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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

Y l.l/2:Serial 13748 

100-1: United States Congre.. 



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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 7 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13748 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 7 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. -Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. -Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnited States 3tnate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman ^^ 
Vice Chairman 



III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fap->release to the public. 

enely yours. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Stajf Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence /Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Raynor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority' Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tuliy 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 7 



Preface XXI 

Cooper, Charles J 1 

Coors, Joseph 713 

Corbin, Joan 773 

Corr, Edwin G 837 

Coward, John C 896 

Coy, Craig P 937 

Crawford, Iain T.R 1135 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Bamett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Rudd). 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward ! 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Volume 15 



Jr. 



Volume 16 



Lei want, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhorne A. 
Mulligan, David P. 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 24 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

TuU, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits -documentary evidence- were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



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DEPOSITION OF CHARLES J. COOPER 



Monday, June 22, 1987 



U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 

Washington, D.C. 



The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in 
Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Pamela J. Naughton, 
presiding . 

Present: Pamela J. Naughton, Staff Counsel; Richard Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel; and Tina Westby, Associate 
Staff, on behalf of the House Select Committee. 

Richard Parry, Associate Counsel, on behalf of the Senate 
Select Committee. 

Also present: Dee Benson, personal representative to 
Senator Orrin Hatch; and John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney 






General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Departme nt of 



Justice, on behalf of the witness_^ 



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Whereupon, 

CHARLES J. COOPER, was called as a witness, 
3 and after having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
^ i testified as follows: 



EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Could you state and spell your name for the recor: 
please. 

A Charles J. Cooper, C-o-o-p-e-r. 

Q ' This IS a deposition taken by the House Select 
Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 
My name is Pamela J. Naughton, Staff Counsel to the House 
Committee . 

Would the others present please introduce 
themselves. 

MR. LEON: Richard Leon, Deputy Chief Minority 



J7 jl Counsel for the House Committee. 

^3 ' MS. BENSON: Dee Benson, Senator Hatch's 



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personal representative to the committee. 

MR. BOLTON: John Bolton, Assistant Attorney 
General for Legislative Affairs. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Mr. Cooper, are you personally represented today? 

A No. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Then, Mr. Bolton, according to our 



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rules, you should not be here. 

THE WITNESS: I am advised by Mr. Bolton that he is 
here representing me in my official and personal capacity, 
which was the understanding reached by the Department of 
Justice and representatives of the Select Committee, as I am 
advised . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Well, Mr. Cooper, you are the client. It is your 
choice. 

. Do you choose to have Mr. Bolton personally 
represent you in this deposition? 

A I choose to have .Mr. Bolton here if that is 
consistent with the committee's rules and understandings, 
but I have not retained anyone as personal counsel. 
Q Okay. 

Mr. Cooper, according to the rules, the rules • 
prohibit any observers to the depositions who are not the 
personal representatives of the witness and specifically pre- 
clude any observers from the agencies from which the witness 
comes. That is why we are sort of splitting hairs with you. 

You are entitled to a personal representative at 
this deposition, but observers are not entitled to be at the 
deposition. 

So I have to ask you whether you are personally 
represented by Mr.' Bolton or whether he is here to represent 



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1 .| the Department. 

2 (Witness conferring with Mr. Bolton.) 

3 i THE WITNESS: I am advised by Mr. Bolton that 

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4 with respect to previous witnesses who have provided deposi- 

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5 li tions to the committee, that representatives and counsel from 

6 i' their Departments were present as personal and departmental 

7 || representatives, and based upon that precedent, I would cer- 

j 

5 'I tainly designate John Bolton as my personal representative of 

g '■ those within the Department. 



, BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q I understood your sentence except for the last 



phrase . 



What do you mean "of those within the Department?" 
A Well, of all the individuals within the Department, 
J5 II that I think it would be appropriate for me to have present 

•g 'j at this deposition, John Bolton is the individual. 

li 
._ I So I am pleased to have him here as my personal 



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,- • representative as well as the Department representative. 



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Q So it is your understanding that .Mr. Bolton is 
here as your personal counsel, as well as representing the 
Department of Justice; is that correct? 

A Pam, the — here is the pitch, okay. Let's go off 
the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. 



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We are back on the record and let the record reflect 
that we had a discussion of this and m the meantime, two 
others came into the room. 

Would you identify yourselves for the record. 

MR. PARRY: Richard Parry, Associate Counsel with 
the Senate Committee. 

MS. WESTBY: Tina Westby, Associate Staff, House 
Committee . 

.MS. NAUGHTON: As I explained off the record to 
Mr. Cooper, the rules of the House Committee permit personal 
counsel to appear with the witness, but do not allow people 
representing the agencies to appear as observers to the pro- 
ceeding. This is for protection of the witness as well as 
protection for the committee's materials. 

Tnerefore, Mr. Cooper, I would ask you again, are 
you personally represented at these proceedings? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, and as I discussed off the 
record, I advised counsel that I have no intention of retainir.c 
private counsel in this matter, but based upon counsel's 
explanation of the understanding reached with the Department 
and of the purposes for which personal counsel are here, and 
are permitted to be present, that I recognize John Bolton to 
be here as my personal representative. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Okay. And do you wish these proceedings to remain 



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confidential or do you waive attorney-client privilege? 

A I waive attorney-client privilege. I have no wish 
that the proceedings be confidential. 

MR. BOLTON: For the record, we do not necessarily 
accept either the committee's rules or the committee's 
interpretation of its rules as binding on the Executive 
Branch. 

However, in the spirit of full cooperation, which 
we have displayed throughout the committee's investigation, 
we have determined, in agreement with the committee, to abide 
by the procedures that Ms. Naughton has previously stated. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Mr. Cooper, I am going to hand you — this is a 
letter inviting you to appear at the committee hearing this 
week hopefully. The letter says that you will be advised as 
to when your testimony will be wanted. It is sort of a day-by 
day thing in terms of how the committee progresses and when we 
will be needing you. 

I envision right now Thursday afternoon perhaps 
that you will be testifying, but that is not etched in stone. 
It is sort of like a trial and things sometimes go more slowly 
than anticipated. 

If you could block out Thursday and Friday on your 
calendar this week, we would appreciate it. It will be in the 
Russell Building on the Senate side on the third floor. 



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A Fine. I would be happy to do so. 

MR. BOLTON: The letter is addressed to Hon. 
Charles J. Cooper with his title and address, dated June 19, 
1987. I think the record should reflect that to my knowledge, 
no one m the Department has seen this before so we are receiv 
mg it at approximately 9:55 on June 22nd. 

"The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert 
Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on 
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposi- 
tion will resume its ]oint hearings on June 23, 1987. 

"The members of the committee request your 
appearance before those :joint hearings. 

"You will be notified of the exact date and time 
your testimony is requested. If you have any questions con- 
cerning your appearance before the committees, please contact 
John Nields, the committee's Chief Counsel, at 225-7902. 

"Thank you for your cooperation m this matter. 

"With best wishes, I am sincerely yours, Lee H. 
Hamilton, Chairman." 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Could you please tell us something about your back- 
ground? Let's go through law school and then with jobs you 
have had since. 

A I attended law school at the University of Alabama 
School of Law. I bffs^c been an undergraduate at Alabama as 



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well. I graduated in 1977 and from there accepted a clerkshic 
with Judge Paul Roney of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

After ray clerkship to Judge Roney, which last.ed 
one year, one term of court, I clerked for Justice William H. 
Rehnquist of the Supreme Court and after that clerkship, I 
returned to the South to Atlanta, Georgia/' to practice law 
for two years m the law firm called Long and Aldridge. 

At that time, it was Long, Aldridge, Heiner, 
Stevens s, Sumner, where I worked as an associate in the 
litigation area of the firm in a general corporate commercial 
litigation practice. 

In the summer of 1981, I joined the Department: of 
Justice as a Special Assistant to Brad Reynolds in the Civil 
Rights Division. 

I stayed in that position for a year or thereabouts 
and was promoted to Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and I 
served in that capacity m the Civil Rights Division for the 
next three years or thereabouts. 

On November 13th, I think, 1985, I guess, I became 
the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel, having been appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate. 

Q Thank you. 

So since when have you been with the Department of 



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A In August, actually, of 1981. Not long after 
Mr. Reynolds was confirmed. 

Q Now, concerning the Iran arms transaction, which is 
the subject of this committee's inquiry, did you have any 
knowledge of the shipments prior to, let's say, November 1st 
of 1986? Were you aware of any findings or that any shipments 
had taken place? 

A No , I was not, unless by that time there hod been 
news reports with which I was familiar, although I don't think 
that is the case either. But that would have been the only 
source of knowledge on my part. 

Q So your involvement, I take it, JJIcame in November, 
on November 7, 1986; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Can you tell us what happened on November 7th, 
1986, to bring your attention to this? 

h On that day, the Department, the management level of 

the Department, was meeting out m the Virginia countryside at 
the Xerox conference facility. We were having a management 
retreat, so to speak. And I think it was on the 7th, we were 
there for a couple of days, but I think it was on the first da' 
that we were there, and on the morning of the 7th, the Attorne 
General, when he had arrived from Washington, before we got 
started, pulled me to the side and advised me that the Iran 
arms controversy that had been at that point disclosed and 



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discussed quite prominently in the press was something that 
would, in all likelihood, generate some work for me m my 
office, and that I should be alert to that fact, and he was 
just giving me a heads up. 

But I think on that occasion, he suggested 
that I get in touch with Paul Thompson at the NSC, who was 
the General Counsel at the NSC at the time; m general to dis- 
cuss this matter and to start developing some factual back- 
ground . 

Q 'When you spoke with the Attorney General, what 
were his legal concerns about the Iran arms shipment? 

A He did not, to my recollection, identify any 

specific concerns. He just suggested that there would be 

some -- undoubtedly some legal work to be done in connection 

I 
with this whole matter, and I think at that time he told me it 

was a very sensitive issue, a very sensitive matter and that 

it should be treated accordingly within my office, whatever it 

was that ensued with respect to my office. And that I should 

try to limit the individuals who worked with me directly on it, 

and to the extent I could limit the number of people working -- 

assisting me in any of the work that ensued, that would be 

advisable . 

Q Did you discuss at that time -- 

A In fact, I think he expressed a preference that I 
try to keep the staffing on this down to one lawyer assisting 



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2 '' Q Did he suggest to you any particular individual? 

3 1 A Oh, no. I don't think he would know the names of 

4 anyone in my office other than me and my deputies, probably. 

5 Q , Did you discuss any particular statute, the Axms 

6 I' Export Control Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act? 

!i 

•7 1 A No. There was no specific legal discussion, 

I 
a I ]ust the general heads up that legal work would be generated 

by this for my office. 

Q , Did the Attorney General at that time mention 
that he had participated in the finding in or around January 
of 1986? 

A I don't think that he did. 

Q Did he tell you anything about his prior 
knowledge; that is, his knowledge prior to November of 1986 
about the Iranian arms transaction? 

A No. This conversation was literally one that we 
had in the hall as individuals were filing into this meeting 
room, and it was extremely brief. 

I mean, there ]ust was no -- it wasn't a chat. 
He was just essentially giving me a heads up, as I said. 

Q Now, you met with Paul Thompson, I believe, on 
November 12, 1986; is that correct? 

A To the best of my recollection, and as well to 
the best of my recollection at the time, I did my chronolcg-..- , 



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with which you are acquainted, it was November 12th. 

Q When did you actually write the chronology? 

A Well, there is not a specific date, but it was -- 
the chronology actually kind of grew in that in going back 
over it other things would occur to me and I would mter- 
lineate them as well as the assistant who assisted me on what 
now has become every phase of this Iran business, John 
McGinnis reviewed it as well and made interlineations and 
notations of his own. 

■But I would say that it was within a week of the 
Tuesday press conference, and I should think not long after 
that press conference, maybe a couple of days or so, th^at I 
sat down and searched my memory in order to create this 
chronology, knowing, I think, at that point that my participa- 
tion in this matter on a from beginning-to-end basis would 
become of interest to others. 

But as I say, the thing did kind of grow. There 
are ways to see the matters that were added after the initial 
drafting of the chronology, because that was in green, although 
this may not show up on your copies of the chronology, but 
there are red and blue interlineations that were added after 
the green, the basic chronology was created. 

Q When you refer then to the Tuesday press conference, 
you mean the Attorney General's on November 25, 1986? 



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A Yes. 

Q Did anything transpire regarding your work between 
November 7 and November 12 when you met with Mr. Thompson? 

A Yes. We kind of -- when I say we, I mean John 
.McGinnis and I -- not long after I got back from the Xerox 
center, I asked John McGinnis to be prepared to assist me 
with respect to anything that came down the pike on this. And 
we were kind of rooting and,j>uraglve3 with only the mformatio 
that we gleaned from the newspaper, which at that point was 
kind of rudimentary, but based upon the information that we 
could glean from the media, we started trying to identify 
statutes and Federal laws and what have you that would apply 
to the whole Iran thing. 

I should say that John McGinnis pulled the laboring 
oar on that. He was the individual who was kind of searching 
around in the juris and lexis for statutes that govern arms 
sales to foreign countries particularly. 

Q So by the time you went to speak to Commander 
Thompson, did you have in mind what some of the legal issues 
might be after speaking with Mr. McGinnis? 

A I would say not really. To the extent that I did, 
it was the vaguest and broadest outlines. By that time, we 
might have discussed the Arms Export Control Act, which is 
pretty obvious in terms of its potential applicability anyway, 
and -- but I just don't remember having any specific 

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^ conversations with John prior to the time I talked to Paul 

2 ' Thompson. 

3 I Q Did you discuss with Mr. McGinnis prior to the 

4 November 12th meeting, did you discuss with Mr. McGinnis 

5 that there had been a finding or the legal significance of a 
g finding regarding these shipments? 

7 A I don't think so. I don't think so. It is 
a entirely possible that we did, but I just don't remember 
g i whether we had identified the National Security Act and 
jQ ; Hughes-Ry^n -- I am certain we had not focused particular 
ff attention on Hughes-Ryan, but — 

•2 MR. LEON: Did you know what a finding was? - 

THE WITNESS: No, the concept of a finding was 
quite foreign to me, certainly before November 7th, and it 
wasn't until some time after November 7th and it may well 
have been not until after my meeting with Thompson that the 
concept of a finding -- well, no, let me take that back, 
because when I went there, I knew I was going to see a finding 
and I had had conversations over the telephone or at least a 
conversation over the telephone with Paul Thompson, and so 
prior to the time I actually sat down with Thompson on the 
12th, I had become acquainted at least conceptually with a 
finding and the fact that it is required under certain statute 

■0. 

governing this stuff, Hughes-Ryan, in particular. 



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BV MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q And at that time prior to November 12th, did you 
know that there were any 1985 shipments? 

A No, that we didn't know until we received a 
chronology, a draft chronology from the NSC from Paul Thompson 
some time -- November 17th — at least by our best reckoning, 
November 17th. But we were entirely unaware that any pre- 
fmding arms activity of any kind had taken place until we 
received that chronology. 

Q Had you tasked Mr. McGinnis with writing you a 
memorandum of statutes that could be involved? 

A Well, I tasked him with preparing a memorandum 
not to me really, but with preparing a draft that would be 
from me or the office to the Attorney General that would 
identify in a general way applicable statutes and e.xamine thos* 
statutes against the facts as we knew them, which was not cer- 
tainly authoritatively, but it was that kind of memo that was 
contemplated, and that he was at that time preparing. 

Q I assume you went over to the Old Executive Office 
Building by the White House on November 12; is that correct? 

A It was the White House, Poindexter's office was in 
the West Wing, and Paul Thompson had a little very compact 
office right next to his, Poindexter's. 

Q Did you meet with Mr. Poindexter? 

A Yes, I did. I met him and had some general 



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- conversation in his office with Paul present for what couldn't 

2 I have been more than ten minutes or thereabouts. 

3 You know, it was a brief conversation. The purpose 
^ ! of which seemed more for me and Poindexter simply to make 

2 each other's acquaintance. 

g I had never met the man prior to that and he un- 

■j doubtedly didn't know who the heck I was, never heard of me. 
_ But we exchanged pleasantries and in the most general way our 
conversation touched, I guess, on the Iran arms transfer, 
but in te^s of developing actual facts or background on it, 
Poindexter was going to leave that to Paul Thompson and I 
subsequent to my meeting with him. 

Q To the best of your recollection, what did 
Admiral Poindexter say to you? 

A I don't have any specific recollection of anything 
that he said to me. I only have a general recollection that 
it was just general chitchat really and just getting acquaintec 
with one another. 

I just can't recall any specific points in our 
conversation. 

Q So Admiral Poindexter did not tell you about any 
specific shipments of arms to Iran and he did not discuss 
with you any particular legal problems that he wanted you to 
look into; is that correct? 

A That is correct to the best of my recollection, yes 



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1 I and my recollection is that that did not take place. 

2 I Q Okay. 

3 What was his understanding as it may have been 

4 expressed to you that he understood you were to do? Did you 

5 discuss that — in other words, your role in this? 

6 ' ^ Well, I am certain ~ i mean, my reason for being 

7 there was to discern from people who were knowledgeable about 
e what the facts were, what the facts were so that I could 

9 examine them for legal issues. 

10 ' I was there as the Assistant Attorney General for 

]) the Office of Legal Counsel, and the very nature of my office 
j2 and my position as such that we examine legal issues, and do 
^3 so authoritatively for the Executive Branch. 
14 So it was quite obvious that I was there for that 

fj purpose. 

]g I don't, however, recall any specific legal 

j^ issues having been raised in ray conversation with Poindexter, 
18 I "° citations to particular statutes or anything of that 
J J : nature, 
3 I Q So to the best of your recollection, the only thing 

Poindexter basically said to you is, "Hi, how are you and 

Paul Thompson will tell you the facts?" 

A Well, I just don't have any recollection even that 

he said those things, although I do know that — and I do have 

a firm recollection that Paul Thompson was to provide me with 



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\ 1 the information that they could and had been able to develop 

2 ' up until that time and, therefore, could provide me. That 

3 ■ was not -- I was not there to debrief Poindexter on facts. 

4 Q Did Admiral Poindexter say that you would get all 

5 the facts? 

6 I A Oh, well, I don't recall him making any specific -- 

7 ;! any specific point of that, but that was — there was no 

8 indication to the contrary. 

9 I mean, the whole thing was quite obviously open and 
jQ they were, there to try to provide me, and they assured me 

\\ that I was going to be provided with all the facts that they 
^2 could probably develop. 

Q I guess I will ask the question in the negative. 
Did he tell Mr. Thompson or you that there were some facts 
that you couldn't know about? 

A No. --M^f I can say that with great confidence. 
to.. LEON: Let me ask one question. 
Was it your sense that you were there because 
Admiral Poindexter wanted a review of the Department of 
Justice of potential legal problems or because the Attorney 
General was asked to do that at the behest of somebody else 
other than Admiral Poindexter? 

THE WITNESS: It was not the latter. I had no 
understanding or evidence supporting an understanding that 
someone other than Poindexter and the AG were interested m 



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\ having the — any legal issues that were raised by the 

2 ■ facts that were gathered examined. 

3 i BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
i 

4 I Q Did either Admiral Poindexter or Mr. Thompson 

5 tell' you that other legal departments of other agencies or 

6 White House counsel were also going to work on the legal 

7 issues? 

8 A No, though your question brings to mind the point 
g that it may well be that in my conversation with Poindexter, 

jQ and certainly in my conversation with Thompson later, the 
fl point was made that the finding itself had been reviewed for 
j2 legality and passed on by the AG, and I think Stan Sporkin was 
13 cited at that time as well, though I am less certain of that. 

Q Was there any discussion of, let's say. White House 
counsel being involved in studying the legal issues? 

A None at all. 



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Q Was there any discussion of the State Department 



.g I Legal Advisor's Office being consulted on legal issues? 



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A Certainly not that I recall, although the State 
Department did provide the analysis on which some of the 
authority was based for the finding and for the arms transfer 
activities. But that had been under a previous regime in 1981 
when Davis Robinson had analyzed a similar circumstance, and 
that analysis explicitly provided the foundation for seme of 
the leg«l conclusions that were reached with respect to the 



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J i finding. And I think that there was conversation between Paul 
, i Thompson and I on that point as well. 
3 Q But no discussion of contemporaneous legal 
review? 

A No, not that I recall, 
g Q You then went with Commander Thompson or stayed in 
his office or — at the White House; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he produce for you the finding? 

A He did. 

Q Which finding was this? 

A It was a finding dated January 17th, and along 
with the finding was a cover memorandum or a memorandum which 
elongated on the basis and purposes of the Iranian initiative. 

Q Was there writing in blue ink on this one, do you 
recall? 

A On the finding? 

Q Yes. 

A No, I don't recall that. 

Q Were there any handwritten insertions in the 
finding? 

A I don't recall having noted any, and when you say 
blue ink, I don't remember what color ink the signature was in, 
but it was my impression as I looked at this document that it 
was an original, and that it had the original ink markings on 



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it, and it may well be that it was blue, but I don't recall. 

Q But other than the signature, I am talking about 
insertions or handwriting in the text itself — you don't 
recall seeing any of that in the finding? 

. A Well, actually there was a notation of some kind to 
that -" I understood to have been a notation made by John 
Poindexter. 

However, I don't recall what it said — something 
to the effect that the President has been briefed on this or 
something, But I can't recall what it said. 

Q Now, what was the substance of your conversation 
with Commander Thompson regarding the finding? What did he 
tell you about it? 

A I don't have a specific recollection of him making 
any particular points with respect to the finding itself. 
He gave it to me, he had it in an envelope in some hidden 
place in his desk and he produced it to me along with the 
cover memo and I sat there and I read the finding and the 

•3 

cover memo for whatever length of time it took me to read it, 
and I think our — you know, the only parts of our conversa- 
tion I have a specific recollection of didn't relate particu- 
larly to the finding. 

Q What legal issues did you discuss with Commander 
Thompson? 

A I don't have a specific recollection of discussing 



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I 
\ I any legal issues with him at that time. I just recall having 

2 discussed the background of the initiative and the facts lead- 

3 ing up to and justifying the initiative. 

4 ; Q If we could stop there for a minute. Rather than 

5 ask a general question to describe the conversation, tell me 

6 what Thompson told you to the best of your recollection. 

7 A I recall him advising me that Ledeen has a lot of 
3 the factual background of this, he mentioned Ledeen particu- 
9 I larly, and that somebody should talk to him. 

jQ , I recall him suggesting to me that they were in the 

ff process of developing a chronology of all the facts that they 
could gather on implementation of the finding and the whole 
Iranian initiative. 

I recall him making some points about the fact that 
the AG had been in on the legal review of the finding when it 
was proposed. 

Q What did he say about it? 

A That the Attorney General had examined the legal 
authority for the finding and had concluded it was authorized. 
I don't recall there having been any specific discussion about 
the Attorney General's st^utory analysis or anything that the 



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Attorney General specifically had said, just the conclusory 
point that this was something that had been examined by him. 

I do think he referenced to Sporkin, and the 
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\ 1 authority to do the things ordered in the finding. 



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I recall him saying that Israel had approached zr.z 
United States with, the idea or at least that was his under- 
standing -- I also got the impression that he had no personal 
knowledge of the facts, but that the facts that were being 
gathered for this chronology were being gathered by people wr 
did have personal knowledge, and principally that was North, 
in conjunction with McFarlane. 

But he mentioned that apparently Israel had 
approache^d us, that it was their understanding, NSC ' s under- 
standing, that -- or belief, suspicion, that Israel had 
engaged in arms transfers to Iran prior to the time that thev 
approached us, and, in fact, he suggested there was some 
I intelligence to the effect that Israel had sent arm; 




I do not presently recall any other specific 
snippets of our conversation, but those are che ones that 
occur to me at the moment. 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you have any particular legal points in mind 
regarding the issues involved that you asked Thompson 
about? 

A No. Again my purpose for going over there, and 
I had been nagging Paul prior to the time that I went over 
there for the purpose of obtaining information, authoritative 
facts relating to the Iran initiative. The truth is, I was 
quite disappointed when I got there and there was no chrono- 
logy bte«*fi#- prepared at that moment that I could have and 
take back with me. 

The only useful thing that I accomplished on , 
that visit was to read the finding and the background 
memorandum and that was very useful, the background memoran- 
dum was, because it alerted me to the Willieun French Smith 
letter that endorsed the earlier State Department analysis 
which was identified in the memo and was acknowledged by 
Poindexter to have been the legal foundation for the 
finding . . -^ 

So I knew if it was a Smith letter that I could 
dig that out at Justice and at least get on the legal trail 
through that means, but that was the only thing useful to 
come up . 

You guys have seen the finding and you have 
seen the memorandum that covered it, so you know essentially 



UNCLASSIJJFJn 



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everything that I knew when I left. I didn't know much 
more than that. 

Q Did you discuss with Thompson the issue of 
timely notice? 

A No. I feel confident that I didn't discuss 
that issue with him. 

Q How about any discussion of congressional 
notification? 

A Only that it was -- if there was any discussion 
of it, it 'was that it is taking place. 

Q Contemporaneously, you mean. 

A Yes. Yes. 

Q Did he say when they started the work on the 
chronology? Did he say we have been working on it for 
a week, a day, or an hour? 

A Well, no. My impression was that they had been 
working on it for a -- certainly longer than an hour or 
a day, but I couldn't tell you with certainty exactly how 
long. Perhaps in the neighborhood of a week. It was some 
period of time that was significant. But he did not have 
anything that he could share with me at that time. 

Q Did he mention who else was involved in drafting 
the chronology other than Colonel North, Admiral Poindexter 
and Mr. McFarlane? 

A Actually he didn't -- I ^aolt _5tate with 



I 



I 
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\ 

2 

3 
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n 

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certainty that he mentioned McFarlane but I can state with 
some confidence that he didn't mention Poindexter as being 
part of the group that was developing the chronology. 

I can also state with confidence that he did 
mention North but if he mentioned McFarlane or not -- I 
think he probably did, but I don't have a specific 
recollection of it. 

Q Had you ever met Oliver North? 

A No, I don't think I had. I don't think I had 
ever met North. 

Q Have you since November 12th? 

A Oh, yes. Yes, I have met him since then. Yeg. 

Q Why don't we digress a minute and you tell me 
about that. 

A I met him in what I think was my first 
acquaintance at all with him on November 20. 

Q Okay. This is the drafting session? 

A Well, I wouldn't — that is not what I would 
call it, but it was a session in Poindexter "s office. 

Q Why don't we forget that, then, for the moment. 
We will go on chronologically. 

Did Commander Thompson ask anything of you? 
In other words, in drafting this legal memo, did he wish 
to be kept informed or anything? 

A No, I don't think so. 



iiNmmiFn 



27 



wmmm 



27 



Q When you returned to the Department of Justice, 
then did you discuss this with Mr. McGinnis? 

A I am sure that I did at some point and it would 
have been some point prior to the November -- prior to the 
end of the following day and I suspect I discussed it with 
him straight away. 

I do know that as soon as I got back to the 
Department of Justice, I undertook a search for the 
William French Smith 1981 opinion. So I am virtually 
certain that as soon as I got back, I asked John McGinnis 
to runja search of our own files which is where I expected 
to find this. He did, and was unsuccessful. So I went- 
and talked to Mary Lawton about it and she dug it out. 
We did have it, and relied upon it for the November 13 
general legal memo that we sent to the AG. 

Q Did you discuss with Mary Lawton the issue of 
congressional notification in regards to this Smith 

■2 

letter? 

A I don't think I did. I don't think I focused 
on that with her . 

Q In other words, you were not relying on the 
Smith opinion to say that Congress needed to be notified? 

A No. 

MR. BOLTON: Say when, the November 13 memo or 
generally, or what? 



m\mm 



28 



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1 

2 

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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Let's Start with the November 13 memo. 

A Actually I didn't rely on that at any time, 
November 13 or any time thereafter, for any analysis 
regarding timely notification. 

It is my recollection, though hazy, it is my 
recollection that that memorandum suggested that the 
President should notify Congress with regard to that 
particular episode and I have no qualms at all with that 
conclusicn. But the thing that the memo was important 
for was the proposition that arms could be exported from 
the United States in connection with an intelligence 
activity and, therefore, freed of the restraints of the 
Arms Export Control Act, that when the arms -- when the 
President has available to him at least two authorities 
that support the transfer of arms to other countries, the 
Arms Export Control Act or the National Security Act if 
it's in connection with an intelligence activity, which 
this seemed clearly to be, so it was that proposition that 
the Smith opinion and the related State Department opinion 
were relevant and important to us on. 

Q So it is your understanding if the option of 
using the National Security Act were taken to sell the 
arms, it still would require a finding and congressional 



notification? 



IIMCUS£i£IFn 



29 



29 



A Oh, yes. In fact, only if it was done under the 
National Security Act and the CIA was used would a finding 
be necessary. But the memo discussed that alternative 
source of authority for transferring the arms, a finding 
wouldn't be necessary if the Arms Export Control Act in 
and of itself were used to transfer arms. 

Q Now, on November 13 did Mr. McGinnis produce 
for you a memoranda talking about these legal issues we 
just discussed? 

A 'He did. 

Q Do you recall when in the day he produced that 
for you? 

A It was late afternoon on into the evening that 
he and I worked on that or at least that is the point in 
time that sticks in my mind. It may well be that I am 
sure we had discussed prior to the time we actually were 
examining his draft, the legal issues and analysis that 
was going into the draft. But I recall it was very hectic 
that evening because I was finalizing a lengthy speech and 
lecture to be given at the University of Chicago on Saturday — 
well, I'm not sure when November 13 was. 
MR. LEON: Thursday. 

THE WITNESS: It's a Thursday, okay. That is 
helpful. 

On Saturday -- maybe it was Friday, but I was 



iiNCiiSsen 



30 



mmism 



30 



under pressure to complete a very lengthy lecture and article 
on consent decrees and was working with another lawyer on 
that, and they were kind of coming in and out in an alter- 
native fashion. But John and I worked on this late into 
the night. 

.1 tried to also keep an eye on the President's 
speech to the nation which took place that night and from 
which we got additional information. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q 'Now, if we can begin with some of the documents, 
and if I could have the reporter mark this as CJC-1. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-1 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q This is, Mr. Cooper, is it not, your handwritten 
'6 chronology that we discussed earlier? 

17 A That is what it appears to be. It has a first 

18 page that really isn't part of the chronology but was 

I 

19 ; certainly the first page on the legal pad of which the , 

20 chronology begins on the second page, so this does appear 

21 I to be my chronology. 

22 ! MR. BOLTON: For the record, it bears document 

23 production 7694 through 7700. 

24 MS. NAUGHTON: And if the reporter could mark 

25 CJC-2. 



IINlHiil^Mn 



31 



\imsm\\ 



31 



(Exhibit No. CJC-2 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Referring to what the reporter has marked 
CJC No. 2, is that the legal memorandum Mr. McGinnis 
furnished to you? 

A This is the legal memorandum that I'm referring 
to, earlier in our conversation, I mezm. He did provide 
me a draft of it and we worked on it and produced it 
together .' 

MR. BOLTON: This docximent bears document 
production Nos. 330112 -- that is the only document produc- 
tion number that it has. The other pages being numbered 
only consecutively as pages of the memorandum. It's 
classified "Secret." 

MR. LEON: It also can be located at Bates 
J-7634. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q I put a document in front of you that I don't 
want marked as an exhibit yet unless we can identify it. 
There are some notes at the top of the page from Paul 
Thompson. Are these your notes taken of the Thompson 
meeting or is this some other topic? 

A T'^ese are my notes. They are not taken from 
the meeting that I had with Paul on or about November 12. 



\\m L^m^n 



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ummtfiED 



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IS 

16 

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22 

23 

24 

25 



It is a single page and it references from Paul Thompson 
and then under a line it references to Dave CIA GC, that 
IS Dave Doherty. These notes were taken at a meeting 
I assume -- ain I answering the questions you are not 
interested in? 

Q If you can just give me an approximate date of 
when the notes were taken. We will take it chronologically. 

A My approximate date would be a very, very 
approximate date and I would really only be able to give 
you a range because I'll be darned if I can remember what 
the date was of the meeting, though I remember the setting 
and the context of the meeting. 

I don't remember what the date was. I don't 
have a good sense at all for when it was, but it is 
something that we don't have to rely upon my memory alone 
on, because Paul Thompson was there, Dave Doherty was 
there, Peter Wallison was there, I think Larry Garrett 
was there, and it was in Peter's office and I just don't 
remember whether this was before or after. Ma'am, even the 
weekend fact finding. 

Q I may be able to help you. 

A I hope you can. 

MR. LEON: Is there a number on those notes? 

MS. NAUGHTON: No. 

MR. BOLTON: " I think it would be appropriate 



BNHiSSIHEIL 



33 



UiliSSIFIED 



33 



to mark as an exhibit. 

MS. NAUGHTON: We will when we get to it. We will 
go chronologically. 

MR. BOLTON: You just passed it. 

MS. NAUGHTON: No, we haven't. 

MR. BOLTON: I want to be sure there is no 
ambiguity as to which piece of paper Mr. Cooper is looking 
at. If you are going to mark it event j(ally, why not mark 
it now? 

'MS. NAUGHTON: We will/ chronologically . 

Now, as to -- 

MR. BOLTON: Excuse me, then. 

MR. LEON: Can we identify for the record what 
it says? 

MR. BOLTON: I think that is a good idea. The 
top line says "from Paul Thompson" and the last notation 
reads, "The arms transferred were not cunong the arms 
suspended per ex ord (plus which had been previously 
approved by Cong)." And the sign for "therefore," a 
triangle of dots, "ccxild have been sent by Pres. if ex 
ord revoked (even implicitly)." 

This is all in your handwriting? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, it is my handwriting. It is 
all mine. 



I 



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UNCUSSlEifn 



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2 I 

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t1 
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24 
2S 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Getting back to November 13, you received the 
memo from Mr. McGinnis. Did you take it -- 

MR. BOLTON: I think he said he received a draft 
of a memo from Mr. McGinnis. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you receive a copy of a memo from Mr. 
McGinnis? 

A On November 13? 

Q 'Yes. 

A I did receive a draft of a memorandum as I had 
requested from Mr. McGinnis, yes, November 13. 

Q And did you show that to the Attorney General? 

A I did. It was delivered to him the following 
day. 

Q That would be November 14? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you take it personally? 

A No, I don't think so. I don't recall having 
delivered it to him personally. I don't recall having 
done so. 

Q How do you know then it was delivered to him 
on the 14th? 

A It was — I left instructions that it should be 
provided to the Attorney General in the normal course of 



->-» 



iiniii<u£iFn 



35 



wmsm.' 



35 



your — I don't give all our legal opinions that we do for 
the Attorney General to him personally. We have a regular 
delivery routine and I don't even know what it is. It just, 
here it is and it goes. 

Q' Okay. Between November 7 and November 14, then, 
did you discuss any of the legal issues or what you and 
Mr. McGinnis had begun to find out with the Attorney 
General? 

A It is entirely possible. It is entirely possible 
and I might even say probable, but I don't have a specific 
recollection of a meeting in which — no, I take that back. 
I take it back because I do recall on the question of , 
timely notification, providing to the Attorney General the 
signing statement from Carter as well as an excerpt from 
the legislative history between Javits and Huddleston, 
which of course are parts -- reflected in the legal opinions 
that we have done on this question. 

I remember providing him with those particular 
excerpts when he was having lunch in the AG's dining 
room and this would have been prior to November 13 when we 
finalized or finalized the legal memorandum to which we 
have been making reference. 

It seems entirely likely and probable that we 
had other conversations of some kind or another that 
related to legal issues. If we did, they were very brief 



iiNniAOTFn 



36 



13 



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36 



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2 

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8 

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10 

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13 

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16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



and fleeting chats because I don't remember having sat 
down and walked him through anything. So that is the best 
state of my recollection. 

Q Do you recall specifically discussing with him -- 
this is in this time frame now, before the 14th -- the 
importance of a finding regarding the activity of the arms 
sales? 

A No. No. I don't recall having had that kind 
of a conversation. 

Q 'Of what you recall of your conversations -- 

A The time^frame we are talking about now I take 
it is November 13 and prior? 

Q Yes, from November 7 until the end of the day, 
the 13th. 

A I don't recall having had any conversation 
that focused particularly on the importance of a f.inding. 

Q Do you recall what legal issues you did dicuss 
with him? 

A Well, I just recalled the timely notification 
issue but beyond that, I don't have a specific recollection 
of having discussed another particularly legal issue, 
though, as I say, it is probable that I did. 

Q Of the documents that you gave him, you said the 
legislative history and the Smith letter, what legal issues 
were involved in those documents that you gave him? 



wmmi\i 



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UN§emED 



37 



1 

2 
3 

4 I 
5 



6 
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II 
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25 



MR. BOLTON: I think we have something confused 
here. I think what Mr. Cooper testified before was that 
he gave an extract from the legislative history and a copy 
of President Carter's signing statement. You are getting 
back into the Smith letter. Do you mean to lump those 
together? 

MS. NAUGHTON: Let me rephrase the question. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q When you gave him the documents over the lunch 
period on whatever day you did that, do you recall what 
legal issues were involved in those documents? 

A Well, I recall them as having had relevance to 
only one legal issue or at least our having focused on 
them for their relevance to one legal issue, and that was 
the question whether the President has the authority to 
not provide prior notice of a significant anticipated 
intelligence activity under the National Security Act, 
and it was certainly the Attorney General's view, as is 
reflected by the fact, if nothing else, that he passed on 
approvingly the finding itself which says "don't provide 
prior notice," it was certainly his view that prior notice 
was not statutorily required and the statute itself says 
what it says but in addition to that, I think the legisla- 
tive history, the Huddleston-Javits debate and the Carter 
signing statement were relevant to it. I know he didn't 



IINCIiSSIEIFn 



i 



38 



15 



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1 

2 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



have them so I had provided them to him. 

I am also now recalling that at some point, and 
I think it may well be that it was prior to the November 13 
legal opinion, I provided him with a slender notebook like 
this, only more slender, three-ring binder, that had certain 
relevant statutes, statutes that we had been able to 
identify at that point as bearing on arms sales. I feel 
certain that it had Hughes-Ryan in it. National Security 
Act, Arms Export Control Act, at a minimum those. Perhaps 
the Export Administration Act. In other words, a notebook 
much like this which contained certain statutes in it. 

It might well be -- now I think it was I provided 
that to him prior to November 13. 

Q That notebook would have included simply copies 
of the statutes and no legal analysis? 

A Right. Copies of the statutes with an index. 
They were tabbed. 

Q Did you discuss with him prior to November 14 
your research indicating that the President could waive 
the Arms Export Control Act? 

A It seems likely that we discussed the Smith 
opinion, but I'll be darned if I can remember a specific 
instance. It would have had to have occurred, I should 
think, I should think it would have had to occur between 
November 12 if that is when I met with Paul Thompson, and 



IINnUL^B 



39 



mmmi 



I 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

to 

II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



the 14th because the William French — I don't think I had 
any knowledge of the Smith opinion until its existence was 
disclosed in the memo covering the finding. I don't think 
that the AG and I had conversation about its existence 
or his reliance on it or anything like that. But when I 
did see it in there, I dug it out and -- but I don't recall 
whether I then had conversations with the AG about it 
particularly but it is entirely possible that I did. 

Q What was your understanding during that period 
of time about the, that the President could waive the Arms 
Export Control Act? What sort of waiver was contemplated? 

MR. BOLTON: Contemplated by whom, and -- are. 
you asking -- 

MS. NAUGHTON: I have not finished my question, 
counsel. If you let me finish the question. 

MR. BOLTON: Fine. Please finish your question. 

MS. NAUGHTON:. I will start again. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q During that period of time, what was your under- 
standing the Presidential waiver constituted? In other 
words, was this an express waiver that you were contem- 
plating had to occur to waive the Arms Export Control Act 
or was this an implied waiver, or did you have any of that 
in mind when you discussed it with the Attorney General? 

MR. BOLTON: I will raise the same question: Are 



UNDliSllED 



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2 

3 

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you referring generally to authority under the statute or 
are you asking about a specific instance? 

MS. NAUGHTON: I am asking about his state of 
mind at the time he discussed this with the Attorney 
General . 

MR. BOLTON: I will repeat my question. 
Generally under the statute or as to any specific instance? 
MS. NAUGHTON: I don't understand your objection. 
MR. BOLTON: Are you asking something in connection 
with the January, "86, |inding or are you asking his 
interpretation of the statute generally? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Both. 

MR. BOLTON: If you can understand that, you are 
more than welcome to try and answer it. 

THE WITNESS: Well, actually I think the premise 
of the question to the extent it relies upon a waiver 
theory is not something that I would accept. 

I don't think I have ever analyzed this in the 
context of the President or anyone else waiving the 
applicability of the Arms Export Control Act. Rather, my 
conception, and I think the conception that is displayed 
in the analysis in our opinions, is that there are two 
alternative statutes, at least two, and there may be 
others, but at a minimum there are two statutes under which 
this country may transfer arms to other countries and other 



UNfUSSlHED 



41 



wmmtiis 



41 



persons. One is the Arms Export Control Act, and when that 
is used, its restrictions must be complied with. One is 
the National Security Act, and when that is used, its 
restrictions must be complied with but it is not a question 
of waiving this one; it is just a question of this one 
being applicable and this one not. 

The National Security Act is applicable and 
governs arms transfers that are made in conjunction with 
intelligence activities. Arms Export Control Act governs 
probably 'everything else but it doesn't govern those kinds 
of arms transfers. 

So it is not really a question of waiver; it -is 
]ust a question of which one is applicable. I think that 
was the analysis in '81 and that is certainly our analysis 
now. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q So your understanding during this time period was 
that if the President opted to sell the arms for intelligence 
purposes, that the Arms Export Control Act would not apply? 

A Yes. If he made the decision that in connection 
with this intelligence activity, this covert operation 
which is in the national interest or whatever, we are going 
to transfer some arms to some country or group that we 
support and want to help, then Arms Export Control doesn't 
apply, National Security Act applies. It contains some 



I 



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21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



requirements that are then invoked, but the Arms Export 
Control Act requirements are not applicable under those 
circumstances . 

Q And those requirements under the National Security 
Act is the finding is made and congressional notification 
is made of the covert activity at some point. 

A The finding would only be necessary if the 
CIA was going to be involved. The finding requirement only 
applies to the CIA by virtue of Hughes-Ryan but the reporting 
requirements apply no matter who is involved. So even if 
the CIA is not involved and therefore no finding is necessary 
the reporting requirements under the Natinal Security Act are 
applicable . 

Q Now, after the Attorney General was provided the 
memo drafted by Mr. McGinnis on or about November 14, did 
you discuss its contents with him? 
MR. BOLTON: Excuse me. 

THE WITNESS: There seems to be an implicit 
assumption in that question and some of your others that 
McGinnis was virtually the sole author of this memo and 
to the extent that is the case, I want to negative that. 

John did provide a draft to me and it was a 
very thorough draft and one that I did not find much to, 
if anything, to quarrel with, but I did review it 
thoroughly and found it entirely sound and ultimately 



iiMHii^siEiFn 



43 



DKeHtKIRED 



43 



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3 

4 

5 

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8 

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12 

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1» 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



signed it and accepted responsibility for it. 

So I just want to make no mistake about that and 
I apologize, I have forgotten your question. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q I didn't mean to convey that. I am only referring 
to it as the McGinnis memo by virtue of referring it to 
somebody. You can call it Exhibit 2 if you like. 
A Let's call it the November 13 opinion? 
Q It doesn't have a date on it, is the problem. 
A I That is true. That is right, it doesn't, although 
one can date it by internal reference. 
Q Okay. 

A There are internal references that date it, but 
you are right. 

MR. LEON: It refers to the President's speech 
that day. 

THE WITNESS: That is right, and we were 
literally working on it as the President was speaking and 
finalized it after he concluded. 

MR. BOLTON: To the extent it can be referred to 
as anybody's memorandum, it's Mr. Cooper's. He signed as 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the legal office 
of the Department of Justice, as is customary. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Counsel, are you testifying? 
MR. BOLTON: No, I am clarifying the record. 



iiMTiii^mim 



44 



21 



UlffiEimED 



44 



9 

10 

11 

12 
13 
14 
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16 
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16 
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24 
25 



MS. NAUGHTON: I thought Mr. Cooper did that 
fine. 

MR. BOLTON: I em sure he did, 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q As to Exhibit 2, did you discuss that with the 
Attorney General? 

A I don't recall having a specific conversation 
with the Attorney General about that memorandum, but we 
did discuss at various times the various legal issues and 
analyses bhat are embraced by that memorandum. But I don't 
remember having sat down and discussed, you know, gone over 
the memorandum. We certainly didn't do it prior to the' 
time I gave it to him. 

Q So he didn't call you in, in other words, for a 
meeting to specifically discuss the memo? 

A I don't recall any such meeting, no. 

Q Moving on, then, to when you received the draft 
chronology from the White House on or about November 17, 
1986. 

A Yes. That is our best reckoning for when we got 
it and we do have and did receive from the NSC a chronology 
dated the 17th. I think that is our principal reason for 
concluding that we got it on the 17th. 

Q As you may have heard from testimony in the 
public session of the hearings, there have been several 



UNCimiElED 



22 



45 



mmm 



chronologies prepared by the National Security Council. 
I would like to go through some of them with you and ask 
you which ones you had seen and which ones you had not 



If the reporter could please mark this as 
CJC No. 3. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-3 was 
marked for identification.) 
MR. BOLTON: While Mr. Cooper is reviewing the 
documents, let me note in the document, the first page 
bears document production 330081, and it contains several 
redactions on its various pages and has several handwriiten 
notations and markings on some of the pages. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Mr. Cooper, I direct your attention to the 
second page, although they are not numbered. Referring co 
the second full paragraph of the page, reads, "In ^Jovember, 
1985, as the next step in the operation, the NSC arranged 
for Israel to send IS^^^^^^^H^awk missiles to Iran." 

Then it goes on to explain how the missiles were 
rejected by the Iranians. 

Do you recall ever seeing this document before? 
A I have never seen this document before until 
this moment. 

Q All right. Fine. Thank you. 



UNCIASSIHED 



46 



UIiulAuSimlD 



46 



23 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



MS. NAUGHTON: I would ask the reporter to mark 
this next document as CJC No. 4. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-4 was 
marked for identification.) 

MR. BOLTON: While Mr. Cooper is reviewing 
this document, let me note that the front page bears 
document production No. N-8349 and it is numbered consecu- 
tively throughout ending with N-8354. 

This document also contains redactions, some 
handwritten notations and some marks, not all of which 
are legible. 

THE WITNESS: I don't believe that I have ever 
seen this document. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q And that is the chronology dated November 13, 
1986 , is that correct? 

A That is what it purports to be. It does contain 
similarities to other documents that I've seen which are 
subsequently dated chronologies from the NSC, but I do not 
believe I have ever seen this document before this moment. 

Q Calling your attention, Mr. Cooper, to the 
third page of that document, the second paragraph starting 
with "throughout the remainder of 1985, the U.S. Government 
maintained contact with the Iranian expatriate. A number 
of meetings were conducted" -- and so on. It skips then to 



iJMWiSiUcirn 



47 



UNffltSSmED 



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"In December, 1985, the National Security Adviser met with 
the Israeli official and the Iranian contact to make clear 
the nature of our interest in the dialogue with Iran." 
It goes on from there. 

Do you see that portion? 
A Yes . 

Q Do you see anything on that page -- after all, 
this is a chronology -- that mentions the shipment of 18 
Hawk missiles to Iran in or about November, 1985? 

MR. BOLTON: I'm going to object to that question. 
The page obviously speaks for itself. 

If you want Mr. Cooper to go through and read^ 
it and answer when what is obvious to anybody who can read 
it as well, that is fine. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Fine. 

MR. BOLTON: I am just objecting to the question 
as to form in case there is a subsequent proceeding where 
that might be pertinent, Ms. Naughton. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Can you answer the question? 

A I certainly do not see a reference on this page 
to November transfers of arms of any kind, including Hawks. 
Q Okay. Thank you. 

If I could get the reporter to mark this next 
document as No. CJC 5, reference, N-8337. 



l)m4S<UEIFn 



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(Exhibit No. CJC-5 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Do you recall receiving a copy of this 
chronology, Mr. Cooper, while you were at the White House? 

A Well, I recall receiving and know that we 
received -- because it is in our documents and we have 
produced them to you -- a chronology from the NSC that is 
dated 11/17/86. I don't recall whether it is 2000 hours 
maximum version or whether or not this is it. There are 
large black excisions in the document and I did not receive 
any document that had such markings as this, and I reaUy 
don't recall having received a document that had what 
looked to be as many interlineations and certainly didn't 
receive one that had "Top Secret" crossed out, and unclassi- 
fied. 

Q For the record, Mr. Cooper, this document is what 
we can use in public session. It has been unclassified 
by the White House and that is why you see the markings 
out and deletions. 

A I see . 

Q With that under — because that will be the 
ones we will use in your public testimony. If you could 
please look at portions that are not redacted and see 
whether or not that is the copy of the chronology which 



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you received. 

MR. BOLTON: For purposes of clarity here, the 
document noted on the first page, N-8337 and is consecu- 
tively numbered ending on N-8348. 

THE WITNESS: I don't resist in the least that 
this document was provided, but as I look at it, my 
recollection of the November 17 document, and I did not 
study It closely, I frankly don't think- I ever read it all 
the way through, but I don't recall having received a 
document that was quite as rough as this one is, but you 
people will be able to tell me whether I did because we 
produced to you the document that we received and I am - 
happy to compare it to the one that we have. But if this 
IS It, then fine, this is it. I just don't know. 
BY MS. NAQGHTON: 
Q Okay. Do you recall being interviewed earlier 
by Mr. Nields and myself and Mr. Leon and others? 
A Oh, yes. 

Q During that interview, do you recall having 
your direction specifically brought to page 4 of this 
document, the N-8340 document, production number -- excuse 
me, page 5, and the second paragraph that starts, "In 
late November, 1985, the Israelis, responding to urgent 
entreaties from the Iranians, provided 18 basic Hayjc 
missiles to Iran in order to improve their static defenses 



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around Tehran. The Israeli delivery of HawX missiles 
raised U.S. concerns that we could well be creating 
misunderstandings in Tehran and thereby jeopardizing our 
ob]ective of arranging a direct meeting with high-level 
Iranian officials. These missiles were subsequently 
returned to Israel in February, 1986, with U.S. assistance." 

Do you recall reading that particular paragraph 
on or about November 17, '86, when you were doing your 
research? 

A . I do recall having read that paragraph or 
perhaps the paragraph like that, or the corresponding 
paragraph in the November 20 chronology that we also 
received from NSC. I can't tell you that I recall having 
read this specific paragraph, but these words and sentences 
and information to that effect, I definitely did read, 
yes. 

Q Do you recall then that on November 17 or • 
thereabouts when you received the first chronology is the 
first you learned about a November, '85, shipment of Hawk 
missiles? 

A Yes, absolutely. 

Q And would it have been from the chronology? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q No one told you about it?- 

A John McGinnis told me about it, but it was from 



UNCLMEIFD 



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\i\mmii 



51 

the chronology that he learned it. He examined the chrono- 
logy and advised me straight away that the September and 
November events were -- which were news to us — were 
portrayed in the chronology. 

At that point, I was preparing for what was then 
my first presentation to the President on the question of 
Federalism and I had other things on my mind, but John was, 
John did review this as soon as it came in. 

Q If I could turn your attention to page 4, then, 
since you discussed the September shipment, the second 
paragraph on page 4 reads as follows: "In September of 
1985, the Israelis advised that they were close to achieving 
a breakthrough in their contact with Iran and would proceed 
unless we objected. It is important to note that U.S. had 
long been aware of Israeli efforts to maintain discrete 
contact with Iran and to provide our grant with assistance 
in its war with Iraq." 

The next paragraph goes on to explain, "On 
August 22, 1985, the U.S., through the U.S. citizen 
intermediary, acquiesced m an Israeli delivery of military 
supplies (508 TOWs ) to Tehran. We were subsequently 
informed that the delivery had taken place at the end of 
August, although we were not aware of the shipment at the 
time it was made." 

Do you recall reading that section in the 



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chronology which you saw on November 17? 

A I do not recall that specifically. As a matter 
of fact, my recollection of the September, what I call and 
have always called, the September transfer of 508 TOWs was 
that the U.S. learned of that in September, but that it had 
occurred in, allegedly in August. I don't have a specific 
recollection of having read this. 

Q In the third paragraph it states, "We were 
subsequently informed that the delivery had taken place 
at the encj of August, although we were not aware of the 
shipment at the time it was made." 

Is that consistent with your recollection ot 
what you understood the September transaction to be 
about? 

A Yes, that is much more consistent, though that 
is not precise. I do have a pretty vivid recollection 
that the time of us, of the U.S. being informed or 
learning of the September shipment -- of what I call the 
September shipment, was in September and not in August, 
and so of course it wasn't too long into this that we 
discovered the September shipment was in fact a September 
shipment, unless of course you all have better information 
than that. 

But this better represents the state of my 
knowledge now and to my recollection at all times. 



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53 
Q When Mr. McGmnis brought this information from 

the chronology to your attention, what did you discuss 

regarding legal issues that these shipments presented? 

A Well, that was our concern obviously, that these 

transfers, if they in fact took place, took place before 

a finding. 

3- 

Now, our concern wasn't -- our concerns were 

twofold. There was no finding so to the extent the CIA 

played any role in either of these or at least to the 

extent th^t appropriated funds were used by the CIA, then 

we had a legal problem; or at least on the face of it, a 

legal issue was raised, and we knew -- and I suspect we, 

knew from this document, this was the only document we 

had dealing with it -- no, at that time I guess we had 

no idea that the CIA had been in any way involved in the 

November shipment and our concerns did not focus on the 

November shipment at that point, but rather, the September 

shipment because the November shipment, according to this 

portrayal, had been canceled out. The impression that was 

created was that the United States Government was upset 

by the transfer of these Hawks and that through means 

that we either brought about or encouraged and assisted 

the arms that were transferred were returned so we concluded 

that if there was some kind of a violation. Arms Export 

Control Act violation, it was not a problem that anyone is 



uimssn 



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going to focus on because the arms were returned. 

We did focus, however, on the September shipment 
of 508 TOWs for which there was no suggestion that the 
arms had been returned and on Arms Export Control Act 
problems because there was no information suggesting that 
that transfer from Israel to Iran had been a part of any 
kind of covert operation or intelligence activity that 
would bring it within the National Security Act, so we 
realized that under the Arms Export Control Act, Israel 
had apparently violated the restraints that that Act places 
upon retransfers of U.S. military munitions. 

Q All right. 

A And we also were acquainted with the fact and 
the most serious concern to us was the fact that the Arms 
Export Control Act places certain restrictions and 
reporting requirements upon the President. So that was 
the focus of our concern, of course, was whether or not 
this event could be used to criticize the President or 
suggest that something illegal had happened that the 
President was responsible for. 

Q Now, did you discuss at this time the issue of 
replenishment, in other words, whether the United States 
government had promised replenishment to Israel if it sold 
the TOWs? 

A I don't remember if we discussed it. It wasn't 



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long that we discussed that but I don't recall having 
discussed it particularly on the 17th, but that analysis 
emerged not long after we began examining these pre-finding 
events . 

Q Were there any other legal issues that caused 
you concern? You have expressed the two. Were there any 
others at that point that you wanted to focus on? 

A I don't recall any. We looked at the Foreign 
Assistance Act, which also is related to arms purchases 
by foreign countries. We wondered whether these TOWs 
were or had come to the Israelis through Arms Export 
Control Act sales and therefore were encumbered by Arms, 
Export Control Act restraints, but certainly those -- 
I can't recall any other concerns, but if they were, they 
were secondary to the ones that I have outlined. 

Q After you received the chronology and were 
aware of 1985 shipments, did you tell the Attorney General 
about them? 

A Yes, I did, not long thereafter. I can't tell 
you the exact date. But, yes, I did advise him that we had 
new information that raised legal issues. 



UNCUMIfn 



56 



taiv 

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UI^<A8^ED 



56 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you explain to them your two concerns? 

A I am sure that I did whenever htsft conversation 
took place. 

Q What did the Attorney General say? 

A I don't recall any reaction, any particular -- 
in fact, I don't recall the conversation, though I know it 
happened. I don't have any specific recollection of our 
conversation when I advised him of the new information. I do, 
however, have a general recollection of advising him of that 
fact and have a general recollection of his being surprised. 

Q That there were 1985 shipments? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall how you received that impression? 
MR. BOLTON: You mean advise~-i«^^- 'Verbally? 
THE WITNESS: That is my — he didn't say I am 
surprised or something like that. At least I don't recall 
him having articulated it. I just formed that impression from 
his reaction. It was clear that he had-^nown about that fact 
I mean, like me -- this was his first evidence of any such 
pre-finding events involving arms having taken place. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did he give you any instructions after that in 
terms of more fact gathering or more legal analysis? 

A No, I don't recall him having given me any 



UNCUSSIHFD 



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instructions. I feel confident that I advised him that I 
was examining the legal issues that are raised by these - 
by this new information and that, you know, as soon as I had 
some preliminary conditions to share with him, I would. i 
mean, that is my - that would be my normal operation and I 
don't recall there having been any deviation from that. 

Q After learning of the 1985 shipments from the 
chronologies, did you contact Admiral Poindexter or Commander 
Thompson or Oliver North or anyone you thought might have some 
answers fpr you? 

A well, I am certain I did not contact Poindexter or 
North. It is entirely possible I talked to Thompson, but I 
don-t recall having done so. I do not recall having done so. 

Q On November 18th do you recall there being a meetm 
at the White House in Mr. Wallison's office? 

A I don't have any recollection of that or at least 
of that date. I recall a meeting in Wallison's office and 
I referred to a meeting in that office earlier today, but I 
don't have a specific recollection of the date on which the 
meeting that I recall took place. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Please mark this document CJC-6. 
(Exhibit No. CJC-6 was marked for identification.) 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q If you could describe for the record what that 
document is, please? 

A This document, which has been' ma'rlTed' CJC-6 , are 



^coi_i.i.ue Lur tne recora w, 

UNCUSSIRED 



58 



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hcindwritten notes that I recognize as my own. The notes were 
tcUcen at a meeting that I attended in Peter Wallison's office 
and at which Paul Thompson, Dave De uyh e rt y , at least, also 
attended. 

My recollection is that Sofaer or a representative 
of his office probably attended, and Larry Garrett or a 
representative of his office probably also attended. 

Q For the record. Judge Sofaer is head of the Legal 
Advisors Office at the Department of State? 

A . Yes. 

Q And Larry Garrett is general counsel — 

Q General counsel at DOD. But I cannot say wi<h 
certainty that either Sofaer or Garrett attended, but it is 
' my best recallection that they did. 

MR. LEON: What was D ou g he r ty' c position at that 



A He was general counsel at CIA and I think this was 
the first time I had ever nwft Dou >j hevt. -y , but that may not be 
accurate. The people who were assembled in that room are, 
except for Doughartiy , are the adviST^rs who form what we call 
the War Powers Group. Whenever there is an incident in the 

/offi^ing that involved use of American forces and therefore 
raises a question regarding applicability of the War Powers 
Resolution, the White House counsel will convene a meeting in 

^ his office of/white House »4^±c&t OLC Assistant AG, DOD 



ge 



neral counsel, and Department of State legal adviser, some- 



59 



uimsmED 



59 



times the NSC general counsel is there, and Paul Thompson was 
often at these as well. 

But It is by reference to that group that I^call 
the players at this meeting, because it was a group that was 
the samfe group, at least that is my recollection, with the 
addition of Dave D ougherty .( 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q What was the purpose of this meeting? 
A Well — the purpose of it, which appears generally 
from my note/and occurs generally in my recollection — was 
to discuss generally the Iranian controversy (t)l^at was 
swirling about the Administration at the time, and to figure 
out what was going on. 

Q Did Mr. Wallison call the meeting? 

A It seems entirely likely to me that he did. It was 
in his office and that was my understanding was that he was 
calling it. 

Q What was your impression of how much Mr. Wallison 
knew about the Iranian arms sale? 

A I don't recall having formed a particular 
impression of that fact at the time. I think everybody's 
impression was that they didn't know very much about the arms 
sale. Paul Thompason provided some, and probably the only 
factual data that was discussed — well, not the only, because 
I note here that Dave Dougliertv noted that Weinberger had 



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looked at the legal issue back in January. But nobody really 
had a good factual understanding of what had taken place, 
and Wallison was no different. 

Q What was the purpose of the meeting then? 

MR. BOLTON: He has already answered that before, 
his answer was to discuss the Iran controversy, so I am going 
to object on the grounds of repetition. He can answer if he 
wishes. 

THE WITNESS: I really can't supplement my note 
from my memory in terms of what was said at the meeting — 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Why don't you go through your notes then and_ tell 
me what was said? 

A Thompson said that in September of 198 5 arms were 
sent by Israel to Iran and were replenished after the finding 
I don't know -- oh, okay -- after the finding in January. 
He noted that at most there were 2,000 Tows that had been 
shipped to Iran from whatever sources, and that there were 
apparently three shipments of those Tq^s. 
(Counsel is conferring with witness) 

THE WITNESS: A point was made that some of the 
Tow transfers were made after — or at least some of the Tows 
were transferred after August 27, 1986, and my note indicates 
that when the Arms Export Control Act was amended to — and 
I know what that means, but my note does not reflect that, but 



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UlALlOOII 




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, it was amended at that time to prohibit arms transfers to 

2 countries that the Secretary of State had declared to be 

3 terrorist nations and I don't say whether this is a point made 

4 by Paul Thompson or by somebody else in the room. 

3 The next line of my note says 500 replenished Tows 

g to Israel. I don't know particularly what that means other 
^ than I guess another reference to the fact that some Tows that 
g had been transferred by Israel to Iran were replenished by the 
U.S. 

. Then I have got a note that says DOD to CIA — an 
arrow between them — aind another arrow after CIA to 
proprietary, parens, non>CIA, to Israel to Iran. So this is 
-- this appears to be the path of the arms that they took 
from the U.S. to Iran. And I am quite confident that is what 
it is. I don't say with equal confidence that Thompson 
related this, but I think that he did. 

So that the arms came out of the Department of 
Defense, they were then transferred to the CIA on an Economy 
Act basis. I have got a note here that suggests that to me 
and I subsequently learned that was the case. 

And then CIA transferred them to a propriS^tary 
non-CIA. I don't know what that means. The propri^tj^r^that 
I subsequently, I think, became acquainted with was an 
airline operated by CIA, but I don't know what was intended 
by that note. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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And then they were transferred to Israel and then 
to Iran, according to this note. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Was it your understanding that that path of arms 
sales was for post-finding sales or for all the sales or was 
that distinguished? 

A I don't recall whether it was distinguished 
specifically but I would say it probably distinguished. 
Certainly that is my understanding for the post-ginding arms 
relationship (hflat was established with Iran. Not the pre- 
finding relationship. 

Then I have a note beneath that which says Paul 
says total value less than -- and that is the end of the note 
-- so I don't know what he said to finish that out. I ]ust 
don't have any recollection at all. 

Then there is a line across the page and beneath 
that, I have Dave, CIAGC, which identified to me that this 
fellow with whom I think I was being acquainted for the first 
time, was named Dave and he was CIAGC. I don't think I had 
had any dealings with him prior to this. 

He related apparently, from this note, that in 
January Weinberger had looked at the legal issue and was 
satisfied. Then underneath that, so did Meese presumably. 

My recollection, such as it is — very general and 
sketchy -- but is that the legal issue that this references 



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DNeStSSfFIED 



63 



IS the question whether arms could be transferred under the 
National Security Act and thereby rendering inapplicable to th,. 
Arms Export Control Act. 

Then the note says re September, which to me meant 
September, the September shipment of Tgws . Note the language 
in Arms Export Control Act, and use of term "wouldfly' "^^^^ 
President approve sale by A good government, Israel, to a 
prohibited country, Iran^ 

My best recollection is that this point was made by 
Sofaer. ^hat is another reason why i think that Sofaer was 
at the meeting, and not by Dave. But I could certainly be 
corrected on that. I then have a line that says -- 

Q Could you interpret that for us — when you 
heard that exactly what point was he making? 

A I did not entirely understand it at the time., i 
remember that I was not immediately acquainted with the phrase 
that he was referring to in the Arms Export Control Act, the 
"would" phrase. Since then I now know what it was he was 
referring to, but at the time, I did not understand that point 
Q What is your understanding now? 

A I think he was suggesting chat the standard for 
whether the Arms Export Control Act, its restriction regarding 
— well, I just don't recall what the word "wouldR, what 
provision of the Arms Export Control Act is in. But it sets 
up a standard and I don't recall whether it is for consenting 



64 



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to the transfer, but I think that is what it is. And he 
suggested that the standard is would the President have 
approved this himself if he subsequently finds out about it? 
I think that is the point he was making. 

I can examincthe pertinent reference of the Arms 
Export Control Act if you would like me', to see if that 
assists my memory. You want me to do that? 
Q No, that is fine. 

A The next line is, is there any significance to 
fact, and 'that is the end of it. I don't have a clue as to 
what is being discussed that relates to that truncated note. 

The next line is the arms tranferred were not among 
the arms that were suspended per executive order and which 
had been previously approved by Congress, which is in paren- 
theticals, and therefore coulahave been sent by President if 
executive revoked even implicitly. 

I don't remember who made this point but the point 
was simply that prior to the time that an embargo was 
established regarding Iran, they had bought a large stocky as 
I understand it, of arms, arms of various and sophisticated 
kinds. We embargoed those arms by executive order, so the 
point, as I understand it, was that if the arms that had been 
transferred to Iran had been the ones that they had previously 
purchased and paid for, there would be no Arms Export Control 
Act, no Na-tional Security Act, no problems of any kind — at 




65 



UmtSPED 



65 



least that is the proposition. 

I have never examined it — I don't know whether 
that is accurate or not, but this was a point of information 
and I suspect — I just don't know where it came from, but it 
mordorlless foreclosed that legal analysis if that was 
factually correct. 

And since we have completed this document, I take 
it, could I get a three^minute recess? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Sure. 
(A short recess was taken) 
MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Just a few more questions about that November I8th 
meeting at the White House. 

A Incidentally, I am prepared to accept your 
information that that happened on the 18th, but you are 
telling me, so hasn't really inspired my memory on that and 
I can't confirm that of my own recollection. 

Q Fine. We will just refer to it as the meeting in 
Wallison's office. 
A Okay. 

Q Was there any attempt by those present to get more 
information out of Mr. Thompson, other than what he had or tha 
he was willing to provide? 

A I seem to -- yes, I seem to recall some irritation 



IINCLASSIFIFD 



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exhibited, particularly by Inphir r and Garrett -- if again 
I am correct and they were at the meeting. And my recollectio 
though it is vague, is along the lines that the irritation was 
because of the lack of information on what had happened that 
was forthcoming from NSC to the other interested agencies. 

Q What\ves Commander Thompson's response to you? 

A Well, his response to me on numerous occasions was 
that they are doing the best they can and working very hard 
to reconstruct the matter from the people who were involved, 
and from any documents that are relevant to it, and I — while 
I don't have specific recollection, I suspect that is what he 
offered to this group. 

Q Do you recall that -- did he ever say that Admiral 
Poindexter had told him not to impart certain facts to this 

qra Op 

"^^ep or to keep it closely held, something along those lines? 

A I don't recall that. 

Q Do you recall how the meeting ended? In other 
words , what was to be done or whcit were the participants going 
to do? 

A No, I don't recall there having been any agreed 
action steps that would then take place. I mean, they were 
acquainted with the fact that — and I didn't make any secret 
of the fact, I am sure — that I and my office, my office was 
examining the legal issues that we were able to identify -- 
so I suspect that there was universal understanding that that 
proiect was going forward, but I don't remember there having 

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been any taskings or any agreed upon next steps for that 
group. 

Q Do you know whether or not any of the participants 
at that meeting had a copy of the chronology? 

A^ I do not think that they did, but I don't recall 
that specifically. I just — my general recollection is that 
It does not associate chronology with that meeting and I 
think that if they did have a chronology the chronology would 
be on the table in front of everybody, and I do not recall 
that as ha.ving been the case. 

Q Do you know whether or not Commander Thompson 
promised to get them a chronology? 

A I can't say that he did. I just don't recall. 
Q Did he promise to keep them informed of the facts? 
A I would suspect -- I mean to the extent -- well, 
actually I ] us t don't have a recollection of what representa- 
tions Paul Thompson made to this group or what responses he 
made to the protests that I vaguely recall having been made. 
I suspect, however, that in light of the context he suggested 
they were doing the best they could, and they would, of course, 
be provided with information at such time as it was developed 
I suspect that, I don't recall it. 

Q Do you happen to recall what time of day this 
meeting was? 

A No, I can't tell you whether it was morning 



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or afternoon, to tell you the truth. 
2 Q Then we go to the 19th of November, 1986, the day 
- of the Presidential press conference. Do you recall watching 



the press conference? 

A Yes, X do. 

Q Did anything in it strike you as remarkable? 

MR. BOLTON: I will object to that question. I 
don't know what the word "remarkable" means. If you want to 
ask him his impressions, I think that is a legitimate question 
but asking with words like remarkable doesn't seem to be 
answerable. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Your objection is noted. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Answer the question, please. 

A I do recall the press conference. I recall having 
noted particularly a statement that the President made to the 
effect that there were no third countries involved in our 
efforts. I can't tell you what his formulation was, or what 
question it was in response to, but he did make that statement] 
it seems to me, generally towards the end of the latter half 
of the news conference. 

And all the information that I had thus far 
developed from the finding and the memo regarding the finding 
to the chronology of eveMothing else, was that in fact Israel 
had been involved very, very prominently in this with us, 



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so that is one thing that yes, does come immediately to mind 
— in response to your question. 

Q After hearing that did you do anything? 

A Yes, I did. xTaterally, as soon as the press 
conference concluded, I called Paul Thompason at the White 
House and it was really an unnecessary call because he knew 
why I was calling and the point I was going to make, and by 
the time I chatted with Thompson, apparently a decision had 
already been made to correct the erroneous statement that the 
President , had made regarding no third countries. 

Q Did you discuss any other issues with Mr. Thompson? 

A I don't recall having done so. I had a preoise 
purpose for calling and we did not chat. As soon as we 
established that they were addressing the problem then and 
there, that was the end of the conversation insofar as I 
recall. 

Q Do you recall anything else on November 19th that 
you did regarding the Iran arms sales? 

A I am sure that there were other things, because on 
each day I was conferring with John McGinnis and reading 
statutes and -- you know — just doing things that were -- 
that had some relationship to this matter. But I don't recall 
specifically having done anything. Nothing comes particularly! 
to my mind. 

Q Now then, turning your attention to November 20th, 



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again, I want to go through some chronologies that are dated 
November 20th. Not that you necessarily received them, but 
I want to find out if you ever saw copies. The first one is 
dated November 20, 1986. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If I could have — it has previously 
been Exhibit 58 in the McFarlane Exhibit Book, but I would ask 
the reporter to mark it as CJC Exhibit 7. 

(Exhibit CJC Exhibit 7 was marked for 
identification. ) 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q I would like to turn your attention to page 6 of 
this chronology, which is the portion we are concerned with. 
The second full paragraph, which starts "In mid-November the 
Israelis, through a senior officer" — and it goes on then 
regarding requested help for a shipment that is ultimately to 
go to Iran. In the middle of the paragraph it states "we werej 
assured at the time that the Israelis were going try oil 
drilling parts as an incentive since we had expiassed so much 
displeasure on the earlier Tow, shipment." 

It goes on to relate the CIA's involvement in 
obtaining a propriatary and in helping with that flight. 

Now, do you recall seeina this version of the 
chronology? ,.«— ' 

A I think this is the version of the chronology I 



received, yes. 



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Q In other words, do you recall the November '85 

shipment being referred to as oil drilling equipment? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall when you received this chronology? 
A 



I can't say any better than the 20th. I just don't 
— well, actually, this thing is dated the 20th at 2000 hours, 
which would be I guess 10 o'clock at night, and it seems very 

8 unlikely -- 

9 Q I am not sure that that reference is to the time. 
YOU shouldn't assume that because we have other versions with 

11 the same enumeration on it. 

12 A Other versions that say November 20th? 

13 Q Yes. 
MR. LEON: Let's for the record, make it clear. 
THE WITNESS: Then I can't make any statements that 

^5 I are authoritative. 

17 MR- LEON: For the record, let's make it clear that' 

f3 this exhibit in the upper right corner on the front page, 

f9 after the date, has a reference to 2000 hours. 

20 '^"E WITNESS: Yes, which Counsel Bolton has advised 

21 me is 8 o'clock at night. I stand corrected. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Let me ask you this. 

A Because you have advised me I cannot recall that we 
received varying versions of a document with identical marking 



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f in the upper right hand corner, that is identical date, and I 

2 what I have always and did then, take to be a time — I always 

3 regard that as 2000 hours in the military lingo of the people 
. who prepared this thing. 

- But to the extent that there were chronologies that 

g bear those identical mark^kings but bary in their text, 

I really cannot represent to you whether or not this is the 
one I received. I can find out with certainty, however, by 
making the necessary comparisons. I am happy to do that. 
But I guess I feel that this is rather treacherous in terms 
of me identifying with certainty any of these documents, 

because I did not presently recall that we received varying 

/pi 

documents with identij^cal legends in the upper right hand 

corner. 

Q H(vQe you retained copies of the chronologies you 
received? 

A Absolutely. And we have provided copies to the 
committee of all the chronologies we have received. So if you 
got this from me, then yes, I will associate myself with it. 

MR. BOLTON: Could we clarify that for the record? 
We have marked three or four versions as exhibits. If you 
want to question on documents received that is legitimate. 
But I don't think we ought to play tag. Ask him about the 
one you think he has seen and put that m froTrt of him and 
let's stipulate that is the one. I don't think anybody could 



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recall the specificity, every word in a document they read 
eight months ago. 

THE WITNESS: Let me add this. I do not recall 
ever having seen a document, a chronology from the NSC that 
had the marginalia that this one has. This may be marginalia 
that has been added by the committee or something. 

MS. NAUGHTON: For the record, we would not add 
any such markings to an exhibit. 

THE WITNESS: I note that we have established that 
the black deletions are the committee's. But to the exent 
that this marginalia was on the document -- 

MS. NAUGHTON: Can we go off the record? 

THE WITNESS: I think it is important to be 
precise here. Because I have never seen a document that has 
that marginalia. 

(Discussion off the record.) 



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MS. NAUGHTON: All right. Back on the record. 

THE WITNESS: During the of f -the-record 
conversation, I established at least to my own satisfaction 
that the document that has been marked as CJC Exhibit 7 was 
not among the chronologies that we received from the NSC, 
although I have also agreed to revisit our files with respect 
to all chronologies we received and send copies anew to 
Pam of all chronologies that we received. 

I also have with me, and have had identified to 
counsel one of the chronologies that is dated 11/20/86, 
and it is marked 1300, historical chronology that I know 
we received and which bears the marginal notations of 
John McGinnis, my assistant in the Iran-contra matter, one of 
them. 

v;e have compared the two documents, CJC Exhibit 7 am 
the chronology that I brought with me, and have identified 
some discrepancies in the two, but they are largely similar 
in their discussion at least of the November transfer of Hawljs 

MS. NAUGHTON: Fine. 

MR. LEON: And you will produce -- 

THE WITNESS: We will produce after White House 
declassification copies of all chronologies that we have that 
are different, including chronologies that are the same 
versions out of the NSC, but bear different authorizations- 
marginal notations such as mine or John McGinnis'. 



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MR. BOLTON: I would note that it is our view that wel 
already have oroduced these documents, since we have already 
emptied our files on several occasions, and it could well be 
that they are actually up here already, but we are happy to 
provide them again. 

THE WITNESS: Just to reemphasize that point, I know 
our files, we have gone through them on a number of different 
occasions to provide copies to a number of different bodies, 
from the Tower Board to the PIAB, to Mr. Walsh, to the 
committees 'of Congress, so it is impossible for me to say 
with any certainty just which bodies got which documents, but 
it was my understanding that virtually all of these bodies 
got all of the documents. 

Ms. NAUGHTON: Okay, fine. 

If the report could mark this version as CJC Number 
8. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-8 was marked for identification.) 

BY MS . NAUGHTON: 
Q This is a chronology again dated November 20, 1985, 
it is documentation number N-9385 through 9401. It is an 
historical chronology again dated 2000 hours. I will direct 
your attention to page N-9390, and ask you whether or not 
you recall receiving that chronology? 

A As I page through this chronology, it does appear to 
be a copy of a chronology that we received bearing the 



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identifying marks in the right-hand corner, 11-20-86, 2000 houri 
But in light about the confusion of the chronologies, I don't 
want to say with certainty that it is until we have actually 
produced the ones in our files, and a comparison has been made, 
but I don't see anything on the face of this document as I 
page through it to suggest to me that it is not the one we 
received bearing these markings. 

Q If I could direct your attention to 9390, the page 
number, the second full paragraph, in late November 1985 -- 
refers to a CIA proprietary being chartered to consider just 
cargo, and then it is later learned that it was actually 18 
Hawjs. missiles. 

In other words, there is no mention of oil drilling 
equipment. 

A That appears accurate, yes. 

Do you recall — does that refresh your recollection 
as to whether or not you received a copy of this? In other 
words, you get one chronology that says it was oil drilling 
equipment, and then you get another that says no, it was not, 
it was just cargo. 

A I am not sure we have established that I received 
a chronology that said oil drilling equioment, but I do know th^ 
the oil drilling equipment line became known to us early on. 
I can't tell you which document or how, but oil drilling 
equipment was the story. 



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I understand, well, just — 

A I guess I also have to note for you that I didn't 
page through the chronologies as we got them, comparing and 
noting discrepancies or at least I don't recall having -- I 
know I didn't do that, and I know John McGinnis didn't do that. 
We were given to understand, and we fully expected that the 
differing versions of the chronologies would be different, 
because the point was emphasized upon us that the task of 
gathering the facts was difficult, and that new facts and new 
mformatioh was coming to light, and it was being compiled 
and updated feverishly by people at the NSC, and that each 
version simply reflected the best knowledge and understanding 
that they had at the time the version was created. 

So, we didn't do anything like a side-by-side of 
each of these chronologies. We just wouldn't have had time forj 

one thing. 

What we ended up doing, at least what I ended up 
doing was seizing upon one of them and using that more or less 
as the basis for our legal examination, because the basic legalj 
facts, or at least the basic events that raised in our minds 
legal issues did not change dramatically. 

Whether they called them oil drilling parts or 
not didn't change the fact that there were Hawks on that 
plane, and the issue remained, and you know, whether the 
September event was the thing that most concerned us and that 

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the important trail of that event didn't change much anyway. 

So that is by way of explanation to say I would not 
have noticed,! suspect, that one of these says oil drilling 
and one of them doesn't, but that was early on a line that we 
were exposed to. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Would you mark this next Exhibit q» 
CJC Number 9? 

(Exhibit No. CJC-9 was marked for identification.) 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Now, CJC Number 9 refers to a document dated November 
20, 1986, chronology of events, the document production number 
taken from the House Intelligence Committee is 330081. 

MR. BOLTON: I might note also that this document 
is classified top secret, so for purposes of — and it is not 
declassified in any way. 

So, for purposes of the classification of the 
deposition, it should be top secret as well. 

V& . NAUGHTON: This document is entitled "Chronology 
of Events," and it is what we have referred to as a 
mini-jchronology, in other words, not a narrative chronology, 
but r^ather a date in the chronology. 

I ask you if you have ever seen this document before? 

THE WITNESS: I have certainly seen a document 
that bears striking similarities to this one. I suspect 



I have seen this one. 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Do you recall when? 

A My best recollection is this document was along 
with another of the November 20th narrative chronologies 
that we. received. 

Q Do you recall whether it came with the last 
chronologv or would it have come with the November 17 
chronology? It is dated November 20, which is why I asked. 
A I really don't. I really don't. 
Q Dkav. 

A I would suggest that Mr. McGinnis might have a more 
precise recollection of that than I do on this. He really was 
more directly involved in receipt and study of the chronologies! 
as they came in. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Can we go off the record? 
(Discussion off the record.) 

MS. NAUGHTON: Let's take a lunch recess now for 30 
minutes, and come back at 1 p.m. 

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the taking of the 
deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., the same 
day. ) 



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1:05 p.m. 

AFTERNOON SESSION 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

MS. NAUGHTON: Could you please mark this as Exhibit 
10. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-10 was marked for identification.) 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q We are back on the record again, and Mr. Cooper, I 
have shown you what has been marked as CJC Number 10, which is 
what IS called the PROF note from Oliver North dated November 
20, 1985, and it has been used previously as an exhibit in 
the public hearings, which is why there are so many redacted 
portions . 

Paragraph 1 starts, the Israelis will deliver 80 
mod, short for modified. Hawks, at noon on Friday, 22 
November. These 80 will be loaded aboard three chartered 
aircraft owned by a proprietary which will take off at 2-hour 
intervals for Tabriz. 

It 4oes on to explain the flight and the H^^ missiles. 
Really, 1 have only one question for you: Have you ever seen 
this PROF note, have you ever seen it before? 

A I have never seen this document before now. At least 
I have never read it. I don't think this document has 
ever been before my eyes, but it has certainly never been 



read by me. 



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Q Prior to November 22, when Mr. Reynolds and 
Mr. Richardson went over to the NSC and were reviewing 
documents, were you aware that such PROF notes existed? 

A I don't even know what a PROF note is right now. 

MR. LEON: That is a good answer. You couldn't 
have reviewed it if you didn't know what it was. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If this could be marked as Exhibit 
11. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-U was marked for identification.) 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Mr. Cooper, this is another PROF note again from 
Oliver North, dated 11-22-85, marked Exhibit 11. I ask 'you 
whether or not you recognize this document? 

A I do not. I do not believe I have ever seen this 
document, and I am certain that I have never read xt. I am 
wondering if you can tell me what this says, though, when it 
says, note from Oliver North, subject, private something, 
something. 

MR. LEON: Private blank check? 

THE WITNESS: Private blank check? 

MR. LEON: That is a communications channel between 
North and Poindexter. ^ ,.^<^ 

MS. NAUGHTON: Would you mark this as Exhibit 12, 
please? 

(Exhibit No. CJC-12 was marked for identification.) 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q CJC Exhibit 12 is a PROF note from Oliver North 
dated December 4, 1985, and it describes, among other things, 
the November attempted transfer of 18 Hawk missiles which 
"went awry" because the Iranians were in fact seeking a 
weapons system that would be capable of stooping Soviet 
reconnaissance flights along the Iranian-Soviet border, and 
on the Iranian- Iraqi border. 

I ask you whether or not you have ever seen this 
document before? 

A I have never read this document, I don't believe 
I have ever seen it, nor do I believe I have ever seen any 
document like this document. 

Q Okay. 

MR. LEON: By that, you mean the PROF format? 
THE WITNESS: I mean visually in its appearance, 
anything that looks like these documents do. They are 
rather distinctive. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Now, on November 20, 1986, did there come a time at 
which vou went to a meeting at the White House regarding 
DCI Casey's proposed testimony? 

A Yes, I did attend a meeting in Mr. Poindexter's 
office, at which his testimony and Poindexter's informal 
briefing of members of I think both the Senate and the House 



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Intelligence Committees was the subject of discussion. 

Q How was It that you went to this meeting? in other 
words, who informed you and who asked you to come? 

A The Attorney General, I think, sometime earlier 
that day, informed me that I, essentially that I would be 
attenting a meeting with him that afternoon at that time in 
Poindexter's office on this Iran business. 

Q Did you have a draft of Mr. Casey's testimony? 
MR. BOLTON: At what time? 

THE WITNESS: I do not think I did prior to the 
time I actually got to Mr. Poindexter's office. I don't 
think I had received a draft of his testimony. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Do you know whether or not the Attorney General 
had a draft of it prior to going to Mr. Poindexter's 
office? 

A I don't know, but I assume that if he had a 
draft prior to that time, I would have received a copy, but 
actually, I just don't know whether he had a copy of it or 
not. My impression and belief is that he did not. 

Copies of the testimony, of a draft testimony were 
of course handed out at the meeting. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I would like to have both of these 
documents marked next in order as 13 and 14. 

(Exhibits No. CJC-13 and 14 were marked for identif icatiorj. 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q CJC-13 is a document^ dated Iran Testimony, 21 
November 1986. It is House Intelligence Committee Document 
No. 330086, and has 10 pages to it. 

For the record. Exhibit No. 14 is White House Document 
No. N-10007, also dated 20 November 1986, and entitled 
DCI's Iranian Testimony for HPSCI and SSCI 21 November 1986. 

These appear to be drafts, Mr. Cooper, of the 
Casey testimony. Do you recall which one it is that you saw 
at Mr. Poirtdexter's office on November 20? 

A Yes, I do, at least the exhibit marked CJC No. 13 
is the one that I recognize as having been distributed and 
the subject of discussion in Poindexter's office that afternoon 

Q Did you ever see the other version, that is Exhibit 
No. 14? 

A I did, and when I say that I saw these versions, 
I assume these are the only versions of -- in other words, 
I am assuming there are not versions of this that have the 
same identifying markings, a la the chronologies. 

But, yes, I did see this. I have seen this. 

Q First of all, did you see -- 

A I did not see this in Poindexter's office, however. 

Q Let's get that again. How many versions m all did 
you see of the Casey testimony? 

A Three versions. 



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Q Is the first one before you? 

A Yes . 

Q That is Exhibit 13? 

A Yes. 

Q- And you saw that in Mr. Poindexter's office? 

A Yes. 

Q The second one that you saw, can you tell us when 
that was, and if that is before you? 

A I saw It in Mr. Casey's office the following morning, 
on November 21, Friday, in his office. I saw another version 
which this may or may not be, I don't know. Exhibit 14, CJC. 

There was a version that was undergoing minor ' 
revisions right up literally until the time Casey got in his 
elevator to go to his car, and I don't -- those revisions 
were -- I don't recall them having been substantive m nature, 
and they strike me now as being minor, and I don't recall 
anything about what they were particularly, but the fact 
that certain revisions of that kind were being made suggested 
to me that if this is the final one he handed in, there was 
one that is not reflected here that underwent those minor 
revisions . 

Q Between the first draft and the second draft, is 
there -- are there any differences that you would characterize 



as not minor? 



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Q Would you explain what those would be? 

A Well, they are not differences really from this 
draft to this one. What they are are differences from an 
insert, a separate sheet of paper, that was also discussed 
in the Poindexter meeting, the meeting in Poindexter's 
office, in which -- which detailed the November Hawk 
episode independently. And I understood that document to be 
a separate document in the nature of a substitute for the 
discussion of the November episode that was contained in 
this draft'marked No. 13. 

Q We will get to that document. Aside from that 
change, which is a fairly substantive change, were there" any 
other changes that you note that were not of a minor 
nature? 

A There may well be, but certainly the only one that 
I attached particular significance to is the one we are about 
to get to, and there may be plenty of them, but I ]ust did not 
then and have not since compared these two documents. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If we could mark this then as CJC No. 
15. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-15 was marked for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q CJC-15 is a document with a secret classification 
headed by the subject in capital letters, CIA, AIRLINE 
INVOLVEMENT. It is a one-page document of typewritten and 



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handwritten changes on it. Had you seen this document before? 

A Today? 

Q Yes. 

A Certainly. Yes, I have. 
•Q Can you tell us what the circumstances were? 

A Yes, this is the document that I am -- that I referr^i 
to earlier as being a separate one-page document that discusses 
the November episode, and that I took to be in the nature of 
a substitute for the discussion of the November episode in the 
draft Casey testimony that is identified as No. 13. 

The circumstances surrounding this document are that 
It was the primary subject, primary focus of discussion "about 
the November Hawk episode at the meeting held in Poindexter's 
office on November 20. 

Q Let's set up the meeting first, if we could. 
Approximately what time of the day was this meeting? 

A My chronology reflects 1:30 to 3:00, that is an 
approximate time, but it comports with my best recollection. 

Q And who attended the meeting? 

A To the best of my collection, the meeting was attends 
by Pomdexter, Casey, my chronology reflects that Gates was 
there, but I cannot see him in my mind's eye. 

I do not visualize him, North was there, Paul 
Thompson was there, I was there, the AG was there, and I think 
that IS all I can recall as having been there. 



ecaii as having been tne: 

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Q Do you know who called the meeting? 

A I understand Poindexter called the meeting but, 
you know, I may have assumed that from the fact that it was 
in his office, but I don't have any knowledge other than that 
it was Poindexter. 

Q Did someone at the meeting begin by explaining the 
purpose of the meeting? 

A I don't recall any preliminary remarks that were 
focused on that particularly. We were examining Casey's draft 
testimony $nd this substitute page, and there was general 
discussion in the room about the Iran initiative and the 
facts underlying it, and North's efforts, particularly in 
conjunction with McFarlane to develop an accurate and 
thoroughgoing accounting of the facts that surrounded that 
initiative, but there was no opening statement from anybody 
as to why we were there. 

It was quite obvious why we were there. 

Q Did anybody sort of run the meeting? 

A Well, no, it was not -- there was no formalities of 
any kind. It was not run in the sense that somebody recognized 
people to contribute and speak. 

It was just a -- no, you know, a very informal 
discussion. There were some people who participated more 
than others, but there was no one who I would identify as 
having run the meeting. 



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Q Did you go through his testimony paragraph by 
paragraph or page by page or was it a general discussion 
whoever saw something that needed discussion would bring it up? 

A It was much more the latter than the former. 
We did not go through it page by page. We did go through, 
however, this document, marked number 15, pretty much 
paragraph by paragraph. 

Q Do you recall who presented the insert? 

A I don't. I don't recall from whence either of these 
documents emanated. I assumed then, and I certainly have 
never received any information to the contrary that they were 
both produced by the CIA, but I have no information on that one 
way or another, at least I don't recall. 

Q Was anyone from the CIA's General Counsel there, 
to your knowledge? 

A I don't think so. I don't think Dave Dougherty ^ 
was there. I thought Gates was there, but then again, I would 
never have seen Gates before that time, and I guess 
identifying something -- I know somebody was there with Casey 
and the thing about which I am least confident in terms of the 
people who were in that room was who was with Casey. 

I thought that it was Gates. At least when I wrote 
this chronology, I thought so. 

r 

Q Do you recall that person, whomever it was, making 
any comments during the meeting? 



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A I do not. I don't recall Casey having made any 
comments particularly. I do know that he made -- he did make 
some comments, but none that I have any recollection of. 
He participated very little in the meeting. 

Q Going through then the insert, first of all, was it 
just presented for people to read and then comment on or did 
anyone actually sit down and verbally describe what happened 
in that way? 

A It was presented, and it wasn't really -- I don't 
really remember anyone actually presenting it, though that may 
have happened. The thing I remember is that I sat down on 
the couch and all I can remember in my mind's eye is there was 
a copy of this on the cushion next to me, but it had to be 
passed out by somebody. 

I just don't remember who did it. There was 
nobody who just went line by line through it. We did just 
read it and discuss particular elements of it that were -- that 
various people raised. When I say various people, that is 
putting too high, because North was the one who was by far the 
dominant participant in the discussion of this document and 
that episode. 



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Q Okay. Now, the document you have before you seems 
to have two -- at least two different kinds of handwriting. 
Do you recognize any of the handwriting on the document? 

A The darker handwriting I suspect is the 
Attorney General's. But the only thing I can say with 
absolute certainty is that it is not mine, none of the 
handwriting on this document is mine. There is a document, 
however, that does bear my handwriting. 

Q The third full paragraph seems to have the first 
substantive 'Change in terms of the handwriting. In other 
words, the phrase there, "intermediary with the Iranians" 
is crossed out and the phrase the "Israelis" inserted in - 
what appears to be the Attorney General's handwriting. 

Can you describe what that discussion was that led 
to that change? 

In other words, another change is made later on 
in a similar vein. Was there a discussion that we shouldn't 
discuss the intermediaries being used? 

A No. Not at all. In fact, I think that was 
simply a factual error at least so Mr. North — 
Colonel North — I associate these changes, each one of them 
with Colonel North, but — because he was the only one at 
the meeting who was speaking in a way that impressed me as 
being authoritative in that he had some basis for knowledge 



of the facts. 



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Nobody else at that meeting impressed me as having 
any personal or other firm basis for knowledge of the facts. 
And I think this was simply that that was a factual error, 
that the NSC passed the name of the airline, the NSC being 
North, the name of our airline to — directly to the 
Israelis, not to anyone representing Iran. 

And that was consistent, I think, with -- probably 
with any of the chronologies that had been distributed up 
until that time. 

Q If we go down three more paragraphs, starting with 
the paragraph, "To the best of our knowledge...", "neither.. 
this part is changed -- "the intermediary did not know that 
he was dealing with a CIA proprietary" is changed to the 
"Israelis nor the Iranians knew that they were dealing with 
a CIA proprietary." 

Can you tell us what the discussion was revolving 
on that change? 

A I am confident that it was a change suggested by 
North. I don't have a recollection specifically as to the 
conversation that revolved around this change. I would 
suspect that it was a change that simply harmonized it with 
the earlier change that was made and was based upon North's 
knowledge of the facts. 

But there wasn't a lot of conversation and I don't 
have any particular memory for that change. 



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Q If we could skip down then to the next paragraph. 
The airline was paid...", and then the phrase -- "by the 
Israelis" is inserted. 

Was there a discussion of who paid the airline? 

A Well, I assume from this interlineation that there 
was a discussion, at least a discussion that consumed enough 
time for North to make this point, and I again believe that 
it was North who would have made this point. 

But I don't recall any -- you know, my general 
recollectioh is that there was some conversation about these 
things, although North was clearly in the driver's seat on 
these changes. 

He was the only one who, at least by my impression 
at the meeting -- nobody challenged his knowledge of the 
facts and these are factual points that were being made. 

Q What about the last substantive change, in other 
words, the sentence, it had, in fact, made a legitimate 
flight into Tehran carrying commercial items prior to the 
22-25 November incident was changed to "It had, in fact, 
made another unrelated...", and the phrase "legitimate" 
stricken. 

That seems to be not a factual change, but rather 
a re-characterization. 

A That is right. 

Q Do you recall that being discussed? 



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A I do not recall it. I do not recall -- this seems 
more like a lawyer's change than a /arf wi I I'li' sv' change, but 
I don't remember whether that is something either I or the 
A.G. suggested be made or somebody else. I just don't 
remember . 

It is entirely possible that one of us did suggest 
that change. 

Q Finally, let's get to the big change. On the 
paragraph starting, "To the best of our knowledge...", the 
second sentence, "We in the CIA did not find out that our 
airline had hauled Hawk missiles into Iran until mid-January 
when we were told by the Iranians..." was changed to "No, one 
in the U.S.G. found out that our airline had hauled 
Hawk missiles into Iran until mid-January, when we were told 
by the Iranians." Do you recall who proposed a change from 
'no one in the CIA knew it" to "no one in the U.S. Government 
knew it"? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q Who was that? 

A Lieutenant Colonel North. I have a vivid memory 
of this and the reason I have a vivid memory of this 
and a general, vague memory of the other changes is that 
immediately after this meeting concluded my — I had occasion 
to have my attention focused on this passage and this change. 
This is the change that got the ball rolling, so to speak. 



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But yes, North did suggest that this was not -- 
that this change was necessary to avoid the implication that 
somebody in the U.S. Government knew about the Hawks, 
though It wasn't in the CIA. He wanted to make clear that 
nobody in the United States Government knew about these 
Hawks until we were told in mid-January by the Iranians. 

And he was -- you know, nobody argued with him, 
but he was emphatic about that. I mean, he was firm in his 
view that that should definitely be changed. 

Q So he stated that no one in the U.S. Government 
knew about the Hawks? 

A Yes. That was his formulation. 

Q And no one at the meeting objected? 

A No. 

MR. LEON: Nobody had left the meeting -- what about 
at the beginning? 

THE WITNESS: Paul Thompson was in and out and 
North, in fact, was in and out a couple of times during the 
period that I was in there — but, no, the point is -- 

MR. LEON: Was Casey and Poindexter there when he 
suggested this? 

THE WITNESS: Absolutely. They were there. And 
so, you know, there is a document that bears my own 
interlineations precisely to that effect and we just made 



the change and went 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q And you recall no other substantive changes that 
you took note of or can recall at this time? 

A Substantive changes? 

Q To Mr. Casey's testimony. 

A There may have been others that were made, but none 
that I took note of. This is the only one that had any 
significance for me or does now. 

Q At that time when that change was made, what was 
your understanding about the November 1985 shipment? 

A My understanding was -- 

Q Excuse me. Let's say, walking into the group,- 
not after the insert was given to you, what was your 
understanding of the arms shipment? 

A It was generally in accord with, and I can't tell 
you I had received this document prior to the time I walked 
in there. 

Q This is the 11/20. You had received a version on 
11/17. I can show you a copy of that. 

A Right. But what I am suggesting is what time is 
1300 -- that is one o'clock? 
MR. LEON: Yes. 

THE WITNESS: It is possible that I had this 
document prior to the time I went in there or that I was 
presented with it when I got there. I just don't remember. 



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But either one, I mean they are not dramatically different 
m terms of the portrayal between the November 17 
chronology and the November 20th chronology. 

But my understanding was basically as reflected 
there, that we had gotten the Haw,ks back, that we had been — 
that the Israelis had acted unilaterally in sending Hawks, 
that we were unwitting of any such fact. 

By that time I feel certain that oil drilling 
equipment had been introduced into the -- into the event. But 
the salient features for me, looking at it in terms of what 
kind of Hughes-R^'an problem we might have, because a CIA 
proprietary was used, was that we were unwitting of the fact 
this was Israel who was attempting to do this, and that we 
had upon discovery gotten the Hawks back, that the Hawks 
had been given back and that we had been encouraging, if not 
the motivating force behind that. 

Now, North at the Poindexter meeting very much 
encouraged that understanding of the November event. In 
fact, I recall him using the term jawboning to describe 
how they had to get the Hawks out of the Iranians. There was 
no suggestion that the Iranians were displeased with the 
items and irritated and wanted to give them back, only that 
we were displeased by the event and that North had been 
dispatched by McFarlane or Poindexter, I don't recall whom, 
to ensure the return of those Hajvk missiles. 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Why? 

A Well, I didn't know anything other than that we 
were irritated and that this was not good, and that what the 
chronology said, which was to the effect that this 
transfer somehow ]eopardized our ability to establish a 
direct link with the Iranians. 

MR. LEON: Was Casey and Poindexter there when he 
said that? 

THE WITNESS: No. I don't think that was 
articulated at the meeting. That was articulated in these 
chronologies or at least in the one that I focused on. 

MR. LEON: The jawboning? 

THE WITNESS: No, the jawboning was a statement 
that, to the best of my recollection. North made at the 
meeting. 

He went through a portrayal of the event! that 
included the fact that he jawboned the Iranians to get those 
Hawks back. And it was tough going, you know, and I 
mean he portrayed the event as though it had happened. 

MR. LEON: My question is when he gave that 
description, Poindexter and Casey did hear it? 

THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. Poindexter and Casey were 
there throughout the entire meeting. They did not leave to 



my recollection. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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At least they were there during the time that I 
was there and I didn't leave until the end of it. 

But when you say "why("|^ I am reporting now what I 
understood to be the fact from a chronology. He didn't say 
that anything other than that this was upsetting our plans. 
I mean, some conclusory statement I am sure he made. I 
remember he was fond of the word "dork", and he was saying 
"this dorked everything up". 

I recall him using that word in Poindexter's office 
and I recall him using it as well in the A.G.'s office, as 
well on Sunday. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q But did he make any reference outside of what is 
in the insert in terms of the U.S. Government's knowledge in 
terms of when they find out this was Hawks? In other words, 
several of the chronologies say we didn't find out until 
January. Others sort of fudge on that question. Did he 
make any affirmative statements as to when the United 
States Government found out they were Haw^s? 

A No, I don't recall him making any such statement, 
but if he did make a statement, he didn't make one that 
diverged from the suggestion made on this piece of paper 
or we would all have focused on it and changed this piece of 
paper, because he was the one calling the factual shots. 

Q Did anyone else in the room volunteer when they 



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found out It was Hawks? 

A No. North comrianded absolute deference from 
everybody in that room. When I left that room I did not -- 
I had the distinct impression that nobody had any factual, 
personal factual knowledge of the events that we had ]ust 
discussed, and certainly didn't have any knowledge or 
evidence for the proposition that anybody had doubts about 
what North was reporting. 

Q Well, I am not so much asking if anyone was 
skeptical, but if anybody supported his statement that 
no one knew. In other words, did Casey or Poindexter 
say, yes, I didn't hear about it until January? 

A No. At least I don't recall. It is possible 
that such statements were made and they didn't register 
in my memory. I just don't recall any such statements 
having been made. 

Q Let's go to the participants then. Do you recall 
what, if anything. Admiral Poindexter did say at the meeting 
on any topic, but particularly this topic? 

A I don't recall anything that he said on this topic 
and I guess in the recollection of it the one thing that as 
more information came to me struck me about my recollection 
was that he didn't say anything about it. 

And the same is true of Casey. There was no 
contribution that I can recall to this factual information 



UNCUmiED 



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that we are discussing here. And about the only thing — 
now, Pomdexter had -- he did participate in the 
conversation at -- you know — at certain intervals, but 



4 I don't recall anything m particular that he said except 



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I do recall that it was my impression that he -- that using 
the information contained in this testimony that he was 
basically doing an outline for himself to assist him m 
his briefing the following day, and I can recall -- I don't 
know why this sticks in my mind, but I can recall him referrinc 
to such an .outline and that he would follow along that outline 
in his briefings. 

Q What about Mr. Casey? Do you recall any partieular 
comment that Mr. Casey made about anything discussed at that 
time? 

A No. I just have a general recollection of 
Mr. Casey, you know, at certain intervals making a comment. 
I don't have any recollection for what it was or -- you 
know, I ]ust don't have anything other than the most 
general recollection at all, other than this incident, which 
has external reasons for sticking in my mind and I can't 
tell you what he may have said other than a general sense 
that he did make a comment now and again. 

He did not participate much, however. 

Q -Mr. Thompson was at the meeting. Do you recall 
any comments he may have made during the meeting? 



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A No. I have no specific recollection of comments 
or contributions he made. That is not t'^ say he didn't make 
them. I ]ust don't recall. 

Q What about the Attorney General, do you recall any 
comments the Attorney General made during the meeting? 

A The only thing I can recall that -- the only part 
of the conversation I can recall that the Attorney General 
made points and participated in with respect to his own 
knowledge was the legal review point, because I do remember 
everybody agreeing that they had a meeting in Pomdexter's 
office on what -- I shouldn't say everybody, the people who 
were in that meeting and I take them to be Poindexter and 
Casey at least and I guess Sporkin was with them, but they 
had a meeting on December 7th or thereabouts, and the A.G. 
focused on, with the others, legal issues related to the 
finding, to a finding that was proposed or in the offing 
or being drafted. 

But the question was whether or not, as I understand 
it and recall, the finding was appropriate in this context 
and whether the arms transactions could be accomplished, 
and Sporkin had done, it is my understanding, background 
legal research on that and the A.G. was looking over his 
shoulder on it, so to speak. 

Q Was there any discussion of Secretary Weinberger 
and his participation in that meeting on December 7th? 



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A I don't recall, although through some other meeting 
or source , I have now been given to understand that 
Weinberger wanted himself independently to check the law, 
and he did that and then reported shortly thereafter that 
he was comfortable with the analysis. 

Whether that happened at that meeting or it happened 
at some subsequent meeting prior to the time the finding was 
actually aisigned, I cannot tell you, but I don't have a 
specific recollection of Weinberger's participation in an 
earlier meeting having been discussed at the Poindexter 
meeting that I attended. 

Q Do you recall any other comments that the Attorney 
General might have made at that meeting? 

A No, I don't. Though, you know, he did make other 
comments. I have the general recollection that he made 
other contributions to the meeting. 

Q But you have no specific recollection? 

A I just really don't, no. 

Q You did not leave with the Attorney General; is 
that correct? 

A I left the meeting at the saune time the Attorney 
General did, but he went to West Point to make a speech. 
In fact, he had delayed his trip in order to attend this 



meeting . 



And I went to Peter Wallison's office. 



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Q What did Mr. Wallison tell you, if anything? 

A Well, it really wasn't -- he didn't ask me 
to come to this office really to tell me anything. As soon 
as I was leaving the meeting, I was handed a message by the 
Secretary whose office is right there outside of Poindexter's 
office door that said Peter Wallison would like to see 
you. 

Paul Thompson was there next to me so I made him 
aware of that fact and we both went to Wallison's office. 
The only thing that sticks out in my mind other than that 
he wanted to know what our meeting was about and what was 
discussed, whatever, was his expressing his own irritation 
and regret that he had not been invited to attend the meeting. 

MR. BOLTON: I think there may be an ambiguity 
on the record. Were you talking about Wallison's 
irritation that he had not been invited to the meeting? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. He directed that at Paul 
Thompson. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did he then tell you about a message he had 
received from the State Department? 

A No. While we were having a conversation, 
Abe Sofaer called, and I can't recall precisely the sequence 
of calls, but I think Abe Sofaer called into Peter's office 
to express to Peter a.qpap^ra ^^ .^^^.i^ij^rstanding of the 




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November episode that some were under or were advancing 

was not consistent with the State Department's understanding 

of that episode. 

He suggested that -- and I don't remember whether 
he got any more specific from that, but I do remember 
gettin<3 on the phone with Abe and saying, you know, was this, 
what do you -- what is your understanding, because these guys 
are going forward with theirs tomorrow. 

And he said he didn't want to discuss it on an open 
line. So hie called back secure, Wallison has only one secure 
phone in his office, and so Wallison fielded the call. 

My recollection is that Wallison then reported 'to me 
and to Paul that according to Abe, Shultz remembered a 
conversation around November 18th in which McFarlane advised 
Shultz that the Israelis were going to transfer military 
equipment to the Iranians. 

Nothing about oil drilling parts, but arms. 
When Wallison reported that to me and to Paul, my mind 
immediately went to this statement about no one in U.S.G. 
knew that they were Hawks. 

And I confronted Paul with that and said we just 
left a meeting at which North made emphatically this point 
and that now the credibility or reliability of that point 
was seriously questionable and I also pointed out that the 
portrayal in the chronology had never struck me as a 



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particularly obvious explanation for why the Hawks were 
returned, if they were returned. I didn't really -- and I 
told Thompson that. 

I told him that is not a credible story. I may 
even have said it seems incredible, although if I used that 
word I think I put it a little high, but at that moment I 
was very concerned and was speaking in very stern language 
to Paul about this, trying to impress upon him the 
seriousness of this matter m light of the fact that 
two cabinet officials would be making these statements 
tomorrow, or at least that was the plan. 

So I told Paul to get back with North immediately 
and to re-examine this point here. So he said he would. 
Now, I don't remember what else we did during that meeting, 
but those things, of course, are vivid in my recollection 
about the meeting. 

So I think that is about the size of the Wallison 
meeting . 

Q Did you speak to Sofaer later that day? 
A Yes, I did. And my concerns were exacerbated. 
Not only that, I recall having spoken both with John here 
and Brad Reynolds to indicate that a problem was in the 
offing, but frankly, I don't remember whether I spoke to 
them before or after I had talked to Sofaer on the phone. 
But when I did return to my office, I spoke with both Paul 



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Thompson on the phone and Abe Sofaer. I had not spoken 
with Abe except fleetingly in Wallison's office. And I 
don't remember whether I called him up or not, but in any 
event, the burden of my part of the conversation was 
"are you sure, Abe?". I mean, this is a serious discrepancy, 
and are. you certain of your end of this? 

And he said we have a note -- we have notes, 
contemporaneously recorded notes reflecting this 
conversation that say Hawks. And that just heightened 
dramatically my own concerns about it. 

Now, I don't remember whether I had already talked 
to Paul and Ed told me that North and McFarlane are sticRmg 
by their story or whether -- but I think I had -- and then -- 
but in any event, I called Paul back and related to him that 
the credibility for the State Department's end of this had 
]ust gone up dramatically and that, you know, in even 
sterner language, suggested we can't fool around here, this 
has got to be ironed out and resolved immediately or both 
Casey and Poindexter will -- the offending statement or the 
uncertain statement would have to be taken out of their 
testimony. 

Q Did you speak to Oliver North that day, after 
the meeting for the testimony? 

A I did not. But Paul represented to me that he had 
and it was my understanding that North in turn had talked 



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to McFarlane and the report that I got back was that that is 
their best understanding of the facts. 

Q Did Judge Sofaer make any comments about 
threatening to leave the Government or having to leave 
the Government if this testimony went forward? 

A He made a comment that is more responsive to the 
latter than to the threatening part. He indicated that the 
following day he, too, would be on the Hill and would be 
representing Armitage or Armacost -- I guess as 
Armacost, who was up there testifying as well from their 
end on this or would be, and that they would be up there 
at the same time Casey was, and that obviously if Casey ' 
said anything inconsistent with their understanding, at 
least with anything that they had good reason to believe 
was inaccurate, that Sofaer would have to advise his 
client to make known their understanding of the facts right 
then and there. 

And it struck me that -- I recall having concurred 
with his view that that is obviously what you would have to 
do, and he made a reference or a statement rather cryptic, 
actually, that obviously if all that happens, something to 
the effect that he may be packing his bags. 

I suggested to him if that happens a lot of us 
may be packing our bags. 

But I also told him he riee<ialt-iifl.ncern himself, 




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because that ain't going to happen. I was quite 
confident that that was not going to happen, that they 
would be prevented from saying anything the accuracy of which 
was now m doubt. 

Q To your knowledge, did Judge Sofaer communicate 
with anyone else at the Department of Justice on this issue? 

A It does strike me that he had a conversation with 
Arnold Burns earlier that day. I do not recall, however, 
that he made the points to Arnie that he had just made to 
me . 

I did not understand that. 
MR. LEON: For the record, Mr. Burns was 
Deputy Attorney General of the United States at that time? 
THE WITNESS: I guess he was by then. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did Judge Sofaer discuss with you what he and 
Mr. 5[rQns had talked about? 

A I don't recall that. It may well be that he did, ' 
but I don't recall it. 

Q Did you talk to Admiral Poindexter then that 
afternoon? 

A I did or that evening, late that evening, later. 
After I had more or less closed the loop with Paul Thompson 
and had learned from him basically that they were sticking 
by the story. 




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[said, Paul, that is not 



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I think I Said, Paul, that is not viable or 
something to that effect. 

I told him that the State Department has con- 
temporaneous notes indicating there were Hawks on that 
plane and that he needs to get back to those guys and try 
again . 

But after that I then undertook to get hold of the 
A.G. and I did remember having talked to Brad and to John, 
both of whom fully concurred that the A.G. should be advised 
and essentially asked to come back, but — 

Q When you talked to Admiral Pomdexter, did you ask 
him whether or not McFarlane had told Shultz that there vJere 
Hawks on that November 1985 shipment? 

A No. 

Q Why not? 

A First, I don't think I told him the source of my 
conclusion that there was a discrepancy about the accuracy of 
the statement "no one in U.S.G.". I don't think I outlined 
all this other than to say there is a serious question about 
the accuracy of the statement and essentially that I and the 
A.G., obviously, particularly the A.G. does not think that 
statement should be made the following day. 

I certainly did not ask him the question you :ust 
asked if I asked. 

Q Did he ask you what the discrepancy was? 



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A I don't recall him having done so. I don't think 
he did. 

MR. LEON: Your notes indicate he said he couldn't 
reach you. 

THE WITNESS: That he couldn't reach -- 

MR. LEON: McFarlane. 

THE WITNESS: I think that is an inaccurate note, 
but I will get back to that. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q My question was did Mr. Poindexter ask you what the 
discrepancy was? 

A I don't think so, but -- I mean, I do not recall 
having outlined to him the discrepancy and if he had asked 
me, I would have outlined it. 

It was sufficient for his purpose that we had 
serious doubt or concern about the accuracy of that statement, 
that he seemed to be entirely nontresistant to the 
proposition that it might not have been entirely accurate. 
He didn't question me at all that I can recall. 

He also suggested he would get to Casey and advise 
him. Now, I made that call at the Attorney General's 
instance and suggestion, whom I, after two hours of 
incredible hassle, managed to get through on a secure line, 
and outlined to him the things that I have outlined here 
to you now about why we had a problem, and I further outlined 



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that he should in my opinion return to the Department the 
following day and get his arms around -- or somebody should 
get their arms around this problem before something 
inaccurate was publicly stated. 

Q So you told the Attorney General what the discrepancy 
was. In other words, you explained to him your conversation 
with Judge Sofaer? 

A Yes. 

Q And what was his response to that? 

A I't was one of complete agreement with my 
conclusions that I drew from it. He didn't -- I mean other 
than -- I don't know if you have talked secure on one of- 
these portable things, but it makes for a very awkward and 
stilted kind of conversation. 

You have to say "over"], and then the other person 
then comes on, and basically he just said "I see. I see. 
Okay"\. And then advised me that he would attempt to cancel^, 
his day the following day. 

He fully agreed that he should return, that this 
was a matter the potential of which was dramatic, and so 
he assured me he would be there the next day. He instructed 
me to get hold of Pomdexter if possible that evening and 
advise him that his briefing should be revised accordingly 
and to try and get ahold of Casey or the CIA General 
Counsel to alert them to that fact, but that I probably 



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also should go out to Casey's office the following morning 
]ust to ensure that the change in the testimony was made. 
And that ittms my main concern was the testimony, because it 
had been, at least insofar as I knew from this document 
number 15, there was imprinting in writing this information, 
the accuracy of which we seriously questioned. So I followed 
his instructions and made the calls. 



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114 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did Admiral Poindexter tell you that he had 
spoken to DCI Casey^ 

A He did, but I don't believe he told me in that 
conversation, though, there is something -- well, he did 
tell me he had taken -- that he had spoken to Casey; that he 
had tried to call him; that Casey -- he had woken Casey up 
and that Mr. Casey was sufficiently groggy that he would-- 
PoinJjyter was not at all confident that any real 
communication hcd taken place. 
Q Okay. 

A So from this I must conclude I talked 
to Poindexter twice that evening, and if I can digress for 
]ust a moment, Dick, I think your earlier reference to that 
note, that is John McGinnis' interlineation. 

MR. LEON: That is at the bottom of page 1? 
THE WITNESS: Of ray chronology. 
MR. LEON: J- 7 69 5. 

THE WITNESS: Corresponds to the 11 o'clock entry 
on November 20. 

MR. LEON: Yes. Would you read the entry for the 
record. Chuck? 

THE WITNESS: "Eleven o'clock, CJC call to 
Poindexter who said he had not been able to talk to 



McFar lan^. 



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I think that -- I don't think Poindexter is the 
one who was reporting to me that he had not been able to talk 
to McFarlanff. I think my conversation with Poindexter 
insofar as it related to his conversation with somebody 
else related solely to Casey. 

What I think John McGinnis has in mind here -- at 
least my recollection of what took place --is that later on 
after I had chatted over the phone with Paul Thompson, and 
told him that I had got a note here that says Hawks, or so 
I am told.' I subsequently connected on the phone with him 
at the Kennedy Center. 

I think he advised me that he had not been able to 
get m touch with either of the two again, McFarlancJ or North, 
because I had reiterated that he should go back and try again 
and do what he could to refresh their recollections. 

So I think that is the explanation, Dick, for 
this entry. At least what I have just told you is my best 
recollection from what took place that evening. 

BY MS . NAUGHTON : 



Did you also call Mr. Daugherty at CIA? 



Yes, I did. 

And what happened? 

I advised him that a statement that had been 
inserted in the testimony we had reason to believe may not 
be accurate. I notified him which statement it was and he 



)tJ.ried him wnicn statemer 

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told me that he had already deleted that entire sentence. 
At least that is ray recollection of what he told me. That 
obviously took care of my problem. 

Q Did he say anything had been substituted m its 
place? 

A Well, no, I don't recall him having 
said that something was substituted in its place, but I 
did, I guess, subsequently learn, and it may well be that 
he made reference in that call, to the fact that they said 
the CIA-- -they limited the disclaimer of knowledge to the 
CIA in the testimony. 

I think the draft-- I mean the testimony marke<3 
CJC Number 14 is consistent with that. 

Q Did you make arrangements through D oughtcrt y to 
see Director Casey the next morning? 

A It wasn't so much to see Casey as it was to join -- 
well, I may have. I may have. To tell you the truth, I 
]ust don't remember whether they were already going to have 
the meeting or whether I suggested it, a meetinfl in his 
office like at 8:30 or 8 o'clock or whenever it was. 
My notes say 8:00 to 8:30. i just don't remember, although 
I do know that we discussed my coming over that morning. 

