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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

Y l.l/2:SeriaI 13749 

100-1: United States Congre... 



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JULlilSSO 









100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 8 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13749 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 8 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. - Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987.— Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnitcd States Senate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman V^ 
Vice Chairman 



III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 20615 

(202) 226-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fo^-Yelease to the public. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courier, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Ray nor 
Joseph D. 

Small wood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



♦The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katharine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority' Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Sjjencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 8 



Preface XXI 

Crawford, Susan 1 

Crowe, Adm. William J 121 

Currier, Kevin W 193 

DCM, Country 15 267 

DEA Agent 1 311 

DEA Agent 2 637 

DEA Agent 3 905 

deGraffenreid, Kenneth 979 

de la Torre, Hugo 1037 

Deputy Chief "DC" 1055 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Bamett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Rudd). 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., Jr. 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 15 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhome A. 
Mulligan, David R 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Volume 24 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refiising to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



xxm 



.1 



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25 



TOP SEC 

uNcmsra 



RET 



DEPOSITION OF SUSAN CRAWFORD 

Monday, June 15, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, O.C. 



* 



The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:20 p.m. in 
Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, with Joseph 
Saba, House Select Committee, presiding. 

Present: On behalf of House Select Committee: 
Joseph Saba, Roger Kreuzer, and Robert Genzman. 

Also Present: Robert J. Winchester, Special Assistant 
to the Secretary of the Army for Legislative Affairs; 
John Wallace, DOA. 



aider provWoiH of E.0. 123S6 
SMo, NaiioiM] Security Councfl 







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82-702 0-88-2 



STEIN/bap 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

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20 

21 

22 

23 

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mm^m 



RET 



Whereupon, 

SUSAN CRAWFORD 
having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, 
and was examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Ms. Crawford, for the record, could you please 
state your full name and give us background as to your 
present duties, when you came to your prei^t station and 
a little bit of an explanation, aboutithej 
system? ' ~y^ *: ^ _' 

A My name is Susan Craw£ord7 I,^|^the Generals J^ 
Counsel for €Re Depaz!tB^lt4i^^nny pxiA have be^ General 
Counsel since Septemb«erbf"l^^ ^~ .. '*^ --^ 

For two years prior to that, from September '81 
to '83, I was the principal Deputy General Counsel for the 
Department of Army. I report directly to the Secretary of 
the Army, Jack Marsh. When I was the Deputy, I reported to 
the then General Counsel, and of course the office reported: 
to the Secretary oiLdthe Kcm^. .^^ 

In th«-**i V"* * S^f— largitly ingsg^cd.to a nuaber 
of systemic probleas ~tbat b«d. beea^ (ui< 



result of 
the so-called ^mllow frui^BEBvestig^^ion, th«r^a^-ntab- 




lished a new offi 



Parttaly 




ONS^SSHIilT 




1 purpose of that office was to get o«ntralix«d control of all 

2 classified programs both in the procurement and special 

3 projects special support to other agencieSf^s «r«ll as all 

4 special access programs that ttv^Amj^ould deal in. 

5 The office worked directly under the Vice Chief of 

6 Staff of the Amy, and Is the centr;>\ clearinghouse for 

7 Army support to other agencies that would be in the 

8 sensitive or classified arena. This office establishes a 

9 paper flow, a trail, an audit of requests coming through 

10 the Army through the 

11 This office contain^^^^^^^Hpeople, including 

12 an Army Judge Advocate, an Army lawyer, and they work up 

13 the paper that becomes the request that flows through the 

14 Army leadership and basically from the 

15 ^^^^^1 the action, the request for Army support would 

16 go to the Judge Advocate General, the legal member of the 

17 Army staff, to the Vice Chief of Staff and the Chief of 

18 Staff, and then come to Secretary, the civilian leadership, 

19 which includes my office, before it finally goes to the 

20 Office of the Secretary of the Army. 

21 So we have basically three legal reviews along the 

22 way, the initial one| 

23 by an Army General Advocate, a review by the Office of the 

24 Judge Advocate General as the action goes to the Army staff, 
oe and when it comes to the Secretar iafc,--i t comes to my office. 





mmm 



1 and I personally review the actions as they come through. 

2 I have an attorney in my office assigned to be 

3 the action officer who would first review the action, and 

4 then bring it to me with his recommendations, and we would 

5 then review it together, and then it would go on to the 

6 Secretary of the .'.rmy. This is our normal] 

7 procedure in the headquarters of the Department of the 

8 Army and to the best of my knowledge until the TOW missile 

9 incident arose in January '86, I was not aware of any 

10 actions that had been outside of this^^^^^^^^^l system 

11 or outside of this process. 

12 Q If you would, could you explain for us how the 

13 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^K would for example, early 

14 January ' 86 a request from the CIA for support were to come 

15 to the Army? What type of paper would normally be generated 

16 by the agency in its request, and if you could briefly 

17 walk us through the movement of that paper to the point where 

18 the agency would receive the equipment, let's just call it 

19 the equipment requested. 

20 A To the extent that I am knowledgeable, at some point 

21 along the way my involvement either hasn't begun yet or has 

22 ceased to exist — 

23 Q If you could also recall not only the titles of the 

24 persons to whom it %rauld go, but if you could at that time, 

25 January '86, mention for us the names of the persons to whom 



mmm. 



Ofjea^iffT 



1 

2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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12 
13 
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it would 90- 

A W« are talking about requeflts here as they come in. 
That is an lanportant distinctiom, because looking at the 
TOW transfer and later the Hawick that was not a request 
earning thro'i^h the system, that was an order to execute. 
Q Vert's take the pre January 15th — 
A Tz^ normal type of action. 

Q t,ert's assume for the sake of our example January 6, 
1986, we doc't knew anything about what is going to happen 
and it is v*z^t you might view as a routine request for 
equipment t-zrm tb»-agency. 

Z vould like you to eatplaflp to-iis how thaliNiw^ld 
enter the #75tem and how it woa2.d be processed. 

A I- would come to the Axmy from the JCS. The 
agency woulx£ send the request co the joint staff, the joint 
staff woul^ -then take it to the Army, and I assume to the 
other servloes, although I can^'t speak to 




Q So the JCS would rece^'ve the paper from the 
agency and one of the members <s£. the JCS would then 
take i1 

A TS»ey would have 

Q 9Bio was the person a^ -:that time who headed it up? 

A ra» the JCS I do not icaKjw. In the Army in January 



iHTObnJjWfififtlT 



UIKKKIKII&ET 



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of '86 It would have bee 





Q So the request would go to the JCS and they would 
refer tc 

A I don't think they call^^^^^^^^^^^H I don't 
know what they would call it. ^^^^^^^^^^^Hof fice is how 
we refer to it. 

Q All right. 

A In the Army'! 
would ^en be a piece of paper that would describe what 
it is that is being requested with specificity, what type of 
equipment and the quantity of the equipment. If a 
presidential finding, for example, were involved, the 
request would reference that this is in support of a 
presidential finding on whatever country it may be, or 
whatever year of the finding, perhaps a month of the finding. 

Q Typically would the existence of a presidential 
finding be known? 

A The existence of a presidential finding would be 
known. The Army, until recently, has not been permitted 
to review presidential findings. That has been a very 
recent development, and in the Army only the Secretary and 
I are authorized to review presidential findings. 

So in January pf_'8.6j_Dp_fiae in the Army would have 





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be'^Wuthorized to review a presidential finding. However, 
we would have known that one existed, there would be a 
reference to it, specific finding and the date of the 
finding. 

O^^urse, not all requests yould reference a 
presidential finding. Some requests would be simply to 
replenish stocks of the agency and if that were the case, 
the request would then say so. 




We have a master data list called the Army 
Master Data File, the famous AMDAF, and that generally 
has a price listing for goods, for items of equipment, 
and I understand that we follow that in most cases. But 
those sorts of details would be worked out 




SIFtEftET 




1 

2 
3 

4 
5 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■then the the 

7 would start its flow through the Army leadersliip and 

8 going first, as I described earlier, through the Office 
g of the Judge Advocate General, and then to -- the 

10 Judge Advocate General in January "86 was and still is 

11 today,- General Hugh Overholdt 

12 There might be another Army staff office that 

13 would be involved depending on the nature of the request. It 

14 could be the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for lo 

15 gistics if it were an equipment issue or an intelligence 
1g issue — in January of ' 86 that was General Ben Register 
17 General Russo was his deputy. 
ig If it were an intelligence^related issue, the matter 
ig would go through the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
20 for Intelligence. At that time, the Assistant Chief of 

Staff for Intelligence, the ACSI, that is General Tom 
Weinstein, and it was in January '86 as well. It may be 
an operational issnc^!igfS>-ch would take it through the Office 
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for operations, January of 
'86, Colonel Vuono, soon to become the Chief of Staff 



UWUiKnMrfm 



OHUffilWF 



1 And then it would, of course, come through the Vice Chief of 

2 Staff, General Max Thurman, to the Chief of Staff, John 

3 Wickheim, to complete. It would not go through all of those 
^ Army — each action would not go through all those staff 

5 offices. 

6 It would depend upcn the nature of the request, 

7 but any one of those could be a stXp along the way. The 

8 Judge Advocate General is always a stop along the way as 

9 is the Chief of Staff of the Army. 

10 Q What would be the review that the Judge Advocate 

11 General would do? 

12 A Very similar to the review in my office, and . 

13 that would be one for making sure there was an underlying 

14 authority for the transfer, reviewing the terms of 

15 reference to make sure that they were adequate, 

16 reviewing — of course making sure that if it were a 

17 transfer of equipment that the Economy Act would be used. 

18 If there were any restrictions on funding, 

19 restrictions on activities, congressional restrictions, 

20 statutory restrictions, we would look to review those 

21 as well in addition to any regulatory restrjifctions that may 

22 be there. There are some activities that the Secretary — 

23 Q Would this include congressional notification 

24 requirements^ if any? 

25 A Yes. Normally, the Army has included that almost 



HSjJ^SEtbRET 



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as boiler plate in the terms of f^ reference from the very 
early days of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^R we have 
insisted upon the user notifying Congress. So that is — 
that is just a given from the Armyfljf — as one of the 
Army's conditions. 

Q <5o normally it would be correct to say the process 
provides that the Judge Advocate General would be the first 
legal review and among his reviews would be questions as to 
Congressional notification? ' 

A Actually, the first legal review would be done 
by 




just to assist in the write-ups. 

That is an early legal review, but that is not 
a substitute for the Judge Advocate General reviewing it. 

Q Does the Judge Advocate General himself usually 
give an opinion on these matters? 

A Normally, it is a concurrence, sometimes with 
a caveat here or there. Now that the general counsel is 
permitted to review the presidential findings, the Judge 
Advocate will concur subject to general counsel review of 
the presidential finding. 

Q What other legal reviews might have been involved 
in early '86 in addition to the Judge Advocate General's 



n addition to the Judge Advoc 



11 



nmsstffiBT 



11 

a review ^f^^^^^^^^^^^^l 

2 A A review done by the General Counsel's office in 

3 my office. Once the action leaves the Chief of Staff of the 
* Army, it then leaves what we call the Army staff, the uniformeld 

5 leadership of the Army, comes over to the civilian leadership 

6 side, which generally is the Secretary of the Army, sometimes 

7 the Under Secretary of the Army, depending upon the nature 

8 of the request, and always the General Counsel of the Army. 

9 So it would come to my office before it would go 

10 to the Secretary or to the Under Secretary for final 

11 approval . 

12 Q And what would you be reviewing the matter for? 

13 A Basically, the same items that I outlined that 

14 the Judge Advocate General would look to. I perhaps carry 

15 it one step further in that although my responsibilities are 

16 not in the policy area in many of these activities, if I 

17 see something that just doesn't sound right or perhaps 

18 look dumb — I call it the "Suzie from Pittsburg/test." 

19 Something doesn't strike me right, I will raise it in my 

20 office to see if we should raise it with the Secretary. 

21 Z don't substitute my judgment for that DCS/OPS 

22 in an operational matter, or the ACSI in an intelligence 

23 matter, but give it a litmus test there as to whether or not 

24 the Army is doing a smart thing. 

25 Q And your opinion would go to the Secretary of the 



^WJP^wTORfer 



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2 

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Army? 

A Yes. From time to time I have put my opinion in 
a memorandum going to the Secretary. None of the legal 
reviews work in a vacuum, however. When the action^^^^H 

if the lawyer 
has a problem with it, he will call 
upon the lawyer in the Office of the Judge Advocate General, 
as well as in my office and try to work that out before 
it goes through the formal staffing process. So we are 
not working independent of one another, but working together 
to prevent problems from arising. 

Q Would there be other legal reviews of a request. 

A In the Army there would not be. 1 can't speak 
to what would be outside of the Army. I know that the 
Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense 
occasionally gets involved. Maybe there is a review at 
the JCS level as well, and I don't know what review the 
agency or CIA or requesting agency might do. But in the 
Army, those would be the three principal legal reviews. 

Q As of January ' 86 prior to the 17th of January 
that year, had there been requests received from other 
agencies which were reviewed by the^^^^^^^^H system? 

A Had requests for support from other agencies come 
through our^^^^^^^^^Hsystem? 



Yes. 



um^iu 



13 



mmw 



1 A Yes. 

2 Q So that the system had been used — 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q You and others were familiar with the system and 

5 prepared to Ipnplement it should the requirement arise? 

6 A Yes, it had been used and is still being used 

7 as we speak, I'm sure. 

8 Q I would like to turn to the events of February 1986 

9 in connection with the provision of TOWs to the CIA, and 

10 I would ask you to explain to us in your own words how 

11 you first came to know of the matter, with whom you met 

12 and if you would explain to us the events which led to your 

13 writing the memo — your memo of 13 February 1986, which 

14 we will enter as Exhibit 1. 

15 (The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 1 

16 for identification.) 

17 BY MR. SABA: 

18 Q InVour narrative, please work up to the memo 

19 rather than backwards from it. 

20 A Sometime in late January or early February of 

21 1986 the attorney in my office who^I have described as the 

22 action attorney on requests for support that would come 

23 through the^^^^^^^^H system, his name is Tom Taylor — 

24 came to me and brought with him an Army major by the name 

25 of Chris Simpsoij. Chris Simpson was described to me by Tom 



UELI^ffin 



14 



nmmF 



14 



1 as a DCS/LOB action officer, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

2 Logistics, someone wi»0) Tom had worked on a variety 

3 °^^^^^^^^^H "^^^ said that Chris had a particular action 

4 that he was working that sounded a little curious, and 

5 he thought I should know about it. 

6 Tom and Chris came into my office and closed 

7 the door and Chris described to me what I learned he 

8 had previously described to Tom Taylor; that the Army 

9 was about to transfer something like a Stinger missile. 

10 We were not told, Tom Taylor and I, what it was specifically, 

11 but it was something like a Stinger missile. 

12 He couldn't tell us how many and therefore he' 

13 couldn't tell us how much it cost, what the transfer would 

14 be, nor could he tell us where it was going, but he wanted 

15 a legal review. Obviously, we advised Major Simpson — 

16 Q Standard form. 

17 A That we could not give him a complete legal 

18 review. He was very respectful. He did not just come 

19 in demanding a legal review, but that we could not give 

20 him a complete legal review without more information. He 

21 did establish the transfer should be done pursuant to 

22 the Economy Act on a reimbursable basis, but beyond that 

23 we couldn ' t comment further because we didn ' t have enough 

24 facts on which to operate. 

25 It was obvious to me at that meeting that Major 

IIMCIiC£lCU;iU^ 



15 



mmm 



15 



1 Simpson was very nervous. I don't recall if he said so 

2 at that meeting or if Tomr^ Taylor told me afterwards. I think 

3 it ceune up during the meeting, but Major Simpson had been 

4 instructed that he wasn't to talk to anybody about this actior 

5 Q Did he indicate who instructed him as to that 

6 matter? 

7 A As I recaj.1, it would have been his superior, 

8 General Russo, and he may have indicated that General 

9 Russo was under the same sort| of admonitions, but that 

10 it was highly sensitive. There was to be no paperwork 

11 on the activity. It had already received a legal review 

12 at the highest levels of government without being specifc 

13 as to what those levels were. 

DOTSON/bap 14 Q So he didn't indicate anything other than the 

1:45 

15 highest levels of government? 

16 A That is right. 

17 Q He didn't tell you who else had reviewed it? 

18 A No . 

19 Q Did he mention any statutes or particular laws or 

20 particular concerns? 

21 A No. In fact, I am not even sure he knew who would 

22 have reviewed it at the highest levels of government. 

23 Q He had the impression somewhere there had been a 

24 review at a high level of government? 

25 A Yes. And he was, as I said, nervous because I 



mtm^ 



16 



WPTffi' 



16 



1 think he realized that he was probably going against orders 

2 not to discuss it. But, being the good action officer that 

3 he was, he wanted as complete a staffing as he could get. 

4 During that meeting, I remember asking him does 

5 the Secretary of the Army know about this? He did not 

6 kn-^w. He did not know whether or not Secretary Marsh knew 

7 aoout it. And I, out loud, in thinking and talking with 

8 Tom Taylor, said perhaps we need to alert the Secretary 

9 to make sure he knows about it, at the same time protect 

10 Major Simpson from coming forward and speaking to us. 

11 I thought it was good he had done what he had done, 

12 but I did not want to expose him to any difficulties, which 

13 is why the memo that Leonard wrote to the Secretary was 

14 somewhat subtle in terms of what the issue was. I am 

15 not sure it could have been more specific, not knowing 
15 more facts. 

•]7 Q I take it you are referring to — 

■]8 A The 13 February memo. 

•J9 Following our meeting with Major Simpson — 

20 Q Do you recall the date of that meeting? 

21 A It would have been prior to the 13 February memo 

22 quite clearly. It could have been some time in the first 

23 week of February. I do not recall the date, to answer your 

24 question specifically. Early February of 1986 is as best 

25 I recall. I keot no records of that meeting. 



M ^ 





17 



18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



UMftftSSflWT 



17 



1 Prior to me sending the memo to the Secretary of 

2 the Army on 13 February, I do know that Tom Taylor was 

3 called to Vince Russo's office. General Russo's office, to 

4 discuss the Seime matter we discussed with Chris Simpson. 

5 We had talked about the issue of congressional notification 

6 with Major Simpson in addition to wanting to let the 

7 Secretary of the Army know about the transfer. Congressmen 

8 to be notified was something that came up. 

9 Major Simpson could not answer either of those 

10 questions. I was not present at the meeting with Tom 

11 Taylor and General Russo. I believe Tom Taylor has been 

12 interviewed by the committee, and has talked about that: 

13 That precipitated — 

■J4 Q I take it Mr. Taylor returned from the meeting 

15 and reported to you. 

■J5 A Yes. That he had been — 

■jy Q What did he report to you? 

A He reported to me that he had discussed further 
the matter that he and I discussed with Major Simpson with 
General Russo and that he basically told General Russo 
what we had told Major Simpson and that is without more 
facts we cannot give you a complete legal review. 

Q Did he say why General Russo had called him in? 
A He did not know specifically why. He and I 
surmised — we speculated, perhaps. Major Simpson, and this 



HNtUSSlRRIrFT 



18 



unM 



ET 



18 



1 is only our guess. I don't know. Perhaps- Major Simpson 

2 was nervous that he had come to us and thought he had 

3 better report it to General Russo. Otherwise General 

4 Russo might find out about the it otherwise. That is 

5 the only explanation. 

6 Q But the request for Russo to Taylor came about, 

7 as you understand it, to discuss this particular 

8 provision of TOWs. It was not some other matter? 

9 A Yes, TOWs, as we found out later. Something 

10 like a Stinger is what — something like a Stinger missile. 

11 Q- What did Mr. Taylor tell you about that meeting? 

12 A He said that he discussed the issue of 

13 congressional notification with General Russo, and also the 

14 provision of the fiscal year 1986 Intelligence Authorization 

15 Act, which was the subject of that 13 February memo. But 

16 again, as I said earlier r he could not give General 

17 Russo a complete legal review. 

18 Q Had General Russo asked for that? 

19 A General Russo had not asked for that. General 

20 Russo had not asked for that. I know that it is — 

21 that at some point there was a meeting in my office with 

22 Tom Taylor and General Russo and Major General Bill Suter. 

23 Bill Suter is the Assistant Judge Advocate General. General 

24 Overholdt was out of town when this happened. I believe he 

25 was in the Far East, and General Suter was the acting 



19 



tlKOtifflSffffiF 



19 



1 Judge Advocate General, I think, as it is officially called. 

2 So my dealings with the Office of the Judge Advocate 

3 General on this matter were at that time with General 

4 Suter. 

5 Q I take it this meeting was prior to the 13th? 

6 A I do not recall whether or not it was pr^-or to 

7 the 13th. I see that General Russo has a little note here 

8 on the bottom of the memo dated 13 February that we had 

9 discussed a date, and it could well have been that very 

10 same day. 

11 Q ' I take it in looking at Exhibit 1 and the hand- 

12 written note on the bottom, you recognize that to be 

13 General Russo 's note. 

14 A Yes. I have no reason to think that it is not. I 

15 believe that would be General Russo 's note. 

16 Q Do you recall did you provide this memo to 

17 General Russo on that day in the meeting? 

18 A I do not recall. Obviously I did provide him 

19 a copy when I sent it to the Secretary, but I don't — 

20 we may have met — discussed the issue. Then I sent the 

21 memo and then sent him a copy of it. It could have been 

22 that way. I just don't recall. 

23 Q Could you tell us about those discussions? 

24 A Well, we generally discussed the issue of 

25 congressional np(i4i^Af^^g>^9^||^f ■"N"^^^™^"^ ^° notify 




I 



20 

1 Congress if it should fall within the provisions of the 

2 fiscal year '86 Intelligence Authorization Act. General 

3 Russo wanted to know whose responsibility it was to notify 

4 Congress, and I advised him that it has been the position 

5 of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the user 

6 agency bears the ultimate respor.::ibility for congressional 

7 notification; not the supplying agency. 

8 Q Just so we understand the context of this 

9 conversation, had General Ri^io infociRd yo\f Ln thT»- 

10 meeting of the details of the transaction? 

11 A' No. 1 learned the details of the transaction 

12 in November like everybody else. November of 39 86. 

13 Q Correct me if I am wrong, the conversation 

14 essentially between General Russo and the attorneys 

15 involved is somewhat abstract in the sense that TOWs 

16 were not mentioned. 

17 A That is correct. 

18 Q The agency was not mentioned. 

19 A I believe we knew the agency was the requestor. 

20 Q We knew the materials were to go to another 

21 United States Government agency, the CIA. 

22 A Which is why the Economy Act was the governing 

23 legal provision. 

24 Q Did you know the weapons were intended for another 

25 country, or another purchaser 



\im 




FT 



21 



llttfiEF 



21 



1 A We did not know that. I surmised they were 

2 probably going somewhere outside the United States, although 

3 from time to time we do replenish! 

4 Although with all the secret activities surrounding this, I 

5 didn't think this would be a normal replenishment 

6 action. 

7 Q Did General Russo tell you for whom the misses 

8 were intended? 

9 A No, he did not. To the best of my knowledge, he 

10 did not know. 

11 Q • Was the meeting at his initiative or your own? 

12 A I believe it was his. 

13 Q And why did he think, there might be a congres- 

14 sional notification problem? 

15 A Well, he would be the best one to answer that. 

16 I really could not answer that for him. But the issue 

17 had been raised by my office to Major Simpson and surmised 

18 back to General Russo. 

19 Q Was the fiscal year '86 Intelligence Authorization 

20 Act discussed at this meeting? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q Could you tell us to your recollection what that 

23 discussion was? 

24 A Simply it was Tom Taylor and 1 informed General 

25 Russo of the provision and of_ t^e^^^ygressional notification 



\im 




FIT 



22 



22 

1 requirement of that provision just to — I believe that he hac 

2 more facts than I did as to type of missae and quantity 

3 and cost and would be able to tell from me pointing out 

4 the provision to him whether or not we were in harm's way. 

5 Q At that time, do you recall what you informed 
^ General Russo the requirements of that Act were or what 

7 you thought they were at that time? 

8 A I described for him ^at the Act — what my 

9 understanding of the Act was as I put in the memo to the 

10 Secretary. 

11 Q ■ I am interested in what your understanding of 

12 Act was at the time. 

13 A My understanding — and I have later learned 

14 my understanding was perhaps not correct. My understanding 

15 was that if the articles in the aggregate exceeded 

16 $1 million that there was a notification requirement. 

17 It has later been pointed out to me that perhaps I should 

18 have viewed it as individual items cosing a million 

19 dollars each. 

20 Q But at the time you thought — 

21 A It was in the aggregate. 

22 Q i^^i-^z 3 rMttUft::^<^^ems which aggregate $1 million 

23 or more required congressional notification? 

24 A That is correct. 

25 Q And your understanding was who would bear the 



ullHrtpygSfl«E' 



23 



mm& 



23 



1 burden of the notification? 

2 A The agent — in this particular action it would be 

3 the CIA. 

4 , Q Just so the record is clear, because there is some 

5 confusion on the matter, your understanding was that if 

6 there were $1,500,000 worth of bullets requested, that 

7 would trigger the notification requirement? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q That it would not be necessary that there be a 

10 single item costing $1 million; is that correct? 

11 A That was my understanding at the time. 

12 Q And that is what was conveyed to General Russb. 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Did he have any response to that opinion? 

15 A I do not recall that he did specifically other than 

16 asking whose responsibility, who bears the responsibility 

17 of notifying Congress. 

18 Q And do you recall conveying your memo of 13 

19 February '86, Exhibit 1, to the Secretary, to Secretary 

20 Marsh? 

21 A Yes. I sent it to the Secretary of the Army. 

22 As I mentioned earlier, I did not — one of my chief 

23 concerns was is the Secretary informed — does he know of 

24 this transfer. I harken back to the days before 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H\|(t«i| the Army 



^^mBfflP. 



24 



lINHBi^RIST 



24 



1 learned, supplying equipment to other agencies without the 

2 knowledge of the senior civilian leadership and sometimes 

3 without the knowledge of the senior military leadership, 

4 and so one of my principal concerns was whether or not 

5 Secretary Marsh was personally informed. 

6 Q At this point I will interrupt for a moment -- 

7 in your meeting with General Russo, did he refer to the 

8 transaction as a requirement or a request? 

9 A I do not recall what specific language he used. 

10 It was pretty clear to me by the unusual nature of the 

11 action' that the Army was, that the equipmenti|/nad been 

12 BJUCutre. Send these, whatever they were, how^ever many- of 

A 

13 them there were, to the CIA. 

14 That had come from the Office of the Secretary of 

15 Defense directly to the Army and we were marching out to 

16 execute. 

17 Q Also — 

18 A But I don't recall — to answer your question, I 

h 

19 don't recall what specific description General Russo 

20 put on the transaction. That is what was in my mind. 

21 Q So you then gave the memo to Secretary Marsh 

22 because you were concerned he may not be informed. 

23 A Yes . 

24 Q And how did Secretary Marsh receive the memo? 

25 A I received it back with a note from him across the 



IHwiftw.nfefeT 



25 



UNCH^fP^ 



25 

1 top that said, "What's the next step," which caused me to 

2 schedule a meeting with the Secretary, which I believe 

3 was held on the 24th of February, as I recall. It was 

4 Monday afternoon, which I believe was the 24th, on or about 

5 the 24th of February. 

6 Q Do you recall who was prejent? 

7 A Yes, I do. General Bill Suter, the acting Judge 

8 Advocate General and myself. Of couse the Secretary was 

'\ 

there ^^^^^^^^^^^^^U^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^H 

10 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I 

11 Cameft Cavezza, C-A-V-E-Z-Z-A, who was the executive to 

12 thejsecretary of the Amy wqfs present, and General Russo^ 

13 was also present. 

14 As I recall, we started the meeting without 

15 General Russo, and they asked us to find General Russo and 
1g have him join us. 

17 At that meeting, again, the type of missile, to 

18 the best of my recollection, was not discussed, the 

19 quantity and the price were not discussed. 

20 Q Destination? 

21 A Destination was never discussed. And the Secretary 

22 had been aware, but not with any specificity, as to what 

23 the action was. He had been informed. I don't know by 

24 whom. This request had come to the Army. But it was clear 

25 to me when we started the meetinahe was searching his own 



m 




26 



WBLI^fflBr' 



26 

1 mind to recall what the activity was. 

2 Q Did he ask where the orders or where the line of 

3 direction had been? 

4 A I believe he did, because we discussed Colin 

5 Powell, General Colin Powell, Colin PoweVll's involvement 

6 and the fact General Russo had been dealing directly 

7 with Colin Powell without paper work, just verbally dealing 

8 with him. 

g The Secretary told General Russo to do two things. 

10 He told him to make a memorandum for the record, a memcom, 

11 as the Secretary calls them, of the matter so that there 

12 would be a record, and secondly, to raise the issue of » 

13 congressional notification with General Powell. 

14 Q And those were instructions to General Russo. 

15 A To General Russo. 

1g Q And General Russo 's response? 

17 A That he would do so; that he would do so. 

ig Q Do you know if in fact General Russo did so? 

ig Did he report back? 

20 A He did not report back to me at that time. I 

21 found out some months later that he had done so. Of 

22 course he had no reason to report back to me. The Secretary 

23 asked him to do it, and he said he would do so, so I 

24 assumed that was — 

oe Q We will return to that in a moment. Did 



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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Secretary Marsh ask further details about the transaction 
during that meeting? 

A Not during that meeting. Not that 1 can recall. 

Do you recall any other subject other than 
congressional notification arising in that meeting? 

A I think I probably kicked off the meeting by 
raising the issue of what I called an off-line action that 
was within the ^^^^^^^^^| process. 

Q What was the nature of that? 

A Just that I had become aware that there was 
this action in the Army for us to handle a number of missiles 
without knowing what kind of missile and that it concerned 
me. I wanted to be sure that he was aware of it and that 
all the legal bases and other bases the Army could touch at 
least had been considered by the Army. 

Q Would it be correct to state that you were 
concerned about this off-line transaction? 

A 1 was concerned — yes, that is correct. The 
Army, as I described for you earlier, in earlier days did 
not have control; senior leadership did not have control 
of these types of actions, and that is why^^f 

■was established, to get control 
so that the Army would not be an open conduit in terms of 
supplying other agencies. Not that we were an open conduit, 
but there were some acti_vi^ifi,% ^¥^ itDuld usually not be 





28 



Hf$fSSI{«fe 



^ 28 

1 going on. 

2 Q Would it be fair to state you were suggesting 

3 to the Secretary of the Army the^^^^^^^^| system would 

4 be bypassed in this particular case? 

5 A I told him it was my understanding the normal 

6 process had not been invoked in this case; that is 

7 correct. 

8 Now, 1 did not say to him I thought it should 

9 have been. I can accept the fact there may be activities 

10 that are so sensitive that normal procedures would be 

11 bypassed. But my concern was does the Secretary himself 

12 know what is going on. He makes the decision. 

13 If senior leadership makes the decision to bypass 

14 it, I can accept it. But I wanted to be sure he knew 

15 about it. 

16 Q Were there any other subjects discussed at the 

17 meeting. 

18 A No. The purpose was to discuss this subject. 

19 Q Just so we are clear, other than requesting the 

20 memcon of the matter and requesting General Russo to raise 

21 the issue of congressional notification with General Powell, 

22 did Secretary Marsh request any further action? 

23 A Not that I can recall. 

24 Q Did General Russo, to your knowledge, provide 

25 any indication that in fact he had created that memo or 



X llM^NI H »€lWr^Ctt''T' 



29 



UimASaEliIrT 



29 



1 had reported to General Powell to you, to your knowledge 

2 or to Secretary Marsh? 

3 A He did not report that to me. I believe he 

4 reported back to the Secretary of the Army, perhaps, through 

5 the Director of the Army staff. 

6 Q I would like to show you a set of documents 

7 which we will mark Exhibit 2. You may not have seen them 

8 before. I will provide them to you and give you a moment to 

9 look at them. 

10 (The documents referred to, were marked as Exhibit 

11 2 for identification.) 

12 THE WITNESS: I am ready when you are. 

13 BY MR. SABA: 

14 Q Have you ever seen any one of these three 

15 documents before? 

16 A Yes. I have seen all three of these documents. 

17 I believe they came to my attention within the last six 

18 weeks. We had searched for the third document here, the 

19 March '86 memo from General Arthur Brown to Colin Powell. 

20 We had searched for that in early November or mid November 

21 of 1986 when the matter first beceune one of public concern. 

22 In fact, I sat with General Brown in his office. 

23 He thought he had sent a memo to Colin Powell, but no one 

24 could find it because he hadn't kept a copy of it. I 

25 remember going through his note books with him as to dates 



U 





30 




30 

1 following the meeting with the Secretary and he was 

2 thinking in his own mind, "Did I really write one or did I 

3 walk up and tell him? I think I wrote a memo. " But 

4 we couldn't find it. 

5 So this is finally surfaced I think about a 

6 month to six weeks ago. 

7 Q For the sake of clarity, do you know how tkie requesi 

8 from Secretary Marsh to General Russo may have channeled 

9 its way through General Brown? Would that have been 

10 a normal channel? 

11 A' Yes, it could well have been normal, although 

12 I don't have any specific knowledge. It is not at all . 

13 unusual for the Secretary of the Army to call upon 

14 General Brown on matters such as this on any other matters 

15 Director Brown's position is one of interface 

16 not only with the military, but rinmnTi niny-mr|||| •'- tbe 

17 Army as nlml^ 

18 Q ^ dSI you have any occasion between the time you 

19 first learned of this matter in early February until the 

20 time of General Brown's memo to discuss the matter with 

21 General Brown? .l.^S_ 

22 A To the best of my knowledge, I never discussed 

23 it with him during that time^reune. General Brown thought 

24 when he and I were searching his files, he thought perhaps 

25 he had — asked General Suter, Bill Suter, to draft the 




mm^ 



31 



mM\M 



RET 



31 

1 memo for him. I don't know whether — Bill Suter had no 

2 recollection of drafting the memo. 

3 Q Directing your attention to the document dated 

4 12 March 1986, marJwd wi.«l a Senate stamp Number N-9899, 

5 a memo for Vice Admiral Poindexter ant' signed by General 

6 Powell, had you seen this document contemporaneously with 

7 its execution or before theee weeks ago? 

8 A I did not see it contemporaneous with its 

9 execution. I saw it at the same time that I saw the earlier 

10 memo I described from General Brown to General Powell. 

11 I saw all three of these at the same time as a package, 

12 which would have been the last month to six weeks, whenever 

13 it was discovered. 

14 Q But not in 1986. 

15 A No. Apparently the Army did not keep a copy 

16 of the General Brown memo, and I think we got it through 

17 the FBI or independent counsel or whatever channels. 

18 Maybe I shouldn't have said that on the record. 

19 Q After having had a chance to review this, would 

20 it comport with what your memory was at the time it was 

21 executed? 

,„ -"■ -^-. ^- 

22 A My under^^nding of the Seere^ g^jH concern >~the 

23 issue of congressional notification be raised? 

24 Q Yes. Specilically, I refer to the second sentence, 

25 which I believe refers ^ov^Bm\^mts at the tijne. I am 



leve refers to va|aE|V*M^ at tm 



32 



l|lM$ilS£:T 



32 



1 asking whether or not that sentence is an accurate 

2 reflection of your views at the time. 

3 A Yes, it is an accurate reflection of my views at 

4 the time. 

5 Q And it was correct that your understanding was 

6 that the Army did not have responsibility for congressional 

7 notification? 

8 A That is correct. It has been the OSD position that 

9 it is the receiver. That is not to say I don't think the 

10 Army had responsibility to raise the issue. 

11 ■ As I said earlier, they practically make that 

12 boiler plate in their terms of reference. 

13 Q At the time General Powell wrote this memo, or 

14 shortly before, but after February 13, 1986, were you asked 

15 to provide any additional legal memo on the fiscal year '86 

16 Intelligence Authorization Act or any other statute that 

17 might have governed this transaction? 

18 A No, I was not. 

19 Q Did there come to your attention any other legal 

20 memoremdum prepared by the Department of the Army or any 

21 other U.S. Government organization concerning the transfer 

22 during that period? 

23 A Of this specific transfer, no. Later in the fall 

24 then, of course, I became aware of that. I did not link 

25 the two of them together until November. 



\imjmBE 



33 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



(iiittssffusET 



33 



Q I would like to show you a document dated April If 
1986, which we will refer to as Exhibit 3. I will give 
you a moment to read it. 

(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 
3 for identification) 

THE WITNESS: This document looks familiar, which 
is the 18 April 1986 memo from Carl Vuono, then the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, written to the 
Director of the Joint Staff. I did not see this 

contemporaneous with its execution. 

o 
I believe during /)Ur subsequent investigation 

after November 26 of 1986 this document came to my 

attention, either during our own Army Inspector General's 

investigation of the issue or thereafter as we were 

supplying documents to the committees or to the 

independent counsel. 

BY MR. SABA: 

Q Do you know what caused General Vuono to 
execute this memo? 

A Specifically, no, I do not. Although he 
references his concern here in paragraph 2, I can only 
assume that is what — I do not know specifically what he 
is referring to. 

Q Could you explain to us briefly what General 
Vuono' s position was at that time and his duties that 



wmm^ 



82-702 0-88-3 



34 



wmmw 



34 



1 might have caused him to create such a memo? 

2 A Well, of course as the DCS/OPS, as we call him, 

3 he, as a member of the Army staff, would work very 

4 closely with the joint staff, the JCS staff. He, along 

5 with the Chief of Staff of the Army, would probably have 

6 the most interface with the JCS staff. 

7 I note this memo is directed to the Director 

8 of the Joint Staff, which is a position that would be 

9 somewhat equivalent, I suppose, to the Director of the Army 

10 staff. 

11 Q I mention this because at the time we learned that 

12 the JCS did not have direct knowledge in February and March 

13 of the transaction and had not entered into the JCST 

14 mode system, and it ;e^as, ai^ye have been told by others 

15 and yourself, closely held. 

16 Among those shown on the list as having knowledge 

17 of the action at that time, we don't normally find General 

18 Vuono seeking your assistance in determining the back- 

19 ground to this memo. 

20 A Equipment types of requests of course would come 

21 through a desk log on the Army staff, although issues of 

22 training, issues of readiness would be within General 

23 Vuono 's expertise as the desk opens. So it could be — as 

24 I recall, there was a readiness issue on some of the Hawk 

25 spare parts requests. I am only guessing. 



uNcusma 



prp 



35 



ummitiF 



35 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



MR. WALLACE: Can we go off the record? 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
MR. SABA: Back on the record now. 
BY MR. SABA: 
Q Ms. Crawford, I now would like to direct your 
attention to the fall of 1986, roughly the period September 
and October. I presume that following the period in 
February, perhaps early March, and the meetings you had 
then with Army Secretary Marsh, that you were not further 
involved in the matters which we now refer to as the 
Iran initiative. 

A That is correct. 1 was not. 

Q What was your next involvement in the transfer 
of weapons? 

A My next involvement came in late September, 
early October of 1986 when 




to me with an action that had already 
been ongoing for sometime, and that was the action for 
Hawk missile radar component spare parts. 

specifically had a memo for 
the Judge Advocate General, asking us to give a legal 
review to the transfer. Really, an after-the-fact legal 
review, because some items had already been transferred. 
Yet, there was an ongoing request we were still transferring, 



wmmn 



prr 



36 





1 

2 
3 

4 
5 
6 
7 
8 

; 

9 

/ 

10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



36 

and I believe he Indicated he had discussed with General 
Wlckham, the Army Chief of Staff, the need for a legal 
review. 

^^^^^^^^^^^Hindlcated to me he 
been Involved In the early conmencement of this action, the 
early transfer of materials, but at some point along the 
way during the summer this requirement found its way 

tha^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and he 
received a legal review and was asking for one. 

Q I would like to show you a document which we 
will mark Exhibit 4, and give you a moment to review it. 

(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 4 
for identification.) 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Can you tell us if you are familiar with the 
document, which is a memo dated 22 September 1986, addressed 
to the Vice Chief of Staff Army. The subject is room 
stock support. The author is Colonel Robert T. Howard. 

A I believe I have seen this document. 




It looks familiar. 

Q Did^^^^^^^^^^^l mention to you how the request 
for Hawk spare parts, which is known as project Crocus, 



1 1 nvfnTliinH/fff iBlLif 



37 



mmm 



37 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H s y s t en ? 

2 A Not with any specificity, but he did explain 

3 to me that it had started outside of the system and that 
^ somehow in the summer, I believe in August sometime, it 

5 found its way into the system; that it had been recognized 

6 in the system. 

7 Q Did he indicate — 

8 A He did not indicate how, no. 

9 Q Did he indicate any distinction in the way the 

10 matter was tasked that caused it to come into the system? 

11 A I do not recall whether or not he might have 

12 discussed that. 

13 Q How did you^espond~to his request? 

14 A By reviewing the package with the actlE^n o^lcer 

15 in my office, which prompted me to send the memo of 10 

16 October 1986 to the Secretary of the Army. 

17 Q The memo of 10 October 1986, which is a memo from 

18 the Secretary of the Army, signed by Susan J. Crawford 

19 will become Exhibit 5. 

20 (The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 5 

21 for identification.) 

22 BY MR. SABA: 

23 Q Can you give us some additional information about 

24 the memo, what you understood accomplished? 

25 A I recall that when Colonel Howard came to visit me 

i AQQirirn 



^i»J!m\i/a»r 



!ET 



38 



IIWK^flWT 



36 



1 he had — we discussed the fact that here we have another 

2 activity coming through the Army that had not gone through 

3 the^^^^^^^^^lprocess, and he sort of jogged my memory 
* as to this January /February 1986 time frame and the 

5 missiles, which is why I felt it necessary to register 

6 my concern to the Secretary that we have an activity 

7 caning through that had not had legal review. 

8 Also, it caused me to be a little pickier than 

9 I normally would, although I pointed out that I did not 

10 have sufficient information upon which to base a complete 

11 legal' review. Normally, I might have stopped there, 

12 but he went on a little bit further in this particular -memo 

13 and noted, as you can see in the memo, that if we 

14 supported the request, we would have a zero inventory balance 

15 in a couple columns there and that raised some question 

16 about the readiness issue. 

17 That is a little pickier than normal because we 

18 had another off-line request coming through. I raised the 

19 issue of the Iranian claims tribunal noting some of the 

20 Hawk radar was impounded awaiting resolution of those 

21 claims. Again, never having any indication these items 

22 were going to Iran, were destined to go to Iran. 

23 Q In this case you did not mention congressional 

24 notification. Is there a reason this time you did not? 

25 Particularly find this — 



11U»EIU 



39 



STEIN/bap 14 
2:30 ^ X 



\imm 



A I don't think any — again, congressional is 



39 



1 

2 usually presumed by the Army. We have just as a long- 

3 standing matter made that a condition of doing business, 

4 Congress be notified. I don't recall why he didn't 

5 specifically mention it in this memo. 

6 Q What was the result of your memos being provided 

7 to the Secretary? Did you discuss it with him? Did you 

8 comment? 

9 A I did not discuss this with the Secretary. It 

10 is my understanding he — and I have this on second-hand 

11 information. The Secretary met directly with Mr. Taft to 

12 discuss some of these matters, but I was not party to that 

13 meeting, 
Q Di(^^^^^^^^^^^^^K>rovide you with information 

at that time as to the ultimate destination of the spare 
parts? 

17 A No, he did not. I do not believe he knew. 

18 Q So the reference in the first page of the memo 

19 in a subparagraph marked small A, and in parens, upper case 

20 S, as I read the first sentence, there is some indication 

21 to me that perhaps you knew or guessed what — where these 

22 weapons were headed. 

23 A You are on the first or second page! 

24 Q I am on the first page. 
25 



The second paragraph — 

UrvDICll lOlmimjni 



m 



I 



40 

1 Q Yes, Paragraph A, (s) , I am referring to both 

2 sentences. 

3 A No, I indicated there that the purpose of the 

4 request and the destination of the material were not known 

5 to me. 

6 Q I am referring then having said that, the next 

7 sentence perhaps suggestions that you might have guessed 

8 or that someone had told you perhaps. 

9 A No, the review by the DUSDP? 

10 Q Yes. 

11 A' That is a pretty standard requirement, a 

12 regulatory requirement internal to DOD and the Army that if 

13 any one of those activities should be involved, any one 

14 of those risks involved that the Secretary of the Army 

15 himself does not have the authority to approve it, it 

16 must go through an OSD policy review. I was trying 

17 to think of — I was being picky. 

18 Q Was any issue as to pricing of the TOWs raised 

19 at the time or the Hawks? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Or the Hawk spare parts. Was any issue at that 

22 time raised as to einy of the intermediaries which might be 

23 involved in the transfer of the weapons? 

24 A You mean other than within the Department of 

25 Defense or the CIA? 



mmm. 



41 



2 



10 



WffitASStPIIS'^ 



41/42 
^ Q Other than U.S. Government. 



A Oh, no. 



3 Q So your understanding was that these spare parts 

^ were to be delivered to the CIA and other than the CIA 

^ you didn't have any specific knowledge of further transferees 
" A That is correct. 

7 Q Could you tell us a little bit about the Hawk 

® radars for the record? Did you have information 

9 concerning Haw^ radars at the time, the Iranian assets 
question? 

11 A ' There were some Hawk radar components on the 

12 list, as I recall. I don't have the list in front of me, 

13 but on a number of different items of spare parts that were 

14 requested, including radars for the Hawk system, and that 

15 caused me to raise the issue of paragraph small case C 

16 there at the top of the second page; that somebody ought 

17 to check and make sure that if they are going to transfer 

18 radars that they aren't those radars that are part of the 

19 frozen Iranian assets, because I knew we had some that 

20 were frozen at Fort Hood. 

21 Q I take it that the last paragraph on page 2 

22 indicates your continuing concern at the method in which 

23 these transactions are taking place? 

24 A That is correct. The original additional request, 

25 what I am referring to there are the Hawj; requests. I had 



IWaUMIEfe 



42 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



uim»FT 



i 



43 I 

I 



not made a connection with this request and the earlier 
TOW request. I did not know -- 

Q That was my next question as to whether your 
reference to original and additional is to distinguish this 
request for Hawk spare parts from the request in January of 
1986 for TOWs? 

A No, it was not. This relates only to the Hawks. 
I knew that there had been an ongoing request and that the 
Army had continuously supplied that request as far as the 
Hawks go. 

Q What was the reaction to — if any — to your memo? 

A I did not discuss my memo with the Secretary - 
personally. 




General Overholdt, as you note from the 
memo, the Judge Advocate General, was out of town. I 
discussed the matter with him upon his return to inform 
him, because I did use his name. 

Q I would like to show you a document dated 22 Oct. 
1986, a memorandum through the acting Chief of Staff 
Army for the Secretary of the Amy on Project Crocus, and it 
is signed by Robert Howard and bears a handwritten note 
on the bottom of page 2, and this will become Exhibit 6. 

(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 6 
for identification. 




PT 



43 



^^SSf^T 



44 

1 BY MR. SABA: 

2 Q Are you familiar with the document? 

3 A I have seen this document. Again, I believe it 

4 came to my attention some time after the latter part of 

5 November as we were gathering together documents for the 

6 various investigators. 

'( Q Are you familiar with the events mentioned in the 

8 handwritten note on page 2? 

9 A Personally, no, I am familiar because of reading 

10 this document and what I have learned afterwards, after 

11 this all occurred. 

12 Q Did you inform General Kavezza or Secretary Taft 

13 of the matters? 

14 A No, I did not. 

15 Q Did Colonel Howard request additional information 

16 from you or support following your October 10th memo 

17 whether in connection with this memo or subsequently? 

18 A To the best of my knowledge, no. 

19 Q Were you involved further in Project Crocus? 

20 A Not as a project. 

21 Q How were you further involved? 

22 A I became further involved both with Project 

23 Snowball, which was our name for the TOW transfer and 

24 Project Crocus after the publicity came out that in early 

25 to mid November about the U.S. dealing with Iran. 



ulwwJwWiH^ 



44 



HNtUSSIPIItT 



45 



1 Q And is it correct that after approximately October 

2 10th when you wrote the memo that you didn't have further 

3 involvement with either project? 

4 A That is correct. 

5 Q Did you have any knowledge of or involvement in 

6 a request from the agency to provide yet further TOWs which 

7 we now know were to have replenished Israeli stocks, in 

8 1986? 

9 A No, I did not have any involvement in that, that 

10 I can recall. I had been involved in an earlier matter, 

11 earlier than '86, dealing with TOWs, but it was with the 

12 Customs Service or the FBI in a Sting operation in 

13 Florida run by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Orlando. 

r 

14 An Army lieutenant colonel by the name of Gilespic; 

15 was caught up in that investigation. 

16 Q Returning back to the fall of '86, could you 

17 tell us your involvement with the matter, which I will call 

18 the Iran initiative. Project Snowball, Project Crocus, 

19 following the disclosure of the initiative? 

20 A Following the disclosure — 

21 Q I would also appreciate for the record your own 

22 reactions as General Counsel to the Army having been 

23 involved certainly with several memoranda and some legal 

24 opinions in the abstract, so I would be interested in your 

25 involvement, but in your reactions to those events and your 



UWUMPp 



45 



uiwswa^ 



46 



1 coining to know of what the facts were? 

2 A Following the disclosures for the first time, 

3 I learned what it was that we were transferring, the TOW 

^ missiles and where they were intended to go and linked the 

5 two activities, both Crocus and Snowball together. Our 

6 immediate -- my immediate concern, and I think the 

7 Secretary's as well, I won't pretend to speak for him, was 

8 there any illegality or wrongj-doing? Does the Army share 

9 any blame as far as that goes? 

10 Our immediate concern was how did we price the TOW 

11 missiles. As you may recall that became an issue early on. 

12 We had different types of TOWs that were transferred. The 

13 Army had done some modification to the TOWs, changed 

14 warheads to take TOW 2 and make it into a basic TOW. 

15 I didn't know there were so many types of TOW missiles. 

16 •=- -^ jjaJt^j^ earned a lot about them in November. That 

17 caused the Under Secretary to get involved and look at the 

18 pricing. Another attorney and I met with him early in the 

19 morning after Thanksgiving. I am referring to James 

20 Ambrose, the Under Secretary of the Army, and ended up in 

21 the Secretary's office making the recommendation that we 

22 ask the Army Inspector General to look into the Snowball and 

23 Crocus activities, and particularly look at how did we 

24 price the TOW missiles. 

25 You probably have a copy of that I.G. report. 



UimSSiEliib 



46 



UNJHSSIFIEFi' 



47 



1 But that was our immediate involvement! was there anything 

2 improper about the way the Army priced the missiles. 

3 Personally, I was concerned that if a profit was made on the 

4 missiles in selling them to Iran and some of the press 

5 stories were indicating that at the time, did anyone in the 

6 Army purposefully keep the price low in orde" to drive the 

7 profit up on the other end? 

8 I think the I.G. report clearly showed that that 

9 was not the case, but that was a concern that we shared, 

10 the Army leadership and the Judge Advocate General and 

11 the Inspector General, and a two-month I.G. investigation 

12 ensued. 

13 At the same time I knew that the Department of 

14 Justice was looking into the matter, and he was very quick 

15 to get some of the knowledgeable people over to meet with 

16 officials at the Department of Justice to tell what they 

17 knew and then to meet with the FBI and various agents of the 

18 FBI that had questions for people in the Amy. 

19 This is before the independent cown e g i was 

20 established. 

21 Q Do you recall about when that was? 

22 A As I recall, the first meeting with the Department 

23 of Justice was two days prior to Thanksgiving, a Tuesday — 

24 Q Late November ' 86? 

25 iA< Yes, the same day, as I recall, that Admiral 



UW^tSSiflEfe 



47 



UWflJIWIpT 



18 



1 Poindexter and Colonel North were relieved of their 

2 assignments and then that weekend following Thanksgiving 

3 we had a nxjraber of FBI interviews with people in the 

4 Army. 

5 Q I have two documents, the first of which we will 

6 label as Exhibit 7. It ir a 26 November '86 memorandum for 

7 the Deputy Chief of Staft Logistics; subject: Department 

8 of Justice Questions, and it is signed by Susan J. Crawford. 

9 (The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 7 

10 for identification.) 

11 ■ MR. SABA: The second document is a memorandum for 

12 the record also dated 26 November '86; subject, meeting. 

13 with Department of Justice. This memorandum consists of 

14 four pages and is signed by Tony Gamboa, Deputy General 

15 Counsel, Logistics. Attached to that memo originally was 

16 Exhibit 7, which we just referred to, and in addition, 

17 an undated partial draft letter to Mr. Chuck Cooper, Office 

18 of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. 

19 I would appreciate your looking at both of the 

20 exhibits at the same time and then explaining their contents 

21 to us. 

22 (The document referred to was marked as Exhibit 8 

23 for identification.) 

24 THE WITNESS: As I described a moment ago, I had 

25 occasion to go over to the Department of Justice, and I 



^mm^ 



48 



21 
22 
23 



25 



mm& 



49 



1 believe as this memorandum for the record indicates, it 

2 was the evening of 25 November '86. I remember that it 

3 was a Tuesday, and we within the Army with the 

4 Under Secretary and people in DCS/LOG were attempting to 

5 reconstruct what the Army had transferred and how many 
5 we had i-ransf erred. This was the same day, I believe, 

7 that Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North were relieved 

8 of their duties and the Department of Justice was involved 
g in trying to ascertain the facts. 

^Q Chuck Cooper, Charles Cooper, the head of the 

•J1 Of f ice .of Legal Counsel, had called me several times by 

•^2 telephone to try to ascertain some of the numbers and spme 
of the facts. I told him I didn't feel that we 
should be discussing classified information over open 

■J5 lines. Why didn't I gather up the knowledge of the 

Ig people in the Army and get over to his office and sit 

•J7 down with him and tell him what we could, which we did 

13 that, I think. 

19 BY MR. SABA: 

2Q Q Who is we? 



A From my office I went, Tom Kranz, who was the 
principal Deputy General Council, and Tony Gamboa, who was 
the Deputy General Counsel for Logistics, and we took with 



24 us a Lieutenant Colonel Armbright, Larry Armbright, who 



worked in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 



mmm 



49 



mmm' 



50 



1 Logistics. He had been the key action officer on Project 

2 Crocus and had taken over Project Snowball from 

3 Chris Simpson and a civilian by the name of Jim Emahiser, 

4 a senior civilian in the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

5 Logistics. And we went to Chuck Cooper's office and 

6 present were Chuck Cooper and Bradford Reynolds and Mr. 

7 John McGinnis, who worked for Mr. Cooper at the Department 

8 of Justice, and basically went through what we knew in terms 

9 of numbers of missiles and price of missiles and explained 

10 how the Army would price missiles using the roaster data file 

11 ' Colonel Armbright and Mr. Emahiser were the 

12 Army experts in this area and they, of course, carried -the 

13 ball in terms of the discussion. The people at the Department 

14 of Justice had a number of questions, some of which we 

15 attempted to answer that evening; others we could not. 

16 You will note my list of questions here referring 

17 to the Department of Justice meeting. I asked, and I 

18 believe Tony Gamboa had some phone conversations with 

19 John McGinnis following that meeting, and was able to 

20 transcribe the specific questions. 

21 Q Other than questions concerning price and 

22 quantities, did Mr. Cooper or any other person from the 

23 Department of Justice focus questions on any other matter? 

24 Did a matter other than pricing arise? 

25 A The quantity seemed to be more important to 



owussw 



ET 



50 



uim; 



^M)4)!; 



1 Mr. Cooper than the price at the time, and he — one of our 

2 transfers was either for 508 or 509 missiles and the 

3 distinction as to which it was, 508 or 509 was very 
* important -"^o him. 

5 The reason he told me was that 508, I believe, 

6 represented the number that he thought Israel had 

7 already transferred to Iran in 1985 , and that is why it was 

8 important to him to establish whether the request was for 

9 508 or 509. 

10 Q Was he trying to establish the difference between 

11 a replenishment of Israeli stocks and weapons which were 
12* directly transferred? 

13 A I am not sure exactly what he was trying to 

14 establish. We discussed the differences between a foreign 

15 military sales activity. I tried to explain for him what 

16 H^^^^^^^^^^ system was. We really covered the waterfront 

17 that evening for two and a half or three hours. 

18 That is why I had Tony Gamboa along, because he was 

19 our legal expert on logistics matters and foreign military 

20 sales. 

21 Q Has there any focus that evening on the issue of 

22 congressional notification and a threshhold number of 14 

23 missiles? 

24 A That may have come up. I don't recall that specif i- 

25 cally, but as I said, we covered so many topics that evening 



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and it had been a very hectic day. That is when this was all 
breaking and I recall walking into the Pentagon that 
morning and my Secretary met me and took ray coat and said, 
"Go up to the Under Secretary's office." And the same 
group that I described was huddling with the Under 
Secretary, trying to reconstruct after the fact when 
suddenly it became clear to us that it was the Army's TOW 
missiles. 

Q So the evening of the 2 5th was your meeting at the 
Department of Justice? 

A Yes. This was a Tuesday evening, as I recall. 

Q It was primarily an oral session? 

A Yes. 



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Q Were there notetakers, do you recall? 

A Well, the attorneys for the Department of Justice 
may have taken notes. I believe Mr. McGinnis was taking 
notes. I don't recall Chuck Cooper or Brad Reynolds 
taking notes, although they have have been. 

Q I take it that meeting led t'^ your preparation 
of what is Exhibit 7? 

A Yes. 

Q Could you explain to whom, in terms of a name, 
the memorandum is addressed? 

A Well, it went to Lt. Gen. Ben Register, who was 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Specifically, 
his deputy, General Russo's replacement, a General 
K-i-c-k-1-i-g-h-t-e-r . who had become the assistant to the 
Deputy Chief of Stafr'Sor Logistics, who had really inherited 
all this from General Russo, he was taking charge there. 

What we were doing was attempting to comply with 
requests for information from the Department of Justice. 

Q Are the handwritten notes of this photocopy of 
the exhibit yours on the side next to the questions? 

A AMC, SASA, AMC, yes. 

Q What do they refer to? 

A SA would refer to the Secretary of the Army; 
AMC would refer to the Army Material Command. I don't know 
whose notes those are. They are not mine. 



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Q They are not yours? 

A They are not mine. 

Q Turning to Exhibit 8, are you familiar with 
the cover letter, the three-page letter by Gamboa? 

A Yes, I am. In fact, I asked him to prepare 
this memorandum for the record so that we would have a 
written record of our meeting with the Department of 
Justice on 2 5 November. 

Q So you would say that the memorandum was pre- 
pared at your request? 

A • Yes. 

Q Did you review it? 

A I did. I probably reviewed it in draft, may 
have made a suggestion or two to Tony, although I don't 
recall. Normally I would have done that. 

Q So that in general you would say that you are 
in agreement with the letter? 

A Yes, although I haven't looked at this in some 
time, but this would be a pretty accurate — touching 
upon the main topics that we would have discussed that 
evening. 

Q I notice that in the third paragraph, which 
commences on page 1 and carries over to page 2, there is 
some discussion indicating — initiated apparently by 
the Department of Justice as to FMS prices for basic TOWs. 



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A Yes. 

Q And certain prices. Do you recall from the 
meeting how the issue of FMS came up, an FMS is an acronym, 
as I understand it, for Foreign Military Sales -- 

A That is correct. 

Q Which is handled by DSAA? 

A Yes, which would be an OSD activity. I don't 
recall specifically how it came up but I know that there 
were a lot of questions early on about what type of 
transaction this was, was it a foreign military sales, or 
was it ^n Economy Act transfer. Clearly it wasn't an 
Economy Act transfer. How would the price of an Economy^ 
Act transfer compare with a foreign military sales trans- 
action; Would the price be different? 

Q I take it you referred to the Department of 
Justice officials to Jerome Silver, then the DSAA 
counsel? 

A That is correct. 

Q Is it correct that in your understanding of 
the matters brought to your attention that the issue of 
foreign military sales had not arisen? 

A That is correct. This had been an Economy Act 
transfer between two Federal Government agencies. 

Q In the normal course of events, would an FMS 
type sale come to your attention? 



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A Normally not. 

Q Would a transaction in which the United States 
was replenishing the arms of a foreign nation which had 
acquired such arms through FMS come to your attention? 

A Normally, no. I say normally because I really 
can't think of any FMS transactions that my office has 
had occasion to review. I suppose if one were to raise 
a question and the Secretary would ask us to look at it, 
or another member of the Army leadership would, we would 
do so, but I can't recall that. 

Q ■ Just for the sake of the record, if the United 
States were replenishing the stocks of Israel for Haw)c 
missiles, i^ it co^^;t ^|^t sutfh a replenishment would 
be an FMS -type transaction and*?hat the legal review would 
go to Mr. Silver? 

A I don't know that it would be an FMS transaction 
exclusively, but you are correct in the second assumption 
that it would go to Mr. Silver for review if it were an 
FMS activity. 

What role the general counsel of the Department 
of Defense would play, I don't know, but there may be a 
role played there as well, my counterpart of the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense. 
Q Who would that be? 
A That is Larry Garret. 



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Q Referring back to the exhibit, which is Exhibit 8, 
page 2, the second full paragraph on page -- which commences 
with "Mr. Cooper," could you explain this paragraph? 

A I believe I touched upon this earlier when I 
said the number 508 was very significant to Mr. Cooper 
because he had explained to me that that is the number he 
thought that Israel had earlier in 1985 transferred to 
Iran. Which brings up a question of replenishment, I would 
assume, of Israeli stocks. Code A assets, condition code 
A assets, I learned through this review that we have 
different condition codes attached to the missiles, and 
at the time that the order came into the Army to transfe^r 
X number of TOWs, we did not have sufficient number in the 
condition code ready to go so we had to do some modifica- 
tions to the missiles. 

In some cases, the modifications involved adding 
a safety device; in other instances, it occasioned the 
Army a^ctually changing warheads from a more modern version 
of the TOW back to the basic TOW in order to satisfy the 
number demand in the condition code that had been 
requested. 

Q Let me ask you if you knew at the time, the 
time being February, 1986, that the missiles were destined 
for Iran, would that have changed your views any, and 



how? 



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58 



A You mean in terms of my legal opinion? 

Q Yes, and I would give you the opportunity what 
you think you would have responded then and what you think 
you would respond now if there is a difference. 

A It is always easy to play Monday/morning quarter- 
back. If I had known that the ultimate destination were 
Iran, I would still want to know the quantity and the price 
and I would want to know what was the underlying authority 
for the transfer. And in this case, of course, as I found 
out after the fact, there was a Presidential Finding that 
was the underlying authority. Then, in terms of legal 
review, I think that some of the missing factors that wexe 
not known to me in February of 1986 would be satisfied. 

From a pure legal review point of view, I 
possibly would have passed on it had I been satisfied that 
the authorities were in order and the price and quantity 
were within the reporting threshold of the requirements to 
Congress. 

Q In your view, would you have thought that a 
Presidential Finding would have been necessary in that 
case? 

A For this transaction, as I understand it to be, 
yes. By that I mean it is not a foreign military sales 
action, it is a transfer and a Presidential Finding would 
have been required. 



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Q Turning your attention to the last page of 
Exhibit 8 — 

A Page 4 of the Ga-nboa -- 

Q Yes. It appears to be a draft of a letter to 
Mr. Cooper. Are you familiar with this document? 

A Oh, this is following Mr. Gamboa ' s -- 

Q That is correct, following Mr. Gamboa ' s letter. 

A This is not the same -- this is the same, yes. 
A list of questions? 



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Q No, it is the last page of Exhibit 8, the very 
last sheet -- that is correct. 

A Oh. I am sure I have seen it. Oh, yes, yes, I am 
familiar with this. 

Q Do you know who drafted this? 

A This could well have been typed in my office. As 
I recall, I may even have taken some handwritten notes over 
the phone, additional questions that Mr. Cooper had, it 
might have come from John McGinnis, and this could well have 
been typed from my own handwritten notes taken over the 
telephone. 

Q Do you recall if these answers were provided " 
directly to Mr. Cooper following this meeting? 

A It took some time to gather these answers together, 
and by the time that the Army had them together, events had 
proceeded to the point where we were dealing with agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Independent 
Counsel was at least on the scene or in the picture, and the 
questions — the answers were provided, but I don't believe 
that they were provided directly to Mr. Cooper, who was 
out of the picture at that time. 

Q I see. I want to show you another exhibit which 
we will mark Exhibit 9. 

(The following document was marked as Crawford 
Exhibit No. 9 for Identification.) 



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BY MR. SABA: 

Q It is handwritten notes, dated 1 December 1986. 
It appears to be on Department of the Army, Office of General 
Counsel stationery, and it is a two-page set of notes which 
apparently bears your initials. Could you tell us the 
circumstances surrounding this memo? 

A I believe that following General Russo's interview 
by agents of the FBI, he called me to give me a backbrief 
via telephone, and these are my notes on his report to me of 
his interview with the FBI. Early on in this, I would say 
right around the Thanksgiving timeframe, the Secretary of 
the Army appointed the General Counsel's office as the •-- I 

because that confuses it, 
las the central clearing bouse for all release of infor- 
mation, all information to be released to investigators, 
whether they be Independent Counsel or Department of Justice 
or Congressional, would be provided to my office, and we 
would then alert the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
through the General Counsel at OSD and then release the 
information, a procedure that we are still following today. 

The Secretary of Defense did the scune with his 
General Coxonsel so we would have a centralized office to 
gather the information and turn it over to the investigators. 

Q I understand there came about, in response to the 
various inquiry procedures whereby information collected 




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within the Army would pass from your office and from your 
office to that of the Secretary of Defense? 

A General Counsel for the Secretary of Defense. 

Q So you would provide information directly to Mr. 

Garret? 

/I 

A That is correct. 

Q I show you another document, marked Exhibit 10. 
It is a document dated 15 December 1986, and it is entitled 
"Notes for the General Counsel, Department of Defense"!. 

(The Following Document was Marked as Crawford 
Exhibi-t No. 10 for Identification.) 

THE WITNESS: These are information papers prepared 
by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, to 
which I attached a cover memo, this note to Larry Garret/ 
and sent up to him. As you can probably appreciate in this 
late November-early December timeframe, we were doing a lot 
of reconstructing, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
through the General Counsel was asking a lot of questions, 
questions that we were trying to answer internally within the 
Army as to quantity and price, and thatjis why I believe I 
added in here, sort of covered myself — I know you are 
aware — we had discovered an error in pricing. How big an 
error and why it occurred, we didn't know as of 12 December. 
That is why we had asked the Army Inspector General to do an 



investigation. 



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BY MR. SABA: 

Q Turning your attention to the third page of the 
exhibit, are you familiar with that document? 

A I have seen this document, yes. 

Q It appears to have been created from the prior 
page of this exhibit, which is your — 

A This one perhaps I have not seen before, but I knew 
that this was being prepared, that that is what Mr. Garret/ 
was going to do. 

Q The third page of the exhibit is entitled, 
"Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, TOW Missile Transfei 
PricingH.y This memo does not bear a date, though it aE>pears 
to have been prepared by Mr. Garrev, and judging from the 
date of your cover memo, it was probably prepared, I think, 
after 12 December 1986. Do you know when it might have 
actually been prepared? 

A I think your guess is probably as -- fairly 
accurate. It would have been shortly thereafter. I know 



that Mr. GarreV ~~ I don't want to say he was pressuring the 
Army, but he was under a great deal of pressure himself to 
try to get the facts out as quickly as he could. 

Q Would it be fair to say that these three papers 
demonstrate the flow of information concerning pricing from 
the Army to the Secretary at that time? 

A Yes. The conduit was my office to the General 





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Counsel, Department of Defense, for most information. 

Q So that if, for example, the Secretary in late 
December thought the price for a TOW was $8,4 35, it is 
reasonable to presume he might have obtained that information 
from this paper? 

A That is a reasonable assumpti'^i, I am sure. The 
Army Inspector General report was not concluded until some 
time in late January during one of the snow storms, I know. 

Q For the sake of the record, I show you what will 
be Exhibit 11, which is a memorandum, dated 15 December 
1986, and it is signed by Susan Crawford. 

(The Following Document was Marked as Crawford 
Exhibit No. 11 for Identification.) 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Can you give us a little bit of information on this 
memorandum? 

A Yes, actually I was a little uncomfortable in 
sending this memo. I didn't think it was my place to inform 
the Army leadership that the transaction Project Snowball 
was to cease. As you probably know, we had not transferred 
all the missiles that had been in the requirement, and some o 
them are still sitting in the Anniston, Alabeuna Army Depot. 

-c 

In a phone conversation with Larry Garret, he 
informed me that the Secretary of Defense had said that we 
were to discontinue support of Project Snowball. When I 



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passed that on. Garret asked me if I would pass that on to 
the Army leadership -- I said I would be happy to do so, but 
I thought that it would be more appropriate if the Secretary 
of Defense were to inform the Army leadership. He responded 
that the Secretary of Defense had informed him, and he was 
informing me so I toe!; on the task of informing the Army 
leadership through this memo. 

As a practical matter, the Under Secretary had 
prior to December 1986 said we are not going to ship any 
more, so the Army practically had already stopped. 

Q This would not be the normal channel to use -- 

A No, that is why I was uncomfortable doing it,- but 
the General Counsel asked me to do it, so I did it. 

Q The appearance is that the lawyers have taken over? 

A More properly, this should have come from the 
Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army, and maybe 
it had through other channels I was not aware of. 

Q I have aiw^^r •xhimt, Exh^iC^lftj^^A^ich is a 
memorandum for the General Counsel, Department of the Army, 
from General Register, dated 18 December '86, and there is 
a six-page memorandum attached to it untitled and undated. 
I would ask you to comment on this. 

(The Document was Marked as Crawford Exhibit 12 
for Identification.) 

THE WITNESS: I believe these were in response to 



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the questions that we reviewed earlier that were raised by 
the Department of Justice on the evening of 25 November and 
in phone conversations the next day or so thereafter. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Were these provided by you to the Department of 
Justice? 

A As I said, by that time — I am sure they were 
provided to the investigators. I probably provided them to 
Larry Garret, and then they went on from there to the 
investigators. By that time, Charles Cooper and Brad 
Reynol.ds were not the preeminent investigators for the Depart 
ment of Justice. 1 don't recall whether or not the Independent 
Counsel was operating at the time. 

Q General Register would have provided you with this 
memo, and your recollection is that you would have provided 
this to whom? 

y 

A To Garretl or to his office. He has an attorney by 
the name of Ed Shapiro who was his key man to gather the 
information for him. 

Q Would you also have provided that at that time to 
the Independent Counsel? 

A Either Garret/would have done that or asked us to 

r/ 
do that and give Garret/ a copy. 

Q Do you have any recollection of providing that memo 

to the Department of Justice? 



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A No. When you say the Department of Justice, you 
mean the active investigators at the time? 

Q Let's start with that, yes. 

A We would have provided it td^^-^tarestiMeAors. I 
don't recall whether or not we would have sent it to Cooper 
and Reynolds or to Cooper's office, because I believe by 
this time he was no longer actively investigating the matter. 
It may have been — most likely, we gave it to him, and we 
can check this, wej>a?ujd have given it to the FBI agents who 
had entered the investigatory picture the weekend of Thanks- 
giving and had remained active. 

Q During the period November and December 1986, did 
you provide at any time memoranda to anyone on the National 
Security Council staff? 

A No. 

Q We come to the last exhibit — this is the 1st 
exhibit — handwritten notes dated 15 January 1987. It 



appears to be addressed to you, and it is signed "Georg 



^ 



(The Document was marked as Crawford Exhibit 
No. 13 for Identification.) 
BY MR. SABA: 
Q Can you tell us who George is? 

A Yes. George is a Major George Peirce, P-e-i-r-c-e, 
an American attorney, a Judge Advocate assigned to my office. 
George Peirce was ray key action officer from the summer of 



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1986 until last Friday, replacing Tom Taylor, who had gone 

to school for a year. 

Q And was Major Peirce tasked with responding to 

various requests and coordinating this matter? 

A Major Peirce was my office's key action attorney 
I 
in dealing with Larry Garret's office and the transfer of 

all documents and information to be released to the various 
investigators. 



U 





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(3:15) 
*4 

DOTSON 
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BY MR. SABA: 

Q Can you tell us for the record what has been the 
procedure in 1987 concerning the transmission of information 
from the Department of Army to other Executive agencies 
of the government? 

I am specifically excluding all committee":. 
I would prefer — 

A You mean in terms of the investigation? 

Q Yes. 

A We have had a number, as you know. Our own 
investigation, the GAO, Congressman Aspin's staff, the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, the HPSCI, SSCI and of. 
course the select committee, in addition to the Independent 
Counsel, now the Independent Counsel or the FBI. The 
procedure basically has been that within the Army, my 
office would gather the information, the documents, and 
transmit them to the Office of the General Counsel of 
the Department of Defense. In some instances. General 
Counsel for the Department of Defense would ask us to 
transmit the documents directly to the requestor, just 
notifying the Office of General Counsel of DoD we had done 
so. 

Some places we would leave copies with DoD 
General Counsel. In any event, we would not release 
without at least notifying the General Counsel of DoD we 



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had done so. 

Q I have a few questions of a more general nature. 
You mentioned earlier in your testimony and I 
believe in other interviews that since these events have 
unfolded, there has been a change with respect to your 
access as the General Counsel to *-he Department of the 
Army to findings. 

Can you provide us with more information about 
that? Specifically, when did the change occur? Is there 
a requirement you see the finding? Is it that you had 
access 'to the finding? What is the current situation? 

A Actually, the change has been that the Array now 
has access to review a Presidential Finding and specifically 
within the Army, the Secretary and I are authorized to 

review a finding. That change occurred in the early spring 

I, 

of this year, 1987. 

From time to time in the past, the Army, whether 
t hr o u g-h ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 o 1^ 
predecessor as General Counsel of the Army has requested 
access to a Presidential Finding and that request has been 
denied. I have always felt, as did my predecessor, that 
in order to truly meet a legal review, I need to review 
the finding to make certain that the support that is 
requested of the Army is within the scope of that finding. 

And, as I mentioned, since the early spring 



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of this year I have had access — by access, that means 
when a transaction comes through my office, the underlying 
authority of which is a Presidential Finding, I call the 
Deputy's office, the office of the Under Deputy of Defense 
Policy; there are two people designated in that finding 
to me and remain with me while I review it and then take 
it back and lock it up in their safe. I'm permitted to 
take limited notes, which I have retained a copy in our own 
internal files, so if I'm absent from the record and an 
activity comes through, the action officer can check the 
register of findings I have reviewed to make certain the 
activity falls within the scope of the findings I have - 

3 

reviewed. 

Q How would you know there isn't a finding? 

A Normally a finding, the fact of a finding has 
t, •> 

been known to us for a number of years. The request 
coming into the Army would reference a finding by country 
and by date. 

It is just that we in the Army have not sat down 
to read the text of the finding. We know that one 
exists. 

Q As an exeunple, I point out that in this case, 
there was no information provided as to a finding, although 
we know there in fact was a finding on approximately 
17 January 1986. How would that situation be avoided 



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under current procedures? 

A I'm not sure that it would be. The SNOWBALL 
transaction was, as I say, outlined. It wasn't a normal 

came th^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J it was 
an order to execute, a requirement; here's a requirement. 
Army, fulfill the requirement, and I'm not sure that just 
referencing a finding would avoid that from happening. 
Q My concern, as you appreciate then, is what 
triggers a ^^^^^^^^^ review and the possibility that it 
can be bjT^ssed through what you refer to as a requirement 
as opposed to a request. Could you define for us the 
difference in your mind between a requirement and a 
request? 

A Well, a request obviously gives us some discretion 
and flexibility and the opportunity to say no, which a 
requirement does not. But perhaps I can better describe 
it, I think perhaps I touched on this earlier, I can 
accept the fact there are some activities or transactions 
or operations that are so sensitive that perhaps there 
would be no paperwork, and reviews would be limited. 

For example, in the invasion of Grenada, I did 
not know about that in advance, nor do I think I needed to 
know about that in advance. There may be other such 
activities that would be similar. 

My conff ^^ ^pl^ be, does the head of the Army, 



qi 





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the Secretary of the Army, know, is he satisfied all of 
the appropriate reviews are in place; whether or not the 
Army has done them, has somebody done them? Has there been 
a legal review, has there been a policy review or a concern 
of congressional notification addressed? If he is 
satisfied with that, I can accept the fact there are some 
activities that would be of so sensitive a nature they would 
not go through our normal staffing process. 

I think those are exceptional and I think that 
is the exception, not the rule. 

Q • Other than Project CROCUS and Project SNOWBALL, 
do you know of any other provisions of equipment to the - 
CIA by the Army since the initiation of the! 
system which have gone outside that system? 

A I'm not aware of any others. These are the 
only two that I'm aware of. That is not to say there 
aren't others, but I'm not aware of any others. 



OdCLt^Sracn. 



73 




Di 




74 



1 Q In an earlier interview you had mentioned that 

2 in an ideal world you would want to have additional facts. 

3 I think you indicated that because of an embargo, in 

4 reference to Iran. You would have been curious about 

5 the existence of a presidential finding. 

6 Do you recall that general line of discussion? 

7 A Yes. I believe that I do recall that. Although 

8 I suppose one can say the Army's responsibility is to 

9 transfer to the CIA and the Economy Act governs that, and 

10 perhaps that is where our responsibility ends, but I am 

11 always' curious as to what happens after that. Whether or 

12 not the Army should be curious about that, I suppose 

13 one could d^arce. ^^t H^ '^ 

14 Q Leaving aside the issue of a transfer to the CIA, 

15 ass\iming that that is not the case, what would your 

16 understanding have been legally in the event of a transfers 

17 directli ~ 

18 A T Ltiiiy i l ttiJfii iP K lirect!^? 

19 Q Yes. A sale by the United States Government. 

20 A By the United States Government. 

21 Q Yes. 

22 A What would be the nature of the transaction? 

23 Foreign military sales or what type of transaction? 

24 Q Let me strike the first — the natureof the 

25 tr2msaction. First, a sale directly by the United States 




uliviBagna^^ 



74 



ap-2 



ums^EF 



75 



1 government of Iran. 

2 A Well, it is my understanding therdls an embargo 

3 placed upon such sales by the President, and would take 

4 the President lifing that embargo in order to authorize 

5 that transaction to take place. 

6 Q Do you recall, are you referring "pecif ically to 

7 something under the Arms Export Control Act? Do you have 

8 specific concept of what you mean by embargo? 

9 A It is my general understanding rather than 

10 specific, that the United States Government, by presidential 

11 decree,' was not to deal with the government of Iran and 

12 that that related back to the taking of the hostages in- 1979, 

13 the storming of our embassy. 

14 Q Suppose the transaction was the replenishment 

15 of Israeli weapons and let's assume this replenishment would 
1g be at a value greater than $14 million. 

17 A I would be speculating off the top of my head to 

18 that. I would need to review that, the authorities. I 

19 iun not prepared to answer that one. 

20 Q Let me tell you what we have come to know, and this 

21 might help you to see where I aza going. We know that in 

22 the middle of November 1985 there was a request made over 

23 to DSAA as to the availability, modalities of transfer of 

24 a substantial number of Hawk missile systems, and it became 

25 known very shortly in November we were discussing Iran as 



UNMSl^ 



pqi 



75 



bap- 3 



yifGHisBmFT 



76 



1 the ultimate destination of these Hawk missile systems. 

2 Let us say it was not clear at the time as to the 

3 nature of the transfer whether it be to an official of 

4 the government of Iran or whether Israel would transfer 

5 weapons immediately, but for their own security reasons 

6 wished almost immediate replenishment of those missiles. 

7 Let us say also that it is unlikely that Israel would have 

8 made the transfer to Iran, sale to Iran without the 

9 United States' consent, but the transaction would have been — 

10 Israel would have sent, sold to the government of Iran 

11 more than 100 Hawk missiles. Iran would have paid Israel 

12 for these missiles in cash up front and Israel in turn . 

13 would have purchased those missiles almost immediately 

14 from the United States. 

15 Assuming that were the transaction, the time period 

16 is November and the first week of Deconber 1985, and that 

17 request had come into the Army. What would have been the 

18 response? 

19 A I am sure I would have raised a lot of questions 

20 in terms of the underlying authority for the transaction. 

21 I would need to determine the applic2ibility of the Arms 

22 Export Control Act for military sales provisions. Was 

23 this a classified activity? What sort of intelligence 

24 ramifications, if any, would be there and whether or not 

25 a presidential finding would be necessary. 



IMMSi^JlF^ 



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bap-4 



iWMm 



ET 



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1 It is possible to accomplish that, but I think 

2 several factors would need to be considered ahead of time to 

3 make sure the authorities were there. 

4 Q These factors would be needed to be considered 

5 ahead of time. Do I take it you are not prepared to give 

6 me an instant legal opinion? 

7 A No, I am really not prepared to do that. 

8 Q So you don't want me to ask you — 

9 A You are welcome to ask. You get what you pay 

10 for. I haven't done my homework on all that. 

11 Q ■ Had anyone asked you for such an opinion in that 

12 time_ frame? 

13 A No. 

14 Q Have you ever developed a legal memorandum or 

15 opinions in 1985, second half of 1985 or in 1986 concerning 

16 the possibility of such transfers? 

17 A No. 

18 Q Would it have been your understanding in 1985 

19 that a transfer by Israel or replenishment of Israeli 

20 weapons, a value which would exceed $14 million, would 

21 have required advance congressional notification? 

22 A If the transfer were done pursuant to the Arms 

23 Export Control Act, I believe the $14 million threshhold 

24 is a provision of that amount. 

25 Q Did anyone discuss with you in the period of 



mmmk 



P.T 



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mwifw 



78 



1 November or December 1985 the transfer of TOWs or Hawks to 

2 either Israel or to Tehran? 

3 A No. 

4 MR. SABA: I have no further questions. 

5 MR. GENZMAN: I have no questions. 

6 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

7 BY MR. KREUZER: 

8 Q We discussed earlier that it is the policy of the 

9 Secretary of Defense that the recipient of I guess Economy 

10 Act transfer items has the responsibility to notify 

11 Congress if they exceed the threshold of the value 

12 established by Congress. Is that something you were 

13 discussing earlier? 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q Do you happen to know the origins of that policy? 

16 Is that a recent policy? 

17 A I don't think it is recent. I think — I believe 

18 ""y predecessor, former general counsel, dealt with it also. 

19 That has been the position of the Office of the Secretary 

20 of Defense since I have been involved in reviewing these 

21 types of transactions. 

22 Q Would you comment on what you perceive to be the 

23 rationale behind that policy? 

24 A The primary responsibility is with the receiver, 

25 with the idea the receiver is the user, and it is the 





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user/receiver's activity that would be of principal concern 
to the Congress. /* 

Q Would this be a question that would be primarily 
addressed in an Economy Act transfer such as we are looking 
at at the CIA or foreign military sales? What would the 
scope be? 

A I am talking Economy Act, because the underlying 
basis for most of our transfers of equipment, virtually 
all I can think of to the CIA would be the Economy Act. 

Q Then would you say that most of the Economy Act 
transfers that occur involve the CIA? 

A The ones that would come through the 

We have a lot of other 
Economy Act transfers with other agencies in the Federal 
Government, butithose with the special access type of nature 
or classified transaction would be with the CIA. 




MR. SABA: I think I can ask the question a little 
different way. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q Is it correct that once the transaction is 
structured such that the Army is transferring weapons to 
another United States Government agency, in the absence of 
a specific statutory requirement, the Army believes it is 



\immm 



FT 



79 



UNMSm^T 



80 



1 governed by only the Economy Act, which essentially 

2 establishes pricing? 

3 A The Economy Act governs the pure transfer of the 

4 equipment. It does not govern the us^age of the 

5 equipment; it governs the actual transfer itself. 

6 Q Asked another way, once the transaction is 

7 structured such that the agency receives the equipment, 

8 the Army believes that it has no furthe^obligation as to 

9 other statutes for congressional notification? 

10 A Well, that is stated a little strongly. The 

11 Army leadership, and by that I mean John Wickham, the 

12 outgoing Chief of Staff, and Secretary of the Army, 

13 are very concerned about the end us^age of Army equipment 

14 and that all legal authorities are complied with whether or 

15 not it is the Array's job to comply with them or responsibility 

16 to comply with them, and that includes congressional 

17 notification. 

13 Q I will be blunt and frank. There were individuals 

19 in the Department of Defense, and including in the Army, 

20 who in January 19 86 were aware that these weapons would 

21 ultimately go to Iran. It has been argued that the 

22 Department of Defense, specifically the Army, had no duty to 

23 comply with any statute in general regarding notification to 

24 Congress because the transfer was structured in such a way 

25 that it became an Economy Act transfer. 



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The implication, when we say Economy Act transfer, 
is that the DOD becomes absolved of notification 
requirements that would otherwise pertain if DOD were making 
the transfer. The question then is: does the Army believe 
that even if it knew weapons were going to Iran it would have 
no notification requirements? 

Suppose they told you, suppose General Russo 
had now said to you, "I know these weapons are going to 



Iran'1, would your answer still have been the same, that the 
obligation for notification rests with the agency? 

A- I would say, first of all, I am surprised General 
Russo knew -- 

Q I don't say he did. But let's assume that he 
did. 

A I think, technically speaking, the Army is not 
in a position to countermand the policy of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. That office has made it clear it is 
not the Army's responsibility to notify Congress. Now 
having said that, and knowing Jack Marsh, as I do, I think 
he would have been very uncomfortable, extremely 
uncomfortable, in not knowing whether or not Congress has 
been notified. 

I would, I am sure, make it a condition the 
congress be — in fact, in this case he raised the issue. 

Q It is troubling, because there is in your memos 



^MiHp^iflfw 



81 



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2 

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and other memos in the Army a certain discomfort, a 

certain unease, others call it a sort of gut feeling 

that we are not happy about this. Yet it appears that the 

transaction is structured in such a way that as a legal mattei 

that the Department of Defense is absolved from any 

congressional notification. 

I ask the question in a technical sense now, 
because we are also looking to writing a report making 
recommendations and the Members of Congress will consider 
current statutes and whether they are sufficient or 
insufficient, and so I would distinguish between what some 
might feel is a moral obligation or a gut reaction and - 
what the legal requirement is. 

Leaving aside questions of moral unease, even if 
General Russo had come to you and said, assuming he knew, 
"These weapons are being transferred by the agency to Irann, 
and I point out that it is likely that General Powell 
certainly knew that, and if they had come to you and said, 
"These weapons are going to Iran;!,/ would it make a difference 
in your legal opinion as to congressional notification? 

A It would have raised the uneasiness factor a 
couple d osiiBBlB to be sure. 

A 

Technically, the primary legal responsibility 
to notify Congress would still rest with the CIA. Whether 
or not I would feel compelled to recommend to Jack Marsh, 



i*rlaW*^Bcifer 



82 



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whether or not he would feel compelled to buck the system 
and have the Army independently raise the issue, which is a 
rather drastic countermanding of a superior, 1 don't know. 
I don't know whether we would have considered that at the 
time. 

I believe the Army, that General Russo did not 
know, he has so stated, and that the Army was purposely 
not told. Whether it was to protect the Army or just keep us 
from learning — 

Q This is a wonderful loophole. We can do it but 
not doi it because we are going to give it to the agency to 
do it. 

A You are talking about a dual reporting system 
then or making the DOD main responsibility and not — 

Q I am asking if the Economy Act was, in fact, a 
convenient loophole to avoid congressional notification as 
a legal, technical matter, and place that responsibility 
or permit it to fall on another agency. 

A Under existing authorities, though, I don't — 
the Economy Act governs most of our transfers of equipment 
not only to the CIA but to other agencies. I don't think 
people will just, looking back on it, I don't think people 
had a choice to go this way, this way or that way. The 
Economy Act is really the only way we do it. I don't 
know if it was searching for a loophole. 




lA 




83 



MWiir 



84 



1 Q I don't mean the Army. I am taking an overview, 

2 I eun looking at the entire role of the Department of 

3 Defense and the United States Government. 

4 Because the issue of congressional notification 

5 is obviously what our members are concerned about, and 

6 there is this unease in the memos throughout the Army. The 

7 Army clearly ^as not told who the weapons were going to. 

8 One gets the impression this was done very carefully and the 

9 Army was not told. Yet, frankly, there were those who 

10 knew, I am not saying those in the Army who kna£l>ut^here 

11 were people who knew. 

12 A No one assigned to an Army activity, of course, he ^s 

13 an Army General, but assigned to OSD. 

•J4 Q There were also other civilians but not in the 

15 Army. I am looking as a lawyer, though, because I am 

"15 looking to determine whether the laws are adequate or not. 

17 If the sense of the people, including the sense of the Army, 

18 there should have been notification, then I have to look at 

19 the statutes to see if, in fact, it is required. If it was 

20 not, then I make another decision and it falls that way. 

21 That is why I asked you. 

22 If you knew it was Iran anyway, apart from unease, 

23 would your opinion have come out the same anyway? That is, 

24 the burden of notification ot^Mjfi staEtx^a^wftuJ^ have pasjsia^ 

25 to KJf§^ »t«nrtiMMt-jpMMBiJteBWIofe^^Mii»giJg4iB^ 



TOP SFCPET 



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ONRMiST 



85 



CAS- 8 1 of the Army would have no congressional notification 

2 requirements? 

3 A Technically I believe that would still be my 

4 conclusion, but as I said, the unease factor would have 

5 been r^aised to a level of perhaps the Secretary of the 

6 Army and with others would have considered raising the 

7 issue -- we would have been in a better position to raise 

8 it more strongly if we had known where the missiles were 

9 intended to go. 

10 Q So it might be said, it i^^t'iMi. j^Bttr statement 
one way to circumvent the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand 

12 possibly circumvent, I don't mean illegally, notification 

13 requirements would be simply to not tell the Amy, or another 

14 agencyfnot to tell the Army what the end use of the weapons 

15 is going to be? 

16 A Or perhaps the activity of the transaction was 

17 so sensitive, as 1 mentioned earlier, I can accept there 

18 would be some that would be so sensitive that I certainly 

19 do not need to know and, for national security reasons 

20 I would be better off not knowing and others in the Army. 

21 Q That is one way I could get weapons out of the 

22 Army and not raise all these^^^WMl^lA tM AiUjf*^ 

23 A I think it would be a little harder to get them 

24 today than it was a year ago. But for the sake of 

25 argument, yes. That possibility would exist. 



USMft^ 



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Q I have only one other question. At any time in 
1985 or in 1986, do you know of your own knowledge or 
did you hear of Colonel North, someone from the NSC, 
asking about the price of TOWs? 

A No. I knew that after the fact when we were 
trying to reconstruct the — 

Q No one ever said to you in the course of 
conversations that, for example, in late November 1985, 
Colonel North called up and asked for the price of a 
TOW? .iS 

A ■ No. I heard that also again when the I.G. was 
doing its investigation a year or so later, but I had n® 
knowledge of that "In 1985. 

Q When you heard about it a year later, what was 
the context of your hearing 2ibout it? 

A The context was during the course of the 
Army Inspector General's interview of a number of witnesses 
attempting to re-do, re-look the transaction as to how 
we priced the TOW missiles, the allegation, I guess, or — 
I will call it an allegation, was raised that Colonel North 
had called someone in the Army and asked about pricing 
of TOWs. I think that allegation did not bear out in the 
final report, perhaps there would have been some 
discussions but I believe it wasfas I recall the report. 



at the OSD level, not with the Army. 



UNCktSMiF. 



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CAS- 10 "• 

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Q I assume you don't recall any evidence or come to 
know of any evidence, in fact. Colonel North had called 
someone in 1985 and asked what the price of a TOW — 

A I recall that coming up as an issue, but I don't 
recall any evidence that would — 
Q That it occurred? 
A That it occurred. 

MR. SABA: I have no further questions. 
MR. GEN2MAN: Nothing from me. 
MR. SABA: I would like the record to/show 
Ms. Crawford came voluntarily. We certainly appreciate 
the time she has given us and, once again, we express oyr 
appreciation to the Department of the Army for the 
cooperation they continue to show these committees. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m. the deposition was 
adjourned. ) 




"(mFuSni^^ 



87 







DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

orrxem or tmc ocnchai. coun*^ 

wAaMiNoroN. oe Mti« 



1 3 FEB 1988 




.NEMORAMOUN FOR TBB _SBCR£TARY_Or TBI ARNTJ 
SOBJCCT: Support to Xnt«lll9«ne« Operations 



During a recent review of an issue in our office, 
we noted a significant provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 that we wanted 
to call to your attention. 

During Fiscal Tear 1986, the transfer of defense 
articles or services exceeding one million dollars by 
an intelligence agency to a recipient outside that 
agency is considered a significant anticipated intelli- 
gence activity for the purpose of reporting to Congres- 
sional intelligence oversight conaittees. In addition, 
an intelligence agency may not transfer any defense ar- 
ticles or services outside the agency in conjunction 
with any intelligence or intelligence-related activity 
for which funds were denied by the Congress. 



provisions appear to reinforce our view of 
■nea at ronaressional notifications in con- 



These provisions appear to reincorce our vk 
the importance of Congressional notifications in 
nection with support to intelligence operations. 






Jci^y^^ \f. u<JJi.o/tuL. 



(^ 



Susan J. Crawford 
General Counsel 






88 






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9897 



olvJ'* 







r 



Released on JLlF^W 
undei piovisions o( E 0. 12^6 
by K Johnson, National Secuniy Council 



RECEIVED 
FSI 

NOV 29 19a6 
Cooy IS Receiot 




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UNCUSffO 





orricf or THC « cut ta«»v or ocrcNsc 

WASMINOTON. e 20101 



12 March 19I< 



'899, 



ftiiotAjiooii roa vrct^^Dwriut roiNocxTCR 

«ILf: !* 5**", •*•■*■• *"* "»• A"y •»•• b««n told nothlna with 

aiSJiSL'"* •Pf"P'4««* •9«ncy and that th« Attornay G«n«al h!. 
provided an ooinion that aupports this poaltlen. 




Colin L. 

Major Ganaral, OSA 
Sanior Military Aaslstant 
to tha Saeratary of Oafansa 



Deci3ssified/Release3 on wftf*8 ^ 
under provisior.s of E 12356 
by K Jotinson National Security CouncH 




90 





Of ^AltTMf NT or rut AMMV 
e"<c( 0* f-t CMiM o» •?«»» 

M*«HIN«TOM < a«ll« 



,OACS-tO 



^900 



7lliK :^«j 



'^^aiil%thWt TO TBft StCKITJUlT Of OIFCNSI 



MEMORANOOM FOR TBI NZLXTAUr 

SOBJBCti Coo^rcaaleaal Netif ieatlen of Sl«nif leant Qitalll9aAe« 
Aetitrltlaa (0) 



1. rrs/MOrORI) Oa ll Jaaaary I9M, tha hrmf raapondad to a Tarbal 
taakln^ froa your oiflea to prevldo l.OOO tOW miaallaa to tho 
Caatral Zntalll^aaeo Agoaey vitb a eoatla^oacy for ),S09 aara at a 
latar data. Tho flrat 1,000 aiaallaa vara dollvarad oa 
14 raferuary 1910 to tho CXA. 

LN) Thla raquaat for aopport eireuavoatod tho aoraal 
lyatoa for raaaooa of aocvrity, yot tho aapport 
SI alllloa throabold aatabllahod la tho rtU 
Xatolllfoaeo Aathorltatloa till for ropertlao to Coa^raaa ta a 
'alfaifleaat latolllgoaeo activity." Fuada la aaeaaa of 93.9 
■ill ion wara provided by tho CZA to roioiborao tho Ar«y for tha 
flrat 1,000 aiaallaa. >illlBf aad payaaat vill occur vlthin 90 
daya, or whoa all aiaallaa ara dollvarod, whlehovor is thortar. 
Tho AQoaey aspocta to eoayloto tho projoct witbla 90 daya. 

3. \l/ »orOR») SBCPMf aa^raadua o f 11 Joao 1913, aubjoeti OeO 
Support ■■■■■■■■iH^B (t), aatablishaa raapcaalbility 
for ootilieatioa of Coofraaa o^eO support to tho A«oacy with tha 
Dopaty oador Soeratary of Dafoaao for Policy. It also confiraa 
that priaary raapeaaihility raaldaa «ltb tho Olraetor, Caatral 
Xntalli^aaeo. ta tha caoa of tho VM aiaallaa, tho Aray 
undorataadino oa coapoaaibUltloa for aetifleatioa eoaforaa with 
year Joaa 1903 aaaaraado*. 

4.>M/K)r0UI) Thla aaao la to aaaora andarstandia« of statutory 
roqulraaaata abeaXd thla laaao bo raiaod by eao of tho 
Coa^raaaioaal iatolll«aaco coaalttaoa la tho faturo. 



Partially Oeciassified/Reteascd on fH^C^S B 
undei provisions o» E 12356 
by K Jolmson National Security Council 



Atnoi t. Biioini, Ji. 
Lloatoaaat Oaaaral, Ot 
Olractor of tho Arsy Staff 



CU^SZriBO bTi 
OBCLASSIM Oai 



DASr 

OADR 




91 



/s- f^r-i^^'.- 





orricc or tm« oc^wty cmicf or ttatw wnm opcnATiON* amo n^Ms 

WASHINOTON. oe Ull« 



DAMO-ZA 

MEMORANDU M FOR DIREC TOR, JOINT STAFF 
SUBJECT: ^^^^^systen. (U) 



18 dPR I93S 




insure, adei°a^"s:;ef:;%e^°iinr't.T?:5i:,";.::°'"-^^*' -^ 

technologrCeaJonJ "?™ ^f "?)?"" involving transfer of high 
_mi..n.,^^r r.P!"_' ^"g« quantxtie, of limited, sophisticated^ 
■■■■^■svaLm ^ ^^ density weapons have bypassed the 

^'WiHl^Jhrsec^tarv'^r^.'' have been made by ambers oi 

cials. ^^M^^JgfJJi^j^^A^ens^irectly to Service offi- 

^i^^iP^te^reren^SIHrt^^^Ml''*' •^'^*^*'^ "°' P"- 

3. (S) Requests which bvoass fh» 1^^^^^^^^ ,. ^ 
Service and no Joint St»ffL! -^^^^M ^y^^®" receive less 
Service's warfiahtiJa ™hM 1?^'"^' y*' "»5f i-Pact on the 
Should be mile liare'tha? n«^^'*!'w "^^ Secretary of Defense 
may degradrslcuri tj oJerallaL^f »'"''' channels to support the CIA 
acuticy overall and impair national security. 



Pari'aJy 0cci3ss.t,5d/Rei^ssed on . I P<:S 8fl 

unoer prowsions o( E 12356 

")"< Jo''"son, National Secunry Council 



(Lpm 



JWo^^ 







CARL E. VUC 

Lieutenant General, <;s 
Deputy Chief of staff for 
Operations and Plans 






"^' % -^ 'I'^^STi 



SPrCIALHAirotlNO 07 THIS DOCUUCTT IS 



c.:--.- /.lor /• -^ I 



cu<'u:s 




92 



OAlaina'ON > < I*!-* 010* 



OACS-DMP 

7(0 
MEMQRANDUM FOR VICE CHIEr OF STA 
SUBJECT: ROAM STOCK Support (U) 



^ 2, Jc^9 <F^ 

D 9324 

2 2 SEP r936 



.rr..n.j2^)Mr-^ 



(U) Reference ODCSLOG action memorandum first under. 



2. (S) Support to project CROCUS was directed by the CSA to 
OOCSLOG in late May or early April 1986. Although the Chief, 
was advised o^^^^^oui red support, taskings did not flow 
through the^^^^^^^^H System. Therefore, supporting memorandum 
with normal ^Vg^^TT^Rw and formal Army leadership approval are 
unavailable. Reference was prepared in an attempt to begin 
formal written documentation for support to project CROCUS. 
However, the OOCSLOG aenorandum fails to adequately provide the 
necessary background foe the leadership. / 

3. (C) Recommend you discuss this issue with the DCSLOG as the 
requested support does impact on the Amy's air defense 
capability. 



by K Johnson, National SeLu.i:/ Council 




Pariiaiiy Oeciassidec/flelesseo on /' _ 

unrtet o'oviEajns of E ;?3« ^ . /' _^^^ J^V^— ■^""^/J 




ROBERT T. HOWARD 

Colonel, CS 

Chief, Technology Hanagment Office 



^^<i^ codded ^s 4t(, 5 ' T^fL^J -^ CJ/h 

I y!oi.in:o?T::!SDo:uaTis Vw^''^^ 

;». >. u.-:,Tj;.-.^v vv;-..'i';?rj;iHO, >■ ^ 

i'-LS s-i ' ac f 5^ u.-j:!). /.:ciss 1 1 11 AI JO O J r? m ^ 

r.tlSDOCUGNTXUSISSLiaiTZDtO lllul^VriflRTl'iS- O Ctj^SSinZDVT: OASPCU) 

is^Jraou-.-.i-ajJiriSia/ORUAiia* '^l ''wKrilXflIf r) ii declassify ok: oadr 

EXHIBIT R-14 OtUn ^ 



93 




^^i^iED 



06PA«TMBNT OP THB ARMY 



6 Oct^^ 







1 OCT 1988 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARV OP THB ARMY 
SUBJECT: Additional Support of Pcojtct Crocus (U) 



\) 



if 



3S f 
tag 

|S| 




(U) Tht action mtaorandua to you of September 8, 
1986, SAB, concerns additional support Cor this project 
beyond that already provided in May 1986. The Chief, 
TMO provided tDe with tht action acmorandua and sup- 
porting docuaentation because the orioina^request was 
not processed through the prescribed^^B^||HI||systea 
and did not receive the legal review^^Tquire^oy the 
OASP(U). The action aeaorandua on additional support 
also oaits TNG, OTJAG, and ay office. 

TS4. Z have not been provided with sufficient 
inforaation on this project to perait a coaplete legal 
review oc concurrence, but the available inforaation 
(oc lack thereof) does raise serious legal and policy 
concern* that should be resolved prior to your action 
on this request. Specifically: 

a. Y9< Since the ultiaate purpose of this 
request and destination for the aateriel have not been 
disclosed, I cannot address statutory or other restric- 
tions that aigbt apply, or the approval authority 
ccquiced undec 000 Oicective 5210.36. Review by the 
OUSO(P) is cequiced if this request involves substan- 
tial risk of eabarrassaent to the United States or 000, 
or, if in youc judgaent, it involves questions of pol- 
icy oc pcopciety. 

b. >CJ. The cequest, if suppocted, will 
result in an inventory sero balance on three iteas and 
iapact on the Acay's ale defense capability. Both 000 
Oicective S210.36 and the OASP set focth a policy of 
pcovlding suppoct to non-000 agencies if it will not 
Interfece with, oc iapede, the pecforaance of the ais- 
sions and functions assigned to 000. Thus, the iapact 
of this requested support on the Aray should be care- 
fully evaluated. 



6^H 



Special handling of this document Is 
required. Handcarry during routing; 
normal administrative distribution 
channels shall not be used. Access 
must be Halted to those who 
know the Information. 



CLASSIPIEOBY: 



OASFCtJ) 



OICLAtSIPfONi 



MLAMiED 




94 



llNCLliS^lFIED 




-2- 



c. (S) It is not clear from tti* supporting 
memoranda whathar i^oam Scocic still contamplatas trans- 
ferring radar systems chat were previously identified 
as Iranian assets pending settlement of claims by the 
U.S. - Iranian Claims Tribunal. Any such proposed 
transfer should be reviewed by OSO. This would be 
treated as a separate request for end items, rather 
than repair parts. 

(U) I am concerned that it was deemed necessary 
to handle both the original and additiona^cegucsts 
through other than the established HBHHi System 
and to exclude both OTJAG and my office from the review 
process. Due to his attendance at the JAG Conference, 
NG Overholt has not yet had an opportunity to review 
this matt»r, but I am confident that he would concur in 
my view that sensitive programs should be given proper 
legal review before the Army leadership is committed to 
their support. 




UN(it»SSIFlED 



95 




Oe^A«TMeNT~0? THC ARMY 




OACS-OMP 



ONCiASSIFIED 



2 2 OCT r986 



zi^, 



1^ 



^ 



MEMbitANOUM THRU CHICr OP STAFF, AR 
FOR SeCRETARy OF THE ARMY 
SUBJECT: Project CROCUS (U) 



^ Ml 



,*.x^ 



1. (S) Th« OCSLOC mttnorandum at blua flag recommends Secretary of 
the Acay release to ROAH STOCK additional HAWK Missile System 
repair parts/support items. The OCSLOC position is that release 
will have minimum impact on Army readiness. The memorandum 
relates to an earlier, verbal directive to OCSLOC to provide HAWK 
items to ROAM STOCK for project "CROCUS." Four radar sets were 
also part of the original request. Two of these are Iranian 
assets which are being held pending settlement of claims by the 
U.S. - Iranian Claims Tribunal. All four sets are still under 
Army control at Letterkenny Army depot; they are no longer part 
of the current ROAM STOCK request. At Enclosure 1 is a matrix ^ 
suoaaarlzing the status of the CROCUS action. * 



2. (S) This office became involved whe^DCSLOG requested the 
memorandum at blue flag be carried byj^^fto the Army leadership. 
When it reached the CSA he indicated c^RI was sensitivity 
regarding written material on CROCUS but did direct that the 
memorandum be sent to TJAC and GC for "review." Their comments are 
attached at Enclosure 2. 



3. (S) In view of the sensitivity of CROCOS, recommend the 
Secretary of the Amy discuss the project with the SECOEF making 
the following points: 

a. Details of project CROCUS need to be provided to appropri- 
ate authorities within DoO. 

b. When details are known, proper DoO legal review should be 
accomplished. 



■S'- lawz or ?u*s coc'T^ir is 
.■QuiiiAi). R.s::-..r -.' iyr;:::3::vj7iBa. 

L'.n33L3 SH • : ♦, r; .- ::: y.-go. a-tcxss 
) Tn:s =oa- ; • • ■-;•/ 35 iijit .ed 10 • 
'031 nil- .• • i- - >«v.>»„....« 





CLASSITIEO (V: DASP«/) 



n 



96 





OACS-OMP 

SUBJBCT: Project CROCUS (U) 

c. Th«r« should b« no further coloaao o( matorl*! until th« 
• t(ovm occurs snd a lagal position is astabliahsd. 




ROBERT T. HOWARD 

Colonel, C8 

Chiaf, Technology Nanagamant Offica 






mmm 



97 




DEPARTMENT (OF THt A:WW^ 



26 November 1986 



2 (^ a)o^ ^ 




S. (Crawford Hx ^"7- 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTlf CHIEF OF STAFF FOR 
LOGISTICS 

SUBJECT: Oepartnent of Justice Questions 



During a meeting at the Department of Justice 
between Mrs. Crawford and Mr. Chuck Cooper, Assistant 
Attorney General, the Department of Justice requested 
that the Army provide answers to the following ques- 
tions: 



1. Provide a reconstruction of the fluctua- 
tions in condition Code A assets for the 
basic TOW missile going back to 1 July 
1985. 



4. 



A ^^ 



Provide the FMS price of basic TOW from 
stock and break out the elements of this 
price. 

Does the Department of State or the 
Department of Defense have a policy which 
precludes approval of export licenses for 
direct commercial sale of TOW missiles and 
requires all sales to other governments be 
by FMS? 

