ior President Campaign and
what point it was transition funds.
Ue all received the same checks, late.
Q Were these government checks or were these private
checks?
A You know, I don't recall. I do not recall.
2 Did you continue to be paid at the same amount?
A I believe so.
2 Do you know how you were selected to be involved in
the State Department transition team?
A I don't know how the selection process was worked.
I requested some--that I be given some area in the transition
team because it was quite interesting to me, and I wanted to
participated in it.
2 Did you request State?
A I don't know. I honestly don't know.
2 Had you previously known Dr. Fuller?
A No, sir.
2 Had you previously known Ambassador Shakespeare?
A Mo, sir . . i
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2 During the period from the election until the
Inauguration, how frequent was your contact with Ronald
Reagan, x£ any?
A If any, it was minimal.
2 Do you recall any occasion when you spoke with hira
during this period?
A No. I recall occasions being in the same room with
hira on a number of occasions, but not having a conversation
with him.
2 How frequent was your contact with Hr . Oeaver, if
any?
A There was contact, but it was probably relatively
infrequent.
2 Did the--was the contact related to your
responsibilities during this period?
A Yes.
2 How frequent, if any, was your contact with Hr .
Keese?
A I,imited--inf requent.
2 And the same question with respect to Hr . Nofziger.
A I think infrequent. I don't remember spending time
during that transition period with any of them. I certainly
a> them, but I don't remember having any discussions with
them or--
2 The transition. i*eriod covered approximately three
UNCUSSIFIED
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NAHE: HIR212002 vllUkriUUII I L> W PAGE 314
824 months, is that correct--tuo and a half itonths?
825 A Two and a half months.
826 fi And I think you have described three general areas
827 of responsibility during this period: One. the State
828 Department transition team; tuo . work in connection with the
829 Inauguration: and, three, continued work with respect to
830 scheduling or advance work.
831 Is that a fair description of your areas?
832 A Generally, that is probably pretty accurate.
833 2 Which of these areas did you devote most of your
831* time to during this period?
835 A Well, I think the most intense application of
836 efforts was in connection with the transition report. I had
837 never done anything like and it was brand new to me, and I
838 was concerned about doing that--a reasonable job.
839 e I take it from your comments that prior to the work
8t«0 on the transition team, you had not had any prior experience
8m in dealing with the Department of State?
842 A That is correct.
843 e Or the Agency for International Development?
844 A That is correct.
845 Q You described a report which you prepared concerning
846 overseas private investment?
847 A Yes, sir.
848 2 How did you hafpVn to prepare that report on that
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NAME:
8U9 subject? Was that assigned to you by soiieona?
850 A Yes, it was. It was assigned by Mr. Fuller or Mr.
SSI Shakespeare at one of the meetings that we had.
852 2 Hou many people were involved in this transition
853 team?
SSM A Total number of people on the transition?
855 2 Hell, let's start with that, yes.
856 A I have no idea. I would guess — I have no idea.
857 Hundreds probably.
858 2 Was there a smaller group that you dealt with on a
859 periodic basis?
860 A Yes, sir.
861 . fi What was the size of that group?
862 A 12 people, perhaps.
863 C And did you have periodic meetings, or what was the
864 nature of your contact with the others in this group of 12?
865 A We had several meetings — I don't know, two, three
866 meetings perhaps at the Heritage Foundation. The meetings
867 were either chaired by Hr . Fuller or by Hr . Shakespeare if
868 he here there.
869 2 Was Hr . Fuller the person generally in charge of the
870 organization of the transition team as you understood it?
87 1 . A Of the State Department transition?
872 2 Yes.
873 A Yes. • ^
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8714 MR. HEEHAN: So, it is clear when you say transition
875 tea™, in the hundreds he is referring to the overall
876 transition and the team he worked on was the State
877 Department transition.
878 MR. FRYMAN: Well, let's focus on the group of
879 approximately 12 that you have described who were involved
880 in the State Department transition.
881 BY MR. FRYMAN:
882 2 Now, was the larger group of hundreds involved in
883 the transition--does that pertain also to the State
8814 Department or is that to the entire Executive Branch?
885 A That--to the entire Executive Branch, not to the
886 State Department.
887 2 So that particular State Department group was
888 limited to this group that you met with from time to
889 time--insof ar as you know?
890 A So far as I know, yes. sir.
89 1 . 2 And that was organized by Mr. Fuller.
892 A Mr. Fuller and Mr. Shakespeare.
893 2 Mho were the other members who you recall that were
894 in this group?
895 A The only two members I can recall were Elliott
896 Abrams and I believe Henry Nau, H-a-u.
897 2 What was Mr. Nau's position other than being a
898 member of the transitXPi^ team?
UNaA55iritil
441
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ONGUSSIflED
PAGE 37
899
900
A I believe Mr. Mau was a ptofassot at the college or
graduate level at a university here in Washington, D.C. at
90 1 the time. I am not certain of that, but I believe that uas
902 his position.
903 2 Other than your work on the report concerning
904 overseas private investment and your attendance at the
905 periodic meetings of the group, what else did you do in
906 connection with this work?
907 A With the transition--
908 2 Uith the transition.
909 A I attended several meetings at the Department of
910 State. One such meeting was a meeting, I believe, of all
911 the Assistant Secretaries at the Department of State. That
912 is my recollection. I had another--! have another
913 recollection of a smaller meeting that I attended, and I
914 will be perfectly frank with you:
915 . I can't tell you who was at the meeting with rae .
9 16 There was at least one person from the--ona Assistant
9 17 Secretary or two Assistant Secretaries from the State
9 18 Department and one or two members from our group of 12. I
919 don't recall whether that uas Hr . Fuller. Mr. Abrams, Mr.
920 Hau or someone else. I don't know who it was with at the
92 1 tiaa.
922 2 Did you work with other people in the preparation of
923 this report, or did you ^basically write the report by
442
flNCIiSSIflEti
NAME: HIR212002 1 1 1 1 ULrtU U I t 1 V» fl^ PAGE 38
9214 yourself?
925 A I worked with one other gentleman. His first name
926 uas Roy, and his last name I cannot recall, who was a
927 financial consultant to the campaign. I worked under Bay
928 Buchanan. And I asked for his assistance, because in
929 par t--obviously part of my reporting on the Overseas Private
930 Investment Corporation involved reviewing their financial
931 statements to make sure that I was accurately interpreting
932 that data.
933 2 Now. you mentioned that Hr . Abrams was a member of
93<4 the team. Had you met Mr. Abrams before your work with him
935 on the team?
936 A I don't think so. I will quality that by saying we
937 may have met once before. I may have been introduced to him
938 by Bill Tiraraonds . Somehow, I seem to have a recollection of
939 that, but I am not certain that is the case. I can't tell
940 you when that would have happened.
9m . It would have happened probably immediately prior to
942 the transition, and my first recollections of Elliott Abrams
9U3 are during that transition period.
9UU 2 What was Mr. Abrams' position during this period,
945 other than being a member of the transition team?
946 A I am not certain. I can't tell you what he was
947 doing.
9(t8 2 Was he living J.ii Washington?
j; f^ (-^ f_ fT»? ip. ^^
443
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 -^ -w^-- . _ »- PAGE 39
9'<9 A Yes, sir--r think ha was living in Washington.
950 2 HoH frequent was your contact with Hr . Abrams during
951 this Hovember to January period?
952 A Not very frequent. It was infrequent. I sau hira
953 when ue had the meeting at the Heritage roundation--didn ' t
954 see hira m the regular course of my transition
955 responsibilities, because he wasn't involved Kith the
956 Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
957 I frankly can't tell you what Elliott's specific
958 responsibilities were during--on behalf of the transition
959 team other than knowing that he was involved in a State
960 Department transition.
96 1 . 2 What did you do after the Inauguration?
962 A Well, at some point after the Inauguration, I
963 accepted a position under Mr. Abrams who had then been named
96'* Assistant Secretary for International Organizations as an
965 Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary in that agency under
966 Elliott.
967 2 When you say at some point, approKimately when was
968 this?
969 A You know, I would guess sonetiae in February,
970 although I can't assure you that that is accurate.
97 1 .» 2 Do you know what led to the Administration offering
972 you this position?
973 A I had gotten W know Elliott Abrams during the
UNCUSSiFIED
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NAME
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975
97t
977
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979
980
981
982
983
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989
99C
991
992
993
991.
995
996
997
IIR2 12002
yNWSSlFIED
PAGE 40
course of the months preceding that, and at some point,
either late in the transition period or post-transition, I
had raet Elliott's uife--I don't even think their iirst child
was born yet at that point--hard to reiiiember--but I started
establishing a friendship with hiii outside of the political
arena--and with Elliott's wife, Rachel.
2 Is it your understanding that Hr . Abrams nade the
decision to offer you this position?
A I believe so. He's--I got the telephone call fron
Mr. Abrams, and he asked me if I would be interested, and I
said I would be, and I went over to chat with him about it.
He was already in. I don't know that he was confirmed at
that point, but he was already Acting Assistant Secretary.
2 How long did you continue in this spot?
A Only for a feu months perhaps, three months. I
don't remember the exact amount of time. I left to join the
law firm, and I believe I--I believe I started with the law
firm either at the end of Hay of 1981 or the beginning of
June of 1981 .
C When you started this job in February, had you
intended to stay for such a brief period?
A I don't think I had — I was kind of up in the air at
that point, frankly, about what I wanted to do. I had a
strong desire to go back to California at that stage of the
game. Frankly, worki»^^for the United States Government is
UNGUSSiHED
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999
1000
100 1
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
lom
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
HIR2 12002
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE
not an appealing prospect to me.
2 Why was that?
A I just didn't feel comiortabla in a bureaucratic
situation, which is why I never went to work for a large law
firm, and the State Department was clearly quite
bureaucratized .
e Did you have daily contact with Mr. Abrans during
this February to approximately Hay period when you were
working--
A Unless he was traveling. I am sure I did.
2 And in addition to your professional association
with him, you indicated you had become personal friends--and
with his family.
A That is correct.
2 And you saw them socially as wall?
A Yes.
2 Here you married at this point?
A No, I was not.
2 Then, as I understood your answer, when you took
this job in February, you took it with the intention of
staying fox a short period of time?
A I am not sure I could say that in all honesty. I
can tell you very honestly that I didn't know whether I
wanted to stay in Washington oz go back to California, and I
had frequent discussion^ about that with friends of mine and
ihdmt
446
UNCUSSIHED
NAME: HIR212002 UI«UL.nUUll I &> ft/ PAGE ^2
102U uith my father, for eKaraple, and with friends in California.
1025 I was kind of town between going back to California
1026 and staying in Washington.
1027 2 Did you tell Mr. Abraras when you took the job you
1028 weren't sure how long you would be able to remain in that
1029 position?
1030 A I don't remember specific conversations, but I am
1031 sure I was quite upfront with llr . Abrams because we were
1032 friends.
1033 2 What led you to quit in approximately Hay of 1986?
103U A I was unhappy at the Department of State, and I was
1035 offered a job at the law firm that was vary attractive to
1036 me .
1037 2 What was attractive about it?
1038 A I liked the people. It was a new firm. It was
1039 headed by Mr. Stan Anderson. Mr. Anderson and I had gotten
10M0 to know each other and become friends during the campaign.
lom Mr. Anderson was a — I don't know what his title was. He was
1042 a consultant to Hr . Timmonds during the campaign, and we had
10>43 established a nice relationship.
lOUU He had worked for a larger law firm and had left
ions with three of his partners and they were starting a new
1046 vanture and had very exciting plans with the venture. And I
lOU? was very impressed with the people, and it looked like a
1048 terrific opportunity, j£i*ankly, and I was delighted with the
UNCLASSIFIED
447
NAME:
1049
10SO
10S1
1052
1053
10SU
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
106H
1065
1066
1067
106{
106<
1070
1071
1072
1073
HIR2 12002
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 43
offer, and I accepted it.
2 And you joined the firm as an associate in May of
1981 ?
A That is correct.
2 And you became a partner two years later in 1983?
A Two years or less--raay have been less than two years.
2 Mr. Artiano, we have talked about a number of
individuals that you have known and you have worked with in
the campaign and in other capacities. I want to now turn to
a few additional individuals that we have not discussed.
First, David Fischer, F-i-s-c-h-e-r . I take it you
know David Fischer?
A Yes, sir.
2 When did you first meet David Fischer?
A Either in late 1975 or early 1976 would be ray best
guess .
2 That was during the period right after your
graduation from law school and while you were working as an
Executive Assistant to Ronald Reagan: is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
2 What was Hr . Fischer doing then?
A He was doing advance work.
2 For whom?
A For rtr . Reagan, as I was.
2 Had he at that.' ^oint been working for Ronald Reagan
UNCLASSiFIEG
448
HIR212002
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE UU
NAME
1074 for a period of time?
1075 A No. sir. My best recollection is that Dave came on
1076 after I did.
1077 2 Did he report to you?
1078 A No.
1079 2 You uete at th« same level, would you say?
1080 A Ue were doing essentially the sane things. I think
1081 I probably had started a feu months before Mr. Fischeri and
1082 so, I would guess, did mora of that type of uork during 1976
1083 than Mr. Fischer did.
lOSM 2 What was the period of time that you worked with him
1085 doing this advance work--approximately six months or four
1086 months?
1087 A I am guessing. I will guess four months. Somewhere
1088 in that vicinity.
1089 2 And I take it you had frequent contact with him
1090 during this period?
109 1 A We had--ue had contact. I am not sure I would
1092 categorize it as frequent, because advance men were being
1093 sent to different places all the time, so we would
109M occasionally bump into each other.
1095 I really cemented a friendship with Hr . Fischer
1096 during the «w*«ft*^>M«wMi and I am trying to remember now
1097 where our "-' " ^-— ^-.- j^J^ ^975 — Atlanta perhaps, or
1098 wherever it was — Nashvilie. Mr. Fischer and I — all of the
UNOLASSIFIEO
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NAME ■
1099
1 100
110 1
1 102
1 103
1 104
1 105
1 106
1 107
1 108
1 109
1110
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1112
1113
1114
1 1 IS
1116
1 1 17
1 1 18
1119
1 120
1 12
1 122
1 123
HIR212002
ICUSSIHED
PAGE 45
advance men were teamed up. We had--there were two of us
working together--all the time, and Mr. Fischer and I were
working together during that »w*MMr^i4t«wMi / and obviously
spent day and night together at that point, and got to know
each other very well, and established a very close
friendship .
2 Ronald Reagan, as we know, was unsuccessful in that
e*^MM«4-iMMiMr, and aiter that •wA«M«^iJi««Mt , you returned to
San Diego and eventually began work with the law firm in San
Diego. What did Hr . Fischer do after the ««4«M«^i4»«wMr?
A Mr. Fischer stayed on as — I believe as an eitployee of
Deaver and Hannaford and served in the role oi personal aide
and Chief of Advance Operations for Governor Reagan, who was
then continuing to nake speeches around the country and had
a host of activities that Hr . Fischer assisted him with.
2 Now, you have testified that you became involved in
the 1980 campaign with this organizational meeting, which
was either in late 1979 or early 1980. Prior to your
involvement in the 1980 campaign, did you continue to have
contact with Mr. Fischer from 1976 to 1980?
A I did — you know, my best recollection is I probably
didn't see him for a period of about two and a half years.
We talked on the phone a few times, and the frequency with
which we spoke on the phone increased as 1980 approached,
and Mr. Reagan's bid if>i the Presidency was getting started
mmm
82-690 0-88-16
450
UNCLASSIFIED .... ■•
NAME: HIR212002
112U again.
1125 fi Did his role with respect to Hr . Reagan change as
1126 the 1980 campaign began, or did he continue to do basically
1127 the same sort of work he had been doing for the preceding
1128 several years with Hr . Reagan?
1129 A I think it changed in the sense that he became more
1130 purely a personal aide to Mr. Reagan, as opposed to going
1131 out to the field in advance of Mr. Reagan. We, at that
1132 point, had--we very quickly put together a host of advance
1133 men who were doing that.
1134 . Hr . Fischer would occasionally--any time he chose,
1135 frankly, would go out and investigate a site or an
1136 opportunity and use his own judgnent and so advise the
1 137 advance men.
1138 2 Uhen you say he became purely a personal aide, what
1139 do you mean by that?
1 mo A X mean, he stayed with Mr. Reagan, he traveled with
imi Mr. Reagan and was not detached from Hr . Reagan and his
11(42 immediate group for any extended periods of time.
11M3 The difference is where an advance man is given a
liui* site, might have a meeting with Hr . Deaver or Hr . Tyson or
1145 ma at that stage of the game and be given general parameters
1146 for a series of events in Florida, and that advance men
1147 armed with that information would then go to the field alone
1148 or in conjunction witb-'^one other folks, meet with some
UNCLASSIFIED
451
y^CUSSIFIED
Hknt- HIR212002 VIlUL-rlUUII IL.U I'AGE M?
11U9 Secret Service people and begin putting this series of
1150 events together and pick up a phone and call one of us in
115 1 the office for guidance, and ue would ultimately have a
1152 typed, printed schedule for that series of events, which
1153 that advance man was responsible for.
115U . Mr. Fischer, uho was doing both that for Ht . Reagan
1155 and serving I guess in a quasi-personal aide function prior
1156 to--betueen 1976 and 1979, by 1979 had evolved into what I
1157 would describe as purely a personal aide, and he stayed with
1158 Mr. Reagan all the time.
1159 When he was on the ground, when the plane would
1160 arrive with a party that traveled with Mr. Reagan. Mr.
116 1 Fischer would precede Mr. Reagan off the plane. He had
1162 almost always been in intimate contact with the advance man
1163 on the ground before that time.
1164 He knew pretty much exactly what was going to happen
1165 step by step, from a logistical perspective. If there were
1166 any changes to be made, if he disliked something, he would
1167 instruct the advance men to change or otherwise alter it or
1168 cancel it. or whatever needed to be dona.
1169 The word came through Dave; occasionally came
1170 through Mike Deaver, but for purely logistical things, it
117 1 caae from Dave frequently.
1172 2 Who frequently was your contact with Mr. Fischer
1173 during the 1980 campai_jrf?
452
ONCUSSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 VllvL-rlvlVli IkM PAGE U8
117M A Well, I wasn't traveling and He. Fischet was. When
1175 I say I wasn't traveling, that is in geneEal--stateraent . I
1176 saw Mr. Fischer quite a bit in Detroit. I saw him obviously
1177 quite a bit in Los Angeles when--beiore we got to Detroit.
1178 By the time we got--we left Detroit, I saw him less
1179 and less because he was always on the road with tlr . Reagan
1180 and I was virtually always, with perhaps two or three
1181 exceptions, in problem areas at the office in Washington,
1182 and ue talked probably every day on the phone.
1183 Those conversations were a function of both our
118U responsibilities, my responsibility being one of the things
1185 he was interested in in terms of his performance and the
1186 fact that we were close friends and would chat during the
1187 day or at the end of each evening.
1188 Q So, to summarize, you consider that you had
1189 established a close friendship in 1976, you had intermittent
1190 contact with him during the next three years, and then you
119 1 begin to work together very closely during the campaign and
1192 had almost daily contact at least by telephone.
1193 A It seems to me that we had--probably had daily
119<4 contact. Otherwise, as you probably Know in a situation
1195 like that, you spend 12 hours a day on the telephone, so I
1196 couldn't tell you that was exactly true, but sometimes to me
1197 it was virtually on a daily basis.
1198 2 Hr. Fischer, following the campaign and Mr. Reagan's
JNCLASSIFIED
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NAME ■■
1 199
1200
120 1
1202
1203
1204
120S
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
12 14
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
UNCLASSIFIED
HIR2t2002 Itllil.l LR.\.\fil 18 Si PAGE 49
election iiTigSO continued to serve as his personal aide; is
that correct?
A That IS correct.
2 What was his title after the Inauguration?
A I couldn't tell you precisely. I would guess it was
Special Assistant to the President--would be my best guess.
e And what did you understand his responsibilities
were in the White House? Was it basically the same sort of
thing or did his responsibilities change?
A You know, it is difficult for ma to say, because I
wasn't in the White House during this period of time. I
think that, clearly, he continued to stay with the President
through every day and indeed every weekend, he would travel
to Camp David, for exampl*, and if the Presidant took a trip
out of tha country, Dave obviously accompanied him on this
trips .
Dave had a very small office immediately off the
Oval Office in the White House, and I think to the extent--!
guess he generally did have the same type of role. He made
sure that things worked in a timely and orderly fashion,
there were no surprises, and when Mr. Reagan was moving,
literally moving, going somewhere or worrying about a
calendar or timetable, Dave is tha person ha looked to, not
advance man or men who happened to be on the assignment.
Dave was alway:S his target, so Dave would work with
ONCUSSIflEO
454
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 V I ^ V&-I «Vr W ■ « - — — pAGE 50
122<4 uhomever. He made sure that calendar flowed in an orderly
1225 fashion.
1226 2 What was the frequency of your contact with Hr .
1227 Fischer after the Inauguration?
1228 A You know, we were very close friends. I would guess
1229 that during the first six months after the Inauguration,
1230 both Mr. Fischer and I were so busy and were then working xn
1231 different places, that we probably didn't see each other a
1232 whole lot during that time period.
1233 I would go over to the White House and visit, we
123U would have lunch somewhere, we .would get together for dinner
1235 if time permitted. His schedule was virtually impossible
1236 and didn't lend itself to a great social life. As time went
1237 on, however, and I settled in with the law firm and he
1238 settled in in his job, we talked on the phone regularly, you
1239 know, several times a week, tried to get together at least a
12140 couple of time a month to have lunch or have dinner or just
12(4 1 take a walk.
12(42 He would have two hours when the President would be
12(43 tied up in a meeting and he would call me and see if I can
12(4(4 break free and ue would get together and see a movie.
UNCIASSIFIED
455
NAME :
12U5
12U6
124'
124£
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
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126 1
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1263
1261
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
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HIR2 12002
RPTS CANTOR
DCMN GLASSNAP
M 1 ^ US a.m. 1
2 Did you consider hin one of your closest friends?
A Yes.
2 At what point did he resign froii his position in
the White House?
A I don't know the exact date. I think it is 1985,
early 1985. I am not sure, or late ' BH .
e And he moved to Utah?
A Yes, sir.
2 So the nature of the contact that you have been
describing of talking to him several times during the week
and seeing him as time permitted, that contact, that type of
contact, I gather continued from approximately mid 1981,
when matters settled down in your respective jobs, until he
left his position in the White House in early 1985?
A That is correct.
2 What was the nature of your contact with him during
the period that he lived in Utah? Did you have direct phone
contact with him?
A Yes.
2 I take it you didn't see him as frequently, because
he was in Utah and youi' liere here?
ONCLASSIFIEO
456
HIR2 12002
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 52
MAME
1270 A Mo, I didn't. He got back here a couple of times
1271 on business ioi the company he was working for in Utah, and
1272 obviously when he was back, we managed to get a lunch or a
1273 dinner or a novie , or something, and got a chance to talk.
1274 Ue talked on the phone fairly regularly, and I, in fact,
1275 have a client in Utah, and I think at least once during the
1276 year in Utah managed to get out and sea a client, so I saw
1277 Dave, spent a couple of nights at his house.
1278 8 Was it his practice to stay at your house when he
1279 was in Washington?
1280 A Not at that point.
1281 e Not while he was working in Utah?
1282 A No, while he was working in Utah, ha would fly back
1283 here on business for the company, and I believe he stayed at
12814 the Marriott typically.
1285 (Discussion off the record.)
1286 BY HR. FRYMAN:
1287 e Mr. Artiano, do you know Richard Miller?
1288 A Yes, X do.
1289 2 What do you understand to be the present position
1290 or occupation of Mr. Miller?
129 1 A President of International Business Communications,
1292 which is a public relations firm.
1293 2 When did you first meet Mr. Miller?
1294 A In 1980. -^
UNCLASSIFIED
457
UNCLASSIFIED
NAHE: HIR212002 I i I '9 LI E_IPt\J| |^ | g | La i<* PAGE 53
1295 2 In uhat uay?
1296 A He uas not sure if he was working for our campaign
129"^ here in Washington or uas a volunteer for the campaign, but
1298 he uas here, and ue met while he uas lending his services to
1299 the campaign for Mr. Reagan.
1300 2 Did he work for you?
1301 A No.
1302 2 Approximately at uhat point in the campaign did you
1303 meet him? I take it this was after the convention.
13014 A Ves It uas after the convention. I an not exactly
1305 sure uhen I first met Mr. Miller. My earliest raenories of
1306 having the types of conversations you uould relate to having
1307 uith friends probably occurred during the transition.
1308 2 What was his role during the transition?
1309 A I am not exactly sure. I know one of his roles uas
1310 he uas responsible for transportation for I guess everyone
1311 in the transition. Ue had a large motor pool, and I believe
1312 that Mr. Miller uas running the motor pool at that point. I
1313 think he may have had other responsibilities, but I can't
13 114 tell you uhat they were.
1315 S Prior to the transition, had your contacts uith him
1316 been infrequent? Would you characterize them as infrequent?
1317 A Yes. I can't frankly renenber exactly when I met
1318 him. It couldn't have been more than a month or tuo before
13 19 the transition at best^- '
ONCLASSIFIEO
458
ONCLASSIFIEB ..
NAME: HIR212002 UllVa-riUUtS iVmlJ P*°^ ^U
1320 2 And prior to the election you say you met hire, so
132 1 uould you describe him as an acquaintance as opposed to a
1322 personal friend?
1323 A A very difficult line to draw. Our friendship grew
1324 as ue got to know each other during the transition.
1325 2 How frequent was your contact with him during the
1326 transition?
1327 A Fairly frequent.
1328 2 Daily?
1329 A I don't know. I don't know if it was that
1330 frequent. I had cause to need transportation for myself or
1331 for someone else that I was arranging transportation for,
1332 and Mr. Miller was the guy I dealt with.
1333 2 Was this contact both in your professional work and
1334 socially during this period?
1335 A You know, I don't know whether Rich and I
1336 socialized a great deal during the transition period. It
1337 was a pretty hectic period.
1338 2 Throughout the transition period, you understood he
1339 was responsible for transportation.
1340 A Yes.
134 1 2 What did he do after the transition period?
1342 A I believe he first served in the Public Affairs or
1343 Public Relations Office of the Department of Transportation
1344 when Drew Lewis was tb* 'Secretary of Transportation.
DNWSSiFiEO
459
NAME:
13U5
13U6
1314-
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
135M
1355
1356
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1358
1359
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136 1
1362
1363
1361-
1365
1 366
136'
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How long did this last?
I couldn't tell you. I would guess at least a
year .
2 Did you have contact with him during that period?
A Yes. I think we had contact.
2 Social?
A I don't remember when we started having a lot of
social contact. It is quite possible during that period of
time that I had some social contact with him, but I don't
frankly recall.
2 During that period, do you recall having
professional contact with him?
A I seem to remember seeing him a couple of times at
the Department of Transportation, but I can't tell you in
connection with that or whether I just was there for another
reason and went in and said hi to Rich.
2 What do you recall that he did after the Department
of Transportation?
A To the best of my recollection, I believe he went
directly from the Department of Transportation to the Agency
for International Development and served as either a
Director or Deputy Director of Public Affairs.
2 What is your recollection about the length of time
he served in that position?
A I am guessing,! '* I would guess a year to two years.
mm\m
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NAME: HIR212002 V •«**•-» '"^ "^ ' ■ PAGE 56
1370 2 Did you have contact with hira when he was in that
1371 position?
1372 A Yes.
1373 2 Both professional and social?
1374 A I don't know that I had any proiessional contact
1375 with hira either at the Department of Transportation or AID,
1376 but I ara sure at that point we had already started having
1377 social contact.
1378 2 At least by this point you considered him a
1379 personal friend of yours?
1380 A Yes.
138 1 2 And what is your understanding about what he did
1382 after he left AID?
1383 A I again believe that he entered into a partnership
138U with Hr. Frank Gomez, and they opened up International
1385 Business Communications, which is a public relations firm.
1386 2 Do you know Hr . Gomez?
1387 A I know Mr. Gomez, yes.
1388 2 When did you first meet him?
1389 A Rich introduced me to Hr . Gomez. I would guess it
1390 uas--I can't tell you--'8i4.
139 1 2 Has that after Hr . Hiller joined with Hr . Gomez to
392 start their company or before?
1393 A After.
139U 2 After? ■/'
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HIR2 12002
A Yes, sir.
2 What has been the frequency of your contact with
Mr. Gomez since your first meeting with hira?
A Not too frequent. During the period from late
November. 1985 until perhaps March or April of '86, I saw
Mr. Gomez once or twice a ueeK perhaps at a maximum.
2 That is in connection with your work for IBC?
A That IS correct.
2 We will get into that later. Apart from that
association, what contact have you had with Mr. Gomez?
A None.
2 Would you characterize Mr. lliller as a close
friend ?
A Yes.
2 And am I correct that you have considered hira a
close friend since at least 1982 or 1983?
A He has been a good friend, yes, probably since
about that time.
2 Do you recall Oliver North?
A I was introduced once to Hr . North. He shook
hands, and that is ray sole contact with Mr. North.
2 You have never spoken with him on the phone?
A No, sir.
2 Do you know John Roberts?
A No, sir. •. '•
iieUSSiFIEB
462
mM,i\m
NAHE: HIR212002 1 3 I V 1 1 t_nLJ 1^ i I 1 4_ W PAGE 58
1U20 e Do you know Jonathan Miller?
mzi A No. I would like to just state ior the record that
1422 It IS possible I was introduced to these people at some
11423 point and shook hands, but I don't know there.
114214 2 You have no recollection of any meeting with
mas Jonathan Miller?
1426 A I don't. Honestly I have not.
1U27 . 2 I take it then you did not consider Jonathan Miller
1128 to be a friend of yours?
1429 A That is correct.
1430 2 Mr. Artiano, you entered into a business
1431 relationship with Mr. Miller's corepany. International
1432 Business Communications, did you not?
1433 A Yes, sir.
1434 2 And did that business relationship also involved
1435 Mr. Fischer?
1436 A Yes, sir.
1437 8 Would you describe the origin of that business
1438 relationship and how it cane about?
1439 A In late Movember or early Decembaz of 1985, I
1440 received a telephone call from Mr. Miller where Mr. Miller
144 1 told ne that in order to increase the services he was
1442 rendering to existing clients, to attract additional
1443 business to IBC, and to generally improve the services he
1444 was holding out to exi^t^ng and prospective clients, that he
mmtim
463
HIR2 12002
yilASSlFlEO
NAME
1445 uas looking for someone uho had sorae Washington experience
lUUb at a relatively senior level, uho uas of good reputation,
114147 had good common sense and judgment, and might entertain the
li4<48 prospect of entering into a relationship with his firm.
114149 2 What did you do in response to this call?
11450 A At sorae point shortly after I received that phone
lUSl call, I talked to Mr. Dave Fischer about his interest, if
1US2 any, in ray pursuing this conversation with Mr. Miller on his
mS3 behalf.
1454 2 What uas Mr. Fischer doing at this point?
1455 A Mr. Fischer had been for the preceding 10 months, I
1456 uould guess, been working as Vice President for
1457 Administrative Affairs I believe for Huntsman Chemical
1458 Corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah and had been expressing
1459 to me over the preceding three months his general
1460 dissatisfaction with that job and his desire to return to
146 1 Washington and do consulting work for clients in Washington.
1462 2 Had he explained to you the basis for his
1463 dissatisfaction?
1464 A I think it was, to the best of my recollection,
1465 merely a case of the job not involving the types of things
1466 he anticipated it would, and it just wasn't very rewarding
1467 or challenging to him, I guess. He was not particularly
1468 happy with it.
1469 2 Did he indicate dissatisfaction with the
UNOLASSiHED
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1487
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A No .
e Do you know if at the time of your call from
Richard Miller whether he had at that point ever met Mr.
Fischer ?
A I don't think so. I don't know that for a fact.
They may have at some point or another been introduced, but
they didn't know each other.
Q So the origin is Mr. Miller calls you and says he
is looking for someone. You over the preceding few months
had been hearing from Mr. Fischer that he might be ready to
come back to Washington and try something different, and
then you spoke to Mr. Fischer and explained the approach to
Mr. Miller, is that correct?
A That is correct.
2 And did Mr. Fischer ask you to express an interest
on his behalf with Mr. Miller?
A Mr. Fischer's response, to the best of my
recollection, his initial response to that information, was
a request that I further investigate it by way of having
more extensive discussion with Mr. Miller about what he
wanted, what he was looking for. and who his clients were.
He made it clear to me during the initial
conversation that while he was interested in returning to
Washington and acting _as a consultant, he didn't want to
IWSSlflE
465
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1U9S
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151 ■
1512
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1517
1518
1519
ISUSSIFIEO
align himself exclusively with anyone, so that even li this
were something that would be of interest to hiii, it would be
a nonexclusive attangement . He wanted to do soma checking
himself into Mr. Miller and IBC generally with people in the
administration, I guess, to see what kind of response he
would get.
Q In your initial discussion with Mr. Fischer, was
there any consideration of your involvement in a
relationship between Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller?
A That happened very quickly. I don't know whether
that topic was discussed during the first conversation I had
with Mr. Fischer, the second conversation, but over the
course of probably the first week, if not the first couple
of conversations we had, that was something that was raised
and discussed, yes.
S Was that raised by Mr. Fischer?
A I think so, although I honestly couldn't tell you.
2 Uhat did you understand that you were to add to the
relationship that was being contemplated possibly between
Mr. Miller and Mr. Fischer?
A I think you have to put that question in a
timeframe for me, if you would.
2 Let's talk about the beginning, when you were
having these initial discussions and it was raised either by
you or Mr. Fischer injr^UE conversation with him that you
Murnm
466
UNCUSSIFiED
NAHE: HIR212002 4| § ^ ^l^flU W* 1 3 18-lW PAGE 62
1520 would have some involvement in this.
1521 A One oi the very early conversations I had with Mr.
1522 niller, I don't know ii it was the first conversation or the
1523 second conversation, in response to I an sure a question by
1524 me in connection with what types oi services he was looking
1525 ior on the part of a consultant, I an sure at this point I
1526 had raised Hr . Fischer's name.
1527 He gave, to the best of my recollection, both a
1528 general and a specific response. Mr. Miller's general
1529 response was that he was looking at a nunber of projects for
1530 existing clients that hadn't yet taken shape, that he was
1531 about to embark on a najor business development aspect of
1532 his business, that he was looking for someone who could help
1533 him m his evaluation of projects I have just mentioned,
1534 help hira to formulate a strategy in connection with business
1535 development, help hire service his clients across the board
1536 in the form of advice and judgment from a public relations
1537 perspective, public relations in Washington.
1538 The more specific request was he indicated one of
1539 his most significant clients was a gentleman by the name of
1540 Mr. Channall who had several organizations that were raising
1541 money for programs that supported the President's position
1542 in different areas, and that in connection with one, I don't
1543 know frankly at that point if ha even named the National
1544 Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, that that
UNEUSSiFiEO
467
yNClASSIfltS
NAME^ HIR212002 I J 1 3 <L! JL.II'U' *»^ B 5 !»-«•' PAGE 63
1S4S particular client had asked for meetings with Don Regan, who
1SM6 uas then Chief of Staff, with Senator Paul Laxalt, and with
15147 Assistant Secretary Elliott Abraras.
ISua He advised roe early on that this client was a
ISug client that had had regular contact with the administration
1550 for quite a while and was highly regarded by the
1551 administration. I recall that because it was the first
1552 specific request where he identified a service that was made
1553 in the course of these early conversations.
155(4 8 And specifically, the service was what again? Was
1555 this to arrange the meetings?
1556 A No. Let me backtrack a second. He explained
1557 generally what type of services ha was looking for from a
1558 consultant on behalf of IBC, and again I an trying to
1559 reconstruct, doing the best that I can. I suppose, in
1560 response to a question such as, well, is there anything you
156 1 have on the burner right now that needs attention, his
1562 response was, ''Yes. For example, this guy, Hr . Channell,
1563 is one of my principal clients, and he just recently called
15614 in over the past few days I guess and asked for me to line
1565 up meetings with the following three people'*, and that was
1566 the first specific thing that was ever discussed with Hr .
1567 Miller and I in connection with services.
1568 2 Going back. Mr. Artiano, the initial call from Mr.
1569 Miller where he explaijv^d to you he was looking for someone.
yNCUSSIFItO
468
.....UriMSSIFiEO
NAME: HIR2 12002 %/B «\P!ir.3 «»^** '■ « « *«= iw PAGE 64
1570 am I correct that you did not mention Mr. Fischer's name in
1571 that conversation?
1572 A I don't think I did. I think I opted at that point
1573 to chat with Mr. Fischer before I even raised his name.
157U 2 And then after chatting with Mr. Fischer, you had
1575 further conversations with Mr. Miller where Mr. Fischer's
1576 name was mentioned?
1577 A That IS correct.
1578 2 At what point was it discussed that you would be
1579 involved in this arrangement as well as Mr. Fischer?
1580 A Very early on.
1581 2 In the early phone conversations?
1582 A Yes. I am sure the early phone conversations.
1583 £ And who suggested that?
1584 A I don't know. I honestly don't remember.
1585 2 The services that were being sought by Mr. Miller,
1586 would you describe them as generally public relations
1587 consulting services?
1588 A Public relations, business development, political
1589 type consulting in terms of evaluating a project or a media
1590 campaign.
159 1 2 How soon was there a faca-to-face meeting between
1592 you, Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller?
1593 A Again, I can't tell you a specific date. I would
1594 guess it was within tujO 'weeks of the first telephone call.
mmis
469
yiLASSihtu
NAME: HIR212002 V ■ « W K.1 SW W < •• * t^V PAGE 65
1595 2 After that meeting at some point, the three of you
1596 reach an understanding about a working relationship and
1597 compensation arrangement, is that correct?
1598 A That is correct.
1599 2 Did it take several meetings to reach agreement on
1600 those matters?
1601 A Yes.
1602 2 Approximately how many meetings and over what
1603 period of time?
16014 A I can't be specific because I just don't have the
1605 recollection. I uould guess that ua had three or four
1606 meetings at least. They probably went over a couple of
1607 weeks, three weeks. I am guessing.
1608 2 Prior to the first meeting > had thexa been any
1609 discussion among the three of you about the terms of a
1610 relationship, or were there phone conversations just looking
1611 toward setting up a meeting for a more specific discussion
1612 of terms?
16 13 A I had had conversations. I had discussed
16 1<4 compensation with Dave over the phone, and I had passed
1615 along what Dave and I had discussed to Mr. Hiller. I
1616 believe, prior to our first face-to-face with Hr . Hiller.
16 17 S What was the conpensation which was discussed with
1618 Dave?
16 19 A There are sev^^al aspects to those conversations.
ONCUSSiFlEO
470
yHyiHddinty
NAME: HIR212002
1620 I don't think anything was said in concrete that early m
1621 the first week or tuo, but generally Hr . Fischer advised rae
1622 that. A, It needed to be made perfectly clear to Mr. Miller
1623 that there was going to be no exclusive agreement for
162U services, that he intended to develop a host of clients here
1625 that he would like to consult with: B, that ha felt he could
1626 lend a great deal of value to a host of clients, including
1627 IBC, and that he expected to be compensated accordingly.
1628 Uhen we talked about numbers, wa talked about a
1629 retainer of «20,000 a month for the consulting services to
1630 be rendered, and Mr. Fischer told me that one of the things
1631 he absolutely did not want to do was get involved in the
1632 representation of a client which was going to be 30-day. 60-
1633 day, 90-day projects. He didn't want to do that. He wanted
163U a long-term relationship, and he asked me to explore with
1635 Mr. Miller early on whether Mr. Miller would be prepared to
1636 enter into a long-term, 24 months say, two-year agreement
1637 for services.
1638 He further advised me that, Mr. Fischer advised me,
1639 that prior to accepting a consulting agreement either with
16U0 IBC or anyone else, he would have to be real comfortable
16U1 with them as a client, and from Hx . Fischer's perspective
16U2 that meant reviewing them to the extent that ha could with
16143 his friends in the administration and whoever else he opted
1644 to check them out with, Ho make sure that they were people
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yriOUSSIFlEP
PAGE
67
he wanted to be associated with.
e Were the terras that Hr . Fischer initially described
to you, that you have described, were these basically the
terms that were eventually agreed upon, that is a retainer
of »20.000 a month for a period of 24 months?
A Generally, yes. I would say that was essentially
the relationship that was established. The other factor, as
I mentioned also, which were components of that agreement,
which were that Mr. Fischer was not an exclusive consultant
to IBC and could go about developing his own business and
that he would not be a full-time consultant with IBC. It
was the beginning of a new relationship.
2 But am I correct that at the end of this period of
negotiation, Mr. Miller basically agreed to the terms that
Mr. Fischer had laid out for you at the beginning, that is
*20,000 a month as a retainer for 24 months, and that was to
be a nonexclusive arrangement?
A That is correct.
2 What was the subject that was covered in these
three or four meetings where you had negotiations? Had Hr .
Miller been resisting this arrangement?
^^r A No. I think we were discussing a host of things,
M I recollect them. For example, while Mr. Miller had no
problem with Mr. Fischer representing other clients, he was
not comfortable with tAe^ prospects of Mr. Fischer
OlUSSiflEO
472
1IR212002
mmm
PAGE
68
NAME:
1670 representing another public relations firm. That was of
1671 soA« concern to hire. He wanted to know if Mr. Fischer's
1672 other intended representations called for hiii to be out of
1673 the country for long periods of time, for eKanple, a
1674 question which obviously Mr. Fischer didn't have an answer
1675 to.
1676 Wanted to know if Mr. rischer--Fischer still lived
1677 in Utah at the time and did for another 1 U months
1678 thereaf ter--uhether Mr. Fischer would still b« available, and
1679 if so, how many days a week, to come in to Washington. D.C.
1680 to render these services. I can't recall all of the things
1681 that were discussed, but we also spent a great deal of time
1682 allowing Mr. Miller to describe what his company did and
1683 getting to know Mr. Gomez a little bit. getting to see some
168<4 of the presentations he had made to clients, finding out
1685 what he had done, what he intended to do, who he was
1686 interested in securing as a client, further defining the
1687 types of services he was looking for.
1688 S Did these negotiations lead to a written agreement
1689 between Mr. Fischer. Mr. Miller and yourself?
1690 A Ko, sir.
169 1 S In these negotiations, were you acting as a
1692 txlncipal on your own behalf rather than as attorney for Mr.
1693 Fischer?
169U A That is corracli. X was not at any tine acting as
loussife
473
Hknt- HIR212002
1695
1696
1697
1698
1699
1700
jrjLm^SJSk »^.l^ PAGE 69
an attorney for nr . Fischer or anyone else in this natter.
S And this agreed-upon retainer for 24 nonths in th
aaount of «20,000 a month contemplated services by you as
well as Hr. Fischer, is that correct?
A Initially, that is correct.
[Recess . ]
UNCLASSIFIED
474
NAME- HIR212002
1701
1702
1703
170M
1705
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RPTS CANTOR
DCMN GLASSNAP
[ 1 ^25 p.m. 1
Whereupon ,
MARTIH ARTIANO,
resumed the witness stand, and having been previously sworn,
was examined and testified further as follows:
BY MR. FRYHAN:
2 Mr. Artiano. when we broke for lunch, we were
discussing the consulting agreement that you, Mr. Fischer
and Mr. Richard Miller had reached in lata 1985, and on*
aspect of that agreement is that there was to be a monthly
retainer of «20,000 a month. At the time that agreement was
reached, was there an understanding between you and Mr.
Fischer that you would receive half of the monthly retainer
of «20,000?
A Yes.
e What was the origin of that agreement or rationale
for that agreement?
A It was contemplated that Dave and I would jointly
ba in a position to render the types of consulting services
to IBC that they had articulated to us.
2 Did Hr . Fischer at some point tell you that because
of your assistance in getting up this arrangement, he wanted
ONCLASSiFIES
475
yNCLASSIFItO
NAME: HIR212002 fj | H Vkl O^' ^^ " * - — — - pjQj 7,
1726 you to have half the money?
1727 A As I just indicated, we both intended to provide
1728 consulting services to IBC . I don't know what effect the
1729 fact that I had introduced Hr . Fischer to Hr . Miller in this
1730 connection, how great a part that played in Hr . Fischer's
1731 mind in terms of agreeing to split the fees.
1732 2 What did Hr . Fischer say to you about this? I
1733 mean, the original proposal, I take it. that he made in the
173U first conversation that you had with him about this is that
1735 he wanted a retainer of «20,000 a month for himself, is that
1736 correc ;?
1737 A Ue discussed the «20 , 000-a-month retainer. X don't
1738 know whether it was the second conversation or the third
1739 conversation when we discussed sharing our retainer.
17U0 2 Did he raise the subject of sharing the retainer,
174 1 or did you?
17142 A I don't recall.
1743 e Was it made known to Hr . Miller from the beginning
17Ut4 of your meetings with Hr . Miller that the monthly retainer
1745 would be split between the two of you?
1746 A I believe that was made clear to him fairly early
17U7 on.
17<48 2 By fairly early on. does that mean before you
1749 reached an agreement about the consulting arrangement?
1750 A I guess that^ii probably right.
UNCLASSIFIEO
476
UNCLASSIFIED
KAME: HIR212002 UH^LinUWII Ih-I^ PAGE 72
1751 2 But you are not sure?
1752 A I am not positive whether ue discussed it before
1753 the first check was cut or at the time the first check uas
17SU cut.
1755 e Is that the latest time that you discussed it uas
1756 when the first check was cut?
1757 A Yes. I am reconstructing now.
1758 MR. HEEHAN: The latest time you first discussed
1759 you mean?
1760 BY MR. FRYMAN:
1761 2 Yes.
1762 A Yes, it had been discussed by the time the first
1763 check uas cut.
176U 2 As we discussed this morning, this consulting
1765 agreement uas basically for public relations services, is
1766 that correct?
1767 A I guess I will fall back on the description I gave
1768 it this morning. I think that is probably generally
1769 accurate. There were a range of services that Mr. Miller
1770 discussed with Mr. Fischer and I that he was going to look
177 1 to us for, and that the entirety of those services
1772 constituted what we were going to do on behalf of IBC.
1773 2 There were a number of specifics that I understand
177M came under the general category of public relations
1775 services. If there are Mother types of services that do not
UNCLASSIFIED
477
iiHCUSSife
NAME: HIR212002 11 M ULiriU V ■ ■ ■ •• •^ PAGE 73
1776 fit under that general category, I think you should identify
1777 those now.
1778 A I think, unless something cones to mind with a more
1779 specific question, what I described earlier today in terms
1780 of the services Hr . Hiller was looking for were the types of
1781 services we rendered.
1782 2 Once again, public relations is a particular area,
1783 and I think you have identified other specific categories of
178>4 public relations services, but is there anything that falls
1785 outside the general description of public relations services
1786 that you were to perform?
1787 MR. nEEHAN: Hy problem with tha question is that
1788 he has defined the services. If you want to say that is
1789 what public relations means, some oi it was client
1790 development, some of it was specific services, some of it
179 1 was generalized advice and programs. Whether client
1792 development is public relations or whether it is
1793 professional development, business development, I guess it
179>4 depends upon how you define public relations. And I think
1795 that his answers describe the services.
1796 And If you want to say let's call them, for
1797 purposes of future purposes, public relations, we are
1798 prepared to deal with it that way.
1799 BY HR. FRYHAH!
1800 2 Just so there-i?s no confusion. Mr. Artlano, I don't
UNCLASSIRED
478
UNCLASSIFIED
HAHI HIR212002 Jj |\HjLHOO 8 I 5 LU "°' ''
1801 want to take a lot of time on this, but speciiy again as
1802 briefly as possible the areas of services you contemplated
1803 uere to be performed under this agreement.
ISOU A To review strategies and advise IBC in connection
1805 uith the existing clients, projects that were underway in
1806 behalf of those existing clients, contemplated projects by
1807 those existing clients, presentation for representation to
1808 prospective clients, targat clients of IBC, the compilation
1809 of a brochure that IBC could distribute for purposes of
1810 business development, and I guess the type of general advice
1811 that Mr. Fischer and I were in position to render.
1812 2 And what areas were you to render general advice?
1813 A I guess in connection with all of the things I
1814 mentioned, and I think, as is probably the case in all new
1815 relationships, things that we couldn't contemplate at the
1816 time and we didn't, not that I have anything specific in
1817 mind .
1818 2 Mr. Fischer had a background in public relations
1819 going back to his work for the Deaver firm, did he not?
1820 A That is correct.
182 1 e And he had been working in the public relations
1822 area with Huntsman Chemical in Utah?
1823 A I probably shouldn't answer that question, because
182U I an not exactly sure what the scope of his responsibilities
1825 uere . ■ ^
UNCIJISSiriED
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2 You ate not certain what ha did?
A Yes.
2 Your background is that of a lawyer, and you have,
as you described this morning, done extensive uork in the
logistics area in political canpaigns.
A That is correct.
e What expertise did you bring to this arrangement
that was being entered into that you understood met the
needs that Hr . Miller wanted met by this agreement?
A I think the amount of tine and the level of my
prior experience with Presidential campaigns was something
he wanted to take advantage of, my experience in business
development, areas of business development, my ability to
evaluate prospective business opportunities that might arise
that IBC might be able to take advantage of, my assistance
in the presentation, or at least the compilation of
materials for presentation to prospective clients; my
experience in Washington vis-a-vis representing clients in
terms of strategies for a public relations firm to the
extent that those were translatable. Those are among the
services that Hr . Miller thought he could take advantage of.
e Your prior experience in Presidential campaigns was
basically in logistics, as I understand what you testified
to this morning.
A That is correct.
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2 Hou would that experience useiully translate to the
services you were to perform for IBC?
A Uell. perhaps I should elaborate a bit on what that
kind of logistical experience is. Essentially when you
prepare an event for a Presidential candidate, you are a
quasi-public relations man. You attempt to present the
candidate in the most positive light, both in terras of what
you personally do prior to his arrival and during his stay,
and in terras of your decisions about how and where he is
going to be making public appearances.
I was, if not a principal player, certainly a part
of the group that made decisions throughout both of those
campaigns, made decisions about all aspects of the campaign
even if my role were primarily that of an auditor in those
meetings, and as such I had accumulated and believe I still
have a great deal of experience that lends itself directly
to public relations.
In addition, I think my experience with the law
firm in representation of clients here and my time in
Washington essentially was appropriately thought by him to
be something that he could take advantage of.
2 Did you understand that the contacts and people you
knew were important?
A At the outset of this relationship, the only
meetings, for example ,. ttith people that I mentioned were the
UNCLASSIFIED
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HIR2 12002
yNCUSSlFIED .
'AGE 77
three I mentioned earlier. I an not exactly sure how you
can separate, when you are looking at someone's experience,
how you can separate and pazse out that particular aspect.
I think Rich knew certainly that I had been involved with
the Reagan Administration in a couple of different
capacities for a long tine, that I had a nunber of
relationships that were solid relationships, and I frankly
don't know to what extent that impacted his evaluation of
what I could lend to IBC.
2 You and Hr . Fischer ended up splitting the retainer
50/50. You took «10,000, and he took ♦10,000 of the «20,000
monthly retainer, is that correct? I mean that was th«
agreement you reached between the two of you.
A That was the agreement, that is correct.
2 Going back to your discussions with him about
reaching this agreement, was that 50/50 split agreed to
because you contemplated contributing equal amounts of time
to this arrangement?
A I think initially that is true.
2 That was the rationale?
A Yes.
fi Was it contemplated at the beginning that you and
Hr. Fischer would devote a substantial amount of your time
under this arrangement to work for Hr . Channell's
organizations ■
UUSSIFIEO
82-690 0-88-17
482
UNCLASSIHED
NAKE' HIR212002 UlvUbrlUUII I L. U Pl^OZ 78
190 1 A I think It became clear by the latest early January
1902 that at the outset, there were some pressing things that
1903 needed to be done on behalf of that client of IBC, and that
19014 uas uhat the principal focus was at the onset.
1905 S You and Mr. Fischer were paid, however, by IBC, is
1906 that correct?
1907 A That is correct, our arrangement was with IBC.
1908 2 You were not paid by Mr. Channell directly?
1909 A No, sir.
1910 2 Did you later enter intca supplemental arrangement
19 11 with Mr. Miller and IBC?
1912 A Yes.
19 13 S Uhat uas the origin of that?
19 1U A I think there are two components to the answer.
1915 Let me see if I can do it as clear as possible. Over the
19 16 first two months of the relationship, January-February, if
19 17 that long, frankly I think it was even shorter, three weeks
19 18 to a month into this relationship, it became quite clear to
1919 everybody concerned, Mr. Miller. Mr. Fischer and myself,
1920 that the amount of time that uas being asked for and the
192 1 devotion of timtt to this endeavor was so much greater than
1922 had been initially contemplated by anyone at the outset,
1923 that we all understood that there uas going to be an
19214 adjustment in compensation.
1925 I can't tell .y4u at uhat precise point ue had that
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HIR2 12002
yNCUSSlFIEB
PAGE 79
specific discussi<
but I can tell you that it was quite
cleai to all of us at the time and that we had some
discussion about it, that the services being rendered m
terms of time and to call upon both Oave and myself to be in
attendance at meetings and review data that was being
produced, and advice on campaign strategies and make
arrangements on behalf of Mr. Killer's clients, in
particular Mr. Channell, was far in excess of what we had
originally anticipated and that, therefore, there would be
an adjustment upward in the original negotiated price.
To move to a second of what I guess would be three
points, both Mr. Fischer and I expressed to tlr . Miller the
desire to accelerate the already negotiated payments,
because we felt we were getting way ahead of the curve, in
light of the amount of time we were spending, and to some
extent in light of the fact that Hz. Fischer found himself
almost unable to go out and develop other clients. He did a
little of that.
As a third point, down the road, if you would like
me to jump there chronologically, at some point I guess in
the spring or early summer, I can't pinpoint the exact time,
it became clear that Hr . Fischer was indeed spending, as
both of us had been spending, an inordinate amount of time
on this, virtually all his time in Washington, D.C. when he
returned from Utah, and^that he was developing a very nice
sife
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UNCUSSIFIED .:.
NA«E HIR212002 I I M I ll H.ll .^ T 1 1 1 1 PAGE 80
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relationship with Hr . Hiller, and that he foresaw the growth
oi that company and was thinking about getting nore
involved, and at that stage Hr . Fischer and I had a
conversation.
Hr . Fischer made clear that he was talking to Rich
or would be talking to Rich, and perhaps might even be
talking to Kr . Channell. which continued to consume a good
deal of time, about a different financial relationship, and
that he would work that out.
I was at that point, by the early summer, at any
rate, less of a hands-on person in terms of attending
meetings during the day, for example, continued to advise
both Dave personally throughout the year and IBC from time
to time .
Dave indicated that he would attempt to compensate
me at or near the amount that had initially been
contemplated in the first discussion, which was a two-year
contract for *20,000. and an amount that would have been
about 50 percent of that.
The agreement was never concrete, was in a state of
flux almost from the word ''go*'. I don't know much about
the financial agreements after late spring-early summer
between Hz. Fischer, Mr. Miller, Mr. Channell, and Hz.
Fischer and Hr . Channell, and it started out and continued,
as far as I was concerned, as a good-faith arrangement. I
yNCLASSIFlEi)
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mimm
PAGE 81
1976 uas friends with both Mr. Mill
«r and Mr. Fischar, alloued it
to develop.
2 Focusing on your own arrangements, did you enter
into a supplemental arrangement with Mr, Miller where you
had an additional monthly retainer?
A Yes.
2 When was that?
A I would guess it was in Jun« or July.
2 Of 1986?
A Of 1986, yes, sir.
2 And what uas the reason for that?
A As I indicated a few moments ago. I had becoma less
active hands on, and Mr. Fischer had commenced certainly by
that tima his own discussions about payments and
relationships with both Mr. Miller and Mr. Channell, and I
think that Rich Miller, because he is a good friend of mine,
felt kind of concerned about ma. I think he was worried
that this change in direction, that Dave's increased
devotion to this firm might have caused soma degree of a
problem batuaan Dave and I personally, and ha also wanted me
to stay available to IBC, and as a consequence called me and
said that he wanted to enter — that is Mr. Millar — he wanted to
enter into a separata agreement with ma, through which I
would remain available to IBC for soma of the things I had
discussed earlier, f or . avaluation of business opportunities
UNCLASSIFIED
486
UNCLASSIFIED
KAME: HIR212002 U I 1 ULMOlJ 1 1 I L I J ^'^°^ °^
200 1 that they had and for business development and to continue
2002 to review the materials they sent out to prospective
2003 clients, and asked me to write a letter to him.
200M I, again, during the course of those discussions
2005 told Mr. riiller that I would be happy to do that, but that I
2006 was constrained, as I had been irom the start, in terms of
2007 what I could do, and it was important that he understand
2008 that. That amount of time that had been devoted early on
2009 was more than I could possibly devote in the future to this,
2010 that I certainly couldn't do any legal work as I had from
2011 the start, that if these clients he was hoping to develop
20 12 conflicted with any of the clients that my law firm
2013 represented, I would not be in a position to do it.
2014 I don't have a copy of that letter. I believe Mr.
2015 Miller still has a copy of it. and if under those
20 16 circumstances that was a relationship ha wanted, that X was
20 17 delighted and happy to go forward with it, wrote him that
20 18 letter, and he agreed to it, and that relationship stayed in
2019 effect I believe for about a period of five or six months, I
2020 am not exactly sure.
2021 Q So this letter was in effect a retainer agreement
2022 that you drafted and sent to Mr. Miller?
2023 A It was a consulting agreement. It was a letter
20214 back to Mr. Miller. I wrote it a long time ago, but it said
2025 essentially ''Rich, you^asked me if I would remain available
UNCLASSIFIED
487
"'" "" "° IINCUSSIFIEO "" "
2026 to oonsulf'Ji^Ir TK: oh th« follouing matters'" or I
2027 dascribftd somsthing in genaral tarns. ''I advlsttd you of
2028 th« following constraints'', which I just exprassad. I
2029 don't renanbar then all. ''If under these circunstances IBC
2030 IS still interastad in having na availabla as a public
2031 relations consultant, I would ba happy to go forward.''
2032 e And did the letter specify «5,000 a nonth?
2033 A I don't know. That was certainly what we had
203<4 discussed. I don't know whether it was in the latter.
2035 2 You don't know whether it was in the latter.
2036 A I don't have a copy of the latter.
2037 2 Why didn't you keep a copy?
2038 A I thought I had, frankly, and looked for it and
2039 couldn't find it.
2040 2 What nakes you think that Hr . Miller still has a
2041 copy?
20U2 A I an not certain that he does.
2043 2 Have you spoken with hin about it?
2044 A I don't think I have ever asked. I have certainly
2045 spoken to Hr . Miller, but I don't know whether X asked hin
2046 whether ha had a copy of that latter or not.
2047 2 You indicated a ninute ago that you thought that he
2048 still had a copy, and I was just wondering what your basis
2049 for that belief was.
2050 A I an not sura.i He nay not have a copy.
^nmm
488
UNCLASSIFIED
NAHE: HrR212002 --w^-. .^^ pj^j. g^
2051 2 So you don't know one way or the other?
2052 A I am not sure if he does.
2053 2 Was there any tine period specified in this letter?
20SU A I don't remember.
2055 2 And pursuant to this agreement that you reached
2056 with Mr. Miller, you received a number of payments of *5,000
2057 a month, in addition to the amounts that you were sharing
2058 with Mr. Fischer?
2059 A That is correct.
2060 2 A little later we will get into some specific
2061 checks from IBC, but let me ask you, what is your
2062 recollection, based on your review of your records, of the
2063 total amount of money you received from IBC pursuant to both
206U the original agreement with Mr. Fischer, as well as the
2065 supplemental?
2066 A I don't know specif ically ► exactly, but I think it
2067 was in the vicinity of about ♦200,000.
2068 2 Did you on some occasions receive funds from IBC
2069 and then you paid a portion of the funds to Mr. Fischer?
2070 A Yes.
2071 2 The *200,000 that you mentioned, is that after the
2072 deduction of the amount that you paid to Mr. Fischer?
2073 A Yes.
207U 2 So you believe you retained something in the area
2075 of «200,000? • ^
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NAME
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HIR2 12002
UNCLASSIFIED.
AGE 85
A That is correct.
2 And those services were periomed beginning in
December oi 1985?
A That is correct.
2 And they continued through the end of 1986?
A That IS correct.
2 Did you perform any services in 1987?
A I don't think so. I don't have any specific
recollection. I might have gotten together with Rich on a
matter in January. If I did, I don't remember it, but that
certainly would have been the last time.
2 So basically the period of time is 12 to 13 months.
A That is correct.
e And you were paid *200,000?
A That is correct.
MR. HEEHAN: Approximately «200,000.
THE WITNESS: That is correct.
BY MR. FRYMAN:
S ApproKimately 4200.00, yes.
Rather than looking forward, as we have been doing,
talking about the negotiation of the contract and what was
oentemplated that you would do, at this point I would like
to look backward and get your description of the services
that you actually performed for these funds in this 12 to 13
months. Hhat did you db?
UMWSSife
490
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 -ww.. . « b^ PkGZ
2101 A We spent, and most of this is in the context, the
2102 initial part of my explanation will be in the context of
2 103 what was done in meetings which were attended for the most
210U part by Mr. Miller, Mr. Fischer and Mr. Gomez, and on
2105 occasion by Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad.
2106 2 In your answer, Mr. Artiano, you are certainly free
2107 to bring in contributions of other persons, but I want to
2 108 focus on what you as an individual did for the compensation
2109 in the area of «200,000, so if you could keep that in mind
2110 in your answer.
2111 A I advised IBC on an overall strategy for growth of
2112 that company. Ue had lengthy continuing conversations about
2113 the types of clientele IBC should ba serving, about thtt
21 m resources IBC would have to marshal in terms of personnel
2115 and expertise to properly serve those clients, that we work
2116 together on the preparation of materials for presentation to
2117 prospective clients and on an evaluation of the needs of
2 118 those prospective clients and how IBC could best offer up
2119 its services to those clients.
2120 Ua worked, from my perspective, we had again
2 12 1 continuing lengthy meetings and conversations in connection
2 122 with a number of projects that Mr. Channel! either had
2 123 ongoing or was contemplating, tha first of which was
2 12U National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty. Others
2 125 included tha Space Dafenpa Initiative, Constitutional
ONWSSIFIEB
491
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 1 1 1 V lJt_ril.ll^ 1 I ll-K^ PAGE 87
2126 minutes, a film that he was attempting to raise money to
2 127 produce and get clearance to produce about CIA activities,
2128 an end of the century foundation, which uas going to raise
2 129 money and gather a host of people to go to Rome in the year
2130 2000, an endowment which he hoped would raise approKimately
2131 »20 million, the purpose of which was to fund activities by
2132 President Reagan after his second term, in terms of speaking
2133 and maintaining communication and being a voice for the
213M Republican Party.
2 135 In many of those instances we prepared Mr. Miller's
2 136 firm with guidance and advice from me, for this
2137 conversation, prepared lots of brochures and just general
2138 paper on all of these projects, in addition to reviewing
2 139 them, in some instances ad nauseua, in meetings.
2 1^0 We prepared, and this was quite an extensive
2141 project, a brochure for IBC. which I unfortunately don't
2142 have a copy of it with me, but it was a fairly extensive
2143 brochure, and I think fairly well done. A gentleman was
2144 called in at my recommendation to do some of the drafting.
2 145 Ue all discussed again at length what should be included in
2 146 that brochure and how it should be prepared, to whom it
2147 should go.
2 148 We talked about, in connection with the projects I
2 149 discussed above, media campaigns, did cost breakdowns of
2150 those, talked about the Apolitical strategy that would best
KIASSIFIED
492
UNCLASSIFIED ~
NAME: HIR212002 ililllll nilllil II IJ PAGE 88
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2152
2153
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2155
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apply in each instance. I virtually on a nightly basis,
when Mr. Fischer was in Washington, he stayed at ny home
three to iour nights a week ior the course of the year, and
evenings I would estimate we spent an average of three hours
a night, just the two of us, going over all of these natters
that I have just described. I don't think that is
comprehensive, but that gives you a sense of the types of
things we were working on.
e During 1986, you were a member of your law firm.
A That is correct.
2 And you had been a member of that firm in 1985?
A That is correct.
S Here your billable hours to your law firm
substantially less in 1986 than in 1985?
A I don't believe so.
2 So this work for IBC did not cut into the time that
you devoted to your law practice?
A Ho, sir.
2 Did you keep any records of the time that you spent
for IBC?
A I don't believe that I did. I think my calendar,
as I know I sent over a redacted calendar--there were just a
handful of entries in that calendar. Typically during the
day, for example, when Mr. Miller and Dave and I met, Dave
and I would drive down, irom my house, for example, early in
HHCLASSIHEB
493
yNCUSSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 IIIISII ntlUll ILU PAGE 89
2176 the morning and hava a breakfast, have a couple of hours in
2177 the morning. That wouldn't appear on my calendar.
2178 Ue might have lunch, which w« did, until about the
2179 summer, on a regular basis, get together for lunch. I would
2180 find a slot in my day, if there was a reason for us to get
2181 together during the day, when I would just have an hour or
2182 hour-and-a-hali, and Rich's office is fairly close to mine.
2 183 I would go over to the office and join them in a meeting,
2 18i| and did to a large extent a lot oi this work in the evenings
2 185 at home with Dave.
2 186 Q So you were able to fit this work in without
2187 cutting into your law firm hours.
2188 A I think that is true. I was feeling a little
2 189 pressured for the first few months, because the load was
2190 much more than I had anticipated it would be, but I don't
2 19 1 think I was feeling quite as pressured after the first four
2192 or five months of 1986.
2193 Q You mentioned you spent a substantial amount of
2 19U time on the IBC work in the evenings with Mr. Fischer at
2195 your house discussing these matters.
2196 A That is correct.
2 197 2 And you would spend additional time driving to work
2 198 with him in the morning and at breakfast meetings with Mr.
2199 Miller, is that correct?
2200 A Hell, I drive. 4o work in the morning anyway. Dave
wmm
494
UNCLASSIFiED
NAME' HIR212002 U I 1 ULfllJlJ 1 1 ll.U ff^OZ 90
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2225
and I would drive m together. Dave didn't have a car for
most of that time, and I would drop Dave off typically at
rtr . Miller's office or wherever his first meeting was, and
to the extent that we needed to meet in the mornings, early
in the mornings, we would do that, park and have a meeting
at Mr. Miller's office, and then I would go to work from
there.
e Did you draw more money from your law firm in 1986
than in 1985?
A I think so.
e Did that reflect additional hours that you devoted
to your law practice in 1986?
A Hours are one component of a formula, a very loose
formula .
MR. MEEHAN: Answer. Did it reflect more hours?
THE WITNESS: I don't know.
BY MR. FRYMAH:
2 Did you bill more hours to your law firm in 1986
than in 1985?
A I don't know.
C Did Mr. Fischer live at your house most of 1986?
A He was at my house, I would estimate, three to foui
days a week for almost all of 1986. and into January of
1987.
2 He continued ,t» maintain a home in Utah?
mmwE
495
UNCLASSIFIED
NAHE: HIR212002 vllVtaflwwII IL.1/ PAGE 91
2226 A Yes. His wifa and children were at his Utah hona ,
2227 and ha started building a hone hare in Vienna sonetine in
2228 the fall, I think, oi 1986.
2229 2 I asked about time records of your work ior IBC,
2230 and you indicated you have no tine records.
2231 A That is correct.
2232 2 Hhat documents do you have that reflect work that
2233 you performed for IBC?
2234 A Probably none. To the extent that I had--
2235 MR. MEEHAH: It will go quicker if you just answer
2236 his questions.
2237 BY HR. FRYMAN:
2238 2 Do you have evidence of anything that you wrote in
2239 connection with this consulting agreement?
22U0 A Kot in my possession.
224 1 2 Hhat is there that is other than in your possession
22U2 that you know about?
22tt3 A Hell. I think if I had an opportunity to review
22<4i4 IBC's files and materials that they produce, I could find a
22M5 host of things that Z contributed to.
22(46 2 Hhat do you recall now?
22M7 A As I indicated a few minutes ago, we could start
22M8 with the brochure that IBC developed.
22149 2 This was the brochure that was written by the
2250 consultant that you b&bught in to draft it?
UNCLASSIFIED
496
HIR212002
UNCIASSIHED
PAGE 92
NAME
2251 . A He was one of the participants, that is correct, in
2252 the preparation of the brochure.
2253 2 And what was the subject of this brochure?
225U A IBC.
2255 2 Was this brochure published?
2256 A Yes.
2257 2 And distributed to potential clients?
2258 A Yes.
2259 8 When was it published, if you recall?
2260 A I don't. I would be guessing.
226 1 2 Describe the appearance of the brochure.
2262 A I am not great at size. It is probably eight-by-12
2263 or lU-by-IO, or something like that.
226M 2 Larger than regular letter-sized paper?
2265 A Oh, yes.
2266 2 Is it in color?
2267 A Yes. it is. It is slick. It is a very slick, high-
2268 gloss finish. It has got individual cards in it not only on
2269 the individuals who are the principals of the IBC, but also
2270 on the range of services that are provided by IBC. There
227 1 are about seven or eight different areas of expertise that
2272 IBC, wrote statements about it, it discussed work that IBC
2273 had done without breaching any confidential relationships
227U with clients that they had had in the past. It was, I
2275 think, a very good product.
iiNcussife
497
UNCLASSIHEO
NArtE: HIR212002 V I 1 liLtrlU il 1 1 II.U PAGE 93
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2277
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2295
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2297
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229
2300
Q Did it hava pictur«s?
A I am trying to raii«mb«r if it had pictutas. I
think it night hava, but I haven't saan it now for a uhila.
2 How many pagas?
A It wasn't really in page format. It is a fold-out,
and it has kind of a jacket inside of it for inserts. I
don't know if there were eight pages in it, 12 pages in it.
It had things about that length, cards, hard cards or a
little wider, that slipped in and out. It was made
obviously for subsequent adaptation, and spent quite a bit
of time developing it.
2 But in terms of equivalent pages of text. Hr .
Artiano, I mean we are talking about five to ten pages of
tent?
A I am guessing at text. I would guess It is longer
than 10 pages of text, but I would have to look at it again
now to tell you exactly what the quantity of it was.
e Between 10 and 20 pages of text, such as you would
generate in your law practice, in terms of number of words
per page?
A I don't know. Perhaps between 10 and 20 pages of
tttxt as I would generate, but it was a totally different
type of product.
2 And this was a brochure you worked on with a number
of other people? '•'
UNCUSSiRED
498
UNCLASSIRED
KAHE: HIR212002 U I lULllUU I ■ ILU ^^'^^ 'M
2301 . A That is correct.
2302 2 You talked with others about it?
2303 A That is correct.
2304 2 You didn't write it?
2305 A No > although I reviewed it after each section was
2306 written, may have made some contributions.
2307 2 You may have edited it?
2308 A That is correct.
2309 2 What, other than this brochure, did you participate
2310 in generating in terms of written product?
2311 A Material that was put out, some material I believe
2312 on HEPL, some material on the Space Defensive Initiative
2313 program, material on constitutional minutes, some proposals
231'4 that were sent to specific clients, although frankly outside
2315 of I believe Panama I can't give you the names of those
2316 clients.
2317 I attended--
23 18 MR. MEEHAN: He just asked you about written
2319 materials.
2320 BY HR. FRYMAM:
232 1 fi Here these materials you have just described apart
2322 izoa the proposals to clients, were they in the nature of
2323 brochures also?
2324 A They were in the nature of — no, they weren't. I am
2325 trying to remember th»' format they were in. Z think they
UNCIASSIRED
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HAnZ- HIR212002 U I * UI-MUU 1 1 whmiJ PACE 95
2326 were typically in a jackat, a regular typawrittan, sangla or
2327 doubla-spacad pages in a jacket as thay were sent out to the
2328 prospective clients.
2329 2 You nentioned HEPL and SDI and constitutional
2330 minutes. Hou nany itens do you recall, or to the best of
233 1 your recollection, do you believe were generated in terns of
2332 products for these entities? Are we talking about more than
2333 10?
233U A Oh. much more than ten.
2335 2 More than 100?
2336 A Perhaps, perhaps. There were endless drafts and
2337 letters and promotional pieces, the range of services in
2338 public relations, media evaluations, demographic studies.
2339 the types of things you would expect a public relations firm
23U0 to put together.
23>41 2 So you think there may have been more than 100?
231(2 A Ky guess would be yes. there were probably well
23<43 over 100 in the course of a year.
23(«U 2 So we are talking about generating one on the
23U5 average of every three to four days?
23U6 A Haybe more. Again, I don't have possession of
2347 these files. I have never counted them. I am just giving
23U8 you my sense, impression, that there was a tremendous amount
23M9 of paper generated by IBC and by the clients of IBC that IBC
2350 was reviewing.
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2351 . 2 And to generalize, what was your role in the
2352 generation of this paper, these apptoximatelv' 100 brochures?
2353 A I might take exception to the word ''brochures''.
23SU They weren't all brochures.
2355 2 Or items.
2356 A These items.
2357 e Information items. Did you draft them?
2358 A No.
2359 e You didn't write them?
2360 A In some instances I participated in the drafting of
236 1 them or edited them. I sat through meetings, strategy
2362 meetings prior to drafting, in which we came up with
2363 conceptual notions about how we wanted to approach
2364 something, about what items should be included in the final
2365 product, about identifying the proper people to whom they
2366 should be sent, working out a review process in each case
2367 prior to publication, talking about costs to the business.
2368 2 These strategy meetings, were these generally the
2369 meetings with Mr. Fischer in the evening that you have
2370 described or the meetings early in the morning with Mr.
237 1 Fischer and Hr . Miller? I mean, were those a substantial
2372 number of this type of strategy meeting?
2373 A They were, yes. The answer is yes in both
2374 instances.
2375 Q You also ment'ioned proposals to clients. How many
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KAHEt HIR212002 UllULriUUII lL«U '''^^E 97
2376 proposals do you recall you participatad m?
2377 A I think ue had discussions. I think wa had
2378 discussions about probably a dozen prospective country
2379 clients that IBC was interested in securing as clients oi
2380 IBC, most of them in Central America, a couple of Asian
2381 countries, and some Arabic countries.
2382 2 I thought you indicated you participated m the
2383 preparation of some written proposals to clients.
23814 A That is correct.
2385 2 Hou many of such written proposals?
2386 A As many as either Ht . niller or Hz. Fischer raised
2387 with me. As the business was developing, they would decide
2388 to target. They would get some information that would cause
2389 them to target a particular country, whether the country be
2390 Panama, Morocco or Brunei, whatever they happened to be. Ue
239 1 would sit down and talk if Fit. Miller decided that was an
2392 appropriate target, or Mr. Fischer did. we would sit down
2393 and figure out how to best go about doing it.
239(4 2 Did you write any of these proposals?
2395 A I wasn't the exclusive author of any of these
2396 proposals, but I participated in the manner I described a
2397 few moments ago in the preparation of most of this material.
2398 fi That is you talked about then before they were
2399 written.
2>400 A He talked aboju^ them before they were written.
iiNcussro
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2U01 2 And you read then after they were written.
21402 A Sometimes Mr. Fischer would cone back with an
2403 outline in the evenings. We would go over it, try to flesh
24014 it out, decide what needed to be included, what probably
2<405 should be excluded, and how best to make that presentation,
2406 to whom it should be directed, hou the prospective services
214O7 should be described, what that would mean to IBC in terms of
2408 time and personnel. Those were regular, virtually nightly
2M09 conversations we had.
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tPTS MAZUR
UNCUSSIFIEO
DCMN DOKOCK
2 15 p.m.
BY MR. FRYMAN:
2 Right. You mentioned a minute ago your calendars,
which you have produced, and we will get to those in a few
minutes .
Apart from the meetings in the evening with Mr.
Fischer and in the early morning with He. Fischer and in
some cases Mr. Miller and the othttr tine you were able to
make available at odd periods for then, do your calendars
that you have produced reflect all of the meetings that you
participated in in connection with this IBC arrangement that
occurred during your regular working hours?
A Mo.
2 Uhy not?
A X would guess not.
e Hhy not?
A As I indicated earlier, if I had an hour, hour and a
half during the course of a day free, and it had been
requested that I go over to Rich's office, I very well may
not have entered it at all on my calendar.
It wasn't a law firm matter. I keep that calendar
for purposes of time for the law firm. There are instances
where I will put othe»-' things on it clearly, but certainly
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2435 not all the time, as opposed to representation oi a client,
21436 where I will typically enter all of the time I spent.
2H37 2 Does your law firi» have the practice oi all of the
2438 attorneys preparing daily time cards for billing purposes?
2U39 A Ue all have call cards. He Keep then in different
2'4<40 ways, and at the end of the month, each attorney subnits a
2'4'41 tiree sheet through his secretary, which is, you know,
2'4<42 computerized.
2UU3 C Summarizes hourly charges by client.
214(4(4 A Yes, sir.
214(45 Q Now, just to wind up the types of written uoik that
2U146 you participated in for IBC . We have talked about th« ZBC
2>4(47 brochure, we have talked about the various information items
2(4148 that were generated for NZPL and SOI and others, and we have
2(4(49 talked about proposal to prospective clients.
2(450 What else in the nature of written materials were
2(451 you involved in?
2(«52 A X can't--there may have been other things. I can't
2(453 recall them at the moment.
2(4514 S Here those the major items?
2(455 I I think so. You know, Mr. rischex would come--in
2(456 addition to telephone conversations I had during the course
2(457 of the day, which were frequent--! guess that is--that is at
2(458 least what I can recall as I sit here, having reviewed or
2U59 discussed the one--for one purpose ox another duzlng the
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aueo course of the relationship,
2»«61 fi Well, as of today, looking back on this period of a
21462 year which ended seven or eight months ago, the types of
2<463 written materials that you have identified are the ones that
2M6I4 you recall today?
2M6S A That is correct.
2466 fi Kow, did you understand that part of your
2467 compensation was for arranging meetings?
2'*i8 A I think I understood from the beginning of the
2U69 relationship that there would be occasions where Dave and I
2U70 or one of us would be asked for one of various reasons to
2471 assist IBC on behalf of its clients in arranging a meeting.
2M72 2 And did you do that?
2473 A On several occasions, yes.
24714 2 What were the occasions?
2475 A At my invitation. Elliott Abrans attended a
2476 luncheon. Either occasion. Elliott Abrams--! scheduled a
2477 visit with Elliott Abxams at his office at the State
2478 Department. '■
2479 2 Anything else?
2480 A Ko. Nothing that comes to mind immediately.
2481 2 Well, take a minute or two to reflect.
2482 A I am not recalling anything at the moment other than
2483 those two meetings that I on my own set up.
2484 2 Well, did you-assist in setting up any others?
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21485 A Well, I thmK in every--in most instances anyuay,
2486 certainly in many instances when Dave was asked to set up a
21487 meeting, Dave and I discussed it before it happened. I may,
2"488 by the way, set up a meeting m the Vice President's ofiice
21489 uith--I may have set up a meeting with one oi the Vice
21490 President's staii.
2149 1 I know we had a meeting over there. I am not sure
2492 if I or Dave did that, but on any occasion when Mr. Fischer
21493 uas asked to arrange a meeting, he and I reviewed it.
214914 Typically, he was the one that made the telephone call, not
2U95 me.
21496 2 So, in terms of making the telephone call, you did
2U97 It for the two meetings with Abrams.
21498 A Yes.
2499 2 And one in the--one meeting with a member of the Vice
2500 President's staff.
2501 A I think that is correct.
2502 2 Uho uas the member?
2503 A I don't recall. I know a lot of people--! don't know
2504 if Craig Fuller was in that meeting or if Lee Atwater uas at
2505 that meeting. I just don't recall who was there when ue had
2506 the meeting.
2507 2 Uhen was the lunch with Hr . Abrams?
2508 A I am sorry. I don't recall the date of the lunch.
2509 2 What was the mdn'th?
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NAME
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251 1
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2513
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UNOUSSIFIEB ....
103
A I can't tell you.
2 Was it m early 1986?
A I believe it was prior to the sumner oi 1986. It
uas probably in the spring, but I don't recall the specific
date .
e Who attended?
A Mr. Abrams and myself, Mr. Fischsr, Hr . Hiller, ftr .
Gomez and Mr. Channel, C-h-a-n-n-e-1 .
Q Two Ls .
Who asked you to arrange that meeting?
A Mr. Miller.
2 But Mr. Hiller did not attend?
A He did.
2 But--I missed that. So it uas Abrams. you, Fischer,
Miller, Gomez and Channell.
A That is correct.
2 Did Conrad attend?
A I don't believe so.
2 And Miller requested the meeting?
A I believe so.
2 Do you know if Channell requested Miller to set up
the meeting?
A Yes.
2 That is your understanding?
A Yes.
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2535 . 2 Then Channell basically asked for the meeting?
2536 A Yes, but I got the request through Rich.
2537 2 Through Miller.
2538 A But I believe it was on behali of Mr. Channell.
2539 That is why he was at the meeting.
25U0 2 Uhy did you understanding this meeting had been
2541 requested?
2542 A nr . Channell had never met Mr. Abrams , I don't
2543 believe--prior to that time, and I think for obvious reasons,
2544 Mr. Abrams is--uas Assistant Secretary for Inter- American
2545 Affairs, and was senior spokesman for the United States in
2546 matters concerning Central America, and Mr. Channell had an
2547 organization that was supportive of the President's position
2548 on the contras . and it was for purposes of an exchange of
2549 information.
2550 I think Mr. Channell wanted to communicate to Mr.
255 1 Abrams what he was doing and see what Mr. Abrams' thoughts
2552 on the matter were.
2553 2 What happened at the lunch?
2554 A Mr. Channell--to the best of my recollection, most of
2555 the luncheon was dominated by Mr. Channell. He told Mr.
2556 Abzans about all of the things he was doing, not only NEPL,
2557 but his other projects, some of which I have touched upon
2558 here, and talked about how he was hoping that he would be
2559 successful in supporting the President's platform on this.
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2560 and appreciate the fact that Ke . Abrans was such a great
2561 spokesman for the Administration.
2562 That was that type of luncheon.
2563 e Did Mr. Channell show Mr. Abrans any written
2564 material?
2565 A I don't recall. He may have brought material to the
2566 meeting with him--to the luncheon with him to shou Mr.