Q Okay. Now, the next morning do you recall when the 
meeting was at the CIA? That is Friday, November 21st. 

A No. The best -- my chronology suggests it was 



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8 o'clock or 8:30. 

Q Tell us what happened when you got there. 

A Well, when I got into his office, there were several 
people who -- well, there were two or three people whom I did 
not recognize milling about, it seemed, and maybe these were 
legislative officials or something of some kind. 
MR. BOLTON: That is'we usually do. 
THE WITNESS: But D ttugh e r -feV was there and Casey 
was there and we had a brief conversation about the 
discrepancy and the information that had come to light the 
previous day. 

BY MS . NAUGHTON : 

Q What did you say? 

A My best recollection is that I outlined the fact 
that State Department and Secretary Shultz, particularly, 
was given to understand that there were Hawks on that ship„ 
not oil drilling equipment, and that obviously, there have -- 
it could not -- until that was resolved, it could not be 
said that no one in USG knew that there were Hawks until 
January. And Casey was, you know, he was in no way 
resistant. He accepted that as fine. 

Q But to the best of your recollection, can you tell 
us what his pa &p < 3n sibirlity was? 

A He didn't really have a Fesfffenaibilx-t? other than 
to concur or acknowledge the fact that until the uncertainties 
were resolved that understanding of the event that we had 



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agreed upon to follow the previous day could not be 
shared with Congress or anybody else. I just don't recall 
him, what specifically he said in response if anything other 
than one of agreement with the point that we could not 
go forward with that information in the circumstance. 

Q So he agreed that he could not say no one in the 
U.S. Government knew they were Hawks, conversely, did you 
discuss whether he could volunteer to the Congress that 
Secretary Shultz believed he was told by .Mr. McFarlan*" that 
it was Havks? 

A No, we didn't discuss that. Certainly, it was not 
my impression that he intended to do that. The matter, " 
you know -- it was a fact that was -- the state of the 
United States Government's knowledge regarding the Hawks 
episode was simply one of uncertainty at that point. We 
had conflict. So I did not expect or otherwise suggest to 
them, to him, that he should make any point one way or 
another on that other than that this would now become among 
the things that we are still gathering information on. 

Q Did you tell Director Casey that Mr. Armacost 
would dispute it if you did say that no U.S. Government 
official knew? 

A No. I have a high level of confidence that I 
didn't get into that. 

Q Was there any discussion of what Mr. Armacost' s 



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testimony would be? 

A No, I can recall no reference at all to that. 
Q Did Mr. Casey volunteer as to what he knew about 
the Hawk shipment? 
A No. 

-Q Did he volunteer as to when he learned they were 
^i'awks? 

A No, he didn't. My impression was that he was 
just like me, a receiver of information, not a possesser 
of information. That was my impression in Poindexter's 
office, and it again was -- I had no contrary evidence at 
all in Casey's office. 

Q The other unidentified people in the office, 
did you learn there identities later? 

In other words, were any of them Charlie Allen or 
Mr. McMahon or any of the people you subsequently inter- 
viewed? 

A No. McMahon was gone by then. 
MR. LEON: He retired. 

THE WITNESS: I do recall Gates coming in from what 
appeared to be an adjoining office or suite of offices 
sitting down for a very brief moment of time, and then going 
back into his office. But I do not recall Charlie Allen as 
having been among the people who were up there. But then 
I had never met Charlie Allen, but when I did interview him 



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I don't recall him as being familiar to me. 
BY MS . NAUGHTON : 
Q What about Mr. Clarridge? 



A No, I don't think Clarridge was among them either. 



I can't speak to that with certainty. I remember 

and I remember George J ainico n joined us ]ust before he left. 

Q So did Jdjuison hear you give your explanation of what 
Sofaer had told you? 

A I don't think he was there at the time. 

Q Were you given a revised copy of Mr. Casey's 
testimony? 

A I think I was. I think I took one back to the 
Justice Department. 

Q This would be number CJC Number 14. 

A Yes. If I was, yes, I assume it would be 14. 
If this -- if JC 14 is indeed a copy of what he ultimately 
testified from or delivered to the committee. 

Q At 8:30 after you left the CIA where did you go? 

A I went back to ray office. To the Justice 
Department to my office. 

Q Did you attend any staff meetings that morning? 

A No. I didn't, although I recall — it seems to 
me that -- does anybody know what time Casey was to testify? 
MP. BOLTON: It started before HPSCI m the morning 



like 9:30 or 10:00. 



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MR. LEON: 9:30. 

THE WITNESS: Okay, this 8:30 ending time may be 
underestimated because I remember that they were quite 
concerned about being tardy when we left very hurriedly 
and put the light and the siren on, and I remember pulling 
in very tight behind the follow-up car so I could get the 
benefit of that siren through the ungodly traffic that was 
on the George Washington Parkway at the time. 

But they were pressing to get there in time for him 
to testify; and I would suspect that I got back to the 
office around 9:00, between 9:00 and 9:30-- 9:15 maybe, or 
thereabouts. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Do you recall then meeting with any senior 
Department of Justice people that morning? 

A Well, I recalled at the time I did this chronology 
that I met with the A.G., Brad Reynolds, and John Richardson. 
Whether Aara ay was there or not is a question mark both 



on ray chronology and in my mind. But we did meet not long 
after the A.G. arrived, I'm sure, from Westboint, and that 
was prearranged between the A.G. and me. 

We were going to meet as soon as we both got back 
into the office and it was plus or minus 9 o'clock when we did. 
Q Somewhere between 9:00 and 9:30? 



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Q Did you discuss what had transpired the day before? 

A Yes. I'm sure that we went over again that 
and the -- I am quite certain as well that I described the 
conversations I had had with Poindexter and Casey. 

Q And what did you all decide to do then? 

A Actually the next big decision was already made, 
the A.G. had pretty much resolved in my conversation with 
him, though I feel certain he confirmed his decision in that 
morning meeting we had. But he had resolved in our 
conversation the night before that he was going to go in 
and talk to the President about the state of the President's, 
the government's knowledge of the Iran matter and advise 
him that somebody needed to take responsibility for getting 
their arms around this matter discerning and collecting 
the facts as accurately and completely as possible in as short 
a period of time as possible before some error was made. 

I can recall very well making the suggestion to 
him that he do that and that he take the responsibility to do 
that, and he concurred enytirely. I also recall that that 
was a suggestion concurred in by Brad Reynolds, and I think 
by John Bolton as well. 

Q Did you meet that morning, Friday morning with 
any other senior officials or were they present in any 
meetings that you attended; that is, senior officials of the 
Department of Justice? 



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A I do not think so. I don't know, you know. I 
have meetings all the time, but they were not meetings that hadj 
any particular significance or at least any -- they didn't 
make an impression on my memory or I would have tried to 
record them. 

So I have to think not. I also think that on that 
particular day there wasn't too much on my plate other than 
this. 

Q Do you recall any — was there any discussion that 
morning, Ffiday morning, of the criminal (^ivision being used 
to help with this inquiry, to put these facts together? 

A I would suspect that there was conversation 
among the A.G., Brad, John and me about that at this meeting. 
We did have conversation about it very early on, and I 
know that the A.G. had a discussion with Bill Webster on 
that subject very early on in this process, but that is — 
if we did have it, it would have been in that context. 

Q Were any of these discussions with anyone from the 
Criminal Division, in other words, Mr. Weld or any of his 
deputies? 

A No, not that I participated in. 

Q And what if anything did you -- when you did discuss 
this with the Attorney General and Mr. Reynolds and the people 
that you mentioned, what was decided regarding the use of 
criminal division attorneys? 



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A Well, I don't really recall that -- actually now I 
guess I should back up because I don't think the conversation 
was about the use of Criminal Division attorneys. I don't 
think we had -- the conversation along those lines that I 
can remember was the use of FBI agents, but I don't recall 
any specific conversation devoted to Criminal Division 
attorneys . 

I guess It is possible, but it would have been, I 
mean, the same analysis that I associate with the FBI, 
I guess, would have applied with the Criminal Division 
attorneys, and that is there is no reason to escalate this 
matter to such a level at this stage. There is no -- 
we have no evidence of criminal behavior at that point. 
We basically viewed it as a continuation of the counseling 
function that we had begun actually prior to Poindexter's 
meeting, but certainly the counseling function of which 
that meeting was a part, the same thing lawyers would do 
for their clients at any time that they would, you know, 
detect a divergence in their account of factual matters. 

Q Were you aware of any request by the Criminal 
Division to become involved in this process before, shall 
we say, November 25, 1986? 

A November 2 5 was -- 

Q The day they announced the diversion, the Attorney 
General had his press conference. 



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A No, I don't recall anyone having requested to be 
in on this. The earliest I can recall there having been 
perhaps me having had a conversation with people from the 
Criminal Division was on the 25th almost immediately after 
the press briefing, but I guess it is entirely conceivable 
that there was conversation before that. 

I certainly don't think I participated in such 
conversation, and I am certain -- well, certain 
as I can be at this point -- that I didn't participate in 
any conversation on Friday with people from the Criminal 
Division. I did not understand that they had even an 
inkling that this matter was going forward except to the 
extent that the A.G. outlined it to Bill Webster, but 
there was --in fact, at the time I met with the A.G., there 
was only the A.G. and me who knew the course of action 
that we had resolved to pursue. 

Q If I could then broaden my question to include 
the Iranian arms sales issue in general, not the specific 
discrepancy in the testimony, but the arms sale in general 
and ask ray question again; to your knowledge, did you 
discuss with or did anyone from the Criminal Division 
bring this to your attention and ask to participate m any 
investigation regarding the Iranian arms sales prior to 
November 25? 

A Well, it is hard for me to — I don't think my 



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answer changes with respect to prior to November 25. 

Q Okay. 

A It doesn't change at all with respect to Friday, 
Movember 21st, because there wasn't a general concern about 
the Iran arms sale matter that was kind of abroad in the 
department as being something that was for criminal 
investigation. 

The only thing that inspired me and, therefore, 
in turn the A.G. to engage in this fact-gathering was the 
discrepancy, so if it is separated from the discrepancy 
that was detected on Thursday, late Thursday there is 
really -- I don't know of anything that gives rise to a - 
suggestion or a hint that criminal should have been involved 
in some way, let alone that the FBI should have been involved 
in some way. 

Q Okay. 

A In other words, the discrepancy is the thing that 
suggested to me that we should be involved in some way. 
The A.G. should be involved beyond the role that we were then 
playing. 

MR. LEON: Was he going to recommend to the 
President -- was it your understanding that before he met 
with the President on Friday morning, he, the A.G., would 
recommend to the Preisdent that he, the A.G., do an 



investigation? 



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THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, that was my understanding. 
MR. LEON: Okay. But not a criminal investigation? 
THE WITNESS: He was going to offer his services 
essentially to address what appeared to be a very serious 
need for somebody to take responsibility. 

MR. LEON: But he was not going to suggest a 
criminal investigation? 

THE WITNESS: Oh, no, no, no. You know, I mean 
on what basis would the A.G. have suggested, Mr. President, 
we are going to investigate -- he wouldn't ask the President 
for permission on such a deal as that or suggested this 
course of action, but on what basis would he have 
suggested to the President we are going to send in the 
FBI agents and investigate criminally your White House? 
We had no basis for such a thing as that. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Do you know when the Attorney General spoke to the 
President that morning? 

A Well, I understand that it was in the neighborhood 
of 11:30. It was the President and Regan. 

Q To your knowledge, Mr. REgan was present? 
A That is my understanding, yes. 

Q Did the Attorney General tell you that the President 
had given him any information regarding the 1985 shipments? 
A I just don't recall that he did. I would have to 



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suspect that he didn't because that would be information 
that I should think would stick in m-^ mind and I don't think 
he did. 

Q Did the Attorney General -- you told us last time 
that the Attorney General said the President was surprised 
that there were pre-finding shipments. 
A I did? 

Q That is what my notes indicate. I want to make 
sure whether or not he said that to you or what your exact 
recollection was at that time. 

MR. LEON: Do you remember which day he said it? 

MS. NAUGHTON: No. 

THE WITNESS: My recollection was better then than 
it is now, because I don't recall that. I do recall, however, 
that he was surprised and then some when the A.G. outlined 
the contra diversion to him, but I don't presently have a 
recollection that he was surprised about pre'January arms 
shipments . 

BY MS . NAUGHTON : 
Q Did you ever discuss whether or not you should 
just ask the President whether he had authorized the 1985 
shipments? 

A I am -- it seems likely that we did. I don't have 
a specific recollection for having done so, but to the 
extent we discussed it, I imagine that we in the circumstances 
wanted to know the answer to it or at least have examined 



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everybody who might know the answer to that before we 
talked about it with the President. 

This IS against a backfdrop in which — all of this 
actually proceeds against the backfdrop of the November 19 
press conference that had a very upsetting effect on the A.G. 
and I think on anyone who had anything to do with the Iran 
matter. 

MR. LEON: Why? 

THE WITNESS: Well, because the President did not 
appear to have been as well-briefed and did not appear to 
have -- have had his recollection reflected as thoroughly as 
I think many of us thought he should have been before he 
was put out to do a hastily organized and scheduled press 
conference . 

So I do know that that was part; that was among 
the reasons that the A.G. thought it important for him to 
stay behind from Westjpomt and to participate in this 
meeting with Poindexter. 

Undoubtedly, it weighed heavily as well in his 
mind about the need as it did m mine; the need for somebody 
to take responsibility for gathering thoroughly and accurately 
as possible the background of this whole thing. 

I say that by way of trying to give you a flavor to 
the extent that I can for the undertaking that we were pursuir.: 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Okay. Did you have a meeting around lunch time 
that day on Friday to then decide what your plan of action 
was going to be? 

A Yes, I do show a lunch here and that comports 
with my general recollection that we did have a lunch after 
the A.G. returned. I have down here that John Bolton 
was present for that lunch. I, however, have a 
question mark on it. 

■I do know that on that date John was listening to 
Casey's testimony, but whether or not, John, you actually 
attended that lunch or not, I just don't recall entirely, 
but the A.G. and John Richardson and Brad and I did have 
lunch on that day. 

Q And what did you decide to do? 

A We — well, the A.G. reported the fact that the 
President did entirely agree with the Attorney General 
tbft* understands the circumstances that he, the attorney/, 
should indeed take responsibility for trying to get his arms 
around this matter and to find out the facts and hopefully 
to report thera to the President by Monday at 2 o'clock and 
an NSPG meeting had been scheduled prior to the time that the 
A.G. met with the President to discuss the Iran matter. So 
the President wanted to be briefed by the A.G. before that 
NSPG meeting if at all possible on the background of the 



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Iran initiative. So we obviously knew that we would have to 
do this on a very expedited basis, but I don't think that that 
schedule was something that had occurred to us. 

Q Was there any discussion during that meeting or 
any other that day regarding whether some of the TOWs had 
been diverted to the contras? 

A Some of the TOWs? 

Q Yes. 

No, I do not recall any discussion of that kind. 
Dkay. 



I don't recall the contras having been introduced 
into my consciousness on this until lunch at the old U m i i ^ 
Grill on Saturday. 

Q How was the McFarlani interview setlup? 

A The A.G. set it up. As I understood it, he called 
McFarlandf and asked him to come in and chat with us. He 
explained to him that the President had commissioned him 
to do this and asked him to come in and chat with us and 
McFarlana" did. 

Q Was Mr. McFarlanjf alone when you interviewed him? 

A He was . 

Q Did he mention whether or not he had retained 
counsel at this point or had counsel -- or had consulted with 
an attorney? 

A I do not recall him having made any mention of it. 



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And I think I would recall that. I think my notes would 
reflect that and if they are not reflected in my notes, I 
would have to conclude he did not. 

Q Would you mark this next in order? 

(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 
CJC -16 for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q CJC 16 is before you now, Mr. Cooper, entitled 
CJC notes of discussion among McFarlanJ, A.G. Meese, and 
CJC dated .November 21, 1986. This appears to be a typed, 
but incomplete document of the McFarlanS interview; is t.hat 
correct? 

A That is an accurate description. 

Q Can you explain to us why it is incomplete? 

A Well, it is very simple. I simply didn't have 
time to complete it. I had begun this process with the idea 
that at the end of each interview I would use my notes and 
dictate a memo like this one regarding the interview itself. 

I started that process, but events kind of swept 
over me. 

Q Was the information on it accurate to the best of 
your recollection? 

A On this? 

Q Yes . 

A Yes, I thipW.5f3.J::tecau5.e J did dictate this that 



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evening in fact and some of it the following morning. 
MS. NAUGHTON: The next document is CJC-17. 
(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 
CJC-17 for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q I am showing you what are handwritten notes of that 
McFarlani interview, and ask you if those are the notes you 
took during that interview? 

A They certainly appear to be. I don't remember 
offhand how many pages my notes on that interview comprised 
but I certainly don't notice any omissions. 

Q For the record the numbers appearing on the top 
right-hand corner are 3093 through 3099. 

They appear to be cut off at the bottom of page 2 
and page 4. I would ask you whether or not you have a more 
complete set in your possession. 

A Well, mine are cut off as well. I have copies as do 
you. The CIA — the FBI has the originals, so I can't -- 
whether mine are superior tayours, all I can do is take a quick 
look. Yes, my page 1 is considerably superior to yours. 
I have two, three lines that you do not have. I also have a 
line that you do not have on page 2, the same for page 3, 
and -- actually yours is better than mine on page 3096. In 
fact, I remember when I penciled this in. It was because you 
advised me that that is what that said. 



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Yours IS better than mine on page 3097 and 
better as well on 3098. That is the end of it. So I will 
trade you my good ones if you give me yours. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Why don't we go off the record for 
a minute. 

(Discussion held off the record.) I 

MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q I gather when you intervi#ewed Mr. McFarlane 
you went basically through a chronology of how the Iran 
arms sales began and what transpired during 1985 and 1986; 
is that right? 
A Yes. 

Q Did Mr. McFarlane mention the November 1985 
shipment regarding — in other words his knowledge of whether 
they were Hawks or not? 

A He did. Without my notes, I just -- have you got 
another copy of McFarlane 's -- 

MR. LEON: Why don't you use mine? , 

THE WITNESS: There was conversation that we had withl 
him on this subject and my notes really are the best recorded 
recollection, I guess, that there is of that fact, and I 
do not -- I am happy to review those notes to see if I can 
supplement it with my independent memory, but here on the 
third page of my notes is a discussion of the November Ha^k 



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episode . 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q What did Mr. McFarlan* tell you about whether he 
knew they were Hawks in November 1985? 

A He, by implication, told us he did not know 
because he said he thinks he first learned of it when he 
was briefed for his trip to Iran in May. He then described 
an episode or an event that took place while he was at Geneva 
during November 16 or 17 at the Summit and he did not suggest 

that in fact the strong implication is that he did not 

board 
understand that there were HawJ<s on Baedsd. 

He says he learned that Israel had shipped oil 

equipment in fact. That is what he reported to us. 

Q And did Mr. McFarlani tell you that some of the 
money had been diverted to the contras from the Iran arms 
deal? 

A No, there was no mention of the contras or any 
diversion of any kind. 

Q Did Mr. McFarlanJ indicate to you that Oliver 
North had inci a ta d to him that he may be shredding some 
documents involving either the contras or the Iranian arms 
deal? 

A No, he did not. 



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stein 3:00 
take 7 

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Q Did he indicate to you whether any documents 
involving either -- well, at this point I guess the Iranian 
arms sale -- had been destroyed in the normal course of 
business at the National Security Council? 

A No. I don't recall there having been any conversa- 
tion about that at all, either by a question that we asked 
or any information that he volunteered. There was just no 
discussion of documents that I can recall. 

Q Was he asked to provide any documents to you or to 
the Attorney General? 

A I do recall him saying that the only thing he had 
was his phone logs. I do believe he said that, and I 
believe that the AG asked him if it became necessary for him 
to have them, would he provide them, and I think he said 
of course. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Could we go off the record for a 
minute? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. 
For the record, CJC-17, we have interspersed the 
better copies from Mr. Cooper's records into what we 
previously had, so we hope that this is the best copy in 
terms of most complete version of his notes. 

THE WITNESS: And the way to discern that with 
certainty is that the replacement pages do not bear a number 



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_^ 137 

as did the others, right? 
BY MS . NAUTHTON : 
Q Very good. Yes, that is correct. 

Was there any discussion during the McFarlane 
interview of whether or not the President could make an 
oral finding. 

A Before I answer that question, do you not want to 
replace your top page with one of mine, because I see that 
mine is much better by three full lines, not that those are 

important lines, but 

Q I think I have yours. 

Oh, that is yours. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

BY MS . NAUTHTON : 
Q We are back on the record. 

The new page 1 has been inserted and on the page 
labeled 3096, that the word "not" should be inserted. 

If you could explain, Mr. Cooper 

A That is on page 3096? 

With respect to the line that begins "December 7, 
McFarlane said we should," and then there is a cross out — 
"provide arms, no talk, re problem with arms already given 
By Israel . " 

Now, I don't know what is under that cross out, 
but I do know that the statement McFarlane said we should 



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provide arms is inaccurate by my independent recollection, 
I can state what McFarlane said was that he maintained that 
he had said we should not provide arms. 

And so I am now changing on the official 

exhibit 

MS. BENSON: Before you do that, could we go off 
just a second? 

MS. NAUGHTON: Yes. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Mr. McFarlane said he would provide you with his 
phone logs. Did he say that he would provide any other 
documents? 

A No. I think that — my recollection is that 
McFarlane identified phone logs as the only documents that 
he had that related to his time in the White House, let alone 
to the Iranian initiative. He did, however, as I recall it, 
suggest that he would be entirely willing to provide us his 
phone logs if we requested them. 

Q I asked you earlier if there was any discussion 
regarding an oral finding being possible on the part of the 
President during this meeting. Do you recall any discussion 
of that topic? 

A I recall, generally having conversation about 



oral findings, yes. 



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Q With Mr. McFarlane? 

A Oh, no. I do not recall any discussion at all 
with Mr. McFarlane about oral findings. 

Q Do you know whether or not the Attorney General 
and Mr. McFarlane had discussed, on this occasion, ora 1 
findings? 

A No. Certainly not during the time that I was 
present, which was all but a fleeting period of time. 

O When the interview was over, did Mr. McFarlane 
and the Attorney General have an opportunity to speak to 
each other outside your presence? 

A Yes. As the meeting concluded and Mr, McFarlane 
and I were exiting • the AG's of f ice, more or less all of 
us together, he — he was completely outside the offices, 
both of us were, and he kind of turned around and went back 
into the AG's office with the AG. I did not accompany 
him, however. 

Q How long did that last? 

A My recollection or understanding is that it was 
very momentary; and my impression was that, frankly, that 
McFarlane wanted to say something that was not in my presence. 

Q Did the Attorney General tell you later what Mr. 
McFarlane had told him? 

A My recollection is that he did advise me that 
McFarlane told him something to the effect that he was trying 



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to -- I don't think the words, "protect the President" 
were used, but that was the essential theme of what it 
was that I understood McFarlane said to the AG. And the AG 
further told me that he had reiterated what the AG has told 
McFarlane at the beginning of our conversation, which was 
that the best protection that the President could have right 
now is that all these facts without distortion, without 
omission, be brought forward and gathered accurately and 
completely, and that the worst possible thing was that 
the way to damage the President was to provide evidence or 
any credibility to the claim that the Administration is 
trying to cover up anything. 

Q Did the Attorney General tell you whether or not 
they had discussed or he had mentioned to Mr. McFarlane 
the possibility that an oral finding ever had been made? 

A No. I do not recall any such mention of an oral 
finding, that I rather think I would remember if there 
I had been conversation between the two of them about the 
oral finding. 

Q After Mr. McFarlane left, what did you do? 

A Well, this was also after I had this short con- 
versation with the Attorney General in which he related to 
me, the equally short conversation that he had with McFarlane 
outside my presence. I went back to my office, and first 
of all, I guess I undertook to dictate my notes, I began 



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that process, I am sure. 

I also embarked upon an effort to secure access 
tcj^^^^^^^^^^^Hfor John McGinnis that evening. That was 
a very time-consuming effort, I should also add. It was 
very difficult for us to get a hold of peoplei 
and to get all the hoops jumped through that we had to jur.p 
through in order to get there that evening, which is something 
I wanted very much* accomplish . 

Q After Mr. McFarlane left, did you and the Attorney 
General discuss the interview with him? 

A Ever so briefly, ever so briefly; just some general 
impressions. 

Q What did the Attorney General say? 

A I remember us discussing the particular exchange 
that McFarlane and I had had, which is not reflected in 

',n 
these notes. I did not take notes as I had^this exchange. 

But at the -- towards the end of our conversation, 
McFarlane -- McFarlane throughout the conversation had said 
that he opposed arms to Iran consistently while he was 
National Security Adviser. And you will note in my notes 
several places, including the place where I added the "not," 
in which he maintained that proposition. 

At the end* it I asked him if this had been his 
position within the Administration consistently and throughout 
why he had, the day before, the day before we had our little 



jefore, the day oerore w< 

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meeting, made a public speech in which I had assumed responsi- 
bility on his own shoulders personally for the whole arms 
to Iran initiative. It did not seem like -- that did not 
seem like the act of a man who had counseled subsequently 
against trading arms to Iran. And he responded that he -- 
that he felt if he had just done more, if he had ^ust been 
firmer in his opposition or in his ^^ajj l iaiini r perhaps 
this never would have gotten started, and ever would have 
turned into such an explosive and controversial event that 
is obviously damaging the President .. .blah , blah, blah. 

I did not then regard that as a persuasive 
explanation, but I do recall that the A.G. and I had 
a conversation which he acknowledged that that seemed to 
kind of punctuate a sentence that he had that Mr. McFarlanS" 
was not at ease and that he was probably not entirely forth- 
coming with us, and that squared entirely with my own 
impression of the interview. 

Q Do you know what the Attorney General did after 

e. 

the meeting with McFarlani? 

A I guess he went home, but I do understand that at 
some point that day and after he had received his commission 
from the President he talked to Shultz about interviewing 
him, and I kind of suspect -- I think that he had that 
conversation after we had talked with McFarlanJ. 

But beyond that I can't tell you what he did. I 
mean I just am sure he prepared himself and things of this 



143 



25 



UNffimiED 



143 

' nature. 

2 Q Did the attorney general make the arrangements 

3 for Mr. Richardson and Mr. Reynolds to go to the White 

4 House the next day, or did you or someone else? 

5 A The Attorney General, I do know and understand, 

6 talked, to Poindexter that afternoon and advised him of the 

7 President's directions to the A.G. and told him we would 

8 obviously want in due time to talk with him, but also we 

9 intended to review all documents in the NSC that pertain to 

10 this Iran initiative and would he undertake to gather 

11 them and make them available. 

12 Now, there is some uncertainty in my own mind 'as 

13 well as evidently in the minds of others who were there on 

14 the A.G.'s team as to who may have been m touch with Paul 

15 I Thompson because the A.G. and Poindexter identified Thompson 
J6 I and Richardson as the coordinate points of contact. I do 

j7 not recall having called Paul on Friday to tell him that he 
^3 i should, you know, gather the documents or whatever, but -- 
fg nor do I recall having talked to him on Saturday morning 
20 and having handed the phone to John Richardson, which is what 

I understand is John's recollection. 

But those things may well have happened. I do 

not have a recollection that they did, however. But in any 
-J event, somebody talked to Paul Thompson to make arrangements 

for John and Brad to come to the proper office in the NSC 



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and review all the documents. 

Q Were you present when the Attorney General made that 
call to John Poindexter? 

A No, I don't think that I was. 

Q To your knowledge had anybody at the White House beei 
told prior to the call to John Poindexter to expect a tecim 
from Justice to arrive and to get their documents together? 

A No. I have no knowledge that any such communication 
was made. But I can state with some confidence that there 
was no such communication emanating from me to that effect. 

Q By the way, if I can skip back for a minute, when 
the Attorney General told you that he had met with the 
President and Mr. Regan, did he tell you he had met with 
anyone else at the White House either before, during or 
after that meeting? 

A I don't recall him having mentioned Lhat he 
met with anybody else. It is entirely possible, I suspect, 
but the meeting that had relevance to me and that was 
reported to me was that he met with the President and Regan. 

Q Did anything else of any consequence happen Friday, 
either late afternoon or evening, that you can recall? 

say, I ^^^^^^H^^^I^H^^^I^^^^^^^IH 
^^Vand expended a lot of ef fort-tryTng to get John McGmnis 
over to^^^^^^^^^^K^^^^^^^^^^^^M He 
get to do that and ^ggnt oract^call^the whole night over 




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there. 

MR. LEON: Can we go off the record for a second: 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
MS. NAUGHTON: We are back on the record. 
THE WITNESS: Let me back-track a minute, 
because the point I was making about John going over to 




^the idea for doing that was -- did not come to us 
until John Bolton had heard and reported on Casey's 
testimony, at which time at least that was the first time 
I can recall any of us realized there were 
that relate to this matter! 

Apparently Num, in questioning Casey, had made 
ref erence^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand upon John's reporting that 
facts we resolved we would have to have access to them as 
we will for our purposes. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Saturday morning, November 22nd, do you recall 
when you arrived at the Department of Justice? 

A When I arrived there -- I would suspect that -- 
actually I don't recall whether I went to the Department of 
Justice before I went over to the State Department or after 
or I went straight to the State Department from home. 

Q Okay. At any rate the meeting with Secretary 
Shultz and the Attorney General was at the State Department: 



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A Yes, it was in Shultz' office. 

Q Do you know the approximate time of that? 

A Approximately 8:00 to 9:00. Shultz apparently 
told the A.G., if we wanted to catch him we had to catch 
him at that time because he was going out of town or 
leaving the country or something later on that day. 

Q And who was with Secretary Shultz? 

A A gentleman by the name of Charles Hill. 

Q Was that it, then? 

A There were just four people in that meeting. 
MS. NAUGHTON: If I could have this marked as 
CJC-18, please. 

(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 
CJC-18 for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q I am showing you now what has been marked as 
CJC-18, notations dated 11-22-86, document Number 3100 
through -- they are all 3100, and they all pertain to 
notations of your interview with Secretary Shultz; is that 
correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Were these notes contemporaneously taken with 
the interview? 

A They were, although your exhibit does not have all 
of the notes. It is deficient by several pages. 



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MR. LEON: How many pages do you have in yours? 

THE WITNESS: I have five pages. This document 
has three pages, only one of which comes from my notes. 

(Discussion held off the record. ) 

MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. Let the 
record reflect that we have -- I believe -- a whole set of 
your notes from the Shultz interview marked CJC Exhibit 
Number 18. 

THE WITNESS: Which comprise page numbers 3100 
to 3104. 

BY MS . NAUGHTON : 
Q Do these notes reflect to the best of your 
knowledge, are they accurate reflections of what Secretary 
Shultz and Mr. Hill had to say to you m 
that meeting? 

A Yes, to the best of my recollection. 
Q If you could sum up for us what it is that 
Secretary Shultz and Mr. Hill had to say particularly about 
the November 1985 Hawk shipment. 

A Well, Shultz and Hill recalled the November 18 
discussion with McFarlan*^ and related it to me, to the A.G. 
and me in a way that was quite subsequent with what Abe 
Sofaer had Tfold me; that McFarlan# had come to George Shultz 
to make him aware of the fact that a shipment -- a 
transaction was then in the offing that would have as 



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elements a transfer of Hawjs^ missiles to the Iranians from 
the Israelis through^^^^^^B and that -- that that transfer 
would JDe accompanied by the release of Americans held 
hostage . 

Q So it was basically a perspective narrative; 
that is, he is telling them what is about to happen; is 
that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q He was not telling Secretary Shultz that this 
had happened? 

A That was my understanding. 

Q What was Secretary Shultz' reaction to what 
Mr. McFarlanC had told him? 

A He advised us^ the A.G. and me, that his reaction 
was very negative; that he thought it was a bad idea; that 
it wouldn't work. He advised us that he basically understooc 
that -- the impression he got was that he wasVfceing 
consulted on the matter, was being made aware of the 
transaction- in the offing, but was not being consulted for 
an approval of the transaction; that it was a matter that 
had already been approved and set in motion. 

So that was his reaction as far as he advised us. 

Q Did you get a sense of how definite he was he had 
been told this? In other words, was his memory faint or 
was he fairly emphatic about what he remembered? 



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A No, I did not other than the precision of peripheral 
details. I found that he did not — he seemed quite confident 
of his recollection of it and Mr. Hill seemed quite 
confident as well of his recollection of the phone call. 
Actually, the portrayal of the event that they 

e. 

shared with us then was that McFarlan* had come to see 
Shultz. The note itself, however, suggested that the 
information was imparted to Shultz through a secure phone 
call and to this day I don't know which happened, although the 
contemporaneous note Hill subsequently advised me suggested 
it was a secure phone call. 

But except for details such as that, there did" 
not seem to me to be any lack of confidence in either of their 
^ ^^ 8 8 regarding the information imparted. 

Q At that point, did Mr. Hill actually produce his 
notes for you? 

A He did not produce his notes at that point, no. 

Q Did you ask him to produce the notes? 

A Either the A.G. or I made it clear that we would 
like to see a copy of the note itself. 

Q Was there reluctance on Mr. Hill's part to produce 
the notes? 

A He agreed readily, but I had been-- at that point 
I had talked to Sofaer a couple of times in an effort to get a 
copy of the note, and I had been given to understand there was 



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some reluctance. Hill regarded these as his personal notes, 
not his official State Department docume. .-s, and he did not 
want to, as I understood it, did not want to prejudice 
their status as personal notes. But in the end he did two 
things. First, he read to me the note over the phone 

on Sunday. I think it was Sunday morning, and I took it 

b 

down verbatim, and you have a copy of that verfatim note that 

I took down. And secondly, not too long thereafter, and I 
should think it was Monday, he gave me a copy of the note 
page itself. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If we can go off the record for 
one minute. 

(Discussion held off the record.) 



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take 8 

BOYUM:mhl 

3:45 

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MS. NAUGHTON: If we can go back on the record. 
If the reporter would mark this next in order CJC-19, please. 
(Exhibit No. CJC-19 was marked for identification.) 
MS. NAUGHTON: And mark this document CJC-20, 
please . 

(Exhibit No. CJC-20 was marked for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Now, Mr. Cooper, directing your attention to number 
19, which starts out "secure phone call, N-GS, in Geneva from 
one hotel .to another." Are these notes you took of what Mr. 
Hill told you over the phone on Sunday, November 23? 

A They are the notes I took regarding a conversation 
with Hill that was a telephone conversation. I can't say with 
absolute certainty it was Sunday, but that is certainly my 
best recollection. 

Q And did you take down what he was saying verbatim 
or are these your interpretations of what he was saying? 

A No, this is as close to verbatim as I could get. 
With respect to the body of the note here, that is the materi 
underneath November 18,(180^. I recall having asked him to 
slow down a couple of times so I could get it verbatim. 

Q And then referring to Exhibit No. 20, which has 
in the upper right corner, document production number J-74 38 
and the date in the left hand corner, 11/18. Is this the 
note, copy of the note that Mr. Hill actually gave to you? 



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A Certainly looks like it. 

Q And he would have given vol: this on Ncverier --, 
is that correct? Monday, November 24? 

A I think that is when he did, yes. I we.".t out and 
had a short interview with Hill a.nd Sofaer, on the r.ornir.^ 
of Monday. 

Q Okay. 

A I would note, however, that my note of my conversa- 
tion with Hill and the actual note, that is CJC No. 20, that 
Hill took of the actual McFarlane to Shultz conversation, are 
not precisely identicial in terms of the information they 
have. My last term, my last phrase in my note 




I would have to see my version of this note in 
my files to be confident that this little addition at the 
tail end of^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m^as reflected on mine well 
that I received on Monday as well. But it is obviously not 
something that Mr. Hill said to me over the phone because 
I took down everything he said to me over the phone. 




153 




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MS. NAUGHTON: Would you mark this as 21, please? 
(Exhibit No. CJC-21 was marked for identification. 
MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q We are showing you what is marked CJC Exhibit No. 
21, which appears to be your notes of an interview with 
Stanley Sporkin on November 22, 1986. Is that correct? 
A ' That is correct. 

Q And were these notes contemporaneously taken with 
your interview? 

A They were. 

Q Are they accurate to the best of your knowledge? 

A They are. 

Q Do you recall when this meeting with Mr. Sporkin 
was? That was whether it was in the morning of the 22nd or 
in the afternoon? 

A I should note that the last page of this exhibit 
contains a document that does not relate to my conversations 
with Mr. Sporkin and is numbered 3108. 

Q Why don't you remove that then from your packet? 

A All right. 

Now, the entire exhibit relates to my conversatior 
with Stanley Sporkin. 



L* . r. 



ONCUSSIRED 



MR. BOLTON: And bears document identification 



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document numbers 3105, 3106, and 3107. 

THE WITNESS: What is your question again? I am 
s o r ry . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q My question was whether this interview took place 
in the morning of the 22nd or the afternoon? 

A This interview took place, to the best of my 
recollection, afternoon, after lunch actually. That is my 
recollection and it is my recollection that -- my recollection 
is supported by my chronology. So, when my recollection was 
fresher that it is today, that was my recollection as well. 

Q Does it help your recollection to point out that 
during the lunch of course the diversion memo was discussed. 
In other words, that some of the Iran arms money may have gone 
to the contras. It is noticable I think in your interview 
with Mr. Sporkin that nothing is mentioned about that in this 
interview. 

Is there a reason he wasn't asked about it, or 
rather, would it lead us to doubt whether or not the interview 
was in the afternoon as opposed to in the morning? 

A No, it doesn't lead me to doubt it. I do not 
recall Sporkin as having been asked about it. In fact, the 

only person who was asked about this after we had discussed 

t 

this matter at the Old Ebb*tt Grill, was North, at least in 

any meeting that I was participating. 



.n — I don't recall wh^h 



Sporkin — I don ' t_recal^^whj^her we actually 



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discussed that we whether we would ask him about that or not, 

but we may well have. That is, the Attorney General and 

myself. But at all events, I don't think he is somebody 

we would have expected to have any knowledge whatsoever about 

that because he had become a judge several months before 

any diversion would have taken place. So he just was not, 

as I reconstruct this — because I don't have any recollection 

whether we actually discussed whether we would ask him or not 

-- but as I reconstruct this, I see that this would not be 

something 'that I would expect him to have any knowledge of. 

MR. BENSON: Do you recall when he became a judge? 

MR. BOLTON: He was confirmed in December '85. 

SWOMI 

When he was aero in, I don't know. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you know that at the time when he assumed the 
bench? 

A Well, I don't remember whether I knew that prior 
to the time I talked to him, but I certainly knew it after 
the time we talked to him, because he told us the dates he 
was in government and when he was out. It was quite clear 
that he was out, that his involvement in this was by the time 
we had canvassed it he was just nowhere close to the contra 
diversion, at least the time period in which the diversion 
was -- 

MR. LEON: It was an undated memo? 



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THE WITNESS: It was an undated memo, yes, but it 
contained dated items of reference and one can identify its 
date. I think it is May actually. I think it is May. I 
don't recall precisely what the dates are or the terms of 
reference, but -- 

MR. LEON: It wa? read in April. 

THE WITNESS: The memo? 

MR. LEON: Yes. 

THE WITNESS: In any event, this document reflects 
that we did not ask him about the contra diversion. It 
definitely reflects, it would have reflected if we had asked 
him about the contra diversion, and that does not shake. in 
the least my recollection that we talked to Sporkin after 
lunch rather than before. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Then in that case, do you recall when the lunch 
took place? 

A My recollection is that the lunch took place as I 
have here, from 12:30 to 1:45. 

Q And you interviewed Mr. Sporkin then say sometime 
around 2? 

A Yes. 

Q Then, let's go to the luncheon first. Had you 
agreed with Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Richardson^*® were at the 
NSC reviewing documents on the morning of the 22nd, to meet 



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1 them at a particular time and place for lunch? 

2 A I thought that is what we had done. I do not 

3 believe that I called them to say, why don't you meet us at 

4 Old Ebb«ttf Grill or anything, I think this was all 

5 pre-j-determined. 

ff 
g Q- And when you got to Old Ebb«tt4l Grill, were they 

•J already there or did you wait for them? 

g A I will be darned if I recall. I just don't know 

g whether they were there or whether they joined us. It seems 

to me we v*ent to a table all together so maybe they were there 

or came in virtually contemporaneously with us. 

Q Do you recall what you started discussing onte you 

were all together? 

A Probably -- 

MR. BOLTON: In what order. 

THE WITNESS: Many things. With respect to this 

matter, I don't recall particularly except I am sure that 

the AG and/or I related to them that we had met with Shultz 

and that, yes, he had confirmed the note and the conversation 

and probably whatever else was important and noteworthy about 

the conversation we had with Shultz, we probably relayed it 

to them. 

At some point during that conversation Brad made 

known, of course, that he had come across a memorandum which 

contained a reference to funding the Nicaraguan resistance. 



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Q When you said "Brad."\, you mean Brad Reynolds? 

A Brad Reynolds. 

Q Can you tell us exactly what he told us to the best 
of your recollection? 

A Just that in his review of documents he had come 
across a document that contained a reference to a diversion of 
some of the profits from the arms transactions and I think he 
probably suggested the figure which my recollection is was in 
the neighborhood of S12 million, or something like that, but 
a diversion of profits from the -- generated by the arms sales 
to the Nicaraguan resistance. 

Q Did he tell you what this document purported, to be, 
that is, did he tell you that it looked to be a memorandum to 
a certain person from a certain person, or these were simply 
sketches by someone, or did he describe it in any more 
detail? 

A I think that he probably did describe it further, 
yes. I don't recall specifically how he described it, but 
you have the memo and I have, of course, seen the memo since 
then, and I can't -- to the extent he did describe it, I am 
sure he described it in a way that is consistent with the 
reality of it and I did not understand at our lunch that it 
had a particular addressee, for example. That, I did not 
understand particularly. I did not understand that the 
President was the addressee. 



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Q Did he know who the author was? 

A Well, I don't recall there having been any 
statements made by him with respect to its authoriship, 
although there was likely to have been some speculation that 
it was authorised by North. 

Q- In other words, speculation was during the lunch? 

A I am saying that seems to me like it was a likely 
topic of conversation -- who authorised the memo. 

Q When he first raised the sub]ect of what he had 
found in this memo what was your response? 

A One of ««» surprise^, and this I think took us all 
S 
unaware^ as to this being a possibility -- the AG's reaction 

was one of equally evident surprise, perhaps even more 

evident in terms of his surprise. 

I did not immediately appreciate the legal 

significance of this. I am not sure I still fully appreciate 

the legal significance of it, but for example, I was not 

closely acquainted with the requirements of the Boland 

Amendment or with any appropriations restrictions on aid to 

the contras, or with the debate that had raged about that. 

I mean, I was acquainted with it obviously as a member of the 

public and as a member of the Administration, but this was not 

something I was immersed in by ciny stretch. 

Q When you say the Attorney General was i:1 o 1 1: ri b cO , 

can you please describe his reaction as accurately as you 



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,a|gt CQuld? 

2 ' A Yes, although I hope you don't ask me to do -- 

3 MR. BOLTON: You may have to classify this. 

^ THE WITNESS: — to do this in public testimony, 

_ because I would find it difficult to report my recollection 
of his reaction, which is that he said, "oh, shit." 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Anything else? 

A Nothing that sticks in my mind. Nothing that made 
an impression on my mind. We did have further conversation 
about this memo but -- 



Q Was there a discuss/iat that lunch of what to_ do 
with the information that was imparted? 

A If there was, it related to confirming that this 
eventually took place, something which was obviously not 
at all certain from the description of the memo that to the 
best of my recollection. Brad imparted to us. 

So, the first step was to confirm it and try to 
figure out what it meant. Aside from the obvious political 
ramifactions that it had if it did take place. 

Q Did you discuss those? 

A I don't recall anyone articulating specifically 
those kinds of points. You know, if it did happen, then I 
don't think anybody there had any doubt that it would be an 



24 /^ 

extraiordinarily politically controversial and explosive 



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161 

element of this whole thing. 

Q On the way back from the lunch with the Attorney 
General, did you have a similar discussion? 

A The Ap, and I did drive back together and I do 
recall as having some conversation where he -- I do recall hi- 
expressing concern about the possible use of these monies for 
the contras, that it was suggested by this memo. 

Q Specifically do you recall what he said? 
A I really don't. I just have a general recollect lor. 
that he made note of that as being a cause for concern if this 
was accurate and we needed to find out if it was. 

Q You are speaking about concern now in a political 
sense? 

A Yes. I think -- at that point, I think the AG's 
sensitivity from a legal sense, was greater than my own. His 
knowledge of and background and association with the Boland 
Amendment back and forth, was substantial and much more 
substantial than mine, so I would suspect that he was express- 
ing a concern that had primarily a political component, but 
with a recognition that this may have legal implications as 
well. 

You are still -- 

He 3ust didn't articulate it clearly, just concern. 
Q But when you say concern, do you -- did you recall 
did he say "I am concerned about what Congress will do with 



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contra aid? 

I am not quite clear how this concern was imparted 
about the contra aid. 

A No, it wasn't -- that was not the impression I 
got, but he didn't say I am concerned about bla, bla, bla. 
He said, I am concerned about this reference to contra 
assistance, not that I aim concerned about the political 
ramifications, or I am concerned that the law may have been 
violated. Just, I am worried about this reference. 

Q Did he say why he was worried about the reference? 

A I do not recall him having articulated particularly 
why. It is not something that -- I mean it was sufficiently 
obvious that this was a matter for concern, and for worry, 
and he may have used the term worry, it would seem more likely 
that he used that term than he useA the term concern, really, 
to me . 

But it seemed obviously, he didn't feel it 
necessary to explain obviously, and I didn't feel it necessary 

^-^ 

to prob/e. This was a worrisome element of all this. That 
didn't need articulation. 

Q Once that document had been discovered, and you 
learned about it at the lunch, was there any discussion of 
what to do to secure the documents to make sure that they were 
not shredded or stolen? 

A No, no, I don't recall any such discussion. We, 



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you know, John and Brad were there making copies of documents 
and they had identified this document as one they wanted a 
copy of, so I don't think anybody entertained -- certainly the 
thought never occurred to me — that the document, having beer, 
identified and reviewed by Brad, that it would somehow 
disappear. 

Q So there was no discussion of it? 

A I don't recall any discussion at all. 

Q Did Mr. Reynolds or Mr. Richardson tell you that 
Oliver North was at the White House as they were leaving? 

A Yes, he did. In fact they did. In fact, they 
noted that North was positioned during their review of 
documents in a proximity at a desk that was sufficiently 
approximate that they could hear him making phone calls and 
I think they suggested it appeared to them that he wanted 
them to hear him making phone calls. I don't recall who he 
was calling. 

I also recall them suggesting that he had made 
mention of the fact that he had retained a lawyer. 

Q He told them that? 

A He told — yes, that is my recollection. And ]ust 
generally he was attempting to at this point, engage them 
in conversations and to relate to them whatever it is that 
they wanted him to relate to them. He wanted to talk to ther- 



right then. 



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"Let me tell you about --. Let me give you my 
story on this right now." 

That was -- that I can recall them having reported 
to us . 

Q Was any decision made then, was it at lunch the 
decision was made when and where to interview Oliver North? 

A I don't recall when that decision was made, but 
I do recall early on conversations devoted to ordering the 
interviews and I do recall as well that there was general 
consensus that North should be — we should discuss this matte 
with North last after we developed information from other 
people who had some personal knowledge. 

MR. BOLTON: Just to clarify one thing on the 
record. You used the phrase ordering the interviews. Did you 
mean directing that interviews take place or establish the 
order in which they would take place? 
THE WITNESS: The latter. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Do you know how the arrangements were made with 
Oliver North to get him into the interview on Sunday? 

A My understanding was then and is now, that the 
Attorney General contacted him and made the arrangements 
directly. 

Q Do you know when that was? 

A I don't know. My best judgment and recollection 



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on this essentially I guess on this, would be Saturday 
afternoon, but I ]ust don't know. I do recall that North 
called to postpone by some relatively brief increment of time 
his interview with us. I think it was scheduled to take place 
Sunday around noon or perhaps even Sunday morning, but North 
evidently contacted the Attorney General and asked if he could 
come in later, like 1 o'clock or so, and the reason that I 
recall that, according to the AG, was that North wanted to, 
in keeping with his usual practice, go to church and have 
lunch at McDonalds with his family. 

Q Were you there when any of these calls to North 
occurred? 

A I do not believe that I was. 

Q So this was related to you by whom? 

A I am sure it would have been the Attorney General. 
The AG was to the best of my knowledge, making the interview 
arrangements with all the individuals that^were interviewing 
that he was participaing in the interview. 

I made arrangements regarding interviews of people 
that I either alone or with John McGinnis interviewed, but 
all the other arrangements, as I recall, were made by the 
Attorney General. 

Q Okay. 

After lunch you met with Mr. Sporkin, correct? 

A That is my recollection. 



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Q And you have before you CJC No. 21, your notes of 

the Sporkin interview, is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And do these appear to be complete and accurate 
notes of your interview with him at that time? 

A They appear to be. 

Q Could you summarize for us what Mr. Sporkin told 
you about the November ' 85 Hawk shipment? 

A Yes. He related an account of it to the effect that 
in the imityediate aftermath of the shipment, he received a 
call from McMahon and McMahon was concerned about the shipment 
and so he sent over two fellows from the OPS division wfio 
knew what had happened so that they could outline to Sporkin 
what had happened and Sporkin could render some legal analysi^ 
in connection with it. 



Sporkin identified Ed-; 



as having been 



wkose. 
with him when these two fellows, a h c woo names he could not 

remember, came to discuss the matter with him. And the thing 

that struck me about it was I guess the fellows from the OPS 

Division, according to Sporkin, told of an arms shipment and 

transportation that they had played some role in regarding 

the arms. 

He could not remember what the arms were. He did 



MR. BOLTON: He, being Sporkin: 

IINCURSlElFn 



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THE WITNESS: Sporkin . 

He did not respond when Hawks was suggested to 
him. It did not ]ar his memory but he did have a memory 
that, to the effect that he was advised that there was an 
arms shipment, not oil-drillmg equipment. 

So m light of that fact, it seemed that some- 
body in the CIA must have known if they told Sporkin after 
the fact, they must have known at that time or before the 
fact that there were Hawks on the plane so that struck me 
as having .particular significance. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did Mr. Sporkin also tell you about the so-ca^lled 
mini-finding of November 26, 1985, which he drafted subse- 
quent to this revelation? 

A He did, but he didn't use the term "mini-f inding , ' 
to my recollection. That term I did not become introduced 
to until later in the evening. 

But he did describe the fact that it was his 
judgment that a jinding was necessary if this kind of 
matter was going to continue, and so he drafted one up. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If I could have this marked next 
in order, please, CJC , I believe, 22. 

(Exhibit No. CJC-22 was 
marked for identification.) 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did you eventually see a copy of the November 26 
finding ? 

A I did. The so-called mini-finding. 
Q Do you recall when you first saw it? 
A Yes. I think I saw it, my recollection is that 
I first saw this m Dave Doherty's office on the evening of 
the 22nd. 

Q So we are referring now to Exhibit No. 22 entitled 
"The Director of Central Intelligence, November, 1986, 
Memorandum for Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter." 

A Yes. Although your document marked No. 22 is_ a 
two-page document, of which the finding is the second page. 
Q Yes. 

A The first page appears to be a memorandum for 
Poindexter from Casey and it is not a document, to my 
recollection, I have ever seen. 

I have, however, seen the second page of this 
document, which is the finding itself. 
MR. LEON: Unsigned? 

THE WITNESS: I have never seen a signed 
version of this, no. 

MR. LEON: Did you ask him if it had been signed? 
THE WITNESS: Sporkin? 
«R. LEON: Yes. 



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THE WITNESS: No, I don't think there was conver- 
sation about that, but there was m Doherty's office on that 
question. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you decide, then, to go on Saturday evening 
to the .CIA? 

A Yes. 

Q And do you recall when you went? 

A Yes. Well, my notes reflect and my memory does 
not dispute that I went over there in the neighborhood of 
6:00 and stayed to very nearly 9:00. 

Q Prior to leaving the Department of Justice, were 
you aware that the Attorney General was going to visit 
with Mr . Casey? 

A I don't think that I was. I don't have any 
recollection to that effect. But it is certainly possible 
that he advised me of that fact. I do not recall it. 

Q Did he tell you either the next day or any other 
time later what he and Mr. Casey discussed on Saturday 
evening? 

A Well, I can't recall when I learned what they 
discussed, but I did ultimately learn what they discussed. 
I don't recall having had conversation with him about it, 
for example, the next day. I can't say to you that I didn't 
have conversation about it with them the next day. I ]ust 




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don't recall having had it. 

Q When you did have a conversation about it, what 
did he tell you was discussed? 

A Well, I can't recall a specific conversation on 
it, but I do know that information about it came to me. 

I do have a general recollection that we had some 
conversation about his earlier conversation with Casey. I 
do remember him making reference to at some point Furmark, 
and the complaining that certain businessmen were doing 
about not, getting their money. I cannot pinpoint for you 
when It was that I had that conversation. 

When I say, "I had a conversation," you know,_ 
many of these conversations are not ]ust one-on-one 
conversations. They are discussions that would take place 
generally in the context of the whole group gathering to 
discuss the matter. 

There weren't that many one-on-one conversations 
that I had with the AG, although there were a few. 
Q Okay. 

It IS not as important when he told you this or 
in whose company, but specifically of the meeting between 
Mr. Meese and Mr. Casey Saturday evening, your recollection 
that Mr. Meese told you they discussed the Furmark visit 
and that Furmark had said that investigators were complaining 
about not getting their money? 



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A I can't tell you whether that is a subject matter 
that was taken up that Saturday night or whether that is 
something that was discussed as between the two of them, you 
know, very shortly thereafter, Sunday or Monday. 

I know that the memo itself, the so-called Furmark 
memo, did not come into the Attorney General's possession 
until the 25th, at least that is my understanding. 

And I know that they discussed it, but I guess 
I can't say with confidence that they discussed it Saturday 
night or that they discussed it shortly thereafter. I ]ust 
don't know. I know they discussed it. 

MR. BOLTON: Could I have ]ust one second? 

(Counsel confers with witness.) 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q When you say they discussed it, do you mean they 
discussed it prior to the Department of Justice receiving 
Mr. Casey's transmittal of the Furmark memo on November 25th ? 

A Yes, I think that that is certainly correct. 

Q Do you recall the Attorney General relating the 
Furmark visit or episode or information, whether or not 
Furmark 's comment to Mr. Casey that the investigators felt 
the money had been diverted to the contras was mentioned? 

A At some point or another, yes, it was. 

Q .So, in other words, at some point before the 25th 
you have some sort of rumor or corroboration in the form of 
a rumor that someone else might know there was a contra 
diversion? 

A Yes. 

(Counsel conferring with witness.) 

THE WITNESS: I should, I guess, be more specific 
than I have been previously with respect to this business 
about Furmark. It is not my understanding that the Attorney 
General discussed the matter of the contra diversion with 
Casey on Saturday night. That, in fact, it is my under- 
standing that he did not discuss the matter of the contra 
diversion with Casey on Saturday night. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q How do you know he did not? 

A He has testified in a couple of different 



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contexts that that is the case and I have no information 
contrary to that. 

I do know that the Furmark memorandum, which 
incidentally I have never read, but which I understand 
has either displayed in it a reference to the possibility 
that the moneys that these investors were concerned about 
were transferred to the contras, or Mr. Casey, in conver- 
sation with Furmark or people associated with him, learned 
of this complaint or this possibility. 

■I also understand that the document that covers 
the Furmark memorandum that Casey sent over makes reference 
to the fact that the AG and Casey had discussed that Fujrmark 
memorandum earlier. Whether that had taken place, whether 
earlier, that is obviously something that I don't know. But 
I don't want to leave any impression that I have any inkling 
or evidence to the effect that Casey and the AG, as of 
Saturday, discussed the contra diversion. In fact, all the 
evidence that I have is to the effect that the AG specifi- 
cally refrained from discussing at least what he knew about 
the indications that we had that there might be a contra 
diversion involved in all this. 

Q Did he tell you that he did not discuss this 
with Mr. Casey? 

A I don't recall him having told me that he didn't 
discuss this with Casey, but he did tell two committees. 



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Intelligence Committees of Congress this, and I heard him, 
I was present at that time, and I don't recall him having 
said this to me previous to that time. 

Q But does your answer still stand that prior to 
Mr. Casey's transmittal of the Furmark memo that there was 
some discussion between yourself and the Attorney General 
and perhaps others of what Mr. Casey had told him regarding 
the Furmark memo? 

A No, I don't think that was my testimony and if 
it was, I. would like to revise it, because I think that my -- 
I don't recall I guess prior to November 25th having had 
conversations with the AG about this Furmark business o.r 
that I had ever heard the namie Furmark prior to November 
25th. I am not even sure that on November 25th I heard 
that. 

November 25th is important only because now I am 
acquainted with the document, the Furmark memorandum, which 
Casey, on the face of the cover memo, anyway, suggests he 
sent him on the 25th and it references the fact that they 
had conversations about those documents prior to the time 
that he sent them to them. So from that, I infer that there 
had been some conversations between the two of them, at 
least Casey, apprising the Attorney General of the informa- 
tion that Furmark had shared with him. 

(Counsel conferring with witness.) 



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THE WITNESS: Well, I do not recall — I should go 
back on the record -- i don't recall there having been any 
reference m the cover memorandum that Casey sent the AG 
relating to contra, to any reference by Furmark to the 
contras . 

I do, however, have a general recollection, and 
I would -- I would suspect with confidence that this pertains 
to a period of time after the 25th. But a general recollec- 
tion of a conversation m which the AG referenced his know- 
ledge from CAsey or from this memorandum that Furmark was 
complaining and making specific points about the possibility 
of a contra element to the moneys that he was -- that his 
investors were out of. 

BY MS. NAL'GHTON: 
Q You didn't see the cover memo or did you? 
A No , I have seen the cover memo, yes. 
MR. LEON: From Casey to the AG? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, cover letter, cover memo, 
whatever . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q At first you told us that the cover memo referred 
to prior conversations Mr. Casey and Mr. Meese had with 
Mr. Furmark. Then we broke and Mr. Bolton spoke to you 
and now you state that the cover memo did not reference 



prior conversations. 



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A No , I was unclear perhaps. The cover memoranduin, 

as I recall it, and I haven't studied it recently, but as 

I recall it, made reference to the fact that Casey and the 

AG had discussed the documents that Casey was transmitting 

to him, and that obviously Casey had agreed to send him 

these documents. 

Among those documents was the Furmark memorandum, 

which I understood to be a memorandum that Furmark sent to 

I 

Casey complaining j^XWiL on behalf of investors, about moneys 

that they had loaned and never been repaid. I don't think. , 

I have ever read that document. But that is my understanding ' 

I 
of its content. 

And that there was also another document that I 

somebody at CIA, probably or perhaps Charlie Allen, had i 

I 
drafted that related in some general respect to this Furmark ! 

business. I think Charlie Allen had interviewed Furmark or 

discussed the matter with him, went up to see him, I think 

is the case. 

The cover memo did not make any specific reference, 

to my recollection, to the contras or the possibility that 

that is what happened to these moneys that the investors 

were complaining about, but it did make reference to Casey 

and the AG having discussed those documents. 

Q Prior to the transmittal of the documents? 

A Yes. One can infer from that memorandum that 



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they discussed those documents prior to the time that the 
cover letter was authored because it references the discus- 
sion and the cover letter is dated the 25th, and I also 
recall the AG making it specifically known to comroittees 
that I heard him testify to that he received it on the 
25th. 

I also recall having been a participant in a 
conversation m which the AG referenced the fact that Furmark 
had raised this prospect of a contra element to these funds 
much earlier with Casey than of course we had become 
acquainted with the possibility of a contra element to 
these funds. I cannot state with certainty when I partj.ci- 
pated in that conversation, but my general recollection and 
my strong, reasonably confident conclusion is that that was 
after November 25th. 

Q After the -- well, was it after the criminal 
division had been called in to take over the investigation? 
A I -- 

(Counsel conferring with witness.) 
MR. BOLTON: Could we have that last question 
read back, please? 

(The reporter read the record as requested.) 
THE WITNESS: It was -- I can't say that it was 
after the time that the matter was -- that the FBI was 
called in to continue and complete the investigation. I 



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]ust really don't recall. Although, obviously, my own 
participation in that -- in this whole matter was discon- 
tinued almost completely at that point, which was Wednesday 
whenever Wednesday was. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did the Attorney General tell you this before 
your participation was completed? 

A Well, I really can't tell you that he did. I 
don't have a present recollection for when it was that this 
conversation took place. Even after my own personal 
involvement in the investigation was completed, there were 
various subsequent conversations of a general nature with 
the AG, so It is possible, though I would have to agree 
with the suggestion of your question that it is entirely 
reasonable and perhaps even likely that it occurred before 
that Wednesday evening when, you know, I faded out of the 
hands-on investigatory work. 

Q Getting back, then, to the Casey meeting with 
.Mr. Meese, what do you recall Mr. Meese telling you about 
the substance of that conversation? 

A I ]ust recall his reference to Furmark and 
Furmark's prior relationship with Casey and that Furmark 
had somehow -- had suggested that the moneys that his 
clients had invested in this or loaned to people involved 
m an arms transaction had been used for purposes of 



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assisting the contras, his suggestion of that. And that 
Furmark had apparently made these claims or suggestions 
early — you know, as early as a couple of months before 
we started our weekend investigation, and I have a general 
recollection that according to Casey, he mentioned it to 
PoindextLer, that Poindexter put him at ease on this fact. 

Q Casey had mentioned it to Poindexter? 

A Yes. 

MR. LEON: How? 
■ THE WITNESS: How had Casey mentioned it to 
Poindexter? 

MR. LEON: How did he put him at ease? 
THE WITNESS: Evidently, to the effect that that 
is not accurate, that is not true. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Getting back to the CIA meeting Saturday night 
from 6:00 to 9:00 p.m., you interviewed -- first of all, 
did anyone accompany you to the CIA that evening? 

A Yes, John McGinnis. 

Q Did either you or Mr. McGinnis interview 
Mr. Clarridge? 

A No, not that evening. We did the following day. 

Q When you did, I just want to stick with that 
for a minute, when you did interview Mr. Clarridge, what 
was his position regarding his knowledge of the November 



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Hawk shipment, do you recall? I don't have your notes 
before me and I don't intend to put them into evidence. 

A That IS because they don't exist. I didn't take 
notes of that interview and didn't participate m it m an; 
significant way. 

John McGi.nnis conducted that interview and toe!-; 
notes, but the two noteworthy features of the mter-v'iew, 
as I recall them being reported to me by John, were that 
Clarridge maintained that he was told oil-drilling 
equipment and that he was the one who fielded North's call 
for a -- the name of an airline or provision of a plane 
that could accommodate a very bulky load on short notice 
and very discret^ely , and the other significant thing, I 
guess, IS that Clarridge also attempted to arrange through 

as I understand it 
kind of flight-landing authority or something that was 
necessary for the November shipment from Israel, the orig 
plan from Israel to^^^^^^^f, and on to Iran if the hostages 
were released. 

Apparently there was a hang-up| 
Clarridge said that he tried to arrange to fix that hang-up 
througi^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V. Those two events stick out 
my mind as being significant. 

Q Did you on either Saturday evening or Sunday 
morning speak to .Mr. J^w-rstrn from the CIA? 




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■asM-scm was involved. He is 



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2 I with the General Counsel's Office. He was taking a very 
active role in the CIA's effort to get its arms around its 
own facts and what have you. 

Q At any point, did Mr. Jami c o ^i tell you that there 



was some 'question that perhaps the pilot of the proorietary 
airline used had knowledge that it was military equipment 
aboard? 

A Yes. 

Q -Can you tell us how that came about? 

A Yes. Actually, the only time I can remember 
J.am±-srm having made that known or that possibility known 
was when I was at CIA on the morning of Casey's testimony, 
and at the very end, as we were hus](ling out, Jamioo ri 
whispered to me that, something to the effect that they 
have an indication or there is some suggestion or evidence 
to suggest that the pilot who flew the Hawks into Iran knew 
there was something other than oil-drilling equipment 
onboard, and specifically that there was some kind of 
military equipment. 

MR. LEON: When did he say that to you? 

THE WITNESS: The morning of Casey's testimony, 

Friday morning when I was out there in Casey's office and 

It was the very tail-end of -- literally almost as people 

were leaving to go up to the Hill. He ]ust kind of -- it 



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was an aside, almost. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q What significance did that have to you? 

A It had significance in that it suggested that 
somebody at the CIA, anyway, that this pilot at a minimum 
was aware of the fact, and it further raised, I guess, 
further concerns about the -- not concerns, but it tended 
to support the State Department's side of this. 

Q Were you concerned at that point about Casey's 
testimony j in other words, Casey testifying that no one 
at the CIA knew it was military equipment? 

A Well, actually I should have been, but I wasrv't 
because it ]ust did not click to me that there was still a 
reference m the testimony to the effect that CIA, nobody 
at CIA knew. I ]ust did not put the two together. 

MR. LEON: Did finding click in your mind, the 
need for a finding? 

THE WITNESS: Not particularly. I don't recall 
having had -- I don't recall having responded mentally to 
where was the finding or anything. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Is it your position — if I can digress for a 
minute -- that a finding would not be required if oil- 
drilling equipment was being sent for intelligence purposes: 



No, It is not 



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Q So it IS the CIA involvement, m your nir.d, t'r.at 
triggers the finding, not the materials involved? 

A Exactly. It wouldn't matter -.vhat was on that 
plane . 

MR. LEON: Would that have to have been a knowm: 
involvement as opposed to if they had been duped into 
thinking it was one thing when in fact it was another? 

THE WITNESS: Well, if it was part of a signifi- 
cant intelligence activity, the fact that they thought it 
was oil-d'r il 1 ing equipment and it turned out to be Kawks 
wouldn't matter, because oil-drilling equipme.nt would be - 
it wouldn't change the character of the event as being a 
covert operation. 

MR. LEON: It is the conduct. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Sunday morning you went again to the CIA; is 
that correct? 

A Yes, and in relation to your question, the 
earlier question, Dewey Clarridge did advise, as I under- 
stand it, McGinnis, and I may have been present on that 
score, that there was a cable, some kind ol 
^^■cable traffic from the pilot to ground control to the 
effect that the pilot answered military equipment or some- 
thing like that m response to the question "what do you 



have onboard?" 



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Q Clarridge told this tc Mr. McGinnis? 

A Yes. That IS my recollection. 

Q Did you ask anyone either Saturday night at the 
CIA or Sunday morning at the CIA about diversion of these 
moneys to the contras? 

A No, I didn't. 

Q Is there any particular reason why you didn't 
ask? 

A Yes, there is. The reason is that it seemed 
important, to take North unawares on that point, and I had 
no confidence at all if we asked about that matter at the 
CIA that that matter would be -- would not be reported . 
back to North. 

In fact, I had the gravest doubts that it would 
not be reported back to North m some form or another. 

Q Do you recall when you briefed Mr. McGinnis 
about the diversion memo? 

A I don't recall, no, I don't, but he and I have 
had conversation about it since that time. 

MR. LEON: Do you want to take a break? 
(Recess . ) 



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MS. NAUGHTON: Let's go back on the record then. 

I had asked you about Mr. McGinnis' knowledge of 
the diversion memo. Could you just tell us when you recall 
telling him about it? 

THE WITNESS: I don't recall telling him about it. 
I don't- recall when I told him about it. He advises me that 
he did not learn of it and I did not tell him of it prior to 
the Monday, which strikes me as quite odd, but I don't have 
any recollection of it now. 

Certainly I do not dispute his recollection of it. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Do you recall him telling you on Monday that there 
was a rumor at the CIA that the funds had been perhaps 
diverted to the contras? 

A Actually, I don't have a recollection of that, 
of him making that statement to me on Monday. I do, however, 
recall him telling me that he had picked that up. And he 
says that is when I told him that we have other reasons to 
suspect that happened or something to that effect. 

That is when I made him aware, he tells me, 
of the memorandum or the reference in the memorandum and 
whatever it was that North told us Sunday evening confirming 
the memorandum. 

Q So you did not have a specific recollection of wher 
he told you about the rumor at CIA regarding diversion. Is 



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Is that accurate? 

A That IS accurate. I do recall him making th.at 
known to me. I can't tell you that it happened on Monday 
from my own recollection, but neither do I resist in the leas:: 
John's recollection on that. 

I defer to his recollection on that. 

Q Do you recall that it happened before the 
Attorney General's press conference? 

A I would suspect that that is correct, yes, because 
if It had happened after it would not have -- I mean I don't 
even know if he would have mentioned it. It would have 
reduced it into insignificance. 

Q While you were at the CIA on Sunday morning, 
did you meet with Director Casey? 

A I did. 

Q Can you tell us how that came about? 

A Yes. I met with him because Charlie Allen did not 
want to impart to me / certain information, actually the 
name of a contact within the Iranian Government. He through- 
out the conversation was expressing inhibitions and obiections 
to the nature and sensitivity of the information we were 
looking for. 

I can recall him expressing objections to John 
.McGinnis' presence since we could not assure hi.m that John 
had had the necessary clearances in the formal ways. This was 




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of similar -- similar kind of objection. He did not want to 
relate to me this name and I thought that was not a reasonable 
position for him to take in the circumstances, but he very 
abruptly suggested, well, I am not going to state this name 
until the DCI himself tells me. 

He picks up the phone and calls the guy, calls 
Casey in his office. 

MR. LEON: DCI? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

I had no idea until that moment that Casey was in 
his office, right there in the same building, but he called 
him and then he either in that conversation or in a separate 
phone call moments thereafter, Casey called down to him, I 
think that is what happened, and asked us to come up to see 
him. 

So we did. We trooped off to see him. And Casey 
indicated that he had discussions with the AG and the AG agreed 
that It wasn't absolutely necessary, at least at that point in 
time, for Charlie to tell me the name of the character; but 
that we should continue on with our conversation. 

BY MS . NAUGHTON : 
Q Excuse me. From the time you were in -- was it 
Mr. Allen's Office? 
A Yes. 
Q Until you went up to see the Director, Director 



Casey, he had spoken to the Attorney General? 

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Yes. 



Q Okay. 

A That was my understanding. 

What else did Mr. Casey tell you? 

A Only that he stressed, as I recall, the very 
sensitive nature of this fellow's name and Allen had done 
so previously. He had suggested that if this name ever was 
made public, the consequences would be extremely dire for hi.-n 
and Casey simply said that in the circumstances, if it did 
become necessary for me to know the name, for us to know 
the name, that they would, of course, provide it, but until 
it became absolutely necessary, they did.n't want to da it and 
Meese had agreed to those terms. 

Well, the conversation didn't last five minutes 
and then we went back down to Allen's office and resumed the 
interview. 

Q Did you discuss anything else about the Iranian 
arms sales with Mr. Casey at that time? 

A No. 

Q Did he ask you how the inquiry was going? 

A I don't recall any chitchat of that kind. 

Q Did Mr. Casey refer to the meeting he had 
had the night before with Mr. Meese? 

A No , he didn ' t . 



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Q After you finished at the CIA, did you go to the 
Department of Justice? 
A Yes. 

MR. BOLTON: Was that on Sunday now? 
THE WITNESS: This is Sunday morning now. 
. BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Sure. 

A Sunday. Yes, I did. I went back to the office. 

Q Do you recall what time you got back, to the 
Department? 

A Well, it was, from my chronology, I would place 
it sometime probably around 11:30 or so because my chronology 
reflects that we left the CIA and we concluded our business 
there in the neighborhood of 11:00 o'clock. I had actually 
thought, to tell you the truth, that we had been out there 
more than two hours, but we did split up the interviews once 
John was kicked out of mine. 

Q Before Oliver North arrived for his interview at 
the Department that afternoon, did you have a meeting with 
the other members of the team to discuss how the interview 
would go, your strategy for interviewing Mr. North? 

A I don't really recall having outlined any particular 
strategy on that. I guess the interview was unusual in that 
all four of us attended whereas previously only the AG or the 
AG and myself were involved in the interviews that we had haa 



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at DOJ anyway, at the Justice Department. 

But I don't remember formulating any particular 
strategy or any way of approaching it. I think the AG 
had been working on that in his own mind and he had a stratea 
outlined in his own mind. 

Q Speaking of that, if I can digress for a moment, 
is It your understanding that the Attorney General spoke with 
Defense Secretary Weinberger at some point during the weekend 
A Yes, It is. Actually, I can't tell you that it was 
not on Monday. He may well have discussed the matter with 
him on Monday, but sometime between the time we spoke with 
McFarlane and the time of the Tuesday announcement, he had ha 
a conversation with Weinberger, a telephone conversation. 
Q Did he tell you what Weinberger had said to him? 
A No, or at least if he did, it wasn't significant 
enough to stick out in my mind. I think the significant thii 
about Weinberger was that there was nothing significant. 
Q There was no specific conversation then as to 
Weinberger's knowledge of the HAWK shipment or any requests 
from the CIA for similar equipment in the fall of 1985? 

A No. Actually, there had been no transfers out of 
DoD prior to the finding. The replenishment that took place 
for — that ultimately took place to replenish the 508 TOWs 
that Israel sent m September didn't take place until someti: 
several months into 1986, so there had been no transfers out 



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of Defense. 

I am sure that the AG would not have had conversa- 
tion about that. 

My recollection is that Weinberger, he was sick, 
or his wife was sick or something and he was not viewed as 
a particularly momentous or important contributor to this 
whole thing. 

Q Back to the North interview then; do you recall 
what time during the day it took place? 

A Well, I don't have a recollection different from 
the one that is recorded here in my notes, my chronology 
which suggests it took place from plus or minus 2:00 o'clock 
to 5:45. That is my best esti.mate. 

Q And did the Attorney General absent hi.Tiself for 

part of this interview? 

A He did, towards the end of the interview. I am sure 
we had been going on for two hours at a minimum and probably 
closer to three by the time the AG had to go pick his wife up 
at the airport. 

We then continued on for another hour or thereabouts 
with North. 

Q Did you take notes of this interview? 

A I took maybe one note. John was our scrivener, our 
notetaker during the interview. 

Q John Richardson? 



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A John Richardson. I do understand, I mean Brad 
took some small amount of notes, but John was our designate 
notetaker . 

It was his responsibility to be the notetaker. 

Q Now, using your recollection then, do you recall 
what Colonel North had to say about the November 198 5 shipmep.: 
of HAWK^? 

A Well, I recall it was rather confused, but yes, 
I do have a recollection of that, a recollection that I would 
defer to the notes on, but I do have a recollection of his — 

MR. LEON: We have John's notes if you would like 
to look at them. 

THE WITNESS: I have them here actually. I recall 
our probing that area. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q In the interest of time, I don't want to go 
through all the notes, but do you recall what he said m 
general about his state of knowledge as to whether the 
November 198 5 shipment was HAWKS or oil drilling or something 
else? 

A Well, let me tell you what I can recall as we sit 
here. . 

He did say that he was told it was oil drilling 
parts, equipment, I think he said by Rabin's man, Rabin's 
attache or something, who was in New York at the time and he 



UNniASSIEl£D 



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dd ends/?10 



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carr.e down to see North as a result of Rabir. 's call to 
McFarlane for assistance in the problems they had develcne. 
3n an operation that was important to our -ufi, 
mterests. 

So he learned from that fellow or at least that 
felIow_ represented that there was oil drilling equipment or 
this cargo. 

North said that he -- I mean somebody asked him : 
he had any doubts about whether there was oil drilling equ; 
ment and, he confessed that he did and that if push came to 
shove, he would probably -- basically, that he strongly su: 
pected that there was something other than oil drilling 
equipment, but that he could pass a lie detector test on t; 
question -- he made that point specifically -- as to what : 
believed and understood was involved. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Let's go off the record for a 
second. 

(Discussion off the record.) 



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THE WITNESS: That is about all I can recall in 
terms of his statements regarding whether it was Hawk or 
oil drilling equipment, although I do remember that he 
learned he said from Secord that there was actually Hawks 
on that plane. But this-- it was my understanding he 
learned subsequent to the actual shipment, and he learned 
even after that from Nir, or at least it is my recollection 
that he received that Nir subsequently told him as well that 
this involved Hawks. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Was it his position that this shipment was at the 
instigation of the Israeli*s? In other words, a unilateral 
transaction? 

A Yes. It was his position that this was 
something they were doing that they needed our help for. 

Q Did — 

A This was another place where I referred earlier to 
his use of the term "dork." He said this whole thing was 
"dorked up" and if he had been involved m it from the 
beginning it would not have been screwed up, but that Secord, 
when Secord came on the scene as a result of North's insti- 
gation, Secord did a long memo on how totally screwed up the 
whole thing really was. 

Q Did he stick with his story that he had jaw-^boned 
the Iranians into giving the Hawk missiles back? 



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A I think he retreated from that story somewhat. 
Because I think he said, and there is references somewhere 
in those notes to which I would defer, but I think he 
indicated that they -- that the Iranians did not -- were not 
pleased with the Hawks. I think he confided that to us. 
And I think that is in here somewhere. 

Q Either prior or during this discussion with 
Colonel Morth was he asked if he had an attorney? 

A North? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't think so. I don't recall him having 
been asked that. 

Q Did he mention having an attorney? 

A I don't recall that either. 

Q Did he mention the name, Tom Green. 

A No. I am quite confident he didn't mention Tom 
Green's name. I think the first time I had ever heard 
Tom Green's name was the following day. 

Q Did Colonel North say that any documents had been 
destroyed or were missing? 

A No, he didn't. 

Q Not even in the normal course of NSC activity? 

A No, he did not. 

Q Was there any statement made to Colonel North to 
preserve documents or to gather them or to give to you, provide 



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to you any documents? 

A The one thing that comes to mind in response to 
that question is an episode in the conversation which 
when his attention was focused upon the smoking gun 
memo, he asked not long after he recognized the memo if there 
was some kind of a cover sheet or cover memo with it. 

And I don't know who said no, but I guess it was 
Brad who was authoritative on the thing, said no, and then 
my recollection is somebody, and I think the A.G. said, is 
there supposed to be? 

And North said no, essentially he just wondered, 
but that he did not -- he did not suggest to us that the. 
document was incomplete. 

He simply seemed entirely satisfied by the fact 
that there wasn't such a cover sheet. But the notes, John's 
notes, reflect that North at that point essentially suggested 
that he would look further 3ust to double-check that there 
was no such cover sheet. 

That is the only -- and I don't have a specific 
recollection of that, and the only reason it comes to mind 
in response to your question is that I went through this 
precisely with representatives of Mr. Walsh. 

MR. LEON: Did he suggest it was just a draft? 

THE WITNESS: What -- the memo, the smoking gun 
memo? 

MR. LEON: Yes, the diversion. A rough draft as 



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opposed to complete. 

THE WITNESS: I -- 

MR. LEON: Do you have a sense? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, I have a sense that we were 
talking about a document that was not a final document. 
As I recall the document has -- it looks like a draft, it 
has interlineations, it has str ike-throughs or cross-outs 
or something, not many, but a few and one presumably wouldn't 
send that on as a final document. 

But the point that seems more -- whether it was 
final or not, it was a document that North suggested went 
only to Poindexter and that the only people in the 
Government who could have known about the matter of the 
diversion was Poindexter and McFarlane, or to his knowledge, 
who likely would have known or who did know to his knowledge. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Was he asked specifically if the President knew? 
A Yes, or there was conversation about that. 
Obviously we were keenly interested m just how high this 
knowledge went. And he, as I say, indicated that the only 
people that he thought knew were McFarlane, Poindexter and 
himself . 

MR. BOLTON: We are talking about what people knew 
here was the contra diversion? 

THE WITNESS: The contra diversion or who had 



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received any version of this memo, because I can recall 
the A.G. asking about what the normal N.S.C. filing 
practices are and where -- the point he was trying to 
elicit was that if this document had gone to the 
President, surely there would have been some version 
other than this one m the file, and if not, you know, 
where would such a document be housed, how could one double- 
check to make sure that the thing hadn't gone up to 
McFarlane -- excuse me -- to Poindexter or Regan or the 
President or the Vice President or anybody like that. 

So, yes, there was conversation about that and he 
gave us to understand that he did not think this had gon& to 
the President. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Was he asked if there were any other documents- 
which outlined the diversion? 

A It seems likely that he was, but I don't have a 
specific recollection in mind now. I would imagine that 
any such statement, if he was asked, would be contained m 
these notes, however. 

If they are not in the notes, I would have to 
conclude he wasn't. 

Q When he was shown the diversion memo, could you 
describe for us his reaction? 

A Yes. Actually, my reaction, and I think -- and this 



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IS an area where as I in the past have reviewed these notes, 
I am unclear as to what the message is in these notes -- mv 
recollection is that the A.G. handed him the memo prior 
to the time that he asked him about the contra diversion, 
that the A.G. handed him this memo and asked an innocuous, 
entirrely unnoteworthy question or two before he asked him 
about the contra diversion. 

So my reaction is when he got the memo his 
composure didn't change in any particular way, because mv 
reaction iS that he did not, when he got the memo, he did 
not immediately recognize the significance of the memo. 

But his composure did change when the mention " 
was made of the contra diversion to the Nicaraguan freedom 
fighters . 

Now, it may well be that his composure changed 
as soon as the memo was placed in his hands, but that is not 
my recollection. I just stated to you what my recollection 
of It is, but his composure changed and he obviously -- it 
changed from calm to one of great surprise. 

Q What did he say when asked about the diversion? 
Or when asked about the contras? 

A He just answered the questions. I mean, he didn't 
have any exclamation, no expletives or anything like that, 
but his facial expression was markedly -- was quite 



perceptible . 



UNCliMIFd 



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Q Did he deny it at first? 

A No. 

Q What is the first thing you recall him saying about 
It? 

A I think he just -- I don't really recall except 
that -- beyond that he was answering questions put to him by 
the Attorney General, and acknowledged the contra diversion 
element . 

I don't think it was long at all, perhaps the very 
next question, when he was asked how much was diverted. He 
said he really didn't know, but he knew who did know, and 
that was Secord. 

MR. LEON: Were you sitting right across from him, 
facing him. Chuck? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. I was sitting next to the 
Attorney General who was sitting directly across from him, but 
he was also in front of me. Brad was sitting in a position 
such that he was next to or to the side of North. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Whose idea did North say it was to divert the funds 
to the contras? 

A Nir. Nir of the Israeli Government. 

Q When Oliver North left the interview, could you 
tell us what the substance of the conversation then among 
those of you who had interviewed him was? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



201 




201 



A I do remember us all remarking that the change in 
North's composure on the raising of the contra diversion 
issue, that was perceptible to all of us, and we 
concluded, I guess, that he really hadn't expected that 
to come out, to come to light. 

'And I am sure we had additional conversation about 
it, but I can't remember any specific points that were made. 
I know that my own thinking at that point started to, with 
new seriousness, incline toward the legal issues, and I 
recognized 'that we needed to really get a solid footing on 
what legal implications there were to this, now that we had 
confirmed the suspicions that had been created by this 



At least confirm to the extent that we believed 
North, and this seemed to us to be something we believed 
him on. 

Q Did you discuss whether or not you should share this 
information with anyone or if you should keep it closely 
held? 

A I don't recall having discussed what our attitude 
on that should be, although -- specifically — although 
I do know this. 

At that point the question was, it seemed to us, 
and whether we discussed this immediately in the aftermath 
of North's interview or beginning with the next morning or 



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that evening, but I do think that John Richardson, 
Brad Reynolds and I, I recall us going to my office and 
brain-s-orming a little bit on this fact and where it placed 

.IS . 

And It may well be that -- well, we recognized the 
sensitivity of this information, the fact that it was 
information that had to be made public by the President and 
nobody else, that if the Washington Post made this fact 
public prior to the time that the President did, it would 
be very calamitous, because no one would believe that we had 
discovered this along the lines that we had and that it 
was something that, you know, we fully intended to make 
public . 

The point was can we verify and touch the bases 
that we need to touch between now and the time that we make 
this public before some other leak or some other reporter or 
something gets wind of this. 

We didn't have a sense that there was, you know, a 
Post reporter or anything else breathing down the neck of this 
information, but we did fully discuss and recognize that it 
may well be no more than a week away. 

So we recognized clearly that it was important 
that this information be made public by the President, that 
It not be leaked m any way and that it be made public 
before anyone else made it public through whatever means they 



'.*•■ 



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might obtain the information. 

At that point we had no confidence that North 
might not take measures to make it public or other people 
who knew about it. 

Who else knew about it? The Israelis knew about 
It, Secord knew about it, the contras, we assumed, knew 
about It -- so that is the flavor for the kinds of things that 
were kind of rushing pell-mell t.hrough our minds. 

But there was a unanimous and the most enthusiastic, 
vigorous agreement on the proposition that the President 
himself had to make this public pronto. 



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Q Was that communicated to the Attorney General? 

A Yes, I am sure that it was. I don't think it is 
something that the Attorney General needed a news flash 
from us on, however. I am sure that he -- I mean I 
don't recall anyone trying to convince anybody that these 
were the facts of life here. We were quite -- everybody 
seemed to be instinctively cognizant that it would be 
calamitous really if this information was made public 
in any way other than the President himself doing it. 

Q Was there a discussion then about securing the 
documents, perhaps getting the FBI to go in and secure 
the area so that documents wouldn't be destroyed? 

A No . I think there was Monday, and I am certai.n 
there was no later than Tuesday, but I don't recall as 
having had any conversation about being concerned or worried 
that some documents would be destroyed at that point. Or 
at all, really. I mean, I may be too trusting and too 
naive, but that is an inconceivable event almost to me. 
But It did not occur to me that people were likely to be 
destroying documents, particularly not them. 

To the extent that you think to destroy documents, 
that the reason to destroy documents was to at that point 
to obscure the fact of the contra diversion, it was too 
late. It was too late. And I can't think of any other 
element of this that would come close to rising to the 



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level to ]ustify people taking so extreme -- doing such 
extreme things as to destroy documents they know other people 
are interested in looking at for the highest purpose here. 

So no, I don't think there was any discussion 
at that point about securing the place. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Did you have specific questions 
on the North interview -- because I am done. 
MS. BENSON: Just a few if I could. 
MR. LEON: Why don't you take your time and do 
what you 'want . 

E.XAMINATION ON BEHALF OF SENATOR ORIN HATCH 
BY MS. BENSON: 

Q Did you show North any documents other t.han this 
undated memorandum in your interview with him? 

A I do not recall having done so. 

Q Could you give us ]ust a little better feel for 
how this interview was conducted, and did North come in a.nd 
was It informal and friendly or was it formal and 
hostile -- give us a little flavor for the meeting. 

A It was very informal and very friendly. North 
was -- you know, seemed quite gregarious in his -- and 
friendly to each one of us. I recall him referring to me as 
Coop, and that is a -- that I think bespeaks the attitude 
that he was taking in that matter, and nobody there was 
taking a hostile attitude toward him. We were businesslike. 



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ni3 \ I however, and t^at is I guess aoout the best I can do. 

2 Q What was the purpose for your having called him 

3 , in. At this point was it to learn more about the entire 

il 

4 Iranian initiative or to confront him with this memorandu.-n 

5 j, or both? 

6 i A Before we even learned about the memorandum we hac 

11 

7 ;i intended to speak with North and to speak with him last 

!i 

g l| because he was to us the most knowledgeable person, likelv 

9 Ij to be most knowledgeable of the whole thing. When the 



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contra element was discovered it ]ust added another area of 
inquiry that we had to take up with him. 

Q Did you attempt to go through that chronological 
fashion with him at that time the significant events of the 
Iranian Initiative? 

A Well, I am not sure that it was entirely 
chronological, but the AG did the great bulk of the ques- 
tioning on this, and the order in which -- and it was m a 
general sense chronological. That is the way he had -- 
my recollection is, and I think my notes will bear that 
out, that IS the general outline or system that he had in 
his questioning. 

But I am sure there are certain places where they 
are skipping around. 

Q When you got to the undated memorandum, the 
so-called diversion memorandum, was there any suggestion cy 



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the Attorney General or the others m the room other than 
North that that memorandum indicated some wrong/doing? 

A Was there any suggestion by us? 

■3 Ves . 

A No , none at all . 

Q . Did there seem to be any inference to that effect 
from North? 

A Yes. I won't say there was inference of wrong- 
doing, but my recollection is he described it towards the 
end of this as the only black -- the word "black" sticks 
in my mind -- he may have used another word like dark -- 
but It IS the only black element of the whole thing. i^nd 
I can recall him expressing out loud the hope I guess 
that that matter would not have to ever be made public. 

Q Did he mention any kind of a commercial cutout 
or private enterprise being the recipient of that money? 

A No. 

Q Not in any fashion? 

A No. His explanation was that the Israelis 
conceived of this plan and that Nir had placed -- that he 
then went to Calero, got account numbers, gave them to Nir 
and then Nir put the scrape-off into the accounts. He 
did suggest that Secord would know how much the contras 
got, but he didn't suggest that Secord was pulling strings. 

Q Did he specifically state it then that the money 



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I would have gone into a Swiss account number, into an account 

controlled by Calero, is that your recollection? 

1 A The only name, personal name associated with the 

contras was Calero's. He did mention Calero and he mentioned 
il 
,i that he had gone to Calero and either given him three 

: account numbers or gotten from him three account numbers. 

i| In any event, there were three Swiss account numbers 

I understood to be for contra use. 

ji Q After you heard this from him was there any 

li 

suggestion to him. Colonel North, this was United States 

government money, Treasury money that belonged to the United 

States, how could you think you had the authority to divert 

It in this way -- was there any discussion of that nature? 

A No, none at all. I don't think anybody there 
had by that time thought through whether this was U.S. 
money or not, and on the face of it in fact it wasn't clear 
at all that this was U.S. money. 

Now, I think those of you who are familiar with 
my opinions on this recognize that I believe there is a 
very substantial argument that this was U.S. money, but that 
was -- that was certainly not the inference that flows 
from the facts that he related to us naturally. 

Q When you first learned of the diversion, the 
feeling in old Ebbitts Grill was that this is bad news. 



this looks bad, right? 



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j UlffltSSailED 

m6 \ ] A Well, yes -- I mean that was certainly the 

2 sense that I was gripped oy , more the political implications 

3 .1 than -- struck me immediately much more so than the legal 
ii 

4 , implications, although I was savvy enough to realize tnis 
probably had some legal implications. 

Q Of course the political ramifications would only 
be there if there were possible legal problems, wouldn't 
that be a fair statement? 

A I don't think so. 

Q In your -- after you have shown him this memorandur 
how long did you discuss it? Can you think back and give 
us any estimate of how long you probed this with him oa 
]ust exactly what happened? 

A It IS very hard for me to state with any 
confidence how long we discussed either this memorandum 
or the event that it described regarding the contras. I 
would think it probably consumed at least half an hour of 
our interview with him, probably more than that. 



end stein ,. 
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Q And when you finished with that discussion 
with Colonel North, were you satisfied that you had at that 
point understood what had taken place with respect to any 
diversion? 

A Well, I don't think any of us had anything approacn 
ing absolute confidence, but it seemed all quite like a quite 
believable, reasonable explanation for what took place. 
So I did not find it inherently doubtful. 

Q Did you come away thinking it was Israeli money or 
American -money? 

A From that conversation? 

Q Yes. 

A I really didn't form an opinion on that. It was 
not at all long after this Sunday interview that I and my 
assistant devoted considerable time doodling on ]ust that 
question, but I certainly had not formed any even impressions 
at that time. 

Q Then I take it you and your assist^at did a legal 
analysis of this issue, of the possible diversion of funds? 

A Not long thereafter, Monday night certainly, no 
later than Monday night, John McGinnis and I discussed, and 
John had been looking at this issue at my request during 
Monday, what the potential legal ramifications were of this 
diversion and obviously we identified things like the 3olar.d 
amendment and possible misappropriation to personal use ot 



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government money^, Antidef iciency Act, Neutrality Act, 
there were a host of things that we went through and we have 
and I am sure you all have notes of the matters we discussed. 

As we thought through it, we became sufficiently 
concerned that there might have been, that this thing might 
have been unlawful under a certain understanding anyway of 
whose iwBfteys those were; that is, an understanding that 
would have had all or a part of the mcncyii belonging to the 
taxpayers that we, you know, I discussed, and the AG wanted 
us to db that and I reported back to him we were a little 
concerned about that. 

On the face of it, though. Dee, the money appeared 
under the description that North offered to be the Israelite/ 
money . 

Essentially, they received X TOWs, paid X dollars 
to the United States and then turned around and sold them 
for whatever they could make off them, was theirs. 

The thing that immediately occurred and one of the 
reasons that — and this is really why it took us til 
Tuesday to identify a potential theory of illegality such 
that it would justify calling in the FBI, because we had to 
identify some theory under which this money belonged to the 
United States and therefore that it had legal consequences 
under our laws, that it was sent to the contras or kept or 
anything else, kept by the Israelis or whatever. 



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ummiFiED 



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3 1 

• I We spent a good deal of time thinking through 

2 ' the question whether this was our money, some of it was our 

3 I money or all of it or none of it was our money, the United 

4 I States' money. 

5 It occurred to us immediately that, well, it 

6 |. looks like this is Israel's money, but then the question 

7 j becomes, well, did we receive in the $12 million that we 

8 1 got for the TOWs which was an Economy Act price, was that 

9 j fair market value? 

10 ' Is this the money we would have gotten in an 

11 arm's length transaction under the Arms Export Control Act 

12 with Israel? 

13 And if it was not, if it was considerably less 

14 than that, we concluded that perhaps maybe some of that 

I 

15 I money could be said to be due and owing to the United States 
15 I taxpayers and as long as that was true, if some of it went 
17 I to the contras, then it seemed to us we had a Boland amend- 
13 !| ment problem, potential problem. 

19 I Q Was it your understanding under the Economy Act 

£0 that the Department of Defense could only sell to the CIA 

21 I for a specified price something like book value? 
i 

22 ' A That is the understanding that I think we ultimatelh 

23 developed, yes. And on Monday night, I think it was Monday 

24 night, perhaps it was Tuesday, but in any event, one of thos 

25 evenings, we had a lengthy meeting with the people from the 

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Department of Defense, their officers who were in charge of 
sending the TOWs out the door and were in charge of sending 
these particular TOWs out. 

And we at length discussed with them the account- 
ing on all those. 

It was designed to, for us to educate ourselves 
on whether or not an arrangement could be made that some of 
this money was in truth due and owing to the Government 
and that was Monday night. 

Let the record show that I have been advised by 
counsel that -- 

MR. LEON: Wait a minute. That would be Tuesday 
night; 25th. 

THE WITNESS: Tuesday evening my chronology 
reflects the meeting that I described with Susan Crawford 
and other people from the Department of Defense on this. 

BY MS. BENSON: 
Q So under the Economy Act, the Department of 
Defense was restricted in the price it could charge another 
branch of the Government, in this case, the CIA, correct? 

A As I understand it, the Economy Act sets the 
price. 

Q Now, when the CIA, in turn, sold those weapons to 
the Israelis to the Secord enterprise directly to the 
Iranians, was it your impression that the Economy Act then 



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I restricted the amount the CIA could charge? 

A No. 

Q The CIA, in your opinion, in your legal opinion, 
could have charged any amount they wanted to? 

A Well, I don't know about that, but it was not 
my impression that the Economy Act governed the sales price 
of that transaction. 

I think the CIA probably had authority, it may 
well even have had authority under ~- it has got some 
extraordinary statutes, it may well have had authority to 
give these things away, but the point is the Arms Export 
Control Act was relevant only in terms of the price that 
It set to the CIA because I knew or had been given to 
believe that the CIA, in turn, turned around and charged 
the same price to the Israelis or to the Iranians, whoever 
It was who was paying that price, plus some additional 
for preparation and for transportation. 

So then the question, it seemed to us, was is 

19 the Economy Act price less than a fair market value arm's 

20 ' length transaction price? And we discovered, in fact, it 

21 I almost certainly was, though we got varying accounts as to 

22 : how much less it was and I don't know to this date if — 

23 well, I am sure the DoD has figured it out on that one. 

24 Q After talking with Colonel North about this then 

25 on Sunday afternoon and then doing your legal research, did 



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you make any other attempts to factually determine whose 
money that was? 

A Yes, I did. 

As I say, I can remember talking to Abe Sofaer, 
I think It was Monday, maybe Tuesday, but very prominent 
m my mind and in John McGinnis' mind at that point, we wer€ 
working on this question, so I talked with Abe Sofaer, it 
was his view that all of the mon o y s that Iran had paid were 
due and owing to the United States. 

I have subsequently come to see that there is a 
good deal of merit to that view. But at that time, I have 
to tell you I did not think that that view had merit- as I 
was talking to him because I was conceptualizing this trans- 
action as one out of CIA into Israel into the Iranians, 
two buyers, and two sellers. 

I since have come to believe that the appropriate 
way of visualizing this transaction is one out of the CIA 
into the Iranians with an intermediary. 

Q The intermediary — 

A A transaction between the United States and Iran, 
not between the United States and Israel. 

Q And the intermediary being which entity, or which 
person? 

A Israel. That was my view at the time, yes. Of 
course, even then we knew that one of these transactions. 



'H 



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I think a shipment of a thousand TOWs did not involve the 
Israelis, any intermediary activity by the Israelis. I 
think that was in February or so. 

Q I thought I just heard you say that now your view 
is that it was U.S. Government to Iran through an inter- 
mediary? 

A That is the way I find it most reasonable 
conceptually the transaction now. 

Q I am ]ust asking who was the intermediary? 

a' Israel. I mean, I am not making a factual 
judgment here for you, I am saying that was the assumption 
on which I developed this conceptualization that I am shar- 
ing with you. I did not know facts different from that. 

Q So -- I don't want to take too much more of your 
time, and the counsels' time -- but was it that assumption 
that it may be the United States Government's money that led 
Attorney General Meese to hold his press conference on 
Tuesday, the 25th? 

A No, on the contrary. By that time, this thinking 
that I am sharing with you was still in full swing and no 
conclusions -- I can't tell you the conclusions have even 
yet been made, but the thinking was still unformed and still 
at that time while I think I had perhaps thought tnrough 
to at least the possibility of this conception whereby all 
the r MH i Lj ^ were due and owing to the United States, it is 



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not something that I have sat down and walked the AG througn 
by then and the AG was still — and I had not become per- 
sonally at rest on it by then. 

But we know that the AG was — he was 
under the impression that, indeed, this was not U.S. money 
and — or at least he said we are still -- m his news 
conference -- he said we are still looking at this question 
but It appears that there was no U.S. money transferred to 
the contras. 

But he hedged all his statements with all kinds of 
disclaimers in terms of the level of confidence that he had. 

Q Why then the press conference if at that p6int he 
didn't know if it was U.S. Governjnent money? 

A At that moment, the primary motivating concern 
was not "Was thJs U.S. money that was illegally diverted?" 
That is something we still haven't -- I still haven't come 
to rest on and the Justice Department, I don't think, has a 
position on. 

It was that "This is an explosive element of 
all this, something new, something very, very politically 
sensitive, assistance to the contras." 

We had all been acquainted with the argument that is 
raging now between the Congress and the President as it 
has for years regarding that policy and it just seemed very 



explosive . 



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Whether it was legal or not, I mean even if nobod-/ 
would ever have remotely questioned the notion that this a^r 
money belonged to Israel for them to do what they wanted to 
do, we still recognized that this had the potential of dome 
exactly what it did do. 

Q I was going to say -- 

A If there is any -- if there was any doubt in 
our minds about it, it was erased completely Tuesday at 
aroimd 1:00 o'clock. 

Q. Just one last question from me, and I am sure 
Dick can explore this further tomorrow, but you indicated 
that it was your collective judgment, you and I guess Brad 
Reynolds and others who had interviewed North, other than 
the Attorney General, John Richardson, yes, that the 
President should make this disclosure. 

Was any attempt made to have the President make 
this disclosure rather than the Attorney General? 

A When I say the President, I mean the 
Administration. I did not mean to suggest there that he 
personally should go before the cameras and make known 
details, but that this is something that had to be perceived 
as coming from the Administration as a fact, as an element 
of this whole controversy which was already quite hot, but 
that element of it had to be something that was made known 
by the Administration in the nature of making public its 



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discoveries about it as they happened, particularly 
discoveries of this significance. 

MS. BENSON: Thank you. Thank you. 

MR. LEON: I will have stuff on that tomorrow. 
It has been a long, long day. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you very much. 

{Whereupon, at 6:18 p.m., the taking of the 
deposition adjourned, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m., Tuesday, 
June 23, 1987, at the same place.) 



IINCUS^OFJfn 



zzo 



STENOGRAPHIC BflNUTES 
Unreriaed aii.t UnedHcd 
Not for Quot: tlon or 
Duplication 



«Ncusjife -^.^^^ 



Committee Hearings 

oftha 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 




WPirfiany Declassified/Released on h'^' ^? 
under provisions of E.O. 12356 



by N. Menan, National Security Council 



OFFICE OF THE dJERK 
Ofltlce of OfflcUl Rcporten 



UNCLASSIFIED «--^ 



'^ ^-^ CPDE3 



221 



MAHE: HIRI714OO2 



Partially Declassified/ Released on 



under pro' 
by N. Menan, 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 1 



*PTS TETER 
DCHN TETER 

DEPOSITION or CHARLES J. COOPER 

Tuesday, June 23, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9^10 a.m., in 
Room B-352/ Rayburn House Office Building, with Pam 
Naughton, (Staff Counsel of House Select Committee) 
presiding . 

Present^ On behalf of the House Select Committee: 
Pam Naughton, Staff Counsel; Richard Leon, Deputy Chief 
Minority Counsel; and Tina Uestby, Associate Staff. 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Richard 
P«rry> Associate Counsel. 

On behalf of the Witness: John R. Bolton, Assistant 
Attorney General, Department of Justice; and Thomas M. Boyd, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice. 

MS. NAUGHTON: We're back on the record for the 



h II -S3 



sions of E-0- IZJio 
^lational Security Council 



ICLASSIFIED 



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NAME ■■ 
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UO 

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SO 



UNCLASSinED 



HIR174002 UlllfkflWWII llaV PAGE 2 
second dar" of- depos itiort £oi Charles Cooper. The date is 
June 23rd, 1987. 

If the people around the room could please 
introduce themselves. 

My name is Panela Naughton; I'm Staff Counsel to 
the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran. 

MR. LEON: Richard Leon, Deputy Chief Minority 
Counsel, House Committee on Iran. 

MK . PARRY: Richard Parry, Associate Counsel 
with the Senate Select Committee on Iran. 

MR. BOLTON: John Bolton, Assistant Attorney 
General for Legislative Affairs. 

MR. COOPER: Charles J. Cooper. Assistant 
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, and your 
faithful deponent. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Okay, Mr. Cooper, you were suorn 
under oath yesterday, and, of course, the oath stands. 

MR. COOPER: Of course. 
Whereupon , 

CHARLES J. COOPER 
Mas called as a witness and. having been previously duly 
sworn, was examined and testified further as follows: 

THE WITNESS: Before you begin-- 

MS . NAUGHTON: Sure. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



223 



NAME : 
51 
52 
53 

514 

55 

56 
57 
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60 

6 1 
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HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 



THE WITMESS: — continue with your questioning, I 
want to make note on the record that I brought with rae today 
the chronologies that we discussed yesterday and that were 
declassified by the White House yesterday. 

If appropriate, I will identify then for the 
record . 

We have--that is, ny assistant, Nelson Lund, has 
examined our files at Justice and discerned that these are 
all of the different copies of chronologies that we have in 
those files, and he's marked then OLC 1 through OLC 10. 

OLC 1 is the date chronology, and it appears to 
be the one from which I worked because I recognize ny 
handwriting on a couple of very ninor interlineations. 

OLC 2 is a chronology that is--that is narked 
11/20/86 1300 in the righthand corner, and that is the 
identifying legend the NSC put 40 on it. It also appears to 
be the copy fron which I worked--in fact, I can assert with 
certainty that it is the copy fron which I worked because it 
does have ny interlineations on it, particularly on page 6 
wherein the Novenber Hawk episode is described. 

This is the document which was ny dominant 
working docunent, the version of the chronology of the 
various versions that we received fron the NSC. This is the 
one that I used in ny work during that weekend. 

MS. NAUGHTON: However, it's dated 11/20. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



224 



MAME : 

76 
11 
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79 
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31 
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83 

814 

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UNCLASSIFIED 



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THE WITNESS; Right. 

MS. NAUGHTOK: Does that nean that is not the 
on« you got on the 17th oi November? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, I think that is what that 
means . 

OLC 3 IS a docunent that is not ftoi» NSC. but 
rather is a chronology that John McGinnis did independently, 
and I don't know why it's in here, but here it is. That was 
not among the documents I requested, but certainly it's 
among those that I'm happy to provide you with. 

OLC 4 IS another of the three-page date 
chronologies and it doesn't appear to bear any 
interlineations that would identify it as belonging to any 
particular person. 

OLC 5 is another date chronology, three pages. 

MR. LEON: What's the date on that one. Chuck? 

THE WITNESS: November 20th, 1986, and that is 
also the date on OLC M. 

OLC 6 is another date chronology and it bears 
the date 11/20/86 1930. And I can provide no other 
information about it. 

OLC 7 is a copy of the long narrative chronology 
Hhioh is dated 11/20/86 2000 hours. I do not immediately 
see any marginalia that would identify this as being any 
particular person's copy. 



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PAGE 5 
MS. NA'JGHTON: So, Mr. Cooper, although you nay 



hava seen this, this was not your primary working docunent? 

THE WITNESS: That is absolutely right. I am 
sure I saw all of the different versions, at least to lay 
eyes on and know that there was a different version, but 
never did I closely study, let alone compare these various 
versions,, except for the one that I've identified as my 
working operating document. And that one, I only studied 
closely with respect to the prefinding events, which was the 
dominant, almost entire focus of my own concerns at that 
time . 

MS. NAUGHTON; When you say ''that one,'' you're 
referring to the 11/20 1300? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

ns. NAUGHTON: OLC number 2. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. The one that has my 
marginalia, and yes, I think that's the one that is OLC 2. 

OLC 8 is--is a chronology that has a--well, first 
of all, the second page of OLC 8 identifies this as a long 
narrative chronology marked 11/17/86 2000 hours, and it has 
marginalia in it, but It is not marginalia that--or it is 
marginalia that it had on it when we received it. This is 
not--these marks are not the marks that anyone in the Office 
of Legal Counsel put on it, to my knowledge. 

It also--the first page of this document is a 



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mi4 

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UNCUSSIHED 



PAGE 



document that I don't readily recognize. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Mr. Cooper, do you know uhen you 
received this one? It's dated the 17th. 

THE WITNESS: Right, and the best recollection 
and estimate that I. combined with John McGinnis, can give 
you is that ue got that on the 17th sometime, but we 
obviously didn't get it before the 17th, and it's possible 
that we got it on the 18th, but our best guess is ue got it 
on the 17th. 

OLC 9 is a--OLC 9 is barely visible here so I 
will improve it by marking it myseli--OLC 9 is a narrative 
chronology dated 11/20/86 1300, and this document bears the 
interlineations and markings of my assistant, John HcGinnis. 

So it appears that this was his doninant working 
version , as well . 

MS. NAUGHTON: Do you recall, Mr. Cooper, if you 
had studied this document? 

THE WITNESS: I had studied my copy of that 
document, yes, but I don't--that was not my working version 
of it. That was John HcGinnis' working version of it, his 
personal copy. I have a copy of his with his 
interlineations, but my dominant working copy is the one 
thftt I've previously identified. 

HS . HAUGHTON: Do you know if you have a copy or 
your copy of this, as opposed to Mr. HcGinnis'? 



uNcmssinED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, and it uas my copy that 



that was-- 

MR. LEON: Nunber 2. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, it is fron ray copy that the 
copy I 3ust gave you was taken. 

MS NAUGHTON: All right. So number 2 and 
number .9 are the same chronology, although nuraber 9 is nr . 
McGinnis ' ? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's right. 

In other words, they are the same version of the 
NSC--of the many versions oi the NSC chronology. They are 
the same version. 

OLC 10 is a document that I also don't readily 
recognize, but it is headed ''Subject: Background and 
Chronology of Special Project.'' So--and I cannot--it also 
has Ollxe North, his name, in somebody's handwriting in the 
righthand-- 

HR. LEON: It looks like--that's 
Poindexter--PoindeKter's initials . 

THE WITNESS: And It has beneath that the 
initials JP. Now, I do not recognize this document. 

HR. LEON: It's dated what? 

THE WITNESS: I don't see a data on it, other 
than the declass-iiication date here in the left--lower 
lefthand corner. It's a three-page document and Nelson Lund 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



KAME: HIR17U002 UllVbllWWH IkV PAGE 8 

176 apparently found it in our files. I don't know where it 

177 cane from and I do not readily recognize it. 

178 MS. MAUGHTON- For the record. Hr . Cooper, that 

179 was already placed into evidence by us yesterday. 

180 THE WITNESS: Okay, that's already been 

181 identified as an exhibit. 

182 MS. MAUGHTOK: Yes, and at the tine, you did 

183 not, as I recall, you did not recall having seen it before. 

184 MR. LEOM: Exhibit 3. 

185 MS. NAUGHTOK: It makes reference to — on the 

186 second page, in November 1985, as the next step in the 

187 operation, the NSC arranged for Israel to send 18 Hawk 

188 missiles to Iran. 

189 Do you know when you received this document? 

190 THE WITNESS: No , I don't. My best guess for 
19 1 you IS that that document was among the documents that were 

192 obtained as a result of the review of John Richardson and 

193 Brad Reynolds. I do not renember ever having seen the 

194 document, let alone receiving it iron any source. 

195 MS. NAUGHTOK: So, would It b« falz to say that 

196 you did not see this document until aitez the Attorney 

197 General's press conference? 

198 THE HITHESS: That's entirely possible. I mean, 

199 assuming that I had seen it. This emerged--! take it that 

200 this emerged from our files, but I do not readily recognize 



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NAME- 
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iCLASSIFIED 



this documen 

MS. NAUGHTON: Would it be fair to say that had 
you received it around November 17th or November 20th, the 
reference to the NSC arranging for the Hauk shipment to 
Israel would have caught your eye? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, it would be more than fair to 
say yes That would have caught ray eye and that document 
would have been a document of major, major significance to 
me . 

ns. NAUGHTON: Very good. thank you. 

If I could have the reporter, at the end of the 
deposition or during a break, mark these exhibits next in 
order--I believe we left off with Exhibit CJC Number 22. So 
these should be 23 through 33, I believe, or 32. 

THE WITNESS: Also, before ua resume the 
questions and answers, I would like to share with you the 
fruits of some additional reflection and minor research that 
I did last night upon thinking of some rough spots in the 
testimony yesterday. 

I think--it was certainly helpful to ma and I 
think it'll also be helpful to your understanding, as well. 

First, I recall testimony yesterday dealing with 
ny trip and my conversations that immadiately preceded my 
visit to the CIA on Friday morning, in anticipation of Mr. 
Casey's testimony. The thing that inspired me to reflect on 



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PAGE 10 



this was your showing me a copy of what I understood 
yesterday to be Director Casey's testimony to the HPSCI and 
the Senate Committee on Intelligence. 

And it would probably be helpful to me if we 
could dig out that document, although I dug out my own copy 
last night and I looked at it again and further reflected 
upon it . 

And in just a moment, I will get to the--I will 
get to the pertinent references in that document because I 
do not believe that is, indeed--at least that the exhibit 
number-- 

ns . NAUGHTON: Ue have Exhibits numbers 13 and 
14 you identified as drafts of llr . Casey's testimony. 

THE WITNESS: Okay, yes, and the one that is 
Identified as Exhibit Number 13 was the draft that was under 
discussion in the meeting in Poindexter's office on Thursday 
afternoon, and that continues to be ray recollection. 

The one that is marked as Exhibit Number 14, 
yesterday when I reviewed it, I focused particularly my 
attention on the passage dealing with the November episode 
and I don't know whether I identified it as the version that 
was the final version that we were dealing with on Friday 
morning in Casey's office, or whether I didn't quarrel with 
that proposition, but whatever it was, I do know that in my 
raind, I accepted the fact that this was the final version. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



231 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR17MC02 limial U.'%.1iriril PAGE 11 
and I do not believe it is. I am coniident that it is not, 
in fact. 

So-- 

ns NAUGHTON: Had you see this draft before? 

THE WITNESS ■■ Yes, I had, yes, I had. I had 
seen this draft before. I have a copy of this draft and I 
have a copy of Exhibit Number 14. What I do not have a copy 
of, and what it appears you may not have a copy of is the 
version from which ue were working on Friday morning, which 
did not contain two very important references, and which 
caused me to have consternation yesterday that I had 
simply--you will recall, when you asked me quite 
perceptively, why I did not recognize the significance of 
what nr . Jameson told me about the pilot possibly knowing 
that there was an oil drilling equipmant for the statements 
made in this version. The statements are, ''this little 
air '' --excuse me. The statement's, ''neither the airline nor 
the CIA knew the cargo consisted of 18 Hawk missiles.'* 

There is, subsequent to that, another statement-- 

HK. LEON: Where are you reading from, Hr . 
Cooper ? 

THE WITNESS- I'm reading from page 2 of that 
document, which is also identified as page N10008. 

HR. LEON: The first paragraph? 

THE WITNESS-- Yes, it's the first paragraph, and 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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111 

zia 

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HIR17U002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 12 



evidently the only--or the principal paragraph that deals 
with CIA's state of knowledge regarding these HawkS . 

Later in that paragraph, there's also the 
statement, ''To the best of our knowledge, neither the 
Israelis nor the Iranians knew that they were dealing with 
the CIA proprietary, not did airline personnel know what 
they were carrying.'" 

Well, as you noted yesterday, and as I did not 
iraraediately--and as I basically accepted, that was in--these 
statements would not be entirely consistent with what 
Jameson told me. And I simply--! had no explanation other 
than I didn't make the connection, I suspected, or I guAss I 
just didn't make the connection. 

Uell. upon the reflection of it, I came to the 
conclusion that these statements were not in the version 
that I was dealing with as the final version out there in 
Langley on Friday morning. And another thing that suggested 
to me that this was not the final version is that a sentence 
that I very vividly recall suggesting be placed in the 
testimony, and this was among the minor revisions that I 
identified as having been made right up until the very end. 
I Identified this yesterday. 

A sentence that I advocated being inserted, and 
which was, was a sentence to the effect that the Senate 
committee should basically understand that these are the 



IINCUSSIFIFD 



233 



HI R 174002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 13 



best facts that ue have, based upon the information that 
we've been able to gather thus far. But our efforts 
continue and as facts th^t are relevant to this corae to the 
fore, those facts, of course, will be made known. 

Now, that sentence nowhere appears in this 
version and no such suggestion appears m this version. 
Now, upon ray reflection on these points last night, I called 
George Jaraeson and his recollection was precisely as mine. 
He also told rae that he needs know nothing further than that 
this document is dated 20 November '86 2000 hours to know 
that was not the final--that was 8^00 Friday night, and ny 
conversation that I previously testified to with 
Doher ty--eKcuse rae, 8^00 Thursday night in ray conversation on 
Thursday night with Doherty, came fully, he says, four hours 
after that. He says I called hin at midnight. I didn't 
think it was that late, but it is entirely possible that it 
was and he advised me that he had taken out completely the 
sentence ''no one m the United States Government.'* 

He also remembered, and I now recaM very 
confidently that this is correct, that the reason he took 
that out. as ha explained to me that Thursday night, was 
that the sentence said, ''Nobody in the USG found out that 
thare were Hawks until January.'' Until January. 

HS. NAUGHTON: Uh-huh. 

THE WITNESS: And putting to the side, you know. 



uNCUssra 



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3U 1 
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349 
350 



mussw 



HIR174002 llllllal Hal>lll ll_t/ PAGE 14 

who knew what there at the time it happened, he knew, from 
Stan Sporkin, that Sporkin knew there was something other 
than oil drilling equipment and something that was arras, 
though he may not have known they were Hawks, prior to 
January, and in fact, within a few days at the maKiraura of 
the time that the--that the shipment actually took place. 

So he knew that was inaccurate, even though he 
didn't have the same basis for knowing that it was 
inaccurate that I did. He also advises me that I did not 
tell him why I thought it was inaccurate, just that I had 
information that it was inaccurate, and he also tails me 
that It's his firm recollection that I did not, the 
following day when I was with Casey and the others, explain 
what the basis for my concern about its accuracy was, just 
that we had received evidence that it was inaccurate. 