Does the Army have any record of requests 
for price and availability of TOW missiles 
from any other U. S. Government entity 
prior to the 18 January 1986 request? 

Provide the number of TOW missiles sold or 
transferred to Israel by grant, FMS, direct 
commercial sal.e, copcoduction, or 0. S. 
approved transfer from a third country and 
the dates of such transfers. 



5»^ 



*WH» Declassified/Released on . '< ^€r& 8 R 

under previsions of E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Secunly Council 



UNCIASSIHED 



(»^ 



98 



ilNCUSSIFIED 



-2- 



Pcovide the same infocmation relative to ^fi 
Israel as called for in question five for 
HAWK missiles and equipment. 



7. With regard to questions 5 and 6, the Under 
Secretary has directed that the same 
information be compiled for all Middle Cast 
countries. 

Request that your office compile answers to 
these questions as soon as possible and provide 
them to me for transmission to the Department of 
Justice. 



3A 




Susan J. Crawford/ 
General Counsel v ^ 



99 







SECRET 



P^^r 



'!] 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ABMY 

^*SH*<iTON oc ;03'0 0'0« 

26 Movembec 198G 



2Qy^cru p<r 




S 



^^AWR3^D hX.^i 



MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 

SUBJECT: Meeting with Department of Justice 



(U) In response to questions raised by Mr. 
Chucic Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, . Of f ice of 
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (Tab A) , a 
meeting was held with Mr. Cooper at 1920 hours, 25 
November 1986, in his office at the Department of 
Justice. Army representatives included Mrs. Susan 
Crawford (General Counsel), Mr. Thomas Kranz 
(Principal Deputy General Counsel), Mr. J. a. 
Emahiser (Deputy Director, Supply and Maintenance 
Directorate, ODCSLOG) , Mr. Anthony H. Gamboa 
(Deputy General Counsel (Logistics)), and LTC 
Armbright (Log Accounts Office, ODCSLOG). In addi- 
tion to Mr. Cooper, Mr. Brad Reynolds and Mr. John 
McGinnis represented the Department of Justice. 

(U( Mrs. Crawford began the meeting by stating 
that the formulation of the Justice questions ne- 
cessitated some background discussion. Accord- 
ingly, a meeting was the best approach. 

(U) Before addressing the specific questions 
asked of the Army, Mr. Cooper asked if a chronology 
of events existed concerning these transactions. 
LTC Armbright provided three documents, one a chro- 
nology for Project SNOWBALL and two chronologies on 
Project CROCUS. These documents along with others 
provided during the meeting are listed in and 
attached to classified ODCSLOG Memorandum for 
Record, subject: Projects SNOWBALL and CROCUS (U) , 
dated 26 Nov 1986. 

(^»L The Department of Justice attorneys aslced 
several questions about the number and type of 




X 

-f 






•ir Declassified^eleased nn ' ' rC/g fe - g 

un08( orcviiions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. Nalional Secunly Council 



^i^i'l> 



Special Handling of this Docvment is 
Required. Handcarr^ Duri^g routing, 
—^ Normal AJirinistrjieiiw Diitribution 
n *^^lr irr^ Channels Shall ttot Be Used. Access To 
' • ^ * } Thiit nr«Tiiw»nt- F*i«st Be Limited TO Those 



This Dociment Must Be Limited To Those V^a 
Must Know The information 



100 



MLlj.sLl 



-2- 



missiles transferred. Mr'. Eraahiser stated that the 
Army transferred a total of 2008. A quantity of 
1508 were basic TOW in Condition Code A and 500 
were I-TOWs modified to basic TOW at Anniston Army 
Depot. It was also pointed out that the original 
request from the CIA was for 4509 (oral request) . 
To meet this requirement a check was made of Condi- 
tion Code A assets. 

(U) A determination was then mad* to convert 
2500 I-TOW to basic TOW. Justice was also informed 
that the 2008 were shipped in three increments, the 
first of 1000, the next of 508 and the last of 500. 

(U) Mr. Cooper asked several questions about the 
numbers requested and fluctuations in Condition 
Code A assets. The Justice attorneys appeared to 
attach great significance to the quantity of 508 
which constituted the second shipment. Mr. Cooper 
then requested that the Army reconstruct the fluc- 
tuations in Condition Code A assets going back to 1 
July 1985. He also wanted to know if the Army 
had any record of requests by any source for price 
and availability figures for TOW assets prior to 
the instant order of 18 January 1986. 

(U) The discussion next turned to 'valuation,' 
the scope of the initial OOJ questions. Mr. Gamboa 
and Mr. Emahiser explained that the transfer was 
made between governmental agencies under authority 
of the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. S 1535. Mr. Gamboa 
explained that use of the term 'value* was not 
technically correct and that different costs were 
charged depending on the type of transaction 
involved. Army Regulation 37-60 (based on OoD 
7220. 9-M and 4000. 19R) called for charging the 
standard price for sales to other government 
agencies. This standard price is based on the 
current procurement or production cost of the item 
at the time the price is established. For the TOW 
missile the standard price is published in the Army 
Master Data File (AMOF) and is $3169 for basic TOW, 
the last basic TOW contract price of 1976. Mr. 
Gamboa pointed out that a different formula was 
used for FMS pricing under applicable regulations 
based on the Arms Export Control Act. The Army 
personnel did not have an accurate FMS price and 
were not prepared to speculate. However, it was 

i'.- ■ - ocr-nrr " ■ * 



101 



'^^'^kfeT"^'?^ 



stated that the PMS price foe basic TOW would 
Likely be higher. Mr. Cooper then requested the 
FMS price Cor a basic TOW froo Army stocks. Mr. 
Cooper also asked what a basic TOW would cost 
today. Mr. Emahiser answered that based on Army 
estimates/ the price would be about $8400. 

(U) The Justice attorneys also asked what the 
most favored nation, such as Israel, cost for TOW 
would be. Mr. Gamboa stated that 'most favored 
nation' was not a term used in the Security 
Assistance contract. There are not separate costs 
depending on the customer involved. However, some 
countries would be eligible for military assistance 
or credit. In short, there was not a separate FMS 
price for Israel. Mr. Gamboa also provided some 
explanation of Security Assistance procedures and 
the applicability of the Foreign Assistance Act and 
the Arms Export Control Act. For additional 
detail, Mrs. Crawford referred Justice to Mr. 
Jerome Silber, the DSAA Counsel. 

(U) Mr. Cooper also stated that he understood 
that TOW missiles were only available through FMS 
and that they could not be sold directly by U. S. 
industry. He asked if such a policy existed. Mr. 
Gamboa explained that industry required an export 
license to transfer Munitions List items to other 
governments. These licenses were granted by the 
State Department who coordinated with the 000 in 
significant cases. Army representatives were un- 
sure of the policy cited by Mr. Cooper, but agreed 
to look into the matter. The Justice attorneys 
also inquir«d whether TOWs were available from 
other countries. Mr. Gamboa answered that other 
countries may be authorized to coproduce TOW, but 
that the United States required its approval before 
a coproducing country could sell to a third 
country. 

*tSJ In reviewing the chronologies, Mr. Cooper ''C' 
inquired about who directed the Army to provide the ^ 
equipment to the other agency. Reference was made 
to MG Russo's MFRs and these were provided to '"'' 

Justice. Mrs. Crawford explained that this was an ^ ' -' 
"off line' transaction which did not follow normal • 
procedures. Mr. Cooper asked who tasked the Army. ; 
However, the Army regMsenkativea present did not 



ir 



102 



MiW'^ 



know and Mrs. Crawford stated that he would have to 
ask LTG Russo. There were, however, references to 
MG Powell in the margins of MG Russo 's MFR. Mrs. 
Crawford also made reference to her memoranda to 
the Secretary of the Army upon learning of the 
possible existence of off-line transactions. 

^^ The Justice attorneys next asked about the 
actual procedures of the transfer which LTC 
Armbright provided in detail. He stated that he 
had letters from CIA certifying fund availability 
and requesting shipment. He also had copies of 
checks and transfer receipts. Justice asked for 
copies of the CIA letters. 

(U) In closing Mr. Kranz asked what the purpose 
of the Justice inquiry. Mr. Reynolds responded 
that they were trying to reconstruct the entire 
transaction and determine how the entire complex 
affair fit together. He also stated that the con- 
gressional hearings were very likely and that the 
Administration should conduct its own inquiry of 
what happened. 

(U) A list of all the Justice questions was 
provided by memorandum from the General Counsel to 
the DCSLOG dated 26 November 1986 (Tab B) . 

(U) The Justice attorneys expressed their 
appreciation to the Army representatives for their 
responsiveness and cooperation. 



Anthony H. Gamboa 
Deputy General Counsel (Logistics 



CLASSIFIED Bii DASP(U) 
DECLASSIPr ON: OADR 



!?^!ri^2^»nrn 



103 



• 1 ■% » > ■ - ■•■' <~ 1 '^i ^»% - I I 'T 'j'l** 







OEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

0"CI 0» '-t OI«««»<.TciL»«Ml. 

26 November 1986 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTlf CHIEF OF STAFF FOR 
LOGISTICS 

SUBJECT: Department of Justice Questions 



During a meeting at the Department of Justice 

between Mrs. Crawford and Mr. Chuck Cooper, Assistant 

Attorney General, the Department of Justice requested 

that the Army provide answers to the following ques- 
tions: 

1. Provide a reconstruction of the fluctua- 
tions in condition Code A assets for the 
basic TOW missile going back to 1 July 
1985. 

2. Provide the FMS price of basic TOW from 
stock and break out the elements of this 
price. 

3. Does the Department of State or the 
Department of Defense have a policy which 
precludes approval of export licenses for 
direct commercial sale of TOW missiles and 
requires all sales to other governments be 
by FMS? 

4. Does the Army have any record of requests 
Cor price and availability of TOW missiles 
'from any other U. S. Government entity 
prior to the 18 January 1986 request? 

5. Provide the number of TOW missiles sold or 
transferred to Israel by grant, FMS, direct 
commercial sale, coproduction, or U. S. 
approved transfer from a third country and 
the dates of such transfers. 

• II.-. ' ' A ' ? • 

, ■ ■: •■'•156 -. ' -■'■' 



104 









-2- 



6. Provide the same information relative to 
Israel as called for in question five for 
HAWK missiles and equipment. 

7. With regard to questions 5 and 6, the Under 
Secretary has directed that the same 
information be compiled for all Middle East 
countr ies. 

Request that your office compile answers to 
these questions as soon as possible and provide 
them to me for transmission to the Department of 
Justice. 







105 



l^l^ULHi. 



J^di-U 



ChucJc Cooper 

Assistant Attorney General 
Office of Legal Counsel 
Department of Justice 
Rnnm. S214 



1. What is the value of the item (TOW/HAWK spare 
parts) to the U.S. taxpayer? (Cooper called this 
the "arms-length" value) 



2. 'What IS the value of the item as it sits in the 
Army's inventory? How does the Army assign this value? 



3. Is the value/cost charged to a favored nation like 
Israel less than the value/cost charged to other nations? 
(FMS) 



•Mr. Cooper wants to approach the valuation question from 
every conceivable angle on all items that left Army inventory. 



..-I c:-...:iv '...rul 



:;c:n 



106 






/ a^ H> 



^arti3,iy neclassitied/Released on_ji£c^S£ 
under Dfovisior.3 01 E 12356 
')v K Jonnson, Nalional Secui,;^ Council 



3*!7C Ai.- DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Si<-^ " OFTICK or TM« aaNKNAI. COUNSn. 




5a)e 




(//c£ .JtyzflG- 










— "N 



107 



• iJ 



~a ' 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

OPPICK OP THK OKNCnAI. COUNSO. 

wASHiNaroN. oc iMie , 



at 






108 




U GENERAL-COUNSEL OPTHE ARMY 

WASHIN«TON. O.C. tMIO 



►■thi 



I.C. ai 

12 December 1986 



/ l/lu. S^Cf 



NOTE FOR THE ^ff^RAL CCdNSEL 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 



lAL CWNSi 



As you requested, attached is an 
Information Paper for the Secretary of 
Defense on the pricing of TOW missiles. 

As I know you are aware, the Depart- 
ment of the Army Inspector General is 
currently investigating how the error in 
pricing occurred. 

Susan J. Crawford 
Attachment 



Oeclassified/ReieasM on M^r^g fe 
under provisrons of £ 12356 
by K Johnson, National Security Council 



(S?) 







109 



'SSJliflEO 



INPORMATIOM PAPER 
SUBJECTt TOW Misaila Pricing Action 



1. <S) Purpos«: To provide th« Secretary of Defense with 
information on how the price for TOW ■iasilee transferred to the 
CIA was determined. 

2. (S) Factst 

a. (S) The initial request on 18 Jan 86 for missiles was a 
Basic TOW missile, (BGM-71A) (NSM 1410-00-087-1521). The initial 
price quoted, $3,169 was correct for the BGM-71A. On or about 26 
Jan the request was modified to serviceable condition code A 
missiles (Basic missile with Missile Ordnance Inhibit Circuit 
(MOIC). This changed the configuration of the orqinallv 
requested missile to a BGM-71A2 (NSM 1410-01-139-1512) which had 
an AMDF price of $8,435. A pricing error was made at that time. 
The price charged was $3,469 ($3,169 plus the cost of the MOIC, . 
$300) rather than charging the AMDF price of $8,435 for the 
BGM-71A2. 

b. (S) The final 500 missiles were I-TOWS that were con- 
verted to Basic TOWS with extended range, BGM-71A1 (NSN 
1410-01-007-2507) by exchanging warheads, because an adequate 
number of BGM-71A2s were not available. The correct AMDF price 
for the BGM-71A1 was $8,435. Another pricino error was made. 
The same price of $3,469 was charged for the final 500 missiles. 

c. (S) The DAIG is investigating all the facts and cir- 
cumstances concerning the TOW missile transfer. Thev have not 
completed their investigation at this time. 

d. (S) Summary i 

BGM 71A TOTAL MISSILES REQUESTED - ^508 



BGM 71A2 (Basic TOW) 
Prepared 
Shipped 
In storage 


2008 

1508* 

TOT 


BGM 71C (I-TOW) 




converted 

to BGM 71A1 

Prepared 
Shipped 
In storage 


2500 

500< 

TOOT 



■MV Declassified/Released onl lfe< 
under provisions of EO 12356 
by K Joftnson. National Security Council 



• Total Missiles Shipped 2008 



CLASSIREOBY: DASP (U) 
DECLASSIFY ON: OAOR 




110 




iRRLCOONSI 



GENERRl COONSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON. O C 20101 



lORANDUM POR SECRETARY OP DEFENSE 
SUBJECT: TOW Missile Transfer Pricing - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 

(U) The DAIG is investigating all the facts and circumstances 
concerning the TOW missile transfer. The investigation is not 
yet complete, but the facts presently known are set forth below. 

(S) The initial request on January 18, 1986 was for a Basic TOW 
missile, (BGM-71A) ( NSN 1410-00-087-1521). The Army quoted a 
price of $3,169, which was correct for the BGM-71A. On or about 
January 26 the request was modified to require "Condition Code A" 
missiles (Basic TOW with Missile Ordnance Inhibit Circuit (MOIC), 
a safety device). The Army's cost of adding a MOIC to a 71 A was 
$300 per missile. The price to be charged was therefore changed 
to $3,469. However, the Army had no MOICs in stock and could not 
effect the modification. Instead, the Army could fulfill the 
request only by providing another basic TOW (BGM-71A2) which 
already included a MOIC. Further repricing was either not con- 
sidered, or was rejected (investigating to determine which), 
because the MOIC was seen as the only significant difference 
between the 71A and the 71A2. However, the 71A2 (NSN 1410-01- 
139-1512) had been built later than the 71A, and had a price of 
$8,435 in January 1986. 1508 units shioped. Undercharge: 
$7,488,728. 

(S) The last 500 missiles shipped were I-TOWs that were 
converted to Basic TOWs with extended range, BGM-71A1 (NSN 
1410-01-007-2507) by exchanging warheads, because not enough 
BGM-71A2S were available. The same price of $3,469 was charged 
for these missiles because of the same error described above. 
(The correct price for the BGM-71A1 was $8,435.) The S300/unit 
charge for MOICs in this transfer was an error in the Army's 
favor, because these missiles were inadvertently provided without 
MOICs. 500 units shipped. Undercharge: $2,333,000. Total 
undercharge: $9,821,728. (Undercharges approximate; certain 
associated costs still under review.) 

SUMMARY (S) 

BGM 71A TOTAL MISSILES REQUESTED - 4508 

TOTAL MISSILES SHIPPED - 2008 

BGM 71A2 (Basic TOW ) BGM 71C (I-TOW) converted 

Prepared 2008 to BGM 71A1 (w/o MOIC ) 

Shipped 1508 Prepared 2500 

In Storage 500 Shipped 500 

In Storage 2000 



CedassilieJ.'Reieaspd nn l) l-£S ^g 
unaer pronjiois o( E ;23i5 
by K Johnson. Natronal Secuiity Council 



5'', H. tawreiifc^lSarrett, III 



HI 






J< 



^d2/^r 




DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

orricx or tmc ocmcmal counscu 

wasminoton. e.e. Mil* 

IS 0«c«mb«c I98( 



/SO^ S-c 



••'}//■ 



f .y'ioC . 



lO' 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMt 
CHIEF OF STAFF 
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 
— -JVICE CHIEF OF STAFF 

SUBJECT: Project SNOWBALL (U) 



(S) The Central Counsel, Depertaent 
oC Defense, asked ae to in^gra you that the 
Secretary o£ Defense has directed the Depart- 
ment of Defense to discontinue support of 
Project SNOWBALL. Accord in9ly, the 2,500 TON 
missiles at Anniston Aray Depot will not be 
transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency. 
These missiles, however, should continue to be 
retained in their present state pending comple- 
tion of all ongoing investigations. 



J^U^&y^'J- 



Susan J. Crawford 
General Counsel 




Mmbi Declassitied'Reieased on uf^&8 p. 
unoe' provisions of E 12355 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 



55QO 



■1.5 iA/', 



Sir 



// 






112 





/*? iX^^c^ 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY' 

OFFICE OF TH6 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOH LOGISTICS 
WASHINGTON. DC. :03ia09 



1 6 C£C 133S 



DALO-ZA/ME.GCl 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OP THE ARMY 

SUBJECT! Background Inforaation - TOW Misailea and Hawk Missile 
Repair Parts (U) 



(S) Enclosed are ten questions and answers concernlna the 
transfer of TOW Missiles and H^wk Missile Repair Parts to another 
U.S. Government Agency. The ^ni^ had no knowledge at the time 
regarding the subsequent retransfer of these assets. 



End 




BEN; 

l' 



MIN P. REG I 
eutenant Gene 
Deputy Chief of 
for Logistics 




ER, 
ral, GS 
Staff 



CF: 

Secretary of the Ar«y 

Under Secretary of the Ar«y 

Chief of Staff, Arvy 

Vice Chief of Staff, Army 

The Inspector General 

Office of the General Counsel (Mr Gaaboa) 



i 



^■ft' Deciassified/Released on llFe'S P.f\ 
unacf provisinns or E )23i6 
by K Johnson, Nalfonal Secuc.ly Council 




Classified bys DASP (U) 
Declassify ont OADR 



mx 



ir^J^'Z^Z 






aa 



■'■r 



113 






1. Qi WHAT PRICE DID DOD CHARGE rOR THE NISSILEST 
At A unit ptle* Of $], 40.00. 

2. Qi HOM WAS THE rHICB COHPtmO? 

At Tb* I34(> p«i Itca cost a^al* tb* Arsy Hastcc Data rila (amdp) 
prlc* fee a laale TOW (aodal no. BGM 71A) plua tb* coat o( tb« Mlaallt 
Oidnanea labibit Circuit (NOIC) «31(t ♦ 300 - t34(». It baa baan 
dlacovarad tbat tba amdp baa an antry for a Baale TOW Mlaalla vltb a NOIC 
(aodal no. BOl-TlA-2) with a ranqa of 3000 aatara pclead at $I43S (In 
Jan SO. Tliia fact »aa alaaad dua to tb* taattletad aatuta of tba action 
and tla* conatralnta. n* only dlffaranc* b*tw**n tb* t«o(2) alaallaa la 
a MOIC Inatallad at tha dapot. Tb* Azay n*v*r procucad Baale TCW Nl'aallat 
with a NOIC. Ratlonala fee ptlea cbanta* la undat Invaatlgation. 

3. Qi the PRICE CHARGES IS 11 1*7( DOLLARS. miY WASH'T IT ADJUSTED 
POR IRPLATIOH OR CURJUITr NARUPACTUIUHC/REPLACEMEIIT COST? 

At Th* AMDP pi lea la baa*d on tb* laat prlc* paid by tb* Govarnaant for 
an Itaa. Thla Includa* tb* aanufacturara coat plua tba coat of Govarnaant 
Purnlahad E4ulpa*nt (GPE) and aaaoclatad adalnlatratl** coat*. Tha pcovl- 
aiona of All 37-«0 (par 2-< and Tablaa 2«1 and 2-2) provlda for raductlona 
on ralaburaabl* tranafara to purcbaaara outalda of tha Dapartaant of 
D*f*na*. Pactera of aga. dafarrad aalntananca. and rapalr* InCluanea cha 
utility or daalrablllty e( an Itaa and abould b* uaad for prlea caductlona 
of Itaaa wban ralabaraabla tranaactlon* ara aada. Tbaa* factor* w«i* not 
eooaldarad. tatlenala for prlc* cban9aa 1* undar ln*a(tl9aten. 

4. Qt WIAT TTPB AMD HON NAMT MISSILES WERE SHIPPED? 

Ai A total of 20et Baalc TOW Nlaallaa war* tranafarrad In tbraa 
•aparat* «blpa*nt* (1000, SOI. and SOO *acb) . Tb* final SOO ablppad w*ca 
Baale TOW Nlaallaa tbat w*r* originally cenflfurad aa I Ttm Nlaallaa. Thaaa 
alaallaa war* een**rt*d by *ieban9la« tb* I TOW warbaada wltb Baalc TOW 
Hlaall* vathaada tak*B fro* • ateckpil* of *tc*aa Baale TOW Nlaalla wachatda. 






114 






l^i^SECRET -^ 



S. Oi NBT WIKX I TOMS CONVZHTEO TO BASIC TOT? 

At n» euatemat c«qutst«d 4S0I ••■le TOM Nlasllai (aodtl no. bch 71a) 
and tubsaqutntly th« euttomat raqucstad that th« aiaatlct b« In Condition 
Cod* A (t.t.f no toittietions et Italtatlon on uaa) . Sufficient quancicias 
of Male TOM Nlaallaa In Condition Coda A vara not avalXabla in tha 4S-day 
tlaa (taaa apactflad by tbo euateaot dua to a lack of NOICa. A total of 
3500 X TOM Riaailaa vara eenvattad to Baate TO* Nlaallaa. Tba Saalc tow 
Niaatla vatbaada eaa« froa a ateekpila o( ateaaa TOM Nlaalla vathaada balnq 
eonaidatad for daallitatliatlon. 
<. oi MAS TU raopia mici cbadceo ro> tu missiles? 

At If Initial aiaalla raouaat on II Jan •< waa for a Baaic TOM. 
Miaaila, (BGII-TIA) (MSI 1410-00-017-1531). Tha initial $],l<t priea quotad 
vaa eorraet for tba Baalc TOM HlatUa vlthout NOIC, aCH-71A. On or about 
3( Jan tba raquaat vaa aodifiad to aarvicaabla Condition Coda A aittilct 
(Basic Ta»"Misailo vttb Nlaalla Ordnanea Inhibit Circuit (MOIC) ) . Thia 
chanqad tba configuration of tha orlqinally raquaatad aiaalla to a Baaic 
TOM Nlaalla »ltb NOIC. BeN-7U2 (MSH 1410-01-13t-lS12) vhlch bad an AMOr 
price of tt.4JS. A edcing arror vaa aada at that tlaa. Tba otlca chacqad 
«as t3.4<» (t).l(t plus tba coat of tha NOIC, )300) rathar than ehacqlnq 
tha AMSr prica of ft. 435 for tha ■SH-71A3. Tha final ahlpaant of 500 
aiaallaa vara X-TOH Ntsailas (ranqa 3750 aatara) . Thara bad baan conractad 
back to Basic TOMs («itb aitandad ranqa, BCN-71A1 (NSH 1410-OI-007-2S07) ) 
by asebaaqlBq aarbaada baeauaa an adequate nuaber of BCN-71A2a «eca not 
available. The correct ANDF price for the BCM-71A1 waa $1,435. Anothac 
prlcia« error aas aada. Tha aaae price of I3>4(* vaa ebarqad for tha final 
500 Baale TON Nlaallaa. Tba follovinq table provldea a auaaatv of ahipaanti. 






SECRET 



.) 



115 



~~" ""secretF n^y 

stnotvuT or ton missile THAHsrtM 

BSM 71A TOTAL MISSILES UQOESTEO - 4501 

BOM 71X2 (B«»le TOW -Ith MOIC) 

Pr*pacid 2001 

Shipped' 150« * 

In (tocaq* 500 

•CM 7XC (I-TOW) eon»«rt»d 
by chaining warhaads 

to BCN 71A1 (Baaie TOU with Bmtandad Unqal 
Ptaparad 2S0O 

In atocaqa 2000 

• Total Miaallaa Sblpp*d 2001 

Th. DAIC la In».atl9atln9 all tha facta and cltcu.atancaa eonc.rnln, tha 

TOt. -laalla ttanafat. Thay ha»a not co.platad thalt In^aatlqatlon at thla 

tlaa. 

7. Qi WEM FM miCIHO PR0CE0OM8 POLLOIrtOT «T7 

A, MO. thla .aa not an FM tranaaetlon but cathat a tranafat to anothat 
O.S. Go»atn.ant a9«ncy acco.pllahad undat tha Eeono.y Act. Thia tr.n.f.t 
waa conalatant .Ith ptavloua tranaaetlon. and baa ba.n d.tat.intd to ba 
propar and In co.pU.nca -Itb th. law. fHS prlcin, pcocaduta. only apply 
to aala. to fotal,n countrla. and utilUa a prlcin, ayata. that alio- th. 
Go..rn.ant to r.coup T.rlou. da..lop.ant.l and an,lna.rln, coat., r.cutcln, 
.uppott coata auch •• ah.lf-Xlfa autTaiU.nca. docu.antation cban^aa and 
tachnlc.1 ...l.t.nc.. It .hould .1*. b. notad that ms prlc.a -ay b. 
dlaceuntad foe aipaDd.d ua.ful llf.. 

t. Q. ■«. won WAX* »*«» FOB TO 1A« 8TSTBI «« TRAMSftHMOT 

Ai JIB dlff.r.nt lln. lt.»a ■•t. tran.f.tt.d. 
,. 0, MAT fBICI DID OOO ClUUKa FOB T« FA.TS7 BOW MAS IT C0«0TK.7 

■ A. n. ptlc. for .ach part ... th. .tandard unit ptlca publl.had on th. 

AT-T —t.t 0.t. FU. (*K)F) o. ... CO«.l.t.nt with th. cutt.nt contract 
prlc. Tb. MDF unit ptlc. .a. than .oUlpU.4 b, th. nuiib.t of unit. 



116 



•rnrtdad ptlc* (or •aeh Una. To 



pcovidtd to davalep tb« •irartdad ptlc* (or •aeh Una. To this prle* is 
added an additional ebacqat foe tranapottatlon and raektag, Critinq and 
Handling (Ktl) . 
10. Qi ION iioci Nomr ias doo uciivid rot tbcsi actions irvolvinc tow and 

HAMS PARTS? 



COST lOItDOT 
ITtM DtSCHIPTloB" 

TOtTNodifieatlOB ■rioct (Hot* 1) 



- 


Olraet labor 








lagular boura - 
(S.iai bra) 


103.002 












Ovartiaa boura - 


7t.*SS 






(4,741 bra) 








Indiract t.abot 


1*4,311 






Can Adainiatratlon 


10,1C3 






t TOM Warhaad raturn 


1S« 






to factory 








COST BOItOOP 






ITKM 


DESCmPTIOB 


COST 




TOW ShipBant 








(13 rab l<) 








Malarial 










Nlaailaa S3 


,1«»,000 


00 




(1000 1 f3,l**) 








NOIC 


300.000 


00 




(1000 1 S300) 






04MA Ceata 










Ttanapertatien of 


1,200 


00 




cargo nata froa n 








Caapball to aJA (itota 


2) 






•acurity Gaarda at 


7, (SO 


00 




Airfiald a beading 








Aiaa (let* 3) 








Trip to Littla Rock 


*00 


00 




Tvl • ft Di*B (Hot* 


2) 






t*daten* Labor t 


S,»41 


.00 



Nat*rt*l (Safaty ina- 
paeter, carpantara. 
Trana. Ofticor, Ktl) 

nx - 2 Tripa to RSA 



COST BILLIHC 



$377,720.00 raiaburiad 



COST BILLIHC 
S BILLED RTMARXS 



S3.4(t,000.00 Raiaburscd 



IS, (91. 00 R*iabu(s*d 



Tickat cost 
aubaitttd thr 
SATO. No 
Par Oiaa ehgi 



03i 



SECREl' ' ^iJ 



117 





IIMHIt: 


^^'tw* 


l^ 


:irn 


TCW Shlpaant 


oHiM! 


fiof 


If 


IlU 


(I* lUv lO 


V 1 V w ■■ 


J i tr -3> 






iut«rl«l 








-•+r»«B,25J.0O Miaburttd 




Nl*Sll*« 11 


,«09,I52. 


.00 






(SOt I S3, 1(9) 










MOIC 


153,400. 


.00 






(SOt I $300) 








OtMA CeatB 








S 7,500.00 Ralabutiad 




Trantpectatlon 


3,3(3. 


.00 






»/«acoct Froa Annla- 










ton to UA (Hoea 4) 










Saeutlty Ouarda at 


157. 


.00 






loadlnq ataa 










Xadatona Labor • 


3,><0. 


.00 






lUtatlal (aa abo*«) 










TDT for aODA POC fre« 


*00, 


.00 


aatiaata Par Dita fllad 




Maahlnqton to KSX 






Tlcltat cost 
■ubaiettd thru 
SATO ebanncls 




COST BOILOO? 






COST BILLING 


ITEM 


OBSCmPTIOH 


COST 




f aiLLZO it£MAUS 


TOW Shlpaant 










(3 Ho* ao 










Mattrial 








11,734,500.00 (Nott 5) 




Niaallaa }1, 


,514,500. 


.00 






(500 t $3,1C») 










MOIC 


150,000. 


00 






(500 I $300) 









OtMA Ceata 



Tranaeertatien 
w/aacort Proa Annla- 
ton to RSA 

Saeurlty Cuarda at 
Loadlnt Araa 

Kadatona Labor t 
Natarial (Safaty Ina- 
paetor, earpantara, 
Traaa. Officar, PCti) 

TBT for BQDA POC ftoa 
Maahinqton to MA 



3,3(3.00 

157.00 
3,5(0.00 

(00.00 aatiaata 



3,3(3.00 

157.00 
3, 560.00 



(207.00 Par Dita file 
(274.00 Tlekat cost I 
aubaittad thru SATO 
channtls 



!, <«■ ^cr--f 



1^^ 

* 'SECRET 



n 



AU 



118 



BAWI Hlaaila 
Mpair Parts 


UI1< 

AMC 

Matarlsl 

(21t Una itaaa) 

Tranaportation 

Ktl 

TOY 


in 

t4 


,040. IIS. OS 

S. 000. 00 

141, 42*. 32 

1.000.00 


5-U 


,1(2,3S9.« 


(Not* S) 


- 


OLA 

Mataclal 

Transportation 

Kai 

OSAT 

Matarlal 

Tranaportation 

pcta 




141.703.12 
2,000.00 
4,>S*.00 

]tS.2S 

100.00 
14.00 




*13].»>l.24 

384.00 
0.00 Incl 


(Not* 5) 
(Not* 5) 
«/aattrial 



(1) Open rsauast (or datallad braakout a toundlnq arror of $100.00 was 
IdantKiad. Thta la balna raaolvad. 

(2) Air ahlpaant praparatlon rsqulrad Ar4C3L pallata ba acquirad. A osxr rtitrve 
unit In Llttla Rook leanad than to MA. Carqo nats also raquicad (or air stiio- 
■ant. 

(3) Orlqlnal plan was to ship by air (roa RSA Airfiald. This raquicad sacucicv. 
Cuateaar dalaya rasultad In eonatant saeucicv (or an axtandad oaciod o( tiaa. 

<4) Haw DOD policy in a((aet which raquiras additional quarda and ascort «ahieles 
(S) Billa raeai*ad to data. Bainq procaasad (or raiaburaaaant. 



n 



i 



mmmm 



I 



119 



mmm 



/T Jam 



^? 



li 







DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WA.MINOTON.O.C miO 



s: 



AX4-eUA/ 



■^..-.■?: ^^-AWFCRD BX.^/3 




to A yjL^j^^A^ fe^ Fo//\ 
(U^^^^^f^ to Clfl) 



120 



iyri <• <^ ; ' " Ml 



SAGC/Mr . Pe 1 r ce/bd/ 1 i Jan8 7 



15 .JAM 1387 



MGKORAaOTN rOB TSB OXRBCTOR OF TBS AJMT STAFF 

:i:U3JEC7t Status Seporc on Freodoa of information 
Act Requests Rslatsd to tn« Transfer of 
Ara3 to Iran 



T^o Indeoeadent Counsel lovestl^stin^ the 
'iransCer of TOW aissiles «nd BAWE systea repair 
:>arts to Iran nas requested that OSO provide in- 
Jocaatton on Froedoa of Inforaation Act (FOIA) 
cequests received concerninq this aatter. Please 
jcovlde ae with copies of all such FOIA requests 
received within BQOA, alonq vith inforaation oa 
cheir status (i.e.* pendinq response, full re- 
lease, partial release, or total denial of infor* 
.lation requested). .. 

Tbe 000 General Counsel has asked that X -j"; 

provide this inforaatloB by Vednesday, 21 January 
1987. 

- ISignadj SuaanJ. C-.-fiwford "1 



1 



Susaa J. Crawford 
General Counsel 



ASG 
«— t)GC 

Mr.Peirce 
Mr S.Crawford 



Decl3S3ifiefl;Re'es$ecl in iiil^*^9 
under provisions ol E G '.j'.-Vi 
byK Johnson National Sec. ;, :jjncil 






121 



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2 

3 

4 

5 

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7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

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23 

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25 







DEPOSITION OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR. 



Thursday, June 18, 1987 



U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D. C. 



The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:45 p.m., 
in Room H-128, the Capitol, Joseph Saba presiding. 

Present: Joseph Saba, Roger Krttfizer and Bob Genzman, 
on behalf of the House Select Committee. 

John Saxon, on behalf of the Senate Select Committee. 

Also Present: Colonel Hichardson, Office of General 



Counsel, U.S. Army, OJCS . 



EidWU 



joasiBi 






mmmi 



-2)^a^ 



<=\ si;^v\ 



122 



1 



10 



UNDU^SIr 



Whereupon, 

^ ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, was called as a 

3 

witness, and after having been first duly sworn, was 

examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 
' Q Sir, for the record would you please state 

" your name, your rank, your current station and duties. 
^ A William J. Crowe, Jr., I eun an Admiral in the 

U.S. Navy,' Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
''1 Q Admiral Crowe, we have had a discussion prior 

^2 to this deposition and I believe you met once on 
^3 an earlier occasion with Mr. Saxon from the Senate Select 
^^ Committee. 

15 MR. SAXON: And Roger Kreuzer. April 10, 1987, 

16 BY MR. SABA: 

17 Q And that the purpose of that discussion was to 

18 review the matters on the Iran issue, what has become known 

19 as the Iran Initiative as well as certain assistance 

20 provided to the contras. 

21 With respect, sir, to the Iran Initiative, 

22 could you tell us wh.fn.you first came to know of the 

23 transfer of HAWKs and TOWs to Iran and the circumstances 

24 by which you came to know? 

25 A Well, -L was first aware that transfers had been 



-I. J'aS- f irst aware that 1 

Mmm. 



123 



mmms 



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3 
4 
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e 

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16 
17 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



made to Iran I believe in late June of 1986. 

I came into my post on the First of October 
in 1985 and had not been in there very long until I began 
to see various pieces of information concerning and regarding 
our hostages in Beirut. I then from then on occasionally 

^^^ and 

was briefed occasionally on matters concerning the 
hostages and proposals that might be made to either free 
the hostages or improve that situation. 

I have a special assistant. General Moellering 
who attends a great many meetings on my behalf around 
town and one of the groups that he belonged to was 
the TWG, I believe that is the Terrorist Incident Working 
Group. 

MR. SAXON: And General Moellering is 

Lt. General John Moellering, Army General? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, and his title is special assistant to the 

i * 

Chairman . 

This group as I understand it is siezed 
with terrorist problems, incidents, counters, and a great 
many covert, or I should say a great deal of covert 
information regarding terrorists and U.S. plans to do 
something about it. 

In late June General Moellering attended a 
meeting and I must tell you that late June is the best that 



wmm. 



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2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



VNttHSSiPiiT 



he and I can pin down. I am not absolutely confident the 
day or the week of this information, but in later 
reconstruction I am pretty sure we are -- it is either late 
June or early July that he attended a meeting where there 
were some references made to arms transfers to Iran, which 
confused him. He had not heard of this. He didn't 
understand what it was about and when he raised some 
questions, one of the attendees from our Department, 
Rich Armitage said, "I will talk to you about it later, 
John." 

They returned to the Pentagon and Rich Armitage 
told John Moellering about in a sort of general fashion, 
about some of the things that had been going on with Iran 
and in particular, that some arms transfers had been made 
to Iran. 

Whereupon John Moellering came in to see me and 
told me or repeated his conversations with Armitage. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q When do you recall that he told you specifically 
in that conversation? 

A That evidently there had been some contacts made 
between I believe he said North and the Iranians and 
that he wasn't aware of all the substance of those 
contacts, but that one of the purposes was to deal with 
the hostages and that evidently was the reason it came up 



mmmi 



125 



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2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



MnuWoolnar 



5 



looiriLU 

in the TWG and that in the process some arms transfers 
had been made to Iran, specifically TOW missiles. 

Q Did he tell you when those TOWs had been 
transferred? 

A No, he did not. 

Q Did General Moellering provide you information 
about how many or the circumstances? 

A We were under the impression it was somewhere 
between a thousand and 1500. 

Q Did he indicate whether or not the transfers had 
taken place in 1985? 

A No. He did not know exactly when the transfers 
had taken place. Or if he did he did not repeat it to me. 

Q So he relied for his information on the oral 
briefing, at this point from an oral briefing of 
Secretary Armitage and he conveyed that information to you 
and that involved TOW missiles in 1986 of 1000 to 1500. 
That was my understanding. 

MR. KREUZER: And — excuse me. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q And upon hearing this information, did you inquire 
further to seek additional information? 

A Well, he and I talked about it and I told him 
that if he had any additional information he was to give 
it to me. 



ii^m 



126 



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11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Wtti^ffQBr 



^ Q And did he do so? 

2 A We came back and talked a couple of times about, 

g number one, what we felt the impact of it was and if he had 
heard anything else that would nail it down, and he said 
that -- well, he didn't change the original estimates at 
all. But, no, there was nothing on dates or more specifics 
of the deliveries. 

Q Did he discuss anything about HAWKs? 

A I believe we did subsequently in another meeting 
shortly a^ter that, he had learned that there were some 
spare parts on HAWKs but he did not know how much or 
any of the details. 

Q Were HAWK missiles or HAWK missile systems 
discussed? 

A Between he and I? 

MR. SAXON: Separate from HAWK repair parts. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q As opposed to HAWK repair parts. 

A No, not as part of the transfers, no. At no time 
did I hear HAWK missile launchers had been transferred. 

Q Did you understand at the time that the 
transfers were coming from the United States Army? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you come to know of the mechanisms for those 
transfers? 



iCIASSIFIFD 



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8 

9 

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11 

12 

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14 

15 

16 

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18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



umstiffiiT 



A No, not until the story had become more public. 
_ Q When did you first learn that the TOWs which 

_ were transferred in 1986 were transferred from the 

Army's point of view pursuant to the Economy Act type 
transfer to the CIA? 

A When I talked to Secretary Weinberger. 

Q And when was that, sir? 

A A few -- within 2 or 3 weeks after that. 

Q You are referring to November 1986? 

A The middle of the summer 1986. 

Q I understand. So in the middle of the summer 
1986 then you spoke to the Secretary on this matter? 

A Yes. 

Q Was this a — at his initiative? 

A No, at my initiative. 

Q ' At your initiative. Did you seek to speak 
with him specifically on this issue? 

A Yes. We were alone and I told him I had 
learned of it and we talked about it for a few minutes. 

Q Can you please relate to us the substance of this 
conversation? 

A Well, I was interested in whatever background he 
could tell me and why I had not been kept informed, and he 
told me that he had known about it for some time and that 
he had opposed it and that the decision had been made by 



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the President and that there had been some transfers in a 
specific way in order to keep distribution to a low level, 
and that it was his understanding that a conscious 
decision had been made that it was not a military matter 
so it was not necessary to bring in the military and 
that he had made strong representations opposing it, and 
that it was an accomplished fact and we talked in a few 
more minutes and both agreed that the Commander-in-Chief 
of the United States can do what he wants to do. That 
is within his pegvie w. 

Whether it is wise or not is a separate question. 
MR. SAXON: Did you agree with Secretary 
Weinberger's definition of what constitutes a military 
matter? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know that he told me what 
constituted a military matter, no. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Did he indicate there would be additional 
transfers following that summer? 

A No, he did not, if he knew about it he 
didn't say. I really had the impression that it was winding 
down if not completed. 

Q Did he indicate, provide you with information 
regarding the legalities of that? 

A No, we did not talk about a finding. 



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Q So there is nothing about a finding? 

2 A No. 

g Q Or the Economy Act transfer? 

A No 



Q Or the financial details? 

A No. 

Q Okay . 

A I clearly concluded number one, it was intended 
as a covert operation, it was a sensitive matter and 
that obviously some deliberate decisions had been made 
to do it in a certain way which didn't include me. 

Q Did the Secretary make a reference to transfers 
in 1985? 

A No, he did not. 

Q By Israel? 

A No, he did not. 

Now, Israel — I had never heard that mentioned 
by Moellering or the Secretary. 

Q Sir, independently of the Secretary and 
General Moellering and prior to November of 1986 when these 
matters beceune public, did you have information brought 
to your attention or did you acquire information from 
whatever source that Israel had or was in the process of 
making a transfer of weapons to Iran? 

A No, I was not aware of that. 




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Q Sir, I would like to show you a document that 
I would like to make an exhibit in this deposition, and I 
suspect you have not seen it before so we will take a few 
minutes to review it. It is referred to as a Prof note. 

(Exhibit Crowe No. 1 was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q The date and time of the message is at the bottom, 
I would call your attention to that if I may, sir. 

A Okay . 

Q ,My question is not about the specifics of^^| 
^^^^^^^^^hich is referenced but several 
other matters. 

As you might notice from the note and the date 
which is March of "86, apparently there were some 
discussions with General Moellering about 
and putting a request through the^^^^^^^^^|system and 
this involved discussions with Oliver North who is the 
author of this paper. 

He also makes reference to General Secord being 
upset about the^^^^^^^^^system. 

Do you recall becoming involved in the request 
in connection withj 

A This specific request? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A I, am not quite sure what the request is for. 




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Q Well, apparently the request was a request which 
they wanted to put through the^^^^H^^^Hsystem from the 
agency to DoD to provide certain equipment and 
backup assistance. 

A Incidentally we have a number of these, you 
understand. This goes on all the time, particularly as 
we were dealing with specific hostages, et cetera. We 
also had a number of operations which started and never 
came to anything that were handled with the 
system, et cetera, et cetera. 

MR. SAXON: We have no interest, sir, in gettlng^ 
into anything that is operational. 
MR. SABA: Right. 
MR. SAXOM: Not even — 

THE WITNESS: My instincts tell me that is what 
this was. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q Would most of these have gone through 
General Moellering? 
A Yes. 

Q And come to your information? 
A Yes, I think so. 

Q We have provided that information to you in most 
cases. 

• A Yes. Yes. 

Q So thaH]iq|i^t^r§ jj^jjgj^l^in formed about all 



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matters? 



A I felt I was. Matters where we ha d a role in 
f u r n i sh i ng^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H f u r n i sh ing 
trained people or furnishing some equipment^^^^^^^^^^f 

Q I take it you understand that the transfers in 
1986 and for that matter 1985 did not go through thej 

Isystem? 

A Yes. 

Q Just to leave this for a moment, do you recall 
making an inquiry as to why they did not go through the 
Isystem in the case of the earlier transfer?^ 

A As it was explained to me this was set up at 
NSC request to do this. Part of the^^^^^^^^V system 
was used but not the no rmal^^^^^^^^H system. 

Q All right. 

Do you know of any other requests from the CIA 
th^^^^^^^^l sy s t em ? 

A No, we have not. And in retrospect we have tried 
to track down whether there were any and so forth. 

Q Thank you. Do you recall being briefed by 
General Moellering in this time frame as to a| 
system request in connection Wi.t^ 

A I don't recall it specifically, but I must tell 
you that we hav^ tfl<l A J'uipt'i'^-pf_^Re%ff?-quite a number of 





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Q There is an implication in this message that you 
may see that General Secord had been quite unhappy with i 
th^^^^^^^^^^Hsystem and there is some implication that 
the matter should be dealt with further, and the message 
at the bottom states that at some point in the not too 
distant future it would be good if you, Casey, 
Weinberger and Crowe, can sit down and review both^^^^^f 
ind the OSG. 

Do you recall if such a meeting shortly after 
this time took place? 

A No, I do not. 

Q He is writing to Admiral Poindexter at this 
point . 

A 

Q 

A 
what — 

Q General Moellering would be the person who 
would attend. 

A He might. He has a whole series of those that 
he attends. 

Q Do you recall in this time frame, sir, whether 
General Moellering might have informed you that the NSC 
and some others were involved in this operation and that 



I don't recall such a meeting. 

In connection with this particular — 

The OSG I never go to OSGs. I don't know 



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it included General Secord? 

A I don't recall him informing me of that. I would 
think that if his suspicions were aroused that he would 
have. I don't recall Secord 's name ever coming up in 
any those plans^^^^^^^^^^Hjj^Hor 

Q Do you remember it coming up in the context of 
the transfers to Iran during '86 — 

A Vfhen I was being informed about this? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A No, they were not. People who talked to me 
about it didn't seem to know the details. 

Q I take it, sir, this is, today is the first day 
you have seen this message? 

A Yes. 

Q Had there been any other occasion on which a 
member of the NSC staff had brought a matter to your 
attention seeking to bypass the^^^^^^HHsystem or 
complaining that it was unable to handle these matters? 

A No, I don't think so. Now, you understand that 
as far as the^^^^^^^^Kictually procuring equipment, 
et cetera, et cetera, the JCS is not in the process of 
procuring but they were in the^^^^^^^^Hnetwork to 
be kept informed from oparational standpoint and on many 
operations we were asked to provide instead of getting a 
gun or something, that would be in the 



Inetwork 



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but would come from one of the services who happened to own 
the gun. We would be arrangin^^^^^^^^^^ services, 
arranging clearances, we would be arranging some of the 
schedules and also notifying military commanders. 

Q So I take it that even in the case of very closely 
held covert incidents that it is a general rule that 
requests from other agencies for DoD assistance would pass 
th e^^^^^^^^H sy s t em ? 

A ^^^^^^^^^Kystem, and th« 
that w« assumed that would keep us informed. 

Q I have gone through this line because w* hav* 
gon* through some conversation indicating that the 
incident of the TOM transfer was n:;t informed to you or 
went through the^^^^^^^^^Hsysten. There was some 
implication that that is because it was covert, but what 
I obviously am trying to develop is that in virtually 
every other case that we are aware of, that you are aware 
of, even covert requests for assistance to the DoD 
pass through the^^^^^^^^^^ystem. 

A Oh, yes, absolutely. This is all covert. 

Q So in your learning of this, I take it, that 
this TOW transfer incident was a unique surprise. 

A That is absolutely correct. 

Q In general, sir, are you now and were you then — 
"then" being summer '86 — satisfied with the response of 



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the ^^^^^^^H system.' 

A I — of course John Moellering and I talked about 
our participation and we didn't have any reason to object 
to the^^^^^^^^^H system, but it became clear to me I 
think very quickly that I wasn't totally satisfied with 
the NSC relationship to the JCS. 

Q All right, sir, that is exactly the next point 
I wish to go into, and that is what is that relationship 
and I would appreciate if you would expand on that statement 
further. 

A Well, I can expand on it. I hope it is 
germane. I mean if you are just going to hear some of my 
own personal biases that I am not so sure are germane 
to what we are talking about at all, but it was my 
reluctant conclusion that there were military people on the 
NSC that in certain instances were willing to, in order to 
keep something closed for whatever the purpose, would say, 
well, we will provide the military advice. So you have 
the military input and you don't need to worry about 
going further afield outside of this very small select 
circle and I didn't necessarily appreciate that. 

And that was a deduction, not a — nobody told 
me that. This was over a period of time on a variety of 
issues. 

Q How would the NSC, being relatively small staffed, 



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acquire the means to provide that advice on military 
matters? 
_ A Well, of course my theory was they didn't have 

the means. You better inquire of them. Of course 
they are speaking from experience in particular areas of 
their expertise, they were speaking from some time in the 
job and they were speaking from great knowledge of how the 
mechanism works and there were ways to -- obviously there 
were ways to manipulate the mechanism. 

Now, from my perspective, if an item came to the 
National Security Planning Group or to the National Security 
Council, I was invited and I attended the meeting, and I 
immediately knew something was afoot or what the decision 
was and what was being discussed, and I had an input. But 
as in so many things in this town, the top level was 
sort of the tip of the iceberg, there is a whole huge 
iceberg of things going on at the working level, and so 
forth. 

Q To focus and relate what you have just said 
to the matters we are currently concerned with, do you 
know of any studies done to relate or to assess the impact 
of the transfer of the TOWs and the HAWK parts and 
earlier TOWs and HAWK missiles to Iran given that Iran 
was then engaged in and is engaged in a war? 

A When .L learned about it I did considerable 




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looking into it on my own initiative without -- I was 
dealing with a sensitive covert matter here which I was 
not necessarily supposed to know about, so I attempted to 
keep my own investigations, my own inquiries restricted 
and without connecting them to anything, but I looked at 
the TOW situation both in our own military and also what 
impact I felt it had on hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war 
as well as our ability to deal with it if we had to confront 
it. 

'I really didn't feel that the HAWK parts were 
going to be that crucial or critical one way or another. 
The TOWs worried me. 

Q Why is that, sir? 

A Well, we were transferring arms with some 
capability, at least that was my initial conclusion until 
I knew more about it, that was my conclusion. Of course 
the U.S. Army inventory at that t ime wa s about! 
TOWs. When we left Iran we lef t^^^^BTOWs in Iran. They 
had already run through that inventory, of quite a few 
TOWs. The TOWs we were transferring were j^^^^^B TOWs, 
2000 of them, no launchers. My people thought that Iran 
probably had j^^^^^^^^^Blaunchers left, not fewer. That 
was just our best estimate. 

I went back and looked over a lot of the 
information we had on the battles, how the TOWs had been 



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used and our information was by no means complete, but I 
_ could find no evidence first of all that Iran had 
_ employed the TOWs in a very skilled fashion. As a 

matter of fact, it looked like they worked through the 
original inventory very quickly in '82 and '83 with very 
little result. 

Q I take it you are basing your analysis on 
information which the Pentagon has at its disposal. 

A And we follow the Iran-Iraq war further. This 
had nothing to do with anything. This is just the analysis 
of the battles we followed day by day, the way the 
Iranians and Iraqis were using tanks didn't necessarily- 
lend itself to a TOW battle. 

I could find no evidence after that, of course 
there was a little quid, there was no way to show how soon 
they would show up, I could find no evidence the TOWs 
were influencing the course of the war. Now, whether they 
influenced the course of the individual action or battle is 
another matter, and I couldn't really nail it down. 

Q But to your knowledge, sir, prior to the time 
you did such an inquiry, do you know that resources of 
the Pentagon were employed prior to that transfer of TOWs 
initially? 

A The arms transfer? 

Yes. 



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A No, not 

Q So those transfers which you first learned in 

approximately June '86 had gone forward, correct me if I am 

wrong, had gone forward without the benefit of the analysis 

and the resource, the analytic resource of the Pentagon? 
9 

A That is correct. 

Q And in your opinion, sir, did the NSC then in 
existence and the staff which we are acquainted with now 
that made its own decisions on these matters, did they 
have at their fingertips the kinds of resources to make 
these analytical decisions? 

A They may have, but I am not aware of it. Now, 
they have access to the DIA, they have access to the studies 
of the battles and so forth like I do. They have access 
to the intelligence sources. 

I think if I could express an opinion on it that 
they concluded that the number was so small that it was 
giving the size of the opponents and scope of the battle 
that it was not that important. 

And to be frank about it, in retrospect looking 
at it I eun not so sure it was. But I suspect that their 
judgment was an intuitive one, not an analytical one. 

Q I take it that one purpose of th 



system — 

A Would be to draw our judgments in, absolutely. 



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ONCUSSfPffFckET 



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Q And that by avoiding ^^^^^^^^^ system the 
transaction proceeds without the sure benefit of those 
procedures and analyses. 

A Absolutely. 

Q And in this case it proceeded without even the 
knowledge of the top military leadership? 

A You are essentially right. 

Now, please understand that the Commander-in- 
Chief, if he is playing for stakes he feels justifies 
something like that — you can rationalize a move like 
that. 

Q I do understand that, sir. 

A You don't want to put it in a cut and dried light 
that everything must be done in a certain way for certain 
reasons where the Commander-in-Chief has no discretion or 
other way. 

Q Do you know, sir, in looking back now and 
having perhaps looked at these events more closely, how it 
came to be specifically that the ^^^^^^^^^1 system was 
bypassed? That is, it was a decision by the Commander-in- 
Chief. 

A I think it was done by discretion. 

Q And there was a finding — well, do you know 
where that direction actually came from? 

A No, I understood it came from the NSC but I do 




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not know that personally. 

Q I am as you appreciate trying to determine 
_ understand that the Commander-in-Chief can make a 

decision. We know today that there was a finding. But 
in other circumstances where similar events have taken 
place with a finding and an order, the^^^^^^^^H system 
came into play. 

A And I suspect the decision to go around the| 
system was not made by the Commander-in-Chief. 

Q Do you know who made that decision? 

A No, I do not. 

Q Do you have any advice for us as to a way that 
we might assure that it wouldn't happen again in that 
manner? 

A I don't have any practical advice for you. You 
know, I have been in the Service for 40 years and we can 
have a man pull out at 45, shoot himself in the foot and 
we then issue 25 instructions to prevent this, and next 
year some guy will pull something out of his holster 
and shoot himself in the foot. 

MR. SAXON: That is an interesting analogy. 
THE WITNESS: You are asking me to draw up a 
Constitution of the United States that covers all problems. 

Now, I don't have any flaw-proof advice for 
you. The best advice is to get good people that have some 




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allegiance to doing well and staying~within their 
_ authority. 

BY MK. SABA: 

Q Yes.^ I take it what you are saying is that 
you are satisfied with the current procedures provided 
they are followed. 

A Provided they are done right, that is right. 
And I cannot design a system that a man with great authority 
cannot get around without unduly hampering him so he 
cannot do his job. That is the dileama. If you think that 
the most important thing in the world is for him to never 
do anything wrong, you can design a system that will keep 
him from that and you will also design a system so that 
the United States never achieves anything. It is a 
terrible dilenana. I don't find it a comforting one. 

Returning to our historical chronology, I believe 
you said you met with the Secretary in approximately — 

A In a matter of weeks. 

Q Did you have further meetings with the 
Secretary on this matter? 1986? 

A No, we did not discuss it. 

Q Were there meetings following the public 
disclosure of the events? 

A Yes. 

Q And can you tell us in your own words briefly -- 




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A I heard the subject discussed and elaborated on. 
One of the problems I have in this is what I learned then 
and what I learned earlier and distinguishing the two. 
I am not always confident of my time lines. 

Q Let me pick a transaction I eun a little interested 

in and that is I am interested in 1985 transfers of weapons 
being TOWs in August-September 1985 by Israel, and a 
small shipment of HAWKs in November of 1985. 

When did you first come to learn of those 
transfers? 

A In the newspaper. 



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Q And that would have been in November of '86? 

A Shortly after the — 

Q Can I ask, as I am sure you know, the public 
assumes that, as does the world I suppose, that we know 
everything, how is it do you think that intelligence 
information or other papers would not have come to your 
attention indicating the transfers? 

A Well, of course, I an just not in the transfer 
business. My staff is not in the transfer business. If it 
doesn't show up in that^^^^^^|Hsystem, I just don't know 
how we would know. 

Q I am looking at the 1985 transfers by Israel of 
Tows and then some Hawk missiles. I will tell you that we 
heard earlier today from DSAA that they had no knowledge of 
the transfer of those weapons which were provided to Israel 
pursuant to foreign military sales, military assistance 
program contracts. 

A I find that quite astB^unding, because that is 
their sole concern. That is what they do. That is their 
business. I don't see how — all they do by any means. 

Q Were you aware before a few moments ago that DSAA 
did not have knowledge of that transfer? 

A No, I was not aware. 

Q So — 

A See, I would think a lot of things go on that 
somebody in my sljflfy ,iji^,s^^ ^r^d^^o^orth might s^e, but 




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they would not flag for me unless there was something very 
unusual about it. Some antenna were pulsed, or that some- 
thing was going on that they didn't quite understand. 

Q Would it be — 

A I don't see everything that comes through my shop 

Q Would it be fair to say then that you might have 
presumed prior to today that OSAA would have come to know of 
those transfers other than the newspapers? 

A Well, not necessarily. As I understand the way 
the system was handled, they went straight from NSC to the 
Secretary's office to the Amy. 

So that was in the case of the 1986 transfers of 
Tows? 

A I didn't know there was a distinction between that 
and '85. 

Q The method, if I can, the method of transfer was 
quite different. In 1986 — 

A That I am not aware of. 

Q In 1986 in the case of the Tows in August and 
September they were Israeli Tows being provided by Israel 
directly to the Iranians with an interesting question as to 
who knew what and when in the United States. 

That was followed in November by an attempted 
shipment of — take your pick — a good guess is 80 Hawks 
of which 14 Hawks were deliverd, 13 returned in 1986. 



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A From Israel to Iran, returned? 

Q Yes. Through the intervention in that case of 
General Secord, who provided some pilots and support in 
Israel to help the transfer over. 

Those Hawks and Tows that were transferred in 1985 
were provided to Israel pursuant to the usual FMS sale. 

A That wouldn't come to my attention if it was a 
usual situation and decision. 

Q And it should have been subject to the usual 
procedures involving American consent in order to transfer 
those. 

In the case of the 1986 Tows, which were provided 
in parts, there was a finding the CIA did a provision 
pursuant to complicated modalities -- 

A But the normal transfer I would not be brought 
into. I don't know any reason I would or should. 

Q Would it be, though, that the NSC would have not 
only full information on this but would have actively 
participated in these movements of weapons while the Pentagon 
essentually didn't have the information? 

A I don't think that the NSJffC would have participated 
in it without everybody having the information. You are 
looking backwards at the connection now established that was 
not clear at the time the transfer was made. I don't know if 
DSAA elaborated on it, but they do a lot of veapons trai~^<^i ■, 




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Q They simply were not involved and they didn't take 
charge. Again, what I am trying to develop is whether or 
not in this case also, as in 1986, there were sets of 
procedures which otherwise would have picked up the transfer 
and in this case, did not. 

A If there were, I wouldn't know about it. 
Q So, you were unaware of that? 
A Yes. 

MR. SABA: Do you have further questions in this 
area? 

MR. SAXON: I have a number of questions, but mayb<i 
it is better just to wait until you finish all your 
questioning. 

MR. SABA: I want to move to a different area, 
if you want to deal with Hawks and Tows — 

MR. SAXON: You are going to go to the contra 
area? 

MR. SABA: And other general areas. 
MR. SAXON: Then let me go ahead. 
MR. KREUZER: I have one for clarification. 
BY MR. KREUZER: 
Q Sir, you discussed earlier about General 
Moellering's coming back initially to you in June of '86 and 
saying I have just had a conversation with Mr. Armitage about 
something that I wasn't aware of and that is the Tow missiles 




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^ for Iran proposal, and did he say at the time that Armitage 

2 had said that the hostage exchange was involved? 

3 A It had come up in the TWG in the context of 
A hostages. But he did not connect the two as being not 
c anything else but hostages. He didn't say that. He just 
/. said some dealings done with Iran and one of the problems was 

hoping to get more movement on the hostages or one of the 
others 

BY MR. SAXON 

Q Admiral, I would like to ask you a number of 
questions. When we first met back in April — April 10, 
1987, and I interviewed you, I believe you indicated that 
you had not been interviewed by the Tower Commission, is that 
correct, sir? 

A That is right 

Q I recall that you expressed some surprise that you 
had not, is that correct? 

A Yes, I was surprised 

When you learned of the arms shipments to Iran in 
late June or ;>(e surly July '86 I believe you told me previously 
that that reaffirmed in some way the suspicions you had about 
the NSC, and you talked about that relationship, is that 
correct, sir 

A Yes. 

Q And would it be fair to say that you weren't sure 



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whether, which was the chicken and which was the egg, Llwife 
there had been ongoing problems? 

A Well, yes, I think that would be a fair 
characterization. On the other hand, I really thought that 
— this was a personal conclusion — that this was a question 
able proposition that the purpose, unlike on some other 
matters that we deal with, was to keep dissent out of the 
decision-making calculus. 

Q So if this asks for a pin, then you can clearly 
denominate it as such and I guess that it does, but are you 
saying that your sense is that individuals on the NSC staff 
thought that the fewer people who knew something which you 
could perhaps justify, because of the sensitivity, would also 
mean you didn't have a lot of people criticizing you? 

A That was my conclusion. 

Q How would you characterize your reaction to 
General Moellering when he first told you about the arms 
to Iran? 

A Characterize his reaction? 

Q No sir, your reaction. 

A Well, I was startled. 

Q Would it be — 

A I have been around a long time, though. 

Q Would it be you were startled, sir, because of 
the underlying nature of the transaction itself, or because 



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1 you weren't included? 

2 A By the nature of the transaction. 
2 Q Let's talk about that a moment. If someone had 
A asked you whatever date that was — June, July, '86 -- Mr. 

Chairman can we, do we, will we send arms to Iran? What 
c would have been your answer based on your understanding of 
U.S. policy at that time? 

A Of course, it depends on the question you are 
asking me. If you say on the basis of U.S. policy, I would 
say I find that rather strange, because that is contrary to 
our policy. 

If you were asking me can we do this militarily, 
et cetera, that would be a different question. 

If you were say the typical case testifying on 
the Hill before one of the Armed Services Committees at that 
time and someone had said to you, Mr. Chairman, do you think 
it wise as a matter of policy for us to trade arms for 
hostages, what would have been your response? 

A Well, it is pretty hypothetical. I think I will 
just say given our avowed policy that is not a good idea. 

Q What do you mean, given our avowed policy? 

A Because we don't ransom hostages. Now, in a 
number of cases that I talked about where we did put our 
minds to hostages and the possibility of releasing them, I 
think off and on a number of offers have been made in screwy 



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channels -- "I get a man for so much" or something -- and 
as far as I knew, we never took that over or really ever 
explored it. 

I believe you told us whenw interviewed you 
previously, that relations with the NSC have improved 
considerably since Mr. Carlucci took over. Is that correct? 

A That certainly is my impression. 

Q Let me go to — 

A I think that is reflected in a number of ways and 
by a number of sources. 

Let me go to your meeting with Secretary 
Weinberger, which I assume was the first one en one meejting 
you had after finding out about these tremsfers? 

A Yes. 

Q What do you recall being the way in which you 
expressed your dissatisfaction at not having been included 
in the process? 

A Well, I don't know that I was up there complaining 
so much as I was there to try to find out a little more about 
it and obviously number one interest was to find out if 
opinions had been expressed on the matter. And he is my 
boss. The President is the Commander-in-Chief, but I also 
work for the Secretary of Defense, and he has greater access 
than I do, et cetera, et cetera, and when it became clear 
that he had waded in rather heavily on this matter, that was 



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^ was really the primary piece of information I was looking 

2 for. 

3 And the decision to overrule that argument had 

4 been a deliberate and consciousAand that it just had not been 
e made because people got out of the way, it had been made in 
g the face of opposition — the decision was. 
- Q You told us earlier, in response to a question 

from Mr. Saba, that the Secretary indicated he didn't conside • 
this a military matter 

A I thinJc he said that the decision had been made 
that it wasn't. I don't know that he said that 

Q Please understand that I am not trying to — ^ 

A No, Z understand 

Q To get at odds with the Secretary or for that 
matter, anyone else, but we are trying to make sense of this 
and as somewhat novices in the field, we are trying to 
determine what is an appropriate reaction when we find 
something out and what isn't 

So let me indicate one way that someone could 
characterize this. 

A All right, sir, go ahead. 

We are providing lethal equipment, missiles, and 
missile repair parts out of U.S. inventories which, whether 
it is significant or not, draws down our stocks to some 
extent. We are giving them to a country that is on the 



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^ state Department's list of being involved in promoting or 

2 supporting or assisting, facilitating terrorism. That 

3 particular country — Iram — is engaged in open hostilities, 

4 has been at war with Iraq for some number of years. We have 
c a professed U.S. policy of neutrality in that war. We have 
A been pressuring our allies not to send arms to Iran. And 

notwithstanding all of these things, the decision is made 
p by somebody that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and our top men in uniform had no business being involved in 
this or even being apprised of it. 

To some people that would be startling. 

A Hell, it will come as no surprise, I am sure, 
that I don't know a lot of things that go on in the U.S. 
Government and 1 don't expect to know a lot of thin9S and 
I don't think I should know a lot of things. 

Q Do you believe you should have kno«m this? 

A There are areas where I should very definitely 
know about, but whether I should have known this is probably 
a question of judgment, considering all the facts and all 
the information. And I am well aware that the President 
has some very deep concerns on his mind, and it was pretty 
obvious to me that he was playing for high stakes in this 
move. I don't find that so amazing. 

MR. SABA: Sir, did you discuss this with the 
President? 



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■\ THE WITNESS: No, I did not. That is the kind of thing 

2 that he is paid for, that is what we expect of him. 

3 I guess you can say that my ego was dented or 

4 something. On the other hand, if in fact he was playing for 

5 a new regime in Iran, if he was playing for the end of the 
g war or playing for long term stakes with United States 

J relationships with Iran, I don't think he is bound by any 

P particular rules in that regard, and I don't think you can 
design a formula that he must adhere to in every instance. 
That is a judgment decision. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Let me ask you, sir, about the questions th^t you 
raised. You said questions were raised in your mind once 



you found out about this with regrad to specific types of 
analysis that you thought should have been examined. You 
touched on this briefly in response to a question from Mr. 
Saba, but when we interviewed you back in April, I believe 
you indicated there were three specific questions. 

A There were, yes. 

Q What can you tell us about those? 

A I looked at the question of what we do to U.S. 
inventories, 

Q The readiness impact? 

A Yes. 1 concluded that given the overall numbers 

and cimount tranferred and what was coming off the production 



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line that really it was negligible. 

Q I believe you said, second, you looked at the 
strategic impact of the Iran/Iraq War? 

A The impact on the Iran/Iraq War and I could find 
no measurable impact. 




Q So after this — 

A Incidentally, the people in NSC that did this may 
have done a simiA look at it. I cannot say they didn't. 

Q If they did, sir, we have not found it. 

A Okay. 

Q Let me just say to make sure we have this clear 
on the record then, after you did that examination or had 
your staff assist you in taking that look at these three 
issues, you concluded that there would have been no objection 
raised to having gone forward? 

A I concluded the military questions were — if 



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there were good reasons to do this, the military 
questions were probably not influential, or shouldn't be. 

Q But it is fair to say as far as you know, in terms 
of the Pentagon, this examination had not taken place with 
their input previously? 

A It did not, that is right. 

MR. KREUZER: Are you going to stay on that topic? 
I have a question on that. 

MR. SAXON: Go ahead. 
BY MR. KREUZER: 

Q What if you were to know, sir, that individuals 
were to take the Iraqi battlefield strategy and order of 
battle and reveal it to the Iranians, and reveal that 
information to them? What would you say if you knew that had 
been passed? 

A I would say "wow." 

Q Would you say that that is something the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs should know about, or have input? 

A Yes. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q You indicated. Admiral, that the readiness concern 
which you might have had, really was more addressed to the 
Tows than the Hawks. 

A Yes. 

Q But I also recall when we met in April, that I 



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provided some data to you which we took directly from the 
IG report from the Department of the Army that indicated 
with regard to the 234 repair parts for the Hawks, which were 
requested, and most of which were transferred to the CIA 
and ultimately to Iran, th*t the Army concluded that at the 
time the decision was made to meet the requirement and send 
it forward, that those 234 repair parts there would have been 
46 on which there would have been something classified at the 
level of significant depletion — specifically, 15 of those 
repair parts woulcaiave been totally depleted, 100 percent 
of our inventories. 

Eleven of those repair parts would have been in 
excess of 50 percent depletion, and 20 percent of the repair 
parts would have been under 50 percent but still significant 
depletion. And I recall having asked you what your reaction 
was when you found out about those figures, and I believe 
I am correct in saying you indicated that that had not been 
brought to your attention until — 

A No, it did not, and I found that rather, that is 
a rather significant finding, that if I understood at the 
time should have been flagged. 

Q I should make clear for the record that the DAIG 
at the time it conducted in late '86 concluded that with sor. 
things that had come on line, with some different snapshot 
of a different day of the U.S. inventories that the numbers 



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were not that alarming, but at the time the decision was made 
to make that transfer, those were the numbers that they 
were looking at. 




Q I believe you told us when you met with Secretary 

Weinberger the issue of the Presidential finding did not come 
up? 

A I don't believe it did. 

Q And the issue of legality had not come up? 

A No, I don't remember that coming up. 



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Q Do you recall whether Secretary Weinberger 
indicated that he himself had ever indicated to the President 
or anyone else that he had some questions about the legality 
of these transfers? 

A No, I don't recall him saying that. He did 
describe warning him vigorously against it. 

Q Am I correct in saying that in mid-1986 when you 
first found out about these transfers, you did not know 
anything aJbout the Israelis as an intermediary? 

A I did not. 

Q I have got just a couple more questions. 

Going back to th^^^^^H ^^| system, sir, I had 
an interview about the same tine as the one we conducted 
with you with retired General Richard Stilwell who, in his 
capacity at the Pentagon had theH^^Hsystem DpO-wide. 

General Stilwell, in response to the question, 
said that the^^^^H system was, as far as he knew, designed 
as the exclusive means for transfer stocks from one of the 
services to the CIA. 

Would you concur with that assessment? 

A As far as I know. 

Q And I think it is clear from Mr. Saba's line of 
questioning that we have had some very sensitive transfers 
made to the agency which, nonetheless have gone through the 



ency which, nonecneiess nave 

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system? 

A To the agency that have gone, yes. I believe, 
as I understand it, that those transfers were made by people 
in the^^^^^^^^^H system, that it was just an abbreviated 




Q That is one of the things I wanted to get to. You 
stated a few minutes ago that there is a real dilemma that 
we want to have the proper review for something like this, 
but we don't want to hamstring people, unduly hamper. 

■But it is true, is it not, that there are pro- 
cedures written into the ^^^^Hsys tern to speed up the process 
of review? 

A But I don't think that is to reduce the network. 
I think that there are ways to move things quicker, 
th^^^^^^^^^l system? 

A Yes. 

Sometimes a requirement arises with a very, very 
short fuse on it. If you can't meet the fuse, it is useful. 

Q And there is included through th 
review process legal review at several levels; is that 
correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And there is also readiness review, one of the 
things that is looked at is readiness? 

A You 4nders^and_ the great bulk of these things 




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we are talking about are not readiness i 




Q We have learned in the course of these investiga- 
tions that perhaps some sensitive intelligence was provided 
to the Iranians in the course of these meetings by U.S. 
Government officials as some way of establishing our bona 
fides. 

If that, in fact, is true, is that something, as 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that would concern you? 

A It would be my opinion that it would, that I 
should be informed or in on that. 

Q MR. SAXON: Other than follow/ to one or two 
questions, that is all I have. 



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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. GEN2MAN: 
I might have missed your answer regarding use of 
an abbreviatec 

In what instances was that used? 
A This is the only one I know of, the TOW transfer 
and the HAWKS. 

Q That was an abbreviation of the 
A To my understanding, it was. This was an under- 
standing subsequent to November. 

MR. SABA: So your understanding of what you call 
an abbreviated! 

THE WITNESS: I was talking about from the NSC 
to the Secretary's office to the Army to CIA, with no other 
distribution. 

You probably know more about that than I do. 
MR. SABA: That is essentially correct, sir. 
THE WITNESS: But these were^^^^^^^Hlcontacts , 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q These were people normally involved in the| 

system? 
A That is my understanding.' 

Q But the requirement itself did not go through the 
normal^^^^^^^^^l process; 




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^ A That is probably right, yes, 

2 MR. SABA: If I can be more specific, we have now 

3 had interviews with most of the individuals involved and very 

4 specifically. General Thurman, who happened to be on duty at 

5 the time you caune, stated that as he put it, he is by chance 

g the^^^^^^H^Hpote , but he did not understand them coming tc 

7 him in that capacity. 

g THE WITNESS: That is another matter. 

Ok. 

g MR. SABA: But in a different capacity, and he is 

•jQ on the note, among other things, but others including the DAIG 



report, I believe, have all concluded that certainly in the 
case of the TOWs, the^^^^^^^^Hsystera was bypassed. 

I think — 

THE WITNESS: I said you know more about it than 
I do. 

MR. SABA: Apparently there was some application 
of the system in the case of the HAWK radars, and again the 
DAIG report indicates how the^^^^^^^^Hsys terns, the over- 
view and readiness review by example, were, in fact, applied 
to the provision of the spare parts and there had been a 
request for radars which did not go. 

So the^^^^^^^^^|system from the testimony we 
have in the DAIG report appears to have been brought to bear 
in part on the HAWK spares and radar request or requirement, 
but in the case of the TOWs, it would seem to be the conclusioh 



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of the individuals involved at the DAIG that it was bypassed. 

I relate all this, not to testify myself, but in 
terms of background because I think it is crucial in a way to 
our investigation to understand how and why, in this case, th( 
system was bypassed and whether, in fact, the system is 
adequate. 

If it was bypassed because it was not responsive 
and that has been the thrust in part of our questioning on 
this matter to you. 

MR. SAXON: But what is interesting to note is 
even with regard to the HAWK repair parts, the first request 
for HAWK repair parts did not go through the 
system itself and the second request, which was a follow-on 
for additional HAWK repair parts, sort of went through the 

system, but only because the Army forced it 
through rather than it coming through the agency to] 
and down through the process and the Army made the determina- 
tion that the additional request for HAWK repair parts 
beyond the 234 initially asked for did not qualify as part 
of the first request, but was a new request and they wanted 
to treat it through their system. 

So the system worked. The Army forced it back 
through the process. It got sat on and was never complied 
with. 

THE WITNESS: My instincts would tell jne that is a 



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result of reservations from what had been done earlier. 
MR. KREUZER: But no request entered through 
I which is the front door to th^^^^^^^^^^H system, that 
IS where a request would come in to be looked at and a 
decision made whether or not it is valid, to whom it should 
go for action? 

THE WITNESS: I didn't understand -- you may be 
right. I didn't realize that it did go to other members as 
well. ^^^Hwas the mailbox for everybody else. 

MR. KREUZER: That is sort of the way I read 

is that the one that says 
this where the first rung is, this is the entry to the system; 

THE WITNESS: They are an important rung on the 
ladder, no question. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 
Q Did you have occasion, following your acquisition 
of Juiowledge of these events, to have any discussions further 
with General Wickham or General Thurman about it? 

A No, not consciously and deliberately. I think one 
time it was mentioned in the tank, but in the context that 
I am going to be giving a deposition or something — 
Q These would be 1987 — 

A You have got to. understand, that once something 
like this starts, people are very careful about the 



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information -- everybody says I would like to know and the 
standard answer is you will know, you will get all the 
information, but right now the people that are under fire and 
so forth are careful who they talk to, et cetera, et cetera. 

So I remember it coming up in the tank that time 
and nobody queried or explored it or probed. 

Q The question is directed to 1986 when you acquired 
knowledge of the transactions. You would agree that the Army 
provided the TOWs and the parts and my question was whether 
you had go;ie to General Wickham or anyone else in the Army 
to inquire as to what had gone on? 

A The standard answer, okay, we are going to get 
all the dope when it is put together here. I am not about 
to embarrass the Chief of Staff of the Army when he thinks he 
is under -- you have got to understand the environment. 

It is not that he is not going to be forthcoming, 
and he will. This would be hashed at great length, but 
there is quite a production being made of this right now. 

Two or three things that are missing in this kind 
of query or inquiry, that is that the normal press of 
business in the Pentagon is unbelievable, and while today on 
the television and so forth this is the item of great 
interest, and it sounds from listening to people testify as 
if there was nothing going on but this, you have to realize 
that a lot of this stuff gets lost in the background noise of 



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the everyday business of the Pentagon. 

The hard part of the Pentagon, which comes with 
experience, is picking low- level signals out of the back- 
ground noise as to something going on. 

These things don't come across your desk with a 
great big red tag on it or anything. There is -- in trips, 
travel going back and forth when you are looking at the 
people in th^^^^^Kystem, you will find that a lot of times 
they are not there when something happens, somebody else was 
there . , 

"Hiat is sort of the ambiance that seems to me 
gets totally ignored and lost. 

Incidentally, that is with any system you design, 
whatever you conclude, you have got to design a system that 
will operate inside of a tremendous amount of business. 

Q I have one more question on the TOW HAWK business 
and that is, I take it you were, since the time you assumed 
your position as chairman, aware of Operation STAUNCH and 
our public policy against providing weapons to Iran. 

Would you describe that as a well understood 
policy, not only within the military, but also generally? 
A I think so. 
Q Did you have — 

A At least as a general policy proposition, yes. 
Q Did you have occasion to discuss this with foreign 



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military personnel? 



A With foreign military — yes, in a social way in 
NATO and so forth. 

Q Would you say that we made it our business to 
inform our allies and friends, our trading partners, that we 
were sincere in our opposition to providing weapons to Iran? 

A Oh , I think so, yes. Of course, you understand in 
the groups I deal with, the military, this is preaching to 
the choir. Also, in parts of this conversation, I was 
lectured many times on the fact of life -- I am talking about 
in foreign countries -- and my counterpart might say while I 
understand the wisdom of that and I think you are right and 
so forth, companies in my country are going to sell to Iran 
no matter what. 

Q But is it correct that you found yourself in the 
position always of stating American policy against that 
trade? 

A If it came up, yes. 

Q That would be through 1985 and then again in 1986? 

A Again going back to what I said about so much 
business, that wasn't a prominent topic in discussions and 
meetings . 

There were meiny countries that pay very little 
attention to the Iran-Iraq war. 

Q By any chance did any foreign person ever bring 



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23 

24 

25 



to your attention an allegation that we were providing -- 

A No. 

Q That the Israelis were providing — 

A No. 

Q That the Israelis were providing weapons to Iran? 

A No. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Since these matters have become public, given 
that we had a stated public position on sale of arms to Iran 
by other nations and we were pressuring our allies and yet 
apparently we were doing that ourselves, have you had ^ 
occasion to be lectured, as you say, by any of our allies? 

A Yes. 

Q Without naming names, can you tell us — 

A I just took a trip through the Gulf a short time 
ago. The references weren't too direct, but the implications 
were clear. 

Q I guess we can understand a little bit of that. 
Do you personally foresee a serious damage with our allies 
because of this distinction between stated policy and the 
actual circumstance? 

A That is a difficult question to answer. 

Number two, my instincts tell me that the damage 
doesn't come from the instant, per se, as it comes from 



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TOP SECRET 



51 



1 accumulation. 

2 I am talking about damage to our Arab relations 

3 primarily. It is just another brick in the wall that worries 

4 them. And they have -- they keep tab, they keep a ledger 

5 on the United States, and in fairness, this is not as impor- 

6 tant in our Arab relations as the turndown by Congress of the 

7 arms packages. 

8 That is the number one item. And then these 

9 other things fall in line. And this is another straw in the 

10 haystack. 

11 But they have been remarkably restrained about it, 

12 to be frank. 

13 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

14 BY MR. SABA: 

15 Q I would like to turn to the other hemisphere. 
15 Sir, on assuming your position as Chairman of the Joint 

17 Chiefs in October 1985 and subsequently, were you provided 

18 briefings, and I am thinking primarily legal briefings in 

19 this question, as to what could and could not be done pur- 

20 suant to various statutes in force at the time in terms of 

21 support for the anti-Nicaraguan Government forces? 

22 A Well, I received a number of briefings on South 

23 and Central America, but I don't think it was very express on 

24 that aspect of it. 

25 Q Did General Galvin provide you with any 



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ICUSSIFIEIU 



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information as to the status of our military forces and any 
support which may or may not be provided to the contra 
forces? 

A He encouraged me to visit Central America and he 
also talked to me about his relationship with El Salvador, 
Honduras and particularly the Panamanian situation and some 
of the work that he did in Latin America proper. 

And I did visit Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras 
in January of 1986. I had a trip scheduled in November. 
I canceled it and visited in January. 

Q I take it then shortly after taking on your post 
as chairman, you did take an interest shortly in Central 
America? 

A Yes, I did, primarily because I was very shy in 
my background on Central America. I had never been associ- 
ated with the area, I had never been there. 

Q Admiral, I am going to introduce another exhibit 
here which is Exhibit No. 2. This is, I believe, your 
letter. 

Do you recognize the letter as being a copy of 
one of your letters? 

A Yes. 

(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Could you provide us some information about the 



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1 letter, the circumstances surrounding its creation and 

2 perhaps specific information on paragraph 2? 

3 A Well, I think this was in response to a number of 

4 requests from a number of sources to^^^^^^^^^^^^fand 

5 improve intelligence. That expansion took quite some time 

6 and didn't take place right away. 

7 Q I am sorry — 

8 A The expansion took some time. It didn't take 

9 place for quite some time. 

10 Q po you recall when it may have occurred? 

11 A It says the first phase is scheduled to begin in 

12 January. I don't think we had the people in place for - 

13 several weeks after that. I don't know exactly when it was. 

14 Q Sir, I am particularly interested in the second 

15 paragraph, the last sentence, which, in an earlier copy, 

16 has been highlighted and, therefore, it appears slightly 

17 shaded in the exhibit. 

18 A In what regard? 

19 Q Do I understand it that the intention was that 

20 the^^^^^Krfould provide intelligence information to the anti- 

21 Sandinista — 

22 A I don't believe that was the intention. 

23 Q Well, perhaps you could explain what was intended. 

24 A Well, the main thing was to provide it to our own 

25 people, to the Pentagon and to users here as well as on 



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Galvin's staff. 

In any event, I am informed that it never was used 
in that fashion, for any Sandinista resistance. 

Q Sir, do you recall whether instant to preparation 
of this letter and matters that are discussed in it, if you 
were provided a legal briefing at the time as to whether 
tactical intelligence could or could not be provided at that 
time or in the near future to the anti-Sandinista resistance? 

A I guess the fair answer is I don't recall, but I 
don't beli,eve it was provided. 

Q Do you recall now whether at that time it was or 
was not permitted by the legislation then applicable? " 

A At the time of the memorandum — my understanding 
of it, it was permitted in 1986. 

Q Do you know as a matter of fact whether or not 
any support was, in fact, provided during 1985? 

A Well, it didn't even form until 198 5, the expanded 
group. I am told that it never provided anything to the 
Sandinistas. 

Q So to the best of your knowledge, the group in 
existence at that time had not provided? 

A That is right. 

MR. SABA: I have one more exhibit, which will now 
be Exhibit 3, I believe, sir. 

(Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.) 




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THE WITNESS: Okay. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Sir, do you recognize the letter as being yours? 

A It is mine. 

Q Could you please give us some information about 
the letter, the circumstances leading into its preparation 
and events subsequent that are discussed in it? 

A Well, as I recall, this was a request by the CIA 
for this kind of support and that was the purpose of the 
letter. 

Q Would you view this letter as being part of a 
Isystem review of that CIA request? 

A Part of a] 

Yes, sir. 

A No, I don't think so. 

see -^^^^HjHH^^^^^^^^^^Iare 
being utilized to fulfill -- this is probably the best 
mechanism -- 

Q So I take it the intention here -- 

A I assume I did feel that way. That is what the 
sentence says. There was a legal look at this, I recall 
that. 

Q That is my next question, sir. 

Do you recall if there was a legal review of this 
also? 



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Yes, there was. 



Q So you obtained advice as to what could and could 
not be done prior to this letter? 
A Yes. 

Q I would also be interested, sir, because we have 
had some other testimony as to the best kind of support to be 
provided, as to your view, if you care to express it, as to the 
provision of DoD support, being whether that should be a 
direct provision of support or continue being, through another 
agency request and continuing to run this through the system. 

A I think that was part of the legal review, that it 
should come through the agency as I recall. 

COLONEL RICHARDSON: I think the question is mili- 
tary versus civilian aid through the — 
MR. SABA: That is correct. 

COLONEL RICHARDSON: General Calvin's proposal 
was that it primarily should be a militarily-run operation 
as opposed to being a CIA-run operation using substantial 
military assets. 

I think the question is as to how you feel about 
the two proposals. 

MR. SABA: That is right. We have had the 
advantage of having spoken to General Galvin. 

THE WITNESS: I think our judgment on balance was 
that it should be a CIA-run operation with military support 



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and that this reflects that. 

Is that your understanding. Colonel? 
COLONEL RICHARDSON: Yes. General Calvin 
initially proposed that he would have preferred a military 
operation and after discussion with the agency, this was 
deemed to be the best way to go. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q So these|^^^^Hpresumably are dealt with through 
the ^^^^^^^^^1 system? 

A Ves. 

Q I take it you are satisfied with the functioning 
of that system? 

A Yes. In this case — 

COLONEL RICHARDSON: Essentially, everything 
relating to the new legislation of which this is a part is -- 
all goes through the^^^^^^^^^Hsystem religiously and this 
was just part of it. 

BY MR. SABA: 

Q My next question, for the sake of a complete record, 
is whether in the case of this new legislation, you know of 
any circumstances which, in the case of Central America 
being bypassed or not going through the^^^^^^^^^^Hsystem? 

A I don't know. 

Q So we don't have a situation where we had an order 
and a bypass of the system? 



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A I don't think so. This was a different type of 
matter. We were setting up a system here which was widely 
discussed even though it was a sensitive matter by the 
participants in the agencies with meetings, et cetera, at all 
levels and of all agencies. 

During the period you have been Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, have you had any substantive input into issues 
involving security assistance to the Central American 
countries? 

A I have been kept familiar with, for example. 
El Salvador and Honduras because we have a particular inter- 
est there. And I visited there, as I said in January,- and 
heard their view. 

Q January of 1986? 

A 1986. 

Q Are you familiar, sir, with the request by 
Honduras for F-5Es? 

A Yes. 

Q And can you tell us your understanding of that 
situation? 

A Well, we felt it was a request on their part to, 
as a matter of fact, an interim fix for aircraft that were 
becoming rapidly obsolete and outmoded and one that they 
felt very strongly about. When I was there in January, I 
received some information from their military on their 



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security assistance request and this was a prominent -- not 
to elaborate on, but obviously a prominent item that they 
were very interested in. 

Q At that time during that meeting in January 1986, 
did their military express to you^ concerns about the 
contras? 

A No, certainly not in regard to the F-5s. 

Q I will take it separately. 

My question will be whether or not they had 
indicated concerns abou]^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthe contras that 
time. 

A No, I don't think so. 

Q My next question — 

A It was an orientation visit, a short visit, 
my first visit, and in the official meetings I had with the 
military, no. 

Q Did you have subsequent visits or meetings? 

A Obviously in the socal context, they are aware 
that there are contra^ 
and so forth and that that is of interest to them, but I had 
no approaches to me. 

As a matter of fact, a couple of calls I made, 
it was interesting, there was no mention of it at all. 

Q So since January 1986, you have had subsequent 
contacts with the Honduran military? 




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A I haven't been back, no. I just went two weeks 
ago to Panama. That is the first time I have been back since 
Galvin's change of command. 

Q So other than the contacts you have had with the 
military in January 1986, you have had no additional contact? 

A President Azcona came to Washington once and I 
attended a meeting with Secretary Weinberger. 

Q On that occasion, did the subject of the F-5Es 
arise? 

A . Yes, but in a very general way, how do you think 
they are going in the Congress. 

Q Did the subject of the contras arise? 

A No. 




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wmstFier 



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never -- certainly from our perspective, the health of the 
Honduran military is a much more important one and that is 
the way we look at it. 

From the overall perspective, the health of the 
relationship between the United States and Honduras is 
important to our whole policy in Central America. 

Q In the case of^^^^^^^^fhas an allegation ever 
been brought to your attention that there have been false 
end-user certificates executed 




I believe they probably call hi 

A And these would be American security assistance -- 

Q No, sir. These would be end-user certificates 
which he signed and were used in connection with furnishing 
of weapons to the contras. 

A No, I have never heard that. 

Q In the case °^^^^^^^M ^^^ ^°^ °^ °^"^ 

information linking ^^^^^^^attitude toward the contras 
or its favorable assistance providing end-user certificates 
to security assistance? 

A Linking that with security assistance? 



Yes, sir. 



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A No. 

MR. SABA: I don't think I have further questions 

lor Honduras. 
MR. KREUZER: I have. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
KREUZER: 




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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 
Q My last question, in connection with these 
various reports that you just mentioned, did you receive 
reports since becoming chairman of the private resupply of 
the anti-Sandinista forces? 

A Privately supplied? 
Q Yes, sir. 



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A Yes, we saw some intelligence, I see intelligence 
occasionally that there was private supply, a plane was 
intercepted or detected and the information was we thought it 
was a private supply plane. 




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BY MR. SABA: 



Q Did you know General Secord was involved? 

A No, I did not. 

Q Okay. 

A The only one I knew in that, and that is 
through a different period in my life, was Singlaub. I 
knew him at a different time in a different place. 

Q In -- 

A I used to know Secord several years ago. 

Q Okay. 

A I did not realize he was involved in the contras. 

Q Did you have any indication of where the private 
suppliers obtained the funds for the weapons in their 
operations? 

A No, I did not. Aside from private subscriptions 
I had no — I not only had no indication I had no view 
on it. 

MR. SABA: I have no more questions in this 
subject. 

MR. SAXON: You have some on any others? 
MR. SABA: Just a general one. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q I have one and possibly two other questions, 
and then a broad general one, sort of a wrap-up at the end. 



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My first question to go back to the impact 
of the TOW transfer on the strategic balance in the Iran- 
Iraq war, I believe when you met with us back in April, 
sir, you did indicate there was some evidence that in 
small battles the Iranian use of the TOWs had been 
effective in knocking out Iraqi tanks, is that correct, sir? 

A Well, they looked like there might be some 
evidence to that effect. It was pretty tough to even 
connect the two but it looked like they might have enjoyed 
some success that they have not previously enjoyed, and 
this might be attributed to it. 

MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record for a second. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. SAXON: Back on the record. 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q I just have one final question. Admiral, and that 
is sort of a botfead philosophical question. As we will 
ultimately terminate our investigation and complete our 
hearings -- 

A I didn't know you were going to terminate. 

Q Notice, I didn't say when, though. I said 
ultimately, one day this will all be over and there will be 
a report written and in that report there will be a 
section we assume on recommendations for how to do it 
differently, how to do it better, whether there will be 



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structural or institutional mechanism changes that are 
required. 

Do you have any thoughts for us and for the 
members of the committee who will read this deposition on 
those matters? 

A I think obviously I have given some thought to 
my relationship with the NSC and what I think is a proper 
relationship, and I think that the question of military 
officers serving on the NSC should be examined. I don't 
mean served or eliminated, but I think that the 
question should be examined primarily with a view to putting 
some kind of fixed limit on the term of service over there 
for a military officer. 

Q Is there not in fact a limit now but it can 
be extended? 

A As a practical proposition the limits are sort of 
irrelevant because if an officer does well it is requested 
to extend him and they give him a position of prestig/e 
on the NSC and it is always honored, et cetera, et cetera. 
One of the attractions to be frank about it to a military 
officer is that we pay their salary, not the NSC. 

Q So I assume — 

A I assume for most of the officers that are 
extended, I assume it is their talent involved in their 
extending and keeping someone on. But the problem in the 



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military, is the problem of having very talented people, 

and we do send talented people and often they become 

very important on the NSC staff, and they do very good 

service, so much so that they end up over there for a 

period of time and their military skills, their 

military usefulness degrades. On the other hand nobody in 

the NSC can understand why the military doesn't reward this 

man who has performed great service in important tasks 

for his country. I can understand that attitude but he 

is a military officer and I think it is a mistake to, 

there are other options available. These have been exercised 

on occasion, where an officer left the Service and stayed 

in that line of work and went another path which is 

just fine. 

But to retain his rank and expect to be promoted 
with his contemporaries in the individual services, that is 
asking quite a bit of a service if you keep him a long time. 
And yet the NSC sort of operates unto itself. 

MR. KREUZER: Keeping in mind, sir, that when the 
inquiry comes from the NSC to the military departments, 
would you spare this individual for another term of one year 
as it always does, do you think that in the future the 
military departments might take on a little bit more stiffer 
attitude with the Executive Branch when they respond? 

THE WITNESS: Well, it is tough to — it is easy 






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to express that attitude but it is tough to sustain that 
position. I Know that in these cases time and again it has 
been said, look, you can keep that fellow, we know he is 
important to you and he is a fine man, but you are 
jeopardizing his promotion and the answer comes back, I will 
take care of that, or I will handle that. 

MR. KREUZER: That is from the requester? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. You know what he is saying is 
I will get somebody of great influence to protect that 
man. But I don't think that is fair to the man or to the 
Service. 

Now, if that man is of such tremendous value to 
the nation — and incidentally some of them are, they 
really are, then I think he should decide that is his 
profession, that is his line of work and leave the Service 
and -- 

MR. KREUZER: Give that space to somebody who is 

going to come along. 

THE WITNESS: That is right. There are a lot of 
people out on the battlements doing dirty work in the 
battlements and^^^^^Band Pentagon, I don't mean 
necessarily out of town, but that are doing a lot of work 
and they should — their prospects shouldn't be jeopardized 
either. And I understand it is a difficult proposition. 
I would not propose anything that freezes the military out 



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of the NSC because I think the exchange and having the 
talents in both places and the points of view is a worthwhile 
one and profitable to both sides. It is just that I think 
to have a man in a position for too long -- and I don't 
think an active military man should lead the NSC, I just 
really don't believe that. That is a very prejudiced 
view because as the Chairman, I think if you want a military 
bias in the sense of the Chiefs, you should go to the 
chairman, not to the NSC adviser. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q But I assume you would not object, to the NSC 
adviser having a military assistant? 
A No, I do not. 
Q Thank you. 

A You know, the best guard of all is to get good 
people and sometimes you succeed at that and sometimes 
you don't. 

MR. SABA: Mr. Saxon asked my general questions 
so I have nothing further, sir. 

MR. KREUZER: I have nothing. 

MR. GENZMAN: Nothing further. Thank you for 
your time. 

MR. SABA: Sir, On behalf of the House Committee 
we wish to thank you very much. We certainly do appreciate 



your time. We hope that we will finish one day. If you 



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mMmr 



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m7 just come from the Gulf -- 



THE WITNESS: We hope -- this is off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. SABA: That is all. 

(Whereupon, the deposition of ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. 
CROWE, JR. was concluded.) 



imClASSlQEIL. 



193 



mIMSIFIED 



EXECUnVE SESSION 

DEPOSITION OF 
KEVIN W. CURRIER 



COPT NO- 



Select Conunittee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with 

Iran, 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Washington, D.C. 



Tuesday, May 5, 1987 




The deposition convened at 9:15 a.m. in Room 352, 
Rayburn House Office Building. 

Present: Pamela Naughton, Staff Counsel, House Select 
Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 
Iran; Richard Leon, Deputy Chief Minority Counsel, House 
Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions 
with Iran. 



Pai^ny Declassified/Released on l-^^-9f 
under provisions of LO. 12356 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



■AiM 



LASSIHED 



82-702 0-88-8 



194 



wsAzm 



MS. NAUGHTON: We are on the record. 

My name is Pamela Naughton. I am staff counsel to 
the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran. 

If the other people in the room will please 
introduce themselves for the record. 

MR. LEON: My name is Richard Leon. I am deputy 
chief minority counsel for the House Committee on Iran. 

MR. CURRIER: My nam'e is Kevin W. Currier. I am a 
3pficial^gent for the FBI at the Miami division. 

MS. NAUGHTON: This is a deposition taken in executiv 
session, which means it is secret material. I provided a 
copy of the committee rules to the FBI liaison, Bruce Asrae. 
I wonder if you had a chance to discuss that with him or see 
a copy. 

MR. CURRIER: He discussed the matter briefly with u: 
this morning. 

MS. NAUGHTON: For the record, here is my copy, and 
you can look at it, should you have any questions or want to 
consult. 

Do you have any questions before we begin? 

MR. CURRIER: No, I don't. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Okay. The rules will be right here ir 
case you have any questions. 

The reporter has infomed you he is not a D.C. notar> 



195 



15 



lOAS^niD 



Do you have any objection to waiving that particular 

^ jurisdiction? 

3 MR. CURRIER: No. 

* MS. NAUGHTON: And taking the oath today? 

5 MR. CURRIER: No, I have no objection. 

^ (The witness was sworn.) 

Whereupon, 

8 KEVIN W. CURRIER 

' was called as a witness and, having been duly sworn, was 

^° examined and testified as follows: 

11 EXAMINATION 

12 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

13 Q Mr. Currier, you are here today without counsel; 
^* is that correct? 

A Yes, it is. 

16 Q Did you have personal counsel to attend this 

^^ deposition? 

l» A No, I don't, or I haven't. 

19 Q It is your option. I just want to explain to you. 

20 I don't see it is necessary, but under the rules you have a 

21 right to a personal attorney at the deposition. 

22 Do you understand that? 

23 A Yes, I understand. 

24 Q Let's begin, then. 

25 How long have you been with the FBI? 



iiNciAssm 



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and I 




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^ 


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^^^^^ 






Co 


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I bel 




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•«^^^ 






C. ^ 


24 


A 




25 


Q 



mussm 



Over six years. 

And what did you do before that? 
I was an attorney in Puerto Rico. 

What law school did you go to? J 

University of Puerto Rico. 
And how long were you in Puerto Rico? 
Approximately .13 years. 
How old are you? 
I am currently 31 years old. 
And what did you do with the FBI? 
In other words, what places were you stationed? 
I was in San Juan for approximately one year, 
and I have been at Miami division for five years. 
So, this is your second office? 
Yes, it is. 

How long will you be stationed in Miami; do you know? 
No, I don't. 

What unit do you work in? 
I am a member of the anti-terrorist squad. 
Have you always been in that unit? 
Since it was formed in approximately 1983, 
e. 

And does that take your full time? 
Yes, it does. 
Could you give a little idea what the squad does? 



( 






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A Well, I worked the Omega 7 terrorist group in 
Miami for several years, and we neutralized that group. We 
deal with bombings, terrorist organizations. We try to 
neutralize terrorist activity in Miami, gathering information 
regarding terrorist groups, etc. 

Q Now, did there come a point at which you became 
involved with Agent Kiszyn^i? 

A George Kis 2 ynjki — K-I-S-Z-Y-N-S-K-I. George R. 
Kiszyntfki. 

Q Did there come a time that you became involved with 
Mr. Kiszynfki? 

I am going to ask you about two separate 
investigations, if you recall as to the Posey investigation, 
involving CMA and any alleged attempts to invade Nicaragua. 
Were you involved in that investigation? 

A I got involved in that investigation. Our 
neutrality investigation started in early August 1985. Georg< 
had %<orked the Posey matter in January of 1985. I was not 
involved in the case, that other case at that tim^ Thomas 
V. P-0-S-E-Y. 

Q He worked the Posey case in when — the winter, 

early spring? 

\^ 

A I am aware that George was involved in the case at 

A 
least January of 1985. 

Q By the time you began working with him, in the summe 



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itussro 



of 1985, had the Posey case ceased? That is the first one. 
A There were two separate investigations. I was not 
involved with the Posey, wasn't involved in the Posey 
investigation at all. I think the investigation was out 
of Alabama — Huntsville, Alabama area. 

We were just an auxiliary office covering leads 
when they arose. And George worked on that case briefly. 
Then the case was assigned to another agent. 

George had a separate Investigation he was 
conducting in Miami regarding the Continental Bank bombing 
in — I think it was March of 1983 that brought him in 
contact with a lot of the subjects who would later become 
important in our investigation which is titled Rene CorvtkJ 
et al* Neutrality Investigation. 

So, George was working with individuals that we would 
later come in contact. earlier than January. But the actual 
investigation was initiated in August of 1985. 
Q Let's talk about August of 1985. 

How is it you came to participate in the investiga- 
tion? 

A There was a newspaper article in the Miami Herald — 
I think it is Sunday, I believe, July 21 , — Miami Herald. 
It was on the front page, statements by an individual in jail 
in Costa Rica by the name of Steven Carr, regardin g an arms 
shipment that had left Fort Lauderdale 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



'^f 7 




We thought that article was very interesting. 

brought it to the attention of my supervisor. He 
concurred in initiating an investigation into those 
allegations. 

We V ASi t a d the ^reau of our interestiC^which is the 
procedure,>4e have to get authorization from FBI headquarters 
to initiate a neutrality case. 

In About a week we did get the authorization, and we 
initiated the investigation.. By the way, during this period, 
George was in Europe — George Kiszynzki. 

Q So, this stemmed from your reading the article on 
the Carr interview. 

A I was unaware of George's involvement in similar 
matters before August. He instructed me about his involvemen 
in the case when he returned to Mieuni later. We decided 
to work together, as we have done in other things. We 
worked on the Omega 7 together. 

Q Was Carr incarcerated at that time? 

A Carr and four other mercenaries were incarcerated 
at the La Reforma Prison. 

Q And where was that? 

A San Jose, Costa Rica. 

Q What were they in prison for? 

A They had been arrested at Pocoso^r Costa Rica on 
April 23, 1985, for Costa Rican neutrality violations and 



foc»Sci 



200 



Mt 




w«apon» charges, along with approximately IS other 
Nicaragua!! contras. 

Q Was this for hostile acts? 

A Yes, that was the term used. 

So, what did you do once you got authorization to 

conduct the investigation? 

A Mr. Kiszynzki was working on the Continental Bank 

piafMOV 
case with a Miami detective by the name of P ae s ape Diaz. 

X Jiew* helped George while he was in Europe. X helped 

Diaz in a few matters. - 

Mr. Diaz is very well informed regarding terrorist 

and neutrality matters^ the Cuban community in Miami, so 

X approached him regarding the article and the people 

identified in it. i>wi fclisy had mentioned police officers 

who had given weapons, and he gave me a list of people that 

were possible subjects. 

repress 

By chance that treekend — let me ynS i issr here — 
so, I had a general idea of the people involved in the 
article through speaking to Mr. Diaz and our otm 
investigation. 

That %«eekend, by chance, Z was the duty agent. 
X got a call from Secret Service. They had been telephoned 
by an individual by the name of Allan Saum who had made 
allegations regarding a plot to bomb the Soviet and Cuban 
embassies in Micaragua. 



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I telephoned Mr. Saum. He sounded irrational over 
the phone, but because of the phone call from the Secret 
Service, I met with Saum that afternoon at a Miami 
restaurant. I met with him in the car for three to four 
hours. 

We discussed several issues, but the one that was 
of special interest — he spoke about the Cuban underground 
involved with transporting large amounts of weapons from 
Miami for the contras. He spoke about other matters. He was 
irrational. He lied during or- provided inaccurate statements 
during the interview, but he did mention an individual 
by the name of Jesus Garcia, and I had heard about 
Mr. Garcia from Diaz. I. heard about him from the Corrections 
Administration, because Mr. Garcia was implicated in t^^^/f-*- 
attempt, the alleged attempt to get prisoners out of jail, 
narcotic-related individuals, out of jail. 

Mr. Saum stated Mr. Garcia was in possession of an 
automatic machine gun and described the briefcase and machine 
gun. 

Q Excuse me. What was Sanm's background? 
A Secret Service said over the phone they had run a 
check on Mr. Saum, that he was briefly in the Marines. He 
had been discharged after a short period of time, that he had 
helped FBI in the Tylenol matter, provided information which 
didn't work out, and they provided some additional information 



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on Saum, nothing really important. 

Q Did he have any connections to anyone in the 

Administration? 

A Saum has no connection with anyone in the 

Administration that I am aware of. 

Q Were any numbers or letters or anything found in 

his possession that would connect him with anyone in the 
Administration? 

A That is right, he mentioned that he was in contact 

with Vernon Walters at the United Natior^J/ He. rambled on, 
like I said, for hours. 

We did make copies later of certain papers and 
documents that he had on him when he went to the FBI office. 

Q I am interested in that. 

A He had been given some telephone numbers by Thomas 

LMfmiJA 

Posey. There was an Oscar La gatina on them. General Alvarez 
Martinez. 

Q What about Donald Gregg? 

A No. 

Q Anyone from the Vic* President's staff? 

A No. The Secret Service had mentioned that he had 
contacted the White House and Secret Service mentioned 
Mr . Gregg ' s neune and another individual who worked for the 
Vice President. That is the reason they called us. 

Q I don't want to get bogged down in the details of thf) 



203 



iiNtmsro 



11 



investigation, because that is not the purpose of our focus. 
' What I am interested in is eventually you made a case 

against Mr. Garcia regarding the machine guns; is that 
correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q And when was he indicted; do you recall? 

A He was arrested in early August. I don't remember 
when he was indicted. He went to trial in early December 
of that year. 

Once we got the machine gun ATF assumed jurisdiction 
in the machine gun matter. We conducted interviews in the 
case with Garcia 's associates at the flower shop, narcotic- 
related individuals, and the person we believed provided 
Garcia with the machine gun. 



Q Who was that? 

A Enrique * m ii i ty - I had personally known 

nn»i Irniui/ doatK^- the Omega 7 investigation. 

Q Now, during the trial or in any statement that 
Mr. Borricaudy made during the investigation, what was his 
defense to the gun charge? 

A I don't recall at that time during the trial what 
his defense was. I was not that actively involved with that 
aspect of the case. I did testify in it briefly. 

Q After he was convicted, but before sentencing, he 
offered to cooperate; is that correct? 



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A That is right. 

Q And did you interview him? 

A Yes, on January 7, 1986. 

Q Who was with you? 

A Special Agent George R. Kiszynzki, an investigator 
from the United States Public Defender's Office by the name 
of Rafael Maestri. I think that is it. 

Q And did Mr. Garcia tell you that he had heard of or 
had knowledge of a plot to assassinate Ambassador Tambs? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did he also tell you about any gun running activities 
to the contras in Nicaragua? 