2567 Abrams. I think we talked about the commercials that Hr .
2568 Channell's organizations had produced.
2569 I think he asked Mr. Abrams if he had ever seen any
2570 of the commercials. I don't recall whether Hr . Abrams had
257 1 or had not. It is very possible he brought information or
2572 literature with him, but I don't recall if he did or didn't.
2573 S At this point, you and Hr . Abrams were very close
2574 friends.
2575 A That is correct.
2576 2 Is that correct?
2577 Old you talk to Mr. Abrams afterwards about this
2578 luncheon?
2579 A I mean. I certainly talked to him afterwards. I
2580 don't recall that we specifically talked about the luncheon.
2581 He may have, but it was--if wa did, I guess it was
2582 inconsequential, because I don't recall his comments post
2583 that luncheon, about it.
2584 2 How, you said^you arranged a second meeting with Mr.
UNCUSSiFIEG
510
UNCUSSiFIED .
Hknz HIR212002 IJ I Y Ui_niJLl i S II !.J P'^''^ 1°^
2585 Abraras.
2586 A That iS correct.
2587 2 When was that?
2588 A I don't recall exactly, but it was subsequent to
2589 that, the luncheon.
2590 2 And who was In that neeting?
2591 A nr.--it was in Hr . Abrams' office, and Mr. Fischer
2592 and Kr . Channell and I were there.
2593 2 What happened at that meeting?
259U A nr . Channell had requested the meeting because he
2595 was at that point--! am sorry, I don't recall the
2596 date--concerned that the President was about to withdraw his
2597 support from the contras m one form or another, and was
2598 hoping to get some assurance from Hi. Abrams if that is the
2599 case.
2600 The three of us went into Mr. Abrams' office. Mr.
2601 Channell's sort of talking. He got very excited because Mr.
2602 Abrams was telling him that at the minimum the President was
2603 firm in his support and really wasn't saying much more, and
26014 Mr. Channell started giving a speech and Hr . Abrams after--!
2605 don't know exactly how long the meeting went; certainly
2606 couldn't have been more than 10 minutes, as ! remember it.
2607 Mr. Abrams finally just got up and said,
2608 ''Gentlemen, you will have to excuse me. ! have another
2609 meeting.'' We all goC up and walked out of the room, and
UNClASSIfiE
511
UNCUSSIHED ..
NAME' HIR212002 UllULrlUVll I L. 1/ P>^^^ ^01
2610 clearly. Mr. Abrams was upset by fir. Channell's demeanor.
2611 2 Did you discuss this afterwards with Hr . Abraras^
2612 A I apologized to Mr. Abraras by telephone afterwards.
2613 e What did he say?
2614 A He said it happens. You know, ''I an not
26 1 5 offended . ' '
2616 2 And you recollection about a meeting with someone on
2617 the Vice President's staff is very imprecise?
2618 A Very imprecise. This, by the way. is another
2619 project being worked on and talked about that never came to
2620 fruition. Mr. Channell was attempting to put together a
2621 project which involved a series of speaking engagements to
2622 small groups of conservatives around the country, and was
2623 hoping to get the Vice President to commit to a number of
26214 those, to appear at a number of those engagements.
2625 This was--I guess another fund-raising vehicle for
2626 Hr . Channell's organizations. Several letters, as I
2627 recollect, uere--that X know I saw and may indeed have had a
2628 hand in drafting were sent back and forth between Mr. Miller
2629 and the Vice President's office.
2630 At first, it appeared that the Vice President was
2631 going to commit. I believe that commitment was later
2632 withdrawn. X don't think it ever happened.
2633 2 All right.
263U A And my recoll»<jtion is that is what that meeting was
iSifitO
512
HIR2 12002
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 108
NAME ■
2635 about, although I tell you I--the meeting is kind of a fog tc
2636 me. I don't have any specific recollection of it at all.
2637 2 Now. you have indicated that you considered--one of
2638 the contributions that you were making pursuant to this
2639 arrangement with IBC was to arrange for these particular
2640 meetings .
2641 A I think the way I stated it was that--I think I
2642 understood right from the outset that part of the services
2643 would be that there would occasionally be a request on Dave
2644 or on me or on both of us to assist IBC on behalf of one of
2645 their clients to set up a meeting with somebody in the
2646 Administration.
2647 fi And these are the ones you arranged particularly?
2648 A Those two, I did on my own, yes. sir.
2649 2 And I think you used the phrase you made the
2650 telephone call?
2651 A That is correct.
2652 2 And part of your compensation was for making the
2653 telephone call?
2654 A I would hardly describe it that way, but part of my
2655 compensation was for rendering services. Included in those
2656 services was assistance in connection with giving or getting
2657 information from the Administration, and in that respect, I
2658 agreed to help set up those meetings, and did.
2659 2 You said that ^a's contemplated from the beginning
513
NAHE
266(
266
2662
2663
26(
2665
2666
2667
2668
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267U
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2676
2677
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2679
2680
2681
2682
2683
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UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE lOS
that you would assist setting up such raaeting, and that was
to be coveted by the compensation of--
A That as correct.
2 Now, the telephone calls for the other meetings you
said were made by Mr. Fischer and not by you?
A They were not always in the form of telephone calls.
Some were in the form of letters requesting meetings. That
we would draft joint or someone would do a rough cut of it,
and we would all look at — and had it sent out.
2 And you were aware that Hr . Fisher was making a
request m one form or another for these other meetings?
A Yes, sir, I was.
2 And did these include meetings with the President?
A Yes, sir.
2 And Attorney General Heese?
A Yes, sir.
2 Mho else?
A Charles Wick--the meeting, for example, at the White
House in January, the briefing in the Cabinet Room that was
arranged with the help of Ht . Fischer in January of 1986
included Colonel Horth, Assistant Secretary Abrams, Don
Regan and the President.
S Okay.
KoH, going back to your original series of meeting
with Mr. Miller about -this consulting arrangement, from the
UNCLASSiFIE
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NAME:
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
2690
2691
2692
2693
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269S
2696
2697
2698
2699
2700
2701
2702
2703
27014
2705
2706
2707
2708
2709
SSIFIEO .. ,.
HIR2 12002
earliest discussions it was understood, was it not, that one
of Mr. Miller's objectives from you and Mr. Fischer was
setting up meetings with President Reagan?
A That is not correct.
2 When did that cone up?
A The first tine that came up uas . as I recall it. was
in January of 1986.
2 What were the circumstances?
A I am testing my recollection her*, but to the best
of my knowledge, it came up at a meeting at IBC which was
attended by Mr. Miller and Mr. Fischer, myself, Mr. Channell
and Mr. Conrad. Either prior to that meeting or at that
meeting for perhaps the second or third time, we were
reviewing a file that had been given to David and myself by
either Mr. Miller or Mr. Channell, which included a stack of
letters from Mr. Meese — I believe Mr. Regan and the President
and perhaps the Vice President commending Mr. Channell for
his efforts and making reference to meetings that Mr.
Channell had already had at the White House, and the
different agencies of the Executive Branch, and we were
discussing at that meeting his current strategy for HEPL and
media campaign they were planning to mount, things of that
nature .
I don't have--a crystal clear recollection of this
meeting. It was--a possibility of a briefing for a group of
lltCU
515
NAME: HIR212002
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 1 1 1
2710 donors to NEPL at the Uhita House--as far as I can r«call was
2711 raised in that meeting for the first time, and I can't tell
2712 you uho raised it, who raised that possibility, because none
2713 of us had thought about it.
2714 I certainly hadn't thought about it, nor Hr . Fischer
27 15 before that time, but it sounded like a terrific idea, and
27 16 we went about seeing if we can raake it happen.
2717 2 So, going back to the original discussions, which
2718 you believe occurred in probably Oacember of 1985, it was
27 19 contemplated iron the beginning that one of the
2720 contributions that would be made by you and Hr . Fischer
272 1 would be to arrange meetings in general, but the President
2722 had not been specifically identified in that original series
2723 of discussions or negotiations.
2724 A That is generally accurate.
2725 2 Well, in what relationship is it not accurate?
2726 A Well, I guess we keep attempting here to define what
2727 services that were contemplated initially were. I have done
2728 my best thus far to give you my understanding of the range
2729 of those services as were discussed initially.
2730 2 Right.
273 1 A As I indicated, one of many things mentioned in
2732 those — that first series of conversations and in the early
2733 negotiation with Mr. Miller were at three meetings that I
2734 references with Mr. Rtfjran and Hr . Abrams and Hr . Laxalt on
\mmm
516
UNCLASSIFIED ,.
NAME^ HIR212002 V I 1 Wkl l^' ^^ ■ ■ ■ 1- »* PAGE 112
2735 behali of NEPL for purposes oi exanination of information
2736 and perhaps getting some--getting additional support from
2737 those people for the types of programs that NEPL uas
2738 undertaking.
2739 To the extent the meetings uere discussed, that is
27U0 it. This subsequent January conversation. I have ^ust
27U1 described to you, uas indeed something absolutely new m
27>42 terms of the shape of this relationship, and the services to
27143 be rendered. It uas not something that had been
271414 contemplated initially.
27»»5 e Okay.
271(6 Hou many meetings did you and/or Fir. Fischer arrange
27M7 uith President Reagan and on behalf of an individual or a
27148 group associated uith Mr. Channell?
2749 A I can't give you a specific ansuer to that question.
2750 because I didn't arrange those meetings myself and didn't
275 1 attend any. but one of them, and the one I attended uas not
2752 uith an individual. It uas the one I just described. It
2753 uas uith a group of probably 30 people--35 people in the
275U Cabinet Room.
2755 I would be guessing--six .
2756 S You uere auare, uere you not, of Hr . Fischer's
2757 efforts to arrange such meetings?
2758 A Yes, sir.
2759 e But he made th* 'phone call, not you — I think to use
UNCLASSIFIED
517
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NAME: HIR212002
2760 the phiasai
2761 A Figurativaly , yeah, he nade the arrangements.
2762 2 Now, did you become ware at some point in 1986 that
2763 Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad had the understanding that they
2764 uere paying you and Mr. Fischer »S0,000 for each meeting
2765 with Mr. Reagan?
2766 A At some point in 1986, early in 1986, although I
2767 can't again tell you the date, both Mr. Fischer and I,
2768 through a vehicle I can't recall now or I would share it
2769 with you, became aware oi the fact that either Mr. Conrad or
2770 Mr. Channell or both of them felt that they had made a
277 1 payment for arranging a meeting.
2772 2 This was told to you, I take it, by someone?
2773 A Yeah. I mean, it was either a comment that was made
27714 to Dave or in somebody's presence, but we became aware of
2775 it, and were very concerned about it.
2776 2 Why were you concerned?
2777 A Because that was not--it was inaccurate. That was
2778 not the relationship ue had then. It was not the
2779 relationship we anticipated, it was not one we would have
2780 entered into and it was inaccurate and we wanted to correct
2781 it.
2782 e What did you do?
2783 A We had a meeting — called a meeting.
278'* 2 When was this meeting?
UNCUSSIFIEO
518
UNCUSSIFIED
KAME: HIR212002 11 1 « 11^1100 ■ ■ CL.t/ PAGE 1 m
2785 . A I don't recall the date of the meeting, but it was
2786 imnediately after this became known to us and we were
2787 concerned about it, and we telephoned Mr. niller and said,
2788 ''Ue would like to have a meeting.'*
2789 Q Where was the meeting?
2790 A It was IBC's offices.
2791 2 Who attended?
2792 A Mr. Hiller, fir. Gomez, Hr . Fischer, Hr . Channell,
2793 nr . Conrad and myself.
279(« Q What was said at this meeting?
2795 A We addressed the issue I just discussed. Said, ''It
2796 has come to our attention you may feel* '--this was addressed
2797 to nr . Conrad and Mr. Channell — ''or that somebody may have
2798 mentioned or indicated that we have been paid for meetings
2799 or retained by one of your organizations, and that is wholly
2800 inaccurate, and we have called this meeting to make sure
280 1 that everybody understands that we have a continuing
2802 retaining relationship with IBC, we are available to IBC for
2803 all of the reasons — all the prefaces I have discussed with
280U you already here earlier today.*' and that ''we would
2805 appreciate It if no one ever made that kind of inaccurate
2806 remark again. ' ' and there was complete concurrence around
2807 the table as to all points.
2808 2 Had you received a payment of •50,000 from IBC after
. 1
2809 the January meeting w£\h President Reagan?
UNCLASSIFIED
519
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NAME: HIR212002 WllVbflWil I L. U PAGE 115
2810 A Ue received--best oi my recollection--! don't have the
2811 schedule in front of rae--received a »S0,000 payment either in
2812 late January or early February.
2813 e And the retainer agreement that you have described
2814 provided for «20,000 a month?
2815 A That is correct.
2816 2 What was the reason for the «50,000 payment entered
2817 late January or early February?
2818 A There were two reasons for it. The first reason
2819 was, as I indicate now and on several occasions, is that
2820 between the commencement of this relationship in December
282 1 and mid-January, or by the second week in January, it became
2822 very clear to us--it certainly had by the end of January--that
2823 the amount of tine that both Hz. Fischer and I, perhaps at
282>4 that point more so Kr . Fischer, had been called upon to
2825 dedicate to this, was grossly in excess of what had
2826 initially been contemplated.
2827 Therefore, we asked Mr. Hiller, and he obliged us to
2828 accelerate payments, and I think as early as that date, we
2829 were discussing or at least thinking about increasing the
2830 initial financial remuneration in the anticipation that this
283 1 increased call on time and resources was going to continue
2832 and thereby preclude Mr. Fischer for one from developing a
2833 broad-based consulting operation.
283M He also, I win add — Oave and I both had some concern
UNCIASSIHEQ
520
UNCLASSiFIED ....
KAME: HIR212002
2835 over being paid at all. I think that is aluays--always in
2836 the back of your mind in one oi these relationships, and ue
2837 felt a lot more comfortable being ahead of the game at that
2838 point, just on the basis of the initial agreement than
2839 behind the eight ball, and we are both as I indicated a
28140 moment ago, talking about the fact that there would have to
28U1 be an adjustment in the compensation if this amount of time
28'42 and effort were going to be dedicated on a regular basis.
28U3 C Do you recall that the original «50,000 check was
2844 returned for insufficient funds?
ZBtS A I think that happened — I don't recall that
2846 specifically, but I think that happened on mora than one
2847 occasion during the course of this relationship. ^
\
2848 8 When you had this meeting with Hz. Channell and Mr.
2849 Conrad, did they tell you that they had understood they were
— ^850 paying $50,000 per meeting with President Reagan?
2851 A Ho, sir.
2852 2 Well, did they deny that was their understanding?
2853 A The--my recollection of that meeting, there was
2854 absolute unanimity among all of us in connection with what
2855 the relationship between Mr. Fischer and I and IBC was.
2856 There was absolutely no remark that I can recall in that
2857 meeting challenging that or disputing it in any sense.
2858 He didn't hold that meeting to create any animosity.
2859 Ue held it to make sure' that they understood that, and to
UNCUSSIHEO
521
NAME
2860
2861
2862
2863
2864
2865
2866
2867
2868
2869
2870
287 1
2872
2873
28711
2875
2876
2877
2878
287'
2880
2881
2882
2883
288U
HIR2 12002
UNCLASSIFIED
'AGE 117
the extent that somebody had made a lamaik along those
lines, that wouldn't happen.
2 Dad you ever become aware that subsequent to that
meeting, fir. Conrad said they paid you »50,000 per meeting
with President Reagan?
A Subsequent to that meeting?
Q Yeah.
A Mo.
2 Did you ever arrang* meetings with Administration
officials, for anybody else, under any other consulting
arrangement other than the ones you described today?
A Consulting arrangement other than IBC?
2 Yes .
A And outside of the law firm?
e Yes .
A Yes .
2 What?
A I consulted to--in connection with several other
people--Hicro-Gravity Research Associates, which is a high-
tech organization that manufactures a type of crystal. A
meeting was set up--two meetings were set up on their
behalf--one with Mr. Keyworth, who was the present--since
advisor, and I believe one was an official at the Department
of Transportation, although I didn't attend that meeting.
And in other rnstances--and I an now going back to
vHmms
522
UNCLASSIFIED
NAHE: HIR212002 w . . .»« ^s i w Vf 1 1 I h. t^ PAGE llj
2885 19814, perhaps, as early as 198i4, naybe •8S--there was a
2886 project that was presented to ne by sone folks in Nan York
2887 who owned an advertising barter company, and they had access
2888 to both nuraerous--by numerous, I mean tens of thousands or
2889 airline tickets they had gotten control o£ in a transaction
2890 with one of the airlines, and I don't remember which one,
289 1 and discount hotel rooms, and they ware interested in
2892 selling those to the United States Government, and they were
2893 being sold at a rate cheaper than the best government rate,
289>4 and asked me to set up meetings, which I did, with the folks
2895 responsible for those types of decisions, and three or four
2896 different agencies.
2897 I don't recall the precise people with whom I set
2898 the meetings up, but yeah. I did that. sure.
2899 2 In response to my original question, you made the
2900 remark other than through your law firm. Is that a part of
290 1 your law practice, to arrange meetings with Administration
2902 officials?
mmm
523
,. wifcssm
NAME: HIR212002 ||tft,U'l IlVXIrlrll PAGE 119
2903 RPIS nAZUl
290U DCKM BAKNAN
2905 A No. The only meAtings w« had uara--I was just
2906 trying to dafina your quastion.
2907 2 Why did you think you naadad to axcluda your law
2908 firm?
2909 A Wall, thara hava bean tinas in the last fiva years
29 10 when I hava had reason to sit down with somaona in the
29 11 Administration on behalf of a client that I hava, because it
29 12 is a matter pending before that agency or under that
2913 person's jurisdiction for advice or whatever.
29 1(4 2 But that is a meeting that you yourself have--
2915 A Yes, sir.
29 16 2 — rather than arranging an introduction for someone
2917 else?
2918 A Yes, sir.
29 19 KR. FRYnAN: Ask the reporter to mark as Artiano
2920 Deposition Exhibit 1 for Identification a subpoena duces
2921 tecum addressed to Hartin L. Artiano, June 3rd--dated June
2922 18, 1987.
2923 (Artiano Exhibit No. 1 was marked for
292U Identification. 1
2925 [Discussion off the record]
2926 BY HR. rRYHAN:
. i
2927 2 Hr. Artiano, T show you Exhibit 1 for
mmsim
524
NAME
2928
2929
2930
293 1
2932
2933
2934
2935
2936
2937
2938
2939
2940
2941
.^; 2 914 2
"^ 2943
294U
2945
2946
2947
2948
2949
2950
2951
2952
HIR2 12002
ICLASSIFiED
PAGE 120
<J^
Identification and just ask you to confirm that's a copy of
th« subpoena duces tecum that was setvad I guess on your
counsel on behalf of you.
A Yes.
MR. FRYHAN: Ask the reporter to mark this volume
as Artiano Deposition 2 for Identification, which contains
the records produced by Mr. Artiano's counsel relating to an
account at the American Security Bank, account number
[Artiano Exhibit Ko . 2 was marked for
identification . 1
MR. FRYMAN: Ask the reporter to mark as Artiano
Deposition Exhibit No. 3 for Identification documents that
have been produced by Mr. Artiano's counsel relating to a
checking account at the American Security Bank, account
nurabe r^^
[Artiano Exhibit Ko . 3 was marked foe
identification. 1
MR. FRYMAN: i ask the reporter to mark as Artiano
Deposition Exhibit 4 for Identification documents that have
been produced by Mr. Artiano's counsel relating to the
following accounts at the American Security BanK^ account
nusber^^^^^^^^^^^^i nunber^^^^^^^^^^^B
OlUSSlFiEO
525
OfffiLASSIflEO "
NANE HIR212002
2953 idantif ication. )
295U BY HR FRYMAN:
2955 2 Now. Hr . Aitiano, Exhibits 2, 3 and M--
2956 MR. HEEHAN: Exhibit 2 appeals to ba your PC
2957 account, check register and bank statements with checks.
2958 Are the checks included here? I haven't had a chance--yes
2959 they are--and also statements from--sorae statements from youi
2960 accounting firm summarizing some of the bank statements, and
296 1 these were produced in response to the subpoena that was
2962 served on you by me and ueie obtained by me from the
2963 accounting firm-- Anthony C Williams is the name of the
2964 accounting firm.
2965 MR. FRYKAK: And Exhibit 3 is the materials that
2966 you have produced relating to the personal account, account
2967 795--
2968 MR. MEEHAN: These are documents many of which carae
2969 from Mr. Artiano's office, because some of these personal
2970 accounts were kept there and ate the bank statements with
2971 checks. The check registers are in here also. I believe.
2972 This account number did change on its first two
2973 nuabers, becameHHr ather than^H
297U . There is another personal account. Is that marked
2975 as Kuaber U?
2976 MR. FRYMAN: Hell, if you will look in Exhibit U.
2977 there are three accounts in there. The last digits are
yiiissifiEo
526
MAHE
297
2979
2980
2981
2982
2983
298U
298S
298
2987
2988
2989
2990
299 1
2992
2993
299U
2995
2996
2997
2998
2999
3000
300 1
3002
HIR2 12002
mmmm -
MR riEEHAN: Which appears to be a money market
account at the American Security Bank.
MR. rRYHAN: And flj^.
MR. MEEHAN: Which appears to have been opened in
early 1986.
The account ending in nurabei^^^Happears to be a
personal account uhich had, I believe, its only actual
transactions in and out in Decenber '85 or early 1986, and
account number ending with^^^His a premier credit line
statement with the American Security Bank beginning--it
appears in the summer of 1986--the first statement appaars to
be September 1986 and continues to April of 1987.
BY MR. FRYMAN:
2 Now, subparagraph A of the schedule attached to the
subpoena. Mr. Artiano. calls for you to produce for the
period July 1, 1985, to the present, all records relating to
bank accounts over which the respondent had any authority to
uithdrau funds, and then it describes particular types of
documents relating to those accounts.
Now I will direct this question both to you and
your counsel^ Is it your belief that Exhibits 2, 3 and M
constitute all of the documents that aza responsive to that
paragraph of that subpoena?
A Yes . _ '
Mumm
527
MAME ■
3003
3004
300S
3006
3007
3008
3009
3010
301
3012
3013
30m
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020
3021
3022
3023
302'
3025
302f
3027
HIR2 12002
UNCLASSIFIED „,
HR. MEEHAN: I believe it does. Ue supplemented
Apparently ue might have had some statements in the original
response and since then supplemented it, so--
BY HR. FRYMAN:
e And are those accounts that have been identified,
ftr . Artiano, the only bank accounts during that period over
which you had any authority to withdraw iunds?
A Yes, sir.
MR. FRYMAN: Ask the reporter to mark this document
as Artiano Exhibit 5 ior Identification.
[Artiano Exhibit No. 5 was marked for
Identification. 1
BY MR. FRYMAN:
2 Mr. Artiano. Exhibit 5 is a 1985 Federal Income tax
return and there also are some materials relating to a
Virginia return included in that.
Are those the only materials that you have that are
responsive to subparagraph B of the schedule attached to the
subpoena, which calls for 1985 and 1986 tax returns?
MR. HEEHAN: I think ue submitted the extension
certificate for the 1986 tax return.
MR. FRYMAN: All right. There was not a 1986 tax
return?
MR. MEEHAN: No. But there was an extension and
certificate that was i^led with the Internal Revenue
UNCIiSSlFIE
528
NAME-
3028
3029
3030
3031
3032
3033
3034
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
30140
30U1
30M2
3043
30MU
3045
30U6
30M7
30>48
3049
3050
305
3052
HIR212002
wiftssiFe
PAGE 124
HR. FRYHAN: And that is also includftd in Exhibit
5.
Mr. Heahan, it is my baliei that Exhibit 5 is all
of the tax materials that you have submitted, and if you
would just look through that land confirm that is the case.
MR. KEEHAK' He have a separate document form 4868,
but that is the '86 extension notification to the Internal
Revenue Service, as well as a copy to the State of Virginia.
HR. FRYHAH: And those are the materials that Mr.
Artiano has which are responsive to subparagraph B; is that
correct?
MR. MEEHAK: Yes.
HR. FRYHAH: Finally, I would ask the reporter to
mark as Artiano Exhibit 6 for Identification a group of
calendars or redacted calendars which have been produced.
[Artiano Exhibit Ko . 6 was marked for
identification. 1
MR. FRYHAK: Mr. neehan, if you and Mr. Artiano
will look at Exhibit 6 and confirm those are the calendars
that you have produced.
THI HITNESS= That's the redacted calendar for the
period of 1985 through July 1987— or to July 1987.
HR. FRYHAM: And were those calendars produced in
. -i
response to the request in subparagraph C of the schedule
UNCUSSIFIED
529
UNClASSIFIEn
NAHE: HIR212002 V » 1 VIUI •'W « » nh-"' ^^^^ ^^^
3053
30SU
3055
3056
3057
3058
3059
3060
306
3062
3063
306U
3065
3066
3067
3068
3069
3070
3071
3072
3073
30714
307S
3076
3077
attachad to the subpoena?
THE UITNESS: Yas .
MR. MEEHAM: Also in xasponsa, in fact, to
subparagraph E in part, as wall as soma of tha bank
statements, are in response to C as wall as A, as you would
know. Ha related to David Fischaz--soiia of tha portions of
the calendars relate to meetings with Hr . Fischer, and Hr .
Miller obviously is covered by C.
HR. FRYMAN: All right.
Now, do the documents that have been marked as
Artiano Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 constitute all of the
documents in Mr. Artiano's possession which are responsive
to subparagraphs A, B, C, D and E of tha subpoena?
MR. MEEHAN- I believe they do.
MR. FRYMAN: All right.
BY MR. FRYMAN:
2 Just a few brief questions, Hr . Artiano, with
respect to Exhibit 6, tha calendars.
These calendars, I take it, are the only references
to work performed pursuant to tha consulting agreement with
IBC?
A Yas. sir.
fi Is that correct?
If you would look at tha calendar entry for
February 25, it is a »«ierence to a breakfast meeting at
UNCLASSIFIED
530
UNSUSSIFiEB .
NAME^ HIR212002 ■»•-—— pjQj ,36
3078 Dupont Plaza and the initials appear to be DF, RM and SC .
3079 Mho do they represent?
3080 A Dave Fischer, Richard Miller and Spitz Channell.
3081 S There is another reference on a page that has 13,
3082 and I can't tell the month. And there is an entry at 11^30,
3083 it appears, for a White House lunch, or HH lunch, which I
30814 take \t is White House lunch.
3085 A That's correct.
3086 HR. HEEHAN: The next page is March of '86.
3087 BY MR. FRYMAM:
3088 e What does that entry relate to?
3089 A I don't know. I pulled it because I suspected it
3090 may have been something that needed to be supplied pursuant
309 1 to the subpoena.
3092 I had a lunch at the White House with Dave Fischer
3093 and the Warns, I believe their names were. They were
3094 contributors, donors, to Mr. Channell's foundation, I think
3095 to MEPL. Dave had invited them to lunch at the White House
3096 and had invited me to come along, and I didn't know if that
3097 was the reference to that, because I had lunch at the White
3098 House other times clearly.
3099 fi Who else attended this luncheon at the White House
3100 with the Warms?
3101 A Myself and David Fischer.
. ■I
3102 2 Now, at this time Mr. Fischer was not a White House
UNCUSSifiEB
531
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME HIR212002 IJIlULflUwII **»*' PAGE 127
3103 employee?
3104 A That's correct.
3105 fi Uas there any White House employee who attended?
3106 A It's possible that Jim Kuhn or someone uas there
3107 when ue arrived and sat us down at our table, but from ray
3108 recollection only four of us sat through the whole lunch
3109 uith nr . Fischer and myself and Hr . and Hrs . Warm.
3110 2 Was this luncheon in what is knoun as the White
3111 House ness?
3112 A Yes. sir.
3113 8 Did Mr. Fischer retain privileges at the White
31 m House Kess after he resigned?
31 IS A I don't know. That's a good question. I don't
3116 know whether Hr . Fischer retained those privileges or not.
3117 e But you have no specific recollection of anyone
3118 from the White House being a participant in this lunch?
3119 A No. The only four people I remember being at the
3120 lunch are the people I mentioned. I don't know whether
312 1 someone came in and sat us down at the table and then left.
3122 S li you would--
3123 HR. HcGOUGH: Do you know if Hr . Fischer retained
312U his White House pass after —
3125 THE WITNESS: I believe he did.
3126 HR. HcGOUGH-' Did he use the White House pass to
3127 gain entry to the Whife House Hess?
UNCLASSIFIED
532
NAUE HIR212002 0 i1 ULHuU 1 1 I LU PAGE 128
3128 ^ THE WITNESS: I don't think so. You know, when you
3129 go into the White House, you have to clear a security on the
3 130 outside. Typically you do that by calling in to whenever is
3131 going to clear you. You give your name, you're cleared at
3132 the gate and, when you go in, you present some kind of
3133 picture identification at the gate.
313U I have no idea what he submits at the gate when he
3135 goes in. Once you're in the White House, you're typically
3136 met by somebody or you go into somebody's office and then
3137 proceed from there. But I never saw someone show a pass to
3138 get into the White House Hess.
3139 To get into the White House you just need to be
3 1140 cleared by anyone inside the White House.
3im HR. HcGOUGH: Did you ever see Hr . Fischer display
31 142 his pass during the meeting with the Harms or during the day
31>43 with the Warms?
3141* THE WITNESS: Ho.
3145 HR. ncGOUGH: Just a White House pass?
31(46 THE WITNESS: I don't think I've ever seen his
3147 White House pass, as a matter of fact.
SIMS HR. OLIVER: Isn't it true when you go to the White
31149 Muse Hess, you're given a badge?
3150 THE WITNESS: Similar to what you've got around
3151 your neck.
3152 HR. OLIVER: i>id Hi. Flschez wear a visitor's
ONCUSSiRED
533
UNtliSSlFlEO
NAME: HIR212002 lllllll HlllJll 11.1/ PAGE 129
3153 badge?
3154 THE WITHESS: I hav« no idea. I have no
3155 racollection.
3156 BY MR. FRYMAH:
3157 2 Turning to tha antry on March 19th, thara's a
3158 rafarenca to a naating with Hr . Luss.
3159 Hho is Hr. Luss?
3160 A Mr. Luss is chaiznan of San Diago Fadaral. That
3161 uas--that maating is totally unralatad to tha subjact ua'ra
3162 discussing, but it was an antry on ny calandar that showad
3 163 Dava Fischar and I includad it to arr on tha slda oi caution
316<4 in terns oi responding to tha subpoena.
3165 fi I show you the entry on March 13th, 1986. Could
3166 you read that entry ior the record.
3167 A Yes. Keed to firm up proposal with Conrad.
3168 2 What does that refer to?
3169 A I have no idea. I'a sorry.
3170 2 There is an entry on April 9, 1986, to a dinner at
317 1 Kaison Blanche. Do those initials indicate Mr. Channell and
3172 Mr. Fischer?
3173 A Looks to ae like SC and DP, although — I guess I
31714 {gfought it was, which is why I pulled It out of here. But
3175 it's not real clear to ne from that, but it could very well
3 176 be Mr. Channell and Hr . Fischer at the Halson Blanche.
3177 2 Finally, there is an entry on July 21, 1986, a
wtmmi
534
yNCUSSIFiEB
NAME: HIR212002 «,> 3 i] U«U9 %«^ Vf 1 ■ « B« »»' p^gj ,3^
3178 U:00 White House lunch or HH lunch which, I take it, neans
3179 Hhlte House lunch.
3180 A Correct.
3181 2 What does that refer to?
3182 A I don't know.
3183 Let me tell you what I did when I uas redacting, to
31814 share the process with you.
3185 Typically when I had a White House lunch, I put
3186 something next to it. In other words. I identified who I
3 187 was going with. On the two occasions that appear in the
3188 redacted calendars, there was nothing next to the White
3189 House lunch and I knew that I had gone at least once with
3190 Mr. Fischer and the Harms to lunch. I didn't know if that
319 1 related to this matter so I included it anyway.
3192 S All right.
3193 A I wish I could tell you more on that.
319U HR. FRYHAK: Why don't we take a break for less
3 195 than five minutes.
3196 [Recess]
ONCLASSiFiE
535
mkmw
mfimm
536
PliiliB
WiSSiREO
537
NAME
3722
3723
372U
3725
3726
3727
3728
3729
3730
3731
3732
3733
3731
3735
3736
3737
3738
3739
3740
3741
3742
3743
3744
3745
37U6
P»GE 152
Discussion off th« racord 1
OR. (1EEHAH; U« hav« gon« through a lot of personal
financial transactions with Hr . Artiano which ar« unralatad
raally to your investigation.
I undarstand why you had to asK than and I'm not
sura what is going to happan with tha transcript, but I
would request that staff 30in with ma, if tha transcript is
to be released, requesting that this portion ba redacted so
that It not ba any part of tha public record at any time.
KR. FRYHAN: Your request is noted and we will
attempt to comply with that request.
riK. HEEHAK: On that line, obviously, we are
concerned about the Kew York Times article yesterday in
which It appears that the day before ha comas up here to
testify, the article ran and that somehow inf ormation--it
certainly did not come from us or from anyone connected with
nr . Artiano--with respect to the fact that he would be coming
up here .
And so we are concerned about material leaking out
ky accident or for any reason, and this material, which is
M«lly totally unrelated to the investigation, it seems to
«• should not come out in any event, and ue request that as
the time and the report is prepared--! don't know that other
. \
people have had to turn over documents relating to their
mmwm
538
NAME^
37U7
3748
37149
3750
3751
3752
3753
3754
3755
3756
3757
3758
3759
3760
3761
3762
3763
376U
3765
3766
3767
3768
3769
3770
3771
HIR212002 yiiC^l^&i^^^--'
PAGE 153
(divorce in situations lika that, but to tha extant that in
his casa i£ a portion oi this is going to ba mada public, it
ba linitad to that uhich relates to the investigation.
MR. FRYMAM: As I say, your request is noted, and I
think it's a reasonable request, and ua uill attempt to
comply with that.
I would also just like to note that you and I,
prior to the commencement oi tha deposition, discussed the
Keu York Times article and I expressed to you my concern
about that article and I stated to you that tha first time I
had any inkling that tha article was coming was when I read
it in tha paper yesterday. If you have any Indication of
tha source of that article, I would Ilka to know about it.
I have discussed it with tha Chief Counsel of the
House Committee and I have expressed my concern to him about
that article. It is a discussion we had yesterday, and I'm
sure he would equally like to know tha source of that
article, and if you get any information I would appreciate
it.
HK. n£EHAN= Ue knew a day in advance because Hr .
B«xke was trying to reach Hr . Artiano — the man whose byline
la on the article. But certainly tha source or the idea of
tha article did not come from us. though Hr . Hibey did speak
with him when he reached him on the phone, though ha didn't
. i,
know when he answered" the call that that is what it was
m
SjtS (Is
^t.
539
fe^fiiJiiJu. /PAGE 154
MAHE: HIR212002
3772 abdut. But sons of tha mat*iial andad up in tha articla but
3773 wa don't know whaca or how it cana about.
37714 HR. FRYMAH: As I say, I shara your concarn.
3775 BY MR. FRYHAM^
3776 fi Lat ma just ask a faw concluding, ganaral
3777 quastions, Hr . Artiano.
3778 You hava indicatad that you racaivad approximately
3779 «200,000 from Intarnational Business Communications; soma of
3780 the monies that you racaivad, you relayed to Hr . Fischer
3781 pursuant to your understanding with him, and that some of
3782 the monthly checks were made payable to you and you then
3783 paid him a portion of it.
3781 Other than the monies that you relayed to Hr .
3785 Fischer, did you transfer to anyone else any portion of the
3786 monies you received from IBC?
3787 A Ho, other than the things we hava just gone over.
3788 I commingled that money with my personal money, with my PC
3789 money, and than spent it, as you can see.
3790 fi But other than that commingling, was there any
379 1 sharing of the proceeds —
3792 A Absolutely not.
3793 fi — from tha IBC contract with anyone other than Dave
3794 Fischer?
3795 A Absolutely none.
3796 HR. FRYHAH: Hr . Heehan, as I indicated, I will
?iC'^-SI
T?
540
KAME:
3797
3798
3799
3800
380 1
3802
3803
380U
3805
3806
3807
3808
3809
3810
381 1
3812
38 13
38m
38 15
38
3817
3818
3819
3820
382
UNCL^SS./,
HIR212002 unUL^a^^^j^::,,;:. '*" '"
follow up with you with some writtan questions about sone of
the othei materials and the bank records.
I an hopeful that we can resolve those questions m
writing .
I have no further questions at this time.
In the event that we are unable to resolve them, it
may be necessary to resume the deposition at some point.
But It is my hope and expectation at this point that we can
avoid that.
MR. MEEHAN: Fine. Ue will attempt to respond
promptly to your request.
BY MR. McGOUGH:
2 Mr. Artiano. we spoke before, I believe, at the
interview .
When did you first inform your law firm of your
activities with or on behalf of IBC?
A I advised all of my partners of my participation
with Mr. Fischer on behalf of IBC early in 1987. I believe
It was January or early February of 1987.
2 So that would have been really a year or thirteen
months after you first entered into this arrangement with
Kx. Fischer; is that correct?
A That's correct.
S There was a period of time, was there not, when Hr .
Fischer was actually doi^g business from your office?
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KAHE
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JhW^ik^ki i; >.-.,■ PAGE 1S«
HIR212002 w.« w«i« a'<to'^>6«i i;*.^, pjge isg
A Theia was a period of tina uhan Mr. fischtti was
coming into Hashangton, using tha IBC oificas, and
occasionally coming by ray ofiica and using a sacond phona I
have in my office, which is on the opposite end of the room
from my desk.
He would come in for half an hour, 45 minutes, make
a few calls and leave.
2 Did you explain to your law partners who ha was and
what he was doing?
A ny law partners know Hr . Fischer.
2 Here they aware that you had any kind of business
relationship with Mr. Fischer at the tima ha was coming in
and using your ofiica?
A Probably not.
2 Can you tall ma. give ma an estimate of the number
of billable hours you reported to your firm in 1986.
calendar 1986?
A Ho.
2 Was it over 2,000?
A I doubt it. but it was probably around there. Ky
billable hours have been pretty consistent.
2 In the neighborhood of 2.000 hours?
A I think so. but I would have to go back and take a
look.
. \
2 During the first quarter of 1986, whan I believe
0^CLS3S^^"?tJ
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name: HIR2,2002 U Nd ASS ^ H^ ^ 0 P»" '57
38U7 iLou said your activity on bahali oi Mr. Channall's
38148 organization was most intansa--it would b« January. February,
3849 Harch of 1986 — did tha billabla tina you wera reporting to
3850 your firm drop at all?
385 1 A I don't baliava so. I would naed to go chack thosa
3852 records to give you a specific answer, but I was spending
3853 most evenings working on this with Hr . Fischer, and I was
3854 spending weekend tine working on it, and as I described in
3855 the answer to Mr. Fryman's questions, I was doing my best.
3856 I believe I accomplished the end, the goal, of not having it
3857 interfere with my activities on behalf of the law firm.
3858 e Did you have any other business ventures during
3859 that first quarter of 1986 that required any of your time?
3860 A nicrogravity may have been active fox me at the
3861 beginning of 1986, but I don't remember. That is a
3862 possibility, as well as Combs, which were both separate
3863 ventures. I didn't spend an extraordinary amount of time on
386'4 either of those matters.
3865 Those are the only two business matters I can think
3866 of.
3867 fi Can you tell me what your approximate gross
3868 receipts were from the Hicrogravity project?
3869 A ny personal receipts from that were about 46,000.
3870 Q And as far as Combs is concerned?
387 1 A About 5,000-6,000 approximately.
543
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HIR212002 Wll Vlt>ir^'^'«^E2 t'^^'ijl PAGE 158
Q What col*, if any, did you hava in setting up
itaatings ioc Ms. Channall and/or his contcibutocs at tha
Uhita Housa?
A I knau that thay uaza intandad . I discussad than
with Mr. Fischar, with Ht . Hillac, occasionally with Mr.
Channell, and pachaps He. Conzad. Ha talkad about all oi.
tha things you would ocdinacily talk about in satting up
thosa typas oi naatings, about tilling, about claacanca
pcoceducas, about datas, thosa typas oi things. I had no
dicact contact with tha Hhita Housa.
S That was going to ba ay naxt quastlon.
Did you spaaK with oc communicata with anyona at
tha Whita Housa dizactly?
A Ko, sic.
Q He. Fischac handlad that and of it?
A Yas, sir.
2 Tha scheduling .
Did you assist in pcapazing any wcittan
descriptions oi He. Channall 's ocganizatlons oc his
contcibutocs ior submission to tha Hhite House?
A I believe I worked with He. Fischec in the
preparation of a itaaocandum ha sent to Chief of Staff Regan.
2 And that namocanduB desccibed. did it not, NEPL and
tha Amecican Consecvative Trust and their actlvitia!
IS
. \
that fair to say]
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3897 -. A I have not saan that maaoEandum pcobably for ovat a
3898 yaaz, but I would guass that that's probably what was in tha
3899 mano.
3900 e In January of 1986 uara you awara that Hr . Channall
390 1 and his organizations wara raising nonay for diract
3902 assistance to tha contras, that is. monay to ba givan or
3903 passad along through intaritadiarias to tha contras?
39014 A Ho.
3905 C What did you understand?
3906 A Wa understood their role to ba a aadla-oriented
3907 role. Ha knew they were doing coaaercials. They were
3908 planning to do mora conmarcials . They were supporting the
3909 Administration policies in that respect. That is a fairly
3910 expansive way to go.
3911 I also — although I never was franKly real familiar
3912 with exactly how this was done. I knew that they were
39 13 providing humanitarian aid, or believed they were, for tha
39 1(4 Hicaraguans.
3915 e Can you elaborate on how you knew they ware
39 16 providing humanitarian aid?
39 17 A I read the formal packages that had been prepared
39 18 on behalf of NZPL prior to Hr . Fischer and I beginning our
39 19 consulting relationship with Hz. Miller.
3920 I was certainly present at meetings where NEPL was
3921 discussed, and these programs were discussed.
!^5 "SSIkO
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PAGE 160
As I say, I don't hav« a spaclflc t«coll«ction of
any discussion of humanitarian aid. All of my lacollactions
go to madia campaigns. That was tha principal part of tha
conversation .
2 But you war* awara at laast on* facat of thair
activities was raising monay for tha supply of humanitarian
aid to tha contras?
A I beliava so. Had I baan askad at that tima, X
probably would hava raspondad that way.
e Do you racall whathar tha mamorandum you halpad
prapara for submission to Ht . Ragan includad any rafaranca
to that aspact of HCPL's activitiai?
A I don't. I'm soxzy.
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PAGE 161
WIS HAZUR
DCMN BANNAK
14: IS
BY HR. ncGOUGH:
2 Do you recall anyone aver making a conscious
decision not to mention that appearance of HEPl's activity
at the White House?
A Ko.
2 Were you at all — involved at all in setting up
meetings with Charles Wick?
A Mo.
e How about with Attorney General Heese?
A In setting up that meeting.
2 In setting up the meeting. I know we won't go to
attending it.
A Mo.
2 You weren't the contactor involved in that?
A No. I don't believe so.
2 You were present, however, at a meeting with
Attorney General Meesej is that correct?
A That is correct.
e Can you describe what that meeting was about?
A That was a meeting attended by Dave Fischer,
Richard niller. Frank Gomez--I believe Frank Gomez was
there--flr. Channell and Hr . Conrad.
mwm
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3980
3981
3982
3983
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HIR212002 ^'^^^Iti^i^^ij'f^'g^j "GE 162
This was m connection with the Constitutional
Minutes program. They were trying to get organized. They
had already done some preliminary — produced some preliminary
paperwork on, I believe — certainly in the form of a
description--a proposal for it.
They were interested in advising the Attorney
General and his staff that they were planning to do this,
and the purpose of the meeting was to let them Know that and
to seek any kind of guidance or help that the Justice
Department might be able to lend in terms of recommending
constitutional scholars that might help draft these
television spots and that sort of thing.
fi Do you recall who set that meeting up?
A I believe Hr . Fischer set it up.
2 Let's jump, if we could, to January of '86, where
in the discussions about the upcoming briefing at the White
House for HEPL contributors, I believe you said that in
discussions--whethet late in '85 or early •86--someone brought
up the possibility oi such a brieiing and it sounded like a
terrific idea, and you and Hx . Fischer pitched in to help it
happen.
Is that a fair summary of what —
A That's correct.
2 During those discussions was there mention — did
anyone mention to you'that there had been earlier briefings
mmi
• ™ lo F-; «si
548
SS^FE9'- '"
NAHE: HIR212002
3985 at the White House?
3986 A As I indicated eailiez, X saw a — a folder.
3987 e Yes.
3988 A And in that folder, which had been provided to ma
3989 through Mr. Miller, he had received it iron Mr. Channell,
3990 I'm sure, or had prepared it for Hr . Channell with a stack
399 1 of letters, and the letters referenced meetings.
3992 There were letters commending Mr. Channell and his
3993 organization--meetings in the White House, and I had been
3991* advised either by Mr. Channell or by Mr. Miller, as I did
3995 Fischer, that they had had a series of meetings in the White
3996 House and that from this recollection that was substantiated
3997 in this packet of letters.
3998 S So is it fair to say when the idea of a briefing
3999 was discussed in late '85 or early '86, it wasn't a new
14000 idea; it was a variation on something they had done before?
400 1 Is that fair to say?
4002 A That's correct.
ii003 2 And what did you and Mr. Fischer bring to the
UOOU January briefing that was different in any way from what
4005 they had done before?
U006 A Hell, I don't know this for a fact, but I don't
U007 believe they had ever had a Cabinet Room briefing. Those
4008 are obviously difficult ,to arrange for a host of reasons.
4009 We discussed — precisely that, frankly, at the meeting, how
UNCLASSiF^ED
549
NAME: HIR212002 U 11 V i-WVl^':^ 2 J » iK; f V pj^j ,^4
4010 diificult that is to do, you knou, uhat would ba involvad,
40 11 uhat steps needed to be taken, the fact that we would need
40 12 to advise--iranediately advise the Chief of Staff and perhaps
4013 some people at the Kational Security Council--! don't
4014 remember who.
4015 But Dave and I, during the course of that meeting
4016 and afterwards at length f or--probably twenty occasions--
40 17 discussed it, and Dave went forward and we prepared the
40 18 memorandum to Hr . Regan.
4019 I know Dave spoke to Hr . Regan about this prior to
4020 that briefing and probably spoke to other people, although
4021 you have to ask him with who he spoke, and managed to get it
4022 approved and put on the schedule.
4023 2 You either stated or implied, I think, that it was
4024 in the course of discussing that Hhite House briefing that
4025 the idea of an appearance or meeting with President Reagan
4026 was first broached to you.
4027 Is that — am I correct or did I draw that correctly?
4028 A Ko, you're correct. That was the first time anyone
4029 had raised any kind of meeting or making the President
4030 available for any purpose.
403 1 fi Mhose idea was that? Do you recall?
4032 A You know, I don't. I don't remember who initiated
4033 it. We were kind of having a strategy session around the
4034 table and talking about the future of NEPL and what Hr .
UNCLASSIFSB
550
NAME :
U03S
M036
M037
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4054
4055
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4059
HCLASSIBEB »=. ■»
HIR212002
Channell hoped to acconplish. you know, getting soneone from
the Administration to voice directly to the donors that--you
know, this was a real important policy for the
Administration.
2 And I guess whenever it was voiced, everyone agreed
that would be a good idea, to have the President--
A Correct.
2 By that time you and Ht . Fischer had been on a
$20,000 a month retainer for a couple of months; is that
fair to say?
A For two weeks .
2 Two weeks .
A I believe. Approximately two weeks.
2 There came a point, did there not, when I think you
said the deal was renegotiated and--there was an agreement to
accelerate payments; is that fair to say?
A That's correct.
2 Can you be a little more specific about what the
payments--the new payment structure was to be?
A Hell, I can--the best I can tell you is this. The
payment structure--af ter the first arrangement which set
forth the »20,000 a month, «20,000 a month payment stayed in
a state of flux for as long as I was a direct participant in
any of those discussions.
. -i
By mid to the third week oi January it was clear
UNCLASSIFlED
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J^t ?! JS ri ^
NAME
14060
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4063
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HIR212002 UllljI_*Br;a^5g^-'.^^j- PAGE 166
that Dave Fischer was spending virtually full tine on behalf
of IBC. X was spending a lot more time than I ever dreaned
I would be spending on it, and Dave and I--to each other, and
I'm sure to Rich Miller--indicated this uas not anticipated,
that the fee structure would have to change and it would
have to be increased and indeed, as I've expressed earlier,
that both Dave and I were concerned about the fact this
would just stop as suddenly as it started, so we thought it
was wise to get an advance payment so we were not behind a
curve .
Q Do you recall striking an agreement at that time to
accelerate payments so that *280,000 would be paid over the
course of the next four months?
A No.
2 Uas there ever any agreement to that •ffect--I'm not
saying that was what the payment stxuctuze uas. but do you
ever recall striking that agreement?
A No, I don't.
2 Do you ever recall--do you recall what the
accelerated payment schedule was to be?
A Z don't think there was ever a specific agreement
about it. I— I know that Mr. Millar , at least at the
beginning, although I--at some point was not again directly
involved in these conversations--Has very amenable to the
re<iuest for acceleration of payments.
552
NAME
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4087
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i40e
4090
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4092
4093
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4095
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4097
4098
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410 1
4102
4103
4104
4105
4106
4107
4108
4109
k^l^ita^i^^iiLi'aiLi^ pjoE ,67
2 But let's get a little bit mora specific. Hhat
were you asking for as far as--I nean acceleration can mean a
lot of things. Hhat uas your proposal to remake the
contract ?
You had an oral agreement to take «20,000 a month
over 24 months. Uhat did you propose as an alternative in
January of '86?
A Two things happened at that point. One was first
the acceleration, and the number that Dave and I came up
with was »50,000 in terms of give us an accelerated payment
at the end of January or February, get ahead of us a little
bit, give us a check for 450,000.
S One S50,000 accelerated payment?
A Yeah. I don't remember if there was another check
during the course of the year for 450,000.
e I'm just talking about the proposal at this point.
I understand the deal continued to evolve as time went on,
but what I'm trying to do is get a snapshot of what the deal
was in January of '86.
A You've got the snapshot.
2 And what is that?
A The snapshot is that we asked for an accelerated
payment, an accelerated payment In the form of an amount
over and above the «20,q00 to be paid at the end of January,
the beginning of February, and advised Rich Miller that to
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSlnE
M>*GE 16£
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41 16
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the extent that the dedication of tim« was going to even
approximate what had happened m the first month of this
agreement, that--nurabe r s will have to be renegotiated out.
e I understand that.
Now, the payment that you wanted at the end of
January or early February was »50,000; is that correct?
A That's correct.
e Did you discuss any future--any other acceleration
at that time? Did you look beyond--for accelerated payments
beyond late January or early February?
A I don't believe ue did. If we did, I certainly
don't recall the conversation along those lines.
2 So you don't recall agreeing to essentially
compress the «280,000 over a four-month period?
A Mo.
2 Do you recall Hr . Hiller or--do you recall either
hearing from Hr . Channell or Hr . Hiller relaying to you any
requests by Hr . Channel! for — or any conditions by Hr .
Channell on that acceleration, anything you would have to do
for him?
A I'm not sure I understand your question.
2 Did Hr. Channell ask for anything in addition
to--anything in exchange for the accelerated payment?
A Ho. First of all, the question is not really
answerable because Hr . Channell was not the person with whom
UNCLASSil-?©
554
UNCLA3Sy';ED
MAKE: HIR212002 «J IV «# kri«^«#' M M ■ Aa W pAGC 169
4 135 vre had the financial atrangenent . It was Ht . Hillet.
4136 2 I understand that. But it is answerable in the
4137 sense that did Mr. Channell express to you, either directly
4138 or through Mr. Miller, a desire for anything in exchange for
4139 agreeing to concur in acceleration of payment?
4 140 A By concurring you nean that he was--he was making
4141 payment to Mr. Miller?
4 142 Q That's the explicit assumption, that Mr. Miller was
4 143 not the one bearing the payments.
4144 A I guess the answer is I don't Know if there were
4145 any conditions put forward.
4 146 I know that Mr. Channell certainly for the fir«t
4 147 several months and I believe thereafter was delighted with
4 148 the services he was getting, both from IBC and from the
4149 additional input of Mr. Fischer and myself, and I believe
4 150 was getting what he wanted from IBC.
4 15 1 fi Did Mr. Miller ever coma back to you and ask for
4 152 any additional effort or any additional commitments in
4153 exchange for the accelerated payment of «50,000?
4154 A Well. I'll be perfectly honest with you--and I'm not
4155 trying to not answer this question; I just don't understand
4 156 it. Mr. Hiller--the reason the accelerated payment came up
4 157 in the first place was because Mr. Miller kept asking for
4 158 more and more and more and more in terms of time and energy
4 159 and devotion to his business, and as a consequence of that
Q^^-r'p.r"'"^
555
HIR212002
m^mm
JJ PAGE 170
NAME
UUO ue said hey, why don't you guys get ahead of us on this and
U161 why don't you rethink these numbers because it's not going
14162 to uoik at 420.000 a month. I said this isn't the deal ue
U163 cut. this isn't the way we uant to proceed.
4164 Mr. Miller continued to ask ior lots and lots of
>4165 things over the course of the entire relationship. That's
14166 the best ansuer I can give you.
U167 2 Did you discuss scheduling presidential meetings
14168 with Mr. Miller?
14169 A Yes.
14170 fi Your ability to do that?
14171 A Our efforts to do that, sure.
4172 2 Or efforts to do that.
14173 Did you discuss the scheduling of those meetings in
141714 conjunction with the acceleration of payments?
14175 A No.
14 176 2 Old Mr. Miller ever come back to you and ask you
m?? prior--strike that; start again.
14178 Prior to agreeing to accelezata payments, did Mr.
m79 Miller come back to you and inquire as to youz ability to
U180 schedule four presidential meetings over the next four
14181 months?
m82 A You know, I don't even think I oan answer the
14183 question, and I'll tell you why. Hhen we sat down at a
UISM table with Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller and perhaps Frank
UNCLASS^P^B
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4187
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4 19 1
4 192
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4206
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HIR212002 UlQSj'L«%l^2/aik»E>PAGE 171
&«mez and myself, and we're going ovec all oi these things,
ue may have covered five or six subjects at the same
meeting. In other words, Mr. Miller may have come to us and
said, you know, gee, can we do this three or four more
times, and that would be one segment of a conversation, and
also can ue do this, this, this, and that would be another
subject, and ue may have raised payments at the same meeting
in the course of the same two or three hours or the same
breakfast.
You know, in my mind certainly those things were
never tied together. They uere all components of the
relationship .
C But they uere certainly all discussed in the same
time frame?
A I'm sure that they were all discussed in the same
time frame, yeah.
2 And presidential meetings never even was raised as
a subject until January of 1986; is that right?
A That's the best of ay recollection. That's the
first time that surfaced.
2 And it was also January of 1986 when you and Mr.
Fischer requested an acceleration of your payments; is that
correct?
A That's correct.
2 And the amount of acceleration requested was an
mam
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ONCLASl'.iiiiiJ
HIR212002 fcflPMII'II SJ»"V.--. ■ ! • . , ,^ fxGt 172
additional fSCOOO payment for th« month of January; is that
correct?
A Yeah. I need to looK at the records. I don't knov
whether they paid us 20 plus 50 or whether they paid us 50
instead of 20. I don't know.
2 Do you recall which it was?
A I don't. I can look at the records and tell you.
2 Why don't you do that. Has it 20 plus 50 or was xi
50-
jounced .
MR. FRYMAN: This appears to be the check that
BY MR. McGOUGH:
2 So it appears to be the 20 plus 50?
A Yes. The 50 was an accelerated payment.
2 Let me put this as directly as I can, and I realize
we are talking about conversations that Here all occurring
at or about the same time.
Did Mr. Miller, in substance, ever come back to you
and say before I accelerate or agree to accelerate your
payments, Mr. Channell needs to know whether you and Mr.
Fischer feel that you can schedule four presidential
meetings over the course of the next four months?
A I honestly do not remember ever hearing that from
Mr. Miller.
2 Or anything to that effect?
ONCLflSSifED
558
NAME
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UNCLASSieED-
HIR212002 IBBWH.I M '^ "^ ,^ fii Li '-« '. -^p AGE 173
- A No. He had endless requests, endless requests from
Mr. Miller for the type of briefing ue set up and Hr .
Fischer set up in January, for more of those. And obviously
any time they can get the President at a function, what a
plus for Mr. Miller and for his client.
I don't--those were common conversations that ue had
regularly all of the time.
2 Do you ever recall him presenting it as four
presidential meetings in the space of four months?
A I don't remember. I mean, we talked about
different numbers of presidential meetings.
2 What numbers did you talk about?
A I have no idea. I don't recall whether we talked
about it--can we do two meetings in February, is it possible
to do three meetings the same month, you know, how far ahead
can ue schedule a meeting like this, how much notice do we
need to give somebody if we want to get them into
town--typical types of logistical questions and scheduling
questions you would ask ii you were undertaking that kind of
an assignment.
fi And these conversations — an I inferring correctly,
these conversations took place at or about the same time you
were discussing acceleration of your fee?
A He discussed t]>e acceleration of the fee in
January. If you're asking me whether we would call a
0NCLASS!F'^h9
559
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4260 meeting and say tha sole purpose of this nesting is to
4261 discuss this--
4262 e No. I understand that. I'm not that naive.
4263 A --that wasn't the case.
"^264 e Hy question is, were these matters being discussed
4265 in or around the same time frame? And the matters are, one,
4266 scheduling presidential meetings and in particular hou many
4267 presidential meetings can be discussed, and. number two,
4268 acceleration of payments under the consulting agreement.
4269 A I can tell you that--both of those things, both
4270 acceleration of payments and presidential meetings, were
427 1 discussed in our meetings.
4272 I would be misrepresenting the truth if I told you
4273 I had a specific recollection about both of those things
4274 being mentioned within the scope of a single meeting or
4275 within the scope of two hours.
4276 2 But they were both mentioned in January 1986?
4277 A Unquestionably.
4278 2 To your knowledge, does Hr . Fischer know Ron
4279 Piccini?
4280 A I have introduced them. sure.
4281 2 And on how many occasions? Are they^ just passing
4282 acquaintances or--
4283 A Just passing acquaintances. nz . Fischer probably
4284 met Hr . Piccini at my house on a weekend.
MCLASS§FED
560
NAHE^ HIR212002
4285 -. MR. McGOUGH: I think that is all I have.
4286 HR. OLIVER: I will try to be brief. I just wanted
4287 to ask a feu questions relating to some of the answers you
1288 gave to Mr. Fryman, to clarify soite matters.
M289 BY MR. OLIVER:
4290 • 2 You said that you gave political advice to IBC, as
1*29 1 well as business advice and advice on projects and that sort
U292 of thing; is that correct?
4293 A That's generally correct.
42914 2 Is your political experience limited to the two
■4295 Reagan campaigns for president?
4296 A Hy--in terms of my acting in a full-time capacity,
4297 yes. *
4298 2 Were you considered an insider in the Reagan
U299 campaign because of your early activities and your longevity
14300 with the campaign?
430 1 A An insider meaning what? I'm not sure.
4302 2 I mean someone who is on the inner circle of the
•4303 campaign. You mentioned there were 7 = 30 meetings and you
43014 were one of the people who attended those meetings on a
M305 regular basis.
4306 A I certainly had relationships with several senior
4307 people around Mr. Reagan, had bean around myself since 1976
4308 and was fortunate enougl) to have been included in those 7:30
4309 meetings. So if that's the definition of an insider.
lillOLASSiiS
561
UNCLASSiFiED -- '
NAHE: HIR212002
4310 somebody in an inside circle. I uas that.
4311 2 You've indicated that you uere ask*d by Hr . Tyson
4312 or nr . Meese to come up from San Diego to set up a national
4313 advance organization; is that correct?
4314 A Right.
4315 2 Was that at the beginning of the 1980 campaign?
4316 A Yes.
4317 2 So that really would have been in 1979.
4318 A I'm not sure of the date. Could have been '79.
4319 2 Well, it uas before Hr . Reagan announced for
4320 president; is that correct? I aean. there would have been
4321 an exploratory period and a lot of things building up to the
4322 announcement of his campaign.
4323 A I tell you. I don't know the date. I don't know--it
4324 uas very early on. We did not have a national advance team
4325 put together.
4326 2 Did you travel on some of these advanced activities
4327 yourself?
4328 A I think only on one or tuo until a pre-conwention .
4329 I remember one trip to Denver.
4330 2 Did you ever go to Iowa?
4331 A This is in 1979. '80?
4332 2 1980 Iowa caucus would have been held.
4333 A I don't think so.
4334 2 But you remember the Iowa caucus in which Hr . Bush
UNCLASSlf'D
562
UNCLASSIFIED -
AGE 177
NAME: HIR212002
M335 defeated Mr. Reagan. That was a traumatic moment for the
U336 campaign.
4337 A Yes.
14338 I don't believe I Was there.
14339 2 But you were full time on the campaign at that
143140 point?
>43U1 A I believe so, but I need to check the dates here to
'43'42 make sure I'm right about this, because I might have--
i43<43 2 Did you ever go to New Hampshire?
4344 A Mo.
4345 2 You uere full time in the campaign by the time of
4346 the New Hampshire primary, when Hr . Reagan won that primary?
4347 A I believe so.
4348 2 Isn't it the case that right about the time in the
4349 New Hampshire primary that Mr. Sears was fired and Hr . Casey
4350 was named as campaign raanager--
4351 A That's correct.
4352 2 So that would have been Hatch of 1980. Then full
4353 time m the campaign from then until November 4th; is that
4354 correct?
4355 A That's correct.
4356 2 When you came to Washington in--after the convention
4357 in Detroit, you indicated that you were the deputy director
4358 for logistics and scheduling: is that correct?
4359 -A I think my title was deputy director in scheduling
ONCLASSfP^f}
563
UNCLAS3iP»tD
NAME: HIR212002 V II V kFl^^^' ■ ■ UP-*-' PAGE 17£
14360 advance operations.
14361 Q Who asked you to take over that job?
4362 A Mr. Tyson.
(4363 e Mas It also Mc . Tyson who asked you to be the head
U36U of logistics for the convention in Detroit?
4365 A Yes.
4366 e You also indicated that you had brought a debate
4367 consultant from Virginia into the caapaign; is that correct?
4368 A Although I'm not sure that Hr . Miles Hartel uas
4369 from Virginia. I'm not sure where he was from.
4370 2 Why were you bringing a debate consultant into the
4371 campaign?
4372 A I was just--was a matter of interest to me. I was
4373 concerned that we get an early start, a head start on the
4374 debates, and everybody was real busy and didn't have tine to
4375 focus on it, and I took it on myself to start looking into
4376 it and had an opportunity to have discussions with some
4377 people I consider to be knowledgeable and they, among other
4378 things, recommended Hr . Hartel, and I then looked into his
4379 credentials and was impressed and made the recommendation.
4380 It was out of my role.
4381 2 And you said you went to Bill Timmonds and Stu
4382 Spencer regarding that debate?
4383 A That's correct,
4384 e And the purpose oi that was to persuade them that
UNGLASSi?:D
564
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME- HIR212002 ~ - ^ b^ VXGt 17<
4385 something needed to be done about debate prepaiat ion?
U386 A They had two purposes. One was I wanted to get a
4387 response from Bill Tiramonds and Mr. Spencer to see if they
4388 agree with my assessment that this was a good time to get
4389 started.
4390 I wanted to let them know what I had collected and
439 1 got done already and was trying to enlist them to spearhead
4392 this, because I alone couldn't havai catalyzed an early
4393 operation, debate operation, and I think I was partially
4394 successful.
4395 2 And you said earlier you remember two important
4396 meetings with Bill Casey, one of which he called you and
4397 asked you to come up and talk about the debate.
4398 A They were important to me because I remember them.
4399 The first meeting was one in which I guess after
4400 either Bill Timmonds or Stu Spencer called Hr . Casey and
440 1 told him that--discussed the debates and said Marty Artiano
4402 has collected all this stuff and he's interested, and Mr.
4403 Casey called me up to his office to eKplote it with ma, aird
4404 he said who have you spoken to and all, and I shared it with
4405 him, and, okay, okay, fine, I'll address this meeting, and
4406 so it was immediately out of my hands.
4407 It became a meeting that Mr. Casey and Jim Bakar--
4408 2 What were thos* matetials you collected?
4409 A Materials of public record, briefing books that had
UNCLASSIFIED
565
UNCLASSIFiED
NAME: HIR212002 —-- — —--— p^j.^. ,gg
Umo been prepared, for example, for President Ford that are now
414 11 at the library. I believe I even had sons from Mr. Carter's
UU12 campaign in '76. Different periodicals that I had
UU13 researched.
4414 e Did you have any briefing material that was
4415 prepared for Mr. Carter's 1980 campaign?
4416 A No.
4417 2 Were you aware of the briefing materials from Mr.
4418 Carter's campaign that came into the possession of Mr.
4419 Casey?
4420 A No.
4421 B You didn't read about that?
4422 A Well, I mean I was aware after the fact.
4423 e But you didn't know anything about it at that time?
4424 A No.
4425 2 You said that Bill Timmonds had introduced you to
4426 Elliott Abrams, to your recollection?
4427 A I think that's possible, yeah.
4428 Q That was during the campaign?
4429 A I think so.
4430 2 Has Kr . Abrams involved in the campaign?
443 1 A You know, I haven't spoken a lot to Mr. Abrams
4432 about that, ironically. I think that — I believe he was
4433 helping us in one of the campaign areas at the time, and I
4434 can't even remember what> whether he was working on the
UNCUSSlF'tD
566
UNCLASSiFBED
NAME: HIR212002 w ■■ w —■■■«»■ ^^ ■ ■ ■ ■■ air pjcg ,3,
MUaS Jewish vote or what exactly he was doing. But I know that
U1436 he had volunteered his services and was doing everything he
41437 could, and Hr . Timmonds thought highly of him.
uuas e He was a Democrat at that time, wasn't ha?
41439 A This was after his change of heart.
MUUO 2 You couldn't remember all of the names of the
UUUl people who were on the transition team Ed Folder and Frank
U14U2 Shakespeare headed. Uas Ken Adleman on that team?
'4'4'43 A Mr. Adleman might have been but I don't recall.
uyuM I should, :ust for purposes of putting this in
MMMS perspective, let you know when I got to Washington I
UUUS couldn't find my way from election headquarters to the White
(4(41(7 House. These names didn't mean much to me and I was kind of
1414148 scrambling around on my own.
1414149 2 You said that in late November or early December
MMSO 1985 you got a call from Rich Killer indicating that he
141451 needed some help with his organization and that they wanted
UUS2 a high-level fellow with Washington experience.
141453 Would you consider yourself someone with Washington
144514 experience of the kind that he needed at that point?
141455 A I think I probably--i£ you evaluate my experience
14456 and credentials, they fit soma of the criteria that he was
4457 looking for.
4458 2 And had Dave Fj.sch«t had any Washington experience
4459 before he came to the White House to work as a personal
UNCLASSIFIED
567
unclassif:cD
KAHE: HIR212002 »» - - w — p^^j ,33
UI460 assistant to the President?
446 1 A Not to ny knowledge.
4462 2 Had he been involved in any Washington activities
UU&B oc politics or Governnent besides that job?
MMSM A He had been involved, I believe, with Senator Hatch
141465 prior to--I believe with Hr . Hatch, but I'm not sure. He had
141466 some political experience prior to 197S, prior to l975--prior
141467 to hooking on with Mr. Reagan, or between '76 and '79,
141468 although I think the former is correct.
141469 2 So you felt that the experience that you and Dave
141470 Fischer had had in Washington fit the bill for what Rich
141471 Hanna wanted?
41472 A I think the cumulation of our exper ience--you know,
141473 when you're handling scheduling in advance for the President
144714 of the United States, you're an image-maker.
141475 The answer is yes.
141476 S Did you--how soon after you talked to Mr. niller did
141*77 you and Hr . Fischer meet with Hr . Channell and Mr. Conrad
14478 and Hr . Miller?
4479 A I can't tell you exactly. It was shortly
4480 thereafter, within a couple of weeks, I would guess.
4481 2 So it was in December of 1985?
4482 A Yes, I believe it was in December of 1985.
4483 2 And at that meeting did you discuss the
4484 arrangements for you services?
UNCLASSIFPEO
568
NAHE
MM85
UU86
4487
14U90
l4U9 1
UU92
4493
44914
4495
4496
4497
4498
4499
4500
4501
4502
4503
4504
4505
4506
4507
4508
4509
HIR212002
UNCLASSIHt.},.. ,
83
A At a meeting uith Mr. Fischer present and Mr.
Channell present?
2 Yes.
A I don't recall. Wouldn't surprise me if we did.
Our negotiations were with Mr. Miller.
Q They were not with Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad
present at a meeting?
A No. As I said, they may very well have been
present at those initial discussions.
2 And did you discuss directly uith Channell and
Conrad what the arrangements would be, what services you
were going to provide?
A Uell, you know, the services we were going to
provide were as I've described them. There was never any
question in anybody's raind , from start to finish, that Mr.
Fischer and I were going to be working for IBC.
We also were made aware very early on that Mr.
Channell's organizations were a big client of IBC and the
thing needed the first thrust h«ie.
2 Well, isn't it a fact, Mr. Artiano, that the exact
amounts of money that were paid to you by IBC were paid to
them by Spitz Channell?
A I will give you a specific answer to that question.
Answer number Qne , I have no idea, none, how much
money was paid from Mr. Channell or any of his organizations
liNCLASSIFJB
569
UNCLASSIFSED.
NAME^ HIR212002 w ■ ■ w ■■■ B^r %# ■ ■ Mkb/pAGE ISU
4510 or anybody elsa, or any other client, to IBC. I have never
USll looked or had access to any of the books of all those
4512 organizations.
^SIS Huraber two, wouldn't surprise me at all if Hr .
MS14 Miller, to fund this obligation to Mr. Fischer and I which
■45 15 he had undertaken and which w« pzoc««d«d on in good faith
4516 without a written agreement, was funded in large part--and
4517 perhaps getting into a hole--by Mr. Channell . I don't know
4518 that to be a fact; I was not present in those discussions.
4519 2 Well, the reason I was asking questions about
4520 whether Mr. Channell and Hz. Conrad were present with you
452 1 and Mr. Fischer and Mr. Miller when you were discussing your
4522 services would be to--if your contract was with IBC, why
4523 would Mr. Channell and Mr. Conrad be present at those
4524 negotiations?
4525 A If Mr. Miller chose to discuss that matter in front
4526 of one of his clients, it frankly didn't concern Mr. Fischer
4527 and I.
4528 2 You ware not aware that ISC was billing Mr.
4529 Channell for the fees, exact amounts of fees that you and
4530 Dave Fischer were receiving?
4531 A Ho.
4532 Q You were never made aware of that?
4533 A No. But as I have indicat«d--no .
4534 S And you had nothing in writing with IBC, no
UNCLASSIFSED
570
UNCLASSIFSED.. ,.
NAME: HIR212002
U53S contract, no letters of agreement of any kind.
M536 MR. riEEHAN: Describe that. August, June or July
U537 letter of 1976.
H538 MR. OLIVER: I'm talking about prior to that time,
U539 December, January, February period.
US40 THE UITNESS: Ho, sir.
45141 BY MR. OLIVER:
45142 2 Did It concern you or Hr . Fischer that you didn't
4543 have some kind of an agreement because you wanted a long-
4544 term arrangement, not 3ust something that would be cut off?
4545 Did you ever ask for something in writing?
4546 A No, sir.
45"7 2 Was the lunch that you arranged with Elliott
4548 Abrams--did that take place on or about January 6, 1986?
4549 A I don't know, and I'd be surprised if it occurred
4550 that early, but it may have.
4551 MR. MEEHAN: Is it on the calendar?
4552 MR. OLIVER: i don't know if it is on his calendar
4553 or not.
4554 BY MR. OLIVER:
4555 2 Here you aware at tha tine of the luncheon that Mr.
4556 Fischer had begun to tzy to mak« arrangements with the White
4557 House for a briefing for Spitz Channell's organizations?
4558 A I don't remember the time frame so I can't give you
4559 an answer to that question.
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571
UNCLASSiFlLD
NAME HIR212002 UllVkn^^ll B k 1^ PAGE 18(
I4S60 ". I think I was auar«--uhenever Mr. Fischer had
4561 started that, attempting to get that accomplished, I uas
U562 aware of it.
US63 e Was there a discussion at that luncheon of the
MSe^ Central American Freedom Program?
MS6S A Of NEPL's program.
14566 2 Essentially what they call tha Central American
4567 Freedom Program.
US68 A As I indicated, Hr . Channell went through all of
M569 his organizations and activities.
11570 2 Did they shou story boards of the ads to Hr . Abrams
457 1 at that luncheon with text and so on?
4572 A You know, I don't recall. I honestly don't recall
4573 the luncheon that uell . I mean, I recall being there and I
4574 recall Mr. Channell did most of the talking, and it's
4575 possible that they had some paperwork or story boards, but I
4576 don't remember it. I'm sorry.
4577 2 Were you aware that one of Hr . Channell's projects,
4578 the one that I described as Central American Freedom
4579 Program, was directed toward influencing the congressional
4580 vote on aid to the contras?
4581 A My understanding of what Hr . Channell was trying to
4582 do was to raise grassroots support for the President's
4583 program through his med^a campaign.
4584 2 Was there ever any discussion in your presence of
UNCLASSIFIED
572
NAHE
4585
4586
4587
4588
14589
14590
<4591
4592
U593
1459U
"4595
(4596
M597
4598
4599
4600
4601
4602
4603
4604
4605
4606
4607
4608
4609
HIR2 12002
UNCLASSIFIED.
GE 187
itinning those ads in particular congrassional districts?
k I renenber being around, although I didn't--!
rereeraber discussions about where certain ads should run anc
about demographics. That uas less my area oi expertise, s<
I don't have real strong recollection about any of that.
S Do you know a woman named Eddie Frazier?
A No, sir.
2 Did you ever meet her?
A li I did, didn't strike me, I guess, because I
don't remember the name.
2 Jack Lichtenstein?
Drawing a blank.
Bruce Camran?
Ho, sir.
Penn Kimble?
I don't believe so.
Did you ever attend any meetings in Rich Miller's
office to discuss strategy on the vote that was to take
place in the Congress on contra aid?
A To discuss strategy on the vote? I don't--! don't
know. ! mean, we talked about the vote all the time. While
it was immediately before the vote, it was a matter of
concern to us, obviously. We were hoping that it was going
to go forward and ! don't remember having a strategy meeting
about it.
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14610
161 1
M6 12
U613
uem
4615
U616
46 17
4618
4619
4620
4621
4622
4623
4624
462S
4626
4627
4628
4629
4630
4631
4632
4633
4634
e Who did you discuss that uxth?
A Oh, with Dave, with Rich. It was obviously a
matter that ue were interested m.
2 Do you know Dan Kuykendall?
A I don't. I don't think I know hin . I know the
name but I don't think I know hin.
2 These papers and brochures that you said you
reviewed or helped prepare for IBC, did you retain any
copies of those?
A Ho . I had--the answer is no. I had--what I had at
i»y house--when Dave moved out of my house into his house,
kind of packed up everything, and I would guess that what
wasn't packed up I tossed.
2 When was that? Whan did Dave —
A January.
2 January of this year?
A December or January, yeah. December of '86 or
January of '87 — yeah.
2 That's your recollection, you threw those materials
away?
A I don't have any recollection. If there was
anything left after Dave moved out, it is not there now,
because I've taken a look.
2 Did you say that Hr . Fischer came to Washington
every week during 1987?
UNCLASSfF^Ef)
574
UNCLASSIFSEa.
HAHE: HIR212002 '^ ■ ■ W fcrM^#%#i i I^^^AGE 189
i«635 ~. A I would guess 95 peicant of tha tin*.
14636 e Has h« still enployed in Utah at that tin*?
4637 A No. Ha had soma kind of axrangamant, but ha was
K638 not enployad with Hudson Chemical at that point. He may
(4639 have had soma continuing relationship aitaiwaids .
146U0 e Hhy was — at tha meeting which you attangad in
U6>41 Elliott Abzams' office, why was Elliott Abrams upset with
U6(42 Spitz Channall?
i<6'43 A You Know, because he was very excited and wouldn't
(46t4i4 let anybody else gat a word in edgewise and was kind of not
M6M5 listening to an attempt to answer him. It was--
i46<46 fi Has there a discussion at tha luncheon which took
>46<47 place in January of--of tha arrangements for a meeting in th<
<46<48 White House later on that month, the meeting with Abrams and
146U9 Fischer and you and Killer and Channall?
(4650 A Could you repeat tha question? I'm sorry.
(465 1 2 You arranged a lunchaon with Elliott Abrams for
(4652 Spitz Channell attended by you and David Fischer, Elliott
M653 Abrams. Rich Hiller.
1465(4 Has there a discussion at that luncheon about the
U655 pzospectiva Hhlta House meeting?
(4656 A I have no recollection. I'm sorry.
(4657 Q Has there a discussion there about Hr . Abrams'
(4658 participation in such a White House briefing?
(4659 A I also don't recall that.
UNCLASS!F:E3
575
H»«E: HIR212002
OHOLASS^FiED .
GE 190
•4660 2 Did you have any discussion with Rich Wilier or
U66 1 Spitz Channell in December or January this year about your
4662 arrangements with them during the prior year for financial
4663 payments to you and Fischer?
•^een A I'm sorry, repeat the question.
"^665 . . 2 Did you have any discussions with Spitz Channell or
•4666 Rich Miller in December of 1986 or January of 1987 about the
•4667 financial arrangements which had been made for you and David
U668 Fischer with them during 1986?
■♦669 A Well, unless I*m--unless I've blocked something out
'4670 of ray mind, I haven't seen — didn't see Mr. Channell at all in
4671 that time period.
4672 2 What about Rich Miller?
^673 A I don't know. I certainly must have spoken to hire
46714 during that time period. I don't know — that I had any
4675 specific discussion about the financial arrangement?
4676 2 Yes.
4677 A Between IBC and Fischer and myself?
'*678 2 Yes. Were you aware that Rich Miller had been
4679 asked by Spitz Channell to reconstruct the relationship
4680 between IBC and Spitz Channell's organization in relation to
4681 what the money they had given them had been spent for?
4682 A Mo.
■^SSa 2 Did you have a,^ discussion with Rich Miller about
4684 the payments to you from IBC in January of 1987, about the
UNClflsqjrTn
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UNCLASSIFIED
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U68S
4686
M687
>«688
>4689
U690
1*691
14692
U693
46914
14695
U696
14697
(4698
14699
4700
14701
14702
14703
I470U
14705
U706
4707
14708
14709
previous payitants?
A I guess ray best ansuer to that is I certainly spoke
to Rich--I'ii sure I spoke to Rich during that period of tme .
I don't even know if that uas the subject of the
conversation. If it was, I don't recall it.
MR. OLIVER: Thank you very nuch. I have no
further questions.
MR. BUCK: I have a few short questions for you,
Mr. Artiano.
BY MR. BUCK:
fi To the best of your knowledge, did anyone in the
Uhite House, any employees in the White House, including the
President himself, receive any money from Mr. Miller's
organizations--Mr . Miller or his organizations, Mr. Channell
or his organizations, yourself and Mr. rischer--for the
meetings that were set up with these private contributors?
A Absolutely not.
fi Do you know any reason why Hr . Channell would
believe that he was paying Hr . Hlllaz «50,000 for you or Hr .
Fischer or Hz. Hlller to set up meetings within the White
House?
A As I Indicated, I don't — I don't have any--never had
any access to their books and didn't know what their
financial relationship i^as . But, you know, it would not
surprise ■• if Hz. Millez weze Baking requests so that he
UNCLASSIFED
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4710
471 1
47 12
47 13
47 14
4715
47 16
4717
4718
47 19
4720
4721
4722
4723
4724
4725
4726
4727
4728
4729
4730
4731
4732
4733
4734
HIR212002
UNCLASS1F!ED.„
192
eould get funded at IBC to honor his obligations to Mr.
rischar and to ma .
2 Did you considar Mr. Channall poiitically naiva
when you--b«ior« that January naating uhan you had to discuss
with hin tha fact that you uara not arranging naatings with
tha President ior a sat anount oi money?
A Restate the question. I'm sorry.
MR. MEEHAN: I think tha meeting was not in
January, but if you just refer to • • the meeting'* without a
time frame--
HR. BUCK: Okay.
BY MR. BUCK:
2 I guess what I am trying to understand is why Mr.
Channell had this belief that you had to dispel at the
meeting, and if it wasn't anything you told him or anything
that Mr. Fischer told him or that you knew that Mr. Fischer
told him, was it just because he didn't understand how
things worked?
A I suppose it was a misunderstanding of the
relationship. As has been indicated, the relationship was
n*ver formalized in terms of putting it in writing. It was
oonstantly in a state of flux. There were continued
discussions and negotiations about it, the timing of
payment, amount of payment, and I guess it was--the generous
explanation is that there was just misunderstanding. But
UNCLASSIF"P3
82-690 O-88-20
578
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR212002 Vll VLfl V Vl I I LL7 '^^^ ^'^
*473S th*ra was no misundatstanding by myself or Hr . rischar, and
4736 I trust not by Mr. KilKr •itK«r.
14737 2 Okay.
4738 Did you raad a Kaw York Tinas articla on July 30th,^
4739 1987, on paga 10 of tha Kau York Tinas, writtan by Richard
4740 L. Barka?
4741 A I'm sorry to say that I did.
4742 e Tha sourcas idantifiad in this articla ara your
4743 lauyar and othar officials, and I baliava uhan it rafars to
4744 your lauyar. it is actually rafarring to a law partnar of
4745 yours.
4746 A That's corract.
4747 e And I'd lika to raad a statamant hara and gat youc
4748 raaction to it.
4749 Hidway down tha first column it says. Hr . Artiano
4750 and Hr . Fischar aach racaivad about «300.000 last yaar for
4751 arranging maatlngs batMaan tha Prasidant and waalthy
4752 consarvativa donors, tha officials said.