I am perfectly--! mean, I defer to his memory on 
that His is firrai mine is not firm at all. I ^ust don't 
recall whether I outlined why. 

MS. MAUGHTOH: Since we're on the subject — 

THE WITNESS: Yeah. 

HS. NAUGHTOH: — if I can show you another draft 
now of what we believe is the testimony. I would like to 
h«v« that marked at this tima--I think It would be CJC 33. 

[The following document was marked as Exhibit 
CJC 33 for identification: ] 



UNCIASSIFIED 



235 



HIR17U002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 15 
EXAHINATION OK BEHALF Of THE HOUSE SELECT 
COHMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

2 You'll notice--f irst of all, I • ii showing you 
what's been marked as CJC 33, which is an undated document, 
entitled "'Presidential Finding,'* and it begins by saying, 
''Let me begin by stating the obvious.'' 

A Uh-huh. 

2 The House Intelligence nunber on tha document is 
330085. 

A This appears to be a statement nade--dr af ted for 
a person to say, and it has the forn oi fir. Casey's drait 
testimony as given. 

A That certainly would appear to be correct. 

2 I'd like to direct your attention to page 3, in 
which it begins Wy saying ''chronology.'' And it says, ''In 
late November 1985, the NSC asked the CIA for the name of a 
discreet, reliable airline which could assist the Israelis 
in transporting a planeload of Israeli Hawk missiles to 
Iran. Tha name of our proprietary airline was given to the 
NSC, which, in turn, passed it to one of tha intermediaries 
daaling with the Iranians.'* 

In other words, there's no reference to oil- 
drilling equipment or bulky cargo. Tha paragraph-- 

A Uh-huh. 



^fimm 



236 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME : 
376 
377 
378 
379 
380 
381 
382 
383 
384 
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386 
387 
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39U 
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397 
398 
399 
MOO 



HIR1714002 



PAGE 16 



2 --states it was Hawk missiles and that the HSCS, 
th« CIA to provide the narae of an airline to transport Hawk 
miss lies . 

Do you recall having seen this draft? 

A No . I do not . 

2 Is there any-- 

A This is not among the drafts that I have pored 
over during that period of time, or at least, it's certainly 
not one uherein this statement was made. 

2 Is there any way you can tell from your 
insertions during any of the drafting sessions or any 
insertions you know were made that you could data this 
document? In other words, whether it was generated before 
the drafts you have just discussed or after? 

A I think to give you an answer that is useful to 
you. I'd really have to read this document because I do not 
recognize this document. I do not think I have ever read 
this document before. I know I have never read the passage 
you just directed my attention to before. 

2 That's fine: I won't put you on the spot. Hr . 
Cooper. What I'd like to do, then, is provide you a copy of 
all the exhibits at your deposition so you can go over them 
in preparation for your public testimony and maybe get a 
better chance to look through some of these drafts so that 
you're more certain. 



UNCUSSIRED 



237 



HIR 174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 17 



A Hell, I'm happy to do that, but I don't--let me 
just make clear, I don't have any uont of certainty 
regarding my acquaintance with this paragraph that you've 
:ust directed ray attention to and this was not among the 
chronologies that I am familiar with or that I pored over in 
an effort to make them accurate. 

e All right. Had you seen this draft, would this 
paragraph have alerted your attention? 

A Oh, ray goodness, yes. This was obviously the 
uppermost concern in my mind at the tirae . The dispute or 
the discrepancy that had surfaced concerned who knew what 
was on that plane, particularly with respect to Hawk 
missiles. And this further corcoboiates the State 
Department version that soaabody in the USS at very high 
levels knew that there were Hauks on it, but this is my 
first acquaintance with this document, or at least this 
paragraph . 

But before we move on any further, let ne close 
the loop on the point I was making about the version that we 
discussed yesterday, that is, CJC Nunbar 1 <4 . I asked Dave, 
and I talked to hira last night, as wall as George Jameson, 
a they could consult their own documents because this is 
tha bast version I have. This is tha latest version I have 
and where I got it, I can't tell you, but I asked them if 
they could consult their own filas to see if they have the 



UNCIASSIFIED 



238 



NAME: 
1426 
427 
428 
429 
430 
431 
432 
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44 1 
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447 
448 
449 
450 



UNClASSra 



HIR174002 mill B iixxiririi page is 

later ver?ibn.~ They both agreed entirely with ne that this 
is not the version we were working off of and that the 
version we were working oi± oi did not contain these 
references that I've already identified regarding the state 
of the knowledge of airline personnel. 

Dave, in the time that was available to hint, has 
not identified anything that he understands to be the final 
Casey testiraony from which Casey read, but ha did have a 
transcript of Casey's testimony and he read the pertinent 
paragraph to me, and it is consistent with my recollection 
and his and George's that, indeed, the phrases that I've 
identified were not testified by Casey. 

It also--that transcript also reflects that — at 
the end of his testimony, he made essentially the disclaimer 
that I thought should be made regarding the state of our 
knowledge and the continuing efforts to improve the state of 
our knowledge . 

So I just--I thought it important to try to 
smooth out that rough spot in my own recollection yesterday 
and in the transcript. 

There is one other thing that I tried to smooth 
out in my own mind last night, and that dealt with this 
Furmazk subject matter that we discussed yesterday. I--we 
had some conversation back and forth about when it might 
have been that the Attorney General discussed the Furmark 



ONCUSSIFIED 



239 



HIR17U002 



UNCLHSSra 



PAGE 19 



menoiandum or the Furmark episode with Casey. 

I have consulted the cover raerao and my 
recollection was accurate. It does reference that they had 
discussed it prior to the--the cover memo dated November 2Sth 
references a prior conversation, though that conversation--! 
mean one would infer that that conversation took place that 
raorning, which is entirely possible, or at least, the 
promise by Casey to provide the documents took place that 
morning . 

I reviewed Mr. rieesa's transcript on the 
Tower--to the Towei Board and his testimony there was that ha 
and Casey--that Casey brought up the Furmark business on 
Saturday night when he went by his house, so they--ha did 
have conversation with Casey about the Furmark angle on all 
this, evidently Saturday night, and so, therefore, I think 
ue can conclude--! conclude that it was entirely possible 
that the conversation ! referenced yesterday, and of which I 
had then and do now a general recollection of having 
participated in with the AG, could have happened as early as 
Sunday, whatever Sunday was, the 23rd, but I am very 
doubtful that It did happen on Sunday. I just don't think 
we got around to--I do not recall that having happened in 
what I can remember from the Sunday sequence of events, but 
I think It probably didn't happen too much after that--too 
long after that. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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NAME • 

M76 
477 
478 
479 
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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 20 



So that IS by nay of improving your 
understanding of the matters that I discussed yesterday, as 
well as improving ray own recollection of those natters. 

2 Okay, Thank you. I appreciate the clarification 
and might I say we appreciate you getting those documents 
cleared for us so quickly at the White House. 

-A And I will return to you now these exhibits . 

2 These are 14 and 33. 

Okay, I think when w« last left you, we were on 
Monday, the 24th of November 1986. You had described 
earlier your visit to the State Department to retrieve Mr. 
Hill's notes which you eventually did get that morning, I 
understand . 

A That's my recollection. 

2 Okay. 

That morning, then, I believe your chronology 
shows that between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 11^30 a.m., 
the Attorney General met with Mr. McFarlane, the Vice 
President, Donald Regan, John Poindexter and the President. 
Were you present for those meetings? 

A No. On Monday, I was not. In fact, while he 
was meeting with McFarlane, I was at the State Department, 
■■••ting with Abe and--Abe Soia«r and Mr. Hill. I did not 
attend any of the other meetings that are referenced here 
Mith the President, Regan or with Poindextei and the Vice 



BNCUSWB 



241 



NAME: 
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HIRI714002 



UNCUSSffi 



PAGE 21 



Piesident . 



8 Is there any reason you're aware of that the 
Attorney General went alone to, I assume, asK these people 
about the diversion? 

A No, there's no--I mean, I don't know of any 
cone e ienoe reason. Certainly it's nothing ue discussed. 



No. 



tt*°' 



,^ 



2 Do youAwhether or not the Attorney General took 
any notes of those meetings? 

A I am not aware of any notes . I have not seen 
any notes . 

Q After these meetings, did he tell you what had 
occurred ? 

A Yes, he did. Now, when you say * 'after,'' I 
cannot identify with any specificity precisely when after, 
but yes, he did advise me and others on the information that 
he had obtained, not long thereafter, certainly. 

2 Let's start with Hr . HcFarlane . What did the 
Attorney General tell you Hr . HcFarlane had told him? 

A That HcFarlane had, indeed, been acquainted with 
th« contra element of this by North. 

2 Did he say when he was informed of the 
diversion? 

A Yes. HcFarlane, it is my understanding, advised 
the Attorney General that he was informed when he came back 



UNCLASSIFIED 



242 



NAME ■■ 
526 
527 
528 
529 
530 
531 
532 
533 
534 
535 
536 
537 
538 
539 
540 
5U1 
5M2 
5143 
SUM 
545 
5U6 
547 
548 
549 
550 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



HIR174002 IllVlal U.A-'%inril PAGE 22 
into this project m May or April, or whenever it was, for 
th« personal Tehran mission he periormed. 

e Did Mr. fIcFarlane tell the Attorney General why 
he did not tell you that on Friday afternoon when you both 
interviewed hin? 

A I do not recall, no. 

MR. LEON: Do you know if he asked why he didn't 
tell us? Do you know if the AG asked? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know if he asked or not. 
MR. LEON: He might not have? 
THE WITNESS: Ha certainly might not hava . 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Did Mr. McFarlane tell the Attorney General, to 
your knowledge, that there was a possibility that Oliver 
North or others had destroyed documents at the NSC? 
A Not to ray understanding, no. 
C Now. as far as--one other question. 

Regarding the November Hawk missile shipment, 
did McFarlane change his story on Monday, as far as you 
know? 

A I don't know if that's a subject matter that 
they discussed during that meeting. 

fi Now, a$ to Admiral Poindaxter, what did the 
Attorney General tell you that Admiral Poindaxter had told 
him regarding the diversion? 



UNCLASSIHEO 



243 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR17t4002 lllllll rialalll II II PAGE 23 

551 A That he, too, had been provided with infornation 

552 that led him to conclude that this was happening, this 

553 contra diversion eleraent of it. He was cognizant of it, but 

554 as I understand it, Mr. Poindexter did not put it that he 

555 uas advised of it or that he was consulted on it or anything 

556 like that, just more in the nature of it was an activity 

557 that he had reason to believe was occurring, but he just 

558 more or less didn't look into it. 

559 I also recall hin saying that--I also understand 

560 and recall that he said to the AG that ha realized he would 

561 have to resign if this matter energed. 

562 C Was there a question at that point as to whether 

563 it would emerge? 

564 A Certainly not in my mind or anyone with whom I 

565 uas dealing. It may have been in his, but I don't know the 

566 state of his mind. 

567 2 Okay. 

568 As to the Vice President, what did the Attorney 

569 General tell you he said regarding the diversion? 

570 A Before X get to that, I should note further, 
57 1 before we switch subjects from Hr . Poindexter that Mr. 

572 Poindexter did make clear to the Attorney General that this 

573 is not something that he had ever advised the President of 

574 and that the memorandum which contained the reference to 

575 this activity that we had been--become aware of did not go to 



UNCLASSIHED 



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HIR 174002 



the President 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 24 



MR. LEON- Do you know if he presented you uith 
the memo to look at' 

THE WITNESS: I can't--! don't know the answer to 
that. 

HR. LEON: You don't. 

THE WITNESS: With respect to the Vice 
President, he just said he didn't know anything about it, 
the contra diversion, of course, and I don't think there was 
any more to it than that. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
2 And what about Mr . Regan? 

A He, too, reacted, apparently, with visible shock 
at the news, I an given to understand, and did not know 
anything about it. 

2 And finally, the President, what did the 
Attorney General tell you about his conversation with the 
President that morning? 

A That he had no knowledge of the contra diversion 
and It appears that uppernost in the nind of the President, 
as well as the Attorney General at that point, was 
davAloping an orderly responsible way of naking this public, 
making this known. 

8 Did they discuss the details of that, to your 
knowledge? 



UNCUSSinED 



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HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIREO 



PAGE 25 



A Weil. I don't know if they did discuss the 
details of it. It's my understanding that they recognized 
that they needed to--at a mmiraum, recognized they needed to 
discuss the details, but I don't think at that moment--! 
.Tiean. the Attorney General's purpose was not to develop a 
plan for that, but rather, to gather additional information 
and make the important people aware of the information ue 
now uere confident of. 

So r don't know if they discussed details, but I 
have to tell you I would doubt it and I certainly haven't 
been told they discussed the details. 

2 Do you know whether or not the Attorney General 
spoke to anyone else at the White House, other than the 
people that we have mentioned? 

A Well, it's my recollection--! cannot supplement 
my note with recollection to that effect, so I do not know 
of any others . 

S Do you know when it was decided that Oliver 
North would be reassigned and that John Poindexter would 
resign? 

A I imagine it wasn't decided until the Commander 
in Chief decided it on Tuesday to the extent that--! assume 
h* was tha one who made the d«cision, or at least accepted 
the decision or the advice of others who thought that would 
be the appropriate thing to do. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



246 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



naue : HiRiTuooa wl lUlBfllJlJII ILU page 26 

*26 . fi So when the Attorney General-- 



UNCLASSIHED 



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euM 

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HIR1714002 



UNCLASSIHED 



PAGE 27 



DCHK STEVENS 



A They both uere re-ass igned . Heithet of then--I 
mean, they are both now still in the raxlitary, as I 
understand it . 

2 What I am getting at, though, is when the Attorney 
General arrived back, let's say around lunch time on Monday, 
uas It your understanding that this had already been decided 
that they would be re-assigned, or uas it still--the decision 
still m the process o± being made? 

A I don't know that a whole lot of focus had been 
brought to bear on that question. My first recollection of 
conversations or discussion about what would happen comas to 
rae as Tuesday morning. I can recall sitting with the AG and 
with John Richardson wherein we discussed how that element 
of it ought to be handled, and even discussed potential 
resignation language for Poindexter. 

MR. LEOKt On Monday. 

THE UITNESS' No, this uas Tuesday morning. 

I don't recall--it is entirely possible some 
discussion was devoted to that element of all this on 
Monday, but I don't think so. 

Actually, I was more or less taken--! won't say by 
surprise, but very early Tuesday morning, I was called at ny 
home by the AG on his car phone. He was on his way into the 
office. They uanted me to be there at 7:115. or something 



UNCLASSIRED 



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67 1 
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HIR 1714002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 28 



like that, some early time 



And by that time the wheels were already set in 
notion for the events of Tuesday, and not until that time, 
at least to the best of ray recollection, did I understand 
that the matter would proceed with so much expedition. I 
knew that we had to move very quickly, and that was 
certainly ray pitch and my belief. 

But I did not understand this would all happen on 
Tuesday, as it did. The nomentun for this obviously picked 
up considerably when the appropriate people at th« Uhite 
House were nada aware of these facts . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
2 At approKiraately two o'clock on that day, Monday, 
November 2'4th, you and Mr. Reynolds met with Tom Green; is 
that correct? 

A That IS correct. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If I could have these marked as CJC 
number 34 . 

[Exhibit number CJC 34 was marked for 
Identification. 1 

BY MS. NAUGHTOM: 
e Did you take notes of that meeting? 
A Z did, and it appears that number 3i« is a-- 

HS . NAUGHTON: For the record, the notes start off 
saying ''Tom Green- 1 1 /2i4/86 '' . And this document's 



UNCLASSIFIED 



249 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIRnuOOa |||«||l HlJ|j|l ll-U PUGZ 29 

677 reference number is 3114 through 3116. 

678 BY MS. NAUGHTOM: 

679 . 2 Were these notes taken contemporaneously, fir. 

680 Cooper? 
68 1 A They were . 

682 e And are they accurate as far as you can recall? 

683 A Well, I haven't reviewed them, but I certainly 

684 don't know of any inaccuracies except for one, and this 

685 isn't an inaccuracy so much as it is--well, it suggests 

686 something that does not accord with my memory, and that is 

687 the first line on this says, ''Reps M and Secord,'' that is 

688 North and Secord, and what this statement therefore says is 

689 represents North and Secord. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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NAKI' 
690 
691 

692 
693 
694 
69S 
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7 1 1 
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7 13 
7 1 4 



HIR174002 



uNtussm 



PAGE 30 



DCHN DONOCK 



My recollection is that Tom Green, aiter he 
basically made a statement to this efiect, or to the effect 
that he has represented North and Secord, he then was most 
purposeful about making clear that he was not here as a 
legal representative of any of these men. 

In effect, towards the end of the conversation, I 
thought that to the extent he represented as a lauyer any of 
them, he probably represented Hakim, because Hakim, my 
impression by the end of the conversation, was apparently a 
client and it appeared to me a long-standing client of Mr. 
Green's. 

So, this cryptic note really gives off an inaccurate 
signal regarding his status as we mat with him. 

Q What did he say that gave you the understanding 
touards the end that he represented Albert Hakim? 

A Uell, I can't really--he knew a lot about Hakimi he 
knew a lot about his background, ha is a very successful 
businessman, ha is an Iranian expatriate. He described 
these things to us. 

And it was my impression that he had--that Hakim 
•Ithar was a long-standing acquaintance of his> 
wlthout--well , actually I just perceived from all this 
general discussion that the man was a long-standing client 
of Green's. That may be entirely inaccurate, but that is 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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739 



HIR174002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 31 



the inpr«ssion that I caraa away from than with. 

fi Did you still have that impression aiter ha said 
that It was Hakim's idea to divert money to the contras? 

A That did not alter my impression, though, you know, 
I--tha impression that I had--well, no, I guess it just didn't 
alter ray impression that, to the extent he was representing 
anyone, though I can't tell you that I had the impression 
that he was there representing somebody in a legal capacity. 

That was not my understanding. Ha want out oi his way to 
try to-- 

NR. LEON: Why was he thara? 

THE WITNESS: Because, as ha put It, ha was thara to 
share with us information that had coma to him that is vary 
important, important to this Administration, important that 
ue understands^ it correctly, rather than the way we were 
given to understand it by North. 
BY HS. NAUGHTON: 

C Has it clear to you that ha had spoken to Oliver 
North aiter North had baan intarvlauad by yourself and the 
Attorney General? 

A Yas , it was . 

fi Was it your under standlng--str ike that. Did ha 
■•ntlon to you that ha had net with North on Friday, 
November 21st? 

A I did not understand that, no. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



252 



HIR174002 



UNClASSm 



PAGE 32 



NAME 

7M0 2 Did he describe any meeting with Faun Hall on that 

7M1 day, or any other day? 

7M2 A No, he certainly didn't describe that. 

7143 8 Did he mention Faun Hall in any way? 

744 A The name Fawn Hall, I don't think I had ever heard 

745 that name until I read it in the newspapers, and that was 

746 considerably after this meeting with Mr. Green, so the 

747 answer to that is no, ha did not mention har name. 

748 2 Can you give us just a general sense oi what his 

749 pitch was, what his point was in coming to speak with you 

750 and Mr. Reynolds? 

751 A Uell, yes, I will give you a general sensa, and 

752 however preface it by saying as with the other interviews 

753 that I have participated in, my notes are generally the most 

754 complete and accurate statement that I can offer to you. 

755 The general sense was that Secord--eKcuse me, that 

756 nr . Green wanted to provide us with a different 

757 understanding of the contra alamant of all this than the one 

758 ue received from North. 

759 Ha prefaced it by saying North is the kind of 

760 fallow, you know, tha diehard Harina, who wants to step 
76 1 foEward and take all the spaars in his own chest. And I 

762 think that was the allusion that ha used. 

763 And he seemed to me to have two purposes along in 

764 that vein. One was to provide a different set of facts that 



UNCLASSIFIED 



253 



mmm 



HIR17I4002 mVIIB_IVAlAHI ■■_■! PAGE 33 
led to tha contra divarsion, one which involved Mr. Hakim as 
being the origin of the idea; and the other was to convince 
us that there was nothing illegal about it, that this was 
not money that belonged to the United States that was being 
sent to the contras. and that if this natter became public, 
that the consequences apparently would be extraordinary for 
certain individuals who would die. 

I got the impression from him that there would be 
people in Iran particularly who were allied with the United 
States in this who were the moderates, and out contacts, who 
would die; also that some of the hostages would be at risk 
with their lives. 

So, that is my best recollection for the essential 
points and the flavor of that meeting. 

Q Did you have a response to his argument that this 
should not become public? 

A Ko . Hr . Reynolds and I--I said very little. Hr . 
Reynolds also said very little. Mr. Green just kind of spun 
out this explanation and these points, and that was about 
it. 

I do recall that there was some conversation between 
Szaen and Brad Reynolds towards the end to the effect that 
If this matter was to be made public, that Brad would do him 
the courtesy of giving him a head's-up. I don't remember 
the language that was used, but that was the general--my 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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791 
792 

793 
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795 
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799 
800 

80 1 
802 
803 
SOU 
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806 
807 
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809 
810 

81 1 
812 
813 
814 



HIR17U002 



ONCIASSIFIED 



PAGE 314 



sense oi the exchange 



And Btad--ray recollection 13 that Brad said he was 
happy to do that. Brad and Mr. Green had litigated with 
each other in private practice, and they were on the nost 
courteous pr oiessxonal , friendly terns. 

So, that was about the end of it. 

2 Well, did Fir. Green ask for immunity for anyone? 

A No, he didn't. 

2 Did Mr. Green discuss with you the advisability of 
asking for Independent Counsel; in other words, did he argue 
for or against it, or did the subject cone up? 

A Well, I certainly don't recall any such subject 
natter being discussed. And if there is no reference to it 
in ny notes, I would conclude with confidence that it wasn't 
discussed . 

S On Decenber 1st, 1986, Mr. Reynolds mat again with 
Mr. Green and Mr. William Hendricks. Were you aware of that 
meeting ? 

A I am certainly aware of it now. Whether I was aware 
of it contemporaneously, I just don't recall. It is 
entirely possible that I was. 

fi Is there an/ reason that you know of that you were 
not in attendance or invited to that meeting? 

A Ko , none that I know of. It may well be that I had 
other things that I was attending to, and there was no 



UNCUssra 



255 



NAME 
815 
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817 
818 
8 19 
820 

82 1 
822 
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83 1 
832 
833 
83U 
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837 
838 
839 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR17U002 IIIVI.I U.AAiriril PAGE 35 
necessity ior me to be there, although actually it strikes 
ni« that by then--I don't recall when that meeting took place, 
but I--as you asked nie about this, it--I am beginning to 
recall that it aliiost certainly took place aiter this natter 
had been transferred to the Criminal Division of the FBI for 
criminal investigation. 

And so, I didn't par ticipat6--if that is true, then 
the answer with regard to uhy I wasn't there seeras to rae to 
be pretty obvious . 

S Given what you just said, then what was the reason 
for having Mr. Reynolds at the mtteting on December 1st. 
1986? 

A Okay, wall, if this meeting took place on--I guess it 
was because Green wanted to meat with Reynolds . 

fi Were you-- 

A Reynolds was--Green knew Reynolds, had a previous 
relationship with Reynolds, and presented himself to us. or 
at least to Brad, and as I understand it from Brad, 
previously as somebody who was--would like to try to be 
useful and helpful to us in our effort here. 

And it was on those terms and on that basis that the 
decision was made to hear him out. But I can't tell what 
th« background was for the second meeting. If it was alon^ 
the same lines, I guess it is just that ha wanted to talk to 
Brad, but I don't know. 



i-wusjm 



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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 36 



i Ate you auare of any discussion as to whether it was 
advisable or anyone had raised any questions about Mr. 
Reynolds meeting with Mr. Green at this time, on December 
1st. 1986? 

A No. I mean, it may have happened, but I don't 
recall having participated in any such discussion. 

2 Mow. as we discussed yesterday, nr . McGinnis told 
you. and you testified he recalled on Monday, and you were 
willing to take his representation, that there had been a 
rumor at the CIA that he picked up on Monday morning, the 
24th o± November regarding the possibility that some of the 
money for the Iranian arms sale had been diverted to the 
contr as . 

Do you recall that? 

A Um-hum. 

S All right. Do you know whether or not you passed 
this information on to the Attorney General? 

A I can't specifically remember having done so, but I 
have no reason to think that I didn't. 

Again, I don't have a specific recollection of 
having sat down and purposefully done this, but it is among 
the Kind of things that would naturally have been Introduced 
In our conversations . 

S Okay. 

KoH, later, at some point on the 24th of November, 



UNcussm 



257 



HIR17M002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 37 



you received a call from Mr. Casey? 

A I received the call, and my chronology places the 
best understanding and recollection that I/or/and John 
McGinnis have of going, that took place. It says the 
2'4th--my chronology says that, to my best recollection. 

2 There was some confusion on that. 

A Yeah. Yes, I see it is in my Tuesday entry, and ray 
note is--excuse rae . At some point Tuesday evening, I think 
may have been Monday, Casey called ne to ask if I have 
ever--excuse me, ''Lakeside Resources'' in our inquiry. I 
said I vaguely recalled some such raieranca. 

2 Was Hr . McGinnis present? 

A Yes. That is my recollection. 

2 Anyone else in your office? 

A I don't think so, although it is possible that there 
was, because I remember, I do renanber putting the phone 
down and saying to whoever it was that was in the room, and 
that was at least John McGinnis, that I just had the oddest 
phone call from Casey or something to that effect. 

And than I asked John if ha can recall a Lakeside 
Rasourcas. Ha know now that wa are talking about Lake 
lasourcas, but my best recollection than and now is that he 
said Lakeside Resources. 

2 Hou did ha preface this inquiry) in other words, did 
he say he had learned of this nana, or-- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 38 



A He didn't preface it at all, and that is another 
thing that added to the oddity, I think, of the 
conversation. He just basically asked rae , without preface, 
if in our research on all this, ue had come across Lakeside 
Resources . 

And it took rae by surprise. I mean, the fact is. I 
could not specifically recall any such reference, but it 
seemed to rae that that was vaguely familiar for sone reason 
And I can recall llcGinnis what he renenbered. if anything, 
about Lakeside Resources, and asking him to run a NEXIS 
check on Lakeside Resources. 

That was about the sane tine that we either had or 
were m the process of running a NEXIS check on Secord, to 
find out sonething about hin. 

2 Do you recall, was this before or after you had 
spoken with Ton Green? 

A I really can't place it any better by reference to 
the Ton Green neeting . 

Q Let n« ask you-- 

A X have it here, it was definitely in the evening, it 
was in the evening, so if ny neeting with Brad and 
Gxeen--what do I have there — 

riR. LEOH< 2^00, I believe, 2 to Z-^S on Monday. 
THE HITMESS: Yes. In terns of when. I do not 
recall better than it was Tuesday oz Monday. I still think 



UNCUSSIFIED 



259 



HIR174002 



UNCIASSIHEO 



PAGE 39 



It was probably Tuesday. The reference to Tom Green doesn't 
inprove my memory on that, although I do know it was in the 
evening that I spoke to Casey, so whether it was on Monday 
or Tuesday, it was Monday or Tuesday evening. 
BY MS. NAUGHTOM: 

2 Do you recall Mr. Green making any references to 
Lake Resources or Lakeside Resources? 

A I don ' t . I don ' t . 

MS. HAUGHTON: If I could have this marked, please, 
as CJC Number 35. 

[Exhibit number CJC 35 was mazked for 
identification. 1 

THE UITNESS' I recall, however, Grean making 
reference to Hakim's financial network, but I don't recall 
him making--and of course, now I know that Lake Resources 
plugs into that somehow, I take it, but I do not recall hira 
having mentioned Lake Resources or Lakeside Resources. 
BY MS. NAUGHTOH: 

Q Showing you Exhibit Number 35, which is a one-page 
handwritten document numbered 3057, starting with AECA may 
ba inapplicable. Are these youz notes, Hr . Cooper? 

A Yes , they are . 

Q Do you recall when you wrote thasa notes? 

A Not immediately. Let ma read this note a little 
further, I may have a better answer for you. 



Wssife 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR174002 ■llVll^nWII Ik*' PAGE 40 
MR. BOLTOK: Are ue finished with 34? 
THE WITNESS^ Yes . I 

I have read the note, and it really doesn't help ne 
with any real specificity in terras of identifying when I 
wrote this note. The note deals with a legal issue that 
related to the pre-findmg, September and Hovember 
shipments, and it reflects, I think, a relatively advanced 
state of my thinking and John HcGinnis' thinking on this. 

to 

So, simply by virtue of that fact, I would have-^say 
that--well, it is really very hard for me to time this. I 
would suspect the timing of it was probably after the 
weekend investigation, but I can't say that with confidence 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

2 Mould it be before the Attorney General's press 
conference on the 25th? 

A It seems to me doubtful, but it is certainly 
possible. You see, this does not deal with any of the legal 
issues that would arise by virtue of the contra diversion. 
And in fact, our legal analyses that you have been provided 
so far have dealt with pre-January legal Issues, as does 
this one. 

So, the element of the contra diversion doesn't 
really help to date this. 

2 How about the underlined portion, in which you refer 
to an OLC memo regarding dastabilization? 



I. 

I 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR17(4002 mill. I U >.MI II II PAGE U 1 

A '^aah, I don't know what that refers to, to tall you 
the truth. 

HR. BOLTON: oLC before it began? 

THE WITNESS: You can strike that if possible. This 
guy is my representative? 

However, I can tell you what I suspect it is, and I 
will bet you that John McGinnis knows what it is. 

HR . LEON: Is that your underscoring? 

THE WITNESS: No, the memo read des tabilization . Is 
that my underscoring? Probably, yeah. No, I think I am 
confident that it was mine. 

There is a memo in the Office of Legal Counsel, 
authored by Griffin Bell, in which he acknowledges the 
legitimacy of the concept of an oral finding. He says that 
he thinks that there is nothing in the statute to insist on 
a written finding. 

And I think in the lengthy analysis we did of this 
very question, we cite to that Griffin Bell conclusion. And 
that memo may well regard destabilization , whatever that is, 
but that Is the best suspicion that I had at the moment. 

BY HS. NAUGHTON: 
fi If I can expound that on the first paragraph, which 
•«ys that the Arms Export Control Act may be inapplicable to 
the September 1985 and October 1986 transfers from Israel to 
Iran, basically Israel is simply a conduit and the U.S. 



uncus; 




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991 

992 

993 

99M 

995 

996 

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1007 

1008 

1009 

10 10 

1011 

10 12 

10 13 

10 m 



HIR174002 



sells to Itan. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 142 



A Exactly. 

fi Uould that take an express--! don't want to call it 
finding, but an expressed assertion by the President that 
Iran uas not a terrorist nation or provide sone exenption 
from the Act? 

A No--uell, it uould take a decision by somebody with 
authority to make it, and certainly that would include the 
President, but it might not be exclusively the President, 
but it would take a decision that under the authorities 
provided by the National Security Act, wa would sell arns to 
Iran in connection with an intelligence activity. 

So, the only thing--and the second paragraph, which 
IS bracketed, deals with the second concern, ii that is the 
case. li, indeed, that was the case, the second concern is, 
uas the CIA involved in that operation? If it was, then 
Hughes-Ryan does require a Jinding. 

But Hughes-Ryan, as I read and understand it, only 
requires a finding, a Presidential finding, oral or written, 
if the CIA is going to be Involved in the operation; if it 
is going to be sone other entity, a finding is not required. 
So, that is the dual concern, if one collapses this 
transaction and understands it as one out of the United 
States into Iran, with Israel sinply being the stake-holder, 
in essence . 



UNCLASSIFIED 



I 



263 



UNCLASSIHED 



PAGE 43 



Did your analysis include Executive Order 12333? 

Ue were certainly acquainted with it, yes, and aware 



HIR17U002 

2 

A 

of It. 

2 If ue can go off the record for a minute, please. 

(Discussion off the record. 1 

riR. BOLTON: Why don't ue go back off the record, if 

you could, and take a short break. 

[Recess . ] 

MS NAUGHTON: Ue are back on the record. Let the 

record reflect that Mr. Tom Boyd of the Department of 

Justice has joined us and substituted m as personal counsel 

for Mr. Cooper in place of Mr. Bolton. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

2 Now, you stated earlier that on November 2Sth, which 

is the Tuesday m 1986, that you helped to draft, I believe, 

the President's statement, which was to be made later that 

day regarding these issues; is that correct? 

A I did do that. When did I make that--I have 

previously said that in that deposition. 

C Well, you mentioned that at 7 ' 45 in the morning, you 

ueie called to the White House to help draft this statement. 

A Wall, that is accurate, whether I mentioned it or 

not . 

MR. LEON: Well. I think he testified that the AG 
Car liKonf 



tiled him from his ron-feranoe t 



o be in the office at 7 : 45 . 



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THE WITMESS: Or something liK« that, he called ne , 
h« asked me to be there very quickly. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I an just trying to skip ahead to the 
important points. 

THE WITHESS: Right. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
2 Did you take any notes of that particular session? 
A No, not that I recall, although there was a document 
from which ue uere--actually . when I got there, Dennis Thona 
and Peter Hallison had already worked up a draft from which 
they were working, and I introduced my own thoughts into 
that process as well, and we worked together for the next 
half -hour . 

I am quite confident that didn't begin at 7:45; 
however, my notes reflect that it wasn't until about 8^15 
that I actually met with Hallison and Thomas. The first 
thing that we did when we got-- 

MR. LEON: Who is Thomas, just for the record? 

THE WITNESS: Dennis Thomas? 

MX. LEON' Yes. 

THE HITNESS: He was an aide and a close and high- 
level aide to Don Regan, or so that is my understanding. 

But the first meeting, as I say, that took place 
when we got to the White House was a large one among several 
people in Don Regan's office. I know Peter Wallison and 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



HIR17U002 IIIVIll Hllllll ll_LI PAGE US 

Dennis Thomas were there, but so also were several people 
who I did not recognize and did not Know. I think David 
Chew, however, was among them, now that I think about it. 

And that is the point when Regan proposed the review 
board idea, which ultimately became the Tower board. And 
then I then branched off over to meet with Uallison and 
Thomas m Wallison's office, and we did work on a draft of 
the President's statement. 

MS MAUGHTON: I would like to have this marked CJC 
36 . 

(Exhibit number CJC 36 was narked for 
identification. 1 

BY MS. NAUGHTOM: 

2 For the record, CJC 36 has no data. They appear to 
be your handwritten notes. Could I ask you, Mr. Cooper-- 

A They are? 

Q Are these notes taken during that day, November 
25th? 

A On Tuesday, yes. th«y ara, though not in--they were 
not taken in the context of my meeting with Wallison and 
Thompson to work on the President's statement. 

2 Do you recall when they were taken? 

A Yes, I think they were taken--or, actually they may 
well reflect several different notes taken at different 
times, and I would like to examine the document further to 



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ascectain that, but this first one, which says, 
PoindeKter--says ''Poin'', but PoindcKter should say, ''--he 
has learned that some involved have provided money--had 
generated contra9--doesn' t know all the details, but in ligh 
of Congressional soraethlng--President needs fresh start, neu 
policy team •' --that essentially was some general ideas that 
we were discussing with the Attorney General, I think prior 
to the time we actually went to the White House, in 
discussing them in his office. 

2 Would this have been very early in the morning? 

A Oh, yeah, would have been--if my recollection is 
correct, it would have been quite early in the morning. 

2 Could you explain what your notes mean about whmt 
Poindextei should say? I assume you ai« speaking about his 
resignation statement? 

A Yes. I think that is my recollection as to what we 
were talking about here. 

S Okay. Could you then try to decipher your notes fot 
us? 

A I really--' 'He has learned that some were 
involved--som« who were involved in this Iran business have 
provided money generated by the sales''--! would imagine that 
■•ans to the contras. ''He doesn't know all the details, 
but in light of Congressional''--! should think--! really 
don't know what that means--' 'but in light of Congressional 



UNCUSSIflED 



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HIR17400 



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PAGE 147 



interest in this matter'' or something, I can't oKplain how 
that plugs into it. but the important point. I guass, was 
the next one, that ''the President needs a fresh start and a 
new policy team in the foreign policy area,'' and therefore 
Poindexter would resign. 

The note then continues after soma bracketed 
material, '''I would therefore like to be relieved of my 
assignment.'' So that was obviously PoindeKter making 
public that point. 

I don't really understand the remaining notes to 
pertain to that particular PoindeKter resignation statement. 

P, I think P means President, because in the bracketed 
material, it says ''P briefed Congressional leaders first,'' 
and certainly that was our plan, and that is exactly what 
happened. And then I have just got an errant P on the page, 
and I don't know what it refers to. 

Then the phrase, ''As public discussion proceeded.'' 
I don't know what that means. ''Inquiry continue. As soon 
as all facts known, will make disclosure to Congress and 
American public.'* I would imagine that is a reference to a 
point that naadad to be made publicly, as wall as to 
Congress, in connection with anything that--in connection 
with the iaots that ware about to be shared with them. 

Then, finally on the page, uncovered information in 
course, in course of our weekend fact-finding, ''Some funds 



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PAGE 48 



generated by these transactions were provided to the iorces 
opposing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Provide full 
inio at earliest possible time.'' 

This was--I do recall that the phraseology, ''forces 
opposing the Sandinista regime m Nicaragua'' was a 
phraseology that I think originated with ne . and this was in 
connection with an effort to formulate exactly how it would 
be expressed. I think, by the President, perhaps by the AG. 
but probably by the President. And I think that note was 
taken with the AG. not with anybody else. And I have no 
reason to think that these notes weren't all taken with the 
AG . 

Q Now. at some point in tine that day. did you talk to 
Secretary Armitage at the Department of Defense? 

A I talked to Armitage. it nay well have been--it 
probably was Tuesday, and it may have been Monday, but I 
suspect It was Tuesday. I called hin up at somebody's 
suggestion. I had never talked to hin before in my life. 
and I don't remember whose suggestion it was that I talked 
to him. but the purpose of my inquiry was to find out 
something about the mechanics of Economy Act transfers, as 
well as something on a very quick basis about the terms on 
which these particular arms ware txansfexxed on that Economy 
Act basis . | 

HR. LEON: Could the General Counsel at D0D7 



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HIRIVMOOa 



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PAGE >49 



THE WITNESS: It is entirely possible. 

MK. LEON: Who was that at the tine? 

THE WITNESS: Larry Garrett, with whom I have a long- 
s tanding-- 

MR. LEON: He might have suggested it. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, and if I had to guess, I would 
guess Larry Garrett. I talked with him and he told ne to 
call Armitage, but it is a wild guess. I don't think I just 
called hin because I thought, well Amitage knows about this 
stuff. I an sure that somebody suggested I call Armitage, 
although around that tine I was talking to Susan Crawford as 
well, and I talked to her on the phone, I an fairly 
confident Monday night to discern infornation of this Kind. 

And this was all part of our effort to try to 
analyze and understand the terns on which the nilitary 
equipment is sold under the Econony Act, and whether or not 
that represents fair market value or sonething beneath fair 
market value, as well as whether or not other questions, 
such as can somebody obtain TOWs from any source other than 
the United States through an FHS transaction or. you know, 
an Arms Export Control Act transaction? 

These were all issues entirely foreign to ne . in 
taxms of what these background and the process under those 
statutes was. 

BY nS. NAUGHTOK: 



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HARE: HIR17U002 Ulllll Hllalll 1111 PAGE 50 



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2 The issue I want to iocus in on, though, is a fairly 
narrow one, in terras of your conversation with Hr . Arnitage. 
and that is the pre-finding shipments. Did you discuss with 
hire, first of all, the TOM shipment in late August 1985? In 
other uords, the question of whether or not those had been 
replenished, whether or not he had been asked to have then 
replenished and at what point ha was asked to have them 
replenished ? 



f 



UNCIASSIFIED 



271 



HIR174002 



DCMK DOHOCK 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 51 



A I don't think I took that up with Armitage . 

2 What about the 1985 Hawk shipment; did you discuss 
that with Armitage? 

A I don't think so. I think the primary focus of 
those discussions, as I say, was just to understand the 
process, but it also was for specific factual information. 
It may well be that it was he that referred me to Crawford 
actually, but I do not recall having focused with him on the 
question of replenishing the TOWs . 

S Did you discuss with him the Hawk shipment; in other 
words, did he tell you that they had received a request for 
more Hawks in the fall of 1985, or anything concerning the 
pre-finding activities? 

A I don't think so. I certainly don't think he told 
rae they had received a request for more Hawks from the CIA. 
I assume you mean the CIA, but I don't think--I do not recall 
that having bean a part of our conversation, and I have to 
tell you that I have only the vaguest general recollection 
of the conversation. 

2 Did Secretary Armitage tell you anything about any 
lagal issues that may have cropped up at the Department of 
Daittnse contemporaneously with these activities? In other 
words, did he say he consulted anyone for legal opinions at 
the time? 



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ICLASSIRED 



HIR174001IIUI.I U \ Mrir II PAGE 52 

A At the time of our discussion? m 

2 No, no, at the time of the transactions, back in 
1985 and 1986. 

A I don't think so. although I do remember having--!* 
IS ray general recollection, I had conversations with Susan 
Crawford along those lines, but I don't think there were any 
transactions out of DOD, that involved DOD prior to the 
finding. I mean, it would be news to ne now if there were 
arms transfers out of DOD prior to the finding. I think 
that would be news to me now. I 

The replenishment, it has always been ny 
understanding, did not take place until after the finding, 
and considerably after it. For example, the 508 TOH 
replenishment, my understanding is took place several months 
into 1986, and I don't understand that they ever replenished 
the 18 Hawks. Maybe they did. 

C Old Mr. Armitage ever tell you how the replenishment 
for the TOHs cane about; did you discuss that with him? 

A I don't think so. though I had a lot of discussions 
with Susan Crawford and her people about that, a lot of 
frustrating discussions, but I don't think I had that with 
kr«ltage. I have to tell you it is entirely possible that I 
did. but I don't--by my conversation with Armitage really 
just wasn't a vary lengthy one. as I recall. 

Q We are still on the data of November 25th. Did the 



iifimim 



( 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR17U002 III1II.I IIXXI^I»-II PAGE S3 
T\ame Tiny Rowlands come up at "any tiraa during this period? 
A Yes , It did . 

Q Can you tell rae how that came up? 
A Yes, It came up in our interview, mine and the 
Attorney General's interview with Charles Shultz and Charles 
H1II--I mean George Shultz and Charles Hill-- 

MR. LEON: On Saturday norning . 

THE WITNESS: On Saturday morning. Soma reference 
was made during that interview, and I have a note reflecting 
it to the effect that a fellow named Tiny Rowlands, and that 
name didn't mean anything to ma at the time, had walked into 
the U.S. Embassy in London and had asked our Ambassador or 
some official in that Embassy about, evidently about tha 
bona fides of some people who would coma to him suggesting 
that they were involved in an arms transaction that had the 
backing and support of th^ United States Government 

I remember the name Charles Price. Was Hr . Price 
the Ambassador at the time? Okay. Price then advised 
somebody at State, and it may wall have been even George 
Shultz himself, but I think George Shultz was out of town at 
tha time and was advised while ha was out of town--I may 
actually ba recalling my notes mora than I am recalling the 
conversation . 

But as I recall it, Shultz once again became very 
agitated that it appeared that this arms activity was 



UNCUSSIHED 



274 



UNClASSm 



NAHI> HZX17>400a|||ll||_niJ\#ll ■k*' PAGE SM 

12731- continuing notulthitandlng th* i«ct that h« ialt Ilka h* had 

127>t baan lad to ballava that It was at an and. 

127S And also, It Is my undatstandlng thay got back word 

1376 to Tiny Rowlands that ha should stay away itoa this? 

1277 BY HS. HAUGHTOH' 

1278 S Was thaie any mantlon of Hi. Rowlands and his 

1279 possible Involvemant Inj 

1280 A I caitalnly don't lacall any tafazanca at all to 

1281 I^^B 

1282 Q Now, lataz--ona mora question on that. Has thaza any 

1283 Indication that Hz. Rowlands was at all afilllatad oz had 
128>« any contact with Adnan Khashoggl? 

1285 A Yas , Khashoggl was associated with Kow'landt In all 

1286 this, and I think It was ay understanding that Rowlands was 

1287 checking on Khashoggl, the vezacity of Khashoggl's stozy, 

1288 but--well, that was my impression, I understand. 

1289 Q Mow, latez on the afteznoon of Noveabez 25th, did 

1290 you meet with any zepzasentatlves of the Cziminal Division 
129 1 at the Dapaztmant of Justice? 

1292 A On the 25th? 

1293 a Yas. 
129U A Yas. 

1295 fi Okay. Who did you meet with? 

1296 A Hazk Richazds and Bill Held. 

1297 S Did you bziaf them on what had tzanspized? 



wmsro 



! 



275 



HNOussm 



NAME: HIR17U002 11 1 lUk«f V^' '^ " '^ PAGE 55 

1298 A I briefed then on what we knew, yes. 

1299 Q Is that, to your knowledge, the first conversation 

1300 you had with either Mr. Richards or Mr. Weld regarding the 

1301 Iran arras transactions? 

1302 A It Is certainly the first one I can recall. It is 

1303 undoubtedly the first one I had with Hark Richards, because-- 
1301* MR. LEON: For the record, because I have heard his 

1305 name said both way. is it Richards with an ''s'' or Richard? 

1306 MR. BOYD: Richards with an ''s*'. 

1307 THE WITNESS: That has always baan what I have 

1308 called hira. 

1309 MR. LEON: And what is his title? 

1310 THE WITNESS: Deputy Assistant of the Criminal 
13 11 Division . 

1312 MR. LEON: Just for the record. 

1313 THE WITNESS: And you know, ha has authority in this 
13 114 international area, so he is definitely an expert, but I had 

1315 had--you know, I don't have nuch contact with Mark, and I had 

1316 only I think social gatherings within the Departnent kind of 

1317 contact with Mark prior to this meeting. 

1318 I can't remember a professional contact prior to it, 

1319 it was possible. But what I am saying is I know I have 

1320 never discussed anything that had anything to do with Iran 
132 1 with Mark Richards before that, and I do not recall having 
1322 discussed anything with Bill, either, on this subject matter 



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prior to that time . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

2 Did you have any involvement in tha Evans case, the 
sting case out of Hew York involving Iranian arras sales? 

A I did after all of this, not before Tuesday, but 
after Tuesday, Bill Weld or one of Bill's deputies made me 
aware of some information that was being shared with them by 
an attorney for one of these characters, which sounded very 
familiar in terras of the fact that he was claiming that he 
was a part of a U.S. Government-sponsored arms sale activity 
to Iran, and he was using names that in the coursa of our 
fact-finding on this had cone to us. 

And I can't tall you what those naraes wera, but I do 
remember having conferences with Weld and his team of 
lawyers. Jack Keeney specifically, as well, dealing with 
what--how ue were going to respond to this, whether or not 
this was legit, and what have you. 

C To your knowledge, was there a request by Mr. 
Giuliani's office to have the Dapartmant certify that no one 
in the U.S. Govarnmant was Involved in that particular arms 
sala in tha Evans case? 

A Well, I think the Assistant U.S. Attorney on that 
casa. and I nay wall have had a fleeting conversation with 
that person, and I think that parson was a woman, was 
obviously eager to know if thara was truth to these clains 



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PAGE 57 



that were being made. Apparently, sha--I don't knou why she 
attached enough credibility to it to call, but I Imagine it 
uas because of the story in the paper that was mentioning 
Weld with the story that this guy had given her long before 
the papers started outlining events that were quite 
familiar . 

And it may well be that they were asking for a 
certification. I don't Know what it was, but it is 
certainly true they were trying to check the accuracy of the 
matter. I think they realized, and certainly it was ny view 
that we shouldn't be up there prosecuting somebody If Indeed 
he was brought into aisarms transfer scheme that was run and 
operated by the United States Government. 

Q To your knowledge, though, did the Attorney General 
ever consult with John Poindexter or anyone at the White 
House regarding the Evans case? 

A I understand that he did prior to my introduction 
into the whole matter, but never--he didn't consult with him, 
to my knowledge, on the subject matter relating to Evans 
that I had involvement m, after Tuesday. 

2 When the Attorney General did consult with Hr . 
Poindexter. were you aware of it at the time? 

A No, absolutely not. 

2 So you only knew of the Evans case and the problems 
that arose with it after November 2Sth7 



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ifiiusmn 



PAGE 58 



Yes. after that. 



8 On the next day, Hovember 26th, do you recall if you 
attended the staff meeting that day? 

A On the 26th? 

2 Yes. 

A If we had one, I probably attended it, but it 
certainly didn't rate an entry on my chronology, so I don't 
know . 

2 At some point with senior staff, did you discuss the 
Iranian arms sale and what was going to happen from then on, 
as far as the Department of Justice's involvement? 

A On Wednesday? 

2 Yes, the 26th. 

A Oh, yes. I am certain we did. 

2 Okay. During the course of these meetings, did 
anyone, including yourself, express the sentiment that 
perhaps it should be handled as a civil matter rather than a 
criminal matter? 

A No. Emphatically including myself, although the 
civil matters that remained to be resolved were very 
iaportant and they pertained directly to what I viewed as my 
tmsK that remained m this matter, which was to examine 
civil legal issues that would arise, which seemed to me--and 
I still think are the dominant legal issues in this thing. 

2 Okay. Aside from the merits of the issues, which I 



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NAME: HIR174002 V ■ 1 V K»B 1«^ V7 ■ n » ■- — ' pjjQj. 59 

1398 don't want to get into. 

1399 A Y«s, I understand. 

1400 Q Did anyone express the sentiment then that it should 
lUOl not also be handled criminally; in other words, did anyone 

1402 advocate going on the civil track rather than in a crirainal 

1403 investigation? 

1404 .A I don't recall anyone advocating that. The only 

1405 question that I can recall having been debated, and I don't 

1406 recall there having been any real debate about it, was 

1407 whether or not the criminal--whether or not the investigation 

1408 that was going to then be advanced on a crininal track by 

1409 the criminal professional investigators would feed into the 

1410 civil side of this, the civil legal analysis that I was 
14 11 involved in . 

1412 And It seemed to na that--and I don't recall there 

1413 having been any dissent about this, that the information 

1414 that was--any new information that was derived that had civil 

1415 legal implications should be provided to the civil legal 
14 16 thinkers, me and my office, at such tine as it was 

14 17 confidently determined that we had some information that had 

1418 those implications. 

1419 And the Attorney General, in fact, did not want the 

1420 civil legal side of this to be ignored as the criminal thing 

1421 picked up, but there was no discussion that it should be 

1422 :ust civil. But the criminal people were in there, it was 



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HIP. 174002 



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PAGE 60 



going to be their investigation, and you know/ there was no 
dissent from the view that that was obviously the 
appropriate course of conduct at that point. 

And I think I was among those. I an certain I was 
among those who found, as a result of my own research and 
analysis, credibility to the proposition that it is entirely 
possible that some of this was U.S. money, and that 
therefore it was entirely possible that there was some 
potential criminal implications. So, you know, at no point 
did I argue against proceeding on that track. I fully 
endorsed it. 

Now, I have to also tall you, to give you some 
flavor for this, because it is troubling for me, that the 
meeting wherein this matter, this 3'30 to 5^30 meeting that 
IS reflected on my chronology for Wednesday, for my first 
entry on Wednesday, November 26th, the AG outlined how we 
would proceed, this was a meeting of a criminal 
investigative team, the best people that the Justice 
Department has. 

And the AG--it was a time for me to meet and Brad to 
meat, and for us to share whatever it was we had and 
otherwise to just gather for the hand-off. so to speak, to 
tha professional criminal investigators and lawyers. And 
the AG outlined an approach along tha lines that I have :)ust 
outlined to you, and ha suggested that Bill Weld and I would 



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be more or less the senior Justice Department officials on 
this matter . 

And I can't cite to you a specific comment or piece 
of body language that I perceived, but I perceived some 
reservations about ray being involved, or about there being 
an equally important civil element to this matter. 

riR. LEON: From whom? 

THE WITNESS: Well, not from Bill Weld, who seemed 
to--uho I didn't detect any questioning at all of this. But 
I guess, more than anybody, Floyd Clark sticks out in my 
mind-- 

ns. NAUGHTON: From the FBI? 

THE WITNESS: From the FBI. And Floyd, sinca that — I 
think that was the first time I had ever met Floyd Clark-- 

tlR. LEON: The Tuesday meeting. 

THE WITNESS: --in a professional context. I had seen 
hira before . 

Since that time, I have worked on a professional 
basis on other matters equally difficult, sensitive matters 
with Floyd Clark, and I just think I have nothing but the 
highest admiration and respect for hire. 

But I have to confess that I did sense some 
reservations about the process that the AG outlined, and the 
further fact of it is I did not have, that I can recall, 
another meeting with any of this team, I didn't press the 



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HIR174002 llllll.l U A Mrir II PAGE 62 
matter with them, I sxraply receded from the whole thing. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

2 In fact, the FBI never briefed you on what they were 
doing, or what interviews they had conducted? 

A No, or on the information, whatever it might have 
been, that they were developing. Now, not long after that, 
of course, the curtain fell that represented the IC request, 
and so the whole Department was iced, but I receded from the 
matter, I had a couple of interviews with FBI agents, I had 
one further meeting with Bill and Arnie Burns and two or 
three of the senior investigators in which, quite--and this 
was a couple or three days later--in which they were 
discussing some of the things that they were doing, and I, 
more than anything else, was making suggestions for other 
angles they could pursue, based upon ny own knowledge. 

But I guess what I am trying to provide you a flavor 
of is the reason that I did not press my own participation 
m this, even though the Attorney General had outlined that 
I would be a co-leadei, so to speak, of the matter, and you 
know, that was it for ma. 

2 Did the Attorney General ever ask you to brief him 
then on what was going on? 

A No. 

2 Do you know who made the arrangements to secure the 
White House documents, and when that was made? 



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KIR1714002 IIIVIII Milllll ILU PAGE 63 

A Arnold Burns was tasked with tha mission of securing 
the NSC docunents. That was the first tasking that I can 
recall Heese having nade, and in fact, I guess it was 
Tuesday-- 

MR. LEOH: 2^30. 

THE WITNESS: 2^30? Okay. Yes, okay. 2^30, in 
connection with this meeting, where the decision, I guess, 
was made to turn this over, or at least the instructions 
were given that the natter was being turned over to the 
Criminal Division for taking it forward. 

He directed Arnie to call Hallison and have the 
place sealed off. Now, I do recall the subsequent meeting, 
as well. I can tell you the truth, though I can't remeaber 
when it was, but it seems to me it was later that evening. 
But, the AG asked Arnie if he had done that, and he hadn't 
done it yet, and the AG was most agitated. 

MR. LEON: Evening of tha 25th? 

THE WITNESS: I can't tell you for sure. 

ns. NAUGHTON: We az* on tha 26th. So, Burns was 
told at 2:30 on the 25th to aak* the call to tha White 
House . 

THE WITNESS: That is my best recollection as 
substantiated by my chronology. 

HK . LEON: But it seams to you it was soma point 
after that? 



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HIR174002 IIIVIll U.l.lll II II PAGE 64 

THE WITNESS: It would have to ba after that. Now, 
if I an wrong that--it was definitely after that that Burns 
reported that he a -adw ' ' t dona it yet, but he had 
misunderstood the direction, he said, but it certainly 
wasn't unclear to rae that the AG was most agitated. He 
rarely is visibly agitated. 

And Burns, I think excused himself immediately to do 
that, whatever it was that the AG found out hadn't been 
done . 

BV MS. NAUGHTON: 

C Do you recall, was this a large meeting or was this 
DUst yourself and Mr. Burns and the Attorney General? 

A Where Arnie suggested that ha hadn't-- 

2 Yes. 

A --understood correctly the nature of the direction? 
It was more than me and the AG and Burns . There were more 
people in there than that. I can't identify for you who 
they were . 

Q Do you know whan the FBI actually went to search the 
White House for documents? 

A It strikes ma that it probably wasn't until 
Hadnasday . 

fi Do you know for sure? 

A That is my recollection, but I don't know for sure, 
but I am sure they could tall you. 



ONCUSSIFIED 



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HIR174002 



UNCLASSm 



PAGE 65 



2 They say Friday. 

A They say Friday? 

fi Thursday is Thanksgiving. 

A Wall, yes, Thursday is Thanksgiving, but I had two 
FBI Agents in my oiiice till Wednesday night, quite late in 
the evening . 

2 Did they tell you that FBI Agents had gone to the 
White House to search documents? 

A No, no, I just think I perceived this as a general 
understanding that I developed on this Wednesday meeting 
where ue all got together with them, and I thought this was 
a topic oi discussion and agreement that it should be done 
forthwith . 

2 Did you give anybody irom the Criminal Division your 
notes ? 

A Yes--oh, the Criminal Division? I don't believe so. 
I mean, I think the only people I gave my notes to are the 
only people who asked for them, the FBI, but obviously it 
was for, I take it, the Criminal Division and anybody else 
who wanted those was free to have them, but no, I don't 
think I--I cannot recall anyone from the Criminal Division 
collecting my notes from me, but the FBI did collect my 
notes from me. 

2 Now, moving on, believe it or not. 

After the Hasenfus crash in early October of 1986, 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 66 



there was a request from the House of Representatives for an 
Independent Counsel to look into allegations that 
Administration officials were involved in the Hasenfus 
expedition in suppling the contras . 

Did you produce any documents or other material for 
the people in the Criminal Division investigating this 
allegation? 

A Regarding Hasenfus? 

2 Wall, there was a general call for an Independent 
Counsel regarding any cases involving the contras' resupply 
operation and Administration officials. 

A You mean our request for aw Independent Counsel? 

2 Ko . There is a request irnm Mh» Independent Counsel 
by the House of Representatives from the second week of 
October requesting an Independent Counsel be established to 
investigate the Hasenfus crash-- 

A Okay. I am with you now. 

S --Southern Air Transport, and any connections they may 
have had to Admiral Poindexter, Oliver North. Vice President 
Bush-- 

A Oh, yes, this is the Kerry thing? 

Q No, it is not the Senator Kerry thing. The request 
was made by the majority members of the House Judiciary 
Committee . 

A Oh, okay. Yes, that is vaguely familiar. 



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HIR17U002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 67 



2 Okay. The people m the Criminal Division tasked 
uith looking into this sent out a query to all conponents of 
the Department oi Justice to see if they had any active 
cases or any materials relating to that subject, and the 
question to you is. to your knowledge, did your office. 
Office of Legal Counsel, provide any materials to them for 
that, inquiry? 

A Well, ray answer is I don't knew, though I seriously 
doubt it. I would imagine when I got that, I sent it to my 
so-called Iran team, the people who have been bird-dogging 
all of this document production from day ona . poor guys. 
And if we had anything that was responsive, I am 
sure in the normal course it was provided, but I cannot 
imagine we would have anything to do with Hasenf us . 

2 I want to get it clear, this is a separata call for 
Independent Counsel, took place long before the Iran arms 
transactions were even discovered. 

A Okay, yes. But I don't, certainly not since I have 
been in the Office of Legal Counsel, have materials that 
seem to ma to be responsive to what you just described and 
ganaratad . 

fi Okay. Did you participate in either staff meetings 
or other maetings with Department of Justice officials 
regarding the active cases concerning the contra opposition 
in Nicaragua? Is that a no for it? 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



288 



UNCLASSIFIED 



K\nZ HIR1714002 ^rm W^m^W M^0^0tu Ikakir pjcj 53 

1623 A That is a no, I do not recall having participated in 

1624 any such discussions. Now, it is certainly possible that at 

1625 the morning staff meeting, such discussions were brought to 

1626 the table. I don't recall as having been true, but any 

1627 manner of sub:)ect matters can be brought and discussed at 

1628 that table, but that is not one that I would have 

1629 participated in. 

1630 It is not at all often that OLC participates in an 

1631 operational way in these cases. Ue :ust grind out opinions, 

1632 and provide occasional litigation, consultation and advice 

1633 on legal issues. We don't have any litigation role at all. 

1634 MS. NAUGHTON: That concludes my questions, and I 

1635 thank you for your patience. Dick, do you want to go ahead. 

1636 THE UITNESS: Dick, before you do, can I excuse 

1637 myself for :ust a moment? I will be right back. Good 

1638 stopping point. 

1639 . I Recess . ] 

1640 MR. LEOM: Shall we go on the record? 

1641 BY MR. LEON: 

1642 S Hr . Cooper, I want to 90 back over a few things in 

1643 your testiaony today, and I will try to do it 

1644 ohzonologlcally , based on using the foznat in the chronology 

1645 that Ks . Maughton has used, I think that would probably be 

1646 the easiest. 

1647 A Very well. 



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HIR17U002 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



PAGE 69 



2 In your own chronology, at least. With regard to 
tha Novenber 7th through 12th period, when you first were 
being brought into the loop, so to speak, talking to the 
Attorney Gener al--what I would like to try to get a feel for 
IS. what was your sense of why it was that the Department of 
Justice was being brought in at this point to a White House- 
NSC matter? 

I don't think I have a clear sense of that. Maybe 
you could help us on that. 

A Well, be tween--actually nothing of any significance 
happened between November 7th and November 12th-- 

e Okay. 

A --that occurs to ne now and that occurred to ne at the 
time I put this chronology together. 

2 The AG had given you a heads-up. so to speak, on the 
7th. 

A That is right. 

S And told you that there was going to be some legal 
issues coming down the pike? 

A Wall, there were already, as I recall, public media 
discussion with legal issues that surround this thing, 
although if they didn't already appear by November 7th, 
th«v> weren't long in being discussed publicly, and-- 

2 Well, let me stop you there and focus on that a 
second. I believe it was November 5th oi right around then. 



musm 



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HIR1714002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 70 



just around the time of the 7th, that the reports Mere 
comng out in the neuspapers of McFarlane having made a 
trip, and it had been leaked to an Iranian newspaper and 
then, in turn, it had arrived in the American press; that 
refreshed your recollection a littla bit as to the press 
accounts, doesn't it? 

A Hell, actually, that is not inconsistent with my 
recollection, but I only have the vaguest general 
recollection that the press accounts were beginning to 
appear, and I think it was starting to make the talavision 
news as well, but my recollection also of my meeting with 
the Attorney General was that he referred to press 
discussion of this Iran arms matter, and suggested that in 
all likelihood, it would generate some DOJ legal work which 
would involve me, and that I should just simply be aware of 
that fact, and that I think he made reference to Paul 
Thompson, though he may not have, but in due time, I would 
be meeting with Paul Thompson and try to find out more about 
It . 

2 As you look back on it now, thinking back to what 
you were thinking of when you went over to the Uhite House 
on the 12th, which was your first meeting, wasn't it, with 
Poindextar and Thompson? 

A Yes , it was . 

2 Okay. As you were heading over there that day in 



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HIR 174002 



UNCLASSIHED 



PAGE 71 



anticipation of those meetings, did you have any sense of 
what types of issues might be about to pop up in front of 
you, m terms of legal issues, or had you gotten to the 
point where you were thinking about that? 

A No, we were thinking about it. I don't believe we 
had any refined state of thinking at that tine. The truth 
of the matter is I and my assistant were kind of groping 
around the U.S. Code for statutes that seemed relevant to 
the question of arms transfers and foreign policy generally, 
using our only factual reference at that point, was whatever 
was discussed in the papers, and I just have no recollection 
what was in the papers at the tine, so wa were trying to 
follow it . 

2 Do you think, looking back on it now--you don't 
obviously have the press accounts in front of you--do you 
think what was back in the papers at that tine was the fact 
that there had been arms shipnents between the U.S. and 
Iran? Had that come up at that point? 

A I think so. I would be surprised to find out that 
It hadn't, but that is my recollection of it. 

2 Okay. And of course, the President was going to be 
giving a speech on the 13th-- 

A Right. 

e --najor address to the country. 

A Yes. although I am not sure when I knew that. 



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HIR174002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 72 



2 Well, it would probably have been announced at least 
by the 12th when you went to meet with Poindexter and 
Thonpson . 

A Perhaps so, perhaps so, I just don't recall when I 
knew he was going to do that. 

C So, at least as I understand what you are saying, 
what you were doing or about to do, in terras of looking into 
legal questions, had nothing to do with the President's 
upcoming speech on the 13th, at least as you saw it? 

A Oh, right. 

2 Had nothing to do with straightening out any legal 
issues before the President addressed the Nation in regard 
to Iran, or whatever? 

A No, that was not--there was no specific reference in 
ray task, and at that point, it was still an unforned notion 
that legal issues are raised by this, and we need to examine 
them, but no, it had no reference to the President's speech, 
no particular reference to that. 

2 All right, now whan you get over there on the 12th 
to meet with Poindexter, I believe your testinony was that 
your naating with hiit was rather briaf-- 

A Yes . 

2 --and he didn't go into great detail about what your 
mission was; is that about it? 

A That IS correct, yes. 



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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 73 



2 He was leaving it to Thompson, in essence, to sit 
down and discuss with you the potential legal questions that 
you might be looking into. 

A My purpose wasn't so much to discuss potential legal 
questions as it was to gathec from the NSC, Paul Thompson in 
particular, some information about the truth of the Iranian 
initiative . 

I had been in touch with Paul prior to that time, I 
am confident, and had been kind of nagging, really, Paul to 
provide me with some information. He had made reference. I 
think prior to that, but certainly on the 12th, that a 
chronology was being put together, and that it would be 
shared with rae as soon as they had soma confidence-- 

e I believe that Mr. McFarlane testified that they had 
been working on the chronology since the week before that. 

A That is entirely possible. That is entirely 
possible, and it was my understanding that this chronology 
had been under construction for some significant period of 
time . 

2 Okay. 

Mow, was this the first time that you and your 
oiiice had been involved in a--let's say, a legal review or 
evaluation of issues bearing on the NSC? 

A I am sure it is not the first time my oiiice had-- 

2 I mean when I say your office. I mean since you have 



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NAME: HIR17M002 



DNClASSIFe 



PAGE 714 



1773 been heading up your office 



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A I cannot confidently say yes to that, but that is--if 
iocced to give a yes oe no answer, that is the one I would 
give. We have jthe variety of issues that cone into the 
office, is extraordinary, and wa have got a lot of issues 
that are in the national security area, though I cannot 
specifically remenber an issue that involved the conduct of 
the National Security Council or its staff. 

Ue have War Powers Resolution^ which cone 
infrequently, and they always involve the national security 
apparatus, including the National Security Council. 

9 Okay. Had you, prior to that time worked together 
with Thompson with regard to legal issues and legal 
questions bearing on the NSC? 



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HIR17M002 



KNCUSSIFIEO 



PAGE 75 



SCflN DONOCK 

A Yes. but I can say with soma confidence that those 
previous occasions uere confirmed War Powers Resolution 
issues . 

C And did you--is it fair to say that you viewed his 
role,, Thompson's role, at this point to be more a provider 
to you of information rather than a colleague who would be 
joining m the legal analysis with you of the issues? 

A Yes I did not--it was not on any understanding 
along the lines that you just described that I visited him 
at the NSC, but rather, as the point of contact wherein ray 
office would be provided whatever factual information the 
NSC developed dealing with this matter. 

fi Now, of course you knew Peter Uallison, White House 
Counsel at that time. 

A Yes , sir . 

2 And he wasn't present the day of the 12th, when you 
met with Thompson and Poindexter, right? 

A No , ha was not . 

e Noz was there anyone from his office represented? 

A That is true . 

S Did it strike you as odd that the White House 
Counsel's Office at that point hadn't bean involved in the 
Kind of legal analysis that you were about to engage in, or 
was not involved in it at that point, together with you if 



UNCUSSIHED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



NAHE- HIRIVUOOa %f | 1 W^» "^^ '^ * " PAGE 76 

1812 only from a nonitotmg standpoint if nothing else? 

1813 A I don't think I took particular notice of that at 
1 8 1 U that time. I did take notice of the absence of the Hhite 

1815 House Counsel not long thereafter, but I don't recall having 

1816 taken notice of that. 

1817 In fact, I would not have expected ray meeting with 

1818 Paul Thompson to have been something that anyone other than 

1819 he and I attended in that particular context. 

1820 e Did you have sense that the White House Counsel was 

1821 being kept out of this? 

1822 A I don't think that I developed any sense of that by 

1823 that point. 

18214 2 Now you did testify, on tha 20th, you did testify 

1825 with regard to events on the 20th that after your meeting 

1826 that afternoon with the Attorney General and Poindexter, and 

1827 I believe Thompson was there, to review the testimony of 

1828 Casey and Poindexter the next day-- 

1829 A The afternoon of the 20th. 

1830 2 The afternoon of the 20th. 

1831 A Right. 

1832 Q That after that meeting, that Mr. Uallison had 

1833 expressed that he was upset that he was not present at that 
ISSM meeting. Do you recall that? 

1835 A Yes, I do. 

1836 2 Okay. 



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UNCLASSIRED 



PAGZ 77 



And did he also express any concern at that point or 
prior to that about not being involved in this review that 
you were engaged in? 

A I don't recall him having expressed concern vis-a- 
vis me and ray office's work. 

2 He was aware you were doing it, wasn't he? 

A On the 20th? 

2 Yes. 

A I should think he probably was. In fact, by the 
refreshment of my recollection that I received yesterday 
from Ms. Haughton regarding the meeting that was held in 
Peter Uallison's office, it appears that that meeting took 
place on tha 18th, and I do recall, as I mentioned 
yesterday, some criticism and dissatisfaction having been 
registered by some of the attendees at that meeting. 

But my recollection is that it was focused on the 
HSC , not on ne and any legal work that I was doing. In 
fact, throughout this matter from day one, I have not sensed 
anything other than perfect cooperation and useful 
consultation from the other individuals who were at that 
meeting on the 18th, as well as in terms of the work that I 
was doing. 

They have conceded and recognized that the legal 
judgments of the Administration on all matters that have 
preceded in connection with Iran initiative had to be 



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HIK17U002 IllVlal H.l.lll II II PAGE 78 
uniform, and obviously the Attorney General is the final 
uoid on such issues, and there has been no argunent about 
that. 

e Okay. 

On the occasion of your meeting with Thompson, the 
12th, he showed you a finding, and I believe your testimony 
was that that was the first time--I believe your testimony 
was that that was the first time you had ever seen a 
finding; is that right? 

A Yes, that is correct. I certainly don't recall ever 
having seen a finding or a document of that appearance 
before 

Q And I believe you testified also that he informed 
you on that occasion that the Attorney General himself had 
reviewed the finding that you received, and-- 

A That Paul had told me about? 

Q Yeah. 

A Yes, I certainly think that was correct. 

2 Did he mention to you on that occasion that Deputy 
Attorney General Jensen had been involved at all in the 
discussions or consultations with regard to the preparation 
oi that finding, or any other findings prior to that? 

A No. 

S Do you have any knowledge with regard to the former 
Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen's 



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HIR17t4002 IllVlal Mtltlll I Wi I' PAGE 79 
involvei»ent--assisting Attorney General neese in any findings 
at any tine? 

A No, although I think I can say that it has not been 
until within the last week that I have been given to 
understand that, indeed, Jensen nay have had sone kind o± a 
role, that the context or the content of which I was 
completely unaware^-- 

2 There is a notation in Oliver North's calendar, for 
eKample, which I don't have in front of ne , but I think I 
recall well enough to state that on January 6th, 1986, North 
meeting with Jensen and Meese . 

Were you aware that that meeting took place? 

A No . I was not . 

S And that was around the time of these findings at 
various stages were being worked on, and hence, one of the 
reasons why I raised that question for you, as to whether 
you were aware of that? 

A No , I was not aware of it. As I say, within the 
last week or so, I becana aware of something along the lines 
that you have just described, but not until within the last 
weak have I heard Jensen's nana mentioned in connection with 
th« Iran initiative, that I can recall. 

fi On the 13th, the President gave his address to the 
Nation, and you have testified that you heard that, and 
during the course of it, you heard him make reference 



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HIR1714002 IIIVIbI Maltlll ■lak' PAGE 80 
erroneously to no involvement by other countries, and of 
course, you were aware of the Israeli involvenent ; is that 
tight? 

A That IS correct. 

B Okay. And you brought that to Thompson's attention 
by phone call after the address. 

A Yes , I did . 

2 Now, at that point, did you have any chronologies, 
had you been given any chronologies by Thompson and his 
people? 

A No, I state confidently that I had not by than, 
because the only thing that I can recall that was tangible, 
that uas a document that had been shatad with me was tha 
finding and the memorandum that covered tha finding. That 
was shared with me, to tha best of my recollection, November 
12th. 

I was frustrated that nothing more useful and 
informative than those documents ware than available, or so 
I understood. The President's spaach, in fact, was, by that 
time, as useful a source of information as wa at that point 
had regarding the outline of tha initiative, the factual 
outline and implementation of tha Initiative. 

fi And It was that day that you prepared tha 
memorandum. Exhibit 2, that was provided to tha Attorney 
General pursuant to his requestj isn't that right? 



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HIR174002 



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PAGE 81 



A That is correct. 

2 And uith regard to the preparation of that 
raeraorandum. had--this memorandum obviously reflected your own 
opinion and the opinion of your office, did it not? 

A Yes . 

Q And you hadn't had--nobody had suggested to you, had 
they, either at the NSC, from the NSC staff, or the Attorney 
General himself, that you come up with a certain conclusion 
with regard to this memorandum? 

A No. 

2 This was an independent evaluation by yourself and 
your staff . 

A Absolutely. In fact, the contours of it uei* not 
even discussed outside of myself and my one staff member. 

2 Do you Know if a copy of this memorandum was 
provided to Paul Thompson or the NSC? 

A It was certainly not provided by me to Paul 
Thompson, and I do not know or have information to the 
effect that it was provided by anyone else. 

2 How about-- 

A For example, the Attorney General, who was. of 
course, the addressee of the menozandua. 

2 And you. have no knowledge that it was provided to 
the White House Counsel's Office, do you? 

A Well, ultimately, I think all of these opinions have 



UNCLASSIFIED 



302 



UNCIASHD 



KAME: HIR17M002 if | 1 Vkl 1%^ «# ■ ■ ■ •■ — ' PAGE 82 

1962 keen provided to everybody, but I understood your question 

1963 to relate to-- 

19614 fi At that time. 

1965 A --some time iraise reasonably contemporaneous-- 

1966 2 Absolutely. 

1967 A --with the production of the document, and the answer 

1968 to that is no . 

1969 2 For exanple, let's say this, on your Novenber 18th 

1970 meeting that you had uith Mr. Wallison, okay, that you have 

1971 testified to in the last day or so. 

1972 A Yes. 

1973 2 Do you have any reason to think that on the day of 
197M that meeting that Hr . Wallison had a copy of this nemorandua 

1975 or had read it? 

1976 A I don't think so, I mean that does not--that would 

1977 strike me as incorrect to say that. 

1978 S And had you considered the possibility of asking the 

1979 Attorney General whether or not to give Paul Thompson this? 

1980 A I don't remember us having conversations along that 

1981 line. 

1982 Q That would have been unusual to do that, wouldn't 

1983 it? 

1981) A Hell, not necessarily, no, it wouldn't, but I don't 

1985 remember it having been a decision to do that, I don't 

1986 remember the subject having been discussed. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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1989 
1 990 

199 1 
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HIR1714002 



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PAGE 83 



2 Okay 

Now. when you had your meeting on the 18th with 
Hallison and that group. I believe you testified there was a 
group oi people who normally are part of the War Powers 
group that you described before, various counsel from 
vario-us agencies. Departments of the government. 

During the course of that meeting, what was your 
primary focus, as you recall it, as to the legal issues that 
were concerning you at that point? 

A I would imagine it was Arms Export Control Act, yes. 

2 In order to evaluate those issues, did you think at 
that point you would need to get information from the 
Department of Defense regarding pricing and the way certain 
transactions were handled financially? 

A No , I don't think that became important until later 
than that. At that point, the September shipment was, in ray 
mind, the most troublesome, and that is not the term I would 
prefer to use, but it was the event that raised the most 
legal questions . 

The November shipment would hav* raised the sana 
lagal questions, except at that point. I was under the 
understanding that Hawk missiles had been returned, and to 
the extent there was any legal problem, it was quite 
technical, and I didn't perceive that that would be the 
subject of a lot of high-pitched criticism, as long as the 



UNCIASSIFIED 



304 



NAME ■ 
20 12 
2013 
20 14 
20 IS 
20 16 
2017 
20 18 
20 19 
2020 

202 1 
2022 
2023 
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2025 
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2028 
2029 
2030 

203 1 
2032 
2033 
20314 
2035 
2036 



HIR174002 



UNCIASSIHED 



PAGE SU 



arras had indeed been returned 



But the 508 TOUs allegedly transferred in September, 
or August, whatever it was, was news to me. and raisad--and 
it was pta-f inding--i t raised questions about notification of 
the Congress and questions of Presidential consent to the 
transfer. It must be secured by the foreign country under 
the Arms Export Control Act, 

So, I think arras export control is our principal 
concern, and a concern related to the Septenber TOW 
shipment . 

2 Now, It was the day before that, the 17th. that you 
got your first chronology, wasn't it? 

A That is our best raenory of it. 

2 And that was the day that you, for the first tine, 
realized that there have been pre-January activities, and in 
particular the TOWs and the Hawks shipments? 

A That also is correct. 

2 And I believe you have also testified that upon 
learning that, you brought that to the Attorney General's 
attention, about these pre-January events? 

A I am sura that I did straight away; how irenediate we 
had a chance to discuss it, I don't know, but yes, we did 
discuss it. 

2 Do you think it was probably prior to your meeting 
on the 18th with the Uallison group? 



HHcussro 



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2014 1 
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PAGE 85 



A Entirely possible. 

2 And I believe you testified--! don't want to say 
that. Is It your testimony that the Attorney General uas 
surprised to learn that there had been pre-January 
acti VI ties ? 

A Yes. it uas clear to me that he did not have an 
inkling that that was the case. 

S And, of course, you both appreciated, didn't you. 
that because of those pre-January events, that there were 
new legal issues, potentially, that were now on th« horizon 
that you had to be concerned about? 

A Uell, certainl'/ by that tine I appreciated it fully, 
and I am sure that I tried to share my appreciation of that 
fact with the Attorney General. 

2 Here is a question I got for you: in light of this 
revelation on the 17th. and the Attorney General's surprise 
with regard to it, did the Attorney General, to your 
Knowledge, in response to learning this, make any phone 
calls, make any inquiries at the White House as to those 
events personally? 

A I do not know whether he did or didn'ti I :ust don't 
have any personal knowledge at all about that. 

S If he did, he certainly didn't report it to you? 

A Not that I recall. 

2 You hava no knowledge of him contacting, for 



UNCIASSIFIED 



306 



UNCUSSIHED 



NAME: HIP.1714002 ■»■ - - w ^ - — - w - - -— ^ PAGE 86 

2062 example, John Poindexter, inquiring into, you know, what are 

2063 these events about? 

2064 A I don't recall hire having told rae that he had done 

2065 it. and I don't recall having learned that iron any other 

2066 source. I am not trying to say that--I mean, it is entirely 

2067 possible that he did do that. 

2068 2 Did you, upon learning it, contact Thompson or 

2069 anyone over there, and express your surprise and concern 

2070 upon learning these things? 

2071 A That is entirely possible. I don't have a 

2072 recollection to the eiiect that I did do that, howaver. 

2073 e Did you tal)< to Uallison about that on the 18th. 
207M about your being surprist^d to learn about this? 

2075 A I don't remember having expressed myself along those 

2076 lines m that uay . It is possible that I did. My 

2077 recollection, and if I had the note in front of me, it might 

2078 inspire ray recollection, but it is that the September 

2079 shipment was a subject matter that was discussed at that 

2080 November 18th meeting. 

2081 2 Did Uallison have a copy of the chronology? 

2082 A That X don't know. I just do not recall. 

2083 2 Do you recall hin expressing any surprise also about 
208U learning about these pre-January events on the chronology? 

2085 A Peter Uallison? 

2086 2 Yeah. 



UNCLASSIHEO 



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NAME : 
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209 1 
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2 103 
2 lOU 
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HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 87 



A I just don't have a recollection for that kind oi 
reaction, one way or another, in Peter or really in the 
other participants in that meeting. 

8 I guess what I am getting at, in part here, Mr. 
Cooper, IS that, of course as you know, the President was 
giving a press conference the following day, the 19th, and 
you have testified that the Attorney General was upset, I 
believe, about the manner of preparation that the President 
had had prior to that press conference, because his 
performance, as you testified, wasn't as good as you and the 
Attorney General had hoped it would be. 

And what I am trying to get at here is whether or 
not you had any sense that Hr . Mallison was concerned about 
these pre-January events to the point where it had been 
brought to the attention of Donald Regan? 

Do you have any knowledge of whether or not those 
were brought to the attention of Mr. Regan? 

A I have no knowledge of that. 

Q Do you know who prepared President Reagan for his 
19th press conference at the White House? 

A I guess I should go back and say I have no 
recollection of that. 

C Are you aware that John Poindextai and-- 

A I am sorry. What was the intervening question 
again? 



Kifcssm 



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2 115 
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2 118 
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2133 
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2135 
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HIR17U002 



UNCUSSiriED 



PAGE 88 



2 Do you have any knowledge whether or not Donald 
R*gan was informed by Peter Wallison of these pre-January 
events ? 

A Oh, of that, I just don't have any recollection of 
having learned information on that question. 

2 Do you know if the President in his preparation for 
the January 19th press conference had been, you know, had 
been prepared as to the information on the chronology, pre- 
January 1986? 

A You are talking about the pre-January information? 
Mo, I don't. I don't know what^into the preparation of the 
President, and-- 

2 Do you know who prepared him fox that press 
conference ? 

A Ho, I don't. I assume that as Chief of Staff, Regan 
was involved in it, and I have to assume that Poindexter was 
involved in it. 

2 Beyond that-- 

A Sut those are assumptions. I don't know-- 

2 Did the Attorney General, for example, share with 
you his knowledge as to who prepared the President for that 
press conference? 

A No, although I certainly get the distinct Impression 
that ha had not participated in that, much to his chagrin. 

2 Now, of course, after the press conference was over. 



ONCussra 



309 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HknZ- HIR17U002 w ■ - — ' — - — PAGE 89 

2137 had you--did you watch the press conierance? 

2138 A Y«s. I did. 

2139 fi And were you watching it with the Attorney General? 
2 lUO A No . 

2141 e Did you detect any problems in the press conference, 

21U2 with the President's answers? 

21143 A Nothing that made a particular inpression on ny 

2 144 raeraory-- 

2115 2 You didn't have to call-- 

21'46 A --that cones to mind here and now. 

21147 Q You didn't call Mr. Thompson, for example, again, 

21<48 like you had after the 13th speech? 

2149 A No. 

2150 S Did you share-- 

2151 A That I can recall. I can recall an exchange between 

2152 the President and some reporter on whether or not TOUs are 

2153 shoulder-fired or whether they are, you Know, launched from 

2154 a stationary site. 

2155 And I certainly had no earthly idea what the answer 

2156 to that was. 

2157 Q Was it the following morning, then, after the press 
2 158 oonfarence on the 19th, was it that morning that the 

2159 Attorney General shared with you his concern about the 

2160 preparation that the President had had for the press 
2 16 1 conference ? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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2 163 

2 164 
2 165 
2 166 
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2 168 
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2 178 
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2180 
2 181 
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2183 
2 18<4 
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HIR17U002 



UNGLASSIHED 



PAGE 90 



A Yes, well, I am sure that at some point the 
following day. whether we met in the morning-- 

C Do you usually meet with him in the morning? 
A I usually participate in a morning meeting with the 
Attorney General; it is a staii meeting at which certain 
members of his management level staff are present, on a 
daily basis . 

e A daily meeting. Hhat time is that usually held? 
A 8:30. 

Do you recall if you went to it that day? 

I ]ust don't have any recollection. 

It is not reflected on your chronology, that is why 



A 

fi 
I asked . 

A Yeah, and in fact, that meeting Is not reflected 
anywhere on any of the days in this chronology, but I am 
sure I attended that meeting on many of the days reflected 
on this chronology. It is just a general session. We woulc 
not have gotten into any noteworthy conversation regarding 
the Iran matter at that meeting. 

2 Would the subject of the President's performance the 
prior evening have come up? 

A Yeah, entirely possible, entirely possible. 

2 I guess what I an trying to get to here is, had the 
Attorney General shared with you his concern about the 
President's preparation for his press conference before or 



"finuissim 



311 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME HIR17LI002 PAGE 91 

2187 aitet you found that day that you were going to be attending 

2 188 a iieeting at 1^30 with the Attorney General at the White 

2189 House? 

2190 A I just don't have a clue. I couldn't give you a 
2 19 1 guess on that . 

2192 2 Do you recall uhen you were told that you were going 

2193 over to a meeting at 1:30? 

2194 A Uhen I was told that? No. I mean, it was sometime 

2195 prior to 1:30, and I think it was sometime on the day of tha 

2196 20th I don't think it was before that. 

2197 2 Do you recall preparing to go to that meeting; in 

2198 other words, reviewing the chronologies or the legal issues 

2199 that you had been working on up to that point, before going 

2200 to that meeting? 

2201 A I recall, actually there was some--there were a lot 

2202 of things on my plate that day. 

2203 2 Vou were working on the Chicago speech, that you 

2204 told US-- 

2205 A No, actually that was behind ma. That I had 

2206 completed tha weekend before, but I guess I just have this 

2207 vague recollection that my preparation for that meeting was 

2208 vary hutiiad. It had to be compressed in a vary short 

2209 parlod of tlna immediately before I want over, and I tried 
22 10 to page through the chronology that wa had up until that 
2211 time, in order to prepare myself for it, and I am virtually 



WUSSIflfO 



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HIR17M002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 92 



certain that I had a conversation of a ganeral nature with 
John HcGinnis in preparation ior it. 

2 Now, as you understood it, the purpose oi your 
attending the meeting with the Attorney General was what? 
The Kovember 20th meeting at the White House. 

Why were you and the Attorney General going to that 
meeting at the White House, as you understood it? 

A As I understood it, it was the obvious purpose that 
lawyers attend preparation meetings with their clients, when 
they are preparing to testify on matters that have raised 
legal issues . 

I fully understood it and likened it to the 
preparation of a client for a deposition in the civil 
litigation context. I mean, that is just basic to the way I 
approached it, and it did strike me as pretty obvious. 
Okay, that is point number one. 

S Let me just stop you there for a second. Did you 
understand that the reason was to prepare Admiral Poindextet 
and Or. Casey for testimony the following day? 

A Yes, I fully understood that Casey was going to 
provide testimony on the Hill the following day, and that 
Polndexter was going to brief the same cast of Congressmen 
and Senators as well. 

fi Did you have any reason to think at that point that 
you, you meaning you and the Attorney General, that you were 



UNCIASSIHED 



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HIR1714002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 93 



rreeded to be there because of anticipated coniiicts or 
problens with their testimony? 

A No, no, not at all. 

Q Okay. 

Did you have any sense that you were needed there, 
you and the Attorney General, to avoid possible problens 
that might arise the next day? 

A Ko . I mean, m terns oi--I think about this in terms 
of the context of what eventuated, but there was no hint or 
inkling in my nind that what, it did actually happen in 
terras of detecting a serious conflict, had no Inkling that 
that might happen. 

So, if that is essentially the--let ne be clear on 
that--to the extent that is what you are interested in. 

2 Well, that is only part of it. What I an trying to 
get to, in part here, Mr. Cooper, is how it is that the 
anticipated testimony of two non-Depar tnent of Justice 
officials rises to the level of concern that the Attorney 
General hinself is asked to be there to review it with then, 
when the facts that will be testified to by those two people 
are facts which there is no reason to think that the 
Attorney General has any personal knowledge of. 

A No, that is not correct. 

Q Okay, well, let's go through that. 

A And, in fact, it was clear to ne that because the 



UNCUSSIRED 



314 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR1714002 \0 1 ^^0mmm w^ -^ - - PAGE 94 

2262 Attorney General had the participation he did, particularly 

2263 the legal call participation that he did in early January c 

2264 this, that the meetings he attended, and the advice that he 

2265 gave and the level of legal review that was given to this 

2266 whole initiative was under intense legal scrutiny, was a 

2267 matter of obvious concern and would be in the testimony, oi 

2268 at least in the 2-and-A, among the people on the Hill. 

2269 So, if for no other reason than to participate at 

2270 that level with the individuals in Poindexter's office, th« 

2271 Attorney General's presence at the meeting seemed obvious. 

2272 Mine was not nearly so obvious, but the Attorney General 

2273 asked me to cone along, I had been looking at legal issues, 

2274 I had been reviewing chronologies, and it was just possible 

2275 I guess it struck him, that my participation might well 

2276 prove helpful in some way, in case some legal issue with 

2277 which I was acquainted, or had done some study on, became 

2278 the subject of conversation. 

2279 As it happens, I was not an active participant, to 

2280 say the least, in the meeting, though I do recall having 

2281 held forth for a couple of minutes, frankly, on some legal 

2282 issues, and it doesn't even occur to me what it was. 

2283 2 Well, at that point, you had had the chronology a 
228M matter of a couple of days, right? 

2285 A At the most. 

2286 2 Okay. And you, by your own testimony, have admitt( 



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231 1 



HIR17U002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGr 95 



-that you were trying to get a handle on what the facts were. 
They were still being collected by the NSC staff-- 

A That is right. 

fi --the chronologies were changing almost daily, every 
couple of days-- 

A They were certainly under constant revision, yes, as 
I understood it. 

2 --and the Attorney General, as X understand it, hadn't 
been reviewing the chronologies, had he at that point? 

A Uell, I think that is right. He had not. I don't 
think--! nean, I would imagine--it is entirely possible I was 
giving him copies of the chronologies as they cane in, but I 
don't think that I was. 

S You didn't view his being there as being there for 
the purpose of providing facts that might have otherwise^, 
people might not know the answer to, did you? 

A Uell, he did have a personal involvement at the 
level that we have described. He met with the President, he 
met with Poindexter and others. In which legal issues were 
examined, and he rendered a legal judgnent. 

So, yes, ha had that level of factual involvement on 
which his memory could supplement those of the other people 
In the room, and they could just make sure that nobody was 
under mistaken memory on the matter. 

2 Do you think his decision to attend this meeting, as 



«NCUSSIFI£0 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR174004 IIHIll UalBlll II II PAGE 96 

opposed to just sending you was motivated in part because of 
his reaction to the level of preparation that the President 
had been given the night before? 

A I feel quite confident, /es , and that is ny 
understanding. He would never have made the decision just 
to send ne > however. I mean, to the extent there was 
somebody whose presence was not obvious, it was nine, and 
he, as I appreciate it and understand it, he brought me 
along in case I might be helpful in the neeting, but 
certainly not because I had any factual information to bring 
to the table . 

C You had judgment that you could render based on your 
knowledge at that point of the facts, and the issues on the 
horizon certainly. 

A Yes, but as it happens, I didn't really get to share 
much of that, either. But the point is, I cannot recall 
having attended a meeting in the government where I felt 
like something--that the meeting was a waste because we had 
too many people there. I can recall many meeting where we 
didn't have the right people there, and I don't think it is 
possible to err on the Inclusion side. 

Of course, in this instance, we are talking about a 
very sensitive matter, and you wouldn't have invited-- 

2 Yeah, well Congress throngs to it. Congress was 
about to be briefed on an area that was obviously a high- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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2361 



HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 97 



^iX^^ 



p-rofile area politically, an area oi graat concern and 
sensitivity to the Administration. 

A Absolutely. 

2 Mow, the people at the meeting, you have testified 
jsb your chronology indicates who they were. Mr. Poindexter 
was represented not only by himself, but he had his counsel 
there, nr . Thompson. Mr. Casey was present, but did not 
have anyone from his legal staff, as far as you can recall. 

A That IS right. 

2 His General Counsel, who at that time was who? 

A Dave Doherty. 

2 Dave Doherty was not present-- 

A That is my--somebody was there with Casey, I don't 
think it was Dave Doherty. 

2 Mr. Uallison and his office was not represented, as 
you have testified? 

A Right. 

2 Did you think it odd that he wasn't there at that 
point ? 

A 

2 

A 

fi 

A 



That Hallison wasn't there? 

Yeah. 

By that time-- 

Especially after the meeting two days before that. 

Yes. By that time. I was beginning to sense and 



certainly appreciate the fact that Peter Hallison was not a 



UNCUSSIF1ED 



318 



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2386 



HIR174002 



uNOinssro 



PAGE 98 



p-articipant in this, did not seem to be at all being 
included in this matter generally. 

8 Was he being frozen out-- 

A I and Mr. Poindexter. 

2 Was ha basically being frozen out of this situation? 

A I. within an hour of this meeting, certainly 
understood that that was his view of it. 

e Was it your view? 

A It is obvious that he wasn't involved, so presunably 
conscious decisions were made not to involve him. 

2 Did you think it odd that there was no one there 
representing Donald Regan, his staff? 

A Hot particularly, not particularly, and I really 
can't say it was odd that Hallison wasn't at this meeting, 
but I do think it was odd that he wasn't at any meeting 
other than the ones that he called to find out what was 
going on. 

It was quite clear that there was some kind of 
fissure between the MSC and Pater Uallison of the White 
House Counsel. 

Q Have either Thompson or Poindexter indicated to you 
in the past, prior to that meeting, that-- 

A Ho, I don't-- 

2 --anything that indicated that that was the status of 
the situation? 



UNCIASSIHED 



319 



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2387 
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2390 

239 1 
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241 1 



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PAGE 99 



A I don't recall that to be the case. 

2 Now, you have testified as to what happened at the 
meeting, and you testified about Mr. Casey having a prepared 
text, that It was being reviewed, and that there was an 
insert to the text that Colonel North was holding forth on. 

Was there any discussion or text regarding Mr. 
PoindeHter's upcoming testimony? 

A Yes. 

2 Let's start with the tent. Was there any text or 
outline being reviewed by the assemblage with regard to 
PoindeKter ? 

A No. And Poindexter was not going to testify. He 
was going to brief. 

2 Yes, let's clarify that. He was going to brief the 
House Intelligence Committee, was he not, the next morning? 

A One of them, to tell you the truth, I don't know 
who. I thought he was going to brief both of them during 
the course of the day. 

2 He did brief both, I believe. It was the House 
Intelligence Committee I think he briefed first. 

A Yes. 

fi First thing-- 

A Fine . 

2 But he didn't have a prepared text or notes, as you 
recall ? 



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PAGE 100 



A Mo, I think he did have notes and an outline o± some 
Kind, or at least that was ny impression. I do tend to 
recall that he made mention of the fact that he would follow 
his outline, which closely followed the testimony that, as I 
understood it, I had never seen the thing, but as I 
understood it. closely followed the testimony that Casey had 
prepared, and that as it was revised in our meeting. 

2 So, was it your sense that Admiral Poindexter gave 
you and the Attorney General the impression that he was 
basically going to be stating the same things that Casey was 
going to be stating? 

A Yes. 

Q And that there weren't going to be any--you didn't 
see any anticipated discrepancies between thelt versions of 
the events? 

A No, right. 

Q Were you satisfied, in light of the fact that the 
chronologies that you had been getting were changing 
constantly, that Poindexter was in a position of knowing 
enough of the facts solidly to give a briefing the following 
morning ? 

A Hell, I had no reason to doubt that the information 
that had been collected and established as of that moment 
wasn't the best information developed up until that time, 
notwithstanding the fact that even that information might 



ttHtlkS«B 



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HIR174002 



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PAGE 101 



uell. upon additional development or efforts to gather the 
story, change or modify; and in fact, it was just precisely 
that point that I discussed with Mr. Casey the following 
morning-- 

e Exactly. 

A -^which got put into his testimony. 

2 Exactly, that he should nake it a point to let the 
committees know that this was based upon his best knowledge 
at that point, and the facts were constantly being updated 
by those who were most knowledgeable. 

A And that the facts were being gathered and we are 
doing our best, and we are ref rainin9--and he made this 
statement in his 2-and-A. in fact. I am told, that we were 
refraining from saying anything with respect to the state of 
CIA knowledge, let alone USG knowledge regarding the type of 
goods that were being transferred in that November Hawks 
episode . 

But, yes, that is the point. I had no reason to 
suspect that this wasn't the bast information that was 
therefore accurate to the extent it was possible for it to 
be accurate, under the present circumstances. 

But there was no question but what these--that the 
facts as we then understood them were going to be shared 
with the Congress the following day. Congress was not 
going--nobody was going to suggest, ''Let's just tell them. 



HHWSSW 



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UNCIASHD 



PAGE 102 



Look, we ate going to put this off another week as we 
continue out fact-finding.'' That would not have dona in 
the citcuns tances that prevailed at the noment. 

S Now, when you met at that meeting, the 1^30 meeting 
on the 20th, the language was ptoposed at that point, no one 
in the U.S. Government had any knowledge, and it was 
accepted . 

Latet that day, of coutse, you learned about the 
conflict with Sectetary Shultz's knowledge. When you 
learned about the conflict with Secretary Shultz's 
knowledge, you brought it to the attention of Thonpson 
iiiraediately , right? 

A Hell, actually, Uallison brought it to both ouz 
attentions contemporaneously. He had the secure code phone 
call with Abe, and mentioned that Secretary Shultz recalls a 
telephone call or a conversation with HcFarlane. 



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HIR174002 



RPTS TITER 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 103 



DCHN TETER 

Q And as I recall your testimony, it was at the 
end of that day, the very end of that day that you spoke 
uith Counsel Doherty over at CIA and he informed you that he 
had takeji that language out of the draft for Director Casey. 
Am I right? 

A That's right. It was either at the very end of 
that day-- 

fi Like midnight. 

A --or the very beginning of the following day . 

8 And even having been told that, you still were 
planning on going over the neKt morning, as you did, to 
review it one last time? 

A That's exactly right. 

2 Now, after that phone call with Doherty, did 
you--I can't recall if you've testified to this or not, did 
you contact, or anyone on your behalf contact Thompson or 
Poindexter to tell them that that statement had been removed 
from the DCI's testimony, anticipated testimony, that it was 
not going to be used? 

A No. I'm pretty confident I didn't make any 
phone calls after Doherty. At least, I certainly don't 
recall any. 

2 Okay. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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A But I was--that was an evening filled with phone 
calls. 

C In fact, I believe you testified you were trying 
to reach Thompson at the Kennedy Center in order to get 
telephone calls over to PoindeKter and ncFarlana as you 
were trying to iron out their stories. 

A Actually, just flcEarlane, or at least that's ray 
recollection . 

A Okay. Here's what I'n trying to gat at. 
Between the time Doherty told you that that statement was 
coming out, no U.S. --no one in the U.S. Government — and the 
time the next morning you met with Casey, Director Casey, 
just before his testimony, as you testified to he was 
dashing off to make, during that time interval there, did 
anyone, to your knowledge, contact Poindexter or his office 
to let them know that Casey is coming off of that statement, 
that statement is not going to be used? 

A I don't understand that that is the case, no, 
because, to the best of my recollection, in my conversation 
with Poindexter, he advised me that he had called Casey to 
tell him that, to share with him the advice that I had given 
to him, Poindexter, but that Casey--he had woken Casey up and 
that Casey's response was--satisf ied Poindexter that he could 
not be confident that any real communication had taken place 
because Casey was very groggy and sleepy, so I do not 



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PAGE 105 



understand that, at least, when I concluded ny uork that 
evening, that Poindexter knew that Casey was cognizant of 
the existence of a problem. I feel certain that I told 
Poindexter that I'™ going to go out there in the morning m 
all events and nake sure that there's no slip-ups on this. 

But no, I do not understand that Poindexter knew 
that Casey was squared away on this. Flaybe he did. Maybe-- 

2 I think you night have lost me. Let me raake--get 
it clear for myself. 

Was it your understanding that by Friday 
morning, when you met with Mr. Casey, that Poindexter, like 
Casey, was not going to state-- 

A Oh, yes, that's-- 

2 --no one m the U.S. Governmant knew? 

A Yes, he was not going to state that. That was 
my understanding. 

2 That was based on your conversation with him 
personally ? 

A Yes. 

2 Okay, and that was late that evening? 

A It was--yes, late that evening, after my 
conversation with the AG, which was pretty late that 
evening . 

2 Okay. 

That was despite the fact that HcFarlana hadn't 



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HIR17H002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 106 



changed his story, vis-a-vis Shultz. 

A I don't think I outlined to Poindextar the basis 
on which I doubted--we doubted the accuracy of the ''no one 
m USG statement,'' but I did explain to hin that ue doubt 
the accuracy oi it or uncertainties have arisen so don't use 
it. There's no reason to use it. just don't say anything on 
that. We don't know what the facts are. And he was not at 
all resistant. He was entirely yielding to that advice. 

Q But certainly the inpiession he'd given you was 
that he didn't know about it. He, Poindextec . 

A Exactly. My impression f rom--throughout , was 
that Poindexter was a receiver of facts on that matter, not 
a knower of facts. Just very little difference between hin 
and me on it . 

2 Was he and Casey, in your mind, free to state to 
the committees that maybe someone knew about it? 

A Excuse me? 

2 Were they free, in your mind, to state to the 
committees that naybe somebody knew about it prior to 
January? 

A I would not have objected to such a statement, 
but neither--but even that was not--I mean, maybe somebody 
knew about it-- 

C In the U.S. Government? 

A yes, but we did not know that somebody in the 



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HIR174002 



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PAGE 107 



U.S. Government had known that there were Hawks on that 
plane. I don't think one could have--I would not have been 
comfortable at that tirae stating the proposition one way or 
another, but to stats it maybe would not have troubled me at 
all. But I frankly would prefer that the matter simply not 
be raised and that following the general catch-all of issues 
and facts, it was still trying to run down. 

2 And if it had been raised, what was the position 
he was going to take, Casey? 

A Casey? 

2 Yeah, if someone raised that question, a member. 

A We're still examining that question and we just 
don't have--we don't have a confident response for you on 
that . 

2 All right. 

The next thing I'd like to go over with you is 
the debriefing. How, I believe, after you went out to the 
CIA that morning, you came back to the Department of Justice 
and, at some point, you had--I believe it was you had lunch 
with the Attorney General. 

A Right. 

2 And John Bolton was present at that-- 

A Malt a second, what lunch is this? 

2 This would have been on Friday, the 21st. 

A Well, I have a Bolton (?). My memory hasn't 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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HIR17t4002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 108 



iraproved since I wrote that. 



2 Well, lefs-- 

A And John did not take any opportunity yesterday 
when that was noted to improve our understanding, so I don't 
know. naybe he doesn't. 

8 He had given ne the impression at one point that 
he was there, but I'm not going to testify. 

A He was--I know this. He was at soma oi the 
luncheons that we had. We were having lunch together, i.e., 
the Attorney General, me. Brad Reynolds and John Richardson. 

We were having lunch together pretty consistently 
throughout this week-long period oi time. And I remember 
John was there for several--on several of those occasions, 
though not every occasion. 

2 Okay. 

The Attorney General had met with the President 
that morning and the President had given him the go-ahead to 
pursue an investigation, as you've testified, and of course, 
it was at that point that ncFarlane--excuse me, Poindexter, 
had just finished, or was in the process of briefing the 
House Select Committee. 

Now, did the Attorney General indicate that he 
had any discussions with Admiral PoindeKter. either before 
or after meeting with President Reagan Friday morning, the 
2 1st? 



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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 109 



A While he was at the White House? 

2 Right. 

A I do not recall any statement by the AG to that 
efiect. It would not surprise me, however, if he had said 
that to rae * , but I don't know either whether he made the 
statement or whether he had a chat with Poindexter. 

S You just have no knowledge one way or the other. 

A I just don't have any recollection of it. What 
I do have a recollection of and did when I had this 
chronology was that he met with the President with Regan 
present. 

2 Fine. 

Do you have any knowledge of whether or not the 
Attorney General that morning at the White House met with or 
spoke with Oliver North? 

A I have no recollection of that. 

2 Is that the kind of thing that if you'd heard 
about it, you'd probably remember to put on the chronology? 

A Oh, yes, I think I would. Now, I do know at 
soma point between that time and Sunday, he talked to North, 
and probably talked to him two times, to schedule and 
airttnge for his visit with us. But it's my understanding 
that that didn't happen until Saturday. 

2 Uh-huh. 

A When he first talked with North about coming 4o ^^af" 



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HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 110 



him. It's also i»y recollection--and this actually nay be in 
addition to what I've previously testif ied--that it's ny 
recollection, though it is vague, that ue wanted North in on 
Saturday, Saturday aiternoon late, but that couldn't be 
ar r anged . 

I could certainly be corrected on that, but, in 
any event, that is my best recollection. 

2 Okay. 

Now, Mr. Bolton that norning, I believe, went to 
sit in on the testmony of Casey-- 

A Uh-huh. 

2 --before the conmittees . Was there anybody from 
Mr. Bolton's office, or on behalf of the Department of 
Justice, for that matter, attending the Poindexter briefing? 

A No, I don't think so. I don't recall anybody 
having done so . 

fi Uas anybody at the Department tasked with the 
responsibility of debriefing Poindexter after his debriefing 
of the committees to find out what he had to say to them? 

A No, certainly not that I can recall. 

fi So had an inconsistency taken place between the 
testimonies of Casey to Congress and Poindexter to Congress, 
you wouldn't have been in a position to know about it by 
that noon luncheon on Friday? 

A That's quite true. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



331 



UNCUSSIFIED 



MAME: HIR17U002 PAGE 111 

2678 2 Okay. If you recall, at that noon luncheon, did 

2679 Mr. Bolton give you a btieiing or the Attorney General of 

2680 what Director Casey had-- 

2681 A I don't think it was at that luncheon. 

2682 a Do you think it was before the meeting with 

2683 Mcfarlane at 3^30? 

268U A I--yes, I do think that, but — 

2685 C Okay. 

2686 A --it's entirely possible that it wasn't, and 

2687 that, in fact, he briefed us after that, but my bast 

2688 recollection is that he briefed us sometime midaf ternoon . 

2689 2 But it was that day? You are very confident it 

2690 was that day, the 25th? 

2691 A Yes, I am quite confidant of that. 

2692 S Who was present for the briefing, as you recall, 

2693 besides yourself? 

269>4 A I would expect that Brad and John Richardson 

2695 were. 

2696 fi And was the Attorney General present? 

2697 A Oh, yes. 

2698 fi And without recounting his entire briefing, with 

2699 regard to the points that you had been specifically involved 

2700 in in ensuring the accuracy of--what was Mr. Bolton's 
270 1 recounting of that? 

2702 A That Hr . Casey's testimony on those matters that 



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HIR174002 



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PAGE 112 



£ was particularly alert to was entirely consistent with my 
hopes and expectations. 

fi And prior to Mr. Casey's testinony, had you been 
able to briei Mr. Bolton on how you had left it with Mr. 
Casey out at Langley-- 

A Prior to that? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't have a specific recollection of it, but 
I would imagine that he was somehow alerted to the relevance 
of Noverabar-- 

C The Shultz discrepancy. 

A I just don't remember whether we got Into that, 
to tell you the truth, but X think he went up there knowing 
that November was an important subject matter of discussion. 

2 And he took notes, in any event; didn't he? 

A Yes. 

2 And he had the benefit of those notes for the 
review, the briefing he gave you and the Attorney General. 

A I recall very well that he paged through his 
copious notes. 

fi And he had a copy of the prepared text that the 
Director had with him? 

A I do not remember that. I wish he had because I 
would have found it last night. 
( Laughter . ) 



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HIR174002 



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PAGE 113 



BY HR. LEON: 

2 But you recall satisfying, to your own 
satisfaction, in getting your briefing, that Director 
Casey's testimony uas consistent with your understanding of 
uhat it would be when you left him at Langlay? 

A Yes. The only thing that was new or 
particularly noteworthy about Casey's testimony as reported 
by John Bolton was the fact of certain information contained 
in documents that were gathered and preserved by certain 
Federal agencies 

Is that better-- 
[ Laughter . ] 

THE WITNESS: --based upon your remark yesterday 
as to the word I should not use? 
BY MR. LEON: 

C Yeah, I think ''intelligence,'' certainly using 
the word ''intelligence agency'' is okay, and materials of 
an intelligence agency. 

A All right. 

2 Before I move on to the HcFarlan* masting, I'd 
notad In ay notes that when you were testifying about 
Exhibit 8, which is the chronology on the 20th of November, 
th* 2000 hour chronology, if you want to call it, historical 
chronology, that you commented at one point that the 
information was being gathered and updated feverishly, and 



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UNCIASSIRED 



PAGE im 



as a consequence of that, you didn't feel you had time to be 
sitting there, you know, comparing the various stages of the 
chronology because you understood they were being changed on 
a regular basis . 

A That's right. 

2 Is that consistent with your recollection of 
your testimony yesterday? 

A Yes. 

2 I guess my question is, what was the great sense 
of rush? At this point, you didn't know anything about the 
diversion memo clearly. You're doing a legal analysis of 
issues; there's no court date on the horizon that you have 
to be prepared for. Obviously there were important facts 
and issues to be looking into, but, you know, they were 
being gathered and worked at, you know, diligently. 

What was it that--what was your sense of what the 
rush was to get it all assembled and to reach a conclusion? 

A My rush? 

2 Ho, the rush over at the NSC. I mean, the rush 
to get the facts together quickly and to come up with some 
legal conclusions. What was the great urgency? 

A I don't think NSC was rushing to come up with 
legal conclusions. 

2 Okay. 

A That was my job, at least my job as I understood 



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PAGE 115 



it in relation to ray superior, the Attorney General, who 
wanted to hear from me my legal analysis on the issues and 
the statutes that apply. 

2 I'm talking noM pre-20th. 

A But their rush to put the facts together was 
to--uas to accurately share there with Congress. 

S You mean the-- 

A I'm not sure that I was at all satisfied with 
the state of their urgency-- 

B Yeah, let me-- 

A I thought that this project was, you know, as 
compleK and as long a period of time as this initiativ« had 
consumed, I guess I was a little impatient, frankly, with 
their ability to gather the facts. But--so it didn't strike 
me that they were--while they were proceeding, I am sure, 
with dispatch in an effort to get it done so that the story 
could be shared with the Congress--keep in mind the context 
in which this whole thing took place. 

It was even then at a fevered pitch, the 
political controversy that had been created by this. 
Remember the press conference. 

fi Oh , yes . 

A Remember the controversy was so intense that the 
President felt like he had to speak to the Nation a week 
earlier. This was a very big-ticket item for the 



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PAGE 1 16 



Administration from a political standpoint. 

2 What I'm trying to-- 

A People were trying their best, I thinK. to 
provide the facts oi the Administration's story and 
explanation for this initiative. It was kind of dribbling 
out in one successive news story after another, rather than 
in a coherent story with a beginning, a middle and an end. 

2 Okay. Let n» see if I can put it in context. 
Up until the 20th, up until the point on the 
20th when you had a dispute between two cabinet officers 
over a very important fact, up to that point, the sense that 
I've gotten from your testimony is that there was great rush 
and urgency over at the HSC to assemble these facts and put 
it into a chronology. That's the sense I've got. 

A I don't think that's inaccurate. 

2 Okay. And so much so was the case that these 
chronologies were changing. I mean, I believe there was a 
chronology at 1300 hours on the 20th; there was one at 2000 
hours on the 20th. I mean, they were changing constantly. 

A Yes. 

e And-- 

A They were being revised and updated, was my 
understanding . 

2 And as experience certainly would dictate, when 
you're trying to master a huge project under great haste. 



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PAGE 117 



Itlstakes can be made and facts can be overseen. 

A Absolutely. Absolutely. 

e Was there any sense prior to that that naybe 
they're going toofast; ue've got to slow these guys down; 
let's get the iacts right the iiist tine; let's not let 
anything fall through the cracks . 

Has there any sense that maybe the NSC was 
rushing so much that they were going to overlook something? 

A That was not a sense that I had developed. It 
may well be, Mr. Leon, that if I went through the various 
versions of the chronology and compared them painstakingly, 
which I have never done-- 

e Uh-huh. 

A --but if I did that, I'd get a sense that is 
similar to the one you described — 

2 Okay. 

A --but I didn't have it then. I had a sense, 
certainly, and it was my view that the matter should be 
accurate, whatever facts are shared and whenever they're 
shared, they should be facts on which we have confidence of 
their accuracy. 

B Okay. Obviously, I couldn't agree with you 
more . 

KOH, let's shift to the 20th. Kow, on the 20th-- 

A But that we should do our darnedest to gather as 



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HIR1714002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 118 



much oi the factual story as possible to share at the 
earliest possible time. 

2 Of course, of course. 

A Beyond that, really, I guess I Hould not be 
willing to accept any other characterization. 

2 On the 20th, you have a new situation, as I can 
see it. You've got a conflict on major factual issues 
between two cabinet officers and the Attorney General 
recoiiii»ending--and his recommendation being accepted by the 
President to begin an investigation into the facts. 

A That's on the 21st. 

2 Excuse me, the 21st, and a deadline has bean 
set, at least tentatively, of 2=00 Monday. 

A Right. 

2 Three days later. 

A Right. 

2 To do an investigation into the matter for the 
NSPG meeting coming up. Who set the deadline? 

A The President. It coincided with the NSPG 
meeting that was scheduled to discuss the Iran controversy 
initiative . 

2 Do you have any knowledge from your discussions 
with the Attorney General or anyone else as to whether or 
not setting that short a deadline was raised as a problem at 
that meeting between the President, Donald Regan and the 



UNCIASSIHED 



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HIR1714002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 119 



Attorney Genecal? 

A Mo. I don't have any knowledge that that was. 

S Has it your sense that the Attorney General 
thought that was a reasonable deadline to do this type of an 
investigation? 

A Hell, now, I really think that the scope of the 
investigation that I infer that you have in iiind may be a 
little bit different than the scope that I have in mind. 
The focus of our attention, ray attention, certainly-- 

2 On Friday. 

A Ves. Has pre-January. Everything that happened 
after January seened not to have a whole lot of controversy 
about it. There weren't collisions in recollections-- 

2 Uh-huh. 

A --that we had detected or had taken note of. 
There certainly weren't--we were confortable with the legal 
posture of post-January, so our focus was pre-January. 

But even thus limited, the period of tine that 
we had to interview the people with knowledge regarding pre- 
January, whether the United States of Anerica had a fornal, 
official role in those events was very short, and we were 
fully sensitive to that fact. 

fi And you were proceeding into that Investigation, 
is it fair to say. on the assumption that those who you 
would be talking with would be totally candid and forthright 



UNCUSffD 



340 



NAME ■■ 
2903 
29014 
2905 
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2908 
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2926 
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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 120 



and honest about their knowledge of the U.S. Government's 
knowledge oi the events? 

A Well, yes. with the footnote that we had reason 
to believe by '^^^/^ that the recollection of Hr . North and 
Mr McFarlane with respect to the November episode was 
flawed on a point that it was--it seemed unlikely that one's 
recollection would be flawed. Okay? So it was not with 
blinders on or with, you know, an overly naive sense of 
trusting that I approached the interviews, either of Mr. 
HcFarlane or Mr. North. 

e In the case of McFarlane, you had reason to be 
suspect because there was a direct conflict between him and 
Secretary Shultz, who had notes verifying what he believed 
McFarlane knew; correct? 

A That's right. 

Q Okay. 

Uith regard to North, as of that Friday 
afternoon, your question as to North's candor would have 
been in your mind based on what? 

A Hell-- 

fi The assumption that McFarlane had told North 
that he Knew prior to January? 

A No, nothing--nothing--well , certainly the distinct 
possibility-- 

<2 I mean, why were you suspicious of North as of 



uNcussife 



341 



NAME : 
2928 

2929 
2930 
293 1 
2932 
2933 
2934 
293S 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 121 



Kovember 21st? 



A I think perhaps to say ''suspicious'" puts it 
too high. 

2 Okay. 

A It was with th« footnote that I've already 
described . 

2 In other words, when he proposed no one in the 
U.S. Government knew about that-- 

A He may well have been nothing other than a 
reporter oi what McFarlane told hin-- 

2 Exactly. 

A Certainly that is true. 

2 Exactly. / 

A Certainly that is true. 

2 Okay. 

A Nonetheless, it is also possible that he was not 
:ust a reporter on that fact. 

2 You know there's a close relationship between 
North and McFarlane. 

A So I was given to understand. And I did know--or 
at least I was given to understand that the two of them were 
the principal authors, so to speak, of the chronology and 
that they had worked together in an effort to produce the 
chronology . 