A See, in the press over the last few months he has 

said that he provided all this to the United States 

government, detailed information regarding gun running in the 

contras, etc., etc. 

■thfff 
It should be made clear. Mr. Garcia, during the 

interviews, was very, extremely hesitant to provide any 

information on anybody Latin. He was only interested to speaV 

about the Americans he believed had betrayed him and set him 

up. 

Especially he was angry about Thomas Posey, because 
he believed Posey had sent Allan Saum to Miami to get him out 
of the way. 

We had between that period between August and Januarj 



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had done a great deal of investigation on this matter. We 
had very, very good information of what actually had 
occurred regarding gun running, the truth regarding that 
flight and other flights, extremely good information. 

Q What was that? 

A The information? 

Q As a summary, you don't have to name sources. 

A Well, we were aware of the people involved, Miami 

Cubans involved in the gun running, weapons, ammunition, on 

several occasions from Miami to Central America — the 

people involved, where the guns had been stored, how the 

money was raised, etc. 

So, when we spoke to Garcia we were well aware of 

what had occurred, but Garcia was very hesitant to provide 

any information. He would only speak about the Americans. 

He said a lot — made a lot of inaccurate 

statements, a lot of things that^later totally disproved 

themselves. 

He did talk about a plot to assassinate Ambassador 

Taunbs. He mentioned several names. Through our investigation 

we have not been able to substantiate through reliable 

information which would support the allegations that such a 

plot actually took place. 

who 
Garcia put people in Miami at meetings tha* were not 

even here at the time. The people who were here strongly 



206 






\mm\B 



14 



denied any involvement in such a plot. Garcia was 
afforded a polygraph regarding the plot on January 14th. 
I want to make it clear Garcia, v«b»« information we did get 
from Garcia regarding gun running, we had to get it out of 
him — isn't it true, this, this, this. 

He did not speak about the Cuban contras, Miami 
Cubans. He did not speak about narcotics trafficking with 
the Cubans, and we questioned him regarding that. He was 
afforded a polygraph on January 14 in two areas. 

The first area was regarding the meetings, alleged 
meeting at Howard Johnson's where the plot to assassinate 
Tambs was discussed. The results of that were inconclusive. 

The second area was Thomas Posey's involvement in 
such a plot, and he was deceptive in that area. After the 
polygraph, he admitted being confused regarding Posey's 
involvement and retracted much of what he had told us 
regarding Posey. 

Q I want to get back to one thing. When you said 
you had knowledge of the gun running, the information of the 
shipments, did you learn where these shipments were stored? 
Were they stored in 

A At that time? From our Miami investigation we were 
not aware where they were stored. We were aware of what was 
occurring or what had occurred in the Miami division. 

We — FBI Miami — spent a lot of time on this 



I 



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investigation between August and January. 

Q What was your knowledge regarding the amount of 
weapons going down? 

A It was not a large amount of weapons. 

Q Could you give me an idea? 

A The individuals in this investigation would obtain 
donations of weapons from the Cuban community, and the 
Cuban community being as anti-communist as it is, readily 
opened there, whatever they co'uld do to fight the communists 
providing weapons, money, whatever. 

Q So this is under one hundred guns, shall we say? 

A Yes. 

Q Was any C-4 involved? 

A We heard allegations regarding explosives. We have 
yet to substantiate that explosives were on board any of 
those shipments. Well, like C-4 or things like that, no. 
I guess mortars are explosives. 

Q And at this point in the fall of 1985, was Posey 
implicated in the gun running aspect of the investigation? 

A Yes, he was. The Miami Herald had implicated 
Posey from the outset. 

Q After you interviewed Garcia and after he did not 
do so well in the polygraph, did you discuss abandoning the 
case with the Assistant U.S. Attorney? 

A Never. 



208 



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UNCUSSIFIEO 



16 



Q Why not? 

A Hell* wc tried to substantiate Garcia *s allegations. 
Anybody who starts talking about plots to assassinate an 
ambassador deserves at least an investigation. We attempted 
to corroborate everything Garcia said. We sent out leads to 
other offices. We all agreed that it was indispensable 
to get e ccpe gati e n from the individuals who are incarcerated 
at La Reforma PrisoniGarcia said were definitely involved with 
the alleged plot. 

We sent out leads for these individuals to be 

interviewed by U.S. officials in Costa Rica. We made 

I 

ourselves available for thv interview? and they were 
interviewed later in January of that year. 
Q By whom? 

-A By U.S. embassy officials in Costa Rica. 
Q Nho? 

A Z think James Magle« Robert Thompson, and Stephen 
Carr were interviewed by U.S. embassy officials in late 
January 1986. 

Is Mr. Nagle a security officer? 

yes. 

Is he en^loycd by the State Department? 

I think he is, yes. 

Did you receive a report of the interview? 

Yes, we were sent the results of the interviews of 



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UNCUSSIREO 



Carr and Thompson. 

Without going into th« nitty-gritty of what both of 
them told Nagle, I am interested in what you later went in 
April to interview Thompson and Carr. M»* it the same story? 

In other %#ords, did they give the same version that 
was reported by Nagle in January? 

A Basically, yes. They denied any involvement or 
knowledge in a plot to assassinate Tambs, Ambassador Tambs. 
Carr did adaut involveatent in gun running weapons from 
Port X^auderdale to Central Aaerica. 

Q And in that January interview, did Carr 
incriminate anybody else in the gun running plots? 

A Yes, he did. 

Whoa did he iaplieate? 

A The same subjects we were investigating. 

See, Carr had given the aaae story to the Miami 
Hgrald which initiated the whole investigation — > Renett 
Carvfll, > apA %e Peg iw iMec , and others like that. 

Q Xn January, did Carr Mention to Nagle the name Robert 
Owen? 

A Z don't recall. Z do not think so. 

Q What about the name John Hull? 

A Yes, he did. 

We were aware of Hull ourselves. 

Q How did you become aware of John Hull? \ 



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A Source information. We were aware of Mr. 


Hull 


as far as 198 5. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ft 


^^^I^^^^^^^^^^H we know was 


There 



were so many allegations regarding him, among them being an 
operative for the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q Now, during this period of time when Garcia is 
cooperating and takes the polygraph and you are doing your 
background investigation,' did you have periodic meetings with 
Mr. Feldman, the Assistant U.S. Attorney? 

A Yes, we did. 

Q What was his attitude toward the investigation? 

A Mr. Feldman, Garcia' s public defender by the neune of 
John Mat,tes, all agreed it was necessary to get the 
corroboration to substantiate the allegations Garcia had 
■ade. 

Q Would you describe Feldman 's attitude as enthusiastic 
about the investigation or disinterested, or did he think it 
was weak as a general proposition? 

A None of the above. 

Q I don't, want to put words in your mouth. I am 
trying to give a range of options. 

A He was open to the investigation, but he 
understood that Garcia 's allegations, especially after the 



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polygraph, were not alone^to pursue the matter actively. 
^ He left it in our hands as investigators to pursue the 



investigation to substantiate the Garcia allegations, which 

we did. 

Q When did you first request the use of any yrand 

° jury subpoenas? 

A Agents Kiszynzki and myself spoke to Mr. Feldman 

about the possibility of impaneling a ^rand ^Jury as early 
9 

10 

11 

12 
13 



as February 198 6, Mr. Feldman specifically mentioning 
impaneling a ^rand j^iry -on several occasions in March of 
1986. 

Q When he mentioned it, did he want to? 



A He agreed that the ^^and ^ry was necessary to 
^* investigate not only the gun running but the allegations 
^^ regarding the plot against Ambassador Tambs. 

Q Did he say he needed to get permission to use the 



^^ grand jury? 



A No, he said he anticipated invoking^ impaneling 
a ^and iury to investigate this matter in March. He said 
as much on several occasions. 

Q Have you done work on terrorism — have you done many 
criminal cases? 

A The Omega 7 case was an extremely complex case 



^* where, like I said, we were very instrumental in the"^^^ 
^' investigation. We took it to trial and they convicted the 



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JuJ^y subpoena for bank records? 



leaders of the group. 
^ Q But what I am getting at — in terms of your 
^ experience in the Miami office, is there some special 

permission or special step that has to be taken in a criminal 
investigation to issue ai^randj^^y subpoena? 
A I don't — 

Q Well, in other words, let's say you are doing a 
routine fraud case and you need to get bank records for a 
* witness or for a suspect. Would anything else be required 
^° than just going into the U.S. Attorney's office and asking 
'^ the assistant assigned to the case to issue you aj^rand 
12 

^3 A No, that would be how we would do it. That is one of 

^* the reasons we wanted the ^andj^^y, to obtain records. 

Q What I am getting at — what puzzles me is the huge 

discussion that goes on throughout this spring of 1986 in the 

^^ U.'S. Attorneys Office regarding whether or not to use a<%rand 

^ury, even to obtain routine documents. 

A I am not aware of the discussions. 

Q I was wondering from your perspective if something 

special was required to go to use the^rand_iury . 

A Not that I am aware of. 

1 
Q Now, were you aware that the U.S. Attorney Kelner 

had inquired about the case? Were you aware of his interest 

in it? 



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A I met with Mr. Kelner and Mr. Feldman on March 14, 
1986, where this case was discussed. 

Q Was Kiszynzki there, too? 

A No, he wasn't. 

Q Why not? 

A Well, I had gone to Mr. Feldman 's office to provide 

him with some Customs records which I had obtained a few days 

before. 

While I was there he' went to show the documents 

that substantiate -- went to show them to ^na Barnett, Imile 

we were in Barnett's office. She had been inquiring., # 

Mr. Kelner had been asking questions if anybody knew anything 

about this case. He had been getting inquiries from Justice 

n 

Department regarding the case. 

1 
We proceeded to Mr. Kelner' s office. Like I said, 

I was there, Mr. Feldman was there, I believe, A/(na Barnett 

L 
was there, and, of course, Mr. Kelner. 

He stated he had just been on the phone with high- 
ranking officials in the U.S. Department of Justice who were 
inquiring regarding the Garcia matter and regarding the 

mercenaries incarcerated at La Reforma. 
1 
Q Did Mr. Kelner say the focus of their inquiry 

A 

was the assassination plot or the mercenary gun running 

activity or was there a distinction? 

1 
A At that time, Mr. Kelner did not appear to be aware 



214 



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UNClASSra 



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of the investigaticn. 

A That is why we — Feldman and myself — we briefed 

1 
Kelner about the investigation. 

Q I understand that I am asking about the inquiry 
from the Department of Justice. In other words, you said 
he wanted to know about the assassination plot. Did he 
say or did he say they wanted to hear about the Garcia matter 
or — 

A I recall first regarding the mercenaries in Costa 
Rica and I believe the discussions regarding the alleged plot 
against the life of Ambassador Tambs. 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 



What did 



idvou 



tell Mr, Kelner about the case? 



% 



In other words, how the investigation was progressing? 

A As I recall, we fully tealiavad him about the 
investigation. 

Q Dif* he ask any questions? 

A Yes, he did. I really don't recall what the 
questions were. 

Q Do you recall how long you spent with him at that 
meeting? 

At least an hour. 

Did you discuss using the ^rand jury at that time? 

I don't recall that we did discuss thefa^rand 



ry. 



Q And what was the sense of Mr. Kelner' s comments? 
On the other hand, was he encouraging, was he discouraging? 
Did he tell you to go forward as quickly as possible or was 
there any sense of any direction? 

A I don't recall any sense of direction. He just 
wan^ to become informed as to our investigation. 

Q So it was clear when you ended the discussion 
that you %#ould proceed with your investigation? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q Did you discuss whether or not to go to 
New Orleans to interview Jack Terrell? 



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A The question about interviewing Mr. Terrell came 
about through other information in Miami^ "Jn the attempt to 
substantiate Garcia, we heard that an individual by the 
name of Jack Terrell, Colonel Flaco, »ft4- would substantiate 



i 



specific allegations regarding the plot. 

Q Where does Colonel Flaco come from? 

A An individual by the name of Jose Coutin mentioned 
that Garcia — no, mentioned that Terrell had told him that 
he had information regarding the plot. We had New Orleans 
agents immediately go out and interview Mr. Terrell regarding 
the allegations, and he was interviewed by New Orleans division. 

Q When was that? 

A Early March, 1986. 

Q That was before you interviewed him? 

A Yes. 

Q I still don't understand Colonel Flaco. Who is 
Colonel Flaco? 

A He is Jack Terrell. Jack Terrell is Colonel Flaco. 

Q Where does that come from. Colonel Flaco? 

A Late 1984, Mr. Terrell was a member of the CMA 
led a expedition of CMA members to Los Vegas, Honduras, to 
the FDN's camp, and he assumed the rank of Colonel, and took 
the name Flaco as his pseudonym. That was in November 
1984, that specific Terrell CMA expedition. 

Q Did you discuss the New Orleans trip with Mr. 



II 



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Keln«r or wai that discussed later just with Mr. Feldman? 

1 
A X did not speak with Mr. Kelner again for a long 

time. 

Q So the New Orleans trip %«bs not discussed in that 

1 
first aweting with Mr. Kelner? 

A Z do not believe it was. It nay have though. We 
received the infomation, the teletype, from Mew Orleans. 
We thought it was extremely interesting, so we decided to 
interview hia our sieves. 

Mhy did Jeff Peldaan go along? 

A Because hm mi the Assistant United States Attorney 
in charge of tiie investigation. He %ranted to go. He requcs'^ed 
to go and^i»«ff Mr. Terrell, and the other agent who went 
was George Kiszynski. Z did not go. 

Q Oo yoa know whether or not Mr. Terrell was 
questioned regarding the gun running accusations? 

A Be was questioned for over 1< hours. Z an sure 
it was discussed with hia. We have the statenent. X am 
sore it is on there. 

Q Could^ tell me how the trip to Costa Rica came 
about? 

A Mr. Feldman and ourselves, after all these inter- 
views, reached the conclusion that it was necessary to settle 
this matter once and for all, to discuss with the people who 
allegedly tooK an active part in the plot, specifically Mr. 



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Steven Carr, whom Garcia had stated was one of the leaders 
of the plot, the individual who had U.S. vmbassics plans 
on him, et cetera, so we arranged the trip to Costa Rica 
which we did on March 31, 1986. 

Q Prior to leaving, do you know whether or not Mr. 

1 
Keller was briefed by Mr. Feldman? 

A No, I don't. I am not aware of that. 

Q Also prior to going, do you recall Mr. Feldman 
putting together a little chart, with little boxes, and trying 
to map out who was on this investigation? 

A Yes, but by that time we had a pretty good idea 
regarding the allegations, gun running, contras, the plot 
against the ambassador. I don't know if Jeff did that 
specific diagram in Miami or over therein Costa Rica before 
the meeting with Ambassador Tarabs. I believe he did the 
diagram over there, but I definitely recall the diagram. 

Q And he showed the diagram to Ambassador Tambs? 

A Yes. 

Q I think we are jumping ahead. Im am sorry. 
For the record — so we are talking about the same chart, 
is this the chart that on the top of it has Oliver North? 

A Yes. There wre names in depending order from 
Rene Corvo, on top of Corvo's name was John Hull, on top of 
Hull's name was Robert Owen, and on top of Mr. Owen's name 
was Oliver North. It had other names on the chart also. 



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Q From where had you obtained Mr. North's name? 

A A good question. Mr. Owen's name had first come 
up in late 1985, and Mr. North's name probably came up in 
around February or March of 1986. I can tell you later 
where we first heard about each of the individuals. 

Q That is what I asked. 

A I don't recall right now off the top of my head, 
but it was in that time frame. 

Q When you say Owen came up in late 1985, I think 

you told me earlier that Garcia had mentioned Owen? 

If 
A No, I do not recall Garcia mentioning — no, » 

Garcia did not mention Robert Owen. Jack Terrell mentioned 

Robert Owen. Investigator Mattes, Public Defender M addt-s, 

mentioned Robert Owen, and several other individuals. 

Q When you went to Costa Rica, what did you under- 
stand Owen's role to be? Did you have any idea? 

A There were allegations that he was a lobbyist workinc 
for Gray and Company, who was assisting John Hull in the contra 
network in Northern Costa Rica. 

Q Do you know where he was getting his money? 

A Not at that time. I take that back. Mr. Terrell 
had made allegations, I believe, I eun not sure, that Mr. Owen 

had connections with the United States Government. I think 

1 
he mentioned the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q And as to Oliver North, do you recall when you 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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first learned about him? 

A Not right now. I don't. 

When you got to Costa Rica, did you check 
in at the embassy? 

A We spoke to several United States embassy officials 
there, George MitchelL James Nagei/, and then we were taken 
to see Ambassador Tambs. 

Q what did you think about that? 

A Well, our purpose of the trip was to ascertain if 
such a plot against the life of Tambs occurred, so we wanted 
to question hin about that. 

Q Is that what you 

A If he had any knowledge. 

Q Is that what you thought was the purpose? 

A One of the purposes. 

Q And when you did meet with him did you ask him 
these questions? 

A Mr. Feldman did most of the talking. Mr. Feldman 
briefed Mr. Tambs thoroughly about our investigation. He 
took out his diagram and he proceeded to go-e^the different 
aspects of the diagram, and then he went up that little 
ladder from Corvo to Hull to Ov«n and North. 

Q Let me set the background just for a minute. 
Before you went to see Tambs, did you discuss with Jeff 
Feldman the wisdom or whether or not you should tell these 



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people anything in terms of what you were here for and 
what questions you had? 

A Yes, we discussed generally what we would discuss 
with the ambassador. 

Q And what did you conclude? 

A What was on the diagram. 

Q So you all agreed to tell him everything? 

A Yes, discuss the investigation with him. He was 
United States Ambassador to Costa Rica. 

Q And when you came into meet the Ambassador, what 
did he say he wanted? In «ther words, how did he expres's his 
interest in the investigation? 

A We were there basically explaining to him the 
purpose of our trip. 



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Do you want the names of the other people present? 
Q At first, yes, when you first came in. Tambs is 
there. Who else is there? 

A Myself, Special Agent George Kiszynzlci, Assistant 
United States, Jeffrey Feldman, our Legat in Panama, Patrick 
Lang, and James Na^^^ 

Q Now, as Mr. Feldman took out the chart and began 
explaining it to Ambassador Tambs, can you tell me what 
happened? 

A Well, after Mr. Feldman finished with the diagram, 
and very soon after he mentioned the names Robert Owen and 
North, he Nagel, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M and 
came into the room. 
Q Was that the Ambassador's only comment when Oliver 
North's name was mentioned? 

A That Is the comment Z can recall. I don't remember 
what else he may have said. He didn't seem to react, 
■ake any comments regarding the diagram. He just wanted ^^| 
Ln there. 
So ,^^^^^^^^^^^Bcame into the room. 
Yes, he did. 

How were you Introduced to him? 
I believe as thej 

And what happened whei^^^^^^^Hcame in: 
I believe Feldman went briefly over the diagram 





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again 



UNCUSSIRED 




Q What did he say about Hull? 




Q You wer* aware at this time of the Boland Amendment? 

A Ye», I was. 

Q And what did^^^^^^^^^B«ay about Robert Owen, 
anything? ^^^^^^^^^ 

A I don't recall^^^^^^H making any statement 
regarding Mr. Owen. 

Q Nhat about Oliver North? 

A The same, no statements that I recall regarding 
Oliver North. 

Q Do you recall Mr .^^^^^H saying anything about 
Oliver North had introduced him to the President? 

A That wasn'ti 



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Q Okay. 

Who made that statement? 

A Later — I believe it was on April 3rd — 
Mr. Nag'^1 made a certain statement to us. 

Q We are skipping ahead, but that is okay. What 
did he say? 

A Regarding the President? 

Q Yes. 

A Something to the effect that Mr. Hull was a friend 

of President Reagan's, and Hull personally knows Mr. Regan, 

^> ^ 

if you understand what I mean. 



[meeting on — I guers 



Q Getting back to the] 
it would be April 1st. 

A Yes, it was on April 1st. 

Did^^^^^^^Vsay anything to the effect that Olive: 
North had Introduced him the week earlier to the President? 
- A No. 

Q Did he ask you if you knew who Oliver North was? 

A Not that I recall. 

Q What else do you recall about that meeting? 

A They were very polite with us, very cordial. But at 
the same time there was a reluctance on their part to us. 
They seemed protective of Mr. Hull and people that we were 
there to discuss ahe u t, but I want it to be made clear they 
were very cooperative with us during the time we were there. 



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They took us to La Reforma. They never got in the 
way of our investigation by any means, but we did note a 
certain reluctance on the part of these individuals. 

Q Did they let you interview people by yourselves 
or did they insist on being present? 

A We were allowed to interview people alone, eve" 
though Mr. Nagel was with Mr. Kiszynzki for the interviews 
of Peter Glibbery and Robert Thompson. 

Because of manpower limitations, there were only 
three of us, and because of time contraints, myself and 
Feldman did the interviews of some of the people at La 
Reforma, while Kiszynzki and Nage(j did the interviews of 
others. 

Q Did you ever get the impression for the several days 
you were down there that they were keeping close tabs on your 
actions or that they were following you or that they were 
listening to conversations, anything along those lines? 

A They were there wheire we did our investigations. 
They were the ones who took us there and backyfrom the jail 
to the hotel, so they were there almost all the time^except 
when we were at the hotel. 

Q Did you know of or overhear any person employed at 
the embassy calling anyone in Washington, or did you hear 
of any such references? 

A I heard about such calls through Assistant United 



82-702 0-88-9 



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34 



m mm 



states Attorney, Jeff Feldman. 

What did you hear? 
qive 

A Can I ?te a little history on this? 
Q Sure. 

A From day one there, we attempted to interview 
John Hull. At the beginning we thought it would be very 
easy. Somehow we did make contact with Hull through embassy 
officials, I believe, and he agreed to be interviewed on 
April 3rd. 

On, I believe it was, April 2nd at the hotel,. 
Mr. Feldman got a telephone call from Mr. Hull. Mr. Hull 
said to the effect that we had caused problems with our 
interviews, and that he had been told not to speak to us. 

Mr. Feldman asked if he had been told that by 
anyone at the United States embassy, which Hull denied. 

The next day, when we did go to the United States 
embassy, we were made aware by U.S. Consul Kirk Kutola that 
Hull had been to the embassy on April 2nd, that he had made 
inquiries about if he had to speak to us or if he needed 
a counsel present. 

Mr. Kutola told us that he had informed Mr. Hull 
that it was his right to have a counsel present and that it 
was his decision to talk to us or not. ^ 

While we were speaking with Kutola in the ^ e ouwi. 
area, Mr. Feldman was speaking — spoke briefly to an 



227 




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individual by the name of Paul Fitzgerald, who was an 
employee at the United States embassy. I have no personal 
knowledge of this, but Feldman told me this soon after, that 
Fitzgerald had told him that Hull had been to the embassy, had 
spoken to Ambassador Tambs, and that he had been in contact 
with National Security Council officials in Washington 
regarding our inquiries. 

Q That Hull had been or Tambs had been? 

A That Hull had been td the U.S. embassy the day 
before, had spoken to Tambs, and had been in contact with 
National Security Council officials in Washington regarding 
our inquiries. 

Q What did you think about this when Feldman told you 
that? 

A Very interesting. 

Q Did you do anything to follow up on thc.t?. 

A We all thought we were on to something. We thought 
that the matter, the whole investigation should be 
pursued. We were all optimistic about returning to Miami 
and initiating — I aaa n n »t initiating, but pursuing this 



matter aggressively. 

I believe we spoke about the iJijrand 3ury investigation! 
I mean getting a (©rand ^ry to help us in this matter. 

Q Did you prepare a report of your interviews in 
Costa Rica?- 



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I 



A Yes. 

Q Did you also prepare information regarding the 
things of which you just told me? 

In other words, that is, NSC had talked to — that 
you had reports that NSC had talked to Hull. 

A I reported our conversations with the Ambassador 
to FBI HQ. 

9 

Q HQ is a biS place. Whom did you send it to when 

you send the -n-j r t^rm'j the 'teletype? 

A To the terrorist section, to the supervisor . 
who was in charge of our investigation at ^adquarters. 

Q Was that in Division 6? 

A International Terrorist Unit. I don't know. And 
I don't recall the supervisor on the case. We have had 
many . 

Q In Miami? 

A No — supervisor in Headquarters who was handling 
the investigation up in D.C. 

Q There are many of them? 

A No, we have had several supervisors on our case over 
the course of the investigation. I think we have had five 
or six supervisors, so I don't want to give you any names 
now of the person it was sent to. 

Q But what I am getting at, when you say 
"supervisors", do you mean in D.C. or Miami? 



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*+ ll 

A Washington, *n Ifsadquarters. 

Q Do you know who Buck Revell is? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q Have you ever discussed this case with him? 

A No, I haven't. 

Q Has he ever inquired of the case, to your knowledge, 
either in writing or verbally? 

A Yes, he has. 

Q When was that? 

A In March 1986. 

Q Can you tell me how that came about? 

A To the best of my recollection, myself and George 
Kiszyntki were told by an ;4ssistant_yt)ecial ^ent in fcharge 
in Miami by the name of Jim Freeman that Mr. Revell wanted 
a summary of our investigation in the Rene* Corvo matter 
expeditiously to be forwarded to headquarters. 

We spent a lot of time. When anl|ssistant 0ft.rector 
wants it, he gets it — putting it together in LHMjletter- 
head memorandum, ifi a cover ti r - t a l ag r am to FBI HQ with a 
summary of the. case up to that time. 

Q Did that include the reference to the NSC? 

A Owen was mentioned because we included Terrell's 
statement in the LHM, and on the cover aig tel e giam we 
mentioned that we anticipated the ^and ^Jury, and we again 
mentioned Mr. Owen, Mr. Hull, Sam Hall as targets, possible 



230 



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38 



targets of the ^rand ^ury. 

Q Did you mention Oliver North in the LHM? 

A I don't recall. 

Q Your office maintains a copy of that? 

A Sure. 

Q Did you mention nsc? 

A I believe Terrell mentioned Owen and the NSC. I am 
not sure. 

Whatever Terrell said was in the LHM. 

Q But your LHM didn't go into the facts of the . 
embassy, what Hull had done? 

A No, because it was in March. This was before our 
trip to Costa Rica. 

Q Oh, yes. I am sorry. 

A We were in Costa Rica from March 31 to April 4. 
The LHM, I believe, is dated March 20. 

Q Did you show the LHM to Jeff Feldman? 

A We probably presented — I am not sure. We probably 
gave Mr. Feldman a copy of the I,HM. It was about 38 pages. 

Q And after you sent the LHM, did you hear any 
response from anyone at headquarters, including Mr. Revell? 

A No, we didn't speak. Normally we don't. 

Q No questions or follow-ups or directions? . 

A No. An LHM is very customary in investigations. 

what we twv« done to date, and we forward** 



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it to keadquarters for their information. We didn't expect 
a reply. 

Q Had you or had Mr. Revel 1 asked you about any of 
your other ca.<;es or, you know, come through channels? 

A I may have in previous cases. I really don't recall, 
I probably have. 

Q Were you asked at any time up until December of 
1986 to provide updates on that LHM? 

A No. 

Q That is the only one you prepared in terms of. 
summary of the facts? 

A No. I provided one before March. I provided one 
in October 1985. You want to know where I sununarized the 

Q Yes. , . _^i.iiue^^ 



BrosecutMT wport da 



A On a prosecutes Import dated July 31, 1986. 
Q And that is the one that went to Mr. Kelner? 
A That is right. 

Q Was a copy of that sent to ipeadguarters? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Do you know to whom? 

A Eight copies were sent to Headquarters. It is 
formal procedure to disseminate that to headquarters. «k "^ 
•^Department of Justice. 

I don't recall specifically who got copies of the 



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LHM or the vrosecutvc.'tsport. 



f- 



Q Did you send either the March LHM or the 
rosecuti«f» Keport to any field offices? 



rosecutoc- Eeport. 



A Later, because it is a pretty good summary of the 
invest: 

I believe I sent one to New Orleans, who was handling the 
Posey matter or had the case on Posey, and I may have sent 
it to other offices. I don't really recall, but at the time 
it was written I believe I only sent copies — we only sent 
copies to iKadquarters and, of course, the United States 
Attorney's Office and Customs, Miami U.S. Customs. 

Q Do you deal with any particular individual at 
Customs in Miami? 

A 4iML Kilfoil. He is still helping in the 
investigation . 

Q Did you ever hear from a Mr. Rosenblatt from 
Customs? 

A Rosenblatt works for Mr. Kerry? 

Q No, that is a different name. This is 
Mr. Rosenblatt, the director with Customs. 

A Not that I am aware. 

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Revell made further 
inquiries regarding your case after asking for the March 
summary? 

A Not that I am aware. 



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Q Do you have any reason to believe that the contents 
or the LHM itself was disseminated to anyone other than 
personnel at FBI headquarters or field offices? 

A Not that I am aware. 

Q Do you have any reason to believe that? 

A Recently in the media I have read that some people 
have memos that were written in early 1986, but I don't know 
if that is the LHM or what, so I really dor 

Q While we are on the subject of memos, then, did 
there come a time in which Jeff Feldman prepared a memo for 
his boss? 

A Yes, there did. 

Q And did you get a copy of that from him? 

A I got a copy of the second version. 

Q Just for the record now, there are many versions. 
They are all dated May 14. 

A That is correct. 

Q So, we are talking about the same memo. 

I think it was actually four versions, just so we 
set the record straight. 

Mr. Feldman does a rough^ draft in which there is not 
very much of a conclusion other than going forward. It is 
sent back for revision. 

The conclusion is elaborated. It is still going 
forward. Mr. Kelner concurs. Then there is a meeting and th« 



234 






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43 



conclusion is redrafted by Mr. Reiner's assistant? 

A Then there are five versions. 

Q There is another version? 

A Yes. J 

Q What is that? 

A What I understand, because I was in the office with 
Feldman — he had already prepared the rough draft, but he 
hadn't done the recommendations, the conclusion, so we were 
seated there. We put in — can I regress? 

Q Sure, start from the beginning. 

A He called me in, because he wanted to go over this 
memo that he had prepared, so he reads it to me. I generally 
do not like the tone of the memo, and I said so to 
Mr. Feldman. I thought it down-played the investigation. 
It wasn't strong enough. 

But he did include our statement in there. that we 
%fanted a ^and^ury, and he put some of the reasons why we 
wanted the ^and ^ury, so I was happy with that. I 

He also stated — he wrote a paragraph at the end — 
that he did recommend the %rand3ury* M^ ^ ^^^ with him when 
he wrote that. 

I left. I thought that was it. I thought we were 
going to have our^^and jury. . 

I later got a copy — no, I was later told by 

1 



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recommendation for the (^rand jury, and that now the conclusior. 

stated that the (grand ~jury was premature. I was given 

a copy. I asked for a copy of that version, and I got it, 

and that is the one I have, but that copy is not the one that 

I have become aware of recently, which mentions in the last 

paragraph/a fishing expedition. So, the only copy the FBI 

has -- and I did forward this to our headquarters in, I believ 

June of 1986 -- the only version that I am aware of that 

I have, and, therefore, I believe Headquarters has, is the one 

which saySj^^rand jury is premature" but makes no mention of 

a fishing expedition. 

Q For tht: record, I am going to show you a 
memorandum dated May 14, 1986, "Subject Costa". 

The last page, page 21, refers -- makes this 

// 

reference here to a fishing expedition. So is it my 

understanding now — correct me if I am wrong — that this 
is not the version that you received from Mr. Feldman, 
the last version you received from Mr. Feldman? Is that 
correct? 

A That is correct. I have never seen this 
specific page to this memorandum. 

Q Why don't you take a minute, then, since you 
haven't seen this, and starting at the conclusion on 
page 2 0, read through that. 

Had you read that before? 



236 



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45 



A The initial part of the conclusion, the first 
and second paragraphs, are similar to the version that 



I have about the initial conclusion and the FBI requests 



■^fera ^rand^ury, and the reasons described therein. 

The last paragraph after the first sentence — 
the second sentence — is new to me. 

Q What was your opinion of the reasons given for not 
using the ^rand j)ury, especially for the request, just to get 
routine documents? _ 

A As I say, these are some of the reasons we had for 
the ^and 3ury. 

I mentioned to Feldman several more. I don't recall 
them now. He said, "No, that is enough," because we 
anticipated the ^and 3^ry. 

What was the question again? 

Q What you think — I mean, in your experience from 
this case and other cases, what do you think of the reasons 
given there for not seeking the power of the ^and jury, 
eapecially to issue subpoenas for routine documents? 

A As case agent, one of the case agents on the case, 
we trould have liked the (^rand Jury to be able to at least 
have the opportunity to get the documents we needed in the 
investigation. It would have been a very helpful tool. 

Q I assume you received this memo — not this memo, 
your version, what you got, from Mr. Feldman some time in 



237 



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46 



late April. 

Would that be about right? 
A No, May. 
Q Mid-May? 

A Yes, around the date, this date, because upon 

1 
hearing from Feldman that Kelner had asked him to change 



the memo, we wanted a copy of the memo. He provided it 
to us, and, of course, we forwarded it to our iJbadquarters 
afterward. 

We were disappointed, but we did continue k* 
forward with the investigations, and we did some extremely 
important interviews, including the main subjects, some of thi 
main subjects in the investigation^ who had made a lot of 
admissions regarding the gun running. 

Q Did those interviews include Robert Owen? 

A No. 

Q Did they include Tom Posey? 

A No, but we interviewed — you see, at this time, 
we were mainly interested in the Miami -si t a. We were 
investigating CMA and Posey and Owen, but I ha ve to build it 
up. 

We interviewed Rene« Corvo, who was in charge of the 
,1 Qlh-C-imf down therey second in command at camp^ people who 
piloted flights from Miami — I mean, from Fort Lauderdale — 
and we were able to corroborate that the flights had, indeed, 



238 



UNCIASSIFIFD 



4 



occurred, that weapons were on board the flight, and more 
important, that Mr. Corvo and others were recruiting 
individuals from Miami to go fight with the contras in 
Central America. 

Q When you sent your version of the May 14 memo 
to headquarters, did you send with it any recommendation or 
any memorandum explaining it? 

A We made it a custom to send headquarters copies of 
all of our investigative reports, of our interviews, just 
for their information. 

Q Did you at any time during the period from May until, 
let's say October of 1966, make any attempt through 

f 

the U.S. Attorney to change his position? 

A Yes, we did. 

Q Can you tell me what you did in that regard? 

A The main thing we did, we wrote the prosecutas 

mport. My supervisor was sick. At the time, I spoke to 

the relief supervisor, by the name of Edvardo Sanchez, and 

we discussed what could be done to get this case going, 

especially after .interviews of some of the main subjects in 
r 

the case, who basically admit*ted to the allegations that we 
were investigating. p ^^^^-^-^^ y^§T"-(5ixt J^^XX^-y^^ 



I 



1 



iadquarters or through any of your superiors to try to get 



their hand^ tA^^ .. 




We agVeed that the J^rosecute^ isport would force 



\ 



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liNCUSSIRfO 



48 



'^ "+he United States Attorneys, upon seeing the i^iS 



^ and the evidence we had, would have to make a decision! one 
way or the other regarding the ^and jjury in » the T matte^ ■ 



or taking it to prosecution, so, therefore, myself and 

George Kiszynzki — I did most of the writijig myself -- we 

put together about a 200-page prosecutive K^port which 

outlined the violations and the evidence we had obtained g^P 

to that time to support the prosecution of this matter. 

Q This went over to Headquarters, I assume? 



A The M!rosecuta r? s report was dated July 31. I believei 
I personally took it to the United States Attorney's Office 



10 

11 
12 
13 

^* Q Now, what was done in terms of the FBI hierarchy? 



in Miami on that same date and delivered two copies to 

1 
a Jeff Feldman, one of them for Mr. Kelner. 



send 



A We sent the necessary copies which you normally 

■srosecutMr l^eports to jiieadquarters. We sent, I think, 
about eight copies to Beadquarters, not for any particular 
reason, except ''*«- the number that is required to be sent up 
there. 

Q What I am getting at, though — did you or any 
of your supervisors or Mr. Kiszynfki have any conversations 
with anyone at headquarters to get them to perhaps go 
up your chain and up the Department of Justice chain to get 
pressure? » ^ 

A After we wrote the prosecut** ^port, we waited 



240 






yNCiASsra 



49 



a while, because we anticipated the United States Attorney's 
Office either invoking a^rand3»*i'y oi' prosecuting the matter 
or at least making a decision. 

Nothing happened. Nothing. We became aware later 

1 
that Mr. Kelner told Mr. Feldman not to do anything on the 

case until he made a decision on the Eurosecutor H^port. We 

didn't know that. 

We continued our investigation, but at the same 

time, as time went by, nothing was happening. We started 

to telephone the supervisors, our supervisors in 



I 
I 



Washington an < i n FBI HQ, letting them know that the 
United States Attorney's Office was, I would say, dragging 
their feet in this matter. 

At the seune time, we frequently went to Mr. Feldman 's 

office o r >e the United States Attorney's Office to pressure 

and 
Mr. Feldman m» the United States Attorney's Office to make 

a decision in this matter. 

We would call Mr. Feldman two or three times a 
week, asking him, "What about this? What is happening?" 

At the same time, I personally spoke to jljeadquarters 
to see if they could go directly to the Justice Department 
to see if they could force the United States Attorney's 
Office in Miami to take action in this matter* av* I went 
on vacation in October — early October, I believe — and 
Georae Kiszyncki also telephoned lieadquarters and spoke to 



I 



241 



liNCUSSm 



50 



the supervisor or agent who was handling the case to ask 
^ them to go to Justice. 

Q First of all, who did you speak to at headquarters? 
A Like I said, we had so many. It depends who was 
handling the case at the time. 

It could have been Simeon*?' I don't want to give 
names, but we could get the names from the file, whoever 
was handling the case. 



iia^ssra 



242 



nagl-«iB 



UNCUSSm 



51 









1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

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15 

16 

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Q Did you ever get a positive response? 

A Sure. 

Q In other words, did anyone plan to go to the 
Department of Justice? 

A They were very receptive. They understood our 
dilemma. They said they would try to help us, and they said 
they would and that they did. They told that to George, 
that they would, and they did go across the street to Justice. 

Q Do you know that they did? 

A They told George that they did. * 

Q Do you know to whom they spoke in the Department of 
Justice? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Do you know who from the FBI went? 

A No, I don't. I assume the supervisor we spoke to. 

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Revel was involved 
at all in this process? 

A No, I don't. Like I said, Headquarters appeared 
very receptive to our inquiry. They appeared to really 
want to help us in the investigation. 

Q Regarding the May 14 memo, you referred before to 
press accounts of this memo. Had you heard at any time 
that this had been leaked to the press? 

A Yes, recently. 

Q Did you give a copy of this memo to anyone other tha; 



243 



ilCLASSIHED 



52 



e/3 



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an employee of the FBI? 

A I don't have a copy of this memo. 

Q All right. The version you have, did you give one 
to anyone other than an employee of the FBI? 

A I may have given one to Feldman. 

No, I take that back. Feldman had it. Just to the 
FBI. 

Q Do you know whether Mr. Kiszynzki gave a copy of 
this to anyone not employed by the FBI? 

A Not that I am ^ware. 

Q Do you know whether Mr. Kiszynzki gave a copy of this 
to Buck Revel? 

A No, I do not. No, he did not give a copy to 
Buck Revel. 

Q Do you know of anyone, either at the U.S. Attorney's 
Office of at FBI headquarters, who disseminated this memo to 
anyone not a Department of Justice employee? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Do you have any idea? 

A Yes. 

Q We can go off the record if you want to. 

A Okay. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. 



244 







53 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Do you know whether or not either this memorandum 
of May 14, 1936, your HHM, or any other investigative 
reports were sent to the National Security Council by 
anyone at the Bureau? 

A I have heard in the media and in the Webster 
confirmation hearings that Mr. North has copies of — 
I know for a fact he has copies of teletypes which were 
sent in early 198 5 regarding the James Adair matter. 

Q That is the Posey Alabama case? 

A Right. Right, but on our case I have no knowledge. 

Q Did you ever hear Mr. Kiszynjki make any references 
to any contacts with the NSC on this matter or any other 
matter? 

A There have been allegations to that, but George 
Kiszyn^ki does not know Mr. North or anyone else with the 
NSC that I am aware of. 

Q Do you know whether or not, though, that he might 
have sent any information on this or any other hiatter to the 
National Security Council? 

A Through FBI channelsvhe sent copies of a January 
teletype. He asked that it be disseminated to Mr. North, 
but that was because of the previous teletype from Los 
Angeles, and he did it through FBI HQ. He has no direct 
contact with Mr. North that I am aware of whatsoever. 



245 



WMSS/fifi) 



54 



1 

Q When Mr. Feldman told you that Kelner had told him 

to stop working on it until he had made a decision, do you 
recall when that was? Was it after your memo, your 
prosecution memo had been given to Mr. Feldman? 
A He told us that just a few weeks ago. 

Q And what did he tell you? 

1 
A That Kelner had told him not to take any action, 

not to issue any subpoenas, not to do anything, period, 

regarding the investigation pending his review of the 

^ »^£l - 

prosecutos- Kport. 

Q Did Feldman tell you that Kelner referred to 
political reasons? 

A No. 

Q Was there any mention of politics involved? 

A None at all. 

1 
Q Did Feldman mention to you that Kelner had gone to 

the Department of Justice in August to discuss this matter? 

A I don't recall he did. 

Q Did you ask your SAC or your assistant SAC to 

1 
contact Kelner directly to get the matter moving? 

A We never met with our SAC to discuss getting this 

moving. We discussed ways of getting moving among ourselves, 



the supervisor, and we decided, if I recall, that it was 
best to do it through 'Jteadquarters, which is what we did. 
n Worn vou aware of the Attorney General's visit in 



25 



246 



UNClASSra 



55 






1 
2 
3 

4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



April of 1986 to Miami to visit the wounded FBI agentf? 

A Yes, I was. 

Q Were you aware of that before he went? 

In other words, were you aware he was coming? 

A Yes, I was. 

Q Were you part of that convoy or the escort detail? 

A I was at the funeral, and I recall Mr. — well, 
I was at the funeral when theAgents were buried. 

Q Was Mr. Meese present? 

A I believe he was. 

Q Do you know whether or not Meese inquired of anyone 
either at the U.S. Attorney's Office or the FBI, about your 
case? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Have you since been told by anyone who inquired 
about your case? 

A I read about it in the Village Voice and other 
related articles, Newsweek, etc. 

Q When you read about it, what was your reaction? 

A Surprise. 

Q Why? 

A I was more curious if it was true or not. Like 
I said, I am not aware of any facts to substantiate or dispro 

such allegations. I still am not. 

L 
Q To your knowledge, did Mr. Kelner ever instruct the 



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14 

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22 

23 

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^mssim 



56 



FBI either by himself or through any of his assistants to go 
slow or to cease doing any more work on any other 

investigation? 

I 
A Kelner and the United States Attorney does not 

tell the FBI how to conduct their investigation^ . ^^ ^^s never 

directly interfered in any investigation that I am aware of. 



iimssifp 



248 



THOMAS/mag 
(11:00) 



UNCUSSiFlEO 



57 



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2 

3 

4 

5 

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9 

10 

11 

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13 

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25 



A Could I add something? When we have spoken to 

i 
Mr. Kelner, he just appears to be ignorant regarding the 

specific allegations in the case. 

He to this date, I believe, still thinks that the 

case has to do with a few weapons. I have no indication that 

he ever conspired to obstruct justice or anything of that 

nature. 

Q Had you or Mr. Kiszynzki ever briefed Ktlner other 
than that very first conversation you described in March of 
1986? 

A We spoke to him during December of 198 6 briefly, 

at a party at the United States Attorney's Office. George 

1 
and I were there, and Mr. Kelner walked in and approached 

us and started talking to us about the case, and again 

in January discussed it briefly with him again. 

In December he didn't understand what all the 
conmotion was all about, because all it dealt with was a few 
weapons. We tried to explain to him it was a lot more than 
that because of the recruitment of people that were being 
sent down there and consequently had been arrested and 
incarcerated there and probably would be in jail a long, long 
time either in Nicaragua or Costa Rica. 

Then again in January we spoke to him, again, and 
he made more or less the same comments. 

May I go back to December? He said — the only thine 



249 



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2 

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16 
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23 
24 
25 



UNCUSSIFIED 



58 



he did in the case was to leave the f(rosecut(W?s Report on his 
desk for several months. 

Q That is your report? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he indicate to you that he had read your report? 

A Not that I am aware. 

Q Did he say anything which indicated that he hadn't? 

A I think he said he briefed through it. 

Q Scanned it? 

A Yes, briefly went through it. 

Q During this period of time that the case sort of — 
for lack of a better wotd — stagnated in the U.S. Attorneys 
Office and Mr. Feldman was working other cases, was there 
any discussion of asking the U.S. Attorney to re-assign 
it to an assistnat who was less busy with other things? 

A No; we have always been very happy with the way — 
when Feldman works on the case, he is very good as a 
prosecutor, very good attorney, extremely thorough. You 
couldn't ask for a harder working /e|ssistant to handle the 
case with you. 

So we have no complaints on the way Mr. Feldman 
has handled the investigation aspects of the case once the 
case got forward. 

Q My question was, during the summer months he is 
pre-occupied with other cases. Was there ever discussion of 



250 



UNCLASSIFIED 



59 



assigning another even to ]ust help him with your case? 

A Not during the summer. 

Q Was there ever any discussion of giving any help 
to Mr. Feldman? 

A After we finally got the^and 5"ry, October or 
November, there was a discussion about getting assistance 
for him to help out in the investigation. 

Q How much renewed effort do you see attributed to 
the Hasenfus crash? 

A What I know is that we did get the^rardTury' after 
the Hasenfus incident. I really can't say if it was a 
direct result of that or not. 

Q Did you ever see any memorandum written by 
Mr. Greg^rp, the chief of the criminal division, in October 
regarding this case? 

A No, but I heard about it. 

Q What did you hear? 

A I don't recall, but there was something regarding 

Gregfor]f s memorandum for the initiation of ^ca.nd jbry to 

investigate this matter. I think Feldman may have mentioned 

it, where it was recommended that the (^r and jury be initiated 

in this matter. 

L 
Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Kelner during this 

period from, let's say April of 1986 to October of 1986 — 

whether or not he had been confirmed as U.S. Attorney? 



251 



UNCUSSIFIED 



60 



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2 

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25 



A I don't think he had been confirmed as U.S. 
Attorney. 

Q Was there any discussion between you and 
Mr. Kiszyn^ki or anyone else at the FBI regarding why 
Mr. Kelner was proceeding so cautiously in the case? 

A There was a small incident — I don't recall the 

details of it — that Kiszynyki allegedly had made a comment 

1 
that the reason for the delay was because Mr. Kelner had not 

been given his appointment. At least the statements were 

attributed to Kiszynfki and later they were attributed' to our 

supervisor^ by the name of Paul PhilipY. 

heard Paul saying 



)r. by the name of Paul Philip 
Paul ana awe neveri-* never 






anything to that ef feet .t*«t came to the attention -*e^f- 

1 '^ 

Mr. Kelner, who telephoned our office, and then there was 

A 

a brief commotion regarding the statements — who had made 

them and who said what. Then it da s aa wde d. ' 

1 
Q Was there ever any discussion either with Mr. Kelner 

1 
personally or that you heard of where Mr. Kelner expressed 

concerns that innocent people might be dragged into a 

(^rand'jRiry investigation or names disclosed that shouldn't 

be? 

A Not that I am aware of. 

Q Regarding the Hasenfus investigation, did you 
participate in that at all? 

A No, I did not. 



mtmrn 



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2 

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fumssim 



61 



It was out of my squad, though. 

Q Oo you know whether or not that was generated 
by the local FBI field office or by headquarters? 

A Initially, it was generated by our Miami office, 
to the best of my recollection. 

Q Don't you have to get an FBI headquarters approval 
first, assuming it is a neutrality act? 

A Yes, as I stated earlier, so they may have. I don't 
really — I do know several of our squad members did go 
out to Southern Air the day after or something after the 
revelations were made, but I don't know that much about the 
case afterward. 

Q Were you aware of any communications to Judge Webste 
or Mr. RAveli concerning delaying that investigation in the 
early weeks of October of 1986? 

A I am not sure, but certain individuals from FBI 
nsadquarters did contact individuals on our squad regarding 
the Hasenfus matter — specifically, I believe, Mr. RCvell^ 
Mr. RAveUfflay have telephoned Eduardo Sanchez, but like I sa: 
I was not that involved with the case, not involved with it 
at all, just what I have heard. Contact them and they can 
give you more information. 

Let me ask about another case — ^^^^^^^^^ Were 
you familiar with that at all? 

A Is he 



4 




253 



.,:, ^v >• - 



OO 



C^SF 



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1( 

M 
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iiEussra 



62 




I am aware of the investigations, yes. 

Did you ever participate at all in that? 

VMI5 ^n€ 

It k » w a y out of our squad. I was there during the 



A 

Q 
A 

arrest. I did one of the searches of one of the major 
subject's residences. I testified in the trial. 

So, Z am basically aware. generally. about the case, 
though I was not an active part of the investigation, per se. 

Q What was the aentinent amongst the people who 
worked the case of how serious his crimes were? 

In other words, he was charged with a very serious 
offense, and yet the sentence he receives is fairly lenient. 
A I am not that familiar. 

Z am aware that the FBI investigators who handled 
that investigation did an outstanding job throughout the whol 
investigation. You couldn't ask for harder workers. 

Q Here they disappointed in the guilty plea bargain 
and then the sentence? 

A Z don't know. You must ask them. 
Q In your work on that case, as participating in the 
search team or any other connection, were you aware of any 
kind of connection between^^^^^^^^land the National 
Security Counsel or people acting as consultants or on behall 
of any agency of the U.S. Government? 



254 



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63 



A Not that I recall. 

Q Were you aware of any agreements or attempts to 
transfer] 



I 




A No, I am not. 

Q Regarding the investigation we have been spending 
most of our time with, getting back to that for a minute, 
is there anything that we haven't gone over that yoia think 
should be included for the record, any incidents, any 
statements, any things that you think would be of import 
to the committee? 

A Nothing except to say that we actively, aggressively 
pursued this investigation from its initiation. We never 
stopped or slowed down our side. We pursued this as 
aggressively as we could. 

We have always been interested in the prosecution 
of this natter. 

Q I am going to ask you some names and ask you whethei 
or not either you are familiar with them, because, either 
number one, you have met these people, or you have spoken 
to these people, or these people have been mentioned in the 
course of your *rork. 

In other words, everything you might know about 
these people other than what you might have read in the 



I 



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2S 



UNCUSSIHED 



64 



A I may not go into detail as it affects our pending 
investigation. 

Q Z understand. 

A I guess I could let you know if we are aware of 
their activities or not. 

Q That is really all I want to know. 
Elliott Abrams. 

No, just what is in the media. 

Were you aware of any connection with Mr. Abrams 
Did ^^^^^^^^^H ever mention Elliott 



A 

Q 
and 
Abrams? 

A 



A 



Not that I am aware of. 
Did you ever interview! 

Only met him on that occasion in Costa Rica. 
I would like to speak to him. 

Q Have you made any request of the CIA to interview 



Not specifically, no 
Charlie Allen? 



No. 



UNOASSra 



Q James Bastian? 
A No. 

Q Enriee Bermudez? 

A Heard about him. He is an FDN military leader. 
He has come up repeatedly in our investigation. 



256 




65 



,hO»Jit •*-' 



1 


Q 


Adolfo, Mario Calero. 


2 


A 


I know of both of them. We have interviewed Mario 


3 


Q 


Was that in New Orleans? 




A 


Miami. 




Q 


Vince Cannistraro. 




A 


No. 




Q 


Tiomas Castillo. 




A 


that^^^^^^H 




Q 


Good. How do you know that? 




A 


Through the course of our investigation. 




Q 


George Cave. 


12 


A 


No. 


13 


Q 


Carl 'spitz" Channel 1. 




A 


No. 







Linda Chavez. 




A 


No. 




Q 


Oewey Clarridge. 




A 


His name has come up during the investigation. 




Q 


Thomas Clines. 


20 


A 


No. 


21 


Q 


William Cooper. 


22 


A 


''*^" iiftini iccicicn 


23 


Q 


o.„... con... uNClASMrlti) 


24 


A 


No. 


2S 


n 


P/iiil Putter. 



I 



257 



iiNCiiissro 



66 



A No. 

Is there a case in the southern district of Florida 
involving Paul Cutter? 

A Not that I am aware of. 

Edward DeGaray. 

No. 

Ken DeGraffenreid. 

No. 

Pires DeMiranda. 

No. 

Ambassador Robert Dueailing. 

No. 




No. 

David Fischer. 

No. 

Donald Fraser. 

His name sounds familiar, but nothing that I recall 

Roy Furmark. 




82-702 O-88-10 



258 



' « NO. 

^ Q Richard Gadd. 

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It 

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ttwussife 



I 

I 




r, b* is not an active part of tha 
casa. It is just baeausa of his activitias tharaj 
his nasM has fraquantly baan aantionad. 

Q Oo you know hia by any othar naaa? 
. A Palix Rodriguas. 
Q Donald Gra99. 



^* A Initially in tha casa. 

^ Q That was froa SauB. 

tl 



A Frosi Sacrat Sarvica regarding Alan Saua. 

Q Albart Hakia. 

A No. 

Q Williaa Langton. 

A NO. 



I 

llNCUXSIflffl 



259 




68 



Rafael Quintero 



UNCUSSIFIED 



A Oh, yes. 

Q In the course of the investigation? 

A Yes. 



260 



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uneusa, 



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Q Nestor Sanchez. 



■>% 



A No. 

Q Wallace Buz^ Sawyer. 

A No. 

Q Richard Secord. 

A Yes. 

Q His name came up in the course of the investigation? 

A Yes. 

Q Ted Shackley. 

A Yes. 

Q Daniel Sheehan. 

A No. 

Q John Singlaub. 

A Yes. 

Q In the course of the investigation? 

A Yes. 

Howard Ttticher. 

A No. 

Q Chuck Tyson. 

A No. 

Q San Nataon. 

A No. 

Q Faith Ryan Whittlesey. 

A Excuse me. 

Q Whittlesey. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



261 



ilNCUSSIFIED 



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A No. 

Q She is Ambassador to Switzerland. 

A No. 

Q I show you two really terrible photographs and ask 
you if you recognize those two individuals. 

A Yes. 

Q How do you recognize them? 

A From the media. 

Q For the record, those are pictures of Albert Hakim 
and Richard Secord. 

Q Have you spoken on any occasion with Mr. Jamar at 
FBI headquarters? 

A Not that I recall. 

Q Had you or anyone you know of at the FBI in Miami 
been asked to run any leads on Mr. Zadeh out of Pennsylvania? 

A Not that I am aware. 

Q This is an investigation involving Richard Miller 
and a man who claimed to be a prince, Saudi Arabian prince. 
Have you read about that? 

A Yes, I have. 

Q You have had no involvement in that? 
A No. 

Q Prior to your coming today, did you discuss your 
deposition with anyone? 



25 



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15 



oo 



wussw 



71 



deposed. 

We did have dinner with Mr. Feldman and his wife on 
Saturday. We hardly discussed -- this is our families, 
George Kiszynzki, his wife, myself and my wife and Feldman 
and his wife. We went out to dinner, and we had been 
planning to do so for a long, long time, and he basically 
said that he had been here, which we were aware of before, 
that he was coming down and that he had been questioned 
regarding the delays. 

He didn't give. any type of details, and we didn't 
ask for them. He was aware that we were coming down here 
this week. 

Q What, if anything, did he tell you? 

A That it was regarding — the inquiry was regarding 
the United States Attorneys Office and that nature, and 
because of the Village Voice article we assumed there would 
be in that nature ourselves. 

No, he never mentioned any type of questions he was 
asked or provided, or we didn't ask any type of details. 
We assumed what we would be asked about. 

Q He didn't tell you about the thumb screws? 

A No, he said he was a little nervous before he went 
in. He was interviewed for about five hours. That is about 
it. 

Q Did he mention any conversations he had with 



263 




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Mr. Kelner either before or afterward? 
/^ 

A I know that Mr. Feldman had been in contact with 

i 
Mr. Kelner before he went in, but I don't know the nature. 

I know they had meetings together. I assume it was 

to discuss this, but I have no direct knowledge nor has 

Feldman discussed — he does not tell us about his discussion: 

with Kelner, even if we ask. 

Q Have you met Agent Michael Boone from Los Angeles? 

A I have not met him. 

Have you spoken to him? 

A No, I have not. 

Did you ever run Oliver North's nan* through any 
checks, either at the FBI or through any other law 
enforcement system or any other type of check? 

A Not Mr. North's. 

Nhat about Mr. Owen? 

A I think w* did. 

Q What did you come up with? 

A I believe we ran his nan* through the CIA, but 
I do not recall that much. We ran most of the names of the 
subjects in our case throughout the course of the 
investigation. I don't remember specifically what the reply 
was. It wasn't anything earth-shattering or I would have 
recalled it. 

Q Did you request at any time to interview 



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Oliver North? 

A No, we haven't. 

Q Were you aware that he had been interviewed by FBI 
agents on other occasions? 

A No, I wasn't. We wanted to start at the bottom. 
Q Okay. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I think those are all the questions 
I have. As I said, my colleagues from the Senate couldn't 
make it today because the hearings started this morning. 
So, they may have additional questions for you which I hope 
we can do by telephone, through some sort of conference call 
or something, so you won't have to come back up. 

THE WITNESS: You don't anticipate me going before 
any committee or anything? 

MS. NAUGHTON: I can't answer that, because that 
is a joint decision not made by me, but I don't anticipate 
Lt. I don't think I will recommend it, but we did want 
to get your entire statement on the record, so if there is 
anything else you want to make clear for the record, everythir 
will go into the committee report and records of the committee 
into our final report. 

THE WITNESS: Nothing. 

Could I ask a question? 

MS. NAUGHTON: Sure. On or off? 

THE WITNESS: I would rather it be off. 



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MS. NAUGHTON: This concludes the deposition of 
Mr. Currier. 

(Whereupon, at 11:30 p.m., the deposition was 
concluded. ) 



m ^^^^^ 



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Partially Decl3SSiTJ<| 
under 



UNCUSSiriED 





EXECUTIVE SESSION OCM , Co^;*v4r.^ iS" 

DEPOSITION OF 

Wednesday, May 27, 1987 

House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert ;u:ms Transactions with 

Iran, 
Washington, O.C. 



The committees met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., 
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Neil 
Eggleston (Deputy Chief Counsel of House Select Committee) 
presiding. 

Present: W. Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel; 
Tim Tray lor, Investigator, House Select Committee; Robert w. 
Genzman, Associate Minority Counsel, House Select Committee; 
Terry Smiljanich, Associate Counsel, Senate Select Com- 
mittee; Timothy Woodcock, Associate Counsel, Senate Select 
Committee; and George Taft, Counsel, Department of State. 



/Released nn ^a^!w^m n 
Wiort of to. 12356"^ 



^ UNClASSIFiED 



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1 Whereupon, 
2 

3 was called as a witness by the Select Conunittees and, having 

4 been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 

5 follows: 

6 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HCfKSB SELECT 

7 COMMITTEE 

8 BY MR. EGGLESTON* _ ^ 

9 Q ^^^^^^^^H^l for the record, my name 

10 Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel for the House Select Com- 

11 mittee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 

12 Also present are two representatives of the Senate Select 

13 Committee. Both committees were established pursuant to 

14 resolutions and have various enacting rules. The State 

15 Department was provided with copies of both the resolutions 
1g and rules. If you want copies for any reason, we can 
*j certainly provide them to you 

The mandate of both the House and Senate Committees 
which are now conducting joint hearings, is to investigate 
the circuastancea surrounding primarily the Iran affair, 
but also the United States Government's involvement with the 



22 contras. This is being conducted pursuant to those rules. 



Let me just aak you at the outset to tell us a 
little bit about your background in a very brief fashion. 
If you could just tell me a little bit about your schooling 

HNnr 





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days we'll talk about, he was out of the country, and I was 
in charge. 

Q You are the Deputy Chief of Mission? 

A That is correct. 

Q Pardon me, I have not done too much work in the 
State Departmer*-. Others have done a lot. Is there a Chief 
of Mission? 

A The ambassador is called Chief of Mission. * 

Q You are the ranking person in his absence? 

A That is right. The way the embassy is structured, 
the American Embassy, it is a little different. The Deputy 
Chief of Mission doesn't have a line responsibility. He, 
like the ambassador, has general responsibility for all of 
the functions of the mission. Therefore, he is prepared m 
the ambassador's absence to take over. 




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Q Let me ask you then — now that I have established 
some baclcqround, let me ask you, as I indicated a moment ago 
off the record, the principal area I wanted to ••k you. 
questions tOjout. is the tine period primarily, say, November 
20 through the end of your own involvement in this particular, 
operation. Could you just, without questions or promptings 
from me, relay the best you can recall what your involvement 
was when you arrived into the operation of the various 
functions that you performed. 

A Yes. There was, I suppose, one event prior to my 
actual involveement that's worthy of note>. On the. 21 of 
November, the pol^t^oal consular, who was the Acting 
Deputy Chief of Mission since I was in charge at the tiae, 
was called over to the Foreign Ministry and was told^^ thax 
there was an Aaarican who claimed to be a^etired General 
seeking^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H concurrence for transfer 
arms to Iran, <uid the ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ was by 

this and wanted to know what our policy was since we had on 
many occasions told them our policy was to discourage such 
shipments. 

The Acting DCM confirmed to the government that 



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our policy was to discourage shipment of axns to Iran. We 
reported that in a telegram, which I believe you have access 
to. 

Q That occurred on November 21? 

A Yes. And I think we sent the report out the 22. 
^ , -c Now, on about noon on the 22, tht 
^^^^^^^^^^P came to me, and he said that he was involved 
in a very difficult situation, it wasn't exactly how he 
described it, and he needed my help and guidance, and he 
said that he received instructibns, I -believe, the night 
before or early in the morning to come ir 

open up his communications and act upon whatever communica- 
tions were received. The first telegram that he received 
instructed him not to inform the ambassador. 

He came in, he was told to get in touch with some- 
one acting under a pseudonym at a local hotel or at a 
telephone number which he assumed was a hotel, and to help 
him." The pseudonym was R. Copp. 

He called him and — this is as related to me, 
and probably not in the precision that it was related, 
because it's been a year and a half — but essentially he 
was to with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m^in 
authorization for the arrival of aircraft bearing arms for 
Iran, which would be transshipped in^^^^^^to Iran, ^///^j 
was not cooperating because they really 



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didn't know what was going on, they were confused. At least 
that was the sense of it. 

Isaid thatl 
Ithe Foreign Minister, Prime Minister or someone 
who worked in those offices to be helpful in this process. 





didn't know how to go about it and didn't feel he would be 
successful in any event. 

He said he had told Headquarters that he^ould need 
the help of the Charge to get these things done; if they 
wanted it done, they should engage the Charge. I said to 
him at that point that — well, we both agreed it was an 
astounding operation. But, beyond that, I said that I would 
be prepared to cooperate, but first he needed authorization 
to tell me what he had told me, and, second, I needed to know 
that the Secretary of State knew about and approved the 
operation. 

Late that afternoon, I think about 5:00 o'clock or 
so, he received — all of this was in CIA channels — he 
received a telegram which was purportedly from John Poindexter 
which asked that I be shown the communication and be asked to 
pull out all the stops to get approval for the transit, and 
he said the Secretary knew and approved of the operation and 



.« ^^x-*-. 



Jim AC'x'""" f 



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N ^.-Jt- rK:r> '±t:>F bfc;(^"Khi'i^ 




asked that State Department communications channels not be 
used because only the Secretary and Assistant Secretary 
OaJtley were aware of the operation, given its obvious 
sensitivity. 

Based on that, I got in touch with] 

land 

said I needed to talk to the Foreign Minister. He told me 
the Foreign Minister was in a Ceibinet meeting and was in- 
accessible unless I could tell him that my request was coming 
from the highest levels of the United States Government. I 
said I could, based on the assumption this was, in fact, 
from John Poindexter, who was National Security Adviser to 
the President at the time. 

He then explained to me why they had been negative 
to this point. H* went back over the contact that they had 
received froa a so-called retired American General and why 
they had sunBoned our political consul. Acting OCM, to ask 
him about our policy; and based on our reiteration of our 
policy that we were trying to stop shipment of arms to Iran, 
they had decided not to cooperate. This is just by means of 
explanation. 

Q Is this now your first contact? 

A This is my first contact wit 
evening of the 22. 




inrn 



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Q Okay . 

A I did not talk to the Foreign Minister that evening 
My interest in getting the cooperation o 

[was passed on to him, but I did not actually talk 

to him. 

Late that evening, it was about 11:00 o'clock or 
so at night, received a call f ron^^^^^^^^^^| He had 
received a telegram indicating that Robert McFarlane, who 
was then in Rome I was told, I am not sure, but he was in 
Europe in any event, had talked to the Foreign Minister on 
the telephone and that the Foreign Minister had agreed to 
facilitate the transshipment. 

I was asked to get in touch with the Foreign 
Minister's staff and confirm that. I was unable to do so 
at that time. 

At 7:00 o'clock the next morning, the 23, I was 
called again ^y^^^^^^^H|B Whoever was sending him the 
telegrams back here was anxious that we get that confirmation 
as soon as possible because they wanted to go ahead with the 
operation. They asked I move as quickly as possible to get 



gp^jj-S^e^'NC' '" ■ -'fO 



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the confirmation. 

Finally, mid-morning I was able to talk to^^^^H 
the Foreign Ministry, who said he was 
aware of a conversation but not aware of any commitment to 
facilitate the shipment without a diplomatic note requesting 
it and pyplaining the reasons for it. 
I subsequently talked to th 
^^^^H Foreign Minister who said the s^une thing, he said the 
note needed to contain where the aircraft were coming from, 
where they were going, the reasons for the operation and the 
cargo. I communicated all of this, or ^^^^^^^^^H did, 
back to Washington. We were authorized to deliver a note, 
which, as I recall, and I am sure you have the text of it, it 
was rather skimpy, it did not give details about cargo or 
reasons. I can't remember, but it was by^^^^^^^^^^^it 
meet ^^^^^^^^^H request . 

took that over and delivered it ^°^^^^^^^^^| 
[the Foreign Ministry, 
Anyway, he 

received the note, complained to me about the way we had 
handled it, the whole operation, and noted at the time the 
note didn't look like it met their needs, "^ 

That afternoon we went back and forth several 
times between the Foreign Ministry and myself, between^^ 
[and Washington, about how we might embellish upon 




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th« not* to make it acceptable^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^Th, 
^l^^^fmeanwhile wer* meeting rather regularly, the Foreign 
Miniater meeting with the Prime Minister to decide whether or 
not they would cooperate. 




late afternoon, I had a good sense of what kind 
mee^^^H^^^^^^^^^B needs, to have 
some information about cargo, but it didn't have to be 
specific. It had to make some reference* to huBUiitarian 
purposes, and it had to have the origin and ultimate destina- 
tion of the cargo. 

At this point, the second effort to put this opera- 
tion together was running up against a deadline, as I under- 
stand it. That is, planes were in the area and on route ^^H 
^^^^H and hcd'm turn-around tine that was getting fairly 
short. 

Sometime in the afternoon of Saturday, they turned 
around, and I guess whoever was running the operation back 
here decided they would do it sobm other way, because I 
received instructions to deliver a rather short and curt note 
that essentially said "thanks for not helping this humanitarian 
operation." 



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12 



I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister scheduled 
for that evening, Saturday evening, about 7:00 o'clock, 7:30 

Hm^^^H^^^^^^^^^lmeanwhile been hard 
at work, and they were at this point, as I understand it, 
prepar»d.^ agree if we provided the information that they 
requested. 

I went to the meetingl 




We were not under the best conditions to mee 

I must say. Anyway, we met, there were 
about five of us in the room. He had two staff members with 
him. I showed him the note, and they were very upset because 
it was in a sense impolite. 

Also, we had turned them inside out for about 24 
hours, and now w« war* ainply saying "thanki, but nb thanks", 
we don't — «• are not proceeding dotm this track. 

That's essentially it. Z am sure there are gaps. 
Maybe you can ask questions. 

Q I will. There are actually not that many gaps. 
Let me start by asking you if you could just go 
over the telegram that you sent or that waatasent on the 21. 
This has been previously marked ERC-1. Maybe, so the record 






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13 

is clear, we should have it marked — what are your full 
initials? 
A 

Q ^^^ 

(The following document was marked a^^^^^xhibit 
No. 1 for Identification.) 
COMMITTEE INSERT 








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Uj 'cc'qrn TOi^StGi^E^^ 



14 



BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Let me show you^^^l and ask you, as best you can 
recall, if you can elaborate on this, the early conversation 
of the 21 about the .contact between the Acting Deputy Chief 
of Mission with regard to this contact bv the retired General 

A As earlier ^^^^^^^^H who was 

Political Consular, was called over Ly the Deputy Political 
Director and told that an official from^H^^H^^^dealing — 
well, an arms dealer I guess m|m^H who, as I understand, 
by the way, is related to one of the officials in the Foreign 
Ministry, and that's why tkat contact was made. He was a 
brother-!- in- law. That's why the contact was made in that 
fashion — had said that he was working in cooperation with 
a retired American General or a person who claimed to be a 
retired American General and that they wanted to arrange 
for the shipment of some arms to Iran. 

The Foreign Ministry, knowing of our general policy 
in this regard, was confused and they had asked 
to come over and reiterate our policy essentially, which he 
did. We reported back the following day. 

Q Z take it, as of this time, the Acting Deputy Chief 
[did not know the name of the supposed retired 
American General? 

A No. 

Q Was there any indication whether the retired General 



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15 



had indicated this was a United States Government operation? 

A My impression is yes, but I don't recall precisely. 

Q Is this^^^l a telegram that you sent back to the 
State Department here in Washington? Is this your cable 
essentially? 

A Yes. It w^s actually written by^^^^^^^^B i 
saw it before it went out and approved it. 

Q Let me just take a look at it and make sure there 
is nothing in it I wanted to ask you eibout. 

You may or may not know, based upon whether you 
read the Tower Commission or all sorts of things, there came 
a time, when General Secord receives a letter signed by Colonel 
North with a signature indication of Mr. McFarlane indicating 
that Mr. Secord 's services are needed with regard to a 
particular operation. Did you ever see that letter during 
the course of this time period? 

A No, I didn't. 

Q So he never showed it to you or to your knowledge 
did not show it to' 

A To my knowledge, he did not. He certainly didn't 



show it to me, because I have never met General Secord. 



I, do you 



Q From your conversations withi 
know whether he ever showed it to him? 

A I do not know. I don't think he did. 

Q This cable suggests that the Acting Deputy Chief of 



UNC 



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282. 



m 



16 

Mission responded immediately and forthrightly that this was 
not a United States Government operation; at least as far as 
he knew, it was not. I take it, I don't see why there would 
be, tim^ was no efforvby anyone in your office to check 
with the State Department to see whether or not it was an 
official United States Government operation. 

A No. Our policy was longstanding and fairly clear, 
quit* clear, so there was no attempt to check. 

Q And prior to the time that this contact takes 
pl*c«, as far as you know, General Secord, or Mr. Copp, had 
not contacted anyone at the embassy for help or authorization 

A I am certain he had not. 

Q As of the 21, I take it, you probably think that 
this is a dead American mission. 

A Exactly. 

You indicate around noon or so, you speak to the 

and h« says he needs help in a difficult 
situation. Old h« describe at that time what he had been 
asked to do by Headquarters? 

A Yes. He brought me up to date on everything at 
that point. 

Q Just as best you recall, what is it he told you 
as of noon on the 22nd? 

A He had been asked to get in touch with this 



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'« vL'..:yLr"-ii 

individual, and he had done so on the phone, and the person, 
R. Copp, had told him the United States Government was seek- 
ing to assist in the transit of some arms from Israel to 
Iran through^^^^^^H and he had been asked to getl 
lapproval for this. 

Q So it was your notion what he needed was approval 
for the airplanes to land ^|^^^m|^^ reload, or whatever? 

A Exactly. Airplanes to come in with the cargo, re- 
load into other airplanes and take off. 

Q As of this time, when you have this conversation 
with him on the 22nd, did you connect this event with what 
you had learned the previous day? 

A I began to, yes. 

Q I take it, as of this time, you don't know whether 
R. Copp is a retired American General. 

A Not until later when ^^^^^^HHH actually met with 
him and talked with him, and he told him who he was. 




284 



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"^^imm^ 



18 



1 

2 Q You had indicated that in the afternoon of the 22nd 

3 you began to be somewhat concerned before taking steps along 

4 these lines, you get authority from your own agency and reot 

5 merely instructions from the CIA. 

6 A Yes. I told^^^^HHthat I would be glf"\ to help, 

7 but only if first of all he had authoriaation \o tell me 

8 that I had — that I wa& actually requested -^o do so and that 

9 I knew the Secretary of State knew and approved it. 

10 Q I take it, though, at no time — you followed the 

11 instructions not to use the State Department communications 

12 system . 

13 A I did. 

14 Q And your communications then are through the CIA 

15 channels. 

1g A Total. Under today's ground rules, I would not, 

17 but at the time it seemed like a reasonable thing to do. 
1g Q I assume a lot of things may have changed after 

19 this both here and in Central America. 

20 Did you involve anybody else in your office, on 

21 the embassy staff, in this? 

22 A No. 

23 Q Did you have any conversation with — you gave us 

24 his n2une, and I forgot it. 



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19 




No. 



About this after the 21st7 
No. I told him — 
Nothing? 

I told him he didn't want to know. He knew. He 
knew there were strange things going on', because I was going 
to a dinner party at his house SzlBtrday night and was about 
two hours late for it. Since I'was at the Foreign Ministry, 
he knew where I was. -^ a 

Q So he did not help you? •- 

A No 
Q 
A 
Q 
Mr. Copp? 

A No. 

Q 
received a call fromJ|||^P indicating he received a cable 
telling hi« Mcrarlane had actually spoken to the Foreign 
Minister, and you said you then took steps in order to confirm 
Those steps took place the evening of the 22nd, which were 
unsuccessful. 

Th«n you had conversations wit^people on the 23rd. 
I was a little confused as you went through whether you were 
ever actually able to confirm that phone call and the agreement 
that seemed to be reflected to you in the cable. 

m^\ AO!^iri 



You indicated that you Rever spoke "to or never met 



You indicated on the 22nd, around 11:00 a.m., you 
cmekUf 





286 





1 A In my conversations the next morning, yes, there 

2 was a confirmation the phone call had occured. The Foreign 

3 Minister that Saturday evening told me he had talked to 

4 Mr. McFarlane. The- difference between the telegram we received 

5 on the evening of the 22 and what^^^^^^^^^^Htold me on 

6 the 23 was the perception of the agreement of the telephone 

7 call. Mr. McFarlane believed that he had agreement from the 

8 Foreign Ministry to permit the and^^^^^^^^^^H 

9 said that they had agreed to consider it promptly and 

10 positively, or whatever. They had some — once they had the 

11 necessary background information. 

12 Q And one of the things they asked you for was a 

13 formal diplomatic note that requested their anistance? 

14 A Exactly. 

15 Q You indicated one of the things they wanted was an 
18 indication of whAt th% cargo was going to be. 

17 A That is ri^> 

18 Q Did jpou h^a conversations with then that the note 

19 would reflect the cargo was going to be weapons? 

20 A They kn«W by the tiae I was involved that the cargo 

21 consisted of weapons, but I don't believe they, knew what kind 

22 oC weapons. 

23 Q Did thay know that from the conversation they had 

24 on the 21st or from conversations witlJ^^^H^Hor from 

25 conversations with you? 



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or from the 



A They knew that from eitherf 
retired Anverican General. 

Q But in your conversations with the people in^|H 
it was always clear the cargo that was 
going to be on these planes was going to be weapons? 

A Yes. 

Q Mas there any discussion about how you would phrase 
that in the note, how much specificity they wanted in the 
note? 

A They wanted — y«*> there was. They wanted types 
and amounts. We didn't provide that in a formal fashion 
ever. 

Q Did they want exactly what kinds of missiles? 

A I can't recall that we got into that kind of detail. 

Q But they wanted — 

A They wanted those things, yes. 

Q They wanted formal acknowledgement they were being 
asked to help in a weapons shipment. 

A Bsaetly. 

Q Z take it., that is one of the things that concerned 
them, they wanted a formal request from us to them they help 
in this somewhat unusual initiative sending weapons to Iran. 
Is that fair? 

A Yes. 

Q There coaes a time on the 23rd — well, let me ask 



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it this way. Does there come a tine, as far as you know i 

think you indicated there came a time wheni 



^^^^^^Imet with 
Copp? 

A Yes. 

Q Was that on the 23rd, or do you recall? 

A As I recall, it was the 23rd. I can't remember 
whether it was mid-morning or late afternoon. It was some- 
time on the 23rd. 

Q Did he tell you etbout the meeting he had with — 

A Yes, he did. 

Q Can you tell me what you recall he related to you 
about the meeting? 

A It was a brief meeting, only about, mm X recall, 
IS minutes, Copp identified himself as Richard Secord, 
retired American Air Force General, who was working for the 
National Security Council trying to put together this ship- 
ment of arms. And he singly urged him to be responsive. 



He also told him what arms were involved. 

CM 

Q Do you recall today what the'^ Chief 
you Copp had said to the^ Chief! 



I told 



A In precise terms, no, although I do know they were 

was told that by^^^^^^^^B. 
Q Z have identified some of the cables, I may or may 
not want to ask you about your recollection. 

Is the concept of Zulu time something that is 



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familiar to you? 



A Yes. 

Q Is Zulu time and actual time inl 



23 



the same? 



Q I thought that was true. These time changes are 
probably a common event for you, but less so for me. 
Who was Ambassador Oakley as of November? 

A The Assistant Ambassador for combatting terrorism. I 
think that was the title. 

Q Had you ever met Ambassador Oakley? 

A No, I never met him, but I knew his role. 

Q Bear with me a second. As a result of your memory, 
there ar« few I will need to ask you about. 

Did you have throughout this time period a sense of 
how many flights were going to be coming into and out of 



A Yes. I thought I did. I thought there were two 
aircraft coming in and two going out. It might have been two 
consolidated into one going out, but various airlines were 
mentioned at various times. 

Q Did you have any sense of how many missiles they were 



82-702 0-88-11 



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talking about? 

A No, I did not, I don't recall that I did. 

Q Do you recall any discussion about a bribe attempt? 




A Oh, yes, I remember. Ny parception at the dme was 
although bribery is not out of the question in these kinds 

particulaz^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hoff icial 
have over-reacted. He seemed very nervous about the whole 
thing. He might have over-reacted because he received a bribe 
attempt, I don't know. 

Q It didn't appear to you the bribe attempt had come 
from the United State* Government, but froi 
^^^^^^^H he is owner 

Q Is he the one with the relative in — 

A Yes. 

Q 




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25 
helping Secord, who is referred to here as Copp, in this 
transfer. Did you know that at the time? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you knoi 

A I don't think I had ever met^^^^^H. i have had a 
lot of — a lot — occasi'^nal indirect contacts with 
because it's someting that's in the newspapers or in the press 
from time to time. It is a well-known company. 

Q Is it a private company? 

A Yes. 

Q It is not a government-owned company? 

A It is not a state-owned company, no. - 

Q 




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A Yes, I do recall. Apparently Secord, Copp, and 
probably^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H tried to intercept the 
Minister and Prime Minister at the VIP lounge of the airport, 
they were returning from some trip, the idea being they would 
try to persuade them to go ahead and agree with all this 
without going through normal channels. 

It didn't work because they landed on the military 
side of the airport and didn't go through the VIP lounge. 
Meanwhile, hanging around this place, which has high security 
and is very visible, they had created — suspicions is 
probably a gentle word, but suspicions, antagonism. 

Q Do you have any recollection today of how much -- or 
approximately what day it was the Foreign Minister and the 
Prime Minister had returned from whatever trip and had gone 
through this airport? 

A My guess is that that was either the 20th or 21st, 
but I don't know. 

Q 

A 

Q I take it there comes a — you sort of basically 
have taken us through the 23rd. 

A That is right. I have got a note here to take you 
to the 25th. On Monday, the 25th, I was called in by * 

|and given two diplomatic notes 





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' : > 3 I II I ij 

I am sure you have those notes. 

But essentially one explained their understanding 
of the terms under which they would have agreed, and the other 
one complained about the way we went about the "Whole opera- 
tion. 

Q I have a cable here that may help you refresh your 
recollection. Did you receive instructions to keep the 
possibility of usingj^^^^^Hjalive and poxAje as a place in 
which this operation could be uadertalcen? 

A I don't recall that I did. 

Q This may or may not refresh your recol^Rtion, bat 
it is CIIN 2211-A, it is a cable to^^^^^|from ~ j^nd again 
this is a CIA cable — from Headquarters ^o^^^^^B dated 
November 27, Zulu time of^^^H and ]ust ask you — this 
actually makes reference to other things ttitt go previously. 
If you need it, that would be fine< 

A ¥•■> I do recall this cable. I was shovn it at the 
time. The reason tSt iX, the back^rdund is I was fairly 
confident if we hMdled it correctly, we could ge 
cooperation for a sensitive operation if it was in our national 
interest to do so. 

But these instructions suggest I not raise it with 
the Prime Minister, but if he raised it, that I sort of keep 
it open. I didn't talk to the Prime Minister about this case. 
In talking to the Foreign Minister, I think I left the case 



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pretty well a closed case. 

I take it no one ever came back to you again for 
help in moving shipments of arms through^^^^^Hin order to 
get them through Tehran? 

A No. To the best of my knowledge. General Secord 
had lef t^^^^^Hand moved on to greener pastures. I gather 
I was wrong. 

Q Have you ever discussed the events surrounding 
November 21 to the 27th or so of '85 with the Secretary of 
State? 

A I have not. 

Q Have you discussed them — I guess you have not 
discussed them with Ambassador OAklay either? 

A I have not. 

Q Do you know Dewey Clarridge? 

A I met him about 1980 or '81 when he wasl 



Q You did not hKtm ^ny contact with him except through 
these cables? 

A That is correct. 

Do you know Colonel North? 

A I never met him. 

Q Do you know Admiral Poindexter? 

A I have met him in meetings when he was with the 
National Security Council. I can't say I know him. I am sure 






295 



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he doesn't know me. 

Q You have never discussed these events with them? 

A No. 

Q Admiral .Poindexter or similarly Mr. McFarlane? 

A No. 

Q Have you discussed the events of this week in 
November, '85 with anyone else at the S-tat« Department? 
It is kind of an open-ended question. 

A Yes. The answer is yes, I have. I have discussed 
it with, not in this detail, but with the Assistant Secretary 
of State foi 

Q 

A 

Q Was that a oantemporaneous conversation? 

A No, it was not. 

Q Do you recall when it was? 

A Last summer. Nearly a year later. 

Q But before all these events beceune public in 
November, 1986? 

A No, on the contrary. I do not believe I ever dis- 
cussed it — I am trying to think back. I assumed I had dis- 
cussed this with ^^^^ but I probably had not. I did not open 
the subject up to any conversation with anybody in the State 
Department. It was not public knowledge then, I simply didn't 




toH^^S^p- 



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do it. 

Q You were following instructions to only discuss it 
with Oakley or -- 

A Exactly. Th e only other person I did discuss it 

wasj^^^^^^^^^^^H, When he i told 

what had occurred, and besides saying, "Thank God, I wasn't 
here," he really didn't have anything to add. I feel fairly 
confident he didn't discuss it with anybdSy at the State 
Departm ent, 

Q 




MR. EGGLESTON: I don't have any other questions. 
BY MR. SMILJANICH; 
Q Oid^^^^^^^^^^ ever put a name behind who 
Headquarters was giving instructions? 

A Ever is a long time. He did afterwards. I am tryinc 
to remember whether he did at the time. He explained the type 
of channel he was receiving the instructions on, which was a 
privacy channel, and it came from the operations side, but I 



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don't know that he mentioned Clarridge's name. 

Q What about after the fact? 

A After the fact, yes. 

Q Anyone e].se? 

A No. I mean, I know that Clarridge, Deputy Director 
of Operations, theoretically might have been involved, although 
I also gather he may have been out of town at the time. 

Q There are independent communication channels that 
are available to you that run directly to the Secretary of 
State, is that correct, as Charge? 

A I could use State Department channels and have a 
highly restricted distribution on this end, but none that I 
would feel confident using under the circumstances at the 
time. 

Q So there is, in fact, no way in which you could have 
directly communicated only with the Secretary of State and 
no one else? 

A Not at the time. I have a telephone now. But at 
that time, we didn't have. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^Hx am Tim Woodcock with the Senate Com- 
mittee. I am going to have to jump around a little bit, as 
I was following these notes. The information that you first 
f rom^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B I 
^^^^^Hreceived it first — 



•9— "« ^ 




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A That is correct. 

Q That referred to a manager of the firm| 

A I believe that wasl 

Q So that from your understanding^^^^^^^was involved 
early on, as well as the person waiting in the VIP lounge? 

A That is my understanding. I was not in the VIP 

lounge, so it is second-hand information. 

Q 





Q In his pre-hearing remarks. General Secord said 
that he personally had some reservations about the use of 
I because he said^^^^^Hwas "not smooth" . Do you 
know enough about^^^^^Hto know why he would be considered 



not smooth? 



* ^"p^-k^^^S^av^ 



299 




iii i": II 33 

A I have an impression that^^^^His heavy-handed, 
but that is an impression, not based on my knowledge. To my 
knowledge, I haven't met the man. 

Q When you say heavy-handed, what do you mean by that? 

A Too direct, rather blunt, given to bluster. 

Q Do you have knowledge at all o 

A I have met] 

Q He IS also a partner ^^i^^^B is that cofrect^^" - 

A That is correct. I think he and^^^^^^lown equal 
shares, perhaps. I am not sure. But he is parifters with him. 

Q Do you know of any involvement — I am speaking 
broadly here -- of Thomas Clines ii 

A I do not. 

Q Do you know Thomas Clines? 

A No. 

Q Do yovur«call at what point you learned that Copp 
was, in fact, Richard Secord? 

A When^^^^^^^^^H returned from the meeting wit|^ 
him, which was sometime during the day of the 23rd. 

Q Did the name Secord mean anything to you? 

A No, it didn't. 

Q When Ambassador^^^^^^^^H returned, you testified 

you briefed him on the matter. Is it also true^^^^^^^^^H 
participated in that briefing? 

A I am certain he did at ont point . Whether — I 



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can't recall whether I briefed the ambassador independently 
first or we did it altogeth^. I am not sure. The normal, 
of course, event would have been that I woold have given him 
a very brief summary of what happened and askedj^^^^^^^^^H 
to go through it all. But I can't recall that's the way it 
happened. It's a question of trust involved here. 



I have very high regard for^^^^^^^^^^as an 
honest person, as a person of integrity, and I think that's 
probably reciprocated. I wouldn't wa«t you to read into what 
I have said anything that suggests I have cut him out or he 
is trying to cut me out of any conversation with the ambassador 
That was not the case. 
Q Thanks. 

DidJ^^^^^H^^I advise you that he was in regular 
communication with Headquarters? 
A Yes. 

Q Did he advise you that he had relayed to Headquarters 
the information that General Secord had told him about the 
nature of the airplane mission? 

A Yes. i 

Q Did he advise you of that on November 23 or long 
after the fact? 

On November ^ ^ > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
ind although I did not see all of those, I 
did see some of them. He told me what was in them. Normally 



\rs 




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I saw them, and he provided a running account of what was 
going on^^^^^^^^^to Headquarters. 

Q Your understanding — 

A Within that running account was the conversation 
with Secord and the indication the aircraft would be carrying 
Hawk missiles, yes. 

■^ .--rI; You are referring to a running account, and I 



has given you. Is 



gather that is the account 
that correct? 

A No, I mean that he was giving Langley. 

Q I want to divide this into two parts. There are 
actual communications going to Langley from^^^^^^^^^^H i< 
that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q When you refer to a running account, that is what 
you are referring to? 

A Exactly. 

Q With respect to the communication which^^^^^H 
made to Langley recounting the substance of the Secord 
conversation, did he simply tell you about it, or did you 
actually see it? 

A I don't know. 

You don't recall? 
No. 



C'/» cMie r- 



X gather some of the messages he sent out you 



302 



1 actually saw, and others he told you about, is that correct? 

2 A That is correct. 

3 Q But I gather — 

^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hl saw 

5 Q ^That specific one? 

6 A That is correct. 

7 Q Your memory is clear, I gather, on the point he did 

8 tell you contemporaneously with sending the message he had 

9 communicated with Headquarters on the substance of the Secord 

10 conversation. 

11 A That's what I recall. 

12 Q I gather — you have already testified to this, just 

13 to make it clear — that conversation recounted the nature of 

14 the cargo being Hawk missiles to the destination point being 

15 Iran and the purpose being for the release of the hostages, 
15 is that correct? 

17 A That is correct. , _ 

1g Q Do you recall whether Ambassador 

19 municated any dismay to CIA after the fact about the manner 

20 in which this whole operation had been handled? 

21 A My impression is that he did not. He intended to, 

22 he said he was going to. My impression is that he did not. 

23 Q Now, was that at your suggestion, or was that his 

24 idea? 

25 A Well, he was appalled by it, let's put it that way 



-^a^Silit- 



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37 



so I can't recall whether it was my suggestion or his idea, 
but it could have been either. 

Q You were in accord with it, is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Would that have gone — if that communication had 
been sent out, would that have g^^ne to the Director of Central 
Intelligence, Mr. Clarridge, or some other person? 

A It would have gone to the Director of Central 
Intelligence, because Ambassador^^^^^^^^^Hand the Director 
were personal friends, as you probably know. Can I go off 
the record for a second? 

MR. EGGLESTON: Sure. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Have you heard now, subsequently, through all these 
events, whether Thomas Clines was even present in| 
during these operations? 

A I have read thathe was. But I don't know by my 
own knowledge. I have not talked to anybody in^^^^^^H that 
says he was there. I never asked^^^^^^^^H whether he was 
there, who was one of those two partners I have met. 

Q Have you ever sought to confirm through your con- 
tacts in^^^^^^^whether it was, in fact. General Secord who 
went to the VIP lounge? 

A No, I have not. 



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Q Has anyone ir^^^^^^Hconfirmed to you that this 
attempted bribe, or whatever the attempted influence was, was 
sought to be effected in the name of Robert McFarlane? 

A No, I have heard nothing along those lines. I am 
only vaguely aware of this concern about a possible bribe, 
and certainly not in terms of utilizing Robert McFarlane 's 
name. 

Q Did this incident which occurrec 

[have any lasting effect on 
relations between the United States 

A That's a difficult assessment to make. It's 
possible that it created some suspicion within the government 
about how we deal with other governments. It also might have 
had a concern this particular government hac 




[so it may have 
complicated the relationship somewhat, but I can't be sure. 




And I might add, if I can, for the record, that 
that really accounts for why I did not seek further informa- 
tion about who was really at the VIP lounge. As far as I 
was concerned the event was over with, and we were better off 
going ahead trying to build the relationship rather than 
spend too much time worrying about what had happened. 

Q I may have asked this question already, but let me 



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ask again. Following this incident, did you come across, 
through your sources ^"^^^^^^V ^^y association of either 
General Secord or Thomas Clines with^^^^^Kn subsequent 
dealings? 

A No, I was not aware of General Secord or Tom Clines, 
Thomas Clines, being in^^^^^^Haf ter that, until i read 
about it in the press a few months ago. 

Q Now, the same question only with respect to 
association or involvement with^^^^Hbefore the events of 
November 22, 23 and 24, 1985. 

A I am not sure what the question is. 

Q The question being, did you come across information i|i 
your contacts in^^^^^^^fof association of General Secord 
or Thomas Clines with^^^^Hat any period before November 22, 
23, or 24? 

A No. At least none that I can recall, because I 
wouldn't have recognized those n2unes at the time, in any 
event. 

Q I am speaking — this is after the fact, even up to 
the present. Have you, through your^^^^^^^Bcontacts, 
received confirmation of the involvement of these people with 



A I haven ' t . 

Q Let me ask you the same tandem of questions with 
respect to Albert Hakim. Is that a nzune you are familiar 







306 



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40 



1 with through your contacts ir 

2 A No. 

3 MR. WOODCOCK: I think that is all I have. Thank 

4 you, sir. 

5 BY MR. GENZMAN: 

6 Q Regarding the curt note delivered t 

7 ^^^^^^^H[ was that at the instructions of Admiral Poindexter? 

8 A It was my assumption it was at the instructions of 

9 Admiral Poindexter. It came through the CIA channel, and it 

10 was purportedly under his instructions, yes. 

11 Q And was the wording of that note also from Admiral 

12 Poindexter according to your information? 

13 A Yes, it was. 

14 Q Was there any Department of State approval or 

15 Secretary of State approval — 

16 A No, there was not. 

17 Q — of the note? 
1g A Not that I knew of. Once again, going back to the 

19 basic operating thesis, that is I was operating on the basis 

20 of my understanding given to me through CIA communications 

21 that the Secretary knew and approved; therefore, that was 

22 just an extension of that. 

23 I might, if I can, sort of expand here. You asked 

24 or Mr. Eggleston asked if I had ever discussed this with the 

25 Secretary of State or with Assistant Secretary Oakley after 



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that event. First of all, I don't really have many occasions 
to meet with either one of them/ and I "have only been back 
to the United States once since then, and that was last summer, 
or twice last summer, I am sorry, briefly. To that point, 
this had not become public knowledge, so I didn't discuss it 
with anybody else. 

My assumption still at that time was that they knew 
and approved. I had no reason to believe otherwise, and, 
therefore, I didn't seek an opportunity to raise it. 

MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing further. Thank you. 
MR. SMILJANICH: One last question. 
BY MR. SMILJANICH: 
Q Physically, when you received the wording of the 
diplomatic note via VIP channels, did you take that or re-do 
it? 

A It is done on a standard diplomatic note format. It 
was done by a secreta; 

Q Did you retain a copy of that? 
A Yes, I have a copy. 

in^^^^^v 
A Yes. I believe you have it. Do you not have the 
context of it? 

Q I don't know we have anything other than the CIA 
cable itself. 

MR. EGGLESTON: I don't know I have seen it in the 
formal fashion. Il^*fl, 



25 





308 



1 BY MR. SMILJANICH: 

2 Q Was a copy of that ever sent to any office here at 

3 the Oapartment of State? 

4 A No. 

5 MR. EGGLESTON: I don't have anything further. 

6 MR. W00DCCX:K: Let me ask a coupl© questions. 

7 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

8 Q When you received this terse note, would it be 

9 fair to say you were concerned about the quality and ton«- 

10 of the note? 

11 A Yes. We appealed actually. _ 

12 Q How was that done? 

13 A As I recall, it was done in^^^^^^Bconununications. 

14 It is possible, however, and I don't know, it is possible 

15 that — because sometimes communications came via Secord. 

16 He had his little radio. So some of the appeal might have 

17 gone through those channels, or^^^^^^^^^Hmight have talked 

18 to Secord and said, "Look, we cem probably get this done if 

19 you do it this way" and — but I don't really recall. We 

20 did appeal, I appealed personally the tone of the note and 

21 substance of the note. I thought we were throwing away an 

22 opportunity to get it done if they really wanted it done. 

23 Q You testified that you were instructed not to 

24 communicate through State Department channelsS at the outset, 
is that correct? 



^liit^sij^ftr- 



309 








43 
^. ....,-, 

1 A That is correct. 

2 Q So your personal appeal was directed, to the best 

3 of your recollection, either through CIA channels or through 

4 Secord's communication device, is that correct? 

5 A That is correct. 

6 Q Who would that >iave been directed to, CIA Headquart- 

7 ers? 

8 A Yes, CIA Headquarters. Whoever was — actually, 
it was to the NSC as far as we were concerned. The in- 

10 structions that came outj^^^^^^^^^^^^were this a NSC 

f1 operation, or the NSC asks that you or instructs that you do 

12 the following, as I recall the opening telegram. So all of 

13 this was we were working for Admiral Poindexter as far as 

14 we were concerned. 

15 Q So under those circumstances, I gather, it would 
1g have been inappropriate for you to have appe<Lled to the 

17 Secretary of Stata, ia thakt correct? 

1g A Yaa. My aaao^tion at that poiixf would have been 

19 the Secretary of State, although aware of the operation, was 

20 not aware of the details at this point. Tiae was running 
out. It wouldn't have been a reasonable thing to try to do. 

Q Now, let me just ask a couple more questions. You 
testified you never met Secord, is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q So, therefore, your knowledge of this communications 




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44 



^^^^^^^^1, is that correct? 
A That is right. 

Q I gather, then, you were;^elying upon his representa- 
tion this was a Secord communications device, is that correct? 
A That is correct. The only reason that — I mean, 
land I became aware almost inad- 



we bec'Tie aware,! 
vertently Secord had his own communications device because 
he was able to get things out of Washington we subsequently 
got through CIA channels. He would be on the telephone 
saying such and such is happening. 

Q I take it there were points in this operation 
where Secord was, as they say in the CIA, waiting in advance 
you and^^^^^^^^^^K is that 

A I think that was the case most of the time. In 
retrospect. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I think that is all I have. Thank 
you, sir. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 10:32 a.m., the committees were 
adjourned subject to the call of the chair.) 



-T^i>^ilgiiiT 



311 



*y«- 1^ y 



DEPOSITION O^jBBm^BI 

2 Wednesday, August 12, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Comnittee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. ■ 
Deposition °'B^^^^^^^H^H| called as a 

9 witness by counsel for the Select Comnittee, in the 

10 offices of the Senate Select Coaaittee, rooB-SH-901, Hart 

11 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C, conmencing at 

12 6:04 p. a., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL 

13 ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of 

14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask 

15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her 

16 direction. 




Partially Oeclassrfied/Released nn I "> J A«^ ™ 
unflef provisions ot E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 



mlJ. 



JM^ 



\mttis® 



A 



(~Ni /tA«ll 



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1 APPEAIUUrCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senata Selact Conunlttea on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 TIMOTHY WOODCOCK, ESQ. 

6 HANK FLYHN 

7 On behalf of the House Select Coomittee to 

8 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

9 PAMELA NAUGHTON, ESQ. 

10 ROBERT GENZMAN, ESQ. 

11 ROBERT BERMINGHAM 

12 On behalf of the witness: 

13 DAVID P. SCHIPPERS, ESQ. 

14 David P. Schippers 6 Associates, Chartered 

15 79 West Monroe Street 

16 Chicago, Illinois 60603 



UHWSSlHtB 



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ilLKSIFiEi) 



CONTfMjc 
2""" — -— ^- 



3 WITNES.'^ 

4 



6 

7 

8 

9 

10 



EXAMINATTON OW RF»:ir 
£EM1E HOUSj 



5 By Ms. Naughton 

By Mr. Woodcock 30 

By Mr. G«nzinan 

By Ms. Naughton 

By Mr. G«n2Ban 

By Ms. Naughton 
^^ By Mr. Woodcock 

^2 By Ma. Naughton 

^^ By Mr. Woodcock 

^* By Ms. Naughton 

^5 By Mr. Woodcock 

^* By Ms. Naughton 

^^ By Mr. Woodcock 

^8 By Ma. Naughton 

^3 By Mr. Ganzaan 

20 By Ms. Naughton 

21 By Mr. Ganzman 

22 By Ms. Naughton 

2 3 By Mr. Woodcock 114 

24 By Ms. Naughton 



62 



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1 EXHIBITS 

2 ^^^pIXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

3 1 27 



UNetASSIFlEO 



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mumm 




1 PROCEEDTWGS 

2 Whereupon , 

4 called as a witna«« by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

9 Q Could you state your name for the record, 

10 please? 

11 A 
Q ^^^^^^^Hfor the record, my name is Pamela 

13 Naughton. I'm staff counsel with the House Select 

14 Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 

15 Iran. 

^* I' your counsel would please introduce himself 

17 for the record. 

^8 MR. SCHIPPESS: My name is David P. Schippers, 

19 and I am counsel for^^^^^^Hfrom Chicago, Illinois. 

20 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

21 Q Mr. Genzman has joined us from the House 

22 Committee, as well as Mr. Bermingham, and then from the 

23 Senate Mr. Woodcock and Mr. Plynn. We will all be 

24 jumping in with questions during the deposition, but feel 

25 free at any time to consult with your attorney or to ask 



UNCKSSIP" 



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for a break or to ask for clarification of any questions 
that aren't clear to you. 

Let's get started with just a few background 
questions. When did you join the Drug Enforcement 
Administration? 




When I arrived in country I was assigned to 



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Q Nov, do you ]cnov a man named Ed Hlckey? 

A Y*S. 

Q Could you tall us who Ed Hlckay is? 

X Nov he's ths Chairman of th« Fsdsral Maritime 
Commission. ^. -/'• v. 

Q And during the pmr±a±' aC JtlaaasY 1985 what was 
his position? 

A He was Assistant to the President of the 
United States. I forget his exact title. It was 
something like Military and something else Affairs. 

Q And did you know Mr. Hickey? 

A Yes. 

Q Hov did you knov Mr. Hickey? 

A He's been a friend of my family — my brother, 
myself, my father — for 20 years. 




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iH« was with tha Stat* Department, 
regional security officer, I think. 

Q Now, how did the subject of the hostages held 
in Lebanon first come up between yourself and Mr. Hickey? 

A In the latter part of January 1985 he called 
me at home over a weekend and said do I Icnow if DEA has 
any sources of information in Lebanon, 

I said I didn't know 

I don't 

have anything really to do with i^, botrl would check and 
find out. 

Q Is this the first conversation you had with 
him regarding the hosteges? 

X y«s. 

Q Did he say why h« was calling? 

A He didn't even say because of the hostages at 
this first telephone call. He said does DEA have any 
sources in Lebanon^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H because 
aware a lot of drugs were running out of there. 

Q Did you get the impression he was calling at 
his own behest or that someone had asked him to check 
this out? 

A I think it was at his own behest. He would 



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call. I D«an, I would talk to him just about avery 
weekend, at least once, personally — you know, 
friendship-wise. 

Q Did you then try to find out whether or not 
DEA had any sources 
A Yes. 

And what did you find out? 
Z found out that we did. 
Where did you go to find out? 
Tol 

Why did you go 

Because I knew ^^^Hf air- aenrvrml. y«aza . I 
knew he had worked ^^^^^^^^H Z knenrh*: had numerous 
sources of informants or sources of in formati on. And I 
asked around and somebody told me that^^^^fprobably 
would be the best guy to talk to, and he was running our 

I at that time. He was the 
_^__^_^ If he didn't know, then 
ha would know who knew. ^^^^^^^^^ 

Q And what did^^^^^^^^Htell you when you 
asked him (Jaout the sources? 

A He said we have some sources. He says, Z 
personally have some sources, but, you know, I'm not 
going to give them up just on a whim. Find out what they 
want, what these people want. 





UNCroiHED 



320 



Ui^eWHED 



10 



1 Q What was th« naxt step? 

2 A I callad Hickay and mada an appolntnant to sea 

3 him tha naxt day or a Monday or Tuasday. I think it was 

4 a waakand whan ha called ma first, so Z called him and 

5 mada an appointment to see him. 

Q And you tak^^^^^^^^^fwith 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q Nov, when you met with Mr. Hickey, was this 

9 early January of '85, late January? 

10 A Late January. 

11 Q Has anyone els* m!t:ttm..mmKt±at other than the 

12 three of you? 

13 A General Matthew Cof field. X think he was a 

14 Colonel then, full Colonel. He later became a general. 

15 Q Do you know why he was there? 

16 A He's Hickey 's aide, his military aide. 

17 Q But do you know why he was there? 

18 A No. I assumed that he was everywhere Hickey 

19 vent, because every time I saw Hickey I saw him, except 

20 at a party or something like that. 

21 Q And did Hickey explain why ha wanted to know 

22 if you had sources? 

23 A At this meeting he did. 

24 Q What did he tell you? 

25 A He said — well, it started out like you're 



IJNMOTED 



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11 



1 awara that there are several Americans being held hostage 
Lebanon |^^^^^^|[^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^^ we re 

3 exactly sure where, that he was working on two 

4 committees, I believe, on what was called the HLTF, the 

5 Hostage Location Task Force, and then there was another 

6 one, the TWIG Committee — the Terrorist Working Incident 

7 Group • 

8 And there was one hostaga they were very much 

9 interested in, and that was Buckley, and he told me that 

10 Buckley was then — 

11 KR. SCHIPPERS: Can I interrupt for a second? 

12 At this point there was some conversation about Mr. 

13 Buckley that is extremely sensitive. Are you aware of 

14 what they were talking about? 

15 MS. NAUGHTON: Yes. 

16 MR. SCHIPPERS: Do you want him to go into the 

17 conversation? 

18 MS. NAUGHTON: He should. The deposition is 

19 classified Top Secret. 

20 MR. SCHIPPERS: Because apparently Mr. Hickey 

21 vent into very great detail. 

22 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

23 Q Please tell us what Hickey told you about 

24 Buckley. 

25 A He said that Buckley was an old friend of his, 



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mM\B 




■that CIA was not having any 
success in locating any of these people over there and 
that they were trying everything. 

They want to try every way possible to confirm 
the guy's existence, to find out whether he's being 



tortured, 


to find out where he's being held^^^^HHBH 






A He had wor ked with Buck ley. 

^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ But guess 
ny question is did you get the sense that this was his 
concern because Buckley was his friendl 

or was this the CIA's concern? 

A I was under the impression that he, being co- 
chairman of these conaittees — I know he was co-chairman 
of one; I don't know about the other one — that it was 
the committees' concern, not any Individual's concern. — 
that it was the committees' concern, and because I'm a 



IKlfiSSinEO 



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friend of his he just happened to try to call me in 
personally because he ]cnows I wouldn't really go talking 
in front of some committee or something. 

I mean, it was on a more personal basis at 
this point. It later became professional, but, I mean, 
this was more personal. 

Q What was personal? 

A His asking me. I mean, he could have called 
John Lawn or Bud Mullens, but I don't think he knew them. 

What did^^^^^^^Ethen Mickey 
about the sources that he had in Lebanon? 

A Well, he said we have one very, very reliable 
sourde 




he balievad at that time that 
he would be aore than willing to help the United States 
in any way. 

Q Has there any discussion of how this was going 
to happen, how you were going to structure this? 

A At this time all he wanted to know was if we 
could find th« location. 

Q What was. the next step? 

A The next step after the meeting? 



"'DNfihtSSIHED 



324 



lonssro 



14 




1 A We went back to headquarters. 

2 and briefed Frank Monestero, I believe - 
who was ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand they 

4 went up and briefed Monestero, Frank Monestero. 

5 MR. SCHIPPERS: May I have a second? 

6 (Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

7 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

8 Q Were you there for that briefing? 

9 A No. 

10 Q Did you hear later what their reaction was? 

11 A They were very favorablA. .Thay were actually 

12 proud that the White House would thinlc ta ask DEA. 

13 Q What's the next thing that happened? 

14 A I don't follow. The next thing that happened? 

15 ^^^^Hbaae downstairs and told me that they can do It and 

16 Monestero was going to set up a special fund for us, the 

17 SEO. 

18 Q And this was account 471? 

19 A Right. 

20 Q Do you know how much money was put In the 

21 account? 