4753 first of all, lat ■• ask you. is that statamant
4754 corxact?
4755 A Ko.
4756 a Saoond of all, did you tall Hr . Barka anything that
4757 would laad him — that would giva him information to writa
4758 that? ^
4759 A No. Z rafusad to spaak to Ht. Barka whan ha triad
UNCIASSIREO
579
NAME:
4760
476
4762
4763
4764
476S
4766
4767
476
4769
4770
477 1
4772
4773
4774
4775
4776
4777
4778
4779
4780
4781
4782
HIR212002
to reach na .
UNCLASSIFSED
PAGE 194
2 Hava you talked to yovi law vartimi thai did spaak
to him on this subject?
A Yas, I hava.
2 Is it your undatstanding that your law partnat gava
Mr. Barka any inioraatlon that would allow him to writa
something lika this?
A Absolutely not.
2 Do you hava any suspicions as to where that
information may have come from, if you or your law partner
did not tell this reporter that information?
A I have--! don't have a firm enough idea of where it
came from to want to accuse somebody of doing something like
that. We regret it and, as nr . Heehan indicated, I hope it
doesn't happen again.
MR. BUCK: X have no more questions.
HR. MEEHAK: He did get through.
NX. FXYMAN: Yes.
He will conclude the deposition at this point, in
accordance with the understanding that was stated earlier
katween Hz. Heehan and me.
(Hheraupon. at 5:<tO p.m. the deposition was
concluded. ]
UNCLASSIFSED
580
TORlaSEORET
HSITfi I ^ 1-
/87
THIS IS A COVER SHEET
FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
ALL INDIVIDW^fflWDUN^^^^^^I^^P^^^^B«D TO PROTECT
IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED
DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE
ORDER(S). STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.
Partially Oeclassified/Reteased nn /<kj»i88
unOer grovisions of E 0 12356
Oy K Johnson. Nalional Security Council
TOKiflifiBiT
, ,„. Pr.jcriwa By
ARO FORM 703 (
By GSA/ISOO
581
#^'
^0ifmim>
EXAMINATION
BY MR. KERR:
Q Would you state your full name for the record, please.
Q What position do you hold with the Central intelligence
Agency at the present time?
:!>
A The Associate Deputy Director for Operations.
A
Q You joined the Central intelligence Agency when?
Q would you trace chronologically your career with the Central
ntei I igence Agency?
ONCIASSIBB
Partially Declassified/Released nn 'uvJ i^nSB
under provisions o( E 0 12356
by K Johnson, National Security Council
582
A That's correct. And then I moved up to the Assoclatt
Deouty Director for Operations Job.
0 At that time you would have taken what had been Mr.
Juchniewicz's position?
A That Is correct
583
liNClASSlfe
^i^c^3
To 77^1^
UNCLASSIFIED
584
Q Anc^^^^^^^^^Hremalned In the Deputy position until
he succeeded you in April of 1986.
A That's right. The first of May. actually, end of April.
That ' s correct .
0 with regard to the way you handled duties as between
yourself and your Deputy, can you give me kind of an overview
of the allocation of responsibilities between yourself and
your Deputy?
A well, I have always taken the approach that the Deputy
has to be one's alter ego as far as being made aware of,
(XfvcK
being brought in, pr totally Interchangeable sort of duties.
In the press of work, part
and South A;
n an area like the Near East
585
UNCLASSIFIED
If, you know, if you're off for a weekend, or you're on the
seventh floor, or yourgout down here In a hearing and something
comes up, and the Deputy begins to handle it, then perhaps he
remains more or less the expert on It because he talked to the
people first, ilir; there Is no sharp division, though, unless
It was something that — for Jnstance,]
jrobably carried 90* of
the load on that Issue, which was one of our largest and
required a lot of effort and decisions and a lot of hearings
down here on the him. So i suppose i sort of specialized
Other than that, s i ncel
suppose I tended to push things having to do with the Arabs,
particularly those [ inawdlfcie^ a little bit more his way.
But basically there was a fairly even distribution.
Q During the course of your tenure as Chief of Division,
were there any projects as to which you compartmented out
mean, you can compartment
UNCIASSIFO
oHCUssim
things for security, and you do a lot of that, but you don't
comoartment your Oeouty out, unless It's maybe a personnel
matter that might come ud briefly that needs to be resolved
and can't be spread around.
Q But you do not recall any projects that you were engaged
In as Chief of the Near East Division when, for security
you kep^^^^^^^^^^^out
A No, I do not recall any.
Q ^^^^^^^^Hhas indicated that, for Intents purposes
he kept himself informed of the same matters that you would
be keeping yourself Informed of. Is that essentially the way?
A Essentially, yes. That's right. Not perhaps in as much
detail, since if you don't speak the language, maybe you don't
deal withi
inquiry, can you tell me when you first came to meet Col
North?
A Probably, i don't remember exactly, but It would have been
sometlKM, I think a couple of months after I was on the Job.
So sometime in October, late October maybe, 1984. Because i
remember we had a problem dealing with terrorism in Lebanon,
and he took a great interest In the terrorist issue, and i
believe that was my first encounter with him.
Q Now that would have been on a working basis?
IINClftSSIRFn
587
^
UNCUSSIREO
A On a working basis, having to do with a possible activity,
uh. counter-terrorist activity. f
4 for lack of a better expression, operational activity?
5 A Not In the Intelligence and security sense. I was aware,
6 of course that he had played a role In the Grenada operation and
7 that sort of thing, but,
8 Q No, I'm thinking of operations In the classic sense.
9 A No. 0
-K) Q When did that first come to your attention that Coir North
11 was going to play or was playing an operational role with regard
12 to intelligence matters?
13 A wei I , let me think. l suppose it would probably have been
14 around the time of the Achllle Lauro incident.
15 Q That would have been early October 1988.
16 A That's right, I suppose, i wasn't In the country then, but
17 when I got back, I heard, you know, what the dealings were with
18 the Israelis, and how the matter had been handled out of the
19 White House rather than out of State or the Agency, and that.
20 Q ill come back to that in a moment. Were you aware prior
21 to that time of an operational role that CoC^North had with
22 regard to Nicaragua-Contra related activities?
23 A What I was aware of, and what generally sort of seeped
• icTNortr
UNCUSSIHFn
588
ONCUSSIFIED
1 around town, I suppose. Is that the whole private benefactor
2 activity and private Amerian, private money, volunteers, i don • t
3 know what. Whoever had things to do with helping the Contras
4 when we were not , ^(r that 01 lie was certainly one of the lead i ng
5 persons In the White House Involved In encouraging, going around
6 making speeches, basically encouraging, I suppose, people to make
7 contributions to support the Contras during that period.
8 Q What was the source of your knowledge about that. is that
9 basically read the newspapers?
10 A Sort of osmosis and read the newspapers, and then l remember
11 at one point, well, the committee staffers would make remarks
12 about this or ask a question, or, and I know It got things
13 raised to the point that I believe Bud McFartane came down
14 and talked to one or both the Oversight Comnlttees. l don't
15 know that, I remember that happening. So It was sort of the
16 general knowledge around town that this was going on and that
17 there w«re other people involved In It with him, perhaps more
18 directly.
19 Q Old you ever have occasion to talk with Col. North
20 directly about his activities relating to the Nicararaguan
21 Contras, or Indirectly, in passing, any conversation?
22 A Only Indirectly In the sense that I remember a
23 couple of times a terrorist incident would come up in the
589
UNCUSSIFIED
1 Middle East and there would be, you know, perhaps something
2 going to happen over a weekend, and I suppose the first direct
3 sort of knowledge was when he told me, 'You can reach me on the
4 Mhite House number and they will know where I am and I'M ca ii
5 you, but I'm going to be down South,' and down South' obviously
6 In the context he said it didn't mean down in North Carolina or
7 South Carolina. And, in fact, as i recall, there was something
8 that came up and I called, and he called me either from the Miami
9 or the Atlanta airport. Apparen^^\ he had called the White
^...■"fO House and they would say^^^^^^^^Be^i-ed and said can him at
11 home. So I knew that he was travelling down there, but 1 did not
12 have — I don't ever recall any direct knowledge of any particular
13 activity, or him describing It to me, or ever having knowledge
14 of It.
15 Q This telephone exchange relating to him being down South,'
16 approximately when In time did that take place?
17 A Mel I , there was always something happening in Beirut on the
13 weekend. it would have been sometime in probably that winter of
^ 1-9 ■ 84 or '86. I don't have good, ^i D\jt l know that he took more
20 than one tr ip, ^'cause a lot of times something would come up--a
21 terrorist Incident — he usually came and sat on this working
22 group, and he wouldn't be there, and someone would say, "Well,
23 he's off on a trip and he'll be back. He was always on the go,
m%\mm
590
UNCUSSIFIED
and a lot of it. to the South.
•9 I n Col'fNorth ' s
Q Your phone number appears In Col'^ Norths collection of
telephone numbers-. Indicating that he must have called you or
spoken with you with some regularity. How frequently were you
In touch with Co I'-fT^iorth In the '84 - '85 period, before the
time he left ae i uh i ^-^y
A It moved In spurts. I'd say In the summer of '85 at the
time of the TWA highjacking probably there were a lot of calls
over a weekend.
three or four calls on a weekend, but I might not deal with
01 I le for a month or two months or even three months, other
than bump Into him at some meeting. So it was very much a
function of the activity that might come up.
Q As between yourself anc^^^^^^^^^^H was there any
distinction drawn between you
care of CorNorth?
terms of who would be taking
A No, I'd say not until the finding of January of last
year, when we began to work more Intimately on vn^ specific
project, namely, this arms^-e>^ — —
That would be the January
I98S memo.
A That 's r Ight .
ONCLIlSSinEO
591
UNCLASSIFIED
Q And at that point, uh, was tnere an allocation of roles
2 assigned between you
3 A Well, by virtue of the--l need to tell you what haooened ,
the way it worked. I was there as Division Chief. I left on
tr ipi
^and when i got back
n the office, and i had had foreknowledge
before l left that there was something cooking in terms of the
White House NSC trying to work out a deal with the Israelis
and Involving some other people, but i didn't know there was
going to be a finding. And when I got back, I was told the
finding had been signed and that Cla I rdTand^^Bhad gone down
to read It, that our role was one of logistics, financial.
sort of Intelligence support, and that things had moved to the
point that, you know, we were deal I ng with the ml i itary about
some weapons and so forth. Slnce^^Hwas so deeply involved
In this at that point, that largely became his baby. m fact,
the last, I suppose, three months of my tenure in NE Division,
that's when the balance shifted perhaps, and I suppose. ^^^H
UNCIASSIFIEO
592
■«msff®
1 spent, ah well, he still certainly performed his role as
2 Deputy, but I suppose he spent, gee whiz, some weeks a hundred
3 percent of his time on this, and other times, I don't know,
4 fifty-sixty percent. So. In that sense, there was a role
5 division the last three, three-and-a-half months.
6 Q Your Involvement from that point on would have been
7 nominal, relatively nominal. You were keeping posted. What
8 would you describe It...
9 A Keeping posted. ^^^Hcame to me at times and said,
10 "Look, there are going to be a lot of details here that i,
11 ^^^^Bcan't handle because It's homework. It's calling the
12 military trying to figure out which serial numbers match
13 what, and what Is it these people are talking about because
14 It gets one list or request and then you get another one."
br I ng^^^^^^^^Hi n
16 So, s I nce^^^^Bhad been peripherally In on It Interviewing
17 this fellow Qhorbanlfar earlier. And so we got^^^Vin on
18 It. I think maybe he brought someone else on i t at some
13 point, but t was aware of that, but I was generally briefed
20 on I t . That's right.
21 I did encounter Oi I le after that — Oliver North on other
22 Issues.
23 Q I'll return to that in more detail a little later, with
UNCLASSIFIED
593
mism
egard to your trip o«
you were on
a trip with Director Casey?
A Part of the time. l rendezvoused with Director Casey in
^^^^^^^^^Hcame back^^^^^^^^^^^^Hw I th
Q III return to that in chronological sequence. with regard
to Director Casey, can you tell tne when you first came to meet or
know Director Casey.
A We I I , I met him when he took over from Stan Turner in I98i .
I was still at HeadquartersI
Q You did not know him before he became Director.
A [P»u«« No aud m I fr nnt*"*' . ]
Q Can you describe your relationship with the Director
prior to the time that you became Chief of the Near East
Division, In terms of the working relationship. how often
you dealt with hlw, those klnds^of things?
muivm
594
ONCLASSIFIED
O After you took over as Chief of the Near East Division.
can you describe for me the extent to which you would have
been in contact directly with Casey?
A well, It varied. On^^^
Ich he took an Intense Interest,
there would be a tremendous burst of activity. You'd be
getting ready to flo on a trip. In fact, we went on a trip
and I suppose that s when i really got
to know him, travelling on an airplane with him, and i0^
dealing with him on that Issue sort of non-stop, pressure
cooker, which was his approach to things.„-i^» for__three,
four days. And so I got to know him pretty wellT'^He was
It, a Division Chief, I mean. In the Near
East being a very active area, he was always calling witr
questions. So i suppose I saw him — It was rare that I
didn't see him once or twice a week.
0 During the course of that experience, on that or any
other time, did you get any sense of his relationship
IJNCIiSSIFIEfl
595
j_
wmi\m
tn Col . North?
A well. I knew he talked to him on the phone. I didnt
get any sense of any personal relationship. He admired Oi tie's
can do' attitude. I'd say that. A proactive approach to life,
which Is exactly what SMI Casey had.
Q Did you have any sense of the frequency with which North
and Casey were meeting.
A No.
Q You were or were not aware that they would meet for
breakfast on weekends and that sort of thing?
A I was not aware of that. Usually when I heard about it
was when Bill had gone down to the White House to see
Polndexter or somebody, and he would say, 'While I was down
there, I saw 01 Me and this happened or that happened.'
0 On how many occasions did you travel
wi th the 01 rect
596
UNCLASSIFIED
Q With regard to^^^^^^^^^^^^^Htr I p, who accompanied
8 you and Director Casey on that trip? Who else was with you?
9
10
16 Q Old you have any knowledge of discussions that Case>
17 or anyone else in the group had witr
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■about contributing money for
19 the benefit of the Nicaraguan Contras.
20 A No.
21 O So there were no meetings that you attended on that trip
22 [ inauJIUte]. '^ i<^c/^ r«dO( r
23 A That's correct.
-?
well, that's one of the toolcs I wanted to touch on with
you. There is a reference in a McMahon note to what may be
a suggestion that Casey was going!
^^^Hto ask^^^^^^^a contribution to the Nicaraguan-contras .
Were you aware of any such?
A No.
Q You're not.
A No.
w h e n^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l y o u
were not privy to any conversations in which contributions by
■to the Nicaraguan Contras was discussed?
A That's correct.
Q on the^^^^^^^^^Htr ip, any
^^^^Hcontr ibut ions to Nicaraguan Contras?
ICIASSIFIED
598
yilASSlFIEfl
1 A No.
2 Q And you didn't hear any discussions taking place on
3 that trip?
4 A That • s r I ght .
5 Q And on the^^^^^^^^f tr I p , any such discussions?
6 A No.
7 0 Old you ever acquire knowledge that Director Casey
8 solicited funds from!
^^^^^^^^^Hto the Nicaraguan Contras?
10 A No .
11 Q And you never discussed this matter with Mr. McMahon?
.J^ A J^nuse. — Ua audtbie Tesponaeri —
13 Q What was your relationship with McMahon? McMahon had
14 been with the Agency for quite soma tlme--had you had a
15 chance to work with him?
16 A I had worked with him when he was Deputy Director
17 for OD«rations. That's the first l ever heard of him
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I n He
19 made 000 sometime earlier that year, and so the first
20 time I ever even met McMahon wa:
21 ^^^^l^h or about July 1978. i think I had a good working
22 relationship with him. I admired him. And we travelled
23
together on a couple of occasions.
liCIASfJIFirn
599
lUSSinED
'But I never had any
Intimate, personal, family relationship.
Q So he was not a social acquaintance. it was a
professional relationship. Alright, now let me turn to
another interesting gentleman — Manucher Ghorbanlfar was
the subject of concern in the Near East Division in 1984.
Much of the concern would be generated shortly before you
became Chief of the Division. Can you tell me the extent
to which you were familiar with Manucher Ghorbanlfar and
the matters which caused the Agency to put out a burn
notice on him in 19847
A I think that burn notice was put out In August or
so , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B I seeing
the burn notice at that time, when t was briefed
generally, well. I was briefed specifically on the
land so forth as part of my Division,
[operations and threats and that
sort of thing. You know. I suppose In that briefing
probably there were half a dozen or more dirt balls
of the fabricator variety that would pop up. And i
had been dealing wl th^^^^^^^^^Hj^Hf or
years, and his name may have been mentioned at that
time, because I do recall that it was somewhat familiar
the following summer when It first popped up on the
•%*a
MWIFirn
600
liiussra
screen. And then sofnebody said, "Oh, he was a guy
that, you know, he said there was a threat against the
President and this and that. And so, I remember at that
time It clicked. Of course, it may have been a generic
thing, '^ause there are lots of Iranians. But I was not
familiar with those aoecific events, but i did hear about
them later, the things that had caused the burn notice to
be Issued.
Q Just so I'm clear. The decision to put out the
burn notice and the Inquiry that gave rise to it all preceded
your taking the position?
A ■t*tj\. I
woudn't make the decision on the burn notice
anyway. I mean, that wouldn't be approved by me.
Q That Is a question I want to raise with you. I'm not
quite sure how one gets a burn notice approved. What is
the process on that?
CLASSIFIED
601
liNWSsra
Q That's right. As to Ghoreani
category he fit In In late-19847
A I didn't know at the time. No. But it's when i read
the burn notice — It's pretty clear. The following summer.
or whenever I read it, it's pretty clear that that was ♦*«
MtAe-r "•
Q Give me your best recollection of how you would
characterize him at that point. 1 read that burn notice,
and I'm not as familiar with what you guys were looking for
\m m\B
602
ONCUSSIFIED
1 as you are. So what would that have told you about
2 Ghorbahlfar? Simply that he was a Mar. or that he was
3 a Mar with a motlv^e?
4 A A I lar with a profit motive, proBaBiy. Although,
5 sometimes it's not clear. i mean, I've run into dozens of
6 fabricators, and some Me for the sake of lying; some lie
7 for purposes of feathering their own nests and working out--
— 8 they're con men. "»n>-4frid occasionally, there may be some
9 Idc^aloglcai motivation. But, that's very rare. But he's
10 Jusc, he's not an atypical Iranian bum who, you know, made
11 his living as a police Informant. Savak Informant. Israelis.
12 I'm sure he worked with the Israeli shipping companies.
13 I recall back In the revolution days, and probably been
A
M associated with the Israelis since that time.
15 Q Let me take you into the summer of 1985. At that
16 point, June of 1989, you apparently were advised by
17 Director Casey that he had been called by a gentleman
18 named John Shaheen, who had that story to tell about
19 Cyrus Hashemi and a program Hashemi had for releasing
20 the hostages and releasing himself from prosecution. Oo '
21 you reca I I that?
22 A Yeah, I recall that. ^^ ^^, | f p^^^o o^oc.w..^^ T^ ^ ^c^^c^
J.2 Q Can you tell me. and yeu'Fe free to [ I nniiri i b i w)-r-~
yHCLASSIFIED
603
mmmis
1 but give me your best recollection of how this matter came to
2 your attention in the summer of 1985?
3 A Shaheen , John Shaheen called Casey, which was not unusual.
4 Shaheen was always calling Casey. They're old, they were old
5 OSS buddies or something. Shaheen was born In the same town
6 that Ronald Reagan was born In, I think. He's a very patriotic
7 American. tHiiThad a lot of contacts. He was always giving
8 Bill Casey hot tlos on this or that. And he'd call Casey,
.^-'^''^ yt
9 and then Casey sent me a note, as I recall, and It was well
^^0 knowAwhat sort of fellow Hashemi was and what h l^s motivation was,
/^^l and I think he had been cut off once before aaf [y on with some
^,->«^ scheme, talking about ransom for the hostages T^Th i s time he
scheme, talking about ransom for the hostages.
13 claimed to have the contacts with the Iranians at some fairly
14 high level, and I w«nt to State. i told Casey, I said, "We
15 won't approve this one this way dealing with this guy. if he's
18 really In touch with someone who represents the Iranian
17 Qovernnant or who's in the Iranian Qovernment, then they ought
18 to be, and they want to talk, then we ought to get State in on
Q
..i^— It and find out, you know, how we ought to handle it. i went
20 to see either Dick Murphy or Arnie Raphael. i think i tried to
21 see Dick Murphy, and then I may have seen his Deputy, Arhie
22 Raphael. And we worked out, they worked out, we talked about
yNGiASsra
604
UNCLASSIFIED
It. They also knew about Cyrus Hashemi. i mean they had. you
know, the burn notice I think had been run on him. I'm not
sure of that. But, at least, somehow he'd come to their notice
on one of these previous schemes. Maybe about the thing he'd
been prosecuted for/y^ i guess illegal export, or something or
other. And so, what they worked was through our Embassy^^^^^f
»here he claimed to be able to — of course, these guys,
"fabricators or con men like Hashemi or Shorbanifar, they always
want to. they gotta do something right nowjy'" The moment you
hear, the guy's coming on Wednesday. So he claimed that he
could produce an Iranian, very senior level importance, and
Join with me very quickly. So, State's position was, "We're
always ready to listen, but we are not sure we want to go
this guy . "^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H because
the mention of the Red Cross had been made since it involved
hostages .
^^^^ig^^t^^S^^rTToS^^Msten to what
this sanlor Iranian has to say about iran-U.S. relations
and what influence they might bring to bear to get the
hostages re I eased .^^ So that was set up, and a phone number
was given i think to Hashemi to call and, of course,
nothing ever happened. I mean, nobody ever showed up.
However, his lawyer, who was Eiiiot Richardson, did call
UNCLASSihED
605
BNCUSSIfe
^
^^^^B- 1 don't remember whether I went oot of town, had gone
on leave, or wa3--somehow or othcr--oh, i know what haooened .
In order to get the details of this after Casey sent me the
note, and I talked In general principles to either Dick Murohy
and/or Arnie Rapl^ae I .^^^Bthen went up to New York and talked
to Shaheen to get the details, to get names an so forth. And
the name o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bwho
In later events of course, and the name Manucher . and that's
a fairly common name, as I recall. I'm not 100% sure, but
we fairly quickly established it was Manucher Ghorbanifar.
Or likely to be him. Or maybe even Shaheen said, had his
full name. But whatever it was, we talked with State, and
the deal was set up that i f^^^^^^^H who was identified by us
as a bona fide Iranian official at some level. i don't remember
exactly the level, but fairly senior. If he showed up. the
would be happy to talk with him
and listen to what he had to say about iran-U-S. relations
and th« hostages, but that they would not se« this guy.
Manucher Qhorbanlfar if he alone came along with Hashemi.
And then, as I recall, s i nce^^Hhad met Shaheen, that was
probably why Elliot Richardson had caiie(^^^K>n the phone
one day and said he represented Cyrus Hashemi and he understood
that something was being worked out with regard to nolle pros
yNCL/l<:.^lF!Pn
606
12
mmm
on this case against him. an<f^fended it off at arms
2 length and said he would have to talk with somebody else.
3 no^e. It was obvious that Shaheen had given Hashemi
^ ^^^■chone number, or he had given it to Elliot
5 Richardson or somehow Elliot Richardson had gotten It.
S Q I want to go back on a couple of things and show
7 you some documents. With regard toKls initial contact^^-^S^
8 did you have a meeting with Casey? Casey brought you in
9 and told you John Shaheen has told me x. Y. and Z. that
0 kind of thing, or did he Just send you a memo?
1 A As I recall, he sent me a memo, and he may have
been going someplace or. you know, he went out of town
13 for the weekend a lot of times. l don't remember. He
M sent me a note, though. i remember that.
15 0 You had had other notes come from Casey by way
16 of Shaheen, from Shaheen by way of Casey?
17 A I don't recall having any other notes. i recall
18 Shaheen coming up with this or that or some other
19 possible lead into information about the hostages.
20 etc. . etc.
21 O were you aware of Shaheen's relationship to a
22 gentleman named Roy Furmark at that time?
23 A No.
24 Q You were not aware In the summer of 1985 that
607
UNCUSSinED
1 Furmark was a business associate of Shaheens.
2 A I never heard of Furmark until It was In the
y newspaoers when I deer hunting Xrrf end of November^^ u<-/'^^
,-¥ The first time I ever heard of Furmark.
5 Q Similarly, you were not aware that Furmark,
6 Mr. Shaheens business associate, was a partner of
7 Manucher Qhorbani f ar , Adnan Khashoggi and Mr. Hashemi
8 in a venture to sell materials to Iran In the period
9 January through August I9B17
10 A No .
11 Q During the course of these discussions, Ghorbani far ' s
12 business relationship with Furmark — the one with Hashemi
13 and those people — it was not discussed at allT
14 A In the course of which discussions?
15 Q The discussions relating to what Casey told you in
18 the June, July. August period. Let me give you a better
17 question. in that period of time, June, July, August, was
18 It brought to your attention that Ghorbanifar had a business
19 relationship with Hashemi or Adnan Khashoggi?
20 A Not with Adnan Khashoggi. but since, no, but he had some
21 sort of legitimate or otherwise business relationship, but
22 an association was established, because Hashemi said this
23 fei low^^^^^^Hwas coming, and the .other guys name was
24 Manucher. And we checked that, as l recall, so obviously
l!Nf!IAJ;.<JIFIFn
608
UNCLASSIFIED
1 there was a hook up tjetweeh Hashemi and Manucher . which ought
2 to b9 not surprising since they're both Iranian.
3 Q Was It ever explained to you how Shaheen came to come
4 by this knowledge that Hashemi was Interested In putting this
5 deal together?
6 A Hashemi had told him this.
^7 Q Did he tell you how It was that Shaheen would be in contact <^^
8 Hashemi .
^9 A . ih the spot oil market or some other shady international
10 bus I ness deal . But 1 1 didn' t come to my at tent Ion sped f leal ly .
Q was you to but^^^^^^^^^B
12 A That's correct. He went up to New York and got the details
13 of this thing, as I recall, and I talked to State, and again.
14 I think I went out of town, because l th l nk^^^Btalked with Arnle
15 Raphael or maybe with Dick Murphy — they were our counterparts
16 at State — and confirmed that, okay, if there's some. If the
17 people had something to say. And I talked with Casey once
18 more about It at some point by saying, "BIN, this Is the
19 way to handle It. we don't want to get into all this 'Who shot
_20 John?' »n^ deal ">< th these guys. If they come forward and have
21^ something I eg 1 1 imate. ^and this guy^^^^^^^^' ^ou see, the
22 thing about Shaheen and other guys — they have a lot of contacts —
23 and they come up and It would be a tantalizing sort of thing.
UNCLASSIFIFn
ymssiFe
1 I mean, the Idea was the guy has access here, and that would turn
2 out to be true, and you needed, you had to explore, but you nad
3^ to exDiore It. but you had to be very careful -t-f' you did if, or
A you'd get involved with another fabricator or swindler, you know.
5 Because the further you unravelled the thing the wormier it
6 became. But. once In a while we'd have a contact that would
7 make sense.
8 Q Did It come to your attention during this period of time
9 that Mr. Ghorbanlfar, as reported In his 201 file, once said that
10 ^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas Involved in the kidnapping of Mr. Buckley?
1 1 A I don't recal I that .
12 Q 0 1 d^^^^^^^^^Hcomm 1 1 to writing what he learned in his
13 Interview with Mr. Shaheen? , ,
14 A He committed to wr 1 1 1 ng--;>*n, I don't know whether or not -
15^ ^^"^1 remember him later committing to writing sort of how the
16 thing was being handled, and what, you know, once we talked
17 with State and had the deal laid on that State would talk with
18 ^^^^B I remember^^^Kirr 1 1 1 ng something saying, 'I called Shaheen
19 and told him this, -«aL thatHasheml Is serious and he can
-20 really produce these people, **»* he should i >fct-nic call this
21 number, and they'll be met." And he also told Shaheen that.
aprr about the dea I ,HH^H^H|^H f i ne,
23 because he had been proven to be a bad character and not
cn
82-690 0-88-21
610
UNCLASSIFIED
1 worth deal Ing with. Ahd so I remember thaf he wrote that dowr
2 Q Do you recall aporislng Mr. Casey of the fact that
3 Manucher Qhorbanlfar was indeed someone that Operations
4 preferred not to deal with?
5 A Yes.
6 Q And you would have told him that approximately when,
7 sometime In the June or July period?
a A Yeah.
9
Jtk^Q
10 A I don't recall. It might have been on the phone.
11 It would have been sort of, "Hey, Bill, we have traces on
12 this guy. He's a bum." That sort of thing.
13 Q Do you recall anybody else that would have been
14 present when you related this to Mr. Casey?
15 A No, I don't recall relating It to him face to
16 face.
17 Q I see. You do think It was conveyed to him?
18 A Oh, y«s, because If Bill Casey got a lead on something
19 from John Shaheen or anybody else, he didn't let go of it,
20 and you didn't Just forget about It. You responded and you
21 explained to him the why and wherefore, and in this case,
22 why it would have been a dumb Idea to have done It otherwise.
23 Q Let me show you a memorandum dated June 17. 1985 from
mw
611
ssro
31
1 Mr. Casey, aooarentiy to yourself which would be Exhibit i
2 of your deposition. Would you review Exhibit I and ten me
3 first If you recognize that document?
4 A I was talking about--
5 Q This would have been the initial memorandum from Casey
6 to you relating his conversation with Shaheen .
7 A Shaheen. that's right. That's right.
8 Q And does this review of that document given you any
9 further recollection on this Initial phase of this that
10 you haven't testified to.
11 A No, as I say. there was ne'^er any, you know, sort of
follow up. At least not as far as
know. I talked to State and It was a question of allegedly
14 talking about a change In policy here, and the usual boiler
15 plate of, you know, release the prisoners and provide weapons.
16 They were always--the Iranians were always looking for weapons.
17 It doesn't raise any additional Inferences.
18 0 Okay. Now. In terms of following this along. This document
19 Is dated June 17, 1985. We have a document we have obtained
20 from the State Department dated June 22, 1985, and I want to
21 apologize for the wretched quality of the copy. State's copy
22 machines aren't nearly as good as^ uh-
. — 23 A Is this a telegrami
^--24 Q MJiu^he first Is a memorandum from Mr. Murphy to Mr.
gob s
_25- Armacost. The second Is a cable to Vaughn (epZ^- -^
— ?«■' A That would have been in i-i-m^rr&fWTeT'-
ilNCLASSIRED
612
UNCLASSiFiED
1 0 What I'd like you to do is take a look at what
2 would be Exhibit 2 and do the beat you can to read
3 the wretched quality and we'll see where that takes
4 us Just In terms of chronology.
5 A orelimlnary question will be whether or not
6 you have seen this document before.
7 A I do not recall having seen it, but I recall
Is.
S. the details of %*>• *W, what said In It. And I
9 recall specifically that Mike Armacost approved
10 this because i remember I made reference earlier
to a note tha^^^^^^^^^^had written
12 summing up where we were going pn this, and In that,
13 I remember him saying that It had been Mike Armacost
14 who had approved It, and they were sending another
T5 cable ^^^^^^^^fcer fol low
16 Q Murphy Indicates In this memo that he, as he
17 says, consulted urgently wlth^ Justice on June 20
'T8 «*r'to learn Justice's reaction to the Hashemi
19 proposal. Did you have any Involvement in that
20 meeting with Justice?
21 A No.
22 Q Old you have any knowledge of it.
23 A I had knowledge of it, but I recall that he
24 did talk with him.
25 Q Do you know of anything In writing generated
26 by Justice regarding the Hashemi proposal.?
mwB
613
UNCLASSIFIED
2
3
4
5
6
1
8
9
10
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
21
22
23
24
25
26
A I wouldn't think there would have been because
nobody was wl l l ing to offer a no I le oros on the basis
of a promise i^'i a guy I Ike Hashemi .
Q Being It a habit of government agencies to block things
out that I want to know about, I want to ask you about a
block. They say. we suggested that we could ask the blank
to send a professional to llste_frto the Iranian representative
|next week. Do you have any Idea who It was suggested
should go^^^^^Hto listen to the Iranian official?
A I don't recall whether we offered, uh--lt may well
be ClA,y^9iwee he woXjid speak Pars I. and he would--
Q That would be my guess, and so I'm asking.
A I don't know for sure. It could well be because we
probably would have offered that as long as State had
approved I t .
Q Al I r I ght .
A It's Just that we wouldn't have wanted to go out on
a limb dealing directly with these guys.
Q -t^nrtthere's a reference in the. last paragraph that
I want to oursye. It says, 'finally, Bill Casey is
anxious to move ahead on this proposal. I suggest you ca i
him to say we are urgently, l think it's considering or
working on the issue, and we'll be back to him as soon
as possible, we have passed the same message to and the
reference appears to be to you. So you were in touch witr
State on this matter
Mmm
614
UNCLASSIFIED
A With Murphy and/or Raphael. I don't recall. They
were very careful. Yes. l remember. 'Cause I out a fair
amount of, you know, Casey got the tlo from Shaheen, and he's
talking, and he runs Into]
ind you know, he goes to Long island for the
weekend and see I4 more people, and you want to get this
r
thing under control and In the right channel before, you know,
there's some other angle that we have to send somebody out to
ibout something that's
probably not going to amount to anything. So, i probably said
"Bill's persona My Interested." But he may have ca I I ed, we i I
he to^^^^^^^^Hso maybe^^^^Hta Iked
Q Old you perceive Casey to be very anxious or particularly
Interested In this suggestion by Shaheen?
so Wl> o"^
A No more so than other similar hot lee^ds that he'd come
In on Monday morning and start -{ twaudlB le> out people to
follow up on. I mean, yes, he was interested and, it had to
do with the hostages. ^Jft»/2t that point, we did not know
Bill Buckley was dead, and In fact, we thought he was still
■again through one of
these contacts that Casey makes that leads to something.
Q In any event, as of late June 1985, you had not reached
the conclusion that Buckley was dead.
A Absolutely not. That's right. . ,
Q And It was your perception t.h«» 4hen the Agency, at the
too levels where you were, that that perception also was not
the official perception. Is that right? You thought Buckley
m I ght still be a I I ve7
A At that point, yes.
Q Yes. Do you have any recollection of any discussions
with Charles Allen during this period of time, June 1985,
regarding whether or not Buckley was dead or alive?
A No. I don't recal i it.
Q You don't have a recollection of his view about whether
or not Buckley was dead or alive as of June of 1985.
A No . No I don ' t .
Q Let me show you a couple more documents. These are
UNCLASSIFIED
616
mimm
1 documents that came from Ghorban l f ar ■ s 201 file. They are
2 documents from the Central intelligence Agency, and they
3 are documents for which I have great hopes of someday
4 being able to read the entire text. Let me show you a
5 cable dated July 9. 1985. which had previously been marked
6 as Allen Exhibit 3, a typewritten message to Arnle from
7 Peter, dated July 11. 1985, which is Allen Exhibit 4,
8 A To Arnle from Peter?
9 0 Yes sir. And a cable dated July 12, 1985, which Is
10 Allen Exhibit 5. What I would like you to do is read
11 these documents and tell me first if you recall having
12 seen them at or about the time of their date. First, with
13 regard to these documents, would you have seen them at or
14 about the time of their date?
15 A Not necessarily. Something like this would probably
16 have been brought to my attention. I don't recall having
17 seen-- I don't know what this document Is.
18 0 1 was hoping you would be able to help me out with
19 that .^^^l^^^^l Do you know an Arnle or a
20 A I know Arnle Raphael. And since they have — uh . Peter.
21 Peter. Peter, Peter, Peter Do i le'^( j^r) from the State
22 Department? l wonder, did this come from us or from
23 State?
24 Q It came from CIA.
?
-25 A It was In Qhorbani far 's file.
-20\
26 Q It was In Ghorbani far 's file. [■saiu s iiiiu I laneous i ywTEh
A
617
UNCLASSIFIED
,W^ c^^f'^''^
that we use
A And somebody's written
for him, but uh —
Q By that you mean it
A Yes. Update on the Hashemi as of last night Deputy
Chief CIA was still negative about the two names offered.
This sounds as if It was written outside of CIA. in other
words, we were closely in touch . ^^^^^^^^Hor the PMs
office and Manucher Intel i Office. It turns out he was a
fabricator with detailed knowledge of^^^^^^^^Hour only
knowledge o f^^^^^^^^f i n the biographic files, see that's
State phraseology. That's not Agency. i can swear to
that. it sounds like they're referring to their own
report I ng .
Q Right. That's very possible.
A The other cables may or may not have come to my
attention. Probably the fact of their existence would
have been gotten to my attention.
Q Exhibit was issued by thc^^^^^^^^ 1 1 that
ghat's right, yeah.
Q ^^^^^^^^^^H I s
A it's somebody on the]
some--that's a person who read the cable. it may have been
an Intel i assistant or whatever.
Q Okay. The authority for the cable would be yourself.
iiNWSsiFirn
618
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
'1 1
^2
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
-25
26
Correct?
OlUSSIflED
A R I ght .
O Would that mean that you would have read it?
_NflX nee^eaari ly?
A Not necessarily. Cables can be released down at tt
^^^^^^leve
Q All right. The cable Is being sent to^^^^^H to tt
Ithat handled terrorists?
A No. this" Is tr
Q All right. And essentially what the cable, which Is
Allen Exhibit 3. Is asking for Is additional Information
land Ghorbanlfar. Is that correct? Or Manucher .
A Yeah. FY! Headquarters suspects that Manucher is
Identical with Ghorbanlfar. we note that he had contacts with
Indicated by this Exhibit, they think It's probably the same
guy. And he Is the fabricator, and circulated the burn notice
Q Okay. All right. So essentially, as of July 9, operation;
Near East Division Is trying to develop Information on who
ind Manucher Ghorbanlfar are. is that right?
Is that what you're doing as of that time?
A They're trying to develop further informat ion <>• te
lINCUiSSIflEO
619
iiK-mim
The other lead Is from,
to Casey to me. but this came i
Q well, then, help me understand what this imoMes. This
suggests that whatever Qhorbanlfar and^^^^^^^Hwere doing
vis-a-vis Mr. Hashemi and Mr. Shaheen, they had made another
aooroach to the United States by way of|
IS that right?
A Well, they made an approach to]
^^^^^|had told us about It. Whether they had — and it's
not unusual for people doing something like this, particularly
a guy like Hashemi or Ghorbanlfar to cast that net and you
see which, you know, where you get your nibble. And If you
have a message or something you're trying to promote then /
you go through numerous channels to try to do it.
Q All right. The Exhibit S cable talking about the
meeting. That would have been the!
620
JllASSIFIED
think so. It's not too clear
Q They sort of black It out.
A There are two ref erences-^^^^^Band Director
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^nd him as lows
don't remember ever seeing this cable. . I don't understand j
exact I y, what — [ I oaud I b I e--aga I ii i eaa I i^ij aioua from tt>g" document ]
A ^ wrong assumpt I on->H think this Is following up on the
other lead.
Q On the Shaheen lead?
A' »e*h, because an intermediary has advised us — that would
be Hashemi — that we can confirm the full identity of the latter
this Manucher (S^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B And probably
what ' s blacked out
Q That would be. my guess. I look forward to «A^-Ht9 that
24 someday.
"^5 A No. I think It's following up on the other. T Uun'-i —
28
:s--i somehow had rememberedl
yiLASSIREO
got Into It,
621
i ^ ,' \e
but I thought It was b«causa. uh, that they had heard about
Q Oo you have any further recollection or knowledge of
what haopened^^^^^^^^nd elsewhere with this overture from
Ghorbanifar and —
A So far as I recall It Just petered out because they
did not show up^^^^^^H I mean, he did not call. Shaheen
was going to pass this message to him with the thing that
^^^^^^^^H-you asked he wrote something up about
we were gonna do. Shaheen was gonna call Hashemi In Geneva
— these guys were always floating around Qeneva. He was
gonna call him and say okay, if you've got something to say,
go here or call this number. And as far as I know, nothing
ever happened on that.
Q Oo you recall telling officials at State on the even 1 1
of July 10th that you were, you yourself or
were negative on^^^^^^^land Manucher Qhorbanlfar?
A I don't recall specifically, but It's certainly In
the context of what I believed and thought at the time.
But the guy was only trying to get this nolle pros', and
that he would Just come up with another cockamamie story.
But, sine* It possibly involved hostages, and maybe
Improved relations, from State's perspective, you had
to listen to him. I personally didn't think he'd show up.
Q This document dated January 11th refers to OC/NE.
beH|^^^^^^^ correct? Deputy Chief?
mmim
622
WUSS/fffi)
1 A That'* right.
2 Q The rnomo also makes reference to the Issue coming
3 up at 3 p.m. meeting C/NE. Is that you.
4 A That's me. That would have been me. l normally
5 had meetings once a week with Oick Murphy or Arnle.
6 That's why It makes me- think that that's Arnle Raphael
7 up there.
8 Q This memo also makes reference to the point I made
9 a little bit earlier, which says that our only knowledge
10 of^^^^^^^Hin the biographic file Is the report on
11 Manucher , who claimed, among other things, that]
12 "was the Individual responsible for the kidnapping of
,13 William Buck I ey . ■ V^That give you any further recollection
14 of what you a I I knew about)
15 A No. I don't. That doesn't refresh my recollection
18 at all.
17 Q Oo you have any recollection at all of what impact
18 ^^^^^^^^Hrol* on the kidnapping of Buckley had on your
19 evaluation of whether or not you should be doing business
witt^^mijHv
21 A Well, If It cones from Manucher Qhorbanlfar, I would ^
22 put about as much credence In that as anything else he
23 says. So. It wouldn't have had any Impact whatsoever.
24 Q with regard to a meeting In early July with State,
25 discussing these matters, do you have any further
26
recollection of what was discussed?
UNCLASSIFIED
623
mn
mm
1 A No. I mad* th« arrangement. They said they would
2 send a cab le^^^^^^^^Band I think maybe another cable
3 had already been sent. And it was agreed that at some
4 point that, no, they did not need our officer to sit In,
that ^^^^^^^^^wou Id be hapoy to do for them,
8 that was — and that's all i recall on that, it was Just
7 left at that.
8 Q During this same period of time, June or July, we
9 now know It from the Tower Commission Report, that there
10 were a variety of meetings between Michael Ledeen and
11 Ghorbanlfar, Bud Mcrarlane and people speaking on behalf
12 of Qhorbanlfar. Were you aware In the June-July time period
13 that Qhorbanlfar was making an effort to reach the United
14 States by way of the National Security Council?
15 A No.
18 Q At no time, to your knowledge, did Mr. Shaheen apprise
17 the Director of an effort to reach the United States by
18 way of the NSC.
19 A No. Not to my knowledge. It seems to me that had he,
20 I would have thought he would have mentioned something to
21 ^^^H" *°"^* context, because he was a very open sort of
22 guy onc«, you know, he got one of these leads and you
23 talked to him, he'd sort of tell you everything he knew about
24 It. But, he seemed to accept the fact that our records showed
25 that this guy, Qhorbanlfar, was not the sort of fellow we
28 wanted to deal, but, that if he could lead tol
.:"J
624
1 mayb* h« was worth It.
2 Q In terms of Shaheen, though, you did not develop the
3 impreaelon that Shaheen had a profit motive In trying to
4 put this relationship together.
5 A No.
6 Q And It Is your that^^^^^^^^^Bwou I d
7 have gone to New York and actually interviewed Shaheen.
8 Is that correct?
9 A That Is my recollection.
10 Q Do you recall anyone else being present at that
1 1 I ntervlew?
12 A No .
13 Q If you were to try to give me an estimate of when
14 this aspect petered out, came to an end. would It have
15 been in mid-July or at a later time.
18 A Well, It was Just left hanging. We sort of had It all
17 In place by the, I don't know, the 10th or 12th of July,
18 and then It Just sort of — we were waiting and, no call.
19 Q Old you ever determine why there was no call?
20 A NO. My assumption was that it was, that he Just
21 couldn't come through, when he was pinned down and we
22 didn't want to talk about arms or about ransom or something,
23 that, In other words, that he had to appear and state his
24 case on the merits as to what the Government of Iran
29 wanted to say to the U.S. Government, what they might
28 do to effect the release of the hostages In return for
UNCUSSIFIED
625
iiflLSSSIFIED
better relations or something, that that wasn't the
game that he was capable of playing. Either]
or whoever^^^^m^^Hcontacts he In
[IniMtf ihie] ■ <2.?^^ {^^<A .
Q It did not come to your attention that this
Initiative had died because In mid-August 1985,
Ghorbanifar and^^^^^^^f succeeded In getting the
United States' agreement to have Israel ship TOM
ml ss I les to I ran .
;Kt?^
.t*/u<
A It did not come to my attent Ion -♦+-> long after'
Q Was there merely one Interview of Shaheen by
^^^^^^^to the best of your knowledge?
A As far as I know. He may have met him on another
occasion, but that's the only one that I recall.
Q Where would the Central Intelligence Agency
have kept Its records of matters relating to this
Incident?
A Matters relating to —
To this Incident, the Hashemi ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
Qhorbanlfar connection in June-Ju ly-August , 1989.
A Weil, the cables were sent, i don't know
whether they have a file number.
0 we have a 201 f I le.
A Yeah. And this Is out of QhorbanI far ' s 2017
Q Yeah.
A Probably after he was identified, I mean that
IJNCLASSIRED
626
roswssw
1 Manuchcr was him. It would have bean put in there,
2 and there was a file on Hashemi, too, i think. So,
3 It would have been in one of those files, they're
4 probably In both of those fUes.
5 Q Have you had occasion to review the Hashemi
6 file related to this matter.
7 A No.
8 Q Have you had occasion to discuss this matter or
9 Incident wlthl
10 A Over what period?
11 Q within the last month or so.
~^2 A We have talked about, «W not In the detail we have
13 talked here today, about Hashemi and Shaheen and all that.
14 We have talked about Qhorbanlfar.
15 Q Well, let me come at It a little later. Oldl
16 ^^^^^Hadvise you that he had been asked questions .
17 about this Hasheml-Shaheen-Qhorbani far matter during
18 the course of his deposition?
19 A No .
20 Q So you have not had the benefit off
21 recollections to refresh your own?
22 A No.
23 Q According to the Tower Coflimlsslon Report and the
24 other documents that you've now seen In the period
25 June 1985, there were efforts underway to ransome
26 two hostages. Including Mr. Buckley, being supervised
27 by Col. North and being done In conjunction with two
UNCLASSIFIED
627
liNCUSSIRED
agents from the OEA. Were you aware of such effort!
In June 1988.
A June of 1985. I don't recall any. I recall
that periodically there were leads that came up.
DEA , you knov
and they were informants, not agents. But. no, i don't
recal l .
Q Do you recall it coming to your attention during
your tenure as Chief of the Near East Division, of
plans or a program to ransom one or mora American
hostages?
A Our pol Icy on that was. no.
spring of last year^ ■wu.ijgaaane. what was the guy's name«
\i\e was later determined to bo. well, ha was later killed,
but first everyone thought he was dead, one of the
hostages, t can't recall now, and then we got Information
through a source that he was ai Ive and wa got pretty good
proof that ha was alive, and the guy, thay claimed they
wanted something like a million dol lara.-or so to let him
loose. We obviously didn't pay ransom /^We talked to the
White House about that, specifically Oil le North^woj uii -
Ijfie talked to him about It. and he said there was private
iCLASSlFIED
628
mmwE
1 money available to pay for this sort of thing. But that
2 one never worked out. The guy was killed.
3 Q Let me focus you back In June. Were you aware of
■4 a prooosal In June of 1985 to pay several million dollars
5 in ransom for hostages and to utilize monies which Col.
6 North characterized as monies generated in his Nicaraguan
7 project to pay that ransom?
8 A No.
9 Q with regard to the matters we were discussing before,
0 the Shaheen-HashemI initiative relating to Ghorbanlfar and
to your knowledge, did the conclusions that you
12 all reached, the suggestions that you all made about not
13 dealing with Ghorbanlfar get related to the National
M Security Council?
15 A At that stage?
18 Q Yes sir.
17 A I 'm not sure. I don't have any recollection that they
18 were communicated to the National Security Council.
19 They were certainly communicated to Casey. State knew about
20 It at the Armacost level.
21 0 Secretary of State Siihultz has testified, as you know,
22 that as of mid-July, about July I6th, he had seen intelligen<
23 reports on Ghorbanlfar, I believe they related to this
24 Incident, that he was aware of Qhorban I far 's track record
25 and how he was perceived by the Central Intelligence Agency.
26 A Yeah, I suppose that's probably right.
''iiiissiFe
629
'^MmiEij
1 Q Oo you have any knowledge of a similar conveyance
2 of Information to Bud McFarlane during this period of
3 time?
4 A No.
5 O Do you specifically have any knowledge of this
6 Information being passed to Col. North during this period
7 of time?
8 A No.
9 Q Given Col. North's position relating to the hostages,
10 Is It likely or unlikely that the Central Intelligence
11 Agency and State would have apprised him of this Shaheen-
12 Hashemi Initiative during the June and July period of time?
13 A It's probably likely that It would have come to his
_J-4 attention In some of the,-yi.iu lillUl^i, i\m periodic meetings
15 on the hostage situation." Although, at that time, this
16 hostage- locat I ng task force had not been formally established.
17 Q No, I'm familiar with that, but it was Col. North's
18 turf, so to speak, to deal with hostages in June and July
19 of 1985. Isn't that right?
20 A Yeah, yeah. l mean, he was dealing with It. I don't
21 know that It was, if turf Is exactly the right word. It
22 wasn't exclusively his turf.
23 Q I m not suggesting that. But that certainly —
24 A Yes, It's quite likely it could have come to h I s
25 attention, but I have no knowledge whether It did or did
26 not.
UNCLASSIFIED
630
«.'iff/fe
50
1 Q You, yourself, did not, you don't recall having had
2 such discussions.
3 A I don't recall having said. I might have said something
4 like, you know, we've got a lead, or Casey might have said
5 something to him about John Shaheen's given us a hot lead,
6 and then, he might have asked me, and i might have said,
7 well, yeah, it turned out to be a bummer, or something.
8 But, I don't recall. That wouldn't be Impossible.
9 Q Do you have any knowledge of^^^^^^^^^Bcommun Icat I ng
10 with Col. North about this matter in the June-July-August
11 period?
12 A No .
13 O Let me move you into the fall of 1985. Did you become
14 aware in the period of late August-September that Col. North
15 was involved In an Initiative with certain Iranian expatriates
18 and others?
17 A No. i think my first knowledge that something was going
18 on. Well, of course, Meir was released, and It was after then.
19 That was, as I recall. In September. After that, there was
20 it may have been early October, oh, I guess the first thing
21 that alerted me, it was about the time Weir was to be released.
22 Q Weir was released on the I8th of September.
23 A Okay, that's right. Somebody said. I don't know If it
24 was over a weekend or what, that Weir Is about to be released,
25 and, I don't know, Claire Qeorge may have said that, or John
28 McMahon may have said it, that they're expecting to get Weir
-mmm
631
m
mssim
51
out, and wh«th«r that means, you kno>», th« Church or State,
or the Iranians, or 01 lie North,, or whatever, but that there
was anticipation at the White House that Weir was going to"
be released. And, Bingo, he was re I easedTt <And then I gradual
became aware that some credit was being claimed for this in a
satisfied way, by the White House. That they had worked with
somebody and had gotten him out. Now whether, what It was,
I didn't knov/r-H^Then, In early October, John McMahon and
were on a tr l p^^^^^^^^^^^^^^and during
that trip, during which the Achllle Lauro thing took place,
John and I were sitting around having drinks somepi
he said something
about, gee, I hope they know what they're doing. I hope this
all works out about the Iranians and the hostages. And that's
all he said. The unstated thing was that it was, you know,
the White House was working somehow with somebody In touch
with the Iranians. I did not know of the Israeli end of It.
Q Let me focus you on a couple of events and see what
you can tell me about them. Mr. Allen places It at September
9; contemporaneous records place it more like September 12.
In any event, during that period of time. Col. North asked
Charles Allen to lncreas<
[efforts on what we now know to be Manucher Qhorbanifar
Did you know that that asking as you like to
t had been placed on Mr. Allen at that time.
mmm
632
1?^?;?)
'amssim
1 A NO, I did not know at that tlm«.
2 Q Director Casey didn't have any discussions with you in that
3 oerlod of time about Mr. Allen's activities?
4 A No.
5 Q Do you have any knowledge of a request coming In from Mr.
6 Allen's office relating to Manucher Qhorbanlfar, relating to an
7 alias name - Ashgar I , relating to^^^^^^^^Hask i ng you to
8 tell them what was In your file on those people?
9 A It's quite possible he did, i don't specifically recall it.
10 It wouldn't necessarily come up to me, or even to^^^H but it
11 probably would have been brought to my attention, but i Just
12 don't recall whether it was or not.
13 Q Just In terms of dates, the first Israeli shipment of a
14 hundred TOWs was August 30, then 408 TOWs went out on September
15 14. Your testimony Is that you had no knowledge of those.
16 A That Is correct.
17 Q We do have a memorandum that was done In 1987, suggesting
18 that you all had cable traffic on the September 14 flight, at
19 least the fact that It went Into Tabriz, that sort of thing. Do
20 you recall what you all knew at that point about Israeli flights
21 Into lr«n?
22 A I raoall about some reporting but l thought that was later.
23 In September?
24 Q Yes sir.
29 A Was this the flight that came back out to Israel and then
28 there was something In the paper about that. I thought that was
27 later.
-mim
633
\iiwssw
1
2
, s
6
7
8
9
10
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Q Tn«r« WAS also, in Octobar. thara, thara, a raoort about
tha, tha planf stopping and going to Africa.
A ^3*. "at-V
someth I ng,
\S
■amambar. and I ramambar tnara was
somebody raportad.
"Hey. hereH something^ happened." They didn't have any
knowledge of what it was. And I think that's probably what, that
contributed to my overall Impression that something was going on.
Weir was out, the White House was happy, McMahon later, i think
In October, said something to me, and It may have been this
plane. It was pretty obvious that something was going on.
Q You also apparently learned or your division did that there
had been a suppraaslon of a story in Israel about a Klmcha-
McFarlana meeting and Its reaulta and how it related to the
release of Weir, any recollections...
A I don't have any recollections.
Q According to Mr . Allen, he and director Casey met on
September 16, two days after or a day after Weir was released to
discuss the wair release and during the eoursa of the
conversation Casey indicated what ha knew about the American roie
in th%,tfan Initiative. Old you attend that meeting?
A Pin.
0 Old you have any knowledge of that meeting?
A No. I know Charlie waa Involved and everyone was trying to
get In on^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m and
Charlie In terms of who would go down^^^^^^^^^^^Rnd so
forth.
yNOlASSIRED
634
antmsro
Q Who from your office of anybody dealt with that
A I think It probably had
can't think of the name
ight now at the time. And"would have coordinated with the
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^H^^^^Hi
the guy.
Q Was Col . North in evidence to you In those September M, is,
16 period, trying to set up or establlshJ
and the other accoutrements that go with the release of the
hostages?
635
ii'MSsm
A I don't recall anything specific. No.
-^ Q Do yoLrTD-ecol lect whether or not you had concluded that
19 Mr. Buckley was or was not dead at that point?
20 A I think we'd pretty much concluded by that point that he was
bcTT
^1 dead. ■^Theugh we weren't going to publicly confirm it.
22 Q I understand, I understand. im going to show you what's
23 previously been marked as Allen exhibit number 7, l doubt that
24 you've seen it be^re, but perhaps you could look at it and ten
25 me I f you have. There's one point of reference that I wanted to
26 mention to you. On the second page of Mr . Allen's memo he
mimm
636
winssffl
56
Indicates that as of th« data of that memo, which i believe is
October 7th, the Central intelligence Agency, he says, has strong
evidence that Mr. Buckley is dead. Do you know what the strong
evidence was, that Mr. Allen's referring to on October 7th7
A It seems to me that there were bits and pieces reporting
dead, ^^^^^^^^^1 didn't have anything offerred
any hope. There 'd been something about people being moved and
Buckley hadn't been with them. But I don't recall any strong you
know, single piece of evidence or even, that stood out from the
others. It was. you know, that we hadn't heard from him. The
reporting about the hostages and we had I think by ther
Q Did It come to your attention during this period of time
that Mr. Ghorbanlfar had made an Inquiry as to the condition as
to Mr. Buckley and had advised US representatives as of this
period of time, 7-8 October, that Mr. Buckley was dead?
A No, It did not come to my attention that Qhorbanlfar had
done that. It may «4-. that Intelligence may ef^ been passed to me
in some form that, you know, that somebody said this, but i don't
recall his name coming up again until sometime later.
Q While we're In this period of time I'd like to show you one
other document that was generated by Mr. Allen for Col. North on
the 19th of September, relating to Iranian arms deals. Allen
exhibit 8, ask If you saw that document at or about the time it
OILASSIFIED
637
57
states.
A Market arms scams things, rings a bell, but I don't recall
the covering on It. I certal n ly . . .Char I le Allen to Oliver North,
I don't really recall this one. i remember the basic document.
Q Do you recall knowing that Col. North was being given this
Information by Mr. Allen at this time.
A No.
Q Or why It was being given to Col. North.
A No.
0 Sorry to Jump around. I missed one other thought. At the
October 6-7-8 period, when Qhorbanlfar was In town, that Is the
same time as the Achllle Lauro Incident, were you Involved In the
CIA's efforts to follow and be of assistance In the Achllle Lauro
matter?
A John McMahon
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ We heard about It
there.
Q In terms of the way you all operate, when you are away, when
you are on the road like that t take It that operational
responsibility would Me with your deputy back at headquarters,
is that the way It works?
A Yea .
Q Sc^^^^^^^^Bwou I d have had is comes
down to .
A Yea, that's right he would have been in charge of any, had
f •«IP-e%
638
DNWSsro
58
soRiethlng serious come up he would send me a cable.
Q Were you aware that Mr. Ledeen was playing a role in the
Achi I le Lauro matter?
A No.
Q Old you know Michael Ledeen at that time? Have you ever met
Michael Ledeen?
A I've never met Michael Ledeen. I've seen him in the
distance. I'd never heard of him until... I've heard of him of
course, he has written things about Iran. But, I mean heard of
him In our circle, until December of 1989.
Q 857
A December of 1985, that's right.
Q And you would have heard of him in that context because of
the Ghorbanifar memo?
A That's right. When that came out.
Q in mid November 198S, Mr. McFariane Is said to have had a
conversation with Mr. Casey and Mr. McMahon, relating that the
Israeli's were giving arms to Tehran. Old you have any knowledge
of that discussion, that conversation had with Casey?
A No.
Q Col. North at that same time, mid-November 1985 was In
London meet i n(
Manucher Ghorbanifar. Did y^u have any knowledge
ad no knowledge of him meeting with
HaKSiFlfn
Ghorban I far
Q Your relationship with Dewey Claij^ldge, at that time was
what? You knew each other professionally, I assume.
A Hhm?
You knew each other professionally?
A Oh, yea, yea, I've known him for years. He's the first real
^e CIA case officer I met^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^|and somebody said that's
a Case officer headed for somewhere. He wasl
it that point.
r
Q Had you had occasion to work with Mr. Ciarldge on any of
your assignments?
A In the old days ^^^^^^^^^^^^pwe' ve never served
overseas together
I guess. That's the only time
with h
ve ever worked In the same unit
ii.^.siFiFn
640
mmsim
Q With regard to events of November 22, 23, 24, 198S, were you
M In the country at that point?
15 A I was In the country at that point.
16 Q with regard to the flight ultimately made by the CIA
17 proprietary airline Into Tehran, were you aware of matters
18 relating to that flight while they were going on?
19 A No, no I was not. I didn't hear about that flight until, uh
20 It must have been early December .. .could have been the very end
21 of November, but I think It was, sort of the week or next week
22 after It. maybe ten days or two weeks.
23 Q You were or were not aware that Colonel North was at the CiA
24 the weekend of the 22nd7
25 A I was not aware of that.
26 Q Mr . Clarridge at no time talked to you about the events as
WUSSIFIffl
641
UNCLASSIFIED
thay w«r« going on?
A NO. Absolutely not.
Q with that also be true of your personnel.!
A I'm sure It Is, because i remenber when we learned about it,
I don't remember I f^^^Bheard about 1 1 or I heard about it... one
or the other... then we sat down and discussed It... what went
on... and there was apparently a flight.
And then I think there had been
a news story there about an airplane going to Tabriz and all
that, so I obviously knew something was going on but it didn't
enter my mind that it was one of our aircraft. it entered my
mind In a pure speculation — I wonder what this has to do with
the deal that may be going on, so I assumed It might be some
airplane that might be Involved with Secord or somebody that had
some Central American connection. But It didn't occur to me that
we had. . .
Q When did it actually come to your attention that the CiA
proprietary had been used?
A I think It was a weak or tan days after, maybe early
December I think It was.
Q Whan did you learn the cargo of the flight that was made by
the proorlatary?
A I learned, I think, when I learned about the flight I
learned that there was a concern to the point that John McMahon
had raised hell and said... that the concerns based on the fact
that there may have been military supplies, I didn't have any
iwssm
82-690 0-88-22
642
UarOTEO
62
1 specific knowledge. .. there had been a flight and It obviously had
2 been some sort of deal with Iran, and that military supplies had
3 been involved, and whether It had been Hawks or TOWs or anything
4 like that I didn't learn until later.
5 Q Has It ever come to your attention that a cable was sent
6 ^^^^^^^^^|^° ^'^ Headquarters on the 23 of November relating a
meeting between the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band
Secord. . .that Mr. Copp Identified tothe^^^^^^^^^^H that
9 the cargo was In fact Hawk missiles?
10 A I think that only came up, or came to my attention within
11 the last couple months, since I've been A.D.O.Oed. . . I n the course
12 of the Investigation and the Independent counsel and all that.
13 Q Have you ever seen that cable?
14 A No. I have not seen that cable, l have heard talk about it,
15 and I may have seen some of the I .0. notes on the Interview
I nvol vl n^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hbut the cable
17 know.
18 Q Do you have any knowledge that the cable does or does not
19 exist somewhere In the records of the CIA at the present time?
20 A No, I do not. I know there was cable traffic... I am not sure
21 what you mean by THE cable.
22 0 There Is A cable that weVe looking for Were you aware in
23 late November that Mr. McMahon felt a finding was required
24 because of this flight... a presidential finding?
25 A Either late November or early December, simultaneously with
28 the fact of the flight... in fact It came to my attention because
MOTHED
643
Mmim
63
1 John McMahon had said, "Be careful... no airplanes, no nothing
2 unless we have a f l nd l ng . " . . . that context... he didn't say that to
3 me, but I believe he said that.
4 Q Do you have any knowledge of who McMahon assigned the task
5 of checking with the White House periodically to determine if a
6 finding had been assigned?
7 A No I do not .
8 Q And you don't know what If any responsibilities either
9 Charles Allen or Dewey Clarridge had In that regard?
10 A No .
11 Q Let me show you a memorandum dated November 26, 1985 from
12 Mr. Casey to Vice Admiral Polndexter, enclosing a proposed
13 finding which approves of the Marcus Allen exhibit 10. i ask
14 that you look at that and tell me If you have ever seen that
15 document before.
16 A No .
17 Q YOU have therefore had no role In drafting the language or
18 suggesting the language to be used for this finding... the concept
19 behind i t . . . the rest of It was not your bailiwick?
20 A Absolutely not.
2 1 Q Do you remember attending a meeting I n Mr . McMahon 's office
22 on the 5th of December in which among other things the Iran
23 initiative was outlined and the November flight was discssed?
24 A I don't recall that. It's possible. As I say I learned
25 about the flight in very late November or early December, it is
26 convelvable that I could have attended the meeting, because i
ONCLASSm
644
>^
2
3
4
3
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2S
26
' mm\m
64
would h«v« understood the context of It.
Q Let's see if i can refresh your recollection. Let me show
you a memorandum that was done November 28, 1986 byl
reconstructing notes that Mr. McMahon made of a December 5, 1985
meeting held at his office amongst yourself, Mr. Qates, Mr.
McMahon ,^^^^^^^^^HMr . Juchnlewicz and^^^^^^^^^^H Let me
have this document marked as exhibit 3, Is that where we are?
I'd like you to take a few minutes to read It, because I'd like
to see If It would refresh your recollection at all on what
happened at that meet i ng .
.Paul several things, I've been reflecting back on the
situation and I was thinking a little later than this, I knew i
heard about the flight, then I knew that John talked to us,
talked to me, about the meeting that was taking place at the
White House on the question of the Initiative with the Israeli's
and the Iranians and I... ^oo soft to make out] . . . i have
difficulty In recalling this specific meeting but all of the
facts that are mentioned, most of the facts that are mentioned in
there I recall. But I don't remember this about the President
signing a Finding.
Q Well, that was question number one on the list. You don't
recal I that being discussed?
A No.
Q You don't recall who discussed It. I guess Is even more
Important, who raised the point?
ONCLASSIRED
645
w&jmm
65
1 A I sure don't, i Know the whole context was that if we were
2 to play any role and do something, there would have to be a
3 Finding, but I don't remember anything about a Finding
4 authorizing us to do th I ngs . . . they talk here about Oliver North
5 arranging five plane loads and a lot of this meeting was to get
6 Intelligence, i think so John would be prepared when he went to
7 the meeting on the 7th and you know, with facts. So that claims
8 by the Israeli's or others might be met with facts. But I do not
9 recal I that bit about the Finding.
10 Q Now, I m going to show you this document In a moment. On
11 December 7th, 1985, Mr. McMahon wrote another memo, a memo for
12 the record, and he said that "after repeated calls to NSC
13 personei on 27 November, and during the week of 2 December,
14 continuously receiving reassurances of the President's Intent to
15 sign the Finding, we were notified on 5 December that indeed the
16 Finding was signed. The President directed us not to inform
17 Congress for reasons of the safety and secure release of the
18 hostages until he so directed." December 7, 1985. Have you any
19 further recollection of what you all knew about a Finding you
20 sent to the President?
21 A I didn't know anything about a Finding. The first I heard
22 about a Finding was later In January. The first time I recall
23 hearing about a Finding.
24 Q At no time since these events have you or Mr. McMahon had
25 occaislon to discuss what caused him to believe a Finding had
26 been signed In December.
Mmsim
646
sn himji c
1 A John had gone to Lt. Aidrldge, I've seen himp couoie of
2 times you know, we've been back to testify in town, but I've
3 never talked with him.
4 Q Okay. If I could borrow that memo back. I'd like to ask a
5 couple of questions. What took place at this December 5, 1985
6 meeting. The second bullet Indicates that Mr. McMahon said that
7 he was going to be attending a meeting on 7 December, with the
8 President discussing the Israeli / i ranlan initiative. He says
9 that a new "Private Interlocutor was working with Israeli foreign
10 Ministry official David Kimche." Do you recall who the Identity
11 of that private Interlocutor was?
12 A No. I could make an assumption based on what i learned
13 later.
14 Q I understand that. Do you recall Manucher Qhorban I f ar ' s
15 name coming up In the context of this meeting, In early December?
16 ^^^^^^npparent ly shakes head. No.) Old not come up?
17 A I don't recall It coming up.
16 Q Do you recall Ledeen ' s name coming up at this meeting?
19 A No, No.
20 Q Were you aware that the day before, December 4, Dewey
r
21 Clarldga and Charles Allen, met with Mr. Ledeen at length to go
22 through the Qhorbanlfar Initiative?
23 A No. The first I heard of Ledeen was a little bit later when
24 he came up with some terrorist Information and other Information
25 and we got into It In the N.E. division.
26 Q Mr. Allen and Clarldge did not keep you apprised that they
UNCLASSIFIEO
647
iClASSIFIED
67
1 met with Ledeen In late November, met again with him on December
2 4, to discuss Ghorbanifar.
3 A No, absolutely not.
4 Q Do you recall^^^^^^^^^Hdo you recall him apprising you
5 all of what the cargo of the plane was that had flown on November
6 23rd?
A 7 I remember him mentioning something but, you know, I don't think
8 I focused that much. I knew it was weapons, or you know,
9 military goods, but I don't remember specifically what he said.
10 Q Well, let me just pursue that a tad further. Apparently
11 there was discussion at this meeting of North's plan to send
12 perhaps as many as five more plane loads including 747 's with
13 weapons to Tehran. Do you recall that discussion at all, what
14 the program was?
15 Q No. I don't. I mean it may well have been that. I mean it
16 was sort of at times Col. North tended to over dramatize if not
17 exaggerate things sort of, "get all this done and we're gonna
18 send five airplanes and get out seven hostages," and that sort of
19 thing. So I'm not sure I would have accepted at its face value
20 that yea, that's really going to happen in the next couple of
21 weeks even had ^^^^^^^Hs a id it having heard it from the White
22 House.
23 Q The reason I'm focusing on it, is because insofar as you all
24 were going to be backing up Col. North on that progreun given
25 McMahon's position that you all knew the Presidential Finding,
26 suggests to me that there mu|9 Ji»Mf been some discussion with the
648
%*^'
^^'^^mm
K*^-^^
.*''5%.
^- ^c^^
^JLillUWi
.^#i?
68
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Finding in place at this time, otherwise McMahon wouldn't have
had you all helping out Col. North.
A Well as I tell you my recollection at this meeting is that
it is primarily for John to get himself up to speed; we had the
DI people involved in this and Bob Gates and his deputy for the
Near East area ,^^^^^^^H myself ; that it was to get himself
armed with facts, facts and figures to go to this meeting to talk
about what ever was going to be done, but I do not recall him
mentioning a Finding or a specific role of CIA. The reference
there is right I think ^h*4|^H°^ somebody said well if Ollie's
going to get these airplanes then —
Q Let me add one other fact to the mix — we know from cables
that we reviewed that there was a lot of cable traffic during
this period of time trying to arrange for overflights in various
countries, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and the like —
A You mean through our channels?
Q Yes. Through the CIA. Seems to have been done primarily
out of Clarridge's shop. I'm just curious why you all weren't
playing a role, if you weren't.
A Well I've always, I mean I've reflected on that since the
time. It started out there was a flight to go from^^^^^^nd
there was a question getting clearances and that's!
[didn't really impact on the Middle East
and sort of started out from there and why it continued that way,
I don't know.
Q Coming at it from another angle, were you aware that of the
\\Mm
i .-S
■;iD
649
69
1 fact that the CIA was Indeed trying to obtain clearances for
2 these succeeding flights In early December?
3 A I don't recall being aware of that, no.
4 Q I'm trying to stir recollections which would suggest that
5 you would have known the Finding. But no such —
going^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^that cover any
7 anyway, so —
8 Q I understand- -
9 A There's no reason for me to be aware of that.
10 Q It was landing in Tehran though, it's under your turf, isn't
11 that right?
12 A It does, but it gets on to my turf, but I wouldn't be
13 involved the clearances of the flight clearances.
14 Q Okay. Alright. There is a reference in this collection
15 notes again going to the interlocutor that I have trouble with,
16 its key players were Rimche and the private U.S. citizen
17 interlocutor. Any further recollection of who that might be?
18 A Other than my later assumption; this would have been Ledeen.
19 Q Yes. But in terms of a specific recall of him being
20 discussed?
21 A No, not then. The first time I heard Ledeen' s name was
22 later. It up around the 20th or 21st of December, as I recall.
23 Q Do you recollect what assignment, if any, any division was
24 given to get McMahon up to speed for this meeting with the
25 President?
26 A I think it was sort tracks on the Iranian political
UNCLASSIFIED
650
70
1 situation, you know the moderates, the Mullahs, the middle-of-
2 the-roaders, identities of the people in the hierarchy who had
3 political clout, etc., etc., that sort of thing. And we would
4 have worked witn^^^^^^^H and his people on that, and if we had
5 something to add, you know from the intelligence hierarchy or
6 some reporting that fleshed out with the DI might , we
7 probably would put it together and given it to him. I don't
8 recall the product.
9 Q Do you recall McMahon expressing anything about his view of
10 the merit of this initiative, at this meeting prior to meeting
11 with the President?
12 A I recall, I don't recall when he expressed it; I think I
13 know what his attitude was, and I know what my attitude was at
14 the time, and I think he thought it was sort of a cockamamie
1 5 scheme .
16 Q Was that a view that you shared?
17 A Yeah. Well I thought, I began to think that it was really
18 cockamamie when I got Ghorbanifar's circus from Ledeen, and all
19 this stuff. Before that, when I heard this Israelis and, I mean
20 I thought it was you know not my bailiwick, political-diplomatic
21 decisions, but that it was a politically, you know when you've
22 been very careful walking a careful trail not to pay ramsom, not
23 to deal with terrorists, even though you weren't dealing with the
24 terrorists, you were dealing with the Iranians, and it was a
25 politically-charged dynamite, but you know I said something to
26 Bill Casey is this really what people want to do? And—
UNCUSSIFIED
651
B=
71
1 Q Wh«n would you have had that conversation, roughly.
2 A Roughly in December or January, I suppose.
3 Q Was this a one on one session, or in passing along the hall,
4 or what?
5 A It was probably at the conclusion of one of the meetings
6 that I had with him when we sen^^H^HHto talk with Ledeen.
7 I don't remember exactly. But on the other hand, if it were
8 something that could be done quickly and really have an impact on
9 U.S. - Iranian relations and get the hostages out, may be, cause
10 the results of the potential for them may be ... . . ._
11 Q Were you aware that Charlie Allen was preparing a memorandum
12 on the political situation in Iran at the same time?
13 A I don't recall.
14 0 You don't remember McMahon saying to Charlie Allen you've
15 need to give me a briefing on Iranian politics?
16 A No, I don't recall that.
17 Q You don't recall anybody saying why Charlie Allen, NIO
18 Counterterrorisra was doing this as opposed to the NIO for Near
South-Asia orj^^^^^^Hoffice?
20 A Well Charlie Allen's a man who fills a vacuum... I mean he
21 was still in terrorism quite legitimately and ...terrorism, Iran
22 was certainly a country that had been involved in state-supported
23 terrorism, and so I wouldn't have found it unnatural that Charlie
24 was sort of in his way dug up a lot of facts about Iran or
25 in the process of preparing
26 Q Clarridge was out of the country on the 5th of December
652
yNCUSSIFIEIl
72
1 which Is why his deputy attended this meeting. So was Mr. Casey.
2 Do you know If they were out of the country at the same location?
3 A No, I don't recall
4 Q Mr. McFarlane and Colonel North met with Mr. Ghorbanlfar In
5 London Immediately after the meeting of December 7th. Did you
6 know that was taking place at the time It took place?
7 A Not at the time It took place.
8 Q When would you have learned that?
9 A I think I heard about that, I learned, in fact I learned
10 more about what had gone on from Michael Ledeen's revelations to
11 ^^^^^^^^^V-'^ their first meeting that I had known. I mean that
12 provided then a very good framework for all these facts. I
13 learned it all from Ledeen. Ledeen told^^^ftll that 3 or 4
14 days before Christmas, including the fact that he had been in
15 touch with Ghorbanlfar and Ledeen was the promoter for
16 Ghorbanlfar.
17 0 Now let roe show you Mr. Allen's memo dated December 18,
18 1986, of his meeting with Mr. Ledeen on December 4. Did I say
19 December 18, 1986? December 18, 1985, of his meeting on
20 December 4, 1985 with Mr. Ledeen. Ask you to look at It and tell
21 me if you've ever seen that meroorandun before.
22 A Probably did see this. I can't say for sure, but I think it
23 was you know when Ledeen had proposed the day they had this scam
24 it might work against Khaddafl, and which was a cockamamle sort
thing, a sting operatlon^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand
26 lOiaddafi, and even Khaddafl isn't dumb enough to fall for It a
UNCUSSIFIED
653
^^■:^
73
1 second, well he might, but not a bird (laughter) so I heard about
2 that and it was about this time that either Claire or Clair* and
3 Casey, or maybe just Casey, I don't remember talking to us about
4 taking a look at this guy Ghorbanifar 's information well first
5 talking to Ledeen and leaving Ghorbanifar. Because we had bad
6 experiences with us; he sure had and so I may have in the course
7 of being briefed on here's the situation, I may have been handed
8 this memo. I don't recall it. But I'm certainly fauniliar with
9 most of the facts in this. Yeah. Either out of here or from
10 Ledeen 's conversation with
11 Q Has that document been marked? I don't think so. Let's
12 have it back and mark it.
13 A (Mumbling, typist can't distinguislij
14 Q Memorandum does make reference to a 1984 effort by Ledeen to
15 get McFarlane to open up contact with Iran. Did you have any
16 knowledge of the 1984 effort that McFarlane made to open contact
17 with Iran?
18 A No.
19 Q Did you ever explore that point either with Mr. Allen, Mr.
20 Clarridge, or someone else who had talked with Mr. Ledeen?
21 A No, no I don't think I did.
22 Q Reference to that memorandum to one of the schemes, which is
23 a suggestion by Ledeen as we read etbout Mr. Allen. That had been
24 discussed with Colonel North. Did you have occasion to discuss
25 these matters with Colonel North in the early December period
26 times?
UNCUSSIFIED
654
UNCLASSIFIED
74
1 A No, No.
2 Q Indicated in terms of Mr. Ghorbanifar, as I understood your
3 testimony, you knew of the situation that occurred in June/July
4 when the initiative came in You became aware
5 of Ghorbanifar again in December I take it.
6 A I think before then.
7
655
UNClASSIFiED
lElASSM
656
^■'^^^^c^
Q Let me stop you. Were you told that your White House
contact was to be Colonel North? How'd you know that North was
the guy tc
A I think the requirement came from North.
Q From North?
A Yes, I think so.
Q Did you actually meet with North on this requirement?
A I don't rem«nber whether I did not.
Q Did you pass this assignment to^^^^^^o carry out? Is
that the way it
USSIFJED
657
K?W^ ]¥
HEOv^r mfrn^f^
0 Do you recall any direction being given to^^^^^^^^or
anybody else to commuicate this information back to Colonel
North?
A About what?
Q That Nanucher Ghorbanifar had been subject to a burn notice
and was known to the CIA as a fabricator? A fabricator?
OllASSIFlEO
658
UNCLASSIFIED
78
1 A I don't recall that. I don't recall that.
2 Q Do you recall this matter coming to the attention of
3 Mr. Juchniewlcz?
4 A No.
5 Q Do you have any recollection of Juchniewicz callin'3
6 in and giving^^^^^Bthe assignment of advising Colonel North as
7 to the background of Manucher Ghorbanifar?
8 A No, it's quite possible.
9 Q Do you know if^^^^^Hever did that when he carried out the
10 assignment, told Colonel North about the background of Manucher
11 Ghorbanifar?
12 A Right at this time, I don't know. I know that Colonel North
13 by mid-December certainly knew the background of Manucher
14 Ghorbanifar; no question about that.
15 Q How about in early November?
16 A I don't know, I don't recall that. It's possible, but I
17 don't recall that. The trace or check on Ghorbanifar would turn
18 up the burn notice, and would have earlier.
19 Q One of the concerns I have is Mr. McFarlane, as you probably
20 know, from the Tower Report, professes not to have known Manucher
21 Ghorbanifar from an Edsel, so sometime in December 1985; do you
22 know of this information being passed on to the NSC, to McFarlane
23 before December 1985?
24 A I don't know. As you mentioned earlier in the preceding
25 summer when Hashemi came up with^^^^^^^HManucher thing. I
26 think its quite possible that North was told about it, but I
ICII^^SIFIEO
659
ddinlu
1 don't know the specifics.
2 The deposition adjourned at 12:45 p.m.
iinmim
Q
660
A^sociAit DDO
' •■ \:fr.." ■' 17 June 1985 'f '•:'■: •
MEMORANDUM FOR: "Chief. Nev East Division, 00
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:- Release of Hostages
2. Shaheen received a call from a Or. Cyrus Hashemi who 1$ currently
in Hamburg at the Hilton Hotel in Room 703. Hashemi has tried to get In
touch with us before offering to put us in touch with leading figures In
the Iranian Government. When we learned that Hashemi is under investigation
for violations of export control laws, we pulled away.
3. His recent call to Shahaen offered a change in Iranian policy (or
infqrmation about a change in policy) "that he could provide J^ the
American Government would be able to get him a nolle prosequi -- in short,
if we are able to take the pending indictment for conviction off his back.
Shaheen said that he had no power to do that but then asked whether Hasheni's
contacts with the Iranian government were good enough to spring the hostages
if he could be gotten off the hook. Shaheen did this knowing that there
have been occasions where nolle prosequis had been arranged for high
national security considerations. What he was doing was feeling out
Hashemi to see what kind of a reaction he would get. Hashemi said he would
call bacl^n^i^tw^^^r^^ja^back on the phone having, he said, lalked
.Xo_th^H|HIH^HBH^^|^H He came back for the release of
the DAWA hostages, plus TOW weapons, plus his nolle prosequi. Shaheen
dismissed this saying no weapons, no DAWA prisoners. Then again, to feel
him out, said, although I can't speak for the US Government, I understand
that it will not negotiate with terrorists, and vou mioht
j1 ies or soffethinq like
Again /j/asneai saio ne would check ar
thin a^Cupie or nours claiming that he had talked aoain to^^
ind that they weren't interested in Itanirt TOdltJl suppT
representative from Tehran!
■■iFw-»i.»t.H.''-WBlWAaJ.U'l'lJJB
jrsoay
@)
C/;V J7ii
3
.-. V - kEY*€^0/p<f UREASE
661
-...^U
>:
fier>Hfl_t Mnjaihea Shekeleh (no further id*nt1f1c*t1on) to conUct
thelraniansbn tfm. Shaheen claims that he has nadt It clear that he
can't do It for anything, tha^h^J^QX4rm|fl^oew»o^eal with terrorists!
there a ''i^^t ^ "9lH^^H|mHHHHHHa0th i ng at
could be agreed upon in advan^^^^^ff^«o<n^D^T^t^tn^Tranians to
thedHIB*'^^^ ^'^ offtr whic^^^HBB|^i[^HI||^^H|inight
be able to work out.
-?