2 Who told you that? 



ONCtASSIHED 



342 



HAME: 
2953 
295X 
2955 
2956 
2957 
2958 
2959 
2960 
296 1 
2962 
2963 
296U 
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2967 
2968 
2969 
2970 
2971 
2972 
2973 
29714 
2975 
2976 
2977 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A I think Paul Thonpson did. But certainly when 
Paul Thompson--when I told Paul Thonpson to go back to Korth- 

Q On Thursday night. 

A On rriday--on Thursday night to go back to North 
and particularly have him reexanine ncFarlane-- 

2 All right. 

A --the response that I got back was that that had 
been done, but there was no change in their recollections. 
Oi course, since then, I had an additional reason to place 
credibility in the Secretary--in the State Departnant ' s 
understanding of the events . 

e Exactly. 

A So I think at this noitent, we nay understand 
each other on the state of our nind . 

2 I think that is very important for the record. 

A And it is very important on the state of tha-- 

e The Attorney General's Bind? 

A Well, I can't represent that, but that is my 
best to represent my own. 

2 Let me focus your attention on-- 

HR. LEON: Can we go off the record for a 
••eond . 

(Discussion off the record. 17 

HR. LEON' I would like some reference on the 
record that we will be proceeding ahead without 



ONCUSSIFIED 



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KAHZ: 
2978 
2979 
2980 
2981 
2982 
2983 
298U 
2985 
2986 
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2991 
2992 
2993 
299M 
2995 
2996 
2997 
2998 
2999 
3000 
3001 
3002 



uNcuiSsn 



HIR17U002 llllU^BriVVil «*■*'' PAGE 123 
capresentation by Senate counsel and House najority counsel 
just so that ue can Keep going and at least that's on the 
record . 

MR. BOLTON: I would be prepared to offer on 
Chuck's behalf as well that if, when you do see the 
transcript or hear reports of the questioning that goes on 
in your absence, if you've got further questions before 
Thursday, if they're relatively brief, we will try to 
address them, either over the phone or — 

MR. LEON' Could do a conference call or 
sonething . 

THE WITNESS: oi course. 

MR. LEON: So the House and Senate counsel have 
no objection to our proceeding? 

Is that a yes? 

MS. NAUGHTON: Assuming there are no off-the- 
record conversations of substance that I won't get in the 
transcript . 

THE HITKESS: I will not participate in any 
suoh-- 

HR. LEON' There absolutely will not be. 

MS. NAUGHTOK: Fine. Thank you. 

MR. PARRY: Nor involving m* . 

I Laughter . ] 

MR. LEON' I will give you the same assurances. 




344 



KAHE: 
3003 
300U 
3005 
3006 
3007 
3008 
3009 
30 10 
301 1 
3012 
30 1 3 
301M 
30 15 
3016 
3017 
30 18 
30 19 
3020 
3021 
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HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 12(4 



that thftre will ba no such thing. 

(Wheraupon, at 1=00 p.m., the deposition was 
laoassad for lunch. ] 

AFTERNOON SESSION (1:25 p . n . ) 

MR. LEON: (Presiding) He're back on the record 
in the never-ending saga oi the Charles Cooper deposition. 
Phase IV. I guess we're in now. 

Ua have present John Bolton, Assistant Attorney 
General, and obviously Mr. Cooper and myself, and Tina 
Uestby . 

When we left off, Kr . Cooper, wa were on 
November 2 1st events and I was commenting, I believe, on ona 
of your earlier statements in the deposition about the 
feverish pace at which they were doing the chronology. I 
was inquiring into why it was that the NSC seemed to be 
rushing to get everything compiled. 

Now, oi course, things shifted on the 21st to a 
dispute between cabinet officers, a rather important fact, 
and now an NSPG meeting was the new deadline to iron out at 
least a portion of the investigation relating to the pra- 
January events. And with that as a context, let me--let me, 
baioze I go into the Hcrarlana interview and the matters 
ralatlng to that and strategy of the investigation, take you 
to Exhibit 15, which I've noticed in my notes I made some 
notes about that I wanted to ask you. 



UNCLASSIHED 



345 



NAME 
3028 
3029 
3030 
303 1 
3032 
3033 
3034 
303S 
3036 
3037 
3038 
3039 
30140 
30m 
30142 
30143 
SOUM 
3045 
30146 
3047 
30M8 
3049 
3050 
3051 
3052 



HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 125 



Let me hand you Exhibit 15, Mr. Cooper, which I 
believe is the insert that you were reviewing at the neeting 
on Hovenber 20th; is that right, the CIA-proposed insert? 

THE HITKESS: I don't know who's proposed it-- 

riR. LEON: Hell, that's a good point unto 
itseli; you don't know who proposed it. 

THE WITNESS- In other words, I just don't 
recall what the precise origin oi it was; whether it was 
something that the CIA oiiered. I suspect strongly that it 
was. I doubt it was NSC since the person who had the most 
knowledge at NSC, obviously, oi at least apparently. Colonel 
North, made a number of suggestions for change in it, so 
presumably it did emanate from CIA. But, yes, this is the 
document that I referred to yesterday. 

BY MR. LEON: 
C Now, what portion of the meeting would you 
estiraate--I think your notes indicate the meeting want from 
1:30 to 3:00. What portion of the meeting would you say 
that the discussion of that document, roughly, concerned? 
Twenty minutes, an hour? 

A I really don't have much confidence in my 
•stlaate, but the estimate that I would hazard would be in 
the natui*--ln the neighborhood of 20 minutes or to an hour. 
This event, from a factual standpoint, uas--this November 
event was the dominant source of discussion and we did focus 



UNCLASSIFIED 



346 



NAME ■■ 
3053 
30514 
30SS 
3056 
3057 
3058 
3059 
3060 

306 1 
3062 
3063 
306M 
3065 
3066 
3067 
3068 
3069 
3070 

307 1 
3072 
3073 
3074 
3075 
3076 
3077 



HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 126 



attention on this particular insert more than, to my 
recollection/ we iocused on any other single matter, and 
more than ue focused on the rest of the testimony itself. 

C Did Mr. McFarlane's name come up in the context 
of these events here being reviewed since he was the NSC 
advisor at the time? 

A I feel certain that his name came up during this 
meeting. Whether it did in the context of this particular 
November matter. I just don't recall. It's entirely 
possible . 

2 Do you recall any^ commenting that we've spoken 
with Bud HcFarlane and he doesn't know? He didn't know 
about anything pre-January? 

A No. I don't recall any particular reference 
having been made to HcFarlane by North, who was the one who 
was making this point that you're referring to, but I do 
recall--or it is my recollection that Colonel North made the 
point that to leave it the way it is is to suggest or 
provide the basis for an inference that someone other 
than--someone at NSC or elsewhere in the United States 
Government Knew about this and that was not the case. 

So presumably that would include, at least to 
North's knowledge, McFarlane. 

2 And you were aware at that point, were you not, 
that HcFarlane had been involved in helping putting together 



IINCUISSIFIED 



347 



NAME: 
3078 
3079 
3080 
3081 
3082 
3083 
3084 
3085 
3086 
3087 
3088 
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3090 
3091 
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3093 
309U 
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3098 
3099 
3100 
310 1 
3102 



HIR17U002 



the chronol 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 127 



A That was certainly ny understanding. 

Q And, therefore, that North and he and Poindexter 
had been in contact with one another relatively recently 
about these very matters. 

A That was my conclusion. 

Q So you have no reason to think that what was 
being proposed here was inconsistent with what Bud 
PIcFarlane's knowledge was at that tine? 

A No, I had no reason to think that. In fact, I 
had, I think, a basis to conclude precisely the contrary, 
that this was consistent with his--ncFar lane ' s understanding 
of the facts and represented, in fact, his and North's 
understanding of the facts. 

2 The phraseology that was agreed upon at that 
meeting that no one in U.S. Government had knowledge, did 
that strike you on that occasion as being a little too 
categorical ? 

A No, not at the meeting, it didn't. 

Q The next morning-- 

A After the fact, that was the fact. I had no 
basis on which to question it. 

S The next morning, you proposed to Director Casey 
a caveat-type of language that he should include in his 
testimony with regard to the facts that he knew. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



348 



NAME ■■ 
3103 
3104 
3 105 
3106 
3107 
3108 
3 109 
3110 
3111 
3 112 
3113 

31m 

31 IS 
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3 119 
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312M 
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3127 



HIR1714002 



wussra 

Yes . 



PAGE 128 



2 Did that come up as a possibility at that 
meeting with regard to this statement? 

A No . 

B Ho. 

Did the Attorney General, at that meeting on the 
20th, make any comment to those assembled, Mr. Casey, 
Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, did he make any comment 
to thera about his surprise, since he had registered it to 
you a feu days earlier, his surprise about pre-January 
events ? 

A Hho? 

S The Attorney General . 

A When I--it was--I was thoroughly clear that the 
Attorney General did not know about the pre-January arms 
activities prior to the time that ua , he and I, were made 
auare of that in the chronology. 

Q And he knew that baiore this meeting on the 20th 
because you had told him about it, the January 17th events. 

A The January 17th? 

fi I mean the pre-January events, excuse me. 

A Yes. 

Q So What I'm wondering is, at the meeting on the 
20th, which brought together a lot oi the major players, did 
he express to them on that occasion the same kind of 



UNCLASSIFIED 



349 



NAME : 
3128 
3129 
31 30 
3131 
31 32 
3133 
3134 
313S 
3136 
3 137 
3138 
3139 
3140 
314 1 
3142 
3143 
3144 
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3 147 
3148 
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HIR174002 



UNcussm 



PAGE 129 



surprise that he'd expressed to you when you brought his 
attention to pre-Januaty events? Did he express that kind 
of surprise to them? 

A I do not recall that. 

2 Okay. 

Do you know if he ever did in any other setting 
with then? 

A He may have done it in that settingi I just 
don't recall that element of a conversation of the meeting, 
if indeed, it was an element of the meeting, but neither do 
I recall anything that answers to that description at any 
other time . 

2 Okay. 

Did he voice any--the Attorney General voice 
any--make any point to you about Don Regan or his office not 
being present at that meeting on the 20th? Did he comment 
to you either way about that? 

A I don't recall a comment to that effect, no, or 
an observation along those lines. 

2 What was Hr . Uallison's reaction to being 
informed later that day of the discrepancy between McFarlane 
and Shultz on the pre-January knowledge of the Hawk 
shipment? 

A I--his reaction was not one of perceptible or 
particular noteworthy change in his demeanor. He expressed 



MUSSIFIED 



350 



NAME: 
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3154 
3155 
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3 157 
3158 
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3160 

316 1 
3162 
3 163 
3164 
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3166 
3167 
3168 
3169 
3170 

317 1 
3 172 
3173 
317M 



HIR174002 



iiNtmssife 



PAGE 130 



to us what Abe had just said and-- 

2 Mas he concerned about it? 

A Yes. I cettainly--his reaction was not one oi 
unconcern, but I think I was--I would not describe his 
reaction as an agitated or excited one . 

2 Did he express the possibility of a need for an 
investigation? 

A No, I don't recall that. 

2 Did he express any intent on his part to bring 
it to the attention of Donald Regan? 

A I do not recall any expression to that effect. 

2 Did the Attorney General inform you after his 
meeting with the President and Donald Regan on Friday 
morning, the 21st, that Donald Regan had, at that meeting, 
mentioned being informed by Hallison on the previous day 
about this discrepancy? 

A No . 

2 Do you have any knowledge of Hallison ever 
informing Donald Regan about that prior to the meeting with 
the President? 

A I have no knowledge at all of what, if anything, 
Hallison did as a consequence of that meeting. 



uNtussro 



351 



NAME: 
3175 
3176 
3177 
3 178 
3179 
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3 183 
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HIR1714002 



HNtussro 



PAGE 131 



RPTS TETER 
DCHM TETER 

2 Old you inform Uallison on Friday, after the 
Attorney General requested the investigation and the 
President authorized one? Did you inform Wallison the 
investigation would take place? 

A No, I don't think I had another conversation 
uith Peter throughout the f actf inding-- 
2 --weekend . 
A Yeah . weekend . 
2 Okay . 

A As a matter of fact, I think the next time I had 
a conversation with Mallison, it was Tuesday morning when I 
went over there and we started working on the President's 
statement . 

2 All right. 

Now, at the lunch on Friday with yourself and 
the Attorney General, Brad, Mr. Bolton, I believe was 
present. Is that right, Hr . Bolton? 

HR. BOLTOH' X recall being present. 
HR. LEOH: Okay. 

THE WITNESS- That's consistent with my 
chronology . 

BY HR. LEON: 



\misM^ 



352 



NAME 
3200 
320 1 
3202 
3203 
32014 
3205 
3206 
3207 
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3209 
32 10 
32 1 1 
32 12 
32 13 
321M 
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32 16 
32 17 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIRI74002 linil.l U.A.MTII II PAGE 132 

And John Richardson. John Richardson was there. 
J.R. 

A Well, I defer to ray chronology on that. I can 
say that, yes, he was. 

2 Mas it at the time of that luncheon that the 
Attorney General laid out the game plan for the 
investigation or was it afterwards? 

A Ua discussed the matters that--the task at hand. 
Whether or not ue closed on a so-called game plan is 
something I can't confidently state, but we discussed the 
things that we needed to do, and including identifying the 
people we needed to talk to. 

2 Okay. 

A And either at that lunch or very shortly 
thereafter, we ar ranged--ti« had discussion about the order in 
which ue ought to try to spaak to these people. 

2 Let me focus your attention on the first page of 
Exhibit 1 . 

A Uh-huh. 

2 These are your notes; are they not, on this 
page ? 

A These are--at least the notes above the fold, so 
to speak, are mine. There is a small square note that John 
McGinnis wrote to ree on the bottom, at the bottom half of 



the page . 



UNCUSSIRED 



353 



MAME 
3225 
3226 
3227 
3228 
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3231 
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3249 



HIR174002 



UNCLASSIfitii 



PAGE 133 



What does that note begin with, the one HcGmnis 

• 'Chuck . ' ' 

Okay. And it ends with what word? 

• ' ftcFar lane . ' ' 

Okay. But all of the handwriting above that is 



yours 



A Everything else is nine. 

8 Okay . 

Mow. when did you take these not*B, if you can 
recall ? 

A I cannot recall. I do not remember whether I 
took these notes as we planned the Interviews that we would 
have or whether I took them after we had had some of the 
interviews that we were going to have. I just don't 
remember when I did it. It's entirely possible that I took 
these notes before, but I can't state that with firmness. 

2 Mould it be fair to characterize the listing at 
the top that starts with HcFarlane's name and it goes down 
to Casey's name, would it be fair to characterize that as a 
proposed batting order in which to see the witnesses? 

A If I did this before we actually saw them, yes, 
that would be fair--it would be fair to characterize it in 
that way . 

2 Uell, is it. in fact, the order that you 



IINCtJISJ|f|£D 



354 



NAME ■■ 
3250 
3251 
3252 
3253 
3254 
3255 
3256 
3257 
3258 
3259 
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326 I 
3262 
3263 
3264 
3265 
3266 
3267 
3268 
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3271 
3272 
3273 
3274 



HIR17U002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 134 



ultimately saw the witnesses in' 



A Yes. At least the ones that I pazticipated in 
the interviewing. I can't speak iron the standpoint of 
personal Knowledge that the ones belou the bracket, that is, 
the ones below North, were seen by the AG in that order, but 
they were certainly seen by the AG in turn, in some order. 

2 Let's clarify it. According to your chronology, 
and I believe your testimony, you saw HcFarlane first; is 
that right? 

A That * s true . 

2 And Shultz was seen the following morning, 
Saturday morning. 

A That's right. 

2 Sporkin followed later that day. 

A Right. 

2 North wasn't seen Saturday, was seen Sunday 
afternoon . 

A 

2 
It is-- 

A Sporkin was Saturday afternoon according to my 
chronology and my memory, although X take it from yesterday 
that there is some uncertainty about that. 

2 Between Sporkin and North, the Attorney General 
spoke with Hr . Casey over the phone? 



That's right. 

Between Sporkin on Saturday morning, I believe 



UNCLASSIFIED 



355 



NAME 
3275 
3276 
3277 
3278 
3279 
3280 
3281 
3282 
3283 
3284 
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3297 
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3299 



HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 135 



A EKCUse me? 

2 He raet with Mr. Casey that evening, Saturday 
evening; did he not? 

A Yes, yes, that's ray understanding. 

2 And then he spoke over the phone, was it, with 
Secretary Weinberger on Sunday? 

A I--he did speak over the phone, or at least 
that's ny understanding. It was certainly not at any time 
when I was present that I recall. 

2 Let's take a look at your chronology to see if 
ue can pinpoint when he spoke to Weinberger. 

A I don't think you'll find Weinberger reflected 
on this chronology. 

2 Do you remember him reporting to you that he had 
spoken with Weinberger? 

A I do not. 

2 You don't. Are you confident that he had spoken 
with Weinberger before he saw the President? 

A Yes . 

2 Okay. 

All right. Then turning your attention to the-- 

A Before he saw the President on Monday morning? 

2 Monday morning. 

A I guess I can't say I am confident of that. He 
may have spoken with Weinberger after that. 



UNCUSSIFe 



356 



NAME: 
3300 
3301 
3302 
3303 
3304 
330S 
3306 
3307 
3308 
3309 
3310 

331 1 
3312 
3313 
331U 
33 15 
3316 
33 17 
3318 
3319 
3320 

332 1 
3322 
3323 
332U 



HIR1714002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 136 



fi All right. 

Then turning your attention to Monday the 2Uth 
on your own chronology, according to that, the Attorney 
General met with ncFarlane again at 10^00. Then he net uith 
the President and Donald Regan together. Is that right? AG 
at 11:00. It says, ''AG meets with President and Regan.'' 

A Yes. 

Q And then he separately thereafter net with 



Poindexter . 



President . 



Right. 

And then he separately met with the Vice 



A That is my understanding. '| 

2 Okay. 

Now, let's start off by focusing on--so, looking 
back to now the batting order on the first page of--or the 
listing--! shouldn't say batting order--the listing on the 
first page of Exhibit 1 . 

As to the witnesses below North, as it turned 
out, that wasn't the order in which they were seen. Because 
under that order, Poindexter and the Vice President are seen 
before the President and Regan is seen after the President 
and Casey is seen after the President when, m fact, it 
didn't turn out that way. 

A Apparently that's the case. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



357 



IINCLASSiFIti) 



HAHE: HIR17U002 ^1*^— pjg^ 137 

3325 2 Okay. 

3326 Now, I believe you testified that HcFatlane 

3327 certainly was one oi the people on this list-- 

3328 A I want to say that I don't have a high level of 

3329 confidence regarding ray chronology's representation or the 

3330 suggestion that the chronology gives that he met with the 

3331 President and Regan before he net with either PoindeKter or 

3332 the Vice President. That is-- 

3333 2 You're not sure. 

3334 A I'm not. He may well have net with Poindexter 

3335 first, the Vice President second. I just don't know whether 

3336 this reflects an understanding I had at the tine that I 

3337 wrote it that this was the order, as opposed to the--in which 

3338 he net then, as opposed to the fact that these were the 

3339 people he talked to and he talked to PoindeKter and the Vice 
33140 President separately and apart fron anyone else. 

33M1 2 So you're not certain about the order. 

33M2 A I'n not, though I have to say I think that this 

33U3 would also record ny understanding at the time of the order. 

334M 2 All right. 

33145 How, you've testified that McFarlane — as to Hr . 

33U6 HcFarlane. certainly there were--there was concern before he 

33147 Has even interviewed that he night, because of his 

SSUS discrepancy with Secretary Shultz, he night not be totally 

3349 candid. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCIASSIRED 



PAGE 138 



McFar lane '> 



2 Right I think you'va testified to that. 
A I've testified that it was against the 
disciepancy that we had discovered that we interviewed Hr . 
ticf ar lane . 

2 But you were concerned about his candor; were 
you not? 

A Afterwards? 

2 Before. I think you just testified a while ago 
that, as to North and HcFarlane in the beginning of the 
investigation, you were worried--you were concerned about 
their candor . 

A Against the backdrop of — 
[Telephone call. ] 

nR. LEON: Let's go off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.! 
HR. LEON: He're back on. 

THE WITNESS: I don't want to appear to be 
resisting your characterization. It was against the 
backdrop of the discrepancy that was discovered on the Hawk 
episode, coupled with evidence to suggest that it was the 
State Department version which was most likely to be correct 
that I approached the interview with HcFarlane, but I would 
resist the notion that I expected him not to be candid or 
anything like that. 



\MmSW 



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NAME 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 139 



2 I'm not saying that. What I'd earlier asked you 
was, when you began the investigation phase that afternoon 
on Friday, were you proceeding on the assumption that 
everybody that you would question would be truthful and 
candid, you know, fully complete in their testimony? And I 
believe--! don't want to raischar acter ize now, but I believe 
'your answer was, well, therte were concerns about North and 
PoindeKter--excuse me. North and McFarlane, based on the 
events of the night before where you had a Shultz story 
corroborated by notes, versus a McFarlane story, not 
corroborated by notes, which not only HcFarlane was 
unwilling to change, but which North, upon learning about 
the discrepancy, was unwilling to back off of his position, 
even, which raised some questions in your nind with regard 
to North and HcFarlane as to whether they'd be completely 
candid . 

I think that's what you said and I want-- 

A I would just prefer the cold transcript to--and 
the--to reflect what it is that I said on that-- 

S let me put it to you succinctly. Were you 
ooncerned, as you began the investigation, were you 
oonceined, personally, with respect to HcFarlane and North 
as to whether they'd be completely candid and honest? Here 
you concerned? 

A I was wary. It was not, as I tried to mention 



UNCUSSIHED 



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NAME : 
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3413 
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HIR174002 IIIVIll U. 1.111 II II PAGE 140 
earlier, it was not with blinders or without--it was not 
without this awareness of and sensitivity to the evidence 
that had previously come to us that I approached the 
interview with Kr . McFarlane . 

e Okay. 

Now, do you think-- 

A I should add, X'd never net the man. 

Q I understand. 

A And I had no other reason ior entertaining any 
doubts about his candor. 

e Do you know if the Attorney General had any 
doubts in that regard as you began the investigation? 

A I don't think--I don't recall either of us having 
discussed it particularly. 

2 How-- 

A But it was obviously--it was obviously Mr. 
McFarlane's and Hr . North's adherence to a version of the 
facts contrary and understanding the facts supplied by other 
sources that the whole thing was taking place in the first 
place . 

fi And that was certainly a great concern to you. 
I assume It was the Attorney General's decision and not your 
own to question Hr . HcFarlane first in the order of 
witnesses . 

A Yes, I was not--the Attorney General was making 



icussife 



361 



HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 141 



the decisions here- 



2 Right. 

A That, however, was one which I entirely 
concurred . 

2 Do you have any insight--did he provide you any 

insight as to why he wanted to start with McFarlane, who, in 

your 

V^atMvind, at least, was--you were wary oi, as opposed to 
waiting until later, after you'd heard other people's 
stories before you met with him? 

A I think HcFarlane was the obvious first choice. 
He was the one alleged to have had a 50 percent role in the 
conversation that the Secretary oi State recalled and which 
was allegedly documented in contemporaneous notes. So> 
talking to him directly about that seemed to be to us the 
first thing on the list. 

2 Now, you'd never run a criminal investigation 
before, had you? 

A I had not. 

2 This wasn't a criminal investigation; I don't 
want to imply that, but this wasn't one. 

A It was not. 

2 Okay. 

The Attorney General had been a prosecutor in 
his youth: had he not? 

A Oh, yeah, he had. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



362 



NAME: 
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HIR174002 



UNCUSSIfe 



PAGE 142 



2 Was anybody else on the team, so to speak, a 
former prosecutor besides the Attorney General? 

A No, not to my Knowledge. 

2 Are you aware that it's common in the conducting 
of criminal prosecutions to leave the targets, so to speak, 
the questionable people in the investigation, until the end 
of the Investigation, after you've gathered evidence which 
nay tend to corroborate or not corroborate their testimony? 
Are you familiar with that technique as part of 
a criminal investigation? 

A Well, I'm not familiar with traditional 
techniques of criminal investigation-- 

2 Okay. 

A --but I certainly don't resist that proposition, 
though. It seems to me to be logical and to make sense. 

2 Do you think Mr. NcFarlane would have--did you 
expect Mr. McFarlane would have some kind of documentation 
that might support his version or recollection of the 
events ? 

A I didn't know what he night have to-- 

fi He hadn't alluded to any in the conversations he 
had had with Thompson, certainly, had he? 

A I have no idea. I don't know of any 
conversations he may have had with Thompson particularly. 

2 Well, hadn't Thompson reported that he had 



UNCLASSIFIED 



363 



HIR17U002 



l/NCMSWD 



PAGE ms 



spoken with HcFarlane and that he wasn't changing his story? 

A No, I think--iiy recollection is that he spoke 
with North, who. in turn-- 

fi Oh, Hith ncrarlane, all right. 

A --and, he hadn't, and in fact, subsequently he 
hadn't been able to get in touch with either of them. 
That's my recollection, anyway, after I reiterated my urging 
to him to get back to him if he could and advise him of what 
I had just learned. That changed their recollection or 
improved it, so I don't think--I'm not aware of any 
conversation he may have had with HcFarlane. 

2 When you had finished the questioning of 
HcFarlane that afternoon, I believe you testified that you 
and the Attorney General spoke about it and you each 
expressed concern about his candor. Is that fair? 

A I think we both had a sense of--let me say a lack 
of complete confidence that Hr . HcFarlane had been entirely 
forthcoming . 

S Okay. 

And you've testified that he didn't mention 
anything about Oliver North mentioning shredding documents 
that day. 

A He certainly didn't. 

fi But that he did mention, at least according to 
the Attorney General's recollection, as told to you, that he 



UNCLASSIFIED 



364 



NAME: 

3500 
3501 
3502 
3503 
3504 
3505 
3506 
3507 
3508 
3509 
3510 

351 1 
3512 
3513 
351M 
3515 
3516 
3517 
3518 
3519 
3520 

352 1 
3522 
3523 
352U 



HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



I 



PAGE 1MU 



intended oi wanted to do whatever he could to help the 
President as best as possible. 

A He had a brief conversation at the tail end oi 
our interview with the Attorney General, in which I was not 
present, the theme oi which is, as I recall from the AG 
acquainting me with the theme oi it afterwards, that he 
expressed a desire to help the President. I also would 
hasten to add that the Attorney General's response was the 
way to help the President was to be entirely candid and 
forthcoming and to avoid anything that might b« 
characterizable as a concealment. ' 

Q Now, at that point, having met him and talked to '. 
him and having both jointly had reservations and concerns by i 

what he said, and knowing that you were going to be seeing | 

I 
Shultz the next morning and that he would have notes to 

verify his position, did you and the Attorney General 

discuss the need to see HcFarlane again at a later time? 

A Ue may have discussed that, but I don't recall 
it having been discussed. 

e Did you discuss what other means or methods that i 
you could employ besides seeing the notes that Shultz had to 
try to determine independently the truth or falsity oi what 
HcFarlane had said? 

A Well, aside from our intent to examine all the 
documents that pertained to the Iranian Initiative, which we 



UNCLASSIHED 



365 



HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE ms 



just didn't hava any idea what that night yield, as well as 
our intent to that evening, if at all possible, review the 
materials that had been collected by a certain intelligence 
agency, I can't identify any other specific things we may 
have discussed regarding that. 

Ue did not then know that it was Charles Hill, 
that there was a second person. I don't think we realized 
that Charles Hill had a role in this, and could add 
additional personal testimony, corroborating the Secretary 
of State's version of the event. That was--I think that came 
as news to us . 

2 By the tine you'd finished speaking to HcFaxlane 
at 5: MS, according to your chronology, by the tine you'd 
finished then, the NSC had already been informed that they 
were to have the documents on the Iranian Initiative 
available to be reviewed the next morning? 

A That's my understanding. 

2 And was it your understanding that they would 
have all documents at the NSC relating to the Iranian 
Initiative available, as opposed to just Oliver North's 
documents ? 

A It is my understanding that they were to have 
all NSC documents that relate to the Iranian Initiative in 
any way available for review. 

2 Had anybody informed you that the place where 



iiNcussm 



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MAflE: 
3550 
3551 
3552 
3553 
35SM 
3555 
3556 
3557 
3558 
3559 
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3562 
3563 
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3566 
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3S70 
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HIR1714002 



UNCLASSIHED 



PAGE 1146 



those documents would be reviewed would be Oliver North's 
office? 

A I don't recall having had any infornation to 
that effect. I certainly received infornation to that 
effect at lunch the next day. 

2 Without getting too far ahead of nyself there, 
did that surprise you. that that would be the office where 
those documents would be located? 

A Not necessarily, no. In fact. I guess a matter 
of this kind, of the compartmentalization, which is 
certainly a word that everybody involvad with it uses 
frequently to describe it, and the sensitivity and sacrat 
initiative nature of it. I guess I'm not that surprised that 
the documents would be housed in a--in tha office or in the 
safe, something like that, in a very secure position in a 
single location by the person who was largely implementing 
the policy. 

2 Did you--af ter--either before or after you met 
with McFarlane on Friday, Hr . Cooper, did you discuss with 
the Attorney General or any of tha other nambars of tha 
investigation team the possibility that perhaps tha CIA. in 
ganatal. and Hr . Casey in specific, might hava known about 
all of this before January '86? 

A I don't think so. At that point--car tainly we 
realized that there would be some people over there who at 



UNCLASSIFIED 



367 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR174002 UIWLflUiill I I. U PAGE 147 

3575 least knew whether or not they received a telephone call 

3576 from Korth saying, ''Can you advise us of an air carrier we 

3577 can use,'' so yes, we knew that that element of all this 

3578 involved the CIA and we were going to-- 

3579 e Talk to them. 

3580 A --talk to them, yes. And for that reason, 

3581 Stanley Sporkin was on out list, but, you know, it was ny 

3582 impression that Mr. Casey was--my impression with respect to 

3583 Mr. Casey was the same as my impression with respect to Mr. 

3584 Poindexter, that he didn't have personal knowledge of any 

3585 pre-January events, particularly the November one in which 

3586 his agency was alleged to have had some small role. He was 

3587 out of the country, it was my understanding, during tha 

3588 relevant period of time, the November 2Sth period of time, 

3589 thereabouts. 

3590 2 Well, with regard to Mr. Poindexter, like you 
359 1 say, you reached the--you had the same feeling-- 

3592 A Yes. 

3593 2 --and yet, with regard to Mr. Poindexter 's 

3591 office, you wanted to go over and review all their documents 

3595 in that area. 

3596 A Right. 

3597 2 How about a similar type review of CIA documents 

3598 relating to the use of that airline that did the 

3599 transportation, those kinds of documents? Was there any 



"wusxife 



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HIR174002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 148 



req.uest nade as part of the investigation that the CIA 
should have zeady to be reviewed at its offices all of those 
docunents ? 

A yes. There was no fornal request, but I was in 
touch with Dave Doherty and his deputy, Mr. Janeson, and we 
discussed certain docunents that they had and they had 
identified in this and the fact that they fully understood 
we'd like to take a look at them, and I-- 

e Did they nake them available? 

A Well, in the end. yes, but not immediately, 
although I have to say they were entirely cooperative and 
forthcoming in sharing with us information as they developed 
It. 

Q As of Friday evening, before you turn to 

Saturday's events, as of Friday evening, did you have any 
reason to think or suspect, for that matter, that there had 
been a finding submitted to the President by the CIA prior 
to January of 1986 relating to the Hawk shipment? 

A In what period time frame are you referencing? 

2 Friday evening, after you've met with HcFarlane, 
prior to Saturday's events, okay-- 

A Yes. 

S --at that point, having spoken with CIA officials 
for the last day or two intermittently, having spoken with 
NSC staff officials, did you have any knowledge that there 



UNCIASSIHED 



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3647 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR1714002 III lULfllJiJII IL.U ^'^^^ ^'*^ 
had been a finding subnitted to the President by the CIA foe 
signing prior to January 1986-- 
A No. 

2 --relating to the Hauk shipment. 

A No. I think by that tine, I had learned that 
there was a finding dated January 6th or 7th or thereabouts 
that was virtually identical to the January 17th finding, 
but I did not know of the finding, I do not think, that you, 
I suspect, are referencing, a document which the CIA 
referred to as a raini-f inding when I visited them on 
Saturday evening. 

2 Did they show you that? 

A Ves . Now, it's possible that I--that in my 
conversations with them, that I had learned of it prior 
to--or in that time frame, but I don't think I did. 

2 Okay. 

Did Director Casey mention to General Heese, as 
far as you know, when they spoke on Saturday evening, about 
that finding that was submitted for signing? 

A Ko , I don't know if that was a subject matter of 
their conversation. 

2 How, on Saturday, you testified at length about 
the events that morning, the meeting with Shulta, the 
luncheon that followed later on at midday, with regard to 
uncovering of the diversion memorandum, was it the Attorney 



UNCLASSIFIED 



370 



NAME: 
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3652 
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3654 
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3674 



UNCUSSIFIED 



HIR17'4002 IIIHIll U.l.lll II II PAGE ISO 
General's reaction upon learning that to now suspect anyone 
else besides North as to their conduct? 
Can you recall ' 
A To suspect North, anyone other than North? 
fi To suspect anyone in addition to North with 
regard to that diversion memo? 

Mr. BOLTON: You mean as the author of it? 
fIR. LEON: As to not only the author, but as to- 
THE WITNESS: Knowledge of — 
MR. LEON: Knowledge of its contents. 
THE WITNESS: I do not recall any particular 
discussion on that as to who he might or might not suspect. 
I think the potential was left to my mind; I suspect it did 
to his as well, it's just not clear how fax this idea night 
have gone if anya«>c. 

BY HR. LEON: 
fi Was it the uncovering of that document that led 
to the--led the Attorney General to want to see HcFarlane 
again on Monday morning? 

A That's my understanding, yes. 

C And with regard to Poindexter, of course, he 
hadn't been seen at that point, but you intended to see him 
anyway . 

A Exactly. 

2 Right. And you don't know today--you' re not 



UNCLASSIFIED 



371 



NAME 
3675 
3676 
3677 
3678 
3679 
3680 
3681 
3682 
3683 
36814 
3685 
3686 
3687 
3688 
3689 
3690 
369 1 
3692 
3693 
3694 



ONCUSSIFIED 



HIR17U002 mill. I U % '^iriHIl PAGE 151 
Certain whether he was seen, Poindexter uas seen before the 
President or after the President. 

A I don't know the answer to that. 
2 The chronology indicates afterwards. 
A Right. 

S You're not certain. 

^ When you learned about the diversion memo, was 

there discussion about the possibility that there might be a 
finding somewhere that accompanied that^ 

A That accompanied the diversion? 
2 Uh-huh. 
A No . 

2 In other words, upon seeing it, did you consider 
the possibility that it was--ref lected something that 
actually had happened and that a finding had been put 
together to support CIA involvement in accomplishing it? 
A No . 

[Telephone call.] 

HR. LEON: X think wa should go off the record. 

[Discussion off the record. 1 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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NAME: 
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3696 
3697 
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3699 
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HIR17U002 



iPTS DOTSON 



DCnN GLASSNAP 



12=15 p.m. J 



PAGE 152 



UNClASSiriED 



BY MR. LEON: 

2 Let's go back on. Baioze we broke foz the phone 
call, riz . Coopec, my question uas words to the following 
effect: Upon learning about the diversion memorandum, did 
you consider the possibility and discuss the possibility 
with the members of your team that it might reflect 
something that actually happened and that as a consequence 
there might be a finding that was prepared to legally 
support the actions that were described? 

A He did discuss certainly the proposition that the 
contra diversion that is proposed in the memo might actually 
have, subsequent to the memo, eventuated. That was 
obviously our concern. The memo does not say it was 
something that was done. It says it was in the nature of a 
proposition, a proposal. But we didn't discuss the 
possibility that a finding might exist to somehow support 
that activity. That didn't occur to me at any point prior 
t« the question. 

fi Of course, if the CIA had acted in order to 
accomplish that proposed diversion, there would have been 
need for a finding, wouldn't there, to a cover-up? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



373 



NAME : 
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HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 153 



li on« assunes--! an not at all suza. li on« 



assumes that that was pazt and parcal of th* opazation that 
was authozized under the existing funding, then, no, 
additional funding wouldn't be necessazy. But It also 
assumes that that Is something that on the--that diversion of 
moneys generated to the contras would be U.S. funds, I 
guess, and if they were U.S. funds, then a finding could 
support the legality of it. Heither of those propositions, 
though, do I have a judgment on. 

2 Did you and the Attorney General infozm Hz. 
Reynolds and Richardson at that luncheon what George Shultz 
had told you earlier that nozning? 

A Hz. Leon, I am sozzy, because, to tell you the 
tzuth, I was contemplating my last answez when I said I 
don't have a judgment on those things. I actually do have a 
judgment with respect to the question whether these are U.S. 
funds. 1 won't say I have a final concluded judgment on 
that, but I have some inclinations on the study and 
research . 

2 Do you want to share it for the record? 

A Only if you ask me. I am happy to do that. But I 
Ju«t did not want to leave anything that might in any way be 
inaccurate on the record. 

With respect to whether a finding, assuming those 
were US moneys. If we assume that for the moment, whethez 



UNCLASSIRED 



374 



UNCLASSIFIED 



KAME: HIR17U002 ^'■IVkfflVwII ILU PAGE IBM 

3745 a- finding would have supported the legality of the activity, 

37>46 that is something I don't have a judgment on. 

37147 2 I think the next question I had was whether or not 

37U8 you and the Attorney General briefed Hr . Reynolds and 

37149 Richardson at the luncheon about what Secretary Shultz had 

3750 told you earlier that morning. 

3751 A Yes. 

3752 fi you did? 

3753 A I am sure that we had some discussion along those 
37514 lines, yes. I have a general recollection of that. X don't 

3755 have a specific one. 

3756 2 Did either you or the Attorney General ask 

3757 Secretary Shultz if he had informed the President about the 

3758 information McFarlane had told him about the Hawk shipment 

3759 back in Hovember, 1985? 

3760 A No. 

3761 2 No, you didn't ask him? 

3762 A I don't recall us having asked him that. 

3763 2 Did either Reynolds or Richardson ask you at lunch 
37614 whether or not Secretary Shultz had informed the President 

3765 of what ncFarlane had told him about the Hawk shipment? 

3766 A I don't recall whether they did or not. 

3767 e Has there any reason why he wasn't asked that 

3768 question? 

3769 A Asked what question? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



375 



MAKE : 

3770 
3771 
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3773 
377U 
3775 
3776 
Zlll 

ziia 

3780 
3781 
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3790 
379 1 
3792 
3793 
379U 



UNCUSSIFIED 



HIR17<4002 IIIVI-I U X Xiriril page 155 

2 Whether or not he. Secretary Shultz, had Iniorned 
the President oi what McFarlane had told hin about the Hawk 
shipiient . 

A Mo. First the question is premised on the notion 
that ue didn't ask the question, and ue nay well have asked 
it. but X don't remember. But I frankly doubt we asked the 
question. Kr . Shultz made clear to us during his 
description oi that episode that it was his impression ha 
was being informed and advised of the event that was in the 
offing but not consulted for approval of that event. 

So he further indicated that essentially he went on 
about his business after he had reiterated HcFarlane uas--his 
strong objections to the whole concept, and he went about 
his business of ''summitry'*, whatever he was doing. 

In the next few days, when he noticed that no 
hostages were released amongst great hoopla and fanfare, he 
figured it simply had not been pursued. So all of that 
suggests to me that we didn't ask the question, because the 
answer was implicit in what he did tell us. 

fi Upon learning from Secretary Shultz at that 
interview that he. Secretary Shultz, was not in favor of the 
shipment and didn't care for the idea — 

A He didn't learn it there foi th« fitst time. That 
was something the Attorney General knew of his own 
independent knowledge. He was present during the meeting 



UNCUSSIFIED 



376 



NAME : 
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3796 

3798 
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3800 

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381 1 
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PAGE 156 



With the President, and so Secretary Shultz's opposition to 
It was not a matter on which there was any doubt. 

S Has he asked at the interview why he hadn't 
expressed his concern and displeasure imnediately or shortly 
thereafter ? 

A To whon? 

Q To either the President or members of the Cabinet. 

A About what? 

2 About the HawK shipment. 

A Ho. I don't think that question was asked. But. 



again-- 
S 
A 
S 



Do you think that bothered the Attorney General? 
What? 

The notion the Secretary oi State would be against 
a natter of that great a sensitivity and yet wouldn't bring 
his attention--of being upset about it to the President 
immediately? 

A No, my understanding is that during that period of 
time when the proposal was being discussed and the President 
was in his decision making on the question, the Secretary 
made known his opposition to it and outlined his reasons for 
opposing it. 

S I think we are miscommunlcating . 

A Okay. 

Q Let me put into focus what I am trying to get at. 




377 



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PAGE 157- 



The Secietaiy of State is mfoireed by the National Security 
Advisor to the President that a Hawk shipment is about to 
take place that he has knowledge oi between Israel and Iran, 
correct? 

A Right. 

2 Okay. And according to the Secretary of State, he 
expressed his displeasure with that to HcFarlane on the 
scene . 

A Yes. 

C And at that tine they were in. I don't know if it 
was Vienna or Geneva-- 

HR. BOYD: Geneva. 
BY MR LECH: 

S The President was with hin. was he not? 

A I suspect the President was there. 

C This was Shultz's first knowledge of this event 
according to Shultz; this is the first time he learned about 
this, when HcFarlane told hia. 

A Yes. 

2 And he was upset about it. So it would seem to me 
a logical question of George Shultz would be > ''Hell, if 
you ate so upset about it and you hadn't been consulted 
about it, why don't you :ust turn to the President of the 
United States at some point right there and say, you know, 
'Uhat is going on? I don't care for this, and how come I 



UNClASSinED 



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NAME ■ 
38U5 
38M6 
381*7 
38U8 
3849 
3850 

385 1 
3852 
3853 
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3856 
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3858 
3859 
3860 

386 1 
3862 
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38614 
3865 
3866 
3867 
3868 
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UNCLASSIFIEI) 

ted'?-' It just seeTft*^c 



""""" 'IIHbLMWINtli "" ' 

wasn't consulted'?'' It just seenfi^o me that is a logical 
kind of thing to confront the Secretary of State on if he is 
upset about being cut out of a decislon-naking process and 
doesn't care for the decision being made, then I think it is 
a logical question for the Attorney General to ask hin, 
'•How corae you didn't express your concern about it to the 
President of the United States?'' I don't know if that is a 
ques tion . 

A It certainly enhances our understanding, because 
you are right, I did not understand your train of analysis 
earlier . 

2 So what I am asking is: jn light of all that, did 
the Attorney General, when he met with Secretary Shultz that 
Saturday morning and Shultz brings up the fact that he is 
learning all this and is unhappy about it, did ha say, ''Why 
didn't you voice your concern right on the spot and say 
something about it?'' 

A I do not recall the Attorney General having asked 
that question, no. He did not confront the Secretary of 
State with that probability. 

fi Kow, knowing he did not do that, Hr . Cooper, did 
he, the Attorney General, share with you his evaluation of 
the Secretary of State's failure to do that? 

A No. 

2 Ha did not. Okay. When you were with the Attorney 



(INCUSSIHEO 



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NAME 
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General at the luncheon, the diversion aeno cane up, and 
then aitetwards in the car going back, on both occasions you 
have testified he eKpressed his concern about then, he uas 
very concerned about then. 

And I think you have testified it was a joint 
concern, it uas sonething that uas politically significant, 
as uell as legally significant. Is that fair? 

A Could you repeat that? I apologize. 

e I an trying to sunnarize a little bit before I get 
to ray question and put it in context. I think uhat you have 
testified to is that the Attorney General, both at the 
luncheon and in the car afterwards uhen you were with hln, 
expressed his concern about this diversion nanorandun and 
that, as I understood your testinony, he was concerned not 
only because of its political sensitivity but because of its 
potential legal sensitivity there night have been 
illegalities involved. Is that right? 

A That potentiality, yes, was a concern, but I uas 
not at that point acutely sensitive to the legalities 
involved. I just had this vague--I recognized that 
additional legal questions would undoubtedly be raised by 
this, but I did not have an acute sensitivity to the depth 
oz seriousness of then. 

S But there is no question in your nind the Attorney 
General saw the grave potential political significance to 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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-this and to its being leaked to the public. 

A I knou I did, and I had every appreciation of the 
Attorney General, in all likelihood, rauch more acutely than 
me. I recognize that facet of this. 

Q That being the case, was there any discussion uith 
you and the other members of the team at that point about 
the possibility of going to the President right then on the 
spot ? 

A Mo. 

2 It wasn't even considered? 

A It wasn't considered by me, and I can recall no 
discussion that I participated in with anybody else. If it 
went through anyone else's mind, I don't recall it having 
been expressed . 

8 Has the Attorney General at any time shared with 
you the reason why he chose not to go to the President about 
it until Monday? 

A No. But I have never, I have never entertained any 
idea about that, so I have never asked him. To me, it's 
been self evident why he didn't do that. 

C Hhy is that? 

A Because the memo that we discovered was not 
something we could conclude, simply based upon the memo, 
reflects facts that actually took place. And It wasn't 
until Korth was examined on that fact that we could 



UNCUSSIHED 



381 



liNfiussm 



NAME: HIR17U002 -"^^^IIIL,!/ PAGE 161 

3920 conclude, or we discovered additional documents establishing 

392 1 this took place, that ue could conclude that it did and, 

3922 therefore, share that fact uith the President. 

3923 But obviously at such time as we did conclude in 

3924 out own minds that this represents a fact, not a speculation 

3925 or a proposal that never got inplenented, he did share it 

3926 uith the President straight away. 

3927 2 So the judgment uas basically get more information 

3928 and assess the information before going to the President 

3929 uith It. 

3930 A Yes. You don't bring to the President things that, 

3931 you knou, anything lightly. 

3932 Q I want to make that point for the record because 

3933 there im a lot of people that don't understand why decisions 
39314 like that are made, and I think it is important people see 

3935 that you have to do certain things before you elevate an 

3936 issue to the level of the President, and you just don't go 

3937 to the President. I just want to make sure the record 

3938 reflects there was some thought given to that process. 

3939 A Hell, I can't say that thought was given to the 
39U0 proposition we go to the President before we established 
39m oonildence in the accuracy of the eKistence of the fact. I 
39(42 don't think anyone even remotely considered that we would 
39143 just go to the President and--no more than we did then. I 
391414 knou it didn't occur to me. 



UNCUssm 



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NAnE : 
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What would the President have done? He would have 
said, ''Wall, go see if this is true.'' Me would have said, 
''That is exactly what we plan to do.'' 

2 I :ust want to make sure it is clear. 

A It is in my raind . 

2 You might be asked about that, and I think that is 
a question you should give some thought to. 

Did the Attorney General tell you that any request 
had been made by Thompson or North for a US-hour period to 
get their files ready before being reviewed by Reynolds and 
Richardson? 

A No . 

2 That a request had been made for additional time to 
get their files m order before having them reviewed? 

A I don't recall that, no. Are you saying that 
Colonel North made a request upon the Attorney General for 
time to gather files or something? 

2 What I am trying to determine is whether you have 
any knowledge of a request being made, either by Colonel 
North or by Colonel North through Ht . Thompson, for a 
minimum of a US-hour period to get together the files on the 
Ix«n Initiative before they would be reviewed. 

A I can recall no such request having been made. 

S The Attorney General obviously met with Hr . Casey 
alone--that is your understanding, isn't it?--on Saturday 



UNCLASSIRED 



383 



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PAGE 163 



Yas 



(2 It was at some point the next day he recounted to 
you what had happened, is that right? 

k Ho, I cannot say that with confidence. 

Q Well, sometime thereafter. 

A It was definitely sometime thereafter. 

2 Mould you say it was before he went to the 
President on Monday morning, the Attorney General? 

A I doubt it. 

Q So it--Mould you say it was before the press 
conference ? 

A You knoH-- 

2 I don't Know if the chronology-- 

A Well, the chronology might help, surprisingly 
enough, because I do not recall having a conversation with 
the AG about his discussions with Casey and the so-called 
Furmark matter prior to the time that ue discussed this with 
North. I do not recall that as having happened, and I think 
I would recall it if it happened in that time sequence. 

And I know it didn't happen Monday morning because 
I Mas over at--at least I feel pretty confident it wasn't 
Monday morning, because there wasn't much opportunity for it 
to happen. I was with Abe Sofaer and Charles Hill at the 
opening of business. 



UNClASSinED 



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NAME ■■ 
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3996 
3997 
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3999 
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UOO 1 
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MOOM 
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4012 
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PAGE 164 



2 Did the AG ask North on Sunday about tha Fuinaik 
incident? 

A I do not recall him having nantloned Furnark at 



But he had talked to Casey about it the night 



all . 

Q 
beiore? 

A That is what I understand, yes. 

2 Do you know whether or not the Attorney General and 
Casey, nr . Casey, discussed the diversion nemo that 
Saturday? 

A It is my understanding they did not. 

Q That the Attorney General refrained from doing so 
for the purposes oi the investigation, so to speaK? 

A He reirained irom doing so ior, as I understand it, 
yes, for the purposes oi the investigation. 

2 After meeting with North on late Sunday and prior 
to meeting with the President the next morning at 11^00 
o'clock, I believe it was, you have testified that the 
Attorney General asked HcFarlane about the diversion memo, 
is that right? 

A Yes. That is my understanding. I wasn't present 
at the meeting. 

Q If your chronology is accurate, if it is accurate, 
it would appear that after meeting with Mr. McFarlane, the 
next person the Attorney General met with was the President 



UNCLASSIFIED 



385 



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402 1 
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PAGE 165 



hiraseli and Donald Regan, if your chronology is correct. 

A Yes. that is right. 

2 Now, if that IS true, do you know If there is any 
reason why the Attorney General didn't first neet with 
Poindexter to confront hini about the diversion meno before 
going to the President and Donald Regan to tell then about 
the diversion memo? 

A I don't know, but, you know, he may well have been 
governed by natters that he could not control. You just 
don't pop in on the President any time you want to. That 
may well have governed when he met with the President, and 
that may have governed all other scheduling. 

e But surely. Hr . Cooper, if he wanted to see Hr . 
PoindeKter earlier on Monday he could have, or for that 
matter Sunday night. The Attorney General could have called 
Mr. PoindeKter up and said, ''I want to see you right 
away . ' ' 

A I an sura he could have gotten a hold of 
Poindexter . 

fi And Donald Regan, for that matter, if ha wanted to. 

A Right. 

S And the Vice-President perhaps. 

A I an less confident of that. 

2 He spoke with McFarlane alone, is that right? 

A Yes. At least I know I wasn't there, and it is my 



UNCLASSIFIED 



2-700 0-88-14 



386 



NAHE : 
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4046 
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PAGE 166 



understanding nobody else uas 



2 Do you know where it took place, that meeting? 
A In the Attorney General's office. 
S You don't know if anyona else uas present? 
k It IS my understanding nobody else was present, 
fl Do you know why he chose to meet with hi™ alone 
having already met uith him once before when you were 

present? 

uJtl-j 
A I do not. I do not knowAhe chose to meet with him 

alone. He couldn't meet with him with ma. bacausa I was not 

there , to the extent he wanted me to be a part of that 

meeting, and I just don't know the state of his mind on 

that. 

2 Here you available? 

A Ho, I was not. I was doing something that we 
considered equally important. 

2 You were at the State Department? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you know if He. Reynolds or Hr . Richardson uas 
available ? 

A I don't have any idea. However, neither of them 
had mat with Mr. McFarlana on the previous occasion. 

fi You testified that the AG spoka with Secretary 
Weinberger at some point and that the Secretary informed the 
Attorney General that he had no specific knowledge of the 



ifimim 



387 



MAHE ■ 
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PAGE 167 



~RawK shipitant. Is that correct? 

A I don't recall having testified to that eiiect. 

S Haybe my notes are incorrect. Hhy don't you tell 
us what the Attorney General told you Secretary Weinberger 
told hill . 

A I don't recall the Attorney General having told me 
about the contents oi his conversation with Weinberger . He 
did not aiiix on Weinberger as someone who would really be a 
particularly useful fact witness for this November or the 
pre-January stuff. He did call Weinberger. My 
understanding is that either Weinberger or Weinberger's wife 
was sick, and he just didn't linger in his conversation with 
him . 

But I don't know what it is they covered. I think 
he cane, he concluded that Weinberger just really didn't 
have much to add that was beyond that which we already had 
discerned . 

2 Do you know if he asked Weinberger about the 
diversion nemo? 

A I don't know. I don't know whether he did or net. 

fi Now Hr . KcFatlane, as I recall your testimony, told 
the Attorney General that he was aware of the diversion. 

A That was my understanding. 

8 Colonel Horth told him-- 
[ Recess . ] 



mmm 



388 



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PAGE 168 
MR. LEOM' I guess ue can go back on the racocd. 



Can you laad back the last question. 

I The reporter read back the pending question. ] 
BY HR. LEOK: 

fi Just recapping, Hr . Cooper, your testimony at one 
point, as a preface here, is the Attorney General informed 
you that Hr . McFarJlane informed him that he, HcFailane, was 
aware of the diversion, is that correct? 

A Yes. 

2 And that it was Hr . North who told HcFarlane about 
the diversion, is that right? 

A That is my understanding. 

2 Did the Attorney General Inform you as to whether 
or not he asked HcFarlane whether HcFarlane told the 
President about it? 

A I don't recall. I just don't recall. I know that 
was upper most in the Attorney General's mind at the moment, 
so it is entirely possible that he did. I am equally 
confident if he did, he told me that HcFarlane had not told 
the President, but I just don't recall that element of the 
conversation . 

S Let's compare it to the conversation with Colonel 
KoEth the afternoon before that you were present at. Okay? 
During that conversation Sunday afternoon. Colonel Korth 
acknowledged that the diversion memorandum was his 



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PAGE 169 



authorship, did he noti 



A He did. 

e And that he had submitted it to Adniral Poindexter, 
IS that correct? 

A It IS. 

2 - Did he inform you that he had told HcFarlane about 
It? 

A No. 

2 Did he iniorm you as t whether he had told anyone 
else about it? 

A No. Actually, he did say ha thought HcFarlane knew 
about it and Poindexter, and he knew about it, but those 
were the only three people he thought knew about it. 

2 Of course, you subsequently learned, did you not, 
iron Mr Green that General Secord knew about it? 

A Oh, no, I learned from North that Secord knew about 
it. 

2 And that Hakin knew about it? 

A I learned that iron Green. 

2 That was a iew days later? 

A Monday, I guess. 

2 There was a possibility Mr. Calero knew about it. 
[ Recess . ] 

[The pending question was read by the reporter. ] 
THE WITNESS: Yes. Certainly North's statements to 



UNcussro 



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NAME : 

U1U5 

u me 

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Ms suggested he knew about it. He was alleged to be the 
recipient o± large suns of raoney. 
BY MR. LEOM: 

Q Comparing the Attorney General's neeting with 
tlcFarlane. to the entent you know about it, and the neeting 
with North the aiternoon before which you were present for, 
upon acknowledging that he was the author of the diversion 
memo, acknowledging that he had sent it to Poindexter, what 
was the Attorney General's reaction to learning that? 

A No particular reaction. He just continued with the 
interview. I mean, he did not-- 

Q He didn't get upset? 

A No, he didn't. 

2 Did he voice any concern to Colonel North about the 
political explosiveness of a scheme of that nature? 

A No . 

Q Did he ask them in any kind of stunned form, ''How 
could you have engaged in something that could be so 
potentially dangerous to the contra program or to the 
President? ' ' 

A I don't recall him having reacted in the way you 
dasorlbed, no. 

S How about with HcFarlane, to the extent ha has 
recounted to you how that meeting went, did he give you any 
indication that he expressed to HcFazlane any sense of 



mussro 



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PAGE 171 



incredulousness that McFarlane hadn't blown the whistle on 
It and informed the troops about it earlier? 

A No. I don't recall him describing any such 
exchange . 

2 I hope you understand why I ask those questions, 
because it seems that this is iniormation that is so risk- 
iraught to the President and to the contra program by its 
very nature that to have engaged in it. North and 
PoindeKter--f or McFarlane to have known about it was to have 
created the existence of a risk that could be very damaging 
to the administration and to the contra program which was so 
important to the President. 

A I think those are accurate points, but the Attorney 
General did not, m my presence anyway, confront Mr. North 



with these obvious realities or up XiuJ* hii» in any manner. 

2 Did he share those insights with you and the 
members of the team? 

A I an sure we discussed the implications, the 
potential implications for this, yes. Ue were fully aware 
and cognizant that this was a major news item, let's say, 
and that it was going to be extraordinarily controversial 
and said In train precisely what it has said in train. 

Q Let me put it in context so you can think about it. 
I think you told us a little while ago the Attorney General 
got visibly upset when he learned that Deputy Burns hadn't 



UNCUSSIFIED 



392 



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PAGE 172 



made airangenents to seal off the office or. under his 
demand, that the office of North be sealed off. Do you 
recall that? 

A Yes. But visibly upset is-- 

2 How would you put it? 

A A flash of irritation. A flash of irritation. 

C But he was upset, is that correct? 

A I think that is a fair description, though it did 
not involve the Attorney General criticizing or dressing 
down Mr. Burns or anything of that nature. It involved a 
visible flash of irritation and reiteration, a stern 
reiteration, that he had requested that he nake that 
directive earlier. At least that's the best ojE ny 
recollection of that little episode. 

The Attorney General is not an excitable man. He 
is a calm man. 

2 That is good to know. Has he at least as irritated 
or more irritated about what he perceived to be the level of 
the President's news conference on the 19th? 

A I think he was irritated in the sense of being very 
disappointed about it and feeling depressed about it for the 
President's sake. 

2 In light of those two instances of examples 
proximate to the time of meeting North on Sunday, of his 
being able to get irritated or upset, how can you account 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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PAGE 173 



ior not getting upset uith North that he would do sonethmg 

KfX^e- 
as haii-brained as that? 

A I don't understand why you are so insistent he be 
upset . 

2 I am not insistent. 

A The fact is he asked, he was conducting a very 
business-like interview and-- 

S I want to get a flavor for it. 

A The Attorney General did not react in the way that 
you described. He maintained a caln demeanor throughout the 
interview, which is, with rare exceptionsr the only demeanor 
with which I am acquainted. 

HR. BOYD: Off the record. 
[Discussion off the record. 1 



wmw 



394 



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PAGE 174 



DCHN aUINTERO 

BY MR. LEON: 

e I am just trying to get some assessment of the 
nature of the quality of the Attorney General's reaction to 
learning about having confirmed that his present actions, 
which I think is safe to characterize, in ny own 
characterization, as being explosive politically, and 
eKtremely damaging to, not only the President and his 
Administration, but the contra program, which is so dear, 
obviously, to the Administration; I just want to get some 
sense of how one of the President's very closest advisers 
reacted to learning about something that was this risk- 
fraught, that was just done at the self -initiative of an NSC 
staffer? 

A All I can say is every act that the Attorney General 
took was consistent, fully consistent with complete 
appreciation and acute sensitivity to the potentials that 
you describe, that he did not react in a way similar to 
that, from a way which you described, and Horth acknowledged 
the contra diversion events, he maintained a calm demeanor, 
as did all of us. We did not get excited and start jumping 
around . 

BY KR . LEON: X am not suggesting you :]umped around 
the room. Of course, we don't know, because no one was 



I 



UNCLASSIHED 



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4283 



HIR174002 



\immm 



PAGE 175 



there to witness what his conversation was like with Mr. 
ricFarlane Monday morning. 

A Right. 

e So ue can't account for whether or not he was nore 
demonstrative than his being upset with Mr. McFarlane? 

A We cannot. Ue will have to r.r 1 n y upon his memory. 

Q Absolutely. As well we should. 
Did the Attorney General report to you the President's 
reaction, besides :ust that he was shocked to learn about 
the diversion memo, and the fact that it was known by his 
National Security Advisers as well as his former National 
Security Adviser? Was shock all he described it as? 

A He really didn't go into a description of the 
demeanor of the participants of the meeting. I don't think 
he felt obligated to provide rae with a lengthy account of 
the flavor of the meeting, which I certainly would be 
interested in those things. 

But he Dust indicated thatfhe^ President didn't know and 
the President reacted-- 

2 Was the President upset, from what you understand? 

A I am not saying that he wasn't. Because I don't 
know . 

fi From the account you heard? 

A Wall, the account I h^ed is not one that included 
descriptions of whether the President was upset or whether 



DNcussm 



396 



UNCLASSIHED 



NAME: HIR17U002 WI1WL.nLJIJII II II PAGE 176 

4284 he uas--that I can recall. Just that he was taken by 

4265 sutpcise. and that he had not--and this was complete news to 

U286 hm. as it was to Mr. Regan. 

4287 fi Let me put it to you in another way. Did the 

4283 Attorney General give you any indication the President's 

4289 reaction was one of indignation that his subordinates would 

4290 unilaterally act in such a way as to put him at risk, and 

4291 his Administration at risk, m the political sense, not to 

4292 mention the contra program at risk? 

4293 A I do not recall the Attorney General characterizing 

4294 the President's reaction in any way, and particularly not in 

4295 that way. 

4296 e How about Donald Regan, did you get insight what 

4297 Donald Regan's reaction might have been along those lines? 

4298 A Mo. I just don't recall the Attorney General 

4299 describing or characterizing reactions in that way. I 

4300 think, however, I can recall some reference to Regan's 
430 1 response, response being identical to the response that I 

4302 recall the AG making. 

4303 S Those words, that phrase he used? 

4304 A I have a. vague reaction that that was also Regan's 

4305 rasponse precisely. 

4306 2 Did you get any sense-- 

4307 A On these points, however, only the participants to 

4308 the meeting can provide any authoritative insights. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



397 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIRnuOOa %f M ^ ^0 K.I t\^\JH li.f^ pagE 177 
4309 2 Absolutely. 

U310 Did you get any sense that from talking to the AG about 

4311 Donald Regan's reaction that Regan felt particularly upset, 

4 3 12 by virtue of the fact that it was his responsibility as 

M313 chief of staff to be aware of those kinds of things 

'431'4 happening in the White House? 

4315 A No, I didn't get a sense on that point from the 

4316 Attorney General, that I can recall. 

43 17 2 Do you know why the Attorney General met with both 

4318 President Reagan and Regan simultaneously, as opposed to 

4319 meeting with Regan first to find out if he had learned about 

4320 It from either ricFarlane or Polndexter, before meeting with 

4321 the President to report his findings? 

4322 A No, I don't know. I never have, to my recollection, 

4323 discussed that question-- 

4324 2 That was a decision he made aiang? 

4325 A Mho. 

4326 2 The Attorney General. 

4327 A I am not sure he made any particular decision as to 

e 

4328 whether he wanted to met with Regan outside the President. 

A 

4329 I just don't recall anything along those lines. He may 

4330 have, but it is not one that I think I participated in. 

4331 fi Did the Attorney General tell you Sunday evening 

4332 that he would be meeting with McFarlane the next morning? 

4333 A I think I knew that, yes. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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NAME : 

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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR174002 IIIVIil U.A.Ainni PAGE 178 

2 Did he tell you why he intended to see HcFarlane 
befoie seeing the Ptesident? 

A Well. I ara quite confident that it was to question 
hin regarding the contra diversion. 

2 To find out if he knew about it? 

A Yes. 

2 And to find out who he had told about it? 

A Yes. 

2 And to corroborate North's statenent that he told 
HcFarlane? 

A North had made that statenent so, therefore, 
HcFarlane was obviously among the two people that had to be 
questioned on that score. 

2 Did the Attorney General tell you whether or not he 
had asked HcFarlane why it was that HcFarlane, on a Friday 
night, Friday afternoon, I should say, had not informed you 
and the Attorney General about the diversion there? 

A Yes. 

2 Did he ask HcFarlane that? 

A I don't know. 

2 So he night have asked HcFarlane that? 

A It is entirely possible. I just don't recall having 
received any information fron the Attorney General on that 
point . 

2 Do you know if the Attorney General met with 



iinmm& 



399 



NAME ■■ 
M3S9 
4360 

436 1 
4362 
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4382 
4383 



UNCUSSIHED 



HIR174002 lllvlll Hlltllriril PAGE 179 
foindexter alone, or was Thompson present? 

A I think he met with Poindextar alone. I know he met 
with Poindexter. and I have no knowledge that he net with 
Thompson, either with Poindexter or by himself. 

2 Did you speak with Paul Thompson at any point during 
the weekend oi the 21st, that weekend? 

A I do not think I did. 

Q So between Friday, the 21st, and Monday, the 24th, 
after Friday, when would you have next spoken with Thompson, 
do you think? 

A Well-- 

e Let me take a look at your chronology. It might 
he Ip us . 

A I don't think you will find any references to 
Thompson in the chronology. 

2 It doesn't look like you met with him on Monday. 

A Hith whom? 

2 Thompson. 

A That I did? 

2 It doesn't look like you did. 

A I have no recollection that I did. And, in fact, ray 
recollection is that I did not meet with Thompson on Monday. 

Is there information to suggest I met with Thompson 
Monday ? 

2 No. I am trying to determine whether or not 



UNCLASSIFIED 



400 



NAHE 

14381) 
4385 
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G-omi»ander Thompson TnToxTuFd^S^, "W'anybody inf ornad you on 
his behali, that on Saturday aiteznoon, aft«z Btad Reynolds 
and Richardson had been with you that nonday, that Colonel 
North proceeded, with a bunch of documents under his hand, 
over to the Uhite House Situation Roon, Thompson walked with 
him back to the White House? 

A This event, if it took place, is news to me as of 
309, June 23, 1987. 

2 Yet you have talked to him on a number of occasions 
since then, have you not? 

A On a number of occasions would tend, I think, to 
suggest aw exaggerated view of it. I have talked to him 
several times . 

It would be hard for me to pinpoint the next time I talked 
to him after the weekend review, although I think It was m 
a meeting with a group of people Uallison had gathered in 
his office to follow and keep up with this Iran matter in a 
coordinated fashion. 

2 When would that have been approximately? 

A It is hard for me to tall you, to tell you the 
truth. Probably within a week after the Tuesday of 
ravalations, the Tuesday press conference, around a week 
aitar that. 

It may have been as much as two. In any event, I remember 
Paul, essentially, apologized to people in that room and 



UNCLASSIFIED 



401 



MAHE • 

4409 
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44 1 1 
44 12 
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HIR174002 



IINCUSSIFIfO 



PAGE 181 



assuring the people in that room that he had been, 
essentially, not brought into the intrigue, so to speak, of 
the Hor th-Poindexter matter, and it was a-- 

Q Poindexter, on Friday afternoon, kneu you were going 
to be reviewing documents that weekend; did he not? 

A That is ray understanding. 

C Thompson certainly did; did he not? 

A That IS also my understanding. 

2 Did either one of them indicate to you that there 
was a PROF system on which there were PROF note 
communications during relevant time periods between North, 
Poindexter and North, and HcFarlane? 

A No. Because I don't think--I am sure I didn't talk 
to Poindexter on Saturday or Friday, and I do not recall 
having talked to Paul Thompson, though that isn't 
impossible . 

But I didn't--you know, since that time I have been made 
aware in the newspapers, they have this very sophisticated, 
apparently, computer system that keeps everything in place. 

2 It wasn't until yesterday, as I recall your 
testimony, that you had ever seen what a PROF message looked 
like. 

A That is accurate. 

S That IS one of the exhibits we showed you 



yesterday ? 



mu^ssw 



402 



NAHE •■ 
4434 
4435 
4436 
4437 
4438 
4439 
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4458 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR174002 lllllll Malalll II II PAGE 182 

A Yes. I do not recall ever having seen a document 
like that before. 

What does ''PROF'' mean, by the way? 

2 It is a term used to describe a computer system. It 
IS an acronym, and I can't tell you what the individual 
letters mean, but it is an internal computer message system 
at the White House. 

Why I bring that up is because you were not aware then, I 
assume, that there were PROF messages on Monday, the 24th. 
between North and Poindexter, indicating theiz intentions to 
resign from the NSC? 

A No, I certainly was not. 

fi Simply, you would not have been aware then that 
discussions were underway as early as Monday, the 21st, 
between North and Poindexter, about North's being reassigned 
to the Military War College by the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps . 

A I never heard of that either. 

2 On Tuesday morning, the 25th, you went over to the 
White House, according to testimony, your chronology, to 
assist in preparation of the President's statement. Is that 
right? 

A That is correct. 

2 And before doing that you met earlier in the morning 
with the Attorney General, himself; didn't you? 



UNCUSSIHED 



403 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR17M002 IIIIUL^V^" IkV PAGE 183 

miS9 A Very briefly, yes. 

14I46O 2 How, at that meeting, did the Attorney General 

MUSI indicate to you whether or not a decision had been nade at 

141162 that point as to whether or not John PoindeKter would be 

14L163 resigning? 

141464 A That morning? 

U1465 2 Yes? 

141466 A Yes. 

14467 2 Did he indicate to you that it was planned that 

141468 Poindexter would be resigning? 

14469 A My recollection is that that was the course of 

4470 events that was set enjtrain. 

447 1 2 With regard to Colonel Horth, was it your 

4472 understanding that morning, Tuesday morning, he would be 

4473 resigning or he would be fired? 

4474 A There was confusion about that all the way up until 

4475 the time of the President's public statement. 

4476 2 That IS something I want to see, if you can shed 

4477 some light on. 

4478 A I will try, but I doubt it. 

4479 S Let's start at the earliest point that day, the 

4480 m««ting with the Attorney General. Was it your impression 

4481 fxom talking with the Attorney General, Tuesday morning, at 

4482 7:00, something that it was the Attorney General's 

4483 understanding that Horth would be fired or Hotth would be 



UNCLASSIFIED 



404 



NAME : 
U1484 
4U8S 
14U86 
4487 
U1488 
4489 
14 490 

449 1 
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4500 

450 1 
4502 
4503 
4504 
4505 
4506 
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HIR174002 



resigning 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 184 



A I don't recall speciiically that there was 
conversation about that. 

Q Do you know ii he uas advocating one of the two 
positions, or advising, I should say? 

A This is vague--my recollection on this is not one I 
am confident on, I suggest to you. But it seems to me that 
the Attorney General supported resignation, permtting North 
to resign, as opposed to firing him, but I don't recall the 
specifics . 

2 Uhen you arrived at the scene at the White House to 
work on the President's statement, at that point, whan the 
President's statement was being prepared, had a decision 
been made between firing North, or North resigning? 

A I :ust don't recall, Mr. Leon, I just don't recall. 
I know that a decision--at a minimum. North resigning was 
contemplated. His no longer being at the NSC was fully 
contemplated . 

Q Uhen you met with Donald Regan and Peter Uallison 
that morning, according to your chronology, and Dennis 
Thomas, I believe it is. who worked for Donald Regan--did 
Donald Regan, on the occasion of that meeting, express a 
position as to whether North should be fired or whether 
North should be allowed to resign? 

A Did Regan? 



wussife 



405 



NAME : 
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45 10 
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/ 4523 
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HIR174002 



uNcussra 



PAGE 185 



Donald Regan? 



A I just don't recall whether he did or not. 

2 How about Wallison? 

A I certainly don't recall Peter taking a position on 
that. To tell you the truth, I don't recall that having 
been a subject matter of conversation. 

2 Did the President's statement include when it, the 
statement to the iact North was fired? 

A I don't reiuenber . It is a matter of public record. 
We can find out. 

2 It was either in that statement or it was in the 
Attorney General's meeting with the President at 11:30 that 
that came out. I can't off the top of my head tell you it 
was, but I think it was the President's 

A It seems to me it wasj^ as wall. 

2 Before the President made his statement at 9=30, it 
was reviewed by Buchanan, Speakes, yourself, Wallison. Do 
you remember any discussions back and forth during that 
meeting as to the political dimensions to the decision 
between firing Kocth and allowing him to resign? 

A I do not. 

S So you have no insight as to who made the decision 
and when it was made? 

A That is true. I am sure I have at least the insight 
that it was made sometime to Tuesday morning. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



406 



I 



1453U 
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4552 
4553 
4554 
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4558 



UNCUSSIFIED 



HIR174002 Ulllll nililll II II PAGE 186 

2 It certainly was the President's decision in the 
final analysis, that is for sure. 

A I don't think anybody overcame his will on the 
question , no . 

2 But you don't have any recollection who was 
advocating--f irst of all, whether there was a dispute as to 
which position was being advised the President take, and 
what those positions were. 

A I do not. 

2 How, the Ton Green notes--let me give you this 
Exhibit 34. 

According to your chronology, the neeting between 
yourself, Mr. Green, and Mr. Reynolds took place on the 24th 
from 2:00 to 3: 45 . 

A 3:15. 

2 3: 15? Did I misread it? 

A That is my chronology statement. 

2 That is what I want to go with. 3:15. I misread 
it. Sorry. So atJhour and 15 minutes. 

You were there the whole time; is that right? 

A Yes. 

2 I believe it is your testimony, correct me if I am 
wrong, that Mr. Gteen did not definitely characterize 
himself as being there representing North and Secord? 

A Right. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



407 



NAME ■ 

4559 
4560 

456 1 
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457 1 
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HIR174C02 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 187 



In fact--i»y recollection is that he made clear that that 
uas not the capacity in which he was meeting with us. 

S Did he inform you that he had met with North before 
North met with the Attorney General and yourself Sunday 
af te r noon? 

A Did he make clear? 

2 Yes . 

A It uas obvious that he had. He knew what North had 
said to us . 

2 Before . 

AI am sorry. 

2 Not after. 

A I am sorry . 

2 Before . 

A Oh. before? 
No. No, that is not something I can recall him having 
made known to us, or me having formed an opinion on. 

2 Did ha inform you that he had met with North Friday 
afternoon before Saturday morning's events and after North 
had been Informed of the upcoming review of his files? 

A Ko . If I followed your question, and I apologize. 

fi Let me see if I can put it more simply. Mr. Green, 
aoootdlng to North's calendar and other people's testimony, 
met with Oliver North on Friday evening, early Friday 
evening, the 21st. Did he inform you that he had met with 



UNClASSra 



408 



NAME : 
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HIR174002 



North. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 188 



A He did not, to ray recollection. 

e That was at a point after Morth knew those documents 
were about to be reviewed and before they were reviewed? 

A It appears that he did know that, yes. 

2 And that he met with North again Sunday morning, he 
didn't tell you he had met with North Sunday morning? 

A That IS correct . 

2 He obviously met with North after North met with you 

-AS/ 

and the Attorney General, because he told you »r much by 

telling you that North had informed him what he told the 
Attorney General? 

A That is correct as well. And that is the only 
meeting that I had knowledge of, or can recall having been 
made aware of, only because it was obvious, as you point 
out . 

MR. LEON: Off the record, 
[Discussion off the record. 1 

THE WITNESS: Mow that ue are back on the record. 
It IS, now that we discuss it further and I focus on it 
again for the first time, perhaps, ever since the Green 
meeting, it does come to mind that Green professed a 
thorough under-going understanding of the Iran initiative 
and the contra diversion, borne of information received by 
him from North, Secord and Hakim. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



409 



NAME : 
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46 10 
46 1 1 
46 1 2 
46 1 3 
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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 189 



BY MR. LEON: 

2 Contemporaneous with the events? 

A No, no, that is not an assumption I cane to--or we 
corae to now. But in light of his statement, it could well, 
though that reality, if it is true, would bespeak a 
background by Green, which exceeded that which one could 
have obtained from Saturday night after North left our 
office tilH-excuse rae , Sunday after North left the office 
until Monday when we met with Green. See ray point? 

In other words, if the only amount of time that Green had 
been meeting with them was Sunday evening from the time 
North left our offices until Monday the next day, when he 
met with us, it would have been very hard for him to have 
developed the kind of background and full-breadth 
understanding of the fact, purpose, and what have you, as he 
professed to have in that period of time. 

So it did bespeak I guess, a participation m the 
discussions that would have predated Sunday evening or 
Monday morning. 

2 Here is what I am trying to clariiy-- 

A But h* did not identify, to my recollection, any 
specific time when he sat down and he discussed this matter 
with the three of them even to--either collectively, or 
individually, to my recollection. 

2 What I am trying to get clear for the record here is 



UNCUssm 



410 



KAME • 
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4650 

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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 190 



tha extent to which Mr . Green alerted you and Mr . Reynolds 
to his relationship with Colonel North, only as an attorney- 
client relationship, which is certainly important, but just 
a relationship in terms of prior knowledge of events, 
perhaps, outside the claim of privilege. I am trying to get 
that clear for the record . 

It sounds to rae like he did not come there representing 
himself as North's attorney at the time; is that right? 

A That IS correct. 

C That he indicated only generally that he had any 
prior knowledge of North and North's involvement in this 
matter; is that fair? 

A No. He suggested that he had a thorough under-going 
understanding of the Iranian initiative, it as important for 
us to share in and the contra diversion. 

Q But the source of his knowledge, as I understand 
your testimony before, and I nay have misunderstood it, it 
was Hakim and Secord rather than North? 

A Well, I am not sure that I did testify along those 
lines. If I did, I erred. 

I think it was by virtue of Hakin, Sacord, and North. I 
think he, in fact, represented himself to be. entirely 
accurately, as far as I know, the only person who had the 
perspective of what he believed were the three people most 
knowledgeable about the whole implementation of the 



iiNcussra 



411 



NAME 
4659 
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U6614 
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4681 
4682 
4683 



HIR174002 



initiative 



UNcussife 



PAGE 191 



2 And did he indicate also that he had represented in 
the past, Secord and Hakin? 

A I think so , yes . 

e Did he indicate that he was representing either one 
of them in litigation? 

A No. He>w^s quite--niy recollection is that he was not, 
he made knoun to us that he was not there as a lawyer 
representing any particular client, and, in fact, he was 
cagy about whether or not he was a lawyer, was the lawyer 
for any of these particular gentlemen at that time. 

2 I think you testified he did most of the talking? 

A Green? 

Q Yes . 

A No question about it. 

e Mas there perhaps some question in your own mind as 
to what extent you could reveal any of this material you 
knew about which was highly classiiied and highly 
confidential ? 

A Yes , there was . 

e So h« did most of the talking? 

A Yes, he did 

2 Which leads me to wonder-- 

A Besides we weren't there to engage in a dialogue 
with hira so much as to receive whatever itWas that he was 



UNCLASSIFIED 



412 



NANE ■ 

ueau 

4685 
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4688 
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4690 

469 1 
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4700 

470 1 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR174002 lllllll H.l.lll II II PAGE 192 
there to provide us that would be helpful to the United 
States Government. 

2 For a// hour and 15 minutes you took only a page and 
three-quarters of notes. If he did most of the talking how 
corae there is so little notes? 

A These are the notes that I took that-- i 

2 Here they the high points, so to speak? 

A Well. I try to get high points on notes. I 
obviously don't take verbatim notes, that is clear from all 
of ray notes, I am sure 

2 I Dust want the record to be clear on that, you 
weren't trying to be verbatim on this? 

A No. 

2 These were a sketch outline of the high points? 

A Yes, to the extent I could get down the high points. 

2 If there were any raa:ior things discussed, you 
believe they are included in those notes? 

A I would have to review the notes right now to see if 
there is anything that my memory would call to mind that 
isn't in the notes, that might be characterized as major, 
but I an otherwise satisfied with your statement. 

2 Let's :]ust put it this way, so there will be no 
misunderstanding by any parties at a later date; when you 
took these notes you intended to make sure those notes 
included all ma^or points discussed in the conversation? 



iimssim 



413 



M709 
47 10 
47 1 1 
47 12 
47 13 
47 14 
47 15 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



NAME HIR174002 llllll.l U.A.Mriril PAGE 193 



A That IS true of all ray notes, to the extent I could 
and there are. however, points that would be viewed as 
salient, particularly, I should think, in the hindsight of 
this matter, that may well not have made it into ray notes. 

For example. I don't know whether ray notes reveal the fact 
that, as Mr. Green attributed to Hakira the idea of a contra 
diversion . 



"NMS/f/ffl 



414 



HAME • 

47 16 
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HIR174002 



RTTS DOTSON 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 194 



DCHN DANIELS 

2 Because in your notes you have A-k-i-m, AKim. 

A I didn't knou who it uas he was talking about. I 
don't knou if he uas talking about a fellou named Akira or 
Hakim. This uas the first time this name had come into ray 
cons c lousness . 

2 It uas a phonetic spelling on your part, was it 
not? 

A Yes . It uas . 

2 And since you have groun mora knowledgeable about 
the events, you have come to realize the Akin in your notes 
uas fir. Hakira, H-a-k-i-m? 

A That is right. But, as I say, I do not immediately 
see in the notes any statement that the contra diversion uas 
Mr. Hakim's idea, but that is definitely what Green told us. 

So I uould regard that as a raa:or element of this. 
I do remember very well the scenario that Green suggested m 
terms of this idea. 

2 You met uith Mr. Wallison on Thursday afternoon, at 
the tine of the phone call from Mr. Sofaer regarding the 
conflict between Shultz and McFarlane and then the next time 
you net with hin , according to your chronology, would have 
been Tuesday morning when you mat uith Donald Regan and him 
and Dennis Thomas prior to drafting the statement for the 



liNClASSIFIED 



415 



NAME : 

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UNClASSiriED 



PAGE 195 



record; is that right? 

A That IS right. 

e Did Mr. Uallison at that meeting or after the 
meeting, before the meeting, share uith you his reaction to 
the events that unfolded in the four days between the 
conflict arising on Thursday and your investigation and its 
products Tuesday? 

A Not in any intimate or private uay, but it is quite 
obvious everybody at the White House was, shared the 
reaction of surprise and concern about what the consequences 
would be of this . 

2 Was there any reaction on his part to the affect, 
or implication on his part to the effect if the White House 
Counsel had known all about this earlier, none of it would 
have happened? 

A Peter never suggested anything to me along those 
lines . no . 

Q Have you ever heard that echoed by anyone, the 
White House Counsel felt if the White House Counsel had been 
brought fn earlier on, this kind of thing would never have 
occurred, would have been rooted out a lot earlier? 

A I never heard any statenent to that effect, no, out 
of the White House Counsel's office or attributed to the 
White House Counsel's Office. 

You mean statements that would say if they rather 



UNCLASSIFIED 



416 



naue : 

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mil 

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UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 196 



than the Justice Department had done the fact-finding or if 
thay had been in on it back at the inception of the 
initiative in January of 1986. the whole thing-- 

9 Or for that matter, even earlier' Let's say for 
example if they had been appraised of the respective use of 
the CIA in the shipment of HAMKs-- 

A It would never have happened-- 

2 They might have seen the legal issues that would 
have been on the horizon or counseled against it? 

A I feel certain that is an accurate statement. It 
IS certainly an accurate statement if the Justice Department 
had been in there at the time. We would have hopefully 
noted the legal problems and counseled against it. 

2 If the National Security Adviser to the President 
had sought the advice of the President's counsel with regard 
to Mr North's proposal that a diversion take place before 
the diversion took place, that the White House Counsel's 
Office would have counseled Mr. Poindexter against allowing 
It to take place and it never would have occurred? 

A I should think they would have. 

Q I an sure you would think the Office of Legal 
Counsel would have so cautioned then and advised then not to 
allow that to happen. 

A It is with utmost confidence I confirm that 
cone lusion . 



IINCUSSIflEO 



417 



HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 197 



2 But you never heard any discussions along those 
lines ? 

A No, I didn't. I really didn't. I think there uas 
a lot of ''if only kind of hand-wringing'' a lot of people 
were doing. But at that time, that point, ue had what ue 
had and there was not a darned thing anybody could do about 
it. 

2 One question, I an sure you will be asked about it, 
I think you have probably been asked about it, I think it is 
something we need your answer on the record, why uas the 
Attorney General, to the extent that you know, why did the 
Attorney General wait until Tuesday to order the sealing of 
the documents in Mr. North's office having learned about the 
diversion memo as early as Saturday? 

What would be vour answer as to the delay from 
Saturday to Tuesday before sealing off all those documents 
to ensure they weren't shredded as we have learned some of 
them were or altered as we have learned some of them were 
subsequent to the investigation beginning? 

A The criminal investigation? There was shredding 
that took place even after the criminal investigation began. 

2 I shouldn't say shredding. Hell, first of all-- 

A The shredding took place on Friday, right, Friday 
afternoon? 

The report on that that I have seen-- 



miAssro 



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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 198 



There could be some shredding after that. Let's 



leave that aside ior a second. At least in theory there 
could have been some shredding after that. " 

I am not going to make any statement to that 
effect, but ue do know from the testimony of Faun Hall that 
documents were removed, there is no question about that, 
prior to the sealing of the office. 

Indeed, just as it was about to happen, being 
sealed off, she testified she was gathering then up and 
taking them out on Tuesday. 

Excuse me, on Wednesday. So--I guess the question 
is why the delay from mid-day Saturday to I guess it was 
ultimately, the decision was made on Tuesday afternoon by 
the gentleman tasked. Mr. Burns, but I guess it wasn't fully 
implemented until Wednesday. 

2 That is essentially ray understanding of the fact. 
The simple answer is not until Tuesday was a decision made 
to, I won't say launch, but to turn over this fact-finding, 
or turn this fact-finding into a criminal investigation. 

Not until Tuesday had wa developed our thinking and 
analysis such that ue recognized the possibility of criminal 
liability under certain possible scenarios we could not then 
discount . 

And as soon as the decision was made that this 
matter should be investigated for possible criminal 



WUSSW 



419 



NAME: 

Msm 

U842 
i48>43 
>«8I4>4 
^BUS 
(48146 
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148'48 
■4849 
(4850 
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(4852 
U8S3 
(485(4 
14855 
(4856 
(4857 
(4858 
•4859 
(4860 
(486 1 
(4862 
(4863 
(486U 
(4865 



HIR17U002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 199 



liability, the obvious decision to do those things that one 
does when a criminal investigation is launched were done. 

But prior to that time, we had not reached any 
conclusions that there was any crininal activity that might 
have taken place. 

S Was there anything, just to make sure we have got 
this clear for the record, was there any reason for you, 
let's start with you and then we will go to the Attorney 
General, was there any reason for you to think prior to 
Tuesday afternoon when the Attorney General made that 
decision, was there any reason for you to think there was 
any risks those documents that had been looked at by Hr . 
Reynolds or any other documents would be destroyed, altered, 
or shredded in the next few days? 

A I had no evidence to alert ne to that possibility. 

Q Did you even have any possibility that would 
suggest that that was likely to happen or even remotely 
likely to happen? 

A I had no evidence to suggest that that was likely 
to happen. 

KoH, by that time. I was not entirely, I mean 
obviously we had encounters with Hr . North and Kr . HcFarlane 
that accentuated our concerns, I guess, or provided a 
foundation for the conclusion that they had not been 
entirely straightforward and forthcoming in the chronology 



lEUSSra 



420 



NAME ■■ 
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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIHED 



PAGE 200 



and certainly not with respect to the existence oi this 
contra business . 

2 The diversion. 

A Right, but at that point, I just can't, you know, 
ue had no evidence to suggest that the act of shredding 
documents, which to rae , I think I expressed yesterday, is 
truly extraordinary kind o-f course of conduct to embark 
upon . 

2 In fact, it is a crine, is it not? Aren't you 
aware the destruction of official documents is a felony? 

A I am certain that that is true. I am not 
acquainted particularly or closely with the statutes in this 
area. But I am vaguely enough to know this would be a 
matter of the gravest--and this is a matter of the gravest 
concern . 

2 Would it be too strong to say it seemed to you 
inconceivable on Friday, I mean on Sunday or Monday even for 
that matter that critical documents might be about to be 
destroyed or altered permanently? 

A I don't think that would be too strong. 

Q How about the Attorney General? Did you have any 
reason to think that he had reason to think, based on what 
he knew, that that was likely, documents were likely to be 
shredded or destroyed, permanently altered during that time 
frame up until Tuesday the 25th7 



UNWSIFIED 



421 



MAME: HIR17t4002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 201 



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4912 
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A No. I mean, the fact any one of us had a basis on 
which to conclude-- 

2 Suspect-- 

A --that was likely-- 

2 Oi suspect it was likely. 

A We would have taken steps immediately necessazy to 
stopyto prevent it just as we took steps immediately to 
prevent inaccuxate testimony from being provided to 
Congress . 

2 So when the Attorney General made his decision on 
Tuesday, you viewed that as a means to protect the documents 
for the future rather than to stop something that was about 
to happen or in the process of happening? 

A Right. Absolutely. There was no thought there was 
anything in the office or underway in the nature of 
destruction of documents and evidence of wrongdoing. 

2 And did you view the Attorney General's decision as 
being a decision that would be typical and consistent with 
the institution of an investigation? 

A Yes. 

2 So not even really an unusual decision under the 
context of the decision that has been made that day? 

A Ko, that is exactly right. I mean I have confessed 
to you earlier I am not, I have no criminal prosecutorial 
experience or investigatory experience, but it did not 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



422 



NAHE: 

U916 
M9 17 
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HIR174002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 202 



strike rae as odd in the least that that would be the first 
matter disposed of on the launching of a criminal 
investigation . 

C The meeting that carae up at is, I believe, that 
230 meeting on Tuesday. 
Is that right? 

A I am sorry. 

2 I believe the meeting at which the discussion of 
and decision to freeze the documents and seal off the room 
carae up at the meeting at 2^30 on Tuesday the 25th; is that 
right? 

A Yes, apparently it did. 

2 That was a meeting attended by not only the 
Attorney General, but yourself, Steve Trott, Judge Webster. 
Director of the FBI, among others. 

Who was it at the meeting that suggested this be 
done? Was it the Attorney General himself, Mr. Trott, or 
Mr. Webster? 

A The only thing I recall is the Attorney General 
directing Ami* Burns to do it. I do very well recall the 
Attorney General clearly requesting Hr . Burns to be in touch 
with Peter Wallison to accomplish that. 

2 Now, Ms. Naughton raised a question, Hr . Cooper, 
that-- 

A And, you know, now that I re-exanine these notes. 



il 



UNCLASSIFIED 



423 



HAME : 

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4960 

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HIR174002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 203 



it IS entirely possible when ue reconvened with the AG at 
5^45 to 7:00 on Tuesday that it was at that time that Hr . 
Burns indicated he had not yet formed the request. 

I just suggest that as a possibility. I don't have 
a crisp recollection that that is the case. 

2 Was he accompanied by any of his deputies at either 
the meeting at 2 30 or the meeting at 5^45? 

A I do not recall it. I think the answer to that is 
no . 

2 Ms. Naughton raised the question earlier, I don't 
think you got a chance to respond to it, naybe it wasn't a 
question, maybe it was just a suggestion and you nay, for 
the record, want to respond to that. 

She identified, I believe on the record, Mr. 

L£)^uj4oM LauJ + flNl 

Cooper. Mary TlLiiUh^nii You know Hary luuglklia n, don't you? 

A I do. 

2 I think she is regarded as an expert on national 
security natters. Mould that be a fait statement? 

A I think it would. 

2 There seemed to be sone question or suggestion that 
perhaps you, in conducting yourself in this investigation at 
sone point should have called her in, Hs . I t^ufht en, and 
sought her advice with regard to findings, not the fact 
there were findings and the need for findings. 

Is there any particular reason why you did or 



UNCLASSIFIED 



424 



NAME : 
U966 
4967 
U968 
14969 
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S 



PAGE 204 



HIR174002 
didn't do that along the uay? 

A He did consult with Us. L u uj li L ui^ s office in 
preparation for a December 17 nemorandun , memoranda on 
certain issues. I cannot immediately recall to mind for you 
uihat issues they may have been, but I do know that we 
discussed it. 

Q Was there any specific reason why she hadn't been 
brought into the loop, so to speaK. earlier on with regard 
to the investigation of the pre-January events? 

A In our fact-finding? 

2 Either at the fact-finding stage or afterwards as 
you were doing a legal analysis of it. 

A Her office was consulted by nine in connection with 
the legal analysis. 

2 How about as to the fact-finding stage? Has there 
a need for her to be involved in that particular task? 

A Fact-finding? 

2 Yes. 

A I don't — 

2 When you and Mr. HcGinnis were putting the 
chronologies and all that information together? 

A I do remember discussing with Maty the so-called 
Bill Smith opinion. In fact, her office tracked it down for 
us . 

2 Did you go over it with her? 



UNCUSSIFIFD 



425 



HIR17U002 V I >l VE-' SV%^3 > K *- fc' PAGE 205 

A In a general sense, in a general way. But not in 
any detail. Once we had the opinion we had whatever it is 
the opinion says . 

2 How about the exhibit. Exhibit No. 2, your 
meraorandun to the Attorney General that you and Mr. HcGinnis 
worked on? She didn't have any input into that particular 
memo , did she 7 

A Hell, no, not beyond the--in terms of input, no. 
But we did obtain from nary the Smith opinion and that had a 
role, oi course, to play in that opinion. 

2 But you didn't view any particular necessity for 
her to be involved in the drafting of that opinion or 
assisting you in that? 

A No . 

2 She wasn't a member of your office, was she? 

A No, she is not, although--you Know, my task was to 
provide my legal analysis to the Attorney General on these 
matters, and that is exactly what we did. These were not 
particularly difficult or intricate, obscure points wa ware 
making . 

fi Hho did Assistant Attorney General Uallison assign 
from his division to head up the investigation on that 
Tuesday? 

A I don't know. I don't recall. 

2 Was it nark Kichardson? 



BNtussro 



426 



KAHE> 

5016 
50 17 
50 18 
SO 19 
5020 
5021 
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HIJ11711002 



UNCLASSIRED 



P&SI 206 



I Ko, X don't think so. Although Hark had a cola. 




I do not icankly cacall who was 
Bill Weld's ptinclpal daputy on this pactloulaz pcojact. 

Q Let me ask you the kitchen sink question before I 
turn it over to Tina. 

Is there anything I haven't asked you or Pan 
Naughton hasn't asked you that you think Is iaportant that 
you would like to have Included on the record In order to 
better clarliy It iron the perspactlva of what you did and 
what the kttornay General directed you to do and what the 
tttozney General did? 

A I can think oi nothing now I would like to add at 
this time. 

MS. UESTBY: I have a couple slapla quastlons. 
EXAHINATIOH OK BEHALr OP THE HOUSE SELECT COHHITTBE 
BY MS. UESTBY: 
8 The first one Is: when Heese pulled you aside In 
this confarenoe to say there alght be soae legal questions 
that you might be Involved with, did he at that tlae or at 
any tine soon after give you the iapresslon that he knew 
details on this or had been asked about the legality of an 
oral finding? 

A An oral finding? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



427 



HIR174002 



UNCUSSIHED 



PAGE 207 



2 Did he let you know he had been in conversations 
beiore? 

A Beiore an oral finding? 

Q Ox did he just say this is an issue that has cone 
up and be aware it might come to your office? 

A It was more in the nature of giving me a heads up 
that our office would almost certainly be examining legal 
issues that relate to the Iran initiative, then very much in 
the news . 

I subsequently learned, of course, that the 
Attorney General had been involved from the standpoint--at 
the inception of the Iran initiative, at least the part of 
It that was begun by the finding, early to mid-January, by 
providing legal advice, legal advice that, of course, would 
be under scrutiny. 

2 Did you learn that from him? 

A Yes. I learned it from other sources, everybody. 
There was no secret he was involved in it. I don't recall 
having had conversations about that on November 7 out at the 
Xerox training center, however. 

2 Even in the coming weeks, did he provide you any 
Kind of information, did he sit you down and say, "'By the 
way, you ought to know I was asked this question oz I was 
asked about the finding?'* 

A Asked about the finding? 



UNCUSSIHED 



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NAME 

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HIR17M002 



Well-- 



WNCUssm 



PAGE 208 



A I did know that he did undertake to pass on legal 
issues, the legality of the finding-- 

HR. LEON- Did he do that orally or in writing? 
THE WITNESS: Orally. At least to this day, I have 
never been acquainted with anything wrong he did although 
Sporkin worked up some legal documents, analyses, but he 
reviewed and discussed the matter with Sporkin and concluded 
it was indeed legally authorized. 
BY MS. MESTBY- 

Q Old you see him though when you were iirst 
introduced to this matter as an outsider to these events and 
then by the time you get around to meeting with everybody 
concerning Casey's testimony, realize he was a participant? 

A Oh, no, no. Certainly before the Casey meeting 
in--the meeting in PoindeKter's office regarding Casey knew 
very well he had the role I described. 

2 He did discuss that with you? 

A Oh , yes . 

2 All right. 

Tha other question I have was regarding your phone 
conversation with Richard Armitage. When you were on the 
phone with Armitage, I understand you to have been calling 
hira to find out what is the procedure for this kind of 
transaction . 



UNCLASSIFIED 



429 



NAME : 
5091 
5092 
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S09U 
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HIR17I4002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 209 



Did he give you any--did he say to you, ''Gee, whiz, 
I know more than how this thing works. I was asked about 
pricing on this?'' Did he give you--did he provide any 
details about his own participation? 

A Uell, I don't recall him having provided me any 
details about participation. 

S He didn't volunteer anything? 

A --in the sense o± participation prior to the 
time--contemporaneous with the events that ware being 
invcs tigated . 

Ho, I don't recall any oiiering oi his that h* had 
participation at that level. At best, I have a recollection 
that he was examining the details of the Economy Act 
transfers that took place and that that information was 
information that would be made available to us, of course, 
but I didn't--! do not recall any reference that he had any 
kind of involvement, let us say, in the DoD end of any of 
the individual transactions Hhen they took place, the TOW 
transfers . 

S What did he understand your role to be in this? 
Did he understand that you were investigating this for the 
Attorney General or did he just think you were calling out 
of the blue on behalf of the Attorney General? Did he know 
you were investigating this matter? 

A Wall, I am sure to the extent this happened before 



UNCLASSIHED 



430 



NAME ■■ 
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5 119 
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513M 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR174002 lllllll M.l.lll II II PAGE 210 
tha Tuesday press conference, I am sure I told him that ue 
ware looking into this matter and that it would ba helpful 
to us to have some information and some assistance on 
figuring out the Economy Act process, in general, and in 
particular as it related to the individual shipment of arras 
to Iran . 

2 And he never told you that his office was involved 
in that process ? 

A I don't recall him ever having told me that, no. I 
do not recall that. 

Now, when you say involved, let rae be clear; you 
mean in the Economy Act controversies that related to, let's 
say, the 508 TOWs or the 1000 TOWs-- 

Q Did he ever tell you his office had prepared 
documents or proposals or point papers regarding the 
specific shipments of HAUKS and TOUs? 

A I do not recall him having said that to me. 

2 Did ha ever tall you that he ever had any 
conversations with Ollie North about, for instance, the 
November shipment? 

A Ko , ha certainly didn't tell ma that. That is 
soaathing that I would have a racollaction of if he told ne . 

2 Did ha ask you anything? 

A I don't recall any struck na as odd or that made an 
impression on my memory. 



iiNcussro 



431 



NRME : 

Sim 
5m2 

5 ms 
5 my 
5 ms 

5 146 
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5 ISO 

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5 160 

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HIR174002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 2 1 1 



MS. UESTBY: That is about it for me. 

MR. LEOK: Let rae :ust finish with one thing, 3ust 
one simple point. I want the record to be clear about this. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. LEON- 
2 From the point your investigation began on Friday 
afternoon to lunch time after the Attorney General spoke to 
the President, up until the President was informed on Monday 
morning by the Attorney General of the events, during that 
time frame, is it safe to say, Mr. Cooper, that you and 
other members of that investigation team were working on a 
constant basis long hours and under great pressure? 

A I think that in all candor and all modesty, it 
wildly understates the matter. 

e I think this IS important because, first of all, 
the press will be reviewing whatever portions of this 
transcript probably are unclassified and historians will be 
reviewing it and this investigation is going to be the 
subject of scrutiny probably for years, not to mention the 
neKt few days, and I think it is important that those who 
review it have a flavor, a sense of how the four of you that 
u*ra doing this investigation, the conditions under which 
you were operating, the sense of urgency and pressure under 
which you were operating. 

And while the chronology gives flavor certainly to 



KlASSlfe 



432 



MAHE ■ 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR17U002 |JI1Lll_niJIJII ll_&J PAGE 212 
Ihe constant grind of meetings of very sensitive matters and 
complicated matters, I think it is important for you to 
state in your own words for the record some sense of the 
rush of it all, the burden of it all, so that people can 
view what was done and the decisions that were made in 
perspective of how the four of you were living. 

So if you could :ust give something to the record 
for that point, and I invite you to state it as fully as you 
wish, because I have no other questions. 

A nr . Leon, I appreciate your affording me that 
opportunity, because it is not possible for my chronology or 
any recounting of events I might provide to you or your 
colleagues even over a span of what now has exceeded 20 
hours m testimony by me, by me alone, DUst one member of 
that small group of people who were involved in this 
project. 

Even over that length of time, it is really 
entirely impossible for me to fully provide you with a sense 
of. with an adequate, accurate sense of the circumstances of 
that period of time . 

It uas--to call it exhausting and hectic and 
complicated all would be pale ad jectives and I really am 
unable to provide a description of it. of that weekend that 
would accurately suggest the circumstances under which we 
were proceeding. 




n 



433 



NAME ■■ 

519 1 
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/ 5199 
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HIR174002 



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At the same time, I do not for a moment deny that 
it was very eKCiting. I don't mind saying that, 
notwithstanding it was--you now the thing has led to such 
extraordinary consequences . And the full consequences are 
not even now fully appreciated probably. 

But obviously I do not participate in meetings in 
which I am personally interviewing on matters so sensitive 
and so important to the Nation and to the President, 

matters--! po not often sit in and discuss matters of that 

/ 

kind with the Secretary of StatA rid National Security 
Advisers, and Directors of Central Intelligence. 

So I cannot disguise, nor do I disclaim the fact 
that it was an element of excitement to have been involved 
in this and to have been in that place at that time in 
history. But by the same token, it was a matter, 

the importance of which the Nation was uppermost in my mind, 
and I think in the minds of everybody there. 

And the potential consequences for the Nation, for 
this Administration, were fully appreciated and simply added 
a sense of gravity to the undertaking . 

But it was, my chronology and the amount of time 
that It has taken me to answer your questions, do provide 
some flavor, perhaps, of the nature of the weekend and the 
pressures we were operating under. 

2 I think it is important to state that because there 



UNcussm 



434 



NAME: 
5216 
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HIR1714002 **■ ■ w"" •w'^»" - — — PkGZ 214 
will always be a lot oi Monday morning quarter backing and in 
this case it is an apt analogy because it was a weekend 
event, but I think you have captured the sense and I think 
you would agree that there was an operational sense anong 
the four oi you that were acting out oi a sense oi great 
caution because oi the importance and sensitivity oi what 
was going on. 

I think you would agree there was a sense oi every 
effort was being made to act deliber atively , but yet at the 
same time, very cautiously. 

Would that capture in part the manner the four of 
you were conducting your duties? 

A I do not quarrel, but rather accept your 
characterization, yes. 

2 On behalf oi the House Conmittee , and I am sure I 
speak for the Senate, you know, we sometimes don't 
adequately express our sense of thanks . You have been 
extraordinarily generous of your time. 

As an Assistant Attorney General, you have a busy 
calendar and you and the Office of Legislative Governmental 
Affairs have bean very cooperative and worked very long 
hours to assist us in the collection of your testimony and 
you have been very helpful in the collection of documents to 

oar 

supplement ml prior discovery, which you were very helpful 
with . 



WUSWfl 



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PAGE 215 



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On behalf of the House and Senate Comnittees and 
the Henbers. I would like to thank you for the time and 
effort and candor and inconvenience to your schedule. Ue 
appreciate it very much. 

A I am grateful very much for that, for your 
comments . I also uant to nake known on the record that I 
have been accorded every personal and professional courtesy 
by the staff of this conmittee, and for that I an most 
grateful as well. 

MR. LEON: Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 14 : 1 5 p.m. , the deposition was concluded. 1 



fifimsim 



436 



STENOGRAPHIC MDWTE8 
Unrerlsed an 
Not for Quo< 
Dupttcatlon 



» . UnrerlMd and Unc^ltoK' 

* Not for Quotation or 



uncussified'^^ 



'•5'%' 



r 




> Committee Hearings 

oftha 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES f 



PartialW Declassiried/Releasecl on ±^ 
under provisions ot t.u. uj3o 
byNMen.n.N.tion.l$«:untyCounc.l 



W 



OFFICE OF THE CLEBK 
Office of Ofllctal Bcportcn 



UNOASSra 1^' 



437 



NAHE: HIR182000 



mimm 



PAGE 1 



RPTS TETER 
DCHH TETER 

DEPOSITION OF CHARLES J. COOPER 

Uadnesday, July 1, 1987 

Housa of RepresentativAs , 
Select Connittea to Invastigata 
Covert Arns Transactions with 
Iran , 
Washington, D.C. 

The Select Connittae net, pursuant to call, at 10 ^UO 
a . n . , in Room 2226, Raybutn Housa Office Building, Richard 
Leon (Deputy Chief Minority Counsel) presiding. 

Present: on behalf of the House Select Connittee^ 
Richard Leon, Deputy Chief Hinorlty Counsel: and Panela 
Naughton, Staff Counsel. 

On behalf of the Senate Select Conmittee: Richard 
Pazxy, Associate Counsel. 

On behalf of the Hltness^ Thomas H. Boyd, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice. 
HR. LEOK: On the record. 



Whereupon, 



Partially Declassified/Released on 



W-?F 



mmm 



under provisions of EO. 12355 
Menan, National Security Council 



438 



Hint 

26 
27 
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m 

142 
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49 
50 



HIR182000 



yNCLASSIHED 



PAGE 



CHARLES J. COOPER 
was called for as a witness and, having been first duly 
sworn, was exanlned and testified as follows ^ 

MR. LEOK: Why don't we have--we'll go around the 
table and have everybody introduce themselves. 

Hy nane is Richard Leon. I'n Deputy Chief 
Minority Counsel of the House Conmittee on Iran. 

tin. PARRY: Richard Parry> Associate Counsel of 
the Senate Select Connittee. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Pamela Kaughton. Staff Counsel 
with the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran. 

HR. BOYD: Thomas Boyd, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Justice Department. 

THE HITKESS' Charles J. Cooper, Assistant 
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, Department 
of Justice. 

HR. LEON: Hr . Cooper, thank you so much for 
coming today. He never expected last week, after 18 hours 
worth of depositions, approximately, that we'd feel a need 
to call you back and prey upon your good offices and your 
patlance and tiaa . As I have promised you, and Hr . Boyd, 
we're going to try to be very brief about this and get you 
in and out. 

Hhat's precipitated this deposition today, as 



•m 



J A 



X 



ftSSM 



439 



ICLASSIflED 



KAME- KIR182000 ■■'■='— »w w •■• ■■■.r p^Qg 

51 you, I an sure, are aware, there's an exhibit that was 

52 submitted--actually it wasn't an exhibit, I believe, it was 

53 the release of a transcript of the deposition of Judge 

54 Abraham Sofaer, Legal Counsel to the Secretary of State, a 

55 deposition dated June 18th, 1987. 

56 House minority was unaware that that deposition 

57 had ever taken place until it had been released that day in 

58 the hearings last week when you appeared and we had no 

59 knowledge that it was going to be referred to m any 

60 questioning of you, and of course, you had never seen it 

6 1 prior to the hearing last Thursday, nor been questioned 

62 about it in any way, shape or form prior to the hearings. 

63 Having reviewed the transcript, there were 

6'4 questions that we feel need to be asked on the record of you 

65 regarding certain conversations that are recounted m there 

66 by Judge Sofaer, and because of that, we've asked you to 

67 give up some part of your time to answer those questions and 

68 we thank you very much for being here today to answer those 

69 questions . 

70 THE WITNESS: I'm happy to be here. It is ray 

7 1 purpose to respond to the Committee's request until such 

72 time as my usefulness has been expended, and you all will 

73 know that; I won't, but I will continue to cooperate in any 
714 way I can. 

75 HR. LEOH: Thanks. 



iwssro 



440 



NAME-- 
76 
77 
78 
79 
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83 

814 

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HIR182000 



IINCUSSIflED 



PAGE 



My colleagua, Pam Naughton. I'm iniotmed, has 
only ona question she wants to ask and I think, for the sake 
of her busy schedule and--I think it would be easiest ^ust to 
defer to her and have her ask her question and whatever 
follow-up she has and then I'll go back to the transcript 
and address the questions that precipitated calling you in 
here . 

MS. KAUGHTON: Thank you very much, Dick. I 
think first we should get the prelininaries out of the way. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

fi Mr. Cooper, are you represented here today in 
your personal capacity? 

A Mr. Boyd is hare from the Department of Justice, 
under the same understandings, agreements and statements we 
made on the record on the first day of my hearing, so yes, 
he is here as both tha Department's institutional 
representative, as well as my own. 

fi So it's your understanding that ha represents 
both yourself and the Department of Justice? 

A Precisely the same understanding that I 
expressed and that we discussed upon--and I guess the 
deposition transcript will reflect--on the first day of my 
deposition of testimony. 



mmm 



\ 



441 



NAHE: 

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HIR182000 



mmsm 



PAGE 



2 Then I'm a littla confused, Mr. Cooper, because 
I understand that the Departnent nade some public 
statenents, and you made a public statement that you ueie 
not represented personally at the last deposition. I wanted 
to clear that up. 

A. Well. I — 

MR. BOYD: Could ue have clarification as to 
what these public statements are? 

HR. LEON: I have a copy of the deposition right 
here if you'd like to refer to it. 

THE WITNESS: I do not have a copy of that, but 
I recall our conversation on it and-- 

HR. LEON: Would you like to refer to it? 

THE WITNESS: --and my own position on this 
matter hasn't changed at all. And on the same basis on 
which Mr. Bolton and, for a considerable amount of time, Mr. 
Boyd were present for the earlier portions of my deposition. 
I understand them to be present today. 

ns. NAUGHTON: I just want to get clear, then, 
what's going on today. 

BY HS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Are you both--does Hr . Boyd both represent you 
and the Departnent of Justice? 

A The understanding that I have regarding Kr . 
Boyd's presence is reflected in this deposition transcript. 



UNWSIHED 



442 



NAME : 
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ms 
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ISO 



HIR182000 



UNClASSinED 



PAGE 



which nr . Leon has--has displayed here to ne , and, you know, 
I'm satisfied with that--that description on the record 
there, and really don't perceive a reason to articulate it 
all over again. 

I nean, you know, I explained in detail what ray 
view oi this was. Pas. It hasn't changed at all. I haven't 
had any further conversations about this since the tine that 
we outlined the essence, so Hr . Boyd is here on the sane 
basis that he was. 

S That was unclear in the deposition and there's 
been a great deal of controversy about that, tlr . Cooper, and 
that's why I want to get it straight today before we proceed 
to-- 

A The controversy has escaped ny attention. Where 
is this--where is the--that has involved me and the status of 
my-- 

fi I withdraw that comment. I simply ask you, does 
nr . Boyd represent both yourself and the Department of 
Justice today? 

A That Is my understanding, yes. 

fi Okay, thank you. 

ns. KAUGHTOK: And Hr . Boyd, for the record, 
whom do you represent today? 

MR. BOYD: I represent Hr . Cooper in his 
capacity as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 



Mussro 



443 



NAnt : 
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HIR182000 



ONCUSSIflED 



PAGE 



Office oi Legal Counsel, consistent with agreements that 
we've reached with counsel on both sides of the Hill and the 
Select Connittees of both Houses, and have exercised in 
previous appearances before this body. 

MS. NAUGHTOH: Okay, and is it your opinion that 
you also represent the Departnent of Justice at this 
proceeding ? 

KK. BOYD: rir . Cooper is an employee of the 
Department of Justice, and when engaging in the conduct 
about which he has testified, he was a representative of the 
Department and ue are representing him personally, at his 
request, before the Select Committee. 

nx. LEOM: So if there were a conflict of 
interest-- 

HR. BOYD: If there were a conflict of 
interest--if his activities were in any way--we'd have to 
recuse ourselves, of course. 

HS. NAUGHTON: All right, so your position is 
that you represent him personally, and not the Department of 
Justice; is that correct? 

HR. BOYD: I'll not sure I understand the 
question, but I represent him personally before this 
congressional committee at his request. 

HS. HAUGHTOK: All right. 

BY HS . HAUGHTOK: 



wmm 



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HIR182000 



UNCussm 



AGE 



8 



2 And is that your undaistanding , Kr . Cooper? 

A That is largttly my undars tanding , you knou. It 
has navar baan ny raquast that anybody acconpany to thesa 
depositions, howavar, neither do I have any objection to--to 
anyone acconpanying aa to thasa depositions or answering 
these questions undaz--under spotlights and in public. 

But my understanding o{ tha arrangements that 
have been worked out on this batwaan our Department and this 
Committee are laflactad in that transcript, and I have no 
understanding beyond that, tha transcript of tha deposition 
from my first day oi testimony. And I — you know, I endorse 
it, I incorporate it by reference and I don't hava any basis 
on which to elongate on it. It's just tha same state of 
affairs that etiisted back than that I understand to exist 
now . 

S So you accept Mr. Boyd's representation that he 
rapzesents you pazsonally today-- 

A I do — 

2 --in thasa proceedings . 

A — accept that representation, as I accepted that 
understanding of tha status of affairs on tha first day of 
my dapositlon whan tha whole thing was axplainad to me then 
for the very first time. 

nx. LEOM: And was applied the second day of 
your deposition, Juna 23rd. 



uNWsro 



I 



* 



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KAME: 
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BNCUSSm 



PAGE 



THE HITHESS: Yes, y«s. 

MR. LEOK- you didn't hava to ba reexaninad on 
that occasion. 

THE HITNESS: I don't racall a conversation 
about It. 

HR. BOYD: Let ita ask a question for the record, 
and that is, Ms. Kaughton mada taieranca to public 
statanants . Could you give us note specifics as to what 
public statenents you're rafaiiing to? 

HS . NAUGHTON: Yes, I understand the Department 
oi Justice spoke to reporters yesterday or the day before. 
You said that Hr . Cooper was not represented personally at 
the depositions which we held last weak. 

MR. BOYD: Where did those conments appear? I 
haven't seen then; have you? 

MS. HAUGHTOM: Well, I ' a not hare to testify. 

THE HITKESS: I have knowledge that sounds 
similar to the points that you're making and I did discuss 
the status of my own representation with a reporter from the 
Legal Times. I recall, and tried, in the best way I could, 
to explain to him as accurately as I could the arrangement 
that was worked out, but I stressed to him then, as I 
stressed her*, and I will stress again. I've not retained 
private counsel to represent ae in any aspect of any element 
of my conduct throughout this. and--and. you know, I'm eager 



WMSSW 



446 



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'mmm 



PAGE 10 



to not piojAct any inpiession ot czsata any iniezance that I 
havA . 

HS . MAUGHTON: Did you tall anyone, including 
the repoitez, that you weza not pazsonally zepzasented at 
the depositions? 

THE WITNESS: No, I don't baliava I told anyone 
that, no. I think what I told anyone who I discussed this 
with is an undazstanding , a zepzasantation oi the 
undezstanding about the zeasons ioz Hz. Bolton's oz Hz. 
Boyd's pzesence heze in a capacity that is pezsonal to ne , 
but I caztainly navaz--navaz dasczibad that undezstanding in 
a way that's inconsistent with the undezstanding zailected 
on this deposition tzanscript, not to a zapoztez, not to 
anybody else . 

HS. NAUGHTON: Okay. Hell, I'n glad you had an 
oppoztunity to cleaz that up. 

THE WITNESS: Yaah. 

HR. BOYD: I have said, too, foz the zecozd, 
that ouz zepzesentation oi Hz. Coopaz is in no uay diiiezent 
fzoB the zapzasantation of othaz agencies who have testified 
on both sides . 

BY HS. NAUGHTON: 
fi Hz. Coopaz, if we can gat to the substance now, 
I Dust have one question foz you. 

When you and the Attozney Genezal intezviewed 




447 



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RobAit KcFai 



Jiussifii 



PAGE 1 1 



6, in the afternoon. 



Friday aftarnoon-- 

A Yes. 

2 --do you recall whether or not either you or the 
Attorney General told Mr. HcFarlane about Secretary oi 
Shultz'- note, that is, the note that Hr . Hill had regarding 
the statement that Mr. HcFarlane had told Shultz in November 
oi '85 that there were HauKs on that shipnent? 

A It's my recollection that ue did not tell hin 
about that note. In fact, I can recall going into the 
interview thinking that we would question hin about a 
conversation and, ii necessary, suggest the existence of a 
note that documented that conversation, but in fact, that 
line of inquiry never was asked--or I should take that back. 
Ue did, indeed, discuss the question regarding any 
conversations that he may have had in November about the 
November episode, the November event, and about 
conversations that he may have had with Shultz. 

