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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 3 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13744 



United States Government Priming OfFui- 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 3 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. -Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. - Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnittd ^tatcB ^tnatt 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 

Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 

Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 

and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 

of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 

available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman V^^ 
Vice Chairman 



III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SeitCT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON DC 20515 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of t he 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified foj-jrelease to the public. 

enely yours. 




Lee H . Hami Iton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courier, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Raynor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Miilhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummel! 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, HI 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



♦The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was tiled but had. dunni.' 
the life of the Committee, provided services 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Nields. Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistatits 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratclift" 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Gen/.man 
Kenneth R. Bui 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B, Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna. Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
OR. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangia 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courier 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Dornan 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 3 



Preface XXI 

Byrne, Phyllis M 1 

Calero, Adolfo 35 

Castillo, Tomas ("W") 239 

Cave, George W 563 

C/CATF 1077 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez. Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage. Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Barnett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman. John R. (With Billy Ray Rcyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier. George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig P. 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Ducmling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietcl, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton. Robert C. 
Earl. Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber. Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor. Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney. Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd). 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus. Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle. Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Volume 15 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Jr. 



Volume 16 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald. John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhorne A. 
Mulligan, David R 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revel! , Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson. John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinettc, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Rose man, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt. William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez. Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer. Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley. Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher. Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman. Jacqueline. 



Volume 24 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering diem to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses -or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those respxjnses — could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits — documentary evidence — were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some ca.ses. where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents apf>ear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair 
1 volume, 1987. ■'•' ' 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the US 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



Scenographic Transcript of 
^ HEARINGS J 

Before the 

SENATE SELECT C0MMITTE2 

TOPJECnET 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

DEPOSITION OF PHYLLIS M. BYRNE 



ITY LNPORMAI.oN 
^ .Unauchcjrized Disclosure 
r Subject to Criminal Swictioiu 




Dnder prjvh!:al*( t(V BJSI . ,• jun. 16. 1987 
MPl^'^ Rafibml Secirttir CdbmI 




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DEPOSITION OF PHYLLIS M. BYRNE 



Washington, D.C. 

Tuesday, June 16, 1987 
Deposition of PHYLLIS M. BYRNE, a witness herein, 
called for examination by counsel for the House and Senate 
Select Committees on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 
the Nicaraguan Resistance, pursuant to notice, the witness 
being duly sworn by SUSAN A. HARRIS, a Notary Public in and 
for the District of Columbia, at the offices of the Senate 
Select Committee, 901 Hart Senate Office Building, 
Washington, D.C, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., Tuesday, June 16, 
1987, and the proceedings beina ta .n down by Stenomask by 
SUSAN A. HARRIS and transcribed mde . her direction. 



*IDI»$0N «IPO«TINC COMPANY INC 



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APPEARANCES: 



MARK K. BELNICK, Esq. 
VICTORIA NOURSE, Esq. 
Senate Select Committee 

CLARK B. HALL, Esq. 
RICHARD J. LEON, Esq. 
House Select Committee 

JOHN P. SCHf'ITZ, Esq. 

Deputy Counsel to the Vice President 

ALA^' CHARLES PAUL, Esq. 

Associate Counsel to the President 



AIDIRSON RIPORTINC COMPANY INC. 
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Deoosition of : 






Examination 


by 


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PHYLLIS M. BYRNE 






Senate 






House 


By Mr. Belnick 






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By Mr. Leon 












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2 (Witness sworn.) 

3 Whereupon, 
PHYLT.IS M. BYRNE, 

5 a witness herein, was called for examination by counsel for 
e the Select Cotmnittees and, having been first duly sworn by 

7 the Notary Public, was examined and tes.tified as follows: 

8 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE 

9 COMMITTEE 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

Oi State your name for the record. 
12 A. Phyllis Byrne. 

Ql Phyllis, you're employed where? 

14 A. In the office of the Vize President, in the 

15 national security affairs office. 
15 Q. For whom do you work personally! 
17 A. Donald Gregq. 
ig ft And he's the Vice President's national security 

advisor? 

A. His title is assistant to the Vice President for 

21 national security affairs. 

22 ft And how long have you worked for Mr. Gregg? 

23 A. I joined him in March 1983. 

24 ft And you have worked for him continuously since 

25 then? 
A. Yes. 

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Q. I'm ooing to show you a document which has been 

marked by the reporter as Byrne Exhibit 1. It is headed 
"Office of the Vice President, Washington, April 16, 1986," 
and then it reads "Schedule proposal." 

(The document referred to was 
marked Byrne Exhibit No. 1 
for identification.) 
I take it you have seen this document before. 



& 

Phyllis? 
A. 
ft 



Yes, I have. 

Can you describe to me what type of a document 
this is? What is a schedule proposal? 

A. This is really a form, and it is a form that 
asks us to provide certain inforration for meetings for the 
Vice President. 

ft Is it a form used when a meeting is proposed for 
the Vice President? 

A. Yes, it is. 

ft Some member of his staff requests that he attend 
a meeting? 

A. That's correct. 

ft How are these schedule proposals typically 
filled out in your office? 

A. Well, they're usually filled out by me, and they 
are filled out with information that has been provided to 



AIDIRSON REPOKTING COMPANY INC. 
JO » ST., M.W. WASHINGTON. DC 20001 IJOJ) 62«»300 



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me by staff members, usually with a request from the State 

2 Department or people from the outside. And with that 

3 information, Don examines it and decides whether or not a 

4 meetinq should be requested. 

5 If he decides that it is, I complete the oroposal. 

6 ft And where does it go after you complete it? 
A. It goes to the scheduling office. 

8 ft Is it reviewed by Mr. Gregg? Is the schedule 

9 nroDOsal that you complete reviewed by Mr. Greaq before it 
10 goes to the scheduling office? 

A. It usually is. This oarticular one was not. 

12 ft We'll get to this one. I want to talk about the 

13 usual practice. Usually Mr. Gregg reviews the schedule 
proposal , correct? 

A. Yes. 

ft And if he approves it, re outs his initials next 
to his name on it? 

18 A. Yes. 

19 ft Then it qoes to the scheduling office? 

20 A. Yes. 

21 ft ivho's in charge of the scheduling office? 

22 A. Hector Irastorza. 

23 ft Aqain talking about the general practice with 

24 schedule proposals, as I understand from your testimony, the 

25 information that you put in a schedule proposal always comes 



ALDCKSON RIPOITING company INC 
]0 t ST NW WASHINGTON. DC 30001 }0]l 6]l«]00 



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to you from either a member of the staff or the State 
Department? 

A. In most cases. 

Q. What about the other cases? 

A. Well, it would come from a telephone call. 

Q. But my ooint is the information never oriqinates 

with you. It comes to you from somebody else? 

A. Correct. 

Oi And that's always the case? 

A. Yes. 

Qi You fill out what you're told? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And then typically, after you have completed it, it 

aoes to Mr. Gregcr for review, he i-itials it, and then oft to 
the scheduling office for the vice President, correct? 

A. 

ft 

A. The chief of staff to the Vice President. 

ft And who is Sam Watson? 

A. Deputy to Don Gregg. 

Qi And are they members of the staff who from time 
to time will give you information for a schedule proposal? 

A. Rarely with 9reg. Sam, frequently. 

ft Frequently Sam Watson. Who else frequently gives 
you information for schedule proposals? Mr. Gregg himself? 

ALDIftSON REPORTING COMPANY INC. 
20 t ST.. N.W . WASHINGTON. DC 30001 [202I «2l-9JOO 



Yes. 

Who is Cro ^ Fuller? 



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A. Mr. Greaa himself. 

2 Q. Sam Watson you say frequently? 

3 A. Sam V/atson. The State Department. 
Q. Is that frequent? 

5 A. Very frequent. 

6 Oi Who at the State Department? 
A. It would depend on what the visit is, the person, 

8 what desk at the State Department is concerned with the 

9 visit. 

10 5i Well, let's say it was a visit relating to 

Central America. What desk or desks will you typically 

'2 hear from? 

13 A. Well, it would depend. There again, it would be 
from that desk and the country. 

15 Q. So if It was from El S-". "-vador, it would be from 

16 the Salvador desk? 

17 A. That's correct. 

18 Ql If it were something to do with the contras, it 

19 would be from where in the State Department if it came from 

20 the State Department? 

21 A. Oh, probably Nicaragua. 

22 Q. Anyone else, aside from Greg Watson and State 

23 Department, who frequently qive you information for schedule 

24 purposes? 

25 A. Mo . 



AlOIRSON •IPORTING COMPANY INC 
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gt HOW many schedule proposals do you complete m 
the averaae durirq an average week? 

A. That would fluctuate, depending on foreign 
visitors who are coming. It would be difficult to gu.ss. 
There would be no formula for that. 

Q. Is It a regular part of your task to fi'. . out 

the schedule proposals? 
A. Ves. 

As far as — 

It's a very mechanical exercise wit.-i me. 
And you do it day after dav? 
Yes. 

All the time? 
Yes. 

Let's then look at Byrr.e Exh>b>t 1 specifically 
now. And this was addressed to Debbie VVutton. Who is 

Debbie Hutton? 

A. She at the time was head of the scheduling 

office. 

0, When did she cease to be in charge of the Vice 

President's schedulinq office? 

A. I'm not sure of the ex .ct time, but I think it's 
been about four or five months ajo. 

0. Then going back to t.is Exhibit 1, which again 
is dated April 16, 1986. it says it's from Don Gregg and 



A. 
Q. 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 



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f ST NW WASHINGTON, DC 20001 .lOJl 6JI-9300 



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there are initia.ls "DG." Did Mr. Gregq put those initials 
there? 

A. No, that is my writing. 

Ql Why did you initial this document as osoosed to 
Mr. Gregq? 

A. Because he wasn't in the office at the time that 
I had completed it. He knew that I was preparing it. To 
expedite it, I put his initials on the document and noved 
it forward. 

Ji Did Mr. Gregg see this document before it went 
out? 

A. No. 

0. Did you read him the contents of the document 
before it went out? 

A. No. 

Ql Had you ever before sent schedule proposals on 
to the head of the Vice President's scheduling office 
without Mr. Gregq even hearing what it contained? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Is that something you do regularly? 

A. Yes. 

Q. How do you know whether it's authorized or not? 

A. Because I usually have discussions with 
Mr. Greqg prior to my preparing it. 

Ql Did you discuss Byrne Exhibit 1 with Mr. Gregg 



AiocasoN DiPotriNC company inc 

JO > JT N W WASHINGTOM. D C 20001 i J03l 6Ji_9)00 




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prior to preparing it? 

2 A. Yes. 

3 Q. Did you tell him what it contained? 
A. Well, at the we were talking about it I had not 

5 prepared the schedule oroposal, so I didn't really know the 

6 exact lanquaae that would appear in it, that I would put in 
it, at the time I told him about it. 

8 0- I know it's hard to remember a specific day, but 

9 in reference to the date on this, when would you have 

10 discussed this with Mr. Gregg? 

11 A. That same day. 

12 Q. April 16? 

13 A. Yes. 

14 Qi Where did you get the Lnformation that appears 

15 in this schedule proposal? 

16 A. Well, the information that I got came in several 

17 ways. It came in a telephone call from Felix Rodriguez 

18 from El Salvador. 

19 Q. You say in several ways. How else? 

20 A. Well, he told me when he was coming and that he 

21 would like to see the Vice President for a short time. Those 

22 are his exact words. I checked my notes. 

23 Qi You have notes of that conversation? 

24 A. I have shorthand notes of that conversation. 

25 Q. Do you have them with you? 



AIDIKSON REPOKTINS COMPANV. INC. 
10 r ST.. N.W . WASMINCTON. O.C. 20001 |]02l 62l'»}00 

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A. r don't. 

MR. BELNICK: I'd like to make a request that we 
receive a copy of those notes. 

MR. RAUL: We will provide those. 

5 MR, BELNICK: Thank you. 

6 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
& All right. Mr. Rodriguez told you when he was 

8 coming in and said he would like a short meeting with the 

9 Vice President, right? 
10 A. Yes. 

n ft What else did he tell you? 

12 A. He didn't tell me anything else except that he 

13 left phone numbers where he could be reached at different 

14 times in El Salvador. 

15 ft Did he tell you what ho wanted to speak to the 

16 Vice President about? 

17 A. No. 

IB ft What did you do after Mr. Rodriguez called? 

19 A. I told Mr. Gregg that he was coming in, and he 

20 said go ahead and put in a schedule proposal to effect 

21 scheduling of the meeting, and this is the result of that. 

22 ft Did Mr. Gregg tell you what to put in on that 

23 nart of the form that describes the purpose of the 

24 meeting? 

25 A. No, he did not. 



AI.0EIISON RfPORTING COMPANY INC 
20 F ST N W WASHINGTON. C 20001 llOll 63l'9300 



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Oi Did he tell you anything about the background 

2 that ought to be put into this schedule proposal? 

3 A. No, he did not. 
Ql Where did you get the other information from 

5 that appears on Byrne Exhibit 1? 

^ A. The Durpose of the meeting was given to me by 

' Colonel Watson. 

8 Q. And how did Colonel Watson become involved in 

5 this schedule proposal? 

'" A. My desk is located right outside of Colonel 

Watson's door and my word processor is there, too. I 
turned to him when I was preparing this and asked him to 
give me a phrase. 

Oi And he gave you the : allowing phrase: "To • 
'5 brief the Vice President on the status of the war in El 

Salvador and resupply of the cor. tras"? 
" A. I don't believe that he gave me those precise 

'8 words, but he did tell me — the resupply of the contras was j 
'9 the Dhrase that he nrovided to me. 

^^ & He did tell you that. When you say he didn't 

2' give you those orecise words? 

A. Well, he didn't give me the complete sentence 
as it appears here. 

0. But he gave you the substance? 

A. That's right, and I just structured what he 



AlOCRSON aiPORTINC COMPANY. INC. 
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qave me into a sentence. 

2 Qi So he told you in essence that the purpose of 

3 the meeting v/ould be to brief the Vice President both on 
the war in El Salvador and resupply of the contras, 

5 correct? 

6 A. Yes. 
1 Ql And that's what you typed on the schedule? 

8 A. That's my recollection of what he told me. 

9 & You don't recall getting the purpose from 
'0 anyone else, right? 

A. No. 

'2 ql And you didn't make it up yourself, correct? 

'3 A. No . 

Ol Then the infornatior that appears next to • 

15 "background," from where did ycu qet that or from whom? 

16 A. I wrote that myself, 
gi You knew that the Vice President had previously 

'8 net with Mr. Rodriguez? 

'9 A. Yes. 

20 I Q_ The date, that came from Mr. Rodriauez? 

2' A. Yes, it did. The date came from Mr. Rodriguez, 

22 and in a second telephone call he told me that he would 

23 not be coming on the 22nd or the 23rd because he was 
2* waiting for a plane to bring him to Miami. 

25 Qt So he told you April 28, between April 28 — 



ALOfRSON RIPOITINC COMPANY INC. 

10 t ST . N.W . WASHINGTON. O.C. 20001 1102) 62l'9)00 



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A. Aoproximately during that time, yes. 

ft Is it your handwriting, "28-May 2"? 

A. It is. 

ft And you put that on there after you typed the 
schedule proposal? • 

A. Well, I knew of the change in dates. i 

ft Before it was sent? I 

A. Mo, I think afterward. j 

ft And then you conveyed the information to Debbie 
Hutton how? Submitted it again?- ' 

A. No. I think it was by either a personal visit to 
our office or else by phone. 

ft So you were making the change on your office copy? 

A. Yes. 

ft The duration, 15 minutes, that's because Felix 
told you he wanted a short meeting? 

A. Correct. 

ft Location, OEOB. How about the participants? How 
did you know who would participate in the meeting aside from 
the Vice President and Felix? 

A. Well, Craig Fuller routinely joins the Vice 
President in most of his meetings and I automatically 
included his name. An.d of course I put Don's name there 
because he was concerned with the meeting from our office. 

ft And then we have what seems to be some, what I woulc 



ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. 
10 f ST.. N.W . WASHINGTON. O C. 30001 ilOll 621-9300 



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auess, boilerplate for something like this, no remarks 
required, staff ohotoqrapher to be present. 

A. It's just a filling in the blanks. 

0. And Don Grego would be the contact. He's the one 

5 who recommends the visit. There is some handwriting at the 

6 bottom of the pace, "5/1 or 5/2 oer Justine." Is that your 

7 handwriting? 
A. Yes, it is. 
0. And who is Justine? 

A. She was the deouty to Debbie Hutton. 
Ql And was she telling you that the meeting would be 

held 5/1 or 5/2? 

A. Yes. 

0. And then was it subssecjuantly scheduled for 5' 1 
at 11:30 in the West Wing? 

A. Yes. 

T. Where in the West Wing would such a meeting be 



18 held? 

19 



A. The Vice President's office. 

Ql And all that handwriting is yours? 

A. Yes. 

Ql There seems to be a squiqgle at the bottom. Is 
that — 

A. I don't know what that is. 

Q. An "M" that went crazy? 



ALOilSON REPOKTINC COMPANY rNC. 
20 f ST.. N.W WASHINOTON. DC 30001 l]02l «]i'«300 



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A. It isn't anything in my writinq. I don't know what 

2 that is. 

3 Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Gregg before this went 
out the puroose of the meeting as you had been given it by 

5 Colonel Watson? 

6 A. No. 
Q. Did you discuss that with anybody before this 

went out? 

A. No. ; 

I 

Qi Did you show it to Colonel Watson? ' 

A. No. 

'2 & You qot the information from him, typed it up, 

13 and because Mr. Gregg was not there you initialed .Mr. Gregg's 

initials and sent this out to Debbie Hutton? 
15 A. That's correct. < 

'6 0- Let's look at the next oage, which has been 

marked Byrne Exhibit 2. 
'8 (The document referred to was 

19 marked Byrne Exhibit No. 2 

20 for identification.) 

21 Q. Now, I take it that this is the memo back from 

22 Debbie Hutton approving the meeting that Byrne Exhibit 1 

23 requested, correct? 

24 A. Correct. 

25 Q. Scheduling it for May 1, putting the time and 



AiDERSON ikpoiitikk: compamt. ihc 

JO f ST N W WASHINGTON. DC. JOOOI |J02) 62l-*100 



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place in, correct? 

2 A. Correct. 

3 Ql Now, would you turn to the next page of the 
exhibit, which has been marked Byrne Exhibit 3. It is a 

5 one page document, office of the Vice President, Washington, 

6 dated April 30, 1986, entitled "Briefing memorandum for 

7 the Vice President." 

8 (The document referred to 

9 was marked Byrne Exhibit No. 3 

10 for identification.) 

11 0. You have seen this document before? 

12 A. Yes. 

13 ft Did you prepare this document? 

14 A. I did. 

15 ft And from where did yc : aet the information that 

16 appears on this document? 
A. v;ell, I repeated the language that I had 

18 included in the schedule proposal. 

19 ft Is that the way you typically do it, with a 

20 meeting briefing memo for the Vice President? 

21 A. Well, when it's something of this nature, 

22 something as simple as this. 

23 ft These briefing memorandums are usually prepared 

24 a day or so before a scheduled meeting with the Vice 

25 President? 



ALOIRSON kCPORTINC COMPANY INC. 
JO f $T NW WAJMINGTON, DC lOCOl JOJ 6]l'«)00 



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A. Yes. 

Ql They follow a fairly standard form? 

A. Yes. 

Q. The same as the form we see on Byrne Exhibit 3? 

A. That's right. 

Ql Now, this memo is listed as being from Don Gregg 
and it goes directly to the Vice President? 

A. It goes to Tom Collamore, who is the staff 
secretary. 

Ol And he was then the staff secretary? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you know whether it's Mr. Collamore ' s practice 

to give these memoes then to the Vice President? 

A. Yes. He prepares a boc at the end of every 
day and includes background materiil for meetings that will 
follow the next day. 

0. So basically, it would have been given to the 
Vice President to read? 

A. Yes, it would have. 

Ql And it was from Don Gregq, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Ql Did Mr. Gregg put his initials on Byrne Exhibit 3? 

A. No, he did not. 

gi Who put his initials there? 

A. That is ny writing. 



AlOmSON RIPOITINC COMPANY. INC. 
20 r ST N W WASHINOTON, DC. 20001 (2021 «2i-9300 



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1 0- Did you show this briefing memo to Mr. Gregg 

2 before you put his initials there? 

3 A. No, I did not. 

4 Q. Why didn't you? 

5 A. He wasn't there. 

6 Qi Had you previously signed off on briefing memoes 

7 for the Vice President without Mr. Gregg seeing them? 

8 A. Yes. 

9 Qi In which cases did you feel you had the authority 
10 to do that? 

Ti A. Well, in cases where it was a matter of fact 

12 situation, where I knew that it was a meeting that I had 

13 enough information to provide a memorandum that would meet 

14 the requirements for the next day. 

15 Qi And the information tha-. appears on Byrne 

16 Exhibit 3 you took directly from E.rne Exhibit 1? 

17 A. Yes. 

18 Ql Did you show this briefing memorandum to anybody 

19 before you sent it to the Vice President? 

20 A. No . 

21 Ql Now, Phyllis, do you recall whether the Vice 

22 President's office responded in any way to this briefing 

23 memorandum? 

24 A. I don't understand your question. 

25 gi Did you get a call or did Mr. Gregg get a call 



AiDiDSON RfPoariNC company inc. 

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asking about the purpose of the meeting after this 
memorandum was sent to the Vice President? 

A. I don't believe so. 

Q. Not to your knowledge? 

A. Not to my knowledqe. 

Q. When was the last time you discussed either this 

briefing memorandum or Byrne Exhibit 1, the schedule 
proposal, with anyone in the Vice President's office? 

A. Well, I guess I looked at it yesterday and 
talked to John Schmitz about it and Doyd and Gii^gq . 

Q. Have you spoken to Mr. Gregg about this dodument 

in the nast? 

A. Yes, we have. V'e've examined it. It was 
discovered bv Mr. Gregg when we v/°re exaunining our files. 

Q. Did he ask you at that time about — what did 

he ask you at that time about eit.er the briefing memorandum 
or the schedule proposal? 

A. I don't believe he asked me anything. 

Qi Well, what did you talk about when you found 
the documents? 

A. Well, we were selecting documents that applied 
to the document request and this was one of them. And it 
was brought to his attention at that time. 

Ol Did he say anything when he saw the document, 
either the briefing memo, Byrne Exhibit 3, or the schedule 



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proposal, Byrne Exhibit 1? 

2 A. Well, we knew that it contained lanauaae that 

3 was beincr questioned at the time, but I don't recall any 
■* specific Questions of >'r. Gregg. 

5 Ql What language did it contain that was being 

® questioned? 

' A. The resupply of the contras. 

^ Ql By whom was that language being questioned? 

' A. By counsel who had asked us to provide the 

documents to them. 

Ql By the Vice President's counsel? 
A. Yes. 

'3 Qi Did Mr. Gregg say anything about that language 

to vou? 

A. Ko, he did not. 

Q. Either when you found the documents or at any 

time after that? 

A. No, he did not. 

Ql Did he ask you where you got that language fron? 
A. We have talked about that. 
Q. And what did you tell him? 

A. That it was provided to me by Colonel Watson. 
23 g^ Did Mr. Gregg say anything else about that 

^* language? 



A. 



AlOEDSON BiPOariNC COMPANY INC. 
20 F Sr NW WASHINGTON. OC ]000l 302: 62l'9)00 

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Ol Did he say to you that's incorrect? 

2 A. No. 

3 fr Did he reaister shock or surprise that it was 
there? 

5 A. I don't think so. I don't recall. 

6 0. Did he reqister disapproval of your having sent 
either the briefinq memo or the schedule proposal? 

A. No. 

9 MR. BELtJICK: I have nothing further. 

10 MR. LEON: Let me just ask a few questions. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 
BY MR. LEON: 
Ci If I have understood yc r testimony right, this is 

15 a form that you fill out weekly, ; number of them weekly, 

16 right? 
A. Yes. 

18 Q. In fact, you probably fi.ll some out daily? 

19 A. Yes. 

20 0- And as I recall the chronology from the Vice 

21 President's office, I believe Mr. Rodriguez only visited three 

22 times with the Vice President? 

23 A. Yes. 

24 Qi And he might have visited on a couple of other 

25 occasions with Mr. Greqq . I can't remember the exact number, 



AIDIPSON REPOBTING COMPANY INC. 
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but it was a small number of times, is that right as far as 
you know? 

A. As far as I know. 

Ql So he wasn't exactly a regular visitor to the 
Vice President's office or to Mr. Gregg's office? 
A. No . 

Qi That's for sure. And you are filling out nu.ibers 
of these weekly, as you have testified. I guess what I'm 
having t rouble understanding is how it is you can remember 
today the circumstances surrounding filling out that form 
that far ago, that long ago, with so many other forms between 
now and then that you have filled out. 

Why is it that you can remember the circ-mstances 
surroundina how vou qot the ouroose? 

A. Because I went back to • notes of that day. I 
use a notebook that is dated every iay. 
Qi Stenographic? 

A. Yes. And when I went back to my notes, I found 
this, notes of my conversation. 
Qi With Colonel Watson? 
A. No, with Felix Rodriguez. 
Q. And did that help you remember the events of that 



dav' 



A. Yes, it did. 

Ql Now, did your notes contain any passage relating 

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to your conversation with Mr. Watson that day? 

A. No, no. I was typinq at that time. I was just 
putting together the languaae. 

Q. So I nuess what I'm trying to figure out is, as 

busy as you are and all the things you are doing, how it is 

you can recall that it was Watson that gave you the passage? , 

A. He was the only person there. He was the only ; 

I 
person in the office who would have been able to provide it, : 

and it was a word that I didn't even know. It was language | 
that I would not have known. i 

Qi But I lust want to be sure of one thing. I-s it 
that you remember him saying it to you or is it that there 
was no one else who could have said it to you? 

A. I recall his telling re. It's my Ecollectioo that ; 

he told me. 

CL I just wanted to be sure about that, because it's 
been so long and I know you are doing these things all the 
time. I know I fill out standard forms all the time and 
I'll be darned if I can remember. 

There wasn't something specific about the 
conversation, was there, that makes it stand out in your 

mind? 

A. About what conversation? 

Ql The one with Watson. 

A. No. 



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Q. But you do recall it. 

A. Yes, r think I do. 

MR. LEON: Thank you, ma'am. 

(Whereupon, at 10:22 a.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition ceased.) 



SIGNED 


AND 


SWORN 


TO 


before 


me 
198 


Signature 

this 


of 


the 


witness 


day of 


• 









Notary Public 



My Commission expires; 



ALOiasoN xpoariNc company inc 

JO f ST NW WASHIHOTON. OC 30001 3QJi «]i«}00 




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S CHEDULE PtOPOSAL 

10: 

FROM: 

REQUEST: 

PURPOSE: 

BACKGROUND: 



DATE: 
DURATION: 
LOCATION: 
PARTICIPANTS: 

REMARKS REQUIRED: 
MEDIA COVEKACE: 
' CONTACT: 
w RECOMMENDED IT: 



ICC ^RKllOCNT 




April 16. 1916 



DEBBIE MUTTON 

DON grecg];^ 

VP Hcttlni with Felix Rodrlguct, • 
counttrlnsurgtncy txp«rt visiting 
froa El Salvador. 

To briof th« Vict Pratldtnt en tht status 

of tho war in El Salvador and rasuppl/ 
of th« Contras. 

Th« Vlca Prasidant has aat praviously 
with Hr. Rodrifuax during his visits to 
Washington and will b« intarastad in 
tha currant inforaation ha will b* abla 
to provide. 

Anytiaa on April -ia •t a>. 

IS ainutas 

OEOB 



Tha Vica Prasident 
Craig Fullar 
Don Sragf 

Nona raquirad. 

Staff photographar 

Don Gragg, 4213 

Don Gragg 



Falix Rodriguez 



3SI3 



UNCLASSIFIFO 



32 



MFMORANDUM 
TOi 

moMi 

tUKJlCTi 
BVlKTl 

DATIi 
TIMBi 

LOCATION: 
ATTBNDANCBi 
RBMARKa REQUIREOi 
PRESS COVBRAGBi 



Ofna Of TMI VKI WISJOIKT 
WASHINGTON. O.C 



</28/86 



Don Gr«9g 



■'lit, 




DEBBIE HUTTONy 

A ppwoygp V TC* P^eaiDgNTIAL ACTIVITY 

Meeting with Felix Rodriguas 

Thursday, May 1. 1916 
11:30 a.B.-llilS a. a. 

WW 

3 

None required 

Staff Photographer only 



MRS. BUSH PARTlCUTIONi ^^ 

Business Suit 



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33 



OFFICf OF TH£ VICI ^RCSIOCNT 

WAtMINQTOM 



UNCLASSIFIED 



April 30, 19S6 




BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOK THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Evtnt: 

D«t«: 

Tla«: 

Proa: 



Meatini with F«lix Rodriguaz 
Thursday, Miy 1, 19S6 
11:30-11:45 a. a. - West Wing 



Don Grtgg 



^ 



PURPOSE 



FcllJ' Rodrigutz, t counterinsurgtncy «xp«rt who is 
visiting froa El Salvador, will provida a briafing 
on th« status of th« war in El Salvador and 
rtsupply of tha Contras. 



III. PARTICIPANTS 

Tha Vlca Prtsidant 
Craig Fuller 
Don Gragg 
Saa Watson 

IV. MEDIA COVERAGE 
Staff photographer 



Felix Rodrigutz 




3&li^ 



UNtUSSIFe 



82-692 0-88-3 



34 







Susan A. 'larrl; 



, t.-.e am. 



:efcre w.-.m -.-.e fcregci-g dsposit:.or. was takar., do r.erabv zartif/ 
:ha- r.-.e vit.-.ess v.'-.cse tastiJicr.y appears :.r. the fsrecoir.r ds = csi-i;: 



was duly sworn by Tie 



nat t.-.e testiaor.v cr 



said wit-ess was taker, by ne to the best of ay ability ar.d thereait= 
reduced to typewriting ur.der =y direction; that said deposition 13 £ 
true record of the testiraony given by said witness; that I aa r.eitr.s 
counsel for, related to, nor eaplcyed by any of the parties to the 
action in which this deposition was taken, and f'urther that Z a-Ts no: 
a relative or e=ployee of any attorney or counsel er.ployed by ahe 
parties thereto, nor financially or other-wise interested in the 
outcome of the action. 



NCTA.^:; ?V3i: 



My commission e.>raire3 d, /j / r/lO 



ONCIASSIFIED 



35 



■M- $ 



mffs 




TfflS IS A COVER SHEET 

FOR 

INFORMATION SUBJECT TO 

Basic security requirements contained in Department of Justice Regulations 
(28 CFR Pan 17). 

The unauthorized disclosure of the information contained in the attached docu- 
ment(s) could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the 
national security. 

Handling, storage, reproduction and disposition of the attached document(s) will 
be in accordance with ptolicies and procedures set forth in regulations cited above. 




021 



Partially Declassified/Released on R-/T-37 
under provisions of E,0. 12356 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 






COPY NO, 






COPIES 



(This cavtr shtet u uAcUisstfled wtun trpcmted from cLustfird docum^ms) 



36 



URKASSIPir 



DEPOSITION OF ADOLFO CALERO 
Thursday, April 9, 1987 

United States Senate 
Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assii-tance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan 
Opposition 
Washington, D. C. 
Deposition of ADOLFO CALERO, called as a witness 
by counsel for the Select Committee, the witness having been 
duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for 
the District of Columbia, at 10:00 a.m., at the offices of 
the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate Office 
Building, Washington, D.C., and the proceedings taken down 
by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, and transcribed under 
her direction. 



COPIES 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



HSTS g>\o 



37 



musswn 



APPEARANCES: 

On behalf of the Select Committee: 

THE HONORABLE HOWELL HEFLIN 

ARTHUR L.LIMAN, ESQ., Chief Counsel 

PAUL BARBADORO, ESQ. , Deputy Chief Counsel 

RICHARD PARRY, ESQ., Associate Counsel 

LOUIS ZANARDI, Investigator 

PHIL BOBBITT 

DEE BENSON 
On behalf of the House Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

RICHARD J. LEON, ESQ., Deputy Chief Minority . 
Counsel 

KEN BALLEN, ESQ., Counsel 
On behalf of the witness: 

JOSEPH J.PORTUONDO, ESQ. 

Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein 

Southeast Financial Center, Suite 3700 

Mianii, Florida 33131-2369 



KlASSlFe 



38 










CONTENTS 










EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 


WITNESS 






SENATE COMMITTEE HOUSE COMMITTEE 


Adolfo Calero 






By 


Mr. 


Liman: 




3 


By 


Mr. 


Ballen: 




148 


By 


Mr. 


Liman: 




169 


By 


Mr. 


Ballen: 




172 


By 


Mr. 


Liman 




173 


By 


Mr. 


Ballen 




173 


By 


Mr. 


Liman 




175 


By 


Mr. 


Parry 




175 ^ - 


By 


Mr. 


Liman 




177 


By 


Mr. 


Ballen 




180 


By 


Mr. 


Liman 




180 


AFTERNOON SESSION: 


Page 77 










EXHIBITS 


CALERO EXHIBIT 




FOR IDENTIFICATION 


No 


1 






14 


No 


2 






14 


No 


3 






35 


No 


4 






66 



No. 5 



No. 6 
No. 7 



wm^^^^ 



77 



116 



172 



39 




3 

P R C E£D I N G S 
Whereupon, 

ADOLFO CALERO 
was called as a witness and, having been duly sworn by the 
Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE 
BY MR. LIMAN: 

Q Mr. Calero, could you give us a very, very brief 
description of your educational background? 

A Yes. I went to grammar school back home in 
Nicaragua with the Christian Brothers, to high school in New 
Orleans, Holy Cross Brothers, to college at Notre Dame,. 
South Bend, Indiana, and then back in Nicaragua I got a law 
degree at the Jesuit University, but I haven't practiced. 

I did some post-graduate -- two post-graduate 
courses here and attended seminars and other things. 

Q And your age is? 

A Fifty-five in December. 

Q And are you a citizen of Nicaragua? 

A I'm a citizen of Nicaragua, yes. 

Q And you are a resident of the United States? 

A No, I'm not a resident of the United States. 

Q You're a non-resident? 

A I'm a non-resident, yes. I have refugee status 
since 1985, I think. 



««WS«B 



40 



ggassster 



4 

Q Now prior to the time that the Sandinistas took 
over in Nicaragua were you a businessman in Nicaragua? 

A Yes. I was general manager of the Coca-Cola 
Bottling Company in Nicaragua, a franchise. The Nicaraguan 
company, we had a franchise foe-fCoca-Cola for 25 years and I 
was director of various business enterprises that grew out 
of the Coca-Cola area, like automobile distributorship, 
hotel, a ceramics plant, and a refrigerator plant and 
various other things. 

.gr- .JBjj>L. - And had you been a critic of the Somoza regime? 

A Yes, I was a critic, strong critic of the Somoza 
regime. When I left Nicaragua in 1982, in December 1982, I 
had been for the last three years the spokesman for the 
Conservative TiSsty^- 1 was jailed by Somoza in 1978 for 
about a month and on a few other occasions, too. 

Q And when did you leave Nicaragua? 

A I left Nicaragua on Christmas vacation in December 
1982 and I could not come back because there were rumors 
that they were after me. Apparently my name had been leaked 
as belonging to various organizations, especially the FDN, 
and my home was looted by national security forces towards 
the end of January 1983. 

So I decided to stay out and join the FDN, 
official category as a director. 

Q And when did you join the FDN? 



\SSWS»B 



41 




s 

A WftT?lally as director I made an announcement here 
in Washington in February. 

Q In February of 1983? 

A '83, yes. But I had had relations for quite some 
time, as I had with other exile groups, too. 

Q That's Mr. Bobbitt of our staff who just entered. 
Could you give us just for the record some 
description of what the FDN was and how it was founded? 

A The FDN came about through a fusion of various 
groups of Nicaraguans. Some of them, like Berdo Joaquim 
Gonzalez, who had belonged to the Sandinista military, and 
other Sandinista guerrillas, national guardsmen who were 
also gathering to counter the Sandinistas, and people, 
others like me, who had never had anything to do with 
neither the Sandinistas nor the Somoza regime. 

That was back in 1981. It acquired its name, I 
believe, towards the end or the beginning. I'm not sure -- 
the end of 1981, beginning of 1982. It began to be known as 
the FDN, Nicaraguan Democratic Force. It had a civilian 
directorate and a military directorate at the time. 

I was invited a number of times to participate, 
but I was still in Nicaragua and I didn't want to come out. 
I wanted to stay and fight inside. But by the end of 1983, 
December of 1983 — 

Q December of '82 or '83? 



.WUiSSIEe 



42 



Mil 



6 

A ' 82y §3? L ' tf> 'g' V i % Vy fl^'t^fgctorate came up, the 

seven-person directorate, and a slot was left in it for me 
for when I came out. And it was supposed to be in pectore. 

Q What is that? 

A In pectore is in the chest. 

Q In the heart? 

A The group decides, but it doesn't come out. And 
well, of course, that leaked. 

Q And that's when you left Nicaragua? 

A No, no, because I found out about it in Nicaragua. 

I was still in Nicaragua and I had been without a passport 
for about two months, and finally one of the members of the 
junta got me a visa to go out for a vacation, and I had all 
the intention to go back. 

Q Now, when you decided to not return and to 
officially join the FDN, you mentioned that you became a 
director of the FDN. 

A Yes. 

Q At that point, which would be the beginning of 
1983, did the FDN still have both a military directorate and 
a political-civilian directorate? 

A Well, it was supposed to have only one 
directorate, which was the civilian directorate, with one 
military member, six civilians and one military. However, 
in practice it actually had two directorates. 



KIASSIFIED 



43 



ll««fflKT 



Q And you joined the civilian directorate? 

A I joined the civilian directorate, yes. 

Q And was there a leader of the FDN at that point? 

A No. 

Q Who was in charge of the military side of the FDN 
when you joined? 

A Weli,^ Iifcsuld say there wa^ar ^ief of staff. 

Q And who was that?' 

A That was Emilio Echaverri, and also as a member of 
the civilian directorate was a man with military background, 
which was Bermudez, Enrique Bermudez. Militarily Echaverri 
was at the head, was the chief of staff, but I would say 
that Bermudez was, say, more respected or more -- 

Q He was b«trsr known? 

A Yes, better known and more respected. 

Q Now the directorate functioned as a committee? 

A The directorate functioned -- I don't know what 
you mean a committee. 

Q Was there a chairman of the FDN at that point? 

A No, there was no chairman of iha "fciN at that 
point. 

Q Was there a person who was first among equals? 

A Well, no, there wasn't at that point. we all had 
different areas of concentration. ~~'_ .^^- 

Q And what was your area of concentration? 



yNCLASSIFIED 



44 



mws 



8 

A My area of concentration was the political 
aspects, international political aspects. I was doing more 
writing than anything else. There were others in charge of 
the -- I think Bermudez and another fellow, Rodriguez, were 
more, had more to do with the military. Then Edgar 
Chsunorro, who seems to have become feunous'^or denouncing us, 
he was in charge of publications. 

Q Now was the FDN founded in around 1981? 

A I believe so, yes. 

Q And by the time that you became a member of this 
directorate in the beginning of 1983, was it engaged in 
military or paramilitary operations? 

A They had already -- the kickoff, let's say, point 
of the organized Nicaraguan resistance is March 22, I 
believe, of 1982. 

Q And what marked that kickoff? 

A The blowup of bridges in the northern part of 
Nicaragua. One big bridge was blown up. Another was 
seriously damaged. And the Sandinistas clamped down on the 
civilian rights in Nicaragua. So that was the kickoff, I 
would say. — - - - _^- £g^ 

Q Now did you have some information about what the 
size of the FDN forc^waa when you joined it in the 
beginning ot"^%jf jF :^ 

A We did not have much information. 



mmmw 



45 




Q A rough figure -- 5,000? 

A Two thousand, maybe -- 2,500, 3,000. 

Q Now, at that point how was the military operation 
of the FDN being funded? 

A remember ^^^^^^^^^^^Hwere there when came 

There were^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthere who were pare 
of the training and who were also -- I understood by stories 
that I was told that there was no direct involvement between 
Americans and Nicaraguans. All was done through] 
but I'm just talking reference. 

<2 Did you come to understand at some point that the 
CIA was funding the FDN? 

A That was my impression, b .t it was being done 

It one point, and I don't remember 
how long after we were there. Then there was a direct 
connection. Direct connection was established with -- 

Q The CIA? 

A Well, I never saw -- they never showed me the 
card. 

Q But with the United States? 

A With people working for the United States 
Government, yes, whom I gather were CIA. -^f -^ 

Q And during this period when the United States was 

directly involved who handled the procurement of supplies, 
military supplies? 




Yi^jU 



:';0»i 



46 



mm^ 



10 

A I don't know who did, but all I can tell you is 
that we were handed over whatever our needs were, and there 
was a ceiling. I remember talk about a ceiling which was at 
different levels at different times, and I wouldn't 
remember. 

Q Is it fair to say that the weapons and military 
supplies were given to the FDN? 

A Yes. 

Q And that the FDN was not involved in purchasing? 

A In procurement, definitely not. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Excuse me a second. Adolfo, you 
have never given a deposition before, but it's difficult for 
her to write down or copy when both people are speaking. 
Why don't you wait until he finishes his question; 
otherwise, she is going to have a very difficult time. 
THE WITNESS: Fine. 
BY MR. LIM^N: (Resuming) 

Q How did the FDN receive the funds to pay its 
troops? 

A Troops were not paid as such. Some of the 
officers and some of the people in different jobs who had 
families tS support were given what was called family 
support . 

Q And where did that money come from? 

A My understanding is that it came from the United 



imwssifiM. 



47 



IBlKfiBfc* 



11 

states Government. 

Q And do you know how that money was transferred? 

A No. 

Q In 1983 was there a budget that the FDN had for 
paying its people? 

A Well, I don't remember a budget as such. I mean, 
I was not connected with that aspect of the operation. 

Q Who handled that aspect of arranging for the 
payments? 

MR. PORTUONDO: For family support? 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q For family support. 

A To tell you the truth, I don't remember. I know 
Echaverri would get a certain amount of money and he would 
in turn distribute it to different people. That was for the 
military. 

Q Do you know where he got that money from? That's 

from the United States? 

A From the United States. 

Q Do you know who actually handled the transfer of 
the money? 

A No, sir. It would be impossible. I can tell 
you -- 

MR. PORTUONDO: Your answer was no. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 



nmWB 



48 






k^V«« " 12 

Q With whom did you deal as representatives of the 
United States Government in 1983 in connection with funding 
of the organization? 

MR. PORTUONDO: It assumes you dealt with someone. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q He indicated he had earlier. 

^^^^^^H|^|head was ^^^^^^^H and also 
lots of dealings with^^^H-- he went by many names. I knew 
him as^^^^H but then everybody began to talk about] 
ll'll remember the name later on. 
Q And what did he do? What was his role? 
A He was in charge of Central America or he was. 
maybe project director or whatever. And then there was 
another , ^^^^^^^^^1 also that we dealt with. 

Q Did you deal with Colonel Steele? Did you deal 

with him at all at that point? 

A Colonel Steele? The name doesn't -- 
Q Did you deal in 1983 with Oliver North? 
A Well, I met Colonel North. I believe my 
'recollection was that I met him^^^^^^^^Hin 1984, but I 
did not meet him, and if I did, I have no recollection. 

Going back to the money, I did not finish telling 
you that the directors were given also family support and 
that was given to us at different times ^^^^^^^H or put 
into accounts, into accounts of ours, and as far as I know I 



m^ssw 



49 



mm^ 



13 




can tell you about me. I don't know about the others, how 
they got it. 

Q In 1983 where were you living? 

A I was really nowhere because I had no status 
anyplace. 

Q Were you spending time I 

A r was spending a lot of time^^^^^^^^^H Most of 
my time, I mean, I spent traveling also in other countries, 
in Europe. 

Q And is it fair to say that you were trying to 
develop political aupfeStrt.-Xor the FDN? 

A Yes, yes^ deflnl-tely^^-politica^support and waswere 
trying ^_C»'v.u»vi nii||<>eap ia''. t!JH ii^slgF, «t iHe^meraber, was 
tryiner to tell the world what the Sandinistas really were, 
see, because we Nicaraguans were the first to find out what 
they were doing. 

Q Did you know how much the United States Government 

had appropriated in 1983 for support of the FDN? 

A No. No, sir. 

Q Oo you know what the '9K£tttMB#ces were that led 

to the withdrawal of | 

A No. 

Q When did^^^^^^Hcome 

A ^^^^^^^^Bcame in in 1983, but before^^^^^^^rame 
in, when we came in as directors, let's say, there was 




UNtussifia 



50 



ismi^w* 



14 

already an invention of establishing a direct relationship 
between the Nicaraguans and -- 
Q The United States? 

A The United States. Then there was no need for 
this middle man. 

Q I would like to mark as the first exhibit some 
records that were produced by your counsel, I believe. And 
let's mark as Calero Exhibit 1 a record of financial 
expenditures beginning with July 1, 1984. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Calero Exhibit Number 1 for 
identification. ) 
And as Calero Exhibit 2 i record in the same form 
that begins with September of 1985. 

(The docu.-nent referred to was 
marked Calero Exhibit Number 2 for 
identification. ) 
Mr. Calero, I'll show you Calero Exhibits 1 and 2 
and can you tell me if you've seen these before? 
A Yes . 

Q And what are they? 

A These are the monthly expenses^^^^^^^^^Band 
it's indicated here what it covers. 

Q And who prepared these records? 

A In our office, in our finance office. 



DfMsra 



51 



^mmm 



15 

Q And when were they prepared? 

A They were prepared at the time of -- I mean, I 
cannot tell you when these were copied. 

Q Were these records prepared for the Senate 

Committee and the House Committee or were they kept at the 
time in this form? 

A ^^|o.£«cords have been kept all along in our 
offices, and they are records of all our expenditures and 
there are to the point where it has been possible to keep 
all invoices. We have a few trunkfuls of invoices. 

Q But were these schedules here, these exhibits 1 
and 2, are these schedules that were constructed from thtf' 
records that you kept there? 

A I would not be able to tall you. 

MR. LIMAN: Do you know now these records were 
prepared? 

MR. PORTUONDO: No. Let "tjbUK^gtffip^ he wants 
to know if whtT ^t/KBj/S/l^^^l^ ' ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^<^ Exhibit 2, 
were something that you prepared for the first time to give 
to the Senate Committee or are LUeae records which have been 
made and kept all along when the events occurrec 



THE WITNESS: These records were prepared. I 
mean, these were written in order for us because we were in 
the process of reconstructing everything in order to be able 



KUSSW 



52 



16 

to present an understandable record of our expenditures. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q So that these are financial statements? 

A These are financial statements which have been 
taken out. 

Q From the original records? 

A From records, yes, from original records. I would 
say yes. 

Q And were these prepared at your request? 

A They were prepared -- let me see -- I don't know, 
about two months ago, three months ago. And I asked -- 

MR. PORTUONDO: When he says "prepared", he 
doesn't mean photocopied. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Let me just see if I understand what happened 
here, Mr. Calero. The organization kept records of its 
expenditures. 

A Yes, we have records. 

Q And kept records of its receipts, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And there came a time when there were inquires 
made of the organization as to how much money it had 
received and how much it had spent, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And you can date that to the time that there were 



BHCUSSIFIEP 



53 



mm\ 



17 

disclosures in the United States about diversion of money 
from the Iranian arms sales; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And in order to demonstrate how the funds that you 
received were spent you had drawn these schedules based on 
your original records to show in an understandable form how 
much money you spent each month; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And the records from which these exhibits were 
prepared are records that are| 

A Yes. 

Q And they were records that were made at the time 
of the expenditures? 

A Yes, which I have never seen. 

Q And you have bookkeepers there who keep that kind 
of records? 

A Yes, we have bookkeepers there. In other words, 
this was not drawn up every month. I mean, this was not 
drawn up in July of 1984. 

Q I untf^Bwnd now. Now, were "there rerords that 

you received regularly that showed how much was being spent 
and for what purposes? In 1983 did you receive a report 
from your financial people? 

A I would not see them regularly. I would not see 
them regularly. But I have a record which is very difficult 



ONCUSSlFiED 



54 



umssne 



18 



to understand and to follow on account of it showing 
conversions and all sorts of -- 

Q 1 understand that. And what record is that that 

you have? 

A That's a record. It was a report. It's an 
accounting that I have. 

Q It's a report? 

A Yes. 

Q And who would provide you with that report? 

A That report was provided by the head finance man, 
Mr. Montes^^^^^^^^^^^H Oscar Montes is the name he goes 
by . ^^^^^^^^^^^ 




Q And how often would you receive these reports from 
Mr. Montes? 

A Monthly. 

Q And what did you do with your copies of those 
reports? 

A I would have them||^^^^^^^H in Miami, wherever. 

Q Do you still have those records? 

A I have those records. 

Q Could we get copies of them? 

A Sure. 

Q Now if I show you these records maybe you can help 



UNClASSiREO 



S5 



m^^to 



19 

explain it. Let's look at Calero Exhibit 1 and the second 
page in it, which is a compilation for July of 1984; am I 
correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Could you tell me there's a heading "concepto" . 
What does concepto translate to in English? 

A Concept, account. 

Q That's the account? 

A Yeah . 

Q And under that are various items which are items 
of expense; am I correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And the first item says maintenance of personnel, 
is it? 

A Yes. 

Q And what does maintenance of personnel represent? 

A That would cover -- 

Q Are those the family allowances or is that some 
other item? 

A That would be -- let me read a little bit more. 

Q Take your time. I call your attention to the fact 
that there is another item called maintenance of troops. 
Does the item maintenance of personnel mean FDN personnel 
other than the troops? 

A That includes -- this mantenimiento de personal is 



DIUSSW 



56 






20 



all our administrative and what we call family support for 
officers and for air force and doctors and hospital 
personnel and all of that. 

Q But the largest item on this sheet is, as I read 

it, for the maintenance of the troops, well, maybe it isn't 
in dollars, but it's| 

A ^^H^^^H 

Q ^^^^^^^^M And that would be the family 
maintenance allowances for the troops in the field? 

A No , no . 

Q What would that be for? 

A That would come out of here. It would come out 'of 
here. 

Q When you say "come out of here", it would come out 
of maintenance of personnel? 

A Yeah. 

Then be the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B? 

The ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwh i c h 
let's see — 

Q It's equivalent to| 

A Yes. 

Q And that's under the heading of maintenance of 

troops. What was that for? 

A Maintenance of troops was food for troops. 

Q And the second item here, it says Viaticos. What 



Kiftssro 



57 



-i^cmie 



21 



is that? 

A viaticos, that's per diems and travel expenses, 

Q Now this schedule for July of 1984 shows, am I 
correct, that the total expenditures in dollars after 
translation comes to about 

A Yes. 

Q Am I correct that that money is the money that was 

provided by the United states Government? 

A No. 

Q Where did that money come from? 

A This money in July 1984 we began to receive money 
from foreign sources. This has nothing to do with United 
States money. 

Q When you say you began to receive from foreign 

sources, into what account were you receiving that? 

A Into the accounts that you already have. 

Q I believe that the substantial money that you 

began receiving from foreign sources into your account began 
in July of 1984. 

A That's it. 

Q So this money was being spent out of .the money 
that was coming into the account that you maintained? 

A Ye4Kai# 

Q And before that, before July of 1984, you also had 
these expenses; am I correct? 



ptusa® 



58 



DinfiPftSisffir 



22 

A Yes. 

<3 And how was that money being received? 

A That was money received from the United States 
Government. 

Q And into what accounts were those monies put? 

A They did not go into accounts rtrall. - 

Q That money was disbursed directly by the United 
States? ""** 

A It was disbursed directly by the people who were 
your representatives down there on a weekly or biweekly 
basis, depending on the type of the expense. 

Q And those were the people that you mentioned 
earlier? 

A Yes. -,--^^ 

Q Were you aware when you joined the FDN that the 
President of the United States had authorized the CIA to 
provide assistance to the FDN? 

A Yes. I was told so. 

Q And who told you that? 
^^^^^^H his name 

Q And did he have a position with the United States 
Government? 

A Yes. He's the one that I described as being the 
project director or the chief for Central America. He, if I 
remember correctly, is the one who told me that this project 









59 



\iimi®& 



23 

had the baclting of the President of the United States and 
that it was being funded, obviously, by the United States. 

Q And^^^^^^|^H| I gaO«¥, the name that you 
were trying to think of before? 

A Yes, yes. That's it. 

Q Now did there come a time in 1984 before you 

started to pay these expenses directly out of your account 
when you were told that there was doubt whether the United 
States government would be able to continue to provide 
funding? 

A Yes. 

Q Tell me about that in your own words. 

A Well, through 1983 we were seeing that our project 
had many detractors, that it had bad press, that it 
definitely was beginning to turn ir.to a partisan issue. 

Q Dispute? 

A Dispute. That the President's backing was clear. 
It was clear the Republican backing was clear. The 
conservative Democrats were pretty much on our side, 
southern Democrats, and that we were in more trouble. I 
mean, it was very obvious since 1983. And then came the 
time in 1984 when there were no more funds voted, in June -- 
May. 

Q Do you recall that as early as February of 1984 it 
had become apparent that you would be running out of United 



mm 




60 



mmw 



24 
States funds by May or June? 

A Well, I don't remember exactly now. 

Q Do you remember that there was some advance notice 
that the funds were not going to be sufficient to cover the 
full year? 

A Oh, yes. I don't remember, though, exactly when 
that became apparent. 

Q I can understand that. Do you remember that the 
revelations about the mining of tjjpk harbor created some 
outcry in the Senate? 

A Yes, I remember. Yes. 

Q And the House? 

A Um-hum. 

Q And was it at or about that time that you realized 
that it was going to be very, very difficult to get 
continued funding from the United States Government? 

A Yes. We realized that. 

Q 4'^^^HPV^^ have been a source of some concern. 

A Yes, definitely. 

Q You had troops who were dependent on the FDN being 
able to receive money in order to subsist, correct? 

A Yes. 

And this was a cause that you felt very deeply 
about, correct? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



61 



fi» 



25 
Q And you were told that the President of the United 
States felt deeply about it; am I correct? 
A Yes. 

Q And you were told that many Members of the 

Congress felt deeply about this cause? 
A I heard from them directly. 

Q What plans, if any, were made to provide continued 
funding after Congress' money had run out? 

A Well, we began talking about our concern to very 
many different people, like General Singlaub I remember was 
one of the first that we saw about this and so many other 
people that I would not remember. General Singlaub was like 
-- we felt he was the closest person we had to us. 
Q When did you meet General Singlaub? 
A I think in the fall of 1983 I attended a meeting 
of the Council for world Freedom -- no, no -- the world 
Anticommunist League. So I must have met General Singlaub 
before that time, in summer 1983, probably, at the CNP 
meeting, the Council for National Policy meeting, in Arizona 
I believe it was. I think I met him there. 
And we have been close ever since. 
Q At that time General Singlaub was not still in the 

military of the United States; correct? 
A No, he was retired. 
Q He was retired. 




'ijii/Ln^' 



62 




Yes. 

Q Who did you talk to who was still employed by the 
United States- Government about what other sources of funding 
might be available once the official funds ran out? 

A Well, just #t the time there is a meeting that has 
been referred to, which I have called like a pep meeting, a 
pep talk, which took place ^^^H^H^^^fwhen Oliver North 
-- and I believe that's my recollection of meeting Colonel 
North. ~=3«? 

Q Do you recall when that was? 

A June maybe. May, '84. 

Q Colonel North's diaries reflect a meeting with you 
on April 6, 1984 in Washington. 

A In his office. I was shown that by the -- 

Q Independent Counsel? 

A Independent Counsel. However, I said I'm sorry, I 
do not recall that 

Q You recall that there came a time when you did in 
fact meet with General North in his office in Washington; 
correct? 

A Oh, yes, but that was aftei 

Q So that your recollection is that you first met 



him I 



A Yes. 

Q And then whatever meetings you had with him in 




63 



m 

Washington were after that meeting 




27 



A Yes, because I don't remember. See, as I said, a 
meeting could have taken place, but I cannot remember it. 

Q When you first met North^^^^^^^^^ was anyone 
accompanying him? 

A Yes. 

Do you remember who that was, what name? 




And who else? 

Clarridge, and posslbly^^^^^^Hwas there. 
Now I understand how dif f icuIir~l:C is {M>-^ecall 
from memory a particular date, but let's see if we can fix 
this in time in terms of events. At the time that you Had 
the meeting^l^^^^^^^Bhad it already become apparent to 
you that funding in Congress was m trouble? 

A Well, funding in Congress was in trouble since 
1983. As I said, we never Jtnew if it was going to be 
continued or not^-*** 

Q Do you remember that for the fiscal year '84, the 

United States fiscal year which ends on September 30, that 
Congress had appropriated $24 million? Does that ring a 
bell at all? 

A No. I don't thinJc — I wasn't even very much 
aware of when the fiscal yea*~4B^-'*tJithe time. I was not -- 
I mean, I had left the United States for such a long time. 



wmsro 



64 



iHKCt^P 



28 



Q Does the figure $24 million ring a bell? 

A No. 

Q Did the meeting ^^^^^^^^H take place before the 
mining incident? 

A No, after. 

Q So it took place after the mining incident. 

A Yes. 

Q And tell us what happened at that meeting. 

A Well, I mean, that's another thing very difficult 
to say, but the thing was that, like I say, the way I 
described it before -- and I would do the same again — it 
was like a pep talk, you know, that something would come 
about . 

Q Who was pepping whom up? 

A Well, they are pepping us up. I mean, we are the 
ones who are in bad shape. And we're the ones who have our 
brothers in the field, you know, under the threat of getting 
killed. 

Q Did they say they wanted you to continue? 

A Of course, of course. 

Q Did they say that you still had the support of the 
President of the United States? 

A And that he would keep on trying and trying, that 
he wouldn't give up, that he would try and request again and 
again and again. 




65 



T^KiMitB 



29 

Q Did they say that they would try to find other 

sources of funds for you? 

A Well, I would be saying something that I cannot 
recall exactly. 

Q I'm not trying to put words in your mouth. But 
you were at a time when if the funds ran out you would have 
troops starving, correct? 

A Well, funds ran out afterwards and we got credit, 
you know. Now we owe 

MR. PORTUONDO: Adolfo, please listen to the 
question. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q It was clearly a source of concern to you to hear 
that the United States might not be able to continue 
funding, correct? 

A Definitely. 

Q And after the bombing incident you had this 
meeting^^^^^^^^H am I 

A Yes, chronologically it was after the bombing. I 
mean, not on account of the bombing. 

Q But it was chronologically after the bombing? 

A Yes. 

Q And it was at a time when there was doubt whether 

the funding would continue, correct? 

A Correct. 



\SWm«B 



82-692 0-88-4 



66 





30 

Q And you did discuss the subject of funding with 
them? 

A We did discuss the fact that possibly -- I don't 
know if it nad been announced already or not that there 
would be no more mamj^d *>«* that that could is* a 
possibility. I remember talking about that we would have to 
go to solicit funds, to people, to countries, whatever ways 
we could fund our -effort, that we would get all the help 
possible in this thing. 

Q Who would give you all the help possible? 

And tRis was your first meeting with Colonel , 



Sir, I ha^ifcflone over ^hat before, and I have 



The meeting we're talking about now»is the meeting 
!t meeting with him. 



A 

Q 
North? 

A 
said -- 

Q 
that 

*^ 

Q And was Colonel North described to you as having a 
particular role in assisting the FDN? 

A Let ' s say I could gather that he was a newcomer 
into this picture, into the situation. 

Q How did you gather that? 

A The fact of the way of the introduction, and also 
then I had information and experience after that that he did 




miAssw 



67 



iciiii 



31 



become a primary player in this thing. You see, I would say 
-- I mean, he became, after a couple of more meetings with 
him, I realized that he was going to be the interlocutor, 
let us say, for the United States Government. 

Q Now what about Mr. Clarridge? What did you 
understand his position to be? 

A Mr. Clarridge, we didn't see him very often. 

Q Had you met him before this meeting? 

A Yeah. He had been^^^^^^^^^H I had met him in 
Miami, but I don't remember when -- back in '82 or '83, 
sometime. 

Q Did you understand that he was with the Agency?' 

A Yes. That was my understanding. 

Q Was one member of this group -- did one member of 
this group appear to be the leader of the group at this 
meeting? 

o n e ^^^^^^^^^Hy o u 

Q Yes. 

A Well, it was Clarridge that appeared to me to be 
the top person in the group, yes. And there was someone 
else, but I have no idea. There was someone else, too, in 
that meeting. 

Q Was there someone from the State Department in 
that meeting? 

A I don't recall. 




68 



109 



W^0SB 



32 



Q Was it Mr. Armitage of the Department of Defense? 
Was it Mr. Armitage? 

A I would not be able to remember that, because I 
met Mr. Armitage in an occasion that seemed to me for the 
first time not too long ago, last year sometime. 

Q When you discussed with the members of this group 
the possibility of obtaining funds from other countries and 
other persons, do you recall what Dewey Clarridge said? 

A No, sir. 

Q Do you recall what Colonel North said? 

A Well, not at that meetingi 

Q Was there a subsequent meeting in which you 
discussed plans for continued funding? 

A We met once more. 

Q When did that meeting occur and where did it take 
place? 

A Possibly here in Washington. I would not remember 
the date. '^'^ ^I^^^H ^^ could have been 

Q Maybe we can get some milestones. You remember 
that in July of 1984 the FDN started to receive $1 million a 
month? 

A Yes. 

Q And were there meetings that took place between 
the first meeting you had^^^^^^^^^H with Colonel North and 
the July date when you started to receive the money? 




69 




33 

A I can tell you now. That reminds me. I gave 
Colonel North, sometime in June, an account number for a 
bank. 

Q And how did that come about? 

A Well, that came about that there was the 
possibility of foreign sources helping us. 

Q Who told you that? 

A If I gave him the bank account number -- 

Q It had to be Colonel North? 

A It had to be Colonel North, yes. 

Q Do you remember the conversation at all? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Was it a telephone conversation or in person? 

A No. I gave him the number in person, if I 
remember correctly. 

Q Was it in his office? 

A In his office I gave him, yes. 

Q And did he tell you at that time that he had some 
good news for you, that they had gotten some money? 

A No, no. Then General Secord came into this 
picture too just about the same time. As a matter of fact, 
I don't remember who I gave my account number to first or 
how many people did I give it to. I remember giving it to 
General Singlaub, to Colonel North, to General Secord. And 
General Secord spoke about getting money, trying to get 



UNWSSm 



70 



ymmm 




money for us from, I believe, 
or something like that. 

Q Was that before the first $1 million came in? 

A That was before. If I remember correctly, it was 
before -- you see, what happened. Let me explain one thing. 

What happens is this: The most important thing for me was 
that our men would have food, that our men would be able to 
defend themselves, that our men would not be sacrificed in 
vain. 

So all the circumstances, all the talks that 
brought this about, I don't keep a diary. I never write 
anything down. This war that I was in, you know, was 
supposed to be clandestine. So all the circumstances made 
it so that sometimes I would purposely not pay attention to 
detail or to nothing. 

Q Mark as the next exhibit a schedule that we 
prepared from the bank records that you provided to us, 
which are the monthly balances for the six Calero accounts 
that you gave us. 

A The six what accounts? 

Q Well, we call them Calero accounts, but they are 
the accounts that you had some authority over and they have, 
as you will see, for each month the total amount of the 
deposits and then the total disbursements, and then what the 
balances were. 



UMASSIFtfO 



71 



mmm 



35 



(The document referred to was 
marked Calero Exhibit Number 3 
for identification. ) 
For the record, the accounts are^^^^^^^f 
^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H which was 
account^^^H; the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^account the 
same place, account number^^^^f-- the first account was in 
the name °^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^^ second account was the 
name °^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^| '^^e from 

we extracted the information that you gave us the materials 

is^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H in the 
name °^^ 

The fourth account is 

in the iiii l^^^^^^^^^^^^^M 'i fifth account 

anothei 

And the final account is a^^^^^^^^H account at the 
which is also in the name of 





If you look at Exhibit 3 you'll see that until 
July of 1984 the amount of activity in these accounts was 
very little; am I correct? Until you got the $1 million 
there was very little money that either went into the 
account or was disbursed. 

A Look, sir, that account was a personal account. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Adolf o, he just asked you 



UNCLASSIFIED 



72 




mm 



36 



something that calls for a yes or no answer. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q There was very little activity. 

A Yeah. 

Q And so the first major activity was when you 
started to get the $1 million a month; am I correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And am I correct that it was Colonel North who 
told you that you would be receiving $1 million a month? 

A No, I don't remember that he told me that I would 
be receiving $1 million a month. 

Q Well, who told you that? 

MR. PORTUONDO: It has been assumed here that he 
was told that he would be receiving $1 million a month. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Well, were you told that you would receive $1 
million a month? 

A No. I don't remember being told that I would be 
receiving $1 million a month. I remember General Secord 
told me that he was trying to wor)c for a donation of between 
$15 million and $25 million, and I remember that I informed 
Colonel North, because I Icept him informed of all our 
activities, our situation. Every time I saw him I would 
tell him how we were, what we were doing, what were our 



73 



mMw 



37 
problems, what were everything. 

And so I told him that I had received that, and I 
don't remember he ever telling me you are going to get $1 
million a month or you are going to get so much. I don't 
remember that. 

The only time was when General Secord said that he 
was working on some friends to get us between $15 million 
and $25 million. 

Q Let's go back to Secord. When did you first meet 

General Secord? 

A I don't remember. 

Q Who introduced you to Secord? 

A I don't remember. I wasn't introduced as such. I 
believe that it was through Colonel North and I don't 
remember if I called General Secord or if he called me on 
Colonel North's recommendation. But I do not remember. It 
was here in Washington at a hotel. 

Q Was the hotel one on 734 Jackson Place? 

A 734 Jackson Place? 

Q Does that ncune mean anything to you, sir -- 7 34 
Jackson Place? 

A Well, I met -- if that is the place that's across 
Lafayette Park? 

Q Yes. 

A Okay. I met Colonel North there a number of 



UNCLASSIFIED 



74 





8t 



times. 

Q Where? 

A In an office there. 

Q Do you know was there a name on the office? 

A If I saw it, I would remember it. 

Q Was it called the Commission on the United States 
Constitution or the U.S. Executive-Legislative --• 

A Look, sir. What I can tell you is that it is -- 
MR. PORTUONDO: Adolf o, he is not arguing with 
you. He is trying to refresh your memory. If you don't 
remember, just say you don't remember. 

THE WITNESS: I don't know the name of the office. 
I cannot remember it. All I can tell you is it was across 
the street from Lafayette Park. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Who gave you the address to meet him there? 

A Colonel North, the person I was meeting. 

Q And who was present when you would meet with him 
at this address? 

A I was offered coffee by someone who was there, but 
I don't remember having anybody present there. I do not 
remember if I ever met General Secord there. I do not 
remember. 

Q Am I correct that you do not remember the name of 
the office as you sit here today? 



yNCUSSIFlEO 



75 




39 

A No. I remember clearly that it was right across 
the street from Lafayette Park. 

Q Did you meet him in a conference room? 

A No. I think it was -- yeah, in a conference room. 
There was a conference room there, and there was an office, 
too, downstairs, and there was a conference room upstairs. 
But I don't remember exactly. I remember meeting him in a 
conference room. 

Q You testified before that the operation of the 
organization, the FDN, was supposed to be clandestine. Do 
you remember that a moment ago? 

A Yes. 

Q Was the purpose for meeting Colonel North at this 
place as opposed to his office in order to keep it secret? 

A No, because -- I don't know why. 

Q It was his suggestion? 

A It was his suggestion that I meet him there, but I 
after that met him in his office. So I don't know what the 
purpose was. It was easier to go there because it was no 
clearance and no this and no that. 

Q I'd like you to probe your memory on this. Do you 

have a recollection as to whether you met Colonel Secord 
before the $1 million a month started coming into these bank 
accounts? 

A It would be -- 




.nv 



76 



m«6»*® 



40 

Q You don't recall one way or the other? 

A I don't recall. To me it made no difference, sir, 
one way or the other. 

Q I'm not saying that made a difference. I'm just 
trying to get a fact, and the fact is that you really at 
this point, in 1987, do not recall whether you met Secord 
before or after the $1 million a month? 

A It could have been before. 

Q It could have been after? 

A Yeah. But, I mean, I remember that -- I mean, if 
I were to really -- you know, I would say before, "You see. 

Q That's your best recollection? 

A My best recollection would.-bc l>«iore. But« 4S I 
say, there are things that I just simply did not attach that 
much importance to. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Adolfo, Mr. Liman doesn't want to 
be argumentative with you and you may get that impression. 
What he's trying to do is give you certain reference points 
to enable you to refresh your memory. He understands that 
things that didn't have significance three years ago you 
wouldn't be able to recall now because they do have 
significance. He understands that. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Mr. Calero, when you started receiving the $1 
million a month, did you have any discussion with Colonel 



KUSSW 



77 



fiMSffffiB 



41 

North as to how long this would continue for? 
A No, I did not know. 

Q Had you given Colonel North any information as to 
what the needs were of the FDN? 

MR. PORTUONDO: He means in terms of how much 
money you needed. 

THE WITNESS: I would say that he had ways to know 
that. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Why do you say that? 

A Because he could have checked with his own 
government. I remember -- 

MR. PORTUONDO: Excuse me. Adolfo. The question 
was asked. 

THE WITNESS: Look at my process, Joe. My process 
is that I am thinking out loud, and you are sharing in my 
recollection of my thoughts. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Take your time and give the answer 
then. He wants you to be as accurate as you can. He 
doesn't want you to guess. 

MR. LIMAN: I appreciate that we're talking about 
events that occurred three years ago and that at the time it 
may not have been important to Mr. Calero to remember 
whether he was told something by North or Secord or by 
someone else. I appreciate that he is struggling with the 



wiftssife 



78 



m^mn 



42 

memory and I don't mind his taking his time with his 
answers. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Think to yourself. 
MR. LIMAN: This is not a grand jury. It's an 
effort to try to find out what happened, and I appreciate 
the effort you are making and the records that you gave us. 

THE WITNESS: You understand it is extremely 
difficult to be able to remember things exactly and to the 
best of my memory I never knew for how long we were going to 
receive this. The figure that I heard mentioned clearly was 
General Secord saying he was going to try to get between $15 
million and $25 million. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Let me see if I can try to help again, this time 
using Colonel North's diaries. Do you remember meeting with 
Colonel North at the Hay Adams at any time? 
A Oh , yes . 

Q And where would you meet him at the Hay Adams? 
A We had breakfast there once that I remember very 
clearly, and we met downstairs, downstairs in the London 
Grill or something. We had lunch there a number of times. 
Yes, I remember meeting him there. 

Q Do you ever recall meeting him at the side of the 
parking lot at the Hay Adams? 

A A parking lot? There is no parking lot at the Hay 



KLUSSIFIED 



79 




43 

Adaims. 

Q Or the side of the park of the Hay Adams? 

A Oh, that's where I referred to, the place you 
called Jackson Place. That's what I referred to. Across 
the street from Lafayette Park, which is the park by the Hay 
Adams, is where I met Colonel North -- three, four, two 
times. I don't remember how many times. 

Q Now I will tell you that the first time that 
Colonel North's diaries refer either to Jackson Park or to 
the Park itself are an entry for June 26, 1984, which is 
just prior to the first deposit of $1 million into the 
account. Does that refresh your recollection at all as .to 
when you were first told that money would be coming in? 

A No, because, see what happens is that my 
recollection of giving Colonel North my account number was 
in his office and not in that place. 

Q Well, the diary of Colonel North indicates that he 
met you at his office on June 25, 1984, and June 12, 1984. 

A In Jackson Place? 

Q No, at his office. 

A Maybe June 12, mayb^§g^ave him. 

MR. PORTUONDO: He doesn't want you to guess. 
B^||^,^|gAN: (Resuming) 

Q You had three meetings with him, according to h|H 
dimry, in Jun*^ -- ^o in his office and then a third at 



MNMSSiFltO 



80 




44 

Jackson Place. That doesn't refresh your recollection? 
MR. PORTUONDO: As to what? 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q As to the time that you gave him the account 
number. 

A Account number? I gave it to him in his office. 
That's my recollection. »»-_ 

-, "' Q^. D^you r't;*'^^ how much time passed between when 
you gave him the account number and when the money first 
came? 

A No, sir. 

Q Do you recall him telling you where the money yras 
coming from? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did he tell you it was coming from a foreign 
state? 

A No . -T"- 




the unit 

procur^ent pfatCtTgilS-j^^ yoM ^fa anization change? 

A Well% #^ore, t^^Sbuted States Government used to 
supply us with weapons and ammunition and also uniforms -- 
if I remember correctly, uniforms and boots. 

Q And what happened after the U.S. Government 
funding ceased and you started to receive this money in your 




81 




45 

UIXULhOOIl ILU 

accounts? 

A Then we started to buy all these things ourselves. 

Q And who handled the procurement for your 
organization? 

A Well, it was different people. 

Q Tell me who. 

A The procurement of boots and uniforms and belts 
and web gear was handled by my brother. 

Q And where was he located? - pj, -^^ 
^ A._^rie>iMM located in New Orle«Ss^ I handled the 
procurement of weapons and aininunition. And^^^^^^^^we 
had a procurement office that handled all the food and - 

purchases -^^^^^^^^^B- ^^^m^^^H 
we also began to obtain things, some things. 

Q Did you have any expertise in procurement of 
weapons before this? 

A No, sir. 

Q So let's get the sequence. The United States 
Government funding ends, funding starts coming into your 
bade account and all of a sudden you have to become an 
expert in buying weapons; is that fair to say? 

A Well, there were very few things that we were 
buying, you know. It was not a matter of -- it was a matter 
of buying only a very limited line of weapons and 
ammunition. 




82 



::i- 




46 

Q Who gave you advice on where to go to buy the 
weapons and anununition? 

A Well, the first procurement I got from -- I had 
met a Colonel in Nicaragua, U.S. military attache. Colonel 
McCoy. 

Q Colonel McCoy? 

A Yesi. Coloiiftl^McCoy,-. And. Colonel McCoy approached 
me one time and said, you know, whenever I needed anything, 
you know, I could call on him -- Jim McCoy -- and that he 
had a connection with a company that could help us out. 

Q Was that Gretsch World or Mr. Martin's company? 

A At first I got a card from him that said R&M > 
Equipment Company. 

Q R&N? 

A R&M Equipment Company. And when I found myself in 
the situation wiieqibwe were to buy stuff ourselves, then I 
called on Martin because we were in an emergency and then at 
the same time also I was speaking to General Secord, who had 
told me that he could -qagBB^gy tuff , too. 

Q Let me give you some dates that we have extracted 

from your records and maybe this will help put things in a 
time frame for you. Your first purchase from Martin or 
Gretsch World, as he called himself, was in August of 1984. 
Your first purchase from a Secord company, according to the 
re0»r<l«, was in December of 1984. 



uNcussra 



83 



\,mMm 



, .w - 47 

A Yes. 

Q And between your first purchase from Gretsch 
World, which was August 7, 1984, was for ^^^^^H then you 
bought in September for^^^^^^H Then there's a wire 
payment in November for^^^^^^^| And then in December we 
see the first purchase from a Secord entity called Energy 
Resources, which is for 

I tell you this -- I haven't put a question -- 
just to give you a time sequence from your records. So 
let's start with Martin or Gretsch World. Who put you in 
touch with him? Was that McCoy? 

A McCoy, yeah. McCoy handled the procurement. -I 
did not meet Martin for quite a wh^ie. 

Q So McCoy handled the procurement. Did you tell 
him what you needed, or did he find that out from the 
commanders? 

A Oh, no, no, no. I told him. For instance, I told 
him that we needed -- the first thing, I don't remember what 
exactly was the first thing we bought from him, but we got a 
credit from the* f^ rifles. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Excuse me, Adolf o. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

g Th4EiMa||[^^£^K' Mr . Martin's company? 

A Yes, what turned out to be Gretsch World. 

Q And how much did you get as a credit? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



84 



UMEMSSffil 



48 



which we 



A The total amount was about| 
paid in installments ol 

Q Did you understand that Martin was the principal 
or a broker? 

A I understood him to be working for -- 

Q Gretsch World? 

A R&M Equipment. And it turned out, I found out 
later, that R&M Equipment were brokers or agents for this 
Gretsch WolRd. '"^ 

Q How did you know how many rifles to order? 

A Well, from our needs. We were having thousands of 
people swarming over to us which we could not arm. 

Q And who would communicate to you how many rifles 
you needed? 

A Bermudez . 

Q And is it a fact that McCoy would deal directly 
with Martin on what type of rifles you should buy and what 
the price should be? Who handled the negotiation with 
Martin on what type of rifles you should buy and what was a 
fair price? 

A We were of fered^^^^^^|G=3s. This was a purchase 
of opportunity, that the rifles were in -- 

Q 

A No. It turned out afterwards they were in^^H 
ind that they_tfeMBin bond, that they 





■)-^: :. ..^-r.' 



85 




could be given credit and that the price was $300, which was 
half the price of what I understood the FAL was costing. 

Q Who gave you that advice that this was a good 
price? 

A I knew what the price of the FAL was. Oh, McCoy. 
When I first talked to McCoy -- that must have been in the 
summer of '84 -- I passed on his card tol 



Q Who was that? 

A I don't remember who it was. But I passed on the 
card for them to check them. 

Q And did you get a report back? 

Well, not a report. 

An oral report? 

Yeah. 

Who gave you that oral statement? 

I don't remember exactly who it was, 




Q And what were you told about Martin? 

A That it was okay for us to do business. 
Q Now during this period when you are buying the 
weapons from Martin and before the first purchase from 



nnwssm 



86 



\m^^ 



50 



Secord, were you seeking advice from Secord on weapons? 

A What happened with Secord, you see, with Secord we 
put together that order months before we made the first 
payment. You see? 

Q The first payment was in, as I told you, December 
19, 1984. What was it for? Do you remember what your first 
purchase was from Secord? 

A Yes. He put together for us, and it took a while 
for the thing to -- ajrvnunit j 




[I don't remember. I would have to 
look at the records to know exactly what. 

Q Do you remember how long ic took? 

A A long, long time. 

Q To work out the arrangement? 

A Well, it took -- the ship came until April. 

Q And you began paying in December? 

A Well, I don't remember if I paid in December for 
something else, you see, because in January and February we 
got three air shipments on an emergency basis. 

Q Your records, as I've told you, show a December 
payment. 

A Yes. 

Q Do you remember when you first began talking to 
Secord about supplying you with weapons? 



UNMSSlflEB 



87 




51 

A Possibly in July. 

Q And do you Icnow what toolc all of the time from 
July till the first of the year to get weapons through 
Secord? 

A That they came fron 

Q And Secord told you he was getting the weapons 
f rom^^^~ 

A Yes. He was not getting them directly; he was 
getting them through a company that had connections there. 

Q Did he talk to you about the fact that^^^^Hi^ould 
need some end user certificates in order to make the 
shipment? 

A Yes, and I believe -- I don't remember exactly. 
For parts of those things there were end user certificates 
obtained. 

^^^^^^^^^B o ne s ? 

A Yes. 

Q Who handled that? 

A Someone ir 

Q Somebody for the CIA? 

A No. A friend of ours, a Nicaraguan -- a 
Nicaraguan friend of ours. But I don't remember what things 
needed, because I remember one thing very clearly that he 
said, because it stuck in my memory. He said that the 

>ell the rounds like firecrackers, that there was no 




1 ♦.* 



■.jLm>^ 



88 




52 
need for end users. 

Q Mr. Calero, do you recall that there came a time 
when the United States Government adopted the Boland 
Amendment prohibiting further U.S. funding of military and 
paramilitary activities of the freedom fighters? 

A Yes, I remember the Boland Amendment. I did not 
remember when it was, when it began to apply. However, I 
have read. 

Q You now know? 

A I now know. 

Q That it ceune into effect in October of 1984? 

A Yeah. 

Q Let me see if you recall a series of meetings that 
you had in September of '84 with Colonel North and some 
others. As a way of trying to give you a framework for 
recollection, let me tell you what North's diary shows. 

On September 4, 1984, his diary shows that he had 
breakfast with you at the Hay Adams at 7:30 in the morning. 
It shows that at 8:30 in the morning Mr. Clarridge, Colonel 
North and^^HH|^H met you at the Hay Adams. That must 
have been a continuation of the breakfast. 

It shows that at 9:30 Colonel North, Mr. 
Clarridge^^^^^^^^^^^^Hcontinued the meeting at the 
Jackson Place office, and it shows that at 11:30 there was a 
meeting in the Hay Adams lobby with you, Rob Owen, Colonel 



IMSSW 



89 



mu^wB 



53 



North and Mr. Livingston. 

Does that in any way jog your memory of a series 
of meetings at the beginning of September? 
A All those took place in one day? 
Q Yes. It was just sort of one series of meetings 
for you with Colonel North and these individuals after 
another -- one after another. 

A I remember -- I don't remember seeing Clarridge 
I is _- well, I think I know who 



anc 

you mean. He used to go by another name. 

Q what name did he go by? 

A I'll probably think of it later, but right now- it 
doesn't come to mind. I'm sorry, but I do not. As I've 
said before, I remember having breakfast very clearly one 
time or twice with Colonel North at the Hay Adams, but I 
have no recollection of that particular meeting. 

Q Do you recall any meeting that took place at or 
about the time that the Boland Amendment was passed with 
Colonel North? 

A AS I said, I met him regularly. Whenever I came 
to Washington I met with Colonel North. 

Q Do you recall any meeting at which you and Colonel 
North discussed the effect of the Boland Amendment? 

A See, there was so much information on the Boland 
Amemdinent in the newspapers. 



iwssra 



90 



mmm 



54 

Q Did you have any discussion that you can recall 
with Colonel North of the Boland Amendment? 

A I cannot remember any clear conversation. It 
doesn't come to mind a conversation. But, as I say, we used 
to talk about all the things related to us, so I would 
expect that that is something that could have come up. 

Q Did your business with Colonel North continue 
after the Boland Amendment the same way as before? 

A Well, I continued to inform him of our situation, 
of our needs, of our problems, of our successes, of our 
position. 

Q And did he continue to give you advice? 

A Well, I remember I was aslced before about did he 
ever tell you about Sandinista troops. I remember we talked 
about the Sandinistas massing troops near the border, which 
was something that we knew. I remember talking about the 
Sandinistas getting new shipments of Soviet weapons. I 
remember about seeing pictures, maybe that I saw published 
in ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

Q What pictures? 

A Pictures of Sandinista installations. 

Q Mr. Calero, did the method of operation with 
Colonel North continue the same way after Boland as before? 

MR. PORTUONDO: Did you continue to have the 
meetings and so on? 




O^W 




91 




55 
THE WITNESS: I had answered him. I continued co 
meet with him. I continued to tell him all our problems, 
all our needs, all our successes. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Did you continue to get funding? 

A We continued to receive money in our bank 

accounts . 

Q Did Colonel North have a code name that he used 

with you? 

A Yes, yes. 

Q What was that code name? 

A He told me that the Soviets listened to everything 
that we talked on the phone in the east coast of the United 
States and that we should address each other -- I would call 
myself Barnaby and he would call himself Steelhammer. 

Q Do you remember him introducing you to Rob Owen? 

A That's what is not clear. My recollection is that 
Robert Owen was working for Gray and Company, and because I 
remember the na^^Rntly, Gray and Company, and coming to 
me with a proposal for public relations. 

And I understood that that was on Colonel North's 
recommendation. But I don't know if I was introduced to him 
or he came to me with this proposal on Colonel North's 
recommendation. I do not remember. And I remember, 
however, that the recommendation or the proposal was not 



ONCLASSIflED 



92 




56 

taken because it was something expensive and I was doubtful 
that it would look good to have our effort, which was poor, 
hiring an expensive -- 

Q An expensive PR firm? 

A PR firm, yes. 

Q Do you remember meeting a Mr. Livingston with 
Colonel North? 

A The name does not -- Livingston? What does he 
look like? 

Q Let me go back to that purchase of^^^^^^Pweapons 
from Secord. How did you arrive at the price that you would 
pay for those weapons? 

A Well, they were quoted by Secord. 

Q And was Colonel North present when Secord quoted 
those prices to you? 

A No. 

Q When you would communicate information to Colonel 
North would you tell him what you were paying for weapons? 

A Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I told him what we had 
ordered. As I say, I kept him -- I gave him all the 
information and I told him the money we have received. 
MR. PORTUONDO: Your answer was yes. 
MR. LIMAN: You can let him answer. 
MR. PORTUONDO: I don't want him to repeat 
himself. 



ill^FIED 



93 



MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 



57 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Mr. Calero, did Colonel North tell you to whom he 
was reporting this information? 

A No. 

Q What did you expect him to do with this 
information that you were communicating to him? 

A That the U.S. Government should be informed of 
what we were doing. We were allies and we also gave 
information to the CIA people. 

Q Which CIA people? 

A The CIA people were always snooping. For a while 
we called them the snoopers because they wouldn't do 
anything for us and all they would do was look after us, you 
see. 

Q Did Colonel North ever say to you that he wanted 
to know how you were spending the money that he had raised 
for you? 

A The way you put the question, sir, is -- 

Q Did he ever ask you to account for your 
expenditures of money? 

A I did submit to him three, four times, a written, 
you know -- that we have purchased so much this, so much 
that, an idea of what we were spending. But I never gave 
him an invoice or anything like that. 

Q But you submitted to him some handwritten account 



mmssfiffl 



94 



\S8(!fef^il 



58 



of what you had purchased? 

A Yes. 

Q And how much you had paid? 

A Yeah, approximate, because it was all from -- 

Q From memory? 

A From memory, yes. 

Q And was it handwritten? 

A Yes. 

Q And when did you first submit such an account to 
him? 

A It must have been in 1985, beginning of 1985, 
because it must have been after we got -- see, I did not put 
a big order in until we got the big money. 

Q The big money is what? 

A The big money we got in February and March. 
Before then we were getting $1 million, and then the next 
month another $1 million, and we never knew if it was going 
to continue, for how long it was going to be. 

Q And the big money was the $24 million that you got 
in February and March of 1985? 

A Twenty-four and a half or 24. I don't remember 
exactly. 

Q And when you received that money, that's when you 
began to submit these handwritten accountings to him? 

A No, because before I had given him more or less an 




95 



TfRtflSS*^ 



59 



idea of what were our expenditures, monthly expenditures. 

Q How did you give him that -- orally or in writing? 

A Well, I must have orally told him about it, and 
then sent him or given him figures of what we were spending. 

Q Did you mail them to him or hand them to him? 

A That's a hard one. I remember mailing a few 
things to him, but I don't remember what. I remember 
mailing him cartoons that would appear that were funny. 

Q I'm going to ask you about this. 

A I don't remember exactly, sir. 

Q Was it given to him on a monthly basis? 

A No, no. Not on a regular basis we didn't giva an 

accounting. 

Q Now after what you call the big money came in in 
February and MarciFof-H985^ on how many occasioflB did jfou 

^ -^^^H|Bii^^^^elieve . 

Q And that showed how you were spending the money? 

A That showed how much we were, yes. It showed what 
we had gotten, what we were about to get. 

Q In equipment or in money? 

A No, in equipment. Just gave him. I don't 
remember telling him, you know, we got so much money, but i-r 
remember telling him, giving him the handwritten -- so many 
this, so much of that, so much of that. 



msM'B 



96 



#^yP 



60 



Q Where do you remember giving it to him? 

A Where? In his office I gave it to him. 

Q Did he ask for it? 

A We'd start a conversation, you know, and then it's 
so difficult to determine if he asked or I offered, you 
know. We came to the conclusion that it was good for him to 
have that. I think it was good to have, and he wanted to 
have it. But, you know, it's very hard. 

Q Mr. Calero, did you write that out in his office? 

A Yes. I believe I wrote it out right there on a 
piece of paper. I believe I did. 

Q And did you observe that he then had that piece 'of 
paper typed? 

A No. 

Q Did he ever give you a typed document that 
reflected the amounts that you were spending? 

A No. 

Q Going back to the purchase that General Secord 
arranged from UKt^^^^^^ was that the very first 
transaction you had with Secord? 

A Yes, that was the very first. 

Q And what steps did you take to make sure that you 
were getting the best price? 

A Well, I had gotten price indications, but more 
than anything else I trusted that a retired general of the 



KIHSSIFO 



97 



wmim 



61 
United StAtes Amy, who had, according to what he had said, 
helped us secure money and had our best interests would be 
giving us prices that were good. 

Q What money did he tell you that he had helped you 
secure? 

A Well, the money that we were getting. 

Q Which money — the $24 million? 

A This money that we began to get in July. 

Q General Secord told you that he had helped get 
that $1 million a month? 

A No. Well, he didn't say that. He was going to 
help us get between $15 million and $25 million a month."- 
MR. PORTUONDO: Listen to his question. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Mr. Calero, in July you began to get $1 million a 
month; is that so? 

A Yes. 

Q And do you recall that then in February and March 

you got this $24 million-$24. 5 million? You recall that, 
don't you? 

A Um-hum. 

Q Now did General Secord at any time tell you that 
he had helped get either the $1 million a month or that $24 
million to $24.5 million? 

A Specifically he didn't say I helped you get $1 




Lncc 



m 






82-692 0-88-5 



98 



lill»Hl 



-— — 62 

million a month. 

Q Did he ever say he had helped you get that money? 

A He said that he was helping to get the money. 

Q Who did you thank for getting the money? 

A No one. 

Q You never thanked Colonel North? 

A No one. 

Q You never thanked General Secord? 

A No one, because he didn't tell me I put so much in 
there. I just never thanked anyone. 

Q Colonel North never discussed with you that you 
were getting $1 million a month? 

A Sir, I told you that I used to keep him informed 
of what we were doing, but I never knew. Nobody ever told 
me you're going to get so much, you're going to get $1 
million a month, and then so much and so much. No one ever 
told me that. 

Q Before that $24.5 million arrived in February and 
March were you told that substantial deposits would be made 
in your account? 

A Well, I was told when I gave my account numbers to 
Colonel North and to General Secord, my understanding was 
that I was going to be getting money. 

Q But that's not quite the same. Did anyone tell 
you you were going to be getting approximately $24 million 



BmmSSW 



99 



mmm 



63 

in February or March? 

A No. The one I remember saying that, I'm trying to 
get between $15 million and $25 million, the one that I 
remember saying that was General Secord. 

Q Was it a surprise to you when you got a 
notification from the bank that $24 million roughly had been 
deposited? 

A I was really happy. 

I have no doubt that you were happy, were you 
surprised? 

A Well, if being surprised and being happy are 
associated. 

Q Well, you can be surprised and be unhappy, right? 
You agree with me on that? 

A I was surprised and happy, then. 

Q You were surprised? 

A Yes, I was. I would say I was surprised. 

Q No one told you that you could expect deposits of 
$24.5 million? 

MR. PORTUONDO: In addition to what you have 
already testified to about General Secord. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q General Secord told you he was going to try to 
raise money. 

A Try and get between $15 million and $25 million. 



mm /lecj 




100 




But he never told you he had succeeded; am I 



64 



Q 
correct? 

A Well, I mean he might have led me on to believe 
that what I had gotten had been through his efforts, you 
see. 

Q After you got the money did you say to General 
Secord I have received the money? 

A Well, I told him, yes. And I said now we can sit 
down and put in a good order, becauf« the order we had put 
in before was accumulating. And how yoti esked me about 
prices, how did I know about prices. I will tell you how I 
just remembered. - ^. 

Wft made a. bvfiHSt£^ '^"^ "* 

Q Who's "we"? -. — . 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^H made a budget! 




and^her^ was T Sd q^ia&d * ^ 
we w«Ee ijfilfirf tn nifffrj ^^w^< tt!l^'yi|Mq | tg**SL* '°""^ 
kind of thing. So Z uS«d th^Pas my guJ«Hil._jai^^ waSaery 
happy when I found out that we were- pay ii^ up to 24 cents 
for the linked ammunition, referring to our budget, and 18 
ceiits for one rofflid of anmuni$Jbn. ~ :i. Z. " * 

"^ 'And then- " 
costed 7.S;^eTrty per round fS^er tftsn 18, aaS tjy^links 
were free, and that we could link them, and we could obtain 



fit Hritfc;.aniPutvfcfci<^r ^ ge ^ f romi 



mihmm 



101 



mm^ 



anmunition for about one-third of what the U.S. Government 
people were budgeting it at. -r; - ^. 

Q When wits «hia bu( l f »» prepared? .-^ • 
A Oh, it must have been the end of 1983— We should 
have a date- '" .-»^,^^ -~-. 

Q Do yojt have it? ^r ^-' 

A I will look for it. 
Q Could you produce it? 

A we'll look for it. I remember seeing it in a pile 
of papers not too long ago. If I find it, which I think I 
will, it must have been prepared the end of '83 or beginning 
of '84. I don't remember exactly when, but I will look for 
it. Would you jot that down? 

MR. PORTUONDO: He'll remind us when it's over. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Was there a U.S. representative by the name of 
Masterson? 

A Masterson? 

Q Yes, whom you consulted -- Masterpool? 

A Oh, Masterpool. I mean, I met him two or three 

times. 

Q Who was he? 

A He was a consultant, a volunteer consultant. 

Q For whom? 
A For us. 




r^nv 



102 




66 



A Yes. And he was in our base camp. I saw him 
there three times, four times. 

Q Did he advise you on procurement? 
A No. 

Q Did you discuss with Colonel North the fact that 
you had gotten the $24 million? 

A I told him. I informed him about it. 
Q Did Colonel North tell you before that money was 
received by you that it would be coming? 
A Not to my recollection. 

Q Mark as the next exhibit a document signed 
Steelhammer, addressed to My Friend, and it appears to be a 
draft with handwritten markings on it. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Calero Exhibit Number 4 
for identification. ) 
A I read about that in the paper. 

Q Would you look at this and tell me whether you've 
ever seen this document before, including at the Independent 
Counsel's office? 
(Pause. ) 

MR. PORTUONDO: It's a three-page document, but 
you can answer the question that's pending. And that is, 
did you see this at the Independent Counsel's office or have 



liillASSiFIED 



103 



«ERSS!FSD 



67 

you seen this before? 
(Pause. ) 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Have you seen it before? 

A No, sir. I mean, a letter like that -- I mean, it 
has many points with which I am familiar. 

Q But do you recall whether they were communicated 
to you in writing? 

A In writing, that letter I do not remember seeing 
it. 

Q Did you ever receive a letter signed Steelhammer? 

A Not to my recollection. 

Q Did you ever receive any writing signed 
Steelhammer? 

A Well, I remember one. I got a little one of these 
index cards, but I didn't get it from him. 

Q Tell me what that was. 

A It contained a ncutie, a Cuban-American that wanted 
to meet me in Miami and gave me his name and a phone number. 

I mean, that I remember. 

Q And when you say you didn't receive it from him. 

A Well, the secretary gave me one time -- 

Q Fawn Hall? 

A Yeah, a piece of paper with the name of a person. 
I mean, I didn't attach any -- 



uNMSsra 



104 



ll.Lftl 




68 

Did you ever see the name Steelhammer written out? 

MR. PORTUONDO: As opposed to typed? 

MR. LIMAN: Or typed. 

MR. PORTUONDO: You just answered that it was on a 



card. 



BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q No. He didn't say Steelhammer was on the card. 
He said there was the name of a Cuban-American on the card. 
Did you ever see the name Steelhammer on a piece of paper? 

A It is possible. Well, I tell you I remember right 
now I got a phone call at my hotel, that Steelhammer had 
called, so I've seen it, yes. 
Q other'^tharTthal? 

A I'm trying to think. I just remembered that one. 
MR. PORTUONDO: How can you forget a message from 
Steelhammer? If you remember, you'll remind him of it? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I'll do that. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Did you ever receive any document from Colonel 
North addressed "My Friend"? 

A (Nods in the negative.) 



Q If you loo)c at Ca lero EJthibit 4^ 1 Ittjl^frts^ 

is being delivered via a trusted courier who has no 
Itnowledge of the contents but who can help carry out some of 






105 




m 



n 




h 



69 



what this l«tt«r 1« *bout. 

Did Colon«l worth •v^r ■•nd any docujn«nt to you 

vl« « courier? 

A I'm trying to z*mmiatfx if I •vmx got *ny document 
from Colonel Morth vie courier or directly. 

Q You Ju«t don't recall? 

A I don't recell ever getting a documen t from him. 

Q If you look at thia documen t it aayaj 




106 




BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q After those paragraphs that have the dashes in 
front of them, it says: And now the best news of all. Next 
week a sum in excess of -- 

A It's crossed out, too. 

Q Next week a sum in excess of $20 million will. be 
deposited in the usual account, while this must be 
husbanded carefully, it should allow us to bridge the gap 
between now and when the vote is taken and the funds are 
turned on again. 

Do you recall being given that message in 
substance orally by Colonel North? 

A (Nods in the negative.) 

Q The answer is no? 

A No, sir. I don't remember. And the way we got 
the money, I remember my surprise and my happiness when the 
person who was in charge of the bank account -- it wasn't me 
— told me so much arrived. And for me it was all sort of 
like Santa Claus, you know. 



M^SW 



107 



mMWi 



71 

Q Were you told, Mr. Calero, that this money would 
have to be conserved by you to last for some months? 

A No, not for any determined period. As a matter of 
fact, for me I sort of felt bad when I didn't see any more 
money coming. 

Q Well, were you told that no more money was going 

to be coming after this? 

A No, I wasn't told. 

Q Do you remember that by the summer of 1985 this 
money had pretty much run out? 

A Yes. But then at the end is when we got the -- 

Q Humanitarian aid? 

A Humanitarian aid. We already had -- I had 
purchased -- I think I exaggerated the purchase of 
anununition. 

Q You stockpiled eimmunition? 

A Yes. 

Q And you stockpiled weapons? 

A We spent almost $20 million, yes, or about $20 
million in ammunition. 

Q When this money ran out, do you recall that it was 
at about the sununer of 1985? 

A Just about, yes. It coincided -- 

Q With the grant of the humanitarian aid? 

A Yes. 



yN6LASS!F![B 



108 



yiiSMEBT 



72 

Q Do you recall that after this money ran out the 
FDN started to receive weapons directly again? 

A No. 

Q Were you ever told that a group of private 
benefactors were now supplying weapons directly to the FDN? 

A No. 

Q Were you ever told that General Secord had 
arranged for the supply of weapons to the FDN? 

A (Nods in the negative. ) 

Q The answer is no? 

A No, sir. I'm sorry. I forget. 

Q Were you ever told, Mr. Calero, by Colonel North 
that he was not satisfied with the way in which you had 
managed money that had gone into this account? 

A No. I don't remember it. 

Q Were you ever told that Colonel North had arranged 
for General Secord to assume the management of the 
procurement of weapons for the FDN? 

A Well, he had done it for us. 

Q Who had done it for you? 

A General Secord had procured weapons for us . 

Q But you had paid for them. 

A Yes. Also, General Singlaub had obtained weapons 



for us. 



And you had paid for those? 



IINCUSSIFIEO 



109 



DieswT 



73 



A Yes. 

Q But were you ever told that instead of the money 
going to you and you then paying Secord or Singlaub for the 
weapons that they were going to purchase the weapons with 
funds being given to them directly? 

A No , no . 

Q Not through you? 

A No. 

Q You were never told? 

A No, I was never told what you are saying. I was 
never told, no. 

Q And were you ever told that an air strip was going 
to be built 

A I heard about the air strip, which I had nothing 
to do with. 

Q But you heard about it? 

A I heard about it and I've been asked about it, and 
I've been trying to think where I heard about it or how I 
heard about it. 

Q But, Mr. Calero, the one thing you knew was that 
you were not paying for the air strip. 

A We had nothing to do with 




When you heard of this, did anyone tell you where 




-nui^ 



no 



■•.;W 




the money was coming for that? 

A No. 

Q The answer is no? 

A No , sir. 

Q To your knowledge from the time that this money in 
your account ran out sometime in 1985 until Congress made 
available money f off- weapons again in October of 1986, did 
the FDN receive any weapons? 

A The weapons we purchased. 

Q Apart from what you had purchased before your 
money ran out. 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q No one told you that there were any kind of air 
drops of weapons? 

A - No. Well, the air drops of weapons were weapons 
of ours that were being air-dropped. 

Q Who was paying for the dropping of those weapons? 

A I don't know who paid for it. Let's see. I 
remember that I learned about it after it had been 
established and I remember that I told Colonel North about 
it. And I remember saying that it was lousy service we were 
getting. 

Q But you were getting a service for which you 
weren't paying? 

A For which we weren't paying. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Ill 



Dimi^ffiii 



75 

Q But you're an experienced businessman, so you know 
you get nothing for nothing, right? 

A I am very much experienced in making a profit. I 
used to be experienced. 

Q Now when you spoke to Colonel North about the fact 
that you didn't think that the service was good -- 

A I expected that he could do something about it. 

Q Did you ask who was dropping this out of the sky? 

A No, no. I did not inquire. 

Q Did you ask who was paying for it? 

A No, I didn't ask who was paying for it. 

Q Did he tell you who was handling it? 

A No. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Wait until he finishes his 
question, please. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q When you complained about the service did he have 
any comment? 

A He probably did, but I would not remember what it 
was. 

Q Did he tell you Secord was handling it? 

A No, he didn't say, to my recollection. He didn't 
tell me that Secord was handling it. I didn't see Secord 
after about the summer or fall of '85. I did not see him 
again until February of '87. He disappeared from sight -- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



112 



76 

from my sight anyway. 

MR. LIMAN: Could we take a break for lunch now 
and then resume? Would you have enough time if we resumed 
at 1:30? 

MR. PORTUONDO: That would be plenty of time. 

THE WITNESS: More than enough. 

MR. PORTUONDO: Can we ask now if you intend to 
go -- I 

MR. LIMAN: I think I need two more hours. 

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., the 
same day. ) 



UNCUSSIRED 



H *#».-. wr 



113 



77 



AFTERNOON SESSION 



(1:30 p.m. ) 



Whereupon, 



ADOLFO CALERO, 
the witness herein, having been previously duly sworn by the 
Notary Public, was further examined and testified as 
follows: 

MR. LIMAN: Would you mark as the next exhibit 
this document? 

(The document referred to was 
marked Calero Exhibit Number 5 
for identification.) 

MR. PORTUONDO: Before you go on to the next 
exhibit, Mr. Liman, Mr. Calero and I have talked over lunch 
and reflected on some of the questions you have asked him. 
I think he should clarify a few things. I can go ahead and 
say it and he can confirm it, and you can follow up on it. 

Basically he said in regards to the issue of 
whether or not North ever told him who was paying for the 
air service, he told me that he recalled that North had said 
to him that a private group. 

THE WITNESS: But not who. 

MR. PORTUONDO: And nothing else. You can go 
ahead and ask him, if that will help somewhat. 

He also recalls in regard to the Clarridge and 



limSSlflED 



114 



mmm 



78 
North meetings, he does recall a luncheon with Clarridge and 
North in Rosslyn, Virginia. 

In regards to the park issue, he said he has a 
vague recollection of walking with North in a park. 

THE WITNESS: Lafayette Park. I don't know if we 
met there or if we came out of the place and sat at the park 
or talked in the park. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE - Resumed 
BY MR. LIMAN: 
Q I appreciate your amplification of the record and, 
as I told you before, I understand we're talking about 
events that occurred years ago and you've had many, many, 
conversations with many people. So I'm appreciative of 
that. 

On the first point that was just raised, you have 
a recollection that Colonel North told you that a private 
group was paying for the air service. 
A Ves, a private group. 

Q Tell us when the conversation occurred and what 
was said? 

A I couldn't say when but it was at the time that 
this air service was going on. 

Q And what was your understanding of the air 
service? what was it doing? 

A It was helping us. We always had a logistic 



UNCWSSIFiED 



115 



mmmi 



79 

problem, always. Today we have the same thing. And they 
were to deliver stock that we had to deliver inside 
Nicaragua. 

Q And where were they getting the material that they 
would be dropping? 

A From our warehouses, because they would come to 
our warehouse ^^^^^^^^H and they would take the stuff. 
was never there. I never met the people in charge of that. 
Captain Cooper was the manager of the whole thing and he was 
the person that contacted and spoke to our people down 
there. And he was the one who would fly the plane. But I 
never met any of the people. 

Q So you understood that tr.e air service would pick 
up weapons or munitions that were m your warehouses ^^| 

A And they would deliver thera to Nicaragua, yes. 

Q And these would have been arms or munitions that 
you had already paid for? 

A That we had already paid for, yes. 

Q Did you have any understanding that in addition to 
that a private group was paying for an air service to 
deliver either weapons or munitions that were being paid for 
by the private group? 

A No. The only thing was that we were short-shipped 
in the big shipment that came from Europe arranged by 



UNCUSSIFIED 



116 




80 

General Secord. We were short-shipped, if I remember 
correctly, M-79 grenades, 40 mm grenades. 

Q Was that the first sealift? 

A No, no, no. It's the second. We had two sealifts 
from Secord. 

Q And so you were short-shipped in the second one? 

A We were short-shipped, yes, and we were short- 
shipped that, and I believe C-4 also. And I wouldn't know 
what else. And those things came at some time. It must 
have been in the late fall, 

Q Of what year? 

A Of '85. 

Q But that's what you had already paid for? 

A Yes, what we already paid for. 

Q But so far as you know, Mr. Calero, all of these 
weapons or grenades or ammunition that you received, the FDN 
received, were paid for? 

A Were paid for yes, by us. 

Q Were paid for by you. And you have no knowledge 
of Secord delivering you weapons that were paid for by 
others? 

A No , sir. 

Q The second thing was a recollection that you have 
of a meeting in Rosslyn, Virginia with Dewey Clarridge and 
North. Tell me about that. 



wussm 



I 



117 




81 

A Well, it was like for, you know, an old times' 
sake meeting. 

Q When do you place the date of that? 

A I would not venture, but it was after Mr. 
Clarridge -- after he had left the service in Latin America. 

Q And was it after the CIA had been excluded from 

support for the freedom fighters? 

A Well, when is your date? 

Q I would put that date as October of '85. 

A Yes. 

Q October of '84. 

A It was after that date, but I don't know if the 
meeting was in '85, the lunch was in '85 or '86. 

Q And what do you recall being talked about at the 
lunch? 

A How things were, you know, how things were going. 
Like I say, it was more he wanted to know, apparently, how 
we felt, how things were, the long way we had come. You 
know, how we had survived and that kind of thing*) -- how we 
were doing. It was just -- I would call it an old times' 
sake meeting as far as Mr. Clarridge was concerned, yes. 

Q 'B^ yeiFrenaro^lpr^lJ^tJting idJDd^tthAj; m««Lh|R. the 
walk that you had with Colonel North in LafayetCe Park other 
than that you walked there? r^Ji 



UNWSSSe 



118 




82 

Q Were V*tt walking from one place to another? 

A You see, what happened was this. I was probably 
staying at the Hay Adams because I used to get a place 
there, or the other hotel I used to stay at at that time was 
the Carl#ton, the Sheraton-Car l»ton. That was right, you 
know, very close to each other. And the Old Executive 
Office Building was on the other side of the park, and I was 
on the other side. So I remember that maybe it was we came 
out of this Jackson Place and walked in the park. 

But I remember talking to him in the park. 

Q Going back to the period of 1984 when the first $1 
raillSjn, the first monthly $1 million, what discussiorts did 
you have with any representatives of the United States 
Government i^out how ytfu «»Ould be able to manage, now that 
you had to handle the procurement rather than the United 
States Government? 

A I find no answer for that. 

Q No recollection? 

A No SEllection. TmeS^^ just got into this. 
As you can see from the items listed there, there were not 
very many items that we had to get, you know. It was not a 
very complicated matter. 

Q But you had never bought a weapon before 1984? 

A If you see who we bought weapons from, we bought 
weapons from a former colonel who I knew before. 



UNDUSSffl 



119 




83 

Q That is? 

A McCoy. A former general that was introduced 
somehow by Colonel North. 

Q That's Secord? 

A Secord. Another former general whom I had met 
before. General Singlaub. So I was very much afraid of the 
arms because I had heard a lot about the arms dealers and 
arms merchants. 

Q So you chose people whom you considered to be 

trustworthy and whom the United States Government had 
recommended? 

A No, no. -' ■*■-■-- — ^~"-; 

McCoy wST'tfecommended? 

A Well, no, McCoy was not recommended. 

Q I thought you said that you checked on McCoy. 

A I checked on McCoy. 

Q And you checked on Secord? 

A And they said nothing against McCoy and Secord I 
had met. 

Q Through North? 

A Through North. So, I mean -- 

Q That was a good recommendation? 

A The f a^^%if' thfy 'twere former American officers 
was, for me, a recommendation. I was not afraid to enter 
into this type because I had read a lot about these arms 




120 



DiPiWe^ 



84 

dealers that were, you know, not very good people and all of 
that. But I felt good with these people -- best of all, 
I'll be very frank, with General Singlaub. 

Q Mr. Calero, did North ever say to you that he 
wanted you to deal with Secord? 