6. This should probably be taken up witi]
it is ready under the circumstances to see^
^^ would be willing t^^sten to whatever proposition tne Iranians aiign
III iiiliiil III liii|liii|^^Mfrra ta hStfefl^o wnaWii' surrounding information
might be a'TaTTacT?^^^ T:
7. I ran into Rick Burt last night and discuss this with him. He
thought that it was interesting and indicated that there had been recent
knowledge that a nolle prosequi had been arranged and said he would talk
to Dick Hurphv about it. I think jjt might touch base with the Assistant
secretary or ^tate tor international. Organizations^s well as with Kurohy and
in doing so tell Dick about Burt's reaction. I suggest that he raignt want to
check with Burt. "~
William J. Casey
e
DO
^
3
3733
•SECRET
49o70
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kUNi;UlSSIFIE[bP«r^
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Tf ■^■■■■^■■jiggcii jiTC ''^^'''"^' C^lassifi^d/ Released on Syd/fy
^^^^^^^^^ unoer provisi:iis of EJ. 12356
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'-■noer provisonS of £J. 12356
^■1 ^ Reger, N^tirna! Secur; . Cfuncii
ITI
ONCUSSIFIED
667
\^-
^'
A^^
l!L-'.('^'iK
CIIN NC-_11^ TITLE John Mc'lalion's note pad Reference fo.J^ember_ 5._lQa:._
approval o": Findiag' related to ".SC nroiect.
DESCRIPTOI? - TO/FROn
Partially Cec'25S.fisJ.Rele3sefl onj«Lli£t^ tf
unccr ufoviiinns oi E 0 123t6
by K Johnson, Naiional Sscunf/ Council
(^3l)
668
28 Sov»»b«r 19S»
7.-.e .o.lcw:n9 is i :ecc.-.s tr jct ion of ccyjtic notes l^.ac I hav« f.-on i
; rece.T-er 19£; "^"- "■"'iii,^"--- ^°^'^ ^' HcMahcn's Cffice with then Dc:, 3ob
rhe CDCI requested tacts on t^.e following by the next day:
-Was It tru« that Iran ^o trying t
to '<noclc Otftr Soviet t8««^fttlfftr»tt
--The status of the Iran/Iraq war, i.-.cludinq a prognosis
of whit «3<;}5 might do and a table reflecting an order of
battle for each side.
ODCI noted that he vould be attending a iieeting at 10:00 AM on
•atjrday, 7 ^ece.Tber, with t'e President recarding the expansion of the
nfcf.Tial lirA bet-een the Iranians and the Isnslis;
--He noted that a new 'private interlocutor' was worVing
with Israeli Foreign Ministry Official David Kimche;
^ --Koted that Iran wanted to get closer to the United States
and wondered (CDCI) whether this could be a ruse to get
Hawk xissiles.
° DDCI noted that Saturday's .-neeting would take stock of the two-t:ack
rcgra.-n new uncer-ay: one to free th« J)^jt0ges «i)d^ t^ oihec to »x?ar.d our
ies wich Iran. Xeetirigs were planned In ■Geneva bet^^^fl h\* Uniteid States a
ran in the short ter-. ■* ' "^ '' ' fi----'-
^3-J^M^.
;&uD(9
W^
669
^-'m
rtvlewtd wh*t tti t«»ft <jon« to facT-
""^■"* ri**« lo*d ^ad i..n s«nt to iht Irann.-u on ""
--r-:v«t Sctth was to ^*t to Icr.con -,^.4t .^sKtnd
■ if i:ic-j$iic-s; :^» follc-irj wte< ;-.» vai
e:t*r,ci.-.g jp to f;v« rli,-.e loads, inclj.ii.ig
747»;
--?resii»nt sig.-.ed the finding; C 1- o.vm. ->o-V o,«>*»<»^>» -'^»
Clivsr r:cc:?i vas lining jp th« planes; -e don't
■«ncw how.
In response to a .question aicutaclsarance foe t;-.« landing
rights, soxecne noted ^^'^':ESHHH|B''er« standing by;
A question was raised regarding a plane going to Iran froia
Jerusalex ar.d oossiblv stooping in Texa s :
iev oi t»:*nt Iranian reporting noted the foUcwingi
--No real opposition that we could capitalize on;
--Khon^^jini s«e-ed to ;e in better health;
--The econcnic situation was deteriorating;
--The possibility of a new .T.ajot offensive could
stimulate opposition within Iran;
— Key players were Xi.nche and the private J.S. citize
intetlocjtor.
estedany intelliaence coverac
"Tlcus
iiiit i
670
lizt iss .•.^::T: * "hjs I i«i .ro.-.«y i;»r.i to continue
• lii^enc* f.;w :t<^i:iir\^ l^» location of tht
mmim
671
^ wmsm
ORIGINAL
Stenographic Transcript of
HL^NGS
Before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILI^Y ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE MICARAGUAN^PPOSlflON
UNITED STATES SENATE
DEPOSITION OF JA>fES A. BAKER, III
Monday, June 22, 1987 ^
j^niierp:Ovis::n<! of E.U. !2^5o
^y 9K ■'^ai'Qilii of curit; Council
i 1 W^ii
^^-fl
(202) 623-9300
20 F STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 200 01
672
UNWSIFe
1 DEPOSITION OF JAMES A. BAKER, III
2 Monday, June 22, 1987
3 United States Senate
4 Select Committee on Secret
5 Military Assistance to Iran
6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition
7 Washington, D. C.
8 Deposition of JAMES A. BAKER, III, called as a
9 witness by counsel for the Select Committee, at the
10 offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate
11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 9:31
12 a.m., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN
13 SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of
14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask
15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her
16 direction.
17
UNGUSSIFIED
673
*-©//?£//
1
appeara::ces:
2
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret
3
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
4
Opposition:
5
TERRY SMILJANICH. ESQ.
6
On behalf of the witness:
7
C. DEAN MC GRATH, ESQ.
8
Associate Counsel to the President
9
ED WILSON
10
11
MICHAEL SMITH
UNCLASSIFIED
82-690 0-88-23
674
IINCUSSIflEO
^ CONTENTS
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF
"^"^"^ SENATE
4 James A. Baker, III
5 By Mr. Smiljanich 4
^ EXHIBITS
7 BAKER EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION
8 1
11
9
UNfiUSSIFiED
675
UNCUSSIHED
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 Whereupon,
3 JAMES A. BAKER, III,
4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate
5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary
6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:
7 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
8 BV MR. SMILJANICH:
9 Q Mr. Secretary, you are currently the Secretary
10 of the Treasury; is that correct?
11 A • Right.
12 Q And you have served as Secretary of the
13 Treasury since when?
14 A Since roughly February 3, 1985.
15 Q And prior to that you served as Chief of Staff
16 to the President?
17 A That's correct, from January 20, 1981.
18 Q Up to the time you were confirmed as Secretary
19 of the Treasury?
20 A Up to the February 3 date, if I'm not
21 mistaken. It may have been February 1, but I think it
22 was February 3.
23 Q During the late summer of 1981 when you were
24 serving as Chief of Staff did you become aware of a
25 specific program^ whij^h was^j
IsilKkr^
676
A I don't have any specific recollection of
that, although it might well have come up in connection
with a meeting I attended, but I don't specifically
recall it today.
Q Putting aside the name of the operation for a
minute, -do you recall any such activity at that time or
discussions concerning the possibility °^^^^^^^^^^^|
A I don't have a specific recollection of any
such discussions.
Q Pursuant to that program sometime in either
late 1983 or early 1984 ti
Did you have any knowledge
of those matters?
A As we sit here today I don't have any specific
recollection of that, but, as I said, I attended most NSC
meetings and of course I attended morning briefings with
yiffiussifo
677
mmmiB
1 the President, and I can't tell you that the matter was
2 not discussed in a meeting that I attended. I don't
3 recall it.
4 Q In the summer of 1984 there is some indication
5 that there was an NSPG meeting at which the possibility
6 of third country solicitation was discussed in connection
7 with the Nicaraguan resistance. Do you recall an NSPG
8 meeting at or about that time in which that topic was
9 discussed?
10 A I recall an NSPG meeting which I thought was
11 in the fall of '84, which was held before the Boland
12 Amendment became effective to discuss the possibility of
13 third country funding for the contras.
14 Q And who do you recall being present
15 specifically at that meeting?
16 A Well, I specifically recall that Mr. McFarlane
17 chaired the meeting as the National Security Advisor.
18 The President was in attendance. The Secretary of State
19 was there. And those are the only people that I
20 specifically recall being there, although — well, those
21 are the only people I specifically recall being there.
22 Q Do you recall that the possibility of third
23 country funding was the primary focus on that NSPG
24 meeting?
25 A As I recall it, it was.
UNCIJSSSIFIED
678
UNWSIFIED
1 Q This was a full-fledged NSPG meeting and
2 discussion of the matter?
3 A Yes, it was.
4 Q Do you recall whether or not any action was
5 taken pursuant to that discussion?
6 A I do not believe any action was taken.
7 Q Do you recall the question of the legality of
8 such third country solicitation being discussed?
9 A Yes.
10 Q What was your position at that time with
11 regard to the legality of the matter?
12 A My view was that we should take a very close
13 look at that question and I so stated in the meeting.
14 And it was my view that we could not do indirectly what
15 we could not do directly. My recollection is that a
16 similar reservation was expressed by Secretary Shultz,
17 that the meeting generally concluded with a decision to
18 take a hard look at the legality of third country
19 solicitations. ;jg^ .
20 Q Do you recall what the position of Mr.
21 McFarlane was?
22 A Well^^p&infc-^^^c^r*^n^^rfic«ted at^ one
2 3 point that tffft'^C^g^nsie^Fsd t^fe^rgucR^^.jMpjp'^'i
24 were le'ga\ but , :^^ rei^^l^^^<aS9<I^^^^B»w ;^ *hat
25 before ther«Pwa*'^^^«(^t5^i*ct ion there should be
UNCOSSIFIED
679
UNCLIiSSIFe
1 another scrub on that qviesfeiSs. "■- ^- -.
2 Q. ^iUiM it daffided thatj^e Attorn^Tfisn^^l ^=;._~
specifically should take a ^^^''^^^'^fth'T**'*^**^ ^»"*»««-
3
4 matter?
5 A I can't ■?Wa 11 that^«nd f rankty^ I don'tjgp» ^~
6 recall whether the SCtorney General was in attendance at -^
7 this particulir^jaeetiBg. J^ ^
8 Q Do you.xecall whether »jr ' jwjt th» cldlwr^ook
9 at the Sltua^en was going tcr jep-^one by tit* i^orney
10 Genera%^8 of fice as of^sed to NSC^L^^L^bulWiJ^I^- T^w J
11 r* • ^f-: really don >^^ncatl^ut-_it would h^^ ij»>»T- i
12 guess that it wSE^ pi^^bly hajlfm 1 liJj^^^OJpMj JiT)' "^
13 Gener^j^ sinc^j^Ui^tsly «h»^to]^ij|^lfeiq^l^^twi to
14 pass on thoat^K^rot aStl^m^B. ^W^ - -1 .--- .^ 36
15 Q I had- indicated to yod^irt^e ago thaS^the ' aa
16 notes of Chai9.^-Hill, i^o wdgsecr»€arj^a|gij^8 jaecial
17 assis^n^aj^^aatbiVe^^PisttfBr, ^Afaatji that in^ -r--^-' r
18 discussion he had with Secretary Shultz on June 28, 1984,
19 Secretary Shultz told him that at a recent NSPG meeting
20 he had had some reservations about the legalities of
21 third country solicitation and stated that your position
22 at the time was "Jim Baker thinks it's an impeachable
23 offense."
24 Do you recall having any specific opinion like
25 that or such as that'
imSSIFIED
680
uiM^ro
1 A No, I don't recall using that language or
2 having a specific opinion such as that, although I do, as
3 I have stated, recall feeling that we should take a very
4 close look at the question of legality and feeling that
5 we could not do indirectly what we couldn't do directly.
6 Q Would it be fair to say that your position at
7 that time was that there was, in your opinion, a very
8 good chance that such activity would be illegal under the
9 current state of the law?
10 A Well, I hadn't examined the law and I was not
11 in a position to pass judgment on it, but I felt that it
12 was important that it be looked at carefully and that it
13 was important, quite frankly, from a political standpoint
14 as well in terms of public support and that sort of
15 thing.
16 Q Did you have, at that time — let me just ask
17 you what was your position with regard to the policy of
18 third country solicitation, putting aside the legality of
19 it for a moment? Did you have an opinion?
20 A Well, I strongly supported the contra — did
21 and do strongly support the contra effort. I did not
22 really have a specific opinion with respect to the
23 question of third country solicitation as long as there
24 was no question of illegality apart from the public
25 relations and public support and Congressional support
UNCLASSIFIED
681
imanssw
10
1 aspect.
2 Q Do you recall whether or not the President had
3 or expressed an opinion at that meeting about either the
4 policy or the legality of third country solicitation?
5 A I don't recall whether the President expressed
6 an opinion, but the meeting, as I indicated earlier, I
7 think ended in a decision to take a close look at the
8 question of the legality of third country solicitations.
9 Q I've shown you earlier minutes of an NSPG
10 meeting for May 16, 1986, during which time the subject
11 was again discussed. Do you recall that particular NSPG
12 meeting at which you were in attendance?
13 A Well, I do now that I've seen the minutes.
14 Q And at that meeting some further discussion
15 was held about the possibility of approaching third
16 countries for support for the contras; is that correct?
17 A That's correct.
18 Q At that point there was a change in the law
19 with regard to whether or not such activity was
20 specifically addressed as being appropriate or not by
21 Congress; is that correct?
22 A That's correct. Evidently Congress
23 specifically provided for third country solicitation for
24 humanitarian assistance.
25 Q Having read the minutes, did you recall
mtmmw
682
UNCUSSIFIED
11
1 anything beyond what's contained in the minutes with
2 regard to the positions of the various people in
3 attendance on that issue?
4 A No.
5 Q What was your position on that matter at that
6 time?
7 A Well, to be very honest with you, I'd have to
8 reconstruct my position from the minutes, and my position
9 was that it was important that we do what we could to
10 sustain the contras as a viable force during the
11 implementation of any Contadora agreement, and I see here
12 where I said that it would appear that Congress had
13 changed the law with respect to the question of our
14 approaching other governments for assistance.
15 MR. MC GRATH: At this point it might be
16 appropriate to mark the minutes as an Exhibit.
17 MR. SMILJANICH: Sure, why don't we do that?
18 (The document referred to was
19 marked Baker Exhibit Number 1
20 for identification.)
21 BY MR. SMILJANICH: (Resuming)
22 Q Mr. Secretary, Assistant Secretary Elliott
23 Abrams has referred to this whole subject of third
24 country solicitation as "tin cup diplomacy", and I
25 believe Secretary Shultz has also expressed a general
UNMSIFIED
683
UNfliSSIFIED
12
dislike Cor this as a policy matter. Did you have any
opinions one way or another with regard to the overall
policy concerning third country solicitation?
A No. I suppose my view would comport with
theirs, that it would be far better for the policy to be
supported by the legislative branch of government and for
the funding to come from appropriations.
Q Did you have or do you have at this time an
opinion with regard to whether or not third country
solicitations will always give rise to a question of quid
pro quos.in connection with any contributions?
A I didn't have an opinion then. I was not
really involved in the business of third country
solicitations. That wasn't my responsibility, and I
didn't do any of it.
Q Okay. In the summer of 1984 the evidence is •
that money began to arrive on behalf of the contras from
^^^^1 sources . Did you have any knowledge, starting in
the summer of 1984, that^^^^^^^^were making any
contributions directly for the contra effort?
A None that I can recall.
684
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Q When the matter of third country solicitation
was discussed in either the summer or fall of 1984 do you
recall or were you aware of any other planning to prepare
for the impending cutoff of aid for the contras via the
Boland II amendment?
A I don't recall being aware of any. I just
simply don't recall it. I can't tell you that there were
not discussions involving private assistance and that
yWtSSSIFIED
685
mumm
14
1 sort of thing, but I don't recall those and I didn't, the
2 best I recollect, attend any meetings called for that
3 purpose.
4 Q Do you recall any discussions concerning the
5 involvement of the National Security Council staff on
6 behalf of the contras to fill the breach created by the
7 cutoff of funds to the CIA and Department of Defense?
8 A No. The only thing I recall involving the
9 National Security Council staff would be the public
10 liaison activities where we would have briefings in the
11 Executive Office Building designed to build public
12 support for the contra policy. Those went back to, I
13 would imagine, the end of '82, start of '83. And those
14 were held by the public liaison people in the White
15 House, not the National Security Council, but they would
16 have National Security Council staffers brief
17 occasionally the diplomatic and military situation.
18 Q But this was all in connection with a public
19 diplomacy —
20 A Public diplomacy effort. It was basically run
21 by Faith Whittlesey's shop in the White House.
22 Q Okay, one last area. .-"Were you aware during
23 your tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, starting in the
24 spring or summer of 1985, up- through November of 1986, of
25 any activities on behalf of the United States which have
ummiED
686
UNCUSSIFIED
15
1 come to be Jcnown as the Iran initiative — in other
2 words, the whole matter involving trading of TOW missiles
3 or HAWK spare parts to Iran in an attempt to get our
4 hostages in Lebanon released?
5 A No.
6 Q Anything with regard to our cooperation with
7 the government of Israel in connection with this
8 provision of military supplies or equipment to Iran in
9 connection with getting our hostages released in Lebanon?
10 A During 1985 and '86?
11 Q • In '85 and '86 specifically.
12 A Not that I recall, no.
13 Q You had no knowledge or awareness of the
14 matters which have come to be known as the Iran arms-for-
15 hostage deal? You had no knowledge of it at the time?
16 A I had no knowledge. I had no knowledge of any
17 dealing with Iran of arms for the release of our
18 hostages, no.
19 Q What about dealing in arms with Iran in
20 connection with the opening up of a new strategic
21 relationship with Iran?
22 A No.
23 Q You were not aware of Mr. McFarlane's visit to
24 Tehran in May of 1986?
25 A No, I was not.
OttCtJtSSIFlEO
687
UNCLASSIFIED
16
1 MR. SMILJANICH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
2 That's all the questions I have.
3 MR. MC GRATH: I would just like to let the
4 record reflect that the Secretary appeared here
5 voluntarily today to cooperate with the Committee and its
6 investigation and that these proceedings will be
7 classified at a rainimum of the Top Secret level. We
8 appreciate the Committee's assistance.
9 MR. SMILJANICH: And we appreciate the
10 Secretary's cooperation in this matter.
11 (Whereupon, at 9:50 a.m., the taking of the
12 instant deposition ceased.)
13
14 Signature of the witness
15 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
16 , 1987.
17
18 Notary Public
19 My Commission Expires:
mmim
688
UNCUSSIFIEO
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ca.cen by ae ro :he best of my ability ana charea:
mdar ny iireccion; thac said deposition is a true ra:or:
givsn Dv said witness; thac I aa neither counsel :or, r.
eoiploved by any of the parties to the action in wnich th:
was ta*en, and further that I am not a relative or anplo;
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NOTARY ?':3LIC [
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UNCLASSIFIED
689
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690
TRANSCRIPT ""^-^^e;
OF PKQCEEDCJJGS
UNITED STATES SENATE
SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
DEPOSITION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BARBULE5
■^^^cuss/n©
Partially Declassified/Released on 1-4-^'
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by N. Wenan. National Security Council
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, September 22, 1987
UNCLASSIFIED ~
Ace-Federal Reporters, Lnc.
SftfTKjfypf Wtpfwtfn
■m North C^tol Street
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 347-37D0
IStalioawidtCovci^i
WaI* jJO" oo4o _
SECREtr "«'«:=^^-^^«-^
691
TRANSCRIPT
OF PRQaEEDINGS
UNITED STATES SENATE
SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
DEPOSITION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BARBULES
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, September 22, 1987
Partially Declassified/Released on
under provisions of E 0. 12356
by N. Menan, National Security Council
Ace-Federal Reporters, Lnic.
Sifftotypt /vportprs
444 North CapitDl Serm
Washington. D.C. 20001
(202) 347-3700
Nation wi«k Cowiagc
800-336-6646
Miy^iiFipn
692
UNULAbbiritU
SECRET
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
DEPOSITION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BURBULES
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, September 22, 1987
Deposition of LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER G. BURBULES,
called for examination at the offices of the Senate Select
Committee, Suite 901, the Hart Senate Office Building, at
9:45 a.m., before LOUIS P. WAIBEL, a Notary Public within
and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf
of the respective parties:
JOHN SAXON, Esq.
Associate Counsel
United States Senate
Select Committee on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition.
ROBERT W, GENZMAN, Esq.
Associate Minority Counsel
ROGER LEE KREUZER,
Investigator
United States House of
Representatives Select
Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.
CI-flKUU. aiMMTttS INC
UNGUtSSIHtD
12356
3tional Security Council
j/Released on
'3v::ions of E.O. 12356
693
uNci^sm
COLONEL JOHN K. WALLACE,
Office of the Secretary
Headquarters,
Department of the Army
III, Esq.
t-nttu*. unmat. inc
mmim
694
nmmm
CONTENT
Lieutenant General Peter G. Burbules
By Mr. Saxon
EXAMINATION
EXHIBITS
BURBULES EXHIBITS
IDENTIFIED
Exhibit 1
12
Exhibit 2
15
Exhibit 3
17
Exhibit 4
17
Exhibit 5
2C
mimm
695
UlU^ffiED
PROCEEDINGS
li Whereupon,
i'
PETER G. BURBULES
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. SAXON:
Q Will you state your name for the record, please,
sir.
A Peter George Burbules, Lieutenant General,
United States Army.
Q And what is your current position. General
Burbules?
A Deputy Comaanding General for Material Readiness,
United States Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia.
Q And when did you assume your position at the
Army Materiel Command?
A I assumed my position, I believe, on the 1st of
June 1985.
Q *86?
A Yes, '86. Yes, you're right.
Q And prior to that, sir, what was your position?
\immm
696
SECRET
A I was Commanding General, Missile Command,
Huntsville, Alabama, Redstone Arsenal.
Q And what were your dates of service at MICOM,
if you recall?
A It's approximately from May of '85 to late May
1986.
Q Sir, as you know, the area of our inquiry that
concerns you has to do with the shipments to TOW missiles
that took place from Anniston Army Depot through MICOM in
1986. There were three shipments. The first shipment took
place in February, while you were still at MICOM; the second
shipment was taking place about the time you were leaving,
and the third shipment took place in November, after you
were in your current position at AMC.
Then the HAWK shipment tasking caune down in
early April and was being worked through the month of April
of 1986.
Those will be the two things we will focus on.
In a previous meeting with you on June 2, 1987,
Roger Kreuzer, a House Staff Investigator, and I met with
you. We covered a fair amount of ground which we have put
in an interview memorandum which is available for subsequent
\ims&m
697
UNei^sife
readers of this deposition, so I'm not going to take the
time to cover all of the material in that memorandum, and
that was the subject of our earlier discussion, where you
were, on what day and who said what to whom.
In terms of the general picture, what we want
to do, specifically, is to focus on the pricing questions
which attended the first TOW shipment and then some questions
about the HAWKS.
Let me ask you, sir, when you became aware that
there was a tasking to MICOM to ship TOW missiles to, at
the time its customer was CIA.
A As I mentioned to you before, I became aware when
colonel Jim Lincoln, Project Manager for the TOW missile
system, came in my office and told me that there was a
classified movement under way and that he had concerns about
the price that was to be charged on it. He felt that the
Army was going to charge too low of a price, and I believe
he asked my advice and asked for my support.
Q All right. Let me fill in one or two things,
sir.
When he came to you, this was after he had
already received the requirement and had begun work; is that
CI-ftOUM. MKtTUt. INC
UNMSFIED
698
vHmum
correct?
A Apparently so. How long after, I don't know.
Q And in fact. Colonel Lincoln had been told by
his point of contact here in Washington, at DA Headquarters,
that he should not inform you; is that correct, sir?
A I found that out very late. As a matter of fact,
earlier this year, 1987.
Q So, while in a technical sense. Colonel Lincoln
may have been countermanding the instructions he was given,
he had some concerns and, as his commanding officer, he
went to you with those concerns?
A Yes. Apparently that's why I ws brought into
it so late, because of that caution not to, you know, it
was highly classified, not to tell anybody, which I have
learned since.
Q All right, sir.
When he came to you, did Colonel Lincoln give
you the specifics of the price question that he was concerned
about?
A No. Only words to the effect that they're asking
us to charge the older price for the missile, whereas the
cost to replacing them currently with new missiles would be
m^Mm
699
uNCki^ra
much more, and the Army would end up with fewer missiles in
the stockpile.
Q So as best as you recall it, the entire subject
for your discussion with Colonel Lincoln had to do with
replacement price?
A Right.
Q And for the record, the Army sold to the CIA and
subsequently to the Iranians, basic TOW missiles, which were
entered in the Army Master Data File or AMDF, at a price
of $3169. They had to have safety modifications, the
missile ordnance inhibitor circuit or MOIC — M-0 I C — '
in order to bring them up to the condition code alpha, which
had been specified by the CIA.
Unbeknownst to certain parties involving these
transactions, when the Army realized, in the early '80s,
that certain of its basic TOWs had to have the safety
modification, MICOM officials created a new national stock
number and a new price for the basic TOW that went into the
AMDF, which had a MOIC
Rather than taking $3169 and adding $300 and getting
$3469, which seeins logical to do, the decision was made, as
we have subsequently learned, to add to the entry price of
UNEUISSIFIED
700
- It
S3169, some inflation in the price for the subsequent
purchase of basic TOWS, along with one other factor, having
jl an eye to the cost of conversion, the cost of the MOIC, in
order to create a higher price for the basic TOW with MOIC
of $8435. And the price of $8435 is separate and distinct
from the replacement cost of selling a basic TOW and
replacing it with, say, TOW-II, at a price of $11,000.
So if you will follow that analysis, let me ask
this question:
When Colonel Lincoln came to you, as I understand
your testimony, he was saying, we're selling basic TOWS.
We're getting" — he may not have said $3469 or $3500 -- but
"we're getting a price in the low range. We're going to have
to replace them with I-TOW or TOW-II, and that costs a lot
more . "
Is that the way he put it to you?
A Yes. Did not discuss any specific dollars.
Didn't get into those details. Just the basic concept of
original acquisition costs versus replacement costs.
Q Just to make sure, then, that we understand
your testimony for the record, he did not talk about the
fact that there had been a discovery of a second price for
C-fEDUAl. •CHMTCIIS. mC
wmm
701
mfmm
-.t-nOUM. DCKMTMJ. INC
the basic TOW with MOIC?
A No, he did not.
Q All right, sir.
And if I understand your testimony, at no time
when Colonel Lincoln came to you in his discussion, were
specific price amounts discussed.
Is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q Did you have a general knowledge at the time of
these transactions and at the time you had a discussion with
Colonel Lincoln, that when the Army took a basic TOW and put
the MOIC on it, that that changed its national stock number
and gave it a new and higher price?
A No, I did not know that. Nor, as I testified to
you before, did I know anything about a MOIC, in that I'm not
a missile expert. I was sent down there to assist in their
procurement programs, and I did not know the details of those
missile systems.
Q All right, sir.
I want to ask you. for an opinion, and I clearly
denominate this question as an opinion question.
In your opinion, from the time you spent at MICOM
wmmm
702
UNCUSSIHir
:i-ruM*i. iinNiTciiJ. inc
jl and the many years of service in the Army, should someone who
i!
, was in a position of being the Project Manager for the TOW
■Office have been familiar with the details of pricing of the
missiles under his control, or are those the kind of details
I that people working for him would better be expected to know?
|| A People working for him better understand that,
because you have to understand the Project Manager as generally
a very small office, and he is supported more or less by the
large Commodity Command, the major support command, and all
the staff. there, and they're the ones that provide the
expertise.
For example, he does not have item managers under
his control. They work for the Material Management
Directorate. He doesn't have any lawyers under his control.
They work with the Legal Department. He doesn't have quality
assurance specialists, except maybe just one representative.
Those work for the Quality Assurance Directorate. So he
draws his support fran the major Support Command and deals
mainly with programmatic issues, you know, costs, scheduling,
and technical performance in a broader sense, leaving the
details to experts in that area. And it's a very complex
business, as you found out, and just think, it would be
mm£o
703
mmmm
|i unreasonable to expect the Project Manager to know the details
^ of the individual costs of individual parts of his weapons.
|, Q What I would like to do now. General, is to show
jjyou a few of the documents that create a paper trail on the
TOW transfers. I have no reason, necessarily, to expect that
you have ever seen these and, in fact, if you haven't, that
would not only not surprise us, but probably, given your level,
would make perfectly good sense that you have never seen them.
What I would like to do is have marked as
Deposition Exhibit 1, and give that to you and give you a
chance to look at it, but before you do, let me tell you what
you're looking at. You are looking at the Material Release
Order or MRO, as it's called, which is a standard MICOM form,
that was prepared for each of the three coshipments, and I'll
give you a moment to glance at that.
(Burbules Deposition Exhibit 1
identified.)
THE WITNESS: Yes, I think I can answer your
question now. I did not see these while I was at the Missile
Command. I did not see them in any aspect of my involvement
in this affair. I think I saw them when Mr. Mike Sandusky,
of our headquarters, was doing his investigation, his
c-rtDCUL •cratTEis. mc
UNWSW
704
mmm
after-the-fact inves\:.i.gation. He tried to assist the
Department of Army Inspector General and ourselves in
reconstructing the cost history. I think he may have flashed
these by me in showing me how he was reconstructing the price
history. This is all after-the-fact.
Q What I would like you do is take a look at, while
some of this material is second and third and fourth
generation copies and some things are blurred, if you would
look at the quantity block of the 1000 that lets us know we're
looking at the first shipment.
If you look at the National Stock Number block,
the last four digits which are 1512, your specialist at MICOM
will tell you that 1512 — that's how they refer to it — is
the shorthand form for the basic TOW with the MOIC. Then if
you look at the unit price that's been entered at $8435, this
is the first document that was created when the tasking came
down from Washington to MICOM. This document was the basic
release order in order for Anniston Army Depot to begin work,
and the information on it was flown down from Redstone to
Anniston Army Depot, and I understand a hard copy followed.
If you turn the page to the second copy, this is
dated 16 May, for the second shipment of 508 TOWS, and
UNE»SSinED
705
UNSiy^sife
I likewise, the S8435 price appears therein.
The last page is for the third shipment of 500
TOWS, and it has a price of $8164, which is different from the
$8435, because of the I-TOW conversion that was done, and that
shipment took place after you were gone. But the point from
these documents is that someone at MICOM, working in the TOW
Project Office, who prepared this Material Release Order
clearly knew that a basic TOW with MOIC cost $8435.
I take it from you saying you haven't seen this,
you also were never made aware that that was the price put in
the basic work documents at MICOM.
A No, I was not. And I can't even read the
signatures, but I see Mr. John Finafrak's name here, and he
doesn't work for the Project Manager. He was in the Materiel
Management Directorate, as I mentioned to you before. What
I'm saying is, that possibly this document was prepared in
the Material Management Directorate, not in the TOW Project
Office.
Q All right, sir. Let me ask you to look at the
second exhibit and ask that be marked.
This was prepared at Anniston Army Depot and, again,
there's no reason to believe you would have seen this document,
\lWILfSS4WtB
82-690 0-88-24
706
uNcussm
|| but it is the Ammunition Planning Work Sheet.
jj Let me simply ask you first if you have ever
I' seen, generically, an Ammunition Planning Work Sheet or are
familiar with its use.
(Burbules Deposition Exhibit 2
identified. )
BY MR. SAXON:
Q Sir, if you would look in the quantity block here,
you see quantity of 1000. This is for the first shipment of
TOWS. The stock number shows the 1512, which means it's a
basic TOW with MOIC, and the unit price — this is all 1000,
so you if you do some quick division and drop the zeros, you
see the unit price is $8435.
A That tracks back to the $8435 that was on the
Material Release Order.
Q Yes, sir.
Now, as the folks at Anniston Army Depot then began
to work the requirement, they generate the next document in
the trail, and that is a standard transfer document which is
on DD Form 1348. I'll give you that.
A 21 January or February? I can't read that.
CI-rCKUU. «C»«TE«$ IHC
ItNCy^lFIED
707
nnmsmii
Q January.
A January. Okay.
Q This is a copy — and I ask that be marked as
Exhibit 3 — of the first iteration of DD Form 1348, which, as
you see, is from Anniston Army Depot to Redstone, and if you
look in the quantity block, you see we've got 1000 missiles,
j and the stock nuinber again is the 1512 or basic TOW with
MOIC, and the unit price in the upper right-hand corner is
$8435.
. So again, the people at Anniston who were working
this apparently knew that a basic TOW with MOIC had that price
or had simply taken that price that came down from the MRO.
A I don't know where they get the price, nor do I
really know where the people at MICOM got the price, nor do
I know that that price is necessarily correct.
Q Well, after the fact, a number of people have
concluded that the price is not correct in terms of how it
went into the A^EF. At the time, it was the correct price,
according to the Army Master Data File for basic TOW MOIC,
and having interviewed and deposed the person who prepared
that Material Release Order, he said he took that figure not
so much from the AMDF. but from his head, because he worked
UNIiASSIHED
708
""mm
with the TOWS all the time and knew that the basic TOW with
! MOIC had the price of $8435.
ji A Again, you say "the correct price," but I believe
i
I you're saying it was the correct price, because it was in the
!| AMDF. But because it was in the AMDF does not necessarily
mean that it's the correct price. Errors are made.
Q Yes, sir. But my understanding is that no one
knew that errors had been made in entering that price and that
was the price people worked with.
A Presumed to be the correct price.
Q Yes. I think that's a better way to put it. It's
the presumed correct price at the time.
Let me have you look now at the next exhibit and
ask that this be marked as Exhibit 4.
(Burbules Deposition Exhibits 3 and
4 identified.)
BY MR. SAXON:
Q This is a series of the same document, and the
reason it's a series is, this is for the first shipment of
1000, but each document represents a breakdown of a certain
portion of lot of that 1000, and this was signed at MICOM
by Mr. Chris Leachman, who at the time was the head of
UNCIASSII^ED
709
mmmi
logistics for the TOW Project Office. He is now the TOW
il Project Deputy. And if you look at the unit price block and
II
r
track that all the way through on all of them, you will see
that --
A I don't see a unit price on the top one.
Q That has been left blank, yes, sir.
I A I see. What are the dates of these, relative to
the dates of the first ones we saw? This is 29 January.
Q Yes, sir; that's correct.
A And the other one is 21 January?
COL WALLACE: Yes, sir.
THE WITNESS: Have you looked into the possibility
that the folks may have started to move out on this, because
it was a rush shipment, started to move out, assigning prices,
and have you looked into the possibility that disputes over
prices occurred after these documents had been cut?
MR. SAXON: We have looked into just about every
possibility, aaid I don't mean to be glib about it sir, but
to ascertain when the prices entered into the document, when
a price disappeared from the documents.
BY MR. SAXON:
Q I guess the thing that strikes us at least curious
mmma
710
UN6IASSIFKD
is that in Exhibit 4, we have no price. Not that it isn't
S8435, but that it isn't even $3469, which is a price that
everyone at MICOM says they were working with, in terms of
hipment.
I| A I think it's a reasonable observation, and you
[ probably have asked why was the price omitted.
I don't know why the price is omitted on this
document.
Q And I take it that this would be the first time
you have been made aware that when the transfer document gets
to MICOM, and Leachman, on behalf of MICOM signs for the TOW,
that there is no price in the unit price block?
A No, I'm not aware of those details.
Q All right, sir. The final document is to show
you what happens when individuals from the Department of Army
Logistics Office, and in particular. Major Chris Simpson, who
is the Action Office for this, working under General Russo,
Simpson arrives on the scene at Redstone to physically take
possession of the missiles for the Army and then transfer them
to the CIA.
I'd ask you to take a look at this document and
have that marked as Exhibit 5.
"'^miEli
711
Q
(Burbules Deposition Exhibit 5
identified.)
BY MR. SAXON:
If you notice a signature at the bottom of Major
Chris Simpson - and all of these documents have been
declassified in this redacted form, and we have blacked out
that particular name, but underneath has been put the letters
"CIA," and the particular individual who signed on behalf of
the CI, and then the price reappears in the price block, and
it's $3469.
Let me just ask, for the record, if you have ever
seen this document before.
A No, I have not.
Q And have you had any awareness of the fact that
that particular price was entered?
A No. Again, I had no involvement in those times
with the detail prices, other than the initial acquisition
cost and replacement value on those.
Q Now when the issue of replacement cost was
flagged for you by Colonel Lincoln, what action did you take?
Did you, in fact, have a phone conversation with General
Russo?
UNISJiSSIilED
712
wfmwm
■■HOUM. Mnrrtii. inc
A I believe I did and expressed our concerns, and,
as I mentioned to you last time, General Russo noted my
concerns, and he said he'd look into it. And again, reaching
back in memory, I don't know how I found out, whether he
called me back or whether a message was sent out or whether
Colonel Lincoln came back in and told me that Department of
the Army had decided to go with the lower price, the original
acquisition cost. And I accepted that as a decision by my
higher headquarters, a decision by competent authority and
dropped the matter.
Q And was it your understanding that the issue of
replacement cost in whatever way it was done up here had been
considered, but basically rejected?
A Yes.
Q When you talked with General Russo, did he tell
you anything about the nature of the consideration that would
be given, by whom it would be considered?
A Nothing. I knew of this only as Operation
Snowball, didn't know anything about the CIA's involvement.
Frankly, I thought it was a classified FMS sale directly to
a foreign government.
Q Well, we certainly know it was classified and it
mmmm
713
UNCbASStflED
was directed to a foreign government.
A No, directly, directly to a foreign government.
Not directed.
Q Did General Russo indicate to you anything about a
ceiling, which the customer had to operate with or for which
reason it might be difficult to get a replacement cost?
A No.
Q Did he indicate to you that the issue of a
replacement cost had already been pressed forward by the Army
and been rejected?
A NO.
Q None of that?
A No. Merely that he would look into it, as I
recollect.
Q Did you mention to General Russo at that time what
any of the replacement cost would be?
A No. Because I didn't know uhat the replacement cost
would be. Just that it probably would have been substantially
higher.
Q And he didn't ask what the specifics would be,
in terms of replacement cost?
A No, not to my recollection, anyway.
mm&m
714
wmmm
Q I'm ready to move off the TOW subject.
Is there anything else that you think we should
know, sir?
A No, I can't think of anything that I can add.
MR. SAXON: Bob? Roger?
MR. GENZMAN: Nothing.
BY MR. SAXON:
Q What I'd like to do now, briefly. General, is go
to the subject of the HAWK missile repair parts. Let me
simply ask you for the record when you first became aware
that MICOM was involved in what we now know was a follow on
to the TOW requirement, with the same intermediate customer
being the CIA and the same ultimate customer being Iran.
When were you first made aware that there was a
HAWK requirement?
A This year, after I had come up to this headquarters
and when the situation broke and the investigations were
begun. Only then. And frankly, I learned about it, I guess,
on the television when there were allegations about —
actually, as I learned it first, they were HAWK missiles, I
think was what the TV program said. And I knew nothing about
that.
t-nauiu. ttrtmtn.
UNEblSSiFe
715
HNiwsamB
Q In fact, as we now know, there were actually HAWK
missiles shipped from Israel to Iran in November of 1985 in
a quantity of 18, 17 of which were returned to Israel, and
there were ultimately to have been 120 shipped, but in terms
of our particular focus with you, it's the HAWK equipment
repair parts that MICOM was tasked with providing on April 10,
1986.
A The HAWK Project Man§ger did not inform me while
I was down there that this was going on. I can't speculate
why. Perhaps he was under the saune cautions of secrecy.
In any event, I was in the process of departing the Command.
I had been selected for promotion, and I was in the process
in early or mid-May of departing Missile Command.
Q For the record, do you recall who the Project
Manager was at the time?
A Yes. Colonel Sam Liberatori — L-i-b-e-r-a-t-o-r-i.
Q I take that from your testimony then, not only
did you not know that a requirement had been passed down by
headquarters of the Department of the Army to the HAWK
Project Office on ground equipment repair parts, but that no
one in the time you were there, admittedly, as you were
transiting to your new assignment, no one ever brought to your
mmim
716
Mfummi
attention the fact that there might be some readiness impact
from the provision of these repair parts?
A No.
Q Let me walk you through what we now understand
to be some of the facts of the transaction and see if you
could render us a judgment from the roughly two years you
spent as MICOM Commander.
A I was only there about eight or nine months.
Q ,1 see. That's correct. From August 9, 1985, to
May of "8.6.
When the requirement was imposed on MICOM on
April 10, a list was transmitted, fax'd from AMC, which had
gotten a list from Major Simpson, who had gotten it from his
CIA counterpart, who had gotten it from Colonel North, who
had gotten it from Mr. Ghorbanifahr , who gave it to North
in Paris in March of 1986. And in fact, Ghorbanifahr got it
directly from the Iranians. So that's the trail of this list
of HAHC r^air parts. It gets down to MICOM, and as best we
can determine, the officials in the HAWK Project Office did
a terrific job, one heck of a job, on short notice, and with
a lot of pressure, to cast about and see where these parts
were, the location, the availability, the quantities in
mmim
ci-rtecui. •iPoiTcas.
717
wvsmm
26
I which they were available and any possible readiness impact,
.i if they were provided in full in those quantities.
ji The same day, or later in the evening, that
information was fax'd from Redstone Arsenal up to Department
! of the Army, at which time it was determined -- the Iranians
had asked for 234 line items of HAWK repair parts. It was
determined that if they met all of the quantities requested
on the ones that they could locate — and only 221 repair
parts could, be located — that there would be a potential
readiness. impact on either 46 or 47 of the items.
The actual list provided us by MICOM said 47; the
DA IG said 46. The breakdown on those numbers comes from the
DAI IG. I don't have the additional item, I think the
number is 47, The DA IG breaks down to 46, as follows:
On 15 of the items, it would deplete our inventories
100 percent, if we met all of the requirements on requested
quantities. On 11 of the items, it would deplete them in
excess of 50 percent, and on 20 of the items, it would be less
than 50 percent, but still significant depletion.
That information was provided to the Department of
the Army, As MICOM then worked with Simpson, over the matter
of a few days, they argued about various quantities. The
vxm^m
718
mfmmi
numbers as to quantity were actually reduced, so the impact
was not only with reqard to the 46th or 47th items, because
all of those materials were not provided.
Let me stop at this juncture and ask you, for the
record. I assume you were never made aware of any of this
information?
A No, I was not.
Q All right, sir.
What happens next is that Major Simpson is told
by John Chapman and Billy Reyer, as MICOM, that with regard
to the quantities that he says they should provide, that
there would be significant depletion as to 10 or 12 items,
and in fact, 100 percent depletion as to 10 or 12 items, which
they thought would have an adverse impact on readiness.
Major Simpson discusses that with General Russo.
There's some back and forth between Simpson and his CIA
counterparts and, in essence, the CIA says that you must
ship all of the quantities requested. Simpson then, on
April 23rd, prepares a "must ship" list that is fax'd down
to MICOM, and they realize that they have to provide the
quantities that are requested.
The ultimate conclusion that has been presented
:E-riKaiu. •imTus.
Mmmn
719
WOFIED
28
us by appropriate officials at MICOM who work with the HAWK,
and then the supervisors of those individuals, was that we
did actually provide 10 to 12 items that totally depleted
our inventories, and there was a readiness impact on some of
those items, that, in particular, where there was a serious
readiness impact on one of the items, that they put it in a
The Iranians had asked fc^^Hbf these items. We
only had^^^^^^^^^^H in our inventory. The MICOM officials
with whom we spoke protested and did not want to provide those.
In essence, the CIA overruled the Army an<^^^|
^^^|had to be provided.
The make whole date that MICOM has give, if we
accelerate the procurement pipeline from the vendor which, in
this case is the Varian — V-a-r-i-a-n — Corporation and
accelerate those that are down for maintenance and repair,
ONEI^SSIfii
a
720
^amms
is not until 1989.
I would simply ask for the record, if any of this
was ever brought to your attention?
A No.
Q Let me ask you now for an opinion, so I clearly
denominate that.
If anyone had come to you in this time period,
whether you were exiting or not, if, as MICOM Commander, this
had been brought to your attention - and we clearly understand
it wasn't - would it have given you any pause, and would. you
have taken any action if your specialist told you it would
deplete your inventory as to this one part being a high risk
category, and we wouldn't have
A You bet. I'd have gotten on the phone, just as I
did in the other case, and voiced my objections; however, 1
understand that there are national policy objectives that may
have equal important considerations, such as in 1973, in the
Israeli-Eqyption War. We drew down a lot of our stocks in
support of the Israelis.
Yes, that too hurt our readiness, but the idea is,
you know, meet the national policy objectives, and the whole
ONCEilSSIFfED
721
mumm
matter of defense is one of calculated risk with respect to
investments and how much you buy and how many days' supply
II
'^ you have on hand and where to position it, and so forth.
Those risks have to be weighed along with
side by side our national policy objectives, and I can only
trust that somebody who is a patriot and interested in the
national defense and interested in the survival of this
nation appropriately considered this at the appropriate level
and made the decision that the national policy objectives
were worth the risk of a temporary drawdown of readiness.
Q So, if I understand your testimony, it's not
simply a matter of saying readiness might be impacted; we
have to look at the broader national policy objectives.
But you also seem to be saying that you hope that that would
be a deliberative process and that the people making that
decision are clearly aware of the alternatives when they do
so.
A Precisely.
MR. SAXON: I think that's all I've got on the
HAWK repair parts.
Any further questions?
(No response.)
icraiTus INC
^mmm
722
mmmi
MR. SAXON: General, let me say, for the record,
you have been very helpful today and very helpful when we
i; saw you in June .
You would probably have been more helpful if
:i anyone had thought to share any of this with you at the time,
ji but that's not of your doing.
We appreciate your testimony and on behalf of
both committees, let me simply thank you.
XHE WITNESS Thank you.
• And I stand ready to assist in any way you may
request in the future.
(Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m., the taking of the
deposition was concluded.)
CE-fEKIAI. lEfOaTtHS. INC
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Deposition of: Ana Parnett
Bxecutive Assistant United
States Attorney.
Friday, July 17, 1987
^fs-X
U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee to
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran,
Washington, D . C .
Partially Declassified/Released on /-4 -S"^
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by N. Menan, Natioiul Security Council
Appearances
H. Thomas McGough, Jr.,
Associate Cousel, Senate
Select Committee.
\ Robert W. Genzman,
Associate Minority Counsel
Jack Perk ins ,
Department oC Justice,
Legislative Affairs.
mu^®
JACK BESONER S, ASSOCIATES, INC.
172 West Flagler Street. Miami. FL 33130 (305) 371-IS37
737
mmim
MR. MCGOUGH: Good morning. My name is
Tom McGough. I am associate counsel with the
Senate Select Committee on the Iran-Contra «
matter.
MR. GENZMAN: Robert W. Genzman,
Associate Minority Counsel with the House
Committee.
MR. PERKINS: Jack Perkins. I'm with
the Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of
Justice .
BY MR. MCGOUGH:
Q. Would you please state your name.
A. Ana, A-n-a, Barnett, B-a - r - n- e - t - t .
Q. And what is your title here at the U.S.
Attorney's Office?
A. Executive Assistant United States
Attorney .
Q. What does-- what are the duties of the
Executive Assistant United States Attorney?
A. On paper, in the organizational chart,
I have supervisory responsibilities over the civil
section of the office, the appellate section of
the office, and the adn i nis t ra t i ve side of the
office, and I report directly to the United States
JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INCT
82-690 0-88-25
738
wmM
1 As a practical matter, the lines aren't
2 that rigid.
3 Dick Gregorie lives in a parallel *
4 world, where he has supervisory responsibility
5 over a]l of the criainal side of the office, but
6 essentially, we are acting U.S. Attorneys, when
7 the U.S. Attorney is not here.
8 Matters that cowe up-- we just deal
9 with then on an ad hoc basis, and try to solve the
10 problems as they arise.
11 I also speak for the office. We have a
12 press policy where line AOSA's do not speak
13 directly to the press, or answer inquiries.
14 That's done by ayself or Dick Gregorie.
15 Mostly, I do it.
16 Just other things, as they come up.
17 It's very hard to say.
18 Q. Let ae see if I can get a picture oE
19 the organization of the office.
20 Leon Kellner is United States
21 Attorney.
22 Is there a first Assistant U.S.
23 Attorney?
24 A. Well, Dick and I are essentially the
25 firstass is tants
yNClASSIFiED
JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
739
mmm
When the ofCice got to be beyond a
certain number of AUSA's, that position got split.
For example, in the Southern District,
of Florida, they have three, instead of just two.
They have an associate-- a term of art.
I guess we're the first assistant.
Q. So then as an organizational chart
matter, you would be supervising the civil and
appellate and administrative, and Mr. Gregorie
would be supervising the criminal side?
A . Yes .
Q. Where does Mr. Scharf fit into the
organization?
What is his title?
A. Special Counsel, and if I might, I can
clear it up, if I can draw the little
organizational chart here (indicating).
Q. Sure.
A. I sometimes do things in the criminal
domain, and Dick, sometimes in the civil domain,
depending on who is here and what comes up.
Larry is over here (indicating). Then
we have the others (indicating).
Larry doesn't report to anyone but the
U.S. Attorney, and has tasks as assigned.,'
neu^sL
ES, INC.
740
UNCLASSinED
If I had to describe him most commonly,
he is the office oracle.
He's brilliant, and has many, many, ,
many years of prosecutorial experience, and as a
result, he handles the extremely complex ca3(?s or
novel cases that arise, that are usually given to
him for review to deal with in the office.
Q. In your position as Executive Assistant
United States Attorney, do you still maintain a
case load of your own at all, or do you deal with
cases, solely fro* the supervisory standpoint?
A. Fro« a supervisory standpoint, except
as things cone up.
I have-- as a request of a judge, I
have a case before that particular judge to try,
but I don't ordinarily have a case load in this
pos ition.
Q. Is that a civil or criminal matter?
A. A civil matter, a class action filed by
Haitian refugees that were retained.
Q. I would like to get a little bit of
your background, if I could, starting with law
school .
When did you graduate, and from where?
A. Okay. I graduated from law school-- lot
iwssira
JACK
, INC.
■» ■> 1 1 n I yn^
741
KASSm
me start with undergraduate school, because I'm a
late bloomer.
Actually, I went to law school latr. I
just didn't-- why did you go to law school so
late, right?
I graduated with a 8A from
undergraduate school in '68 from the University of
Florida .
I have a Masters Degree from Florida
State University.
Q. What is that in, the Masters Degree?
A. In psyche, in 1970.
Then I did real work for a few years.
I taught at Miami-Dade Community
College and was a counselor there, and then I
started law school in '73, so I graduated from law
school in '76 from the University of Miami.
Right out of law school, immediately
out of law school, I went to work for the State
Attorney, which is what we call the District
Attorney here in Florida, here in Miami.
I was there until 1978, when I came to
work here.
Q. Here you doing criminal trial work in
"' "'" ' uNCUssm
JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
742
ONCIASSIFIED
A. Yes, I did, criminal, and when I came
here, I started in the civil division and stayed
there. ,
Q. So in 1979,. you cane in as an Assistant
United States Attorney?
A. No. Actually, it was aid '78.
Q. And how long were you, if I could say,
a trial attorney in the civil division?
Is that a Cairly accurate description
of the position you filled?
A. Yes.
I tried more cases than any other civil
attorney has ever done in this office.
I did all of the swine flu litigation.
I was there until Stanley Marcus became
U.S. attorney, which I think is was '82.
MR. GGNZMAN: It was '82.
THE WITNESS: When he became the U.S.
Attorney, he appointed Leon Kellner chjejijf of th^i
civil division .
He brought him in from private practice
in New York, and appointed me to be the deputy
chWiV of the civil division, and I did maintain a
case load, but a more limited case load that was
just limited to larger cases, or things a{ssigned
UNCLASSIFB
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the U.S. Attorney .
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Then some time, a year or so after that
time, Leon Kellner became the Executive Assistant,
and Stanley Marcus made me the chief of the civil
division.
I'm a little fuzzy on those dates.
Then he was appointed judge, and I have
lost track of when that was, but some time in-- I
left the office in early '85 to private practice.
I thought that would be a good time to
try it, and then in October, late October of '86--
no. Excuse me. Late October of '85, I came back.
I didn't stay very long-- to this position.
Q. What did you to in private practice?
A. Civil litigation with a civil firm.
Q. What is your co««ercial telephone
number here?
A. CoBBercial telephone number is area
code 305-536-5242.
Q. Is that the saae as your FTS number?
A. No. The prefix is gp .
Q. And the saae four digits?
A. Right.
Q. Do you know Leon Kellncr's-- what is
his-- does he have a direct dial number or direct
■> West Flaaler Str
S|>tJVrES, INC.
Miami . FT. "^ "^ 1 T 0 f 305^ ■> 7 i
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exchange number?' ''V-^u-
A. 5401 is his last four digits, and the
same thing, the 536 or the 0^ exchange. »
Q. And what's the general office number
here?
A . I do n ' t k now i t .
Q. Now, obviously we're here to discuss
primarily an investigation that's gone by a number
of names .
We have called it the Garcia case, the
Cuervo case, the Costa case.
Does it have a name that everyone would
recognize it by in this office?
A. Costa, but-- although no matter what
you use, we all recognize it.
Q. Okay. Let's keep the terminology
straight. Let's call it the Costa case.
What was your first contact with the
Costa case?
A. Well, there's really two ways of
answering that.
My first official contact with this is
today, and I have to refer to this chronology that
Jeff Feldman prepared, because he's the only
compulsive person that kept^J^tes and tim'es of
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things, and none of us did.
Q. That's fine. You'll provide us with a
copyof — ^
A. Certainly, although you have these
her e .
Q. Are those your notes?
A . Yes .
Q. We would like to see all documents
tha t--
MR. PERKINS: Let Be just give it to you
through channels, so we can keep track.
MR. MCGOUGH: I prefer to/^have it
today, really even before we adjourn the
depcs i tion .
I will be glad to look at the documents
and see if there are any questions we have on the
documents before we go back.
MR. PERKINS: He don't want to get into
the business of handing over the-- handing over
documents every time a witness goes to be
interviewed .
MR. MCGOUGH: I understand that, but if
a witness uses a document to refresh their
recollection during the course of a deposition, we
" " " °^ ° "° " pussiREa
JACK BESONER i A S S 0 C lAT E S , I N C .
172 West Flagler Street, Miami, PL 33130 (305) 371-1537
746
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1 I thinlc it's pretty clear, and we'd*
2 like to see it during the deposition.
3 I guess to put it bluntly, if the />
4 witness refers to the document-- we'll take it
5 through the noraal channels, but if she does, we
6 would like to refer to it before the end of the
7 deposition, in case there are any questions off of'
8 it, then we can take notice of that without
9 reconvening the deposition.
10 BY MR. MCGOUGH:
11 Q. You said you had two ways of answering
12 the question-- going back to the question.
13 A. Officially, on March I4th of '86 when
14 Jeff Feldnan came into my office with, according
15 to this-- with Kevin Courier, an FBI agent.
16 Q. Now, do you-- on the chronology, do you
17 recall that Meeting?
18 A. I recall the meeting very vividly.
19 I just don't recall the day it took
20 place, the timing of it.
21 Q. Can you tell me-- you said that was
22 your first official contact.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you have unofficial contact that
25 Bight have predated that? |||LlA| AOOI^''' T
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JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
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k. Yes .
I only realize that in retrospect.
Toward the end of '85, soon after I <
returned to the office in this position and
started getting-- well, the first thing I got is--
the clerk of the court called me up. That's one
of the things I do when problems come up. I handle
those problems .
He said, "He have a letter here. We
don't know what to do with it. Should we file it
as a case? It involves--" and I said "Send me a
copy and if it's--"
As it turned out, it was a letter
written by Mrs. Garcia, you know, protesting the
treatment of her husband in the course of his
trial .
I basically thought another pro se
defendant. He have hundreds of these. Pile it in
the crank file. That's that.
It was only in retrospect, as things
are developing-- I said "Oh, I think I have seen
these letters . "
These letters, throughout the next few
weeks, I guess they were mailed to lots of people
all over. I don't know who all got them»
JA
ES, INC,
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1 I know the 11th Circuit got them, and
2 they started sending us copies and we started
3 getting copies o£ these letters back Crom various
4 people, additional people that got them.
5 Q. When you say they were sent-- not by
6 thi s of f ice?
7 A. Oh, no.
8 I have to assume it's Mrs. Garcia that
9 sent out a nailing oC these letters.
10 Q. Did you do anything with that letter,
11 other than put it in what you-- I think you
12 referred as a crank letter file?
13 A. The first one, no.
14 We had one that was referred by the
15 11th Circuit, and they decided to deal with it as
16 though it were a habeas corpus, you know, because B
17 it was a pro se filing, and I think it was passed
18 along to the civil division, but I'm pretty sure
19 nothing ever became of it, because it was a
20 petition filed on behalf of someone, rather than
21 by the prisoner himself.
22 It was dismissed. I think the 11th
23 Circuit decided to dispose of it in some fashion.
24 I didn't follow-up on it.
25 Q. So you didn't pass it on to Mrj. Kellner
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or Main Justice, anything like that?
A. No.
He, I think, got a letter, also, and .
then passed it on to me.
I said, "Yes, I think I have seen it
before. It's an ongoing case, an active case,"
and I think eventually we passed it off to Jeff,
who had the underlying case, once we figured out
it was something that involved something that was
ongoing and pending.
Q. Do you recall what the allegation in
the letter was?
A. That the judge had been extremely
unfair by keeping out evidence-- I guess there had
been a supression hearing of some kind, and that,
you know, her husband was innocent, and he had
been-- he hadn't been allowed to prove his case.
It was a funny allegation. He said his
attorney was in cahoots with the government and
conspiring to convict him, and that's why he
wasn't able to put in all of the evidence that he
needed to put in to prove this case.
You know, allegations-- that's very
broad. That's not the details of it, but that's
the general nature of it, as I remember. .'
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Q. Between these letters, all of this, you
really didn't take any affirmative steps?
A . Right. ,
Q. Did you have any contact with the Costa
case prior to March 14th?
A. From time to time, and I really can't
remember now if it was really before or after--
you know, there started slowly to be from time to
time, a call from a newspaper or somebody, saying,
you know, "There's a man named Jesus Garcia--"
there seemed to be interest in him, and it seemed
unusual for a gun case, but that's the only thing.
Q. And did those press inquiries predati^
the March 14th meeting, as best you can recollect?
A. I'm really fuzzy on that.
I really can't tell you.
I have to suspect-- I have to think
that it probably did, because a lot of them had
questions about-- not a lot, but-- a lot, a few,
two, three, questions about Garcia, about who he
was .
I know we mailed out-- people asked for
copies of the indictment.
An L.A. paper stands out in my mind as
asking for copies of the indictment, and. M anted
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copies of pleadings.
I said, "We send out copies of
indictments, because they are public," but
pleadings, it gets into too much trouble to send
ou t .
Things like that. Nothing that really
seemed out of the ordinary. Only in retrospect it
does. At the time, it didn't.
Q. Let's go to March 14, 1984.
What do you recall about that meeting?
A. That Jeff and the FBI agent caae in
very excited, that they had, you know, heard about
the plot to assassinate a U.S. Ambassador and blow
up embassies, I believe it was in Costa Rica.
At that time, I think they camo into my
office, because the U.S. Attorney may have been in
a conference or had people in this office and his
door was shut .
I thought, oh, my God, this is really
serious stuff. We have got to, you know, do
something about this, and look into this right
away .
What really stands out in my mind, as
we're talking about this, it's being relayed in a
very excited manner
JACK BESONER
m
752
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17
Leon walks in, opens the door in my
office, and says-- Leon comes into my office and
says, "I have got to see you. Something has com^e
up. "
I said, "I have got to see you, too.
This is very important. They have got to convoy
something about a plot to kill an ambassador."
He said, "That's what I have to see you
about," so at some point-- I'm not quite clear how
it merged. He got the information from a
different source, I think, from Washington, as
they were telling me, so we moved into his office.
Q. Let me stop you there for a second.
In the course of laying out these
allegations, did Mr. Feldman or the FBI agent/-
mention any allegations about gun running?
A. I can't remember, because that's-- that
was, like, the most exciting part of it, the very
idea there were people planning to kill a U.S.
Aabassador and blow up U.S. embassies. That's what
really stands out in my mind.
They may have, but I just don't
recollect that.
Q. Do you recall any mention of any public
firms or government employees being invol'ved in
mmM.
ATES, INC
753
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the plan, the conspiracy that they were
describing?
A. No. ,
I-- there were naHes that didn't mean
any th i ng .
Q. But they didn't specifically-- you
don't have a recollection oC any specific
reference to the NSC, for exaaple?
h. No. Not at that point, no.
Q. Hho in Washington made the call?
Did Mr. Kellner indicate who nade the
call to hi«?
A. At that tiae, I don't think he did.
Let ae see. I think I asked about it.
No. I don't think I did ask, but I think it uas--
I think it was a call and it aay have been,
because at soae point, there was talk about it.
It aay have been generated because of a
letter. It could have been another one of Mrs.
G«rcia'9 letters.
She was becoaing a regular letter
writer after a while.
Q. When Leon came into your office, did he
seea to know about an alleged plot to assassinate
Ambassador Taaas?
UNCLASSIFIED
JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
754
vmmm
A . Tha t • 3 who it was .
Q. Were those allegations included in Mrs.
Garcia's letters? ,
A. The letters I read-- I don't remember
reading tha t .
My only recollection of the thing, that
it could have been generated by a letter, and that
was a later conversation we had, just basically
saying, how we did find out about this thing, and
that was thrown out-- it's really speculative.
I'M really Euzzy about how Leon case to
find out about it .
Q. You don't recall if Mr. Kellner
Mentioned specifically who in Washington called
him and--
A. No.
Q. What happened after you went in his
office?
A. They went in and they told the story
again.
Probably they told it in great detail,
if you have ever spoken to JefC.
I guess at that point, probably
discussions about, you know, what to do next,
maybe get on it, go down tQ^^osta Rica, tja 1 k to
"" West F1»r,l--
on it, go down to^^o
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people, things like that, because I know that
after that point-- see, we're at a point it was
where Gramn-Rudman-- Cor soae reason, our travel »
money was very tight. That was another thing that
stands out in my mind.
There was always going back and forth
conversation about, can we afford a trip to Costa
Rica, this and that, and that was a discussion
that was happening, the travel budget was running
low.
I don't know if it was at that very
meeting or soon thereafter-- "Yes. Absolutely, do
whatever you have to do to get to Costa Rica and
talk to these people."
Q. Was there any discussion about getting
to Mr. Terrell in New Orleans, T-e-r-r-e- 1 - 1 ?
A. Jeff told ae so, but I don't recall it.
Q. You aean at a subsequent time, Jeff
told you he had spoken with Mr. Terrell at that
■eeting on March 14th or--
A. I don't reaeaber any of the names that
were mentioned at the March I4th meeting.
What Jeff told ae was that after that
time, he went to New Orleans to interview Jack
Terrell about this
o Jack^Tgrrell must Kave had
bout this, so Jack Tgrrell m
756
fffitftSSW
21
some kind of knowledge about this.
Q. You don't recall any discussion, even
in the context, say, oE the travel budget, oC ,
going to New Orleans or not going to New Orleans?
A. No. That we didn't-- was out of the
country travel probably, and I nay have my dates
confused .
We may not have discussed the travel to
Costa Rica until after the New Orleans trip, when
he came back with more information after talking
to Terrell.
It was something like that.
Now, the dates kind of merge together.
Jeff is the one that is real, real
clear and certain on what happened that day.
Q. Do you recall any discussion of an
impending sentencing proceeding with Mr. Garcia?
A, I don't have any independent
recollection of that. I don't have any independent
recollection of that, but I have been told that
that was discussed.
Q, By whom? Who told you that?
A. Jeff. Jeff did, that that was
discussed when he explained how he got, you know,
ahold of this, and how he got involved i it this,
JA
ES, INC,
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that it was really as a result of having
prosecuted this gun case.
Went back to the beginning and told t+ie
whole 3 tory .
Q. Do you recall any discussions of a
grand jury at that Meeting?
A. Oh, no. Not at all.
Q. Do you recall anything else about the
meeting that aight have been touched on?
A. Other than, you know, it dealt with,
you know, a very pressing and exciting natter, and
that stands out, but other than that, no, nothing
else really does stand out.
Q. Do you reaeaber anyone else's
participation in that aeeting with yourself, Mr.
Kellner and the FBI agent?
A. No. I don't reaeaber who else was in
the aeeting.
It would be very possible that or more
than likely that either Dick or Larry would have
gone in there or both, or one or the other of
thea, just siaply because we don't have a lot of
foraalities in the oCfice, and the way just things
generally operate, we, you know-- it's pretty
loose, and it's very likely whatever nceb'ing Leon
177 u <t«
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23
1 was having before, you know, when that broke in,
2 either Larry or Dick were in it, and when we just
3 moved into there, they just stayed. ,
4 Q. Now, we have learned that after the
5 meeting or that Mr. Garcia's sentencing was
6 originally set for March i9th, and there was an
7 effort made to postpone that sentencing.
8 Do you have any recollection of being
9 involved in that at all?
10 A. No.
11 I aean, in-- again, in-- that's one of
12 those recollections only in retrospect that it
13 happened, and, you know, Jeff tried to put it in
14 context for me, saying that was right, because we
15 were trying to verify these plots were real, and
16 if we thought it was true, we would speak up at
17 the sentencing, you know, it would have some
18 impact.
19 Q. Do you recall any inquiry or
20 instructions from Main Justice about postponing
21 the sentencing procedure?
22 A. No. I don't personally remember that.
23 That's again one of those things that
24 Jeff has it on his chronology, and it probably had
25 a much greater impact on him, that he wov|ld have
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read it, but I really didn't reaember.
At that tiae, I still was really fuzzy
about Garcia, and, you know-- as far as I could «
see it, it was just another gun case, and we
literally have hundreds o£ gun cases, guns and
drugs. That's what we have hundreds of in this
district.
Q. What is the next event of which you
have an independent recollection regarding the
case?
A. Running into Jeff when he was returning
f roa Cos ta Rica .
Q. So that would have been early April,
April 3rd, April 4th, soaething like that?
A . Apri 1 4th, yes .
Q. Uhat do you recall about that?
A. I waa coaing back tron lunch, and, you
know, the little guard station downstairs, going
e.
through the aagn^toaeter, and running into Jeff,
who was also coaing in, and said-- had his
suitcase with hia.
He said, 'I just got back Croa Costa
Rica. I have got to talk to everybody. It's just
real iapor tant . "
I said, -We're around," and latter that
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afternoon, we sat around and Jeff came in and told
about the-- all the events that developed when he
was down there, and all the interviews. ■*
Q. Prior to the larger meeting later that
day, did you have any one-on-one conversations
with Jeff about what he had found in Costa Rica?
A . I might have .
I don't remember, but-- Jeff might have
stopped in and told us something, but he is such a
detailed person and so full of the names, so used
to throwing the names around, and when you don't
know the names, it really doesn't mean a whole
lot.
I do Icnow that when I ran into him, he
was really excited, you know-- "This is really
excitiing stuff. I have got to tell somebody."
It's just look a kid bursting to tell the news.
Q. So there was a meeting later that day?
A. Yes.
Q. Has it in Mr. Kellner's office?
A. Hell, before you leave, you can see
what his office looks like.
His desk is over on one end, and at the
other end of the room, there's a smaller
CO
nference table, but nevertheless, a rel'atively
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large table, and usually most of the meetings
about cases and things, take place there.
We all sat around there and had JeEe .
tell what he knew.
Q- fan you remember what time of day that
meeting took place, approximately?
*• It had to be after lunch. That's my
recol lection.
Q- Do you remember who was there?
K. Well--
Q- Who do you recall being there?
A- Okay. That's one of those other
a n 3 we r s .
Now I recall Leon, Dick, Larry, Jeff,
and myself.
It wasn't till-- I a«-- it wasn't till
recently that I realized that David Leiwant came
in toward the end of the meeting.
Q. Do you have any independent
recollection of Mr. Leiwant being in the room
during that meeting?
I
A . Yes . Now, yes . I
Once he cane and told us that he was
there, I remembered him, because, in fact, it was i
Iwhohadcausedhimtobethere. ,' |
'in
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We were discussing-- generally, we were
discussing--
Q. Let me interrupt for a second. Let's
start at the beginning oC the meeting, and tell me
what happened, really, is the question.
A. Okay. Well, Jeff started telling the
story about why he was down there, and the things
he had found out .
It was so full of odd names, like,
Tegucigalpa, Quinta, you know, just names, odds
things and jumbled together.
It was mostly he was interrupted by--
"Go back to the beginning. How did you get there?
Who is this person? " It was that kind of meeting.
It wasn't like a smooth story. He
didn't say, "I arrived on the plane and proceeded
to do this, that and the other," whatever.
He was jumping around a lot. What
would have ordinarily probably should have taken
an hour, really dragged out.
It was just getting dragged out. I do
remember that.
Different people were trying to parse
out the facts, you know, who said what to whom,
and how did they know it, and what does i^t mean.
JA
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At some point-- and if you ask me right
now, as many times as we have gone over this, i
couldn't tell you what all he told others, and •
certain things stay in my mind.
He talked about John Hull, how he had
an appointment with Hull, and Hull cancelled the
appointment, and he ended up sitting on the same
plane as him, a few seats behind him.
Told about the meeting, the two
prisoners down in Costa Rica, and I'm not even
surewhat--
Q. Do you recall any mention of the
National Security Council?
A. I don't know if it was the National
Security Council, but I think at that time Jeff
started mentioning Robert Owen, and again, it was
like a name that, you know, didn't mean anything,
and he probably did mention that he thought
somehow he was associated with the National
Security Council, although it didn't just stand
out .
Q. Do you remember what he said about
Owen?
A. Something in connection with Hull, and
again, I didn't-- I didn't take notes or-f-
7 2 West Eli
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Q. Do you recall any reference to Oliver
north?
A. I don't know if the reference to Oliver
North was then or at a later tiae.
I aean, at some point, his name did '
coBe up, and at that point he was all-- who is
Oliver North then. He wasn't faaous then.
I don't recall if it was at that
■etting or at a later Meeting on this case
Q. Do you recall any aentioi
A. Yet.
Q. In what context?
A. I reaeaber specifically, because Jeff
said he had talked to soaeone who Identified
hiaself as
sn't they supposed to be
discreet?-
I reaeaber asking that, because it just
seeaed so-- it didn't fit in with ay idea of the
way the peopl^^^^^^^^^Hare to
Q. Do you recall Mr. Feldaan describing
b
his aeeting with Aabassador Taaas, in which he
outlined his investigation? .'
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A. I know he talked about hia meeting with
h
Ambassador Tanas.
Now, when he told us that he showed ,
TamJ^s this diagram o£ his, you know, his theory oE
the case or not-- I'm not sure if that happened
then or at a later time.
It could have happened then, but he did
talk about it, and he put a diagram-- I'm not sure
we're still talking about the same diagram.
I know at this meeting, he had diagrams
with him, lots of diagrams, or at least more than
one, as I recall, and he had made copies of them.
He laid them out on the table, and wc
were having trouble explaining how, you know, box
number one over here connected to box number two,
and I just remembered, you know-- writing or
doodling on these different graphs that he had.
Q. Did you see this--
A. I didn't, but Jeff did.
Q. You didn't save the ones that you
wrote, did you?
A. I think he saved all the ones that
people wrote on, because I know that at some later
point when this all came out, we said, "Yes, I
remember--" just going back to talking ar{d
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discussing, and I said, "Yes, but I think some of
that stuff was just doodled on," and he said "Yes,
I think I saved them all."
Q. Did you take any notes on a piece of
paper or--
A. Not in the sense-- I would jot down a
name, and kind of go like that and--
Q. Cross it out?
A. Or actually make little drawings around
it, something like that, but it wasn't notes,
extensive notes on the meetings, though.
One of the other people, though, I
think was taking notes.
I started to, but frankly, it was so
hard to follow what Jeff is-- maybe I was being
remarkably dense, but it was so hard to follow the
story, and I kind of sat there.
Q. Did you save what you took?
A, No. I think I left and left the pad
there.
Q. You say one other person was taking
notes .
Uho was that?
A. By process of elimination, it must have
been Larry. I know that Dick never writer anything
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JAcijii9|yM^in^o|Utg^s , INC.
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during any meeting.
I know he retains it all.
Larry was writing notes. He may have ,
had a pad in front of him, or doodling.
Q. Why do you remember someone taking
notes , wi thout--
A. I don't remember-- that's another one
of those retrospective recollections, only because
we had a discussion about that after all of this
became-- came to the light of day.
Saying, "Did you take notes? No. No.
No. "
Larry said, "I think I took notes," and
I'm not sure if it was that meeting or another
one .
I don't really have an independent
recollection .
You have to understand, it's a table
considerably smaller than this, and he brought in
ail of these files, and he had color photographs
he had out, and all these pieces of paper spread
around on the table, and newspaper clippings and
things, and it was just full, so, you know, a--
lot of stuff spread out.
Q- Do you recall any discussion aft that
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■eeting about the use of a grand jury?
A. No.
My most vivid recollection of that ,
meeting is that Jeff-- we were asking after a
while, talking to Jeff, saying, "What do you think
you have in terms of the law," and he was talking
about Neutrality Act violations and he kept
mentioning the Boland Aaendaent, and Dick and I,
embarrassing enough to say, we had no idea what
the Boland Amendment was.
We hadn't followed that and weren't
aware of it, and we said, "What's the Boland
Amendment," and Jeff described it, and I said,
"Shouldn't we look it up to see what it says, you
know, just to make sure," that kind of
discussion.
The legal aspects of what it was, did
it have a criminal penalty, what did the
Neutrality Act mean. We spent a lot of time going
back and forth on the elements, you know, of the
Neutrality Act violation.
Q. When the discussion of the Boland
Amendment came up, was it you who went and got Mr.
Leiwant?
A. Inaway,yes. ;
JA
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ES, INC.
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We couldn't find it in the books. Leon
has the USCA in his office, and we couldn't find
it, so I volunteered to get it out of Juris, whiph
is the computer-- I said that it must be in Juris,
which is the computer, and I went to Juris, and
when I went to the Juris terninal, David was
already sitting at the machine on line researching
something, and I said, "I need to get something,"
and he offered to get it, and frankly, his
reputation in the appellate section, he is very
handy with the computer, and what would have taken
me a long time to get out, he got it in a few
moments, and I said, "Dave, I'm looking for
something called the Boland Amendment. I don't
know when it was. I know that it deals with the
Contras," and I said, "Please bring it to Leon's
office," and I came back, and a little bit after
that, David came in with a printout.
Q. When Mr. Leiwant came in with a
printout, do you recall who was at that meeting at
that time?
A. The same people.
Q. To the best of your recollection, were
all of the people there, present throughout the
mee t i ng?
m
TAd^^rtVHTR-r ireTOCIATES, INC.
172 West Flagler Street, Miami, FL 33130 (305) 371-1537
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A. I think so.
There might have been phone calls and
things, and people walked in and out, because my4
recollection is that it was just very, very long.
I know that I get very restless, you
know, si-tting for long, long periods of times, and
it seemed like it was dragging on and on and on,
and I suspect people got up and left and got
coffee and came back, something like that.
Q. In the context of discussing the Boland
Amendment, as you may now know or knew then, the
Boland Amendment deals with government aid to the
resistance forces.
In the context of discussing the Boland
Amendment, do you recall what form the government
aid-- the allegations of government aid took, how
the governaent was supposedly involved with this,
with this group of people who were allegedly
assisting the Contras?
A. Not specifically, except in the
beginning, when Jeff was describing what he had
found out till then.
There was a section when he was
describing these telethons that had been conducted
in the Miami area over the Latin radio stations.
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you know, fund raising telethons, and he mentioned
some group that met out in the Everglades and gave
training and gave some guns that went on to Eigh^
in Costa Rica.
As it turned out, it was some six or
seven AR-15's, something like that.
I think it was in the context of money
raised locally by this Cuban- Amer i can
organizations here.
Q. And possible government involvement
with that fund raising?
A. No. At least I don't recall that being
how-- that was the context of the money part of
it .
There was also a discussion of a Howard
Johnsons-- that's kind of coming back to me-- this
meeting at a Howard Johnsons, and I remember that,
because it was so bizarre.
There was a meeting at a Howard
Johnsons here in Miami, where all these people
had, like, a little mini -convention , I guess, and
they sat around and planned when they were going
to land, what they were going to do, and all of
this kind of thing, and I think there were people
there talking about raising money, but it* just
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seemed-
the only thing that sticks in ray mind is
the recollection of the telethons, because I
thought who would have thought that would have ,
been a way to raise money like you do for cerebral
palsy.
Q. Just my question is really directed as
to why there were thoughts that the Boland
Amendment might be implicated.
The Boland Amendment speaks to
government assistance, and so forth. This sounds
like private efforts.
A. See, I don't know. That's why we
wanted a copy of it.
None of us were sure what it said.
Jeff kept throwing Boland Amendment
around, and I said, "You know, do you know
precisely what it says," and it seemed to me he
was very vague on it.
He said, "It just prevents aid to the
Contras," and that was his initial position, and
then we got the printout.
i don't think it was being looked at
from the perspective that the Boland said it was
limited to the types of people who could give aid,
because we didn't know what the Boland Anfendment
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said at that point, or we didn't have it in front
of us to tell.
Q. Do you recall any telephone ,
conversations in the context of that meeting, that
related to the case?
A. No. I don't-- you can't say that no
phone calls occurred during the course at that
meeting.
It was long, and, you know, Leon's
secretary buzzes him, this, that or the other, but
I don't recall-- I certainly don't recall any
phone calls that were significant enough for it
to-- the U.S. Attorney to turn around and relate
it to us, so in that context, I don't remember,
you know, any phone calls.
Hell, it could have been or could have
not been .
I do not know, and this is disputed
again, we go back and discuss what happened at
that aeeting-- I do recall being present in the
rooa when there was a conversation regarding the
Neutrality Act with Mark Richard, and it was
sonething to the effect of, you know, what are the
elements of the Neutrality Act, and ny impression
was that we had calle
we had ca 1 1 ed MajLl^Uchard , sim
.HMEH^ML
Riy
172 West Flagler Street. Miaai. FL 33130 (305) 371-1537
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1 because he supervises that section that deals with
2 Neutrality Act violations, in the hopes they had
3 already briefed this issue in the past, because *
4 there have been Neutrality Act violations brought
5 probably in the mid '60's or so, and hoping they
6 had some briefs and memoranda prepared on the
7 elements of the Neutrality Act, and could send
8 those to us and save all of us some work on that.
9 Q. Has that in the context of the April
10 4th meeting?
11 A. To my recollection, I thought it was,
12 but I only think of it as being then, because I
13 have a vivid recollection of really-- of talking
14 about the Neutrality Act at length during that
1 5 meeting .
16 I know that I was the one who
17 personally owned that book, and we were
18 discussing, what does it mean.
19 To set foot from, that sticks out in my
20 Bind, because I said that, "Set foot from".
21 I know we discussed the Neutrality Act
22 and the eleaents of it at that meeting, is why I
23 believe that's when the, you know-- we called Mark
24 Richard to find out if they had the briefs on it.
25 The Mark Richard call-- it could have
JACI
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been some other time, but it just seems to me that
must have been.
That's the only call that I remember,*
you know, actually having a conversation relayed
back to us, saying, yes, they do, but they have
got these briefs and it has been done before, and
don't re-invent the wheel, wait to get it.
Q. Does this office, by the way, maintain
any phone records, toll records?
A. Yes.
Q. Would those be helpful in determining
whether FTS calls took place during that meeting?
A. Yes. I would imagine.
Q. Have they been maintained for--
A. Well, FTS toll records-- I don't know
who keeps FTS toll records.
It's either the administrative
department or us, but I imagine they are kept.
I know that we have whatever telephone
toll records we have, were sent to-- on a written
request by letter from the independent counsel. It
was sent.
Q- Do you send originals or copies?
A . Copies .
Q. Could we at some point, look alt the
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originals for, it would be March and April ot
16?
A. They should be here upstairs in--
Q. Let's see if we can straighten that o«t
before the end of the day.
If you would look at that--
*• Yes. When we finish, I can call the
admin people and have them bring the originals to
the room so you can look at them.
Q- In the course of that meeting, do you
recall any discussion at all indicating that Main
Justice or anyone, for that matter, wanted the
case to proceed slowly?
A. No .
Q. Do you recall anyone at that meeting,
instructing anyone else to handle the case in a
slow or dilatory fashion?
A. No .
That has been the-- has been the most
perplexing part of this whole case, when the
allegations first arose, where they have come
from, and we speculated a million things, and this
was the last thing that we could have imagined
when we did find out what it was.
Q. Do you recall any discussion at that
meeting of Steve Trotter or Jensen? .'
mmvm
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No .
Q. Do you recall any discussion of the
Attorney General? 4
A . No .
The only name that I recall coining up
was Mark Richard, as a department person.
Q. This is at any meeting?
A. That's what-- well. Trotter and Jensen
wouldn't stand out, but I know the Attorney
General's name would, and that was an important
person .
Q. Do you recall anything else about that
meeting on April 4th?
A. That when it broke up, I don't think
anything had really been resolved, other than JeEC
was asked to put the facts down in writing, that
maybe by articulating the* in a written form, you
know, he aight be able to sort it out better so it
would be aore understandable, and that's how he
left it, is put it in a Heao, you know, to
organize the case, so aaybe we can get a focus.
It just seeaed to be all over the case,
the gun case, the Neutrality Act, whatever.
Q. And again, you don't recall the
discussion about whether the case was reafdy to go
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to a
gra
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any thi
ng.
a t th
at point?
A.
I don • t
recall
that being discussed at
that
point .
'
There was a
point
where
- - a meeting
where we
discussed
and
ma
de suggestions of things
to d
0 be
fore going
to
a g
rand
jury
, like, getting
financia
1 records ,
so
you
can
make
a dec is ion of ,
you
know
, who to call.
because you
don't want to
^nd
up calling witnesses
who-
- jus
t to be more
focused
and organized.
bu
t I
don * t
think it was at
that
meeting.
My impression
was
that
it was at a
late
r meet ing .
Q.
Do you reca
11
any
discussion at that
meet
ing.
of potential
Con
gres
siona
1 votes on the
Cont
ra aid issue?
A.
I don't
recall
it.
but
Jeff said that
he mentioned it.