X r««lly can't remembez whether he offered the 
iniozaati.on> as I recall it now, that he doesn't recall 
having a conversation, but he thinks he probably did--he did 
say that during tha interview--or whether the Attorney 
General asked him the question whether he had such a 
conversation. But in any event, he did make reference, as X 
have just described, to a possible conversation that he had. 



m i^ssif iw 



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UNCUSSIHED 



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HIR182000 PAGE 12 

but thais was no teietttnca during that interview to notes in 
ny recollection. 

2 Wall, when Mr. ncrarlane said he nay have had a 
conversation with Shultz, did he say that nay have involved 
Hawk nissiles-- 

A Oh, no-- 

2 --Hawk nissiles? 

A No, he did not. That--that I can be quite 
confident in ny stateaent about. 

2 Has it indicated in any way to hin by either 
yourself or the Attorney General that Secretary Shultz had 
told you or had told soaeone else that Hr . ncFarlane had 
nentioned the Hawk aissile shipment to the Secretary in 
November of '85? 

A No, it was not, not during that conversation, 
but I can tell you this ^ I, as the interview was taking 
place, I believed silently that HcFarlane knew that we knew 
that there were notes of a Shultz/HcFarlane conversation on 
this subject matter. 

a Hhy did you get that feeling? 

A It wasn't so much that I got that feeling from 
the context or anything that h« said. 

fi Uh-huh. 

A It was just that I had had conversations with — on 
Thursday evening, with Paul Thompson, In whlch--you know, I 



f««i) 



449 



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HIR182000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 13 



was really quita urgently about the business of trying to 
gat the testiaony straightened out and was advising Paul 
Thompson that they were very--very serious cloud over the 
statement that, you know, we had gone into at length, both 
here and in public testimony, and I--and I advised him that 
ue had information of a conversation and later, I advised 
him not only did we have different recollections, but that 
the Secretary of State's recollection is supported and 
corroborated, I am told, by a note, an allegedly 
contemporaneously taken note of the conversation. 

So--and it was also ay understanding from Paul 
Thompson that he had talked to North and that Horth, in 
turn, had talked to McFarlane, though I never talked to 
North, and I never talked to ncFarlane. This is what I 
perceived and--froa Thompson, and upon learning--and that 
notwithstanding these facts, they still maintained their 
position on it, that--that the conflict was unavoidable and 
we couldn't clear it up. He would simply have to deal with 
the immediate problem, which was getting it out of any 
testimony or mny reference that Poindexter might make in his 
informal briefings and clear it up in due time as 
expeditiously as possible. 

So, Hs . Kaughton, I--as we were discussing it, I 
believed that McFarlane probably knew about the existence of 
this note as he was discussing the question of the November 



mm raFltD 



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HIR182000 



transfer 



IINCUSSIHED 



PAGE 14 



2 But he--l can assume he never referred to-- 

A He never--he did not, he did not. 

US. NAUGHTON: Thank you very nuch. I appreciate 
your indulgence . 

THE WITHESS: Certainly. 

EXAHIHATIOM OM BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT 
COHHITTEE 

By HR. LEOM: 

2 It occurs to ite . Mr. Cooper, that anong the 
exhibits to Judge Soiaer's tastinony is a Novenbez 21 
menorandun which Judge Soiaer advised the Secretary of State 
not to--not to neet Bud HcFarlane's request to neet with hin 
about a prior conversation, in that Sofaet testified that 
there was an inquiry on HcFarlane's part into what they had 
talked about--and notes were going. Did Sofaer bring that to 
your attention on the 2 1st at all? 

A Bud's request to neet with the Seczetary--and 
the 21st is Friday? 

fi Right. Oo you recall going over that with Bud? 

A You know, I don't have a specific recollection 
of Abe Sofaer telling ae ',hat HcFatlane was trying to do 
this, but I have a very general and vague recollection that. 
indeed, he aay have nentioned that. I Bean, I knew that 
that event had taken place before I read about it in the 



lifiCLASSIFIED 



451 



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IINClASSIfe 



PAGE 15 



deposition transcript. But whan it cam* to aa or in what 
contaxt Soiaar or anybody else might have made that known to 
me, I do not recall. 

It may well ba--you know, it may well be that 
that iniormation or that--you know, it occurs to me that the 
Secretary of State may have mentioned that in our interview 
with him Saturday morning that HcFarlane was calling him or 
attempting to sat up a meeting with him and that he — and that 
he was going to decline to have such a meeting with him. 
I have a general and vague recollection that 
that may well--I hate to keep qualifying it, but I only have 
a general recollection that Shultz may have mentioned it 
Saturday morning and I just have no recollection whether my 
notes reveal that or not, but my notes may even--may even 
provide some insights on that. 

Q So it's possible that Bud HcFarlane on Friday 
was inquiring of th* State Departaent about notes that he 
had heard about axisting betwean--concerning the conversation 
between him and Shultz--that he had heard about those 
notes--the axistance of those notes from Thompson or somebody 
else as a result of your conversations on Thursday evening? 

A Oh, yes, and I fully--not only possible--! mean, I 
have a strong sense that Paul Thompson--! mean, ! fully 
expected him to communicate these facts to Horth and 



HcFarlane-- 



HHtiAssro 



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HIR182000 
A 



UNCUSSIREO 



PAGE 16 



To sea if that changed their story oi 

Exactly . 

--or changed their recollection. 



A Exactly, exactly, exactly. 

S So it wasn't like sonething that you wanted 
hidden iron them. 

A Mo, no. Mot at that time; not at all. What I 
wanted was the--a consistent zecollection oi the events by 
all oi the people who were players, and taking all the 
iniormation that had come from various sources and sharing 
it with the people who had memories, or had some other basis 
for having knowledge, was the--my obvious and first eiiorts 
to try to clear up what, on the iace oi it, seemed like 
diiierent recollections oi failures oi recollections or 
whatever . 

But I do not recall — I don't think that Sofaer 
would have told me that ncfazlane is trying to see the 
Secretary of State prior to the time that I met with 
McFarlane, so I don't — so X think that my supposition that 
I've suggested earlier, that HcFarlane knew about the notes 
and probably knew--well, that HcFarlane knew about the 
existence of the notes# even while we were interviewing him, 
notwithstanding his answers In no way suggesting that he 
did, is not based upon knowledge that he was at that point 
attempting to see the Secretary oi State. X don't think I 



pcmssinED 



453 



vnmsim 



HXnZ HIR182000 ^^ ■ ■ ** Wf I WUI I II 11 PAGE 17 

UOl kneu that while ue were interviewing McFarlane . I'm quite 

402 coniident that I didn't know it, but I do have the general 

403 recollection that I cane by that iniornation not long 

UOU thereafter, probably very shortly thereafter, and I think 

UOS with the Secretary of State. 

406 2' Let lie direct your attention to the principal 

UO? reason why I asked you to come in today, and that is to 

U08 address certain questions that arise in connection with 

409 Judge Sofaer's testimony, vis-a-vis his conversations with 

4 10 Deputy Attorney General Burns-- 

411 A Uh-huh. 

412 2 --on the 20th of Novenber, 1986, and as I said 

413 before, these were conversations that were not covered in 

414 your public testimony, or at least, your knowledge of then 

415 and your knowledge of the events relayed in then, and I 

416 would like to ask you some questions on it. 

4 17 Have you had an opportunity to read through the 

418 deposition of Judge Sofaer that's been released? 

4 19 A I have. 

420 s Okay. 

42 1 I'd like to direct your attention to the page 37 

422 az*» and then the area within there and let aa focus in on a 

423 few of tha facts . 

424 Judge Sofaer testified on page 38 that he called 

425 Deputy Attorney General--he tried to reach the Attorney 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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HIR182000 



^mssim 



PAGE 18 



Ganeial on the 20th and was unsuccessful, and that aftei 
being unsuccessful, he called the Deputy Attocney General, 
Arnold Burns, around 2^30 in the afternoon and left certain 
information with hin. and from looking at the structure of 
the deposition, it appears that the iniocnation that he left 
with Burns is that which he recounts earlier on page 37 
between lines 14 to 19. And for the record, let rae indicate 
what that information, at least as he seems to indicate it 
to have been. 

He wanted to call the Attorney General to advise 
him that the testimony of Casey that was anticipated the 
next day contained information about a shipment allegedly of 
oil-drilling bits and that he, Sofaer, did not believe that 
statement, and that in Secretary Shultz' notes, which 
Charlie Hill, his Executive Assistant, had a copy of, was an 
indication of a shipment in November of Hawk missiles and 
that ncFailane knew about it. 

This seems to be what Judge Sofaer was 
indicating he left as a message for Hi . Burns . 

He then went on to testify that he heard back 
from Hr . Burns and Hi. Burns indicated to him, sometime 
around 3:15 on the afternoon of the 20th, and this is 
indicated on page 38 of Judge Sofaei's testimony, that he 
spoke with Judge--excuse me, with Deputy Burns and Deputy 
burns indicated that he had conveyed this information I've 




455 



NAME : 
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46 t 
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HIR182000 



MNCUSSm 



PAGE 19 



:]ust desciibed. and on page 39, h« recounts that he conveyed 
the information at about 2^30 to the Attorney General about 
the November '85 shipment from Israel and about the CIA's 
testimony concerning a White House urgent request for 
assistance m that shipment and a White House/NSC denial of 
such assistance. 

Judge Sofaer then goes on to testify that Deputy 
Attorney General Burns indicated to him that the Attorney 
General had responded to that by stating that he had spent 
the afternoon with Poindexter and Casey on Casey's testimony 
and that he, the Attorney General, was fully aware of the 
facts that had been mentioned by Sofaer to Burns and Burns 
went on to say that the AG was profuse in his thanks for the 
warning of Judge Sofaer and appreciated his motives, but 
that he, the Attorney General, knew of certain facts that 
explained all these matters and that laid to rest all the 
problems that Sofaer might perceive. 

And then Sofaer goes on to add that Burns said 
the Attorney General did not give him. Burns, any facts and 
that h«> Burns, was simply passing on the mysterious--Sof aer 
says this was a characterization that Deputy Burns 
used--myster lous assurance that all was well. 

Now, having focused your attention on that 
series of events of statements, let me start off with this 
point . 



456 



MAKE : 

M76 
U77 
U78 
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U82 
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HIR182000 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 20 



After the Attorney General left the meeting that 
you attended with hm at the White House, he was heading to 
West Point, wasn't he, Mr. Cooper? 

A Yes , he was . 

2 And you, of course, stayed behind to neet with 
Mr. Uallison at Mr. Wallison's request-- 

A That ' s right . 

S --and it was shortly thereafter that you learned 
about because of Judge Sofaer's phone call which he 
testifies to to Wallison's office, which he says he was 
unsatisfied with Deputy Burns' response to hin and that was 
what prompted him to call Wallison and that's when you 
learned about it. 

A Right. 

C Now, from that point forward, when was the first 
time you spoke with the Attorney General, to the best of 
your recollection, on the 20th, regarding this conflict that 
you now knew about and perceived to be on the horizon? 

A It would hav* been sometime around--uell , 
actually, ay chronology, if you've got it. will best 
reveal--it may well be that I talked to him prior to the time 
I had a secure conversation with him, but it was only to 
suggest that we have to have a secure conversation. 

fi Okay. 

A And, in fact, I don't think I made any other 



IJNCUSSinED 



457 



UNCLASSIHED 



HAKE: HIR182000 UllULa^Uvll IkU PkQZ 21 

501 airarvgemants with the AG on an open line, but rather, dealt 

502 with Ann Rondeau, who is kind of his National Security 

503 Advisor, or was, so it's possible that we had a conversation 

504 over the phone prior to the time that we had our secure 

505 conversation which took place, according to my notes, from 

506 10:30 to around 11. But any such conversation we might have 

507 had, and I don't think we did have one, would have been 

508 designed for ma to tall him it's imperative that wa talk on 

509 a secure line . 

5 10 2 Uh-huh. 

511 A I do know I said that to Ann Rondaau, and It 

512 was--and that was probably about an hour and a half, mayba 

513 even two hours before I ultimately did gat through on a 
5 14 secure line-- 

515 2 Okay. 

516 A --because it was an eKtraordinary hassle to get a 

517 secure connaction to tha AG at that time. 

518 2 Kow, was it your impression when you reached the 

519 AG finally over a secure line and you had an opportunity to 

520 discuss with him tha problems that you saw about tha 

52 1 testimony and tha conflict between Shultz and HcFarlane, 

522 that ha had already been .'^riefed about those problems by 

523 Deputy Bums? 

52'* A Ko . it was not. 

525 S It was not your impression? 



UNCLASSIHED 



458 



^ 



NAME : 
526 
527 
528 
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531 
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541 
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HIRia2000 



UNCUISSIFIED 



PAGE 22 



A Ko . It was not. It uas--i»y inpression was quite 
tha contrary. 

2 Okay. 

Kow, had--prior to your speaking to tha Attorney 
General over tha secure phone about this matter, had Deputy 
Burns or anyone in his behalf mfomed you that he. Burns, 
had spoken with Soiaer about this problen? 

A I recall no such conversation and I have every 
confidence that I would recall such a conversation. 

Q Do you recall Judge Sofaer, as he's testified, 
indicating to you that he had spoken with Burns and was 
unsatisfied with tha answer Burns had given hin? 

A I do recall Judge Sofaer nentioning to na that 
he had talked with Bums and had raised his concerns or had 
raised a concern. That is the extent of ray recollection, 
but it is certainly ny recollection that Sofaer, in my 
conversation with hia. not whan I was at Uallison's office, 
but later whan I was in my own office and wa had our further 
conversation, that ha nantionad ha had--that ha had talked 
aazliax with Arnia. 

Q Okay . 

Did you, at soma point, within tha next day or 
two, speak with Burns about these matters? 

A I don't think I've aver spoken--well , until the 



last 24 hours- 



yNCLASSlFIED 



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NAME : 
551 
552 
SS3 
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555 
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56U 
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5714 
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HIR182000 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 23 



Yeah. 



A --With Bums about what, if anything, h« recalls 
or did or anything else . 



You naan in terms of talking to Sofaer about 



the- 



Yes , exactly . 

Okay . 

And was that pionpted by this deposition-- 

It was , indeed . 

--the Sofaer deposition? 

Yes, it was. 

Okay . 

Kow, going back to the Sofaer deposition again-- 

X had no idea until this deposition was 
released, in fact, that Sofaer night have explained to Burns 
what he explained to ne . 

2 Now, according to Sofaer's recollection. Burns 
characterized his--excuse me, not char acter ized--Burns stated 
that the Attorney General had said to him. Burns, that he, 
the Attorney General, ''knew of certain facts' '--I'm quoting 
now, that ''he knew of certain faicts that explained all 
these matters and that lay to rest all the problems that 
I,*' meaning Sofaer, ''might perceive,*' and that's en page 
39 of Sofaer's transcript. 
A Uh-huh. 



iiHcussra 



460 



NAME : 
S76 
S77 
578 
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HIR182000 



UNCUSSIRED 



PAGE 24 



2 Had the Attorney General ever indicated to you 
that he uas aware of certain facts that explained all these 
matters and laid to rest all the problems that-- 

A In my conversation with hin? 

2 Has he ever--had he at that tine ever indicated 
to you that he-- 

A No. of course not. 

2 Uas it your impression when you talked to hin 
over the secure phone that the conflicts that you were 
outlining to him and the Shultz position versus the 
KcFarlane position was something that he hadn't focused on 
and didn't even really realize existed? 

A That is--I--that is precisely the case. He--he 
recognized, as surely as I did, the conflict. I described 
to hira the whole background, everything that I'd found out 
from Sofaer, and its irreconcilability with the information 
that we had that had been developed in this meeting with 
PoindeKter--in Poindexter's office. Also that neither side 
of this dispute would relent on their recollection of it and 
that it seemed like a serious matter to me, fully 
appreciated, and was in no way knowledgeable from any ; 
indication I got from the secure phone call of any of the 
facts that I was relating to him. 

Incidentally, I have noted in Nr . Sofaer °s 
deposition, which, incidentally, is in every respect, in 



UNCLASSIFIED 



461 



NAME ■ 
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602 
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604 
60S 
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6 12 
613 

6114 

6 15 
616 
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619 
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621 
622 
623 
6214 
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HIR182000 



ONCLASSiriED 



PAGE 25 



tarns of its description of conversations uith rae and 
exchanges that we might have had. comports with my general 
recollection of those events . 

2 Okay . 

A And my recollection--! can recall that the public 
testimony was refreshed by Ms. Kaughton on a conversation 
that I hadn't remembered that we had had, but sure enough. I 
do recall it now and it is--largely as Judge Sofaer's 
described in his deposition testimony. 

But he--he mentions something here about--at the 
top of page 39 of the deposition--about the Kovember 1985 
shipment from Israel and one matter that he was concerned 
about, about the CIA's testimony concerning a White House 
urgent request for assistance in that shipment and the White 
House/NSC denial of such assistant. 

Kow, the only thing I have any recollection on 
is the November 1985 shipment from Israel and the oil- 
drilling element of that and the state of knowledge of U.S. 
persons regarding what was on that plana. That was my sole 
focus of attention. That was the only--I am not--I do not 
undazstand now what Sofaer is referring to as he describes 
th* request for assistance and the HSC's denial that it 
requested the assistance, although that may well be 
something that Sofaez and I discussed, but I have no 
recollection of that and its immediate significance. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



462 



UNCLASSIHED 



626 
627 
628 
629 
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63 1 
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63M 
63S 
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6U0 

6m 

6U2 
6M3 
6UM 
6U5 
6<46 
6147 
6U8 
6>49 
650 



HIR182000 



PAGE 26 



Cattainly it did not occur to ne then, and it still doesn't 
occut to ma. Uhat did iocus ny attention was the 
McFazlana/Shultz conversation. 

2 Let na ask you this. Uith regard to the 
characterization that the Attorney General-- that Sofaer 
recalls, the Deputy Burns characterization of the Attorney 
General's response as being ''mysterious''-- 

A Uh-huh. 

S --had that ever been shared with you by Deputy 
Burns or anyone that he felt that the Attorney General had a 
''mysterious'' explanation of events? Have you ever heard 
that before, seeing the Sofaer deposition? 

A Ko , I had not. I certainly have no recollection 
whatever for it and that is something I would recall, I do 
believe . 

2 Kow, the Attorney General was en route--he was 
flying up to Kaw York, was ha not, from Washington, D.C., on 
the 20th? 

A Ha laft--you know, I don't know what he did 
batwaan tha tlma ha left my prasanca-- 

S Uh-huh. 

A --and got to Hast point, but-- 

e To Hast Point. 

A --but it was my understanding whan he left that 
he was--ha was leaving hurriedly-- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



463 



NAME: 
651 
652 

653 
6514 
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HIR182000 
A 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 27 



Uh-huh . 

--to gat up thara. 

Is it--ii--is It possible that if Burns reached 



him in the time frame suggested by Judge Sofaer, sometime 
prior to their 3^50 in the afternoon conversation, then 
Burns had reached the Attorney General while the Attorney 
General uas en route, either m plane or in a car or 
something ? 

A That's entirely possible and I--I have no reason 
to doubt that Sofaer's time estimates here are inaccurate. 
In fact. I would place--he does reference it, he called into 
Wallison's office around 14:00 and that's about when I would 
place it. 

2 If Deputy Burns was trying to teach the Attorney 
General while the Attorney General was an route, either in a 
plane or in a car, would you say the likelihood was that if 
he reached him, it was over an unsecure phone line? 

A I would that there's no--I just don't think there 
are secure phones in the AG's cax . I may be wrong on that, 
but-- 

fi How about on the planes that he would fly on, if 
he could even be reached while in a plane? 

A Hell, now, I take that back because the FBI, 
when it travels with him, carries secure phone hookup-- 



e Okay. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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HIR182000 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 28 



A --but I don't think that is something they can 
facilitate in the air or in the car and I doubt very 
seriously it's sonething that--as I understand it. you have 
to have the male and female part of these things and Burns 
has a regular secure phone, so no, it's just clear to me 
that if they did have their conversation telephonically-- 

2 Uh-huh. 

A --it would have been over an open line, no doubt 
about that. 

2 If that were the case, in light of the nature of 
the type of thing that Burns would have wanted to have 
conveyed to the Attorney General from Sofaer, is it likely 
that he would have gone in an open line into that great a 
description of the conflict, as you did when you did it over 
a secure one? 

A Throughout this, Hr . I.eon--well, in this little 
involvement that we're discussing that Burns may have had in 
this matter, he was. as I recall and as I know, a complete 
blank check in terms of his own mental status-- 

2 Uh-huh. 

A --and knowledge of what was going on in this Iran 
thing or what I was doing or what the AG and I were doing at 
that time. So the information that Sofaer would have given 
to him, I have no doubt it might as well have been in a 
different language in terms of the context that ha had for 



IINClASSin[D 



465 



NAME: HIR182000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 29 



701 
702 
703 
70M 
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it. or in teins of his ability to appreciata its 
signiiicanca . 

2 So-- 

A Nou, I don't know what Sofaer told him. I have 
since talked with Abe and I know what Abe thinks he probably 
told him, even though Abe does distinctly represent to rae 
that his — his--he would not have and did not go into anything 
like the details with Burns that he went into with me. 

2 Uh-huh. 

A But-- 



wiASsro 



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HIR182000 



ONCIASSIFIEO 



PAGE 30 



RPTS TETER 



DCHN TETER 

S I guass what I'n trying to gat at hera, Mr. 
Cooper, is that it would appaar, at first blush anyway, that 
ii Deputy Burns, as Judge Sofaar saens to recall, did have a 
conversation with the Attorney General while the Attorney 
General was en route to New York, it would appear at first 
blush that there's a high possibility, maybe even 
probability, that the conversation between Burns and the 
Attorney General night have been over an unsecure line and. 
hence, even Bore lacking in detail and aore cryptic and, 
hence, more prone to being misunderstood by the AG then it 
would have been--the conversation you had with the AG over a 
secure line later in the day. 

A Oh, yes, and there's no doubt that the AG did 
not perceive, in his conversation with Burns, what he 
perceived in his conversation with me. But I can't tell you 
why that may be or what it was that Kr . Burns precisely 
communicated to the Attorney General. 

But by the same token, I do want to elongate to 
this extent. This response that Burns communicated back to 
Soiaex does seem to me to be logical and a sensible response 
ii one realizes that the AG did not perceive that--the 
significance oi what I later shared with him. 



Uh-huh. 



UNClASSlflED 



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HIR182000 



ONClASSm 



PAGE 31 



A In other words, I--and I'm offering you here 
speculation because I wasn't a party to any of these 
conversations, and the parties to those conversations would 
be the ones whose memories of them are most useful to you. 

2 Before you speculate-- 

A Yeah. 

2 --let me ask you this: Did the AG, in your 
conversation with him over the secure line, indicate to you 
that he had already spoken with Burns about this problem or 
that he had spoken with Burns at all about these matters? 

A Ko , not at all, and--at least nothing that I can 
recall. There was no reference that I made to the fact that 
it's my understanding that Burns and you have talked-- 

2 In other words, you didn't tell the AG-- 

A --nor-- 

2 --what Hallison had told you, that he had spoken- 

A It was Sofaer who had told me 

2 --with Burns---excuse me, Sofaer had told you. 

A No, no. I don't recall having mentioned that. 
That was tha fuztherest thing from my mind at the moment. 
Tha thing on my mind were the things that I communicated to 
his, and I do not recall him having mentioned to me in any 
way that ha had zacaivad information from Burns. 

KoH, it's possible that he did, but it certainly 
didn't leave an impression on my mind. Whatever the 



UNcussra 



468 



NAME : 
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764 
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766 
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768 
769 

no 

771 
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111 

lis 

779 
780 
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78M 
785 



HIR182000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 32 



conversation uas between Bums and the AG was quite 
irrelevant, insofar as I was concerned. I had infornation 
that I had to get to the AG and get action on, and it was 
clear from ray conversation with the AG that this uas new 
information to him, that he in no way, prior to our 
conversation, perceived that we had an irreconcilable 
conflict m recollections or accounts of an important event 
in this whole matter. 

I should also add that Hr . McGinnis was in the 
room, the small room at the FBI, where I placed this secure 
phone call and he heard every element, every word that I 
said to the AG, though he obviously did not hear everything 
the AG said to me, but he can recall no reference at all to 
Arnie Burns m my conversation with the Attorney General. 

And another thing that I've taken care to 
reflect upon, as well as to inquire of Mr. HcGinnis on is 
whether I made any mention of the conversation, the snippet 
of my conversation, with Sofaer in which the two of us 
discussed resignation as a possible consequence of the 
feared chain of events . 

e You didn't share that with the Attorney General? 

A Ho. I didn't. I mean. I — 

S You didn't see any reason to, did you? 

A Look, I didn't think about that again until such 
time as individuals such as yourself and representatives of 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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787 
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80 1 
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HIR182000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 33 



Mr. Walsh's ofiice began asking na about that conversation 
and that is an element of it that I recalled then, but--and 
ncGinnis recalls it because he was in the roon when I talked 
uith Soiaer, so he recalls ny end oi that resignation 
conversation, but never again did I share that with anybody. 

That uasn't a motivating influence on me m the slightest, 
nor could it have possibly been a motivating influence on 
the Attorney General. He never knew about that until the 
recent media reports on that question. 

fi In fact, you've testified, I believe, didn't 
you, that you were proceeding on the belief, every belief on 
Thursday evening that this problem wasn't going to come to 
pass, that it was going to be straightened out and there 
uasn't going to be this, you know, inaccurate testimony the 
next day, and no need to resign the next day. 

A Oh, I knew that certainly, and I did make points 
to that effect with Sofaer earlier. I took our conversation 
to be an entirely theoretical one. I mean, I'm sure that we 
both meant what we said, but I knew it was entirely 
theoratical because those events that he feared were not 
going to transpire. I knew that with certainty. And I told 
him that, that the AG will not let those events transpire if 
there is a cloud over the accuracy of this information. And 
I was right. 

2 Okay, now. On page MS of Abe Sofaer's 



mussro 



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HIR182000 



UNCLASSinED 



PAGE 34 



testimony, lines 11 to 13-- 

A I'm sorry, page US? 

e Yes. 

A Yes. 

Q Judge Sofaer is testifying about his 
conversation with you and he at one point is coranenting that 
he was asking you to follow up, so to speak, with the 
Attorney General regarding the conversation Burns had told 
hin he had had with the Attorney General. 

To quote: ''Make sure that the Attorney General 
is not beiug sold a bill of goods.'' Do you have any 
recollection of Judge Sofaer making that kind of comient to 
you on the 20th? 

Page M5, line 11 to 13, lines 11 to 13. And to 
put it in context, you might want to, for your own--before 
answering it, you might want to start with page--I mean, line 
2 on that same page, where he's asked a question about his 
conversation with you and then he answers it and then he 
gets to that point on line 1 1 . 
(Pause .1 

THE HITKESS: Well, let me just take these 
things in order here. I do note that on page MM, he does 
describe a portion of our conversation that I well remember, 
wherein we--I Informed him that the testimony had only been 
kind of bolstered in its inaccuracy In that it had gone from 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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NAHE 

836 
837 
838 
839 
840 
SU 1 
8U2 
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HIR182000 



UNCUSSIRED 



PAGE 35 



no ona in the CIA to no one m the USG knew about it, and 
that whether or not the previous statement was accurate or 
not, the modified, revised statement appeared quite clearly 
that It was impossible that it could be accurate. 

And then he says that he asked if I'd spoken 
with the Attorney General by then about this. I don't 
recall him asking that question, and I don't recall if I 
told him whether I had or not, although--oh, I'm certain that 
if ue had a conversation about that, I said, ''No, I haven't 
talked to the Attorney General about this,'' and I described 
the whole background of this matter and my meeting to him as 
I've described it to you all. 

So there's no question but what I hadn't talked 
to the AG about this issue, and that that fact was, if not 
specifically stated to Abe, was quite clearly the case by 
virtue of my own reaction and my own assurances to him as to 
how the Attorney General would receive this information. 

He may have well have — I do recall him 
referencing to me that he had spoken with Arnie. I do not 
recall him saying that he was disturbed by the answer that 
he had gotten because I don't--I did not perceive that he had 
outlined anything other t*-an conclusions to Arnie. By that, 
I mean I--you knoM, conclusions such as ''I am very concerned 
that there are statements in the Director's testimony that 
are inaccurate or are in error.'* Hot that he had displayed 



icussw 



472 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME : 

86 1 
862 
863 
86U 
865 
866 
867 
868 
869 
870 

87 1 
872 
873 
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877 
878 
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88U 
885 



HIR182000 PAGE 36 

to Arnie the evidence on which he based his conclusions, the 
McFarlane/Shul tz conversation, things that were very 
inportant to ne but would be meaningless to Arnie . He may 
well have outlined the sane evidence to Arnie that he did to 
rae . I just don't know, but I certainly didn't perceive that 
was the case, I ' n sure, in ny conversation with Soiaer. 

BY HR. LEOH: 
2 And you certainly knew that to the extent that 
Burns was doing anything, he was nothing nora than a 
messenger who was relaying a nessaga ha had no knowledge the 
background about or any specific understanding about. 

A He was a very high-level messenger in this. yes. 
Ha had no context, no knowledge. 

I don't recall Sofaar suggesting that I follow 
up, but he may well have dona so. I do certainly know that 
any such suggestion ha nada would have bean superfluous . My 
course of conduct was a course of conduct that I had begun 
in Hallison's office whan--as soon as Hallison got off the 
secure line, turned to ma and, in the presence of Thompson, 
outllnad tha assanca of this NcFarlana/Shultz conversation. 
I, in turn, turned to Paul Thompson and outlined a course of 
conduct for him to undertake Immediately and in tha firmest 
terms . 

So my course was sat immediately, and prior to 
tha time that Judge Sofaar may wall have suggested that I, 



UNCUSSIHED 



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NAME- 
886 
887 
888 
889 
890 
89 1 
892 
893 
89M 
895 
896 
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900 
901 
902 
903 
90H 
905 
906 
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9 10 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIK182000 lllllll tfllalll II If PAGE 37 
you know, try to do sonething about this. I was already 
trying to do somathing about it. 

S Hara's what I'n trying to get at. Mr. Cooper. 
I, unfortunately, didn't have tha opportunity, nor anyone 
else on bahali oi the ninority, to be present at the 
deposition of Judge Sofaer, and had I been, I would have 
focused on this particular fact. 

In giving tha answer ha gave hare on page U5, 
lines 11 to 13, that I've just pointed out to you, there is 
an impression that could be drawn fron these, and I assure 
you wa will endeavor to ask Judge Sofaar about this, but 
there's an inpression that you could draw from this that he, 
Sofaer, was calling you in part because ha was concerned 
that Deputy Burns was selling the AG a bill of goods, and if 
I had had a chance to ask Judge Sofaer that, I would have 
asked him point blank, was that a concern of his or was it 
the concern of him that a bill oi goods was being sold to 
tha AG by McFarlana or Casey or somebody else? 

Kou, with that concern with mind, I want to ask 
you this: Did you at any tin* avar get an impression from 
Judge Sofaar that ha. Judge Sofaar, thought that the Deputy 
Attorney General of tha United States was trying in some way 
to sell the Attorney General a bill of goods or deceive hire 
in any way? 

A Of course not. 



wM\m 



474 



NAME • 
9 1 1 
9 12 
9 13 
9 1 U 
9 15 
9 16 
9 17 
9 18 
9 19 
920 
92 1 
922 
923 
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925 
926 
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934 
935 



HIR182000 



UNCUSSIHED 



PAGE 38 



2 Good. I :ust uant-- 

A Of course not. 

C --the record to be crystal clear on that. 

A Not only no, but heck no. that was never-- 

Q Good. 

A --any--not until you have ]ust suggested that has 
that even renotely entered ny nind . 

2 Wall, there are reporters-- 

A What he was referring to-- 

S --who may draw those conclusions, and I don't 
want there to be any chance taken that-- 

A Oh, ay goodness-- 

2 --that kind of thing might be-- 

A Reporters, since the time I publicly testified, 
Mr . Leon--repor ter s have been drawing some conclusions 
that--that astonish and appall me and. you know, I would love 
another several hours with you to go lina-by-line the 
various reports and accounts that I have read subsequent to 
my public testimony on this, to answer each and every one of 
these conclusions, but-- 

2 I just want it to be crystal clear-- 

A --but that one is-- 

2 --that never was given to you. 

A No, it was never was, and-- 

2 Good. 



HNtussm 



475 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 39 



KAHE: HIR182000 

936 A --and the proposition is an absurd one. 

937 2 Good. 

938 A But It IS quite cleat to me that the other 

939 hypothesis you suggested is correct; Soiaer did think that 

940 the Attorney General and. therefore, I, were being sold a 

941 bill of goods. I nean. I think that was a suspicion-- 
9U2 2 By? 

943 A By all of those people who were providing us 

91*4 information at that point. 

945 2 At the meeting on the 20th? 

946 A Uh-- 

947 2 By Casey — 

948 A Yes, although I don't know that Sofaer knew that 

949 meeting was taking place. 

950 2 Okay. 

951 A It's entirely possible that he did. I've been 

952 impressed by the amount of information of events that occur 

953 that comes to Sofaer and to the State Department, but--but he 

954 didn't know from me that we were having that conversation, 

955 although that evening, I told him that we had had that 

956 meeting and that the statement ''Ho one in CIA'' was changed 

957 to ''Ho one in USG,'* and he saw the significance of that, 

958 obviously, as surely as I did. 

959 But no, Arnie Burns--it is just not conceivable 

960 to me that Sofaer was attributing to Arnie Burns any such 



UNClASSra 



476 



KAHE: 

96 1 
962 
963 
964 
965 
966 
967 
968 
969 
970 

97 1 
972 
973 
974 
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976 
977 
978 
979 
980 
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982 
983 
98U 
985 



HIR182000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 40 



enterprise . 

2 Fine. I :ust want to nake sure that that 
inierence--if someone should draw it, is totally without 
factual basis from your perspective. 

A None whatever . 

2 Good. 

A It's--it's an absurd hypothesis. 

2 Okay. Just want to be clear for the record. 
Kow. one last point beiore I ask you two 
questions that ny colleague asked me to ask to you. 

Judge Soiaer goes on, the next page, page Ub, to 
relay a conversation he had with nr . Uallison. Obviously 
that was between himself and Mr. Uallison, in which Judge 
Sofaer recounts Mr. Uallison telling him words to the effect 
that the President keeps getting deeper into this because 
people operating in his name and that by people operating in 
his name, Uallison was indicating Poindexter and North and 
others were taking actions and taking actions without the 
President's approval. 

Old Hr . Uallison share with you those similar 
sentiments ? 

A No. I do not recall having had another 
conversation with Peter Uallison after I left his office on 
the 20th that evening, late afternoon-- 

S And do you have any knowledge of-- 



UNCLASSIFIED 



477 



NAHE: 

986 

987 

988 

989 

990 

99 1 

992 

993 

9914 

99S 

996 

997 

998 

999 

1000 

1001 

1002 

1003 

100(4 

1005 

1006 

1007 

1008 

1009 

1010 



HIR182000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE U1 



A --you know, throughout this period of time, this 
waakand flurry of activity. 

2 And do you-- 

A Though I nany timas did talk with Sofaer off and 
on. 

fi. --and do you hava any knowledge from any source 
as to whether or not Wallison, upon learning about this 
problem from Sofaer. and discussing it with you on Thursday 
the 20th, in turn went to the Chief of Staff of the 
President. Donald Regan, to discuss it with him and bring it 
to his attention? 

A I don't know what course of action Peter 
Wallison took. 

2 Okay. 

A I have no idea. 

2 Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not 
he, Wallison. was ever directed by the Attorney General or 
yourself or anyone at the Depaztmant of Justice, not to 
discuss it with Donald Regan or anyone else? 

A Dlzaotad by whom? 

e To your knowledge, was Wallison at any time 
dlzaotad by the Attoznay General or anyone else at the 
Depaztmant oi Justice, not to discuss it with Donald Regan 
or anyone else? 

A Ko. not to my knowledge. I don't think--! don't 



UNCLASSIFIED 



478 



NAME : 

1011 
10 12 
10 13 
10 m 
10 15 
10 16 
10 17 
10 18 
10 19 
1020 
102 1 
1022 
1023 
10214 
1025 
1026 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1030 
1031 
1032 
1033 
10314 
1035 



HIR182000 



BNCUSSIfiEO 



PAGE 42 



recall there having been any contact between Peter Uallison 
and the Attorney General during this period at all. 

2 So if Mr. Uallison didn't bring it to the 
attention of Donald Regan, it wasn't because he had been 
directed not to bring it to the attention of Donald Regan? 
As far as you know. 

A As far as I know, that is correct. I 
cer tainly--as I say, I don't think I had any other contact 
with Peter after I left his office that evening of the 20th. 
And I've never received even a hint of infornation that he 
nay have been directed along the lines that you suggest by 
anybody . 

Q And I believe your testimony on Thursday last 
was that — that after hearing the Attorney General's account 
of the Attorney General's neeting with the President and 
Donald Regan on Friday norning, the 21st, the impression you 
got was that was the first tine the President and Donald 
Regan had heard about this conflict when they heard it from 
the Attorney General? 

A Uh-huh. yes. that is — 

fi Okay. 

Kow, Ms. Kaug*-ton, who had to leave, has asked 
me to ask you a couple of questions and let me put those to 
you . 

The first on* is. what did Hr . Burns tell you 



UNCLASSIHED 



479 



NAME: 
1036 

1037 
1038 
1039 
lOUO 

lom 

1042 
10U3 
10414 
1045 
1046 
1047 
1048 
1049 
1050 
1051 
1052 
1053 
1054 
1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1059 
1060 



HIR182000 



iiNcussm 



PAGE 43 



recently about what he, Mr. Burns, told the AG and what he 
told Sofaer? 

A Mr. Burns--and I spoke to hira yesterday on this-- 

2 Uh-huh. 

A --his t«collaction--initialiy , he had no 
recollection at all oi a conversation with Judge Sofaer or, 
in turn, with the AG. His recollection, as ue talked, 
seemed to become somewhat refreshed and he--it is my 
understanding that he does recall a conversation with Abe. 
He doesn't recall anything that Abe may have told him, but 
it is his view that whatever it is that Abe told him, he 
repeated to the AG shortly thereafter in haec verba. That's 
his formulation, not mine. He suggests that--and that 
obviously makes sense to me. Ha has no context or knowledge 
of these matters and so whatever concerns that Abe expressed 
as being important that the AG have, Arnie believes that he 
then repeated those in haec verba to the Attorney General. 

fi Did he have any notes that he had kept to 
indicate the convexsations back and forth between himself, 
Sofaer and himself and the Attorney General? 

A He is confident that he did not, but he--but, you 
know, ha could not state that with certainty, but he knows 
of no notes. 

2 Ha didn't have any whan you talked to him, 
certainly. He had-- 



UNCLASSIHED 



480 



NAME : 

106 1 
1062 
1063 
1 06U 
1065 
1066 
1067 
1068 
1069 
1070 

107 1 
1072 
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HIR182000 



UNCUlSSIFI[0 



PAGE 44 



A Mo . 

8 --not located any? 

A No, no, absolutely not, and I asked hire if there 
might be some notes that could enhance his memory of the 
event and he did not think so. 

2 Okay. 

A But I'm sure that, to the extent he has any 
uncertainty on that at all. he is reexamining any files that 
he might have that would contain any such notes. He doesn't 
recall the Attorney General's reaction that is described in 
this depos'ition and he had reviewed this portion of the 
deposition-- 

e Uh-huh. 

A --and so, that is the state of my knowledge on 
this at the moment. I asked him, in fact, if he thought 
that his conversation with the AG would have been telephonic 
because it was not ay understanding that the AG had stopped 
back by the Department-- 

a Uh-huh. 

A --before he went directly to the airport to go to 
West Point, and on that, he has no recollection, but that 
it--he believes it may haII be that the AG did stop by and he 
had a conversation with hin in person on this. 

Again, in my conversation with Hr . Burns, he--he 
qualified his every point by noting that he has--at first, he 



UNCLASSIRtO 



481 



1086 
1087 
1088 
1089 
1090 
109 1 
1092 
1093 
109(« 
109S 
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1 100 
1101 
1 102 
1103 
1 lOM 
1105 
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1 107 
1 108 
1 109 
1 1 10 



HIR182000 



ewume 



PAGE US 



suggested that he had no recollection oi this at all and, as 
we got into it, he seemed to begin to have soma very vague 
and hazy recollection of it beginning to return to him. 

Q Okay. 

Her second question was ^ What did the AS tell 
you recently, if you discussed it with him, about this 
series of conversations between himself, the AG and Burns 
and-- 

A Yes. 

S --himself and you? 

A Yas, yes. Let ma just make clear for the record 
that I'd discussed this with Sofaar; I discussed it with the 
AG and I discussed it with Burns. 

8 Since your testimony last Thursday. 

A Since my testimony last Thursday, since the time 
that I've-- 

Q First saw the deposition. 

A Exactly, and I discussed it with tham at 
different times and separately — 

ft Uh-huh. 

A --and tha AG does hava a vague recollection of 
his conversation with Burns. He thought it was while he was 
on his way to tha airport in tha car — 

S In tha car . 

A --in tha car. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



482 



NAME: 

I 1 1 1 
1112 
1113 

II 114 
1 1 IS 
1116 
1117 
1 1 18 
1119 
1 120 
112 1 
1 122 
1 123 
1 124 
1 125 
1 126 
1 127 
1 128 
1 129 
1 130 
1131 
1 132 
1 133 
1 13>4 
1 13S 



HIR18200C 



IINWSIFIED 

On an unsecured line 



PAGE '46 



A On an unsecured line, and that his recollection 
IS that concerns, if they uere--to the extent they uere 
expressed in a conclusory way, and that he recalled that he 
had :ust--that htt probably nada the point that he had :ust 
finished an hour-and-a-half -long meeting with Poindexter and 
Casey and North and knowledgeable people, at which a number 
of factual natters were discussed, and in which what 
appeared to be the knowledgeable people were revising 
testinony. in order to accord with factual infornation, so 
ha thought that any such concerns nust relate to tha natters 
that had already been addressed, raised and addressed by tha 
people in that room, and that thay ware ironed out. 

Q And Burns wasn't focusing in thair conversation 
specifically on tha ''No USG involvamant ' ' -- 

A Oh, no. 

S --insart that Colonel North was proffering at 
that — 

A Ha couldn't possibly have baan. Ha couldn't 
possibly hava baan, bacausa Sofaai wasn't avan focusing on 
that. Ha didn't know until I told hin that that statement 
had baan--that tha original statamant, "'No one in CIA,'' had 
bean changad to ''No ona in USG.'' Ha was concerned about 
tha accuracy of no ona in CIA, so no, there was no possible 
rafaranca to that spaclflc statamant. and of course, ny 



UNCUSSIRED 



483 



NAME: 
1 136 

1 137 
1 138 

1 139 
1 lUO 

1 mi 

1 142 
1 143 
1144 
1 14S 
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1 147 
1 148 
1 149 
1 150 
1 151 
1 152 
1 153 
1 154 
1 155 
1 156 
1 157 
1 158 
1 159 
1 160 



HIR182000 



ONCIASSIFIEO 



PAGE 47 



whole reference uith the AG later that evening was with 
respect to that specific statement, which the AG knew about 
and I knew about, but Burns didn't know about and Sofaer 
didn't know about. 

Now--well, S0--SO the AG's point is, as I 
understand it, or at least his recollection when I discussed 
the matter with him, was to recall m a vague way Burns' 
call to hire or his communication with him--he thinks it was a 
telephone call--and that he, without specific references such 
as those that I had, suggested concerns that Abe has 
concerns, but the AG did not appreciate the basis for those 
concerns or obviously the seriousness of those concerns 
which he ultimately did when I discussed it with him and he 
assumed that any such factual problems would, in all 
likelihood, have been raised and disposed of in our meeting 
with Poindexter, and the matter seemed--when we left that 
meeting--let me just reiter ate--uhen we left that meeting, you 
know, there were smiles on our faces because it seemed like 
everything was quite stable and on which--and that there were 
no apparent problems . We were all about a course of action 
that seemed entirely proper . 

Not until that evening, when I talked to the AG 
personally, did he--lt is my firm impression that he had any 
serious basis on which to undertake the measures that we 
then immediately did undertake. 




484 



NAHE: 

116 1 
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1 185 



HIR182000 



ONOWSSIfe 



PAGE 48 



And one last thing and I'll turn it over to my 



colleague, if he has any questions, :ust reiterating 
probably the obvious, but let there be no doubt about it. 
Judge Sofaer, in his deposition, makes it a point to explain 
how concerned he was that a cover-up might be on the 
horizon; that there might be a cover-up in the process, and 
how concerned he was about avoiding that and rooting it out. 
Is it your testimony., fir. Cooper, that you were 
3U5t as concerned as he was and that the Attorney General 
was just as concerned as he uas and that that's what you 
were endeavoring to avoid happening? 

A It IS my testimony., yes. I do think, however, 
there were differences in my state of mind and Abe Sofaer's 
state of mind at that point. He had seen these notes. 

2 That's right. 

A Ha had evidently discussed this matter with 
people who participated in that conveisation-- 

2 The Hill notes, you're referring to? 

A The Charlie Hill notes of the Shultz/McFarlane 
conversation. Ha had--thasa things ware alleged to have 
taken place and alleged to exist to us . I did not--I did not 
question »ba's--in any Hay--Abe's statements on this, but he 
had actually saan tha avidanca-- 

2 Uh-huh. 

A --of tha Shultz/McFarlana conversation, Ue had 




\V3 



485 



NAnE : 

1 186 
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ONCUSSIFIED 



HIR182000 Ulllll Plalalll II II PAGE U9 
only heard about it, so his--I think his state of suspicion 
at that point, with reason, uas considerably higher than 
mine uas . 

The one thing I knew with confidence, and which 
I uas--I knew with confidence was that ue had a serious 
collision in memories that was not--that the parties to the 
events were not going to and were not able to reconcile for 
me. And I certainly did entertain sensitivity to the 
prospect that one of the parties knew better, but I was 
reluctant to come to that conclusion, and certainly had not 
come to that conclusion at that tine. 

2 Okay. And it was that very thing that led the 
AG to go to the President the very next morning-- 



second . 



Yes . It was . 

--to extend an investigation? 

Yes , It was . 

Absolutely . 

Hr . Parry . 

HR. PARRY: Could we go off the record for a 



[Discussion off the record. ] 

HR. PARRY: B^'ck on the record. 

I have no questions for you, Hr . Cooper, but I 
would like to just supplaaant the record made by Mr. Leon 
with regard to the knowledge that both the Senate and the 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCLASSm 



NAME ■■ 
12 11 
12 12 
12 13 

12 m 

12 IS 
12 16 
12 17 
12 18 
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HIR182000 



PAGE 50 



House minority counsel were given of the Sofaer deposition 
I've made inquiries since the public testimony, Mr. Cooper, 
and I've learned that neither the Senators primarily 
responsible for the examination of Mr. Cooper, nor the 
Senate staff counsel primarily responsible for preparing the 
Senators, were informed of the existence of the Sofaer 
deposition, its contents or that it was going to be made the 
subject of a line of questioning at the public testimony. 

THE WITNESS: I have--I have a few points. 

MR. LEON: Do you want it on the record? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, on the record, that I would 
like to make and one that I feel obligated to make because 
it is in the nature of a clarification of my public 
statement, ray public testimony., and it relates to a line of 
questioning that Senator Sarbanes, as I recall, presented to 
me in the public testimony regarding the unlikelihood that 
so much excitement and urgency would have been generated by 
the November activity--by the November event or activity if, 
indeed, everybody believed that there were oil-drilling 
parts on that plane, and my recollection from my response 
was something to the effect that his point seems well-taken, 
it does seem unlikely now that he mentions it, but I did not 
recall having been struck by that at the time. 

I'd like to clarify my response because since 
then, John McGinnis has reminded me that--that at some point 



UNCLASSIREO 



487 



Hknt ■■ 

1236 
1237 
1238 
1239 
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1 2U2 
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I 2M14 
12US 
12M6 
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12>49 
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HIR182000 



DNClASSIFe 



PAGE 51 



during th* w«ak*nd and almost caitainly aftaz ua had 
discu9sad--aitaz tha ncFailana Intarviaw had takan placa, 
but-- 

nR LEON' Can wa 90 off tha racoid a sacond? 

THE WITNESS Sura. 

[Discussion oii tha lacotd . ) 

THE WITNESS: Ua'ia back on tha lacotd? 

MR. LEON: Back on tha zacozd . 

THE WITNESS: Okay, in any avant. I do tacall 
my--my ansuai to Sanator Saibanas. John ncGinnis has now 
inpiovad tha stata of ay zacollactlon on this point, and 
indaad, ha laminds ma > and his lacollaction on this is quita 
supaziot to mina, but I aa laaindad that wa had a 
convacsation. ha and I, about tha pzoposition that tha thud 
country ^^^^^^^^^Vwould hava baan adamant in its zefusal. 
whathaz it zaally would hava baan adamant in its lafusal to 
parmit tha plana to land If oil-drilling parts had baan tha 
only thing on tha plana, so ha--ha racalls to my mamory that 
wa did hava a convarsatlon , ha and I, to that aifact. 

I don't racall any othar convarsations that 
iocusad spaciilcally on that point, but thara may wall hava 
baan. It was a vary sacondary discussion or alamant oi our 
brain-storming on this whola mattar, but I did think it 
important and I did iaal obligatad to corract tha stata oi 
tha racord on that point. 



488 



NAME: 

126 1 
1 262 
1263 
126U 
1265 
1266 
1267 
1268 
1 269 
1270 

127 1 
1272 
1273 
1274 
1275 
1276 
1277 
1278 
1279 
1280 
1281 
1282 
1283 
128U 
1285 



HIR182000 



icussm 



PAGE 52 



I also want to say that in reading Judge 
Sofaer's deposition, I note that he felt that it was very 
unlikely that the CIA would have--would have insisted on a 
finding should they ever be again involved in the shipment 
of oil-drilling parts to Iran. That is not a conclusion 
that I came to, because we also--this cane to mind, I can 
recall, and--during the weekend, and we were quite satisfied 
that a finding would, indeed, have been required, whether 
there were Hawks or oil-drilling equipment on that plane. 

So it wasn't all that astonishing, the oil- 
drilling parts story--wasn ' t all that inherently incredible. 
First of all, we were given to understand that Iran's 
lifeblood was oil and that oil-drilling parts were very 
iraportant--highly sophisticated oil-drilling parts were very 
important to Iran. 

Second of all, no matter what was on that plane, 
if it was a covert operation in which the CIA had some 
legally significant role, a finding would be required. 
Hawks, oil-drilling parts, you know, foodstuffs, no matter 
what, and finally, we also examined the question of whether 
or not oil-drilling parts were something that were 
prohibited to be exported to Iran and they are, or at least 
we came to th« conclusion during that weekend that they 
were, no less prohibited than were Hawk missiles to Iran. 
The Export Administration Act has a list of prohibited items 



i}>-:-.<':^i\^CU It 



489 



NAHE ■ 
1286 
1287 
1288 
1 289 
1290 
129 1 
1292 
1293 
129M 
1295 
1296 
1297 
1298 
1299 
1 300 
1 30 1 
1 302 
1303 
130M 
1305 
1 306 
1 307 
1308 
1309 
1310 



HIR182000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



FACE S3 



to certain countries, very similar to the Arms Export 
Control Act and the Munitions List, and oil-drillng parts, 
ue concluded, are prohibited itens to be exported to Iran 
uithout the appropriate governmental clearances. 

Finally, I do know that in the aftermath of my 
public testimony, and there are many, many things I would 
clear up if the news reports were my standard, but they are 
not . 

MR LEOH: We'll accept a letter if you'd like 
to send one to us . 

THE WITNESS: Gosh, I've got too many things to 
do. You all know better than those news reports. I am 
confident of that. If I thought for a moment that this 
committee--that its inclinations were in the same directions, 
then, yes, I would--I would do whatever was necessary to 
clarify the committee's mind. 

But in the aftermath of my public testimony, 
much has been made of the fact that Casey did not, :n 
his--Director Casey did not, in his statement, make reference 
to the fact that Hawks were on that plane. Now, at all 
times in this, I was never under the impression that--that 
the ultimata fact that there were Hawks on that plane would 
m any way be concealed from the Congress . The only--there 
was no disagreement on the fact that, yes, there were Hawks 
on the plane; the only disagreement was who knew there were 



UNCLASSIFlEi) 



490 



NAME 

1311 
1312 
13 13 
1 31U 
1315 
13 16 
1317 
13 18 
1319 
1320 
132 1 
1322 
1323 
1324 
1325 
1 32C 
1327 
1328 
1 329 
1330 
1 331 
1332 
1333 
1334 
1335 



H1R182C00 



Mmm 



PAGE bi4 



Hawks on that plane and when. That was the only thing ue 
uieie addressing. 

And I--because this uas a concern in my own mind, 
I asked the CIA for the transcripts ?f Casey's testimony, as 
well as the es and As. I do know that at least with respect 
to his Senate-side testimony that day. he acknowledged that 
there were Hawks on that plane. I think ha was asked the 
question and the question was asked, I think, by Leahy, and 
It makes clear that Poindexter advised them that there were 
Hawks on that plana, but by the sana token, Poindexter 
alleges, according to this particular Senator, that 
Poindexter did not know there ware Hawks on that plana until 
the previous day. About that, I'm sura the committee's 
knowledge is superior to my own, but in any event, it does 
appear clear from the transcripts of the 2 and A portion of 
the Intelligence Committee's inquiry, then, on November 21st 
the fact that there ware Hawks on that plana did, indeed, 
come out and thaia was no--thara was no failure by anyone to 
at least acknouladga that Hawks were on the plana. 

Finally, there is also in tha transcript of his 
testimony at tha and of each of his--at the end of his 
prepared statement, both in tha House and in tha Senate, he 
makes tha point that he's confidant that tha facts that he's 
shared with them are accurate, but that our effort to 
discern tha facts is ongoing and that whan wa learn new 



UNCLASSIFIED 



I 



491 



m 



NAME; 
1336 
1337 
1338 
1339 
1340 
1 34 1 
13142 
1343 
1344 
1345 
1346 
1347 
1348 
1349 
1350 
1351 
1352 
1353 
1354 
1355 
1356 
1357 
1358 
1359 
1360 




^% 



HIR182000 '"■'f V-fiTJIjII II II PAGE 55 

facts that are oi significance, they will be shared as well 
with the coitmittees. That is a caveat that I can recall 
quite distinctly suggesting be added to his testimony on the 
raorning when I visited Director Casey in his offices, and 
indeed, I can recall quite distinctly even scratching out a 
feu lines to that effect on a sheet of paper. I've never 
seen that sheet of paper since, but the point is that even 
as ue realized there were certain facts that uere not 
being--uere certain potential facts that were not being 
shared with the committees, such as that there's a dispute 
raging over who Knew what about these--what exactly was on 
these planes, this plane m November, it was very important 
to indicate that the state of our knowledge was incomplete 
and that we're undertaking to improve it and that the 
Congress will be made--the state of its knowledge will be 
improved as soon as the state of our own knowledge is 
improved and we can make factual statements in which ue have 
confidence, and Director Casey did indeed take that advice 
and he did indeed make those statements to both committees. 

Beyond that, I am satisfied now with the state 
of all the records in this matter. 

HR . LEON: Hr . Cooper. I know I speak for our 
committee and I think I speak for the Senate Committee when 
I tell you how grateful we are that you found some time in 
your very hectic schedule to come out here today. I regret 



DNCIASSIFIEB 



492 



NAME: 
1361 
1362 
1363 
136<4 
136S 
1366 
1367 
1368 
1369 
1370 
1371 
1372 
1373 
1374 
1375 
1376 
1377 
1378 



HIR182000 



ONcussra 



PAGE 56 



that tha circums tancas unfoldad as they did last weak such 
that wa had to do this this week, and I legrat that we 
hadn't had tha opportunity to iron all of this out m tha 
deposition last week, but because oi the circumstances, 
which have already been detailed on the record, we didn't, 
and in light of the fact that you're now embroiled in 
helping advise the Attorney General and the President on a 
new Supreme Court appointment to replace Justice Powell, I 
know how precious these minutes are to you and we Thank you 
very much for giving us this time in your hectic schedule. 

Ha wish you tha vary bast. 

THE WITNESS: I appreciate those remarks, and it 
is my pleasure once again. Let m« know if I can be of any 
further assistance to you. thank you. 

nR. LEON: thank you. i 

MR. PARRY: thank you. 

[Hhareupon, at 12:05 p.m., the deposition was 
concludad . 1 



I1H5USS1FIF.0 



493 




UNCLASSIFIED 



1 Ar.j (^ 



J 7694 







V^<»v«. '**^^ "*N«-*. ~V^^*i*N^X*<V. sj»<V.>4<o,.^ 

Xv.^ ojj:«>*a.v. t>.V NV£#^ v^o^ OvJi 






494 



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UILASSIFIEO rcVr/^**"' 



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a/o/. ^^/ Citt^ 



497 



UNCUSSIHtU ■ - 

i^'vt'S-'fr Aui^ V^ ^y ^^^ ^a. 

Jnrr^. /Vov: ^*^. . 

•a .• *^- 

7-K a^-t. ^ J". R ^x-ww^*-^ /)^*u^ 74 t4;.^^' 



f 



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^^ ^NCUSSIFIEO , «„ 

eO^^ ^fiia^^ ;^^^S4) . ^^. ^^ ^ 

fLt A/5C Qi^^ L 'Ay^ . /^)rc^ /Swv^ 

^ ^h^ usMJk ^ 

) ^M ^r^**vj». P^W" TTou. jOre^^ -- / T^'^" "^^^ Aa*^- 



499 



u^. N.v^ UNCLASSIFIED , „.. 



■«mssra 



500 




U.S. bepv^nt of Juitloi 
Offlct of Lepl Counsei 



)4Tc' 



itUSgWr 



orric* of th« 

Auuiini Aiiomo' C«ncral 



ytihmtiOK. D C 20i30 



Re: 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 



Statutes Relevant to Recent Actions 
with respect to Iran 



The statutes most directly bearing on the legality of the 
recent missions to and transactions vith Iran are the following: 
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, the congressional reporting provisions 
of the National Security >ct, and the Arms Export Control >ct. 
Based on our understanding of the facts, we believe that the 
recent actions with respect to Iran, including the transfer of 
arms to Iran by the CIA, do not violate the Hughes-Ryan Amendment 
or the National Security Act. Moreover, under the the executive 
branch's prior interpretation of the Arms Export Control Act, 
this Act is inapplicable to the arms transfers to Iran. (S) 

Hughes-Ryan Amendment . The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 
legislation authorizing the operations of the Central Intelli- 
gence Agency was passed in 1974 in response to revelations of 
covert CIA operations. The Amendment, as amended in 1980, pro- 
vides (22 U.S.C. 2422): 

No funds appropriated under the authority of this 
chapter or any other Act may be expended on behalf 
of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations 
in foreign countries other than activities intend- 
ed solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, 
unless and until the President finds that each 
such operation is important to the national secu- 
rity of the United States. Each such operation 
shall be considered a significant intelligence 
activity for the purpose of section 413 of title 
50. 

Because the President made the appropriate finding, the Hughes- 
Ryan Amendment does not prohibit the use of CIA funds for the 
transfer of arms to Iran. (S) 

Congressional Oversight Provisions of the Nationa l Security 
Act. In 1980 the National Security Act of 1947 was amended to 
provide for congressional oversight of "significant anticipated 
intalligence activities." This section now provides (section 
501 of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. 413(a)) (emphasis 



added) 
under prcvisiori o 



ty B. RcS£f. b :tion3l SefuriiX^ofl^ 



?*sH)NCUSS!FIED 




'3'^f^-' < '^ 




501 



To tht txf nt conslsttnt vlth all aooUcabla 
authoritlts and dutiai. IncludlnQ thoat conf<rre<} 
bv tha Conatitutlon upon tht axacutiv and leoii- 
- lativa branches of tha government, and to the 
extent consiatent with due regard for tha protec- 
tion from unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information and information relating to intelli- 
gence sources and methods , tha Director of Central 
Intelligence and the heads of all departments, 
agencies, and other entities of the United States 
involved in intelligence activities shall — 

(1) Iceep the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
on- Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
. . . fully and currently informed of all intelli- 
gence activities which are the responsibility of, 
are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on 
behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of 
the United States, including any significant 
anticipated intelligence activity, except that (A) 
the foregoing provision shall not require approval 
of the intelligence committees as a condition 
precedent to the initiation of any such anticipat- 
ed intelligence activity, and (B) if the President 
determines it is essential to limit prior notice 
to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting 
vital interests of the United States, such notice 
shall be limited to the chairman and ranking 
minority members of the intelligence committees, 
and the majority and minority leaders of the 
Senate .... 

Section 501(b) of the National Security Act applies to those 
situations in which the President fails to give prior notice 
under section 501(a) ; 

The President shall fully inform the intelligence 
committees in a timely fashion of intelligence 
operations in foreign countries, other than activ- 
ities intended solely for obtaining necessary 
intelligence, for which prior notice was not given 
under subsection (a) of this section and shall 
provide a statement of the reasons for not giving 
prior notice. 

Section 501 of the National Security Act does not 
contemplate that prior notice of "intelligence activities" will 
be given in all instances. Subsection (b) of section 413 makes 
specific provision for situations in which "prior notice was not 
given under subsection (a)." Because subsection (a) includes 
situations in which the President provides notice to the full 
intelligence committees under subsection (a)(1)(A) and situations 
in which he provides prior notice restricted to designated 



UNCUSSIFIED 



502 



UNaA:^»ttflET 



members of Congress, including the chairmen and ranking menbers 
of the House and Senate intelligence committees under subsection 
(a)(1)(B), it seems clear that subsection (b) contemplates 
situation* in vhich no prior notice has been given under either 
of these provisions. This interpretation is confirmed by a 
colloquy betveen Senators Javits and Huddleston, who were on the 
committee that drafted this provision. Senator Javits asked: 
"If information has been withheld from both the select committee 
and the leadership group (as section 501(b) envisages ), can it be 
withheld on any grounds other than 'independent constitutional 
authority' and, if so, on what grounds?" Senator Huddleston 
answered: " Section 501(b) recognizes that the President may 
assert constitutional authority to withhold prior notice of 
covert operations , but would not be able to claim identical 
authority to withhold timely notice under section 501(b). A 
claim of constitutional authority is the sole grounds that may be 
asserted for withholding prior notice of a covert operation." 
126 Cong. Rec. 17693 (June 28, 1980) (emphasis added). 

Moreover, the preamble to the provision maJces clear that 
disclosure is required only when such disclosure is consistent 
with the President's constitutional duties. Accordingly, the 
President is not required to malce disclosures when he is acting 
in a situation in which he is employing his inherent foreign 
affairs powers. As the President made clear in his televised 
address to the Nation this evening, the primary purpose of the 
recent actions with respect to Iran was diplomatic. The 
"intelligence activities" involved in the Iran matters consisted 
of, inter alia , negotiations with a foreign sovereign, of which 
the arms transfers were an integral part, and attempts to gain 
information relating to Americans captured abroad. These 
intelligence matters were inextricably intertwined with and 
essential to the President's foreign policy goals. We therefore 
believe that the President was acting at the height of his inher- 
ent power in foreign affairs. In United States v. Curtiss- 
Wright . 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the Court made clear that the Presi- 
dent has plenary power over negotiations with foreign powers: 

In this vast external realm [of foreign affairs] 
with its important, complicated, delicate and 
manifold problems, the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of 
the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and 
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. 
Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot 
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to 
invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument 
of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, 
"The President is the sole organ of the nation in 
its external relations, and its sole representa- 
tive with foreign nations. 

The Court in Curt iss-Wr ight also quoted. approvingly George 
Washington's message to Congress in which he refused to give the 




503 



ims^ 



Houst of R«pr*stntatlvtf docxunents rtlating to negotiations ovtr 
tht Jay Treaty, characterizing the refusal as one 'the visdora of 
which vas recognized by the^House itself and has never since been 
doubted." 299 U.S. at 320. Accordingly, given the strength of 
the argument that Congress cannot require the President to make 
disclosures concerning negotiations vith foreign governments even 
after they are completed, the argument that he cannot be forced 
to make disclosures during the pendency of sensitive negotiations 
is particularly compelling. (S) 

Second, ve believe that a good argument can be made that 
section 501 of the National Security Act does not require 
disclosure of information in particularly sensitive 
circumstances, even if the President is not acting in a manner 
that implicates his inherent constitutional powers in foreign 
affairs. The preamble to Section 501 qualifies the requirements 
of the provision not only by reference to constitutional 
authorities, but also by reference to the need to keep certain 
national security information secret. President Carter, in his 
signing statement for the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1981, 
stated the understanding on the basis of which the bill received 
executive approval (emphasis added): 

It is noteworthy that in capturing the current 
practice and relationship, the legislation pre- 
serves an important measure of flexibility for the 
President and the executive branch. It does so 
not only by recognizing that there are circum- 
stances in which sensitive information may have to 
be shared only with a limited number of executive 
branch officials , even though the congressional 
oversight committees are authorized recipients of 
classified information. Circumstances of this 
nature have been rare in the past: I would expect 
them to be rare in the future. 



^ As quoted in Curtiss-Wriqht . 299 U.S. 320-321, President 
Washington said: 

The nature of foreign negotiations requires 
caution, and their success must often depend on 
secrecy: and even when brought to conclusion a 
full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or 
eventual concessions which may have been proposed 
or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for 
this might have a pernicious influence on future 
negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, 
perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other 
powers. 



UNCLASSIHED 



504 




^fffflET 



Prtsidant Cartar s«emj to hava conttmplatcd that thtrt vould 
b* instancat in which the Prtsidtnt would rtstrict infomation 
even when -there was no constitutional basis for doing so. 
Cutting against this interpretation of section 501, however, is 
the previously quoted colloquy between Senators Javits and 
Huddleston in which Senator Huddleston suggests that *[a] claim 
of constitutional authority is the sole grounds that may b« 
asserted for withholding prior notice of a covert operation." 
126 Cong. Rec. 17693 (1980). Because we believe that the 
President was act'ng in a manner that implicates his inherent 
powers, we need not now decide the question of whether the 
National Security Act permits the President to withhold prior 
notice on other than a constitutional basis. 

Arms Export Control Act . The Arms Export Control Act places 
a number of restrictions on the export of arms executed under its 
authority, including: 

1) Sales must be made only to countries with respect to 
which the President has found that such sales will strengthen the 
security of the United States and promote world peace ( 22 U.S.C. 



ity 
a)tl 



2753(a)U)); 

2) The articles must be sold only for use for legitimate 
purposes and the recipient country must agree to use the arms 
only for legitimate (e.g. self-defense) purposes (22 U.S.C. 2753 
(a)t2)); 

3) A report of the proposed sale of major defense equipment 
valued at $14 million or more must be submitted to Congress (22 
U.S.C. 2776(b)). 

4) As of August 26, 1986, no arms may be exported to 
countries that the Secretary of State has certified as supporting 
terrorism. See Section 509 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security 
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. (The Secretary of State has 
certified that Iran supports terrorism). 

The Department of Justice, however, has previously concurred 
in the conclusion of the Department of State that the Arms Export 
Control Act is not the exclusive authority for transferring arms 
to foreign countries and that arms may be transferred outside the 
context of that statute. See Letter 'from William French Smith to 
William J. Casey (Oct. 5, 1981). In the case considered by 
Attorney General Smith the government relied on the CIA's author- 
ity under Section 102(d) of the National Security Act in 
transferring arms to a foreign country for the primary purpose of 
achieving certain intelligence objectives. Section 102(d) 
provides that it shall be the duty of CIA, under NSC direction, 
to perform services of common concern for the benefit of existing 
intelligence agencies and to perform "such other functions and 
duties relating to intelligence affecting the national security 




505 



UNi;iJ\o;»Gap£T 



as th« National Stcurity Council may froa tiaa to time dirtct.* 
W« understand that tht arma transftr to Iran had an inttlliganca 
objtctiva among its objectives. Accordingly, under prior 
precedentT section 102(d) of the National Security Act furnishes 
authority for the President's action, and the restrictions of 
the Arms Export Control Act do not apply. (S) 

We therefore believe that the Department of Justice can 
successfully rebut arguments that the actions with respect to 
Iran violated either the congressional reporting provisions of 
the National Security Act or the requirements of the Arms Export 
Control Act. 




Charles J. Cooper 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of Legal Counsel 



We understand that the President informed members of Congress 
of this transaction pursuant to the section 501 of the National 
Security Act. 



uNcussra 



506 



I. 






SUIJICTi lackiroiiiid tti OirvaeUfr •( Sp«<l*l Pr«j«ct 



lACKOOUiret Tk* use h«« tctl*«lr teuiht thfl r«l«4i« of 
Aji«rlea* he>t*g«t h«U la trta threutn rtrleut ch«nn«U itnc* 
1«S4. la tddltlea. tht UK bat beta tnt«r«(t«4 is |«ttlrt| th« 
CoTtrnaant of I'*" t« ao4«rttt Itl luppert (or Inttrntt lsn«l 
tarrerlia. A* It b*cta« clatr tbit toa* of tb« heitttct ««r« 
balni bald br t^* pre-lrtalan (tctlea of tba Htibdtth, It «ti 
fait tbac tha trtnlan Covarnaont at|ht ba tbla to put pratiura 
ea tba Hltballab to ralatia It* hott«tat. 

la lata 19I4> Mlchial Ladaan appreachad tha NSC to dlicuis 
contact* wltb Iraa and »u|fa>tad tha NSC work with lirtaU - 
official* vho aTratdr bad contact* wltb Iran basad oa thalr 
covart tra* da*l* with that country, Ladaaa aai with rrlaa 
Miaiatar Fara* who tgraad to halp and lotroducad Ladaan to 
David Ilacha and Jacob Nlaradl , two othar Itraali official*. 
Thaaa two Iiraallt, la tura, introducad Ladaaa to Minuchar 
Gorbanifar, an Iranian ara aarchant oparatlni ta Europa who wai 
actlTolr Involvad with tha laraallt. Ladaaa Introducad 
Gorbanifar to NSC official*. Gorbanifar tppaarad to ba wall 
tiad In with vartout faction* within tha Iranian Sovarnaent and 
ha aarvad a* tha Intaraadlarr batwaaa tha NSC and tha Iranian*. 

la Juna 19IS, tha Hltballah hijackad TWA fll|ht 147 and 
Iranian Majli* Spokkar lta(*tnjanl playad an Ijpurtant rola '.n 
ratolrinf that incldant, which Includad tha ralaaaa of a nuabar 
of Labanaaa Shl'a hald by laraol. 

Throughout 19IS NSC contact* with Ladaan, Gorbanifar, and 
tha laraali* contlnuad. In luaaar 1911, NSC mmm^ff official* 
flr*t aat Aairan Nlr, an Itraali official on far**' itaff who 
wa* to bacoaa tha prlncl|tf» Iiraaii contact in NSC daalln|s 
with Gorbanifar and tha Iranian*. 

( a-A^lv Santfh.r 1911. tha CIA wai aikad by tha NSC ta 
oat raiaaaa ot iH Aaarlcan hpttaja. Tha_ NSC Infaraad the 



CIA that Gorbanifar and) 
lnrelv«4. 



■P* 



Oa 14 Sapteaber 19IS, Raverend Weir wa* ralersed by the 
Hltballah. At the saae tlaa, the Itrtellt, at NSC behest, 
dalivarad SOI TON alitlla* to Iran. Since the Iranian] would 
net pay (or tha TON al»»llai until they were delivered, tnd 
(lac* tha NSC wa* Instructed not to u*a any USC fund* (or the 
oporatloa, Gorbanifar uiad bl* contact* with Saudi financier 
Adnaa Xh«*ho||l to coaa up with $S alllloa USD to pay for tha 



WUININC NOTia 
lyTTLLIODCE StXJWiS 
A/C ►CTHDOS INWLVB) 



CL BY 

DEa 
UCAlTBTFRJT 




/" 



Partially Declassified /released on ^1J^a*-4]38^ 

under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by B. Reger, N-tona! Security Couniil 




330061 



I 



507 



fc 



UNCUSSIFIED 



TO* ■IStllCf. Til* NSC tfrtc^ t* fftiU th« Iirttll* witk SOI 
TOV alitiU* t« rtpltc* tho*« tlMy proflda^ r«r the op«r«tlea 
Th« tlrcrtft ctrrrlni the TO* •ItitUi 4tllT«rt4 thta t* Ttkrii 
but h«4 Bfotl fi durim t h» rttura rtlght whick forced t 
■bf f«r« rcturalfii to Itraol. 



tochntcal (top 



On ) October 19IS, th« Hitbollth (nnouncti th«r [>Mi7 klllod 
itt|o lucklor. theu|h lator dobrloMn|« of roltttod ho>ti|(« 



laOio eptritloa, tho 
■■Ihavk atistlos to 
rtaoTo tho Iiraoll 



he 

Indlctto ha probably diod la otrly Juna'l9<$ 

la Novoabtr ItIS, at tho aait ita 
NSC *rran|od for Itrtol to load lljl 
Iran. Hevovar, tho Iiraolit aaglactad 

■ arktni* froa »obo of tha •Istllat. TTilt o»arii|ht^ piui tha 
fact that tha Iranlint had baoa lad ta oipoct tSoy would bo 
rocolrlniBBHHHAVX ■lollat. lod to a hu|a dlttfrooaont 
which cautad further dofolopaaatt to grind to a halt. 

la Dacaabor 19IS, McFarlana laft tha NSC and Pelndtittr 
ordorod Lodaan out of tha oparatlon and aada Olll a North 
dlroctly raspooslbla for daallag with Corbanlf ar ^^MM 
On tha Israeli side, Nlaradl was replaced at tha p^aa^r 
contact by Aalran Nlr. 

In January 1916, the President tpprovei the operation to \--^ 
work with tha Iranltnt for the releata of hottaies In return \ 
for oilltary equlpaent. The ClA Xrttked te provide lo|l»tic«l, 
and operational support. »** J 

In early 19 16, con tacts with Corbanlfar serTinf as a 
go-between to^mUll^ cent Inue. 

In aid- February, tha NSC daUrers 1000 TO*s to Iran. 

In March 1916, Sorbanlfar HflMH^acet with the NSC in 
Geraany. Tha NSC are given a list of spare parts for HANI 
■IsslXa batteries and radars requested by the Iranians. CIA 
than works with select nuabar of OOD officials to obtain the 
spare parts. It Is agreed that the spare parts plus aore TOW 
■Issllea will be delivered ta Iran at tha successful conclusion 
of a aaatlBg between NSC officials and Iranians in Tehran. 

Te provide the US with the aoney for the spare pares ind 
TON alsslles, Corbsnifar aust again finance the deal. He raises 
16 alUlon dollars which Is passed te the US. with the 
expectation that tha Iranians will, la turn, pay hia once the 
Itaaa hava bean delivered. Corbanlfar again works with 



mmm 



508 



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iJNCli^lHED 



Khithofil t* rtlM (h« aontr (rea itTtrtl Ctnidltn, Aatrlctn 
tn4 Arab iBTtlteri. 

On 22 April 191*. • U.S. Cuttoas Sarvtct "Stlni" Opcrtilon 
In Swltttrltnd undtr cht Stitt D*p<rtatnt'i "Operation Staunch" 
dlaruptt a larit on-|oin| Iranian arai procunatni dad b<ln| 
run by Gorbanltar. Thli daal was unrtlattd to th« NSC 
optratton. Gorbanlfar li arrtitad by the Swlsa, but raltased 
aftar 24 liours. SerbanKar loaas tha aontr b* and thashe||l put 
Into that particular eptratlon, fundi probably raltad froa tht 
Inveators for tba NSC eptratlon. 

On IS Hay 1916, Gorbaniftr finally coati up with lufftclcnt 
fundi for the ntit sttp of the NSC operation and a atetlni n 
arrangtd to take plact In Tthran. 

On 22 Hay 1916, HAWI aliille spare parts arc picked froa 
Kelly AFB and flown to Israel and tha US teaa departs for 
Europe. 

On 2} May, a second aircraft picks up SOI TOM alssUes and 
files to Israel. 

On 24 Hay the US teaa goes to Israel where Nlr joins thea 
for the trip to Tehran. The Teaa departs for Tehran. They 
bring along soac of the Spare Parts to show the Iranians their 
good faith. 

On 2S Hay, Che US teaa arrives In Tehran and holds aeetin|] 
with tha Iranians. However, the aeetings do not go well, 
probably because the Iranian factional concensus Is falling 
apart. The second aircraft load of spare parts is recalled 
while on its way to Iran and returns to Israel. The US teaa 
departs after five days, having aade no progress. 

In June and July 1916, talks with Gorbanifar and flHlBM^^ 
continue and it is decided that the Iranians aust show their 
good faith by farcing the Hitballah to release another hostage. 
In July Gorbanlfar goes to Lebanon and Syria in an effort to 
get Faihar Janko released. 

Oa 26 J«lr 1916, Father Jenko is released. 

On 5 August 1916, the reaalnder of the MANX spare parts 
that have been collected are delivered to Iran. The spare parts 
ara picked up at Kelly AfB and flown to Iran via Israel. 



KUS$IHED 



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m SECRET 



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U.3./IKAWIAW COWTfcCTa WD TMI ItfttHICAM H03TAGg» 



...J.--V 



rro« th« ••rliact aentlia «elle«rta« th« lalaaie r.volution in 
Iran, th« U.S. tevarnaut lui ateanptad to r*«st«AUtn official 
contact with ti>at TovarnMnt in ordar to diaeuaa »trata«ie 
d«ToiopMnta la that critical |>art of tha world uid to trv and 
raaata^llah a conatructiva werkln^ ralationahlp. tvan bafora 
Praaldant toa««a caM to offlcn tha O.J. Oovamaant aaraad to 
axpaad a«curlty, aeenoMle, pol.itleal, and latalliganca 
ralacienahlpa at a paea accapt<ibla to Tahraa. «»aa tha taerat 
MovMbar I, H7» Motlav la Al^lara, batwaae IrtatlAakl «nd Prioa 
Mi(t.latar|atar«aa, baeaM puAlle, radical alaaaati in Tahran 
feread tha uuam of tha lasar-faa ^evamaant. That apiioda haa 
-mfluancad subaaquant Iranian ■villingnaaa to an^aga in *ny d rac 
contact with tha USC. 






D«aplta 

usa^ 2ur itrata^ic intaraata In tha raraian Sulf aandata 
paraiatant afferta on our part to try to aatabliih a di«lo^a.<J;*^«*' 
la thia ra^ard. It la aotatola %hat only a faw aajor countriat ^<kJ^^ 
do_not hava ralatlona with Ira.:_i- 5^^ JOfilfc.T- tteroeeo, 
TaraaX, South Afr<- _ „^ j^, unitiad Stataa. tv;n I'riq contmu.i 
to !._.. .xpioaatlc ralatlona withllran. 

Iran, tha kay to a ration of vital ii^ertanea to tha Si*r. , n 
incraaalaflly thraataaad by 4rawu>4 Soviat allitary and political 
influanea alenf Its berdaca aad &naida ita country. Tha 
^ incraaainf daaparatlen brought o't by tha eoata of tha Iran-lnq 
,,/i4 war (urthar axacarbataa Iraa'i nilnarabillty to growinq So«-i*t 



inf luaaca. 



Horaevar , 



'4 



Sovlat daa .^n* m Afgnaniitan^ praiiura on 
PaJclataa, aad aecoai ereaaberdar ftrlkaa in Iran, Ifava oada 
roepaalav a a«xat««te dialofva laeraaain^ly laportant. of ..^ 
parclevlax laportaae* la thia contaxt haa baan a naad to oora j 
aff«c«iT«l7 aeaitar S«Tlac actlvltlaa la tAa ration aad, if 
peaaibla. to r»-«atabliali o«r alactrealc aurvalllanca capability) 
aloRf «1M S«vl«« bet4«r. 




iBfiiaaa to preeaad, neaa of 



iMaarnna ladivlduala aad prtvata partlaa hava likawlaa attamptad 
to b« halpful aa latar**dlarl«* in arran qiaq tha ralaaaa of our 
cititaaa hald hcataqa la Latoaeoa. 




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In l»85, a prlvrsa A««rlc«fl etel««a •«• TBrTaTT!!^^^^ 

th« 0.«. Gov.rnM^t. In Iekno*l2diri»y^^!^"' contact vitA. 

*spona«ra' in Tahraa could aUofu^Btf'rl^L^""*^'!*^ *^« "i* ' 
hoata^a .ttuatlon m Mlr^t ' r«««l»« tha African 

iJrori;rj^%a"!i:::%2i^U"t*^'*'?H.'.''"r''-»-"'-««-«i/ 

wmsMMmmm 

nodaratloB ot Iranlaa poiiclaa; in His e»I!'r, « !?" 

contact* wara aar*''' ' .n.n ,i.„ .1 -■•.•».. •>• "•»• 

.ta«f w.tH . .„, full taS:?a^sr:r..:„'* :"^»"*^ s-=-'^=y cc.n=.. 

».f— u,. vary flrat ■^tin. vith if2 T!^*?? =**i"«« offiear.. 
-•■ •■9ha*li*4 tJ>*t tA. OK ~oi«rSS.^!'!!^f! "^ "• tr»nl«n. ;t 

a*Mi« th. r«iM«« o< thi hnJefclii^JtSi!! ^^"A" official, to 
of UM hijacjwd PMaiftJaM i.^J^'* •J»*'«««ly fro. tha raat 

roi« la thla Mttar. ^"* PwfcXieiy acknowlad^ad m, 

'L??i^« ''br.'"ih;^,h*:rt'ii: SoIL**^ "^^ ^'^•^ -"• =^— 

l»«>e«^ viaiaaa «#• o6ja«Md tii^ hoata,. aituation and would 

contact viui Iran aad^ nrovfi! i^ •<foft« to naiatain diacraat 

raraalia to daai.t. larLi ^iJ^J'!*'** '* eon^inc. tAa 
*n4 indtsatrlal taehnoloiy tTtfJiS tC2 hU'rZ'^^^ niHtary 
I'raalia (#o«ld paraiat li tLil^' "*• "•« )««««•<• that tha 
objoctiona, baciull J^y b^JtJ*?!'* '^fi^'-""' da.pita our 
intaraata. ' o«ii«»«d it to b« in thair atrata^lc 



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••irut by «• lalaaie Jlh*d Or» "itatioa. Thii r«i«««yc.. 
pr»««d«d by u intanM .(fort o n tJi« p»rt of Hr. T.rrY^wIit- , 

ni. Ji.it. r««in. tn. only w, .rn.r ta »«• m^g dif.g" i * .ttJ 



r.i..M. th. U.«. .etiuiltewl L- *« l«r.«U 3.1i?.ry of lulit.^ 
•uppU.a (SOt TOW.) to T.hrM. . O.J. •oiui.«e.ne. In tAl. i.rMli 
operation w.a b«Md on a dKia.«on at um hiyh.at l.v.i to .«!oit 

th. Miatiaf Zara.li ehuut.la I'ith Tahraa in an .ffort to '^ ''"' 
• atabliah aa Aaariean ttratefi'^ dlaioqu. with th. Iranian 
90v.rna.nt. 

Throughout th« rMaind.r of 1»3». th. OK Mintain.d contact with 
th. Iranian .xpatriat.. A nu«P«r o< M.tln«8 ««.r. conducted in 
Europ. meludinq MSC, CIA, lar**!!.. ahd Iranian r.pr...ntativ.. 
rroB th. outt.t, th. U.S. sid. aou^ht to arrana. a dir.ct B..cin» 
with hi^h-l.v.l Iranian offici»i«. In 0.euib«r, Ills th. 
National Security Adviaor aat <*!■«'> th. lara.ii officii: and th. 
Iranian contact to nak. cl.ar ">• Mtur. of our int.r.at in a 
dialog, with Iran. At thi» .^.tinq, Hr. McFarlan. stat.d that 
our goala w.r. ^t follow.: ,. 

Ending th. I ".--Iraq War on lonorabl. t.rma. 

-^"Vincinq Iran to e.a*. iti support for t.rrori»» *nd 
radical auAv.raion. 

U.lpinq .naur. th. t.rriter «i int.qrity of Iran and 
coerdinatiaf way. in whicb >« ai^bt count. r Sovi.t 
activiti.a in th. r.4ien. 

a. Bad. el«.x th.t any aueh dial'MV. could net d.v.lop without 
th. prior r«l..M of O.S. ho.t««a.. 1. alao •**. cl.ar that «. 
could Be« .ii«M« ih tradinf arm. for bo.«.9.a- 

In JMUAry. HM, th. rr«.ld«nt .pMerod a cov.rt action flndin<» 
dix.ctla« tA.« th. int.lli«M>e« eoiMUiity precMd vith ipeciai 
aetlTlti.a alMd at accMVllsMiM tJM «o.la ••« forth abor*. Tn. 
.M«U«loa of tM.ioaa witJi Lib*.., ueludinf th. April U atrix.. 
prvv«n«*tf ttxxtmt dialo«\M fr«« taXia* plac. until th. J'*^*'"?, 
contacted th. lnt.r«.diary (Oorfe^nifart U lat. April, J y.-hrr- 
that poiat, th. Iranian axpatrl «t. adTi».d ua that th. Laadaranip 
in Tahru was pr.parwl to coiBM.nc. a a.cr.t dialo<ru. «ith tn. 
Unit.d St.t.a alonq th. lin.a c£ „„, aatabliabad <joala. ". 
b.li#»« th.t th. Iraniaaa w«r« .tiaalatod to ran.* th. contact oy 
th. ■urdec of he.ta«. F.t.r Ki ib^ra by 1.1SY" authoriti... 
jlinadlfl la r.taliatioB fo» t>^ o.i. raid on Libya. Th. "•""" 
wp«trl«t« told th. NSC and CX j^ offlcra, -ho tmt. with hi*, tnai 
'*"> Iranlut. did not wiah to b>, 4ec«8*d of aay oilpabiHtv in . . 
Kilbum'a death. 



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on May I J, th« rraaldane »<itAer^l^* —cvt Biiaten to T«hr«n by 
'or»«r HatleiMl Saeurley Mvtac^"^'*'^*''*' «ceo«p»ni«d by t C'A 
otiiemt. ■ a tir» of th« msc •■f'"' •»* tha Israall and Iranian* 
Intarlocutort. In erdar to-^""«'» oparetlonal aaoirity, tfta trip 
*•• ■•d* froa laraal, eein^dai^^ *^^ ^"^ dallvary of a paliat of 
apar* parta for Iranian 4*fana ''^* «««pena ayataaa (HAhk tpara 
par«a) . At eh« ap«c^fie.ef tr.*"' '^l** feraign docuaantation was 
obcaln«d fro* tbm CXA. 

In tha eeura* of thia four-day "^'^t' lan^tny maatin^t vara ^.ald 
with high-lavai Iranian offiei*^*' "*• 'if at direct eont«ct 
batwaaa tho two gevarnaMnca ir "'^•' *^* yaara. Mr. Mcfarlana and 
hia taa« vara abla to aatablit '^ ^* baala for a furtAar ralition- 
ahlp and elaarly artieulata eu ^ ob}aetivaa, eonearna, and 
intantlena. Tha group waa aXa ° *^^* '° aaaaaa first hand tha 
intarr.al political dynaaic in ''*'>'•<) *n4 tfta affact of tha war 
which Iran elaarly can no lon^'*' *^- Oaing rraaidantially 
approved Taraa of Rafaranee, ^''^^'Ch had baan raviawad and approved 
by appropriate Cabinet officer •• •'«'«H««e ea^haaixad that our 
intareat in Iran transcended t^* hoatagaa, but tha continued 
detention of hoatagea by a ueb *"*** 9'oup philoaophieaily aligr.ad 
with Iran prevented pregreaa. During the viait, Mr. McfirUna 
mada clear: 

that •,, fundaatentally oppoaad Iranian efforts to axpal -s 
!.3ffl tha Middle ta at; 

that wa tirmiy oppeaod thair uaa of tarroriaa; 

that v« aeeaptad thair revolution and did not seek to 
reveraa itt 

that V had nuaareua etbar dlaa^raiwanta involving regional 
peliclaa (I.e.. Labanen, Hieara^oa, ace. I. but aight also 
find araaa of eoaaoa latar^at (i.e., Xfghaniatan) through 
dlaXofua. 

Tha XraAlana aaphaaixad that the O.S. aabar^o on hardware paid 
for by tba Shah waa, for tJtaa. tha aeat alfBif least deterrent to 
iaprevad relatiena. Mr. HcTarlana eoneludad tha viait by 
8uaMaritin« that netwithatandlrig iraniaa intareat in carrying an 
with tha dialo^a. wo could no». proceed in light of their fiilur* 
to exart thalr influence to eauaa tha ralaaaa of the hostages. 

On June 10, Najlla Speaker Rafaaajaal, la a apaach in Tehran mada 
guardad rafaraaea to Iraniaa intareat La iayrovod relatione with 
tha O.S. On July 2<, rather (.awraaea Jaaeo vaa raleaaad in the 
•akXa Vallav and found hla way to a tyrlaB *illtary checkpoint. 
On Aufuat 3, a planeload of electronic parta for Iranian 
anti-aircraft dafaaaaa (HAMt kiaaila aub-ceapenenta) arrived in 
> bandar Abbaaa (frea laraal) . 



nt im»a t- 



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TOP S E CRE T 



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In early Aufuat, th« eoneaet with tJi« :rtni«n •)c9atristc ba^an to 
foeua aaeluaivaiy an »n« wtiiin^naaa at tha osc te erovida 
■illtary aaaxctanea eo Iran Ia axeOAnqa ;er hosta^as and wa 
aeufht to aataftiiih dlffarant rhannala at eoaBEunicatlon which 
would laad ua aera directly te pra^aatle and sederaia alaaancs i.n 
t>e :ranlaa hlsrarachy. la Kiti-Aufuat, a private AeMrlean > 

eitltan (NeSM SlchAri Secerd, USAS' (Itat.l) actiaf within the ^- 

puxviow of the January jJl^rarv^stlon Pindia^t. aada contact in 
turope with a relatiffeBM|M|of c acnior Iranian official 
(Mfaanjanii. In early Septcner, dise-jiaions were initiated In 
waahlnqton with thu eloae confidant of che «an jadqad tc S« t.ia 
ooat influential tnd prafaatie pclitieal figure in Iran 
(Rafaan^ani) . Theae diacusaiona reaffiraed tha ^acie ob^activat 
of tlie U.S. in leekinq a political dialogue with 7ehran. w« alto 
provided Intelligence deaifned to diaeeura^e an Iranian offantiv* 
and contribute to an Iranian d acision te negotiate an end to tna 
war. 

Through Aufuat, Septeeiber. and October, further aoetinqa were 
held 1ft Europe betveen U.S. and Iranian repreaantativea. Sun.i^ 
theae leaaiona, the U.S. aide :onaittantly inaisted that the 
releaie of the hoatagea waa • .' v-*«' re^uiaite tu'S.X. ofoaraia. T>.a 
Iraniana, for th»-..i part, urfed tr.«8 we take a mora" active roia 
in luppcrt '.or the Afghan reaiatuice and luggetted t.nat, if w« 
wouid r-.ovide TOW weapena te Iran, they would train_*nd aquip 
' nighan ratiatanee fightera with t hete weapons. The :r«n:«ns «:sa 
proffarad. _an4_the. U .S. accepted, the offer of « Soviet T-'2 ta.-. x. 
^■^■■^HHI^H^HB '^ • further daaenstration of U.S. ^ood 
faith, laraal provided Iran with an additional incraBont iJOO tew 
Biasileai of thae« defenaive weapona on October 3). 

Seen th«r««ft«r, the aedarata fa'etioa in Iran prevailed over iiore 
radical eX«Meata te ua« tiMir Influence ever the SKballah, 
enabliAf the »enf<amb*T 2 releaae of Dewid Jaeebaen. Jacebaen't 
releaae wee aaaiaced toy th« •tt6t^» of Terry Weite, who was 
on-ac«n« in kelr«t vhea it eecs^red. 

TIM p«rsie«ea« O.S. effort te eitabliah eent«e« with Iran hat 
iataaaifiad a power atruft^* ^ traa bet w een eoderata aleaents 
(led by BafsaajeAi) and aer* rsidieal faetiona (under the ovarall 
apeaaerahip of Ayacellah nentai-.ari^) . In late October, radical 
aupporters (of Hontaseri) reveiKled the (lUfaanjani) contact wit.i 
the USQ and the tcrae of the cioataet. In order to defend himself 
agaiaat chargea of colluding with ttv« UM and te preserve a 
degree of latitude for bo^ peVtiea. HeUis Speaker Kafian^ani 
prewldad a highly fabricated vlleraiett of the i«ercrlaAe Kiaaion in 
his MeveeAer 4 address te the ,aesa«s. Moderate Iranian political 
leaders nmt feel eesatraiaod ^ settle their iatemal political 
probleaa before prs>ee«diag viith th«- U.S. relationship. The 



UNCtDmpSED 



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11/17/JI 2000 
IHAxiaua Vaciionl 



O.S./imWIAtI COWfACTS AlfJ TCT )mg»ICAW HOaTACta 



rro« th« •arliast aenchf (ellowli'i^ thA Itlaade rovoLutlon in 
Iran, th* U.S. OevarruMni ti«a ««««e9«ad to r*«tt«fil.lsh o<{].ciaI 
cenuct wltA thAt fevamatnt in or4*r to dlacuas ttrata^ic 
d«v«lepatnts ia tiMt critical pnrt of «£• world uid eo try «nd 
r*«staAliah a ceeaertietiva work lof ralatlenahlp. Bvan bafora 
Praaldant toa^aa eaaa %e offie« th« O.t. Gevariwant i^raad to 
•xp«nd aacuflty. acenoalc. pel'.tlcal, and intalli^anes 
ralationahipa »z a paea aeeapcaola ts tehraa. In tha fall ot 
l$Tf, uia O.S. iiAd«rtoei( tAra<i aacrat aisalena to Tahran: 




-^^-^K^t-Wcvaabar l»7» 

norwallSir.o.. o: c«iatlunai 
' * -' , ^ ^ 
Whan thaaa aaatin^a an d tha aacrat Movaabar I, 1»7» n*,.**''"' "■-. 
Al^lara, baewaan Irsaa mafel and PrUaa Hlns.aear laxar^an, B«c*... 

public in Iran, cAay p caclpitata^ tna takaevar of tn* U.S. 
Ovbaaay by radical ale aanta and lad to tha raaxqnation of •-'■» 
Baxargari ^ovarnaant. Thaaa avanta hava advarialy influanctd \ 

Iran 'a auAaa^aac will in«naaa to anqa^a m any diraet contact 
with tAa use. 

Oaapita cacual dlf fieu. uiaa invelvad in ra-aatabliahinq normal 
ralatiena, our atrata^: ;e ictaraata ia tha Parsian Gulf aandata 
paraiataat a<ferts on t >ur part to try te aatablish a dialo^Ma. 
In till* r«9«r4, it i« r otabla that anly a faw aa^or eeuntriaa 
do f>o< lUT* raUtlena « ith Iraa — l^ypt. Jordan, Morocco, 
TaraaT. South Africa, a nd tit* Onitod Stataa. tvan Ira^ continuaa 
te hav« dlpleaatie rala tloaa witA Zraa. 

Iraa. tbo k«y to a ro«i en ot vital Utpertanea te tha Waat, la 
ineraaalAf^y thraatoaod tj ^rewlaf Soviet kllitary and political 
iafleenee aloM ita bonier* and inaida its territory. Ovar tha 
ceoxao e( the laat two i>aara. tha Sonriata and their turro^ataa 
have Moved actively te < /ain influence in tha Suit: 

The Sovtata bellevt . that once Cioaelni dies, they will hava 
aa aacelleet oppert >ta>ty w iafliieaee tha (er»ation of a 
eevernaaat ia Tehre u (whieh) serves Soviet strategic intaraata 
la the area. ^^ 

TOi' OCCRn 



Deelasslfyi OA0« 




515 



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5333 






CoaBunift nation* hav* b«eer<« principal *rmi fup^llart to 
Iran — aakin^ Iran 4«p«ndafit on tnii 9oure* oi supply m 
centandinq with an incraaalii^ly thr«atanin^ tfaq . This 
laada i>* to tha eeneluiion that tA^ S4V1ACD uy wall b« 
attaaiptin? to puriua tltair own ravelutlon m Iran. That is. 
by fuallnf betfi sidaa la tria eenfUet, tha seviats could 
w«ll aneeura^a a dlaattreu • 'final offansiva* by Iran that 
would praeipltatc a polltl eal dlaiataqratioB la Iran, 
laavinf a pewar vacuus whj.eh the iovlata could >za^olt. 

aeiftcally, tha CLWHunjL. it tafluanc* la Iraa ataM^ «ra«i y^' 




n» laeraaain^ deaparac-ien brought en by tha eeata of th« Iran- Iraq 
war haa axaearbatad Irai,>g vuiacrablllty to Soviat lafluanea. 
Meraovar, »owla« dasl^t, la Afftuutlitaa, praaaura on raklstan, 
«a4 actual creaabecdar ^trlkaa In Iras froa Af«hanlstaa hava nada 
r«op«niA« a atrata^ic dl^aio^^M IneraaaUifly Utpertaat. 



fa» ate— » 



TO P GCCRn 



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N 8339 



In »horv^ tn« Sovlaea war* ftr b« itt«r peaitien«4 to .jvaiuf ictntTy 
laprova'thair Influanea in tha r' Hio" i" ms wftan wa wlln ' 

praaantad with an opportunity to opan a diaieTua with Iran. In 
daeidin^ to axpleit thia opanin^ . «a avaiuatad pravioua at forts 
tttroufh Bora eonvantionai ehanna^Xt which had not luecaadad. 



^ Sine* lit], varleua ceuatriaa h ava sada ovartur 
/Iran tn anaftert to ttlaulata dlraet contact. f 



tha O.S. ind 



put tw o yatf I IfB. MiaXor Iranian w>.,twi,aA« ,| 
that ao— a eeo^»dation with tha o.i. waa J 
nry. boiwvii', mcmii Iplita and dabatas aada it difficult 
for th«a to raapend to thaaa ' jvarturaa . 

NuBaroua iadlviduala and pri< /at* partiaa hava likawiaa attaoptad 
to b* helpful a* iAtar««41«r !•• Is aataAllahin^ contact in Iran 
or in aa«ltiA» Iranian «« »<«» -»ne* in tha ralaaaa o< our cit iiana 
haldhoataaa in Labanon . f 




In 1»I5, a privata *■• rieaji eitltan (Michaal Ladaan) waa 
appreaehad by • rmprmt .nt^tiva of tha laraali <jovarn»ant ( 
Kiaeha) , who rapertad ^^^ j^,y f^^^ aataftliihad « U«iion 
ralationahip with an I .^.i^j^ aspatriata iMahucftaJvr GhorBanifari 



tlary'a baekf round axhauativaiy 
r. Thla aiMlyaia lad thaa to 



Tha tar««lla aB«ly««4 t j^^, ^^ 

in erdac to valldata hi , i.«.itlaMr 

hav* astraaaly hifh eoa j^^mm* la hla atandlof and fanulna 

ralatloBshlp to tlM >kif noat Xraaiaa official*. Maad in lar^a 

part oyoa tho laraoll •'vaXaatioa aad la raeofitltlon of tha elaar 

O.t. lataraat la a dlal>.,-^^ ^^, alfht, owar tiaa. lead to tha 

■edaratloo of Iraalan P>Viielaa. tba U.S. aatatollthod ah indiraet 

eontae« with tha Iraalai , mcar^idiarv in ■ld>l«IS. through tha 

prlvato O.S. eitlsaa aiM 



, iatatMdlary la Bld-ms, throuq 
1 a aanler laraall official." That 
eontaeta wara aatabllah4,^ throuch tha lUtlonal Saeurity Counci. 
ataff with tha full kno^ i ^,, .« appreprlata Cabinat officara. 

* lft€ wltJ» tM tataalla and tha Iranian, it 
OM could BOt proe*«d wit* diract contact 
rrorlSaaM inatruaoat of atata policy. 



rroa tho vary firat 
waa aaghialtad that tho 
unlaaa Xraa ranouacod 



TO. P SECRCT 

\ 



*^*^ 



517 



K ^U»M»WT 






3340 



in Ju«« o< l»«»; in th. ud«t of ^, TllA.i47 hij.ekin,. u., 
^•!!2'•i.*"^''^•^^^" ^^5?" «»««•« «io> «• lr.ni«« •«p«tii.t. 
• akad hta to um hi. mflu.ne. «ioi Miliar Ir«ni«n offlci*!. to 
obtain tA« ralaasc of th« hijae)?.^ p«tMn««r«. Tvo dayi aftar 
^\??*"?!2'*' *"'" *««riean. h^i4 wpar^taiy froa tha raat of 
tha hijackad p^jaangara v ara fr.^ 4^4 tttrna^ovar to Jvrian 
•utJMritiaa. HpBjB^BI^BMBHBBHH^HBnHBHaili* I 
Spaaxar MfaairjaBl, <rt»o »aa trnrallia, L> tlta «id-«aat'^ tAa " 
.ti«a, «a4 Xraalaji foraifn Hiai ,tax VaUyatl botJj intarvaDad with 
tlM eapcera. «*f««i>34ni, Ltx h.i, ,p,^h ^ Hevaabar «, 1M(. for 
tha ftrtt tlM publicly tcxnc^i,^,^ uia rola in this aattar. 

In Saptaabar of 1»IS, tha !•' talii tdviaad that thay »ara cloaa 
to »chiaviR« a braakthrouqh m thair contact with Iran ind would 
proca*d (inlaaa w« ofc3aeta4. it if uipertaat to aeta that tha 
U.S. had Ion* baan awara of iiraall afforta to aaintain diiercat 
contact witb Iraa and to p fovida Iraa wit* aaaiitaaea in iti war 
With Iraq. Oaapita lon^-t ,„ 0.5. afforta to convinca tha 
laraalia to daaiat, laraal eontinuad to provida iuutad ailitary 
and inAUK'lZl rjC.inoi -_ ,- ._„ "*• 0»« Judqad that tha 
laraalla would paraiat"^ ^,„ 8;er«*'dallvaj;"' "l^Pi" »"' 

ob^actiena, ' -" 

intaraata. 



baeauaa e ,y ^aliavad it to ba in thair ;!r*««^" 



On Au^vat 22, 1>^5, t> ^ 0.1., through tha U.S. citixan intar- 
"*"**i*2Ll •^''^^•y* *•" an taraali dalivary of fiilitary suppliaa 
(501 TCWa) to Tahraa. ^ ^„ aubaaquantly iaf oread that t.l« 
dalivary had taXaa pl«e, ,4 tf., ,nd of Au^at, thouqh wa wars r.az 
awara of tha ahipaant ^^ ^^, ^^^^ ^^ ^,, mada . U.S. «cqui»«c«nca 
in thia laraali oparat ^^^ ^,, baaad on a daciaion at tnm m^haat 
laval to axplolt aalatijjj. laraall ehannala with Tahran in an 
effort to aatabUah "ri^rieaa atratagic dialo^a with tJ»a 
Iraniaa gevamaant. 



Ob S«ptaHb«r 14, IftS, 

totrat br tlM taUaie 
pr*e«d«d by aa lataaaa I 
Sp«el«I iBiaaAzy of 
Ms. ««ic« rwMiaa th« 
kid 



ft«ir«r«a4 »aaja*la Mir waa ralaaa«d in 
Uu4 Orvaaiaatioa . Thla ralaaaa waa 

ffort OA tba frt of Mr. Tarry ««aita, tha 
ArehbiaiM* of Caatarbury. To thia date, 
directly 



OB October 4, IIIS. tal-mie Jlh«4 aaneuae*4 that it had *axacutad* 
Mirvc ttatiea Oilaf "i ni,. lucklay la retaliation for tha 
October 1 laraali air tt^^^^ ,„ ,j^ inatallationa in Tunia. Thia 
anaeuneaaaat lad to a »«,j^,, ,j Baatinfa ia Curopa aaonq tha U.S. 
(CZA aa4 ■»C) , laraali, ^^ iraaiaB intar^adiariaa. In theaa 
■MtiA«8, tha Iraaiaa* I ndicatad that, while their ability to 
iafluaac* tha lifballah >^,, «aaia«, tha lisballah had net killed 



T"O P GCCie 



,^^J^ 



j^tf 



518 






■uekXayi ha h«d in f»ct died t«v»'*^ ■onthi •arliar of n«tur«i 
eaua«a. Ma hava ainea tuAatantla-'*^ titla interaatxen in dabriafi 
of Fathar Jance and Oavid Jacoba*'"' ^*'' *' who* indieaca that 
•ueklay probably diad on Juna 3, 1*'* »* pnav»«onia-l.lka lyvptoat. 

J^ , Cm laea aevaatoar l»U, tha tira**^'^*' r««pondln< to ur<|ant 
kd*L. antraatiae fro* tha Iraniaaa, p.-"»^id** !• b«»ie >AJ«« Uaallat to 

\l^ l^lrm in erter to livreva tha at**^* dafaaaaa around Tahran. Tha 
J-»^ laraaii dalirary of lAMC ai««l>«* tH—d 0.1. eeneana that va 
could wall ba eraatln« ruaunda-"**""*"** ^, Tahran and tharaby 
:aopardltln<» our objaetxva of •rran^lng a dlract aaatln^ with 
hiah-laval Iranian offiexali. ■"?••• •i»»il«» "'r* iufiiaquantly 
ratumad to laraal In Fabruar' }***< »ith 0.». aaaiatanea. On 
Oaeai^ar «-•, 1»I5, tha Hatie'"*^ Jaeurlty Adviaer aat (In London) 
witii tha laraali official an'* ^ Iranian contact to aaJca elaar 
tha natura of our Intaraat ."n • <*i«lofua with Iran, fct thi. 
Motin«, «. nefarlana ataf*^ "»** ~» t'>*^* "•'• •• 'oil***: 

Oavifin* a fonmila fo ' '•-••tabliahin^ a atrata^ic 
ralatj.^nahjo.--' r.nran. 

tndin^ tha Iran-Ii-aq War on honerabla tanaa. 

Convincing Iran to eaaaa ita support for tarroriim and 
radical aubvaraioii. 

Halplnq anaura thii tarritorial intaqrity of Iran and 
eoerdinatinq waya i in which wa aifht countar Soviat 
activiciaa in tiM\ra«ioa. 

Mr. MeFarlaaa aada ela4r th^a^a Haatam dialoqua with Iran would 
ba prael u dad aalaaa Iraln jtaa willinf to uaa ita inf luanea to 
aehiaira th* ralaaaa of Maatam hoata«aa in Mirut. Ra alao mada 
claax that «• could net ind weald net an«a«a in trading ar«s for 
heataf •• . 

Ob Jaaoarv •. 1>I*. thai Praaidaat apprevad a cevart action 
Findiaf dlractia* that fjM IntaXlifanea ■ uiiiuity preeaad with 
apaeial ac«lvltlaa aiaa<i at aeeeapXiahinY tha qeala aat forth 
above. la accord with firtaat atatutaa, tha Praaidant directad 
that tha Director of Central Intalli«ence refrain froa raportin? 
the Pladlnf to the appropriate coeMltteea of the Conqraas until 
reaaenably aure that the Uvea of theaa carrying out tha 
oparatlea (be«h U.S. and foreifu) would net be in jeopardy. 



Or rebruarr S-7. V-*- officials OK and CIAJ 
repreeentative of the t««».»ii fiff m^t* 
aenloflevol Xraalaa officia 



TiaP GCCRET 0^ 



^l 



A 



519 



vlfet288S£2 






9J42 




_ in-tt«r»«ny. At th n ■••tlnf, th« Ir4nians •qr**^'' 

civac. i.i toa UK (fould prevlda TOM ««apena to Iran, th«y would, 
in turn, previda laaa to elia Afghan Nu^aliidaan. Tha U.S. aqrtad 
to azplora tAia poaatbtlity and • vorkln^ «lth tha Itraalia, 
aetabliaftad tha following aachaoiaa Cor trantfar of tha waapom: 

Tha Iranian lntar»*dlary <Shorb«fllfarl would dapoait funds 
la an taraall aeeoune. 

Tha taraalla would tranafar fuads to a ttarile u.s.- 
conerellad account in an ovaraaaa banX. 

Ufinf thaaa funda, tha r.IA weald eevartly obtain oatanal 
authorixad for cranatar fro« U.S. ailitary acocki and 
tranaport this to lara*'! (or onward aevaaant to Iran. 



Uain^ tha procaduraa atlpu\atad abeva, (unda w«ra dapotitad in 
tha CIA account in Canava on Pabruary 11, l)t( and on Fabruary 14 
00 TONS wara tranaporta <1 to laraal (or pra*poaitioninq . 'r>.a 
a wara,-:««-i';»^«''„ lo' placao' in •'."."*•*« I«raaH facility. 



tha CIA accoun 

1,0 

T0W8 

On rabmary l»-31, O.S «"'* I'«ni»n offlclala (NSC ...'_■' ^lAl »at 
again in Caraanv to di: '«^«« problaaa in arran<»inq a aaatin? «„"*5 
highar-laval ofticialt ■ *« t*"*-* "aatinq, tha U.S. iida aqraad zo 
provida 1,000 TOWa to ^'^h •• • elaar tiqnal of U.S. tincarity. 
Thia dalivary waa coaM i"^*^ on tha aeminq of Fabruary 20 and .; 
coaplatad in two trana '■*• " Tehran on Fabruary 21. 

On March ?, U.S. (CIA < "^ NSC) and Itraali rapratantativai maz 
with tha Iranian Intar* '•^i«0' m farii to datannma wp.at.-.ar *ny 
furthar proaraaa waa pe ••i*l« 1^" arraaginq for a hiqh-laval 
aaatinq wltb O.S. and X r^tiaa offletali. During thaaa aaatmqa, 
tha intar«a4tary aanhaa ^**^ t-'^* datariorating aeenomie situation 
in traa aa4 Iranian anx '■•«l-«» ragarding ineraaainf Iraqi Military 
af {•ccly«a«ss. 




-r rtm aaealatlM of t anaior 'l.ytM LUtf. Uadln^ up to ^« *P"^ 1« 



520 



^^ 



\mmE 



N 8343 



• fforc in Uta April, l)t( 



Ac tlut point. U)« Irviian «apatriat* 
«... „-. ^ -_ ^^^ 

our 
•**"fc w«i>« 4A mil A*>r» wv&« *^^'uiata4 

f vi 17 ■u£4cr 01 ncata9«~Vatar 

>,« rata iiatioB for tha O.S. 



• iiorc i.n ia«a Apm . i*(a. ac coat point, uta xranian aapatt 
adviaad ua that tha laadarahip in Tahrait waa prapar*4 to eoa^ 
a aacrat dlalogua wit* tna anlt»»d Statac alon^ tha Unaa of ou 

aatabllahad goala. Wa ballava that tha Iranuna vara atlmi lat 




•aaad on «aaurancaa that ««• could at laat aaat faea-to-faea with 
top-lava) Ai;r."Jir Jt't 11 '*• fa fraaidant au«heriiad 

a aacrat aiaalon to Tal ■>-*i-». on Nay .. ' «ae\irlty Mvltor 

Mcrarlana. accoaipaniad ^f*" by fotmar Nationa* , -"^atort, 

manbara of tha NSC ata ^Y • CIA annuitant, CIA eoa»u... 
tora. In ordar to ana "> •"^ ">a laraall and Iranian intariow. 
fro« laraal, eolncidan ■»*• oparational aaeurlty, tha trip wai sada 
parts for Iranian cafa ^ with tha dallvary of a pallat of apara 
partal . At th^apjj^"*^'* "aapont syataaa (HAKT ipara alactrsr.ic 
joc'jjBantationflBH^|B^^ raquoat of tna Iranians, alias {or*. jr. 

■^■■■i'aj.obtainod froa tha CIA, - »<a4 mm^ 
In tha eeurao of tba (c 

vara hald with hlgh-la\ "»'-^*y "'ay 25-J») visit, lan^thy naacmqa 
coRtaet b*«v««a the cwc^*^ Iranian offlelala, tl\m first dlraet 
Mcrarlana tad hla taaa fovamiMBts la evar six yaars. K£ . 
eontintiUtf r«latlonshlp **'• ^O^ «o aataAllah th.i baais for a 
eoneama. aMI Uitantlon ""^ claarly artieulata our ofijactlvas, 
first ha»4 Um intariMl •• ^^ froop waa alao aAla to aaaaaa 
affset of tte war vhleli ^litleal «yn«aJ.e *.? Tahraa and tha 
Praaldaatially ap^rerod ^**» claarly c«a no lonfar win. aaln^ 
b««n r«vt«w«4 aa4 appro* farm* o( aafar«ae« (Tab A) , which had 
Ne/arlaiM afl^haalsaiS Uu'«d by apprepriata Cablnat offleara, 
hoataf««, bat tha cenUr'^ o^*' lataraat la Iraa tranacandad tha 
9roap phlloaephleally al>*^*^ dateatlen of hoataqaa by a Labanasa 
Durlhf tha vlait. Mr. Me ^?nad with Iraa pravantad pro^raaa. 
Parlaaa nada claan 
that wo fundaMantal 
Croa th« Niddla Saa ^r eppoaad Iraaiaa af forts to axpal us 



that wo flnaly oppe 



tt 
No4 



thoir ua« of terrorlsaii 



WNift^f£0 



0^ 



ti\ 



I.WL 



521 






N 8344 



that w« «cc«pt«d thair ravo'-ution and did net laak to 
ravarsc it; 

tKac v« had nuiMroua othar diaafrsaaanta involving rational 
polleiaa (l.a., Labanen, N^earafua, ace. I, but mi^ht alae 
find araas of -lannn intar •** li.a. , Af^haaiataa) tArou^n 
dialofua. 

Ourlnf thasa Maatln^a, both it ^* oaad tAa opportunity to datall 
tAc obataelaa ^e la^lattantln^ a tuatMfle ralatlonaMp baevaan 
ti>« two countriaa. In additic'" " ^* potn** notad abova, Mr. 
-Ncrarlana aaphasixad tba peXl tleal preOia*« eauaad by Iraalan 
iHTolvMHttt ia tha hcstafa ir>*u«- f*^* trenlaaa objactad to tha 
ase a^Mrtc oa <!•(• military luppltaa alraady paid (or plua tha 
continual OK bloeHinq of Iranian aiaat* la tha O.S., avan attar 
U.S. courts had rulad m th '^f favor. During tha ceuria of thata 
aaatinfs, tha Iranian o<fit'«i« adaittad that thay could not win 
tha war. but vara m a dll •*** ^h TaKran wt how to and tha 
conflict 9lvan tha naad tf praaant an Iranian •victory* b«fcra it 
could ba ,.---1..-..-. - -_„,,,: • "^'t «"• original aqqraator. 

S«aa«a luaaain. auat b« rasevad fra* po<rf«r in - -'.uia th«t 

to and. Kr. Merarlana coneludad t:ia viatt by auaas^.. ' 'Xmi» 
necwitHatandlnf Iranian lataraat ia carry iaf on with tha dia^., 
wa could not procaad wxth furxhar diaeuasiona in lifht of tha::.r 
unwillin^nasa to axart tha full waight of thair influanea to 
causa tha ralaaaa of tlia heata^aa. 

On Juna 10, Majlia Spankar Rafaanjani, in a tpaaeh in Tahran nad* 
9uardad rafaranea to Iraniaa intaraat In i^^rovad ralationt with 
tha U.S. On July 2(, rathar Liwranca Janeo was ralcaiad in tha 
Sakka Vallay and found his way to a Syrian military enacxpoint. 
^ On Au9-uat 3. thraa pallata (lasa thaa ^i planaloadi of slsctronic 

< parts for Iraniaa anti-aircraft dafanaas (BAWX aissila lub- 

|ce«pon«ata) arriw«4 ia Tahran (froai Israal) . 