A I don't recollect, but I dealt with Singlaub after 
I had dealt with North, and there was no objection, I would 
say. I didn't feel that I was forced to deal with Secord, 
but I felt in a way that if he had helped to get us money, 
if he had gotten us materials in^^^^f before, I could, 
although I felt best, as I say, with General Singlaub — I 
mean, I had a lot of confidence, blind trust, in him. "- 

Q Were there any inciden<:s with Secord that gave you 
any reservation about doing business with him? 

A No. But I did not feel as good, let's say, with 
him as I felt with, let's say, with General Singlaub. The 
more contact I had with him, the more I appreciated him and 
liked hiffl. 

Q What was it about Secord that -- you are having a 
difficult time verbalizing it and it's there. 

A Maybe his ways, his personality. 

Q I don't know him, so maybe you can describe it, 
the way he dealt with you. 

A Maybe too self righteous. I don't know. I mean, 
it's one of those gut feeling* thtft-wne f^ about people. 



UNWSSiaED 



121 



mmm 



85 

you know. So if you compared the two, as I said. General 
Singlaub and Genen£L^Jt«qpp4., I m««n,. General Singlaub was 
all heart as far as I'm concerned, and I didn't think the 
other one was that way. 

But -- maybe General Singlaub one time made a 
remark -- I'm trying to recollect. I don't want to put 
words in General Singlaub 's mouth he didn't say. 
MR. LIMAN: Off the record a moment. 
(A discussion was held off the record<4 
— jy MR, LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Did Secord ever express to you any dissatisfaction 
with the way that the FDN was running its operation? - 

A No, because he didn't know how we were running our 
operation. But I remember now that he told me, when I told 
him that I was going to buy some rifles and some things from 
General Singlaub and I told him the price -- not from 
General Singlaub. General Singlaub had friends that were 
going to get them for us, and I told him the price. He told 
me, well, he's never going to be able to deliver that. He 
said something like that. He won't deliver or it's 
impossible. 

Q The price was too low, according to Secord? 

A Yeah, the price was too low. 

Q Did you ever have to negotiate price with Secord 
where he came in at one price and you negotiated it down? 



W?l 




122 



UNSBlMir 



86 



A I would always try and get better prices. 

Q Did you ever succeed or did he give you a fixed 

price? 

A Most of the time I would say he would say he would 
try and get a better price, and I believe he might have in a 
few items. 

Q Let's look at this schedule. Exhibit 5. Have you 
ever seen this before? 

A I believe, if I remember correctly, I wrote this 
longhand. That's what I referred to. 

Q And this is the document in longhand that you gave 
to Colonel North; am I correct? 

A I believe so, yes. 

Q And I will tell you that this document was typed 

in Colonel North's office. That's Exhibit 5. 

I'd like to review it with you. The first heading 
is independent acquisition. Does that refer to the items 
that you acquired through Martin? 

A Yeah. These items were acquired through Martin, 
the rounds and the magazines, I believe. Let me see. where 
did I get those? That must have been it. But the rounds 
were ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and 
^^^^^■hand grenades came to us, and the^^^^H-- I mean, it 
was a very close figure to^^^^Hbut apparently I just 



rounded. 



HNtUSSW 



I 



123 



ymssra 



87 



Q ^^^^^^^^^^^H3-3s , they came to you? They were 
delivered to you? 

A To us, yes. 

Q And if we look down to the next item, it says 

airlift number one, February 1985. Now, do you recall from 
whom you got airlift number one? 

A This was airlift number one, airlift number two. 
Apparently there are only two airlifts here, but I believe 
there were three, but it could be only two. Or maybe two as 
of April 9. Those were Secord. 

See, what happened was we were waiting for the 
srder that took a long, long time and delay ed - 
immensely, and we caime to a point where we couldn' t^^^^^^H 

ind ve needed urgently 
ammunition. And so we got these two airlifts. 

Q Now those were obtained from Secord. Sealift 
number one, which is an April arrival, do you remember where 
you got that? 

H^^Hl That's 

Q And that was from Secord also? 

A Yes, Secord. Yes, sir. 

Q Now was sealift number one negotiated with Secord 
in the summer of 1984? 

A Sealift number one? 



Right. 



iWSSffl 



124 




A Oh, yes, it must have been negotiated sometime in 
August, I believe. 

Q In August? 

A Yeah. 

Q Was that your first transaction with Secord? 

A That was the first transaction with Secord, 
although, of course, coming from a shorter distance and by 
air the other transactions, the airlift came before the 
sealift. 

Q And that's because the sealifts were slow in 
arriving? 

A We used to call itl 




Q And sealift number two also came from Secord? 

A Also came from Secord, yes. 

Q And what was the origin of those weapons? 

A It was various origins. As you see, HK is German, 
Hauklan and Koch, AK magazines are Iron Curtain. The GIP-3 
rifles are German. The M-79 grenades are U.S. 

Q And where was the ship coming from, do you recall? 

A I have no -- 

Q Was this a European ship? 

^^^^H^^^Hj^^^^^^B That's was 

Q Now if you look at this schedule, the items 
airlift one, airlift two, sealift one and sealift two are 



iwsssffl 



125 



wmm^ 



89 

all Secord purchases, correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And then the first one is called independent 
acquisition. Do you see that? 

A Yes. 

g Was that word "independent" your word? 

A I don't recall if it's my word or not. 

Q Do you know why you would refer to that as 

independent? 

A No, sir. I don't know if that is my word, if I 
put that down or not. This was taken off from something 
handwritten by me. 

Q Now there was also a sealift of material that came 

from Singlaub, right? 

A Through. 

Q Through him. I'm not suggesting that General 
Singlaub was the principal. He — 

A Arranged it. 

Q Arranged this. And when did that come? 

A That came, if I remember correctly, right after 
this other one. 

Q Right after the May one? 
A It must have come in July-August. 
Q And where did that come from? 
A That came from! 



KUSSifiEB 



126 



iiNai^f^ 



90 




So you were able to get weapons and ammunition 
from^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l fron 
and from Western Europe to help you in your struggle with 
the Sandinistas. 

A And the easiest thing to do is to get 
weapons because they are anxious to sell. 

Q To get the hard currency? 

A To get the hard currency, yes. And] 
thing. I was invited to^^^^pby some] 
but I was afraid. 

Q I don't believe that you are afraid of anything, 
given the difficulties you've had to go through. 

A But they are unnecessary risks that I'd rather not 
take. 

Q Was the person who invited you to gol 

A No, no. I don't remember. Some man. I wouldn't 
remember his name. 

Q While we '.re still with this exhibit, as I 
understand it you used the money that had come into your 
account to purchase these weapons as well as to provide for 
the maintenance of the troops and the organization during 
the period of the cutoff. 

A Yes. 

Q And you bought more weapons than you immediately 
needed in order to stockpile them? 




127 




91 

A Yes, in order to have sufficient amount of 
weapons, and the last purchase I made was more on account of 
the fact that it was such a good price that, you know, I 
wanted to take advantage of it. 

Q And that was the purchase that was arranged 
through General Singlaub? 

A Through General Singlaub, yes. 

Q And did you at any time after you had completed 
these purchases and before the United States Government 
funding got turned on again in the fall of 1986 ever ask. 
Colonel North to arrange for more purchases of weapons? 

A No, sir. He did not arrange for these purchases. 

Q Did you ever ask him to arrange for any purchases 

of weapons during that period after you had run out of money 
and before the government funding got turned on again? 

A No. I mean, I remember discussing with him the 
nea^M*^|^^gBmnV^V^«HMWi=lMf^^e«lse the 
helicopl^^stS^^^really -- the beginning of September of 
'85, August -- well, August or September of '85 -- the 
Sandinistas began to make heavy use of the helicopters, of 
the MI-24S. "^ 

Q Those are the Hinds? 

A The Hinds, yes. So we talked a number of times 
about ground-to-air missiles, the need we had -- you know, 
how urgent that was -- but we just talked. 



\iHtmsm 



128 




92 

Q Did you ask him to help you yet thero? 

A Well, I roust have. I must have. I don't remember 
how I worded it, but I must have. I told him of the urgenqr 
of our need, of the necessity of those things. 

Q What was his response? 

A I'd sure love to. I wish you had them. I'd sure 
love to be able to do something. 

Q But you didn ' t get them? 

A No, we didn't get anything. 

Q Did you ever discuss it with Secord? 

A No, because, see, I didn't see Secord from that 
time on, until I found him at the Independent Counsel. v i 
discussed — the one that I discussed this more with was 
with Martin, whom I had met, and he did try to get them for 
us, but it was very, very difficult. 

I talked to General Singlaub about getting ground- 
to-air missiles, but then we had no money. And I remember 
that the package -- these were SA-7s, and we were more 
interested in the blowpipe. The SA-7s are heat-seeking and 
we had been told that the Hinds had these heat deflectors. 
So, you know, we were thinking about blowpipes. But the SA- 
Ts, I remember ,. cost at the time some figure that was 
quoted. And then I got quotations, I got letters from all 
sorts of dealers — $160,000 for three state of the art, 
they would call them, start of the art, the latest Soviet 



WmSintB 



129 



\m^ 



mm 



93 



ground-to-air missiles -- three missiles and one launcher. 
$160,000. 

So that was a lot of money and we didn't have 
money then. We didn't get any more money after that. 

Q After the money stopped coming did you ever ask 

Colonel North why it had stopped? 
A Well -- 
Q Or anyone else? 

A I'm working from memory. See, you have to know my 
personality. I wouldn't come to anyone and say, you know, 
give me money. I mean, for me it's very difficult to do 
that. I must have said, my God, I wish we were getting 
help. I mean, we're not getting r.elp. Nothing has come. 
Maybe that was my way of asking. Then General Singlaub, I 
remember, at some point took a trip and I was more relying 
on maybe that General Singlaub could do something, took a 
trip to ^^^^^^^^^1 and talked to friends 
that he had, very good friends] 

AndMH^H 

And^^^^^H But he wasn't given the support. 

Support from whom? 

The support from his government. 

Which government? 

From this government, the U.S. Government. 

He told you that? 



UNCLASSiriED 



130 




94 

A Yeah, he told me he was not given support, that he 
had talked to his friends and everything, but they would 
wait for some kind of a signal, which apparently they did|| 
not get. And that's why he was not successful in getting 
the money. 

Q Did General Singlaub ever tell you he was being 
cut out? 

A Well, I remember that General Singlaub told me 
that he had been told by Colonel North to stay away from 
him. 

Q To stay away from whom? 

A From Colonel North. That I remember. 

Q Did he tell you why? 

A Too much high profile or something. I would not 
recall exactly, but he told me this. He told me I haven't 
seen Ollie in months. 

Q Did he ever say to you that North preferred 
dealing with Secord? 

A No, no. I don't remember it being put in those 
words, no. 

Q You didn't see the two as rivals for supplying the 
liberation forces? 

A No, no. I did not see the two as rivals. And, as 
I say, I'm buying from one. I went and bought from the 
other, and I felt that I had absolute freedom to do that. 



KUSSW 



131 




9S 

And I would not know if they were pleased or not pleased, 
and I didn't ask. 

Q But chronologically at least after you bought from 
Singlaub the money stopped -- chronologically at least. 

A Yes, chronologically. Chronologically it stopped. 

Q Now I'm going to ask you to search your memory for 
what you thought at the time. Did you associate the end of 
the funding with the fact that you had done business with 
Singlaub? 

A No, sir. I did not associate it because the last 
money I got was in March and Singlaub, I started dealing 
with him maybe in May, June -- May I think it was. Was it 
in May? 

Q Our first record of payments to General Singlaub 
for shipments that were arranged by General Singlaub would 
have been April 26, 1985, which would have been $2 million. 

And then -- ^^^^c^^m 

A Three million three? 

Q Three million three in May. 

A Well, that's it. 

Q And on that the reference is "to be picked up by 

Claude". Do you know who Claude was? 

A No. That's expecting too much from me. 

Q I didn't know whether that was a code name. 

A Well, it was for them. This was done this way. 



WIKSSW 



132 



mm 




96 



You know, they gave me an account number and the 
indications, and I would order my lawyer friend to send 
money to such and such a place, and that was it. But now 
that you mention it is the first time that that has come up. 

Q Were you purchasing for just the northern front or 
also for the southern front? 

A Well, we did not purchase for the southern front 
as such, but we supplied the southern front. 

Q With money? 

A With money and with ammunition and weapons. We 
made a few flights. They are filmed. One air drop is 
filmed. There was more propaganda in the south than we ' 
were. 

Q Let me go back to some documents. Over the period 
of the account we notice that there were payments of some 



some-odd to 



Q And that was for the southern front. Your account 
also indicated that there were travelers checks totalling 
some^^^^^^^^^l What were they for? 

A The travelers checks we used to send -- first 
before we got this thing rolling, before we made contacts 
that would make transfers through accounts in the States and 
deliveryi^^^^^^^^^H we would do most of our business 




isii^ssro 



133 




97 

through travelers checks, and we would do a lot of the 
purchasing with travelers checks, too. 

But then we started to use -- see, we had a 
currency broke i^^^^^^^^fv^ho had a bank account in the 
States. We did it through various ones. Then we would 
deposit in the States and they would deliver^^^^^^V in 
lat the parallel rate, which always higher. And 
then travelers checks we used for -- it was a very 
convenient way and we were not charged for them by the bank. 

Q When did you last see Oliver North or speak to 
him? 

A Late October or the first of November that T saw 

him. And then ^'^^l^^^^l ^"^ °" '"^ ^^^ bac)<^^^| 
in Miami I was ambushed, as I said, by a crowd of 
reporters who, you know, said what do you say about the gun 
money. 

Q About the diversion -- so-called diversion? 

A The diversion of money, about Colonel Poindexter 
resigning and Colonel North being fired. And that was very 
shocking to me, really. That night, after I went to some 
newscasts and everything, you know, because they were all 
after me, I came home and I called Colonel North at the 
National Security -- what do they call it -- SIGNET? 

Q SIGNET? 

A SIGNET, right, which was a very easy number. I 




134 




98 

this day -^^^^^^^^ 

Q And what happened? 

A And he answered the phone and I said, Ollie, I'm 
shocked to hear what's happened and I feel very deeply and I 
pray to God that everything will turn out all right. And I 
don't know of any money. And he said, well, thanks buddy -- 
he used that word, "buddy" -- thanks, buddy. Things will 
come out all right and God bless you. Via con Dios, he 
would say all the time, via con Dios. And then that's the 
last time I have talked to him. 

I've been told, that I could see him or talk to him 
because it's not against the law, but I have not done at. 

Q Did you ask him in the conversation about this so- 

calLed diversion of funds? 

A I said, I don't know anything about this. I told 
him I didn't know. I didn't ask. I said I don't know about 
anything. I haven't gotten all -^^^'iiffl«g'^'at they say I 
got. I haven't gotten any money sine* 

A "1 had cfotteB~$l-iliSIi«B". 

Q Right, but not big money. 

A Not big money, no nothing. And I don't know what 
he said, but he was not very talkative. I imagine he must 
have been -- and he said, you know, everything will be all 
right. This is crazy, all this money. And I believe he 




NCLASSiFlEO 



135 




99 

used these words: this is all crazy. Or something like 
that. 

And then he said things will be all right and via 
con Dios, or something like that. And I don't remember 
exactly. 

Q Did you ever meet Admiral Poindexter? 

A Yes. I met Admiral Poindexter. First, he came 
into Mr. North's office one time when I was there, I 
believe. 

Q When? 

A I don't remember. And then when I saw the 
President. 

Q when was that, what year? 

A We saw the President the first time in April, I 
believe. It was in April '85. 

Q What was the meeting about? 

A He met with the resistance, the Nicaraguan 
resistance and it was a protocolary thing, I would say. And 
then we met him again after the vote when he told us --you 
know, it was a pep talk. 

Q This was the vote -- 

A The vote that we lost. 

Q The vote that cut off the funds in 1984? 
A No, no. I never met -- in 1984 I never met the 
President. The first time was in 1985, I believe. I'm not 



UNClftSSinfil 



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y 




HgSSCIHET 



100 

too sure. And then I think we lost the vote -- no, no, when 
we lost the vote in 1986, because soon afterwards we won the 
vote. 

Q This is when the House first voted against? 

A When the House first voted against. 

Q Against the aid. 

A It was almost a public meeting, you know. 

Q Now Poindexter was at one or another of these 
meetings with the President? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever have any discussions with Admiral 
Poindexter? 

A No. I don't remember having much of a 
conversation with Admiral Poindexter, no. I don't remember 
ever seeing him alone or anything. 

Q Did you know Mr. McFarlane? 

A Yes, I know Mr. McFarlane. I believe the first 
time I met him was^^^^^^^^^f and I had about a 20-minute 
talk with him. 

Q Was that in 1985? 

A No, 1984. 

Q And was that when he made a trip just before the 
inauguration of the President for the second term? Do you 
remember that, January of '84? 

A January of '84? I don't remember when it was. I 



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m^WB 



101 



remember that he was 

Q Do you remember what he said? 

A I did most of the talking. I mean, I remember him 
as a very tight-lipped man, not very talkative, and he 
wanted to know how things were. And I told him. i 
explained to him our situation and our position. I think 
that must have been sometime in -- 

Q It was in January of 19847 

A It was in January? 

Q Yes. 

A He was not there after. 

Q Did you also meet him after? I know you mentioned 

January of '84. How many times did you meet him^^H 



A Once. I only saw him once. 

Q January of 1984? 

A I met him in January 1984, and then I saw him 
again here once, twice, three times. When we saw the 
President the first time he was there. Then I don't know if 
I met him before or after I met with him. 

Q Did you talk to him about getting more funding? 

A I talked to him about our needs. Definitely I 
must have told him our needs. Oh, yes. But that was -- 
let's see, I'm trying to think if it was in both meetings. 
I'm trying to remember when. You see, I must explain to you 




\^ 



vyhi" 



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lA^iJ 102 

so you know my situation, that I never tcept -- you saw my 
appointment book. You know, I started writing in it and 
then I just let go on it and never wrote another, and then 
for one year I didn't buy a memorandum again. 

Did Mr. McFarlane ever talk to you about arranging 
for funding for the Contras? 

A I have read. After that I have read that he had 
something to do with^^^^^^^^^Bor something, that he had 
been offered something, but I am trying to think. As I say, 
I found him not very talkative and he would listen. Maybe 
he did say in that January meeting, you know, we will see 
what we can do or something like that. But I don't renember 
any exact. I would be putting words in his mouth if I told 
you that he told me this and that or if I left a meeting 
with him real happy, I would remember it. 

Q And you do not recall any separate meetings with 
Admiral Poindexter, as I understand it. 

A No. I do not recall any. 

Q And in your meetings with the President of the 
United States, these were meetings which were group 
meetings? 

A Group meetings, yes, sir. 

Q And those were meetings in which he pledged to try 
to get support for your cause? 

A Yes, vital support. He asked for it. 



WUSSifO 



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mmm 



103 



Q Let me go back to November of 1984, which was 

right after the Boland Amendment ended U.S. aid. Do you 
recall telling any United States representative at that time 



had ceased to support the 



No, because they never supported us before. In 




1984J 



Q Yes. Had they provided ~ari^ttchnical support? 
A No, sir. I remember talking to a man named^^^HH 
I think his name is one you have a copy of ; he was the 

asking him for help, and he said well, we'll see. You know, 

a situation ^l^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^l 

^^^^^^^H But we'll see. Maybe with medicine we can 
start, but we never got anything from them. 

Q Bid you ever trf^il^get any t»lp frwn^ 




This thing can be 
done again, et cetera, et cetera. And then he said I don't 
know what we can do. 

Then one time he called me back. I don't know 
precisely the dates. He called me -- yes, he called me in, 
I believe it was, '85. No, in '86 he called me, in April of 






140 




104 
'86. I remember because in April of '86, I will never 
forget, that's when we had our internal problems. And he 
called me to come to Washington. I was very enthusiastic 
and when I came to Washington he told me he was about to 
retire and that he was going to set up a company and wanted 
to do business. 

So I said, okay, sir, we'll take anything on 
credit, you know, 

Q You should have shown him your bank account at 
that point. 

A And then he said, well, that's very difficult and 
I think we would require letters of credit. So it came -to 
an end. 

Q Let me ask you, let's go back to November of 1984. 

Do you recall learning in November of 1984 that the Soviets 
had delivered the Hind helicopters to the Sandinistas? 

A Well, I recall talking about the Hinds arriving, 
you know. 

Q Do you remember talking to Colonel North about it? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q Do you remember telling him that you were upset 
that the CIA hadn't warned you that these helicopters were 
arriving? 

_; A Well, I complained many times -- I don't remember 
if it was in November -- that we would get no help from the 



E'LllSSire 




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rGBMStfiED 



P 

105 
CIA and that the CIA only served their own purposes and that 
they would want to snoop on u*i^nd try to find out what we 
were doing and whatgJrfe were thinking even, and that they 
would give us no help at all?="^^ 

And I remember complaining, but I don't remember 
the times that I did, nor do I remember when I did it. 

Q Am I correct that the reason that you would 
communicate this to Colonel North is thaC- he appeared to be 
sympathetic to you? 

A Yes, he was definitely sympathetic. I don't know 
if you know Colonel North, but he seems to be -- he's a very 
dedicated person. He has a warm -- I mean, you know, .you 
can't help liking him and appreciating him. And he was very 
sympathetic, yes. And he would have ears for us, you know, 
for our crying, I would say. 

Q Did you ask him to provide you^^Mi any 

intelligence so that you c4^||||MMtroy these helicopters? 

A ^''^^^^'^K^S^^ that, but the helicafHMfltf 
everybody knew wmf'Jaf^e ManaiJ>t jj^jP^jbecause people 
would see them there, and we knew they were there, and we 
knew that they were building the airport in Punta Wette and 
that when that airport in Punta Wette was built that had 
underground storage that they would be transferred, and that 
the best thing would be to destroy the helicopters on the 
ground like the Viet Cong used to do. 



UNClASSiFIED 



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106 
t '-J ^ 
But we didn't have the expertise. Yes, we talked. 

Q Did he provide you with any intelligence on that? 

A That's difficult. I will tell you one thing, sir. 



This I know for a fact, that we never did, we never did any 
military action -- because I don't know what intelligence is 
and I don't know what general knowledge ij in many ways, and 
I don't know what's sensitive. I don't know what is not 
sensitive. I mean, I couldn't judge that. .^^ 

But I can tell you one thing. We never took any 
action on accowrtt of"'~any information -^rovAdlid by Colonel 
North, whether it was intelligence or just plain information 
or just — 

Q Did Colonel North ever tell you that he couldn't 
help you in any request you made because of United States 
law? 

A He would sajflw wHFJjflfewas always on the edge. I 

remember he didn't use that word, but -- - "y*jTl l 

Q You mean U.S. law? 

A Yeah, that's what he referred to -- being -- 

Q On the edge? 

A On the edge. In other words -- 

MR. PORTUONDO: Walking a tightrope? :~ 
THE WITNESS: Yes, walking a tightrope or, how 
would I put it -- that he was conscious of a law and then he 



was trying to -- 



UNCLASSIFIED 




143 



BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Walk right up to the edge? 

A Yeah, that was my -- I mean, I don't know in what 
word he put it. 

Q But that was the substance of it? 

A Of what he said. I mean, he could have made that 
comment a few times. 

Q What were the occasions on which he made that kind 
of comment? 

A I mean,_he made it, I don't know, a few times -- 
three, four times, or five. I don't know. 

Q But what kinds of requests by you would provoke 
that kind of comment? 

A You see, sir, again I did not come up and say give 
me this or give me that or do this for me. I don't 
remember. I just explained our situation, our problems, our 
quest7~aflfa there are many ways to skin a cat, like you say, 
and there are many ways people have of expressing 
themselves. And I have never been one to go and extend a 
hand and say give mSTgive me. 

So maybe the way I talked, I don't know if you can 
gather anything about me by the way I talk here. I mean, I 
try to cooperate. I try to tell you the truth as I remember 
it. I will not say something I don't remember or that I 
cannot recall as a fact. But each one has a way of 



DNCiSSaB 



144 




108 

expression. Maybe because my father was a writer I tend to 
go off. 

Q Do you remember any kind of statement you made 

that led him to say I'm on the edge? 

A Maybe any kind of a statement he said. Right this 
very minute I'm not able to. 

Q Do you recall at all in the end of 1984 thatfl^^B 

I-- had stated that 
it would not go forward with the arms sale that had been 
arranged for you? 

A There were difficulties involved. 

Q Do you remember what those difficulties wer&? 

A No. 

Q Do you remember that the shipment was supposed to 
be tc^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hdid not want to send any weapons 




A There was something about^^^^^^^^^l The ship did 
come^^^^^^^^^Hand everything was fflfppedl 

Q But do you know who arranged to overcome those 
obstacles? 

A No, sir. I only dealt with J36ner»J^^copd on .!I" 
that. I r^moqjl^ pSt thtre were delaxa^^*^! re«^ei_s<xn« 
talk with General Secord about the end users. The end users 
were necessary only for a few of the items, and I don't 



UNCLASSIFIED 



145 




SECRET 



109 



know, I don't recall if he did provide end users from some 
other placs because m^^f^^Hweren' t, or if the ship had to 
go to another place or was routed to another place and then 
diverted. I don't remember that. 

Q Do you remember being asked to pledge to recognize 

I if you gained power in Nicaragua? 
A No. I wouldn't have done it. I don't remember. 
I mean, I'll tell you one thing. If it takes an offer like 
that, you know, a political offer which one not necessarily 
has to comply -- 

Q You would have done it? 

A It does represent something for us. I mean, - then, 
you know, politicians make lots cf offers. 
(Laughter. ) 

MR. PORTUONDO: Present company excepted. 
MR. LIMAN: Let the record reflect that there's no 



comment. 



Branch. 



Q 
you wit 
A 



SENATOR HEFLIN: You're speaking of the Executive 

( Laughter . ) 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Did General Singlaub ever arrange any meetings for 
to get arms? 
never ant^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m met^^^^l 

I forgot to tell you before, when I talked 




WUSSIflEO 



146 




110 



here. I visitec 



Q Who arranged that for you? 

A I went t 

Q Was that arranged by General Singlaub? 

A No, no. to^^^^^^^^Hmyself . 
there myself and I identified myself to him. 

Q Anything come of it? 

A No. You would have seen the money reflected. 

Q Now you talked before about getting blowpipes to 
deal with the helicopters that the Sandinistas had just 
received front the Sovl«c Unioiu Did you jyer make a trip to 



Ye*. At.pna time I was 

ealivd 
^v|^e goin^^d 9Bt* >** -" 

Q Blowpipes? 

A _- ^b¥. '.Th«3(^ were goifi^ to 9ti* us the projectiler" 
and s e^gMi) ptT»~Tlr-^jfrgf-^ i*^^^ blowpipe the IraiwMr Js 
more expensive. 

Q Do you remember they were asking $15,000 each for 




DNWSSife 



147 







the launch^ 

A I think it was more. I think it was $25,000. And 
so I went^^^^^^^H you know, to see what this thing was. I 
was ^^^^^^^H 

Q What happened! 

A Well, I didn't see anyone. The one who had 
offered it to this other officer of the FDN was away. 

Q So nothing came out of that trip? 

A No. I mean, I made a deal with 

Q Who? 

we were going to buy stuff ^^^^^^^^| and he was going to 
supply some of it, and some of it would come from the 
government manufacturing plant there. And I even sent some 
money ts 

Q If 

A No, in^^^^^^^^^l But then the whole thing f.<;ll 
through and so I didn't buy anything fron 

Q Did you get your money back? 

A Oh, yeah. We ordered the money --we didn't get 
it bacHT; but we ordered that the money ^^^^^Hhad received 
be sent to another Swiss bank for a Secord payment. 

Q How much money did you send to the| 
accounts? 

A I don't know if it was $600,000 or $300,000, 




\1E11SSW 



148 



M0^^ 



112 



Do you remember when that was? 
That was in December. 
December of '84? 
Yeah. 

And who introduced you toj 
When I came here -- 
He in^^^H? 

He was in^^^H. This FDN man had already made 
all| those visits. 

Q How does he spell his name? 



And what nationality is he? 





Now do you recall discussing with Oliver North any 
of the problems in trying to get blowpipes 

A I told him about the trip. I told him about 

I had offered. As I told you before, I used to tell 
him everything, so I told him about this. 

Q Do you recall any discussion with him about the 
fact that^^^^^^^^^^B needed to get the permission of the 
British in order to supply the blowpipes? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q Did you ask him to see whether or not he could get 
you permission from the British to buy the blowpipes? 

A Well, I don't know how I put it, but I remember 



limASSIFIED 



149 




113 

asking him what could be done about that. 

Q And what did he tell you? 

A We'll see or we'll try, or, you know, we'll try. 
We'll do something -- something like that. 

Q Was there anyone else in the United states 
Government to whom you reported the way you reported to 
Oliver North? 

A No. 

Q Why was it that you were reporting to Oliver 
North? 

A Because he was the one, he was the man with whom 
we could talk. I mean, there was no one else that we could 
talk to in the government the way we could talk, freely and 
feel good about it. 

Q Because he was sympathetic? 

A He was sympathetic and he was open to listening to 
us and he always seemed to have time for us. And I didn't 
know anyone else besides. 

Q you with^^^^^^HHat all? 

A That began in -- I don't remember. His name is 
Ito us. And I didn't feel the same response.! 




150 



mjBsatttT 



114 





Did he ever provide you with any assistance, 



A No. He was very, very -- how would I say? 

Q Wavering? 

A No. You know when something's going to hit you 
you go like that -- 

Q Evasive? 

A Yeah, that's the word — evasive. I didn't feel 
that talking to him would get us anyplace. But here again 
he was more interested in knowing everything we were doing 
but more for his information, I could tell, rather than for 
using that for us, you see. 

Q What about Elliott Abrauns? Did you have contact 
with him? 

A I don't remember when my first contact with Abrams 
was. According to the press, he's not my friend. But I 
don't remember when we began dealing with him. I met him a 
few times and our meetings had to do more with the 
international diplomatic aspect of things. It was always 
group meetings. Well, I had a meeting with him, the only 
meeting was in January, I believe, or February I met alone 
with him one day. 



:iiUSSIFI[D 



151 



iimmrn 



115 



Q Let's move to another subject. Do you remember 
anything about a ship called the Monimbo? 

A Is that the one we were supposed to blow up on the 
high seas? 

Q Or at least seize. 

A I read about that. To tell you the truth, sir, I 
don't remember speaking about. 

Q Do you remember any ship that was coming from 
Taiwan with Iranian armaments to be delivered to the 
Sandinistas? 

A No. 

Q Did Oliver North -- 

A What I told Oliver Nort- -- what we were talking 




Q Oliver North didn't ask you whether or not you'd 



mrnma 



152 



iji&fSW 



116 



be willing to put up the money for an operation to seize a 
shipment of arms from Taiwan? 

A I don't recall. One time we were offered — I 
will tell you why I have problems and you will laugh at this 
one, too. One time a fellow from Malta who lives in 
California someplace came to me here in Washington with a 
proposal for me to send 300 of our men to take over Malta 
and that he would give me $50 million after the operation. 
So you hear all sorts. 

Q I'm going to show you some^^^^^^^^Hend user 

certificates and ask you if you've seen them before. Would 
you mark these as the next exhibit? 

(The document referred to was 
marked Calero Exhibit Number 6 
for identification.) 

A I don't remember exactly these, but I have seen - 

g You have seen end user certificates J 
end user certificates? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever give Oliver North copies of 
lend user certificates? 

A I don't remember. I remember sending end user 
certificates to General Secord. 

Q In Virginia? 

A In Virginia. 



iClASSife 



153 




117 

Q And what were the circumstances of sending end 
user certificates? 

A To cover shipments of weapons and I believe I sent 

directly^^^^^^^^H i j 

Q Do you recall in June of 1985, which is after your 
last sealift from Secord, having a meeting with Secord and 
Tom ^lines in Oliver North's office? Did you ever meet 
Clines? 

A I met Clines, but my recollection of meeting 
Clines is at the time between the airlifts and the sealifts, 
but my recollection of meeting Clines is at the hotel 
Carl#ton with Secord. That's my -- 

Q What do you recall talking about with Clines? 

A He was apparently, to re apparently was Secord 's 
man over there, you know. 

Q In Europe? 

A In Europe, yes. And we didn't talk -- 

Q Did he tell you that Clines was the person who had 
helped to arrange the purchase of the weapons that you were 
getting fron 

A That was his associate, his something-or-other . I 
did not have very much to do and I don't remember if I met 
Clines again or not. 

Q You hav« ■»» recollection of a meeting in the 
office of Oliver North? 



uNWSsro 



154 



T0Rb£g88gTL 



118 

A No, sir. 

Q With Clines? 

A I have no recollection of meeting and I believe -- 
I mean, I was asked that question before. 

Q You were asked that at the Independent Counsel's 
office? 

A At the Independent Counsel, and I said I 
remembered seeing -- that I did not remember seeing Secord 
at North's office, but I did remember seeing Secord and 
North in the CNP meeting in Palm Beach. 

Q A CNP meeting? 

A The Council for National Policy meeting -- the' CNP 
— in Palm Beach. 

Q When was that? 

A I don't remember. I have been to about six of 
those meetings, you see. It was maybe two years ago -- 
maybe a year and a half ago. I don'*- remember, sir. 

Q You probably have been asked this by the 
Independent Counsel, too, because you've been through this 
now several times. Do you recall in November of 198 5 being 
told by Oliver North that an airlift of ammunition was going 
to be delayed because Secord 's planes were engaged in other 
activities? 

A I've been asked that question before, and I've 
said no, I don't remember. I've read about that. I've read 



UNCUSSIFIED 



155 




119 

about it. 

Q You saw it in the Tower report? 

A I saw it in the newspaper. I haven't read the 
Tower report. I haven't got a copy of it yet. Maybe I can 
pick one up here. I read about that, but I don't remember 
because we weren't getting anything else. 

Q At that point, in November of 1985, as far as you 
were concerned, you had your stockpile of weapons and 
ammunition? 

A Yeah, and we weren't getting anything else. 

Q You had no money to buy any more. 

A Um-hum. The only thing that was concerning me in 
November of '85 was the famous ground-to-air missiles. 
That's all I felt we needed to be able to carry on. 

Q Did North ever tell you that Secord had bought a 

ship for the Contras? 

A No. 

Q Did he ever tell you that he had bought four 
planes for the Contras? 

A I remember telling North about the small planes 
that we got. I don't remember if there were three. And 
then I remember seeing the CBS movie or newscast. It showed 
Secord as being the one who bought them, and I remember then 
talking to General Singlaub about the small planes, and we 
weren't very happy about the small planes because, you know. 



yNCL»M 



156 



W^^ 



* 



120 
they were very weak things. 

Q Who paid for the planes? 

A I don't know, sir. 

Q Well, you had an impression that these planes 
belonged to you; am I correct -- to the FDN? 

A Those planes were delivered. I never received 
them, of course. 

Q But they were delivered; am I correct? 

A They were delivered by the son of Mr. Mall, who 
has his manufacturing plant. 

Q And where were they delivered? 

A They were delivered -- as far as I know, they were 
deliverec^^^^^^^^^^l but I don't know exactly in which 
location. 

g And was that in 1986 or 1985? 

A I don't remember, sir. 

Q Do you remember that you didn't pay for those 
planes? 

A I remember that we didn't pay, and it was just, 
you know, a private donation. 

Q And you thought that these planes had been donated 
to your cause, correct? 

A Donated to our cause, yes. 

Q And later you were told by someone that these 

planes belonged to Secord? 



eiL4SS!FIED 



157 



SSfi* 



121 

A No, no. I saw in a newscast. They say that he 
had purchased them, that he had purchased at least one or 
two of them. 

Q But do you remember any argument about whether he 
could take those planes back? 

A No, no. I never had any argument. 

Q What was your conversation with Singlaub? 

A Well, General Singlaub said that those weren't the 
best planes for what we wanted them, you know, that they 
were not very sturdy. 

Q Did you ever discuss those planes with North? 

A I told him -- when they arrived I told him that 
those planes had arrived, and he said, okay, fine. But I 
don't remember any conversation. They were very cheap 
planes to begin with. I mean, they were no big deal. 

Q Was there a C-123 also that was delivered? 

A No. The C-123, what I heard was in connection 
with this air resupply operation that began in April of 
1986, April '86 -- the Hasenfus operation. 

Q And that's when you heard of it? 

A Yeah, because I was traveling a lot and I never 
dealt with Cooper. 

Q And who did you understand was paying for that 

Cooper operation? 

A A private group. That's what I was told. 



ONCLASSiFlEO 



158 



mBm' 



122 



Q And who told you that? 

A Colonel North told me a private group. 

Q Did you ever hear them referred to as private 
benefactors? 

A Well, maybe private benefactors. 

Q Did you ever hear the term "Project Democracy"? 

A No, I never heard the term. 

Q Did you ever hear the term "Udall Corporation"? 

A No, sir. I've read about those things afterwards. 

<3 Was there any delivery in 1986 to the FDN from 



A No, sir. 

Q Did anyone ever tell you that there was a shipment 
of eunmunition and weapons f rom^^^^Hthat was going to be 
delivered in 1986? 

A No, sir. 

Q Mr. Calero, I will tell you that there are 
references in various things that have been written by 
Colonel North to this private supply network. I'll read you 
something now: There are several million rounds of most 
types of ammo now on hand and more than $3 million worth on 
the day by ship frorn^^^^^^ Critically-needed items are 
being flown in from Europe to the expanded warehouse 
facility ^^^^^^^^^M Boots, uniforms, ponchos, et cetera 
are being purchased locally and Calero will receive $500,000 




159 






123 




for food purchases by the end of the week. 

A We received one time $500,000, but that was in -- 
you have the record. Intel. In^^^^^H| there was a 
warehouse. I haven't been tc^^^^^^^^in -- 

Q Who was paying for what was being shipped there? 

A The NHAO. Vou see,^^^^^^H toward the end of 
'85, was it -- 

Q Are you talking about when^^^^^^Hwas not 
willing to accept any more direct shipments? 

A Yes. So a lot of stuff went tc^fj^^^^B, And I 
know -- I think NHAO paid for a warehouse in] 

Q But that would be for boots and not for weapons. 

A I don't know about it. I know that some shipments 
went ^°^^^^^|H but, I mean, I nave no check on that. I 
have no record of that. 

Q As you sit here today can you think of any 
conversation in which you were told that General Secord was 
now going to take over the supply of weapons for your 
organization and that you were no longer going to handle the 
purchases? 

A No, sir. I was never told that, and if that was 
in some people's mentality or mind, I mean, I was not told 
that. 

Q Mr. Calero, are you aware in 1986 of any purchases 
of weapons or other equipment for your organization or for 



nntussw 



160 




124 
UNO by General Secord or his organization amounting to about 
$30 million? 

A Sir, I could tell you that I couldn't be aware of 
a small purchase, but a purchase like that I would 
definitely have to be aware, and I am not absolutely aware 
of any such purchase having been done or any such purchase 
having been consulted with me. 

Q In 1986 what was it costing a month to maintain 
your forces? 

A It reached real heights on account that our forces 
came out of Nicaragua and was over $1 million a month -- way 
over. 

Q $1.5 million? 

A $1 million-something. I can check it. 

Q Where was that money coming from? Was that NHAO 
money? 

A Well, the NHAO money went from July -- the NHAO 
money began -- no, it went from September '85 to more or 
less -- it extended. There were some payments into -- there 
were small payments even in July or June-July of '86. we 
ran up a debt of $1.9 million, almost $2 million between 
July of '86 and November -- July and October, when the $100 
million -- the last week of October the $100 million began 
to operate. 

We still have that debt. And then we picked up 



liiffiinssife 



161 



TOP 






'. ^yijiiLlssit 



125 



some money, wljai^y^j^iU'Wd' ^ITct^ from -- 

Q Miller? 

A Miller, yes. Channel Miller associated things. 
And that's how we kept alive. And then we had made a 
differential, a profit on a differential exchange, an 
exchange rate differential, which we reported to the NHAO, 
and which is reported and accounted for. 

Q Mr. Calero, were you consulted about whether or 
not $27 million was what was needed for this humanitarian 
relief project? 

A I don't remember. 

<3 You don't know whether or nor that figure waS 
derived from discussions with you? 

A I don't remember how it was arrived at, no. 

g Were you able to spend the full $27 million? 

A Well, we did not spend it all, of course, but -that 
was'^JI^^JSjfely by -- I mean, mostly in reality it was 
managed by the Nicaraguan Humanitarian ' r tljiiaiWfc Office. 
We would receive the stuff and they would pay for it either 
through brokers, for those who didn't have dollar accounts 
in the States, or directly to suppliers who had accounts in 
the United States. 

Q Was that money sufficient to meet the maintenance 
needs apart from weapons or ammunition of the organization 
until the summer of 1986? 







162 




126 

A Yes. The quality of the food was greatly- 
improved. 

Q So you weren't in a position, as I understand it, 
in the winter of 1986 of saying we don't have money to feed 
our troops? 

A Oh, yeah. I was in the position, yes, because the 
NHAO money was ending and we didn't know where or when. 

Q But that would be after that money, but during the 
period that you were getting it you were able to feed your 
troops? 

A Oh, yeah. 

Q Now you were saying that you will need money- after 
that money is going to stop. 

A But we had family support to give to our men, you 
see. 

Q And where were you getting that money from? 

A The family support came mostly from the money from 
Channel Miller and money that had been made on the exchange 
differential. 

Q And was there any other source of money? Did you 
get any money from Secord? 

A No, no. 

Q And you still had eimmunition and weapons left from 
what you had managed to squirrel awcy in 1985? 

A Yes. And then at one time we got a $75,000 



HNf,U.SSir£5 



163 




f Ti 




WB 



127 
donation. I don't exactly know where it came from. We got 
$50,000 from phone calls that I made. And that was paid to 
and that money had been sent to Ann Scott, 
no, Ann Stone. And $75,000 that checks that were made did 
not pass through our account, checks that were paid directly 
to the ^^ 

Q Did you ever ask the NHAO office to provide you 
with funds to hire Mr. Owen as a consultant? 

A We sent a letter which was signed by the three 
directors of UNO recommending Mr. Owen. 

Q What led you to do that? 

A The fact that he knew our operations and he "had 
visited with us a lot, with the :-.dians, with the people in 
the south and with us. 

Q You had testified to one meeting with him when you 
decided not to hire the organization. 

A Not to hire Gray Company. But then we felt that 
Owen on his own -- he left Gray and he came to me and said, 
you know, he could help us out and we did use him as a sort 
of -- he knew a lot of Congressional people. He had been a 
Congressional aide and he could help us in the effort of 
meeting with Macomb. Congressman Macomb, and around his 
office there was some kind of medical money available and he 
helped us out on that. 

And he came down with Dr. Chaney and made a 



wicussire 




164 



medical survey, and also we felt NHAO was getting off to a 
very slow start. 

Q Did North recommend that you hire Owen? 

A Well, we knew that Owen was a friend of North. I 
mean, I suspected that Owen would inform North of everything 
he saw down there, and apparently they were close. That was 
our impression. But we were not asked, that I remember. I 
was not asked, and I said "we" --me and the other two men, 
we were not asked. I was asked by Owen himself, I remember, 
you know, if we would recommend him. 

Q Did you ever meet Bob Earl? 

A Bob Earl? The name does not -- 

Q Can you tell me from the time that the U.S. 
Government funding ended in roughly June of 1984 until 
September of 1986 what did Colonel North do for you? 

A Would you please repeat the question? 

Q During that period what did Colonel North do for 
the Contras? It's a broad question, but I'd like you to 
answer it as best you can. 

A Well, I felt that he was our listening post, that 
he would keep other people informed as to what we were 
doing, what we were needing, that he was going before 
Congress giving briefings, that he would brief different 
groups, that he would further push our cause. 

Q Were you looking to him for military advice? 




c%A'i 



r\VJ\ 



165 




129 

A No. I did not look to him for military advice. 

Q Did you consider that he had raised the $1 million 
a month that you received? 

A I considered not necessarily for the $1 million a 
month, but 1 considered that he was instrumental for us in 
speaking out for us, that he had the credibility, that he 
had the position, that he had the connections that a 
foreigner cannot come to this country and talk, but a U.S. 
military man or Marine who could speak well -- 

Q Who did you think had raised that $24 million you 
received in February-March 19857 

A Sir, I didn't care really much who did. 

Q I can understand that you didn't care where it 

came from, but who did you think had raised it-? 

A Even that. I mean, my objective ..was keeping a 
struggle going. I did not -- 

Q What would you have done if you hadn't received 
the $24 million? Would you have had to close shop? 

A No. We would have kept on going somehow. 

Q Was the $24 million important? 

A The $33.5 million. It was $33.5 million that we 



got. 



That was important? 

A That was very important, yes. 

Q And still you didn't inquire where it was coming 







166 




-w 130 

from? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you conclude that it was a matter of secrecy 
and that you shouldn't ask? 

A I thought it was a matter that the less it was 
talked about the better, that I shouldn't even know, and 
then I began reading. In the back of my mind I always had 
this is, you know, ^^^^^^^| you know 
and this, that and the other thing. 

Q So that's where the money was? 

A That's where the money was and that was my 
feeling. 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 



Q 
A 
Q 
A 

Q 
A 

took it 



But no one told you that? 

Except for General -- 

Secord? 

Secord talking about talking to 

5r whatever. 
Did he ever mention which^^^^^^^^^^he spoke to? 
Maybe he did give the name, but I don't remember. 



Well, I've read his name. 

Do you know whether he mentioned that? 

No. I could not attest that he mentioned that. 




167 



131 

Q Let me put a question to you that we've been sort 

of going around. I gather you had a great deal of 
confidence in Singlaub. 

A Yes. 

Q And you believed that General Singlaub was not in 

this for his own personal profit. 

A Yes. 

Q And that General Singlaub would act in a way that 
would be in the best interests of your cause. 

A Yes. 

Q He's a person whose heart is in what he was doing. 

A Yes. 

Q Was one of the reasons ihat you were giving arms 
orders to Secord because you believed that Secord had raised 
the money for you? 

A I could have had that -- I could have felt that 
there was somewhat of an obligation, maybe. But on the 
other hand, you know, this did not happen over a long period 
of time. It was so fast, you know. 

Q But the money was fast and the orders were fast. 

A Everything was fast. 

Q When you gave those orders for these weapons, you 
didn't even have the money in hand, did you? 

A The first order from^^^^Hwe talked about it in 
August. We didn't know how much money we had available, we 



168 



mm 



132 

had to wait to see if more money would come in, and that is 
why you see that the payment was made later, you know. it 
was being talked about and I would tell him -- I mean, 
that's what my memory more or less tells me. 

I would tell him, well, let's see what we get, you 
know. 

Q Was it a case where Secord was in effect helping 
to finance those purposes of arms? 

A No. He didn't help finance. 

Q By suggesting at least that he was going to raise 
the money for you? 

A Well, undoubtedly it created a sort of link there, 
you know. 

Q And not a legal obligation but a sense of moral 
obligation to give business to him? That's fair to say? 

A Yes, or to have him do this because this is 
detailed here. He acted as if he wasn't making a profit. 

Q Secord acted as if he wasn't making a profit? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he tell you he wasn't making a profit? 

A Well, he detailed the freight, demurrage, 
insurance, this, that and the other thing. 

Q That information you got from him that ' s on the 
North schedule? 

A Yeah. And then, you know, I didn't put him 



mumm 



169 



ommm 



133 
against the wall and say -- because, you know, I had respect 
for the person -- and I didn't say you are making a profit. 

But you had some suspicion? 

A To tell you the truth, well, yes. 

Q Mr. Calero, was Secord with you when you gave the 
information to Oliver North that is reflected in that 
schedule? 

A No , no . 

Q Because as you look at this and you see how 
detailed it is, isn't it clear that you had some information 
with you? 

A Oh, yeah, I must have had. I must have had 
information because I had these details on a little piece of 
paper, I remember, in squares -- very informal, very, very 
informal -- because I never got any invoices or anything. 

Q Where did you get that information? 

A From Secord. 

Q From Secord? 

A Yes. And I must have had that. This information 

here was from memory, but this was detailed. And this was 

an estimate, the miscellaneous. 

MR. BALLEN: When you say "this", that's not going 

to be reflected on the record. Which was the information 

from Secord? — ^ ..^i 

THE WIUJESS; llSt a i i^ 1 i f t number one, the airlift 
ft ■ 



m 




170 



iiiui.i fix ^ 

134 
number two, the sealift number one, and the sealift number 
two. This one doesn't even have prices. He had a deposit 
that had already been paid in rounded figures, as you can 
see, the $5 million, and then the estimated cost was $6 
million. It came to $7 million or something. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Was the way in which you worked with Secord, was 
that you would give him the deposit of $5 million and he 
would supply $5 million worth of weapons, ammunition, and 
bill you for whatever it was, so that if it turned out to be 
$6 million you would pay $6 million, and if it was $5.5 
million you would have paid $5.5 million? 

A Yes. 

Q So that you were really relying on him to act in 
good faith in purchasing this equipment for you; isn't that 
fair to say? I mean, there's no getting around that. You 
weren't an expert in this. 

A It is fmk i^ jjm ^m» that I was relying on the fact 
that he was «^in9" in good faith, ve ««LV ^ ; 

Q And in fact, you know, he told you that apart from 
using his expertise in getting you these weapons he was 
helping you to raise the money to pay for them? 

A Yes. He said that, yes. 

QsS^' ff^i yet -- and this puzzles me -- yet even though 
he is raising this money for you, you felt more comfortable 



UNCLASSIFIED 



171 



WǤ 



■sr 



135 
dealing with General Singlaub. 

A Well, I mean it's a matter of personalities, of 
course. 

Q Did you ever show General Singlaub what the prices 
were that Secord was charging? 

A I might have told him. 

Q That would have been a natural thing,"^orrect? 

A I might have told General Singlaub, yes. 

Q Given the confidence you had in General Singlaub 
it would have been natural to show this to him. Do you 
remember any comments he made? 

A I told you before that he thought that Secord was 
making money on this. 

Q Did you ever report that to North? 

A I don't thinJc I did because this was a comment. 
You know, it was gossip. 

Q What was the reason that you gave this schedule to 
North? 

A We would inform him, as I told you before. I 
would tell him everything -- what we were doing, how we were 
doing, what we were buying, what we had. I mean, I would 
inform him of everything -- what our situation was. 

Q That's what you did, but why? 

A I felt that he was our -- 

Q Liaison with the government? 



wussire 



172 



mm\ 



136 

A Our liaison with this whole world, you know. If 
we didn't tell h£ifi, we didn't have anyone else to tell that 
to. 

MR. LIMAN: Can we take a bferak,' and then I think 
I'm probably done. 

(A brief recess was taken.) 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q I have some just names which come out of your 
accounts. First, there was a deposit that was put in the 
account, two of them, one on 10/23/85, the next on 10/25/85 
of $200,000 -- $25,000 on one day, $175,000 on another, 
totalling $200,000 -- from Lake Resources. Do you know what 
that was for? 

A Well, that was for our use. 

Q Was that a refund for some purchases you made? 

A No , no . 

Q What were the circumstances under which that was 
transmitted to you? 

A The circumstances were that we were receiving 
money, that we needed money. We were in need of money at 
the time. 

Q Because that was after Congress had appropriated 
$27 million. 

A Yes. The NHAO did not pay our logistic expenses, 
many of our family support for our fighters, because that 



UNClKSlFitli 



173 



m,m3! 



137 

was connected with -- 

The military? 

A The military. And then our air operation. 

Q Who did you ask to give money on behalf of Lake? 

A To begin with, I found out that that money had 
come from Lake. 

Q When did you find that out? 

A Well, he found it out and told me. 

Q Just recently? 

A Yeah. 

Q Did you know that General Secord had arranged for 
this $200,000 contribution? 

A (Nods in the negative.) 

Q Did you ever meet a man by the name of Hakim? 

A No, sir. I never met Hakim. 

Q Did you ever hear of Lake Resources? 

A Never heard of Lake Resources until I saw it 
published in the paper and then it was he -- 

Q Your lawyer? 

A My lawyer, yes, that went through the bank 
records, which he did before I did, and told me that that 
had come from Lake Resources and that was the company that 
had been named in the paper that day. 

Q But had you at the time that the $200,000 was 
received, did you know that $200,000 was deposited? Did you 



ONCLASSIflED 




174 



138 

get a notification that you had received $200,000? 

A Yes. 

Did you have any information as to where it came 
from? 

A My impression was that it had come from Channel 
associated companies. I would talk to Rich Miller. At one 
point I was talking to Channel, and I worked. I mean, I 
felt that whatever money the Channel organization would give 
me, we had earned it, because I talked in three or four 
different occasions to people, to potential donors, who 
Channel had gathered. So I felt all the right to ask Miller 
and Channel himself, and I told him myself many times and 
even wrote a letter to Channel saying, you know, that we 
needed money for that. 

Our family support came to about $175,000 a month, 
so that was a lot of money that was not covered by the NHAO. 

Q And that money was being paid out of the accounts 
that you maintained? 

A Out of the accounts that we maintained, yes, plus 
the earnings out of -- 

Q Out of your currency? 

A Out of the currency, yes. 

Q We noted that the account reflected payments to a 
company called 




^^^^^^^^^^^^H is a 



175 




m 



FT 



_^ 139 

Q Money broker? 

A Money broker, yes. 

Q So that was to change dollars into local currency? 

A Yes. 

Q And is the same true of 

A Yes, sir. 

Q What about M&S Supplies? What was that? 

A M&S Supply was boots and uniforms. They are the 
companies that sell surplus materials and things like that. 

Q And RM Equipment? 

A R&M Equipment is weapons and ammunition. That's 
— the last payment that I made for those rifles, rather 
than Gretsch World they asked me 'o make it to R&M 
Equipment, since through them was the deal. I made it and I 
found since, you know, when I asked him why was that -- I 
didn't ask at the time -- they said well, it was their 
commission or something. 

AndHH^H^^B? 

political'^C^Stion In^^^^HH[and they also purchased 
somefl^^^^H there for us at times, and we used to keep 
that. Let's see, he was a sort of broker in the sense that 
he purchased. He used to take care of expenses that we had 



He was an agent? 



176 



mmm 



140 

A He was an agent of ours, yes. 

Q And Hondu? 

A Hondu Carib? 

Q Yes. 

A Hondu Carib is a transport company that 
transported for quite a while merchandise that we got and we 
purchased in the States and took down to| 

Q And Bibbins and Rice? 

A Bibbins and Rice is another one of these surplus 
web gear and boots. 

Q Front Line? 

A Front Line is the same. 

Q DIACSA? 

A Those were the transfers. We made intra-account 
transfers. 

Q And Genesco? 

A Genesco is a boot manufacturer in Tennessee. 

Q That's right. Forest Surplus? 

A Fowler? 

Q Forest. 

A Forest, another one of these suppliers of surplus. 

Q And ONYX Aviation? 

A ONYX Aviation. We bought a plane one time there. 
$65,000? 

Q Yes, you've got a good memory. 



UNCLASSJHEG 



177 



um^fflT 



141 



A Well, I've been looking at those things. 
Q ^Hjj^^Hj ^^^^^ 

^^^^^^^^His an ^^'^I^^^I^^B '^^° also 
did^^^^^^^^^^^lwork for us ^^^^^^^^^H in 
At one point we wanted to build up a force. A lot of people 
[were asking us that we take care of it because 
Pastora was crazy and there was nothing going to happen over 
there if we didn't. So we started to. 
Q ODOM Aircraft? 
A ODOM, they sent parts. 

Q And then there was a payment that we weren't able 
to identify that went to the world Bank of Canada for - 
$432,000. 

A The World Bank? That was a Secord payment. 
That's sealift number one. 

Q That's sealift number one? 
A Yeah. When was that? That was late fall. 
MR. ZANARDI: 11/6/84. 
THE WITNESS: That's a Secord. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q And would the same be true of that $326,590 
payment? 

MR. ZANARDI: That went to a Swiss corporation, a 
Swiss bank. 

THE WITNESS: That's the one that I believe is the 




ILni.!"U' 



178 



ymm 



land ther 



142 



transferred 



one that went first tc 
it. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q To Secord? 

A To Secord, yes, because we didn't want the money 
to come back. So we ordered that. That must have been in 
January? 

MR. 2ANARDI: December 24. 

THE WITNESS: If it's December, no, it's not the 
[thing. The ^^^H^fthing would have been in 
January, a similar $300,000-something, a similar amount. 
BY MR, LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Did you ever deal with any Canadian arms dealers? 
No. No, sir. We had these three main — 
Martin, Secord — 

Martin, Secord and Singlaub. We never had any 
direct dealing with — 

Q Do you remember whether Mr. Livingston was the 
Canadian? You remember I referred to Livingston. 
A The name really is blank for me. 
Q Did you ever meet a man by the name of Olmstead, 
with one eye? 

A (Nods in the negative.) 

Q You testified this morning that because of the 
publicity that surrounded General Singlaub that Lieutenant 



UNCLASSIFIED 



179 



yNsasw^T 



143 

Colonel North had indicated to you that he was 
uncomfortable. 

A No. I think -- well, it might have been both. 
Both North and Singlaub told me that on account of -- that's 
a recollection; it's an idea, maybe -- that it was best for 
him not to see -- 

Q To see General Singlaub? 
A Yeah, for General Singlaub to keep away. 
Q From Lieutenant Colonel North? 
A Yeah. 

Q Did Colonel North ever indicate to you any 
displeasure at the fact that you had done business wit,h 
Singlaub? 

A No, sir. No, sir. The only comment that I 
remember was that of General Secord's that said that that 
was not going to go through, you know, that that was going 
to fall. 

Q Because the price was too good? 
A ^SBP^ow, yeah. 
Q Did you ever meet Dutton? 

A Dutton? I've been asked that question before and 
another one. 

Q Gadd? 

A Gadd. _.. -*■ - 

Q Do you. hav«_(|ny r«K>liection of me«tii>«r either of 



UNCLASSIFIED 



180 



w&isam 



144 



them? 

A One time X met someone whose naose I do not 
remember, who offered me airplan*».' -■ ~ .y. 

Q To buy? :^ - - ^s 

A To buy airplanes or to lease — bi^^or lease 
airplanes. -^ 

Q - Did you have money at that*ljne? 

A No. So nothing ceune of it. And then at one time, 
at the NHAO office, I met a man who had planes, who did 
something for NHAO and who seemed very familiar with Central 
America, but whose name I do not recall. It could have been 
Gadd, could have been Dutton, could have been someone «lse, 
too. 

Q There were a number of payments that you made to 



A One time -- those were for uniforms, for 
amnunition. One was for ammunition, $155,000, I think it 
was. Another one was for uniforms. And then I sent money 

ti^^^^^^^H and one time we paid for some ammunitionl 

So we also paid. 
Did you ever pay any money to Lieutenant Colonel 




Q 

North? 
A 
Q 
A 



Pay him any money? 

Yes. 

Well, I gave him some money, yes. 



C! 






181 



\mWt^ 



145 

Q When was that? 

A I don't remember when. I've never been asked that 
question until now, when you bring it up. I gave him money 
for some trips that he had to make or some people had to 
make, but I don't remember exactly when. 

Q How much? 

A I would have to check that. It could have been 
$40,000. 

Q And was it in cash? 

A No, in travelers checks. 

Q Travelers checks? 

A Yes. ^ 

Q And how would you check when you paid that to him? 

A How what? 

Q How would you check when you gave him that? 

A How would I check? I would look for -- when I 
gave it? 

Q Yes. 

A I would look for a piece of paper where I put down 

jf - 
those things. 

Q_ . f^ld you do that and communicate with us? Do you 

remember where it was you handed it to him? 

A In his office. 

Q Was it on one occasion? 

IF'' No. It was on different occasions. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



182 




146 

Q How many occasions? 
-^^ A Maybe four, way back. That could have been in 
•85. 

Q Did he tell you what it was for? 

A Something connected with hostages. 

Q What did he say? 

A That that was going to be used in connection with 
the hostlges, ^because the United States Government could 
not, you know, couldn't do anything like that. 

Q Was he talking about the hostages that were taken 
in Lebanon? 

A Yes, yes. Those hostages, yes. 

Q Did you know he was working on that project? 

A Pardon? 

Q Did you know he was working on the project for the 
freedom -- 

A Oh, yes. I mean, he was — he mentioned the 
hostages and he said that that was going to be used for 
people to travel in relation with the release of the 
hostages , yes . 

Q Did you ever give any money to any other employee 
of the United States Government? 

A No. 

Q Would you please check those records as soon as 
possible and let us know? 



SMSSiFIE 



183 



UNeuts^iiOET 



147 

I don't have any other questions. 
A I think I could do that. 
Q Today or tomorrow? 
A No. 

MR. PORTUONDO: We don't get back until 11:00. I 

know you are anxious. 

MR. LIMAN: I had forgotten he doesn't keep his 
records here. I've not dealt with any real person, but, by 
the way, I define a real person as a person who lives 
outside of the Beltway. 

THE WITNESS: I believe that paper, that's^^H 

I believe. 

MR. LIMAN: Why don't you ask the question? 

MR. PARRY: Why did you use six different accounts 
for receiving the private donations? 

THE WITNESS: I've been asked that before. To 
begiUMifH^Miinessmen always have various accounts. In 
our case, it was necessary to have various accounts because 
we had to be very careful to not put all the eggs in one 
basket. That was a lot of money that was in consideration, 
so it was better to have it spread over banks. 

And if you will see there were a lot of transfers. 

You know, one time we heard that^Hwas not -- it's not a 
very big bank, so we felt okay, then better we transfer 
money from^Hto another account. So another account was 




U' 



184 



Iji^feliittr 



148 
opened. And then we would transfer back to^^^| back to the 
^^^ because ^^^^^H were where our men had the most access 
to. And then we also thought it was necessary to have 
accounts in banks I 

And an account of ours ^^^^^^^H was closed on 
account of a letter that was sent by one who sent $30. We 
never knew where he got that account number, and he said 
"for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters", and then it was 
closed down. 

But it's usually for businessmen to have, but that 
was the reason. We never had a bank account in Switzerland. 
MR. LIMAN: Paul, do you have any questions?. Lou, 
any questions? 

MR. BALLEN: Yes, I have some I'd like to ask you. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE 
BY MR. BALLEN: 
Q I want to focus your attention in March of 1985. 
Did you ever at Colonel North's direction deposit money into 
(account? 
A No. I never did deposit any money into| 
■account . 

Q Did Colonel North at any time ask you to deposit 
money into^^^^H account? 
A 





UHCLHSSIFIEO 



185 




So it was dropped. 
Q So you never in fact -- no money was ever in fact 
given to you for that purpose? 

A No money from us went direct ^°^^^^| 
Q Did it go indirectly? 

A That I cannot -- I mean, now that you ask that 
question, I mean, this is supposition, this is speculation 
on my part. Could it have been that the money that I gave 
to North -- did he — 

-*■ I, Mft' ' ^a ttijBBMMMfcJiiill, he told you that money was going 
for hostages, right? 
. j;^-:4i ~7MiS WITNESS : Yes . 

BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 
Q But he asked you for that money -- North asked for 

the money? 

A If I could make some money available because there 
were some trips to be taken by some people in connection 
with the hostages. And my answer was, you know, this money 



>^,.'i 'u k<.' .. . 



186 



\mimm 



150 



is not mine. The money belongs to freedom, you know, for 
whatever it can do for freedom. 

Q And did he tell you how much he needed? 
A I have to look at these records. I remember one 
time it was $15,000 and $10,000. It must have come to 
$50,000, something around that amount. 

MR. LIMAN4- Jhat ' s what you're going to get the 
record for. 

THE WITNESS: What I have, yes. 
BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 
Q What made you associate in your mind that that had 
to do wit^ 

A Well, now your question. 

MR. LIMAN: He didn't associate it in his mind. 
He put the question of whether there was something that was 
indirectly for^^^H 

THE WITNESS: So it came to me. You see, you 
asked me a question that brought in my mind an association. 
BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 
Now you about ^^^^^^^^^^^H Did 

■- those were broker fees for what? 
No, no. He was a broker. 

A currency broker? 'fel^J -siZ--::^^" "^^ 

Yes. I would order a deposit to be made in 

■account in the United States, and^^^^^l 






Uba 'j-fe--- 



187 




151 




would in turn give local currency to our mer 




was he involved in any of the 



was used as a broker also by the 



Q 
NHAO -- 

A 
NHAO people. 

Q And the money made on the currency transactions 
froQ^^^^^^^^^^^^flwould any of it go rlirectly back to 
you, or did all of that currency transaction go back to 
NHAO? 

A No, it went to us. It went to us, but we reported 
it to NHAO. 

Q And did you have authority to spend that in any 
way you saw fit? 

A No. I even signed a letter saying that that money 
was going to be -- because we informed NHAO that we were 
making this exchange differential, so we wrote a letter 
saying that that money -- I signed it -- it was going to be 
used exclusively for the same humanitarian. It wasn't going 
to be used for military purposes. 

Q Mr. Calero, do you know a man by the name of 
Rafael ^aiiLMH.) ? 

A I know Rafael e«n*««5, yes. 

Q How do you know him? In what context? 

A Well, I met him in connection with -- I don't know 



mmmm "^-'^^'^^ 



188 



MW 



152 

if r met him before or if he had been introduced to me 
before in Miami, but I met him in connection with --my 
formal recollection is meeting him in connection with Secord 
and he traveled^^^^^^^^f for Secord. 

Q When do you recall that occurring? 

When? 

Yes. 

When did I? Sometime in '84. 

And when you met him in 1984 it was with General 



A 

Q 

A 

Q 
Secord? 

A Well, my recollection is of meeting him with 
General Secord, yes. 

Q Was anyone else present at that time? 

A No. 



Q And what were the circumstances of your meeting? 

A The acquisition of weapons, and then Cafttero was 
sent ^^^^^^^^Hto determine what our needs were with our 
military men down there. 

Q And which military men do you know that he might 
have met with? 

A Canf go? He must have met with Bermudez and 
others there, you know — the logistic and different people. 

Q And this would be in 1984? 

A '84 or '85. 

Q So the purpose of his going to meet with the 



IINCUSSIFIEO 



189 




153 

military men was to determine precisely what the needs were? 
A To meet them and what our needs were, yes. 



Q Did you have any subsequent conversations with 

*o after meeting him that time? 

A Oh, yeah. I saw him once in a while. I would say 



yes. 

Q JUnder .what ciccunistances would you see -him? 
jV _r^th relations to what he was doing, you know, the 
work that he was doing. 

Q Which was? 

A Which was drawing up these lists and he would 
maybe bring information as to the state of the shipment and 
all of that. And then we made an estimate -- he made an 
estimate — but I don't recall the dates. 

Q He made what kind of an estimate? 

A Estimate for our needs. 

Q Did he do this on more than one occasion? 

A Yeah. I don't remember exactly when he went down. 

Q Was his estimate of your needs, did that 
correspond to what you feel your needs were? 

A He did it with our military men, you see. 

Q Did you review those lists that he drew up or not? 

A I saw them, yes. Of course, the estimates -- what 
I'm trying to think of is if there was an estimate made 
after the purchase. You see, that's what I'm trying to 



190 



^ 





154 
determine. It could have been so. 

Q In other words, there could have been more than 
one estimate that he made? 

A Yeah. But what I'm trying to determine is if 
there was an estimate after the second sealift, which I 
don't remember exactly. 

Q And the second sealift, that was the last delivery 
from Secord? 

A That was the last delivery. Well, the sealift, 
yes, but remember that I had said before that there were 
some thing which were short-shipped. 

Q Did you ever receive the things that were short- 
shipped? 

A Yes. I don't know when they came, but I asked if 
they had arrived and I was told yes, that they had arrived. 

Q Were you ever aware of any arms being delivered to 
[for the FDN? 

A No, except — well, what was short-shipped went to 



Q Do you recall — you said you didn't recall. 
Would that have been sometime after the second sealift? 

A It was after, definitely, because they were short- 
shipped. 

Q So it would have been either in the summer of '85 

or later? - i* 



Mmi^ 



191 




155 

A No, no, in the fall. 

Q The fall of "85? 

A In the fall of '85. 

Q. Ana how large a shipment was that that was short- 
shipped? What are we talking about in terms of arms, to the 
best of your recollection? 

A Some^^^^^^^|40 millimeter grenades and some C- 
4 , maybe . 

Q . Do you have any idea what the value of the 
shipment was approximately? 

A No, no, because it had been paid before. 

Q Are you aware of any other munitions or armaments 
that were shipped and stored atl 

A No, because we didn't buy any. I mean, I was 
aware that those grenades and the C-4 and maybe another 
little thing, but very, very minor, I would say, compared to 
what we had purchased, c^tb WttS^ter date. And they did 
come, because I was told they had arrived. 

Q Who told you? 

A Our logistics people. I asked the logistic people 
if they had arrived and they said yes. 

Q Well, you testified earlier that the air resupply 
was f rom^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band 

[into Nicaragua. Is that correct? 

A The air resupply was delivering weapons from our 



INCLASSIRED 



192 




156 



into Nicaragua, yes, by wai 



Q Would that be from^^^^^^V 

From^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H but 
of, you know, very scant information which to me did not 
matter, you know. 

Q But that's what I want to inquire into. If they 
were delivering your weapons out °^^^^^^^H ^^Y were they 
also going ti 

A That was on account of the flight pattern. The 
pattern was^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand these people 
had all their operations and all their people, they had 
everything ^'^^^^^^^l They had nothing ir 

Q Were you aware of the fact that they were taking 
weapons at^^^^^^Hintc^^^^^^H for 

A No. They brought in what was ours. That's the 
information I had. They brought in what was ours, what we 
had purchased. But as to new weapons there, I was not 
aware. 

Do you know a man by the name of Felix Rodriguez? 
Oh, yeah. 

And when did you first meet him? 
I don't remember. He came to visit me after he 
stopped. I was introduced to him by another Cuban-American 
and he came to visit me when he stopped a shipment of two 



OiSlilSSIFIED 



193 





157 
fast boats out of the United States to the Sandinista 
government on account of a law that he was familiar with, 
and he brought it up to the Customs to stop the shipment of 
those boats. 

And then we developed a friendship. I was in 
lone time with himi 
And then he promised to come t<<:;^^^^^^Hto help us, but he 
fell in love with -- he told me he was going to Salvador for 
a while to help the Salvadoreans and then he would come to 
us. And he just became absolutely taken by the Salvadorean 
work he was doing and never came to us. 

Q Why did he stop the shipment of the boats? . 
A Why? Because he thought that those boats were 
going to be used for military purposes by the Sandinista 
government and they have some technical qualifications that 
made it possible under the law not to be shipped to the 
Sandinista government. 

Q These were boats that were destined for the 
Sandinistas? 

A Boats that had been purchased by the Sandinista 
agent here in this country. 

MR. LIMAN: Allegedly as pleasure boats. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, as pleasure boats. 
MR. LIMAN: But they could be used for military 
purposes. 



Uh'CLASSIflED 



194 





158 
THE WITNESS: But they had some technical things 
there that could be used for military purposes. I have 
described him as a freelancer for democracy, this man Felix 
Rodriguez. He had something to do with Che Guevarra. I met 
him in^^^^^^H one time when I went tc^^^^^^H with this 
same^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^who was going to help us -- I 

excuse me, not^^^^^^^H -- a 

BY MR. BALLEM: (Resuming) 

Q Did he provide any direct assistance to you, 
though, in your effort? 

A No, no. He was going to. He was going to provide 
direct assistance. He offered to participate personally and 
evex^hing but , as I say^. b«.st4yed in Salvador .- 

Q You are not aware, then, of any efforts he might 
have made in El Salvador in your behalf? 

A Well, I have read about it afterwards, you know, 
that he became involved. 

Q Are you pers***!^ TflWir^^^^Ijs: , 

A No. Personally aware, no. He told me to visit 
him in Salvador and he told me that he was using the name 
Max Gomez and he gave me his phone number in Salvador, but I 
have never had the opportunity to visit with him in 
Salvador, which is just as well. 

Q How about a man associated with him by the ncune of 



195 




Ramon Medina? 

A No. I never met Ramon Medina. 

Q Did you ever have any dealings withl 



159 



A I know^^^^^^^^^^^^H I've talked to him about 
maybe three times. He's been very, very much sympathetic to 
our cause, always ready to help. But most of the contact 
with^^^^^^^^^^^^Bhas been b)^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B not by 
me. I have met him twice, three times. One time I saw him 
in Miami. 

Q Were you aware of any efforts he was making in 
terms of the air resupply of weapons to you either 
personally or through your commanders? 

A I don't think I ever discussed what he was doing, 
biit^^^^^^^^^^^^^His man who we could assume that if he 
was there and there was something going on, he would know 
about it and he would sympathize with it. I mean, that was 
my impression. He has been very sympathetic all the time. 

Q But you are not personally aware in any way of any 
way he's been of assistance? 

A I'm not personally aware exactly what he did or 
how he did it, you know, because I haven't beer 
in a very long time. The last time that I was there was on 
transit and one time I had to overnight on account of not 
being able to land^^^^^^^^^H But I didn't see anyone. I 



l^-'lUiflC^filr:/! 



5-ri 



196 



mmmrn 



160 



went from the airport to a hotel and from the hotel to the 
airport. 

Q You testified earlier to the meeting that was in 

Wa a^^^^^^^^^^^^Ha t 
that meeting? 

A Um-ura. No, no. It was only between the Americans 
and Nicaraguans. 

Q Was there ever a meeting with Colonel North and 
linl 

A Not that I was present at. 

Q Not when you were present? 

A They must have met, but I don't recall ever ^ 
meeting with them. I saw Colonel North maybe twice or maybe 
three times at the most ia^^^^^^^^^V-- twice. I can say 
that I never met wittf^^^^^^Hand Colonel North. 

Q And there was no discussion witl]^^^^^^Has to 
him being the liaisoi^^^^^^^^^Hfor the private benefactor 
network, the private group? 

A No, no, "^jfag 

Q That you are aware of? 

A No. 

Q Do you recall ever meeting in Colonel North's 
office with Singlaub and Secord both present? 

A No. I don't remember. That's a new one. I don't 
remember. 




n*)ull III 



197 



^mmm 



161 
Q Let me see if I can refresh your recollection. Do 
you recall a meeting at the White House in the spring of 
1985 with North, Secord, yourself and General Singlaub where 
SAM-7S were discussed, surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles? 
A In the spring of 1985? 

Q Well, that's a general date. Or at any time. Let 
me ask that question. 

A At any time? I do not recall a meeting that both 
of them would have been present. I mean, as I say, I have a 
faint recollection of having been in Colonel North's office 
and General Secord having arrived or having been there and 
General Secord having arrived. To tell you the truth,. I 
wouldn't swear to that because it's not clear in my mind. 
And being there with General Singlaub. I remember that one 
time we met the President and Singlaub was there, so we were 
together in the Executive Office Building, and then we went 
to the White House with General Secord and Colonel North. 
MR. LIMAN: General Secord or Singlaub? 
THE WITNESS: Singlaub. I'm sorry. I'm getting 
all mixed up. But I do not remember ever having attended a 
meeting with General Secord and General Singlaub. 
BY MR. BALLEN: ^R«aiJUiing) 
Q Let me refresh your recollection in a different 

way about the subject matter of the meeting. Do you ever 
remember discussing the purchase -- you talked about 
surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft missiles -- where 

fin ^3^ k'? 



198 




162 

Secord, where General Singlaub said he believed he could get 
those and General Secord said something to the effect that 
he could provide instructors with them, instructors to 
operate, to teach the FDN troops? 

A I remember a conversation about instructors 
because Secord sent an instructor when we got the SA-7s from 
you see. He arranged for an instructor, an 
from^^^^^^H 

Q Do you recall any discussion prior to that 
instructor arriving with him about an instructor, that he 
could provide an instructor with it? 

A I remember talking about an instructor with. 
General Secord, but where I don't remember. I remember his 
sending an instructor and I remember the instructor being 

I remember all of that, but I do not remember 
" — and the instructor gave a course to our men. 

Q Do you remember ever having a conversation with 
General Singlaub about SA-7s and his ability to provide them 
to you? 

A Oh, yes. Oh, yes. The price that I was telling 
you he told me, that price, $160,000 for these three state- 
of-the-art SA-7s, the latest that had been made in the 
Soviet Bloc, that were immediate. 

Q Do you recall ever discussing the price of those 
same SA-7s with General Secord as opposed to General 



199 




163 
Singlaub? 

A I'm sorry. No, I don't. I might have. It's a 
possibility, but I don't recall it. 

Q I'm just trying to get at if there was a 
difference in those two prices which one would you purchase 
from if there was any reason. 

A Well, I didn't purchase any from either one. 

Q Well, how did you get those? You said that 
General Secord shipped to you -- 

A Those were fromH^^^f Those cost, I believe, 
$47,000, if I remember correctly. 

Q But you said you didn't purchase them? 

A Sure. I said after that. In the sealift from 
.^e gotl 

Q Is this the shipment that you discussed the 
instructor coming? Is this when the instructor came? 

A Those came in April of '85 and then the instructor 
came to teach our people the use of those SA-7s that had 
been manufactured^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^f 

MR. LIMAN: And the instructor was provided by 



Secord? 



Secord? 



THE WITNESS: By Secord, yes, sir, 



MR. LIKal%^■ 



frchased from 



200 



yHuLnOuM 



164 



BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 

Q Did you ever meet with Barbara Studley? 

A Oh, yes. I met her through General Secord. 

Q Through General Secord? 

A I mean, General Singlaub, yes. 

Q What were the circumstances of your meeting with 
her? 

A Well, she helped General Singlaub. She helped 
General Singlaub in this acquisition of the weapons that he 
got for us. I think somehow she let her company name be 
used for that. 

Q Did you give General Singlaub the bank account? 
Let me ask the question a different way. How were you to 
transfer the money for the purchase from General Singlaub? 

A He gave me a bank account number where I sent the 



money . 

Q _ 
could de 

A 

Q 
recall? 

A 



Did you ever give him a bank account where he 

rLes that he raised? 
Oh, yes, sure. 
What bank account did you give him? Do you 



I don't recall, but I gave him -- I must have 
given him the first one that I ever had, and then I must 
have given him another one and another one so he'd have a 
choice. 




201 



fSiHSEriiP 



165 

Q And did he, to your knowledge, deposit any monies 
in those bank accounts that he had raised? 

A No. I believe that those $30 came from -- 

Q The $30, that would be the sum total -- $30 
million? 

A No, $30, $30 from^^^^^^Hthe one that closed 
down our bank account^^^^^^^^^ I mean, there's $25,000 
that could have come from General Singlaub. 

Q But that's the extent of it? 

A Yeah, because, you see, what he did was he 
acquired things. For instance, he was instrumental in 
buying the Lady Ellen, for instance, the helicopter. He 
picked up the money. He seen about people sending us down. 
But I have no record, no recollection or nothing of that. 

We've gotten a lot of medicine, a lot of clothing 
and things that have been sent down to^^^^^^^Hand that we 
have given to the refugees V|tflJ9BB^1^9Hi9flll^^ °^^ troops 
and to our troops. We give medical attention in our 
hospitals to the ^^^^^^fpopulation around. We take care 
of their children and people, and we operate on them and 
everything. 

Q Let me ask you this. Did Sfrayl^uB^ever call you 
in reference to Me* Pastora? 

A Yeah. 

Q What were the circumstances of that? 



llHWSSffl 



202 



oiHs^ia 



166 
He went^^^^^^^^^^H at one point and talked to 
Pastora and gave me a list of things that Pastora needed, 
and he thought that it was important to get Pastora back 
into the picture. But then I understand that people here 
were upset by this situation, having General Singlaub mixed 
up in these things. So we never did send, we ended up by 
not sending anything to Pastora. 

Q And :Siat was because people here were upset about 
it? 

A Well, yes. We heard -- Pastora was always a 
problem and we werlF'upset, too, you see. 

Q Who did you hear from here that was upset about 
the agreement with Sin^ai;^? 

A I'm trying to see how it was. We were upset by it 
to begin with. 

Q I understand that, but who from up here did you 
hear from that was upset about it -- "up here" being the 
U.S. Government? 

A I remember telling General Singlaub he should talk 
to the government people, that they should give an answer, 
and I would say that if my recollection is good, I would say 
that it nust. nave beefi^^^^^^^gthe one that seemed upset 
about that. I would gather that, but I don't know if he . 
ever talked to General Singlaub or not. I do not" "> - 
recall . 



ONCLASSIFIED 



203 




KM^IfJOfiir 167 

Q Did he talk to you? 

A I think. That's my recollection. We both agreed 
that it would be a problem. 

Q And did he communicate with you not to deliver the 

supplies? 

A I have been very respectful of the U.S. Government 
people and they have been very respectful of me, and we 
don't give each other orders, you know. We have taken their 
points of view into consideration and they have taken ours. 

Q And what was his point of view? 

A That Pastora was a problem, that Pastora was a 
problem, and that was my idea, too, that Pastora was a- 
problem. And I didn't know, you <now, Singlaub was going to 
make this arrangement with Pastora, and I didn't know about 
it before. 

And then General Singlaub also went to a meeting. 
One time he went to a meeting who are called Condor Group. 
*^he Condor Group is made up of former national guardsmen, 
some of whom were kicked out of our-^rgat8t*iffron,- some of 
Qie^lef t" the organization. And he went to a JMnSflng with 
them which created expectations on their part. 

^■irSL. And these people, unknowingly to him, have been 
very problem#atic to us, to the FDN. 

Q Let me just ask you one final question on Pastora. 

Apart f ron^^^^^^^^B-'l Ul J^HiL JPStj^ji. J^ anyone else such as 



Tiissasi* 



204 



mRmmi 



168 



Colonel North or Elliott Abrams about the Pastora agreement? 

A When did it take place? 

Q 1986. 

A I could have. I don't have a clear recollection. 
I could have told Colonel North about it. I could have told 
him, but I don't remember. I don't remember talking it over 
with -- I have no clear recollection of talking about it 
with Mr. Abrams, although, yoxx teiow, you talk about one 
thing with people who are so closely associated and it's 
very difficult to determine which one you said it to and 
which one you didn't and when and who did you tell it first 
to. And it's difficult. 

Q Because you had discuss. ons with all these people? 

A Yeah, sure. 

Q Did you or the FDN ever have any Swiss bank 

accounts? 

A No. 

Q Do you personally have any? 

A No. 

Q How about your brother Mario? Does he have any? 

A No. He has much less. I don't have any. 

Q Did you av«r;:have to make any payments other than 
for supplies t6| 

A No. 

Q No bribes? 



lINCUSSSfiED 



205 




A No bribes as such, no. I paid for services for a 
warehouse, for people who were taking care of the warehouse, 
people who were loading trucks and things like that. 

Did they ever take any of your weapons that were 
destined for you? 

p^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas 
AK-47S of ours. I mean, you know, we -- 

Q Was that voluntary? -^ 

A Sure. We have given AK-47s to two different 
^^^^^^^^^1 a 1 s o . 

Q There were certain credits that I don't know 
whether you had wanted to get into or not that we hadn-' t 
explored. My lists are different than yours. I don't know 
whether they concern the Miller part of it. You might just 
want to go through. anctJiee if there's any that you feel. 
I have one question while they are looking at 
that. "^axJ^ESH-^^y — 1* '"limi^ about money being 
paid^S^^^^^H What was that for? 

A For the upkeep of men in^^^^^^^fthat we hoped 
we could get together into a fighting force. 

Q Did that ever occur? 

A No, no. It didn't come through, so we had to give 



it up. 



BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

We thought these were Miller, but do you want me 






206 



wmm\ 



170 



to take them? Your bank account shows deposits June4, 1986, 
of $25,000 by order of Bank Scandinavia. Do you know what 
that's from? 

A That's the one, the $25,000 that I referred to 
could be from -- 

Q From Singlaub? 

A From people associated with General Singlaub. 
Q Then the next one is May 14, '86, $48,770 by order 

of Chase Paneuna. Do you associate that deposit with 
someone? 

A $48,000? 
Q $770. 
A $48,770. 

Q From Chase in Panama. 
A That could be Channel. 

Q And then on August 29, 1985, there was a $300,000 
by order the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Do we know 
what that was? 

MR. 2ANARDI: What was the date? 
MR. LIMAN: July 20, 1985. 

MR. ZANARDI: That's not in one of his accounts. 
MR. LIMAN: It says 
MR. ZAMARDI: That could be a transfer. The^^^H 
^^^H that's one of his accounts. 

MR. LIMAN: That's an internal transfer. Is this 



ONCLASSIFIEO 



207 



yi'WIiEIBftT 



171 



another internal transfer? 

MR. ZANARDI: What's the date? 

MR. LIMAN: September 27, '85. 

THE WITNESS: That sounds like the one when they 
closed the account. That's the closing of the account. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Then on September 30, 1985 there's a deposit by 

order ofl 

A That's a transfer interaccount. 

Q Then there was a $50,000 reimbursement, it seems 
to say, from^^^^^l 1/27/86. Do you know what that is? 
A No. 

Q REM, FMB^^^^^^I Do you know what that is? 
Do you know? 

MR. ZANARDI: I think I know what happened. There 
was a debit and then a credit. 

WITNESS: They are reversing. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Do you know what that was about? 

They made a wrong entry and then they reversed it. 
Then March 3, '86, there was a deposit by order of 
is that what that is? 
A We served as -- we served UNO as a channel to giv e 
that money to the radio station operation! 
^^^^H I think there were about four deposits made bv 




UNCUSSifiED 



— •- » »-. J 



208 




172 
to our account and we in turn turned that money over. 

BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 
Q Just one other matter. I forget which committee 
exhibit -- the end user exhibits. 

MR. LIMAN: I think we covered these. 

MR. BALLEN: I just want to see if I have a 
different one. I have a different one. 

THE WITNESS: May I tell you a story? Are we sort 
of finished? 

MR. BALLEN: We have one more question. 

MR. PARRY: And then I have one more question. 

BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 
Q Have you ever seen that document before? 

MR. PORTUONDO: He's looking at what purports to 
be an end user certificate with a date of 28 November. 

MR. BALLEN: We should mark that as an Exhibit. 

MR. LIMAN: Let's mark that as Calero Exhibit 7. 
We'll have it Xeroxed -- two end user certificates dated 
November 28, 1984, addressed tc 

I think you referred to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^lat 
one point in your testimony in connection with 




(The document referred to was 
marked Calero Exhibit Number 7 
for identification. ) 



wuissra 



209 



iim*^* 



173 




BY MR. LIMAJM: (Resumimg) 
Q If you look at this, does it ring any bells to 
you? 

A Yes. I mean, I don't remember seeing it or 
reading it, but I'm reading it now. It's very clear that 
these ^^^^H were the ones that were bought f ron 
BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 

These were ^^^^^^^Hthat were bought from 
|that went to you? 
A Um-hum. 

Q It seems to indicate -- maybe I'm just misreading 

it -- but it seems to indicate in there that certain rifles 
were sold by ||^^^^| which would be you, to the 

Is that correct or am I misreading the 

document? 

A I didn't read it, to tell you the truth. 
Q Would you read it, please? 
A That we have purchased, I think it says. 
MR. PARRY: You mean translate it? 
MR. BALLEN: Maybe you should read it. 
MR. LIMAN: Th e certificate says on it, in 
referring to ^^^^^^^B that we have bought f ron 
^^^^^H-- you see that language there. So that's what the 
translation is. Now your question? I think that*what% you 



were pointing out. 






210 



174 
BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 

Q My question is, the certificate then would say 
that bein^^^^^^^^^^^^H have bought from 

would that be correct? 

A That's what it says. 

Q But the weapons went to you? 

A (Nods in the affirmative.) Yes. 

Q Did you have any discussions witt 
who signed it, that the weapons were going — 

A No. 

Q Do you Itnow how that end user certificate was 
obtained? 

A By a friend of ours. 

Q Who? 

A 

Q And who is that? 

A ^^^^^HHi 




Testified, those wmpe obtatned^with t"^3»lpSf Mr. Secord? 

Q All of them? 

A Yes, sir. I really dislike to talk about those 
things. They involve other countries. 

MR. LIMAN: Our record is not a public record at 




m\t 



211 




mmij 



175 
this point, and you've expressed yourself on it. 

THE WITNESS: I hope they remain non-public. 
MR. LIMAN: YOU have one question. 
BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Let me ask you a question. On those travelers 
checks, did you give him travelers checks that were 
unsigned? 

A Unsigned. 

Q Unsigned travelers' checks. 

A Yes. 

BY MR. PARRY: 
Q I have two areas. Mr. Martin has told us that he 
stockpiled a large amount of arms ^H^^^^H through an 
arrangement with you where the FDN would be able to draw 
those weapons out as needed and pay for them as they needed 
the weapons. 

A He did that with^^^^^^^^f because we have 
authority to do anything like that. 

Q Were those weapons intended -^oR use by the Contra 
or the FDN in particular? 

A Well, let's say if we had the money we could have 
gotten those weapons. 

Q You are aware that there was a large number of 
weapons? 

A I was aware, yes. 



UNtUSSI 



3 U: 



212 



vHMmm 



176 



MR. LIMAN: He bought them on speculation in the 
expectation that he might be able to sell them to you? 

THE WITNESS: Well, I would say yes. But through 
an arrangement , a formal , legal arrangement that he made 
with^^^^ 

MR. LIMAN: We're not suggesting there was 
anything illegal. 

THE WITNESS: They have custody and everything. 

MR. LIMAN: We're not suggesting there was 
anything illegal in that. But as the foundation for the 
questions that Mr. Parry was going to ask of you, you were 
aware that he had brought in weapons which he was 
stockpiling^^^^^^^^^in the hope that he would be able to 
sell them to you, right? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's what I could gather. 
They would be available to us and they would be available to 
[in case of a problem with Nicaragua. 

BY MR. PARRY: (Resuming) 
Q Did you in fact draw any weapons from that source? 
A We took some of those things, which we shouldn't 
have done, and some of our people did take some of those 
things and we have made no payment for them. We don't have 
anything to pay with. 

Q Was that about $1 million worth? 
A Yeah. 



yNCUSSif 



213 



177 

Q Now the rest has remained there as far as you 
know? 

A Yes. It's there as far as I know, yes. 

Q Mr. Martin feels that you discontinued using that 
source due to pressure from Mr. Secord. Is there any basis 
for that? 

A No, no, because -- look, we requested, we asked 
that those things be purchased because they were there, but 
it's the government people that have not wanted to buy any 
of that. There were also some -- 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

Q I don't understand that answer. What government 
people didn't want to buy? 

A The U.S. Government. I discussed with the U.S. 
Government people. 

Q Since October of 19867 

A Since November - October, 1986, the possibility of 
acquiring those things that were there. 

Q And the United States Government has not wanted to 
buy them? 

A Has not wanted, but there were some weapons stored 
in our facilities. Some of those things were stored in our 
facilities and some of those things were dispatched. 

Q Dispatched means what? 

A Dispatched to our people. 



i^t^jiitrn 



riili 



214 



UNt^AgiJfe 



178 



Q Did Mr. Martin ever complain to you about the fact 
that you weren't buying weapons from him that he had stored 



A Well, he certainly is worried about all that 
material there. 

Q He's put a lot of money into it. 

A He's put a lot of money and he's lost his shirt on 
it and nothing has come of it. 

Q Did he ever express to you the view that it was 
General Secord who discouraged you from buying from him? 

A No. But he has expressed to me that Secord made a 
good lot of money on us. He has expressed that. 

MR. ZANARDI: If you had had the money, would you 
have purchased the additional weapons from him? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, because they are very good 
weapons. The prices are very, very reasonable, and they are 
there. "^^^P^*" "^ 

MR. ZANARDI: How do those J^i^ws compare with 
what you got from Secord? 

THE WITNESS; They were different items more or 
less, but I don't remember exactly, but from Secord, from 

[shipment -- I have to be honest about it -- we 
got rounds of ammunition for $75 per thousand and that's a 
darn good price. The best price that we could get from the 
^as $110 -- of course, better ammunition. 




215 




\\i ll_U 179 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

A ^^^^^^^^^H is better ainmunition. And I have not 
gone to the trouble, you know, of comparing prices, but the 
prices that we could purchase the Martin stuff is a good 
price. , 

Q I gather ^fisc since you have found yourself in 
this business of buying arms you've discovered that arms 
have no ideology. 

A None at all. Really, we are now fighting, most of 
the fighting that we are doing we are doing against the 
communists with communist weapons. It reminds me of the 
Indian wars, you know, that you had -- that they were 
selling to the Indians and also selling to the cowboys. 

MR. ZANARDI: So at the end you would still be 
buying weapons if you had the money, even though you had 
this early inventory. 
THE WITNESS: 




Iwe bought 
[rounds of that, and we bought^^^^^flAK rifles. I 
mean, all our troops now have AK rifles except for the 
remaining FALs and D-3s that some of them still carry. But 
the majority of our fighting troops have AK. 
BY MR. BALLEN: (Resuming) 



.T'jr" 



fiC^^iVl 



«Uob\ 



216 



ufftenSiiS© 



180 

Q Is from th£^^^^^^ th^l^^^^^^^l rounds, 
was that from the last Singlaub purchase? 
A The last Singlaub. 

BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Have you ever heard the code neune Clutch? 
A Clutch? 
Q Or Spark? 
A Spark? 

Q In connection with Miller? 
A In connection with Miller, Richard Miller? 
Q Yes. Did he ever use those names? Did you ever 
hear those names -- Clutch or Spark? 
A No. 

MR. LIMAN: We have no questions. After we go off 
the record I'd like to hear /our story. 
THE WITNESS: All right, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 4:52 p.m. the taking of the instant 
deposition ceased. ) 



Signature of the witness 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 

, 1987. 



Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 



UNCUSS 



217 



CflUo £i^l 



^ 



pas 



L<^M\ei) 



^\ 



ToTBL 
Ex 00004 -&X00O ISA 




218 



lb pas 







5101 



219 



Date 

05-83 

06-83 

07-83 

08-83 

09-83 

10-83 

11-83 

12-83 

01-84 

02-84 

03-84 

04-84 

05-84 

06-84 

07-84 

08-84 

09-84 

10-84 

11-84 

12-84 

01-85 



V-tV^i'-) " 



■',\:- 



...-■ 31' •■ 



UNcussm 



MONTHLY BALANCES FOR 

THE SIX CALERO ACCOUNTS 

(as of 4-06-87) 



E X 



^pn.'^') 

ooooi 



Disbursements 



Month-end Balance 




■ UNCLASSIRED 



220 



UNCUSSIFIED 



00004 




UNCIASSIHED 



221 



UNCIASSIHED 



O 



MONTHLY BALANCES FOR 

THE SIX CALERO ACCOUNTS 

(as of 4-06-87) 



Date 
01-87 



Deposits 

80,264.67 



Disbursements 



Month-end Balance 




Total Net Deposits: 34,471,161.49 

Total Net Disbursements: 

Total Net Interest: 

Total Items: 592 

This report is a listing of transactions associated with six 
Calero accounts. Transactions between bank codes 1007, 1020, 
1024, 1071, 1073, and 1075 have been eliminated. 




UNCUSSIHED 



222 



/ 



ONCLASSiFIED 



i^a r^ 



My Friend; 







UNCLASSIFIED 



Cril 



f- V c 



tx- 



223 



mmsm 



N 6389 



So that we have a plan, I propose the following steps as hiqhest 
priority; • 

The forces in the northern part of Nicaragua need to be dispersed 
so that ^hey are not caught in the firestorm as _th e Se ndinis ta 
intend. 




regular resuppiy program can 

be deposited next week, we can 
start a regular logistics program of one flight every 10-15 days 
and the steady movement of supplies and ammunition to the forward 
bases. 

Most important is saving the force from what I believe will be a 
serious effort to destroy it in the next few weeks. WMle I know 
It hurts to hide, now is the time to do it. While they are 
hiding, the man who is carrying this message can start the 
regular resuppiy process. I believe it would be wise to dedicate 
as much as $9-10M for nothing but logistics. To coordinate a 
major effort such as this, I strongly urge that you bring aboard 
a logistics expert who is both knowledgeable and trusty. The 
^urier should be able to help with this. 




ng them hard as tney phase down 

"TnTrus^raWon trom 'tTieTr~c\n:rent operations and strikinc at 
selected strategic targets with your enhanced capability. 

This new money will provide great flexibility we have not enjoyed 
to date. I would urge you to make use of some of it for my 

British friend and his services for s pecial o perations. I can 

grcduca him at the end of this mont 




IINCUSSIFIED 



224 



ICLASSra 



6Z90 



You and I both recogn ize his value and limitations. 

5ome in our Congress 

us coul 

levestating to our forthcoming campaign to restore the funding. 
I will find out how much he is getting and let you know, but it 
|Seein* as though something should be sat aside for this purpose. 




Request you advise me soonest regarding the depos it and de stroy 
this letter after reading. The map can be passeddimH with 
!fly best wishes. Please do not in any way make anyone aware of 
the deposit. Too much is becoming known by too many people. We 
need to make sure that this new financing does not become known. 
The Congress must believe that there continues to be an urgent 
need for funding. 

Warm regards, 
Steelhamner 



\lHtm»^ 



225 



^ Af^ 96- 



ONCLASSIFIED 



As cf April 9, 



TDK Expenditures and Outlays 
July 1984 throuoh February 1985 



N 6408 



Quantity 



Independent Acquigition 




G-3 riflei 
Magazlnei 
Round* 7.6 2 x SI 
Rounds 7.62 x SI 
Band grenades 




- February 198S 



Airlift «2 - 



cRiurrage 
Karch 1985 



Blmni grenades 
60mni grenades 
5 cal API 
Rounds 7.62 x 
Rounds 7.62 X 
Ins., etc. 




Rounds 7.62 x 39 
RPG-7 grenades 
Hand grenades 
60nun mortars 
C-4 

Fuses and detonators 
G-3 rifles 
G-3 magazines 
Cleaning kits 
60mm grenades 
SO cal links 
Demurrage, Ins., etc. 



Scalift «1 - April Arrival 




RPG-7 rockets 
Rounds 7.62 x 39 
Rounds 7.6 2 x SI 
Belt* for 7.62 x 
SA-7 launchers 
SA-7 rockets 
M-79 grenades 
s . , and other exp 

M-79 grenades 



J^-r 



./y> - 




UNCLASSIFIED .. 




226 



UNCLASSIFIED 





39 

51 
7.62 



Deposit paid 
Estimated cost 




Item 



Rounds 7.62 X 

Rounds 7.62 x 

Rounds linked 

Hand grenades 

M-79 grenades 

60mm grenades 

61mm grenades 

6 2mm grenades 

Ri'G-7 rockets 

Claymore nines 

50 cal API 

12.7 ammo 

57mm recoiless rifles 

3 7mn ammo 

Anti-tank mines 

G-3 rifles 

»v^ 'rif«"in9 kits 
AK rifles 
G-3 magazines 
AK magazines 
Hv'^^"* K magazines 

*'"79 launchers 

9mm pistols 

AK-39 links or belts 

Fuses and detonators 



Uniforms 
Boots 

Radio and comm equip 
Air and ground transp 
Military gear 
Aid to southern front 
Aid to Misuras 
Food, family asst 
upkeep of base 
camps, air force 
hospitals, etc. 
Political activity - 
offices in various 
countries and cities, 
travel, p.j- ' 
Acquisition two 
transp airplanes 



Cost 



N 6409 



51 




UNCUSSIFIED 



227 



UNCIASSIHED 



N 10596 
As of April 9, 1985 



FDN Expenditures and Outlays 
July 1984 through February 1985 



Quantity 
Independent Acquisition 



Cost 




G-3 rifles 
Magazines 
Rounds 7.6 2 x 51 
Rounds 7.62 x 51 
Hand grenades 



Airl 



February 1985 



^jLfcd-- 



.J) 




81nun grenades 
60nun grenades 

5 C'l API 



Rounds 
Rounds 



39 
51 



Airlift *2 



Demurrage, Ins., etc. 
March 1985 



1. 




Rounds 7.62 x 39 
RPG-7 grenades 
Hand grenades 
60nun mortars 
C-4 

Fuses and detonators 
G-3 rifles 
G-3 magazines 
Cleaning kits 
60mir. grenades 
50 cal links 
'raight, 0«murrage, Ins., etc. 

Seallft •! - April Arrival 



RPG-7 rockets 
Rounds 7.62 x 39 
Rounds 7.6 2 x 51 
Belts for 7.62 x 39 
SA-7 launchers 
SA-7 rockets 
M-79 grenades 
and other exp 

M-79 grenades 




UNCIASSIHED 



228 



UNCIASSIHED 



N 10S57 



FDN Expenditures and Outlays 
July 1984 through February 1985 



(Cont'd. . . ) 



Quantity 
Sealift ♦2 - May Arrival 



Item 



Cost 




Rounds 7.62 x 39 

Rounds 7.6 2 x 51 

Rounds linked 7.62 x 51 

Hand grenades 

M-79 grenades 

SOnun grenades 

Slmin grenades 

8 2nun grenades 

RPG-7 rockets 

Claymore mines 

50 cal API 

12.7 ammo 

S7mm recoileis rifles 

57mm ammo 

Anti-tank mines 

G-3 rifles 

G-3 cleaning kits 

AK rifles 

G-3 magazines 

AK magazines 

Swedish K magazir.es 

HK-21 machine guns 

RPG-7 launchers 

M-79 launchers 

9mm pistols 

AK-39 links or belts 

C-4 

Fuses and detonators 




Deposit paid 
Estimated cost 

Miscellaneo-.:s Expenses Since July 1934 



Uniforms 

Boots 

Radio and coma equip 

Air and ground transp 

Military gear 

Aid to southern front 

Aid to Hisuras 

Food, family asst, 

upkeep of base 

camps, air force 

hospitals, etc. 
Political activity - 

offices in various 

countries and cities 

travel, p.r. 
Acquisition two 

transp airplanes 



UNCLASSIFIED 




229 



lINCUSSIflEO 



hi f^t^ 




N 71 E5 



la de febrero de 1,925. 



ZliiHGY RESOraCES IHTIJUJATICNAL 
4^0 ^;aT3le Ave. East 
Vieca,"''a., 22180. 



4^ 



Ser.ores: 

::os diricizos a ustedes, para canif esttrles que por es, 
te Siedio estascs exteadieado CISTIilC-.JICi; ZZ ^Z^Z.V.Z t^..i^ 
per OIZZ ^iIL (10,000) riries autozaticos, los cuales sera:^ 
dectLaalos para uso exclusive del Ioe"=^-o ^s^^^^^^HJ 
-3 ssrLr. ree^rzortalrs ni ver.liics a ct"o pais, sier.uo| 
^^^Hel destico flzal. 

=ate. 





uNcwssra 






230 



UNCLASSIFIED 




N 7190 



1H de febrero de 1,955. 



Ser.ores: 

INZSGY RZS0U3CES INTERNATIONAL 

iJ^O Kaple Ave. East 

Viena, Va. , 22180. 



Ser.ores: 

I'os dirigiflos :. usteaes, pa^a Ea^ifestarles que por e_s 
te zedio e£taz.os exteadiecdo CEHTIJICASIC;; DE DESTIJO JI^AL 
por DIE2 MIL (10,000) libras de explosive (HE) - O o TUT y 
UIJ NIL i'JINIENrcS (1,500) detonadores variados, los cuales 
.ser in destir.adcs para uso exclu'ivo eel Ejercitc de^^^^^H 
7 CO serin reexportados ni vendidos a otro p^is, sisr.dr 
Fel destir.3 rir.il. 
Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportuniiad para sus_ 
cribirae atenteimente. 





UNCLASSIFIED 



231 



UNCLASSIFIED 




f^ 7191 



14 de rebrero de 1,985. 



S.aores: 

ENZ3GY RZSCUHCIS INTESKATIONAL 
4A0 Maple Ave. East 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



I 



aer.ores: 

;Cos dirigijnos a usredes, para nanif esrarles que per es- 
te zedio esta::os exter.iiendo CZLSTIrlCACIO:; TI riSTIl.'O ?i;"Al 
dil material cue a coatmuacion se detallaj^^^^^^ sera des 
tlnado para uso exclusive del £j£rciro dest^^^^^H? Qo se- 
rd reexportado ci vendido a otro pais, siead 
destmo final: 

A. 150 aaetralladoras 

3. 150 Eorteros de 60i::i:. -corpletos-. 

C. 100 -crteros de Sloe, -coipletos-. 

D. 150 laazazranadas r.-79 
Z. -30 fusiles sin retroceso de 57=::. 

5ia otro particxilar, aprovecio la oportuaiiad par. 
critirae atentaiente. 




umsw 



232 



UNCUSSiFiED 




N 7192 



14 de febrero de 1,985. 






Sef5ores: 

£:tZHGY H3SCUHCiS IKn3JN'ATI0NAL 
44-0 Maple Ave. East 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



li'os dirigiEos a usteles, para ca^ifestarlBS que por e> 
te r.edio estates exter.dieado ClSri?IC.-.CIC" " ZtZSZZ'.'O ri'.r.-j. 
del material que a cc:::ir.u£ci6n £e detslla, ^_^^al_£era 
destiaado paxa ulo exclusivo del Zjerciro de^ 
seri reexportado ni vendido a otro pais, siend 
el destico final: 

A. 10,000 -ranadas i:-79. 
E. -3,000 cranadas de 60:l:. 
C. -2,000 iranadas de aicjn. 




UNCLASSIFIED 



233 



UNCLASSIFIED 




N 7195 



iu de febrero de 1,985. 



t 

^^^. 



|3?.g"rZ3C'JHC£S INTEa-N'ATLVAL 
t-aO .".aple Ave. East 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



:-o. dirisiios a ustedes, Para_5a3irestarles que^por^.f!" 

"l-ste-^al que a contir.uacicn se deta-l^e^||^ se. a -ei 
t--^~3 -ara uso exclusive del Ijercito ^^^K^^^^j -' 
rrreex^ortalo ai veclido a otro pais, si^nJo] 

destine fir.al: 

A. 3,000 E^ar.adas ?-^-7. 

B. ICO laizagraaadas RPS-/. 




UNCLASSIFIED 



234 



yNCLASSlFIED 




N 7194 



14 de febrero de 1,985. 



iJ., 



Senores: 

Hi'iRGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 

^440 Maple Ave. East 

Viena, Va., 22180. 



Ser.ores: 

Nos dirlgixos a ustedes, para maniftstarles que por es_ 
te cedio estaaos exteadiendo CEP.TIFICACIO" DE DE3Tr"0 FI.VAL 
por DOS KIL (2,000) minas anti-persc=ales y UN MIL ('i,000) 
niaas anti-t&nque, las cuales seran destinadas para uso ex- 
clusivo del Ejercito de^^^^^^^lTr.o seran reexportadas - 
ni vendidas a otro pals, sier.do^^^^^^^| el de3tino final. 

Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportunid:id psri sur 




mm«B 



235 



mimm 




N 7195 



1* de rebrero de 1,985. 



Senores: 

£:JI-^GY RiSOURCES IXTESNATIONAL 
**0 Maple Ave. E»st 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



oenores: 

I>'os dirigisos a ustedes, para aaaif estarles que por'es^ 
ce ceiio es-azos extenliecdo ClRTinCACIC" Ei EIsr:"C TZ'.-fJ, 
por TR£3 ML (3,000) LAW ROCKETS, que vienen destiaados pa- 
ra uso exclusive del EJ^rcito dc^^^^^Hmy no eer&n reex- 




cortados Qi vesdidos a otro pais, sieLdd^^^^^^^H el desti. 
ao flaal. 

Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportonidad para s-_ 
cribirae ateotamente. 




236 



yNCUSSIFIED 




N 7196 



1A de febrero de 1,985. 



Senores: 

ENERGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 
iUtO Maple Ave. East 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



^ 



Sei5ores: 

Nos dirigizcs a ustcles, para car.irestarles que por"es- 

te cedio estar.cs t;cte:;iiendo CZRriEICACIC;: DE 2E3ri"0 rZi'.'S. 

por 3IE2 (10) lajizacobetes tierra-aire y ClNCuENTA (50) Eis_i 
les tierra-aire, los cuales vieaen destiaados para uso exclu 

sivo del EJercito de^^^^^^^| 7 no serin reexportados si — 

vendidos a otro pais, siendc^^^^^^^Hel destino Tinal. 

Sir. otro particular, aproveiJr.o la opor-uzidal para s\;: 

cribirae ateataaente. 




llNMSIflEO 



237 



ONCLASSIFIEO 




N 71^ 



14 de febrero de 1985- 



Sefiores EieHGY R£SOURCES INTERNATIONAL 
4A0 Maple Ave. East 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



I 



Sencrss: 

i;os dirigimos a ustedes, para saniiestarles que por e_s' 
te ledio estazos extendiendo CZP-TZTIZXCICU IE DE3TIN0 TIKIZ. 
per CinCO KILLOKiS (5.000,000) de cartuchos Ball Amo, cal^ 
bre 7.62ttin. , los cuales seraa destinados para uso exclusivo 
del EJercito de^^^^^^H? no serin reexportados ni vendi- 
dos a otro pals, siend^^^^^^^H el destino final. 

Sin ctro particular, 3-:rovec>.o la c?:rt-.:iidad tara 5-^ 
cribirae de ustedes atentajuente. 




mimm 



238 







M AR 000057 



CEBTIPICACIOg DE DESTINO PINAL 

28 da noTiembre de 1,984. 