Q.
At that
mee
tin
g on
the
4th?
A.
Yes .
I think
he
says that he
mentioned that.
Q.
That there
was
an
impen
ding vote?
A.
Yes .
Q.
And you
don
' t
have
any
independent
reco
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A . Not really, I don • t .
If it was mentioned, you know, I jcist--
it didn't leave an impression. I don't remember^
it .
Q. And you don't reaenber any response or
any discussion Eroa that-- at that point?
A. No.
You have to reaeaber, you were at the
point where two of the people in the rooa, Dick
and I, had never even heard of the Boland
Aaendment. I know it sounds odd living down here,
but--
MR. GENZMAN: Let ae interject.
BY MR. GENZMAN:
Q. Uhat did Jeff recall about mention of
the Contra aid vote?
A. I recall Jeff saying that he-- you
know, this is a very hot topic, you know, this is
a hot topic in Washington, a lot of controversy.
I think he expressed it like that. He
did aention it, and this is in a aceting that we
have had, to see what happened at that aeeting,
that we don't reaeaber.
He said "Yes, I just mentioned it in
passing, and you and Dick were oblivious,;" and we
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1 went on to something else.
2 Q. Did Feldman mention uhere he had
3 obtained his information about the Contra aid voV:e
4 ■ i n Washi ngton?
5 A. No, but I suspect that he was really
6 probably reading the papers more avidly, and
7 having-- following that portion of the case, may
8 have been following news reports in the news, you
9 know, and things relating to Nicaragua, you know,
10 more closely than the rest of us.
11 Q. You didn't get the impression he had
12 been relating this to his trip in--
13 A. Oh, no .
14 I remember at the meeting he had
15 newspaper articles, photographs, and that wasn't
16 only fro« local papers.
17 He had gotten clippings from things
18 about that, but my impression was that he got it,
19 juat siaply because he was interested and he was
20 Collowing the developments.
21 MR. GENZMAN: Thank you.
22 BY MR. MCGOUGH:
23 Q. We understand that there was another
24 meeting on this matter on April 11th, which was
25 the day of the FBI shooting down here. At; least we
172 west Fla^^l^BpMliljJ'T"L"3 13r'(3 05) 37 1-1!
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have been informed that there was a meeting that
day .
Do you recall a meeting on that day? ,
A . No .
Well, what I recall that day, is-- in
Eact, I was the acting U.S. Attorney that day,
because Leon was away and he was due to arrive
back some time that afternoon from-- I think he
was in Great Britain, and then the shooting thing
developed during the course the day, and it became
very, very hectic around here, and that was also
the day when--
What I recall that relates to this
case, was that-- and I don't know who told me
this. It may have been Jeff. Probably is, because
Jeff would come in to see me a lot, tell me this
is going to happen and that's going to happen,
that there was supposed to be an AP article coming
out about his case, and I said, "Fine, because we
can't deal with all of this. This is really a
horrendous thing happening."
He had the FBI pick Mb up at the
airport and bring hia right into the office, and I
couldn't-- you know, we were trying to deal with
things, how did the shooting occur, and pending
iii^ini Aooinri
JACK
72 West Flagl_e
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, INC.
'2 2 1 30 (305^ 371-153 7,
782
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UNCLASSiHtfl
out to the scene, because we didn't want
the locals questioning the agents, you know, and
it was just a very intense day, and I just don't*
think that would have been it.
Q. Up to that point, up to the point o£
the FBI shooting, do you recall any discussion of
the potential political impact o£ Jeff's case on
what was then Mr. Kellner's pending-- I don't know
that he had been foraally nominated then, but he
was acting U.S. Attorney at that time?
A. Yes. I think he was acting at that
time, and he had been nominated.
Q. Do you recall any discussion at any
point, the potential impact of the-- Mr. Feldman's
case on Mr. Kellner's nomination?
A. No, I don't, but because this has come
up before, Jeff tells me that he did say that to
me, and, you know, he says he said it.
He says he said it.
I don't recall the discussion, and he
may have said it and my comment, "So what,"
because there was no other nominee, and nobody
else who wanted the job. He was the only one.
It was inconsequential, from the day
that Stanley left to be a federal judge, :and-- he
.,„.....-iCUSSlFP,,c,^^ ^^
17? Hp«t Flflnipr^Tr^rr Mi^.i ft. ^^nn r^ns^ iTi-is-*
783
wussra
48
says he nentioned it and he thought that, you
know, that was something relevant to bring up,
but, you know, I just-- he may have brought it up
tome.
I know I didn't remember it, and I
don't remember it coming Cro« me.
Q. And you don't recall discussing it with
anyone else in the context oE this case?
A. In the context of this case, no, except
about being asked about this, by other people, as
a result of, you know, the different
investigations .
BY MR. GENZMAN:
Q. If I can interject-- can you give your
best recall of what exactly Feldnan said about
this issue?
A . I really can ' t .
I have to just totally rely on Jeff's
recollection of it, and I'm relying on him, simply
because he's the most compulsive human being I
have met. He's so certain about everything, and
I'm just fuzzy, so I have to assume he did tell
me, if he said he did.
Q. What did he say he had told you?
A. That he said-- he had asked me; if Leon
784
DNtftSSW
49
had been, you know, finally appointed--
Q. Confirmed?
A. Yes, as the U.S. Attorney, and I
probably said, you know, no, that it's pending.
I guess it was pending at that time. I
don't know, it's pending before the House or
before the Judiciary Committee, whatever, and, you
know-- "Well, do you think they may be holding it
up or something," and I said no.
What I wish, and I haven't asked Jeff
this and it just occurred to me, maybe the timing
of it would have helped-- if it was maybe about
the time-- there was a period of time when
allegations started surfacing about JefC's case,
and I don't know if it was in that period of time
when it would have made sense to say it, because
of the context.
I don't remember the whole thing at
all, period, let alone the context.
Q. Has Feldman with his compulsive
demeanor, able to pinpoint the time at which he
had previously told you that?
A. I don't remember if he did.
I would have to ask him.
We went over his chronology. .1 didn't
JAC
172 West Flagyl
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785
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have it in here, so I don't know.
He may actually know. He may actually
not much a recollection of when he said it,
A
either .
I don't know that .
Q. But you don't reaeaber that
conversation?
A . No, I don • t .
There was a point, you know-- we met a
lot. Not to put in the foraal sense of the word,
but I have-- I guess it's part of my job
description, whatever, !'■ just sort of there when
somebody needs something, soaething comes up, you
know, my doors are always open, and I guess my
office is first before you get to Dick's, and
people just come in. There was a period where he
started stopping by more often.
I don't know when or how often, or
what, because it's not by appointaent or anything
that would have recorded it.
Q. If he had made such a statement, do you
think he would have remembered it?
A. I think so. I think so, although-- see,
the problem is that then it wouldn't have meant
anything,
IINCLASSm
JACK BESONER S. ASSOCIATES, INC.
172 West Flagler Street, Miami, FL 33130 (305) 371-1'
786
UNEtrnFlffl
It only becomes important now, you
know, with this whole thing, and iC I had only
known this was going to happen, I would have ,
remeinbered it then.
I would have done a lot of things. I
would have written it all down.
BY MR. MCGOUGH:
Q. Shortly after the FBI agents were shot,
the Attorney General caae to Miami to visit the
FBI .
Do you recall that?
A. I recall-- yes. I saw it on television.
Q. Did you have any contact with the
Attorney General during this visit here?
A. No .
Q. Did you discuss the Attorney General's
visit with Mr. Kellner?
A. Only because after they had run into
each other at the hospital, Leon called me, and I
I don't remember if it was the weekend, but he
called me up and said, "Guess what. I was invited
to be in the group of people that-- dignitaries
that went with the Attorney General that went to
visit the wounded agents. They drove ne out in a
limo." He was very excited.
set, Miami, FL 33130 (
JACK BESONI
172 West Flagler Street .' 'Miami . FL 33130 (305) 37 1-153-
787
yNCUSSIFIED
We see ourselves here, very remote from
the department.
If you ever have been a AUSA-- people*
in Justice refer to us as the field. We're
provincials, and the very fact we would get to rub
shoulders with dignitaries--
Q. I was a AUSA in Pittsburgh, and that's
even more of the field.
MR. GENZMAN: I was in Orlando.
MR. PERKINS: I was in San Francisco.
THE WITNESS: But Main Justice refers to
us as the field, and that's ny recollection of it,
and the thing was, you know, "I got to be in the
group that was there, and watch the news. I'm
going to be on TV."
I think the local news stations carried
the visit, because it was so intense, the pulicity
surrounding the shootings.
The press followed everybody around,
and I think they stood outside the door of one of
the hospitals, and Leon was standing in the
background, and the Attorney General said a few
words about how brave they had been, and that kind
of stuff.
Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Kellnter,
........i^JilMSS
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anything that he might have discussed with the
Attorney General?
A. No.
In fact, I was really surprised to find
out-- was only well after that, I found out during
that visit, he had been asked about Jeff's case.
Q. And when did you find that out?
A. At soae point when all of these things
started surfacing about the Meese call to go slow.
At first we thought it was a joke. We
all have a joke, "Well, because I wasn't there
when Heese called".
We just all called about it. We laughed
about it, and said, "This will go away. It's a
silly thing," and it never did.
I don't reaeaber the timing of this,
but we saw some article that quoted a Department
of Justice person saying that yes, Meese had
talked to the U.S. Attorney in Miami, but it, you
know-- he had never said to do anything one way or
the other about the investigation, but I know
there was an article about it.
I said Leon, "Look at this." I think
it was a Wall Street Journal, but we called public
affairs and said, "Who is saying this," a(nd as it
172 west FlattPliltlJ9vlfffiVFr3313r(305) 371-1537
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54
1 turned out, lota of calls back and forth, what
2 they were referring to was the meeting that they
3 had had while they visited the injured agent in ,
4 the hospital, and that's how it came up.
5 Hesaid"Yes, that's theonly time,
6 never on the phone," but the way the article had
7 it printed, it made it sound like it had been a
8 phone-- made a phone call, and I don't know the
9 timing of that article, when it caae up, but it
10 was another one of these days where he spends
11 hours on the phone back and forth, until we were
12 able to get the facts about what had happened.
13 Q. Going back to the end of the April 4th
14 meeting-- after that meeting was over, what is
15 your next recollection of any contact with the
16 Costa case?
17 A. Probably-- the only thing I recollect
18 offhand, is reviewing the meao, when he did
19 soaething down on paper.
20 Q. Would this have been the first draft of
21 the aeHorandua?
22 A. Probably.
23 Q. Ue've been told that that acaorandum is
24 dated April 28th, or thereabouts.
25 Is that-- do you have any reason to--
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A. No. I don't have any reason to doubt
it .
Q. Put it at a different time? ^
A . No .
I'm just relying on that.
Q. What do you renember about that
memorandum?
A. Very little independently, other than I
know I-- I saw some of the sentences were
extremely long, and it was very long and
confusing, and I probably made some editorial
suggestions as to clarify who's talking or who is
saying this, that type of thing.
Q. To whom did you make those suggestions?
A. To Jeff, I have to assume.
I seem to recollect that we were back
again in, you know, in the office, at the
conference table, discussing the memo, and--
really, that's about all I recollect about the
memo, itself .
Q. Hhy would you review the memo?
A. Probably because I had been there when
he first raised the issue, and sometimes I'm used
as the litmus test because of not having, you
know, a^ deep a criminal background as th>e others,
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to 3ee if it is in plain enough English so i can
follow who did what to whon and when.
Q. Do you know i£ Mr. Feldman gave you t^e
memo or merely Kellner gave it to you, or how it
came to you?
A. No, I don't think so.
As far as I know, we were all given
copies and sat there and went through it together.
Although, you know, I may have had it
before then, and it may have probably just sat on
my desk .
Q. Do you recall soae press reports-- I
believe they were in May, but don't hold me to
this-- that the Department of Justice had recorded
there was no investigation?
A. Oh, yes. I reaember that very well.
Q. Can you tell me what happened there?
A. Before that article came out, and--
and, in fact, I can even tell you what led up to
that.
Ever since Jeff got back from his trip,
and back-- it started right after that AP article,
that happened at about the tiae of the shooting,
either the 12th or 11th, the very day of the
shooting, about the gun running and flighfts out of
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basis, calls about the case, and about that time,
also people-- and I mean, people calling, and
saying, I think, this, that, or the other thing,
you know, and I called public affairs and told
them, you know, "Look, we have an investigation,
and we're just getting drowned."
It would seem to me-- "Drowned, getting
at least two calls a day on the this thing, and
I'm going to start referring them up there."
They started getting calls, and-- they
said, "What is the case about? Tell me something
about it? Tell me what to say," and I said, "So
far, this in the beginning. This is in the
beginning stage, but it's an ongoing
investigation. So far we don't have a lot to go
on . "
Q- Who are you talking to at DOJ?
A. For sure, Pat Corton.
Q. C-o-r-t-o-n?
*• C, and it may be e-n at the end. I'm
not positive how it's spelled.
Possibly John Russell, but at any rate,
they had-- they had an inquiry, because it's not
unusual, public affairs gets inquiries atfout
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different offices, and they call and say, "Tell me
what to say? What is the case about," and it's--
even today as we speak here, what we have got, ,
half a dozen AR-15'3 arrived, some hand grenades,
a mortar, launcher, and an assortment of hand
guns, hardly what you would have a war with.
That's what's provable, and that's what
we have to this date, and--
You know, the next thing I see — look
at this, it looks-- what the New York Times did,
called them up, and say-- the New York Times
article, where they say it's about a half a dozen
guns or so, which is true, but they characterized
it as not being an investigation, but they
characterized it-- I thought it was from the
eupheaisB they used-- they said it was less than
an investigation, but something like an inquiry,
words like that .
Q. They, being the article, or they, being
the Departaent of Justice?
A. Oh, no. Whoever was quoted in the
article, in that New York Times article.
Q. I guess that's ay point.
Were they quoting somebody from the
Department of Justice about that? ;
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A. They said a Department of Justice
official .
I'm sure the article-- I don't know ii
they named the article or not, but they quoted a
Department of Justice thing.
At that point, then everything took on
a different meaning as far as we were concerned,
but the way I saw that, I said, like, "This is
terrible. They are making someone-- someone wants
to make it sound like we don't have a case and
we're not doing something--" this may seen very
paranoid, but I said, "I don't like this, and we
have to make it clear we do have a case," and I
called public affairs and told them that yes, we
do have a case, and, in fact, after that point,
then we started talking about the case.
Q. What did they say at public affairs
when you called then?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Do you remember who you spoke to?
A. I spoke with Pat Corton, but I don't
remember .
I'm sure it wasn't angry. I'm sure it
was the kind of call, "Look, this is wrong. You
have left the impression th^x^ i' "o case(.
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There's an investigation, and it may not be grand
jury yet, but an assistant is assigned to it, two
agents, and interviewing people, and you shouldnit
give that impression, it's less than what it is."
Granted the a«ount of arms involved has
always been small. The Miami Herald-- put this in
context about the same time, something about six
tons .
All these publications are reporting
tons .
To date, as we speak today, we're
nowhere near close to six tons, but about six
guns, a mortar, a few grenades, a few hand guns,
and maybe a sniper rifle, things like that, but
not tons .
He just aren't into tons, and, you
know, I don't know-- it's very likely or most
likely it was a misinterpretation, you know. I
said, "It's just a few guns so far, so far no big
deal," and that was interpreted to diminish what
it was, that it wasn't tons. We are looking to
make a great case.
Q. Can you put a date on that?
A. It had to be the day that the article
came out. I think it was ii
think it was in Hav.
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I think I wrote down the date and time
of the article when I was getting ready for this.
I just wrote,, article. May of '86, New,
York Times article.
Q. Now--
*• Oh, the other thing I wanted to mention
about that, is why it changed the character of
things, was that after-- probability, I think
Larry to-- anyway, at the time, just discussed the
general facts, you know, "What is this? Why is
this happening, when we do have facts, have
this . "
Then Jeff's aemo, which had originally
been written down so we can understand the fact
took on more significance.
Now it became, "Write it down, because
we want to have something deCintely in writing to
show this is an investigation, that you did, in
fact, talk to people, that we are, in fact, doing
something . "
Then the memo took on a different
significance.
Q. Do you recall receiving a second draft
of that memo?
A- No. I don't remember the difCerent
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drafts, and there was a point that-- I really
didn't contribute to the nemo.
It was mostly, you know, others that ,
may have done editorial suggestions in the memo,
because it was after that article in the New Ifork
Times that the memo-- see, the memo was never
intended to go anywhere.
It was just for us, so we could
understand the case.
At that point, the nemo took on a
character of, this memo is going to go to
Washington, so the people in the department
realize we have a case, and then it had to be
looked at as other people were going to be reading
it, and we had to make it very clear.
After that point, I think it was looked
at more carefully.
Q. Do you recall seeing a draft of the
■eao, and this would have been a draft which was
approxiaately 22 pages in length-- in which Mr.
Feldman felt it was appropriate to issue grand
jury subpoenas?
A. I always thought it was the first
draft, but it ended up it wasn't.
I was present when there was aj
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1 discussion about the grand jury, whether to go to
2 grand jury or not to.
3 Idon'trecall thedateof themeetin^g,
4 " but I was present during a discussion of the memo
5 and that particular part of it, do we start a
6 grand jury right now, or do we do, you know, what.
7 Q. Going into that meeting, had you
8 already read Jeff's memo?
9 A. I'm pretty sure I had read it by then.
10 Q. Going into the meeting, do you have an
11 opinion as to whether the grand jury was
12 appropriate or not?
13 A. I don't recall-- what I thought going
14 into the meeting, I don't recall, but I do know
15 going into the meeting, as things developed-- this
16 is-- granted my background for the past few years
17 has been mostly civil and I'm learning a lot of
18 criminal as things go along, but my limited
19 knowledge of criminal cases, I felt that you still
20 couldn't really understand the direction of the
21 case from what was in the memo.
22 That was my going into the meeting
23 feeling.
24 At the meeting, I know one of the
25 things that I recall saying to Jeff, or, .'you know.
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in the general back and forth of the different
people who were there, is what did you plan to get
out of the grand jury-- I mean, what were you •
going to present to the grand jury, becau-se we
couldn't overwhelm the grand jury with every
single thing, you know, because we are-- and none
of it nakes any sense to us, and it has to be more
organized and thought through, or have a focus and
direction, and then others had specific
sugges t ions .
Mine were aore broad.
Q. Do you recall discussions of issuing
subpoenas for records, bank records, gun sale
records, that sort of thing, as opposed to witness
subpoenas?
Q. No.
What I recall, I thought, was when we
case up with certain naaes, that certain people
hadn't even been interviewed yet, that that should
be done first, and that I know bank records-- that
decision was not nine. That was someone else, and
about toll records, too.
You also see toll records, to see if
particular people were where they said they were
at particular timeSc
JACK BESONER
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Q . Do you reca 1 1 --
A. All that had to be done.
Q. Do you recall any discussion of the .
down side or any argument against issuing bank
record subpoenas, or telephone toll subpoenas?
A._ Not specifically about this, but I
imagine there must have been, because I have been
in enough meetings on other cases, where I know
there are certain downsides about them that are
raised, especially in a case where we had no clear
idea of what and whom was being targeted.
Q. Do you recall who at the meeting, took
what positions or-- as far as grand jury goes, or
did people stake out a position?
A. Nothing really stands out.
I was probably less involved in that,
because it's an area that I didn't feel very
confident in, because I would suspect that Larry
was the aost cautious, because Larry, by
reputation in the office, he's knows as "Doctor
No- .
He's very conservative in terms of
leaning into anything, and he's always-- turns
out, he was generally right.
His idea was, do your backgroifnd work.
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investigative work, all this homework, and then
you take it to the grand jury.
He is a very detailed person, and thaX
would probably be my guess.
I don't know-- Dick, I don't-- I don't
really have a particular recollection of what
others were saying.
Q. Oo you recall what position Mr. Feldman
and Mr. Kellner took, Mr. Feldman and Mr. Kellner?
A. Mo, I really don't.
I know that Jeff, in spite of being
very certain what to say-- very certain about
things, like the facts of when things happened,
and he also listened, and, you know, it wasn't
like a heated discussion. I don't remember it
being, like, somebody staking out a position, Jeff
saying, "Yes. Yes. Yes. Go for it. Why are you
holding me back," and others saying, "No. No.
Me-
lt wasn't just that acrimonious. I
don't have that good of a recollection of it.
Q. Has there a consensus come to at this
meeting, regarding the grand jury?
A. Well, my recollection is not that good,
but my recollection is one of-- the agentfs were
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supposed to go out an X, Y and Z people
interviewed, and-- there were going to be some, I
thought it was, airline records or something liW^
that, but-- maybe some toll records, that were
going to be gotten, other things that were going
to be gotten, and then sit down and re-visit the
issue .
Q. As you recall it, at least, there was
supposed to be some sort o£ subpoena issued Cor
some records?
A. I think so.
Q. At that stage of the investigation?
A. I know there were going to be some kind
of records maintained.
I seem to recall airlines. Cor some
reason, the airline records.
Do you recall any ATF records?
ATF records?
Yes.
No, but--
X don't mean ATP, I mean gun stores
records that the ATF could obtain?
A. That they could obtain?
That doesn't stand out in my mind, but
that probably should have been one oC th» things.
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Q. Let me make sure I have the people.
There was Mr. Kellner, Mr. Feldman, Mr. Scharf
and-- ,
A. Dick may have been there.
Q. I understand, but we have Kellner,
Feldman, Scharf and yourself?
A. Uh-hu«.
Q. And perhaps Mr. Gregorie?
A. Right.
Q. Anything else that you can recall,
anybody else?
A . No .
Q. Is there anything else about that
meeting you can recall?
A. No .
Q. What is your next contact with the
case?
A . Let ' s see .
In By note on that Meeting, on May
20th, Jeff recollects that-- now that I mentioned
something about it, we were still unsure about
what kind of case it was, whether it was focusing
to be a gun case or Neutrality case, and we still
needed to get better focused in on the law in that
area to start developing those facts. ',
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My next recollection-- I really didn't
follow-up with the memo after that.
I think I was shown the tnemo before ii
went out.
Q. Which memo were you shown?
A. The final, you know, the ultimate memo
that was sent out.
Q. We understand that there was a draft
that Mr. FeldBian did and subiiitted to Mr. Kellner,
and then Mr. Kellner and Mr. Scharf or Mr. Scharf
made some changes in that aeMO, and then it was
the Scharf /Feldman meMO that went to Justice, and
I did see the copy or--
A. I'm pretty sure I saw the ona that went
to Justice, the old one that went out, without any
cover on i t .
Q. Do you recall anything about that
nemoranduB?
A. No, except that soon after it was sent,
people knew about it. That was renarkable.
Q. Have you any opinion as to how that
memorandua found its way into the public domain?
A. Did I have an opinion as opposed to
facts?
I have no facts that would leaJd me to
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believe one way or the other, other than my
cynicism of Washington, and that eventually
everything that crosses the District of Columbia/"
line, ends up somewhere in the public domain.
Q. So it's your opinion that the memo was
distributed out of Washington?
A . Yes .
Q. All right.
A. And that's a strictly unfounded
opinion, but based on personal prejudices.
Q. The memo went to Washington, had an
ultimate conclusion section, and that conclusion
was that it was premature to involve a grand jury.
Do recall that?
A . Yes .
Q. And it listed some reasons for being
premature, and it said at one point, the grand
jury at that stage, would be quote, a fishing
expedition, close quote.
Up until showing that reference in the
memorandum, do you recall hearing discussion of
the grand jury being a fishing expedition, and
again, this may refer back to the meeting on May
20th or at any other time?
A. I don't remember that. ?
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1 I do remember expressions of, you know,
2 "You can't just let a grand jury run amock."
3 You have got to have them focused, ,
4 things like that, uhich I guess amounts to the
5 same thing, but just not in so many words.
6 Q. Do you recall any reference to the harm
7 that might befall innocent contributors to the
8 accounts that might be subpoenaed in the event
9 that subpoenas were issued?
10 A. Yes. That was discussed at one of the
11 meetings.
12 Again, I'm not sure of which one, but
13 there was a discussion-- you know, here's these
14 people. They don't know what they are
15 contributing to.
16 They write out a check, and what is the
17 result of this, what do we do with that,
18 especially in this coB«unity, everybody-- I mean,
19 one day it's earthquakes, and another day, mud
20 slides in Coloiibia, or earthquakes in Honduras-- I
21 mean, revolutions here and there.
22 You go into little Havana on Southwest
23 8th Street and walk into randomly nine
24 restaurants, and where up north you see Jerry's
25 Kids, and there you're going to have the JContras,
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and then whatever the cause the people have there.
This is an exile c omni un i t y . That's the
uaytheydoit. »
Q. Do you recall discussions of those
facts in context of issuing grand jury subpoenas
in this case?
A. That you-- you know, it was discussed,
the factors of the checks, as a result of the
telethons, things like that, and we obviously
couldn't be focusing on all those people, and what
did we want out of it, and things like that, yes.
Q. Did you have any input in the final--
this is after May 20th, up until the memo goes
into the Department of Justice.
Did you have any input suggestions or
changes to that memo?
A. No, not that I recall.
Q. Now, the memo was sent to the
Department of Justice on or about June 3rd.
A. Yes.
Q. At or after that time, what was your
next contact with the Costa case?
A. It was very really little, and then I
went away, and people were on vacation.
I returned^ mid August-- my neWt
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1 chronology could have been at the very end of
2 August, and Leon called me into his office and
3 showed tne a mailing that he had received in a •
4 large brown envelope, and he said, "Look at this.
5 What do you think of this? You know, what do you
6 make of this," and it was something from-- I think
7 it was from Costa Rica, and it had affidavits in
8 it of the people who had been imprisoned in Costa
9 Rica, and it was juat very odd, you know, and it--
10 it just looked fishy to me.
11 Infact, Isaid, "This isthekindof
12 thing you kind of hate to have your fingerprints
13 on. Who knows--"
14 It was making allegations against John
15 Kerry, allegations of improprieties, and purported
16 to have sworn affidavits of these two guys that
17 were down there, but all the facts we knew to date
18 were totally contrary to some of the things that
19 were stated in those affidavits.
20 They could have been true for all we
21 knew, but by now, you know, we were starting to
22 focus on the case, you know.
23 There was a lot nore public attention
24 on it, and I said, "I just have a feeling-- I
25 don't know-- for somewhere down the line,; we're
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being set up by other people, but--" you know, "I |
I
suggest you immediately do not just hold this, but I
passthislong." ,
Q. Old you discuss passing it along to
whom?
A. Yes, to submit that to Washington, you
know, to make sure we-- make people aware we had
gotten this packet.
As it turned out, we learned we weren't
the only people to get it. We just assumed we
were singled out, and it turned out there was a
mailing to other people, also.
Q. Prior to late August, I believe the FBI
gave a very thick prosecution memo to Mr. Feldman,
and he passed it on to Mr. Kellner.
Did you ever see that?
A. No. It's not a prosecution memo,
p-r-o-s, but after the last thing-- in the sense
that we write prosecution nemos, before we
initiate a RICO prosecution, something like this,
but simply a compilation of all of the 302's,
without characterization of inclusion, things like
that .
I was aware it existed, but I didn't--
it came in when I was-- either it came i nf after I
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had gone on vacation, and I was getting ready to
leave, so I was winding things up.
I really didn't see that. »
Q. You say you were aware of it.
When did you become aware oE it?
A. Soaetiae after that, that that had been
prepared, and passed along.
Q. Were you ever asked for any input on
the decision, about what to do for the memo--
A. The prosecution aeno?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. After Mr. Kellner received-- after the
episode in which he received the affidavits that
you aentioned earlier in late August--
A. Uh-hua.
Q. What was your next contact with the
case?
A. It was about that tiae when we started
getting calls, saying, you know-- asking for
coaaents on whether we were told to stop this
case, you know, at the request of the Department
of-- the request of the Attorney General, and, you
know, froa there it just really snowballed, and
the press saying-- I was sitting around laying
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this is-- this was out of the blue. It's--
Q. You nean the press comments?
A. Yes, the comments. ,
I mean, around here, it's often we're
the last to know, and we usually get most of our
information from the press, and that's how we
first heard of this allegation.
Q. When those allegation came in, did you
go to Mr. Kellner or anyone else, to attempt to
determine what the status of the case was?
A . Oh , yes .
Well, I discussed the allegations with
Leon, and I imagine Jeff at some point.
Q. What did they tell you?
A. Starting in there, I really don't
remember in terms of what the case-- we would have
to see what Jeff was doing at that time.
Garcia-- the Garcia sentencing on
September 15th, seemed to be a landmark for the
beginning of a lot of calls and things on this
issue .
Q. When you talked to Mr. Feldman, did he
tell you that he had passed the prosecution memo
on to Mr . Kel Iner?
A. Hemayhave. ;
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1 I was dealing from a very limited
2 perspective of just dealing with little events as
3 they cane up. <
4 At that point, I really didn't see the
5 day-to-day supervision of the case.
6 The case now-- well, at some point,
7 Jeff started working-- or one of the senior people
8 started working with Jeff on the case.
9 I don't know when that was.
10 At that time, it was the person, Dick
11 Gregorie's predecessor, Joe McSorley, and once
12 Joe, you know, was assigned, to work on it with
13 him, the rest of us kind of faded out.
14 Q. Can you remember when the press
15 inquiries about alleged pressure from Main Justice
16 began to come in?
17 A. The go slow calls?
18 Q. Not the calls, themselves, but the
19 ones--
20 A. I call them the go slow calls.
21 It started with-- I know it started
22 after I came back in August, you know, sometime,
23 late September-- late August, September, they
24 started.
25 Q. Before the Garcia sentencing, Jhich was
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in Septenber?
I
A. I think-- my recollection is that there |
I
was intense attention right around the time of the i
Garcia sentencing, but even before that, there j
was, just, like a call from here, a call from
I
there on this, so it was starting to maybe build
momen tun .
Q. Mr. Feldaan has told us that he passed
along the prosecution meao to Mr. Kellner some
tiBC in mid August or so, and ultimately, he got
it back from Mr. Kellner in early November.
If you were receiving press inquiries
as early as the middle of September and taking
them to Mr. Kellner at that time, was he giving
you any indication as to what he was doing with
the prosecution memo or with the case, in general?
A. I don't recall any discussions in terms
of the case, itself, but more discussion really
Cocused on, you know, why is this happening.
You know, it may be a very limited
perspective to take, again, in retrospect, but
that was it. It was very s i tuat ional ly oriented
discussions .
Q. I'll be frank here.
The case from the time the prcfsecution
,. .... ..i;#l(!U!SSffifl^!;.;rooM 3n-.s3,
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1 ■emo came in and went to Mr. Kellner, until it
2 came out of his office on November 1st, very
3 little, if anything, occurred in the case, and at«
4 the same time, you were feeding press inquiries
5 about this go slow allegation.
6 Were you making an attempt to find out
7 why the case seemed stuck in one place for the
8 better part of three, four months?
9 A. I imagine that 1 talked to Jeff from
10 time to time about it, but I really didn't look
XI beyond that, and, you know, I should have in
12 retrospect, but I thought that, you know, things
13 were just taking their course, and, you know, what
14 was-- what was needed to be done, was being done.
15 Q. Were you aware that Mr. Gregorie was
16 reviewing the prosecution memo?
17 A. No.
18 !■■ trying to figure out at what point
19 in time Joe left.
20 I don't know if he started reviewing it
21 when Joe left, or he just started reviewing it
22 also at some point, but no.
23 Q. you were not contemporaneously aware
24 that Mr. Gregorie was reviewing--
25 A. No.Notreally,no.
luini AOOtnri
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I generally stayed out of the-- the
specifics of the case at that point.
I had very little contact with it. »
To this day, I don't think I have seen
the FBI pros nemo, the compilations of the 302's.
Q. Do you recall when the C-123 in which
Mr. Hasenfuss was riding, was shot down?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. How did you learn about that?
A. Well, interesting enough, again, the
press calls-- we had a very well known case, or
famous, where Barry Scale was a prime witness. He
returned the cartel indictment based on his
testimony, and he flew a C-123 loaded with dope
into Nicaragua, a trans-shipment point, and that
was the basis for our cartel indictment.
The immediate press reaction to that
was that it was the same plane, and when Barry
Seale had been assassinated in Baton Rouge, there
was a lot of notoriety around it, and they had,
like, a 20/20 show focused on Barry Seale, and all
these things, so the initial calls we were gettin^j
was, you know, was this the same C-123.
There's just not that many of these
planes around anymore
JACK BESO
jmmm
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Did you discu
S3 the Hasenfus/ shoot
down with anyone in relationship to Mr. Feldman's
case? ,
A. To Jeff's case?
At some time later, probably initially
it was basically discussed in trying to find out
if there was a connection with the-- the same
C-123 that Seale had used at a later time.
I mean, later could mean a day or two
later, just not that same day.
I know that I talked to Jeff about it,
and/or Jeff came in, or I walked in where Jeff
was, one of those things, and there was probably a
general discussion about that in relation to this
case, was there any indication this could have
been something related to the people he was
looking into, things like that.
Just general-- I don't have specific
recollections of what particular was discussed,
other than, you know, yes, there probably was at
some point, firm discussion-- got together and
said, you know, "Do you think this relates to
you . "
Q. You say people got together.
A. I wish I knew who, except, aga'in, I
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would suspect it's Larry, Dick, and myself, and
Jeff, and I'm not-- I don't have a fix on Larry
and Dick, and also, that's not to mean-- there .
were other meetings, you know, where Dick could
have met with Jeff and Leon, and the rest of us
not being there.
I can tell you with certainly how
much-- that as to David-- David's only contact
with that case was with the printout on that
particular date, contrary to the report.
He did not work on the case.
Q. Did you ever discuss--
A. Did not participate.
Q. Did you ever discuss the Hasenfuss
incident with Mr. Kellner?
A. Probably.
Q. Here you getting press inquiries at
that ti«e, linking the go slow, the Costa case,
with the Hasenfusi case?
Is this-- the question is, is this the
saae investigation?
A. Yes. It was again about that file,
when that was, again, cosing up again, and the
other thing that had come up was Leon had given an
interview, had talked to this man from-
:l think
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Murray Wass-- I want to say New Republic. I can't
remember now exactly what magazine it was, but
I think that was, like, in September or so that ,
that happened, and that article came out around
that time .
That was, like, a retrospective of the
Garcia and go slow, and that, I think, was in
time-- happening about the same time as Hasenfuss.
It all gets mixed together in my mind.
I think it was all happening about the
same period of time.
Q. Getting back to that, do you remember
having discussions with Mr. Kellner about
Hasenfust and Costa?
A. Yes.
I just don't remember what we
discussed .
You know, can this be part of Jeff's
case, what's going on, maybe it's more than six
guns and a mortar, all of this-- maybe he's part
of that? Is there any way to tell?
Q. Do you recall discussing the correct
status of the case with him at that point?
A. I'm sure at that point it really got
discussed in detail, having talked to-- who we
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talked to, you know, the-- these people, what hav<
they been telling you, that kind of thing.
Q. Did you talk to Mr. Kellner about-- <
A. What was Jeff doing?
Q. What was Jeff doing and what was he
doing about the case, where it was in the
pipeline?
A. I probably asked where it was and what
wa sgoingon.
Q. Do you recall what you were told at
that time?
A. No, I really don • t .
I more vividly recall Jeff telling
things, you know, than I do being told by Leon,
what was going on.
I'm sure we did have the discussions,
you know, because it makes sense we would have.
Q. Other than contact with the public
information office, Pat Corton, did you have
discussions with anyone at the Department of
Justice on the Costa matter?
A. No .
Q. Are you aware, other than discussions
with Mark Richard, of any communications between
this office and Main Justice, on the Cost'a case?
JKASSn.
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A. No.
Q. Do you recall any meetings or
discussions-- ^
A. Wait a minute. I just want to clarify.
I am not personally-- that's the only
one I have a total independent recollection of.
Now, since then I have heard Leon say
he had discussed the case with others that--
Q. But at that time--
A. But at that time, I'm not aware of it,
no .
Q. How many trips did Hr . Feldman make to
Central America?
A. One.
Q. Did you have any contact on the Costa
case, with Mr. Mathis, Mr. Garcia's attorney?
A. No, not directly, but that became a
large part oC my life, when that thing came out,
that article, the accusations against Jeff for--
that Jeff allegedly told Mathis to butt out or he
was going to do it to him, something like that.
By that time, because of the conduct--
a mother figure, whatever, but Jeff would come in,
and he was down, would tell me, "I'm depressed,"
and I would boost him up, and when that happened--
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Jeff is very young, and he was absolutely
des troyed .
He was really beside himself. He «
called me at home that night. Really didn't know
what to do next, just really upset, something like
this had never happened to him, and from that
point on, it almost became my mission to keep Jeff
boosted up and going on this thing, and him
saying, "It looks like everything I do gets looked
at wrong. How can they say this to me."
That was a real important event in this
whole scenario.
Q. You never had any personal contact with
Mr. Mathis?
A. No.
As a matter of fact, until this
happened, I have no knowledge of who he was.
Q. Up until, say, November of 1986, did
you have any contact with any investigators from
Senator Kerry's staff or any other Congressional
investigators?
A. I may have.
You know, we got phone calls. May have
gotten telephone inquiries.
Q. Mere you ever interviewed by alnyone
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froB those staffs, from the Congressional staffs?
A. Over the phone or personally?
Q. Personally. ,
A. Well, I don't recall, but there was a
time we were being visited-- in that fall, we were
visited by lots of people, and again, that's
another one of those things where I wish I had
kept logs, where I did have things of who it was,
because it would have been nice to know who it was
now, but I don't recall.
I don't have any independent
recollection of that.
Q. Did you ever have any personal contact
with Murray Haas?
A. On the phone, and then I sat in on-- I
think it was part of an interview he was having
with Leon .
Q. To the best of your recollection, did
Mr. Kellner tell Mr. Uass anything that departed
Cro« what you have related to us today?
A. No.
I thought-- what I was particularly
angry at was because I think I was in the room for
the part when he was asked, "Have you talked to
the Attorney General
Kussii
JACK BESONEl
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It wds a-- it was two distinct
questions, which when he wrote the article, merged
into one ,
The first part of the question was.
"Did you talk to the Attorney General about the
case," and Leon said, "No. No, except for that
one event."
He said, "No. I never got a phone call
from him. Never talked to him about it."
Q. All right .
A. And the second part of the question,
"Did you talk to the Attorney General at all," and
he said, "Maybe half a dozen times in my life,"
and when he wrote the article, he put it in such a
way that it made it sound like, although Kellner
talked to him, the Attorney General-- he did at
least speak to him half a dozen times about it.
In the context of the way he put it, it
was really pitiful the way he put it, and it
bothered me that anybody would have done that.
Let me say that was my first loss of
virginity with the press, and I said, "This is the
end of trus t now . "
Q. Other than the pieces of correspondence
or memoranda that we have discussed and t>he notes
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you have-- said you saw, do you have any
recollection of seek or having input any other
correspondence, memoranda, anything like that? ,
A . Well --
BY MR. GENZMAN:
Q. Any written products on the Costa case?
A. No. No, because other than that memo, I
don't really remember any other major written
product on that case, involved in that case.
Q. Let me ask the ultimate question.
To your knowledge, did anyone in this
office or in the Department of Justice, give or
receive instructions or suggestions that the case
should be handled in a dilatory fashion or someone
should go slow or words to that effect?
A. No, and you know what is really
remarkable about this that really upset me to know
end, if there was anything that we have after this
whole thing came out, discussed, is how odd it was
that nobody did anything or said anything, and
that, you know, wonder-- maybe it was deliberately
ignored or deliberately left alone, because
somebody thought it might come back some day,
but-- at the time it didn't seem to us it was
going to be a highly charged case, just l;ike
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another gun case in Miami, but nou, I really-- the
fact nobody did anything is kind of interesting,
I
in itself. >. I
Q. Since the time when Mr. Kellner and Mr.
Feldman came to Washington to offer their
depositions-- I think that was the end of April--
A . Yes .
Q. Have you discussed with Mr. Kellner or
Feldman, what occurred at those depositions?
A. Yes.
Q. And on how many occasions?
A. When they came back, I was consumed
with curiosity.
Q. Did they tell you what questions were
asked?
A. Not specifically, other than the
general topic matter was the go slow business, and
then we know that, you know, Jeff was called back
a second time, and he came back and he told me,
"Ana, your name came up all of the time, you know,
and now everybody wants to know if you said or did
anything, to David," and I said, "Oh, great."
Q. In the course of any of these
discussions, be it the discussion on the
chronology or the depositions, has anyonef ever
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suggested to you or asked you to say anything that
wasn-t truthful, or try to create a recollection
you feel honestly you did not have? ,
A . No .
Absolutely not, no.
I'll tell you what-- this job just
isn't worth it to have done it.
Q. Have you had any discussions with Mr.
Leiwant about this case, since the day he came
apparently to you and told you that he had been
the source of the story?
A. Yes, and not of «y making, because I
really-- from the day he went-- and it was to Dick
and I-- Dick and I were talking, and he came in
and told us, you know, "I have been so totally
uncomfortable about it," and knowing, you know--
going back and saying, "Oh, my God, how did this
thing come up," just trying to avoid any further
thing, and immedia tely--
We're in the provinces, but we're not
that stupid, realizing that the next step,
anything we say beyond this would be interpreted
badly, no matter what we did, so we specifically
just tried to stay away.
I made, you know-- David did c^sme in to
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92
see me a couple of times, and it was about news,
so on, and usually-- more mechanical questions.
I think he was very upset when «
different events happened.
I recall a newspaper article the first
time his name came out in the paper, he was very,
you know, upset.
You know, he came to see me, and said,
"Do you know that my name is in the paper," and I
said no, and it was-- he had a friend. It was a
paper in another city, and he had a friend that--
who called him up and told him, and I think it was
Boston.
You know, it seems like it was Boston.
I don't remember, and I said, you know, "Well,
David, it's bound to happen."
You know, "What can I tell you?"
Then we had discussions about how he
was going to go up there, I guess, when you guys
talked to him the first time, the arrangements
forjf the travel, and then when we heard that
Hughes-- the Hughes Committee had voted to issue
subpoenas and David was one of the people before--
he read it in the paper, and I went and told him
that he would-- these things were going tio be
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1 happening, and he was going to be, you know-- it
2 was going to come out in the paper the next day.
3 Q. Did you ever discuss your varying ,
4- recollections with Mr. Leiwant?
5 A. Yes, on the day he walked in and told
6 us .
7 I think it was on a Monday, and it was
8 in Dick's office, and I came in-- thought he was
9 coming in to see Dick, and I was just leaving, and
10 ^"^jK^said " No, Ana. I want to tell you something,"
11 and he told us this, and my thing was, how could
12 you say this-- if I was supposed to have been
13 there, I never-- I have never been in a room when
14 Meese called about anything.
15 BY MR. GENZMAN:
16 Q. Can you remember, the best you can
17 recall, what he told you and Mr. Gregorie on that
18 day?
19 A. I came in and he said he had been-- the
20 reason he was coming forward, he had been called
21 by Heydon Gregory and a reporter, and he felt it
22 was going to come out eminently, and that he had
23 to tell us that he had been in the room where-- at
24 a meeting, although he doesn't remember Dick and
25 Larry being there.
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He just recalls it yas me, Jeff and
Leon, and that he thought that Leon-- he was there
and Leon was talking on the phone, and that he get
the impression that he was talking to someone from
the Justice Department, that he may have said a
name, like. Trotter, Jensen at the time. I don't
recall.
When he got oft the phone, he said
something to the effect that, "They want us to go
slow," and said he grimaced and-- "I knew it was a
joke," and that was that, and he went to Atlanta--
he's in the appellate section of the office, and
he had gone to an appeal in Atlanta soon after
that, and he ran into this good friend, John
Mathis, and at some point had a couple of drinks
with him, and said, "Guess what I saw or heard,"
whatever, and you know, I just remember after
that, it all registered, because until that point,
until thmt very minute, that was-- I had no idea.
He were all running around, saying, "I
know it's not me," and, you know, "It's you" and
just all came together.
I said, "But you were only at that
meeting when you brought in the printout for a few
minutes," you know. ^>«..^a»«»k •'
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"Is that the meeting? Yes. That's the
meeting . "
I only remember-- just don't know ho**-
you could remember that, and I was there, and the
only call I ever heard was from Mark Richard, but
at that point, some sort of happening, where you
realize, this is the time to stop talking, don't
want you to change your mind. If that's what you
believe, fine, so be it, but our recollection is
different.
Q. What was Gregorie's response?
A . Stunned .
I don't think that Dick said anything,
which is ironic.
You know, this whole thing was over,
and we sat down together over it. I said, "Dick,
you're the great criminal advisor. He didn't ask
how, when, where, what, how many people did you
tell, and all of the relevant questions we are
dying to know, because you just--" it could have
blown us away. There was no way we could have
ever thought that.
Q. After that meeting, did you ever
discuss the episode again with Mr. Leiwant, the
different recollections?
JACK BESONER
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I asked you at the beginning, "Did you
ever discuss it with him," and you said not of
your own volition. ,
A. Yes, because after he was in
Washington, he was deposed and he cane back, and--
I don't know the tiaing, but after he was deposed,
and Larry Scharf was sitting there, and I just
started spontaneously talking about-- he said, you
know, "Well, I'« glad it's over."
It was one of-- giving the impression
it was all a big misunderstanding and it was kind
oC resolved.
He talked about it, and I don't really
remember, because I know that Larry and I just
kind oC sat there, surprised, you know, it was
like a little recollection of what he had said,
and I think he wanted to tell us, "Look, I took
care of it all," or, "It's all straightened out."
At least that's ay impression of the
conversation, but we studiously avoided
questioning hia, and saying although-- I think we
did ask him, "You still don't even remember Larry
being there," something like that, and I-- he
probably said no.
That was the other time when that was
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discussed.
Q. This is probably a hard question to
answer, but I got to ask it anyway. ,
Do you know of any reason why Mr.
Leiwant would say this? Do you have any
explanation for it?
A. For it?
Q. Yes, just different recollections, any
motivation Mr. Leiwant might have to--
A. To have done that?
Q. To come up with this?
A. I don't, and that has caused me no end
of sleeplessness, simply because I always prided
myself as having a lot of insight to people, and
why people do things, or where people are coming
from and why things happen, and this is just one
of the most totally perplexing things I have ever
been involved in.
It's beyond me to understand it.
Moreover, I'm still just amazed that
David has no-- at least that I can perceive
comprehension of what has happened as a result of
this.
I mean, he just doesn't appreciate-- he
just thinks it's a slight mi sunders tandi n}g , and it
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will go away .
He had no understanding of the
incredible hurt it has caused to people, and the*
hurt it has caused him, which is kind of sad in
another way, too.
Q. Do you know of any political
motivations or personal animosities, that you are
aware of?
A. No, simply because in the appellate
section, I mean, it's a section in the office that
just really isn't involved.
He-- until then, he always enjoyed the
confidence of the U.S. Attorney.
I know he had been called in to work in
special confidence, on projects and things, and
the only thing that makes any sense, and it really
could explain it, is simply that-- I don't say
this happened for sure, but Mathis might have
laid, 'I'm working on such and such a case," and
he said, "I was there and they were discussing
it," and talk, you know, exaggeration, you know--
I don't know, something to make yourself feel more
important than you are, that you are in on
something, and--
In fact, that doesn't really itfake
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sense, but that's the only plausible explanation I
could have for it.
Then being caught in a situation, you,
know, you're saying you never thought it would go
beyond tha t .
You know, the old story, you tell your
kids even if you tell a little lie, at some point
it becomes a big lie, and then you're almost
commi tted to i t .
I don't know if it was political. It
would-- I never have just thought of anybody here
as being political in any way.
1 don't even know whether they are
Democrats, Republicans or what.
MR. MCGOUGH! I think those are the only
questions that I have.
Do you have any further questions?
BY MR. GENZMAN:
Q. Just a few.
I heard you aentioned that Mr. Leiwant
indicated it was just a misunderstanding.
A. That was the iapression he gave me.
He gave me that impression from his
deposition in Washington that day, and it was
almost as though-- and I find this remar Ifab le--
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almost as if he was making light of it.
I guess it was to re-assure us, "Look,
it's all solved, taken care of," almost a ,
childlike innocence about it. It was amazing.
Q. Did he go into detail about the nature
of the misunderstanding?
A. No, because we didn't want to get
really in it, but that was just the impression, it
was, like, it was all taken care of, and he
explained everything, and it was all, you know,
done .
I think it was, "Don't worry, guys.
It's all resolved."
Q. Has he ever expressed any occasions
that he had been confused or had exaggerated the
incident?
A. Not to me. Not to me, but then, you
know, maybe some day when this is over, I can say
what did happen.
1 just really would like to know what
did happen.
Q. But to your knowledge, he has always
stuck by his account of what happened?
A. I'm not really sure of what his account
of what happened is, other than what he t:old us i
.JMiiUSStt '
172 West Flagler Street, Miami, FL 33130 (30 "5) 3 7 i - i 5 3 7_
that day.
itBssro
1
2 I have to tell you, ny most vivid
3 recollection is that I literally felt that I had* a
*• lump in my throat, when I finally realized,
5 "David, it's somebody here."
6 You know, I think that's really what
7 the overwhelming response was.
8 He gave an explanation at that point.
9 I don't remember it specifically, you know, what
10 would have made him do that.
11 Q. In conversations with you, his story
12 has never been inconsistent, has it?
13 A. No, but then I have never known the
14 story, so that's one thing.
15 Q. What I'm getting at, from what he has
16 said on various occasions, have you found any
17 inconsistencies or reservations or admissions of
18 confusion or mistake?
19 *• Only in that he's just remarkably
20 vague.
21 The story about the grimacing, because
22 I know he didn't do anything, because-- "Leon
23 went, who are they, and went ahead--" it's
24 something that I don't even remember happening.
25 That's the only thing-- that Ue
JACK
m M ■ ■ t n
*, INC.
837
liNCUSSIFIED
102
repeated again, when he came back, that little
part of it.
I re«e«ber that, so I guess he is ,
sticking with whatever he said.
I would love to see what he said.
I would like to see his deposition, but
"^en we'll all know, because Hughes will have it
and it will be on TV .
MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing further.
MR. MCGOUGH: Nothing further. Thank
you .
THE WITNESS: What I'« going to do is
gratuitously add something, by the way.
MR. GENZMAN: We ask you to do that.
Tell us the answer to questions we should have
asked.
THE WITNESS: You mentioned I recall
earlier something that triggered something that I
recollected.
You said how many times had Jeff
Feldman gone to Costa Rica, and I recall seeing
IiiiiiB Tam^s testify that there were two trips, and
I came back to the office and I went to admin, and
asked, "Did Jeff Feldman go to Costa Rica two
times? Let me see his travel vouchers,", 'and there
^A^ES, INC
PT -> ■» 1 -s n
iusim
103
was only one trip, so I went to Jeff and said,
"You know, that wan said you were there two
times," and then we started-- he was confused. .
It was not Jeff Feldman. It was John
Mathis, because he testified at some public trial,
and for some reason, either-- I don't know,
whatever. I'm not going to say he would
misrepresent himself, but he got misrepresented as
a U.S. Attorney, and that created some kind of
inquiry to this office about unauthorized travel
by a AUSA, and I said, "That's what that was
about . "
He had an inquiry about unauthorized
travel at the time, and that's my gratuitous
comment .
MR. MCGOUGH: Okay.
(Thereupon the deposition was concluded.)
BIASSIFIED
JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
"> U«a»- rixniAT- Qt-T-AAt- u;>»: or 1 1 i 1 n / 1 n c; \ 1 7 1 - 1 S '^
mussm
CERTIFICATE
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE
1, Stan Sep
Shorthand Reporter and
the State of Florida a
that I reported in sho
Barnett; that the depo
that the foregoing pag
103, inclusive, consti
transcription of my sh
depos i t ion .
I further c
counsel, 1 aa not rela
attorney to this suit,
outcome thereof.
The foregoi
apply to any reproduct
any means unless under
direction of the certi
IN WITNESS
affixed my hand this 2
lin, being a Certified
Notary Public in and for
t Large, do hereby certify
rthand the deposition of Ana
nent was first duly sworn;
es, numbered from 1 through
tute a true and correct
orthand notes of the
ertify that I am not of
ted to nor employed by an
nor interested in the
ng certification does not
ion of this transcript by
the direct control and/or
fying shorthand reporter.
WHEREOF I have hereunto
2nd day <fi JmuA 1987
Stan Sepp.i|n, CSR, NOTARY
PUBLIC AT^LARGE. MY
COMMISSION EXPIRES:
12-25-89.
yNClKSIFlEO
JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
177 M>«» P1anl».r StF-^^ Miami. FI. mih M 0 S ^ "( 7 1 - 1 ■? 1 7
840
i . . JIKDOTTIOJ "SITS J2J-^ m
Scenographic Transcript of
HEARINGS
Before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
UNITED STATES SENATE
DEPOSITJON OF LINDA JUNE BARTLETT
Friday, June 12, 1987
UNCLA$S!R[
Washington. D.C
^,:C Z/ /f^ 7
m^^
by D. Siffco, Natior:;i ;. :-;- " ■ ■ -i_3 £"50 ^ I "C'Cl" '^G
(202) 529-930: (_ A
20 F STR££T, M.W. W^ NO \x^ (
WASHINGTON, D. C 200 01
841
muMi
'i\
1 DEPOSITION OF LINDA JUNE BARTLETT
2 Friday, June 12, 1987
3 United States Senate
4 Select Committee on Secret
5 Military Assistance to Iran
6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition
7 Washington, D. C.
8 Deposition of LINDA JUNE BARTLETT, called as a
9 witness by counsel for the Select Committee, in the
10 offices of the Senate Ethics Committee, Hart Senate
11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 10:14
12 a.m., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN
13 SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of
14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask
15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her
16 direction.
mfflfO
842
mmm
1 APPEARANCES :
2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret
3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
4 Opposition:
5 VICTORIA NOURSE, ESQ.
6 On behalf of the House Select Committee to
7 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran:
8 JAMES BLACK, ESQ.
9 On behalf of the White House:
10 C, DEAN McGRATH, JR.
11 Associate Counsel to the President
mmm
843
liili^SiriEO
? 9 N T E N T S
EXAMIffATIQN ON BEHAT.F nP
Hl^i^S^ S£MIE HOUSE
Linda June Bartlett
By Ms. Nourse 4
E X H I p X X «
10
1 24
2 25
3 ^0
UNttftSSlFlED
844
OillSiflEO
PROCEEDIMfi.q
1
2 Whereupon,
3 LINDA JUNE BARTLETT,
4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate
5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary
6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:
^ EXAMINATION
8 BY MS. NOURSE:
9 Q Could you state your full name for the record,
10 Ms. Bartlett?
^^ A. Linda June Bartlett.
^^ Q And sometime during 1981 you came to be
13 employed at the National Security Council?
^* A That's correct.
^^ Q And at that time were you assigned to work
16 with Ken deGraffenreid?
^^ A yes, I was.
^® Q And you left the NSC sometime during March of
19 1987; is that correct?
20 A That's correct.
2^ Q And during that entire period you were
22 assigned to Mr. deGraffenreid; is that correct?
" ^ That's correct, except for a period of a month
24 to a month and a half, two months. I was assigned to
25 someone else.
mmm
under oro.icior ;f 5.0. 12356
"^D. SirUo. .XJa'-cr I .urlty
845
UmSSiFIED
1 Q Who was that?
2 A Barry Kelly.
3 Q Could you just give us a quick description of
4 your duties on behalf of Mr. deGraf fenreid?
5 A I was his secretary. I typed, took dictation,
6 phones, filed — the usual.
7 Q Let me ask you some questions about our
8 favorite system. System IV, and System IV documents. I
9 understand that System IV documents are those that relate
10 to covert action or are highly sensitive; is that
11 correct?
12 A That's correct.
13 Q And System IV documents are kept in a separate
14 file room or safe that is taken care of by Jim Radzimski;
15 is that correct?
16 A He was in charge of those at one time.
17 Q He was the security officer in charge of
18 System IV documents up until November of 1986; is that
19 right?
20 A He left, yes, that fall.
21 Q And Brian Merchant took over from Jim
22 Radzimski as the security officer in charge of the files;
23 is that right?
24 A Yes. He took over temporarily, yes.
25 Q To your knowledge, did Jim Radzimski and his
UiUi^lFIED
846
y
?, Of&grs
1 successor, Brian Merchant, did they — how should I put
2 this — let me ask this a different way.
3 Did Mr. deGraffenreid, to your knowledge,
4 supervise Mr. Radzimski and his procedures for taking
5 care of the System IV documents?
6 A Supervise in what way?
7 Q Did Mr. deGraffenreid create the procedures to
8 take care of those documents or did he approve the
9 procedures that Mr. Radzimski would use to take care of
10 the System IV documents?
11 A I don't know how to answer that.
12 Q If you don't know, you don't know.
13 A Mr. deGraffenreid was head of the
14 intelligence.
15 Q And as head of intelligence he would have
16 general responsibility for everything within the
17 department, but you don't know specifically about the
18 procedures; is that what you're trying to tell me?
19 A Hell, since he was head of the intelligence
20 directorate there and System IV documents were located
21 there ~
22 Q Did he have overall responsibility to take
23 care of the System IV documents?
24 (Pause.)
25 Let's move on for a minute. Let me ask the
UNGtmiFIED
847
UNdlASSiFlED
1 question in a more concrete fashion. Would Mr.
2 deGraf fenreid and Jim Radzimski or, later, his successor
3 have meetings, discussions about the System IV security
4 procedures, to your )cnowledge?
5 A I don't recall any specific meetings. I think
6 over the years they must have. There would have been
7 something there.
8 Q On a day-to-day basis, if someone in the NSC
9 wanted to see a System IV document would they go to Jim
10 Radzimski? Would they go to Mr. deGraffenreid? Between
11 those two, what would be the normal procedure?
12 A If they requested a document, then they would
13 go to Jim, or they may call through me. It would just
14 depend.
15 Q So you did get calls occasionally for System
16 IV documents?
17 A On occasion.
18 Q They would call you and ask you to pass a
19 message to Mr. deGraffenreid?
20 A If Jim wasn't there, or I'd say well, you'd
21 have to talk to Jim or something like that.
22 Q Okay. Let me get this clear. If Jim
23 Radzimski was not availzible for a System IV request,
24 someone from the NSC might ask you to go look for the
25 document, or would they ask you to. speak to Mr.
ONWSiRED
848
10
UNMSSFIED
1 deGraffenreid about the document — just on a normal
2 daily basis. I'm just talking generally.
3 A If Jim wasn't there, then of course they would
4 go through me to request the document.
5 Q And was it your normal practice to then go to
6 Mr. deGraffenreid and speak to him about getting the
7 document, or would you go to the files and proceed to
8 fill the request?
9 A As a procedure, I would probably occasionally
speak to Mr. deGraffenreid. It would just probably
11 depend on —
^^ Q So on some occasions you might speak to Mr.
13 deGraffenreid —
^* A And on some occasions I may just go directly
15 to the files.
^* Q By the way, did you know Mr. Radzimski? i
17 mean, was he a part of sort of a team in the office, or
18 was he off on his own doing his own job? Was he
19 integrated into the whole intelligence directorate?
2° A He was part of the office. He was working
21 right in the office. He couldn't help but be part of the
22 office.
^' Q I» where he works just physically close to
24 where you worked? I'm just curious.
25 A Yes.
UNKSSSIFe
849
uNciminEo
Q Did he keep what you considered to be a very
Close hold on the documents? Was he very protective of
his domain, so to speak?
Well, the documents were sensitive.
Q was he generally considered a reliable person
6 in the office?
"^ A Yes.
1
2
3
4 A
5
Q
He was a dedicated, reliable person.
Let me ask you this, could you just tell us
9 who had access to the System IV files?
■"■^ A Physically?
" ° Physically, the hard copy in the safe, who
had the combination to the safe to have access to those
13 documents?
* ''*''' "-li-tically anyone in the office would
have had access to the safes.
Q Anyone in the intelligence directorate?
A Yes.
Q And could you just nam. for us those people in
the office, to «a)ce sure we have a clear record?
A At that time, of course, me, Mr.
decraffenreid, Mr. Canistraro, Mr. Major. Who else was
there at th. time? There was Jim, the secretaries there
Q Kathy Gibbs?
A Kathy Gibbs and Pat Rawson. And Colonel May.
UNCI:^S$tflED
850
mms^m
10
1 Q He was in charge of space programs, as I
2 remember, a highly relevant topic to this investigation.
3 A Yes.
4 Q Were the combinations in a separate location,
5 a central location — the combinations to the safes — so
6 that if someone wanted to have access to the safe they
7 could go to a drawer and look at the combination?
8 A Yes. The policy was to have them in one place
9 and people would )tnow that one safe combination in case
10 there was a necessity to pull it out.
11 Q And everyone in the office knew where those
12 were?
13 A They were supposed to. I can't vouch for them
14 all.
15 Q Theoretically they knew.
16 Now I understand Mr. Radzimski kept a computer
17 record of his documents in the System IV files. Were you
18 familiar with that computer system at all?
19 A No. I never got involved with the computer
20 aspect of it.
21 Q Do you know if anyone else in the office was
22 either involved with the computer aspect of it or knew
23 how to run the computer?
24 A That was brought up one time. I didn't have
25 time to do it. Pat was trained on it briefly — Rawson.
OiraiSSIflEB
851
mmmm
11
1 That must have been at least a couple of years ago —
2 briefly. I'm not sure if she remembers how to do it.
3 That was quite a while ago.
4 Q Have you seen her actually using the computer
5 ever?
6 A Oh, at one time. As I said, this was probably
7 at least two or three years ago.
8 Q Were these occasions when you saw her using
9 the computer two years ago, these are the times that you
10 remember; or do you remember it occurring on and off?
11 A No. We were severely understaffed.
12 Q At the time?
13 A At the time.
14 Q So that when you saw her using the computer it
15 was two or three years ago, or two years ago?
16 A To the best of my recollection, yes.
17 Q Was there anyone else in the office that was
18 trained on the computer?
19 A No, not to the best of my recollection. No
20 one else was trained.
21 Q Did Mr. deGraffenreid know how to use the
22 computer, to your knowledge?
23 A No, not to my knowledge.
24 Q And you said that you yourself did not know
25 how to use the computer; is that correct?
UNCtASStflED
852
mmPB
2 Q I take it as Mr. deGraf fenreid's secretary you
3 had occasion to type in System IV documents; is that
4 right — type for him?
5 A Yes, that's correct.
6 Q And you would get a number from Jim Radzimski
7 for the document; is that right?
8 A That's correct.
9 Q Okay. Did you ever have occasion to type a
10 document that did not have a number and was termed a non-
11 log document?
12 A When we submitted admin memos I don't believe
13 we put them in the system.
14 Q By admin memos do you mean memos dealing with
15 administrative affairs?
16 A Administrative matters.
17 Q These memos did not include highly sensitive
18 matter?
19 A No. Those were usually unclassified.
20 Q That's why they didn't get a system number,
21 because —
22 A Well, that was the procedure at NSC, whoever
23 formulated the policy, but I'm not sure about that.
24 Q These were day-to-day, normal affairs. Okay.
25 Have you ever seen a non-log document? Did
mwmm
853
wtmrn
13
1 you see a non-log document in the course of your duties
2 as Mr. deGraffenreid's secretary? What I mean by that is
3 a document that on the upper righthand corner, instead of
4 the System IV number you will see the term "non-log".
5 A I don't recall any specific particular
6 documents.
7 Q Let me as)c you again, to go back to the
8 procedures for the System IV documents, if someone came
9 to you and asked you for a System IV document, how would
10 it be that that document would find its way back into the
11 files? In other words, was there a procedure so that if
12 an original was taken out of the files that it would go
13 back in where it was found?
14 Was there something that you did when these
15 requests came to you?
16 A Well, the person requesting the document would
17 bring it back to the office. It would be logged back
18 into the computer log, and then it would be filed back
19 into the file itself, the hard copy.
20 Q When you say logged back into the computer
21 log, if an original were taken out, there would be a
22 computer entry indicating that it would be taken out, to
23 your knowledge?
24 A That would be the procedure, yes.
2 5 Q How many times would you say that requests
mamm
854
ONCk^iFIED
14
1 came to you for System IV original documents? Was it a
2 normal event — it happened every day ~ or was it once a
3 month, twice? I'd just like to get some idea.
4 A It's hard to say. It varied. There was no
5 set pattern.
6 Q Let me see if I can get you to be a little bit
7 more specific on that. How many times during the course
8 of your duties in a year would a request be made to you
9 to pull a System IV original — ten times, 100 times?
10 Can you give me any ballpark kind of figure?
^^ A I really couldn't, because it varied — people
12 requesting.
^^ Q Would you consider it to be a normal request
14 for a System IV document, or would it be unusual for
15 someone to come to you for a System IV document?
^* A It would be a routine request for somebody on
17 the staff calling up for an intel report.
^® Q And would these requests come to you generally
19 when Jim Radzimski was unavailable or would people just
20 talk to you?
21 A It would depend.
^2 Q Sometimes even if Jim might be available as
23 well?
^* A It would depend. Since, you know, they knew I
25 worked in the intel office, it just would depend.
mmim
855
25
yNJiissifiED
15
1 Q What would you do when a request came in for a
2 system IV original? You'd go to the hard copy, pull it?
3 A I would ask the person handling the System iv,
4 if Jim was there, if he could, if not, then I would try'
5 to fill the rec[uest
Q Okay, so normally if someone asked you for a
system IV document you would go to Jim Radzimski and ask
8 him to pull the document. He would do so. He would hand
you the document, the original document. At that point
would some entry be made somewhere to indicate that the
document had been taken out of the System IV files?
^^ ^ T^*^ "°"ld b« the correct procedure, yes.
" Q would you make that entry somewhere? Would
14 you make a written record?
^^ ^ " *^" "^s "°t available, it should be on the
15 computer, yes.
^^ ° °^^y- I'» sorry to be so dense about this,
18 but if w. can just back up a minute, if jia Radzimski
19 were there and you had a request for a System IV
20 original, you would bring it to him, he would pull the
21 hard copy. He would make an entry on his computer; is
22 that correct?
^^ * '^*^*t would be the correct procedure, yes.
^* Q A^l right. If Jia Radzimski were unavailable
and there was no one tending the files that day and
IINCtASSIFIED
856
iJNCJiSSiFIED
16
1 someone had brought you a request, you would go in and
2 pull the hard copy and then would you make a notation
3 somewhere, a note for Jim, or what would you do?
4 A That would be the right way of doing it
5 because I don't know how to work the computer — writing
6 it down on paper.
7 Q That's what I wanted to know.
8 A I would write a note.
9 Q You would write a note to Jim and say I took
10 these documents at so-and-so's request — something along
11 those lines?
12 A Yes.
13 Q Do you remember any specific request for
14 System IV documents in the year 1986?
15 A In 1986?
16 Q First of all, tell me how many times you think
17 people requested documents, if you can, during 1986.
18 A It's hard to say. I don't know how many came
19 directly to Jin.
20 Q Well, no, only those requests that came to
2 1 you .
22 A Came through me?
23 Q Yes.
24 A I really don't recall.
25 Q Do you remember requests from Lieutenant
msimm
857
wmmm
17
1 Colon«l North during 1986 to pull a System IV original?
2 Do you remember any such request?
3 A No, I don't recall that at all.
4 Q Do you remember any requests from Fawn Hall,
5 his secretary?
6 A To the best of my recollection, I don't recall
7 anything.
8 Q Perhaps earlier in date, covering 1985, do you
9 remember any specific requests from Robert McFarlane for
10 a System IV original document?
11 A No, I do not recall that.
12 Q How about from his secretary, Wilma Hall?
13 A Mo, I don't recall that either.
14 Q Back to 1986, do you remember any requests
15 from Lieutenant Colonel Earl for a System IV original?
16 A No, I don't.
17 Q And Commander Coy for a System IV original?
18 A No, I don't recall that either.
19 Q Did Mr. deGraffenreid ever ask you to pull
20 System IV originals for him? I imagine that during the
21 course of hia work with these documents that he might
22 have.
23 A Well, it was Mr. deGraffenreid 'a habit, or he
24 did like to work with original documents because of all
25 the notes written on the original documents so that he
UNeU^iFlEO
858
\\mmB
18
1 could see. That was something normal for him.
2 Q The notes written on the originals, he wanted
3 to see notes on the original documents, or the originals
4 would be clean so that he wouldn't have to deal with
5 notes on copies? Which one of those?
6 Let me ask the question in a simpler fashion.
7 He wanted to see the originals because of notes that were
8 written on the originals?
9 A Yes, any side margin comments or anything like
10 that.
11 Q Okay. And so it was his regular practice to
12 ask you for a System IV original and you would go to
13 either Jim or to the files and bring him back the
14 original document; is that correct?
15 A Yes, that's correct.
16 Q Let's go to November 1986. Did Mr.
17 deGraffenreid ask you during November 1986, do you
18 remember any specifics about documents that he asked you
19 for during that period?
20 A I don't recall anything specific, no.
21 Q Let me ask you a question that I'm curious
22 about. You mentioned to me that Mr. deGraffenreid liked
23 to work with originals because of marginalia on the
24 original. Do you know how that marginalia would arrive
25 on that document?
isisssra
UNiAS^RED
19
1 A When we create the System IV documents they
2 are information or action memorandums. They do go across
3 to the West Wing for whatever purpose, and then when they
4 come back It would sometimes have comments or notes or
5 something to that effect on them.
6 Q So as a general matter it would likely be that
7 the marginalia would be —
8 (A discussion was held off the record.)
9 MS. NOURSE: Back on the record.
10 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming)
11 Q I was in the middle of a question. The
12 marginalia would generally be something someone had
13 written in the West Wing, typically the National Security
14 Advisor; is that right?
15 A Yes, it would be, typically.
16 Q Aside from that reason, do you know of any
17 other reason why people would want to see the original as
18 opposed to a copy?
19 A I can't answer for other people; I don't know.
20 Q Okay. It's just something I'm curious about.
21 Generally when a System IV document would be requested,
22 would you assume that the original was what the requester
23 would want? Let me clarify that.
24 If someone came to our security officer and
25 said I want X document, he would hand me a copy of the
UNMSSIFIFD
860
lIHiiilFlffl
20
1 document, not the original, and I'm just curious whether
2 it was a standard practice to hand out the originals or
3 whether you would make a copy if a request came to you
4 for a document.
5 A Could you repeat the question again, please?
6 Q- Sure. Was it your normal practice to obtain
7 the original from the System IV files upon a request for
8 a particular document, or would you make a copy of that
9 docviment and give it to the person who had requested it?
10 (Pause.)
11 Let me give you a hypothetical. Someone from
12 the NSC calls up and says I want document 4002, and you
13 say fine, hang up the phone. Jim Radzimski's not there.
14 You are there. You go look for the hard copy of the
15 file. Now you find 4002. Is it your assumption that the
16 person wants the original at that point and you will hand
17 him the original, making a note to Jim that you've done
18 that?
19 A It would not probably be my assumption.
20 Q Would you ask the person in this case whether
21 they wanted a copy or the original?
22 A If I were processing the document, I would
23 probably just — it would depend if they would want it as
24 an add-on to their other package or, you know, the reason
25 they want it. It would just depend.
UNffOFe
861
UNfilWIEI)
21
1 Q What were the typical reasons that they would
2 want — you mentioned something about an add-on to a
3 package.
4 A Yes. If there was a follow-on action or
5 something to a package that was already initiated, yes.
6 Q So I've never been very clear about add-ons, I
7 have to confess. Could you explain for us simply what
8 the add-on procedure was or what an add-on memo is?
9 A Certainly. If the first docximent you
10 initiated in System IV goes across the street and is
11 acted upon by the Advisor or the Deputy, it comes back
12 for further action. If it was necessary for you to
13 resubmit another memo, you would probably usually do an
14 add-on and retain the same original number, System IV
15 number, so that it could be logged in together. It would
16 be a good reference point.
17 Q Would you need the original System IV document
18 when you were creating the add-on? In other words, you
19 had suggested earlier that one of the reasons why one
20 might request a System IV original is for the purpose of
21 creating an add-on memo. I'm just not quite sure how
22 that works.
23 A Hypothetically, if I was doing the package I
24 would probably send over the original. It might be an
25 attachment or something to the_add-jDn package, so that
: something to the add-jsn
862
mmmm
22
1 the Advisor could see the original.
2 Q I see. Aside from that reason, are there any
3 other reasons you can think of why one might request the
4 original System IV document?
5 A I really do not know myself.
6 Q Let's go back to the situation about the
7 difference between originals and copies. If someone
8 called you up and asked for a System IV document and Jim
9 Radzimski was not there and you'd go in and try and
10 process the request, if the individual requesting the
11 document did not say one way or the other, would it be
12 your standard practice to make a copy of the document
13 that's in the files and give the copy to the person
14 requesting the document?
15 A I don't )cnow if you would really say a
16 standard practice. I guess it would just depend, you
17 know.
18 Q But you did on occasion? On some of the
19 requests you would make copies?
20 A Make copies of the System IV?
21 Q And keep the original System IV document in
22 its file?
23 A I may have on occasion done that. I don't
24 recall any specifics.
25 Q And on other occasions you would actually send
UmSSIFI[D
»NWf![!)
23
1 the original to the individual recjuesting the document?
2 A I would send whatever, the System IV Intel doc
3 or report to the person.
4 Q You would send the original to the person?
5 A The intel report itself, rather than Xeroxing
6 it.
7 Q Are these particularly long documents?
8 A Some of the intel reports are.
9 Q Let me go back again to how you would let Jim
10 know that you had taken out an original or made a copy.
11 It was your practice to leave him a note, is that
12 correct, as to what action you had taken — whether you
13 had made a copy or processed the document by sending the
14 original on? You would tell him what you had done so
15 that the file —
16 A I would verbally tell him, if he were there,
17 if he was going to be back, or I'd write a note or
18 something if he was not there for a while.
19 Q Okay. Was there any other system by which
20 those documents were kept track of?
21 A I don't understand.
22 Q Was there a log in which you would write I
23 signed this document out to Admiral Poindexter, for
24 instance?
25 A No, I'm not aware of any log.
UimSSIFIED
864
llNSU^IflED
24
1 Q There was no other procedure aside from
2 letting Jim Radzimski know by telling him orally or by
3 writing him a note that you had taken the original and
4 made a copy?
5 A That's correct.
6 Q Let me show you a note. I will mark this as
7 Bartlett Exhibit 1.
8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Bartlett Exhibit Number
10 1 for identification.)
11 No doubt you have seen this note before, since
12 it was blown up and shown on television recently.
13 A So I understand, if this is the same one.
14 Q Let me ask you this. Aside from the
15 television blowup version of this document, which is a
16 series of seven System IV numbers, did you see this
17 document ever prior to November 1986?
18 A No, I don't recall seeing this.
19 Q Let me ask you, because the question is
20 slightly unclear, did you see it during November 1986 at
21 any time?
22 A I don't recall seeing it during November. I
23 was shown it later by the Independent Coxinsel, if this is
24 the same one with my initials on it.
25 Q We'll get to that in a minute, but you don't
wmfmw
865
um^'Pfl
25
1 recall seeing the note in this form aside from
2 Independent Counsel or what you might have seen on TV?
3 A No, not to the best of my knowledge.
4 Q Let me mark this as Bartlett Exhibit 2 .
5 (The document referred to was
6 marked Bartlett Exhibit Number
7 2 for identification.)
8 Let me ask you first to focus on the lower
9 lefthand corner, to a note signed JB, which appears to
10 read: signed out to Ollie North, with the initials JB,
11 all in a circle. Is that your handwriting?
12 A Yes. It's my handwriting. JB.
13 Q And JB are obviously your initials. Do you
14 remember ever seeing this document?
15 MR. McGRATH: Let's go back and go slow. Is
16 the handwriting, "signed out to Oliver North", is that
17 your handwriting?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes. It appears that it is my
19 handwriting.
20 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming)
21 Q And the initials JB are your initials?
22 A Yes, that's correct.
23 Q All right. Do you recall seeing this
24 document, which is another set of System IV numbers with
25 a handwritten note above it?
mms^m
82-690 0-88-29
866
mmm^
26
1 MR. McGRATH: Also we should reflect the fact
2 that it is the same set of System IV numbers as Exhibit
3 1.
4 MS. NOURSE: That's right, Dean, the same set
5 of System IV numbers, along with a handwritten note
6 apparently signed Brian beneath those System IV numbers,
7 and another handwritten note that we have just identified
8 as being in the handwriting of Ms. Bartlett.
9 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming)
1° Q Do you remember ever seeing this document,
11 aside from anything on television or before the
12 Independent Counsel?
13 A I really don't recall this. I see my
14 handwriting here. It was a request I processed and I see
15 a lot of documents I don't remember each specific
16 document.
17 Q Let me ask you the same question about the
18 document without the note above the word Brian. This
19 appears to be a note by Brian Merchant. Have you ever
2 0 seen the document without that note on it? In other
21 words, it would be a series of System IV numbers and
22 simply your note about signed out to Ollie North.
2 3 A Without the Brian note?
2 4 Q Without the Brian note, yes.
25 MR. McGRATH: With just the circled part?
wmmm
867
\imissffl
27
1 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming)
2 Q With just the circled part and the System IV
3 numbers.
4 A I don't recall it, no.
5 Q The reason I ask that is that it appears that
6 one may be superimposed on the other and I don't know how
7 the original form of the note might have been.
8 Let me ask you this. Could you identify what
9 this reference here, which appears to be —
10 A It's a scribble.
11 Q It appears to be partly within the circle
12 surrounding your note.
13 A BM, Brian Merchant.
14 Q I see. Do you ever remember seeing on another
15 piece of paper, separated from the System IV set of
16 nximbers, this note by Brian Merchant?
17 A Separate from the numbers or what?
18 Q Separate from the numbers, yes. Do you
19 remember seeing a note not necessarily attached to the
20 System IV numbers and not necessarily with this notation
21 that you've identified to be in your handwriting, but
22 just simply a note from Brian Merchant indicating — and
23 I will read from the document — "all originals attached
24 except 401214", et cetera?
25 A No, I don't recall.
mumw
liill&SiFiEfl
23
1 Q Let me try and refresh your recollection about
2 this. Do you remember at all an incident in November of
3 1986 in which Ollie North asked you to obtain some System
4 IV documents for him?
5 A I don't recall any specifics like that, no.
6 Q Do you remember any incident in November 198 6
7 where Fawn Hall came to you on behalf of Ollie North and
8 asked for System IV originals?
9 A No. I don't recall that.
10 Q Okay. Did you ever have a conversation with
11 Mr. deGraffenreid during November 1986 in which he said
12 Ollie North wants some System IV originals?
13 A I don't recall anything like that, to the best
14 of my recollection, no.
15 Q So Mr. deGraffenreid never asked you to sign
16 out originals to Ollie North, to the best of your
17 recollection, during November of 1986?
18 A To the best of my recollection.
19 Q Do you know whose handwriting the System
2 0 numbers are in? Would you recognize the handwriting, if
21 given to you?
22 A No. I do not know whose handwriting that is.
2 3 Q It appears that there are notations on the
24 side that may be in different handwriting than the System
2 5 IV numbers themselves. Does that notation, which appears
ONWrniED
a^u
gty^Sriti)
TOP SECRET 29
1 to say "cover", do you know whose handwriting that might
2 be?
3 A No, I don't Jtnow.
4 Q What about this reference to Yediot Aharonot?
5 A I don't even know what that is or whose
6 handwriting that is.
7 Q Just for your information, it's an Israeli
8 newspaper, so you get to learn something today.
9 A Now I know.
10 Q You know that that's an Israeli newspaper.
11 Have you heard of this before?
12 A Only on testimony.
13 Q Testimony you've heard during the hearings? I
14 see. Okay.
15 A Or maybe on the news. I don't recall.
16 Q So you don't know whose handwriting that is?
17 A No.
18 Q And this handwriting, "all originals attached
19 except", signed Brian, would you recognize that as Brian
20 Merchant's handwriting?
21 A I don't know if I've actually seen him write
22 out more than a word or two. I see the signature there.
23 Q Based on that you would believe it would be
24 his.
25 Let's look at the dates on the document.
yms^iFSEe
870
UNeLftSS!R[0
1 There's a November 21, 1986, stamp date, and there's also
2 a November 25, 1986 stamp date. It's unclear to me which
3 of these dates refers to which of the notes, but let me
4 ask you this.
5 During this period, November 21 to 25, 1986,
6 there was a lot of — there were press conferences, et
7 cetera, about the Iran initiative, particularly on
8 November 25, when the Attorney General announced the
9 existence of the diversion memo. This was a period in
10 which I assume that a lot of attention was paid at the
11 NSC to the disclosure of the Iran initiative.
12 I am wondering if you can try and put yourself
13 back in that period and remember anything that might have
14 had to do with Ollie North and signing out original
15 documents.
16 A The 25th was a Tuesday; is that correct?
17 Q That was Meese's press conference on that day.
18 A No.
19 Q You don't remember Ollie North coming to ask
2 0 you for originals on that day?
21 A No.
22 Q Do you remember any other requests by anyone
23 else on that day for a System IV original?
24 A No, I do not recall anything.
25 Q Do you remember on that day, November 25,
mtmm
871
m^mi
31
1 1986, did Mr. deGraffenreid ask you to pull a System IV
2 original?
3 A I'm sorry. On what day?
4 Q November 25, 1986. This is the day of the
5 press conference.
6 A No, I don't recall anything specific.
7 Q Do you remember any conversations on that day
8 that Mr. deGraffenreid might have had with Oliver North?
9 A I have no direct knowledge of that.
10 Q By "direct knowledge", what precisely do you
11 mean? Let me ask you another question.
12 A I don't know if he saw him out in the hallway
13 or said hello. I don't know.
14 Q You did not overhear any conversations between
15 Oliver North and Mr. deGraffenreid on that day?
16 A No.
17 Q Did Oliver North come to visit Mr.
18 deGraffenreid that day, if you remember? That's the day
19 of the press conference.
20 A I don't recall seeing Ollie in the office that
21 day, in our office.
22 Q Do you recall seeing him in the office the
23 previous Friday?