In aarly Aofqat l*t4, tha contact with tha Iranian axpatrlata 
b*3afi to (eeaa aaelusiT«ly ea tha willixi^Baaa of tha OSC to 
prevlda ailltAX) asaisCAa«a to traa ia oxchaa^a for hosta^as and 
wa scufht ta aatAbliab 4iffar«at ehaaaaia of .u — uu icatiaa which 
««e«14 I— a us aera dlracKly to prafaacie aad aetfarata alaaants in 
tha Iraaiaa hlaraxae&y. Ia aid-tof«*«, a pxlvata Aaaricaa ^ 

y eititwi (NBB tlebsrtf S*eer«, OSAT (*•«..]! aetiaf withla tha ht^ 

\^ ^purrlaw of ^^J^aa^CoTir^tetiaan^^c^^^^^^et in ^ w 

^ J oaalor IranWJ^I^S^^nUfaSlSTTTWlthth^aaaHBBea of tha 
^ f^^ Zlk. thia Iranlan^|HBv<as breufht eavartly to waahinqtoa for 
dataila4 dlseussienr^^tn judqad this sffert to b« uaaful in 
aatabliahinf contact with: a clesa confidant of tha aan judgad to 



48^ 



■t!\ V 



. 



522 






^ 



mmm 



i 



834S 



b« th« aeat lnflu«ntl«l «n4 prar***^^ poXitlcai flgura- in irin 
(Raftaa]anl) . Th«M dlaeuaaiena raafflraa^ tha baeie efiiaettvat 
o« the O.f. in •aa»ln» « politic al dfalofua witi> Tahran. w« «i,o 
^ provi«ad inealil^anee 4a«lana4 f-o 41aeeura«a an Iranian offanalv. 

r^ and cencrlbuta ts an Iranian daciaiea to na^otiata an and to uta 

war. -rta ' iNtf i^im 

T>-reufh Aofuac, Saptaabar, and October !*•*, nuaareua additional 
■aatla^ta war* hald la Sure^ i-a«waaa O.S. rapraeantacivaa ana tha 
naw and Iraa4.aJ> eontaeta. OuKtaf tAa Oetedar }i. ltt( aaatinq m 
Frankfurt, Sarmany, tAa O.S. ilda, aa In tha past, intiitad that 



t^ tha ralaaaa A^^A^^oataaa^ «'aa a pra-ra^i«ita to any pro^raat. 
"""^ Tha Zranlaa.f^BHIJ^Bifl •tf^atf t*4tj«« r.»)tm « ■era *etiv rni 




Tho Iraaiana alac prott»xa4t_aiM-tM.JLJ . aeeaptad, tha 
a Sevlat T-7^BIB|^^HBHHHHH'^* ^^* •aatlnf^ 
staead that uBSwaa a •-'ary ^eod enBiea that tnethar Aaarican 
_ ~ or tvo wfi-J^ .^^|^-W«o' ar>en.* On vituJ^.' J'- •<*«'> 0-«- aequlicanea, 
laraal prevlAa^Xran with an additional lneraiZ*"«-<SOO TOW 
aiaailaa) efthaaa daf.taaivia' waapeaa.'. ■'' 

1^^ Lata on Oetobor ]l.HH[|^^|H|H|^Healiad tha 

-> (BaJiia) taakad to ana taia eeataet and ad^laod that Iran had 
'axarelsad Ita Influaaeo with tha Labanaaa* in ordar to obtain 
tha ralaaaa of^^aaricai — David Jacebaan -- and an uncartain 
nuabar of Franeb beata<|aa. Sa furthar aotad that this waa part 
^^UMi porpcaa of UM ^raalaa Feraifa Mlalatar'i vialt to Syria. 
• ^^Batatad that tha alt-.aatloa la Tahran, aa wall 
litballfch wara bcth datarloratlaail 




ih 



f-*h 



^^^ OB Hovaabar 

rlvaa ta a polaQ aaar tM Aid Aaarleaa 
icy BiMnaaiH la «■•« Baicwt. Am 0.1. tabaaay la taat lainit 
l^aadiataXy diayatebad aa aatoaaay a<(iear ta Maat Mirat to pick 
119 NT. Jaaefcaaa. 

Xe ta aow apparaat that paraiataat O.S. afforta to aatabliah 
eoata«« with Iraa hava probably aaaearbatad tha pewar •tniq^la In 
Iraa batwaaa pra^aatle t>laaaata (lad by Dafaaa^anl) and aera 
radical factloaa (vtadar tha ovarall apoaaorahlp of Ayatellah 
Mentatarl). la lata Octobar, radical a«ippertara (of Neatasari) 
ravaalad tha (Saf aaajaal ) eontaox with tha OM aad tha taraa of 
tha eaatae«. Xa ordar to dafaad hf aalf a^alaat char^aa of 
eellodlAf with tJM OM aitd ta praaarva a da^raa of latituda for 
both partlaa, Ma] 11a »9mk**' >af aaajaal arevldad a Q^f'^y 
f abrleata^] waraloa of th^ Nay Ift* Nefarlaaa alaalon la hla 



TO t' GCC R n 



^ 



^\ 



^i 



m 



ISSiRED 



523 



<^' 



^ 



TO P SECRET 



S346 



Nov««&«r 4 cddrtae to th« oatMi ttedarxLa tp»<.. __, 

poittxe.i pro6i«; b-for. pri2::4fn^":tth t^: "'; "r^tiSnT*' 

Octo*«r l)l< «rra«t of radical laadar m>h^i BA.hZI. ■ 

co-fid«t .«d .o„,i„.u. Of Jiiiti:'«s;?ti.M*i:^'.'j':r 

torrorlM u>A tr«*«.r> h., caua«d fartf,., l,at*ra«l «nfUe? 

by wMia^ Iranian lnfl««,e« in Ufewwa d«« in p«rt to aa«ci!t 
eeaatralata ajtd tJi« fact tSut th* U^ua ar« ^^ ^ 'laaacial 




to Mist^in dir»et ec«% *?? !?!!*rL"fSi* ' i*Li""^f "* «"""«• 
act wltll tte use and act aa^^n , ^n G^nmv^ 

and CIA ropraaantativa. 




It la iapertanc ta ae«« 



contact with Iran tJvgra 
••nt ee^Xleity in acta 

thAt tiM t«^4 

aa4 Tracy war* natfartal 
o.S.-lraalaa atrata^la 
Iraaiaa pewar atrafflj 
hav ^ 



that alaca tho initiation of tha use 
I haa b«aa ae a«i4«nee of Iraaiaa ^evarn- 
«f tarrcriai a<;aiaat tha U.S. Ma baliav* 
|ar kldaafylAfa of Maaaara. l*«d, Cieipfio. 

ia aa affert t« oadarmina tn* naaeaat 
Jlalofoa aad axaeari»ata tiM ietaraal 

■ iat tbm Modarata factioa with which wa 



they wars 
rappre«ehs«nt 



TIT lfriB» 



3= «-f !lfI-'?-.*?l'««l**i''« t«pori» that thaaa neataqaa 
^-o^e TTIIi^^« i*"^*** *^ «eqMiaition of aora ar«a, 

hssnt with Iran w*"'** ^ ""*•* " »'•''•"* ^* "•'> 



a aro taakinf. 



fW\mftff 







»f*^ 



■\.. 



(! 



. J 



:-'L'J 



524 



<3 



^^ 



yNCUSSifiED 

TO P SI-'CSET 



8347 



Throughout thi« precaai, tha OSG »•• »cx.»4 vithin th« liaiti of 
• ■tabl,i.*h*4 policy uid in eoapli. »ne« with «i: U.S. i«w. Th« 
ihipMht o< 2,00i TOW« and 235 I *•« alssila p«rt« «aa und.rtin.n 

under tho previaiens o< a eovor- - •etlon finding. to% M*udU ii«. KJ^ 

lo auppert et thta rindln? aad •« th« diraetlon of tha rraaidant 
tha CIA providad tha followliif oparatlenal aaalataneai 



Starlla ovarsaaa banJc ace ounts for flaanelal tranaaetiona. 

A saeura tranahipaant po ^"t for tha dlapateh of O.S. 
military itama froa tha U-S. 



* 



•nt of ailitar y !■«• 



tha U.S. to Iiraal. 



Coeantnleationa and Int allifanea tuppert for tha iMatinqt 
with Irahian official ' •"* tha (tefarlana trip to Tahran i.i 
May. 

(Jlaarad aaatln^ ai< "at with Iranian 

officials. '-** ih turep* (or aaat^... 

Alia* docuaantatle: 

maatlaa* in tureea ^ '^' <3.t. and forai^n official! for 
and Tahran. 
Tha waapona and aatarla. 

way adaquata to altar tJ *■ P'o^tdad undar thla proqrasi »ra ;.-, r.c 
tha war with '• b'i*"** of military Bowa i .-.cr •..'.« 

" ^hava, howavar, 

nant to traaiaa tarritef^WH^Hrid*Mnitratad tha U.S. co«Bit- 
ovar tha laa« II aeiitha ^*^ IntafFTty. Purthar, U.S. affortt 
peXlcyi hava had taAfUla raaulta on Iraniah 

thm tafaanjaAi/Vala- 

1 147 paaaaofari (J«i^**^ iatarvantiea en bahalf of tha TVA 



& 



ranlaa 41r*etlae t» ^ , ■ 

■Ti niiiilit lifl ti'** *'"' »ij*ek«« faa »m (73 aaatd net M ■ueeu'ii 




~ TIM ralaaa* of thraa 

Aaarieaa and.tve Pranch hoataqaa. 

It shevld also ba aotad ti aTKa^T 

lAf, Hast tttsopaaa natlona'*' "»• ".«. arM a«>arae notwlthatand- 
aiUtary aquipMat to Irarf •'•'^ pwridad SSOO aiUloa a yaar In 
plialMtf with aevarnMat lu5- "»•« «' **••• "■"•'•rt wara aecoa- 

(wla4f« aad/or aequlascaaca. ^^ 



0^1 



I 



525 



^' 



^ 



^^ N 8348 



All appreprlat* C«bln«t Officer* ruv« b««n tppriiad thr«..-.. 

«. «tr.ortiiu^ .^n.ltivtty of our Irt^JJ coS".e« «2 ttl ^= 

A«t«, flMlly. our affort* to a«hi«v« tn, r.i.Mo e<^, * 

ho«t««M^« L«>«n«n Bust eont^nu. to rely oo 41aerMt contact. 

and UitacMdlarlaa «he eaAjtec parferm if thay ara revaaiad 



■^Hfffilf 



*^^^ 



sitCi; 



526 




/Zy^ /)/fTB 



5^ /\a,^(^Q»~lCL T3^s 4n Ti^**.^ 






^b 






CIA- ^ (>^-*>yVfl^^ /a/»m- d^>»^-^ SrjX -t-lJ. 



Da-^ - C//t- 6>^. 






'♦-^^^ / tj«-. j-«A*yC«> . 



■A*-/* 



Dtr sisitiea'Released on i0^64_8o 
'.I'f ,Tr,vuioris 01 E 12Jd6 
joii'isim Nalional Secunly Council 



i 



^ 



M?>^ T^e. ^- •- /^.-s ij/^J Ci^»/ /^ ^ i^^ i/ y^i/L*^ 



T^it Ai.K>< /I: 




^<M. Vdt^ $W ^ ^AM 'J /ir 0rt7 /U^li (W*^ vSJU^M. \ , 

UNCLASSIFlte 



I 



527 



A \^ 



i_c ^^^ ^^ 



"'t srckxT 



4. _; - 



q.S./T»AX !Aj< CONTACTS mO TMt Af^lHICA^ HOSTXCtJ 

From t.*.« ••rUait montht foUovin^ t.1« liUwie f'^oljtion m 
Ir*n, tn« U.S. Govtrnm«.nt !va* «etampetd to re«»e«fiUin ottlc-.t'. 




Octcfcar l*' 



m«t i«cr«tly with B'zir^^n «t •.«,, 




Cetob«r-Nov«(fi«r ;97f - 
norw4l :zac;on o{ ralation 

wh«n chaia waatxnqi and tl^a sacrac Novambar I. 1*7* ma«i;-^ :i 
Algiars, bacwaan Brzatinski. and friina Miniicar Satargan, :t;>-« 
public m Iran, thay halpad pracipitata tha takaovar oJ :-t .5. 
Enaassy by radical alarants and lad to tha raai^nation of -.-t 
Bajarqan qovaran<ant. Thaea avant* hava advar«aly mflua-cti 
:ran'i subiaquant willmqnaaa to anqaqa m any diract tor-tc: 
wit.^ tha wSC. 

Oaipita mutual difftcyltlaa involvad m'^a-aitabl ishi-ig -c:— »' 
ralations. our atrata^xe incarasts in tfta Fersvan Gulf -»ri»i.t 
parsittant afforta to astabUah a dialo^ua. In tnis zt^ttt. .-. 
if notabla tftat only a f*w major eountriaa ijo not hava :•.«?;;-$ 
witn Iran -- C^ypt. Jordan. Horoceo, laraal. Soutn Afr;r«. trt 
t^a Unitad Statat. Kvan Ira<q contmuaa ta '••ava dip'.er«t:: 
lalatient witA Iran. 

Iran is U»« k«y to a raqion of vital llT^por':*r^ca to fa -,,•,, .,- 
It if laertaaUflly tnraatanad by qrowinq Soviat miUtiry pc*: 
and pelltleal Influanca along ita bordara and inaida uj 
tarritory. Ovar tha couria of tfia laat two yaara, t^* Sov.f.s 
and thair aurregatas hava movad activaly te gain gra«ttc 
influanca In th« Culft 




??>• SevLa^s ballava that on«t IthoBwlnl diat, they wi^. r*'. 
Mn axctllant opportunity to influanca tha forwation o. a 
"■^ovarntfont in Tahtfin that larvaa Sovlat strategic i-tart*' 
tho araa^. e a. T^ 

1 cf t .2:;5 / 

OAC« 



TCJStCJU? 

Caelaaaifyi 



: in Tahrfin that larvaa aov 



nir ;rovi: 
-t»er, i' 



528 



UNCIA]SSIFIED 



Co«ur«lit rutioni h«v« 6«eom« th, pri.nei.p«l trmt lupp'' 
to irtn .- ««)nnq ir»n d«p«nd«f>t on tnn «ourc« o( lupp 
cont«ndin^ with «n inert«tin^ly acc-tn^tntncd Irjq. r*; 
lead* at to tn« conelutiori tn«t tn« Sovitei m«y w«:: tj 

• tttmptin^ to purtu* tn«ir ovt> rtvolvition in Ir»n. -^4 
by fu«lin9 both sida* in eh« confUet, tn« Sov;«., cjui 
w«U •ncoura^t • disastrous 'final offansi^a' sy :•»„ I 
would prteipitata a political disintaqrat ion in :;(n. 
Itavmf a povar vacuum wnieh ch« Seviata could txpioi> 
Sp«cif leally , tha indicators of Comixunist influanct in 

• r«i 



• ri 
t 

- '%. 

i 

•«t 



J 




mri-iri 



TH« Inerttilnf daip«r««loB brought on by th« cost* of t^a rr; 
war n«i axtearbstad Iran's v>jlnar»6lUty to Soviat infUanca 
Her«dv«r, Sovtae dasl^nt U Afghanistan, prassura on tikitttn. 
and actual eretsberdac strUaa In Iran from Afghanistan ^«v« '*dt 
raop«ntnf 4 strata^ie dlalofu* ln«t«a«lnfly Important. 



-fii.iicin- 



* 



i 



529 






ni 



OOii s 



In fhort'i tha Sovittt w«r« ttt b«tt«r poticontd to iwprovt 

• i^n;,! ie«ncly their in;iu«nc« ^n th« rtfion ;n 1)1) wn«n «« v«rt 
pr«t«r.t«d with «n opportunity to op«B a dl«lo^u« with Inn. :.i 
doeidirq to exploit tMs opening, vt •vtiu«ta4 prtviom •iisr** 
through mer« eonvtnticnal enannols vhieh had net tuecaa^td. 

AJbout tve yaart a^o. senior Iranian officials apparently itc-.iti 

thet some aecomnodation vith the U.S. vas necessary. Sir^ca m* 
veriou* countries have been enqa^ed in overtures to the c.s. 
Inn in an «4fert to stimulate direct e ont^et 
countri««. -|.^_____«__._.._ . 

TMr> f y ^^l* *^^ attempted to stfve an intf riocutori in t.^n 
gmllml^However. internal, splits kr>^ dadates made it difficile 
for tht Iraniane to respcnd to th«i <iveri"rt8. 

Numerous i.idlviduals and pr-'-cte jfeitiee have likewise attempted 
te be helpful as inteftn**! at lee in eatt&U«nin« contact in Iran 
or ift seeKin? tranian 
Meld hostage in Lebanof.. 




In th« ipriftf §f HIS, • privar.e Arerican citixeft 'Hichael 




hest««« tituction in loirut 



In J«n« of IMS, in tho midft of tho ?va-|47 hijacki^^, 

'iraell offlclaU In dlr«ct contact with the Iranian e»? 

Itked him to Mf hH influenc* with senior I?«hi«n offi: 

*■ ■' n.m WW ».i4.-fc«^ BAatanaers. TVO days 



Jitlln th. %l.«.o Of t^. hi i-^i* p*...h<,ers. ?vo day. 

tho hi1^cH»^»gg«»|<«g»||V|^ lg*«< AaAtpnii^flvtg w a 

avithorniiotrnlHBm^^HHiM^^^.^jt .ikAaiAi^Asc 

tiro. m4 Irani** forelfl* iHnlfWt ^jlJliU J^.^^^i"/''^"' 
th, 0.3?". Mfsanianl. In ^^^^ •^^.«'" "Jj^rf JiJ',! 
tho first tim« publicly acHnovledqed hH role in this 

1 • s s /» 



« t .- : « t « 

lalt t(J 

alier 
est 3^ 

rian 

rt t!"iB 

)««, f-.x 
tttf . 



TOP 3tC«T 



0^' 



530 



r 







rOn July 3. HIS. during • vUlt te w»«htnq«on, «n IirttU ~) 

offici*! (Klmch«) adviatd M«tion«l Security A4viior, Hae^rt 

' Mer«fUn«. tn4t Israel h«4 ••««bUihe»d « eh«nn«l o? Jefw.uniett ■ an 
with 4U6hof it«tiv« tl«m«nc( in Iran wno w«r« intarajted i^ 
dcetrminin^ wMcthar tna Uni?a4 Stttas was ep«n to « ducrts* 
hi^h-laval dlalo^ua. Tha Iranians wcrt d««crlb«4 *i eonpn.^^^- 
tf\9 principal fiquras of tha foverrunant (l.a.i Spasker o( (.■>.• 
Hajlis RAfsan^ani. rruna Hlnlttar Musavi, and IU^o«aini'| 
jh«lr-app4rcnt. Ayacollih Mentazari) and as b«in9 ^evoctd to » t 
[r•orl•n?atio^ of Iranian policy. [ 

[At this iU" . m««einq, Mcfarlana want to ^raat Isnqth to draw ouTl 
( tP« lira*!' 4. to w^y ha foynd fha Iranian proposal cradibla, I 
9i/•'^ th* i8*,&ntd >,f tn^ past ii* yaara. Tn« Israali rapl lad' that 
th«2.r Qsnauat^v* an^^j/tiz had ^^na bayond the surfaca loqic 
deriviiif froA th« en^i,.^ ^nd dacUna within Iran and tha 
da^anarttiv* effects of t.:ii «er. to nero een«r«ta tasts of tha 
willin^nass of the Iranians ?.9 tska personal, risks. Ma notad 



that th« Xraniana hsd sxposad tiafiialvas to posvlbl* cowpromisa 
by mactin^ with Isratlis and by passl.if axtramaly saniitiva 
intalliqcnca on tha situation !ud .yolitlcafiittinF'vip' 
inforR^ati«n whic;4toci^ptev«iva»rsll4' ^^k -« tJ^ ~ ^ 



fkAhvir Irtn 



I Tha Israali askad fo; 



I ;n« iscavik asK«« kwi our position on opsiinf such a dial:^ua. / 
h^o Jti^tiorv- vee aad* •# «fty pr«-c««titieA4^»*' Iranian pn.or;t;ts.' 
Mefarlan* ecnvaytd this proposal ts tha Pras'.dant (in t^a 
presenc* of thd Chiaf of Staff), the Frasidant said that ha 
beiiavad such a dialefa* would ba worthwhile at laast to tha 
point of dtt«?minln4; t.h« validity of th« intarlocutori. This r 
I decision w«s p««s«d t9 the Israeli diplenat by t eUphena on 

ffiJLAxi'' °n_A"1H^^ ^' ^^^'* - ^l^* Ursell called again on McfarUra. At 

tMs aeetinq. h« stated that he had conveyed our position to t^a , 
Iranian interaodlary and that the Iranians had respordad t^at ^ 
th«y rtco^nited the need for both sides to have tangible avidfca 
eC th« tena (ld«s of the other and that they believed tray csuli 
affect th« raleese of the Anericans held host^fe m Ui4non.^ 

_Jii. J ( Aecocdinq to th« Israel i, the IranUns separately stat«<i t"*t 

''^**'*^ they were vulnerabld a« a froup and before having any projpact c. 

Lbein^ able to affect change within Iran they, would need to be 
substantially atren^thened. To d« •«, they would need to lacura 
the cooperation of •llitarY «nd/«s Revolutionary Guar^ leaders. 
Toward thl« end. they expressed the vlr* t.Ka^ y\^.'^o«« credible 
dewonatratlon of their Influence and tbiUtiee would b« to lecurt 
(limited anounte of U.S. e^lpMflt. The Israeli atned for our 
/position on sueh actions. 



531 




«*JU«^ 



f 




r""n 






Mr. Mcrarl«n 
m««tln9 vleh 

ttACcd tn«e, 

«nd uUim«t« 
m«ttrl«li. at 
daallnf with 
military nat 



ita ovn p«Xiey znearaata 
dialog* in b«^i 









• alavtead thia propoiuion to tha 'ra«ld«ne «t < 1 
in 4ayt tnat meludad th« Saeratarlaa of Si«tt ind i 

tha Oiraetor o( Cantral IntaUiflanea. Tha rr«(id.n<. 

wftila ha eeu;^ undaritantf thaftaauwin^ tn, 
f tha intarlocywra, thay t«euld ba qyita vMintr«bU 
ly isi^ht daaarva our tuppcrt to inciuda tan^ibia 
tha tima, without any firat hand a«parianca m 
tham, ha eould not tuthorlta any trantfaci of / 
ariai. Thia waa convtyad to tha ItraaU. \ 

Oh Auqm t H>, ms. tha Iiraali diplomat eallad o'nca nort to — 1 
raport that tha matia^a had baan eenvayad and that an iflip*.,. ., ' 
eonfidanea axistad. I« aakad what tha peaition of tha \}.s 
|Oevarnjnant would ba to^Aft laraali tfaa«f«r o( nedaat oantui.. 
of dafanaiv* nilitary Mtarial^ MerarIaA«'r«pli*4^at to him 
auch an action would rapr^Mnt a 4^|^nction' ««ithout a diffaranc* 
Tha laraali diplomat axpITlnad at'lNbt lon^th that Xtraal had 

that we«l« ^MMrvod bv foatarinq tueh a 
f of t^• O.S.« b«t Ihat #vctol«a would ariia 
whan ultimately tMLnaadad to raplaeo iM«ff~«lkipf«4. Ma atkad 
whoeiar laraal wovnV b^abla to pureh«fll r#^lac«manta for itama 
th4pehea«ftte «»!> >■_ it c»«rlanc Ata<^Eflt>t th« tecua was not c.ia 
ability of Xara^nr>urehata "VEIitW^iTuipmant -f roa tha us. 
thoy h^ de«i so^or a^^^rVlion tW 
-' b4V rathae^Aa ift«>Mi!Vta wh«tJiar ii 

allow othara to ship military aq\iipmant to Iran. Tha Iirati 
askad for a position frea our fovarninant. HcFarlana alavtttd c^4 
quastion to tha Frasidant (and to tha Saeratariaa of Stata «nd 
Dafansa and tha Oiraeter of Cantral Intalli^aneal . Tha Pra8id«n* 
statad that, whila h« could anviaion previdinf aatarial support 
te aedarat* «l«»«nts la Iran if all th« Mastarn hests^as vara 
ffraod. ha could net apprev* any tranafar of military «atari«L s- 
tha t tim*. This peaitien waa eonvayad te tha laraali dip:c'-4c. 

On Saptambar 14« 1909. Revarand lan^affiin Wair waa ralaatad i.. 
Beirut by the Xalaaie ,^ihad Or^anitation. Thia ralaaia w«i 
praccded by en intanaa affort on tha part of Hr. Tarry w«k,tt. -< 
Speelel fBittary of the Axehbishep of Cantarbury. ?o th;s 'in 
Kr. Welte reaelna the onl y, wastamar t e a var a>aat d irteth 
tneae kidnap paxja. 

ftH lata Saptambar^ wa {earned that the Xtratlia had transfarrad 
1 901 TOW aiasllea to Xrea and that ihH ahipaant had takan pUca 
'-tin late Aufyst. The Xsraells told «• that they undartook tha 
I action, despite eue ebjeetlons. because they bellavad it to s« in 
I their atratsfle Interests. The Iiraella aana^ad thia antlra 
operation, to Include dellvary arran^aaents, funding, *nd 
tranapertatlen. Xfter dlacusslnf this mettar with tha frasviant 
it was deeldad not to expose this laraell dalivary bacausa va 



BlA^e 10 m tha ;.*..r« 
'as^W. ^licy to tn:p er 



TOT sicurt 



expoae t 



532 




UNIW^-' 



w«ntt4 %• r«C«ln th« option of •xploitinf th« «xi(cinf :ir««u 
c^•nn^l with Tthran in our ovn •ttott to ««tabU>h « scrttt^ie 
di«io^y« wlt^ «^• rr«ni«n fo*«tn^«nt. T>io total v«ly, o( ^f,, jgj 
TOW* iMppod by Isreol w«t (titinatad to b« !••• th«n S2 mlUen. 

On October 4, '^1919, itUmie Jlh«d anfleune*^ t^at it ha4 '«x«cjttd* 
B«irut Station Chifti wi;uajB lueklay in rttalTation for tn* 
Oetobor 1 Itraali air r«i^ on' f LO lna«^lacMna in TMmi. rrm 
anneuneamant lad to a sariat of ••atln^ th Curopo a/ncnq th« r.,; 
(C!A and NSC), Itraall, and Iranian Inttrmodiariaa. in c.>i«|, 
••atln^s, tho Iranians indfeattd that. wMlo thair ability to 
Influanca th« Hitballan was waning, tha aiiballah had net kUlid 
Buenlay; ho had in fact diad sovaral vniha oarlior of naturil 
eausas. »« havo^xflco substintlkf*4 tt^a tfti» rm^icn in dabriafs 
of ratha'r Janee Mv David JaeebsiA. both df^nea indt«ata that 
Bucklay probably dlad on Juna 3, 19IS of pnaumsnia-lika sympto**. 

In mid'Novombar , tho Israalls. throufh a sanier offlear in tha 
rerai^n Ministar's offico (Xiiaehal , indleatad that tha Ccvarna«nc 
Qt Israal was eonvmead that thay wars naarlnf a braaktnrouqh 
with Iran on a hiqh-laval dialo^a. Tha Israoll contactad « U.S. 
official (HorthI and askad for tha n«r«« of e Kuropoan-basad 
airlina which could dlscraatiy transit to Iran for tha purpcia cf 
dollvarin^ pastanqars and car^o. la specifically notad t.'4c 
n«it.*iar a O.S. carriar nor an Israall afflllatad carriar csu:^ tt 
usad. w« wore assurad, at tho tisM. that tha Israalis v«re qoi*.? 
to 'try oil drilling parts as an ineantiva,* sine* wa had 
•xpratsad so much dlsplauuraova^th^aarXiar TOW shipmant. T>.a 
na;na of tha propriatarv Jj^BHBSIHHHW *"' passad to 
Israall, who tubsaquantly had tha airerafTchartarad through 
normal eomtnorelal contract for a fllfht froa Tal Aviv te T«b..:. 
Iran, on Nevambor 2S, 191$. Th« Israalls war* unvittin^ of t's 
CZA's invelvosont in tho airllna and tha airllna was paid «t t^.a 
normal fcs&l££^il charter rata (approiinataly Sl27,700). rr.a 
iro also unwitting of tha car^o thay carritd. 



normal f '■"trSUl «^ 

airlina\parsowor{woi 



Xa J4auary» «• learned that the Israelis, responding to urqtit 
entreaties fveet the Xreniana. has usad the proprietary aircrtft 
to trMievort It NAtnt ■isslles to Iran in an effort to improv* t>a 
atati« air defenses around Tehran, ^r belated awartntis t.ttt 
the Israeli's had delivered NAtOl elssUes raised seriovii us. 
concerns that these deliveries weca Jeopardlslnf our objactivt of 
srranflnf a direct eeetlnf with hlfh«level Iranian offieialf. Xt 
« eensaquence of U.«, Initiative and by itutual aqraaffant of »U 
three parties, these alsslles were returned to Israel in r«bcj«ry 
19IC. 

On Oecatnbex 7, the President convened a Bteetlnf In the whita 
House (residencet to dlscMss ne»t stapa In our efforts to 
establish direct contact with the Iranians. Attending the 



iMM kmm^ 



•*^e «»<•••• 



533 



\liUi88«S 




L: 



n<««cin« w«rt the CMtf of Staff, S«cr«cari«i ot St«c« «nd 

0«f«n*«; in« 0«puty Olraecor of Cantral Int«Ui9«nc«. md th« 
Asiiatant to tna 'raaidant for Hatienal Saeurity Afftiri tm r\\.t 
Dapviey. I.t^cdiataly aftar ch« maatxnf, Mr. HcfarUn* dap4rcad 
for London to maat witn tha taraaU official and tna litmtn 
contact to mal^a claar tna natura of our xntaraat in « !ii*:o<ju« 
^itf> Iran. At tftxa maatin^, Mr. Mcrarlana. aa intiructtd by .., 
Fraaldant, atatad tnat: "- — j 

tha U.S. waa opan to a political dialo^ua with [ran, but 
tnat no suen dialoqua could vaka pre^rasi for tt lon^ tj 

<}roupa saan as dominatad by Iran hald V-S. '^oita^ai; «nd 

tfia U.S. could undar no cireuAStaneas tranafar ar»a to Iran 

in axehan^a for hoata^aa. 

Tftaaa points vara ■'^ada dlractly to th« Iranian intarlocutor . Tha 
Iranian rapliad that, unlasa hia assoeiatas in Tahrtn w«ra 
stran^thanad , tnay could not risk ^oin^ ahaad witn t.^a diale^ua. 
MX. Mcfarlana acknow:«dqad th* poaition but atatad wa could net 
chan^a our poaition. in a saparata maatin^ witA tha Isriali 
official. Mr. Mcfarlana mad* claar our strong ob]actions to 

sraali waapons snipmants to Iran. Follovinq tnasa n«ct;-qi, ■, 
Mr. Mcrarlana catumad to Washington and snortly tnara«(^«r ItftJ 
activa qovarnirant tarviea. — -^ 

On January 2. tha frma Ministar of Israal dispatei^ad « ipaci«l 
amissary to tha U.S. (Aniran Nir) to raviaw proposals tez ntm 
staps m doalxnf witA Iran. Tha Israalia urqad tha? wa rtconsi^tr 
th« issua of providing linitad dafansiva arms to thosa at:arp*.-^ 
to taka powar in Taltran. sinct all othar mcantivas (tconomic 
assiseanca, wadieal suppliaa. maenina parts) wara of .10 v4L.1t in 
shorm^'up the«« who wantad an opanin^ to tha wast, xdmiral 
Peindastar net«4 our strin^ant objaetions to tha hawk mi tula 
shipifants m Nev««vbar and netad that tha U.S. would n«v« co *t: 
to h«v« tti*m raturnad (a stap undartakan in rabrjary, wnan «ii 
II ■ioallftl war* raturnad to Israal). In that any implana'MAe :o!^ 
of th« lartcli proposals would ra^ira tha aetiva panicipat .:n 
of th« lJlt«llif«nca eomwunity, tha HSC Staff (Horthi was t«i(td 
to pr«p«r« « CQvart action finding, work on this ?r«tLd«nci«l 
finding coRunancad on January 4. 

On January «. tho Frasldant. tho Vleo frasidant. tha Chiaf of 
Staff, and tho National Socurity Mvtfor and his assiitant 
rovlovad tho flrit draft of tho rin4ln« and tha racci-.-andations 
mado by tho »rt»o MinUtar of Xaraol through hit spacial 
amiaaary. 

on January 7, tho Prasldant mot In tho Oval Of flea •i^'J^J'* ^^^^ 
Praaidant, tho Chlaf of Staff. Sacratarias Shult* "^^ "V*-^!!^ 

Attornay Conoral Haaso; Olroctoc Caaoy, and tha National Sacuri.y 



<>^a <»ra*^ 



«rf*ni 



534 



rot iicun 



mm' 



f 



in 



Iran tnd proap«ett 



Advitor t« 4iseM«« tM« overall ■ltQ«ti«n 

for • itrata^ie di.«i,o^u«. It *•• t^Hn no««4 th«« kt'. «er«fii«« 
on rtturn fro« hu trip to Lcndon, had rteom»«ftd«d tnas no 
fuftnar action b« tak«n unlot* • Mehanism could b« iitailijLj 
by wiMch t^• U.S. could •ftt b«tttr control ov«r •v«nt«.' n, 
«9r««d. In principlo. vxtn eiraetor Casey that provide, ' ^ ^^^^^^ 
quantitia* of dafanaiva arms aftar tn« hoitaqa* wara rtl««t«d 
atlll had marit. Both Saeratary Shultt and Sacratary ^^ir.btcatr 
objaetad to any provmoR of arms, citing that «• eouU not t* 
»\if that thasa would raally haip sedafatc alamants •n4 (,>,^^ , , 
•xposad, th« pro^aet vould net b« undarstood by swdarita ikxait ' 
and would b« saan as centravanin^ eur poUey OTf not daallno wi.t>. 
statas that support tarrorisM. Tha ^rasldant dacldad that wa 
should attampt to kaap tha Israali channel tctiva as lenf asdt 
offarad possiblUtlas for maatln^s with hifh-laval Iranian 
officials and laft open th« xssua of providinf dafansiva ar«a to 
Iran it all tha hostages ware released. 

:t was further determtnad by the President that any dialogue with 
the Iranians must be aimed at achiavin^ the follovin^ qoalsi, 

Oevlsinq a formula for ra*astablishin9 a strategic 
relationship with Tehran. 

Ending the Iran-^Iraq War on honorable terms. 

Convincing Iran to cease its support for terroriim and 
radical subvarsion. 



Helping enevre .^Mfr tarrtt 

coordinacinf vayt iM wnt 
activltm in tM refien 



int%|iity oC Iran an< 
we Might counter Soviet 



Tho President sad* clear chat a western dialogMe with Iran would 
be precluded unless Iran were willing to use its influence to 
achieve th« release o( wastarn hostages in Beirut. Ha also rtia 
claa; ttut v« could net and would net engage in trading arvt (or 
hest«f««« Secretaries Shults and Weinberger retained tneir 
orlfln«l ^titlen on providing any amrs to Iran, but Attorney 
Cenerel Hcetc end Oireeter Casey both supported the concapt as a 
valid ■•«»• of opening the dtalo^e. Attorney Canatal Maatt, 
noted a 1911 determination by then Attorney Cenaral rranch Snlih 
that transfcrrinf small ^antities oC ams through third ^ 
eeuntriet under • Covert Action rindinf was not illegal. 




TOP itctrt 



535 



TOfSfCWt 






^itCLftSohiLi 




On J4nu«ry n, ;«•( 
rindlM (T«b A) 4ir 
vlth tpteial a?tiv), 
forth &bcv«. Th« f 
«utherita4 by en* r 
neclfieation due to 
•sttbllthad. n« fu 
pro^ru* would plaet 
risk. Noting hia e 
operation (both u.S 
of Cantral IntaUl^ 
appropriata eomnitt 
tAoa* involvad wevil 



, tho Fraaldtnt apprevvd a Cov«rt Action 

• ctift^ tnat tha lnt«4li^«nea conwymty procta" 
tiaa aiRi«d at aeceaipllahln^ tha ^oali sat 
raaidant futhar 4atanainad that the •e«ivif.. 
indlfif Juatltiad wlU»holdin^ prior Conart.i'L, 

tho axtrtM lanaltlvlty of th« dialocua b.i«- 
rthor notad that putolie krovlad^s of Jha 

tho AjMriear. heataftc in Ubanon at iraatar 
oncarn for the Uvo« of thoea carrying ovi th« 
. and foraifn). ho dirtetad that tha oiractor 

• nc* rafrain fro* ra^rtlnf the rinding to tha 
aea of tha Cen^rata vAtil raaaenafely aura that 
d no l;>n9ar 6« in jsepardy. 



^ 



on rabruart S-T, U.8.=«f 
repratantativ« oftAa^Z 

aonior-laval I 




,S. aid* aqraad to axpler* this peasxbility and, woi 
th« IsraaUs, aatabliahod tha fellovin^ SMChanisa for transfar of 

th« vaapons: , 

T>.a Iranian intormodiary ICherbanifar) would dapoait fundi 
m an laraali account. 

?h« Itraalia would transfer funds to a star:.le U.S.- 
eentreilad account in an ovacteas bank. 

OtlAf thasa funds, tha CIA would covertly obtain nattr.al 
a«thorlta4 for transfer froa O.S. ailitary stocki and 
transport this to Israel for onward aovament to :r<n. 

Usin^ tha procedures stipulated above, |3<1 million wt< dapositad 
in tha CIA account in Canava on February 11, l)l< and on 
rabruary 14, 1,000 TOWa vara transperta4 to Israel for pra-poiUi: 
inf. Thasa TOva wara transfarrad by CXA froa OOO (U.I. Amy 
iten. Alafea»a) an4 tran sported throug h/ 
}usin« standard CXA*0OO^BHHB|JLo*n*ties 
Follcy-laval eoordinatfln !or these arranqamartt 
was effected by NSC (North) with 000 (Araita^e) and CIA iciair 
Ceor^e). Tha TOMa wara placed in a covert Israeli facility 
awaitinf onward shipaanti • ■ 

Tor sicurt '! 



in^. *n«s« iwwi 

st^k^^^nist 

arranfil^^ff^ 1 



536 



i^fi^fir 



mmt 



0« r«brv«ry Il-Ji. u.J. insC «n4 C:a» . ":«f*«li and tranun 
offiel«li ««t in C«nfi«fty to dlteuts prebl«ffs in 4rr»n«,n- < 



: r • ni « n i conwitf d 



lflei«l». 



^ _ _ Aft«r codtd «utnormt,a- 

w«s ric«iv«d isom w•e^J,f.qton, th« w.s. aid* «frttd to provid, 
1,000 TOWa to Ir«n •• « clttr il^nal ot U.S. »ine«f;ty. 7^^, 
dslivjiry w«8 co(tw«nc«d on tft« iwrninf of r«bfu«ry 2Q and cei^pls-,- 
in two transits t© Tahran on Fabr-jary 31. Traniportation '--.^ 
Isra«l to Iran was aboard a !alt« fUf Israeli aircraft, cn-x. 
return flight fro« Iran, tn«s« aircraft earriad tha 11 hamv 
mtssilas which Israal had tant to T*hran m Novambar liij ^v.w 




On r«bru4ry 34. U.S. (CIA an4 NSC) officials mot again m 
rrankfuft with th« Israoli and Iranian officials to diseusi -axt 
stops. At t^is mooting, tho U.S. sido urgad that tha Icamant 
• xpodito 1 Rooting ajneng highor-lav«l officials on both sidas. 

On fobruory 2t« tho ^ris« Minister of Israol wrota to ^raiKiant 
Koagan (Tab S) urging centinuod afferts to acniava a ie?«ta<7ie 
broakthrougti vltli Iran, but asking eonsidaratien for t.'.a sa(acy 
of roeontly s«iso4 Israoli hostagos. 

On HAteh T, O.S.«(CIA and NSC) and Israoli raprtsanca'. ;v«s -at 
with tiMi Xronian intarmodiacy in Pans to datsrnina wnat^a^ «n/ 
furth«r ptogrots was possible in arranging for a hi<}rflav«i 
mooting with O.S. and Iranian officials. Owring trtaia r-ttt.-^t, 

tho inton^iodiary omphasited tho dotoriorating acononic sit.u4ticn 
in I?kA and Iranian aniiotioa regarding increasing Iraqi -nil.'.acy 
of feetivonoss. - 

Tho etealotlen ei tonsient with Libya, leading up to t^e Apr;l :« 
•trlko, provontod further dialoguo fro« taking place until tne 
Iranian* urgo4 tho internodiary IChorbanifarl to aeealaraee the 
effort in lato April, 1JI«. At thot point, the Iranian txpatria-.a 
advised ua through tho Israeli polnt-of-contact that the 
loadorship in Tehran was prepared to cownence a lacrat dialoque 



TOP sicurr 



ilitt}(AC32!lfil^ 



537 



■J 



muMt 



n 



with lh« 0nit«4 StAcaa •l«nf th« Unas of our ••tabUth*^ -a.i. 
w« b«U«v« that tho iraniina war* itimulata^ to ranaw th- eo!,!;. 
by tn« April \^ murdar ot heata«« ratar tnhurn^mimm^ ^*^^ 




Tho Ir»nlan axpatriata xoaq «na mc and CIA oisicart, who m^ 
with hia In Curepa at tn« and of April, that tha Iranitnt di] 
wiih to ba accuaad of any culpability in Hilbwrn'a daath 




On Hay C. 7, l)|(. U.S. and laraali effiears nat in Undon with 
tho Iranian Intarmadlary in which h« ur^od that wa taka ^.sunadUta 
atapa to trrtnqa for a hl^h-Iaval U.S. /Iranian Mating in Tahran. 
Ourlnf tha t.ondon (naatlnf, tha Iranian vir«ad that wa (U.S. and 
laraal) act urqantly to h«lp with Iranian air daftnsa. Ha 
amphaaitad that %Ti9 Iraqi Air rerea waa incraaainfly affaeeiva of 
lata and that tha Iranians wara datparaea to atop attacks on 
population eantara. Tha Israalis alae usad this eppcrtjnuy cq 
prlvataly aik tha U.S. to raplaca th« SOI TOWa whien tnay >«d 
sant to Iran in August, HIS. 

Saaad on assurancat that w« could at last m««t faca-to-faca wkm 

tep-Ioval Iranian eCfieials, on Hay IS. tha ^rasidant «ut.tor;z«d 
a saerat miislon to Tahran by forvar National SacMriey Advvser 
Mcrarlana. aceempaniad by a CIA annuitant. CIA eoiwunieaton . 
mamfiars of th« NSC staff, and tha Israali and Iranian mtarlsc-j- 
tors. Tha Israelis w^ra inforead via cedad mossa^a en M«y is 
that tha U.S. had a^raad to tha Iranian raquast for limitad 
anti-air dafons« aquipmant and to raplanish tha SOI TCw« tar: :y 
Israol. 



On Nay II* th« Iranians, through tha Iiraalis provi<itd 5(.Sm ioe 
d«pctit in th« CIA ««eur« funding saehanitti. Tha fjnds wt:t ustd 
to acqvir* S^e TCW ■Itsilas (for raplcnishinf tha TCMs :sr«tL 
sMppad in Sapta«to«r HIS) and acquiring HAWK aistilt^I^ctronic 
spara parti. This Mtarial vas subsaquantly nevad (o^HHl 
^H^H rapackaqad and shipp«4 to Sally hit for onward^ffcvamant co 
TaralT on »Uy 32. As in th« fabruary shlpiMnt, tha CIA providad 
lofiflties support for th« aevaMnt of this Mtarial to !tr«al. 

:n erdar to ansura oparatienal sacurlty, tha Mcfarltna ^np wn 
mad* froia Israal. coincidant with th« dalivary of a pallat of 
spar* parts for Iranian dafansiva waspons tystans (KAWX tpara 



TC> SICKXT 



;;Wt.ifi?fRET-n 



538 



m^^ 



• l.ctronlc p«rts). At th« la^eifie f^tu ^.t of t^• :r,n;,„, 
«Xxa* ror«i.(jn docum«nc4cxsfl n^^^H|B^b(ain«d from ^.i, c*x -. 
waa usa4. CIA alto prov^da^ eo<*4l\ tTtntpotxttion lupport'fram 
CONUS to Itraal for eha Mefarlana party. Th« ^reup w«t 
tranapcrta4 from Israal to Tanran aboard an IiraaU Air rorca *-•' 
with falia fla^ markm^a. 

In th« eouraa of tfit four-day (May 2S-2I) vlait. lanqt.iy -•«•;--. 
■ w«ra hald with hi^ft-laval Iranian efftelala. th« fUit d;r»c** ^ 
contact batwaan tnc two 90v«rn«tanta In ev«r Jlx yaari. Mr. 
McFarlana and hit taan wart abla to aatablish ch« bans (or « 
continuing ralatiomnip and elaarly articulate our ob]aet;v«i, 
eonearna, and intantiona. Tha freup was alao ablt to aisasa 
first hand tha internal political dynaale in Tahran and tha 

• ffact of tha war wnicn Iran claaxly can no len^or wiiv. Utin^ 
Praaidanti^ly approval Tanw o(Si(«rfV« (T*b *t . which had 
baan raviawad and cpprovad by appropriate Cabinat officars, 
Mefarlana amphaaizad that eur intarast in Iran transeandad tha 
hoata^at. but tha continued detention of hesta^aa by a Labantta 
group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented pro^rtss. 
During the visit, Mr. McFarlane made clear: 

that we fundamentally opposed Iranian efforts to tx;a: .i 
froa the Middle Cast; 

that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism: 

that we accepted their revoUtion and did not ta«k to 
reverie it> 

that we had nuffereua other diiagraements involving r«gi,c*«i 
polieiea (i.e.. Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.). but *x^r\t t.to 
find areaa e( eewaen interest (i.e.. Afghanistan a.-.d '.-a 
Soviet threat to the Culf) through dialogue. 

Ourinf these Meetings, teth sides used the opportunity to i*:»i: 
the ebeteeles %e implementing a strategic rslationsnip Btt««ir> 
the two countries. In addition to the points nota'd tbova, »;. 
Kerarlane eaphesited the political problems caused by iTintn 
involveaent ih the heatage issue. The Iranians ob;«cttd to fa 
use embargo on U.S. Military supplies already paid (or plui t-a 
continued USC bleoxinf of Iranian assets in the U.S., •'^•n «(ttr 
U.S. courts hed ruled in their favor. During the eeucia of t>tsa 
meetings, the Iranian offieiels adaittod thet they could not win 
the war, but vere in • ^llenu in Tehran ever hov to and tr\e 
conflict given the need to present an Irenian 'victory' Safora it 
could be concluded. They eaphasitad that the original t^^raitor. 
Saddaa Hussein, nust be rsMoved froa power in order for t-a *4C 



Toy sicurr 



ONBfcftSSIBEP 



539 



ij 

t 

to •n4. H*. Hef4rl««« eenelu4«4 th« vtiit by •um.r i.'..- .w., 
n©twitnit4ndtnt Ir.nun xnccrttc in c«rryln« on with th. d!,iL«- 
wo could not proe««4 with furthor dlteuttlena u u«ht of th.Ir 
«nwillin^no«i to acort tho full wolfht of thoir lnflu«nc« to 
eauto tho rol««*« of th« w«st«rn hoata^ot In Ubanon. 




On August 3, tho ramaxninf thrto pallots (lots «ti«n S ftanaioadi 
of oloetrenle ottf for Iranian aftii*4irer«f t 4^ont«o (lAvnt 
misstlo auto'col^enanta) arrived In folfTan^ Aa tn all flights 

"an Xaraoli 
r n«in« of 

m TfwtnAii a 



to/froa Iran thla dolxvary waa aada w 
aircraft <707) uain^ faXta flaf »Ai 

waa baaad on coordination iinniln. iTl 

officials. 



i1^tl 
an Xaraoli Air rare* 

Tiainf of tho da U vary 
' ' * TraAian 



In 
bo^a 



«onta«t 

on««no 



oarly August IMfe tha i 

*n to focus «x4pa^v«iy 
prevido military aisiitaneo jttklti 
wo sought to astabHsh diffonfft e 
would laad us mora diract^ to pM««^iir a 
tho Iranian hioraracfew In ji*4»Aufust» * pri^i^i 



cxtiton (HGCN Richard 
purviaw o 



:orr. USAT 



azpaeritoa 

f tho UJC eo 
for ho«t44ti 4ad 

nicatiOPi ihtfh 
'•Cjta olartnts in 
rUan "^ ^ 
hin tna 

t in 



assi 



:na 



datailad dis^t^ 
• statolithinf ««iitMt 
bo tho most indtion 



,^—r~-~^- . ,_^ . •• Waohinaton for 

s. Mi JMcd this oaer^» b« usofuHP a 

t vltft ^ieto^onftcaiit^P Ao n^njud^ to % 
tit* tatL 9Uf*'^^*^^^^^«*^^^^fi9^lztn 
(Hafsanjani) < Thoso discussions roAfRrmd tho barfv ob]«etivaa 
of th« U.S. ia sookinf a pelitieSl diale^o with Tohran. w« auo 
prevl4«4 assossaonts da*l«nad to ditcourafo an Iranian efftnsiv* 
«n4 MAiributo to an Iranian docision to no^otlata an and to tha 
war. tlM Atsassmants also dotailad tho Soviot threat to Inn. 

Through August. Softambor. snd Octo^f Ht^ nu^arous 'additional 
mootin^s vcxo h«14 in Curepo botw^W O.S. raprasantativas and tho 
now IraniftA eori««cts. Ovrlnf tho Qetebar~3«, 4»«r Motin« in 
rranXfurt, 0«CMny, tte O.t. sl««v •• Ch th« past, insistad that 
tha rtlMS««ef_«^|jK2SI-^* * pcton^isUa to any pro^rass. 
C \ tho Iranian , 
in 



540 



14 



fn, 



••f%/f-^ 






Th« Irtniifti »i»9 prpffar* 

« Sovitt T-72 tann 

o 

S 

t^« 

b« «r««4 •oon.' on Oetobar 19. with O.'s. «e«ux«e«nc«* ilr««! 

provided If»n with «n •ddltienal inervMnt o£ d«f«niivt w,*a^.. 
(500 TOW «iiaiU«) . ••pont 



j<f«f«d to provid. « copy of th« 400 y«,« inttrrMaUoh of ilTr.. 
Itttien Chi.f wuUmi iuekUy. At this M«tin,|iBii';i.t!d !,,i' 
tfff Wit • 'v.ry food ehanea th4t «neth«r A««riflf^r two w«a*^ 



L«c« on Oetob«r Jl-.'lHiPiHHBiBlMl^tll*^ th« 
(H*ki«l tasked to m«int«in contact «n4 advltod that Iran'h,^ 
••xarciiad its xnnuanea wltA th« Ubcnosa* in ordar to obtain 
th« r«l«as« of an Amoriean — Oavld Jaeeba^n — and an uneartiiB 
nuinb«r of Franeh hestaqta. R* fuvthor netad that this would ha 
part of th« purpose of tha Iranian ferai^n Ministar'a visit ta 
Syria •- an avant wa bacajta awara of on Mevambar 1, 19|«. flntf? 
statad that tha situation in Tehran, a a,wall a> Irani an inWSfSa 
over Klrballah vara both detarioratin--'*^'— ^^^^^^— ■^— ^^~ 



r« aaar tha old 

h/i^Ticm D4Ha *r^Qfl[^QflMf )*. ^AJlilBb IVU U ThCO.». Embassy in 

East Bairut i.nuna4«ataL^^s'(ftteha4lM^,«a^Bliy o4fSnr to uast 

BaifMt j^pi^ up HTr 

It»i« now apparent that p«riTI%«*« U.S. efforts to astabUth 

contact with X^an an4 subsequent pubtie speculation ra^ardinf 
thas* contacts hava probably aiacsrbated tha power stru^^la m 
Iran batvea.i pr«f««ti« el«*ants (led by lUfsanjani) and mora 
radical factions iundor tha overall sponsorship of Xyacollah 
Hentateri) . In l«t« Ootobar, radical supporters (of Henttxari.) 
revealed th« (IUfsan]«ni) contact with the USC and c^e tarn* of 
tha contact. Xa ordar to defend hiaself against eharqes of 
eolludinf with tito UIO and to pretarva a decree of l«cicu(£« !sc 
both f«'^^**' Hajli* <r««^*r Mfsanjani provided a purpotaly 
dittorto4 versicn Af tha Hay 19IC Merarlane mission in his 
Novoa^or 4 address to tha aasses. Moderate Iranian poUcictl 
loadara apparently now feel constrained to settle thair inti:-<«I 
political preblaas befera ptoceadlnf with the U.S. ^eIatlont^;p. 
The revelations in Tehran re^ardinf the HcTarlane nissien «ca 
daiaonstrabla avidanea of tho intamal power stru^fle. The 
October Ifld arrest of radical laadar Hahdl Hasheai. a close 
confidant and ten in-law of Ayatellah Hentasarl, tor 'CM^ o< 
terror isa and traatwt haa eauao^ further intarna^dlffint. 

Kasolutlon of tha Lebanon hostage situation is also eompUcttsd 
by waning Iranian influence in Ubanon due in part to (intneUi 
conatrainta and (ha fact that tho Libyans are aspandinf thaic 




TO* SCCUT 



?ilV 



rr 



/S 



541 



TOP itOMf U 



m:m 



loyal eo th« now impritenod M«hdl R«th««i. It to, thi« could b« 
• n «<{ert to undtmin* cn« nAtecnt U.S. •Iranian itritaaie 
dialog* and asaearbaea th« intarnal Iranian pcwar ttruqait 
a^ainat tha pra^atic taction with which w« hava baan in cont«ct 

Throughout thia proeaaa, tha USC haa actad within tha limtt of 
aatabliahad policy and in eomplianca with ail U.S. Uw. 7^, 
ahipntant o< 2.001 U.S. TOWa and 2]i RAWIC aiaaila alaetronic 
part* was undartakon within th« provisions of a Covart Actio 
rmdinf. 



on 



Ourinf tha eeurta of thia oparation •- and bafora •• th« u.s. was 
cs^nitant of only thraa shipments freai Israal to Iran. 
Spaeifieallyt 

Th« Israalis acknovladqad tha August 19IS shipmont of SOI 
TOWS aftar it had takan plaea. Until w« wara advisadTy^^h* 
Israalis, and had tha information subaaquantly eonfirmad by 
Iranian autheritias, w« wara unawara of tha composition of 
tha shiptiant. w« subsaquantly a^raad to x*e.^*e« chaia TCwg 
in Hay of 19l«. 

Tha Novasvbar DIS shipmant of .11 IsraaU RAWK misail«i w«t 
not an authorisad axeaption to' policy.' 'TRii'TKipinant'V*! 
ratriavad in fabruary 19K aa a consaquanca of U.S. 
intarvantion. 

Th« Octebar ISIC shipiMnt of .S.OO.JOWa froa Israal to Iran 
was undartakon with U.S. aequiaseanea. Thasa TCWs wara 
c«Qlacad_en Nevambor 7. 

In support of thia finding and at tha direction of tha rrai idar.t. 
tha CIA provi4«4 th« fellowinf oparational assistanea; 

CXA eeaasunieations officers and an annuitant to (oist .n 
vcxleut phases of tha operation. 

Storllo overseas bank accounts for financial tr<nt4ct 1.3ns . 

A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S. 
military items fro« th« U.S. 

— Tr»nihlp«tnt of military items from the U.S. to lirtal. 

— CoMnanicationt and intolll^ence support for the maatm^s 
with Iranian officials and the Mefarlane trip to Tahran in 
H«y. 



:;Ui 



,b 



542 






(U P jecMZ T lUr ohURur u/J0/«« 30^0 ^-S5 

• ■''<i! ft" •^.•. ■ (lli«torle«l Chronoloovl 

O.t./IUMIIAM CONTACTS KKb THE mlHICm HOSTACZS 

Pro«i th« aarllaat loonthi following th« lilanic revolution in 
Iran, th« U.S. Govarnaane hai attaaptad to raaitabliih official 
contact with that qovarnnant in ordar to diacuaa atrataqic 
davalopnanta in this critical part of tha world and raconatruct a 
working ralatlonahip. Bvan bafora Vraaldant Raaqan caaa to 
offlca tha O.S. Sovarnaant aqraad to try to aspand aacurlty, 
aconoalc, political, and intalliganca ralationahip* at a paca 
aceaptabla to Tahran. In tha fall of lt7», Uia O.S. undartook 
thraa aac?at alaaiona to Tahrani 



S«pt«Bb«r l»7» ___^__ 
raquaat of tha Iranian* 



t aacratly with Satarqan at tha 




Octobar-Novamtoar 1979 

nonBalixati.on of ralationa) 

Whan thaaa maatinqa and tha sacrat Novambar 1, 1979 naacin^ in 

Al^iars, baewaan Briaiiniki and Priaa Ministar Batar^an, bacana 

public In Iran, t.'iay halpad praclpitata tha takaovai of tha U.S. 

Oabasay by radical alaoanti and lad to tha raaiqnation of tha 

Baxargan ^ovarnaant. Thaaa avanti hava advaraaly Influancad 
Iran 'a aubaaquant willingnasi to anqaqa in any diraet contact 
with tha use. 

Daapitc mutual difficultiat invoivad in ra-attablishlnq normal 
ralationa, our strataqic intarasts m tha Parsiin Culf cnandata 
pcraiatant afforta to aatablith a dialo^ua. In this raqard, it 
ia notabla that only a faw aa}or countriaa do not hava ralationa 
with Iran -- Eqypt , Jordan, Morocco, Israal^ South Africa, and 
tha Unitad Stataa. Evan Iraq continuaa to hava dip.smacic 
ralationa with lean. 

Iran ia tha kay to a ration of vital iaportanca to tha wait, yat 
it ia incraaalnfly thraatanad by ^rowinq Soviat aiUtary povcr 
and political influanea alonq its bordara and inaida ita 
tarrltory. Ovor the eourae of tha laat two yaara, tha Sovicta 
and thair aufrogataa hava aovad actively to qain greater 
influanea In tha Culft 

The Soviata balieva that once KhoaMini diea, they will have 
an exeallent opportunity to influanea tha formation of a 
90v«maaat in Tahran that aarvaa Soviat atrateqic intareata 
in the araa. 



Daclaaalfyi OAOR 



wmm 




:\' 






bi6 



• or OLljKZr 



N 9336 



CoMtunlst nationt h«v« b«ee»a tn« principal •rms tuppUar* 
to Iran -- making Iran dapandant sn tnia iourea of mppiy in 
eontandlnq with an ineraatln^ly itranqtnanad Iraq. Thu 
lead* ua to tha conclualon that tha Soviata may w«n ba 
attaaptinq to puraua thalr own ravolution in Iran. That is, 
by fuallncj both lidai in tha conflict, tha Soviats could 
wall ancoura^a a dlaaatroua 'final offannlve' by Iran that 
would pracipitata £ political diainta^ration m Iran. 
laavlnq t powar wacou* which tha Soviata eould oxploit. 
Specifically, tha indtcatora of Coaauniat inflvianca in Iran 
arai 




Th« Incraaainf daaparation brought on by tha coata of tha Iran-Iraq 
war haa axacarbatad Iran'a vulnarabllity to Sevlat Influanca. 
Moraovar, Soviat daai^na in Afqhaniatan, praaaura on Pakiatan, 
and actual croaabordar atrikaa in Iran froa Af^haniatan hava mada 
raop«nin9 a atrata^ie dialo^ua ineraaain^ly important. 



TO P sccna 



v.* .V 






544 



■i^ 



-c^ 



mmm 



N 9337 



NuMrout individuals «nd private partial hava Uk«vi«« -»►— . ^ 
hald heataoa m Lab*non. MmoM^mi^mAi^S. '-"" "'^ °"T citltana 




^d«n. ?LrL2'/'"' • P'"'^"* *»•"=•" ci*"-n (Michaal 
^n^h2 isfr!^ 't"* •" r«"-ii -jovariunant officUl (David 
Kincha) that the laraalii had .ttabUshad a Un,on r.lationihio 
with an Iranian ««patri«ta (Manuch.hr Ghorb.r.far) in EuroM who 
sought ara.li h«l^ in ..tabli.hin, contact with thi u s l^v^Jn- 
m.nt. In aclcnowi.dgin, th. n«.d to i.monitr*-.. -i, borafides " 
th. Iranian official, involv.d, h. (Ghorbani: > r ) mdi-a'ed "*-" 
hia'ta^i't^Iti^ ir^r^ir'' ''"^ '""' " ""'^^' ^'>-'*»— caa. 

In June of i»«s, ia tna aidat of th. twa-«47 hijacklno, th. 
^""^L''"^^*'* ^" ^^"«* contact with th. Irinian «p^triat. 
SStJtn'^/;.?- ''^•/''"''«=« "ith -n^or Iranian =fn?JlIs to 
tSlt 2J5^I!^*;" 'S **• '••^3»«**'» pa.a.n^.rs. Two day. aft.r 
th- h??!^^"' "*^ J^-ric^s h.id s.p.rat.iy froe th. r..t of 

Spaiak.r »«f.af?lnr^^»?fSWmr!^^t^id-a^^R*^h.^* " 
t^;»S^«,i""i*^ for.i^ Rini.t.r V.Uyati both int.rv.n.d with 
th. capeor.. Raf.anjanx, in hi« ipaoch on Novenb.r «, l9t< fer 
th. fir.t tia. publicly ae)tnowl.d,id his rol. trthi. matt.;. 



*°^iiii?rciiin 



tT£Mf 




545 



ij 



mjmm 



N 9383 




d.t.rmxnin, wh.th.r th. Un'tiS 111,.." "'" ^"«"»««<1 m 

th« principal flf,,,, o< thl^i^",^'" "l***"*)**! •• coapriiin, 

r.ori«nt.uon of'^ir.ni" ^?!""^' "^ *• ''•^"9 <l«vot.d to . 
At thi« flrit aaatlna M^r^ri... 

th. i.r..u .. to Why hrfS^Sthr;' *?."■••* ^•"T" *» O"- =« 

9iv«n tha avant* of tha pa.r.i, !« ^'JL^"***"^ cradlbla, 
thalr axhauttiva analy.i, had aLl !I*' J^* I»r«aU rapliad that 
darlvin, froa tha chao. «2^5-'??* '••y«"»* ">• "rlaca Utt« 

da,an.r2tiva aJ^CctJ"; "^ ^^ "! il^"'^" ^"" "<« ^*^ 
-ilUn,na.i of tha Ir.ni.nt tliAt ^11 "?*="*• «•«• »< tha 
that tha Iranian, had axpolad th!»!.f^ """'^ "•*"• '• "»*•'» 
by nvaatin, with I.raali^^nd h^ ! •^''•* " P°»»^bl, compromua 
intalli,anca on thI"itua?Jon '^«2"'?? ""•»«iy Mnaitiva , 
" information vhi^h'v^^^rlCI'OflfS! ""^ ''"''''P' '''"^'" ''*" 

Ho*«int":n^a':'';:^di''o%°" "t:"^!" ?" °P«"-' "C" . dl.lo^ua. 
Mcrarlana conva"d thi, pJo^;:rto tirS °'i «••""" Pr^oritiaa. 
praaanca of tha Chlaf of s»??J> 2w ' ''"••i"'""* <ln tha 

point of datarmlnln, iha vaUditv o? t^ f,! *? ^•••* '"' *''• 
dacl.ion v.. pa.aad'to tha lirialllipi:.^?'"'"^"*!'! 



Thia 



Iranian intarwadlarT^nd th^t rh! T*'"'* °'"" P°«^'=^°n «= tha 
thay ra==,nixad tha'^n::d )o'\T,' llu'/^l 'Iv.'r''""^ T' ''"- 

:J.:^: ^:%it^:L'^f*^°-jJ -/ L^ .v'b:i!-d^^;;ar=^:vr 

— «i WW Aaaricana hald hoataga in Labanon. 



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546 



rconcn 



▼^^"^ffcyt? 



ai^CUSSifltfl 



9 3 89 



# 



--but i.thar til. li.u, »«. wh.th.r it w.. i; f -^uJ^,,^!?!' 

• skad for a pofition from our govarnaant Hcfarl.n. .i-„:. i ,. 
q>...tion to tha Pra.idant Cnd'to tSTS^cra^Jtii'SJ «ItJ I^d * 
Dafanfa and tha Dlractor of Cantral Int.ll ia«n;!i ^pw ^ 

f?.^ hi ^'^h"*"*' '" ^"" i' »U tha Wa.taJn ho.t.^a. wS^ 
th!? ;,^! ri*^ "°* "PP^"^' "y tr.n.f.r of military iatar!" .t 
that tima. Thi, po.ition wa. conv.y.d to tha :.r.ili~!pIo«*t 

On Saptanbar 14, 19i5, Ravarand Bar.jamm Wair w.t rala.j.d ' r, 
Bairut by th. I.l.mic Jth.d Org.niiitxon . Thi, r,:„" !f, 

^°i:^tf -:::i];,-^hr:n ?;';s^;:°^:'.f'-!--:!fr: jz. i^j- '-- 

th atgbanaaa kidnapr — ^MMMiM i »* I'^lf "^'^ diractly with 
iS.^i^ »«Pt«mbar, wa Uarnad that tha I.raalli had tr.nafarrad 

•ction, daaplta our objactiona, bacauaa thay ballavad it to b« ir 
thair atratagle Intaraats. Tha I.raaltt >«]^.aad thti int!ra 
oparation, to Includa daUvary .rran,a«ant., fS^dln,! "d 
!t wirSi^ii!!;- *'*" dl-cu^iln, thi. .att« with ?ha"ra.td.nt. 
it wa* daeidad net to axpoaa thia Iiraali dalivary bacauaa; 



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UNtL-S^irB 



H« wantad to r«t«in tha option of aKpioltino tha •,t.»i.« 
ttrataqlc dl«lo,ua with tha Iranian govarnmant ••*«''l^"' « 

"^i^^l"^/,^' !»"' I«l"ic Jihad, announcad that it had -a.acut.d- 
S^t^r 1*?"" f^*f "^li^«" 'uo^l-y in rataliation for tha 
f^«f^J-L !'?*i^ '^^ "^'* °" '" inatallationa in Tuni, thi. 
t??! -^;^Q^ ^'r *" ? ••"•• °' "••tin,, in Curop. a«,na\h. U s 
I^r,;2f "»='■ I^Mli' 'hi Iranian intarwtdiariia. In th«a 
■••tinga, tha Iraniana Indicatad that, whila thalr abiUtv eo 
BuJi?:""^"? "i*"*"*" -• -nin9. tha Biiball.h hii not^Ulad 
=^u«r' »! k'" '". '•" '•'•'' ••^•"1 ~"«h. aarliar of natural 
o? ?!?; T *"• •i"=* «^«t«ntiatad thi. infonaation in dabrlaf. 
BucRjiv orob^bTv'S" °•^^^^•=°«»••" - both of whom indxcata thSt * 
Buckl.y probably diad on Juna 3, 1985 of pnau»onia-Uka .ymptom.. 

ll.\*ill *'°^'"^'" '»"• •" 'Ircraft ownad by a CIA proprlatary 
cirio ?,)!;'r"?'"^ "'""'"' "°™*1 conr^arci.l contrict to^arry 
finSur ril^ndlna'L"" '""'•^•"tly datar»xnad that thS ^ 
thi !.r^;.5! r ? ' " urgant antraatia. froai tha Iranian., uiad 
^« iii^^5 ^" tran.port II hawk mi..il.s to Iran in an affor? 
to laprova tha .tatic air dafania* around Tahran. Tha I.r.ali. 

:!r!.nri::':!id'.r:K"*'' ^?-^-—"t .„ tna aini:: I'l'ikf 

5i37 7nnT ^ ","" """"^ conBiarci.l rata (approxlaataly 
tii3'I2rt;.H V"i'"' ?•"«"•! "•" 'I'o unwitting of tha cargo 
thay carriad. Tha I.raali dalivary of HAl« mn.il.i r.i.ad 
!!^i2^" ; concarna that tha.a dalivaria. wara j.opardiiing our 
^f??f?iT! °' •"•"'in? • diract maating with high-l.v.l lrin!.n 
official!. A. a con.aquanca of U.S. initiativ. and by mutual 
agraarant of all thraa partia., thasa trusil.i war. jubi.qu.rtly 
raturnad to I.raal in FaDruary 19(«. oj.qu.r.ciy 

On Dacambar 7, tha Praaidant convanad a maating in tha Whita 
Houaa (raaidanca) to diacu.. naxt .tap. in our af fort, to 
aatabllih diract contact with tha Iranian.. Attanding tha 
maatln, wara tha Chiaf of Staff, Saerataria. of Stat, and 
Dafanaa, tha Oaputy Olractor of Cantral Intalliganca, and tha 
Aaaiatant to tha Praaidant for National Sacurity Affair, and hi. 
Daputy. Inmadiataly aftar tha aaating, Mr. Ncfarlana dapartad 
for London to Mat with tha I.raali official and tha Iranian 
contact to maka claar tha natura of our intara.t in a dialooua 
with Iran. At thia Mating, Mr. Mcfarlana, aa in.tnictad by tha 
Praaidant, atatad thati r ■- • 



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uNCLASSiriEO 



N 9391 



th« U.S. »«• op«n to a political dialoou* with rr.„ k.,, 
that no .uch dl.logu. could »ak. ptogrl,' Tol\l loi^a A 
group. ,..n ., do«.n.t.d by Ir.n h.ld" s. ho."„2:'.„" 

th« U.S. could und.r no circumttanc.. tr.n.f.r .™. .- r 
in axcnanga for hottaga*. "anjf.r .™. to Iran 

^''*** point* vara oada dirarclv to rh> r... 

Iranian^rapliad that.'u^l::^;;!.".:::^' ::^t:; Tih^i'::,^:'- ''' 

•tranqthanad, thay could not riik golna .haad with Jh. 3fV 

Kr. Mcrarlana .cicnovlad,ad tha po.ltio? Sut ttltaS w^ coutd net' 

Ttt1l'iA"^'tli°''\ '" •••?".« «..tin, with thl Ur«U °' 

official, Kr. Mcfarlana mada claar our .tronq objactiona to th. 

laraali .hipnant of th. HAM -i.aila. and no'.d that thi 5% 

would hav. to act to hava thaa raturnad (a .tap undart.Jan ' !n 

Pabruary, whan all II .Laila. wara raturnad to Lraalr 

Pol loving tha.a maatin,., «r. HcParlana raturnad to w,,hin,ton 

and shortly tharaaftar laft activa govarnnant .arvlca ' 

On January 2 , tha Prima Mini.tar of I.raal di.pateh.d a spacA.l 
a»i..ary to tha U.S. (Amlr^n Nir) to raviaw propo.al. for n«t 
.tap. in daaling with Iran. Tha I.raali. urgad that w. 
irff»^ I*" '!'"' °' providing UBitad daf.n.lv. arm. to thosa 
attampting to taka powar in T.hran, .inca all othar incantive, 
(aconomic aa.i.tanca, inadical .upplia., m.china part.) w.ri of no 
v.lua in .horing-up tho.a who w.ntad an opaninq to tha w." l" 
that any implamantation of tha I.raali propo.al. would raquir. 
St!fr^iortSrwi!'f"i°:: °' '^* ^«alliganca community, th^ NSC 
^r^on ?h?^ B ^"''•"*,'- Pr.para a covart action finding. 
Work on thi. Pra.idantial finding commancad on January 4. 

On Jjnuary 6 tha Pra.id.nt, tha vica Pra.idant. tha Chi.f of 
Staff, and tha National Sacurity Advi.or and hi. assistant 

"h"k ,:^%'^''" "^"'^ °' ^^* '■'"'i-"'? *-■=! -■•• --eccrmanda-..-, 
.-.ada by t.ia Prima Mini.tar of Ismal throug.l Ms ssecia' 
amia.ary. "^ 

On January 7, th* Praaidant mat in tha Oval Offica with 'ha Vica 
Pra.idant, tha Chiaf of Staff, Sacrat.ria. Shulti and WainSarg«. 
Attornay Ganaral Maa.a, Dlractor Ca.ay, and tha National Sacurity 
Adviaor to di.cuaa tha ovarall .ituation m Iran and prospacts 
for a atratagic dialo^a. It wa. again notad that Mr. McParUna, 
on raturn fro« hi. trip to London, had racomnandad that no 
furthar action ba takan unlaa. a MChani.B could ba a.tablishad 
by which tha U.S. could axart battar control ovar avant. Ha 
agraad, in principla, with Diractor Ca.ay that providing' linitad 
quantitia. of dafan.iva arma aftar tha ho. tag*, vara ralaa.cd 
•till had marit. Soth Sacratary Shulti and S*cratary Halnb*rg*r 



■>et jiuur r 



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939: 



obj«Ct«d to 4ny provlilon of «niii, citing that w« could not b« 
sura that that* would ra«lly h«lp nodarat* •Itnantt «nd that, if 
•xpotad, th« pro]«ct would not b« urd«ritood by »iod«r»t« Arabi 
«nd would b« t««n at contravaninq our policy of not daaling witn 
statai that support tarroriim. Tha Praiidant dacvdad that w« 
ihould attampt to Kaap tha Iiraali channal activa *t long as it 
offarad possibilltiai for naatinqt with hlgh-laval Iranian 
officials and laft opan tha iaiua of providing dafansiva arms to 
Iran If all tha hoatagas wara ralaasad. 

It was furthar datarminad by tha Prasldant that any dialogua with 
tha Iranians must ba ainnd at achiaving tha following goals: 

Davlslng a formula for ra-astabllshlng a strataglc 
ralationahlp with Tahran. 

Ending tha Iran-Iraq War on honorabla tarmt. 

Convincing Iran to caata its support for tarrorism and 
radical subvarsion. 

Halping ansura tha tarritorial intagrity of Iran and * 
coordinating ways in which wa might countar Soviat 
activitias in tha ragion. 

Tha Prasldant mada claar that a Wastarn dialogua with Iran would 
ba pracludad unlasa Iran wara willing to uaa its influanca to 
achiava tha ralaasa of Wastarn hostagas in Bairut. Ha also mada 
claar that wa could not and would not angaga in trading arms Cor 
hostagas. Sacratariaa Shultx and Wainbargar ratainad thair 
original position on providing any aars to Iran, but Attornay 
Canaral Maasa and Dlractor Casay both supportsd tha concapt as a 
valid maans of opaning tha dialogua. Attornay Ganaral Maasa 
notad a 1981 datarmination by than Attornay Oanaral Franch Smith 
that transfarring small quantities of ams frough third 
countrias ur.dar a Covart Action Finding was Joe il'.aqal . 




On January IC, a aaatlng waa hald in tha National Sacurity 
Advisor's of flea with Sacratary Mainbargar, Attornay Ganarai 
Haaaa, Diractor Caaay, and CIA Canaral Counaal Stanlay Sporkin. 
At this SMatinf, tha final draft of tha Covart Action Finding was 
raviawad and waa forvardad to tha Prasldant with Sacratary 
Mainbargar dlaaantinf . 



TO P Gccna 
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550 






^ 



^ i^i 



On J«nu«ry 17, 19|(, th. rr«tld«nt .pprov.d « Cov.rt'*,.,. 
forth abOV*. th* Prandanr ftirhai- ,«...' 9c«li tat 

..t.bU,h.d. H. further not.d that pubUc^icSLi2!j .J 'l!' '^'"' 
pro^rM would pUc. th. Amricn ho.iM„ ,„ Slbtnir !5 "'' 
rl.k. Notin, hi. conc.rn for th. Uv« of ?h^^ 2!^ *' <Jr..t.r 
op.r«tlon (both O.S. .nd for.lm) h« dir.^»^ !►, 7'"' """^ «"• 
of C.ntr.l Int.lU,.nc. r.fr.irf^B- ,-ii f *^ ^^* *"* Director 
appropri.t. co«iltl... of th! rJl '•Portin, th. rtadin, to Ui. 

thS..^„vol^ -"iS 'o°fo„'5:r's."'irj.^'^iy""°"*^^^ •'" -^« 

On P.bru.ry 5-7, U.S. official. (hsC and CI*/ 
r.pr...ntativ. of th. I.ra.U Prt^TM ?"?.,"' 
.aanior-l.v.l Iranian official** ™' "'""'^'^ 



and « 



" r!;'.n"«::ii"::c^:nt"^ <Ghorbanifar, would d.po.it fund, 

" «IlJ«M!i" *'°"^'^ tran.f.r fund, to a it.ril. u.s.- 
controlLd account in an ov.rs.as bank. 

~ Uiin? th... fundi, th. CIA would cov.rtly obtain mat.n.l 
authoriLd for tr.n.f.r fron, U.S. military stoci, "S 
tr.n.port thi, to I.ra.l for onward mov.m^nt to Irin 

Uiing th. proc.dur.i ttioulatad jhnu. «Mf^,^• „•.. j 

Anni.ton, AlabaM) and trantportid^throughJafiiMllaM^^^ 
-" '— WlS^^^^MCd. .,r.Jd to provid. ' 



■ M ■ ICM.r 



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-^1 * ''• 



'^if. 



t 



551 



*> t JiLnx r 



ill (. wLbHtl 



offiei.lt Mt in C«rm*„y to di.cui. probiw in Jrr.noiic . 

1,000 TW. to IrM «. . el.«r .1^,1 of U.S. iinctrtty ^1! 
djliv.ry w.. cooMnead on th« .jmin, of f.bni«ry"o i^d I^l.t,. 

rotuxn flight fro. Ir.r'th.^'.'^^Jtlt «" id'^il'lPi;,^ *"* 




ty 



.« "^. .' °'- '*^" •"<* "»C' offlciali Mt aqain in 
fr.nkfurt with th« I.r.oli 4nd Ir.nimn offiel.i. to di*eu«s n««t 
.t.p. At thi. ■.•tin9, th. O.S. .id« ur9«d that th« Ir.nl.n. 
•xp«dit« a Rwacinq among highar-laval official! on both iidaa. 

On Fabruary 29, tha Prina Miniatar of Iiraal wrota to Praiidant 
Raagan (Tab B) urging continuod afforts to achiava a ttratagi 
braakthrough with Iran, but aaking conaldaration for tha lafa 
of racantly taizad laraali hoatagat. 

On March 7, O.S. (CIA and MSC) and laraali rapraaantativai mat 
with tha Iranian intanMdiary in Paria to dataraina whathar any 
furthar prograaa waa poaaibla in arranging for a high-laval 
•Mting with O.S. and Iranian offieiala. During thaaa Baatingt, 
tha intaraadiary aaphaaiiad tha datarioratlng aconoaic aituation 
in Iru and Iranian anxlatiaa ragarding incraaaing Iraqi ailitarv 
affactivanaaa. ' 

Tha aaealatlon of tanaiona with Libya, laading up to tha April 14 
atrika, pravantad furthar dialogua fro« taking plaea until tha 
Iraniana urgad tha intarvadiary (Ghorbanifar) to aecalarata tha 
•L '?".^" ^"^ *Pfil' !»•«• *t that point, tha Iranian axpatriata 
adviaad ua through tha laraali point-of-contact that tha 
laadarahip in Tohran waa praparad to coananca a tacrat dialogua 



Jot s we m - 



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liNCUSSiflEO 



552 



i UH li&lrci 







Ourin, th. London m-.tinq! thJlr.ni!;^ i"."***"' ^" T.hr.n. 

of Ut. «,d th*t th. !r.„J2n. iirl 5S:j;.'t. to':j-"'^' .".ctiv. 
population c.nt.r.. Th, Hr..!!",l"*^f!^'t!?/*?P *«•=''• o" 

prlv.t.ly <.k th« U.S. to r.ol.cl tltr^^nl^l^ k?'?""'"'^'!' " 
..nt to lr.n In August, 19SrTh.r!r.!M^* '"'^"^ '^'^'^ "•'* 
cod«d MS. .9. on mI; 15 thlt'thlS i ;!i ' "•■"! ^"'°™«d "!• 
r*,u..t for limited .nti-.tr dif.n.f ".!, f J!"*** 1° ^^' I"*i«n 
th. SOI TOW, .,nt by I.r.il ''•'•"" •<nip«.nt .nd to r.pl.nl.h 

B.i.d on .*iur.nc.« th.t w. could «t l«.t m^.t *.— . . 

top-l.v.l Ir.nl.n offici.l, on m*v - ^ ,h!^5 '•=«-*°-f«c« -ith 
. ..cr.t »i.,ion to T.hrin by ?o™r m;,^^! f"^"*'"' "^thorii.d 
Mcf.rl.n., *ccomp«ni.d bv . CIA IT ^'^^""•^ S.cunty Advi.or 
m.ab.r. of th. NSC it.ff Ind^! ?""'?'' "^^ coo-unic.tof ., 
tor,. «t«ff. .nd th. I,r«.U .nd Ir.ni.n int.rlocu- 

dSp^it'!; th': ciri:cu;.'?!nd!„' '" i"*"'* ^"^^^-^ "-'^ '=- 

JlillU?fI!\ i m.t.ri«l W.I iubs.qu.ni:ly nov.d 

:o,i,tic, .u^pi^; 4- ih".^-v::.^^roi t-s.^HiUr!:: ^^^Sr^=:l"•^ 



TOP SlCR£T 



553 






• l«ctronic p«rti) . At th« »B^llletaayi«»t. of th« Ir«nttnf 

• li«t forstqn docunantationl^^^BBB obtained froa th« CIA -• 
w«f ut«d. CIA alao provid«dcovl?^^8niport*tion lupport from 
CONUS CO Iirial for the HcFarltn* party. Tha group was 
tranaportad from Israal to Tahran aboard an Iiraali Air Forca 707 
with falaa flag aarkin^a. 

In tha courea of tha four-day ()Uy 2J-2I) viait, langthy maatinai 
wara hald with high-laval Iranian officiala, tha flrat diract 
contact batvaan tha two govarnaanta In ovar fix yaara. Hr 
>teParlana and hi* taaa wara abla to aatabliah tha baaia for a 
continuing ralationahip and claarly artlculata our objactivai, 
concarna, and Intantiona. Tha group wa< also abla to aasasi 
firat hand tha internal political dynaaiic in Tahran and tha 
affact of tha war which Iran claarly can no longar win. Ualna 
Praaidantially approvad Tar»a of Rafarcnca (Tab 11 , which had 
b«an raviawad and approvad by appropriate Cabinet officers, 
Mcrarlane amphaaitad that our Interaat in Iran transcended the 
hoitagaa, but the continued detention of hoatagea by a Lebanese 
group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. , 
During tha visit, Hr. HcFarlana nade cleer: 

that we fundamentally oppoaed Iranian efforts to expel us 
fron the Middle East; 

that we flnaly opposed their uaa of terrorisa; 

that wa accepted their revolution and did not seek to 
reverse it; 

that we had numerous other disagreements involving regional 
policiea (I.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but might also 
find areaa of connon interest (i.e., Afghanistan and the 
Soviet threat to the Gulf) through dialogue. 

During these aeetlngs, both aides uaed tha opportunity to detail 
the obataclea to iaplaaanting a atratagic relationship between 
the two countriaa. In addition to tha points noted above, Hr. 
Mefarlana a^hasised tha political problaaa eauaed by Iranian 
involvesMnt in tha heataq* laaua. The Iraniana objected to the 
use eabargo on U.S. Billtary auppllaa already paid for plus tha 
cootinuad UK blocking of Iranian aaaata in tha U.S., even after 
U.S. courta had ruled in their favor. During the courae of theae 
■Metlnga, tha Iranian officiala adalttad that they could not win 
tha war, but were in a dlleaaw In Tahran over how to end the 
conflict given tha need to present an Iranian 'victory* before it 
could be concluded. They ea^haaised that the original aggreaaor, 
Saddaa Busaala, auat b« raaoved froa power in order for the war 



TO P SECRO 



554 



"T^' TTlur-, Lr- 



mMB. 



535; 



tl>« O.S. On July 2«, f.th.r Uwrincc J^nro^^-n r.f*'*''°"* -'^'> 

»•... v.u.y .„. round hx. w.y to"r^y^!.T„:i,\:;;%^'.%\-,-. . 

• ircr.ft (7071 utinq u'li filJZ.l^^ *" ^•'■••li *ir 'ore. 

-..^...•. on =ocr..2„':^rj^;i r?^!"?:..,!— 2 ?j.„^r:„-^-^ 

would la.d u« Bor* dlr.ctly to orlaiTr!; -.5 =o««»nic.tion which 

th. ir.ni.h h..r.r.ch""i); «!d?i:i::t'%*;ri~tr;i:.:'*"'"* ^" 

d.t.il.d di.cu.I"S^^riu5«d'?h,r";r^>' " •'*«hln,ton for 
..tabU.hIn, coht^c?-wlth i ciSm conftL^rJ^^S* """^ ^" 

::^"srt;uii:^'::u%:;:::;i\::;:dH:;:::::rr;:r" 



Tn« Iranian. .He proff«r.d, «nd tha a.S.~n^7Sr. 

a Soviae T-72 tMnktB^^Ktm^^^^^m^lr," " 



rOP SECRET 

iJNCUSSSFIED 



555 



'^^NGiAiSiriED 



yi: 



Ut« on October 31 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^.., , . .. 

jH*ki«» tailed to 5TSt!T!ff5!!t!?^TB^«i fh"V"'- =^'"«" 

••>.rcl.«d It. lnflu.„c. with th. LiS.n",i !n orSIr ►*" k*" 
th. r.l.... of .n A«.ric.n -- D.vld "cob!.n -- I^S','" °''**^" 

?:".°--':n' iv.fr." ?"• ^"-" '"."^" «- :j„'^i%r:r,^^ ^• 

ov.r Hltt>«ilah w,r. both datanor.tin' -J* " " ^'^'"'«" 



sciLrio-^.^r:^^;,'-^^?:^!-^ - -"- o^f Jc.f-tr:r.- 

It it now tpparant that p«r«latant U.S. affort. to a.t.i>i<.h 
contact With Iran and iub,*,u,nt public tpacul.tiL rl^ii? 
th... contact, hav. probabir.xacS^i„d fJr^ir.t^^Hi !n 
Iran batwaan praijBiatic alanant. dad bv Raf.anTanii -^'2^ 
radical faction, (undar tha ovarall .o^n«rIS?i^J\ ? ??'§ 

ootn pariia., Ha^li. Spaakar Rafianiani providad a DurDo.«i« 
NovI^Ir 4"!;53'°" °' "• *^y ^»" Hcr.rlana iil.xV"'^"^ 

damon.trabla avidanca of tha intarnal oowar struoai. th. 

^^??5I„^'!n/""? °f "'*^=*^ ^•"'•^ ^^'' 3"h22 a c':., 
confidant and .on In-law of Ayatoll.h Mont.zari, for acts o' 
t.rrorisn, and traa.on ha. cau.ad furth.r inc.rnil ccnJtict 

Ra.olution of th« Labanon ho.ta^a .ituation i, ,i,o comDlicat.d 
tl ••"^"' '""i*" ln"««nca in Lab.non du. xn p«t to finincxll 




TDQ nrrnrT 



556 






N 9399 




D««ptt« thai* lnt«rn«l dif f iculti.. . ^ 

contact with tha use .„d -at 2«?rf li* " ■•^"'•In dlract 
^Ji|^j»^n^I^apraMnt«lv2J WW^i^yaM|l^lO^ 




=:ni:ct'"st^r?j.„"t;;a°^: h:r.;i„"=:o\'^r^*"'j°" °' ^^- "=== 

mant complicity in ,ct. of t«rSri!m li *"^' °f ^'^"'" 90v.rn- 

IMa.ar.. Raad, Cicippio, Inl "r^v^ ?h-°r?'" '" "''^^ 
Or9.n11.t10n (IJO) hi._iit2l,i^d^'..„^* i»^*"^= -'^".d 
^r.ni.n int.rloeutorr ■JiM^p- ""°"*"''" ^'V " «* h« v« our 

*««ric.n. 53?^uSISp5P|W?ifr-^.'*°"'5^v''^^''^'^^^ 
loy.i to tha no« i— Jilonad Mahdf^ h"" °' ''•"i" r.dic.l, 

.,..n^ t^ p"--*-«-":!t"-ihL'rir..--s.:r-'io-nt.ct 
•hiPMnt of j?ooro" is.irrsi ^'i^Mii" r^' "•^- ^-- ^»'- 






^<! ' 



\J' 



:d 



i 



557 



Ourln? th« eoursa of thl« operation -- «nrf k-/— 

=o,„i..„t Of o„iy ^_,n.^„,. J°S, utlt^'drr.;: l^c^JlcI!!, 

in Nay of 1916. '""••<I"«"«iy agraad to raplaca thai* toh» 
Tha Novaabar 19IS ihtpaMnt of 18 i.raalx HAMK .L.ti.. 

. * '^^^ P^°''"-'^*'^ tha foUoving oparation.l aiiiitanca: 

-- Starila ovar.aa. bank account, 'for financial tran.act ion.. 

" mil!ta^ ir!2!''i''"'"*w^^"* '°^ ''^' dispatch of U.S. 
"ilitary itama from the U.S. 

Tranahipnant of military itaraa from tha U.S. to Iiraal. 

— CoBBunlcationi and Intalliganca support for tha maatina. 

with Iranian official, and th. McFarl.na trip to Tahr.n in 

"' of'icltir**^"' *"" ^" '"°P' '"^ "'••'=^"9» -^"^n Iranian 



documantation for U.S. and foraigr. officials 'or 
maatin?. in turop* and Tahran. 

I«*hI*?S!!;L.'"^ Mtarlal provided undar thi. pro^raa vara ^udg.d 
It. in«<»«q««ta to altar althar tha balance of Bilitary power or 

th! S"r*'^!l^f.*''" "" T^*^ '""• •^•y ^•^•- ''o«.v.r.laSI^!tr"ad 
tne U.S. cooBltBant to Iranian territorial inteqrity and served 
to .upport those in Iran mtara.ted in opening a itrateqic 

hIiri!3*^iS.Ti^ "• V-'- "•'• •"«"» °^« «="• i"t Ta month, 

have had tangible re.ult. on Iranian policy: 



Iranian direction that the hijacked Pan Am t73 would net be 
received In Iranian territory if It left Karachi . 



The Raf.anjanl/Velayatl Intervention on behalf of the TVA 
••47 pa. .anger. (June 1»IS). 

chat the hijacked 
1 territory if It 

m Gccnrj 
y^^CLASSIFIED 



558 



. 'tO' 



N 9401 




Tha raiaaia of thraa Aaarxean and at laatt two franch 
hoatagaa. 

Tha initiation of an Iranian dialog* with thair rational 
naifhbora. 

Continuad dalay in th« Iranian 'final offanalva. * 

Finally , it mat alao b« notad that tha U.S. arma aabargo 
notwlthatandinq, Haat Europ«an nationa hava previdad $S00 Billion 
a yaar in ailltary aqulpaant to Iran. Moat of thaaa tranafara 
wara accoapliahad with govarnaant knowladqa and/or aequiaacanca. 

All appropriata Cabinat Officars hava baan appriiad throughout. 
Tha Conqraaa wai not briafad on tha covart action Findinq dua^^ to 
tha axtraordinary lanaitivity of our Iranian contact* and tha 
potantial conaaquancat for our atrataqic poaition in Southwaat 
Aaia. Finally, our afforta to achiava tha ralaaaa of tha 
hoatagaa in Labanon nniat continua to raly on diacraat contacts 
and intaraadiarias who cannot parform if thay ara ravaalad. 



559 






Fab 14 I 
Jun 14 I 



Jun 






Au9 


22: 




Aug 


30: 




Sep 


01: 




S.p 


14: 




Oct 


04: 




Nov 


17- 


18 


Nov 


24- 




D«c 


0«- 


08 


D«c 


20 




D«c 


22 




D«c 


23 





Himmi 



Nov«mb«r 20, 198* 



CHUONOUWY or rVEWTSi 



U.S.-tttn Dl«loqu« 



; DEPOSITION 
} EXHIBIT 



Hichaal Ladaan ioi;qaicad to tha NSC chat IiiaaU 
contacta may ba uaaful In obtaining calaaia of tha 
U.S. hostaqaa In Labanon . Ghorbanifar was 
Introducad to Ladaan and tha NSC aa an Iranian 
intamadlary . 

Jaramy Uavln aicapad. 

TWA-847 hljacklncj. Iranian qovarnment offlctala, 
contacted by laraalis and Ghorbanifar, halp In 
obtainlnq tha raleaaa of four Anwrlcans hald 
separately from the rest of tha hijacked paisan- 
9era. Last known Instance of Iranian influenced 
ijroup perpetrating terrorlta againit U.S. nationals. 

Draft NSOO on Iran clT»>HCi* to yrlncipkli . ■^■ 

David Klmcha met with Bud HcFarlane in NashlMton. 
;08 TOM misailas delivered to Iran fron Israel. 



Reverend Benjamin Weir released. 

Islamic Jihad claimed it murdered U.S. hostaqe 
William Buckley in retaliation for Israeli raid* 
in Tunis. 

Separata meetings in London with Ghorbanifar and 

Waite. 

Israel delivered 18 HAWK missiles to Iran^^^H 



Meeting in London with McFarlane and Ghorbanifar. 
Hostage Location Task Force (HLTD formed at CIA. 
Ghorbanifar to U.S. for talks with U.S. offlclala. 
Nlr bacane primary Israeli POC. 



TOP SEtRET ^ 






a I 



'X^ 



-U^ 



560 



rfcr'stW 



i9a( 






J<n 


17 




r«b 


05- 


07t 


F«b 


14 




r«b 


19- 


21: 


r*b 


20- 


21: 


l.«c« 


r« 


bi 


Apr 


17 





l;l.l.,...?vli!Li 



Pr«ttd«ntnl rindlnq on Iran. 



M«etln9i In C«n«vi with Ntr and Chorbanifir ICtA 
and NSC) . 



U.S. dallvari 1,000 TOW* to taraal. 

In London and Frankfurt (Ghorbani f arl 



May 09: 
Ha/ 1}: 



May 22-29: 

May 23: 
May 24: 
May 25-27. 

Jun 10: 

Jun 30-Jul 02: 



1,000 TOWa dalivarcd to Tahran (roa laraal. 

11 HAWK mlaallaa raturnad to Israal. 

U.S. hostaga Patar Kllburn nurdarad in ratallatlon 
for U.S. raid on Libya. 

Ghorbanlfar arrested In Swltzarland for indabtnasi 
apparently related to tha FBI atinq of arma salaa 
to Iran by private citizent from tha U.S., 
Germany, and Israel. 

Planning meeting at CIA IDDO and NSC paraonnal). 

Tarma of Rafarenca (TO»l approved for artablTshlnq 
a itrataqlc dlaloque with Iran. U.S. obJ«t:tlvaai 

Establlah a correct relatlonahlp with Iran. 
End Iran-Iraq war. 
Return U.S. hoatagai. 



Meetings in London^^^M 
Tel Aviv (Nir and RabinIT 



and 



Cyprus 
U.S. delivers SOa TOWs to Israel Ireplacamanta) . 



McFarlane party to Tehran. Soma of tha 240 HAWK 
mlaalle parts accompany tha party. 

Rafsanjani news conference containing possible 
"signal" that Iran wanted improved relatione with 
tha U.S. 



toy-gtc^jg 



TOP SECRET 



561 



<Df_ 


«tCSIT 


Jul 


2i-2li 


Jul 


2(1 


Aug 


0]t 


Auq 


08. 


AuiJ 


10 : 


S.p 


19-201 


S«p 


22-23. 


Oct 


0]> 


Oct 


05-07; 


Oct 


28-21: 


Oct 


29. 


Nov 


02: 


Nov 


05-07: 


Nov 


07: 



01lM,?ECR|^?;: 



Meetlnqt in Frankfurt (Chorbant f ir , Nir, NSC, «nd 
CIAI . 



F«th«r J«nco r«l««i«<). 



Pcinaindar of 240 HAMK niaalla parta delivcrad to 
Tehran. 



Frankfurt meatlnqa. 



Initial contact! »lth| 
Madrid and London. 



Olscusslona In Waahlngton with naw Iranian 
intarmadiary INSC and CIAI. 



Maatlnga In London (CIA, NSC with Nlr) . 




Frankfurt meatinqa (CIA, NSC 



Frankfurt (Malnit meatinqa of U.S. and Iranian 
regxesantativaa iCIA, NSC, laiaall rep INlrl.H 



500 TOW misillaa dcllvertt" to Iran from Itrael. 

David Jac^^sp• released. 

Mcetln<^i In Geneva wit.h^^^H| (NSC and CIAI. 

500 TOW inlssllei delivered to laracl 
(replacements) . 



COP S6^Bfcf 



Mmmii 






562 



^ r /\JC t^ 



UNCLftSSlFJEO 



DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



Partiallv Dfciassitiedffleieased nn /Qh^S wD 
under pFonsiuns oi E "2355 
by K Johnson, National Security Council 





8* >• a M »■• ». 
•t • ^ ^ > « a 



563 



UNClASSIFiED 



i 




I - 



UNCLASSIFIED 



s: 



e ■■ ■ 

■ •> • 

• * • 

^ a m 

Sw a 



564 



2 / A'C u c . 



< I 



UNCLRSSIFIEO 






Partially DeclassilieJ/Released on loF<Sfl 69 

under provijinns o( f ;2356 
byK Johnson National Sscui ity Coi-ncil 




I . 



UNCLASSIFIED 




- «i 

I il 

i hi 



565 



UNCLASSIFIED 



J 






• « ■ 



• « 

iz* 

lii 

« • • • 

If: 






• • • - 



w • • 

S .2 



2602L N 



• • • « * 

: ! !!t* 

■ i n:J 

" S Mi. 

I <1 2'dli 

• -5 HI-, 

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f Li :-; :-: il»i ; 

I : I : :in t 



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• • ■ • « « • 

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UNCLASSIFIED 



566 



UNCLASSIFBED 






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!60!l N 




UNCLASSIF3ED 



567 



f-om NSOLN 
To NSJ* 



■ -CPtJft 
■CUA 



W\ Z 



UNCLASSIFIED 






>• n«olr to not* o' a8/31/8S 13 2S 



j^A^fr -- 



■^C. 29 if. 



9908 






NOTE FROn OLIVeR NORTH 
Subj.ct PRIVATE SL'^NK check . ---Cf 

iuOject Currant Status of Oo«'"«tion Recovery. Followir^ su«i««ry u 

disojssions in S«n«v« a«ong K i ■ch« , Cope. GoP6«rnf«rip and 
itcn uer* concludad this wackand, subsaojant discussions 
uith Mendy flapon hara in Uashington uhicM ara contiruing, and calls btun 
CoQO and KiKcha's assat (Ninrodi) who i« 'baby sitting' tha Iranian* in 
Pans (uher* thay ar* are racaiving ^idanc* fro« Tahran). 

Th« attenotad transfer j^^^^^^^^^^B of Aistllas aury 

bec«j»e tha Iranian* wara^^^^^^sael^ng a ueaoon* systan that would ba 
caoabla of stoooing Soviet raconnal ssanca flights along tha Irani an/So»i at 
border and on the Irani an/ Iraqi border. Gorba rptd that these flights occur 
regularly and a* deeo as 40ni inside Iranian airsoaca. Sacajsa Schwinner 
and Ledeen uare jnfawiliar with the ooerational poranaters of the MflUK , they 
agreed to ship 1Z9 weapons that war* totally inadeguat* to i^eet the rgnt* 
established by the Iranians. This delivery ha* created an atnosohere of 
extraordinary distrust on the part of the I ranian*; in KiHCha 's 
view, becsise the credibility the 6orba'']m^^|^H^mni ssion 

probably been seriously called into gjestioru 

Despite this perception ( Sorba said runerou* tmes that ihis whole thing 
was a "cheating ga^e ' on the part of the Israelis , Copp I Kinche have 
been able to proceed with a renewed dialogue whic^ still promises hope 
for achieving our three objectives 
-- support for a* pragmatic - ar«y oriented faction which could take o*er 

in s change of government 
-- return of the five AHCIT hostage* 
-- no wore terrorise directed against U.S. personnel or interests. 

^-o" these ongoing discussions, which m two cases included Iranian 
"litary officers, Copp and Ki^ch* conclude that the "ilitary situation 
in Iran is desperate. The Iranian dascription* of the state of their 
equipment, lack of competent nanagement, inability to use ^jch of the 
remaining U.S. "ateriel portends the real possibility of a "ilitary 
collapse < at lea*t by tha ftrmy ) in the near to mid-term. Thvis, there is 
considerable pre**ur* on the interlocutor* in Europe to prodjce - quickly. 



.t/> t^~ c^ 

i' it' 



Given tha relatively low level of competence on the part of the Iranian* 
in Europa, and the fact that any *upoli** delivered will undoubtedly have 
to ba eioninad by an ftrwy or AiP Force officer, it i* very doubtful that 
a "Jingla tran*action' arrangement can ba worked out with tha portle* in 
Tehran, no matter what i» agreed to in Europe. In short, they have been 
"ecammed" *o many times in the pa*t that tha attitude of distrust i* very 
high on their part. At tha *aM* time, in all dl*cus«lon« (including today's 
phone call*) they are desperate to conclude soma kind of arrangement in the 
ne«t 19 day* and have even asked that tha meeting sche^^^^^Saturday i n 
London b e advanced. Based on what conclude ^^H^^^^^^H^^^^^^B 

|H|^^ku« believe that they art very concerned tha^tha hostage* ( ihe onl 
Iraniin leverage point beside* the Jew* in Iran) may be 
releaeed by tha Syrian*. Oruze, Phalange or Amal in tha 
contact* with tha captor* seem* to corroborate thl* assaesment. In short 




killed or captured/ ^^ 
near future. Uaite's \ 



\\m K^int-p 



568 



ti-e 



ihort 'or al i oarties concerned. 



wm>m 



9909 



cont I nue at a 
and will 90WC 



of 
not the 
or hou our syjten uor«; 
JSion over the fact 



P^inail*. t"e'e a the "atter of the longer ten« strategy for wrat 
shouij be atte"<Dting to acco"ioii»h »ij a *i2 the !ran-Iraa \jar and 
a wore reasonaole govenni»ent in Iran. Froi" "y personal diacusiion 

d Heron it is aoDarent t.-ie the Israelis want the war to 
staiewate, a "ore moderate Iranian government in the eno 
ou find a uay to contirue getting their people ( Jeus • out 
of Iran through sone kind of darter arrangement. In that the first tuo 
of their goals are, it uoold seen, generally congruent y/ our interests. 
and their last a fact of life, we should orobaOly be seeing the return 
of the «nCIT rostages as a subsidiary benefit -- not the orimary oOjective. 
though It may be a part of the necessary first steos in achieving tre orcaaer 
objectives. uhile "imche, neron, Cooo and I all agree that there is a hign 
degree of risk in oursuing the course ue have started, uo are now so far 
doun the road that stoooing uhat has been started could have even more 
serious repercussions. Ue all view the ne»t steps as "confidence 
building' on the part of both sides. None of us have any illusions about 
the cast of characters ue are dealing yith on the other side. They are 
a primitive, unsophisticated group who are e« traordinari 1 y distrustful 
the Uest in general and the I srael i s/U. S . in particular. They hav 
slightest idea of what is going on m our governner 

Today for enample, Gortja called Copp in absolute cc .._. ...„ 

that Rafsanjani had just received a letter from (of all people) Sen. Helms 
regarding the American Mostjges. Since the Iranians are adamant that they 
not be publicly connected with the seizure, holding or release of the AMCITs, 
uhy. Goroa uanted to knou, uas Helms being brought into this 'solution to 
the puzzle. " Gorba reiterated that "Batn ought to have more control over 
the memters of his parliment' than to allou them to confuse an already 
difficult problem. Dick told him the letter had nothing to do uith what 
we are about, but Gorba did not seem convinced that this uasn't some sort 
of effort to emoarass Iran. 

Given this very unsophisticated vieu of things on their part and the dis- 
trust that the Iranians obviously feel, ue believe that if ue stop the 
current effort at this point and do not at least proceed uith a 'test' of 
the current relationship ue 
-- run the risk of never being able to establish a "foothold" for the 

longer term goals in that the people ue are dealing uith uill be 

totally discredited at home, and 
-- incur the greater likelihood of reprisals against us for leading 

them on." These reprisals could take the form of additional hostage 

seizures, execution of some/all of those nou held, or both. 

While the threat to carry out sanctions against us has not. to my unouledge. 
ever arisen (it certainly hat not since K imche/Copp/North have been 
direct!/ Engaged -- and Michael never mentioned it), it is interesting to note 
that when Copp qjestioned the bona fides of Gorba and his cohorts as capable 
of delivering on their end of the arranQoment, Gorba carefully noted that 
since these (jiacutsions began u/ Michael & Schwimmer, there has not been a 
single Islamic Jihad bomb threat, hijacking or kidnapping -- and that there 
uou 1 d be none i< this "worked.' O.K., Copp and I regard this to be at least 
one sign of confidence that this activity may yet prosper. There are some 
leeser indications of confidence m recent days' 
-- in response to Copp's demand for funds to be deposited in advance to 

defray operational costs, and uhat the Iraniant were told uore "purchases' 

on the arms market" a total of t4in has been deposited. 
-- the 18 HflUfs delivered last ueek have been repackaged and are ready for 

return to origin on the ne«t available flight; 
-- the parties in Europe continue to stress that their requirements are 

long-term and that they are an«ious to get on uith a longer range program 



Lii; 



Ul.ru,^ 



\) 



569 



o' Israeli o'-ioiA«t«d ^uoooi-t yhich ucxj 1 d mclud* ttchnical «»«iitanc« w/ 
^oo^l »t I catao narduart ynlc^ is critically naeoad but d<adlin«d im this 
regard Goroa at on« oomt noted tnat at tiaee th«y hav« at ftu as 5a 
ooerational 'tanits and lass than a dojan flyaola aircraft). ij 

With all o' th« abov* at a lengthy oraanOla dascriblr^ tuo nearly 
frantic geeks «/ the Israelis I Iranian*, the following proposal has evolved 
uhich the Iranians today said they wd like to discuss m detail 
on Saturday 

-- The total 'package" frow the Israelis ud consist of Sd I HflUKs u/ PIP 
<proc)uct i«orovenent package) and 3300 basic rous. 

Deliveries wd coi""«nce on or about IZ Oecenber as follows 

H-hr 1 707 u/300 rOUt = 1 ftUCI T 

H»iahrs 1 707 (sane A/O w/ 300 TOUs - 1 flnCIT 

H«16hrs 1 747 w/S0 HftUtC s & 400 TQUi = Z flflCITs 

M*20hrs- 1 707 y/3aO TOUa = 1 AMCIT 

H + 24hrs 1 747 w/Z000 TOU» = French Hottag* 3*3^* 



5910 



All involved on our side recognize that this does not neat one of the 
basic criteria established at the opening of this venture- a single 
transaction which wd be preceded by a release of the hostages. However, 
given the points above regarding the ^jtual distrust in the dialoQje, we 
all believe it is about the only way we can gat the overall process noving. 
neasures have been taken to reeijce the chance for duplicity on the part of 
the Iranians and to preserve a measure of OPSEC in carrying out the 
transaction. In the case of a double cross, one of the Irani ans will 
be in the hands of assets we control throughout. One of ^'^*" 'SJ^^^IhII 
has already suffered a serious (though apparently not fatal) heart attack 
after last week's i-tAUK transaction failed to protJjce results. The first 
tuo deliveries, via 707 freighters are relatively snail and if they do not 
produce the desired outcomes, all else stops. All • are now under our 
control . 



OpSEC concerns are threefold coniTjni cat ions , deliveries enroute 
to Iran and reel eni shnont of the Israeli stocks. To solve the first 
problen an OPs Code is now in use by all parties. This code is simlar 
to the one used to oversee deliveries to the Nicaraguan Resistance and 
has never been conpronised. fhe del i very/ f 1 ight planning security problem 
has been solved by a i«jch wore deliberate selection of aircraft and aircrews 
as well 35 a series of transient airfields which can be used enroute to the 
field controlled by the Iranian Amy at Tabriz. Appr opriate arrangements 
have also been nada to eneure that the overflight of ^^|H i * '^ot 
challenged. All A/C will be inspected by one of the Iranians at a 
transient location between Tel Aviv and Tabriz. Before the A/C actually 
crosses into Iranian airspace, the aopropriate releasee s) ^ist occur. 
The last OPSEC concern, that of replenishing Israeli stocks, is probably 
the nost delicate iss ue. The ojantity of TQUt requested represents ^Bi^^l 

Hm^l^l^HII^^H Meron and I are working u/ the Israeli purchasing 
office in NYC to ensure that the replenishment can be accompli shed quickly 
after December I Z at possible. All recognize that c^antlties ^^^^^HBHH 

Hm^^l^lHH'^^''"^* Is''**li readlnata and that the items will need to 
be dispatched quickly in order to preclude disaffection and leaks. Heron has 
solved at least one of the problems in this regard by identifying a means of 
transferring the required cash to an lOF account which will allow cash (rather 
than FMS credit) purchases from the U.S. 



In order to put this plan into action, Klmche, Copp, Schwimmer and Goode 
plan to meet in London on Saturday morning torevieu alj^ arrangements. If 




570 



iati>'i«d that all our aitcti 



"""-■iM^^iriti 



•r» iati>'i«d that all our aitati i-'onay, «ircr«/t, aircreut, 
'acilitit*. overflight «rrang«n«ntj ana mlitary aojioocn 
Cooo and Kixcha ^ill «««t at another hotal with Gorea and 
th« plan. Our no* uill than raconven* lata 



in tha 



•r« pr toafeo . 
^1^1 to 

• ■■- »..«". -— • * . w- - -.. ■ -»»...-.. .«.,, »,, 1,,^ waning at o^jr hotel 

review an>i. La«f m rvi t e changai. I yd then call you (using the Ops code i , 
transmit the aQreed upon arrangewent* for approval and, if you M 

concur, KincMa & Copo will "••t again u/ the lrani»n% on Sunday a.«. 
to e«pre»» our agreement with the plan. Copp & Goode ud return to the 
U.S. Sunday P.". on separate 'lights. On the Ilth. the day tjefore 
the plan is to bo e»eajted, Copp wil l establish 
^^^^^Hcontrol 1 ed airf 1 eld ^^^^^1 where he car 
stop it at 



991 1 



a in^^^^^at the 

nonitor i wpl ew ent at i on 
The secondary ' i el ds ^■■^^HJHI 
^^_^^^___i_^^i^_^^,^_^^^^ w 1 11 be covered by Copp controlled assets 
who are not uitting of the tru« origin, destination 
''/C but uho can 
of our other peop 



ng ot the trua origin, destination or contents of the 
fi«' things in a lurry i f sowath ino goes urong. One 
le will be in contact i n^^^^Hthroughou t . 




Once in hand, tha hostages will bo Mown ^^^^|^^hh^h to Larnaca on 
our Navy HH-53 where they will be picked up by a EUCOM C-141 and flown to 
Uiesbaden for debriefing. 19hrs later Oakley will proceed frow Andrews AF8 
to Uiesbadod with fanily ne«ber» -- tlxis allowing us Z4 uninterrupted hours 
for debriefing. The debrief toa» will be staged at Uiesbaden IZ hours in 
jdvance, just as ua did two weeks ago without notariety. Oway is the only 
other pereon ful ly witting of this entire plan. Copp is not briefed on 

^^mH^H|^^B|H though he suspects. The Israelis are in the sane 
position. Uaway and I have tttn through the whole concept twice looking 
for holes and can find little that can be done to improve it given the 

trust factor" with the Iranians. In that all parti es involved have 
great interes t m keeping this as quiet as possib le, ^^^^^I^HIi^^^lH 

^H^^I^^HI^^H^^^I^l^B^^I^B^I^^^^^^I^HlJI we beleive to be 

worth the risk. I have not confided in Oeway re the longer tarn goals 
we could/should hope to achieve. Thus, tha only parties fully aware of 
all dinensions of what we are about art you and RCn. 



I have given careful consideration to what you suggested re an RCM meeting 
with the Iranians in an effort to obtain release of the hostages before 
starting on an effort to undo tha present regie«« in Tehran. Like you and 
Bud, I find the Idea of bartering over the lives of these poor nen repugnant. 
Nonetheless, I believe that we are, at this point, barring unforseen aeveloo- 
"onts in London or Tel Aviv, too far along with tha Iranians to risk turning 
back now. .If wa do not at least nake one mora try at this point, wa 
stand a good chance of condenning sone or all to death and a renewed 
wave of Islanic Jihad terrorisn. Uhile tha risks of proceeding are 
significant, tha risks of not trying one laet tlna are even greater. 
END OF NOTE 



FroR. NSOLN --CPUfl 
To: NSJHP --CPUfl 



LZ3 C3« 

0«te and tine lZ/e4/3S BZ 82 S5 



♦•• Reply to note of 89/31/85 13 26 



SL^ 



SE/RET -- 



NOTE FROM OLIVER NORTH 

Subject PRIVATE BLANK CHECK 

Subject Current Status of Operation Recovery^ Following sunnary is 



UNCLSSSm 



571 



572 



% 



Partially 

mm 



UNCLASSra 



20 >o> 86 



tltlaOAjr 



ThreufAevt txt llt«9«n *datnt|trit<on, ftetK tM nittontl itcgnt/ cminit. 
<n« tB« inttlKjtnc* c>"»««nit/ hn« BtttI tttnljr ixrt in« COAJtjntly conctrn»a 
ibout tn« 9«opoMt<cil poiuion <»« Iht ttrttigU ttgniflcinct of Init. >\,cn 
:nou9nt in4 iffort n<t ottn atvottd Co noo >« aignt dotlop conticci <n4 

tntr« ind t ^. W ^j * ^u i aiun Jul ii U t n i jw i n ^icn •19111 it<d to ii«pro.«o 
rtlit tonjnipt littr on. 

i-tci ll tp «<«'"9 to 

IDOut tr>t inporti mt »f Our <aont1f]rtn9 tna tttiPHiMnf connct 
ith ItlOtrt in 4 fgturt lr«n. | 

|l4id t^«t ■• do not know w«o~ 
• ill tmtrg* to I««d Irjfl in tn» futuct. Put tfni •• mm gitnor all tnt 
ttrjnai tn4 nold ft* in a^f n«ndt 10 tN4t 



I 





In tn« f«ll of 19Si, Sud "cTarUno. afltr^ •«t>l; nttt msi""''" "• • 
n'J Stput/ "«a "UB nt ind "x atputjr, <it*d ■"# to It*/ 5tni"a. ■■• '.ala "» 
iDout diicujl'onj nt nad njo it tnt nijneit ItvtU in Uratl yrjinq -r* 
aojifibllU/ of dlJCuSJlpnj .itn offlc>al» m Irjn ind off 



'jt^y: 



ipnj •itn 



ffinj cn«nntlj o' 




etl».~ 4($liBCtljr i"tc*li HcFjrUnt mpnjji Jin? tnat tne purpoit 0' s.ci Jy~^ 
dt»Cu»il0<i» »0u1d BO tnt 'uturt rtUtioninipj «it« Iran and i-.i jreat -;;-:j-'c» 1 
iH {ht Eatt-Wttt and Niddlt fajt-?tri(a<i Sglf tquation. 'nt Itratl'i -a^-ta 9^'" 
to put us IB togcK "UR an Iranian tipatnatt. Tht I»ratli» i*i« tntj -aa •*'Yr 
cRKkttf out tntt ««n't eact9rogn4 tn« contacts imauttxtl/ and ^ad nign 
confldtnct In tnt qualltjr of ni» rtlatiommp -un n'9n Iranian official. 



^fPi- 



o-Jl 



uNCUssra 



33008B 



573 



UNGUsmu 



Mcr«r1»M IM AMD tol4 tH«t It tit* tia* «f tl<« TVA 747 htJictUt m 
IMS, tM UfMlIt h*4 4ikM tnu lr«)il«<i tip«tri«tt ta gtt mt uriutiK* 
■ttJi SMtor IruiltK offldtU t« Mtitn tiM rtltti* «f to<i« of tM HtjiciM 
p«l>«n«tr«, Jutt ti<« d«x« 1it«r, tour Aatricmi iAo K44 Dttn.s^irtcM froa <^^ 
tA« bulk of tn« KtJtckM pitl«n9tr« avrt frt«4 IM tumM l**r to Syrlin 
iu(r>«r<tt«t. ni« Spt«k«r of th« M«jlli. ntfiit>i4i>i , ^t crtTtHng in tht 
N<4d1« Cttt <t tM t1a« aitn Ir4n<<n rortlffl NiAltttr V*1<r«tt ind ^rt 
6«ltt««« to ft««« inttrvtoM ■UN tHt ctptprt tO rtltlM CK« four tatrtctm. 
R«fltnjM4, in « sptt«n on 4 Hottmotr 198< I'l Mi I jmi "j. for cnt firtt 
ttfl« puOHcljr tcknotti *<];»« nit rolt m jtcurinf tK« frt»daa of tn« nijtctM 
P4>Sin9tr«. 