No8 dirisiaos a usted, para manlfestarle que por este medio 
eatamoe extendiendo CTBTIPICACION DE DESTINO FINAL por CUATRO MIL- 
SETECIZNTOS VEINTICnATEO (4,724) fuailea CETME calibre 7.62 NATO - 
con sua acceaorioa; y TEIHTE (20) BROWNING 1919A4 ametralladoras - 
calibre 7»S2 NATO, que heaoa comprado de? 




Material especifieado Tiane eonsigsado para uso exclu- 
siTO del EJereito ^^^^^^^^Hy no sera reezportado nl vendido a- 
otro pais, siend^^^^^^^Hal destino final. 

Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para auscri— 
birme de usted, cono su atento servidor. 




'7 ?..;.• 



UNCLASSIFIED 



239 



ffiRKSSIRBIEWORl)' 



uriginai 

Stenographic transcript of 
HEARINGS 



Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE OM SECRET iHILlTARY ASSISTAUCE 
TO ISAi4 AND THE NICARAGUA;* OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 



TESTIMONY O^j^mUJj^H L^^ M a ^ Co^fz/lf, 
Monday, April 20, 1987 



PadMy D«cbs>lw<]/Release(^ oivii^^£2. 

3 oi«r pro tRrms of LO. 12r56 

... ^, r^/- lyMIA Katkmi Security Coufld 

Washington. D.C ^^^?Ly<«. ^ 



SEONEr^SMBVVORD 



(202) 628-9300 



240 



241 



UNWSIEI 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 



TESTIMONY OF 

Monday, April 20, 1987 

Unit«d States Senata 
Salact Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran 
and th« Nicaraguan Opposition 
Washington, D. C« ^xJ) 
Deposition of ^^^^^^^^^f^^^H called as a 
witness by counsel £or the Select Committee, at the 
offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate 
Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 10:17 
a.m., the witness having been duly sworn, and the 
testimony being taken down by Stenomask by ANNE 
PELLECCHIA HOROWITZ and transcribed under her direction. 



Partially Declassified /Rele«se,1 m <^^h€c.81 
jndcf pf ovisbns of £.0. IZTSC 

*^-^ONiOSOtt) 



UWUiSllED 



242 



UtttiWIED 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Coninittee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 THE HONORABLE WARREN RUDMAN 

6 ARTHUR LIMAN, ESQ. 

7 Chief Counsel 

8 PAUL BARBAOORO, ESQ. 

9 Deputy Chief Counsel 

10 MARK BELNICK, ESQ. 

11 Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel 

12 TOM POLGAR, Investigator 

13 On behalf of the House Select Committee to 

14 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

15 RICHARD J. LEON, ESQ. 

16 Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 

17 NICHOLAS P. WISE, ESQ. 

18 Associate Staff Counsel 

19 On behalf of the witness: 

20 THOMAS E. WILSON, ESQ. 

21 MARY BETH SULLIVAN, ESQ. 

22 WILLIAM F. PENDERGAST, ESQ. 

23 Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson 

24 1111 19th Street, N.W. 

25 Washington, D. C. 20036 



uiwsiFe 



243 



>imwvi\ 



1 




CONTENTS 


2 




EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 


3 


WITNESS 


SENATE WITNESS 


4 




m^^H; 


5 


By 


Mr. Barbadoro * 


6 


By 


Mr. Wilson 196 


7 






8 


^^3 


EXHIBITS 


9 




1 EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 


10 




6 


11 




31 


12 




53 


13 




60 


14 




140 


IS 




142 


16 




142 


17 




142 


18 




171 


19 






20 







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PROCEEDINGS 
SENATOR RUDMAN: If you would remain standing, 
pleaaa rais* your right hand. Do you svaar that the 
testimony you are about to give in the course of this 
deposition should be the truth, the whole, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God? 

KjJ ]^||^^H|H|||| ^ 

SENATOR RUDMAN; You can be seated. 
Whereupon, 

called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 
Select Committee, having been duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE 

^ BY MR. BARBAOORO: 
Q ^^B^^^I^^H when did you became the 
Stat ion H^^^^^^^^^ 

A I decline to answer. ^ 

SENATOR RUDMAN: |Him^m ^ ^'^ going to 
read an order to you, to you and your counsel, and I am 
going to put it in the record at this time. 

It is United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, the Senate Select Committee on 
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 
Opposition, the United States Senate, Washington, DC. 



y 




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1 Th« ord«r wa« filed March 30, 1987. 

2 Upon consldaration of th« application by the 

3 Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 

4 Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, upon determining that 

5 the procedural requirements of 18 U.S. Code Section 

6 6005(b) have been satisfied, and upon consideration of 

7 the application of independent Counsel Lavnrence E. Walsh 

8 under 18 U.S. Code Section 6005 (c) to defer this order for 

9 20 days from the date of the Select Committee's request 

10 for the order, it is. this 30th day of March, 1987, 

11 ordered thatmSHj^HHRmay not refuse to testify and 

12 provide other information at proceedings of the Senate 

13 Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 

14 and the Nicaraguan Opposition on the basis of his 

15 privilege against self-incrimination, and it is further 

16 ordered that no testimony or other information compelled 

17 under this order (or any information directly or 

18 indirectly derived from such testimony or other 

19 information) may be used against |||^^^li^^|B i" any 

20 criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a 

21 false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with this 

22 order. 

23 And it is further ordered that this order 

24 shall become effective on April 19, 1987. Signed by the 

25 United States District Judge, dated March 30, 1987, 

SiflEB 




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WMSB 



1 Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. 

H^HHI^^Hb upon raadlng that ordar, Is 

3 tha opinion of tha Connlttaa that you ara now conpallad 

4 to tastify and you naad not assart your Fifth Amandinent 

5 prlvllage bafora answering tha questions. Tha privilege 

6 wa understand you have assarted. The iDaunlty Order 

7 gives you iDmunlty that tha lav allows and wa can now 

8 proceed with Mr. Barbadoro's question. 

9 Paul, Z an going to stay hara for just a few 

10 minutes and then I will leave. 

11 MR. BARBAOORO: I would like to mark thir 

12 order as flU^P^Exhibit #1, and the record should 

13 reflect that I have handed H^^^H^^Hj a copy of tha 

14 order as wall. 

15 (Tha document referred to was 

16 markadfl^^Hpi Exhibit Number 1 

17 for identification.) 

18 MR. WILSON: Mr. Barbadoro, for the record, it 

19 is our understanding that while this proceeding has been 

20 denominated a deposition it is considered by the 

21 Committee to be an executive session and executive 

22 proceeding of the Committee. 

23 MR. BARBAOORO: It is considered to be an 

24 executive proceeding but it is a deposition rather than a 

25 Committee hearing. 



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BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

Q ^mUH^IV "^ know from the records 
we have reviewed and %he witnesses we have interviewed 
that you played a significant role in the development of 
the southern front military forces. Who gave you your 
instructions regarding the southern front? 

A Well, first of all, let me start by saying 
that, the exercise of privilege aside, I appreciate the 
opportxinity to explain exactly what my role was. Your 
question uses the word "developed|"U That Isn't quite a 
clear description of my role in working with the southern 
military front of the Hicaraguan resistance. 

Q Well, why don't you just describe what your 
role was? 

A To briefly describe it — I think we'll get 
into it and we'll get into it certainly as my testimony 
goes on — is that it begins with July, 1984, when I 
arrived ^^^^^^^^Kind assumed command of the CIA 
station ^I^^H^^ And by that time there had already 
been a southern front, primarily under the direction of 
Eden Pastors, with a smaller military force under the 
direction of Fernando Negro Chamorro. 

My arrival came after the Boland Amendment had 
taken effect and, therefore, my responsibility was 
essentially to maintain contact with these people over 



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whom w« had questlonabl* control at any time during thair 
davalopmant prior to my arrival thara. 

so, it was basically an intalliganca 
collaction operation to detarmina what thay ware doing. 
And as time progressed, of course, we developed more and 
more expertise in learning what they were doing. But to 
say there was any control on our part would be 
inaccurate, even at times ludicrous, given the nature of 
these people and their circumstances at that time. 

Q well, it was more than just an intelligence 
collection operation, wasn't it? 

A Yes. The other half of it was political 
action activities,] 




So, it was sort of keeping them 
all together and keeping them looking at what their 
primary objective was, the democratization of Nicaragua, 
rather than — and to keep them apart when conflicts 
arose or to straighten out or mediate amon g the various 
i>,H«T - i.nd political f lcQires_and_so_forthJ 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ It was a 

different situation. 

I would say that virtually at no time did we 
ever have control. I certainly d^d_my best to exert 



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\l#NWtB 



Influanc* on than, but I was abl* to do so only to th« 
extent that ^Hallowed it. 




Q Let me go on here, though. It was more than 
just an Intelligence collection operation. You were 
given, for example, specific instructions' to separate 
Pastqra's commanders from Pastora, were you not? 

A No, Z don't recall ever receiving specific 
instructions. I think it was my o%m strategy to attempt 
to diminish his influence with the fighting forces inside 
because he was so erratic, so uncontrollable, creating so 
many problems for the U.S. mission and U.S. policyt^H 
^^^^^^^H In terms of a specific instruction, I. don't 
recall that there was a specific instruction. 

Q Did you COB* up with a plan to subvert 
Pastora** commanders from Pastora? 

A Well, it was sort of an evolution. In terms 
of that's what — we recognized — let me stop. We 
recognized that inside Nicaragua there were 
approximately, well, over a period of time, from^^^Hto 
maybe ^^^^Hfighting men who still had nominal allegiance 
to Eden Pastora, nominal in the sense that he remained 
either on the border! 




lSPIBT 



251 



\HWe^W 



10 



1 And, by radio h« would exercia* his — h« 

2 would •xarcla* damagoguary ov«r hi« p«opl« Insida, and 

3 coincidantally in tarns of, in political terms, the need 

4 to hav« Kagro Chanorro, the man who waa, and with his 

5 small group of f ightara about 




6 Q Excuse ma , ^^^^^^^^^H My queation to you 

7 was did you coma up with, a plan to aaparata Pastora from 

8 his comaandara? 

9 A Tha question is too specific. I would say 

10 that I would like to think I did. Let me put it that 

11 way. But I think It was probably an evolved plan. 

12 Q Vfho did you discuss tha plan with? 

13 A Oh, with tha officers in my station, with 

14 headquarters officers. The more v« could diminish 

15 Pastora and get Negro Chausorro and his forces inside to 

16 link up with tha other forces, it created a more solid 

17 political situation. 

18 . Tha difficulties that Pastora presented to us 

19 in political terms simply created a vary erratic, 

20 unstable political aituation. He was always the fly in 

21 tha ointment, in political terms. So as we tried to 

22 maneuver Negro and his forces to leav^^H^^^f and 

23 encourage them to follow what had been the political 

24 thame of the democratization or the pressure on the 

25 Sandinistas to get out^^^H^^H and inside, it also 



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meant an equivalent reduction In the presence the 
position of Pastora. 

Now Pastora vae the nonlnal leader. The 
commanders inside had a dialogue with him by radio and so 
forth, but in terms of Dllltary operations it was the 
commanders Inside who made their own decisions. 

Q I'm not asking you to explain the way Pastora 
related to his commanders. My question was simply did 
you come up with a plan, and I understand ^ your answer to 
be, yes, but you consulted with other people about the 
plan. Is that right? *' 

A Again, I am at a loss to answer your question 
specifically, and I am certainly not trying to be 
evasive. It's just that as these discussions took place, 
as this thing, as this sort of nebulous situation became 
more definitive, I can say, sure, I discussed it with 
headquarters officers. There was cable traffic on it. 
But to say that there was em A, B, and C, no. 

Q Let's do it this way. You became Chief of 
Station/^^^^^^^^^B in July of Vlhat was your 
assignment immediately prior to being Chief of station? 

I was of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H at 
Headquarters for the Central Aaerican Task Force. That 
meant I was responsible for all of the non-fpilitary 



activities of the Central Aaerica/^^ountries, primarily 




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UNUmED 



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dealing with press, propaganda, political action 
operations, political programs -- in other words, dealing 
with all of the problems and so forth surrounding the 
Nicaraguan resistance primarily and how they impacted on 
the other Central American political situations 




Q Was ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^lyour immediate superior? 
' A Y*S/ he was. 

Q And Dewey Clarridge was Chief of the Latin 
American Division at that time? 

A For a period of time. Z don't recall exactly 
when he left, but for the most part while I was there, 
yes. 

Q Do you know why you were chosen to be Chief of 
Station^" 

A Hell, one likes to think that I was the best 
candidate for the job. 

Q Who informed you that you were chosen to be 
Chief of Station? 

A Dewey Clarridge, the Division Chief. 

Q Did you have any discussions with Dewey 
Clarridge at that time about what you were supposed to be 
doing regarding the Contrasj 

A Well, to conduct all of the headquarters- 



ymsstfiEB 



254 



u 





13 



1 directed operations and to continue the onfgoing programs 

2 as they existed at that tine. Of course, this was in the 

3 aftermath of both the Boland Amendnent and the bombing 

4 attack on Pastora. 

5 Q What was the status of the military movement 

6 in the southern front when you became Chief of station? 

7 A Poor, and it got worse. 

8 Q How many men were in the field in July of 

9 1984? K 

10 A Inside Nicaragua Pastora claimed^l^H X 

never thought there were more than jj^HV to^^^^S|^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^^H the camps there were perhaps another- 

13 300 to 500. 

14 Q Who was in charge of the military operations 

15 for the southern front at that time? 

16 A Oo you mean the station officer responsible? 

17 ^ Who was the contra leader in charge of the 

18 military aspect of the southern front? 

19 A Negro Chamorro for his group, and Eden Pastora 

20 for his group. 

21 Q Were they working together ot were they 

22 entirely separate forces? 

23 A Entirely separate. Well, entirely separate. 

24 I guess there was some contact from time to time. 

25 Pastora nominally had brought Chamorro into his group, 



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but It was mora of a casa of compassion on Pastora's part 
bacausa Negro Chanorro^^^^^^^^^^^^Hdidn't 
hava control of his people, and so Pastora had agreed to 
bring or agreed with Negro to bring him into his group. 
But after the bombing attack on his camp] 
[on May 31, 1984 ~ 

Q Who is "his camp"? 

A Pastora's camp. Pastora, of course, was 
severely injured and that's vhen things Kind of started 
unravelling for him. 

Q How were those ^^^H troops being supplied- in 
July of 1984? 

A Those troops had been supplied by CIA prior to 
the Boland Amendment cut-off and they received massive 
resupply, 1 guess, in the early part of 1984 and they 
lived on that for cpiite a while. Then Pastora had his 
own sources in the Christian Democratic ^vement, the 

Social Democratic Jtovement, through Latin America and 

some help from^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^ I guess, 
Cuban-Americans in Miami, but none associated with CIA. 

Q It was clear to you when you became Chief of 
Station in July that the CIA money was running out and 
the CIA was not going to supply the Contras again for at 
least a year, isn't that right? 



lirtfSIED 



256 




IS 

1 A I 'Believe that at that time CIA money had 

2 already run out. I gave no money from the time I assumed 

3 command to — official CIA funds we're talking about, of 

4 course; it's not my money. 

5 Q The money had run out, right? 

6 A I'm almost sure. I don't know, but all I can 

7 tell you is I did not disburse funds to Pastora after I 

8 assumed command. 

9 . Q Did you have any discussions with Dewey 

10 Clarridge prior to becoming Chief of Station as to how 

11 the Contras were going to be supplied once you got down 

12 there? 

13 A No, no. 

14 Q There was no discussion at all about what 

15 would happen to that southern front force without CIA 

16 money? 

17 A Well, you say did I have any discussions with 

18 Dewey Clarridge. My answer to that about that is no. I 

19 assumed and I don't know, I assume or I believe that or 

20 it was my impression at the time that they would get 

21 funds ^Mr' private sources. 

A 

22 Q Where did you get that impression? 

23 A I don't know. I just can't tell you because 

24 it was just an impression that they would survive, okay, 

25 and that Negro and Pastora and the others would seek 




iL 



257 



UNGUSSiED 



16 



1 support from somewhere. 

2 Q Did Clarridge say anything to you about 

3 private sources supporting the Contras? 

4 A I can't remember that he ever did. 

5 Q Did you have any discussions with the Director 

6 prior to going down to become Chief of Station? 

7 A No. 

8 Q You didn't meet with him? 

9 , A No. 

10 Q Once you got your assignment? 

11 A No. I'm smiling because the press is alleging 

12 all sorts of things and it is simply not true. 

13 Q Isn't it customary for someone before he's 

14 made Chief of Station to have a meeting with the Director 

15 before he goes down? 

16 A That depends. After ''^^■^^^^H^* 
major not^l^^HHjH^^ I was only, 

18 am only a GS-15, I am not in the senior service. It is 

19 customary for chiefs of station to be given the hail and 

20 farewell handshake, but — 

21 Q You didn't have it. 

22 A 1 didn't have it,' no. I think the last person 

23 I saw may have been the DDO, Clair George, and I don't 

24 even remember if I did. 

25 Q Did you have any discussions with George about 



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A 

Q 
A 

Station 



how th« Contras were going to be resupplied? 
A No, sir. 

Q Let me ask you about a meeting in August in 
Did you attend a meeting] 
Chiefs of Station in August] 
Yes, I did. 

What was the purpose of that meeting? 
It was a regional meeting, the Chiefs of 

to discuss 

the status of their operations, the problems they were 
facing, and sort of an overview thing and to look to .the 
future . 

Q The Director was at that meeting, was he not? 

A Yes, he was. 

Q Was Clair George at the meeting? 

A Yes, he was. 

Was^^^^^^^^^^^^B at the 
my understanding that he was not. 

A That's right, I don't remember him being 
th«r«. , 

Q At that time he was the head of the Central 
American Task Force, wasn't he? 
A Yes, yes. 

Q In your experience, isn't that unusual for a 
meeting of Chiefs of Station to take place and the head 



^"^WSSIflFB 



259 



UNa 



18 



1 of th« Central American Task Force not to be there? 

2 A No, Clarridge was there and certainly, you 

3 know, to have everybody leave Washington at the same 

4 time, I mean, who runs the shop back home? So since 

5 Clarridge was there, he is familiar, you know, all of the 

6 activities of the Central American Task Force, so I 

7 suppose that they decided to leave ^^^^^^^H to run 

8 things back home. 

9 Q Is it safe to say that — 

10 A That is an assumption on my part. 

11 Q Okay. Is it safe to say at that time that it 

12 was Clarridge rather than ^^^^^^^Hthat really had the 

13 day-to-day control over Contras, CIA's Contra activities? 

14 A Yes. If you know Clarridge, the only possible 

15 answer is yes. 

16 Q Who else was at that meeting that was not in 

17 the CIA? 

18 A Colonel Oliver North. 

19 Q Anyone else? 

2 A It seems to me there was somebody from State, 

21 but maybe I'm mistaken. 

22 Q North came down with the Director, didn't he? 

23 A Well, I really can't say. I arrived|^^mm 
2 4 ^^Hand they were there, you know. I met them; they 

25 were there. I don't know how they travelled; I assumed 



260 



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19 



1 they did. 

2 Q Was that the first time you met Oliver North? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q Did you find it unusual that he was, that a 

5 non-CIA person was at a Chief of Station meeting? 

6 A Well, unusual, I'm not sure that — no, I 

7 don't think so, although I had no previous experience. I 

8 mean, I hadn't been to — that was my first Chief of 

9 Stations meeting. Secondly, however, I would have to say 

10 not unusual because I was aware that Oliver North had a 

11 close working relationship with Clarridge. And, you . 

12 know, the fact that he was there did not seem unusual. I 

13 believe that when we did our overview, station overview, 

14 I don't think Korth was present. I think it was just the 

15 Director, Clair George, and Clarridge. 

16 Q Do you know why North was there? 

17 A I assvime because we were talking about 

18 Nicaraguan political — the Nicaraguan situation. 

19 Q What did he do when he was there? 

20 A I don't remember him speaking other than in 

21 the exchange of ideas and views and so forth. He didn't 

22 make a presentation or anything like this, like that. 

23 You know, it just, there was no — 

24 Q Had you met North during your tour in the 

25 Central American Task Force? 



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A No, sir. 

Q Did you have any personal discussions with him 
at this meeting of August? 

A Yes. 

Q What did you talk about? 

A Well, it was not at the meeting. It was at a 
cocktail party on one of the evenings that we were there. 
We were there two or three days, and during one of the 
evenings we had a cocktail party. I went over tb him and 
introduced mvself and told him I was f rom | 




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Q How long was that meeting with North? 

A Oh, a few minutes on the terrace during the 
cocktail party. 

Q And it was your first private discussion with 
him? 

A Yes, private. I mean in front of other 
people. 

Q What else did you talk about? 
, A Families, that sort of thing — personal 
things. It's the only thing I can remember. I didn't 
talk about — I don't recall talking about any other • 



Q Did he say anything to you about the status of 
the southern front forces? 

A I don't recall that he said or I said anything 
at the time. 




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Q What als* did you tal)c about in that nesting? 
w« ovar^^^^^^^^^H aspects, 
rsmambsr bacausa that was tha thing I'd raally bonad up 
on sinca that was whara I was waa)cast. I Knaw tha 
Nicaraguan situation obviously from my tima in 

Washington, and 1 talked about soma o f tha major 

ope rations that w^iad^^^^^^^^^^BP^^B^^^^^^^^B 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H that 

Q Did you talk to him about Pastora and his 
troops? 

A Wall, that had all been covered in the 
overviews. 

Q Did you talk to him, though, in this private 



IJNttRSStflED 



266 




27 

1 masting about Pastora and his troops? 

2 AX don't remember saying anything about that. 

3 Q Did he sa^ anything to you about how the -- 

4 A No. 

5 Q — contras were going to be resupplied during 

6 this period when the Boland Amendment was in effect? 

7 A No. I frankly can't recall anybody saying 

8 anything. It was an assumption on my part, and I can't 

9 specifically say from where, that they would survive 

10 somehow with private assistance. ;: 

11 Q And, to your knowledge, there was no 7 

12 discussion at this meeting ^^^^^^Habout how the 

13 Contras were going to survive during the period the 

14 Boland Amendment was in effect? 

15 A To the best of my recollection, no, there was 

16 not. 

17 Q Were you given any Instructions at that 

18 meeting as to what contacts you could and couldn't have 

19 with the Contra forces? 

20 A Oh, well, it was. all specifically, yes, not 

21 only then, but prior to going down as a result of the 

22 Boland Amendment that it was strictly intelligence 

23 collection and keeping the political worms in the bucket 

24 until, of course. Congress decided to resume funding and 

25 we did not know how long with was going to be. 



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Q Had you conc«iv«d of your plan to separate 
Pastora from his commanders by that point? 

A No. 

Q When did you develop that plan? 

A Much, much later. I guess it was in, if there 
was even, as I say, a plan, it was kind of a thought 
process. But when we received a report,] 

that the two commanders, two or three commanders 
inside Nicaragua had met with commanders | 
it the FDN 

and that they, on their own, sat down and signed a 
pact that they would cooperate with each other in the 
field regardless of what their political alliances might 

be — meaning that 

I the FDN out of ^^^^^Band the ARDE 
conunandera nominally under Pastora from the south, that 
they agreed that in the field they would work together, 
and this occurred in November, 1985. 

Q When you say ARDE, that included Pastora 's 
people. It also included Blackie Chamorro's people? 

A No. Blackie, Negro Chamorro, had his own 
organization called UDN/FARN which stands for tho 
National Democratic Union/Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed 
Forces. And as I say, there was a period in 1984 when 
they had sort of joined together, but this dissipated 




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over th« period of 1984-1985, I think mainly because 
Pastora was sort of patronizing toward Chamorro, and it 
wasn't really what you might call an alliance between two 
leaders. 

Q What were the names of Pastora 's principal 
military commanders? Wa^^^^Hone of them? 

A No^^^^H Please now, you are calling back 
things that over the time have eluded me. ^H^H I 
believe, was under Negro Chamorro. Under Pastora there . 
was! 

Q Was there a c^uy nickname*^ 

A Yes.^^^^Hwas one of the field commanders. 
He wasn't one of Pastora 's, say, headquarters staff. 
^^^H was a field commander inside, and there were other 
field commanders inside besides ^^^^B— six to eight. 
Well, two of these or three of these were the ones who in 
November of 1985 met with] 
and signed this pact. 

At that point the thought process 
crystallized, and we saw the opportunity, I saw the 
opportunity — "w4,'v/ I'm talking about my station 
officers who were involved in this — to capitalize on 
that because it was the first time that the south had 
ever had any kind of rapprochement with the north, with 
the FDN, and obviously for political reasons this brought 



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UNKAWEO 



30 



1 together the things we were not able to accomplish in 

2 terms of Adolfo Calero and the FDN, with Alfonso Robelo 

3 and Arturo Cruz in the south. 

4 So we thought that the political process could 

5 be stimulated by the fact that the field commanders, that 

6 the patriotic objectives would form the basis for an 

7 actual political unity. 

8 Q That was in November of 1985? 

9 A November of 1985, correct. 

10 Q Let me ask you then, who isj 

11 A That is Eden Pastora. 

12 Q Well, isn't it true that this plan had really 

13 been conceived as early as June of 1985? 

14 A Well, again I'm not sure that I can call it a 

15 plan. 

16 MR. LIMAN: Call it an idea for this purpose. 

17 THE WITNESS: It is a concept, and I felt that 

18 anyway that I could work to diminish Pastora 's influence, 

19 that that would, first of all, raise up the stature of 

20 the Negro Chamorro people who were aligned with Robelo 

21 and Cruz in the south that worked politically together 

22 with them and that then that idea and the fact that 

23 Pastora 's duplicity with his own commanders could bring 

24 about an amalgamation of the military people in the field 

25 and that this would give substance and support to the 



I 




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I AOCIfltft 



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political typasJ 

I a«an, it was sort of trying to do two things 
at tha sam« time. To what sxtant it was an idea or a 
plan it is very difficult to dsfine bscaus* w« had 
nothing, no l«v«rag«. W« had no leverage whatever either 
on Pastora or on the field conmanders because we couldn't 
deliver anything to them. 

MR. BARBAOORO: I will get to that for a 
moment . 

SENATOR RUOMAN: Paul, if you will suspend for 
a moment, our rules do not reqpiire me to stay for thi-s 
examination, so I am going to excuse myself on the 
record. Thank you very much. 1 have another meeting to 
go to this morning. 

MR. BARBADORO : Thank you. Senator. 




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W. w.r. c.rtainly trying to giv. status, 
political status, to UNO. It was, aft.r all, th« 
uBbr.lla organization of th. Nicaraguan r.sistanc. By 
th. sa». to)c.n, w still had to deal with Past ora a, a 
tang.ntial, influential, disruptiv^nd^^dual 




NOW her. w. are on. th. on. hand trying to 



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raise the political status of UNO to say that it really 
represents the broad spectrum of the Nicaraguan 
opposition, from the social democratics on the one side 
to the right-wing conservatives on the other. And yet we 
had those loose cannon sitting out there in the form of 
Pastora, who could adversely affect things that we had 
been working on for a considerable amount of time and put 
a considerable amount of effort into it. 

In my capacity as Chief of Station in this 
particular situation, in this particular case, it was 
part of my responsibility in orde r to promote the one 
organizati 




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UNClASSIflED 



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And with Pastora, the 
more that w« could do to diminish his influence and at 
the same tine elevate the influence of others, it was — 
it served our objectives. 

MR. LIMAN: When you say our objectives, whose 
objectives? 

THE WITNESS : The U.S. Government ' s . 

MR. LIMAN: And who coBBunicated those 
objectives to you? 

THE WITNESS: Well, some of them I initiated 
and I proposed to headquarters, as in this particular 

cable. 

MR. LIMAN: Well, who is headquarters? 

THE WITNESS: Washington, the CIA, the Central 
American Task Force. 

BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) C,/^-^^^^^J 



Q But at that point it'sj 
A Well, sure 



isn't it? 



^H^B^^ 



274 




35 

1 MR. LIMAN: So it is^^^^you're talking to 

2 about that? 

3 THE WITNESS: Sure, and let me say that this 

4 is one of hundreds of instances, not only in the case of 

5 Pastora, but all others, where we had political 

6 operations and there were things that I would, operations 

7 that I would propose, operations they would propose, and 

8 ask for my views on it and the constant give and take 

9 over, two and one half years had God knows how many 

10 exchanges similar to this. 

11 He made a proposal. They said stand down on 

12 it. Okay, we'll stand down on it. Maybe next month 

13 there might be more propitious opportunity, and might 

14 even say, hey, we'd like to resurrect this old idea, and 

15 they may say, hey, now is a good time to do it. 

16 So that's part of the dialogue that works in a 

17 good situation between headquarters and the field. It 

18 doesn't always work that way. Sometimes there is 

19 misunderstanding. Sometimes, you know, we are not always 

20 in sync|. But generally, that's the way it works. So to 

21 bring out one piece of paper and try to say, you know, 

22 did you have a plan — 

23 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

24 Q Whatever you want to call it. Let's call it 

25 an idea. 



OWSStflEO 



275 



llNCtl«HI 



36 



1 A In my vi«v it was a concept bacaus* Pastora 

2 was a dlsruptiv* alansnt and what v« n««d«d to do was put 

3 hia aslds and at th« sam* tlms enhance th« organization 

4 that w« had that w* were supporting. 

5 Q Did the concept involve causing Pastora 's 

6 commanders to break away from him and unite with the FDN 

7 forces? 

8 A That is a misconception. What happened is 

9 that in December of 1985, after this pact had been 

10 signed, the commanders came out of Nicaragua and they 

11 came out, three or four of them did, and they were of. one 

12 mind. They were going to confront Pastora and say 'we 

13 need support now. We can't take it any more. We're 

14 being decimated in the field, and if we don't get 

> 

15 support, we're going to go talk to the UNO people. 

16 And in fact, in December they came out. we 

17 heard they came out. They did in fact meet with Negro 

18 Chamorro and Negro Chzmorro's assistants. They met with 
Alfonso Robelo^^^H^^H|^|HH^^^^|^H^^^^H 

^H^^^^^^Hjm The discussions, they 

21 initiators. We responded to their interests and their 

22 interests were to obtain support. We could not promise 

23 them support, but what we did do was to encourage then to 

24 get back inside, to take Negro Chamorro 's people with 

25 them so that there would be unification of their efforts 



I'NfitSSSfflED 



276 



UNWSINil 



37 



1 in opposition to the Nicaraguan regime. 

2 What Robelo may have promised them, what 

3 Chamorro may have premised them, whether they were empty 

4 promises or promises that — it was something that I did 

5 not participate in. 

6 MR. LIMAN: Even if you didn't participate in 

7 the mass chief of station, you surely would want to know 

8 what those promises were. That's part of intelligence 

9 gathering isn't it? 

10 THE WITNESS: Well, it was, but as it turned 

11 out — 

12 MR. LIMAN: What did you find out? 

13 THE WITNESS: I want to say that we found out 

14 that Robelo did promise them some help, but I am not 

15 certain that I can. I'm not certain that I can. 

16 MR. LIMAN: You are not certain that you can 

17 because of your memory or because that you don't want to 

18 talk about it? 

19 THE WITNESS: No, no, memory. Wait a minute. 

20 Everything in this room, sir. I mean, everything I'm 

21 saying is absolutely on the table. I am not in any way 

22 trying to dissemble or to be obtuse. 

23 MR. LIMAN: That isn't want I was trying to 

24 put to you. I just wanted to know whether there were 

25 some subjects that you were just uncomfortable talking 



n 




277 



W4ssn 



38 



1 about. 

2 THE WITNESS: Sir, if there are any subjects I 

3 am uncomfortable talking about, I am going to tell you I 

4 am. 

5 MR. LIMAK: Okay, fine, as long as we have 

6 that understanding. 

7 THE WITNESS: I have a problem with this in 

8 that I simply am not sure. Now I'd have to look at our 

9 cable traffic for the period of December, January — 

10 December of 1985, January of 1986 — to tell you that. 

11 MR. LIMAN: But you understood that the reason 

12 or one of the reasons that they were dissatisfied — 

13 THE WITNESS: You're right, I misspoke. 

14 MR. LIMAN: With Pastora was the fact that 

15 they weren't getting supplies. 

16 THE WITNESS: You're correct. 

17 MR. LIMAN: Now they're going to go along with 

18 Chamorro and what did you find out about the commitment 

19 for supplies? 

20 THE WITNESS: Let me clarify. My attitude was 

21 throughout this period to be as careful as I possibly 

22 could concerning matters dealing with the Boland 

23 Amendment. I wanted to be absolutely sure. I wanted to 

24 be absolutely sure of the fact. That I may not have been 

25 at certain times is the nature of the business. 



um;!iiEo 



278 



UNGlASSIflED 



39 



1 But I consciously tried not to get into a 

2 position where these commanders would turn to me and say 

3 or expect from me, from CIA, because they knew who I was 

4 and they knew who my officers were, to expect from us 

5 lethal support, okay? 

6 MR. LIMAN: You didn't want to promise them 

7 more than you could deliver? 

8 THE WITNESS: I knew I couldn't deliver 

9 anything. When I met with them I knew I couldn't deliver 

10 anything. Yet, I did not want to be placed in the 

11 position because this was a very delicate negotiation; I 

12 did not want to be placed in the position whereby if they 

13 asked, and I couldn't deliver, that what we were trying 

14 to accomplish in terms of the political unification might 

15 suffer. 

16 I frankly avoided that point with them. 

17 That's what I was trying to say when I said it before. 

18 Yes, we did have a responsibility, in response to your 

19 question, to collect intelligence on what was discussed 

20 between Negro and the commanders, and between Robelo and 

21 the commanders. 

22 MR. LIMAN: But you must have seen that as 

23 quite a dilemma. One the one hand, you wanted to 

24 encourage them to join up with the UNO people, and, on 

25 the other hand, you weren't in a position to deliver 

itJ 




279 



10 



M^aSIWD 



40 



1 lethal aid at that point. 

2 THE WITNESS: That is correct, and that goes 

3 to the very crux of the matter of my responsibility at 

4 that time. I essentially was doing all of this and it 

5 reached the peak at that time in January of 1986. I was 

6 doing all of this with mirrors, the whole question of 

7 bringing these people together, we had nothing to offer 

8 them. And at the same time here we were trying to keep 

9 them pointed in that direction. 
Believe me, it was not easy. I tried not to 

H be duplicitous with them. I tried to be as honest as . I 

12 could. Obviously, we kept hoping with each time that the 

13 issue came before the Congress that, well, three or four 

14 more months, let's see if can't last until then. And 

15 then, you know, a negative vote and you are down again. 

16 And you wait until the next opportunity. 

17 I did tell them that we were optimistic about 

18 the April vote, which was only""four | somei months away, the 

19 April, 1986, vote. Well, you know what happened to that 

20 one. In any case, in what I consider an act of really 

21 ' extraordinary good faith, they decided to bring 

22 Chamorro's troops with them back inside, or take then 

23 inside with them, into Nicaragua. And really, they were 

24 kind of, you know, betting on the fact that there would 

25 be the resumption of aid. 




280 



UNmSStFtED 



41 



1 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

2 Q When was that? 

3 A That was December, January of 1986. 

4 Q Didn't you have some other leverage at that 

5 point? Hadn't the humanitarian aid started at that 

6 point? 

7 A I don't know what impression you have or what 

8 you've heard from others about the hiunanitarian aid, but 

9 the humanitarian aid, for all the good it did in the 

10 south, was virtually useless. He couldn't get the 

11 deliveries. People inside were unable because they ~ 

12 didn't have adequate communications. The terrain was 

13 horrible. They were illiterate, untrained in the 

14 receiving of supplies, so the humanitarian aid, whatever 

15 there was, as it was administrated by State went through 

16 either the people there ^^^^^^HHH the various groups 
^^^^^^^^^Hand I think w« maybe two 

18 deliveries by air inside. 

19 But it was a very unsatisfactory thing, what 

20 it did more than anything else was it offered false hope 

21 that was only satisfied to the commanders inside who 

22 needed a hell of a lot more than just, you know, some 

23 boots and uniforms and something. They needed everything 

24 right down to salt, aspirin, and bandaids, and — 

25 Q Did they go to the field with that hope? Take 



yiraranED 



281 




42 

1 your time. Take as much time as you need. 

2 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

3 MR. LIMAN: Back on the record. The whole 

4 purpose of this inquiry is to learn. 

5 THE WITNESS: The problem came about when 

6 there was great optimism, great anticipation for the 

7 people inside who had been deprived for so long to 

8 receive something that would at least enable them to 

9 survive. My anticipation, which I'm sure was 

10 communicated through me, through my officers to the 

11 resistance was, oh, now we have $27 million that we have. 

12 We can't give you guns and bullets but at least you will 

13 have, you will be able to take care of your people. 

14 And the $27 million, whether it was 

15 administratively misused or not misused, or however, we 

16 found that while the State Department people did as good 

17 as could be expected, there was never a substantive 

18 assistance given to the people in the southern front. 

19 There are lots of technical reasons, I guess, why — 

20 planes, flight crews,' getting the stuff on a timely 

21 basis, whether it be pants and shoes and medicines. 

22 And there were instances and 1 can recall one 

23 where the plane full of nonVlethal supplies, pai d for b y 

24 NHAO, had to make an emergency landing in ^^*HH||^| 

25 International Airport in the middle of the night with a 




282 



.UNC[]!S»D 



43 



1 blown engif 

2 I sent my deputy out to the airport and he was 

3 able to keep the crew on board. Finally, the customs 

4 people came out and said, what's on there? And the 

5 deputy sort of said, well, this is a private flight, and 

6 so forth. And then — not indicating what it was — but 

7 it was loaded with boots and so forth, all with stenciled 

8 markings on these big plastic bags full of supplies. 

9 And then, finally, when the plane took off, it 
10 again had another problem and it landed it ^^^^^^^^^1 

^^^I^Pwhere was conf iscated^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 

12 helped out through our^^^^^^f^^Hfriends, tellingjMHt 

13 ^^^^^^^Hthat in fact there was a flight planned for 

14 that aircraft from^^^^^^f I mean, it was just a badly 

15 run Mickey Mouse operation. And what happened was the 

16 people inside who expected better didn't get what was 

17 expected. 

18 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

19 Q Did they go to the field in part with the hope 

20 that th«y were going to be given some of this 

21 humanitarian aid? 

22 A Well, they were already in the field. They 

23 had been there since 1982, and they said, as they still 

24 say to this day, that with our help or without our help, 

25 they are going to continue the fight. 



mmm 



283 



10 



UNCUiSSIHED 



44 



X Q In January, you signed an agreement, or an 

2 agr««m«nt was signad, with th« southern front commanders, 

3 was it not? 

4 A Yes. 

5 Q Who negotiated that agreement? 

6 A We mediated it. 

7 Q Who is we? 

8 A The station officers. 

9 Q Who was involved in the negotiations? 
A The ARDE commanders negotiating with Negro 

11 Chamorro, and, for the UNO people, Alfonso Robelo, Negro 

12 Chamorro. 

13 Q Were there any representations made — 

14 A Maybe facilitated would be a better word than 

15 mediated. 

Ig Q Okay, were there any representations made by 

17 the UNO people as to what kind of support the southern 

18 front people would get? 

19 A I think there was, but I can't answer with any 

20 degree' of certainty. I'd have to look at the cable 

21 traffic for that period. 

22 Q Was there anything said about military support 
2 3 for them? Were they going to help them get arms? 

24 A I hesitate to say yes, but I'm not sure 

25 because I'm not sure. 

■/I 




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llNOtftS« 



45 



Q Was there anything said to them about how they 
were going to get food and medical supplies? 

A Yes, well you know, we had — that was another 
problem. You see, all of the supplies going into these 
people had to be done by air or by sea. It could not be 
done over the land for a number of 




Secondly, the Sandinistas, the Sandinista 




Th« Sandinistas either patrolled or had mined 
all of th« trails on the Nlcaraguan side. We even feared 
that they may have crossed on some occasions because we 
had reports of mines going off on ^^^^^^^^^^^J side . 
The Sandinistas crossed over and mined parts °^^^B^^| 
^^^Hslde. So, any kind of — for example, if you 
wanted to send 50 100-pound bags of rice into Nicaragua, 
you couldn't do it by land. I mean, you couldn't put it 
in th« back of a truck and send it up because there was 

!M1 



•'Nl 



285 



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1 

2 

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no way to gat it in and that was tha onca you got it 
across ^^^^^^H thara was nobody who was going to carry 
it north. 

So all of the supplies had to go in by air. 
That's why wa had countad so much on tha Nicaraguan 
Humanitarian Affairs Office to provide the air delivery 
of the supplies. 

Q Did the FDN have the capacity to fly flights 
directly to the resistance forces in the south? 

A Well, they had a couple of old planes — a C- 
47, I think, and I think they had a DC-6, but it was, on 
the ground out of service more than it was up in the air. 
And then there was a problem with some of the pilots 
where they were afraid to fly in hostile territory. 
Well, you can imagine how much more difficult it would be 

south^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H than 
have bean from their own. 

So what we ended up with was the situation 
whereby they took — the easy path was taken. Sure, they 
supplied, the $27 million was used to supply the people 
it was easiest to get deliveries to. But the people who 
needed it so badly, the ones in the south, with the 
exception of one, maybe two, flights, they got nothing. 

Q Was the FDN capable of flying! 



\imm"i^ 



286 




47 

1 southern Nicaragua and back without stopping for fuel 

2 somewhere? 

3 A I think tfle plane is capable of flying, but 

4 I'm not sure. I mean, if the plane was in perfect 

5 operational condition, it would be capable of doing it. 

6 But, from my understanding of what those planes were like 

7 in terms of their avionics, or lack of avionics, and 

8 their age and their mechanical condition, I don't think 

9 they could have made it all the way down and all the way 

10 back. 

11 It would have had to have been done by 

12 Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance people contracting 

13 with commercial companies. 

14 Q When that agreement was reached in January did 

15 the commanders, the southern front commanders, think they 

16 were going to be supplied? What was said to them about 

17 how they were going to be supplied? 

18 A I'm not sure. I'm just not sure. I know I 

19 emphasized the fact that the program was coming up for a 

20 vote again in April and that the resumption of support 

21 would be official support if the Congress voted the 

22 funds. 

23 Q Did they come out of the field in January to 

24 negotiate this agreement? 

25 A Four or five commanders did. You'd have to 



UNet.ill^lED 



287 



UNCLASSIFIED 



48 




1 look at the traffic. 

2 Q Right. And that was negotiateq 

3 A (Nods in the affirmative.) 

4 Q And then they went back into the field? 

5 A And then they went back. Yes, I think they 

6 all went back. One or two may have stayed behind to get 

7 some medical problems taken care. 

8 Q Weren't they going to depend on the private 

9 benefactors to resupply them in January? 

10 ' A The private benefactors, to the best of my 

11 knowledge, at that time did not have their act together 

12 yet. In other words, to be able to supply them from, to 

13 be able to supply them in the south. 

14 Q How were they going to be supplied when they 

15 went back in to fight? Who was going to give them the 

16 medicine that they needed and tha food that they needed? 

17 • A • Well, wa gave them — I know when Negro 

18 Chamorro's people went back in, we gave them or Negro 

19 Chamorro got from the Nicaraguan humanitarian, as much as 

20 thay could carry on their backs. 

21 Q But they were going in for a long time. 

22 A Thay had been in for a long time, okay? They 

23 had been in since 1982 and they had done without, with 

24 the exception of a very little bit that Pastora was able 

25 to give them. They had been living, surviving throughout 



IfflttAmiED 



288 



UNGIiA^IEiJ 



49 



1 that period. They were really guerrillas in the true 

2 sense of the word, at least much better guerrillas than 

3 the people in the north in that they were able to capture 

4 supplies from their adversaries. 

5 Q It was clear in June of 1986, based on the 

6 messages that you were sending, that you were very 

7 concerned about these people that were out in southern 

8 Nicaragua fighting, that they may be starving to death, 

9 that they had mountain leprosy. You were concerned about. 

10 that in June. Were you concerned about that in January? 

11 A Yes, and the previous January. Yes, 

12 throughout the time I was there. 

13 Q How did you think they were going to be 

14 supplied? 

15 A (Nods in the negative.) Until the private 

16 benefactors at the end of January, early February, were 

17 able to, when they came, when they made, when they 

18 offered to deliver the supplies, I didn't know how they 

19 were going to do it. 

20 When did you get the offer from the private 

21 benefactors? 

22 A It was late January, early February, I 

23 believe. 

24 Q How was the offer communicated? 

25 A You are really testing my memory with this. 



lEtASStFIED 



289 



UNfiWriED 



50 



1 Q I understand. How was the offer communicated? 

2 A Either from Colonel North — I guess it was 

3 from Colonel North. 

4 Q Do you? 

5 A Oh, yeah. 

6 Q And how was that communication accomplished, 

7 by telephone? 

8 A Yes, I think so. 

9 Q Tell me about that call. 

10 A I was on the phone a lot with Colonel North. 

11 And of course everybody here in Washington was very 

12 excited, I guess, about the alliance, the pact, the 

13 agreement that had been signed among what we now call the 

14 non4aligned commanders, as to distinguish them from the 

15 ARDE commanders and Negro Chamorro. 

16 I was on the phone frequently with North, but 

17 in spurts. It might be three or four weeks that would go 

18 by that I wouldn't talk to him, and then I might talk to 

19 hia three or four times in a row, days in a row, and this 
2 was on a secure line from the embassy to his office at 

21 the NSC. I have to assume that it was at this time, 

22 during this period, because it seems like the natural 

23 time sec[uenc« that he said that the private benefactors 

24 were prepared to deliver a plane load of supplies to the 

25 people ina 



"imiKm 



290 



umASStnED 



SI 



1 This was after the pact had already been 

2 signed and after the commanders had returned inside — or 

3 at least Z no longer had contact. I had no longer direct 

4 contact with the commanders. There's a point I wanted to 

5 make. Yes, okay. So he said that he had, that he could 

6 arrange, or that delivery could be arranged. Although I 

7 don't think he said that he had direct control, my 

8 impression is that he certainly would be influential or 

9 could be influential in seeing to it that the southern 

10 front got some supplies. 

11 Okay, I'm giving you impressions. Again, I 

12 could be off on the timing of this. 

13 Q Let me give you a point of reference. North 

14 and his family came to visitjH^^^^Hin December. 

15 A Ko. 

16 ' Q NO? You tell B« the date. 

17 A Late February, March. About then. 

18 Q Okay. Was it before or after this visit that 

19 North told you that the private benefactors might be able 

20 to help support the southern front? 

21 A Before. 

22 Q Okay. So you're thinking is that it probably 

23 was sometime after the agreement was signed with the 

24 southern front commanders and sometime before February 

25 when North and his family came down? 

It! 



NttJCTIED 



291 



y 



52 



1 A To the best of my recollection, yes. Again, I 

2 say it's hazy. But it certainly was after the 

3 conmanders. 

4 MR. LIMAN: Did he use the term private 

5 benefactors. 

6 THE WITNESS: Private sources, private 

7 something. 

8 MR. LIMAN: The term private benefactors 

9 ultimately came into your vocabulary didn't it? 

10 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think it may have been 

11 me that used the word for the first time, benefactor.- I 

12 don't )cnow why. 

13 MR. LIMAN: Did you know who they were, when 

14 North said that he could arrange the private airlift of 

15 supplies? 

16 THE WITNESS: No, sir. And of my own 

17 knowledge to this day, I do not know who they are. 

18 MR. LIMAN: And why did you ask North about 

19 arranging the private airlift as opposed to^^^g 

20 THE WITNESS: I don't know. No, no, it was 

21 North who offered it to us in the south. Now let me get 

22 back to something else. I think I have the point I 

23 wanted to make. 

24 It was my understanding also at that time 

25 that, based on or as an outcome of the Nicaraguan 



292 



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humanitarian assistance and the communications 
assistance, that it was proper for me to pass information 
to the resistance which would or which could be used for 
the safe delivery of supplies to them. Let's see, I got 
a bit ahead of myself. 

So when North offered to arrange for the 
private benefactors to deliver supplies, my question was 
a question of is this legal, is this proper, for me. He 
said, well, actually all you'd be doing is passing 
information in terms of where the drop zones are, which 
would be Information I would obtain from the commanders 
inside, and, on the other hand, to pass information to 
the commanders when the drop was expected, and how they 
should be — that they should be positioned to receive 
it. That seemed acceptable to me to play that role. 

Now what was your other question? I thought 
you asked a question and then Tom passed you a question. 




293 



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^aJ/BV Ja) 



/O K^L- 



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Q Around this time, did you hav« any discussion 
with^HBabout tha building of an airstrip in Costa 
Rica? ^ 

A August of 1985? 

Q Yes. 

A No. The idea I don't even think had been 



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Q Th« ABbassador started in Costa Rlca< in July 
of 1985 is that right? 

A y«s, correct. 

Q Ambassador Tanbs has testified in his 
deposition that he was sent to Costa Rica with his 
principal instruction being the opening of the southern 
front. Did he tell you that 

A Immediately 




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1 mat at hla resldance with th« dafansa attacha and with 

2 tha deputy chiaf of mission at which tima ha said that 

3 his mission in Costa *Rica was tha — what was it? -- was 

4 tha astablishmant or tha davalopmant or tha support of 

5 tha southern front in tarms, as I understood them, of 

6 both military and political. 

7 Q Did ha say who had given him that mission? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q Who was that? 
10 ' A Colonel North. 

\\ Q What else did he tell you about what North-.ha<* 

12 told hlB? 

13 A I don't 
14 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■j And remember 

16 the meeting other than that or any more. 

17 Q Did it eurpriee that an ambassador wae being 

18 given an aesignment to establish a southern front by a 

19 National Security Council staff officer? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Did you understand the Ambassador's 

2 2 instructlone from Colonel North to be consistent with tha 

2 3 requirements of the Boland Amendment? 

24 A Yes. 

25 Q How could tha Ambassador establish a military 




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1 front in southern Nicaragua consistent with the 

2 requirements of the Boland Amendment? 

3 A Well, my interpretation, as I reflect on it, 

4 and I'm not sure what my thought was then, but this is my 

5 impression of that conversation now, is that he was 

6 talking in a generic sense about the southern front, the 

7 southern front he meant in a political as well as the 

8 military, and essentially trying to do the same things I 

9 was doing in keeping the southern front military viable 

10 in terms of its position vis-a-vis the political side, 

11 and to encourage them not to lose faith, not to lose. 

12 hope, that things would change as the Sandinistas 

13 demonstrated more and more the totalitarian aspects and 

14 that the Congress would get — that's what I would have 

15 understood it to mean. 

16 1 certainly didn't infer from what he said nor 

17 did I think he meant to imply that there was any kind of 

18 violation of the Boland Amendment intended. 

19 Q So you took his instructions to be to give 

20 moral support to the military forces in the south and 

21 nothing more until Boland was changed? 

22 A Well, to support my operational activities. 

23 My operation activities, that he would do whatever was 

24 necessary in support of what we had as specific 

25 operational objectives, that being to keep the political 



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Q At any point in 1985 did you t«il th« 
Ambassador about th« CIA's plan not to hava contact with 
Pastora and to separata him from his commandars? 

' A Th« Ambassador was wall awara of my efforts to 
alavata tha status of UNO and to diminish tha status. of 
Pastora. 

Q Okay. In that initial maating with tha 
Ambassador that you described earlier did he tell you 
about hi* desire to have a Contra resupply airfield 
constructed in Costa Rica? 

A No, I don't recall that. 

Q Did you have discussions with the Ambassador 

prior to|H|August ^^iHJi^ll^^H^B ^" 

was apparently a discussion about the building of an 

airfield in Costa Rica for Contra resupply? 

A There may have been in conceptual terms. I'm 
sure I said to him things like, you )cnow, if we aver get 
the money it would be great to get an airf ield^^Jin 
Costa Rica to be able to resupply these people inside and 



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so forth and so on. But I can't specifically remember it 
I actually spoke in such definitive terms. 




iTambs and I 

probably did discuss in conceptual terms such a thing 
because he was the type of person that you could talk in 
conceptual terms to, and then he would suddenly run off 
with the ball and sometimes before you could reach out to 
him and pull him back in, he had done something or other 
that -perhaps had gone beyond, you know, just 
brainstorming. 

Q Was it in your mind of August, 1985, that an 
airfield would be helpful to the Contra resupply effort 
if the CIA were ever to get back into business? 

A Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, it was an 
essential in my view. 

Q Did you ever tell that to anybody? 

A Oh, I'm sure 1 did. I mean, why not? Why 
wouldn't I have? Sure I would have. 

Q Did you ever tell it to Colonel North? 

A I don't think so. August of 198 5? I didn't 
have — I don't know. I don't think so, but I don't 
know. 

Q Let me ask you this. Colonel North's travel 
records show that on August 10, 1985, he made a one-day 




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1 ^rlp^^^^^^^^^|. H« laft on th«, It Is my 

2 understanding he left on the 9th, was there on the 10th, 

3 and came back on the 10th. Did you meet with him at that 

4 time? 

5 A Did he travel with^^^^ 

6 Q I can only tell you what his travel records 

7 show. Hang on just a minute. 

8 A I don't know. 

9 Q Hang on just a minute. 

10 • 1 will represent to you that his travel 

11 records show that he left Dulles on August 10, arrived 
that day |^^^^^^V and leftfl^H^f the next day 

13 the 11th. Do you recall meeting with Colonel North on 

14 that trip? 

15 A I don't have any recollection of that trip 

16 whatsoever. 

17 Q Between August of 1984, whe« you first met 
North, 1985'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^| 

19 ^^^^^^^^H did you have any meetings with North? 

20 A Although I can't give you dates, I believe I 

21 did, and to my recollection is that I met with him here 

22 in Washington a couple of times. 

23 Q What were the purposes of those meetings? 

24 A Again, this is general impressions because I 

25 can't recall the exact discussions — to keep up a 






302 



1 friendship or an acquaintanceship. At that time I found 

2 him to be very bright, articulate, charismatic. I 

3 enjoyed being with him. He certainly had a thorough 

4 grasp of the political dynamics involved on my side of 

5 the activities. I found that he was very sympathetic to 

6 my views concerning the political situation there. 

7 After all, he was Deputy Director of Political' 

3 Military Affairs for Central America. I also )cnew that 

9 he was on this RIG, this regional, or whatever it is. 

1^ 

10 . Q This Restricted Interfagency Group? 

-^ 

11 A Yes. This Restricted Inter+^gency Group. And 

12 obviously I felt that it behooved me to be able to get my 

13 thoughts, give him my impressions, my views, about what 

14 was happening so that he would essentially represent, 

15 accurately represent, again in my view, the political 

16 situation in the south. So there was the personal side 

17 and there was the political side. 

18 Q Did you decide in August of 1984 that you 

19 wanted to develop this acquaintanceship? 

20 A No. 

21 Q When did you decide that you wanted to develop 

22 this relationship with Colonel North? 

23 A I think several months after that I was up 

24 here and I just gave him a call, as I do with people. I 

25 call them up to say hi, how are you, why don't we get 

itJ 



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1 together for a b««r. 

2 Q Wh«n was tha naxt tina you racall maating with 

3 him aftar August of 1984? 

4 A I don't know. 

5 Q And do you think you saw him mayba twica up 

6 hara? 

7 A Yas, two or thraa timaa. I'd, you know, have 

8 a beer near my hotel or at my hotel or something like 

9 that. He'd come by on his way home from work. We'd stop 

10 and chat about things, that's all. I think once I did gb 

11 over to the NSC office, but I'm not sure when that took 

12 place — 1984, 1985, 1986. There wa« once in 1986, but I 

13 don't remember when before that. 

14 Q When was the first time you recall maating 
him injj^^H^H 

16 A When he travelled in December of 198 — 

17 Q With McFarlane? 

18 A Yea. , 

19 Q That's 1985. 

20 A No, it was December of 1984. 

21 Q You're right, excuse me. Poindexter was 

22 December of 1985. 

23 A That's correct — Poindexter and North. 

24 Q Yes. 

2 5 A December of 1985. 




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1 Q So th« next tima you saw North was in December 

2 of 1984. The next time you saw him in ^^^^^^^| was in 

3 December of 1984? 

4 A That is correct. 

5 Q And you saw him perhaps a couple of times 

6 after that up in Washington? 

7 A After August of 1984. 

8 Q After December of 1984? 

9 A After December of 1984? Let me think about 

10 that^. 

11 (Pause.) 

12 Yes, yes, I guesa, I'd not sure. 

13 Q During any of those meetings did you discuss 

14 with him the status of the southern front forces? 

15 A Of course. 

16 Q Did he give you any indication as to how they 

17 might be resupplied during the period the Boland 

18 Amendment was in effect? , 

19 A No. Not that X recall. 

2 Q He didn't mention to you at that time the 

21 possibility of private sources being used to supply the 

22 Contras? 

23 A No. You know, I can't definitively answer 

24 that question, but my impression is that he did not. 

25 Q Did you discuss with him in any of these 




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meetings your belief that an airstrip needed to be 
constimcted in Costa Rica it the southern front were to 
be properly resupplied? 

A Z would have to give the same answer to that 
question. Until, of course, this August of 1985 period, 
I don't think the question of an airstrip came up at any 
time before Tambs arrived in Costa Rica, okay? That's 
July of 1985. My impression would be it just wasn't, it 
wasn't a viable thing, all right, to even have discussed 
it. - 

And the other point was Pastors 's people were 
still Pastora's people. Chamorro's people weren't 
inside. If there was any talk of it — and my impression 
now is that there wasn't, and I could be mistaken, but my 
impression is that there wasn't — it was because it 
sinply wasn't viaQile yet. 

Q By August 12 it had apparently become viable 




Is that right? 
A Well, it was viable as far as Ambassador Tambs 
is concerned, okay? 




If it came up with him, and gee, wouldn't it 

1 1 refcflcTni^DWw" 



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b* graat If, you ]cnow, w« could g«t sooathing ready now 
for wh«n«ver w« get the resumption of funds and so forth 
and so on. And there was obviously, and this is an 
important point to make, a great deal of tension at least 
from our perspective, mine, the CIA station chief, and on 
his part because the presence of these people 
^^^^^^^■had, and I certainly must have added to the 
Ambassador's concerns, because these people were creating 
such a difficult situation 




can't you get those people under control? 
Can't you'do it, look, they juat do this and that, I mean 
it was just one headache after another. 

Q So you had to find a way to get them into 
Nicaragua ' 

A wanted them out^^^^^^^^^H How they 

were going to get in? 

They certainly had to get 
their act together and their guts in place and say no 
more ^^^^^^^^B sanctuary, let's go in and fight the 
Sandinistas. 

They were extremely — and that is not an 
overstatement — they were extremely reluctant to do so. 
Negro Chamorro to this day that I know of has yet to get 









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72 

insida Nicaragua. And tha last tima I remember Negro 
Chamorro being Inside Nicaragua was in 1983 when he 

the border ^^^^^^■^^^■^^^■■1 and 
attacked, ir you can imagine, a guard post, a guard house 
30 meters or 30 yards inside Nicaragua. And then when he 
started to get his, when the Sandinistas counter- 
attacked, he ran to a telephone on the(^HH^Hside and 
dialed me in Washington, D.C., at Langley headquarters 
asking for mortars! 

(Laughter. ) 

So h«lp ne God! And I asked hin, where in the 
hell are you calling from, and he said from the guard 
P°3^ ^^^^^^^^B ^* said* we are under attack, you need 
to send ma arms, and I said, you've got to be out of your 
mind. 

Q When was this? 

A 1983. This is no joke. He called our outside 
lin*. 

Q Soma of your messages reflect that the fact 
that Chzmorro did not have a lot of courage. Is that 
right, that people were concerned that it was hard to get 
him into Nicaragua to fight? 

A That is an accurate representation. Ves, sir. 
Well, getting back to this, if I may, if you don't mind I 
would like to refer to some notes here that I wrote. 



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Q No, that's fine. 

A Immediately after the Tower Report came out to 
correct some inaccuracies that I saw in there, that 
question of the airstrip came up several times in the 
Tower Commission Report. And just to give an 
appreciation for what my recollection was at that time. 



This refers to page C-12, right side of the 
page -in the Tower Commission Report. Partially quoted 
as, learned of the airstrip project from a CIA field 
officer. 

MR. WILSON: That was Tambs. 

THE WITNESS: My comment is this statement by 
Ambassador Tambs is inaccurate. According to my 
recollection, the continuing presence of the Nicaraguan 
resistance elements ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H caused 
constant political friction] 

who felt that these elements 
were the responsibility of the U.S. government who had 
been supporting them prior to the Boland Amendment cut 
off. 

Likewise, it was recognized that these 
elements would not leave theirq|^|HU^m sanctuary 
unless they could be routinely supplied inside southern 




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Nicaragua. And ther« was no secure or practical means of 
doing so other than by aerial resupply, which necessitated 
a site in Costa Rica where the resupply aircraft could be 
refueled. 

BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 
Q Let me ask about this. Oh, finish that. 
A Coincidentally, the re was a growing 
a pprehension'^ 

Ithat the Sandinistas would use their 

military capabilities ^^^^^^^^^^^^" The 
Sandinistas h ad already at tacked] 

[and did so with impunity. 
Since Costa Rica has no army and depends on a 
constabulary for its defense, authorities felt that other 
arrangements for defensive resupply need ed to be 
considered — that is, a landing fielc 

^HB where U.S. and other Rio Treaty pact nations could 
land ■ilitary aircraft. 




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Q What did you understand this airstrip was 
going to be used for? 

A Initially I envisioned it as — let me stop 
there. Let ne correct that. It my impression that at 
the time ^^^^^^^^^^ 

lere was no thought, no thought 
had been given either by Tambs and certainly not at that 
point about who would build this airstrip, okay? It was 
in the idea stage. 

How it evolved, that the airstrip could be 
built other than a U.S. government entity, it seems to ine 
that that came from — that Tambs said, why don't we 
raise it with Colonel North, with Ollie. Now, I am not 



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76 

■ur« of that, okay? And I'm not sura that it was evan 
discusaad at that tima. It just seemed like a good idea 
to think about. 

MR. LIMAN: You'ra not sure about what — that 
h« suggested that it be raised with North? 

THE WITNESS: In answer to Mr. Barbadoro's 
question, there is, or I infer that he's trying to, or 
what's he getting at is how, what was the thinking behind 
this at that point. 1 don't think that there was. I 
recall what happened subsequently, but at that point it 
was gee, it would be great if we got their approval, .as 
though that was the first thing to do. 

But there wa sn't really anything aft er that as 

well let'sj^^mUmBII^'' "^^ 
sort of to get them on board, and then we'll figure out 
it will be done. 

BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

Q in August it was a concept; you didn't have 
ths details down. 

A That's right. 

Q But the concept was to have an airfield for, 
and resupply depot for the Contra s, wasn't it? 

A And 




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Q Who was going to do th« resupply? That's my 
question. 

A CIA. 

Q Wasn't the Boland Anandment in effect? 

A Oh, yes, yes. But please keep in mind that 
throughout this period there waa always the optimistic 
view that within the foreseeable future forces, political 
forces, would be marshalled in Washington to ovcrturr) the 
Boland Amendment. Now maybe it was three months down the 
road or six months down the road. I don't think any of 
us could have survived in that job without feeling that 
way , okay? 

Q So it was your hope that once you got approval 
for this that it could be constructed somehow or that 
when the CIA got back into business soon it would be used 
for resupply? 

A 




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I added, I said I wanted no Nicaraguan to ever 
)cnow about the existence of this base|| 

I the air base. 
MR. LIMAN: By Nicaraguan, you included 



Contras? 



okayl 



THE WITNESS: That's who I was talking about, 



MR. LIMAN: Okay. 

THE WITNESS: Contras. Because. I mean there 
is no such thing as a secret among the Contras. And in 
my mind if this was to be a viable CIA air operation, the 
Binut* we told the Contras that such a place existed, 
th«r« wouldn't be an air operation. There wouldn't be 
anything secret about this place. 




Il was clearly thinking 
ahead to the point where we, CIA, would be able to have a 
secret place that was not known to the Contra elements. 
BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 
Q I understand. Now tell me, when did you first 
get an idea as to how this airfield was actually going 



to be built? 



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1 A Sometime after this — a week, two weeks, I 

2 don't recall — the Ambassador called me into his office 

3 and he said there is somebody here I want you to meet. 

4 So I went in and there was a young man sitting in front 

5 of his desk and he introduced him to me as Rob Owen. 

6 I had he^rd about Rob Owen. We had numerous 

7 reports about Rob Owen's activities in Costa Rica with 

8 his contacts with the various Contra elements. However, 

9 we had no contact with him nor were we really interested 

10 in contact with him because he was an Aaerican citizen. 

11 Q Did you know that he was associated with Korth 

12 at this time? 

13 A I did not know that he was associated with 

14 North. I assumed that it was the Ambassador who told me 

15 that he is associated with North. That was th« first 

16 definitive information I had that there was a definite 

17 relationship between North and Owen. 

18 Q Tell me what happened at that meeting. 

19 A Now, to this day I still don't know, although 

20 I have officially first-hand knowledge of who Rob Owen 

21 was working for. I have read in the newspaper that he 

22 was working for a firm here in Washington. But I didn't 
2 3 know it then. And until he eventually went to work for 

24 the State Department's Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance 

25 Office, I didn't know. 



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Q T«ll m« about that meeting. 

A At that meeting, to the best of my 
recollection, the Ambassador raised the issue of building 
the airstrip with Rob Owen with words to the effect of 
why don't you take a trip up there and have a look at it. 

Q Had a site already been chosen? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^H chose the in 
minutes. The only site thatj^^^^^Hwould be adequate in 
all of Costa Rica for this because of its isolation. 




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Getting back to the meeting, Rob Owen agreed 
to go up and take a look at this site. 




Q This was before the land had been purchased 
from Hanilton? -, 

A Oh, yes. T his was just to look ^tl^^^^^^^J 
I^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H just to take a 

look at the place. 

Q And Tanbs asked you to go with Owen to look at 
the site? 

A I can't say that he asked me. I can't say how 
it developed. But we agreed that I w ould accompany Owen 
up there] 




I understand. What happened next? 




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So w« want up, flew up th«r« in thej 

halicoptar. 
Who wa« with you? 




Rob Ow«n, mysalf, and the pilot. 
And we flew up to the site, and Rob walked it and took 
photographs of it with a 35 millimeter camera. And then 
we flew around the area and then we returned^^^^^^^^H 
I later learned he took those films and delivered them to 
Colonel North. 

Q Did you have any discussion with Owen about 
how the strip was going to be built? 

A I don't remember. Well, yes, I guess we must 
have. But there was only one way to build it because the 
thing had hills or a mountain on each side and was sort 
of an elongated canyon. And there was only one — now 
somebody had said that former General Somoza of Nicaragua 
had a farm near there and that ha used to land a plane 
there whenever he came to spend his weekends. I am not 
sure if that's true. 

But the land was generally level. There was a 
stream bed running through it. There were some trees 
that would have had to have been knocked down. But it 



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83 



1 was totally isolated. 
■2 MR. LIMAN: How did you learn that Owen tooJc 

3 the films and delivered them to North? 

4 THE WITNESS: Colonel North told me after he 

5 received them and saw them. And that's where the — 

6 BY MR. BARBAOORO: (Resuming) 

7 Q Did Owen tell you who was going to build the 

8 strip? 

9 A No, sir. That's really the end of Owen's 

10 participation. Now let me just complete the contact with 

11 Owen so that we don't misunderstand. Oven didn't have 

12 anything to do with that activity after that. Owen 

13 amazingly, in my view, had contact with a very wide 

14 circle of people in the resistance movement. And what's 

15 amazing about it is that he doesn't speak Spanish. But 

16 he is a very engaging, highly intelligent individual. 

17 And he wins people over. He Knows how to ask questions. 

18 And so, when the Ambassador introduced him to 

19 me, I asked him about his interest in these people and he 

20 said, well, he just keeps in touch with him, that he had 

21 been a long-time friend of John Hull, and through John 
Hull he had met a lot of these individualsH^^f^^^^H 

24 Subsequently he volunteered a lot of 

25 information to us, operational information, especially 



319 




84 

about tha llttl* conflicts among som« ot tha groups that 
w« rsally didn't havs a good handls on. w« found his 
infomation to b« accurat* in most casas. Wa fodnd that 
his, and wa did not task him bacausa wa couldn't; as an 
Amarican citizan, ha was maraly voluntaaring this stuff 
to us and v« couldn't use him for intalliganca 
collactlon. But it was claar that his intarasts wara 
essantially our intarasts. ^ 

And at ona point I racallH^Hsaying that he 
sura vould like to recruit this guy as an Agency officer 
bacausa ha was an axtraaaly perceptive individual and, he 
had 9oed instincts for the business. Contact existed 
through, I guess — well certainly he then joined the 
Nicaraguan Humanitarian Affairs Office in the State 
Dapartaant . 

That's when, when he did that, then we did 
have a such Bore operational relationship. We were able 
then to ask his a lot of questions about things that 
before we could only get from him on a voluntary basis. 
After the Kicaraguan humanitarian affairs thing, I don't 
think we had any contact with him at all. 

Q Let's go back to the visit at the site of the 
airstrip. Did you tell anybody in haadcjuartars that you 
had gone to look at the site of the airstrip? 

A No. If I did, It would be in cable traffic, 




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14 

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17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



I' 

and I don't recall writing a cabla about It. I 



85 




So 1 don't know. I don't know if I did a follow-up or 
not. 

Q Did you t«ll North that you had b«en out to 
look at the airstrip? 

A Oh, h« knew it because Owen had returned from 
Costa Rica and gave him the filn. 

Q When did you meet this fellow who identified 
himself as Olnstead? 

A Sometime after North told me he had received 
the films of the strip. But I'm not sure of the sequence 
of things. North told me that he was sending somebody 
down to look into the possibility of building the 
airstrip, which, of course, was kind of precipitous, in 
my view, given the fact that we still didn't have, that 
we hadn't resolved the Boland Amendment problem yet. 

Q Let me stop here and go back to something. 

A At that point he sent Olmstead down. 

Q When did this conversation with North take 
place when he told you about the films? 

A Shortly after Owen returned and it was by 



phone . 



Did he initiate the call or did you? 




321 



^wmi 



86 



1 A Oh, I wouldn't know, because wa were on the 

2 phone frequently, on the secure line. Either he had a 

3 question to clarify or I had something that I wanted to 

4 bring to his attention. And, as I said, there were 

5 periods were we would go weeks without talking to each 

6 other and then some matter would come up which was of 

7 some import and I'd get on the phone and I'd say, you 

8 know, be sure you are aware that this is going on or that 

9 is going on. 

10 And maybe as a part of one of those 

11 conversations either way, he could have said, he did say, 

12 oh, look, a got the film. 

13 Q Tell me as best as you can remember what he 

14 said about the films. 

15 A That he had th« film* and the place looked 

16 like it night well be suitable for an airstrip. That he 

17 was going to eend this fellow down to take a look at it. 

18 That's what I remember. 

19 Q And what did you understand he was going to do 

20 about this airstrip? 

21 A Well at that point, nothing. I mean, it 

22 wasn't even — it was only a conceptual thing. 

23 MR. LIMAN: Do he say he was sending someone 

24 down to make some plans for building it? 

25 THE WITNESS: Well, that was really -- 



UHCriSSSIFIED 



oo f?no /~\ oo 1 o 



322 



y 



87 



1 MR. LIMAN: Later? 

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was later. 

3 MR. LIMAN: He didn't talk to you about funds 

4 in the phone call for building it? 

5 THE WITNESS: He never talked to me about 

6 funds . 

7 MR. LIMAN: Never said — 

8 THE WITNESS: Never said. 

9 MR. LIMAN: Never said I will get the — 

10 THE WITNESS: Never said a word to me about 

11 funds at any time. And that's — 

12 . MR. LIMAN: Did he ever make a point of saying 

13 to you that I'm never going to talk aOsout funds with you? 

14 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

15 MR. LIMAN: Did you ever ask him where he was 

16 getting his funds? 

17 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

18 MR. LIMAN: He never told you don't ask me? 

19 THE WITNESS: No, no. Let me, let's get to 

20 that for a moment. It was a matter of assumptions on my 

21 part, perceptions — okay? He talked about people 

22 without identifying them — that there were people who 

23 were supportive — and he used euphemisms — supporters, 

24 the private supporters, things like that. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Patriotic Americans? 




323 



ilNettSStflEfl 



88 



1 THE WITNESS: Patriotic Americans. Good 

2 Amaricans. 

3 MR. LIMAH: Okay. 

4 THE WITNESS: But in terms of cost, what would 

5 it cost, that funds would coms from A, B, or C, no, that 

6 in terms of that, okay. I did later learn in very, in 

7 sort of a very nebulous way, that when they eventually — 

8 "they", the private, the good Americans — made the deal 

9 with Hamilton, that the arrangement — and I'm not really 

10 clear on this — that the arrangement was purchase for 

11 $50,000 for the property, with a second $50,000 in the 

12 second year. 

13 However, if they didn't come up with this 

14 $50,000 in the second year, then some sort of a 

15 lease/note thing would come about and that the owner 

16 would repossess the property. 

17 MR. LIMAH: The owner was Hamilton, because we 

18 have another Hamilton who's the Chair on the House 

19 Committee. This is a different Hamilton. 

20 THE WITNESS: Yes. For the record. 

21 MR. BARBADORO: Do you want to take a lunch 

22 break and come back in half an hour, 4 5 minutes? 

23 (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the taking of the 

24 instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. 

25 the same day. ) 



D 




324 



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12 

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15 

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23 

24 

25 




89 



AFTEKNOON SESSION 

(1:33 p. a.) 



Whereupon, 



vO 



th« witness herein, having been previously duly sworn, 
was further examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE - Resumed 
A BY MR. BAKBADORO: 

^^^^^^^^^^H before we broke for lunch, 
had -asked you about when you first heard that this 
Olmstead fellow would be coming down to Costa Rica. Can 
you tell me when you first learned of that? 

A Sometime after Owen had returned with the 
photographs and Colonel North mentioned that he was 
sending someone down to look into the possibility of 
this, constructing an airstrip at this site. 

Q Can you give me a month as to when you went 
out to look at the airstrip with Owen? 




A Rough guess, September. 

Q Okay. How about a guess or estimate as to 
when it was that Olmstead came down? 
A Same month. 
Q Did North mention a name of a person to you 



\mmm 



325 




90 

1 wh«n h« said somaon* would b« coming down? 
' 2 A y«s, h* said he would b« coming down, 

3 mantionad th« nam* of th* person, and then he said that 

4 he would — I don't recall if North told me what name he 

5 would be using or if it was Olmstead himself who told me 

6 that he was using the name Olmstead, okay. 

7 Q Did North give you the guy's real name? 

8 K Yes. 

9 Q What was his name? 

10 ' A To the beet of my recollection it was Haskell 

11 or Hastings or the H-A-S or H-A-Z eound was — I think it 

12 was Haskell. 

13 Q You think it was Haskell? 

14 A I think it was Haskell. 

15 Q How long after this phone call — 

16 A Do you know his name? I mean, just out of 

17 curiosity. 

18 Q I believe it's Haskell. I do know his name 

19 and I think you're right, it is Haskell. What else did 

20 ha tell you about this person? 

21 A That he would be the responsible person for 

22 looking into dealing with the owner of the property. 

23 We're getting ahead of ourselves, though. 

24 At some point after Owen took the film back, 

25 but before Olmstead came down. North asked — I think 



l|l«»l) 



326 



ONOl^SIFIED 



91 



1 North as]c«d th« Ambassador, bscaus* th«y had contact too, 

2 or h« may hav« asksd m«; I know I talkad to th« 

3 Aabassador about It, but how it got to that point X don't 

4 ramambar — who tha ownar of tha proparty was. ^^H^^B 
m^^HHHHHHJI^H told ma, that tha ownar this 

6 proparty was an Amarican. 

7 Hall, bacausa of CIA rastrictions about 

8 daaling with Aaaricans or any contact with Aaaricans, 

9 unlass it's, bacausa of tha aattar of an intalliganca 

10 ralationship, wa, I don't know if you'ra awara of this, 

11 wa hava to inform an Amarican whan wa talk to tham who wa 

12 ara. So Z wantad to avoid that. 

13 ^^^^^^^^^1^°^*^ "* ^^'^^ ^** '^ Amarican, 

14 and it was a fallow by tha nama of Hamilton, not to be 

15 confusad with tha Chairman, and that North aakad, as I 

16 say ha aithar askad ma or ha askad tha Ambassador, but 

17 tha Ambassador and I talkad about it, could wa find out, 

18 or could it ba datarminad if ha was, if Hamilton was 

19 somaona who would cooparata with, who would ba 

20 cooparativa. I don't think — thara's no with — who 

21 would b« cooparativa in tarms of making this proparty 

22 available. 

23 'I^^^^^Hvoluntaarad that ha thought that tha 

24 fallow would ba cooparativ« 
25 



327 



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2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 




^^^^^ that th« f«llow 
was a right-thinking individual. 

In any casa, I don't know whara tha Aobassador 
found out or how tha Aabaaaador found out — could again 
hava ^••nHilllHIHI ~~ ^^^ ^^* ^'l^ov was from North 
Carolina. Ha was in tha taxtila industry in North 
Carolina and ha had a soma aort of taxtila businasa in 
San Josa. So tha Aabaaaador callad up Sanator Halas' 
offica, in ay praaanca, and ha apoka to Sanator Halaa' 
Adainiatrativa Aaaiatant, I baliava. 

And ha askad hia or har to find out what they 
could dataraina about thia individual 'a political 
attitudaa — Taaba to Halas offica, aithar that day or 
tha naxt day or tha day aftar, at aoaa point in thara. 
Ha racaivad a call back froa Halaa 'a offica. 

Q In that firat call did tha Aabaaaador say why 
ha wantad to ]cnow this? 

A Ha aaid that this is an Aaarican businassaan 
hara in Coata Rica, and that ha just wantad to know 
aoaathing about hia. So, aa I said, tha aubaaquant call 
back, tha anawar was, ha 'a all right, wa guaaa, bacausa 
ha aada contributions to both caapaigna. And I just 
happan to raaaabar that aa baing kind of an unusual 



UNtDOTED 



328 




93 

1 comffl«nt by Senator Helms 's office. 

2 In any case, there was no derogatory 

3 information about th* individual, that he was strictly a 

4 businessman. And then Olmstead came to town. It gets 

5 very fuzzy in here, okay. So please bear with me. 

6 Q Did Olmstead meet with you when he came to 

7 town? 

8 A Oh yes, when he cam* to town, yes. And I 

9 learned that, I forget whether he — he had some problem 

10 with' his passport, or he didn't have a passport, because 

11 you can to Costa Rica on a tourist card just showing your 

12 driver's license or some other form of identification. 

13 And he didn't want to use his tourist card at 

14 a hotel where he would have to show some identification 

15 and he didn't want to use a credit card, if he even had 

16 one. So he asked me how he could take care of that, and 

17 I said well, just simply go into any of the smaller 

18 hotels and tell them that you were fishing up country and 

19 something, and you lost your passport and your wallet, 

20 but you have some cash, and the passport is being 

21 replaced, and they'll check you in. 

22 And that's what he did. As I understand, he 

23 did it on subsequent visits as well. So, I'm not sure if 

24 he actually had a passport in the name of Olmstead or if 

25 — what the circumstances were in that regard. 



UNtMFIED 



329 



UNCLASSIFIED 



94 



X Summing It up, h« mat with Hamilton. H« 

2 n«gotiat«d a contract with Hamilton, which as I racall 

3 was, and I m«t with him s«v«ral timas aftar that, to 

4 racaiva from him a raport on how it was going^^^^^^^^H 
B^H^I^^^^^^H But participata him 

6 this thing, what seemed to ba a protractad negotiation -- 

7 through October, November of 1985. 

8 Q Did ha stay down there or did ha make several 

9 trips? 

10 - A No, no. He would ba do%m there for one, two 

11 days, and then he would go back, and then he'd come back, 

12 and so forth. 

13 Q Did he tell whether he was going to buy the 

14 property or lease it? 

15 A He did say it, but I don't remember it. It 

16 was one or the other, or a fora of buy with or lease with 

17 option to buy or buy with sort of a balloon note at the 

18 end. In any case, there was a point at which, as I 

19 understand from the Ambassador, from what the Ambassador 

20 told me, that Hamilton did not want to get involved with 

21 this group of businessmen that Olmstead represented. 

22 Q Did Olmstead tell you what his story was to 

23 Hamilton about what the property would be used for? 

24 A Just as a group of businessmen who are 

25 interested In putting up a tourist resort. It's my 



'■■■ ■ "idOi. Jl 




330 



95 

1 loprasslon that at soma point, Olmstead probably gave a 

2 lot of winking to th« guy who realized who, you know, 

3 probably asked who would be putting up a tourist resort 

4 in this place where there was no road for 20 miles. 

5 I'm trying to keep the sequence of this, the 

6 reason being that at some point the Ambassador contacted 

7 Hamilton and told Hamilton that the place was to be used 

8 for an activity in support of the Nicaraguan resistance 

9 and that he, Hamilton, would be doing his country a 

10 service. 

11 Hamilton, as Z recall the Ambassador telling 

12 me, asked about the reliability or the trustworthiness of 

13 these individuals that Olmstead represented. And the 

14 Ambassador assured him that, gave him personal assurance, 

15 that they were of the utmost trustworthiness. 

16 Q Did Olmstead tell you who he was working for? 

17 A NO. 

18 Q Did he tell you where the money was coming 

19 from to pay Hamilton? 

20 A No. As I said, the only time a figure was 

21 raised was that figure of $50,000, and Z could be 

22 mistaken on that. And Z don't know hov the $50,000 

23 worked aa a mortgage payment. 

24 Q Did you have at that time any idea where the 

25 $50,000 was coming from? 



UmSSIFIED 



331 



wsmm 



9« 



1 A No, sir. Zn fact, Z didn't haar that figure 

2 until Buch later. Z don't think Z heard that figur* 

3 until auch latar. Zt'a By iBpraaaion that tha figure of 

4 the $S0,000 caBe up at aoBe tiae later on, not during the 

5 OlBStead discueeione. Olaatead said that Haailton was, 

6 as part of the agreeaent for this year or two-year, a 

7 year renewable, two for two years, agreeaent, that he 

8 wanted a road put in froa the highway to this property 

9 which was adjacent to the coast through soae of the aost 

10 rugged terrain in northern Costa Rica. 

11 And to a« that would have cost an enomous. 

12 aaount of aoney to do it. Z think that originally, until 

13 they realized that how iapossible this was, because these 

14 were steep canyons as so forth, that probably out of good 

15 faith, Olaatead said, had told ha said that ha had agreed 

16 to putting in thia road. 

17 Tha other thing that Haailton inalatad on was 
IB sinking a wall at tha alta and finally, that the property 

19 not be ecologically disturbed. Thia waa iaportant, and 

20 in fact I aupportad that atrongly when Z heard it. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 Not only that, along the strip of the cove 




UNtCIOTED 



332 



UNIM»ED 



97 



1 juat vh«r« th« airstrip was to b* built, about a quarter 

2 of a mil* from where the airstrip was to be built, is a 

3 place where turtles com* in and lay eggs, and it has been 

4 a constant problem of poachers in the area coming and 

5 taking the turtle eggs. 

6 And so that was basically all that Heunilton 

7 insisted on — the road, the sinking of th* w*ll, and the 

8 ecological portion of it — all of which Hamilton told me 

9 at one time or another. But th* road — 

10 MR. LIMAN: You mean Olmstcad told you that. 

11 THE WITNESS: Who did I say? 

12 MR. LIMAN: Hamilton. 

13 THE WITNESS: No, Hamilton. Olmstead told me 

14 h* had with Hamilton, th* discussions h* had with 

15 Hamilton. And what *ls*? 

16 BY MR. BARBAOORO: (R*suBing) 

17 Q Did this 01m*t*ad/Has]c*lI t*ll you anything 

18 about what hi* r*lationship va* to North? 

19 A That th*y w*r* good fri*nds. North told m* 

20 that th*y w*r*, that h* was v*ry, v*ry clos* to this man. 

21 H* •\i]b**qu*ntly told n* a f*v month* lat*r that Olmstead 

22 wa* a Marin* Corp* offic*r who — again, I might not have 

23 it correct — but that olmstaad had lost hi* *y* and was 

24 •«v*r*ly wound*d in th* fac*, and that North brought him 

25 out from bahind *n*my lines in southeast Asia. 



uimssinED 



333 




98 

1 And that th« bond b«tw««n th«« was v«ry, vary 

2 cloaa. 1 undaratood that ha waa an accountant, or had an 

3 accounting buainasa- And tha othar thing that Morth said 

4 was that ha waa doing all of this, going dotm to Costa 

5 Rica and so forth, at his own axpansa. At soaa point, 

6 aftar I think thay had, and I'm not sura of this, but 

7 aftar thay had aithar mada tha agraanant with Haailton or 

8 just bafora, Olastaad cama down with a aoila apacialist, 

9 an anginaar, Rafaal Quintaro. 

10 Thara wara four of than. Four or fiva paopla. 

^^^^^^^^^^H I at thair raquast, for thaaa 

12 paopla to go up to do a aurvay of tha araa whara tha 

13 landing atrip waa to go in. I did not go with tham to 

14 tha aita. 1 want with tham — I want to a placa naar by 

15 bacauaa I was worriad about, you taiow, thair halicoptar 

16 crash or whatavar thaaa paopla. But 1 did not go to tha 

17 atrip with tham ao I don't know what thay did thara. 

18 1 subsaquantly haard tha« diacuasing what thay 

19 found, and froB what I could tall of thair findings, thay 

20 said that tha soil was not suitabla, that tha placa was 

21 not long anougb for tha purpoaa intandad, that 

22 construction in that araa bacauaa of its isolation would 

23 ba vary difficult. It was a vary nagativa raport. 

24 Q Tha purpoaa intandad waa to build tha 

25 airatrip? 



\immm 



334 



99 

1 A Oh, y«s, y«s. That was, as I aald, it vaa 

2 aithar at tha and of tha nagotiatlons or juat aftar tha 

3 nagotlatlona had baan complatad. And this would hava 

4 baan Novambar 1985. I frankly laft that — whan I laft 

5 that maating, I aaid, this thing is not going to go 

6 anyvhara. Thara's too aany nagativas, too iapoaaibla to 

7 do. 

8 Tha naxt that happanad was that, and X don't, 

9 Z'va navar saan Olostaad sinca than. Tha naxt that 
10 happanad is that Quintaro cana down and Quintaro 

contractad^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

12 ^^^^^^H^^ atart bringing in a gradar and a bulldozar to 

13 tha aita, and it had to ba brought in ovar this 20-soBa 

14 milaa of canyons and mountains. And aftar that Quintaro 

15 just routinely told aa how things vara going, and nona of 

16 it want wall. 

17 Q Whan did you laam that tha negotiations for 

18 tha purchase of tha property ware auccassful? 

19 A Noveaber or so. 

20 Q Did you report that to anybody? 

21 A No. You mean to ay headquarters? 

22 Q Right. 

23 A No. 

24 Q You mentioned that Rafael Quintero came down 

25 either shortly aftar or shortly before the negotiations 



imSSIflED 



335 



1 w«r« compl«t«d? 

2 A Wa'r* gattln? ahead of ours«lv«i. You just 

3 r«mind«d m« of •oa«thing. And w« hav« to chacJt th« 

4 chronology h«r«. I don't know wh«n Assistant Sscrstary 

5 Abrams toolc ovsr from Tony Motlsy as Assistant Sscrstary 

6 for Latin Amsrica. Ths rsason I'm bringing this up is 

7 bscaus* — 

8 MR. LZMAN: Spring of 1985. 

9 THE WITNESS: That dossn't fit. 

10 MR. BARBADORO: It was August of 198S. 

11 MR. LIMAN: That's right. 

12 THE WITNESS: That's right, It didn't fit.. Hs 

13 C2m« down. 

14 MR. LIMAN: Hs cams down, 

15 THE WITNESS: Mo, it wasn't 

16 Wsll, hs cams, this was sort of an orisntation trip. 

17 BY KR. BARBADORO: (Rssumlng) 

18 Q It was in Oscsmbsr of 1985 or Novsmbsr of 

19 1985. 

20 A All right. Wsll, it was in this psrlod hsrs, 

21 oKay. 

22 Q Ths psrlod whils ths nsgotiations wsrs going 

23 on for ths purchass of ths land? 

24 A Ths rsason your qusstion triggsrsd this, is 

2 5 that, did you rsport this. Ths rsason it triggsrsd it is 





336 




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7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



101 

bacausa whan Abrams cama down thara, ha aakad or wa 
arran^ad aa a mattar of protocol, a brlaflng Cor Abrana. 




And than Abrama aat back and aaid, wall now, 
tall na about Point Haat. Obvloualy at thla point, I had 
aaaunad, Z guaaa naivaly, that thia waa assantially a 
mattar of tha Ambaaaador'^^^^^^^H with ma 
sitting aa a spactator listaning and tailing tha 
Ambasaador and ao forth. Eaaantially, I aupposa, I 
raalizad anyway, that thia waa at laaat unorthodox, my 
involvamant with it. 



MCTIED 



337 




1 But ones I h«ard that, Z was raally shoclcad, 

2 taJcan aback, first of all that h« would cosa out and so 

3 blatantly say, tall as all about Point Hast. Hot only 

4 that, ha was sayin? it in front of two officars that had 

5 no naad to know, that ha didn't avan ask if thay knaw and 

6 should thay know. But obviously tha outcoma of all of it 

7 was, that this was sonathing that avarybody in Washington 
knaw iLbout, and hara was,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthinking 

9 Z had a real sacrat. 

XO Q What did you tall Abrass? 

11 A Oh, I told Abraas. Z said, sir, up until now 

12 I thought that in Costa Rica thara wars only four or iCiva 

13 paopls that knaw about this placa. Now, bacausa of your 

14 question, thasa two officars, who had no naad to know, 

15 now know. Oh, ha aaid, Z apologiza. Z'b sorry. Z 

16 didn't raalizs it. And Z said, now tall aa somathing, 

17 Mr. Sacratary, who up thara knows? Oh,^|^^H and 

18 Colpnal North — Ollia, and^fHHjsr Z askad hia if 

19 B^^Bknav. And ha said, oh, yas, of coursa; this was tha 

20 RZG. 

21 So Z said, well, okay. On tha ona hand Z was 

22 upsat bacausa thasa two officars who wara raally, you 

23 know, thay waran't privy to this thing, and yat, it was a 

24 raliaf on ay part bacausa ay aup ariors knaw. 

25 Q Othar than] 

|T/( 




338 



UNOASSiBED 



103 



1 ^^^^^^^^1 you hadn ' t told headquartars anythinc^ about 

2 Point WMt, had you? 
A As I sald^ X don't know If I did a follow-up 

to that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J^^H^^^^^^^^^H 
My recollection is that I probably didn't, Z don't think 
I did, but Z Bay havs. 

MR. LZMAM: Do you rscall whan Admiral 
Polndsxtsr C2un« down to Central America right after he 
was named National Security Adviser in December of 1985? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you meet with him? 

THE WITNESS: As part of the country team? 

MR. LIMAN: Yes. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. LIMAN: You did meet with him. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. LIMAN: And Oliver North was with him? 

THE WITNESS: And Oliver North was with him. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you discuss Point West with 
hlB? 

THE WITNESS; No, sir. That was a meeting 
with the country team, which consisted of the AID 
Director, the Chief of the Economic Section, Chief of 
Political Section, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the 
Defense Attache, et cetera, et cetera. 



mmm 



>iimmB 



104 



MR. LZKAN: It was just too public of a 
■••ting for you to discuss It? 

THE WITNESS: Right. At that Bsatlng, after 
that masting, at tha and of It which too)c place outs Ida 
of tha Embassy — thay wara only In town for an hour, so 
wa didn't avan hava tlna to gat all tha way Into tha city 
from tha airport. At tha and of that aaatlng^^^^^^^H 
^^^Bcaaa and Admiral Polndaxtar Invltad hla to tha vnilta 
Housa for a photo opportunity. 

And that had baan alraady llnad up In that tha, 
offar would mada, llnad up In cabla traffic, and so 

who thara too ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

visit with a spaclal addition of tha 
visit to tha Oval Of flea. 

MR. LZMANs Was this to show appraciatlon for 
his assistanca on Point Wast? 




BY MR. BARBAOORO: (Rasuming) 
Q Did you discuss Point Wast wlth^^^^^^^H O 
whan ha was down thara with Polndaxtar for that trip in 



llfiCraFIED 



340 



'Miumi 



105 

1 Oecembar? 

2 A There wasn't enough time on that trip to even 

3 discuss the really important things. 

2 

4 Q He was there only for a few hours. 

5 A Please, if I may give you an appreciation 

6 about everything we are discussing here, Tom asked me, 

7 Tom Wilson asked me some time back how much did all this 

8 represent in terms of — I'm talking about the air drops, 

9 I'm talking about the ai^^strip ~ what did this 

10 rcprjBsent in the totality of your work. About one 

11 percent of my time. 

12 So when you're asking questions, asking me to 

13 recall dates, there has to be something associated with 

14 it because, believe me, if I had 15 minutes withHHHl 

15 wouldn't even have bothered asking about Point West, 

16 because it really didn't mean anything to me in terms of 

17 the much more important issues and problems that we had 
with the oveijall^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ell of the other 

20 operations that we had going at the time. 

21 Q When do you first recall discussing Point west 

Withf^HH Cm 

23 A 1 think it was at headquarters, and I can't 

24 possibly remember the date. It could have been late '85; 

25 it could have been early '86. I don't know how it came 



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iimmiBB 



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^ 



out, but^^^B '''*"^^°'^*^ Point West and I said yeah, you 
know. It's under construction or whatever it was. ^ 

Q Who brought up Point West, you <3i^ ^^^H 

A I don'l^i,recall. 

Q Did ^^^H appear to )cnow about it? 

A Oh, yes. Oh, definitely. 

Let me bring up another name because it adds 
to the totality of impression in my mind as to the level 
of knowledge about Point West. As you mentioned earlier. 
North and his family came to spend a few days with me and 
my family on a completely personal trip. At the end .— 
forgive me if I interject some humor here — North and I 
had gone toflH^|^|H^^Bhave him brief my staff on the 
ovarii Washington view of the Nicaraguan situation. 
We left from there and vm went out to the 
airport, where we were supposed to meet our wives and the 
children, and my wife had taken his wife downtown for 
shopping at the artsy-craftsy things. And the schedule 
was that they were to leave at 1:30 on General Calvin's 
aircraft. It's a MATS flight where there is space 
available. And General Galvin was flying Hm^^^HH^ 
to Atlanta, and the Norths were going to board 
ind get off, of course, at Atlanta, which he 
was entitled to. 

So the arrangement was to meet at the airport. 




liltfiSStfitD 



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limmaB 



107 



1 and, sure enough, we got there and the General was 

2 waiting and they were loading the luggage and my wife 

3 doesn't show up for 3 minutes, for 40 minutes, 60 

4 minutes. The engines are turning. And we are, the 

5 Ambassador, General Galvin, Colonel North and myself are 

6 sitting in the executive section of the airplane and, of 

7 course, I am extremely nervous, upset. My wife is 

8 holding up a four-star general, et cetera. 

9 But during that conversation, during the time 

10 we were together. Colonel North gave General Galvin and 

11 updated briefing on Point West and the Ambassador chiming 

12 in and so forth. Z was an observer. I wasn't asked for - 

13 any opinion, and North just simply told him what the 

14 status of it was. 

15 MR. LIMAN: So it was a widely^held, closelyi^ 

16 guarded secret? 

17 (Laughter.) 

18 THE WITNESS: Yes. And the end of the story 

19 is finally that my wife showed up and we put them on the 

20 plane, but they forgot their passports. So when they 

21 arrived in Atlanta immigration gave them a hard time. 

22 MR. LIMAN: That wouldn't stop Oliver North. 

23 (Laughter.) 

24 . THE WITNESS: No, it did not. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Probably some immigration officers 



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UNiAS«D 



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1 have baen fired. 

2 (Laughter.) 

3 THE WITNESS: That was what Tom wanted(> to 

4 remind me, that there was this impression on my part that 

5 this was an accepted undertaking, an acknowledged 

6 undertaking. 

7 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

8 Q When did you meet Rafael Quintero? 

9 A When that engineer and that soil specialist 

10 cane down to do the survey on the field. 

11 Q Did North give you any advance warning he 

12 would be coming down? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Did he explain who he was, what his 

15 relationship was to this operation? 

16 A He said I will put my hand in the fire for 

17 this fellow. That's what he said. 

18 MR. LIMAN: Really? Literally he said that? 

19 THE WITNESS: Literally. 

20 MR. LIMAN: Had you heard of Quintero before? 

21 THE WITNESS: No. Later, of course, I was 

22 reading Peter Maas' book Manhunt, which I'd just pick up 

23 for, you know, entertainment during ablutions, right, and 

24 I saw the name and I almost choked, until I read it. You 

25 know, he acted in a responsible way, given the 



\mmm 



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UNCiASSm 



109 



1 circumstances ha was In. 

2 But I really did depend on the hand in the 

3 fire reconunendation. 

4 BY MR. BASBAOORO: (Resuming) 

5 Q What was Quintero's role in the construction 

6 of the ai£3t'^iP' 

7 A He was the project manager. He was the guy 

8 that, you know, got ^^^^^^^^H to get the bulldozer and 

9 paid the whatever it was. He never told me about 

10 specj.fically how much it was costing, except he 

11 constantly lamented of the fact that he thought the Costa 

12 Rican was ripping them off, which, you know, is the cost 

13 of doing business there. 

14 Q Did he mention the name of the company that he 

15 was working for? 

16 A No. 

17 Q Did you ever hear Udall mentioned? 

18 A After the photo opportunity at the White 

19 House, that afternoon was the first afternoon I heard 

20 that nam*. 

21 Q Okay. Is that the meeting with Secord? 

22 A That's correct. 

23 Q Okay. We'll get to that in a minute. How 

24 frequently was Quintero down there when the construction 

25 project was going on? 



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UIWISSIIIED 



110 



i 

11 A H« mad* — oh, I don't know — nor* than fiv«, 

I 2 probably less than ten, trips. 

; 3 Q Did he meet with you while he was down there? 

4 A He'd check in with me. Sometimes he came in 

5 and we'd talk on the phone. Sometimes we'd get together 

6 for breakfast either on the way in or on the way out. 

7 Q Did he update you on the progress of the air- 

8 strip? 

9 A (Nods in the aff iniative. ) Well, more or 

10 less. Frankly, you know, update means that I am 

11 interested and I ask appropriate questions. Frankly, _ I 

12 didn't have that much interest in knowing what they were 

13 up to. you know, I didn't really care. It's a strange 

14 thing. 

15 Q This was to be the air-strip to resupply 

16 the southern front troops. Weren't you concerned about 

17 it? 

18 A I never believed that the thing would ever get 

19 off the ground. Okay? I never believed it, frankly. 

20 Q Why not? 

21 A Why not? Because it was a damn near 

22 impossible situation. The isolation of the place. How 

23 are you going to keep people there? How do you transport 

24 pilots and mechanics? Where do you get the fuel from? 

25 You couldn't get a 55-gallon drum of fuel into Costa Rica 

tRl 




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111 

b«cau8« It's a controlled material. It would have to be 
floated up on a barge from one of the Pacific coast 
ports. 

They were going to fly in and they eventually 
did fly in some gasoline up there. To me, for a clean 
operation, unless it was a CIA air operation project 
where you have the expertise and it's not a Mickey Mouse, 
half-baked, maybe it's done this way or maybe it gets 
done that way, but where you go in with a plan and, you 
know, you put down a strip and it's going to work because 
you've got the kind of people that will make it work. 
What did we have here? We hadj 
who was acting probably only himself — 

Q 

A 




When Quintero came down he was telling me all 
about th« problems he was havingJ^^^^^^^H frankly 
could care less. Okay? 1 say all that and probably the 
record will look like that maybe I had more interest or 
maybe others might say I had more interest. Well, even if 



mmm 



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•mussm 



112 



you aslc Quintaro h«'d say oh, yaah. But lat ma tall you 
I was rol«playing, borna out by tha fact that thay navar 
did gat th« airstrip flnlshad. 

Tha thing was lavalad and gradad, or it was 
just lavalad but navar fully gradad. And whan tha rainy 

6 saason cam* and it startad to com* apart, tha work thay 

7 had dona, it was a poorly constructad thing bacausa that 

8 straam bad, it *rod*d part of th* air strip. Thay navar 

9 got what thay — tb* Icind of adninistrativ* s*tup that 

10 could hav* mad* th* thing work. 

11 And th*n, finally, whan Prasidsnt Arias v^ 

12 *l*ct*d and than inauguratad and ha said no to tha usa of 

13 tha strip, it bacaaa a non-jissua. , 

14 Q Didn't you go out to visit tha strip aftar 

15 construction had bagun on it? 

16 A No. 

17 Q So you had baan at that strip ona tima? 

18 A On tha ground ona tima. X flaw ovar it a 
19 
20 
21 tha ground onca. 

2 2 Q By tha point at which Quintaro startad coming 

2 3 down thara ragularly and startad working on tha 
2 4 construction of tha airjtrip you must hava known that 
25 this was not going to ba a CIA airstrip, didn't you? 



coupla tiaas^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 



IMWmiED 



048 



mjmm 



113 



1 A I still had hopes, but I knew that if it was 

2 ever to be a CIA airstrip CIA would have to come in and 

3 either finish the job or correct what had been done. 

4 Q What did you understand these people to be 

5 doing out there? 

6 A Leveling, clearing a 6| 000-foot runway, 120- 

7 foot wide. 

8 Q For what purpose? 

9 A For the eventual use by CIA-contracted FDN 

10 aircraft. Did I know? Yes. And/or private benefactor 

11 aircraft. 

12 Q So by December of *85 you had an idea that- 

13 there was a possibility there might be a private 

14 benefactor use of this air strip? 

15 A Ko, not by December. Maybe a little later. 

16 Mayb* by January, but not December. That thing really 

17 hadn't gotten to the stage yet. I don't even think they 

18 got th« bulldozer in by December. They might have. 

19 Now let me explain something else to you to 

20 giv« you an example of my concerns. Quintero one day -- 

21 oh, excuse me. The DEA office in the Embassy called me 

22 and said, look, we've got a call from the airport 



2 3 authorities that they are holding a fellow out at the 
24 airport that fit/their drug stereotype profile and that 
2 5 he was taken into a room and questioned and searched and 



iCaSSIFIED 



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UNGUSSiEii 



114 



1 no drugs w«ra found. 

2 But they started to go through his brlsfcas* 

3 and this was somstlme, I gusss, in April. Y«s, it would 

4 havs b««n April, April or so. Thsy startsd going through 

5 his brisfcass and ha stopped them and ha said, please 

6 call this telephone number, and it was my number^^^^^H 

7 ^^^^^^^H And the airport authorities, instead of calling 

8 that number, called the DEA office and said, loo)c, would 

9 you check this out, and they called ma. 

10 And so they gave me the name and I said yeah, 

11 I know this fellow and that, as far as I know, he's okay. 

12 So X mat with him after that and said why did they stop 

13 you, and ha said wall, because Z was carrying $5^000 in 

14 cash for the usa of paying bills and materials and so 

15 forth. And Z said, wall, that's no problem. You know, 

16 people can carry, vrhat story did you give them? He 

17 said, I waa a cattle buyer. 

18 Okay. And ha said, but whan thay started 

19 going through the briefcase I didn't want them to see 

20 what I had, and I said well, what was that. And with 

21 that ha hands ma anvelopaa, brown manlla envelopes, the 

22 White House, with photographs of the photo opportunity 
with^^^^^^^^^Hand the myself my 

24 wife with the President. 

25 And he said I felt that if the airport 



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350 



UimSSiEIED 



lis 



1 authorities see that, you know, that that would raise a 

2 whole lot of other questions. I said, all right. 

3 Now you can see that these people are not at 

4 all professional. 

5 Q Who was this? 

6 A Quintero. 

7 Q Quintero, and that had to be after March, 

8 right? 

9 A Oh, yeah. March was when the thing took 

10 place. That's why I said it was probably April. 

11 So one of the things he asked for was, he 

12 says, can you help me get through the airport when X eome 

13 back because I don't want these people -- oh, they 

14 apparently took his briefcase. They apparently took the 

15 money into another room and they counted the money or — 

16 no, they took the money into the room and when they 

17 returned it to hin, I asked him, I said, did you count 
13 that money? 

19 He said, well, I gave it a quick look and, he 

2 says, t think they took a couple of hundred dollars from 

21 the money. And I said, well, I think you probably did 

2 2 well with that. 
2 3 (Laughter.) 

24 And the other thing he requested was some kind 

25 of identification or ID, a good guy letter — that's my 



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UNCUSSIHED 



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t«r» — •© that h« could g«t through th« airport without 
being has hassled again if it's anothsr craw on duty< of 
airport authorities on duty. 




■This fellow is 
of good reputation, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, et 
cetera, of good reputation, et cetera, and I gave him 
this letter. 

He also asked for 




decided that the letter was sufficient and I destroyed 
the ID. I never gave it to hia. 

One other matter is that he had in his 
briefcase a little cassette for the KL-43 that I had, the 
Secret/NOFORH, which North had also given him. 

Q Tell me about North's visit in February. He 
brought his family with him? 

A Yeah. I invited him down here, so, you )cnow, 
our families could get together. I )cnew or I sensed that 



UNCreiflEO 



352 




117 

1 he was under a great deal of stress, as I was, and 

2 together with our wives and the children we decided to 

3 take three or four days off, and he was able to catch 

4 military flights at that time. So it worked out well. 

5 And we also had an agreement with our wives 

6 that there would be no business discussed during that 

7 period, and there wasn't. 

8 Q Did you go to the beach? 

9 A Yep. We went to the beach and the only thing 

10 we talked about was the families, our hopes, dreams, his 

11 experiences in southeast Asia, mine with the Agency. 

12 Q You didn't discuss what that air field was- 

13 going to be used for? 

14 A No. Really we didn't discuss it at all. 

15 Yeah, the airfield is being constructed, but that's all. 

16 At some point — and I don't think it was then — he said 

17 he wanted the Agency to pick up the tab on the air field, 

18 but I can't say if it was then or not. 

19 Q Wasn't that much later in maybe the summer of 

20 '86? 

21 A I don't know. I remember that he made that 

22 comment about them picking up the tab on the aii^field. 

23 Q Did he express any interest in going to see 

24 the air~field when he was down there in February? 

25 A No, and I wouldn't have let him either. 



mmfm 



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UNCLASSIFIE 



SECRET/CODEWORD 118 

1 Q vniy not? 

2 A Because I don't thin)c — you know, having 

3 Oliver North, who weM well )uiown to the Sandinistas, 

4 running around northern Costa Rica. No. The fact that 

5 we were together. He was with us within the context of a 

6 family activity to the beach, back^^^^^^^^^and home 

7 was enough. I don't even think he ever expressed an 

8 interest in going up there. 

9 Q At that point had there been any discussions 

10 up t9 that point, at any time, with North about private 

11 benefactors? 

12 A I think you need to say more. In what sertse? 

13 Q Had there been any discussions about how these 

14 contras in southern Nicaragua were going to be supplied 

15 by February of '86? 

16 A I don't remember any specifically. He never 

17 talked about who the benefactors were or what kind of 

18 money we're talking about. I mean, he really didn't, and 

19 I'm grateful for it. Tell me about his business, okay? 

20 And I think he probably knew I didn't want to know. 

21 Q Did you tell him in January of '86 that the 
2 2 agreement had been reached with the southern front 

2 3 commanders of UNO? 

24 A Oh, that was a matter of regular Intel 

25 reporting and he would have received all of the Intel, 

1 




354 





119 

1 intelligence, disseminated intelligence reports from all 

2 of the activity. 

3 Q Did you have any discussions with him about 

4 that? 

5 A Oh, sure, about all of the political things, 

6 you know, but during that beach trip, no. We really 

7 religiously tried to avoid shop talk. The wives insisted 

8 on it. 

9 Q Okay. Let's move away from the beach trip. 

10 In January of '86 this agreement was signed and these 

11 commanders went back into Nicaragua. At this point you 

12 knew an air strip was under construction and that someone 

13 was putting up money for the construction of this air 

14 strip. 

15 Did you have any thought that the same people 

16 who were putting up the money for the air_jtrip might be 

17 willing to put some money to supply the southern front 

18 forces? 

19 A Thoughts like that didn't occur to me. Let me 

20 try to explain it this way. At some point somebody asked 

21 ma, either the IG or the Tower Commission — I guess it 

22 was the Tower Commission — did North ever tell you about 

23 Project Democracy, and I said he used that term, what 

24 did it mean to you? And I said I understood it to be 

25 that kind of generic term like patriotic Americans that 



mSSfflED 



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120 

1 he used when he was referring to support for the 

2 Nicaraguan resistance, that these were good Americans who 

3 were willing to put up money in various quantities for 

4 the support that these people needed to attain their 

5 objectives. 