22 A I think around $50,000. Zt might have been 

23 $30,000 to Start with. 

24 Q Have you since had a chance to look at the 

25 records? 



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A No. 

Q w«r« you told how much money was put in the 
fund? 

A I probably was. I thought it was $30,000 for 
PI and $2 0,000 for travel, but I'm not sure. 

Q When you say PI, what do you mean? 

A Purchase of information. 

Q This is to pay sources for information? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you then begin to work the sources? 

A Well, I called Hickey and told him that 
Monestero and everybody, they're setting up a special 
thing, a special fund, and we were going to be taking off 
pretty soon to go up to^ New_YoT k and talk to the source 
and probably go|HH^|H||^H|to meet some the sub- 
sources . 

Q Did Hickey volunteer to coordinate with any 
other agencies or to smooth things along? 

A At this time he just said let me know. 

Q Now, who else knew about the 471 account other 
than^l^^^^^^Band Mr. Monestero, yourself and^HI 




A ' Westrate. I'm sure — I don't know for a fact 
— that Mr. Lawn and Mr. Mullens know through Abraham 
Azzam, who they stipulated be in charge. 
PPi 




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UNCLASSIFIED 



16 



Q When was that decided, that he would be in 
charge? 

A When we told Monestero or Westrate, one or the 
other, that we were going toj 

Q Now your first trip was when? 
A Around, I think, the first week of February, 
February 1, February 2 — something like that. 
Q Vou went to New Vo^? 

We went to New Yc>rk first. I net a source. 
Now this source — what we've been doing with 
lis numbering the souroeA. 
Source 1. 
Source 1. So that vm*v» rwTking- about the 





York? 



Does his name start wit 

First name. 

And who went with you on this trip to New 

Myself andl 
id what did the source tell you? 

[had already briefed him on the telephone 



And wh 

m 

la^lread 



and he had^lready made some calls and he had arranged 



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KUSSW 



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for his main sub-source to meet us ^^^^^^^^^^H that 
following week. This was on like a Thursday or Friday or 
something. 

Q Is this the first you had ever met that 
source? 

A Yes. 

Q Has ha paid any money that first week in 
February in New York? 

A I would have to say we gave him expense money 
for flying ^<3^^^^^^^|^ I don't know how much we gave 
him. He has vouchers. You have copies of all that stuff 
that Hoffman gave you. I believe he would have signed 
for that because that was DEA money. 

Q We have a voucher that indicates a source was 
paid $1,C00 on January 31 of '85. Woulil that be it? 

A No. That was a different, sourc*. 

Q Okay. VRiich source was paid $1,000 on January 
31, 1985? 

A I don't think that's the one. This was a 
different source. This was not the one that we were 
masting in New York, although wa did pay him in New York. 
This was a source from ^B^^^^^^^H another person. 

ha believed that he may be able 
to help us. Can I 6aa the number? Does he have an 




access number? 



yNMSlFlED 



328 



UNCLASSIFIED 



18 



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Q What I have her« is a synopsis that the 
Conunlttea prepared. I don't have the actual voucher. 

A I mean, we wouldn't have given S ourc e 1 $1,000 
because air fare to^^^^^^^^Hand back is 
something. So I believe — I know somebody has these 
vouchers, the 103s we call them, but I believe this is a 
source ^^^ 

Q That source fron^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas also paid 
on February 7 $3,500; is that correct? 

A We paid him the $1,000 just to fly hia to New 
York and then fly back ^^^^^^Msecause he had to prepare 
himself to go over there and he had to buy some things, 
and then we gave him more money when he actually flew t^o 
He met his control agent, so to speak, 

|who was actually handling him. 

Zi 

Yee. And then he went on tc 
Is this source, then, connected at all with 
Source 1? 

A No. This source, he did that and that's all 
he did. He came out. He took a few pictures and said I 
can't do. it. I can't help you. 

Q So he mad e the one trip tc 
A To meet 



flew to 

■ 





And he did go in 



DNCUSSIFIEO 



329 





19 

1 A Yes. Ha came out with some information but it 

2 wasn't very useful. He rather fancied himself to be the 

3 James Bond type and he was taking covert snapshots and 

4 everything of thd poppy fields and everything and 

5 actually, although we were always interested in narcotics 

6 throughout this whole affair, it wasn't exactly what we 

7 were expecting from him. 

8 Q We have indicated here that you paid him 

9 $1,000 in January. ^^^^^^^^Hpaid him $3,500 in 

10 February. 

11 A That was all out of the SEO. I called 

12 and told him to give him the money and get a 103 and s^nd 

13 it. 

14 Q This is all from the 471 account? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q And $1,000 was paid 

17 A He probably hit ^^^^^V°J^ aam« more money. 

18 Q Do you know whether or' not be was paid any 

19 Bore money? 

20 A No. I never paid him any more money. 

21 Q Okay. And then I guess we get to Source 1, 

22 whom you met in New York, and you recall paying him some 

23 money. 

24 A Yeah. I would say we probably gave him $5,000 

25 or $10,000. I don't know how much money we gave him to 




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UiUSSIFIED 



20 




start with for his trip with us tol 

ha had to fly his sub-sourca out ot/[ 

You )cnow, that would all ba on tha racord. Hoffman gava 

away copies of these 103s to everybody except to OEA 

agents . 

Q Nov, at any rata, in New York was it decided 

that tha source would make a trip into the Middle East 

and sea what ha could do? 

A No. First of all, wa want toj 

Q And what was tha purpose of going to 



To meet his sub-source so va could debrief 



him. 




Nov, can you tall us — I gather you went to 
[sometime around — 
A The first week of February. 
Q Around February 6 or so? 

A No. If wa met Hickay, it was tha first week 
in February, I believe, because we were back. All this 
comas from my 1012s, so if it was February 1, the 31st we 
left to go and then we went to New York. Tha first we 
went to^^^^^^^^Hand the fourth wa ware back. 




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UtKl^SIFIED 



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Q And with whom did you meet? Where did you go 




We didn't stay 



\ 

Q Any other cities? 

A Well, we landec 
there; we just transited. 

Q And in^^^^H^^° ^^' part of this meeting? 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H picked us 
up. Azzam was there, ^^^^^Bt^^^Bliras there. 

Q And^^^^^^l isf 



A He was then, yes. 

Q Anybody else? 

A The sub-source, myself ,^^^^^Band Source 1. 

Q And what was the gist of that meeting? 



Well, Azzam was already over there 





He didn't have the slightest idea what we were taPcing 
about. ^^^^V.idn't have the slightest idea. I^^^^H 
didn't have the slightest idea. They were just told to 

be there ^i^^Hh 

So we outlined first of all to them what we 
were going to try to do and everybody agreed that we 
could probably do something, if just intelligence-wise. 
Then we outlined more or less to our sub-source — I mean 



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Sourc* 1 and his sub-source what we were trying to do, 
although Source 1 was pretty much aware. He wanted to 
talk to his sub-source first and run things by him. 




Q We've been referring to him as 2, what you 
refer to as the sub-source. 

Give us the conclusion of this meeting. In 
other words, were the sources tasked to do anything? 
A Um-huB. 
Q Vfhat's that? 

A Well, everybody was enthusiastic about it. 
Everybody was kind of happy that we were doing this kind 
of thing, and it would also enhance our drug operation in 
the Middle East. And Azzam was all for it. Although 
really had not much to do with it, being in 

but he would help in any way he could. And 
fas very enthusiastic about it, although he was 
only'^e number two guy over there ir 

The sub-source — well. Source 1 and 2 were 
all very enthusiastic and they both, when they departed, 
when we left, I think they stayed mayb e one more day in 
land both sources went into 





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Q What were they to do? 

A Try to find out any information they could 
regarding the hostages, any infomation, and try to 
recruit other sources if they could. 

Q Did you )cnow at this point that, Azzam, was part 
of the Hostage Location Task Force? 

A He wasn't. 

Q When was he assigned to that, to your 
knowledge? 

A I speculate. He met with — I think he met 
with Hickey once, I think he said. No. It's after this. 
It's much after this. I mean, it's not going to be in 
chronological order here. Azzamj, when he came back from 
his trip ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hm he to 
Hickey, so he did, and Hickey showed us a memorandum 
saying that the FBI, State Department Security, State 
Department terrorist people, and DEA and whatever other 
agancles all should have at least one representative — 
CIA and HSA and DIA — they all should have one 
representative . 

We didn't have a representative at that time, 
so Azzam appointed himself to be the DEA representative. 
That wasn't now, I don't think. I'm positive it was 



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later on. 



Q Whan did you next meet with the source after 
he had come back, or speak to the source? 

A In the latter part of February. 

Q Was that in New York City? 

A Yes. Myself ,^^^^^HandfAzzaa. 

Q AMd what did the source tell you? 

A He said the whole thing looks feasible but it 
was going to take a lot of time, a long time and a lot of 
money . 

Q Take a lot of money to do what? 




Q Is this the first time that an actual plan to 
bribe ^^^^^^^^^1 came to 

A No. 

Q When did that first come in your minds as a 
possible plan? 

A Well, when we first talked to the source. He 
•aid the only way you can get anything over there was 
through money. They're not going to do you any favors. 
And we were very aware of that anyway. 

And ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^H that be 
be^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bin Lebanon? 




TOP SECRET 



UNCIASSIHED 



335 



UNCLASSIFIED 



25 



1 Q And what was their connection to the captors 

2 of the hostages? 

3 MR. SCHIPPERS: You mean what did they know at 

4 this time? 

5 THE WITNESS: We didn't )cnow what their 

6 connection would be. They would probably put — for the 

7 right amount of money, they would probably put the 

8 source, introduce him to somebody — • I don't Icnov — to 

9 somebody else who would want more money, and that guy 

10 would probably introduce him to another who would want 

11 money. I don't )cnow. The idea wa« to.get to the right 

12 people that had enough inf lusncv ta vt: laast locate — at 

13 this time we were still trying to loca^* — them. 

14 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) n^,.^* 

15 Q Now on 6 February ^H^^^^^Hpa id $5,000 to 

16 the source. 

17 MR. SCHIPPERS: Source 1? 

18 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

19 Q Hell, that's what I'm asking — Source 1, and 

20 h« did that with your knowledge? 

21 A Um-hum. We probably told him to. 

22 Q When you met in Hew York did you pay the 

23 source? 

24 A The one in late February? I don't believe we 

25 did. 



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ICtASSIFIED 



26 



I hav* a note hera on 2/25/65 that you paid a 
source $3,000. 

A In New York? 

Q It doesn't say. 

A I think we gave one of^Azzam's sources — if i 
reaember correctly, we gave one of his sources. He had 
this jerk^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwho he was 
going to help, and the guy was a waste of time. All he 
wanted was a trip to Lebanon. 




Q And when did you meet witlr hia? 

A I Bet him at^^^^^Hbffice. I never talked 
to the guy. All I did was Azzam said give him $3,000. I 
gave him $3,000. He signed a 103. There's a 103 in 
there because we gave — this is still OEA money. 

Q Do you know when this was? 

A That's the only time I remember giving anybody 
$3,000, so it must be this guy. But there's a 103 for 
that. That's the only one I can think of. 

Q There's also an indication that on February 28 
you paid $2,000 to a source. 

A February 28? 

Q Yes. Would that be the source whom you met in 
New York? 

A I don't know. I don't remember. I'd have to 



'I 



fflmiED 



337 



)imm\m 



27 



1 9«« thoa* vouchers. I mean, they will Identify 

2 everything. They give the number, the informant code 

3 number. 

4 Q Let's put it this way. For the period of time 

5 for which DEA was actually financing the money to pay 

6 sources, every time you paid a source did you get a 

7 voucher, fill out a voucher and get a receipt? 

8 A Correct . 

9 Q So there's no time at which you did not do 

10 that? 

11 A Not when we were using SEO 471 money, no. 

12 Q Let's ask the same question, then, of the CIA 

13 money. I'm jumping ahead, but so that we can get the 

14 money straight. Of the CIA appropriated money that was 

15 spent, did you receipt that money? 

16 A No. I mean, I had to give them a receipt for 

17 the money, but they didn't ask for anything. They knew 

18 what we were going to do with it anyway and they never 

19 asked for it. 

20 Q So when you paid sources from the CIA money 

21 did you get any sort of receipt or fill out any paperwork 

22 to indicate what source had been paid and how much and 

23 what date? 

24 A No. 

25 Q The CIA never asked for that? 



ymssiFiED 



338 



ySiWSIFIED 



28 



1 A No, not that I remember. 

2 Q If we could have that marked as^^^^^xhibit 

3 Number 1. 

4 (The document referred to was 

5 marked ^^^^H:xhlbit Number 1 

6 for identification.) 

7 I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit 

8 1, which appears to be a receipt you signed froa funds 

9 provided by the CIX. Do you recall signing that? Is 

10 that your signature? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q And it indicates that you acknowledge 

13 receiving $50,000; is that correct? 

14 A Correct. 

15 Q And that's on March 18? 

16 A Correct. 

17 Q How did it cone about that the CIA was giving 

18 you this money? 

19 A , Az 2 am arranged it. Actually, in March, I 

20 b«liev«, shortly before this, we took the CIA officer 

21 here and another retired CIA officer, who was introduced 

22 to him — I knew him^^^^^^^Hbut he had been retired, 

23 but he was introduced to me as a Middle East expert — 

24 Q Is that 

25 A Yes. 



ONetASSIflED 



339 



mwssro 



29 



1 Q And who was t h« other offlcar? 

2 A 

3 Q And th«y accompanied you to N«w York? 

4 A No . ^^^^Band I w«nt to New York and they met 

5 us up there. 

6 Q And what did the four of you do in New York? 

7 A This isn't the same time frame, my lawyer 

8 indicates. He says — we were reconstructing this 

9 yesterday and the day before yesterday — that I got the 

10 money, the $50,000, Z signed for the $50,000 before we 

11 went to New York. 

12 Then we went to New York, introduced 

13 anc^^^Hto Source and^^^Bbriefed him. 

14 Q So they only met with Source 1? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q vnien you got the $50,000, was it in cash? 

17 A Yea. 

18 Q What did you physically do with it? 

19 A Brought it back to the office and put it in 

20 the safe. 

21 Q In your office? /^/tfT 
A No, in^^^^B<=>'^^<:** 

23 Q 

24 A Yes. 

25 Q Did you take it to New York with you? 




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UNCLASSIFiED 



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with ui 



March? 



26. 



A Ho, not all of it. I believe we took $20,000 
as. 

Q And did you pay that $20,000 to the source? 

A Yes. 

Q And that would have been sometime in later 
? 

A Right, the middle of March sometime. 

Q I've got you in New York City March 19 through 



A That comes off my vouchers, so it would have 
been that time frame. 

Q And what was this $20,000 for? 

A It was for the expenses of the source, his 
sub-sources, travel for him and his sub-sources, and 
bribes to certain people in Lebanon. 

Q So this money was for prospective work that he 
was to do? 

A Yes. 

Q How, did you discuss with elthei 

[their opinion of the source? 

A Yes. 

Q And what was their opinion of the source? 

A Very high. 

Q How do you know that? 

A Because they said this is one of the best and 



mmmm 



341 



UNElftSSIFIED 



31 



1 moat Intalllgant parsons ragardlng tha Mlddla East that 

2 wa'va talkad to in qulta a whlla. 

3 Q Did you avar saa any raporta that thay had 

4 wrlttan of thia maating? 

5 A No. 

6 Q Did you coma to laam that latar on thay had 

7 raportad in lasa glowing tarms? 

Aftar va an argumant^^^^^^n/hara^^^H 

9 got avarything bac)cwards, that's whan wa said wa didn't 

10 avan want to work with him anymora if that was tha way ha 

11 was going to raport things. 

Q ^^^^^Htha naxt big avant? 

13 A Yaah, Z guass it is. 

14 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

15 Q Bafora wa go^^^^^^HLat ma just ask a coupla 

16 of quaations on tha $50,000. Y^u racaivad tha $50,000, 

17 according to your tastimony, in March 1985. 

18 A That's what Z atatad. 

19 Q And who gava you tha $50,000? 

A I^^HV 

21 Q ^^^^^Vhiaaalf gava you tha $50,000. Did ha 

22 giva you any instructions as to what kind of raport ing 

23 raquiramant you would hava to maka back to CZA as to tha 

24 disposition of tha $50,000? 

25 A No. 



l)N§liS$IFI£D 



342 



UNtUSSIFIED 



32 



1 Q Now l«t ma ask you this. This exhibit which 

2 has bean narked^^^^HExhibit 1 reads as follows: "I 

3 hereby acknowledge receipt of $50,000 from** — and the 

4 CIA officer's name is blanked out — "in support of a 

5 joint sensitive operation. Said amount will be accounted 

6 for in full upon completion of approved activity." 

7 Now, what did you understand that sentence, 

8 that latter sentence, to mean — the one that said you 

9 would have to make an accounting in full upon completion 

10 of the approved activity? 

11 A I don't really remember. I mean, ha knew, 

12 through Azzam, what we were going to do with the money 

13 anyways. So Z mean, I guess we told him we gave it to 

14 Source 1, the guy you met in New York. 

15 Q But I gather you and he did not discuss this 

16 latter sentence here as to what it meant; is that 

17 correct? 

18 A No. I just went out there to pick up the 

19 money. Azzaa had made the arrangements. 

20 Q And you signed Exhibit 1 while you were out 

21 there? 

22 A Right. 

23 Q And this sentence is in Exhibit 1? 

24 A Well, I can't remember what their reporting 

25 requirements were, if thev wanted something in writing or 



were, if they wanted som* 

UNeti^iriED 



343 



icLissra 



33 



1 not. I don't remember giving them anything in writing 

2 that we gave the money to anybody. 

3 Q Do you recall the subject coming up at all? 

4 A No. I don't remember it, no. 

5 Q And when you signed this you don't recall 

6 saying hey, this thing says I'm going to be accounting in 

7 full for this; what does that mean? 

8 A I didn't say that. 

9 Q You don't recall that. Okay. 

10 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

11 Q Between the meeting, then, in New York City 

12 around the third week in Ma rch until the meeting ^^^^^^H 
^ — was there any 

14 A There was always a lot of activity. It was 

15 usually on the telephone, meeting with Hickey, talking 

16 with him, getting calls from Lebanon, making calls to 

17 Lebanon, looking through some files trying to find some 

18 other infomants, some other source* — that kind of 

19 stuff. But there wasn't much we could actually do 

20 physically until the one source came out. 

21 MR. SCHIPPERS: May I have just a moment? 

22 (Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

23 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

24 Q My records indicate that then, in April, /)^£a)T 2. 

25 around the 17th or 18th, of '85 you and^^^^^^^Hwent , 



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UNCUSflM 



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met with the source. He 
we had made arrangements 



I guess, t^ 

A 
was coming back from 
before we left to 

Q And did you all get together with the source? 

A Yes. 

Q And when was that? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^Aind him^l^^^^^^Knd 
the source, ^^^^pnd myself fl 

Q And you met with 

A Yes. 

Q Was anyone else there from the CIA? 

A Not that I know of, but there probably was. 

Q What did your source have to say? 





it would take a large sum of money 
do it for each individual that they could even obtain or 



iir^nilsmED 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



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attempt to obtain. There is no guarantee of anything 
over there. 

Q When did the subject of bona fides come up? 

A Later. No, we always asked. Anything you can 

get us 




I That's the 
first thing we ever asked for, to verify. 

If these people say they can do it, they 
should be at least close enough to try to do that. 

Q But at this meeting, then^^^^^^^Rwas the 
source specifically asked to go back and get that type of 
evidence? 

A At this meeting? I don't think so. I mean, 
he was always willing to. I don't think we said — every 
tiae he went in there we asked him for this, so I don't 
know if that specifically came up on this. I mean, if he 
had come out with a piece of paper or something it would 
have been better because the CIA, you know, they're 
skeptical . 

I don't remember it coming up specifically. 



iJNetASSIflED 



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Q How did you leave it with the source, then, as 
this time^^^^^^H 

A ^^^^^Bgot all excited because he thought that 
it was the source's idea to pay large sums of money, and 
that's the way he had it in his head and he couldn't get 
it out of his head. So the source — I think the source 
decided to sta^^^^^^^^B and see what our decision was 
once^^^^^Bme and^^^Hwent back to the States and had a 
meeting with the people more important than^^^Hbecause 
I think^^^Hwas getti ng on people's ne rves at the time 

he came of ^^^^^^^^^^^^Bthere and said 
what the hell am Z doing here. I don't even like this. 

I said, well, we're supposed to meet you here 
and you're supposed to debrief the guy. He, I don't 
think, liked the source, and the source didn't like him. 
Let's put it that way. There was a mutual disagreement. 

Q When he said he didn't know what he was doing 
there, did h* say that he hadn't been — 

A I think he meant it as a joke, and the source 
had just come out B^^^^^^H and he's a very serious 
person. 

Q Waa^^^^^l concern that the source himself was 
trying to get money by virtue of this operation or that 
the source was going to be stung by his contacts to try 



to get money? 



IMSSIFIEO 



347 



miumm 



37 

1 A No. I think it waa^^^^H concern that the 

2 source was making his own deals with these people without 

3 getting prior approval, that that was wrong. That was 

4 not what t he so urce had told his. The source had told 

5 hia — and^^^^Band I were sitting right there — the 

6 source had told him these people told me, not I told the 

7 people, and^^^Hwent back and reported that he told the 

8 people he could get a lot of money if we can get these 

9 people. 

10 It was not ever that way, and we ha d a big 

11 argument w hen we got back over at Langley with] 
boss , ^^^^^Hand^^^^Vand some other people — his and 

13 some other people. 

14 Q How did you know that that's whatH^Hhad 

15 reported back to the CIA? 

16 A Because when we got into the meeting they 

17 asked him to repeat what he had told everybody else, and 

18 ■•, Azzaa.ant^^^^^Bre sitting there. 

19 Q And this meeting, then, was sometime in late 

20 April? 

21 A Yeah. 

22 Q At this point you've now got $30,000 left, 

23 right, from the CIA monies? 

24 A Um-hum. 

25 Q Has there any discussion of holding off on any 



llNf!fat?inFn 



348 



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38 



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Bor* paymants or what to do with thosa monies? 

A No. Ones we explained it to^^^^^landj 
and^^^^^H— and there was a couple other people in 
there, I don't ]cnow who all — they were enthusiastic. 

Q So they wanted to go forward? 

A Yeah. We had given them a lot of 
intelligence, so to speaK, that the source brought out 
with him — you ]cnov, nanae and areas and things like 
that. 

Q After that meeting then did you get baclc to 
your source and tell him that you had a green light to go 
forward? 

A Yeah, I guess. I'm sure we did. 

Q What's the next event, then, that happened? 

A I don't think the source ever came back to the 
United States on that trip. I think he had stayed in 
id he was recruiting some people, 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ He was 
talking with some of them, I 




So he would stay there and do most of his 
calling in and out until we wanted him to go back or 
until he thought it was necessary for him to go back. 




349 



yNClMiEO 



39 



1 Q Your records indicata that you were in New 

2 York City on May 4 of '85. They also indicate that you 

3 paid a source $10,000 on that day. Now this is DEA 

4 Bonies from Account 471. Has that paid to Source 1? 
5^ A I guess it was. I'd have to see those 

'6 vouchers. I don't have that in ny chronology, that Z 

7 gave anybody $10,000. May 4? 

8 Q Yes. 

9 A I was there myself? Wa8^^^H|with oe? 

10 Q We only have you listed on May 4. 

11 A If I was in New York, I didn't pay any source 

12 in that period of tine DEA money except Source 1, I 

13 believe. 

14 Q Is there any specific reason why you would use 

15 DEA money for that payment as opposed to the CIA money 

16 that you had available? 

17 A Has it DEA money? 

18 Q Yes, it was from 471. 

19 A No, I can't answer that, really, honestly. 

20 Q I had one other question. I don't know what 

21 time frame to put on it. I'll just ask you in general. 

22 Did you have some sort of contact or something to do with 

23 the fire department in New York City? 

24 A Me? 

25 MR. BERMINGHAM: Taxis to FD. That might not 

II 



350 



r^i 



SSIFIED 



pi>si^i3t^iririi 40 



1 b« fir« department. Federal District Court? 

2 THE WITNESS: Federal District Court. 

3 MR. BERMINGHAM: Would you normally have put 

4 FD down on your expense account? 

5 MR. SCHIPPERS: May we have a second? 

6 (Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

7 THE WITNESS: No. It would say more than 

8 that. Is that off my 1012? 

9 MR. BERMINGHAM: Yes. 

10 THE WITNESS: On the voucher, taxi to FD? 

11 MR. BERMINGHAM: It Bight have said fire 

12 department. 

13 THE WITNESS: I've never had anything to do 

14 with the fire department. BrooJclyn. That's Federal 

15 District Court, then. 

16 MR. BERMINGHAM: In connection with this 

17 operation would you have been going to the District 

18 Court? 

19 THE WITNESS: In Brooklyn, yeah. 

20 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

21 Q Actually, this was in April of '86 — I mean 

22 March of '86, March 20-21, '86. And we've got New yor)c, 

23 FD, regarding — and it from this account, 471. But a 
notation ^^^^^^^^^^^| 

25 A April of '86, was that when 



NetmiFlEO 



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Q What' 

A 

Q It's a drug oparatlon? 

A Yas. 

Q And did it concam son* of th« people] 




A (Nods In the affirmative.) And It concerns 
the hostage thing, too. 
Q Rlgh^_ 

A ^^^^^fevas reporting narcotic information that 
ve were getting from all our sources over there under 




He were also 

Interested in narcotics. We can't neglect that. Just 
because we're doing one thing, we're still narcotics 
agents first, once and above all. 

Q Than is the money you gave them from the 471 
account or froa another narcotics-related account? 

A Narcotlcs-relatedl 



I'm sorry. We got a little off-track. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Can I ^larlfy a point, please? 

imr" "" 



iSMSaRB 



352 



lEiftSSlflED 



42 



1 Th« 510,000 to a source out of 471, was that in May of 

2 1985 or in May of 1986? 

3 MS. NAUGHTON: May 4, '85. 

4 MR. SCHIPPERS: So we'r* talking about two 

5 different things here? 

6 MS. NAUGHTON: I skipped ahead to the New York 

7 stuff. 

8 THE WITNESS: FD. I'll have to think about 

9 that. If I saw the 1012, I could tell you what it is 

10 right away. 

11 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resualng) 

12 Q Was your testimony, th^, that you didn't 

13 recall paying the $10,000 on May 4, '85? 

14 A I don't recall that. I 'a sure I could 

15 document it, because if it's SEO 471 money there is a 

16 voucher. If I did it, I did it. I made a lot of 

17 payments over the last two years, and I just don't 

18 remember that one specifically. I've tried to put some 

19 half-jointed chronology together here just going from 

20 wbat^^^^|and I can remember off our records and our 

21 1012s and our 3528 and things like that, and from tickets 

22 and stuff we had left. 

23 And I just don't remember that. 

24 Q DO you recall, then, on May 4 of '85 what you 

25 went to New York City for? 



ifflssife 



353 



liWSSlflll) 



43 



1 A That's the thing. That's th« reason — 

2 MR. SCHIPPERS: May I once again clarify 

3 something? Is this FD in May of 1984 or '85? 

4 MS. NAUCHTON: No. 

5 MR. SCHIPPERS: That's the other one. 

6 MS. NAUGHTON: That's March '86. We're off 

7 that. 

8 THE WITNESS: It has nothing to do with the 

9 Federal Court, then. It was '85 when I was going to 

10 Federal Court up there, not in '86. '86 was whenB^fB 

12 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuaing) 

13 Q May 4, '85, you're in New York City. What are 

14 you doing in New York City? 

15 A That's a good question. I can't tell yov> I 

16 do not know. I don't remember at this time. I'll get my 

17 vouchers and from my 1012s X can tell you. I just don't 

18 remember. I mean, I have a total blank on that. Even on 

19 my chronology I don't have anything for May 4. 

20 Q Aside from the sources that we have discussed, 

21 trfaich is Source 1, the guy that showed up at Azzam's 

22 office that was paid a small amount of money, and the one 
that was ^"^^^^^^^^^H ^*'* there other 

24 sources of which you are aware that were paid from, first 

25 of all, the DEA funds, the 471 funds? 



wmm 



82-702 0-88-13 



354 



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A 

Q 
A 

Q 
Source 1? 
A 
Q 
A 



I do not believ* so, no. 

vrhat about from CIA funds? 

No. 

Old th« whola $50,000 In CIA funds go to 

Yes. 



When did the reaalnlng $30,000 go to Source 1? 
Between the end of April and first part of 
May, as far as I can tell right now — the first half of 
May, I would say. 

Q Do you recall where you were when you paid hia 
the money? 

A I believe in New YorJt.j 

Q Where? . 

A New — He ^^"^^^^1^1 ^ 
reaeober because I reaeaber going through^H^^^^Band 
they looked all through ay bags and were exaaining ay 
toothpaste, but when they saw the aoney they didn't even 
blink an eye. They just kept on going. 

Q Did you have an official passport? 

A No. 

Q That's encouraging. 




IINCtaSSIFIM 



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after that? 



Q Nov th« $30,000, was that paid to him before 
h* vent back into the Mideast? 

A No. We paid it to himQ 

But was he to go intc 

Right. 

And did he go into| 

Yes. 

And vhat was he to dol 





|ve still vere concerned 
about all the hostages, but Buckley vas the nusber one 
priority. And he said he would get some kind of 
documentation that Buckley was still — 

Q His contact said that? 

A K»«> ' 

Q Did you stay^^^^^^Hthen vhile he vent into 
the Mideast? 

A Yes. 

Q And did he come back and meet you] 

A Um-hum . 

MR. WOODCOCK: You have to respond audibly or 
it von't get picked up. 



ijmssiFe 



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THE WITNESS: Yes. 

B^ MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

Did he hava any evidenca when he got back? 




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Q So at th« tin* that th« aourc* gav« this to 
you did you think that this was g«nuin«? 
A Ym. I still do. 




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can't 

think that he would try to do something like that for a 
relatively small amount cfc money. 

I mean, all right, they will rip anybody off 
for anything over there, but I just can't see him doing 
this when he had prospects. He knew that the source was 
going to take it back and document it, and I can't see 
hln doing something like this in my own mind, never 
meeting this guy personalLj, talx: doing- -soaething like 
this real^^^^^^^^^^Hbacauav he 

look forward to a lot more. Why shaald.h«. do this for a 
pittance when he could — 





BY MS. NAUGKTON: (Resuming) 
Q Before the source went) 
this evidence had you or anyone told himi 
would be forthcoming if the evidence turned out to be 
accurate? 

A We said some more money will come for this and 
.TOP SECRET 



359 



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MSKmrn 

for other things, 

Q Did you mentio 

A I don't think wa mentionad a figure. We said 
we'll see what it's worth. 




lid you contact either Azzav or anyone at the 
CIA or at the White House? 

A I was over there. I flew back. We flew over, 
I think, on a Friday. I came back on Sunday or Monday. 
I went to Ollie's office first. 

Q Why did you go to Ollie's office first? 

A Because as far as I'm concerned he was running 
this hostage location — I wanted to go to Mickey's 
office, but Hickey was out of town or something, so I 
went to Ollie's office. 

Q What gave you the impression that Horth was 
running it? 

A North gave me the impression he was running 

hi 



to# (icax^"] ^ ; , 



360 



50 



1 it. 

2 Q I guess w« didn't over North. I gather from 

3 what you told us at your first interview you first met 

4 Oliver North at a breakfast meeting at the White House 

5 with Hickey and Cof field and Azzam and^^^^^^Bis that 

6 correct? 

7 A Right. 

8 Q Did you meet with him then subsequently? 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q Before this came up? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q So when you say you had the impression Ollie 

13 was in charge from what he told you, was that in 

14 subsequent meetings with Colonel North? 

15 A Right. Hell, Hickey at one time said from now 

16 on, you know, coordinate everything with Ollie. If I'm 

17 around, let me know. 

18 Q Did North ever tell you that? 

19 A No, not really. I mean, he said from now on I 

20 guess we'll be working together. He says I'm going to 

21 handle this. I don't know if he said exactly that, but I 

22 just assumed that North was in charge of the thing 

23 because that's the way he was. I mean, I knew Azzam was 

24 technically in charge of me, but he was not on a daily 

25 basis — he had many other things to do. He was aide to 



361 



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51 



1 Lawn and h« was traveling a lot. He had a lot of other 

2 things to do. 

3 And Ollie was not alwaye there, but usually 

4 when we told him we were going to have something he would 

5 be there. And he was kind of more or less running things 

6 as far as 1 was concerned. 

7 Q Well, I'm trying to get at this point in time 

8 what you thought he was running. When you go to the big 

9 meeting at the CIA after BH^Ba««tlng, North is not 

10 there; correct? 

11 A Ua-huB. ' 

12 Q And as far as you know he's not in charge of 

13 the $50,000 that was given by CIA? 

14 A UB-hUB. 

15 Q What exactly was he in "chat9» of? 

j^g A I had no proble* with the CIA. They didn't 

17 ask to se« the evidence right away. 

18 Q Had North asked to see the evidence right 

19 «wy? 

2Q A I callsd and told him and told him I had it 

21 and I would be bringing it by his office as soon as I got 

22 back. I don't know if he said come by here. I aaid I'll 

23 be there as soon as I g.t into Dullss. My wife picked me 

24 up and drove me d ownthere^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 



362 




52 

1 ' 
2 

3 Q So When you brought it to North, than, you 

4 w«r« not awar* that Azzam or anyone •!■• had mad* plans 
9 to hav« it •xaainad? 

6 AX know that plans war* bsing nads, but Z don't 

7 think thsy had b««n mad* than, .and Z don't baliava that 

8 ona bit. 

9 Q You don't baliava that ha did hava thosa 

10 plans? 

11 A Z know ha had tha plans for tha naxt fav days, 

12 but Z don't baliava ha had tham, if Z walkad into his 

13 offica with tham that day that thara would ba somaona to 

14 whip than ovar to the FBI laboratory. Z don't think so. 

15 Q Z guass Z'B still confused as to what you 

16 thought that North would do as opposed to bringing it to 

17 OEA, to the CZA, or to the FBZ. 

18 A Well, once Ollie looked at it Z called Azzam 

19 and said I'll be over with it. He was very upset with 

20 ■•. Z'va been upset before. He's been upset. Z got 

21 (9sat with him. He was making a jerk out of himself. 

22 Q Did this conversation occur in North's office? 

23 A No. Z phoned in from Dulles. Z phoned him 

24 from North's office and said are you going to wait 

25 around, because it was about 5:00 or 5:30, and he said 



IllMREP 



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UNSU^IHED 



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y«ah, I'll wait. 

Q North said he'd wait? 

A No. 

Q Azzam said h«'d wait? 

A Azzam said he'd wait. 

Q So when you brought it to North, what was his 
reaction to it? 

A He was very happy with it, 




Q WhoB did he call? - •. ^ 
A I don't know. 
Q The CIA? 

A I'd sure it was Dewey or Clair George or 
something like that — Casey or something t hat. 

Q And did he discover that was not^^^^^l 

A Um-hua. 

Q And what was North's response to that? 
A He didn't have any problem with it. 
Q Could you elaborate on that a little bit? 
A He was happy with this. I mean, I can't 
elaborate very much more. I don't know what to say. 



He 



said, you know, this may b e some — I think I suggested 
to him] 



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that's my reasoning bshind ths thing. 
I mayb* that ' s why I < m 



I want it to b«i 
reasoning that. 

bslisvs it'sHHU^^^H Tha 
sourcs b«li«v«8 it. I think Colon«L..Vaa=aT-b«li«vas it, 
and I thinJcj^^^Hbaliavas it. I don't think Azzam does. 
Z think the CIA, they were very happy when we went over 
the next day. They were more than happy with that. 

Q Hell, I'll explore that, but did Colonel North 
have any objection to your taking ^^^^^^K I gather he 
didn't keep it in his office. 

A Then I left Colonel North's office and walked 
through the park over to our headquarters. 

Q Did he have any objection to your taking] 



wmm 



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Iwas there any discussion as to whether that 
caused it to be suspect? 




BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

Q After you left North;*.«.afeia» did you. bring it 
to Azzam? 

A Yes. 

Q And Z gather his reaction was less 
enthusiastic? 

A Right, to put it mildly. 

Q What did he then do vith| 

A I forget. He made arrangements for us to have 
a meeting at CIA the next day in the morning, because I 
was dead tired because that's a 19-hour round trip — I 
mean, one way. He made arrangements to meet at 9:00 or 
10:00 at the CIA headquarters. 

Whether he kept^^HHH||or 
and brought it out there the next morning, I don't know. 
I think I <ii<iL^^_^ 

lEC 




367 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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BV MR. GENZMAN: (Resuming) 

Q Can I ask a question? You say he was less 
than enthusiastic. 

A Yes. 

Q What did he say? 

A He wasn't happy with this. He says, that's 
all? Is that all? And I said, that's all. 

Q He expected something? 

A I think he expected a. littl» ■«»; yes. 
HHH^^^^^^I perhaps?. 

A Whatever. I think BHBhad. wiplainedto him 
that's what we had over the telephone. See,p^^stayed 
behlndj^^^^^Hvith the 

Q Did he go into detail regardingj 




A 1 don't know what he said because we were 
having — I never cared for Azzaa to star^|^ith^IWe 
worked with him on this thing. ^^^^^^^^^H 
H^^H^^^^I I worked with him in 
wouldn't care what Azzam said. I'd forget what he said. 
I don't know what he said. If he didn't like it, he 
didn't like it. That was his problem, not mine. 






l^ClffSSIFIEn 



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A I don't know. I didn't find anything wrong 
with it, thinking or reasoning th« conditions in whic h it 
was probably given. 




BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q The next morning at the CIA, who was there? 
A There were about eight peo^e. at least — me 
Azzam,^^^^^B>- was^^^^^^BafdoCi^^^^^^^H 
That's his last name; I don't know baLC of-. tbclr. first 
names. A guy named^^^^H| and I don't remember the rest 
of the people. ^^^K^as there and probably if ^^^Hwas 
there^^^^^l was 

Q When you say they were very happy with it, who 
exactly do you recall saying they were happy? 

^^HB H^Hlsaid, this is this 

is right, this is fantastic, he said. This is better. 
This is the best thing we've had in quite a while. 

MR. GENZMAN: Did you say, if he said it's 
right? 

THE WITNESS; Yeah. 




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Q What was th« stap that thay vara going to 
taka, than, to chack it out 



Giva it to tha FBI, 
And what happanad? 
Thay gava it to tha FBI 




Q But who actually sant it to tha FBI? 

A I think I took it over. I'b not sure. Either 
■• or Azzaa. I think we sealed it up and gava it maybe 
to ona of tha drivers or else I took it or Azzam took it 
because h« was going over there anyways to have a 
neeting. I don't remember exactly how it got there, but 
that was tha same day that we had tha meeting. 

Q Now I gather that the FBI report on that was 



INCtraflED 



370 



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Q Whose decision was it, then, not to pay^^^H 

evidence? 

A Abraham Azzam. 

Q Do you have any sense oC vtay 1^ was he was in 
control of whether those monies would be spent as opposed 
to someone from the CIA being in charge of that? 

A I don't understand that. 

KR. SCHIPPERS: Why him and why not CIA? It's 
CIA's money. 

THE WITNESS: I wish the CIA was in charge of 
it, because they would have given it to us right there. 
I don't )cnow why. They came up ~ Azzam and | 
were plotting somethinc 




371 



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372 



UNimiFIED 



62 



1 ^^^^^^ 

2 Q Did you speak to Colonel North about the 

3 reluctance of Azzam to pay upl 

4 MR. SCHIPPERS: Before he answers that, could 

5 Z talk to hio for a second? 

6 (Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

7 (A brief recess was taken.) 

8 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

9 Q I think we were all the way up to May of '85. 

10 Okay. North's reaction to Azzam's refusal to pay^^^^H 

11 Hf^^H What I'm getting at here is dixl North say that 

12 he would take any steps to see that thei Btstay' was paid or 

13 would somehow get the money? 

14 A He did, but I have to explain that. I asked 

15 Mr. Hickey for a meeting. I went over and explained the 

16 situation to him and Cof field. Cof field was there, and 

17 they called North and North came over to Mickey's office, 

18 and I laid out the situation — that this guy can't do 

19 anything without going back in and giving these people 

20 SOB* money for this thing, and that Azzam refuses. The 

21 CIA did not refuse, but did not offer, to pay any more 

22 money because they said it's up to Azzeua. 

23 So I told Ollie at that point as far as we're 

24 concerned if this guy, this source, is dead out of the 

25 water unless we give him some money to go back in and pay 



mmmii 



373 



MMO 



63 



1 V thasa paople, whoever, and I said if you want, you know, 

2 ^' ^^^^Vand I are out of It as of this time unless somebody 



3 comes up with soma money. We'll turn the guy over to 

4 you. Ollie can run him. I said, I don't care, and we're 

5 finished. 

6 So then North said, well, let ma see what I 

7 can do. Ha says I don't have the time, I don't have the 

8 people here to control him. I don't have the people that .y, 

9 maybe the guy would trust to work with. He trusted ^H^^H 

10 and I and basically ha trusted^^^^Hmplicitly. He'd do 

11 anything for^^^^^^^^^^Hknav him for years and years. 

12 Q Did Hickey say ha would take any steps to try 

13 to loosen up the money? 

14 A No, I don't think so. 

15 Q Was there any mention? 

16 A North, ha said ha would saa what ha could do. 

17 Q Ha* thara any mention of bringing Poindaxter 

18 into it? 

19 A Not by name. Ha may have said I'll have to go 

20 chack with my boss or something. I don't know. I don't 

21 raaambar that. 

22 Q Was thara a discussion at that point of 

23 perhaps soliciting private funds to pay? 

24 A No. Ha just said — the Colonel said he would 

25 saa what he could do. 



UNCtlSSSIFIED 



374 



ams^itD 



64 



1 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

2 Q Let me interrupt and just clarify something. 

3 You said a moment ago that someone trusted ^^^^nnd had 

4 known him for years and years. Who were you talking 

5 about there? 

6 A The source. 

7 I made one final try with Azzam. Azzam was 

8 scheduled imminently to go under some kind of operation, 

9 major operation, and I gave him one call at home, I 

10 remember, zibout 8:00 at night. ^^^^Bind the source were 

11 still ^^^^^^HUaiting, and I called hla and I said, 

12 lookit, you know, you are hanging^^^^^out. You are 

13 hanging the source out. what are you going to do? 

14 He said, I ain't doing nothing. He says, I'm 

15 going to have my operation. You guys can do what you 

16 want to do. Z said, that's it, then. I said, I'm 

17 finished with you, and that's it. 

18 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

19 Q Is that when Azzam basically dropped out of 

20 the picture in terms of this operation? 

21 A No. I think after he had his operation he 

22 came back and North said, you know, I'm happy with| 
and^^^l 

24 Q Who did North say that to? 

25 A I assume he said it to Azzam. I wasn't there. 



NOl/!SSIF|[D 



375 



ONfiUfiSffl 



65 



1 but Azzam kind of was out of the picture ever since then. 

2 I don't know if there was anything formal or infozrmal or 

3 whatever . 

4 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

5 Q How do you know be did that? 

6 A Because he didn't bother me any more. 

7 Q But how do you know that he tried to get back 

8 in and North said I'm happy wit 



Lthfljim and lIHH 



9 A I shouldn't maybe have said that. I don't 

10 know. I assumed that. 

11 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

12 Q Okay. Now I gather there is a point at which 

13 the source is paid $200,000.: 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q Right? ■y'>' 

16 A But in between that^^^^nnd the source came 

17 back. 

18 Q Hell, did the source come back to the United 

19 States? ^ v 

20 A I don't know. ^^H||c<^* back to the United 

21 States (uid we had some meetings with North and Hickey. 

22 Q More meetings with Hickey? 



23 A Yeah. I think^^^^anted to go over and 

24 explain the whole thing. J||||f|Pwanted to get his 

25 explanation, so to speak, on record, so to speak — not 



IE! 



376 



lilJWSSiFIED 

^ ~0P SECRET 



66 



1 wrlttan down, but h« wanted to let him )cnow what we had 

2 done and explain Azzam's actions to Hickey, because^^^^| 

3 was more or less in charge of this thing for DEA, as far 

4 as I was concerned. 

5 Q Here you part of that meeting? 

6 A I don't believe I was, but^^^^Rold me about 

7 it. 

8 Q And what did he tell you was the result of 

9 that meeting? 

10 A He said that the Colonel is more than happy 

11 with that stuff, that he had shown it to somebody who I 

12 think he referred to as "the old man", and the old man 

13 was satisfied that it was perfectly legitimate. 

14 Q And who did you believe the old man to be? 

15 A Casey. 

16 Q Who told you that Casey was the person 

17 referred to? 

18 A Nobody, because he referred — I think] 

19 told me that he said that those people, my own people 

20 •cross the River don't sometimes know what they're doing. 

21 MR. SCHIPPERS: Who said that? 

22 THZ WITNESS: I don't know who said it, but 

23 that's what^^^|told me. ^^^Htold me that Ollie told 

24 him that that's what the guy said. 

25 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 



ONctassinED 



377 



UNCbASSIflED 



67 



1 Q That was Casey's reference to his own people 

2 at Langley? 

3 A As far as if it is Casey, that's an 

4 assumption. 

5 Q If we could digress for a moment here about 

6 Casey, were you ever present when Casey and North spoke 

7 on the telephone? 

8 A No, not that I know of. He was constantly on 

9 the telephone. I don't know who he talked to. 

10 Q Were you ever present at any meetings between 

11 North and Casey? 

12 A No. 

13 Q Did you ever meet Director Casey? 

14 A Never. 

15 Q Did North ever refer to conversations with 

16 Casey to you? 

17 A North would tell me that he would meet Casey 

18 quite frequently, but iUsout what I don't know that it 

19 digressed into why it took place. 

20 Q Why would he tell you that? How did that come 

21 up? 

22 (Witness conferring with counsel.) 

23 A Because in the mornings — if you want to 

24 write it down, I don't care — in the mornings North 

25 explained to me that Clair George — he would talk to 



WffiSlflED 



378 



UllteSIFB 



68 



1 Clair G«org« In the morning, who I guess is the number 

2 two or three guy over there, or four or something like 

3 that, in operations or something. But usually after 

4 lunch he couldn't get too much of a response from Mr. 

5 George, so he would talk to Casey instead. That's what 

6 he told me. 

7 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

8 Q Has that intended to be an observation on 

9 George's declining powers of perception as the day vent 

10 on? 

11 A I don't know. I take it for what it's worth. 

12 That's what Ollie told me. Ollie was very candid. I 

13 mean, we got to trust each other pretty much. He tested 

14 us to see how far stuff went that he told us, and he 

15 found out it didn't go anywhere. 

16 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

17 Q Did Morth say that he had briefed Casey on 

18 your activities? 

19 A Z don't know. I don't remember him ever 

20 telling ma directly that I talked to Casey about this and 

21 ran your plan down to him. No, I can't say that he ever 

22 told me that. 

23 Q Hell, can you explain this to me? If North is 

24 close to Casey and speaking to him often and Casey was 

25 happy with this evidence, why is it that Casey could not 



UNCDS!;S1FIED 



379 



jm: 



mm 



69 



1 fraa up ^^^^^^^^Hto pay your source? 

2 A I don't know. 

3 Q That was never explained to you? 

4 A No. 

5 Q Is the next thing of significance that 

6 happens, then, the^^^m^^Btrip and the $200,000 

7 payment — I mean not the^^^^^^^H the Jay Cobum? 

8 A When I met Cobum in Ollie's office? 

9 Q Yes. 

10 A I guess. Let ma sea. Yeah. 

11 Q Can you tell us how that czuna about? 

12 A Fawn called ma at home. I was at home because 

13 I had base duty that weekend, so you get the day before. 

14 It was Friday and I had Saturday and Sunday duty and 

15 Friday and Monday off. 

16 MR. WOODCOCK: That would be Fawn Hall, 

17 correct? 

18 THE WITNESS: That's correct, and aaid can you 

19 ba down hare around 6:00? Ollia wants to sea you around 

20 6:00, and ha says he'd like you to be here. So I said 

21 aura. So I drove down and ha explained to ma that ha had 

22 got soma donor money or private money coming and we would 

23 be able to clear up this misunderstanding and we'd be 

24 able to continue on. 

25 So I said fine. 



iNSSifiFn 



380 



OfilMSIflED 



70 




1 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

2 Q Was this the first mention, then, of using 

3 private money? 

4 A No, I don't think so. We had talked — well, 

5 on some trips to New York we had^talksd to one of our ex- 

6 DEA people,! 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■and very well 

8 connected with the Catholic Church, with the Cardinal, 

9 the Cardinal in New York — 

10 • MR. WOODCOCK: O'Connor? 

11 THE WITNESS: O'Connor. 

12 MR. SCHIPPERS: I should know that. 

13 THE WITNESS: I should know that, too. But we 

14 had talked to him about Father Jenjj^o. The Catholic 

15 Church was extremely interested in obtaining the release 

16 of Father Jer^J^o and everybody knows the Catholic Church 

17 has a lot of money and at that time, you know, he said if 

18 I can ever help in any way let me know. 

19 And we told Ollie about this and actually this 
was Moneatero's idea, because Monestero ^^^^^^^^^^| 

21 vara vary good friends and they were in touch with each 

22 other. But I think Monestero retired around this time, I 

23 believe. 

24 Anyway, that would be the first time private 

25 funds cama to light. But that had nothing to do with 



UNfffflFIFn 



381 




71 



1 North. Z mean, wa told Korth about ^^^^^^H 

2 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

3 Q Do you know if he ever pursued that? 

4 A Who? 

5 Q North. 

A No. He didn't even Icnow^^^^^^^Hfrom 

7 anything. He said if we get Father Jen^o out we may have 

8 to hit them up for some bread. That's all. 

9 Q I see. So it was just sort of a post facto 

10 payment? 

11 A Well, ^^^^^^Hwasn't too receptive. He said 

12 if the government's going to do it, let the government do 

13 it. I don't want to hit these people up for money if the 

14 government's going to pay for it. So that's kind of the 

15 way we left it. 

16 Q Were you aware of any contacts that North had 

17 with officials of the Catholic church to try to obtain 

18 the release of the hostages? 

19 A No. This was from Monestero, who was one of 

20 the DEA people. He suggested that we mig ht want to be in 

withl^^^^^^^^ I knew^^^^^^^Hfrom years 

22 but I didn't know he was that tight with the Catholic 

23 Church. 

24 Q But my question is, were you aware of North's 

25 contacts with the Catholic Church? 



iiii 



omiED 



382 




72 

1 A No, I wasn't. 

2 Q War* you awar« of North's contacts with any 

3 other churchss in regard to trying to extricate the 

4 hostages? 

5 A No. 

6 Q Now we were on the Jay Cobum thing. It comes 

7 to pass — and correct me if I'm wrong — that you sort 

8 of recruit your brother into taking the money to Europe. 

9 A Um-hua. 01 lie said, we got the money. Do you 

10 want to get a guy? Do I want to get a guy? I said if 

11 I've got to travel with him I want somebody. 

12 Q Was that this Friday night when Fawn called 

13 you? 

14 A No. 

15 Q This is earlier than that? 

16 A Later than that, because w* didn't have the 

17 money yet. 

18 Q Then let's go back to that Friday night when 

19 she called you. What happens when you come to Ollie's 

20 office? 

21 A Ha explained to me that a guy was driving up 

22 from Baltimore with $200,000 cash. He was being driven 

23 by some security guard company. We waited until almost 

24 midnight and I said, you know, I've got to be at work at 

25 8:00 the next morning and I have got to man the radios 



mmm 



383 



wMsm 



73 



1 and base station and everything, and this q\iy kept 

2 calling, saying ha was h&ving problems. Ha couldn't get 

3 across — the private guard company would not cross the 

4 state line with the money. 

5 So they had to get a company from D. C. to go 

6 out and meet him. So finally the guy got there about 

7 1:30, 2:00 in the morning. He walked in and — Ollie 

8 went down and picked him up because he had to escort him 

9 upstairs. He said, H||||H[this is Jay; Jay, this is] 

10 Z don't even think we used last names. The only way Z 

11 knew it was Cobum is because he had the money in his 

12 briefcase and he had Cobum on it, Jay Cobum. 

13 He took these envelopes — Z think it was four 

14 or eight — • four manila envelopes — out of his briefcase 

15 and laid them on Ollie 's coffee table — this was when 

16 Ollie had his old office, before he moved upstairs to his 

17 bigger office — laid them on the coffee table. We had a 

18 talk for about 15 minutes, just generalities zUsout some 

19 of the things he had done when he was in Zran. 

20 Q In Zran? 

21 A Yeah, emd he still had some friends over 

22 there, but they were not in Zran any more; they were in 

23 Pakistan in these refugee camps, and he was trying to get 

24 this one person out, of his family out, and he wondered 

25 if DEA could help in any way 



fwoKife 



384 



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2] 
22 

2: 

24 
25 



mamm 




So w« said we'll s«« what happens. Give us a 
call. Glv« us th« information, bscauss h« didn't have it 
with hio. And than h« said Z got to gst going. So 01 lie 
waDced him downstairs. I stayed in the office. 

Q It's not clear to me what you're doing there. 
I mean, why does Ollie want you there? 

K I guess he wanted a witness when he was 
getting the money because Fatm wasn't there. Z don't 
know, or he wanted somebody around. Z don't know. 

Q Well, was it your impression that you would 
later be dealing with Jay Cobum and he wanted to 
introduce you? 

A No. Z never thought Z'd see him again. 

Q But Ollie introduced you, obviously, as a OEA 
agent or affiliated with DEA? 

A Yeah. Z don't remember us using last names. 
Z think he said this is^^^Hhe's with narcotics or DEA 
or whatever. 

Q Did Jay know what the money was for? 

A Z don't know. He didn't tell me he knew. 

Q So Z gather there was no discussion of the 
hosta^ges in Lebanon? 

A There might have been a general discussion. 



'Mmm 



385 



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75 



but I don't think it cam* up that w« war* going to uaa 
this for thaa. I don't )cnow, raally. You know, I kind 
of ballavad that ha knaw what it was for, but I don't 
think it vaa diacuaaad, raally. 

Q So whan ha gava tha nonay ha didn't aay what 
thia waa for? 

A No. Ha aald I waa told to bring thia ovar, 
gat it ovar to you. 

Q Did you know that ha workad for Roas Parot? 

A UB-hua. Only — Z didn't associata hia with 
Roaa Parot that aaaa night, but than whan I atartad 
thinking whan ha waa talking about ha had frianda in 
Iran, ha had workad in Iran, and ha waa atlll trying to 
gat aoaa of thaaa paopla out of Pakiatan, Z raaaabarad 
raading tha book "Whara tha Eagla Pliaa", or whatavar it 
ia, and hia naaa waa in that. That 'a %rhara Z aaaociatad 
it, but it waan't that aaaa night. Zt was a coupla daya 
latar. 

Q Old ha bring $200,000 axactly? 

A To tha baat of ay knowladga. Wa didn't ait 
thara and count it. 

Q What waa dona with tha aonay? 

A Aftar Ollia walkad hia dotm — ha took it out 
of his briafcaaa, put it on tha coffaa tabla. wa had a 
ganaral chat. Ollia walkad hia down. Ollia caaa back 



UNurem 



82-702 0-88-14 



386 



UNCL^IHED 



76 



1 and said what do you want to do vlth It? Ha says, do you 

2 want to take It ovar and put it In DEA's safe, or do you 

3 want to put It In ny safa? 

4 I said, wall, I don't faal lika walking around 

5 with it at 2:00-2:30 in tha aoming ovar to our 

6 haadquartars . So Ollia said, well, we'll just put it in 

7 ay safe, and he put it in his four-drawer safe there. 

8 Q Now when did you have a discussion then about 

9 how this was going to get to the source? 

10 A When — okay. We got that toward the last 

11 week in Nay. I think it cane up where Ollie said 

12 whenever you guys need it, let ae know, or whenever 

13 you're ready for it, let ae know. The inforaant or the 

14 Source 1 was not sure that he could go right back in 

15 because such a tiae period had elapsed, and he was not 

16 sure. He had to aake soae calls and talk to soae people 

17 to find out if he was going to be killed when he went in 

18 or if they would welcoae hia or be cordial to hia or 

19 Whatever. 

20 He did deteraine that if he caae in with the 

21 Boney he would be welcoaed. So he inforaed ae and 

22 of that. We went over and talked to Ollie. Ollie says 

23 fine. Whenever you're ready to go, let's go. Who wants 

24 to get a guy? Do you want to get a guy or do you want to 

25 use one of ay guys? 



UNCHSSinED 



387 



lirlWSiFIED 



77 



1 Q This is my question. Wh«n was it discussed 

2 that you had to havs a guy? 'tf-''^ „ ^ 

3 AX learned about this through ^^^^H ^^^Hvas 

4 having meetings with Lawn, not daily but naybe weekly, 

5 keeping him appraised of things. 

6 BY MR. WOODCOCK:. (Resuming) 

7 Q Hov do you know that? 

^^^^■told was sitting ^"^fl^^^^H 

9 office. I'd know when he'd go to see Lawn. Z was with 

10 ^^^^^pust about all the working hours. 

11 Q Would he come back to you after having had a 

12 meeting with La«m and say I just talked to him and kept 

13 him up to date on how things were going? 

14 A Of course. yes,^^^^H^old me everything 

15 about it. 

16 Q And based on that, your best guess is he was 

17 meeting with him approximately once a week and keeping 

18 him up to date; is that fair to say? 

19 A Either Lawn or McCurnan. 

20 Q John McCurnan? 

21 A Yeah, John McCurnan. Sometimes Lawn was in 

22 the Far East or sometimes he was in China or whatever. 

23 Q When he was in the Far East, he'd meet with 

24 McCurnan; is that right? 

25 A Right. 



wmmm 



388 



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12 

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17 

18 

19 

20 

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23 

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78 



Would ha keep him up 



Q And how aboutj 
to date at all? 
A Yeah. 

Q What would you gauge the regularity of that? 
A Dall^ 




BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q What did he tell you that Lawn had said about 
the use of private money? 

A Lawn said that the AG told him, the Attorney 
General told him or somebody — or Webster told him; I 
don't knov who — but somebody told him that it was fine 
to work with them, to do whatever we can do to get the 
hostages out. Don't lose track of the narcotics thing 
because there's still a lot of information and a lot of 
cases to be made emd seizures to be made, et cetera. 

However, if you're going to be using large 
■urns of unappropriated funds, have somebody else handle 
it because it wouldn't look right, because half the 
people we were dealing with knew that we were with the 
government, and it was not government money. So he 
wanted us to use somebody else. 

Somebody wanted us to use somebody else. 
Whether it was the AG, whether it was Poindexter or 
McFarlane or whoever, I don't know. 



vmrnm 



389 



llltftSSIflED 



79 



1 Q When you say because it wouldn't look right, 

2 was that the only reason given to you then — because it 

3 wouldn't look right to the people who were going to be 

4 paid? 

5 A That's the way Z understood it. I was never 

6 told this. Z mean,^mtold me this and Ollie inferred 

7 it, that he had talked to somebody, either the AG or 

8 Webster or McFarlane or Poindexter, and they told him, 

9 you know, you can't have government agents running around 

10 paying these funds or something. Z don't know. 

11 This is the way Z understood it. 

12 Q What reason did Ollie give? 

13 A He didn't give us a reason. Z think he gave 

14 us the reason that this is the way the AG told him that 

15 you can work with these guys, or that these guys can work 

16 with you, but they can't go around paying large suss of 

17 unappropriated funds. You have to use a private citizen. 

18 MR. WOODCOCK: Do you recall his attributing 

19 that to the AG himself? 

20 MR. SCHZPPERS: "Him" being North? 

21 MR. WOODCOCK: That's correct. Do you recall 

22 North attributing that? 

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Z believe so. 

24 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

25 Q So when Jay Cobum arrives with the $200,000 



ONCUSSiHEO 



390 



'ifiomm 



80 



1 you already know in your ovm mind that you won't b« able 

2 or you won't b« tha one to actually physically carry it? 
A Correct. 
Q Did you approach your brother about helping 

you out on this before or after Coburn arrived with the 
money? 

A I would say I approached hin when — I can't 
answer that because I don't know if it was before or 
after. I approached him when Z learned that we were 
going to have to have a courier or private citizen as the 
courier for the money. That's whenever that happened, 
whenever Z learned that, which Z assume is after the 
money was there because there wouldn't be no sense — if 
we didn't have the money, there's no sense in informing 
him about this. 

Q How soon after the money arrived with Jay 
Coburn that Friday night did you actually physically go 
over ^^^Hf^^^H 

A He left June 26. It was about three or four 
weeks later. 

Q And it was yourself and your brother. Anyone 
else? 

23 A No, myself and my brother. 

24 Q For the record, your brother it 




NffilSSm 



391 



mMmJi 



81 



1 Q waa h« to gat any sort of faa for this? 

2 A No, just his axpansas. 

3 Q Do you know what thay totalad? 

4 k 1 think it was pratty closa to tha $5,000 that 

5 Ollia gava him. I think ha had mayba $50, $60 laft ovar, 

6 and ha gava that to na. 

7 Q vman Ollia gava him monay wars you prasant? 
S A Yas. 

9 Q Hhara did that monay coma from? 

10 A Ollia 'a dask or his safa, ona. or tha othar — 

11 or his briafcasa. 

12 Q Ona of thosa thraa? 

13 A Right. His briafcasa, I think. 

14 Q Did it coma in cash or travalar's chacks? 

15 A Travalar's chacks. 

16 Q Do you ramambar what kind? 

17 A Banco da Ecuadoro, I think it was. I think 

18 thay wara VISA or Mastar Charga or somathing. Thay 

19 waran't Amarican Exprass. But Z had navar haard of this 

20 bank. 

21 Q It was soma sort of Spanish nama? 

22 A (NcMlp in tha af firmativa.) 

23 Q bid you ask Ollia. a^out thasa chacks, whara 

24 did thay coma from? 

25 A I askad him. I said what is this, you know. 



\immm 



392 



yNEUiSsra 



82 



1 Ar« th«8« things good? Th« first thing I did was went 

2 out and cashsd on* and mad* sur* th«y w*r* good b«£or* wa 

3 took off. My wi f* was waiting outsld* for us. 

5 plcksd hln up, plckad my wif* up, and sh* was going to 

6 driv* us out to Dulles. 

7 Sh* waltad outside in the car. ^^^^^Bind Z 

8 went in. He were in there maybe ten minutes at the most 

9 in Ollle's office. And I said, you know, as soon as I 

10 get out to the airport I'm going to cash one of these 

11 things and it better be good,' you know, else we'll take 

12 the $200K and ase that for th* trip. N*'ll pay it out of 

13 th* cash. 

14 H* said don't worry about it. Thsy'r* good. 

15 Th*y'r* good. So I said fin*. 

16 Q Did 0111* t*ll you wh*r* h*'d gott*n th* 

17 trav*l*r's chscks? 

18 A No. 

19 Q Did h* hav* you sign any sort of r*c*ipt? 

20 A Mo. 

21 Q What was your imprsssion wh*r* th*s* 
23 trav*l*r's ch*cks had com* from? 

23 A Z don't hav* th* slightsst id*a wh*r* th*y 

24 cam* from. 

25 Q Did you think th*y w*r* gov*mm*nt or prlvat* 



'mmR 



393 



l)N8l*SSinro 



83 



1 Bonlas? 

2 A Z thought th«y w«r« probably CZA aonlaa. I 

3 don't know. 

4 Q And that this bank was aoaa aort o£ a front or 

5 covar or aoBathlng, an account or fronfe company? 

6 A Whara thay had accaas to thla or aomathlng. 

7 That was ny flrat lapraaalon, that ha had soaa kind of 

8 working ralatlonahlp with Daway or Gaorga or Casay or 

9 soaabody and thay gava hla this for axpansas or 

10 soaathlng. I didn't know. 

11 MR. WOODCOCK: Old you know Daway Clarrldga at 

12 this point? 

13 THE WITNESS: Mo. I knaw a guy naaad Daway 

14 that ha would talk to on tha phona a lot, and I knaw- who 

15 Daway was, but Z had navar aat hia. Z aat hla 

16 subsaquant. 

17 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Rasualng) 

18 Q And was your laprasslon that thasa wara CZA 

19 accounts for covart oparatlons? 

20 A That's what Z ballavad. 

21 Q Did you ask hla whathar or not ha wantad any 

22 sort of vouchars or any aort of racalpts to Indies ta how 

23 you had spant tha aonay? 

24 A NO. 

25 Q YOU navar dlscussad that with Colonal North? 



ynKSsro 



394 



UNCLASSra 



TOP SECRET 84 

1 A Never. 

2 Q Did you ever offer to give his such vouchers? 

3 A My brother asked him. He said, do you want me 

4 to sign for this, and Ollle said no. 

5 MR. WOODCOCK: Did he give you a reason for 

6 not wanting your brother to sign for it? 

7 THE WITNESS: No. He just said no. My 

8 brother was very concerned about this, you know. And I 

9 had cleared it with Customs. I had cleared it with DEA, 
LO the Washington field office. They have a Customs guy. 

He was there and walked us through, and my brother said, 
we don't have to fill out any forms or nothing. I said 
no, Customs will go with us. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

Q Given that you had to si gn a receip t for the 
CIA funds that you picked up froa^^^^^^^^| didn't you 
think it odd that North got these monies from the CIA 
that you didn't also have to sign a receipt from North 
when you picked up the money? 

A No, because that's the way Ollie worked. He 
didn't want anything. He didn't want anything %n:itten 
from us. He would write things in his books sometimes 
when we'd give him names and we'd give him places or 
vehicles or what have you, but he never really asked for 
a report or asked us to write it down and give it to him. 




395 



OMOissinEo 



85 



•van though h« waa writing it down. 

Q Did h« •vt say to you h« didn't want it 
written down? 

A No. H« n«v«r asked for it, so wa n«v«r wrota 
it down. I don't think ha said, look it, don't giva me 

6 any written reports. Z don't think he ever said that. 

7 But it was just I think it was more understood between 

8 him and^^^^kaybe that we weren't going to put nothing 

9 on paper. I don't know. 

10 Q If I could skip ahead just a moment, when you 

met Charlie Allen antj^^^^^^^^^^^^Bdid anyone from 

12 their side of the shop ask you for any written reports or 

13 written intelligence? 

14 A No. They always wrote everything down. They 

15 were the writers. 

16 Q That wasn't my question. Did they ever ask 

17 you for anything? 

18 A No. I mean, they might have asked. They 

19 never got anything. 

20 Q Well, do you recall that they asked? 

21 A No. They might have, I said. Charlie Allen 

22 was always asking for anything he could have because he 

23 had to go to these Monday morning meetings or meetings 

24 every 9:00. He was always looking for stuff, and we 

25 would give him what we could. But we would give the same 



orasm 



396 



iitmj^ra 



86 



1 to 0111«, and Olll* said wall, you know, when you glv« 

2 Information to two paopla, Wt Invarletbly half th« tls* 

3 sonabody ball«v«s on* thing and somebody b*l lavas 

4 another. 

5 So then after a while we stopped giving It to 

6 Charlie to keep It straight. 

7 Q You were getting Information from your source. 

8 How did you keep It straight If you weren't trrltlng It 

9 down? 

10 A As soon as Z got It I would give It to Ollle. 

11 Q Well, he wasn't always around, was he? 

12 A No. But I'd just give it to him. 

13 Q You'd just keep It In your head until you 

14 spoke to Ollle? 

15 A I'd trrita some names down sometimes. And to 

16 get spelling. Like half these names I couldn't spell, 

17 and I would writ* them down on a piece of paper lik* 

18 this, and I'd go in th*r* or I'd m**t 0111* in th* park 

19 and I'd giv* him th* pl*c* of pap*r. I'd say this Is how 

20 you sp*ll th*s* or this is th* city. Half of th* cities 

21 yea can't spell — I couldn't spell, anyway — so I would 

22 gat the phonetic spelling from the source, «rrlte it down 

23 the way they believed it was spelled, and I'd give the 

24 piece of paper — like not a report, just a little scrap 

25 of paper — to Ollle. 

i 



immfB 



397 



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IB 

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i)M»sin[a 



87 



Q You and your brothar than left froa Dullas. 
Whara did you fly to? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^■vfadidn ' t stay ovamightj 
Wa trans itac^^^^^^H' 
Q And how long did you stay ^^^^^^^H 
A Two or thraa days. 
Q Did you maat with your sourca| 
A Yas. 

Q And I gathar your brothar handlad tha aonay 
this whola tiaa? 
A Yas. 

Did ha giva tha sourca tha $200,000? 

Yas. 

Did you gat any sort of racaipt from tha 



Q 
A 

Q 

sourca? 
A 
Q 
A 



Yas. 

VQiara is that racaipt? 

Hoffman has it, Oannis Hoffman, Chiaf Counsal 



.of tha Drug Enforcamant Administration. 

Q Did you giva it parsonally to Mr. Hoffman? / 
A Yas, I did. 
Q Whan was that? 

A I want to say thraa waaks ago. I'm not sura. 
I didn't writa it down. 

Q Whara was it until you gava it to Mr. Hoffman? 



msmsi 



398 



UNCUSSIRED 



88 



1 A It was in a box In ny of flea. In ona of ny 

2 of fleas. Z'va baan transfarrad four tlnas sinca Z'va 

3 baan working on this thing, so I don*t avan bothar using 

4 a dask any nora. I just throw crap In boxas. Z forgot 

5 all about it, to tall you tha truth. 

6 My brothar says — I'va talkad to him aftar ha 

7 had sat with, Z think, you two gantlaaan, and ha says, 

8 you know, Z could swaar that whan wa wara In that room wa 

9 algnad a racalpt. So Z said, wall, Z'll look. Z said, I 

10 don't raaaabar. And lo and bahold, out poppad a racalpt. 

11 Q Has tha racalpt in with othar docxiaants 

12 partalning to thasa transactions? 

13 A No. 

14 Q Zt was mixad in? 

15 A Mixad in with ay dailias, ay Bonthlias. 

16 Q And yotir dailias or your Bonthlias didn't hava 

17 euiything to do with thasa subjacts that wa'ra discussing 

18 at this dapcsition? 

19 A No. Just ay traval. Wa don't writa daily 

20 raperts any mora. Actually, it's waaklias, fom 352. 

21 Zt's just tha aaount of hours you spand travaling, and Z 

22 would aaka a notation on tha sida wa wara working on SEO 

23 471. Evan though 471 aonay had run out, Z still usad 

24 that as a coda naaa, as this oparation. 

25 Q Right. But would you ba spacific than in your 



UNttASSinEO 



399 



wskimm 



89 



352? 



A For hours? 

Q This is just to )c««p track of your hours? 

A Y«s, for my tins card. 

Q Lat's say fron tha pariod of May of '85 until 
tha aarly fall of '86 what parcantaga of your tiaa would 
you say that you davotad to spanding on this hostaga 
oparation? 

A I'd say 95 parcant. Do you aaan ay working 

10 tina? I'd say 95 parcant. Mayba not quita 100 parcant, 

11 but you'd hava soaa a rguaant with paopla in^^Btacausa I 

12 was assignad to^^^knd, you know, thay waran't gatting 

13 any work out of ma, and thay would say 100 parcant of tha 

14 tiaa. But I would usa ay offica down thara, and I was 

15 putting in ay tiaa cards, so you hava got to figura fiva 

16 parcant of tha tiaa I was doing that. 

17 Q Do you know what tha sourca actually did with 

18 tha $200,000? 

19 A Did I saa hia? 

20 Q I gathar you didn't saa hia bacausa ha 

21 supposadly paid contacts in Labanon; is that corract? 

22 A No. 

23 Q Did ha kaap tha $200,000 fo r hiasalf? 

24 A No. Ha gava it to soaabodyl 

25 Q Tha sourca gava it to soaaona^^^^^^^H Who 



UNCtAS^FIED 




400 



UNCLASSIFIED 



90 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




did h« give It tol 

A Th« person we refer to as] 

Q All $200,000? 

A That's what h e told me J 
However, you know, I met^^^^^^^Bnd we had numerous 
conversations about Lebanon and America and the problems 
in each country. And he, the source, told me that 

|oes not want to be seen in front of anybody taking 
this. So X said fine. I can understand that. 

I am under the impression that this, we'll 
hia a sub-source .actually, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
land I can understand his not wanting to 
be seen getting paid off by somebody. So the source told 
me he gave him the money. 

Q When you met^^^^^^^B was this after or 
before he had received the money? 

A Before . 

Q And did you ever meet with him after he 
received the money? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he acknowledge receiving the money? 

A No. He aelcnowledaed in an offhand way. 




mwmi 



401 



IJNCUOTED 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




ISO, you Icnow, I took that as an ac)cnowledgement 
that h* didn't want to gat rlppad off or what hav* you. 
Q And did you acconpany his? 
A y«a.^^^^^Hmys«lf , my brothar, and two 




w« want to tha bar and had a drlnJc, and ha had this 
brlafcasa with him at all tlsas and didn't lat go. 

Q Do you hava any indication — 

A And Sourca 1 was with ua, too. 

Q Do you know what ha did with tha nonay when he 
got to Lebanon? 

A Via hearsay. I know what he was supposed to 
do with it or what the source told me he was going to do 
with it, was to give it to certain influential people 
that would enable ua to gain mora information and the 
possible — possible — release. There was nothing 
guaranteed in this. It was a venture. It was a risk. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: May I clarify one point? This 
source that you referred to as^^^^^^^Hs not the 
source we referred to as sub-source 2 originally? 

THE WITNESS: No. This is a different sourca. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: ; (Resuming) 




402 



I 



1 

,2 

3 

4 

S 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
13 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



ttW 



92 



Q What I'm 9«ttin9 «t !• do you know how th« 
$200,000, was •vcntually broXan dotm? 

A No. 

BY MR. CENZKANt (Rasualng) 

Q Do you hav« any ganaral idaa that it was 
dlstrlbutsd? 

A That's ay bsllsf. 

Q Earllsr you had said that ths payaant was for 
ths ovidanc* as wall as othar things to cobs. Nhat othar 
things caas as a rasult of ths'92Q0,poo paymant? 

A Vary llttls intolliganca inforaation, bacausa 
right around this aama tlna tha TWA thing want off] 




[this TWA thing scrawad things up, too. 

KR. SCHIPPERS: Which aourcs ara you talking 



MTJ 



403 



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10 

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IC 

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2S 



WUdmB 



93 



about? 

THE WITNESS: Source 1. 
BY MR. GENZMAN: (Resuming) 
Q Did you raceiv* any information or benefits 
which would lead you to believe that the $200,000 had 
trickled down to the right people? 

A Yeeih, via Source 1. He would say that they 
have given me this information. I am meeting with these 
people. I am meeting with these people. He gave usi 




But with reference to the hostages, yes. He 
would try to inform us of the movements, if there were 
movements, and we would tell 01 lie. But it was 
information that was really not what you would call too 
verifiable, so to speak, because it was usually a week, 
two weeks old. Although it was "good" intelligence, it 
was not good for up to date instantaneous kind of stuff. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q Okay. Did you come back with your brother? 



A No. He went 

Source 1 and myself. 

Q You all went 

A Yes. 




irst — my brother. 



404 



yNCUSSIHED 



94 



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3 

4 

5 

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7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

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16 

17 

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22 

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25 



Q For what puzposa? 

A H« m«t^^^^Bth«r«, and w« formulated sod* 
mora plans and w« war* masting — not msatlng but trying 
to plan what our naxt mova was going to ba. Tha sourca 
did not raally want to stay^^^^^^B Ha wantad to gat 
out of thara for a littla whil4 




fait that ha wantad to saa how this 
monay, aftar it tricklad down or filtarad down or 
wharavar it want, how that would affect his status ovar 
thara. 

So want^^^^^^^^^nd mat^^^^H and mada 
plans on what things wa wara going to do. 

Q Now your plans apparently went a%n:Y when one 
of the contacts died. 
A Um-hua. 

And the TWA hijacking occurred; is that 



Q 

correct? 
A 



That was Source I's contact. 
MR. WOODCOCK: He's the one Icno%m asl 
right? 
TH2 WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MS. KAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Was there anything else that could be 



wmmii 



405 



UNCLASSIFIED 



95 



1 attributed to th« failure of those plans? 

2 A No. But I have to say this. In a certain 

3 sense, once we started wor)cing with 01 lie completely, 

4 there were times when he would say, lookit. Hold off. 

5 Tell your guy not to do anything. Tell all your people 

6 over there don't do anything right now. All right. If 

7 he gets some information, okay, but don't try to then 

8 make any moves right now, because some other people got 

9 some things going. Somebody else has something going. 

10 So sometimes when you've got something to do 

11 and it's somebody that you've called off because you have 

12 a better avenue, a better shot at it, it throws your 

13 timing off. 

14 Q Now I'm speaking specifically about the plan 

15 you were formulating in and around May or June of '85. 

16 A '85. 

17 Q Old that plan encompass your renting a safe 

18 house in the event the hostages would be released? 

19 A There was some talk about that, yes. 

20 Q Did you take any steps to rent a safe house? 

21 A No. We decided not to because, to my best 

22 recollection, if we had a safe house we would have had to 

23 get a doctor, and Ollie inferred that he had good 

24 connections, and I knojy^^^Jhad_good connections with 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H so we 




406 



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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 




m 



96 



th«y had th«s« connections and If th« r«l«as« was 
inaincnt wa'd us« than bacausa thay would ba undar guard 
that way. 

Q Did your plans includa your ranting any boats? 

A If naad ba, yas. 

Q And whara did you plan to rant thaa? 

A FroB soBa ol 




Q Just so wa gat tha plan straight, tha plan 
ancoBpassad tha payBant of soaawhara around $1 Billion 
par hostaga; is that corract? 

A (Kods in tha aff iraativa. ) 

Q Hhara was that Bonay to coaa froa? 

A North. 

Q But whara would ha gat it? 

A I assuaa ha would gat it tha saaa placa ha got 
tha $200,000. I'a not positiva. I don't taiow. in '85, 
I don't know, but I can juap forward in '86, whan wa wara 
going and Cobum showad up^^^^^^H so I'a just 
assuaing. I aaan, ha didn't tall aa whara it was going 
to coaa froa. I baliavad that ha had savaral sourcas, 
savaral paopla willing to donata if soaathing was 
iaainant . 

I baliavad tha CIA would hava coaa up with it 
at ona tiaa, bacausa thay raally wantad Bucklay out. If 

^11^ 




liwlJ 



407 



UNCIASSIRED 



97 



1 th«y could have got Buckley, I think the CIA would have 

2 paid, or Ollie might have had to get the money and CIA 

3 would have reimbursed him. I don't know how they would 

4 work that. 

5 Q Did you ever get the impression that Cobum or 

6 Perot was simply fronting Cor the CIA? 

7 A No. I got the impression Cobum did whatever 

8 Perot wanted him to. Perot said do this, and he went and 

9 did it. 

LO Q Were any steps taken to get the money over to 

^^^^^^^^^^^1 some point ,^^^^^1 

^^^^■in 19857 
L3 MR. SCHIPPERS: You mean the Billions of 

L4 dollars? 

LS THE WITNESS: No. We had — the people that 

L6 Source 1 was talking to, we had made various methods of 

L7 payment available to him — not made then available — 

L8 given hia suggestions as to how, because the money was 

L9 not going in there until the bodies came out. So we said 

to you can do it in a bA<^^|Him ^^u can send a guy 

tl here. Their people could send a guy here. As soon as we 

t2 get confirmation of the bodies out, the guy takes the 

t3 money. We'll guarantee we'll put hia on a plane and he 

t4 can go wherever he wants to go. 

We could meet^^^^^^l We could meet in 



mmm 



408 



DNGt 




98 

(^^^^^^M W« m«et^^^^^^^H{H« could Be«t(fl^^| 

^^^^^^^^^^1 B««t^^^^^^^| — wh«r«v«r th«s« 

3 paopla f««l coBfortabl*. But you hav« to strass th« 

4 point that this is it. Thara ain't no aora nonay going 

5 in thara until aomathing conas out, aa far as va vara 

6 coneamad. Kow if othar paopla vantad to do it, thay 

7 could do it. As far as^^^^Bnd I vara concarnad, and 

8 Ollia was concarnad. ' 

9 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Rasuaing) 

10 Q Nov it coaas to pass in 198 S that you aaat a 

11 guy who is callad tha Princa — al-Mahoudi. 

12 A I don't avan think that's his naaa. Al- 

13 Mahoudi is his naaa. Is that his raal naaa? 

14 Q Wall, vho )cnovs. His easa goas by tha naaa of 

15 Zadah. 

18 A As Z say, I don't think al-Nahoudi is his 

17 naaa. 

18 Q Could you tall us how that caaa about, that 

19 you caaa to aaat this parson? 

20 A Yaah. ^^^^Mnd I vara ovar in Ollia 's offica 

21 ona tiaa talking and aaking plans, briafing hia or 

22 soaathing, and ha aaid I'va got — 

23 MR. SCHIPPERS: Who ia "ha"? 

24 TH£ WITNESS: North. Colonal North says I 

25 hava this sourca froa tha Middla East. Actually, ha's a 



vHtmsiFe 



409 



UriGlASSIFIED 



99 



1 Saudi Arabian, he said. But he's part of the Royal 

2 Family, but he's blacklisted. He's a black sheep of the 

3 Royal Family and his part of the family tried to take 

4 over from the other. I don't know the whole story. He 

5 was part of the family who tried to take over from the 

6 other party of the family and, therefore, they kicked him 

7 out of Saudi Arabia. 

8 But they gave him a certain way to maintain 

9 his life style, that he would get a certain amount of 

10 crude oil per year or per month or what have you. But 

11 when he got here to Washington some Saudi Arabian 

12 security people came to his house or his apartment or 

13 whatever, asked for his passport, and took his Saudi 

14 passport. So he's now traveling on some kind of 

15 Grenadian passport. 

16 So I said, that's interesting. What do you 

17 want us to do? He said, well, he's helping the United 

18 States in certain ways. 

19 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

20 Q Did he mention the contras? Old he say that 

21 this person — 

22 A I think he said he was helping me, through 

23 Miller, through Richard Miller. So Ollie said, you know 

24 — what did he say? He just was explaining because I 

25 asked who that guy was — not Al-Mahoudi but Miller, . 



-WME 



410 



UNCUSSIRED 



100 



10 

1] 
u 

12 
u 

1! 

1( 

n 
i( 

19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



bacaus* I saw Millar con* out of his of flea and ha lookad 
fanlliar to ma. So ha said, wall, ha's running this guy 
for na. 

Ooas that answar it? Do you want na to go on? 

Q I hava ona quastion first. Did North avar 
mantion, for lack of a battar naaa, tha Princa, if wa 
could call his tha Princa, to Azzaa in your prasanca? 
Did ha avar ask Azzaa what ha thought? 

A No. 

Q Did ha ask you to chack this guy out? 

A Not chack hia out par sa, lika wa would chack 
ona of our normal — if wa wara going to put tha guy to 
work for us — you know, giva hia a DEA nuabar and pay 
hia through DEA. 

Q Did ha ask you to chack hia out in any way? 

A No. Wa did, without North knowing about it, 
whan wa got hia a visa do%m in tha Bahaaas. 

MR. WOODCOCK: How di d you cha ck hia out? 
THE WI TNESS; Ha ,g* v^^^^^^ businass card 
or soaathing and ^^^^^^^^1 who f oi^^^^^t 
that tiaa, happanad to ba in tha Bahaaas^J^^^^^^^^^ 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^H He 
gainad tha guy's confidanca whan ha was waiting. Wa had 
to wait ovamight tp gat tha visa, and tha guy told him 
whara ha livad and^^^^^^as froa tha saaa town and 




411 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

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7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

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20 

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24 

2S 



iwoMl 




)cn«w th« hous* and )cn«w it was a v«ry lBpr«a«iv« housa 
and avarything lika that. 

Ha didn't know tha guy, but ha knaw tha house 
and tha araa. So that's basically tha way wa checkad him 
out. 

BY MS. KAUGHTON: (Rasuaing) 

Q OJcay. What did North tall you Rich Millar 
did? 

A Rich Millar? North told urn that Rich Millar 
halpad or was — I don't know. I caaa to laam what ha 
did, but I don't think Ollia told aa. Ha said ha usad to 
ba with AID. I thought ha was actually ax-CZA, but I 
don't know. But ha was vary yoxing. I naan, ha lookad 
young. 

Q Whan you spant soma tiaa with Millar, what did 
ha tall you ha did? 

A Workad for ZBC or IBM or soaathing lika that. 

Q What did ha say IBC was? 

A Intarnational Businass Corporation or 
soaathing lika that. Z had his card soaaplaca. 

Q What did ha tall you ZBC did? 

A Z don't know that ha avar did tall aa that. I 



was confusad thara for a whila. 



Misssro 



Z thought thay wara soaa 



412 



UNCUmED 



102 



1 kind of fundraisers. Than I thought they were lobbyists, 

2 and then I thought they were publicity agents or what do 

3 you call them, public relations people. I really was 

4 confused about what he did until Z subsequently found out 

5 exactly what he did. 

6 Q Did you know who their clients were — in 

7 other words, who they were raising noney for? 

8 A No. I mean, I learned, but I didn't know 

9 then. I'm sure that if Ollie said he was helping him it 

10 was down south, but I didn't know that for a fact. 

11 Q And you're referring to Central America when 

12 you say "down south"? 

13 A Yeah. 

14 Q There came a point at which you accompanied 

15 Mr. Miller and the Prince to Europe; is that correct? 

16 A OB-hua. 

17 Q Do you recall when that was? 

18 A In the summer, late summer — July, end of 

19 July. 

20 MR. SCHIPPERS: '85? 

21 THE WITNESS: July 1985. 

22 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

23 Q Now why did you go to Euro pe with t hem? 

24 A Ollie called me one day *^^^^^H o^'i^e and 

25 asked me to come over to see him. He said he had a 



URCIKSSIFIED 



413 



UHClASSiie 



103 



1 littl« problem. So I went over there and he explained to 

2 oe this Grenadlan passport and that the Prince and Miller 

3 were going to England and that they had to go there to do 

4 some business, some business transactions, with some 

5 banks, some fiduciary interests in London. 

6 So, he said, with this Grenadian passport — 

7 they had tightened controls throughout all of Western 

8 Europe, and he was worried that the Prince may have a 

9 problem with immigration, getting through Heathrow — 

10 let's say getting into London. So he said you know a lot 
people over in — |^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
■^^^^^^^^^HHe said, can you just go along with him, 

13 because Miller didn't know what he was doing. Miller 

14 took him down to the Bahamas and they put hla In jail 

15 and, you know, we had to bail him out of that -- not bail 

16 him out but get him a visa. 

17 So Ollie said I feel much more comfortable if 

18 you go along. Plus the fact that this guy, he thinks, 

19 knows a lot of the Middle Eastern type people — 

20 Iranian*, Iraqis, Kuwaitis, and Leban ese. 

21 So I went back and I askec^^^^H andj 

22 says yeah, by all means. And when you're there, see what 

23 the guy knows and further develop whatever I can. If 

24 not, it's a chance. Maybe the guy will work out; maybe 

25 he won't. 






WSSIflEfl 



414 



BNttlfiSIFIED 



104 



But I know that North and Millar war* vary 
high on tha guy. Now I had navar aat Millar paraonally 
until Ollia callad hia whan I was in hia offica and aakad 
hia to coaa ovar. 

Q Whan you want to London with thaa, how aany 
days did you apand with thaa in London? 

A Fiva or six, aavan. 

Q Did you avar gat a aanaa of what thair 
connaction waa to aach othar, what thair buainaaa 
ralationahip m_|^^MM|||^^^^M^Mm|| 

tha ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

12 bacauaa I Icnow tha guy that ia haad of aacurity thara. I 

13 triad to gat thaa to atay thara, but thay would hava 

14 nothing to do with it — thay wantad to atay in tha 

15 Zntarcontinantal — bacauaa I know tha guy that ia haad 

16 of aacurity and tha Princa waa acarad that ha waa going 

17 to, you know, w« had a boab thraat on tha airplana whan 

18 wa wara ovar thara and wa had to land at Dublin,: and tha 

19 Princa thought thay wara out to try to gat hia. 

20 Z would go through tha Zntarcontinantal avary 

21 day, just about a coupla tiaaa a day, juat to aaka aura 

22 thay wara okay, and thay wara alwaya aitting, talking, in 

23 tha lobby with a bunch of paopla. Z didn't aaka lika Z 

24 knaw thaa and thay didn't aaka lika thay knaw ua. 

25 Q Wara thaaa paopla Nidaastam looking? 



UNCUSSSIFIED 



415 



w&issm 



105 



A No. Th«y war* vary English-looking. At tiaaa 
I guaaa thara vara soaa Mlddla Eaatam typas thara. 
BY MH. GENZMAN: (Rasuaing) 

Q Why did you stay thara fiva to savan days? 

A Why? 

Q Yas. 

A Z wantad to maka sura avarything was okay, 
that thay waran't going to gat hasslad, bacausa soaatlaas 
Zaaigration will cona along and hassla thaa soma mora. 

10 Q So it was your undarstanding all along that 

11 you would stay as long as thay stayad? 

12 A No, not as long as thay stayad — as long as I 

13 fait — it basically was up to na. As long as Z fait 

14 thay would b* okay, than Z could laava. 

15 Q Did thay atay longar? 

16 A Z don't know how long thay stayad in England. 

17 Millar had brought his wifa along. So that's how Z got 

18 to gat closa to tha Princa, bacausa Millar would taka his 

19 wifa out sightsaaing and avarything, and tha Princa 

20 called ma and said Z'a going by aysalf. Coaa ovar. 

21 So want ovar and talkad to hia. Ha knaw all 

A 

22 tha good naaas of all tha paopla in Zran, Zraq, Jordan, 

23 Kuwait, Labanon. Ha knaw all tha aullahs. Ha had hia 

24 robas and all that stuff. Ha said ha wouldn't sit naxt 

25 to a woman if aha didn't hava pants or a long drass on. 



lEcora 



416 



uNeiASsra 



106 



That's 



b«caus« If sh* had a skirt on h« would turn away. 
th« way h« was. That's th« way ha actad. 
BY MS. NAUCHTON: (Rasualng) 

Q Okay. So you bagan to davalop him as a 
potantial sourca. 

A Ha mada nuaarous talaphona calls. It was all 
in Arabic. But what could I do? 

Q Did ha avar ask you for aonay? 

A Ask ■•? NO. 

Q Did you pay his axpansas in any way? 

A In London? 

Q Yas, lat's start with London. 

A No. 

Q Now, did thay stay in London whan you laft? 

A To tha bast of ay knowladga. 

Q How waa it, than, that you andad up travaling 



A X caaa back tha baginning of August froa 
London , tha 15th, around tha isth, circa August 15, '85. 

Id aysalf flaw froa Washington^^^^^^Hto ja 
with Sourca 1, wh o was just coaing outl 
Whila ^^^^^^B af tar about four or fiva days, wa got a 
call froa Ollia, trtio said can you guys go^^^^^^^^H Tha 
Princa has a saall problaa, or has a problaa, or thara is 




soaa thing wrong 



mmm 



417 



M\m\m 



107 



1 Can you go ^^^^^^Hand hook up with the 

2 Prlnc* and sa* what's wrong? So w« said yeah. The last 

August we went ^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand we 

4 talked to him, and he said he had his passport stolen. 

5 Somebody broke in his room and took his passport. 

Q Did^^^W^ave? 

A Yeahl^^^^Hleft. ^^^^^ptayed a couple more 

8 days and then left. He was going to go back and find out 

9 what 01 lie wanted us to do. 

10 MR. GENZMAN: Which passport was stolen? Was 

11 that the Bahamian passport? 

12 THE WITNESS: Ha didn't have a Bahamian. He 

13 had a Grenadian. 

14 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

15 Q And whose idea, then, was it to try the 

16 American embassy? 

17 A Mine. v 'V'"^. 

18 Q And did you contact 

19 A Urn-hum . 

20 Q And the two of you then went to visit 

21 Ambassador j 

22 A Um-hum. Yes. 

23 Q And what did you tell Ambassadoi 

24 A Well, first we ran it by this^^^^^^| who 

25 vaa the consular officer there. 





iraiRED 



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unpiissra 



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8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

2S 



Q For the record, that's 

A Okay. We ran it by her, and she said well, 
you know, she says, I don't know all the details. So I 
called Hickey, and Z said, look, this is what we need. 
You can check with Ollie. Can you see it, 
can do this? I explained what we needed. 

Let oe back this up first, if you don't mind. 
I asked Ollie. I said, what is it with this piece of 
crap Grenadian visa. I said, why don't you get CIA to 
get hia a visa? He says, I asked Casey to do it. Casey 
said that because this guy is part of the Saudi royal 
family but he's persona non grata back there] 




[that they would prefer to 
stay out of it because they don't want to get the Saudis 
angry at thea, the CIA doesn't, or the United States 
Govemaent doesn' 



So I explained to Hickey what we needed. 
BlOcey call^^^^^^^^^Kind I'll call you 

right back. He called her. He called ae back and said 
wait in the office. Expect a call in about five ainutes. 
Five ainutes ,^^^^^^^^^^^1 called us us to 

coae downstairs. 



We explained to her, and! 



what did you 



419 



mm& 



109 



1 say h«r name was? 

2 Q 

3 A^^^^^Hwas down there, and she blatantly lied 
to ^^^^^^^^^^^Hand course,] 

5 I'll do whatever you want me to. And she says well, do 

6 whatever these agents want you to do. And she went 

7 outside and she too)^HHHMaslde and said^^^^Hl can't 




^^■■■■aslde saic^^^^B] 



8 do it. It's impossible. 

9 So that was it. 

10 Q How did he eventually get travel papers? 

11 A Through another country, froa me. 

12 Q Froa you? You arranged through one of your 

13 contacts to get hia other travel papers? 

14 A (Nods in the affiraative. ) But not for 
peraanent. In order for hia to reaain^^^^^^^^^^Hhe 

16 had to have soae Iclnd of papers, so the papers were in my 

17 control. They weren't his for good. I had a lot of 

18 ideas how to go about doing it once I got back to the 

19 United States. I couldn't do auch over there because I 

20 didn't have that aany contacts over there, and I was out 

21 of money. 

22 I was over there for like a aonth and a half. 

23 Q Okay. Let's get to that. Did there coae a 

24 time at which you received soae wire-transferred money? 

25 A I don't know how it caae about. I called 



tlNCraflED 



420 



Wtk^lM 



no 

1 Olll*. I called^^^^Hind said, look, I haven't gotten 

2 any noney and over a month and a half my American Express 

3 bill is out of sight. I*m paying this guy's freaking 

4 bill. I'm paying his telephone bill. I've got — 

5 American Express is calling my house. I said, you've got 

6 to get me some money. 

7 ^^^^^ ^° Ollie — this is the way I guess it went. 

8 ^^^H:alled Ol lie and Ol lie said all right, I'll see 

9 what I can do. ^^^^^^Hcalled me the next day or two 

10 days later and said they're going to wire some money to 

11 the Prince. The Prince will give you soae and he'll have 

12 some, because the Prince was out of money, too. 

13 The Prince said they took his money when they 

14 took his passport or something like that. I forget. 

15 Q Were you there when the Prince received the 

16 wire transfer? 

17 A No. 

18 Q Do you know how much he received? 

19 A No. 

20 Q How much did he tell you he received? 

21 A I don't think he did. He said I've been 

22 Instructed to give you $15,000 in traveler's checks, 

23 American Express. He called me. I was staying in the 

24 hotel up the street. He was staying in one hotel and I 

25 was staying in another. 



iiMtifisra 



421 






111 

1 Q Did^^^^Htell you how much was going to be 

2 s«nt to th« Prince? 

3 A No. 

4 Q Did^^^^^ell you you w«r« going to be 

5 getting $15,000? 

6 A Um-hum. 

7 Q So you were just expecting $15,000? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q So you were just expecting $15,000 and you 

10 didn't knov how much the Prince would get. 

11 A Correct. 

12 Q Did you get $15,000? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q And these were in the fora of American Express 

15 traveler's checks? 

16 A Correct. 

17 Q Were they blank? In other words, did you have 

18 to sign thea? 

19 A Yes. 

20 Q Did the Prince indicate where this had come 

21 froB? 

22 A No. Z do't know. What Z know is what he 

23 told ae. He said Z have been gone and asking for money 

24 from Mr. Miller — or he called him Richard — for days 

25 now, and Richard keeps stalling me and keeps stalling me. 



mmm 



422 



UNEIASSIHED 



112 



1 H* says, I havs to pay my bill. H« had on* of these 

2 Rolax watches with all the diamonds in it, and he was 

3 going to leave that with the desk until he got some 

4 money. 

5 So I can only assume that he was talking about 

6 Richard Miller. 

7 Q But did it not concern you, then, if the money 

8 was coming from Miller and you were taking $15,000 of it? 

9 A As far as I know, my money was coming from 

10 Colonel North, because Z never talked to Miller. Z mean, 

11 Z talked to him. Z would call Miller sometimes and tell 

12 him, look, this guy is driving me crazy amd Z really 

13 don't believe him too much. And he says don't worry, 

14 don't worry. He keeps telling me the thing's going to 

15 go, the thing's going to go — this crude oil thing or 

16 something. 

17 Q You thought your money came from North? 

18 A Tha t ' s who Z told. Z told^^^Bz needed 

19 money. ^^^^Btold me he talked to North. North says, 

20 don't vo^^^ne'll be taken care of. 

21 Q But if the money is coming from North to you, 

22 why is it going through the Prince? 

23 A Z don't have the slightest idea. 

24 Q So you thought that the Prince got his money 

25 from Miller, that you got it from North, but it was all 

3P.SJ 




423 



iirJSiASSiFIED 



113 



1 in on* wire transfer? 

2 A I don't ]cnow that. X was not there. X can 

3 assume that, but I don't )cnow it. 

4 Q Hell, do you ]cnow of any reason why you would 

5 not have gotten a direct wire transfer from North? 

6 A No. 

7 Q When you were with the Prince, then, in 

8 Europe, did you meet with anybody else to try to figure 

9 out if this guy was for real? 

10 A Yes. 

11 Q Was that someone you learned later to be 

12 Richard Secord? 

13 A Yes. He used the neune Copp. You showed me a 

14 picture the last time and X recognized him. And Zucker. 

15 Q Were they together? 

16 A At one time they were. The first time it was 

17 Copp by himself. 

18 Q And how did that meeting come about? 

19 A Ollie called me and said that this guy would 

20 be calling to set up a meeting with the Prince for him. 

21 This guy is very well versed in the Middle East and he 

22 wants to evaluate this guy, meaning Copp. 

23 So X did that. And I asked Copp for some 

24 money too, and he said he would get me some, and then he 

25 vanished. 



UNttSffO 



424 



wi&mB 



114 



1 Q Bacausa you flcpirad h« had a pipeline to 

2 Korth? 

3 A Well, I flcnired North must be talking to him. 

4 I didn't know he was Secord. North said he worked with 

5 North on this hostage thing. 

6 Q Who did you understand Copp to be with or work 

7 for? 

8 A 01 lie. He's a friend of Ollie's froa his 

9 nilitary days, he said, and he had been in Iran and knew 

10 his way around the Middle East. 

11 Q But you understood him to be outside the U.S. 

12 Govemnent? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Did you arrange a meeting, then, between Copp 

15 and the Prince? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q And how long did that meeting last? 

18 A About an hour, an hour and a half. It was in 

19 the afternoon in the lobby of my hotel. 

20 Q And did Copp ask him questions? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q Did you speak with Copp after that meeting? 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q And what was his assessment of the Prince? 

25 A He wasn't sure at that time. He wanted not to 

TOP SECRET 




•J\. 



425 




Mii.wj^rN.?i 



115 



1 believe him. He thought he was probably a Savama and he 

2 might be a possible — what's the word they use? He 

3 might be a plant by the Iranians or Iraqis or someone. 

4 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

5 Q In other words, he thought right off the bat 

6 he wasn't a Saudi; is that correct? From what you are 

7 saying, Secord or Copp figured out pretty early on that 

8 he was not a Saudi? 

9 A He didn't figure it out. He didn't know. 

10 Q If he thought he was Savama, then he would 

11 have thought he was an Iranian, right? 

12 A He thought he could be. He just didn't know, 

13 and he wanted Zucker to come and evaluate him. 

14 Q So he suspected, at any rate, that he might 

15 not be a Saudi right from the start; is that correct? 

16 A No, not really. 

17 Q It isn't correct? 

18 AX don't think so. 

19 Q He thought he was a Saudi working for Savama? 

20 A This is the first time he had met the guy. 

21 Q Wait a minute. I'm just trying to back up a 

22 little bit. It's a minor point, but he told you after 

23 this meeting that he thought the Prince was working for 

24 Savama? 

25 A He didn't say he thought. He said he could 



UNCDISSfnEO 



426 



UNCbASSiFlED 



116 



1 b«. Th« word he used is — 

2 MR. SCHIPPERS: Ag«nt provocateur? 

3 THE WITNESS: Something like that. You know, 

4 this happened a long time ago. If that's what Secord 

5 says he said, then I said it. I don't think he knew who 

6 he was. He wouldn't positively say he was not who he 

7 says he is. 

8 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

9 Q But he speculated to you that he was with 

10 Saveuna? 

11 A Could be Savama. But he said he could also be 

12 the true thing, because he looked at all the papers. 

13 This guy had papers, cables, telexes, briefcases full of 

14 this crap coming out. And Secord didn't know what it all 

15 meant. That's why he wanted Zucker to look at it. 

16 Zucker was a business la%ryer or something familiar with 

17 these kinds of transactions that this guy was saying he 

18 was in on. 

19 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

20 Q Did Copp explain to you what his relationship 

21 was with Zucker? 

23 A No. Yeah, he didn't. Whenever I would call 

23 Copp or Copp would call me, and sometimes I wouldn't be 

24 in my room, it would say call back, and it would be 

25 Zucker 's telephone or Zucker 's office, because I guess he 




no 



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yNHASSIFIED 



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1 ansvarad. I don't know how I knaw that. 

2 Q Did you ultlmataly arranga a maating batwaan 

3 tha Princa and Zuckar and Copp? 

4 A Yas, that sama avanlng. 

5 Q And what happanad? 

6 A Tha Princa navar ahowad up. 

7 Q Did you hava a chanca to chat with Zuckar? 

8 A Yaah. Wa sat around for about an hour, half 

9 an hour. Thay waran't going to giva his nuch tiaa, 

10 bacausa it waa a Friday night and Sacord or Copp was 

11 going up to tha Mattarhom and Zuckar wantad to go hona. 

12 Q What did Zuckar tall you about hiasalf? 

13 A That ha was an Aaarican. I wantad to know how 

14 coma ha's living ovar thara. I said how's tha lifa ovar 

15 hara? It saasM to ba pratty axpansiva to ma. Ha said, 

16 wall, it's got its ups and its downs. It was just 

17 ganaral convarsatlon. 

18 Q Did Zuckar indicata what kind of work ha had 

19 ba«n doing for Copp? 

20 A (Nods in tha nagativa.) 

21 Q Did aithar of tham mantion Albart Hakim? 

22 A No. 

23 Q Old any of tha thraa of you discuss Colonal 

24 North? 

25 A Colonal North? 



mmmw 



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1 Q Y«s. 

2 A Yaah. 

3 Q Do you reaember what that — 

4 AM* and Sscord — m* and Copp. 

5 Q Do you raoember what that discussion was 

6 about? 

« 

7 A How h« cao« to know Olll*. H* said he knew 

8 Ollle In Vletnan. 

9 Q Did you discuss North with Zucker? 

10 A Not that I remeober. w* might have. I 

11 couldn't say. I don't remeDber. 

12 Q Did Zucker or Copp know why it is they were 

13 checking out the Prince? 

14 A I would sa y because Ollle asked them to. I 
was saying to^^^H— now what^^^Hwastelllng to 

16 Ollle, Z don't know, but I was talling^^^Hthls guy is 

17 really strange, man. I have never really spent this auch 

18 time with a guy and he keeps stalling. He doesn't do 

19 anything. Z keep telling him, look, everything can go 

20 right if you put up what you say you are going to put up. 

21 Bither put up or shut up; Z'a wasting ay tiae. 

Was tlred^^^^^^^^Hby this 

23 tiae. Z wanted to go home. 

24 Q But did you get the iapression froa talking 

25 with Copp and Zucker that he knew what this Prince was 



UNttTOREG 



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OtiCUSSIFIED 



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1 supposed to ba doing — in other words, what thsy wars 

2 chscklng him out for? 

3 A I balisvs Copp did. I don't know about 

4 Zuckar, but I baliava Copp did. 

5 MR. WOODCOCK: May I jump in hare? 

6 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

7 (Whereupon, at 9:00 p.m., the taking of the 

8 instant deposition was recessed, to reconvene at a date 

9 to be determined.) 

10 



11 Signature of the witness 

12 Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of 

13 , 1987. 

14 



15 Notary Public 

16 My Commission Expires: 



l->% 






MWED 



430 



CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 



I, MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, th« officer b«for« whom th« foregoing 
deposition was taken, to hereby certify that the witness 
whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly 
sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by 
me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to 
typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a 
true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am 
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the 
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and 
further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney 
or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 



Notary Public ^ 
in and for the District of Cclumbia 



Hy Commission Expires: February 28, 1990 



mwssro 



431 



STENOGP VPmC MmUTES 
Uimrlaed and Unedited 
Not for Quotation or 
Duplication 



"fsmi 



HSmJLU /87 



m 





(J 

ONCUSSinED 



Committee Hearing! 

OftlM 

U A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATI¥BS 



»R»» Partially Declassitied/Released on I^OftN "O 

undef provisions o( E 12356 

Wby K Johnson, National Secun " 



OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Offlcc of Otnclal Bcpoitan 



79:^ 



^c_^.. 



COPY NO S^ OF — ^:=r::r COPIES 



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IIRCIII^»pT 



OGA Acyp^ "^ 




DEPOSITION OF 



Friday, August 28, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m. 
in Room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Pamela Naughton 
[staff counsel] presiding. 

Present: Pamela Naughton and Robert Genzman on behalf 
of the House Select Committee. 

Timothy WoodcocJc on behalf of the Senate Select Commit- 
tee. 

Richard Giza on behalf of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. 

David B. Schippers on behalf of the witness. 



Partially Declassified/Released on, 

undet provisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Secufity Council 



HJ^f l88 



IIHCLASSIM 



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MS. NAUGHTON: This is a continuation of a deposi- 
tion. My name is Pam Naughton, staff counsel for the House 
Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 
Iran. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Tim Woodcock. I am with the Senate 
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 
the Nicaraguan Opposition, associate counsel. 

MR. GENZMAN: Robert Genzman, associate minority 
counsel with the House Committee. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: David Schippers, representing the 
deponent. 

Whereupon , 



was recalled as a witness and, having been previously duly 
sworn, was exeunined and testified further as follows: 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q ^^^^^^^^^ I think when last we left, it was some- 
time in or about May of 1985, and we had been talking about 
the prince. I think we should probably finish with that 
part of the episode and then work our way a little bit back 
to talk about the plans or the things you tried to do to 
locate and, hopefully, extricate the hostages. Now, I believe 
we went through - and correct me if I'm wrong - I think we 
went through the episode in the^^^^HEmbassy when you tried 



to get 



iKuaa, 



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A I was never on a^^^^Hembassy . 