I« l4tt «ovt««tr I98S. tfi« NSC lUM our offic»r» to ftc—ing 1 cMrttr 
ilrKnt, t«t roliipllUr of whtelt »t could »ou<l« for, to e4rry ton* cirf« 
froa Ttl Oui^^^^^H»4i tolO th4t tfttrt »«t lorn* u'ffcy 

leout tnis In connt«tton attn « «t«(tnf \n C*nt«« b*t««tn in |rtni4ft>off Uijl . 
inttmtowrjr, pri««tt Our^^^^^^^^^^H 

rtcaaiii«n4oo | propnttirjr txolrt C4l Im^^^^^H^^^^Vhim Ticfit 
lirlint rt^u\tr\f took on comiorcUl >tncurtt /a« MT 4*0 not knoa >n4C >4t 
3tin9 aevod, w^tn tno pUnt 9et to T«l *<i«, cn« pilots >«rt toio '.nt cir;a 
•IS ip4ro pirts for tno oil fttlds ino •!> Co 90 into Tiortt. Ou 
iStcldM that In ordor to prottct tno pUno, our^^^^^^^^^^^tnoulo :• 
ilkod to tot fllsitt doirincts Into Inn. On 2$ l«o>««»or I98S, tno pUn« 
dropped tno Cirgo In r«nrin aitnout knoa1n9 .n«t it aos. rh« Itrttln .«-t 
unalttin) tMt tno plino a4t I CIA preprlttir; «nd tno.iirlint cnirjtd -.-t 
norail cOMMrclll rtto aAlcK a«s ipproilaotol; tl27 ai t a ion. Our lisoc'itt 
Ooputy Olroctor for Oporittons lutnoriiod tno fligM Mciuto of cno iHt^fd 

2 

SECItT 




wmm 



574 



ur9«n<y of th« n^irmmnt, 6Bt-4Hyi nil lull illi^i lltl> tlw Otputy Olrtttor -JP t-^« 
dtc14t4 tMt «• Mwld net provtd* any futur* support of fltghtl tnto \r*n 
fn tho ibtoflct of 1 finding. 

M Otdn't Ifirn until laaottao In J«nu«ry 19M th«t tht tDlpatnt tn«ol«M 
II «1r dofonto altslloi tnO tK4t It •«> littr rtjocttd 6/ tM IrtnUnt on cn« 
&«|1| tA«t tt ««t not wKtt tno InnKns ntt ordortO tram tho ItrioHt. In 
thli tfftlr, our «1r propriottry i<«d boon aodo tvdiltblo to <cco>nod4t( t 
doMvory rtoulrtaoflt in anien tttt NSC ■«« Inttroitod tno tdo thlpaont •<« 
bllltO <nd pifd for «t tho nonu) rttoi cntrgod by our ilr propritttry. 

In tho nointiM, tn* poHcy of arebinf tn« pOKlblllty af dttcusitoni 
■itn Irtnun offldtli, including vmII Alpatflts of trai to titiblltn our 
good faltn ind to Induct tnta to uso thtir Influonco oltli tbeto noldinf sur 
^ott49ts, w4( dlscusitd tt snt or t»« oMtlnft of tht NSPG princlptlt. Th«rt 
■trt dUftrtncti of 'ito <b}ut tho JtllrMillty of tnit policy, but i: -*% 
flntlly dtcldtd thtt It should bt ciutleudy piT'Sutd. ; 

On 6-8 Otcwetr 198S. Bud HeftrUnt. thtn NttlontI Stcunty M>fl0^ 
mtt In London «Un tht Itritll officuli 4n« tht Ir«nltn upttrtitt. «t 
tnli ntttlng, nr, HcFirUnt tttttd our goals of pursuing tht rtUtionsmp 
•1th Iran >trt thtsi: 

-- Otvlsing a formula for rttstablisning a strattgtc rtlationsnip 
•itk Tttiran. 

— Ending tht Iran- Iraq War on honorabit ttras. 

— Convincing Iran to ctast Its support for tarrons*. 

— Mlplng tnsurt tht ttrrltorlal inttgrity of Iran and 
coordinating aayt to counttr So»nt attWitm in tht region. 



] 

secitT 



^•nrt^ 



575 



vmmn 



Hr. IttftfltM M4* cittr tn«t In tHIi rtlltlonthtp »• aould iip«<t Inn 
(0 tf«« <tt UfllMflCt to <cnl««« tht rtltll* of Uatttrn hottlftl M Lte4non. 
H* «1iO aM* It cittr tMtt ■« could net IM <ieuld not tfl^tft tn tridinf 4r«t 
for f<o>t«9«i. 

On 17 Jtnutr; 19(6, < Prtsldtntttl flnolnf »«t itjnM dtrtctin9 cm CU 
to pro«l4t op«r(tlon<l 4nd lo^itdctl lupport for « pro9rta aim*d <t 
(1) t»tiBl1»h1m • loort i«oatr»t» 90»trnii«(it In Ir«n, (2) obttining innll'gtnet 
to dtttr«1nt two cjrrtnt Irtnun jovtrnatflt'i Inttntloni wun >-tspKt to itj 
ntt9h6ort tnd «1th rtspcct to ttfforut ict», tnt (3) furth«rin9 tnt rtlttii 
of taarlctn hotti9ti »*^« 'n Stirut <nd prtvtntlnf furthtr ttrroritt lets ar 
tntit 9roupl. 

Tht F1nd1n9 it«t»d tn«t tht uSS will providt oodtrjtt tltrntntl .itiio tnt 
90vtrn«tnt of Irtn .itn jrM tquipmtnt ind rtljttd "tttrttl in ordtr to tnnjnet 
tnt crt41Bil1t/ of thfit titotnti in tntir tfforti lo icnmrt < raort -"octr^tt 
90»trnmtnt tn Inn 3y Ce-^njtnt '"9 tnttr iOtlity to 06t4tn rttourctt »0 ct't"« 
tntir country. f » 

In tht F1nd1n9, tnt Prindtnt dirtcttd tnt CIA to r«fr4in from ^jprtinq 
tht F1ndln9 to tnt Con9rtis 4t proytdtd m Stctton 501 of tnt N4tion4l St^.nt/ 
Act of 1947, 4S 4n«ndtd, ymil otntrwut dirtcttd. 

At tnt tint tnt Pr»»idtnt1«I findin9 .41 J'lintd. tnt CIA'j aff'ct 0' 
Gtntrtl CeunMt provldtd mt It94l opinion tn4t tnt Prtjidtnt c!t4rl;f -41 
tnt 4uthorUf to »tthho1d pnor notict of ootr4tioni from tnt Con9re»?. 
Stctton SOI of tht N*tion4l StCunty Act tipreiily pro.'Cti t"4t "oti':.: o" 
of tnttllHtnet 4Ctl»ltit» to tnt Con9rt»« tntll Bt pro»iatd "to '."» k-t-c 
contlfttKt with «n 4ppHc4Blt 4uthorlt1t» 4nd dutitj, ine1udin9 :»05t 
canftrrtd »» tho Conjtttutlon.' 






576 



UNCIASSIHED 



nt Act «lM U4US th«t tM Illt*l1t9t«<t COMlUttt* 6« InfoiW tf 

«<ttf)tlM ttr rtica M »ritr notict Ml 9i«t« «t tM ippraprtut tiiw 
<« tntrmiHtt kjr th« rr««idt<it. T)i«t <tt ( cUtr r«^)i«B«ttM tri«t 
«itrterdln«r/ ctrci^(t«ncti couK 1*«4 tn« rrt%\«tfH to conclud* tntt 

■^otlc* of in eptrttlofl tAOuli 6« ■itnht14, )n oAol* or m H^t. 

Tfto history to tnt 0«trtt9M Act intfltlUn M KWWca«tlon rKofninnf 
both tho >rts14ont't const i tut < en* I rtsponstftU tt/ tnt «utn«rU| <n4 tk« 
Cangrissteni) gvorilgltt rtsponslDiHty tn4 Iwtnorlty aft ri«cntf In tuts 
'ofltUtloO prsctsi. Tho tuOS04uont proco4uros «9rto4 upon «j tho KI *M 
tno SSCI on riporttnf co«ort tctlon op«r«t<on* provloo thot ««»«*<4flBiert t nf 
of iucK optritions aould <lse bo tuOJoct to cfto oicoptlonol clrcuastmcts 
contMiplatoO In- Sottlon SOI of tho Notionol Socurltjr *ct. 

Tho Prosldont dotoromoO th«t tho ictWUIot luthorWo4 by tho Finoinf 
Justified sithnololnt prior notiflcition duo to tho iitroao tt^^ttldt/ of 
tho dlalofuo Doing ostoslijhod. his jdtlsors rtcofn<204 Ch«t ifj^MI foct 
of this profrsa Socono kne»n, tho Amoncin hvstlfOS m Ltbinon aould bo tut • 
It * grootor ris«. ' 

On 5-7 Foeruiry 19g«, U.J. offleiils f'dm ino hSC *rit C* ->«t in G«'— <>•/ 
• ith roprostnt4ti»OS of tho Isrtolt Pnmo Ministry ind < JOi<ior-lt»«l '.rtntn 
officio). »t this nooting. tho IrinUns ivi'tod ;««t i' tno uSG .oula ^'■c.:t 
^OU Hoopent to Iron, thoy •ould.J 

ItM U.S. ifrood to oiploro this possibility ind. -or 
■Ith tho tsrtolls. ostiOlishod tho foMo«l«9 aochonlsa for tr*nsfor at -.-t 
ooopon* : ^ ^ 

— Tho Irsnion inttr«ool*ry aouto doposU fun«s m *« Iirjoli k::-";. 



S 
StCilT 



UNCUSSiHED 



577 




KIASSM...... 




U.S.-<ontr«llM 
Kcewt In w oftnttt Dtnt. 
— Utlnf tiMi* fiit>«*, CK« CIA icul^ eoirartl; otttin iMt*ri«l 

<u(AorliM for trantfar frea U.S. allltirjr itockt <n« trjniport 
tAtl to ItrttI f»r onatrO nevtaont to tr«ii. 
Ultnf tMta procMurts, funof sort dopotltM In tM CIA iccovnt m 
S«ntv« on 11 FtOruar; DM <n4 on U Ftferuory 1,000 TOWt sort trtmportM 
to Iir«ol for prt-po»1lioniB9. Thoio TOUl xri trintforrad By CU fro* DoO 
(U.S. krmy ttockf In Annisten, AUbMo) intf trtntport«4 tnrou9h^^^^H|^^H 

uslnj ttinoard CIA>OoC^^^^^^^f 09t$t1ci trrtngrMnti. Pol'cy- 
Itvol coerotnatlon for tntt* amngomontt Mt offoctM fty NSC (N«rtn) ,\x.t> 
OoO (AraU<9« tnd (ocn) ind CIA (Clair G««r9«). n<« TOUl «*rt plicM m «..-r-J 
covort Isrttll factlUy oxitlnf onxard tli<|fa«nt. 

On 19-21 FMruarjr, U.S. tnt iranUn e'f<ci«1« (nSC tn« CIA) mt <sa<n 
in Comanjr to discuii prooltui in arranging a ntotmf loong hightr-ltnti 
offlclall. At thtt ntltln9, tl* U.S. t<«ri9rttd to provtdt 1,000 fOUtKCO 
Iran at a cloar «i9nal of U.S. tinctrttjr. Him OtHvtry oat caM*«n(t« In c^« 
nornlng o/ 20 FtOruary and coapltttd m t»« trant<tt to Ttnrtn on 21 F«3r. ary. 
Transportation froa Itraol to Iran «as aeeard a 'alt* f1a9 Iiratl' orcaft. 
On 7 Mtrcn, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israalt rtprtttntati»tt itc ^itn -.-t 
Iranian IntoCMdlary in Paris to dtttrmin* .natntr tny furtnar pr9S''<tt -at 
possibit In 4rrtn9ln9 for a nign-laval aaating Bitn U.S. and Iranian off<c 4:1. 
Ourinf thasa awatlngs. tna Intaraadlary (nipnasltad tna Oatanortt mf rcc- c 
situation In Iran tnt Iranian anaiatlat ra9ardln9 incraasin9 Iraqi mli-.a'-; 
affactuanatt. 



I 
SCCMT 



UNCUSSIHED ' 



82-700 0-88-20 



578 



rfsaws?, 






IrMitM •rricltll. ta 11 "(y tut rrt««««M tirtMrliM « Mcrn aiiitoM u 
T0ef by fofwr Mtlona) SMurity M«<Mr iicftr)«M. tccaa»M<M ty t ciA 
tM«U4nt, CIA ceoMi Utters, ut irt cf <M NSC Stiff. m« ut IirMll <n« 
IrMUN <nt*rlKuteri. In ordtr to t«itwr« OMrtttontl saciirlty. tl«« trip xt 
■•«• froa Isr«tl. coincident ■KM tM Ml1*«ry of t »«n«t of iporo porti for 
IrtnUn dofonttvo xipon* tjrttMt (HAW iporo tloctronU ports). «t th« 
specific rt^uost of tf>« Irimtns. ttl«« forolga Ooci«wnt4tion^^^^Ha«t<int4 
froa the CIA'-««t usM. 

[n tie cowrso of tnt fogr-o«jr (ti-n Nay) visit, lon^tliy aoottnfs aore 
hold «1th Hlgn-levol tr«nl4n offldtlt, tit* first direct contoct ftetaoen tKo 
too governaents In over sli /oors. fir. Ntforleno t«4 kis tOMi sore <olo to 
ostoelisn tne oesis for a centln«inf ralaalonanip ana clearly artiCHlate our 
90Joctl«es. concerns, and intentio««. Tka |rou» ao* alsd aktl^t* aasast first* 
'>4n« the Internal political dynoalc la 1«kra« and tne of fe«f jC tue'var o* tr«n. 
usinf aresldentlalljr-approved rara* *f Idferenca, ^ica 
approved Oy appropriate Cabinet officer*. NcfarlaM aapltasii 
in Um trenscendod tne n«sta(**, b«t tna continued detent f«r#^« 
a Laeanese group pnllosopntcally allfned altb (ran prevented progress. :»<- 
tn« visit. Mr. NcfarTone aadd clear: 

• • that ■* fu<idM«ntally opposed Iranian efforts to a>pei us 

fr*a tM Middle (att; 
•• tHat «a firaly opposed tAair «t* ef terrerisa; 
•• titab ■• accepted Uittr r«««l««i*« a«d did nM see* to >-tverta i 
.• tlut ■* bad niMdroM ttaar dlM«rodad«t« Uvdlvlng regional 
palUitt («.».. inmat Wirefd. eM.). but aignt also fme 
area* ef cacaaB intertst^^^^^^^^^^^Kurougn 
T 
UCMT 




UNCUSSIHED 



579 




'"^ 




Oiir1«fl tlHM aMtlnft, Mtk <<4M v««4 tH« otfartiwUy to 4it«n tn« 
oMtMlM t« laplMwntlrtf « ttrittfic r«UtlM«Mp »«■•«• tM cao ceuntrltt. 
ft tMltleii t« tn« point! not«4 «M«o, Hr. MeftrUno «vk«tUH tri« politicil 
protlfM ctHtoO Oy Irtnttn Involiwofit <• tlM hott«40 Ittuo. nto trtnlmt 
stjoctod to tM USa (MOtrfo OM U.S. alKttry tiipollot »\rtt«j p4t« for plm 
tM C0M1AUO4 UM fttocktAf of IrwtM tttott <■ tM U.S.. t*on iftor U.S. 
court* ho4 ruto4 <» tMtr fivor. 

On 10 JuM, Nojltt $po«Kor lorsoojooi. to • ipoocN I* r«nrtii nto* iutratf) 
roforonco to tronlM mtorttt to laprovo^ rolotlono altk th« U.S. On It July, 
Fothor Llaronco Joxco att rt1«4l00 I* tKO lokk* Volloy «i4 founo hli a^y to « 
SyriM alllttry choctpoMt. Oo 3 <«fMt, tkroo pollots (los* thoN 1/2 pUitoloM) 
of oloctroNlc ports for Ir^nuo ««t1-otrcr«ft dofooM* (NAM* alttilo tuO-coa»o«Oflt 
«rr1vo4 lo ToMron (fro* Iiriol). *^ , 

In alo-Aufirtt, tM o"^to<t» ■pro aodo wU* Iri«. 6 oo« < l ^ <^* < 
aUh^^^^^^H^^^HH^^^K 4114 onto WK^ii^Ea^ocfJ. 
■un^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^KftnoTonior Irooio* f^^^'vffiH^' 
nirouflt Aufalt. SOfftoWor, t»4 OctoMr 1«M. ni^orou* oMItfonol aootoft 
•oro i«l# la ttiropo Botwoon U.S. roKoiontotivo* *M tM i>0« 4>>0 Irtnttn 
contoctt. During tno 21 OctoMr 11M oootlof tn froatfurt. 5or"««>y. :'■» 
U.S. <1M. n la tM post. 1n««StO« tMt tM roUotO Of Jtio MttlfOt •«« • 
pro-ro^ltlU U oay profritt. TM IroaUo^^^^^^^^f urfoO tit«t •• 
tot* aart octlva roU <* twMart^^^^^^^^^^^^^^pM tufftttto 
tfClft tkM If ■• c«al« K>»«o ««ltToaat roi aoofoatu 



!>ntoct 




UNCUSSIHED 



580 






tkll aMtlMl^^itttM tMt »«r« w»t I 'xry 
9««« cUMca tMt llMtlMr tMflcw tr t«« ««iil« M rr*M mm.* (ki n Octooar. 
v«UI U.S. K«ilKtMC«, ItrMi »r«*4tf«« In* «4tk «• *MU1on«l iiKrmmt of 
W«ntl«« >>««p«A« (MO rOH aMintt). 

Th«s« dlicuillon* altn^^HttltflM u» first th«t ■• aar* tflrtctl; tn 
tSuCK aftk tOf 1t«4frtnl9 in Iran <n4 tA4t thtrt ■«« %em Inttratt in aornnf 
tei«th«r la ca<<«ar9ln4 cna itrattftc tntartttl »t Irtn mk tlia U.S. tna our 
■odtrtta Arat frlandi in tna NrsiM CmW in pretactinf thM rroa tna tnrtat 
of S««<at i)9raiiie«. 

Lata 9<i Octeoar.^^^^^^^^^^^^BaMaa citiian (Hakia) 

tatkad to aatntaln contKt an^ a4«l«aa that Iran l««4 'tiartlia4 Its influanca 
■Itlt tha LtOanata* la oroar ta eatala tita rt}t*M of aa taar1can--0avi4 Jacobian 
tn4 an vncartain nuaear af FrtacH Kattafa*. m furtHar aatat tnat titit *a« 
part of (ha purpota of tna Iraniaa foralfn mnlitar't vltlfLtC'jy^**- 
On Z l«e«««Mr, Oavia Jacoetan aat raltatat By kit captorsj 
Eaeaisy coiipoun« in uatt Nlmt. Tha U.S. Caoaity la U 
dlipatcha* an taeatiy efflcar to wast lairwt to pick up 

It nov appaars that partiitant U.S. tfforts to tstaltfW^* 
Iraa ri««a proeaoly tiactroata* tka po«ar itruffia In Ira* Bataaan prafnat'c 
aloaants ('a< ftjr aaftanjant) an4 aora raaical factions (unaar cna g«tr«ii 
tponsortkip of Ayatollak Nofitaiari). In lata OctoOar. raaical sugpor'.tri 
(of Naataiarl) rovaolM tna (lifsaajaai) contact -itk tna uU tfi^ era -.ft 
of tka caatoct. «#partni1y ta uftM kiasalf afainst chargas of coi'uoixf 
«1tfe tk« use aM ta prtMri* a MV** ** Utituat far »atk partiit, 'ajin 
S#Mk«r toftaajaal k*«i<*< • fur^Maly <lstarta« <arsiaa of tna Uy 1914 
Ntfarlaaa alttiaa ia kis « liWir oMrast ta tka aastat. 



StUIT 




UNCLASSIFIED . 



581 




OtMit* tun* ii>ttr««l tfiffinltiM m» mmmm MKcity i* tii* 




It «t lapertMt t« ii«t« tbtt tlaca UM UU1«t«« Af 
•Ufe Irw, tli«r« Mt BM« It* nKanc* af trtaiM m i fam ^i»tin9w:' >" 
Ktt af tarrariM tgatnat tM V.S. ua aaiiava tMt uta Saatwaar-Octoaar 
kia«aat<*1< of Nitft. *aa«. Clcla»4a. *<w Tracy w^rt vnaartikaa m «• affert 
ta wiMralaa tha MKaM «.S.-tr«««aa ttr«ia«l( tUlatMa *«« aiacaratta tia 
intaraal Irtalaa hm^ n»u««la tfatatt wa aaaaraa ftcttaa aiti* aftica «a 
ittva kaaa la • 





ta «aac«Ut<<a rn^i% 

taaaa i»st««M mt* toaa «• araar u utmlata ika Ka«i«4tia« •t nara 
iHtl aara aaat Hkaly <aftara« (a araar ta tr*—t tha fao rt9aro«cni«fit 
~ ~ ■• ar* taattaf. 

ucarr 



uNcussra 






582 



UNClASSIFItO 



DOU^^ 



^ (^ ,.<r 



- ^gg A <T/jg. v ^/'r i / » ' ^ 



OCfs Inn T«jt1fiony for MPSC! *n(3 SSCl 
l\ No»eiriO«f 1986 



2- NC* 3C, 



N 1 :CC7 



CO 

ro 
I 

-J 
o 
o 



en 
oo 
ro 



->iro'j9^ou: :-e Seaman Aamm, sirjt 'on . 5otn :ie national secu-it/ coffltrun'-. 
and tie intell-gence community na,e ^egn »eenly a-are and constant'^ concer-ea 
aoou: :ie geoooM-.ical position ana t.ie s'.ratsjK significance of \r\n. -uci 
tnougnt ana effjr: Mas been aevoted to now «.« migni develop contacts if^a 
ne) at lonsni OS -nici would provide a oe'.ter jnderstanding of what is naoptnmg 
there and estaolisn contacts and rel at lonsni ps wmcn might lead to improved 
rel at lonsh' PS later on . 

1 ^^HH|[^H||^9^^^B^^H^HH^^^Kflj^^^^^H 

hoout tne importance of our identif/ing and esUblismng contact 

B^gEB^a-SJr^ ^ tjMSl^^K^B^B^Bl^^KP^Hf s a ' d tnat we do not know >no 
will effierge to lead Iran in tne future. Out tnat we Tiust gatner all tne 
strands ir^c nolo tneiTi in our hands so that we will be ready. 




In tne early fall of 1985, Bud wcfarlane, after on* of the wee«ly meetings 
which he and his deputy had with in« and my deputy, asktd fM to stay Behind. 
He told me aoout discussions he had had at tne highest levels In Israel 
urging the desirability of discussions with officials In Iran and offering 
channels of access. He told me that, for oovious reasons, only a nanoful 
of people in the Israeli and American governments were to be told about this 
effort. I distinctly recall »^cFarlane emphaswmg that the purpose of such 
discuss'ors -o-io pe the future relationships -ith Iran and Iran'sjr^^- _ 

- " ' - 'i V L'J 

importa"c« n '.-e [jst-west and Miaale East-Persian Gulf equation.. ~\ 



iCC ft ET 










Impi Aooinrn 



583 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N T0CG8 

C!A's 1 nvo i ve^eit segan wren tne A^eicjr •«« asiea to recomend a 'e'liaole 
airline :na: cou^fl :rar$port SuUy oil-dnlling oarts to an unsp«cifiea 
destination in trie "'dc'e East, we recommenaed a proprietary of ourj called 

"His little airline regularly toon on coflwercial ventures. 
Neither tre arl-e -:- CIA ime* t.ie car;3 cors'sted o^ '8 ''ink -nTSsi'ss.* 
When tne pl^pe got to Tel Aviv, tne pilots were told tne cargo ■*$ spare 
parts ^or the oil ''elds and was to go mto 'afiriz. (X>r^^^^^^^Hdec*de<j 

in order the p1 ane^^HS|H^^^HH|^^B should 

get flight clearances into Iran. On 25 Novemoer 1985, the plane dropped the 
cargo in 'e'lran. 'o fe best of our tncwledge, neither the Israelis nor the 
Iranians unew trat :"ey were dealing with a CIA proprietary, nor did airline 
personnel tnow wnat they were carrying. The airline was paid tne normal 
commercial rate wnich amounted to appronTiately J127,700. I should stress 
that the airline does » con$1d«raDlt amount of nonnal Business in addition 
to Its support to CI*. 




Our Associate Deputy Director for Operations authorwe<3 the flight 
because of the alleged urgency of the requirement. When the Deputy Director 
t><s consulted on 25 NovewDer, It was decided that we would not provide any 
future Support of flights into Iran In the absence of a finding. 



2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



584 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 10Q09 

In tne iw^ntime, tie Israeli proposal of probing im poss'bil-ty of 
aiscussions wun Iranian o'^icials. incljcmg making sma't SMpments of »rri 
to es-.aDl'sn ei.r 5000 faun i-a ro mojce •.".em to use '."e'r 'n':je"ce v^t.t> 
trose nc^^-ng our nostages, «as cscjsseo a: one or t»o Tieetings of :ne ns?G 
principals, 'riere -ere aiffe^e"ces of vie- aDout tne aes'rasili:/ of this 
policy. Dui It »as finally aeciceo tnat it should Be cautiously pursued. 

'.'• " ~.i:e"ce' '935, 9uC "i-j-'a-e, '."i" Nat'ona! Secj-'t/ iflv'sor. ref* 
in London «itn Israeli officials ana tie Iranian expatriate «r.o was tneir 
inter-ne^Ji a'y to tie Iranian government. At tnis meefng, Hr. >V:Farlane 
Stated our goals of pursuing tne relationsnip witn Iran »ere these: 

-- Devising a formula for rees t aD 1 1 sh 1 ng a strategic rel at ' onsriip 

■iin Tehran. 
-- [ncing the Iran-Iray war on nonoraDle terms. 
-- Convincing Iran to cease its Support 'or ter-onsm. 
-- Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran anc 

coordinating ways to counter Soviet activities m the region. 
Mr. McFarlane made dear that In this relationship w« would expect Iran 
to use Its influence to achieve the release of Western hostages in Lebjnon. 
Me also made it clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms 
for hostages. This matter was discussed again several times with the President 
and others in the national security cOfiiiumty following tne OecefliOer McFarlane trip. 

On 17 January 1986, a Presidential Finding was signed directing the CIA to 
provide operational and logistical support for a program aimed at (l) estaDlisnirg 
a fcre mcderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining 1 nte' 1 'ge-ce '.z "eter^ii-e the 
Current Iranian government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with 
respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of Ar.e'ican hostages 
held in Beirut and ;;reventing further terrorist acts by these groups. 

3 

4Cf ( JT 



lINniAQQIPIFn 



585 



UNCLASSIFIED 



&1 C ft C ^' 



N 10010 



T^e Find'^y s:4'.«a tm: :ne uSG •oula provide mcitrt'.t eleiTi«n;j Bitnin 
inc without trie government of Iran witrt irms equipme'^t ira related ««tenel 
•n oraer : o ef^rance •."'e -*e<3 ■ c i i i ;/ o^ '."^ese e'ements m •.-e''- e"crts to 
icn^eve a -^ce -ncce-ate jove'-me'it in [ran Oy ce-nonstrat i nq ;"?■' aDiiity to 
ootain resources to oe'end tneir country. 

In the Findiny, the President directed the CIA to ^ef^»^n from reporting 
ne finai'''9 to tne Congress u^tii otherwise directed. The Finaiig was reviewed 
and concurred in iy the Attorney General. 

At the tice t'^e ''es'dentiai Finding was being drafted, the CIA's Office 
o' Genera' Counsel provide'd the legal opinion that the President has the 
authority to withhold prior notice of operations 'rom the Congress. Section SOI 
c' the National Security Ac: eipressly provides that notification of intelligence 
a:tivities to the Congress shall be provided "to fe eitent cons'stent with 
all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the 
Const 1 tut ipn." 

The Act also itiies that the Intelligence Comriittees be in'ormed of 
activities for which no prior notice *i»i given »\ the Appropriate tim« 
«s deterTfline<5 Dy the President. This was • c1e*r recognition that 
extraordinary circumstances could leaa the President to conclude that 
notice of »r\ operation should be withheld, in whole or in part. 

The "istory to the Oversight Act shows tnat »r^ accomodation recognwing 
both the President's constitutional responsibility and authority and the 
Congressional oversight responsibility and authority was reached m this 
legislative process. The subsequent procedures agreed upon zy fe OCI and 
fe SSCI on report-ng covert action operations provide that adva'^ce reporting 
o' Such ;perations wou'.- .Iso be subject to tne eiceptional circumstances 
contenplated in Section SOI of the National Security Act. 



£CCfl£ T 



UNCLASSIFIED 



586 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 10011 

The Pr«j)(Jent h«$ instructta •«« to «(3vl$« /ou tfi4t N* dtt»r«in«<i r.r\H 
:^« *cti*vti«$ authori:ea Sy tn« Finaifig jus:ifi«<3 ■itnholaing prior notif'Cition 
c.e to :Me exire<ne sers^ : • <■ -.y of the dialogue Semg estjolishefl. ^e aetermi^ed 
"."at )f fe fact of tii^ j'oi^ram secame irnown, fose carryiny out the dialogue 
:oth U.S. and ['io;iri-, inc tne Ariencan hostages i" Leoanon would oe out at 
a greater ris». 

'he'e -ave civ ;ee" '.-c finomgs sirice fe 'ncestion o' the o»ers'9'** 
process ten years ago .men na»e not been Driefed to Congress. This is one. 
The sec:nd ■as t"e i-i'^'an "ostage rescue mission. 

Now I would lite to eis'<i'"^ exactly what activities were undertaxen 5y 
the CIA in carrying o^t fe directives of this Finding signed on 17 January 1986. 

On 5-7 February 1986, ..3. officials (^*SC). a reoresentative of the 
Israeli ?ri-ne ^m-stry iVniram Nir), and a senior.i»vei Iranian official 




■Tiet in Germany. At tnis meeting, the U.S. side 
epphasized us desire to enter into » strategic dialogue with the Iranian 
side. The Iranians raistd their dtslrt to rtctlvt U.S. ireiponj, Th« U.S. 
i<;ret<} to explore tfi1$ posjiftillty. Working with the I$faeliSr-th« following 
mechanism for transfer of tne weapons w*s estaoHshed: 

-- The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbam far) would deposit funds in tn 

Israeli account. 
• - The funas would then be transferred to t sterile U.S. -control led 

account in in overseas bank. 
-- using these funds, the CIA would work with the Antiy logistics 

Ci<Timand to ootain the materiel. 
-- The Tiatenel would thi.. ., transported to Israel for future 
snipment to Iran. 

5 
jTCBCT 



UNCLASSIFIED 



587 



UNCUSSIFIED 



&€0^C ^ 



N 10012 



using fese ji-oceajres, S3. 7 million was deoosuea m t"e CiA account 
m Geneva on :; ^ei-'^a-/ : 9d6 'or :ne purcfiase of 1.000 'Ow mssiles ana 
ass3c-a:ea costs. 

On 15 PeC.-uai-_*. Office of Loyistics personnel aeli»ere<; tne 1,000 T0« 
-■5S':«s :o Ke ■ -•' -:^:? :ise. >ft- missiles -ere ce" trd?s3orte3 to 
israe'. 'or oc-arj s-i— i^-^e^t to Iran. CIA was not in.ui.eo m '."e : -ais^orta t ' on 
cf tiis snipme-t. 

Cn 19-2' 'e:r.jary, U.S. [SSC ana CIA) ana Iranian officials met again 
in 3e'~'ian/ to cisc-SS orcoleTis m arranging a meeting among higner-'evel 
off'c:als. it t-'s -eetm.;, trie U.S. side agreeo to ?ro*ioe '.GOO "Cws to 
,'ran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity and support for tne faction we were 
talung to. '^is aeiivery »as commenced on ine mormng of 20 feeruary and 
completed in t-o transits to Tenrin on 21 FeOruary. Transportation from 
Israel to Iran was aBoard a false flag Israeli aircraft. 

On 24 February, the same U.S. officials traveled to Germany where they 
•et witn the intermediary and an Iranian government official. At that meeting. 
the Iranian official provided a list of varying quantities of appronmately 
24U different spare parts needed for the Hawk Bissile batteries provided by 
tne uSG to Iran during t^e Span's reign. The Iranian official asked for 
USG assistance in obtaining tnese spare parts as additional proof tnat this 
c-anne' nad t^e a;oro»al of tne highest authority m the USG. 

Cn 25 Febrjiry. ■_•.( j , 5 . officials, as they continued to CO m later 
contacts -itn '."e I'-aridns, proviaeo me iia.iians witn limited information 
designed to encourare an Iranian decision to negotiate *r\ end to the war 
and increase '.rjn^in a-are^ess of the Soviet threat to Iran. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



588 



yNCUSSiFe 






N 10013 



Througnout f-arch ana A(jri!. cne Office of Log'st'cs -onea «itn OoO to 
r'arifjr tne i-emj ^n jTj i'anuns' lis: of spare par'.i i^c iceniif^ «nicn 
• •-Sffls were tn 3o0 s:oct5 . 

On 7 Marcn, U.S. (C;a ana nsC) inc Israeli rejresertati ^es i>et wun tn« 
Iranian intermeai ary in Pans to aetermine wfietner tny fj^tner progress wis 
;.-ssi5'e in ar-a-igmg ':' a "igri. level mee'.mg »i:n u.S. i'^<: :ranian officials. 
Oviriny cnese meetings, t.'ie mcermeaiar^ e(nynaswe<J tue co'.er lorai mij economic 
situation in \rin ana banian aniieties reqaraing increasing Iraqi military 
e "ecti *eress. 

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-'ace with top-level 
;-anian officials, on 15 ^iy the President authorized a secret mission to 
"eiran By former National Security *dvisor McFarlane, accompanied 6y a CIA 
jrnuitant, a CIA comnunicator, members of tne NSC Staff, ina :.":e Israeli and 
I'anian interlocutors. 

On 16 May 1986, the Ir«n1inj providM J6.5 million -..irough an inter?ne<d1*r/ 
'or Hawic spare parts and in addltionjl 508 TOW missiles. The receipt of tht 
Iranian funds set into motion arrangementj for the planned yisit to Iran as 
f ol loxs : 

-- The Office of Communications provided secure omunication 
equipment and the services of a communications officer to 
travel to Iran with the U.S. team 
-- The Office of Technical Service was tasked to provide ten 
jassports for use 6y the tejn ana me air 
crew of the aircraft that woula fly from Israel :o 'tr^rtn^ 
The Iranians insisted on me use of non-u.S. sassporti 
passports were chosen because the Israeli aircraft used for the 
journey carr i eo^^^^H-eg 1 St rat 1 on numoers. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



589 



UNCLASSIFIED 



*tv*C r" 



N 10014 



-- The Off-ze of Log'sdcs dssenbled the ivai'ole Hawn n'ssile 
spare yj^'.s ii ^e' :» Air force Base. Tne ua-'.s -ere -.len 
transjof.ec :; :s-ael Oy a private contractor !Soufe^i Air 
Tra-S?or:, . 
-- The Cf'ice of Loystics delivered 508 TOw missiles to Kelly ^ 
Air :;r;? iae 'd' ;rwaf-a shiprrert to :s'ael ;» 3"vi;e 
c:'t*a:::' Scufe'i '-ir 'ransport). 
On 25 May, fe U.S. team traveled to Tehran via Israel, 'he CIA 
provided txO memoers of :-e team--a comrnunicat i ons officer ana a farsi 
speamng annuuant "iti cors'cerasle experience in [rtrwin af'airs. The 
annuitant provced translation services and advice to t-e team, "e :3rtinued 
to be involved in suosequent meetings with Iranian representatives. 

The U.S. team Drought a single aircraft pallet of »»^t missile spare 
parts with theffl to Tehran at the time of the meeting. Hcweve'", it -as oecided 
tnat the greater portion of the spare parts would stay in Israel for later 
deliver/ to Irin pending further progress In tstablishmg the dialogue, we 
understand that those spare parts were ultimately delivered to Iran. 

The 25-29 >'ay meetings were held with high-level Iranian officials, tne 
first direct contact between the two governments In over six years. Mr. McFarlane 
arKj his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing -eiationsnip and 
clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and Intentions, 'he group -as 
also able to assess first-hand the internal political dynamic ii 'e^rai and the 
effect of the war on Iran. Using President lal ly-approved 'erm$ of Reference, 
which had been revie-ed ina approved by appropriate Cabinet o"::'S, ^cParlane 
emphasized that our interest in Iran transcended the hostages, but tne continued 
detention of hostages by a Lebanese group philosophically aligned -'tn '.nn 
prevented pro^^ress. Ouriny the visit, Mr. McFarlane made c^etr 

3 



UNCLASSIFIED 



590 



UNCLASSIFIED 






N 10015 



-- tfiit we funciinef\n\]y opposed lrtn\in tffom to eipel ys 

'^om tne Miaaie im , 
-- tnic „e firmly opposeo tneir use of ztrrocMit; 
-' that -e accepted tneir revolution tnc did not seek to reverse U; 
-- true we Mid numerous otner disagreements involvin9 regional 
^olices (i.e., LeDanon, "Nicaragua, etc.), 6ut might also (•''C 
ir-i^i conrton i nteresc ^^^H^^^^^^^^B cnrou^l 

On 19 Septemoer, three Iranians traveled to tne U.S. for detailed discussions 
»itn tne U.S. team. These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives of the 
U.S. in seeung a political dialogue with Tei^rtn. 

Throughout August and SeptemDer, numerous additional meetings were held 
in Europe Between U.S. representitlves and the new Iranian contacts in tn 
effort to oeve'op the dialogue autnonzed by the Presidential finding. 

On 6 Octooer, those Iranians traveled to Frankfurt for meetings wun 
the U.S. team. 




On 26 October, more (i»eet1ngj were held in Frankfurt with the same 
P«rt1cipant>. 

The Iranians proffered, and the U.S. accepted, the offer of a Soviet 

tank^^^^H^^^^^H^I That be in our hands shortly. 

On 2 November, the Iranians provided S2.037 million and the Office of 
Logistics procured SOO more TOW missiles from OoO. 

Those missiles -ere delivered by the Office of Logistics to Kelly A-- 
Force Base on 6 •■ovemDer. A uSAf C-U) aircraft carried the aissiles to 

»»ere they were transshipped by a CIA air proprietary aircraft -nich 
carried the missiles to Israel. 

9 



UNCLASSIFIED 



591 



UNCLASSIFIED 



StC^'C f 



N 10016 



This eringj tn« rtcora of CIA \ nvol veffien t in thes« «Cli*ltt«$ *uthori:e<l 
3/ tht 17 Jtn\jiry 1986 Presia«ntnl Fin<jiny up tO dJte «J of tn« pr«$ent l\mt. 
•« jhoula not* tna: lone of me we^oons came from CIA stockj. 

Wt hjve received no requests to acquire tny more iinnnel of »ny type 
'or shipment to Iran ■jr\<ier tnij program. ^ 

I would line to -eicerate ".'lat tnc 'unus for tne procurement of tne 
•Jttriel enun»era:eo aoove, as -ell as for all associated costs, were provided 
by tn« Iranians tnemselves. Funding from Iran was transferred to CIA for 
aeposit in a covert funding mecnamsm. Tni s action provided secure (neans 
'or control, payment, ano accountaoi 1 1 1/ of all funomy associated with tnis 
prograni. The Iranian funds, a total of 512,237,000, were deposited into a 
special account m a Swiss bank. 

The only costs incurred By the CIA in this activity were expenses for 
the travel of CIA offi cers involved in the v arious meetings, the costs of 
^ot^1 rooms l 

[operational support! 
•aountlng to appronaately 548,000. Tht costs for this support nave bttn 
chirgtd against normal operational accounts. Since all travel by CIA officials 
Is routincl/ charged to such accounts, to do otherwise m the case of the 
trips undertaken during this program would niy/t cowpromised the security 
of the activities. 

Let me make it perfectly c^ttr that u was apparent to all that this 
initiative was a controversial one. Even tnose of us who supported going 
forward understood :iat it was a close call and a nsky operation. There 
w«re no illusions. 




lU 



UNCLASSIFIED 



592 



UNCUSSIHED 



N 100^7 



w*s It J reuoniDlt cjll? Tej. I trunk it -*J. *» tn« '>««Un of ichcxixini 
riis (3ec)inea o»er tne p^si /e*r, xe h4»» seen *n )ncre«»e m f*ciion*l 
infighting in Tenrin. Thi5 infigntmq h4$ been sn^rpened Oy severe economic 
pro&lems, as -ell a tMe war wun Iraq. There nave been numerous arrests. 
This factional infighting has implications for both the Unitefl States tnd 
the Soviet union, it -as the Aommistratton's judgment that any powerful 
Innian factpon seenmg to reestaolisn ties xiin tne west and -illing to 
attempt to curtail Iranian support for terrorism was worth talking to. 

It was in that context that the judgment was made that providing a small 
amount of defensive weapons would give this faction some leverage in the 
internal struggle By suggesting that there were advantages in contacts with 
the uest. 

As I stated iSrrller, Iran i$ not going to go away. Its geographic 
and strategic positions guarantee that it will remain a geopolitical force 
which the U.S. will have to de«1 with. If we do not establish ties to the 
various Iranian factions now wc will be faced with the problem of doing so 
later. It is that simple. 



U 



Li I 



H?.\ i<?.^iTirn 



593 



SUBJECT: CIA Airline Involvement 



A'O PA~& 



\Mv^^\m ^^ 



o»osmoN 



i I 



In late November 1985, a CIA proprietary airline was 
chartered to carry cargo to Iran at the NSC " s request. The 
cargo was described to us as oil drilling spare parts. 
Although we did not Know it at the time, the cargo was actually 
18 Hawk missies. The chronolgy of the incident is as follows: 

I On 22 November>9fl5;^he NSC contacted the Agency with in 
urgent reques t-„t«« Lhe iiame i^f a discreet, reliable airline 
that could transport bulky oil-drilling parts to an unspecified 
destination in the Middle East. 

He offered the name of the CIA's proprietary airline as a 
company which could handle the NSC request. The NSC passed the 
name of our airline to '' i " ^f r-- I i a r y f i rh rh e Ii tr r-inr i 

In the interim, we contacted our airline and told them that 
they would be receiving an urgent, legitimate charter request. 
The SSC intermediary contacted the airline that evening (22 
November) and mad e arrangements for the airline to pick-up the 
parts ^^^^'~~ 



anged to Tel Aviv an<f two o4 



__ ^ The d estination was>cnangea to Tel Aviv and" two _. 
'aril line '1 Boeing 707 ' s/arr ived in Tel Aviv 23 November. The 
cargo was ultimately loaded onto only one of the aircraft. 
Loading was completed by 24 No vember and the airc raft proc eeded 
to Iran via a stop at||^|^BBand then overf lying ^mJB|| At 
the NSC's request, and for the protection of our a^^^^^, we 
helped arrange foe the overflight clearances. 

TiY- ^(- ' '*^fif| , -Kr^ Ht, /<>*«-**»• 
To the best of our knowledg«,^th« i n nii >e<*at y d iii inm t n i u » 






that ttiey was dealing with a CIA proprietary, n o r . d ij \^^ ^ftfuA* 

personnel know what they were ct'rying. '-'V'T'^'^Tn^ ■ ^^^^y^--^ 

out that our airline had hauled Hawk missies into Iran until 

mid-January when we were told by the Iranians. 

The airline was paia^thc normal commercial rate which 
amounted to approximately $127,700. I should stress that the 
airline does a considerable amount of normal business in 
addition to its support to CIA. ^It had, in fact, made h*»iijft i««»»i / «*<U- 
^i| tttietg flight into Tehran carrying commercial items prior 
t-^ the 22-25 November incident. 

Senior CIA management found out about the flight on 25 
/Vovt^U^ F eb tu a t . y . Although we did not know the nature of the cargo, we 
thought that any future support of this type to the NSC would 



require a Finding, 



UNCLRSSlFffiD 



( 5506^ 






< ] 



<harris>c>Tuclc 



594 



UNCLASSIFIED 



C^c 




CJC NOTES OF DISCUSSION AMONG McFARLANE, AG MEESE, & CJC 
(11/21/86) 



On November 21, 1986, Attorney General Meese and Assistant 
Attorney General Cooper interviewed Robert McParlane concerning 
events surrounding recent contacts with certain elements of the 
Iranian government. The interview took place in the AG's office. 

The AG opened the interview by explaining that the President 
had asked him to develop an accurate and complete account of the 
facts relating to the Iranian contacts. The AG briefly summa- 
rized his understanding of the major events in the chronology of 
these events and asked McFarlane to describe, to the best of his 
recollection, all events relating to contacts with Iran, with 
particular emphasis on anything having to do with American mili- 
tary supplies or weapons. 

McFarlane (hereinafter referred to as "M") stated that his 
first contact on this issue came on July 3, 1985, when Kimche, 
Eli Bubenstein, and perhaps others from Israel met with M in the 
latter's office. M also noted that Kimche phoned M on July 30 to 
set up an August meeting on this subject. On August 2, 1985, 
Kimche (who is Director-General o^ the Israel Foreign Ministry) 
met with M in Washington. At the July 3, 1985 meeting, Kimche 
advised M that Kimche had been contacted by an Iranian represent- 
ing elements of the Iranian government seeking change in Iranian 
policy toward the United States and interested in establishing 
renewed and cooperative contacts with the U.S.A. These elements 
of the Iranian government recognized that their country's economy 
was declining, and that the Soviets were attempting or likely to 
attempt to exploit the situation. These elements believed that 
the fundamentalist drive was bad. Kimche believed that his 
Iranian contacts were legitimate and credible because they had 
taken certain risks to prove their bona fides. Kimche believed 
that these elements of the Iranian government might be able to 
influence the captors of the hostages, but a quid pro quo in 
terms of ailitary support would eventually be necessary. 

In Bild-July, around the 13th, M briefed the President, along 
with Don Regan, at the hospital. 

At the August 2, 1985, meeting M told Kimche that the 
President was interested in establ ishini^ a dialogue with these 
elements of the Iranian government, but was cautious regarding 
any transfer of arms. M advised Kimche that the President might 
be willing to provide such support at a later date, after we had 
become better acquainted with the intentions and good faith of 
these elements in Iran, and after we had become satisfied with 
the firmness of their, asserted opposition to terrorism. The 



under prviJioTi :f tt 1:255 
Ey B. Rc:er, h:^cn:l SsCurity Cotf.lCf! 



(i^y 



595 



UNCLASSIFIED 



President "was not willing, however, to provide any such support 
at that tiae. 



^'mrno 



596 

UNCLASSIFIED -"^^'^^^ 



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597 



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3017 



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601 



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604 



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605 



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A'« iWZ/vAo/"^ o^^ ^-»v« ^Va«— J . ^ r. uJa-» /''■^^ 



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sl4^ U U^ ^ ^ J aiM cJA M^jA 
i^ ^y f ^r ££-^ -' uAu^s oJi4j^ /4c<^ 



607 



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W. 




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/*- 




it's pr ^^H^ Uy^a..^4JL /f ^^>^^d^ 



'r 




\f^'\ 




faaaljy Declassified/Released on J1\m^a^%7 
liider provisions of E.G. 12356 '^J 
. by 3. Recer. NifionsI %fcm\u r^„n.:. 



609 







PadJally De'claSified7Rel£as«d on^L5V,4»i||Jl ' °. ,'l-%,- ^ * ■- ! j" 1 1 /^""^ ri 
t'WprJ\?(sion^' of E.O. 1235f? ' ^ ',' V ** ud%J U « '^ jS-W \^\ )^ \ \ 
by 3. Reger, Nstionai Security Council . . ' • 



82-700 0-88-21 



610 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



J 106 




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NCUSSIFIED f: ,. , 



44 



sL^ ,,-u»4*^-/» LmfU^ 




14^ 



611 



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1^ s^--- J 



v^ ^TZ? w.jy ^ 7^*^^ .^hiL- ^-^ 



wmmm 



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Mmm 



614 



7 ■^'<' 



■he 0"WtOf o< CoiiQi ;nieiiic.""<c 
• oc.vw 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



26 Novanetp 198S 

' C400 



>ie.'iORANOU« FOR: Vict AdmiPil John M. ?oi-atxttr, .S' 
OfOuty Assistant to tn« Prij-.ain: 
for N«t1on«l StCUPUy Affjip? 



SUBJECT 



Prtjidtnti«l Finding on Cradle iis". 



?upsu<nt to our convtrsAtlon tMs snould go ta 
tnt Prtsid«nt for his signtturt «nd snould not 9« 
9<sstd ground m any nands atlow our livil. 



Attacnmtnt: 
As Stated 




CL SY :c:3:ri 
?vu :a:?- 



UNCLASSIF9ED 



•1 rvvoj-ifsj 



® 



: DEPOSITION 

I EXHIBIT 



615 



Finding Pursuant ;3S«e;;on 662 of tha ror«i.qn 
AsiiitAnet Act ot 1961, A8 Afftnda^, ifoncTni.nq 
op«f*eion» UndTfXan av ;n« Ctntral Inc«l.Uq«ne t 
Aq»ncv xn foraiqn Cauner.t». Ctnar 
inf nd«d ioial ' " 



lor zr.9 ?ur20s« 3! 



•.«n 



r^.os* 



40 



: .".Av* 3««n bri«i«d on tn* tffarts b«inq w*(i« by privitt 
P«rtj.as C3 oocam cna c«I««s« of Ari«ri.c«ns n«Id host4o« :.•>. 
ch« Middl* CAst, And h«r«oy find cnAC zi\» following 3p«rt-i = -s 
in foreign counerias (including «1I support n«c«ss«ry ts 
such op«r4tions) ara imporcanc co tn« national sacunty of 
ch« Umtad seatat. Bacauaa of cna axtrama tansicivi:y of 
tnata oparations, in tfta axarcua of tha Praaidant's co-i-i- 
cutional autnoriciaa. t diract cna Oiraecor of Cantral 
Intalliganca not to briaf tna Congraaa o£ th« unitad Statas, 
as providad tor in Saction 501 of t."ia National Sacurity Act 
of I94T, aa amandad, until sucn tirrta aa I may diract otharwis*. 



SC3PS 

Hoataga Raacua 
Middla Caat 



:escription 

Tha proviaion of ••siatanea by tha 
Cantral Intalliganca Kqmncy to 
privata partias m thair attampt to 
obtain tna ralaaaa of Aoaricans 
hald hoataga in tAa Middla Eaat. 
Such aaaiatanca la to ineluda cAa 
proviaion of transportation, 
comaunieations, and othar nacaasary 
aupport. As part of thasa afforts 
cartain foraign natarial and munitior 
nay ba providad to tha Govarnman- 
of Iran' which is talcing staps to 
faeilitata tha ralaasa of tha 
Aaariean hosta^aa. 

All prior actions takan by U.S. 
Gevarnaant officials m furtharanca 
of this affort ara haraby ratifitd. 



Tha whita Housa 
washi.ngtor. , S.C. 

Data: 



^ 0^1'??.'] 



««H:USSIF!£D 



616 



y 



•i— / 



DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



spcfft^-^ 



UmffiED 



cjC J\/o\y€^c 



Nov«fflb«r 20, 1986 



1985 
Jan 



F«b 14: 

Jun 14: 



CHRONOLOGY Of EVgNTSt U.S. -Iran Dlaloqu* 



Micha«l' L«d««n suggested to th« NSC that IsraaU 
contacts may b« useful in obtaining ralcas* ot tha 
U.S. hostagas in Lebanon. Chcrbanifar was 
introduced to Ledeen and the NSC as an Iranian 
intermediary. 

Jeremy Levin escaped. 



Jun 


' L 


Aug 


22: 


Aug 


30: 


Sep 


01: 


Sep 


14: 


Oct 


04: 


Nov 


17-18 


Nov 


24t 



v-^" 



TWA-847 hijacking. Iranian juOtiunsnt oevtcials, 
contacted by Israelis and Ghorbanifar, help in 
obtaining the release of four Aocricans held 
separately from the rest of the hijacked passen- 
gers. Last known instance of Iranian influenced 
group perpetrating terrorism against U.S. nationals. 

Draft NSOO on Iran circulated to principals. 

David Kifflche m«t with Bud Mofarlaa* in Washington. 

508 TOW missiles delivered to Iran from Israel. 



Reverend Benjamin Weir released. 

Islamic Jihad claimed it murdered U.S. hostage 
William Buckley in retaliation for Israeli raids 
in Tunic. 

Separate meetings in London with Ghorbanifar and 
Wait*. 

Israel delivered 18 HAWK missiles to Iran^H 



Dee 0€-0t< Meeting in London with HcFarlane and Ghorbanifar. 

D«c 20: Hostage Location Task Force (HLTF) formed at CIA. 

Dec 22: Ghorbanifar to U.S. for talks with U.S. officials. 

Dec 23: Nir became primary Israeli POC. o^ 



50PJSECRW 

6Vc IaWkf/v^*D * 




^^ 



r. V-a'i- 






TWSeCMg^ 



617 



UN«l>^g({fSEp 



1996 

Jan 17: 
F«b 05-07: 



— ^ r«b 14: 

F«b 19-21: 



Pr««id«nti«l Finding on Iran. 

Ma«ting» in G«n«v« with Nir and Ghorbanifar (CIA 
and NSC) . 

U.S. d«liv«rs 1,000 TOWs to laraal. 

M«<ting«_in London and Frankfurt (Ghorbanifar ^B 



F«b 20-211 
Lata F«b: 
Apr 17: 

Apr 22: 



4f^ ^ 

May 09: 
Hay 15: 



May 22-28: 

Hay 23: 
May 24 1 
May 25-27! 

Jun 10: 



1,000 TOW* d«liv«r«d to Tahran from I«ra«l. 

18 HAvnc missilas raturnad to Xaraal. 

U.S. hostaqa Patar Kilburn murdarad in rataliation 
for U.S. raid on Libya. 

^^[ ^horban ifaj>arra»tad in Switzarland for indabtnaaa 

a'pparCntly relatad to tha FBI ating of arms salat 
/to Iran by privata citizana from tha U.S., 
'^Garmany, and Israal. 

Planning maating at CIA (DDO and NSC parsonnal) . 

Tama of Rafaranca (TOR) approvad for astablishing 
a stratagic dialogua with Iran. U.S. objactivas: 

Cstabliah a corract ralationship with Iran. 
End Iran- Iraq war. 
Raturn U.S. hostagas. 



Maatlngs in London 
Tal Aviv (Nir and Ral 



Cyprus 



and 



U.S. dalivars 50 i TQWa to Israal (raplacamants) 



McFarlana party to Tahran. Soma of tha 240 HAK7 
missila parts accompany tha party. 

Rafsanjani naws confaranca containing possibla 
'signal* that Iran wantad improvad ralations with 
tha U.S. 



Jun 30-Jul 02: Ghorbanifar in U.S. for discussions with CtA and 
NSC. 



TQPStC*B^ ~^ 



IINCCBM 



618 




Jul 26-28t 

Jul 26: 
Aug 03: 

Aug 06: 
Aug 10: 

S«p 19-20: 

S«p 22-23: 
Oct 03: 

Oct 05-07: 
Oct 26-28: 

Oct 29: 

Nov 02: 

Nov 05-07: 

Nov 07: 



M««ting« in Frankfurt (Ghorbanifar , Nir, NSC, and 
CIA) . , 

Father Janco ralaased. 

Ramaindar of 240 HAWK raissila parts dalivarad to 
Tahran. 

Frankfurt maatinga. 

Initial contacts with| 
Madrid and London. 

Discussions in Washington with naw Iranian 
intarmadiary (NSC and CIA) , 

Meetings in London (CXA, NSC with Nir) . 




Frankfurt maatings (CIA, NSC, 



Frankfurt (Mainz) maatings of U.S. and Iranian 
raprasantativas (CIA, NSC. Israeli rap [Nir] ,■ 



500 TOW missiles dalivarad to Iran from Israel. 

David Jaeobsen released. 

Meetings in Geneva with^^^ (NSC and CIA). 

500 TON missiles delivered to Israel 
(replacements) . 



aQ»-sscftrr- 




619 



\t DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



TOP yfcft^ 

JiMi - 



Ui^iiiMMt u 



O.rc i^ec 



/20/86 noo 

(Hittorical Chronology) 



U.S. /IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AJ^ERICAN HOSTAGES 



From '.^m earliest monch-s following the Islamic revolution m 
Iran, t.^.e C . S . Goverr.rent has attempted to reestablish official 
contact with that government in order to discuss strategic 
developments in this critical part of the world and reconstruct a 
worlcing relationship. Even before President Reagan came to 
office the U.S. Govern;nent agreed to try to expand security, 
economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace 
acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, th« U.S. undertook 
three secret- missions to Tehran: 



September 1979 

request of the Iranians) 

October 1979 



(met secretly with Bazargan at the 




October-Novenaer 1979 
normalization of relations) 



(discussed 



When these meetings and the secret November I, 1979 meeting in 

Algiers, between Brzezinslci and Prime Minister Bazargan, became 

public in Iran, they helped precipitate t-.e ta)<eover of the 'J . 5 . 

ETnbassy by radical elements and led to t.-.e resignation of t.-.e 

Bazargan goverrjnent. These events have adversely influenced 
Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact 
with the USG. 

Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal 
relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate 
persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it 
IS notable that only a few ma]or countries do not have relations 
with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and 
the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic 
relations with Iran. 

Iran is th« )c«y to a region of vital importance to the West, yet 
it is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power 
and political influence along its borders and mside its 
territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets 
and their surrogates have moved actively to gain greater 
influence in the Gulf: 

The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have 
an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a 
government in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests 
in the area. |* 



TJpPStCjXT 
DScJ^siT 



fy: 



OADR 



Partial, Deck^Uei/f^i^,^^^ on^^%^l 
JyS.Reger.NctoaJ Security Co.r. 

TOr SECRET 




620 



II 



Uiil«SW.O 



TTfy^ECRgP ^ 



Conununist nations have become the principal arws suppliers 
to Iran -- making Iran dependent on this source of supply i- 
contending with an increasingly strengthened Iraq. This 
leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be 
atterptmg to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is 
by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could 
well encourage a disastrous 'final offensive* by Iran that 
would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran, 
leaving a power vacuun which the Soviets could exploit. 
Specifically, the indicators of Communist influence m'lran 
are: 




The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq 
war has exacerbated Iran's vulnerability to Soviet influence. 
Moreover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan, 
and actual crossborder strikes in Iran from Afghanistan have made 
reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important. 




621 



50Psi?K£T- 




In short, the Soviets were far better positioned to irprove 
significantly their influence in the region m 1985 when we were 
presented with an opportunity to open « dialogue with Iran. in 
deciding to exploit this opening, we evaluated previous efforts 
through more conventional channels whicn had not succeeded. 

About two years ago, senior Iranian officials apparently decided 
that some accommodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1983, 
various countries have been engaged in overtu res to the U.S. and 
Iran in an effort to stimulate direct contact! 



for the 



However, internal splits and debates made it difficult 
rranians to respond to these overtures. 



Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted 
to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran 
or in see)cing Iranian as sistance in the rele ase of our citizens 
held ho! 




In the spring of 1995, a private A/nerican citizen (Michael 
Ledeen) learned from an Israeli government official (David 
Kimche) that the Israelis had established a liaison relationship 
with an Iranian expatriate (Hanuchehr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who 
sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Govern- 
ment. In acltnowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of 
the Iranian officials involved, he (Ghorbanifar) indicated that 
his 'sponsors' in Tehran could also help to resolve the American 
hostage situation in Beirut. 

In June of 1985, in the midst of the TVJA-947 hijacking, the 
Israeli officials in direct contact with the Iranian expatriate 
asked him to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to 
obtain the release of the hijacked passengers. Two days after 
this approach, four Americans held separately from the rest of 
the hijacked p«senqerswerefreedan^tv^ie^ov^^t^Syr i a n 
authorities. iBH^^BI^HHHI^^Bil^HHH^HBHHII^HS "a j 1 ia 
Speaker Rafsanjani, who was travelling in the mid-east at the 
time, and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati both intervened with 
the captors. Rafsanjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for 
the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter. 



622 





At this first meeting, McFarlane went to great length to draw out 
the Israeli as to why he found the Iranian proposal credible, 
given the events of the past six years. The Israeli replied that 
their exhaustive analysis had gone beyond the surface logic 
deriving from the chaos and decline within Iran and the 
degenerative effects of the war, to more concrete tests of the 
willingness of the Iranians to ta)ce personal risks. He noted 
that the Iranians had exposed tnemselves to possible compromise 
by meeting with Israelis and by passing extremely sensitive 
intelligence on the situation (and political line-u^J" within Iran 
-- information which was proven valid. 

i 

The Israeli asked for our positren on opening such' a dialogue. 
No mention was made of any pre-conditions or Iranian priorities. 
M cFarlane conveyed this proposal t o the President (in the 
presence of the Chief ot StatTF ! T?Te^ President said that he 
believed such a dialogue would be worthwhile at least to the 
point of determining the validity of the interlocutors. This 
decision was passed to the Israel i diplomat by telep hone on 
July 3 0. 

On August 2, 199} , the Israeli called again on McFarlane. At 

this meeting, he stated that he had conveyed our position to the 
Iranian intermediary and that the Iranians had responded that 
they recognized the need for both sides to have tangible evidence 
of the bona fidee of the other and that they believed they could 
affect the release of the Americans held hostage in Lebanon. 

According to the Israeli, the Iranians separately stated that 
they were vulnerable as a group and before having any prospect of 
being able to affect change within Iran they would reed to be 
substantially strengthened. To do so, they would need to secure 
the cooperation of military and/or Revolutionary Guard leaders. 
Toward this end, they expressed the view that the most credible 
demonstration of their influence and abilities would be to secure 
limited amounts of U.S. equipment. The Israeli asked for our 
position on such actions. 



top >gB<;g 



Ri2— 




623 




top SBCBFT. 



Mr. McF*rlan« •l«vated this proposition to th« President at a 
meeting within days that included the Secretaries of State and 
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President 
stated that, while he .could understand that assuming the 
legitimacy of t.-.e interlocutors, they would be quite vulnerable 
and ultimately might deserve our support to include tangible 
materiel; at the time, without any first hand experience in 
dealing with them, he coula not authorize any transfers of 
military materiel. This was conveyed to the Israeli. 

On August 22. 1985, the Israeli diplomat called once more to 
report that the' message had been conveyed and that an impasse of 
confidence existed. He astced what the position of the U.S. 
Government would be to an Israeli transfer of modest quantities 
of defensive military materiel. Mcfatlane replied that %o hi^^ 
su^ an action would represent a distinction without « difference. 
The Israeli diplomat explained at great length that Hracl had 
Its own policy interest! that would be served by foetering such a 
dialogue in behalf of the U.S., but that a problem would arise 
when ultimately they needed to replace llwiV ttiippeil ^^ aslced -^ 
whether Israel would be able to purchase -^Blacements for iten« 
they chose to ship. McFarlane stated tJ»«t^h« issue w^ not tA^ 
ability of Israel to purchase military equipfflen^ froa Ote t^. — 
they had done so for a generation and would do »o in the future 
-- but rather the issue was whether it was U.S. policy to ship or 
allow others to ship military equipment to Iran. The Israeli 
aslced for a position from our government. .McFarlane elevated the 
question to the President land to the Secretaries of State and 
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence). The Preside-t 
stated that, while he could envision providing materiel support 
to moderate elements in Iran if all the Western hostages w«re 
freed, he could not approve any transfer of military materiel at 
that time. This position was conveyed to the Israeli diplomat. 

On SepterJDer 14, 1985, Reverend Benjamin ( ^ei r was released in 
Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization. This relea se '■'as 
preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Ter< $ wait e> the 
Special Qnissary of the Archtishop of Canterbury. To this "date , 
Mr. Waxte remains the onl y westerner to ever meet directly with 
the Lebanese kidnappers. ■^■^^^^^■■■^^^■■^^^■■^^■^"^^^■'^^■'^ 



In late September, we learned that the Israelis had transferred 
508 TOW missiles to Iran and that th.is shipment had ta<en place 
m late August. The Israelis told^'/tfs^that they undertooK the 
action, despite our objections, be'»**rse they believed it to be in 
t.heir strategic interests. The Israelis managed this entire 
operation, to include delivery arrangements, funding, and 
transportation. After discussing this matter with the President, 
It was decided not to expose this Israeli delivery because we 



%Q9^TCC9iX~^ 




624 



0NJl5P,SEegTj 



v(EQ£-^gfc^SaL^" 



wanted to retain t.^e option of exploiting the existing Israeli 
channel with Tehran in our own effort to establish a strategic 
dialogue with the Iranian goverament. The total value of -he 509 
TOWs shipped iy Israel was estimated to be less than S2 million. 



'V; 






85, Islamic Jihad announced that i* had "executed" 

hief Williaxn Buckley in retaliation tOtt the 

1 air raid on PLO initallationi in Tunis. This 

to a series of meetings in Europ« among the U.S. 
sraeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In .tNss'e 
anians indicated that, while their ability to 
zballah was waning, the Hizballah had not killed 
in fact died several months earlier at natural 

since substantiated tIU« tnformatiolAbi d«^i«# 
and David Jacobsen, both of whom indicat«^hat 

died on June 3, 1985 ofpfiMufltonia-lik* IpiipioRS. 

, f^<^ In mid-November, the Israelis through a senior officer m the 

Prime Minister's office (Amiram Nir) , indicated that the Government 
of Israel was convinced tnat they were hearing a breakthrough 
with Iran on a high-level dialog^je. The Israeli asked a U.S. 

'..•'V' J of f icial (North) for the name of a European-based airline which 
^^^ could discre^r^A"— iiarsi,t_^to Iran for the purpose of delivering 



On October 4, 19 
Beirut Station C 
October 1 Israel 
announcement led 
(CIA and NSC) , I 
meetings, the Ir 
influence the Hi 
Buckley; he h^d 
causes. We have 
of FattK/E Jenco 
Buckley probably 



•>■ 



-i 



^^assengers and cargo. We were assured, at the time, that t)' 
Israelis were going to"~*Tfy oil drilling parts as an incentive," 
since we had expressed so Tiuch displea sure over the earlier TOW 
shipment. The name the propr ietary|[^^H^^^^^|^m was 
passed to the Israeli, who subsequently had the aircraft 
chartered through normal commercial contract for a flight frosk-^ 
Tel Aviv to Tabriz, Iran, on November 25, 1985. In January ,QVe^"^ 
learned that the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from 
the Iranians, used the aircraft to transport 18 HAWK missiles to 
Iran in an effort t o improve the static air defenses around 
Tehran . The Israelis were unwitting oi the CIA' s involvement m 
the airline and the airline was paid at the normal commercial 
rate (approximately $127,700). The airline personel were also 
unwitting of th« cargo they^5^***i«d . f,lof i.r^i 



^c^3 

The Israeli delivery of HA WX, mi ^ gsiles raised serious U.S. C c_oncern s^ 
that these deliveries wereC^eopTTdizTn^our objective of arranging 
^— a direct meeting with hi gh- level Iranian officials. As a conse- 
v^ quejice of U.S. .X" 1 1 1 a t v7^ and by mutual agreement of all three 



sarties, these missi ies/were subsequently returned 
rary 1986. 



:o Israel in 



On Decemijer 7, the President convened a meeting in the White 
House (residence) to discuss next steps in our efforts to 
establish direct contact with the Iranians. Attending the 



tOB^'^ECRi't— 



625 




reetinq w«re the Chief of Staff, Secretaries of State and 
Cefense, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and t.-.e 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his 
Deputy. r.-.-ediately after the meeting, Mr. .McFarlane departed 
for London to r.eet with t.-.e Israeli official and the Iranian 
contact to make clear the nature of our interest in a dialogue 
with Iran. At this meeting, .Hr . McFarlane, as instructed by the 
President, stated that: 



the U.S. was open to a political dialogue with Iran, but 
that no such dialogue could ma<e progress for as long as 
groups seen as dominated by Iran held U.S. hostages; and 

the U.S. could under no circumstances transfer arms to Iran 
m exchange for hostages. 

These points were made directly to the Iranian interlocutor. The 
Iranian replied that, unless his associates m Tehran were 
strengthened, they could not risic going ahead with the dialogue. 
Mr. .McFarlane aocnowledged the position but stated we could not / 
change our position. In a separate meeting with the Israeli 7 
official, .Mr. McFarlane made clear our strong ob]ections to the ' 
Israeli shipment of the TOW missiles. Following these meetings, 
MX. McFarlane returned to Washington and s-.ortly thereafter left 
active govern.r',ent service. 



On January 2, the Prime Minister of Israel dispatched a special 
emissary to the U.S. (Amiram Nir) to review proposals for next 
steps in dealing with Iran. The Israelis urged that we reconsid 
the issue of providing limited defensive arms to those attemptin 
to taice power in Tehran, since all other incentives (economic 
assistance, medical supplies, machine parts) were of no value i.i 
shoring-up those who wanted an opening to the West. Ad.miral 
Pomdexter noted our sjringent obiections to the HAWX missile 
shipments m November and noted that the U.S. would have to act 
to have tnem returned (a step undertaken m February, when all 
' 1 3 jnissi les were returned to Isra*.,. In that any implementatic 
of the Israeli proposals would require the active participation 
of the intelligence community, the NSC Staff (North) was tasked 
tojirepar* a covert action finding. Work on this Presidential 
finding commenced on January 4. 

On January 6, the President, the Vice President, the Chief of 
Staff, and the National Security Advisor and his assistant 
reviewed the first draft of the Finding and the recomj-endat ic.-.s 
made by the Prime Minister of Israel through his special 
emissary. 

On January 7, the President met in the Oval Office with the vice 
President, the Chief of Staff, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, 
Attorney General Meese, Director Casey, and the National Security 



er // ; 
1 



_J 



tg^^^sibftgr ^ 



626 



ouIim65IEI^ 



TQ^ sKuyg ^-^ 



Advisor to discuss th* overall 
for « strategic dialogue. It 
on return from his trip to Lon 
further action be taken unless 
by which the U.S. could exert 
agreed, m principle, with Dir 
quantities of defensive artns a 
still had merit. Both Secret! 
objected to any provision of a 
sure that these would really h 
exposed, the project would not 
and would be. seen as contraven 
states that support terrorism, 
should attempt to keep the Isr 
offered possibilities for meet 
officials and left open the is 
Iran if all the hostages were 



situation in Iran and prospects 
was again noted that Mx . McFarlare, 
don, had recommended that no 

a mechanism could be established 
better control over events. He 
ector Casey that providing limited 
f ter the hostages were released 
ry Shultz and Secretary Weinberger 
rms , citing that we could not be 
elp moderate elements and that, if 

be understood by moderate Axabs 
mg our policy of not dealing with 

The President decided that we 
aeli channel active as long as it 
ings with high-level Iranian 
sue of providing defensive arms to 
released. 



It was further determined by the President that any dialogue with 
the Iranians must be aimed at achieving the following goals: 

Cevismg a formula for re-establishing a strategic 
relationship with Tehran. 

Ending the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms. 

Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and 
radical subversion. 

Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and 
coordinating ways in which we might counter Soviet 
activities m the region. 

The President made clear that a western dialogue with Iran would 
be precluded unless Iran were willing to use its influence to 
achieve the release of Western hostages m Beirut. He also :^ade 
clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms tzz 
hostages. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger retained their 
original position on providing any amrs to Iran, but Attorney 
General Haesc and Director Casey both supported the concept as a 
valid m«ans of opening the dialogue. Attorney General .Meese 
noted a 1981 determination by then Attorney General French Smth 
that transferring small quantities of arms through third 
countries under a Covert Action Finding was not illegal. 



627 



/f^^-WCTgT -w 




On January 16, « meeting w*» held in the National Security 
Advisor'i office with Secretary Weinberger, Attorney General 
Meese, Director Casey, and CIA General Counsel Stanley Spor«in. 
At this meeting, tne final draft of the Covert Action Finding was 
reviewed and was forwarded to the President with Secretary 
Weinberger dissenting. 

On January 17, 1996, the President approved a Covert Action 
Finding (Tab A) directing that the intelligence community proceed 
with special activities aimed at accomplishing the goals set 




of Central Intelligence refrain from reporting the Finding to the 
appropriate comnittees of the Congress until reasonably sure that 
those involved would no longer be m jeopardy. _ ^ -• 

On February 5-7, U.S. officials (NSC a4|l CIAHH^Hp, a 
representative of the Israeli Prime Ministry (Amra^wlr) , and a 

senior-le vel Iranian of f icial^ ^*^^™^"^^^^'^"^^^^^"'^"""^^^^^^™ 

^.et m London. At this meeting, the Iranians agreec 

that"^ n^the CSG would provide defensive weapons (TOWs) to Iran, 
they would, m turn, provide same to the Afghan Mu]ahideen. The 
U.S. side agreed to explore this possibility and, wor)ting with 
the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of 
the weapons: 

The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar I would deposit funds 
in an Israeli account. 

The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile 0' . S . - 
controlled account m an overseas banlc. 

Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain materiel 
authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and 
transport this to Israel for onward movement to Iran. 

Using the procedures stipulated above, S3. 7 million was deposited 
in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on 
February 14, 1,000 TOWs were transported to Israel for pre-?ositi.c 
ing. These TOWs were transferred by CIA from DOD (U^S^^Ar-" 
^oclcsinAnr^ston, Alabama) and tran sported throu gh^^"™ 
I^^Bimm u s 1 n g CIA-OOClHmBH^BI 1 :9^5^ 1 .-^ 

arrangements. Policy-level coordination for these arrangements 
was effected by NSC (North) with DOD (Armitage) and CIA (Clair 
George). The TOWs were placed in a covert Israeli facility 
awaiting onward shipment. 

Tt>tk,SSClCrf'"^^ 



628 




"fOP^tj 



10 



On February 19-21, U.S. (NSC and CIAI , I»r««li. and Iranian 
officials met in Germany to discuss problems m arranging a 
meeting among higher-level off icials... At this meeting, th« 

Iranians commi tte e _^_^__ 

__ After coded authorization 

was received from Washington, the O.S. side agreed to provide 
1,000 T«Ws to Iran as a clear signal of U.5. sincerity. This 
delivery wes conunenced on the ftorning of February 2ft- and 
completed in two transits to Tehran on February 21.*Trans- 
portation from Israel to Iran was aboard a false flag Israeli 
aircraft. 



On February 24, U.S. (CIA and NSC) officials met rfgain m 
Franitfurt with the Israeli and Iranian officials to discuss next 
steps. At this meeting, the U.S. side urged that the Iranians 
expedite a meeting among higher-level officials on both sides. 

Cn February 28, the Prime Minister of Israel wrote to President 
Reagan (Tab 3) urging continued efforts to achieve a strategic 
breakthrough with Iran, but eslLing consideration for the safety 
of recently seized Israeli hostages. ,3? 

On March 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives xet 
with the Iranian intermediary m Pans to determine whether any 
further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level 
meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these reet.rqs, 
the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation 
in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military 
effect iveness . 

The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 
strilce, prevented further dialogue from taJ^ing place until the 
Iranians urged the intermediary (Ghorbanif ar) to accelerate the 
effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate 
advised us through the Israeli point-of-contact that the 
leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue 



ros^^^^c^s^ 




629 



TOP SECatT 




with th« Unit«d States along the lines of our established goals. 
We believe chat the Iranians were stimulated to renew th e contact 




The Iranian expatriate told the NSC and CIA officers, who met 
with him in Europe at the end of April, that the Iranians did not 
wish to be accused o f any culpability in Kilburn'i death. 




On May 6, 7, 1986, U.S. and Israeli officers met in London with 
the Iranian intermediary m which he urged that we ta)te immediate 
steps to arrange for a high-level U.S. /Iranian meeting in Tehran. 
During the London meeting, the Iranian urged that we (U.S. and 
Israel) take immediate steps to help with Iranian air defense. 
He emphasized that the Iraqi Air Force was increasingly effective 
of late and that the Iranians were desperate to stop attacks on 
population centers. The Israelis also used this opportunity to 
privately ask the U.S. to replace the 503 TOWs which they had 
sent to Iran m August, 1985. The Israelis were informed via 
coded message on May IS that the U.S. had agreed to the Iranian 
request for limited anti-air defense equipment and to replenish 
the 508 TOWs sent by Israel. 

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with 
top-level Iranian officials, on May 15, the President authorized 
a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor 
.McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, CIA communicators, 
memisers of the NSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocu- 
tors. 

On May 16, th« Iranians, through the Israelis provided S6.5M for 
deposit in the CIA secure funding mechanism. The funds were used 
to acquire 508 TOW missiles (for replenishing the TOWs Israel 
shipped in September 1985) and acquiring HAWX missile ^^e^^^^c 
spare parts. This material was subsequently moved to|B|^|B 
^^^H repackaged and shipped to Kelly AFB for onward :nover^ent to 
^ra^ on May 22. A» in the February shipment, the CIA provided 
logistics support for the movement of this materiel to Israel. 

In order to ensure operational security, the McFarlane trip was 
made from Israel, coincident with the delivery of a pallet of 
spare parts for Iranian defensive weapons systems (HAWX spare 







630 



*^'.TOP 



NTOy .-MgfJT ^ 12 



electronic parts). At the spe^^^c request of the Iranians, 
alias foreign documentation jim^Hf -- obtained from tne CIA -- 
was used. CIA also providec^covert '.ransportation support from 
CONUS to Israel for the McFarlane party. The group was 
transported from Israel to Tehran aboard an Israeli Air Force 70? 
with false flag maricings. 

In the course of the four-day (May 25-29) visit, lengthy meetings 
were held with high-level Iranian officials, the first direct 
contact between the two governments m over six years. Kr. 
McFarlane and his tean were able to establish the basis for a 
continuing relationship and clearly articulate our ob]ectives, 
concerns, and intentions. The group was also able to assess 
first hand the internal political dynamic in Tehran and the 
effect of the war which Iran clearly can no longer win. Using 
Presidentially approved Terms of Reference (Tab B) , which had 
been reviewed and approved by appropriate Cabinet officers, 
McFarlane emphasized that our interest in Iran transcended the 
hostages, but the continued detention of hostages by a Lebanese 
group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. 
During the visit, Mr. McFarlane made clear: 

that w« fundamental lya|ppposed Iranian efforts to expel us 
from the Middle East; 

that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism; 

that we accepted their revolution and did not seek to 
reverse it; 

that we had numerous other disagreements involving regional 
policies (i.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but might also 
find areas of common interest (i.e., Afghanistan and the 
Soviet threat to the Gulf) through dialogue. 

During these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail 
th« obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between 
the two countries. In addition to the points noted above, Mr. 
McFarlane emphasized the political problems caused by Iranian 
involvement in the hostage issue. The Iranians objected to the 
use embargo on U.S. military supplies already paid for plus the 
continued USG bloclcing of Iranian assets in the U.S., even after 
U.S. courts had ruled in their favor. During the course of these 
meetings, the Iranian officials admitted that they could not win 
th« war, but were in a dilemma in Tehran over how to end the 
conflict given the need to present an Iranian "victory' before it 
could be concluded. They emphasiied that the original aggressor, 
Saddam Hussein, must be removed from power m order for the war 



UNMSKSn 



631 



^^ ^EQE^^^tc^SX^ "-^ 




to «nd. Mr. Mcr«rlan« concluded the vint by summarizing that 
notwithstanding Iranian interest in carrying on with the dialogue 
we could not proceed w-ith further discussions in light of their 
unwillingness to exert the full weight of their influence to 
cause the release of the western hostages in Lebanon. 

On June 10, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made 
guarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with 
the U.S. On July 26, Father Lawrence Jenco was released in the 
Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint. 

On August 3, the remaining three pallets (less than ^ planeload) 
of electronic parts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses (HAWX 
missile sub-components! arrived m Tehran. As in all flights 
to/ from Iran this delivery was made with «n Israeli Air Force 
aircraft (707) uiing false flag markifl^g.^^taing of the delivery 
was based on coordination among U.S., Israeli and Iranian 
officials. 

In early August 1986, the contact with the Iranian expatriate 
began to focus exclusively on the willingness of the USG to 
provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for hostages and 
we sought to establish different channels of communication which 
would lead us more directly to pragmatic and moderate elenents m 
the Iranian hierarachy. In mid-August, a private American 
citizen (MGEN Richard Secord, USAf (Ret.;) acting within the 
purview of th^Janu^^Cove^^Action Finding, madecontact in 
Europe with ^HH||m^B|Hmi|^a relative mH^Bof a 
senior Iranian oC^cial (Raf sanjani) . With the assistance of the 
CIA, this IranianmHl^p/as brought covertly to Washington for 
detailed discussion^^^we judged this effort to be useful in 
establishing contact with a close confidant of the man judged to 
be the most influential and pragmatic political figure m Iran 
(Raf sanjani) . These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives 
of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran, we also 
provided assessments designed to discourage an Iranian offensive 
and contribute to an Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the 
war. Th« assessments also detailed the Soviet threat to Iran. 

Through August, September, and October 1986, numerous additional 
meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the 
new Iranian contacts. During the October 26, 1996 meeting in 
Frankfurt, Germany, the U.S. side, as in the past, insisted that 
the release ofthehostaqes was a pre-requisite to any progress. 
The Iranian, I^^IBI^H^^H urged th at we take a more active role 
support for the Afghan resistanceP 



632 



(••/ 



tof ^zfalx l 



iJi J ^:*:^flf= 



f8PsM9 



14 



The Iranians aiso proffarad, and tha U. S. accaptad, tha offer of 
a Soviat T-72 tank^HJ^^^H^Bi^HIB '^^* Iranians have also 
offered to provide^^cop^oftha 400 "page inter rogati on of Beirut 
Station Chief Willum Bucltley. *" " ^^^~ 



At this meeting 



stated that 



there was a "very good chance that another American or two would 
1 soon.* On October 29, with U.S. acquiscence, Israel 

provided Iran with -- --■'«• ••*«-«i i«-— ^ — - -« j-« 

(500 TOW missiles) 



be freed «>./vfii. y^n ww^wwv^ *'» —*!>.■ w..«. «w^uxsv.d<^«# ^s^avi 
ided Iran with an additional increment of defensive weapons 



Late on October 31 .^pB^^^^HH^^^HB called the U.S. 
(Hakira) tasked to maintain contact and advised ttjiat Iran had 
'exercised its influence with the Lebanese* in o<4er ^^obtain 
the release of «n American — Oavld Jacobsen — and an vincertain 
number of French hostages. He further iloted^ that this wo»M be 
part of the purpose of the Iranian Pq^eign Mlnister'a vi»i t tc 
Syria — an eiiant we became aware of oa Mveaber 1, l!^6.' 
stated that the situation in Tehran, a s well a«. Irwiian in Cluenee 
over Hizballah were both deteriorati 



On November 

2, David Jacobsen was released by his captora near ^thm old 
American—Embassy compound in West Beirut. 4l> U.S. Eabasi^ in 
East Beirut immediately dispatched aa embassy oflficer to^rast 
Beirut to pick up Mr. Jacobsen. 



It is now apparent that persistent U.S. efforts to establish 
contact with Iran and subsequent public speculation regarding 
these contacts have probably exacerbated the power struggle in 
Iran between pragmatic elements (led by Rafsanjani) and more 
radical factions (under the overall sponsorship of Ayatollah 
Montazeri) . In late October, radical supporters (of Montazeri) 
revealed the (Rafsenjani) contact with the USG and the terns of 
the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of 
colluding with tlw USG and to preserve a degree of latitude for 
both parties, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani provided a purposely 
distorted version of ^he Hay 1986 HcFarlane mission in his 
Ncveiaber 4 address to the masses. Moderate Iranian political 
leaders apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal 
political problems before proceeding with the U.S. relationship. 
The revelations in Tehran regarding the Mcfarlane mission are 
demonstrable evidence of the internal power struggle. The 
October 1986 arrest of radical leader Mehdi Hashemi, a close 
confidant and son in-law of Ayatollah Montezari, for acts of 
terrorism and treason has caused further internal conflict. 

Resolution of the Lebanon hostage situation is also complicated 
by waning Iranian influence in Lebanon due in part to financial 
constraints and the fact that the Libyans are expanding their 



^m^m 



633 



wmmm 



IS 



:ts with more radical Hizballah alcman 




On Nov«mb«r 7, th« day aftar a m««ting with ^."^of f icials, 
Iranian govarmncnt authorities arrested six other individuals 
involved in radical activities. Aaong the two were senior 
military officers and a Ma]lis deputy (Ahnad Kashani) , the 
grandson of Ayatollah Kashani, a conspirator in the 1949 attempt 
against the Shah. 

Despite these internal difficulties flM attenduit-pUBlicity CH 
the Western media, the Iranians continue to maWtain dilvct 
contact with the USG and met again in GeneM |- on No^ftmber 9-10^, 

representatives. |B|H^HHiHHHIB^MHHii 

P( the two principal Ir«aliui contacts 




Both ^Bimil^mH have warned that further 
risclosures could harm them personally and the longer-term 
interests of the two countries. 

It is important to note that since the initiation of the USG 
contact with Iran there has been no evidence of Iranian govern- 
ment complicity in acts of terrorism against the U.S. We do not 
know who seized the last three American hostages in Beirut 

(Messrs. Reed, Cicippio, and Tracy). The Islamic Jihad 
Organization (IJO> has di_iclaimed res ponsibi lity -- as have qui 

Iranian interlocutors. 



■■■■■■■{■■(■■^^■H^l IS possible 
TSe^can^Jerekidnappedatthe direction of Iranian radicals 



km^s^ 



634 



^SpJSgffHi 



^P yg€bMt7 " . 16 



loyal to th« now imprisoned M«hdi Hasheni. If so, this could be 
«n effort to undermine the nascent U.S. -Iranian strategic 
dialogue and exacerbate' the internal Iranian power struggle 
against the pragmatic faction with which we have been in contact. 

Throughout this process, the USG has acted withm the limits of 
established policy and in compliance with all U.S. law. The 
shipment of 2,008 U.S. TOWs and 235 HAWK missile electronic spare 
parts was undertaken withm the provisions of a Covert Action 
Finding. 

During the course of this operation — and before — the U.S. was 
cognizant of only three shipments from Israel to Iran. 
Specifically: 

The Israelis acknowledged the August 198S shipment of 508 
TOWs after it had taken place. Until we were advised by the 
Israelis, and had the information subsequently confirmed by 
Iranian authorities, we were unaware of the composition of 
the shipment, we subsequently agreed to replace these TOtit 
in May of 1986. 

The November 1985 shipment of 18 Israeli HAWK missiles was 
not an authorized exception to policy. This shipment was 
retrieved m February 1986 as a consequence of U.S. 
intervention. 

The October 1986 shipment of 500 TOWs from Israel to Iran 
was undertaken with U.S. acquiescence. These TOWs were 
replaced on November 7. 

In support of this Finding and at the direction of the President, 
the CIA provided the following operational assistance: 

CIA communications officers and an annuitant to assist in 
various phases of the operation. 

Sterile overseas bank accounts for financial transactions. 

A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S. 
military items from the U.S. 

Transhipment of military items from the U.S. to Israel. 

Communications and intelligence support for the meetings 
with Iranian officials and the McFarlane trip to Tehran in 
May. 



TOPSEjCR^l 



635 



cor-aecKg^ — 




Cleared neeting sites in Europ* for meetings with Iranian 

officials. 

Fabricated and alias documentation for U.S. and foreign 
officials for meetings in Europe and Tehran. 

The weapons and materiel provided under this program were judged 
to be inadequate to alter either the balance of military power or 
the outcome of the war with Iraq. They have, however, demonstrated 
the U.S. commitment to Iranian territorial integrity and served 
to support those in Iran interested in opening « strategic 
relationship with the U.S. U.S. efforts over the last 18 months 
have had tangible results on Iranian policy: 

The Raf san]ani/Velayati intervention on behalf of the TVA 
1847 passengers (June 198S) . 

Iranian direction that the hijacked Pan Am #73 would not be 
received m Iranian territory if it left Karachi. 




The release of three American and at least two French 
hostages. 

The initiation of an Iranian dialogue with their regional 
neighbors. 

Continued delay in the Iranian "final offensive." 

Finally, it must also be noted that the U.S. arms embargo 
notwithstanding. West European nations have provided S500 million 
a year in military equipment to Iran. Most of these transfers 
were accomplished with government knowledge and/or acquiescence. 

All appropriate Cabinet Officers have been apprised throughout. 
The Congress was not briefed on the covert action Finding due to 
the extraordinary sensitivity of our Iranian contacts and the 
potential consequences for our strategic position in Southwest 
Asia. Finally, our efforts to achieve the release of the 
hostages in Lebanon must continue to rely on discreet contacts 
and intermediaries who cannot perform if they are revealed. 



636 



>> i^3(i_ 



OLCS 



: DEPOSITION 

I EXHIBIT 



iif''^tmm 



SUMMARY CHRONOLOGY OF ARMS SALES TO IRAN 



1. September of 1985: United States acquiesced in Israel's 
shipment of 508 TOWS to Iran. (These arms were apparently 
shipped at the end of August). 

2. September 14, 1985: Benjamin Weir released. 

3. November of 1985: Israel sent 18 basic HAWK missiles to Iran. 
These missiles were subsequently returned to Israel in February, 
1986. 

4. February of 1986: CIA using money from Iran bought 1000 TOWS 
from the Department of Defense. These missiles were sent via 
Israel to Iran. 

5. May 15, 1986: McFarlane, accompanied by HAWK missile spare 
parts, goes to Iran. 

6. July 26, 1986: Father Lawrence Jenco released. 

7. August 3, 1986: three pallets (less than S planeload of HA'--x 
parts) delivered to Iran. 

8. October 29, 1986: United States acquiesced in shipment of 
500 TOWS by Israel to Iran. 

9. October 31, 1986: David Jacobsen was released. 



xV" 




bNOLASSIF:tD 



637 






Jun 




Auf 


22 


Au9 


30 


5«p 


01 


S«p 


14 


Oct 


04 



"^ifflim 



^C -.c- %C 



Nov«ab«r 20, ltt( 



CHUOWOtOCt Of tVPfTSi U.».-Ir«n DUloqu« 



DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



Mtch*«l Ladaan suqqcitad to tha NSC thac Iirtalt 
contact! nay ba viaaful In obtalnlnq ralaaaa of tha 
U.S. heataqaa Ln Labanon. ChorbanKar waa 
Introducad to Ladaan and tha NSC ai an Iranian 
IntanMdiary . 

Jaraaiy Lav in aaeapad. « ^ 

TMA-I4'> hijacklnq. Iranian qovarnawnt oCflclala, 
contactad by laraalla and ShorbanKar, halp In 
obtaining tha ralaaaa of (our Aiaarlcana hald 
•aparataly Iron tha ratt of tha hljackad patian- 
(jara. Last known Inatanca of Iranian Influancad 
9roup parpatratlnf tarrorlaa aqainat U.S. national!. 



Nov 24i 



Draft NSOO on Iran ctifVtacM to BrinciB^a. •^■' 
Oavld Rlacha nat with Bud Hefarlan* in Waihijaton. 
sot TON Blaailaa dalivarad to Iran (roa laraal. 



Ravarand Banjaain Wair ralaaaad. 

lalamlc Jihad clalaad It murdarad U.S. hoataqa 
williaa lucklay in ratallatlon Cor laraall raids 
in Tunia. 

Saparata maatlnqa in l«ndon with Ghorbanifar and 
Haita. 

Iiraal dallvarad II hawk aissilaa to Iran^^^V 



Dae 0i-0(i Haatinq In London with HcFarlana and ShorbanKar. 
Oac 20 1 Hoataqa Location Task rorca tHLTT) (ormad at CIA. 
Oae 22: Ghorbanifar to U.S. (or taika with U.S. o((iclala. 



Oac 2]i 



Nir bacaaa primary laraali POC. 



^^ OA.. y)((fls|SSIFeEi) 



i 



'.\> 



638 



■^/t^nj^ 



"mi 






Jan 


I7i 




r*b 


05- 


•07t 


r«b 


14i 




r«b 


19- 


•21. 


r«b 


20- 


■21i 


Lata 


1 rabi 


Apr 


17, 





Apr 22i 



Hay 09: 
nay ISi 



Hay 22-29: 

Hay 23 I 

Hay 24 t 

Hay 25-27. 

Jun 10: 



i)rji!f.;« 



Praaidantial rindlnf on Iran. 



Maatlnqt In Canava with Nlr and Ghorbanifar ICtA 
and NSC) . 



U.S. dallvara 1,000 TOWa to taraal. 

In London and Frankfurt (ChorbaniCarl 



1,000 TOWa dallvarad to Tahran (roa Uraal. 

II HANK Bliallaa raturnad to Iiraal. 

U.S. hoataq* Patar Kllburn aurdarad in ratallation 
for U.S. raid on Libya. 

Chorbanifar arrattad in Swltxarland for Indabtnasa 
apparantly ralstad to tha rtl atinq of ariaa aalaa 
to Iran by privata cititana froa tha U.S., 
Carnany , and laraal. 

Planning naatinq at CIA (DOO and NSC partonnall . 

Tarma of Rataranca (TORI approv e d for astabtTshinf 
a atrataqic dialogua with Iran. U.S. ob]activaai 

Cstabliah a corract raiationthip with Iran. 
End Iran-Iraq war. 
Raturn U.S. hoatagaa. 



Hcatinqi in London^^l 
Tal Aviv (Nir and Rabin 



and 



Cyprua ^ 

U.S. dallvara 501 TOWa to laraal (raplacaaanta) . 



HcFarlana party to Tahran. Soma of tha 240 HANK 
miaaila parta accoapany tha party. 

Pafaanjani nawa confaranca containing postlbla 
'liqnal* that Iran wantad improvad ralationa with 
tha U.S. 



Jun }a-Jul 02i ChorbanKar in U.S. for diacuaaiona with CIA and 

NSC. 



t'oyrgcyr 



UNOLiSFSlFIED 



I- 



639 



Tpy >tcTtrf ^ 



Oh 



5'^ J 

■I i--:if 



Jul 


2(-2li 


Jul 


lit 


Au« 


OJi 


Auq 


0<i 


Auq 


lOi 


S«p 


19-201 


S«p 


22-ni 


Oct 


03i 


Oct 


05-07! 


Oct 


2<-2t: 


Oct 


29i 


Nov 


02: 


Nov 


05-071 


Now 


07: 



Mcttlnqi In rrtnkfurt IChorbanlftr , Nlr, NSC, 4nd 
CIA) . 



rathar Janeo calaaiad. 



Ramaindar of 240 HAW aiialla parta dallvarad to 
Tahran. 



rrankCuit maatinqa. 



Olseuailona In Wathinqton with nav Iranian 
IntariMdlary INSC and CIA) . 



Maatlnqt In London (CIA, NSC with Nlr) . 




Frankfurt maatlnqa (CIA, NSC, 



Frankfurt IHalnt) maatlnqa of U.S. and Iranian 
reoraiancativaa (CIA, NSC, laraall rap |Nlrl,| 



500 TOW miiallaa dallvarad to Iran (roa laraa] 

David Jacobian ralaaaad. 

Maatlnqa In Canava withf^^^f (NSC and CIA). 

500 T0« mlaallaa dallvarad to laraal 
(raplacamanta) . 



vibr sv^laK 



t<«sfe 



. -t 



640 



OLCS 



1985 
Jan 



F«b 14: 

Jun 14 i 



Jun 






Aug 


22: 




Aug 


30: 




Sep 


01: 




S«p 


14: 




Oct 


04: 




Nov 


17- 


18 


Nov 


24t 




D«C 


06- 


08 


D«C 


20: 




0«c 


22 




0«c 


23 







i\-iJ ^* 



CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS: U.S. -Iran Di 



Z c 'it ^V6 



Nov«mb«r 20, 198$ 



- OEPOSITION" 
EXHIBIT 

'21 Jt 



Michael Ladacn suggested to the NSC thet Israeli. 
contacts may be useful in obtaining release of the 
U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Chorbanifer was 
introduced to Ledeen and the NSC as an Iranian 
intermediary. 

Jeremy Levin escaped. 

TWA-847 hijacJcing. Iranian government officials, 
contacted by Israelis and Ghorbanifar, help in 
obtaining the release of four Americans held 
separately from the rest of the hijacked passen- 
gers. Last known instance of Iranian influenced 
group perpetrating terrorism against U.S. nationals. 

Draft NSDO on Iran circulated to principals. 

David Kimche met with Bud McFarlana in Washington. 

SOS TOW missiles delivered to Iran from Israel. 




Reverend Benjamin Weir released. 

Islamic Jihad claimed it murdered U.S. hostage 
William Buckley in retaliation for Israeli raids 
in Tunis. 

Separate meetings in London with Ghorbanifar and 
Wait*. 

Israeld* live red \% HAWK missiles to Iran^^^V 



Meeting in London with McFarlane and Ghorbanifar. 
Hostage Location Task Force (HLTF) formed at CIA. 
Ghorbanifar to U.S. for talks with U.S. officials. 
Nir became primary Israeli POC. ~ 



a 



\i^ ) 



[OPSJECRET 
5icT4iiI?X»- 0*^" 



UMHA^KIED 



p(^ 



f^?7 



641 



^watssinea 



SUBJECTi CIA Airlin* Involvcmtnc 



In latt Nov«ab«r I98S< t CIA p(op:i«cacy airline was 
chartered to carry cargo to Iran at th« NSC ' s taquest. Tha 
cargo was described to us as oil drilling spare parts. 
Although we did not know it at the time, the cargo was actually 
la Hawk missies. The chronolgy of the incident is as follows: 

I On 22 November>9fl5 ^o^the NSC contacted the Agency with an 
urgent request ^^g^ fi^ e ir am e u f a discreet, reliable airline 
that could transport bulky oil-drilling parts to in unspecified 
destination in the Hiddle East. 

We offered the na.-ne of the CIA's proprietary airline as a 
company which could handle the NSC request. The NSC passed the 
name of our airline to I' l ii i -lrf-- r t ia rj nrh th e In i m in i i 

In the interim, we contacted our airline and told the* that 
they would be receiving an urgent, legitimate charter request. 
The NSC intermediary contacted the airline that evening (22 
Novem^^^^^j^jj^e^ar f angements for the airline to pick-up the 
parts 



The dest mat ion 
"1 Ine '1 Boeing 



'as^^ang 
s/ar r i ved 



anged to Tel Aviv anit tw< 
1 ved 
d ont 
d bj^^Nov 

rSfo^^w 



, 707 ■ s/ar r 1 ved in Tel Aviv 23 November. The 
cargo was ultimately loaded onto only one of the aircraft, 
Loading was completed b^^^November and the airc^^^pyceeded 

Iran via stop ^ <flH|^^^|a "^ then over f ly In^mBj^H A t 
the SSC's request. an^fortW protection of our a^^^^^^ we 
helped arrange for the overflight clearances. 

To the best of out knowledge ,, the i n t i itwe ^ta ty J id neit kv \ w 
that ttiejr was dealing with a CIA proprietary, nor, d vd, f.V''.^' kC^ ^- 
personnel know what they were carrying, ue^ H* f*T nii i n * eT~ f rrr^ 
out that our airline had hauled Hawk missies into Iran until 
mid-January when we were told by the Iranians. 

The alclina was paid^the normal commercial rate which 
amounted to approilma tely $127,700. I should stress that the 
airline does « considerable amount of normal business in 
addition to Its support to CIA. It had, in fact, made aiv<w y'^-iU H U> 

^ iq L 1 1 m itc flight into Tehran carrying commercial items prior 
to the 22-25 November incident. 

Senior CIA management found out about the flight on 25 
F ebg u afry . Although we did not know the nature of the cargo, -e 
thought that any future support of this type to the NSC would 
require a Finding. 



lji&^ 






EO.. 



■^^ 



t 



M' 



642 



T^>~&gCy£T 




I98< 
Jan 17s 

F«b 05-07; 

F«b 14 3 
F«b 19-211 

F«b 20-21: 
Lat* F«bi 
Apr 17: 

Apr 22: 

May 09: 
Hay 15: 



May 22-28: 

May 23: 

Hay 24t 

May 25-27J 

Jun 10: 

Jun 30-Jul 02; 

fOP StCRET 



Presidential Finding on Iran. 

r;rNsl?/" ^•"""* "''' ""^ -"^ Chorban.far (CIA 
U.S. daliveri 1,000 TOWa to Ifra«l. 
j^^^a^ London and Franlcfurt (Ghorbanifar |^» 

1,000 TOW, d.liv.rad to Tahran from Uraal. 
18 HAWK misailas raturnad to Israal. 

?o?-c;'l";2!d';n'"[i;ji'"" ""''•"" ^" r.taliat.on 

fn^IrflJif" "rast.d in Switiarland for indebtnas. 
to^Tr!ri^ '*^^'^ ^° ^''•^I 'ting of arms sal.. 
to Iran by privata citiiana frtta tha u^., 
Garmany, and Isra.l, " 

Planning m.€ting at CIA (DDO and NSC parsonnel). 

I'^TrJL'^*'!''*?*'' ''^°'" approvad for establishing 
a strategic dialogae with Iran. U.S. obiectives: 

Establish a correct relationship with Iran. 
End Iran-Iraq war. 
Return U.S. hostage.. 



Meetings in London 
Tel Aviv (Nir and 



Cyprus 



and 



U.S. delivers 508 TOW. to Israel (replacements) 



McFarlane party to Tehran. Some of the 240 hawk 
missile part, accompany the party. 

Rafsanjani news conference containing possible 
"signal" that Iran wanted improved relations witH 
the U.S. 

Ghorbanifar in U.S. for discussions with CIA and 
NSC. 



iiNi]|^(^^«JtE^!) 



^^P-SECjlET 



643 



i| 1 



Jul 26-3tt 

Jul 26: 
Aug 03 i 

Aug 6 : 
Aug 10: 

S«p 19-20: 

Sep 22-23: 

Oct 03: 

Oct 05-07: 
Oct 26-28: 

Oct 29: 

Nov 02: 

Nov 05-07: 

Nov 07: 



M««ting« in Frankfurt (Ghorb«nif*r , Nir, NSC, «nd 
CIAI . 

fathvr J«nco released. 

Remainder of 240 HAWK mitiile parts delivered to 
Tehran. 

Frankfurt meetings. 

Initial contacts with] 
Madrid and London. 

Discussions in Washington with new Iranian 
intermediary (NSC and CIA) • 

Meetings in London (CIA, NSC with Nir). 

Whit e House ap proves provisio n of int elligence to 
Iran 




Frankfurt meetings (CIA, NSC, 



Frankfurt (Mainz) meetings of U.S. and Iranian 
representatives (CIA, NSC, Israeli rep INir|,fl 



500 TOW missiles delivered to Iran from Israel. 

David Jacobsen released. 

Meetings in Geneva with ^^^|^f (NSC and CIA). 

500 TOW missiles delivered to Israel 
(replacements) . 



tQg_-SJCiteT 



»Mie 



644 



z 

Oi- 



T 






1985 
Spring I 

fab 14: 

Jun 14: 



Jun 


: 


Jul 


03: 


Au9 


02: 


Late 


Aug: 


Aug 


30i 


Sep 


01: 


Sep 


14; 


Oct 


04: 


Nov 


17-18: 


Nov 


25: 


Dec 


06-081 


Dec 


07i 


Dec 


20: 


Dec 


22: 


Dec 


23: 


TOP 


SECR£T 



CHRONOLOGY Of EVENTS t U.S. -Iran Dlilogue - 



11/20/86 1930 



Michael Ledeen suggested to the NSC that Israeli 
contacts may be useful In obtaining release of the 
U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Ghorbanifar was introduced 
to Ledeen and the NSC as an Iranian intermediary. 

Jeremy Levin escaped. 

TWA-847 hijacking. Iranian government officials, 
contacted by» Israelis and Ghorbanifar, help in 
obtaining the release of four Americans held 
separately from the rest of the hijacked passen- 
gers. Last known instance of Iranian influenced 
group perpetrating terrorism against U.S. nationals. 

Draft NSDO on Iran circulated to principala. 

David Kimche met with Bud McFarlane in Washington. 

David Kimche met with Bud McFarlane in Washington. 

David Kimche met with Bud McFarlane in Washington. 

508 TOW missiles delivered to Iran from, Israel.- 




Reverend Benjamin Weir released. 

Islamic Jihad claimed it murdered U.S. hostage 
Willian Buckley in retaliation for Israeli raids 
in Tunis. 

Separat* meetings in London with Ghorbanifar and 
Waits. 

Israel delivered 18 HAWK missiles to Iran^^B 



Meeting in London with McFarlane and Ghorbanifar. 

Meeting of President with Regan, Shultz, Weinberger, 
McFarlane Poindexter, and rCe^fea , and Poindexter at 
the White House. Ht'^'^'^o-^ 

Hostage Location Task Force (HLTF) formed at CIA. 

Ghorbanifar to U.S. for talks with U.S. officials. 

Nir becane primary Israeli POC. 



Declassify t ^OADR 



UN|»AS8lK(m 






't 



I'^l 



645 





TOV $€Nk59-- 




1986 




Jan 02t 




Jan 07 t 




Jan 17 « 




Feb 05-07! 


*0>^ 


Tmh 14t' 




F«b 19-21: 


.^ 


f«b 20-21 f 




Feb 24: 




Lata Feb: 




;-3r 07: 




Apr 17: 




Apr 22: 



May 06-07: 

May 09; 
May 15 1 



May 22-23: 



YOP >g€<«T 



llN^t)t$S4llED 



Nlr (naeta in U.S. with Poindexter. 

President meet! with vp Bush, Regan, Shultz, 
Weinberger, Meese, Casey, and Poindexter. 

Presidential Finding on Iran. 

Meetings in Geneva with Nir and Ghorbanifar (CIA 
and NSC) . 

U.S. deliver! 1,000 TOWa to Iirael« 

Meetinga^iii London and Frankfurt (Ghorbanifar ^H 



1,000 TOWi delivered to Tehran froa Israel. 

CIA and NSC officials met with Israeli and Iranian 

officials in Frankfurt. 

18 HAWK missiles returned to Israel. 

CIA and NSC officials met with Israeli and Iranian 
officials in Paris. ^ 

U.S. hostage Peter Kilburn Murdered in r«0»liation 
for U.S. raid on Libya. 

Ghorbanifar arrested in Switzerland for indebtness 
apparently related to the FBI sting of arms sales 
to Iran by private citizens from the U.S., 
Germany, and Israel. 

U.S. and Israeli officials met with Iranian 
officials in London. 

Planning meeting at CIA (DOO and NSC personnel) . 

Terms of Reference (TOR) approved for establishing 
a strategic dialogue with and trip to Iran. U.S. 
objectives: 

Establish a correct relationship with Iran. 
End Iran-Iraq war. 
Return U.S. hostages. 



Meetings in LondonJ 

Tel Aviv (Nir and Rabin) 



WMim 



Cyprus 



and 



646 



rj2_2?5fS?' 



likablssffit^ 



Nay 2211 

May 24 1 

May 25-21/ 

Jun 10: 



Jun 


30- 


•Jul 02 


Jul 


26- 


-28: 


Jul 


26i 




Au9 


03: 




Aug 


06: 




Aug 


10: 




Sep 


19- 


•20: 


Sep 


22- 


■23: 


Oct 


03: 




Oct 


05- 


•07: 


Oct 


26- 


•28: 


Oct 


29/ 


Nov 


02: 




Nov 


05- 


•07: 


Nov 


07i 


1 


tQ? "SfiCWWL 



U.S. dalivars SOI TOWs to laraal (r«pl«c«Mnt«« . 

Tarry Waite flown to Beirut <U.S. helicopter). 

McFarlane party to Tehran. Soma of tha 240 HAWK « 
mieeila parts accompany tha party* 

Rafsanjani news conference containing possible 
"signal* that Iran wanted improved relations with 
tha U.S. 

Ghorbanifar in U.S. for discussions with CIA and 
NSC. 

Meetings in Frankfurt (Ghorbanifar, Nlr, NSC, and 
CIA) . 

Father Jenco released. 

Remainder of 240 HAWK missile parts dalivared to • 

Tehran • 

Frankfurt meetings. 

contacts with'^^^^^^^^^^HH||^Hin 
Madrid and London. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

Discussions in Washington with new Iranian 
intermediary (NSC and CIA) . 

Meetings in London (CIA, NSC with Nir) . 

Whit e House approves prov ision of intell igenc e to 
Irani 



Frankfurt meetings (CIA, NSC, All, Samaii). 

Frankfurt (Mainz) meetings of U.S. and Iranian 
representatives (CIA, NSC, Israeli rep [Nirl.H 



900 TOW missiles delivered to Iran from Israel. 

David Jacobsen released. 

Meetings in Geneva with.^^HHH(NSC and CIA) . 

500 TOW missiles delivered to Israel 
(replacements r. 



^5:T^^ 



647 



n 






: DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



in/1? 



KiiASSIHtL 



:.^£- /\c 



^ J 



leal Chreneiafy) 



o.t./mmim cowtact« mo twi mmiCAW hostach 

rrea the ••rU«tt nench* (eltevinq th« Itltnle rtvelutlen tn 
Iran, tha U.S. CovarniMnt haa attamptad to raastabllah otflclal 
contact with that ^ovarnrviant In erdar to dlieuaa ttrttaqie 
dav«Lop«>«nta ^r\ this critical part of tha uorld and raconieruct 
vorktn^ ralatlonihi-p. Cvan bafora Praaldant Daaqan caoa to 
o((lca tha U.S. Cavarninant aqraad to try to aapand tacurlty, 
•conofiiic, peUtlcaL. and intallifanca ralatienihipa at a paea 
accaptabla to Tahran. tn tha (all of IS7«, tha U.S. undartook 
Chraa aacrat niitiona to Tahrani 



Sa^tambar 1»71 - 

roquait of tha Iranianal 



ll>at laeratly with Basarqan at cha 




Oetobar-Novanbar l»7l - 

norma Illation of calacioni 



(dltcuttad 



Whan thasa naatmqi and tha facrat Novanbar 1. It'* naatmq in 

Alqiara, batw««n Briaiinski and Prina Hlniitar Baiarqan. bacana 

public In Iran, thay halpad praeipitata tha takaovar of tha U.S. 

Obaaiy by radical alantantt and lad to tha ratiqnation o( tha 

Baiarqan 90v«rruT««nt . Thata avants hava advarsaly influancad 
Iran't subsaquant willinqnasi to anqaqa in any dlract contact 
with tha use. 

Oaspita mutual difficultiaa involvad in ra-attabl Ishmq nomal 
ralationa. our ttrataqie intaraatt in tha Partian Cult nandata 
paraittant afforti to attablifh a dialoqua. In thii raqard. it 
It notabla that only a faw ma^or countriaa do not hava ralationa 
with Iran -- tqypt, Jordan, Morocco, laraal^ South Africa, and 
tha Unltad Statas. Cvan Iraq continuaa to nava diplomatic 
ralationa with Iran. 

Iran la tha kay to a raqion of vital importanca to tha wait, .^at 
It la Incraaainqly tntaatanad by qrowinq Soviat military jowar 
and political influanca alonq iti bordari and iniida it> 
tarritory. Ovar tha courta of tha lait two yaars, tha Soviati 
and thalr turroqataa hava aovad activaly to qain qraatar 
influanca In tha Sulfi 

Tha Sevlati ballava that onea Khoaalni dlaa, thay will ^^-4% 
an axcallant opportunity to influanca tha formation of a 
(}ovarnawnt in Tahran that larvaa Soviat itrata^ic intaratti 
in tha acaa. 



jif^^rfiEc 



Eadiiitti 






1^' 



U^ 



648 




Ceawnlit natloni h«v« bacoa* th« principal inii (upplitri 
to IriB -- •4mrn Ir«n 4«p«nd*nt en thli tourc* o< supply in 
eentandlnq with «n inertttinqly ttranfthanad Iriq. Thii 
latdf uf to tha eonelutlen that tha Sevlatt aay wall ba 
attaoptlAf to purtua thalr own ravelutlon In Iran. That la, 
by fuallnq both tlda* in tha conflict, tha Sovlati could 
wall anceuraq'a a dlaaitroua 'final offanalva* by Iran that 
vouLd praelpicata a political dlaintaqratlon In Iran, 
laavlnq a powar vacuuja which tha Sovlati could axplou. 
Spaclf Ically, tha Indlcatora e( Coawunlat influanca in Iran 
arai 




Tha Ineraaalnf daaparatlon brought on by tha coata of tha Iran*traq 
var haa aaaearbatad Iran' a vulnarablllty to Sovlat mtluanca. 
Horaowar, tovlat daalqna In kf^hanlitan, praaaura on raklatan, 
and actual croaabordar atrlkaa In Iran froai Afqhanlitan hava auda 
raopanlnf • attataqle dlaloqua ineraaaln^ly Important. 



viHCUSSjrto 



649 






ti'* 




About two y«<r« cqo. <«nlor Iranian effleltla apparsnciy daeidad 
that ioaK acceiKiKjdation witR t^« U.«. aaa nacaaaajy, Slnca i»l3, 
varioui eountriaa hjvo b«an an^a^aiJ In avarturaa to th« U.S. and' 
Ir«n In an affort ts atlmuUtt ditaet contact b«t« a«t< th« 
countrla*. 




(or 



How«v«r, intarnal apllti and dabatai acde It dltflcMXt 
Iranian* to raapond to thaaa ovarturat. 



Nuiwr'oua tndlvlduala and private partlaa hav* likawlaa attampead 
to bo helpful a* intartiedlariei In aatabliahlnq contact In Iran 
or In aeaki.-iq Iranian ai atatance In 

^eld hoata 




In the tprlnq o( HIS. a private taiarlcan eltltan INiehael 
LedeenI Learned fron an Iiraeli fovernsent official lOavid 
rinchel that the laraella had eatafiliahed a Ualton relationihip 
with an Iranian eipatriate IHanuchehr Cherbanifar) In Europe »no 
aeuqht Israeli help In eatabllshln^ contact vlth the U.S. S«v«rn- 
ment. In acknowladqinq the need ts dementtrato the bonafidai of 
the Iranian officials involved, ha iChorbanif arl -.ndicated that 
his 'sponaera* in Tehran could alio help to resolve the Aneriean " 
hostaqa situation in Beirut. 

In June of 1»I5, in the midst of the 1V»-|47 hljaehinq, the 
Israeli officials In direct contact with the Iranian aipacriat* 
asked hln to use his Influence with senior Iranian officials to 
obtain the release of the hijacked passengers. Tvo daya after 
this approach, four Aaericans held separately trots the rest of 
the hijacked D««|jg|«iswer«frj«d*ndt«n«dover_»oSv«^ 

authocitie*. HB^l^SBHIiHHHHBiHBHRHH^pu ] 1 1 s 

Speskar RaAaniaat, wne »•• ttavelllM in tna Bid-eatfal th« 
tUM, »nC tranlaa rer»lM Hlotvter Valtyatl both Intervanad with 
tha eaptata. Mfaaalaiil. la hlft spaaeh oa Nevaabac 4, Ittc, for 
tha tlrat tlaa yufellelr aeknawladia4 hit tela In this aatter. 



«NCLA3Slr!ED 



650 



■s 



9 l^jUWf^^ 




On July J. !»•*. during < vLilt to ««t»M,nqtoB, tn Ur««U 
official mii"Ch«l idvu^d Mationil S«eurvey Advlict. »ob«rt 
Merarl«n«. tnac I*r««l Had aatabUihad « cnannal of ?omnuni.cac ion 
with auenorltattva alamantt In Ir«n who uaca Intarattad In 
datarmlnlnq whathar tnm unicad StAcafl was opan to a ditcraat, 
hiqn-laval dialoqutf. Tha Iranlang wara datcrlbad a> cofopciiinq 
tna principal (iqurai of tha qovatnwant II. a., Spaakar of tha 
F<a)lls llafianjani, Pruoa Hinlitac Huiavi. and Khomaim'i 
halr-apparant , AyatolUn Montatarll and aa balnq davotad to a 
raoriantation of Iranian policy. 