6 To me, then, when you're talking about the air^ 

7 strip or that they were obtaining lethal supplies, to me 

8 it all came out of the same pot. I didn't differentiate 

9 it. I didn't )cnow Udall, and I didn't know what other 

10 entities there were. You know, I'm reading the 

11 newspapers now. I've got a fairly good idea. None o,f 

12 that was ever said to me by Oliver North, that there was 

13 this or there was that or that money for this was going 

14 for that. 

15 He would refer occasionally to Project 

16 Democracy. I thought it was sort of like the term he 

17 would us* for the all-American effort. I mean, he could 

18 have used any term like that and that's the way I 

19 interpreted it. I didn't know that it meant a specific 

20 thing. Okay? 

21 So I can understand where you're coming from 

22 with your question. The problem I have — and it almost 

23 sounds a little naive — well, didn't you know that 

24 thing? Well, no. I understood that these were people 

25 who on the on* hand they would put up money to build this 



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1 air__strip; on the other, they might be giving an airplane 

2 or something to the FDN. 

3 Okay? 

4 Q As a United States Government representative 
^^^^^^^^^^^^Hdid you a responsibility for the 

6 southern front troops that were sent into southern 

7 Nicarasgua? 

8 A Of course. 

9 Q Were you concerned about how they were going 

10 to b^ supplied? 

11 A I was concerned that they be supplied. I 

12 didn't care who supplied them. These people were being 

13 decimated and their existence not necessarily for our 

14 purposes, which was U.S. policy objectives, but for their 

15 own survival as human beings, required that they at least 

16 have something to defend themselves with, that they have 

17 the wherewithal to withstand the attacks of the people 

18 inside, the attacks of the Sandinistas. 

19 Let me tell you there is another aspect to 

2 this which I don't think I have seen properly addressed 

21 either in the press or dealing with the whole problem of 

22 the southern front during this cutoff period. We found a 
2 3 direct correlation between the activities of abuses — 

24 and I am talking about very serious abuses — by the 

25 Sandinistas against the civilian populace when there was 



UmilSIFIED 



357 




1 a i l lii ii <liiii«ii « nf activity on the part of tha resistance 

2 forces inside, as though the Sandinistas would then feel 

3 confident that they could go out, you know, take names, 

4 and — 

5 Q X understand what you are saying. 

6 A Now, so there was not only a concern for the 

7 people who were under arms; there was also a concern for 

8 the civilian population in the southern part of 

9 Nicaragua. The north might have been a different story, 

10 but In the southern part of Nicaragua there was this 

11 concern that when the resistance didn't have the arms 

12 that the civilian population suffered inordinate abuses. 

13 So there was obviously a moral imperative at 

14 work here on my part that when or, rather, after I had 

15 persuaded these people for" political reasons to return 

16 back to southern Nicaragua to carry the fight inside, 

17 while it may have served my own reasons to get them out 
^^^^^^H^fand the neutral territory, that they 

19 done so on the basis of my persuasion that the funds 

20 would be coning forth from Congress. 

21 There was also the moral imperative that once 

22 I sent them back in that the people inside, the civilian 

23 population, might be affected as well. Okay? Now, faced 

24 with that, when Oliver North said in early '86 that he 

25 was prepared to send a full flight load in of lethal 

Icq 



358 



NOASmiEO 



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1 material I said, well and that h« asked me to handle the 

2 coordination in terms of getting the drop zones and the 

3 information from the commanders. 

4 I said I will do that. I will take that 

5 responsibility. Mr. Barbadoro, I didn't ask Director 

6 Casey. I didn't ask Clair George. I didn't askJ^^H C^ 
1 I^^^H I didn't ask anybody. I made that decision on my 

8 own to accept his offer. 

9 Now once I did that, because I realized that 

10 this, Larry, Moe and Curley operation, from having seen 

11 the way they handled the air-strip, X did send a cable to 

12 headquarters and I said the resistance forces are 

13 expecting to receive from private benefactors a load of 

14 arms, an air load of arms, and I asked for flight 

15 information, flight path information, risk of hostile 

16 forces, radar coverage — the whole nine yards — and 

17 headquarters sent it to me not once but several times. 

18 And nobody at headquairters came to me and said 

19 tell me about how this is all working out, how are the 

20 southern resistance commanders inside? They didn't ask 

21 any logical clearly understandable questions like how are 

22 ^ the commanders inside getting the information about the 
2 3 drop zones and the timing of the flight to the delivery 
24 people, who by then I understood were ^^^^^^^^^^| 

2 5 Nobody asked, and when they sent down this 



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Pnobody 

asked for that flight how are the commanders in the field 
getting that information to the benefactors. 

I volunteered that at a later date and we'll 
get into that as we go along. 

Q When did he first offer this lethal resupply? 

A Hold my feet to the fire, but it was January, 
January or February — and it didn't happen until April 
because their planes couldn't make it, aborts. You know, 
for the flight there must have been six aborts. I didn't 
keep track or count, but it was a horrendous record. 
I mean, it was send the information about 
where the drop zone is and start a novena. That's the 
way it ran. 

(Laughter. ) 

Q Did you have any discussion with North during 
the January discussion about whether this proposed lethal 
resupply flight was legal? 

A Yes, oh, yes. 

Q Tell me what you remember about that. 



yWfiSSiflED 



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yfwnD 



125 



1 A And about what am I doing is legal. Is that 

2 legal, Ollie? And he'd say yeah, you are passing 

3 information. You are just passing information. You are 

4 not coordinating. You are not running a military 

5 operation. You are passing information; is that clear? 

6 You are just passing information. 

7 I said, fine, as long as that's the case, then 

8 that's all I need to know. 

9 Q Did he say anything about having legal 

10 opinions on the subject? 

11 A No, but I had, because we had been told at 

12 some point — I think it was December '8S when we had a 

13 meeting ^^^^^H of the COSs — that we were permitted to 

14 share information with the contras. Oh, yeah, the other 

15 aspect is — and Tom just brought this to my attention — 

16 is that part of that shading of information, as I 

17 understood it from^^^B was that we were permitted to 

18 share information which could be used for the secure 

19 delivery of lethal equipment and materials. 

20 Is that correct, sir? 

21 Q What dic^^H| say that led you to understand 

22 that? 

2 3 A The secure delivery. That meant 

24' communications, secure communications. That meant other 

25 things involved in the secure delivery of materiel and 



mSSIFIE 



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126 

1 that cam* out of an agreement worked between the House 

2 and the Senate as a result of the S27 million and the $3 

3 million communications provision. 

4 Q Who gave you that understanding? 

6 Q When? 

7 A I don't know. Certainly during this period. 

8 Oh, here's a good point. I triad to be as close to the 

9 letter and spirit of the law as I possibly could. My 

10 officers will tell you that time and time again I 

11 cautioned then about th« whole issue of what can we do, 

12 how far can we go within the restrictions of the Boland 

13 Amendment and all of the attendant other Agency- imposed 

14 qualifications of that restriction. 

15 There were times when some things were very 

16 easy — I mean, to be able to handle. There were times 

17 when it really as a close call and I had to go back to 

18 headquarters. Let ne give you an example of one. 

19 When we were allowed to provide communications 

20 training and communications equipment, specifically 

21 HHjHjHradios, for the resistance fighting inside, and 

22 that of course was one of the things that we were able to 

23 provide to the commanders who signed the agreement in 

24 January, part of the things that they carried back in 
with them wree the^H^^Hradios, onef-time pads, as 



25 




362 




127 

1 well as we trained a couple of them so that they could 

2 train others inside. 

3 Well, we had the occasion about the sane 

4 period, early January, when we were going to send in some 

5 Miskito Indians along the Atlantic coast and we had 

6 trained them and given them radio equipment to take in 

7 with them. Not only that. We purchased with 

8 humanitarian funds the boats and motors so that they 

9 could take the medical supplies and the radios in. 

10 They came back to us and they said, hey, wait 

11 a minute. You expect us to go up here along the Atlantic 

12 coast at least 100 miles into Nicaraguan territory 

13 without guns. How are we supposed to defend ourselves or 

14 how are we supposed to protect the radio equipment that 

15 you just gave us to take inside, plus the one'ftime pads 

16 and the other thing? I said, well, good question. 

17 I went back to headquarters and I asked them 

18 the question, and they came back and they said well, no, 

19 we can't provide them with weapons even if they are for 

20 defensive purposes, but why don't you suggest to them 

21 that they contact Negro Chamorro and ask him if they will 

22 lend, if Negro will lend the Indians some weapons so that 

23 they can carry them back in. 

24 I thought that was a very Solomonic decision. 

25 It was a judicious decision on their part to avoid the 



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1 question and yet settle the problem. Now we tried that. 

2 We followed that practice as much as we could. It wasn't 

3 always simple. The questions at times were difficult, 

4 but we did the best we could. 

5 Q Let me move to a different subject. 

6 A And let me get into one other thing, too. 

7 Q I don't mind your counsel passing you notes. I 

8 will say that if he wants to develop certain ideas with 

9 you on the record he will have a chance to ask you any 

10 questions. But go ahead, bring up the subject. 

11 A Because I think it is relevant. You need to 

12 make, or I think that the people looking into this 

13 situation need to make a judgment call on the 

14 difficulties that I was faced with in dealing with these 

15 people who were not of a professional — who were not 

16 professionals by career, and yet were trying to enter or 

17 get into areas where we had always practiced and followed 

18 certain regimens and we would not have allowed some of 

19 the things to happen that did happen, such as the 

20 problems with the airstrip and how to get through Costa 

21 Rican customs and immigration with $5|000 in their 

22 pocket, and not carrying tapes or photographs at the same 

23 time. 

24 I wantjto bring this situation up because it 

25 does impact on my personal responsibility as well as the 



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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

H 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




129 

judgmental aspects. During a discussion, and I think it 
took place some time in the spring of '36 with Quintero, 
I brought up the problem of the fact that these people 
had, the people inside, had no ability to defend 
themselves against Sandinista ambushes. 

And one of the things, from our experience, 
that would clearly have been helpful would be explosives, 
demolition! training. There were demolitions. There are 
demolitions inside of Nicaragua and the resistance forces 
inside can steal it or capture it, but they had no 
ability to use it. They didn't know how to use it, at 
least in terms of military usage. 

And so Quintero said that he had, he thought 
he knew somebody or had access to somebody that could 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hdo some training 

people^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 3"<^ 
said, gee, that would be a nice idea and sort of let it 
go at that. Next thing I know, I got a call or a message 
from Quintero that he was sending in someone by the name 
of Kenneth, Kenneth or Kevin, that would conduct training 
of the resistance^HH^HH of two peopl^^^^^ 

^^^|and that they in turn could train others inside 
Nicaragua. 

All right, fine. The next thing I know, I got 
a call from this Kenneth — I can't remember his last 



UimSSIFiED 



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130 

i name or even if he gave me one — and he said he was 

2 staying in room such and such at a local hotel. So he 

3 said he was there to conduct the training of these 

4 people. So I said, well, let me come over and talk to 

5 you. I would like to know something about you, what kind 

6 of person you are, fully intending only to provide an 

7 introduction — this is so and so, this is so and so — 

8 and walk away from it. 

9 Well, I went over and I found that he was a 

10 very clean-cut young man. He had several books in 

11 Spanish, Spanish language primers. He has some Spanish 

12 but not nearly enough to work with, and he had said he 

13 was making an earnest effort to improve the little that 

14 he had. 

15 I asked him about his background. He was very 

16 reserved about it. He said a military background, and 

17 that he had experience in demolitions work. He then gave 

18 ma a list of things he needed from hardware stores and so 

19 forth, and I said look, friend, I'm not going to go out 

20 to hardware stores looking. If you need this stuff for 

21 your training activity, you go out and get it, and I 

22 assume you have the money because you won't get any 

23 money from me either. 

24 So he says, okay. It will give me a chance to 

25 learn my Spanish or to improve my Spanish, and he did. 



liClSSmiED 



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UNCUSSD 



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1 Several days later he calls ne up and he says, okay, I've 

2 got all the material or I've got all of the tools and the 

3 stuff Z needed from the hardware store and they just 

4 delivered the material. I said what do you mean? What 

5 material? He said the material that I'm going to teach 

6 these people to work with. 

7 I said who delivered it? He says, I don't 
Some guy^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^H 

9 just appeared at the hotel door with this material. And 

10 I understood what he was talking about, but I didn't 

11 understand what was behind all of this. But it was clear 

12 that they were explosives that had been delivered to his 

13 hotel room. 

14 I said you stay right there. You don't leave 

15 that hotel. And I raced out of that, out of my office in 

16 virtually a state of panic because all I could envision 

17 is this Aaerican spending the next 20 years of his life 

18 in^^^^^^^^^Bjail for having a case of explosives 

19 his room. 

20 Well, I went to a phone, called the contact in 

21 the resistance and made an arrangement for him to pick up 

22 this fellow, to be introduced and pick up this fellow and 

23 to get him out of town. I went to the hotel, parked in 

24 front of the hotel in an unlicensed car, went upstairs to 

25 the room, and I told him let's pack the explosives. He 



lliraSSIFIED 



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wmmm 



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1 had two cases of commercial plast ic explosive. 

3 ^^^^H I am going to take this stuff from this room 

4 downstairs. You check out of the hotel and you meet me 

5 in my blue car outside. AnWd that's what I did. I 

6 carried — there must have been 50 pounds each case, 

7 trying to make it look like they were normal pieces of 

8 luggage, walked out, stuck them in the car, took him, 

9 made sure that we were not under surveillance, because I 

10 was convinced that this was a setup. Somehow or other 

11 this man had been discovered and somehow or other this 

12 whole operation was going to go up in smoke. 

13 And I felt that my responsibility was to it. 

14 But what I think — and I've never been able to determine 

15 this yet — 1 recall only being very mad at Quintero, but 

16 I think what they did is they brought, they somehow 

17 brought into the coxintry or obtained in-country, this 
commercial plastic explosive, and either^^^^^^^^^^H 

19 or one of his minions delivered this to this guy's hotel 

2 room. 

21 Now, you know — 

2 2 Q Where did you take the explosive? 

2 3 A I turned it over to — I mean, I carried him 

2 4 and the explosives in my car to the resistance and then 

2 5 he took it up-country and they blew it all up during the 



yifCL'CTIED 



368 





^__ 133 

1 training period. 

2 Q Did you t«ll Colonel North about this episode? 

3 A No, I don*t think so. I'm not sure that I 

4 did, no. 

5 Q Let me leave that and move to a different 

6 subject. When did you get your KL-43? 

7 A Early '86, I believe. 

8 Q Who brought it to you? 

9 A Quintero. 

10 , Q And had North told you that this would be 

11 coning down? 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q What did ha want you to use it for? 

14 A Our communications. 

15 Q Well, you were able to conaunicate with North 

16 on secure telephone. 

17 A Yeah, but that was only between 8:30 in the 

18 morning and 4:30 in the afternoon, after which! 

19 communications closes down. It wasn't available on 

20 holidays. It wasn't available on weekends and it wasn't 

21 available at night. 

22 Q The CIA didn't have its own access to a secure 

23 telephone? 

24 A Wa had another secure telephone line, but it 

25 didn't connect with North. 



U 



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1 Q Okay. So you understood that th« purpose of 

2 this 10.-43 would b« to communlcats with North? 

3 A And with Quintsro. 

4 Q What communications would you havs with 

5 Quintsro that you would have to us* a sscurs 

6 communications device? 

7 A Well, after the offer to send the lethal 

8 material in — and that was about the time — well, maybe 

9 it wasn't January; maybe it was even February — when 

10 this piece of equipment came down. 

11 Q Where was Qulntero when you would conaunicate? 

12 Z would assume it was for purposes of communicating the 

13 intelligence information and the flight information 

14 concerning the flight; la that right? 

15 A Either Miami ori 

16 Q And what was your understanding that Qulntero 

17 would do with the information once you transmitted it to 

18 hla? 

19 A Coordinate the information with the pilot and 

20 the crew that was flying the plane. 

21 Q So you would call Qulntero at either Miami or 

22 ^Hm vherever the plane was, with the Information? 

23 A No, no. Where he was. I never Jcnew that the 

24 plane was anyplace else other thaqj^H^m If he was 

25 in Miami he would communicate with his people and I 



UNWStflED 



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135 



1 didn't know who they wer«, who war* ln[ 

2 prasunably by th« sam* sacure nathod, and tall them that 

3 the commanders had this drop zona or whatever the 

4 information pertained to the operation. 

5 Q Did you ever speak directly using this device 

6 to people ati 

7 A No. Well, only to Quintero. There were only 

8 two people that I used this davic* with — Quintero and 

9 North. And I used it with Quintero when he was either at 

10 ^^^^^^1°'^ ^^ Miami, and with North only when he was in 

11 Washington and Z couldn't talk to him on the secure line. 

12 Q i^H^^^^^^^H ^^^ y°^ participate in the 

13 planning of these air drops? 

14 A No. 

15 Q Did you play any role in deciding when 

16 equipment had to be dropped, how much equipment had to be 

17 dropped, whara It had to ba dropped? 

18 A Please understand that neither the station nor 

19 I, nor avan tha communications canter or the remnants of 

20 tha little support staff that the armed resistance hac^^ 

21 ^^^^^^m had any influence or control over what was 

22 happening inside. The commandara ware autonomous. They 

23 decided tha targets they vara going to have. They 

24 decided what their situation waa and they told us we can 

25 take a delivery within the next 48 hours or the next 24 




371 




136 



1 hours or, as happened on occasion, thsy had a dalivsry 

2 scheduled within 24 hours and they said we can't; we are 

3 being pursued. We have to change, will advise you. 

4 Being pursued by the Sandinistas. 

5 They picked the time and the schedule, and as 

6 far as location is concerned they would give us a 

7 location where they thought they were. When the aircraft 

8 got into the area, they night be seven, eight Jcilometers 

9 away because they weren't able to read maps. They would 

10 say,' we are, say, three kilometers from the bend in the 

11 river. 

12 Well, they wouldn't know or they didn't 

13 realize that there was a bend in the river that 

14 topographically or from the air looked identical to the 

15 bend in the river where they were. So they couldn't even 

16 give us map coordinates. 

17 And I want to try to answer the last part of 
IS your question. Toward the end, in September, what we did 

was^HH^^H working the resistanc^^^^^^^^^J 

20 was to pick out this bend in the river (indicating), and 

21 then we'd figure out the coordinates or the resistance ■■ 

22 ^^^^^^H would figure out the coordinates and the 

communications center^^^^^^^^ the 

24 communications center, would tell the commanders, all 

25 right, this is — when you go to this spot, walk in a 



l||#^iH^^!rn 



yi'il»L»)»fOi8i iUJ- 



372 




137 

1 northwest direction three kilometers and then this way 

2 (indicating) . 

3 Then that's where the thing will be, and then 

4 there would be an alternate. But that waf done because 

5 the equipment kept getting lost or the commanders inside 

6 would give the wrong place. So in terms of what input 
was^^^^^^HJ^I that was the only input. the 

8 private benefactors who told us when and what they were 

9 delivering and when they were going to deliver it. 

10 ^ We had no control over that. We couldn't even 

11 call it off. 

12 Q So it's your testimony that you didn't 

13 participate in the planning but you were simply given 

14 information as to when, where, what, was being dropped? 

15 A That's correct. That's correct. 

16 Q Was it your objective to create a 2|500-inan 

17 force? 

18 A I would like to respond to that with the 

19 answer that X prepared in response to the appearance of 

20 that question in the Tower Commission, if you will permit 

21 me. 

22 Q Sure. 

23 A I don't know what the exact terms are, but the 

24 reference to my message to Korth is on page C-8, right 

25 side of the page, which quotes, in part, "My objective is 



NctraiD 



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IINIMSBD 



138 



1 th« craation of a 2;500-man force which can strike 

2 northwest and link up with Quiche to form solid southern 

3 force." My comment fs as follows. 

4 The portion of the April 12, 1986 message 

5 which mentions the creation of a 2^500-man force reflects 

6 a poor choice of words on my part and needs explanation. 

7 First, the message should be understood in the context of 

8 an informal communication and, as such, was written in an 

9 ofttianded style. It was obviously not meant to be 

10 anything more than a simple direct expression of an 

11 ideal, perhaps unattainable, situation. 

12 Secondly, in a more appropriate choice of 

13 words I might have cited the expectation of the southern 

14 front commanders, whose views I was essentially 

15 representing as my own, and the exhortation that all of 

16 USG and resistance elements pull together in support of 

17 the southern front, including the NSC. 

18 For the record, the message represented a bit 

19 of brainstorming and I subsequently wrote an identical 

20 cable to headquarters in a a6s£f channel message. The 

21 existence of this cable was made known to the Office of 

22 the Inspector General and I used exactly those terms with 

23 exactly the same proposition, that bring the FDN force 
2 4 operating at the northern part of southern Nicaragua 
25 together with the southern front. 



omsstfiED 



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ONMSm 



139 



1 Q You have just read verbatim from notes that 

2 you prepared earlier on this subject? 

3 A Immediately after the Tower report was issued. 

4 Q And those notes that you read from there are 

5 essentially your response to several things, several 

6 inaccuracies in the Tower report? 

7 A Yep. 

8 Q Would you be willing to give us a copy of 

9 that? 

10 KR. WILSON: Well, these were prepared for us, 

11 Paul, for the lawyers' use. 

12 MR. BARBAOORO: But ha has used it to refresh 

13 his recollection. Ha has also read soma parts verbatim 

14 into the record. Certainly under the rules I would be 

15 entitled to it and I may push it, but I will just ask you 

16 now would you be willing to glva it to us. 

17 MR. WILSON: Wa don't hava any object ion. 
13 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

19 Q Okay. 

20 A Soma of it, of course, is conceptual in terns 

21 of references that are made to the cutoff and so forth, 

2 2 and obviously things that I found interesting. There are 

2 3 some things that I think are very — that are essential 

24 to the question especially about the air-strip because 

25 they refer to things in there that are definitely 



mmm 



375 



\iiimm.s 



140 



1 inaccurate, according to my Information. 

2 Q Wall, that will b« halpful and wa can go over 

3 that latar. Lat ma mark £ha April 12 massaga that has 
baan rafarrad to as H^H^^H Exhibit S. 

5 (Tha documant rafarrad to was 

6 markad^BH^^H Exhibit Numbar 

7 for idantiflcation.) 

8 Taka a look at Exhibit 5. I think that is tha 

9 cabla that you rafarrad to in your last anawar; is that 

10 right — axcus* ma, tha KL-43 massag* that you rafarrad 

11 to? 

12 A V««. That's intaraating. I covarad a whoia 

13 gamut of things. 

14 Q Is that a copy of a massaga — and I am 

15 referring now to^H|BH| Exhibit S ~ is that a copy of 

16 a message that you sent to Colonel North on April 12? 

17 A Yes, it is. well, I don't know the data. I 

18 am accepting what is written on there. Was there a data 

19 on it? Yes, that's fine. Okay. 

20 Q And that message does use the phrase "my 

21 objectivei'^,, to begin a sentence saying "My objective is 

22 creation of a 2J500-man force." Is It your testimony 

2 3 today that when you used "my objective" that you did not 

2 4 mean my objective, that you mean to refer to the southern 

25 front commander 'W objective? 



!JN8t«|fiED 



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1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



141 

A I'll Stand by what I read from my notes in 
that within the context of representing I was 
representing the views of the commanders as well as my 
own, as my own ideal of what I would have hoped a 
situation could eventually be. It was a bit of 
brainstorming. 

Q Okay. Did I also hear you correctly that you 
sent an operational cable to CIA headquarters that used 
the phrase "my objective" in connection with the 
discussion of a 2|500-man force? 

A I was more formal, as I recall, in my cable to 
headquarters in that I probably would not have used the 
first person. I would have said the objective should be 
to have, et cetera, et cetera. 

Q Was that cable sent around the same time? 

A Maybe within the following two to three weeks. 
That's my best recollection of that. 

Q Okay. f^^^^^H Exhibit 5 also says 
plans during the next two to three weeks includes air 
drop^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 
^^^^■marltlme deliveries, NHAO supplies to same, NHAO 
supply to UNO/SOUTH, but with certified airworthy 
alrcraftA, et cetera. 

Is It your testimony that the use of the 
phrase "our plans" refers to the plans of the southern 



UmiSSIFlEO 



377 



2S 





142 

1 front coBBand«r« rath«r than your plans? 

2 A Sur«. It's ahort for tha aoutharn front 

3 position. 

4 Q I would lHta.ths naxt thrsa axhibits markad. 
Tha massaga haadad '<|H 4/15/86" is||H^^|s- 

6 (Tha docuaant rafarrad to waa 

markadHHBjI^I Exhibit Nuobar 

8 for idantiflaation.) 

9 Tha massaga haadad H^| 6/ 16/8 <" i*| 

10 7. 

XI (Tha docunant rafarrad to waa -■ 

BarkadHriHHJlExhibit Nuabar 

13 for idantification.) 

14 And tha naasaga haadad "2000 Houra, 3 Juna" 

is^i^ms. 

14 (Tha docuaant rafarrad to was 

17 aarlcad Famandaz Exhibit Nuabar 8 

U for idantification.) 

19 V Ta)ca a loolc at 6, 7, and 8, plaasa.j 

21 A I did not sand thia aaaaaga. 

22 Q You ara rafarring to Exhibit 7? 

23 A That is corract. u) 

24 KR. WILSON: Raad it carafully,^^^ 
THE WITNESS: That 'a corract. I did not aand 



HKCn^S?"^" 



ioJi! slJ 



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UNCIA»E0 



143 



1 this massage. 

2 BV MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

3 Q Did you receive it? 

4 A I do not recall ever receiving this message. 

5 MR. LIMAN: Have you seen this before? 

6 THE WITNESS: I was shown this message. I 

7 believe I was shown this message by either the IG or the 

8 Tower Commission, and in my notes I referred to this. I 

9 think I referred to it. Is this the one that's referred 

10 to where I say no way did I — no, it's the next page, 

11 next one. 

12 Ah, field officer sent another secure message, 

13 page C-8, first paragraph, right side. I will read it. 

14 Quoting from the Tower Commission Report, page C-8, "(4) 

15 Three days later the field officer sent another secure 

16 message to confirm a delivery to an airjoase in a Central 

17 American country." And my comment: the field officer 

18 they are referring to is me because it follows a previous 

19 paragraph which said, which refers to a cable I did send. 

20 End of ny comment. 

21 He tells Lieutenant Colonel Korth the delivery 

22 is loaded with ammunition for your friends. He asks 

23 Lieutenant Colonel North when and where do you want this 

24 stuff. We are prepared to deliver it as soon as you call 

25 for it. My comment to that was: I did not, as stated the 

ItEl 




379 




144 

coaaant above, Z did not sand this massaga. Furthamore, 
tha q[uaatlon askad In tha allagad massaga Impllas that I 
had control of matarlal and was praparad to dallvar it. 
It also Impllas that I had soma maans of dallvary. 

Q So that tha racord Is claar, taka a look at 

|6. Old you sand North that massaga? 
A No, I did not. 

HR. LZMAN: Is that tha massaga that you hava 
just b««n rafarrlng to? 

THE WITNESS: That's tha massaga that I was 
rafarrlng to. 

MR. LIMXN: Not 7? 

THE WITNESS: I supposa not. 

MR. LIMAN: Now look at 7. 

THE WITNESS: I did not sand this massaga. 

MR. LIMAN: You did not sand 7 aithar? 

THE WITNESS: No, and I don't ballava I 
racaivAd this massaga aithar — racaivad or sand. 

(A discussion was hald off tha racord.) 

MR. LIMAN: Lat's go back on tha racord. Wa 
ar« now rafarrlng to Exhibit 6. It Is addrassad to you, 
isn't it,||p^ 

THE WITNESS: Yas, it is. I did racalva this 
ona. I racall racalvlng this ona. 

MR. LIMAN: Do you know what tha BT at tha and 



yf!Et«SSin[D 



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UNDUSSIFIED 



145 



1 of a message means? 

2 THE WITNESS: It was Ollie's signoff. okay? 

3 Yes, it would make sense if I received it. I had looked 

4 at it because of the Tower Commission as though I had 

5 sent it. I didn't send that. It looks familiar. I 

6 would say yes, I did receive it. This one (indicating) , 

7 if I may, again — 

8 MR. LIMAN: Now look at 7, which also looks 

9 like it was sent addressed to you and signed BT, North, 

10 and read it with that in mind. 

11 (Pause.) 

12 THE WITNESS: Geez. I don't remember seeing 

13 this one. 

14 MR. LIMAN: You don't remember seeing it? 

15 THE WITNESS: Well, let me look at it and 

16 concentrate on it. 

17 (Pause.) 

18 I know we talked about that subject, the 

19 mountain leprosy. 

20 MR. LIMAN: Do you have any recollection of 

21 that message as such? 

22 THE WITNESS: Parts of it. 

23 MR. LIMAN: It's fair to say, as you sit here 
2 4 today, you cannot say definitively whether or not you 

2 5 received it? You may have and you may not have? 



IIKSrflffl 



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UNmSSI^lEO 



146 



1 THE WITNESS: G««. I want to b« totally 

2 pr«cis« with you on it. 

3 MR. LIMAK: But you either have a 

4 recollection. 

5 THE WITNESS: Soma of it looks familiar, some 

6 references look familiar, but I don't ever recall him 

^ telling ne anything about pilots and the repair people. 

8 That's the first thing that strikes me, the fact that 

9 they didn't see the zone lights. That was frequently 

10 mentioned. I mean, that wasn't the first time. 

11 I remember him saying at one point that he 

f 

12 wanted Ralph on the scene to beter handle the 

13 transaission of information from the commanders through 

14 me so that he would be right there and could talk to 

15 ^^^^^^H and come back to me. And I know I asked for the 

16 mountain leprosy medicine. That was a constant request. 

17 I would have to say that even though I don't 

18 recognize this message specifically that the contents of 

19 it, that in the contents there are things which I do 

20 rcall receiving. 

21 MR. LIMAN: All right. 

22 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) x 

23 Q Now the last one, which is ^^H^^^f Exhibit 
2 4 8. Did you sent that message to North? 

25 A Fine. This is my message. 



UNftMm 



382 




147 

1 MR. LIHAN: This is my message, h« said. Let 

2 the record reflect that he is reading the message to 

3 himself. 

4 (Pause.) 

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, I sent this message in the 

6 case of sending the two qualified men. It was apparent 

7 that the field commanders were having difficulty in 

8 either receiving the drops or something and the support 

9 staff of the resistance people^^^^^^^^Hwanted to send 

10 two "qualified — and I don't know what they mean by 

11 '•gualified"l but it just occurs to me that it was either 

12 qualified In handling communications or qualified in 

13 setting up a drop zone, and so they were prepared to send 

14 some people in for the purpose of the coordination 

15 inside. 

16 And that's all. 

17 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuaing) 

18 Q Let me ask you something about this message. 

19 The message appears to have two paragraphs to it. The 

20 first paragraph ends "Need July cassette ,HH|'* Is that 

21 the end of your message? ^\ 

22 A I never signed mine^^H first of all. 

23 Whoever wrote that message was teOclng it off the machine 

24 and simply substituted ay signoff and this other thing 

25 here (indicating). I assume that the person who received 




T^imt 



383 



148 

1 this massage -- and I don't know where this went to or to 

2 whom it went. Let me see if X can decipher it. 

3 Q Do you reftember who you sent that message to? 

4 A You see, I would have sent that to Ralph. 

5 Q Quintero you are talking about? 

6 A Yes, to Rafael Quintero. 

7 Q What looks like a second paragraph says: 

8 "From Ralph)'"\.,' Is that something that you send? 

9 A No. Let me try to explain. There were times 

10 when — and I assume that this would have been one of the 

11 occasions and this is from Ralph who told me this, thit 

12 there were occasions when he would take and relay my 

13 message to North verbatim. In other words, he'd get back 

14 on his machine and he would relay it. 

15 On occasion I received from Rafael, from 

16 Ralph, messages that North had sent him verbatim. Okay? 

17 That often happened — well, not often happened, but that 

18 happened when, for example. North couldn't get a hold of 

19 B« and he had to leave on a trip or he was going out of 

20 town or he had to go to a meeting. So he would send the 

21 message to Rafael because there were times I was out of 

22 contact with either my office or my home or he would call 

23 me late at night when it was convenient for him. 

24 And he would then relay North's message to me. 

25 I can only assume that the person who wrote this piece of 



iimmifo 



384 



miymm 



149 



1 paper received two messages. The first one I remember 

2 vnrltlng that message. The second one I don't. I assume 

3 it was from Ralph but not through me or from me. 

4 Q That's what I wanted to know. Thanks. The 

5 message, the part that you sent, says, in one part of it, 

6 the sentence begins "Even so, we are making new efforts, 

7 sending two qualified men by boat 1 July." What is that 

8 referring to? 

9 A As I said earlier, it refers to that there 

10 vara problems inside. I don't recall exactly what they 

11 were now. The people that were going In were people from 

12 the resistance support staff ^^^^^^^^H I mean, we 

13 didn't send Americans in. These were their people going 

14 in. 

15 Again, it's a question of shorthand. 

16 Q You meant they, they sending in? 

17 A Hell, most of the trips, as I recall, most of 

18 the trips of the people who went inside, such as these 

19 people hare went in with our money because they were 

20 going in on an intelligence mission, either for the 

21 purposes of intelligence collection or for coordination 

22 of intelligence information regarding the secure delivery 

23 of supplies or to carry in extra communications equipment 

24 or to carry in medicines or food and so forth, as in the 

25 case of the boat going in. 



.iMP'^ 



385 



u 




150 



1 So th«ra Is a nix back and forth b«tw««n on* 

2 thing and another. Whan I said "sanding two paopla in", 

3 mora than likaly va paid thair axpansas for gatting back 

4 insida. 

5 Q Wall, this massaga says, it follows that 

6 sentenca I read to you: '^Ona to Comoandar Gonzo, ona to 

7 Conunandar Ramon to sat up sacura drop zona area and 

8 organize reception." Are you telling ae that these 

9 people were paid by the CIX to go in and do that? 

10 . A Boy, you are putting ne on the spot. Z don't 

11 remenber, you know, in that particular case. I would^ 

12 say, hypothetically speaking, that if we were sending a 

13 support staff persod[|^^^|H^^^^Hto Gonzo and to Ramon 

14 to set up drop zone, secure and for the safe delivery, 

15 yeah, we would have paid his expenses to go inside, 

16 that's correct. That would have been a legitimate, in my 

17 estimation, a legitimate function. 

18 That was hypothetical. To give you a 

19 definitive answer, I'd have to know more, and I can't 

20 recall it from the circumstances, as they are presented 

21 there. 

22 Q I'd like to go into a new area. 

23 MR. LIMAM: I'd like to ask something. This 

24 might be something that you have covered. But during the 

25 period from, let's say, the fall of 1985 to the fall of 




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Miimm 



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'86, how oft«n would you cominunicat* with North? 

THE WITNESS: There were periods when I didn't 
talk to him for five or six weeks, and there were times 
when I would talk to him three or four times over a 
period of several days. 

MR. LILIAN: Did you have more contact with him 
than with ^^^w 

THE WITNESS: Counting cable traffic, no — 

I much more. I mean, our cable traffic was running 
"I 
approximately 1]^200 cables a month, all to the Central 

American Task Force, and, incoming 3^000-3^^100 a mon€h. 

MR. LIMAN: Were there things that you 
communicated to Nor^ that you would not have 
communicated to JH^H? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. LIMAN: Give me some Illustrations. 

THE WITNESS: When I was attempting to block 
^political moves, especially where^^H 
I were concerned, I enlisted North so that 
— and it also occurred with some of the shenanigans of 
Arturo Cruz ~ I enlisted North to be my advocate or the 
advocate of my views at the RIG. -^ 

MR. LIMAN: And why was that? ^ 




wrong. 



£ 



WITNESS: Because I believed i 
was coming from a — 




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UNei^lFIED 



152 



1 (A discussion was held off th« record.) 

2 MR. LIMAN: Back on the record. 

3 What you have just said is that there were 

4 some issues where you felt that it was important that 

5 they be aired at the RIG and that you used North as the 

6 channel to obtain that airing. Is that fair to say? 

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. And, to expand on 

8 that, that he act as an advocate for the views that I 

9 held concerning these political problems. 

10 MR. LIMAN: This may have been covered, and if 

11 it has been just cut me off. When North came down for ^ 

12 that short vacation with his wife you observed that he 

13 was a man who was tired; am I correct? 

14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

15 MR. LIMAN: He had been working very hard? 

16 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. 

17 MR. LIMAN: Did he tell you that he had been 

18 working on the hostage release problem? 

19 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

20 MR. LIMAN: Did he tell you ~ 

21 THE WITNESS: He did not say it at that time. 
2 2 MR. LIMAN: Did he tell you that he was 

2 3 hopeful of getting some money from any source for the 

24 contras? 

2 5 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

|T/| 




^. 



388 



UNCLASSIFIED 



153 



1 MR. LIMAN: Did he ever discuss with you the 

2 possibility during that visit, the possibility of getting 

3 money other than from Congress? 

4 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

5 MR. LIMAN: Now you say he didn't tell you 

6 about the hostages at that time. 

7 THE WITNESS: Correct. 

8 MR. LIMAN: When did he tell you about the 

9 hostage mission? 

10 THE WITNESS: One night here in Washington we 

11 got together for a couple of beers. 

12 MR. LIMAN: Was this while he was still at' the 

13 NSC? 

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, and he drove me back to the 

15 hotel and we were sitting in the carport of the hotel and 

16 ha told D« that Bill Bucldey had been tortured and 

17 killed. He knew that I knew Buckley. He broke down and 

18 started crying, causing me to do the same thing. It was 

19 the first Indication that I had that he was involved in 

20 any way with any hostages, the first and only indication, 

21 and that he had apparently been engaged in some effort to 

22 get Buckley released. 

23 But it was a terribly emotional moment for 

24 both of us. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Did he ever tell you that he was 

»ORD 




389 



UNCL^SSIte 



154 



ganar^ting any nonay from Iran to halp tha contraa? 

THE WITNESS: At no tina, in no way, did he 
avar, thankfully, mantion to na that ha had anything to 
do with that. Tha first tina I haard of it was when 
Attorney General Meese spoke of it in November. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he ever tell you that any of 
tha money for the contras was coning from foreign 

8 governments? 

9 THE WITNESS: No, I don't think he ever 

10 menti:oned that. I think perhaps that ^^^^^^^H ^ 

11 mentioned something, but in very vague terms, and than 

12 after the announcement by Attorney General Meese j^^^H ^^ 

13 did tell me about the mixup of the bank account 

14 instructions for the Brunei matter in the context that he 

15 was just dumbfounded at what Assistant Secretary Abrams 

16 had dona. 

17 MR. LIMAN: During this period when you were 

18 station chief was there a sense on your part that the 

19 southern front was getting shortchanged compared to the 
2 FDN? 

21 THE WITNESS: Well, you know, you are always 

22 dealing from perceptions in that. Yes, sure I did. 

23 MR. LIMAN: And I gather you identified 

2 4 yourself with the people you were working with in the 
2 5 southern front? 



mmmB 



390 



UNCLiissn 



155 



1 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 

2 MR. LZMAN: And you became their advocate? 

3 THE WITNESS: In the Cj^wefta of the Central 

4 American Task Force, yes, that's very true. 

5 MR. LIMAN: Go ahead. 

6 THE WITNESS: But then no more or no less than 

7 my counterpart 

8 BY MR. BARBAOORO: (Resuming) 

9 Q That he was being an advocate for the FDN? 

10 A You're darn right he was. 

11 Q How many resupply drops — 

12 A And we are very close friends. It's just .that 

13 it was a lot tougher and it took a lot more effort to get 

14 stuff to us and it was a lot easier to get stuff to them, 

15 and we didn't get anything except for the one flight in 

16 April until later on, and it was a matter of the FDN 

17 certainly didn't want to deliver anything to the people 

18 in the south because they wanted to take care of 

19 themselves first. 

20 So the people in the south were left, you 

21 know, to the benevolence of the private people that were 

22 connected to Ollie. 

23 Q How many resupply flights were there? 

24 A To the best of my ability there were nine. 

25 Q What did they contain, those flights? 

SECRET/CODEWORD 




mm 



391 



W4S»D 



156 



1 A Ammunition, grenades, mortar rounds, some 

2 rifles, some machine guns. 

3 Q How about humanitarian aid, non-jlethal aid? 

4 Was that also on these flights? 

5 A It was not on any of the private flights. 

6 MR. LIMAN: It was or was not? 

7 THE WITNESS: There was no non'f lethal material 

8 on any of these. 

9 MR. LIMAN: These nine flights? 

10 THE WITNESS: The private flights, not even 

11 the mountain leprosy. I never got — that all ended up 

12 at the FDN. 

13 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 

14 Q Were there flights with just humanitarian aid 

15 on it? 

16 A Yes, sent by the Nicaraguan Humanitarian 

17 Affairs Office. 

18 Q How many of those? 

19 A One or two. I think there were two. 

20 Q So during this period, January '86 until the 

21 CIA got back in the resupply business? 

22 A No, no. Wait a minute. Go back to spring of 

23 '84. 

24 Q Okay, from the spring of '84 until the CIA got 

25 back in there were elev«n? 




392 



WMMH 



157 



1 A Excus* m«. L«t n« avan clarify that Dor*. 

2 From th« sprln? of '84 until January 24, 1987, tha only 

3 supplies that raachad thasa paopla vara tha humanitarian 

4 suppllas, ona or two flights, and tha nlna flights of 

5 lathal agulpmant dallvarad by tha prlvata sourcas. The 

6 monay was approved and In CIA's hands, and this Is a sore 

7 point, Mr. Llman, on October 24, 1986, physically In 

8 their hands. The first resupply flight to reach those 

9 people was January 24, 1987 — three months later. 

10 Q Approximately how many people were out In the 

11 field then? 

12 A Now? 

13 Q No, back then in '86. 

15 Q Were these flights enough to supply them? 

16 A Oh, no. 

17 g Are you in a position to estimate the value of 

18 the lethal assistance that was given to them? 

19 A Z have no idea. Z don't even know what a 

20 bullet's worth. 

21 Q Was any record made of what was going to them 

22 as far as lethal assistance? 

2 3 A Whenever a drop was made the commanders, as 

2 4 you will sea in one of those reports, prepared an 

25 inventory which he radioed in on his one+time pad, and 



393 



UNCLASSra 



158 



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2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
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12 
13 
14 
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2S 



that constituted th« •ss«nc« of a dlsssamlnatad 
intalllganca raport, so avary drop had an intalliganca 
raport sant to Washington. 

Q So from thosa intalliganca raports wa could 
raconstruct axactly how much lathal assistanca was givan 
to tham? 

A How much thay actually racaivad. 

MR. LIMAN: How much thay racaivad if thara 
was a drop that hit than? 

THE WITNESS: That's right. Thara was ona 
casa whara a drop of savan-soma bundlas was navar 
racovarad. It want into tha rain forast and thay navar 
found it. 

BY MR. BARBAOORO: (Rasuning) 
Q In March you and your wifa anc 
and his wifa want to Washington saa tha Prasidant. 




394 



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159 

th« actual — th«"pliO«r feJpUtliity, that was handled, as 
I understand it. Admiral Poindextar surrendered five 
minutes of his morning briefing time. 

Q Who arranged that, do you know? Was it North? 

A It was either North or Poindexter or both. 




Q Was that visit with the President made to 
fulfill Poindexter 's promise in December when he told 
^^^■about meeting with the President? 

was think, ^^^^^^^^^H the 
combination of a dreaa. You know, he considers the 
President — he has great admiration for the President. 

Q After you came out of the photo session with 
the President^HH^^H was at the White House, wasn't 
he? ^ 

A H« was in the outside area there. 

Q Had that been arranged between the two of you 
that he would be there? 



N 




SSWED 



395 



ikASSffl 



160 



1 Q W«r« you surprised to sa« him thara? 

2 A No. 

3 Q Was thara any maatlng — 

4 A Ha was awara of whara wa vara going to ba at 

5 that tima. ^ 

6 Q Haa thara any maating with ^^^faf tar this 

7 photo opportunity? 

8 A Not a maating in th« sans* of — thara at tha 

9 Whita Housa? 

10 ' Q Yas. 

11 A No.^l^Bautographad a pictura book I 

12 ^^^Bwhlch ha had also givan tha Prasidant. Ha brought 

13 four of tham — ona forHHf^ ona for North, ona for 

14 Poindaxtar, and ona for tha Prasidant. And ha had 

15 prasantad it to tha Prasidant, tha pictura book to the 

16 Prasidant, but hadn't yat autographed it or dedicated it. 

17 So whan va laft h* dedicated ona of tha other three 

18 copies he had outside and I think the secretary carried 

19 it into the Oval Office and then brought out the blank 
2 one and left the other one. 

21 He then went, dedicating each of the remaining 

22 three and he handed one to^B^Hand he handed one to 

23 Colonel North and we stood around for about ten or 

24 fifteen minutes waiting for Admiral Poindexter to come 

25 back to finish, I guess, his briefing, and so we chatted 



mmm 



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161 

thara — if that can be called a meeting. Nothing of any 
substance was said. 

Then, when Admiral Poindexter came back, 
Colonel North, Admiral Poindexter^^^^Hand I went into 
Admiral Poindexter 's office where the Admiral and] 
[had an exchange 




Nothing concerning 
the air_strip, resupply — to anticipate your question — 
or Anything else was conducted at that time. 
Q Thank you for saving m« the tin*. 
(Laughter.) 

Tell me about your meeting with Secord that 
day. 

A Either before or after this — I guess it was 
after — when we broke up after the meeting with 
Poindexter, our wives had already gone on shopping and 
North said to^^^^I want you to meet with someone this 
afternoon. His name is Secord. He will be coming by 
your hotel and I took the liberty of setting it up for, 
what was it, 2:00, 3:00, whatever it was. 

He would like to meet with you about the air^ 
strip. 

Q Was this the first time you heard Secord 's 



name mentioned? 



HMflED 



397 



mmmm 



162 



1 A Y«a. 

2 Q Did you racogniza tha nana whan It waa 

3 mantionad? 

4 A From tha book, yaah. 

5 Q From what book? 

6 A FroB tha book "Manhunt(\j/ I don't think North 

7 had evar mantionad it baforahand or — I'm trying to 

8 think now. But that's daflnitaly tha first tima that it 

9 mada an imprassion on aa. 

10 ' Q That you aasociatad Sacord in any way with tha 

11 airjitrip or tha raaupply? 

12 A That's corract. That's my imprassion. I 

13 maan, I might ba wrong, but that's tha only tima that — 

14 that's tha first tima I think I haard it. And thara is a 

15 curious thing. I mantionad this to tha Towar Commission. 

16 For soma raason, as Z haard North talkingf 
^^^HHz hava tha imprassion that^^^falraady knaw 

18 somathing about Sacord, who Sacord was, or that thay had 

19 discussad it bafora, bacausa ha immadiataly sort of yes, 

20 sura, instaad of aaying who is ha. You know, it's as 

21 though it had alraady baan aort of arrangad and ha was 

22 just finally tallingHV and I fait a littla laft out. 

23 It's a faaling that you gat aa though you ara coming in 

24 tha middla of a convarsation, although I hava nothing to 

25 basa it on axcapt that faaling. 




398 



mmis 



163 



^^^^^^^^^^V turned to me want 

2 you to be there, too. I said, yes, sir. So we got back 

3 to the hotel. We went out someplace Cor shopping or 

4 something, and then we got back to the hotel and we 

5 waited in the Four Seasons, as you walk in, there's the 

6 reception desk and then there is a large open area with 

7 seating and we waited there so we could have a clear view 

8 of the people who were coming in through the door. 

9 And Secord appeared with Rafael Quintero, so I 

10 knew' who he was, although Quintero was not mentioned as 

11 being a participant when North mentioned ^^^^^^^H' A"<^ 

12 it's the only time that I know of that^^^^sawQuintero . 

13 I mean, we talked about it and so forth. We went up to 

14 ^^^^^Hroom in the hotel and they sat down, the two of 

15 them, and started talking, and it was^|^^Band this is 

16 the second reason why this remains in my mind. 

17 ^^^^^^Bhad it clearly in mind what he wanted to 

18 tell Secord, as though it was something he had been 

19 thinking eUsout, and he said look, there are things. I 

20 want a letter from the company that's building this 

21 strip, and that's when I heard the name Udall, which I 

22 thought was ironic in view of the fact of Morris Udall 

23 being a super liberal and here they use this name, the 

24 Udall name, for one of their companies or for a company 

25 which now I found out was one of many. 



ii 




399 



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25 



UNCUffifO 



164 



^^^|Bdlctat«d terms. For example, that the 
Civil Guard would have. access to this airjitrip field. I 
don't remember the exact terms. The letter was published 
in the press. And Secord sat there and wrote down the 
terms f^^^^^^^^^^^^l They a 
some minor points, but it was clearly ^^^Bwho was in 
charge. And Udall — no, not Udall — Secord said that 
he would get the Udall letter to him. 

And it's a little fuzzy now, but for some 
reason or other I seem to think that somehow that letter 
was delivered later that day. I did not s ee that lette r 
until much later, weeks It 




And then I never knew until I actually saw the 
letter in the paper that it had been signed by Robert 
Olmetead. Now I don't know if Secord signed Olmstead's 
name or Olmstead was sitting there in some office in the 
neighborhood and signed it. I don't know. 

Q It's the Tico Times? 

A The Tico Times. 



400 



WSSiED 



I6S 



1 Q That was after Arias had announced the 

2 existsnce of the airstrip? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m It was th^^^B 

4 Minister who showed the letter to the press at the famous 

5 news conference. 

6 Q Did you ever meet with Secord again? 

7 A Never, and I never talked to him on the 

8 telephone, and Z never sent him a message. And Z want to 

9 be very emphatic about that. I told Tom this. I don't 

10 even-)cnow if it's appropriate, but have you ever had an 

11 instant dislike for somebody — I mean an instant? The 

12 chemistry is absolutely not there. I mean, some people 

13 you just — you )cnow. But Secord just sent me the worst 

14 possible vibes, and Z told Ollie this later. I said, I 

15 do not like that man. Z don't want to have anything to 

16 do with him. 

17 There was just an antipathy that I cannot 

18 explain. 

19 Q Did Ollie ever explain to you what Secord was 
2 doing, what his involvement was in this? 

21 A He said Secord 's a good man, Secord can be 

22 trusted. Z said, well, Z certainly don't agree with you, 
2 3 and that's not my sense of him. 

2 4 MR. LZMAN: Did you have the sense that he was 

25 in it for profit? Zs that what struck you? 



401 



UtlCUkSHIED 



166 



6 

7 
8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
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25 



THE WITNESS: No. I hav« since h«ard that 
that aay w«ll hav« b««n th« cas«, but I hava no way of -- 
that was not my sans*. 

MR. LIMXN: That wasn't what struck you? 
THE WITNESS: No. It was his personality. It 
was that ha cana across as a ruthlass man and I empathize 
a great deal with people and I cam get along with 
difficult people, but I haven't had a feeling like that 
in years about somebody. That's a commentary, probably 
isn't important. 

BY MR. BARBXDORO: (Resuming) ~ 

Q Did you meet with anybody at CIA headquarters 
while you were up on that trip? 
A Oh, yeah, sure. 
Q Did you meet with t he Direct or? 
A " 




Q How many times did you meat with Casey from 
the time you became chief of statior 

A I met him in August '84J 
^^^^^^H I him 
trip i n '85. I went alone 

isit. And when he came to the 




ymsstfiEO 



402 



uiiwsstfe 



167 



1 Station in Novembar to present us with a meritorious unit 

2 citation. 

3 Q November ef what year? 

4 A Of '86. 

5 Q Was that the trip immediately prior to him 

6 coming back, having to coma back to testify about the 

7 Iran matter? Was it around the 18th or 17th of November? 

8 A Yes. But I didn't know what he was doing. I 

9 know what he did^^^^^^^^H but I don't know what ha 

10 did after he left. 

11 Q Did you ever discuss tha contra resupply . 

12 effort with tha Director? 

13 A During his visit, part of the briefing I told 

14 him we had received the drops in September, which is all 

15 part of the intelligence reports that wa had given — you 

16 know, just the ovaxjall briefing of where they were and 

17 wht thair condition was. 

18 Q Did you tell him about North's involvement in 

19 the resupply effort? 

20 A No. 

21 Q And you didn't talk to him about the air strip 

22 at all? 

23 A No, ever. 

24 MR. LIMAN: I'm going to leave you. 

25 MR. BARBADORO: Okay. I've got about a half 



NftJfflftED 



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10 

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an hour mor*. 

MR. LIMAH: I will sec you befor* you leave 
anyway. It was very nice meeting you. 

THE WITNESS: It was very nice meeting you, 
hopefully again under better circumstances. 

MR. LIMAN: I hope this hasn't been too 
unpleasant. 

BY KR. BARBAOORO: (Resuming) 
Q When did you first meet General Singlaub? 
' A The first and only time I ever met General 
Singlaub was in the Ambassador's offlcej 
I don't recall the date. 
Q March of '86? 
A Yeah, okay. That sovinds good. 
Q Did you know what he was ^"^H^^^l '°^^ 
A well, the Ambassador called me in and said he 
could explain what he was in^^^^| ^°^' *"** ^^^^ *'*' 
to approach Eden Pastors in an attempt to get Eden 
Pastors to work out his difficulties with the United 
States Government and somehow act as a mediator. And I 
spent about ten minutes in an attempt to dii|uade General 
Singlaub from any such attempt, that there was no 
interest in doing so, and that in fact if he attempted to 
do so it would probably be detrimental to the best 
interests of U.S. policy. 




404 



oNemwD 



1 I th«n left town for headquarters the next day 

2 or the day after, and when I returned I found that he had 

3 in fact gone to see Eden Pastora and worked out some sort 

4 of an agreement with Pastora in which he presented 

5 himself as a representative of the United States 

6 Government and that then subsequently the Ambassador went 

restricted channel message, ^^^^^^^^^^| 

8 ^^^^^^^ which my deputy had sent and in which they 

9 outlined this thing. 

10 And when I saw it I went high order with the 

11 Ambassador and with my deputy. 

12 Q You mean you were extremely upset? 

13 A Extremely upset. And I went in with what the 

14 Ambassador meant to say, because parts of his cable — 

15 and I was clearing it with the Ambassador, but part of 

16 his cable was just Incredible, that he, knowing the 

17 situation as It stood, would have allowed this cable or 

18 this representation that Slnglaub made and that he in 

In hls^^^^^^^^Hcable endorsed. 

20 You don't often get upset with Ambassadors, 

21 obviously, but I could taks certain liberties with Tambs, 

22 and this was one of the times where righteous indignation 

23 was called for. 

24 Q Before lunch you mentioned that the Ambassador 
'25 was well awarsift4 j^ i^St^^'il.^^ vas not CIA policy to 



iiwm\E 



405 








170 



1 encourag* Pastora. At this point it was CIA policy to 

2 have no contact with him, and you testified that the 

3 Ambassador was well aware of that fact. Did you raise 

4 that issue with the Ambassador? 

5 A I don't remember exactly what I said at that 

6 time, but he knew that everything, that this whole 

7 Singlaub affair raised ~ was contradictory to strategy, 

8 policy and legality, because to support the private 

9 effort of this American, Singlaub, who was, you know, a 

10 private citizen, contravened the Boland Amendment 

11 certainly in that it endorsed in an official way what the 

12 guy, what Singlaub was doing, to say nothing of the fact 

13 that we didn't want to give Pastora any encouragement 

14 whatsoever. 

15 Q Did the Ambassador explain to you why he had 

16 done it? 

17 A Well, you know, he apologized. He says, you 

18 know, I didn't realize it, and then he put it off on my 

19 deputy, that my deputy should have known better and that 

20 my deputy, you know, let it slip. Well, I went to see 

21 the Deputy, and the deputy said what the hell am I going 
2 2 to do when the Ambassador tells me, he dictates the 

2 3 message to ■•? 

This ^^^^^^M 
25 A Yes. 




f. ,"■ * •' d <"^ ■ I 



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171 

(J 

Q L«t's just mark this as^B^^H Exhibit 9. 

It is a cable ragarding Pastora-Singlaub agreement . 
(Th« document referred to was 

I Exhibit Number 9 



markedi 

for identification.) 

A By the way, this started off the real Abrams- 
Tanbs conflict. I thought that Tambs would not survive a 
month because Abrams just, and from then on their 
relationship went dowr^ill. This was the push over the 
top.' 

Q Did North tell you that Singlaub was going to 
be coningP 

A No, sir, and at no time did I ever recall 
North telling me he had any connection with Singlaub. 
He'd say things like Singlaub's a good guy, Singlaub's 
trying to be helpful, but never did he ever say that 
Singlaub and he had a connection. 

Q Old you ever tell him about this agreement 
that Pastora had signed with Singlaub? 

A Oh, he didn't need to. I mean, ^^Bj^H|| 
I message went right to three people — Abrams, 




9, that is the message, isn't it? 
Let oe see it. 
Let the record show the witness is reading to 



<imm& 



407 



"Nftfflfe 



172 



1 himself 

2 (Pause.) 

3 A Now that Jls a misstatement. That is what 

4 Singlaub proposed to obtain. In the paragraph which says, 

5 to quote the docximent: "It was agreed that if Singlaub 

6 could obtain Pastora's written agreement to meet certain 

7 conditions Pastora should receive supplies via UNO." 
3 That's not correct. It was not agreed. It was what 

9 Singlaub proposed. He met with very strong objections 

10 from, me, less so from the Ambassador. 

11 Q Let me just say first, Exhibit 9, is that the 

12 back^channel cable? 

13 A Yeah. Hell, it looks like the one. 

14 Q Okay. 

15 A You see here this cable shows the implicit 

16 endorsement by Tambs and no objection made in the cable 

17 whatsoever to the term "the United States will provide" 1/ 

18 In any case, I sent a cable some days later, when I 

19 returned, in which I wrote the Ambassador meant to say, 

20 ba-ba-ba, et cetera, et cetera. 

21 Q Did you discuss with North the fact that 
2 2 Singlaub had entered this agreement with Pastora? 

23 A No, no. Essentially the whole situation 

24 created so much heat between Abrame and the Ambassador 

25 that all anybody had to do was just sit back and watch 

lA 





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1 th« eiraworks. Tha thing, tha issua was daad. Nobody 

2 was going to taka this seriously. 

3 Q So you never discussed this agreement with 

4 North? 

5 A No. 

6 Q To your knowledge how many times was the air. 

7 strip in Costa Rica, the Santa Elena air strip, used? 

8 A To my knowledge? 

9 Q Yes. 

10 ' A According to Rafael Quintaro it was only used 

11 onca and that was tor an emergency landing of a resupply 

12 flight which suffered either from bad weather or engine 

13 damage or something like that, and it landed on tha air^ 

14 strip in July — June 16. 

15 If I may quota from my notes — 

16 Q Go ahead. 

17 A According to my information, the runway was 

18 usad on only one occasion for an emergency landing, when 

19 a rasupply aircraft was required to abort its mission 

20 because of bad weather. This landing occurred on or 

21 about June 16, 1986. On landing, tha aircraft landing 

22 gear became stuck in the mud on the uncompleted strip. 

23 Nota: See page B-123, last paragraph on right side, and 

24 page B-124, first part of tha paragraph on the left side 

25 which refers to a North memo dated June 10. States that 



UNcraswiED 



409 



t is "mir«d in th« mudj\^ 



174 



an aircraft is "nirad in tha mudf^.j I cannot account for 
tha diffaranca in datas. 

In ordar to fraa tha aircraft and rastart the 
anginas additional aircraft flew to tha site, within 
approximately 48 hours all aircraft departed. This 
occurr«nc« was the last known, to me, use of the site. 
FYI: Z informed the Ambassador immediately after I was 

8 initially notified of the incident. I also informed 

9 Colonel North and subsequently, on or about June 18, I 
notified ^HH^^|^^H°>^ ^^* Latin American Division 

11 Chief ,H^^^^^^orboth, when Z arrived in Washington 

12 for a consultation visit. 

13 Q That was the only time that you Jcnow of that 

14 the airstrip was ever used? 

15 A That's correct. However, according to tha 

16 Tower Commission report, it refers to apparently other 

17 aircraft being at the airjatrip and I had abaolutaly no 

18 knowledge of that. I refer to it again in my notes 

19 because — well, Z refer to it in the notes. You can see 

20 it. 

21 Q We'll look at the notes. On June 21 and July 

22 12 of 1986 you arranged for two resupply flights to land 
at m^^l International Airport? 

24 A That's correct. 

25 Q How did you make those arrangements? 




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1 A Wall, let me go back a ways. At some point -- 

2 and I don't recall how or from whom — I learned that 
^^^I^^^^^^^^^V Air National Guard had a camoflaged C- 

4 123 which was identical to the aircraft being used at 

5 that time by the private benefactors. The private 

6 benefactors informed me that they could not make a round 

7 trip with a full load of supplies without refueling, and 

8 they couldn't land at Point West. 

'i So I came up with the idea that well, why 

10 don't they just land at^^^^^H International Airport, 

11 not say anything to anybody, and just simply refuel '' 

12 there, pretending, without saying anything, that they 

13 were the^^^^^^^^HAir National Guard aircraft, since 

14 it was a known aircraft from other training trips, from 

15 training trips that it made — ^^^^I^I^^B ^^^ 

16 National Guard. 

17 I discussed this with the Ainbassador, and the 

18 Ambassador thought it was a novel idea, but he became 

19 concerned and he just said that he wanted somebody from 

20 the U.S. Mil group to stand by and watch to see that 

21 nothing went wrong, although these people were to handle 

22 all the transactions themselves. 

23 I added a stipulation that the aircraft could 

24 not land if it had a single bullet on board. I wanted it 

25 to be absolutely clean and I told Quintero that I didn't 



mmm 



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176 

1 car*, that if thay didn't find tha drop zone or if there 

2 vara aona othar acrav up, thay ware to kick the material 
anyway bafora cama ^^|^^^m||^H- 

4 On two occasions — 

5 Q So they'd do a drop and than land 

6 at tha airport? 

7 A That's correct. I don't )cnow that those are 

8 tha dataa. I accept your characterization of it. They 

9 did land. Tha first time thay want in, refueled and were 
10 out, 'and tha Hllgroup parson informed ma — 

Was that^^^^^^^^^v^ 

it wa^^^^^^^^^^^B^ Ha informed 

13 that tha flight had departed without difficulty. The 

14 second time it cama and it apparently had lost quite a 

15 bit of oil, and thay had, in addition to tha refueling 

16 coat, thay had to put in 18 quart* of oil in the engine, 

17 and thay didn't hava enough monay for tha 18 quarts. So 

18 thay signed a voucher for it. 

And ^^^^^^^^^^H told ma they 

20 this and tha next time I saw Quintero, or Quintero came 

21 to town, which was aoma weeks later, I told Quintero that 

22 thay owad $60-soma, $60-80, for the oil that they had on 

23 tha voucher, and ha gave ma an envelope which he said 

24 contained tha dollara. I did not count it. 

25 I. tOQX»the.eavfJ.aM,W<l».I '3*v* ^^ ^°l 



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But both toolt 



and 1 said, this is for th« bill 
off and land«d without incident. 

Q Do you know whether the flights were 
humanitarian flights, or lethal? 

A These were lethal supply flights. 
Q How did the other lethal supply flights make 
the deliveries if they weren't using Point West and if 
they weren't stopping at^^^^^^Hlnternational Airport? 
A They took a smaller load. 

And flew round trip non+^to 
Pardon me? 



And flew round trip non4sto 




Well, as you will recall, I mentioned that I 
asked for flight information from headquarters. They 
provided that flight information for the first flight or 
flights after that. 




However, using the smaller aircraft, they had 
to carry more gasoline if they were going to make that 
long trip. And, by carrying more gasoline, they carried 
less of a payload. So, the trips inside, especially 
during September, during the six drops in September, the 




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private benefactors decided that they wanted to get as 
much in to these people as they could. So, instead of 
taking that long route, with a lesser payload, then they 
decided to gol 




As I understand it, they did that; they used 
that route the six times — certainly not with my 
concurrence, but that's what they did — six times to 
make the deliveries. The seventh time they tried it, 
which was not a delivery to the southern frojit, but to 
the FDN in the South — it was the Hasenfus flight. - 

Q Do you knov 

A Yes. 

Q To your knowledge, was he ever out at Point 
West? 

A Oh, he certainly could have been, but I don't 
know that, that he ever went there. 




Q You never made arrangements for him to be out 
there? 

A Oh, no sir. The fact that he went, he went on 
his own. Certainly,! 
about Point West, especial] 




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because they flew us up there. 

Q Do you know, I can't say his name right, 

Dagoberto Nunez. 

A Yes, I know of him, but I have never met him. 

Q You have never met him? 

A No sir, but I know him. 

Q Did you know that he claims to have known 
Oliver North? 

A I don't know that to be a fact. 




(A discussion was held off the record.) 
BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming) 
Q Back on the record. Were you aware that he 
had meetings with Rob Owen? 
A Yes, J 




Q I understand. What did you understand those 
meetings to be for? 

A In the same genre of meetings that Rob Owen 
had with a lot of people associated or involved in the 
resistance movement. 

Q Do you know a guy who has called himself Glenn 
Ford? 

A No, never heard^hat. ia«Scre . Who is that? 




415 




180 

1 Q A guy who calls himself Glenn Ford who met 

2 with Rob Owen and Nunez . 

3 A Kever heard the name before. 

4 Q Do you know if Nunez was involved in any 

5 activities regarding the Honey and Avrigan lawsuit? 

6 A Yes. He was one of the people named in the 

7 Miami Federal court case, and he was also involved in a 

8 very sensitive operation related to that, which not even 

9 counsel knew about. 

10 Q Okay. My question then, and I will focus it 

11 very narrowly on Oliver North and Rob Owen, do you know 

12 whether Nunez had any contact regarding that lawsuit at 

13 the direction of Oliver North or Rob Owen, or somebody 

14 working for them? 

15 A Yes, to this extent. Dagoberto Nunez obtained 

16 from some source copies of the Federal suit, the legal 

17 papers, and, if I'm not mistaken, I think he turned over 

18 a copy of his copy to Rob Owen. To the best of my 

19 knowledge, that is all I know. 

20 Q And that is all you know about the contacts 

21 with Owen and North concerning that suit? 

22 A Yes, that he, Dagoberto, kept Rob informed 

2 3 about what he had learned concerning these people. Honey 

24 and Avirgan. Now, where he got that information from, I 

25 don't know. I think it was from his Miami-Cuban 



wmmm 



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contacts, but I don't know. 




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?^^ 



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Q9 fiQ9 n.88.1 F. 



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couple of other questions. 

Dutton. When did you first hear that name? 
A Who? 
Q Du|^(y>| «ir-« DfjUrt?*- 




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A Except in the papers that I've read since I've 
been here in the States, I've never heard of that name. 
Q Did you ever speaJt with a Robert Dutton? 
A Not that I know of. 

How about a Richard Gadd? 

No, sir. 

How about a Max Gomez or a Felix Rodriguez? 

I was involved! 




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iThat was 
the last time that I saw Felix Rodriguez -Max Gomez. 

However, it occurred to me that, just several 
weeks ago, that at some point, in September, I had heard 
from Raphael Quintero that Max Gomez was really creating 
all Kinds of problems for Quintero, and for the warehouse 
and the benefactors there ^^^^^^^^^H the crews and so 
forth. I don't know exactly what it all was, and 
Quintero gave me Max's phone number or Felix's phone 
number just before I went on a trip to the States, and 
when I was in Miami, I telephoned his home and I was 
going to tell him, look, don't be obstreperous. Be a 
nice guy. 

You know, we go back a long ways, and so 
forth. But, after I got him on the phone, and I heard 
that voice again, that tough arrogance, I just said, 
No, look, I just wanted to give you ray regards. You are 
— you know, I appreciate everything you are doing. I 
was going to go much further than that. I didn't, and I 
hung up the phone. That's the only time I've talked to 
him since 1971, 




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«N«tifiSifl[0 



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Now, a lot of things have b«an said around and 
assumed around, but that's it. 

Q Thsrs was' a Chiefs of Station mseting^^H 

in the spring of '86 whsra the new head 




of LA,^^^^^^^^B was down to meet with you folks, 
wasn't there? 

A Yes. However, let me back up for you to 
explain that meeting. 

Q And this is the final topic I have. So, when 
we finish that, I think we can finish., 

A In April 1986,^^^^||^^hviaited| 
station in a pre, whan ha was Division Chief-designate, 
in sort of a pra-takaovar, get to know the Central 
American region. And, when he came in, when we net, 
and I must tell you thatflH^^^ and I have been close 
friends for a long time. We've worked together. In 
fact, ha brought ma in origiQally to the task force, when 
he was Chief, whan ha was 
predecessor. 

So he knew a lot of the players, and 
it was really sort of an update on what the political, 
military and the rest of the situation was. While he was 
there I told him about communicating with the private 
benefactors, and I had behind me on the floor behind my 
desk the KL 4]bfl«^^%t 4k tfi|^|^|{|lVa9- And I told him 





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IIN6HS«ED 



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thi« was th« devica I'm uilng for sacure communcations. 

Q To whom did you tall him you were 
communicating? 

A To North. I don't Icnow if I mentioned 
Quintero, but I mantionad North. 

Q Okay. 

A And he said, have you informed the Ambassador? 
And I said, Yep, the Abmassador knows about all this. 
And ha said, well, look, I don't know the points of law 
regarding this, but I'm going to go back home and I am 
going to check on it, and I will advise you. I said,^ 
fine, but as far as I am concerned, it's passing 
information for the purpose of secure delivery of the 
materiel, et cetera, at cetera. 

And he said, okay, but I'm going to check on 
the law, and I'll gat back to you. Thanks ,^^^^ ^ 
That's that last part of the discussion. 

A meeting was held in May 1986 
^^^^^^^B — well, there were several meetings. But the 
one we are concerned with here is the meeting that took 
place with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H myself ,|^^^^^^^^H and 

and tha subji^ct immediately upon the door 
being closed was, look, ^^^f got a problem, and we've 
gotta fix it b%:#ij%^W'Wl'ff iWr''^'^^* communication 




subject 

mm 




424 



liNCUSSiED 



189 



1 for th« passing of information of th« thing is 

2 complicated, and it could present us with a problem. 

3 That's the gist of it. But, he did say.^^B uJ 

4 has a problem and we need to fix it. And so it was our 

5 common problem. Okay, the solution we came up with was 

6 the following: in order to take me out of the loop, 

7 we would train a Nicaraguan Riisistance ^mnunicator^^V 

8 ^^^^^^^igive him communications equipment, and one- 

9 time pads, and send him^^^^^^^^H where he would be 

10 located and interface with the private benefactors, and 

11 when he received information from the private benefactors 

12 concerning a flight, he would encipher it, send it to the 

13 Resistance Communications (/•nt»r ^^^^^^^^M who would 

14 relay it inside to the commanders. 

15 Likewise, information from the commanders 

16 concerning a drop zone, timing, et cetera, request needs, 

17 would b« relayed through the coanunlcatlons center, which 

18 would encipher It and send It on the corresponding one- 

19 time pad to their man inside ^^^^^^^^^B It looked 

20 like an ideal situation. 

21 Q It didn't work, though, and the reason it 

22 didn't work was they decided later on that they couldn't 

23 provide the support necessary to put the UNO South 

24 communicator ^n^^^^^^^^H isn't that right? 

25 A No, not quite. We worked. We trained the 



U 




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190 

man. W* selected him. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H We got him 
all set up to go^^^^^^^^H The private benefactors 
provided a paid ticket. The problem was, we couldn't get 
the man a visa in his Nicaraguan refugee document. I 
communicated with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ asking him to go 

could go 
jet a visa for this guy to be 
able to go up there. ^^^^^^^^^^^^H came back and 
said, no, we can't do 




we asked him, can you fix it so that this communicator 
can get up there, or this individual can get up there? 
And he said, I don't think there is any problem. And he 
did 




Juet at that point, with the viea fixed, the 
airline ticket in hand, the training completed ^^H| 
^^^^^^^^^H| ready to then up 

cable from l^eadguarters , dated July 12, which says, stand 
down on the whole operation.. SiiQcJt, .Qf all shocks. I 





426 



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191 



thought v« had th« problaa and that w« vara going to taka 
cara of It. Nov tha stand down, and, you know, tha taxt 
of tha cabla. 

I go up to ^aadquartara aftar that on 
consultation, and Z want In to ***^|^^| ^>^^ ^* said, 
What happanad? Z said, what happanad? Ha said, Z callad 
In. This is tha aftamath. ^H^^l said ha callad In 

rafarrlng to tha stand-down cabla, and ha said, Z 
thought that wa had to flxH|^|problaB by gattlng a 
couninicator up thara. Nhy did va sand out this cabla? 
C^^^^^not raalising what cabla ha was talking about, . 
talli|^|B^Voh, don't worry about it, that's 
all baan takan cara of — maaning that, or thinking 
that, wa wara atill talking about tha visa problan. 

So, l^l^^^^^th^ Division Chiaf, is laft 
with tha iaprassion f roB^^^^^^B| that tha cabla ha Is 
rafarring to, tha July 12 stand- dowp cabla, has baan 
takan cara of. At tha saaa tiaa,^^Hls rasponding to 

L9 Lm^^^^K^y tailing hia that it's all baan flxad concaming 

SO tha visa. 

All right. Now, lat's just finish tha atory. 
Tha comvmlcator didn't go bacausa of tha stand-down 
cabla. HfeHknaw that tha coaaunicator didn't go. Early 
Saptaabar, North tails aa, ha said, wa want to claar out 
tha warahousa at^^^^^Hand sand avarythlng down in a 



■aunlcai 

life' 

a: 

• at^^^^^^Hand 

UlilStFIED 



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mSSIflED 



192 



1 big push to th« p.opl. in th« south. And hs said, can 

2 you — ws don't havs a communicator. Can you handle the 

3 coordination of the Information, of the passage of 

4 information? 

5 I said, sure, have him come down. And that's 

6 where the other six flights came in — seventh, ninth, 

7 eleventh, fourteenth, eighteenth, and the twenty-third — 

8 and every one of those flights, every one of those 

9 flights, either in operational traffic or as disseminated 
intelligence report, or both, were reported to 



11 Headquarters. ■k)cnew we didn't have a communicatQr up 



12 there. ^^^^^^^B )cnew we didn't have a communicator 

X3 atjjH^^lhandling all this traffic. 

j^4 My question is, in retrospect, who do they 

15 think was doing it? There was no fairy godmother up 

16 there handling a thing. I had done it earlier because I 

17 had told the.. They Jcnew I was handling. I had to be 
handling it now, because th« communicator had not gonej 



18 
19 
20 
21 
22 on 



Q But my point to you is that you also knew that 
you weren't supposed to be passing those communications 



23 
24 
25 A 



A Why not? 

Q Weren't you told that in May? 

I was told in May that there was a problem and 



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193 

1 that th«y naadad to fix it, but then th«y stood down on 

2 th« solution that I offered to them about sending the 

3 conuDunlcator up there. So, we were back to sc[uare one. 

4 I was still passing the traffic. 

5 Q So, you assumed that even though there was a 

6 problem, since the solution had been not implemented, 

7 that you should continue? 

8 A But, of course. All right, let's say that was 

9 the case with the first flight, or even the second 

10 flight, or even the third flight. Did anyone come down 

11 and tell me, hey,^^^| stop, you know, don't do that. 

12 Stop. Nobody said it. Flight after flight after flight 

13 went in, and the reports and the traffic outi 

14 back to Headc[uarters informing them of it. You know, 

15 it's very easy to Monday *morning quarterback on these 

16 things. But, when you take a look at the facts ,^^^^k ^ 

17 ^^^^ftells the world, I didn't know anything about it. 

18 Por favor. 

19 Q The last thing I have, let me read you some 
2 names of Cuban-Americans. There are five of them. One 

21 of them ia Dagoberto Nunez. The other four are: Claudio 

22 Picasso, Rene Corvo, Petro Hernandez — 

23 A Wait a minute, Claudio Picaeeo is not a Cuban 

24 American. Claudio Picasso is an Italian- 

25 Nicaraguan. 



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[Laughter] 
Okay. 




Q L«t ID* just finish this list. Th« last person 
I have is, Felipe vidal Santiago. Mere any of these 
five people involved in any way with the private 
benefactor operation? 




430 



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MR. BARBADORO: I don't hav« anything else. 
It's be«n a long day. But, that's all I have. 

MR. WILSON: I would like to ask one 
clarifying question, if I could. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE WITNESS 
BY MR. WILSON: ^ 

Q On this business AhoMtj/j/^^got a problen, 
Did you ever discuss withf^2[^the nature of the 
problem as he perceived it? Was it a legal problem- or a 
political problem. What kind of problem was it? 
A Are you asking me the question? 
Q Yes. 

A I think it was probably a political problem 
because everybody is pretty clear about the whole 



UNCtftSStflED 



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Pi ^ v-^ir 




197 



1 quaatlon of passing Infomation. I did not raally 

2 hava a problaa in tha South in tarms of tha 

3 straightforwardnasa tof it. I think, for axampla, 
tha and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H must hava 

5 had a daily — I can't saa how thay oparatad without 

6 a lawyar, bacausa thay vara auch aora involvad in 

7 military. 

8 Z maan, tha FDN was such aora involvad 

9 in ailitary aattars, and it had to slop ovar into 

10 ^^^^^H concams . So, I think that raally in ay 

11 casa it was a political problaa. Wa vara daaling 

12 vith tha passaga of inforaation. Yat, what happens if 

13 tha Congrass finds out and vants to aaka an issua of 

14 this. I think that's vhat va vara all trying to avoid -- 

15 tha infaranca or tha iaplication, tha insinuation of a 

16 violation of tha Boland Aaandaant. 

17 Claarly, that vas tha casa vith tha July 12th 

18 cabla, and it said so. That wa'ra vary closa to tha 

19 vota. Ha'ra about to gat it. Wa don't want to do 

20 anything to andangar it. I aaan, it vas a Johnny Tvo- 

21 Stap that just said, look, guys, back off on facilitating 

22 tha coBBunicator up thara. 

23 MR. BARBADORO: Okay, tha Housa paopla wantad 

24 aa to lat you knov that thara is a possibility that they 

25 aay vant to dp. » .4JAil«:wi#C>f»Atk«rv Of course, they 



WWED 



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UNCUSSIflED 



198 



1 would hav« ^ours available to tham, and it would b« much, 

2 much shorter. 

3 MR. WISE: Y«», in fact v« will b« in contact 

4 with you regarding a conununication of th« immunity order 

5 by the c[uoruB on our Committee. 

6 MR. BARBADORO: Thank you very much. 

7 (Whereupon, at 4:39 p.m., the taking of the 

8 instant deposition ceased.) 



9 



10 , Signature of the Witness 

-1 Subscribed and sworn to before b« this day of 

12 _, 1987. 



13 



14 Notary Public 

15 My CoBBission Expires: 



UHfik*SSIf!ED 



434 






^ CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC 

2 

I. ANNE PELLECCHIA HOROWITZ, the officer 

before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby 

certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the 

foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the 

testimony was taken by me by Stenomask and thereafter 

reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am 

neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of 

the parties to the action in which this deposition was 

taken; and further, that I am not a relative or employee 

of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties 

thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in 

the outcome of the action. 



Notary Public in and for the-- 
1» State of Marylsmd. 



19 

20 ^ Commisaion expires, 

21 
22 



/ / 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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lJ 



DEPOSITION OFi 






C I <r> m n '^ C(i "3 / / // cj 




Monday, May 4, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select CoiTunittee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., 
in Room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, with W. Neil 
Eggleston (Deputy Chief Counsel of House Select Committee) 
presiding. 

Present: W. Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel; 
Tina Westby and Richard H. Giza, Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence; Richard L. Leon, Deputy Chief Minority 
Counsel and Thomas E. Wilson and Mary Beth Sullivan, on 



behalf of 




Partially Declasshedmeteasad on.£J*^ 

undef D'ovisions ol E I33S6 

by K Johnson. National Sacwity Counc* 



yNWSSiFlE!! 



3/?o/). 



s 



436 



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14 



1 Q Were you aware that Robert Owen was carrying 

2 munitions lists from the contra leaders to 

3 Colonel North? 

4 A No, sir. 

5 Q Did you know whether he was making payments to 

6 the contra leaders of funds he received from Colonel North? 

7 A No, sir. I had heard rumors to that effect, as 

8 everybody heard rumors and, in fact, he was in the press 

9 that Robert Owen was some sort -- he never said that to me, 

10 I never questioned him on it. I just didn't. 

11 Q The rumors were that he was a bag man for Colonel 

12 North? 

13 A That he was a bag man for the contra leaders, 

14 that he was bringing money to them. 

15 Q Now, I am not asking you what you knew. I eun 

16 asking you what the press and the rumors were that 

17 you were aware of at the time. Were those rumors 

18 reporting that he was carrying money on Colonel North's 

19 behalf? 

20 A Frankly, I didn't put much stock into this whole 

21 thing because I didn't think they were true. I thought 

22 that it just seemed to be a conclusion that somebody 

23 had drawn by the mere fact that he was always around and 

24 always there and always lent him a sympathetic ear. I don't 

25 personally know of any occasion when he brought money to them 



Mm h \J\ Qmrtfe irm 



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Whereupon, 



having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, 
and was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

my name is Neil Eggleston. I am 
Deputy Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee to 
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Also 
present are Congressman Brooks and Congressman Fields, both 
members of that committee, and Mr. Giza and Tina Westby are 
also present and your two counsel. 

This deposition is being conducted pursuant to 
rules and a resolution which was passed establishing the 
committee and permitting the committee to conduct depositions 
in furtherance of its investigation. I have previously 
provided your counsel with copies of the resolution and of the 
rules. If I haven't or if you would like to see them, I have 
brought them with me today. 

MR. WILSON: We do not have a copy of those. We got 
them from the Senate. 

MS. SULLIVAN: We do have them. 

MR. EGGLESTON: If you didn't, I have brought 
copies with me in case there is any confusion. 



imsm 



438 



umStabvis 



1 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

2 ^^^^^^^^^^^1 do you know a person by the name of 

3 Colonel Oliver North? 

4 A I respectfully decline to answer on the grounds 

5 that it would be inconsistent with my Fifth Amendment 

6 privilege. 

7 Q I take it that if I asked you additional questions 

8 about your involvement with Colonel North or other activities 

9 you will similarly refuse to respond; is that correct? 
10 A That is correct. 

Q ^H^^^^^^^^^l let me advise you that on March 

12 30, 1987 Judge Aubrey Robinson, a United States District' 

13 judge in the District of Columbia, signed an order which 

14 provided that you were immunized from the use of your 

15 testimony or information derived from your testimony. I have 

16 presently provided a copy of this to your counsel. Have you 

17 seen this? 

18 A Yes. 

19 Q I ask that this be made part of the record. 

20 (Whereupon, the document referred 

21 to was made a part of the record.) 

22 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

23 Q Mr. Brooks and Mr. Broomfield, let me shqw you a 

24 copy of it and we will ask you now to direct 

25 to respond to any^ gue scions ^h^t_^^n3y_^^ posed to him since 




Mlfflflr' 



im^HEF 



this order does grant him immunity from use of his statements. 
He is directed to respond. 

MR. BROOKS: He is, yes. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q ^^^^^^^^^^B let me tell you hope to do 
in this deposition. 

You have previously given a deposition to the 
Senate at which a^plepresentative of the House was 
present, although he was not asking questions because at 
that time the immunity order had not yet been conveyed upon 
you. I have not yet had that transcript made available to 
us. 

I would like to ask you general questions about your 
background and then instead of conducting a complete 
deposition, there are various areas that I want to question 
you about that in my understanding from the Senate may or 
may not have been covered but I would like to cover: them in 
a little more detail. 

Let me ask about your background. When did you 
begin with the CIA? 
A 

Q What was your first assignment? 

A After training, ray first assignment was a temporary 
duty ^^^^^^^^1 for a few months. And my first permanent 



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Q You are a little later coming to the CIA than most 
of the people with the CIA that I have had occasion to talk 
to now. What did you do before you began with the Agency? 

A I was a police officer for eight years, 




I started as a patrolman and left as a detective 
sfrgeant . 

Q If you could just complete the' various assignments 
you had at the Agency up until the time that you were 
appointed Chif of Stati 




Central American Task Force, late 1982 until July 1984, Chief 

of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^HJBranch,! 

July 1984 until present. Chief of Station,] 



Q Are you still as of today with the Central 




iumssiaoi. 



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Intelligence Agency? 



Yes, sir. 

Is your retirement scheduled? 
I have no intention to retire. 
You have no intention to retire? 
That is xi 




administrative leave at present. 

Q Let me just ask you -- as I say, I am not going 
to -- I know that the Senate spent almost an entire day with 
you. I don't intend to spend that long and want to 
ask you some questions about particular areas. They are "not 
necessarily going to come in chronological order and 
Mr. Giza and Ms. West might have questions as well. 

When did you first get one of the encryption 
devices? 

A Spring, I think — I think — Spring of 1986. 

Q In April of 1986, as I understand it from 
reading the various files that, as you well know, have now 
been created on you, there were the first of the four 
shipments where you cabled for vector information and you 
got the responses; is that correct? Is the first one of 
those in April of 1986? 

A There was a flight in April 1986, only one. You 
mentioned four. 





it 



442 



mrnm 



^ Q I am sorry. I meant the first of four, the first 

2 one being in April. I didn't know that there were four in 

3 April. 

4 A As I recall, there were nine altogether, and I have 

5 them categorized in my mind as the first one being the 

6 Bell 100 fligl.c, which I believe was in April of 1986. That 

7 is when the delivery was actually made. 

8 However, prior to that there were attempts which 

9 were aborted for reasons of mechanical failure or whatever. 

10 After that April flight there were, I believe, two, and then 

11 there was the final group of six in September. 

12 Q As of — I guess the question I was sort of leading 

13 towas as of the time of the first flight in April that 

14 actually went through, did you have the encryption device 

15 by that time, if you know? 

16 A Yes, I think I had it by the time that first 

17 flight came in. 

18 Q Who gave you the encryption device? 

19 MR. WILSON: May I clarify for the record that the 

20 encryption device is a KL-4 3? 

21 MR. EGGLESTON: That is correct. 

22 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

23 Q That is correct. To the best of my recollection, 

24 it was Rafael Quintero, a private American citizen. 

25 Q It is also my understanding that on these KL-4 3s 




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that it is sort of a physical device but in addition to the 
physical device, there has to be a key, the 
encryption code that goes with i( 




it was obviously a U.S. Government -produced tape 

Q My question is did you receive more than one of those 
over the period of time — 

A I received 

Q How did you get each of those? 

A Mr. Quintero delivered them to me. 

Q You think you got them from Mr. Quintero each 
time? 

A Yes, I don't think North ever gave me one. I know 
that Quintero did. 

Q You kept the device ttuyuahSeptember? 



;ept the device thrpuohSi 



444 



IMflW 



1 A I kept the device from the time I received it 

2 ^^^^^^^^^^H with me until December 1986. Of course, 

3 I didn't use it after early October. And in December I 

4 brought it to Miami, put it in a box, unlabelled, sealed 

5 box, and left it at my mother's home in Miami. 

6 I subsequently turned it over or she on my 

7 instructions turned it over to an Agency officer] 

8 who returned it to Headquarters. 

9 I would hope that my mother would not be involved 

10 in this matter. 

11 Q It sounds as if your mother received a sealed 

12 box -- 

13 A That is correct. Unlabelled, sealed box. 

14 Q Which she turned over to an agency official. 

15 Other than Rafael Quintero, Colonel North and 

16 Mr. Copp — why don't I ask it this way. Who did you 

17 cominunicate with -- 

18 A Only Colonel North and Mr. Quintero. 

19 Q You never communicated with Mr. Copp? 

20 A I did not. 

21 Q Let me go through the other people. 

22 A Let's clarify — I did not know who Mr. Copp 

23 was until I was told by the Tower Commission investigators 

24 that that was a pseudonym used by Mr. Secord -- or General 

25 Secord. I never communicated with him via this machine and 



uMfiiiism. 



445 



HNffiMffiF 



10 



I only saw him one time, which I have, of course, explained 
to the committees. 

Q Were you aware that there was a Mr. Copp 
who was involved with Mr. North in the re-supply operations? 

A It is difficult to say because at times North 
would say names and -- because they didn't mean anything to 
me, I didn't pay attention to it, never registered with me. 

Q So what you are telling me is that he may have 
mentioned a Mr. Copp or he may not have, and you don't really 
recall? 

A There were other names that he mentioned that I 
simply do not recall. I am consciously trying to avoid 
recalling, even letting it register with me. 

Q Did you know a man by the name of Robert Dutton? 

A No. 

Q Robert MacAlister? 

A No. 

Q Let me go through the list. 
Richard Gadd? 

A No. Now, that is a name that I had heard North use, 
but I did not know who he was and I have never met him. 

Q Did you know Robert Owen? 

A Yes. 

Q How did you first meet Robert Owen? 

A Ambassador Tambs introduced him to me in his office. 



iim&!^i!Hf4L 



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Q Do you recall when that was? 

A I pondered that question, and the best I can come 
up with is some time in August or September of 1985. It was 
after Tambs arrived at post and that was July and 
we had heard about this Robert Owen, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and 
I had heard his name being mentioned by Nicaraguan 
resistance personnel, but we had never met the guy. 

Q So you think the first time you met him was in a 
meeting -- 

A I remember the occasion when Ambassador Tambs called 
me into his office and said there is somebody here I want 
you to meet. 

Q What did Ambassador Tambs tell you about 
Robert Owen? 

A To the best of my recollection, and I am not sure 
it is accurate, that he was someone who worked with Colonel 
North. 

Q Did you understand that to mean that he was a 
Government employee? 

A Oh, no, it was quite clear to me that he had no 
Government connection and I never asked him nor do I know 
to this day who he actually worked for. I have heard reports 
that he works for some public relations firm but I never 
asked and he did not tell me. When he eventually became 
associated with the NicaraguanJiiunajiititf ian Assistance 





447 



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Office of the Department of State then, of course, I knew 
who he worked for. 

I was very careful in dealing with Mr. Owen because 
he was an American citizen. I can't task him under agency 
regulations to find out something, even though my officers 
and I were well aware that Robert Owen probably had the most 
extensive network of contacts among the resistance leaders, 
including people with whom we did not want to have contact 
with, and who, however, were involved with the Nicaraguan 
resistance. 

To explain that, there were, for example ,^^^^ 
^^HHHH mercenaries, people like this, that were 
accepted by the Nicaraguan resistance as compatriots in their 
struggle. However, we were very leery of these people. 

However, Robert Owen had an entre to them and so 
from time to time when he came to town I would meet with 
him for breakfast or a cup of coffee and he would voluntarily 
give me sort of a round-up of what he knew about what was 
going on, which I accepted as any American citizen who 
wishes to volunteer information to its Government. Later on 
when he did become involved with the Nicaraguan Humanitarian 
Assistance, I did ask him, because then he was a Government 
employee, I did ask him to find out things about what was 
happening with that group or another group, but that was the 
extent of it. ||iini APPjl 





Wi 



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Q Did you know the date of his relationship with 
Colonel North? 

A I assumed he was a leg man for him and went out 
to find out on behalf of Colonel North or people that 
Colonel North had contact with what was going on^^^| 

|among the various political and resistance 

groups . 

He didn't deal too much with the political area, 
but since there was overlap, he occasionally came up with 
tidbits that were interesting. 

As I say, he was very well informed. 

Q Do you know how he developed these contacts? 

A I assume he did it through one principal 
contact he had, John Hull. 

Q You knew him to be a close associate of Hull's? 

A Yes. Someone told me at one time Hull 
considered him sort of his adopted son. 




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and whatever the press reports were, I simply don't -- I 
can't recollect. 

Q You never asked Owen whether he was carrying money? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you ask Colonel North whether Owen was carrying 
money to Colonel North? 

A No, sir. 

Q I know that everyone has asked you lots of 
questions about the airstrip. I have read your Tower 
Commission testimony about the airstrip and I eun not going to 
soup to nuts the airstrip and I am sure that the Senate 
asked you lots of questions about the airstrip but I don'.t 
have the transcript available. 

When did you first become knowledgeable that there 
was an effort to build the airstrip? 

A As I explained^ I think more amply to the Senate 
than to the Tower Commission, the idea of an airstrip was 
really an idea, a concept, that grew out of a problem that 
the United States mission and most specifically myself, 
and to just a slightly lesser extent, the Ambassador, 
were experience 




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Well, as you know, our influence diminished after 
the Boland Amendment was enacted and whatever leverage 
we may have had on them before, which was minimal, believe 
me, was close to non-existent at the time so it was a 
problem for us having to deal witt 

and the fact that we were at the seune time attempting to 
keep this force viable until the Congress could re- 
consider the question of support to the military side of 
this. 

At the same time, I had the responsibility of 



same time, I had the res 

li^lEliSiimtl 



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trying to bring about some sort of a coalition -- probably a 
better word is aggregation of the political groups -- 
well, since the political groups were closely tied to the 
military groups and that these were their brothers in arms, 
it became a complex problem or it was a complex problem. 

So in looking for a solution! 

the obvious solution is 
get them back inside Nicaragua to fight. 

How can this be done without some means of 
eventually supporting them? Well, in looking again in 
conceptual terms, down the road to when there would be a 
re-institution of military assistance, it became apparent 
that the only way that these people could be supported was 
through some site^^H^^^^^^^HK^hich -- where there could 
be for re-fueling or re-supply that the aircraft could 
land and re-supply the southern Nicaraguan forces. 

All of this was discussed almost on a very frequent 
basis with the Ambassador because of his high degree of 
interest in the whole matter of southern forces. 

So in either — I think it was August — August or 
September, maybe late August or early September, but in 
there -- Ambassador Tambs 




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Shortly af ter^^^^^^^^^l Owen visited the Ambassador 
and the Ambassador suggested that Owen go up to the site -- 
to the site^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H selectedl 
(Owen, that he should go up. 

I accompanied 

Owen and we went up to the site withi 

land walked the site and Owen took pictures of it 
and, as I understand, he later delivered those to Colonel 
North. 

That is where the idea of an airstrip started and 
why. Subsequently, Mr. Quintero came down to handle the 
details. He followed a person by the name of Robert 
Olmstead, who actually contracted with the owner of the 
property, who was an American citizen also, by the name 
of H£ui\ilton — but all of that I stayed on the periphery. 
I knew about the negotiations. I was kept informed of them 




453 



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19 



Q So^^^B^^H was the one who primarily kept you 
apprised of the negotiations? 

No, 



Q Let me go back to the first sort of step that you 
told us about. You had indicated that there was some 
notion that this airstrip might be a place that would be 
used once, assuming Congress reversed its position and 
once official U.S. military support became permissible, 
again? 

A Yes, let me — my feeling about it was that 
these people were doing this thing and I thought that was 
primarily their business. I didn't advise them on how they 
should proceed other than that I wanted the thing to be 
kept absolutely discratt^ and quiet. I didn't want, and in 
fact, I insisted^^^^^^^Hthat no Nicaraguan should ever 
know about the existence of this airstrip. My reason for that 
was I eventually envisioned that the agency would take over 
this operation and that it would be run as a paramilitary 
air operation site once there was the re-institution of the 



funding. 



IMASSIfm 



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I never really thought that these people could do 
anything more than -- the private people could do anything 
more than to really build it. If that is what they wanted to 
do, fine, but for operational reasons I could see that this 
could only be carried out by our own people with the necessary 
expertise. 

Q Your supervisor, I take it, generally at the 
agency during this period of time wasj 

A During this period, yes. 

Q He, as I understand it, was Chief of the Central 
American Task Force from October 1984 — He and Boland 
come in at the same time; is that your recollection? 

A Could you ask me the question again? 

Q It was a wandering question, not jjery well framed. 
Is it your recollection that ^H^^^^^V began as 
Chief of the central American Task Force right around the 
time, the Boland Amendment became effective, early October 
of 1984? 

A No. I think it was later than that. I think — 
no, in fact, I am certain it was later than that. ^^^^^B ^^ 
took over the task force in the spring of 1985. I am 
positive. 

Q Why are you positive? 

A Because I know who was the Chief of the Task 
Force in October q£_13'14- 




IftSSlBEL 



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Q And who was it? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B and he that 

winter and then the first time I met ^^^^H was when he made 
a trip ^^^^^^^H in the Spring of 

But at least by August of 1985 -- let me just 

c 

tell you, ^^^^B has told me that i.e started in October 
of 1984, that ^^^^^H^H[ -- can we go off the record? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. EGGLESTON: Back on the record. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
^ Q In any event, it is your recollection that 

'does not begin as Chief of the Central American 
Task Force until the Spring of 1985 and that 
remained in the position throughout the Fall of 1984 -- 

A That is my impression. Certainly in the fall of 
1984, and I would -- I am pretty sure it was into the 
winter of 1984-85, and that^fl^^^^^l took over some 
time around March or April of 1985, and that there was an 
interim chief or maybe there was just an acting chief 
during that period. 

Okay. But in any event, at least by August of 
is Chief of the Central American Task 




J had discussions with^^^^H 



about the need 



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to create an airstrip if the agency got back in military 
re-supply prior to August of 1985? 

A Prior to, no, because this all came about due to 
the increase in difficulty that we were having with the 
Nicaraguan resistance people ^^^^^^^^^^^| It had been over 
a year that we hadn't been able to give them any support 
except moral support, and things really reached a very 
bad point, with lots of incidents such as the ones I described 
earlier, and so the coincidence of Ambassador Tambs ' 
heightened interest, 

the locating of an airstrip in Costa Rica sort of 
brought together the opportunity 




you are going to get the contras back inside they have to be 
re-supplied and they won't go back inside unless they have 
re-supply, yet they can't be re-supplied unless there is a 
site where they could be, even though it is another place and 
the aircraft could be re-fueled there. ^ 

So it wasn't a subject of conversation with^^^^H 
at that time or even -- 

Q That was the next question. When is the first 
timg that you think that you had a discussion with 

face-to-face, I am not talking about cable 
traffic, but face-to-face about the airstrip? 




457 




In our parlance we talk to our headquarters 
counterparts or supervisors by cable, in those terms. So 
that would have been the first time. 

Q And you think that was immediately after -- 

A Yes. I don't recall the date of that cable, 
but I would say certainly within a week to ten days after 
the Ambassador reported back to me. I had completely forgotten 
I had written that cable until the Senate counsel showed it 
to me, which, in fact, was a very fortuitous aspect. 

Q And then you received a cable back; is that right? 

A Well, as I said, I didn't remember even sendincf 
it so I don't really remember getting an answer, no. 

Q Let me get to the answer to my question. Do you 
recall a time when you discussed personally with 
the airstrip? 

A Yes. Some time, much later on, a visit that I 
made to headquarters, but I don't remember whether -- but I 
did discuss it with him. 

Q Was that still in 1985? 

A Oh, yes. It would have to be. The fall of 1985, 
some time in the fall or early winter of 1985. The reason 
I say that is because the airstrip was a fits and starts 
thing, and it was some time after construction had been 
started, and it was some time after I had talked to 



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Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams about it, or rather, 
that Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams raised it with me. 

Q Right. I am not going to ask you about that 
because you testified that at least in the Tower Commission 
and I assume before the Senate. 

A Yes. 

Q That is one of those areas there is no point in 
me covering -- 

A Except that it allows me to answer the question 
with this comment. I took it for granted then that 
since the RIG was apparently aware of it, then obviously 
^^^^■had to be aware of it. In fact, I asked, if_ I am not 
mistaken, I asked Assistant Secretary Abrams if j 
aware of it and he answerd in the affirmative, yes, that is 
correct. 

Q And that occurred during the conversation that you 
had with Abrams and the two case officers — 
^^^^^^^^^H that 

Was there other cable traffic in the fall of 
1985 with regard to the airstrip? 

A I don't think so. Because, as I said, I took 
this as being extrzmeous to my situationfm^mm^ 

It didn't involve me 
personally. It didn't involve my funds. It was being 
undertaken by these people 



Kiffiia 



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was one other aspect that in February of 1986 I was present 
at a meeting funong the Ambassador, General Galvin, Colonel 
North in which Colonel North briefed General Galvin, updated 
General Galvin on the airstrip and the existence of the 
airstrip. 

Q Where was that? 

A Aboard the aircraft! 

Q What did he tell him? 

A Things were proceeding, construction is a little 



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behind schedule, but it was fit into a general update of 
the overall political military situation, 

land other parts that had to do with non- 
private benefactor matters. 

Q Did -- 

A Excuse me. Let me, again, to make sure that you 
understand me and these sort of disjointed comments, I 
understood that this was an officially acceptable 
activity. I mean, when you hear Assistant Secretary Abrams 
saying he knows all about it and that he is aware of it 
by virtue of his meetings with the other two members of the 
RIG, and General Galvin was being informed of it in a sort of 
a matter of fact way and I had airiggd the Ambassador and he 
was interested in it ^^^^ 

while the actual physical 
construction of the place was being carried out by American 
private citizens, as Counsel LMman mentioned, I guess I 
was the only one who thought it was a big secret. It was a 
secret that everybody knew about. 

Q I am going to introduce a series of questions by 
commenting that there was a story in yesterday's New York 
Times reporting statements that Mr. Tambs had made. 





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^ Q In the story, Mr. Tambs refers to essentially 
^ taking his orders from what he considered to be the RIG. 
"^ MR. WILSON: For the record, we are referring to 

the story starting on page 1 of the New York Times dated 

Sunday, May 3, 1987. 



BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q That is correct. The far right hand column is the 
story. What was it your understanding that the RIG was 
and what its function was? 

The RIG stands for Restricted Interagency Group 
and the members from NSC were Colonel North, from the CIA, 
taaabl^l^ from the State Department, Eliott Abrams; is 
that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q What was your understanding was the function of the 

RIG? 

A It was a policy coordination body that brought 
together and discussed and made decisions on interests 
regarding the Central American military/political situation, 
and that this was the main policy spokesman for the U.S. 

Government. 

Q But I take it it was clear to you that the RIG was 
a policy body and that you w^e - you were a CIA employee 
and your supervisor was|^ilH^"'^ ^^°^^^ ""^"^^ ^'"^ 
in the CIA? 



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A That is correct. 

Q You didn't take orders, I would assume, from 
Elliott Abrams? 

A No. The Ambassador did. 

The Ambassador did -- you would take orders from 




A That is correct. 

Q And Ollie North took orders from whomever? 

A I did not take orders from Ollie North. 

Q You didn't take orders from Ollie North? 

A Absolutely not/. Ollie North and I were 
professional colleagues first, friends second, very close, 
one to the other in terms of where — because our professional 
relationship certainly was also based upon the fact that we 
were very friendly to each other. But I »ver took any 



orders from Ollie North 
'' I kept him informed when he asked questions about 

'" difficult political situations going on in the south 
'' Q And I take it at least to the best of your knowledge, 
Ambassador Teunbs did not take orders from Ollie North? 

A That is my understanding. He did not take orders 
from Ollie North 

Q And similarly the RIG as an organization did not 
issue orders. Orders-implementing RIG decisions would have 



25 come you f'^onfll^^l^^^V' 

JIMCII 



icciflca. 



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A That is correct. 

Q They would not have come to you from an organization 
called the RIG. 

A They would not have come to me either from 
Assistant Secretary Abrams. Now, on occasion, and there 
were several occasions when Assistant Secretary Abrams 
or the Central American unit at State would send orders 
to their people, the Ambassador and the 




any problem with it let him cable up to CIA headquarters 
and then they would -- we will discuss it up here, which 
was a very convoluted way of doing business, obviously. 

If State did do anything — when State attempted to 
become involved! 




immediately informed headquarters and -that was 
problem then to resolve it with Elliott Abrams. 

Q And although that might have been cumbersome, it 



ii[iri&si!ii[a. 



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1 was up to them to fight those fights, not up to you? 

2 A Certainly. But getting back to this, I am 

3 going to anticipate your question -- 

4 Q Go ahead. 

5 A I think that it was the Ambassador's perception -- 

6 I don't think there was any -- that he received instructions, 

7 I think he simply in his enthusiasm and his diligence to be 

8 as forthcoming as he possibly could, may have perceived 

9 this to be their desires rather than their instructions. 

10 Q That was what I anticipated hearing, actually, 

11 because — let me get back to the airstrip and just a few 

12 more questions about the airstrip. Had you met Rafael 

13 Quintero prior to August of 1985 -- let me ask it this way -- 

14 prior to the time that he becomes involved with the 

15 airstrip? 

16 A No. I had never met him. 

17 Q How did you establish his bona fides. How did you 

18 know who he was? 

19 A North told me he was coming^^^^^^^^^^^^^^land 

20 he said he was a person that he trusted completely, and that 

21 was enough for me, to hear it from Ollie North. 

22 Q Did you want to make a comment about another part 

23 of the story? 

24 A Only that he refers to the strip in here where it 

25 is a total inaccuracy. I am referring to a paragraph 



Mmi^iO^IL 



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vifiu: 



iuuini:r 

'' contained in the New York Times article which appears in 

2 the continuing portion on page 14 of the same edition in which 

3 it says — in which Mr. Tambs allegedly said that when 

^ he arrived in Costa Rica in July 1985, Mr. Abrams and other 

5 officers of the Restricted Interagency Group asked him to 

6 persuade the Government to allow contra supply pilots to use 

7 a secret 1.2 mile long airstrip that Colonel North's operatives 

8 had built just south of the Nicaraguan border. 

9 The 1.2 mile airstrip did not exist in July of 

10 1985, in 1985. It really didn't start to be constructed 

11 until late November, early December of 1985. Construction 

12 was stopped in March of 1986. It was never completed. The 

13 grading -- the leveling had been done but the grading had 

14 not been. 

15 It was not possible to land an airplane at this 
18 strip with any degree of safety as we found out when Quintero 

17 reported that in June of 1986 an emergency landing had to be 

18 made there and that the plane got stuck in the mud, because 

19 there was virtually no drainage, none of that work had been 

20 completed. 

21 So I don't understand if Tambs is quoted correctly 

22 how he could have said this. 

23 Q Because, if anything, was clear it is that in 

24 I July of 1985 there was no airstrip? 

25 A There was no airstrip and I can't even conceive of 



UMPiassra^ 



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1 anybody in the RIG asking him to persuade the Government to 

2 allow contra supply pilots to land there. It was still a 

3 concept, it was an idea which came about as a result of 

4 all these problems we were having with the resistance 

5 people^^^^^^^^^^^H and that was some time after 

6 July, August or so when it really reached a heightened 

7 point. 

8 And so if this tracks with the rest of what 

9 Tambs is saying here, he is obviously under a mis- 

10 i"^pression or he is not being quoted correctly. But I 

11 want to clarify that because it gives che impression -- 

12 he gives the impression that there was some sort of — that 

13 he was instructed to go through with some sort of an 

14 arrangement. 

15 Well, that is not so. 

16 Q Let me ask you this — I understand from reading 

17 your Tower testimony that it was your estimate, if I have 

18 got the right person's testimony, that the amount of money 

19 put into the construction of the air field was about a 

20 quarter of a million dollars. 

21 A That is what Quintero told me. 

22 Q And that an additional $50,000 had to do with the 

23 purchase of the — 

24 A I don't know what the arrangement was. I suppose 

25 only Colonel North or Mr. Olmstead can answer that. It was 



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either a purchase arrangement with some sort of a 

baljoon note at the end of a year or two year period, or it 

was a lease purchase arrangement. I know that I heard 

the figure $50,000 a year is what the lease for a year was 

going to cost, the lease or the purchase or whatever that 

agreement was, the occupancy of that property for a year 

was $50,000. 

Quintero told me, and of course he could have 
exaggeaated or it could have been a guess on his part, that 
the cost of leveling that site and the little bit of 
construction that they did on sort of a shack there, which 
was never finished either, was $250,000, which I felt was. 
exorbitant. 

Admittedly this place was very isolated, it was 
at least 20 miles to the nearest road of any kind, and the 
graders and the tractor — the bull dozer had to be brought 
in through these canyons and I guess the cost of these things 
is somewhere around three or $400 a day, but it still 
se«med to me that $250,000 was a lot of money. 

But I had nothing to say about it. It was there — 
Q That is what I wanted to ask you. This was a 
substantial investmeat. into a capital asset for the contras 
at a time when they didn't have a whole lot of money. Where 
did you understand — 

A Oh, I don't know that^ ^ M^r knew anything 



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about the money. I didn't know if they had millions or 
billions . 

Q Did you have any understanding about where the 
money was coming from to pay the lease and to construct the 
air field? 

A No. 

Q None? 

A None. The first time I heard about that 
there was even an event it was much later, when the name 
Udall Corporation came up. 

Q By "much later", not to rush ahead — 

A March of 1986. 

Q And how did it come up in March of 1986? 

A During a meeting between|H|HHGeneral Secord and 
Mr. Quintero here in Washington. 

Q And this was around the time of the photo session? 

A 

Q Did ^^^^^^^H meetl 

A Oh, yes, and me. 

Q My next question -- 

A Our wives -- it was social. 

Q But did they have a non-social — did they have a 
business meeting? 

A No. 

Q Was there any discussion of the air field between 



The afternoon of the photo session. 

c 

Did f^^ 



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the two of them? 

A No. 

Q When the name Udall came up in the course of the 
meeting which occurred among Secord, yourself and 
was there anyone else at that meeting? 