Q American Embassy trying to get a passport for the 
prince. After that time - please correct me if I'm 
wrong - after that time was the prince wired a certain 



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uifiiassiifflE' 



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sum of money from Mr. Miller? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall how much that was? 

A No. I know I got $15,000. I don't know how much 
money he was wired. 

Q How do you know that $15,000 ceune from Mr. Miller? 

A I didn't say it came from Mr. Miller. 

Q I did. Do you know? 

A I talked to Colonel North. Then I talked to 
and I said, look it. I have been over here almost 30 days now, 
40 days. I don't need this. I want to go home. I don't have 
any money. Colonel North called me and said - this is when 
I met Copp - he said Copp will probably give you some money. 
I met Copp twice. He didn't give me nothing. And I said, 
I'm leaving. 

Q When you spoke to Copp, did you get a sense that 
North had talked to him about money, or when you mentioned 
money, was that a brand new subject to him? 

A I think it was a brand new subject to him. That's 
the feeling I got. 

Q Did you ask Mr. Copp for money? 

A Yes. I said, did Ollie say anything to you about 
expenses. 

Q And what did he say? 



He said, yes. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



m^'^T^ ni-i •^T^ -r^' 



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Q Was that all he said? 

A To the best of ray recollection. I can't remember 
everything he said. I think he said I'll see what I can 
do bippety boop, boopety bop and he was gone. I never saw 
him again except for that night, same night with Zucker. 

Q Were you introduced to Mr. Zucker by Mr. Copp? 

A Yes. 

Q Did they arrive together? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you meet them at the hotel? 

A At my hotel. 

Q Did you go anyplace with them? 

A No. I think we sat there and waited for the 
Prince al Masoudi there. 

Q Did the Prince ever show? 

A No. 

Q When Mr. Copp introduced you to Mr. Zucker, did he 
tell you what their connection was? 

A No. He said that Zucker would know more about all 
the paperwork. The Prince, he had so much paper. 

Q Okay. The Prince had some documents and you 
wanted Mr. Zucker to look at them? 

A Documents. Don't say documents, say paper. This 
guy had so much paper. And they were all letters of credit, 
letters of this and letters of this for millions of millions 



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of dollars and I didn't understand itT 

Q Why did Mr. Copp bring Mr. Zucker. 

A Because Copp, I don't think, understood it. He 

said this guy is a lawyer. He could maybe make sense of this. 
But, I think then, after the prince left, the guy said 
this guy is Savama, that's what he thought. I still don't 
think the prince is. 

Q That is what Copp thought? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, when you met Mr. Zucker, what did he tell you 
about - 

A Wait a minute. Can I say something? Before 
all this happened, I was calling Ollie and I said, this guy 
if full of crap. 

MR. WOODCOCK: That is the prince? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. Because all he does is come 
over here and give me all this paper. I said, we don't need 
paper. We need to put it on the table. Okay. I just 
wanted to make that clear. 

MR. WOODCOCK: What did Ollie say when you said 
that? 

THE WITNESS: He said, it's not my problem. It's 
Miller's problem. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did Ollie ever tell you that he expected the 



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prince to make a donation to the contras? 
A No. 

Q No? Did Mr. Miller ever tell you that? 

A No. 

Q Did Zucker or Copp - 

A What do you think, people come and they ask you? 

I mean it was known. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: That he was trying to do this? 

THE WITNESS: I had nothing to do with anything 

south of the states. I knew what was going on, you know. 

But I had nothing to do with it and if I had, I would tell 

you. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Is it fair to say - 

A I knew they were trying to use the guy to get a 

couple million dollars, sure. 

Q What did he say about that? What did the _ _ _ 

say about that? 

A He loved it. But the guy was a fraud. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Wait a second. 

THE WITNESS: This third party stuff, I won't 

swear to God, but I have sworn to this and you know. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: He was told this. 

MR. WOODCOCK: But you know how you know; is that 

right? Presumably, you do know how you know this, is that 



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correct? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Well, even though you may not have 
heard it directly from the prince, if you could explain 
how it is that you know these things that would help us 
along. 

THE WITNESS: I could unload. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Who told you? 

THE WITNESS: Miller. 

MR. WOODCOCK: How did it happen that he told you? 

THE WITNESS: When we were in r.ondon. 

MR. WOODCOCK: And what did he tell you? 

THE WITNESS: He said that the prince was help- 
ing Ollie on this thing down south. 

MR. WOODCOCK: On his work down south? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: What did that mean to you? 

THE WITNESS: Well, to me it meant he was probably 
getting money for the Sandinistas or the contras, either 
one or the other. I didn't understand this whole contra- 
Sandinista thing. 

MR. WOODCOCK: But you understood North was work- 
ing on that matter, is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Let the record reflect that Richard 



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Giza has come in. Mr. Giza is with the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and is an associate staff 
member of our committee. I want to ask you a few questions 
about Mr. Zucker. While you were waiting for the prince 
and were conversing, did he tell you anything about himself, 
what he did for a living. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. He was an American living in 
Switzerland and he said, it's tough. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q It's tough to live in Switzerland? Was he talk- 
ing about finances? 

A Finances, yes. 

Q Did he get the impression that he was not financi- 
ally - 

A He was talking about the value of the dollar. 

Q Do you know where he was from in the United States? 

A No. I assumed either Pennsylvania or California. 

Q Why did you assume that? 

A It must have been something he said. 

Q Did he mention to you anything about Colonel North? 
Did you discuss Colonel North with Mr. Zucker? 

A No. Well, I can't say I didn't, but I can't say 
I did. With Copp earlier in the afternoon - this was later 
at night. With Copp I did, yes. I said, how do you know 
him. He said, I worked with him in Vietnam. 



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In Vietnam? Did he say he worked with him anyplace 



else? 



A Not that I know. I can't say. 

Q Did Copp ever talk about Bill Casey? 

A No. But once I - let me just explain. 

Q Do you want to go off the record? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Q I will ask you this. Did Mr. Copp indicate to you 
that he knew any agency people, let's say in Europe? 

A No, no. He said just Ollie in that he had worked - 
he had extensive experience in the Middle East. 

Q Did you believe Mr. Copp to be either a CIA asset 
or officer? 

A Yes. 

Q Which? 

A I would say asset. You know, I'm thinking now I 
know he's General Secord. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You know at this point he's General 
Secord or later? 

THE WITNESS: I didn't know then. 
MR. WOODCOCK: I just wanted the record to be 
clear on that. 

THE WITNESS: I thought he was one of Ollie 's guys, 
you know. He spoke Farsi, Arabic, a little. I thought he 
was just one of the guys that Ollie knew. I can't say he 



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1 was CIA or, you know, whatever. 

2 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

3 Q Did Ollie explain to you who he was? 

* A Never. He said there's this guy by the name of 

5 Dick Copp who will call you and meet with you, and he should 

6 give you some money, and he never did. He met with me, but 

7 he never gave me any money. 

8 MR. WOOIXOCK: He never gave you any money at any 

9 time or during this fall period? 

10 THE WITNESS: Any time. I picked up - he met in 

hotel '^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^I^^H^^^ He never 

12 gave me a dime. I picked up the tab for him and Zucker, 

13 and then Zucker came about 11:00 o'clock that night. 

14 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

15 Q How long did you three v/ait for the prince? 

16 A About two hours. From about 10:00 to midnight. 

17 Q What did Copp tell you about his business? In 

18 other words, what business was he in? 

19 A We really didn't talk about business. We were 

20 talking more, he was going to try to climb one of these 

21 mountains over there, the Matterhorn or something like that. 

22 And, after about 4 5 minutes, we realized the prince wasn't 

23 going to come, so we just, you know, had general conversation. 

24 Q Did you see the prince after that? 

25 ' 



Yes. 



UNCI 






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Q Did you ask the prince why he didn't show? 

A Yes. 

Q What did he say? 

A He said he got beat up and mugged because he was 
wearing his robes. He had all the Mullah stuff on, you know, 
the hat and robe. 



Did he say who beat him up? 

No. He said he thought it was something to do 



Q 
A 
with me. 

Q Why did he think that? 
A I don't know, 

MR. WOODCOCK: They didn't get his ring? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know what they took from him. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Wasn't his nickname "The Jewel" 

a. 
because he wore^big ring? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, he wore a big ring. He wore 
a big watch. He had a watch that was worth probably 
$30-$40,000. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did he still have it after having 

been mugged? 

THE WITNESS: I don't remember. Because I said 
then, I said, I'm coming home. That's it, fini, complete. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did the prince indicate - 
A That's when he went to jail in Switzerland. 

11 



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Q First of all on the beating, did he say how many 

people beat him up? 

A No. He said some people jumped him because he was 

wearing his robes and they don't like all those Arabs over 
there. 

Was this 

Yes. 

How long after that - and I assume we are in August 



Q 

A 

Q 
of 1985? 

A August, September. 

Q How soon after that was he arrested? 

A I think he was arrested the next day 

Q Here you there when he was arrested? 

A No. I was at home. 

Q You were what? 

A I was in my house 
called me about - 

MR. SCHIPPERS: It would have been some time after 
the 19th of September because ^^^Hbame back the 19th of 
September. So, if he heard it at home, it would have been 
some time shortly after that. 

THE WITNESS: He called me about 3:00 o'clock in 
the morning and he says I have all these policemen in my room, 
He said, what should I do? I said, do what you want to do. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON 




UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q Was he calling from^ 

A Yes. 

Q So, these were^^^^Hpol.rce. 

A From his hotel room, because I could hear all the 
police in the background. 

Q Did he say why they were coming to get him? 

A Yes. Because, 1 think, they were going to have 
over there, and they were locking every Arab 
that was in^^^^^Bup. I think the 
right? 

Q Do you know how long he stayed in jail? 

A No. He called me, you know, several times at my 
house. 

Q When he called, was he in jail? 

A Once or twice. A couple times he was in L.A. and 
a couple times he was in Philadelphia, and a couple times he 
was - he would tell my wife when I wasn't there, he would 
tell her*, I'm in - what was that one country - this guy 
could travel. He was in 

And he never said the prince. He would always just 
say tell him Mohammad called. 

Q Did you get a sense of how long he was in jail in 
In other words, when is the first, the soonest 
that you got a call from him? 

A I think about two or three weeks. I'm not sure 



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about it, a month maybe. 

Q Did he ever give you a specific reason why he was 

arrested? 

A No. I tried to find out and I could never find out. 

I tried through all my resources over there. 




BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you ever run these guys' prints through any 
indices in the United States? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever run his name through any indices? 

A No. 

Q Why not? 

A He wasn't my guy. He was Ollie's guy. 

Q Didn't Ollie ask you to check him out? 

A No. 

Q He wanted you to figure out if he was for real. 

A He never ever asked me to check the guy out. 

Q Did it never occur to you to try to do that? 

A Yes, sir, we tried. 

Q What did you do? 

A Well, I didn't do anything - see, if you're in DEA, 
if you've got an informant, you have to run the guy complete- 
ly. This is not my informant. This is a guy that is probab- 



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ly a fly-by night, you know, so I think with Miller - the 
guy showed up. He had a briefcase full of travelers checks. 

Q The prince did? 

A He had more passports than - 

Q Did you ever give the prince - 

A I will tell you this. When I met the prince, 
I said to Ollie, I said, why don't you just get an American 
passport. Ollie said, I can't do that. I said, why?! 




Now, if they find out that we are helping this guy, because 
he's allegedly a black sheep of the family there, that was 
that. So I never said anything else. 

Q But, do you know whether or not North told Casey 
about this guy's planned donation to the contras? In other 
words, did North - 

A Do I know , no . I don ' t know that . I know by 
inference is about all I know. I don't know. He never said 
anything in front of Casey and me. 

Q Did you meet with Casey at any time? 

A Never. I mean, I met Casey, but I - never within 
that scope. 

Q Nothing having to do with Oliver North when you 
met with Casey? Did it have to do with Oliver North? 



No. 



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Q When you did meet Mr. Casey, what was that about? 

A It was at Hickey ' s house, at a cocktail party. 

Q At Mickey's house? 

A Yes. 

Was that the only time you met Mr. Casey? 

A Yes. Because I couldn't understand a word he said 
because I said to my wife, what is this guy talking about? 
You should talk to the guy. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: If I talked to the guy now, they 
would put me somewhere. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q When you met him, was it in 1985 or 1986? 

A 1985. 

Q Do you know from your conversation, what you could 
make out of it with him, did he know you were working with 
Colonel North on this project? 

A No. He knew I was a friend of Mickey's. That's 
it. 

Q 
doing? 

A No. We never - no. 

Q I want to get back for just one second to the 
money that the prince was wired^^^^^^^H Do you know 
how much he received? 

A No. 



T 



Did you discuss at all with him what you were 






449 



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BNttftSKiafiT 



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Q You said you received $15,000. 

A I don't know how much he got. I tol 
told Ollie. Ollie said - called me snr' said, don't worry 
about it. I don't know where the money came from. I know 
it was American Express. That's all I know. 

Q When you got it in what form was it? 

A Travelers checks, American Express. 

Q Do you know from where it was issued? 

A No. I don't have any records. I didn't even - 
I think I went^^^^Hthat afternoon, and I was trying to 
cash some 

fyou know, and I wanted to cash them in. I asked 
Lf he could, you know, cash some in and he couldn't 
do it. 

Q Why not? 

A Because the guy in the embassy, this is very - he 
had bought them maybe two weeks ago, three weeks ago, very 
low and I wanted to cash in a lot of money, and he said no. 
I had to go to his bank. 

Q For the record, 

lis that correct? 

A Right. He'll remember that. 

Q Did you ever give the prince any blank travelers 




checks? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



450 



unaii^j^T 



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Q Do you know if any travelers checks that were given 
to you by Colonel North were ever cashed | 
A I know now, but not then. 
Q Can you tell me how that came about? 
A Because when we were in here last - 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Not how you know, but how it came 
that the checks were cashed! 

THE WITNESS: I don't know. It's^^^^Hgave them 
to Morrow. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q This is not a source then that cashed them. 
A Oh, no, never. I cashed all mine, either myself 
or my brother cashed everything. 

Q Before we leave the subject of the prince, is 
there anything else regarding that episode that we haven't 
asked you, but that we should know about? 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Could we go off the record? 
(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Is there anything you haven't cov- 
ered concerning the prince that you think would be relevant 
or they should know? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. I will tell you this. The 
prince called me from - when he was in jail] 
He called me when he was in jail in Philadelphia and he is - 
this guy has good information. He's a con man, but he knows. 



T 



451 



mufssm 



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He )aiows Rafsanjani. He knows people in the Iranian govern- 
ment. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q When he called you from jail in Philadelphia. 

A All I was interested in is getting the hostages 
out. I was not interested in anything else. 

Q When he called you from jail in Philadelphia, obvi- 
ously by that time you knew he was in trouble in the United 
States. 

A I didn't care. 

Q But what I'm getting at is, did he then tell you 
who he really was? 

A No. 

Q Did he still maintain - 

A He called my house. My wife said, this guy Masoudi 
called or whatever his narae was, al Masoudi. She thought his 
first name was Al. 

Q We are back on. Is there something you want to 
add? 

A Yes. This guy knew just about every name that I 
have ever heard in the Middle East, Rafsanjani, 
He said he was tight with these people. So, I said, all 
right. This is why I never or DEA, I would say, DEA never 
really went further, because this was Ollie's informant or 
Miller's informant. We could have checked this guy out, and 




ilHCUSm 



452 



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we did a little, you know. We knew he owned a house in 
California, which was rented. We knew he had two Rolls Royces 
and a Mercedes out there, which were all rented, and he 
never paid the bills on them. But - 

Q When he called you - 

A He was not a DEA informant. He was theirs. 

Q I understand that. I'm only interested in what he 
said to you. When he called you from jail in Philadelphia, 
did he tell you then that he wasn't a Saudi prince or did he 
still maintain he was the Saudi prince? 

iu4 



.gf^ 



A He said,fl^^Hwhat^they do to me? They got me in 
here. I said, I can't help you. I told you a long time 
ago ^^^^^^^^^^M put the paper up. If you produce, 
will take care of you. You don't produce, then you go to 
jail. 



m Wfcnctrlr^R wJV 



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Q Did he tell you what he was in jail for? 

A No. 

Q Did he ever use the name Z-a-d-e-h, to your 
knowledge? 

A No. I know he had a credit card -- when we were 
land he was trying to cash some travelers checks 
that I gave him and they wouldn't take them. So I had to 
go over and cash the things for him. He had some phony 
credit cards or something. 

Q Where was this? 

A 

Q 

A 

Q What time frame are we talking about? 

A August or September, '85. 

Q This is before you left Europe, then, so early 
September? 

A Bef ore I left Europe? It would have been the 

I had to pick up his room. I paid for his 
room. I paid for his telephone calls and this guy was 
calling Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. 






Was the prince able to get any information on 



UNHUSSMa. 



454 



URaSSSiFI^ 



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them? 

A He provided some good information, but not on 
that, no. 

Q What did he tell you that was good information? 

A He said that this guy Rafsanjani — I can't 
remember the other guy's neune — were Iranians that they 
could talk to, and that — 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Have you got more? 
MS. NAUGHTON: What you have just told us has been 
in every newspaper in the world. 

THE WITNESS: He said maybe I can do this if you 
can do that for me. And I said, "No, I can't do that for 
you until you put something out front." 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q What did he say he could do? 

A He said he could produce one or two hostages. 

Q Did he tell you how he could do that? 

A No. He said through his religion, his Moslem 
connections. 

Q Okay . 

A His Mullahs. He was a mullah and that's what he 
told me he was. 

Q Was he a Shiite? 

A No. He was a Moslem. 

Q You don't know what sect? 



I1NCU£SMD.„ 



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A He wasn't a Druze. He wasn't Christian. 

Q But you don't know what sect of the Moslem faith 
he was? 

A I assumed that he was a -- no. I don't know. 
I don't go into religion with people. I'm a Catholic. You 
know, I hate all those people. 

Q But wasn't it important in order to decipher who 
held the hostages and who would have control -- 

A He said the Iranians have control over them and 
he said, "I know some people." 

Q I don't know that there was a question pending, 
but I think you had an answer pending. 

A What was I saying? 

Q We were talking about what he could do to spring 
the hostages. 

A He knew a lot of people, so he said. Now, I 
learned this in. London when I first went over there. Then 
when I went ^^^^^^^^-- this guy, I was paying his tele- 
phone bills, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. You know, 
you're talking 2-, 3-, S400 a call — not one day, I mean a 
call. This guy was talking to somebody. I don't know who 
he was talking to. 

Q When is the last time you spoke to him? 

A A year ago. 

Q Was he at that point doing time? 



i! <l 



Krp 



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BNttlSSIFBT 



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A In Philadelphia. 

Q Or wherever he's been assigned. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Was he in jail already? Was he 
acquitted? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know. I never found out 
that he was acquitted. I heard that he swindled the Bank 
of Philadelphia, the Franklyn Bank up there, out of 200,000 
bucks. I don't know. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Were you ever contacted by anybody else in law 
enforcement about the prince? In other words, it was an FBI 
case. Were you contacted by the FBI or the U.S. Attorney's 
office? 

A No. Never. I asked Ollie, I said, "You know, you 
ought to look into this guy's background and have the FBI 
check this guy out, because I don't feel comfortable with 
this guy." 

MR. WOODCOCK: When you say "Feebs," that's the 



FBI? 



THE WITNESS: Yes. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q When did you tell him that, before he was arrested? 
A Oh, yes, when I was overseas. 
Q Once theprince was arrested, did Ollie have any 



comments about that or that case? Do you know if he did 





you Kn 

TPT 



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LH6 




26 



anything about it? 

A I don't have the slightest idea. I wasn't sitting 

was ^^^^^^^^^^ 
Q I understand that, but over the course of that 
time, then, from the fall of '85 — 

A No. I don't know. I think that he found out that 
the guy was a jerk. 

Q Do you know if he did anything on his behalf in 
regard to his criminal prosecution? 
MR. SCHIPPERS: He being? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Colonel North. 

THE WITNESS: I doubt it very much. Ollie has a 
lot of power, but he didn't have that to interfere in a 
criminal case, no. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q You said -- ^^^^ 

A He would have asked me oi^^^^^^to do it 
Q I gather he did not. 
A ~ No. Never. 
Q Were you ever contacted by either the U.S. Attorney's 
office or the FBI in the case? 
A !!J- was not. 

Q Was Colonel North, to your knowledge? 
MR. SCHIPPERS: Do you know if he was? 
THE WITNESS: No 




um 



.^^^^^^was. 



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nffiEASSIPIEBi' 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

^^ was; 
Yes. 
By whom was he contacted? 






Q Wait. I'm talking specifically about the prince 
case We will talk about^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H later . 

A ^^^l^^met the prince 

Q What I'm getting at is, did the prince to your 
knowledge tell the FBI in order to get himself out of 
trouble that he was working for you guys? 

A Never. 

Q So he never gave up your relationship, in other 
words, as far as you know, to the prosector or the FBI? 

A As far as I know. I'm sure that the kind of guy 
he is, he would do anything he could. 

Q You never heard from them. 

A He would say he was working for Ronald Reagan 
direct. ^^^^^^^^ 

MR. WOODCOCK: ^^^^^^H I want to ask you a 
couple of questions based on some notes that appear in note- 
books we have received from Lieutenant Colonel North and 
see if you can shed some light on them. 



IINCLASSIBEL 



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wmm 



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BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q The first one is dated October 31, '85, and it's 
headed "A Call f rom^^^^^^^^^^^H' and then it's got a 
reference to your name and then it says, "Why did Miller 



cal 




Jewel says "nothing pending." Does the FBI 



n 



want this guy. 



A 
Q 
point? 
A 
Q 
A 



The jewel is the prince. 

Right. Do you know what's happening at that 



No, 



Let me go down a few days later. Go ahead. 
It's pretty obvious that I must have said some- 
thing to Ollie that there's something, there's a little 
scam going on here, and I didn't feel comfortable. Because 
I was still overseas then, right? Is this October? 

Q This is October 31. 

A I came back in November and 1 said I don't think 
this is kosher. 

Q ^^^^^^^^1 you have had an opportunity to 
review some of your notes with counsel. Do you think you 
can place this North note in more context? Where do you 
think you were on October 31, '85? 

Q What was happening^^^^^^^^K>n October 31? 
A I had been there almost — how many days? 



I1M£USSJ£1£Q.^ 



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29 




MR. SCHIPPERS: Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: I had gone on this trip starting 
August 25, thereabouts, not exactly. The prince or the 
jewel, whatever you want to call him, had got another guy 
from^^^^^^^^^A^o come over and to go into LebanonI 

He could fly in and fly out. I said 
I didn't trust the guy. The guy from^^^^^^^^^^went over 
there. I gave him maybe 3500 bucks. 

SCHIPPERS: ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
THE He got^^^^^^^^^Hand the 

was supposed to give him more money to go into — the jewel 
gave him nothing. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q In other words, nothing? 

A He just said you go in and come back; I'll give 
you the money. 

Q Let me do this. I'm going to read you a second 
note that North entered on November 4 and this may put this 
in a little more context. I'll ask you to comment on it, 
This is head "A Meeting witr 




Here it starts out, "Jewel insists that deal will sti'Il go 
through." What deal are we talking about? 

A The hostages. 

Q The deal for the hostages? 



Yes. 



wmm 



461 



UNCK^Ft^'^ 



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Q What are the particular terms of the deal? 

A He said he could get two. 

Q What did he have to do to get two? 

A He said he could do it. 

Q Just by asking? 

A Yes. 

Q So there was nothing com^^from the United States 

that was going to release some hostages? 

A Never with the jewel, never. He never asked for 
anything . 

Q There's a reference here dealing with Dr. Rocco, 
R-o-c-c-o. Who was Dr. Rocco, do you know? Does that name 
mean anything to you? 

A Yes. 

Q What does it mean to you? 

He was a jerk f^^^^^^^^fwho the 
duced me to and I said as soon as I saw this guy, I said 
okay. 

Q He's a contact of the prince? 

A Yes. He's a^^^^Bbusinessman but he's a fast 
paper guy. 

Q What was he supposed to be able to do? 

A He was going to move some paper for the prince. 

Q Meaning money? 



IIMSM 



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mmm 



31 



Meaning what? 

I don't think these guys had any money. 



Q 

A 

Q What paper was going to be moved? 

A Letters of credit, phon^ letters of credit. 

Q Now, there's another entry that says , ^^^^| show 
nothing," and under that, "No FBI warrants." Do you know 
what's happening there? 

A Yes. That's when I asked Ollie, "Check the guy 
out further." Because DEA had nothing on this guy. Our 
computer didn't show anything. 

MS. NAUGHTON: When you say "this guy," who are 
we talking about? 

THE WITNESS: Masoudi, the jewel. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q There's a reference capital "J" which I take to 
be an abbreviation for Jewel, says he paid 250K to a bank. 
Do you remember him telling you about that kind of money? 

A Never . 

Q Then there's another reference, says that Miller 
is benefiting. Do you know what's happening there? 

A I don't know nothing about that. I didn't like 
Miller when I first met him, and I still, I wouldn't trust 
the guy as far as I could throw him. 

Q This appears to be a change of subject. There's 
an entry. 3ays,^^^^^^|going back] 



Ti 



!l^ 




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32 



in motion at this point? 

A Yes. ^^^^^^^Hwas always motion. 
Q ^^^^^^H^^ totally separate from the prince; is 
that correct? 

A Exactly. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Can we identify ^^^^^| with a 
source number? 

THE WITNESS: Number one. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Did we assign a number to -- 

WITNESS: ^^^Hno . 1 , ^^^^^^^^No . 
MR. SCHIPPERS: Not in this deposition. There 
were other numbers. Did we establish a number for 




MR. WOODCOCK: We haven't. 
THE WITNESS: Number two. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: No. We have used two. Let's use 
No. 5 just to make sure. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Let's make sure on the fellow from 

'he referred to him as^^^^^^^His that correct? 
THE WITNESS: That's No. 5. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Correct. And his name in fact begins with| 
Is that correct? 

A His first name? 
Q First or last. 




JIMSIOED 



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URBBl^fl^T 



A One of his names, yes. 
Q You also identified him as being] 
correct? 



33 



is that 




BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Let me continue down this note. This contains 
also a reference to source No. 5. It says, "Source No. 5 
says that 2 million could be enough." What's happening 
there? 

A Could be enough. 

Q What's happening? Has he got something, too? 
It say-, "No. 5 says that 2 million could be enough." 



lltimSSlEIEIL. 



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Bi(e«F 



34 



A Yes. 

Q What's happening there? 
A When is this? 
Q This is November 4, '85. 

A We had to -- we had already put a lot of money 
into this, sent seed money over there. And he said that 
for relocation of families, for relocation of his own people, 
2 million may not be enough. But I said, "Hey, we can't 
do it." 

MR. SCHIPPERS: May not be enough? The note says, 
"2 million may be enough." 

THE WITNESS: Dave, you can't say that -- 
MR. SCHIPPERS: Answer the question. 
MR. WOODCOCK: Wait a minute. I'm not so concerned 
about whether it's 2 million is enough or not enough. What 
I'm more concerned about is what 2 million represents. 
You're testifying that 2 million represents money that would 
be used to relocate persons who are helping to rescue the 
hostages; is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: In bribes to certain^ 
^^^^1 people. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q So it's a combination; is that correct? 
A And buy a boat . 



Purchase a boat or rent a boat. 

UNCUfffiL 



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A You've got to buy one because they are going to 
sink the thing. 

Q Why don't you explain that to me. What kind of 
boat is being purchased here? 

A We would have, if we could do it, we would get a 
small boat. We could have one for I think about $40,000. 

Q What kind of a boat is it? 

A A fishing boat because the Israelis are over there 
and the Israelis will sink anything that looks like a pleasure 
craft or anything like that. So they had to get an old 
fishing boat. 




i 



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p^^ ''^ 



'ToTdL. 



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MR. SCHIPPERS: Who was directing source No. 5 
and all of his activities? 
THE WITNESS: Mel 




\ 



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3<^ .r^d 31 






#j&^«^^^ 



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DNttJWffiT 



40 




Q And then down here at the end of the note it 
says owe ^^^H and it has a little tabulation, 13.5, under 
that, 2.4, with a line, and then it says, with a dollar sign, 
$15.9 thousand K. Are those the expenses that have been 
run up over your about 60-day periodi 

A You have to add it up. I don't know. Does that 
come to 166? 

Q The note only comes up to 59. 

A It's mine and^H^^^^^ And I still owe the guy 
noney . 

Q No~ 5? And those are expenses you incurred from 
August 28 until you returned to the United States in early 
November? 

A Yes. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Excuse me. The money you were 
using to pay the guy^^^^^^^^^^^B source were you 
getting that from Colonel North? 

THE WITNESS: Not until we <:ame back. I got the 




IINP.I HflJ 




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imS^EikT 



41 



15,000 in travelers checks from the prince. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Is your question, did the money 
he paid the source No. 5 come out of North's money or out of 
DEA? 

MS. NAUGHTON: That's correct. 
THE WITNESS: North, never DEA. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q What happened to this rescue effort involving 
No. 5? 

A What do you want me to go into a narrative or what? 
Q Let me ask you this. The rescue attempt of 
No. 5 did not succeed, correct? 
A This is not '85. '86. 

The rescue effort with No. 5 did not succeed, 
correct? 

A No. Nothing succeeded. 

Q When was it completely terminated, the No. 5 
effort? 

A I think about August or September, *86. 
Q Of 1986. 

A Whenever Ollie got in trouble. The thing was 
over, but we were still working together. 



Q So the No. 5 effort that's discussed in this 
note -- 



miASSIHED 



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W^^KfiT 



42 




Q So as far as your involvement and No. 5 is 
concerned, that terminated when this thing became exposed 




Q Let me ask you another question. I want you to 
shift forward from August, '85, to August, '86. Do you 



know or did you ever meet IMMMi^ Nir? 

ntT\iruTi\ 

A Never . 

Q Do you know who he is? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you associate him in any way with the prince? 

A Never. 

Q Let me read something to you and see if you have 
any information on it. This is a note dated August 27, 
'86. 

A I remember the day well. 

Q August 27, 1986? How do you remember that? 



msML. 



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A Because I had my back -- I had been digging a 
hole in my yard. My foot slipped off the shovel and I threw 
my back out/ and I went to th^^^^^^^lHospital . ^^^^^w:alled 
me at the hospital and said, "Come on down. You've got to 
come." I said, "I can't even walk " He said, "Well, can you 
drive?" So I drove down there. 

Q What happened when you got down there? 
A Him and some people went into Ollie's office. I 
sat out on Pennsylvania Avenue right in front of the EOB . 
Q What happened? 
A I don ' t k now . 

Q Did^^^^HVant you down there to sit outside the 
office? 

A 
or anything. 

Q Who else went ir to the meeting? 
A ^^^^^B ^^ °^^ °^ ^y best friends. I would drive 
him, you know, any place. I picked my lawyer up, you know. 




ikes drivers, you know. I'm not a boss 



IINCLASSIFIEO 



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Who else was in the meeting? Do you know? 

No. I heard, but I don't know. 

What did you hear? 

I heard they met some Irish guy. That is what 



Q 

A 

Q 

A 
I heard. 

Do you remember his name? 

A I think it is the guy you are talking about, but 
he wasn't under that name. 

Q I need the neune. 

A I don't remember the name, but^^^^^Kaid the 
guy walked in and he had one eye that just stared straight 

he was with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Uwas, 
and source number one. Is this the meeting? ^^^^^^ 

Q This is something else. Let me run this by you 
and see if it means anything to you. This is a note 
from Nir, and it says, "Call from Nir, principals in Paris/ 
Geneva, freed, now trying to make deal with us." 

Do you know of anything going on with the 
principals at this time? 

A No. 

Q There is also a reference — 

A Oh, yes. I do. When we provided the principals 
with some documents I kind of fibbed to 
let's call it I fibbed to the source country. I said that 
he -- this is his idea -- he said, "Look it. If we want to 



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get the hostages out, I will provide a boat load of 
medicine, penicillin," you know, all that stuff, medicine, 
bandages, stuff and that would be an offer on my part, 
an offer, and I can say, "Look, we are trying to help you. 
Now you help me." 

So that was when that was. 

Q Now keep in mind this is August 27, 1986 when you 
put your back out. Is this the period you are talking 
about? 

A No, no, no. 

Q So — 

A What did I say? 

Q This is August 27, 1986, the note that I am 



reading to you. This is a note attributed to a call from 




A I never met Nir, never had anything to do with 
the guy. 

Q Let me just go over this again with you. The 
note reads, "Principals in Paris/ Geneva. Freed, now 
trying to make a deal with us." Now, does that mean 
anything to you in that time period? 

A No. Although I think the principals was in jail 
in Philadelphia then. But I would say — 

Q You are here to enlighten us. 

A This guy could do more from a jail cell if he could 



UIOSWU 



476 



bap- 3 



ufffiiasaRHFT 



46 



1 get a telephone. I never had nothing to do with that, 

2 Q There is another entry that says, "Trying to 

3 make principals put up performance bond." Does that 

4 mean anything to you? 

5 A No. I think that was either Miller or Ollie, 

6 because I think Miller was scared to death. I think I 

7 told you I never trusted Miller. 

8 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

9 Q I am sorry we have to skip around here 

10 chronologically, but we need to go back to the early 

11 summer of '85. There came a time where your plans got 

12 advanced enough that North said he could provide you the 

13 ^200,000 that was needed in order to — for the payment of 

14 bribe and so forth. 

15 A Right. 

Ig Q I gather there came a tijne where somebody was 

17 to actually physically bring the money down eventually 

-|g for your brother to take ^^^^^^^H Can you tell us how 

•jg that came about, how you got called down by North and 

20 so forth? 

21 A I can tell you that. I got a call. I was -- 

22 it was a Friday afternoon. 

23 Q What month are we talking about? 

24 A May . 

25 MR. SCHIPPERS: Are you talking about when he 



iiMfi!:.^^;;™^™ 



477 



wjmm 



47 



1 got the money or when North first got it? 

2 THE WITNESS: May. This is the late or later 

3 part of May. 

4 MR. SCHIPPERS: Is that what you want to know 

5 when they first delivered the money? 

6 MS. NAUGHTON: Right. 

7 MR. SCHIPPERS: Sorry. I was mistaken. 

8 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

9 Q All right. You got a call. 

10 A Fawn called me at home. I was working nights 

11 because we have the 24-hour duty, and said, "Can I come 

12 down there around 6:00 or 7 o'clock because Ollie has got 

13 something?" So I said sure. So I went down there, and 

14 we sat around there until almost the next morning, 2 o'clock. 

15 Finally this guy showed up. 
1g Q Was this Jay Coburn? 

17 A Yes. 

<lg Q Did you know at that point who he worked for? 

19 A No. 

20 Q When did you find out who he worked for? 

21 A I can honestly say I still don't know who he 

22 worked for. I just, you know, I cun not dumb, you know. I 

23 figured out who he worked for, but I did not know at that 

24 time. The only way I knew his name was even Coburn, 

25 because Ollie never said his last name. He said, "This is 



UivbLnuwvHfcirrr 



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ONtmiFIEffi' 

m 

I know, 1 



48 




Jay, this is^^^^ He never even said I was a DEA agent. 
He said, you knoW, this is Jay. 

Q How did you know his name then? 

A Because he had his name on his brief case. 

Q Did you later figure out or discover that he 
worked for H. Ross Perot? 

A No, only through -- is this relevant? 
MR. SCHIPPERS: Answer the question ,j 
please. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: How did you find out? 
THE WITNESS: I read that book. Where Eagles Dare , 
and I found out Jay Coburn was one of Perot's guys. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you ever believe he didn't work for Perot, 
but worked for the Intelligence Agency? 

A CIA, yes. I thought that. But, you know, working 
with Ollie was working with a lot of different people, 
and it wasn't easy to figure out where these people came 
from. 

Q When Coburn finally showed up that night, late 
Friday night or early Saturday morning at Colonel North's 
office, did it appear that they knew each other from 
before? 

A Yes. Oh, yes. 



UMCli^l&lElfll, 



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bap- 6 



wnei^inNFT 



49 



1 Q Could you tell us what they talked about? 

2 A No. I can only say what I talked about. I can 

3 say that after him dropping the brief case this guy, 

4 Coburn, said or Jay said, "Do you know anybody] 

5 I said, "You know, we have got three offices over there. 

6 May be able to help you out." He said, "Some of my 

7 friends that help me in Iran are now in refugee camps 

8 ^^^^^^^^^1 Can you help us get one or two of them out, 

9 especially one." Some little kid. I didn't know what his 

10 name was. 

11 I said, "Hell, check with me later." I said, 

12 "I can't do it at 2 o'clock Saturday morning, you know. 

13 We will see what we can do." 

14 Q Did you indeed help him with that? 

15 A No. He never got back to me. 

16 Q How did he know you were OEA? 

17 A I don't think he knew I was DEA. I think he 

18 knew through Ollie. I don't know. 

19 Q Did he have a suitcase as well as the brief case? 

20 A No. Brief case. 

21 Q Was anything -- 

22 A Ollie had to go down and get him from the 

23 guards and bring him up. I couldn't go down because I had 

24 a gun and once you go through the raetal detector, you 

25 know -- 




iXi 




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leumsF 



50 



1 Q Did you see inside his brief case? 

2 A No, 

3 Q So while he was with Ollie he never opened it up 

4 in your presence? 

5 A Oh, yes. 

6 Q He did? 

7 A He took the money out and put it in Ollie 's brief 

8 case. 

9 Q Okay. Was there anything else in Jay's brief 

10 case? 

11 A Not that I know of. 

12 Q What did he say when he gave him the money? 

13 How did that go to the best of your recollection? 

14 A There were four manilla envelopes. He said, 

15 "Here." Then we chatted and that was that. 

16 Q Were the envelopes sealed? 

17 A Yes. 

■J8 Q Did they have any writing on them? 

19 A Nothing. 

20 Q They were plain? 

21 A The same ones that I took over or my brother 

22 took over. 

23 Q Did Ollie sign any kind of receipt? Was there any 

24 paper exchanged? 

25 A No, never. 



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Q Was there a discussion of what the money would 
be used for? 

A No. 

Did North make any comments to Jay like the 
President really appreciates this or you will be getting 
a letter of congratulations or anything to that effect? 

A Not that I can say. I am sure he said thanks 
a lot, but I don't know what else. I don't remember. 



How long was Jay Coburn there? 

About 45 minutes. 

What else happened other than exchanging some 



Q 

A 

Q 

money? 

A We talked about this^^^^^^Hthing, and we 
joked about how long it took him to get the money from 
Baltimore up there because it took him almost six hours 
because his guards, you know — I don't think $200,000 is 
a lot of money, but his guards could not cross the D.C. 
border. 

MR. WOODCOCK: That will be reassuring to your 
lawyer. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Glad to hear that. 
THE WITNESS: I was sitting there. Ollie and I 
talked about -- you want to hear what we talked about? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Oh, yes. I am fascinated. 
THE WITNESS: When he was out at Quantico, he 

i'?ifti Aooincn 



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bap- 9 



umsmF 



52 



1 was big brother to some black guy. The black guy was 

2 nice and he was this and that, and all of a sudden the 

3 black guy went out and raped some broad, and you know, 

4 we talked. Ollie and I were very tight. 

5 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

6 Q Who is this? Ollie tells you this? 

7 A Yes. Ollie and I talked all the time. We 

8 didn't talk all the time about this stuff, you know. I 

9 mean I considered Ollie a very good friend of mine. But 

10 with Coburn it was just general conversation. This was in 

11 Ollie' s office, and I think it was the third floor, 305. 

12 He had the Nicaraguan posters and all of that stuff, and 

13 we always joked about it» When are you going down south 

14 again. Who cares. 

•J5 Q Did Ollie ever mention to you a plan to use any 

15 of this money from Coburn or Perot for the contras? 
•J7 A No, never. It was always hostages. All he 
13 wanted was to get these people out. And he said that 

19 it was of utmost importance that we get some of these 

20 people out. 

21 Q Did he say why? 

22 A Not at the beginning. Well, the beginning was 

23 Buckley ■■§. Hickey told me that. After I think the 

24 first oil transaction, the drilling parts and everything, 

25 I knew all about that, and I said, "Ollie, if you had given 



UOSSIEKL 



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ionetnis 



OKftASSt^KfiT 



53 



me and^^^^^/hat you are giving to them people, we could 
have done tKis thing six months ago. 

Q You are talking about the missiles. 

A Well, he said it was oil stuff. 

Q That was in November — 

A He would never say that he had ever sent-- to 
me. He would smile, but he would never admit it. 

Q Was this in November of 19 85 when you had these 
conversations or are you talking about after? 

A When I was^^^^^^^l Because I saw it on 
ITV and roy^^^^^Fisnot that good, but I could — 
there was a plane that landed and took off, and I scoped 
a little out. 

Q In November '85? 

A I called him right then. I called him that day. 

Q In November of '85? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ask him about it? 

A I said what about this plane that landed in 
Iran? He says, "It is just oil stuff, you know." And 
the next day the guy got out. 

MR. WOODCOCK: What was it about the next — 
about it that caused you to connect it with North? 

THE WITNESS: Anything that happened over there 
I connected it with North. 



IliihlLrldiliiiukrrn 



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uRtrnp 



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MR. WOODCOCK: You heard that a plane landed 
and took off in Tehran and you associated it with North? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, an American plane. 
MS. NAUGHTON: Did you ask hin about it later? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. He would never say. He 
would give a little twinkle in his eye or something, but 
he would never say anything. He said that is just stuff. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q He always maintained to you it was oil drilling 
equipment? 

A Well I can tell you this. The last time I 
met him he said when Poindexter tells me the old man wants 
something, I will do anything. That is what he said. 

Q Was he referring to the President when he 
mentioned that? 

A I don't know. 

Q Well, he also referred to Casey as the old 
roan occasionally. 

A Yes. I don't know whether it was Casey or the 
President. Casey was still alive then. 

Q We have been jumping around a little bit. When 
is the last time you talked to North where he made this 
comment? 

A The latter part of November of '86. I saw him 
after, but we never talked about it. 



UNDusmiEa. 



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Q And when you did talk about this, did you ask him 
what was going on in terms of the missiles and stuff? 

A No. I said, "Ollie, what are you crazy? 

Q Why? Why was that crazy? 

A I said, "If I knew you had this kind of pull, 
we could have done this thing six months ago and we 
would have been out of here in '85." 

Q Did you have sources who said that they could 
get the hostages released if they received weapons from 
the United States? 

A Yes. 

Which source or sources? 

Source one and two. Or source one and five. 
What did they tell you? 

I have to digress a little here. When we first 
started in January, we went to source number one, the guy 
from^^^^^^Hand as soon as he got there was hit upon by 
high ranking — I think his name was^^^^^^^ I think 
he Is^^^^^^^^^^Hor something or another. And! 
said, "We don't want money. We want guns. We want 
munition. We want armor." He said, "Well, I can't do 
that," because we were under the guise of -- we were under 

cover, so to speak, you know, j 

land everybody over 
there are very, you know -- they are very comfortable with us. 




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nmsiflftT 



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They knew what we were, but they were comfortable with 



MR. WOODCOCK: This isl 
THE WITNESS: No. We just made this up. We 
weren't, you know.; 





MR. WOODCOCK: Let me understand this. Early 
on you are using^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^as a screen, but 
without the active knowledge ol 
Is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: Exactly, yes. Well, I don't 
know we said^^^^^^^^^^^^l but said| 
So... 

MS. NAUGHTON: So^^^^^Hasked for weapons. 

THE WITNESS: he wanted, and our guy said, "Hey, 
look it. I will get you money. I can't get you no 
guns. I can't get you any weapons, tanks, airplanes, 
helicopters. I can't give you anything, but give you 
money. You can go buy them. Buy them in Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia. " 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did you ever take that proposition back to Ollie? 
A Yes. 



And what did he say when you saidj 



[wanted 



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weapons? 

A He said we can't do it. 

Q Was this in 1985? 

A Yes. This is the first — this was in maybe 
March or April, February or March of '85, the first trip 
we took . 

Q Did the stibject ever come up again after the 
spring of '85? 

A No, because I think we had told the source that 
forget it, you know. It has got to be a bribe situation, 
not a ransom, but a bribe situation. And we can't — 
we are not going to provide any weapons. I think even 
before source number five started working for me, I said, 
"Hey, look. If they ask you for guns or anything, forget 
it." He used to take leather jackets, you know, these 
bomadier jackegts because it gets cold up in the mountains. 
He used to take them to these people. 

Q Did five say that they wanted weapons^ Did he 
come back and say they would deal for weapons? 

A Never. Well, he never told me that directly. 

Q Did you ever bring that subject up with North? 

A Never, no. Well — 

Q That five could deal for weapons for the 



hostages? 



Never , no . 



uTwCMEnattif lui-'i 



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Q When 

A We talked about^^^^^^^^^^^iroining to meet 

North and he is going to want something. Now what he 
is going to ask you, I don't know. And then the whole 
thing blew up. 

Q Who was going to come meet North? 

A 




frame? 



MR. GENZMAN: What is the date, general time 

THE WITNESS: I would say September, October. 

MR. GENZMAN: Eighty- five? 

THE WITNESS: Eighty-six. 




MR. GENZMAN: Have you ever me 



THE WITNESS: Yes. 

liCiSSlElEll- 



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MR. GENZMAN: What occasion? 

THE WITNESS: I met hir 

MR. GENZMAN: ^^^^^^B When? 

THE WITNESS: Eight-six, June/ July '86. 

BY MR. GENZMAN: 
Q What did you ^^^^^^^H talk about? 
A I didn't talk to him. 

Q Who was there? One of your sources? Was it 
source five? 

A Source five, yes. 



59 



Q You had no discuss 
present when source five spoke 
A Yes. 

Q What did they talk about? 
A I don't know. 





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But, again, you know, other than saying hello 
and having a drink with him, I didn't do anything. 

Q Had no substantive discussion. 

A After November something or other last year, 
I have never talked about this whole thing except to you 
people and to the Walsh committee, never. My wife doesn't 
even know. 

■ BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q When you talked to Colonel North then in late 
November about when you found out about the missiles and 
so forth, what was his response when you said, "Hey, if 
I had known you were selling missiles — " 

A He never gave me — that is one other thing. 
Ollie always said -- sometimes we would have some other 
things going and Ollie would say, "Look it, can you hold 
back because we have got some other things."! 




491 



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Q You thought the other things Ollie had going 

were other similar actions. 

A They were always to get the hostages out. 

Q Did you have any inkling he was selling missiles? 

A Never. 

Q Once you learned of that when the public news 
came out, did you ever discuss with Ollie or^^^^Hthe 
irony or that you perhaps are working at cross-purposes? 

A Yes. 

Q You were trying to bribe these people with money 
at the same time they were trying to get weapons from 
North. Did you discuss perhaps that was counterproductive? 

A ^^^^^^nd I talked about it. I said, 'If we 
have the resources these people have, we would have got 
this thing over six months ago. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If we could break now. 
MR. GENZMAN: Could I ask one follow-up 
question before we break? We just talked about cross- 
purposes. Could you explain a bit further what you mean? 
THE WITNESS: I didn't ask about them. 
MR. GENZMAN: You just responded to a question 
about cross-purposes and I am not sure I understand what 
the irony is. ^^^^^ 

THE WITNESS: ^^^^Vand I always talked. We 
said if we had the resources that this government has, we 



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could have got this thing over. 

MR. GENZMAN: Would that be by providing weapons 

THE WITNESS: I wouldn't say weapons, no. I 
would say provide money and then given them the right 
connections to buy the weapons. 

MR. GENZMAN: But it is your understanding that 
Colonel North activities were not to provide weapons to 

but we are to provide weapons to the 
Iranians. Is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: Never. I don't know that Ollie 
ever dealt with the Iranians until I read it in the 
newspaper . 

MR. GENZMAN: That was after November of '86? 

THE WITNESS: Whenever it was. Whenever that 
day was, newspaper got out. 

MR. GENZMAN: Early November of 1986. 

THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
. (Recess. ) 



UNCLASSIRED 



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l)B3KSSfl!fT 



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MR. SCHIPPERS: Before we proceed, may I make a 
statement for the record? 

MS. NAUGHTON: Of course. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: To put the testimony we are getting 
today in the proper frame of reference, I should mention last 
evening ^^^^^^^Hpi eked me up at the airport and an accident 
occurred in connection with his radiator, which, as a conse- 
quence, his right arm has been scalded almost up to the 
shoulder, and he suffered some injuries. As a consequence, 
he was unable to sleep all last night and he is not under any 
medication but he had no sleep whatever last night. So if 
some of his answers tend to ramble a little bit, that's the 
reason. Thank you. 

MS. NAUGHTON: For the record, I should also say 
we may ask for supplemental information which Mr. SchipperS 
has agreed to provide. 

MR. SCHIPPER: There will be no problem with that. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q If we can get back now to the Jay Coburn payment 
of $200,000, what happened subsequently? Can you explain 
to us why you were there at all to wait for Mr. Coburn when 
all that really happened was Coburn gave money to North and 
North put it in the safe? 

A It was explained to me that any large amounts of 
money, unappropriated money, we were not to have our hands 



mmsm. 



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on. He just wanted me there. He didn't say anything. 

Q There was no reason given for you why you were 
there? 

A Well, prior to this we had given Ollie a little 
diagram how we were going to go, where the money was going 
to go. ^^^^^fwasn't there, so he called me. 

Did you tell Ollie where the money was going to go? 
to this 
it would not go from us directly. 
Q You stated that it was your understanding that you 
were not to handle the money directly. 
A Yes. 

I think you used the term "unappropriated funds"? 

Right. 

Where did you get that idea? 

From J 



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11 : 00 a.m. 

Dinkel ^ 

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Q And where did he say he had heard that or been 
told that? 

A I assume -- I cannot say where he said. I can 
only assume it would be from Lawn, or somebody else. I don't 
know. ^^^^^^ 

Q When^^^^^B^told you not to handle the money 
personally — ^^^^^w 

A He never told me not to handle the money personally 
Don't get me wrong there. ^^^^^^ 

Q Okay. What did^^^^^Btell you? 

A He said we can't do tHis. You got to jgT somebody. 
So Ollie said who is going to handle it? You want" t.o get a 
guy? You want me to get a guy? I said if I have to work 
with the guy, I will get a guy. 

Q Oid^^^^^^Btell Ollie why you couldn't do this? 
told^^^^^^r ^^^^^Viad 
already been told by somebody, some — you know, up above. 

Q This is kind of important. Was it North that said 
you can't -- I have been told you can't handle non-.. 
appropriated funds? 

A Yes. Yes. 

Q Did North say he had been told that by the 
Attorney General? 

A I don't think he said that, in words to me. I -- 
(Witness conferring with counsel.) 



UMCI&<IS1F1FJL 



496 



DKKASSt^T 




CAS-2 1 MR. SCHIPPERS. Why don't you ask him — if i may 

2 make a suggestion — ask him what North told him about his 

3 conversation with the Attorney General? 

4 MS. NAUGHTON: Okay. 

5 THE WITNESS: He said he talked to the A.G. at his 

6 house. He said the A.G. got to run it by Webster. 

7 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

8 Q The A.G. what? 

9 A Had to run it by Webster, Webster would run it by 

10 Lawn and there were no problems. But we can't touch it. 

11 But I don't know this. 

12 MR. SCHIPPERS. 

13 MS. NAUGHTON: I understand. 

14 MR. SCHIPPERS. Did you get the whole conversation? 

15 MS. NAUGHTON: We will do it step-by-step. 
15 MR. SCHIPPERS. All right. 

17 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

18 Q First of all — 

19 MR. SCHIPPERS: Listen to the question. 

20 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

21 Q First of all, when did North tell you that? 

22 A I would say early April. 

23 Q Okay. 

24 MR. SCHIPPERS. We can get a better date. 

25 THE WITNESS: Two weeks before we got the money. 



I1MCUSS1E!ED._ 



497 



CAS -3 



Ufffiftsafflff 



67 




Right around the same time we got the money, that Coburn came. 
June, April? May. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q You told us Coburn dropped offthe money late May? 
A I can tell you the exact date. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: We_will get you some dates. Just a 
second. Just a minute 

THE WITNESS: You know, I hate to ask. 
MR. SCHIPPERS: ^^^^Aright here. 
THE WITNESS: I think the 24th of May. 
MR. SCHIPPERS: Early June is the best we can come 
up with. Early June 1985. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Is that for Mr. Coburn ' s delivery? 
THE WITNESS: Conversation with North. 
MR. SCHIPPERS: After the delivery, but before they 
take the money. Some time in early June. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Okay. Colonel North told you that he had — did 
he tell you he had briefed the Attorney General on how the 
plan was going to operate? 

A Ollie never talked about that. Ollie said, hey, 
look it, I am going to talk to Meese, Webster, this guy. 
Maybe he said I will talk to the President. Ollie was like 
that. He usually was a very name dropper. 

Q Yes. But what you told us before — correct me 



JiUGI LCCICIEO, 



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if I an wrong — is that North said he had talked to the 
A.G. at his house. 

A He was'going to^. 

Q Okay. But then when^ did you get the information 
from North that you shouldn't handle the funds directly? 
Was that after he had^ spo ken^ — 

A I got that fron 

MR. SCHIPP£BS: Let iCe have a second. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. SCHIPPERS: If I might make a suggestion, pass 
this for now. Either pass it for now or start all over. 

THE WITNESS: You are talking about a year-and-a- 
half aga. I am trying to recollect what somebody said to 
me. You know, at that time it meant nothing to me. 
BY MS. NAUGHTONi 

Q I am not as concerned with vrtiat it might have 
meant to you, what you felt about it, whatever. What I am 
interested in is what people told you. I want to start with 
Colonel North. 

A All right. 

Q Did he tell you at some point that he had spoken 
to the Attorney General about this? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he tell you that he had briefed the Attorney 
General or told him about the plans? To use the -- the 



Mussm. 



499 



uwijiMii^ 



69 



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private monies -- 

A No. 

Q What did he tell you he told the Attorney General? 

A He said he had spoken to McFarlane. McFarlane 
okayed everything and said you talk to the Attorney General. 

Q Okay. 

A Or he talked to Meese. I don't think they said 
Attorney General. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Go ahead. Then what? 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did Ollie tell you he talked to Meese? 

A Yes. 

Q What did he tell you he told Meese? 

A He said Meese would clear it with Webster and, 
you know, he didn't see any pro blem s. This was just for 
us, me, and — or myself an^^^^Hto work with. Because 
at that time DBA was questioning 'bur association. 

Q Okay. I understand that part. What I am asking 
about now is the actual plan that you had with source one 
and the 200,000 to be paid and so forth and so on. Okay? 

Did North tell you he briefed the Attorney General 
about that? Now, this would have been early June? 

A With our first plan, yes. 

Q And did he tell you that the Attorney General had 
any comments or advice — wait for the question — on 

Unci /L£f iCLClL. 



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70 

whether or not unappropriated or private monies could be 
used to pay these bribes? 
A Never. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: May I make a suggestion? I think 
you have to clarify if you would ask him specifically how 
he found out about it? From who and how he found out about 
not using the appropriated funds or not touching appropriated 
funds. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I will. But I want to stick with 
what North said. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q When North told you he briefed the Attorney 
General on the plan, that is the $200,000 plan, what did he 
tell you that the A.G. said about it? 

A To the best I can say, he said that Meese would 
talk to Webster and Webster would okay it. 

Q Did you ever understand why Webster had to be 
involved in it? 

A He is in charge of the DEA. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Speak up just a little. 
THE WITNESS: Jack Lawn is in charge of DEA. But 
he is — he stilL has to report to the FBI. 
MS. NAUGHTON: All right. 

MR. GENZMAN: Let me interject. You said North 
said the Attorney General would — said he would clear it 



wuwm. 



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with Webster. What was the "it"? 

THE WITNESS: Sc^^^Hand I could work this thing. 
MR. GENZMAN: Can you be more specific? 
THE WITNESS: ^^^^Hand I could work with 
Colonel North. 

MR. GENZMAN: Thank you. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Now, when you were told that you could not 
personally handle unappropriated funds, that someone else 
should do that, who told you that? 
A Ollie. 

Q And did he tell you why? 
A No. 

Q Did he tell you where he had gotten that idea? 
A No. He didn't. 

Q Did he tell you this after he briefed the 
Attorney General? 

A I don't know — 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Time out. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE WITNESS: It was after. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q And when Colonel North told you that you would have 
to have another guy, because you couldn't handle the funds, 
what did he say about that issue? 



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A He said do you want to get a guy or can I pick my 
own guy? 

Q But did he tell you why you needed another guy? 
Why you couldn't do it? 

(Witness shakes head.) 
MR. SCHIPPERS: Out loud. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Is that a no? 
No. 
Okay. 

:old me that. 
Didf^^^^Viell you that before this conversation? 
3ai4 you either get your brother or I will 

old you you needed another guy, did 



lell you? 

Ls is a large sum of unappropriated 
monies. I don't think he said it in those words, but he 
said we can' t touch this money. 

Q Did^^^^Htell you where he got that idea? 
A Fran Lawn. Jack Lawn. Our administjrator-*' 
Q Did he say that Lawn had consulted anybody else 
on that issue? 




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A I don't know. I don't questioni 

Q I am not asking if you questioned him. I am asking 
you if he told you that Lawn had not talked to anybody else. 

A No, he did not. No. 

Q So would I be correct in saying that your sense of 
not being able to handle the private monies came from both 
ind Colonel Nort h? 

A Yes. More f rom^^^^^^^^^Bthan from Colonel 
North. ^^^^^^^^ 

Q Did Colonel North tell you that he had put this 
plan down on paper and sent it up the line for approval? 

A Never. 

Q Have you ever seen -- during that time or since — 
any memoranda that Colonel North prepared in describing 
your plan? 

A No. We gave him a one time. We gave him a 
s c h e ma t i c ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^K. n vo 1 v i ng 
sensitive names. I don't know what he did with it. I don't 
know where it went. 

Q Did he destroy it in your presence? 

A No. 

Q So he kept it as far as you know? 

A As far as I know. 

Q Just for the record, did you prepare any reports 
on your activities to be sent to Mr. Lawn? 



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Never. 

Did you prepare — 

Well, wait a minute. There was 



74 



the first 



three months, I gave Abraham Azzam some briefings. Because 
this guy didn't know what he was going anyway. He had a 
piece of paper in front of him. So, you know, but it was 
all what do you call it? Fluff. It was all — 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Fluff is better than any other 
word. 

THE WITNESS: Everything was moving along the way 
it was supposed to. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Were these all oral reports? 

A No. This was in writing. You should have them 
from Azzam. Did you talk to Av^am? 

Q Yes. We don't have reports from you. 
Did you keep copies of these reports? 

A No. This is only the first three months, 
January, February, March. Not even January, really. February 
and March. 

Q Were these typewritten reports as opposed to 
handwritten reports? 

A Typewritten. Not by me, but one of the 
secretaries typed them. 

Q Did you ever prepare any written reports, either 



imssm^ 



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HNtmHEfiT 



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handwritten or typed for Colonel North? 

A Never. 

Q Did you ever submit vouchers or claims or receipts 
to Colonel North for your expenses? 

A Well, you would have to, you know, go into that at 
length. I would sometimes give him a little piece of paper, 
say this and that. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Let me interrupt for a second. 

kyou have to speak up. He is having a hell of a time 
"picking you up. 

THE WITNESS: I would sometimes take a little 
piece of paper and I would say, hey, this is telephone 
calls, this is laundry, this is the bill. He would take 
them. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Would these be — 

A Not every time. Sometimes I would call him up 
and say, hey, it is about six to eight hundred. He never 
had a problem. He never paid us on time. 

Q Why not? 

A He would give it to us if he had it, but he didn't 
always have it. Sometimes, I mean, we waited three, four 
months. 

Q Did he tell you why he didn't have it? 

A This is a very -- 

i| UPC!! 



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MR. SCHIPPERS: Answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q He never told you why he didn't have it? 

A He would say "I ain't got it." 

Q Was it your understanding these were private 
monies or Government monies? Just — 

A I thought it was CIA money. 

Q Monies just for your expenses. I am not 
talking about — 

A I always thought it was from Dewey or Clair George 
or somebody like that. 

Q Why did you think then that North couldn't get it? 
Or was — why he had to be late with the payments? 

A I really can't answer that. I don't know. That is 
the way he was. He is that type of person. He trusts you. 
I trusted him. He always — sooner or later, he always 
paid. Or came up with our expenses. I mean, you know, 
if I went back — 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Okay. You answered the question. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Does he owe you any more? Were you out any 
money by the time it was all over? 

A I would say yes, sure. 

Q Can you give us an estimate? 



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A No. 

Q A hundred dollars? A thousand dollars? 

A I would say about six, $7,000. 

Q If you thought it was Government money, why is it 
that you thought you didn't have to submit receipts and 
vouchers and claim forms, et cetera? 

A He wanted it that way. He said I don't want to 
see no reports. I said, do you want to see -- he said I 
don't want to see anything. I trust you. He tried us 
out, you know, once or twice. After that — 

Q What do you mean "tried you out"? 

A You know, if you ceune back with ludicrous things. 
Actually, we probably came back with low, because we would 
always complain^^^^^^^^^^^Hthe hotel bills, the 

telephone bills. You would spend maybe six, $70Q ^ day just 

in telephones. I would say, Ollie, why don't you give your 
secretary a call. He would say, no, you call me. 

Q Did he say he didn't warrtt the vouchers just 
because he trusted you or because he didn't want things 
in writing? He didn't want a record? 

A I think because he trusted us. 

Q That was the only reason given to you for it? 

A That is the only thing I can — he never asked 
for anything. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You testified you assumed he was 



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78 



getting the money from the CIA; is that right? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You had received money from the CIA 
yourself in mid-March of 1985? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: When you received that money you 
had to sign a receipt for it? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You later filled out purchase of 
evidence forms, DEA forms; is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. But not for the DEA. Just for, 
you know, giving the money. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Whose forms were they that you fille< 
out? 

THE WITNESS: I used DEA forms. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Who did you give them to? 

THE WITNESS: Sou'ce one. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Let me show you something. 

You gave source number one $50,000 — the $50,000 
you received from the CIA in two installments; is that 
right? 

A Exactly. 

Q Let me show you — actually we should have this 



nraDuni 



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marked as an exhibit. 

(Exhibit^^^B-2 was marked for identification.) 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Let me show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit number 2. 

A This is the S10,000? 

MR. SCHIPPERS: No. He is just showing you that. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Take a look at that, please. 

That is a form that evidences the transmission of 
$30,000 to source number one; is that right? 
A Right. 

Q And your signature is on that form; is that 
correct? 
A 
Q 
correct? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 



Right. 

Also, the signature of 




is that 



Correct. 

Who did you fill that form out for? 

Myself. 

You can see that in the — on the form are 
letters indicating the agency, CIA, which means that we 
received this form from the CIA. When you filled that 
form out, did you know it was going over to the CIA? 

A Yes. Well, I guess they asked for somethir.g. 

IIMPI ACCinrn 



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Q My question is, as you received money from the 
CIA, and the CIA ultimately received paperwork on what you 
did with the money, as is evidenced by this form, yet you 
also received money from North which you understood to be 
CIA money; correct? 

A yes. 

Q Did it occur to you that North would also have to 
justify to the CIA what he was doing with the money he 
was giving to you? 

A North could do whatever he wanted to do with his 
money as long as he gave it tome and didn't ask for a 
receipt. I don't care what he gave to the CIA, XYZ, or 
anybody else. 

Q What I am asking you is different than that. What 
I am asking you is did you believe that North would have to 
justify to the CIA what he did with the money he gave to you? 

A Yes. 

W 
Q How ^s he going to do that if you didn't give 

him the basis on which you spent the money? 

A I don't know. 

Q Did you ever ask him about that? 

A No. . •• -• 

Q How long have you been in Government? 




And as a DEA agfent, you have had to justify your 



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mmm 



81 



expenses, correct? 

A Always. 

Q When you go on a trip, you justify your expenses? 

A Always. 

Q When you give money to an informant, you detail thai 
in writing; don't you? 

A Always. 

Q So that to the extent North wasn't asking you for 
documentary support for your expenses, that was not in line 
with your expenses as a Government employee; is that 
correct? 

A Now, wait, that is a little — I would say that in 
all my years ^^^Hl never worked — I never worked for anybody 
like Ollie North before. 1 have always had to justify 
everything. I have justified everything. 

You can go bacK through my career. I have been in 
a lot of trouble, but I have always justified everything. 
I have been cleared, exonerated of everything I have ever 
done. It is just working with Ollie was like a breath of 
fresh air. We will do it. Go do what you want to do. 

Q But ~ 

A As long as we are trying to get the hostages. 
That is all he was — he was — you know, how can I say it? 
He was passionately involved in this hostage thing. 

Q Understanding that North was unique in your 



uMiU fr^lEIL 



512 



||lfQl<SSIDBE' 

unuu\ootrn!lr 



82 



CAS-18 1 Government experience, still, didn't it occur to you, given 

2 your Government experience, he might be making a lot of 

3 trouble for himself if he didn't ask you for the back-up 

4 documentation for how you spent the money he gave you? 

5 A That is his problem. It ain't mine. 

6 Q Well, you had some regard for North, did you not? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q You didn't want to see him get in trouble, did you? 

9 A No. 

10 Q Well, then didn't you, as a friend, want to take 

11 him aside and say, hey, look, Ollie, you could be creating 

12 a problem for yourself because you are not documenting 

13 what I am doing with the Government money you are giving me. 

14 A Yes. I can understand where you come from, but 

15 I just cannot say that — I mean I just can't answer that. 

16 I can't say that I was worried about Ollie. I was — hey — 

17 Q Did you just think he could do whatever he wanted 

18 to do? 

19 A No. I don't think he could do whatever he wanted 

20 to do. He always said that this is okay. I don't know who 

21 okayed it, but — 

22 (Witness conferring with counsel.) 

23 THE WITNESS: I never, ever questioned Ollie 's 

24 or Colonel North's justification for where he got the 

25 



1 



money. I don't know. 



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BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q You never — 

A And he never questioned mine or 
Never . 

Q You assumed he was getting it from the CIA; is 
that right? 

A I -- 

Q Did you ever ask him? 

A All except the 200. 

Q Pardon? 

A The 200 I knew. 

Q Let's put the 200 aside. Did you ever ask him 
when you were getting this money from him where he was gettin j 
it from? 

A Never. Never. ^^^^^^^^^^ 

Q Do you know if ^^^^^^^^^^^^ever asked him that? 

A I don't know. You have to asl^^^^^^that. 

Q Did you and^^^^Hever talk to each other about 
where Ollie was getting this money? 

MR. SCHIPPERS: During this period? 
MR. WOODCOCK: During this period. 
THE WITNESS: Sure. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q What did you say to one another about it? 

A He always had it in the third drawer of his safe. 



imoFe 



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Q That was unusual in your Government experience, 

too, was it not? 

(Witness nods head.) 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q It was? 

A Yes. Yes. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: You have to answer audibly. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Did you and ^^^^^^^^^^ever talk about that, that 
he was a Government employee and pulled money out of a 
safe in his office? 

A I am sure we did, but I am not — I can't. 

Q Did you ever think to report back to DEA that this 
was an unusual circumstance? 

A No. 

Q What? 

A Never. 

Q Why not? Why not? 

A I can't answer that. I don't know why. It just 
looked like — you are asking me a question I can't answer. 

Q Let me ask the question a little differently. 
You said earlier in your testimony you had been in trouble 
before and always had been able to justify your way out of 
it; is that right? 

A No. I have always been exonerated. 



515 



CAS- 21 



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Q In those instances — 

A Never having to do with anything like this. 
Q I understand. Have the records that you kept 
ever played a role in exonerating you? 
A Never. 

Q The records you kept have never played a role 
in exonerating you? 
A Never. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: I can clarify that. 

THE WITNESS: 

MR. SCHIPPERS: 




That is what he was talking 
about. It had nothing to do with records. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Let me ask the question differently. 
You have been with DEA now foi 
various titles. 
A 

Q You have travelled as a DEA agent? 
A Yes. 
Q And you keep records of your travel; right? 





A No. 



mmm 



516 



Dffiassmr 



86 



CAS-22 ' Q How do you justify your expenses when you come back 

MR. SCHIPPERS: You misunderstand the question. 
THE WITNESS: I keep records when I travel for DEA. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q If any question arose out of what you put in for a 
travel request, the records you keep would assist you in 
justifying your expenses, correct? 
A Yes. 

Q When you worked with Ollie North, you did a great 
deal of travelling, correct? 

A Correct. Not — yes. Quite a bit. 
Q Yet the way he ran the operation, you weren't 
required to keep records of where you travelled or how you 
travelled or how much it cost you; correct? 
A Correct. 

Q Didn't it ever occur to you that further down the 
iabd, you might get into trouble for being unable to justify 
your own expenses? 
A Never. 
Q Why not? 

A Because, again, you asked me a question. You want 
me to expound. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Tell him. Answer the question. 
Why weren't you worried? 

THE WITNESS: If I thought that this thing was 



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87 



going to come down to this, I probably would have. I did 
not believe that anybody that is working for the United 
States Government would ever be questioned in order to 
release some American people being held hostage by a hostile 
country in risking their lives. I would not believe that. 
I still don't believe it today. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Now you — 

A And I don't care how much money. You give me 
52 million. I will take S2 million. You think I would 
take 10 cents? I won't take 10 cents from these people. 
If they want the money , ^^^^^^^^^^| want the money, give it 
to them. 

Q My question is, your travel records protect 
yourself? 

A I don't have travel records. I don't have anj 
MR. SCHIPPERS: Listen to the question] 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Your travel records protect you from any later 
auditing. That has been your experience as a Government 
employee? 

A For DEA, yes. 

Q Right. 



lave anv. 

■i 



You can go get my DEA records. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: No. Listen to the questions 



n 



518 



mmm 



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BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q I want to understand your testimony on this. Is it 
your testimony that it was the nature of the mission that 
caused you to believe that you did not have to keep the same 
kind of travel records that you would have had to keep with 
DEA? 

A Yes. 

Q Is it also your testimony that it was the nature 
of the mission that would have taken you out of any question 
about those records should any questions arise? 

A Yes. Exactly. In all the travel I did, Mr. Lawn, 
my director, my administrator, who is a fine man, never 
asked. All he said was, look, you are cleared. Or he 
tolc^^^^^H you guys can do it with North. 

Q Did it ever occur to you to go to your 
administrator and say you wouldn't believe the way they do 
business over there at the NSC, Ollie just pulls open a 
dravnr and gives us money. 

A Yes. I said I wish I could work like that all 
the time. 

Did you say that to your administrator? 

A I never said it to him. I never talked to Lawn. 



Q Did you ever talk to anybody in DEA about this 
strange procedure of pulling money out of a drawijr? 



msmifa. 



519 



Hit Ai ■ ^A inr^ 



89 



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A No. We did it when we were -- when we had the 
CIA money. We just went up to New York and gave the 
guy 20, 30 grand. You know. 

Q I am talking about — there you had to go to CIA 
and sign for the money; right? 

A I had to. 

Q What I am talking about now is when you went to 

e. 

North's office, North pulls up a drawfr, gives you some 

money. Did it ever occur to you to go back to the 
people at DEA and say, gee, this is unusual, this is a 
strange way of doing business, you won't believe it? 

A I am sure we talked about it. We didn't go up to 
the boss and say, hey, you know, there is something funny 
going on here. 

Q I am not talking about something funny. I am just 
talking about something very much out of the ordinary. 

A I am not saying something funny. Not something 
queer or unusual. Ever. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Can we go off the record for a 
second? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

THE WITNESS: I will go back on the record and 
say at times Colonel North has asked me to go do something 
and said I don't have any money, can you do it? Sooner or 
later, three months, two months down the line, he would 



UNCUl^m, 



520 



mmm 



90 



CAS- 26 ^ give me the money. 

2 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

3 Q Did you just chalk that up to this being a covert 
^ operation? 

5 A No, because I trusted Ollie. 

6 Q No. I mean this lag in time between your 

7 incurring expenses and him paying you the expenses? 

8 Is that your understanding of how the Government 

9 ordinarily works? 

10 A No. 

11 Q What did you attribute that to? 

12 A Well, you know, and I know. But I didn't 

13 know then. 

14 MR. SCHIPPERS: He is asking you what you attributec 

15 it to — 

16 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

17 Q At the time. 

18 MR. SCHIPPERS: Why did you think you had to wait 

19 three months? 

20 THE WITNESS: I don't know where his money came 

21 from. 

22 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

23 Q You assumed it came from CIA? 

24 A Casey was already — always gone. 

25 MR. SCHIPPERS: Wait a minute. Let's get the answe;- 



WiCLiliLllI^fJL 



521 



iweasaflffi' 



91 



CAS- 27 ' on the record. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q What did you attribute the lag of time between your 
incurring expenses and North paying your expenses to? 

A I would think that Ollie would put in like every 
month some kind of voucher to the CIA and sometimes he had 
arguments with certain people. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: In the CIA? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Did you know who they were? 
A And he would always say — I don't have any 
money. I have to wait until the old man comes back. 

Q Meaning Casey? Is that correct? Is that what 
you -- 

A I assumed that, yes. I don't say it is correct. 
I assume that. 

Q Did you ask him why the people were objecting to 
the vouchers he was submitting? 
A Never . 

Q So you had no idea what the problem was? 
A No. 

Q But did he tell you that he was submitting 
vouchers to the CIA? 

A No. I assumed this. 



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mmm 



92 



CAS-28 ' Q Where does this conversation come from that you are 
describing to me? 

A I would tell him, hey, look, my American Express 
is calling me. 

Q What does North say when you say that? 

A He says I will get it for you as soon as I can. 
Trust me. He says, I am having a problem. 

Q With whom? 

A He never said. He said, I aim having a problem, I 
am a little short, trust me. 

He said somebody is out of town or out of the 
country. 

Q Okay. I want to re-trace this testimony because 
now I aun confused on it. There was from time to time a lag 
in your incurring expenses and North paying you for those 
expenses; correct? 

A Exactly. 

Q And there was at least one occasion when you, 
during this lull or this lag time, told North, look, I have 
got a problem with these expenses, what can you do about it; 
is that correct? 

A Exactly. 

Q And North's response was you have got to trust 
me, you have got to give me more time, somebody is out of 



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town; is that correct? 



UNCLASSIHED 



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A That is correct. 

Q Now, was that a sequence that was repeated on any 
other occasion? 

A This was done just about every time. 
Q Did it occur to you that was unusual in your 
Government experience? 
A Yes. 

Q Did you ask North what kind of an operation he 
was running that he couldn't pay in the ordinary way a 
Government voucher, or a Government-incurred expense? 
A I never gave him a Government voucher. 
Q Let me ask it differently. A Government- incurred 
expense? That he couldn't pay that in the ordinary way? 

A No. But I think from the start Colonel North 
explained, he said, hey, look, we get the money when we 
can get it. That is it. 

Q Does that sound like Uncle Sam to you? 
A No. 

Q Did it sound like Uncle Same to you at the time? 
A Did it what? 

Q Did it sound to you like the way the Federal 
Government works at the time when he said we can get the 
money when we can get it? 



Yes. 



It did? 



UNCUSSiHED 



524 



ONesi^iffiv^ 



94 



CAS- 30 



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A Yes. 

Q Why? 

A Because I worked with the CIA many times. And I 
have yet to meet one guy that told me his right naune, let 
alone give me money on time. 

They still owe me money from when I went to | 
for them, pulled a guy out of ^^^^^^^B They are 

Q So you did think this was the ordinary — 

A I ~ 

Q Wait a minute. Is it your testimony this was the 
usual way the CIA worked in your experience? 

A No. I wouldn't say — I am not coming down on the 
CIA. I think they do a good job, as well as they can do. 
They don't do things the way other agencies do them. 

Q And -- 

A I think if Colonel North had legitimate expenses 
that would take him about a month or two months to get the 
money out of the CIA, yes. I will tell you that. 

Q So nothing in that experience led you to question 
whether this was in fact Government money you were receiving, 
is that your testimony? 

A He never gave me anything except cash or travellers' 
checks. 

Q Okay. But that is a different question. There is 
nothing in this lag time that led you to believe that this 



liyruccicuia,, 



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■95 




money that you were receiving from him was not in fact U.S 
Government funding? 

A I never worried about it. 
Q Wait a minute. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Listen to the question. 
Try to answer it. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q There was nothing in your experience with this 
lag time, your going out incurring large expenses and 
waiting months to be repaid, that led you to believe that 
North was using something other than U.S. Government money to 
pay you back; is that correct? 
A Correct. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Okay. Forging right ahead. Still in May or 
June of 1985, how soon after Jay Coburn arrived with the 
money. Colonel North put it in the safe, did you actiAjxIiy 

c 



a 



leave ^^^ 

A About a month. 

Q About a month went by? Okay. 

And what did you tell your brother in rec^''*^ i 
to this assignment? ^^^^^^^^^^^ 

For the record, your brother , ^^^^^^^^^^H(^^)(^j~- 
along with you on this trip; is that correct? 



MJ^rl 



UMCUSSiiarn^ 



526 



wmm 



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A Right. 

Q What was the purpose for him going alone? 

He was going to -- he was going -- he would carry the 
money . 

Q Okay. Did you tell him why he would have to carry 
the money? 

A Yes. 

Q What did you tell him? 

A I told him that we are working on this 
official hostage thing and we had some money here, but 
I can't take it, are you available? And he said, well, 
when can we do it? 

Q Now, for the record, your brother] 
^^ is that correct? 

A Correct. ^^^ 

^^^^^^^Hf^^^mH^^^^^^^^^^^^Hhe made the 
acquaintance of Ed Hickey; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Ed Hickey later became Assistant to the President; 
is that correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Your brother^^^^^^^^^Hand did at the time 
he helped you with the money. Could you explain what kind 
of business he has? 

A For that firm? 





UNCLASSIFIED 



527 



IXmUPiBT 



97 



CAS-33 1 

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Q Yes. What does the firm do? 

A 

Q 

A Yes. 

Q Aside from your brother and yourself, did 
anybody else go ^^^^^^^^Rwith you on this trip? 

A No. 

Q What did you do about the currency transaction 
reporting requirements in regard to taking the money out 
of the country? 

A Absolutely nothing. 

Q You didn't fill out any forms? 

A No. 

Q Did you clear it with Customs ahead of time? 

A Yes. 

Q How did you do that? 

A I called -- well, I shouldn't say that I did. I 
think I called^^^H\nd^^^^^alled the DEA and the DEA 
called Customs and said tha^^^^Bjknd his brother are 
coming out with — or^^^^^pn^artother guy will be out 
there and they are going to take $200,000 out and it is 
all official. 

Q Was the reason for the trip given to Customs as far 



as you know? 



A Never. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



528 



UNCLA^tlWT 



98 



-AS-34 



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Q Now, was there -- were there any wheels greased, 
so to speak ^^^^^^^^H so that your landing and arrival 
would be — 

Even in ^^^^^H when we got to ^^^^^^Athey 
opened the bags. They saw the money. They didn't even look 
at the money. They went looking for hand grenades or 
something. 

Q Did you have to report the money at allj 

A Never. 

Q How long were you I 

A Three, four hours. 

Q And from^^^^^^B^here did you go? 

A 

Q How long were you 

A Two days . 

Q Where did you go from^ 

A 

Q Is thaf where you met the source? 

A No. We met the source and the sources sub-source 








Q Does the sub-source have a code name? 

A 

Q ^ And you met themj 

A Yes, 

Q Did they travel with youj 




529 



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UTOffl^FfffT 



99 



A The source did. The sub-source took the money and 




Q What did you do with the money once you arrived 



What did your brother do with the money once you 
arrived \~ 

MP. SCHIPPERS: You mean physically? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did you keep it at the hotel? 

A The same day -- we got in around four o'clock 
in the afternoon. You can check the flights. I am pretty 
sure it was four o'clock. ^^^^^^^^^Hcicked us up at the 
airport. 
Q 
A 

We went to the hotel. He pointed out the sub- 
source. I met with the source. So I said, well, let's go 
up to the room. I think we were in my room or my brother's 
room. The source came up. There were four manilla 
envelopes, that color. 

(Witness indicating.) 

THE WITNESS: Each containing — I never counted 
it- all, but I assume each containing S50,000 and we turned 




it over to him. 



.UMTLK^iFlFJ] 



530 



UNSKSSIfieF 



100 



CAS-36 



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Q Source one? 
A Source one. 
Q Okay. 

A We went downstairs. He left. My brother and I 
;nt downstairs and were later joined by the 

rfho always had his briefcase with him. 




WUSSIElFn 



531 




;:#im '-'■'loi 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON 
Q Did he pay for 
A This is 
Q Oh, I see 



Q Did he pay for that or did you? 

A I eiin sure — I don't know. I don't remember. I 
would think that that source one paid for that. He always 
paid for everything. Not everything. I mean, everything to 
do with his sub-sources. 

Q Now, while you were in transit with the money and 
when you arrived ^^^^^^^^ your brother had custody of tihe 
money; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q But he was doing with it what you wanted him to 
do with it, instructed him to? In other words, it was not 
his to spend as he saw fit? 

A Correct . 

Q Did you emd your brother leave^^^^^Bat the same 
time? 

A No. 

Q Did you stay? 

A went — after^^^^^Hl went back ^^^^^^H with 
the source. 




Could we have a time period? 



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102 



A Because ^^^^^^^^^^^^V" latter part of 
June. No. I only spent a day or two. 
Q So In late June you left fori 
A I would say June 28th, 29th, 30th, something 
like that. July 2nd. Because there was a TWA highjacking. 
Q Okay. July 2nd you went back to the U.S.? 
to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B Inbetween 
there was the TWA highjacking. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: No. Yes. June 30th. Yes. 




BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q If w e could ba ck up for a minute, afte r the money 
had been paid^^^^^^^^^ why did you go I 

A Because the source did not feel comfortable going 



He wanted to 




right in with the — the sub-sourcej 
see how that would impact. 

Q But why 

A 
We met 
how things were going. 

Q Why did your brother 



IIMHliSSI 



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WSMP&: 



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A He went ^^^^^^H he stayed one day, and then he 
went back to New Yorki 

Do you know how your brother was paid? 

A Travellers' checks. 

Q Travellers' checks? 

A Yes. 

Q From whom? 

A Colonel North. 

Q Were these drawn on a Central American bank? 

A You say "Central", I say "South". 

Q South American? , 

A Yes. Equador, I think. 

Q Do you know how much your brother was paid? 

A $5,000. I got $5,000, he got $5,000, and 

|got $5,000. I picked it all up. I had paid for my 
brother's tickets. It was HmH^^^'^^ ^^'"^ change. 

met us at the airport and 1 gave hiW 5,000. Ollie 
gave me the money. 

Q So Ollie gave you a total — 

A Of $15,000. 

Q — of $15,000 in travellers' checks? 

A Exactly. 

Q Did you ever ask Ollie how come these South 
American travellers' checks came into his possession? 

A Well, we were a little skeptical to start with. 




UNCUlSSlflEIl- 



534 



AS-40 



end D.D, 
end CAS 
12:00 
noon 



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vmwistT 



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but — 

Q Did you ask him about it? 

A Never. I asked him -- yes. I said are these thing 
good? I said I have never seen anything like this before. 

Q What did Ollie tell you? 

A He said don't worry about it. We went out to 
Dulles Airport and the first thing I did was go up to the 
exchange place and cash them in. 

Q Did Ollie tell you he had ever cashed them? 
That he had done it and they were good? 

A No. 



\mwsss\ffl 



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535 



#3 



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imRRSSfftpT 



105 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 



Q Now, I want to ask you a little bit about the plan 
as it was to happen, of course, before the TWA hijacking sort 
of put a wrench in the plan. Could you tell us as specifi- 
cally as possible, what exactly wa s to happen whenj 
went with the 200,000i 

A Well, you have to draw like — he asked us for — 
MS. SCHIPPERS: He who? 
THE WITNESS: Ollie. I will put that as the 






MR. SCHIPPERS: 

THE WITNESS: They are all the same. This is a 
guy neuned — I can't really write all the names the way they 
are. This guy's name 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Is this a reproduction of a 
document you gave North? 

Yes. ^^^^^^^^^^^^B and he 
was the one that source No . 1 said had control , but he would 
have to pay this guy and pay this guy and pay this guy. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Actually, the three at tjie top are going to make 
the approach! 

A No. He had already made the approach, source No. 1, 




iiticusmi£&- 



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UN^ 




106 




^^^^^^^^^^^^^ and the source 
had already talked to this 

nd our source said, "Look it, I'm over here. 
I don't work for the government. I don't work for the United 
States. I'm just the middleman. You want guns, I'll give 
you the money, you go buy guns." Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, over there. I said, I cannot give you guns. So 
he came back euid he said to us, he said, "Look it, the guy 
wants guns." And I said, "Well, gee." Me and^^^^^paid, 
this strictly, you know, ^^^^^^^^H thing . Do what 
you want with the money. You got to pay them off. You got 
to buy guns, buy guns. Who cares? But we can't give you 
guns. So this guy then, although! 

insisted upon it. Now,^^^^^^Hl think his name is — I 
have all the names, but I just can't think of them. 




er the TWA thing, 
source No. 1 in. He ceune back and he said, "Can you get me 
arms?" So we went t^^^^^^^^^^Rnd tried to get some of 
this stuff that you can't use in the Onited States. I mean^ 
I'm digressing, you know 

Q Which one is the one" 



^^^ffl^ffl; 




and according to your 

T!!5?IFIfIl 



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chart, he's central. 

A He's the important person there. 
Q Okay. What I don't understand — 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Could 1 suggest you mark that? 
(Exhibit No. 3 was marked 
for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Showing you what has been marked Exhibit 3 , w hich 
is the diagram we are working on, if it was 
that was to persuade or influence 

had control of the hostages, what part did the 
to play in that scheme? 
Ihad control . 
lad control? Is he 
don't know. 
Did control pass from one to the other? 
He had access. 
MR. SCHIPPERS: 
THE WITNESS: ^^^^^^^ 

lich is where we believed, 
or we — yes, we believed the hostages were being held. 
There's nothing guaranteed in that part of the country. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q All right. If he controlled that, why would you 
have to pay off I 




Hi 



on the bottom of your chart? 



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108 





Because he also, he was 

'his guy wa£ 
people would^^^^^^^^^^ '^hey 
the, you know, the people! 

Q Okay. Do you know how the money was to be broken 
down in terms of who was to get how much? 

A No. 

Q Did source 1 ever come back to you and tell you 
who had gotten what? 

A No. 

Q Did you understand to whom the bulk of the payments 
would be made? 

A Yes. 

Q Who was that? 

A 

Q Now, once the payments were to be made, what 
exactly was to happen? 

A Once the payments were made — it's a very tough 
question. He didn't know what was going to happen. We 
expected the release of certain people. 

Q They don't just 

A Yes. No, not^^^^^^^^ No. 

Q Tell me what 

A 

Q How were these people to be released? In other 





llMriA5£IfIM 



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words, was it to be « forcible extraction? Has it to be a 
bribing 

A Bribing. It was always bribing. May not even be 




Q Is your answer then you didn't know exactly how 
they were going to get the hostages released? 

f rom ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ My answer is t hat they 
were to them ^<^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Put 
that way. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: By "they" you mean the people that 
had been bribed were goirt^ to get them into! 



THE WITNESS: Exactly. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: One way or another, right? 

THE WITNESS: One way or another, yes. 

MR. GENZMAN: Were particular hostages named? 

THE WITNESS: Buckley was always number one. 

MR. GENZMAN: How about the second? 

THE WITNESS: That was I think Jenco, I think the 



priests. 



UNClASSra 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Now, assuming they had physically gotten them out 
^^ nd into^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^K what was then 
to happen? 

A Well, then either source No. 1 would motor them 
I via seagoing vessel ^^^^^^^|pr Colonel North said he may 
be able to either talk tol 

the American ambassador over there, who he 
didn't get along wj 
Q Tol 
A Yes, but we didn't want to motor then 

and we though', you 
know, they would need medical attention. 

Q Al l right. So there were two possibilities. One, 
using! 

A Or American mflAtary. I don't care, you know. 





Q And the other plan? 

A Was to try to get Ambassadoi 





Q Now, what steps were taken by either you or 
o carry out either of these plans? 

A None . 

Q Well, what were you going to do if this had 

moswL 



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iBffiRsaflapT 



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worked and the hostages showed up| 
with no plans being laid? 

A He had our plans between me and 
Q That's my question. What were you going to do? 
A He %rould have to wait and see what happened, 
whichever way it went, whichever way the wind blowed at 
that time. 

Q Let's say the wind blew the hostages o ut of whe re 
they had been held captive and they were now ir 
What were you going to do? 
A Well, I wasn't going to do anything. If the 
source said I have them, we can take them by boat or we czm 
take them to the embassy, do it, whichever is easiest. 
Q Which embassy? 

American embassy. 
Where? * • 
In West Beirut. 

All right. So you were relying on whatever the 
source would tell you he could do? 

A Yes. Not being there physically, I mean we have 
to rely upon this person. 

Q But you took no steps yourself to alert the U.S. 
aunbassador? 

A I didn't. I told — we explained to Ollie what 



we may need. 



*mmm 



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Q Okay. What steps, if any, did Colonel North take? 

A I don't know. I don't have the slightest idea, 
anybody contact ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^to see 
whether or not they could provide a vessel? 

A I know ollie was very close with these people. 

Q I'm not askinqlf he was close. I'm asking, what 
steps were taken? 

A I don't know. 

Q Here there any steps taken with the American mili- 
tary? 

A Never, that I know of. 

Q Were there any steps taken to secure] 



A Yes, a couple. 

Q Could you tell me what that was? 

A Well, we tried'%o1 




Q You meeui his other tripsj 
A Yes. All his trips. We always tried and he could 
never -- the ambassador always said no. 

Q When you say you tried, did you speak to the 



ambassador? 



Me? 



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ifiaOTfflF' 



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speak to the ambassador? 



Yes. 

No. 

Dldi 

No. 

How did you try I 

Talked to the DCM. 

MR. GENZMAN: Is that DCM^^^^^^Bor Beirut? 

WITNESS: ^^^^^^V I talk to 
BY M S. NAUG HTON; 
Oid^^^B:alk to the DCM? 
No. 

Who talked to the DCM?. 
Eithei 
So did elthei^^^^^^^^^^^^B^ake steps to secure 




A No. 

So no steps were taken? 

A It was just to get source No. 1 in and out because 

Then let's go back to my original question. ^^^^ 
»ras out because the ambassador wouldn't go for 

it. 

A No. Yea, To get this source in. But if we got 
the hostages to the American embassy, then I think the 



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IHRKSHflSiT 



114 



ambassador probably would have made a concession and flown 
then overi 

Q But you know of no one who took steps to see if he 
could do that before — you were going to wait to learn that 
the hostages had actually been released , jright? 

A Yes . Once they got out of ^^^^^^^Band over to 

we were confident they would 
be okay. They would have medical treatment. But not like, 
you know, we are used to. They would get medical treatment 
like the Lebanese are used to. 

Q Did you take any steps to see they would get 
medical treatment once they arrivedj 

A No. That was up to Colonel North. He said, "Once 
you get them here, I'll take care of them." 

Q By here — 

A Once you get th%s> out, I'll take care of them. Not 
even that. Once you get your hands on them and they are 
in your physical possession, I'll take care of them. 

Q Where did you intend that they would stay^H 



A I would thinJc^^^^^^^^^^^H I didn't have 
anything — 

Q You made no plans, then? 

A No. They can stay in a hotel. They would stay 
wherever they wanted^ 







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Q Did you ever tell Colonel North you would make 
plans to rent a safehouse? 

A We had talked about It once. 

Q Had you rejected that Idea? 

A I didn't reject It. I don't think anybody 
rejected the idea. We were trying to think whether they 

be better of f^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B because we 
two, then we were going to go back and get the rest. You're 
going to have tOt compartmentalize, split up, put them in a 
box and keep them quiet, because they all want to go to the 
newspapers and tell their story. So we are going to have to 
kind of lock them up, you know. And this w as, the idea. 
I thought it would be better! 




Q But it was up tQ Colonel North to make the arrange- 
ments^^" 

A It was his arrangement, yes. 

Q What made you think once two of the hostages were 
released you could go in and get the rest? 

A That was the deal. That was the deal with these 
people. 

Q Explain that to me. 

A Once whoever effected the release of two of them 
or one of them, they were dead if they didn't come out anyway, 



umimD., 



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116 

BO that was what mainly the money was for, to relocate these 
people. So then there was nothing to stop these people from 
getting everybody else out and all his friends, his feunily, 
whatever, and take the whole bunch if they were all together. 
We did not know that they were all together at this time. 
We were just trying for as many as we could. And not even 
just the Americans. We were trying for the British, French, 
Italian. 

Q Are you saying, then, that once they accept your 
bribe money, the leverage — 

A Once they take the money, they are in. They are 
dead if they don't. 

Q So they might as well release them all, was your 
thinking. Was that going to take more money? 

A Yes. 

Q How much more money? 

A Enough to relocate everybody. 

Q Did you talk in ntirobers? 

A Hell, you're talking about, you know, 500 grand 
a head, probably. 

Q Those are my questions on that episode. Does 
anybody have anything else? Okay. 

Now, was it the TWA hijacking or the death ol 
I that made that plan fail? 
It was a little of both. 




TcWmSpT 



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Q Both? After that episode between, let's say, June 
of '85 and January of '86, what were you doing vis-a-vis 
this operation and Colonel North? 

A What do you mean what was I doing? 

Q What's happening? 

A Well, it was very quiet. The source No. 1 was 
going in and out. 




Q Now, prior to that, if we can go — in December 
of 1985, the hostage location task force was reorganized. 
Did you know anything about that? 



No. 



ITOMO 



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BiffiasaPtEiT 



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Q Did you ever attend any meetings of the hostage 
location task force? 

A Never. Never. 

Q Why is it you were not a part of that? 

A Because Mr. Azzeun was in charge of that. 

Q But after Azzam dropped out in July of 1985, how 
come it is that no one from DEA then attended those meetings 
or did anyone from DEA attend those meetings? 

A I don't even think they told us about them. I 
thought Azzam was handling it. You can't answer that. If 
he's not there and he doesn't tell anybody to take his place, 
nobody goes . 

Q All right. Did anybody, did Colonel North or any- 
one describe to you the meetings or what occurred? 

A No. He thought they were a bunch of crap. 

Q Now, tell me about Charlie Allen. When did you 
first meet Charlie Allen? 

A In December of '85. 

Q Where did you meet Charlie? 

A At his house. 

Q Do you remember when in December that was? 

A Before Christmas. The second week. 

Q How did that come about? 

A He called us up or Ollie — Colonel North had 
said, "Look it, I'm getting really inundated by everything." 



'itimSSIQEH. 



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WttUtfttr 



119 




1 What he mean by "everything, I assume It was down south. He 

2 said, "Look it, whatever you tell this guy Charlie Allen 

3 and his junior partner there, 

4 who went up and met source 1 or source 5, I think — source 

5 1 and 5 — you know, "do what you can.' He said, "Whatever 

6 you tell Charlie will get back to me." 

7 Q Wait a minute. Does Charlie first contact you 

8 or does North tell you to go see — 

9 A North told us. 

10 MR. WOODCOCK: He mentioned^^^^^^^^K>n that 

11 first mention of Allen? 

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Allen, Charlie Allen 
to sluff^^^^^^^Hoff . 

14 MR. WOODCOCK: Wait a minute. 

15 THE WITNESS: He said, "This guy" — 

16 MR. WOODCOCK: When North first brings Charlie 

17 Allen to your attention, does he also bring the name 
^^^^^^^^Hto your attention? 

19 THE WITNESS: No. I was in Ollie's office. 

20 MR. SCHIPPERS: Who did Ollie mention the first 

21 time, was it Allen and^^^^^^^H or just Allen when he 

22 said what you tell him will get back to me? 

23 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 

24 MR. SCHIPPERS: What's your best recollection? 

25 THE WITNESS: I really — my best recollection 



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uifCfLnfDU 




■%?«?<••:>- * 



120 



would be Charlie Allen. 

MR. WOODCOCK: By himself. His name mentioned by 
himself; is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. But about a day or two later, 
01 lie called or Fawn called and said , "Cjin you come over to 
the office and meet this guy^^^^^^^^^H this major.' He 
was a major. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did she call you? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. I don't have a log of this. 
I went over and met this guy and he said, you know, he's with 
Charlie Allen. I didn't even know who Charlie Allen was 
then . 

MR. WOODCOCK: You think this was in December of 
'85. 

THE WITNESS: No. It was before December of '85. 
The first time I met Charlie Allen was December. That was 
at his house. This was not at Ollie's office, if you follow. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I'm not following. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Let's go back to the North conversation. The 
first time North tells you about Charlie Allen, is that in 
December or earlier? 

A Well, early, early December. 

Q Okay . 

A Mid December, then we go out to Charlie Allen's 



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house because 1 remember it distinctly. 

Q Does he tell you he wants you to meet Charlie 
Allen? 

A Yes. He says — 

MR. WOODCOCK: Before we leave this, is this when 
he first tells you of Charlie Allen? Is this a phone call 
or meeting or what? 

THE WITNESS: A phone call probably. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q To you? 

A Probably. 

Q Is that the way you recall it, that North called 
you and mentioned Charlie Allen? 

A He said, "Look it, I'm inundated. I'm going here, 
I'm going left and right." He said, "From now on, just talk 
to this guy. It will all get back to me." I said, "I don't 
feel comfortable with that." 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q What did he say to that? 

A He said, "Well, tell him and tell me too, or leave 
it with Fawn." 

Q Did you know Charlie Allen was with the CIA? 

A Not at that time. 

Q When did you learn that? 

A When I read about it . 



UNC'iSSIFlEO 



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Q In November of '86? 

A No. I think I knew a little before then. I didn't 
know — I thought he was with the other people there, 
because he had all these plans and intelligence stuff. 

Q Can you tell us then how the meeting at Charlie 
Allen's house came about? Did North go with you? 

A No. I don't think you ought to take this down. 
MR. GENZMAN: Why not? 

THE WITNESS: All right. Take it down. I don't 
care. 

He called it up and said, "Hey, look it, I've got 
a meeting with Poindexter every Monday morning." He said, 
"I have to tell him something. Can you guys come over and 
tell me something to tell him?" So we went over his house. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q The first time yo u talke d to him — 

A He lives out in ^^^^^H someplace. I couldn't 
find it again. 

Q The first time you talked to Allen, he was 
requesting information from you. 

A Always. All he wanted was information. He 
didn't want nothing. We were asking him for money. 



Q Why did you think he had money? 
A Why did I think he had moneys 




553 



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123 



Q Yes. 



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A It was inferred from Ollle that he had some money 
or he could get some money. 




And I didn't think he had a 
lot of money but a couple thousand dollars. 

Q At this time did you think Charlie Allen was with 
NASA? 

A Yes. 

You thought he could get you money? 

A Yes. I thought if he was in his intelligence 
gathering or whatever he was doing, that it would behoove 
him to talk to these 




Q Who else was at' Charlie Allen's house when you 
went over there? 

A ^^^^H^n^l h^s wife and one of his kids. 

Q Whose kids? 

A Charlie Allen's. 

It's just you and^^^^Hind Charlie at home with 
his family? 

A This is Sunday afternoon, Sunday evening. 

Q Okay. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Let me ask a couple questions here. 



UNCUMIilL 



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UNSbkSSIflitr 



124 



EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OP THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q According to your testimony. North called you up 
and says, "I'm inundated ," and refers to this fellow Charlie 
Allen. Then your testimony — is that correct? Is that what 
happened? 

A Yes. Basically, yes. 

Q Okay. Then you testified that you next hear from 
Charlie Allen who says, "Hey, I've got these meetings"? 

A No. No, I met — I was over in Ollie's office 
guy ^^^^^^^^^Hcame 

Q I want to get the sequence down. So first you get 
the phone call from North where he says, "I'm inundated," and 
brings up Charlie Allen; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q I assume he's bringing up Charlie Allen as taking 
over some of North's responsibilities because he's inundated; 
is that right? 

A Correct. This was only ~ this was not in actual 
sequence of extracting the hostages. This was more we were 
at this point trying to formulate, were they right there, 
were they right there, you know, exactly put them in the 
house or put them in the prison or a cave over there. 




UNCLASSIHED 



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HNftH^tiBr 



125 



Q So, after the phone call from North, but before 
you meet with Allen, you have a meeting wit^ 



A Yes. 

Q How does that come about? 
A I met him in Ollie's office. 
Q How did it come about that you met him? 
A Ollie said tha^^^^^^^^^H through Allen could 
provide some funding for my source number five. 
And was^^^^^^^^^Bin uniform? 
No. 

Did you understand that he was in the military? 
It would be hard not to. 
That is because of his bearing; is that correct? 

Yes . 

Did ^^^H^^^^^^^^^l confirm he was the military 
at that time? 

A I thinX he said he was a Major. 

Q Has anyone else present at the meeting? 

^^^^^^^^^^ 
Q What was ^^^^^^^^^^^prelationship to Allen 
explained to you at that time? 

A He worked for Mr. Allen. He was ^^^^^^^^^B or 



something. 



Did Ollie explain in front o 

llN£UlSSlEI£If: 




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Iwould be able to get money? What did he explain 
[was supposed to do? 

A He said at that meeting, he said, look it. 
Introduce him to source number five and source number one, 
which we did. We took him up to -New York.' 

How long after that? 

A Within a week. He said, you can trust the guy and 
he will try to help you get some money for these guys. He 
said, I am tapped out. I can't do it. 

Q Now, at this meeting with^^^^^^^^^^ did you set 
up the meeting with Charlie Allen at his home? 

A No. Charlie Allen callei^^^^^^^^^^Hcalled me 
and said, come over and pick me up. It was Sunday afternoon. 
It was snowing. I can't forget it, because we got to his 
house and he says, do you want anything? I said yes. He 
said, well, I don't have that. I mean, I think Charlie Allen 
is just a strategic planner or something. I don't know what 
he does. He is an information-gatherer. 

Q me you this^^^^^^^^^^ If| 
were to say the first time he met you was in thejold Brogue 
Tavern -- 

A He is a liar. 

Q He would be a liar? 

A A liar. 

Q If Charlie Allen was to say the first time he met you 




UMCi miriFn 



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vmmm: 



127 



1 would b« in the Old Brogue Tavernv what would he be? 

2 A He might be telling the truth, I am not sure. 

3 Q Did he meet you in the' Old Brogue Tavern before he 
^ met you in his house? 
5 A Has Ollie there? 

Q At the Old Brogue Tavern? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q Yes. 

9 A I have only been there one time. 

10 Q When do you think that was? 

11 A Early part of 'B6. 

12 Q Why were you there? 

13 A To meet Ollie, Charlie Allen. It might have been 

14 Christmastime of '85. I don't know really. I remember being 

15 at the Old Brogue Tavern /^cause I lost a hubcap that night. 

16 Q And^^^^^^^^^^Biras there as 

17 A I picked himu^md droveS him home. 

18 Q To the best of your recollection, that is the first 

19 tloM you met Charlie Allen; is that right? 

20 A No. 

21 Q You first met Charlie Allen in his home? 

22 A No. 

23 Q When did you first meet Charlie Allen? 

24 A I would say early December. 

25 Q Where did you first meet Charlie Allen? Do you recalp. 



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that? 

A Do you know how many people I have met over this 
thing? I cannot — 

Q If you can't remember your testimony is you 
can't remember. 

A Early December. 

Q Do you remember where you met him? 

A No. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Look, when you drove to his house, 
you say you can visualize that it was snowing. You get to 
his house. I assume he meets you at the door? 

THE WITNESS: He lives in a cul-de-sac. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q I assume he meets you at the door when you come into 
his house. Is that the first time you ever laid eyes on him? 

A NOk I had seen him before. 

Q Let's go to the Old Brogue Inn. North, according 
to other people, arrives later, so when you see Charlie Allen 
at th^ Old Brogue, is that the first time you laid eyes on 
him? 

A Charlie Allen? 

Q Yes. 

A No. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Had you already been to his house? 



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THE WITNESS: No. I an not aure. I can't aay. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q la that the flrat time you aay — 
A It la the only time I ever met Charlie Allen — 
I met him at hia houae one time witl^^^^^^ I met him at the 

Brogue Inn. with ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ollie came 
a half-hour or an hour later, and it waa ao noiay they couldn't 
even talk, becauae they had all thia country and weatern 
muaic playing or something. 

Q At the Tavern there, is that the first time you 
ever met ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

A me^^^^^^^^^^l took him up to New York, 

Q Is it your testimony the trip to New York was 
before the Tavern meeting? 

A Yes. It waa, I would say, the latter part of 
November or early December when I took Majo^^^^^^^^^^^ 
to New We met ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Re source 
five. He lave him $100. 

Source five lost the $100. Then he said, you mean 
to say that we came ^11 the way up here to give the guy $100? 
This is baloney. It cost us more to fly up there. 

MR. GENZMAM: How did source five lose the $100? 
THE WITNESS: He thought — it was really cold and 
he thought he put it in one of his pockets and it must have 
fallen out. He^^^^^^^^^^^Hc^lles] jne and said, what did 



iSHS 




560 



nd6 



DHHiftSSfiilElET 



130 

1 he do with the $100? I said, it wai a waste of time. 

2 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

3 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

4 Q ^^^^^^^^H for your information, and perhaps this 

5 will help place this in time, I have a report which is dated 

6 January 15, 1986, which Major^^^^^^^^^| has identified 

7 as a report that he prepared which places this meeting with 

8 sources one and five on January 3 and January 14 of 1986. 

9 A That is why I said early '86. 

10 Q A moment ago, you testified you thought it might have 

11 been in November. 

12 MR. SCHIPPERS: When did you go up to New York 

13 with source five? 

14 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 

15 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

16 Q What I eun suggesting to you is this report states 

17 that that meeting — 

18 A I can say if I went up to New York with Major 
^^^^^^^^^^H it is on my 

20 ^^ Q What I am saying to you is this report that 

21 ^^^^^^^^^^Bprepared, dated January 15, places that date or 

22 these meetings on January 13 and 14 of 1986. Does that 

23 sound like it could be right? 

24 A Sounds very good. 

25 Q OJ^ay 



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131 

A I an sure my American Express records will reflect 
it. I said at the 

BY MS. NAUGHTON 

Q Was the meeting at the Old Brogue Inn before then, 
that New YorJc trip? 

A I don't know. I would say no. I would say it would 
be after, but that is just off the top of my head. 

Q Did you have any sense of who exactly 
worked for? You said he was military. 

A Yes. NSA. 

Q Did Charlie Allen °^^^^^^^^H ^^^^ y°^ anything 
about what their operation was all Jibout? 

A All they wanted was information. They did not want 
to get involved physically with the extraction of anybody. 

They just wanted — they said they had no sources of informatioh 

*» 

in the Middle East. All they want is some information coming 

out of there, and we said, well, if that is all you want is 
information, we will give it to you. I mean, you could tell 
th«n that, but we introduced them to our sources. 

Q Why? 