24 A In our office?
25 Q Which would be November 21.
mt\m'B
872
mwife
32
1 A I can't remember what I did yesterday.
2 Q I have the same problem, I assure you.
3 A I don't recall if he was or not.
4 Q Do you remember any unusual activity in the
5 office during that period, that Friday, November 21,
6 Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, when the press
7 conference was held?
8 A You say the weekend. I wasn't working on the
9 weekend, I don't think.
10 Q How about that Monday or Tuesday, the 24th and
11 the 25th of November?
12 A I don't recall anything. Monday I was working
13 as usual. Tuesday, of course, was the press conference.
14 Q Did you watch the press conference?
15 AX watched a few minutes here and there, yes.
16 Q Were you surprised at the revelations about
17 the diversion?
18 A I was surprised.
19 Q Yes?
20 A Yes.
21 Q Let me ask you a final question on the note.
2 2 To the best of your recollection, Mr. deGraf fenreid never
2 3 handed you either Exhibit 1 or Exhibit lA and asked you
24 to go look for originals?
2 5 A I don't recall anything like that, to the best
UNClKSSff
873
jsjl,@<»fnrn
33
1 of my recollection.
2 Q To the best of your recollection, Oliver North
3 never handed you either Exhibit 1 or lA and asked you to
4 go get System IV originals?
5 A No. To the best of my recollection, he did
6 not.
7 Q If you saw this note, would these documents
8 mean anything to you? Would you associate anything with
9 these particular numbers — a type of document?
10 A Well, it would be a System IV number. Other
11 than that ~
12 Q You wouldn't recognize those numbers as
13 associating them with any particular content of a
14 document?
15 A No.
16 Q Did you ever have a conversation with Brian
17 Merchant about pulling System IV originals for Oliver
18 North during this period, November of 1986?
19 A I don't recall any specific conversation.
20 Q Do you recall any general conversation?
21 A I don't recall any, no.
22 Q To your knowledge, had Brian Merchant taken
23 over from Jim Radzimski at this time, November 21 through
24 November 25, 1986?
25 A Jim was not there. He hji^ already left.
was not there . He haA i
wmsm
874
\mmiE
34
1 Q He had already left at that time.
2 Were your procedures with Brian for taking out
3 an original System IV the same as with Jim? In other
4 words, if you had taken out an original you would leave
5 Brian a note, as you would for Jim?
6 A The procedures were not changed from Jim to
7 Brian.
8 Q Okay.
9 A To the best of my knowledge.
10 Q To the best of your knowledge Brian didn't
11 require you to do anything if you had processed a request
12 in his absence?
13 A No.
14 Q Would it be correct to say that this note on
15 the bottom of Exhibit 2 "signed out to Ollie North, JB"
16 would be the standard kind of note you would leave for
17 Jim or Brian if you had taken out an original document
18 and given it to whoever had requested it?
19 A If I had retrieved a document from System IV,
2 0 that would have been the standard.
21 Q By this you would tell him who had obtained
22 the original documents?
2 3 A Yes, because it needed to be accounted for.
24 Q Would you follow up on original requests ever?
25 Would you go back to the person and say, hey, where 's
UlttlSSSlFIED
875
llNWSiBEO
35
1 that original?
2 A Things are hectic in the office. I would
3 assume they would return it when they were finished with
4 it.
5 Q Was that basically Brian or Jim's job, to
6 follow up on the original requests?
7 A I would think that would be one of their —
8 Q You yourself never called or had occasion to
9 call someone and say bring that original back?
10 A I don't ever remember doing that — an
11 original intel doc or report or something back.
12 Q It was not your standard practice to keep
13 track of these documents?
14 A No. I had too much other things to do.
15 Q Let me ask you some general questions about
16 your boss, Mr. deGraffenreid. What was his relationship
17 like to Ollie North? Were they close friends?
18 \ A I would say they were friends, as with the
19 other staff members.
20 Q Was Colonel North often in the office?
21 A He came in the office occasionally, no set
22 pattern. It wasn't every day. He did come in the office
23 on occasion.
24 Q Do you ever remember a time in 19.85, the
25 summer of 198 5,. whVWViere^*r» v'i»SP>#*ies =»<='« ^V
ttffiiffl
876
mmw
36
1 Congress about Colonel North? Do you remember that
2 period of time at all? Do you remember the inquiries
3 being made?
4 A In 1985?
5 Q Yes, just generally.
6 A I don't recall anything.
7 Q You don't recall that. Do you recall ever
8 during the summer of 1985 — and this is when the
9 inquiries were being made — that you had a request to
10 pull System IV documents, a number of System IV
11 documents?
12 A In '85?
13 Q Yes.
14 A I don't recall.
15 Q I know it's a long time ago. That's why I was
16 asking you about the incpiiries about Colonel North,
17 because I thought that might help you locate it in time.
18 Q Do you remember ever hearing Colonel North and
19 Mr. deGraffenreid discussing the issue of the inquiry
20 about Colonel North and his activities with the contras?
21 Do you remember overhearing any conversations about
22 Congressional inquiries of Colonel North?
23 A No, I do not.
24 Q Let me tell you this. From what we know, we
25 know that there were documents pulled during this period
UNCUtSSIFIED
877
yNWWiEO
37
1 to respond to Congress' requests, and these were System
2 IV documents, and Brenda Reger had various people working
3 for her to determine what were the relevant documents,
4 including Jim Radzimski. Do you remember that incident
5 at all — Brenda Reger dealing with Jim Radzimski and
6 pulling documents for Congress' inquiry?
7 A Now what time?
8 Q This is during the summer of 1985, August or
9 September.
10 A No, I don't recall that.
11 Q Do you ever remember Jim Radzimski discussing
12 with Mr. deGraffenreid during this period, Aucfust or
13 September of 1984, the pulling of System IV documents?
14 A In '85?
15 Q This is in the summer of '85, whether there
16 were any discussions between Mr. deGraffenreid and Jim
17 Radzimski relating to pulling documents for the
18 Congressional inquiries of North.
19 A I don't recall any of that.
20 Q Do you ever remember any conversations in
21 which Mr. deGraffenreid asked Jim Radzimski to pull the
22 documents that are identified in Exhibit 1?
23 A No, I don't recall that.
24 Q Do you remember Mr. deGraffenreid making a
25 comment to Mr. Radzimski such as well, Jim, I asked you
UNCtAmi[D
878
UNCUSSIREO
38
1 to pull those System IV docvunents; where are they? Do
2 you remember some sort of exchange about Jim failing to
3 fulfill a request during the summer of 1985?
4 A No. I don't recall that.
5 Q Do you ever remember hearing, whether in 1985
6 or 1986, of an occasion when Mr. Radzimski failed to
7 fulfill a request for a document for an individual?
8 A No, I don't.
9 Q Let me ask you the basic question that we ask
10 everyone around here, and that is when did you first
11 learn of the Iran initiative? Was it when you heard
12 about it in the press or had you heard about it earlier?
13 A In the press, the news, media coverage.
14 Q And by Iran initiative I meant the sale of
15 weapons to Iran.
16 A In the media coverage.
17 Q Okay. Had you ever heard, prior to Attorney
18 General Meese's press conference on November 25, about a
19 diversion of funds from the Iran arms sales to the
20 contras?
21 A No, I didn't.
22 Q Has it standard practice for you to see all
23 System IV documents? In other words, when members of the
24 NSC created a System IV document outside the intelligence
25 directorate, would the <^°SJ^9^i'i»rtP'^^'^ * ^°^'^ ^° *°
879
mm
1 you to go through to the files, or would the copy go
2 straight to Jim Radzimski?
3 A It would be addressed to Jin. Someone may
4 drop it off at my desk or leave it in the mailbox. If I
5 picked up the mail, of course, I would get it and put it
6 at his desk. But I did not review them.
7 Q Do you did not review the documents?
8 A Yes.
9 Q You simply transported them?
10 A To Jim, if they came across my desk, but they
11 should go directly to him.
12 Q In any event, let me show you what is now
13 famous as the diversion memo. You can mark this as
14 Bartlett Exhibit 3.
15 (The document referred to was
16 marked Bartlett Exhibit Number
17 3 for identification.)
18 Bartlett Exhibit 3 bear* our Bates stamp
19 number N-590, and I will disclose to you that this is the
20 diversion memo and several pages on there is a key
21 paragraph which begins: $12 million will be used to
22 purchase critically-needed supplies for the Nicaraguan
23 democratic resistance.
24 Do you ever" recall seeing this document? I'll
25 give you a few minutes to read it, if you want.
wmmm
880
\mm\m
1 (Pause.)
2 A No, I don't.
3 Q Vou don't recall ever seeing that document,
4 Exhibit 3?
5 A No.
6 Q Do you recall any specific conversations that
7 might have taken place between Mr. deGraf fenreid and
8 Oliver North concerning the contras, any specific
9 recollection of overhearing a conversation?
10 A No.
11 Q Any specific recollection of a conversation
12 related to the sale of weapons to Iran?
13 A No.
14 MS. NOURSE: Can we go off the record for a
15 minute?
16 (A discussion was held off the record.)
17 BY MS. NOURSE: (Resuming)
18 Q I understand that you don't recall the
19 specific incident involving Oliver North and the note
2 0 that appears on Exhibit 2 in your handwriting. Would it
21 have struck you as unusual for Oliver North to come to
22 you for a System IV original, if in fact that was the
2 3 case, as the not* seems to indicate?
24 A Unusual?
2 5 Q Was it unusual? Had it ever happened before.
mmm
881
1 to your recollection, first of all?
2 A I don't recall any such.
3 Q Okay. Apart from whether you recall any
4 specific incidents involving Oliver North, if, for
5 instance, he had called you up, would you think that that
6 would be a strange incident, that he would be asking for
7 a System IV original?
8 A If he called me up requesting a document, it
9 would just be a routine. It would not be strange to me.
10 Q Do you have any specific recollection of any
11 incidents in which he called you for a System IV original
12 dociunent?
13 A No. I don't have any recollection of that.
14 Q And would that include Fawn Hall, on his
15 behalf — any specific recollection of Fawn Hall
16 requesting a document for Oliver North?
17 A No, I don't recall that.
18 Q And no specific recollection of Mr.
19 deGraffenreid asking you to pull documents for Oliver
2 0 North?
21 A I don't recall that, no.
22 MS. NOURSE: I want to thank you, Ms.
23 Bartlett, for appearing and cooperating with us in this
24 investigation and thank you for putting up with my
25 repetitive questions about Exhibits 1 and 2, which I will
mmmm
12
882
leSSlFitB
42
1 clarify for the record, if I mentioned lA, that I was
2 referring to Exhibit 2. That's the document marked with
3 our Bates stamp N-16346A. Exhibit 1 bears our N stamp
4 16346.
5 I thank you again, Ms. Bartlett.
6 MR. McGRATH: Just for the record, we should
7 probably consider this deposition Top Secret.
9 Signature of the Witness
10 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
11 , 1987.
13 Notary Public
14 My Commission Expires:
wmmm
883
UNCLASSiHED
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
I, MICHAL AN1« SCHAFER, the officer before whom the foregoing
deposition was taken, to hereby certify that the witness
Whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly
sworn by .e; that the testimony of said witness was taken by
me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to
typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a
true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and
further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney
or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.
Notary Public ^
in and for the District of Columbia
My commission Expires: February 28, 1990
yNcussifito
884
IINClilSSIFIED
16346
iIjwi
!.-:rf.;.:,--!(,;E.o. 12::;
1;-P r,;.:, :.';;:;.:;l?-::ri'yCcuN~;
I « • ■ r ! :,
885
UNCUSSIFIED
N 16346-/?
THC WHITK MOUK
i.n'i'r pruvfilons of £.0. 12356
tyP.P^Ser;.NcJio,a|JscurifyCo"
urify Cot-nefJ
NOV 21 1S86
"^T NCV25 -35
yNClASSiFIFO
r^
N , 582
RtLEASr or AKgKICAK MOSTACtS IW ItlKOT
maekaround-. IB Jun« HIS, priv«tt American and ltr««li citizens
eonD«nc«d an op«r«tion to aifcet th« r«l«at* of th« Aaericin
-ho«ta9«* in Bairut in «xehan9t for providing e«rt*ln factions in
Iran with U.S. -origin Itraali military aat«ri«l. By S«pt«afc>«r,
U.S. and Iiratlx Cov«rwD«nt officiala b«caa« involved in thia
•ndtavor xn order to •naur* that th« OSC would:
not object to tht Israeli tranaf«r of «mbar9o«d satarial to
Iran;
••11 replacement items to laraal as replenishment for like
items sold to Iraa by Israel.
On September ><, the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of
the use, transferred SOI basic TOW missiles to Iran. rorty-ei9ht
hours later, Mverend Benjamin Weir w«s released in Beirut.
Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process
have met with frustration due to the need to eo^onicate our
intentions through an Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe.
In January 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action
Finding, the USG demanded a aeeting with responsible Iranian
government officials.
On February' 20, a U.S. Goveranent official met with]
O^firs^direc^uTsTlraniancontac^ii^ve^five yeara ;
this meeting, the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian
attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Onion and the need to
establish a longer term relationship between our two countries
based on more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that the
hostage issue was a 'hurdle* which must be crossed before this
improved relationship could prosper. During the meeting, i* also
became apparent that our conditions /demands had not been accurately
transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it
was agreed that:
The use would establish Its good faith and bona fides by
Immediately providing 1,000 TOW missiles for sale to Iran.
This transaction was covertly completed on February 21,
using a private U.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediaries.
A subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior D.S
and Iranian officials during which the 0.8. hostages would
be released.
Immediately after the hostages were safely in our hands, the
O.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran
using the same procedures employed during the September 1985
transfer.
887
yHCIiSSIHEO
In ••rly_H«reh, th* Ir*nl«n •xpAtriatc Inttncdiary dcaund^d thct
Iranian conditions for rtl««s« of th* hosta9«t nov included th*
prior •«!• of 300 PHOENIX Bistil** and an unspecified nuab«r of
HARPOON Bissilas, in addition to th* 3.00C TOWs which would b*
delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meeting
was held with the intermediary in Paris on March I, wherein it
was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated
the understandings reached in Frankfurt on February 20, and were
therefor* unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian
aircraft and ship launchers for these Blssiles were in such
disrepair that the missiles could not be launched -even if provided
From March 9 until March 30, there was no further effort
undertaken on our behalf to contac^thelranian Government or the
intermediary. On March 26,H|BHBga|^Hmade an unsolicited
call to the phone-dropin Maryland which we~had ••tablished for
this purpose. ^^HHH*'^*^ ^^^ ^* ^*^ "^^ b««n in contact and
urged that we proceed axp^ditiously since the situation in Beirut
was deteriorating rapidly. Be was informed by our Parsi-speaking
Interpreter that the conditions requiring additional materiel
beyond the 3,000 TOKs were unacceptabl* and that w* could in no
cas*provid* anything else prior to the release of our hostages,
^■■■lobserved that we were correct in our assessment of theii
inability to use PHOENIX and HARPOON missiles and that the most
urgent requirement that Iran had was to place their current RAKK
missile inventory in working condition. In a subsequent phone
call, we agreed to discuss this matter with him and he indicated
that he would prepare an inventory of parts required to make
their HAWX systems operational. This parts list was received on
March 26, and verified by CIA.
Current Situation. On April 3, Ari Gorbanifahr, the Iranian
intermediary, arrived in Washington, D.C. with instructions from
^^H^^^to consunnate final arrangements for the return of the
hostages. Gorbanifahr was reportedly enfranchised to negotiate
the types, quantities, and delivery procedures for materiel the
O.S. would sell to Iran through Israel. The meeting lasted
nearly all night on April 3*4, ai>d involved numerous calls to
Tehran.
A Parsi-speaking CIA officer in
attendance was able to verify the substance of his calls to
Tehran during the meeting. Subject to Presidential approval, it
was agreed to proceed as followst
By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer
$17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland. The
Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private O.S.
corporation account in Switzerland the sum of $15 million.
UNCLASSIFIED
888
584
UNCLftSSiFIED
On Tutiday, April S (or •■ •oon •• th« tr«ni«ctioni tr«
v«rifi«d) , th« privitt U.S. corporation will tranafar
$3,651 million to a CIA account in Switzarland. CIA will
than tranafar this auB to a covart Dapartmant of tha Army
account in tha U.S.
On Wadneiday, April 9, tha CIA will conmanca procuring
53.651 Billion worth of HAW aiaaila parta (240 aaparatc
lina itaaa) and tranafarrinq thaaa_part« ^°^^IH^H|
■^■■^^■■■■HIHmil^BIBBlg Thia procaaai^^^
aatinatad to ta)ia aavan working daya.
On Friday, April 18, a privata O.^^ircraft (707B) will
pick-up tha HAWK aiaaila parta atSH and fly thaa to a
covart laraali airfiald for pr«poaitionln9 (this fiald waa
uaad for tha aarliar dalivary of tha 1000 TOWg) . At thia
fiald, tha parta will b« tranafarrad to an laraali Dafanaa
Forcea' (IDP) aircraft with falaa narkinga. A SATCOM
capability will ba poaitioned at thia location.
)n Saturday, April 19, McFarlane, North, Taichar, Cava,
mm and a SATCOM communicator will board a CIA aircraft
in Frankfurt, Gannany, anroute to Tahran.
On Sunday, April 20, tha followino aariaa of avanta will
occur :
U.S. party arrivaa Tahran (A-hour) — mat by
Rafaanjani, aa haad of tha Iranian delagation.
At A*7 houra, tha U.S. hoatagea will be relaaaad in
Bairut.
At A4-15 houra, tha IDF aircraft with tha HAWK miaaila
parta aboard will land at Bandar Abbaa, Iran.
Diacuaalon. Tha following pointa are ralavant to thia
tranaaction, tha diacuaaiona in Iran, and tha aatabliahment of a
broadar ralationahip batwaen tha Onitad Stataa and Iran:
Tha Iraniana have baen told that our praaenca in Iran ia a
'holy comnitJBant* on tha part of tha USG that wa ara aincara
and can b« truatad. Thar* ia graat diatruat of tha O.S.
among tha varioua Iranian partiaa involved. Without our
presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that
we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hoatagea
are releaaed.
IlIIHISSfflj
585
Gorb«nif«hr •p«cific«lly »«ntion«d that
Ohadhtffi'i •ffortt to 'buy* th« host*g«i could succaad in
the n««r future! Further, the Iraniant ere well ewire that
the situation in Beirut la deteriorating rapidly and that
the ability of the IKGC to effect the releaee of the
hostages will become increasingly iwre difficult over time.
Hf have convinced the Iranians of a significant near tera
«nd long range threat froa the Soviet Onion. We have real
and deceptive intelligence to denonstrate this threat durino
the visit. They have expressed considerable interest in
this Batter as part of the longer tera relationship.
The Iranians have been told that their provision of
assistance to Nicaragua is unacceptable to as and they ixivt
agreed to discuss this matter in Tehran.
We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish to
discuss steps le_ading to a cessation of hostilities between
Iran and Iraq.
The Iranians are well aware that their most inanediate needs
are for technical assistance in maintaining their air force
and nav>-. We should expect that they will raise this issue
during the discussions in Tehran. Further conversation with
Gorbanifahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to
raise the matter of the original 3,000 TOWs as a significant
deterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They
have al»o_suggested that, if agreement is reached to provide
the TOWsT
The Iranians have been told and agreed that they will
receive neither blame nor credit for the seisure/release of
the hostages.
\immm
890
006
Th«_c«sidu«l fund* fros this tr«nt«ction art allocatad *■ I
fellows t.
S2 ■illion will b« us«d to purchase r«plac*a«nt TOWt
for th« original 50« told by laraal to Iran for tha
ralaasa of Ban^aain Nair. Thia it tha only way that wc
have found to aaat our coaaitnant to raplanish thaee
stocks.
$12 Billion will b« uaad to purchase critically naadad
supplvaa for tha Niearaguan Daaocratic Kasistanca
Forcat. This aatarial is assantial to eovar shortages
in resistance inventories resulting fro» their current
offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to
'bridge* the period between now and when Congreasionall
approved lethal assistance (beyond the $25 Billion in
'defensive* arms) can be delivered.
The ultiaata objective in the trip to Tehran is to coasiience the
process of inproving U.S. -Iranian relations. Both sides are
aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a aa^or factor that aust be
discussed. We should not, however, view this aeeting es a
session which will result in iamediate Iranian agreeaent to .
proceed with a settleaent with Iraq. Rather, this aeeting, the
first high-level O.S. -Iranian contact in five years, should be
seen as a chance to aove in this direction. These discussions,
as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Teras of
Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is,
hopefully, the first of aany aeetings and that the hostage issue,
once behind us, laproves the opportunities for this relationship.
Finally, we should recognise that the Iranians will undoubtedly
want to discuss additional eras and coanercial transactiona as
'quids* for accoanodatingHpBIHiJi^HHBHI^Nicaragua,
and Iraq. Our eaphasis on the Soviet ailitar>- ana subversive
threat, a useful aechanisa in bringing then to agreeaent on the
hostage issue, has also served to increase their desire for aean
to protect theaselves against/deter the Soviets.
RgCOMMEMPATIOW
That tha President approve the structure depicted above under
•Current Situation* and the Teras of Reference at Tab X.
Approve Disapprove
Attachnent
Tab A - O.S. -Iranian Teras of Reference
liMMHIHFn
891
I)
"^iiri
587
TERMS or nzTznzvci
~ C.S.-Iran Dialogue
I- BASIC PILLARS or C.S. rORIIGN POLICY (Option* n
Presidtnt Reagan came into office at a tiae when Iran had
had a certain impact on the American political oroeea. !
perhaps not what you intended. *^
The President represented and embodied America's recoverv
from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American mili^
and economic strength. **=«" mint
itary
Most important, he has restored American will and
self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in
defense of its interests. He are not intimidated by^JIet
America or Afghanistan.
At the sane time, we are prepared to resolve political
problems on the basis of reciprocity.
we see many international trends — economic, technological
and political — working in our favor. ■^ogicai.
II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN; BASIC PRINCIPLES
A- D.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.
We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The OS is
not trying to turn the clock back.
Our present attitude to Iran is not a product of
prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of
Iran's present policies.
Iran has used "revolutionary Islam' as a weapon to
undezvine pro-Western governments and American
interests throughout the Middle East. As long as this
is Iran's policy, we are bound to be strategic
advaraaries.
Support of terrorism and hostage-taking is part of this
strategic pattern. Me see it used not only against us,
but 'g-inat our friends. We cannot accept either.
Your influence in achieving the release of all hostages/
return of those killed (over time) is essentlllV
uiim^D
892
ONCUSSIFIED
5a8
w« f your tctlvity in m«ny parts of th« world,
Ineludinq tvcn Central Aa«ric«.
- Th« D.S. knows how lr»B vi«wa th« Soviet Union. But
■ubvaraion of W«st«rn intaraata and frianda objaetivaly
••rvas Sovxat intaraata on a global acala.
Thus, our asaaasnant ia that a daciaiva Iranian victory
xn tha war with Iraq would only unlaaah graatar
rational inatability, a furthar aroaion of tha Wastarn
poaition, and anhancad bpportunitiaa for Soviat
tronbla-making.
Tha O.S. will tharafora do what it can to pravant aueh
a davalopaant. Na ragard tha war aa dangarous in many
raapacta and would Ilka to aaa an and to it.
B. Poaaibla Intaraactioaa of O.S. -Iranian Intaraata.
Oaapita fundaaantal conflicts, wa parcaiva aavaral
possibla intarsactions of v.S. and Iranian intaraata.
I proposa wa axplora thaaa araas.
First, tha O.S. has had a traditional intaraat in
aaaing Iran prasarva ita territorial integrity and
independence. This has not changed. The O.S. opposes
Soviet designs on Iran.
we have no interest
a* Iraqi victory over
_ We are aeeking an end to this
conflict and want to uaa an inproved relationahip with
Iran to further that end.
Third, we have parallel viewa on Afghanistan. Soviet
policy there ia naked aggreaaion. a threat to all in
the region. ^^^^•^^^^^'^'^^
But our
objective ia the saae: the Sovieta auat get out and
let the Afghan people chooae their own courae.
O.S. Objective Today.
Me have no illoaions about what is pcaaible in our
bilateral relations. Perhaps thia meeting will reveal
only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of
intereata. Perhaps more. We are prepared either way.
In eaaence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of
relationahip with Iran that Iran ia prepared to have
Mimm
893
mm
30>
III. SOVltT MILITXHY POSTUKX
Motcow ha< daiiqni on p*rt« o« Iran.
Afghanistan lllufltratc* th« price th« Sovivta arc ready to
pay to expand areas under their direct control.
Suanarite Soviet .capabilitie* along border and inaid*
Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran.
U.S. is aware of Soviet activity!
How they would do it.
Soviet plans
Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Nicaragua aids and
abets Soviet designs — makes O.S. -Iranian relationship more
difficult ($100 million in oil last year, plus arms).
U.S. can help Iran cope with Soviet threat.
AFGHAN I STXK
May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to
cooperate against Moscow in Afghanistan.
U.S. can provide hunarfitarian assistance for refugeesfjH
k'e need to know who you work with, what you already provide,
and devise strategy to exploit Iranian comparative
advantage.
He may be prepared to resume a limited military supply
relatiooship.
However, its evolution and ultimate scope will depend on
whether our convergent or our divergent interests come to
loom larger in the overall picture.
What does Iran want?
U
0
894
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTra
UnreriMd and Unedited
Not for Quotation or
DnpUcatloD
imiiiEr
utHUbiTlUN OF JAMES H. BASTIAN
Friday, February 13, 1987
House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran,
Washington, B.C.
The select committee met, pursuant to call
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee Hearings
U.S. HOUSE OfflBEPRESENTATIVES
Partially Declassified/Released on /-?- /7-^7
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by N. Menan, National Security Council
'i-OOi
^^ OF ^ COPIEJ
roDV MO .51*?* ^^
895
mmam
DEPOSITION OF JAMES H. BASTIAN
Friday, February 13, 1987
House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran,
Washington, D.C.
The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 1 0 : 0'O a.m.
in Room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building.
UNCLASSIFIED
896
UNSiASSIFIED
MS. NAUGHTON: Would you raise your right hand, pleas
(Witness sworn. )
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Could you please state and spell your name?
A James H. Bastian, B-a-s-t-i-a-n .
Q As an introduction, my name is Pamela J. Naughton,
N-a-u-g-h-t-o-n , I am Staff Counsel to the Select Committee
on Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, and I will be doing the
questioning today. If the people in the room would please
state their names and positions for the record?
MR. VAN CLEVE: George Van Cleve, Deputy
Republican Counsel for the select committee.
MR. BUCK: Kenneth R. Buck, on the staff of the
select committee.
MR. BERMINGHAM: Robert A. Bermingham, spelled B-e-r,
an investigator with the House select committee.
MR. BECKMAN: Robert M. Beckman , Attorney for
Southern Air Transport.
MS. NAUGHTON: It should be noted for the record that
this is confidential testimony that we are taking today.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Mr. Bastian, where do you live?
A 140 Arvida Parkway, Coral Gables, Florida.
Q How old are you?
w
897
UNCUSSIflED
Q How long have you lived at that address?
A Since November of 1984.
Q And your occupation?
A Aviation executive.
Q How long have you been an aviation executive?
A Well, I have been both an aviation executive and
a practicing attorney for a number of years, kind of overlappi
I would say that I got very much involved in probably half
my time as an aviation executive in 1970, say, January 1,
1974.
Q Could you tell us what your educational background
is?
A I have a Bachelor of Science degree in business
administration from the University of Missouri, and a
jurisdoctorate from George Washington University.
Q Any other education beyond the jurisdoctorate?
A No.
Q Could you tell us just generally what you did prior
to your involvement with Southern Air Transport?
A I practiced aviation law in Washington, D.C. I
graduated from George Washington University in 1956. I am
a member of the District of Columbia Bar, the Virginia Bar and
the Maryland Bar. I joined a law firm immediately upon
graduation that represented Capitol Airlines, and basically
practiced business law and aviation law.
iiNr.1 a<i<(ir;Fn
82-690 O-88-30
UmSSIFIED
Q What law firm was that?
2 A Adair, Ulmer, Murkison, M-u-r-k-i-s-o-n, Kent and
3 Ashby.
0 For how long were you with that firm?
5 A Until 1961.
Q And where did you go from there?
A I was then employed by Air America as counsel in
Washington, D.C
9
10
Q From what years?
A October 1961 until December 1963,
Q Now, at the time you were employed by Air America
as counsel, was it owned by the Central Intelligence Agency;
'^ A Yes, it was.
Q Were you an employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency;
16
A I was not
Q Would you explain how that worked?
A I worked for Air America, a Delaware corporation, and
19
they paid my salary.
20
Q Did the CIA own all the stock of Air America;
21
A Yes, it did.
22
Q And the assets of Air America?
23
A Was owned by the corporation.
24
Q Who was your immediate supervisor at Air America.
25
A Geo
TiniLWIFn
UNGl^HD
Q And what was his position?
A Director — what did they call him -- he was the
Chief Executive Officer -- it was called Managing Director of
that company.
Q And was he a CIA employee?
A I believe he was.
Q What was your function as counsel to Air America at
the time?
A Primarily my job was to take care of their business
interests in aviation interests before the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the FAA and contracting work. It was more commercial
than anything to do with the CIA.
The company probably 90 percent of its business --
I really don't know — was just plain commercial business.
That was primarily my function. I stayed on the commercial side)
Q Did you handle anything of the remaining 10 percent
that was done for the CIA?
A I didn't get involved in that much, no. They had
a need-to-know type approach, and I wasn't involved in that
primarily. I knew, of course, that they were owned by the
CIA, and I knew most of the people involved with things
proprietary.
Q Why did you leave the law firm to go to work for
Air America?
time had financial problems.
litJMKini
900
mmsm
They were purchased by United Airlines, and the law firm that
2 I was with was based in Jacksonville, and I had never really
3 worked with them in their Jacksonville office, so we only had
a small -- it was about a five-member office here m Washingtor
5 serving the Capitol account, plus a few other aviation account!
6 Macke Airlines and a few others, and I didn't see a good
7 career opportunity anymore.
8 I had my options of either going with United 's law
9 firm in Chicago or going to Jacksonville, or looking for work
0 in Washington, and I chose to stay in Washington. And
this was a job I saw advertised in the paper.
2 Q It was advertised?
3 A Yes.
Q And you interviewed for the position?
A Yes.
Q Now, you are familiar, through your counsel, of
course, and other interviews, what our investigation is lookin<
into, and the personalities and people involved.
'^ Could you tell us, was there anybody either employed
20
by Air America or connected to Air America as either a customei
or in a managerial capacity that is related to the investigate
that we are currently undertaking?
A No.
Q Now, you left Air America in December of 1963; is
that correct?
ilCUSSiEIED
901
\m«8»itB
A Yes.
Q Why did you leave?
A Because when I joined Air America, I didn't know
that It was a CIA proprietary. I was told after the fact,
and began immediately looking for other careers. I didn't see
It as a long-term career opportunity, because I didn't feel
that it was an airline that would be around forever.
Q What gave you that impression?
A Well, It was owned by the government, and the
government was not generally engaged in aviation, long-term
wise. They might be there for a specific purpose, but not --
it was not going to be there forever.
Q What was the specific purpose you felt it was for?
A It was proprietary to give them cover, I guess, to do
work in the Far East, in Southeast Asia, given a commercial
presence there so they could carry on activities that they
felt were necessary for their country. !
Q At that time, what relationship, if any, did Air
America have to Southern Air?
A Southern Air was also owned by the CIA at the time,
and I also worked with Southern.
Q What did you do in that capacity?
A I did primarily all of their legal work, but not by
name, because at that time, the management group that was
managing Air America could not be shown to be managing Southern
902
WUSSIFJED
Air Transport. They were two separate companies, and they
2 shouldn't be together at the top. So, in fact, George Doole
3 was managing, was in fact the chief executive officer of
Southern, but he wasn't shown as that in the corporate records
Q Who was?
^ A Stanley Williams
' Q Who is Stanley Williams.
A Stanley Williams was a gentleman who was with
Southern Air Transport in management. I think he was a
secretary at the time it was purchased by the CIA, and
it was a company that was based in Miami and they kept that
management in place, and it ran pretty much as it did before
they acquired it m the Miami, Caribbean, South America, and hi
was the President.
Q Could you explain for us why Southern Air was
purchased and why not all of the CIA operations were done by
Air America?
A Well, at the time, which was 1961, they had a series
of accidents in the Military Airlift Command, I guess it was
called Military Air Transport then, that were unfortunate,
and the Military Airlift Transport, airlift transport, was
purchasing their airlift from various airlines on a
competitive bidding basis.
A lot of people were goina broke, they were bidding
too low, and so, I think DOT put out some kind of order saying
|}IUUJiS5:iF?Pn
903
UNaUA^II'JED
that they would not do business with anybody except those with
a certificate issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or some
operating authority issued by the CAB.
Air America did not have that certificate. Southern
Air Transport did, plus a lot of other what we called then larg^
irregular carriers, so they purchased it to carry on an
activity in the Far East which in fact, Air America had been
doing before.
It was an operation of DC-6 airplanes that flew up j
I
and down the China coast with a Mi^litary Airlift Command j
contract from Tachikawa, Japan; Okinawa; and down to Bangkok.
It was routine cargo, the Stars and Stripes paid for kind of
a communication network, and the CIA felt they needed that to dc
covert missions from time to time, to give themselves a
commercial presence in the Far East that would permit them to
do covert missions from time to time.
So, not having qualified under the new rules, they
acquired a carrier that would qualify, and the business that
Air America was then doing.
Q In addition to George Doole, were there any other
employees of Air America of whom you were aware that were also
employees of the CIA?
A Not in the Washington office. I think there were
a number in the Far East. The Washington office was relatively
small. The operation of Air America and its subsidiary. Air
UNOUfifilfJFn
904
im
Asia, was based in the Far East, and there they had numerous
employees I think at the time, one time up to 8,000 probably -
Q How many?
* A 4 to 8,000, something like that. I think the
maintenance base of Air Asia Company, Limited, had about 4,000
and Air America about 4, I think it was about 8 at one time.
It was a very large operation and primarily a commercial
operation .
Q George Doole, do you know whether or not he is still
living?
A He is not.
Q When did he die?
A A couple of years ago.
Q What was his profession at that time? Was he
retired?
A Retired. He was just a consultant.
Q Now, I have got you up to 1963, when you left Air
America, where did you go?
A I just went out and started practicing law on my owr
singly, by myself.
Q In Washington, D.C.?
A Yes.
Q What was your client base at the time?
A I didn't have much of one. Air America then started
using me, they hired an attorney to replace what I was doing,
HNMiififiiriiirn
905
UKtllii^SIFSED
but they also continued to use my services. And Southern Air
continued to use my services.
I did work for them kind of without attribution.
Q Did you have any other client base?
A Yes, I had a number of local clients. I can't rememb
them all.
Q Were they airline companies?
A Some of them. Southeast Airlines was an airline
company. What was the one -- Sound Air in Canada. I can't
remember them all, it has been so many years. They were small,
most of them were small carriers, and other small businesses
locally.
Q And for how long did you continue this solo practice?
A Until about 1966, middle of 1966, and then I
joined Daggett Howard or Tilford Jones and Harvey Poe and refori
a firm.
Q That is a law firm?
A Yes. It was a law firm. Howard, Poe and Bastian.
Q You mentioned Daggett.
A Howard -- that was his first name, Daggett.
Q I see. Was that in Washington, D.C.?
A Yes, it was.
Q Did you have the same type of clientele?
A Yes.
Q How long did that partnership last^
906
UHClftSSIFiED
' A Until about two years ago.
2 Q Where you an active partner in that law firm?
3 A Yes, I was.
* Q You were active until you moved to Florida?
5 A I was active until 1979, I would say, 1979. Becoming
^ less and less active over the years, but I was an active
^ practitioner of law until 1979, at which time I turned all
^ my clients over to my partners and stayed a partner of the fii
but didn't practice any more.
Q Did Air America and Southern Air continue to be
clients of your law firm from 1966?
A Yes, they did.
Q And did you continued to do work for Southern Air
under the name of Stanley Williams or under his umbrella?
A Stanley Williams was President of the airline,
probably in 1966, and I began representing Southern openly.
I didn't do it primarily when I was --
Q Their corporate counsel?
A When I was their corporate counsel, because I was
corporate counsel for Air America.
Q Okay. When did you assume a position with Southern
Air?
A 1974.
Q What was that?
A Vice President.
nun B^cirspn
907
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
UMftSSlFIED
Q How did you come about?
A Well, that was after Stanley WilUams acquired the
company from the CIA, and he just wanted me to be an officer
in the company. I guess I was also secretary.
0 Where did Williams get the money to buy Southern
Air from the CIA?
A He borrowed it from the First National Bank of
Chicago, and mortgaged all his personal assets.
Q Why did he buy it?
A I guess I would have to ask Mr. Williams.
Q Why do you think he bought it?
A Because it was an opportunity, it was his life's
work, and the CIA was going to sell it, either that or
discontinue it, dissolve it, and there were a lot of people
that worked for the company that he had been associated with
all his life and this was his life.
Q When he — when the CIA owned Southern Air, did
Williams have any operational role in the company, or was he
simply a figurehead?
A No. He ran the Miami operation pretty much on his
own. He had to report to the Board of Directors and had to
get typical approval from the stockholders to do an airplane
purchase or something like that, but he was given quite a
free hand to run it like it had been run before.
Q At the time that he purchased it in 1973 or 1974
iiiiAi iiooir^m
908
UfietftSSmED
there was — was there a suit or some sort of action filed by
2 the employees of Southern Air?
3 A Yes, shortly thereafter, about two months.
4 Q Could you explain that to us, please?
5 A I don't know really how to explain it, other than
6 they got a hold of a lawyer in Florida and brought an action
^ -- I am not quite sure why -- to set aside the purchase on
the basis that -- I really don't know. I guess because they
9 thought they were entitled to it.
° Q Was it their claim that they were Federal employees?
A I don't think in that lawsuit it was. I think some .
them brought such a suit later on.
Q Were you involved in that litigation in any way?
A I was there and I was counsel to the company and
attorney to fight it, yes, I didn't do it myself, because I
didn't feel qualified in that area, and I am also not a membe»
of the Florida Bar.
Q Who was the name of the attorney you hired?
A I don't remember — yes, I do, Don Nicholson.
Q Where is he located?
A He was in Florida. He has passed on.
Q What was his law firm?
A Nicholson something.
Q Was it a sole practice?
A No. Nicholson-Brawner, I think it might have been.
liiini iLQiurm
909
UMCIi^SSIF^ED
Q Are they still in business?
A Possibly. We don't use them.
Q What city?
A Miami.
Q What law firm represented the employees?
A I don't remember that.
Q Who would have that information?
A Maybe you could get it out of the court.
Q Would anybody else connected with Southern Air
or Air America or anyone else you know have that information!
/^
A I don't know. I might have a'&B*^on it, but I
^
doubt it. It is possible I have a file on that.
Q Would that be at your Southern Air office?
A Yes.
Q Would you check that, please, for us?
A Yes.
Q Thank you.
Was that suit filed in Federal or State court, do
you remember?
A State court, I believe, but I am not sure of that
either. Federal Court, on second thought. I think it was
Federal Court.
Q Were you a named defendant?
A , No.
Q Who was named defendant?
lillfili&£&LFI<En
910
UNCtftSSKIED
A Southern Air Transport, maybe Mr. Williams, I am no
2 sure.
3 Q From the period you became Vice President of the
company in 1974, what did you do for Southern Air?
5 A I did most of their contracting, their CAB work.,
legal work, just anything they needed to be done legally.
Also business, I did a lot on the business side for them.
Q Now, were you paid a salary beginning in 1974?
A No, I wasn't. I think I went on the payroll in
1978. I was just paid by the hour.
Q Why was the difference in 1978?
A I don't know. It just seemed easier, I think.
Q You didn't assume any other duty or office?
A No, not really.
Q In this period from 1974 to 1978, aside from Mr.
Williams, who was on the Board of Directors?
A I was, and Bud Eason — Vernon Eason, E-a-s-o-n,
and Mr. Williams.
Q Had Mr. Eason been affiliated with Air America?
A No. He had sold insurance to them. He was an
insurance broker in Miami with Alexander and Alexander.
Q And why was he chosen for the Board?
A He was an old friend of Mr. Williams and Mr. Willia
had a lot of respect for his business judgment.
Q Was aQVQJie added to the Board prior to your purchas
anvape aaaea to tne uoara
911
UNetllSSI^ED
of Southern Air?
A No.
Q Now, besides Mr. Williams, who I take it acted as
CEO during this period --
A Yes, he did.
MS. NAUGHTON: Let the record reflect a relief
court reporter came in the room.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Aside from Mr. Williams, who I gather operated as
CEO during this period, who else were the managers?
A Howard Hinton was Director of Maintenance, William
Dunn was Director of Operations. William Gilmore was Treasure)
And that was primarily the management group.
Q What about sales?
A Sales -- they didn't have too much in the way of
sales, and I guess Dave Williams was — I don't even know what
his title was — Director of Sales.
Q What about Mr. Crummey, when did he begin with
them?
A He came after Mr. Williams had retired, and he
joined the company in -- I guess it was in the fall of 1973.
Mr. Gilmore retired then. I mean 1983 — I am sorry. I
said 1973 — 1983.
Q Was he chief financial officer beginning in 1983?
A Yes, he was. He was Senior Vice President, Finance.
t2u?.i,assiE3c:n
912
ynetftSSiiT^to
0 When did he retire?
A He resigned, I think about a year -- let's see,
1973 -- I mean 1983 — 1984, 1985, I think, in the fall of
1985.
Q Do you know why he resigned?
A He just wanted a different lifestyle. He moved to
the West Coast of Florida and bought a house there, and just
wanted to do private investments or something he said. He
did a little CPA work in the small community of Tarpon Sprinc
he located in.
Q Could you spell that?
A T-a-r-p-o-n Springs. He is not actually there, he
is nearby there. It is on the west coast of Florida.
Q What community is he actually in?
A I don't know.
Q >Jould you have his current address in your records
A Yes, I would.
Q Why?
A I just assume the company has his current records
in their files. He is a friend. I don't have it personally
MQLASiLFaED
913
Ulilii^tA^iflED
Q Now, when did you actually purchase Southern Air?
A I acquired 20 percent interest in the company
in 1974. I acquired another 20 percent of the company in
1975 and then through a stock redemption, the redemotion
of Mr. Williams' stock, I became 100 oercent stock owner in
1979.
Q And where did you obtain the capital to purchase?
A Savings and real estate investments in Washington,
D.C. over the years.
Q You didn't need to take out any loans then to —
A I took out loans on my real estate. I sold some
of it. I think Mr. Williams financed part of it which I paid
him out over the years. But basically I paid it out by
selling real estate.
Q Now, at the time you purchased Southern Air, do
you recall how many aircraft it owned or leased?
A When I purchased it in '79, when I took control
in "79?
Q Yes.
A We had three airplanes owned.
Q What were they?
A They were Hercules L-lOO aircraft.
0 All three?
A Lockheed Hercules L-100.
Q Is there a_ militrfiiy-SaiUvalent?
Ohcla^M;EO
914
^j«ISt!R(SSffa
1 A Not really the equivalent, but it's a — C-130 is
2 the military version of that airplane. The military version
3 is a little shorter. These have been stretched, but
basically they have otherwise the same systems.
5 Q Did you lease any aircraft?
6 A Not at that time. We had in the oast. We had
7 leased and bought airplanes, but we are talking after '79
or at '79. That is the question, wasn't it?
Q Yes.
I had one question for you if we could back up. In
the record you gave me regarding Mr. Houston's, I guess
2 testimony, was it, he mentioned that a former CIA Director
'3 had lobbied to have Southern Air merged with some other
* company that was unnamed when the CIA divested in 1973. Were
5
you aware of that or do you know what that reference is?
A I think that is a misreference. I don't know.
I have read that article numerous times and, of course, I
was very familiar with what was going on and I don't recall
that.
MR. BECKMAN: What page was it?
MR. VAN CLEVE: May I ask whether there is an
additional copy of the document? I don't recall that we had
one produced to us. I have not previously seen the document.
MS. NAUGHTON: I just received it from Mr.
Beclanan's law firm.
915
(^en^^FBED
MR. VAN CLEVE: When, may I ask?
MS. NAUGHTON: Two days ago?
MR. BECKMAN: Whatever the date of the letter is.
MS. NAUGHTON: It's dated February 10, 1987, just
confirming our deposition.
THE WITNESS: It must be in the archives. It's
a document of the Congress.
MR. BECKMAN: I just wanted you to look at it when
she shows you the page.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I'll be happy to give it right
back to you after I take a look at it.
MS. NAUGHTON: I can't find it. I should have
written a page reference, but I can't find it at the moment.
Perhaps Mr. Bermingham, when he comes down to Miami, we can
discuss it and refresh your recollection and whether you
know anything about it. He can speak to you further about
it.
THE WITNESS: Ask the question again.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q There was a reference to a former CIA Director
at the time. This would have been in the early 1970s when,
apparently, there was some problem with the competitors of
SAT feeling that a sale back to Williams would have damaged
their competitive stance in the markets in which SAT was
serving, and at the time apparently there is reference to a
umbi^EJED
916
UNGl'ASSfnEO
1 former CIA Director managing several meetings and putting
2 together several meetings with CIA officials regarding the
3 merging of Southern Air with another existing company,
* only it doesn't make reference to which existing company?
5 A I don't think — I think that maybe there is a
^ mixup on that between the Southern sale and the Air America
' close down maybe because there was some activity on the Air
America close down, I think, and attempts to buy that
' company. E- Systems was one of the people that was interested
'" and ultimately did, in fact, buy Air Asia Company Limited, the
11
maintenance base in Thailand, and there was an ex-CIA Director,
I forget his name now, who was out in the community then as a
consultant that might have been instrumental in bringing the
parties together. But this is all hearsay. Other than what
I read in the papers, I don't have any personal knowledge
of this.
Q That is E-Systems?
A Yes. But I don't think they were after Southern
Air. There was a lot of press at the time and a lot of
activity by Southern Air's competitors to persuade the CIA
to dissolve the company rather than to sell it because that
would give a potential competitor -- obviously they would
have that interest, not that it would serve, not that they
would be damaged unfairly by its continuation, but just they
would like to get rid of it and there was a lot of attemots
UNCLA^LTn
917
l3«CtftSSff?ED
1 on the Hill at that time, lots of pressure.
2 Q Now, when you purchased Southern Air through the
3 stock redemption in 1979, did you install a new board of
4 directors?
5 A No, I didn't.
6 Q So the board of directors remains the same as when
7 it was under Mr. Williams?
A Yes. I added Mr. Hugh Grundy to the board of
9 directors. He had been working for Southern Air Transport
0 and he retired.
1 Q Could you spell that, please.
2 A Grundy, G-R-U-N-D-Y. Hugh, H-U-G-H.
3 Q Okay. What was his position in the company?
* A He was senior vice president.
5 Q In charge of what?
6 A Just in general. He had been added after the
' management group I talked about earlier when Stan Williams
took the company over. I think he came with the company
in about '76 or something like that.
Q And why did you add him to the board?
A He is an old-time friend. He had been president
of Air America for a nxunber of years and he was a very
qualified man, and he was available, and I just thought he
would be a good addition. I had known him for years.
Q Now, in 1979 when you took over full ownership.
UNCUS&ff'Fn
918
UReil^tFIED
who was your CEO?
^ A I was .
3 Q And whom did you place in the hierarchy then?
A I left the company pretty much like it was at
the time I took it oven namely, the same gentlemen that I have
mentioned earlier as being director of maintenance, director
of operations, treasurer, and Hugh Grundy was senior vice
president, stayed the same. My plan was to change management
if I didn't think they were performing, but that took some
time and searching.
Q And when did this change take place?
A It didn't really — I didn't get the program
underway until 1983. We almost immediately upon my
acquiring control, we entered into a recession and things
got very difficult for the next three years, so it was kind
of a survival program then, not building management.
Q During that period from '79 to '83 what was the
status of the government contracts? Did they fall off as
well?
A We didn't have any government contracts.
Q When did you begin to have government contracts?
A We got our first government contract in '83.
Q What was that for?
A We got a piece of the log air business that the
Military Lift Command puts out each year.
iniftiriiMff'pn
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
919
UNCLASStFIED
Q Could you explain that to me?
A Well, for years and years and years ever since
I have been associated with the business, the Military Airlift
command, previously known as Military MATS, or Military
Air Transport System, have a certain amount of commercial
buy they make with all the airlines, maybe three or four
hundred million dollars worth, and they allocate that among
the qualified bidders based on the number of airplanes they
have in the civil reserve air fleet and they have a very
compliacted formula for that. It's been going on ever since
I can remember. It was part of the work that Southern Air
did way back when the agency, the CIA, first bought them.
That was the part of that group l was talking about down the
China coast. it was called the inter-island route and they
qualified in the same way that we do today.
When Southern Air was purchased by Mr. Williams back
in 1973, because of all the political furor that had
developed and because of the terrible pressure that the CIA
was under, the only way that he could accomplish that purchase
and go ahead and close on it, because we were having so many
problems with the competitors, was to give up all of his
CAB authority. The company relinquished it, turned in its
certificates and operated then as what we call a large
contract carrier, large commercial carrier, and we did business
off shore and just wherever we could find long-term contracts.
920
0N^e4.<J>fif'Fn
We couldn't hold ourselves out as a conunon carrier anymore.
So we didn't do any government business. We turned it —
actually the agency had already discontinued all government
contracts about a year before they sold it to Stan Williams.
They are not flying that route anymore. I think World
Airways was, the China coast route that I am talking about.
So all through the '70s we basically weren't qualified
to get government contracts because we didn't have enough
airplanes. They had certain rules and award criteria among
w tich was to get one of these log air routes you had to have
a minimxjin of two L-130 airplanes. We had two 130s and two
120s which was a little shorter. that you could put on the
route because they didn't have any routes that took less
than two airplanes. Then you had to have one backup airplane.
So you had to have a minimum of three 130s and we didn't
have three 130s. In addition, you had to have so many
award points and three airplanes, if we put them into the
civil reserve air fleet program, wouldn't get us enough award
points.
So basically we suffered under that lack of capital,
lack of size to participate. So we did not fly any government
contracts from the day it was sold to Mr. Williams until 1983.
Q And how was it that you obtained then the contract
in '83?
A Well, after I took control that was one of my main
IMIAIrAACIC'cn
921
11
UKMsra
objectives, to see if we could get back into this business.
2 We had two problems. One, we had no authority or we didn't
3 because we had relinquished it, but deregulation had come into
4 being since then, deregulation for cargo. It happened in
6 '78, so in '78 we applied for and obtained a 408, I forget
6 what the part of the act is, that you can have an all cargo
7 route, not route, but just general authority. So that
8 qualified us to again do MAC work.
9 The next problem then was airplanes. We needed more
'0 airplanes.
As soon as I gained control of the company, I traveled
'2 to South Africa, because they had 16 airplanes and I
attempted to lease some airplanes from them. They were unwillirr
to do so under the terms that was required; ncunely, I had to
have control of the airplanes so I could put them in CRAF.
If you can't put them in CRAF, you can't get the points.
Q In what?
A Civil reserve air fleet.
That requires that they be put in in a way that if the
government should declare an emergency that these airplanes
will be put into the emergency service and you can't turn
them back to the lessor. So they had to agree to that. They
were not willing to agree to that until '83, and all of a
sudden they changed their position and were willing to lease
airplanes at a rate -- also the rate was a problem — that
MutniRRimrn
UttOinSSIRED
would let us make a small profit in that business.
2 So in '83 they did a change of position. We were able
to lease two airplanes from them in early '83. We bid on
^ the log air quick trans business. We got one route that
5 used two airplanes. We took that away from Transamerica.
6 Transamerica had had the whole domestic airlift program from
7 the military for all those years, about 15 years. So we were
8 able to get a small segment of that away from them through
3 those commercial activities.
Q Was that on a competitive bid basis?
A The way they do it is, like I say, they award it
basically on how many airplanes you have in the CRAF and how
many — that is just the way they did it. We qualified not
only for a whole route; we got it for ten months and we had
to turn it back to Transamerica and they flew it for two
months. They had another log air route they flew with two
airplanes and the whole quick trans, which is the Navy
operation, took five of their airplanes. So they had a
fairly big package, maybe $40 million a year. Ours was
worth about 10 million a year, but we only qualified for
about nine, so we had to turn the route back to them for
two. months. It is not done on competitive bidding. It's
done on rate making. The military gets all of your costs
and go over them and they set a rate based on your cost and let
you make a small profit. That was the first year.
UNCLASSIFIED
923
UN€liSSrPlED
The second year they said, well now, there is
^ enough competition, we will put it on competitive bidding.
But there really wasn't enough competition because we bid
competitively, because we were afraid we were going to lose
our route, but Transamerica knew they had all the other
Here's and they didn't have to bid competitively and they
boosted their price up to get what they knew would be left
over after we got ours, and the military ended up paying
more than they would under the price rate making that they
had practiced before. So the next year they went back to the
rate making. That would be this year.
Q I want to stop at this point and go on into another
area, but we will take it back up after that. •
For what other companies do you serve on the board
of directors, if 2my?
A None of any significance. I serve for friends
of mine on some very closely held companies just to fill out
their board from the legal standpoint. They need three
members. Permawick is one. Magnum is another, but these
are very small companies. It's more just to get a name in.
Q Do you have controlling stock in any other
company other than Southern Air?
A No, I do not.
Q Aside from these companies you just named, do you
hold any office with any other comofaiion?
924
10
UN€bftSSIF!ED
1 A In these same companies I am a director, I might
2 be a secretary or something, again just to fill out the
3 legal requirement that they have a secretary. I am not active
< in any event.
5 Q Do you use now or have you ever used a secured
6 phone in any business dealings you have done?
7 A No.
8 0 When you were with Air .America, did you use a
9 secured phone'
A No.
' Q Now, I am going to name some companies and the
^ question will be the same for all of them, and that is whether
13
you, number one, own any stock, served as an employee or
officer or had any business dealings with these companies.
Those will be ray questions as to all the companies so we
can go through this fairly quickly.
CSF Investments?
A No.
Q Hyde Park Square?
A No.
Q Are you aware of any business dealings done
between Southern Air and Hyde Park Square?
A No.
Q Lake Resources?
J!MCtlSSIF»EO
925
UHCL^SIIP
Q And you are not a — my questions will also
encompass whether or not you are aware of Southern Air's
dealings, if any, with any of these companies?
A No.
Q Do you understand the question?
A Yes, I understand it. And it may be that some
of these companies -- because I have read about them in the
papers too -- might have been somebody who paid us. I am
not -- I haven't gone back over our financial records and I
assume Mr. Mason can speak to that. If monies were trans-
ferred from any of those companies to Southern Air, I am not
personally aware of it, but it could possibly be.
Q That is my question. I am not concerned with
what you have read in the papers. If we can ask for your
knowledge as of maybe October of 1986, that might be clear.
A I have not gone over our financial records though.
Q Corporate Air Services?
A No as to ray personal recollection. I have read
in the paper since that we apparently advanced some money
to buy an airplane or something like that.
Q But as of October '86 you did not know of
Corporate Air Services?
A No.
Q Energy Resources Incorporated?
A No.
Utt€US5IF!ED
926
um^mfriED
32
1 Q Stanford Technologies
2 A No
3 Q Any Stanford corporations
* A No
5 Q What about Udall Incorporated?
6 A October? No. See, I have been told about these
' companies subsequently. I am not sure if it was before or
^ after October. Basically — is October after all this
news or before?
MR. BECKMAN: It blew up in November. The
airplane went down on about October 7 or something like that
Then things started to come out. It was about November.
^ THE WITNESS: I would still say no
14
12
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Who informed yi i about Udall?
A Mr. Langton.
Q And what about rAST, Incorporated?
A EAST I knew of long before that.
Q And what about Air Mach?
A No.
Q You had no knowledge of Air Mach prior to October
1986?
A No.
Q Why don't you tell me what you knew about EAST.
A EAST was a company that_weji^ done business
uimksW
927
IJiflPmFSED
33
with for a number of months, and maybe years. Not years;
maybe a year or so. But they were a company that we had a
contract with that used our aircraft, I guess on an as needed
basis or whenever they wanted, just like any of our charter
customers except they wanted to provide their own crews for
it, and so we set up a special arrangement where they could
furnish their own crews but would have to live within the
FAR 121 under which we operated, the Federal Air Regulations,
and basically the crew had to be our crew in a sense. Maybe
we would not pay them, but they had to qualify on our air-
plane; they had to pass all the checks and be kept current.
We had to interview them. We had to be certain that they
possessed the necessary qualifications, but it wasn't
necessary that they be directly on our payroll. So we went
into that arrangement with them. We also — if they took
our airplane and they were leasing an airplane and putting
this crew aboard, of course they had to live with our
flight following and this sort of thing. There was a contract
to that effect.
Q When did you first become aware of EAST?
A Good grief, I really don't know. Probably — it
kind of metamorphized into EAST. I think they had a
different name before that and I can't really remember what it
was. Then they changed it to EAST.
Q But it was the same people?
ttllCbft8SiF'.ED
928
(M€iASiStF!ED
34
1 A Summit maybe?
2 Q Was it Summa Air?
3 A The same people.
4 Q Was it Sumairco?
5 A Yes, Sumairco.
6 Q Who were the people you knew of there whom you
^ dealt with?
8 A Mr. Gadd, I guess, primarily.
3 Q Anyone else?
'0 A I don't thinX so. I think it was primarily
Gadd after that. I think "cley was involved earlier who
^ was with Summit Aviation in Delaware. That is the way the
thing first came into being probably in 1982 or thereabouts,
that Summit Air asked for a bid or a quote on our providing
them an airplane and a crew for some minimal flying like
50 hours a month,, and so I prepared the quote which, of
course, was very expensive on a per hour basis and suggested,
you know, maybe they really didn't need an airplane full
time totally committed. If they could just buy it by the
hour, we could really cut the price rather substantially for
them, and they then came to Miami. I did this by phone and
sent them a proposal, to Sximmit Aviation, and I think Mr.
Gadd came along with them.
Q With Mr. Foley?
A I think so. I don't have notes on this, and so
^MCLiSSlFIED
929
UNCLHSSIFJED
35
this is just a very vague recollection. But that was my
introduction to them. It seemed like there was somebody
from the Pentagon that came with Mr. Gadd, but I don't
remember his name either.
Q Excuse me. What is Mr. Foley's first name?
A I don ' t remember .
Q Would that be in your files?
A Possibly or maybe — maybe in the aviation
directory.
MR. BECKMAN: I think we have provided the
Sumairco file.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q It would be in the Siimairco file?
A If it's in there at all. I could even have the
name wrong.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I am not aware that any Sumairco
materials have been produced to us unless it's been in the
last couple days.
MR. BECKMAN: No, no, this was right in the
beginning.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I have been through your
documents submitted to us, and I am not aware of any documents
on Sumairco. In fact, I have the index if you would like to
look at it.
MR. BECKMAN: I would be alad to look at it. We
mim^
82-690 0-88-31
UH(JtRS8UL?tO
submitted it to the Intelligence Committee. In fact, we
2 were informed that all the materials provided to the
3 Intelligence Committee came to you.
MR. VAN CLEVE: Then I will stand by what I
5 said. You didn't produce anything pursuant to the subpoena
^ to this Congress from Sumairco as far as I know.
MR. BECKMAN: With respect, I am sure you don't
° mean to be antagonistic.
MR. VAN CLEVE: Not at all.
MR. BECKMAN: But it was my understanding in
discussions with Mr. Tiefer that the materials provided to
the Intelligence Committee in December were passed to this
committee.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I think they will be in due
course, but what I am saying —
MR. BECKMAN: You mean they haven't been?
MR. VAN CLEVE: I don't think there has been a
formal transfer and the index to your document submission
does not reflect any Sumairco documents. I just want to
tell you that. So what I am telling you is there may have
been documents produced in the 99th Congress pursuant to
a separate subpoena, but I don't believe they were produced
pursuant to this subpoena.
MR. BECKMAN: This is the point I really do want
you to try to follow me on, Mr. Van Cleve.
iiNnus.<(iF'Fn
931
UNCLASSIFIED
MR. VAN CLEVE: I understand entirely what you are
saying, Mr. Beckman.
MR. BECKMAN: We were told that the subpoena we got
from this Congress was met by the documents that we had
produced to the Intelligence Committee.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I am sorry. Mr. Tiefer isn't
here to either confirm or disagree with what you are saying.
Do you have any written representation of that fact?
MR. BECKMAN: As I sit here, I don't have my
file with me.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I don't see a lot of point to
pursuing this. All I am trying to explain to you is you
indicated you had previously produced to the Select
Committee these documents. I take it what you meant is they
were produced to the House Intelligence Committee under a
different subpoena in the last Congress. Is that correct?
MR. BECKMAN: That is correct.
MR. VAN CLEVE: Thank you.
MR. BECKMAN: I aro sensitive on this because we havi !
cooperated totally with this committee.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I follow what you are saying, but
I simply wanted to be clear that when we examined the
docximent production pursuant to the subpoena in the Select
Committee, those documents are not reflected on the index
2uid I don't believe they were produced under that subpoena. I
liMCllSSlF^ED
932
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C-* end 2
Stein fls
(Joyce)
aro not suggesting that you are not cooperating.
MR. BECKMAN: I will re-produce them.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I am not suggesting any lack, of
cooperation. I am just saying it is news to me that you had
done it. That is all.
MR. BECKMAN: All right, Mr. van Cleve.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Getting back to the meeting in 1982 with Summit
Aviation —
A I think it was '82.
Q All right. — with Mr. Gadd and someone you recall
named Foley and perhaps someone from the Department of
Defense.
A Or Army or something. I am not sure.
Q Whose name you can't recall?
A Right.
Q Was this a civilian or military person?
A I thought it was supposed to be a military
person. They were not in uniform, but that is the impression
that I got.
UNClAfilCVirn
UN0bftSS4F!ED
Q Did this person have a short haircut?
A No, I think they told me he was. This is my
reaction.
A Did you make any notes of this 1982 meeting?
Q I don't know. If I did, they are in that
Suroairco file. That is the only file that I was able to
find.
Q If you had dictated or written any memorandum
of that meeting would it b«» in the Sumairco file?
A It would, unless "^ threw it out later because
1 would every couple of year" go through my files and
weed out stuff that was unnecessary.
Q But if you had vnritten one it would have been
filed in the Sumairco file?
A I suspect. I don't have a general correspondence
file.
Q Was this the first time — what did you under-
stand Mr, Gadd's relationship with Summit Aviation to be?
A I don't know. I guess it was just a group of
people trying to get together to lease an airplane, in a sense,
and they were trying to help each other.
Q When did you first meet Mr, Gadd?
A Just now.
Q Was that the first time you had spoken to him?
UNfliliftlMiFini
934
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jm 2
A Yes.
Q Did he call you up to initiate this transaction?
A No, Foley brought them down. Summit Aviation
brought them-dovm. I got the feeling that this was
Suimnits customer, they were trying to put together an
operation.
Q And how were you introduced to Gadd?
A I don't remember. He just was there and I said,
hello, Mr. Gadd.
Q Did you use Mr. or Colonel?
A No, I don't remember. I don't remember Colonel
being involved.
Q Did you know him as Mr. or by his first name?
A Mr. Gadd.
Q When you were introduced to him, were you told
what his role was, or he was the customer, or what were you
told?
A I really don't remember. It wasn't that important
to me. I was trying to lease an airplane and these were
bad times.
Q Who else was present at this meeting besides
Mr. Foley?
A It seems like there three people and that was
UNCLASSIF!ED
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0 From your company anybody?
A Oh, I don't know. Probably if anybody was there,
Hugh Grundy would have been the only one I would have
brought.
0 What did they want the aircraft for?
A I don't know. They had some missions they
wanted to perform with it. Primarily what they were
going to do was they were going to practice with it, they
said they would not take it out of the U.S. I didn't
inquire much beyond that.
0 What did they tell you they wre practicing for?
A They didn't.
Q Did they say where they were going?
A Just that they were going to stay in the U.S.
and they were supposed to follow our flight like we did
and run the airplanes like we do, so I assume Ops. would
know where it went.
Q Your operation person at that time was whom?
A Director of Operations was William Dunn. He
has passed on but we had a whole operations department that
followed airplanes.
Q And they were going to use their own crews?
A They were going to use this crew that we would
interview and see that they met our qualifications, and
they would be on our roster, go through out training, our
U»ia^RS«tD
company training and orientation, and be checked out by our
check pilots, and follow the normal routine, so they weren't
unknown to us; they just weren't on our payroll.
Q They were paid by whom?
A I suppose by East, Inc.
Q We were talking about Summit and now we have
East, Inc. involved.
A Somehow they changed their name to East, Inc. ,
because Summit did not come into the deal. When Mr. Langton
joined the company in the spring of 1983, I just turned
the whole thing over to him, I had very little to do with
it after that.
Q As of May 1983, was it East or Summit?
A I am not sure. It was never Suiranit, it was
Sumairco, and I don't know when it changed from Sumairco
to Summit, nor why.
Q You mean from Sumairco to East?
A Yes.
Q Did you negotiate this contract?
A I negotiated the original contract with Sumairco,
right. I wrote it, as a matter of fact. It was a letter
contract, and I don't know if they are still following it.
After I turned it over tc Langton I don't know if the
nature of the operation changed or not. It wasn't a
major activity of the company, in my judgment, and I didn't
UJIIUJfifiic«cn
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IWei'SSSfFJED
43
follow it very closely.
Q What were the terms of the contract in terras of
dates, was it a one-year contract, a six-month
A It might have been a 30-day cancellation. The
draft might be in the files turned over to you.
MR. BECKMAN: I have a recollection, I think the
document was turned over to you.
THE WITNESS: I am not even sure that the
signed document existed but the draft is in my files. They
might have changed that totally. I know the rates changed,
probably, and I didn't follow it beyond that.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Is it fair to characterize it as a month-to-
month contract?
A I would read the contract, if I were you.
Q I am just asking for your recollection?
A I don't recall.
Q Okay .
Did you enter into any other contracts with either
Sumairco or East after this 1982, or thereabouts, early
1983, contract?
A I think that they changed the nature of the
contract from time to time, maybe just the rates. I don't -
I was not party to that. That was left to my subordinates.
Basically I don't even think they changed the rates. I
UNCLASSirFn
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mmna
think they stayed pretty much the same.
2 Q Do you know whether or not the activity was
3 expanded?
A I don't think it ever did get to be a major
5 activity, no.
6 Q When you say that, is there a dollar figure we
7 can assign to it?
8 A Sure. I don't have it
9 Q Can you give me an idea, $10,000, $100,000.
10 A I don't know. T would rather not speculate.
11 MS. NAUGHTON: Off the record.
12 (Whereupon, at 11:4P a.m., the committee recessed,' to
'3 reconvene at 12:30 p.m., the same day.)
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UfflSSIflED
AFTERNOON SESSION
MS. NAUGHTON: Let the record reflect we are back
on the record after an hour long lunch break.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Now, when we left we were discussing a meeting
that you had with Mr. Gadd, meeting him for the first
time, and an official with Sumairco, regarding a fairly
small contract of contracting in aircraft for what they
said were practice runs. Do you recall that testimony?
A Yes. I think it was some officers of Summit
Aviation. Simairco hadn't really been formed yet, probably .
Ultimately,! did contri ' with Sumairco though.
Q Okay.. . e m said you didn't know exactly
what — was it just one ^^ lane?
A Yes, but not any specific aircraft. They would
take whatever one was available at the time. When they
wanted to use it, they would call and say, we would like
to block out next weekend, and we would look at our schedule
and see if we had availability then.
Q Did they have a specific size requirement?
A No, most of the time they took a Dash-20, the
smaller of the two airplanes.
Q They never told you what these were for or what
they were doing with the plane?
A No. I never asked the, except they were going
IINfilAfifilF'Fn
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UNCti^SSiNED
to conduct it in conjunction with our requirements for an
airplane, not carrying contraband, they had to fly to
where we had insurance.
Q Was this unusual for you not to know what they
were using the plane for?
A It wasn't something I did every day. I guess we
didn't have another customer that furnished their own pilots,
but we knew where the airplanes were going. I didn't ask
every day, where is this airplane going or flight following.
They said, practice missions and training in the U.S.
Q But you did-'t ask them what would be inside the
plane? •
A I don't rent ■- asking that specifically, no.
Q Is that unusu -.a. for you not to know what your
customers are transporting?
A In general, we have bill of lading, and I assume
that when this one flew whatever went on, it would follow
the same conditions that a bill of lading — not a bill of
lading — what did they call it — whatever we made up, a
manifest for an airplane cargo.
Q Would those documents be in the Siimairco file
or in another file?
A They should be in the Southern Air's files, I
think.
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UNOt^ASSIFIED
MR. BECKMAN: When you say those documents, what
are you referring to?
THE WITNESS: The manifest.
MR. BECKMAN: If we had them they would have long
ago been destroyed.
THE WITNESS: They are not there now, probably.
MR. BECKMAN: I think we have a 90-day destruction
policy or something like that.
MS. NAUGHTON: Ii . ju could double check on that
for me, please, and then when _jb comes down, if they are
available we would like to see them?
MR. BECKMAN: I would be happy to. When we Were
interviewed by the FBI I would have to tell them we didn't
have that. We would sink through the stress factor of the
floors.
THE WITNESS: I asked the question of Langton,
and was assured that was what they were doing, was flying
within the Continental U.S. on practice missions.
By MS. NAUGHTON:
Q What did Mr. Langton tell you they were doing
on the practice missions?
A I don't think he knew. They were just flying
the airplane and practicing.
Q The crew that they provided for you — to be
trained by you and certified by you, were these people
942
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with a lot of flight experience or were they training green
people?
A I think they met our criteria, whatever that was.
Generally they used to require 1500 hours, but they were
very qualified people, I am sure. We have their names, I
am sure. They must have been supplied to somebody, if that
was the question.
They were experienced, et cetera, training records.
A When you met with these folks for the first time,
did you meet in your office?
A Yes, I did.
Q How many days did they spend there the first •
time?
A
Q
A
Q
Just the one day.
Did you go out in the evening with them?
No, I don't think so.
When is the next time you had any conversations
with Mr- Gadd?
A I really don't remember. It was a long time
after that, it seemed like. I am not sure if I ever had
another one after having first turned the whole thing over
to Langton. I just don't remember seeing him again.
Q Did you enter into any other contracts with Summit
or their successor company?
HMfilirBiMeiClirn
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UNOUkSSIFIED
49
A NO. And Sumairco is not, I don't believe, a
successor of Summit. I think Summit Aviation still is in
Wilmington or someplace.
Q Then you have got me confused. You contracted
with Summit
A Sumairco.
Q You contracted with Sumairco and Summit just
put together the deal?
A That is my feeling, yes.
Q And then Sum-^irco became East?
A Right, I th^ ik that is correct.
Q What is Mr. Gadd's relationship to East?
A I don't kn- . I think he might be president,
but I don't know.
Q First of a 1, did you have any other contracts
then with Summit?
A No.
Q Did you have any other contracts with Sumairco?
A No.
Q So now we can concentrate on East?
A Yes.
Q When is the next time you heard either from
Mr. Gadd or anybody with East?
A Me personally talking to them?
Q No, any time your company had dealings with them?
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A I think they had dealings with East mostly over
the next two years or three probably.
Q I think it was all emanating from the same earlier
discussions. They may have eventually changed it and not
been following that original document that I drafted by the
time Langton was working with them two years later. I don't
I am sure that they were — their guidelines were the same.
Q If I could go back to the original meeting you
had with Summit, the individual that you thought was a
military person from the Army or whatever
A Yes.
Q What did he say in this conversation?
A I don't remember he said much of anything, frankly.
Q Was it your impression that you could obtain
more government contracts if you took on this contract for
Sumairco?
A NO.
Q Was t here any relationship, in your mind, between
government contracts that you were seeking and any work
done for East?
A No, we weren't seeking any at that time, other
than the fact that I would always be interested in ^g /ir,
flfuiktrans.
Q And that is what you described with Trans America?
That is the contract you described that Trans America was
uaini ASSiFSf n
945
uH^L'H^SiF-ED
involved with?
A Yes, plus other carriers that participated in
this.
Q That is the contract you just described?
A Yes, I was interested in trying to get involved
in that or any MAC business but this had no entry in my
mind. That business is let on a very strict award criteria
that all carriers know, and we follow it by the book.
Q Was there a connection in your mind between
East and anybody in the Defense Department.
A I thought East had a contract with the Defense
Department — the government, not necessarily the Defense
Department. They had the contract and they were going to
hire us, our airplane, to carry out their contract, yes.
Q When did you form this opinion?
A When they first came to me.
Q When Gadd and Foley and
A They might have said, we have a government
contract amd we need this type of airplane.
0 When was the next time that you were aware that
your company did any transactions with East?
You say
A It was an ongoing thing. I was aware that it
was going on. I just irasn't involved in the detail.
Q You also said you don't recall speaking with
WMiFififiinFn
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52
Mr. Gadd until after Mr. Langton came onboard?
A Yes, I really don't.
Q Mr. Langton came onboard when?
A In May of 1983.
Q And when do you next — strike that.
Do you remember briefing Mr. Langton on this East
contract?
A Not specifically, but 1 am sure I did.
Q And how soon after Mr. Langton came onboard
do you recall having any further contact with Mr. Gadd?
A Personally?
Q Yes.
Q I don't remember, but it was quite a while. I
just don't know. Probably a year or more.
Q When you said, personally, let's distinguish that
from, I guess, the company.
A Yes, I think they were talking to him on a
frequent basis, and Mr. Langton
Q Took that part over?
A Yes. And they became more active, I think, after
Mr. La^ngton C2une aboard than they ever had been — we had
this contract in place and I don't remember them doing a
whole lot of flying out there, frankly.
Q What would you say the relationship between
Mr. Langton and Mr. Gadd was? Were they social friends, or
UNfiUfifiiHFn
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UNGLKSSIf^CD
what?
A Business relationship, I believe.
Q When you next personally heard from Mr. Gadd,
what was the context of that contact?
A I don't remember. I could have said hello to hin
he may have dropped into the office. He did come to my
home one time to talk about an operation, and I very frankly,
forget what that was.
I just remember the incident. I was ill, so I didn't
go into the office, so he came to the house.
Q Was that before October oj 1985, or was that the
October of 1985 visit?
A It could have been October of 1985.
Q Is this when he broached the subject to you of
supplying the Contras?
A ProbaUDly, yes, that he was — they were
going to start an operation to help supply the Contras,
and he wanted to know if we wanted to become involved in it.
Q So I have it clear in my mind, aside from maybe
a casual passing in the hallway between you and Mr. Gadd,
the next substantive meeting you had with him was this
October 1985 meeting in your home?
A Yes. I am not sure it was in my home. I had
a meeting in my home, I am not sure that was what the
subject %ras.
UMCLASSIF^ED
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Q Well, did you ever discuss the Contras with
Mr. Gadd outside of your home?
A I don't think so. I may have had a conversation
with him in the office, but I don't remember it.
Q Do you recall discussing the Contras while you
were in your home?
A Yes. I remember discussing the Contras, whether
it was in my home or in my office, I zun not sure. I did
have one meeting with him in my home.
Q Do you remember anything else you discussed
with him in your home?
A I only remember two conversations with him, one
having to do with the Contras, and one having to do with
Iran, and one was by telephone, and one was a personal meeting
in my home. Those are the two that stand out in my mind.
Q Do you remember trtiich cjune first?
A The Contras.
Q How did this meeting in your home come about?
A It was initiated by Mr. Gadd.
Q How did he initiate it?
A I guess be called Mr. Langton.
Q And why did they go to your home?
A Because I was not in the office. I had a cold
or something.
Q Did you tell then to come to your borne?
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A Yes, I said if they wanted to see me this
particular day, they bad to come to -my home. Maybe I just
had ray arm operated on. I was ill and was in my home; no
secret reason ai^M» to be in ray home.
Q I '•j^ suggesting that.
So Mr. Langton brought them to your home?
They ccune together.
Mr. Gadd had not been to your home previously?
I don't think so.
Who else was preso . this raeeting?
That is all, just the th. ae of us.
Anyone from your family?
No. My wife was in the house but she wasn't in
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
the meeting.
Q Where in your home did you meet?
A In the living room,
Q Were any notes taken by any of the three of you?
A Not that I recall, but somebody could have
been taking notes. I just wasn't conscious of it.
Q Do you recall dictating or writing any memorandum
after the meeting?
A No.
Q Do you recall reading any memorandum from either
Mr. Langton or Mr. Gadd after the meeting?
A No.
UNOU^lK'Fn
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lAHeiHSSfFSED
Q Did you ever see anything in writing about the
meeting other than what your attorneys have prepared for us?
A No.
Q Do you remember what time of day it was?
A Midday, I would say.
Q Sgmf why don't you just tell us in a narrative
fashion and then I will ask the questions later — once
they came into your home you sat down in the living room,
what was discussed to the best of your recollection?
A I think Mr. Gadd had some funds to commence
a supply operation for the Contras, private funds — not
government funds as I recall, and he was going to set up- an
airline to do that, and he wanted Southern Air to be involved
in that maybe as a joint venture or a joint venture or —
these were very loose concepts that were discussed. I
don't think the meeting took more than an hour and a half
or something like that. We fpWt, I guess, at the time, that
we just couldn't be involved without being in total control
of it.
It wasn't a concept that we thought was necessarily
wrong or right, or anything, but unless we could control
it we wouldn't be too interested in it. Mr. Gadd seemed
to want to — he had the funds and he had all of the go-ahead
on it, or that is the impression he gave, and so we —
1 guess we left it rather loose as to what we were ultimately
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going to do, and said, well, it is an interesting idea,
Southern Air might be willing to give some assistance and
maybe even become a joint venture, or if it is structured
right — I asked such questions as whose flag does it
fly under, or where would you get the registration for your
airplanes, auid this sort of thing, which he didn't seem
to know.
He didn't have a good feel fcr the business.
Q What was his response to those specific questions?
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ONCtASSIf?ED
58
A No problem. It would all be taken care of. Don't
worry about it — that we had the right contacts, and, you
know, we could either get Honduras registration or Panama
registration or El Salvador or whatever countries we were
talking about at the time.
It was just, you know, no problem. I asked him how
much budget he had, and, well, he had $500,000 or something
like that, and my reaction to that was, well, that is really
totally inadequate to really start up an airline. There is
a lot more to do than they recognized.
You just don't go buy an airplane and start up an
airline. You really have to have an infrastructure, you got
to get the base, you got to get the money, and you got to get
parts. You got to get a company and you got to get your
airplanes registered and become part of the community, having
had some experience in that in the Indochina days.
So my general feeling was that this was not somethin
we wanted to be involved in.
Q Was it his plan to purchase an aircraft specifically
for this?
A Yes.
' Q Rather than use Southern Air's?
A Yes, this was going to be an internal supply system.
Southern Air's airplanes were way too big for this activity.
You needed something that could land on much smaller strips.
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It was going to be a supply system withm Central
America.
Q And ~
A Operating out o^^^^^H^or some place, I guess,
into wherever the contras were.
Q Now, when Mr. Gadd first broached this subject,
did he say whom he represented?
A He said it was private funds, but I got that
distinct impression that it wasn't government money; in some
way it was private money.
Q Did he say he represented a group of private
investors or individuals.
A No, he really .ever got into specifics where he
got his money nor did I ask, and I really didn't know.
Q He just said, we, or —
A Yes, more or less.
Q Is that the phrase he used?
A Yes.
Q Did he mention any organization?
A No, not to me. I don't remember anything about
where the money was going to come from.
Q Did he give you a business card?
A Not me, no. I don't have any.
Q Did he give one to Mr. Langton that you are
aware of or anyone in your company?
954
UNCUSSIflED
A I am not aware of that.
Q Did he ever show you any credentials?
A No.
Q Now, when he said — you mentioned that he told
you that he had the go-ahead.
A Yes.
Q What did you mean by that?
A My feeling was that the administration was giving
him the okay on this, that they were working in some way
with the administration.
Q How did you get that impression?
A From Mr. Gadd, and I am not — I don't have any
specific feelings, because I always felt that his contract,
for example, the contract EAST, Inc., was with the
government in some way, that he didn't just have money
of his own that he was, but it was a government contract.
Q How did you get that feeling?
A I think he probably told me so, and I think it
probably was. I think what happened was they did have a
government contract and that was a different project
entirely. He represented a company VINAL or something like
that that was very big in government contracts, and his
EAST, Inc. was just a spin-off of that.
VINAL — was that it? I forget the n2une of the
company. I might have that card. He might have given me
UNCLAS£ICS^n
955
UMeilSSIFlED
that card. I probably threw it away, though.
Q If you come across it, I would appreciate having it.
A They are a big company.
Now that you mention it, I did visit him, now
that I mentioned it, one time in McLean at this big office.
That was — I have no idea when that was.
Q Was it after this contra discussion?
A No, it was before, early in my dealings with
him. So I had been up there at one time to his office in
McLean, I think -- no, Vienna.
Q McLean or Vienna?
A It might have been Vienna. He had a couple Of
offices up there. The first one he had only one office and
he was very closely connected to what I thought was this
holding company. I was never quite clear on it.
Q Do you remember what the holding company was?
A VINAL or something like that.
Q When you went to visit him at this office, was it
a large office or just —
A It was a large office. He had a small office
within this complex. They might have had a whole floor
in one of those buildings out there. But they — he
explained to me they had a number of government contracts
and this was one of them, that EAST, Inc. ultimately
because EAST, Inc., was operatin
Inc., was operating.
956
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Mi'tlu
I do think that contract — I have no basis for
it — was divorced and not part of an ongoing — the contra
deal that he was getting himself involved in was not an
ongoing part of this other contract that they used our
Here for.
Q Do you recall how you got that address of where to
go in Vienna?
A 1 am sure he told me on the telephone.
Q Do you remember writing down any directions or
anything how to get there?
A I am sure I did, but I wouldn't have kept them.
This is, you know, a few years ago.
Q Did you use a rental car or public transportation?
A I probably used a rental car. I don't know.
No, I didn't use a taxi.
Q Did he introduce you to anyone else at that
company?
A Probably did, but I don't remember who they were.
This is a public company, I think.
Q Okay .
A Remind me. I will look through my card index.
MR. BECKMAN: Do you remember how to spell it?
THE WITNESS: Starts with a " V , V-I-L-L or something
like that.