A No. I went along 
|^^H| and when he sat down he started to -- he took charge 
of the meeting. 

Q We are talking about] 

A You are right, yes. Quintero, Secord, | 
myself were in the room at that time. 

Q Right. 

A " 




sat down and he told General Secord, this 
is what I want from you for the purpose of protecting the point 
west site, the air strip. And he went through and ** said 
that the civil guard would have access to the property, 
that It would be used as a training site, so forth and so on, 
and that is when I heard the name Udall Corporation. He 
wanted a letter from Secord to that effect. 



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Q Was the letter coming from Udall Corporation? 

A I don't recall that being discussed. It was 
just that to^^^^^^^^^^^^Bthis person Secord was going to 
get a letter from whoever it was that had control of that 
property and that is when I first heard the name Udall 
Corporation or Udall Research Corporation. 

Q As being -- 

A As being the people who had title to this 
property. 

Q As of this time, meaning March of 1986, during 
the meeting, who did you understand Secord to be? What 
role did you understand him to have? 

A That he was -- first of all, I knew he was a 
general. That he was somehow responsible for the private 
benefactors' activities. 



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Q I asked you who you understood Secord was -- 

A A general, that he was sort of responsible for 
the private benefactors' activities. 

Oid you know that he was involved with Colonel 
North? 

A Oh, yes, because Colonel Nor«-h told 
that morning that he wanted him to meet with General 
Secord that afternoon ^^^^^^ 

land then sort of to our 
surprise, Quintero was there. 1 didn't even know that 
he was in town. 

Q When you said you knew General Secord was involved 
with the private benefactors, did you think that was in 
connection with supply of the contras? 

A It seems to me that that was the first time 
that I was sure that General Secord was involved. North 
may have mentioned it to me before, but I have no 
recollection of it. That was the day that I knew 
definitely that he was involved, but before that, he 
may have mentioned it, but I have no recollection. 

Q But at least, though, by this tirae you didn't 
know he was Copp? 



guy told me. 



Q That was Brian Bruhf? 

I • "..1 il:^' w^'v';''^"i 



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A Brian Bruhjjf , right. 

Q Did you ever have any conversations with 

Jbout the suitability of this location for 
the air strip? 

A Yes, some time. Again, T can't tell you when. 
It was at headquarters. I was up '^n a visit, and we talked 
about it. It was certainly before this March when, 
met Secord, but I don't remember when. It could have been 
anywhere from when they first got the control of the property 
of the site from the private owner up until March, so that 
would have been some time November, December, up until 
March. 

But, yes, I had talked to him about it. 

Q What do you recall him saying about the 
suitability of that location? 

A That there was a site, that it would have been 
used for refueling, and I think we both agreed that we 
couldn't wait for the reinstitution of the funding, so 
we could take control of it to be able to re-supply 
the people in the south. 

Q Do you recall him indicating to you that he 
thought it was a terrible place to pick for the air strip? 

A I don't know if he knew it or not or if he saw 
the photographs that North had. I thought it was suitable 
because it was isolated and not easily discovered. The 



473 




39 

1 downside was it was 16 miles in the Nicaraguan border. 

2 Q Right, which -- 

3 A But you know, you got to take the good with 

4 the bad. In Costa Rica, which is a very fertile, populated 

5 country, you have very few places where you have that kind 

6 of isolation, and we didn't have anything to say about 

7 the site being picked. 

8 we were left with whatever we had to work with. 

9 Q You had indicated that in the fall of 1985 

10 that during a trip that you had to Washington you had 

c 

11 spoken to^m^Habout the strip? 

12 A Fall or that period of November — mid November 

13 to mid February, let's put it that way. Some time in 

14 that period. 

15 Q Is that conversation the conversation that you 

16 just related to me where you talked about the suitability 

17 of the site — is that the same conversation or is it 

18 two conversations? 

19 A Yes. I can't recall that we actually talked 

20 about suitability. I just don't remember him saying 

21 anything bad about it. I am left with the impression that, 

22 yes, we will as soon as the Congress votes the money, 

23 we will get into business, get on an air operations 

24 activity. But there was only one conversation with him 

25 at headquarters about it that I recall. 



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Q And it was some time, November to February? 

A Some time in that 3 to 4-month period. 

Q And just sort of the last thing, this photo 
opportunity with the President^^^^^^H which I think 
in other testimony you indicated took place around 
the 19th of March — 

A I think it was St. Joseph's Day. 

Q Was there any discussion that you recall 
in front of ^^^^^^^^H about the strip? 

A I beg your pardon? 

You had indicated that! 
present with^^^^^^H yourselves and your wives and it . 
was a social occasion. Do you recall any discussion about 
it then? 

A No. During that visit the times that I recall 
I^^H was present with m^^| and me was immediately after 
we came out of the oval office. ^^^^H was in the 
secretarial office where the secretaries are for Admiral 
Poindexter,^^^^^^B had brought up some picture books 
and he inscribed them and gave one to 
one to North and he had two others; one, of course, 
that he had presented to the President, and one for 
Poindexter. 

And, we chatted there for 5, 10 minutes, but 
there was nothing during that conversation about the 




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air strip. Subsequent to that, we had dinner in Georgetown 
with our wives and I don't recall that he said anything 
at all about that. Most of the conversation would have 
dealt with|^^^|^|^^^HBs^^^^^^°"' ^^^ political 
situation, not the air strip. 




I am reminded about the Poindexter meeting. Again 
not a single word during the meeting in which North, 
Poindexter and I were present ^^^^^^^| was there any 
reference at all to the air stri 




Q You had indicated earlier that in June of 
19 86, in or around June of 1986 there came a time when 
the plane had to make an emergency landing, and it became 
stuck in the nud. 

Did you have any role in that incident? 
Obviously not the incident of getting it stuck, but in 
getting it out? 

A Yea. 

Q What did you do? 

A Well, the first thing, Quintero came into town, 
and met with him in hi* hotel room, and he said, "I have 
been told that I shouldn't tell you this, but I am going 
to tell you this. A plane that was to make a delivery had 



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problems and had to make an emergency landing, and then 
landed at the air strip, and I think that was probably the 
worst moment that I experienced in two and a half years 

because we had just completed assuring the 
President of Costa Rica that the air strip was not being 
used; that it was never going to be used; that we were 
going to close it down and it became a park or whatever." 

Q This was a new President? 

A Yes, the new president. Arias, J 

Here Quintero 
says the plane is there and it is stuck in the mud. I 
got back to the ambassador immediately, and told him 
what was told to me, and he reacted the sane way I did, 
and either he or I put in a secure telephone call to 
North and explained what had happened, and said, "Look, 
do whatever has to be done, but get this damned plane 
out of here. " 

Q Who said "do whatever has to be done, just 
get this plane out of here?" 

A Either the ambassador or I, but that was our 
position, get the plane out of here. Do whatever has to 
be done. He said he would take care of it. He was 
supposed to leave the next morning on a trip to Washington 
for consultation and delayed my departure until about 
11 o'clock in the morning — no I left the office about 



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11 o'clock in the morning. I actually left town about 
1 o'clock in the afternoon, and I arrived in Washington 
about 11 o'clock that night, Baltimore to Washington, and 
I found out that night or early the next morning. I can't 
recall. I know I made some phone calls to find out what 
happened to the aircraft, because they had promised^ 
they had promised that it would be gotten out of there 
as soon as possible. They would bring other aircraft 
in with a starter motor and -- 

Q Who had promised? 

A Quintero had promised that he would do whatever 
needed to be done, and we had obviously made the phone' 
call back to North from the office. Well, it wasn't 
out of there for another day or so. Fortunately, it got 
out of there and^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hnever found out about 
until, of course, the ^BmAt Commission report. 

As I understand it, they had to bring in 
one or two other aircraft. ;i4ii is from Quintero^ to unload 
the first one to lighten the load. Then they had to pull 
it out and once they pulled it out, they had to bring in 
another plane because they couldn't crank the engines. 
As I have described it to others, it was a Larry, Mo and 
Curly operation and very typical of the way I thought they 
ran both the air deliveries and their business. 

Q What was on the plane when it got stuck in 



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the mud? 

A I assume lethal equipment. I guess it was 

lethal equipment, because they didn't carry anything 
el se. 

Q That crew didn't? 

A That is right. 

Q And why did you call North? 

A You want to get something done, you call 
North. Something like that, absolutely. There was no 
question in my mind that North had control or influence 
on and had responsibility for this stuff. No question 
in my mind at all. Not that he ever told me that I eun-^- 
no. 

In the evolution of things, if that was a problem, 
that was the only person I would call. 

Q Because you knew — 

A It was his problem. 

Q Okay. Did North tell you what he was going 
to do to get it out of the mud? 

A No. He just said I will do what has to be done. 
I will take care of it. I will see what has to be done. 

Q Was there anyone else in the Government that 
you regarded as like North in having control or having 
responsibility for the lethal operation going out of 



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1 A No. 

2 No: 

3 A No. 

4 There were two guys who worked with North in 

5 ■■ '^-^ 



the saroe suite: Robert EarlEand esay Coy. 

6 A I never talked to either of them. In fact, 

7 on occasion when they answered the phone I wouldn't speak 

8 to theiti, not until I got the — I was trying to get 

9 information back to him on the Hasenfus flight. I had 

10 received a call from Quintero saying that the plane 

11 hadn't returned, andhad it crashed landed in Costa Rica 

12 °^ had it landed somewhere in Costa Rica. 

13 I said we will, "I'll try and find out." I 

14 couldn't find out anything, and the fact that I couldn't 

15 find out anything is what I wanted to get back to Quintero 

16 and I couldn't do it. I forget now the reason, the 

17 telephone lines were down or whatever. So I called 

18 North's office and said, "Look, I know you must be 

19 concerned about this flight that has not returned to its 

20 home base. I want to tell you that there is absolutely 

21 no information that it is anywhere^^^^K^n Costa Rica," 

22 and on that occasion North was not available. 

23 Earle. answered the phone and I said, "Please 

24 pass this message to Colonel North..." that there was 

25 no evidence whatiftever that that plane has landec 



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1 We will keep checking. 

2 Another hour or so, and Managua announced that 

3 it had shot the plane down. 

4 Q Just to be sure, this is on the record, I take 

5 it the Hasenfus flight was not a flight for which you 

6 were to provide information? 

7 A That is right. I didn't even know it was coming 

8 down. It was not designated for the southern front. It 

9 did apparently follow the same route that the other 

10 planes which did deliver^ material to the southern front 

11 followed, and the Sandinistas — this would have been 

12 the seventh flight during the month of September, and they 

13 were waiting for it. 

14 Q Let me ask you about another thing I know that 

15 you have testified sibout, but I want to ask you specific 

16 questions, and that is the September 1986 incident when 

17 the air strip is about to be exposed. 

18 Mr. Wilson . When you frame your questions here 

19 you should know that was not covered by the Senate 

20 Select Committee. 

21 MR. EGGLESTON: In conversations with them, 

22 I thought they had covered it. If they have not covered 

23 it, then let me do it in a more complete fashion. 

24 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

25 Q Could you describe in a complete fashion that 



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incident and your involvement in it? 

A As I mentioned earlier, the ambassador had 

assured President Anas that the air strip was not to be 
used, would not be used, that in effect construction had 




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was clear to us that the air strip 
was no longer a viable proposition for the original 
purpose intended. 

However, the cunbassador and ij 

were quite adamant 
that the site should be protected. First of all, I had 
a personal interest in the ecological balance of that 
area. 

I felt that at least with the civil guard 
under control of the place 1 
that poachers wouldn't get into this area; that turtle eggs 
along the beach near the site would be left unmolested, 
and other ecological — it is a very — it is a unique 
part of the Central American isthmus, and in that it is 
virtually unspoiled land, and part of the agreement, as 
I understood, between the private benefactors and the 
owner of the property was that it would be maintained as 
ecologically protected as possible. 

So I was insisting] 

keep guards on the property until the 
private benefactors were able to work out their situation 



with the owner. 



II 



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^^^H The ambassador talked^^^^^^^^^^^^^Habout 
putting guardsm^l^^^^^^^Hon the property to avoid 
the possibility of having drug traffickers use that 
site, and this was a continuing concern during the period 
of June, July and August. 

In late August, | 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^t he 
President had decided to announce, to call a press 
conference and announce that the actual purpose or the 
original intended purpose of the site 





THE WITNESS: So I called Colonel North at home. 
Again, it was his problem, and I complained to Colonel 



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North what I had heard and he said, "All right, I wi?] 
take care of it. I will gat hold cf Elliott and 

Shortlv thereafter, jjt/M called me and said 

^^ c_ 

I just talked to Ollie and we had ~~4H said that he 
and Elliott--that he, Elliott and Ollie had all discussed 
this and they thought that the best way to handle this 
situation was to have the ambassador call President Arias 
and put the lid on this press conference. 




I then — and I called^^^Hback and told 
him that, and then I got a call from the ambassador, 
who was in Greensboro, Greenville, something — South 
CArolina or North Carolina, where he was giving a speech, 
and he said that he had contacted Arias and that he had 
persuaded Arias not to hold the press conference. 

Subsequent to that, the Tower Commission and 
so forth, there had been allegations of $80 million. My 
impression is now on reflex, is that the ambassador said 
that he persuaded the President on the basis that this was 
an act of bad faith; that we had fulfilled our part of 
the bargain in that the air strip was not being used, would 
not be used, and he didn't see the reason why it was 



llMriAS£l£lfIl- 



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necessary to go to the press and so forth 




BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q You have made a few references to the Tower 
Conmission. You obviously have read parts of it, probably 
the parts that deal with your part of the world. Let 
me ask you, there have been some claims that Colonel 
North, himself, called President Arias. 

A Not so. Never heard that. He didn't know 
President Arias except by name. He had never met with 
him. How would President Arias know who Colonel North 
was? 

Q So you have no knowledge that he ever called him, 
and your opinion based on your knowledge of the Costa 
Rican situation is that it is unlikely any such call took 
place? 

A I am certain it didn't take place. The only 
two people that could have called President Arias was 
either Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrains or the ambassador 
to deal with this particular question. 




would have been clearly and properly a matter for 



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the eunbassador to deal with or Assistant Secretary Abrams. 

Q Do you know whether there were any efforts 
after there was this announcement that the air strip 
was going to be exposed? Do you know whether there were 
any efforts to get rid of all traces of Udall; whether 
there was any effort to clean up the si*-uation, to make 
sure that there was no -- 

A Well, you know — I don't know if this was a 
matter of conversation or — it seems to me that t^HffB ( 
were left with a problem in how to deal with the American 
owner of the property, Hamilton. And, I am sure I talked 
to the ambassador about it. I don't recall talking to' 
North about it. But how do you deal with a thing where 
you have got this piece of property and they have a 
contract and how do you get out of it and that sort of 
thing? 

Q By this time, does it still have the storage 
tanks on it? 

A There were no storage tanks. There were some 
fuel drums, 55-gallon fuel drums. 

Q That is what I meant. I was referring to the 
fuel drums. 

A Once the thing had been essentially abandoned 
that became civil guard property in terms of whatever was 
left there in terms of fire extinguishers and things like 



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that 





Q So you think that that was gone by then? 

A ^^^^^^^^^H It could still be there for all 
I know , , 

Q I know that you have been shown others of these 
messages before. I want to show you some of these. I euti 
sure that they are the bane of your existence by now, 
and I am sure that you have been asked about some of 
these specific cables. 

I am going to identify them not by having the 
court reporter mark them, but by giving the name and date 
at the top of them so it is clear what we are talking about. 

■ u) 

3/3/86,^^^H If you could just take a look at this one. 

A The Tower Commission investigators showed me 
this one. It has all the earmarks — this is my sign-off-- 

MR. EGGLESTON: By this, he is referring to 
the Capital D, Capital V. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q What does D.V. stand for? 

A It is latin for Dominus Vobiscum, the Lord 
be with you. That is what Colonel North used to answer. 

Q How did Colonel North in his messages -- 



UMPI ACCIflTJI 



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how did he abbreviate that? 

A He didn't. He used another thing, which I 
never knew what it meant-- B.T. 

Q You didn't know what B.T. meant? 

A No. Now, obviously as you read it through, 
I recognize that I wrote thi3, but the only thing is I 
do not remember at all ever writing this first line, or 
the second line, as a matter of fact. 

Q By lines, he is referring to the first and 
second sentences. 

A On February 26 a Maule — the first or second 
sentence. I don't recall having written this. The fapt 
that this plane Ceune in and I described this in my testimony 
to the Senate, this plane came in to ^^^^^H airport as 
a result of an arrangement between Quintero and 




As a test run of this Maule' 

this had come as an outgrowth of 
a conversation that I had with Quintero about the possible 
use of this Maule, which he had told me they had up there, 
to ijnmediately evacuate people from inside Nicaragua 

as well as to take up the leader of the 
southern front inside to meet with his troops, to see if 



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it is possible this Maule could be used for that, because 
it is a short take-off or landing aircraft, and so 
this was the first attempt -- this was a sort of a -- 
this was an attempt to see if the plane could actually 
fly without problems! 




Q Whose Maule was it? 

A Private benefactors. When the thing landed 

and 

the authorities there, proper, requestedlthese people and 
the pilot — it was both pilots. They found that the 
pilot's license was expired, that they didn't have 
insurance on the plane. They didn't have a flight 
plan. It was another Larry, Moe and Curly operation. 

They said there is nothing we can do here for you 
to regularize your situation, and the authorities ordered 
the P^^^s^ll^^^^^^B At^^^^^^H the 
properly called in the DEA. It says they suspected 
the pilots might be ours and they asked the DE.^ to check, 
and that is how the DEA asked me, and that is how I found 
out for the first time that the plane was even in the 
country. 

Everybody was satisfied that these guys were 
not drug runners or anything like that, and they let 
them go finally. 

Q Did you have any role in getting them to let 



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then go finally. 

Q Did you have any role in getting them to let 
them go, getting the authorities to let them go? 

A I told the DEA — I said satisfy yourselves, 
make sure you are absolutely sure that these people are 
not narcotics tr-ffickers, and they did, and they said, 
"Okay, then you don't have any hold on them." They said, 

"No." 1 said, "Tell the authorities that and let them 

II 

work out their problem on the insurance. 

I told Qulntero they better get down there to 
file whatever papers they had with the FAA so these people 
could get the plane released. They were hanging around 
and finally they got into the plane and took off and flew 
it back. That was the end of my problem. 

Q You mean they didn't do emy of these things. 
They jumped in the plane and left? 

A Yes. Never to return again, because, of course, 
the tail number is burned. 

For what reason are you involved in helping 
this plane get released? Row did you get involved? 

A DEA called me and said is this your airplane? 

Q So your only role in this was to tell DEA that 
it was not your airplane? 

A That is right. Once I heard it was a Maule, I 
knew exactly what plane it was. 



llMPimiflfiJ_ 



491 



Q You knew it was a private benefactor? 

A It had to be. Do you know how many Maules 
there are in Latin America? Perhaps 5 or 6. It is QN 
unusual airplane, a fabric-covered single engine^***** ''^ 
aircraft with oversized wings, and it doesn't carry 
more than zbout a thousand pounds because of its-- because 
it simply doesn't have the capacity, so it isn't a plane 
that you would use for hauling goods. 

You use it for airplanes, that sort of thing. 

Q Carrying people? 

A Carrying people, right. 

Q But you didn't help get the plane released 
other than to tell DEA that it was not your plane? 

A As long as they didn't have anything on that 
plane or on those people to police, so inform the authorities 
at 




They had no problem coming to me and asking me 
if we knew anything about it, and I had no problem 
telling them that I suspected that they were probably 
friends of the contras and that if they didn't have a 
problem with it, so inform them and let these guys handle 
the problem on their own. 

Q Let me show you what has Copp: 3/24/86^^^^B 
at che top. This is not from you. There is a reference 



492 



KNKHSSffiBr 



58 



bp-2 2 

1 to a ^^1 in it, which leads me to conclude that you might 

2 have some knowledge about the events. I want to ask you 

3 about the underlying events. It appears to be from Secord, 

4 at that time known to you as Copp? 

5 A While I did not know of Copp and had only met 

6 Seccrd once, that is not to say he did not know of me. 

7 I don't know what North or Quintero told him. Ralph, 

8 which is Quintero, should have held discussions withB 

9 by now with regard to Negro Chamnoro's troops. Let's 

10 start — let's get the record straight right there. 

11 I don't know anything about the L-lOO at 

12 ^^^^^^^H I don't know who th 



uJ 




is that they are 

13 referring to here, but I assume it is the same ^^| here 

14 which is obviously me. But I could in no way do anything 

15 to secure and insure he does all possible to get the 

16 load released f roro^^^^^^H That is at | 

17 Q You could call 

18 A That is right, but I wouldn't have done it, 

19 and didn't do it, and I think it was very presumptious 

20 on their part to think that I would do it — on their part 

21 I an talking about Copp, Secord and Ollie. 

22 Q Do you recall the incident that this text is 

23 talking about taking you out of it? I am not asking you 

24 to ratify your participation in it, but do you recall that 

25 there came a time when there was an L-lOO coming down 



493 



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iin8insaaii:T 



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that was going to pick up supplies? 

A No, I was expecting a delivery, an L-lOO 
flight. I didn't know where the supplies were coming 
from except °^^ fl^^HUH Whether they were supplies 
outi 



or supplies out of Tirabu/ktu, I didn't 



know. 



Q What did you expect to be on the flight? 

A Lethal supplies. 

Q And was this a flight that was going to fly out 
and drop into Nicaragua? 

A That is correct, but where it gets the supplies 
from, I don't know. 

Q It was going to do this without stopping at 
Point West? 

A Point West was never considered as a stop at 
any time because Point West wasn't finished. It never 
was finished. Just as an aside here, I find it remarkable 
that so much attention has been put on Point West when 
in fact all it is or ever was, was a leveled piece of 
ground which was never suitable for the landing of a 
large aircraft. 

It never was completed. In fact, you might 
say here are these crazy gringos leveling off this land, 
and it is unsuitable for anything. I don't understand 
where there is even a suggestion of some sort of wrongful 



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activity, when in fact no Nicaraguan ever stepped on that, 
no equipment with the exception of that one emergency 
landing, and that could have been a corn field. That 
place was never used, although it was intended to be used. 
The L-lOO flight, I asked headquarters in cable traffic 
for flight path, hostile risk of forces information, for 
radar coverage, and headquarters sent all of this information 
down which I then passed along to Quintero, who gave it 
to the pilots of the L-100. 

There was only one flight of the L-100. There 
were several requests because there were a number of 
aborts or that they couldn't get the plane off the ground 
or the plane had to turn around or whatever, but there was 
only one actual delivery by a L-100, that I recall, and 
that was with information provided by headquarters in 
response to my request, all done openly. 

That is the only one. Now as far as all the 
rest of this stuff, I cannot comment on it because I 
don ' t know . 

Q Did you know that Rob Owen had any involvement 
with the L-100? 

A I did not know that until I read it in the 
newspaper that somehow or other he took a flight or 
something or he was involved in something with the L-100. 
I only knew Rob Owen to be a collector of information as 



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61 



a provider of information when he cameJ 

did not know he had anything to do with that L-100. 

Q And the statement in here that Copp--suggesting 
that North, that he callflH if that is a reference to 
you, he -- North -- never called you and asked you to get 
the load released f rom | 

A That is correct. He never called me, and it 
is certainly presumptious on the part of the writer, 
Secord, Copp, to think that I will have or could have done 
anything about that. 

Q Did you ever call^H^^HH^H and ask that 
material, military supplies, be released from locations 



for transportation down to the south? 




August, I went ^^^^^^^^^^^Hand I 

[and asked if he could ask the FDN to consider their 
brothers in arms in the south and provide them with some 
assistance. 

Q How did ^^^^H communicate to you? 
A Personally in Washington and I was supposed to 
and I diverted Washington to Iliami to 
back to Miami back] 
Q Did you talk tc 
A Yes. 
Q He said, "I will pass it along." He didn't 





promise anything, and I didn't expect anything. 



496 



iM^iasi^ 



bp-26 UTlUCnVVirlKi'V g2 

1 Do you know what happened? 

2 A We didn't get anything. 

3 Q Is there any cable traffic reflecting this? 

4 A 1 don't think so. 
5 
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Q So, Other than that occasion, you never called 
or coiiununicated with| 
A No. 

Let me make the point whyfl^^H asked me to qo 

^: ^^^ 

down is because I had told^^^^f what an absolutely 
desparate situation the southern forces were in. They were 
being decimated during that period and they had nothing, 
just nothing. 

Q Had they started an offensive at that time? 

A No offensive. They had not had an offensive 
since 1983. If anything, they were running. They couldn't 
even cover their own retreat operations, because they 
didn't have the material to do it with. 

So, it was -- >» 

Q So, It was after you explained ^<^^^^H ^^^ 
situation in the south that he suggested that you go talk to 



A And see if the FDN, through their own channels, 
with their own means, with their own aircraft, could somehow 
deliver some equipment to the people in the south. 

Q Let me return to this L-lOO for a moment. 

Do you know whether this L-lOO had anything to 
do with NHAO? Whether it had come down with — 

A Now, I know from reading the press that it did, 
but I did not know at that time. 



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uiiHir 



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Q You did not know? 
A No. 

BY MR. GIZA: 
Q Can I ask you — you talk about this insurance 

. c 

department; H^H speaks to you personally after you have 
spoken with H^H telling him the serious situation with 
the southern front. 

A Yes. ^ 

Q Couldn't^^^fB have picked up the secure phone 
ca 1 1 ed ^^^^^^^^^^B himse 1 f ? 

A Yes, sure. 

Q But did you sense that it was his view that 
coming from you personally it would have had, you know, a 
larger impression there with f^^Hpicking up the phone? 

A Probably. 

Q Or was it he didn't want any communications over 
the air waves? 

A Oh, no. No. 

Q Via message traffic? 

A My sense was^^Hf^^^P and I very 
close friends, have been for years, and I can say — I could 
probably be more — I could explain. 

In explaining their plight in the south I could 
be more precise in the details of what their condition 
was, and I presume that that is what it was. We didn't 



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discuss it. He didn't say, "Now, you do it, because 

I won't — " — no, no. It was just, "On your way back, 

why don't you stop off ^^^^^^^^^^^H" and I did. 

stayed overnight, left there the next morning and went back 

to Miami and 

BY MR, EGGLESTON: 

Q This cable is from Copp to North three days after. 

A Three days after what? 

Q Three days after the prior cable which was on 
March 24. This is a cable dated 3-27-86, ^HB at the top. 
Could you take a look at that one? 

A This is the story of our life here. 
Well, go ahead. 

Q Well, this cable also suggests that you were 
involved in — I think the last sentence says that you said 
the deal had been set up a long time ago, and there is a 
sentence before that says that you — I shouldn't quote it, 
because — continues to express surprise. 

A I will express surprise right now. 

Q The surprise language indicates he was in recent 
communication with you or someone who was. 

A Yes. 

Q I take it it is your testimony that whatever is 
in this cable that suggests you had involvement in this 
is just false? 



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A Let's take it point by point. 

I don't know anything about the first part of 
the cable. 

Q Right. 

A Let's get down to where it says "Ramano said FDN 
totally unaware of any agreement to send anything to 
Blackie's troops. FDN totally unaware of any agreement --" 
I don't know of any agreement except the fact that the FDN wa 
certainly aware of the plight of the people, of Blackie's 
troops in the south. 

If Blackie made some sort of a- representation 
that there was an agreement, I don't know about it. 

Okay? 

So, this — but the fact is that FDN never wanted 
to share its — whatever it had obtained or it had in its 
supplies with the people in the south. There were political 
reasons as well as normal jealousies. 

The whole mess is the result of incompetence 
on the CIA's part or worse. Well, that is his comment, 
not mine. ^ 

m^l continues to express surprise — I don't know 
what he means by that other than that I would have 
expected the people in the north to help the people in the 
south. 

Meanwhile, my ability to sell this type MSN — 

iiiini Aooirirn 



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I don't know what that means — continues to erode because 
of lack of professionalism. 

MR. WILSON: "Mission"? 
THE WITNESS: Lack of professionalism. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Just editorial comment. 

A I agree with that. 

"This can not be totally attributable to recent 
comments sinceH^Hclaims deal was put together a long time 
ago — " Now, I think I know what it means. 

This is now March of 1986. The troops in the 
south, and I believe it was early November — 
Q Early November 1985. 

A 1985. ^^^|B and a couple other southern front 
commanders met in the field in southern Nicaragua with some 

commanders |^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HH|^^K and 
they wrote an agreement in the field that they would 
cooperate with each other, that they would share information 
and whatever supplies they could. 

That was sort of an expeditious agreement that 
was made in the field, and it was the first time that the 
commanders in the south had actually had a meeting with 
the commanders from the FDN who were also in the upper part 
of the southern area of operations. 

In December, late December, early January, several 

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of the commanders came out of southern Nicaragua and told 
you about this agreement. 

They then sat down and worked out a political 
agreement with Negro Chamorro — these were primarly 
dissident commanders of Eden Pastora who had come out of 
southern Nicaragua — and they sat down and wrote out what 
they thought was the most substantive agreemept that had been 
reached yet, political agreement that had been 
reached yet, and it was an outgrowth of the basis of this 
agreement that they had written in the field with the FDN 
in the north. 

Prior to that, Pastora had not allowed any of 
his commanders to have any contact whatsoever with the , 
northern commanders. 

When they came out, they confronted Pastora, and 
they said, "Either you give us supplies or we are going to 
join up with the UNO structure," which included the FDN. 

Even though Pastora tried to persuade them from 
doing it, they said, "Maybe they can get us supplies," and 
so that was when they sat down. 




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:hey, in fact, sat down and hammered out an agreement 
with the political elements of the UNC^^^^^^^^^^^^f and 
I assume that that is what is referred to here as "since 
the deal was put together a long time ago." 

Q But the suggestion in here in these last two 
sentences that he has in conununication w'th you -- and 
your expressing surprise that these weapons have not yet 
arrived is indeed an improper suggestion. 

A That is certainly an improper suggestion. 

I had no communication whatever with — whether 
he got that from Quintero^ or he got involved from — or" 
that came out of a conversation he had with North, I don't 
know, but it certainly didn't come from the conversation 
with me. 

Q Are you certain that you got your KL-4 3 from 
Quintero|? 

A I am pretty certain. 

Q Could you have gotten it from Rob Owen? 

A I don't think so. Did Owen say that? 

Q Hell, I never tell one person what another 
person says. 

A Hell, I say I am quite certain. 

Q All right. 

A I just don't remember. 



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Now that you raised a doubt in my mind -- 

Q If you got It from Owen, it might have sort of 
changed your view about just what exactly Owen had to do 
with this whole operation that you -- 

A No, not that he had -- not that he was North's 
representative or North's leg man that is working with 
North, no, but I have to say I am pretty certain I got it 
from Quinterol. 

Q Did you ever talk to North about the reason that 
these private individuals, not just the KL-43, which, as 
I said before, is, to my understanding, not a secret — 

A Wait a minute. I never knew that anybody had 
KL-43S except Quintero|, North, and me. 

Q Quinterof is not a government official, though. 

A Yes, well, but he was working with North, so 
I assume that that — whatever clearances. North got him 
clearances. 

Q But you knew that Quinterof was involved. You 
knew he was involved in constructing Point West. 

A And that he was involved at] 

Q With the private benefactors. 

A Sure, with the private benefactors. 

Q And did you ever talk to North about — I assume 
you knew you had this government cassette that was highly 
secret. 



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Did it cause you any concern that Quintero#, 
working for this rag-tag group of suppliers or working 
with them, had access to and was using this, what 
I understand to be a fairly secret and sensitive cassette? 

A Well, you know, you have to put it in the context 
of Oliver North. This is a National Security Council 
deputy director, political military affairs. I mean, you 
know, to a GS-15^^^^^H^H this guy talks to God, all 
right? 

And he meets at a level, and, obviously, I knew 
where he worked in the Executive Office Building. He has 
got tremendous access -- which is to say, he couldn't simply 
pick up the phone and say, "I want clearance for Rafael 
Quintero(f" or for John Jones or Joe Doe, you know? 

He is outside of my area of experience, or this 
was outside of my area of experience. In the agency we 
certainly wouldn't have done it, but then this is the NSC 
Maybe they have got special things that they do. 
Q Okay . 

A It all goes to the fount of this. I mean. North 
IS not some ordinary American citizen that suddenly is 
in a position -- in this position. This is a man who had 
dealings with obviously the Director of CIA. He was at the 
conference in August of ^'^^^^////j/KM ^ ^^^ ^^"' there. 

You know, he deals with my division chief. I am 

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going to question him as to how come this guy that he 
says is totally trustworthy and so forth. 

I certainly questioned him, but he gave me the 
bona fides. That is fine with me. 

Q But, on the other hand, you hear, you see 
Colonel North obviously involved with lethal re-supply of 
the contra s. 

A Which I understood he was permitted to do. 



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Q In a very active way. He has KL-43s which you 
know he has given to Rafael Quintero. When planes get 
stuck in the mud you call Colonel North to get them out. 
A Right. ^ 

Did you ever tell ^^|^^^^H that you had a KL-43? 

I told my division chief that I did. 

When? 

April of '86. 



Who did you tell? 



And when was — where were you when you told hj 



that? 



A ^^^^^^^^^^^B In my 

Q Did you show it to him? 

A Sitting right behind my desk and I pointed to it. 
Was in a bag with, TRW bag, I said that is the communications 
equipment I got from 01 lie. 

Q What did he say to you? 

A He looked at it and he said, okay, didn't say 
anything, he said — I had raised the whole question that 
I felt a little uncomfortable in dealing with the passing 
of information to the private benefactors that even though 
I recognize that it was permissible under the agreement 
between the Agency and the Congress to pass intelligence, 
I still felt a little uncomfortable in doing it. I wondered 

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if there wasn't a better way to do it, and what he 
responded was when got back to Washington he was going to 
check on the law and check, on this whole situation, and he 
would get back to me. And in May, we had^^^^Bconf erence 

[and he raisad the problem, and he said -- he 
raised it in Tront of^^^^H he raised it in front of 

^^ and 
he said ^^^^1 got a problem, and we got to fix it. 

By that time I had come up with an idea of how to do 
it. 

Q This is by putting it through the — 
A By putting a Nicaraguan communicator 

that we had trained, with equipment 
that we supplied to him, and then he could do an inter- 
face, direct interface with the private benefactors out of 

using our connnunications equipment and our 

bunds 
one-time code tnrt« , communicate with the communications 

center^^^^^^^^^|to the people inside Nicaragua, and back 

the same way to the private benefactors. 

And I guess you know the story of what happened after 

that. 

Yes. 

But — 



But it is your testimony that you specifically 
U 
told m^^^^H when you met with him in April of '86 that 

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you had a KL-4 3? 

A In my office. 

Q And that it was to communicate with Ollie. 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you tell him — 

A The private benefactors. 

Q Sorry. 

A With the private benefactors. 

Q You told him it was so that you could communicate 
with the private benefactors? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you tell him you had gotten it from Ollie? 

A I believe I did. 

Q Did you tell him you had actually received it from 
Rafael Quintero? 

A No, I don't think I ever mentioned Quintero 's 
neuae to him. 

Q But it was clear from what you said to him that 
the private benefactors also had a KL-43. 

A Oh, sure. You know that is who I was communicating 
with and that is what the problem was that we wanted to fix. 
There is a point I want to make here — 

Q Sure. 

A -- and that is I also told him I kept the 
ambassador fully informed in response to his question, and 

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that seemed to satisfy him. As long as you keep the 
Axnbassador fully informed, you know, I don't see that there 
IS a problem -- fully informed in the sense that I was 
passing information, that we had a flight coming, whatever. 
And also that I had requested the flight path and hostile 
forces information from headquarters and had relayed that 
to the benefactors for the purpose of the flight. 

Furthermore, after the L-lOO flight and all the 
subsequent flights all the way through September, I sent 
intelligence reports, disseminated what we call intel 
dissends, disseminated intelligence reports t hough the 
intel community in CIA channels concerning delivery of this 
material and as I pointed out in my testimony to the 
Senate, I think it is evident here when the problem was 
not fixed and when North said he had these supplies to 
send down in September, I agreed to pass the information 
on the drop zones and so forth, and as soon as that first 
intel report was received in Washington, they knew that 
there was — that the communications link had been 
established again. 

They knew it as of the first intel report that they 
received and nobody from Washington caune down and said, 
"Stop what you are doing, ^^H" 



uJ 



Let me show you a memo that has 



4-12-86 



and 



'at the top. 



UNCI ASIslFIFR 



c 



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UttClA^i^T 



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Do you remember this one? 

A Yes. It was referred in the Tower Commission 
report and I wrote up notes for counsel. I would like 
to quote because it was a very spontaneous when I wrote this 
and I think it reflects my thinking now and at the time. 

Q All right. 

A So the portion of the April 12 message which 
mentioning the creation of the 2000 man force, end quote, 
reflects a poor choice of words on my part and needs 
explanation. First the message should be understood in 
context of an informal communication and as such was 
written in an offhanded style. It was obviously not meant 
to be anything more than a simple direct expression of an 
ideal, perhaps of an ideal perhaps unattainable situation. 

Secondly, in a more appropriate choice of wording 
I might have cited the expectation of the Southern Front 
commanders whose views I was essentially representing as 
my own, and the exhortation that all USG and 
Nicaraguan resistance elements pull together in support 
of a southern front, including the NSC. 

For the record, the message represented a bit of 
brainstorming and I subsequently wrote an identical cable 
to Headquarters in a staff channel message of the existence 
of this panel was made in the office of the Inspector 
General — and hopefully has been found. 



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So to summarize I would like that understood in 
the context of being really a reflection of what the 
southern commanders wanted, and this came as a result of 
our contacts with them. 

Q The difficulty is that you creating a 2500 man 
force is the one thing I take it which you knew you could not 
do. 

A Of course I couldn't do, on April 12 although 
we had expected the vote I guess to be a favorable one 
sometime in the spring this was looking, this was 
something that we were looking down the road at. 

Q Right. 

A As it turns out it was what, four months later, 
3 or 4 months later, June -- no, two months later, that 
the vote finally took place but it wasn't until October 
24, '86 thatJ^^^^^Hactually got a scent. 

Q The portion of this memo right before the 
section that you talked about though similarly suggests 
"our plans during the next 2 to 3 weeks include", and it 
lists the various drops, NHAO drops — 

A Please put it in the context of the southern 
commanders. Please put it in that context. 

Q But is it you and the iMukyurii commanders or 
is it 3ust the southern commanders? 

A That is so hard to distinguish. Obviously 



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reflect their concerns. I was their advocate, their 
spokesman. I was the person who was reporting on their 
problems to the communities. 

Our intelligence reports all reflect that 
repeatedly. The condition that they were in, what they ~ 
were suffering. I mean that was my responsibility. 

Q Alleviating their condition, I take it? 

A No, reporting it. 

Q Right. 

A Sympathizing with them, explaining to whoever 
had to know about these things what condition they were 
in so in expressing the question — remember we are dealing 
with a machine there that is very limited in its function 
and so when I said "our" I am representing an aggregate 
of ^^^^^^^^^H views, the commanders' views , the southern 
political views. I am not trying to be cute with words or 
writing for the purpose of the record. 

Obviously had I known that this thing was going 
to get so much scrutiny there would — it wouldn't have 
been done in such a careless way. If you read my intel 
reports in fact you will read most of my operational cables 
I would say 99 percent of them, you will find they are 
very carefully done. 

Q I have read an enormous number of them, I think 
Hr . Giza has probably read every one. 



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MR. GI2A: I read a lot of them. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q And I think that is generally true. 
A I was very careful with the wording so I get 
trapped by the sort of feimiliar style because after all 
I am writing to my buddy, Ollie, and that sort of engenders 
a certain sense of — 

MR. LEON: Informality? 

THE WITNESS: ~ of informality. 

MR. GIZA; You also knew these cables were not 
going to be subjected to the dissemination that your 
cables that were sent to Headquarters would be 
subjected to, right? 

THE WITNESS: Within the general sense of my 
relationship with Ollie, that is correct, and I want to 
make a point about that because I am sure that at some 
point in our discussions here today, it is going to be 
raised. 

What about this relationship with North and me? 
W« were close friends. We — I saw in him a very dynamic 
individual, someone who truly believed as I did, and I do, 
that the cause of the people who I was in contact with on 
an almost daily basis was a legitimate one, that I saw 
in North a person who would not shirk from doing what he 
could do to support these people. 



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UWBI^FIfF 



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By the same token, I must say in all honesty 
that^there were political differences between myself and 
land I saw in Ollie North an advocate at 




the iftif'^revel so that my views could be more fairly 



represented than I thought they were being represented, 
than I believed they were being represented by^^^H who I 
think had a different agenda. 
BY MR. GIZA: 

Q What do you think that agenda was? 

A A much stronger political role for the FDN , and 
that the south led by Alfonso Robel/o was incapable — 
or say that that was the moderate social democratic elements 
of the resistance were unable to adequately represent the 
strong political position that ^^^^Hwan ted them to 
represent . 

^^^HB on a number of occasions attempted to 
manipulate situations -- and don't ask me to pin them down 
because I can't — whereby I felt that the southern poli- 
tical organization was put at a disadvantage, that I 
was being — that my arguments were not being heard with 
the weight that I felt that they should be heard, and so 
essentially what I did is I enlisted Ollie North by 
virtue of our friendship and our relationship to be my 
advocate at that level. 

Now, my cables to a certain degree if you read 

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battled him for a year until he 
finally said this is the way it is going to be, and then as 
a good soldier I said all right, I accept that. But I 
argued forcefully and I enlisted North to ?rgue forcefully 
as though he represented himself and not necessarily me 
in those councils of policy thi 




MR. EGGLESTON: I have seen that show one time 
and that was the one I happened to see. 

THE WITNESS: Well, let me tell you that that 
was one of many points of contention, and in all honesty 
it was a very professional difference, never a personal 
difference. I have great admiration for ^^^^^^palents and 
his abilities. He is a very bright person, forceful person, 
a very articulate person, but as a chief of station trying 
to accomplish certain things, I felt that we were being -- 
that we were not getting the kind of understana/that was 
necessary so, yes, I did do that. Maybe that is called 
political maneuvering, maybe it is called a lot of things, 



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WffliikT 



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but that is essentially one form of my relationship with 
Ollie North. 

BY MR. LEON: 

Q Did you ever act around ^^^^H bacic? 

A Oh, no. 

Did you ever go around ^^^^H back in acting out 
North's wishes? 

A No , oh , no . Look, on the aspect of North and 
what he was doing with the private benefactors and my 
participation in passing the information, I was convinced 
throughout this period that my superiors in Latin America 




Division, 



and North were fully aware of the pass'mg 



of the information, and that was clearly -- 



MR. EGGLESTON: 
THE WITNESS: 




and 

and 



Make sure it's 



MR. EGGLESTON: North as well? 

THE WITNESS: Not my superior, but they knew what 
I was doing in terms of passing information back and 
forth between the commanders and the private benefactors 
as was shown in that meeting in May ^^^^^^^^^H and the 
attempt to resolve the problem and the fact that intel 
reports in September when the flights resumed again, that 
they saw these things coming in and they said nothing. 
They allowed it to continue. So what am I as a reasonable 



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person supposed to assume? Certainly, I had not -- while 
I may not have had specific authorization to do this or to 
do that, neither was there a specific instruction not to 
do It . 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Let me, show you another one that you have 
seen before, ^^^^ 4 - 1 5 - 8 6 , ^^^^HH^HmS" it 
Have you seen this one before? 
A Yes. 

Q Let me just take this one sort of piece by piece. 
First, "delivered to^^^^H^Vby 707 yesterday 
is a planeload of ordnance for your friends." 
Do you know where the 707 came from? 
A No, sir. 

Q You didn't even know if it came from Europe or 
you didn't have any — 
A Or the moon . 
Q You didn't have any idea. 
A No. 

Q About half way down it says, "Is there a UNO/HRN 
communicator being placed in^^^^^^H" I may have 
misunderstood but it was my understanding that this was 
sort of the resolution and that you knew by this time 
there wasn't any. 

A No, no, no, no , ^^^^H cajne down in April and the 



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idea of placing a conununicator was my idea that I raised as 
a proposed solution in May. Of course there wasn't one 
at this time because we had not worked out anything yet. 

Q Right. 

A But that we would put a communicator up there in 



Q Aye. 

A I raised that at the meeting in May, on July 12 
the cable came down and said hands off. 

Q But at this time you knew there was no communicator 

A Right, sure, sure we knew that. There was 
never any communicator. At some point I assume I sold 
Ralph, I don't think I told -- this is from North -- I may 
have told North that one possibility is to put a UNO/FARN 
is the Negro Chamorro portion of UNO, to put one 
Nicaraguan communicator up there, throwing it out as an 
idea. But the thing was not — there was no conanunicator 
then. I was still handling the passage of information then 

When we ventf^HH^P in May I raised the 
idea formally in the meeting with flHjB ^|^P ^^^ ^^^ 
K and that is the chronology of it. 

Q Is this a message from North to you? 

A That is from North. 

Q To you? 



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Do you remember getting it at the time? I don't 
mean do you remember getting it ^^^^^^^^^^ft but -- 

A Yes, I got the message. 

Q Explain to me why he writes, "When and where do 
you want this stuff? 

A "You" — again it is the commanders. 

Q But he is expecting you then to ask the 
commanders? 

A I could not accept a bullet. I would not accept 
a bullet. Where ^^^^^^^^^^1 could I have? I mean, when 
he is saying "you", he is referring generically to you 
in the south, you the commanders in the south. By the same 
token, the commanders inside Nicaragua never had a set 
position for more than 48 to 72 hours because of the 
Sandinista pressure on them. 

So when he comes in, this is shorthand for saying 
when do you want — when do the commanders want the stuff 
delivered. 

Well, at that point I would then see that a 
message got into the commanders saying are you prepared to 
receive, if you are prepared to receive, then please give 
us a location, a drop zone location. 

They would then — this was all done by one time 
pad, secure communications. Now, often when we did this 
we advised them there is a delivery for you, the benefactors 



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mis 1 wish to deliver for you, can you receive it. They would 

2 say no, we are not in a position to receive it and we don't 

3 expect to be for maybe three days or so because of the 

* particular pressure that they were under militarily, combat 

5 that they were under at the time. 

6 When they were ready to receive it they would then 

7 notify the ccrounication center and say, o)cay, now we 

8 can receive it; we will have a location; and they would 

9 give us a location, secure for the next 24 to 48 hours. 

10 That would be relayed bacK^H^^^^^H and they would aay 

11 well, we can't make it in the next 24 to 48 hours, or, 

12 yes, we will try and we will let you know. 

13 Sometimes they gave us 4 or 5 hours notice 

14 meaning that the plane is leaving at such and such a time, 

15 and it will be there tonight. Hopefully we will be able 

16 to raise the people inside and tell them, light the fi*ee 

17 at such and such a time for the drop. Sometimes we would 

18 have -- they would tell us after the flight was under way 

19 that they had to turn around and go back to base. We 

20 would have to notify them. Please understand that^^^ 
^^^^^H myself, the peopl^^^^^^^^^H the 

22 Micaraquan communicators were only a conduit between the 

23 commanders and these people. We did not decide when a drop 

24 takes place, we had no way to do that. It was up to the 

25 people inside to decide when they could receive a drop. 



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We could not dictate to them. We did not know what their 
situation was. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q I understand, but you have indicated -- actually 
before I get into this, let me talk to Dick for a second. 

MR. WILSON: Can we take a short break. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Sure. Do you want to take a 
couple minutes. I don't have that much more to go. 

(Short recess.) 

MR. EGGLESTON: Back on the record. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q I have seen the cables that you have sent to . 
Headquarters and the ceUoles that came back that related 
primarily to vector information, weather information, 
and things like that. 

What I would like to ask you though is did you 
provide information to Headquarters that you were in 
comnunication with the commanders in the field to inform 
them that military supplies were available? Were they 
aware of this type of communication that you were having 
with Colonel North? 

A I don't remember. 
Q Okay . 

A I don't remember what I said in those cables. 
I just don't remember. Just that they were the southern 
forces were expecting a resupply flight and requested 



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^ that information. 

2 That is my recollection that the cables were 

3 essentially saying. 

^ A That is the best I can do for you. 

5 Q If it is not in the cables, it is not anywhere 

6 it is, it is not in personal conversations or secure 

7 conversations or whatever? 

8 A No. Not that I recall. 

9 Q Okay. I am almost done. I have a lot of 

10 tabs but I am not going to be asking about all of them. 

11 A I think when I first talked to anybody about the 

12 whole thing was with] 

13 Q In April? 

14 A Yes, in April. That was just — no, it was just 

15 after the L-lOO flight and frankly I was not comfortable 

16 with the situation and I wanted to be sure that passing 

17 of this kind of information which was according to ray 

18 understanding within the parameters of the agreement, that 

19 it was okay and that is why I talked to^^^^f who was the 

20 Chief-designate for Latin America Division. 

21 I Q Do you know whether the time you spoke with 

22 ^^^^^Hwas before or after? 

23 A You would have to check when I was there, 

24 I don't remember. I know it was before May 1st because 
25 



he took over May 1 



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MR. GIZA: Right. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Do you know when he was there? 

MR. GIZA: No, I think he was probably taking 
a trip around the region before he took over. 

THE WITNESS: Correct. He knew many of the 
characters I was dealing with. 

MR. GIZA: Sure. He was head of the Task Force 
when you were there. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, he brought me into it. 

Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. EGGLESTON: Let's get back on this. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q I only have about two left and we will finish 
up. This is one that says at the top "Copp: 4-28-86 

I eun not suggesting it is to or from you 
or that you have ever seen it before, but there is a 
reference to two things I want to know whether you have 
any knowledge of . 

The first was in handwriting at the bottom, and I 



don't know if you recognize the handwriting, it says 






need to get codes and — looks like photos — to ^^H 

This is at the end of April '86. Do you know 
what this is about? 

A Codes , I can only assume that I needed the May 



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cassette. 

Q Right. 

And does that say photos? 
A Oh, you know what they were? The pictures of 
^^^|and us at the White House with the President. 
Q Okay. 

There is one other thing that I ]ust want to ask 
you whether you know what it is about, paragraph 3, that 
was in handwriting at the very bottom designated as 
paragraph 6, paragraph 3 which is typewritten, Olmsted 
still needs to go to Miami to produce radios for| 
MR. WILSON: Procure. 
MR. EGGLESTON: What did I say? 
MR. WILSON: "Produce". 
THE WITNESS: No, I have no idea. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Just two left, this one says at the top "Copp: 
Below that it says "May 02, ^^^1 
Can you read paragraph 1 and tell me if 
you know about that? 

A The indigenous along the Atlantic Coast were the 
most neglected of all the southern forces and as I 
recall it Quintero wanted to know how they could get -- 
what would be one way of getting deliveries into these 
people, to the Indians along the southern coast. I said 

I'^IAI «noiriir-f\ 




526 



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i20 ^ there are only two ways to do it, one is by boat and the 

2 other is by air. By air it was suggested that they could 

3 fill weapons into 55 gallon drums, seal there, watertight 

4 seal them and then put what he called a Kerelite, it is a 

5 chemical and plastic thing that when crushed the chemicals 

6 interact and it creates kind of -- cylinder would glow so 

7 that when the aircraft kicks these 55 gallon drums out 

8 and they are floating in the water along the coast, that 

9 the little Kemlite thing would glow and the people in 

10 their canoes could come out from the coast and retrieve 

11 them, retrieve the 55 gallon drums. 

12 Well, that didn't ring like it would be very 

13 practical to me because it involved all sorts of 

14 coordination and communication between the Indian groups 

15 and the private benefactors, and what time and all, and 

16 these Indian people were not capable of doing that. So we 

17 discarded that. I discarded that as a possibility given 

18 my own knowledge of their circumstances. 

19 Furthermore, they didn't have radio equipment, 

20 they didn't have — they were not trained in the use of 

21 radio secure, secure use of radios. So these were, I 

22 discarded that. 

23 Then he said, well, what if we provide boats? 

24 I said — 

25 Q These are conversations with Quintero now? 

IlilAI ■ ^^»mm,^^ 



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A With Quintero, yes, he waa asking me based on my 
knowledge of what I knew of their condition inside, what 
would be practical, what would be impractical in providing 
supp>ort to these people because everybody, myself 
included, recognized that the Indians are probably the most 
effective force that exists along the Atlantic, eastern 
part of Nicaragua. They are fighting for their tribal 
lands, they are fighting on their own territory, they have 
their own language, and they have their own culture which 
is something that the Sandinistas have been trying to bring 
under the regime's control and thmy have been generally 
ineffective in doing so. 

Besides that, they can live with a lot less than 
the Caucasian Nicaraguan can live with. 

So it was proposed that they would buy, that the 
privat* benefactors would buy Zodiac — these are rubber 
type boats — I think it was in Miami or someplace and 
that they would deliver them to, by air to the Atlantic 
coast people so they could start running their — runnin g 
some sort of supply lln« up and down the Atlantic 
coast. 




528 



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Iwhat they 
really needed at that time was primarily medical supplies 
and other things, and that is why they were going to bring 
these boats in. 

Well, I don't know what happened. They didn't 
buy the boats. They didn't get the boats delivered. They 
didn't do that or that. There was a lot of promise and no 
delivery. As it was with most things. But that is basically 
what that means. It was another one of these ideas that 
these people and I don't know, some of it evolved from 
conversations that I had with Quintero, others I think came 
from North or somebody but once we tried it on for size 
it just didn't work. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Okay, I have — 

THE WITNESS: Like the Medevac plane, the 
Maul& 

MR. EGGLESTON: I have no further questions 
that I would ask. I will say something more at the end 
when everybody is done. I may want to ask you other 
questions, but thank you for putting up with us one more 
time. 

THE WITNESS: Sure. I aia just sorry I have not 
been able to be more explicit on things but obviously 
I am trying to recall memories and I have not had access 
to any records from Headquarters. My dates are fuzzy. My 

■ ■•■Mil m f^r-.tr^'i'^i*.' 



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recollection is certainly fuzzier. Then I am trying to 
separate what I have read in the paper from what I knew 
at the time. Some of it gets a little bit -- remember 
another thing, too, please in all this. I know I am not 
using it as an excuse, but this whole thing, when you 
put it altogether in one package of time probably didn't 
represent any more than about 1 percent of all my activity, 
Weeks would go by without even a call to North on the 
secure line or a message, and then obviously there are 
the constant disappointments of promised flights and no 
deliveries. 

After all we are talking about a period from 
approximately late January, 1986 until September 23 or so, 
the third week of September 1986, 9 months, 6 of those 
flights as I recall them came in one month, September, and 
the rest of it was a lot of promises, maybe we can do 
this, maybe we can do that, and all the time laboring with 
the problem of trying to stay well within the definition 
of the amendment and at the same time, putting up with 
the terrible strictures of dealing with these 
people face to face and not being able to satisfy their 
real, real needs. 

But my^^^^^^^operations ,| 

occupied 99 percent of my time. 
So if I am fuzzy on these things, it is because it really 

IIMOI Aooinri) 




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)24 1 didn't have the focus of my attention. 

2 So I apologize for that. 

3 MR. EGGLESTON: I don't know who wants to go 

4 

5 BY MR. GIZA: 

6 



let me say I was out of the room 

7 for a half hour and if I ask you a question that you have 

8 already responded to, just say that you have already 

9 responded to it in this session with Mr. Eggleston, and 

10 I apologize. 

11 Did you on any occasion ever have any private 

12 conversations with Director Casey? 

13 A Yes, two. 

14 Q Did you describe this previously in the Senate 

15 committee? 

16 A I sure did. 

17 Q Did you ever have occasion to send privacy channel 

18 messages to Mr. Casey during your period of time] 
19 

20 A No, sir. 

21 Q When you discussed with me the issue of the 

22 southern front and the problem that you had with' 

23 j^^^^H and how you went to Oliver North for assistance to 

24 push this issue — 

25 A Let me say, please don't misunderstand, it wasn't 



ll&IAI inAir-41^7^ 



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a conscious decision. It was just that Ollie offered 
an opportunity to have ray views aired so that there would 
be as much balance as possible. I didn't plot the thing 
out to make sure that Ollie — I didn't say look, I want 
you to do this, I want you to do that; it wasn't that. I 
would give him my views and I expected him, maybe he did, 
maybe he didn't, but I expected him to at least present 
those views at the RIG. 

Q That is understood. Without getting into this in 
a long amount of detail, my basic sense that you are commu- 
nicating to us is that you had a view that differed from 
the view of your superiors in the Central Intelligence 
Agency concerning the activities and operations of the 
southern front? 

A Not from my superiors, from one superior. 

Okay. Did you ever go to your superiors above 



c 



conmunicate that view? Did you ever go 





ror Clair George? 
Not ^^^^^^^^^^VbecauseB^^^^I rea 1 1 y 
I handle all the Central American things, but to 
sure, on several occasions I expressed my 
concerns about what I thought was an imbalance. 

Q Were these in personal discussions or were these 
in message traffic? 

A No, personal discussions. 



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Q Do you )(now — 

A And only to make, to get things back on track. 
It was again, this was, please, it was a professional 
difference of opinion. It wasn't personal. I didn't go 
behind^^^^H back to do it, but I,^H^Hand I had 
worked together a long time|^^^^^Bas well as in 
Washington, we knew how our style of operation was we 
were both Latin America experts; whereas,^^^Hhad a 
different perspective and there were times when I just 
couldn't make points that I really felt needed to be made 

H about it and^^^H 



and therefore I would talk to I 



would talk to I 



■about it. 



UNCUSSI 



-'If: 



iilu 



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BY MR. GIZA: 
One further question. Did you know 



A Yes. 

C Did you ever have discussions witf 
about the general problems of providing assistance to the 
contras? 

A Only in the context that he was 

and that 

were the contras effective from the perspective of 
Nicaraguans, the civilian populus inside Nicaragua and 
my general lament that the cutoff was devastatiing to 
the people in the resistance. 

Q Did you ever have discussions with him after he 
left position^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand 
Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence? 

A I never saw him again. I haven't seen him since 
he left asl 

MR. GIZA: No further questions. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WESTBY: 

Q Is it fair to say then that the reason you got 
involved -- why did you get involved in giving vectors? 

A Because it was proper for me to do so. 

Q And Ollie asked you directly to do that? 



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lltlliU^»T 



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A No. It was proper for mc to pass information to 
the consnandcrs insid* concerning delivery information. 

Q So that was your complete understanding, that 
it was proper for you to do so. 

A Certainly it was proper for me to do so. 

And up until you have the conversation with 




A I said I was uncomfortable with passing this 
information, which was certainly unorthodox in my experience 
as a CIA field operations officer so I raised it with him 
and he said he would look into it. Then we had the meeting 

and I graphically remember the moment when he 
said^^^has got a problem and we have got to fix it and he 
said that to the assembled^^^^^^|^mand we had to 
figure out how to get this communicator up there so he could 
interface and I would be clearly relieved of that 
responsibility and I don't think that there was ever a 
question about the legality of my passing that 
information. 

I think that where there was concern and there 
were certainly events in that cable of July 12 that there was 
a political concern, not a legal concern. 

In other words ,^|BHwrote in that cable we are 
close to the vote, let's not screw up now or words to that 
effect by getting too close to the private benefactors and 



535 



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yet by saying so we would have been essentially denying the 
legitimate need of the resistance to obtain information 
from us concerning delivery of material, including 
information such as risk of hostile forces and so forth 
that would ensure the safe delivery of material in hostile 
territory to them. 

Q So it was never your impression -- you never said 
to yourself well, I know I am doing something wrong -- 

A Let me make it very clear to you, to this very momen . 



I never did anything wrong — ever. Habye I didn't do 
everything exactly right, but I never did anything wrong. 

Q Okay. This may have been covered in your Senate 
testimony, but how did it come about that this started? Did 
Ollie ever say to you -- did he say. Buddy, can you do me a 
favor? Did he ever put it in the context -- 

A Remember, the commanders signed an agreement in 
January of 1986 whereby they, the former Pastora commanders 
agreed to align themselves with the UNO commanders and take 
inside with them the Chamorro forces that were or troops 

were^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H They 
under the aegis of UNO and as a result of that, they 
expected to receive supplies at some point when the 
funding was to be resumed. 

Now, that was expected to be some time in March 
or April. It didn't come about — the vote didn't even come 

mini kk^cui^i'T^ 



sae 



UKIMSHiiE' 



102 



1 about until June. At the same time. North had supplies or 

2 the private benefactors had supplies at^^^^^^^B The 

3 private benefactors advised me that they had these 

4 supplies which they were willing to deliver to the 

5 commanders who were inside now under this political 

6 umbrella of UNO and they asked "ould you pass this 

7 information. 

8 I was well aware that we were allowed to 

9 pass information on the basis of the agreement that had 

10 been reached under the $27 million humanitarian aid and the 

11 $3 million communications aid in that agreement that existed 

12 between the agency and the House and the Senate, that we 

13 were permitted to pass them information or intelligence of 

14 an intelligence nature, of a counter-intelligence nature, 

15 including information for the safe delivery of supplies. 

16 So on the basis of that, I sent the cable off saying 

17 that the southern commanders are prepared — will be receiving 

18 supplies from the private benefactors, headquarters, can you 

19 F^< "■■' ■■ flight path information. At that point had there 

20 been anything illegal in the situation, I am sure headquarters 

21 would have said no, we can't provide that. 

22 They didn't. They provided very detailed informatioii 

23 concerning the flight path and the risk involved in a delivery 

24 flight. 

25 Clearly, I accepted — not deduced, 1 accepted the 



537 




103 

1 fact that this was legitimately passed information and that 

2 my activities were legitimate. I hope I am not being 

3 argumentative with you. 

4 It is just that I have got to get my view out 

5 and it hasn't been so far. It has been distorted in the 

6 press and with the things -- you asked me if I had talked 

7 to -- I haven't talked to Clair George since summer of 1984. 

8 MR. EGGLESTON: I didn't ask you that. It must 

9 have been at the Senate. 

10 THE WITNESS: No. It was the fellow who was here. 

11 The press says I got Clair Goerge's tacit approval. It 

12 didn't happen and it didn't need to happen because I was 

13 functioning within what I felt were permissible -- in a 

14 permissible activity. 

15 EXAMINATION 

16 BY MR. LEON: 

17 Q Did you have any knowledge of the contras being 

18 ripped off in the construction of the base? 

19 A The contras had nothing to do with the base. 

20 Q I should say -- the money that was being used 

21 to build the base. 

22 A I have no information about that. 

23 Q You came across no evidence of over-billing for 

24 the the services of the construction work -- 

25 A Ouintero thouaht that ^^^^^^^^^^^^H was 



Quintero thought that 



538 



UNCH^RfffT 



104 



CAS-6 1 probably ripping him off ten percent, but that was well 

2 within the accepted conditions of that kind of deal in 

3 Latin America. 
* No, I didn't have any, and I don't know about 

5 any profiteering. 

6 Q You never saw any evidence to support that? 

7 A No. 

8 Did you ever deal with General Secord? 

9 A General Secord — I met General Secord once in 

10 the Ambassador's of f ice^^^^^^^^^f The Ambassador 

11 introduced me to him and at that time — Secord or 

12 Singlaub? 

13 Q I asked you Secord, but I will also ask you Singlaub 

14 A I only met Secord at the meeting in Washington. 

15 Q How about General Singlaub? 

16 A He was introduced to me by the Ambassador in his 

17 office and he explained that the reason he was 

18 was to convince Pastora to accept unity under the UNO 

19 umbrella. 

20 Was Barbara Stud#ley with him by any chance? 

21 A I believe she was. I never saw her. 1 think 

22 the eunbassador mentioned that she was there ^^^^^^^^^H 

23 at the time, yes, but she did not participate in this 

24 meeting nor did I ever meet her. 

25 General Singlaub went on with this sort of wishful 

s»iicLAQCirij:n 



539 



IWStASSfflST 



105 



1 hope that he could convince Pastora to accept unity. I 

2 qave General Singlaub about a ten minute recitation on 

3 the capriciousness , instability .erratic behavior of our 
^ experience with Pastora in previous years. 

5 I said I thought that his effort was, while 

6 well-intentic"ed , was ill-advised. I thought that he 

7 should have no contact with Pastora whatsoever because it 

8 might give Pastora the wrong signals. 

9 Here the UNO was trying to consolidate all of 

10 Its political efforts under one umbrella organization with 

11 our, of course, endorsement, and strong urging, and all 

12 that Pastroa could do was to become very disruptive to that 

13 process. 

14 So I did everything I could in those ten minutes 

15 to try and discourage him from doing this. In any case, 

16 he told me that he was determined to do so and that he 

17 was going to meet with Pastora and offer assistance in 

18 return for his cooperation. 

19 I essentially ended the conversation by telling 

20 him that as a private American citizen he could do as he 

21 saw fit but he would certainly not be acting at that time 

22 in what we considered to be the best U.S. interests. 

23 Q What time frame was this? 

24 A I have no idea. 

25 Q 1985, as opposed to 1986? 



IIKIlM AC(i4.ll.a 



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iiffieissfiiF 



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CAS-8 1 A 1986. March -- there is a cable. The Senate has 

2 a cable. Let me tell you what happened. I left town. I 

3 had to go to Miami or someplace in consultation. When I 

4 came back I found that my deputy had released the cable from 

5 the Ambassador to North , ^^^^Hand Abrams in which he 

6 outlined what Singlaub had done, and in that cable the 

7 promise that Singlaub made was that the United States will 

8 provide Eden Pastora with assistance and so forth. 

9 And when I returned and saw this cable, I imniediatel;' 

10 went to the Ambassador and said, sir, I think you have made 

11 a big mistake in allowing not only him -- not disclaiming, 

12 but also distancing ourselves from any such agreement which 

13 says the United States which implies the United States 

14 Government, but I felt that it should not have been 

15 relayed to Washington and we should have sent -- you should 

16 have sent Singlaub back to make sure that he, Pastora, 

17 understood that it is not a United States entity which is 

18 promising him this support. 

19 In any case, by the time I was able to get this 

20 message across. Assistant Secretary Abrams sent 

21 Ambassador Tambs a very strongly worded cable 

22 concerning that. It was so strong that I frankly 

23 thought that Ambassador Tambs' days were numbered. I then 

24 sent -- I wrote a cable in the same channel to the same 

25 people with a -- what the Ambassador meant to say was kind of 



iiiiAi aoo?nr:^« 



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107 



^ cable, and what should be understood by this, and the 

2 Senate did have this cable traffic. That was the only 

3 experience I had with General Singlaub. Who, if I never 
^ see again -- ^ 

5 Do you recall North °>^^^^^H reaction to that 

6 cible? 

7 A They were in full agreement with everybody, with 

8 me, with our position that that was a terribly stupid thing 

9 to have happen, to have Singlaub go out and say this to 

10 Pastora. 

11 Of course, we were only interested in the political 

12 aspects of it. 

13 Q HaveK'ov^ad reason to think or heard rumors to the 

14 effect that Singlaub was sent in there at the encouragement 

15 of the CIA at higher levels in order to effectuate 

16 bringing Pastora out of the bush so to speak, and ultimately 

17 to weaken him? 

18 A That is inconceivable because on the question^ of 

19 Pastora, there was no difference of opinion between 

20 and me and I can't imagine what level of CIA beyond 

21 ^^^^Hwould even have considered such a thing. 

22 And I, frankly, never heard of a link between 

23 Singlaub and North. 

24 Did you ever have any dealings with a fellow named 

25 Max Gomez or Felix Rodriguez? 



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A Yes. 

Q On more than a couple of occassions or limited? 

A Let me tell you about Felix Rodriguez. 




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I never saw him again. I talked to him once on 
the phone, sometime last year in 1986, when I understood 
that he was creating problems ^^^^^^^^^|or he was getting 
himself involved with the FDN versus the southern versus 
the private benefactor and so forth and Quintero gave me his 
telephone number in Miami and in Miami I called to try and 
get him to back off from getting involved in all these 
problems or creating problems. 

Once I got him on the phone, I heard this voice 
again and he is a very argumentative, very forceful guy and 
I said I am not going to get into it. I said,^^^| I ^ust 
want to give you amambrazo, a hug, good luck to you, ciao, 
regards. I never talked to him about it. It is a long 
story, but because there has been too much in the press about 
Max Gomez and this and that, I wanted to get it on the 
record . 

Q Do you have any evidence or any knowledge or 



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reason to believe that Oliver North pocketed any money? 
A Absolutely not. None. No. 
Q No reason to believe that? 
A No. 

Q How about Rob Owen? 
A I don't know. 

Q You never saw any evidence to indicate that? 
A No. 

Q How about Lew Tambs? 
A No. 

How about Chichi Quintero? 
A I don ' t know . 




You, yourself, never received any n»ney in any 
way, shape or form? 

A Absolutely not, except for 68 or $80 for th« oil, 
That is all. That I testified before about. Not a 



nickel, sir. 



IINC/it'JiTii:n 



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mSgggrr 



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Q I ]ust want that to be clear on the record. With 
respect to Elliott Abrams, did you ever have any personal 
dealings with him? 

A No personal dealings. Professional. 

Q I mean in any way, shape or form. Did you ever 
meet with him? 

A I met with him ^^^^^^^^H on several occasions, 
when I briefed him, he brought up about point west. In 
the Ambassador's office, in the Ambassador's residence at 
brief ings ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H the conference 
all the ambassadors and State Department people. 

Q With regard to Abrams, did you have any reason to 
believe that he was aware by anything he said or did that he 
was aware of lethal supplies being provided to the contras? 

A Specifically, no. My impression, I assumed he 




The assumption was based upon your dealings with 



A He gets copies of my intelligence reports and he 
knew that deliveries were being made and that they were 
private benefactors, because the intel report said so, so 
I have to assume that he knew. 

Do I know specifically that he read them? No. 

Q Did North or^^^^Hever indicate to you that 
they had specifically briefed the President on the receipt 

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of lethal supplies by the contra forces? 

A No. 

Q Do you have any reason to beleive the President 
was briefed in that regard? 

A On lethal supplies to the contras? I )(now that 
briefed the President because either he told me or 
somebody told me that he had gone in for a briefing but it 
was an agency briefing and I don't know what was said in 
that briefing. , 

Q So it may or may not have related to latithl 
supply of contras. 

Did Oliver North ever give you either in writing 
or orally a legal opinion that he had received from any lawyer 
with regard to the legality of his conduct or the conduct 
of any others who were assisting him in the resupply effort 
of the contras? 



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A I only asked him about my own situation; is what 
I am doing legal? He said, yes it is legal, you are only 
passing information. There are certain words that remain 
with you for a long time and those I certainly remember. 
And he repeated that more than once, when I 
said are you sure, he said, yes, yes, it is legal. 

Q When he commented did he refer to any legal 
opinion he had received from a private or government 
lawyer? 

A If he did, I don't recall it. 

Q Now, given the fact that North is not a lawyer, 
were you satisfied in asking him alone as to whether what 
you were doing was legal? 

A This was also backed up by my own office. 

Q H|^^^p 

A ^^^^Bspecifically told me that passing^ information 
for the secure delivery of supplies was legal. 

Q Let me stop you there a second. Lethal supplies? 

A Supplies. We are talking lethal supplies. 
Humanitarian supplies, there is no question. 

Q Your clear understanding when you spoke with 
Iwas that he was commenting upon the delivery of lethal 
supplies? 

A Yes. 

Q When would that have been, approximately? 



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A 1986. I don't remember. But you know, there is 
no — there wai never a question in my mind about humanitariar 
supplies obviously, so when we trere talking about legality 
concerning supplies we are specifically talking about 
lethal supplies and in providing information for the safe 
delivery of lethal supplies, that was specifically a point 
that^^^^H4ddressed with me. 

Q Okay. Fine. And nobody else at the agency? 

A As I said earlier, where there was a question 
was in the question of legality, it was in a question of 
political propriety, in other words, we didn't want to 
an ta g a iia^e the Congress at a time when here we were getting 
close to a vote where it might have been misunderstood or 
mi sinterpreted. 

Q So essentially you are saying, if I understand 
you correctly, you didn't have any reason to think that 
you were doing anything illegal at any point in time? 

A Absolutely not. It has been brought to my 
attention a comment that I had made I believe to the Senate, 
at some point when the Indians were promised by us and given 
communications equipment, *rtjich was authorized, they were 
going to take it up — they didn't have a way to take ^^|^| 

[up the coast and into Nicaragua, so they came and 
said we need a boat and we need two motors to put on the 
dugout. And I went to headquarters and I said since they have 



UMTLI^II-Ii 



549 



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imcui^ftiiT 



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got to transport this communications equipment up there, 
can we give them more than for a boat and the two motors so 
they can transport it; and they said, yes. Can they take up 
medical supplies, yes. And food, yes. Then they came to 
us and said since we have the boat, the motor, the communica- 
tions equipment and the medical supplies to carry up their, 
we can't carry it up unless we have guns to take along with 
us to protect this stuff. 

I said that is a perfectly reasonable argument 
but I could also see where there was a question of legality, 
because we weren't allowed to provide military equipment. 
So I sent a cable to headquarters and I asked them for a- 
suggestion or a decision, what do we do? They came back and 
said, why don't you ask them to ask Negro Chamorro to give 
them the guns that they need to protect themselves while they 
are going up the coast, and that was how we handled that 
particular thing. 

So we were very cautious about our position 
concerning the legal questions involved in this. 

Q Who did you get that response from? 

A 

From ^^^^^H 

A Either him or his designee. 

Q And that was a while after you began your first 



From headquarters, 

c 



involvement in all these things? 



IMClimffl- 



2 c:-;d 



550 



UWH^FfffT 



116 



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A Sure. This was during the period after the 
humanitarian aid, the conununications aid had been authorized 
by Congress. You can see where it was a legitimate question 
on the part of both the people carrying the equipment up 
and ^^^^^^ 

Q Absolutely 

A But yet It did cross the line. So we were 
conscious of it. The other question which has not been 
raised here yet is the question, did I direct any military 
operations. I did not direct any military operations. 

We reacted to whatever the commanders inside 
needed or when they — or to what their situation was. They 
were the ones who told us ^^^^^^^^H and we related it to the 
private benefactors, or to Washington in the case of an 
intelligence report. 

Q Thank you. 

MR. EGGLESTON: I am finished. 
Thank you very much. We appreciate you coming 
down. 
(Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the deposition concluded.) 



ilLASSiOElL 



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3[ : I N TEXT CF BACK CHANNEL. 

F OR mmidllim C/L A/CAT F 

3[PiS:v.fNT Cf S:a:[ for iSSiSTANT SECRtlASr :3RiMS 
WHITE MOUSE fOR COLONEL OLIVER NORTH 



SUBJECT 



PiSTCRA/S I NCL AU8 AGREEMENT 



: s s . '. : - • : : v-scn n -^i\i^ii john siNciiuS -^i 

• ■rH^JH^AT RECJEST :r senator ,essiE i-'-.'^i 

'0 ASSESS 'HE SITUATION Of EOEN PASTQRa ANO -IS TROOPS 
ON 2- '/:;CH 'lE S'CniUS PARTr CR OSSED THE S'C^'aGJAN 
BORDER - N D VISITED A PASTORA C AMPf^^HHUH^^HH^I 

|^^^H::mr ccntaineo maximum of ns men jnoer command 
3P adcl^c ';?:■ c-hmcrro ' 'Fri NP comment pOPO" 



. - ■ E ; ; 'f-'in s . ■; c L i u B party! 

:ESERii. 5 '.:LijB CiLLEO AMBASSADOR TamBS^AND ARRiNGED 
WEETINC AT EMBASSY 9931 HOURS LOCAL 2s MARCH 



'\j 



u 



MEETi'lC ON 26 M : R C H C C S' S ' S ^ E D OF BRlEr'M OF 
:".':l:jB ST :'.'8ASSOCR^H||H:n p:S*:RA'S mi;':;v 
SPOILER IT .VAS AGREED THAT IF SiNCLiJB COJLO 32T;,M 
PiSTCPA S uPiTTES AGREEMENT TO MEET CERTAIN CCNOlTiCNS 
9ASTCRA Sr:i,.: RECEIVE SUPPLIES VIA UNO. 



'/:3Ch SINCLAuB AMD PASTCRi SlG'^EO FOl.Cw.', 




5*76^ 



UNCLOflEO 



grniiiy 0«cl«si(te<|Wti,i5«<i on lo^fft)8 R '<) 
uniiff (Koviwos 0' I n 12356 \ 

K jonnson Nji..i/i ,r,rv Council 



554 



UNCUSSIFIED 



N 7111 



2 • : '. : J T E : i : [ m i ? c h h im 

:«,; M[MC S "0 iCKNOiVLEDCE THE AjSEEMEs: vl:i TmS 
:-f :ET.-/f[N VI; :s :EN£R4l jomn k SiNCIALS JSA »£T :no 
::vv:sOtP EO:N PiSTORA 

ThE AGREEMENT IS AS fOLLOWS: 

:-E JNlTED STATES <VILL PROVIDE. 

1 300TS 

I f 000 

: i'f'>:>; ' ' ; :v 
- v: : ; '.£ 

: ['-■CS'S'ED :0MMJS ' :4T I ONS SrSTEMS 

7 MlLiTiSr NEEDS fOR PASTORA'S TROOPS INCLUDING NEW 
ME N WhO JOIN HIS ABMf 
5 - 3 ; I N ■ M : V , S C S S 

• ■ [ : : 3 u 'r-i' i>:'i: : » E 5 i s E c N " r £ •:..;.. ", : 
aopee: :omm!tvents from pastor* 




. t L E A < { WITH K I 5 TROOPS 

P ; S T R A K I U L [ A HIS '.' : N 
Til OE N I CARACUt 

= :ST0R» .•.■ILLINCLT WILL -CT ' K COC-E'-T vE :•.: 
•i;*H MANNER WITH THE OT-EF -'.EMEMTS C- :hE 
: : - i ; E 5 I ! T : N : E 



: ':STORA '.VILLIMCLT will iCT ' fj A COO^E'-TiV; l\: 
::: : : • - ',•:•,•;£? v; I T H : M E i n S ^ S SENT ■ ' ' : i '. i ' : 




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'. ■ - [ f :'..:■' i f. ; skills 

: C :vMyS I C AT I CNS 

: I SC I 'fCT F ; »[ 'E :hn I QJES 

: :■ vc. ' :s5 • xpl osi ve s 

: l:: I s' I C5 

i RiNCER iUiiS.NG 

t P4ST0RA AGREES TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE SOUTH 
AVEBiCA ASO OTKER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO ElP'.AiN 
THE 'RUE nature" Of 'HE MARXIST LENINiS* SiNOlNlSTA 
GOVERNMENT THESE TRIPS WILL BEGIN TO Jiti PLACE iP'ER 
HE MAS MOVED MIS TROOPS anO RESTORED " i S ^PM" INTO i 
S • : : N G f i G H T I N C f : R C E 



S 






en: quote 



:mment . n spite cf ■•? 

ESEHVAT ' :nS THAT PASTOR 
NCE SINGLAUB IS E'JVOr 0' 
T TO HELMS HIS CBSERViT 
ON R E T u P N TO w 1 s H ■ s : • ; '; 

T I on re garo i n: p;:' : = - 

UIAR* r STUDLEY -II. I' 
CRA AGREED THAT ;.L 
RAINING WILL BE li: ■ i ' ': 
L L BE DELIVERED J '; T 
ARAGUA 



'. G : N G L 1 U 8 ? : fl T » LEFT : ' •/ i R ! H 




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WLOFIED 



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559 




4/12/86 1200 



C 5166 



1030 hour«fc- f ^,Apri 1 12. P«r UNO South Force, drop 
succe«*f«4>T' ff«"^«I«^«<3 in 15 minutes. force requested to send 
full report/ inventory. when told , ^^^^Ha lr>ost cried in 
grateful appreciation. Our plans during next 2-3 weeks includes 
air dropl 

maritioM d«llv«ri«s NHAO supplies to same, NHAO air drop to UKO 
South, but w/ccrtifi«d air worthy aircraft, lethal drop to UNO 
South ,^^^^Hvis it to UNO South Fore* with photogs, UNO 
newspapers, caps and shirts, and transfer of 80 UNO/FXRN recruits 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hcarrying remaining cached lethal 
to join UNO South Force. My ob]«ctiv« is creation of 2,S00 man 
fore* which can strike northwest end link-up with quiche to form 
solid southern force. Likewis*, envisage formidable opposition 
on Atlantic Coast resupplied at ox by tea. Realize this may be 
overly ambitious planning but viti| your help, believe we can pull 
it off. 



1 



New subject. AfP story appeared in morning paper ^^^^^^^Hon 
U.S. attorney south Florida investigation arms, drugs traffic 
involving insurgents and U.S. synpathisizers. Terrell, CHA 
named. Focus on Mar 1985 shipment ft. Lauderdali 
V ia^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

New subject. Ref Cruz split, vn^y not offer Cms provisional 
presidency in secret agreement signed by principals? 
Regards, DV . BT 





Panmiy Decijssi'ieo/ReieiMfl on ^' ^'>-** Q£i 
under piovisions ol E 12356 
K jonnson Nalionji Secufiiv Council ^"^ 



(^10? 



560 



l!NCl?KSffli 



^ 5167 




4/l»/ii^^^70«»^ 



Delivarad to^^^^^^Hby 707 yester<jay is a plane load of 
ordn«ne« for your friends. Ammo aboard includes^^^Hrds of 
7.62 X l9' and a like anit of 51. Also have^^HM-26 hand 
grenades, ancillary items for the C-4 plastic explosives — 
blastic caps, det cord, etc., and^^Hlight machine gunds w/ 
rds of linked anuno and a^^^^^^^^^H anti-personnel nines for 

*e in ambushes, when and where do you want this stuff, we are 
p >p«red to deliver as soon as you call for it. Is there an 
UNO/FARN communicator being plac«d in^^^^^^^^Hlf so, please 
have this guy coordinate with Ralph so that we have things wired 
together. Also wish to note tay guys are flying without any 
intel. Can we do something about, getting them the radar profiles 
of Nic AAA radars, etc. BT 



iiiifl*. pfoviaons 01 E 12356 • 
b) K jotiiison. National Security Council 



iOsk^o^S 



TOP SECRET 



mmsE 




S77) 



561 



sfes^j 



msmm 



C 5176 





UlmrTTKB^ 



The pilots and repair people are talking about a week to ten days 
be for* tliey can u*« the C-123 again and that is only if we are 
able to>flnd th* accessary part very quickly. The dual 
navigatiofk systems aboard the aircraft showed them to be within 1 
to 1.5 MI of the OZ for over 40 minutes. They were never able to 
see zone lights and never had contact on th« radio on either 
channel. The pilots never had the agreed upon proposed run-in 
heading, possible enemy locations or recommended pull out 
direction to avoid enemy fire. The pilots described the fire as 
intense KX MG fire, probably 12. >> We are committed to 
commencing drops to the FDN by C-7 tomorrow night but can del^ay 
for one night to do your drop if ve can get the necessary info 
for the pilots. To facilitate, have asked Ralph to proceed 
immediately to your location. I do not think we ought to 
contemplate these operations ■JM^ ut him being on scene. Too 
many things go wrong that the^UKectly involve you and ma in 
yt/gj^^pm^^^^m^a^^^vKl^t ua^ Jfa still don't know what 
ci^VMleiH^^aM^ViK^^ aowttain leprosy. I was asked to 
provide 1500 doses fo r inclusion in the drop and we don't even 
know what we are supposed to b« providing. I know we can do 
better; we have got to if these brave people ■>- the fighters and 
the pilots are to survive the experience. Help. BLNORTH 



PinaKy Oecijssrfiedm^ased on Z,0 
vnoti covisions ol E 12356 
by K Jofwisofl NjiBnil Secufiiy Council 






'mmm ^ 






562 



UNCLASSIFIED 



•^C> :f.vy)ft 



il-u^'7 J July 191' E 



rl^9 




200»Hour« 30 Junt. C 5 ^7^9 

StAtus or Min UNO south forc« <]«t«rior«t«d b*dly p««t 7 d«yi. ludio mqa 

•xtt«Mly bltctr, «ccutinq us of pUyinq with lives. Fore* un«blt find S 

bundlM^^^^Ek^^y •••rch. f4ov do not b«ll«vt bvindlas dropptd. Fores 

\*% . numbcrtfl capturtd rising. Cit* 2 Cubans «monq other; 

> laportanc comdrs rttrtat to R^o San Juaaa •■ txp«ct cros« today. Mtn 

lapvaay widespread, complicatad by lack Mdicina, food, clothes, ammo. 

Botto* line rupCsr* fraqile alliance ARfiC with UNO. due inability resupply. 

Fore* b«li*v«« fMsIt ours they vehemently reject our reasons. Even so 

we fiakinq new effor t, sending two qualified aen by boat 1 July. One to Co^nilr 

Gonzo, one to Comdr lUmoi). to set up secure DZ area and organize reception. 

Expect Conzo will be quickly organized. Request you coma work with us. 

Need July cassette. 

From Ralph: Planning to go to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^on Monday to assess 

situation and atsist^^Hon requaat % depending on our availability. Advise 

on construction plans since I aa supposed to give money to Raoone for regvilar 

expanses. I do not think I will ta>«% enough to cover any extras, v 





^llVs 



'"1^1 proviswns Of £ 12M^ 
»> H Jon,ison. Nauonal S«cu.,ty Couna 



UNCLASSIFIED 



— , ' / 






- 1-(^ 



563 



STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES * 

UnreTised aiwl Uii«dit«d ^ ''^■ 

Not for QooUtloo or 

DupUoktloa 



/ 



UNGSSSIFIED 



*«*» ^^"^ /87 



DEPOSITION OF GEORGE W. CAVE 

Friday, April 17, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D. C. 



Committee Hearingrs 

of the 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



■nrfcr provWons of E.G. i:3S:> 
■ytj D. SMo, Nadocul Security Zov.r.t 



"^ 



OFFICE OP THE CLERK 
Offlce of OfflcUl Reporten 






564 



565 



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Wiiffly^ifi& 



DEPOSITION OF GEORGE W. CAVE 

Friday, April 17, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D. C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., 
in Room H-128, the Capitol, with W. Neil 

Eggleston (Deputy Chief Counsel of House Select Committee) 
presiding. 

Present: W. Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel, 
Richard L. Leon, Deputy Chief Minority Counsel and George 
Van Cleve, Deputy Minority Counsel, on behalf of the House 
Select Committee on Covert Arms Transactions with Iran; 
Timothy Woodcock, Associate Counsel, on behalf of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition; David M. Pearline, 
Legislative Liaiaon and E. Page Moffett, Assistant General 
Counsel, on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

.11 



ifim proiMaM o( Cb. 12356 



T 



566 



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1 Whereupon, GEORGE W. CAVE, after having been 

2 first duly sworn, was called as a witness and testified 

3 as follows: 

4 EXAMINATION 

5 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

6 Q Thank you for appearing here today, Mr. Cave. 

7 My name is Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel of the 

8 House Select Cominittee to Investigate Covert Arms 

9 Transactions with Iran. Also present from the House 

10 Committee is Richard Leon, Deputy Chief Minority Counsel; 

11 from the Senate Committee — which exact name I cannot 

12 remember -- is Tim Woodcock. 

13 We thank you for being here today. Let me tell you 

14 during the course of the deposition I will ask you a 

15 number of questions first about your own background, then 

16 about some of your early involvement in the Iran Initiative 

17 and then I would like to ask you questions taking 

18 you. through your participation in the various meetings, 

19 phone calls and various events that were -- took place in 

20 order to fulfill the Initiative. 

21 Why don't you just start, if you would, by telling 

22 us a little about your own background in the Central 

23 Intelligence Agency, when you started, some of your overseas 

24 assignments, when you left, up to the time that you, I 

25 guess, resigned from the Agency or retired or whatever. 



IMASSIRI^ 



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A I spent -- after getting out of the Hershey 
Industrial School in 1947, I spent five years in the 
military, all of which was either with the Army Security 
Agency, and then assigned to the Armed Forces Security 
Agency; and then when the National Security Agency was 
formed, I was one of the first military detailees to it in 
1951. 

I got out in May of 1952 and went to college the 
following fall. Graduated from college in '56 and ]oined 
the Agency. Entered on duty I think October 1956. 




568 



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decided to retire in February of 1980. 



mnji^^ 



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retired^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and I have 
been a consultant to the Agency ever since on Iran^^^B 

Q Let me ask you what foreign languages -- I think 
I should probably ask it have you spoken or do you speak? 

A Persian and Arabic, fluently, although the 
Arabic is getting rusty. I haven't spoken it in ten years. 
I was very fluent in both languages at one time. I am still 
very fluent in Persian. I speak a little bit of French. 
That is all. And some Urdu. 

Q Some Urdu? 

A Yes. 

Q So I can complete the re -. of your time period, 
you retired from the Agency, at whit time? 

A February 29, 1980. 

Q And what kinds of assignments have you had then 
between February of 1980 and March of 1986? 

A It is — 

Q Generally. 

A Almost 90 percent Iranian operations! 

Q Let me ask you during the period of time that 
you were -- had been associated with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, have you come to know a man by the name of 



Ghorbanifar? 



OtttWrtdp^t^T 



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A Oh, yes. Yes. 

Q And when did you first have dealings with 
Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

A Our first dealings with Ghorbanifar go back to 
I think January of 1980. When he first came across our 
sights.. 

Q Were you personally involved with him at that 
time or was that the time the Agency first became 
involved? 

A I met with him in — once in 1980. I think in 
August 1980. I met with him one other time, I think, just 
to get a better assessment of him. Because we had been" 
getting -- we had had a case officer in contact with him 

iis 

information was such that some of it appeared to be good, but 
a lot of it just didn't check out. 




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on my recommendation, we 
terminated our operational relationship with him in I think 




Q During the period of time then from 1980 to 
1981, at the time you terminated your operation with 
him, was he providing terrorist type information? 

A Yes. He was, oh, providing us information on" 
the organization of Iranian terrorism and attempts to 
export the revolution. Also, some political information on 
what was going on inside. The problem we fov^Jout was 
a lot of it didn't check out. 



And — 

And also making exorbitant demands. 

Financial demands? ~ 

When you say the Agency terminated its operational 
relationship with him, was that your decision? 

A It was my recommendation. It was accepted. 
Q Who IS It in the Agency who would make a 



decision, who actually would have made that decision? 



nave maue i 



572 




that is 



25 



Iconcern 




1 A Well, normally this would be| 

2 concerned. It is 

3 would concur with the decision. Headquarters almost 

4 always goes -- it goes back to the division responsible in 

5 Headquarters. They would concur. Normally, if the field 

6 determines that the guy is not worth running, and wants 

7 to terminate him, no one objects. 

8 Q I take it that there would be some reflection in 

9 his file he had been terminated? 

10 A That is correct. 

11 Q I take it something must then happen such that the 

12 Agency became involved with him again after that time? 

13 A Yes. We became involvec with him again in the 

14 spring of 1984 when he reported on Iranian attempts to 

15 infiltrate terrorist groups into the United States. 

16 Q And did you have contact with him at that time? 

17 A No . I didn't have contact with him at that time. 

18 But I was aware of what was going on and was highly 

19 suspicous of the information he was providing. So we 

20 decided to give him a polygraph test. 

21 Q This was in the spring of '84? 

22 A Yes. I think we gave him a polygraph test in 

23 June or July of 1984. 

24 Q It is my understanding there were a total of 



three polygraphs given to Ghorbanifar, 



mussm, 



b^-..j2 o: 



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A Yes. 

Q Was this the second? 

A No. This was the first. We did not polygraph 



him during our previous arrangemen 




first polygraph I think was in June 
or July. He flunked it. Because some of the information 
that he had, that he had given us indicated that the 
Iranians were attempting to infiltrate a team to assassinate 
senior U .S^-of f icials , including the President, at the 
request of the Secret Service we gave him another polygraph. 
That was in August or September of 1984, I believe. 
At which he also flunked. 

Q As a result of those, the information that he 
had provided, thSf turned out not to be truthful, I take 

-^ ^ 

That is correct. 

A fabricatjif^otice was issued after that? 

A fabrication notice was issued after that. 

Let me show you for the record, there is a 
number, I will use the CIIN number. As I talk about 
these I will refer to them by the CIIN number. 

This has^een marked by the Agency as number 
511. Is that the fabricator notice sent out on him? 



A Yes. 



iiCUSSiEia. 



574 



ItttitASSI^BT 



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Q Are you responsible, were you responsible for 
sending out the fabricator notice? 

A No. You see, as a consultant, you have really 
no authority to take executive decisions. These I think 
are by staff ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H not 

by the operating division. 

Q Were you consulted about whether or not to send 
a fabricator notice on him? 

A I don't recall being consulted. I would 
certainly not have objected to it. 

Yes. Correct. We terminated our relationship 
in September. 




Q The fabricator notice makes reference to one of 
his aliases as Mr. Kralis? 

A Yes. He has a Greek passport. 

Q I notice it also seems to indicate there was some 
belief he was in touch with Israeli intelligence 
services ? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you know why that conclusion was made? 

A One of the most interesting things about 



UVli^fVMZ^iia7qi : 



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Ghorbanifar is up to the time of the Iran initiative 
he never told us about his Israeli connections. We 
knew about him because he had been with Star Shipping. 
He was the Iranian Director of Star Shipping which was a 
]oint Iranian-Iraeli concern with heavy intelligence 
overtones . 

Q It was based on that association that the Agency 
concluded that he had Israeli intelligence associations? 

A Yes. He was also -- that is where he got the 
nickname :n»d<|i . 

Q Let me ask you to put a. date on it. When is 
the first time, in '85 or '86 that you learned that the" 
United States government has renewed its dealings with 
Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

A The first -- it is in early January. I was -- 

Q Early January of '86? 

A '86. I was told that Ghorbanifar had provided 
extensive information on terrorist -- Iranian terrorist 
activities to Charles Allen. I looked at some of the 
material and didn't believe it. It was similar to the kind 
of things he told us before. A mixture of truth. When 
Ghorbanifar does something like that, he is setting you 
up or somebody up to make — not necessarily you — to 
make a lot of money. 

It was decided to give him a polygraph test on 






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this and I and the polygraph operator and the counter- 
intelligence analyst worked for two days coming up with the 
questions for the polygraph. I think the polygraph was 
given on the 17th of January. 

Q I think it was given on the 11th. 

A •■MMIMte The 11th. Maybe it was the report 
on the polygraph that was filed later. In any case, 
he really flunked it. We knew -- I knew what kind of 
questions to ask. He really flunked that one. He showed 
deception — clear deception on 13 of the questions we 
asked and the others, two were inconclusive. As I said 
before, he got his name rightitg 

Q During the fall of 1985, I take it you were still 
working on Iranian matters? 

A Yes, I was. 

Q Was that generally related to the hostages? 

A Not so much because the hostages -- the hostage 
question was really being handled by the counterterrorist 
people. Since it was in Lebanon 




Q But during — between July and early -- 
between July of 1985 and early January of 1986, I take it 
you were not consulted about Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

A No. I was not consulted until early January 
when we put together the polygraph test for him. 



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Q Let me get to the polygraph test in a second. 

I want to show you two documents and ask you whether or not 
during the period of time that you were working on this, 
whether either one of these came across your desk. 

Here is CIIN #1034. That is a cable dated July '85. 

A I don't recall seeing this. 

Q Have you seen it -- ever seen it prior to ]ust 
this minute? 

A No. I don't recall seeing it. But that is -- 
most of the time I would be overseas. I would just come in 
to get a briefing. I did not spend much time in 
Headquarters. 

Q Let me just also show y;u for perhaps the same 
purpose CIIN #1033 which is a document addressed to 
Arnie and signed by, it appears, Peter. It is dated July 

II of 1985. Do you know who Arnie and Peter are? 

A Arnie? The only Arnie I can think of that would 
be there would be^^^^^|^^H I don't recall seeing this 
document. 

Q It is another document which refers IfoJ 
and Manucher, however you pronounce the first name. 

A Manucher. I don't know who the Peter would refer 
to. 

Q Okay. 

How did you come to be involved in -- who asked 



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you to participate then in designing the questions for 
the polygraph? How did that come about? 

A I forget who was the -- it would be the Iranian 
branch chief at the time. I was back here m Headquarters 
area and I cannot recall who it was at the time. But 
that is who it would have been. 

Q You mean the person on the Iranian desk? 

A Yes, head of the Iranian branch. 

Q I will ]ust say was the person you are thinking 
about ^^^ 

A Probably. Probably^^^^H 

Q You knew^^Hl take it? 

A Yes. Very well. 

Q But it was no one at a different level? It 
wasn' it^^^^^^^^^l Clair George? You think the request 
for assistance came fromi 

A Yes, I think it did. Based on his files, he said 
you seem to know as much about this guy as anyone. Why 
don't you help us out on the research on the polygraph 
for him. 

Q Let me ask you sort of the state-*f ^feur h^^ledgt 
as of the tune you were asked to help out on that. By 
that tim^^^^^^^^^Hon December 22 of 1985 had conducted 
a fairly lengthy interview of Ghorbanifar at Ledeen's, 
Michael Ledeen's home. Were you aware of that? 



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'' A Yes, he told me about it after the fact. 

2 Q He did a memorandum on that meeting. Had you 

3 read the memorandum, or did you read the memorandum? 

^ A Yes. I am pretty sure I did. I would have had 

5 to. 

6 Q To help design the questions? 

7 A To design the polygraph. 

8 Q I take it then by that time you were aware 

9 Mr. Ghorbanifar had been involved in some fashion in 

10 fall arms shipments and negotiations about release of 

11 hostages? 

12 A I'm not sure if I was. I think the specific 

13 things that we were concerned abcut, as I recall -- yes. 

14 That is true. 

15 Q Because it was inJ 

16 A Yes. I recall now. v«niat we were — as you 

17 probably know from looking at the polygraph, we were 

18 focusing on one part of it on his information on terrorism 

19 and Iranian -- and also as that concerned the taking of the 

20 hostages. 

21 Q And was it -- what was it -- did you have an 

22 understanding about the reason that you were being asked 

23 to conduct this polygraph? Did you have any understanding 

24 about what it was anticipated anyone would use Ghorbanifar 

25 for? 



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^ A It was crucial that we determine the accuracy 

2 of the information he was passing. 

3 Q Prior to the time that the polygraph was taken, 

4 did you speak to^^|^^^^^^| or Clair George or anyone 

5 about your views about Ghorbanifar? 

6 A No. 

7 Q Were they solicited by anyone? 

8 A I don't recall. 

9 Q Did you make your views on Ghorbanifar known tc 

11 A oh, yes. I think|^H||shared my views. He 

12 thought the guy was, after having met with him, was a 

13 charlatan. 

14 Q Did you understand that there was thought to 

15 use him or to continue to use him on the hostage release 

16 aspect? 

17 A No. In fact, I was very alarmed by it when I 

18 found out about it on the 5th of March. 

19 Q You thought what you were doing is evaluating him 

20 for further information about counterterrorism? 

21 A Yes. And that once — I assumed once the — 

22 see, I got the flu. I was supposed to be at the polygraph 

23 session and wasn't able to make it. And so after coming 

24 back and hearing — talking to the operator, I assumed 

25 that all our relationships with Ghorbanifar were therefore 



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1 terminated. 

2 Q The polygraph examination itself was on January 

3 11th, I think, of '86. Then — you were sick on the 

4 11th? 

5 A Yes. I couldn't make it. I was really in bad 

6 shape. 

7 Q When did you first learn that he had failed all 

8 the questions except his naune? 

9 A When I got back into Headquarters a couple days 

10 later. 

11 Q Who did you learn it from? 

12 A I think it was^^^Hwho told me. 

13 Q Do you recall -- did you speak about Ghorbanifar 

14 then with anyone other than ^^^H Did you have conversa- 

15 tions with — were there any meetings about it that you 

16 recall? 

17 A No. I don't remember speaking specifically about 
13 it. I thought that that ended the matter. 

19 Q There was a meeting which took place on the 12th 

20 of January in Clair George's office. There was discussion 

21 at that meeting about the polygraph result and what 

22 to do and various things like that. Did you attend that 

23 meeting? 

24 A I don't recall attending it, no. 

25 Q Within a few days after that, maybe the day after 



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1 that meeting, Charles Allen actually meets with Ghorbanifar 

2 again and has a long session with him. Did you know that 

3 that was taking place? 

4 A Not at the time, no. 

5 Q You didn't learn that until after March 5th? 

6 A That is right. 

7 Q Let me just ask you — raise it up to March 5th, 

8 but ask you between mid-January of 1986 and March 5th of 

9 1986, do you have any further dealings with Ghorbanifar, 

10 conversations about Ghorbanifar, what to do with him, were 

11 you consulted about him in any fashion? 

12 A I don't recall because -- I am sure. The revela- 

13 tion on Marvh 5 when I was first briefed was quite a 

14 shock. 

15 Q You now know there was a shipment of a thousand 

16 TOWs in mid-^bruary from the United States through various 

17 whatever hands and routes to Iran. Were you aware of that 

18 at the time it was taking place? 
ig A No, I wasn't. 

20 Q Let me direct your attention then to MarJ^h 5 of 

21 '86. Could you tell us how it was that you were brought 

22 into this operation, where it took place, who was 

23 present? 

nA A ^^^^^^^^^^^Hcalled me in and said that -- asked 

25 me how I wguld like to meet Rafsanjani. I said well, 



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1 what is the story? He gave me a briefing that the NSC 

2 has been involved with the Israelis in an operation which 

3 we -- which has several goals; one of them is for us 

4 to reestablish a strategic dialogue with the Iranians 

5 leading to the normalization of relations *nd also hope- 

6 fully get the hostages released. That was sort of the 

7 sumation of the briefing. 

8 Q Who else was present at the briefing? 

9 A I was introduced as I recall to Charlie Allen 

10 later that day. There was a discussion wit 

11 Charlie, and I. I think also I met Ollie North — came 

12 over in the afternoon, that ifiSSBten . 

13 Q You think you met Ollie North then on March 5th? 

14 A Yes. On March 5th. 

15 Q Is that the first time you ever met North? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q I get the impression that was the first time 

18 you met Charles Allen? 

19 A I heard about Charlie. I knew who he was. I 

20 never had anything to do with him personally or operationally 

21 Q How long did the — what ^^^U^^^^^^^^l 

22 title at the time that this meeting took place? Was he 

23 ChieT of the Near East Division? 

24 A I can't remember whether he was chief or the 

25 



deputy chief. 



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1 Q How long -- 

2 A shortly thereafter he was chief I know. 

3 Q How long did this conversation last? 

4 A I cannot honestly remember. 

5 Q What was your reaction when you were told about 

6 this initiative? Did you say anything? 

7 A Well, I thought the idea of initiative -- because 

8 I had long believed and -- that we needed a dialogue with 

9 the Iranians and also we had several indications from other 

10 operations that were going on that the Iranians — at 

11 least it was an indication there was some interest on the 

12 part of the Iranians. That part of it I felt was good.. 

13 The question of arms for hostages -- using the arms 

14 for us to establish our bona fides and their getting the 

15 hostages released to establish their bona fides was a policy 

16 decision made elsewhere and didn't concern me. My real 

17 worry was we were relying heavily on one, Ghorbanifar, who 

18 A to this day cannot be trusted and, secondly, the Israelis 

19 who had different goals in this. 

20 Almost as I got briefed -- you know, most of the 

21 /nitiative was still in the hands of the Israelis. 

22 Q What did you understand or was your view 

23 about the different goals the Israelis had as opposed to 

24 the goals of the United States? 

25 A Well, for the Israelis, I don't know if you are 



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aware of it, but the Israelis under the Shah had an excellent 
relationship with the Iranians, 




Q So what -- as of this time period, the post-Shah 
Iran, what were your views about how the Israeli interests 
differ and how that should affect our judgment about how 
to proceed? 

A Well, the Israeli interest, of course, were as 
long as Iran is fighting Iraq, you go back to the '73 war, 
the fact that Irani 
and Israeli help was able to tie down a great portion of 
the Iraqi army. That was a great help for Israel during the 
•73 war. Iraq was not able to fulfill its military 
obligations to the Arabs during that war. 

The strategic situation, given the war with Iraq, was 
such as that the Israelis were providing 



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Ito the Iranians and would like to 
have done a lot more. To them, an Iranian defeat of Iraq 
is perfectly all right. The last thing they would like 
to see is an Iraqi victory which would strengthen the Arab 
hand. They also by this time had learned, I think, that 
given the situation in Tehran, there was no way they could 
get back to the same kind of relationship with Iran unless 
the United States was able to do some brokering for them. 
This is why -- I thitik this is why they pursued 
this so aggressively, this initiative. 

Q What kind of assistance did you understand 
Israel to have given to Iran up to this time? Military 
assistance? " ""~ 

A Yes. We had had report:.n< 

[that the Israelis had provided considerable 
ajnount of assistance to the Iranians .^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

I 
think the problem caime, for Israel, probably in late 1984 
when the Revolutionary Guard became the supreme military 
power in Iran. 

Q 

A 

A 

And to -- when you get to the Rev Guards, you 





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get to the groups who find Israel an anathema. 

Q At this meeting with^^^^^^^^^^and others, what 
were you told about the Israeli role in the initiative 
up to that time, if you recall? 

A I was told about the fact that the -- it wasn't 
a full briefing. I was told we were involved with the 
Israelis and that a special office in the Prime Minister's 
office headed by their counterterrorist man. General Nir, 
was the point man. And I didn't -- was not able to brief 
myself on all the details until some time later. 

Q Do you recall at that time were you told about 
the prior arms shipments? First, about the February arms 
shipment? Had you been told about that? 

A I think I found that out the next day. 

Q Let me get to that. 

A ^^^^B told me I want you to read up on several 
things that have happened. 

Q Were you told then, still directing your attention 
to March 5, were you told about the fall of '85 shipments, 
the HAWK shipment, and the TOWs from earlier in the fall? 

A I don't think I was. I don't recall being told 
at that time. 

Q When you said that Oliver North came in at the end 
or in the afternoon on the 5th, was that after this meeting 



with I 



|was over? A separate time? 



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2A 



"I A Yes. It was separate. I think I met with^^Hin 

2 the morning. I can't remember when I met with Charlie. It 
was about that time. 
Q Okay . 

5 A And then Ollie came over. He,^^^Lnd I met in 

6 the afternoon. I don't know whether Charlie attended that. 

7 I can't recall. 

8 Q What was your understanding about why you were 

9 being brought into it? 

10 A Well, several reasons. One is that they didn't 

11 want to have to rely on Ghorbanifar as a translator, because 

12 during the meetings when ^H^^^^^^H went over, there were 

13 quite a bit of indications that Ghorbanifar wasn't translatir 

14 accurately. 

15 Sam/thing happened incidentally when we were in 

16 Tehran. So they decided they needed someone that spoke the 

17 language fluently, that they could trust to translate 

18 accurately; and second, they wanted someone that -- up to 

19 this point no one had been involved in this operation that 

20 understood anything about Iran or had ever set foot in 

21 Iran. Those are the two reasons given to me. 

22 Q So in the afternoon you met with, you think, 

23 ^^^^^^^^|and Oliver North, the afternoon of the 5th? 

24 A That is correct. 

25 Q Was that just a briefing as well? 



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A Yes. It was a short one because Ollie was 
involved in several other things. I saw him briefly the 
next day. I can't remember whether it was in his office or 
whether he came over to the building. We left that night. 

Q You left the night of the 6th? 

A That is when I think. Some people say we left 
the 7th, but I swear we left the night of the 6th. 
MR. LEON: Left for where? 

THE WITNESS: For Paris. It was the day the TWA 
strike started. 



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BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q This is the sixth or seventh, whichever. Colonel 
North's calendar seems to indicate you left in the evening. 
Seventh. Who knows? I take it you went over with Colonel 
North? 

A Yes. 

Q Who all went over together? You, North? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^^H 1 1 i e 

Q Who did you meet with when you got to Paris? 

A We went to the airport immediately, to one of the 
airport hotels. I don't know. ^^^^^^^^^| or the 

{ one of the two. Nir and Ghorbanifar were at the 
hotel. 

Q Did you meet them the next morning then? 

A Yes. We got right off the plane and went right 
to the hotel. After the meeting we went back to the airport 
and flew back to the United States. 

Q How long was the meeting? 

A I guess we got to the hotel about 8:00 or 8:30. 
It went on until about noon when we rushed out to — 

Q You caught the afternoon flight back? 

A Caught the afternoon flight back. 

Q Throughout the meeting, it was just the five of you? 

A That is correct. 

Q If you could summarize as best you recall, what 



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was discussed at that meeting? 

A We met briefly with Nir first who told us that 
Ghorbanifar had done a great job about lining up things 
with the Iranians, and then he was called in. We talked to 
hijn. Ghorbanifar said that he had a tentative agreement 
for us — for a delegation to go to Tehran and meet with senior 
officials. He said there is several things — just in 
general terms, they are interested in talking about the 
Soviets^^ 

He also spent an enormous amount of time telling 
us how none of this could happen without his participation; 
that he was the key man. I also recall separately asking 

they done^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ssessment 
Ghorbanifar to satisfy their faith in him. He asked me what 
do you mean? I said, "Well, we have some doubt, and I 
think if you haven't done it, you ought to." 