A Which we would never — because Ollie asked me to. 
Ollie asked me, he says if you trust me, look it, just let them 
go talk to these people themselves. And ^^^^^^^^^| I think 
had worked in the Middle East, because he had a working 



knowledge of Arabic or 



mCLISSIFlEO 



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UfKgilKgiib 



132 



MR. GENZHAM: Did North aay why he wanted theee 
two to meet the sources? 

THE WITNESS: Just said, trust me. Because we would 
never introduce anybody to our sources. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did you thinJc if you did introduce them to the 
sources that the money would be easier to get from them? 

A Yes. ^ _ 

Q What was ^^^^^^^^^^Hopinion of the once 
he met them? 

A With source number one, he was infatuated. With 
source number two, he couldn't believe, because he ha( 



Q Source five, you mean? 

A Source five. He had^^^^^^^ 

[ you know, but I think 
it was a little over his head. 

Q What was his opinion then of source five? 

A He trusted him implicitly. But I think it all went 
over his head. 

Why do you say that? 

A Because I don't think the guy knew what he was 




talking about. 



BY MR. SCHIPPERS: 




DNCUSsra 



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133 

A Yes, the Major. ^^^^^^| He knew how to ask for 

information, but he did not know — he was not used to dealing 

with people like that. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q He wasn't used to working sources. 

A No. 

Q Did ^^^^^^^^^Heyer tell you that he would try 
to get you money or could get you money? 

A Yes. 

Q What did he tell you about that? 

A We were trying to get abont $8 or S9,000, I think, 
out of him, and he said, I will see what I can do. And he 
never did. That was to ge* 

Q Did^^^^^^^^^Hever tell you who he was going to 
go to for the money or how he was going to try? 

A Charlie Allen. 

Q Who was Charlie Allen supposed to get it from? 

A I don't know. 

Q Did either of them mention meeting with CIA Director 
Casey over this issue? 

A No. 

Q Did Allen ever mention Casey at all? 

A I don't think so. Allen mentioned Poindexter, but 
never mentioned Casey, to the best of my recollection. 

Q Did North ever mention that Allen — 

A I think Allen was going to those big wig meetings or 




WliCCJilJiD... 



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HLTF meetings. 

Q Did North ever mention to you whether Charlie Allen 
had pull or had connections? 

A Yes. 

What did he tell you about that? 

A He said if this guy can do it, he will do it. But 
he never, you know — Ms. Naughton, it wasn't in terms where 
Charlie Allen will do this or Casey will do this, or 
Poindexter. It wasn't like that. It was we will see what we 
can do. This guy has a hook here, this guy has a hook there. 
There was never really names or the old man or this guy, you 
know. 

It was never really where they would come down and 
say^^^^H I got to where I called the office, I didn't mentic^ 
hiy njune. I just called zmd Fatm would 2mswer the phone, and 
I would say, it is oe. I wouldn't even ask for 01 lie. I would 
just say, is he there? 

Q Did you ever get money from either Charlie Allen or 




A Never. 

Q Do you know, aside from the $100 that was paid to the 
source, did either of them pay any money to any other 
sources or that source again? 

A Not to the best of my knowledge, unless it was without 
my — not in my presence, anyway. 



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Q Did you ever have any information from your sources 
that they had contacted them independently of you? 

A think^^^^^^^^^did. He called source 

five, but I don't think it did any good. 

Q Did that upset you? Did you talk toj 
about that? 

A I probably did, you know. 

Q Do you recall what you said to him? 

A No. I said, if you want to talk to my source, 
come to me. You people said you would give us this. Now, 
we went ahead emd did it anyway. You gave us "ugads", so that 
the way it goes. 

Q Did you get the impression that Allen and 

were just there to sort of sap information out 
of you? 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 



Yes. That is what I said fron the start. 

Sort of a one-way street? 

Yes. Nothing but. 

Did there come a time when you sort of then gave them 
the cold shoulder? 

A Hell, what we were giving to them we were giving to 
Ollie anyway, so we just said, what is the sense in repeating 
it, you know, because it always gets screwed up. Once you tell 
somebody one thing and tell somebody another thing and then, 
you know, it is better just to tell one person. And Ollie 



)€tter ]ust to tell one i>e 

UNDlASSlA 



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mmsm 



136 



was the best. 

Q So you continued to tell Ollie what you were doing? 

A Always . 

Q Now, as of -- if we can move them to about the 
May period of 1986, there came a point in time where Jay 
Coburn and Tom Clines sort of come into play here. Could you 
tell us what that plan was all about, and how that was to go 
down? 

Could you giVe me a time period? I might not be 
right on that. 

A Middle of May to the first week of June, I was over 
there ^^^^^^^^ At this time, source num ber five had some 
connections ^^^^H^H^^mi^l^^^^^^^^l to 
two or three hostages. At this time, they said that Buckley 
was dead. Colonel North said, well, get whoever you can get. 
We first asked for approval by — or not approval — bona fides 
by saying all right, if Buckley is dead, why don't you just 
give us his bones, which we can take to the FBI laboratory 
and have than amalyzed and say, at least it is American. 
Whether or not it is Buckley, who cares, but he tried that and 
they weren't going for it. They said they wanted some money 
up front. 

So, source number five is always a frugal guy. He 
said, give me 20 grand. So, I called^^^Hind Ollio and they 
said — and Z said, I need some money over there, you know. 



'UilfUCCJfUD.. 



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WiftiMfflr 



137 




Because I think this trip we were on, we paid our own way. 
I paid my way, anyway. So, Ollie said, or^^^^^told me, 
call^^^^^B and you will pick up 30 grand] 
but you are going to have to fly up there. 
I went up there and got 30 grand. 

Q Who did^you get the 30 grand from? 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 




Did he tell you who he had gotten it from? 

Albert . * • 

Albert who? 

Al. He didn't even know. 

How did he know who to get it frcmi Albert? 

He got a call from me, who^^^^Bfiad called me and 
said, he will have^^^^^^call this number and make 
arrangements to pick up the package. 

Q Did you know whose number that was? 

Never. 

Did you know how^^^^H^ot the number? 

From Ollie. I don't know. I assumed. 

Was Copp mentioned at all in this transaction? 

Never. It was Al or Alber^^^^ 

Do you know in what city^^^^^H)icked up the number} 

No. 

Where did you — 

I know where he got it, but I wasn't there 



sw^^H^c 



JJAlPI.A0fiirirj 



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2S 



Where was that? Where did he get it? 
I think he got it] 
Where did you meet him? 



138 





but he is based 



So he drove 



'picked up, met me 

Q And he gave you $30,000 

A Right. 

Q Now, what did you do with that money? By the way, 
was it in cash? *• 

A Yes, hundred-dollar bills. 

Q Was it American dollars? 

A Hundred dollars, Credit-Suisse. 

Q I am confused. You say they were hundred-dollar bill 
that you got. 

A It was with Credit-Suisse little bands around them 

Q Where did you go from there ^^^^^^^^|when you 
got the money? 

A 

Q What happened 

A Z gave source five 20,000. I paid my hotel bill, 
which was by then about $8,00 






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ufua^npT 



139 




BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q What did this plan consist of? Once you gave him 
20,000 — 

A They were going to take themj 




Q Source five's plan contemplated the use of force? 

A I don't know how they were going to do it. 

Q They never explained that to you? 

A Yes. 

Q Source is^^^^^^^^lright? 

A Yes. He was going to get them; however he could. 
He didn't have to use force if it wasn't necessary. He 
was going to get them. 

Q And that was to be two or three hostages? 

A Two. 

Q Two? 

A To start with. 

Q All he wanted for that was 20,000? 

A No. 

Q How was the money to work? 

A That is where the thing went wrong, you see. We 



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said — the 20,000 was more or less for the seed money to 
just get the peopl•^ interested. If they had provided the 
people or the bones or whatever upon delivery, COO, we got 
one live one, we got one dead one, right? Then you get XYZ. 

Q What was XYZ? What were they to get? 

A American dollars. 

How much? 

A There was never a- price. I mean, see, at this point, 
people are getting a little ticklish. I mean, they were saying 
we don't want no British guy. We don't want no French guy. 
We want Americans. 

Q Who was saying that? 

A Ollie. 

Q Where was the money to come from, the big money? 

A From Colonel North. 

Q So, tell me what happened then once the 20,000 was 
paid to source five? Did he go 

A Yes. 

Q What is the next thing that happened? 

A We went in and came out. He went in and came out. 
He went in and came out. Every time he brought me some other 
guys and I was trying to make deals with him. I said, where 
do you want the money paid? Do you want it paid here, do you 
want it paid there? Because there is nobody crazy enough to 
take a large amount of American dollars 



iMUESMa. 



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mmiss!: 



141 

1 And I said we are not going to front anything. 

2 You can leave one of your men over here. They can see the mone/ 

3 He see the body, you get the money and we will guarantee 

4 it. Just get them out of the country. What you do when you 

5 get back^^^^^^^^His your own business. 

6 We talked about Swiss banks, and we talked about 

7 London banks and we talked about Vienna banks , and wherever 

8 you can pay money, Bahamas. But there were never any 

9 specific accounts set up. It was one of these, again, Coburn 

10 came or Jay came. He didn't have any money. I think he 

11 represented money, but he didn't have it with him. 

12 Q Why did he come? In other %rards, was this plan — 

13 A Because this was imminent. 

14 Q This was imminent. So it was to happen in one 

15 week ' s time? 

16 A Two days, three days. 

17 Q Coburn arrived frras where? 

18 A I don't know. 

19 Q Did you know he was coming? 

20 A Yes . 

21 Q Did Colonel North tell you to expect him? 

22 A Yes. I met his plane. He came in a private plane. 

23 Q Was it a chartered plane? 

24 A It was a Leer jet, private 

25 Q Was this. 



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Yes. 




He did not have any large amount of money? 
If he did, it was on the plane. 
How much was he supposed to have access to? 
At least 2 million. 
Did you discuss that with him? 

I wouldn't say we had a big discussion. He came, 
^ceune, Tom Clines came. He came in a private plane, too. 
MR. HCWDCOCK: Tom Clines did? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. He came out of Madrid or 
Portugal. I don't think we discussed the money. I think 
everybody knew or it was understood what was going do%m. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q But what did Coburn tell you about where the money 
was and how to get it? 

A He said, I can get it within a day. 

MR. NOODCOCK: Had this come up suddenly, this 
imminent release? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, yes. It wasn't, you know, we had 
been working on it, but all of a sudden, the guy said he can 
do it. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Once the hostages were released from their captors, 
who were they going to get them to 

A That was up to source five 



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DfisassffipT 



143 



Did you have any understanding? 
A Yes. We were going to meet them at sea. We had 
three plans. 

Tell roe what those were. 

A The first one was we would land 





We were going to meet then 
there. Or else we were going to take them out to sea or 
else they were going to turn them over 



We had three plans. 

Q Let's go over plan one. Tell me how that would 
work. 

A Plan one was that these people who he had been 
bringing over to me would bring these_ 
and they were going to extract them 

put them out to sea in a boat and we had a boat there 
to meet them. 

Q Did you actually have one there? 

A Yes . 

Q How did that get there? 

A How? 

Q Yes. 

A Tom Clines. 

Q So he bought a boat. 



mu&mtA' 



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liNSBSflflap 



144 



A He did it. I told Ollie, we need a boat. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Were you talking directly to Ollie at this point? 

A Yes. Ollie at one time, and when I first met 
Clines, I didn't trust him. 

Q Why was that? 

A Because I just didn't like him, and I talked to 
Earl, one of these people in his office. We had a big 
argument on the phone. I remember very distinctly had an 
argument with him. 

Q So, did you start out talking to Ollie and end 
up talking to Mr. Earl? 

A Ollie was out of town. 

Q With North out of town, you were talking to Robert 
Earl? 

A Only that one time did I ever talk to him and like 

a 
I say. It was/^very bad argument. 

Q Was there anyone else in North's office you would 

speak to over this period of time when North was out of town? 

A No, I don't think so. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

S 
Q Do you know the name of the boat that Clinei had? 

A The Bria. 

Q Who did you understand Clines to work for? 

A Colonel North. 



ittumiQEa 



575 



IDd21 



UNBBSSIfiaF 



145 



1 Q Can you be more specific? Did you understand him 

2 to be an NSC employee? 

3 A I didn't think he was with the government. I thought 

4 — that is whv,I didn't trust him. 

5 Q Did you thinX he was private, then? 

6 A I thought he was ex-CIA, CIA undercover or whatever, 

7 you know, one of them people that never tell you what they are 

8 doing. 

9 Q Did he actually take his boat and — 

10 A He didn't come with a boat. He flew in. The boat 

11 came about two days later. 

12 Q Was the boat actually docked someplace waiting 

13 for the hostages to come in? 

14 A Yes. The boat was docked — not docked. They never 

15 ceime i 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|it always 

17 stayed about two miles out. 

18 Q Is that where it remained, or did it make any 

19 movement toward Beirut or toward Lebanon at any point? 

20 A It never made any movement. 

21 Q So it always stayed — 

22 A I mean, I am just saying I didn't see the boat 

23 floating around. 

24 Q Okay. Did you actually go on the boat? 

25 A Yes 




UNCUS8IFIE0 



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lltt8Bl$StPIE|T 



146 



Q Why did you go on the boat? 

A To look it over. 

Q Were there any preparations made to receive the 
hostages like medical supplies or — 

A No, It was a filthy boat, filthy. It was a 
potato boat. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Who took you out there? Who took you out to the 



boat? 



there . 



I don't know. One of the guys from the office 



Q Did you go with Clines? 

A I think ^^^^^liight have run with Clines. We didn't 
all go together. It was one of these, this is the ship. I 
said, I ain't going on this one. 
BY MS. NAUGHTOH* 

Q But they were going to put the hostages in there? 

A No. We were going to put then in there for maybe at 
the most two hours. 

Q Where were they going to be picked up and where were 
they going to be delivered, according to the plan? 

A I don't have the exact, you know, bearings there. 

Q Just give me an idea. 



lu'iKitwuaiii 



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UUBJiSSlBHlET 



147 




As soon as we had these people before the money 
went down, we would have them or at the same time, we would 
have somebody from, you know. Ollie always said the 
Seventh Fleet or something like that, we will get a boat or 
helicopter or something, you know, med-evac and that. 
Right from sea? 
Yes. 

Did you. have radio equipment aboard the ship? 
Not at that time. 

How were you going to get word that the hostages 
had been picked up? 

A It would be provided. 
Q By whom? 

A By whom, I don't know. It would be at the order 
of Colonel North. 

Q So, North was responsible for getting the logistical 
support . 

He would provide it, yes. I think, you know, I have 
to say you can't have people just waiting around with radios 
and guns and this and that. ^^^^Hand I had a boat. 




But I mean, this was not a thinl where we 

I 

I 

were going to go out in 20 minutes. This was a thing where 



MiAMja, 



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the guy calls and he said, I have got the people. They 
are on my boat. Then we go meet them. Everybody was ready 
and waiting and willing to go. 

It was just a matter of, you know, it takes six, 
eight hours to get going. 

Q So, you had that six or eight hours to, for instance, 
procure radios and whatever? 

A Of course. Once they took them out of 
if they had them — if source five had these people in his 
hands, I would trust him enough to say, hey, look it, where are 
you going? At one time, I said, just take them down and give 
them to the Swiss, because the Swiss still had an Embassy 
in East Beirut. You know, I mean, it wasn't like we were trying 
to go in and save anybody. It was a job. 

Q I understand that, but I an trying to figure out 
exactly what the plan* were. That is the plan then involving 
Clines. Where was Cobum to be while all this was going on? 

A Cobum was there 

Was he to go on the boat as well? 

A I assume so. He had control of the money. 

That is my question. If he is on the boat, how 
can he control the money? 

A He will go on the big boat. 

Q The Iria? 



Yes. 



UI1(WS1P_ 



579 



25 


UNCBSSIBftET 


149 


1 


Q There was a smaller boat. 




2 


A There would have been. 




3 


Q Who would have been on that boat? 




4 


Me and^^^B 




5 


Q Did you take' any steps to secure a 


boat or make 


6 


sure that one would be available? 




7 


Have you ever beei^^^^^^^^H 




8 


Q No. 




9 


A ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1^1 


H^^^^^ 


10 


^^^^H We have boats .^^^^^^^^^^^^H 


^^^^B 


11 


^H^^M^^^^^^^^H 


^^^^V 


12 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 


^^B^v 


13 


^^H^^^H^^^^^^^ 




14 


Q JMere these fast boats ?_ 




IS 


A Yes. That is why we wanted a fast 


boat to make sure 


16 


nobody was coming around behind them because 


this old tub. 


17 


■ria, couldn't do 10 knots. 




18 


Q But without radio equipment, it is 


not much help. 


19 


is it? 




20 


As long as you keep in sight. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 


21 


^^IH 




22 


Q What about weapons? Did you make 


any provisions to 


23 


have weapons? 




24 


A No. 




25 


° " "" J?^^?!™ 





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iiffiitssarap 



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A Again, I would think that Colonel North would 
provide whatever we needed. 

Q Z mean, did you really think you would get the 
Seventh Fleet to show up at the spot? 

A No, I never thought that. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q It would be the Sixth Fleet. 

A I never thought the Seventh Fleet or Sixth Fleet 
was going to come over there. I thought maybe they could have 
a little boat with a doctor on board, where they could get 
a helicopter and then put the people, if we got the people out 
and get them good medical attention. 

Q Did you make provisions for providing some military 
protection? 

A Ho. 

Q So, you had no plan really, if they were being 
followed or if there was — _ 

A Yes. That is what me and^^^^Birere doing. 

Q In your little boat, you were going to stave off 
the — 

A The Lebanese Navy? I don't mean to make jest of 
this. 

You said you had three plans. That was one. What 
were the other two? 

A The second one was to give them to the Swiss or 



UMPi&iCSICKJ). 



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nd 27 

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IINtBBaBffl^ 



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to 




any other Embassy still in East Beirut. 
Q What was the third plan? 

To then^^^^^HJ^^I^^^^I^Hand give them 
that was going to cost a lot of money. 
Q Because^^^^^^^^^^^|would have to be paid? 
A Yes, and^^^^^^^l and then they are still in 
Beirut. Then we have got to get them out. 

Q How were you going to get them out? 

Out by boatj 

Has this using the Uria? 

No. 

How were you going to do that? 

Source number one. 

He would procure a boat? 



He can procure amything he wants 



Q So he would be responsible for getting the 
transportation? 




Q Now, so, according to plan three, if you had had to 
go that route ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|that 
have cost more than the two million? 



Yes. 



Is that a yes? 



UNCLASSIRED 



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mBsm^ 



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A I would say. 

Q What happened to make these plans go awry? 

A The people wanted the money in Lebanon. They 
didn't go forth COD, although we guaranteed them, you know. 
We lied to them. We told them hey, you can have the 
money anyplace you want it, but we are not taking it 
into Lebanon. And they backed down. 

Q Why was that a lie? 

A That wasn't a lie we would take them in there. 
We lied to them by telling them we will give it to you] 
We will give it to you wherever you want. 
Once we have the bodies, we can deal, because they have 
already accepted, they have already made their move. 

Q Why was that a lie that you would give them money 
anywhere? 

A Because we already captured them. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Why was it a lie when you told 
them you would deliver the money anywhere? Didn't you plan 
to deliver the money to them if they produced the bodies? 

THE WITNESS: Then we wanted more. Then we have 
them. They are dead if they go back without no money, but 
they are ours. 

BY MR. W00DC0CK1; 

Q Did there ever come a time at which Coburn did make 
any affirmative step to transfer any money or obtain any money 



IMU^SMD.. 



583 



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IINi!l^ni!F 



153 




that you know of? 

A I don't know. You have to talk to^^^^nboot that 
I really didn't have that much to do with Coburn, 

Q Did North ever tell you the money was poised and 
ready to go? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he tell you where it was or how it was coming? 

A I don't think he said where it was, I think — this 
is what I think. I think Coburn came there. He represented 
the money. The deal we want, he said he could get it within 
12 hours. I didn't believe that 




I think he could do it in 12 hours 
I think one day maybe. 

But I never saw any money over there. 

Q The amount was ^o be two million under the 
first plan? 

A Yes. 

Q Who actually then — was it your call then to call 
this off? 

A ^^^^Hand mine. 

Q \pid Colonel North try to encourage you to stay or not 
to blow them off? 

A He wanted to go on but he said, hey, look it, it is 
out of my control right now. He said - 



Vpid Co] 



iKicussm 



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\|MkliSttBi)kT 



154 



Q What I am saying is, did he advocate putting the 
money up front? 

A No. 

Q So, he didn't — 

A He did n't_ care really, I don't think, but it is not 
ray nature or ^^^^^^ nature to put no money up front . 

So, he never argued about that decision with you? 

A No. no. 




585 



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IWRiMlili' 



155 



A First wee)c of June. _ 

Q Before you leave ^^^^Hlet me ask you a question 
about Tom Clines. You testified that Tom Clines flew into 
(correct? Did you know he was coming? 
Yes. 

Q How did you know he was coming? 
A Eithei^^^^^or Ollie called me and gave me the 
tail number of his private plane. I went out and met| 





Who did you understand him to be? 

A friend of Ollie' s. 

Did you have — 

An employee of Ollie' s actually. 

What did you understand he was supposed to be doing 



•» 



Q 
A 

Q 

A 

Q 
there? 

A Assist us. He said he will arrange the boat, 
because we knew by then we were going to need a boat sooner 
or later. 

Q Has that the first time you had ever heard of 
Ton Clines? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever hear of him again after that? 

A After? 

Q Right. 

A Until this whole thing started? 



IINCUSSIL 



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UNttt 



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uuniLU 



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Q Up to the point where there was public exposure 
in November. 

A I had a couple of lunches with him. 

Q Here in the United States? 

A Yes. 

Q Why? 

A He wanted to introduce me to one of his friends , 
Robinette. 

Q When did he introduce you to Robinette? 

A October-November '86. 

Q Why did he want to introduce you to Robinette? 

A We struck up a relationship over there. He was 
a nice guy. 

Q Even though you distrusted him in the beginning? 

A I will digress a little. He had an ulcer over there. 
He couldn't smoke his cigars and he wanted to. He loves to 
smoke them, so he just held one. He couldn't drink. So he 
said, when we get back to Washington, I will take you out to 
lunch. So we went out to lunch. 

Q You went out to lunch with him a couple of times, 
is that correct? 

A Once . 

Q At that lunch, Glenn Robinette was there as well? 

A Yes. 

Q Was the lunch social or jr*ere you there to meet 



e lunch social or were you t 

IINCUSSiEIEL 



587 



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Roblnette? 

A Social. J^^^^Hmyself ,- it was within two or three 
days after we got b^ck^ 

Q Got back fron 

A Yes. 

Q So that was this June of 1986? 

A Yes. I met Robinette one other time. 

How did that come about? 

A He called either my office or^^^^^^K>ffice, and 
said, can you meet for lunch, and we went to lunch at the 
International Club on 18th and K. 

When was that? 

A That was after we got out, June, July, August, 
something like that. 

Q Why did Robinette want to have lunch with you? 

A To the best of my knowledge, he had some client who 
was an elderly woman whose daughter was strung out or somethin i 
you know, snorting coke or something, and he wanted to know 
what the best way — he was just bull-shitting her to make 
his money. 

So he said, these are two narcotic agents. They are 
friends of mine. Tell your daughter, go check into Hazelwood 
Clinic out in Minneapolis or go to Betty Ford Clinic out in 
San Diego 

Q Did there come a point when you were ^H^^^^^Hdid 



ii£i£;i.^^aEi£a._ 




588 



md 34 



ONttussffeET 



158 



1 you connect Clines with the name Al or Albert? 

2 A Never. The first time I even knew was when 

3 Ms. Naughton showed roe the pictures when I was first over 

4 there. 

5 Q After this lunch in June with Robinette and Clines, 

6 did you ever have any other meetings with Cline? 

7 A Never. 

8 Q Ever speak to him? 

9 A Never . 

10 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

11 Q Were you aware of any contact between Robinette 

12 and Copp? 

13 A Never . 

14 Q Did Robinette ever tell you about working 

15 on any cases regarding the contras or Nicaragua? 

16 A Yes, but is this relevant? 

17 Q Yes. 

18 A Yes . 

19 Q What did he tell you? 

20 A He said they got this hamburger case, he called it, 

21 down south, where somebody allegedly killed somebody or something 

22 and Clines and Calero and all these people are mentioned in 

23 the thing, and he said what do you know about it? I said 

24 I don't know anything about it. 

25 Q Did he tell you he was retained by anybody to work 



umiy^siiitfAr 



589 



UNffifSSIFEFr 



md 33 

159 



1 on the case? 

2 A He said he was protecting his client's interests, 

3 who I assumed was Tom Clines. 

4 MR. SCHIPPERS: Did he tell you it was Clines? 

5 THE WITNESS: Clines never told me. Robinette 

6 called me at home one day. I like Robinette. He is a nice 

7 guy, too. 

8 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

9 Q So, he called you to ask you about this, if you knew 

10 anything about it? 

11 A Yes. Because he thought it had something to do 

12 with drugs. 

13 Q Did he say there had been allegation of drug 

14 running? 

15 A No. I just assumed that anything coming out of 

16 South America. 

•J7 Q Did Robinette tell you emything about what he was 

18 doing in regard to the case? 

19 A No. 

20 Q Did he mention the name Jack Terrell to you? 

21 A No. Terrell? 

22 Q Terrell. Did he mention to you anything regarding th 

23 FBI in this case? 

24 A Robinette? 

25 Q Yes . 



UNCUSSiriED 



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3B - BAT flg5 




160 

A Never. 

Q Did Robinette ever tell you about his relationship 
with Colonel North? 

A Other than socially, other than Ollie is a good 
guy, and you know, this and that. I don't think so. 

Q Did either he or Colonel North discuss the 

c 
installation of the security fenBe on Colonel North's 

property? 

A No, no. I didn't even think — you know, I didn't 
even think he had that big a house out there, because I used 
to push his pick-up truck to get it started when he would 
park out behind the Oval Office and drove a pick-up truck. 

Q When is the last time you spoke to Mr. Robinette? 

A I would say early this year. I didn't talk to him. 
I left a message at his office to have him call me. 

Q Why did you call him? 

A He asked me to check something out, and I said 
I can't do it professionally. I said, you have to go through 
my brother. 

Q What did he want you to check out? 

A A name. 

Q What was the name? 

A I am thinking. I can't think of it. It was one of 
them CIA names, though. 

Q What do you mean one of them CIA names? 



rMiJi^yiA 



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A If you mention it, I will think of it. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: What do you mean CIA? 

THE WITNESS: The names that are talking about 
explosives and stuff. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Names coming up in the hearings? 

MR. WOODCOCK: You mean Wilson, Terpil? 

THE WITNESS: Not Wilson, not Terpil. The 
other guy that did work in Vietnam. 

MR. GENZMAN: Shackley? 

THE WITNESS: Shackley. 

MS. NAUGHTON: What did he want to know about 
Shackley? 

THE WITNESS: Shackley wanted something or 
other, I don't know. So I said, I can't do this. I said 
you have got to talkl 

MR. WOODCOCK: Robinette was working for Shackley? 

THE WITNESS: Or Shackley was working for 
Robinette, I don't know. I called my brother and I said 
you go find out what you can about this guy, and then 
call this guy back or whatever. I don't know. 

MR. SCHIPPERS: Who is this guy, and this guy? 

THE WITNESS: Shackley. Find out what you can 
about Shackley and call this guy back. Don't call me. 

MS. NAUGHTON: You thought Shackley was working 



for Robinette? 



UNCLASSIEe 



592 



bap- 2 



UNCIAMtpT 



162 



1 THE WITNESS: Or Robinette was doing something 

2 and he wanted to know what this guy was up to. 

3 MS. HAUGHTON: What Shackley was up to? 

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

5 MR. WOODCOCK: Did you know that Robinette 

6 had at one tine been a CIA agent? 

7 THE WITNESS: Yes. Only afterwards. 

8 MR. WOODCOCK: You never knew it from him; is 

9 that correct? 

10 THE WITNESS: Not from him. From Tom Clines. 

11 MR. WOODCOCK: When did Clines tell you that 

12 Robinette had been CIA? 

13 THE WITNESS: When we had lunch out at the 

14 place in Tysons Corner. I forget. 

15 MR. WOODCOCK: In June of 1986? 

16 THE WITNESS: Late June, early July. 

17 MR. WOODCOCK: With Robinette? 

18 THE WITNESS: Yes. The Don Dominico. 

19 MR. WOODCOCK: Did Cline ever bring up the name, 

20 Shackley? 

21 THE WITNESS: Never. 

22 MR. WOODCOCK: When did you determine that the 

23 Shackley neune was a CIA name? 

24 THE WITNESS: I read it in the book, the one 

25 by Moss, Peter Moss. I didn't know who the guy was. 



lumsiHiffim 



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Robinette Just called and said, "Can you run a check on 
the guy?" I said, "I can't do that." I said, "I'll 
relay it to my brother and my brother will get back to 
you. It was kind of an in-house thing, you know. It 
wasn't a junk thing. It wasn't drugs. 

MR. tfOODCOCK: Do you know whether your brother 
actually checked on Shackley? 

THE WITNESS: I don't have the slightest idea. 
I don't think so because I don't think Robinette ever 
followed it up or I would have heard. 

MS. NAUGHTON: After the trip! 
the summer of '86, did you take any other trips in regard 
to the hostage location effort? 

THE WITNESS: Not for Colonel North. 




594 



/. -; ,<5S J*l 




?W^ 



/(d'Z 






m^^ 



595 



bap- 5 



URtlA^tRt^ 



165 




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Q What had changed? Why was this different? 

A Well, I thinJc — you asked me what I think. I 
don't know why it changed. You felt the atmosphere. 
Whenever I went into the building they were always looking 
at you. 

Q At DEA — 

A The last time Ollie gave me money he said, "I can't 
give you any money in the office. Meet me in Lafayette 
Park." We went over to Hardees Hamburger place because they 
are searching everybody that went into my office. 

MR. WOODCOCK: When do you place this time period? 



SML. 



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um»ssifiifi^ 



I 



166 



THE WITNESS: October, November. It was the 
last time I really had a personal meeting other than at 
his attorney's office. 

MR. GENZMAN: When did you meet him at his 
attorney's office? 

THE WITNESS: Right before Christmas, a week 
before Christmas, and it was just a "Hi, how are you doing? 
Merry Christmas. Happy New Year" kind of thing. It 
was me and^^^Hand Brendan Sullivan and Sullivan's 
partner. 




597 



bap- 7 



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IS 
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BY US. NAUGHTON: 
Q When you were working your sources in *85 and '86, 
were you also paying them for drug information? 
A Yes. 

Q Yes? ' » 

A Yes. Always. I mean I thought we were concen- 
trating just on the hostages, but always we were making 
drug cases anyway, but that was througH^^^Bpr through 
^^^^^^^^^^ieither ^^^^^^^H or1 

oi^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

Q Here is what I am confused about. When you met 
with the sources, then did you and^^^^ask them about 
or did you leave that to^^^^^and^H^^I 

A No, when we would meet with them in the United 




mssiflEit 



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mitsm!t 



168 




States we would ask. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

Then^^^^B would talk 
to them about narcotics and then he didn't want nothing to 
do with this other thing because the Ambassador was on 
his rear end. 

Q Okay . 

A For getting involved in this political thing. 

Q Presumably when^^^^H would debrief them on 
narcotics, he would pay them from DBA accounts. 

A Oh, yes. 

Q For that information. 

A Well, some money, I think, yes. 




Q What money was that? 
A I think Tom Clines paid for that,| 
Clines paid for that. 




599 



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yflfflOTHF 



169 




MS. NAUGHTON: While you are working your 
sources on the hostage issue and you are paying them, you 
are not making a record of what you are paying them; is 
that correct? 

THE WITNESS: That is correct. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did there come a point in time you met Michael 
Ledeen? 
A 
Q 
A 



Yes. 

Can you tell us when you met Michael Ledeen? 

I met him in his office over at CSIS or whatever 



IINCUSSIEIEJI-. 



600 



imstissiT 



170 



1 it is. 

2 Q Why did you neet with him? 

3 A Fawn had called^HBand said, can you meet 

4 this guy over at this CSIS place, the center for something 

5 for another. ^^^^Bhad just read the newspaper where 

6 this is where McFarlane worked, too, so he thinks he has 

7 something to do with McFarlane. 

8 MR. WOODCOCK: CSIS? 

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, over on 18th Street. He 

10 calls me. I'm on leave. I have nothing to do with 

11 this whole thing. He says, "Look it. I just have a — I 

12 am getting paid $30,000," I think he said, "contract with 

13 Continental Airlines," who just took over Eastern Airlines. 

14 He says, "I want to know how I can stop the United States 

15 Government frcn seizing all our planes down in Miami 
1g whenever they have cocaiif|on board." That was it. 

■^y I said, "I don't have anything to do with this. 

18 I hate Miaal. I don't even go there." I^ said, "Best 

19 tiling you can do is go down and talk to the people in 
2Q Miaal. What are you talking to us for? I thin) 

21 made arrangements for him to meet our regional director 

22 in Miami and regional director in New York. 

23 It was — other than that he inferred he was a 

24 very good friend of Ollie's. That is all, a very close 

25 



friend of Ollie's. 



jiNcuismi 



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bap- 

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BimSffilT 



171 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Was that your only contact with Mr. Ledeen? 

A Only time. 

Q I want to ask you about sane other names and 
some other things and see if they are familiar. Did, 
North ever discuss with youf 

A Not with me, no. 

Q He never mentioned the name? 

A I don't want to be — I believe the name came 
up, but he never mentioned it other than this guy is a 
sainin the neck or some thine 





He never mentioned it to me. 

Q Did he ever mention the name, Quinnones? 

A No. He mentioned this guy, Hull, down there a 
lot. That is the airporf? guy, the landing strip. 

Q What did he tell you about John Hull? 

A He said this guy is getting a bad reputation 
because he is right on the border there, and we are using 
his facilities. I don't know. Really we never had anything 
to do with this down south. 

Q I am not questioning that. 

A No. Quinnones? No. 

Q Did he ever talk to you about Hull and any allega- 
tions about drug running? 



UNGlhSSinEO 



602 



bap- 12 

1 


A 


Yes 


IMISiSSF 


2 


Q 


What was that conversation about? 


3 


A 


He 


said that he had received a letter, I think. 


4 


from Hull 


• 




end 3B bap 5 








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mmm 



173 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 



Q We were talking when we left about John Hull 
and what Colonel North had said about Hull and you mentioned 
that North told you he had received some sort of letter? 

A From Hull implying that! 




was crooked and he was bribing some of our agents down 
there. Along with the United States Customs and the DEA, 
had checked everything out and had found that the letter 
was a bunch of crap, you know, was baseless. I think that 
is on record. I think 01 lie brought that to Mr. Lawn's 
attention or to the head of our inspection detection. 

Q How do you Icnow that? 

A I think I saw the letter. That may be where that 
-- is^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|down there? 

Q No. No. •, 

A It was something like that. It was one of those 

Spanish names. It 

^^^^^^^^^^I think. 

Q Did North write the letter to Lawn? You said you 
saw it. 

A No. This was an anonymous letter sent to North 
about Hull or from Hull implying that — 

Q Wait. It's not an anonymous letter from Hull. 

A It was a letter. I don't know who signed the 




uiiHiDnudfrttMrrL 



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letter. It was in Hull's behalf saying that he is getting 

because^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bare 
crooked and he thinks the OEA — he called them FBI, narco- 
tics agents, were crooked. 

Q As part of that discussion and the others, did 
you ever hear about any OEA agents do%m there rousting out 
an informant by the name of either Kelso or Williams that was 
working for Customs? 

A Never, never. I don't know. I don't specialize 
in — 

Q I understand that. 

A I have nothing to do with South America. 

Q I'm just asking if you have ever heard anything 
about that. 

A No. 

Q Did you know a^y of the agents in Costa Rica at 
the time in '85 or '86? 

A Yes. 




605 



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Q Did Colonel North discuss with you the lawsuit 
that was filed by Honey and Tony Avirgon? 

A No. Robinette did. 

Q Did you already relay that discussion or were 
there other discussions? 

A No. Robinette was very interested in that only 
because — I think I testified before that his client, 
Tom Clines, was mentioned. He said do you know this guy 
Shackley? Do you know this guy — said about 30 names. 
I said I know Shackley oftly because I read about him in the 
book. He said well, can you find out anything about him 
because he figured one guy was a rat in the thing, you know, 
one guy was squealing. I don't know anything else 
other than that. 

Q What about a guy named J 
No. 

Never discussed that with Colonel North? 
Never . 



Did you know anything about Mario Calero's plane 

inrn 



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being stopped by DEA full of drugs? Did you ever hear 
about that? 

A Never. 

Q Did he ever discuss either Mario or Aldolfo Calero 
with you? 

A No. I want this on the record. I don't think 
Colonel North would ever — he may beg, borrow and steal 
money but he would never do anything with drugs to get money 
for, I don't care whether it's anti-communists or pro- 
communists. He would never do anything like that. I 
believe that strongly. 

Q I am asking though about Mario Calero. Did he 
ever mention to you? 

A No. I saw pictures of Ollie and Calero together 
with the President and everything like that, but I 
never. 

Q Through DEA did you ever come to learn that Mario 
Calero had been busted in any way or his plane searched and 
narcotics found? 

A No. 

Q Could you give me a sense in your dealings with 
Colonel North, could you give me a sense of Fawn Hall's 
role in that? In other words, could you leave mention 
with her of substance? Would she be called upon by Colonel 
North to actually transact any business or do anything or 



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was she simply a message taker? 

A I think simply a message taker. She at one time 
let's say gave me an envelope. She says look, Ollie left 
this. I don't know what is there. It is for you. It 
was some travelers checks. But it was a double envelope, 
you know, and it was very thijj|. So I wouldn't think — 

Q Did she know what you were doing? 

A To get the hostages, yes. 

Q Did she know you were DEA? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q Did she know the details of what you were 
doing? In other words, would you leave mention with her? 

A No. Just say Fa%m, as soon as Ollie gets back 
have him call me either at home or at the office or 
wherever . 

Q Okay . 

You mentioned Colonel Earl about one conversation 
you had with him. 

A I am not sure it was Earl. Might have 
been the other guy. There were t%fo guys. 

Q Coy? 

A Craig Coy. 

It was one of them. I think it was Earl though. 

Q Aside from that conversation did you deal with 



either of them again? 



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No. 



Did you ever meet Admiral Poindexter? 

Yes. 

When was that? 




Very early in '85 I would say about March or 

O 
April in Mr. Hikey's office. . He came in when he was still 

A 

the assistant. I think it was our first trip back and he 
was very enthusiastic. He knew all the times and the 

names of the people we were talking about, J 

^^^^^^^lAnd 
you know he knew 4ll the people. He knew all the names 
anyway. He was very enthusiastic. 

Q Was there a discussion at that meeting jUsout 
money? 

A No. 

Q Did Mr. Hikey*^ver take any steps to try to 

see if he could get some money for your project? 

A No. General, I will tell you how it evolved. 
t 
Hikey's aid was General Caulfield. Caulfield, when I came 

back and Attam wouldn't give us the 200,000 that the CIA had 

already given them to us but he wouldn't release it, 

Caulfield says let me make a call and I will see if I 

can set something up. That is when I met Ollie North. 

Q Was that your only involvement with Caulfield? 

A Other than friendship, yes, sir, personal. 



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I mean whenever I met HiJcey^ Caulf ield was there. Hikey 
wouldn't go anyplace without Caulfield I don't think. 

Q Now, do you know whether or not Colonel North 
had any dealings with^^^^^^m^^^^^^Hin attempting to 
extricate the hostages? 

A No. I don't know. ^^^^|and I did. 

Q Why don't you tell us what that was about. 

A We met 




had mentioned that 
we ought to talk to this guy because he was very 
interested in getting Father Jenco out. He saidl 

[may be V>le to provide a little monetary 
assistance. Other than that, it never went any further. 

Q You discussed it with him? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he take it tc 

A I don't know. It never went any further as far 
as I know. 

Q You never heard back? 

A No. 

Q Did you tell Ollie you were going to do that? 



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A Yes. 

Q Did he encourage that or discourage it? 

A No. He said fine. Any way you can help, help. 

Q But he did not tell you — 

A He said fine. I need all the help I can get. 
If you can do that, do it. It was one of ^^^^^^Bsuperiors 
that suggested that we do this, Frank Manastero. 

Q But what period of time are we talking about 
that you went to see him? 

A Early on. I would say the first part of '85. 

Q Do you know whether or not Colonel North was 
involved in any^^^^^^^^^^^^kr whether he was involved 
in^^^^^^^^^Hin regard to extricating the hostages? 

A No. 




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Q While we are on the subject of assassination 

attempts or plots, did you, when you were in the company 
of these people, now talking about whether it be Robinette 



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or Clines or Colonel North, anybody that you met through 
these activities, with the exception of sources or people in 
the Mideast, was there ever any discussion of any assassina- 
tion plots or dealing with any assassins? 

A No. 

Q Is that no? 

A No. 

Q Now, Colonel North has testified before the 
committees that he and Casey -- and it was Casey's dream to 
have sort of an off the shelf separate enterprise or 
organization that he could call upon to conduct activities 
throughout the world, were, you aware of any of this plan? 

A No, I was not aware of any. 

Q When you heard that at the hearings, were you 
surprised? 

A No. 

Q Why not? 

A I think being around Ollie as much as I was, he 
was talking to Casey just about — I don't know what he was 
talking about but he was talking quite a bit. I'm not 
saying Casey — he was talking to a lot of people. I know 
he had these plans and I mean it's just, you just- know. But 
I don't think he was really going to assassinate anybody 
or anything. 

Q What do you think this enterprise was for and 



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184 
what were they? 

A I don't have the slightest idea about that. 
Q Did Ollie ever mention to you that they were 
building up a contingency fund or surplus of funds or that 
in due time they would have a lot more money, anything 
like that? 

A No. He never had any money as far as I am 
concerned. He had money but he never had enough. 
Q 
A 

I met Copp through Ollie so therefore I met Zucker through 
Copp, so Ollie must have known I was meeting this guy. 
Q Ollie never discussed Zucker with you? 
No. 

Did Ollie ever mention Albert Hakim to you? 
No. Not to ma.. 



Did Ollie ever mention Zucker to you? 
No. Copp was the only one who mentioned. 



What about a guy neuned George Cave? Did you ever 



A 
Q 
A 
Q 
meet him? 

A No. 

Q Did Ollie ever mention him? 

A No. 




Were any of your dealings recorded on any sort 



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185 



of tape? 

A No. We were going to but we never did. 
Q Do you know whether or noti 




Q Did you ever discuss that with them? 

A Yes, sir, because they always wanted to know are 
you guys going to be wired? We say no. They say why not? 
How are you going to have a record of it? I said we will 
just try to remember. 

Q Why didn't you want to record them? ' 

A Why didn't we? 

Q Yes. *' 

A I never do that. If I can't trust the people 
I'm with, let alone the people I'm meeting, I trust the 
person that is taking me to the meeting. If I can't trust 
him then I'm not going to the meeting. If I can't remember 
what transpired during that meeting, then I'll send the guy 

back by himself or I will go back and find out. I don't 

at- 
need a record of it. Even, DEA I never get wired. 




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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did North or anyone else ever show you any 



briefing i^ers prepared for the HLTF? 



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^l!^ffi^a*8Hfe' 



187 



A No. I never had anything to do with that. I 
never had anything to do with it, didn't want anything to do 
with it. That's why I handed it to Al^am and he handled 
the TWIG group 2. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I think I'm going to stop for now. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Does the name Robert Fisk mean anything to you? 

A Fisk, F-i-s-k? 

Q Right. 

A Other than — there's a U.S. attorney in New York 
by that name a long time ago. Same guy? 

Q That's not clear. 




Q Are you familiar with a plan in June of 1986 that 

lift? n f^.^\ 



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involved getting the hostages out for a figure of $10 million 

A No. 

Q You testified that as things began to get more 
difficult for Lt. Colonel North and people were searching, 
were they searching him? Was that the problem or who was 
being searched? 

A It was just they tightened up everything in the 

r 

EOB. We use to be able to carry ouf gun in there and 
then they stopped us and you had to put it in a little safe 
so then we started leaving it outside and putting it 
in the trunk of the car. 

Q This tightening of security wasn't aimed at 
North? 

A No. I think it was something after somebody 
climbed the White House fence they tightened security. He 
did say one time when I called I will meet you outside. 

Q Why is it he couldn't give you money inside? 

A He said they are really searching everybody. I 
can get in any time I want. All I have to do is call and put 
them in the computer. 

Q It wasn't a problem for you to get in, is that 
right? 

A Right. 

Q Then why was — 

A It would be a problem getting out unless he went 



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out the side door. 

Q Wait a minute. The problem for you to get out with 
the money; is that correct? 

A I don't want to make it sound like I was 
trying to scam something or something. 

Q Z understand. 

A If he owed me $6000 and he gave me $6000 but 
then if they wanted to they would stop you. I think somebody 
tried to do something in EOB or something, I don't know 
whether they ripped something out but they were looking at 
everybody closely. He said it's better if I meet you 
outside. 

Q Was he afraid you would be searched on your way 
out and this money found? 

A I don't think he was afraid of it. I think he 
thought it was better for both of us. 

Q So he met you outside and gave you the 
money outside. 

A This was the last time, yes. Everybody knew 
something was coming down. 

Q Where did you end up having the money exchange 
take place? 

A Hardees. 

Q Hardee's? 

A Yes. 18th Street. 



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190 



Q Is that a burger place? 

A Hardee^s, H-a-r-d-e-e-s. It's like McDonalds. 

Q Would it be safe to assume that too would be 
unique in your government experience, that you would have 
your expenses reimbursed in a Hardee^s? 

A No, that would not be unique at all. 

Q It would not be unique? 

A No. 

Q Did DEA regularly reimburse you in hcunburger 
restaurants? 

A You are making it sound a little — no. Usually 
I would get my money from DEA offices. 

Q Sometimes in a government check, right? 

A No, I never get a check. Always get cash. 

Q That's before you make the expenditure or after? 

• Ct- 

A Usually after.' Sometimes you take out. traveler 

A 

advance or something like that. 

Q Did it strike you unusual you were getting your 
travel expenses reimbursed in a Hardees? 

A No, because that was the way Ollie did business. 
It was like our meeting in the ©Id Brogen. I don't even 
know what we went there for other than — we didn't discuss 
anything. Charlie Allen and Ollie — Charlie Allen and 

Iwere there. ^^^^^Vand I were there. It was a 
Friday night. We couldn't discuss anything in the place. 



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191 
What we went out there for I haven't the slightest idea. 

Q Let me get back to the Hardees exchange. What 
was that reimbursement of expenses for? What expenses had 
you incurred? 

MR. SCHIPPERS: He can tell you this in a narrative 
Want him to do it that way? 

MR. WOODCOCK: Go ahead. 

THE WITNESS: I think I called him and I said -- 
this is about a week before or two weeks before. I said 
hey, American Express is after me. I need this money 
you know. When can you do it? He says give me ten days, 
a week or ten days. So I called him back and he said all 
right, you know. 1 have got it. How much is it though? 
Because this time he wanted pretty exact, you know. 
Usually he was 57, 67, something like that. This time it 
was pretty, you know like it came down to 70 or 80 dollars, 
something like that, plus whatever the amount was. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q What was the total amount, do you recall? 

A No. 

Q Was it more than a thousand? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q More than five thousand? 

A I think it was around six, something like that. 



oo 

67, 70' 



,00 



ONCUSSIFIED 



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UH^mffifer 



192 



He wanted a more precise figure out of you than 



He came out. He had one of these things. 
One of these is an accordion folder, is that 



Q 

usual? 

A 

Q 
right? 

A A similar thing. He came out and pulled a yellow 
envelope out of that and he is sitting in Hardees and he 
went — and he said this will teUce care of this. 
I didn't even look at him because I trusted him. No. 
This was five grand, 56 hundred for^^^^^because I picked 
.money up. 





Q So you picked up money 
well, is that right? 

A Yes, sir, and I gave it to his wife. 

Q You say North»|iiras a little more particular about 
the aunount that you were requesting than usual . Do you know 
why that was? 

A No. I think it was because he was very close 
to the — I don't think he had that much. 

Q In the past would he just ask you for round 
figures? 

A Not round figures. We would say we spent $58 00. 
He would give you $5800. We didn't come down and say 
$5800 and 65 cents or 5822 or something like that. We would 



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just say. It's not like sometimes he would round it off 
the other way, you know. It was always if it was 5822 
he would give us 5825 maybe or 5820. But mind you, this 
was all on my credit cards,^^^^^Bcredit cards. So we are 
paying interest at 19 percent interest on our credit cards 
sometimes for two or three months. 

Q Did you factor that in, too? 

A No, never. We never charged him telephone calls. 
I've got telephone bills I could paper this place. 

For two years I used my personal car parking, 
$13 a day not counting mileage, gas, wear and tear on my 
vehicle, picking up this shylock here. 

Q Let the record reflect the shylock is David B. 
Schippers. 

A Really I was doing this more than — I was doing it 
for my narcotics job bu^ I was doing it also because I 
believed in what I was doing. Once I talked to Ollie the 
first or second time, man I believed. 

Q Did you ask him why he had to be more precise 
this last time around? 

A No. I knew something was going on. 

Q What did you think was going on? 

A I think the whole thing was coming down. There 
was already word in the newspaper and everything about the 
trip to Iran and all that. 



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Q You thought the operation was at an end, is 
that right, coming to an end? 
A Getting close. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If I can jump in, did Ollie mention 
to you in either October or November that he was in the 
process of cleaning up his files? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MS. NAUGHTON: There was no indication he was 
shredding documents of any kind? 

THE WITNESS: No. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did he make reference to the fact in either 
October or November that he was planning on leaving the 
National Security Council staff? 
A Never. 

We may joke some time, said Ollie, you better 
never go back to the Marine Corps because these guys will 
kill you when you go back there. He would order generals, 
three star, four star generals he would tell them the 
President wants this. That's the way the guy was. 

MR. WOODCOCK: One more question. Rafael tftntero, 
did that name ever come up in any of your discussions? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did you ever hear the name when 



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you were on your assignment? 

THE WITNESS: Only in the newspaper. 
MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing further. 
MS. NAUGHTON: I have a couple other questions, 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did you ever discuss Ambassadorl 
with Oliver North? 
A Yes. 

Q What did you discuss about him? 

A Well, not really with Colonel North. It was more 
with Hikey. Getting a passport for the prince. 
Q I understand that but — 
A Nothing other than that. 
Q Did you know that Colonel North knew Ambassador 

A I assumed it*^ 

Q Did Colonel North ever talk to you about 

Ambassadoi 

A No. I did that primarily on my own through Hikey. 

Q I understand that. I'm talking about any other 
conversations . 

A No. ^^^^^^^^^^ 

H^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^H^^^^I I was 

wondering if the subject had ever iome up? 

A No. I only met her that one or two times over 



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there and one or two times at Hikey's house. 

c 
Q You met her at Hikey's house? 

A Yes. 

Q So — 

A It was just you know, Christmas. 

Q Social occasion? 

A Never to do anything with this. I just said 
hello. 

Q Did Colonel North ever discuss her in your 
presence? 

A No. 

Q Ever heard of a general named ^ 



A No. 

Q Never heard that name in Ollie's presence? 

A Never. ' 

Q Did you watch Colonel North's testimony 
before the select committees? 

A Yes. I didn't watch the whole thing. 

Q Has there anything in that testimony you recall 
him saying that does not comport with your recollection, 
what you heard or saw? 

A Not that Colonel North said, no, not that I 
can — I didn't see the whole thing but you know, I didn't 
hear anything that was out of the ordinary. What General 



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197 



Secord said, that's a different story. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You are referring to the reference 
to the Druze militia? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Nothing else? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

\n 
MR. VJOODCOCK: Nothing else! Secord' s testimony 

that struck you as incorrect? 

THE WITNESS: No, not that I can think of right 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did you ever meet Robert Owen? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Did North ever discuss Robert Owen in your 
presence? 

A No. I only met this guy Craig Coy and Earl by 
accident actually. They worked down the hall from Ollie's 

office. 

e 
Q What about Buck Rlvell, Assistant Director of the 

FBI? Did you ever see him in Ollie's office? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever met him? 

A No. 

Q Did North ever refer to him? 



A Yes. 



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IHmSariiftT 



198 



Q In what context? 

A Well, I know who Buck Rfvell was. 

Q Sure. 

A Mainly it was in a very respectable sense that 
Buck is the number 2 guy over there, you know. I think he 
liked Buck because they both had the same neune, Oliver. 

Q I think they liked each other for more reasons 
than that. 

A I do, too, but I don't know. 

Q Did he ever mention — 

A I know he called him a lot. 

Q Did he tell you what about? 

A I think something to do with the prince or the 



jewel or whatever 




A Can X just talk to you for a second? 

Q Were there any criminal investigations — 
I'm not talking about intelligence matters — any 
criminal investigations in which North referred to any 
encounter with Mr. Ravel 1, that is any criminal cases in 
which he called Rflvell about? 



No. 



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Q Did Ollie ever mention being briefed by Ravel 1 
on any ongoing criminal investigations? 

A Not to me, no. 

Q Were you aware that Colonel North was being 
briefed at any time by DEA on any ongoing drug cases? 

A No. 

Q Specifically, I'm referring to a case involving 
cocaine trafficking out of Miami and from Colombia via 
Nicaragua, and then to Florida. Were you aware that Colonel 
North was briefed in that case? 

A I was not aware. There is only one time and that 
is when there was an allegation made in one of the Los Angele 
papers about some contra people got 50 kilos of coke or 
something in San Franaisco or something. Fawn called 
and she said it's a big stink. Can you find out if it is 
true or not. So we c»^led. 

I went over to his 
office and we called and it was nothing to it. It was not 
contra people. It was some, you know, Colombians or 
something. That's the only time he ever asked to find out 
anything about drugs with us. 





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Q Do you know whether or not Colonel North called 
Buck Rlvell to check out^^^^^^^^H 

A No. I asked Ollie if he wanted an FBI guy. I 
said I've got the perfect guy for you. 

Q You mean to help with the hostage location effort? 
Exactly. 

And was Ollie interested in that? 
Yes. 

What steps did he take? 

He didn't realty take many steps. He wasn't that 
enthusiastic because he didn't trust the FBI. But one day 
I brought^^^^Hover to his office. I knev 
He was a personal friend of mine I 

I said hey, maybe this guy can 
help us. I said anyway ,^^^^1^°^^"'^ like to travel, you 
know. Two or three days and he is gone. So I said if I've 
got to spend all this time overseas, I want to spend it with 
somebody I like and that can help us and the FBI has 
connections. And that was it. Ollie said okay. I think 





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Yes. 

Yes. 

Did^^^^Bever meet with North? 

Only the one time I brought him for about 20 



201 

he called Buck and said cari^^^^^be assigned. I don't 
know what the outcome of it was because I never heard. 

never did anything. 

C 
Q Did Hikey knov 

A ■* 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 
minutes. 

Q Colonel North met with Mr. Lawn in October of '86. 
Do you know what that was about? 

A Yes. I don't know. I wasn't there. I understand 
it was about me and^^^^^H 

Q Did Ollie tell you this? 

No. mi^|t^ci 

Q From whom hac^^^^K heard it? 

A ^^^^Hhad set up the meeting. 

Q Ifhat was the purpose of the meeting? 

A Well, at this point in time it was almost two 
years that I had been working with Ollie, not quite two 
years. But I think Mr. Lawn was inquiring about what was 
going on, why we were — I don't know what the meeting was. 
You have to ask them^ — I really — I heard it went okay. 



That's all I heard. 



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MS. NAUGHTON: I think we have been pretty thorough 
but I always have that feeling like we haven't covered 
something we should. 

Are there any questions or areas we should ask 
you about that might be important to our inquiry that we 
have not phrased in the right way or asked about? 

THE WITNESS: No, I don't think so. I think I 
have been very forthcoming. I tried to explain most of 



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m34 1 my answers. There is always something you think about 

later but I think that in the long run, we tried our best 
and, you know. , 

MS. NAUGHTON: Is there" anything you are 
relieved we didn't ask about? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. SCHIPPERS. I can't think of anything you 
haven't covered. 

We will not waive signature. 

(Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the deposition was 
concluded. ) 



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^^ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPIlOPSSO.000.00 FKOMMPm|||||j& 
Jp^NT SENSITIVE OPERATION. SAID AMOUNT WILL BE 
FED FOR IWUL L UPON COMPLEJJCN OF APPROVED ACTIVITYn ^^•'' 






Partially MMMMmusad on 

"^■plwsoiEO 12356 
IWkxnl Secunty Council 



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Stenographic Transcript of 



iwns. 



HEARINGS 
Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



w:^ 



/fl7 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



Wednesday, August 12, 1987 




/ « ^ 



ML. 



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j1WjS"8 



Partially Dedassitied/Released on 

unaer provisions ol E 12356 
by K Jonnson National Sscuiity Council 



Washington. D.C. 

TOP SECRET 

OR 



' 1JE-SC^. -E-C"^G 




WASHINCTT 



638 



1 DEPOSITION 01 

2 Wednesday, August 12, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Conuaittee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washi ngto n, D. C. 

of^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hcalled as a 

9 witness by counsel for the Select Consittee, in the 

10 offices of the Senate Select CooBittee, Roob SH-901, Hart 

11 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C, conaencing at 

12 9:20 a.m., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL 

13 ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of 

14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask 

15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her 

16 direction. 



i'!iaiiw Oeriassriied/fleleased on _2i}h 

unaet provisions of E 12356 
by K Johnson National Secunly Councrl 



ONimSiFIED 



639 



UNCraFIED 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of th* Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 TIMOTHY WOODCOCK, ESQ. 

6 Associate Counsel 

7 HENRY J. FLYNN 

8 Investigator 

9 On behalf of the House Select Committee to 

10 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

11 PAMELA NAUGHTON, ESQ. 

12 ROBERT GENZMAN, ESQ. 

13 Associate Counsel 

14 ROBERT BERMINGHAM 

15 Investigator 

16 On behalf of the witness: 

17 RONALD S. MORROW, ESQ. 

18 Suite 340 

19 1900 Avenue of the Stars 

20 Los Angeles, California 90067 

21 (213) 272-9009 



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EXAMINATIQl* on 


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1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Wharaupon, 
3 

4 callad as a witnass by counsal on bahalf of tha Sanata 

5 Salact Conaittaa and having baan duly sworn by tha Notary 

6 Public, was axiuninad and tastlfiad as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

9 Q Would you stata your nama for tha racord and 

10 spall your last nana, plaasa? 

11 A 
Q ^^^^^^^^Hmy nama is Tia Woodcock. 

13 Associata Counsal with tha Sanata Salact Conaittaa on 

14 Sacrat Military Assistanca to Iran and tha Nicaraguan 

15 Opposition. This daposition is baing hald undar tha 

16 authority of that Coaaittaa, undar tha rasolution that 

17 anablas it. It is, tharafora, an official inquiry of tha 

18 Coaaitt** and tha inforaation that is iapartad to tha 

19 Coaaittaa through this daposition may ba usad in 

20 fulfillaant of its rasolution. 

21 Also attanding hara ara Associata Counsal 

22 raprasanting tha Housa Salact Coaaittaa on tha Iran- 

23 Contra invastigation — Paa Haughton and Bob Ganzaan. I 

24 think it's fair to say that this daposition, too, is 

25 baing hald undar tha auspicas of thair anabling 



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resolution and this constitutes an official inquiry of 
the House CoBunittss as wall. 

Before we get into the ioaedlate occasion of 
your having been called here, let me ask you, if you 
would, to just briefly cover your professional 




Q Nov, I assume that for the most part you've 
been a special agent of the OEA; is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q You are currently, however, in an 
administrative position with the DEA; is that right? 

A Well, you could say administrative, yes. It's 
> line position, support position we call it. 




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Q So that brings you back to approxloataly what, 
1984? Would that ba correct? 




transfarrad hara to Washington? 

A Right. 

Q ^^^^^^^^B^*^ B* bring you to your 
first Involvaaant with attanpta to locata and rascua 
hostagas in Labanon. Could you tall us whan this first 
cama to your attantion? 

A In January of '85. 



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Q How did it coma to your attention? 

A Z had an agent , ^[|||JiHBcontact«d me sooetime 
in January, and asked me if I had any sources that were 
involved with the Middle East. 

Now ^"^^^^IMfl^l^HiiH ^^ 

correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Did he explain to you why it was he was 
calling you, at whose behest? 

A Yes. He said he was talking with Ed Hickey. 
Is it Hickey? Yeah. 

Q And who did you understand Ed Hickey to be? 

A He was an assistant in the White House. 
That's all Z knew. 



Q So when you got this, you say it was a phone 
frc 
sub j ect? 



call, froB^^BHB^V did you and he get together on this 



A ^f^MSt^nA I did. We briefly spoke about the 
posaibility of getting intelligence out of Lebanon or out 
of the Middle East regarding the hostages. 

Q What steps did you take on that subject? 
22 A I took none at the tiae. Mijfeifsaid that we 



23 would be seeing Hickey and when we got an appointment we 

24 would go and talk to hin about it. 

25 Q Did you then get an appointment? 



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A y«ah . 

Q And was that also in January? 

A In January. 

Q So what happened when you went to your 
appointment with Hickey? 

A I met Hickey and there was a general there. 
General Cc fflel d. We had a very general meeting, talked 
about different things in law enforcement because Ed 
Hickey was a Secret Service agent at one time and he 
asked the question, you know, how was our network. How 
is our intelligence etbility in Lebanon? And I told him. 




he asked about, in general, 
the hostages and the people who I thought was holding 
them, et cetera. And Z explained to him that these are 
terrorists who are also narcotic dealers, that the 

land the 
lis noted for its traffic in hashish and 
maimfacturing of heroin. 

Q Nov were any plans made at this meeting to go 
forward? 

A Hell, there was some concern about the 
hostages, and particularly Buckley. 
Q That is William Buckley? 




ONetiminEn 



647 



Hiwiussire 



10 



1 A That's correct. 

2 Q And did that concern axprass itself in any 

3 next steps planned at that meeting? 

4 A Concern about Buc]cley was very heavy. 

5 Q And did you and Hickey and|||^^lpnd Co££ield 

6 agree on what the next step should be? 

7 A Hell, we decided we would prob* contacts and 

8 sources of information and see what the feasibility is, 

9 the actual feasibility of gleaning intelligence and 
10 collecting it in a timely manner. 

IX Q Now, did there come a time when you brought 

12 this to the attention of your superiors at DEA? 

13 A I sure did. 

14 Q When did that happen? 

15 . A In January, subsequent to this meeting. I 

16 contacted my immediate supervisor. I told him — 

17 Q Who was that? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H And we 

19 right up the ladder. The next person up was Dave 

20 Westrate — N-e-s-t-r-a-t-e. After him was Frank 

21 NeiMStero — M-o-n-e-s-t-e-r-o. And last, but not least, 

22 Mr. LAwn, John Lawn. 

23 Q Now, as you went up the ladder — 

24 A Each level had to approve to the upper level. 

25 You know, the chain reaction type of thing and finally 



ONasssinEn 



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ONcussm 



11 



1 had a briefing vith Lawn and that vaa it. 

2 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

3 Q Exeusa m«. Had Bud Mullan laft by this tiaa? 

4 A No. Ha was thara. 

5 Q Is thara any raason ha wasn't told about this? 

6 A Wall, I didn't hava an audianca with his, if 

7 that's what you aaan. Ha was tha Administrator. 

8 Q But do you lanov whathar or not Mr. Lawn told 

9 hia about it? 

10 A I'B sura Bud Mullan approvad it. I'm sura ha 

11 was brlafad. 

12 Q Whan you say you ara sure ha was, do you hava 

13 any indication that ha was? 

14 A Only what^^^^^Hwould tell oa or Wastrata or 

15 Monestaro. 

16 Q And what did they tell you? 

17 A That is was approvad by tha Administrator. 

18 Q At that time that was Mr. Mullan? 

19 A Right. 

20 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

21 Q Now you say it was approved ultimately by the 

22 Administrator, what precisely was approved by the 

23 Administrator as you understood it? 

24 A What was approved was that we would try to set 

25 up a network in the Middle East in order to get 



KNCMflfO 



649 



UmSfHED 



12 



1 information regarding th« hostages, but w« wouldn't do it 

2 strictly for information on hostages. w« would do it in 

3 two phases. One would be narcotics investigations, which 

4 would be handled by some of the agents in the area. And 

5 the second part, that would be handled by^H^lnnd me, 

6 was the hostage information, intelligence, however you'd 

7 like to call it. 

8 Q Now,^^BHHHHv to your Icnowledge was this 

9 proposal ever reduced to a memorandua form and sent in to 

10 someone's desk, or was it all done orally? 

11 A It was all oral. 

12 Q Mow on the same subject, you understood that 

13 this was basically a split authority, that there would be 

14 som* concentration on the narcotics side and there would 

15 be concentration, specifically you andBMBHH on the 

16 hostage information side; is that correct? 

17 A om-hua. 

18 Q Did you also understand that this plan 

19 comprehended more than simply information on the hostages 

20 but also rescue of the hostages? 

21 A In my mind I understood that. If I had a 

22 chance to extract them, I would have done it. 

23 Q Now, did you have any understanding as to what 

24 your reporting requirements were to DEA on this project? 

25 A My reporting requirement at the time was to 



UNCIrmtnEO 



650 



ilNClASSinED 



13 



1 Aba Azzam, who was put in charge of this operation by 

2 Monestaro. 

3 Q Now, I gather there came a point when you 

4 actually met face to face with Mr. Azzam on this subject; 

5 is that correct? 

6 A Yes. 

7 Q And when did that happen, to the best of your 

8 recollection? 

9 A In February, early February. Azzan was on a 

10 trip overseas, so we decided to kill two birds with one 

11 stone, so we contacted soae sources^^^^^^^^^^Hand we 

12 told then to aeet us^^^^^^^H And then Z contacted 
Azzam^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band 

14 told hia to meet us| 

15 Q Mow when you say "we contacted" — 

16 A Hell, I contacted — a* orj 

17 Q I'll be asking you that froa tiae to tiae. I 

18 know that you and^^Hl^Bd worked as a teaa. 

19 'ax couldn't tell you if he did or I did, but it 

20 was one of us. 

21 Q One or the other? 

22 A Right. 

23 Q And so Azzaa was contacted, and Z gather a 

24 aeeting then ensued; is that correct? 

25 A We met I 




( 

id it. 





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UNCUSSIREB 



Now who was present at th« msatlng? 
^Azzaa, 



It was myself, I 

an agent 
■who was 
agent in charge of that office wasn't 
around, so that's why the second agent came. 
Q What was the purpose of this meeting^^^^H 



A Well, primarily in a manner of getting 
intelligence, 





that's why he 

was present. 

Q The source was present? 
A Well, the source 

■breaking thea down one by one. 
Iwaa there because we picked^^^^Hand 
he ended up being there. 

' Q So it was his turf? 

A Yeah. What can you do? And we decided that 
it would probably be the best place to meet in the future 






Now, I gather there came a point in the course 



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l)i««i»»i$IFIED 



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of this meeting where one of your sources appeared as 
well; is that correct? 

A He had a source and a siib- source. 

Q Now the source — let ne just give you a 
generic description and see if this is the person that 
you were dealing with. 




Is this the person you were dealing 



with? 

A 

goes on 
Q 
A 




Yes. We'll call him Source 1 as the interview 
How's that? 
All right, Source 1. 

Because there will be some other sources, and 
we'll number them. 


Is that Source 2? 
A That's correct] 
Q Nov, Source 1 came to the meeting, I gather, 
to be briefed on what it was you people had in mind; is 
that correct? 

A Well, I had talked to him in the State 
originally about what the feasibility is 

So then we met there 
again to talk about the feasibility of setting up a 
network and the movement of information, location of 



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hostages, and along with that ws also discusssd tha 
narcotic part of it and how w« wantad informationl 




Ws wanted narcotic information to coma out at 
tha sams time,! 




Q Nov by this time was Sourcs 1 agrssabls to 
coopsrating on this, on th« hostag* sids? 

A H« voluntaarad, yss. 

Q And hov about Sourcs 2? 

A Source 2 agreed, yes. 

Q What happened next? 

A We all got up and went home, basically. We 
had agreed with it. The sub-source went back into the 

and I think Source 1 came back with me. No, 
they both went bac 

Q By this time Z gather your operation bad 
fpraal SEO designation; is that correct? 

A A special enforcement operation project was 
••signed to this initial phase, and so we had some money 
to travel and we had some money to pay source and 
expenses. 

Q Nov after this meet ing^^^^^^H what was the 



next step? 



UNElASSm 



654 



UimSSIFIED 



17 



1 A Wall, the next step was that we met with, of 

2 course, my people, with^^^^^Hand Monestero and 

3 everybody. At that time Azzam was in charge, so when 

4 Azzam was in charge you don't have to do anything any 

5 more; he does it all. 

6 Q You mean administratively? 

7 A Everything — verbally, administratively, 

8 supervisory. So we were just kind of there waiting for 

9 calls from the sources. 

10 Q You and| 

11 A Yeah. 

12 Q Fifth wheels? Is that what's happening here? 

13 A Yeah. We were the second channel, I guess, or 

14 third channel maybe. 

15 Q Hell, since Azzam is in charge and Azzam is 

16 doing everything — 

17 A So he was briefing everybody. He briefed 

18 Monestero . 

19 - Q What was happening, then, from your 

20 p«rsp«ctlv«? 

21 A Re briefed Monestero and we were told that the 

22 thing was still authorized, to do it, and he then was 

23 assigned to some committee called Hostage Recovery 

24 something. 

25 Q The Hostage Locating Task Force? 



UNCOILED 



655 



UNtUSSIHEO 



18 



1 A Y«ah, that's right. So h« had his Monday 

2 morning, meeting thara. 

3 Q And that's Mr. Azzam you'ra talking about? 

4 A Mr. Azzam. So ha got vary closa to tha FBI, 

5 and maanwhlla thara was only ona or two FBI agants thara, 

6 but primarily h« got vary closa to CIA in that maating. 

7 Q Okay. Now what's happening? I mean, Mr. 

8 Azzam is joining the Hostage Locating Task Force. He's 

9 briefing Monestero. What are you doing? 

10 A Basically he's in control of it and we were 

11 getting phone calls on occasion from Source 1 giving us 

12 some Information regarding the location of the hostages, 

13 about their health and their movement. 

14 Q And you are passing that on to Mr. Azzam? 

15 A I'm passing that on to Mr. Azzam. Matter of 

16 fact, I gave him some notes, brief notes, on it which 

17 then he would — I don't know what he did. I guess he 

18 briefed the Committee on what a great job we were doing. 

19 - Q Let me back you up a little bit on this. You 

20 ar« getting phone calls from Source 1. 

21 A That's right. 

22 Q Kow does Source 1 call only you, or does he 
free to call^^^^^^^^^H 

24 A He'll caU^^IPif he can't find me. 

25 Q S«a these cooununications that are coming in 



Sa. these cooununications t 



656 



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2 

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4 

5 

6 

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8 

9 

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14 

15 

16 

17 

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19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mmm 



19 




froa Sourc* 1 ar« coaing aithar to you ox 

A Right. 

Q And do you than shara th«a wit 
bring thaa up to Azcaa? 

A Sur*. 

Q And ha vica versa; is that correct? 

A Yeah, sura. 

Q Mov, during this pariod — lat's confine this 
to ths aonth of February so far — what's happening with 
Source 1 froa the information that he's giving to you? 

A Well, we're getting inforaation regarding the 
gr oups that are holding the hostages and th e politics of 
it^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H We'd give 
to Azzan and Azzaa gave it to the CZA. 

Q And I gather the Source is travel ingl 



A Well, the source has coae out, right? And 
then he has set up somewhat of a network that he can call 
the sub-sovirce that we met^^^^^^Bind other people 
that h e » tairfc«d to develop , other persons! 

Q Now, does there coae a point when you get the 
understanding that CIA is also becoming involved in this? 
A Oh, yeah. We Icnew that CIA was involved in it 




always . 



uimsinED 



657 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

• 

9 

10 

XI 

12 

13 

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15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNCUSSIHED 



20 



Q From th« start? 

A Sur« . 

Q Ev«n in January? 

A Yaah. wn«n v« had a masting with Hlckay ha 
said tha CIA was Involvad in it. That's vhara tha 
Bucklay thing cama outi 




Q Bucklay 's status was a sansitlva mattar? 

A Why it was nacassary to pull Bucklay out of 
thara. You'ra avara of that, right? 

Q Wa'ra avara of that. 

A So vara va avara of that. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Rasuming) 

Q Excusa ma. Did Hickay tall you that ha knav 
Bucklay parsonally? 

A Yas. 

Q What did ha tall you about thair ralationship? 

A Kothing. You knov, ha just said ha knav 
Bucklay I 




BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

So you understood that CIA had an interest in 



UNCtASStHED 



658 



biiCliSSIHED 



21 



1 this all along. You also undsrstood thay vara actlvaly 

2 Involvad in tha DEA sida o£ it from tha start; is that 

3 corract? 

4 A Hall, not tha DEA sida. Thay vara activaly 

5 involvad in thair own sida of it. Wa )cnav — you Icnov, 

6 wa had sons, lat's say, coordination with than bacausa of 

7 Azzan's job on that Coanittaa and his maatings with tham 

8 all tha tima. 

9 Q Did thara coaa a point whan you undarstood 

10 that CIA was actually funding this along with OEA? 

11 A Wall, soaawhara down tha lina wa had a fav 

12 maatings and wa got a littla monay from tham. Wa figurad 

13 wa gava tham all this information; thay should giva us 

14 somathlng. 

15 Q It's not an inaquitabla thought. 

16 A And sinca our information was tha bast coming 

17 out at tha tima — 

18 Q Now, whan you say "wa had a maating with 

19 tham", is that you andf^^^^^Knd Mr. Azzam? 

20 A Wall, Azzam always mat with tham. Lat ma saa. 

21 Z hava soma chronological ordar hara. As Z said, Azzam 

22 was tha ona in charga of this oparation, so ha mat with 

23 tha CIA mora than anybody, and wa than,H^Knd I and 

24 Azzam, mat finally with a coupla of CIA paopla ragarding 

25 this mattar. J^4XU?t's whan it was agraad thay would 



Aad ±hat ' s whan it was a 



659 



1 

2 

3 
4 
5 

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7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



lixuuiilSIFIED 



22 



giv* us $50,000 In oparation for sourcas. 

Q And they gave it, I gather, directly ^°^H 
^^^^His that 

A They gave it tomHjright. 

Q Do you recall the names of the CIA people? 

A One was ^^^^B and I don't )cnow. I recall 





Q ^^^^ 

A ^^^^H right. These are the people I think 
we met. ^^^^^^^^^^^M though, I saw a few times. 

Q Would it be fair to say that would be 
approximately mid-March when that money would have 
changed hands? 

A Yeah, exactly. 

Q Now after you received this, what, $50,000 
froa CIA; is that correct? 

A Right. 

Q What did you do with it? 

A Well, initially we made a payment In mid- 
March to Source 1 of $20,000. 

And that's you an<^^^^^^Hwhen 

A That's correct. Which we, by the way, used a 
DEA receipt to acknowledge the receipt of the money, just 
a habit, I guess. 



UNtASSIHEn 



660 



UNCUSSIHED 



23 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

13 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q Prudent. What was th« purpose of giving th« 
monsy, ths $20,000, to Source 1? 

A Wall, h« was traveling back and forth and the 
round-trip ticket froa the Statea^^^^^^^^Kras 
approximately a^^^^^nround-trip, and he's been paying 
that out of his own pocket and his ovm expenses. So we 
started giving hia soae aoney. 

Q Now, was soae of that to reiaburs* hia for 
prior expenses? 

A Well, no. We had soae DEA aoney which ve gave 
hia prior to that, but to set up this network it required 
for hia to go^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M So we gave hia 
expenses we could afford. 

Q So soae of the aoney was travel aoney. Was 
that aoney also intended to go to help hia set up the 
network? 

A Oh, his network, sure. Re had to give thea 
aoney . 




BY MS. NAOCHTON: (Reauaing) 
Q Can Z go beck one step? Excuse ae. In 

February you aet with the source^^^^^^^^^^is that 

correct? 

A That's right. 

Q And you paid the source at that tiae $20,000? 



UHCDtSSIFIED 



661 




^^^ ^^ ... .M. 

24 



asdire 



1 A No. w* paid that source $20,000 in March. 

2 Q Thar* was no axchang* of money, then] 

4 A W« may have paid him through a DEA account. 

5 Q That's my question. I'm not talking about the 

6 CIA money here. I'm talking about DEA money. 

7 A We may have given him some money in February 

8 from a OEA account. 

9 Q Do you know how much that was? 

10 A I have it written down. I'd have to check it. 

11 Q Do you have it written do%m here? 

12 A Sure. Okay. In early February he got $5,000, 

13 and then again in February he got another $3,000. 

14 Q And this is all to Source 1? 

15 A To Source 1. He got $8,000 in February. 

16 Q If I can back up, February 26 or thereabouts 
you a trip ^°^^^^^^^H 

18 A Yeah, around that time we did take a tric]^^| 

20 Q Nov, was that to meet with Source 1? 

21 A Right. 

22 Q Haa Source 1 paid money on that occasion? 

23 A Probably part of that $8,000 wae paid then. 

24 Q Do you have any recollection of the source 

25 being paid more than $8,000 on or about February 26? 



UNttASSfflfn 



662 



yN6MS$iFIED 



25 



1 A I don't think so. 

2 Q So th« most you r«a«mb«r paying Sourca 1 in 

3 February of '85 is a total of S8,000? 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q And that was OEA money, not CIA money? 

6 A That's correct. 

7 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

8 Q That recollection on the $8,000 is based on 

9 the documents you produced. Is that a DEA document? 
10 A That's correct. 

H Q And that's a OEA document shoving 

12 disbursements to Source 1; is that correct? 

13 A That's correct. 

14 Q Would the source have been getting monies from 

15 any other source than DEA? 

16 A Not that I )cnow of. 

from you °>^^^^^^^^^H 

18 A Not froJ^^Hknd I, 

19 Q And that's limited to that period of February? 

20 A Um-hUB. 

21 Q Nov after you gave Source 1 the $20,000 in 

22 March, vhat did he do? what vere his marching orders? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ro further 

24 develop the netvork that was starting up and start 

25 retrieving information. 



UNWSIflED 



663 



MmBiB 



26 



1 
2 

3 

4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 

n 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q I gather he did so; is that correct? 

A Yes. He started that up and he started 
developing also narco tic information and sources of 
na r c o t i c s ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

Q He was reporting back to you during that time; 
is that correct? 

A He reported to me about the hostage stuff, 
yeah. 

Q And is this trip taking place in March or 
April? 

A Well, you know, it's hard to say. I know we 

a trip in to ^^'''I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
But he could have come and gone a couple of times before 
we got there, so I really don't know. That's as best we 
can recollect and tried to reconstruct this thing. 

Q So as best as you can recall he was in and out 



A Sure. 

Q In the month of March and April, and during 
that period of time was reporting back to you an^^H 



A Right. 

Q As he could find you? 

A That's correc t. 



664 



MumEs 



27 




Q Would ha avar call Mr. Azzaa directly? 

A I don't know. I don't think so. Ha may hava, 
though, you know, but I don't ramambar. 

Q Now in your discussion with tha CIA, tha ona 
t hat you had you with^^^^^^^^Band^^^^^^Hand 

was thera any discussion about trying to 
datamina tha bona fidas of tha peopla with whom Sourca 1 
was daaling? 

A Evantually. 

Q But that did not occur in March, to tha bast 
of you racollaction? 

A I don't think so. I think it caaa a littla 
latar. 

Q Whan do you think that occurrad? 

A April, April-May, probably April. 

Q Hov did that COB* about? 

M«ll,^^^Lnd vant^^^^^^l w« with 
tha sourca, and than wa procaadad^^^^^Hto maat| 
^^^1 and^^^^^^^^^^Hand tha sourca 

Q Lat ma back you up. Bafora that naatingj 

^ou don't racall any point at which tha CIA 
suggastad any particular kinds of bona fidas ba 
damonstratad by tha parsons with whom Sourca 1 had 
contact; is that corract? 




UNCtASffiD 



665 



UNGIASSinED 



28 



I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



A You )cnow, Azzao could hav« had th«s« m««ting«. 
Km X said b«for«, h« had a lot of aaatings with thaa. 
But avantually Z )cnov that w« had a aaatlng and w« tallcad 
about bona fidas. H« talked about avidanca. And Z don't 
Icnov. It was in tha April tima fraaa, as far as I can 
recall. 

I think i t was subsaquant to this naati 
fith^^^^^^^Hbacausa wa had a hassla wit 
|who didn't raoaobar a da^m thing. Okay? 
'Q Wa'll gat to that. So you had aat with I 
baforahand and at soma point Z gathar you sat up this 

ind you would aaat 



B 



oaating^^l 




ll presuaa, to daal 



arrangaaant whara ha was goinq 
tha sourca thara; is that corract? 

A No, no, no. 
racall, Azzaa callad us and said I 

ind hava hia dabriaf Sourca 1. 

Q Okay. You waraj 
with Sourca 1; is that corract? 

A Yaah. 

Q And is it your racollaction that when you went, 
aare was no plan in place for you to meet with 

That's corract. 
Q And once you got there you got a call from 
Az zan ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^ 

uItoHIED 




666 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNCLASSIFIED 



29 



A Go De«t him, because it wasn't In the 
itinerary and ve had to redo our ticlcet 




Q When you say "ve", that's you andl 

A ^^^^Hand I and Source 1. We had to pull him 
out of there, too. 

Q Why were you^^^|^^^|meeting with Source 1? 

A For information to see how th* network vaa 
being put together, to see what inforsation was coaing 
out of there! 




UNCHSSIRFn 



667 



mmm 



30 



1 

2 

3 

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5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q How, when you want 
land Source I? 
A That's correct. 
You met| 

Right. 

And what happens?^ 

We brief 

And what ■ s happened up to this point? What do 



Q 
A 

Q 
A 

Q 
you tel] 

A Well, he was being told the names of the 
players, the location of the hostages, things like that. 
I mean, it was while we were sitting there in a hotel 
lobby for about an hour or so. 

Q Ho one else present, I gather; is that 
correct? ^^^^^ 

A Just him, myself ,^^^^Lnd Source 1. 

Q And waa^^^Hsupposed to perform some kind of 
evaluation — was that your understanding — of Source 1? 

A tijon't )cnow, because it was very flighty and 

"U 




668 



VNClASSm 



31 



1 h« said I don't ]cnow what I'm doing har*. Ha said, but 

2 It's nlca to ba In^^^^HLat's hava a drink. So wa had 

3 a drink. 

4 Q Did ha tall you who had sant him thara? 

5 A His paopla had sant him thara. Thara was no 

6 doubt of that. But Z don't Icnow who. 

7 Q Apparantly thay didn't tall him why ha was 

8 thara; is that correct? 

9 A Wall, his ramark was, Z don't know why Z'm 

10 hara, so I said Z assuma you want to briaf Sourca 1 -- 

11 want to dabriaf Sourca 1. Ha says, okay, lat's do it. 

12 Q How la t ma ratum to tha subjact of tha bona 

13 fidas. Did^^^fbring up tha sub j act of Sourca 1 

14 astaiblishing tha bona fidas of his contacts? 

15 A Ha may hava, yaah. Z don't racall 

16 spacifically that it was at that tima. Z racall it in a 

17 maating in Langlay aftar this trip, that wa sat in this 

18 maating and thara was quits a faw paopla in this maating, 

19 and that's whan bona fidas cama out. 

20 Q Nhy don't wago to that? 

21 A Bacausa that was tha first tima, you know, . 

22 that Azzaa allowad us to ba involvad in his coordinating 

23 group with tha CZA. 

24 Q Z'm gatting tha imprassion from soma of your 

25 ramarks ~ and you can corract ma if Z'm wrong — that 



UNCt]llSSinED 



1 



669 



\immm 



32 



1 you fait as though Azzam kind of shut you out of this, 

2 out of th« upper levels of this; is that correct? 

3 A No, no, no. Azzam was in charge of this. 

4 Until I tell you he's not, he was completely in charge of 

5 this, and it was his call, not 

6 Q I understand that. I understand that he was 

7 in charge and that you were his subordinate, but I'm 

8 getting the impression from what you are saying that you 

9 felt as though he was closing you out of certain areas. 

10 Is that unfair? 

11 A No, I don't think he was closing ma out, no. 

12 I just said he was in charge. Ha was supervising it. I 

13 didn't hava to agree with what he's doing, all right, but 

14 I followed his orders. 

15 Q Now did you coma back directly] 

16 A wa did, yeah. 

17 Q And that was you and^^^^^^^nd Source 1 

18 coming together? 

19 ' A Lat ma see. I think Source 1 went back in. 

20 think ha want back in because I hava notes here ol 
and^^^^Hjack to 

22 Q Now you get back to D. C, and what then 

23 happens? 

24 , A Wa had a meeting with Hickey, Poindexter, 

25 ■• ifield -and North at the White House. 



UNCUSSIRED 



670 



summo 



33 



1 Q Now bflfor* wa gat Into tha substanca of that 

2 maating lat na ask you a coupla of quastlons about thasa 

3 peopla. You hava already tastiflad that you sat Hlckay 

4 in January. 

5 A Um-hum. 

6 Q Did you continua to hava contact with him in 

7 tha intaria up until this oaating you'ra talking about? 

8 A ^^^^Blid. That was his contact. 

9 Q So to tha extent there's a contact it's 
through^^^^^^^l 

11 A Ha required that as v« did what wa were doing 

12 to keep his always posted, and so that waa^^^^^Hj ob . 

13 Q So^^^^Bwould keep him regularly posted? 

14 A Sura. 

15 Q Was that something that Azzam was aware of? 

16 A I think so, yeah. 

17 Q Nov how about Colonel C e ffield ? Had you met 

18 with hia in tha meantime? 

19 A I think we met one time beforehand. We had 

20 a«t in February and we brought Azzam there, you know, 

21 bacause ha wanted to meet these people, and we had a 

22 general meeting, again about tha logistics of getting 

23 intelligence out of Lebanon. 

24 Q And is that C e fgield and Hickay that you're 

25 meeting with at that time! 



I at that time?_ .^-^^ 

m<mm 



671 



wmm 



34 



A Yaah, right. 

Q And this is following^^^^^^^|B*«ting; is 
that corrsct? 

A Ysah, right. That's exactly it, and that's 
why w* want ov«r thsrs. w« gav* thaa basically ths final 
word that this was fsasibls in February. ^ ^ 

Q Now how about any othsr asstings with fl s iit s ld 
b«tw««n ths msating in February and the meeting you were 
just about to describe in April? 

A I thinJc the only one I was at was at this 
April meeting. In March we had the meeting where we 
brought Azzam over there, and North was at this meeting. 
It was a breaXfast meeting, as a matter of fact. We were 
in the dining room there at the Vfhite House, a breakfast 
meeting, very little talk — general talk. 

Q You've anticipated my next question, and that 
is at what point you first met Colonel North. 

A That was the first time we met North. 
. Q And that would be in March; is that correct? 

A Right. 

Q And it's a breakfast meeting at which Colonel 
• a ffi e ld was also present? 

A He was there. 

Q Who else would have been there? 

A Mickey was there, and Azzam,^^^Hand myself 



UNcnssmED 



672 



UNetASSIFIED 



35 



1 and North. 

2 Q And Z gather froa your description that this 

3 was just a gsnsral introductory mssting, not a lot of 

4 substance? 

5 k Ysah, surs. You )cnov, thsrs was other people 

6 in there eating breakfast, so it was very toned do«m. 

7 Q Now, did you get an xinderstanding from North 

8 at that breakfast meeting what his position was and what 

9 his relationship was to this hostage effort? 

10 A Right, in general we did. 

11 Q And what did you understand that to be? 

12 A That he was involved in atteapting to get the 

13 hostages out and getting information regarding the 

14 hostages — location, et cetera. 

15 Q Now let me go back to this meeting in April. 

16 You also have testified that Admiral Poindexter was 

17 present at this meeting; is that correct? 

1« A Thet's correct, the first time and, Z think, 

19 last. 

20 Q That was the first time you met Admiral 

21 Poindexter? 

22 A Yea. 

23 Q And to the best of your recollection the last 

24 time; is that correct? 

25 A Yeah. Z don't think Z met him again after 



UNCUISSIHFI) 



673 



mm\m 



36 



1 that. 

2 Q Why don't w« paus* for a moment on that 

3 meeting, and let me ask you if you would testify as to 

4 how this meeting came about and what the purpose was? 

5 A Well, as I said before ^^^^Bwas in contact 

6 with Ed Hickey, I'll say regularly, you )cnow, and I think 

7 it was decided we'd give him an update as to what we were 

8 doing. And at this meeting, when we got there, I thought 

9 it would be, and so did^^^^Hthat it would be Hickey and 

10 G e iti e ld again, and there was Poindexter and North also. 

11 Q Now was it explained to you who Admiral 

12 Poindexter was and what his position was? 

13 A Oh, yeah. 

14 Q What happened in the course of the meeting? 

15 A We briefed them as to what we were doing 

16 regarding setting up this network ^^^^^^^Hand how to 

17 extract this information on a timely basis, and we talked 

18 in general. We explained to then that these people, 

19 these terrorists, were drug dealers and we knew a lot of 

20 thea as it was. We knew the major people involved in 

21 trafficking in marijuana and hashish and in heroin. 

22 So it was easy to set up this network because 

23 it was the same people who held the hostages or 

24 controlled the hostages. 

25 Q Now, did any plan emerge from this meeting, or 




674 



UimSIHED 



37 



1 

2 

3 

4 
5 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



was this just purely informational? 

A No. At tha tima it was informational. w« 
were going to continua on broadening the n«twor)c and 
pulling in information. 

Q Nov, there was, I .gather from your list of 
people present, no one from the CIA present; is that 
correct? 

A There was not. 

Q Now, did Admiral Poindexter or Colonel North 
have any particular role in this meeting? 

A Not really. They asked questions about, you 
)cnow, the network. They asked questions on the 
timeliness of getting the information, and that was a 
problem I explained to them. It's difficult to relay it. 




And so they would try. So we told them the 
preblea v« would have in getting instant information. 

Q Did anyone express any concern about 
communicating over unsecure lines? 

A Hell, there was concern, but we set up our 
little rudimentary code. 



ONetASSIflFO 



675 



UNDlASSinEO 



38 



1 Q Whan you say "we", was that you andl 

2 A Myself anc^^^^^^'eah, and the source. 

3 Q Kow, were you able to put a date on that 

4 meeting? 

5 A It was April 24, actually. 

6 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

7 Q Was there any discussion at that meeting of 

8 further steps to take? I'm talking specifically about 

9 procedures now, as to who would pay for it and how to 

10 coordinate -with the CIA? 

11 A No, there wasn't. It was just understood. 

12 See, there was no talk of anything about North or the NSC 

13 was going to be paying us. We were still with the CIA, 

14 and so we understood that they gave us SOGs and we were 

15 going to use that up and we'd get more from them. 

16 Q Did Poindexter make any comments or 

17 commitments or anything along the lines of funding of the 

18 operation? 

19 A Hot at that time, no. Or he never did after 

20 that because I never met him. But he never did that, nor 

21 did Oliver North, that I can recollect. 

22 Q Do you know whether or not he and Hickey 

23 discussed it? 

24 A No. I recall, you know, when Hickey talked 

25 about it it was the CIA that would be funding us. That's 



pfiAssire 



676 



UNCUSSIFIED 



39 



1 my undarstandlng. And, in fact, up unto this meeting 

2 there was nobody from CIA there and it was just 

3 understood that we would get money from the CIA. 

4 Q Okay. But did Hickey ever allude to you that 

5 he had recruited Poindexter's help in getting funding? 

6 A No, not at that time. 

7 Q At any time? 

8 A No. It was just intermeshed with meetings 

9 that we had with North, and then all of a eudden he says 

10 I'll take care of this. You're getting way eihead of the 

11 chronological order of this thing, though. 

12 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

13 Q Now following this meeting did you again get 

14 together with representatives of the CIA? 

15 A Yeah, we did. You know, again Azzam always 

16 was with them, and I don't know. Something happened that 

17 CIA was upset over something Azzam said, and then we 

18 ended up having to go to Langley,^^^^Kind I, and explain 

19 certain things. And some of this stuff was wrongly 

20 reported by^^^^^^f and we clarified that in a meeting 

21 with a lot of people in it. 

22 Q Let*s go to that meeting for a moment. 

23 A That was in April also, right after the Hickey 

24 meeting. 

25 Q Within a few days? 



UNWSSIfP 



677 



UNCUSSIHED 



40 



1 A Within a few days. I don't have a specific 

2 date, just a throw-away date. 

3 Q What's your best guess? 

4 A The 25th, 26th. 

5 Q Now did this meeting with CIA come about 

6 because it was some question within CIA as to how this 

7 operation was going? __^-^^^-i 

8 A The question was, I think, what ^^^^^^H 

9 reported, and then they got hold of Azzam an^thenwe 
LO went over there to explain it to them, that |||||^^m was 

in no condition to have reported anything properly. 

Q When you say "no condition", what do you mean 
by that? 

A Just that he never took any notes. He just 
sat there and listened and he was trying to make quotes, 
and that's kind of impossible. 

Q Trying to make what? 

A Quota the source, you know, when there were no 
notes- tak«n. 

Q All right. So you had this meeting out. at 

21 CIA, and I understand it's a large meeting. 

22 A Um-huB. 

23 Q Who do you reca ll attended th e meeting ? 

A I think ^^^H was and|^^^^ was 
25 there. I knoy . tfy M, was -^ juv s Itt inq beside me from DIA 



iMmmw 



678 



4 




41 



1 and I can't ramcmber his name. Th«r« was a good 15 

2 peopla in this meatlng, unknown fac«s. Thay went around 

3 the room quick, so and so, and so and so, and so and so, 

4 but, you )cnow, the CIA always gives you false names. 

5 Everybody I've dealt with in CIA, eventually when they 

6 )cnov you they will tell you their real name. They still 

7 do when you call me, call me by this name on the phone. 

8 And I say okay . 

9 Q . Has^^^H present, too? 

10 A Yeah, he was there. 

11 Q And I gather Azzam was there as well? 

12 A Oh, yeah, he was there. 

13 Q Now what happened in the course of this 

14 meeting? What did you find out the p roblem to be? 

15 A The problem was that^^^Hreported information 

16 that Source 1 gave. He reported it erroneously. He 

17 talked about money was going to be given to certain 

18 players^^^^^^^Hfor information and/or for extraction. 

19 At this stage of the gjune we started talking 

20 about extraction. 

21 Q This is the first time? 

22 A This is the first time. And we clarified 

23 that, that no money would be fronted, no large amounts of 

24 money would be fronted for any extraction, and it was a 

25 working meeting. So they talked about, for the first 



ONIWIHED 



679 



\itmsim 



42 



1 tlo«, about •vidence, about bona fides. 

2 Q L«t m« stop you thera for just a minuta and 

3 make sure I have this corre ct. Wh en this meeting came 

4 together you understood that^^^Hhad come back and 

5 erroneously reported — 

6 A Th at Source 1 committed monies to some players 

8 Q And that the purpose of the monies was both 

9 for locaMon information and for extraction information; 

10 is that correct? 

11 A Ko. It's just that thera was no aoney 

12 committed. He said that Source 1 said that unless these 

13 people get money ^^^^^^^^fyou won't get anything. 

14 Well, that's not true. 

15 Q What had Source 1 actually said? 

16 A H« said that these people, if he got evidence, 

17 if he got bona fides, that they would want to be paid for 

18 it. 

19 ' Q For the bona fides? 

20 A Sure, or the evidence. Take your pick. 

21 Q And where does extraction fit into this? 

22 A Well, later in the meeting we started talking 

23 about the possibility of extraction. 

24 Q But^^Hhad not represented that the source 

25 had said something about extraction? 



UNCIA^IHED 



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IDWSIFIED 



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A No. It was strictly on money for avidenca, 
for bona fldss, as I recollect it. 

Q So in the course of this meeting the question 
goes beyond simple location? 

A That was basically straightened out, and then 
we went into bona fides, and CIA indicated they would pay 
for bona fides, particularly on Buckley. 

Q And what did they say about the form the bona 
fides should take? 

A They ' d take anything that was convenient to 
the situation! 




Q So was a decision reached by the end of this 
meeting that the next step would be to get bona fides^H 



A Basically, yes. 
- Q What happened next? 

A Well, after that I think we met North that 
saa« day, as I recall. When I was in there a phone call 
came in the room and that's why I remember we met North 
that day. And the secretary walked in and said is there 
a^^^^l^^^^Hhere , 
there's a Colonel North on the phone, and everybody in 



mtm\m 



681 



VIWWSIFIED 



44 



1 tha room gave me a dirty look. 

2 I said there's something wrong here. So I 

3 went out and afterwards, I think when we were leaving, 

4 Azzam explained that there was a few people in that room 

5 didn't like North. And that's why I remembered that. 

6 And then we met him. 

7 Q So the North name generated some dirty looks? 

8 A Yeah. 

9 Q . But nothing beyond that? 

10 A It was a matter of apparently he never dealt 

11 with that mid-level group. He always dealt with the 

12 upper people in the CIA, and this group disliked that. 

13 That was what was told to me at that time. 

14 Q Was that Mr. Azzam telling you that? 

15 A I thin k he may have told me, and maybe 

16 somebody ,^^^^^Btold^^^^H— something. It came out at 

17 that time that they didn't particularly care for him. 

18 Q Did you ever hear anything from North on that 

19 subject? 

20 A Yeah. I think I may have asked, you know, 

21 when we met him that day. That was new. I didn't want 

22 to have a confrontation with him per se, but we talked 

23 about this problem we had with CIA and this 

24 misunderstanding and this and that, and that we have now 

25 tasked Source 1 to get some evidence. He told me, yeah. 



mmssm 



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vmmm 



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h« said, those people are — a lot of leaks come out 
those people, et cetera. I could tell that he didn't 
have the patience for them. 

Q So now this meeting concludes, and I gather in 
your phone conversation with North you have already set 
up that you will go over and see him following the 
meeting; is that correct? 

A . Yeah, we did. It was a very brief meeting. 

Q When the meeting breaks up at the CIA, it's 
generally decided that the source will go back in and try 
to come up with some kind of bona fides? 

A Um-hua. 

Q And is it correct that no particular bona fide 
was suggested, just a range of options? 

A A range of optionsl 




Q You then go over to North's office. Who goes 
ov«r. there? 

A ^^^^Bnd 

Q And what's the purpose of this meeting at 
North's office? 

A Well, he phoned me at CIA and said he'd like 
to see me, so we went over there afterwards. 

Q And when you got there, what did you find out 



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^umim 



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thfl purpose to be? 

A He says, what happened there? And we 
explained what happened, and we explained that Source 1 
was going to go back into^^^^^^^^^^^^Lnd have 
sub-sources work on getting some evidence as to the 
condition or situation of Buckley or any of the other 
hostages. 

Q Was he in a position to give you any 
additional information on Buckley in particular or any of 
the other hostages? 

A No, he didn't, not that I recall. He told me, 
as a matter of f&ct — all along they told me, you know, 
even some of the friendly CIA people that we got friendly 
with, particularly! 




Q Let me ask you this. Does the name Nathan 
Adaae mean anything to you? 

A Sure. He's a journalist, isn't he? 

Q Well, you'd have to tell me. 

A Adams. That's Azzam's buddy. 

Q He's a friend of Abe Azzaun's? 

A Yeah. He's on the Reader's Digest, isn't he' 



UNCtASSIHED 



684 



UNH^inED 



47 



1 Q You'd have to t«ll d«. 

2 A Okay. That's who I think Kat« Adaa* is. 

3 Kayb* I ' m wrong . 

4 Q Do you connect hio with any information on 

5 Bucklay? 

6 A L«t m« put it this way. If Nat* Adaos is tha 

7 journalist, the only information he had on Buckley was 

8 what Azzam gave him, because that was his buddy, if 

9 that's the' person. 

10 Q Do you connect him with North at all? 

11 A Yeah. I think North knew him, too, because I 

12 remember seeing in his office one of those things that 

13 Nat* Adam* gave people, with their names inscribed in it, 

14 and I picked it up and it was a little thing, and then 

15 Nate Adams, and then oh, yeah, I know him. 

16 Q Now this meeting with North that you had, it's 

17 you. North i^^^^^H Anyone else? 

18 A No. 

19 Q And Azzaa is not at this meeting? 

20 -A No. 

21 Q Nhy is that? 

22 A I don't know. We may have l*ft him at th* 

23 FBI. I don't know — I m*an at th* CIA. 

24 Q Was h* awar* of th* m**tlng, do you know? 

25 A Oh, y*ah. H* was running th* thing, so w* 



vmmm 



685 



^'ilJUSSIflfli 



43 



1 told hia everything we did. 

2 Q Do you have a recollection of whether he chose 

3 not to attend or how it happened that he didn't attend? 

4 A He had other duties, you know. He was the 

5 executive assistant to the Deputy Administrator, so I 

6 assume he didn't attend because he had other duties. 

7 Q After this meeting with North I gather you or 

8 ^^^^^|have to get in touch with th« source and tell him 

9 what the next steps are; is that correct? 

10 A Well, in this meeting here, in this meeting 

11 with the CIA and then with North — and it's ov«rlapping, 

12 okay, the information — we discussed th« paymant for 

13 evidence, and I don't know, $200,000' was set up by the 

14 CIA under the strict authority of Azzam to release it for 

15 any type of bona fide or evidence that was acceptable to 

16 the CIA. 

17 Now, as far as I can recall, it wasn't stated 

18 that well, you can use the $200,000 in one lump sum or 

19 break it up piecemeal. It was just there. Okay? And 

20 both the people in CIA and Oliver North knew that. 

21 Q Now let me back you up just a minute. You 

22 testified that in March you gave the source $20,000 of 

23 the $50,000 for a trip he then took. 

24 A Um-hum . 

25 Q At some point did you give him the remainder 



UNCUSSIHED 



686 



Mmrnn 



49 



1 Of th« $30,000? 

2 A Yeah, we did. 

3 Q When did that happen? 

4 A I think it was in April. 

5 Q And again what was the purpose of that? 

6 A It was for his expenses and the development of 

7 his network. 

8 Q I gather he is keeping you up to date on what 

9 it is precisely he is using this money for? 

10 A Well, he's telling me who he's giving money 

11 to, yea. 

12 Q Now is he in a position where he was required 

13 to substantiate portions of expenses? Does he have to 

14 show you airplane tickets and things like that? How is 

15 that handled? 

16 A Well, let's stop right here and come to the 

17 end. We have about $60,000 in round-trip air tickets for 

18 him. I have those available. 

19 Q So he made those available to you, and hotel 

20 bills and things like that? 

21 A They are all available. I could have the OEA 

22 of f ices ^^^^^^Hget all those expenses. 

23 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

24 Q When were those produced? 

25 A They're not produced. He has them. But I saw 



UNCtASSIFIED 



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UNtraFIED 



50 



thaa. 

Q Would you see them contemporaneously with 
giving him the money, or did you see them at a later 
time? 

A No, no. I knew when he left. I had no 
problem with this man. 




Q So when did you actually see the tickets? 

A I saw them in the end of '86 and '87, as this 
thing started boiling. And we did — very honestly, we 
checked our expenditures and we found out that we didn't 
give him enough money. He paid a lot of it out of his 
own pocket. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q Okay. So by the time this meeting has 
occurred with the CIA on April 24 — excuse me, April 25, 
1 think you testified — you have already given the 
source the $50,000 that CIA came up with? 

A It was done. Now don't forget this is Azzam's 
approval. Azzam's in charge. Let's not say just 



Q That wasn't the implication of my (juestion, 
but I think your testimony was that you or^H^Hactually 
gave him the money; isn't that right? 

A That's correct, with the approval of Azzam. 



UNCttSSIFIED 



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VNcussm 



51 



Q Understood. So now you are out of CIA money, 
the source has to go back^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hto come 
up vlth the bona fides. Did you come up with some money 
to help him there? 

A No. 

Q How does that occur? 

A He had money. He didn't ask for any. We 
talked about that if he made certain contacts with 
certain people and they got some evidence that they would 
have to be paid^these jieople, to see whether we, who 




IINCUSSIFIED 



689 




690 



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UWSIFIfD 



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Q All right. Now you'v* had th« B««tlng with 
North. You now go out and contact tha source and giv* 
him his marching orders, and his marching orders are to 
go back in and coma up with soma bona fidas; is that 
right? 

A Right. 

Q Now do you suggest or^^^^^^^^Biuggast to the 
source, Source 1, what form this bona fide production 
ought to take? 

A Ye2ih. We told him pictures with dates on it, 
signatures, statements, letters, primarily with dates, 
dates and signatures and statements. These are the type 
of things. 

Q Now I gather, then, that the source. Source 1, 
goaa^^^^^^^^^^^^^l is 

A Un-hum . 

Q Do you and^^^^^^^|then travel abroad to 
meet with him at some point? 

A W^dfl,. In May 




3int? 

sy we 9°^^^^^^^^H 

SSIlfin 



691 



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uwussm 



54 



What's your best recollaction on that date 



there? 



A Well, it was off the tlclcet. May 10. 

Q Off a plane ticicet; is that correct? 

A Yeah. I think we had plane tickets on that. 

Q So that places you as traveling on May 10; is 
that correct? 

A 1 think so, yeah. ^^^^^^^^ 

Q Now you meet with Source ^^^^^^^^|^' that 
correct? 

A Ua-huB. 

Q He produces then a bona fide piece of 
evidence; is that correct? 

A Yes. He produces a piece of evidence, right. 
Whether it was bona fide or not, we didn't know at the 
time. He thought it was. 

Q That piece of evidence was] 
is that correct? 
. A Right. 



Q Did he explain to you when he gav e it to you 
the significanc« 

A He told me that he was toldl 






Q Now, had he actually paid out any money for 



UNCbimiED 



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mmm 



55 



this proof, do you know, at this tiin«? 
A 




MR. MORROW: Th« ^estlon was, had you paid 
for th« bona fides. 

THE WITNESS: Not yet, but h« did pay tha 
paopla up to gatting thasa things. Thasa 50Gs want to 
various paopla. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Rasuaing) 
Q Okay. But that's tha nonay ha's paid up until 
April 25? 

A Expanses, at catara. 

Q And sinca that tima ha had incurred additional 
expenses to go get the bona fides; is that correct? 
A Sure . 

Q And did you understand that the people who had 
produced the bona fide had already been paid? 
- A NO. 
Q Or that they were waiting for payaant? 
A No, they were waiting for payaent. There was 
a five-day deadline, approxiaately, that he had to bring 



Q Let me . show you and let ae have this marked as 
an Exhibit, I guess. Exhibit 1. 



UmOTED 



693 



UNCUSSIHED 



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(Tha document referred to was 
oarke<^^^^^^|Exhlbit Number 
1 for Identification.) 
This is marked as^^^^^Kxhibit 1. Do you 
recognize that? 

A Yes, I do. 




694 



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Q Now when you received this, what did you do? 

A I called Azzan and told him. He says bring it 
to him. Bring it in. 

Q Okay. 