MR. BECKMAN: Vill?
iHiciAS&:;';in
957
Ufiei«Sl»F'ED
THE WITNESS: No, it is longer than that.
Vinal, maybe it is V-I-N-A — I don't know.
MR. BECKMAN: Okay.
BY MR. NAUGHTON:
Q At that meeting m his office did you — what did
you discuss?
A I don't know. It wasn't obviously any real
contractual activity. I might have ]ust been in town and
went over to visit him. It is nothing of any consequence,
obviously.
Q Did you ever see him in uniform?
A No. I think he was retired.
Q Did he tell you that or —
A No, I ultimately found that out. I really didn't
know he was military, frankly, until all this came out —
or retired military.
Q Now, let's go back to the meeting in your home.
We got kind of sidetracked there.
When you said you felt he had the go-ahead from
the administration, to the best of your recollection, what
precisely did he tell you about that?
A I think I heard that more from Langton than from
him. These are things that — you are trying to pin it down
to one meeting when all this happened and probably it is
conversations over a period of time with Langton. This is
liNlll.A!C$L;!.n
958
UiCLiSStFiED
the only meeting I had with him.
Q Okay. Let me stop you there. Before this
meeting, did Langton tell you about Gadd wanting to supply
the contras?
A He might have. Might have.
Q And would Langton then have told you at that
point that he had administration backing?
A I don't think he -- I think I was never told he has
administration backing.
You know, don't take my testimony to mean that, i
because I don't think that is the case. My general feeling '
was that they had administration backing from the standpoint
of this was a project that the administration was approving ,
of, but I never got the feeling that the money was coming I ,
in. It was private money, but they were working some way withiii
the White House.
Q All right. That is what I am getting at.
When he said he was working with the White House
or had their go-ahead or approval -- can you explain to me —
first of all, let's go to Gadd, what Gadd told you to give youl
that impression.
A That this has White House approval. This is some-
thing the White House wants done. I don't know if he said
it in those words, but clearly that came across.
Q Did he mention anyone specif ically at the White
Jid he mention anyone spec
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House?
A Not to me.
Q Did he mention the Vice President?
A No.
Q Did he mention anything about the Boland amendment
or humanitarian aid as opposed to military aid?
A Not to me. We were doing some humanitarian aid.
We were flying some of that for them.
Q For whom?
A I don't know if it was at this time or -- well,
Gadd was getting the business for us. So, he was the
agent as far as we were concerned, and we booked it through
his company, one of his companies, I guess.
Q You don't recall the name of that company?
A No.
Q What made you think this was then different
than the flights you were already running?
A Well, the flights we were running was the know-how
flights, whatever they call that, and this was going to be
supplying internally in Nicaragua, Central America, the
movement of goods, maybe some of this tll^^MKr goods that
had to be moved in our type airplanes, including other
airlines participated in the humanitarian air relief.
We didn't fly that alone. Air Mach flew some
and other carriers, but to move that type of goods to the
iMiMiiieiQArTn
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Uf^RSSIFJED
contras required further airlift within country, within
Central America. And this was his desire, to set up this
airline. I think he saw it as, you know, as a business
proposition.
Q But when he explained this to you, was it in
the context of the ^MMI^BHM^ NHAO contract or was it a
separate venture?
A I got the feeling that it was not part of that
contract, but it was something that he was going to do with
whomever he worked with, because there was a need that
existed for distribution in Central America after the .
stuff arrived either by boat or large airplane. You had to
distribute it to or within country, and this was a business
opportunity, in a sense.
Q All right.
A And that I assume he was going to make money at
It.
Q Well, did you get the impression he was doing it
for the money or for some political or patriotic reason or
both?
A I think a little of both. I think he visualized -
I know you are asking me to enter his mind now -- but
visualized a business that made some money, and in addition
was carrying out a function.. . . .. . ^
Q Did you discuss with Mr. Gadd at this time or any
961
UNCLASSIFIED
time the political situation in Central America?
A I don't recall doing that, no.
Q You don't recall having a political discussion
with him regarding the contra movement, who is right or
who IS wrong?
A No.
Q Or what was happening?
A No.
Q What kinds of materials did he discuss trans-
porting?
A I don't recall discussing that at all.
Q Did you ask him if he planned on transporting
contraband?
A No.
Q So you never separated from his mind or your
mind whether they were going to transport explosives or
weapons as opposed to soft goods? -=i^"=">'' "^
Pr^^ No, I never «5tred:ii^t. :*- never considered
weapons transported by an airlinasTthat he formed down
in Central America being ccfttraband. It is just more cargo.
If you are aaXJBg ne, LrAewe; -e^n gave it a thought.
I would assume they would carry weapons.
Q All right.
A Why not?
Q In your mind, even today, transporting the weapons
iniMrftfiiSIFTi)
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mag 1 1
«Wt'ilS«ffED
down there, you see nothing wrong with that?
A I don't see that as a violation. Is that a
violation of the law? I don't know. I don't see that as
being a violation of the law, no.
Q Okay. Would the same be true of missiles or
missile parts, in your mind?
A Probably.
Q Now, he said that he was working for some
private or had private funds, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And he said -- did he say he only had half a
million dollars or that is all he had to spend on this
pro;)ect?
A That is all he had at that time, about a half
million cC>llar«.'^-S®«e .s^y pr janother, M^my nm^d^^j^^^^
I don^ kno^rT?irere it came f?^^^!Sat mSybe up t?a million
and a half might be available, all of which I considered
inadequate .
Q Did he say when this fundraising effort began?
Did he say, "We have been collecting this for years" or
"for months" or "for days"?
A Didn't say that at all. He just said this is the
money he had.
Q Did he say where he had it?
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Q Did you ask him how you would be paid?
A I don't remember that, asking that, no. i did not
ask that. I didn't -- firstly, I wasn't going in the
business, I guess, and so I wasn't too interested in how it
was going to be paid being I wanted no part of it.
We wanted to get paid for whatever services we performed
and we were generally paid cash in advance -- not cash m
advance, but with him he had always been a good customer over
the years. We would give credit. But we got cash on our
invoicing.
Q What was Mr. Langton ' s contribution to this meeting?
Did he try to cement a business deal or did he argue against
It?
A No, I don't think so. I think he and I were in
tune with what Southern Air needed to go forward with
any business arrangement and understand what conditions we
would do it.
Q Did Mr. Gadd envision your company purchasing
the aircraft for him or was he going to do this separately
himself?
A He was going to furnish the money, as I got the
impression, and we never got far enough that I say, you
know, the next question would be, "Well, if you advance a
half million to buy airplanes and you are going to make us a
50 percent partner, how do we pay you back?"
nimiiftSfiiFSPn
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U^ttSSIflED
Because obviously whoever put up the half million
dollars deserves to get his money back first or deserves to
own the assets that that money bought.
So those were problems in my mind because it was
a loose conversation, but it never got far enough that
I had to start resolving all of those.
Q What crew was he planning on using?
A That was another discussion, you know, where
would you get crew members for that. He said, "Well, I know
where I can get some" or "I already have hired some", which
was another alerting to signal to me that we were not in
control of it. He has already hired crews. I don't know
who they are and what their qualifications are and etc.
So, he had already hired crews, and they were
looking for airplanes, that type of thing. I am not sure
this all took place in this meeting. These might have
been conversations that Langton gave me either a little bit
before or a little bit after.
tlNfil.&SSIF'iED
965
UNlMiiED
And when you asked what flag it would be fl
ymg
under, he said he wasn't sure?
A Yes, I think they had not made up their mind yet.
They talked about Panama. I said, well, if you put a
Panama flag on it will^^^^^^Hlet you fly a Panama
flag carrier in their country, because this is a big
problem with airlines and we in the business understand that
you cannot take a U.S. N-registered airplane down to Panama
and fly it around Panama.
Q Internally?
A Internally, or even offshore sometimes. They don't
want you — for example, if you get a Panamanian airplane
you probably cannot fly it in^^^^^^^Hwithout
[giving special permission. Also you got to return
it every, I think they want you to return it every six
months back home, otherwise they won't let you register
the airplane; or return every month. It has to be on a
scheduled operation out of their country.
So these get to be very nationalistic. So setting
up an airline to operate in another country becomes a very
difficult operation without total cooperation of that
administration.
Q Did he ever make any allusions to perhaps paying
anybody off in these countries?
A No, but I think there were allusions that that
IWfilrifi&IF^ED
966
UNetll^SfF^ED
had all been taken care of. They could get whatever
operating rights they wanted to and fly pretty much
where they wanted to. That would have been why I thought
that there had to be government assistance. You cannot
go down there all by yourself as an entrepreneur without
your government helping you or that government bring
friendly to you, getting you an airport to land in. That
was another discussion.
What site are you going to fly out of? How are you
going to get it? Who is going to let you have it?
Q What did he say to that?
A "It has all been taken c-^re of."
Q Did he tell you where they were going to fly out
A Yes, I think so.
Q What did he tell you?
A I don't know, I don't remember.!
I think was mentioned.
^^^^^^^^^^ These names don't stick in
my mind, but it wasl
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Did he mention the farm?
A No.
iuiri.AiifiiF9Fn
967
guess it is people like you to know denote someplace
down m some other country, I guess.
Q
maybe this same type of connotation exists with someplace
down in Central America.
Q But he mentioned some areas that you have since
heard about in the papers?
A Yes, I think so. He might have mentioned others.
I just wasn't focused on them at the time. He mentioned
two or three places that they planned to set uo operations
and the question was well, how do you get the right to
do that? Well, that has all been taken care of, or it
will be taken care of.
Q From your experience you have described to us the
nNP.I ASSIFIED
ms
mmmmm
problems in setting up this kind of operation from the
standpoint of the foreign government and their regulations.
In terms of our government, is there anything special
that you would have to get or any sort of plans you
would have to file or any kind of special permission
you would have to get from our government to run such an
internal route?
Is your answer "no"?
A I am sorry. No. I know of nothing. You are
totally outside the U.S. jurisdiction so there is -- you are
subject to local law.
Q If your flight however, originates in the United
States and then say makes two internal stops inj
IS there then any sort of
permission or plan or anything that has to be filed with
the United States authorities?
A I don't know of anything other than, of course,
if you are exporting something you would have your
Customs problems. We, Southern Air, if you are not an
air carrier and you are engaged in what we call common
carriage, then you would need to get a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to leave the States and fly
to that particular place, but if you are doing just charter
work, ad hoc charter work on an infrequent basis, and you
are a large commercial operator, then I don't know of
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anything you would even need to do that, other than you
of course have to comply with any Customs.
MR. BECKWAN: You were also asked about the plan
which I assume meant about the flight plan.
THE WITNESS: With FAA you do file flight plans.
MS. NAUGHTON: All right.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q If you are flying an internal flight in Central
America and you are a U . S . -registered plane, do you have
to file a flight plan?
A No, not to my knowledge.
Q So to your knowledge there is no U.S. regulations
or requirements that you have to file if you are just simply
doing an internal flight?
A Right. If you are flying a U.S. N-registered
airplane of course you are under the safety rules still of
the U.S. FAA, and you have to comply with those, but they
don't require any reporting. It is just that your pilots
can fly only so many hours and your airplane has to be
maintained under certain levels of safety, et cetera,
et cetera. All N-registered airplanes have to do that.
MR. BECKMAN: When you get to reporting you
also have the Department of Transportation reporting foreign
civil .charters.
THE WITNESS: That
IE WITNESS: That is onlv for a certif
tiNni ASSIFIE6
icated
970
iHCUI^lWfP
air carrier though. The large commercial operators don't
have to do that.
MR. BECKMAN: I ]ust don't know how precise or
broad Pam's question is.
MS. NAUGHTON: I don't know either, I am ^ust
factfinding .
THE WITNESS: We file with the Department of
Transportation some Form 41s on all our charter flights.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q That is even your ad hoc charters?
A Yes.
Q Is this true of your contract flights?
A Yes, we file something on that that might be a
little more general in terms of it keeps repeating itself
type thing.
Q Now is that DOT or FAA specifically?
A DOT. This is an outgrowth of the CAB.
Q What is the form number?
A Used to be Form 41 because it was under Part 141
of the —
MR. BECKMAN: I think it is 217 now. They keep
changing it. I could be wrong as well.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Now, you had this meeting that lasted in your
home about an hour-and-a-half , you said. What was the
971
13N^R58!^SD
sense you had at its conclusion, and did you convey the
message to Mr. Gadd that you were not interested?
A I am not sure it happened on that day. I think
It was left real fuzzy then. He said well, he didn't need
an answer. It might have gone on for a couple more
months m a fuzzy way because he was not yet putting it
together. But then all of a sudden I might have asked
Langton a month later or something, well, you know, what
has ever happened to that?
And he said, well , you know, Gadd is just going on
his own. He has hired crews already and we are doing the
maintenance for these people, or actually we were not
really even doing maintenance. We were providing maintenance
personnel. They were supervising their own maintenance.
We provided maintenance people when they needed
them and asked for them.
Q Who provided the materials?
A We went out and bought the materials for them,
used our purchasing department to do that.
Q And then billed their account?
A Yes.
Q How were you made aware of this?
A Myself, I was made aware really after the fact
by Langton and Bob Mason.
Q But prior to October of 1986?
972
(INCbASStFiED
A How I personally was made aware of the fact
2 that we were performing these services?
Q Yes.
A By Langton, Mr. Langton.
5 Q Okay.
^ A I would ask him from time to time "What is going
' on" and you know, what was our involvement with this
operation down there?
Q Okay.
A Because I would see the airplanes sitting on
our ramp by this time.
Q Let's take it from the next step then. After
that meeting at your home, do you recall when the next time
It is that you spoke with Mr. Gadd?
A I am sure I spoke with him from time to time when
he was down there, more or less ^ust "How do you do", in
the hallways though. But the next time I remember I guess
was when he telephoned late one night, or I was told he
was going to call.
Q By whom?
A By Mr. Langton.
Q What was he going to call about?
A I think that had to do with the Iran movement.
0 ...,. UNCLASSIF'ED
so you really didn't speak to Mr. Gadd substantive
973
UNOL'A^SIF.'ED
No.
Until the Iranian discussion?
Yes.
And do you recall when that was?
No.
Now, were you aware of Amalgamated Commercial
Enterprises?
MR. BECKMAN: ACE.
THE WITNESS: ACE, yes.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When did you become aware of ACE?
A Probably shortly after it was formed, because
my people probably reported to me and said, well, we formed
this Panamanian company for Mr. Gadd.
Q I am sorry, I have to backtrack one more moment.
Regarding the conversation at your home with
Mr. Gadd and Mr. Langton, did you describe this conversation
to anyone else?
A No.
Q Did you tell anyone else about it?
A No.
Q Now, as to ACE, who told you that officials from
SAT had formed this company in Panama?
A Mr. Langton I believe.
Q How did that come up?
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A I think he might have just informed me. I might
have gotten back from a trip or something and he said,
you know, that Bob went down and formed this company.
UNGLASSIfi'ED
975
UNIH^ASSIRED
Q Was this m the course of an ordinary business
meeting or did he call you to ask if it -was okay to do it?
A He didn't ask if it was okay to do it . I guess
it was in a normal conversation. Maybe it came up — I :ust
don ' t know.
Q If he had asked your approval to do this, would
that have been unusual or would you have given your approval
to do it?
A I probably would have given my approval.
Q Had you done this for other companies?
A No.
Q Why then would you give your approval?
A I wouldn't see anything wrong with it. If it were
of use to a customer, I would do so.
Q What did Mr. Langton tell you about forming ACE?
A He thought ACE was going to be the company that
Gadd operated his Central American —
Q Resupply effort —
A Resupply effort, yes.
Q Did Mr. Langton tell you about the specifics, the
mechanics of opening up the ACE account?
A Probably. Which meant they just took some money
down and bought an off-the-shelf Panamanian company and opened
a bank account and that was the end of it. It took a couple
of hours.
UM€LASS;:^'ES
976
Q Whose money did they use?
A Mr. Gadd furnished the money, I believe.
Q Is that what Mr. Langton told you?
A Is that what he told me?
Q Yes.
A I guess so. That is the impression I got from some
source. It wasn't our money, I didn't think. I certainly
didn't authorize anybody to open an account with our money.
Q Would that have required your authorization?
A How much money was involved.
Q Let's say around $10,000.
A No. That wouldn't require my authorization.
I thought they had a quarter of a million dollars or somethin
Just $10,000, maybe they did do it with our money and we got
reimbursed.
Q But you don't know, is your answer.
A I don't know.
Q Now, how soon after the meeting at your home did yc
learn that indeed Mr. Langton and Mr. Gadd had reached an
agreement regarding the maintenance of these flights?
A Oh, I don't know, it might have been a month or twc
MR. BECKMAN: Maintenance of the flights or
maintenance of the aircrafts.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
laintenance of thearrtr^t .
977
UftCtft^fflEO
A They didn't reach an agreement on any ongoing
involvement of Southern Air in the Central American activity,
but we would just be technical advisors and provide maintenance
as they required on call and that is what we were doing. That'
probably came up when I questioned Mr. Langton, what is going
on down there.
At some point, he said we are really not doing
anything other than providing support.
Q When did you ask him this?
A I don't know specifically.
Q A month later? A year later?
A It might have been two or three months later.
Q Why did you ask him?
A Because I started seeing the ai_rplanes around and
I was worried about if we got further involved than what he
and I had agreed to.
Q Is that when he told you about the ACE account?
A It could have been. He could have told me at the
time, too; I don't know. I don't remember it being told to me
before the fact, though, but that is not really important.
I would have authorized him to go ahead and do that.
Q Did you ever see a contract?
A No.
Q Would one have been written?
No
i»l(SW$Sir:£o
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UNCLlAS^iED
Q Why not?
A Well, because we provide drop-in maintenance
for people all the time. I would assume there is a work
order or something. When they want work done on an airplane,
we generally open a work order and have the pilot sign it so
we have something to authorize the work being done.
It is like driving your car into a dealership and
saying, "I have something wrong with my lights and I would
like you to check my brakes and change the oil," and the guy
stands there and makes up a work order and does it and you pick
up the car that night.
Q Would your answer be the same in terms of the term
used, would an invoice have been prepared every time the
maintenance required material?
A Yes, same thing on maintenance materials, if it were I
going directly on the airplane. I understand that we did a
little more in this instance, that they might give us an order
and we would have our purchasing agents go buy the stuff on '
the open market for them because they didn't have that
structure and capability and then we would bill them for it,
or maybe they would give us money in advance and we would draw
against that advance, I am not sure.
It probably happened both ways.
Q Would you generally take out a fee for your
services .
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A We generally added 25 percent for that service.
We do a lot of buying and the standard charge is cost plus 2 5
percent. Then we have a regular hourly rate that we charge
for our maintenance depot like $30 an hour, so if they use it,
we charge S30 an hour.
Q If we can skip ahead then to March of 1986 ,
there was a purchase of a couple of C-123 aircraft?
A Yes.
Q Tell me what you know about that.
A I don't know anything. Ask me some questions.
Q To your knowledge, were some C-12 3 aircraft
purchased on behalf of anybody by Southern Air?
A Only from what I read in the newspaper and I guess
subsequently asking people in my company that we did advance -
I am not even sure we advanced, frankly — we went down and
bought a cashier's check to take to somebody in Fort
Lauderdale to pay the purchase price on one C-12 3 and I am not
sure that that was an advance by Southern Air or just money —
what I was told was that they had a check to pay for it, but
the seller was demanding a cashier's check; he wouldn't
accept their check, so we took the customer's money that was
going to buy the airplane and we issued a cashier's check
from our account to pay for the airplane so the guy would have
good money.
We, in other words, accepted their bank check in
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good faith.
Q Who told you all this?
A Langton or Mason.
Q And this was only after the story broke in the
newspapers?
A Yes. I didn't know we had done that accommodation
until then.
Q Was this unusual.
A Not really, no. We have done this for a lot of
customers or would do it. We have advanced money --
Q To purchase aircraft?
A To purchase something equally expensive. This
was only $300,000 or something. Not that 5300,000 isn't a lot
of money, but this is a customer we have done business with
a man we have known for a long time. He has a check in his
hand, even if he had promised it was on its way, we would
probably do that. And for other customers, we have advanced a
lot of money. Sometimes in aviation, a lot of people want
cash in advance before anything moves and if we can accommodat
them, we do.
Q Would it have been unusual to purchase the aircraft
yourselves and then resell it?
A That I would have objected to because then you get
into the chain of title and if there is a flaw in the airplan
you could get sued for breach of warranty. If you are selling
llimi.JLCCirTn
981
OmiSSlFlED
the airplane, you are liable to be responsible for the
condition of it.
I really wasn't asked on this deal. They might have
done it something like that, but I don't think they did. I
think it was passed directly to the user.
Q I am going to back track a minute because it is
sort of in a separate category. The flights from Lisbon to
Central America, beginning in January of 1985, in early 1985,
January and February, what was your knowledge about those at
the time?
A I don't recall those.
Q Were you told anything about them?
A I could have been, but I don't remember being told.
Q What have you since been told?
A That they were just chartered flights that we had
out of Lisbon to Central America.
Q Who chartered them?
A I never asked and I don't know.
Q Even now you don't know?
A Even now. we do a lot of ad hoc charters and I
assume that most of them are legal, and so I don't ask the
details on each charter flight that we make. I have confidence
in my organization that they will carry it out in a profes-
sional mcuiner.
Q Are you aware ^f_a^cpmEaili named Arrow Air"
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A Yes, I am.
Q How are you aware of that?
A They are a company in the airport out of Miami,
a well-known charter operator and scheduled operator.
Q Were you aware that they were the subcontractor
on the Lisbon flights in earlv 1985?
A I am now, yes, not only from your conversation,
but having earlier knowledge of that, somebody told me either
at the time I heard it in the halls of Southern Air or after
the fact that we had to subcontract it because we didn't have
the airplanes.
We didn't have a 707 in operation.
Q Why don't you go back again and tell me what you
know of the January and February 1985 —
A Was that the Arrow one?
Q Yes.
A Apparently we got a requirement for a Lisbon to
Central America flight. We didn't have airplanes to do it
ourselves, so we went out and subcontracted to somebody else
to do it.
Q Were you aware it was carrying explosives or arms?
A No, but it is no reason I should know that. It is
not illegal. We carry arms lots of times, explosives, Class A
and there are certain procedures you have to go through when
you carry those and I assume they complied with that.
UNfiiA&S!E?En
983
i/N^fiSStFlED
Q To where did the flights go in Central America?
A I don't know.
Q Everything you know about those, is that what you
were told by Mr. Langton?
A Yes.
Q Anyone else?
A No, I don't recall, but I attend meetings in the
company from time to time. We have operators meetings every
morning where we talk about flights that are going to take
place in the next three or four days and it is possible I was
in an operators meeting when they were talking about that we
had some charters from Lisbon to Central America, but that we
were subcontracting with Arrow.
I hear these type of things, but it is business as
usual really. It is not something that would alert me. I
would say we have a flight and had better look into it and see
about it and see that I am not going to be integrated on it in
the future.
Q These are daily meetings in the morning?
A Yes.
Q You attend them once a week?
A Yes, and I walk around halls.
Q Getting back to the contra supply and maintenance
of the aircraft, how were you paid for the service?
A It is_af t_er_tbg^^., ^p^
984
UNClRSSIflEO
Q What did you know about how payment was done prior
to October 1986?
A Other than the general principle of my company
that we get paid for services rendered and we don't let them
get too far behind.
Q So you just assumed then that since you hadn't
heard anything bad, you were getting paid?
A Yes.
Q Tell me what you have since learned.
A Subsequently, I have learned that apparently maybe
a quarter of a million dollars was put into our account and
they drew down against that for services rendered.
I am not even sure that happened in one case, but
apparently moneys were put in our account and we then billed
against that and charged the customer.
I think we are now $130,000 short in that account,
though, so we didn't do our bookkeeping as well as we should
have.
Q Have you billed for that $130,000?
A I don't think so. I don't know. I just found that
out last week. Maybe we don't know who to bill.
Q That was going to be my next question.
A Maybe they headed for the tall grass.
Q Of this $2 50,000, did you ask at ciny time where it
came from?
UNfiLASRlF^Fn
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m
A I told you I ]ust found out after the fact this was
the way we were being paid. Later I found out it was being
transferred from Swiss bank accounts, a couple of transfers.
This particular money. I am sure there were other transfers
for maybe the Arrow flights. I don't know where that money I
came from either. All of that had been made available, I think
through Mr. Mason. |
i
Q I am asking you what you are aware of. j
A I am telling you what I am aware of from talking
to Mr. Mason after the fact like you did.
Q Of the flights on behalf of NHAO, to your knowledge,
was there anything differently done regarding the billing
procedure for that or the payment procedure for that as opposei^
to what we have just been discussing the maintenance, the
services that you performed?
A I don't know. I suspect that those checks came
from the State Department, who was in charge of dispensing
that money.
Q - Does Southern Air have any foreign bank
accounts?
A No. Oh — do we operate in a foreign country —
no , we don ' t . We don ' t .
MR. BECKMAN: Are you still talking about ACE?
MR. NAUGHTON: There is some discussion as to
whether that is a Southern Air
at is a Southern Air account.
986
UKClftS^l^'ER
BY MB. NAUGHTON:
Q With the exception of that, do you have any foreign
bank accounts?
A No.
Q Do you have any in London?
A Yes, we have one in London we just opened because
we ]ust opened a sales office there.
Q Any others?
A No.
Q Any in Switzerland?
A No.
Q To your knowledge, was any of your other business
paid through either Credit S)(isse or any other Swiss account
other than the ones under investigation here?
A There might have been some of our business overseas
in past years. I don't know of any specifically, but I
certainly couldn't rule that out. We have done a lot of
charters in Algiers and Angola and around the world, and agentJ
generally get that business for us, European agents, and they
might use Swiss bank accounts.
Q This would not be unusual then?
A No. I would say this is a little different than
that.
Q Why?
A Well, because this is an American company versus a
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Swiss broker.
Q Okay .
So It would be unusual because you are dealing
with a domestic company that is using a foreign bank?
A Yes.
Q And that would be unusual?
A I would think so.
Q You mentioned that you had a conversation then with
Mr. Gadd regarding Iran and those flights.
A Yes.
Q Could you tell me how that came about?
A I think they wanted us to fly into Iran and carry
some cargo.
Q My question was, how did this conversation come
about?
A He called me up and we started talking about it.
I think it had come up earlier with Langton and so the reason
for the call was they felt they had to get my clearance for
this.
Q So Langton discussed this with you prior to Gadd
calling you?
A Yes.
Q What did Langton tell you before Gadd called you?
A I don't recall the specifics in the way you want to
ask it. Kind of general —
iiMr.L&SSIFSED
UNCtAS^F^ED
Q Tell me what your general sense was.
A Generally, they wanted to talk about flying into
Iran with our airplanes and he said Gadd wanted to call me and
talk to me about that. So they did.
Q When Langton first told you this, what was your
reaction to flying to Iran?
A I wanted to be helpful to any government activity
if that was what was involved, but it seemed a little way out.
I wanted to know how we would be protected.
Q When you say protected, what do you mean?
A I mean our percentage, our airplanes.
Q You mean physically protected?
A From loss, yes.
Q And you just said you had the impression this was
for the government or government-related?
A Well, I can't imagine anybody would fly into Iran
unless it was involved with the government. Iran is off
bounds. You can't fly there if you wanted to.
Q Did you ask either ^4r . Langton or Mr. Gadd if this
was government approved?
A I probably did. I don't recall specifically.
Q Well, this is kind of important. How did you get
this impression other than the fact that Iran is off limits?
What did they say about —
A I don't remember specifically what they said. I
ettCCHSSlF^ED
:ust don't. It IS understood it would be for the government.
They might have said it. I might have asked the question.
I might not have. I don't know.
Q Did you ask, "How are my people going to be
protected?"
A I don't remember. The fact is we didn't do it,
so it became moot. We didn't fly an airplane in there.
Q When Gadd called you on the phone then, do you re-'
call what he said?
A They wanted us to fly our airplane into Iran. That
is all I remember.
Q What for?
A To carry some cargo in and carry some cargo out.
I don't even remember if they mentioned what kind of cargo it
was. It just seemed so --
Q And fly some out?
A Yes. That is what I was told at the time. It was
some kind of exchange, that they had something we wanted and
we had something they wanted. It just seemed so unusual to me
that I really didn't focus on what was going out. I was more
focused on they are going into Iran, this is a place nobody
can go in any more. That was very unusual.
Q But you didn't ask why?
A They told me they had some stuff they were going to
take in and take out.
IHMHrAft&IF'ED
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Q They just said stuff?
A Probably. I don't have an inquiring mind like you
do.
Q You have been a pretty successful lawyer for many
years .
A I didn't really want to know. We weren't going to
do it. I don't ask the question until I decide I am going to
do the operation.
I assumed it was sensitive and people don't want
to tell you everything and I don't always ask everything.
Q When Gadd said they wanted to do that, did h«-tell
you who they were?
A I am not even sure he said they. Maybe he did tell
me who wanted to and I don't remember. I am not trying to be
evasive. I really don't remember.
Q No. I am trying to find out everything I can.
Did you get the impression that this activity was
separate from what Gadd had been doing regarding the Central
American flights?
A Totally.
Q What gave you that impression?
A I guess just the geography of it, for one
thing.
Q Did he say anything about the funding? In your last
discussion, you discussed private funding, you only had a few
UNCLASSIFIED
991
^GL'ASSIF-ED
dollars —
A Because we were going to operate that operation.
This one we were going to get paid. This was just another
charter to us, a little like the Lisbon charters. Those in
my little compartment of mine were different from running the
internal supply operation. That was running an airline down
there we didn't want to get involved. We run an airline around
the world. We charter airplanes and we carry cargo from Point
A to B and someone calls us up and says we got the charter.
We go from here to there. We got a free airplane.
We take it, and so this is something we do every day. Start-
ing an airline in Central America is a whole different ball
game .
So this Iran thing was just another charter and
I guess maybe they were, but in my mind they were separate.
Also I had already done business with Gadd in
different fields of endeavor that I don't think they were
connected. I think he had government contracts to do this and
then by virtue of his contact he apparently got another
government contract to do something else.
I did without getting into specifics again because
I don't remember the hard questions you want to ask, what did
he say — I got the general impression that probably the same
people were involved.
You are going to say, "How did I get that?" I don't
UMittiA&SLF^ED
992
UNCLftSSHiSED
know, but I had the feeling that the same people were involved
in the supply mission to the contras that were orchestrating
the Iran affair. But here again with all the press we have
had in the last three months, I am not sure if it is an after-
the-fact impression or a current one at that time.
Q You mentioned that you had had a lot of dealings
with Gadd by this time. Did you have any others with him m
any other related areas that we haven't discussed so far?
A No.
Q When he broached — first of all, how long did
this conversation last on the telephone with Gadd?
A Probably 15 minutes; 20 at the most.
Q Did anybody else participate in it?
A I think Langton came over to my house before I
received the call. Knowing I was going to receive it at such
and such a time, he drove over to the house.
Q Do you recall approximately when this conversation
took place?
A No.
Q Can you give me a month?
A I really can't.
Q Do you remember a season?
A I someway or another think it was in the winter,
but I really don't know.
Q Would that be of 1986?
iJMftirAifiSUiJED
993
UNCIASSIF2ED
A Probably.
Q Did Langton participate in the conversation or
was he just --
A Did he get on another telephone, I don't know.
I don't know. I don't think so. I am not even positive he
drove over, but I just kind of think he did. It was late at
night.
Q Was it a weekday?
A I don't know.
Q This was then a call that Gadd placed to you?
A Yes, I think so.
Q Did Gadd say where he was calling from?
A No.
Q Could you assume Washington or —
A Oh, yes — McLean or Vienna. That is where he
lived.
Q When he mentioned that he needed someone to fly
to Iran, did you discuss the same sort of logistical things
you had discussed about the contras? In other words, what
flag to fly under, clearances, registration?
A No.
Q After he explained to you what he wanted, what was
your response?
A My inquiry then was what kind of insurance would
we have for our airplane?
lJiiPiACCi!r'r::i
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994
UNetASSfP'ID
Q What did he say?
A Well, I knew we didn't have insurnace to fly into
Iran, so really my question is, could I go for a waiver or
could I go buy insurance in the open market to cover this one
flight? If I couldn't do that, then I would have to have a
hold harmless from a responsible party, and if it is a govern-
ment flight, it would have to be from the government, holding
us harmless for any losses, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
With those qualifications, I probably said that —
Q What did Gadd say to your insurance question?
LDD ends
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A I think he said he understood our needs and would
take it up with his principals.
Q Is that how he referred to them?
A No, I don't think so. Maybe "clients" or
customer. Probably more likely customer. But don't hold me
to that because I don't know what he said. I am trying to
give you the general context of it.
Q I am not asking you to quote anything. I am ]ust
asking the questions.
Did he give you assurances that these things would
be taken care of like he did with the contrast?
A No, he said he would have to talk to somebody
about it to see if they could be done. He said without
them, we couldn't possibly fly; couldn't even consider it.
Q After he said he would take that up with his
customers or principals, then what did you say?
A Then I think we kind of hung up, and then I think
a couple days later they couldn't meet those requirements,
so we didn't do it.
Q What is the next thing you learned about any
flights to either Tel Aviv or Iran?
A It seems like I kind of went out of the pattern
after that, and then I learned and I am not sure if it was
after the fact — it must have been before the fact — that
Langton had arranged to go ahead and do some flights to
isMAijiccirTn
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Israel which we didn't have a safety problem with, and we
didn't have an insurance problem with, and we didn't have
any legality problems with, and then I think--I am sure I wasi
informed before the fact that if we could find voluntary
pilots that we would pilot other people's airplanes into
Tehran that in fact is what ultimately happened.
Q Now, you learned this before the fact.
A I don't really have a nice clean specific time in
ray mind when this revelation was made known to me, but I
kind of think that Langton would not have done that
without prior approval. So I suspect he did come to me befoi
the fact; not necessarily on the flights to Israel, but
our pilots going into, as volunteers, which they were-- into
Tehran.
Q All right. When did--do you remember how Langton
told you this? In other words, was this something like he
came over to your house in the dead of night?
A No.
Q Or was it an ordinary —
A We have offices right next door to each other, and
he kind of walks in and casually mentions something from
time to time. It wasn't a high profile discussion that I can
recall.
Q Did he tellr- yea -tkat- Sadd still wanted to do this,
or the Iran mission was still on, or how did he bring this
997
UNCCAS^IfSED
A I don't know, to tell you the truth. It was my
that after we backed out of it, that they
did run some flights into Iran with somebody else's
airplanes, and so we were totally unconnected with it; but
it didn't go as well as they had wanted, and they wanted
to get Southern back involved in it if they could, even
to the extent of just using our pilots.
Q Langton told you that?
A Yes.
Q When Gadd first told you about this, did he
specify the kind of aircraft he needed?
A No, but they needed a large jet because of the
speed and the range. They were going to have to go down
the Red Sea and around, and they couldn't go cutting
across Saudi Arabia or however. I don't know the geography
that well. I would have to get the map out. But they
showed me, and they needed a DC-8 or 707 type aircraft.
Q When Langton told you about this, was it like he
had already made the plans and was just checking with you,
or was he seeking your approval and then was going to do it?
A I think, it was the former. He had already made
the arrangement.
Q Did he already have volunteer pilots?
A Probably.
Q To your knowledge did they file waivers to hold
HNni AQCi!:r[:n
998
UNOli^lllED
the company harmless if anything happened to them?
A No, they did not. If they did, I don't know
about it.
Q All right.
A They probably should have, to be more careful.
Q Now, after Langton told you that, this was his
plan to go ahead with this. What was your response?
A Okay.
Q All right. Is that because you felt this was a
government-sponsored mission?
A Certainly.
Q When you say certainly, tell me what went into your
thought process.
A Well, I just wouldn't let anybody go into Iran unlei
it was government-to-government under those circumstances.
It was illegal, I thought, to go into Iran probably,
except our airplane wasn't, so we were not going in from
that standpoint, but it was very diqy business, I would
assume, unless it all had been laid on by a government.
I can't imagine private individuals doing that.
Q What did you think at this time — who did you
think Gadd really worked for? Did you think it was CIA?
Did you —
A White House.
Q White House?
iuiiriis5iif{Fn
UNGiASSIflED
A Yes.
Q Why that, as opposed to CIA?
A Because I think by that tirae North's name was
being bandied about in the office.
Q By whom? By Langton?
A Yes, and who he had gotten it probably from Gadd
or somebody.
Q What did they say about North?
A I don't know. He was in the White House.
Q Well, gentlemen, what did they say in relation
to that? Why did he come up? Why did his name come up?
A I don't know. I wasn't in the day-to-day
conversations. I just heard the name.
Q But when you heard it, what was the context in
which they were speaking?
A They basically spoke that the White House was
involved, and I think they might — at some point I knew
the National Security Council was — name was bandied about.
So those came to my mind. Some place in this long process
of conversation.
Q So would that have been a connection with the
Contras, as well as the Iran?
A Probably in my mind it would have been.
Q Have you ever met Oliver North?
No.
UKCLASSIFSED
1000
UNGHASSIF^D
Q Have you ever spoken to Oliver North?
A No.
Q To your knowledge, had Mr. Langton ever met or
spoken with Mr. North?
A No. To ray knowledge he hasn't, but he could
have. I don't know.
Q While they were running the first Iranian
mission, that is the pilots going over, did you keep a
day-to-day contact with it, or were you informed after it
was over that it went successfully or what happened?
A I was ijiformed after it was over that it was
successful. I think it went down pretty fast, and they came
back on the first of the month, as I recollect.
Q Did you ever talk to the pilot.
A Yes.
Q Who was the pilot?
A The one, the only one I have talked to is ^our
vice-president of flight ipaw^iiyr Paul Gilchrist.
Q Mr. Gilchrist.
A Who told me about his trips when he ««^B> back.
Q What did Mr. Gilchrist tell you?
A I don't know. I mean I don't recall. I would
really think you ought to ask Mr. Gilchrist what he told us.
Q What do you recall him telling you?
A
A lot of anecdotes really mainly.
1001
UNbtMFlEO
Q Tell me one.
A I really don't remember. I would rather not try
to paraphrase what he said. I just don't remember that
clearly.
Q What was the impression you came away with after
speaking to Mr. Gilchrist? In the back of your mind did you
say, "Oh, oh, we got trouble," or, "This went well," or
what?
A I think on one of the flights he said it went
very routinely, but-- he went in with McFarlane and Secord,
and I think North went along, too, I am not sure who was
there. I do know McFarlane was. That was a pretty
hairy operation.
Listening to Paul Gilchrist, it was very scary.
The impression you got was that you are in a country that
nobody is in charge; that on one side of the field it is
very nice, and you are in the charge of the mill, but
when you move to the other side of the field and you are
in the hands of the revolutionaries, that you don't know
what is going on, and that they don't live up to their
word.
They promised certain things when they came in,
ancKnne of them came to pass, and you had a real bad feeling
that they might just make a hostage out of you even though
they invited you in.
1002
bap-
UNGiASSU^ED
Q Did Mr. Gilchrist give you the sense that he wanted
to go back or expected to go back?
A Yes. And he did.
Q Did he want to go back?
A I don't know if he wanted to. He certainly, I
guess eo joyed the adventure of it. You have to know Mr.
Gilchrist. He is quite a guy. He went back twice more
without McFarlane; just our crews.
Q After you spoke to him after the first time he
went he had the impression that he would go again?
A Yes. That is the feeling — I didn't ask him,
"Will you go again?" I didn't even know if they had
a need for anymore missions, frankly. He didn't feel that
one went well from the overall observations of McFarlane
and the Iranians.
Q Did Gilchrist mention that he had returned any
of the stuff he came with?
A No, I don't think they brought anything out.
They did on the mission that McFarlane was on; that
things did not go the way they were supposed to, and they
had — we had an airplane in the air that we turned around
and went back to Israel that was on its way with more cargo.
Q Was that later delivered to Tehran?
A I don't know. I suspect it was in some of those
later flights. I don't know how many later flights there
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were, one or two.
Q When you had the impression from Mr. Gilchrist that
there would be more flights, did you tell him--
A I didn't get that impression from Mr. Gilchrist.
He would go if there were more. That is the
impression that--that he wasn't so frightened of his
experience and that he was a good enough citizen, and he
thought this was a mission that the country wanted;
that he would go ahead and do it.
Q And did you encourage or discourage that?
A Neither. I just listened and voiced amazement
and interest.
Q At the time he went, he was on your payroll and
you were paying him, correct?
A I think they put him on vacation when they went
on these trips, but we were paying them, yes, we paid
them.
Q Why did they put them on vacation?
A I think for security reasons. We were trying to
not let the rest of the company know that they were away
and have some excuse for them being away.
Q Whose idea was that?
A I don't have any idea. Probably was Langton,
Secord or something like that. But it was, you know, they
considered it a sensitive activity, and they really didn't
a sensitive activity, and
unclassif!!£d
1004
UHCi^ft^W^Ap
want anybody talking about it.
Q How involved was Secord in the planning of
this?
A I don't know because I wasn't involved in the
planning of it, but someplace, someplace Gadd drops out
and Secord comes into the pattern.
Q Before the flight, the first flight takes off?
— A Probably. I think Secord — I am not sure if
Gadd wasn't just the first introduction to the Iran, and
then he kind of was not involved in Iran at all, and someplace
else along the line he drops out of the Contra, and I
suspect that happened when the hundred million was
appropriated or something, I don't know.
I don't know the sequence of it, but someplace
Langton seemed to be dealing more with Secord and Dutton
than Gadd. I don't know when that took place.
Q That is from around June 1986, perhaps.
A Perhaps.
Q To your knowledge, how many flights were there
by SAT pilots to Iran?
A I don't know. I think three.
Q And on any of these flights did — I am talking
about the return trip from Iran to Tel Aviv — did any of
them continue on to Central America of which you are aware?
A I am not aware of that, no. They might have come
llMPl ii<;ci!:'rn
1005
UNi^A^SIHtD
back via Central America.
Q Why?
A I wouldn't consider that a continue-on. They
were moving cargo, but on the way back from the far left,
we might have done a back"haul from Lisbon to Central
America.
Q On one of the previously existing contracts?
A We tried to get back hauls also when we were
flying, you know, the object of our business is not to
fly empty airplanes, so if there was a back-haul and one
of them could have been the Lisbon-to Central America,
and if the same people were involved in it that would be
certainly an objective I would think.
Q By the way, when you spoke to Mr. Gilchrist about
the McFarlane mission, did he describe to you the bible
incident?
A No, he didn't.
Q And the cake?
A He did describe that they took some pistols.
Q Who had the pistols?
A They took them as gifts, some, maybe dueling
pistols or target pistols, or maybe magnum 500 's, I don't
know, but they had some pistols that they took, McFarlane
took as a gift, and the reason I know that is because I was
one of the — that was one of the anecdotes, the pistol boxes
UNCLASS1P2&
1006
4.
eNeHNSSIF^ED
were lAtt on the airplane, and the pistols had been
delivered so the people guarding the airplane was
wondering where the pistols were that went with the
boxes, because they thought the crew had them, and of course '
they had to then try to convince them that, no, they
didn't have any weapons and everything was safe.
Q But he didn't mention the cake or the bible?
A No, I never heard that part of it.
Q All right. 9
How was SAT paid for these? '
A I don't know. I think they were paid out of
a Swiss bank account. I think there was a mixing of the
monies there.
Q Explain that to me.
A Well, when I first looked into the money, it
was way after the fact, and I saw — they said, well, there
was some, two transfers to our bank account, and I in
some way think they totaled about a quarter million dollars,
and then I asked, well, where did that money go? What ||
services did we provide for that money, and they said,
well, we provided this, and this, and this is Mason telling
me, we provided this service for maintenance, et cetera,
on the contra thing.
Then we provided this Iran flight, and I said,
"I thought those were separate. You are taking it from the
1007
IWCtASSJF'EO
113
same pool of money. How do you do that?" And, this was
my recollection. That might have been straightened out,
and I might have been misinformed at the time, so I think,
you need to get that from Mason, and he has now, I think,
put together a compendium of the money we took in and
where it came from and where it went to and the whole
thing. But this was my first knowledge that maybe there
was, maybe this money was being used for dual purposes.
That would have been maybe not two months ago
or something — shortly after you came in.
Q This was after it became public.
A Long after that.
MR. BECKMAN: Can we stretch our
J^^y
MS. NAUGHTON: Certainly. Let's take a 10-minute
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
imaussiF^ED
1008
take 7
103a
STEIN :mhl
UMet^SWlED
113
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Before the break, you had mentioned that after the
story broke regarding the Iranian trips and you sat down with
Mr. Mason and Mr. Langton to discuss the monies received, you
mentioned two transfers from the Swiss account in the amount
of approximately a quarter of a million dollars to your bank,
and that it seemed to you that the money had gotten mixed
between the contra^ activities and the Iranian activities.
Could you explain to me again what you told them regardil
the mixing of those funds?
A Well, the way it came up was there was a subpoena
outstanding relative — issued by the Customs people and
Customs came over and -- or were going to come over, I guess
it was, and I said I wanted to see what we were
produce for them. "fiagi^^m^mm^ — and I guess Mason — they|
just had a few pieces of paper, one of which was these two
telexes.
I could be wrong on whether it was a quarter of a millio
dollars, but it was two transfers to our account.
I said, what the Customs people are going to want to
know is what did you do with this money, what did you use it
for, so I would like to see the invoices that we charged out
using this money for our customer and that we didn't supply
any of it.
Then they began to explain to me where the money went
iinp.liiss«f.:ed
4'
; 7\oing tc
1009
1141
I
without having the invoices there, and they said, we charged
this to the contra thing and to the Iranian trips, or maybe
^ it was the trips from Kelly Air Force Base to Israel, charter
flights there. But in my mind, those were M different
* movements and of course Customs at that time were looking only
at the contra affair.
As a matter of fact, this was before the Iranian affair
became in the news, before the disclosure on that, before the
last mission there.
I said, you are mixing those things up. Is it all
coming from the same source or something like that. And I
asked Langton to check on that with whomever he was dealing
with, and so I think he tried to get ahold of Secord.
I don't know if Secord was in the Middle East then or
what the problem was, but they couldn't get hold of him right
away, so we put the Customs people off for a day or so to
pick up on this data. And my concern was, not that I didn't
want to go ahead and disclose under subpoena what we were
supposed to disclose, but that this was supposed to be a
very sensitive area -- the Iranian affair -- and that was not
in the news at this particular time.
And I think because of that conversation, I think that
was the time maybe that the FBI investigation was delayed
until they completed the Iranian rescue missions, or whatever
you want to call them.
UfilCLASSIF'ER
1010
ili.»fra
n Had the FBI already been to Southern Air at this
point?
A. Very^early on it had been announced that the FBI
was going to investigate Southern Air, almost imitiediately
upon the loss of that airplane in Central America, but nothing
came of "it. They didn't seem to follow up on it and I don't
think there had been any pressure brought to bear on them.
O YBu just thought the FBI was going to come in and
you wanted to get this straightened out?
A I didn't know whether anybody was going to come in.
Customs was asking for the documents. My feeling was that
these documents would raise more questions than they answered
and Secord or whoever was in charge ought to know this,
because we were ready to turn them over.
Q What was Langton ' s response to that?
A I think he called Secord.
Q What happened?
A I think he said they will take care of it and we
wouldn't have to have any more problems with that subpoena —
Tjhe Customs.
Q So, were your instructions to not turn it over, and
the Customs investigations would cease, or --
A Not to turn it over, yes. But I don't know if the
investigation would cease. I just don't know. I didn't
|]|ii£i^<S£iC9rn
1011
iMMS^iED
116
follow up on that. All I know is I just pointed out the
problem and said if Secord and their group don't get the firms
to do something I am going to turn this over to them and I
didn't know what was going to happen.
Q Langton came back and said he had talked to Secord
and you weren't going to turn over the documents?
A Yes.
Q Did Customs come back to you —
A They have ultimately and we have given them the
documents.
Q What was that, do you recall?
A I don't recall. I recall this one thing because it
was about a week before the last mission into Iran before it
became ^m^mUBBSf public.
Q So this is a week before the last mission was flown?
A Maybe two. I don't really know.
MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me. I don't think we have
given the thousands of documents to Customs that we have given
to you. They asked precise questions relating to export,
that is their frame of reference and we gave them documents
relating to that.
MS. NAUGHTON: Can you perhapse help us with the
time frame on the original Customs subpoena?
MR. BECKMAN: I don't know that there was a
subpoena. I didn't get into the act until the end of November.
lIKfibtfifi/iFi'Rn
1012
SNttHS^lF^ED
Was there a subpoena.
THE WITNESS: Yes, there was
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
^ Q Do you have a copy of that subpoena
A I don't know. No. I cun sure someplace there is
6
one.
MS. NAUGHTON: Could we possible get that?
MR. BECKMAN : I have a copy of a Customs subpoena,
but it was a moveable feast, they kept changing.
MS. NAUGHTON: You mean the production date —
MR. BECKMAN: The reauest itself, because they
didn't ask it expertly, to put it kindly.
MS. NAUGHTON: Was this a grand jury subpoena?
MR. BECKMAN: At first it was an administrative
subpoena. Then it was a grand jury subpoena. We were told
to ignore the administrative subpoena. We should consider
the grand jury subpoena as encompassing the administrative
subpoena. Then the grand jury subpoena we were told to ignore,
In fact, sort of the day before we were to appear at the
grand jury, we were told not to come and we were told to go
back and comply with the administrative subpoena.
MS. NAUGHTON: Who told you not to appear for the
grand jury subpoena?
MR. BECKMAN: The Assistant U.S. Attorney who was
handling it.
UNCLASSIFTH
1013
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
"E9
MS. NAUGHTON: That was out of Miami?
MR. BECKMAN: Yes.
MS. NAUGHTON: The main Miami office?
MR. BECKMAN: The Assistant U.S. Attorney for Miami.
MS. NAUGHTON: Do you remember who that was?
MR. BECKMAN: The name Scrubbs is in my mind. He
signed the grand jury subpoena.
MS. NAUGHTON: Do you recall when it was that you
were told not to appear?
MR. BECKMAN: Let me look at my calendar. I think
we were to appear on the morning of the 9th of December,
because I have a note on my calendar that I went to Miarti the
night of the 8th. So therefore, to the best of my recollection
the appearance was to be on the morning of the 9th and it was
called off very close to the time.
I think this is the day you weren't feeling very
well. You were told to come down anyhow to talk to you.
MS. NAUGHTON: I am just trying to get a handle on
when the original subpoena was served.
MR. BECKMAN: It would have been early October, I
think. On the basis of what Jim says there was a subpoena
served —
MS. NAUGHTON: Would this be before the Hasenfus
crash?
MR. BECKMAN: No, afterwards, or maybe early in
_JLI)ICLASS!F'Fn
1014
UHDLASSIflED
November would probably be closer.
2 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
^ Q When you discussed this problem^Al the double --
^ sort of double account for lack of anything better to call it,
' what was Mr. Mason's reaction to that? In other words, did
he say he — what I am getting at 1? how did he explain how
he knew to bill part to the contras .and part to Iran?
A I didn't ask that auestion, or I don't recall.
Q Did Mr. Mason indicate he had received any
instructions on how to divide up that bulk sum?
A I don't recall. He didn't tell me I am almost
certain.
Q Did you ask Mr. Mason or Mr. Langton if the
accounting was accurate?
A No. I assumed they were doing what was correct.
You know, I assumed they were doing it with more coor|dination
with the customer and that we weren't just debiting accounts
that are willy-nilly, but you would have to ask them, I am
afraid .
Q How is it that you learned that Secord was the
originator of those funds?
A I might have mispoke. I think Langton called
Secord as a result of our conversation on these particular
invoices,, and whether to turn them over to the Customs people.
Q Who did Langton say he was calling^
1015
4JNfltASSIF:ED
120
A Secord I believe, but I am not certain. It might
2 have been Bill Dutton, but it may have been Gadd.
2 Q What was your understanding about Gadd sort of
^ shifting out of this and Dutton sort of coming into it in the
summer of '86?
A I guess I figured that that was about the time that
funding was coming about from the U.S. Government and now it
would move more into an official channel than in a private
g channel. But now you tell me Secord isn't part of the
Q government, so I am not quite sure.
^^ Q In other words, you thought Gadd represented
12 private interests or official interests?
13 A Private. Both of them did. I knew both of them
4 did. Maybe it is just a contractual problem up in Washington,
5 the power struggle between the two, who gets to run this
6 affair.
7 Q Did either Langton or Mason tell you that Secord,
18 that the funds from the Swiss account had come from the same
9 account?
20 A All I saw were the two telexes, one transferring
21 so much money, another transferring so much money, and this
22 was the full source of all the money to pay for all these
23 operations. I knew they were different operations, I said
24 it looks like the money is coming from the same bank at least.
25 If you go down this road the Iranian thing is still very
1016
UNClftSSIf'ED
sensitive. It is not in the public domain. Do they want us
to turn these over to Customs. If they don't, they better
know we are going to do it tomorrow. That was the end of
my conversation in a sense. You better tell whoever you are
dealing with that either help us out here or we are going to
go ahead and comply with whatever subpoenas we have outstand-
ing .
Q And Langton came back after speaking to who you
assume was Secord, and told you to hold off on that, they
would take care of that?
A Right.
Q Have you since given them to Customs?
A Yes.
Q Did you ever see and handwritten notation by Mason
or by Langton —
MR. BECKMAN: I am not sure we have because of the
way Customs subpoenas were drawn. They seemed to be
interested in the C-123s and our documentation of the C-123s
was almost nil.
MS. NAUGHTON: On the purchase of them?
MR. BECKMAN: We didn't purchase or export them.
They were interested in export.
THE WITNESS: They might have redefined their
subpoena and cut it back, because it was very general. Then
also the Special Prosecutor's investigation has made some of
1017
lINCl*SStf"ED
those previous investigations stand aside for a while not to
interfere with his investigation.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q That is obviously after the fact?
A We are complying with whatever outstanding subpoenas
there are.
A Okay. Were you ever aware of any account numbers
from the Swiss banks?
A No.
Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Mason had any
account numbers?
A No.
Q Do you know of any other invoices or billings or
contracts that were paid from the Secord group from those
Swiss accounts other than those that we have discussed today
for any other services?
A Other than what Mr. Mason has given you, no.
Q During the break, I have shown you the materials
which had been marked as exhibits in Mr. Mason's deposition,
which is the underlying accounting materials; that is the
advices, the wire transfers and some of the ledger sheets.
You have indicated — I am showing you a copy now for the
record.
You had indicated that you had not seen those
documents before, is that correct?
iiNni asi^LTTi
1018
A That is correct.
Q I am now showing you the recap which was prepared
by Mr. Mason for your attorneys and provided to our committee
and ask if you have seen that document before?
A This is a recap of the Ace account and I saw it two
days ago for the first time.
Q Now, I am going to have the reporter make this,
please, as Exhibit Number 1.
(The following document was marked as Exhibit No. 1
for identification.)
miti fl5si5:Fn
1019
um^SiF»fB
MS. NAUGHTON: Exhibit 1 for the record is in nine
pages. It has no heading but is marked confidential SAT,
"* indicating a Southern Air document. I can't tell what the
* first three digits are. They look like zeros. The last three
are 720.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I ask you, have you ever seen that memoranduri
before?
A I have never seen this. I don't believe it to be
a Southern document.
Q Why do you say that?
A I don't know, it just doesn't look like something
we would write.
MR. BECKMAN: He means not generated by Southern.
The fact that it has that number means we produced it.
MS. NAUGHTON: I understand.
THE WITNESS: No, I have not seen this one before.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When you say that looks like something you wouldn't
have produced, why do you say that?
A Well, I don't know any of the names in here, any
of the terminology, like the farm, Cincinnati, the plantation.
These are all key percentage, project managers — I have just
never heard of any of these terms. It doesn't look like our
type writer, et cetera.
UNCLASSIfiED
1020
?ED
O Does Southern Air pay for any of your personal
expenses?
A No.
^ Q What about — you have a maid and a cook?
5 A Right.
* Q Does Southern Air pay them?
A Yes, they do. I am reibursed.
Q Can you tell me why that is?
A So that the maid and cook can have the benefit of
Southern Air's health plan and so I don't have to do the
payroll, you know, and the FICA taxes and all, and the company
bills me for all of these costs on a monthly basis and 1 pay
them.
Right now we do not have a cook. We have a yard man.
Q Is there anyone else in that category that Southern
pays that is not a working employee of the corporation?
A No.
Q Have you, or to your knowledge, anyone in your
company ever given over $10,000 in cash to any employee to
take out of the country?
A I haven't, and to my knowledge the company hasn't.
To take out for good, right. I know we used to give pilots
more than that because they had to carry it with them to buy
fuel and things on the road back in the old days, but I am
not sure that we don't have credit every place now.
IIN£l/ftfifiii:?rn
1021
uiiliS^l^lED
126
Q What are their instructions regarding the reporting
2 of that currency?
A I don't know. They have to account to us for it.
Are you talking about to the U.S. Government?
Q Yes.
A I don't know.
MR. BECKMAN: I think what she is asking is do you
expect them to smuggle that through Customs?
THE WITNESS: I don't give any instructions.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
A Okay.
You say the FBI requested you. Do you recall when
that was?
A A month ago.
Q Do you know how long that interview lasted?
A A half hour.
Q Is there anything that you told them on that occasion
that you have not told us so far in this deposition?
A Yes. Their inquiries were primarily related to
ownership. It was almost exclusivfily to ownership and they
got into stock ownership a little deeper than you did, getting
into stockholder records and things like that.
Q And did you provide them with records that you have
not provided to this committee?
MR. BECKMAN: Yes.
l>N(U>asfiu:'i:n
1022
UNGiftSSlF'ED
THE WITNESS: Yes.
2 MR. BECKMAN: We weren't asked. We showed the FBI
agents the stock transfer books, doctor's certificates, which
were not asked for in this subpoena.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Did they request docuinents regarding the acquisition
of your capital to purchase the corporation?
A No.
Q Has anyoneasked for those records?
A No.
Q Did they show you any documents?
A No.
O Was that your original meeting with the FBI? Have
they since contacted you?
A That is my only meeting. And they were then working
Q To your knowledge, how much profit, if any, did
Southern Air make from the Iranian trips?
A I have no idea. I suspect at this stage nothing
after paying legal fees.
Q I don't consider that an expensive —
A I don't know.
Q Excluding legal fees, do you have any idea —
A No. It was a normal operation.
Q I am discussing now both the contra resupply effort.
1023
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
r
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
UNCLflSSIft^ED
the Lisbon runs and the Iranian, everything we discussed to
date, which is that you got paid the usual rate, a lesser
rate, or a higher rate?
A I suspect there was a small premimuin on them. I
did not make the rates, Langton did. I don't know what we
charged. I would imagine that he put a slight premium on
that — maybe ten percent -- for the difficulty of the opera-
tion, the waste, the time — there was a lot of time wasted
in these things.
Q Did it ever enter into your discussions in your
company, or into your own thought that cooperating with the
Secord group or with Mr. Gadd would in any way result in
favorable treatment regarding government contracts that you
were seeking?
A Not at all. The way we get our government contracts
is what I tried to explain earlier to you, it is very open,
an. award criteria is very clear, every place the game is
the same way and nobody is favored. If anything, it could
hurt us, I guess, with all this notoriety.
Q Would you say that it is fair to state that since
'83 or certainly since '79, your company has expaijed a great
deal?
A That is correct.
Q And much of this is the result of government
contracts:
nNci.iuuiifi^E;n
1024
UNWSIMD
A Acquired in the normal course of business through
the award criteria that everybody else plays by. Having
^ nothing to do with Iran and in spite of, I would say.
Q At this point I guess I am really asking, did you
have any sense, in dealing with the Secord group, especially
once you knew it involved McFarlane, and at that point you
knew the National Security Council was involved --
A He was outside then. No, we didn't think of it in
terms that we were going to get business from it. We thought
we were daWng a service and it was something we could do.
Q Were you or anyone in your company ever asked to
make any political donations to any political party or ■
political action committee?
A No.
Q Do you know of any monies diverted for such purposes
from any of those transactions we have discussed?
A No.
Q Could you explain to me when ^ou met Mr. Dutton?
and that was I guess
maybe a couple of days before the last flight into Iran.
Q Could you tell me how that came about?
A I guess it came about because I was complaining
bitterly to Langton and the rest of management about the
terrible press that Southern Air was getting because of its
assistance in the contra affair, and also the high cost of all
len yoi
1025
UNClftSSIF'^Ed
the subpoenas that were being laid on us and the terrible
unfairness of it all, and that someLay I wanted somebody to
take the pressure off. It seemed we were standing alone.
So, as a result of that conversation, Langton had
General Secord and Dutton come to Miami and met with me for
about ah hour and then went back to Washington, I guess, to
kind of calm my feathers.
Q Would that have been in December?
A That would have been about two or three days before
the last mission, because the reason they came there was for
fear that I was going to pull my support out for the last
flight into Iran, which they thought was going to result in
some very favorable action by Iran, and they just came down
to say everything is going to be all right, we are doing what
we can to get the pressure off of you, but will you go forward
and not pull out on us now.
Q When you say unfavorable publicity, you are talking
about the contra end of it?
A Yes. '^HP had not been made public yet.
Q Was Mr. Langton part of this meeting?
A Yes.
Q Where did it take place?
A In the Viscount Hotel.
Q Is that where they were staying?
A They flew down and jrf^ J^d-«Maeeting there.
mmn::^^
82-690 0-88-34
1026
UKQLAS&IESED
Q But they wern't staying:
end msl A No, they just came for the day.
3
4
5
6
7
8
""MS^"
■IDENTIAL
1027
UNCLqASSIF!€D
Q Why did you meet there?
A Because they didn't want to meet in our offices
Q What was your sense between Mr. Secord and
Dutton^
or what was your sense about that
was Se|cord Dutton's superior, or were they co-equal,
Se^cord was -- Dutton was Secord 's subordinate.
Did he tell you that?
No.
How do you know that?
I really didn't get it from that meeting, par-
ticularly. I guess I 3ust kind of heard it in talking to
Langton, that that is the way it was.
Q Tell me how the meeting began.
A I don't know. To tell you the truth, I think
Secord just kind of briefed me on how things were going
along and that they would try to get the pressure off of
us some way, and they -- it wasn't much of a meeting, frankly.
It was kind of in response to my blowing off in the office,
and by that time, I had cooled down, so it was not very
substantive.
Q What did you tell them? You
what did you tell them?
A I told them we would go ahead and support the last
mission. I wasn't about to pull out.
Q Did you tell him you wer^ upset about having to take
had coj^
led down, but
a you tell mm you were up
1028
UN^^isStv;^')
Yes.
What did Mr. Secord say?
I don't remember.
What did Mr. Dutton say?
I don't remember.
I am not asking you for a verbal quote.
I know. I am just telling you it was a nonsubstan-
the heat:
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
as I left with Langton, I said, "You know, I don't even know
what they told me." Well, it is one of those kinds of
meetings. They didn't promise anything, they just kind'of —
I let them mumble their way through and didn't hold them to
any hard promises because I knew they couldn't deliver.
My problem was the press, and they can't make the press
stop. I can't make them stop.
Q Did you ask for more money?
A No.
Q Why not?
A Never talked money. Why should I? I assumed we
were paid.
I didn't call them down to squeeze money out of them
You misinterpret our whole —
Q No, no. I am trying to refresh your recollection on
what they said and what you said.
u«i(»jssie:£d
1029
UNCll^^iP
134
Did Secord give you any -- first of all, did you
know Mr. Secord was a retired General?
A I knew he was called General Secord.
Q Is that how you addressed him?
A I don't know how I addressed him, frankly. I
probably called him by his first name, and I don't even
remember what that is now.
Q Did he tell you that this was going to be the last
mission? The one that was upcoming.?
A I got that impression. I don't think he used those
words. But I got the distinct impression, and I don't think
anything was directly said, but that they expected some
ma]or breakthroughs with this one, probably hostage releases
or something, and in fact that did occur.
Q Did you remember specifically discussing hostages,
did anyone mention that?
A I don't remember, no, I don't remember that being
mentioned. It probably was, though, but I just don't remember
the substance. Like I say, it was a conversation with little
substance for coming all the way down here.
Q What did they tell you about the press, if any-
thing?
A I think they expected some good press once they got
the Iran people released. I think they did say something like
that, that after- the Iran trip we are going to get some good
UNCeSSIFtiED
1030
UNOMSSff^D
135
press, and you will have some good press, and my reaction to
that is I didn't want any press, good or bad. I ;)ust wanted
to be disconnected with it because in our business, you know,
good or bad is not what our bankers are looking for, it is
business as usual, not helping our government.
Q Did they indicate to you if you fulfilled the
last mission that you would receive any sort of reward,
whether it be financial or whether it be other contracts or
whether it be a medal of freedom?
A No.
Q Okay.
A We were not looking for anything. We didn't look
at these people as anybody who could give us anything.
Q I am not so concerned with what you were looking
for as what they represented to you.
A They didn't represent that at all. Nobody in our
company, I think, will ever — you can ask them all that
question -- but we were not looking for business in this, nor-
were they promising anything. This was a contract that stood
on its own. We made some money from it. It was -- except
for the uniqueness of providing pilots to go into Iran, most
of it was business as usual.
Arrow flew two or three flights to Israel carrying
the same thing, and I don't know if they are going through
this same interrogation or not. But they did the same thing
UNfiif^S!S»SL'Fn
1031
Ul^l'KSS»F!ED
136
we did. Mark Air flew a number of flights, at least one or
two, down to Central America. I don't know if they are going
through the same interrogation or not. I guess it's all for
one time. Thirteen years ago, we were owned by the CIA.
MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me, Jim, in saying that you
made some "loney, do you know whether you were paid for the
last flight in October?
THE WITNESS: I don't know, no. I ]ust assume, I
have great faith in my management. I assumed they would
price our product as though if all goes well, we would make
a decent profit from our activities.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q So IS it your testimony that even though they didn't
represent that there would be any benefit to your continuing
to fulfill the last mission and given your discouragement
regarding the press that you had nevertheless went ahead
and did the last mission?
A That is correct.
Q Why?
A I felt, number one, that it was a kind of a com-
mitment that we had already made, we had done several more,
they were ready to make the last one, and I felt that it was
helping our country. Obviously, it was something being done
for the government.
Q Did you discuss at all the Swiss bank account and
Uf(0L^AS®!R'ED
1032
UN€iA5SJF:ED
13-
the double accounting with the invoices?
A No.
Q Do you remember why not?
A Why should I?
Q Do you want to elaborate on that?
A I just don't know -- to me, it was of no interest
other than the fact that it slows their operation. You know,
that obviously the reason I brought it up m the first place
is that I thought this was an extensive mission, and they
were using the same funds, or at least money transferred
from the same funds, to pay both parties, but I didn't see
that as illegal. Why should I question it?
Q Did you get at this time or any time the sense
that the cargo to Iran were arms or missiles or anything of
that nature as opposed to humanitarian relief or oil drilling
equipment?
A I think they knew they were missiles.
Q Do you recall when you knew that?
A Probably when Paul Gilchrist came back from his
first trip.
Q You recall him telling you that?
A Probably, yes.
Q And you expected when you met with Secord and
Dutton that the next shipment would also be military weapons
of some sort:-
UNGtASS^F'ED
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ON^^tiASS'Y'r:^
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A Yes.
Q Okay.
A It didn't matter to me one way or the other.
Q I understand.
A It IS not -- It wasn't a great inquiry.
Q Did either of them mention any other ob]ectives
that they had in these transactions other than the release of
hostages?
A Some place along the line, not in that meeting, but
I got to maybe talking to Paul Gilchrist in one of his
debriefings that they were opening negotiations with what
they thought was a moderate group in Iran and that possibly
a coup could result from this. I think that was certainly
their hope.
Q Did Secord or Dutton say anything of that nature
to you?
A No. I would have remembered it.
Q Did they indicate to you on whose authority they
were operating? Did they mention the White House, did they
mention the NSC, did they mention anyone at the White House?
A Not to me, no.
Q Did anyone take notes of this meeting?
A No.
Q Did anyone, to your knowledge, record a memorandum
of this meeting?
UNOlASfM^::n
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A No.
Q Does the meeting appear on your calendar or appoint-
ment book?
A No.
Q Do you have a calendar or appointment book?
A I have a calendar, but not — well, I guess it is
an appointment book, but it is not well maintained.
Q Do you personally maintain it, or does your
secretary?
A I personally maintain it.
Q Was that turned over to the committee, or was it
requested?
A It wasn't turned over to anybody that I know.
Q After you and Mr. Langton left this meeting, did
you discuss what had transpired?
A Not particularly. I am sure we did, but I don't
recall our conversation other than the one I mentioned, you
know, when I was leaving walking down the hall saying "I don't
know what they told me."
Q What was Mr. Langton 's response to that?
A Well, probably the same, it was a mushy conversatior
nonspecific.
Q Since he had arranged it, since you were upset, did
he think it had gone well, or was he disappointed with their
reaction, or what was his response?
UNCILASSIFr'ED
1035
UNCI:fl$SIF!ED
1-10
A I don't know, you would have to ask him. I don't
know what his reaction was.
MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me. On the appointment book,
they are talking about 1985. Do you know whether you still
maintain the 1986 book?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I Still have it.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I am going to ask you some questions about some
other people, and I guess my questions will all be the same,
whether you know them, whether you have either spoken to
them or met them and conducted any business with them or
know them socially in any context. We will go through the
names, and then you can elaborate if you do.
John Cupp?
A I don't know him.
Q C-u-p-p.
^ T
Do you know Adolfor or Mario Cailerio?
A No.
Q Do you know General Singlaub, S-i-n-g-1-a-u-b?
A No.
Q How about an Edwin Corr, C-o-r-r?
A No.
Q Thomas Clines, C-1-i-n-e-s?
A No.
Q How about Mr. Hakim, H-a-k-i-m?
UK6LASS1FIED
UNCLASSIFIED
A No.
Q Did you ever hear his name mentioned m the context
of General Secord?
A No.
Q Now, this meeting that you had with General Secord,
IS that the first time you had met him?
A Yes.
Q Had you ever spoken to him on the telephone?
A No.
Q Had you ever had any correspondence from him?
A No.
Q Have you ever had any correspondence with him?
A No.
Q What is your impre^Lon of himZ*
A H« is a nice guy. __ ^ - -^ _ _j_
^ i^rfojtic gesture .' "I 'aS surg^he has a^ij^jSe,,
though. But i^^on't think money wa^ the joQtivator .
Q "Di<Phe m«ition t& jfuii Mnj of the other ffeiancial
concerns h^ ^d .tfifct ot;
A No.
ffeianc
Q As to Mr. Langton, when did you first become aware
of him in terms of knowing that you wanted him on board?
A Probably six fir eight aonths before he joined_us.
UlftGtftSlSirED
1037
UNGtASSIU'EH
142
Q How did you become aware of him?
A Well, I was looking for a chief operating officer
for many -- a couple of years, and his name was mentioned to
me by some guy who writes a newsletter. Aviation Newsletter,
out in Oregon, and I forget his name. So I called him up
to interview him.
Q For whom was he working at the time?
A Evergreen. _^
Q What do you know about Evergreen? _^ _
A Evergreen is a supplemental air carriat/ lik^j^ ■—-
Southern Rtr Transport. I have known them for a number of
years. They do.^basically the sance type of work we do, it is.-
a successful company;. --s . --^
Q Do you know whether or not they have ever,
"■*ny wQ£}s foi^feh* CIA or -whether the CIA evfiTTha^ any
-- A ^^ ^ __ _ «^-^,««^
know. - ~-—r7:^.M "-- -i Si^ - -. _ -~ "i#^'
Q Now, did yo\fcj4ust have the one i«.erview wiih
Mr. Lanatafcbeftite you-:*tired him, or was this «a ongoing
A I had about three, I think, interviews with him.
I met him once at a trade show in Denver, I think, the first
time; or, no, I think it was a post office contracting
^:
session.
UNr^ASS!E;ED
1038
rg-12
(JNCLASSIFSED
Then I think I had him come to Miami once, and
2 I interviewed him. Then I interviewed him m Washington,
3 D.C. once when I still had a law office up there.
drg-end
cps fols
UNCift^H^lEO
1039
Boyum/cps
UHOLftSSlFe
144
Q And when he took the position, was it just on a
straight salary basis or was there a percentage of the profit
involved?
A Straight salary.
Q And has it always been that way?
A No , I give all my management people bonuses now.
Q What are the bonuses based on?
A Generally establish a profit goal for the
year and if they -ina)c<f' that goal then theyget a certain
pe^entage of their salaigj^in additioi^.and if they
fall short they get zero and i^ they o#«shoot it, they
get more. And that goes down as far as the director
level pretty much. We have the president, vice presidents,
directors, managers.
Q Does Mr. Langton receive any other income of
which you are aware?
A No, he does not receive any other income of
which I am aware.
Q Do you know how many times Mr . Langton had met
with General Secord?
A I do not.
Q When you met with General Secord and Mr. Dutton,
was that the first time that Mr. Langton had met General
Secord?
UNGkftSM^
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UWOll®S!F"ED
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Q They knew each other from before?
A Yes. They knew each other from business,
from Southern. I don't think he knew him before Southern.
Q But they had personally met before?
A Yes.
Q Do you know where that was?
A I think Mr. Langton had gone to Arlington or
to Washington area a couple of times at least to meet with
Mr. Secord.
Q Do you know what company Secord was operating
out of?
A I do not.
Q How would you describe your relationship with
Mr. Langton; is it simply business or are you social
friends?
A It's primarily business, but we do socialize
together .
Q Does he ever send you memoranda regarding the
status of the company or is it all done verbally?
A All verbally.
Q And when Mr. Langton is not at the company,
who handles the operations?
A Generally we think of Dave Mulligan as being next
in charge. As a matter of fact, I think Langton has put
a memo out to that effect.
UHOflMIEf^
1041
UNCLASSIFIED
146
Q To you knowledge, has Mr. Langton kept a
calendar or appointment book?
A He keeps one similar to me, if he keeps one at
all, which is just a daily calendar, trying to keep track
of your appointments. He probably does it even less
religiously than I do.
Q To your knowledge, has Mr. Langton ever been
employed by the Federal Governemnt?
A I think he was in the^Coast Guard.
Q Okay. Anything, was that as- a young man?
A Yes, out of high school. -
Q Any otherFederal employtnent?
A No, not according to h-s resume.
lltiiffillRmEQ
1042
Q Have you had any other contracts with any
government agenda 'o'ther'than the Department of Defense:
A From when?
JlMfiLASSUriFA
1043
UNCLASSIfiED
Q Take from '79.
A I think we have one now with the Department of
the Interior.
Q What is that for?
A That is for mapping, it's called the Defense
Mapping Agency — maybe they are in a division of the
Department of Defense, and it is for doing mapping. They
have got some new magnetic truck they are going to put on
and they got a mapping project. It hasn't really gotten
off the ground. They are still trying to get their
equipment up and working.
Q Any others?
A Other than ad hoc^ charters I don't think so.
We do ad hoc charters from time to time but no ongoing
contracts. We fly for the State Department to Hm^mmmim
once a month. We were doing that for a couple, three years
resupplying the mission down there. We have flown for AID,
the agency for International Development in Africa from
time to time.
Q Your flights to Angola, are those for
the government or are they —
A They are for the diamond mines. Actually they
are for a company called International Air Service which
is a Gurnsey Corporation and that company has a contract
with the diamond mines.
UNCLASSIFIED
1044
UNebAS&iF;ED
^ So they pay us and they deal with the diamond
min^s which I understand are owned by the Angolan Government.
Q What do you fly there?
A The Hercules L-100.
Q But what IS in them?
A Oh, just supplies, I think, for logistics to
keep the diamond mines running, food and tools and parts.
That IS an internal operation. That goes within the country.
Q Since that meeting with Mr. Secord and Mr.
Dutton at the hotel, have you spoken to either of those
gentlemen since that time?
A No.
Q To your knowledge has Mr. LrWgton?
A I suspect he has. I don't know though.
Q Why do you suspect he has?
A I guess we have ongoing business, they owe us
money, maybe. I just assume he has.
Q Have you heard from anyone associated with the
White House, either the White House proper or the National
Security Council since all of this hit the papers?
A No.
Q To your knowledge, has anyone in your company?
llNfil,&S£liKTn
1045
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A I don't think so, nobody has reported to me
that they have.
Q Have you heard from anybody in the CIA since
this all hit the papers?
A No.
Q Have you received any instructions other than
from your attorneys from anyone connected with the
Federal Government on how to approach this investigation or
what to say or what to produce?
A No.
MS. NAUGHTON: I think those are the questions
I have. I am going to turn it over to the loyal opposition
here for a couple of questions.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q For the record, I am George van Cleve, the Deputy
Republican Counsel for the Select Committee.
Mr. Bastian, I was down in Miami a week or ten days
ago at your headquarters. I will pass on the characterization
of being part of the loyal opposition for the time being.
I have really just a couple of brief questions
to make sure that I understand some of what has been said
here today.
Let me start by saying that your company has
prepared, I think through the attorneys a number of documents
UNIILftSSJFlED
1046
1»I€IAS^IF1£D
151
which have been furnished to us and we appareciate that.
I am referring to a chronology which is
entitled Southern Air Transport Development in the Iran-
Nicaragua Affair, and to a series of memos addressed to
Charles Tiefer, Esquire. Again, we appreciate those.
There is an entry on the chronology on page 1,
it says, August 1, 1979, James H. Bastian acquired all
fli'HfiW;
1047
UNGlftS$IF9ED
You testified H^lrfviously today that you received
a phone call from Mr. Gadd probably in or around January
1986 with respect to the Iran matter.
A Yes.
Q He called you at home, as I understand it?
UN€tdlSSieED
1048
end boyum
end cps ji
um»>En
A Yes.
Q And you had been told to expect a phone call?
A Yes.
Q Did he call you on an open phone line?
A Yes.
Q An unsecured phone line to your knowledge?
A Yes.
Q If I understood your testimony correctly you
said that he told you that they wanted to fly material to
Iran and then material back out; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Was he any more specific than that?
A Not that I remember.
Q That is a very unusual request, isn't it, at the
time?
A Yes.
Q But he was not any more specific with you
about what was required or what they were looking to do?
A Not that I remember, no.
C
UNOASSJJE'-ED
1049
UNWSSfFiED
#9
CAS-1
Of. Would you be willing to set up an offshore Panamanian
company for any of your company's clients on request?
A Probably not. We would have to know them better
than 3ust anybody.
Q Under what circumstances would you be willing to set
up a company like that for a client?
A I guess under the circumstances under which we did
it, for somebody like Mr. Gadd, whom we thought was helping
a government cause. I don't want that to mean that I thought
that it was the government operating. I didn't. I thought
it was something that the government wanted done.
Q I would like to take you in some detail now through
the prior testimony about the circumstances surrounding the
administrative subpoena that you received from the Customs
Service and what I am going to do is go through step by step
what I understood your testimony to be. If at any point I
appear to be not describing it accurately, please stop me or
if you don't understand what I am asking, stop me there. I
want to be sure I understand the whole transaction and your
thoughts about whatever was said to you by Mr. Langton or
Mr. Mason about it.
As I understand, your company first received the
Customs subpoena some time in early October 1986?
A I don't remember when.
Q But it was after the shoot down?
UN€<EASS11t2ED
1050
UNCLI^SSIFeED
155
A Shortly thereafter.
Q That would place it in and around October 1986?
A I don't recall.
Q You don't recall when the shoot down occurred?
A No.
Q If I told you that it was on or about October 6, 1935,
would that refresh your recollection?
A I will accept that date if you are telling me that
was the date.
Q And you received the Customs subpoena shortly
thereafter, then?
A Yes, sir.
Q The original Customs subpoena called for what sort
of documents generally?
A I think it asked for all of our documents on all of
our employees, all the documents on everything we had ever
shipped out of the country. It was a very broad thing. Then
they were going to come back two weeks later and I think there
were negotiations went on with them and Langton. I kind of
threw up my hands .
Q Did Mr. Langton handle the negotiations personally?
A I think so. I don't know if he called counsel
immediately or not on that.
Q So he may have handled them personally?
A Probably
UHO^ftS^eED
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CAS- 3 1
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UNCLASSIFIED
156
Q The general subject was export?
A Yes.
Q Normal jurisdictional Customs problems. And I
believe you then testified that after some discussions,
company officials assembled some documents which they thought
were responsiv^e to whatever had been agreed to with respect
to the subpoena and that you then asked to review those
documents?
A Yes. What happened was we put the Customs people
off and put them off and now we are talking about a month
and a half after the subpoena was first served on us . I
even had a meeting with the Customs people before I got these
documents, maybe say that it was served, then I got involved
in it maybe a month later and talked to the Customs people,
we still hadn't produced any documents for them, asking them
why it was so broad and what were they after and why were they
asked for all the employee records, for example, it didn't seem
it was in their jurisdiction, employee records.
If they wanted to know if we owned the airplane
that was exported, that seemed pertinent. The fact is we
didn't, so we didn't have records on the airplane.
So we had that conversation. They said that they would
maybe try to sharpen up their subpoena and come back.
Q You talked to them personally?
lN<jfeft;?S|FSEo
1052
IHICIPA^SHFIED
15:
Q Roughly how long after --
A Probably about a month after the first subpoena
was served I talked to them personally. Then I think they
issued another subpoena.
Then they got more pressing on it. We were putting
them off.
Q If we say that the subpoena was served in early
October, I believe you have testified previously that --
A Let me tell you what happened and you put dates
around it. I don't remember any dates so you are not going
to get any out of me.
0 I believe you have testified to a couple of dates.
I would like to go along --
A I disavow the dates already given.
Q You can start that way if you want. It is going to
take longer.
A I just told you I don't remember the dates and now
you tell me I gave some dates and you are going to hold me to
them even though I say I don't know.
Q This is an important set of events, as you are aware
There have been allegations made that on the basis of what
apparently occurred here, an effort was made to persuade the
FBI to delay or quash an ongoing investigation and I think it
is important that the record be clear on your testimony on these
UMQfal^SJFSED
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iMEfSSfFfED
158
A I agree and I had read where the FBI has admitted
that it tried to delay.
Q I want to make it as clear as possible what your
company's involvement in that set of events may be. With
due respect, we are going to sit here as long as it takes to
get clear on what your involvement personally in that matter
was.