I don't know if they ever followed up. They 
considered him their agent. They made that known. 
Q Let me — 

A They told us about that. 

Q Let me show you what is marked as CIIN Number 251. 
Is this your report of the meeting on March — is this a 
document prepared by you? 

A Yes. This was — when I got home that night, I 
thought that it was a good idea — I just typed on the 



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typwriter at home. I think I did this at home. Anyway, 
some things that I recalled happened. 

Q There is kind of a summary of the meeting that 
took place? 

A Yes. 

Q At least part of what happened at this meeting 
is there was a discussion about organizing the trip by 
American officials to Tehran; is that correct? 

A That is correct. Oh, and also it was at this 
meeting that Ghorbanifar told us that — what they were 
desperately interested in is getting spares for their Hawks . 
He came up with this long list of 240 line items. 

Q So this was the meeting -- this was one of the 
meetings at which the Hawk parts -- was it your understanding 
this was the first time Ghorbanifar had come up with this 
request for Hawk parts? 

A First, I knew of. 

Q Did he have a written list? 

A He had a written list he had taken down over the 
phone and made up himself. 

Q Did he provide you guys with the list? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you know approximately how many items it was 
at opposed to different kinds — 

A There were 240 different items on the list. Some 



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there were 10, 9. There is a figure somewhere about the 
total number of items, but I don't have it. 

Q Who did you understand he had gotten this list from? 

A From! 

Q I take it you had not met^^^^^^^H by this time? 

A Oh, no. No. 

Q Could we get that back and give it to the witness; 
Page 2, I think the last line of this document, why don't 
I refer you to paragraph 12. If we could ask how this 
conversation csune up. 

A Oh, yes. When he was talking about the deals 




I didn't know what he meant. I didn't question 
him. No one else did, the specifics of what he had in mind. 
He also, as an aside said, and also for Central America^^^^^l 

Q Well — 

A Because it was Ghorbanifar, and it was money. I 
made a note of it just in case. 

Q Let me ask you. As of this time, were you aware 
that one of Colonel North's other accounts, since that 
phrase is used, at the NSC was Central America and the contras? 



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A I don't think so. Because I met him briefly and we 
were discussing this. It wasn't until, I think, after we 
came back from this trip that I learned anything that was 
meaningful. Someone might have said he is concerned 
with terrorism or something else. They might have said 
that in brief. I didn't get any detailed knowledge of his 
other activities until after this trip. I am sure of that. 

Q By this time, Charles Allen had interviewed, 
I think, at least twice Mr. Ghorbanifar. In fact, Ghorbanifar 
made some reference to Charles Allen about using profits 
from some^^^Hdeal to help out Ollie's buys in Central 
America. 

Were you aware of that as of this time? 

A No. 

Q Were you aware of that — 

A I wasn't aware of it until now. 

Q Right now you are not aware of it? 

There is a question I forgot to ask you which is 
in preparation for this meeting. You indicated you had done 
some reading in order to get sort of up to speed, because 
you obviously knew other things had happened. What was it 
you read? 

A I just looked at Ghorbanifar ' s 201 to make sure 
of the dates. When you asked me, remember, in the interview, 
I couldn't remember the dates of when we did what. I just — 




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31 

that is all I read. That is the only thing I read. 

Q So you didn't read information about fW^t had 
happened previously in 1985 and 1986? 
A Oh, no. No. 
Q There was — 

A In his file. I went through his file. But none 
of that stuff was in thepile. 

Q Was there — let me return then to thaC»«eting 
of March 7 or 8 which took place in Paris. Was there 
any discussion at all during the course of that meeting 
about financing of this deal? How much the weapons — how much 
the Hawk parts would cost? 

A No. The only thing that -- what^^Hand I said 
that we would find out the availability of the spares on 
the list and some preliminary information on what it was 
going to cost, because as I recall, it would take us a 
long time to get the costing from the military. 

Q Was there any discussion, if you recall, about the 
method of financing, how it was Ghorbanifar was going to 
cone up with the money, what he was going to do? 

A Oh, no. Not at that meeting. In fact, that was 
entirely in his and Nir's hands. 

Q That was entirely in his and Nir's hands? 

A Yes. 

Q This memorandum that I just showed you which has 



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» 4W*-> "WW 32 

got the number 251 on it, what did you do with the memorandum 
after you wrote it up? Who would you have distributed the 
memorandum to? 

A I suspect that the only people that ever saw it 
were time,^^^^^^^^^Hand^^^^^^^^^H and I am 
sure I sent a copy to Ollie. 

Q Did you think you sent a copy to Charles Allen? 

A I am sure Charlie. By that — shortly thereafter, 
I worked closely -- started working closely with Charlie 
on 
support the effort. 

Q Where were you -- where was your office or where 
were you working out of at this time at the agency. 

A I didn't really have an office. 

Q That is why 1 was curious. 

A I spent sometime going ove^^^^^^^^^^| — I spent 
a lot of time in Charlie's office going over 

everything, partly because he was usually 
away and it was a quiet place, sometime on the Iranian branch, 
sometime in the chief N.E. front office. 

Q Let me ask you another question about this meeting. 
During the course of the meeting, I want to get a sense of how 
far the planning for this United States delegation to 
Tehran went. Was there any discussion about who would go, 
why it was necessary? 




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A No. 

Q Was it Ghorbanifar's idea? Was it our side's idea? 
A My impression was that this had been in the mill 
for some time. 

Q There had been prior discussions? 

A Prior discussions. Because Ghorbanifar says that 
they have agreed in principle to the idea of a delegation 
coming to Tehran. 

Q Okay. As of this meeting, no, it is clear that 
the meeting — as of this meeting on March 7 or so, it is 
clear that the meeting that would take place would be a 
meeting in Tehran? 

A No. Not necessarily. Because as you will 
recall later, the original venue was to be Kish Island. 

. Q Right. After you returned from this meeeting, did 
you meet with anyone? Did you meet with McFarlane or — 

A It was much later on I met with — I only met 
with McFarlane once before we went to Tehran, 
and I went down to brief him. 

Q That was substantially later than this? 
A Oh, yes. 

Q I don't want to ask you until we get to it in the 
chronology, but would that have been after the April meeting 
with Ghorbanifar in D.C.? 



Oh, yes. 



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Q Well, after? 

A Yes. 

Q When you came back then, did you brief anybody 
about the trip? 

A I am sure it was after the -- yes. See, there was 
yes. It was. 

In April, there was the possibility that Ollie 
and I would fly in with Ghorbanifar. 

Q Right. 

A That fell through. 

Q Okay. Did you come back and brief ClairJ George 
or the director or anyone after returning from the trip .to 
Paris in March? 

A I can't honestly recall when the first time I 
met with the director on this operation was. I am not sure 
that I did meet with him right after this trip, 

Q You met with him before the trip to Tehran, 
I take it? 

A Oh, yes. Several times before we went to Tehran. 

Q Do you know whether you met with him by the 
time Ghorbanifar came to the United States? 

A Yes. I think I met with him by then. I can't 
remember precisely when it was. I don't keep diaries or 
anything. 

Q Who is generally at the agency who is sort of the 



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supervisor of this operation? Is i c^^^^^^^^^^H Is it- 
at what level is this being generally supervised? Who is 
the one who is primarily in charge? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^1 I would say, the best one to focus 
on. 

Q Let rae ask you, then, between this meeting on 
March 7 of 1986 and the meeting that took palce in early 
April of 1986, what activity did you have with regard to 
this? Do you recall? 

A I think — I had very little to do with it 
except to work to monitor the intelliger 




Q Were you reading the intelligence that was coming 
in by this time? 

A Yes, I was. 

Q Had you gone back and read the previous intelligence 




A Yes. I reviewed most ot 
I don't think I went all the way back. It didn't concern me. 

Q Did you have any — this is now. I am sort of 
focusing on March up until early April of 1986. Did you 
have any telephone conversations with Ghorbanifar? Did 
he ever call you during this period of time? 



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A I don't think so. Most of the times, you know, 
when he called I gathered he either — his usual contact 
was Charlie Allen. 

Q You don't recall him calling you? 

A No. He didn't have my home phone number. 

Q Did he call — you didn't have any contact, I take it 
with^^^^^^^Heither during this time? 

A No. The first time I talked tc 
when we were in London in May. 

Q During this time period, was there any effort to 
figure out a way to get Ghorbanifar out of the operation? 

A No. He was considered essential. Let me go iato — 
there are a couple of — there was quite a bit of argumentation 
about this. The Israelis, particularly in the person of 
Nir, insisted on Ghorbanifar, for one thing. I was at 
the other end of it, insisting that he couldn't be trusted. 
There were other people that felt that you had to keep him in 
because since he — because he would probably blow the whole 
thing. 

He was investing a lot of money in this operation, 
so that he had to be kept in it. I was more concerned that, 
knowing Ghorbanifar, that Ghorbanifar works for Ghorbanifar, 
period, which is basically what we found out when we got to 
Tehran. 

The interesting thing to me was that the Israelis 



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were still insistent on it. He had to be used after the 
fiasco in Tehran. 

Q What was the understanding of the reason the 
Israelis by this time are involved in this entire initiative 
in such a direct fashion; they are no longer -- by this time 
they are no longer directly providing any of the material. 
What was their role once you get involved? 

A They were -- well, Nir kept a very tight rein on 
Ghorbanifar and the Israeli position was that they wanted 
to get as much out of this operation as possible also. There 
was quite a debate. You know, I made the point I thought it 
would be a terrible error for Nir to go to Tehran and it. 
was decided that because of the way the Israeli pressure on 
this issue, that the only way that you could get him out was 
for the President to call Perez and ask him to say that he 
just can't go. 

I think it was finally left up to McFarlane. He 
said, "Well, he has worked so hard on it, let him go." 

Q Let me just ask you as of March of 1986, were 
you aware General Secord had been involved and was involved 
in this operation? 

A No, not at that time. 

Q How about Albert Hakim? 

A No. 

Q Did you know Hakim had attended previous meetings 

II 



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or Secord had attended previous meetings? 

A Yes. Excuse me. I knew Hakim after I got -- was 
present in the February meetings in Europe. 

Q Did you know Secord — but, so you were aware 
Haki-m had some prior involvement in the operation? 

A Yes. 

Q How about Secord? 

A It wasn't until sometime later I became aware 
Secord-- Dick was involved. 

Q Before or after — at least by the time of the 
Tehran trip you knew, because he shows up in Tel Aviv? 

A Yes . 

Q Okay. 

A The first time I saw Dick was when we met in 
Tel Aviv. 

Q You knew Secord? 

We were^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H but our patlv didn't 
cross. We knew of each other, but had no business dealings 
with each other] 

Q Did you have any understanding about what Hakim was 
doing, why he was involved in the February meetings? 

A No not at that time. 

Q Did you know Hakim before this time? 

A I knew of him. 

Q What did you know of him? 



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A That he was an extremely successful Iranian 
businessman, several cuts above Ghorbanifar. For an 
Iranian to have gotten the contracts and been able to put 
together the firm that he did in Tehran was quite an 
accomplishment . 

Q But your knolwedge of him was basically he was an 
Iranian businessman? 

A Yes. 

Q You didn't know why it was that he became involved 
in this operation? 

A No not at that time. 

Q Let me direct your attention to the meeting 
April 3 and 4 of 1986 that took place here. How did 
that meeting get set up and what was its purpose? 

A Ghorbanifar, as I recall, called Charlie saying 
he was coming over on the third and had -- and also by this 
time we had information on the availability of the Haw k 
spares and also some preliminary pricing data. 

Q Okay. 

A So he came over on the third. We met him at the 
airport. 

Q Who met him at the airport? 

A Charlie Allen and I. 

Q Where did you go? 

A We put him at that Renaissance Hotel in Herndon, 



the Ramada RenaiskSft^d 



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ir as I recall , ^^wasn* t. 



Q Okay. Did you meet with him that night? 

A Yes. I met with him -- we met with him in the 
afternoon. ^^^^Bwas there and then Ollie showed up later. 
We also had dinner at the hotel. It was^^^H Ollie, and 
myself and Ghorbanifar. 

Q Charlie Allen, too. 

A I think Charlie had to go somewhere, as I recall, 

Q So when — sort of a substantive meeting took 
place, Charlie Allen was not present? 

A As fai 

Q How long did that meeting last? 

A We had -- Charlie and I met him -- he was delayed 
in the airport because he was carrying $50,000 and he had to 
fill out all the forms and everything. 

MR. LEON: What time did he arrive? 
THE WITNESS: He arrived on -- it was a morning 
flight from London, as I recall. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Did he have $50,000 in cash? 

A Yes. 

Q Was it United States currency? 

A Yes. We took him to the hotel and had lunch with 
him, then went back -^^^^^pnd I met with him and Ollie joined 
us later in the afternoon. 

We gave him some data on what parts were available 



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and what parts were no longer manufactured at that meeting. 
At that meeting, he again spent a lot of time telling us 
how he was essential to the operation and also gave us a 
better -- a clearer idea of who we would be meeting when 
we went to Tehran, and also that the venue -- proposed venue, 
I think was Kish Island. 

Q Do you recall who he told you he thought you 
would be meeting during the Tehran trip? 

A The problem with this is that some of the names 
came up, didn't come up until we got to London in May. I 
can't say precisely who he — I can't recall precisely 
who he said at this meeting we would meet. I aun sure it. was 
Rafsanjani, and Prime Minister Musavi. 

Q Let me show you what was Number CIIN 513 on it. 
Is this one of your reports, too? Is this the report of the 
meeting? 

A Yes. This is mine. Oh, yes. They couldn't meet 
us in Kish. I know Kish was discussed at this meeting. Yes. 
This is mine. 

Q It is a report of that meeting, I take it? 

A That is correct. I haven't seen this in sometime. 

Q Was there any discussion at this meeting about a 
pre-meeting involving lower level officials? 

A I think this is the — is where we discussed the 
possibility of Ollie, I and he flying in. 




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Q Okay. Was that agreed upon? 

A Well, we agreed to look into it. We came pretty 
close to going eventually, but it was finally -- I gather, as 
far as I know -- scotched by the White House. 

Q Why don't I, since I am on that subject, jump 
ahead. What is it -- maybe just to place this in time, there 
is another meeting that you, I think, attend in early May. 

A Yes. That was the final meeting before we went. 

Q All right. Do you have any understanding about 
why the pre-meeting or a set up meeting was cancelled, 
not allowed to take place? 

A I don't -- this was done at the White House or. 
the NSC, the decision not to go. I was prepared to go. 
But who said in the final analysis, no, I can't tell you. 

Q Did you think you ought to have a pre-meeting? 

A I thought it wasn't a bad idea. Because having -- 
with all my Iranian experience and my mistrust of Ghorbanifar, 
I thought there was an awful lot of risk in us going in. 

Q Personal risk? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you -- and I am getting out of my chronology — 
think there was a personal risk in going in in late May with 
McFarlane? 

A I thought the personal risk would be based entirely 
on what the radical faction would do if they found out that 



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43 



1 we were there, or if it became general knowledge that we were 

2 there. 

3 Q So that it didn't really matter who it was, the 

4 problem was whether or not you would be discovered or not 

5 discovered? 

6 A That is correct. 

7 Q I take it you thought if the radical faction found 

8 out you were there, there was an excellent chance you would 

9 be seized? 

10 A There were members of the radical faction that 

11 knew about it. The problem would be if it got to be 

12 general knowledge that we were there, the radical faction 

13 would have to react. I thought we would be in serious 

14 trouble. Even then, I thought the Iranians would make 

15 every effort to get us out. 

1g Q According to the memo at least there is some discus- 

17 sion at this time about the money, and when it is going to be 

18 deposited and various things like that. 

19 Can you tell us -- and if you want to look at 

20 this again, I would be glad to show it to you. Do you mind? 

21 Q Not at all. I think it might be helpful. 

22 A Okay. Yes. There was a long discussion at 

23 this meeting about the timing. In other words, how much 

24 in advance we had to have the money deposited before we could 

25 arrange everything. That is to the CIA account, because 



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44 



1 nothing -- from that date is when we had to start timing 

2 things, when we can pay for the Hawk s pares and the 508 TOWs 

3 and get them positined and then, because our arrival in 

4 Tehran would have to be based on the time we got everything 

5 prepositioned. 

6 Q Just a couple of questions. First, what was your 

7 understanding about the reason for the 508 TOWs? Did you know 

8 at the time the reason — 

9 A By this time I did, yes. 

10 Q What was your understanding? 

11 A My understanding is that the Israelis had asked — 

12 incidentally, there is an interesting aside on this. The 

13 Israelis to this day swear they only sent 500 TOWs in 

14 September. The Iranians counted 508. 

15 Q Interesting dispute. You think it would be the 
■\Q other way around. 

17 A Yes. We did supply the Israelis with 508. They 

1g asked if we would replace — that was agreed to. So this 

19 shipment included the H^wk spares and the 508 TOWs. 

20 Q You indicated that the timing was important because 

21 it was only as of the date that the money was received in 

22 the CIA I account. 

23 A Everything starts moving on the date that we get the 

24 deposit made in the CIA account. 

25 Q Did you have an understanding or was there anything 

jnr' 



ll £W ft 'I (-^^ " '^-' 

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDKNrr 



2 L C.J 



609 




45 



1 discussed at this meeting about how the money would get 

2 into the CIA account? What route it would take in order 

3 to get to the CIA account? 

4 A No. There was no discussion at this meeting. 

5 Q Did you know or understand the money would go 

6 through General Secord. 

7 A No. 

8 Q Did you have any knowledge about whether the money 

9 would go through the Israelis? 

10 A No. Not at this meeting. 

11 Q Let me — 

12 A In fact, as I recall, Ghorbanifar also took the 

13 position that he was raising money through his bankers. 

14 In fact, even in May, in London, he said his bankers forced 

15 him to take out a life insurance policy, which I thought 

16 was rather odd for bankers. In fact, while we were there, 

17 he had to take a physical, he said. 

18 Q While you were where? 

19 A While we were in London, he had to take a physical. 

20 Q For the life insurance policy? 

21 A Yes. For the life insurance policy. 

22 Q Let me just ask you a few other questions. 

23 Paragraph 4 of this document refers to -- did you type this 

24 at home as well? 

25 A No. I typed that at the office. 



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1 Q You typed this yourself, I assume? 

2 A Yes. I don't spell well or type well. 

3 Q Type well, particularly. 

4 But that is okay. Although I am sort of joking, I 

5 take it you didn't want things like this to be typed by 

6 the secretaries? Or, was it just because you didn't have a 

7 secretary? 

8 A A, I didn't have a secretary. The second thing, 

9 I thought this should be closely held. I would type this 

10 up and make copies and give them to the people that should 

11 have them. 

12 Q There is a reference in here -- 

13 A In other words, that was not in the system. 

14 Q I understand. I thought maybe one of the reasons 

15 you typed it yourself was for a limited close hold purpose. 

16 There is a reference in here to 3,000 Volkswagens 

17 about 10 days later. 

18 A Oh. 

19 Q What does that refer to? 

20 A TOWs. 

21 Q It refers to TOWs? 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q "Ghorba pressed for new additions..." I am quoting 

24 out of the document. "The new batteries," he said, "were 

25 no longer in inventory." What do the batteries refer to? 





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47 



A These were batteries, I think, used in the 
mobile radars. 

Q That actually means batteries? 

A Yes. 

Q I had not understood, I don't think, that TOWs 
were part of this negotiation in April of 1986. Do you recall 
what was said about TOWs. 

A Well, part of it -- whenever we got all of the -- 
all of the hostages released -- that is at this point in 
the negotiatins -- we would provide them with 3,000 TOWs. 

Q I guess earlier we had promised them a total of 
4,000 and delivered a thousand by this time, the February 
shipment. Did you have any knowledge of that? 

A One thousand, five hundred^ eight, if you count _ 
the Israelis.' 




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But 1 am pretty sure at this meeting he mentioned 
nothing about — 

Q Central America? 

A — Central America. 

Q You saw the et cetera at the end of that. I 
thought maybe it was a reference to Central America. 

A No. I am pretty sure I would have made a not^ 
of it. 

Q Let me ask you about paragraph 9 of the same 
document. It says, "It is still apparent that they have not 
given much thought to how a continuing relationship will 
be maintained." 

What were you trying to convey? What was it that 
you derived from the conversation? 

A Based on what Ghorbanifar was telling us, what 
bothered us about this, what bothered me particularly is 
there didn't seen to be much, at least as reported on the 
Iranian side, at least as reported by Ghorbanifar, about how 
a continuing relationship was going to evolve from all of 
this. I was at that point in history very much concerned 



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about that. 

Q Did you conclude from that that thelranians didn't 
care that much about a continuing relationship or just 
that they hadn't thought that much about it? 

A No. The only thing I can conclude is from what 
Ghorbanifar told us, that they hadn't really given serious 
thought about the mechanics of how this would be maintained. 

Q Let me just ask you a couple of questions about 
the mechanics of this meeting. 

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE.) 



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(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q I was asking you about the mechanics of the 
trip. You and Charles Allen picked him up at the airport, 
have lunch with him, meet with him in the afternoon. 
At what point does Oliver North show up? 

A Late in the afternoon. 

Q Are these meetings taking place at the hotel 
you indicated? 

A Yes. 

Q Did any of these meetings ever take place at 
the Old Executive Office Building? 

A No, not that I knew of. 

Q Did you -- how long then into the evening or 
night of April 3 did the meetings take place? 

A Pretty late. We had a late — Ollie got there 
late, early — late afternoon, early evening. 
. Q Around dinnertime? 

A I guess maybe around 5:30, 6:00. Maybe even 
later than that. We talked for a while, then went down 
and had dinner and I guess broke up about 11:00, something 
like that. 

Q Did you and Ollie leave together? 

A No. 

Q Did you leave first or did he leave first or 

1 :*•? ■."*■ ?> 



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51 

do you have any recollection of who left first? 

A I don't recall. I think we all left approximately 
the same time. 

Q What I am wondering is whether Ollie would 
have continued to meet with him after you left or whether 
you would know if he had? 

A I don't know. I don't recall him — 1 thought 
we all left at roughly the same time. 

Q Do you see Ghorbanifar then on the 4th? 

A Yes. I went out briefly, just to talk to him. 

Q Alone? 

A I can't remember whether I dropped him off at' 
the airport or not. Yes, I was alone. It was nothing of 
any great significance. 

Q Ghorbanifar was alone for this meeting, right? 

A That's correct. He was on his way out to see 
his girl friend. 

Q Out in California? 

A Yes. 

Q Was -- the last question about this meeting: 
Was there any discussion at this meeting about the 
mechanics of the delivery of the parts ai opposed to the 
timing of the release of the hostages? 

A In what sense? 

Q Was there any discussion about we have to have -- 



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the Iranians saying we have to have all the parts before 
we release any hostages? 

A I think there was something about we wanted the 
hostages before the parts arrived. 

Was that left in any fashion? Was that agreed 
upon with Ghorbanifac? 

A I think you have to say Ghorbanifar took this 
under advisement. I wouldn't have paid any attention to 
whatever the hell he agreed to anyway. 

Q Let me show you one other document and just 
ask you if you can date this one for me. This is CIIN-16S. 

A Oh, yes. This is one that I did in April after 
the Ghorbanifar meeting, just to p jt some — some things 
of ray own concert 




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You know, knowing Ghorbanifar, you have to -- 
see, there was a lot of dumb things done. Both Nir and 
Ollie North told Ghorbanifar 




change . 

Q I get you. 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^dll we can do is ask 
him and use a little bit of influer.ce, we don't control 
them. Then all at once, there is no problem in getting 
hostages released. 

In fact, that came to be one of the reasons 

that the trip was okay, 

:he Iranians can arrange for the release of 

the hostages. 

Q Did you articulate to anybody your concern^ 

./ere a set-up for you 




lou are talking 



hindsight now. Well, this is a good indication that they 



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are going to be released, that we can get them released. 



Q Did you have an understanding as of this meeting 
or approximately this time about how much money -- putting 
aside how it was going to be financed, and all that stuff, 
how much money the Iranians were going to be charged for 
the spare parts? 

A No indication whatsoever. 

Q That was something, I take it, though, that you 
could have just asked North how much it was going to be? 

A I never asked him. In fact, the only thing we 
ever discussed with North is what it was going to cost ' 
him. In other words, what it was going to cost us to 
release the -- to ship the parts. 

Q And I take it by that you mean how much -- what 
is the cost price, what is the price the CIA -- 

A The cost, what transportation we had to provide, 
packaging, stuff like that. 

Q You never discussed with Colonel North how much 
the price he was going to charge Ghorbanifar or how much 
he was going to charge the Iranians? 

A No. 

Q Was it your understanding he was setting the 
price? 



Yes. Because we gave it to him. He was the one 



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that conveyed the price to whoever he conveyed it to. 
Probably Nir, I would assume. 




that indicated that the price was around $22 million? 

A Yes, but that didn't cor.e until the 7th of 
.May . 

Q Okay. 

A That was the first alarm that I had. 

Q Okay. All right. You are right. I am looking 
at the wrong note. That was around the 7th of May. That 
was after the next meeting? 

A I didn't see that until I got back from -- 

I didn't 

see that until I got back from the London meetings in 
May. The London meetings were the 7th through 10th, 
8 through 10 May. 

Q Let me -- before we get up to the meeting which 



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I think took place around May 6th? 

A Something like that. It was the end of the first 
week in May. 

Q Let me ]ust sort of fill in the rest of April. 
What did you do? What occurred with regard to this during 
April of 1986? No additional meetings I take it took place 
during that time? 

A No. But we had had the final -- in other words, 
this shipment was going to be picked up at I 

It would include the total price was going to be 
over 56 million. It would include not only the Hawk spares 
that were available, that we could get, but also the 508' 
TOWs which would be dropped off in Israel. That was the -- 
there is a lot of confusion in the record over this. I 
recall when you were over interviewing me, one of the 
gentlemen from the Senate kept talking about $4 million. 
That's an incorrect figure because the figure was over 
$6 million that we passed on to Colonel North. 

Q Around $4 million was the price just for the 
Hawk parts? 

A For the Hawks. There is a real lot of confusion 
on who the hell paid for the Hawj^s . 

Q Do you know who paid for the H awks ? 

A I haven't the slightest idea. What complicates 
the confusion is if you go up to our meeting with 



jmiSSiFM^ 



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1 Furmark on the 22nd of October, when he's talking about, 

2 he says the price was S15 million. Did that include the 

3 Hawks ? Because at the same time he also says, we are 

4 talking -- if you recall, it was S15 million is what 

5 Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi raised to pay for the shipment. 

6 They added S3 million on to that to pay for their expenses 

7 and profits and another 2 million bucks for Nir. What 
that S2 million was for, God only knows. They owed Nir. 

9 So they owed Nir. 

The price to Colonel North was over 6 million. 
It was about 6.3 million. 

Q Because it included more than just the spare 
^3 parts? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you know that that was how much money 
Colonel North was being charged? When I say Colonel North, 
I mean how much money the CIA had to receive before it 
would — 

A Yes. I knew the exact figure the CIA had to 

receive. Yes. 

Q That became clear then during the course of 

April? 

A Yes. By the — 

Q By the London meeting that was clear? 

A Yes. A couple of weeks before that. 



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Q Was availability pretty much established by that 
time, too? 

A Actually more parts became available after the 
3 April meeting, because they are being continually 
manufactured. 

Q Now — 

A The military agreed to give up more. 

Q Let me just get this McFarlane meeting in 
here. I have now forgotten when you told me. Has that 
taken place by the time of the London meeting or does that 
take place after the London meeting? 

A I think it took place before the London meetiog. 

Q Assuming that is right, why don't you tell me 
what you remember about the meeting with McFarlane? 

A The meeting with McFarlane was basically -- 
we didn't talk much about the nuts and bolts. It was 
basically to give him our best estimate of what was going 
on in Teheran and I gave him some idea of what I thought 
the risk factor was as far as we were concerned. 

We also took a very recent NIE, National 
Intelligence Estimate, and we were -- there were a couple 
of other things for him to read. 

Q Where was it? 

A At his office downtown. 

Q At his office — not in the White House? 



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A No. He was out by then. 

Q That's what I thought. 

A Nineteenth and K. He had an office, a suite 
of offices . 

Q It was you. Colonel North? 
Mo .^^^^^H|^Bmyself , 

Q Not Colonel North? 

A NO. 

Q was there a reason Colonel North did not attend? 

A I don't know. He might not have been in the 
country at that time. 

Q How was it that you happened to have the 

meeting? 

A During one of our many meetings with Colonel 
North, he proposed that we give McFarlane a brief on the 
current •ituation in Teheran, bring him up to date. And 
we called and made an appointment. 

Q Had it been decided by the time of this meeting 
that Mr. McFarlane might be one of the people who attend 
the Teheran meeting? 

A Yes. By that time it had been decided he would 

head the delegation. 

Q It had been decided? 

A Yes. It was going to be a three-man delegation. 

O Who was that to be? 





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A McFarlane, North, and myself. 

Q There comes a time when Howard Teicher is 
added to the list? 

A McFarlane added him? 

McFarlane added him? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall when that was? 

A It was shortly before we went, because when — 
after — immediately after we returned from London, it 
was just going to be the three of us. 

Q Let me ask you about the London meeting then 
which records seem to indicate took place around May 6t"h. 

A That's correct. Sixth and 7th. 

Q Who attended the meeting? 

A It was myself, Colonel North, Nir, and 
Ghorbanifar. 

Q Was — okay. And was — and how long were the 
meetings? Did they take place on both days? 

A I think we only had really one significant 
meeting and that was on the 7th. Because that was the 
day that Ghorbanifar told us that he had arranged for 
the financing. 

Q Where did the meeting take place? At the 
Churchill? 

A Yes. His suite in the Churchill. 



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61 



Q Tell me about it. I understand there was a long 
discussion of financing and he raised the money. Tell me 
what you recall about those discussions? 

A Hell, what became cl^ to me at that discussion 
is that he had raised the money and was in the process of 
transferring it to an account controlled by General Nir 

:t1^ure. 
irsation. 

and the other asides in the conversation indicated that 
the deposit to our account, that is ^M CZA ^octtlfg^ 
wou£|^0~lHMIe by~G3fi«^l Secord — from an account 
contrj^^d ^X)^JS^ 

^ Ail wMBei£|r# jpfl^antjl^siot^ if yoii^ fSciOl, 
about^.«aeont»,of aone^^? - Okwlously you.Jkii||^2^1** anount 



and I don't think I Itneti. th«' — I got 
As I reca£^r~that dida^ co — ^>t in 





of iggUM.^b«t \\ w Aj m \ m i|> i i os t t] l B ia fn ^f^ acc< 

A No. I don't recall. The only think that I 

recall is Ghorbanifar 's claims that he was going to pay 
20 percent interest on the money raised from the banks, 
by his bankers. I don't recall him ever, in my presence, 
saying how much it was that he raised. 

Q Let me ask it this way: By this time you are 

a little over two weeks to the Teheran trip. You have 
been now sort of at three of the crucial meetings that 
had taken place. At least in your hearing no one has 
ever told Ghorbanifar how much money he's got to come 



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62 



up with? 

A I never found out how much or if North dealt 
with Ghorbanifar. 

Now, I would assume -- I don't want to assume -- 
I don't know who North, whether he told Ghorbanifar 
directly or whether he told, gave the price to Nir. 

Q Did you think that North might have been dealing 
separately with Ghorbanifar over the telephone or times 
when you were not present? 

A He could have been. 

Q You didn't have any idea? 

A I would not know. 

Q Was there any discussion of the 2 million to 
Nir at that time? 

A Oh, no. 

Q During the course of this meeting? 

A No. 
- Q When you said it was an account controlled 
by Nir, was it your understanding that that was an 
Israeli account or a Nir personal account? 

A I didn't know. It was an account he controlled. 

Q Okay . 

A A Swiss account. 

Q So I take it by this time you had a general 
understanding that the money would go from Ghorbanifar to 



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Nir to Secord to the CIA? 

A Well, I don't know if it went from Nir to 
Secord, if there was any intervening bus stops between the 
two. 

Q You knew it was going to go from Ghorbanifar 
to Nir and from Secord to the CIA and you figured in some 
fashion it was getting betwe«B~ Nir and SecqMrd but you 
didn't know what was going to happen in between? 

A I have no positive information of how that 
would take place. 

Q Right. Let me just focus once again. By this 
time, who was going on to the meeting on the American 
side had become pretty fixed, I guess, although Teicher 
was added later on . Who did you understand at that 
meeting you would meet with when you arrived in Teheran? 

A By this time, we had an excellent -- Ghorbanifar 
told us we would meet with the Prime Minister, Musavi; 
we would be MeCmg with Rafsanjani; he said -- and also 
the ^Pres^ent , Khameini . 

He also thought there was a possibility we 
might meet with Ahmed Khomeini, the Imeun's son, and 
also with Ayatollah Farsi, who was one of the leaders 
of the conservative faction. 

Q Did you believe as of that meeting that you 
would be actually meeting with those people or were you 



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64 



still skeptical? You personally? 

A I had a fair amount of skepticism, because of 
Ghorbanifar ' s track record with us. But I presumed the 
Iranians -- by that time, we determined it wasi 

would not have said this, 
or would not have conveyed this unless -- although there 
is nothing reallyl 

[- that would say we would see some senior 

people . 

He them ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H as 

I recall. I thought it was worth the risk. 

Q Again let me just ask you as of this meeting, . 
what did you understand the sequence of delivery of 
yourselves, parts, as opposed to when the hostages were 
going to come out? 

A This is my first discussion withi 
in London. I talked to him on the phone. We run into 
our first major snag and^^^^^^^^is insisting we bring 
all of the Hawk spares with us. I told him we can't 
do that. 

And we haggled, typical, like you are buying a 
rug. Finally, I said. Okay, we will bring a small partion, 
what we can carry with us on the one plane, given the 

fuel, which would be about one p«lXit>^~ Hc^g^ed. 

* -■»• 
Q ^''4P3V' 1^* 'M'^''^!'"*^i"^^*°^"^ what would 





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happen when you and the one pallet would arrive, that they 
would all be released? 

A That they would make an effort to release all 
the hostages. And while we were there, the rest of it 
would arrive. 

Q The remaining three pallets? 

A Three pallets. 

Q And — okay. But at least there was an 
understanding that at least the first pallet would arrive 
along with the delegation before the release? 

A We would be bringing a small amount of the 
spares with us on the plane. That was clearly under- 
stood. 

Q It was not understood, then, or at least -- 
it was clear to you that you hadn't presumed to bring 
half of them? 

A Oh, no. No. 

Q Did you talk -- and you spoke at that time 
directly witt 

A Withl 

Q Did you speak to him on more than one 
occasion? 

A After that, I think I did speak to him. 

Q I really meant at that meeting? 

A Oh. No. Only once . ^ OnJ.vc one conversation. 

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Q Did you have any discussion with him in that 
phone conversation about price? 

A No. But -- but on that same day is when 
Ghorbanifar gave him the initial price| 

Q Tell me how that happened? 
A H€ 




jthe price of the Hawjj spares, I think it was 

something like S20-1/2 million. 




Q Before we get to that, let me make sure I have 
asked everything I wanted to ask about the meeting 
itself. 

Just one more question. Had the pre-meeting 
been canned by this time? What was the status of whether 
or not there should be a pre-meeting involved? 

A Oh, that had been canned in April, by the end 
of April. 

Q So you would not agree — this was essentially 
the pre-meeting? 



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iaiHSIfiSfT 



67 




Q The -- let me ask it this way: Although you 
were not 100 percent positive, I take it, my recollection 
is the 240 and the 22 — 20.2 million, 
they look pretty linkedl 

A Yes. Also, there were two things. Are the 
Iranians paying for the Israeli TOWs again? Because, 
you know, that is -- if you take the total -- I think it 
was S6 . 3 million, 6.4 million for the TOWs and Hawks . 
That figure, I think it was 21-1/2, wasn't it? Something 



IS!3USS2£? 



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like that? 

Q I think -- 

A Twenty and a half. 

Q That's three times six. 

A Six point four, 6.5. That's about three times 
the price we gave to Colonel North. 

1 e a s t ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 y o u 
were concerned that there had been a fairly hefty 
increase in the price, although you may not have been 
100 percent certain it was because of these other deals? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you -- who did you talk to? What did you^. 
do? 

to^^^^^^^^H He 
may have also brought iwap with Ollie. I think Ollie 
said he would check -- talk to Nir about it. 

Q Let's take these one at a time. What did you 
and ^^^^^^^^^^^- what was the discussion you and 
Ihad about it? 

A Well, it was the same thing I said to you, 
that this seems like a rather large mark-up. 

Q How did he respond? 

A He agreed. And I think even -- Colonel North 
was alarmed, too. We didn't want this thing falling 




through because someone is making exorbitant profits. 




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69 



Q Do you recall how you talked to Colonel North 
about it? Did you talk to him over a secure phone, at a 
meeting? 

A I don't recall whether it was at one o£ the 
meetings ve had or not. But: .«v were very concerned. Then 
that was fortified when we got to TehAran. 

Q Than is it nur o^Krstaiiding Colonal North 
then contacted Nir? 

A I can't — I don't know, in fact, whether he 
did or not. 

Q But did Colonel North — 

A We never got a real answer on what transpired^, 
prior to the trip to Teharan, as far as I can recall. 
Why the price was so high. 

Q Were you — 

A Oh, one other thing I might add. While we were 
in London, as I recall Ghorbanifar said that he has 
already spent just on this specific thing $350,000 of 
his own money and that he had already on this overture, 

this operation engaged in, he had spent over a million 

( 
dollars of his own money. 

Q Over the total overture? 

A Yes. 

Q Have you 

ire you becoming -- are there any bells 





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going off about where this overcharge might be going? 

A Well, yes, because you know we hadi 

[the intelligence on the fact Ghorbanifar 
had been arrested. Because of the dates we assumed -^^H 

:hat he and Khashoggi 
had been trying to raise S50 million. We said, That's 
not for us. They could well have been involved in 
financing the sting operation because they were close 
associates of Cyrus Hashemi. 

That was the first bell that rung. The other 
thing is Ghorbanifar just trying to maXe a lot of money. 

Q There were no bells going off that maybe 
money was going to Central America, though, I take it? 

A No. 

Q By this time, did you know that Colonel North — 
I asked you as of March. 

A By this time I knew that you cannot be around 
Colonel North very long without learning a lot about the 
contras. He was very proud of the private effort to keep 
the supply lines open to the contras. 

This is probably as good a time as any to ask 
you what he told you about that . 

A Not so much in specifics, except that he was 
proud of the fact he was able to keep a force of contras 
in — you know, that he had played a role in the effort 

"";Q' 




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of raising private money from private individuals to keep 
the contras supplied for the two years that there was no 
official funds available. 

Q Did he ever talk about his -- about his 
logistics support, about establishing resupply operations 
to keep the munitions? 

A Not any of the specifics. He never mentioned 
an airfield here, or anything like that. 

Now, the only way -- and I found out about 
it -- I knew he was involved, for instance, when the 
plane went down. I saw it on German television first 
and called him. I said -- I don't know if this has 
anything to do with you, but there's a plane that's been 
shot down in Nicaragua. 

Q What did he say? 

A He said, yes, it was. Then he got -- then he -- 

Q You were in Frankfurt at that time? 

A Yes. Frankfurt. 

Q Did he -- was it clear to you that he was 
involved in military resupply of the contras? 

A I didn't know what kind of supply it was at 
the time. Whatever knowledge -- I and my wife were -- 
see, my wife and I went on vacation, a misguided vacation 
the end of September. We got to spend about three or 
four days in Rome and got called in^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand 



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told to go to Germany. We have German grandchildren 
anyway. 

We were sitting in the room getting ready for 
dinner when I saw on German television that a plane had 
been shot down, a C-123. I called him and said, I don't 
know if it has anything to do with you or not, but there's 
a C-123 shot down over Nicaragua. He confirmed, yes, it 
was . 

Q He indicated it did have something to do with 
him? 

A He said he thought it was one that might have 
been one that he was involved with. He wasn't sure at 
that time actually. 



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Q Did he ever mention Project Democracy to you? 
Did he ever mention it by that name? 

A Yes, he referred to Project Democracy. 

Q What did he — 

A The first — the way it came up is the airplane 
that took us in — not took us in, but flew us from Dulles 
tr;^^^^^^^^^- was Democracy Airlines or something to do with 
Project Democracy. That is the first time I ever heard 
about it. 

Q And is that what it said on it? 

A No, it didn't say much of anything. 

Q He told you it was one of his Project Democracy 
airplanes? 

A He said this is Democracy Airlines. He just 
laughed. That was all. 

Q Let me get back — did you discuss with — there is 
one other person I didn't ask you about. Did you discuss 
with Charley Allen^^^^^^^^^^^H take it you probably 
did. 

A Oh, yes. Charley and I used to discus: 




Vti^.j^a^s ^ikely that was tt 



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'Sifi^T 



amount Ghorbanifar was charging for the 240, but you couldn't 
really tell for sure? 

A The problem you get into with Ghorba -- he was 
involved with so many arms deals with them 




iifferent deals, but even that seemed to us that the 
amount he was asking did in some way -- did include -- 
we knew it did include the Hawk spares. 

If that was all it was for. That was an awful lot 
of money. 

Q Did that cause you any operational security 
concerns about your trip to Tehran? Did you have any concern 
that that price was going to cause you a problem? 

A My concern was the egregious overcharging, that it 
could queer the whole deal with the Iranians. 

Q And it might queer it with you sitting in Tehran? 

A Yes. I wasn't that much worried about that. 

Q You were not? 

A No, because the Iraniaas realized they were dealing 
with Ghorbanifar. 

Q Meaning that they also knew that there could be 
overcharges and it might not be that much surprising to 



them? 







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75 



A Yes. I had a lot of private discussions with the 
Iranian side in Tehran over there. 

Q Let me get to the preparations for the trip to 
Tehran. 

Generally, what kind of logistical preparations were 
there involved? You must have had to get passports, arrange 
for the flights, clearanaces, all sorts of stuff. 

A Actually, I didn't have to do much of anything. 
We had people that took care of that. I took charge of the 
passports. I carried all the^^^^^^^Hpassports with me. 
There were other things I had to do that I was 




Q Did — 

A Incidentally, that was one of the key reasons why 
a decision was made to leave, is because 

[did not -give any indication that there was any 
motion on the hostages. 

Q This is — 

A while we were in Tehran. 

Q Let me ask you, at this time, did you know 





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76 



General Secord was going to have a role in providing 
airplanes and getting you from one point to the other? 

A By the time we went to London, I knew that. 

Q Could you describe ]ust your flight path from the 
time you leave Washington, what airlines is involved, until 
the time you arrive in Tehran? 

A I forget the exact date it was we left. We left 
Dulles and we flew via Executive Jet, stopped at 
to refuel, and went on tol 

Q Who is on that plane? 

A McFarlane, myself, Howie Teicher, and the two CIA 
communicators. 

Then we get ^°^^^^^^H ^^ rest on the ground 
there because of the clearances they have and the time that 
we have to arrive in Israel. 

Then we take our proprietary f ron^^^^^^^^to 
Tel Aviv. On that flight are the two communicators, myself, 
McFarlane, and Howie Teicher. 

Q Okay. 

A We arrive at the crack of dawn in Tel Aviv. We 
are met by two -- by Colonel North and two Israeli^s from 
Nir's office who get us through everything and into a hotel 
room without having to check in, etc., etc. 

We work during that day about setting up a commo 
base in the hotejl and resting. We have dinner in the 



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77 



evening and then take off for Tehran. The flight route 
from Tehran, of course, is all the way down the Red Sea, 
around Socotra, the Gulf of Oman, and make landfall at 
Bandar Abbas. That is on an Israeli aircraft, an 
Israeli 707. That was McFarlane, myself, Howie Teicher, 
Colonel North, Nir, and one communicator. 

Q And then you arrive where? 

A At Mehrabad airport. 

You arrive there on the morning of the 25th? 

I believe it was the morning of the 25th; that is 



Q 

A 
correct. 

Q Did you -- just to cover this -- see General 
Secord in Tel Aviv? 

A Yes. 

Q What was he doing in Tel Aviv? 

A He was in -- he was at the hotel when we 
arrived. He introduced us to the air crew he had arranged. 
They left. We had a brief meeting on how things would work 
out. He was sort of going to be our man in Tel Aviv while 
we were in Tehran and would interface with our communicator 
there. 

Did you ask the reason they were using General 
Secord as opposed to a CIA man or somebody affiliated with 
the government? 

A This was always considered to be a NSC operation. 




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The only conclusion that I can arrive at is that Ollie North 
relied very heavily on Dick Secord. They were very close 
friends. 

Q Did you have an understanding of what Secord ' s 
job was or what he was doing for a living, whether he was 
getting paid out of this, just what his role was? He was 
retired by this time. 

A Oh, yes. He was retired and I went under the 
assumption he was doing some sort of -- he was a consultant 
of some sort for the NSC for Ollie. 

By the time we went to Tehran, I was pretty sure 
that he was heavily involved in the private financing of the 
effort to get support for the contras. 

Q You were aware General Secord was? 

A Yes. 

Q What did you think that entailed as of that time? 

A I had no idea what the details were and wasn't 
concerned. We didn't really — I didn't see very much 
of — 

Q Of Secord? 

A -- of Secord. 

Q Did you have an understanding he was involved in 
sort of the mechanics down in Central America as well as the 
private fundraising? 



643 



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1 I assumed that he was involved in the -- had some role in the 

2 raising of the funds and also in arranging for shipment. 

3 Q Did — 

4 A I couldn't give you any -- I have no idea of what 

5 the details were. 

6 Q Did he strike you as Ollie's commander in the field 

7 down in Central America? Was that the relationship? 

8 A No. I never got that idea. I know that he was 

9 heavily involved in getting air crews. 

10 Q For Central America? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q By this time, had you heard of the account LaJce 

13 Resources? 

14 A The what? No. 

15 Q You had not? 

16 A I never heard of Lake — the account for Lake 

17 Resources until after all this in the press. 

18 Q Let me show you some CI IN 164 so we don't have to 

19 pick your brain too much about the trip. 

20 A This is my account of it. 

21 Q Instead of asking you to review everything about 

22 that trip, I take it this account is a fairly complete 

23 recollection of what happened? 

24 A Well, part -- when we were in Tehran, I did an 

25 awful lot of translating. When you are translating, you 




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don't really recall well, because you are concentrating on 
translating. So, this is not really a complete account. 
This is what I can recall of the discussions I was involved 
in really when I wasn't concentrating on all the translating. 

Some of the times Ghorbanifar -- you can't -- after 
a couple of hours, you get groggy. Ghorbanifar would then 
translate. 

Q Let me ask it this way: is this about as much as 

you recall today about those — 

A More. 

Q Probably more? 

A Yes. 

Q Okay. 

Before I get into the questions about the trip, 
had Hakim resurfaced by this time as someone who was 
involved in this at all? 

A Whatever involvement he had, I knew nothing at this 
time other than the two phone calls. 

Q The two -- 

A And the fact he had been used as a translator. 
In fact, I thought ^)j was pretty much out of it. 

Q You did? 

A Because one of the reasons they wanted a U.S. 
citizen as translator — 



Q One of the reasons for you getting involved was to 



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get -- 

A To get the Iranians out of it. 

Was there an attempt then -- were those phone 
calls Hakim placed part of an attempt to remove Ghorbanifar 
from the operation? Was that the purpose behind it? 

A I think — I don't know why the calls were made. 
I was only given — to translate them. You can surmise from 
what transpires in them that it was an attempt to go -- that 
is apart from the Ghorbanifar channel to try to convince — 
through another channel to convince the Iranians that we were 
sincere and would do what we said we would do by Ghorbanifar. 
Q Let me ask one last question before I get intQ the 

guts of it here. 

Had the date that you all would be traveling to 
Tehran — how far in advance of the time you actually arrived 
had that date been set up, if you recall? 

When I say "set u Ay I mean set up with Ghorbanifar 
A This kept changing on a daily basis, because we 
couldn't set the date until we got the deposit in the CIA 

account . 

I think that was on the 16th of May. 

Q I think that is right. 

A Then we were able — we figured we needed about 
a week. Then we were able to set the precise date that we 
would arrive. 

\\\m AC 



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Q Is It your recollection that Ghorbanifar then was 
contacted shortly after the 16th to say we would be there 
around the 25th or whenever? 

A Yes, because he determined his departure on ours. 
He was in Tehran when we arrived. 

Q It was not your impression, though, that you had 
only recently told him of when you were going to be arrived 
in Tehran? It was not a hurry-up trip? 

A Oh, no. We had told him. He was well aware that 
until we got the money in our account, we could not give any 
precise dates, but that as soon as we got it in our 
account, we could. 

Someone called him. I don't know whether it was 
Charley -- to tell him, "Okay, we will be coming." 

Q It was also clear to him it would take about a 
week to ten days after the money was deposited? 

A We said seven or eight working days, because it 
would take us that much to get the ship to get the material 
in place in Israel. 

Q Do I take it that you got about -- that on the 

plane that arrived, you said you took one of four pallets. 

You 9^0^ about 25 percent of the parts with you on the 
A 

plane? 

A It was actually less than that. We took the small 



pallet. 



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1 Q Let me just ask you some specific questions about 

2 the meetings, because for the rest of it we can pretty much 

3 rely on that for your recollection. 

4 When you first arrived -- and as I understand from 

5 reading that, there is some delay before anyone actually come! 

6 out to meet you, which must have surprised everyone -- at 

7 what point do you realize the hostages are not about to be 

8 released, despite the fact that the delegation and the parts 

9 have arrived? 

10 A Our initial meeting that afternoon -- because the 

11 Iranians tell us about the enormous problems they are having 

12 and they go through a long list of conditions that the 

13 captors have placed on the release of the hostages, and it 

14 it also pretty clear to me at this point the Iranians 

15 don't have control of the hostages and are going to have 
•J5 considerable difficulty getting control of them. 

■J7 Some things were pretty bleak. The Iranians were 

18 kind of hostile. In fact, the guy that they brought who was 

19 sort of their spokesman, whom we never have identified to 

20 this day, was really pretty negative. 

21 So, the American delegation was — we were pretty 

22 bleak after the first da^, the first afternoon's meeting. 

23 But things warmed up after that. 

24 What came out of all the discussions was that the 

25 Iranians were pretty sure that they^ould get two hostages 




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84 

released, using their influences, and they were very anxious 
that they would consider the deal for two hostages and the 
H^j^ spares, and then they would work on getting the other 
two, and then any other subsequent shipments would be based 
on their being able to release the other two. 

But at the same time, they wanted to continue the 
dialogue. 

One of the bases for us packing up and going was 
that McFarlane had given an ultimatuqi^ It w^ e*rly in the 
morning_af_the day-aie lft£t* say^ag — they had asked — the 
head of the Iranian delegation asked if we can get two 
released, we think we can, will you give us some time, and 
so he only gave them until -- I think it was 7:00 o'clock 
the following morning, because we had gotten the message that 
there were no -- there was no indication] 

that there was any motion on the 
hostage issue in Lebanon. 

The following morning, when no one showed up, 
including Ghorbanifar -- funny thing -- we decided to leave. 

land the Rev Guard guy showed up, and we told them 
we were leaving. 

We packed up everything and marched out of the 
hotel room. He arranged for cars. They took us -- 
fortunately, about 2:00 in the morning they started refueling 
th€ aircraft. 



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So, we were able to take off. But I was the last 
one on the plane. I talked to the two Iranians. They said 
that they really weren't prepared for us. 

Why, after all that had gone on -- I don't know 
whether you can blame it on Ghorbanifar or what. One of the 
things that came out during the meeting, they showed me all 
kinds of documentation from Ghorbanifar. He was lying 
to both sides. He had painted this to the Iranians as the 
beginning of a long-standing -- a new arms relationship with 
the United States that included PHC^r/yx/missiles, aereal 
cameras, spare parts for the helicopters, si]ff^f.ittf.fi- missiles 
large number of TOWs, 20 radars, a lot of other things. 

Q Have you read this morning's Washington Post? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you read the story on page 1 about Colonel 
North? 

A 

Q 



Yes, I did. 

Just so the record is clear, the story reports, 
as I recall now, that Colonel North early in the morning 
of the day you left struck his own deal with Ghorbanifar, 
ordered the planes to arrive with the rest of the parts, and 
that he either woke up or when McFarlane woke up. North 
told McFarlane what he had done, and McFarlane countermanded 
his order and said that they wouldn't do that. 

Is th^e.,^ijfl||tmith .to that f^ory? 



re^aoMitiiLith .to that Cko 



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A Not that I know of. The plane never left the 
ground . 

Q So you think that story is not true? 

A Not true. It sounds like part of what -- see, 
the deal that we -- as I was just telling you — and 
McFarlane had been briefed on it, too. He agreed, yes, 
if he can get two out, okay. 

And also, Ghorbanifar and I were involved in 
writing the seven-point -- you probably have a copy of it 
somewhere. I can't recall them offhand — the seven points. 
We translated that into Farsi. That was sort of the final 
thing. 

Q Let me just finally ask you about that conversation 
or the meetings that you had. 

There comes a time, as I understand it, during 
the course of those meetings when Ghorbanifar makes 
reference to you about the price of the parts. 

A Oh, yes. 

Q Do you recall — 

A This is very interesting. Why, he approached — 
Ghorbanifar said to me, "I want to talk to you." We went 
out in the hall, because he knew the rooms were bugged. 
He said, "They are going to ask you about the pricing, and 
the pricing -- the price is going to be $24.5 million." 
He says, "It is all right. Tell th^rp^t is all right. 



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87 



because it includes other things, other expenses that came 
up during the course of this, and there is other material 
in there. You have to say it is okay." 

So, I immediately talked to North. I said, "What 
is this on the $24.5 million?" 

He was shocked. So, we called Nir. And we had a 
three-way conversation in which Nir said, "Look, they owe for 
other things." We went through a long song and dance about 
all the expenses Ghorbanifar had up to this. In fact, he 
had to pay a large amount of bribes to a whole raft of 
people and that there was no monkey business) the $24.5 
million was the correct price. 
So, we stuck with it. 
Q Did they ever — did the Iranians ever ask you 
about the price? 
A Yes. 

Q What did they -- how did that conversation come 
up? What is it that they said to you and what did you 
respond? 

A I basically said, "You know, I am not really -- 
I don't know anything. I am not a military man. I don't 
know anything about the logistics, the pricing of these 
things. You have to talk to the businessmen." 

Q What was the question they asked you? How much 

,5 million? 



this going to be o': f-j^^ AS ^^. f h" 



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A Yes. It was -- is this accurate? 

I said, basically, "I assume it is. We can't sell 
you these things direct. We have to sell them to the — the 
military sells them to the middlemen at commercial prices." 

They didn't raise any big stink at that time. The 
thing that they did raise is that the head, the senior 
Iranian, got me aside and showed me letters Ghorbanifar 
had written, giving them all this stuff that we had never 
heard about. We only have a copy of one letter and that 
we got from Nir on a letter Ghorbanifar wrote on the 8th of 
July, after the fact, in which he made all kinds of 
ridiculous promises to them. 

But there were three separate letters which I 
thought we had copies of. But I could never find the damned 
things. They were very interesting, because they — it is 
clear Ghorbanifar was telling the Iranian side one thing and 
us another. Ghorbanifar was presenting it to them as a big 
deal about what the American side was prepared to do. 

Q The $24 million figure -- whatever the figure 
was — 

A Twenty-four and a half. 

Q Twenty-four and a half? What was it your 
understanding that that included as of that time? Just the 
Hawk parts? 

A I don't know. 




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The way Nir said, he said, "Hey, look, that 
includes other things. They owe him for other arms 
shipments he is involved m. He is trying to bring all the; 
accounts up square. It is an accurate figure." 

He was voviching for Ghorbanifar. He said, "It 
also includes bribes that he was forced to pay." 

Q Did you have any further discussion with Colonel 
North about this figure? Is is now -- this figure is 

getting to be pretty close ^^ 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ There was this 
conversation. 

Was there any further conversation with North' about 
this figure of 524 million? What is going on here? This 
is going to be a real problem if we are going to charge this 
much money? 

A One of the things we decided is that the thrust 
of the conversation was that Ghorbanifar was knocking down 
an awful lot on the deal. 

One of the things that was considered -- I don't 
know whether we talked about this in Tehran or later -- is 
if we do any other deals with Ghorbanifar, we tell him 
precisely what he can charge -- you know, a reasonable 
profit — and tell the Iranians the same thing. 

Q This was a conversation between you and North? 

A 



Yes, subsequent to that. 




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Q Was — 

A I don't know whether we talked about this in Tehran 
or right after. I can't recall. 

Q Let me make sure that is everything I wanted to 
ask you about the Iran trip. 

MR. PEARLINE: Could we take a couple minutes 
break? 

MR. EGGLESTON: We are going to have to have 
lunch at some point, because I am not about to end. 

What I was going to do is get you back — we can 
go off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. EGGLESTON: We can go back on the record. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Mr. Cave, have you read the Tower Commission report 
A Yes, part of it. 

Q There is a reference in the Tower Commission report 
to Colonel North on the tarmac telling Bud McFarlane about 
the diversion of money to the Central American contras. 

Do you recall that in the Tower Commission report? 
A I recall it in the report. 

Q I was going to ask you did Colonel North say 
anything like that to you. 
A No. 
Q And I take it you did not overhear Colonel North 



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say that to McFarlane on the tarmac in the Tehran airport? 

A No. 

Q then you leave Tehran in the early morning hours -- 
I guess It turned out not to be the early morning hours, 
on the morning of May 28? 

A It was about 9:00, 9:30 by the time we took off. 

Q How long did it take you to get back to the United 
States? 

A It is a long flight. We didn't get back until the 
evening, early evening, because it was an 11-hour flight, 
ten and a half hour flight. 

The communicator and McFarlane and Teicher and 
North immediately went over and boarded a Lear ]et that 
Secord arranged for them, so they could fly directly back 
to the United States. — *« 

I havSTdegenerative spinal disease^, so I decided 
to stay a night in Tel Aviv. So, I had dinner that night witli 
Nir and his wife and then flew back the next morning. 

Q Did you have any more discussion with Nir during 
that dinner about this financing problem? 

A No, because his wife was not aware of anything. 

Q Was she aware he had gone off to Tehran? 

A No. 

Q Are you married? 

A Yes. 



' PV^^^^K^E^^S ■^^Wt'^"^*^ ^EB^^^^^»^ 



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Q Was your wife aware you had gone off to Tehran? 

A No. 

Q And how long -- you arrived back in approximately 
24 hours later? 

A Yes. I got the TWA flight out of Tel Aviv the 
next morning. 

Q And when you arrived back, how long is it after you 
get back before you report in to the office or wherever to 
brief somebody on what had happened on the trip? 

A It was -- I don't know if it was the next day or th< 
day after. I came in and saw Casey, gave him a rundown 
on what had transpired. I talked to a couple other 
people. 

Q Did you brief anyone at the NSC about your 
impressions of the trip? I assume you had conversations with 
North. Did you ever brief Poindexter? 

A We had a meeting w^h Poindexter some time after 
that. It was just a where-do-we-go-from-here type of 
thing . 

Q Did you ever brief the President? 

A I did not see the President until November 24 at 
the NSPG meeting. 

Q November 24, 1986? 

A Yes. .. .^ --^ -^ 



Had you met with Poindexter prior to the trip? 




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93 



A Yes. 

Q On how many occasions? 

A I met Poindexter before he came — before he 
replaced McFarlane. It was to give him my impressions of the 
Iranian exiles. It was completely different. 

Then I think I saw him once before he went in. 
There was one meeting. 

Q Do you recall how much it was prior to the time thai 

you went in to Tehran? 

_ A It was shortly before we went in. 

Q What was your impression of his view of the trip? 
A He seemed to be a little bit concerned about the 
security of everyone that was going in. So was Casey. 
In fact, Casey told me at one point, "The decision to go in 
IS yours." He asked me, he said, "Look, I want you to give 
this serious consideration, because if you decide — and you 
know better than anybody else — that there is a great deal 
of risk in this, I will call up the President, and we will 

cancel it." 

I said, "No, I thought about it, and I think that 
there is certainly some danger involved, but I think the 
chances of us being really harmed there, of being in harm's 
way, are not too great." 

Q In your meeting with Director Casey after the trip 
did you give him your conclusions about the trip, what had 



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been accomplished, where you should go from there? 

A I was a little more upbeat than the rest of the 
people on the trip. I was more upbeat not -- in hindsight, 
It turns out they were looking at different things. I was 
upbeat because the Iranians seemed sincerely interested in 
maintaining a dialogue. 

I told Casey it was my conclusion that no matter 
what happened, we were only going to get two more hostages 
out at the most. Two more, I think we can count on. Maybe 
another one, a third one. 

I thought if we kept this up, we could get two 
more out, two hostages out, which is what we got. 

Q Did you think -- did you give the conclusion that 
you thought that you should continue with Ghorbanifar as 
the intermediary? 

A No. I thought we should definitely — I have 
always been, of course, against Ghorbanifar as an 
intermediary. Granted, other people had reservations that 
to get rid of him may be more dangerous than to keep him. 
He would certainly try to get even with us for querring a 
good deal that he thought he had. 

Q There is — after the meeting -- and this will 
be the last question I ask before lunch -- after the 
meeting there is a long -- after the meeting in Tehran there 
is a long period of time before the hostages are released. 




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95 

Are there meetings during that time about whether or not to 
close down the entire operation? 

A I don't know about closing it down. 

During this period, most of the action is under- 
taken by Nir in concert with Ghorbanifar. That culminates 
in our meeting in Frankfurt which precedes the release of 
Jenco . 

Q Has your contact with Ghorabanifar dropped off 
substantially by this time? 
A Yes. 

What has happened is, you know, this is the period 
when I get all these calls f rom^^^^^^Hromplaining about thi 
pricing of the stuff. 

Q Let me pick that up after lunch. 

MR. EGGLESTON: We can go off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the deposition was 
recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. the same day.) 



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AFTERNOON SESSION 

1:35 p.m. 
Whereupon, GEORGE W. CAVE, having been previously 
duly sworn, resume the witness stand and testified further 
as follows: 

THE REPORTER: You are still under oath, 
Mr. Cave. 

THE WITNESS. I figured that. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Mr. Cave, at the time we broke for lunch, we 
had just finished the trip to Tehran in late May and the 
immediate reaction to it and your meeting with Director 
casey about it and the reactions and discussions with him. 
The next thing I want to talk to you about is your 
conversations that I think you had with^^^^^^^Hbeginning 
really in June of 1986. I think some of those conversations 
deal with pricing issues. 

Maybe it would make it easier for you if I put CIIN 
515 and — why don't I give you — I will start with 515. 
A Okay . 

Q Is this -- there is really, as I can tell, at 
least from your memorandum, there doesn't appear to be -- 
the fight over the prices is not really discussed? 

A This doesn't come up until later. This is 
the 13 -- I think the first conversation where he complains 



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about the pricing is on the 20th, isn't it? 

Q I don't know that I have a note of one on the 
20th. That could well be. 

A Yes. After the -- you have another one attached 

to this. 

Q Is that a different day? 

A This was based on a speech. This is something 
based on a speech Rafsanjani made. 

Q Are those not connected items? 

A They are not connected. 

Q Why don't you ^ust rip them apart. Otherwise, 
I will confuse myself. 

A Let me ]ust say a brief word about this. After 
we come back from Tehran, whatever movement there is is 
between Nir, Ghorbanifar, and the Iranians in Tehran. 
NOW when we refer to our friend, that is Ghorbanifar. It 
IS quite apparent that^^^anted to talk directly with 
me to see if there was any -- if it was really worth while 
pursuing this. This is the first conversation. 

Q That is what I was going to ask you. Is this 
as best you recall the first conversation you have after 

getting back? 

A Yes. Because I think Ghorbanifar provided the 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H And 
phone numbers^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

called him because I think -tb^.e-wrs » -- this was based 



662 



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98 




1 on a request by^^^^^^H It was passed through by 



on a request by 

2 Ghorbanifar. 

3 I had the one position that I had taken is before 

4 we do anything else, we would want to have another talk 

5 with the Iranians. I didn't think we should go ahead with 

6 the deal until after we could talk with the Iranians. 

7 Q By the Iranians, who are you referring to? 

8 A In this case, we are referring tc^^^^^^^B Such 

9 dialogue as would remain would remain via thej 

10 ^^^^^^^H That is how we left it when we left Tehran. 

11 Q This to me, 515, appears to be not — does not 

12 represent much advancement over Tehran. It seems to be 

13 substantially the same positions as they have set forth? 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q Had you at the Agency made decisions to continue 

16 the contact even though no hostage had been released — 

17 A I didn't do anything without coordinating it with 
13 Colonel North. In other words, as far as we were 

19 concerned, he was still the point man in the operation. 

20 Q Let me just ask you how often did you meet with 

21 the Director about this? Was he — and I don't know 

22 exactly how to ask the question. Did you have fairly 

23 regularfcf meetings with him personally about the project 

24 and the progress of the project? 

25 A Not so much during this period. There were a 



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couple of meetings. But once we had the meetings with 
the new channel, I saw him very often. 

Q But between the time you get involved in March 
and the time of the new channel, the meetings are not very 
often? 

A No. There wasn't that many of them. 

Q Is he generally supportive of this operation? 

A Yes. 

Q Is he enthusiastically supportive? I am asking 
about the time before the second channel? 

A Oh, yes. He wanted -- strongly believed we needed 
some kind of strategic dialogue with Iran. 

I take it -- this is getting way ahead -- I take 
it from prior conversations with you that you were being 
more enthusiastic once the second channel is established? 

A Yes. Because we are talking to people then who, 
it is quite obvious, they are going to -- that there are 
responses and definite -- there are definite proposals made. 
We got no -- despite irl the'h^jlin^ CRtf6^rad(Con in Tehran, 
if you talk about definitive things the Iranian side was 
going to do, it was very little. 

Q The next document I have is 592 and -- I don't 
know that you need to review it, but I just wonder if this 
is the next converw^iOn that you had? It is a transcript 
of a conversatioa* . Xi)S <^be ati "tt ttf H% 3 is June 17 of 1986. 



•^isHMlL 



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A Yes. This is a follow-up of the other one in 
which based on instructions, after talking with North, I 
kept -- adhered to the view that we would do everything 
according to the program we wrote out in Tehran. 

Q Let me ]ust get back to 515 for a second. I note 
at the end you indicate once again that you have doubts that 
the Iranians have control over the hostages at all. 

A That is this one? 

Q Actually it's the last several words of 515. 

A Oh, yes. Because one of the things we had told 
them before we left is if you want this deal to go through, 
they better get control over some or all of the hostages. 
From the way he talked when I brought this up in this 
conversation, I sincerely doubted that he was telling me the 
truth. 

Q Did they — the Iranians — did they essentially 
admit to you in Tehran that they did not have control over 
the hostages? 

A Yes. 

Q That they could exert influence but didn't have 
the ability to snap their fingers and order release? 

A They had a person or persons over there with whom 
they were in contact; and the way they put it to us is that 
they thought that they could get — were pretty sure they 
could get control over two, but it would be a very time 



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101 

consuming process. It was at the Tehran meeting where the 
real problem with the captors emerged, i.e., the 17 Dawa 
prisoners in Kuwait. 

Q It was at the Tehran meeting when that became one 
of the bargaining -- 

A Very clear. Realizing that we could go so far 
and then nothing — nothing could happen with regard to the 
hostages until the Dawa prisoners issue was cleared up. 

Q The next memorandum I have of a conversation 
that you had is number 516 and it refers to a conversation 
on the 22nd of June. A moment ago you mentioned a conver- 
sation on the 20th. 

A It could be the date. I can take a look at it. 
This is the first indication. This is why he is 
urging me to contact the merchant. The merchant refers to 
Ghorbanifar. To contact the merchant to get the deta.rls. 

Q Is this then the first conversation where he begins 
to express concern about the pricing? 

A Well, I am talking about hindsight. That comes 
out later. This is why he is saying contact the merchant 

Q There is just one specific question I wanted to 
ask you about this one. In paragraph 2 of this document, 
which is again 516, it says "He pointed out that the 
previous release of the one person returned for the 
one thousand had not left them in good order as the one 



iiIi£LI&i^^-i 



666 




102 



m7 1 thousand were not that important and they had to return the 

2 other materials." 

3 What is he referring to, the one thousand? 

4 A I assumed that he was referring to the one 

5 thousand TOWs delivered in February. 

6 Q Right. 

7 A But that doesn't make sense. There is nothing 

8 released for. The other things were the HAWK missiles 

9 that the Israelis delivered in November that were all 

10 returned. 

11 Q I take it all the references to four million 

12 and two million, those are referenced to the hostages? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q But your understanding at the time was he was 

15 talking, when he talked about the 1000, he was referring 

16 to the TOWs? 

17 A Referring to the TOWs. 

18 Q That is what I assumed as well. 

19 A But he may have been referring to the -- just 

20 made a mistake in the number and meant the original 

21 500 which precipitated the release of Weir. He may 

22 have got the numbers wrong. He's not very bright. 

23 Q He's not? 

24 A No . 

25 Q Is he the one whose breatlj^could curl — 



lidliiitidL, 



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m8 ■ 



1 Alt was awful . 

2 Q Was that him? 

3 A Yes. 

4 MR. WOODCOCK. For the record, it should be clear 

5 that that is a reference to a breath that would curl a 

6 rhino hide. 

7 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

8 Q You indicated a couple of times, and I have not 

9 asked you any follow-up questions that the people actively 

10 engaged during this time was really not you and people at 

11 the Agency but the people who were active were Ghorbanifar 

12 and Nir? 

13 A Oh, yes. During this period. They were the 

14 ones really dealing with the Iranians. 

15 Q How did you know they were doing that? 

15 A Because there were calls from Ghorbanifar and Nir 

17 and I think to both Charlie Allen and Colonel North and I 

18 think North saw Nir at some point during this period. 

19 Q I have been generally asking you about June of 

20 1986. You think June or July? 

21 A I can't remember when Nir saw the Vice President. 

22 I don't know what that date was. 

23 Q That was June 29th — excuse me, July 29th. 

24 A July 29th. Leading up to all this is that Nir 
« was working very hard with Ghorbanifar to keep this thing 

■*--., M^ a m ;^ - " "^ 




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going . 

Q Do you know who Nir was dealing with on the Iranian 
just ^^^I^^^H 

A But via Ghorbanifar. 

Q I remember from the last time we talked that you 
stated that after Ghorbanifar ' s arrest in late April he had 
begun to have some financial problems and that the Iraelis 
might have been helping him financially? 

A Nir might have. That may have been what the 
reference to the 52 million was in the 22nd of October 
meeting with Furmark. I don't know. We suspected Nir 
was involved financially with Ghorbanifar. For what reason - 
purposes, I don't know. 

Q Was he still financially -- he meaning now 
Ghorbanifar — still financially hurting at this time through 
the summer of 1986? 

A Yes. 

Q The next memorandum — 

I think^HH^^H^I^^^^^^^^^f you 
an enormous amount of complaints. Now they paid him at 
some point in June, which he confirmed, 4 million bucks. 

Q Four million? 

A Yes. Then you get -- there is a conversation 
between I anc^^^^^^^^Hon the 27th of August in which he 
assures me they have settled .all,, theix outstanding accounts 




669 



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with Ghorbanifar. 

Q W d Jj LB b S4^lBillion that he was paid the money for 
the HAWK parts that had been delivered in May? 

A ^^^Hj^m^^^^'^ yes, but Ghorbanifar said no. He 
said only $1 million of lit was for the HAWK spares and 
$3 million for .another deal. 

Q A deal unrelated to the United States? 

A Unrelated, yes. 

Q Did you ever decide who to believe in that one? 

A No. Well, the Iranians were actually — one of 



the sort of amusing things is both the new channel — they 
told us they 



so confused about all the deals that they 



had negotiated with Ghorbanifar that even they... So based on 
the separate meetings here in Washington, I urged them to 
put some accountants onto it, which they did. They said they 
had a team of accountants at, I think, the end of October 
meeting they told us it was worked out. 

Then the figures were given to us on 7 November 
that, yes, they did owe Ghorbanifar another $10 million. 
But the way they calculated, he also owed them an 
additional thousand TOWs and they would be willing to 
discuss it with him. 

It was very interesting that Furroark proposed 
letting him sell a thousand TOWs to the Iranians as a way of 
getting out of ail of thjs^ 



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Q Letting Ghorbanifar? 

A Yes. 

Q How was he going to. get the TOWs? From us? 

A I guess. 

Q My notes reflect there was 

laround June 20th which indicated some very specific 
prices with regard to the amount that the HAWK parts had 
cost. Do you have any recollection of having seen that? 

A That might refer to the Iranians got hold of these 
Department of Defense microfiches which list prices but are 
not really published for the purpose of price. They are 
published to get the serial numbers and descriptions correct 
for ordering them. I think that is what they are 
referring to. 

Arguing with Ghorbanifar, hey, look, according 
to the Department of -- documents we got from the Department 
of Defense the price of these items is only such and such 
and you charged us six times as much. 

Q Let me show you a memorandum of a call with 

3n June 30. It is CIIN 517 which is a call where 
there was a lengthy discussion about -- as you say — 
"continued to harp on the price of 24 items." 

Does he have the microfiche by the time of this 
conversation? 

A Yes. He kept insisting and I kept telling him 



He kept insisting and I 

DELASSIM, 



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that we had to sell them to a middleman and he had to 
deal with a middleman on the pricing". There was nothing 
else I could say. 

See, here I think this is the first time the 
microfiche comes up in our conversations. No. It came 
up once before. That is right. I said well, if you have 
it, send it. And we eventually got it, but even much later 
than this. 

Q You eventually received his copy of the prices? 

A Just part of it. Then we were able to identify - 
what it was he was talking about. 

Q Did you identify where the price list had come 
from? 

A Yes. It is the Defense Logistics Agency in 
Battle Creek, Michigan. They print these things and send 
them all over the world. 

Q So it is not any kind of a secret item? 

A No. At least, I can't — I wonder why they were 
sent to Iran or how they got them. But actually they are 
not — they are not specifically for pricing. There is a 
cover sheet which says these are to be used primarily 
because the pricing of any item is based on the replacement 
cost to the U.S. military. Unless it is going to be 
excessed. 

Q There, ia /i_.Hf ice reij,e.gted ^n it? 




672 




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A Yes. I think — you know, it is very difficult 
for me — the explanation that I got, which we tried to 
later use with the new channel, was that the price was a 
manufacturing price — the manufacturer's cost. Whether 
that is true or not, I don't know. 

Q I am sorry? 

A The price on these microfiches was the manufac- 
turer's cost. 

Q How much after this conversation did you actually 
receive the list, if you recall? This is late — last 
day of June. 

A Sometime in July. 

Q Sometime in July? 

A Yes. 

Q This conversation, probably at least by now, you 

are pretty yell focused.] 

Iyou are focused the Iranians 
believe they paid $24 million or so for these HAWK parts? 

A Well, we don ' tt know — what is very clear is the 
Iranians are clearly aware of the fact they are paying 
a hell of a lot more than the listed price. 

Q Did you -- what if anything did you do after — 
by this time it seems to me — pardon me. 

By this time I would suspect there is some 
concern because they are really starting to get upset about 





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liflKJfiflHFT 



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the prices. There must have been some concern that the 
prices are so high you had to start wondering whether or not 
they are just going to kill the hostages as revenge for them 
getting ripped off. You must have worried about operational 
security, to use a term? 

A There was a concern. I think at one point, in 
one of those conversations, I asked that we discuss it when 
we meet in Europe. I also talked to Colonel North 
about it. But the basic position we took with them was that 
he should haggle it out with Ghorbanifar since Ghorbanifar 
was the man that actually sold the stuff to them. This 
is one of the reasons why when we met with the new channel 
that we did not deal via Ghorbanifar. 

Q Did you and Colonel North ever go to Ghorbanifar 
and say what in the world is going on? We gave you items 
worth $6 million and we are now learning from everybody 
under the sun that you charged $24 million? What 
in the world is happening? 

A No. Because the next time we see Ghorbanifar is 
at the 27th of July meeting. 

Q Is there any — let me ask at what level the 
meetings got on this in the United States as your intelli- 
gence and your information continues to develop? 

A On this specific problem? 



Q This 




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A It was just basically meetings with Colonel North, 
I think ;^^^^^^^^H is involved. Because — and Charlie 
Allen, because there was some concern what the Iranians 
would do. 

Q How concerned are you? I am really talking 
now from here up to the meeting of July 27th? How concerned 
are you that there might be some risk to the hostages as 
a result of this dispute? 

A Well, I don't — 

Q Is it serious? 

A I don't think there was a serious risk to the 
hostages. The hostages were very valuable to the 
captors. 

Q You mean as opposed to the Iranians? 

A Yes. So that I don't think they were going to 
give them up; and the Iranians had other long-term goals 
in mind in this, so that whatever the problem was on this, 
I don't think they would allow that to deter them from their 
long-term goals. 

Q Let me, as I sort of keep going through things 
here, ask you there are a series of meetings — I should 
say two meetings on July 10th and 11th of 1986. The dates 
are reflected on document 169 and 170. Are these your 
notes? 

A This _is„ mine, but I am trying to remember who it 



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111 



was talking to. 

Q Since it has been redacted -- 

A Ten July? 

Q It looks like Hakim is there? 

A Yes. I wonder if I wrote this. Sara is me. 

Q That is what I assumed. 

MR. PEARLINE: Can we go off the record? 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Let's go back on the record. 

I will ask you so the record is clear, I have 
showed you two documents, 169 and 170. Could you describe 
what those two meetings were about? 

A This is the beginning of our attempts to open up 
a new channel. We had learned from business contacts of 

that^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^had been 
contacted a close friend of this guy here saying that 
Rafsanjani was interested in a discrete contact with the 
Americans. For some reason, ^^^^^^^^^^^^also wanted to 
contact Khashoggi. We never found out why. So what we 

brought^^^^^^^H^Hjj^m-- they 
name, don't they? 

MR. PEARLINE: Yes. 

THE WITNESS: ^^^^^^Hto the United States. We 
talked to him on ^t^, l^th jawj Al,t^^ pimply . 




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MR. LEON. Who is we? 

THE WITNESS: I talked to him. I think -- I am 
sure Colonel North met with him on one of these days. 

But the -- he might have met with him separately 
from me. 

But at this meeting it was Albert Hakim and my- 
self talking to him. And also on the 10th of July. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Okay. 

A Colonel North did not panticipate in these two 
meetings, but I think he met with him. 

Q Was this the beginning of the second channel? 
A This was the beginning of it because this man was 
then instrumental in arranging the meeting in August 
between ^^^^^^^^Hand General Secord in Brussels. 
Q Thank you. 

A I am sorry I didn't recognize them. I did that 
on the computer. That is why the mistakes are corrected. 
Q Not on your home typewriter? 
A On my home computer. 
Q I hope it was Tempest secure. 

The following day on July 12, you have another 
conversation — I don't know if you recall it — with 

ll will hand this to you to refresh your recollec 



tion. It is CIIN 518. 




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il8 1 A Oh, yes. I wish Charlie hadn't given him my 

2 home phone number. 

3 Q So he's calling you at home? 

4 A Yes. Which made my wife extremely curious about 

5 what the hell was going on. She knows some Persian. Yes. 

6 Q I take it that this conversation was a continua- 

7 tion of the complaints about the pricing as well as some 

8 discussion of a need to get a hostage released before any- 

9 thing was going to happen? 

10 A Yes. This is a pretty blunt -- and it was 

11 pretty clear at this time that they had not succeeded in 

12 much at this point. 

13 Q That who — 

14 A The Iranians hadn't succeeded. 

15 Q They hadn't gotten very far about getting a hostage 

16 released? 

17 A Yes. 

18 Q Was it your impression they were working pretty ' 

19 hard to get one released? ^^^ 

20 A We didn't have any corroborating — there was no 

inforTnatior^^H|H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H but 

22 we got from Nir and Ghorbanifar was that there was efforts 

23 being made and in the conversations with^^^^^^H^ He 

24 would always keep saying yes, we are trying, we are 

25 trying. 



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Q The next indication of an event I have is 
that on July 21st, you met with Nir. ¥ou must have gone 
to London to meet with Nir, you and Oliver North? 

A Okay. That is when that meeting was. Yes. 

Q First, did anything happen between this conversa- 
tion with^^^^^^^Kn July 12th and this meeting on July 
21st in London? Do you have any recollection of any 
significant events ? 

A No. 

Q Maybe you could just describe the meeting of 
July 21st. 

A This is the one -- this is -- what transpired- at 
this meeting is Ollie and I flew over to see Nir. It 
was one of those typical North trips where you g<»t off 
the plane for six hours and are supposed to get back on 
another one. I didn't. I again spent the night in London. 
But what it was is so they could discuss the fact 
that Ghorbanifar thought he had come to some sort of an 
arrangement to get things moving again. We agreed that -- 
as I recall -- I don't recall an awful lot about that 
meeting. I was awfully tired, but in any case, this is 
what I believe -- the way North put it, if something can 
be done -- I think we were talking about if we get a 
hostage released, we would send the rest of the spares 
in because Ghorban_if^,tty.iil(;^t,h«ni A"ti% can continue on 






679 




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with the deal . 

As I recall, North said yes, they would give that 
active -- our side would give that active consideration. 
That IS about all that transpired at that meeting that I 
can recall. Nir immediately took off to see Ghorbanifar tc 
see what the status of play was; but as I recall. North 
also said that we would do nothing until -- someone has 
to be released. 

Q So you stay an extra day and come back -- 

A The next morning. 

Q — the next morning. 

I take it the next event that takes place is the 
meeting in Frankfurt? 

A Yes. 

Q Who attends that meeting in Frankfurt? 

A Ghorbanifar was there, Nir, North, and I. 

Q And according to my notes that takes place on 
around July 25th? Well, let me ask it this way. Was it 
the day before Jenclo was released? 

A I think so. Wasn't he released on the -- was he 
released on the 26th or 27th? I am not sure. 

Q I sort of lost track. 

MR. WOODCOCK. The 26th. 

r 

MR. LEON: JencJXL was released on the 26th. 

iliiij'iiJi 



THE WITNESS. Tjie.,26th ; ^^es . 




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BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q What occurs at that meeting in Frankfurt? 

A This is the meeting where in return for the 
release of Jenc]^o, they would send in the rest of the 
spares which is basically what happened. 

Q How long does this meeting last? 

A It was in the airport hotel. It didn't really 
last that long. 

Q Couple of hours? 

A About an hour-and-a-half . 

Q Was it another quick turn-around? Did you get 
right back on the plane and come back? 

A As I recall I had some other business I could 
take care of in Frankfurt. North probably -- he always 
did. 

Q North always went straight back? 

A The next plane he could get. He always did that. 

Q Was there any discussion -- this is the first 
meeting then that you had with — 

A Wait a minute. North did send K))-^ 
from the hotel. I guess he did stay that night. Saying 
what was -- to alert them what was happening. And then - 
to make the arrangements to receive Jencjo. 

Q So you think he stayed that night? 

A Yes. ■ ilB K^^t h^f)Si$¥f vcl| inKurope because of 



C]H-47 messag^ ^Kr 



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r 



Jencko. 

Q Were you certain as of that meeting that Jencko 
would be released the following day? 

A Yes, as I recall we were. 

Q Did you have any conversations when you were 
there with anyone in Iran? 

A I don't recall any. 

Q You don't think so? 

A No. 

Q But it was not -^^^^^^^Hwas not present at 
this meeting, you take it? 

A No. 

Q And then Jencko was released the following day. 
Let me ask, you indicated — this is the first time you met 
with Ghorbanifar I guess really since the meeting in Tehran; 
is that correct? 

A Yes. I think — as I recall it is the first 
meeting I had with him since Tehran. 

Q Did the subject of the pricing of thes# — of "^he 

-a 

HAWK- pa]^Jfeom#l j|jy ^^ring the course of this meeting? 

A I think Nir asked us not to bring it up, 

Q Do you know why? 

A No. I don't recall. I was fed up with the 

whole pricing issue by then anyway. 

Q I take it, tjiough, you- sti*| have to be concerned 




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^ that it is on your scope or whatever? 

2 A What happens -- Okay. What happens at this 

3 meeting, we took up something else. It is at this meeting 
^ that Nir tells us — he also tells us at the meeting in 

5 London — okay. That Ghorbanifar had made counter^^roposals , 

6 which is this giving them a reduction in price of 56 million, 

7 what have you, and that there was a letter — had sent a 

8 letter on the 8th of July, 

9 Q Right. 

10 A Nir promised that we had not yet gotten that, 

11 as I recall, when we met. But we were told this would 

12 settle everything. This is — yo.: have a copy of that ■ 

13 letter. 

14 Q I do. 

15 A I don't know whether it was settled, but as I 

16 recall there wasn't that much hassle about the price 

17 afterwards in conversations I had with — it sort of 

18 changed. 

19 It was me pressing^^^^^^Hto get on with the 

20 deal, get everything settled so we could continue. 

21 Q This is after which time now? 

22 A This is after the 27th July meeting. Finally, at 

23 the end of August, ^^^^tells me they settled all their 

24 accounts with him. 

25 Q Let me get to the 27th of July meeting. Where 



jMLmihitL^ 



683 




119 



does that take place; 

A That takes place at] 
Frankfurt . 

Q So have you basically -- you had a meeting on the 
25th in Frankfurt. The 26th Jenc|o is released. Then 
there is another meeting on the 27th? Is that right? 

A I think there was just the one meeting on the 
25th. I might have had the dates wrong. 

MR. LEOM y- C ould that meeting have been on the 
26th instead -of the 25th?'*- 'f^ "^ 

THE WITNESS:^ 1 didn't make a memo of that meeting. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q I think that is right. Let me ask it this way 
because I care less about the dates. You distinctly recall 
having a meeting with Ghorbanifar right before JencJ:o 
is released? 

A I thought it was right before he was released. 

Q Jt* d^' t have a memo to show you but let me — 
I can read It to you. There seems to be some indication 
in some contemporaneous notes North wrote to Poindexter you 
were leaving the night of the 26th and Jenc|o is released 
the 26th and you were going to meet North and Secord in 
Frankfurt tomorrow, which would be the 27th. Nir and 
Ghorbanifar depart London tomorrow. And will also meet in 
Frankfurt the next_ day. 




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I guess the significant issue — 

A You know, I don't recall meeting Secord. 

Q You don't think Secord was in these meetings? 

A I thought it was just Ollie, myself, Nir, and 
Ghorbanifar. I don't remember Dick participating. 

Part of the problem was I had nothing to do with 
the hostages, I mean when they were released. That was all 
taken care of by North. 

Q Right. 

A So I'm kind of hazy about the timing. 

Q Let me ask it this way, I guess, just so we are 
clear. Do you think around this time there was only one 
meeting, though? There wasn't a — 

A I only recall the one meeting. 

Q Do you think that the meeting then -- and I know 
you don't have any memoranda on this -- but is it your best 
recollection the meeting was — it seems to me there are 
two ways. It was the day before, something was along the 
following lines, damn it, you have to get a hostage out 
or we are not doing anything and he says it will happen 
tomorrow. Or the hostage is released and it is said the 
hostage is out, let's get our act together. 

A It was a foregone conclusion he was being 
released when we had the meeting. 



Whether w^ pe^ r 




685 




121 



Q I get It. 

A You know, immediately before, because I know 
Ollie was very busy sending K/\-47 messages abou 



I know ^_ 
t how to ry^ 



handle the — Jenclp when he was released. Didn't they 
hold Jencjto for two days? 



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122 



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Q You mean held him without revealing that he had 
been released? 

A Without revealing he had been released. 

Q I think that is right. Hoping additional hostage.' 
would be released? 

A Yes. I think we were misled by Ghorbanifar on 
that. 

Q Ghorbanifar suggesting there might be additional 
people? 

A I think that is the way it went. We were hopeful 
of getting more. 

Q You think it might have been — 

A The confusion might have been on the fact that 
Jenco was held. 

Q He had actually been released, but it wasn't 
public. 

A He was held for two days before it became public. 
I am hazy — my memory is hazy because I was not 
directly concerned with the hostages. 



Q You think it was only one meeting? 
A I am sure we only had one meeting. 
Q Let me ask you, this is CIIN — 
A There may have been another meeting that I did 
not attend. 



.1 - • 



m 




687 



ifflttASiaiftT 



123 



Q I understand that. 

Is this in your handwriting? 

A No. That can be read. 

Q It seems to say at the top of it "Cave to be." 

A That is not my handwriting. 

Q Can you tell by looking at it what meeting those 
are notes from? 

A Oh, man. 

Q It is not that important if you can't tell. 

A I think that might be from that meeting because of 
the timing of some of the things. 

Q That was my guess. 

A But I couldn't be certain. That is not my 
handwriting. It has "Cave to --" -- I think that is Ollie's 
handwriting, isn't it? 

I couldn't tell you precisely, but from the 
things that are being discussed, it could have been that 
meeting, because it is certainly some time around the end of 
July. I can't positively identify it. 

Q Between — if I didn't, the number CIIN 584 — that 
is the number of the document about which Mr. Cave was just 
speaking — between the meetings that had occurred on 
July 10 and 11 of 1986 and the time of these meetings in 
late July, had there been any further development of the 
second channel? ... . „ _ 






688 



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k CiifTf ^>2 |[?^^B«a tiiicrn 




WWlflWffltiT 


A 


No. That didn't occur until August. 


Q 


Let me ]ust ask you — I will show you CIIN 519. 


That is 


a memorandum dated 9 August of 1986, I think. Is 


this a document you had something to do with? 


A 


Yes. 


Q " 


Who ^ s^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 


A 


Me. 


Q 


Had you changed your alias by this time? 


A 


No. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 


Q 


Unredacted. 


A 


How did that get through. Okay. 


Q 


Do you remember this call? 


A 


Yes. 


Q 


What was the purpose of this call? I can't recall 


this that well. 




Did you call him or did he call you? It is a 


call tcJ 
1 


^^^^^^^■for the 


A 


I don't recall precisely whether he called me or 


I called him, but this was kind of an interesting call, 


because 


nothing ever transpired that was discussed in it. 




By this time we had already contacted the second -- 


the second channel -- 9 August. 




Oh, no, hold on a minute. Wait a minute. We 


had not 


yet <=|'ffeif|f IhAnYf^^^W'"^''- ^^^" ^ ma.de this 




liNi.lA^MH^Ii 



689 



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mas 1 



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125 

call. In this call, he indicates that they were prepared 
to settle their accounts with Ghorbanifar as soon as 
the military had finished the inventory of the parts 
that we sent on 5 August. This is why he is so pleased, 
that we completed our end of the bargain. Yes. It ]ogs 
my memory. As I say in here, to get things moving, we are 
going to have to meet. He agreed to it. He seemed very -- 



he had been in a ^(i*^ mood in all the previous calls. He 

A. 
was very happy about this one because his tail was on the 

line on this one, too, 

Q The next thing I think that happens, at least -as 
nearly as I can tell, is there is a mid-August meeting 
with the second channel. 

A Yes, that is correct. 

Q Could you describe how that is developed and what 
occurs. I take it you don't attend that meeting? 

A No. That was Secord. 

Q Can you tell us how that meeting got put 
together, who was present, what happened? 

A That meeting was arranged by the new Iranian 
contact that we -Bwr on the 10th and 11th of July. It was 
TE>eca5swi^wa?^ easiest for^^^^f 
|to get there. He had business there. Belgium is 
where the Iranians buy most of their medicines for the 
treatment of the wounded. 



:ontact tnat we s««r on tn 
irrangedftjrpB^ Brussels lie 



mmm 



690 



\mssnw 



126 



m2 1 I forget the exact date of the meeting, but it 

2 was sometime around mid-August. At that meeting, he agreed 

3 to come out again and meet with us in Washington. 

4 Q Do you know who met with him in Brussels? 

5 A I think it was just Secord and the other two 

6 Iranians. 

7 Do you know whether Hakim was at that meeting? 

8 A I don't know for sure. I. know -- I know General 

9 Secord was there. I think that Hakim was in the States at 

10 the time, but I couldn't swear to that. 

11 Q As of this time, what is the focus of this second 

12 channel? What is it that you are hoping to achieve through 

13 the second channel that hadn't worked through the first 

14 channel? 

15 A Well, what we were always concerned about is 

16 nothing seemed to happen. In other words, there were no 

17 real concrete proposals from the Iranian side on a 

18 strategic and political relationship. This had been 

19 discussed at great -- ad nauseum in Tehran. And Tehran -- 

20 in Tehran, the Iranians talked about the undesirability of 

21 the Ghorbanif ar^^^^^^Bchannel . So that they agreed to 

22 look for a new channel and we were to consider the new 

23 channel. 

24 One of our assumptions was the initiative 

25 ^^^^^^^^Hwas based on discussions in Tehran. In other 



ltiyClJQ£iCl£lL„ 



691 



mmm§ 



127 



m3 1 

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words, when they got together back there and said what are 
we going to do now, we said well, we will work it out. They 
are very paranoid. 




Q Was It your understanding that this second channel 
was really dealing with the same people? 

A And would deal with the issues. But it would deal 
with issues which never really got dealt with in Tehran. 

Q I think you indicated you had a conversation in 
late August of 1986? 

A Wit 

Q Yes. - ^ ^- ' 

A That is when he tells ir. ; -- I think one o£ the 
last conversations I had widf t^tt wxf on, £~think,rthe 
27th of August. Do you have a record of that? 

Q I don't have a record. I have a record of a 
memorandum by Charlie Allen but not a record that you 
prepared of the conversation. There may be one and I haven't 
seen it. 

A That is the one where he tells me as of the 21st 
of august that they had squared all their accounts with 
Ghorbanif ar . 

Q Is this where he tells you about the — we owe 
him money but he owes us TOWs? 

A No. ^^H^^Hpiii^i^^^^^i^ this. This we get 



692 



UBflSOTffT 



128 



m4 1 from the new channel. 

2 ^^^^^^^^H tried to -- from that point on, tried 

3 to get information out ^B^^^^ of me on the second channel . 

4 Based on conversations with the new channel, I always 

5 sort of ^^ft»«ti him off on it. Stonewalled him on it. 

6 Q Has there been a decision by this time that you 

7 are not going to deal -- you meaning people in the Agency -- 

8 are not going to deal with^^^^^^^land Ghorbanifar? 

9 A There is no concrete decision. There is a great 

10 deal of concern about how we handle Ghorbanifar so he 

11 doesn't go public or doesn't screw up the operation. 

12 Q Who throughout this period of time is participating 

13 in these strategy meetings about "ow to deal with the 

14 termination of the old channel and the surfacing of the 

15 second channel? Who first at the Agency is involved in these 

16 decisions? 

17 A Not me. It is basically the decisions have to 

18 come from the NSC. We give our views 

19 gave his views; I mean; Charlie his. I don't think Casey 

20 had strong views on this. 
2\ The problem was that even after the Tehran 

22 debacle, Nir was insisting on the use of Ghorbanifar; and 

23 after the release of JencJ:o, he continued to argue that 

24 Ghorbanifar proves he can get things done 

25 So it|V4%4^^efy^c3jnglicated thing and it was 





693 




129 



m5 1 complicated by the fact that we wanted to keep the whole 

2 initiative secret and we were afraid if Ghorbanifar was cut 

3 off, he might go public or at least take some steps tc 
^ screw up the operation. 

5 In our initial conversations with the new channel, 

6 ^^^^^^^^^^1 we spent a lot of time discussing this, how 

7 to handle it. They had some ideas and we had some 

8 ideas. 

9 Q So the new channel was also concerned about what 

10 reaction Ghorbanifar might have? 

11 A Yes. And we were very concerned about it also. 

12 Q Let me just expand on -ne question. Is Clair 

13 George involved in these conversations about -- these 

14 planning conversations about what to do? He's a name you 

15 haven't mentioned much up to now? 

16 A I don't think Clair really got involved an awful 

17 lot until after we got into the second channel and then 

18 the thing got exposed. 

19 Q How about Dewey Clarridge? Is he involved? 

20 A Dewey wasn't involved really that much. Dewey 

21 sort of stood in when someone — in other words, he 

22 was involved in a couple of meetings because we didn't 

23 have very many people who were cut in. So when you wanted 

24 to review something, what are you going to do? It is nice 

25 to have a senior experienced officer. Dewey, when^^^Jwas 



694 



UNCa^FSF 



130 



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away on trips, Dewey would take over his role in this 
operation. 

Q So he was essentially there as another sounding 
board, idea guy to decide what to do? 

A Yes. 

Q But he was not involved operationally? 

A He was not a key player in this operation, no. 

Q Between the time of this conversation with 

lin late August and then I take it there is a meeting 
in Washington with the second channel on the 19th and 20th 
of September? 

A That is correct. 

Q Were there any meetings with either Ghorbanifar, 
Nir, or with the second channel between those two times? 

A None that I participated in. That I either 
participated in or knew about. 

Q So could you describe how this second -- this 
meeting on the ^Mrtr and 20th of September gets set up and 

A 

what occurs during the course of that meeting? 

A This meeting was actually arranged when Secord 
met witt^^^^^^^^^Hin Brussels; and it was agreed that 
he would come out^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and when 
out, we would arrange to bring him to the United States 



for discussions. 



I think he came out on the 12th or 13th of 



695 




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2 

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131 



September and Secord made the arrangements. We flew him 
over on the 15th or the 16th. We arranged to have him 
brought in. He stayed out at Seven Corners at the Sheraton, 
that strange Sheraton that looks like a phallic symbol. 
That is right across the street from Hakim's offices. 

We met him in Hakim's offices. This was very 
interesting because he Ccime with some specific proposals 
and was obviously trying to find out how much of all the 
deals that Ghorbanifar had presented to them we were willing 
to go through with. And spoke frankly about their problems 
with the war and with the proposed offensive against Iraq 
but what was important, he made a definitive proposal^ 
about how to proceed on normalizing relations between the 
two countries. 

Q Do you recall what the proposal was? 

A There were two. One was he said that if you 
agree, our side feels that a commission should be formed, 
we "will have four members, you will have four members, 
that will meet in secret and propose steps that can be 
taken toward the gradual normalization of relations between 
the two countries. In order to put a seal on this, he 
also proposed that we have a meeting at the Under Secretary 
level and said their Deputy Foreign Minister would attend 
the meeting. 

1 don't know if it was at that meeting or a 



HffllSSKP, 



696 



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2 

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132 



ASSIFIED 



subsequent meeting that he said that they might bring 
their ambassador in London since he was pretty bright 
and was one of Rafsanjani's men. 

Q Who attended this meeting? 

A There were two meetings on the 19th and 20th. 
On the American side, it was myself, Ollie North, and 
Secord. By this time, the first time, Secord is taking - 
is participating directly in substantive meetings. 

Q This is the first time since you have been 
involved? 

A Really the first time. On the Iranian side of 
course in ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H| but there was anothe;: 
Iranian there who is one of their officers! 




Q He was also present? 

A But he did not participate in most of the 
discussion. 

Q Was Hakim present? 

A He was there but he did not participate in the 
substantive discussions. 

Q I just want to make sure I understand what you 
mean. Was he present for the substantive discussions? 

A He was there, but he did not take part in the 
discussions. In other words, we went into a room and 



talked. 



UNAU^SSiEP, 



697 




m9 



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2 

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Q Without Hakim? 

A Ollie's theory was that Hakim could then handle 
the business end of things such as they wanted. 

Q By this time — it struck me that some of the 
early meetings|||K^^attended way back in the 
spring of '86. By this time he is not attending any 
meetings. Is there a reason that he's not attending? 

A No. I guess they decided to let me handle them. 
We still considered this basically an NSC initiative. 

Q I wonder if there was a decision about why he 
wouldn't be there. Particularly with the new channel which 
seemed to be promising, I wonder if there was discussion 
about someone else should be brou.nt in? 

A No. 

Q There was also a discussion — actually I inter- 
rupted you. YOU told me about the meeting of the 19th. 
was the meeting on the 20th in the same place and the 
same players, substantially? 

A Yes. It was -- we gavej 
briefing on the Soviets on the 20th. 

Q Is that — 

A I did that. 

Q is that substantially all that happened on the 

20th? 

A I think there were some other discussions. 



UNOAiSJ^m 



698 



mfimm 



13J 



mlO 1 
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18 
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20 
21 

23 
24 
25 



follow-up discussions. Ollie told him that for the time 
being our side on the commission he proposed would be 
Secord, myself, and Colonel North. We also discussed 
possible steps. 

One of the proposals made was maybe we could 
open -- take steps in the near future of opening commercial 
relations, expanding commercial relations between the two 
countries leading up to maybe active interest sections 
under our protective powers. Things like that were 
discussed. 

It was very positive and ^^^^^^^^^^B was ver.y 




MR. LEON: Did you say McFarlane was there? 
THE WITNESS: No. McFarlane — after the Tehran 
meeting, I did not see McFarlane until we worked on the 



uNcuasimiL 

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE P RESID ENT 



■ 2 OCO^ 



699 




135 



[iH 1 President's speech. That was on the 13th of November, 

2 1986? Was that the day he made the speech? 

3 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

4 Q Yes. 

5 A We did a lot of the notes for the speech writers. 

6 MR. LEON: Is there any reason why you didn't 

7 see McFarlane again? 

8 THE WITNESS: I don't know, I don't know whether 

9 he decided he didn't want any part of it or what, because 

10 I had no contact with him. At one point sometime in the 

11 sununer, Ollie told me that — he said McFarlane would like 

12 to see you to talk to you again, but it never happened.- 

13 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

14 Q Had you heard of the second channel? Did you 

15 know the person by name prior to the time you had met him? 

16 Is this a famous person? 

We of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hbut 

18 not him. 

19 Q Had you been able to verify that he was indeed 

20 a substantial — had you been able to verify independent 

21 of what he said to you that he was a substantial person? 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q There was also during the course of these 

24 conversations some discussion about their military needs? 

25 A Oh, yes. That is what I said. One of the 



»mujl.mi:jj:a. 



700 





Hi 2 1 

2 

3 

4 

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21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



136 



things that he was trying to find out is just what of all 

the things that they had discussed with Ghorbanifar 

they might be able to expect that they could get from us. 

One of the important things that this — I think 
it is somewhere in there, it was either at this meeting 
or the first one in Frankfurt, North emphasized there can 
be no normalization or resumption of an arms program until 
there is a resumption of the normalization of relations 
between the countries. They fully understood that. 

Q What did you understand him to mean by that? 

A We would have the resumption of normal diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. 

Q Did you also understand that to mean all the 
hostages had to be released before there would be a 
resumption? 

A That would be part of it. But I think by that 
time -- well, everyone had different views. Having spent 
my time in the Middle East, I didn't think we were ever 
going to get all the hostages out. I know a lot about ^^| 

They are one of the most 
independent-minded people in the world. 

Q So I take it you had real doubts they would 
respond? 

A That is what I told Casey when we came back from 
Tehran. I said I think we will" geT Two out, maybe three. 



701 



*!»^j^j 



137 



.ml 3 1 but they would never release all of them until they got some 

2 movement on the 17 in Kuwait. And also when we were giving 

3 the U.S. position to^^^^^^^^^about we want all hostages, 

4 not only Americans released ,^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas very 

5 concerned. He said because the — particularly the French 

6 hostages, where the captors were demanding release of the 

7 Dawa prisoners before there would be much movement on the 

8 French hostages. 

9 Q Just as a matter of interest, was there a reason 

10 he was tying the French hostages so closely to the Dawa? 

11 A I don't know except you know what you can surm.ise 

12 that the captors thought there might be more — the French 

13 might be willing to put more pressure on than we were. The 

14 French might be more flexible. 

15 Q Was there any — at these meetings on the 19th 

16 and 20th of September, was there any specific discussion 

17 about delivery of additional weapons? Was there a plan 

18 formulated? 

19 A There wasn't an outline of a plan. We were 

20 prepared — I think this is the first time we talked about 

21 an additional shipment of TOWs in return for the two 

22 hostages that were at that time being held. 

23 Q There were two left at this time? 

24 A Yes. No. There were — there were three left 

25 at that time. 



iWKIiASSIfm, 



702 



ml4 



end mas 



•^^gLfBSJRft* 



138 



Q That is right. Two had been released and there 
were five total. Had the additional hostages been seized 
by this time? 

A Yes. You will see there is a telephone call 
where I call^^^^^^^Hto complain about the -- 

Q The seizure — 

A This is after they released Jenclfo. Damn. I 
can't remember the dates. I remember calling^^^^^^H to 
complain. You release one and they pick up another one. 
That is a wash. But I can't remember the exact 
date of that. 



UNCLftSSlFlEO 



703 



»3c 



bp-1 



oiffiBisaffif^ 



139 



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Q But it is your recollection that after this, in 
this meeting on the 19th and 20th, there were some 
discussions about going ahead with an additional shipment 
of weapons? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q Was it your recollection that it related to TOWs. 

A TOWs is my recollection. 

Q There is another meeting on October 8 and 10 
in Frankfurt. 

A There were other things that happened. 

Q I was going to blanket it. What happened between 
that meeting and the meeting that takes place in Frankfurt? 

A As a result of the steps , I briefed Casey on what 
had transpired. I ftrote a memo which you have there. I 

to^^^^^^^^^P In my talks with^^^^^^| I 
because of the nature of the promise made by the Iranians — 
the State Department has to be ^iAjfmmt at sufficient level 
^immk because it is becoming a policy issue. 

He agreed and talked to North on the 22nd of 
September, with which North agreed. We also agreed we have 
to look toward sending some intelligence based on these 
contacts. 

On the 24th of September, all this is because it looks 
kind of positive, all this is discussed in a meeting in 
Poindexter's offica in^the White House. I can't remember every 



f f it^ iP the White House. I c. 



704 



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one that was there. 

Q As best you recall? 

A What we did was go over this. I forget -- I 
think Casey was there. I was there. But the important 
thing to me is that toward the end, at the end of the 
meeting, I talked privately with Poindexter, and reiterated 
this point; that the State Department had to be brought in. 
He agreed and said, "I am going to call George Shultz right 
away. " 

So from that time on, I was under the impression 
that the State Department was being kept fully apprised by the 
NSC about what was going on. Because the Iranians were ' 
talking about this deputy foreign minister meeting sometime 
in November. So that is what happened. Everyone seemed -- 
things seemd to be pretty positive. Then we go to the 
meeting on the 8th — from the 8th through the 10th of 
October. 

At this meeting one of the guys who was — one of 
the original four people we talked to in Tehran shows up. He 

We give a brief — 
They give us a brief and a huge 
map of the Iranian military order of battle 





I also aive them a brief on our view of the Iraqi 



give them a brier on our 

Mmm. 



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I think it is at this meeting 
that they give us the four names of the people proposed 
for the joint committee, and also complain that we ought 
to move in along faster. This is the meeting in Frankfurt. 

Q I take it you and North are thetnly two participants 
from the United States in that meeting? 

A Secord. 

Q Secord is also present? 

A Yes and also Hakim is there. Because of the long, 
drawn«»out naturef of these, he translates some of the stuff 
when I am hoarse from translating. So that is in genera-1 
what transpires at the first meeting. 

Then there is more talk about — they had — at 
all of these meetings, they emphasized their need. 




They talked 
about other things. They were continually talking about 
drone aircraft. Th^e j^ere no xomnntmejits made. In fact. 



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HNtASSIFe'^ 



142 



Ollie continually emphasized that we can't have anything 
regularized until after there is formal regulations. 
We also got at this -- at the September meeting and the 
October meeting a lot of the rationale behind why the Iranians 
were willing to talk to us; telling us about the fact that 
they realize once the war was over they had to rebuild the 
country and the only way they could turn was to the West. 

Also concern about the radical wing in Iran, we got 
quite a bit of information we had never heard before S^m 
these things. There is one other thing that was important. 
Oh, what came out was that on ending the war, in addition to 
the fact that they had — they said the rationale behind- the 
final offensive — this was at the early October meeting -- 
was they felt they had to gain enough territory or enough 
strategic objectives so that they would be in a very good 
bargaining point at the end of the war! 




The one worry they had was that once the war was 
over, would the United States resume its arms supply? In 
other words, th^^ilP^VB%~ want to agree to some sort of 
negotiated end to the war, and then findput they would not 
be able to rebuild their military, which they wanted to do 
with American equipment if at all possible. 

Q How did Colonel North respond to that? How can you- 



viVtiLfig|vui^lUl.'i 



707 





143 

did you respond to that? 

A One of the reasons they asked this is that 
North's position has been, look, there can be no normalization 
of arms sales with Iran until after the normalization of 
diplomatic relations. I think he put on as positive a nature 
as he could by saying it depends on whose administration is 
in power at the time whenever this happens. 

Q Let me ask a couple of other questions about this 
meeting. Is this the meeting to which Colonel North brought 
the bible? 

A No. That was in September, I think. 
Q That was the September meeting? 

A Yes. Because he took them through the White House. 
He took hijn on a tour of the White House. I think he gave 
the bible there. See, there was a mix up in my testimony 
to the Senate, because they asked about the cake, and said 
was there a bible. I said, yes. 

Then they didn't ask me whether the bible and cake 
went together. 

Q The cake was in Tehran? 

A The cake was in Tehran. The bible came later. 
Q Do you have a firm recollection about whether the 
bible came in the United States or whether the bible occurred 
in Frank^^t? 

A I am pretty sure it was in the September meeting m 



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the United States. 