At thla flrtt maatinq, McFarlana »ant to qtaat lanqth to dra» out 
tha Israeli aa to why ha found tha Iranian proposal cradlbla. 
givan tha avants of tha past six yaars. Tha Israali rapliad chat 
thair axhaustiva analysis had qcna bayond tha surfaca lo^le 
'jarivinq from tha chaos and daclina within Iran and tha 
daqanarativa affacts of tha war, to mora cencrata tasts of tha 
wtllinqnass of tha Iranians to ta«a parsonal.'r Isks . Ha notad 
that tha Iranians had a<posad thamsalvas to possibla pavpromls* 
by maatinq with IsraaUs and by passing axtrairaly stfnsKiva 
intalliqanca on tha situation (and political llna-upi witbin Iran 
-- information which was provar. mt\ irt . ^ - ^-. ^ 



Tha Israali askad for 3ur position on opaninq such a dialoqua. 
No mantion was mada of any pra-condi t icns or Iranian prioritiaa. 
McFarlana convayad this pr'jposal to tha Prasidant I in tha 
prasanca of tha Chiaf of Staff). Tha Prasidant said that ha 
baliavad such a dialoqua would ba worthwhile at laast to tha 
point of datarmininq tha validity of tha intar locutors . This 
decision was passed to tha Israeli diplomat by telephone on 
July 30. 

On Auqust 2. 19)!. the Israeli called aqain on McrarUne. At 
this meetmq. ^e stated that h9 *id convay'd our position to tha 
Iranian intermediary and that tha Iranians had responded that 
they racoqniied the need (or both sides to have tanqibla evidence 
o{ the bona (Idea of tha other and that thay believed they could 
affect tha release of tha Americans held hostaqe In Lebanon. 

Accordinq to the Israeli, the Irimans separately stated that 
they were wilnerabla as a qroup and before havlnq any prospect of 
beinq able to affect chanqa within Iran they'would need to be 
substantially ttranqthened. To do so, thay would need to secure 
the cooperation of nllltary and/or Kavolutlonary Cuard leader*. 
Toward thla end, they expressed the view that the most credible 
damonatratlon of their Influence and abilities would be to secure 
limited anounta of U.S. equlpaent. Tha Israeli asxed (or our 
position on tueh actlona. 



VjT JcW^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



651 



f 




tiJoiiltU 



.(^V 



Nr. HerirUn* alavitad tMt prepoiitien to th« fratldant at « 
■••tlnf within i»ft that inelu4*d th« $*er*t*rl«« a( St«t* and 
D«(an«« and th« Olraeter e( Cantral Intalll^ane*. th* 'taatdant 
• t4t*d that, tfhtla ha could aadaritafl4 that aattuilnq tha 
latltlaaey of tha Intarleeutori, thay oould 6a quiea vulnarabla 
and ultlmacaly alfht datarva our luppert to Ineluda tan^ibla 
matarlali at tha ti«>a, wttheut any rirat hand axparlanea In 
daaltnq with chaa, ho could net authorlia any tranaCara o( 
military oatarial. Thli «a« eonvtyad to tho laraoU. 

On Aufuat 22, 111}, tho laraall dlploaiat eaUad one* aora (a - 
raport that tha o«aaa<)a had baan cenvayad and that an lopaaaa of 
conddanca asiatad. lo aakad what cha poaitien of tha U.S. 
Cevarnaant would ba to an laraali tranafar of aodaat ^antltl**- 
of dafanalvo ailltary aatarlal.' Nerarlan«'-r«plla4 that to hta, 
auch an action would rapratant a dlitlnctlon' withevt a diffaranca, 
Tha laraall dlploaat a«plalftad at fraat lan^th tlwaV :ara*l had r 
Lit evn policy Intaraata that would be aarvad by toatarln^ auch « 
dlale^a in bahalf of tha U.S., bat that a pr«biaM would aria* 
whan ultlniataly thay naadad to ra^laea Itama thlppa'i. la aaka4 
whathar laraal would b« abl* to purchasa raplacaixanta to^{ 
thay chota to ahip. Hcrarlana atatad that tha. laaua wML-'wt '_ 
ability of laraal to purehaaa alUtvry ^uipaaaat ifjg th« O.f. 
thay had dona ae (er a ^anaration in«-Han4 do-aa IS'tha tvtiM 
— but rathar tha laaua waa whathar It waa U.S. policy to ahtpo^ 
allow othara ee ihip miltcary aquipnant to Iran. Tha laraaU 
aakad for a poaieion (roa aur fovtriuKant. Hcrarlana alavacad tha 
quaation to tha Praaidant land to cha Sacratariaa of Stata and 
Dafanaa and tha Oiraetor e( Cantral tntalliqanca) . Tha fraaidanl 
atatad that, wnila ha could anvmon providing natarlal support 
to nodaraca alamanta In Iran if alt tha Waatarn hoataqat wara 
fraad, ha could not approva any tranafar of military aatarial at ' 
that tina. Thit poaition waa cenvayad to tha laraall diplomat. 

On Saptam^ar 14, 14tf, Kavarand Ban)ai«in w«ir was ralaasad In 
■airut by tna lalaaic Jihad Or^aniiatien. This raleata »aa 
praeadad by an Intansa affort en cha part of Hr. Tarry waita. tha 
Spaclal teissary of tha Axchbishop of Cancarbury. To this data. 
Malta raaalns tha on ly wastarnar to avar aiaat dlractlr wnw 
tha Labanasa kldnappara. 

In lata Saptambar, wo faarnad that tha Israalls ha<S transfarrad 
301 TOW aisailaa to Iran and that thla ahlpmant had takan placa 
' — In lata August. Tho laraalla told us that thay undertook tha 

action, dasplta our ob]aetlona, bacauaa thay ballcvad it to ba in 
thalr atrata^ic intaraata. Tha Israalls nanaqad this antira 
oparatlen, to Ineludo dalivary arran^aaanta , funding, and 
transportation. Aftar dlaoiasinf this SMttar with tha frasldant. 
It waa dacldad not to asposa this Iscaall dalivary baeausa wo 



\iHCUSS\r:to 



652 



lUi^^^^ 



- -wy itcMt ^ 






Manttd to retain th« option o( •ipleltln^ th* •sitting ttriall 
en«nn«l with Tahrin In our own •(fort to ••(ibllih • ttrtttfic 
41«le«u« with tn« irtnlan fovatrwxnt. Th« tettl valta* of th« SOI 
TOW* •Mpp«4 ky ttr*«l »•• ••tL>«t«4 t* k« lati than I] allUen.- 

On OeteOor *• 1*IS. tiUole Jihad announced Chat It had 'tiacutad* 
■•Irut Itatlon Chlaf wilUaa lueklay in rataUatlon for tha 
Oeteb«r 1 laraall air raid oa HX> InatAllatlona In Tunla. mi* 
aiuiouncasant lad to a aorloo •( aoatln^a In Carep* aann^ tha 0,1. 
(CIA and NSC). laraall, and Iranian Intarsadlarlaa. In thata 
tiaatlnqi, tha Iranlana Indfeatad chat, while thalr ablllcy co 
Influanea tha NltbaUah waa wanlnf, tha Rtiballah had ncc muad 
■ueklayi ha had In fact dlad aaveral aentha aarllar of nacurtl 
eauaai. Ha hava alnca aubacantlacad chla tnfonoaclen In dabriaCa 
of rachar Janco and Oavtd Jacebaan, bech of whoa Indicate tn«t 
■ucklay probably dlad on Juno 1, l)tS of pnauannla-lllie ayvp^oaa. 

In mld-Mevembor, the laraaUa, -ttiroitaf^a aaotor efflcor In che 
reralqn Hinlatar'a affleo lllachel . IMtoacad that cha Covernaent 
of laraal waa convinced that they were nearln^ a breanthrouqh 
with Iran on a hiqn-leveL dialogue. The Iiraell cencaccad • U.S. 
official (North) and aaked for the nana of a turapean-baied 
airline which could discreetly transit to Iran for che purpose of 
dollverlnq passenqers and carqo. la specifically noted crtac 
neither < U.S. carrier nor an Israeli affiliated carrier could be 
used. He were aasured. et the CIM, Chat tha Israelis ware fOlnf 
to 'cry oil drilling parte as an Incentive, * since we had 
expressed so much diipleMureova^ch^earUar TOW shipment. The 
name che proprietary ^|HH|^Him|H| »ss to che 

Israeli, who subsequenclynadchesTrerafcehartered throuqn 
normal commercial contract for a (liqht froa Tel Aviv to Tsbrlt, 
Iran, on November 2], '.SIS. The Israelis were vinwlttinq ot the 
CIA's involvement in the airline and the airline waa paid at the ' 
normal raaicariial charter rate (appronaately SIJ^.^OOI. The 
airiine\personel [were also unwiccinq of cha carqo chay carried. 

tn January, we learned chat che Israelis, respondinq co urqsnc 
i entreatlee froa che Iranians, has used che proprietary aircraft 
to transport II hawk missiles Co Iran In an effort Co improve the- 
atatle air defenses around Tehran. Our belated awareness chac 
the Israeli's had delivered HAWK elssiles riised serious U.S. 
concerns ChaC chase deliveries wart leopardiiinq our objective of 
arranqinq a dlrecc meecinq wlch high-level Iranian officiali. Aa 
a consequence of U.S. IniCiaClve and by lauCual aqreemenc of all 
three parties, thesa alssilaa were returned to Israel in rabruary 
ISII. 

On Oecestbar 7, tho traaldant convened a aeatlnq In the White 
nousa (raaldoneal to dlseuaa next steps In our efforts to 
eatabllah dlieet contact with tha Iranlana. Attendlnq tha 



UNCUSSlFltO 



653 









"••tin* ««r* th« Chlaf of Staff, S«er«(ari«( of ]t«t« tna 

Oataniai tha Oapucy Olraeter of Cantral tncalUqanca, and tha 
Aaalatant to tna rraikdant for National Saeutlty A(f>tri md hia 
Oaputy. IswMdlataly attar tna maatlnq, Hr ■ HefatUna dapartad 
tor London to naot »ttn tna ttraaU official and tna (rani«n 
contact to fiaka clair tna natura of our Intarait in a dlaloaua 
with Iran. At tnia naatinq, Hr. ncrarlana, aa inatructad by tha 
Praaldant. atatad thati 

tha 0.1. waa opan to a political dlaloaua wltn Iran, but 
that no lueh dialoqua could nana proqrasa for at lon^ tt 
froupa taan aa doainatad by Iran hold U.S. hoataqat; and 

tha U.S. could vindar no circuiaatancaa trantfar araa to Iran 
In axchanqa (or hottaqat. 

Thaaa polnti wara mada dlractly to tha Iranian intarlocutor . Tha 
Iranian rapllad that, unlcta hit aaaociatat in Tahran vara 
ttranqthanad. ehay could not rtf* ijoinq ahaad xlin tha dlaloaua 
nt . Mcfarlana ae»no«. ladqad tha pontion but atatad wa could not 
ehanqa our poaition. In a saparaca maatinq with tha ttraaU 
official, Mr. Mcfarlana mado claar our atronq objactlona to 
laraaU waapona ahipnanti to Iran. Followinfl thaia maatinqa. 
Kr . Mcfarlana ratumad to W4ahinqton and shortly tharaaftar laft 
activa govarnmant sarvica. 

On January 2, tha Prim. Minnt.r of Itraal dlipatchad a spacial 
amutary to tha U.S. lAniram Nirl to raviaw propoaali for naat 
atapa in daalinq with Iran. Tha Iiraalia urijad that wa raconaidar 
tha iiiua of providinq limitad dafantiva arma to thoia attampcinq 
to ta«a powar in Tahran. jinca all othor mcantivai laconomie 
aiiiitanca. -"adical juppliaa. waehma partil wara of no valu* in 
«horinq-up thosa wno wantad an opaninq to tha wa»t. Admiral 
Poindaitar notad our atrinqent objactiona to tha MAWH miatila 
jhipmanta m Nov«mBar and notad that tna f S. would hava to act 
to hava than raturnad la ftap undartanan in fabruary, whan all 
II niaallaa wara raturnad to ttraaU. In chat any implamancae ion 
of tha laraali propotalt would raquira tna activa participation 
of tha Intolllqanca community, tha NSC Staff (North) wat catkad 
to prapara a eovart action findinij. word on thu fraiidantial 
finding comnancad on January 4. 

On January (, tha Ptatidant, tha Vica Pratidant. tha Chlaf of 
Staff, and tha National Sacurity Adviior and hia attittant 
ravlawad tha flrit draft of tha Plndlnq and tha racommandationt 
mad* by the Frtaw Nlnlttar o( taraal through hit tpacial 
aaiaaary. 

On January 7, tha Praaldant mac in tha Oval Offlea with tha vica 
Pratldant, tha Chlaf e( Staff, Sacratarlaa Shulti and Walnbarfar. 
Attorney Ganarai Maata, Olraeter Caaay, and tha National Security 



ttMCllSSIfiB 



654 



T<Jt UC9h 



.'^■s..?.;u,;s.JL 



Mvlier %• 41ievii th« evarill ittattlen In Inn and preiMctt 
for • ftraeMle dlalofu*. It waa tfain noted that nt . Heraclana, 
on ratiidi (rea hla trip to London, had racoanandad that no 
turthar action ba cakan unlaaa a aaehaniaa could ba att4hllih«4 
by which tna U.S. could aiart battar control ovar avantt. *« 
a^raad. In prlnclpla, with Olracter Caaajr that providing Ualcad 
quantltlaa of dafanalva araa attar cha heata^aa vara ralaaaad 
atlll had narlt. teth taeratary IhuUi and Sacratary Walnbar^ar 
cb]actad to any provtiion of araa, citing that oo could not ba 
aura that thaaa would raally halp aodarata alananta and that, 1( 
axpeaad, tha pro)act would net ba undarateed by nedartta Jkraba 
and would b« laan aa contravaninf our policy of net daallnq with 
atataa that support tarrerlaa. Tha rraaldant dacidad that «a 
ahould attaapt to kaap tha laraall channal actlva aa lon^ aadt 
oCfarad poaalblllttaa (or aaatln^i with hlfh-laval Iranian 
otftclala and la(t opan tha liaua of providing datanalva araa to 
Iran 1( all tha hoata^aa wara ralaaaad. 

It was (urthar datarminad by tha rrasidant that any dlalo^ua with 
tha Iranians nuat ba aimad at aehiavinq tha (ollewinf foalai, 

Oavisinq a (ormula for ra-astablishlnf a strataqlc 
ralationahip with Tahran. 

Zndinq tha Iran-Iraq War on honorabla taraa. 



Halplnq ansura tha^^mtorial intaqrlty at ^» «" ^_^ 
coerdinatinq waya 4% wtTlctl ^K itfftt ceuntar Wvftt '^T^'^. ^ 
actlvUlas In tna rffton. . 

Tha ?rasidant vada claar that a w«tcarn dlaloqua with Iran would 
ba pracludad unlass Iran wara wiUinq to usa ita Influanca to 
achiava tha ralaasa of waatarn hoitaqas In aairut. Ha also aada 
claar that wa could not and would not anqaqa in trading ams Cor 
hoataqaa. Sacratariaa Shultt and wambarqar ratainad thaLr 
original pealtlon on providing any «mra to Iran, but Attornay 
Canaral Haasa and Oiractor Casay both suppoctad cha concapt aa a 
valid aiaans of opaninq tha dlaloqMa. Attornay Canaral Haasa, 
notad a llll datamlnat Ion by than Attornay Canaral Tranch Salch 
that transfarrinq small quantities of arma through third ^ 

eountrlaa undar a Covart Action rindlnq waa not lllaqal. 




UNCLASSiF'itD 



655 



^SLJSSII' 



HH 



4 



'*»*^^ij;llt3 



on Janvary H' • •••tin* «•• ti«14 t* Ut« i««tien«l MCMfUr 
MviMr'f •((!<• «ttlt Sactattry **lnto*t««r. Atterncv Canard 
Haaaa, Olraetor Cttay. *n4 CIA e«nar«l Couflial ftanlar l^rkln. 
At tMt Matlnf, tAa final 4ra(t al tha Covact Action rinding vta 
ravi««a4 and va* (orvardad to tIM »raal4ant with (aerttary ' 
Walnfrarfar dlaaantinf. 

On Jangarr l'^ . lltl. tha rraaldant apprevad a Cevart Action * 

rindlnf (Tab Al dlraetln^ that tha. IntalAlfanca comunlty procaad 
wltn ipaelal aetlvitlaa tL»ad at •ece^Uahlni tno teala lat 
forth a»eva. Thm rraaldant futhar datanalnad that tha tetlvttlaa 
avithorliad by tha rindln« }uatl(iad vlthNeldln^ prior Con^rtitlenal 
notification dua to tha otTaao aamltlatry of tha dlalequa balna 
aatabllihad. Ha furthar notad that puklle kitowladea of tha 
profraa would placa tha AaMrlean hcatafaa la Uabanon at iraatar 
rlak. Metlhf hla eoncarn for tha Uvao of tltoaa earrylnf out tha 
oparatlon (both U.S. and foralfnl, ha dlraetad that tha Otractor 
of Cantral tntalll^anea rafraln fro« raportlnf tha rinding to tha 
appre'prlata conwittaaa of tha Cenfraia ontll raaaonably tura that 
thoia Involvad would no lon^ar ba la ]aof«rdy. 

On rabruary 5-7, U.S. offlelala IHtC an« CIa| 
rapiaaantatlva ot-^m laraall rrl«a fUj 
lanlor-laval trm^fc nf f t*' 'M 




__J""^ '" linden. At thit aaatiBf , tha if ainann^raad 

thar. IT cha USC would provlda dafanalva waapena ITOwal to Itin. 
thay would. In turn, prevtda lajaa to tha Afghan nu}ahtdaan. rha 
U.S. >tda aqcaad to aiplera thli potilblllty and. working with 
tha laraalit, aitabUahad tha following aaehanlas (or tranafar of 
tha waapena: , 

Tha Iranian intarmadlary (Chorbanlfarl would 4ap«ait fundi 
in an laraali account. 



Tha Iiraalli would tranifar funda to t 
contiollad account in an ovatiaaa ban> 



atarlla U.S. 



Oalnf thaaa funds, tha CtA would covarely obtain aatarial 
authorliad for tranefar froaO.S. allitary itocki and 
transport this to Israal for onward novanant to Iran. 

Ualnq tha procaduras stlpulatad abova, fi.^ altllon was dapesKad 
In tha CIA account In C^naft on rtbruarr 11. IIK »ni en 
rabruary 14. 1,000 TQWs wara tran<porta4 to Israel f'sr pra-poaltlon- 
In^. Thaaa TOMs vara tranafarrad by CIA (roai OOO I U . S .^ ' 
stocm in Afinii ton. Alabaaial and tran sportad throu gh i 
■^■HI^HHV usln^ CIA-OOO ^miHIII|b lo^Tstics 

TWRJaSnt^^ fellCY-lawal ceordlnatlon (of tnTio arranqaaanta 
was af(a«ta4 by NM (North) with DOe (Araltafat and CIA (Clair 
Caor^al . Tha TOMt wara placad In a cewart laraall facility 
awaltlnf eawaxd ahlpaant. 

>0«. S^UCT 



l]NCLA3S5r.ti) 



656 



T(rf" uc>^ ^ 



^^^^P^Une 



*^'i :.{} 



On rabnMrr lf-11. U.S. INSC «n4 CIAI , t«r*«lt tnd IrinUn 
efflelali •>»* >■" C«ra4nr to dlacuii prebltai in arnnqinf a 
•••tlB^ axon* huh ar-laval otfictala. At thla — tlna 

eoiwittad r 

] "~ ' authoru«tien i. 

waa racalvad tiea Haahlnfton. tka Q.S7 aM« a^raad to provlM" 
l.OOV TOHa ts Iran aa a elaar al«nal o( U.I. atnearltr. Thia 
dallvary »aa eoii w ncad en tn* antninf of Fabruary 20 and eoaplatad 
in tve tranaLta to Tanran on Tabruarr 11 ^ T ranapoctatten froai 
laraal to lean «aa aboard a (aUa (ta^ rIVSaU aircraft. -^ th« 
raturn flifbt (roa Iran, thaaa atreraft carrla^ th« U HAMi 
■laallaa which laraal had tant t» Tahran in Hevaabar lit% with 
use afar aHno<« lada«. 




On rabraary 24, U.S. (CIA and NK> oftielala Mt a^aln iiy. 
Frankfurt with tha Iiraall a^KlIranian oftlei<la to dtact^Knaxt ^ 
atapa. At thii naatini^. th« V.S. aid* urf*d that tha Iranfana 
axpadit* a maatinq *«<en<j highar-laval offielala on both iidaa. 

On rabruAry 21, tha Prlaa Miaiatar of laraal «'«f|# t« ^rt* l^'filK 
Raaqan (Tab il ur^in^ eontinuad aftorta to achlava a scra'^aqie 

braakthrcuqh with Iran, but aikinq conaidaratlon for tha aafaty 
of cacantly laitad laraali noata^aa.- ^^ '" v^tf 

On Harek '' , U.S.'ICIA and NSC) and laraali rapraiantacivai mat 
with tha Iranian intarmadiary in Paria to datarmina what.iar any 
furthar proqrasa was possibla in arranglnq for a hiqh-laval 
maatinq with U.S. and Iranian offlciala. Ourinq thasa maacinqi, 
tha intarmadiary afnphasizad tht datar lorat inq aconomic situation 
in Iran and Iranian anxiatias ra^ardinq incraaiinq Iraqi military 
at factivanaaa. 

Tha aacalation o( tanaiona with Libya, laadlnq up to tha ipril 14 
atrika, pravantad (urthar dlalo^a (roa taking placa until tha 
Iraniana urqad tha Intamadiary iCherbanifarl to aecalarata tha 
affort in lata Ay^l , ItSt, M that point, tha Iranian aipatriata 
advii«A <!■ ttteqfk tha laiaall polnt-ef -contact that tna 
Laadarahlp in Tahran »aa praparad to coaaaanca a tacrat dlaloqua 



fO»--*«etCrr 



U^WSSIr'.tD 



657 



jmm.] 






ra ji IBCIW - 






^tl^' 



rt 



«4j 



«tth tha Onltt4 Itatat alon« th« Un«« o( our ••t«btlth«d (]o«i. 
Ma b«li«v« ch«t tn« Icinltnt van itliMilttad Co r*nc«tht 




with hlB in luropa ■( tha and of Aprtl, that tha Iranitnt did not 
«l«h te b a lecutad of any eulpaatiuy In miburn'a daath. 




On Nay «, 7, t»»«, U.J. and laraall offlcara «>at In London »ith 
tha Iranian tntarmadiary m which ha ur^ad that wa taka imntdlata 
atapa to arranqa for a hi^h-Uval U.S./Irtnian maatln^ in Tthran 
During tha London inaatinq, tha Iranian ur^ad that wa (U.3 tnd 
IiraaU act ur<)antly to halp w,th Iranian air iafanaa. Na 
aiophatitad that tha Iraqi *ir forea wea Ineraaaln^ly affaetlva of 
lata and that tha Irannna w«ra d«iparst« to atop attack* on 
population eantari. Tha laraalit *.'l: uaad thlt opportunity to 
pnvataly ask tha U.S. to rapUca tha iO» TOMi which thay h«d 
aant to Iran in Au<;uai:, 111). 

Saaad on atsurancat th«, vc could at laet p«at faea-to-faea with 
top-laval Iranian official*, on Hay H. tha fratidant authoriiad 
a aacrat miuion to Tahran tiy fopj>sr National Saeurity Advuor 
Mcfarlana. accor-paniad by a CIA annuitant, CIA co("»ur.ie«rrr • . 
mamaara of '.h* NSC ataff, and tha laraall and Iranian intatlocu- 
•ora. Tha Iiraalia »ars i.-iformad vit eodad naaaaqa on H4y 15 
that tha U.S. had a^raad to tha Iranian raquaat for Uaitad 
antl-air dafanaa aquipmant and to taplaniin tha 50» TOa aant by 
laraal. 






On May l(, tha Iraniana, through tha laraalla providad Jt.iH fo 
dapoalt In tha CIA sacura fundlncj sachaniin. Tha fundi oara u> 
to acqulra 501 TOW miiiilaa Ifor raplanlahinq tha TCw« Iir««l 
ahlppad In Saptamtiar 19ISI and acquiring HAWK niiaila 
apara p arta. Thla matarial waa lubaaquantly aov«d to' 
^■^H capackaqad and ahlppad to (ally KT% for onward 
laraaT on May JJ. At in tha fabruary ahipaiant. tha CIA providad 
loqlatlca aupport for tha auvaawnt of thla natarlal to laraal. 

In ordar to anaura oparatlonal tacurlty, tha Hcrarlana trip wa* 
mada ftoa laraal, colncldant with tha dallvary of a pallat of 
apara parta for Iranian dafanalva waapona ayataaia IHAint apara 



r«f_SlC«T 



uN^EJSSSlF'ktD 



.yp g JtCMT 



658 



bllBlftSSlFVci) 



• l*«trcmle p«rtal . *t th« tejc^^c rcquatt o( en* Iranltm, 
(llai fsrat^n documantition BIBH " obtdntd froa tn« CIA — 
w«i us«4. CI* alio provided eovari transportation aupport froa 
COMUS to laraal (or tn« ncfarlana party. Tha froup was 
tranapertad froa laraal to Tahran aboard an laraaU Air forea lOJ 
with (alaa (laq aatkinqa. 

In tha eouraa of tha four-day (May J5-JI) vtait. lanqthy naacinaa 
wara hald with hun-laval Iranian officials, tha flrai duaet 
contact batwaan tna two qovarrunanta In ovar (Ix yaart. Mr. 
Hcrarlana and Ma taan vara abla to aatabllah tha baali (or a 
continuing ralationanip and cLaarly artlculata our objactivai, 
concarns, and intantiona. Tha qroup waa alao abla to aaiaia 
first hand tha intarnal political dynaale In Tahran and tha 
affact of tha war wmch Iran claarly can no lonqar win. Uslnq 
Prasidantlally approvad Tarns of tafaranca ITab (I , which had 
baan rtviawad and approvad by approprlata Cablnai offleaci, 
Hcrarlana apphaiitad that our Intarast in Iran tranacandad tha 
hesea^as. but tha continuad datantion of hostaqas by a Labanasa 
group philosephieally aU^nad with Iran pravantad proqrasi. 
OtTinq tha Kisit. .lr . Mcfarlana mada elaar: 



f rot 



^a fundawantt J ly 
■~r.s Hiddla titz: 



;posad Iranian afforts to aipal us 



that wa fir .'.7 oppoaad ttiair uao of tarrvrlsai ^ 
/ 

that va accapt.ad ^reir rnvoljtion and did not fK to 

ravarsa it: 

that wa had n....'narou» othar Jisagracmanta involving rational 
poLicias U.S.. '.ateanon, Nie.raqua. ate.l. but »iqht aiio 
find araas of common intarait 11. a., Afqhaniatsn and tna 
Spviat thraat to tha Cult) through dialogua. 

During thasa maatmgs, both aidas -jsad tha .>pportunicy to dacail 
tha obstaelas to implamant ing a ttratagic ralationshtp bacwaan 
tha t«e countrias. In addition to tha points n'-.tad abova. xr. 
Hcrarlana aaiphasizad t^a political problama cauiad by Iranian 
involvaaant in tha hoita<;a iiiua. Tha Iranians objactad co tha 
use anbargo on U.S. military luppltca alraady paid 'or plus '.ha 
continuad USC blocking of Iranian atsats in tha U.S., »vmn attar 
U.S. courts had rulad In thair favor. During tha coursa of thasa 
maatlng*, tha Iranian officials adaiittad that thay could not win 
tha war, but wara In a dllamna in Tahran ovar how to and tha 
conflict gtvan tha naad to prasant an Iranian *victory* bafora it 
could ba coneludad. Thay anphaaiiad that tha original aggrataor, 
Saddaa Hutaaln, suit ba raaovad froa pewar in ordar for tha war 



f«»-st5tas~- 



UN^tftSSlt^cD 



659 



ttfJlOfT 



rmbim 



«• mt>4. Mr. Mertrlana eeneliid«4 th« vltlt by (uMicrltlnf th«t 
netwlthtt^ndlnf trtnitn Inttcatt In etrrylnf en with th« 4l*ie«u« 
w« eeul4 net proc««d «ltr\ further 41ieuialont In ll^ht e( their ' 
unwllllnfneei te eiert the «ull velfht et their Influence to 
ceuae the release ef the Meetern heeceqe* In Lebenen. 

On June 10, Melllt Speaker Ufaanjanl, In a speech In Tehran eade 
f\iarde4 reference te Iranian Interaat In la^roved relations oith 
the O.S. On July ]«. rather Lawrence Jenco was raleaied In the 
■•kka Valley and found his way to a fyrlan aUlltairy checkpoint. 

On Aufuit 1. the resialnlnf three palleti (lait then S planeload! 
of electronic parts (or Iranian antl-alreraf t defensee IIAWI 
leiaelle sub-coaponentsi arrived In Tehran. Kt in all fllehts 
.to/froai Iran this delivery was aude wltA^a Israeli Mk foM* 
aircraft 1 707) uatn^ false flaf aarkln^. rialn« ef the d«tH8ry 
waa based en coordination aaonf U.S., Israeli and Iranian 
officials. - 

In early Auqust 11i(, the contact with the Iranian expatriate 
began to feeua exclusively on the willingness of the UtC to 
provide Military assistance to Iran In exchange for hoata^ea and 
we sought to establish different channels of coesaunlcatlon which 
would lead ua note directly to prafmetlc and Moderate ela«enta In 
the Iranian hleraraehy. In eid-Jtufuat, a private Aaerlcan 
cltlten (HCCN Richard Secotd. USAT |l)et.)l acting within the 
purview of t^^^nuar^^aver^^^^^^L^^^^ide e ontaet In 

Curop^w^^^^^^^^^^^HH^^^^^^^^^H^UHJmHHBHBhB 
■|HM^|HHH|^^|^^^HHm^^^|^^^wlt^tneaa^Rtan^^^^^ n e 
cI^^^f^^^^Trffan^^^wasbroueh^eowe r 1 1 y to Washington tor 
detailed discussions. Me judged this effort to be useful in 
establishing contact with a close confidant of the aen ]udgad to 
be the most influential and pragmatic political figure in Iran 
IRaf sanjanil . Theae discussions rtafflrwad the baale objectives 
of the U.S. In seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. «e alto 
provided asaeasaents designed to discourage an Iranian efftnsive 
and contribute to an Iranian decision to negotiate an and ca the 
war. Ttt« aasessaents also detaUad the Soviet threat to Iran. 

Through August, September, and October ltl(, nunarous additional 
aeetlngs were held in Europe between O.S. representatives and the 
new Iranian eontacti. During the October It, ISli meeting In 
Frankfurt, Sermeny, the U.S. side, a* In the paat. Insisted that 
the rclaaae efth^^uaeea was a pra-requlslta to any progress, 
t The Iranian ,^^|fl|||HH||(^ urged th at we take a aere active role 
In support for the Afghan reslstaneel 




^lof/sjctrr 



UNCLASSIFIED 



660 



^orytKi^t — 






^^^v''^ 






Tt\» Iranian* •I'o PLptt*'**- «n< _»>•_».. «. aeeaptt^, tha afftr o( 
a Sevlat T-'>1 t«nli)^H|^0|BHH^Hi_ Tha havt •!»« 

effarad to prevtda • <opy or «M 400 pa^a Intarroottlen e( lalmt 
Station Chlaf Hllllaa luclilar. At thia Baatlnf J|[^ilacad that 
thara ««a a 'vary feed ehanca that anethar AiMclein or tvo veuld 
ba Craad aeen.* On Oetebar 21, with U.S. ae«ulscane«, laraal 
provldad Iran with an additional Inetaaant o< daCanalva waapena 
(SOO TON Blaallaal . 

Lata on Octobar H'^MBBiHHBVilHfe^'l^*^ "** cltlian 

(Haklal taakad to Baintats aasaaet aM advl»«4 that Iran had 
'asaBcliad Ita Induanca with th« b^^naia* la ecdar to obtala 
tha ralaaaa et an Aaarleaa •• David Jaeekaan — and m aneartaliT" 
numbar o( rraneh hoataqat. i« (urthar noto4 th«t. tkia wa«u b« 
part of tha purpoaa of tha Iranian feralf* Nlnl»««c'a vial) 
Syria «- an avant wa bacaaa awara e( oa Mvaatoar Ic 1*M. 
atatad that tha situation la Tahran, aa wall a» Iranian imt 
ovar miballah wara both da<arloratln^ 




2. David Jaeobaan waa ralaaiad by nia eaptora naar ths Wt^^ 
AAiarlean babaaay eo*peund la M«at lalnat. Tha U.S. ^0k**V^ft 
Cait talrut iiMMdlttaly diipatehad an aaibaaay o((la9r-C|^(t 

Bairut to pick up Mr. Jaeobaan. < ^^' |^ 

It la now apparant that parilstaat U.S. affert* ta aatabllah - 
contact with I^an and lubaa^ant pubtle apaeulattan ra^ardlnf 
thasa contact* hava probably aiacarbatad tha p^tar atMffla la 
Iran batwaan pra^atatie alaaant* (la< by Ratoanjanl) aM^aora .. 
radical factions (undar cha evarall apenaorahlp of AyataHaNS 
Hontatarl) . In lata Octobar, radical auppoftars let HentaiaA) 
ravaalad tha IRaf (anjanil contact with tha OSQ aaj^ha taraa if 
tha contact. In ordar ti3 dafand hiasalf iqalnat MV4**_S' 
eoliudiaf with Uto USS and to pratarva a daqraa ofiatltSVa (or 
both partlaa, Ma]lls Spoakar Kafian^anl provldad a purpoaaly 
dlstortad varalon of tha May 1S(( Hcfarlana alaslen in hi* 
Novaa^ar 4 addrasa to tha aaiaaa. Hodarata Iranian peUtlcsl 
laadara apparantly now faal eonitrained to lattla thair Intarnal 
political problaas bafora procaadtnq with-^a U.S. ralat lonship. 
Tha ravalatlona In Tahran ra^ardin^ tha Hafarlano Blaalea- ara 
daaonatrabla avldance of tha intamal powar itru^cjla, Tha 
Octobar ISM arsaat of radical laadar Hahdl Raabaal, a cloaa 
eonf Idanc wid aon ln-U« a( Ayatellah Hontatarl. far act* at. 
tariorlaa and traaaon haa cauaad furthar intarnal conflict. 

Kaaelutlon of tha Labanon haata^a situation la alto coapllcatad 
by waning Iranian Influanea la Labanon dua In part to financial 
conatralnta and tha fact that tha Llbyana ara axpandlnq thalr 



\op i^i>f 



UNCLASSIFIED 



661 



>0f MCUT 



Of^SlMo^i/ifl) 



eentieti with acf r«dl 




On Hevaabar 1 . th« day cftar • Mcttn^ with O.S. sffleUlt, 
Iranian levcrMMnt •utrierttla* arraatad tin othar Indlvidaala 
Invelvad In radical aetlvttlaa. *«onf ch« two vara aanlor 
nilltary atfleara and a Manila daputy lAAiaad (aahanl) , cha 
frandaen o( Ayatollah Xaahanl, a eenapirater In tha ll4t tttaoft 
aqainat tha Shah. 

Datplta thaaa Intarnal dlff initial «ii4 •fttaftd^B^t id^Ml* "^ 
tha Waatara aMdla. cha Iraivtfia eontino^^k ita^Rln 41rac9^ '^ 
contact with tha use and sat agai n _ifl cJBIi aaJtevaii^T >-U -^ 
with WIC and Ct» raptaaantatlv a«. 
ftha 



^.<^ 




Intaraati o( tha two countrlat. 

It la tiapertant to nota that iinca tha InitLatlon of '.ha USC 
contact with lean thara ha< baan no avldanca of Iranian qovtrn- 
Bant coopllelty In acta of tarrorlia aqalnat tha U.S. w« do not 
know who aaliad tha laat thraa Aaarlcan heataqaa in Saltut 

(Haaara. Mad, Clelpple, and Tracy). Tha lalanic Jihad 
Orqanitatlon IIJOl haa dlaelataad raaponalMltty — ii ha»a aur 

Iranian Intarlocu tor a. 




It la pcaalbla that thaia thraa 

irleana wata kidnappad at tha dlraetton o( Iranian radlcala 



662 



f 




Wl 



^'Ci 



B 



loyal to th« no« impritenad H«hdl Rtthcml. If to, this eeuld ba 
• n •(tort to undamina tn« nasetnc U.S.-Irtnian tcrtcaqle 
dialogu* and aiacarbata cha Intarnal Iranitn powar ttruq^la 
aqaintt eha pragmatic (action with which »a hava baan In contact. 

Throughout thit procaaa, tha USC haa actad within tha llailti o( 
astabliihad policy and in eomplianca with all U.S. law. Tha 
•nipmant of 2,001 U.S. TOWa and 23J RAWX nltalla alactronlc ipara 
pacta wa< undartakan within tha provlsiona o< a Covart Action 
rindlnf. 

During tha coursa of thla oparatlon — and bafera -- the U.S. waa 
coqnltant of only thcaa thlpmantt froai laraal to Iran. 
Spaeif leally: 

Tha Kraalii aeknowladqad tha August MIS ihlpnant of 301 
TOWa aftar it had takan placa. Until wa wara advliail by U* 
Israalit, and had tha Information aubtaquantly confimad by 
Iranian author it lat , wa wara unawara of tha compoattton of 
tha ihipaant. wa aubaaquantly aqraad to xae.laca thata TOWa 
in nay of lit*. 

Tha NovaitCar 1?>S fhlpntant of .11 laraall HAWK wiiailai waa ' 
not an authorixad axcaption to policy^ "TRU^ihipmanf^waa 
ratriavad in Fabruary ISli aa a coniaquanca of U.S. 
intarvantion. 

Tha Cctobar 19(( thlpmant of !S00.TONa from Itraal to Iran 
waa undartakan with U.S. aequiaacanca. Thaaa TOWa wara 
CA(iIacad.^n Novambar 7. 

In support of thii rindlnq and at tha dlraction of tha fraatdant, 
tha CIA providad tha (ellowlnq oparational aiaiatanca: 

CIA eenaunleatlona offlcart and an annuitant to aasiit in 
varloua phatas of tha oparjtion. 

Starlla ovariaai bank accounts for financial transactions. 

A tacura transhipmant point for tha dispatch of U.S. 
military itaaa troai tha U.S. 

Trinahlpaant o( military Itama from tha U.S. to Israal. 

Convunlcatlons and intalllqanca support for tha maatln^a 
with Iranian offleiais and tha Mcfarlana trip to Tahran in 
May. 



UMCUSSIF'ED'* 



663 



"Mnj/|,^f,ij., 



^ «^«*» — 



m 



Cl*«r«d naatinf (tta< 1" iurop* tot M«tlnai vlth Irtnltn 
efdelalt. 

r«brleat«4 and allat doeu»«nt«tloii (or U.$. and forat^n 
otfleiaXa (or iiaatLn^a In Xuropa and Tahrin. 

Th« xaaponi and aatarlal provldad undar «hli pro^ran vara )ud«ad 
to b« Inadaquata to altar atthar tha balanea o( BlUtary povar or 
th« outeeaw of tita war wlcn Iraq. Ttiay hava, howavar, daaonttrata 
tha U.S. eemntmant to Iranian tarrltorlal Intaqrlty and larvad 
to aupport thoaa in Iran Lntaraatad In opaninq a (trata^lc 
ralationahlp witti tha U.S. O.J. atforta ovar tha iaat II aontha 
l'.4v« had tanqlbla rofulta on Iranian polleyi 

Tha «af lanJanl/Valayatl Intarvantlen en bohalf oC tha 1VA 
II4T paatanqari (Juna IttSI . 

Iranian direction that tha hljackad ran A«i IT] would not ba 
raeaivad In Iranian carrltory it It laft Karachi. 












Tha ralaaaa o( thraa Aaarlcan and at laaat two branch 
hoataqai. 

Tha Initiation o( an Iranian dlaloqu* with thalr rational 
naif hfiora. 

Continued dalay in tha Iranian 'final offantlva.* 

Finally. It mat alio ba notad that cho U.S. anaa ambar^o 
netwithatandlnq, uaat Curepaan nation* hava provided 1)00 mUien 
a year in allltary aqulpnent to Iran. Ho«c of theae tranttao 
war* aceeaipllfhad with ijovernji>ent Knewledqe and/or acquiaicanca. 

All appropriate Cabinet Offleera hava b«en apprised throughout. 
The Conqrcss wat not briefed on the covert action rindlnq due to 
tha eatraordlnary (ansltivity of our Iranian contact* and the 
potential consequencei for our itrataqle petition In Souihwatt 
Asia. Finally, our efforta to achieve the raleaia of the 
hectaqea In Lebanon auet continue te rely on diacreet contact* 
and intanwdlaria* who cannot perform it they are revealed. 



" Yor »kmK 



unclassif:ed 



664 



T^ Ui^^&KC^ii :tu 



/- 7 ^J^ J cr. 




III. SQVItT MILIT»«T rOSTOM 



Af9h«nl(tin llluitritct tha prlci en« Soviatt ate r«edy to 
pay ^o aapand ar*«t undar thatr diract control. 

Suaaarlia Soviat caB'^^l^t^** alenq bordar and inalda 
Xfghaniatan »nieh ccgld thraacan Tahran. 



nt Soviat «ctivityi 



Soviat plant 



How thay would do it. 



Iranian support to Sandlnltta raqima in Nicaragua (Ida and 
tbeca Soviat daaiqna -- mckaa U.S. -Iranian ralatlonahlp laora 
dilficult 15100 Billion in oil. plua arna) . 

U.S. can halp Iran copa with Soviat thraat. 

A/gHA/<ISTm 

May ba raal v a lua tor Iran and U.S. to find waya to 

■■■■■■■^■■■l^iBBl^BB 

U.S. can provtda hunxnitarian atttttanca for rafuqaaa^B 
wall a« lathal aid for nujaMdaan. 

Wa naad to know who you work with, what you alraady provlda, 
and davlsa atrataqy to axploit Iranian coasparativa 
advantaqa. 



Ha nay ba praparad to ratuaia a linitad military supply 
ralatlonahlp. 

Rowavar, its avelution and ultimata acopa will dapand on 
whathar our convarqant or our dlvarqant intarasta cob« to 
looa larijar in tha ovarall piccura. 

What doaa Iran want? 



•sac^-- 



'i^^^mE" 



\p 



-ifliaUy J";*- 



..,„^i-4_531 






665 



W^- 



lOf.'ScCRKi jin/17/u ,000 



r'jti 



(Hixlaua v«r»loni 



U . S . / I BAWim CONTACTS AWO THt UMHICM HOSTACtS 



From th« «arlicit montht follovinq th« Iiltmic rtvolution m 
Iran, tn« U.S. <:ov«rrvi«nt no «cct>«pc*d to r<«tc*Blith offleitl 
contact wLtn that qovcrruncne in ordar to diicutt ttrataqlc 
d«va loptT^cnct in that critical part of tha world and to try and 
raastabllah a conatructiv* vorninq ca lat lonihlp. Evan bafora 
Praildant Kaaqaiv cuM to o(fic« tna U.S. Covarrunanc aqraad Co 
•xpand lacurit/, aconomic, political, and Incalliqanca 
ralatlonahipa at a paca accaptaAla to Tahran. In tha fall of 
lf7t, tha U.S. vuidarcook thraa sacrac aittlona to Tahrani 




Octobar-Novamtar H7« _^^_ 
nomalltatlon of ralationa 



dlacuiaad 



wtian thaia maatinqt and tha tacrat Novambar I. It7t naatlnq In 
Alqiari, batwaan Briaiinakl and Prima Hinlitar Batarqan. bacam* 
public in Iran, thay pracipitatad cha takaovar of Ch« U.S. 
bnCaiiy by radical alamants and lad to tha raiignation of th« 
Baiarqtn qovarnnant. Thata avanti hava advarsaly influancad 
tran'i itibiaquanc wtllin<;na*t Co anqaqa In any diracc contact 
uttn Cha use. 

Oaspita nucjal difficulciai involvad in ra-ai tr bl Ishln^ normal 
ralationa, our itrataqlc intaratci in cha Par<l.>n Cull aandata 
partittant afforc* on our pare to cry to attai>ll*h a dlalo^ua. 
In tnia raqard. It ii notabla chat only a f«« najor councriaa 
do "ot hava ralationa with Iran -- Cqypc, .'rrdan, Morocco, 
larial, Souch Africa, and tha Onitad StaCaa. rvan Iraq concinuaa 
to hava diploioacie ralationa with Iran. 

Iran, cha kay Co a raqlon of vlcal importanca Co Ch« Waak, It 
incraaalnqly chraatanad by ^rowlnf Sovlat nilitary and political 
Influanc* alonq let bordara and Inald* let carrlnry. Over cha 
couraa of tha laat two yaara, cha Soviact and Chair t«t«(agacat 
hava Bovad acclvaly to qaln inCluanca in cha Culfi i^ 

Tha Sovl4n baltav* that onea Khettalnl dlaa, Uiay will hava 
an aicallant opportunlcy Co Influanca cha formation of a 
qovarnjaant In Tahran which aarvaa Soviac scraca^lc ^Incaraaca 
in cha araa. 



Dao4^aifyi 4ltoi 






666 



o¥ 



Ks•^ i.:"TOP-s!'cRE;f'ri) 



Coimiunl>t nationt h»v« b«coi»« principal «rin» «uppll«rt to 
Iran -- mimnq Inn d«p«nd«nt on thii loure* of njpply in 
coneandinq with an incraiilnqiy thraataninq !r»q. Thti 
laadt ui CO tha conclusion chat tha Soviati «ay oa 1 1 ba 
attamptinq to purivja thair own ravolution in Iran. That li, 
by fualln^ both aldaa In tha conflict, tha Soviatt could 
wall aneouraqa. a dlaaatroua 'final offanilva' by Iran that 
would pracipltata a political dlaintaqratlon la. lean, 
laaTtnq a poyat vacuua whtak t.-i« Sovlata could axplolt 




Tha Incraailnq daaparatlon brouqhc on by tha cotta of cha Iran-Iraq 
war hai axacarbatad Iran'a vMlnarabt llty to Soviat Influanca. 
Moraovar. Soviat daalqna In Afqhanlatan, ptaisura on Pakistan, 
and actual croaabordar itrlkaa In Iran troia Afqhanlstan hava mada 
raopaninf a atrata^le dlaloqu* Incraaalnqly l^^porta^t. 



Too, stgurr - 



UNfifclkSS^F 'to o^^^^ 



667 



&. 'sm^^ 



^&£^?*r 






Xn short, en* Soviets w*r« far batttr poticioncd to ilqnlf icuttly 
Improve their influence in the region in HH wnen we were 
presented with en opportunity to open • dieloque with Ir<n. In 
deciding to exploit tnu openinq, we eviiueted prevvom efforts 
through more conventions! cnsnnels wnicn ned not succeeded. 




wo years sqo, senior trsnisn offi 
appsrencLy decided that some accoraodac ion with the U.S. was 
necessary. Hovever. Internal splits and debates mede It difficult 
for chea to respond to these overtures. 

Numerous Individuals and private parties have llkevlse attavpted 
to be helpful as intermediaries In establlshtnq contact In Iran 
or in seeKlnq Iranian assistance In the release of our eltltens 




f*. 



In 19IS. s private American ciCitcn IHlchael LedeenI was 
approached by a representative of the Israeli government IDavld 
Rimchel , who reported that they had established a liaison 
relationship with an Iranian expatriate IManuchehr Chorbanlfarl 
in Europe who sought Israeli help in establishing contact with 
the U.S. CovernjTient . In acttnowledging the need to demonstrate 
the bonafides of the officials involved, he (Chorbanlfarl 
Indicated that his 'sponsors* in Tanran could also help to 
resolve the >jnerican hostage situation In Beirut. 

The Israelis analysed this Intemedlary ' s tsckground exhaustively 
In order to validate his legitimacy. This anelysli led then to 
have extremely high confidence In his standing and genuine 
relationship to the highest Iranian officials. Based In large 
part upon the Israeli evaluation and In recognition of the clear 
U.S. interest in s dialogue that sught, over time, lead to the 
moderation of Iranian policies, the U.S. established an indirect 
contact with the Iranian Intermediary in aid-l?l5, through the 
private U.S. eltlten and a senior Israeli official. These 
contacts were established through the National Security Council 
, ataff with the full knowledge of appropriate Cabinet officers. 

"' -f^ Tzom the very first meeting with the Israelis and the Iranian, It 
was emphasised that the USG could not proceed with direct contact 

^> unless Iran renounced terrorisa as an instrument of state policy. 



-rv6>*-^ 



■52»_§£awj__ 



0N0LfS5?lF'EO 0^'^^^ 



668 



^L 



!]«¥.sf!Fi-D 



_»«r«__f_r««jj.jr\tl,^rn«d ovf te Syr lin 



<£C 






In Jun« of 19«5. tn th« midst of th« TV*-|47 hi)icl<ln«, th« 
Iiraali officials In diract contact vith th* Iranian aipatrlac* 
aiktd hxm to u*« Kit i.nflu«nc« »itn s«nior Iranian official! to 
obtain tna ralaat* of the hijacktd pa>>*n9«rs. Two days aftar 
thla approach, four Ajnarlcana hald xparataly from tha raat of 
tha hijacitad pai.ianqara vara fraad 

autnorltlaa. ^ 

Spaakar R^f >an)ani . who 

tlma, and Iranian rorai^n Mlniitar Valayati both Intarvanad with 
th« captors. Kafaanjanl, In hli ipaach on Novaobar 4, l)l(, (or 
tJia flrat tiM_publlciY aeknowladfad hia rol* in this luttar. 

In "liptambar of lyv th« laraalis advlsad that thay war* clos« 
to JCh l aot m a griafcthromh in thalr contMftyUth *Tt> and voultfS 
proc*«rt unlass w« ob]«et«d. It la ijipertan^^ not* that th« 
U.S. had lonq baan awara of Israall aftorts to aaintaln dlseraat 
contact with Iran aind to provMa (raa oitii assistanea in ita war 
with Iraq. Oasptt* lon^-tara U.S. afferts to eonvinca tha 
Israalls to daslstj Israal continuad to provlda Umitad rlUtary 
and Industrial tachroloqy to Iran. Tha USG Judqad that tha 
laraalis would pai;sist in thasa sacrat dalivarlas, daspita our 
objactions, bacauta thay baliavad It to ba in thair strataqie 

On Au(just 2J, HI!, tha U.S., throuqh tha U.S. cltiian Intar- 
madiary, acqulaiad in an Israall dalivary of sillltary suppUaa 
I (501 TOWsl to Tahran. wa wars subiaquantly Informad that tha 
dalivary had takan placa at tha and of Auquat, tJiouqh w« wara not 
awara of tha shipmant at tha tiaa It was mad*. U.S. acqulascanca ' 
in this Iiraali oparation was basad on a daetsion at tha hl(}h««t 
laval to axploit akistini; Israall channals with Tahran In an a^^ 
affort to aatabllah tn Aaarictn ttrat»tie 11 il n||n with the ^ik 
Iranian govarnjnant. * 

On Saptambar 14, 1*IS, Kavarand BanjaaTn H«ir was ralaasad in 
Bairut by tha Islamic Jihad Organlistlon. Thla ralaasa was 
pracadad by an Intansa affort on tha part of Mr. Tarry Malta, tha 
Spaclal Otissary of tha Archbishop of Cantarbury. To thla data. 
Hi. walta raraalna tha onl y Wastarntr to tvc maat dlraetly wit h 
tha Labanasa kidnappara. 



On Octobar 4, MIS, Itlamle Jihad tnnouncad that it had 'aiacutad* 
Bairut Station Chief Wllllaa Sucklay In rataliatton for tha 
Octobar 1 taraall air raid en HO instaUatlona in Tunit. This 
announcasiant lad to a aarlas of aaatln^s in Curop* unon^ tha U.S. 
(CIA and NSC), laraall, and Iranian Intarmadlariaa. In thasa 
maatlnqa, tha Iranian* Indlcatad that, whlla thair ability to 
Influanc* th« Rttballah waa waning, tha Hltballah had not klllad 



TO«L_SCC^ 



uNCMSt^-ED 



0^^^"^ 






669 



^'9^^'^ 



' t^ Jft^US . 





»ucl»l«yi h« h«d In f«ct di«d ••vtril i»onth» t«rli«r of niturtl 
cauiti. Ma n*v« tinea «u6st«nt uted tnii information in dabrtafa 
of fatnar Janco and Cavid Jacotian. both of wnom indicaca that 
Bueklay probably diad on Juna 3, 1>I5 of pnauwon la- 1 Ika jymptoi^*. 

tn lata Novaa\t>«r 1«*5. tha laraalia. ratpondlnq to urqant 
antraatiat from tha Iraniana, provldad II baatc nAMT siaiilat to 
Iran tn ordar to Improva tha ttatlc dafaniaa around Tahran. Tha 
laraaU dallvary of UAWT aaittlaLa raliad U.S. concarni that va 
could wall b« craatlnq mi tundar ita/idlnqa In Tahran and tharaby 
Jaopardttlnq our objactiva of arran^lnq a dlract maatlnq «lth 
hlqh-laval Iranian offlclala. Thata alatllat war* aubtaqMantly 
raturnad to laraal In rabruary l)tt, with O.S. ••alttanca. On 
Oaeantwr «-t, l9tS, tha Mationai- (tcMrlty Mvlavr abt'J^ L«i)4oor 
with UM taraali official and tha ^liiM contAk t« aSc . 
th« natura of our Intaratt U> a tfli^TtL "Itb ttifl^ *wr~ 
aaatlnf, Hr. HcFarlana acatad thlt^eur foals 

Davlilnf (^formula for ra-atxibllshlnt ^^F«ira1 
ralatlonahlp with Tahran. i jja 

Ending tha Iran-Iraq Har en honorabffi^ama 

gonvinclnq Iran to caaaa Ita lupport for t«rr< 
raMcal aubvariton. 

Balpinq ansura tha tarrltorial Intaqrity of Iran and 
coordlnatinq wayi In which »a Biqhc countar Sovlat 
activitiaa in tha raqlon. 

Hr . Hcfarlana viada claar that a waatarn dlaloqua •itfi Iranf^^^ 
b* pracludad unlaat Iran waa willing to uia iti Induanca to 
achiava tha ralaasa of Wastarn hoataqai in Balrut. Ha also nada 
claar that wa could not and would not an<;a;a In trading araa for 
hostaijaa. 

On Januaryi^'' 1"(> c* Praaidant approved a covart action 
rindtn'j directing that tha Intalllqanca cc-munlty procaad with 
apaclal activitiaa aifad at accompli ah Ln<3 tha goal! aat forth 
abova. In accord with axtant atatutat, tha '"* l^.'tTIM^} "■■"'* 
that tha Olractor of CaMxal ^«taUl<;anca aa liat w /ffj ll' ragteting 
tha rindtng to tha apprOprlata eofv>lteeaa of tha Congraaa until 
reasonably aura that tha Uvea of those carrying out tha 
operation (both U.S. and foreign) would not ba In Jeopardy. 

On rebruary S-T, O.S. officials (NSC and CIaBI^BIB, a 
rapresentatlva of tha Israeli Prlaa Ministry (»ffilr«ii iTlr) , and t 
tranltn of f lelal ^^^^^■■■■^^^H^HjMpi 



Id 



670 



^^ 



mM^\^ii 



I—"*' '" ''•">«nr- *' c'lii ractlnq. th« Ir*nt«ni aqrtad 

that. If tn* use would provld* TO* w««poni to Ir«n. th«y voyld. 
In turn, provid* itm* to tn« Afijh.n «vi)«hia««n. Tn« U.S. «9r««d 
te axplora tMi poialbillty and, oorklnq vtth th« Iiraalit. 
•stablithad th« folIovLn^ m«ch«niaa for tranafar of th« waaponai 



Tha Iir*«ll.i would tranafar funds te a itarlla U.S.- 
controliad account in an ovariaat bank. 

Ualn^ thaia fundi, tha CIA i»ogld covartly obtain matarlal 
authorliad for trantfar froa 0.3. aiilitary itoclii and 
tranapoit this to Iiraal for onward novanant to Iran. 

Utlnq tha procadurai atipulatad atoova, funds wara dapotltad In 
tha CIA account In Canava on Fabruary 11, Ul« and on fabruary 14 
I. 000 TOWa »ara tranaportad to Israal for pra-poai t ton tn^ . Tha 
TOHs wara otf-loadad and placad in a cevart Iiraall facility. 

On fabruary 1»-J1, U.S. and Iranian officlala (NSC and CIAI Mt 
a9aln In Carmany to diicusi problaat in arran^ini] a maatinq aaonq 
hlijhar-laval officiala. At thli aaatlnq, tha O.S. alda aqraad to 
provlda 1,000 TOHs to Iran as a elaar signal of U.S. slncarlty. 
This dallvary was coBwancad on tha norninq of fabruary 30 and 
complatad in two transits to Tahran on Fabruary 21. 

On Harch 7, U.S. (CIA and NSCI and Israall raprasantat Ivas sat 
with tha Iranian Intaroadlary in Pans te datamlna whathar any 
turthar proqrass was possibla In arranging for a hiqh-laval 
raatlnq with U.S. and Iranian officials. Ourln? thasa saatlnqt, 
tha Intarsiadlary airphasKad tha datar lorat tnq aeonomlc altuatlon 
In Iran and Iranian anxiatias raqardinq Irrraasinq Iraqi ullltary 
af factlvanaaa. 




TTia ascalatton of tanslons with LlAya, laadlnq up to tha April 
strlka, pravantad futthar dlalo^ua froa taking placa until tha 
Iranians ucfad tha Intarvadlary (ChorbanlfatI to accalarata tjjy 



Tat sjcmt — 



i'1ttAS^:tD 



0^^*^ 



671 



*^^ 



s^ 



jror~HCliT 




• ffort In lata April, Hl«. At thJt point. th« rr«nUn •irpatrKtt 
•4vta«4 ut that cha laadarihlp In Tanran waa praparad to conwanca 
a aacrat (llalo<j«a with tna Ufitad Stataa alon<| tha liraa of our 
aatabllahad foala. Ha baUava that tha Iranlana vara itLmulatad 
to rana w tha contact By tha Apr il 1' nurdar of hoataqa Fatar 
Itllburn^^^^^^l^l^HI^H^B m ratalLatlon for tha raid 




hla In Iurop« at tha and of April, that tha Iranlana d^ 
to ba aeeuaad of any culpability In Kllburn'a daath. 




• aaad on aiturancaa that «a could at laat naat faca-to-faca with 
top-laval Iranian offlclala, on Hay IS, tha Praaldant authorltad 
a aacrat nltalen to Tahran by foraar national Sacurlty Advlaor 
Hcrarlana. accompanlad by a CIA annuitant, CIA communlcatora . 
nambara of tha NSC ataff, and tha laraall and Iranian Intarlecu- 
tora. m ordar to anaura oparattonal aacurity, tha trip vaa vada 
froa laraal, celncldant vlth tha dallvary of a pallat of tpara 
parta for Iranian dafantiva oaaponi ayatana (BAWK apara alactronlc 
partal . At th^ipa^^ic raquaic sf tha Iranlana. allaa (oralfn 
docuaantatlon HH^Hf"* obtalnad froia tha CIA. 

In tha couraa of tha four-day l«ay :i-J»t vlalt. lanqthy maatlnqa 
vara hald with hlqh-laval Iranian offlclala. tha flrat dlract 
contact batwaan tha two ^ovarniranta m ovar alx yaara. Hr. 
Hcrarlana and hla taam »ara abla to aatabllih tha baala for a 
continuing ralatlonahip and elaarly articulata our objaetlvaa, 
concarna, and Intantlona. Tha (jroup waa a . 10 aJBla to aaaaia 
flrat hand tha Internal political dynamic .n Tahran and tha 
affact of tha war which Iran elaarly can no longar win. Ualnq 
Praaldantlally approvad Tama of Hafaranca (Ta^ A), which had 
baan ravlawad and approvad by appropriate Cablnat offlcara, 
Hcrarlana amphailjad that our Intaraat In Iran tranjcandad tha 
hoataqaa, but tha contlnuad datantlon of hoataqaa by a Labanaaa 
qroup phlloaophlcally aUqnad with Iran pravantad proqraaa. 
During tha vlalt, Mr. Hcrarlana aada claart 

that wa fundaaiantally oppoaad Iranian afforta to aipal ua 
froa tha Nlddla taati 



that «a firmly oppoaad thalr uaa of tarrorlimi 



TJik SEC*ff ~-^^ 



UN^LftSSIF'ED 



o^"^^^ 



672 






that w* «ce*pt«d thalr revolution and did net M«li to 
r«v«ri« it> 

that wa had njmarout othar dii<qr«an<anti involving rtqtonal 
policiae <i.a., Labanon. Nicaragua, ate), but siqht alae 
find araaa o( comoon Intaratt II. a., Af^haniatanl throufl) 

dialo^ua . 

During thaaa maatinqt, both aldai utad tha opportu^t/ to datall 
tha obataclas to irplamantlnq a itrataqic ralat lonahlp batvaan 
tha two countrlaa. In addition to tha points notad abova , Kr. 
Hcrarlana amphatliad tha political problana causad by Iranian 
invoivamant in tha hoataqa Isaua. Tha Iraniana objactad to tha 
use amCarfo on U.S. military auppllat already paid for plut tha 
continued USS blockinq o( Iranian oiati in tha U.S., avan aftar 
U.S. courta had rulad in thair favor. During tha couraa of thaaa 
maatinfa. the Iranian officiala adnittad that thay could not »in 
tha war. but wara in a dilanma in Tahran ovar hew to and the 
conflict 9ivan the need to present an Iranian 'victory* before it 
could be concluded. They afflphasiiad that tha original aq^raaaor, 
Saddan Hussein, stust be ranovad from power in order for the war 
to end. Hz. Hcrarlana concluded the visit by svimnarilinf that 
notwithitandlnq Iranian tntatect ui carrying on with tha dialogue, 
wa could not proceed with further discussions in li9ht of their 
unwlllinqnesi to e«ert the full weight of their influence to 
cause the release of the hoataqas. 

On June 10, Majlis Speaker Kafsanjani, in a speech in Tahran aade 
<7Mardad reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with 
the U.S. On July 2», father Lawrence Jenco was releaied in the 
Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint. 
On August }, three pallata (leaa than S planeload) of electronic 
perts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses IHAWK missile sub- 
conponenta) arrived in Tehran Ifroa Israeli. 

In early Auquat ltl(, the contact with the Iranian expatriate 
baqan to focua axcluaivaly on the wlllinqnesa e( the USC to 
provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for hoataqas and 
wa sought to establieh different channels of conenunicat ion which 
would lead us mora directly to pragmatic and moderate alamants in 
tha Iranian hlerarachy. In mid-August, a private American 
cltiien IHCCM Diehard Secord, USA/ |Ket.!) acting within tha 
purview of th# January Cov ert Ac tion rinding, made con tact in 

fiuropa "itiBBHHHlHIHH^HHI^^^HI^BHBBHHB °' * 

aenior Iranian official (Mfaanjanil . witntneasa^Tanee of tha 
CIA, this Iranian (All) waa brought covertly to Washington for 
detailed dlaeusslona. Me Judged this effort to be useful in 
establlfhlnq contact with a close confidant of tha man Judged to 



tb* 



JH^t- 



ONCtASSlF'tD ^^""^^ 



^^^^ 



i^ 



'-WPJIC^K 



673 



i'>^;oi 



£cH 



Mm 



b« th« mat influ«ntlil tnd pr»?tMt!c polltte«l fl?urt In Ir.n 
(••f i«n)«nl) . Th«t« dncu«noni r««<firm€d th« b««ic ob)«ctlv«i 
o< th« U.I. in •••«in9 • polU»c«l ()talo<;u* with T«nr«n. w* «i,o 
providaa IntaUiqtne* cl««i<jn«<l to ditcouri<j« an Iranian offtniiv. 
and eontributa to an Iranian dacition to na^ociata an and to tna 
war. 

Tnrouqh Auquat, Saptasvbar. and Oetobar !»•». nua>«roua additional 
Taatlnqi wara nald in turop* barwaan U.S. rapraaantac Ivat and tha 
naw and Iranian contacta. During Lha Oetobar 2i , l)ii vaatlnq in 
Frankfurt. Samany, tna U.S. alda, aa In tna paat. Inalitad that . 
tha ralaaia of tha hoitaqaa »aa a pra-raq\jl»lta to any proqraia. 
T^a Iranian , ^H^BI^niHI 'Jri'd th at wa talia a nora acttva rola 
tor tna Af^nan ra»latanca| 




Tha Iraniana ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^au. s. accaptad# tha ^^^^ 
a Soviat T-7:f^^^HB^BHimB^ At thla maat Inq , |^M^^ 
itatad that thara vat a "vary 900d enTncm that anothar AmarTcan 
or two would ba raad soon.* On Oetobar 3*. with U.S. acTulicanca, 
laraal provldad lean with an additional incramant (500 TOm 
aiiaiXaal of Lhasa dafanalva waapoaa. 

Lata on Oetobar ] 1 . |^|^H^^B||^HM c a U ad tha cltltan 

_^IHalilJiil tasKad to ma i"n tain conn^^F^a^iiad that Iran had 
'aiarcisad itt Influanca with tha Labanasa' in ordar to obtain 
tha ralaasa of Aavarican -- David Jacobaan — and an uncartaln 
numbar of franch hostiqat. Ha furthar notad that this vat part 
of t ha purpoia of tha Iranian forai^n Hinlttar't vltlt to Syria. 

^■Bttatad that tha situation in Tahran, at wall 

^^^uanea ovar iltballan wara both datar lorat Inq 



^ NovaB\bar TT 
David Jacobaan wa^^^^an to a poLnt naar 'ha old Ajna r I c a n 
Qnbaasy compound In Watt Bairut. Tha U.S Bnbatty In tait Balrut 
Irmadlataly dltpatchad an ambasty oftlcar to Watt Balrut to pick 
up Kr. Jacobian. 

It It now apparant that partittant U.S. afforta to astabllah 
contact with Iran hava probably tiicarbatad tha pcwar ttruqgla In 
Iran batwaan pragmatic alamantt I lad by Rafsanjanl) and mora 
radical faetlona (undar tha ovaraU tpontorihlp of Ayatollah 
Monttzarl). In lata Oetobar, radical tupportara lof Montatarl) 
ravaalad tha (Kataanjanll contact with tha uSC and tha tarma of 
tha contact. In ordar to dafand hLmaalf aqalnat char^at of 
colluding with tha USG and to prasarva a daqraa of latltuda for 
both partlaa, Ha]llt Spaakar ^aftanjanl provldad a highly 
fabrlcatad varalon of tha May MI6 HcFarlana ailttlon In hit 



T^Jȣcm. 



raion or tna r^My i7ie ncrarianw «iii»^un in ni,* ^ 



674 




^f^mifi^o 



"ovjmfc,, 4 tddrtii to th« maitai 

l«<d«ri <pp«r*ntl)> now {••! e 



>iod«t«t« IrtnUn 




Uflktant to not* that ilnet th» Inlt ittla&-Af thm u«e 
contact fR»i Iran th.r. ha. b«.n no avld.nc, ** 



■pr -— - — ■— -. ^...^ .int. tn» initiacioa,^ 
t Txli Iran thara ha* b«*n no avi<4>n,-. «» flLi.. 

that th* Saptat^at-Oetobar Htdnappln,* of HaiaSTTUad CIcImIS 
and Tracy wara und.rtakan In an Vttort to und.^i/Ut naao.'* 
U.S. -Iranian atral.,lc dl.lo,u. and ax.carbat.Th^ InfarnJl 



thai w«: ~:/??;f,"' "l~lr« '^« .cqul.Ulon ot «,r. a™., 
tnay wara noat Ukaly capturad In ordar to eravanc tha varv 
rapproachaiant .ith Iran .a ara taakln?. ?""•"« "• "'ry 



k 



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iiNiitJtmEt 



d^*^ 



675 



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ffl 



\ 



Throughout thu preccii, th« USC hti tctcd within th« Umitt ot 

• ittbllihad policy «nd in coffipl l4r<:t »itn tU U.S. law. Tha 
ihipm«nt of J. 001 TOm and J35 HAWK mnaila partt wai undartakan 
undar tn« provialona o( a covact action rindinq. 

In support o( thla flmdlnq and at (ha diraet i<«».«f th* Fraaldant, 
tn« CIA providad th* (ollowin^ opacatlonal axlatancai 

Starlla ovariati bank accounts (or financial tranaactlont . 

A laeur* tranahlpmant point (or th* dispatch of U.S. 
military Itans (roa th« U.S. 

Transhlpaant of alUtary Itaas (roa tha U.S. to Israal. 

Coiaunieatlon* and Intalllqanca support tor tha — «> >-4t ' 
wnn Iranian officials and tha HcFai'lana trip to Tahran in 
Hay. 

Claarad a^tlnq sitaa In Curopa (or ■aatlitn' vltlr.Iranlndl^ 

official*. .!. ^^F 

Alia* doeumantatton (or U.S. and (or*i(jn officials (or 
naatlnqs In Europ* and Tahran. 

Tha waapons and matarlal providad undar this proqraiii ara In no 
way adaquata to altar tha balane* o( military powar nor tha 
outcom* of tha war with Ir»q. Thay hava , hov*v*r,_had a posltlv* 

• ((act on tha A(9han rasistanea and dainonstratad tha U.S. coniiit- 
mant to Iranian tarrltorlal inta^rity. Furthar. U.S. af(orts 
ovar tha last II aonths hava had tanqibla rasulti on Iranian 
policy: 

Tha R«(san]anl/V*l*yatl tnt*rvantlon on sahalf of tha TVA 
1147 paasanqars (Juna IttSI. 

Iranian direction that tha hljackad Pan An 17) could not 
l*ava Karachi for Iranian tartltory. 



Tha ral^aia of thraa Aaarlcan and two rranch hostaqas. 

u..»^.- . 
It should also b« notad that tha U.S. arms tmbtfjo notwithstand- 
ing. Wast Curopaan nation* hava providad tJOO million a yaar in 
military a^lp«Mnt to Iran. Ho*t of th*** transfers w*r* accom- 
plish*d with fovarnMant knowiadqa and/or acquiascanca. 



ftit^ffiW 



^ffUmiflEO 



0^1^^^ 



676 







All <pprepri<tt Cibinac Ofdccrt hav« b**n tpprittd Chrsuqhovjc. 
Th« Congrats «•• not briaf'd on en* covarc' act ion rindinq dua to 
tha a«tr«ordln«ry aanaltlvlty of our Iranian eontaeta and iha 
pocantial conaaquancai (or our atrataqic poiitkon in Souchwaat 
Aaia. rinally, our adorta to aeniava cha ralaaia of Uta 
hostaqai in Labanon muac coneinua to raljr on dKcraat contacta 
and intarmadiarlaa who cannot parfona if thay ara ravaalad. 



tOP KCtfT 




0^ 



Pi^ 



677 



OUL't 



i^-tNCl 



? cl 



J" 




U/]0/l( DOS ^"^ 'i «•« 

IRiitorletl Chronelofy) **^' 



U.S./IRAWIAH COWTACTS mO THI mtmcAK HOSTACtS 

rroa th* ••rilatt monchi fellowlnf th« Iittale rtvolution In 
Ir«n, th« U.I. aevarruMnt h«» itcanptad to r*«*tabll(h offlel«l 
contact with that fovarnnant In ordar to dlaeuaa itrataqlc 
davalepaanta tn th»a critical part of th« world and raconitruct a 
worklnf ralatlonahlp. tvan bafora rraaldant Mafan eaa* to 
offlea tha u.5. Sevarniaant aqraad to try to axpand lacurlty. 
aconoMlc. political, and Intalllqanca ralatlonahlpa at a paea 
accaptabla to Tahran. In tha fall of 1»7», tha U.S. vindartooJi 
thraa aacrat alaalont to Tahrani 



; DEPOSITION 
I EXHIBIT 



Saptaitbar 1»7» 

raquaac of tha Iranlana 



t lacratly with Baiargan at tha 




Oetobar-Movamear l>7» ^_ 
normalliatlon of ralatlona 

Whan thata maatlnqa and tha lacrat Novanbar 1, 1*74 naatlnq In 
Alglara, batwaan trtatiniKi and Frlma Mlniitar laiar^an, baeaiM 
public In Iran, thay halpad praclpitata. tha takaovar of tha U.l. 
Dnbaaay by radical alamanti and lad to tha raalqnatlon of tha 
Baiar^an qovarnmant . Thasa *v*ntt htvt «dvara«ly Influancad 
Iran' a aubtaquant wllllnqnaaa to anqaga In any dlract contact 
with tha use. 

Daaplta nutv>al difflcultlaa involvad tn ra-aatabllahlnq normal 
ralatlona, our strataqic intaraita in tha Paralan Culf nandata 
paralatant aftorta to aatablith a dialoqua. In thla raqard. It 
la notabla that only a taw major countrtai do not hawa ralatlona 
with Iran -- Eqypt, Jordan, »4oroceo, ttraal. South Africa, and 
tha Unitad Stataa. Evan Iraq continual to hava diplomatic 
ralatlona with Iran. 

Iran 1* tha kay to a raqlon of vital ixportanea to tha Haft, yat 
It is Incraaainqly thraatanad by qrowinq Sovlat military powar 
and political Influanca alonq Iti bordari and instda its 
tarritory. Ovar tha couraa of tha la«t two yaart, tha Sovlatt 
and thalr eurroqatai hava aovad aetlvaly to qaln qraatar 
Influanca in tha Culf: 

Tha Sovlats ballava that onca KhoKainl dlaa, thay will hava 
an axcallant opportunity to Influanca tha formation of a 
qovarniaant In Tahran that sarvaa Soviat itrataqlc intaraati 
In tha araa. 







'**,vr'. 



"??/ \ 



678 



tbr-'ftCRtV — 



E'toitU 



Conauniat nteloni h«v< bacon* th* principal iriM tupplltra 
to Iran -- makinq Iran d«p«nd«nt on this aourc* o( supply in 
contandlnq with an incraaalnqly ttranqtnanad Iraq. Thla 
lead* ua to tha concloaion that tha Soviata may wall ba 
attamptlnq to puriua thair own ravolution in Iran. That la, 
by tualinq both ildaa In tha conflict, tha Soviata could 
wall ancouraqa • diaaatrous 'final offanaiva* by Iran that 
would pracipltata < political dlaintaqration in Iran, 
l«*vln9 a powar' vacuun which tha Soviata could axploit. 
Spaeif teally , tha indicators of Communiat influanca in Iran 




Tha Incraatlnq daaparatlon brouqht on by tha costs of tha Iran-Iraq 
var has axacarbatad Iran'a vulnarablllty to Soviat Influanca. 
Moraovar, Soviat daslqns In Afghanistan, prassura on Pakistan, 
and actual crossbordar strlkas In Iran froa Afghanistan hava mada 
raopaninq • strataqlc dlalogua Incraaslnqly Isiportant. 



TOP SECJ 



uNeenssti^ED 



679 



"i^UBP^iVltlJ 



In short. th« Seviatl war* far batttr potlclonad to Inprovt 
• t<jnlflc«ntly thalr influanca In th« ration in 1»IS whan wa vara 
praaantad with an opportunity to opan t dialoqua with Iran. [n 
dacldlnq to axpLolt thli opaninq, wa avaluacad pravioui afforta 
through aora convantlonal channala which had not auccaadad. 

About cwo yrara aqo, aanlor Iranian offlclala apparantly dacldad 
that aoma accomnodat Ion with tha U.S. was nacaaaary. Slnca 1983, 
varloua countrlaa hava baan anga^ad in ovartu raa to tha U. S. and 
Iran In an affort to atlimjlata dlract contact 




Howavar, intarnal tplltt and dabata* aada it difficult 
rranian* to raapond to thata ovarturaa. 

Nunarous Individuals and prlvata partlas hava Ukawlsa attamptad 
toba halpful as Intarmadiarlas in astabllshinq contact In Iran 
or In aaaklna Iranian asi 




In tha aprlnq of 19tS. a prlvata Ainarlcan cltlian IMlchaal 
LadaanI laarnad fron an laraali govarruiMnt official (David 
Klmchal that tha Israalis had astablishad a llaiaon ralatlonshlp 
with an Iranian axpatrlata (nanuchahr Chorbanifar) In Curopa who 
souqht Israall halp in ascablishinq contact with tha U.S. Govarn- 
mant. In acknowladq inq tha naad to damonstrata tha bonafldas of 
tha Iranian officials involvad, ha (Shorbani far) indicacad that 
his 'iponsora* in Tahran could also halp to rasolva tha Anarlcan 
hostaqa situation In Balrut. 

In Juna of 1985, In tha midst of tha THA-«<7 hijacking, tha 
laraall officials In dlract contact with tha Iranian axpatrlata 
askad hln to usa his Influanca with sanlor Iranian officials to 
obtain tha ralaasa of tha hljackad passanqars. Two days aftar 
this approach, four Aaaricant hald saparataly froai tha rast of 
tha hUaclta d paiaanqact wara traad and turnad pvar to Svr ija - 
a u t ho r 1 1 i a • .■■■■^■■^^■^■■^■^^^■■^■Mu ] 1 i • 
Spaakar Raftanjanl, «ba wa* travallinq TntnSiiIa^aas^al tt)« .. 
tina, and Irania» roralfn Hlnistar Valayatl both Intarvana^Jrltti' 
tha captor«. lafcanjanl. In hi* sp«*ch on Novanbar 4, I9t(, tor 
tha flrat tiaa publicly •eJutowladqad hi* rol* in thi* matter. 



'?^ 



ONCC/ISSlF.'tO 



680 



i}>n.m\:l:^j 



On July 3, 1995. durinq a /lilt "0 wifhington, «n Israeli 
official IKimcfial advised National Security Advisor. Robert 
McFarlane, that Israel had establuned a channel of communication 
with authoritative elements in Iran wno were interested in 
d«termininq wnet.-.er t.le 'Jnited States was 3pen to a discreet, 
hiqh-level dialogue. The Iranians were described as comprismq 
tr.e principal figures of tne qovernment ii.e.. Speaker of the 
Ha^is ?a(san-)ani. Prime Minister Musavi, jnd Khomeini's 
^.e 1 r-apparen t , Ayatollah Montaren) and as beinq devoted to a 
reorientation of Iranian policy. 



At th 



IS first meeting, HcFarlane w 

sraeli as to why he found the 

the events of the past 



out 



to great length to dra 
nian proposal credible, 
'.nv cviEuts ut in« ymxy. =*« j«»*>. The Israeli replied that 
• exhaustive analysis had gone beyond the surface logic 
•ing from the chaos and decline within Iran and the 
lerative effects of the war, to more concrete tests of the 
.ngness of the Iranians to take personal risks. He noted 
the Iranians had exposed themselves to possible compromise 
!eting with Israelis snd by pessmg extremely suiiitive 
ligence on the situation land political line-upl within Iran 
formation which was proven valid. .. 



that 
by m 
intel 



The Israeli asked for our position on opening such a dialogue. 
No mention was made of any pre-conditions or Iranian prioritiea. 
McFarlane conveyed this proposal to the President (in the 
presence of the Chief of Staffl. The President said that he 
believed such a dialogue would be worthwhile at least to the 
point of determining the validity o! the interlocutors. Thii 
decision was passed to the Israeli diplomat by telephone on 
July 30. 

On August 2, 1995. the Israeli called again on McFarlane. At 
this meeting, he stated that he had conveyed our position to the 
Iranian intermediary and that the Iranians had responded that 
they recognized the need for both sides to -3ve tangible evidence 
of the bcna fides of the other and that they believed they could 
affect the release of the Americans held hostage in Lebanon. 

According to the Israeli, the Iranians separately stated that 
they were vulnerable as a group and before having any prospect of 
being able to affect change within Iran they would need to be 
substantially strengthened. To do so, they would need to secure 
the cooperation of military and/or Revolutionary Guard Ifcders. 
Toward this end, they expressed the view that the most credible 
demonstration of their influence and abilities would be to secure 
limited amounts of U.S. equipment. The Israeli asked for our 
position on such actions. 



^>5fc^Tt5Cl 



^Missifa 



681 



fmmi^'tii 



«r. «cr»tl»n« tUvtud thU propotttton to tn« Priiid«nt it • 
naatlnq vlchln dayi tn«t inclvjdtd th« S«cr«t*ri«i of St«t« and 

0«(«nt« and tha Oiractor of Ctntral Inttl U<)anca . Tha Praiidant 
•tatad that, vhila na could undarttand that aiauminq tha 
laqltimacy of tna intar Locutora . thay would ba quita vulnarabla 
and ultiatataly m^ht daaar«« our t^ig^rt to includa tanqibla 
matartali at tha timm. without anyTlrat hand axparlanca In 
daallnq with thaa. ha could not authonta any trinifara of 
military natanal. Thta wai convayad to tha laraall. 

Cn Aurjuat 22, llti . tha liraall diplomat caUad onca mora to 
raport that tha <f»t*»gt had baan convayad and that an impaiia of 
confidanca axlatad. Ha aiKad '•thu tha position of tha U.S. 
Oovarnmant would ba to an Iiraall tranafar of modatt quantltlas 
of dafanaiva nllltary matarlal. Herarl.a/\a r«pll*«: that to hlB, 
•uch an action would rapraaant a dlftln««ia» without a diftaranca. 
Tha Israall diplomat axplalnvd Vt fraat lanqth thM laraal had 
iti own policy Intaraata that lAuld ba Mcvad by natarlnq iueh a 
dialoqua In bahalf of tha U.S., but that • probtan would arlia 
whan ultlmataly thay naadad to raplaea itaai ahippad. Hm »*k*a 
whathar Itraal would ba abla to purchaaa raplacaranti for ttaas 
thay choaa to ahlp. Hcrarlana atatad that tha laru* was noCCo 
ability at laraal to purchaaa Military aquiBp«»V-iro« tha <)i$.^--, 
thay had'^bna ao for a fanaratlon and wou^SBo <%. 1"^ O* M<%^|^^ 
-- but rathar tha iaau« waa whathar II wai U.S. s»liae(b ahi|^^fe 
allow othara to ihip military aquipaiant to Iran. Th^^Sraall^^R 
aikad for a poaltlon from our qovarninant . HcFarlana alavatad tha 
quastlon to tha Praaidant (and to tha Sacratariaa of Stata and 
Dafania and tha Oiractor of Cantrsl Intall iqancal . Tha Praildant 
itatad that, whila ha could anviaion providing matarial support 
to modarata alamants in Iran if all tha wastarn hostaqas wara 
!rcad, ha could not approva any transfar of military matarial at 
that tiina. This position waa convayad to tha Israall dlploaat. 

Cn Saptembcr 14, 1915. Ravarand Ban^amln wair waa ralaasad In 
Bairut by tha Islamic Jihad Organi lat ion . This ralaasa was 
pracadad by *n intanaa affort on tha part o! Mr. Tarry Walta. tha 
Spacial Dnlssary of tha Archbishop of Cantarbury. To this data, 
waita ramains tha only wastarnar to aver maat dlractly with 
the Labanasa kidnappars. 



J 



In lata Saptambar. wa laarnad that tha Israalis had tranafarrad 
501 TOW misallas to Iran and that thia shipmant had takan placa 
in lata August . Tha laraalla told us that thay undartoolt tha 
action, daspita our objaetlona, bacausa thay ballavad It to ba In 
thair strataqlc Intaraata. Tha Israalis manaqad this antlra 
oparatlon, to Includa dallvary arranqamants , funding, and 
transportation. Aftar dlscuaalnq this mattar with tha Prasldant, 
It was dacidad no t to axposa thia Israall dallvary bacausa wa 
"V«<«<^ /'**■'' ''■^■^'>*^" 

CON\^\>»Jk ^^ '^M'»l\ . 









ga«-8€CT»CI^ 



iiHism\fio 



682 



Ui^iuL^ig^i; !tD 



WticS^r -^ 



vantad to ratlin tha option of axploltln^ tha aiKtln^ Iiraali 
ehannal with Tahran In our own affort to ttt«bUth t itrtta^le 
dialofua with tha Iranian ^evarniaant. Tha total vslua e( tha SOt 
TOMa ahlppad by Xaraal »at aatlaatad to b« laaa than 12 ■llUoa. 

On oetobar *, KIS, Iilaale Jihad announced that It had *axacata4* 
■alrut Station Chla( willlaa •ucklay In ratd^totlon for tha 
Octobar 1 Itraall al^ raid on PtO Inatallatlona In Tunla. Tbla 
announcamant lad to a aarlaa e( aaatln^a In turopa aaen« tha O.f. 
(CIA and NSC), laraall. and Iranian Intaraadlarlaa . In thaaa - 
■aatlnqa, tna Iranlana Indleatad that, whlla thalr ability to 
influanea ttit Hltballah «aa waning, tha Hltballah had not klUad 
Bucklayi ha had In fact dlad aavaral Bontlu aarllU-Of nat^ 
cauaaa. Ma hava tinea tubatantiatad thla Infer 
of rathar Janco and Oavld Jacobaan, both of whoa Indleata ^at 
cklay probably diad on Juno 3, IXS of pnaua»nla-llka ayaptoaa. 



l«x of natuni _^ 
■ eflB In d«£n«W 



»»>•.•. V«««ii*^ In ald-Movambar , 
v^ >^«> , *ibUOprtsa Mlnlitar't 



^lla throM^h 
fflea _^ 

of Iiraal was convlncad that tha 
with Iran on • hlgh-laval dlale^a 
official (North! for tha najaa of a 
could dlacraatly >■•*"*''_ f" ''•*n f 
paasanqara and earao. ^a wa ra an 
^try- 



tanlor offlcar In tha, <?Vv 



«d,,*»p»a u a i » a auea_d^| 
6a naiaa of tha propria 



Inca wa had^ 

ahlpmant. __^ . 

paatad to tha laraali. «hd lUBiaqa 
r"*'^ chartarad through nomal ceaaoaja i a l e aaaata 

>^*-***-'' Tal A»lv to Tabrii, Iran, on M oaaafear 2i, 1 

"*■ laarnad that tha Itraalia, raiPonTi nq rn liTTifTfT-^-r*" ■ 

" .^^^^ tha Iranlana, utad tha airet»*<— WTranaport II NAMK altailaa to 

U^ Iran in an af fort t9,-kaTrfova tha itatic air dafanaaa around 

,^ ^ahran. Tha J>»««tl« wara unwlttlnq of tha CI*.' a Involvaaant In 




uanu « 

Tt» fro 



»->»' 



, «• unwl 



tirlinp-tha tha alrlina 
Jroxiiaataly $12'',700 
Tinq of tha cargo thay carriad 



waa paid— at th g "irMl fn—rela 
I . TOa alrlina paraonaljwara al 



rclal 
Ito 






(ha laraall daUvary of HAWK aliallay raliad aarloua U.S. concarna 
that thaaa dallvariaa wara jaopardlilng our ob]activa of arranging 

dlract aaatlng with high-laval Iralilan offlelala. Ai a conaa- 
quanea of U.S. initiatlva and by mutjual agraaaant of all thraa 
partiaa, thaaa aiaallaa wara aubaaqxiantly racurnad to laraal In 
rabruary 1)1*. 



On Dacambar 7, tha Praaldant convanaa a aaatlng In tha whlta 
Houaa (raaldanea) to dlacuaa naxt it4pa In our afforta to 
aatafiliah dlract contact with tha Irifilana. Attandlng tha 



t«w>.. i.K 

Tor itcnirt 



ij*s»VJ»« "W.""**- ik*"'*^ 




683 



^M SjfBM^ 






m««fHi^ wart th« Chl«f of Stiff. S«er«t»rl«i of Stiet »nd 

0«f*n««, tft« D«puty Olrtetor of Ctntril Int«llig«ne«, and th« 
Aiilatint to th« Pr«iid«nt for National Saeurity Affalrt and hit 
Oaputy. Imm«dlat»ly aftar tn« maatlnq. Mr. Mcfarlana dtpartad 
for London to iM«t with tha laraall official and tna Iranian 
contact to maka claar tha natura of our intaraat in a dlaloqua 
with Iran. At thli maatlnq, nr . Hcfarlana, at Inatructad by tha 
Praaldant. atatad that: 

cha U.S. wai opan \o a political dlaloqua with Iran, but 
t.iat no «uch dlaloqua could ma»a proqrtat for as lonq at 
groups taan at dominattd by Iran nald U.S. hottaqati and 

tha U.S. could undar no clrcumatancat tranaftr armt to Iran 
in axchanqa for hoataqat. 

Thaia points wara mada dlractly to tha Iranian Intar locutor . Tha 
Iranian raplitd that, unlast nit atsociataa in Tahran wara 
stranqthanad, thay could not risk qoinq ahaad with tha dialoqua. 
Hr . Mcfarlana acknowladqad tha position but statad wa could not 
chanqa our position. In a taparata mcatinq with tha laraall 
official, Mr. McFarlana mada claar our stronq ob]actlont to tha 
Israali shtpmant of tha TOW missllas. Followlnq thasa maatlnqt, 
,Mr . Mcfarlana raturnad to wathinqton and shortly tharaaftar laft 
actlva qovarnraant larvlca. 

On January 2. tha Prima Mlnlttar of Israal dlspatchad a spaclal 
amissary to tha U.S. (Amiran Nlr) to rcviaw proposals for nast 
stapt in daallnq with Iran. Tha Israalit urqad that wa rtcontldar 
tha issua of providinq limitad dafansiva arms to thosa attamptlnq 
to taka powar in Tahran, slnca all othar incantlvat (aconoaic 
astlstanca, madical supplias, machina parts) wara of no valua In 
shorinq-up thosa who wantad an opaninq to tha watt. Admiral 
Poindaxtar notad our strinqant ob]actions to tha HAWK missila 
shipments in Novanbar and notad that tha U.S. would hava to act 
to hava them raturnad (a stap undartakan in February, when all 
13 missiles were returned to Israeli. In that any implementation 
of the Israeli proposals would require the active participation 
of the intelliqence community, the NSC Staff (North! was tasked 
to prepare a covert action findinq. Work on this Presidential 
findinq commenced on January 4. 

On January 6, tha President, tha Vice President, the Chief of 
Staff, and the National Security Advisor and his assistant 

reviewed tho first draft of tha flndmq and the recommendationt 
made by the Prime Hlnltter of Itraal throuqh hit special 
emissary. 

On January ', tha President mat In the Oval Office with the Vice 
President, tha Chief of Staff, Secretaries Shulti and weinberqer. 
Attorney General Haata, Director Casey, and the National Security 



T^JfepMZ^ 



umft@siFr£9 



684 



Vq»-TriH>rr_ 



:;ii^:^-;LU 



>dvl(oc CO ditcufi the ovartlL tltuiclon In Inn and protpacti 
for • «tr*t«4ie dltloqu*. If- "•> t^n.n noc«d eh«c Hr . ncrtrUna, 
on raturn fro* his trip to London, nad r«convn«nd«d that no 
(urth«r action b« takan unltat a macnaniiffl couLd b« titabUshad 
by whlcK th« U-S. could anart battar control ovar avanta. Ha 
aqraad. In prlnclpla. with Dtractor Caaay that providing Umitad 
quantltlaa of dafanaiva arma attar tha hoataqat wara calaaaad 
atlll had martt. Both Sacratary Shultt and Sacratary wainbarqar 
objactad tu any proviiton o( arma, citinq that wa could not ba 
lura that thaaa would raally halp loodarata alamanta and that. i( 
aipofad, tha pro)act would not ba undaratood by modarata A^aba 
and would ba. aaan a* contravaninq our policy of not daallnq with 
atataa that aupport tarroriaa. Tha Praaidant dacidsd that wa 
should attanrpt to kaap tha Israali channal actlva at lonq aa It 
offarad poaaibilitlaa for maatincja with hiqh-laval Iranian 
otflciala and laft opan tha lasua of providing dafanaiva araa to 
Iran if all tha hoataqaa wara ralaaiad. 

It waa furthar datarminad by tha Prtaidant that any dlalogua with 
tha Iraniana muat ba aimad at achiaving tha following goals: 

Oavislng a formula for ra-astabi 1 shing a atratagic 
ralationship with Tahran. 

Ending tha Iran-Iraq War on honorabla tarma. 

Convincing Iran to caasa iti support tor tarrorlsm and 
radical lubvarsion. 

Malping ansura tha tarritorial intagrity of Irair and 
coordinating ways in which wa night countar Soviat 
activitiaa in tha ragion. 

Tha Prasidant mada claar that a Wastarn dialogua with Iran would 
ba pracludad unLass Iran wara willing to usa its influanca to 
achiava tha ralaasa of Wastarn hostagas in Bairut. Ha also aada 
claar that wa could not and would not engaqa in trading arms for 
hostagas. Sacratarias Shultt and wambargar ratainad thalr 
original position on providing any amrs to Iran, but Attornay 
Ganaral na*sm and Diractor Casay both supportad tha concapt as a 
valid naana of opaning tha dialogua. Attornay Ganaral Haasa 
notad a Hll datarnination by than Attornay Ganaral Franch S»lth 
that transfarrlng snail quantitias of arms through third 
eountrias undar a Covart Action rinding was not lllagal. 




UNeiitssiF:tD 



685 



^T5»^rgCKrr 



.iOJ13tj;80,;;f;y 



-On J«nu«ry U, • mattln? ><•• h«ld In th« N«tion«l Security 
Adviior't offlc* with S«cr«t*ry w«inb«r9«r. Attorney C«n«r»l 
H«a««, Oiraccor C«t«y, <nd CIA Cancral Count«l Stanley Sporkln. 
At thi« ■••tin?, th« final draft ot tha Covart Action Findinq aa« 
r«vl«H«d and wai (oruardad to tha Praildant with Sacratary 
walnbarfar dltiantinq. 

On January 17. 19«6. tha Praildant appcovad a Covart Action 
flndinq (Tab A) diractinq that tha intal 1 iijanca community procaad 
with ipacial activltiaa aimad at acconpl lahlng tha qoali sat 
forth abova. Tha Praildant futhar datarminad that tha actlvltiat 
autnorizad by tha Finding juitlflad withholding prior Con<;raii lonal 
notification dua to tha axtrania lanaitlvtty of tha dlaloqua bainq 
aitabUahad. Ha furthar notad that public knowladqa of tha 
program would placa tha Ajiarlcan hoataqaa In Labanon at qrtatar 
riiK. Noting hn concarn for tha llvai of thoia carrying out tha 
oparatton (both U.S. and foraiqn), ha dlractad that tha Olractor 
of Cantral IntaUiijanca rafrain fro* raportinq tha finding to tha 
appropriata comnittaai of tha Conqrais until raaacnably iura that 
thota involvad would no longar ba In jaopardy... 

On rabruary i-l . ajk. official! {}tS(i-M<l CIA | 
rapraiantatlva of Iha Israali frlma Mlnlatf 
■ lava! Ira nian officia l 

London. At this naatlng, tha Iraniani agraad 

if tha use would provida dafansiva waapons (TOWtl to Iran, 
thay would, in turn, provida latna to tha Afghan Hujahidaan. Tha 
U.S. sida agrtad to axplora this possibility and, working with 
tha Israalis, astablishad tha following machanlsn for transfar oC 
tha waapons: 

Tha Iranian intarmadiary IChorbanif ar ) would daposit funds 
in an Israali account. 

Tha Israalis would transfar funds to a starila U.S.- 
controllad account in *n ovarsaas bank. 

Using thasa funds, tha CIA would covartly obtain aatarlal 
authorirad for transfar fron U.S. miiitat-y stocks and 
transport this to Israal for onward movamant to Iran. 

Using tha procaduras stipulated abova, S3.7 million was daposltad 
in tha CIA account in Ganava on February 11, 1916 and on 
February M, 1,000 TOWs ware transported to Israel for pre-positlon- 
ing. Thasa TOWi ware transferred by CIA fro« DOO (U.^^Armi^^ 
s 'ocks in Annli ton, Alabama) and transpo^a^through H^^|^B 
H^^^^mim^l using CIA-000 mi^l^l^l logistics 

arrangements. Policy-level coordinationforthasa arrangamanti 
was effected by NSC (North) with OOO lArnitaga) and CIA (Clair 
George). Tha TOMs wara placed in a covart Israeli facility 
awaiting onward shipaant. 



686 



10 ' ■' " * 



On r*brvi«ry 11-21. U.S. (NSC (nd CIAI , ItraMi and IrtnUn 
efdclalt Mt in C«rfi«ny to dlacutt problaa* In (crtMlnq 
SMatinq uionf ni9h «r-t«v«l ottlel«t«. At mi l iiwttM. th« 
Ir«nl«ni comml tttdT ^ 




r«c«lv»d trom wathlnqtoa. th« 0.1. aid* tfravd to provida 
1.300 TOW* to Iran a* a claar alqnal of U.S. *lnc*ri.t)r. Thl* 
d*Uv*ry V** conaancad on th* morning o( ratomry 20 and 
coirpl*t*d In tvo cranait* to T*hran on r*bruar|r 21. Trana- 
portation froa laraal to Iran wa* aboard a fala* (laq Iiraall 
aircraft. 




On rabruary 24. U.S. ICIA and NSC) official* aat a^vla In 
Frankfurt with th* IiraaU and Iranian officiali to dlicua* naxt 
itapa. At thl* naatlnq, th* U.S. tida urqad th*< Uia Ir*al,«n* 
*xp*dlt* a Biaatinq aaonq hiqh*<-l*v*l o<ficl*B 4k both *Dlba. ^ 

Cn r*bruary 2t, th* Prim* Mlnlat*r of laraal wrot* to Pr*ild*nt . 
Ii*a9an (Tab SI urginq continuad *(forts to acht^* < itrataqie '' 
br*akthrouqn with Iran, buC aaklnq conrtdaratf » for tha aAfaty 
of racantly laizad Iiraall. tottaqai. 

On March T, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israali r epr*>*nta tiv*i oiat 
with tha Iranian intarm«diary in Pirii to d«t*rmin* wh*th*r any 
furthar proqraai wai poiilbla m arranging !or a hiqh-laval 
m**tinq with U.S. and Iranian official*. Ourinq thaaa maatinq*. 
th* int*rin«dlary aaiphaiiiad tha d*t*r lorat inq aconomic iltuation 
in Iran and Iranian anziati** r*qardin<; incraaiinq Iraqi allltary 
af {*ctiv*n*aa. 

Tha aicalatlon of tanilon* with Libya, laadlng up to th* April 14 
strik*. pr*v*nt*d furth*r dltloqu* froa talMlif P^F* '"«^1 "<* S 
Iranian* ur9«4 th* Intaraa^ary (Chorbanif ar) to acc*l*rat* th* 
•ffort in lata April. l*l(. At that point, tha Iranian axpatriata 
adviiad ui through tha Iiraall point-of -contact chat tha 
Icadarihlp in Tahran wai praparad to coonanca a sacrat dialoqua 



XO£,><CRfeT 



UMBliiSSifJEi) 



687 



So-^tMXl— 



yi^ill#cR|Htll 



with th« Unittd ftittt »lo(H th« Ub«i of our •ttabUihad foali. 
»•• b«U*va that th« Iranian* war* tttaulatad ta ra n«« tha conta ct 




ira, who "at 

with hla In luropa at tha tn4 of April, that ttM Iranlana dl4 not 
wiih to ba tceuaad of any culpabtUty tn filburw'a da ath. 




On Hay (. ''. 1<((. U.S. and ItraaU efflear* aat In London with 
tha Iranian Intarmadlary In which ha urqad that wa taka Imadlata 
stapa CO arranqa for a hl^h-laval U.S. /Iranian aaatlnq In Tahran. 
During tha London maatlnf, tha Iranian virfad that wa (U.S. and 
Itraal) taka limadlata itapa to halp with Iranian air dafania. 
Ha amphatliad that tha Iraqi Air rorca waa Incraaalnqly affactlva 
of lata and that tha Iranlana wara daaparata to atop attacka ea 
population cantara. Tha laraaUs also vjtad thl* opportunity ta 
prlvataly aik tha U.S. to raplaca tha iOI TOWa which thay had 
sant to Iran In *u<}uit, 19IS. Tha IsraaUa wara Infonnad via 
codad mataaqa on Hay 19 that tha U.S. had aqraad to tha Iranian 
raquaat for Umitad antl-alr dafania aqulpaant and to raplanlsh 
tha }0I TOWa tant by laraal. 

Batad on asiurancas that wa could it laat aaat faca-to-faca with 
top-lavil Iranian offlciala, on Hay 1}. tha Praiidant authorltad 
a sacrat million to Tahran by foraar National Sacurlty Advlior 
HcFarlana. iccompanlad by a CIA annuitant, CIA coimunlcators , 
mamcari of tha NSC staff, and tha Israall and Iranian Intarlocu- 
tora. 

On Hay It. tha Iranians, through tha Israall* provldad t(.9M for 
daposit in tha CIA sacura funding aachanlsa. Tha funda wara uaad 
to acquira !0i TOW alssllas (for riplanishlnq tha TOW* Israal 
shlppad In Saptambar 19(!l and acquiring HAWK alsslla^^actronl^^ 
parts. This matarlal was suCsaquantly aovad tc^^^^|^P^| 
[rapackaqad and ihlppad to (tally A/i for onward movasiant to 
araal on Hay 22. Aa In tha Fabruary ihlpaant, tha CIA provldad 
loqlitlca support for tha a»va«ant of thia lutarlal to Israal. 

In ordar to anaura oparatlonal sacurlty, tha HcFarlana trip wa* 
mada froa Israal, colneldant with tha dallvary of a pallat of 
spara part* for Iranian dafanalv* waapona systaata (HAMK spar* 



tM 8 IC» I X ^ 




""TT^ 



m 



688 



TM/StHlT 



!!t^P|||pRTVjj 



• Itctronlc partil. Ac tn« loft^^c rcquoe of tha Irinltni. 
*li«t tertiqn docvuMncicion ^^H^ -- obctlnad fro* th« CIA -- 

• •• ui«d. CIA alfo provld«4 cov«rt trtni;>ort»tl.on tupport fron 
COMO« to Hri«l for th« Hcf«rl*n« p«rty. Th« qroup wii 
trinsporctd fron Iirtal to T«nran it>o«rd an liraaU Air rorc* 707 
with f«la« fl*q iLtrJtlnq*. 

In tn« cour»« of th» four-diy l««y 25-2»l viiit, Itnqthy m««tln<9i 
x*r* h«ld vith n^n-l«v«l Ir«nl«n officials, eh« firit diract 
contact batwaan tna two qovarnmantt in ovar alx yaara. Hr. 
McFarlana and nia taaa vara abla to attabUih tha basl* for a 
continuing raiatlonihip and ciaacly acticulata our ob]actlvaa, 
concarna, and intantiona. Tha qroup was alio abla to astaia 
flrat hand tha intarnal political dynamic In Tahran and tha 
affact of tha war which Irtn claarly can no lonqar win. Ualnq 
Frasidantial ly approvad Tana* of Rafaranca ITab Bl . which had 
baan raviawad and approvad by appropriata Cabinat offlcars. 
Hcrarlana amphatiiad that our intarast in Iran tranacandad tha 
hoatagas, but tha continuad datantion of hostagas by a Labanasa 
group philosophically allgnad with Iran pravantad proqrasa. 
During tha visit, Hr. ncfarlana mada claar: 

that wa tundanantallr^e^f^sail t^lOT attorta to cs^t^ 

frora tha Mlddla Eaat; " 

that wa fimly opposad thalr usa of tarroriami 

that wa accaptad thair ravolutlon and did not saak to 
ravarsa it: 

that wa had nunarous othar disaqraamants involving raqional 
policias (i.a.. Labanon, Nicaragua, ate), but mlqht alao 
find araas of coaanon Intarast (i.a., Afghanistan and tha 
Soviat thraat to tha Gulf) through dialoqua. 

During thasa maatings. both sidas usad tha :)pportunity to datail 
tha obataclas to lOiplemant ing a stratagic ralationship batwaan 
tha two countriaa. In addition to tha points notad abova. Mr. 
McFarlana emphasizad tha political problams causad by Iranian 
involvamant in tha hostaga issua. Tha Iranians objactad to tha 
use ambargo on U.S. ailitary supplias alraady paid for plua tha 
continuad USC blocking of Iranian assats in tha U.S., »vn aftar 
U.S. courts had rulad in thalr favor. During tha coursa of thasa 
maatlngs, tha Iranian officials adnittad that thay could not win 
tha war, but wara in a dllania In Tahran ovar how to and tha 
conflict givan tha naad to prasant an Iranian 'victory* bafora it 
could ba concludad. Thay amphaaizad that tha original aggrassor, 
Saddan Hussaln, aust ba raaovad froa powar in ordar for tha war 



' J^t^ifCnt^ 



UMftSSIFIcD 



689 







On June 10, M4jUi Sp«*k*r H<fi«n)*nl, in i fpcach In Tihrtn uda 
(jtj«rd«4 r*t«r«nc« to Iranltn Inttrttt in improvad ralatloni «ith 
th* U.S. On July ](. r*th«r Uiwrtnc* J«nco «•> r«U*s«d in th« 
t»Xk» yallay tnd found hi* »ty to « l/rlan aiiltarir ehockpolnt. 

On Au9u(t 3, tha raitalnln^ thraa paUati (lai* than S planaload) 
of alactronle parti (or Iranian antl-aircratt daCaniat (HAWI 
■Italia tub-coaponantil arrlvad In Tahran. K§ In all fllqhta 
to/froa Iran thla dallvary vaa nada with an tsraati Air rorea 
aircraft 1707) uainq (alia (laq Barkinqa. Tlainq of tha dallvary 
wat baaad en coordination aaon^ U.S., Iiraall an4 Iranian 
offlclali. 

In aarly Auquat IIK, tha contact with tha Iranian axpatrlata 
baqan to (ocua axclualvaly on tha vllllnqnaii of tha USG to 
provlda ailitary ataistanca to Iran in axchanqa for hoitaqat and 
wo aouqht to aatabllth dlffarant channali of co— unieatlon which 
would laad ut aora dlractly to praqmatic and aodarata alamanta In 
tha Ira.x.lan niararachy. In aid-Aufutt, a privata Aaarican 
citiian inCEN Richard Sacord, USA/ IRat.ll acting within tha 
purviaw of t ha Jiniiiry ffa-irl frrlpn rindlnq, aada contact in 
Curopa with(^^MBpHBm^BgHH^a ralativa ^MBlM^f a 
• anior Iraniano^ ncTal (Kaf lanjanl) : with tha aWWlTnca of tha 
CIA, this Iranian ^^B waa brought covartly to Washington for 
datailad dltcuttiont . Ha ]udqad this atfort to b« utaful in 
attabliihinq contact with a cloaa confidant of tha aan judqad to 
ba tha aoat Ini'luantlal and praqsatic political flgura in Iran 
(Kaf tan^ani) . Thaaa diicuialons riafflraad tha basic ot))activas 
of tha U.S. in taaklnq a political dialoqua with Tahran. Wa also 
provldad assaataants daiiqnad to diicoura^a an Iranian offansiva 
and contrlbuta to an Iranian dacition to naqotiata an and to tha 
war. Tha assaatmanta also datailad tha Soviat thraat to Iran. 

Through Auquat, Saptaabar, and October l)lt, nuaarous additional 
naatinqi wara hald in turopa batwaan U.S. raprasantatlvat and tha 
nav Iranian contacts. During tha Oetobar }i, 1*1( aaatinq in 
rrankfurt, Caraany, tha U.S. tida, as in tha paat, inalstad that 
tha ralaasa of tha hoata.gaj was a pra-raqulslta to any proqrass. 
Tha Ifihl'B' Bfl^HHHHB ir9*4 that »a t aka a aera ac tiva 
in supeect fo^tniTJklShS^raslitanca 




7or jJcia*^ .^ 



\iWdmmtxd 



690 



ilNiKiAmitii 



Th« Iranlint »l«o prqff«r«d. «n4_^ia_itj_ » ■ lecapttd. th« otttr of 

• Sovlat ""'' i^B^Hi^H^^'^9' ^'^* 

otftrad to provtd* ^eop^ottho <00^«9« lnt«trofl«tlon of lalrut 
Scttlon Chl«f wiUliii iuc»l«y. *t thlt nwacin^, ^|||>titt<l ih»t 
chara was a 'vary qood chanca chat anothar AiMrlean or two vould 
ba (raad aocn.' On oetobar J«. with u.t. acqulacanca, laraal 
provtdad tran with an additional incraaant of dafanalva waapona 
1500 TOW niaillasl . 

Lata on Oetobar 31 .|^|^HP^)HBH'=*^^*^ eltlian 

IHakial taakad to malntaTn contact and advliad that Iran had 
'aiarclaad Ita Influanca with tha Labanasa' In ordar to obtain 
tha ralaasa of an Aoiarican — David Jacobaan — and an jncartaln 
nuaibar of rranch hoataqaa. Ra furthar notad that thla would ba 
part of tha purposa of tha Iranian roralqn Hlnlstar'a visit 
Syria — an avant wa bacaiaa awara of on Novaiibar 1. 19t(. ^ 
statad that tha situation in Tahran, aa wall as Iranian Inriua nca 
ovar Hitballah wara both datarioratinq 




David Jacobsan was ralaasad by his captors naar tha old 
Mnarican Einbaisy compound in Wast lalrut. Tha U.S. Eiabassy In 
Cast Bairut innadiataly dispatchad an aiMassy officar to waat 
Sairut to pick up Mr. Jacobsan. 

It Is now apparant that parsistant U.S. afforts to astabllsh 
contact with Iran and subaaquant public spaculation raqardlnq 
thasa contacts hava probably axacarbatad tha powar struqqla in 
Iran batwaan praqmatic alamants Had by Mfsan)anl) and aora 
radical (actions lundar tha ovarall sponsorship of Ayatollah 
Montaiaril . In lata Oetobar, radical supportars lot Hontatari) 
ravaalad tha (Rafsanjani) contact with tha USC and tha taras of 
tha contact. In ordar to dafand hinsalf aqainst cnarqas of 
colludlnq with tha USC and to prasarva a daqraa of latituda for 
both partlas. Majlis Spaakar Kafsanjani providad a purposaly 
dlstortad varsion of tha Hay I9li NcFarlana mission in his 
Novambar 4 addrass to tha massas. Hodarata Iranian political 
laadars apparantly now faal constrainad to lattla thair intarnal 
political problans bafora procaadinq with tha U.S. ralatlonship. 
Tha ravalatlona in Tahran raqardinq tha McFarlana mission ara 
damonstrabla avidanca of tha Intarnal powar struqqla. Tha 
Oetobar \9»t arraat of radical laadar Hahdl Hashani. a cloaa 
confidant and son in-law of Ayatollah Hontatari. for acts of 
tarrorlSB and treason haa causad furthar intarnal conflict. 

Rasolutlon of tha L«banon hoataqa tttuation is also complicatad 
by waninq Iranian influanca In Labanon dua In part to financial 
constraints and tha face that tha Llbyana ara aipandinq thair 



TOf sEcurr 



UlASIEASSfFicD 



691 




On Novaabar 7, tha day a<car a Baatln^ with U.S. offlclalt, 
Iranian fovarninant authorldaa arraatad Hx othar Indlvlduala 
Involvad In radical actlvltiaa. Aaonq tha tvo war* ianlor 
military oCfleara and a Ma]lla daputy IMwad Kaahanll . tha 
grandion o( Ayatollah Xaahanl , a conaplrator In tha liii attaapt 
aijainat tha Shah. 

Daaplta thaaa intarnal dltflcultlaa and attandant publicity In 
tha waatarn nadla, tha Iranlana centlnua to aalntain dlract 
ntact with tha USC and mat aqain In Ganava on Novan^ar )-10 

' \JA 

contlnua to coonun 



<lth MSC and CIA rapraiantatl vaa . ^ 
unicata vllH tha U.S. 




dltcloauraa cou 



parionally and tha lonqar-tar 



Intaraata o( tha tvo countrlaa. 



It ii Important to nota that tinea tha Initiation of tha USO 
contact with Iran thara haa baan no avidanca of Iranian ^ovarn- 
mant complicity In acta of tarrorlaa aqainit tha U.S. fa do not 
know who laliad tha laat thraa Aaiarican hoataqaa In Balrut 
IHaaara. Raad, Clclpplo, and Tracy). rt\9 lalaalc Jihad 
Orqanltation IIJOI haa dlaclalawd rasponalblllty -- aa hava o\jr 
Iranian Inta clc 

It 11 poaalbla that tVaaa thraa 
naricana wara kidnappad at tha dlraction of Iranian radlcala 



TOP SECRTT 



b'N€EffS3lF'E0 



692 



j^^j^e^^ 






loyci to th« now imprisoned M«hdi H«ih«ffi. If to, thu could be 
«n •ffort to und«rniin« tn» na«c«nt U.S.-Ir«ni«n str«teqic 
dialogu* and «x4carbat« tn« internal Iranian pow«r struggle 
a9«insc th« pragmatic faction with wnich we nave been in contact. 

Throughout this process, the USC has acted within the limits of 
established policy and in compliance with all U.S. law. The 
shipment of 2,001 U.S. TOWs and 235 HAhfK missile electronic spare 
parts was undertalcen within the provisions o( * Covert Action 
Finding. 

During the course of this operation -- and before -- the U.S. was 
cognizant of only three shipments from Israel to Iran. 
Specifically: 

The Israelis aclinowledged the August 1985 shipment of 509 
TOWS after it had taken place. Until we were advised by the 
Israelis, and had the information subsequently confirmed by 
Iranian authorities, we were unaware of the composition of 
the shipment. "e subsequently agreed to replace these TOWt 
in nay of 1986. 

The November 1985 shipment of 19 Israeli HAWX missiles was 
not an authorized exception to policy. This shipment was 
retrieved in February 1996 as a consequence of U.S. 
intervention . 

The October 1996 shipment of 500 TOWs from Israel to Iran 
was undertaken with U.S. acquiescence. These TOWs were 
replaced on November T. 

In support of this Finding and at the direction of the President. 
the CIA provided the following operational assistance: 

CIA communications officers and an annuitant to assist in 
various phases of the operation. 

Sterile overseas bank accounts tor financial transactions. 

A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S. 
military itens from the U.S. 

Transhipment of military items from the U.S. to Israel. 

Communications and intelligence support for the meetings 
with Iranian officials and the McFarlane trip to Tehran in 
May. 



bN^K^Icl^d 



! 



I 



693 



^^^•c*r 




Cl<*r«d maatinq iltai In lurop* for naatinqi with IrtnUn 
o((lel*lt. 

rabrleacad and illaa docuaantatlen (er U.S. and (otaifn 
offielala for maatinqa in turopa and Tahran. 

Tha waapon* and xatarlal prevldad vindar thla proqraa wara judqad 
CO ba inadaquaca .co' altar althar tha balanea of nliltary po«ar or 
tha outcoira of tha «ar with Iraq. Thay hava , howavar, da«onitrat« 
tha U.S. conattmant to Iranian tarrltorlal Intaqrlty and iarvad 
to aupport thoaa In Iran tntaraatad In opanlnq a itrataqlc 
ralatlonahlp with tha U.S. U.S. afforta ovar tha iaat li aentha 
hava had tanqibla raaulta on Iranian policyi 

Tha IUttan)anl/VaUyati Intarvantion on bahalt of tha TVA 
tl47 patianqari (Juna DIJI. 

-— Iranian dlraction that tha hl]ackad Pan km CI would not ba 
racaivad in Iranian tarritory if it laft Karachi. 



Tha ralaaaa of thraa Aaarican and at laaat two franch 
hoatagaa. 

Tha initiation of an Iranian dlaloqua with thair raqlonal 
naiqhbora. 

Continuad dalay In tha Iranian 'final offanalva.* 

Finally, It mute alao ba notad that tha U.S. arna aatbarqo 
notwlthatandinq. Watt Curopaan nations hava provldad tSOO ■illlon 
a yaar in military aqulpnant to Iran. Moat of thaaa trtntfata 
wara accomplishad with fovarniaant Itnowladqa and/or acqulatcanca. 

All appropriata Cablnac Offlcari hava baan appriiad throughout. 
Tha Conqraia wai not brlafad on tha covart action rindlnq dua to 
tha axtraordlnary tanaitivlty of our Iranian contactt and tha 
potantial conaaquancat for our ttrataqic position In Southwast 
Asia. Finally, our affortt to achlava tha ralaasa of tha 
hostaqas in I^banon Bust contlnua to raly on discraat contacts 
and Intarsadlarlss who cannot partoni if thay ara ravaalad. 



•^wjtawT 



'utWiMi*§.r.'^'^ 



694 



^^iimmi 



3 -£;;yu5s^ o.&/>N4ijj _^ T^^iuA. ^^^-'^^wv.^^g^ 



UNCLASSIFrtD 



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