We can do it whatever way you like. I want you to
be comfortable, but the record has to be clear. You got
an administrative subpoena that asked for a broad category
of documents.
The president of your company, according to your
testimony, then entered into negotiations with the Customs
Department about the subpoena, is that correct?
A I don't remember what he did. I don't know what he
did.
Q Did you instruct him to contact the Customs
Department and discuss the subpoena with them?
A No. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. VAN CLEVE: Can we go off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
MR. VAN CLEVE: On the record.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q I will ask you, if you don't agree with a date or you
uMHififissinED
1054
IMI^IED
159
think it might be wrong, please tell me or if you don't
remember .
During your earlier testimony, as I understood it,
you received an administrative subpoena shortly after the
shoot down of the C-123.
A That is correct.
Q And you eventually received a grand ]ury subpoena?
A That I don't remember.
Q At a certain point prior to an appearance before
the grand jury, you were instructed to ignore the grand ]ury
subpoena?
A That is what my counsel told me, as I recall.
Q It may have been your counsel who previously told us
today that an appearance was scheduled to occur on or about
November 9, 1986.
MR. BECKMAN: December, I thought I said.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I stand corrected on that. That may
account for my confusion about the chronology. Please, in
narrative fashion in as much detail as you can go through the
way in which your company and its senior officials responded
to the original Customs subpoena.
THE WITNESS: My recollection is that we received a
Customs -- and I think it was probeibly the first subpoena
we received in this whole affair, which was very broad,
shortly after the Hasenfus crash. Mr. Langton handled it
umASSifiED
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primarily with Customs and we were trying to respond. We
wanted to respond, but at the same time I didn't want to go
through our entire company records and they did ask for all the
personnel records of everything in the company.
As I recall, in addition, it had handwritten in it like it
was an afterthought, and then they delivered more documents.
It was very broad and he went back to them and said what we
would try to get together for them.
Then a couple of three weeks went on and a return
date passed and they called us and said what are you going to
do about it and we said we haven't got the documents together
but we are working on it.
Finally, they came over maybe for the second time,
because I don't think I met with them the first time, that
might have been a month after the thing first issued, but it
could have been three weeks.
We have to get the time frame in between the time the
airplane went down and the last flight of the Iran thing because
i
it all has to fit into those dates, these things that happened.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q I understand. That was what I understood you to
have previously said and I think that the last flight would
have occurred shortly before the newspapers disclosed some of
the earlier flights.
Correct me if I am wrong about this, but I think
UN^flS^lgjtD
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around the beginning of November.
A So probably my last meeting with my people would
have been maybe a week or a week-and-a-half before that
last flight. Because I really didn't get involved in the
documents that were going to be produced.
I was hopfing that Langton would sqIvel it and give
them whatever they needed and they would go on about their way
so he was negotiating that with them.
Finally, when I met with them and they came over, and
this was before we produced anything, I started asking
them why did they want all these things, it didn't seem to
me it was ; inent to Customs, particularly people, so
they trier • support that. It finally ended up that they
would go ba'. and try to further define their requirements
and we would -jroduce whatever they wanted particularly
relative to i-he check for the airplane, the one talked about,
that we took money and issued our own check for that airplane,
which could be an issue of exporting an airplane, I could
visualize that and if there were parts that we supplied and
bought so all of it, invoices for parts for the contras would
seem like a pertinent issue so we were going to get those
together and the invoices associated with it.
* Then I had no more conversation about it for awhile,
and I was hoping it would go away like everybody hopes, and
the next thing I know Langton comes in and says they were
WU^|f:ed
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UHeinSStNED
162
ready to give them what they want and what they demanded
and they are going to come over. I said let me what you
have got. They produced a very little skinny file and said this
is all we have got. It had maybe a black check on it and two
telexes in there talking about transferring money to us . I
said this is a lot of money. I think it was $250,000, but
it might have been 5150,000, but at least it was two
transfers of a major amount of money.
And I said, well, what did you do with this money to
our people. They said, well, we used some of it for the flights}
from Kelly, I think — I am trying to remember — to Israel
or some of it went for that and some of it was for maintenance
services provided the contras.
•I said, well, you know, if the Customs people
start asking you what you did with the money, then you are going
to have to tell them about the Iran thing and I understood
that was a very sensitive operation so if you display
all this they are going to start asking the questions
that this raises.
Q And what was Mr. Langton's reaction when you said
that to him?
A He said, yes, I understand what you are saying.
I said you better get ahold of somebody and tell them that we
are going to release these documents if somebody doesn't
get some help on this subpoena.
uireinssiiitED
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We are going to go ahead and respond. We have no
choice but to respond to a subpoena. Then I believe he
called Secord, I think.
Q But did he say to you, okay, I will make a call or
I will call Secord or something along those lines?
A Yes, he was going to call Secord and try to get
this put off or something.
Q I assume these things were happening pretty fast,
you are a day away from having to turn the documents over,
it is a busy company, so I assume you had a meeting in the
middle of tie day about this?
A Yes.
Q He said I will make a phone call and came back not
too much later?
A He made a phone call immediately, but I am not
sure Secord was available. He might have been in the Middle
East, so we were able to put off the Customs people.
Q I don't want you to get ahead of the story that you
were describing. You explained to Langton the problem.
A I thought it was a problem. It wasn't a problem
to us but it could have been a problem to Secord.
Q He says I am going to make a call, at some point you
learned that he couldn't reach Secord?
A I think so.
Q Did he say I couldn't reach Secord, but I talked to
UNGI«SSSt:ED
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tiNeMSfFlED
someone else?
A I think Secord was in the Middle East and he couldn't
get hold of them.
Q Did he say he talked to somebody else or say we
are out of luck, we can't reach anybody?
A I think we just didn't turn the papers over to
Customs that day and solved the problem probably a little
later in this instance.
Q How many later?
A Maybe two or three days.
Q Did there come a time when Bill Langton explained to
you what happened?
A No. Just that they would take care of it, I think.
Q Who is "they"?
A Secord would take care of it.
Q In this context, if he said they —
A I don't think he said "thei|l'.j He was trying to
call Secord.
Q I am trying to help you recollect.
A Why I can't explain it, and I don't want to sound
evasive, I kind of dropped the issue and moved on to something
else, I really didn't care if I turned them over as much as I
wanted them to know the repercussions of turning them over.
If Secord coudln't get the Customs people to quit pressing
on this that -we were going to respond.
UMStll$SlF!ED
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Q And there came a time a couple of days later
when you say you think your problem got solved?
A I do.
Q You are an attorney, you understood your obligations
to respond to a subpoena, you would want your company to be
in compliance. Did anyone in your company tell ycu how you
complied with the subpoena?
A No. You have to remember the context. This was
pushed real hard and then they kind of didn't care^ '^hen they
pushed real hard and then they didn't seem to care. Customs.
So they weren't that pushy about it themselves.
I knew we were about to turn it over to them tpmorrow
and it could have been my company people were able to put them
off a couple more weeks, too, until they could get ahold of
Secord.
Q So you never actually found out from any source how
this matter was resolved?
A No, I did not. Maybe Langton called.
Q A couple more questions on this subject. When you
discovered that your company apparently was using a common
source of funds to make payments to cover money that you were
owed for the Iran operations and for the contra operations,
other than concern about the disclosure of the Iran operation,
did you have any other concern about that?
No, it just never entered my mind.
UN6t«SSIF4ED
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(JNCLASStFiED
166
Q You testified previously that you thought that the
Iran operation was a government-sponsored operation.
A Yes.
Q You testified previously that you had been told
that the funding for the contra operation was private funding'
A Yes.
Q When you say that there might be a common source of
funds for the two operations, did it occur to you that that
might be inconsistent with what you had previously understood
about the sources of funding for either operation?
A No, it should have, but it didn't.
Q So you were concerned about the security issue
but not the financing issue?
A No. It didn't enter my mind. It is easy after the
fact now when people think there is diversion of funds for yoi
to put that together, but I didn't think about it one way or
the other.
Q When you raised the matter with Mr. Langton and
Mr. Mason, neither one of them said anything on that subject?
A No. I don't know why, but it didn't f|bjme to say
is there something funny going on here, if, in fact, there
was.
Q If I understood your testimony on this issue
correctly, the original inquiry from Customs was prompted as
far as you could tell by the shoot down of the C-123?
UNmSSUUED
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CAS-13 1
2
3
4
5
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have any apiUs*«w*T at all
A Yes, sir.
Q To your knowledge, did they make any inquiries
bout the Iran arms diversion?
A I don't think so. I don't recall any, but I am
not up to date on all the subpoenas. We were getting so
many subpoenas for awhile that I couldn't keep track of the
players, but I don't think we did.
Q What I am trying to establish clearly for the record
is that the Customs Department came to you and had a bunch of
questions about the contra operation.
They didn't seem to
A.
about the Iran operation at that time?
A That is correct.
Q On the other hand, the company had internal
information about that operation?
A Yes.
Q And that was the reason — that was what prompted
your concern?
A Yes. I considered it a very sensitive operation
and I knew it wasn't made public at that time.
Q That was the only concern that caused you to raise
the matters with Mr. Langton and Mr. Mason?
A Yes.
Q And that is the only matter to your knowledge
that they then raised with General Secord or whoever it was
UN6bAS&iF?F.D
1063
un€1^ssif;ed
that they actually called?
A Yes.
Q Thank you. No further questions.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. NAUGHTON:
Q I have one other question. Is there anything that
you know of that would be pertinent to this investigation
that we haven't gone through already, is there a question
that is pertinent that we haven't asked yet that you think
would be of interest to the committee?
A I really don't think so. I can't think of anything,
no. I have tried to be as forthright — I recognize I don't
have the photographic memory and I really wasn't that much
involved in an awful lot of this, but I think you will
find that our company, Mr. Mason and Mr. Langton are fully
prepared to give everything that we have.
Q I want to make sure that we don't get the
information because we haven't asked the right questions.
A I understand.
Q Thank you.
MR. VAN CLEVE: Is there anything you would like to
tell the committee based on your experience here, is there
anything that the members ought to know that would be helpful
to them in the course of an inquiry or just as a general
matter?
IMiftSSIf^ED
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UNCin^SfF^ED
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A No, I don't think so.
Q Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m. the deposition was adjourned.)
UWyiAS$Wf,5E0
1065
HAME: HIR2714000
UNCIASSIRED
IPTS STEIN
DCMN DANIELS
DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS F. BRADY
Thursday, October 1. 1987
House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with
Iran,
Wash-ington, D.C.
14 The select committee met, pursuant to call, at
15 10:00 a.m., in Room 215U, Rayburn House Office Building,
16 Richard Leon (Deputy Chief Minority Counsel) presiding.
Present: Richard Leon, Deputy Chief Minority
Counsel; and Ken Ballen, Staff Counsel, House Committee.
=.0e-classifled./R3lea-sedcn^£iU5iZ
.,, under provisions o^E.O-l^;,\
Z^_ p.ger, Ilaticn:' bee.;.:'.; -i ■: -i
UNCLASSIFIED
1066
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR27M00O PAGE 2
HR. LEON: On the record.
Let's start off by introducing ourselves. My name
is Richard Leon and I am the Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
22 of the House Select Committee on Iran and Nicaragua.
23 MR. BALLEN: I am Ken Ballen, Counsel to the
24 committee, the House Committee.
25 MR. LEON: Me have with us our deponent. Senator
26 Nicholas Brady.
UNCLASSIFIED
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NAME :
27
HIR274000
UNCLASSIFIED
'AGE 3
Whereupon,
NICHOLAS F. BRADY
was called for as a witness and, having been duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
EXAJ1INATI0H BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMniTTEE
BY MR. LEON:
2 Senator, by way of formality and in order to assure
that your expenses can be paid, I am handing you a certified
subpoena that has been signed by the chairman of the
committee. I want to note for the record that the subpoena
was in no way necessary, that Senator Brady was more than
willing and glad to come down to appear before the committee
without the necessity of that.
We appreciate very much your coming here with your busy
schedule and we will endeavor to be brief.
As I mentioned to you previously, the focus of our
questions are very limited. They focus on a particular
event that you were present for, and that was a meeting that
the Vice President, George Bush, had with Felix Rodriguez in
May of 1986, I believe it was May 1st.
I want to harken back to that particular meeting,
which I believe you were present at.
Is it correct, first of all, that you were present
'.alassified/r.sleastd o.ijS£kM^
^5/U.-'_^£' pro\/iuons cf E J. 12'. -"5
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR27MO0O ^^ ■ « «r kill W| | ILl/ P*<5E U
52 at a meeting between the Vice President and Felix Rodriguez
53 on May 1st of 1986?
54 A That is correct. I believe that is the correct
55 date. I did have a meeting, but I am not positive about the
56 date.
57 . B On that particular date to the extent that you can
58 recall, you were visiting with the Vice President yourself,
59 were you not?
60 . A I was visiting with the Vice President and we were
61 talking about politics.
62 . 2 At that point, were you still a Member of the
63 United States Senate?
6'4 A Ko, I was not.
65 e What year or years was it that you were in the
66 United States Senate?
67 . A I was a Member of the United States Senate from
68 April 1982 until December 1982. I resigned in the last part
69 of December 1982.
70 2 And since then you have been working in New York
71 City?
72 . . A I have been working in New York City, but I have
73 also been on a number of Government commissions, the
714 Scowcroft Commission, the Packard Commission, the Kissinger
75 Commission.
76 2 Approximately when did you serve on the Kissinger
UNCLASSIFIED
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NAME: HIR27U000 Wl"^'^""^^^ PAGE S
77 Commission?
78 . A I uould have to look up the dates, but I think it
79 was 1984. These commissions ran end to end and I never
80 remember when one started and the other ended.
81 e But the Kissinger Commission dealt with the
82 problems in Nicaragua?
83 A That is correct.
814 2 When you met with the Vice President May 1st, you
85 weren't there to see hira with regard to the Kissinger
86 Commission or any other commission, were you?
87 A No . We were :ust talking politics.
88 . 2 On that occasion when Mr. Rodriguez showed up, did
89 you know beforehand that he uould be meeting with the Vice
90 President that day?
9 1 A No.
92 2 Was it your sense that this meeting between the
93 Vice President and Mr. Rodriguez was something that had been
94 planned beforehand as opposed to impromptu?
95 . A I had no idea whether it was impromptu or planned,
96 but at the end of my meeting with the Vice President he
97 said. "'Why don't you stick around? I have a meeting with
98 these people and you might be interested in what they have
99 to say . ' '
100 2 Was Mr. Rodriguez brought into the room by Donald
101 Gregg or anybody else?
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A As I recall, it was Donald Gregg, Sam Watson and
Mr. Rodriguez. I believe that is all that was there.
2 Donald Gregg at that time was National Security
Adviser to the Vice President?
A Yes .
2 And you knew him?
A Yes.
2 And Sam Watson was Donald Gregg's deputy?
A That is my understanding.
2 Colonel Watson, I believe it is.
Before they brought him into the room. Senator, can
you recall if there was an introduction as to why he was
coming or what the purpose of the event was?
A None that I remember.
2 Let me hand you a document dated April 30, 1986
entitled ''Briefing Memorandum for the Vice President,''
encaptioned ''Event Meeting with FeliK Rodriguez. Date:
Thursday, May 1, 1986. Time: 11:30 to 11:45 a.m., in the
West Wing,'' and it is from Donald Gregg.
It states as the purpose oi the meeting with the
Vice President of FeliK Rodriguez, ''Felix Rodriguez, a
counterinsurgency expert who is visiting from El Salvador,
will provide a briefing on the status of the war in El
Salvador and resupply of the contras . ' '
Let me first ask you if you have ever seen this
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briefing memorandum or was it shown to you on that
particular day?
A It certainly wasn't shown to ne on that particular
day. I may have seen it in all of the Iran/contra hearings
discussions since then, but I never saw it before the
meeting with the Vice President and Mr. Rodriguez.
2 Do you have any recollection of the Vice President
referring to it himself that day during the meeting or
before the meeting?
A No, I am almost positive he didn't. That wouldn't
be his normal practice anyway.
2 Do you recall whether either Donald Gregg or San
Watson or anyone else for that matter before they brought
Felix Rodriguez in read from this document or any document
to tell the Vice President the purpose for Felix Rodriguez's
visit?
A I am sure they didn't.
MR. LEON: I will have that made a part of the
record, that document.
(Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.)
BY MR. LEON:
2 Hith regard to the actual discussion that took
place once Mr. Rodriguez showed up, first of all, roughly
speaking. Senator, how long did the meeting with the Vice
President and Felix Rodriguez last?
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A I can't be exactly precise, Mr. Leon, but I would
be very surprised if it lasted over 10 minutes. It might
have been 15.
e During the course oi the meeting, did the Vice
President discuss with Mr. Rodriguez his counterinsurgency
efforts in El Salvador?
A My memory of the whole meeting is hazy because it
was quick and it seems to me the Vice President was being
perfunctory in meeting with Mr. Rodriguez. I can't
precisely answer that question, because the real event in
the meeting that I remember, in fact, the only event I
remember is Mr. Rodriguez pulled out some pictures of the
jungle and helicopters, as I remember, and people holding
rifles and people pointing at the jungle, and that is all I
remember .
e Were they supposedly photos of his
counterinsurgency efforts in El Salvador?
A That was my understanding, but I didn't pay much
attention because I must have seen a hundred of those when I
was on the Armed Services Committee in the Senate. It just
looked like any jungle. My understanding was that it was El
Salvador and the counterinsurgency effort there.
2 Do you recall whether or not there was any
discussion by Mr. Rodriguez with the Vice President relating
to either Nicaragua or the resupply efforts of the contras?
UNCLASSIFIED
1073
UNCLASSIFIED .
NAME: HIR27(4O00 UlllJLnWwII ■ ■■ "^ PAGE 9
177 A I don't believe there was. My memory is not
178 precise about a meeting so long ago, but I don't think so.
179 e Is that the kind of thing that would have stuck out
180 in your nind?
181 . A I think it would have.
182 e Particularly having been familiar with these kinds
183 of issues as a nember of the Kissinger Commission?
ISU A Exactly.
185 2 So you have no recollection of that being a subject
186 of discussion?
187 A None.
188 2 Do you recall whether or not at the end of the
189 meeting or at any point during the meeting an ambassador and
190 Oliver Horth stopping by to say hello?
191 A I think they did. As I remember there was a
192 picture-taking session at the end of the meeting and I do
193 remember the ambassador, I think his name was Corr,and
194 Ollie North coming in for a brief moment, kind of to shake
195 hands.
196 e Ambassador Corr from El Salvador?
197 . A Yes. The meeting was very brief and I had the
198 impression that the Vice President was anxious to get back
199 to the subject that he and I were discussing. He was being
200 polite, as he always is, but we hadn't finished our
201 discussion and the Vice President seemed to want to get back
UNCLASSIFIED
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202 to that subject, which uas domestic politics.
203 e After Mr. Rodriguez left the room, did you have a
iiscussion with the Vice President regarding Mr. Rodriguez's
205 activities in El Salvador?
206 A No. Ue returned to our discussion.
207 2 Has the Vice President at any time after that
208 meeting commented to you about his knowledge of Mr.
209 Rodriguez's involvement in anything other than
2 10 counter insurgency in El Salvador?
211 A I had forgotten I had been present at this meeting
212 until It came up during the Iran/contra hearings and we did
2 13 talk about it, but the only thing he ever said was that he
2 14 had no knowledge of the resupply mission and that his memory
2 15 of this meeting was simply one of being courteous to someone
2 16 who was working in the counterinsurgency movement in El
217 Salvador.
2 18 MR. LEOH: Senator, I have no further questions. I
219 will defer to ray colleague.
UNCLASSIFIED
1075
(UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR27U000 ^" * W k^ «# iJ I ■ I E 1 1 I^AGE 11
220 BY MR. BALLEN^
221 2 Had you. Senator, met Felix Rodriguez prior to this
222 meeting?
223 A No.
224 2 And if I could summarize your testimony correctly,
225 your memory is not precise as to the exact events at the
226 meeting, but to the best of your recollection you believe
227 that Rodriguez did not discuss resupply of the contras?
228 A That is correct.
229 2 Do you recall whether any words were said to Felix
230 Rodriguez of encouragement that he should stay on helping in
231 El Salvador or in Central America?
232 A I really don't in any precise manner, but I know
233 the Vice President as he is with all of his guest^was
234 grateful for him coming by his office and thanked him for
235 bringing the pictures which we looked at, but aside from
236 normal courtesy, I don't remember anything like that.
237 2 The meeting was a formality, in other words?
238 A It was not only a formality. r\s I mentioned before
239 within the bounds of being courteous, it seemed to me the
240 Vice President wanted to return to the political matters
241 that we were talking about.
2M2 2 It was not something that he applied attention to
243 or focused on or discussed in any great depth?
2414 A He applies his attention to all of his visitors.
UNCLASSIFIED
1076
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245 but ue had an unfinished subject and it seemed to rae he uas
246 anxious to get back to that, but uas being polite to his
2 47 guest.
MR. LEON; It uas almost as if it uere a break in
your meeting uith the Vice President that this took place?
THE WITNESS: I uould say so, although I may have
^/
been a little late getting to my meeting uith thaVice
252 President. I don't remember uhy ue hadn't finished, but I
248
249
250
25 1
26
262
263
264
265
do remember that ue took a feu minutes after that meeting to
finish up the business that ue had been discussing.
MR. BALLEN: I have nothing further.
MR. LEON: Let rae again finish up. Thank you
again. On behalf of the House Select Committee, Senator,
thank you very much for making time in your busy schedule to
come here and to put this account of the event in question
260 on the record. He appreciate that very much.
THE WITNESS: Thank you. I appreciate your
courtesy in arranging the meeting at this time so I could
make my other commitments.
MR. LEON: Thank you very much. Senator.
(Whereupon, at 10:17 a.m., the taking of the deposition
266 concluded . 1
UNCLASSIFIED
1077
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THIS IS A COVER SHEET
FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT
IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
HANDLING, STORAGE. REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED
DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE
ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.
Pirtiaily Declassified/Released on ■//'•^^"^'^ "
under provisions of t.O. liJJoo
bv N Menan. National Security Council
COW
Is unclassified.)
STANDARD FORM 703 (8 651
5.escrlMa Dy GSA/ISOO
3J crn 2003
1078
'^
1 DEPOSITION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARTHUR E. BROWN, JR.
2 Wednesday, June 10, 1987
3 United States Senate
4 Select Committee on Secret
5 Military Assistance to Iran
6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition
7 Washington, D. C.
8 Deposition of LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARTHUR E.
9 BROWN, JR., called as a witness by counsel for the Select
10 Committee, at the offices of the Senate Committee on
11 Ethics, Room SH-220, Hart Senate Office Building,
12 Washington, D. C. , commencing at 10:20 a.m., the witness
13 having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary
14 Public in and for the District of Columbia, and the
15 testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN
16 SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction.
mmam
1079
uussra
1 APPEARANCES:
2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret
3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
4 Opposition:
5 JOHN SAXON, ESQ.
6 Associate Counsel
7 On behalf of the House Select Committee to
8 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran:
9 JOSEPH SABA, ESQ.
10 ROGER KREUZER
11 On behalf of the Department of the Army:
12 ROBERT J. WINCHESTER, ESQ.
13 Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
14 for Legislative Affairs
15 COLONEL JOHN WALLACE
mmxim
1080
\mmm
1
CONTENTS
2
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF Of
WITNESS SENATE HOUSE
Lt. Gen. Arthur E. Brown, Jr.
By Mr. Saxon 4
By Mr. Saba 49
By Mr. Saxon 53
EXHIBITS
10
BROWN EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION
11
1 17
WI^SWD
1081
UNllASMD
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 Whereupon,
3 LT. GEN. ARTHUR E. BROV™, JR.,
4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate
5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary
6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:
7 EXAMINATION
8 BY MR. SAXON:
9 Q General, if you could state your name for the
10 record, please?
11 A Arthur E. Brown, Jr.
12 Q And what is your profession, sir?
13 A I am an officer in the United States Army.
14 Q What is your rank?
15 A Lieutenant General.
16 Q I understand you are about to be promoted?
17 A That's correct.
18 Q And when will you take on your fourth star?
19 A 24 June.
20 Q What is your current position?
21 A I am the Director of the Army Staff,
22 Headquarters, Department of the Army.
23 Q How long have you been in that position?
24 A Just about four years.
25 Q And what were you doing before, your most
1082
w&mm
1 immediate prior assignment?
2 A I was the commander of the Army Readiness and
3 Mobilization Region in the southeastern part of the
4 United States, stationed in Atlanta.
5 Q And what will be your next assignment and when
6 will you assume it?
7 A I will be the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
8 effective the 24th of June.
9 Q All right, sir. What is your current
10 reporting status? To whom do you report?
j^j_ A I report directly to the Chief of Staff.
^2 Q That is General John wickham?
j_3 A General John wiOcham. I also report to the
14 Vice Chief of Staff, General Thurman, the Under Secretary
15 of the Army.
16 Q Mr. Ambrose?
j_7 A Mr. Ambrose, and the Secretary of the Army,
18 Mr. Marsh. My principal superior is the Chief of Staff
19 of the Army.
20 Q And, General, what are your principal duties
21 as Director of the Army staff?
22 A well, I'm responsible, in the name of the
23 Chief, for the coordination of staff activities within
24 the staff. I am also the direct supervisor of the
25 Director of Programs Analysis and Evaluation, Director of
programs nuaj-j; -. j.- -•-
llHWffffB
1083
lEiissra
Management, and I have general staff supervision over the
remainder of the Army staff.
Q sir, I met with you on April 23, 1987 for an
interview, and when I refer this morning to having met
with you previously or you told me previously or whatever
I want the record to reflect that that's the session to
which I am referring and the interview to which I am
referring.
I believe on that day you told me about the
creation of something called the|
I think it
would be helpful if you would walk us through the
creation of that committee, what it did, and the reasons
why you found it necessary.
KR. WINCHESTER: May I ir.terject? ^^^^^^|
THE WITNESS:
If we go back to the summer of 1983
when General Wickham took over as the Chief of Staff,
that summer he wrote a directive memorandum to selected
members of the staff, to include the vice Chief and
myself, expressing concern that we provide an adequate
to ensure^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
jroper oversight, and in the way of oversight he
neant both military and civilian oversight, to include
ICltfflED
1084
adequate Judge Advocate General and General Counsel
concurrence with any action that would go on.
As an outgrowth of that we developed the
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^^^^H which was
designed to provide working level, «««Snclw[ly at the
three-star level — it's chaired by
The Committee meets periodically on call of
the chairman,!
BY MR. SAXON; (Resuming)
Q
I believe you told me General Wickham had an
intuitive feeling that we needed better over-watching, is
the way you put it.
A That's correct, because he'd been the Vice
wmwB
1085
jussira
Chief of staff and was elevated in June of 1983 to the
Chief of staff, and that was the beginning.
Q And did you put together an IG team that was
the forerunner of the permanent IG team!
That's correct. Also, along with the|
went an organization that we have called the!
[but it is a full-time office
consisting of about 15 officers and civilians.
Q You're talking about^^^^now?
A ^^^^Hthat does the day-to-day work in the name
of the Chief and the Secretary of processing approvals of
actions with regard to all of thoset
programs. We also put together an 13 inspection team
which was to go make a one-time pass through all of our
jrograms, and that developed into a
permanent team.
It also has a team from the Audit Agency, Army
Audit Agency, and there is a criminal investigation
element that is available for use by that team, if
necessary.
Q General, let me ask you a few questions about
^^^1 I believe up until the time at which it was
created, and which I also recall was September ,1984 —
A That's correct.
mmm
1185
1086
mmmii
system had been run out of
Q -- the|
DCS/OPS; is that correct?
A That's correct. It was run out of
DCS/OPS. That was the central
point of contact, and each of the staff sections had a
[member who responded to taskings.
Q Undei^^H would you say that it now operates
on a more adversarial basis with the Agency?
A More adversarial than before, yes.
Q And tell us exactly what th«
system is and how that operates.
A Well, the^^^^^^^^l system is a system that
has been set up to accept and process requests from
agencies outside of Defense for support, assistance,
support and assistance, to include provision of material.
Q That could be any agency outside of Defense?
A Yes.
Q But for all practical purposes it's
principally the CIA; is that correct?
A That's correct. Now it should not be confused
with what we call DOMS, the Director of Military Support,
which is also a DCS/OPS organization, which is designed
for military support to civil authority, disaster relief
and those kinds of things.
Q ^^^^^ormally operates in a manner consistent
^^^^Kiormally operates in a
oNftASSIflED
1087
ilCyiSKD
10
with Presidential Findings and the guidance of the
Secretary of Defense; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q And at the time of Project SNOWBALL, the TOWs
to Iran, the head of^^^^was Colonel!
that correct? ^^^
A That's correct.
Q And the head now is Colonel
A That's correct.
Q What would you say relations with the Agency
are now in terras of hov^^^Bis operating in its
administration of the ^^^^^^^^Vsysten?
A In my view the relationships are, I guess I
would review them as "proper" . ^^^| has been instructed
to accept taskings. Before those taskings can be put out
to the staff for processing, they have to go through a
preliminary legal review, and then the Vice Chief of
Staff of the
1088
lioiiSMe
1
2 In both cases it requires legal review at the
3 Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel.
4 Q If I understand your testimony, then, even for
5 minor actions, the approval of
6 ^^^^^Bvice Chief of Staff, General Thurman, is
7 required; is that correct?
8 A That's correct.
9 Q And is that both of them?
10 A Yes, sir.
11 Q Would you say ^^^^^^land the|
12 system have worked well?
13 A I have every level of confidence that they are
14 on track. We have had some criticism about them being
15 slow, but I would say that in those cases where there's a
16 requirement for expeditious action we can move actions
17 very quickly, and do.
18 Q And in fact there are built-in requirements
19 into the procedures that govern thc^^^^^^^^H system
20 for expedited action; is that correct?
21 A That's correct. But none of those procedures
22 allow any short-circuiting. Approval has to be obtained
23 from both senior military and civilian authority.
24 Q Am I correct in saying that the TOW and HAWK
25 repair part transfers bypassed the^^^^^^^^H system?
BNffit
the^^^^^^^^H !
1089
iicusme
12
1 A That's correct.
2 Q And are you aware in the four years you've
3 been Director of the Army Staff of any other transfers to
4 the CIA which have bypassed the^^^^^^^^H system?
5 A Not to my knowledge.
6 Q Sir, if you would, tell us when you first
7 became aware of the TOW missile requirement, what became
8 known as Project SNOWBALL?
9 A I have to refer, because at the time I refer
10 to notes that I made in my notebook which I keep secured
11 in a special safe. The first notation I have was on the
12 18th of February, 1986, which was a Tuesday, in which I
13 was informed by the Chief of Staff of program SNOWBALL.
14 I was told that Major Simpson was the action officer.
15 So it was the 18th of February was the first
16 time.
17 Q And does your log entry show that the Chief of
18 Staff needed legal advice regarding Congressional
19 notification?
20 A That's correct. I have an indication that
21 says the Chief of Staff needs legal advice re the
22 requirement to notify Congress.
23 Q I believe you told me earlier that you then
24 talked to Major Simpson, is that correct, sir?
25 A That's correct.
82-690 0-88-36
1090
UMCUSSIdED
13
1 MR. KREUZER: Sir, what was this date that you
2 first became aware?
3 THE WITNESS: The 18th of February, 1986.
4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
5 Q I believe your next entry is February 24; is
6 that correct?
7 A That's correct.
8 Q And what does that log entry show?
9 A That log entry shows the notation SNOWBALL,
10 which is a trigger for my memory on the project, and the
11 notation says: Okay not to notify Congress — meaning to
12 me that it was not the Army's responsibility to notify
13 Congress but the agency receiving the equipment had that
14 responsibility.
15 Q All right, sir. Let me stop there a moment
16 and ask a few questions to see if we can find out whether
17 anything else happened in that period. After talking to
13 General Wickham, the Chief of Staff, about project
19 SNOWBALL and talking to Major Simpson was there anyone
20 els« in that period of those first few days with whom you
21 spoke about this requirement?
22 A I'm not sure. I don't believe so. I knew
23 that General Russo, who was the Assistant Chief of Staff
24 for Logistics, was the point of contact in the staff. I
25 may have talked to General Russo about it but my log does
MlMffiD
1091
l^ASSIFa
14
1 not reflect that. But that doesn't mean that I might not
2 have spoken to someone.
3 Q When your entry said that the Chief needed
4 some legal advice regarding Congressional notification,
5 is that something that you then sought or executed on?
6 A I'm not sure that I did, but it seems to me
7 that he had indicated to General Russo that requirement.
8 Q So he wasn't telling you you were responsible
9 for finding that out, but he simply told you that he was
10 in the process of getting it himself?
11 A That's right, and he would expect me to follow
12 up.
13 Q And when your entry on the 24th said SNOWBALL
14 was okay or it was okay not to notify Congress but the
15 Agency had responsibility, who gave you that information
16 and that judgment?
17 A I'm not sure. I'm not sure of that. It may
18 be a reflection of the memorandum that the General
19 Counsel wrote prior to the 24th, I believe.
2 0 Q And that would be Susan Crawford?
21 A Susan Crawford.
2 2 Q We'll come to that in a moment. What was your
2 3 understanding of how this worked in terms of the Army
24 didn't have responsibility but the Agency did?
25 A Well, it was my understanding that since we
1092
/
mmms
were providing equipment that exceeded the threshold, the
dollar threshold, to another government agency for use in
accordance with a Presidential Finding or other legal
reason that it would be that agency's responsibility to
5 keep the Congress informed.
g And let me make a statement about that for a
second, if I might. One of the things that came about in
the 1983-84 time frame was the idea within the Staff ~
and it was directed by the Secretary, by Secretary Marsh
and by General Wickham — an intense sensitivity to
11 congressional notification. That was the concern that
12 resulted over Project YELLOW FRUIT and other related
activities.
^^ The Secretary made us very concerned that we
met the requirements of Congressional notification and in
fact Colonel^^H^Band the General Counsel and Bob
Winchester and I made special trips over to all of the
committee staffers to bring them up to date on what we
^^ir.^ In ^^^^^^^HI^^^B oversight. So the
were in ^p^^^^^^^HH^l^^M
notion that the Chief was concerned about Congressional
21 notification was not an unusual concern to me.
22 Q Were the problems with ISA part of that in
23 terms of Congressional sensitivity about covert
24 operations?
25 A I think yes, because ISA had gone through a
WtKSffiO
1093
23
loassfe
1 thorough review in ■82-'83, I believe, and that had been
2 wound up in the spring of '83, as I recall. And that
3 whole review action increased the sensitivity and
4 certainly as General Wickham's leadership took over we
5 were very sensitive to that.
6 Q I believe, sir, I'm correct, am I not, that
7 Secretary Marsh had been a member of Congress himself.
8 A That's right.
9 Q so he was particularly sensitive to the
10 Congressional notification issue?
11 A That's right.
12 Q Now what do your records show was your next
13 entry on Project SNOWBALL?
14 A On the 25th of February I have a note that
15 says: Russo, and then an arrow, memo that quotes
16 statute. And that is that the Chief had issued
17 instructions, and I'm quite sure it was the Chief,
18 General Wickham, would instructions for a memo to be
19 prepared on Congressional notification and the
20 requirement for Congressional notification, that memo to
21 be sent to General Powell. The Chief wanted it in
22 writing.
Q And as far as you know was such a memorandum
24 prepared?
25 A That's correct,
!lCaSS!FI!D
1094
wm/m
17
1 Q And who prepared it?
I colonel ^^^^^^^Pi^epa^ed
3 memo for my signature. It was signed on March 7 to
4 General Powell, and it referred to the requirement to
5 notify Congress.
6 Q General, I'd like for you to look at what we
7 will have marked as Brown Deposition Exhibit 1, and I ask
8 you to look at what is the last page of this exhibit. It
9 bears the number at the top of N-9900, which means for
10 the Senate Select Committee's files it is a National
11 Security Council document supplied by them.
12 I think we should point out for the record the
13 reason for that is that like a good soldier you were told
14 this was a close hold, no notes operation, and when you
15 prepared this memorandum you did not make a copy; is that
16 correct, sir?
17 A That's correct.
ig Q so the copy that we have in our files came
19 from the NSC records.
2Q (The document referred to was
21 marked Brown Exhibit Number 1
22 for identification.)
23 Now I ask you to look at this document bearing
24 a date of 7 March 1985, memorandum for the Military
25 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. That would be
UHCttSSm
1095
uNwsm
1 General Colin Powell; is that correct, sir?
2 A That's correct. The date is 7 March 1986.
3 Q I'm sorry. 1986; you are right. And this
4 bears your name, Arthur E. Brown, Jr., at the bottom and
5 your signature. Is that correct, sir?
6 A That's correct. That is my signature.
7 Q And this is the memorandum to which you made
8 reference?
9 A That is correct.
10 Q If you would look at your memorandum, you
11 indicate in paragraph two that this request for support,
12 meaning the request by the CIA that 1,000 TOW missiles be
13 provided them with a contingency for 3,509 more,
14 circumvent the normal^^^^^^^Bsystem for reasons of
15 security. Is that an accurate statement, to the best of
16 your knowledge?
17 A To the best of my knowledge it's an accurate
18 statement.
19 Q And you indicated that support exceeded the $1
20 million threshold established in the FY 1986 intelligence
21 authorization bill for reporting to Congress as a
22 significant intelligence activity; is that correct, sir?
23 A Yes, sir.
24 Q So when you stated a few minutes ago that the
25 understanding at DA was that this transfer would exceed
mmms
1096
mmsxfm
19
1 the dollar threshold, this is the threshold to which you
2 had reference?
3 A Yes, sir.
4 Q And the statute to which you were making
5 reference?
6 A Yes, sir.
7 Q In paragraph three you indicate that the
8 SecDef memorandum, the Secretary of Defense memorandum,
9 of 13 June 1983 dealing with DOD support to CIA special
10 activities establishes the responsibility for
11 notification of Congress of DOD support to the Agency
12 with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; is
13 that correct, sir?
14 A Yes, sir.
15 Q But then you indicate that in the case of TOW
16 missiles the Array understanding on responsibilities for
17 notification conforms with the Secretary's June 1983
18 memorandum; is that correct, sir?
19 A Yes.
20 Q And what that means is that when the
21 Department of Army transfers in this case TOW missiles to
22 the CIA the responsibility for notification no longer
23 rests with DA but with the recipient agency, which would
24 be the CIA; is that correct?
25 A That's correct.
UNIMSn
1097
IINttiKHEO
20
1 Q And in the final paragraph you indicate that
2 you are writing this memo to assure understanding of the
3 statutory requirement should this issue be raised by one
4 of the Congressional intelligence committees in the
5 future; is that correct, sir?
6 A That's correct, sir.
7 Q And we know now that this issue is being
8 raised.
9 A Well, the important thing is that the Chief of
10 Staff was concerned to make sure that there was a matter
11 for the record that Congressional notification had to be
12 complied with.
13 MR. KREUZER: Could I ask one question on this
14 point? In paragraph three, sir, was this a unilaterally
15 prepared memorandum to the best of your knowledge by the
16 Secretary of Defense or did he have some sort of
17 agreement with the Agency that this in fact would be a
18 procedure that the Agency would honor?
19 THE WITNESS: I don't know.
20 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
21 Q General, before I go further to the trail of
22 this piece of paper of yours, let me go back up to
2 3 something you mentioned a few moments ago. You mentioned
2 4 a memorandum by Mrs. Crawford, the General Counsel of the
25 Army. What can you tell us about that memorandum, sir?
UNttASm
1098
/
liOiSmiED
21
1 A Well, to the best of my knowledge Mrs.
2 Crawford prepared a memorandum for Secretary Marsh which
3 laid out the legal bounds of Congressional notification,
4 and as I recall that ruling, that memorandum by Ms.
5 Crawford indicated that in this case the Army was not
6 responsible for Congressional notification in view of the
7 fact that the material had been transferred to another
8 government agency and therefore the burden of
9 notification rested with that other agency.
10 Q And I believe I'm correct, am I not, that she
11 also referenced the 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act
12 and the $1 million threshold?
13 A I believe that's correct.
14 Q So I'm safe in saying that when you sent your
15 memorandum to General Powell you had the legal authority
16 of the Army General Counsel to back you up on the
17 understanding of how Congressional notification should
18 work in this case; is that correct, sir?
19 A That's correct.
20 Q Now when you sent this memorandum to General
21 Powell what happened?
22 A I have an entry in my notebook dated 12 March
23 1986 which indicated to me that I had received a phone
24 call from Colin Powell with a note that said: Letter on
25 SNOWBALL from Colin to Poindexter informing. To me that
IINemflED
1099
rnm^rni
1 is a trigger that suggested that General Powell had
2 forwarded my letter to General Poindexter informing him
3 ■ of the responsibility for Congressional notification.
4 Q Now, sir, I would ask that you look at the
5 same deposition exhibit. The page on top of your
6 memorandum is a memorandum from Major General Colin L.
7 Powell to Vice Admiral John Poindexter, the President's
8 National Security Advisor, dated 12 March 1986. Do you
9 see that, sir?
10 A Yes.
11 Q And I believe I'm correct, am I not, that you
12 were never provided this memorandum by General Powell, so
13 you did not see this until after these matters became
14 public; is that correct, sir?
15 A Yes, sir.
16 Q In that memorandum he indicates that there is
17 "unease of the Army General Counsel's office over the
18 transfer of items with which you are familiar." He does
19 not say what, but we all know and assume this is with
20 regard to the transfer of TOWs to the CIA ultimately
21 destined for Iran. And it goes on to discuss the belief
22 and the understanding that the Army does not have the
23 responsibility for notification but that the CIA does.
24 And then he indicates that "I make you aware
25 of the Army's concerns in the event you wish to advise
UUSiFlfD
1100
/
UNCUSffiD
23
1 the DCI or the Attorney General," Am I correct in saying
2 that Admiral Poindexter never notified anyone at the Army
3 that notification was taking place? Is that correct,
4 sir?
5 A That is correct to the best of my knowledge.
6 Q And am I also correct in saying that General
7 Powell never notified you or anyone else within the
8 Department of the Army that notification had taken place;
9 is that correct?
10 A That's correct.
^^ Q And no one at DA received any indication from
12 Director Casey that they were notifying Congress?
^3 A That's correct, to the best of my knowledge.
^^ Q And no one at the Department of the Army ever
15 received any communication from Attorney General Meese
16 that notification either was taking place or for some
17 reason was not required; is that correct, sir?
18 A That's correct.
^® Q I ask that you then look at the top page of
20 this Exhibit, which is a handwritten note bearing the
21 initials JP, which we. believe to be John Poindexter, to
2 2 Paul, who we believe to be Commander Paul Thompson, dated
23 3/12/86, and it says: "Put this with the Finding".
2 4 Am I correct in saying that until these
25 matters becajM-nublic you had never seen this notation
:3jP#oa4feV^ you had never
Mimmn
1101
/
I1N£USSIF1ED
24
1 from Admiral Poindexter as to the disposition of this
2 memorandum; is that correct, sir?
3 A That's correct.
4 Q I believe one entry in your log that we
5 skipped was a notation on March 7 that you had sent a
6 memorandum to — that that was the date you sent it to
7 General Powell and that Colonel^^^^^^Hhad prepared it;
8 is that correct, sir?
9 A Actually that was not a notation in my
10 notebook to that effect. The memo to Powell re Congress
11 notified, but I did not have a journal entry on that, to
12 the best of my knowledge.
13 Q All right, sir. Now I believe on March 16,
14 which would be after you had heard from General Powell
15 that this had been passed on, General Russo came to see
16 you to tell you that Secretary Taft — that's Deputy
17 Secretary of Defense William H. Taft, IV — had gotten in
18 touch with the Chief of Staff regarding Project SNOWBALL;
19 is that correct, sir?
20 A That's correct.
21 Q And wha^ does your entry show for that day?
22 A My entry shows that Secretary Taft contacted
23 the Chief of Staff. I was told that that happened in the
24 tank, in the JCS meeting room. My notation shows that,
25 refers to TOWs. It says: TOW-II SNOWBALL. I don't
imeitswn
1102
icussiREir
1 understand the notation TOW-II, because we were working
2 with basic TOWs. My notation says: 1,500, all to get,
3 with an uncertainty, which means we're not sure about
4 that number. Also indicates that the Agency wanted 200-
5 plus or minus spare parts for HAWKs, and the 200 referred
6 to line item numbers rather than the specific numbers of
7 parts.
8 Q All right, sir. Let's leave the HAWKs aside
9 for a moment. It's possible, I guess, that TOW-II
10 SNOWBALL could refer to the fact that this is the
11 requirement for the second shipment of TOWs with regard
12 to SNOWBALL. Is that possible?
13 A Possibly.
14 Q we know that the first shipment was 1,000 TOWs
15 and the second shipment wound up being 508 TOWs. So do
16 you believe your number of 1,500 might have had reference
17 to the second shipment combined with the first to make
18 1,500 all together?
19 A Could possibly.
20 Q So if I understand it, then, it was the
21 directive from Secretary Taft that actually put in motion
22 the second shipment?
2 3 A I believe that's correct.
24 Q Or was it that he was simply notifying the
25 Chief that it had been put in place?
wmm
1103
UNcussn
26
1 A I'm really not sure of that. I think you
2 probably would have to talk to General Russo about that.
3 ' I don't get enough out of my notes to recollect that.
4 Q Okay, sir. Secretary Taft also made mention
5 of some spare parts for HAWK missiles.
6 A That's true.
7 Q Is that the first you had heard about this
8 requirement?
9 A Yes, it was.
10 Q In terms of the HAWK spare parts, I believe
11 you told me previously that General Russo came to see you
12 on April 16; is that correct, sir?
13 A That's correct.
14 Q And what did General Russo say at that time?
15 A Well, he had indicated — actually he had
16 reflected to me that Mr. Taft had talked to the Chief and
17 had mentioned the TOWs under Project SNOWBALL, and then
18 he went on to say that the CIA wants about 200 line items
19 of spare parts for HAWKs. He reported that there were a
20 total of 234 line items and actually 218 were finally
21 provided, my notes indicate.
22 Q Did he give you a specific breakdown of the
23 ability of the Army to meet the requirement?
24 A In general terms, stated that of the 234, 144
25 lines were all right. My note says: 144, okay, which
!H
r.^T^s
1104
/
wmmm
27
1 means they were okay to ship or to provide. Thirty-eight
2 had a negative impact, meaning no readiness impact.
3 Three were substitutes, meaning that there were three
4 lines that were provided as substitute items. Therefore,
5 there were 188, I believe, of the 234 that were
6 requested.
7 Q I believe there were 46 line item numbers
8 remaining that General Russo told you if they were to
9 meet the requirement there would be greater than 50
10 percent of the stocks available with 11 numbers; is that
11 correct, sir?
12 A Yes, that's correct. Eleven items, if
13 provided, would represent more than 50 percent of our
14 stock. Fifteen represented 100 percent or more of the
15 parts available.
16 Q And does that mean there would be total
17 depletion of existing inventories as we knew them to
18 exist at that time if we met the requirement on those
19 items?
20 A That's correct.
21 Q And were there any items for which there would
22 be less than 50 percent but still significant depletion?
23 A Well, let's see. There were 15 that
24 represented 100 percent or more of the parts available.
25 Nine were at zero balance, which we couldn't provide.
ietJtSSIFIED
1105
[iCLASSillD
28
1 The Agency had deleted two lines, and then we had 15
2 lines that were unidentifiable. And then I have a note
3 that indicates that we were to get an answer by the
4 following Friday on the identification of the
5 unidentif iables.
6 Q Did you have in your notations any notice of a
7 get well date for some of the items that would be
8 depleted?
9 A Yes. It seemed to me it was April of '87.
10 Let me just verify that. Yeah, February to April of '87,
11 get well date.
12 Q Now get well date, is that Army readiness talk
13 suggesting the date it would take to replenish the
14 existing inventories from Army vendors?
15 A That's correct.
16 Q And some of those items I assume would be in
17 the pipeline and in the process of being provided, and
18 others would be new procurement?
19 A That's correct.
20 Q I believe these data were supplied to you by
21 General Russo orally; is that correct?
22 A That's correct.
2 3 Q Once you were told that, was it your
24 understanding that this was simply a status report or an
25 update or were you to go forward and convey this
ONftMim
1106
miffiiED
29
1 readiness information to someone else?
2 A No. At that point that was a status report.
3 (Pause.)
4 You had asked about the nature of the Russo
5 report on the 16th of April. That was a routine update,
6 General Russo keeping me advised of the progress of the
7 requirement, and he indicated to me — I have a note that
8 says there was a problem with CIA on the money to be
9 received. No other point about that. But there was not
10 an alarmist notation about the report. And I accepted it
11 as a routine status report.
12 Q Did you convey those numbers to General
13 Wickham?
14 A I do not believe so.
15 Q And did you render any judgment to General
16 Russo as to whether the requirements should or should not
17 be met in terms of any readiness impact?
18 A No, I didn't. Normally the requirement for
19 readiness impact goes to the DCS/OPS, the operations
20 officer.
Q As part of the^^^^^^^^Vprocess?
22 A As part of the^^^^|^^^H process, and in
23 fact of any provision of equipment from Army stocks that
24 must go through the readiness review with the Director of
25 Operations in any formal recommendations to either the
tmmc
n!^y,i*dvi!'
1107
iiNcussm
30
Chief or the Secretary.
Q And I believe there are people at DCS/OPS
through the normal ^^^^^^^^^Bprocess who do nothing but
look at the readiness impact of requests; is that
correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q And is it safe to say this tasking did not
have the benefit of the normal readiness staffing?
A I'm not sure of that. I'm just not sure of
that because of the close-hold nature of this particular
action, but, as I recall. General Russo's report to me
was not one that would say this is a significant problem
for us. And so I didn't view it as that and therefore
jelieved it was important to report it to the Chief.
1108
1
2 Q Now you mentioned a moment ago that General
3 Russo told you there was some problem with the CIA on the
4 money to be received. What can you tell us about that,
5 sir?
6 A Well, the only thing I can tell you is that
7 that's what my notebook reflects, and to the best of my
8 knowledge General Russo indicated that that's a problem
9 that's to be worked. And there was nothing else. If
10 there had been problems subsequent to that concerning
11 that matter. General Russo would have come back to me.
12 And I did not hear from him again on that matter. In
13 fact, that was the last status report I had from General
14 Russo, and therefore was under the irpression that the
15 requirements that were levied on us vare met.
16 Q Sir, as we now know with the benefit of the
17 Department of Army IG and the course of these
18 investigations on the Hill and internal examinations by
19 DA, there were lots of fits and starts on this and false
20 starts from the CIA where they'd say get the missiles
21 ready to ship and then they would back off and that would
22 be changed, and there were delays and safety
23 modifications required and a lot of back and forth.
24 Were you ever made aware of any of those
25 details and those problems?
msimm
1109
WUSSM
32
1 A No, I was not.
2 Q Was there a single individual who actually
3 made the decision on the HAWK repair parts to meet the
4 requirement and ship these to the Agency?
5 A Well, I would assume it would be General
6 Russo. As I understood it, General wickham had charged
7 General Russo as the staff officer responsible for
8 meeting the requirements that were levied by Defense.
9 Q You just put this as a requirement levied by
10 Defense. Is it correct to say that normally when a
11 request comes from the Agency it is a request and it
12 comes in laterally to the Department of Army and goes
the^^^l^^^^B system?
14 A That's correct. In fact, it comes in through
15 the^^^^
16 ^^^^^and then it is forwarded now directly '
17 Q And these two requests, SNOWBALL and CROCUS,
18 were viewed as a requirement coming down from on high
19 within the Office of the Secretary of Defense?
20 A That's correct. It was my understanding that
21 th« direction for both the TOW and the HAWK parts, for
22 the TOW missiles and the HAWK parts, came from the Office
23 of the Secretary of Defense.
24 Q What would be your understanding as to whether
25 the Department of the Army institutionally or any
imSSHlD
1110
9
10
11
2
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
25
UNClMSn
33
individuals involved, civilian or military leadership,
felt there was any discretion in the decision to meet
this requirement?
A TO the best of my knowledge it was an order,
and there was no discretion, and discretion was not in
g order.
Q YOU indicated that in the normal proces^^a
request coming from th^genc^i^j^oul^^through^^J
To your
SSSJ^JJ^dT^^ir^we, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, or the Joint Chiefs collectively ever involved in
any decisionmaking on SNOWBALL or CROCUS?
A Not to my knowledge. I just .on't know.
Q To your knowledge did they ever look at the
provision of TOWs or HAWK repair parts along the lines of
readiness impact or strategic impact in the Iran-Iraq war
or the issue of whether it would be a jeopardy to U.S.
defense for the Iranians to have our weapons systems?
A Not to my knowledge.
20 Q NOW I believe you told me earlier that you had
21 no knowledge of the ultimate destination of these
missiles, TOWS, or HAWK repair parts; is that correctl
A That's correct.
24 Q
22
23
You did not know that they were going to Iran?
That's correct.
mtmm
nil
12
2 Israel?
34
You did not know they were going through
^ A That's correct.
4 Q To your knowledge was anyone within the
5 Department of Army proper aware of their ultimate
6 destination?
■7 A Not to my knowledge.
8 Q And I say Department of Army proper because
9 General Colin Powell is a green suit Army type, but he
was in the office of the Secretary of Defense.
That's correct. And, as I say, I don't know
10
11 A
of anybody that was working in the Department of the Army
that was aware of the ultimate destination.
Q I believe you indicated that on October 29,
1986, you had a conversation either with Secretary Marsh
or his executive assistant, Brigadier General Carmen
Cavezza — C-a-v-e-z-z-a ~ regarding some questions that
had arisen with regard to SNOWBALL and CROCUS; is that
correct, sir?
A That's correct.
Q And what can you tell us about that
conversation?
A Well, there was, as I recollect — and I can't
recall — i believe it was General Cavezza, I was
discussing with him, indicating that there was some
1112
UNClASSn
1 concern about the provision of missiles and HAWK spare
2 parts and that it led me to go back through my mind about
3 the actions that we took with regard to those
4 requirements. As a result of that conversation, I placed
5 a secure phone call to General Powell, who by that time
6 was stationed in Frankfort, Germany.
7 Q He had left the Office of the Secretary of
8 Defense as the military assistant to Secretary
9 Weinberger?
10 A That's correct, and had assumed command of
11 Fifth Corps, United States Army, Europe, stationed in
12 Frankfort. I called him and asked him if he had recalled
13 receiving a memo, because, as I indicated earlier — as
14 you indicated earlier — I did not have a record of the
15 memo that I sent him.
16 Q And you were calling him about the memorandum
17 which we have made Deposition Exhibit 1?
18 A That's correct.
19 Q And let me say for the record, meaning no
20 disrespect to you, sir, but everyone with whom I've
21 spoken at DA or on the Congressional staffs refer to this
22 as the Brown memo, because you wrote it, so you were
23 calling him about the Brown memo; is that correct?
24 A That's correct. He vaguely remembered but was
25 not sure. He subsequently called me back and indicated
wmms
1113
(iHcyissiffii)
''*iLf flvvu-itn
1 that he, to the best of his knowledge, he had forwarded
2 my memo with a cover memo to Admiral Poindexter
3 concerning the policy on how Congress was to be notified,
4 meaning to me that Congress should be notified in that
5 case.
6 I have an entry in my log to that effect.
7 Q Did he have in his files a copy of his memo or
8 your memo?
9 A To the best of my knowledge he did not. I
10 checked with his secretary, his former secretary.
11 Q Who was still in the Secretary's office?
12 A Who was still in the Office of the Secretary
13 of Defense, Miss Nancy Hughes. Nancy indicated to me
14 that when General Powell vacated the office he reviewed
15 his files in a different room and she did not have access
16 to them.
17 Q So as far as she knew there was no record of
18 this?
19 A That's right, and she did not recall that
20 memo.
21 Q Was that your last conversation with General
22 Powell on the issue of the Brown memo?
23 A That was my last conversation with him.
24 Q And was that your last conversation with him
25 on the issue of SNOWBALL or CROCUS generally?
iJNIMOTEir
82-690 0-88-37
1114
Wiumm
37
1 A Yes, it was.
2 Q Now you wrote him initially, General Powell,
3 on March 7 and then on March 12 1 believe you told us he
4 called you back to say that the letter had gone forward
5 to Admiral Poindexter. From that point, if that's
6 correct, that he called you on March 12, until the time
7 you called him on October 29, when he was at that point
8 in Germany, were there any discussions you had with
9 General Powell on the issue of TOHs to Iran or HAWK spare
10 parts to Iran?
11 A No. Well, to the best of my knowledge, I
12 didn't deal directly with General Powell except with
13 regard to that memorandum and the telephone call that
14 followed that.
15 Q As far as you know, did anyone in the office
16 of the Secretary of Defense or the NSC or anywhere else
17 within the Executive Branch of the government ever get
18 back to you personally or anyone at DA and say the issue
19 of Congressional notification was being worked, being
20 executed, being carried forth, et cetera?
21 A No one got back to me and, to the best of my
22 knowledge, no one else in the Department of the Army was
23 notified.
24 Q Did anyone within DA, yourself included, ever
25 raise the question of maybe we ought to go back and check
UNtmm
1115
Mmms
38
1 and see if this was done?
2 A No.
^ ■ Q Do you have a sense of whether that's
4 understandable or appropriate or whether somebody should
5 have raised the issue, or was it your understanding that
6 General Powell made clear it was being taken care of?
7 A Well, in retrospect, as I indicated. General
8 Powell never came back, never fed back that that
notification had been made or that he had forwarded that
memo on. On the other hand, we had made it a matter of
record of the requirement for Congressional notification
and believed that we were in compliance with the law.
Q At any point in your discussions on these
issues did the issue or existence of a Presidential
Finding come up pursuant to which the TOWs and HAWKs
would have gone forward?
A No.
Q Was there any speculation within DA about
where these missiles were going?
A No speculation that came to my attention,
my own mind I thought perhaps they were goinc
I was not aware of any weapons systems of this nature
having been providedf^^^^HT but I
But Iran was the least of my expectations.
'^ ■iA^#l^i'°4"0kB€liNltfHPt about that. When I met
linSfRIB
1116
y
39
1 with you before you said Iran was the last place I would
2 have thought they would go.
3 A That's right. That's a very accurate
4 statement.
5 Q Would you elaborate on that, sir, and tell us
6 why you would have been surprised that they went to Iran,
7 and particularly what your understanding was at the time
8 in terms of our selling arms to Iran directly or
9 indirectly?
10 A Well, I just reflect back to the 1979-80
11 period, when United States citizens were taken hostage.
12 Our relationships with the Iranians were cool at best
13 since that time. We have maintained a neutral stance in
14 the Iranian-Iraq war. But certainly we have not in any
15 way expressed any overt and, to my knowledge, any covert
16 support on the Iranian side.
17 And I will say that there is a great deal of
18 animosity on the part of many members of the officer
19 corps with regard to the Iranians, with regard to the
20 current Iranian administration.
21 Q Was there in fact an embargo in place on
22 shipment of arms to Iran?
23 A That's correct.
24 Q And was there not in fact an operation being
25 headed up by the State Department called Operation
mmsm
1117
mMsm
40
1 staunch in which we were pressuring our allies not to
2 ship arms to Iran?
3 ■ A I'm not familiar with the particular name of
4 operations, but I was aware of the fact that there was an
5 effort on the part of the United States Government to
6 preclude allies from engaging in purchases or sales of
7 arms and also I was aware that arms sales that had been
8 negotiated before the revolution, those deliveries were
9 on hold.
10 Q That would be through normal FMS foreign
11 military sales?
12 A That's correct.
13 Q And is it fair to say that our policy of
14 neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war would have been fairly
15 well understood not only within the Department of the
16 Army but the Department of Defense, the NSC, State
17 Department?
18 A To the best of my )cnowledge it was clear
19 amongst the leadership of the Army.
20 Q General Brown, did you ever have any person
21 involvement in any of what we now know were fairly
22 complicated and confusing pricing questions on the TOW
23 missiles?
24 A No. In all FMS cases and in cases of
25 provision of arms and equipment to agencies outside the
mmm
1118
UNaiSSIIIEir
41
1 Department of the Army those pricing — the pricing is
2 developed in the Army Materiel Command, and normally that
3 doesn't come to the attention of leadership unless there
4 is something that is extraordinary, and in my four years
5 that had never been the case.
6 Q So I take it, then. General Russo never said
7 to you that there were any problems or complications with
8 regard to pricing the TOW missiles?
9 A That's correct.
10 Q Are you familiar with something called the
11 AMDF?
12 A Yes.
13 Q And that stands for the Army Master Data File?
14 A That's correct.
15 Q And what can you tell us, sir, about the AHDF?
16 What is it and how is it used?
17 A Well, to the best of my knowledge the AMDF is
18 used as a pricing guide and that determines the price
19 that we pay for items of equipment and, therefore, that
20 provides the basis for the amount of money that would be
21 transferred in the event those items of equipment are
22 transferred out of the Department.
23 Q And is it safe to say that in sort of layman's
24 terms it's a catalog for material and equipment so one
25 could go to it and look up a particular item and see what
wmma
1119
liNGUSao
42
1 the stock number was, price, et cetera?
2 A That's correct.
3 Q And as far as you know it's fairly widely used
4 throughout the Department of the Army?
5 A That's correct.
6 MR. SAXON: Let's go off a second.
7 (A discussion was held off the record.)
8 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
9 Q General, were you ever aware that there was
10 any pressure on General Russo or anyone else within the
11 Department of the Army to come up with a low price on the
12 TOW missiles?
13 A I was not aware of that, no.
14 Q Are you familiar with the Economy Act?
15 A Basically.
16 Q And I believe that is the Act that is used
17 when one agency of the government transfers something to
18 another agency of the government; is that correct?
19 A That's correct.
20 Q And the Economy Act would normally govern a
21 transfer from the Department of the Army to the CIA?
22 A Yes, that's true.
23 Q And to your knowledge was the Economy Act used
24 in this instance for TOWs and HAWK repair parts?
25 A To the best of my knowledge.
mmw
1120
wussm
43
1 Q Do you have any knowledge about whether the
2 Economy Act permits the transferring agency to charge
3 replacement cost, or have you ever had reason to get
4 involved in the pricing question?
5 A I have not been involved in the pricing
6 question. To the best of my knowledge we have been
7 charging, that the basis of charge is the acquisition
8 cost rather than replacement cost.
9 Q All right, sir. Throughout all of SNOWBALL
10 and CROCUS and any involvement you had, were you told at
11 any point or was it repeated at various points that this
12 was a sensitive operation, close hold, no notes and so
13 forth?
14 A Extremely close hold. A question about
15 whether there was specific guidance about no notes or
16 not, because I have notes about it in general terms, and
17 if there was a specific direction on no notes, then I
18 would not have had any notes at all. But fundamentally
19 it was well understood to be an extraordinarily close
20 hold operation, and there were very, very few people that
21 were aware of its existence.
22 Q I believe you told us earlier, General, that
23 as far as you know there have been no transfers to the
24 CIA other than SNOWBALL and CROCUS from the Army which
bypassed the^^^^^^^Hsystem.
lltlBStFttO
1121
wmms
44
1 A That's to the best of my knowledge. That's
2 right.
3 Q Would that include the fact that there have
4 been some very sensitive transfers from DA to the CIA
5 that have gone through the^^^^^^^^^V system?
6 A That is correct.
7 Q And on matters that were particularly
8 sensitive in terms of the security consideration?
9 A Yes.
10 Q Were you aware of any existing ceiling during
11 1986 that the Congress had imposed on the number of TOW
12 missiles that could be purchased during that year?
13 A No.
14 Q And I would assume, then, that that issue
15 never came up in any of these discussions?
16 A That's correct. That issue did not come up,
17 to my )cnowledge.
18 . (A discussion was held off the record.)
19 THE WITNESS: I wasn't sure. I thought you
20 were referring to some specific language that limited our
21 purchase, our acquisition of TOWs. If you are referring
22 to the authorization act or the appropriations act which
2 3 specify the number of any type of weapons system that can
24 be purchased by the Department, I am aware of that.
25 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
UNfiWSSIflfO
1122
wmm
45
1 Q Would there have been people working on the
2 TOW requirement who would have known what that number was
3 for 1986 and whether they would have been able to
4 replenish existing Array stocks during the calendar year?
5 A Yes, they would have been aware of that.
6 Q But as far as you know when this issue was
7 being worked it was never presented to you as a
8 consideration?
9 A Absolutely not.
10 Q All right, sir. The Department of the Army
11 had an Inspector General investigation into the pricing
12 of the weapons and the transfer of the HAWKs, et cetera,
13 did they not?
14 A That's correct.
15 Q Have you had occasion to review their report?
16 A I had an opportunity to review that report.
17 Q As far as you know, was it an accurate and
18 thorough report?
19 A Yes.
20 Q General, in the process of conducting that
21 investigation the Army IG was told by at least one
22 Assistant Secretary of Defense — and that would be Mr.
2 3 Armitage — in response to a question of who else in the
24 Department of Defense should be interviewed, Mr. Armitage
25 recommended that Secretary Taft be interviewed because he
BNWStflED
1123
1 had had some involvement.
2 As you yourself indicate, while it may be
3 limited he at least was witting of this mission and he
4 had some involvement in it. The Army Inspector General
5 chose not to interview Secretary Taft. Do you have any
6 knowledge of why that might have been?
7 A No, I don't.
8 Q Do you have a judgment from what you know
9 about Secretary Taft's involvement and that you know
10 about IG reports whether he perhaps should have been
11 interviewed?
12 A I would say that was a judgment call. The
13 purpose of the IG report was to look at the specifics of
14 the pricing and it would be a question in my own mind of
15 any of Secretary Taft's involvement in the pricing. He
16 issued instructions, but to my knowledge the relationship
17 of those instructions to pricing I don't see a
18 connection.
19 Q Would it be fair to say the connection might
20 come in that a lot of the problems with pricing resulted
21 because the people who normally would have been involved
22 with pricing were not involved because the instructions
23 given from the Secretary of Defense's office through
24 General Powell and Mr. Taft were that this to be a close
25 hold with not many people involved? Would that be a
mmm
1124
mamm
47
1 possible connection?
2 A Possible, though my understanding is that the
3 pricing for TOWs would have been developed in the Army
4 Materiel Command and based on the acquisition prices. It
5 is complex because there were missiles with and without
6 modifications, and then there were different types of
7 missiles that had to be further modified, which
8 complicated the pricing formulas.
9 But I would not have connected that.
10 Q All right, sir. We're not trying to point the
11 finger at the IG. We're simply trying to make a judgment
12 of whether they should or shouldn't have interviewed
13 Secretary Taft. In your judgment would it have been at
14 all unusual that they chose not to interview the top
15 folks at the Pentagon?
16 A It was not unusual to me that they chose not
17 to interview Mr. Taft.
18 Q Are you aware of the GAO report on the pricing
19 and the transfer issues?
20 A I am aware of it vaguely but I have not read
21 it.
2 2 Q Are you aware that with regard to four
2 3 discrete pricing questions the GAO report concluded that
2 4 on all four of them the prices wound up being low and by
2 5 that the I-TOW price, the assessments that were made on
MttSSIflED
1125
UW^ASKD
48
1 price, came in too low, the price on the basic TOW was
2 too low, the price on the MOIC was too low, and the price
3 that the Army came up with as an estimate for handing,
4 crating and transportation was too low?
5 A Yeah. I'm aware that there was — that there
6 were several audits or investigations that determined
7 that the pricing was too low, but I believe that it was
8 determined, at least to my impression that those low
9 prices were based on error and on the complexity of
10 putting modifications on or changing the configuration of
11 the missiles.
12 Q Sir, is it your judgment that the Army has
13 learned anything in terms of pricing or handling a
14 sensitive request like this from this experience?
15 A Well, certainly the issue of pricing has come
16 to the forefront and the Under Secretary of the Army is
17 deeply involved in ensuring that pricing techniques are
18 watched closely and done very carefully.
19 Q Am I also correct in saying that one
20 additional constructive thing that's come from all of
21 this is that the Army General Counsel now sees
22 Presidential Findings and receives them from the National
23 Security Council for review; is that correct, sir?
24 A I was aware that the Army General Counsel now
25 has access to them. I was not aware that she gets them
UNStftSHO
1126
llHttASSIHED
49
1 for review, but was aware that she has access to them.
2 That's correct.
3 Q I may be incorrect in saying she gets them for
4 review before the fact, but at least she sees them; is
5 that correct, sir?
6 A To the best of my knowledge.
7 MR. SAXON: I believe those are all the
8 questions I have on the TOWs and HAWKs and maybe Joe and
9 Roger have something further.
10 EXAMINATION
11 BY MR. SABA:
12 Q General, I just have a few questions by way of
13 follow-up. Returning to the time you first learned about
14 the requirement to provide the Agency with TOWs, who told
15 you that it was to be treated as a close-hold matter?
16 A To the best of my knowledge, the Chief of
17 Staff.
18 Q That would be General Wickham at the time?
19 A Yes, to the best of my knowledge. I
20 understood fully when I was first informed of the project
21 that it was a very close hold project. It seems to me
22 that General Wickham was going out of town. I could look
23 at calendars to verify that. It seems to me that he was
24 going out of town and he mentioned to me about the
25 project, and it was the 18th of February, and he said I
U[^«m
1127
nmiRED
50
1 need legal advice concerning Congressional notification.
2 And in the context of that conversation it was
3 clear to me it was a very close hold.
4 Q Did he indicate that anyone else had told him
5 to treat it as a close-hold matter?
6 A No, not specifically. I don't recall
7 specifically.
8 Q Who told you that the fulfillment of the
9 requirement would not go through the^^^^^^^^^H system?
10 A Nobody told me that it would or would not.
11 Just by nature, I mean, by the manner in which it was
12 requested it was clear to me it was my understanding that
13 the Chief of Staff had levied the responsibility on
14 General Russo to be the action agent within the logistics
15 community to supervise the action.
16 Very honestly, it didn't flash to me we should
17 put this into the^^^^^^^^| system or not put it in.
18 It just didn't occur to me. I got a set of instructions
19 from the Chief of Staff, who received a set of
20 instructions from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
21 to perform this transfer.
22 Q Were you aware of any requirements in 1985,
23 specifically November or December of 1985, to provide
24 TOWs or HAWKS to either the Agency or possibly to Iran —
2 5 first, the Agency?
UHEtASSm
1128
iOUiS«D
51
1 A No. I was not aware of any previous actions
2 to provide TOWs or HAWK parts to the Agency, although
3 there could have been^^^^^^^^Vactivities, actions
4 that would do that. But I didn't have personal
5 knowledge.
6 MR. SAXON: What about specific provision of
7 TOWs or HAWK missiles, and this would be complete systems
8 and not parts, to Israel in late 1985?
9 THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge. I was not
10 aware. It could have been through a regular FMS case,
11 but those would not necessarily come through our office.
12 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
13 Q Were you aware of any requirement placed on
14 Noel Koch specifically to obtain information about,
15 first, the availability of HAWKs and, second, the price
16 of TOWs in the period November-December of 1985?
17 A No. In fact, in this whole operation or up
18 until that time I didn't know Noel Koch was involved in
19 any of that. I know he was Assistant Secretary of
20 Defense for International Security Affairs responsible
21 for special operations and low intensity conflict
22 matters, but I was not aware of his involvement in any
23 actions such as that.
24 Q Was there any time in which you became aware
25 of Mr. Koch's involvement in determining the price for
mmmmi
1129
WMSXim
52
1 TOWS between the United States and Israel or any third
2 party?
3 A No. I've never done any business or even
4 heard of Noel Koch's name mentioned in conjunction with
5 pricing of TOWs or HAWKs.
6 Q Do you have any recollection in the
7 discussions of pricing that you might have been involved
8 in of the number $4,500 being indicated as the price for
9 the TOWs to be provided to the Agency?
10 A No. The number $4,500 in that context doesn't
11 ring a bell with me.
12 MR. SAXON: Related to that, were you ever
13 told that CIA had a ceiling on the amount of money they
14 could use to purchase the TOWs?
15 THE WITNESS: No. As I indicated, the only
16 point that was ever made concerning the finances of the
17 operation was the one journal entry that I have in my
18 notebook that said some question about the money from the
19 CIA, and that was reflected by General Russo to me, and I
2 0 assume from that that was some type of administrative
21 problem that the Agency had with cutting a check.
2 2 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
2 3 Q So is it correct to say that General Russo did
24 not mention to you in detail what that problem on the
25 finances was
BHtll&SW
1130
nAs«q
1 A No, he didn't at all.
2 MR. SAXON: He never mentioned that the Agency
3 was having to go back to the White House or the NSC for
4 funding?
5 THE WITNESS: Not to me, no. You know, as I
6 indicated, no, there was no discussion of funding at all
7 other than that one point, that he said there's some
8 problem with the CIA.
9 MR. SABA: I have nothing further.
10 MR. KREUZER: I have some. Are you guys
11 through, more or less? I'd like to go off the record.
12 (A discussion was held off the record.)
BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
14 Q General, let me ask you if you have any recent
15 or new information you can provide the two Committees
16 with regard to what we all know now as YELLOW FRUIT or
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|of became a
18 part. Is there any new or additional information about
19 whether there is a secret Swiss bank account that either
20 the Department of the Army is involved with or any
21 current or former DA employee is a signatory on?
22 A Well, we did have a report that Mr. Golden,
23 who was a former member of a covert operation called
2 4 YELLOW FRUIT —
2S Q That would be William T. Golden?
BNWSIflED
1131
1 A Yes, that he had recalled having signed a
2 signature card for a Swiss bank account. We sent Mr.
3 Golden to Geneva to try to find out more details of that
4 account, but to the best of my knowledge he was denied
5 any information by the Swiss banking officials, for
6 reasons that I'm not specifically familiar with.
7 Q So your testimony today would be to the best
8 of your knowledge the existence of such an account has
9 yet to be confirmed?
10 A That's correct. I believe, because Golden
11 indicated that he had signed a number of signature cards,
12 and my suspicion is that there was a signature card that
13 dealt with a Swiss bank account, but we've not been able
14 to uncover any details of it.
15 Q In your judgment is there anything which
16 connects YELLOW FRUIT either specifically or using that
17 rubric for any of the related operations, that connects
18 it to the Iran-contra affair as we know it?
19 A We've been chasing that and have been unable
2 0 to get any connection. Some of the same names crop up,
21 but we have not found any direct connectivity between
22 YELLOW FRUIT or any other covert Army activity and the
23 Iran-contra affair. ^^__^^^_^^^_^^^__^^__
1132
Q I believe you told me previously that there
was an officer — I believe the name you gave me was
Schneider — who spent a year doing a thorough review of
YELLOW FRUIT. Is that correct, sir?
A That's correct. Colonel Schneider worked for
me directly as military supervisor, although he was
working under the auspices of Mr. Ted Greenberg from the
Department of Justice. Colonel Schneider's job was to
review all of the records and inventory and catalog all
of the materiel in operation YELLOW FRUIT. It took him
the better part of a year to do that.
Q And it's safe to say that he never surfaced
the existence of any offshore bank accounts; is that
correct?
A That's correct.
Q To your- knowledge what is the total amount of
money in YELLOW FRUIT that as to this day is yet
unaccounted for?
I don't know
m
now. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
1133
wmm
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Q Doyo!^hin)^^apossible that any
individuals who wer* involved in th« Iran-contra affairs
looked at YELLOW FRUIT or SEA SPRAY and saw demonstrated
a capability there of being sort of out of the system
with money that's less accountable and procedures and
requirements and red tape that was not such an imposition
as it might h- ^-- normal .chanoftlft^and learned a lesson
wmm
1134
57
1 there that may have given to rise to what we've come to
2 , investigate?
3 A Repeat the early part of your question, John.
4 I missed it.
5 Q From what we understand to have taken place,
6 say with SEA SPRAY and the purchase of|
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I the
8 Congressional appropriations process, the ability to
9 rapidly do things to deploy, to move money quickly, et
10 cetera, the question arises whether any individuals may
11 have taken note of that and seen the wisdom or the
12 desirability of creating a sort of outside the system
13 network which we know Colonel North and General Secord
14 and others to have created?
15 A Well, I'm not sure about that. It seems to me
16 that you do see the same names cropping up, but I haven't
17 drawn from that, and I've been unable to run down — and
18 we're continuing to spend a lot of effort trying to run
19 any connectivity between Colonel North's operation and
20 thoae covert operations that we have in place or had in
21 place, but we have not been able to find any
22 connectivity.
23 I think, you know, the capability was there
24 before 1984, but once the^^Hwas put into operation I'm
25 pretty sure that there was notamr opportunity to take
that there was notamr_^j
1135
nwussim
1 advantage.
2 Q In terms of the Department of the Army?
3 A In terms of the Department of the Army, that's
4 right.
5 MR. SAXON: That's all I have on that
6 particular point.
7 MR. KREUZER: I was going to ask the broader
8 question. We may want to go off the record on this.
9 MR. SAXON: Let's go off.
10 (A discussion was held off the record.)
11 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
12 Q General, let me ask you a question that is out
13 of the context of the Iran side of the Iran-contra
14 affairs, that being TOWs and HAWK repair parts, and go to
15 the contra side. There are a number of Army personnel,
16 enlisted and officers in Central America in the various
17 Mil Groups, and in some cases in the Embassies directly.
18 To your knowledge, has there been any formal
19 Army investigation of the involvement of these
20 individuals as to whether they have improperly assisted
21 the contras during any of their activities?
22 A Not to my knowledge.
23 Q If there's been no investigation, let me ask
24 you this. Are you aware of any involvement by any of
25 those individuals which we would deem improper?
lil«D'
1136
wimm
1 A Not to my knowledge.
2 Q The next question deals with security
assistance. While there is an agency within the Pentagon
that deals with that, particularly the Defense Security
Assistance Agency, there are some of the same individuals
in Ar:ny uniforms in Central America who have involvement
7 with security assistance programs.
8 To your knowledge have there been any
9 instances in which the United States has made the
10 provision of security assistance contingent on the
11 recipient country aiding the contras?
12 A Not to my knowledge.
j^3 Q And I would ask that whether it be with us
14 holding out security assistance as a carrot to induce
15 said aid or whether on the part of the recipient country
16 it used aid to the contras as leverage to extract
17 security assistance. Your answer would still be the
18 same
19
20
A Not to my knowledge.
MR. SAXON: All right, General Brown, I
21 believe those are all the questions I have. Let me see
22 if my colleagues have anything further.
23 MR. SABA: No.
24 MR. KREUZER: No.
25 MR. SAXON: Let me say on the record then.
yNCLt<J<^PfD
1137
15
19
UNCLASSMD
60
1 sir, first of all and for the record, you have appeared
2 here voluntarily. We appreciate your having met with us
3 previously. We appreciate your candor and directness,
4 and we also should say for the record, because you are
5 Director of the Army Staff and the Vice Chief of staff in
6 waiting that these committees have received nothing, at
7 least speaking for myself we have received nothing but
8 the utmost of cooperation from the Department of the
9 Army, from Colonel Wallace, from Mr. Winchester, and
10 Secretary Marsh on down.
11 We appreciate that very much.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
13 (Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the taking of the
14 instant deposition ceased.)
16 Signature of the witness
17 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
18 , 1987,
20 Notary Public
21 My Commission Expires:
iiiAS^SIffiD
1138
UNWSIRED
C£XTI?ICAI£ OF REPORTER
; i c h a 1 A . J c '.-. a f
^ , :ria orricer oerore vho-n :ria
i or ^l J XT. I deposition was ca<an, do hereby lertifv chac trie vi:?. ess
wnose testi-nony appears in the foregoing deposition was d u 1 ;•■ sworn
by ^|^_^ ; chat the testimony of said witness was
taken by ae to the best of aiy ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting
under my direction; that said deposition is a true record of tne testi:non;.'
given by said witness; that I an neither counsel for, related to, nor
employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition
was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any
attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.
My Commission expires;
■.'OTARY PUBLIC \J
omssm
1139
Uim^lilEB
OIPAHTMCNT Of TH| AMMY
wAtHiMOTON ee leiio
"' 9900
7 MAR ;ce6
MBMORANDOM FOR THE NILITMtY^>«^STA)rr TO THE SECRBTMT OP OCPENSB
SOBJBCT: Conqrcflslonal Notification of Significant Intalll^anc*
Activitiaa (0)
1. trS/MOPORH) On 18 January 19t6, tha Army raspondad to a varbal
taaking fro* your offica to provida 1,000 TON Bisailaa to tha
Cantral Intalliganca Aqancy with a continqancy for 3,S09 aora at a
latar data. Tha first 1,000 misailas vara dalivarad on
14 rabruary 1986 to tha CIA.
^^rTS/NQTORN ) Thii raquatt for support circunvantad tha normal -
^■■■■■IsystaB for raaaons of sacurity, yat tha support
axcaadadtha $1 Billion thrashold astablishad in tha rT86
Intalliganca Authorization Bill for raportin? to Conqrass as a
■significant intalliganca activity.* Funds in axcaas of $3.5
million vara providad by tha CIA to raiabursa tha Arsy for tha
firat 1,000 Bissilas. Billing and payaant will occur within 60
days, or whan all missilas ara dalivarad, whichavar is shortar.
Tha Agancy axpacta to coaplata tha projact within 60 days.
3. rT5/NQJ0RlJ)SECDE^M^randu^of 13 Juna 1983, subjact: DoD
SupportflH|BHI^Hi[^^^IHHi'^' ' ••tablishas rasponsibility
for notincatlonofCongraa^o^^D support to tha Agancy with tha
Dapoty Ondar Sacratary of Dafanaa for Policy. It also confirms
that primary rasponsibility rasidas with tha Diractor, Cantral
Intalliganca. In tha casa of tha TOM missilaa, tha Army
undarstanding on rasponsibilltiaa for notification conforms with
your Juna 1983 mamorandum.
4. TT«/»0POR«) This mamo is to aasura undarstanding of statutory
raquiramants should this Issua ba raisad by ona of tha
Congrassional intalliganca comaittaas in tha futura. ^
,6
Part,aliy DeC.sif.d /Released on^^V-ia^T ulSJIna^t'SaU 'gs
jjn.erp,-cw;:;,iscfE.O. 12356 Diractor of tha Army Staff
by :. Re:er, ;»at:ona! Security Council
CLASSIFIED BTl DASP
DECLASSIFY 0W» OADR
llNCIiMSillNOFORN
o
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