Q Was there -- were there — did any money pass at 
this meeting? 

A Which meeting? 

Q At the meeting the 8th to 10th of October? 

A^ No. That meeting -- that was what we nailed 
down. ^^^^^^^^^^^H said, "Okay, I am going to go in via 
Damascus and make sure on the release of two hostages 
and we would ship 500 TOWs. 

Q Was there any discussion about how much the 
500 TOWs would cost them? 

A No . 

Q Was there ever a discussion in your presence about 
how much they were going to cost? 

A I never recall any discussion in my presence about 
what the price to the Iranians would be. I assume that 
Nir briefed Ghorbanifar not to discuss it with me or 
something. I never heard any specific pricing on what it was 
going to cost. 

Q By this time Nir and Ghorbanifar are out of the 
picture: is that right? I don't mean out of the picture, but 
out — 

A We are discussing with the Iranians. The Iranians 
at the September meeting that they might get Ghorbanifar back 
to Tehran on arms business, and then keep him there until 



this thing got further along, working on something back in 



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145 



Tehran. One other — they even told us they had discussed 
buying off Ghorbanifar, but Rafsanjani didn't want to do 
this because if it ever surfaced he had paid off Ghorbanifar, 
he would be in deep political trouble. 

So they asked us if we could do anything. We 
said, "VJell, there is not much we can do." So what they — 
at this early — I think it was at this October meeting, the 
early October meeting, H^^H^^^Hsaid that what they would 
do is they would continue to throw some arms business this 
way to keep him quiet. 

Q Did you have an understanding -- 

A I never saw Nir — there was a meeting — I don't 
know which came last, whether it was the meeting in Frankfurt 
or a meeting he attended here. He came here for a terrorist 
meeting. We had a meeting with him. I can't remember when 
that was. 

Q Did you have an understanding as of this meeting 
in early October about just how the transaction would take 
place with the TOWs? Because by now it appears to me that 
you are — at least as to this transaction — essentially 
cut Ghorbanifar out of the loop and maybe Nir with him. 

A They said they would pay direct. 

Q Direct from Iran to Secord or direct from Iran to 
the CIA account? 

A No. No. No. They would pay — they would deal with 



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146 

Hakim. 

Q So they would pay -- 

A Which I guess is the same as Secord. 

Q And any recollection of how much the price was? 

I know I just asked you this. 

A No. When we talk about the meeting at the end of 

October, we can get into how that worked. 

Q Actually I was going to go to that right now. 

A Okay. 



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(Discussion held off the record.) 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: j^ _ 

Q Let me ask you, you have a meeting withi 
again, the second channel, as we have been calling him, 
in late October? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you have any other meetings that were relevant 
to this between the end of the meeting in early October 
and the meeting in late October? 

A Furmark. 

Q We will get to Furmark in a second. Could you tell 
us where did the meeting take place in late October? 

A It was in Mainz. 

Q Could you speil tJiac? M-A-I-N-Z. It is right down 
the river from Frankfort. 

Q Who was present at that meeting? 

A North, myself. Hakim and Secord. 

Q From the Iranian side? 

was^^^^^^^^l and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 wasn ' t 
there at that one. 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^H from — 

A The two — the Iranian in London, the two Iranians 
in London came over, but they didn't participate in the 
meeting. They were there. 

Q What occufied during the course of these conversations 



Well, the ke 



imiHiMf^ 



e were two key 



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148 

things. He told us that he had definitely, in talking to 
the captors, had definitely received a conunitment to release 
one hostage. He asked us if we wanted to name the hostage, 
and we said no. He said he was pretty sure he could get 
a second one released. But he would not promise on the 
second one. He said, "I can't give my word on that. It 
looks pretty good." 

He also said there has been some problems. This 
was the other important thing. He said on the 15th of 
October, the radical wing distributed leaflets in Tehran 
outlining McFarlane's visit to Tehran. Oh, incidentally, 
it took him until then to find out who McFarlane was. 
They told us when McFarlane was in Tehran, they did not know 
him. The only one they knew was me. They could not locate 
Colonel North in the books. 

Q You, they knew, 
Did they think you were leading the delegation? 

A No. In any case, what he said is that these 
leaflets had been circulated. He said also on the 26th or 
the 27th of October, a small rag in the Bekaa Valley — 
Baalbek — had published this story. He said as far as we 
know, no one has picked it up. He warned us the thing was 
liable to get out. They had arrested a lot of the people in 
Tehran in the radical faction who were responsible, including 
the leader of the radical faction. 



UNCLASSKiEOn 



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Q Who were responsible for what? 
A Leaking the story. 
Q Okay. 

A He said that he had brought — my recollection is 
that he said he had brought with him a check for S4 million; 



he said, "I can't cash it. I have to turn it over to him." 
Which he did, and the money appeared in our account, I think, 
on the 28th -- very soon. 

So we arranged, while he was there, we arranged 
to launch the — the 500 missiles — Hawk s — not H^^^kp, 
TOWs were already in Israel. So we arranged to launch " 
those while he was there. As soon as he had heard that the 
plane was in the air. He took off to make sure that one — 
that the hostages would be released. 

I think I left on the 29th. I am not sure. Got 
the first plane he could from Geneva. 

Q Let me ask you about two people whose names come up 
as being involved in the hostage release around that time. 
That is Robert Dutton and Rafael Quinteros. Did you know 
any one of those people? "Hi 

I was introduced to Dutton, but I didn't know the 
other guy. Never heard of him. 

Q To this moment you never heard of him? 



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Q I am not surprised. I was just curious. Where 
were you introduced to Dutton? 

A The meetings we had withm^^^^^f^^Hon the 
19th and 20th were in Secord's office. Dutton was introduced 
to me there. 

Q Did you meet Dutton in connection with this meeting 
in lajB October? 

A No. 

Q And that meeting and the shipment of the TOWs 
results on the third of November in the release of hostage 
Jacobsen? 

A Second of November. 

Q Is it the second of Noveir.ber? After the meeting 
when he leaves on the 29th or the 3 0th, whenever, do you ■ 
leave and come back to the United States, or do you remain 
over there? 

A Yes. I had to clean up a couple of things in 
FrankfJ^rt and I think I took a day off and saw my grand- 

A. 

back. I can't remember. I think it was a Sunday. Then 

I ceune back on Monday. 

Q After the hostage Jacobsen is released, do you 
have a conversation — do you call Tehran or anything? 

A Yes. 

Q Where were you when you called Tehran? 



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^_^ 151 

A I think I was back here. 
Q The 30th would have been a Sunday. 
A The 30th of October? 

Q No. I am sorry. The first of November is a 
Saturday. The second is a Sunday. 
A I guess' I Ccune home then. 
Q On the second? 

A Maybe I saw them on Saturday and came home on Sunday, 
the second. 

Q Saw your grandchildren? 

Yes. I think I did. 

Where were you when you made the call to Tehran? 

Back here. 

Who did you speak to in Tehran? 




A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A ^^^^^^^^^ 

Q ^^^^^^^^^1 What was the purpose of that 

conversation? 

A To findout where the hell the other hostage was. 

Q What did he say to you? 

A He sai<? they are still trying, not to lose faith. 
That was the last time I talked to him. 

Q That is the last time you spoke to him. You 
continue, however, to have additional meetings with regard 
to this, don't you? 

A Well, what we did is after this, after everything 



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comes out in the press on, I guess, the 4th of November. So 
a with|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hin 

Q This is the same man from Tehran now? 

A Yes. On 9 through 10 November, or 8-9 November, in 
which we try to see if anything can be salvaged. I think 
you have a memo on that. 

Q I was just going to show it to you. 

CINN 166. Is that your summary of that meeting? 

A Yes. 

Q And who else — who from the American side, the 
United States side participates in that meeting? 

A Secord and North were both there. There is a * 
long — one of the things — North took extensive notes, 
so I only -- when I took notes, I only took notes on mainly 
things that pertained to me. 

Q Did North take extensive notes of each of the 
meetings? 

A Yes. He was very religious about that. He sent 
more deunned messages back to — this is why the cowboy thing - 
everything he did, he sent a message back to Poindexter. 

Q This is why you don't believe the rogue staffer 
theory? 

A I find that almost impossible to believe. 



M^ 



Did he have — did he usually travel — you said 



w 



4 7 or something. 



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A Yes. 

Q There is a device called a C.L. 43? 
A C.L. 43. Excuse me. The reason I say K.Y. 47 is 
that is a device we had years ago. 

Q I didn't know if you were talking about a different 
device or not. Did he travel with that most of the time? 

A He always had it. He used to drive me nuts 
because .&^^5WHf hungry as hell, but he would have to send 
a message. 

Q Who did he send it back to? 

A To Poindexter. Well, back to his office to be 
taken to Poindexter. Bob Allen was usually on the receiving 
end. 

Q What was the upshot of the meeting on the 8 through 
the 10th? Things are pretty public by now. 

A In short the Iranians wanted to continue the 
dialogue, but thought maybe the best thing to do was leave 
things — just leave things go for a while until things cool 
down. They were hopeful that we, on our side, could arrange 
it so there would be as little notjp-iety as possible. Faint 

hope. 

This is what you will see is what he gave me about 

their views on cfertain aspects of intelligence cooperation. 
This is mainly what this memo is about. There were long, long- 
winded discussions about policy and hostages with he. North, 



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and me translating most of the time and Hakim some of the 
time. 

Q Secord was also present at this meeting? 

A Yes. I did have -- most of what is there is a 
meeting that I had -- the first page -- alone to discuss 
this. 

Q Let me finish out your meetings, go back to 
Furmark, and then I want to ask you some questions about 
sort of as these things were breaking. I just want to take 
you through North's calendar. 

You continued to have meetings into December; is 
that right? 

A The last meeting was on, I think, the 13th of 
December, but the State Department was involved then. 



well? 



Was there a meeting on the 6th of December as 

A I don' t know. 

Q You only remember one meeting in December? 

A Yes. That is all I recall. 

Q Who was at the meeting on the 15th? 

A That was Ambassador Dunbar, myself andl 

Q What was the — where did that take place? 

A That took place in Frankfurt. 

Q What was the focus of those discussions? 



UNCIAS£I£1E0, 



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1 A It was basically to pass a message to the Iranian 

2 side on the State Department's position. That is basically 

3 what happened. 

4 Q Let's go back and pick up Furmark, or, the 

5 Furmark discussions. Sometime in October, you actually meet 

6 with Furmark? 

7 A Yes. Charlie met with him before, while I was 

8 away. 

9 Q Is this while you were in — did he meet with 

10 him during your early October — when you were in — 

11 A Yes. Remember I left the States on the 25th 

12 or 26th of September with my wife. We didn't get back 

13 until about the 12th of October. 

14 Q So prior to you actually meeting with Furmark, 

15 I take your meeting with Furmark occurred around October 22? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q When you return around the 12th of October, what 

18 are you told about Charlie's previous meeting? 

19 A Charlie gave me his memo that he wrote which 

20 basically were his worries, which were also mine. There 

21 were too many people that couldn't be controlled involved in 

22 this and that the dangers of it surfacing were pretty great. 

23 Then also about — told me a little bit about his conversation 

24 with Furmark. And then the director decided after another 

25 subsequent call from Furmark to ask Charlie^ and I to go up 



■ HV^a nHiAo IV kUIpTI 



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I 



156 
>nhiivb^ was . 



1 and hear him out completely, which was what our 

2 So we went up on the afternoon shuttle on the 22nd of October 

3 and had a long dinner with him in New York in which Charlie 

4 and I just sat there and listened to him and took notes. 

5 Q Just the three of you? 

6 A Just the three of us. 

7 Q I know there is a memorandum of it, but as best 

8 you recall, what was the focus of what he was telling you? 

9 A WeXl , what he did was outline^ the fact that people 

10 unbeknownst to us, people had been involved in this from 

11 the beginning, like Khashoggi and that he had known about 

12 it from the beginning when the Israelis started it, and •then 

13 went into his understanding of the financing of the Hawk 

14 deal and how it had been arranged and what the dangers were, 

15 the fact that two of the creditors were still owed 9/ — 

16 about 9 million dollars. 

17 After the meeting was over, Charlie and I called 

18 Casey at home and told him — we didn't tell him much on the 

19 phone, but we told him it was very important, that we would 

20 get the first shuttle out the following morning and come 

21 right to the office to talk to him. 

22 The memo that was written for Admiral Poindexter, 

23 designed by Charlie — actually wrote — both of us 

24 wrote a lot of the stuff that is in there, and then I 

25 shortly thereafter — I left on the 23rd or the 24th to go 



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back to Europe, to make the arrangements for the next round 
of meetings. 

Q How many times did you meet with Furmark? 

A Just that once. 

Q Just the one occasion. Did you, other than writing 
this memoranda, have any further involvement in sort of the 
fallfout from the Furmark meetings prior to the time every- 
thing comes out and you become involved in November? Did 
you meet with anyone else? Did you talk to Poindexter 
yourself? 

A I don't recall talking to Poindexter. I had 
a long conversation with Casey about it. 

Q Was it -- was the point of the conversation the 
security problems? 

A Yes. The security problems and that was his main 
focus about what happen if this surfaced. He had the 
same worry about Ghorbt "ar going public. 

Q Did you regar rhese conversations with Furmark- 
as in the nature of a threat? 

A Yes. And also I was more inclined to disregard them 
than most people. I can't see anyone that is owed $9 million 
trying to go to court the way he said he would go to court 
with any hope of recovering the money. That is why I think 
the threat to us to see if we could do something. 

Q Because they knew that what they had on you was 



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that you needed to keep this thing secret? 

A Yes. 

Q The one thing that is explicit in the memoranda 
at least is that the numbers fairly closely, as I recall, tie 
in with some of the information that you had received 
previously in conversations, the asides in Tehran, the 
figures. 

A One of the interesting things is that it is the 
same thing as Ghorbanifar is $10 million short, thereabouts. 
Almost exactly. Furmark is — his suggestion is why don't 
you let him sell an additional 1,000 TOWs and that will 
even thingaap, let him get back in flush again and this Is 
what the Iranians tell us is that they figure they owe him 
$10 million, but he owes there a thousand TOWs. 

Q So it sounded set up to you? 

A Bells started to go off. 

Q I really want to know where bells are going off 
about diversions to Central America? Because what you had 
heard at least once and Charlie Allen heard in the spring 
was money might go to Central America. The figures turn out 
the same. Furmark tells you of all the excess here that he 
thought was going off to Central America. 

Did you talk to North about funneling this money? 

A No. I never talked to North about any funding 
to the contras. Also, I was far more suspicious of money 



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1 going into Khashoggi and Ghorbanif ar ' s pockets at the time 

2 because of the previous knowledge we had of the 22nd 

3 April arrest, his possible involvement in a a sting operation. 

4 The thing that bothers me is that we didn't know how much 

5 Ghorbanifar paid for the equipment. 

6 I had no knolwedge of that. I mean he raised 

7 15 million bucks supposedly, according to Furmark, but 

8 did he have to raise that much? I don't know. He might 

9 have used some of it for his own purposes. 

10 Also the mysterious thing to me is that I know what 

11 the price given to North is. It is over $6 million. That 

12 includes the 508 TOWs. Now is the money Ghorbanifar is " 

13 raising, does it include money for the TOWs or what? Why 

14 is Nir getting $2 million, according to Furmark? 

15 So there is not an awful lot — all it dcSIa -is ^ 
15 incre|pft~'the fl0Hi^L(34H^uspicions and speculations. I 

17 don't know what the hell is happening. But I never in all 

18 of this long thing ever got any piece of factual information 

19 or definite indication that any money was being •cMM^e^r^e^ 

20 t° thM atoat ras. 

21 Q I just wondered. Now having learned this, having 

22 heard what you heard in the spring, and I know you have been 

23 asked this before, but you also knew Secord and North were 

24 very heavily involved in Central America. 

25 



Yes. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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o~) 

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Q They were also the central players, at least 



as far as you were concerned in this, the Iranian initiative. 
I am just wondering if you were ever tempted to go to 
Ollie and say, "Ollie, you and Dick were the money guys in 
this operation, and now Furmark is tellingias the money 
went off to Central America." If anybody diverted it there, 
assuming it was diverted there, if anybody did that, you 
could assume it was Ollie and Dick. 

Did you ever ask Ollie this? V/hat is going on? 
Did you divert the money away? 

A No. After everything blew up, after about the — 
I guess I never saw Ollie again after the end of Novembelr. 

Q After he was fired? 

A Yes. After he was fired -- 

Q You haven't seen him since then? 

A I haven't seen him since then. So I never asked 
him about it. I figured that if it was really true, he 
wouldn't have said anything anyway. 

Q Did you suspect it might be true? 

A I hate to put my suspicions out. I Ha<ran^twful 
lot of suspicions. The one thing that was obvious was 
there was an awful lot of money involved here. What happened 
to it — 

Q There were a lot of places it might have gone? 

A Yes. The thing that always — I could never 
understand what «-^f "''Tr'f ^ ^ r-tt1rt Jg-i¥^rt^ "^"^'' '''" was, 






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except it is pretty clear they played a role. One of their 

accounts was used and we — monies were obviously owed to 

Nir for something. 

P 
Q Let me just ask you a few clean-up questvns. Then 

I want to ask you some questions about things in North's 

calendar you may or may not recall. 

Have you heard of a ship called the Erria? 

A Yes. 

Q You heard of it prior to November 25th of 1986? 

A Yes. Because at -- I forget whether it was the 
September meeting-- I didn't take notes on this, I don't 
thing. The September meeting or the early October meeting, 
they proposed to give us a mint condition T-72, which 
they would deliver to us in Bandar Abbass as part of the 
deal. 

They also offered to send an 1-24, but I don't 
think we wanted that. This is when I first heard of the ship. 
It was decided to divert this ship from somewhere, wherever 
the hell it was, and send it to Bandar Abbass to pick up the 
tank. 

Qljl Did you have any knowledge of whose ship it was? 

A Yes. Ollie mentioned it was of Danish registration. 

Q Why did you think he had the ability to divert the 
ship somewhere? 

A My understanding was I thought they had possibly 






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162 

leased it. Something like that. 

Q In connection with this operation? 

A No. No. In connection with the contra thing. 

Q You thought that they leased it, you mean Ollie 
and Secord? 

A Well, however they — -, 

Q Or Haki% or somebody? Was it your impression 
that when you said it was diverted, it turns out to be a 
key word in this whole thing — 

A Wherever it was, I don't recall where it was. 

Q Let's go to redirected. 

A Redirected and ordered th«.^^gg^^^sail to Bandar 
Abbass to pick up the tank. 

Q V^as it your — I know this is proba ^jpy ry 
vague, and you didn't pay much attention to this, but did you 
think it was on its way to Central America? 

A I don't know. 

Q I guess the question I am asking is what led 
you to — 

A No. It was in the Mediterranean. 

Q What led you to conclude it was connected with the 
contra operation? 

A I think Ollie mentioned something about having 
used it. But I don't recall what the specifics were. I 
do know when it came up. Secord — it might have been — it 



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was either in the September meeting in Washington or the 
first meeting in Frankfurt in October. Because Secord and 
he were talking about it and they said, "Well, we will just 
get a boat, go down there and pick it up." 

I am not so sure I knew the name of it even then. 
I think I learned about the name after it came out in the 
press. 

Q Did you know Tom Clines? 

A I knew Tom when he was with the agency, yes. 
Not well. 

Q Did you know that he had any association with 
Colonel North during the 1986 time period? 

A I never saw Tom, but Ollie mentioned him a couple 
of times. 

Q Do you recall in what context? 

A No, not really. He had dealings with Tom. I never 
got the impression he was directly involved with him on 
anything. 

Q Any recollection that Clines might have had 
anything to do with this ship? 

A No. 

Q No connection? Clines — and I don't want to assume 
a conclusion you might not share, but it is my general under- 
standing that Clines' reputation around the agency by this 
time, whether it was right or wrong, was at least a guy 



you ought to be s 



tav^^q|w|v^gm^i|ai«^e 

IflntDiKHBIIr ifini ■ 



he had gotten 



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into some trouble? Is that a fair -- 

A I don't know. Clines was — we were never in 
the same organizations in the agency. I knew him only when 
hewas chief of training, because you had to go through him 
to get specific types of training that you needed then. 
I honestly can't answer that, what the basic opinion of 
the guy is. I imagine there are people that know him that 
have one opinion. 

Q Right. That is why I sort of tried to preface it 
with whether it was justified or not. It was my under- 
standing that at least he was by that time regarded as 
somewhat bad news for the agency. 

A I frankly can't recall ever discussing Clines 
with anybody. 

Q Let me ask it this way. Were you surprised to 
find Ollie had associated with Tom Clines? 

A I was surprised when he just brought the name up 
in passing. It was clear that he knew Tom Clines, but 
not — I never had any precise knowledge of what he was 
doing with hira. 

Q And you don't recall it was in connection with 
the contras as opposed to something else? 

A No. I thought it was in conjunction with the 
Libyans, something to do with the Libyans. What it was, I 



don't know. 



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Q You knew Clines to have been — 

A Ollie was doing something with Ghorbanifar about 
the Libyans, but I never knew what it was. 

Q I should sit back down. I have one last question 
before I ask you questions about the calendar. Did Colonel 
North have a regular relationship with two DEA agents 
who did some work with him, if you recall, or have any 
knowledge? 

A Not that I know of. 

Q This can go real quickly. I will put in front of 
you — I don't have it marked, but it is Colonel North's 
week-at-a-glance standard government calendar for the year 
1986. I want to ask you about sqrne things. The 
things I want to ask you about, I wS? in yellow. I don't 
know that doing it this way you are really going to 
remember. What I was interested in is Dewey is here. I 
assume that is Dewey Clarridge. This is September 15. 

A That may have been a meeting at the agency. 

Q This would have been about a week or so prior to 
the meeting with -- the first meeting withj 

A Yes. 

Q No specific recollection of what the meeting was 
about? 

A Yes. I have no specific recollection. If it was 
the meeting -- was this a meeting when Nir came to the 



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states on a -- Nir cane to the states on a terrorist thing. 
We all had a meeting out at the agency. I don't know if it 
was that specific date or not^ 

Saturday. Yes. I think that is what it was. 
We had a Saturday meeting. 

Q With Nir present, was it a meeting in preparation 
for the -- 

A Yes. We told Nir we had opened up another channel. 

Q The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the 
other channel? 

A Yes. Discuss what we hoped to get out of it and 
what to do about Ghorbanifar and whether Nir can in any way 
put pressure on him. 

Q Was Nir at tltifc^point worried that he was getting 
cut out as well? i~:^BJ^^^^ 

A I think the Israelis feel that they have a lot a^M 
at stake in Iraag^BdtJ|riB he would certainly want Israeli 
interest/to be pursued. This is one of the things that 
Ollie tried to reassure him about. 

Q Because in fact as the meetings developed wit> 
the Israelis are not present? 

A Oh, yes. That is one of the first things they 
said is that they wanted Israeli footprints out of this as 
completely and as fast as possible, 
lid? 



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A Yes. That is -- that is when Nir was in the 

states on this terrorist thing. 

Q Here is the week of — it is Friday, September 19. 

A That was the meeting with| 

Q That is — 

A This is their man who wasl 



MR. LEON: Who are you pointing to? 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q I wasn't going to, for these entp.^es, because they 
are names we have been calling] 

Just so the record is clear therels a meeting on 
the 19th at 11*30 involving Copp, Cave ^^^^^^^^B and 
the other individual we were just talking about. 

Here is an -- on Friday — Monday September 22nd, 
Colonel North looks like he has one of those quick trips 
to London. Did you accompany him on that trip? 
A No. 

Q You are listed as having met with him on Tuesday, 
October 14 at 3:30 in the afternoon. At 4 o'clock it appears 
Ollie met with the director. 

Do you have any recollection of this meeting? 
A Well, I was over there an awful lot to go over 
things with him and that is probably one where we did a 



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rehash of the meetings in Frankfurt. 

Q If you recall, did you participate in the meeting 
with the director? 

A (No audible response.) 

Q On Friday, October 31st, it appears — well, let 
me go to Saturday, November 1st. It indicates at 4 o'clock, 
Colonel North leaves for London. This would have been right 
after the Frankfurt trip. Did you go — you didn't go to 
London with him, did you? 

A No. 

Q Do you know why he went to London? 

A No . 

Q And — 

A Might have been to meet Nir. I remember Nir at 
one meeting we had saying it was easier for him to get to 
London than it was to get to Frankfurt. 

Q Similarly he leaves — when I say he, I am referring 
to Colonel North, leaves on November 5th for Geneva at 4:45. 

Did you accompany him on this trip to Geneva? 

4/ 

A Yes. I don't think we went on the stne plane. 

Maybe we did. But that was the trip where we went to see 
if there was anything to be rescued. It was very difficult, 
because they had — in the hotel they had CNN and his picture 
was on every half an hour. So we had to stay in the room. 
Q Now we are really up to the time period where — 



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DlA^ffSSH^mEEiT 



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I am up to Thursday, November 13, which as you remarked earlier 
was the day of the President's speech. It appears that you 
and Secord at approximately 3:15 are present to have a 
meeting with North. Is that in order to prepare the speech? 

A No. That came earlier. 

Q That was earlier? 

A Yes. What we did at that time is we had this 
secure voice thing on which I called Tehran. 

Q What was the purpose of that call? 

A I wish you hadn't asked that. I have a hard time 
remembering at the moment. It was we were trying to maintain 
communications with^^^^^^^^^| We were talking to one of 
his^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l guy 

amintained contact with. As I recall, the secure voice 
didn't work well at all. 

In fact, I think we left and went out to Dick's 
house to see if we could work it from there. We couldn't get 
it any better. It was vice-versa. We tried to do it first 
at Dick's house, and then came back to the office, because 
we couldn't do it there. It was just trying to keep the 
channel open. 

Q You earlier started to describe that you had had a 
role in the preparation of the President's speech. 

A What we did is put together a lot of material for 
the speech writers. In other words, we put together something 



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that the speech writers then boiled down into the President's 
speech. 

Q By this time, had the preparation of a chronology 
begun? 

A I think it had. I forget the dates on the 
chronology. I worked on the chronology, too, after March 5th. 
I didn't do anything before March 5th. 

Q Who all was present and helped to draft the 
speech? I shouldn't say helped draft it. Who else was 
present? 

A McFarlane was there, Howie Teicher, myself, of course! 
Ollie was there. The secretaries were there, and also his 
deputy. Colonel — what is his name? 

Q There were two that worked there. Coy and Earl. 

Q Earl. I don't think Craig was working on that or 
on the chronology. 

Q Was your role in this speech preparation primarily 
fact -development, I take it? 

A Yes. Going over — we were trying to put together 
everything that happened. I was putting in for my part, my 
recollections and notes. Fortunately the speech writers 
threw everything out. 

Q I was about to comment, but I decided not to. 
There are almost no facts in the speech. So I am not sure 
what exact role you played. I hope you didn't work very hard 



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on it. 



A We didn't. This may be when we were really working 

hard on the — 

Q He is referring to Wednesday, November 19th. 
Mr. Cave is reflecting an item at 2:15. This was also the 
day to jog your memory that the President had a press 
conference. 

A Yes. I think we also went to — we also had a 
meeting with Poindexter on that day. 

Q It actually looks like it is reflected around 

3:30 or so. 

A Because a lot of people came over from, I thinfc, 
Gates was there and Casey and Clair|| George. 
LEON :hH^^^^^| 
THE WITNESS: ^^^^^^H He 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Who ^^^^^^^^^^H 
A He is sort of the executive director of the DDO's 

office. 

Q Was there anybody from — do you recall was there 
anybody from the Department of Justice there? 

A No. 

Q Chuck CoopeEi^Ed_Med3fe^_^^nybody^Ii 

A No. 

Q What happened at that meetingl 



Q What happenea at tnac meetAny. 



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umSSfPRST 



173 



A This was a meeting in which basically we were 
discussing what can be preserved, if anything. And how do 
we handle it. I think things were changing so fast then 
that you decide on one thing one day and the next day it 
no longer obtained anyway. But you — what would happen is 
would go to these meetings, get all charged up, read the 
Washington Post the next morning and forget about the 
meeting . 

Q One of the things that I recall happening after 
the press conference or at the press conference is the 
President was asked about participation of a third country, 
and I think he initially commented there had been no third 
country participation and immediately there had to be a 
correction. 

Was there any discussion at this meeting about how 
to handle a third country type question? 

A There was one thing that disturbed me: the one thingi 
that I recall is that I talked to Ollie about the press 
conference. He said, "Well, Poindexter and Regan had 
' fmrnprn^ the President on questions." I said, "What the hell 
do they know about it? We should have been in there 
throwing questions at him. We could have asked far more 
embarrassing questions than those two." That is the one 
thing I recall. 

Nothing much was accomplished in this meeting. 



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(lj(^flSS(Hrar 



174 



Q On Thursday, November 20, there is an indication 
at 1:30 that says, "JMP" which stands for Poindexter, DRI , 
Casey, and Cave had a meeting. Apparently with Ollie. At 
least it is on life* eal-Sndar. 

A I don't think that took place. 

Q You don't think it took place? 

A No. It might have taken place out --wait a minute. 
It might have taken place out at headquarters, because we 
had a meeting out there to discuss things in preparation 
for the NSPG meeting, which was on the 24th. 

Q Right. Well, the next thing that happenes is 
the next day Casey begins to testify. Did you have any ifole 
in preparing Casey's testimony? Casey testifies on the 
21st. 

A Yes. Is this the SSCI testimony? 

Q Both. I think he testifies in the morning before 
HPSCI and in the afternoon before SSCI. 

A Yes. I did go over some of the things with him 
and answer questions that he had. I don't recall the 
specific questions. He asked me something, and I would say 
here is what happened. 

Q Was there a prep session where he was bombarded 
with questions? 

A No. 



Q No? 



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A Not that I recall. He always felt very confident 

when he came up on the hill. 

Q He didn't feel the need for these prep sessions? 

A No. 

Q Did -- I take it the first that you had learned 
that there was a suggestion of a diversion was about noon 
on the 25th during the course of the press conference? 
I don't mean suggestion. Obviously, you had some thoughts, 
but did you know — 

A I was getting to be pretty suspicious that maybe, 
but — by that time. In fact, when Meese made his statement 
I couldn't believe it because going back in my mind, I 
didn't see where they could have found that much money; not 
when you are dealing with people like Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi 
They were not going to let you get away with that much money. 

Q So your reaction was the amounts — it was possible, 
but the amounts were too large? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you at any time during this sort of two-week 
time period in late November discuss with Ollie whether or 
not there might have been a diversion? 

A No. 

Q And do you recall when the last time was that you 
talked to North? 

A I talked to him sometime around Christmas. He just 



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mw^ 



IFIED 



176 



called to wish me a merry Christmas. 

Q He called you? 

A I think it was that way. I called him once, then 
right after New Year's, asked him how he was. That was all. 
We didn't talk about anything. 

Q Mr. Cave, I think I have exhausted myself, if 
not you. I thank you for answering all these questions. 

THE WITNESS: I am getting my second wind. Can 
I get a drink of water? 
(Recess. ) 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LEON: 

Q I just have some questions. I hate to have to 
bring you back to events you have already covered, but 
there were certain questions that occurred to me as you were 
going along I would like to ask you about. Bear with me, 
if you will. 

I tried to note them on my note pad here. I noticed 
in Mr. North's calendar on April 18, which was shortly 
after you got involved in all of this — maybe the 24th. 
Wrong date. Excuse me. April 24th. It was a Thursday. 
There was a meeting supposedly between you and Ollie North 
and a person nc 

A 

Q 




Do you recall that meeting, and 



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mMm 



ET 



177 



if so, what was -- what was the purpose of it? 

A I think that was — we had gotten additional 
information. Remember, there was still the possibility that 
Ollie^ North and I would go in with Ghorbanifar separately. 



Yes. 



The agency was pretty negative on that. 
About? 

About us going in separately ahead of time. 
Why was that? For security reasons? 
Yes. We didn't know what we were getting into. 
We weren't certain what we were going to get into. It 
was a kind of reluctance. I thought it was a pretty good 
idea. 

Q Who in particular at the agency was — was Mr. 
Casey having an opinion on that subject? 

A No. But Clair George had a #Wiy iftgative opinion 
on that. Also, I think we had pretty much^HPthat time 
finalized what we would be able to obtain of the Hawk spares, 
That was part of the discussion. 

Q What was that? What had you concluded? 
A We were able to say here is the finalized list 
of what we would be able to ship. 
Q Who is 

A He is the assistant deputy director for operations, 
Q Who wqiJUitM^ajTe^^MK^i^^o a^^hat time? 




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A Clairf George. 

Q When was it that you first realized that McFarlane 
would be going along to Tehran? Would it hav* been after 
this date? ^ 

A I think it was before this date. It was sometime 
after we came back from the March visit that North told me 
that McFarlane -- if the group went, there would be McFarlane. 
It is pretty soon after we came back from Paris. 

Q What was the reason for why McFarlane would be 
going at all. He was no longer a member of the U.S. 
Government? 

A I think they wanted it this way. 

Q Who is they? 

A The NSC. They wanted to send someone of great 
stature, but who was not a U.S. official. In other words, 
it would have been one thing to send a current serving 
senior official, and another thing to send one who is 
basically a private citizen. 

Q Was anybody else considered, private citizen? *. 

;^E.JHpt that I know. I don't know. 

Q Did you meet and talk to McFarlane about his 
going at any point? 

A Yes. We had one meeting. I had one meeting with 
him before we went. 

Q Was that the one at his office? 



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179 

A Yes. The one at his office. 

Q That you mentioned? Who was it, if you can 
recall? Who was also there? 

^^^^^^^^^^Hand I down to see him. 

Q What was the agency's attitude at that time about 
sending a former national security advisjjr to the President 
to a place where if he was captured in light of what had 
happened to our chief of station in Lebonon, might be in a 
position where secrets might become jeopardized? 

A That is true. There was a lot of soul-searching 
and hand-nassaging over the whole thing. 

Q By who? 

A Casey was very concerned. Clair George was 
extremely concerned. As things began to unfold and I learned 
more and more, I had some concerns, but I thought knowing 
what I ]cnow about Iran and Iranians, I thought we could get 
in and out all right. 

Q Was it viewed by Casey as a great risk? 

A Considerable risk. In fact, as I mentioned to you, 
he put it up to me whether we go or not. 

Q What was North's attitude with respect to the risk 
diinension of it? 

A I don't think Colonel North ever considers risk in 
anything. He is a — very forward — a very forward leaning. 



full of initiative. 



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Q What was your assessment of McFarlane's version of 
the risk, or assessment of risk? 

A Well, he was going at the behest of the President. 
He is a good American. He will do whatever the commander 
in chief tells him to do. 

Q Did you have any reason to believe the President 
has contacted him about it? 

A My understanding was, yes, he was going at the 
behest of the President. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of whether he met with 
the President to discuss this? 

A I think there was reference to a meeting shortly 
before we left, yes. I can't swear to that. 

Q No. I understand. Did North ever represent to you-- 

A Yes. I thought that he and Colonel North met 
with the President shortly before we left. 

Q In March of 1986, shortly after you got involved, 
brought into the picture, the hundred-million-dollar vote 
on the contrasf took place. 

I don't know if you can recall that, but it was a 
major legislative effort. Wednesday, March 19 was the vote. 
It was a major legislative push on contra aid. Can you recall 
any discussions with Colonel North regarding his efforts on 
the vote either before or after it was successful? 

A We had -- there were meetings that had to be 



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rescheduled because he was working hard on the vote. That 
is about my basic recollection. He was working around the 
clock on the vote, that I know. 

Did he express to you that — anything about the 
state of affairs of the contras at that time in terms of 
their funding and supplies? 

A No. 

Q Any indication they were in bad need of money for 
weapons and arms? 

A I don't recall any specific thing that he said. 
We never really talked about the contras very much. I 
mean, you can't be around Ollie without knowing it is one- 
of his overriding interests, but, you know, as far as I am 
concerned, Latin America is on the moon. 

Q I take it that you are right about it, you can't 
be around him much that it doesn't come up, but how does 
it come up? Does he just spontaneously start talking? 

A No. When it comes up, in questions like -- I went 
to his office once. There was a, priest there. He just 
said -- -V 

Q Father >iiniii?- J 

A I forget the guy's name. He introduced me to 
him. He said in passing he is the priest for the contras. 
He was in his office once. Things like that would happen. 
He would never go 






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Q On May 9th, there was a meeting according to 
Mr. North's calendar^ with yourself, Clair George, HHH 
and! 

A There's something wrong. 

Q Any recollection of that? 

A We were in London on May 9 . 

Q May 6? 

A He left to come back. He might have met with 
someone that I wasn't at the meeting. 

Q So far as you can recall, you didn't meet 
with him on May 9, Friday, May 9? 

A He left -- that is when we were in London 
holding the meetings with Ghorbanifar, the 7th and 8th. 
I don't think I came back until the 10th. He came back 
early. So — 

Q Would it be possible thatl 
least in the states or in Washington, 
George? 

A Yes. 

Q So you didn't attend any meeting? 

A I don't recall any meeting. I don't think 
I got back until the 10th. I came back from London 
on the afternoon flight. 

Q On May 13, there appears tcjbe a meeting between 
you and North and a^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H That is on 




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his calendar. That's how it looks. I could be misreading. 

Does it ring any bells at all? 
A None . None whatsoever . 
Q At 2:00. Looks likel 
A Are you sure that's me? 

MR, PEARLINE: It doesn't look like his name 
there. 

THE WITNESS: Looks like National something. 
Oh, up above it. Oh, 1:30. That is probably — I was 
over at Ollie's after this thing started to get moving 
quite frequently, just to talk to him briefly on various 
things. I'm sure this had to do with the upcoming trip'to 
Teheran. We had several meetings. Probably other meetings 
aren't even listed on here. 

I saw him very frequently during that period 

after we got back from London and before we went to 

Teh*ran. 
w 

BY MR. LEON: 

Q Okay. You don't know anyone naunec 

A No. 

Q How about someone named Oakley? 

A Oh, yes. Oakley is the State Department's — 
the head of what -- their ambassador for counterterrorism 
at that time. But he wasn't involved. What is the date 






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on that? 
Q 
A 

matters . 
Q 



Well, let's see. May 22nd. 

He was probably seeing Oakley on terrorism 

Then after that he met a| 

you know him? 




firtt 



No. Don't ring any bells with me. 

When you were in Iran and they told you the 

It they were pretty sure they could get two 

hostages out, but they weren't certain, and it started to 

appear to you that they didn't have as much control over 

the kidnappers as you thought they might have, did you 

feel it was a set-up? 

A No.^^^^^^ 

[there's two different 

communities in Lebanon. There is the 8Mn>** of the Bekaa 

Valley and the 9i»«wt» of the south. The guys in the Bekaa 
A 




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Valley are pretty fiercely independent. 




I have always been skeptical of the 
positions on control — on Iranian control over the hostage 
takers for that reason. This was fortified when we got. to 
Tehfran. 

But I did believe that they had enough influence 
where they could get two released, which they «9i^. I 
thought we were getting closer to the truth in the matter. 
This is the position I took with Casey when we got back. 

Q What did you feel^^^H^^^^f situation was at 
that time when you learned there were going to be trouble 
getting two hostages out? 

A He was very worried. He was responsible for 
us coming in and for us to leave without anything 
happening would not redound to his political benefit. 

Q Was it your sense that he was -- that he felt 
betrayed or that he was in sgiae.wayduped? 



:rayed or that he was in somg,|Way"di; 



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A He was very mad at -- along with the other 
witnestTi'thorbanifar . When they started showing me these 
letters Ghorbanifar had written, you know, he was mad^ . 
We said, Don't blame it on us; it is not a U.S. Government 
position^ it is a Ghorbanifar position. We will tell you 
what our position is. 

Q Did you have any sense at the outset of this 
operation, Mr. Cave, that while it was an NSC operation, 
as you pointed out, that State and the Department of 
Defense had been specifically excluded from knowing about 
it? 

A Not the Department of Defense. The Department 
of Defense played a role in this. There were several 
people in the Department of Defense who were briefed. 




I found it odd that State didn't get it. Was 
cut out. That was a decision made by the NSC. Charlie 
Allen was specifically told to limit dissemination. 

Q Do you know who told him that? 

A Yes. That came from the NSC . Came from 
Poindexter's office. 

Q And did Charlie tell you that himself? 

A Oh, res. But *ll^"^ McFarlane swore that he 
kept the Secretary of State fully briefed on everything 



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that transpired up to the time — while he was -- 

Q Up to the May trip? 

A Up until the time that he left, resigned. 

Q Okay . 

A You know, as I told you, I talked to Poindexter 
on the specific subject only the 24th of September and he 
told me that he was going to call Secretary Shultz 
immediately and brief him. 

Q You don't know if that ever happened? 

A I don't know. From that point on, my assumption 
was that State was fully aware of what was transpiring. 

Q Do you know a Colonel named Moshe, M-o-s-h-e,* 
Zur, Z-u-r? 

A No. 

Q Do you know about his meeting with North on 
July 10? 

A No. 
" Q On the July 17 meeting you testified to before, 
on Colonel North's calendar, there is a person referred 
to as Abe. Would that be Hakim? 

A Hakim, yes. 

Q When you were in Frankfurt, on July 27, around 
that time frame, were you aware of any efforts on the 
part of North to contact the Vice President? 

A No. The only time the Vice President came up 



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TOP SECRET 

UNCLASSIFIED 



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that I can recall is when he was in Tel Aviv. I don't 
know if that occurred at that time. 

What he wanted was for Nir to be able to see the 
Vice President, present his case. 

Q What was your understanding as to the reasons 
why North was trying to set up a meeting between Nir and 
the Vice President? 

A I don't fully know. I never saw a memorandum 
of the meeting after it took place. 

Q Were you told by either Nir or North before 
the meeting took place between the Vice President and Nir 
that they were trying to set it up? 

A Yes. I was aware they were trying to set up the 
meeting. 

Q Was it your impression they were trying to 
set it up in order to have Nir enlist the support of the 
Vice President? 

■ A That was my -- yes. That was my understanding. 

Q To keep this operation going? 

A To keep the thing going. Because of the fact 
we were getting Jenco, I guess it was at that time. But 
I never saw any result of the meeting. I never saw a 
memorandum based on it. 

Q Did either North or Nir ever comment to you 
later how that mp§ting went? 

l^Nt'LASSIRUP 



752 




^ 189 

1 A I don't recall any specific comments, no. 

2 Q Were you aware of North trying to have the 

3 Vice President meet with Jenco in Frankfurt? 

4 A No. I sort of stayed out of the hostage -- I 

5 was never involved in any of the briefings or anything 

6 like that. And specifically asked to be kept out of it. 

7 Q Do you have any knowledge of a $7 million deposit 

8 being made into a numbered Swiss account on September 26, 

9 1986? 

10 A No. 

11 Q By Nir or anybody else? 

12 A No. September 26? 

13 Q Yes. So far as you knew, on September 26, 

14 there was no definite understanding as to another ship- 

15 ment to be made in the future; was there? 

1g A No. We had agreed that we would consider, and 

1^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^fsaid okay, he is going to look to make sure 

•jg they can get the hostages released. That is where, as 

■\Q far as I was concerned, it was left. We didn't get into 

20 the more detailed discussion until the Frankfurt meeting. 

2'j Q You went to Geneva with North, what, at least 

22 once? 

23 A We had the meeting in November. Meeting in 

24 November, yes. 

25 Q Did you ever meet a person in Geneva named 



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William Zucker? 

A No. 

Q Did you know him? 

A I knew who he was. I think he was in some way 
associated with Hakim in business. 

Q What else do you know about him, if you know 
anything? 

A Nothing. He's a Swiss national, I gather. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of him providing 
money to Colonel Dutton at any time in relationship to 
the shipment of arms in October? 

A No. I think the only reason I knew who he was- 
is we came down to the lobby, and Hakim was talking to a 
man and I think it was -- Ollie said. That's William 
Zucker. That's my knowledge of him. 

Q That was where? 

A This was in Geneva. 
- Q Do you know where it was? In a hotel? 

A In the Intercon Hotel. 

Q When you were in Switzerland, do you have any 
knowledge of North or anybody on his behalf trying to 
contact the ambassc 

A No. 

Q Have you ever heard her name come up in the 



;ador. Faith Whittles'^? 



context -- 



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A What was her name again? 

Q Faith Whittlesey, ambassador to Switzerland. 

A No. 

Q You talked earlier about the first meeting 
where Secord was present and directly involved in what 
you considered to be a substantive discussion with the 
second channel. 

Were you surprised to see him present at that 
meeting? 

A Well, I consider myself an experienced operations 
officer. It is always a mistake to mix apples and oranges. 
But I think that the rationale for it is Colonel North ■ 
relied heavily on General Secord. He really thought 
highly of him. 

My understanding is that Secord at one point 
saved his life. I don't know if that's an apocryphal 
story or not. 

Q Do you have any more facts about that story? 

A No. I just heard when they were both in 
Vietnam, Secord saved his life. Whether it is true or 
not, I don't know. 

Q How about Dutton? Had you heard anything about 
Dutton's relationship to Secord and North? 

A The only point where that ever came up was 
when we were having the meetings in Hakim's offices out 



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at Seven Corners. 

Dutton was introduced to me. And after a long 
session, was kindly oblig«rby mixing a martini. 

I think Dick Secord said that Dutton had been 
in Iran^ 

Q He worked for Secord in Irani 

A In Iran, right . 

Q But you had never met himi 

A No. I think I had actually been -- the same 
day when I first went out there. Hakim introduced me to 
Dutton, said he was one of his best employees. 

Q At one point Mr. Eggleston was asking you 
questions about the September 22nd through September 24th 
time frame. 

A Yes. 

Q On the 22nd, I believe you were talking about 
a meeting between North and Casey, Then on the 2 4th, 
it was a meeting between Poindexter, Casey, yourself, and 

A I think Clair George was also there. 

Q Clair George? That was on that occasion that 
Poindexter said, I am going to call Shultz right away? 

A I specifically brought that up with him, because 
we had already — I had brought it up withi 



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who brought it up with Colonel North, who said. Yes, he 
should be brought in. 

I emphasized that point with Poindexter at the 
24th September meeting. His response was, I'm going to 
call Secretary Shultz right away. 

Q And these discussions concerned the hostages 
being released and the second channel? 

A Basically the second channel. It looked very 
promising. 

Q Between North's discussion with Casey on the 
22nd, which was a Monday, and on the 24th when there was 
the meeting with Casey, yourself^^^^^^^Hand Poindexter, 
North flew to London the 2 3rd, in between those two days. 
Did you go with him to London? 

A No. 

Q Do you know why he went to London? 

A No. 

Q Do you know anyone who might have gone with 



him? 



I don't know, no. 



UNCLASSIFIED 

mi'N'rfc riT-1/^T^T'wn 



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SECRET 

ASSfFfED 



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Q On October 9th, North's calendar indicates he 
met with a person. I would like to know if you know who 
this is -- Bahman Maalizadeh. 



A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A-D-E-H. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 



Yes. 

B-A-H-M-A-N — 

He works here. 

— is the first name. The second is M-A-A-L-I-Z- 



Maalizadeh. He works for Senator Helms. 
He does? 

I don't know him personally. 

You don't know why they met or what happened 
at the meeting? 

A I don't recall Ollie ever saying anything about 
it. 

Q Mr. Eggleston asked you about the 14th of 
October. That was the day where you are penciled in at a 
meeting at 4:30 and the DCI at 4:00 o'clock. 

I couldn't recall if he asked if you were there 
when Mr. Casey appeared or not? 

A What is the date of that meeting? 

Q October 14. It was a Tuesday. Supposedly, there 
was a meeting at 4:00 o'clock with Casey, Paul Hanley, 
Syria Terr — T-E-R-R — and Britt Threat — T-H-R-E-A-T — 
in the White HQjiae-5iUial.iQn j-opm_.^ 



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1 A I wasn't at that meeting, no. 

2 Q You weren't at that meeting? 

3 A No. 

4 Q Did you go with North on the 22nd, Wednesday, 

5 October 22nd, to Geneva? 

6 A No. 

7 Q You didn't go on that trip with him? 

8 Have you ever heard of a person named Mark Durpis 

9 D_u_p_R_i_s? 

10 A Mark Dupris? 

11 Q Yes. 

12 A The only Dupris I know is the guy that is the 

13 expert on Afghanistan, but his name isn't Mark. 

14 Q How about on his calendar for that day in 

15 Geneva? He is supposed to meet withi 

16 ^^^^^^^^^^B Have you ever heard of that? 

17 A Who? 

19 A Sounds like an organization DDI would use. 

20 No, never heard of it. 

21 Q How about a person named Gerald Keilson? K-E-I-L- 

22 S-O-N. 

23 A No . 

24 Q On November 19, Mr. Eggleston asked you about your 

25 meetings that day with Ollie and^^^^^^^H ^"d then, of 



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course, there was the DOJ meeting at 4:00 o'clock with 
Casey and Gates. 

On North's calendar, you were scheduled to arrive 
at 2:15 and the meeting with the whole group to go over the 
DOJ preparation wasn't until 4:00. 

Can you recall, first of all, whether you did meet 
with him for an hour and a half before that meeting? 

A I think we were working on the chronology. The 
speech was on the 13th, right? November 13th? 

Q That was the speech. The press conference was 
that night, the 19th. 

A We were working on the chronology, I believe,. 
that day. I am pretty sure. There was one day we spent 
a whole long time working on the chronology. 

Q I think you told Mr. Eggleston that on the 24th, 
that even though you are scheduled here for a meeting at 
North's office with Casey, yourself and Poindexter and North, 
that you don't recall it taking place. 

A The 24th of November? 

Q Right. The day before Ollie was discharged. 

A No, I don't think so. On the 24th of November, 
I went from the agency with Casey to the NSPG meeting. 

Q Which was that afternoon? 

A That afternoon. "-^^ 

Q So, were you out at the ^JTSTftf that day? 




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1 A Yes. 

2 Q Were you aware that if Furmark met with Casey 

3 that day at the agency? 

4 A I think so. 

5 Q Do you know what time the meeting was? 

6 A Was it that day? 

7 Q That is what I am asking you. 

8 A He came — one of those days, but I thought he 

9 came late at night. 

10 Q I believe they met the 24th. 

11 A There was one day — I was told to stay — 

12 Furmark was coming in. Casey's old executive office director' 

13 up there said Furmark was coming in. I can't remenber 

14 whether it was the 24th or not. 

15 Q Did you say Casey's office director? 

16 A Yes. He has an executive director, McCullough. 

17 Q Tell us what he said to you. 

18 A I was talking to him about we were doing our own 

19 chronology, getting ready for subsequent testimony, and he 

20 mentioned to me that Furmark is coming in. I guess it was 

21 that afternoon. Maybe it was that afternoon. I saw 

22 Furmark, but he didn't see me. 

23 Q What happened? 

24 A I can't swear to the date. 

25 Q You remember ^g(^r\fl. aU-tll_1Vy||>L *"" *^^^ NSPG meeting? 



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A Yes. 

Q So, you remember being at the agency on the 24th? 

A That is right. 

Q You remember seeing him at the agency, Furmark? 

A I can't swear it was on the 24th. I remember 
seeing him some time in those days there. 

Q Did the director ever mention to you his meeting 
with Furmark that day? 

A I don't recall him specifically saying anything 
about that visit. I don't think he called me in. He 
might have talked to Gates and Charlie Allen about it, but 
I don't think he specifically called me in to brief me on 
what Furmark had said. 

Q Let's follow it through a second. 

If you did go with the director to the NSPG meeting 
from Langley and he had already met with Furmark and they 
had discussed the events that you have previously recounted, 
wouldn't it be likely that the director would bring it to 
your attention that he had met with Furmark? 

A He did not on that trip. On that trip we were 
going over his opening statements he was going to make to the 
NSPG meeting. 

Q But you do recall seeing Furmark out there? 

A I recall seeing Furmark during that period of time. 
I can't swear it was on the 24th. I know I saw him coming 



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1 to visit Casey. 

2 Q Were you at Langley the next day? 

3 A I don't know. I don't go in unless I have 

4 something specifically to do. I would rather play golf. 

5 I am not trying to mislead you. I just don't recall -- 

6 I recall seeing Furmark going into Casey's office when 

7 I was talking to Jim McCullough. But I don't recall a 

8 specific date. 

9 Q Do you have any recollection of Casey every 

10 telling you after that time period that he had met with 

11 Furmark and Furmark again had made accusations that Khashoggi 

12 was being — 

13 A I recall there was one period after that that he 

14 said that he was very much concerned because according to 

15 Furmark, these people were going to bring a case, were 

16 going to file a — file suit in New York. 

17 Q And did Casey ever mention to you calling 

18 Chuck Cooper at the Department of Justice about that 

19 meeting? 

20 A No . 

21 MR. LEON: Thank you very much. It was nice 

22 meeting you, Mr. Cave. 

23 I have to run to something else. 

24 MR. VAN CLEVE: For the record, to introduce 

25 myself, I am G^f^^g ^^ Cleye^. I am Chief Minority Counsel 



763 



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with the House committee. I have not been able to 

attend except for a short period the earlier course of the 

deposition. I am going to try not to go over ground you have 

already been asked about. There may be one or two places 

where I do that. It is unintentional. I am not trying 

to get you to give me a different version of something you 

have already talked about. 

EXAMINATION BY MR. VAN CLEVE, COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 



BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

Q I have a couple of, I guess, specific factual 
questions. Let me just try to get into them in a reasonable 
sort of chronological order. 

As far as I know, based on your prior testimony 
before us today and on prior occasions, you were not 
involved in any way in the November 198 5 shipment of Haw)^; 
is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q At any time during 198 6, did any of the 
participants in these transactions describe the November 198 5 
shipment of Hawk s to you? 

A Charlie Allen did. 

Q If so, what did he say about it? 



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A It was mainly after the fact. One of the big 
concerns is when these things arrive in Israel — in Tehran, 
the Star of David was on nine of the 18 Hawjcs, and the fact 
that the Iranians didn't accept them, they were the wrong 
models. They had to be picked up and returned subsequently 
to Israel. 

But I was unaware of any detailed — I knew no 
detaijs about either the September or November shipment 
until after everything came out. 

Q When you say "everything came out," you mean 
the disclosure? . . 

A The disclosures. 

Q Your conversation with Allen actually took place 
after those disclosures? 

A No. It actually took place — the revelations 
in the press hadn't occurred, but I was told — when I was 
briefed in, I was told there had been a shipment in 
September of 500 TOWs by the Israelies and that in November 
the NSC had arranged for — with Israel for the shipment 
of 18 Hawk missiles, but I — no great details. I never 
bothered reading anything on it. 

Q This is the conversation with Allen you were just 
referring to? 

A Allen, and also^^^^^^^^^H mentioned it to me 
when he briefed me in. 



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Q Can you recall anything else they might have 
said to you at that time about the November shipment? 

A Just that we played a role in using our 
proprietary to ship it in. An attempt by the Israeli^s 
to ship it viaj^H^^^^I had failed. 

But I was not interested in any details, anyway. 
That was past history. 



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Q I understand. But it occurs to me when you were 
being briefed into what is obviously a fairly complex and 
relatively sensitive covert program, that knowing something 
about the prior history is of considerable use. 
Would I be mistaken in that opinion? 

A Well, the agency's involvement was -- there was no 
agency involvement in the September shipment, and the only 
involvement we had in the November shipment, to my knowledge, 
anyway, is our proprietary was used. 

We were told we were shipping oil field equipment. 

Q Were you told that at the time? 

A At the time I was briefed? Yes, we were told. this 
was oil field equipment we were shipping in. 

Q Can you remember in any greater detail precisely 
what you were told on that subject when you were briefed 
in this, I guess, March of 1986? 

A The only thing I can recall being told is the 
first instance that we got involved was when we were asked 
by North to arrange for clearance for a flight that didn't 
go through. 

Then we were asked by North if we would supply 
a reliable airline to fly some cargo for humanitarian 
purposes. The cargo was described as being oil field 
equipment, and the problem evolved when the crew, after the 
stuff was loaded on the plane, took off, determined that it 



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wasn't oil field equipment they were carrying. 

They were — I think the crew thought it was 
artillery. 

Q Do you recall — 

A But that was about the end of my — the brief. 

Q You don't recall anything else that you were told 
about the prior negotiations? 

A On using our proprietary? 

Q More generally, about the nature of the shipments, 
who had been involved, stuff like that? 

A No. The only nSSBw that came out in it is this 
was a request by North that was made, I think, first to' 
Dewey Clarridge. I am not absolutely certain of that. 

Then it went up to the ADDO's office, and John 
McMahon got involved in it, and eventually they were given 
the name of the proprietary and we contacted the proprietary 
to expect to be contacted to haul a cargo to Tehran. 

But that is about the limit of my knowledge. 
Of course, the problem comes out here -- a lot 
comes out in the press afterwards. You have a hard time 
separating what you learn after reading the Tower Commission 
report from what you were briefed at the time. 

Q I know this is a subject that has been covered 
earlier today, but I do have a couple of additional 
questions about it. 



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Could you explain as precisely as you can why it 
was that Colonel North and whoever else might have 
accompanied him — you, for example — did not go to Tehran 
for preparatory meetings prior to the trip in May of 1986? 

A I think it was just simply because it was ruled 
out at a higher level. 

Q On what basis? 

A I honestly can't answer that. Too risky, I guess. 
I gather at the NSC there was a lot of concern about what 
might happen. The only word I got back on it from North is 
that we can't go. 

Q Were you aware that consideration had been given 
to alternative sites for the Tehran meetings? 

A Oh, yes. Kish Island was the first one. 

Q What is your understanding of why the United 
States agreed to hold the meetings in Tehran? 

A Because the Iranians claimed it was the only 
place they could reasonably hold them where they could have 
the security and where they can maintain the operational 
security and we wouldn't raise that much curiosity. 

They said Kish Island was impossible because the 
desalinization plant had broken down and the runway had not 
been used in years. 

We suggested as an alternative Bandar Abbass. 
They said we would stand out like sore thumbs and the only 



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logical alternative was for us to first come to Tehran. 

Q Were you aware that at least some of the American 
participants in these transactions regarded Kish Island 
as the preferred site for the meetings? 

A Yes. I preferred **e*»» 

A 

Q For security reasons? 

A Yes, I regard it as a preferred site. 



Q Did the justification given by the Iranians for 
not wanting to use Kish Island -- I don't want to characterize 
it, but at the same time, did it seem like a reasonable " 
justification or is it the case the United States simply 
acceded to their requests that these be held in Tehran despit« 
the risks? 

A I didn't think the justification was — had any 
merit that the Iranians gave us for moving the site. 
I thought it could have been done on Kish Island. They didn't. 
really raise much in the way of objections. We had every 
reason to believe that that runway was serviceable. 

But the decision was made to go ahead with their 
demands that we come to Tehran. 

Q Can you say specifically who made that decision? 

A No, I can't. 

Q In your view, based on what you know about the 
level of responsibility, could Colonel North have made that 



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type of decision? 

A I can't believe -- it would have had to go higher 
than him. 

Q As I understand it, when Mr. McFarlane arrived in 
Tehran -- let me back up and try one other sort o* related 
subject first. 

You said that it is your understanding that the 
reason that there was no preparatory meetings in Tehran 
itself was concern over the security risks that are 
entailed. 

Isn't it the case that the security risks from ■ 
having Robert Mc Farlane present at Tehran meetings are ■ 
infinitely greater than the risks entailed by having 
Colonel North attend such meetings in Tehran? 

A I thought so. I thought that we would have been 
better off had we gone — North and I had gone in first. 
But that is hindsight, as things developed. 

I was very amenable to going in first. I thought 
it was a good idea. Both Colonel North and I thought it 
was a good idea, but not many other people apparently 
thought it was a very good idea. 

Q How do you account for the willingness of the 
United States participants to take that level of risk? 

A I can only speak for myself on that. I weighed 
everything. I had a long talk with Casey about it. I said 



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from my knowledge of Iranians, and also from what I have 
learned and the fact that Ghorbanifar himself is taking a 
big risk and a big financial risk that I thought that the 
rec-1 risk to us while we were in Tehran was if it becomes 
public knowledge we are there and the radical faction decides 
to make something of it. 

But I thought that even then they would make every 
attempt to get us out. 

Q Were you aware that Colonel North has prepared 
three sets of press guidances with respect to this trip, 
and that they contemplated specifically the possibility 
that the party would become hostage to the Iranians? 

A I was aware that he was doing something along 
these lines, but not that he had made three specific press 
guidances. 

Q Are you aware of some reason why a private citizen 
other than Robert McFarlane could not have been adequately 
briefed and given responsibility for conducting the specific 
negotiations that he conducted and done equally well? 

A I was given to believe that McFarlane was the choice 
of the President. Whether that is accurate or not, I don't 
know. 

Q But are you aware of any reason — and I am 
asking sort of for an expert opinion here. You have a lot of 
background knowledge about Iran. Are you aware of any reason 



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why a capable private citizen could not have been adequately 
briefed and given responsibility for the conduct of these 
negotiations and done equally well at the job? 

A Well, that is highly speculative. I can't give 
you any specific reasons. 

Q I can be more specific in my question. 

Is there anything Mr. McFarlane knew about Iran 
or about these negotiations that someone else either 
didn't know or couldn't possibly have been told that made 
him indispensable? 

A I think part of the reason was since this was 
a highly secret initiative, McFarlane was aware of what . 
transpired up until the time he resigned his office on 
December 12. Therefore, he is an ideal candidate since he 
knows what has transpired up to that date. 

Q You were briefed in when you joined the operation, 
weren't you? 
■ A Yes. 

Q I assume that someone else could have been briefed 
in as well? 

A But you would have had to add another body thcit 
knew about it. 

Q Okay. 

So, again, not just to be — have the record be 
clear on this E>oint -- is it your view that someone else 



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could have done this job, some other private citizen? 

A Oh, I suppose there are any number of private 
citizens that could have done the job. 
Q Thank you. 

I think I can do this on the record. I want to 
address a question not just to you but to my colleagues. 
This may be one of the areas you have already covered. 
I don't want to go back over this. 

I wanted to ask about your specific understanding 
about the nature of the deal going into the Tehran trip 
in May 1986. 

I believe you have previously covered that? 

MR. EGGLESTON: It is my recollection I asked 
him about sort of on each of the trips what was the under- 
standing as of the end of that meeting, each of the 
meetings, what was your understanding as of that meeting, 
as of that meeting, as of that meeting. I may be wrong. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I think that is right. 

What you might want to do is if you have a specific 
question about perhaps an element of that deal as to 
whether Mr. Cave had an under S<randing, you might want to 
focus your question. He has given a general description 
of it. 

MR. EGGLESTON: I am not sure I was focused on 
any particular. I wanted to elicit an understanding of 



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each stage. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: 1 do have one specific question. 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q It is my understanding that you held some direct 
telephone conversations with Iranian officials prior to the 
Tehran meeting. I believe those conversations would have 
occurred some time in late April, that they were conducted 
from Europe in the presence of Mr. Nir, Mr. North, 
Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

A There was only one. That was the 7th of May. 
Q The 7th of May? 

A Yes, that is when we met in London. 
Q You already talked about that? 
MR. EGGLESTON: Yes. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I don't think I need to go over 
that ground. 

BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q During the Tehran meetings themselves — and again, 
this may be something that you have talked about, but 
I think r have a slightly different question to ask on 
this — it is my understanding that the Iranians made a 
series of proposals. 

Once it became clear that the original under- 
standing with the Iranians for one reason or another had not 
come about, l^^vina aside the gupstlQp of why that might 



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have occurred -- that is, the hostages had not been 
released -- it is my understanding the Iranians made a series 
of proposals to the United States with respect to how many 
hostages they might be able to release if the United States 
sent the rest of the spare parts and so on. Is that basically 
correct? 

A Yes. We went in there with the understanding, 
of course, that all four of our hostages were going to be 
released. 

It became quite apparent shortly after we arrived 
this wasn't going to be the case. They told us they could 
get two. They were negotiating for two. 

A great deal of these changes had to do with the 
time factor as they saw it. They needed more time. 

Finally, McFarlane gave them an ultimatum. They 
can have until tomorrow morning at 7:00. Otherwise, we 
are going to leave. 

■ Q Now, I guess what I am trying to get at is it 
sounds as though they made a series of offers to him which 
were turned down without any question about whether that was 
good, bad, or indifferent. 

The question I have is did he ever make them a 
counter offer? 

A What we had -- what we did, in a long, non-ending 
series of negotiations, agree to a seven-point program which 



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you have a copy of. And also as it became apparent they 
could only get two hostages, we focused on that. 

The main concession that McFarlane made is that 
okay, if you deliver the two hostages, we will send in the 
rest of the Hawk spares. 

They said okay. And then they went about trying 
to arrange — and late — the evening before — they went 
out to see if they could do this. Late in the evening the 
day before we left, or actually early in the morning, they 
asked for time to get two — the two hostages under their 
control and a guarantee from us that we would launch an 
aircraft with the rest of the Hawk spares within, you kiiow, 
so many hours after the hostages were released, wh;'.ch we 
agreed. 

Then McFarlane gave them until the following 
morning to obtain the release of the hostages. 

Q Again, this may be a subject that you have covered 
thi"s morning somewhat, but I wanted to ask you what were the 
precise circumstances surrounding the beginning of the second 
channel? Who approached whom? 

MR. EGGLESTON: There was, George. Extensive. 

MR. PEARLINE: That was extensively covered. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: Okay. No point in going back over 
all of that. 



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BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q I may have misheard something earlier but I 
wanted to ask this question. It's another factual question. 

On November 20, there were -- 1986 — there were 
a series of meetings at the White House, some of which you 
participated in. Were any Department of Justice officials 
present at any of those meetings? 
A No. 




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BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 




A Now we — I think that in the question of 
Ghorbanifar, you have to consider the way he develops his 
access to be able to accurately assess its value. 

Ghorbanifar does everything — he develops his 
access to people in the U.S. Government in the same way, 
to make money. 

This was my great concern about our making use of 
it in that we knew he had the access but he was never 
truthful. 

For instance, during the time that we had an 
operational relationship with him, he never told us anything 
about his association with the Israelils, which would have 
been nice to know. 

Another thing is during the whole business of his 
relationship with us on this Iranian initiative, he never 
told us anything about his direct personal relationship 
with Ayatollah Montazerli, who is Khomeini's heir apparent, 
which had a lot to do with the whole thing coming undone. 

So, when you want to suggest -- if you are look- 
ing -- is it better to do business with someone other than 
Ghorbanifar, yes, I think, kjiowiij^t^jtiat the Iranians were 



im 




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interested, we could probably developed as we eventually did 
better access to the people we wanted to deal with. 

If you go back to the record, Ghorbanifar spent 
an awful lot of time in all of our initial contacts trying 
to convince us this could be done through nobody but him when 
he knew this wasn't the case. 

Q I appreciate that you have a low estimate of 
Mr. Ghorbanifar ' s reliability. I think that is fairly well 
known by this time. 

But I was really trying to get at something 
different. That is what realistically were the alternatives 
available to the United States? 




[did you 

ever have a conversation with people at the agency where 
you sort of said, gee, you know, and then you described 
your personal opinion of Ghorbanifar, which is well known to 
be very low — don't we have alternatives? Don't you have 
better sources? 

A Yes, but the problem is that the agency was not 
picking the person to do this. This was an Israeli operation 
at the time. This did not become basically a U.S. operation 
until the fall of 1986. 

All the initiatives were taken by Israel and 
Ghorbanifar 







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Q You believe in competitive analysis, don't you? 

A In competitive analysis? 

Q Right. Just as a principle, you believe in 
competitive analysis, don't you? 

A Yes. 

Q So, if the United States had a way of going 
around Ghorbanifar to someone with equally good access to 
the Iranian hierarchy, isn't it reasonable to assume we would 
have done that? 

A You are asking me to speculate on something that 
is — 1 don't even think is germane to the whole question 
we are tracing. 

Q Well, I apologize, but I do think it is germane. 




I can tell you that I want to pursue this subject. 




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Ghorbanifar 's performance as an intelligence agency was • 
virtually nil. 

What he did feed us was highly inaccurate most of 
the time. So if you are judging him by the quality of the 
intelligence he produced, it is zilch. 




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:he decision had already beer 
made to use Ghorbanifar when I came on board. 

Q Let me just say as a layman, it looks to me as 
though the United States more or less made that decision 
because it had no alternative. 

In other words, I quite accept your suggestion 
that we were using him because Israel wanted us to, but it 
also seems to me if we had had any practical alternative 
we probably would have chosen it. 

After all, you put him on the burn list. Would that 
be a fair conclusion to draw from the course of events? 

A You are going to have to go higher up the line than 
me to get a conclusion to a question like that. I wasn't 
part of the decision making process. I was told to do what 
I could to make it work. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: Can we go off the record for a 
mijtute, please? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I have one more question for the 
record. 

BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 




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EXAMINATION BY MR. WOODCOCK ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Mr. Cave, just for the record, I am Tim Woodcock, 
representing the Senate Select Committee. 

I am here in my official capacity as an 
associate counsel on the committee, and pursuant to the 
mandate of the committee to pursue this matter within the 
parameters of the committee's fSfiP^^on, and accordingly. 



the committee's r^sp^Lic 



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this is an official inquiry of the committee. 

You might want to remind him that on this end of 
the deposition, which is also being taken in conjunction 
with the House, that the witness is still under oath. 

THE REPORTER: Vou are still under oath. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q I hope to be relatively brief. I have made 
marginal notes of questions here. There will be a certain 
probably logical lack of order to these. I am going to 
throw them out to you as I come across them. 




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end 
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Q In the Tower Commission report, there is a 
reference to the BTE saying that there was historical 
precedent for the sale of arms by Israel to Iran through 
the United States. 

Do you know what he was talking about there? 
This would be December of 1985. 

A I think he was probably referring to the 
embassy case. One of the big bugaboos on that was the r. 
Iranians insisting on the release of the embargoed arms 
which, depending on who we listened to, was anywhere from 




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Q Anyone comment on that? 

A No. The only reason I put that in my notes 
is because it was money and it was Ghorbanifar. 

Q And the combination made you suspicious? 

A Yes. 

Q Did Charlie Allen ever tell you that Ghorbanifar 
made a reference to the possible diversion of wmmmtfm from 



the profits of arms deals to Central America? 

A I don't recall anything at the time. I think 
that Charlie mentioned something after the fact. I think 
I recall him mentioning something, you know, Ghorbanifar 



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said something once to him that he hadn't paid much 
attention to. 

Q When you say "after the fact," you mean after 
this was all exposed? 

A After everything was all exposed. I don't 
remember him at the time he was seeing Ghorbanifar ever 
saying anything about diversion of funds. 

Q In the Ghorbanifar efforts to finance the 
transaction, did you ever become aware of his 



and Nir's approach to Tiny Rowland? 

A We becauDe aware of that when Tiny Rowland 
checked in with the American embassy in London. 

Q How did you become aware of that? 

A The State Department sent a cable. We saw a 
copy of it. 

Q You at the Agency saw a copy of it? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever raise this matter with either 
Nir or Ghorbanifar? 

A No. ,!-.«•' 

Q You recall Jtortft^r anyone else ever doing 
that? 

A No. Has Nir involved? 

Q Well, you don't know then whether Nir was 
yolva^in that; is that correct? 



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A I thought it was Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi 
that brought it up, Tiny Rowland. I don't recall whether 
Nir was -- could have been. I don't recall. 

Q Your knowledge, I gather, would then derive 
from the cable and wouldn't go beyond that; is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q In your association with Ghorbanifar on this -- 
on these negotiations, was there any involvement of the 
hostage location task force? 

A In what way? 

Q Well, that's what I eun asking you. In any 
way? 

A Well, there was always a great deal of 
interest in trying to locate where the hostages were ^^^| 




So the hostage location force was very much 
involved in this, in the location aspect of 




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IttfiUSSIEEBT 

A But by and large, the hostage location foi 



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Q You testified that when you were brought on in 
early March, you had a meeting with ^^^^^^^^^Hand then a 
meeting with Charles Allen and a meeting with North all on 
the same day. 

A Yes. 




Q You said at one point that Nir kept a tight 
reifn, and I am quoting you, "tight rei4n" on Ghorbanifar. 
What did you mean by that? j 

A Well, it was my impression from the dealings with 
North and Ghorbanifar, that Nir tried to keep Ghorbanifar 



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under a very tight reign. For instance, when we met in 
Frankfurt in July, whether it was the 25th or 26th, we 
talked to Nir first. Then he arranged for Ghorbanifar to 
be brought in and talk to us. 

Q Do I gather from what you are saying that what 
Nir was trying to do was to protect Ghorbanifar from you 
as an asset of the Israelis? 

A I don't think so. I think what his concern was 
was that he had an awful lot riding on this person and also 
the Israelis politically. He wanted to make sure he was 
aware of everything that was going on. 

Q He wanted to make sure he wasn't cut out? 
A He was always keeping contact with Ghorbanifar 
and everything Ghorbanifar was doing. 

Q Were you aware that the Israelis were providing 
some assistance to Ghorbanifar during his period of 
financial difficulties? 

A I assumed that. 
Q You didn't know that? 

A But — we assumed"that -•fC/^nvolved in it but 
we didn't have any -- the only factual thing we had is that 
Nir was extremely interested in Ghorbanifar getting paid 
and that after the meeting with Furmark, when you had the 
two million bucks earmarked for Nir, we couldn't figure 
out what that was for. 



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You didn't learn that from Charlie Allen? 

That — 

That the Israelis were helping Ghorbanifar 



233 



financially? 

A That was Charlie's speculation from everything he 
could get. He used to talk on the phone to both Nir and 
Ghorbanifar. He shared that with me. A lot of us felt 
that — we came to feel that Nir was providing a lot of 
assistance to Ghorbanifar. 

Q Did Charlie Allen tell you that he was taping some 
of these conversations with Nir and Ghorbanifar, the 
telephone conversations? 

A With Ghorbanifar. Not that I knew with Nir. I 
knew he taped -- he taped — he had a tape recorder in his 
office for taping conversations with Nir. Not with Nir, but 
with Ghorbanifar. Excuse me. 

Q Do you know whether he would do that invariably 
or most of the time? 

A I think he tried to tape all the conversations 
with Ghorbanifar. 

Q Do you know why he did that? Did he explain that 
to you? 

A To make sure that he got everything. Much the 
same reason that I taped the conversations with 

that I could do the translation and give it to 




: I could do the translat 



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MISSffS 



234 



Colonel North. 



Q Did you ever listen to any of these tapes that 
Charlie Allen made of Ghorbanifar? 

A No. 

Q Do you know whether Albert Hakim was ever a CIA 
assetl 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^H but I don't think you could ever 
call him — on him, but I don't think you could ever call 
him a formal asset. 

Q An informal source of information? 

A I don't think so. 





Q Your understanding of the financing of the May 
HAWK transaction, did you understand that with respect 
to the parts that were available that the United States 
was placing any kind of a cap on the monies that — 
or the point up to which the value of those parts could 
reach? 

A No. What we did is checked with the military, 
the logistics command on the availability of parts. They 
gave us a printout on everything that was available and how 
much they could afford to take out of inventory for us. 



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Q When you say we, you mean the CIA collectively? 

A The CIA could take out of their inventory, how 
much they could afford to let out of the inventory. 

Q But I gather you yourself didn't have any under- 
standing that if the Army came up with a figure in excess 
of, say, $4.4 million, that the Agency would be saying 
you can't go above that? 

A No. 

Q Let me back up and rephrase the question. Did 
you -- that wasn't a very good effort, was it? 

You, I gather, were not involved in the logistical 
end to any great degree in the May deal, is that right J 

A No. Just to make sure everything was moving along 
all right. Because I had — I wanted to make sure 
everything went smoothly. I followed what was going on. 
But I didn't do the nuts and bolts, no. 

Q Who was handling it that you knew of? 

A That shipment would have beei 

Q And^^^^^^^^^H would have dealt with logistics 
people at CIA? 

A Yes. A couple of times when he was busy, I would 
do it for him. 

Q Did^^^^^^^^^Hhave any involvement in that? 

A I think^^^^^^^^Hwa s the guy that gave the 
figures to Ollie North on what it was going to cost. 



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Q When you got the HAWK list from Ghorbanifar in 
Paris, did you yourself bring that back to Washington? 

A Yes. I think I myself carried it back. 

Q Who did you give that to? 

A When we brought it back, we — I discussed it with 
We got someone designated by the 
Office of Logistics to then take the list and find out the 
availability of the parts on the list. 

Q You have also testified that by the time you got 
to Tehran, Ghorbanifar is telling you that the total figure 
for this deal is $24.5 million? 

A That was in Tehran. 

Q That was in Tehran? 

A Right. 

Q Did you have any understanding as to whether that 
figure in Ghorbanifar 's description of it reached only the 
HAWK parts that you had already identified were available? 

A He said it was other charges involved in that, 
not just the HAWKs. 

Q Okay. Let me ask you this: When you came to 
Tehran, you had a pallet of parts with you; is that right? 

A That is correct - 

Q And you also had HAWK parts waiting in Israel 
in the event that your negotiations were successful; is 



that right? 



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A That is correct. 

Q However, the sum total of those parts did not 
encompass all the things the Iranians had requested? 

A No. There were several items that were no longer 
manufactured and there were several items on which we did 
not have the number on the shelf that they requested. 

Q Now did you understand that of some of those items 
that either were not in Israel or were not on your pallet 
in Iran, that they might become available in the future? 

A Yes. We had an idea. Some of them, the 
manufacturing process was very low. We would have had 
to speed it up to get them. 

Q Let me ask you, the $24.5 million figure, did you 
have any understanding that that might also encompass 
parts yet to come? 

A Oh, no. 

Q So your understanding was — 

A Not that I knew of, no. 

Q So your understanding of that was that that 
covered the parts waiting in Israel and the parts you 
brought with you and no other parts; is that right? 

A On that ship^^But Ghorbanifar told me this is 
what they owe me. They are going to ask you what the cost 
is and there are other things involved in this that you 
don't know about. Tell them that that is the right 



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figure. That is when I immediately went to North and 
asked him what the hell was going on. 

Q Just to make it clear, was it your understanding 
when Ghorbanifar brought the $24.5 million figure to you, 
that that covered only the parts in Israel and the parts 
on your pallet in Tehran and no other parts? 

A That was my -- except I don't know about the 
508 TOWs. Someone paid for those. 

Q Putting the 508 TOWs aside, limiting this to HAWK 
parts. Your understanding was it is just the pallet in 
Israel and the parts — 

A The parts in Israel and the pallet we brought, in. 

Q You didn't question Ghorbanifar or anybody else 
further on that, did you? 

A No. What we did is when I talked to Colonel 
North about it and asked him what the hell was going 
on, he immediately called Nir and Nir told us there were a 
lot- of expenses involved that had to be included in this 
figure, and also there were other monies owed to Ghorbanifar 
by the Iranians that were also included. 

In fact, he went into a long explanation, a great 
deal of which I didn't understand. 

Q Did North understand it? 

A I don't think so. 

Q In your testimony, you said that when you found 



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out how high — the high figure that was being suggested 
for the HAWK parts -- and this is even before you arrived 
at Tehran, you had an idea that a high figure was being 
discussed — that you mentioned it to^^^^^H^Hand he 
agreed that it was too high a figure; is that right? 

A Yes. I mentioned to him that — but when we 
discussed it, it is that when 




Q However, you then get to Tehran and the figure 
is high. 

A Higher. " 

Q Higher. Even higher. Do you recall this figure 
which had the possibility of disturbing the whole negotiatio 
being pursued by North to resolve it? 

A Only that one conversation we had with Nir. 

Q How about following Tehran? Do you recall having 
any discussions with North about resolving this matter when 



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you are talking to ^^^^^^Hs till complaining? 

A Yes. I tSalked to -- we had a lot of 
discussions about the pricing, hoping that it wasn't 
going to upset the whole apple cart. 

Q Did North have any idea what the United States 
might be able to do to bring some relief to the pricing 
problem? 

A Well, there were several things. One of the 
things was when I talked to ^^^^^^^^lt|M9isted he haggle 
with Ghorbanifar over the pricing. That is when he came 
down $6 million. Also, we were looking at ways and means 
that we could at least help to cover part of the large cost 
in price by saying, you know — by producing -- we were 

Lng of producing a document which showed that FMS 
sales are -- I think it was 2.7 times the figure given on 
those microfiches. We never did it. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Did you ever produce a document 
to show back to them to justify the prices? 

THE WITNESS: The only thing we did was we produced 
a letter that we showed ^°H^^^^^B^° give — how 
prices are arrived at, which was actually fairly accurate. 
In other words, the price that we got — the >pnF<^ things 
about it is the price we got those TOWs at was much less 
than the Israelis pay for TOWs. On the thousand TOWs Nir 
complained about the cost when we sold them. 



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^11 1 MR. EGGLESTON: Because it was too low? 

2 THE WITNESS: Because it was too low. Yes. 

3 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

4 Q When you first became aware that Richard Secoird 

5 was involved, did you have — or were you aware that he - 

6 had been considered at one time to be associated with 

7 Edwin Wilson? 

8 A Yes, I heard about that, but I didn't know 

9 any of the details about it. 

10 Q Did that cause you any concern? 

11 A Well, I was a little bit concerned about that. 

12 Secord also is I guess what you would call a "can-do" 

13 guy- That appealed to North. North absolutely believed 

14 in him. 

15 Q I just want to clarify this point for the record. 

16 When you arrived in Tehran, or when you were flying to 

17 Tehran, did you actually physically land in Bandar Abbass? 

18 A No. It was nonstop from Tel Aviv to Tehran. 

19 Q Just to clarify the record, or perhaps my own 

20 understanding, when you met with Roy Furmark for the first 

21 time, I gather from what you said he suggested yet another 

22 TOW transaction to clear up the financial problem; is 

23 that right? 

24 A He said if we would permit Ghorbanifar to sell 

25 another thousand TOWs that would get him out of the hole 



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and solve the whole problem. 

Q Did you happen to discuss with Furmark how he or 
Khashoggi came to be associated with Ghorbanifar? 

A No. Our brief from the Director was to listen and 
ask as few questions as possible. So -- in other words, we 
took the position we didn't know beans from batshit about 
this thing. 

Q So I gather Mr. Furmark didn't volunteer the 
origins of his relationship with Ghorbanifar? 

A He spoke very highly of Ghorbanifar and, of 
course, he spoke extremely highly of Khashoggi, the salt of 
the earth, great man, all that stuff. 

Q Let me show you what has been — or bears the 
identification number CIIN 1027 and ask you if you have 
ever seen that? 

A X don't think I ever saw this. But I know for a 
fact that Khashoggi is able to get end user certificates 
f ron^^^^ 

Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about that. 
This is a cable dated February 4, 1986 and it — 

A I never saw that. 




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inl3 1 

2 A I ^would liJc*"to have seen that. That is the first 

3 time I have seen that cable. 
^ Q How is it that that kind of information doesn't 

5 automatically make its way over to someone in your 

6 position? 

7 A Oh, a lot of stuff — see, the problem is I am 

8 not there every day. No one says hey, George ought to 

9 see this. I don't see it, 

10 Q Do you know whether^^^^^^^^^| or Charlie Allen 

11 are aware of that? 

12 A Also, at that time I was not briefed in on the 

13 operation. 

14 Q You would have come in approximately a month 

15 later? 

16 A A month later. 

17 Q Do you know if Charlie Allen or! 

18 aware of that? 

19 A They never mentioned it to me. 

20 Q Vou testified earlier that in your collective 

21 efforts to come up with an explanation for the large price 

22 ^°^^^^^^^H ^'^ explanation that he might believe, it was 

23 suggested that perhaps it could be — the low price 

24 on the list could be explained as the cost to the manu- 

25 facturer. 



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A I think that is what it is. It is the 
manufacturing costs. That is what those microfiche 
lists are. 

Q Do you recall where you get that information? 
Who it was who told you that? 

A I think our logistics people told us that. 

Q Do you recall discussing that as a rationale with 
anyone to run byl 

A No. I think that the only thing that we — we 
never did anything really but we were thinking North 
had the idea of printing up to date microfiches that had 
the prices higher. 

Q North did? 

A But we — we were thinking of printing something 
£or^^|^^^|which we never did either that would show that 
you can't base the pricing on what is on those microfiches. 
Actually, you can't. 

Q You also testified that you received a call at • 
your home at one point from^^^^^H is that right? 

A Yes. He was trying to call at the office and 
Charlie Allen gave him my home phone number. 

Q Charlie Allen can't speak Farsi, can he? 

A No. 

Q Do you know how he was able to transmit this 

information? 



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\15 1 A He was able to get the number, you know. I 

2 thin)(^^^^^^^|had someone in the office that spoke a 

3 little bit of English. Charlie got the number across 

4 to him. 

5 Q Did you ever get involved wit! 

6 discussions to release the hostages in July or release a 

7 hostage in July? 

8 A Well, all that time, we were — you know, we were 

9 saying that we would not -- to ^^^^^^^b that we would not 

10 send in the rest of their — of the HAWK spares until 

11 the hostage is released or something, or if we could 

12 meet. We would do according to the 7 point proposal that we 

13 left behind in Tehran. I consistently took that line 

14 with him. 

15 Q Was it you who suggested at one point that one 

16 hostage would be enough? 

17 A That came about — I didn't make that 

18 suggestion, no. I can't recall precisely who did, but it 

19 came about as a result of our talks with Nir on the 20th 

20 of July, in which he said they could get another hostage 

21 out. And then the decision was made to go ahead. 

22 Q So your recollection is that to the extent 

23 somebody suggested that maybe one hostage would be enough, 

24 that Nir was the source of that? 

25 A I think that was based on Nir's proposal to us 



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in London that one could be gotten out if we sent in the 
rest of the HAWK spares. I am pretty sure that is the way 
it went. Then it was discussed when we got back to 
Washington. 

Q Did you ever have a conversation withi 
where you represented that one hostage would be enough 
was the position of the President? 

A I don't think so. I can't recall saying that 
specifically. 

Q Charlie Allen entered a period in July where he 
spoke to Nir in lieu of Colonel North. Did he share any 
of those conversations with you? 

A Some of them when I was around. I wasn't around 
a lot of time. 

Q Werek'ou aware that Allen had taken over from 
North but North had cut Nir off for a period of time? 

A I wasn't specifically aware that he had cut him 
off. I think what happened is that North wanted Charlie to 
talk to Nir rather than have Nir talk to him. 

Q Rather than Nir talking to North? 

A Since Nir could put more pressure on North than 
he could on Charlie. 

Q Another thing I want to clarify for the record. 
When you have the second channel out to Hakim's office, 
we know that Hakim was in the building. Was he in the 



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room when the discussions were going on? 

A Not on the substantive discussions. 

Q As the second channel developed, did you 
have any trouble conveying to Nir that he was now entering 
into a subordinate stage? 

A A decision was made to keep Nir briefed about the 
second channel. One of the surprising things to me was tha 
after we returned from Tehran, Nir was still very high on 
Ghorbanifar despite what ensued in Tehran, that he had 
been lying to both sides. Nir sort of let that go by the 
boards as being Iranian business practice. I tried to 
argue that it is not quite that way. 

So he was still very high on Ghorbanifar, but 
we told him we were going to develop a second channel and 
actually briefed him on it after it happened. Not in 
very great detail, incidentally 




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Q Let me direct your attention to a reference in the 
Tower Report which refers to a deposit occuring on September 
26, 1986 of $7 million from Iran into Lake Resources. That 
has atootnote reference which reads as follows: "There is 
some discrepancy surrounding these dates. The September 26, 
1986 date is contained in a PROF note from North to 
Poindexter which also contains the $7 million figure. The 
CIA I/G report, relying on George Cave, states that! 

brought a check for $4 million with him to the 
late October meetings in Frankfurt." 

Actually that was mine. Do you have any 
explanation for that discrepancy? 

A I can|t understand what the hell the $7 million 
would have been for. 

Q Your understanding is that $4 million would have 
been sufficient to cover the transaction? 

A Yes. I suppose so. Because right after he -- 
he called up his man and gave him the check and two days 
later, we had the $2 million odd dollars in our account. 

Q Did you physically see this check? 

A No. I never saw it. He just said he had it. 

Q It wasn't produced for you? 

A It wasn't produced for me. 



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ml9 1 Q But your understanding was as far as the CIA 

2 financial office was concerned, the S2 million came in shortl 

3 after the check was produced? 

4 A Yes. I think we got it on the 28th. I think it 

5 was deposited in our account. 

6 Q When you get with the DCI on the Furmark meeting 

7 or the subject of Furmark, did he bring up any question 

8 about the possible diversion of monies? 

9 A No. His great concern at the meeting was this — 

10 the going public with the whole operation through the 

11 filing of the suit. 

12 And the fact that the principals were going to 

13 also contact Congress. 

14 Q Did Charlie Allen ever raise his suspicions 

15 about the possible diversion of money? 

16 A Well, we all had suspicions that there was 

17 something wrong, but there was so much there to be 

18 suspicious of. As I told you before, my main suspicion 

19 was the fact that Khashoggi and Ghorbanifar were trying to 

20 raise as much cash as possible because of being stung in 

21 the April 22 sting operation. Obviously the Swiss banks 

22 were worried about the saune thing. 

23 Q Why, because of the life insurance policy? 

24 A No. What the Swiss banks can do, they can arrest 

25 y°^ ^"'^ hold you until you make good on your obligations. 



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That is obviously what they did with Ghorbanifar. He 
denies that he was arrested, I gather. 

Q I think he has made that a matter of record. Were 
you aware that Ghorbanifar was complaining sometime in early 
April about his California girlJf riend' s apartment having 
been broken into? 

A Yes. He mentioned that at the meetings. 

Q Ghorbanifar himself did? 

A Yes. When he was here in April. 

Q Did he also mention that or complain about 
Roy Furmark's office having been broken into? 

A Not to me. 

Q Do you remember — this would have been -- 

A I never heard of Furmark until shortly before I 
met him. 

Q I am going to read this selectively to you 
and see if it brings anything back to you. Again this 
is -the Tower Commission report. It reads, as a footnote, 

"In a series of telephone conversations with Ghorbanifar 

I 

and Nir, March 24 to April 2nd, Charles Allen learned that 
Ghorbanifar was under pressure in Tehran; that he was passing 
through a difficult period financially, but that the 
Israelis were helping him." 

Is that information he conveyed to you at the time? 
A Yes, I think he did. 



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irk part of it. But y^ 
jreaking in of his girl* 



^21 '' Q The quote goes on, "An NSC consultant reported to 

2 Allen that Ghorbanifar was upset in part because his 

3 California girlif riend ' s house had been entered, as had 

4 Furmark's office in New York. Ghorbanifar blamed the CIA.' 

5 Do you recall that? 

6 A I don't recall the Furmaj 

7 Ghorbanifar comp^tJined about the br 

8 friend's apartment when he was here. I never met the 

9 girl/friend either. 

10 Q You testified that you recognized the reference 

11 earlier in this deposition to the Erria and then later said 

12 you weren't sure that at the time you knew the name of ■ft^e 

13 boat;' is'^at ^^t? 

14 A Yes. In fact, I thought it was something else. 

15 When it came up, when they made the offer of the tank, 

16 that is the first time I ever was aware that there was a 

17 boat involved, because Ollie discussed this that we could -- 

18 they had this boat that was in the Mediterrfmean and they 

19 could have it — change its sailing orders and go to 

20 Bandar Abbass to take on the tank. Which it did. 

21 Q Do you now believe that boat to have been the 

22 Erria? 

23 A Yes. This comes out from subsequent press 

24 coverage. I didn't at the time know the name. 

25 Q In your negotiations with the second channel. 



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were Israeli prisoners ever on the negotiating table as 
being possible subjects of release? 

A Yes. 

Q How did that happen? 

A I think in the initial — it came up because 
we were also talking about the 300 sJrtSnthat were being 
held by the Israelis. 

Q Would that have required more negotiating than 
just with Iran? 

A I don't think so. We asked the Iranians if they 
thought it possible. I guess it was one of the Israelis 
that was killed, but one of them was still alive. It was 
a pilot that came in later. We talked — we talked -- I 
think we only talked about it on one occasion. They kind 
of screwed up their eyes, but said they would look into 
the possibilities because we said that any -- as I recall, 
any release of the 300 being held would certainly be 
contingent on Israelis being released and probably 
some kind of guarantee. 




Q There was a point, I gather, that you made an 
attempt to bring your concerns to Colonel North about 



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m23 1 Ghorbanif ar; is that right? 

2 A Yes, 

3 Q But that was kind of an effort cut short; is that 

4 right? 

5 A Well, as I was mentioning to George, there 

6 is -- there were a lot of countervailing views about 

7 Ghorbanifar and people changed their opinion of him. I 

8 think that the biggest thing he had going for him was the 

9 fact that he had played a role in securing the release 

10 of both Weir and Jencf o . In other words, Ollie likes people 

11 that are successful in doing things. 

12 Q But I was asking a somewhat different question. 

13 You had reservations about Ghorbanifar? 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q That go long back in your career? 

16 A Yes. ' 

17 Q Did you attempt to bring those to North's 

18 attention? 

19 A I did. 

20 Q Did he react to that at all? 

21 A Yes. His reaction is that what you say maybe is 

22 true, but he has demonstrated that he can produce, because 

23 he produced Weir. That was the initial, when I first 

24 started. 

25 Q Did you ever bring Ghorbanifar back to North when 



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the finances began to go awry as proof of your 
opinion of Ghorbanifar? 

A Yes. And also I thought that his performance in 
Tehran had been such that we should be extremely chary 
of him and made my views clear there. And the Iranians 
told us flat out in Iran that they didn't trust him. 

Q Did you have any dealings with anybody in the 
State Department in these transactions? 

A Not specifically with this. The only time it 
came up is I had a meeting — I think it was! 
I don't know if Clair George was there or not. We went 
over before the last trip to Geneva, that is the 8th through 




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Q Did you have any dealings with anybody in the 
Department of Defense? 
A I didn't, no. 

Q Do you know whether other than logistically or 
in — 

A ^^^^^^^^^H dealt with, what was his ncune, 
Jamie Rizzo? I forget his name. He was the head of 
logistics. 

MR. EGGLESTON: There was a Russo. 
THE WITNESS: Russo. That's it. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q You already testified to the possibility of 
danger in your trip to Tehran. Did you have any plans 
i.n the event that you were seized and held captive? 
Run ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^BI There 
weren't many places you could go from the 15th 
floor of the Hilton Hotel. 

Q Are you a subscriber to the Big Sting Theory? 
A No. I think the Big Sting Theory was developed 
by the Iranians to protect the participants. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: For the record, I assume you are 
referring to an article that appeared two weeks ago? 

MR. WOODCOCK: That is right. That is a 
capital B and a capital S and probably a capital T. 






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THE WITNESS: The Iranian comments on this are 
so typically Iranian, The most interesting aspect is that 
Khomeini has never really condemned the initiative. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: Somebody may have asked you this 
question, but what is your view about what Khomeini knew 
about the Tehran trip at the time it took place? 

THE WITNESS: I am certain he did not know we 
were there. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: He did not know? Before, during 
or after? 

THE WITNESS: Not until sometime after. I 
place it as sometime in August-September. Andl 

[told us that he didn't know about it also. 

I was certain because that is -- and I was sure that that 

^/ 

is why we didn't see anyone becaus'no senior Iranian would 

take the political risk of doing it unless they had the 
blessing of Khomeini. Since no one showed up -- the best 
that we can put it together is that^^|^^^Hbroached it . 
to him sometime in late August or early September. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q In your meeting in Tehran, was the Iranian 
assistance to Nicaragua ever on the table? 

A Yes. 

Q That was their assistance both in terms of oil 



and arms? 



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A Yes. They denied it. 

Q They denied they were doing it? 

A Yes. We volunteered to provide them proof. 

Q Did they take you up on that? 

A Yes. But we — where is it? Well, we didn't 
bring it with us. Part of the problem you have as I 
explained before is when I was translating, you know it's 
very difficult when you translate to remember what the hell 
it was that you said. 

Q When McFarlane made it plain that he was going 
to leave unless the -- his conditions were met, I gather 
from your testimony the Iranians asked for some additional 
time; is that right? 

A Yes. There was a lot of different — when they 
saw — North and me stayed behind, and they'll get them. 
He said no, we are all going to leave together. There 
was a little bravado in that. At the time we made the 
announcement, we still had a plane with no fuel in it. 

Q But the Iranians asked for more time and I gather 
McFarlane gave them a certain amount of additional time; 
is that right? 

A This was the night before we left. He gave them 
until the following morning, 

Q Did he leave before that time expired? 

A No. We left sometime after. Even going out 



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19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



to the plane, the Iranians were begging us to stay. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Let's go off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Mr. Cave, I have no more questions. I did want 
to go back on the record to express my appreciation for 
your patience and for your forthrightness. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Thank you. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: Thank you very much, Mr. Cave. 

(Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the deposition of 
George W. Cave was adjourned.) 



]M£U£SMa. 



822 



823 



mmim 



q\^|2'^ 




TAPE ONE (Sides 1 and 2) - TWC/nsd 

' 1 UNITED STATES SENATE 

2 SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

3 ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 
4 

5 DEPOSITION OF GEORGE CAVE 

6 
7 

8 Present: George Cave, Deponent 

9 Timothy Woodcock, Senate Iran/Contra Committee 

10 Jaclc Taylor, House Iran/Contra Committee 

11 David Pearline, CIA — Office of Congressional 

12 Affairs 

13 Paige Moffat, Office of General Counsel 
14 

15 Cave ("C") 

16 Woodcock ("W.") 

17 Taylor ("T.") 

18 Pearline ("P.") 

19 Moffat ("M.") 
20 

21 

22 Let me state for the record my name is Timothy 

2 3 Woodcock. I am an Associate Counsel with the Senate Select 

24 Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 

25 Nicaraguan Opposition. Participating from the House is Jack 

26 Taylor, representing the House Iran/Contra Committee. George 

27 Cave is present as the deponent. David Pearline is representing 

28 the Office of Congressional Affairs/at CIA. Paige Moffat is here 

29 representing the Office of Gener^ Counsel. 

30 Mr. Cave, before we begin, let me make it clear that 

31 this is a statement that we will be taking from you pursuant to 

32 the authority of the Senate Select Committee. The information 

3 3 that you give us will likely be used in the furtherance of the 

34 Committee's investigation under its resolution. Do you 

35 understand that? PwtmyOeciassitwjmeleasedon.ilJ.liiy'SS 

unde< provisions o( E 12356 

36 CAVE: Yes I do. by K Jonnson Nanonil Stcurily Council 

37 WOODCOCK: Thank you. 

:>pics 



UNCLASSIFIED 



824 



Kussife 



1 EXAMINATION OP GEORGE CAVE BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

2 w. Mr. Cava, l«t m« cover soma of th« aarly ground h«r« 

3 with you when you first became involved in the Iran initiative. 

A Mr. Cave, we have come across entries that Col. North made before 

5 and after the meeting in Frankfurt, Germany in February of 1986, 

6 stating that he was forced to use Albert Hakim as a Farsi 

7 interpreter because the CIA could not produce a Farsi speaking 

8 interpreter. For the record, could you state whether you would 

9 have been available to petform the task at that time. This is 

10 February 2S-26, 1986. 

11 C. As far as I know I could have been made available.' in 

12 fact — I was in Europe at the time of that meeting. Either I 

13 was — I was either — I was in Europe immediately — either 

14 immediately preceding or during it, because I returned to the 
United States the February .^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

l6^^^^^^^^^^^^^|m But, presumably could have been made 

17 available to translate for that meeting. 

18 w. And I take it from your answer that you were not asked 

19 to participate, is that correct? 

20 C. That's correct. I knew nothing about this initiative 

21 until the Stb of March. 

22 w. Thank you Mr. Cave. Let me turn to the early days of 

23 your involvement in this initiative. I believe you have 

24 previously testified that your first meeting with Mr. 

25 Ghorbanifar, in what you then understood to be the Iran 

26 initiative was in Paris in March of 1906, is that correct? 



»'^?r,iASSife 



825 



mussLJ 



1 C. That's correct. That's corract. 

2 w. Bafora you want to tha maatlng in Paris, Z ballava you . . 

3 hava alraady tastlflad that you wara brlafad by both^^^^^^^H 

4 who althar was alraady Chlaf NE, or about to bacoma Chlaf NE, and 

5 Charlas Allan. I* that corract? ^y-x^ 

6 C. I was brlafad by bothH^HH|||m and I mat Col. 

7 North, I think, tha aftarnoon of tha day wa laft. I think I met, 

8 as Z racall, Z also mat Charlas Allan, but did not gat much of a 

9 brlaflng from him at that tima. Zt was only latar, aftar I got 

That's whan Z ovar tha old [ ? ] ^^^^^^^^^^H 

11 ^H|^^P|[lntalllganca. 

12 w. Tou want ovar that with Charlas Allan? 

13 C. Aftar Z raturnad from tha first maatlng in Paris. 

14 Air^f^- *<"f' Cava, Z'd Ilka you to racall tha maatlng wlthj 



15 ^^^^^H and Z'm raally asking somathing specific. As Z recall, 

16 whan Z Intarviawad you, along with many other Congressional 

17 representatives, back in March of this year, YQuj;elatad that 

18 whan you wara brlafad on tha inltiatlva by^^HJH^Byou 

19 recommended to him that no — Z think tha phrase you used was "no 

20 serving officer should participate in this initiative." First, 

21 is that corract, and second could you expand on that idea? 

22 C. Aftar I heard about tha initiative Z. Z recommended to 
23HIJHI[^^Band I think also to Clair George, that the 

24 participation in tha operation by serving officers should be as 

25 limited as possible in that it was quite apparent to me if this 

26 operation ever blew, you know, careers would be In Jeopardy. And 

3 



mmim 



826 



wussra 



1 sine* I was an annuitant, it didn't matter. ^ yv I ^ 

2 W. Mh«n you mad* this remark to^^^^^^HHand Mr. 

3 George, what was their reaction to it? 

4 C. Well, they agreed that, you know, that this was a high- 

5 risk operation. And I think every attempt was made to keep the 

6 knowledgeability of the operation to as few a people as possible. 

7 w. In order not to imperil as many, or in order to imperil 
6 as few careers as possible? ^^ 

9 C. Partially that, but I think also that the security of 

10 operations is a great concern to us. 

11 w. Well, for those two reasons. Is that a fair statement? 

12 C. I think that's a fair statement. I, I mean we had to 

13 involv-i people in it as it progressed. But, I mean, there was a 

14 conscious attempt not to unduly involve officers, serving 

15 officers, in the operation. 

16 w. There is a statement in the Tower Report, and I don't 

17 know whether you are familiar with it. It's a footnote. It 

18 comes from the testimony of Clair George where he states, and I'm 

19 going to paraphrase him, that 'George Cave joined the initiative, 

20 and somewhere along the line, became a player." Do you agree 

21 with that characterization? 

22 C. Well, I, I'm not sure. It's obvious that statement was 

23 taken out of context, and I'm not really sure what Clair's Intent _. 

24 was. Because everything I did, I reported back ^°^^^H^H|E. 

25 I naturally became a player in the initiative because I got more 

26 and more involved in it. And though I think Col. North relied 



BUSSSatD 



827 



lIHCmSuO 



1 more and more on m* as It went on, because of my understanding of 

2 Iranians. But, I certainly psported everything that I did back 

3 to, back both to^H|H|ff and in many cases directly to 

4 D i re ctor Case y , 
5 
6 
7 




Bl^SSIflB 



828 



UNtlASSIFiEO 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 




w. L«t iM aak you another question on th« February TOW 
deal. NOW, understanding that you came on the scene after this 
deal had been completed, you nonetheless had an opportunity to 
speak to many of the participants in that transaction. Secord, 
Hakim, North, Ghorbanifar,H|^^Hat one time or another. ■ 



ilHSUSSffl 



829 



uNCUissra 



1 ^^^^H in his tastifflony b«for« th« Towar Board •xpc«ss«d th« 

2 opinion that ha baliavad that tha lOOO tons of Pabruary wara 

3 supposed to, by thamsalvas, spring a hostaga. I thlnJc 

4 Ghorbanlfar and othars hava takan tha position that tha 1000 TOWs 

5 was a good faith makaup for tha abortlva HAWK shlpmant of 

6 Novembar of 1985. Did any of tha paopla that you participated 

7 with axprass an opinion on what was supposed to hava been 

8 achieved by the February TOWs? L^/ai^ 

9 C. If my understanding was the same asim^^that this was 

supposed to cause a hostaga to be released. 

1 w. Do you recall where you gat that understanding? 

2 C. Z think it was f ron^m as best I can recall, because 

3 I remember after Z was briefed, Z think ha told ma that he — we 

4 had expected a hostage to be released, but now we are going — 

5 you know the meeting with Ghorbanlfar will ba an attempt to sort 

6 out some of this and see what tha Iranian position is. 

7 w. Are you referring to tha March meeting with 

8 Ghorbanlfar? 

9 C. March meeting with Ghorbanlfar, yes. 

20 w. Did tha — cjmc 

1 C. Z recall, I recall before we went thatj^^said that we 

2 had expected tha 1000 TOWs to result in a hostage being released. 

3 w. Did tha subject coma up in Paris as to why a hostaga 

4 had not been released? 

5 C. I'm trying to recall exactly what was said with regard 
26 to that. Z think that tha way Ghorbanlfar explained it in Paris 



' ONCL^SSiFIED 



830 



UNCUSSIFIED 



1 went along these lines: that the Iranians were now convinced by 

2 the TOW, the TOW shipment, excuse me, the TOW shipment that we 

3 had good intentions, and that they were now prepared to meet with 

4 us and discuss the future of the strategic initiative between the 

5 two countries, and it also — in that meeting he proposed that 

6 we'll sell them the HAWK spares, to sort of cement the deal. And 

7 that's when he turned over the list of 240 line items. But 

8 that's about how it went. I mean, we had, the, the 1000 TOWs had 

9 established the U.S.'s good intentions, and the Iranians were now 

10 prepared to respond, and he had preliminary agreement to a 

11 meeting in Iran between senior U.S. officials and senior Iranian 

12 officials. 

13 w. Now, you were, at this point, a Johnny-come-lately to 

14 the negotiations, so I gather you were not some much an active 

15 participant in Paris as you were an observer. Is that fair to 

16 say? 

17 C. That's fair to say. 

18 w. what was — Col. North himself was present when 

19 Ghorbanifar was making these remarks I would gather, is that 

20 correct? 

21 C. That's correct. The way the meeting was structured is 

22 that we went immediately from the airport to the hotel, end we met 

23 initially with Amiram Nir, and then he went out and brought 

24 Ghorbanifar in. 

25 w. And Nir was present through the negotiations as well? 

26 C. Nir was present through all the negotiations. 




831 



y{«s::B 



1 W. Did North have a reaction to Ghorbanlfar's statement 

2 t'hat the 1000 TOWs had simply shown that the United States was 

3 serious? 

4 C. I don't recall. I thlnJc he said something like, it 

5 damn well should have shown him that we are serious, something to 

6 that effect. 

7 w. Do you recall him saying anything about, you know, 

8 where Is our hostage? 

9 C. Uh, there was some discussion about, you Icnow, the 

10 great disappointment on our end, about not — the 1000 TOWs not 

11 resulting in the release of a hostage, but I don't recall the 

12 exact words at this point, and I didn't make any notes on that. 

13 w. Let me — I'm going to quote from what now is known as 

14 the famous diversion memo that North is supposed to have written 

15 in early April of 1986. That memo, which is really quite an 

16 extensive memo, contains a retrospective on the Iran initiative 

17 up to that point, and it contains a paragraph that reads that, 

18 that, I'll quote, "the USG [meaning U.S. Government] would 

19 establish it's good faith and bona fides by immediately providing 

20 1000 TOWs for sale to Iran. This transaction was covertly 

21 completed oa February 21, using a private U.S. fainnan[?] and the 

22 Israelis as intemwdiaries." That paragraph appears to line up 
2 3 with those who would take the position that the 1000 TOWs was a 

24 good faith gesture on the part of the United States, but did not 

25 bind the Iranians to come up with a hostage. Do you recall any 

26 discussion in this early April period about this matter? 




nblh 



832 



UNCUSSiHEO 



1 C. It's a difficult question for me to answer, because, 

2 you know I was brought in after the fact. But I do recall, there 

3 was some disappointment that it hadn't produced any motion 

A whatsoever on the hostages. And I can't, I can't at the moment 

5 recall the exact words and who said them, but I know among the 

6 people who were involved that there was some disappointment that 

7 there had been no motion whatsoever with regard to the hostages. 

8 The Iranians just took the 1000 TOWs and that was it. And it 

9 wasn't until we met with Ghorbanifar in March that we got some 

10 explanation. And this is where the idea of this, you know, good 

11 intentions being established by the shipment, came from — 

12 W. From Ghorbanifar. 

13 C. — to the best of my knowledge — 

14 w. From Ghorbanifar. 

15 C. — yes from Ghorbanifar, saying that we had established 

16 our good intentions with the Iranian government and that he had 

17 succeeded in getting in getting a commitment for a meeting at a 

18 future date in Iran. 

19 w. All right. I'm going to move on to another topic. The 

20 — let me turn to the meeting in Tehran. In Tehran there were a 

21 series of neetings over four days, and I gather from your 

22 previous testimony one of the immediate disappointments on the 

23 United States' part was that no one on the Iranian side 

24 commensurate with McFarlane's ranking appeared to negotiate, is 

25 that correct? 