A We also told him that these people were 
expecting the^^^^^^Hor this evidence and for the bona 
fides on their side for future transactions. 

- Q Kov did you have an understanding yourself, or 
did you maJce a judgment yourself, as to whether this was 
sufficient, that this was really from Buckley or not? 

A No, I didn't make that judgment. All I could 
do is, since I've known Source 1 for many years, he was 
excited enough, which I never saw him excited at things, 
that I was ""H l^'rtfl ^rtt tt^ VmA'iLT-"* ** authentic, and 



nmmm 



695 



UNtlASSIFIEir 



58 



1 only bacaus* of his exci tement. 

I )cnow^^^^^^^^^^^^Hso 

3 could I tell you? 

4 Q I gather that part of your judgment there was 

5 that you didn't believe that Source 1 was a person who 

6 would be easily fooled; is that correct? 

7 A Without a doubt he couldn't be, based on the 

8 people he was dealing with. 

9 Q Now you received the proof from Source 1 and 

10 you then head back to the United States with it. 

11 A Z sent^^^^kack to the United States with 

12 the evidence and I stayed there. 

13 Q Have you made any arrangements, you orl 

14 with Azzan as to what happens when you get to the United 

15 States? 

16 A Arrangements. It wasn't exact, but 

17 arrangements were made to get this thing both — well, to 

18 a myriad of people — Azzam, the CIA. Ed Hickey had to 

19 know- and Oliver North. Sc^^^^ook care of that all 

20 v«ry w«ll. He tried to make everybody happy, and 

21* «v«rybody got pissed off at him, I think, particularly 

22 Azzam. Vfhat could I tell you? 

23 Q Now you say that Ed Hickey made everybody mad 

24 by trying to please everybody — 

25 A Not Ed Hickey. 



696 



UNCIA^IHED 



S9 



1 Q How is it that he accomplished this, do you 

2 know? 

3 A Well, he went to all of them, you Icnow, and 

4 showed it to them, and also went to the FBI and brought 

to the ^B^HfJI^^^^I^^^^^^^I Nobody else 

6 that. He did it. 

7 Q How did that make everybody mad? 

8 A Well, you know, Azzam wanted to have it so he 

9 can disperse it to everybody. Instead^^^^^^Bi very 

10 efficient agent and he knew how to get to the FBI 

11 ^^^^^^^^land he knew he had to tell the NSC, and he 

12 knew he had to tell Hickey, and he did all these things. 

13 And he knew he had to tell Azzan, and he did it all. 

14 MS. NAUGHTON: Do you know what order he did 

15 it in? 

16 THE WITNESS: I think it was North, Azzam, 

17 Hickey, and in there was the FBI 

18 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

19 - Q So was it North coming first that excites 

20 Assaa? 

21 A No, just that he wasn't first, period — just 

22 that he had to be first. Okay? He was a very sick man 

23 about this time. He was in heavy pain, irrational, and 

24 he had a major operation within a month of this. They 

25 didn't think he was going to make it. So, I mean, he was 



mmmm 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



60 



v«ry irritable because he was in really heavy, heavy 

I've ]cnovm Azzam. You know ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hso )cnow Azzam very well, 
we always argued and yelled and almost punched each other 
out a few times. So he didn't both»jr me. I )cnew him and 
his personality, but he was very sicJc. 

Q Now when this proof came in do you recall how 
it was greeted? Was it considered authentic? What was 
the reaction to it? 

A Well, I can only tell you what^^^^Htold me, 
right? ^^^Hlent to North ^^^^^^^^^H Okay. 
And that was about it — told him in general what 
happened, what I told you. Source 1 got it. They want 
^^HHand he has five days to bring the money back in to 
show our bona fides. 

Then he went to Azzam, and Azzam knew that 
already. Then he met with Azzam. Azzam and he went to 
CIA^^^^^^^^^^^^I an(^^^^H:emembered was 
14, andH^Htold me that the CIA was satisfied with the 
authenticity of it. They did not complain and they made 
a coamcnt of this is worth^l^^Hto us. 

Q This is Azzam talking tc 

A This is^^Hfcresent with the CIA and Azzam 
sitting there. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Who at CIA said they were 




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UNCtASSIRED 



61 



satisfied with it? 

THE WITNESS: You'll have to ask him. I don't 
know the names. ^^^^Iwill know who they were. 
Apparently, what^^^Htold me is they were s atisfie d with 
it. They said this is cheap 





:am refused because Azzao had the 
final say on the use of this Aoney, which still was with 
the CIA. He said no — completely no. 

And there was an argument that ensued in 
there, I assume, and the CIA said you can have the money. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q Is this CIA talking to you? 

A Talking ^°^^||||B ^ ^as still ^^^^^^^| So 
after that^^^^Hand Azzam got in an argument andj 
said he's finished, he's out of it. Hp resigned from 
this project. 

Q And this is all within a few days of him 
coming back? 

A This was the day he came back. The argument 
began, but he had an obligation to report to Hickey, and 
he called Hickey and he told Hickey. He didn't even get 
to me yet. This I learned later, you know, because we're 
talking about, what, nine hours difference, eight hours 
difference. And he said that he was going to resign from 



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UNCIASSIHED 



62 



this projact and lat Azzam handla it himself, and ha told 
this to Hickay and then to North, and thay had a meeting, 
I think ha told ma. 

Right, on May 16^^^Hhas a meeting with 
■and Hickey and North was there. And that was a 
meeting that ha had talked to me finally and he says what 
should wa do. And I said make Source 1 available to the 
CIA or to the NSC and we'll get out of this business. 






You remair 
A 
Q 
A 



Let me just pull some of these events apart. 



Yeah. 

Why do you remain there? 

Well, if they approved it I was going to be 



there when the evidence went back 




700 




1 Q And you've testified it was li)ce an eight- 

2 hour, nine-hour lapse between — 

3 A Time lapse, right. 

4 Q That would be Hickey would get into eight or 

5 nine hours worth of Washington meetings before you would 

6 )cnow about it? 

A No. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H We're 

8 eight hours, I think, ahead of the eastern seaboard. 

9 Q Let me do it this way. By the time you first 

10 hear fromH^^Hwhat has happened? 

11 A He told me everything. The shit hit the fan 

12 is what he told me. 

13 Q And what you mean by that is that — 

14 A That Azzaa would not release the money. The 

15 CIA felt comfortable with releasing the money. And that 

16 he had resigned,! 

17 Q And had he met with North and Hickey by this 

18 time, too? 

19 A Then, on the 15th he met with Hickey in 

20 Hlclc«y's office, with <e <it e l * and then North came in. 

21 Now this la all told to me. 

22 g And this is the first time he's getting in 

23 touch with you. All these things have happened; is that 

24 correct? 

25 A He called me before, because he met North and 



\mmm 



701 



UNimSIFIED 



64 



1 Hickay lat« in the evening. 

2 Q So you Icnew before he met with North? 

3 A He told me that he was going to that office. 

4 Q So before he meets with North and -CoftteH and 

5 Hickey he's had the meeting with CIA and Azzaa and things 

6 haven't turned out well. 

7 A And calls me. 

8 Q Ha calls you and tells you that. 

9 A And Azzam calls me, and we gat in an argument 

10 on the phone. 

11 Q What's that argument about? 

12 A Because^H^^Rold ma that tha CZA had no 

13 problem giving this money and thay felt it was authentic, 

14 and I said, wall, why is ha stopping it. Ha says because 

15 I say so. And that was it. 

16 Q Now did Azzam tell you that in his view the 

17 CIA was not disposed toward releasing tha money? 

18 A No, ha didn't say that. He said that he was 

19 not disposed in releasing it to us — not tha CIA. It 

20 was navar tha CIA. It was him. 

21 Q Ha didn't align tha CIA with his position; is 

22 that correct? 

23 A No. 

24 Q So thenlHKoes off and has his meeting 

25 with Hickey and it turns out that e o ffiel d and North also 



mwm 



702 



Momm 



65 



1 show up at th« meeting; is that correct? 

2 A Exactly. 

3 Q And following the meeting does^^^^net in 

4 touch with you? 

5 A Yeah. 

6 Q And what does he tell you? 

7 A He tells me that North will take care of this. 

8 Q Kow what does he mean by that? 

9 A That's all. That's all be knew — that North 

10 would take care of this. We assumed that North was going 

11 to go talk — well, he assumed, and I, that they would go 

12 talk to the CIA and straighten it out that way. But, you 

13 know, there was also, you know, constant calls. 

14 I called Azzam again and he wouldn't budge, 

15 and he called Azzam again and he wouldn't budge. And in 

16 our minds — ^^^^^^Hand my minds — we were finished 

17 with this operation. We were not going to work it any 

18 longer. And we were going to turn Source 1 over to the 

19 CIA or to the NSC, period. 

20 Q What's the nex\. step? 

21 A Well, 1 came back because I just stayed there 

22 and everything came to a standstill. 

23 MS. NAUGHTON: Did they ask you for further 

24 bona fides? In other words, to ask? 

25 THE WITNESS: Azzam, I understand, did. 



UNCtASHD 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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MS. NAUGHTON: Was that while you w«r« still 



THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MS. NAUGHTON: What did h* want? 

THE WITNESS: Azzam wanted more. He wanted 
Source 1 to go back in and get further information, and 
Source 1 couldn't do it because you can't come out with 
information that is supposed to be authentic and you 
haven't ever checked it yet, and go back and say well, 
give me some more. I mean, that's just straight — even 
in drug deals you can't do it. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 
Q Did Azzam give you an idea of what he wanted 
in the way of more bona fides? 

A He said something about — I don't know — 




Does that ring a bell? 

Q Sounds like the right genre of questions. 

A Something like that. 

Q Did he tell you where he had come up with 
these questions? 

A I assumed the CIA gave them to him. 

Q Did he explain why it was the CIA was 
producing more questions to substantiate bona fides if 
they were satisfied! 



UN 




704 



UNCmHED 



67 



1 A w« were arguing it on the phone, and Azzao 

2 could influence anybody the way he wants it, so I said 

3 it's impossible. I'm coming home. It's over. It was 

4 done, you know. I had no doubt in my mind that this 

5 thing was over for me. 

6 MR. WOODCOCK: Why don't we take a break? 

7 (A brief recess was taken.) 

8 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

9 Q Now, to resume,] 

10 A At the time there is a point that Ron here is . 

11 telling me to bring up. 

12 Q That's your counsel, Ron Morrow? 

13 A Ron Morrow, right — that I told Azzam on the 

14 phone that this cannot be left by us with just walking 

15 away from this, and I told him that Source 1 is obligated 

16 to, first of all, save face and protect his family^^^| 
^^^^^^^|and that he, that Source is so strong 

18 about this that he would raise all the money he can to 

19 placate these people, even though it wouldn't go any 

20 further. R« would just go in there, give them, he told 

21 ■• at the time, $75,000, $80,000 from his own money, to 

22 placate these people was his hands of it, too. 

23 Q And you relayed that to Azzam while you were 
24 
25 




lEUWffl 



705 



UNei/ISSIFIED 



68 



Q Olcay. Nov froa that point you h«ad back to 
th« Onltad States, having told Azzaa you ara going to 
waah your hands of th« project. 

A Exactly. 

Q What happans whan you gat back to tha U.S.? 

A ^^^^Hind I hava a naatlng with North. 

Q How was that sat up? 

I think ha calladHHLnd^^^|told hla 

whan I was coalng In, and ha said coaa ovar to tha 
o££lca. 

Q Okay. To tha bast of your racoilaction, whan 
do you think that occurred? 

A Ha say It's around May 22. It could ba off a 
faw days or vhatavar. 

Q Lat Ba advlsa you that North 'a notebooks also 
show a Beating with you and^^^^^H^on Nay 22. 

A Okay. Good notes. 

Q They are good notes. Nhat was the occasion 
for getting together with North? 

A Hell, he wanted to talk about this operation 
bttcauae he knew that we were going to retire froB It, 
because that's what I told^HHto tall hlB, too. 

Q Hho was present at this aaeting? Has it 
North, you,^^^^|and anyone else? 

A Thai 



mmm 



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1] 

12 

13 
U 
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2S 



^mmtm 



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Q And who was awar* of this nsstlng? is Azzan 
awar* of th« osstlng, do you )cnow? 

A Probably. You ]cnow, Z would have probably 
told him. 

Q Now what happens in th« asstlng? 

A Wall, w* discussed th« situation, how the 
•vidanca, th« exhibit here, Exhibit 1, was received by 
Source 1, and North kind of cuts us off and he says, I'a 
satisfied with the exhibit. 

Q That is, North was satisfied that the proof 
that had been produced by Source 1 was sufficient; is 
that correct? 

A He was satisfied with the exhibit, and I 
didn't stop there. I told hia, Z said, look, you know, 
from my o%m curiosity what I would like to do is Z would 
like him to give 




we had 
leamad froa the FBI that it was Inconclusive on their 

P«i 

Q Did you know where ^^^^^H was at this 

point? 

A WhatI 




U 



IRi 



707 






70 



1 Q 

2 A Sura I )cn«w where it was. 

3 Q Was it bsing sxaminsd at this point? 

4 A That's right, by the FBI, sura. But 

5 talked to them on the phone and they told him on the 

6 phone I 

7 Q That is, that they couldn't make a decision on 

8 it one way or another? 

9 A Exactly. 

10 Q And that 's^HHtal Icing to the FBI? 

11 A Right. And later we got a memo from them 

12 stating the same thing, with that, I told North — I was 

13 emphatic about it — even if I wasn't going to do another 

14 hour's worJt on this project that I wanted! 

15 And he says, that's not necessary. He said he had 

16 cleared it with the old man, and, being an inquisitive 

17 person, I said who's the old man, and he said Casey. 

18 Q What had he cleared with the old man? 

19 " A This thing right here, this exhibit. Exhibit 

my name,^^^^^H— that ^^^^^^^^^^^| 

^^^^^^^Hthey were with it is the way 

22 put it. 

23 Q So he said he had cleared it with the old man. 

24 So it was unnecessai 

25 ^^^^^Kis that correct? 



mmmm 



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fmmim 



71 



A Exactly. 

Q Now what had h« cleared with th« old man? 
What did that mean? 

A He said that they are satisfied! 



Q That is, the CIA is satisfied? 

A No, that they — he and the old man — were 
satisfie<^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ because was the one who 
was saying, you )cnow, let us check it. We're 
investi gators. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 
^ We're satisfied. 
Let's move on. We're going to give^^^^^H$200,000 was 
hi^ next statement. 

I said, are you sure? He says, we're sure. 

Q Did you have questions yourself about Exhibit 
1 befpg bona fide or not? 

°'a I had questions on the basis of the FBI, who 
said it was inconclusive. Sure. 

Q Did you try to persuade him that it would be a 
good idea not just to rely on his judgment I 



A I pushed that point. 

Q And he dismissed it? 

A He dismissed it. 

Q Now in addition — 



UNcmssn 



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UNClASSinED 



72 



A Becausa, very frankly, it he said no, we'd 
have said goodbye, shaken hands, and we'd have been out 
of this business. And, you know, at this stage of the 
game I was kind of disappointed with a few people and I 
was ready to get out of this business. 

Q It probably looks pretty good from this point. 

A You got it. 

Q Now in addition to discussing, the $200,000, 
did you and North and^^^^^^ftiscuss any further steps- 
that you might take? 

A We did. 

Q What do you recall those to be? 

A We went into the fact of then an extraction of 
Buckley plus one other hostage. Vou know, of course, 
this was all preparation, possibility. We had no direct 
evidence that we could do thi s, but we did have 
conversation by the Source l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
that this was feasible, that we could bribe certain H^H 




and certain hostages would be 

rsleassd. 

And we talked about this. 
Q Now was there a figure mentioned as to what it 
would cost to spring these hostages? 

A The figure was it was going to be $1 million 



nmmB 



710 



ONCUSSIREO 



73 



1 par parson. 

2 Q Now let me back you up just a minut*. On the 

3 $200,000 that North is mentioning, has he identified 

4 where that's coming from? 

5 A At that time, no, not to my recollection. You 

6 know,^^^^Bhad been talking to him while I was away, and 

7 this could have been already understood, and I didn't at 

8 the time. 

9 Q And how about the $1 million per hostage? Did 

10 you have an understanding aa to where that would con* 

11 from? 

12 A Not at the time. Later I did. 

13 Q We'll get to that. 

14 A Soon, later. 

15 g Now was the discussion about getting approval 

16 outside of just William Casey for this, do you recall any 

17 discussion about that? 

18 A Well, at this time, aside from the operational 

19 part, of the hostages, et cetera, he began to discuss 

20 Ass«a and Azzaa was then going to go into the hospital, 

21 and I told hia that he's going to have to seek approval 

22 for us to work with the NSC directly, because we were 

23 working with the FBI and Azzam was in charge of that. 

24 So he said he would handle that, that he would 

25 call the AG. 



UNcawto 



711 



WUSSIFIEO 



74 



1 MR. MORROW: Vou just said you'd been working 

2 with the FBI. 

3 THE WITNESS: I keep saying that. The CIA. 

4 Sorry about that. 

5 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

6 Q So you told North that in order for you to go 

7 further with this that he, North, or someone in authority 

8 with the NSC would have to call Attorney General I guess 

9 it would have been Meese at that time? 

10 A I said he would have to seek approval from my 

11 administrator. 

12 Q And that would be John Lawn? 

13 A Right. And he stated that he would contact 

14 the AG. 

15 Q Meese himself? 

16 A Right. 

17 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

18 g What exactly was this for? Was it simply to 

19 get you assigned, so to speak, to the NSC? 

20 A Yeah, because he wanted us then to work for 

21 his, work with him basically, because we weren't detailed 

22 or anything — you know, it was an assignment then — to 

23 work with him exclusively. 

24 Q Was there also a discussion of getting any 

25 approval for the use of private monies to be used for the 



mmmE 



712 



UNCIA^IHEO 



75 



1 oparatlon? 

2 A That naver cama up In my mind or to my 

3 racollection. 

4 Q Whan you vera discussing how much money it 

5 would taJca to actually free tha hostagas — that is, $1 

6 million each — did you discuss where that would come 

7 from? 

8 A No, because I'll tell you later, you know, in 

9 subsequent meetings we explained that we wouldn't even 

10 have to touch that money , that whoever was going to pay 

11 it, it would be after the fact. We would be in 

12 possession of a hostage, and we would not touch this 

13 money. It would be delivered by whomever. Who cared? 

14 And there would be a contact from the other side to 

15 collect it. 

16 Q But here's my question. At this meeting you 

17 discussed that you would need aOsout $1 million per 

18 hostage; correct? 

19 A It would be $1 million per hostage, correct. 

20 Q And it was clear that the source of this money 

21 would be private funds as opposed to government? 

22 A No, it wasn't clear yet. It was clear within 

23 a couple of meetings from that one, I guess. 

24 Q Would it have been clear by June of '85? 

25 A 




713 



UNCLASSIFIED 



76 



Q Did North mantion wh*th«r or not h« would hav« 
to cl«ar th« us« of private monies with althar th« 
Attorney General or Administrator Lawn? 

A X don't recall that at all. I don't recall 
hln saying anything about that. The only thing, when It 
came to a head that we were going to use donor money, was 
I said that we would use a civilian to handle the money 
and we would escort the money. 

Q And why did you say that? 

X Because I just felt that that was the right 
thing to do. I don't )cnow why. Z just did it that way. 

Q Well, in your interview that we did several 
months ago you mentioned that those were the instructions 
that you had. 

A Subsequently it was, when I met with Lawn and 
then La%m said don't handle unauthorized money — 
unappropriated funds. After that -- see, my meeting with 
Lawn was June 14. Ha says it was okay to work with NSC; 
don't handle unappropriated money. Don't handle 
unappropriated money, so we didn't handle it. 

Q So when Latni is relating to you, then, it is 
okay to work with NSC, who is he telling you gave that 
authority? 

A Hell, he told me he met with the AG and that 
was that. But we talked, and I may have told him there 



mmsssm 



714 



mmim 



77 



1 could b« — you know, that we w«ra going to us* donor 

2 Bonay, and h* may hav* said it from that, you know. But 

3 h« did tall na ha spoka to tha AG, so I don't know if ha 

4 got it fron ny talking to him, bacausa ha said what ara 

5 you doing, at catara, what's happening, and Z just gava 

6 hia a nini-briafing that wa wara going to put this money 

7 in and tha possibility of extracting somebody. 

8 But there's no doubt that he said that he had 

9 met with the XG and that we were approved to work with 

10 NSC. So Z can't tell you if he said it because of the AG 

11 told him about the unappropriated or he said it because 

12 w* vera talking. 

13 Q In June of '85, was that the first the 

14 Administrator heard of the possibility of using private 

15 funds for the operation? 

16 A No. I can't tell ^ou if it was the first or 

17 • last, and I can't tell you directly that ve did talk 

18 about it. I just feel that I would have talked about it. 

19 Q So you don't know whether or not he heard 

20 akoat it tha first time from you or from someone else? 

21 _ k 1 don't know if he heard about it from 

22 anybody. I just feel, you know, a feeling that Z may 

23 hav* said something to him about it. Z m*an, it was a 

24 long tim* ago. 

25 Q Okay. Wh*n h* said h* spok* to th* Attom*y 



ONCttSSlFlEO 



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WUSSIflED 



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G«n«ral, do you ]cnow whethar or not th«y diacussad aort 
of tha oparatlonal aida of tha plan — that la, 
axtrlcatlng tha hoatagaa? 

A Hall, I don't know if ha told that to tha 
Attornay Ganaral, but I told hia that va vara going to 
try and gat two hostagaa out. I told him that. 

Q And did you datall to him what tha plan was? 

A No. Ha is too busy a man. 

Q What did you tall him you wara going to do? 

A That wa wara going to attampt to gat tham out. 
That's all. And hopefully it goas. Ha says, good luck. 

Q Whan you say "wa wara going to gat tham out" 
did you tall him how you would accomplish that? 

A Wall, ha undarstood wa would usa sourcas of 
information that ara out of tha Middle East. I aasuma ha 
undarstood that, but I didn't gat to it. Z didn't datail 
this to hia. 

Q Wall, what I'm getting at is did you say that 
you vould b« paying large amounts of money to people 




CblSSIflEO 



716 



mmm 




1 

2 

3 Q Did you talk to him that th« payment of large 

4 amounts of money to people In order to get the hostages 

5 out was a possibility? 

6 A I just can't recall that, to be very frank 

7 with you. You know, I met him on various occasions and 

8 my meetings with him were one or two minutes. As I said, 

9 he was a busy man. And 1 could have said it very fast in 

10 two minutes or could have, just given him a very general 

11 that we're working on taking these hostages out of there. 

12 The White House is behind us, and he said, good, and I 

13 left. You know, I can't really put it together for you. 
1* Q Well, is it your sense, .then, that you 

15 informed Administrator Lawn that you were doing more than 

16 simply obtaining intelligence information but indeed 

17 making plans in trying to extricate the hostages? 

18 A Well, up until you have these hostages in your 

19 hands you're only working on intelligence. 

20 Q' Well, not necessarily. 

21 k Oh, yes, it is, because it was information 

22 being given to us that this is the possibility. 

23 Q But didn't your plans include obtaining 

24 transportation, renting safe houses and the like? 

25 A That's an exaggeration, by whom Z don't know. 



mwmm 



717 



UNCLASSIRED 



80 




1 but I a lso saw that in the newspapers. We had plans 

2 

3 

4 

5 Q Did you plan then include renting a boat? 

6 A ^^^^^^nd I, if we needed it, we would have 

7 rented a boat, yes. 

8 Q And did you explain those activities? 

9 A No. 

10 Q To Lawn? 

11 A No, 1 did not. 

12 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

13 Q Let me just tie up this May 22 meeting. You 

14 say that at that meeting there was some discussion about 

15 you working for the NSC on this project; is that correct? 

16 A You mean the meeting with North? 

17 Q On May 22. 

18 A Well, yes. The gist of the meeting was that 

19 North wanted us to woric with him. 

20 Q Now let me just break that down a bit. When 

21 you say he was going to be working with you, did that 

22 mean to you that the special enforcement operation would 

23 be terminated and that there would be some new — 

24 A Technically it had been terminated. We were 

25 not using any of the monies in it any longer. There was 



UNimiliFn 



718 



UNCUSSinED 



81 



1 no aon«y In it any longer. 

2 Q So technically it had been terminated. And 

3 did you then at that time also understand that there 

4 wouldn't be a new SEO designated, but you would just be 

5 somehow detailed over to NSC or authorized to worK with 

6 NSC; is that correct? 

7 A That's all. Authorized I think is the best, 

8 because I was not — even on this project, for the two 

9 years I was on it, I must have worked on it like a 30 

10 percent basis. I had other duties going. Now^^^^^| 

11 worked on it on a 90 percent basis, let's say. So it 

12 wasn't a detail in my mind. It was an authorization to 

13 work on this matter with them.' 

.4 Q Now Ms. Naughton has just asked you a series 

15 of questions about your meeting with John Lawn on this 

16 same subject. Did you or^^^^^^^^^^f ever sit down and 

17 write up what you wanted to do or what you and North had 

18 discussed and send that in to Administrator Lawn or any 

19 superior? 

20 A - No, not at that time. I wrote a memo in '86 

21 to La*m, but at that time I don't recall writing any 

22 memo. 

23 Q Let me just run a couple of things by you out 

24 of North's notebook. North is making notes, it appears, 

25 of information that you and^|HUre relating to him. 




719 



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VNCUSSIHED 



82 



and b« has a sarlas of refarancas 




that corract? 

A That's true. • 

Q Thasa notas are datad May 22. 

A 




A W« raportad this to hla. Wa wantad to maka 
sura that this was all straight with him. Wa didn't want 
to put this J200, 000 in thera if ha wasn't sura of all 
these other factors. 




. A That's correct. 

Q There's also &^^ reference in here, "if price 
is too high, you need to keep the door open with 
$50,000." Do you recall keeping the door open? 

A I read that when I was looking at television 
when that was brought out by Stokes, and I don't get that 
one at all. 



iWIFIED 



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UNCU^IED 



83 



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Q That doesn't sound right to you? 

A I don't understand that $50,000 at all. 




721 



UNCLASSiRED 



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Q Now l«t a« get again to this asalgnacnt or 
authorization to work with th« HSC. I gather from your 
testiaony that this authorization came from Lawn orally; 
is that correct? 

A I don't know — to me it was orally, right. 

Q And, to your knowledge, did^^^^Biver sit 
down with Lawn and go through this routine? 

A No. Z tol 

Q So then you conveyed it on ^o^^^^^H 

A Yeah. 

Q And you've testified thatH^^fspent 
approximately 90 percent of his time on this over the 
next year and a half, couple of years? 

A That's correct. 

Q An4 ji-^y ^gent approximately 30 percent of your 

in 




722 



ONCUSSIRED 



85 



1 tin* on it? 

2 A Yeah. 

3 Q Now, you also testiflsd that you filed a 

4 report with Lawn sometime in 1986. 

5 A Um-hum . 

6 Q Was that an update on where things were, or 

7 was there something specific that generated the report? 

8 A I don't know. I just filed a report with him 

9 stating that we were doing the following. 

10 Q Oo you know whether he asked for it? 

11 A He may have. I don't know. 

12 Q Other than that report can you recall any 

13 other written reports that might have come up on this 

14 subject? 

15 A 1 don't recall writing any other report to him 

16 regarding this. 

17 (Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

18 THE WITNESS: Oh, that's a situation paper we 

19 did.- I did a situation paper for him in '87, recently, 

20 M^lained to him in general our operation. 

21 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

22 Q Okay. Let me just have the record be clear on 

23 this. You conferred briefly with counsel and counsel 

24 recalled to your mind a situation paper that you had 

25 written for the Administrator, in _1987 on this subject; is 




SiFIED 



723 



UNCLASSIFIED 



86 



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8 

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21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now, did you have any other way of regularly 

reporting or even periodically reporting to Administrator 
Lawn or anybody else on this? 

A The deal that we had was that if I traveled or 
^|HMtraveled that I would have to contact him to tell 
him that we were traveling so he could cover us in an 

status ,^^^^^^^^^^Him^^^^m^^^^^H 

^^fl^^H^^H^^^^^^^^^^I he ' d like to ]uiow we 
were on that detail. 

So that was the agreement. Anytime I traveled 
andf^^^l I would call his office, usually got him on 
the phone, and I would say, Mr. Lawn, I'm traveling; Mr. 
Lawn,^^^Hi3 traveling on White House business. And 
that was it. He said okay. 

Q And was that invariable? Vou would always do 
that when you were going to travel? 

A I did it with him. I couldn't find him a 
couple of tiaee, so I did it with his special assistant. 

Q Nov who would that be? 

A It wa« John McKernan — a couple of times with 
him and a couple of times with Marion Ramey. 

Q How do you spell that last name? 



R-a-m-e 




SSIFIED 



724 



UNCblSSIflED 



87 



1 Q What's h«r position? 

2 A Marion is a nan. 

3 Q What's his position? 

4 A At th« time he was in charge of all 

5 inspections. Right now he's in charge of one part of 

6 inspection. 

7 Q Now who was it you understood was your 

8 immediate superior on the NSC detail or NSC 

9 authorization? 

10 A I'd say at this time, once it was approved by 

11 Lawn, it was Lawn. 

12 Q And he was the one, if you had anything 

13 important -- 

14 A For this thing. My other boss was still 
^ere ^^^^^^H - But^^^^^^Bcnew everything. 

16 him. When we're leaving, you )cncw, make sure a few 

17 people knew. You don't want any lapse of minds here. 

18 Q So to the extent you had something to report 

19 you would report first to Lawn; ia that correct? 

20 A I told^^^^^H I kept him generally briefed 

21 on, you know, we're leaving, we're coning, we're working, 

22 we're getting intelligence. You know, nothing to bore 

23 him, but I wanted more than Lawn, who had a heavy 

24 schedule and probably had a hard time remembering what my 

25 name was, as most Administrators do. 



UNeUSSIRED 



725 



UNCUSSIHED 



88 



1 Q Now dld^^^^^Hhave an understanding as to 

2 what this whola NSC authorization was about? 

3 AH* Icnsw, sura. H« was in on thos* initial 

4 brisfings at th« beginning, and h* cams over to the White 

5 House one time with us at the beginning, as a matter of 

6 fact. 

7 Q You're saying in the beginning. Is this 

8 February of '85? 

9 A In the February-March thing we brought him 

10 over with us to meet Hickey and Coffield. 

11 Q Do you recall ever having the sane kind of 

12 encounter with him that you had with Lawn where you went 

13 in and gave him a brief upside as to what you were up to? 

14 A I used to tell him we're getting good 

15 intelligence out of there and we're passing it to the CIA 

16 and we're passing it to the NSC. I'd tell him things 

17 like that. 

18 Q And I presume that you also made it known that 

19 this, was in the context of getting the hostages out of 
2 L^«non; is that correct? 

21 A I told him one time we had a shot to get two 

22 hostages out, and it didn't go ~ something like that. 

23 Q And is this still 1985? 

24 A Yeah. 

25 Q And this would be about the same time that you 



yNClISSIFIEI) 



726 



DNMSIHED 



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1 w«r« talking to Lawn, in Juna of '85? 

2 A I would call Lawn and tall hio that wa'r* 

3 leaving. 

4 Q But you're talking toHHHVabout the same 

5 time, June of '85? 

6 A See, I was at work there 70 or 80 percent of 

7 the tine, soj^^^^^lwas there. I did ay job, what I was 

8 doing there, and occasionally I'd just drop some 

9 infomation on hio, saying, you know, we've got soae good 

10 inforaation on this, and we didn't get — we lost our 

11 shot on getting the two hostages out. 

12 There was no briefing. Don't look at this as 

13 a briefing. This is how are you doing? How is that 

14 operation? I says, we're getting Intelligence. The 

15 intelligence is pretty good. 

16 Q Let me ask the question differently. When he 

17 woul4 turn to you and say, how's the operation, would he 

18 have an understanding that this operation covered the 

19 hostages coming out of Lebanon? 

20 A !• don't know. 

21 Q Do you assume he did? 

22 A No, I don't assume anything. He would say, 

23 how's that operation? We talked as any function is an 

24 operation. Even an intelligence probe is an operation. 

25 Q Right. 



\immm 



727 



UNHMFIED 



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1 A So h« just said operation or how's that thing. 

2 Ara you having any success«s? And I would just giv« him 

3 soma vary short answars. 

4 Q Tha raason I'm trying to pursua this a little 

5 further is you're on duty covering mora than just this 

6 Lebanon effort during this period of time; is that right? 

7 A Sure. 

8 Q And therefore you are involved in other 

9 operations other than the Lebanon operation. 

10 A Sure. 

11 Q When he stops you in the hallway or in his 

12 office or whatever and says how's that operation, how do 
1j you )cnow what he's talking eOsout? 

14 A It was understood. There was nothing specific 

15 about anything. I wasn't hiding anything. Maybe he said 

16 how's your hostage thing going. Maybe he said are you 

17 getting any intelligence out of Lebanon. I don't know. 

18 But he is a very close friend of mine, so occasionally 

19 I'd talk to hla about it. Besides, I was working for 

20 hla. 

21 Q Let B« move on a little bit In time, off the 

22 May 22 aeetlng. Do you recall your next meeting with 

23 Lieutenant Colonel North? 

24 A Okay. My meeting — I don't know. ^^^Hhad 

25 some meeting*, and maybe I was traveling or I was gone, 



\mmB 



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but^^^^Hhad the meetings with North and out of thes* 
meetings it came out that ^^^^^^^^^^wasready and was 
in his office and it was set up that^^^^^Psrother, 

|would handle the money and deliver it to 

Source 1. 

And all this took place mostly without me, and 
I may have been traveling on DEA business. 

Q Okay. Let me see if Z can suggest soaethlng 
to you and you tell me if you think this sounds correct. 
According to North's notebook, he shows « meeting with 

}n June 6, '85, at which he relates the following 
information. 




be burned if this doesn't work." 
Does that bring anything back to you? 
A Probably, yeah. Z don't know if it's June 6, 
but I remember that meeting, without a doubt, that be had 
that meeting. 

Q Now there's also a reference in here ^o^^^^| 
^^^^^^^^^^^H me you the — 

MR. MORROW: Hay I ask is that public, by any 
chance? 

MR. WOODCOCK: No. 

MR. MORROW: No chance of its ever being 



UNCbtSSIHED 



729 



finmim 



92 



1 public? 

2 MR. WOODCOCK: These are North's notebooks. 

3 Before North's notebooks would be released to the public 

4 they would have to be declassified by the White House. 

5 MR. MORROW: They are presently classified? 

6 MR. WOODCOCK: Yes, they are classified under 

7 our classification system, and we don't release it to the 

8 public until we send them down to the White House for 

9 declassification. So to that extent, since that does 

10 have a reference in it, you would have to be certain — 

11 and Z SM sure you are certain — that the White House was 

12 sensitive to anything coming in with this source's 

13 identity on it. 

14 MR. MORROW: That's quite an assumption on 

15 your part. 

16 MR. WOODCOCK: Okay. Let's go off the record 

17 ' for a moment. 

18 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

19 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

20 Q Before we went off the record we were 

21 dlseossing a meeting that you had with North on June 6, 

22 1985, and you tiave stated that in the course of that 

23 meeting North advised you that the Attorney General had 

24 approved your working with NSC on the hostage location 

25 matter; is that correct? 



UNCtAmiED 



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A Yes. 

Q Do you recall whether he mentioned the 
Attorney General by name or just by title? 

A I don't know. 

Q Did he say how he knew that, that he had 
spoken with the Attorney General and the Attorney General 
had approved? 

A He may have said he spoke to the AG and he had 
approved our participation. 

Q And that would be you and^^^^^|is that 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Did he discuss anything else 
that he discussed with the Attorney General about the 
operation? 

THE WITNESS: No^ 




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Q Thara's also reference in these notes to a 
yacht moving hostages in six ^^^Psf^HHf Does that 
sound lilce something you would have discussed? 

A Well, that was an idea that if we can get the 
hostages out ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
they would be brought out of there with a yacht. That's 
what he's referring to. W e did discuss certain types of 

metho ds of getting them out^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hso that was 
one of the ideas — just an idea is all. 

Q Now, what effect, if any, did the hijacking 
that occurred of TWA flight 847 have on your plans? 

A A heavy effect, and we reported to Ollie that 




734 



UNCIASSIFIED 



97 



1 stopped at cross-lin« parsons. 

2 Q Nov by tha tima of tha hijacking did you Icnow 

3 that SOB* of tha monias that you would ba using to 

4 ralaasa tha hostagas vara privata monias? 

5 A Yaah, sura. 

6 Q And did you hava an understanding as to 

7 whathar H. Ross Parot vas going to ba tha sourca of that 

8 monay? 

9 A That I couldn't tall you. I didn't knov until 

10 much, much latar. Wa figured it out in '86, needless to 

11 say, because Jay Cobum, vho mat^^^^Hand Oliver North 

12 in that time frame — May 24 — 

13 ^ Q 1986? 

14 A 1985. Coburn apparently brings the $200,000 

15 to Oliver North's office and^^Hvas called in there. 

Q ^^^^1 

17 A Yeah. 

18 Q So vas it at that point that you understood? 

19 - A No. We didn't )cnov vho he vas.^^^Honly 

20 knew that that vas Jay Coburn because this guy on his 

21 briefcase had "Jay Coburn" on his briefcase, and as a 

22 good investigator he took note of that. But it vas later 

23 — it vent into the '86 operation — that Cobum came on 

24 the scene and then ve knev that he vas a Perot man. 

25 Q Did Azzam ever say to you that he suspected as 




'li i« 



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UNeiASSIRED 



98 



1 early aa aarly Hay '85 that Parot might ba a sourca of 

2 Bonlaa? 
A Azzaa got in anothar to-do with hia big mouth 

in a joint maating ovar thara, and ha mantiona that 
thare's donors involved — soma donors could ba involved 
in this hostage thing. 

Q You are talking about the joint meeting? This 
is the big meeting you had at CZA? 

A No, this isn't with us. This is him in his 

10 meeting, his Monday morning meetings with CZA and the FBZ 

11 and everybody else on this hostage thing. Apparently he 

12 mentioned something about donors, and everybody in the 

13 room vent nuts. Needless to say, the CZA then called the 

14 White House. The White House called me and^^^^^HWhat 

15 the hell did you tell him? 

16 Z said, we don't know anything. What do you 

17 mean? And then Azzam want over there and he said, yeah, 

18 that was just speculation that donors are involved. 

19 Q But Z gather you didn't )uiow at that point 

20 that he had speculated as to any particular donors; is 

21 that right? 

22 A No. Z think he mentioned Perot, though. 

23 Later we found out he said Ross Perot. What can Z tell 

24 you? But that was Azzam, between Azzam and CZA. Had 

25 nothing to do with 




736 



omssiHED 



99 



1 Q Do you recall getting orders froa Korth during 

2 thl* period of time — that is, the hijacking period — 

3 to cease and desist for a while? 

4 A Yes. Stand down, he said. It also upset our 

5 schedule too, you know, because you had to keep the 

6 pressure on in this thing, and the hijacking took the 
pressure ott,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M 
^^^^^^^H He And then we had to stand 

9 do%m. So we were losing our bona fides. 
LO And then the threat that there was going to be 

a strike, it just all went against us. We had no luck. 

Q So now did you meet with Korth at all during 
this hijacking period? 

A Well, I think I mat on June 14 with bia. Hold 
on. Ho, z aet June 20. 

Q June 20? 

A Ho,|^^Let with his. X didn't aaet with 
hia. I aay have talked to hia on the phone, though. Z 
spoke to hia on the phone a lot, you know, and X don't 
reaeaber when. It was hard to get in to see hi^ because 
he «aa so busy, and Z would get phone calls at 2:00 in 
the aoming or Z would try to get hold of hia through the 

23 situation rooa and we'd talk on the phone. 

24 Q How would you conuDunicate? 

25 A Z'd have hia beeped. 



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Q Did you have any securs communication? 

A Yeah. 

Q Have a code? 

A Code, but we cut things. That guy and, you 
]cnov, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H- things 
like that. He knew. 




TY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q All right. I've got a note here in North's 
notebook shoving on June 26, 1985, $15K for travel, and 
then says, H^|HH|H^^^|^|depart today 
then it's blank. Do you recall that event? 

A Actually it wasHHfand ^H^Hwho departed 
anc^^^^Hstayed 

Q What was happening then? 

A The deal was that the 207 would still go in. 

Q The $200,000? 

A The S20o7ooo would go in for the evidence and 
to try to get back our bona fides again with these 



ONCttSSfflEI) 



738 



iomzm 



101 



1 p«opl«. ^^^^^Kould handle the $200Kr. and^^^Hwould be 

2 the escort on it, and I did not go in at that time. 

3 Q And you understood, I gather, by this point 

4 that this $200,000 was not government money; it was 

5 unappropriated? 

6 A I )cnew exactly it wasn't. 

7 Q And^^^^^|is handling it because he could 

8 handle unappropriated monies? 

9 A He's a civilian, right. I'm not so sure if Z 

10 couldn't handle it either. It was just set up that way. 

11 He set it up that way. I guess it was also because it 

12 was a large amoi^t of money and it was just better to 

13 have one more witness to say that the money went in. 

14 Q Do you recall who went and got the $15,000? 

15 A Z think it was^^HBpicked up the money, too. 

That ^4|^^^^^|°'^H^^^H 

17 . A Right, because I met them at the airport and I 

18 think h« gave ■• $5,000 of it. 

Q ^^Hdid? 

20 A Yeah. And then, you know, I met them, I think 

21 within a few days,{ 

22 Q 

^^^■and^^^^H and 

24 Q So what happened at that meeting? What was 

25 the plan? 




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A Wall, they came bac)c. The money had gone in. 




[But I met with^^^^B&nd Source 1 and we discussed 
the possible extraction, how it would take place. 

Again, it would be using a yacht. ^^^^^H 

^^^^^^^Hwould put the hostages on a yacht and we would 
have soma time and maybe Oliver North could get some 
military vessel in there. I don't Icnow. You know, it 
was that sort of thing at the time. But, if not, we 
would meet the yacht and take possession of the hostages. 
That was the speculation. 

And we talked about how much money they 
wanted. They wanted $1 million a head, and it would be 
after the hostages were delivered. 

Q Now at this point were you talking about all 
the hostages? 

A We're talking about two ~ Buckley and one 
other. 

Q And that one other would be a clergyman; is 
that right? 

A I think it was one of the clergymen. 

Q So it would either have been Jenko or Weir? 

A Yeah. 



UNMSIFIED 



740 



UNMSIHEO 



103 



1 BY MS. NAUGHTOM: (Resuming) 

2 Q While we're on that topic, could we go to this 

3 Exhibit? Could I have this marked, please, as Exhibit 2? 

4 (The document referred to was 

5 marked ^^^^^^Exhib it Number 

6 2 for identification.) 

7 This fits in real well because in public 

8 record this has been put in as Public Hearing Exhibit 2 

9 for Attorney General Meese. I'd like you to read it. 

10 It's a two-page memorandum. You are looking at the 

11 unclassified version which means several names and 

12 certain places are redacted. But I'd like to have you 

13 read it and tell ma if the information on this memorandum 

14 is accurate. 

15 MR. MORROW: What's the date of it? 

16 MS. NAUGHTON: It's not dated, which is one of 

17 the problems. 

18 (Pause.) 

19 BY MS. KAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

20 ' Q ^^^^^^^^^H after reading the memorandum can 

21 you tell us whether or not in its totality it's accurate 

22 or leather or not there are inaccuracies? 

23 A Generally in its totality it is accurate. 

24 Some things — you know, $500,000 here or there — I 

25 don't know. I don't )cnow, you know. 



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Q Well, why don't we go through it, then? The 
third paragraph, beginning with "Once contact has been 
established", there is a reference that "the two DEA 
officers will deposit $200,000 and establish an account 
for $2 million. $500,000 will be available immediately 
in U.S. dollar cash for use in Lebanon." 

Is that correct or incorrect? 
A Well, you know, I know what he was trying to 
say here. Okay, the $200K went in, what was going to go 
in as the bona fide in payment of this evidence right 
here. Okay. Once we got the hostages in possession 
there would be some expenses because we would have to 
then pay I 

And I don't know. I don't remember setting 
any figure. Maybe that's why he was talking about the 
$500K. I don't know. 

MR. MORROW: Half a million dollars? 

THB WITNESS; Maybe that was their part of the 
bribe. Except for that point right there the rest of it 
!• pretty close — that the money would be paid. Once 
the hostages were in custody, the money would be paid 
later. But the $500,000 doesn't — maybe^^^B=an 
explain it better. I don't know. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q What he says about the agents, the DEA agents, 




UNCtASSinED 



742 



UNaASSIFIED 

1 actually depositing the money is, I gather, not true. 

2 A That's not true. He misunderstood that. ■ 

3 Q And were you to set up an account for the $2 

4 million? 

5 A No way. We told him that one of the 

6 possibilities of this, that somebody would have an 

7 account and it would be passed to them after the hostages 

8 were taken, or they would be met in Europe and they would 

9 be handed the money in Europe somewhere. And then we 

10 told then — or they may want part of it in cash and then 

11 part in the bank, and that's where maybe the $500,000 — 

12 we may have said they want $500,000 in cash and the rest 

13 in the bank. 

14 These were all, you know, speculative f 

15 situations and we were just talking about them. But I 

16 don't recall saying specifically $500K. Maybe we did and 

17 maybe we didn't. 

18 Q Were you responsible for renting the yacht for 

19 transport to Cyprus? 

20 A It was never rented. 

21 Q I'm not asking that. In the plan, as he 

22 states — 

23 A Source 1 would have handled it, and then we 

24 would have been billed. 

25 Q Source 1, then, was to actually rent the 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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UNtUSSIFIfD 



106 



yacht? 

A Him or on* of his- sub-sources. I mean, it 
would be coming out^^^^^^H so obviously it would have 
to be rented there on site. 

Q Now on the second page of the memo, where it 
says "one of the DEA officers will proceed to Cyprus to 
rent a safe house", is that part correct? 

A I don't )cnow. You know, I don't recall saying 
we'd have to have a safe house, because it was my opinion 
at the time that you couldn't keep these__hostae 
incognito in a safe house. Okay' 




And that's not on here, and I know I said 



that. 



Q Where do you think, then. Colonel North got 
the idea that you were going to rent a safe house? 
A Maybe he meant a safe house and I meant the 



Q Well, he would n ot be talking about renting it 
if it was^^^^^^^Hf 

A Well, maybe he misunderstood me. I don't 
recall this. Maybe||^^Htalked about his. But, you 
know, it wouldn't set right with me to rent a safe house 



mmm 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



107 



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IS 

16 

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24 

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So this could just be something — you know, I 
don't know. Maybe^^^^H:an explain it. 

Q The next large paragraph, starting with "it is 
assumed", the sentence that says "the safe house will be 
used to harbor, treat, the first two hostages while 
arrangements (both financial and operational) are being 
made for the remaining hostages. A believes that at 
least 72 to 96 hours would be required for a second 
round . " 

Was it then contemplated that in addition to 
the two hostages indeed additional hostages would be 
freed? 

A We felt, and the information that we had, that 
we could do this once we got two out, and that was the 
whole reason. And I think that's why he used the word 
"safe house". I don't recall using it. But that these 
people would have to stay incognito until we got the rest 
out, because obviously if the word got out and the press 

the bribes ^'^ ^^^HJIi^BIH^^^^l 

it would be over. The 
news would come on the scene. 



ymmm 



745 



UNfiUSSIHED 



108 



1 And, like I say, the word "safe house" wasn't 

2 my word, because I talked about ^^^^H^| 

3 Q But my question is, did you expect, then, more 

4 than the two hostages? 

5 A Oh, yeah. 

6 Q The next paragraph regarding the DEA officers 

7 "are prepared to depart as soon as they are contacted by 

8 A." Is A Source 1? 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q "Travel arrangements and operational costs are 

11 currently being financed from funds from private 

12 sources." Is that correct? 

13 A I don't know. I thought it was covert money. 

14 Q Okay. In terms of your operational and travel 

15 expenses? 

16 A Um-hua. 

17 Q At the time, then, that you were receiving the 

18 money from Colonel North you believed that it was 

19 govemaent money? 

20 A That's correct — not the $200,000, though. 

21 Q No. We're talking about your expense money. 

22 A Right. I thought it was covert money. 

23 Q When did you become aware that it was not? 

24 A When it all boiled out. 

25 Q So not until November of '86? 



UNCtftSSIFIED 



746 



UNWSIFIED 



109 



1 A Exactly. 

2 MR. MORROW: Did you learn then? 

3 THE WITNESS: Only because it was in the 

4 hearings. 

5 MR. MORROW: Well, the hearings didn't start 

6 in November '86. 

7 THE WITNESS: Well, after November '86 I 

8 learned by the hearings or by information, I don't know. 

9 When was I interviewed in here? 

10 MS. NAUGHTON: I believe in March. 

11 THE WITNESS: You may have told me that it was 

12 not government money. But after the whole thing was 

13 over, that's when I learned it. Specifically when, I 

14 can't tell you. 

15 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

16 Q Is this the first time you've ever seen this 

17 memo? 

18 A The first time. 

19 Q Did North show you any memoranda that he was 

20 aaading up the line or to anyone else regarding your 

21 activities? 

22 A No. 

23 Q Were you aware that he was preparing such 

24 memoranda? 

25 A No. not at all. truthfully. 




747 



mmm 



110 



1 Q Was there any understanding that this would 

2 not be put in writing? 

3 A No. It's just that when he told me — like he 

4 said, he talked to the AG, and I assumed that was it. I 

5 was surprised, too, that he was copious memo writer — 

6 from the hearings. 

7 MR. MORROW: Did you discuss a 30-day project? 

8 THE WITNESS: Thirty to 90 days. We discussed 

9 that, yeah. 

10 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

11 Q So it was your understanding, then, in June of 

12 '85 that you would only be detailed to this operation for 

13 30 — 

14 A We discussed 30 to 90 days, and I c^uess he 

15 just shoved 30 in there. 

16 MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you. That's all the 

17 questions I had on that. 

18 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Let me up a minute ^^^^^^^^^^^H 

20 Old North ever tell you — and I'm speaking in the late 

21 May/early June period — did he ever tell you that CIA 

22 had reached the conclusion that Source 1 was being 

23 scammed on this? 

24 A No. 

25 Q You've testified that your opinion of CIA's 



mmmm 



748 



ONemiFiED 



111 



1 position was that it supported this. 

2 A Sure. Well, when we split ways I don't )tnow 

3 what they were thin)ting. 

4 Q Again, you never received any information from 

5 North that CIA had lost faith in this operation; is that 

6 correct? 

7 A Never. As a matter of fact, that could never 

8 have been because it was the CIA that came to me and I 

them ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

10 Q Now you're talking about late '85/early '86? 

11 A That's right. So if they had doubts about me 

12 and my source, why would they com* to ma and ask^^^^^^H 

1* Q The question I had was that North never 

15 imparted to you any information that CIA doubted the 

16 effectiveness of Source 1 or the effectiveness of his 

17 sxib-sources ; is that correct? 

18 A Never. He never did. He always lauded Source 

19 l''s information. 

20 Q North did? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q And he never told you CIA didn't? 

23 A Well, he didn't like the CIA, you know. He 

24 told m* he only dealt with the old man and a couple other 

25 people. I can tell you that. He tc'd me that. 



mmma 



749 



UNCUSSIRED 



112 



1 Q That he didn't like the CIA generally and he 

2 only dealt with the old man, meaning Bill Casey? 

3 A And a few people up on top. 

4 Q Old he ever tell you that when he used this 

5 term "old man", did he ever specifically say when I talk 

6 about the old man I mean Bill Casey? 

7 A I asked him that. I said who are you talking 

8 about? He said Casey. 

9 Q And he would habitually refer to him as the 

10 old man? 

11 A He said the old man a couple times. He said 

12 Casey. 

13 Q I just want to make sure the record is clear 

14 on this point, that North never told you or gave you any 

15 information that the CIA thought that your source, Source 

16 1, or his sub-sources were being scammed in this May-June 

17 '85 project. 

18 A He never told me th at and, to the contrary, h e 

was the skeptic. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^| 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 1 became 

21 skeptic, and he's the one that put all that aside and 

22 says we're doing it. 

23 Q Okay. 

24 A You know, you have to understand there's a 

2 5 rivalry that started here between two DEA agents and the 



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iBid-l«v«l CIA. It would have bean a very heavy slap in 
the face if we got lucky and took Buckley out of there, | 
wouldn't it? And this was the major concern. It came to 
ua by other sources. 

Q So through other sources you get the 
impression? 

A Not my sources — other people in the 
government . 

Q Not North but other people who are saying that 
mid-level CIA are not happy with you ano^^^^^^^His 
that correct? 

A Well, they were afraid we were going to be 
successful is what came back to us. 

Q But the information wasn't coming back that 
they were skeptical of your ability to be successful; is 
that correct? 

A That's correct. No. They were worried. I 
imagine, getting Buckley out, two DEA agents in their 
minds, and that's what came to me, not what you asked. 

Q Nov next in North's notebook is an entry that 
reads: June 30, 1985, call fromj 
Oid you gc 



Call 





e also on the same page has a note: 



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f roa ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Andthen another 
raf«r«nc«: Call from^^^^H Ha's got it down asl 

so ha's got you guys thoroughly wadded in his 
^ind. And tha entry is go or no-go. Do you recall 
reaching a break point in this operation, say on June 30? 

A The only thing I could think of is that we 
were told to stand down and then he told us to go, go 
ahead. 

Q Now I think the TWA 847 crisis had been 
resolved by June 29. 

A That's possibly it. 

Q So the next day this entry appears in his 
book. Do you recall receiving instructions to begin 
moving it ahead after the TWA crisis was resolved? 

A Yeah, I do. 

Q And again are those coning from North, those 
instructions? 

A Yeah. I talked to him on the phone while I was 



Q Now what happens? You are told to go ahead. 
What do you do? 

A We put the thing in motion and Source 1 goes 
in and tries to set this all up. 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^I^B^t this 

is that corri 




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w« l«av«i 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^lith Sourc* 1. Th«n I catch 
up to thami 

Q L«t a« just rasolva this and saa if your 
records resolva this. 

A jflH|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Go 
ahead and ask the question. I'll clarify that. 

Q The question comes froa North's notebooks, 
indicate that^^^^His ^i^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^* 
that inaccurate? 

^^^^^^^^^^^Hmet me^^^^^^Hvith 





Q And then do you recall several days elapsing 
before you went! 

went^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band they 
there. Excuse me. He's right. I met them 



Q Now after meeting them, what do you do? 
A ^^^^^^^^^^H and Source returned 

1 1 return hoo^ . 
Q And what's happening? Is this thing going 




ahead? 



A Well, yeah. 




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standby, in other words. 

Q And I gather that contacts are being made^H 

right? 

A Um-hun. 

Q And there are references in North's notebook 



A He kept good notes, you know that? 

Q They are quite complete. 

A I remember that phrase that ve said over the 



phone. 




Q And it also refers to money actually being 
passed ^^^^^^^^1 Now the 

A Um-hUB. 

Q Then I have another entry, the same date, July 
2, '85 that has^^Hto put up — that is P/U; I read 
that a« put up — $2 million. 

MR. MORROW: Or pick up? 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q Excuse me. To pick up $2 million. What's 
happening there? Do you recall? 

A Only if the hostages were coming out we would 



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hava picked It up — if v vera In possession of the 
hostages. 

Q Nov that is as of July 2, and it appears from 
that note that there's a possibility that if everything 
is going well you can pick up $2 million and hostages 
will be coming out, two hostages, presumably. Is that 
correct? 

A Yeah. But we didn't decide how it would be 
picked up. You know, it would have gone to Europe or he 
would have had it brought to us. You know, and then we 
would have picked It up. Physically in possession of it? 
It depends on how the operation was going to be. It may 
not even have had to come all the way to us. 

The Important thing was that if we had gotten 
out two hostages $2 million would have to be available 
somewhere down the line. 

Q Kov obviously this plan does not bear fruit, 
as hostages do not come out. What happens? It breaks 
down. So what happens? 

A It breaks! 




So what was your next step? 

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Th« next 3tep is we cane home 



IIU 




Q Did you sit down and have a meeting with 
North? 

A I'm sure we did. 

Q Let me bring this to your attention and see if 
this brings it back. In North's notebooks there's a 
reference to^^^Hand^^^H The date is July 15, '85. 




It's not clear 

from the note whether that's a meeting or a phone call. 
Do you recall? 

A I think it was a meeting. I don't know 
exactly, but I could have told him that on the phone, 
too. But usually on a trip like that, coming back, it's 
so important that we did not achieve our goals that I 
would have met with him. So I'm sure that I met him at 
hi«- office or in the park across the street. 

Q So you, I gather, didn't give up, however. 
You are still trying to move ahead on this. 

A We left the door open. We left the door open, 
and at this stage of the game it wasn't costing us any 
more money on the part of Source 1, so we just left^h e 

door open, 

Vol 



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Q Nov I gathar, then, that you advisad th« 
sourc* to continu* to do what h« could to. 
A Th« network was in pli 




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Q So th« iiion«y, for in»tanc«, that Jay Coburn 
provided that then went to the Mideast, was that 
specifically and solely for hostage information? 

A Sure it was. 



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Q As opposad to drug information? 
A It was for hostage information, for the bona 
fides and for this thing right here. 

MR. MORROW: The $200K was gone? 
THE WITNESS: It was gone in May. 
MR. MORROW: Was there any other covert money? 
THE WITNESS: No. I didn't even pay Source 1 
ever again. I think I gave him $5,000 out of my own 
expenses or^^^^^Hexpenses one time. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q That you or^^^Hhad received from Colonel 



North? 



A Out of our own travel expenses. 

Q That you had received from Colonel North? 

A Exactly. 

Q And that was for hostage-related activities as 



opposed to drug information? 




t it clear, what I'm getting at is was 




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122 



1 any what w« )cnow now to b« private monies — that is, 

2 aonies you got from Colonel Korth or from Jay Coburn — 

3 were any of those monies used to obtain narcotics 

4 information? 

5 A No. 

6 Q Likewise, you gave, I assume, none of that 

7 money to any DEA agents^H^^^^Bin order to pay for 

8 narcotics information? 

9 A Kever, no. 

10 Q Did you pass any of that money that you 

11 obtained from Colonel North to anyone else other than 

12 spending it for your own expenses? 

13 A No. 

14 Q And your source, then, got paid just the two 

15 times, the $200,000 — 

16 A That wasn't a payment. That was for a 

17 project. That is not a payment. Let's make that very 

18 clear. That was for a project that was approved by North 

19 for 'bringing this^^^|^|out. He said to me that Casey 

20 was satisfied with this. 

21 Q When you say '•this^^^^^B that's Exhibit 

22 1? 

23 A That was the deal. 

24 Q But nevertheless that was money that was paid 

25 to Source 1? 



UNEt/^IFIED 



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2: 
2: 

24 
25 



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123 



A No, it was not. 

Q It was nav«r given to Source 1? 

A It was glvsn to Source 1 and Source 1 gave It 




Q That was money from Jay Cobum, correct, the 
$200,000? 

A That's correct. 

Q The only other payment that you can recall 
Source 1 or any other source in the hostage operation 
getting private funds, what we now know to be private 
funds or these funds that came from either Colonel North 
or Jay Cobum, vas one other payment of $5,000 that you 
made? 

A No. I didn't know they were private funds. I 
•aid they were my expenses that Oliver North gave to me, 
and I gave him some money one time out of the $5,000 that 
he gave me. I gave him, I think, $2,000 out of that on 
the first or second trip. Then, on another occasion when 
I was there, I gave him another couple thousand. That 
was, to me, covert money, not private money. 



vmrnni 



why I qualified my 



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124 



1 9tat«n«nt by saying what we now know to be private monies 

2 as opposed to appropriated government funds. 

3 My question then is how many times did you 

4 make such payments of monies that you obtained from 

5 either Colonel North or Jay Coburn to any of the sources 

6 involved in the hostage rescue operation? 

7 MR. MORROW: That goes back and covers the CIA 

8 money . 

9 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

10 Q No, because I qualified it by saying any money 

11 from Jay Coburn or from Oliver North. I'm not concerned 

12 with OEA money. I'm not concerned with CIA money. 

is A I can answer that that I did not pay Source 1, 

14 Z think, other than those $2,000 ever again in this whole 

15 operation. 

16 Q The $2,000 from your expense money? 

17 A We're finished with the $200,000 right? We 

18 understand that he got that money and gave it to those 

19 other people. 

20 Q Yes. 

21 A After that I think I gave him $2,000 of my 

22 money that Oliver North gave me, and after that I don't 

23 recall giving him one red cent for the rest of this 

24 operation. 

25 Q So earlier when you said there might have been 



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UNcussm 



125 



1 another $2,000, now you don't think ther* was. Just th« 

2 on* $2,000? 

3 A I said $2,000. 

4 Q And do you )cnow whan that was? 

5 A I don't know. I don't recall. I remember 

6 giving him $2,000. 

7 Q Would it have been in 1986? 

8 A Could have been. But I only took one trip in 

9 '86 overseas. But it could have been then. I really 

10 can't — these years overlap too much for ne. 

11 Q Is it safe to say it was after June '85 — 

12 A I've got it right her*. It was '86. 

13 Q Do you recall when? 

14 A In March of '86 I gave him $2,000. 

15 Q Kov how w*r* you abl* to pinpoint that in your 

16 not*s? 

17 A I talk*d to hia. I ask*d wh*n did I pay you. 

18 Th* h*avy payB*nts h* signsd, and I asked him. I know I 

19 gave' his $2,000, you know, and he told me — 

20 MR. MORROW: What's this? 

21 THE WITNESS: ^^^^Krav* him that, and he told 

22 me I gave hia $2,000 one time when he left New York. 

23 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

24 Q In March of '86? 

25 A Yeah. 



UNCbl»ED 



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ONtolHED 



126 



1 Q So this inforaation is not from any 

2 contemporaneous note you made or received but from your 

3 subsequent conversations with the source? 

4 A Well, it does in a sense. At the same time 

5 perlod^^^^Hvired some money to him, and it was in that 



6 same time that I remembered I gave him $2,000 in cash, 

7 and that's why it did — 

8 Q So his statement is basically corroborated by 
whatJHHHHiid? 

10 A Exactly. He's the one that reminded me that I 

11 gave him $2,000 at that time. Other than that, I gave 

12 nobody any other money. 

13 MS. NAUGHTON: 0)cay. Thank you. 

14 BY KR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

15 Q Let me just follow this money line question 

16 down a little bit. You, I gather, began at some point 

17 receiving monies directly from North himself; is that 

18 correct? 

19 A Yeah. 

20 Q When he would give you these monies I gather 

21 it was In the form of traveler's checks; is that correct? 

22 A My recollection is that my first trip was the 

23 only time I got traveler's checks, in which I think I got 

24 $5,000 worth of traveler's checks. 

25 Q That would be July of '85? 



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UIWSIFIEO 



127 



1 MR. MORROW: When he uses the term "first 

2 trip" he refers to trips under the NSC as opposed to the 

3 earlier trips for DEA. So it's really the third trip, 

4 but he calls it the first trip. 

5 THE WITNESS: I'll do it by months. That will 

6 be more accurate. 

7 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

8 Q Fair enough. 

9 A My first funded trip by Oliver North was in 

10 June. 

11 Q June of '85? 

12 A Exactly. And I'm pretty sure I received 

13 $5,000 in traveler's checks. 

14 Q Nov when you got this money from him, where 

15 did it come from? Where did he pull it out of? 

16 A His office. 

17 Q Were you present when he retrieved it? 

18 A That is right. H^^Bgave it to me at the 

19 airport when I met him at the airport. It was^^^Hwho 

20 got it at the office. 

21 Q Now after this first trip money — that is 

22 June of '85 trip money — do you recall when you next 
2 3 received money from North? 

24 A My recollection is I took a second trip and 

25 then was reimbursed on it after I came back. 



UNCtASSIflED 



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CNMSIWD 



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1 Q Did you ever get money directly from North and 

2 not throughl 

3 A No. You know, I never did. I always got it 
through ^^^^^H 

5 Q So you never were in North's office and he 

6 went somewhere and produced traveler's checks or cash or 

7 whatever? 

8 A I don't recall that. I remember — now, 

9 that's a good point — that I never got it directly. 

10 ^^^^Hilways caught up to me somewhere. 

11 Q Okay. Let me go back to the chronological 

12 procession here. There's a reference in North's 
notebooks to^^^^^^^^Katting on al 

14 flight on July 25, 1985, and ultimately going tol 

15 ^^^^^^^HLondon . Do you know what that's about? 

16 A Yeah. He apparently was with a person that we 

17 coined the name the Prince, and allegedly this guy was a 

18 Saudi prince, as it was told to me by North, and that 

19 this" guy had excellent contacts with the Kuwaiti 

20 govamnent and the Lebanese government. And Oliver 

21 wanted us to see if we could develop anything or any of 

22 these contacts. 

2 3 Q Is this the first time that the Saudi prince 

24 is brought to your attention, this July '85 period? 

25 A Just a minute. 




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UNCIASSIHED 



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1 (Pause.) 

2 I think it was in that time frame, yes. 

3 MR. MORROW: What was the date of North's note 

4 — 7/25? 

5 MR. WOODCOCK: 7/2 5. 

6 MR. MORROW: We've got it that the trip was 

7 7/26, 

8 MR. WOODCOCK: The note is 7/25. It may have 

9 been an itinerary for the next day. 

10 THE WITNESS: ^^HHleft on the 26th of '85. 

11 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuaing) 

12 Q Did North speaX to you directly about this 

13 prince? 

14 A On the phone, I believe. 

15 Q And did he tell you how it came about that he 

16 had gotten in touch with this prince or how the prince 

17 C2une to his attention? 

18 A I think he said through a Miller. 

19 - Q Richard? 

20 A A Miller, meaning Miller, a person named 

21 Miller. 

22 Q Did he provide you with any more information 

23 other than that? 

24 A He just said this guy seems to be a heavy guy. 

25 Q Did he say whether he'd met him or not? 



UNCtASStnED 



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1 A I don't recall that. 

2 Q Did h« tall you his nam*? 

3 A Oh, yeah, we got his name. 

4 Q That was at the tine, over the phone? 

5 A Yeah, I got it or^^^Bgot it. 

6 Q And al-Masoudi is the naune? 

7 A Ebrahim. 

8 Q Ebrahia al-Masoudl? 

9 A Yeah. 

10 Q Did he have any other way of referring to him 

11 other than the Saudi prince? 

12 A We called him, I think, the Gem and then the 

13 Prince. 

14 Q Just let me say this. There are interspersed 

15 throughout North's notes references to Jewel. 

16 A That's right. 

17 Q So when you see Jewel that means the Saudi 

18 prince? 

19 - A That's correct. That's exactly it. I can't 

20 kaap track of our codes. 

21 g Let me back you up in time a little bit and 

22 see If this means anything to you. In North's notes 

23 there's a reference to a May 2, 1985, call from Abe, and 
then down^^H|||||m|H|||^|fl| and then 

25 says "recognized Jewel". 



UNCtASSIFIED 



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iiNCussra 



131 



1 AX recognized Jewel. 

2 Q Do you recall having any information on the 

3 Saudi prince back as early as May 1985? 

4 A Um-hua. 

5 Q How would that have come to your attention? 

6 A I got him a visa in the Bahamas. 

7 Q How did it come about that you were helping 

8 the prince get a visa in the Bahamas? 

9 A Well, he asked me — Oliver asked me, that he 

10 needed a visa on his Grenadian passport. And I said 

11 fine, where is he? He says, where can you get the visa? 

12 I said, you tell me where he is, and I'll get him a visa. 

13 And he says, we'll get him to the Bahamas. I said fine, 

14 and he got a visa. 

15 Q How did he explain to you at that time who the 

16 prince was and what his significance was? 

17 A Yea. 

18 Q What did he tell you about him? 

19 A What I told you before — that he was a Saudi 

20 prince and he had heavy contacts with the mullahs of the 

21 Hizbollah, and that we would then get him a visa, get him 

22 into Europe, and we would then develop him for whatever 
2 3 use we can on the hostages. 

24 Q Now in-between this point where you obtain a 

25 visa for the Saudi prince and late July, had he come back 



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onto your 8cr««n at all, th« Saudi princ«? Had you had 
anything to do with him at all in-b«tw««n Mrly May and 
lata July? 

A I don't Icnow. I don't think ao. I think that 
OUT naxt aaating waa^^^^Hs traveling with th« guy. 

Q Now whan^^^^^was called upon to traval to 
D«at with th« princ* I gather you war* awara of that; is 
that correct? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q Did you aaXe the connection between the Saudi 
prince being the same person you'd gotten a visa for? 

A Oh, yeah. This was going to happen, you know, 
because that's why we got the visa for hia, so that we 
could accouodate hia and then debrief hia and see what 
actually this guy can do. 

Q Now on that May 2 note that Z referred to 
there is a reference ^o^^^^^| Do you know what that 
would be a referral to? 

A Oh^^^^^Miras traveling for ae on other 
aatters. 




Is he a DBA agent? 
Yeah. 



What's his full naae? 

UNCUtS^ED 



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1 A ^^^^^^^^^^^H And that was it, though. 

2 was his supervisor. 
^^^^^^^^^^^1 But Azzaa was In this. He knew, and he 

4 approved this. 

5 Q Z think the note reflects that the call came 

6 from Azzam. 

7 A That's right. Azzam called me. He says, can 

8 you get this done? I said, sure I can. 

9 Q Now I gather, then, that^^^Hdid travel to 

10 London to meet with the Saudi prince; is that right? 

11 A That is correct. 

12 Q And Miller. What happened as a result of 

13 that. Did he come back and make a report to you on what 

14 happened? 

15 A Well, he told me that he was with him and 

16 talked to him ~ very hard to understand the guy, you 

17 know. His English wasn't too hot. But he mentioned a 

18 lot of names which were pretty heavy names — you know, 

19 haavy mullah names — Fadlallah, Masawi — and at that 

20 tla* v« figiired that maybe he did know and he could help. 

21 Q So were any steps taken at this point? 

22 A Well, allegedly this guy was making phone 

23 calls to Kuwait and to Lebanon, you ]cnow, trying to get 

24 these contacts going. That's whati^^^^|told me. 

25 Q So did you and^^^^^ake any steps with 




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1 r*ap«ct to tha Saudi princ* at this tima? 

2 A Wa just had, you know, this information and wa 

3 told him to contact who ha thought was important, who had 

4 son* control on thesa hostagas, and onca ha cama to soma 

5 kind o f accord with these people to contact us, because 

6 ^^^^Hleft there, Z think, August 1 and came home and 

7 left the prince there, I believe. 

.8 Q The people you were suggesting he contact, 

9 these were the sub-contacts of your Source 1? 

10 A No, no. This is separate. This is not Source 

11 1 any more. 

12 ' Q Is Source 1 on the shelf? 

13 A No, no. 

14 Q He's still continuing in his traces? 

15 A Source 1 is passing me information constantly, 

16 and I pass it to Olli e. 

17 Q So you and^^^^^^^H give him of 
persons^^^^^^^Hwho are 

19 A No, no. He gives us names. 

20 Q Explain that to m*. 

21 AW* don't let sources of information — we 

22 don't give thea the names. We debrief him, and he says, 

23 you know, I know mullah Fadlallah. I know Masawi. He 

24 names a bunch of other people. ^^^Hwould know who they 



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Q I an nlsunderstandlng^TCr testimony, then. I 
gather what you then told him was go ahead and get in 
touch with these people you have told us about; is that 
right? 

A Exactly. Get hold of them, set up some kind 
of meetings, try to lure them into Europe, and then he 
said yes, he'd do it. 

Q Now does he need money to accomplish these 
things? 

A As far as I knew he didn't. 

Q Did you give him any money, do you recall? 

A Z did not. Z never gave him any money. 

Q At any point? 

A Z never gave him any money. 

Q You never gave the prince any money? 

A No. 

Q Z'll ask the question differently. Are you 
aware of^^^Hgiving him any money? 

'A No, never did. ^^^^Hpaid a lot of his 
expanses, if that's what you mean — paid a bunch of his 
expenses, which was money from Oliver North, though. 

Q Well, Z don't want to get into a word game 
here, but at some point the prince was incurring expenses 
and^^^His making money available to the prince to pay 



the expenses? 



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1 k But I don't know if that was this trip. 

2 Q I«t B« just ask the question generally. Did 

3 it ever happen? 

4 A Yes. 

5 Q And to your understanding that was money 

6 coming from North? 

7 A Oh, yes. 

8 Q Throughl 

9 A Oh, yeah. 

10 Q To the prince? 

11 A Exactly. 

12 Q Old that money ever paaa through you? 

13 A No. 

14 Q You were aware of it, however? 

15 A Sure^ 

16 Q Nov^^^Hhas met with the Saudi prince, al- 

17 Masoudl, in lata July, and al-Maaoudi ia adviaed to go 

18 ahead and aaa what ha can do with theaa important 

19 Latoanaaa naaaa that ha haa brought up. Doaa ha do 

20 anything? ^^^ happana? 

21 A Wall, you knov,^^^Braa talking to him. I 

22 never talked to him. I couldn't underatand him. So I 

23 told^HJBta had to talk to hia. 

24 Q At what point did you actually aea him to talk 

25 to? 



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I saw him one time in August. I met him] 



Q Do you know approximately when that would have 
been? 

A It was exactly August 22. 

Q Was that the only time you met him that you 
recall? 

A Yeah. I think that was it. 

Q Now has he done anything by then? 

A No. He's just giving us a bunch of names. 

Q Is it at this meeting that you say go ahead. 
It you Icnov these people, go ahead and contact them? 

A It was the August meeting that I finally stuck 
my two cents in and talked to hin. 

Q Then what happens? 

A I tasked hia. I got hard on hin. I says, you 
know, are you going to do it? Are you going to be in 
trouble? I was the bad guy and^^^^Hwas the good guy. 
Okay? So he said he could do it. He swore on Allah, you 
know, and everything else. And I left — like a couple 
days th«r«. 

Q Now there's a reference in North's notes dated 
August 28, '85, that says "call froo^H^f $10K needed 
ASAP." Do you know what that's about? 

A I was in the States by then. 



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Q What's happening? 
A 




got information. There was some imminent possibilities 
of getting lucky again and getting a hostage, and we 
waited there. ^^^^^^^mt 

then August 22^^^Hand ^°^^^^^^| 
and we debrief the Prince. Then I leave on August 25 and 
^^^Hremains^^^^^^Hthrough September my 

conversations, then, with Oliver North is this guy has no 
money. His credit card is almost bankrupt. 

Q That is, the Prince? 

A No, that's^H|H So I says, get him some 
money. So apparently they sent him $15,000 through the 
Prince's hotel, and the Prince got the money. And then 
the Prince gave ^°^^^^^| 

Q So the money was wired to a hotel and the 



Prince? 
A 
Q 

A 

to^^H 



Where the Prince was staying. 

And the Prince gave ^°^^^^^| 

Right. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Did the Prince give all $15,000 

THE WITNESS: I don't think so. You'll have 



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1 to ask^^^^H I 'a not suro how that was brokan out. But 

2 thai^^^^lpald th« axpansas of tha Prlnca and hiasalf 

3 froa that $1S,000. And it was during that tlaa fraaa 

4 that^^^^H davalopad Sourca 2. 

5 BY m. WOODCOCK: (Rasualn?) 

< Q Lat aa back you up a littla bit. You also 

7 aaat with Seurca 1 and you thou^t you might ba gatting 

• lucky. Nhat did you aaan 1^ that? 
9 A Hall, Z thought wa wara going to gat a bostaga 

10 out, that soaa nagotiations had firad back up with tha 

11 old contacts, and wa just thou^t that wa wara aoving in 
la tha right diraction to gat ona out. 

13 Q Is this still tha saaa plan of 91 aillion par 

14 hostaga? 

15 A Yaah. 

1« Q Mhat happanad with that? Why did that not pan 

17 out? 

IB A It didn't pan out. 

19 . Q Any raason? 

20 A X'B net sura, but Z think it tras at this tiaa 

21 ffraaa that wa passad information to Olivar Vox 
22 
23 

24 Q And this is August of '85? 

25 A Yaah. Z think it was August. 




UNKASSinEn 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



140 



1 Q Did North give you any Information in August 

2 of '85 that h* was receiving information from other 

3 sources that Buckley might be dead? 

4 A Yes. Well, that was a constant thing. Nobody 

5 knew if he was alive or dead. 

6 Q But I'm talking about something more specific. 

7 A I'll tell you very frankly I told Oliver North 

8 that Buckley was dead. 

9 Q You did? Based on what? 

10 A Based on Source 1 telling a* th»t Buckley was 

11 dead. 

12 Q When did he tell you that? 

13 A It was, I believe, in this August thing. 

14 Q Now let me ask the question I asked a few 

15 minutes ago. Did North ever tell you, based on 

16 information Independent of what you told him — 

17 A Later, I think. 

18 Q Z'B just staying in the August time frame, 

19 th«t^ he bad received information in August from a source 
2 indapandent of you that Buckley was dead? 

21 A Yeah. I thought It waa CIA told him. You 

22 know, it was what cane first — the chicken or the egg. 

23 I don't know. . But we talked about Buckley. 
24 
25 I told him anothar time in that same time frame that 




mmssm 



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WMfifD 



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1 Buckl«y was dead, and then he told me that yeah, he's 

2 dead and that the CIA said he's dead, too — or some 

3 other sources. 

4 It was one of those things. I don't know who 

5 got to it first. 

^ Q Now let me ask you again on the subject of 

7 Buckley — this is over the entire span of the operation 

8 — did there ever come a point after that where you 

9 received information that contradicted your assumption 

10 that Buckley was dead? 

11 A Yeah. 

12 Q When did that happen? 

13 A I would say in August-September also. It was 

14 after, obviously, what we told him originally — that he 

15 may not be dead. 

16 Q Was that again from Source 1? 

17 A I don't know. I don't remember that. 

18 Q Do you remember having an opinion as to 

19 whether he was dead or alive based on the information you 

20 received from Source 1 that he was dead and the other 

21 information received that he was alive? 

22 A My opinion was that I was uncertain, because I 

23 don't know if it was Source 1 that gave me the 

24 information, and then even Oliver North corroborated 

25 that, too, that his sources or whatever said that he 



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could b« alive. 

Q Do you recall information coning in to you 
much later than that, in early '86, that Buckley might be 
still alive? 

A The prince said that, as a matter of fact. I 
think the Prince. That was one of the heavy's 
information that he passed to us, that Buckley was alive. 

Q Did you have an opinion on that? Was it a 
firm maybe? 

A No. By then, by August — let's see. By 
October — ^^^Bleft. By October 20 Z told Oliver Korth 
that the Prince was a con, a liar, and useless. 

Q October 20, '85? 

A Right. And that we think — and we told him 
that we think he's an Iranian and not a Saudi. 

Q Nov let me take you back again to early 
September. There's a reference in North's notebooks on 
September 3, '85, to^^^^Kieing ln| 

ind then approximately the same period of t ime 
there's a reference to a call from 




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uNcussra 



BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 
Q Zt'a a call from you. 
A I was thsra, as a mattsr of fact. 



143 




Q Now thers's a raference bars to Ab« Azzam, and 
it looks Ilk* "interfered", but it's spelled Incorrectly. 
And then there's a reference to Kontex — K-o-n-t-e-x. 
Does that mean anything to you? 

A No. 

Q There's also a reference to the 7th U.N. 
Conference on Criminal. Does that mean anything to you? 

A No. Azzam used to attend those U.N. 
conferences, though. But I don't know. Z think he was 
laid up in bed. He was laid up in bed for six months 
after he had his operation. Z don't think he was getting 
around much. 

Q Now do you recall — and let's limit this 
question to the September '85 period, or August-September 
'85 — do you recall at any point learning or being put 
in touch with Richard Secord? 

A I never did. 

Q You never did yourself? 

A No. 

Q Do you recall Secord coming into the picture? 



UNi;USSIFIED 



781 



l/NCUSJIflED 



144 



1 A Only after^^^^K^as shown his picture here 

2 the first time we had this informal meeting. Z mean, he 

3 knew it was Secord, because at the time he met him^^H- 
^^^^Hit was Cope or Copp. 

5 Q Copp . 

6 A I^^^^Htold me about that after he left this 

7 meeting. 

8 Q Let me back you up on that point. ^^^^Haet 

9 with Secord. Do you recall in August or September did he 

10 tell you he was meeting with this fellow Copp? 

11 A It was October by then. 

12 Q And what was the purpose of Secord or Copp 

13 meeting with^^^^^f Was that made known to you at the 

14 time? 

15 A I think Copp met with the Prince, too, and 

16 came to the same conclusion. I had talked to Oliver 

17 North and said the Prince is useless, and then he called 

18 Copp to go check t he Prin ce out, too, and I think that's 

19 how he "'^^^^B because ^^^H was hanging around with 

20 th« Prince, you know, waiting for information. 

21 Q And I gather — was Richard Miller in thu 

22 area, too? 

23 A I don't think so. Not that I recall. I don't 

24 think he was there. 

25 Q So 1 gather you understood that Secord was 



UNttASSra 



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vmmm 



145 



1 supposed to do soma )tind of evaluation of the Prince as 

2 well? 

3 A Well, afterwards I figured that out, but at 

4 the time I just )cnew that this guy Copp was someone that 
Oliver North )cnew who with^^^^^^^^^^Hand also 

6 met with the Prince and then told^^^Bthat this guy's 

7 useless. 

8 Q Oo you recall knowing the name Copp as of 

9 October of '85? 

10 A Yeah. I think^^^Btold me on the phone. 

11 ^^^^pcalled me. When he was overseas, he always called 

12 me daily. 

13 Q Oo you recall learning from^^^Hor from Morth 

14 that Secord was providing money for the Prince? 

15 A All I can say is no. He may have been 

16 providing to the Prince unbeJcnownst to us, but he didn't 

17 provide us any money, or he didn't provlde^^^Hany 

18 money. 

19 Q And at this point did^^^Hor anyone else 

20 tall you about Secord bringing along Albert Hakla to 

21 evaluate thla so-called prince? 

22 A Ha told ma there was another guy. He never 

23 told ma the name. I remember he told me there was 

24 another person. 

25 Q Did^^^B?o to the meeting where this all 




783 



vfimififs 



146 



1 occurred? 

2 A I don't Itnow if h« was th«r« when thay w«r« 

3 talking to th« Princ« or h« met them later. He just told 

4 me that they came to the same conclusion as we did, that 

5 the guy was a con. 

6 Q Now in August when you met with the Prince and 

7 you told him to go ahead and make good on his 

8 representations, by October 2 you'd reached the 

9 conclusion that he can't produce. What's causing you to 

10 reach that conclusion? 

11 A Nothing is happening. The same old story. 

12 I'm contacting mullah so and so and he hasn't called me 

13 back. I'm contacting this person; they haven't called 

14 back. It's hard to telephone. It's hard to get the line 

15 through. 

16 Q Is he asking for money? 

17 A No. I know that $15,000 went in there and he 

18 got part of it, so^^^Bcan explain that better than I 

19 can.' 

20 (Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the taking of the 

21 instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., 

22 the same day.) 



UNeumiflED 



784 



UNiib^nEo 



147 



1 AFTEHMQOM SESSIOW 

3 (1:4S p. a.) 

3 Hharaupon, 

4 

S th« witnaaa haraln, having baan pravloualy duly aworn, 

< vaa turthar axaainad and taatlfiad aa follova; 

7 EXAMIMATZON - Raauaad 

• BY m. HOOOCOCX: 

• Q wa had juat gottan to tha point, I think, 

10 ^^^^Kfhara you vara tailing ua you had bacoaa akaptical 

11 of tha Princa; ia that right? 

12 k Yaa. f 

13 Q And X think you had rafarrad to having raachad 

14 that cencluaion by Octobar 20, '85. 

15 A Excuaa aa a ainuta. m 

16 (A briaf racaaa vaa takan.) 

17 BY MR. HOOOCOCX: (Raauaing) 
j^^^^^^^^KC think you taatifiad vhan va 

19 juat brekan for lunch that you had bacoaa akaptical of 

20 tha Princa, by Octobar 28, '83; is that eorract? 

21 A That's eorract. Ha vrota hia off at that tiaa 

22 pariod. 

23 Q Z vant to bring to your attantion in North's 

24 notabooka thara'a a rafaranca on Octobar 31, '85, "call 
froa^^^^^^^^^^Hand says — has a 



B^^^^^^^^^^^B ai 

^1 



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UNGUSSIFIED 



148 



th«n to|^HVand says: "Why did Millar <=*^^Ji||B 

2 J*w«l says nothing pandlng. Ooas tha FBI want this guy?" 

3 Ooas that bring anything back to you? 

4 A Yaah. Z think^^^Beallad w and said that 

5 Millar had callad tha Princa and soaathing about an 

C invastigation panding in tha Statos. And^^^Hcallad aa 

7 and said what is this about, bacausa tha Princa, you 

• knew, get all nervous. And whan X talked to Oliver he 

9 didn't knov anything about it either. And that was it. 

10 Q Mew there's another reference, and this is 

11 dated ll/4/tS, to a aeeting with you and North an^^^^H 

12 Do you recall that aeeting at all? This would be 

13 Moveaber 4. 

14 A It's possible, yeah. 

15 Q Let ae just give you soae snippets £roa that 
IC aeeting. There's a reference here to "Jewel insists that 
17 deal will still go through." 

It A He did. 

19 ' Q Mow what's he talking about thara? What's tha 

20 dMl? 

21 A He's talking about his contacts with tha 

22 aullahe in Lebanon will prevail eventually. 

23 Q Is there any specific deal, or just ay 

24 contacts are going to coaa through? 

25 A That's what ha was talking about. I aaan, as 



UNftASSm 



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UNCUSSIHED 



149 



1' far as what I understood it. You Icnow, I closed the 

2 door, but^^^^Hleft it open with the Prince. 

3 Q Then it says J. , which I assume was a 

4 reference to Jewel "says he paid $250,000 to a bank." Do 

5 you recall him saying anything liJce that? 

6 A I don't know anything about that. I know he's 

7 a con man. Later we found out he's in jail and 

8 everything else, and that was right up his line — 

9 conning people and conning banks. 

10 Q There's also a reference that Miller is 

11 benefitting. "Miller owes J** — I'm assuming that's 

12 Jewel — "money." Do you recall any topic about that? 

13 A Yeah. I think^^^^^old me that the Prince 

14 said that Miller owes him money. But, you know, at that 

15 stage of the game anything that Jewel had to say I didn't 

16 care. 

17 Q I gather this is pretty much a report from 

18 ^^^^H then. Does that sound right to you?| 

19 providing the information on this? 

20 A Yeah. 

21 Q There's a reference here to the| 
|H^^H^^|Hwas in the 

23 A He went and came many, many times, you know, 

24 and I may have just told Ollie that he is going back in. 
25 




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Q Now there's also a reference tc^^^^^Hvho 
was reported as saying that $2 Billion could be enough. 
Do you )cnow what's happening with that? 

A vrhat time frame? 

Q This is again November 4, '85. 

A We were developing^^^^^^H that 
Source 2 and getting him involved in the hostages. 

Q Wait a minute. I'm going to back up on the 
sources here. You referred to a Source 1, 

early in your testimony, and then you 

iting in February there was a 
Source 2, who was^^^^^^^^H This isn't the same 
fellow? 

A Source 3, then. 

Q So this would be Source 3. Source 3 is saying 
that $2 Billion could be enough. And then there's a 




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UNCU^HEO 



151 



I 



r«f«r«nc« to "got $2.4K from blank." 

A I haven't tha faintest Idaa what that means. 




Q Then at the bottom of thia note there la a 
reference to "ove^^^|l3.S plus 2.4, for 2S.9K." 

A Probably, because^^^Bwas out there with no 
noney day after day after day for aonthe. 

Q And that appear* in North's notes. Presuaably 
that's North ovlng^^^Hthat kind of money; Is that 
correct? 

A ^^^^K/as fronting his own money, or his 
credit card, anyway. 

Q There's a reference then eight days later to a 



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\mm\m 



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maating with a fellow namedl 
Do«a that m«an anything to you? 

of^^^^^^^^^H He's an FBI 
Q And it says her* that th« meeting isl 
^^^^H re^^^^Bwork on the hostage What's| 
doing? Is that how you pronounce it? 

A Veah. He's on the foreign desk for the FBI, 
and he had son* good contacts ^^^^^^^Khat ve could 
have used, and that's why he brought him in there to 
introduce him to North. 

Q Here you ahl* to use him? 

A w* used some of his contacts, yes. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q Can I ask about^^^^Hoo you know whether or 
not Korth had any contact with Buck Revel 1 of the FBI 
regarding! 

A I think so. 

Do you know what that was about? 

To get him assigned to the detail. 

Has he then to be part of your team? 

Has he a part of my team? 

Hhen you say "get assigned to the detail'*. 



nd myself. 




(A brief recess was taken.) 



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UNCUSSIHEO 



153 



BY' MR. WOODCOCK: (Rasvuaing) 

Q Nov during th« month of November what ar« you 
and^^^^Bdoing? 

A In Novemb«r^^^|com«s back I 

Q Do you )cnow when that was approximately? 

A He came back November 3. And through December 
we just were getting information from the sources and 
sub-sources^^^^^^^Hand passing the information to 
Oliver. 

That includes Sources 1 and 3; is that 



Q 

correct? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
point? 
A 



One, 2, and 3. 

Two is also feeding information? 

Everybody is, yeah. 

Is anything happening? 



And are you feeding any monies out at this 



No. He have no money. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Who is^^H^H^ do you know? 

THZ WITNESS: No. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuaing) 
Q Let me back up on that. There is a reference 
in a North note that I referred to earlier of November 4, 
'85, which deals in part with the Saudi prince. It also 



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has a rafarence in the same note to dealing with Or. 
Rocco — R-o-c-c-o. That means nothing to you? 

A No. 

Q Now, as we all know, in November of '85 there 
was a flurry of activity involving an effort to release 
the Lebanese hostages through the provision of HAWK 
missiles to Iran. Was that anything you were aware of at 
the time? 

A No. 

Q When did you first become aware of that? 

A When the story broke. 




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Q Okay. Nov there's another raferanc*. in 
North's notebooks to a call coming in fron^^^^^^^^Vand 
the note is dated December 24, and it says: "Two coning 
out next week", and it has a reference to the person who 

believe is Source 3^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vand 
say* ^^^^H^oing to meeting." 

Do you recall anything about what is going on 
at this period of time? 

A Um-ua. 

Q That would be Christmas Eve. Was there 
anything afoot about hostages coming out or sources 
coming out at that point? 

(A brief recess was taken.) 
BY KR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q When we broke a few minutes ago I had asked 
you about whether you recalled anything happening on 
Decaaber 24, '85, which would be Christmas Eve, about 
either your sources or hostages or anything of that 
magnitude coming out of Lebanon during that period of 
time. 

A I don't recall anything. We continued to pass 
information even through the holidays, you know. I have 




•r s \; 



:^!i 



793 



UNIIASSinED 



156 



no •p«elfie r«coIl«ction of anything appearing that was 
•xcitlng at tha tlaa. 

Q Lat ■• just back you up Into Oacambar. vihat 
do you racall going on in Oacambar? Anything happening 
at that point? 

A In Oacaabar Z mat Charlla Allan and startad to 
briaf hia. I usad to aaat hla occasionally and Ollvar 
Morth was so busy that va startad briaflng Charlla Allan, 
and ha talkad to us on tha phona and want evar to his 
housa a coupla tiaas. 

Q Lat ao back you up on Charlla, than. You 
racall aaating Charlla Allan in Oacaabar of 'tS; Is that 
eorract? 

A Yaah. 

Q Do you hava a data en that? 

A Ha aat hia tha first tiaa Oacaabar 11. 

Q Qd Oacaabar 11. How do you know it's Oacaabar 
11? 

A Z think wa had that tnrittan soaawhara. I 
don't knew whara •» aayba en ay waakllaa or soaathing. 

g Now whan you aat with Charlla Allan v**^Hl 

rith you? 

A Yaah. 

Q How ware tha introductions aada? 

A Yaah, it waa both of us. Olivar North 



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VNlUSSIFe 



157 



1 Introduced us. 

2 Q Wh«r« w«r« you; do you recall? 

3 A At the Executive Building. 

4 Q North's office? 

5 A Yeah. 

6 Q Now when North introduced you to Allen what 

7 did he tell you about him? 

8 A He said Charlie Allen was on board and ]cnew 

9 about the hostages, and that we were passing intelligence 

10 and that we were trying to get them out. 

11 Q And was there an immediate purpose for him 

12 introducing you to Allen? 

13 A Yeah. You know, he said that Charlie Allen 

14 would be more convenient for us to contact him and pass 

15 him intelligence, since we hadn't planned any trips at 

16 this stage of the geuae. 

17 Q Has it your understanding at that meeting that 

18 Allen was to be like a substitute contact for North? 

19 - A Kind of, yeah. That was my interpretation. 

20 Q Let me put the question differently and see if 

21 you have the same answer. Was it your understanding that 

22 if you called Charlie Allen it would be as good as 

23 calling North, that the information would get to North? 

24 A Yeah. The information would get to the CIA, 

25 because Charlie Allen was in the CZA. 



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VNGUSSm 



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Q But it would also get to North, too? Was that 
also your understanding? 

A Sure. I )cnew North was giving this 
information to CIA all along. So I guess he was making 
it quicker. 

Q Now what did you understand Charlie Allen was 
supposed to do with this information? What did you thinJc 
hi3 job was? 

A You weuit my opinion? 
Q Yes. 

A Charlie Allen's job was to — I had another 
Azzam on ay hands. He wanted information so he could 
have his meeting at 9:00 in the morning with whomever he 
Bst. I figured that out after meeting him, plus a Major 
who worked for Charlie Allen used to come see^^^Hand 
me. 

Q That would be I 

A Yeah. Nice kid and the whole thing. And I 
fold hla, Z said, your boss stinXs. 

Q Okay. We're going to get tol 
in a alnute. When you met Charlie Allen, however, in 
December in North's office, that was before you met 
Ls that correct? 
A Oh, yes. I didn't meet^^^^^^^fluntil 



after. 



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UNCUSSinED 



159 

1 Q And your opinion of Charlas Allen was that ha 

2 was taking th« information and not making affactiv* usa 

3 of it? Is that what I taka from what you'ra saying? 

4 A No. Ha had to be the one that had the 

5 information; therefore, we were his sources. 

6 Q And who was ha reporting to that made it 

7 valuable to have you as sources? 

8 A Some committee. I'm sure he had some 

9 committee. Oliver explained it to me, what committee he 

10 was on or something. I don't know what it was. Maybe he 

11 was briefing his boss, whoever that was. I don't know. 

12 But he used to call, and when we finally figured it out, 

13 ^^^^^Bind I, he needed it for some 9:00 or 9:30 meeting. 

14 Q And that's what — weekly or dally or what? 

15 A It was daily and weekly he called us. He 

16 wanted an update, and then that's where! 

17 got into it. He was kind of an honest kid who 

18 lefthandedly told us that that's what Charlie was using 

19 it for, and that he was going to go back to the military 

20 and the hell vlth all of this. 

21 Q Nov having met Charles All*n in December, on 

22 Deeoiber 11, did you have any other meetings or 

23 conversations with him during that month? 

24 A Yeah. We met him quite a few times. As I 

25 said, I met him a few times at his house. 



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Q What I want you to do is limit this 
observation to December, if you can. 

A That's the best I can recollect, is that we 
met his a couple times in December, and Z think we even 
met the Major in December, too. 

Q And that was simply to pass information; is 
that correct? 

A That was it. We were passing information, 
intel . ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 



Q Nov was Allen involved in any plans for any 
operations that you ]cnew of? 

A No, none that I knew of. 

Q So it was simply an intelligence-passing 
exercise; is that correct? 

A He had me check somebody out for hio also, a 
journalist by the name of Hayden Guest. 

Q What did he want you to do that for? 

A He wanted to know if this guy was reliable and 
I said no. 




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H* vant«d to know — h« asked s*. H« told m« 
on* tiB«, h« said, th« hostages arc in this tovm. You see 
this town here? And he gave me the name. 
Q In Lebanon? 

Q Who is telling you this? 

A Charlie All en told me. He said check this. I 
s aid it's impossible. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 



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Nov, let's go to th« first tla* you m««t with 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B Do you whera when 
was? 

A I don't recall exactly. I seem to reaember 
that three or four times we met hia. It was in a hotel 
lobby somewhere in Tyson's Corner. 

Q Let me throw something out and sea if it helps 
you. ^^^^^^^^^Bias been deposed and ha has told us 
that to the best of his recollection the first time he 
met you and^^^^^^^^n^as at the old Brogue Inn. 

A You got it. That's right. 

Q Is that consistent with your recollection? 

A Yeah. It was there. I also mat hia at the 
Sheraton in Tyson's Corner. If he said we aet hia there 
the first tiaa, I believe it. 

Q Hov vaa there an iaaediate purpose for your 
bainq introducad^^^^^^^^^^H You ' d already 
at that point? 

A I think Allen sloughed hia off on us. 

Q The idea being? 

A That ha did not find ha could get the 



UNCUSSinEO 



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UNCUSSfflED 



163 



1 inforaatlon dlractly from us, so h« put 

2 us. 

3 Q I gather, than, that you had Inforaatlon you 

4 wantad to giva to Allan; is that corract? 

5 A I wantad to glva it to Ollvar North. 

6 Q And Allan was tha conduit? 

7 A Ha was tha conduit, and then this Major bacaaa 

8 tha conduit. 

you mat ^^^^^^^^^^^Bind Allan Cor 

10 tha first tiaa, do ypu recall what infontation you were 

11 iaparting to thea, or was it just an Introductory 

12 aeeting? 

13 A I think we gave thea soae inforaation on that 

14 occasion. 

15 Q Oo you recall whether North went to that 

16 aeeting? 

17 A Z think he showed up late. 

18 Q Let ae ask you this, was there any 

19 arrangeacnt between you and Allen that you would pretend 

20 net to know who Allen was at that time, or that you would 

21 go through the foraalities of appearing that this would 

22 be an introduction for the first tiae to Allen as well? 

23 A I don't recall that. I know that CIA like to 

24 be incognito, but he wasn't that way, because we went to 

25 his house twice, so he wasn't that incognito. 



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Q Now, do you recall meeting withj 
New York in January of '86? 

A We may have taken him to meet Source 1. 

Q Well, I'll tell you just briefly that he 
recalled going |^^^^^^^^Bandmee ting with you and a man 

who he ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^K ^° 

that? 

A Yeah. 

Q He also said there was^^^^^^^^B^* ^'^* 
introduced to who was also a source that you and 

lad developed; do you recall that? 

A Um-hua. 

Q What do you recall about that event? 

A They wanted a debrief for Source 1 and Source 
3, so Z said go ahead. We weren't getting any money for 
thea. Then he says well, we can probably get you some 
money. Let ua debrief them. I said fine, come on out. 
I had nothing to hide. 

- Q Nov what was the arrangement between you and 
Ma j or ^^^^^^^^H Was j 
identity to be Icnown to these people or was he coming 
incognito? 

A He was incognito also. From what I recall, 
everybody wants to be incognito, so we said okay. 

Q And I gather that neither you norl 



UNCLASStnED 



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DNmSSIHED 



165 



1 would hava iapartad his tni« idantity to aithar of thasa 

2 two sourcaa; is that corract? 

3 A Ha says ha wouldn't hava iapartad mina. Thay 

4 didn't Icnow who this guy was. Wa told him ha was a DEA 

5 intalllganca guy, Z think. That was tha stoty wa gava 

6 thaa. Thay'va got to writa it in a report, so just talk 

7 to thaa. 

8 Q Now was anything supposed to follow froa^^H 

9 ^^^^^^^^H interviaw of thasa two people? Has anything 

10 planned that had caused this evaluation to occur? 

11 A What was supposed to follow Is that as the 

12 Intelligence caae in soae fees would have been paid 

13 through this Major and Charlie Allen, and it never 

14 happened. 

15 Q What never happened? Me intelligence or no 

16 payment? 

17 A Oh, tons of intelligence. Me fees. 

18 Q So both Source 1 and Source 3 went back^^H 

19 ^^^^^1 X gather, and fed intelligence out to you? 

20 A Yeah. They aade trips back there again, you 

21 lOMir, and we got the intelligence. And eventually we 

22 phased Allen and the Major out and we were back talking 

23 to Ollie North. 

24 Q Let ae ask you how you accoaplished that. You 

25 say you phased thea out. How did you do that? 



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A I told thaa I wouldn't talk to than any mora. 

Q You told that to both of thaa? 

K Y«ah, both of thaa. 

Q What was your raason for wanting to phase thaa 



out? 



A Thsy did nothing for th* cause. Thay just 
wantad info to pass to whoaavar thay wara daaling with. 

Q Now what would thay hava dona to do soaathing 
for tha causa? 

A Thi s kic 
^^^^^^^^H Ha knaw you hava to pay sourcas. 
agraad thay should hava baan paid, but avantually ha told 
ma Allan wouldn't pay thaa. 

you and^^^^^^^^K/era looking^^B 
land Allan to coaa up with soma aonay to pay 
off tha sourcas; is that corract? 

A Ua-hua. 

Q Now did you go to North at soaa point and 
Qoaplain about thasa guys not coaing through? 

A Ua-hua . 

Q Do you racall whan that would hava baan? 

A Not raally. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Did^^^^^mtall you 
that thay had approached Casay for money to pay the 
sources? 



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(Pausa.) 

THE WITNESS: B«for« w* start, Ron brought 
somathlng up to ma and you may b« confused about th«s« 




BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Rssunlng) 
Q That's what you had tastifiad to aarllar. 
That's what you designated hia as. 
A 




Q I think wa'ra straight. 

A I was pretty sure you had it. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuaing) 

Q What did ^^^^^^^^Hsay regarding who would 
or wouldn't pay? Did he indicate to you that he and 
Charlie Allen had gone to Casey asking for money? 

A Oh, Casey didn't come out of this, and Charlie 
Allen never said he'd go to Casey. Charlie Allen said to 
ma that ha would gat soma money up so we can send these 
sourcaa back in, and it just never happened. And then 
the Major wouldn't meet me. And then it got to the point 
the Major would meet me or^^^^^and he was embarrassed 
because he came for information and then we said well, 
when are we goii^ (^ setid ^h9s.e__people in there. You 





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168 



1 know? 

2 Ha says, wall, I'm working on tt. I told hin, 

3 ^^^^^1^^ <?°^ ^° ^^* P°^"^' ^ think, at our last 

4 aaating with th« Major, and h« says, that's when h« said 

5 h« can't tak« this any mora and ha's going back to tha 

6 military. 

7 Q First of all, did ha giva a raason as to why 

8 tha Bonay was not forthcoming? 

9 A No, ha navar did. Vou know, it just wasn't 

10 thara. 

11 Q Did ha tall you why ha was dissatisflad «uid 

12 was laaving? 

13 A I don't think ha likad his job, was tha 

14 imprassion I got. 

15 Q wall, what particularly did ha tall you ha was 

16 dissatisfied with? 

17 A I juat don't think ha likad what ha was doing 

18 — flunky work. So you can imagine how wa fait whan this 

19 guy's coming to us for information. Okay? So it just 

20 kind of caaa to a dead end, you know. We said goodbye to 

21 th« Major, who 1 really liked ~ I really respected this 

22 kid ~ and I contacted Ollle Horth and I said don't have 

23 Charlie Allen call me. 

24 Ha said why, and I told him. I said this is 



25 bull. You just can't keep getting information and 




806 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



169 



1 getting Information. 

2 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

3 Q Can you place that at all in time — that call 

4 to North? 

5 A I can't place it. It was after the new year, 

6 I'm sure. 

7 Q Now there's a reference in North's calendar to 

8 a meeting with you and^^^^^^^Hon January 28, 1986, 

9 and that is preceded by exactly one half hour with^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^■Which is^^^^HHH^I^^Vfull 

11 you recall that? 

12 A January 28? 

13 Q Correct. 

14 A No, I don't. I don't have any indication of 

15 that. 

16 Q Okay. 

17 A You know, it's possible. Don't get me wrong. 

18 There could have been a meeting. 

19 . Q But you can't recall it; is that correct? 

20 A No, I don't. 

21 Q Let ae divert just a minute here and ask you 

22 do you recall hearing the namel 

23 A It doesn't ring a bell. 

24 Q This fellow is with the National Security 

25 Agency, and he would have charge of secure communication 



"Wi»!?IS!nFn 



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ONCUSSinED 



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d«vic«s. Oe«« that brinf anything back to you at all? 

A NO. 

Q L«t ■• Bova on, than, to January 31 of I9t« 
Thara i» a rofaranca in Korth'a notaa to a call fr 
^^H|and naxt to that is $7,900. Lot aa ask you on 
that scora, dcas that bring anything back to you? 

A Nhat's tha data? 

Q January 31, '•«. 

A No. 




I can only assuna that that aonay was for Sourca 3. 




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UNCLASSIFIED 

Pa^es 171-176 
ToVkU 



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Q Th« sam* nota, March 3, 1986, has a r«£*r«nc« 
to "two boats rsady to do^^^^^^^H" Do you know 
what's happanlng th«r«? 

A Olll* askad us if w« had two boats availabl* 
for'hla, and w« said yaah. 

Q ' Now (Jhsn you say "had two boats availabls", 
what you hav* avallabls^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hnot to go 

Q That's the way ths not* reads. So thsy would 
b« going^^^^^^^^^His 

A Yeah, or in the water around it. 



UNCtftSStFIED 



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178 



X Q And when you say you had these two boats 

2 available, is this any two particular boats? 
A Yeah. ^^^^^^^ 

^^^^^ So we Icnew what boats were 
available for rental. That's all, 




Q Was there something going on here that caused 
two boats to be at ready to gc 

A Many times. Ollie s«id stand do%m. It could 
have been that tla*. 

Q Do you icnov whether there was something going 
on? 

A I don't know. He just asked me one time. Z 
remember he asked me about can we get two boats, and Z 
said yes. 

Q Oe you ever telling^^^^^^^Hthat 
you end ^^^I^^Vhad boats available or boats that you 
could get held of? 

A Z think Z did. He may have asked us, too, 
about boats, come to think of it. 

Q I'll tell you that he recalled you and 
raf erring to having fast boats available. 

A Fast enough. Not cigarette boats. 

Q These would be boats that you didn't actually 




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UNIFIED 



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own them; th«y wars boats that you would b« abl* to rant. 
Is that correct? 

A UB-hua. 

Q Did you avar gat to tha point whara you rantad 
thosa boats? 

A No, wa navar got tha chanca. 

Q Okay. Now is thara anything going on with 
your various sourcas now — Sourcas 1 through 3 — in 
this Fabruary-March pariod? 

A What wa did is, wa gat soma mora 




Q So thasa would ba in addition to Sourca 1 
through 3? 




A Yaah. 

Q Wara you abla to do anything with those] 
sourcas? 

A Yeah. They gave us information. Once they 



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UNfiU^inED 



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went back in, they passed information. 

Q Did you provide them with any monies to defray 
expenses? 

A We gave them some money. 




BY MS. KAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q VThere did you get the money that you paid 



them? 