26 C. That's correct. 



10 



UNCLASSIFIED 



833 



wiASSife 



I b«li«v« on the second day, an Iranian official by the 

showed up, is that correct? 
That's correct. He was the most senior official we met 




with. 




1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 

11 ^^^^^^^^^^_^^^^^^^^^ 

12 M. And he --^^^^^I^H^^^*^ became a name that was 

13 raised In the very later stages of these negotiations with the 

14 second channel. Is that right? 

15 C. That's true. 

16 w. Old you realize at the time — Z know you realized It 

17 later — but did you realize at the time that the Iranians did 

18 not know who HcParlane was? 

19 C. No, we didn't realize that they didn't know who 

20 McFarlane was until after we met with the second channel in 

21 September. 

22 w. Let ne ask you this. This is a minor point, but the -- 

23 one of the reasons ascribed to the failure of the Tehran 

24 negotiations was that they coincided with Ramadan(?). Is -- late 

25 May, is that the period for Ramadan? 

26 C. Ramadan is based on a lunar calendar, so it changes 



w3Mvm 



>-692 0-8«-98 



834 



ytliASSlFlti) 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

2 

26 



every year. It's really bad when It's during the hot months, 
because you Icnow they can't drink water or eat all during — and 
you have a longer period of light. So, they were pretty 
frazzled, you know, when we had a meeting during the day. By the 
time it was over they were pretty frazzled since they couldn't 
drink anything and they couldn't eat anything. 

w. But that was the holy period they were observing in 
late May, is that correct? 

C. Yes, and based on the current situation in Iran they 
damn well had to observe it. 

w. You didn't notice any shirkers, is that right? 

C. I didn't notice any shirkers — except Ghorbanifar 
[ laughter ] . 

w. Well, he's sewage in Aris(?). There are entries in the 
Tower Report, and we have them in our files, of encrypted cables 
that McFarlane sent out of Tehran. Were you familiar with how 
the communications system was working? I mean, how was it that 
McFarlane was able to comnunicate with Washington? 

C. We took two communicators, two CIA communicators which 
I arranged for, and I did the briefing of them^ 
was kept — stayed in Tel Aviv as a backup! 




nimSSlFlED 



835 



ustmsw 






/:) 



Tfi,U 



[8>!:r 






1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

6 w. When you arrived In Tehran, everyone was removed from 

9 the plane at one point, is that right? 

10 C. When we arrived in Tehran the crew was left on the 

11 plane because they had to taxi it across to the military side of 

12 the airport. 

13 w. But eventually there came a point when all the ' 

14 Americans were separated from the plane, isn't that right? 

15 C. That's true, that was our first crisis and I had to 

16 straighten that out. And it turns out that the reason why the 

17 Iranians wanted everyone off was that they wanted to go over the 
la plane with a fine-tooth comb, which they did. And then after 

19 that everything was all right. 

20 w. Now, was it at that point that they removed the HAWK 

21 parts? 

22 C. No. They removed the HAWK parts on the day we arrived, 

23 immediately. Oace the plane was taxied over, over to the 

24 military side of the aircraft, the three — the four crew members 

25 that were on the plane said that they just came and unloaded the 

26 plane. Wasn't much they could do about it. So they told us that 



14 



yNCUissra 



837 



UNCLHSSira 



1 wben thay showed up at th« hotel. They said they have already 

2 unloaded the HAWK parts. 

3 w. Was that considered a problem at all? 

4 C. Well, there wasn't much that we could do about it 

5 sitting on the ISth floor at a Hilton Hotel. We didn't know what 

6 was going to happen when we arrived anyway. 

7 w. But that, I gather, didn't fall into the category of 

8 crisis? 

9 C. Not really. We were far more concerned because they 

10 wouldn't refuel the aircraft. 

11 w. Did you complain to the Iranians about having simply 

12 removed the HAWK parts? 

13 C. Yes Z did, but they — this was kind of ~ this was 

14 sort of amusing. ^^^^^^^1 being a rug merchant, came up to me, 

15 when we had our initial meeting in the hotel and said, "you've 

16 sent us used parts." And so, I said, you know, I got mad at that 

17 and said, "you know you weren't supposed to unload them until 

18 after the hostages showed up." And then he complained that we 

19 only brought a very small amount of spare parts. And I said, 

20 "well, that's all we could fit on the airplane." And he says, 

21 "well, it didn't take up hardly any space." I said, "yes, but we 

22 only had, we had to fly so many hours that we could only take a 

23 certain amount of weight." And we haggled like that. And then, 

24 the funny thing was, is when the crew showed up and I told -- you 

25 know, we were talking to — I asked him about the parts then. 

26 And they said they took them off. And I said, "well, what did 

15 



IINH! lij;jJ.IF!Fn 



838 



yiUSSlFlEB 



1 they do with them." He says, "well, when we left they were still 

2 sitting on the tarmac. They hadn't opened it up or anything. So 

3 how this guy knew they were used before they had even opened them 

4 up, I don't know. 

5 w. The Tower Report contains rather complete notes of each 

6 day's meetings in Tehran. Do you know who the main note-taker 

7 was for the Americans? 

8 C. Mr. Teicher and Ollie North both took extensive notes. 

9 I was doing a lot of the translating, so I couldn't take many 

10 notes, but what I did do, and you have a copy of my memo on the 

11 trip, I did — I tidied to write down significant points after the 

12 meetings were over, and at those times, and since Z sold(?) it, 

13 Teicher and Korth were taking extensive notes, Z didn't bother to 

14 take them. I just, Z just wrote down what Z thought was 

15 significant so we could compare notes later. 

16 w. Now to get this straight. You — we do have a copy of, 

17 z think a 3 or 4 page single-spaced memorandum that you created 

18 on your visit to Tehran. Z want to understand your testimony on 

19 this. These were based on notes that you made shortly after each 

20 meeting, is that correct? 

21 C. Yeah, usually, because Z would, Z would do — Z did 

22 most of the translating, when Z was hoarse, Ghorbanifar with the 

23 — because we kept catching Ghorbanifar translating inaccurate, 

24 and finally^^l^^^^Vgot so upset with him, you know, that he 

25 jumped up at one point and said, "Mr. Ghorbanifar, you must 

26 translate accurately." Because Z had already corrected 

16 



llllASSinED 



839 



mmim 



1 Ghorbanlf»r, you know, several times on mistakes that he had 

2 'made, which made, made what the Iranians say a little bit 

3 different. And then when he translated the English back, it also 

4 came out a little bit different. Favoring, you know, positions 

5 that he wanted to favor. But, I did make — usually after the 

6 meetings were over Z would write down, I had a steno pad, I would 

7 write down what I thought was significant. And then, based on 

8 those rough notes, immediately after I returned, I put together 

9 that 3-page single-spaced report that you have. 

10 w. From what you later learned aboutj^^^^^^^K was he of 

11 appropriate rank to be meeting directly with McFarlane? 

12 C. I, as the scene — as we learned more about it from 

13 hindsight, yes, because no senior official was going to risk 

14 meeting with McFarlane at that juncture because, as we later 

15 learned, Khomeni was unaware that we were in Tehran. And also 

16 the Iranians knew that Nir was an Israeli. 

17 w. They knew at the time that he was an Israeli? 

18 C. Yeah. They knew at the time. 

19 w. How do we know that? 

20 C. We were told, we were told by the second channel that 

21 in order to protect himself, Ghorbanifar had toldj^^^^^f And 

22 ^^^^HVwas not about to take that on his shoulders by himself, 

23 so he reported It. So I think those two factors weighed against 

24 us seeing any senior official, and quite possibly the fact that 

25 they didn't know who McFarlane was. 

26 W. Did McFarlane actually sit down face-to-face with 

17 



yNCUlSSIFlES 



840 



ffiaifiSitiB 



C. y«s, ha did, on the second day. The Initial meeting on 
the second day. And then after he, after we began to see all the 
problems, he said, "well, tallc to my staff, and if there is any 
breakthrough, I'll tallc to you.* And the last evening that 
^^^^^^^■come up to me and said "I'd like to talk to Mr. 
McFarlane." And we had — it was a brief meeting. And that's 

8 when McFarlane said, "O.K., I'll give you until 7:00 tomorrow 

9 morning . " 

10 w. When McFarlane finally decided to leave, was that 
H direct — did he c(v«itunicate that directly tc 

12 C. Uh, no, the only persons that were there when we 

13 decided to leave were, ^^^^^^H and 

w. That'sl 
C. Yeah. 

w. Andj^^^^^^H is another name for him? 
C. Yeah. And he has a couple other names, too. But, we - 
19-1 toldH^^^H we are leaving, and he kept begging me to 

20 stay. And we just packed up everything and went down in the 

21 lobby, and so — iH^II ''*'*^1' can't you stay up here till we 

22 get the cars? We don't want you hanging around the lobby." So, 

23 McFarlane — we all stormed down, and they arranged for cars, and 

24 they drove us — One interesting thing Is, I don't know what if 

25 something happened in Tehran, but they did not drive us the 

26 normal route to the airport. They took us through back streets. 




nm 



18 



mmE 



841 



UHCUSSlFiED 



1 W. Mr. Cave, w« took a momentary diversion here ta change 

A 

2 the tape, using the word in it's more comnonly-lenown sease. You 

3 were saying that you were not certain whether anything ted 

4 happened In Tehran, but that you noticed that they took you to 

5 the airport by an Indirect route. Is that correct? 

Yeah. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 there Is a qilck 

7 route, a kind of like a super highway that you can take from the 

8 hotel that goes right out to where the big, the big moisnent is. 

9 And then It's directly Into the airport. We went throu^ back 

10 streets all the way from the hotel to the airport. I doK't know 

11 If there was ^ reason for that or not. Ghorbanlfar apparently 

12 has reported that there was supposedly mobs out looking for us. 

13 Z don't know If that Is true or not. 

14 w. There was an article In, I think U.S. News and world 

15 Report back In March of 1986, or excuse me 1987, which eas 

16 entitled "The Big Sting." And I think that In that article they 

17 also postulated that a group of dissidents was looking far you to 

18 seize you and embarrass the regime. I gather you haven't been 

19 able to confirm that one way or the other. 

20 C. No. Wa have never been able to confirm that, ad we 

21 just draw a blank from the second channel. 

22 W. But you did ask him? 

23 C. Taah, «a asked If there was any prob — whan wa 

24 discussing the problems about —with the second channel abcut the 

25 trip to Tehran, whether he told us they didn't know wbe 

26 McFarlane was, that Khomenl had not kno«m that we were la town. 

19 



flliSSlrlED 



842 



iJCUSSIFlEO 



1 We went into some other things liJce that, and one of the things 

2 that came — they didn't Icnow, or else they just weren't going to 

3 tell us, that anything happened. But they just said, there was 

4 no problems that they knew of. 

5 w. Mr. Cave, did you have a poison pill on this trip? 

6 C . No . 

7 w. Do you know whether either McFarlane or North or 

8 Teicher had such a device? 

9 C. I'm absolutely certain they didn't. I think the poison 

10 pill story came about — there was a proposal that North and"^© in 

11 in April with Ghorbqnifar to do some preliminary discussions with 

12 the Iranians. And there was some talk then that, you know, 

13 that's pretty risky, and especially since what North and you 

14 know. North, I think at one meeting, maybe we should take an LT — 

15 they are called L tabs. Incidentally, and, uh, I don't think 

16 there was any real serious consideration given to it. I didn't 

17 give any serious consideration to it anyway. I told him if 

U 

18 things go wrong I'm just going to become a nyyLlah. [laughter] 

19 w. when there is no choice there's no problem. I believe 

20 in his testimony Col. North said that in fact he did have such 

21 appeal and that he got it from CIA. To your knowledge he didn't 

22 have such a pill? 

2 3 C. Not to my knowledge. I don't think he said he got one. 

24 Didn't he say that they were just considering it? 

25 w. I understood his testimony to say that he actually 

26 received one. 

20 



UHCLASS!F!EO 



843 



ONCUSSIHEO 



1 -CI don't-- 

2 T. I thought he said he had one, too. I thought that he 

3 said It was offered to him. 

4 w. I believe he said it was offered to him, in the event 

5 he wished to use one, one was offered to him. 

6 w. Let me just note for the record that this new voice is 

7 Jaclc Taylor. 

8 T. Yes. 

9 w. For the transcriber. 

10 T. I believe I recall that one was offered to him by the 

11 CIA. Now whether or not he took it with him or not, I don't 

12 know. I'll have to check into that. 

13 w. But assuming that that is what he said, to your 

14 knowledge, he wouldn't have had such a pill, is that correct? 

15 C. No, not that I know of, and, I was never offered one. 

16 I just remember that the discussion came up, you know, maybe we 
l1 should, just in case, and — but no offer was ever made to me to 

18 take one, and I wouldn't have taken it anyway. 

19 w. Mr. Cave, in the — again in the Tower Report, and I 

20 believe also in your, in your notes, you came back from the 

21 Tehran mission with the conclusion that irrespective of other 

22 considerations that the Da'wa prisoners were going to remain a 

23 major impediment to any, any real progress on the hostages. Is 

24 that correct? 

25 C. Yes. When I came back and reported to Director Casey, 

26 I said that I thought the most serious problem confronting any, 

21 



iiNi)! mmn 



844 



yNGlASSlFlED 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 



you know, wholesale release of hostages was the Oa'wa prisoners. 
In line with that I also told them that from my talks with the 
Iranians, I concluded that they could spring a couple of them, 
and I told Director Casey that I thought we'd two, two out, based 
on this operation. But no more than — the hostage takers would 
continue to, continue to hold hostages until there was some 




w. Now, when you apprised Director Casey of your opinion 
of the importance of the Da'wa following your meeting in Tehran, 
did you also apprise him of your opinion, and I think you've 
testified to this in other depositions, that the hostage holders 
in Lebanon were extremely independent and were likely to insist 
on their demands, no matter what? 

C. The way I put it is that the Iranians have influence, 
but they don't control the hostage takers. There are — I think 

22 



845 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 I — there are two separate Shl'lte communities in Lebanon. And 
2' the— 

3 w. I think you did describe the one in the valley, in the 

e 

4 B^kka Valley, and then there is the Urban group, is that the 

5 correct distinction? 

6 C. The Southern Lebanon — actually — in fact they are sort 

■fi.jJs.fit-' 

7 of the last renuiants of real futlliwn in Lebanon were among the 

8 Southern Shi 'ites. The Shi'ites in the Bakka valley tended to be 

9 pretty fiercely Independent. And anyone that is familiar with 

10 Lebanon, the area, would say the same thing, so — since no one 

11 else has ever been able to fully control those people, I don't 

12 see how the Iranians could. 

13 w. Well, that brings up another questions. There are — 

14 there were points at which consideration was given to, I think, 

15 the Israelis pressuring Col. Lahad to release Shl'lte prisoners 

16 that he had with his Southern Lebanese army. I gather from what 

17 you are saying that since those Shi'ites were probably from a 

18 different Shl'lte comnunity that would not have had great 

19 Influence on the Shl'lte In the Bakka valley, is that correct? 
20 
21 

22 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

23 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1/ The 

24 interesting thing though is the hostages held by the Phlange, or 

25 the prisoners held by the Phlange that were Shl'lte — the Iranians 

26 seemed to say well, that's a Lebanese problem, let them sort it 




23 



iiNd! mMn 



846 



KUSSKD 




1 out. They weren't too interested in any motion, you know in 

2 getting those people released. They said the Phlange and the 

3 Shl'lte will sort that out themselves. 

4 w. Also participating in the Tehran negotiations, and I 

5 think you have already mentioned them, what this 

6 ^^^^^^H I think true name is in ^^^^'^j^H^^^H 

7 denominated the monster during those meetings by some of the 

8 Americans according to Albert Hakim. First, were you familiar 

9 with that a ab cae and are you familiar with where he picked it up. 

10 C. This came about after the second channel, and he did 

11 not participate in the meetings in Washington, but he did 

12 participate in the first German meetings in Frankfurt on the 8th 

13 through the 10th of October, and I don't know whether it was 

14 Albert Hakim--I thliik it was Albert Hakim that sort of gave him 

15 that 8eiHP«e, the monster. And he's a very hard negotiator. But 

16 a very Impressive guy. 

17 w. I had understood Hakim to say that he received that 

18 nickname in Tehran, is that at odds with your recollection? 

19 C. Yeah, that's at odds with my recollection. I don't 

20 recall that name being used until after we — in fact I found, of 

21 the other people we dealt with outside °'^^^^|^H ^ found him 

22 in Tehran to be the one most interested in some kix)i| of a 

23 breakthrough. In fact, he's the one that told me — I was the last 

24 one on the plane to leave, and I was talking to he and] 

25 and they emphasized, look, you know if this thing falls through 

26 we should still talk to one another. 

24 



IINCUSSIRE!) 



847 



UNCUSbiritO 



1 w. Hakim /also r«f«rr«d to^HH|Hfs the angina. And 

2 this was a tarm that ha davalopad hlmsalf In tha coursa of his 

3 daposition, but ha rafarrad to him as tha angina bacausa ha saw 

4 him In tha second channal maatlngs as tha driving forca behind 

5 tha negotiations. Would you agree with that characterization? 

6 C. Uh — we had — there was a big debate about — there was 

7 arguments on the American side about who was tha more Important 

8 one. You know, the relative °^^^^^^^m ^ always thought the 

9 relative was more important because he spoke — you know when an 

10 Iranian speaks with authority you can usually tell it. I mean, 

11 ^'l^t^^^^^^^H they always thought that he wanted to check back 

12 with someone before he agreed to anything. Whereas tha relative 

13 was able to take a proposal and decide whether to go ahead with 

14 it or not. There was some disagreement among the Americans on 

15 who was more important. I think that one of the, one of the 

16 Important things though was — he was the sole person we saw at the 

17 last meeting. 

18 w. That's the meeting in November, or the one in December? 

19 C. At both meetings. The last— ha came out to talk to 

20 North. Secord, Hakim and myself in Geneva at the beginning of 

21 November. And then ha also came out for the meeting in December 

22 with myself and Ambassador Dunbar. 

23 w. Let me just take a moment here while I look up a 

24 reference. The record should reflect that there was a S-mlnuta 

25 break here for everyone to stretch his legs. We are now back on 

26 tha record. Mr. Cave, I want to see if you can reconcile what Z 

25 



UNCLASSIFIED 



848 



UNCUSSIFitO 



1 think is an inconaiitcncy in th« reports that %r«r« mad* on tha 

2 negotiations in Kuwait on a particular point. And that is— 

3 cm Kuwait? 

4 w. Excuse me, in Tehran. I've got Kuwait on the mind, in 

5 Tehran. As you've already testified to, the subject of the Da'wa 

6 prisoners arose while you were negotiating in Tehran. And in 

7 your, in your suimary you recalled that North addressed this 

8 point and you quote North as saying that the United States would 

9 not interfere in the internal affairs of Kuwait, particularly 

10 where Kuwaiti due legal process had been carried out. Is that 

11 consistent with yoMr recollection? 

12 c. Yes, that's consistent with my recollection. 

13 w. Now, the Tower Report has one of the note- takers taking 

14 down the following exchange, ^^^^^m^aying our dispute is 

15 over the lack of complete agreement, what can you say about the 

16 blank, or it doesn't say blank, the held in Kuwait, is the way it 

17 reads. There is a word missing. Then it has North responding. 

18 It says, "North proposed a statement like: the U.S. will make 

19 every effort through and with international organizations, 

20 private individuals, religious organizations, and other third 

21 parties in « humanitarian effort to achieve the release and just 

22 and fair treatment for Shi'ites held in confinement as soon as 

23 possible." 

24 C. That's accurate except for the release part. 

25 w. Now, do you have a specific recollection that that is 

26 wrong? 

26 



AJj^iFltU 



849 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 C. Y«s I do. What North said. Is as I said bafora, wa 

2 won't intar — wa cannot Intarvana whara dua lagal procass is 

3 taking placa. But, what wa will do is through intarnational 

4 organizations and tha Islamic aquivalant of tha Rad Cross, do our 

5 bast to make sura that the prisoners get good treatment, receive 

6 mail, visitors, etc., etc. But there was no — he did not, in 

7 Tehran, say anything about the release of prison — see to the 

8 release of those prisoners. 

9 w. I'm going to proceed ahead to a little later period. 

10 Following the breakdown of the negotiations in Tehran, there came 

11 a point when the United States began actively pursuing a, what's 

12 now been known as the second channel into Iran. Were you 

13 familiar with how the notion of developing a second channel came 

14 to be? 

15 C. Well, when we were in Iran, the Iranians told us that 

16 they were not happy with the Ghorbanifar^Hf^Hf channel. But 

17 they said, if you guys insist on using it, it^s all right with us. 

18 But wa would like to use a different channel, we, of course had 

19 the problem with the Israelis on Ghorbanlfar, even after Tehran, 

20 the Israelis were insisting, or the Israelis in the form of Ami 

21 Nir were insisting that Ghorbanifar had to be used, we decided 

22 to l ook 
2 3^^^^^^^^^ 

24 ^^^^^H And we met with him on the lOth and llth of July in 

25 Washington. 

26 W. O.K. Let me move you back in time just a moment, when 



lel, and the first step was 



27 



IINOiiSSIREI 



850 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 you said, we decided to seek a second channel, who Is the "we" 

2 you are referring to? 

3 C. O.K. This was basically Col. North's initiative. I'm 

4 tallcing about we, everyone that was involved. That we would look 

5 for a second channel after the breakdown of the negotiations In 

6 Tehran, and the problems we saw with it. And, we continued to 

7 talk, or he continued to talk to General Nir, and I don't know if 

8 he saw Ghorbanifar or not. 

9 w. You are referring to Nir? 

10 c. I mean, no, I'm referring to Col. North in this period. 

11 But we did actively look for a second channel, and that was done 

12 by Albert Hakim and General Secord. 

13 w. Now, North's decision— I gather it was North's decision 

14 to look for the second channel, is that what you are telling me? 

15 C. To the best of my recollection it came from the NSC. I 

16 mean it wasn't — since it wasn't our operation, we didn't feel we 

17 could make a decision like this. 

18 W. That is we, CIA? 

19 C. CIA, yes. 

20 w. Albert Hakim In his testimony attributed the Idea, he 

21 believed, was the way he phrased it, to General Secord. Is that 

22 consistent with anything you understand? 

2 3 C. Well, I think that between General Secord and Col. 

24 North. The idea— we were— it is kinda difficult— and everyone 

25 was in agreement with — I mean, there is nothing that, you know, 

26 there was no contention. I mean, everyone was in agreement, but 

28 



UNCLASSIFIED 



851 



IINCLASSiFIED 



1 I — the action paopl* In looking for It was cartalnly. you Icnow, 

2 General Secord, and of course Albert Hakim gave him a helping 

3 hand. And the first step, as I mentioned before, was 'bringing 

4 HH^^H|^|^H^H^° Washington on the or July. 

thad|^HH^HHH| was initially by 

6 Albert Hakim, correct? 

7 c. what--let me see if I can recall it. Through some 
6 contacts of his in London we learned that 
9 had contact with Iranians who were ex-officio, so to speak. 

10 Running a purchasing operation in London. And when we met this 

11 guy, because he had reported to Albert that the relative had come 

12 out and asked for an American contact, and we assumed that this 

13 was the Iranian effort also to set up a second channel. 

14 W. Now, that I think, was memorialized in your, your notes 

15 of the July 10, 11 meetings with — 

16 ? You have copies of those? 

17 w. Yes, we do. Let me pass your statement just a moment, 

18 here. Your understanding was that Albert Hakim — well, let me 

19 back you up even further than that. You said, "we made contacts 

20 who then located the people who had the connection to the 

21 relative." Who, when you say "we", is that CIA, or — 

22 C. Bxcuse me. Albert Hakim. Albert Hakim had the 

He used ^^^^H^mi|^^^H[bef ore 

24 business. And in talking to him found out that this guy was 

25 associated with these two firms In London. And found out about. 

26 the relative coming out. So what we wanted to do is, through 



29 



BNCUSSiTffl 



852 



UNClASSfiED 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

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13 

14 

IS 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 



this official, when w« brought him to Washington to talk to him, 
as you Icnow from th« notes, is very anxious to get in contact 
with the relative the next time he came out. And that was 
handled by General Secord and Albert Hakim. They met with him in 
Brussels in August Z believe. 

w. That's correct. This ^^^^^^^^^H was | 
Is that correct? 

C. That's correct. 

W. And, were you aware at the time that Hakim had proposed 
to the CZA back in--at least two times in 1983 as a 
possible source of .information? 

C. Z should have been aware of it, but Z couldn't recall 
it because it was something we didn't pursue, normally in this 
business when you don't pursue something it goes from your mind. 
But Z think you, you in fact, showed me one of the cables that Z 
coordinated on. And Z couldn't, Z honestly couldn't recall it. 
So — but, we had nothing to do with^^^^^^B Possibly it might 
have been because of the fact we knewl 




853 



.fjn 



WUlSSlM 




1 

2 ^^^^^^ 

3 w. Now, whan ha cama to tha Unltad Stataa, ona of tha 

4 things ha was subjactad to was a polygraph axamlnatlon which was 

5 conducted by a prlvata commarclal firm. I think you wara awara 

6 that that was among tha plans whan ha arrivad. Is that correct? 

7 c. That's correct. Wa didn't want — tha agency did not 

8 want to get Involved In a polygraph. 

9 w. O.K. That's my next question. Why not? 

10 C. Well, we normally — it was not someone that we were 

11 going to be using as an agent. I mean, the polygraph is pretty 

12 much for us an in-house tool. 

13 w. That is, when you say us, you are referring to the CZA? 

14 C. Yeah. It's a CIA in-house tool. 

15 w. Were you present when tha commercial polygraph was 

16 performed? 

17 c. NO. I didn't want to be president — present, excuse me, 

18 not president — present, [laughter] 

19 w. No higher ambitions even today, is that correct? 

20 C. No. [laughter] 

21 W. It Is correct. Mr. Cave, the polygraph axamlnatlon was 

22 performed by tha commercial polygraph examiner. I've had the 

23 opportunity to interview him and he has told me that the 

24 information that Albert Hakim gave him on which he based his 

25 questions, was so indistinct that he could not vote for the 

26 reliability of the test. Were you ever made aware that that test 

31 




siadoinuL* 



854 



llNCLASSi. lEO 



1 was not a ral labia tast? 

2 c. No. 

3 W. Is that something that you should hava known? 

4 CI would hava liked to have known It at the time, 

5 because the word I got from Hakim, that he passed the test. 

6 W. Uh— 

7 C. As a point here, most polygraph tests are Inconclusive, 

8 as you are probably aware. 

9 w. Except the test you performed In January of 1986 on Mr. 

10 Ghorbanlfar? 

11 C. Whan you have prize, [laughter] Suspect — subject like 

12 Ghorbanlfar, It's pretty easy to come up — see, tha effectiveness 

13 of tha test Is based a lot on the backgroxind 0M Information you 

14 have from which to formulate your questions, because you can then 

15 let the subject know that you know an awful lot about them. 

16 w. That I think was part of the problem that this 

17 polygraph examiner ran Into. In other words, Mr. Hakim was 

18 unwilling to expand on the background Information that would have 

19 allowed this polygraph examiner to sharpen his questions and get 

20 a more precis* result. 

21 C. I never had any — I never knew the questions that were 

22 asked on the test. All I know Is this. Albert Hakim told me 

23 that he had passed the test with particular emphasis on the fact 

24 that^^^^^Vuas not now functioning as an agent of the Iranian 

25 government. 

26 w. Let me pursue this just one step further. The Iran 

32 



yiLKSinEo 



855 



wmsw 



1 initiative was one of — was a very highly compartmented and 

2 sensitive operation during the sunvner of 1986. Is that correct? 

3 c. well, yes and no. I mean, one of the real worries is 

4 that we had too many outsiders that knew an awful lot about it or 

5 we would have no discipline or control. 

6 w. People like Ghorbanlfar and ultimately people like 

7 ^^^^^Hsnd his contacts in London, is that correct? 

8 C. And the contacts in London also knew something was 

9 going on. 

10 w. The reason I pursue that — I think within the American 

11 government it was considered to be a very sensitive operation. 

12 Is that fair to say? 

13 C. Yes, that's fair to say. There were very few people 

14 that knew about it. 

15 w. Let me stop right here. I'll speak into the microphone 

16 for the record. I'll stop right here and change tapes. 
17 

18 [TAPE TWO (Sides 3 and 4) 

19 w. Let the record reflect that we had a short break 

20 enabling me to change the tape, switch machines and make the 

21 thing work. Mr. Cave, my question is, based on the importance of 

22 the Iran initiative to the United States government, and 

23 understanding your answer on the CIA not actually being the 

24 operative agency here, still wouldn't it have been prudent to 

25 employ the polygraph resources of the CIA on such a sensitive 

26 matter? 

33 



iiMoi AQ<jinFn 



856 



1 C. Well, at tm time, it seemed better to do it the way it 



2 was done because ^^^^^Hpad been involved with Albert in 

3 business deals before, and they know each other. We didn't have 

4 much to base a polygraph on and did not really want to reveal 

5 anything about the initiative, so to the best of my recollection 

6 Albert Hakim said that he would devise questions with the 

7 polygraph operator which would get at our basic concerns, was 

8 M^^^Km^^ B^y *'^y involved with the Iranian government or 

9 Iranian government agencies. 

10 w. Well, from what you say there it would seem to argue 

11 even more strongly th^t you or someone else in the CIA or the NSC 

12 review the questions before they are asked. 

13 C. Well, I don't know if anyone did. I don't know if Col. 

14 North, or I — I assume, I don't know, I assume maybe General 

15 Secord did. I didn't. I didn't review the questions, no. 

16 w. Let me ask you a question in a different way. Were you 

17 awara^that following the meetings in Frankfurt in February that 

18 ^Hm^H^A^^ developed some concern about Albert Hakim 

19 himself? whether he was an appropriate person, and that was one 

20 of the motivating factors bringing you Into this arrangement. 

21 C. ¥«ah. I was asked about Albert, and as I recall, the 

22 major connwat Z made was that you know, Albert is basically a 

23 businessman. Re's bead and shoulders above Ghorbanifar, but you 

24 gotta remember, he's gonna look at this initiative as a business 

25 opportunity. 

26 w. Did you, and I'm speaking personally now, did you have 

34 



\\m m\B 



857 



iiNtiASsro 



1 enough confldenc* In Hakim to f««l comfortabl* In trusting him 

2 with, this polygraph *'1'^^^^HH 

3 C. I think In the question of the polygraph, you are 

4 Imputing an awful lot more stature to me In this operation that I 

5 had at that time. Remember, I had only taken part In the meeting 

6 In Paris, and the trip Into Tehran. And, at the time of this 

7 polygraph had not done much with regard to the Iran Initiative. 

8 Nothing much had happened. As you recall It wasn't until — this 

9 was the beginning of the second channel, and we did not have the 

10 meetings In Europe which led to the release of Jenco, I guess It 

11 was, at the beginning of all this. They did not occur until the 

12 end of July. And what period you are talking about now Is the 

13 beginning of July. So, I was still looking at this, as was I 

14 think, everyone else, as an KSC operation. And, I can't even 

15 recall whether we were asked to provide a polygraph form. Or 

16 whether there might have been some bureaucratic reason why we 

17 couldn't do It at the time. No operators available. Z just 

18 don't recall. 

19 w. Let me restate the question because Z don't — I'm not 

20 trying to exaggerate your Importance here, I'm really trying to 

21 get at your personal feelings at the time. Were you, were you 

22 satisfied based on what you knew of Albert Hakim that he would 

23 reliably perform this kind of a vetting of possible source? 

24 C. I questioned Albert on this, and he said that he had a 

25 lot of confidence in this polygraph operator. I think, in fact, 

26 I think I recall him saying that he had used them before. 

35 



llNCUSSffl 



858 



llHCUSSifiED 



1 W. But th« question really is, did you have confidence in 

2 Albert Hakim? 

3 C. Oh, Z have found out in dealing with Albert, that when 

4 he says he will do something, he does it. And you can trust him 

5 on that. My only concern about the use of Albert in this whole 

6 operation was that he is a businessman. And he made no bones 

7 about it that he looked, he was willing to work for the benefit 

8 of the U.S. government, but he also was going to pursue any 

9 business opportunities that came up. 

10 vr. Were you aware that there was a, Z think was referred 

11 to as a derogatory 'block on Albert Hakim which prevented him from 

Offic- 
ii going into the Old Executive Building? 

13 C- Yes. Z was aware of that. But Z never did find out 

14 precisely what it was. 

15 W. Did that cause you any concern? 

16 C. Yeah, it caused me some 

17 

18 ^^^^^^^^^^^Bl couldn't come up with any reason why he should 

19 have this derogatory block. 

20 w. Mr. Cave, also during this June- July period, Z gather 

21 you began to meet and had at least one or two meetings wit^ 
2i^^^^His that correct? 

23 C. Yea. 

24 W. 

25 C. 1 met with him once in July, toward the end of July, 

26 and that was a very promising meeting. But this was coordinated 




muSsiFO 



859 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 with th« Stat* Dapartfliant. Z gava tham, you Icnow, a full rundown 

2 of avarything that transplrad at tha July maatlng. 
3 

4 
5 

6 

7 

e 

9 ^^^^^^ 

10 w. Lat ma bring somathing to your attantlon and lat me as)c 

11 If you ara awara of It. In North's notabooks thara is an antry 

12 datad July 7, 1986. North notas that ha has to gat a biography 

13 of|H||^H^pfor Aba, which was tha psaudonym for Hakim, wara 

14 you awara that Hakim was looking for a biography of ^^^^^^H in 

15 early July of '86? 

16 C. NO. 

17 w. Do you have any idea why ha would have bean looking for 

18 a biography ofl 

19 C. I don't know. col. North was, of course, aware of the 

20 contact witt^^^^^^^H And was awara of our operational 

21 interest in him. But Z have no — he never told me that ha had 

22 discussed this with Albert. 

23 w. Had you known that he had discussed it with Albert, 

24 would that have surprised you? 

25 C. Yeah, I would want to know why. 

26 W. 




i»RSS!f!lB 



860 




1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

e ^^^^^^ 

9 W. I'm gonna go through this particular entry In North's 

10 noteboo)cs and ask you If you have any information on this. The 

11 note Is. as I think 1,'ve Indicated, July 7, 1986. It's headed 

12 "Meeting with Abe." It notes the computer at the white House has 

13 a hold on him. And it says , m||^^^^^ bio for Abe." And then 

14 It has a list of objectives. And the way these read Is 

15 "legitimate". It says "legit bus with Australia," which I read as 

16 legitimate business with Australia. "Legit security contracts 

17 with U.S. entities. Financial network. Income earners. Jose 

18 Defex. Going back to Australian ^ on July 18. 1986, and the l ast 

entry ^^.^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^ 

20 don't close." Let me go through that with you Mr. Cave. Do you 

21 have any id«« what they are talking about with this legitimate 

22 business with Australia? 

23 C. That might —Axistralia might refer ^°^^^^^^m "" 

24 referred to him as the Australian. 

25 W. Assuming that Australia refers to the country of 

26 Australia, would that have any meaning to you? 



38 



iiNH! mmii 



861 



tlNCLASSlFlEO 



1 C. NO. 

2 W. How about the entry with respect to Jose Defex? 

3 C. I draw a complete blank on that. 

4 W. Oo you Icnow what Defex is? 

5 C. Defex? Not offhand. 

6 ? Defex? Doesn't ring a bell with me. 

7 W. if I were to tell you it's a Portuguese arms company, 

8 would that ring a bell? 

9 C. Oh. Yeah. I've heard of it, yeah. Yeah, I've heard 

10 of it now. Defex— is that what it is? Defex? I thought it was 

11 Detex or something like that. 

12 7 D-E-P-E-X. 

13 C. D-E-P-E— O.K. 

14 W. There are, I think, at least two large companies that 

15 have an inter- relationship. One is Defex, and the other is 

16 Indep. 

17 C. One of those, I forget which one. General Secord had a 

18 close relationship with. 

19 w. Yeah. That would be Defex. 

20 C. O.K. 

21 W. There's a reference here. The Jose is not explained, 

22 but there is a Jose Garnell. Does he, excuse me. Does that name 

23 mean anything to you? 

24 C. No. 

25 W. The entry with respect to^ 

26 ^^^^^^^^^^H that was not new information to you was it? 

39 



mMmm 




1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
H 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 



W. General Hashemi Is the one who Introduced Ted Shackley 
to Ghorbanlfar back In November of 1984. Old that Information 
come to you at all 'during the course of this Initiative? 

C. 




Shackley came to him he thought It was a legitimate enterprise. 



w. This Is General Hashemi? 

yeah. H^^^^^^^^H[ ^^' "^~~ 
w. This Isn't the same meeting with Mr. Shackley? 
C. Ko. No. But through this. A^d so Shackley, Shackley 
told him he was functioning on behalf of the NSC. And so he 
helped set up the meeting wlthA^^^^^^^^min Hamburg In 
August of--November of 1984. I found this out after the fact. 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ And 
nothing ever happened, 

40 







863 



UNCiASSiFIED 



1 
2 

3 
4 
S 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 



W. You are speaking 
C 
contact had be«n brokered 




W. Do you know yourself how he and Mr. Shackley met? 

C. No. 

w. Do you know that they have been in business together, 
and I think still are, in business together? 

C. Oh, yeah. I knew — Z was aware that they were in some 
kind of business together. But I don't know how they met. 



w. Mr. Shackley, in November of 1984, not only met with 
Manucher Ghorbanifar, but he met with, I think his entry was. 




And 



w. Now, is there— who is ^^^^^^H then? 

C. They are two brothers. One— the first names I'm not- 
one is a> 

the other has a position, I think in the! 
I'm not sure. There are — actually they're originally| 

41 



ONClASSinEO 



864 



HNCUSSife 



1 tribesmen — unusual for a tribesman to be a clergyman. 

2 very Important because he controls an awful lot of money and Is 

3 considered by a lot of people to be somewhat moderate. 

4 w. And you are referring to thej 

5 C. " 

6 W. And— 

7 c. And I think that Is the one he met In Hamburg. I'm not 

8 sure. 

9 w. Do you recall which name goes with which, whether 

10 ^^^^Hgoes with the 

11 C. I thlnJc->I'd have to check the records to be sure of 

12 It— I think Its 
13 

14 w. Was It your understanding that Mr. Shackley actually 

15 met wlthMHmil^HH or not his brother In November of '84? 

16 C. I was told that he met with — my understanding was that 
he met with ^^^^^^1 I don't know If that's true or not. 

And that's an understanding you gleaned from^^HB 

Is that correct? 
That's correct. 
And I— 
Although, one thing that might be — I think at one point 

23 Ghorbanlfar said that they had — no — somewhere there Is a report 

24 that said Ghorbanlfar had dressed someone up like an Ayatollah 

25 and — [laughter] I don't know whether lt's> » ^ ■■ li e «W ir or not, 

26 but I know there Is a report somewhere that Ghorbanlfar had 



18 


W. 


.| 




20 


C. 


21 


w. 


22 


c. 



42 



yxmm^ 



865 



UNClASSIFItg 



1 dressed a guy up lllce an Ayatollah and had him talk to Shackley. 

2 But I don't Icnow whether this Is tnUil ieh f l l or not. But It's 

3 something that Ghorbanlfar would think of doing. 

4 w. You don't find that to be Incredible? 

5 C. No, I don't find that to be Incredible. And I can't 

6 remember where we got the report. I know there was a report 

7 somewhere along the line that actually Ghorbanlfar had just 
e dressed someone up like an Ayatollah and had him meet with 
9 Shackley. 

10 w. Mr. Cave, let me just dwell on this for a few more 

11 moments. You recall last time we met, which I think was back In 

12 early July, I showed you a series of memoranda and cables 

13 relating to a proposal back In early July, Z showed you a series 

14 of memoranda and cables relating to a proposal back In August of 

15 1976 to, from Theodore Shackley to use Albert Hakim as a source 

16 for the CIA. Do you recall that? 

17 C. I recall you showing me the cables, yes. 

18 w. Do you have any Idea, or do you have any knowledge as 

19 to how Mr. Shackley met Mr. Hakim? 

20 C. I don't recall. And one of the problems, since nothing 

21 ever happened — you know, I never paid any great attention to that 

22 proposal. It went by the boards, we never did use them. 

23 W. Mr. Shackley has told us that he met Albert Hakim 

24 through Ed Wilson. I gather that's something that you didn't 

25 know. 

26 C. I knew that, oh, uh, that Albert had been- -had known 

43 



mmm. 



J 



82-692 0-88-29 



866 



'OlD. 



imtmsiritb 



1 Ed, Ed Wilson, yeah. But I still to this day don't know what 

2 extent he was involved in any Icind of business with him. 

3 w. And when would you have known that. That Hakim had 

4 some background with Ed Wilson? 

5 C. I think it was when I reviewed his file. I think there 

6 is something in the file that says something about that. I'm 

7 not — I couldn't swear to that, but as I recall, I believe there 

8 is some — there's a couple pieces from the paper relating to a 

9 relationship with Ed Wilson. And that would be when I asked to 

10 look at the file after I knew that Albert was in the loop, so to 

11 speak, on this operation. 

12 W. And that would have been approximately when? 

13 C. Probably sometime in, oh, late March, early April of 

14 last year. 

15 w. Did you, independent of your review of the file, did 

16 you have any knowledge of Albert Hakim having any association 

17 with Ed Wilson? 

18 C. I don't recall any, no. 

19 w. Reviewing the file didn't bring back any independent 

20 memory, is that correct? 

21 C. Ho. I knew of Albert Hakim, but never had had any 

22 dealings with him. He's a pretty well-known businessman in 

23 Tehran. 

24 w. Did you pursue this with him at all? Did you ask him, 

25 himself, about his backgroiuid with Mr. Wilson? 

26 C. I did at one point, and he told me it was the dumbest 

44 



UNCLASSIREI 



867 



^9mfV^%\ 



UNtLfcSSihLll 



1 thing he ever did was getting Involved with Ed Wilson. 

2 w. Were you aware of General Secord having had some 

3 involvement with Ed Wilson? 

4 C. Yes, I was aware of that. 

5 W. Let me Just put these two things together and aslc you — 

6 and I'm just speaking on a — you know, your own personal reaction. 

7 Did the combination of all this knowledge about Hakim having had 

8 an association with Wilson, and Secord having had an association 

9 with Wilson. Did that cause you any misgivings about the 

10 participation of these two men and the very secret and sensitive 

11 initiative? 

12 C. I talked to Col. North about this. 

13 w. What did he say? 

14 C. And what he told me was essentially that, look, these 

15 guys made a mistake, and if they had it to do all over again, 

16 they wouldn't do it. They realize it was a dumb thing to do, and 

17 they are working to basically now prove themselves. Albert wants 

18 to really — one of the things, I'll never forget — North told me, 

19 he says, "Albert Hakim is very interested in proving that he's 

20 worthy of being a citizen of this country. 

21 w. Did you know at any time during this initiative that in 

22 December of 1983 General Secord had applied to CIA for a security 
2 3 clearance and It had been denied? 

24 C. I didn't know that, no. 

25 w. When — after Father Jenco was released in — I think it 

26 was on July 26 of 1986, Manucher Ghorbanifar met with, I think 

45 






868 



bi^uLftboiii .u&> 



1 you, and North in Europe. Is that correct? 

2 C. Yes. We had a meeting, I thlnJc It was in Frankfurt, if 

3 I remember correctly. 

4 w. Now, at that meeting, if I recall correctly, he advised 

5 you of what it was that he had promised the Iranians to get 

6 Father Jenco released, is that right? 

7 C. I'm trying to recall it. I didn't take any notes on 

8 that meeting, because North took all the notes. Nir was there. 

9 I think that — as far as I recall the commitment was for the rest 

10 of the spare parts. I'm trying to remember if there was anything 

11 else. 

12 w. Now these are the same — when you say the rest of the 

13 spare parts, these are the spare parts that were planned to be 

14 delivered in — to Iran in May, is that correct? 

15 C. That's correct. The remainder of them. I don't recall 

16 any other commitments that were asked for at that meeting. I 

17 think it was to continue the thing, we should deliver the rest of 

18 the HAWK spares. 

19 w. Do you recall whether at this meeting he proposed what 

20 I think has been. In shorthand fashion, referred to as the 

21 sequential release of hostages and delivery of arms. 

22 C. T«ah. What he told us is that he indicated that he had 
2 3 sent a letter and we were supposed to have a copy of it. This is 

24 the famous letter in which he makes all these terrific proposals 

25 to the Iranians. And there is the idea of sequential release in 

26 that letter. We didn't get that letter until after the fact, as 

46 



WNWSS!f!ED 



869 



I! 






1 you are aware. 

2 w. And If you would for the record, just relate how It was 

3 we ultimately came into possession of that letter. 

4 C. Either he or Nlr sent a copy of it to us via DHL, to 

5 Col. North. 

6 w. The notion of sequential referral was a departure from 

7 past U.S. policy, is that correct? 

8 C. That's correct. 

9 w. Do you recall, and let me place you in the month of 

10 August. Do you recall any discussions with North about the 

11 advisability of departing from the prior policy of insisting on 

12 all the hostages at once, and adopting the policy of sequential 

13 release? 

14 C. No. I always felt in this operation, you )cnow, we were 

15 the mechanics. That the policy decisions were made at the white 

16 House. And the way they wanted to do it was all right with me. 

17 w. Just to be clear. Xou say, "we" again, we the 

18 mechanics, so that's the CIA. Is that correct? 

19 C. That's correct. That's the CIA. Now it was — we did 

20 not immediately, as you recall, release the rest of the spares. 

21 There was some discussion in Washington about the advisability of 

22 going along with this. And I remember a conversation I had with 
2 3 Director Casey on it. 

24 w. What was the position that he toolc? 

25 C. Well, he was aslcing for my opinion, and I said loolc, 

26 the spares are sitting in Israel. The Israelis don't want them. 

47 



UNClliSSIFIEe 



870 



BNWSSiatB 



1 We can't take them back. If they want to keep the initiative 

2 going they might as well send them, send the damn things in. 

3 Also, no matter what kind of a sleaze Ghorbanifar is, he's on the 

4 hook for an awful lot of money. And he's not going to be able to 

5 collect anything until those spares are delivered. So those were 

6 my recommendations and Casey pretty much went along with them. 

7 w. Was there, in your conversation with Director Casey, 

8 consideration given to the inconsistency between saying in May 

9 you can't have any of these, any more of these, until the 

10 hostages are released, and then at the end of July with one 

11 hostage released, gl,ving them all over to the Iranians? 

12 C. I'm trying to recall. After the — in the immediate 

13 aftermath of the visit to Tehran, there was a lot of talk about 

14 the initiative being over, as you'll recall. I was probably more 

15 upbeat than anyone on the plane because I had a lot of private 

16 conversations with Iranians. And I concluded that no matter what 

17 happened, they were very much interested in some kind of a 

18 strategic dialogue with the United States. I think that — we had 

19 a meeting also with Nir before the meeting with Ghorbanifar. And 

20 as I recall, the sequential idea came up first there. I mean, it 

21 was Ghorbanifar. Because Nlr was speaking from the letter. And 

22 Nir later admitted that he had authorized Ghorbanifar to make 

2 3 some of the comnitments that he had made in that letter. But not 

24 all of them. Now, I never got it straight In my mind which ones 

25 he had said he could make, and which ones he did not authorize. 

26 w. And you are referring now to the early August meeting 

48 



«HClllSS!F![9 



871 



ONGUSSIHEO 




1 in London, is that correct? Or arc wa still in lata July? 

2 C. I thought wa mat — didn't wa maet with him in July also 

3 in London? 

4 W. That is Nir? 

5 C. Nir. Mayba it was August. 

6 w. Wall, let ma ask you that question — 

7 C. Oh, yeah, it might — I guess->see, when we met with 

8 Ghorbanifar on the 25th, we did not have the letter. 

9 w. That is the letter toJ 

10 C. The letter that ha had sent to^^^^^^H And I'm kinda 

11 hazy in my memory now when it was. I was not sure whether we met 

12 Nir before and than — Z gat dizzy trying to — we met — it was Nir 

13 and Ghorbanifar and North and I at the end of — because that was — 

14 I was called up from Geneva to meet with them. I had Just met 

15 with^^^^^^^H I think on the 25th of July. I'm not sure. 

16 But, whether we met — I do not recall whether we met with — we had 

17 a meeting with Nir in London before that, or it was immediately 

18 after that, in August. 

19 W. Let me ask you this. There was a meeting in August, on 

20 August 8, between Nir, North and Ghorbanifar. Do you recall 

21 whether that fmi hava been a meeting that you would have gone to? 

22 C. No. Because the meeting that I'm talking about was 

23 just Ollie, Nir and myself. And we flew to London one morning 

24 and I flew back the next day. 

25 w. In September, in early September, North had a meeting 

26 with Poindexter in which he discussed the desirability of 

49 






872 



iiNCUSsra 



1 adopting a sequential release policy. Were you at any time 

2 brought into these discussions with North? 

3 c. No. He would just apprise me of what they were going — 

4 of these discussions with Poindexter and what they were — what the 

5 white — you know, I guess the white House or the NSC, had decided 

6 on. 

7 w. Do you recall him advising you at some point in 

8 September that, that the sequential release notion had been 

9 approved by the white House? 

10 C. I don't remember him specifically saying that this 

11 thing here has been approved because the position we took with 

12 the second channel was that the seven points, as enunciated in 

13 Tehran, would be, would be an — I don't know how you want to 

14 phrase it or characterize it — but would be an agreement that the 

15 United States would adhere to with Iran. Now, the idea of a 

16 sequential release, as I understood it, was [SIDE 3 ENDS] The 

17 fact that there was still a certain amount of mistrust and 

18 perhaps the sequential idea is the best way. They do this and we 

19 do this, and they do this, and we do this. That type of thing. 

20 That's the way I understood it. But, I was not involved — a lot 

21 of this evolved from, I gather private discussions between North 

22 and Admiral Poindexter. We had several meetings at the white 

2 3 House. A couple meetings with Poindexter. But it was basically 

24 the overall thing. And I don't recall really being in one of 

25 those meetings until after the second channel. I think there was 

26 one before, immediately before we met with him, then one 

50 

irii 




LRduSrSLU 



873 



uNCUSsra 



1 iimedlately after. That oo« I remember clearly on the 24th of 

2 September. 

3 w. O.K. We'll go back and cover September in just a 

4 moment. Mr. Cave, we are baclc on the record. I'm going to go 

5 baclc and forth on some subjects here, so fasten your safety belt. 

6 Reports came out of the meeting with, the first meeting with the 

7 second channel, that is a relet ive,^^|mon August 2Sth, that 

8 there was a separate TOW transaction that the Iranians were 

9 trying to put together. I think the fellow's name was Escandarl. 

10 Out of Spain. Were you familiar with that separate TOW 

11 transaction as it was developing? 

12 C. Yes. That was one where this guy was claiming to have, 

13 I forget how many TOWs it was, and we did everything. ^^^^^^^| 

14 ^^^^^^^^^^^K^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m and we 

15 to the conclusion that despite all of the information that we 

16 were getting that this deal was going dotm, that it was a 

17 spurious deal. 
18 

19 ^^^^ 

20 w. Do you recall when they reached that conclusion? 

21 C. I can't recall the exact date, no. But I know that, we 

22 had had word that supposedly the stuff had been shipped and our 

2 3 ^^^^^^H people say, hey, that's a bunch of crap, we would have 

24 picked it up. 

25 W. Were you aware that North contacted Charlie Allen on 

26 this, and asked Allen to report the matter to Customs? 




51 






874 



gt. « 




1 C. Yeah, w« w«re--and we did, we did contact Customs that 

2 we have this report. And Customs was never able to develop any 

3 concrete information on it. And also our — this munitions — 

4 munitions people said that they thought that it was false. 

5 w. According to Allen's memo on the subject. Hakim told 

6 him that he suspected that Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi were behind 

7 it. Was that ever any information that you could verify? 

8 C. Yeah. As I recall there was that speculation of 

9 Hakim's — I think we were able to put, oh, I'm not certain of 

10 this, but I think this guy Erajaskanderi, I believe it was. who 

11 was, had some connection with Ghorbanifar. But whether Ghorbani- 

12 -we never, I don't think we ever got any concrete evidence that 

13 Ghorbanifar or Khashoggi were involved in this deal. 

14 w. This subject came up in early, or excuse me, late 

15 August. Our first written information on it is a report that 

16 Secord made to North on August 27. North's notebooks reflect 

17 that there is still concern about this possible transaction as 

18 late as October 22. Were you aware of that? 

19 C. I don't remember the exact dates. North's concern was 

20 that he didn't want the Iranians to get bold of TOWs because that 

21 was one of the things we were authorized to deal with them with. 

22 And if they were able to develop an alternate source of TOWs, it 

23 would weaken our negotiating position. This is why he was 

24 pursuing shutting this deal off as — if at all possible. But as 

25 far as I recall, when we concluded, there was never a real deal. 

26 Our^^^^|H| people were pretty certain of that. 

52 






875 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 W. Do you know whether the existence of this possible TOW 

2 deal in which Escandari was involved played any role in the 

3 reduction of the price of the TOWs in the October transaction. 

4 That is, the reduction by the United States of the TOW price? 

5 C. Kone that I )cnow of. I never heard of any. 

6 W. Let me shift onto another subject. Charles Allen wrote 

7 a memo in September, on September 8 of 1986, which was directed, 

8 ultimately directed into Admiral Polndexter's hands by Lt.Col. 

9 North attached to another September 8 memo that Lt.Col. North 

10 wrote. And in Mr. Allen's memo he had the observation that, and 

11 I'll quote this, "more and more we suspect that some Hizballah 

12 leaders would be willing to settle for the release of the 

13 Americans and the French for Shi'ite prisoners held by Anton 

14 Lahad's Southern Lebanese army. He prefaced that remark by 

15 saying that those holding the American French are frustrated 

16 because there are no, they were no closer to securing the release 

17 of Da'wa prisoners than they were in March when they kidnapped 

18 William Buckley." The import of that, or at least the way that 

19 reads is that in Mr. Allen's opinion there was coming a point 

20 where the hostage holders were becoming frustrated that they were 

21 not making any progress on the Da'wa, and perhaps were willing to 

22 settle for the Shi'ite who are held prisoner in Southern Lebanon. 
2 3 Was that, firat was that an opinion that you were aware of, and 

24 second was it one that, at that time— and this would be early 

25 September- -you would have e ndorsed? 

26 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^__ 

53 



UNCLASSIFIED 



876 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 




w. O.K. Would you have agreed with what Mr. Allen wrote 
on September 8 then? 

C. Yeah. I would agree in the sense I think it was 
plausible. 




you have to be careful about the generalizations you make. But 
certainly what Mr. Allen wrote was entirely plausible, and fit in 
with things as we understood them at the time. 

w. Do you recall being aware that he submitted that 
opinion in September, on September 8, or in that time frame? 

C. Yeah. I don't specifically recall fi it, but it rings 
a bell that something like that went forward. And, go off the 

54 



UNCIASSIREO 



877 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 

9 

10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 



record . 



ONCUSSIHED 



W. O.K. wa arc bac)e on tha record. Mr. Cava, during this 
period of tijna, let me put you in the August-September-October 
1986 time frame, were you providing advice to North or 
Poindexter on yourself on whether there was any flexibility being 
shown on the Da'wa issue? 

C. By the Kuwaitis? On the— 

W. I'm thinking really on the, on behalf of the hostage 
holders . 

C. 
there was nothing that I could really have provided them with. 

W. So you were not providing them with that kind of 
information. 

Not on that 




But — and also, based on my own 
experience in the area, I thought that the hostage takers and the 
Iranians are going to have to make pretty, pretty iron-clad 
guarantees that there would be no more operations run against the 
royal family in Kuwait before there would be any motion on the 
Da'wa prisoners. 

w. How would, let me ask you just hypothetically, what 
kind of a, what kind of an iron-clad agreement could a group as 



SS 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



878 



UNtUSSffi 



1 shadowy as the Da'wa glv« to a, basically to a governmant on 

2 whether they'll continue to perform terrorist acts. 

3 C. Now you get into — if you'll go to my report on the 

4 final meeting in November in Geneva, one of the things that I 

5 argue for, is that, look, the Iranians are going to have to deal 

6 directly with the Kuwaitis on this, because they are the only 

7 ones that have the influence to make the guarantees and how the 

8 Da'wa thing ends is, we have an all day argument! 

9 Z think on the 9th of November. An exhausting one. It lasted 

10 the whole damn day. It was almost entirely devoted to the Da'wa 

11 prisoners. And which we said we had done everything we possibly 

12 could, it's now up to you guys. And the final thing, he says, 

13 O.K. 
14 
15 

16 w. O.K. We are going to return to that, later on in — 

17 C. Because that is one of the things that I think, where 

18 Secretary Shultz in his testimony was way off. 

19 w. We are going to get to that, too. So make a mental 

20 note of that, and we will definitely get to that. The next thing 

21 I want to ask you about, is there was an article that appeared in 

22 between the two meetings in Germany. One was on October 6-8, was 

23 the Frankfurt meeting, and then there was a meeting in Meinz on 

24 October 29-30. Ii^etween those two meetings, an article appeared 

25 in Newsweek magazine on the subject of the Americans held hostage 

26 in Lebanon. And that article, which was dated October 20, 



56 



ONCUSSIFiEO 



879 



UNCUSH 



1 actually cama out aarllar than that, and It contained the 

2 following observation. First, it stated that Jacobsen, Anderson 

3 and Sutherland were being held by the Magnla family members of 

O 

4 the Mausi clan. Then it went on, and I'll qv^te ostensibly, 

5 "they snatched their victims to trade for seventeen confrairs in 

6 terror jailed in Kuwait. But intelligence sources believe they 

7 might settle for springing just three Lebanese Shi'ites among 

8 them, who have been sentenced to death." First, let me aslc you, 

9 do you recall this article coming out? 

10 C. Yeah. Z think I recall it now. We were somewhat 

11 concerned about it.. 

12 w. Why was that? 

13 C. We were wondering whether somehow, somewhere, something 

14 had leaked on the initiative. But I don't know if anyone ever 

15 made any conclusions about it. Z don't think security ever 

16 investigated, made any investigations or anything. 

17 w. Now when you say, we wondered about it. who was 

18 curious about this? 

19 C. Well, the people tha| were involved. Charlie Allen, 

20 myself, and Z thinkJ^^HUlH and Col. North. Somewhere that 

21 someone had leaked something to them — to Newsweek. Some person 

22 unknown to us. Or whether it was just coincidence that Newsweek 

23 had come up — developed this story independently. Zts so 

24 fragmen--as you know from the article, its pretty fragmentary. 

25 So its hard to tell. But it gets a little bit close to home, you 

26 know, about what we were doing. 

57 






880 



UNClASSinED 



1 w. It was quite close to home at that point, wasn't It? 

2 The — I gather then that there was speculation, but no 

3 investigation, that you know of made on who the "intelligence 

4 sources" were who were the source of the Newsweek article, is 

5 that right? 

6 C. That's correct. Because in a situation like that, if 

7 you investigate, you only call attention. 

8 W. Now there are — the white House put out some press 

9 guidance on this, which was dated October 14, and the press 

10 guidance said that the, it had a series of questions that posed 

11 and then answered itself, and in response to the central theme of 

12 the article, which was that if only three Lebanese Shi'ltes were 

13 released, the hostages could come home. At least Jacobsen, 

14 Anderson, and Sutherland. The press guide then said, "the 

S 

15 question is not whether we would ;^eek the release of three or 

16 seventeen prisoners, we will not negotiate the exchange of 

17 innocent Americans for the release from prison of tried and 

18 convicted murderers held in a third country. Nor will we 

19 pressure other nations to do so. To make such concessions would 

20 jeopardize the safety of other American citizens and would only 

21 encourage more terrorism." Were you aware that the 

22 Administration was putting out that kind of press guidance in the 

23 wake of this article? 

24 C. I can't recall exactly what I knew or didn't know right 

25 now, because it's a long time ago. But there is one thing that 

26 this has jogged my memory on. One of our concerns was the three 

58 



UNMSIREO 



881 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 condemned to death. Because we Icnew that they were never going 

2 to get out. And we were worried about that. It was someone else 

3 leaking something to the press to tell us what their final price 

4 was going to be. But, I don't — I assume that Col. North had 

5 played some role in this, in this statement to the press. But I 

6 don't know that for a fact. 

7 W. Mow the statement to the Press would have come on the 

8 heels of the Frankfurt negotiations. 

9 C. Frankfurt negotiations. 

10 w. And the Frankfurt negotiations resulted in what Albert 

11 Hakim has agreed ought to be called the Hakim Accords. Otherwise 

12 known as the nine-point plan, which maybe that's a term you would 

13 prefer. 

14 C. Actually If you look at them, they are not much 

15 different. It's just an expansion. The original seven-point 

16 proposal that was given to the Iranians In Tehran. 

17 w. O.K. Well, I want to go over that plan with you in 

18 some detail. First, however, there Is a — putting aside the Hakim 

19 Accords, there is a October 10 PROF memo, which was reproduced in 

20 the Tower Report, only It omitted Point 3. Point 3 reads, "Copp 

21 and Sam help prepare a plan for approaching the Kuwaitis to 

22 guarantee no more terrorism against the Amir and by which the 

23 Amir will use a religious occasion to release some of the Oa'wa." 

24 They will take this plan to the Hizballah as their idea (face- 

25 saving gesture) with the Hlzb." Do you recall that being part of 

26 the nine-point plant, reduced to the seven-point plan on a PROF 

59 



HMniKCfpcn 



882 



^ ■ Vr :' ' *' ." - ■' 

1 note. bi«yLhwO(. iUi 

2 C. Yeah, I recall that. I r'ecaTi "tKis. As you can see, 

3 the plan that we finally game them was what had come up at the 

4 November 9 meeting in Geneva, with which you guys have gotta piclc 

5 up the ball and run with it. We've done everything we can. Now 

6 the only thing that I know of that was done — excuse me a minute 

7 while I take a look at this. I don't know if it was this 

8 meeting, but at some point what the Iranians told us was that 

9 they were concerned about the five that got the short terms. Of 

10 these seventeen, three were sentenced to death. Nine got medium 

11 to long prison terms, and five got very short prison, I think it 

12 was just four years or something like that. What they were 

13 concerned about, is that the Monies people, was that the five 

14 would not be released when their terms were up. Now, the only 

15 commitment that I can recall that was made to the Iranians was 

16 that Col. North said that he or Admiral Poindexter would talk to 

17 the, I think the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister about this, to see if 

18 in fact the Kuwaiti's would release these guys when their term 

19 was up, and my understanding — I can't prove it — but that actually 

20 took place, because the Iranians were subsequently told that 

21 these peopl* would be released when their terms were up. 

22 w. O.K. Let me first just make it clear for the record 

23 what I have handed to Mr. Cave and what he has read as a PROF 

24 note, dated 10/10/66 with the, and the time of the PROF note is 

25 215531 hours. It bears our Committee identifier of N12176 and it 

26 has a page 213 up in the upper right-hand corner. Now, Mr. Cave, 

60 



OlLSSSiFlED 



883 



wmaflt? 



1 I'm going to return to the subject of the negotiations In 

2 Frankfurt later on this afternoon, but the reason I put that PROF 

3 note In front of you Is that that PROF note Is based on the 

4 Frankfurt negotiations. Is that correct? 

5 C. Yes, that's correct. 

6 w. And the note does contain in It, a description. In 

7 general terms of an effort that — an undefined effort — that you 

8 and General Secord are going to undertake to see If some of the 

9 Da'wa can be released. Is that correct? 

10 C. What It was. Is that we were supposed to come up with 

11 some sort of plan o^ action for the Iranians with regard to the 

12 Da'wa. 

13 w. Right. And that's what Is embodied In point three. 

14 C. That's embodied In point three. 

15 w. O.K. Now, my question Is, this, the PROF note appears 

16 on October 10. The article appears not long after that because 

17 the press guidance on It Is dated October 14. Do you know 

18 whether any consideration was given to whether this press article 

19 was leaked In order to support the effort that had been made In 

20 Frankfurt by preparing public opinion for partial release of the 

21 Da'wa prisoners? 

22 C. Ho. I have absolutely no Information about any 

23 purposeful leak of that type. 

24 W. And what I'm saying, and I know you are reading me 

25 clearly, is that, is whether this leak might have come from 

26 within those people who were participating in the Iran 

61 



UNCLASSIFIED 



884 



uNuUSsm 



1 Inltlatlva. 

2 C. I know nothing about that, no. 

3 w. Again, this Is another cameo subject I'm going to take 

4 out of the Frankfurt and Melnz negotiations, before I go Into 
them In great detail. You were aware thatj^^^H^^^^^^HV as 

6 he was known In the pseudonym, one of his pseudonyms, was an 

7 Intelligence officer with revolutionary guards. Is that right. 

8 C. Our first Indication was when we were In Tehran, 

9 because when he was Introduced, Ghorbanlfar told me out In the 
10 hall that he has an Intelligence connection. 

H w. You didn't know that already? 

12 C. No, this was when — we'd never met the man until we 

13 arrived In Tehran. 

14 w. Were you not aware that he participated In the 

15 Frankfurt meetings In February of '86? 

16 C. Oh, no, no. X wasn't aware of that, that this was the 

17 same guy. No. No. I mean, when I first — the first time I knew 

18 anything about him was when ha was introduced to me In Tehran. 

19 And Ghorbanlfar on the side said that this Is an Intelligence 

20 officer. And I think that's the first time that we were told 

21 that he had any kind of an Intelligence function. 

22 w. Did that coma as news to you now that ha was—he 

23 participated in the February meeting. 

24 C. Yes. Z didn't know that it was ha that participated. 

25 I never knew that. 

26 w. Albert Hakim advised us that it was one in the same 

62 



yNClASSIRFO 



885 



parson. 

C. 

w. 
as well. 

C. 



I wonder why Albert never told me? 

I can't answer that. General Secord would have known 




They never told me that he was — is all 1^ Is that It was 
ind one or two other Iranian military officers. They 
were described to with ma. 

W. Well, Hakim and—well I know Hakim specif ically-- 
advised us that the man he called the engine was present at the 

10 February intelligence briefing that General Secord, under the 

11 pseudonym of Richard Adam^ performed for the Iranians. 

12 C. Learn something avary day. 

13 W. I believe the background information on the relative H| 

14 JBI^^Bwas that he, too, had a revolutionary guard background, 

15 is that right? 

16 C. Yes. He had been in the revolutionary guard ever since 

17 he got out of high school. 

18 ' W. Now, the revolutionary guard is distinct from the 

19 Iranian army, is that not correct? 

20 C. That's correct. 

21 w. And that's tha military arm of the—would it be fair to 

22 say of tha mora radical element within Iran? 

23 C. Mo. I think that what brought about the revolutionary 

24 guard was the mistrust by the clergy of the military, of the 

25 regular military. Almost an exact replica of what happened in 

26 tha Russian revolution, is that the Red Army was created by 

63 



yNClASSiflFI 



886 



yNClASSiFlEO 



1 Trotsky to replace the regular military organization, and what is 

2 happened In Iran Is that the Rev Guard Is gradually replacing the 

3 regular military in Iran. 

4 w. They are not considered to be more radical than the 

5 Army itself? 

6 C. They are considered to be, they are considered to be 

7 more radical, because the military was pretty much X£i^o^l^l(=sl, 

8 and these guys were organized you know, initially for political 

9 purposes. They were the arm, they were the executive arm of the 

10 revolution, so to speak. 

11 w. The members of the Revolutionary Guard would be more 

12 properly characterized, true believers than members of the 

13 regular army. Is that fair to say? 

14 C. That's fair to say. 

15 vr. Do you — were you aware who was getting — let's limit 

16 this to the HAvnc spares. Do you recall who was getting, or did 

17 you know who was getting the HAWK spare parts? whether they were 
16 going to the regular Army or whether they were going to the 

19 Revolutionary Guards? 




In fact at one point ,J^^^^^H told us that the 

25 military approached and said we hear you guys got some TOWs, we 

26 need them. And they didn't give them to them. In fact, they 

64 



IJNCLfi.l^lFIF! 



887 




were saying If when this whole deal goes through, if we get all 

the TOWs, we are going to sell some of them to the military. 

w. That sounds like a close, professional relationship. 

C. 




The fact is, you )cnow all through the 

10 meetings with the second channel, they say that Israel's 

11 footprints can't be, in this at all. And. one of the, I think one 

12 of the real motivations for Israel to contact on this, is that 

13 they desperately want a strategic relationship with Iran, and by 

14 1984 they began to see that unless the United States gets back in 

15 a position of influence in Iran, there is no chance for them. 

16 w. This remark that the relet ive^^^^^^^Bmade, about 

17 the Army coming to them for the TOWs. Were these the February 

18 TOWs, the 1000 TOWs they received in February, or the later 

19 October shipment? 

20 C. This was th«~he told us this~Z think it was the 

21 thousand— he was referring to the 1000 TOWs. Because he told us 

22 this when we made the arrangements for the final 500 shipment at 

23 the end of October. Even aside he said, you know — he had a good 

24 sense of humor — and he said, "you know, the military had 

25 approached us some time ago when they heard we had gotten some 

26 TOWS, and they wanted some." He says, "well, when this whole 



65 



UNCIASSIFI 



888 



l)NClASSin[0 



1 d"l goes through we are planning on selling them some.- At 

2 exorbitant prices, I might add. 

3 [END OF SIDE 4] 



66 



UNCUSSIFIE 



||NCUSSIFi[ 



1 3IDE3 S AND 6 - TCW/) 

3 w. Mr. Cava, do you recall at any point the question of 

4 the TOWS actually going to the Revolutionary Guard, rather than 

5 to say the Army becoming an issue? 

6 C. I don't recall it ever becoming an issue, no. It was 

7 an Interesting note, as far as we were concerned. The Rev Guards 

8 were handling this. 

9 W. Did you ever see the finding that the sinisVter(?) was 

10 based on? 

11 c. Not until after the fact. I was told about the finding 

12 when Z was brought in^ But there was a finding. Z don't Icnow 

13 whether it was^BM^I^^V Someone who had seen it had taken 

14 notes and said here's what it says. 

15 w. The finding — I'm gonna just go through a portion of 

16 it here — contemplated the United States facilitating efforts by 

17 third parties and third countries to establish contact with 

18 moderate elements within and outside of the Government of Iran. 

19 Let me stop right there because we are going to go a little 

20 further with this. Did you consider that the people you were 

working ^''HII^^^I^^^^^^H "^'^ ^^^' group. 

22 Were they which you would consider moderates within Iran? 

23 C. Z would not use the term "moderate." Z would call them 

24 pragmatic, and use the Iranian term "mlanirow" — middle roaders. 

25 W. Then these personalities were you would consider to be 

26 consistent with the general intent of the finding, the moderate 

27 element aspect of the finding? 

67 



UNCLASSIFI 



890 



icidssire 



1 C. Wall I think modarat* is an unfortunata word, but tha 

2 paopla that wa had to daal with, and wa'ra willing to daal with, 

3 yes, that's who wa ware daaling with. 

< w. The notion of tha finding was that tha modarata 

5 elements, however advisable tha term was, would be provided with 

6 arms and equipment and related materiel in order to enhance their 

7 credibility and that the arms would assist the moderates in their 

8 effort to achieve a more pro U.S. government in Iran by 

9 demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to 

10 defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet 

11 Union. Knowing what you )cnow about the dealings with^B^^HH 

12 and^^^^^^H| and tha others, was this group wa ware dealing with 

13 consistent with tha intent of the Finding? 

i« C Pretty much so. I think if I'd have been involved at 

15 the original writing of tha Finding I would have liked to word it 

16 otherwise. But I don't think that is inconsistent with what we 

17 were trying to do and with tha people that wa were dealing with. 

18 w. And this is, you would say this notwithstanding that 

19 the effect would be also to strengthen tha Revolutionary Guard, 

20 vis-a-vis, the Army, is that correct? 

21 C. Wall, the question was, is that you have to pick an 

22 element to daal with in Iran. That is part of tha strategic 

23 relationship. And what wa ware daaling with is that— was the one 

24 that was the only one willing to deal with us. This was 

25 Rafsanjani's faction, and what made him politically powerful is 

26 his control of the Majlis, and tha large scale influence he has 

68 



UNCLASSIFIEI 



891 




s 



1 among th« R«v Guards. 

2 W. North's notas reflect that at soma point, it's an 

3 isolated entry, but it — in early November he has a note that 

4 H^HUlhas the ambition to build an airwing for the 

5 Revolutionary Guard. Were you aware that he was considering 

6 something that ambitious? 

7 C. The, I think that he is not talking specifically about 

9 the Rev Guard has been actively engaged in building an airway, 

10 and has actually bought aircraft, and have dona considerable 

11 pilot training. 

12 w. The, just for the record, the note does sa^^Hlwants 

13 to build an airwing, but Z think that that's a minor point. 

14 C. I think he's speaking in terms of the Rev Guard when he 

15 speaks about ^^^H Because, I remember, you know, I remember 

16 some discussions about this. 

17 w. Did these, the discussions that you recall, were these 

18 in Germany? 

19 C. Z think that, yeah, the two meetings that he obtained 

20 were the initial one in Frankfurt at the beginning of October, 

21 and then the November one which we had in Geneva. The 6 through 

22 10 November meetings. 

23 w. Let me back up just briefly onto the Revolutionary 

24 Guard point we were discussing earlier. Just to make the record 

25 clear on this. To your knowledge was there any point where 

26 senior officials sat down and thought through the — whether giving 



69 



UNCUSSlflFii 



892 



UNCUSSlf- 






1 arms to th« representatives of the Revolutionary Guard was 

2 consistent with the Finding? Do you recall a discussion like 

3 that at all? 

4 C. I don't recall a discussion like that, no. 

5 w. In the — in your notes of the meetings in Washington, 

6 the first meeting in Washington ^'^^^.^^^^Ib you note that he 

7 told you that^m^had "played a role" in the kidnapping of 

8 Frank Reed. Do you recall that? 

9 C. Yes. He told me that they thought, and they were 

10 investigating it. But, in subsequent meetings, he told — they 

11 never turned up anything. He said he thought — the reason why he 

12 said this is that they thought maybe the radical faction was 

13 trying to create more problams for the moderates. He says, you 

14 know, there is no — in Tehran it's well known that Rafsanjani was 

15 against the taking of hostages. And, since^^^^^^lwas involved 

16 in this, and is also a member of the radical faction, he may have 

17 played a role in the taking of Reed. 

18 W. Did — in your subsequent negotiations, did you — when I 

19 say you, the Americans collectively, press the Iranians on the 

20 status of our investigation of this? 

21 c. The only thing I can recall is, oh, uh — I think it was 

22 during the Meinz meeting that he said that they hadn't come up 

23 with anything. 

24 W. Were they undecided, or were they — or they had 

25 demonstrated that he was not involved? 

26 C. Well, I don't know~we don't know. They just told us 

70 



Mimim 



^m 



893 



UNCUSSIBE 



1 that nothing h as come of the Investigation. 
2I 




But, they — we could never get any 
followup out of them on It. And that might by typical Iranian 
that, well, we're not going to tell the Americans that. It 
might — they Just said, well, we haven't gotten anything. 
But .4a| 



w. But .4A^^^^^^Hhad been Involved In Reed's kidnapping, 
that would have been a breach of all understanding with him. Is 

10 that not correct? 

11 C. Yeah. I was klnda doubtful of that, because, you know, 

12 I had called ^^^^^^P Immediately after Reed was kidnapped. And 

1 3 I^^^^^Hr ^^'^ he ' s no actor , sounded really astonished . 

14 w. The — let me point this out. In your note of the 

15 meeting you don't contain — you don't Inject any editorial comment 

16 on whether you believe what the relative is saying or not. Did 

17 you have an opinion at that point? 

18 C. well, I think it's the way he said it. He said that 

19 there is, you know, like there is some indication thatj 

20 may have been Involved in the Reed kidnapping because they 

21 suspect that the radical faction is doing it. And since I 

22 is involved with us, he may have played a role. But I thought, 

23 maybe I should — I thought it was pretty speculative on his part. 

24 I mean, he was saying, here's an event that happens in Beirut, 

25 and we think this may have happened. Now, I think that they, 

26 they told us subsequently that they thought another group was-- 



71 



UNCLASSiF! 






894 



UNWSSlflEl 



1 and I had a big go around wlth^^^^^^Hon this — and h« told us 

2 at th« beginning of October that they hadn't been able to 

3 determine who it was that took Reed and Ciccipio. 

4 w. Later, I think in early October, North prepared a 

5 memorandum for Poindexter where he attributed the Ciccipio 

6 kidnapping ^°^^|^^^H Do you know what he might have been 

7 basing that on? 

8 C. I don't recall at the time--I think that we were — by 

9 this time, you know, we were very concerned, there was a lot of 

10 speculation going since we were changing channels and everything, 

11 what might happen. -And incidentally, there were several phone 

12 calls by^^^^^^Hand me where he was trying to find out what was 

13 going on. He kept asking me about Brussels. Are we going to 

14 follow that up? And, z, oh, just sloughed him off. But, I 

15 didn't — I never saw that memo. I never — Col. North didn't send 

16 us copies of his memos. We sent him copies ear ours, but he 

17 never sent us copies of his. 

18 w. But you are not aware of what he might be basing that 

19 statement on? 

20 C. I can't, Z can't recall at the moment what he's basing 

21 that statement on. Other than what I'm talking — you know, we 

22 were concerned about the change of channels. whether that would 

23 effect — whether that bad any effect on the taking of the two 

24 hostages or not. 

25 w. Let me, let me turn again to another subject. This is 

26 also during the Washington meeting with the second channel, 

72 



«i;lii?;^irfFn 



895 



UNCLASSIFIED 




In that meeting, according to notas that G«n*ral Secord 
toolc, jj^^^^ladvlsad all of you that William Buckley was not 
killed, that he died of natural causes, that he had three heart 
attacks. There is no indication in the notes that anybody 
challenged him on his assertion that Mr. Buckley died of natural 
causes . ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
in fact he died of complications from beatings. 

C. From beatings, yes. 

W. Do you recall the relative making that assertion? 

C. Yeah, I rem — uh — Z — uh — we asked him about Hi- 
ll treatment and everything, and he said he^ad no information On 

12 that. But that he had not died of torture as reported by the 

13 press, but had died of natural causes. We subsequently learned 

14 of course, that he did die of natural causes, but the natural 

15 causes were brought about by his ill-treatment. And the fact 

16 that they didn't gat him any medical attention that was worth 

17 anything. Uh, the great concern about — cause he told us that 

18 /they had 400 pages of interrogation that he had been put through 

19 while he was being held captive. And also ha made the comnitment 

20 to held — to try and locate the body. 

21 w. On the subject of how Mr. Buckley died, were you, and I 

22 say you collectively, was the American group credulous of this 

23 information? Did they give it some credence, or did they feel 

24 that the relative was giving them— was basically jerking their 

25 chain on how Buckley had died? 

26 C. we were doubtful— well, we Immediately rejoined you 



73 




["JS-fc 



\\\L0 



896 



liHClASSIFiED 



Icnow. wall, w« understand he's b««n subject to serious, you 
know, torture, and the relative's response to that was that he 
had no information on that. 

w. Now, Secord's notes don't show any rejoinder. But you 
recall a rejoinder? 

C. Yeah, there was. And that, oh, uh, we were very much 
concerned--then he told us about the notes, about getting hold of 
the notes. And they promised us that they would get them — give 
us the notes, and also, as part of the deal, we definitely wanted 
his body returned. But there was some Incredulity expressed by 
those there. 




74 



897 



1 

2 
3 
A 
5 

6 

7 

e 

9 

10 

11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 




w. That^^^H^_dld not hav* sufficient contact with the 
Revolutionary Guards? 

C. That's correct. 

W. Let me ask you this. Did you, did you pose to the, to 
or to any Iranian in the second channel, the story that 
Buckley was lifted from Lebanon and brought to Iran, and tortured 
in Iran? 

C. I think that was done by Col. North. And, as I recall, 
^denied it. And I think this was at one of the late 
evening sessions in Washington. 

w. There was sort of a parallel story that went along with 



75 



ONSIASSIREB 



898 



UNClASSIFieO 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 1 
26 



that — a story that might b« placed in lieu of that story. And 
that is that rather than having been taken to Iran and tortured 
that he was tortured but under the guidance and direction of 
Revolutionary Guard officers in Lebanon. Do you recall that 
question being posed ^^^j^^^KK^o^ anyone else in the Second 
Channel? 

C. I don't recall that question being posed] 







899 



UNCLASSIFIti) 



WNMSIf/fB 



900 




M. Did you go on th« whit* Hous* tour? 

C. No. 

W. Do you know who did? 

C. I thlnJc It was just, oh. Col. North and^^^^^H-was 

8 Hakim there? 

9 W. well, somebody would have had to be a translator. I 

10 think Hakim was. 

11 C. I guess Hakim went along as a translator. No, I was — I 

12 stayed In the office to write something up. I forget what It 

13 was. 

14 w. O.K. Let me stop right here and turn the questioning 

15 over to Jack Taylor. 
16 

17 EXAMINATION BY JACK TAYLOR 

18 T. O.K. I'm going to — do you want to take a break? 

19 w. This Is to you transcriber, whoever you may be. I'm 

20 Instructing Jack Taylor In the use of this higher form of 

21 technology. Jack Is going to be asking a few question of the 

22 witness, and it should be noted at some point that he has taken 

23 over questioning. I think he'll Identify himself for the record. 

24 T. My name is Jack Taylor, investigator with the House 

25 Select Committee, continuing the quest ioning. 
26 




mmmm 



901 



Mmim 



Ifi^fio OQ A*0 y(^ 







902 



UNCUSSIFIEO 




1 
2 
3 

4 ^^^^^^^^^^ 

5 ^^^^^^^^^H we were very alarmed about the pricing. 

6 T. Uh-huh. 

7 c. And, uh, because that's a hell of a — we Icnew what the 

8 damn things were costing. That was a hell of a mark-up. I think 

9 the total cost for the two high-powers, and all of the spare 

10 parts and the 508 TOWs only came to about $10 or $11 million. 

11 T. Right. Afl we, I think there was about $12— 

12 C. Well, that was for everything. 

13 T. Everything. Including the shipping, the freight. 

14 C. We never did ship the two radars. But the price for 

15 the radars and the TOWs and the spare parts — I think the total 

16 of that came to just under $10 million. 

17 T. So, at this point, you've had a meeting on the fourth 

18 of April with Ghorbanifar. And you had another meeting In May in 

19 London with Ghorbanifar. And you had another meeting in May in 

20 London when he was discussing these particular parts. 

21 c. He already knew the price because I think it was 

22 transmitted to hln via North and Nlr. 

23 T. Do you know when that happened? 

24 C. No, I don't. 

25 T. Did you participate in any pricing discussion in April 

26 in Washington, D.C.? 



87 



UNCLASSiflO 



903 



UNClASSlFitO 



1 C. wall th« only thing that I participated in was what w« 

2 got from our logistics -- is tha prica of it -- and wa passad 

3 that on to Col. North. 

4 T. And that's the OoO prica that you received from 

5 logistics that was provided by the Department of Defense. Okay. 

6 You didn't hear North — or were you privy to the conversation — 

7 when North discussed with Ghorbanifar the prices at all that 

8 were different from the ones at DoD. 

9 C. No, they were very careful about that. I don't know 

10 whether they were purposely keeping me compartmented. Z don't 

11 ever recall any — the only thing that Z recall about pricing 

12 with Nir and North are two things. One was about the 1000 TOWs. 

13 when we met in Paris, Nir complained that North had sold them too 

14 cheaply. 

15 T. Okay. And what was the other? 

16 C. And the other was in Tehran when Z raised the question 

17 about the cost that Ghorbanifar had asked me to back him up on — 

18 the twenty-four and one-half million for the HAWK spares, and 

19 then Z called this to North's attention and we got hold of Nir — 

20 we were out in the . And Nir, the only time he ever 

21 said anything like it in my presence, he said, well some of it is 

22 based on your mark-up. Now what he meant by that, Z don't know. 

23 We knew that the expenses for all this stuff were being paid out 

24 of moneys also generated by the sales. 
25 
26 



904 



UNCUlSSIFiE 






iii^sim 



905 



ziCLiSlfP 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
S 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 




T. All right. L«t iM jutrtST* a braak h«r«. I'm going 
to tak* a look at my notas. Thar* is on* quastloa along that 
Una, for tha saka of my raport again, and tha accuracy of it. 

91 



mmm 



906 



lii^GLASSiFIED 



1 Did you Indicate that early on In the operation you had suggested 

2 to CIA officials that, that — you mentioned already that you 

3 should have as few service officers — is that the phrase you use? 

4 C. Serving officers. 

5 T. Serving officers, as possible to be witting or involved 

6 in this operation. Did you also have an understanding with 

7 anyone at any time that you should not be present when pricing 

8 was discussed? 

9 C. No. I had no such understanding. My, my whole point 

10 on the serving officers was that this was a — there were two 

11 aspects to it. And ,to keep the Icnowledgeability very limited, 

12 one, was the sensitivity of the operation, and the fact that it 

13 was very high risk. And the kind of thing that when it blows up 

14 it could destroy careers. And I didn't want any serving officer 

15 putting his career at risk, when I could do It without any. I 

16 don't have a career to risk. 

17 T. O.K. Now I along that— taking that a step further 

18 then, you were allowed access to all conversations Involving 

19 pricing, but there may have been conversations where you just 

20 weren't, you weren't aware of them, huh? 

21 C. Oh, I was not involved — I mean, we — the way — it 

22 appears, what Z understand about the pricing. We would get the 

23 DOD pricing by our office of logistics, and give that to North. 

24 And then North would deal with Nir and Ghorbanifar on the prices. 

25 And, in my — in hindsight, they were very careful not to talk 

26 about the costs in my presence. There weren't any other CIA 

92 



KNCUS'lEO 



907 




s 



IFi 



1 off lean pr«s«at. Ones th«y got th« prlc* that thay had to pay 

2 us, than tfa vara out of it. 
T. So your first sansa of alarm than was In May, whan you 

put tha absoluta prlca togathar with 



thosa . 
C. 
T. 



Yaah. This was an awful, awfully larga mark-up. 

And, again for tha racord to clarify my raport, what 
was your rasponsa to North whan you raad that? 

C. wa brought that to North's attantion, and X don't — ha 
raally didn't hava much to say at that tima, axcapt to agraa with 
us that this was a,, quita an agragious mark-up bacausa at tha 

2 maatings in April with Ghorbanifar^!ti0. told us that ha was going 

3 to mark up tha cost 60%. Ha would add his axpansas onto tha 

4 cost, and than mark it up 60%'. That saamad to ba a lot mora than 

5 60%. Ha told us, ha told us in London that his axpansas that ha 

6 had incur rad, with ragard to this shipmant, wara about $350,000. 

7 So X navar, X navar got much of a raaction out of North whan wa 

this up. ^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H X 
9 got mora of a raaction out of hia in Tahran. 

T. O.K. Stapping back to tha April 4 maating in 

1 Washington^ D.C. , you did writa a raport, I think, following that 

2 maating in vhicta you synopsisad tha convarsationa that wara hald 

3 ovar that, Z guaas a day and a half or two day pariod whara you 

4 mat with Ghorbanifar. 

5 C. Yaah, wa mat with hin on April 3, and than X saw him 
26 briafly tha morning of tha 4th bafora ha took off to saa his 



908 



UNCUSSiriED 



1 girlfriend in California. 

2 T. O.K. And In one part of your report you mentioned that 

3 Ghorba began discussing his cut at the Washington, D.C. meeting. 

4 I assume again his cut would be a percentage of — 

5 C. Yeah. He would— 

6 T. — of the payoff. 

7 C. He said that he would add his, add his expenses to the 

8 price and then add 60%. 

9 T. O.K. That was the same figure you just discussed with 

10 me now. 

11 C. Yes. 

12 T. Gotcha. And I take It again as I asked earlier, you 

13 did not discuss pricing for the 240 and the radars other than 

14 what DOD had given you at that meeting. 

is C. Yes. It's all we'd do. we would give that material 

16 to, oh, uh. Col. North. 

17 T. O.K. Stepping to another subject, there was a lot of 

18 confusion over the necessity of a preadvanced trip to Tehran, or 

19 Kish Island, or wherever, and this confusion carried all the way 

20 through, I guess, not necessarily confusion, but perhaps 

21 controversy over whether or not a trip should be held, continued 

22 all the wmg from early March up through early May, I guess, as to 

23 when — 

24 C. By the end of April. 

25 T. End of April? 

26 C. A decision was made that we wouldn't go. 

94 






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1 T. And thttr* was soma, th«ra was a plan to, I think at one 

2 time, meet wlthJ^^^^^Vin Praxikfurt, before you actually 
2 traveled to Tehran. 

4 C. Well, what the meeting wlthJ^^^^^Hwas decided as 

5 superfluous. One of the problems Is Is we can't, we couldn't 

6 believe that this guy could speak with any authority, given his 

7 level of intelligence. There was a lot of discussion about North 

8 and myself and Ghorbanifar. Ghorbanifar said he would hire a 

9 private jet and we'd all fly in and we could talk for, you know, 

10 one day, and fly back out. That was, that was scotched, Z think 

11 by the, to the best of my knowledge, by the white House as being 

12 too dangerous. 

13 T. O.K. Did you ever get to the point to where the 

14 Administration had agreed at one point, where they were going to 

15 send you, and you said you and North, at one point were 

16 considered? 

17 C. Yeah. That was, that was, it was really a proposal 

18 that just never got approved. 

19 T. General Secord testified that at one point he was to go 

20 in and do the same, conduct the same affair, as a pre-advance 

21 meeting to determine an agenda prior to McFarlane's trip. 

22 C. That was very early on, I think, before I got involved. 

23 And then, because when we were talking in early April, it was 

24 going to be just myself and North, and Ghorbanifar flying in. 

25 T. O.K. 

26 C. And that was scratched. 

95 






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uNtussre 



1 M. This is Tim woodcock again. Hr. Cava, what was it that 

2 was, that th« Adminiatratioa perceived was too dangerous about 
2 the advance trip. 

4 C. well, I think that we really didn't know that much 

5 about who we were dealing with. Z mean the only — as far as we 

6 know the only guy on the other end you know, *'*3^^^^^H^ *^'^' 

7 there was a lot of uncertainty, there was considerable mistrust 

8 of Ghorbanifar, and it was decided that we just didn't want to 

9 take the chance. 

10 w. The plans for the meeting in Iran originally, of 

11 course, centered oo Kish Island, but the plans for the meetiiig in 

12 Iran began to develop either during or on the heels of the 

13 Frankfurt meeting in February. Were you aware of that? 

14 C. Yes, I was aware of that. We — this was just general 

15 discussion. It was at the meeting in March in Paris that 

16 Ghorbanifar told us that the Iranians had agreed in principle to 

17 a high-level U.S. delegation coming to Tehran. 

18 w. There is, there are a series of PROF notes and 

19 memoranda that, that go all the way through March and April that 

20 place the meeting, the one that McFarlane was going to 

21 participate in, as being imminent within a week or ten days, and 

22 it keeps receding on the horizon. 

23 C. Yeah. 

24 w. How do you square the imminence suggested in those 

25 memoranda with your statement about the advance meeting being too 

26 dangerous? 

96 






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UNCIASSIFIEO 



1 C. Wall, I don't, Z don't, I was not awar* of th« 

2 discussion which lad to the cancellation of the advance meeting. 

3 Because that was done over at the NSC or the white House. I 

4 wasn't privy to that. Cause all I got from North is that they 

5 decided not to do it, and that we'd go ahead with the regular 

6 meeting based on the guarantees that I was getting over the phone 

7 from Ghorbanifar, one channel, and also from North via Nir. I 

8 mean from Ghorbanifar and Nir via North on the other side. And 

9 the decision was made to scratch the preliminary mission and to 

10 just go with the regular trip to Tehran with McParlane meeting 

11 the party. 

12 w. Correct me if you have contrary information, but I was 

13 always under the impression that the McFarlane meeting that's 

14 proposed in the PROF notes begiiuing as early as late February 

15 and in PROF notes and memoranda, through March and April, is 

16 delayed primarily because the financing for the transaction is 

17 not yet put together. 

18 C. Oh, that, that's true. No. I'm sorry if there is some 

19 confusion. I was confusing the, uh, the preliminary meeting that 

20 didn't come off with — yeah, we kept telling them that we can't, 

21 we can't come, we can't do this deal until after the financing 

22 for the parts, because, you Icnow, one of the proposals was that 

23 they release the hostages and we bring in the parts. And then, 

24 well that no — you gotta come in first with the parts, then we'll 

25 release the hostages, and then we got down to O.K., well we'll 

26 come in with a group and a small percentage of the parts, and 

97 



UNCLASSIFIED 




912 



_ _ _li JLaJ 

1 th«n you guys raleas* lh« hostag«s, and than wa'll bring tha rest 

2 of tha parti In. No, no, you ara corract in that, and tha delay 

3 is that wa did not — wa couldn't buy tha spare parts because we 

4 did not get the money into our account until the 16th of May, I 

5 thinJc it was. And then we had to take the time, you know, to 

6 ship the material to — pre-position the material in Israel. 

7 w. O.K. I'm not going to dwell on this, but where you are 

8 losing m« on this is that from the notes and memoranda, it seems 

9 as though money — the lack of money is holding up the McFarlane 

trip, and that with money tha McFarlane trip could have happened 

1 as early as sometime in April. If your advance trip was too 

2 dangerous to be held, what was it that would have made tha 

3 McParlana trip safer? 

4 C. That's a good question. I think that tha problem was, 

5 is that — I, I honestly can't answer you. Because all I know is 

6 tha preliminary trip was cancelled, but the McFarlane trip was 

7 approved on tha basis that wa thought wa had reasonable enough 

8 assurances by ^^^^^B and Ghorbanifar. Now the money, of course 

9 tha hold-up on the money was, we needed the money before we could 

20 buy the spares, and wa had to have the spares pre-positioned in 

21 Israel before wa could go in. I can't really clear up — I 

22 honestly don't know why the decision was made to scratch the 

23 preliminary mission. I thought — in hindsight, it would have been 

24 better had we gone. 

25 w. Let ma just ask one more question on this. Or two more 

26 questions. The decision to scratch tha advance meeting was made 



UNCLAS 



98 

Mi li.U 



913 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 to your recollection, when, and by whom? 

2 C. I know that by the end of April It had gone — cause — you 

3 Icnow, if you'll see, there, is — we'd even had a date for going, 

4 Ollie and I, somewhere around the 17th of April, something like 

5 that. We were going to go in. And we within about 48 hours of 

6 going when it was scratched. So it was sometime, I'd say around 

7 the third week of April. 

a w. Now let me put some information in front of you. Or 

9 before I get to that, who was it who scratched it? 

10 C. I don't know. 

11 w. It was not North himself, I gather? 

12 c. No. Cause North wanted to go. I thought it had to be 

13 someone in the white — you know. Admiral Poindexter, or someone in 

14 the White House. 

15 w. In late April, I think you are probably aware now from 

16 the Tower Report if you weren't aware at the time, Ghorbanifar 

17 and Nir and Khashoggi, who were in search of financing, 

18 approached Tiny Rowlands in England — 

19 C. We were aware of that at the time. 

20 w. — as a result of that approach they, Rowlands, went to 

21 the British Bnbassy and said I — 

22 C. Th« American Qnbassy. 

23 w. — excuse me, to the American Embassy, and said, is this 

24 an American operation? If so, he was interested in it. 

25 Otherwise, he was not interested in it. That information, 

26 according to the Tower Report and PROP notes that we have, was 

99 



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914 




1 

2 
3 

A 
S 

6 

7 
6 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 



transmitted to G«org« Shultz by Ambassador Prlca. Shultz was at 
a suinnlt m««tlng la Japan with Poindaxtar and tha antlra 
Presidential entourage. Shultz confronted Polndexter, who denied 
to hlft face that the U.S. was affiliated with that initiative. 
Now my question to you is, do you )cnow whether, since Polndexter 
had denied that this initiative was an American initiative to the 
face of Secretary Shultz, your advance meeting was killed in 
order to limit any possibility that Americans might go to Tehran 
and Polndexter might be proved wrong? 

C. No, I can't answer that. I don't know. X honestly 
don't know. 

T. Jack Taylor back. I sounded like a sportscaster, 
right? \ 




T. How close at that stage were you to going to Tehran? 
C. Nell, we hadn't even had the meeting. This was the 
third of May, right? 

T. This would have been. Right . 




100 



UNCLASSIFIED 



915 



UNCUSSIFIE 



1 ^^^^^^ 

2 C. Th«r« was a disconnect between — the only way I can 

3 explain that is a disconnect between Ollie and Nir and 

4 Ghorbanifar. Because, as I told you by that time, the idea of us 

5 going on a preliminary meeting was — 

6 T. Entirely scotched. 

7 c. — entirely scotched. 

8 T. All right. Then I take it another trip to Frankfurt 

9 was replaced by a trip to London in early May to where you 

10 actually met with Ghorbanifar, but not with 

11 C. That's correct. We met with Ghorbanifar and Nit. 

12 T. O.K. And that would have sort of been a pre-advance, I 

13 guess, or the closest thing you can get to a pre-advance. 

14 C. That was when we finalized the deal, and he was rushing 

15 arovind trying to get money. They were trying to get money 

16 transferred into Nir's account. 

17 T. O.K. I'm going to stop here. 

18 [END OF SIDE SIX] 



101 



wmmiB 



916 



UNCUSSIFIED 



1 TAPE SEVEN -- TCW/sl 

2 T: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

3 has asked me to uh, uh, provide three questions to Mr. Cave, 

4 which I'll try and do my best at. The first question [laughter]. 

5 The first question deals with the ODI Analysis of the Iran 

6 factionalism that was analyzed by those people during the time of 

7 the Initiative. And I think the first Indication that they would 

8 be dealing with Is Mr. Fuller's Memorandum, which was, what, 

9 about June 1985? 

10 ?: Yes, It might even have been May of 1985. 

11 T: May 198S. And then later on about 6 or 8 months, I 

12 believe another, um, memorandum was prepared by uh, DDI again. 

13 It was approved, which took a different swing or a different 

14 stance altogether on the factionalism In Iran. 

15 C: I knew about but I don't think I knew about 

16 the second one. 

17 T: Okay, you've discussed this somewhat today already, 

18 about the moderate versus the radicals and the line 1,2,3 and 

19 your own perception of that. Did you agree with the analysis as 

20 provided by DDI as to these factions? 

21 C: This is the analysis that was prepared in the fall of 

22 1985? 

2 3 T: Yes. 

24 C: Uh. • . I never saw — believe it or not, I never saw 

25 that analysis. I don't think I knew. 

102 






917 



UNClASSiriED 



1 T: Did you, th«r« waa a later, one latar, prepared though, 

2 I believe, again discussing line 1,2,3 and uh. . . 

3 C: I would have a hard time now, you know, this far down 

4 the road. I didn't pay much attention to a lot of the analysis 

5 of Iranian Internal politics that was going on by the DOI bade in 

6 those days. 

7 T: Okay. 

8 C: So, Z can't honestly give you an opinion of what I 

9 thought then, Z don't even think Z read the damn thing. 

10 T: Okay, let me try this. This Is very specific, I think 

11 Z do recall something that might be of help here. It was 

12 mentioned to me thAt Mr. Gates had Indicated that Intelligence 

13 that was being brought out regarding the factions was fairly 

14 accurate and good Intelligence and was conveyed to NSC and other 

15 recipients or users of that Intelligence, uh, that was explained 

16 to me. Would you agree with that, at this point? 

17 C: Well, good Is a relative term. 7ou know. It could have 

18 been a lot better, we were getting some pretty good Information 

19 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vy«s. 

20 T: Okay. So, you would agree at that time. At that tlire, 

21 you would have agreed that It was fairly good Intelligence? 

22 C: Yeah, we knew that, we knew that there were fairly well 

23 definable factions within the senior level of the government. 

24 T: Okay, if I haven't asked those questions correctly, 

25 I'll hear about it later but that's about the only thing Z have 

26 along that line unless you have some yourself. Okay, the second 

103 



918 



UNCUSSIFIED 



1 Una of questioning deals with th« uh, relationship between 

2 North, McFarlane, and Polndexter. I guess the best way to 

3 describe this would be a chain of command relationship. I'd like 

4 to hear your point of view regarding how North used the chain of 

5 comnand to your knowledge. Did he abide by It or did he 

6 completely Ignore it In some instances, and let me give you an 
example . ^^^^HH^Hhas described North as sidestepping his 

8 direct supervisor, Hr. Polndexter, on occasion when perhaps 

9 things did not agree with North as far as directions coning from 

his supervisor he often went to DC! Casey with what he thought 

1 should be the game plan. Uh, do you have any background or ' 

2 Information on thli? 

3 C: Yes. First, let me say this. North was religious In 

4 reporting everything back to Casey, uh not Casey but Polndexter, 

5 excuse me. You have all the PROF notes. He was religious about 

6 It. In fact. It usejto /|rk me because I'd get hungry about 9 

7 o'clock at night and he's sitting there with that damn RI.-43 

8 poking out messages to send back to Polndexter. He religiously 

9 reported everything that he did. Now, on — there are certain 

junctures during this Initiative where Polndexter would disagree 

1 or have doubts about whether they would go ahead. And, on at 

2 least two occasions North called me and asked me to meet with 

3 Director Casey and ask him to welgh-ln with Admiral Polndexter or 

24 on one occasion, I think It was with Don Regan ~ to get the 

25 thing moving again. Because Polndexter had doubts about the 

26 wisdom of proceeding with a couple of times, particularly I think 

104 



UNCLASSIFIED 



919 



l 



li 



1 it was on* of th« times wh«n Jenco was relaasad, w«'d go in and 

2 sand in tha rast of tha hawk spares. 

3 T: Okay, another example of jUiat and you may have answered 

4 my second question already. ^^^^^Hagain, indicated uh, that 

5 after the February TOW shipments urn, Poindexter did indicate that 

6 he wanted to pull out, I think that's been pointed by several 

7 people including ■^HH^^B Urn, and he uses this instance as 

8 an example of when North went to Casey for support to continue 

9 the initiative rather than pull out. Are you familiar with that 

10 particular one? 

11 C: I am not familiar with that particular one. I was 

12 talking about two things that happened later on. 

13 T: Okay. That would have been very early in your uh. . . 

14 C: Because that would have been before. Because, in other 

15 words for us to continue and make the March meeting, it would 

16 have had to b««. ikayed in the white House by Poindexter. 

17 T: Alright. Did you have any questions along that line? 

18 W: This is Tim Woodcock again. Mr. Cave, you said that 

19 you recalled a couple of incidents where North enlisted your 

20 assistance to bring the weight of the DCI to bear on Admiral 

21 Poindexter. Do you recall specifically what those two incidents 

22 were? What was the issue? 

2 3 C: The one was when Father Jenco 's release is um — should 

24 we or should we not send in the rest of the HAWK spares that were 

25 in Israel. Z know he specifically called m* on that to ask Casey 

26 to weigh-in, talk to Casey about it, and see if I could get Casey 



UNCIA^SFIEO 



920 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 to welgh-ln uh, with Admiral Polndexter that w« should go ahead 

2 with th« shipmant of th« HAWK spares, which I didn't cause I 

3 thought we shouldn't do It anyway. And there was another 

4 occasion,. I'm trying to, it had to do with, it had to do with 

5 when things surfaced in the press. And uh, I can't remember 

6 exactly what the issue was now, but I Icnow it was right about 

7 that time he called me and asked me to get Casey to weigh-in with 

8 Don Regan, but I can't remember the specific issue. I remember 

9 him calling me though. It had something to do. It was after the 

10 thing, right after the surfaced, and I think it had something to 

11 do with the, oh, uh, November meeting. And I can't remember 

12 exactly what it was — it slipped my mind. But, I know he called 

13 me and asked me to call Don Regan. I don't know whether it was 

14 his attending it or what. It was something to do with whether we 

15 should go ahead with the meeting at the beginning of November or 

16 not because I know I went and talked to Casey about it. I can't 

17 remember exactly what, but it had to do with the holding of the 

18 meeting at the beginning of November. 

19 W: Thank you. 

20 T: Those are only questions I believe I have, if you want 

21 to switch. 

22 W: Mr. Cave, I'm going to bring you back again to the 

23 subject of uh^B^^|^^|Hand his to the United states 

24 in July of 1986. You attended, I think, meetings on consecutive 

25 days with Albert Hakim and^J^^H You produced memoranda of 

26 those meetings and I'm going to show you uh, two exhibits, one 

106 



omssra 



921 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 has b««n marked as lA and one has bean marked as 2A and ask you 

2 if those are the memoranda that you produced? 

3 C: Yeap. Altogether in my Incorrect typing. 

4 W: Your typing Is your trademark. Your memoranda stand 

5 out because — I think it's the machine at home, is that 

6 correct? 

7 C: That's correct. 

8 W: First, Mr. Cave, uh, during this period of time, the 

9 summer of 1986, I believe, that you told me from an earlier 

10 interview, that Mr. Hakim had suggested that you have business 

11 cards printed out presenting you as an employee of STTGZ. 

12 C: That was to explain my presence to the other people out 

13 at his office. 

14 W: That is, bis own employees? 

15 C: Yeah, his own employees. Like, I was introduced to 

16 his, the secretary out there as Sam O'Neil who Is going to be 

17 working with him. And, the cards were printed to cover that. 

18 W: Now, uh, when youmetwith^^^H^^^^H Z think you 

19 told me he recognized you^^^^^^^^^H Is that correct? 

20 C: That's correct. 

21 W: Do you know whether, or let me put the question 

22 differently, did you make plain to him that you were working for 

23 the United States? 

24 C: Yes, I did. 

25 W: What did you tell him your capacity was with the United 

26 States? 

107 



UNCLASSIFIED 



922 



UNCUSSIFe 



1 C: Uh, Z forgat th« axact words I us«d. Z trl«d to lc««p 

2 It as vagus as possible because he knew what my association was 

3 and z just let him go along with the assumption Z was still with 
A the same people. 

5 W: So, for all you know, his assumption would hav« been 

6 that you were still with the CZA. Zs that correct? 

7 C: That's correct. 

6 W: Now, uh. In the uh, the second memorandum, that is the 

9 second In time, exhibit 2A, there is some discussion about Albert 

10 Hakim pursuing various commercial Interest in Zran with^^^^^B 

11 Do you recall those conversations? 

12 C: vaguely. 

13 W: Let me ask you to look at exhibit 2A, and in 

14 partlo.larly if you would, to direct your attention to the 

15 paragraph numbered 3. 

16 C: Okay, now Z remember. Yes. 

17 W: Now, uh, in that paragraph Is there is a statement 

18 attributed to Albert Hakim that he Is, basically that he is going 

19 to proceed to open these commercial avenues to Zran regardless of 

20 what "we" do. What was he referring to there? 

21 C: This was uh, he had two different things in mind. One, 

22 was to get sane comnerclal business to cover his activities. And 

23 what he wanted to do was sell mediclnals, uh, because he had 

24 learned fromiH|^Hlthat the Iranians were buying all of them in 

25 Belgium, and he was certain he could get it cheaper and get 

26 better stuff for them. The other thing is he had in the back of 

108 



UNCLASSIFIE 



923 



mtssxB 



1 his mind. Is that h« wanted all of th« employees of his previous 

2 company, the engineers and the technicians were still In Iran, 

3 and he had hopes of reestablishing that company. 

4 W: And, when It reads that he's going to do this 

5 regardless of what "we" do. Is that a reference to the United 

6 States and Its Initiative towards Iran? 

7 C: That's a reference to our Initiative. That he'll do 

8 whatever he can to help us with It, but he's going to pursue his 

9 commercial Interests also. 

10 W: In the first memorandum, the first In time, July 10, 

11 again in paragraph 3 there's a reference to, and I'll quote it 

12 "Sam and Abe toldHVTwhich is your letter designation for 

13 ^^^^^H/hat there was an Interest on the part of the United 

14 States Government (USG) in trying to use trade to gradually to 

15 re-establish relations with Iran. Sam and Abe planned to 

16 capitalize on the trade part using contacts in the USG with whom 

17 they will coordinate their actions. Now, let me ask you based on 

18 that statement, did you have any plans to participate in any 

19 commercial activity? 

20 C: That's just what we told him, that was part of the 

21 thing. No, I have no desire to get involved In commercial 

22 activities with Iran. Then or now. That was part of the cover 

23 story for what we were doing. And also it fitted in, because Abe 

24 was going to get in, not Abe, but you know, Albert Hakim. Uh, I 

25 went along with this as if I was part of it. 

26 W: But I thought^^^^^^understood that you were with the 

109 



UNCLASSlfiED 



924 



UNCUSSIFIE! 



1 CIA. HOW does that fit In? 

2 C: H« did, but I also told him that I had retired and 

3 still had my contacts. 

4 W: I gather. Do you Icnow whether ^^^^^Hwould have known 
your name^^^^^^^^^H^ 

6 C: Yes, he would 've. 

7 W: So, you wouldn't have given him a b