Q So they were paid out of regular DEA funds? 
A It was a DEA operation. 




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UNSIASSIFIED 




181 



(Pausa. ) 
Q L«t m« direct your attention, then, it 1 say, 
I to another note in Ollie's — I say Ollie — 
Mr. North, Colonel North's notebooks. This one is dated 
March 18, 1986, and it's headed '^meeting with^^^^land 
^^^Vand has the following entries. '*$5K for** I thinX 
the person we've identified as Source 3| 
That's your Source 3, isn't it? 
^fis that correct? 
A "^^^^^^^^^ 
^^^^^^^^^^^^ Yeah, I'm sure. As I say, he" 
was going and coning quite a bit at that time. 

Q Then another entry: "SSK for Source 1* 
A Yeah, that's true. 

Q And then '*$5K for^^Hto California for 
Prince. 







A That's true. 

Q Nhat's happening there? 

A Hall, apparentlymH|waa going to go to 
California and debrief the Princa ona last tiaa, froB 
what I understand. 

Q Let Be stop you there. Do you recall this 



iifmsmB 



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182 



1 B««tlng? Was this billed as a meeting with North, you 
and^^^^H 

3 A I don't )cnow if it was a meeting or on the 

4 telephone. 

5 Q Do you recall three people participating in it 

6 — you and^^^^Bind North? 

7 A It could have been, without a doubt, but I 

8 know about the $5K for Source 1, because we wired that 

9 $5K. Z know we needed money for Source 3 because he was 

10 going back and forth. X thought it was $2K, but it could 

11 have been $SK. 

12 MR. MORROW: This is the two that you gave 

13 Source 1 and then it was five more. 

14 MR. WOODCOCK: Why don't we go off the record 

15 and you can review your notes? 

16 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

17 THE WITNESS: I gave Source 1 $2,000. 

18 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

19 Q Do you recall when that was? 

20 'A That was In March. 

21 Q So this $5K reference is in addition to the 

22 $2,000; is that correct? 

23 A And then^f^fwlred him $5,000, I think to 

24 the old country or wherever he was — Europe or the old 

25 country. 



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Its 

Q Now this r*f«r«ne« te^^M9ein9 to California 
for th« Princo, is this ths saa« princs that's ths Saudi 
Prinea? 

A Right 

Q Al-Masoudi? 

A That's it. 

Q Nov thara's a rafaranca tc 

Who's that? Is that also tha Saudi 




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Q lAt B« run soiMthing by 
^^^^^^HH^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H In Tov«r 
report th«r« !• • r«f«r«nc« to a North PROF Jioto that 
9o«« on for half « eoluan^ an4 in it thoro is a rofaraneo 
to "Dick", vhieh is Richard Saeerd, "has baan worldnf 
with Mir", which is Aairaa Nir, tha Zaraall contact, "on 
this and now has thraa paopla in ■alrut and a 40-aan 
Druca forca working for us." 

A Ha was quoting Olivar North, that's all, and 
that was tha forca wa talkad about, X would think. 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HlOO-aan Orusa 
that cerract? 

A Sura. On tha othar hand, though, you knew, 
tha Zsraalis do control tha Druta. Okay? And, you know, 
Saeord, you knew, out of tha haaringa was vary tight with 
tha Zsraalia. Mayba i« was his own fereai X don't know. 

Q Lat^ aa just ask you this. Oo you recall 
Richard Secord b aing in any way connect ed to this lOO-nan 
force H^^I^^IBHI^^I^H^^I^B 

A I don't know. I never knew who Sacord was or 



ammm 



817 



UNCUSSIHED 



IBS 



1 did until this all cam* about, and than v« found out that 

2 Copp was Sseord in that on* masting hs had with! 

3 Q Nov ths sams qusstion on Aairam Nir. Did you 

4 know who hs was? 

5 A Who? 

6 Q Aairaa Nir. 

7 A Hs's an Zsrasli. 

• Q Old that naas asan anything to you at ths 

9 tias, bacic, Ist's say. in Narch-Juns '•«? 

10 k Mot at ths tias. 

11 Q Is h« seasons yeu'vs eeas to knew only sines 
la ths sxposurs? 

13 A Mo. 

14 Q Hhsn did you first eoas across Aairaa Nir? 

15 A Oon't got norvous and pick up your psn. 
1« Q Kay ths rscord rsfloct Z'a putting ay psn 
17 down? 

It A X didn't know hia oithsr until Z saw his 

It pletura in ths pspsr. I ast hia at ths Hhits Rouss at 

20 tlM. exsoutivo Building undsr s diffsrsnt naao. 
31 Q Hs was undsr a diffsrsnt naas? 

22 A Y«ah. 

23 Q What was ths oceasion oC your assting hia? 

24 A HS was in Ollis north's offics and hs 

25 introducsd as, and hs aaid this was Kr. Moriarity, and Z 



ammm 



818 



24 

25 



UNOASaREB 



itc 



1 s«ld hew do you do. And w« talkad about th« Nidoast 

2 situation in 9«n«ral and than ha laft. 

3 Q Oe you recall when that would have been, 

4 approKiaately? 

5 A Zt had to be in this eaae tiae fraae that 
C we're talking about here. 

7 Q And that would be March to June '••? 

• A March, April, yeah. 

9 MS. NAUGHTON: What did Colonel North say he 

10 did? 

11 THE WITNESS : After he left he told ae the guy 

12 was an Israeli official. He didn't say exactly what he 

13 did, but he said he was an Israeli official. 

14 BY KR. WOODCOCK: (Rasuaing) 

15 Q Now with Boniss being dispensed to Sources 1 

16 and 3 and witl^^^^Hhaading off to see the Saudi Prince, 

17 al-Masoudi — 

IB A He never went. 

19 ' Q Olcay. L«t me break this down, than. Is 

20 anything happening specifically with Source 3 during this 

21 period? 

22 A Yeah. 

23 Q What's afoot? 



-TH^ 



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187 



And so they were 

working on a bribe I 

Q And would it be a combination of bribes and 
ransom? Was it the $1 million a person kind of a deal 
again coming up? 

A Yeah, it was that in the sense that it would 
have been a delivery on a boat, if we could have got them 
out — if they^^^^^^^^H could have got them out. 




MR. MORROW: Could we go off the record for a 
minute, please? 

(Counsel conferring with the witness.) ' 
KR. HOOOCOCX: Why don't we go back on the 
record? 

BY KR. WOODCOCK: ( Resulting ) 
^^^^^^^^^H you ' ve a 
conference with counsel, and I gather from that 
conference you want to take an opportunity to explain how 
this bribe process worked; is that correct? 
A Yes. 

Q How did it woi 
""Wis, 




820 



IINCIASSIHED 



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A Th« bribes — the aoney that would b« us«d for 
ultimate payment would have gone to those people who 
would have assisted in getting the hostages out, and they 
were not — the money wasn't going to go to that whole 
^^^^H^H group. So to the whole^^^^^^^H 

group and everybody was in concurrence there, that would 
have been a ransom. 

But what we did is try to bribe certain 
elements of the group 



Q Now when you say this, is this just the Source 
3 plan that we're talking about? 

A Source 1, too. 

Q So let's move back in time to the May-June '85 
period. When the discussion there was turning on 
approximately $1 million a hostage, did you interpret 
that as bribe money? 

A Sure it was bribe money. 
- Q That was not a ransom? 

A Ho. It would have always been bribe money. 

Q So in your mind there's no point at which you 
are offerin9 ransom money for any of thess operations? 

A Nsver did. 

Q Now with that understanding, vhsn you ars 
putting togethef ^^is operation involving Source 3 in 



I 



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189 

March of '86 is there any figure that's been put on each 
hostage who gets out, as there was in May-June '85, like 
$1 million per hostage? 

A Um-hum. It would have been the same — $1 
million. 

(A brief recess was taken.) 
MR. WOODCOCK: Back on the record. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
Q You were telling us about Source 3, who had 
met with^^^^^^^^Hwho was involvcdl 
I somehow . 
A Through^^^^^^^^H Another contact of his 
had the contact with^^^^^^^^Vwas the way I understood 
it. 




Q And how was the payment of money to free the 
hostages? 

A This was a small part of all the people 

and this guy wasn't^^^^^H 
know, ^^^^^^^^^^ were in control of these hostages. 
They gave the orders^^^^^^^^^^Hnot the 
There's no doubt about that. 




ONCttSSIflED 



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OHCUSSIHED 



190 




A Um-hua. And then, bacaus* th«y v«r« only a 
part of this, thay would ba paid for ua corrupting thaa, 
basically. 

Q But what you'ra tailing us is that| 
had control ovar tha freedom of the hostagea. 

A Sure they did, and they still do, and that is 
where the tie is 




strong organization that has nothing to 
do with tha country. 




BY MR. GENZMAN: 



UNCtAmiED 



823 



UNCUssm 



191 



1 Q L«t ma g«t it straight in my own mind 

2 ragardlng wh«r« th« money would go. Would th* monay b« 
paid to| 

A No, no. The money would b« paid tol 




Q 

A Wa had to bribe them. 

MR. MORROW: The whole $1 Billion? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I maan, there 'a a lot of 
paopla in-batwaan thara that got thair cut. 
BY MR. GENZMAM: (Raaualng) 
Q Just run through the £low of tha Bonay briefly 
vith aa, would you? Tha Bonay goas to 3 •>- 
A No, it wouldn't go to 3. 
Q Hhara would it go? 

A Thara would be a contact. Again, Z Baan, wa 
navar war* going to front this Bonay. If wa got tha 
hostages out, thasa people who wars involved] 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H would up a place tha 
■enay would b« delivered to thea. He wouldn't deliver it 
to thaa. Zt would be done either by Oliver North, Jay 
Cobum, or whoavar else wanted to do it. 

go ^o^^^^^^^^^^^l 
A It would go to the people who were in control 
the people who are in controll 



^^^^^^^^^H^ It • a 



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MS. NAUGHTON: Who are I 

THE WITNESS: Well, it ' s^^^^^^^H overall , 
and, you know, there's other levels. It's not just 

in control over all] 







ise guys here are overall in control of 
these missions — kidnapping and terrorism and everything 
else. 

But the idea was in this case here, using this 
[contact, was a contact he had was used to get to^H 
who had control ^^^^^^^^^^H don't ]cnow who 
(was. Maybe ^^^^Hcnows it. Basically that 
[operation. 

MR. GENZMAN: Can we go off th« record for a 
minute? 

(A discussion was held off th« record.) 
BY MR. GENZMAN: (Resuaing) 
Q As I was saying, I'm confused about 
distinguishing between ransom and bribes, and personally 
■y though-t is if the money goes to the people who 
actually control the organization, who make the 
decisions, such as whether to kidnap people — 
A The money wasn't going to thea. 
Q ~ it would be in the nature of a ransom and 



UNCtKSStFIFn 



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UNtussra 



193 



it would possibly l«ad to further hostags- taking. 

Zf th« monsy w«r* going to peopl* who didn't 
really control the organization but merely had control at 
particular in time^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H then Bore 
in the nature of a bribe? 

A You've got it right. 

Q SOf just to satisfy myself, could you tell b« 
— give •• the categories of p«ople that the money would 
go to? Has th« money to go to people idto vere actually * 
in control of the organization? 

k No. It vas going to be people just belov that 
or on the side of them that could be corrupted, where the 
hmad of the organization wouldn't know about it. So it 
isn't a ransom. A ransom has to be solicited. There was 
no solicitation her*. M* poised the question. We sent 
th« op«r«tlvem In to put this idea in their minds. 
Thim is not a ransom situation at all. 
NX. PLYNll; So The nullahs, never got any 
■onay? 

^THE NZTMXSS: No, they never got any money. 
Matter of fact, the mullahs — 

NX. GEMZMAM: I.et him continue his answer. 
MS. NAUGHTON: I think what Hank meant to say 
is in the plvv^&«^Bul^«>^* vere not to get the money. We 




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iutev no en«. gee «ny aon«y. 

TMT MITNESS: No, th« aullAhs w«r« not 9«ttin9 
th« aonay. P«opl« b«Iow th«B w«r« qoinq to 9«t It. 
BY KX. WOODCOCK: (Rcsuainq) 

Q Pr«sua«bly «t. SOB* point tho aullahs wako up 
on* day and ftnd,.tn« hestagaa gono undar tiris plan; is 
that corract? 

J^ Ca-hum . 

Q And undar your dascription et it tha aullaha 
would than faal that thay had baan burnad, that thay had 
lost out; ia that corract? 

A I wouldn't say burnad, but I would say that 
thay would hava takan on somebody ^^^^^^^^^^^H 



Q How do you )cnow that sose of this monay would 
not hava found its way to tha mullahs to placata them? 

A Wall, I don't Icnow. That's a good point. I 
don't Icnow. 

MR. FLYNN: That is ona of tha critical things 
hara. Not only would^^^^^^^Hhava to gat away,| 

and avarybody alsa, which is ona of tha things 
that thay wara considering with this plan. 

THE WITNESS: Well, the intermediary. We 
would have to take care of him, yes. True. 



BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

IINMSSIflEO 



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Q So all the people who are receiving ooney are 
being pulled out; is that correct? 

A Mo. Our source's contacts would be pulled 

out, which in that situatj 





MS. NAUGHTON: Earlier — and I wrote this 
down and you can correct me if I'm wrong — you told us 
that bribes would go to those people who would get the 
hostages out. The bribes would go to^^^^^^^^Hand 
others who were in control ^^^^^^^^^^H That's 
wrote down. 

THE WITNESS: That's right. That's true. 
There 's^^^^^Hand then there 'si 

he is jusc under an 
ayatollah. We won't be able to bribe him, but there's 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H around there that were on own. 

MS. NAUGHTON: And what you're saying, then. 
Is that those 

v«r« not the ones responsible for kidnapping the hostages 
but did bav* SOB* sort of connection? 

THI WITNESS: Well, everybody 

^ere responsible for kidnapping 

the hostages, period T 

[everybody. They did it — with malice 




ONCtASStFIED 



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aforethought. 

MS. NAUGHTON: All right. Fina. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Rcfluaing) 
Q And Z gather that these! 

i/ere not part of the extraction plan. They were 
going to reaain behind? 

A Oh, sure. Let me nake it clear that the thing 
that we were trying to do, and we got to a certain 
distance on it, was to pick out soae vulnerable group, 
small group of persons who were ready to be corrupted 




So our 

objective was to reach somebody that was corruptible in 
the bureaucrac 




Q Now at this point I gather your infonation is 
that Bucklay ia dead; is that correct? Wa'ra talking 
March . 

A Z at ill hear that both waya. 



To thia day? 



A r 



Massified 



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UNeUSSIHED 



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Q By th« way, did you cona across information at 
on« point that Buckley's body had b««n frozan? 

A Yeah. We heard it was frozen. As a matter of 
fact, I thinX that picture of him that was in the 
newspaper, I think Ollia told me that some doctors said 
that he could have been frozen in the picture . 




lYou know, they always wanted 
the people released out of Kuwait, and he apparently 
died. The word is that he died because of a ton of 
torturing and it wo uldn ' t have been good th at it came out 
that he was dead 




Q Was any of this money supposed to get Buckley 
out or Buckley's body out? 

A He also worked on that, too. You know, we 
continued that part, to get his body or his bones. 

Q But that was on a separate track, is that 
right, from the live hostages? 

A Yeah. 

Q Now of the live hostages, and excepting 



Mmm 



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UNCmHED 



198 



1 Kllbum, who was h«ld by a separata group, you had, what, 

2 four l«£t at thla point — thraa? 

3 A Flva laft. Two caaa out. Thar* vara six. 

4 Q Four laft? 

5 A That's right. Latar thay took anothar thraa — 

6 four laft. 

7 Q And it was $1 million apiaca, so that's $4 

8 million that would ba distributed to gat thosa hostagas 

9 out? 

10 A UB-hUB. 

11 Q This is as of March-April '86; corract? 

12 A Right. 

13 Q And it's that $4 million that's going to ba 

14 spraad around? 

15 A Sura. 

16 Q And soma of tha paopla ara going to ba 

17 axtractad undar your plan — > that is, tha paopla who hava 

18 cooparatad — and soma who hava bean corrupted will 

19 remain behind? 

20 A I'm sure. They had to worry about themselves. 

21 Q They would have to presumably retain whatever 

22 positions they had if they were successful in covering 

23 their cooperation; is that correct? 

24 A (Nods in the affirmative.) 

25 Q Was it discussed with North or anybody else at 




?,'«..? 



831 



UNGlASSinED 



199 



all that with raspact to thosa paopla who ramainad bahlnd 
that thla kind of a procaaa might craata an incantlva In 
than to go out and kidnap mora paopla? 

A Yaah, o£ coursa wa did. 

Q What was tha consansus on that? 

A Wa'd just hava to taka our shot. 
BY MR. GENZKAM: (Rasuaing) 

Q Can I follow up on that Una? Earliar wa wara 
talking about whathar any of tha captors had solicltad 
funds for tha ralaasa or whathar it was an idaa that wa 
had brought to salactad individuals, and Z haard you say 
a aoaant ago that it was your uxidarstanding that what was 
raally wantad by tha captors was tha ralaasa of tha 
Kuwaiti priscnars, tha Oa'wa. 

How did you obtain this infor«ation? 

A Through ay sourcas, through Olivar North. 

Q And than your sourca is tailing you that tha 
organization which had kidnappad thasa individuals had 
not 'dona it for aonatary purposas? 

A No. Thay did it for tha adga. Thay did it 
for tho prisonara in Kuwait. 

Q And X'a axeluding Nr. Kilbum, who was 
kidnappad, avidantly, by anothor group. 




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Q But your sources h*r« arc aaying thay navar 
haard any ransom figures floated around by the captors? 

A Never. 

Q For these people other than Mr. Kllbum? 

A That would have been easy. If we could have 
got information that, for instance,! 
wanted $5 million and they would release him, we would 
have grabbed him and brought hia to Europe and taken care 
of him well, provided everybody else wanted to go for 
that. But it wasn't so. 

Q Did your sources obtain any information as to 
what was desired in return for the hostages specifically 
— whether they wanted the United States to put pressure 
on the Kuwaiti government or anything along those lines? 

A Well, first of all, now you're getting into 
terrorist activity and terrorist mentality, and the 
terrorist mentality wanted — we will kill your people 
and we will kidnap more people unless you release our 
prisoners in Kuwait. That is the threat. 

We tried to go around and find the vulnerable 
ones and bribe them. Unfortunately, we never 



accomplished it. 



imSSIHED 



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OimSSIFlEO 



BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 



201 




Q Nov, just to clos* this subject, I hope, on 
th« subject of the risks that might be run in encouraging 
future kidnapping if these high level officials remained 
in positions after having received some of their money, 
you said that was discussed. VTho was it discussed with? 

A With Oliver. 

Q Is that you andl 

A Probably, yeah — all three of us. 




834 



UNClJlSSIFIED 



202 



1 Q Anyone als* that you would )cnow of? 

2 A NO. 

3 Q And th« consensus, I gather, among you three 

4 was ~ 

5 A Vou know, there's another side to that — that 

6 they could have not gotten more for more money, but we 

7 also had the edge on them that ve could have divulged 

8 that they were corrupted and took bribes. You know, this 

9 is not a game that goes according to Hoyle. You've got 

10 to play it both ways. 

11 Q And that's assuming that you are then able to 

12 tie subsequent kidnappings to the very people that you 

13 bribed, right? 

14 A Urn-hum. 

15 Q If you weren't able to do that, that wouldn't 

16 work very well; is that right? 

17 A ttall, with the people %re would bribe anyway we 

18 would threaten thea and tell them we'll just put it in 

19 tte newspepar and see how long you live. This is a tough 

20 9iBe« you knew. 

21 OX understand. Has that also discussed, that 

22 you had this raaidual leverage? 

23 A I'B sure we brought that up. 

24 Q Okay. I've got an entry here that I want to 

25 bring to your attention. April 24, 1986, a North entry 



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that says S7K fori 

A What data? 
Q April 24. 

A I don't know. You'll have to as)c^^^^^| 
(Pause. ) 

Yeah, he made a trip and that's what it's for, 
but let him explain it. 

Q Were you aware of^^^^^Kraveling during that 
period of time? 

^^H|left 
Q Do you )cnow where he was headed? 

H^^^^HH|H|^^H^H|BHH He left 

April 30 and he came back June 6. So I assume that 
$6,000 was given to him for the trip and ultimately while 
he was there he got more money. 

Q Now, the period of time that trip encompasses 
also covers a rescue effort that brought Tom Clines to 



A That's correct. 

Q First let me ask you this. I gather that this 
event that brought Tom Clines to^^^^Jwas something 
that had been gathering steam for a while; is that 
correct? 

A Sure. 

Q Now, was this the Source 3 plan? 



«»SSIflED 



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ONSUSSIFIED 



204 



1 A That's correct. 

2 Q Were you aware that as this plan was coming to 

3 maturity that North was preparing to go off to be in 

4 Tehran, Iran? 

5 A No. 

6 Q That was something not known to you? 

7 A Not at all. Never what he was doing on that 

8 side. I never )cnew it. 

9 Q Now, was he kept up to date on the maturing of 

10 your plan to work with Source 3 to bring people out? 

11 A Sure. I talked to him on the phone often. 

12 Q Was he aware of the timing of it? 

13 A Yeah. You know, it wound down to May-June. 

14 Q Did you ever reach a point where you were able 

15 to get hold of him and say today's the day? 

16 A We got hold of him and told him that if it was 

17 going to go this is the time frame. And he said, fine, 

18 let's try it. 

19 ' Q Do you remember when that would have been? 

left^^^^^^lMay only 

21 want b«cause that was the time frame. 

22 Q Do you recall — 

23 A I went there the 28th and I left the 6th. The 

24 thing was aborted. 

25 Q Do you recall having any trouble getting hold 




837 



IINCmflED 



205 



1 of North during this time period? 

2 A No. I talked to hin on the phone before I 

3 left. 

4 Q Where was he; do you )cnow? 

5 A No, I don't. 

6 Q Now did you deal with Copp again at all during 

7 this period? Do you remember him coming back into the 

8 picture? 

9 A No. 

10 Q How about Albert Hakim? 

11 A Not as far as I was concerned. 

12 Q Now where were you throughout this period? 

13 A In the States. 

14 Q Did you ever go^^^^^^Hyourself? 

15 A Yes, I did, on the 28th. 

16 Q And you were there for that eight-day period 
.17 until the 6th; is that right? 

18 A Yeah. 

19 Q What was happening^^^^^^^Kuring that 

20 pariod? 

21 A Me were waiting for them to bring two hostages 

22 out. 

23 Q Now I gather you must have met Tom Clines 

24 during that period? 

25 A He was there, sure. 



ppf'^wcicn 



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206 



1 Q How did Clin«s get into the picture, to your 

2 understanding? 

3 A Well, it got into the picture that, 

4 were going to bring hin out on an old fishing boat. 

5 Q Was it him or them? Was it several hostages 

6 or one hostage? 

7 A One or two. And that we would need another 

8 boat in the area to pick them up. I told this to Ollie 

9 and Ollie told me that he could have a freighter — a 

10 freighter was in the area and he could have that 

11 available. 

12 (A brief recess was taken.) 

13 MR. WOODCOCK: Let's go back on the record. 

14 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

15 Q This operation in late May of '86, you didn't 

16 arrive ^^^^^^Huntil May 28. Was the operation already 

17 ongoing by then? 

18 A Oh, sure. It wasJ^^^^Voperation primarily, 

19 and I just caoe in to bolster it. 

20 Q When you arrived was Tom Clines already there? 

21 A I think he arrived the day before I arrived. 

22 Q Did^^^^Hlntroduce you to him? 

23 A Yeah. I think they came to meet me at the 

24 airport. 

25 Q Did you have any understanding as to who he 



yNSliSIFIED 



839 



(INaWlED 



207 



1 was? 

2 A I knew he was an ex-CIA agent. 

3 Q Anything else about him? 

4 A I )cnew — well, I didn't Icnow it. He told me 

5 that he did contract stuff for the CIA. 

6 Q Did^^^^Hlxplain to you how it was that he 

7 came to place trust in Clines? 

8 A I don't get the question. Clines was there. 

9 The freighter was there. When the deal didn't go, the 

10 freighter took off and Clines took off. 

11 Q But presumably if somebody shows up in the 

12 course of an operation like this you don't automatically 

13 place trust in him unless he has the proper 

14 recommendation; isn't that correct? 

15 A Yeah. 

16 Q Did you have any understanding as to who would 

17 have recommended Clines? 

18 A I knew it was Ollie North. Ollie told me on 

19 th«- phone, as a matter of fact. He told me. That's how 

20 I knew ha was ex-CIA. He told me that, that "the 

21 freighter was in the area and Tom clines, who was an ex- 

22 Agency guy, would be there to help you". 

23 Q Okay. I've got a note here from Ollie saying 

24 — it says April 24, but it's actually in his May 

25 context. It says;. m^^Hsending one ops person plus 



u 




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UNCIASSIHED 



208 




Leave Sunday. Would arrivel 
needs A/C", which we always read as 



sending 
Monday p.m. 
aircraft. 

Anything like that or does anything from that 
bring back any recollection? 

A Yeah, exactly. Well, I told him if it worked 
they were going to come out on a fishing boat, and that's 
when he said he had this freighter in the area. It must 
have been in the area because it came in there a couple 
days after I arrived. 

Q And Albert Hakim has testified that he gave 

$30,000 to^^^^^^^^^Hduring this period of time to 
assist in this operation. Was that anything that came to 
your attention? 

A No. Yes, he did give it to him, but I'm the 
one who told Oliver North that^^^^Hhas been there for 
three- four weeks now and he doesn't have a cent to his 
name. His AB«rican Express is bankrupt, and they better 
gat him sob* money or else he's got to come home. 

So he called me back, if I recall, and he says 
h«r«'s this number. Ask for Al. I called^^^Hand gave 
hia the number and said ask for Al. And then he took 
care of it from there. 

Q Okay. And this operation ultimately didn't 



succeed? 



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vniumid 



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A It did not succeed. 

Q Now the last time you came fairly close on an 
operation was, I gather, in May-June '85, and that was 
aborted parrly by the TWA hijacking; is that correct? 

^f^K^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^U Re the ma^or 
contact. 

Q What happened that brought this one to -- 

A I don't know, just that it didn't go, because 
they just couldn't pull it off. The people who were 
supposed to release the hostages couldn't pull it off. I 
mean, there was too many guards around and there was more 
pressure going on, and they just couldn't snatch them out 
of there. 

Q Do you recall Raphael Quint ero having anything 
to do with this operation ^^^^^^^^| Did that name come 
across your screen at all? 

A No. 

MR. MORROW: You mean the TV screen? 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q His personal screen. This is an expression 
they use at the CIA all the time. People have mental 
scopes out there and things come across them. 

A I had no contacts with him. 

Q Does that name mean anything to you? 



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UNCUSSIHED 



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A Didn't he testify? 

Q Was that how you )cnew of him? 

A Yeah. Is he also )cnown as — no, that wasn't 
Max Gomez, was it. That's right. There's two of them. 
I know which one. 

Q This Raphael Quintero also went by Chi-Chi and 
by the name Ralph. 

A I never met hia. 

Q Did you hear of hia? 

A Not before. Not before the hearings. 

Q There's an entry in North's notebooks, June 
says: Jack La%m re^^^^^^^^land 
Does that mean anything to you — 




A No. 

Q Nov that is repeated on June 24, 1986 under 
the to-do list: Jack Lavn,^^^Hand^^^|to help with 



A I don't know who it is. 

Q Does that naae aean something to you? 

A I know b« occasionally called Lawn. He'd just 
call hia to say wa'r* working at this stuff. 

Q Let a* back you up on the subject of Lawn. Is 
Lawn being kept up to date on this hostage release effort 
that goes on 



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A I would hav« told him that we are traveling, 
and I probably would have told him we were working on 
hostages. 

Q And would that plan have ever been reduced to 
writing? 

A No. 

Q 
writing? 

A 



Would your report to Lawn have ever come in 



It never would have. I never wrote any of 
this stuff on hostages. 

Q Did you regularly report to Lawn; is that 
right? 

A Routinely. I reported only when we traveled. 
Q How about^^^^^^^l Would he have been aware 
of this late May '86 effort? 

A Yeah. I told^^^^^Hbits and pieces. 
Q And how about John McKernan? Would you have 
told him about it at all? 

- A Mo. I told John McKernan only that — when I 
couldn't find Lawn and we were traveling, I left a 
aassag* with him. 

Q There's a reference now — 

MS. NAUGHTON: Excuse me. One question. Did 
you ever discuss with Colonel North whether or not you 
should take no^gf _or make reports? Did he ever give you 
fol 



844 



UNCMSSm 



212 



1 instructions either way? 

2 THE WITNESS: I think it was understood — I 

3 don't Itnow if it was tacitly, or if we did talk about it 

4 — that it would be futile for me to make notes or write 

5 reports because when they got it they classified it out 

6 of my own range, and I wouldn't want to be caught 

7 overseas with this kind of information. So we kind of 

8 moved it very fast. 

9 ^^^^^would call me or we would call North 

10 directly or I would call North and we'd dump it and that 

11 was it. And if we had a note on it, a funny name or 

12 something, we'd flush it. It was just too hard. 

13 MS. NAUGHTON: Did North ever discuss with you 

14 what he would do with his notes? In other words, were 

15 you of the understanding that after he heard the 

16 information he would destroy the note? 

17 THE WITNESS: I don't know what he did. I 

18 didn't even know he had all these damn notes here. 

19 MS. NAUGHTON: I realize you don't know what 

20 b« did, but did he ever discuss with you his intention 

21 about putting any of this on paper? 

22 THE WITNESS: Never. The only thing I knew, 

23 we would discuss that he would pass it to the CIA. I 

24 knew that. He had said that before, and he would say, 

25 you know, you corroborated some things that they had 



ONtltSSIFIED 



845 



NCLASSIHED 



213 



1 going and gave them some ideas on some things they were 

2 missing. He said that. 

3 MS. NAUGHTON: But he did not specifically say 

4 to you he would destroy any documents that he had 

5 generated in the course of your discussions? 

6 THE WITNESS: He never said anything, period, 

7 about that. 

8 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

9 Q Let me bring you forward in North's notebook 

10 to June 27. He's got a reference here to a meeting with 

11 Copp and then a reference to funds for^^^^^^^^H Call 

12 Abe. Abe was his name for Albert Hakim. 

13 A Yes, he owed me some money. 

14 Q North did? 

15 A For that last trip. He owed me $3,714.50. 

16 Q And I gather that that's a reference there to 

17 your notes that you made for yourself; is that correct? 

18 A Right there, yeah. And I didn't receive that 
■on«y until — matter of fact,^BHp^<='^^<^ ^^ up^^^^H 
^^^H|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H|Band was 

21 September — in August-September. 

22 MR. MORROW: December? 

2 3 THE WITNESS: No. September-October we got 

24 that money. 

25 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 



846 



tiNcussra 



214 



1 Q Of 1986? 

2 A And^^^^Hgot his, too, at that time. 

3 MS. NAUGHTON: How do you know he owed you 

4 exactly that amount? 

5 THE WITNESS: Because I gave him an 

6 itemization which he didn't take, and he wrote down the 

7 figure on a piece of paper. 

8 MS. NAUGHTON: He didn't take the itemization? 

9 THE WITNESS: No. He never would. 

10 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

11 Q Did he explain that to you? 

12 A He said I believe you. 

13 Q But let me back up. Had you reached the 

14 understanding at this point or any point that when you 

15 would submit an itemization like that and he would give 

16 you money that he was dealing with private money rather 

17 than governaent money? 

18 . A I still thought it was covert money. 

19 Q So you assumed it was still government money? 

20 A That's right. 

21 Q And did you ask him how it was he was able to 

22 pay out covert money without any documents from you 
2 3 backing them up? 

2 4 A No. Why would I? 

25 Q I'm just wondering. You've been in an 




847 



(INCUSSIFIED 



215 



1 administrative position with DEA for a while, and I 

2 gather from that you understand when you get money you 

3 have to justify it. 

4 A CIA gave us $50,000 like that. What do you 

5 think we did with it? 

6 Q Did you sign paperwork for that, too? 

7 A I did not. 

^^^^^^Blid? 
9 A He signed one receipt saying he has possession 

10 of $50,000. 

11 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

12 Q Excuse me. Is it your testimony that you 

13 didn't witness any signatures by^^^^^^^^B on a CIA 

14 dociament? 

15 A I don't think I was there. I don't think I 

16 was with him. I think Azzam was. 

17 Q So it's your testimony that you did not sign 

18 as a witness on any CIA documents for receipt of money? 

19 A I didn't. I don't recall doing that. I don't 

20 think I did. 

21 Q Just to follow up on Tim's question, then, 

22 regarding North not having you sign any receipts and so 
2 3 forth, was it your understanding where these funds were 

24 coming from — some sort of White House fund? 

25 A No.i a^ ^te>HglktAlKvw>i4fKV^ an NSC fund or a 



mmum 



848 



UNMSIFIED 



216 



1 CIA fund. 

2 Q For covert operations? 

3 A That's right. 

4 Q So it's your understanding yours was a covert 

5 operation? 

6 A That's the way I understood it. 

7 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

8 Q I gather it was your additional understanding 

9 that covert operations didn't require any itemization; is 

10 that correct — that if North couldn't produce your 

11 records of your travels that that wasn't a problem for 

12 him? Is that right? 

13 A I want to talX about this. Just a minute. 

14 This is important to talk about. 

15 (A brief recess was taken.) 

16 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q ^^^^^^^^^H you had testified earlier that 

18 you had offered your receipts to North and he had turned 

19 thea do«m; is that right? 

20 A That's right. 

21 Q And you also understood that when he paid you 

22 it was money that you termed covert money; is that 

23 correct? 

24 A That's correct. 

25 Q Now the question I think I had pending was, 



yNw«o 



849 



UNCUfflED 



217 



1 was it your understanding that North did not need your 

2 receipts to justify his acquisition of "covert money"? 

3 A Well, he's the one that said I don't need 

4 that, you know, and I says well, here it is. And I said 

5 take it. He says, I don't need it. I said okay, you 

6 know. I thought I had one here as an example. I don't 

7 have one as an example. 

8 Q An example of what? 

9 A An expense sheet that I would fill out for him 

10 and he didn't want it. He didn't want it. What am I 

11 supposed to do — just shove it down his throat? 

12 Q Did you a'sk him whether he could not get in 

13 trouble for not being able to justify the monies that he 

14 was giving out to you? 

15 A Come on. Why would I ask him that? why would 

16 I ask a guy working in the White House if he's going to 

17 get in trouble? Do you know how the CIA works? The CIA, 

18 when I give them information, they give me a number. 
They say^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HThey say Source 

20 NuBbcr do-do-do. They would never share the credit of 

21 inforaation to anybody with another agency. 

22 So I have a nuaber there, and I'll bet you if 

23 you could trace it that that $50,000 they gave us, 

24 there's a number on it in some covert fund. 

25 Q Well, the $50,000 coming from DEA is not 



ONCIASSIFIED 



850 




M 



218 



1 really what I'm talking about. 

2 A Not DEA. 

3 Q From CIA. 

4 A But I'm paralleling this with NSC, but it was 

5 the same thing in my mind. I knew there was a number 

6 there and I was a source of information. That's all. 

7 Q So your assumption was that at some point 

8 there was documentation for the money coming out of NSC? 

9 A Sure, that was his responsibility, not mine. 

10 Q And going to you? 

11 A That's right. It was his responsibility. I 

12 offered to give it to him. He didn't want it. And so, 

13 you know, that was that. It was no problem to me. I 

14 would have given him any documentation he wanted. I 

15 offered it to him. 

16 Q Right. I understand that. 

17 A And I thought I had brought a copy of a sheet 

18 of paper how I itemized it, and that was one I gave him 

19 and lie refused it — the last trip for $3,700. Well, I 

20 w«nt in there and gave it to him. He says, I don't want 

21 it. 

22 Q Had you ever done that to him before? 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q Offered him and he turned it down? 

25 A Yes. The first time. 



I'NtASSiflED 



851 



ONdUSSIFIED 



1 Q Did you always do that? 

2 A I only took three trips with him. 

3 Q For those three trips you always offered him 

4 and he always turned it down? 

5 A Yes. I always said do you want an itemization 

6 on expense. He said no, I believe you. He'd always say 

7 that — no, I believe you. 

8 Q And to your mind that's all it was a question 

9 of — whether he believed you or not — that he had no 

10 additional requirements on him that caused him to have to 

11 verify what you were doing? 

12 A No, because I reverted to my mentality of 

13 knowing how CIA operates, that you are just a number, 

14 just like I give a number to an informant. The CIA gave 

15 us a number. 

16 Q I gather you are assuming that the money he is 

17 giving you is coming out of CIA; is that correct? 

18 A I thought that, too, yes. 

19 ' Q Okay. I've got a reference here in North's 

20 notebooks "call Jack Lawn, July 11, 1986, rej 

21 and hostages." Do you know what's happening there? 

22 A I think it was just he asked us should I talk 

23 to Lawn about telling him you guys are doing all right 

24 still on this thing, and I'd like him to leave you for a 

25 little while longer. I said go ahead. 



IINCDSSIFIEO 



852 



24 

25 



»»ffilSSinED 



220 



1 Q Do you know from Lawn or anyone else whether 

2 he actually made that call? 

3 A I think I did either call Lawn on this last 

4 trip, you know, or when I got back met him and told him 

5 that we tried it and it didn't go. And I think he told 

6 me that Ollie called him. 

7 Q That Ollie had called him? 

8 A Yeah. I don't know what time frame — before 

9 or after this trip — this last trip. 

10 Q Well, this note is dated July 11, '86. Was 

11 this generated by either you or| 

12 A No, no. 

13 Q Telling North he should call Lawn? 

14 A No, no, no. The theory of the 90-day period 

15 was over a long time ago, right? So we just talked about 

16 the fact maybe a call should go in to Lawn regarding that 

17 we were still needed there. That's all. 

18 Q And I gather from your testimony that your 

19 best recollection is that Lawn confirmed to you that he 

20 got SOD* kind of call from North and it was okay for you 

21 to continue doing what you were doing? 

22 A He did tell me that he called, and he said 

23 they still needed us. 



^^mml^^^ 



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8 

9 

10 

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12 

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25 




Q Now there's another reference, and this is 
August 4, 1986, to ^^^^^^^^H and it just says: "Names 
provided last week." Does that mean anything to you? 

A I think we went into Source 4 phase, and I 



UNCmnED 



854 



mm\m 



222 



1 think we briefed Oliver on Source 4, and that we had — 

2 I think this is the time frame — that's how I recall it. 

3 Maybe^^^Hhas a different idea. 

4 Q Before we get into Source 4, let me go bac)c to 

5 the late May operation and just tidy up a couple of 

6 things. Did the late May operation also involve Perot 

7 money? 

8 A Yeah. It didn't involve Perot money at all 

9 because no money was ever used. No money was ever seen. 

10 No money ever passed, so it didn't involve his money. 

11 Q To the extent that money would have been used 

12 had the plan gone through, was that to be Perot money? 

13 A Allegedly. But I had my own opinion of that. 

14 MS. NAUGHTON: What's that? 

15 THE WITNESS: I think that at any time when we 

16 talked about being successful in extracting a hostage, 

17 that I believe that would have ended up that CIA money 

18 would have been used, not Perot's money. 

19 MS. NAUGHTON: That Perot would have been a 

20 front for the money; is that correct? 

21 THE WITNESS: Yeah. He was just on standby. 

22 I mean, that was my own opinion, only because nobody in 

23 the CIA was going to let Perot take credit for extracting 

24 these hostage. That's just my idea — mine and^^^^^H 
2 5 anyway. 



UNetASSIFlEO 



855 



ONSUSSinED 



223 



1 HS. NAUGHTON: Old Coburn give you any 

2 corroboration of that theory, anything to make you think 

3 that? 

4 THE WITNESS: First of all, Coburn didn't have 

5 any money when he was ^^^^^^H He was dropped there by 

6 a Lear jet that we cleared, because that jet couldn't 

7 clear, we cleared it with the police. He came off of 

8 there with one suit bag, which wouldn't hold a ten dollar 

9 bill, and stayed there five days and left. And that Lear 

10 jet cane in there, picked hia up and off he went. 

11 So the money wasn't there. The Lear jet was 

12 in London and that was four hours away; that's all. So I 

13 figured if we got successful they would have brought it 

14 in. 

15 MR. MORROW: Who paid Coburn's expenses while 

16 he was there? 

17 THE WITNESS: We picked up his neals and most 

18 of his booz«, but Z assua* he picked up his own expenses. 

19 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuaing) 

20 Q That's you and| 

Me andimi^ 

22 Q Nov let's aove to Source 4. Is Source 4 a 

23 source you developed through one of the other three 

24 sources? 

25 A We developed Source 4 througt 



smmim 



856 



ONOASSIRED 



I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

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11 

12 

13 

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25 





Q Now what was the plan with Source 4? 

A A bunch of things! 

lAnyway I 

mean a bunch of things, a bunch of things that I don't 
even know about. 

Q Well, let's talJc about the things you do know 
about and let's focus on hostages. Was that something 
you knew about? 

A Sure. 

Q Was there any kind of a plan that evolved 
through Source 4? 

A He was going to do the same thing. 

Q So this again was the kind of dollar figure 
pr hostage, that sort of things, and bribes] 




A However he could do it. 
Q Was that part of the plan? 
A It was also considered 



857 



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3 

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25 




BY HR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q There's a reference in North's notes — I'm 
not going to pursue Source 4 in any detail, but there's a 
reCarence in North's notes on August 27, '86, to meeting 
with immiHI "passed $10K". Is that a Source 
dispersement? 

A The $10K. I think that was when I got my 
$3,700 and^HHrot his. His bill was $10,000. I think 
he gave him his bill or told him what he was owed. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



858 



1 

2 

3. 

4 

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7 

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UNCUSSIRED 



226 



Q Now there's another reference just a few days 
later, September 2, 19J 




^^^^^— _..^ And 
then there's another reference: "Wanted to know where 
Prince is." Any idea what's happening there? 

A Ollie wanted to Icnow where he was, right? 

Q That's not clear. 

A We knew he was in jail. 




Q I'm going to r\in through the rest of these 
notes and at least bring us to the end of the notes. 
There's a reference to a meeting with you and North and 

Ion September 25, 1986. Do you recall what the 
subject of that meeting was? 



UNmStflED 



I 



859 



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15 

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No, unless it was Source 4. 




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Q Npw it also has, and this is in sort of a 
subheadin^^^^^^^^^H|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^n<^H 
continue hostage." Do you know whether North at this 
point was goirw. bj^qj^^to.l^wj^ 5o_as)t_for your continued 




861 



Uim^l^m 



229 



1 efforts on the hostages? 

2 A No. We had Source 1, 2, 3 and now 4 were 

3 still at it. That's what he meant. Information was 

4 still coming in. 

5 Q Do you know what the reference to Mike is? 

6 A What does it say withJ1ike> 

7 Q It just says Mike. 

8 A The only Mike I know is 

9 and Mike never met Oliver North. 

10 Q How about Mike Ledeen? 

11 A Mike Ledeen? I met Michael Ledeen. 

12 Q Do you recall when you met Ledeen? 

13 A Right around that time or later. 

14 Q Do you recall why it was that you met him? 

15 A Apparently Mike Ledeen had a contract with 

16 Eastern Air Lines and he wanted to talk to the SAC, the 

17 DEA SAC in New York and Miami regarding a training 

18 program for Eastern so they could stop getting their 

19 planes seized by Customs, so they would know how to 

20 pr«v«nt drugs being put on their planes. 

21 I told him I would and I called and gave him 

22 the names of the SACs and that's the last I heard of Mike 

23 Ledeen. 

24 ■ Q So that was a one-time meeting? 

25 A Yeahi 



UNtLASSIHED 



862 



UNCUmED 



230 



1 Q Where was that? 

2 A At that building where the strategic something 

3 or other is. The title of the company is Strategic — 

4 MR. FLYNN: The Institute for Strategic 

5 Studies at Georgetown? 

6 THE WITNESS: Right. 

7 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

8 Q CSIS. 

9 A Yeah. 

10 MS. NAUGHTON: How did you )cnow to go there? 

11 THE WITNESS: I think^^^Hgot a message from 

12 Oliver North's office to call Mike Ledeen, and then we 

13 called Mike Ledeen. 

14 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

15 Q There are notes of Fawn Hall that just say 
Ledeen^^^^^H (Thursday) . 

17 A She probably called^^m 

18 Q Do you recall North's office or Fawn Hall 

19 setting up this meeting? 

2 AX don't think she set it up. I think I called 

21 Ledeen oi^^^Bcalled, and then we met him. That's all. 

2 2 Q Now, one more entry in the North notebook and 

2 3 then we can put this away. There is a reference here and 

24 it would be dated approximately 15 October 86. It refers 
to ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 The 



863 



UNCUSSiflED 



231 



1 reference is, if we need to put one away. That's coming 

2 froa 
A I think it's the same thing. Maybe they 

thought they could do some exchanges. That's all. 

Q Let me just ask you some round-up questions 
here. In the course of your dealings with your various 
sources and with North did you ever come across Mansar 
al-Kasar? 

A No. Who is he? Can you refresh my memory? 

Q He's a Syrian arms dealer, also a drug dealer. 

A Is he a aajor? Is he an officer? 

Q I don't know that he has a military 
coamission. 

A Then I don't know him. I kno«^^^Hpassed a 
lot of inforaation on his own. Maybe he passed this 
information about this guy. I don't know. 

Q How about Ted Shackley? Did you ever meet or 
hear of Ted Shackley in your travels with North? 

A No. Tell am some ■ore about him. 

Q Tod Shackley was one Associate Deputy Director 
of CIA and has had connections with Secord and Hakia. 

A I didn't aeet any of these people. You'd have 
I that. 
How about Dewoy Clarridga? 
I talked to Dewey Clarridge on the phone. 




mmm 



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IINClASSinED 



232 



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25 




MS. NAUGHTON: Had you spoken to or met him 
before? 

THE WITNESS: I don't believe I ever spoke to 
him. I could have been in a room and he could have been 
there and I wouldn't have recognized him. But I don't 
think I spoke to him before. 




865 



UNUASSinED 



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866 



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MMmw 




BV MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 
In response to Tim's question earlier about 
■- and that 'si 
A That's doesn't ring a bell at all. 




Q Did you ever do anything or impart to North 
any information regarding anything involving Central 
America? 

A Not that I recall. He never asked me. 

Q Did he ever as)c you for any intelligence or 
any other information regarding specifically Nicaragua? 

A No, he didn't. 

Q Did he tell you anything about a drug 
operation run out of Miami in which certain officials in 
the Sandinista government were running drugs? 

A I don't think he told me that. I think I 
heard about, you )cnow, some Nicaraguans were involved in 
some operation. You know, I learned of it in general, 
that's all. 

Q But did you ever discuss this with North? 



UNCtJtSStFIFO 



867 



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ONWSinED 



235 



A I don't recall discussing it with him, no. 

Q Did you discuss it with anyone at DEA that 
knew of North's participation in the investigation? 

A Not that I )cnow. North had asked me, if he 
would have asked me in that time frame can you let me 
know if there's any Nicaraguans involved in narcotics, I 
would have checked it for him, because I didn't see 
anything wrong with that. And obviously, since I didn't 
check, he never asked me. 




Q Your trip| 
A Veah. 

Q Did any of that have anything to do with 
Oliver North? 

A No, not at all. It was strictly DEA business. 



Q Now in September of '85 I believe — 

MR. WOODCOCK: Let me interrupt for a second 
and go off the record. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 



UNCl-ASSIFIED 



868 



UNCMSSIFIED 



236 



1 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

2 Q In September of '85 there were two traveler's 

3 checks of $500 denominations from Oliver North, I 

4 believe, with your name on them. 

5 A Okay. 

6 Q At the Los Angeles Home Savings and Loan. 

7 A Yeah. 

8 Q Could you tell us something about that? 

9 A I cashed them. 

10 MR. MORROW: No, I cashed them. 

11 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

12 Q At the risk of making you a witness, why don't 

13 you tell me what happened? 

14 A Well, it was money that was adjusted, and I 

15 cashed the checks — adjusted monies. 

16 Q When you say "adjusted", what do you mean? 

17 A It was money that I already had spent out of 

18 my pocket. 

19 Q For the hostage location effort? 

20 A When I was overseas, yes. 

21 Q And you came back and asked North for the 

22 money? 

23 A No. It was adjusted. In other words, I used 

24 my own money. There were some places wouldn't take those 

25 damn checks, so I used my own money, and then I adjusted 



ONeiMFIED 



869 



UNKI^FIED 



237 




1 it and used the checks to reimburse myself. 

2 Q At some point you got the checks from North? 

3 A That's correct. I got the checks. Well, I 

4 didn't get them from North. I think^^^^^did. 

5 Q And you cashed these checks] 

6 A Yeah. I was there on DEA business. 

7 Q And did those checks then go for your own 

8 expenses, the proceeds, do you recall? 

9 A That's correct — reimbursed to me. 

10 Q Did you ever meet Adolfo Calero? 

11 A No. 

12 Q Now, after the Iran arms sales were made 

13 public sometime around November 4, 1986, and you learned 

14 what had happened, did you discuss this with Colonel 

15 North? 

16 A No. I couldn't get to him. I think we told 

17 you in that first meeting we met him just before 

18 Christmas in his lawyer's office. 

19 Q Did you try to call him any time between 
2 Novaaber 6 and, let's say, December 1? 

21 A No. I think we talked to Fawn and she was the 

2 2 one who told us that you had to get hold of him through 

23 his attorney. 

24 Q Now, the record has indicated he obtained an 

25 attorney sometime after or at least obtained Mr. Sullivan 



870 



tlNGlASSIFIED 



238 



1 as an attorney sometime after the 25th of November. 

2 A That's when we met him, after the 25th of 

3 November. 

4 Q But between the third of November and the 2 5th 

5 of November did you attempt to or did you contact Colonel 

6 North? 

7 A We may have. I don't recall contacting him. 

8 I think we attempted to. I think^^^^ftalked to Fawn. 

9 I talked to her, too, I believe. And then eventually we 

10 met him at his attorney's office at the end of November 

11 or early December. 

12 Q In that period of time, then, November 3, 

13 let's say, to December 1, did you speak to Colonel Earl 

14 or Coy? 

15 A No. 

16 Q Anyone in North's office? 

17 A No. 

18 Q Aside from Fawn? 

19 - A No, not in that time frame, at least I didn't. 

20 Q By the way, was Colonel Earl aware of your 

21 efforts? 

22 A I met him once before the last operation 

23 culminated, before I went to Europe. I met him, because 

24 Oliver wasn't around. 

25 Q Okay. Did Colonel Earl ever relay any 



UNCtAS^EO 



871 




239 

1 messages from Colonel North to you? 

2 A I think he relayed my messages to Colonel 

3 North that there was a possibility to extract some 

4 hostages. 

5 Q Now I wasn't quite clear on one thing. Back 

6 in December of '85, according to North's notes, he may be 

7 expecting the release of some hostages. Were you aware 

8 of that or was that a separate operation? 

9 A If it wasn't mine, it must have been his. And 

10 I don't think we had anything going. We didn't have 

11 anything set up for December. 

12 Q Now, regarding the use of the private funds, 

13 the Perot money, were you aware or were you told of any 

14 specific directions by FBI Director Webster regarding the 

15 use of private money? 

16 A No way. 

17 Q Did his name ever come up when discussing 

18 this? 

19 A No. 

20 Q Is there anyone else who knew about your 

21 activities that we haven't discussed today or hasn't been 

22 mentioned? 

23 MR. MORROW: To your knowledge. 

24 THE WITNESS: YOU know more than I did. No. 

25 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 



IINCIMED 



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Q I'm just raaicing sure we've covered all the 
questions. 

A I don't recall anybody else. 

Q Did you know Dewey Clarridge when you werei 

A Somebody else told me that he was ^^^^^^H 
but I think he left before I got there. 




he got there after I left, and 
that was just chit-chat. I don't know where I got that. 
Q Now were you aware of any of Colonel North's 
efforts to locate or extricate the hostages 




873 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q Did North ever discuss with you I 

the possibility of any of the freedom fighters 
in Nicaragua running narcotics? 

A That's bunk. They're not running narcotics, 
no different than any other group in the world is running 
narcotics. I know that. Recently the country attache 
from Costa Rica and I asked him. He says yeah, sure 
there are narcotic cases in that group of people, like 



liNHMlf^^FIPn 



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23 

24 

25 



242 

there's narcotics cases on any group of people. That 
isn't part of the movement. It's just there are some 
errant crooks also in the movement; that's all. 

Q Did the attache happen to mention John Hull? 

A John Hull? 

Q H-u-1-1. 

A That name is familiar to me. 




A He was on that law suit, one of the defendants 
on the law suit, right, against Clines and a bunch of 
other people. 

Q The suit brought by Honey and Av#rgon? 

A I don't know what it is. I think he was one 
of the defendants on the suit by these people. 

- Q How did you become aware of the law suit? 

A I think Oliver must have told me about it, or 
Clines. I don't know. 

Q Do you recall how that cane up? 

A No. It was just a thing. They asked us if we 
knew whoever these people are. I don't even remember 
their names -k-«Xb4^aaiqc»«/4tili«S^PBntioned to me. And 



^mrnm 



875 



UNCtASSIRED 



243 



1 they didn't ring a bell. 

2 Q Did he ask you to do any sort of investigation 

3 regarding Martin Honey or Tony Av»rgon, the plaintiffs? 

4 A No. We told them that we would give them the 

5 names of some competent private investigators that would 

6 love to do this for them and let them represent them. 

7 Q Did you say you did tell him — 

8 A I told him that, yes.^^^^Hand I -- and that 

9 that kind of work should be done by a private 

10 investigator. We were thinking of touting some friends 

11 of ours. 

12 Q Did you indeed give them some names? 

13 A They never asked. They never asked. 

14 MR. BERMINGHAM: When you say "they", who do 

15 you mean? 

16 THE WITNESS: I mean he, Tom Clines and/or 

17 Oliver North never asked, you know, to provide the name 

18 of a private investigator. 

19 MR. BERMINGHAM: Did that questioning come up 

2 because they were asking you to do something or were they 

21 asking for advice? 

22 THE WITNESS: No, no, no. They didn't ask us 

23 to do anything. The question came up are we aware of 

24 this law suit, and did we know this name. I don't even 

25 remember, because I did nothing with it. I told them -- 



% :iti;;LhOvi 



876 




244 

1 I recoounended to him and then to Clines on another 

2 occasion that we'll give them the name of a good private 

3 investigator to help them if they need help. 

4 ^^^^^fTO^BERMINGHAM: Did you meet Clines outside 
of ^^^^^^^^P 

6 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I did. After this trip I 

7 met Clines for lunch one time in Virginia at Tyson's 

8 Corner. 

9 MR. BERMINGHAM: For any particular purpose — 

10 to discuss this case? 

11 THE WITNESS: No, it wasn't that. He said 

12 I'll meet you for lunch, called up one time and met us 

13 for lunch. He didn't ask for anything. He mentioned 

14 this law suit. He didn't asJc. I was waiting for, you 

15 Icnow, the "can you help us". It was nothing strange if 

16 they can I help you. But we told him if you think it's 

17 serious we can give you some good private eyes that can 

18 help you do some investigating on it. 

19 But that wasn't it. It was kind of, you know, 

20 hav* a few drinks, have lunch, and see you later. 

21 MR. BERMINGHAM: That private law suit also 

22 alleges drug trafficking by Hull and other people. 

23 THE WITNESS: I heard that later, though. We 

24 didn't get into that until all of this started boiling 

25 over. But we didn't do any investigation. I think it's 

TfP^ 




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1 bunk anyway. Okay? I didn't even investigate it. I 

2 just think it's bunk. 

3 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

4 Q Did North ever mention the name to you of 

5 Glenn Robinette? 

6 A Oh, yeah, I met him. 

7 Q When did you meet him? 

8 A I met him — I think I met him with Clines at 

9 that same luncheon. 

10 Q Were they together when you came to the 

11 restaurant? 

12 A ^^^^Hand I were together, and I think they 

13 came in right after we did. We had some drinks and we 

14 had lunch. 

15 Q Who did you understand Glenn Robinette to be? 

16 A Ex-CIA person. 

17 Q And what did you understand him to be doing 

18 now? 

19 A He had a consulting firm of sorts, consulting 

20 or private eye, you know. I wasn't sure. 

21 Q And what was he doing? 

22 A Well, I thought he was — this is an old 

23 agent's mind right here, and I know for a fact that the 

24 CIA hires only their own for contract, and I knew that he 

25 was just like Clines, still working for them. That's 



ONCLItSStFlEO 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



246 



1 all. I don't delve in these things. 

2 Q What did he talk about? 

3 A We talked in general about, you know, where 

4 and did you know this ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and did you 

5 know this CIA officer when he was around and when I was 

6 around. And we knew a few people together, believe it or 

7 not, strangely enough. That was the most of it. 

8 Q Did either Robinette or Clines discuss North? 

9 A You know, not directly. If anything, you 

10 know, because Clines was on that last operation, you 

11 know, we discussed it very briefly — that it's a shame 

12 it didn't go. It was going to break down on it -- things 

13 like that. I need more time, less pressure, et cetera. 

14 Q So Robinette did not mention any work he had 

15 done for North or for Secord? 

16 A No, he never did. 

17 Q Now in your discussions with North during this 

18 period of time in '85 and '86 did he indicate to you that 

19 he was reporting upward regarding the progress that you 

20 had made or the plans that you had made? 

21 A He told me that his boss was Poindexter, and 

22 that he met Casey many times. 

23 Q Did you have any evidence of that? In other 

24 words, were you present when Mr. Casey called North at 

25 any time or present for ^yw-of^iair meetings? 



wmm 



879 



UimSSIFlEO 



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1 A I recall one time I was sure that he was 

2 talking to Casey, but, you know, it's just one of those 

3 third party things that I never particularly like to talk 

4 about. 

5 Q What made you sure he was talking to Casey? 

6 A I don't know. He got off the phone and he 

7 says something about that Casey is doing something, 

8 something very quick, and then we went in to why I was 

9 there. 

10 Q What did he say about what he was doing 

11 regarding reporting to Poindexter? 

12 A He said that was his boss. 

13 Q Did he indicate to you that he was reporting 

14 to him regularly? 

15 A No. He wouldn't talk like that with me. We 

16 wouldn't talk about reporting to bosses. 

17 Q Did he ever indicate to you that there was a 

18 downward flow of orders, in other words that he had been 

19 ordered by any of his superiors to do anything? 

20 A We never talked about those matters. We 

21 talJced about hostages and intelligence, and he used to 

22 show me some intelligence that he gotj 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand we would assess And then 

24 would corroborate information that we gave him, and he'd 

25 show me something and say see, you were right — that 



iCtASSIflEO 



880 



UmSSIFIED 



248 



1 kind of thing. 

2 Q Did he ever refer to any instructions or 

3 discussions with the President regarding the operation of 

4 the hostages? 

5 A Not with me. 

6 Q When you saw North after November 25 of '86 -- 

7 first of all — 

8 A Let me clarify one thing. I knew he was 

9 working on the freedom fighter thing, because if you ever 

10 go in his office all you saw was all these damn posters, 

11 and he always said this is very important, and I got to 

12 get them boats, I got to get them guns — things like 

13 that. 

14 He was very involved in that. 

15 Q Did he say why he had to get them these 

16 things? In other words, had anybody instructed him to do 

17 this? 

18 A Well, you know, he'd say we got to stop these 

19 conuBunists from getting into Central America. You know, 

20 this was quick. Once in a while he'd just say this and 

21 we'd get into our business. 

22 Q When the Attorney General on November 2 5 

23 announced that some of the funds used to buy arms — or 

24 used from the sale of arms to Iran were used for the 

25 contras, I take it that came as a surprise to you? 



ilMOTED 



881 



ONMSIFIED 



249 



1 A Sure . 

2 Q Looking back on it, did you have any 

3 indication that that was happening from your 

4 conversations with North? 

5 A No. I thought he was very open with me. I 

6 was surprised that he didn't tell me that, actually. I 

7 would have given him a better idea. 

8 Q When you did see him after the news broke, did 

9 you discuss with him the arms sale? 

10 A No. 

11 MR. MORROW: You mean the AG? 

12 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

13 Q No, North. 

14 A His two attorneys were there — I guess 

15 Sullivan and an understudy — and they started off the 

16 meeting and were not talking any business. Here I 

17 thought I was in a reformatory. They say you can talk to 

18 your younger brother, you know, just for two minutes. So 

19 he says, you know — so we just talked how are you doing. 

20 How are you? How are you doing? Et cetera, et cetera. 

21 I told him if we can help you, we'll be here, 

22 and he says tell the truth. That's how you'll help me. 

23 He emphasized that a couple times. 

24 Q Was there ever any offer or indication during 

25 '85 and '86 that, at the time that you were negotiating 




y<''}LnOi 



882 



tlNeiA^IFIED 



250 



1 with your sources and so forth, that perhaps the sale of 

2 weapons to Iran might free the hostages? 

3 A Never. As I said before, if he would have 

4 told me that, I would have given him a better idea. 

5 Q That's my question. Was that ever approached? 

6 Was that ever discussed? 

7 A No, it was never discussed. 

8 Q Okay. So none of your sources ever approached 

9 you with that idea? 

10 A To give arms to Iran? None of my sources, 

11 never. My sources wanted to kill the people in Iran. 

12 They didn't want to give them arms. 

13 Q I'm talking about freeing the hostages. 

14 A No, they would never do that. 

15 Q Was it your impression that the Iranians would 

16 have control over those who were holding the hostages? 

17 A There was no doubt about that — no doubt 

18 about it, that they had the control through the head 

19 mullahs, and through Syria's reluctance to go in there 

20 and take them. 

21 MR. GENZMAN: Let me follow up on that. Did 

22 you ever feel that the Iranians could ensure the release 

23 of all of the hostages? 

24 THE WITNESS: Sure they could have. 

25 MR. GENZMAN: Did you feel that way regardless 




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3 

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UNWSIHED 



251 



of whether anything was done for the Da'wa prisoners? 
THE WITNESS: They could have done it like 
that just because they are ruling the day. And they have 
those Shiites, and those Shiites belong to Iran, not to 
Lebanon. Those in the Party of God, all those mullahs, 
there's no doubt in my mind. I've studied this stuff 
long before I even got involved with the Oliver North 
caper. 




's no doubt in my mind that the Iranians 
could have released them. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

Q Now when Benjamin Weir was released in the 
fall of 1985 what was your understanding of how it is he 
came to be released? 

A Well, I think my understanding — I don't 
)cnow. I believe Oliver North had something directly to 
do with it. It was some kind of a private effort with 
th« government involved. That's what I felt. You know, 
he told me nothing about it. 

Q Well, this has always sort of struck me as 
kind of curious because here you guys are working very 
hard to try to get these hostages out. All of a sudden 
one pops out, apparently without any warning on your part 
!)P| 




, ' 



884 




252 

1 that this was going to happen. 

2 A I know. We stood down for him to pop out. 

3 Q Right. Not only did he pop out in spite of 

4 you, it was while you were being told to stand down. 

5 A That's right. 

6 Q So did you then discuss that with North and 

7 ask him how it was that Weir got out? 

8 A Just very briefly. He said he had something 

9 to do with it and that it involved some other players, 

10 and, you know, he wouldn't go into it, and that's it. 

11 You know, it was my impression, I don't know, that Casey 

12 had a lot to do with it. That's all. Because he told me 

13 that Casey took a trip one time during that time frame, I 

14 believe, and then all of a sudden this guy popped out, 

15 and I figured that Casey had something to do with it. 

16 Q Where was Casey's trip? 

17 A He went ^^^^^^^1 1 think. You know, I hate 

18 to talk about this gossip stuff, you know. This is 

19 gossJ.p. 

20 Q Well, did you ask North that since whatever 

21 procedure that got Weir out was successful that perhaps 

22 you might employ that for the other hostages? 

23 A Well, you have to understand Oliver North was 

24 also a military guy, and he had secrets he kept from me, 

2 5 and I had secrets I kept from him. So when he didn't want 




885 



UNMSIHED 



253 



1 to expand upon it any more, I just dropped it. So I 

2 assumed that it was a secret operation and he didn't want 

3 to talk about it any more. 

4 You know, what can you do? Should I have 

5 threatened him? I couldn't. You know, that was it. It 

6 was over. 

7 Q Did you receive any intelligence either from 

8 your sources or from within your agency or from any other 

9 source that indeed weapons were being sent by the United 

10 States to Iran? 

11 A Never. The only thing my sources said was -- 

12 well, it depends which one. ^^^^^^^^^^Hbelieved that 

13 it was the Israelis who provided Iran with weapons and 

14 that had nothing to do with the hostage thing. They just 

15 did it on purpose. It had nothing to do with the hostage 

16 thing. He just said that. 

17 Q Is there anything in the deposition that we 

18 haven't asked in the right way or haven't asked at all 

19 that you believe the Committee should know? 

20 A I don't have anything else to say. I think 

21 that the Committee should get together and figure out a 

22 way to get these hostages out and spend as much money as 

23 they did on this hearing in getting those hostages out 

24 and make some resolutions themselves. This is what I 

25 believe. 




886 



UIWIASSIREO 



254 



1 BY MR. GENZMAN: (Resuming) 

2 Q I have a few questions for you, sir. First, I 

3 want to clarify Mr. Azzam's involvement in your hostage 

4 work. I heard you say early on that he was your 

5 supervisor. 

6 A He was in charge. 

7 Q And I heard you mention that he had a medical 

8 problem in 1985. 

9 A That's right. 

10 Q At what point did his involvement change? 

11 A Around May. 

12 Q And how did it change? 

13 A He went in the hospital. 

14 Q Did there come a time when he came out of the 

15 hospital? 

16 A But much later, and he convalesced for a year, 

17 year and a half. This guy couldn't even walk. He was on 

18 his back. He was in bad shape. 

19 Q So you attributed his lack of involvement from 

20 that point forward to his medical problems? 

21 A There was no doubt about it. This was a very 

22 serious operation he had. He went in for an operation. 
2 3 Q Around that same time frame did he ever 

24 express dissatisfaction with this program? 

25 A Who, Azzam? 



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UmSSIFIED 



255 




Q Yes, Mr. Azzam? 

A Yeah, sure he expressed dissatisfaction with 

this^^^^^^^K, That's why he denied us access to it. 

Q And this^^^^^^H related to the evidence that 

was provided by one of the sources? 

A Strictly. 

Q Regarding this evidence, did you learn at some 

point thatj 

^^^nwas a wrongl 

A Yes, I did know that. I knew that when I saw 
it when we picked it up. 

Q From the very beginning? 

A Sure. 

Q And what was your reaction? 

A It wasn't my decision. That was CIA's and the 
White House's decision. We handed it to them, and that's 
why I was always concerne d with Oliver North. Are you 
sure? Are you 




said it was checked . He says it's fine. 




888 



(limSSIFIED 



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Q Was there any report regarding 

A I don't think there was. I don't think they 
talked about ^^^^^^| on that report, come to think of 
it. 




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It was my understanding through Oliver North that he was 
satisfied with that^^^^^^^| He had the option of saying 
no, forget it, and we would have closed the door and I'd 
have gone back to DEA and gotten involved in what I was 
involved in before. And I emphasized this. 

And I have to tell this to the record. I 
emphasized this. Let me investigate this, I told him, 
and that's when he said that this was checked with Casey 
and they were satisfied. 

Q But without further investigation Oliver North 
was satisfied with this evidence. Is that your 
testimony? 

A That's right. 

Q Without further investigation were you and^^H 
^^^^■satisf led with this evidence? 

A He's the one that had the power to say yes or 
no/. If you want to know did it gnaw at me, yes, it did. 
It still does today. 

Q How about 

A I don't know. You'll have to ask him. He has 
a different personality. 

Q You didn't ask him, when the two of you were 



UNCUSSIHED 



890 



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UNtUSSIHED 



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examining this evidence? 

A Yeah, sure we talked about this later, even as 
we were working, that, you know, we should find out^^^^H 
Igo over there on our own and the 
hell with it, ]ust for us to know. We did. It gnawed at 
me. It still does. 

Q Did either of you advocate going back to the 

source and gettin g better evidence? 

Sure . ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^H 
See, the thing fell apart. 




Q When you first observed what evidence there 
was ^^H^^^^^^^^H did you was 

you had asked for? 

A No, because I understand the Lebanese and 
Middle East and Arab mentality. 




ONCaSSIFIED 



891 



UNeUSSIFIED 



259 



^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H That surprise 

2 Q Did the problems with this evidence lead you 

3 to have misgivings about your source? 

4 A Not at all. None at all. My source to today 

5 believes that's correct. 

6 Q To the extent there were problems with the 

7 evidence you felt it pertained not to your source but to 

8 the people who were getting this information to him? 

9 A He confronted them and they threatened each 

10 other to death — you Jcnow, 100 men against 100 men, 

11 1,000 against 1,000. They were going to meet anywhere on 

12 this matter. Believe me, this was not just a whim and 

13 that other guy said it's righteous. 

14 We discussed this. Like I said before, I had 

15 the same concern, and my source couldn't gain anything 

16 out of this. You Icnow, if it caune out, if it could have 

17 been analyzed and said this is false without a doubt he 
13 would have been very disappointed, but I had to tell him 

19 it was inconclusive, and he says what the hell do I tell 

20 those people over there? 

21 Q With your concerns, did you still advocate 
2 2 that the source be paidi 
2 3 A We did not pay that source 

24 Q Did you still advocate that he be paid? 

25 A No, no. That decision was Oliver North's. 




ONCttSStFIED 



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ONCIASSIRED 



260 



1 Q Regardless of whose decision it was, assuming 

2 you might have had some input — well, did you have 

3 input? 

4 A No. I had the input on the basis that we 

5 presented this incident, we presented the evidence, we 

6 presented the proposal. And Oliver North is the one that 

7 made the decision. If he said no, that would have been 

8 over. I didn't put any pressure on him, if that's what 

9 you mean. 

10 Q So you weren't disappointed that the source 

11 wasn't paid for this evidence? 

12 A What do you mean? He was paid. The $200,000 

13 went in. 

14 Q I misunderstood you. You did not advocate 

15 that that be done? 

16 A It was his decision and I'm the one that kept 

17 asking him, are you sure. I did. I can't emphasize this 

18 — I don't like — you know, I've worked a lot on 

19 narcotic cases in my life, and I never got burned. You 

20 know, I didn't front my money and nobody ever gave me a 

21 load of stuff that wasn't pretty good. 

22 So I handled this the same way, that I was 

23 concerned about the authenticity of it. 

24 Q Just a couple more follow-up questions. I 

25 believe you testified that Mr. Allen or someone from the 

bol 




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A That was Azzam. 
Q Mr. Azzam? 

A Azzam wanted more evidence but it was too ' 
late. You know, everybody had ideas and 20/20 hindsight. 
When we were putting this together they could have said 
specifically you have to get this green pen and it has to 
be etched with a purple one, and we could have sent that 
guy in there and he would have worked only on that. 
But they said get! 

and he was there. They briefed him. They 
debriefed him and briefed him. Azzam talked to Source l 
and so then when he comes out with this they — yeah, go 

there because going into ^^^^^^^^^^^^| is 
just like that. No big deal. 

And the deal was if it's not authentic you 
don-'t pay. The deal's over. That was the deal. So if 
w* would have told Source 1 that this was not authentic 
h« would have went and told the^^^^Hcontact sticJc it. 
But that's not the way it went, because Oliver North said 
it's okay and he says we're going to do it. And that was 
that. 

MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing further. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON:. (Resuming) 



UNCtASSinED 



894 



UNGUSSIFIED 



262 



1 Q I just have one further question. Did you see 

2 any of Colonel North's testimony before the Committee? 

3 A Yeah, I did. 

4 Q Was there anything that he said in there that 

5 does not comport with your recollection? 

6 A He mentioned DEA so very briefly that I almost 

7 missed it, and all the rest I had nothing to do with. 

8 Q I'm not necessarily saying you had something 

9 to do with it. 

10 A Well, I have no comment about it. 

11 Q But in the time you spent with him or the 

12 people you met through him or whatever, is there anything 

13 he said in the public hearing — 

14 A I had nothing to do with that, so I have no 

15 comment on it. 

16 MR. MORROW: He kind of waffled in Rodino's 

17 question about DEA. 

18 THE WITNESS: It was obvious it was going into 

19 the private sector. I mean, I figured that out. And I 

20 think he had to correct Rodino. What did he say? Rodino 

21 said foreign officials, and he corrected him and said 

22 foreigners. Do you recall that? 

23 BY MS. NAUGHTON: (Resuming) 

24 Q Yes, I do. That's why I want to make it clear 

t 

25 with you who those people were. 



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UNClASSiHED 



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A That irritated me, that you can make a mistaJce 
just like that and then he corrected Stokes on the same 
thing. It's hard for them to remember, isn't it? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 
Q On the subject of Buckley^^^HJ^^^B is it 
your t estimony that A zzam never told you that he himself 
showec 




A He never told me that. He may have told 
Ibut I never heard that. 




Q No, no. Back up. Did he ever tell you that 



A No. 

Q The next thing I wanted to ask you — and this 
will b« my last, I think — 

MR. GENZMAN: Can I get another question in on 



MR. WOODCOCK: Go aihead. 

MR. GENZMAN: Did Mr. Azzam ever tell you, or 
that he had misgivings about this evidence? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, he did. Azzam told me 



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UliASSIFIEB 



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that he didn't believe it and therefore we were not going 
to get the money. 

MR. GENZMAN: What specifically did he say 
about his misgivings? He didn't tell you abouti 




THE WITNESS: Azzam said we're not getting the 

before he even saw^B^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^Icalled 
him on the phone and I said we ' ve got^^H^^^^^^^^J He 
says that's not good enough; you're not getting the 
money. I told you I've known Azzam for 20 years, and 
none of this surprised ma. Then, when he got it, he 
said, oh, that's not authentic. I said okay. And that 
was that. You know, he wanted the guy to be 
fingerprinted and photographed and sign the fingerprint 
card and then he would have probably accepted it. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

Q When you testified in response to several of 
Mr. Genzman's questions on Mr. Azzam you said that Mr. 
Azzam went into the hospital and that he faded out of the 
picture as a result. Is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q However, Azzam was in charge of this 
particular special enforcement operation; is that 
correct? 

A That's correct. 
|t^ 




897 



UNtASSinED 



265 



1 Q And that special anforcemcnt operation came to 

2 an end; correct? 

3 A That's correct. 

4 Q In approximately June of '85. Would that be 

5 right? 

6 A May- June . 

7 Q And when you were authorized to work with the 

8 White House or to worK with the NSC that was not a 

9 special enforcement operation, not so designated; is that 
10 correct? 

XI A That's correct. 

12 Q And your superior in that was Mr. Lawn within 

13 DEA; is that correct? 

14 A That's correct. 

15 Q I just wanted to be clear on this point. Is 

16 it your understanding that had Mr. Azzam not had this 

17 long period of recuperation that he would have somehow 

18 had a role or been in charge? 

19 A Probably. 

20 Q Of the NSC operation? 

21 A Maybe not as heavy a role as he had with the 

22 CIA, but I probably would have had to still report to 

23 him. 

24 Q Rather than report the way you did to Mr. 

25 Lawn? 



MSimm 



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WMm 

^ yah. I would probably have reported to h.m 
instead of Lawn, correct. 

Q Why do you say that? 

1,* h»ve still been there and he 
A Because he would have stiix 

was an executive assistant. 

Q Did Mr. Azza« ever say to you that he was 
disenchanted with th. Sorth connection and he wanted out 

of this? 

A Never. He was a sic. .an at the t i.e. He was 

• ,nd once he gave me the thumbs down 
just in extreme pain and once ne g 

on this thing here I .ust .ind of ignored him. 

«,. woodcock: I have no further questions. 
I x appreciate your coming here and staying 
■■f^fSand putting up with all these questions. 
HR. GENZMAM: Thank you very much. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

» ,1- s-40 p.m., the taking of the 
(Whereupon, at s.au p.».. 

instant deposition ceased.) 

Signature of the witness 

vh^a day of 

subscribed and sworn to before me this 

, 1987. 



Notary Public 



My Commission 



899 



IINCUSXIflEO 

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 

I, MICHAL ANV SCHAFER, th. offlc.r b.for. whom th, foregoing 
deposition was taken, to hereby certify that the witness 
Whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly 
sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by 
me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to 
typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a 
true record of th. testimony given by said witness; that I am 
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the 
parties to th. action in which this deposition was taken, and 
further that I am not a relative or employe, of any attorn.y 
or counssl employd by th. parti., th.r.to, nor financially 
or oth.rwis. int.r.st.d in th. outcom. of th. action. 

Notary Public ^ 
in and for th. District of Columbia 

Hy Comais.ion Expir..: F.bruary 28, 1990 



UNCIASSIHED 



900 









901 



UNCLASSm 



m^ mmTs - 



THIS IS A COVER SHEET 

FOR 

INFORMATION SUBJECT TO 

Basic security requirtmcnu conuined in Dcpwtmem of Justice Regulations 
CaCFRPirt 17), 

The unauthorized disclosure of the information contained m the attached docu- 
mentis) could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally gnve damage to the 
national sccunty. 

Handling, storage, reprtxluction and disposition of the attached document(s) will 
be in Kcordance with policies and procedures set forth in regulations cited above 




r ^— ^^^ "^ 

Partiilly Oeclwsifind/Riluswl oniLHUsU^ 
undw provisioas of LO. 12356 
by 3. Regw. N, 




iTVi t0>t AM u Mrtuu^ •*»• M i ftW fitm ■ I m M i* *■' 



UNOMSIFIED (*5P 



902 



0:iSLASS!FIED 



DBA Support gor R«cov«rv of toTlcan Ho»taq«a 
S«n»d in Sairut 



Several weak ago, aa part of the Roatag* Locating Taalc Forea, OEA 
offieara raaatabllahad a contact in Labanen with an aaaat who haa 
conn«etxona with tha Labanaaa criainal antitiaa. Laat waak, 
thair intarmadiary, in raaponaa to awaranaaa that tha Oawa 
priaonara could ba axacutad ahortly aftar tha and of Raradan 
(Juna 19) , agraad to procaad aa followa in an affort to racovar 
tha hoatagaat 

laaat. 'A.* daparta^^^H.^ 
Ill 

J Labanen^ .. __,, 

■to raturn to Labanon and arrange for a maating 

'■- — -^ -* ••^- "•» 'jffiears, hiaaalf, and a 

baan in touch with 



Onca contact haa baan aatabliahad and a aaating arrang«M, 
the two OCA offieara will depart for Cyprus via a European 
city where they will depoait the. $200X and eatabliah an 
account for the $2M (SSOOK of which will be available 
imnediately in U.S. dellara eaah for uae in Lebanon). 

*X* believes that the hostages can be bribed free for SIM 
each as fellowsi 




Trsnspcrt l 

$2S0K apiece in order to 
believes that the ISOOK^AcaiQUi be auj 
establish bene fides to ■■■■■■and foi 
to agree to pessage ot at least 2 Bestages."- unce 
ration i s underway and the h osf qes are through 

" will be provided with up 
to 9S00K1B cash. 

m the hostages over to i 

where they will be placeTaboard a 
anaport to Cyprua, 




Declassify 1 OAOR 



^0? c:cr.s^ 



n 






903 



m; «» 



. TOP ccor.LT "••^ 



On« of th« OKA officers wtll proe««d to Cypru* to r«nt 
A s«f«hout« aa a traporary holding location in th« 
•v«nt that all hostages arc not r«cov«r«4 in tha fir«t 
attampt. •.*t»t 

Tha ranainln? $1.5M mad* availabla by tha donor will b« 
ralaaaad froa tha account in tha European city 
as tha hostages ara aboard tha yacht and 
Thas a funds will b« jtn^to —yl 

L a n<^H^^B^B^^^^ocn 

It is assuaad that th« price cannot be negotiated do«m given the 
number of people requiring bribes. Both the OEA and 'A' believe 
that this effort will produce at least two hostages and that it 
may be necessary to bribe the additlenal hostages free for SI 
each. The safahouae will be used to harbor/treat the 




for SIH 

flrs,t twb 
iona^) are 



hostages while arrangements (both financial and operat 
being made for the renaming hostages. *A* believes that 
Issst 7 2-96 hours would be required for a second round. 

The DEA officers are prepared to depart as soon as they ara 
contacted by 'A.' Travel arrangeaents and operational costs are 
currently being financed froa funds froa private sources. 

The two OEA officers should be made available for this operation 
for a period net to exceed 30 days, preferably directly to this 
organisation. It is iaportant that no other parties beeone aware 
of this operation in order to protect *A* as well as the donors. 



UNCUSSIHED 



904 



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BOYUM 
2:00 p.m. 



T 



O^A f^c^iol 3 



DEPOSITION OF 



Wednesday, May 13, 1987 



House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions 

with Iran, 
Washington, O.C. 



The Select Committee met, purusant to call, at 2:00 
p.m.. Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Pamela 
Naughton, (Staff Counsel) presiding. 

Partial'v Declassified/Released on ijUxJl'^ °° 
under provisions ol E 12356 
by K Jorinson National Security Coundl 



COB HO- 




yNsussra 



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IMffiOSiflll^ 




Whereupon i^^^^^^^^HBI^^ after having been 
first duly svorn, was called as a witness and testified as 
follows: 

EXAMINATION 
BY MS. NADGHTON: 
Q Would you state and spell your name, please? 
A 

Q ^^I^^^BVI ^is is a deposition under the Rules 
of the House Select Conmittee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran. 

My name is Pamela Naughton, I am staff counsel. 
I have asked the other people around the room to introduce 
themselves for the record. 

MR. GENZMAN: I am Robert B. Genzman, associate 
minority counsel. «y 

MR. KAPLAN: Jimmy Kaplan, associate counsel 
with the Senate Select Committee. 

MR. FLYNN: Henry J. Flynn, investigator with 
the Senate Select Ccxnnittee. 
BY MS. NADGHTON: 
Q ^^^^^^^^^Kyou have received a copy of our rules 

22 of the Select Conmittee; is that correct? 

23 A That is correct. 

24 Q And feel free at any time to review or refer to 

25 those rules in the course of the deposition. We discussed 



907 



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iiR?a8i 



:^oi: 



^ earlier your right to have your own personal attorney present 
„ at this stage or at any stage of the deposition. Do you 
g understand that? 
. A That is correct. I would like to enter into the 

_ record though, I was only advised of this before coming 
here, shortly before. 

Q Okay, fine. Do you wisu to have your own 
attorney present? 

Q No, not at this stage. 
A All right. 

Also note that this is executive session material 
which means that the conmittee holds it confidential in 
secret. 

A Okay. 

Q The committee would also strongly request that 
you also keep it secret and what you say in the deposition 
to remain confidential. 

We do think for your own protection as well as 



18 — ? 
19 



for thaprotection of the committee's investigation. 
Do you have any questions about that? 



A No. 

Q All right. 

Let's start off with a little bit of your back- 



ground. 



How long have you been in the DEA? 
Sixteen years. 



908 



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URcntsinipT 



Q And for the record, the DEA is the Drug Enforce- 
ment Administration? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you say six years? 

A Sixteen years. 

Q Sixteen, okay. And you are currently stationed 
where? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

Q And how long have you been^ 

A JBTwo and a .half years. 

Q And prior to that you viere where? 

A ^I^^^I^^^^^H- immediate posting or would 

you like .to know theother postings? 

Q All of your other postings? 

A 




Q Are there any other DEA agents stationed in 



A Yes. We recently received a second agent position 



Q In 



A Yes. 



yNCu.isiFiFn 



909 



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Are there any others? 

A Secretary. 

When did this new agent arrive on the scene? 

In September of last year. 

So there are no DEA agents permanently assigned 




have 



him? 

A Oh, I guess shortly before he was reassigned to 
vhe states, which I believe was in 1980. 

Q And the agent by the name ofj 
you ever met him? 

A Yes, I have. 

Q And where did you meet 
^^^l^^^^^^l was 
[during the same time I was assi' 
therefore we had contact on investigative matters, 



^J<H.>^ 2- 




iiKiPt Accinrn 



910 



lims 



^m: 



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Q NOW, did there come a tine in 1985 that either 
and ^^^^^^^^1 contacted you while you were in 




A Yes. 

Q Can you tell me how that came about? 
A Yes. I believe it was the end of January 1985, or 
beginning of February, 1 received a telephone call from 

who was in the process of departing from Washington 
and he requested that I contact Mr. Abraham 
Azz2un, who was the chief of foreign operations for the DEA, 
who was on temporary duty ^^^^^^^^^M and T 



and 






requested that l>lr. Azzam, myself, and 
agent in charge of the DEA 

I in ^^^^^^^1 following day. 
Q Did he tell you what for? 

A He told me it was a very important meeting and 

S 
that I should advice Mr. Azzam that the administrator had 

requested his presence at the meeting. 

Q That is Mr. Lawn? 

A He was not specific. I think Mr. Mullen was our 
administrator during that time. It was right between the — 
I believe it still was Mr. Mullen. 

Q But he did not give you the subject matter? 

A No. 

Q Did you go ^^^^^^^H the next day? 

ilMPf ACOinrn 



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mmi^ 



Yes, the following day I deove^^^^^^Hand met 

nd about an hour 



Mr. Azzam who was arriving 
later we nietHH^^^^^|and 



New York. 

Q What happened then? 

A We also met up with 
in later and traveled to the 

Q The what? 





deplaning from 



who I believe came 



and 




meeting. 
Q 

A 



gave us a briefing on the purpose of the 



What did 



tell you? 
told us that the President had a 
full-court press going to identify the location and 
possibly win the releas*^f the hostages, and the White 
House had contacted the Attorney General, who had in turn 
requested the assistance of the law enforcement connnunity 
for assistance in locating the hostages. 
Q And that William Buckley,] 




Ithe chief of station for the Central Intelligence 
Agency in Beirut prior to his capture and that this also 
involved a, not just a human terrorist, but Mr. Buckley 
had sensitive information that it was very important that 
he be located and returned. 



UNCLASSIFirn 



912 



.Jt- 



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explained that OEA had received 
official funding of $50,000 for this operation under a 
special enforcement operation 471 and this money was to be 
used to pay for the expenses of people who were willing 
to cooperate to locate the hostages, and that if that money 
was expended that the NSC and slash or the CIA would assume 
the funding depending on the success of DEA to make seme 
progress towards the hostages. 

What didjHflH^Hj^H say the role of the CIA and 
the NSC were? 

A Well, he explained that CIA had had difficulty 
in making progess in locating Mr. Buckley and that therefore 
the law enforcement community, since we have DEA, specifically 
has numerous narcotics sources vho frequently travel in 
and out of I 



, Lebanon area where they vrere 
suspected to be held, could provide Information to the 
agency and the NSC about the situation down there. 

MR. FLYNN: Could you repeat the area? 

THE WITNESS: ^^H^H| 

MR. FLYNN: H|^^H| what? 

THE WITNESS : p^^^^H Lebanon. 

MR. FLYNN: Inj 

THE WITNESS: In I 




IIMSHIL 



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BY MS. NAUGHTONt 

Q Did he tell you specifically what was to be done 
with your sources, in other words, did he make any mention 
of turning the sources over to the CIA? 

A I think that initial discussion was that we 
should determine first of all what sources we had available 

DEA within{HH|||^H^^^H|^^ and 
them would be usable or could develop strategic information 
about this, and they would be actually run by or debriefed 
]3y ^^^^^^^^H and^^^^^^^H but also made 
to the agency for debriefing. 

Q What was the role to be of the NSC? 

A Well, if I can retract a little bit, the White 
House was the word they used. I am assuming NSC through 
what I have read in the newspapers. 

Q Okay. ^<hat w?s the White House role to be then? 

A They would be the central, I guess, clearing 
or collecting house of all 




(mention any specific 



[to evaluate the possibility of 

getting these people out. 

Did j^^^^^^^Bandi 
names at the White House? 

A I believe that they — heard the name of Adirmal 
Poindexter and, I believe, Itr. McFarlane. I can't really 



\mn Accincn 



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10 
remember specifically. I believe Polndexter was mentioned. 

Q Do you recall in what context? 

A That they had spoken with them about what they 
would like to accomplish, what DEA could possibly provide 
in the way of strategic intelligence about the situation in 
Lebanon. 

Q What did they tell you regarding the money other 
than the first $50,000? Did they say anything other than 
the CIA and the White Rouse would provide it thereafter? 

A Well, what they explained to me is that some of 
the informant — I won't even say Informants — some of the 
sources, the people who were willing to assist in the effort, 
it would be easier for them to come out(^^^^^^^^Hfor 
debrief ings 




ifi^^^^H or^^^H were 
unable to meet and reimburse these people for expenses, 
that I would be able to get funding through the SEO fund 
and reimburse them for expenses. 

But that actually, that only happened on one 
occasion. 

Q What else did they tell you at that meeting? 

A Just that we should consider it "to be a priority 
mission and thatkt was to be considered very classified. 
It was not authorized to divulge the operation or any aspects 



iiMPi Accinrn 



915 



. ?i- ,'* 



mmm 



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about it to anyone including our ambassador, they were 
afraid that if this got out that William Buckley would be 
subjected to intensified debriefings 

Q What about 
were you allowed to discuss it with them? 

A No. I was told not to discuss this with anyone. 

Q Did they mention at all the use of any private 
monies or whether or not you should handle any private 
monies? 

A No. 

Q There was no discussion about private monies? 

A No. 

Q Was there any discussion of how operational 
you should be in this? 

A Just peripheBiylly. If the need arose that one of 
the sources had to have expense money and it was convenient 
for him to pick up his mone^^mHl should 
And also I should make an attempt to debrief all of the source^ 
that 1 came in contact with concerning their availability and 
possible value to the program. 

Q But other than contacting sources and obtaining 

intelligence, did you discuss any sort of operational role 

for you or any other DEA agent? 

A No. 

Q In 



UNCUSSIflED 



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Q Did you discuss that at any tine? 

A No, other than being able to help them with 
expenses. That was the extent of my operational role. 

Q How long did this meeting take] 

A Well, we later met with two prospective sources 
who were familiar with the situation ^^^^^^^^H and I 
came in on the meeting a little bit late, but they were 
being debriefed on what the situation was, the political 
situation, what the — as far as the danger of operations 
in that area and what these people would be willing to 
do to assist. 

If Buckley — and there were no specifics to 
these individuals about what the operation was about, just 
if an American could be located, if they would be willing 
to assist in getting higi out of the country, in other words, 
if there was a forceful extraction inside of Lebanon, 
would these people be willing to make sure the person was 
moved out using their connections. 

And the person agreed to try, but said they 
would not since this was sprung on them they would have 
to travel ^^^^^^^^land do some research and find out 
what the situation was. 

Q Was money given to — - 

A No. Now, after these people went 
about a week later I received a call from 

nimi nAoinrn 




and 



91^ 



' ^v ,. ASf- 



BNttASal^ 



13 



^ b« asked me if I would pay one of theae- subjects $5,000 
in reimbursement for his travel expenses because he was 
going to be traveling back ^^^^^^^^^B So 

provided a DEA fund cite via cable for $5,000 charged against 
g the operation 471. 

And I traveled ^^^^^^H met with the subject, 
and paid him $5,000 for which Uhl signed a receipt, DEA 
standard payment receipt. 

Q And did you file that receipt with headquarters? 
A Yes, it was submitted through the standard DEA 
procedures. 

MR. FLYNN: Was that a government form, or just 

a sheet of paper that you 

THE WITNESS: No, it is a government form referred 
to as "payment for expenses" and it is a form that comes in 
triplicate. One copy goes to, normally to the investigative 
file; one copy goes to the file of the subject; and one 
to the voucher processing for internal controls. The person 
was actually paid. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q When you say you signed it to special enforcement 
operations? 

A Yes. 

Q Is that where you got the money from? 

A Yes. 



UNCUSSIRED 



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Q til, is that an account for special operations? 

A Well, DEA has what we refer to as SEOs which 
stands, the acronym for Special Enforcement Operation, and 
if our headquarters finds a specific operation that needs 
headquarters funding which would exceed the normal funding 
available to our district offices, then headquarters will 
agree to fund specific operations whecher it is a cocaine 
project ^^^^^^^^^H or a heroin* lab case ^^^^^^^B 

And they create a number for each operation 
for accounting purposes and also for a file, like a general 

file, a catch-all. You don't know who your subjects are at 

12 f 

the time. Your are targeting specific geographic areas or 

group of subjects. 

Q So were you given a special number for this 
operation? *p 

A Well, the file number was SEO 471. However, I 
aun not — you are not authorized in the field to make 
expenditures for a special enforoement operation unless you 
have a fund cite which is regulated — a fund cite, in other 
words, DEA headquarters will allocate $5-$10,000 to a 
specific district office for use in paying sources, or travel 
expenses, or reimbursements for other investigative expenses. 
And the fund cite basically designates, it is like a standard 
government fund cite where the Department of Justice numbers 



25 come first, the DEA comes second, then it would be designated 



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office of special operations, and then the last four numbers 
would be that specific project; so you keep control of 
expenditures. 

MR. FLYNN: You say the fund cite; is that SITE? 
THE WITNESS: CITE, fund cite, CITE. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q <>so you dxd not receive that special number until 
you requested the $5,000; is that correct? 
A Yes, that is correct. 

Q With that number does there come a code naune for 
the operation? 

A No. 471 was the code. That was the thing that 
it was referred to as. 
'* Q Is that the only time you withdrew from the fund 
■•5 cite? 

^^ A Yes. |^|^m[al-80 — I believe he allocated 
or to the JH||^^H||||H^^H Account for 
telephone expenses, travel expenses, any expenses that he 
^^ might encumber while ^^^^^^^^^^^assisting in this endeavor 
^ Q So the total amount you vere authorized was 

21 $6,000 or less? 

22 A $6,000 — yes, $5,500 or $6,000. 

23 Q Do you recall approximately what month, it was 

24 that you paid this source? il^ini A 
25 



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A Yes, it was immediately after the first meeting. 
It was within 

Q In January then? 

A Within two weeks. Probably, I would say, February, 
Q Now, was this source paid for as reimbursement for the 
fiist trip ^^^^^^^H or was this in advance for the next 
trip 

A It was, I think it was both. I think he stayed 
I longer than he had planned on staying and 
yet he was going to be returning ^^^^^^^^1 so it was a: 
combination of the two. 

Q Did you write any sort of report of either the 
briefing or the meeting with the sources? 

A No, in fact, I did not debrief the sources because 
the agreement was that they should be debriefed by the people 
who %rere in the know of the operation, not to subject 
the sources to various debriefings by people who really 
didn't have knowledge of the names that they were dealing 
with and the background to make a worthwhile debriefing. 

Q So to your knowledge, of all the sources you 
contacted, by %irhom were they debrief? 

^^^|^|^|^|2md^^^^^^^| and believe they 
mentioned someone from the agency also. 

Q Has that a man named 

A I never met or heaurd any agent names, but I believe 



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one of them debriefed an Informant g|^^^^ 

Q Now, after the — I guess In February of 1985, 
then your encounter with the first two sources, what 

■7 

happened regarding your activities in this area. 

A Well, nothing happened until 19 — I believe it was 
August or September of 1985. 

Q Excuse me, I did have one preliminary question 
Was there any discussion of whether or not you 
should write reports on this activity? 

A No, we were told not to. There should be no formal 
reporting done through the DBA channels 

Q Who told you that? 

A 

Q Did anyone else tell you that? 



were all present at the time. Any reporting, I guess, that 
was going to be done would be conducted there at Washington 
for security reasons. 

They just couldn't tzUte a chance on Buckley's 
position becoming known. 

Q So when you submit your authorization for the 
fund cite you didn't list any specific reasons — 

A Just reimbursement for 471 and any questions 
should be referred to^^^^^^^|at headquarters. 

Q Did flJI^^B indicate to whom he reported 
at headquarters? lirJ! * .aILILI! 



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24 
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ONttASSffiiT 



IS 



A Well, the initial discussion I believe was with 
Mr. Azzan, who was — he was either chief of foreign 
operations or going into his new job as assistant to the 
deputy administrator. He had been asked by our headquarters 
people to be the official liaison betweentbe agency and DEA 
to ensure that there was a coordination and that! 
and ^^^^^^^H would be responsible for debriefing the sources 
and Mr. Azzam would be the one to pass that on to the 
agency, 

Q Did that later change? 

A I have no idea. You would have to talk with 
Mr. Azzan. I know he — I know his participation in 
this operation either became limited or he became no longer 
involved after an sunount of time, because I had asked him 
last fall, I guess, if they were having any lucki, and he 
told me he was not involved in that project anymore. 

Q Did he tell you why Wot? 

A No. 

MR. GENZMAN: Who are we talking about again? 
THE WITNESS: Mr. Azzam, he is the special 
assistant to the deputy director of DEA. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Now, you were starting to tell me what happened 



in June? 



August. 



i/Ncussm 



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Q August? 

A Yes, August or September. I am sorry I didn't 
know I was going to be participating or I would have looked 
in my notes here, but these are approximate times, and I 
make you aware of that fact. 

:alled me^^^^^fand said he was 
and he was in contact with the sources that had 
had his passport either lost or stolen, and asked if I would 
be available later that afternoon for a meeting 
Actually, it was in the morning when I got up there. He 
subsequently traveled ^^^HHand told me that he was in 
contact with a subject who alleged to have influence over 
the ^^^^H Community, that was the overseers of the people 
who were holding the hostages, and that his fellow had 
scheduled a meeting, I believe|^^^^^^^W with one of the 
influential ^^^^H and deeded a temporary travel document 

We discussed various possibilities of covert 
identities, but decided since it vras a matter of such national 
priority to request that our eunbassador authorize the issuance 
of a temporary passport forjjj^^^^^H to use accompanying this 
guy to his meeting, and I told^^^^^^H I doubted if the 
ambassador would issue it just based on a DEA request, 
and that someone should call her from Washington at a high 
level and explain to her that this was not a normal DEA 
request should receive her immediate attention. 



\\m h^m^w 



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I then called — ^^^^^^H contacted, called some- 
one in Washington, and explained the situation. 

Q Do you know who he called in Washington? 

A This is only speculation on my part, but I believe 
he contacted Mr. Dickey or Mr, Hickey, who was the special 
adviser, I believe, to the President for terrorism and 
military affairs. 

And then we went to the ambassador's office, 
she was on the telephone at that time with Washington, and 
got off the phone, and we told her^ we needed her assistance 
and she asked the consular officer to come to her office a 
and requested that the consular officer provide a temporary 
passport. 

Q Let's back off a minute, did she say she had 
received a call from Ed Hickey? 

A She didn't. She just was on the telephone and 
said, "I understand," hung up, and thencaimeto us and 
I just briefly told her that we were in contact with someone 
%rho possibly could help get Mr. Buckley located and so that 
at that time she called^^^^^^^^^^H the consular officer. 

Q Did you introduce ^^^^^^H to Ambassador 

A les, as a Drug Enforcement Administration 
agent . 



From Washington? 
Yes. 



ONCUSSIFIE 



925 



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Q Did she inquire why this was coining through DEA? 

A No. No, she apparently was — that was explained 
on the telephone, apparently. 

Q What happened when ^^^^^^^^^H C2une into the room 
then? 

A The ambassador asked her to assist us, and she 
agreed to do it, and then we departed the room, and 
^^^H then explained that the aunbassador did not have the 
authority to authorize issuance of a passport and that 

Q Excuse me, who agreed to do it, the ambassador 
or ^^^^^H 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bagreed to in the 
ambassador's presence. Then after we left the office 
she explained that actually it would not be possible for 
her to do it because of State Department regulations, and 
that ambassadors had gotten trouble for authorizing the 
issuance of passports without following the procedure. 




926 



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'I explained to her that this was a 
TTtuatlon that requb/Ued Immediate action, and thanked 
her for her help, or non-help, and that was It. 

What did ^^^^^^H say to ^^^^^HH when she 
described this procedure to you? 

A He just explained that this was an — well, that 
it involved an American official. He didn't tell her, 
give her any details that Mr. Buckley was actually in the 
agency and if there was not some way to expedite the 
procedure. She said she could check again, but she was 
sure that they would be unwilling to bend on this and 
suggested maybe someone could contact Secretary Shultz 
or someone in the State Department and he explained that 
this was an operation that could not have wide exposure, 
it couldn't, too many people could not be notified over the 
telephone, and so on, it was departmentalized classified. 



i'MPJ iPCinrn 



927 



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would have to 



I and learning the 



Q So what happened? 

^^^^^^1 then went^^^^^^Hand 
him, I guess he contacted me, I believe a week later, and 
stated that they had resolved the temporary papers to enable 
this guy to travel. 

Q How was that resolved? 
A I can only speculate, 
answer as to that. 

Q After speaking wit) 
procedure, did you consider going back to the ambassador 
and having her make a few phonecalls since they had already 
briefed her on it? 
A No. 
Q Why not? 

A We just decided that first of all, we were 
under instructions not even to involve the ambassador. 
We had breached the instructions by even doing that and that, 
just got to thinking about it and decided that that was 
not even the proper thing for us to do, and I believe 
^^Hjalso talked with ^^^^^^^^1 about that aspect 

We should not get people involved in this that 
did not have a actual need to know. Basically, that was 
it. We were starting to get too many people involved? 
Q Did you ever meet this source? 



Yes, I did. 



UNCLASSIHEO 



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IMCHMR^T 






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Q When was that? 

A I met with him. H« and a separate aource who was 
acquainted to this source ^^^HHH I believe it was 
week or two after^Hf^^^Hoff ical meeting|^^^H 
The primary reason for that was the second individual who 
was on contact withm^Hfand this source was also a 
potential narcotics source. 




asked if I %«3uld come doWilj and discuss possibly %«>rking 
as a narcotics source for us, also. 

MR. GEMZMAM: Did you say that is a second 

source? 

THE WITNESS: Second source, yes. 
BY NAUGHTON: 
Q I am talking about the source *rtu) lost his 

passport. 

A Yes, I did meet with, the source who lost his 

passport, and the other subject. 

Q When did you meet the source who lost his 

passport? 

A At the aiJjme time. A week or two after] 
first contacted me. 

Q So 

A Middle of September. 



r.MPi A<jQ!nFn 



929 



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\m 



vinm 



^ Q In February? 

A No, September. 

Q Okay . 

A September. The First two weeks in September. 

Q This is 1985 now? 

A Yes I believe I can — if I can jump 
some questioning, I believe I can clarify a little bit about 
this guy and possibly how it might — how it might have 
relevance to your investigation. 

Q To get it straight, we are referring to the guy 
who is now in prison? 

A No. The one I am thinking of is, he referred to 
himself as a Saudi Prince. 

Q All right. 

A Okay. And he said that he was a Mullah and that 

he had contact with people in both Lebanon and in Iran who 

had religious influence over people who were holding the 

hostages, and that in a humanitarian gesture, he would 

Lt^t'llui7^~ influence them, and as payment for his good 
19 A 

deed he expected relocation for himself and his family 



into the United States. 

Q Did he explain why he couldn't go back to Saudi 

Arabia? 

A He said that he was a member of a -- there were two 
types of Saudi Arabian families, one was — there was a wife 



IlKini AQ^IPIFH 



930 



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URRIIKmaF' 



26 

.| side of the feuoily, and the husband side of the family, and 
2 he was a prince of the wife's side of the family, which 
2 really did not have a lot of clout, and he had run afoul 
A with the Saudi hierarchy, and did not get Into detail why 
5 but he was In hot water with them, and wanted to relocate 
g the the States. 

•, Q Did he say where he wanted to locate in the 

United States? 

A I believe he said he was living in California 
where he had rented a home there. 

Q Is this the only time you met the prince? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you pay him any money in September? 

A No. 



Q Do you know whether] 
paid blm any money? 

A I couldn't answer that. 

Q At euiy time? 

A No, but I know when he — he portrayed himself 
to be a very wealthy Individual *rfiD was doing this out of 
humanitarian reasons and did not — almost would act 
insulted if someone should offer to reimbursement him for 
any of his expenses. 

He made that very clear that he was not in this 
for financial gain. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



931 



m^sKi^ftT 



27 

^ Q Did you meet with the prince In the accompany 
2 of anyone else? 
A Yes. 

Q Who was that? 

A The second source. This was someone who knew the 
g prince. I believe he was using the name of — the prince 
■m was using at that time the neune of Masudi Ibrahim Masudi, 
g and the other fellow who was at this meeting had just arrived 
^^^^^m^mH^mHH^nd gave a 

of the situation there and where, allegedly where one of 
the hostages had been moved in recent weeks. 
Q So these two men knew each other? 
A Yes. 

MR. FLYNN: Excuse me, I got to ask you something. 



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I am a little confused here. These two men here have 
nothing to do with the man you paid the $5,000 to? 

THE WITNESS: No, no, sir. These axe separate 
people. 

MR. FLYNN: Where did you meet these two men? 

THE WITNESS: 

MR. FLYNN: When? - 

THE WITNESS: Sepbember 1995. The other subject 
I met in February of 1985. 



25 



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UNOHSSI^ilpT 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Here you here last week in the United States? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you watch any of the hearings? 

A The stuff that was capped during the news at 
nighttime. 

Q Did you see pictures of Richard Secord? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you see him^^^^^^^^^^^Hat any time? 

A No. However, I did see an associate of his. 

Q Nho was that. 

A Albert Hakim. 

Q Okay. Is this the money tale? 

A $30,000. 

Q Before we ge*^to that, I want to stay on the 
prince for a minute. 

A Okay. 
18 Q You never saw Secord with the prince? 
■•9 A No. 

20 Q Did you ever see a man named Willard Zucker? 

21 A No, 

22 Q Did you know William Zucker? 

23 A No. 

Did^^^^^^B °^ ^^^^^^^^1 speak to you about 
25 the prince. 



UNCLASSIRFO 



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^^^^^^^H had 
Q And what had he told you about the (princeT, 
in other words, what was his evaluation of this guy's 
credibility? 

A Well, he said that this was the only non-DEA 
generated source that they had talked to and this guy had 
been handed over to DEA by the White House. 

A Did he say who at the White House? 
A No. 
Q Okay . 

A And that we should try to analyze his value, 
in other words, if he said that he could meet a Mullah and 
get the hostages out, to hold his feet to the fire and 
make him produce, you know, come up with a meeting to hear 
what was being discussed since it was not a DEA generated 
asset. 



UNClASSIFiED 



934 



cantor 
3:00 



UtltU^EIHfeT 



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Q Did ^^^^^^B tell you he met the prince? 

A I know they were together ^^^^^^^H They had 
been together before he called, but I have no idea where they 
made their initial meeting. 

Q Did^^^^Bindicate when he had met the prince? 
Did you get the feeling this is a recent acquaintance? 

A Yes, A very recent meeting. ^^^^^^^Hv«43s in 
the process of determining the bona fides of this guy, what 
actually, if he could produce what he said he could produce, 
that he did not really know that much about this subject or 
his background. The DEA are very skeptical when we meet a 
new source, especially when it is handed over to us, because 
you don't have the background, and you try to find out 
as much as you can about such before you put your life on 
the line. *f 

Q Usually if the^^ good source they are not handed 
out? 

A Exactly, they are not. Vou obviously have 
had some experience with narcotics prosecutions. 

Q Did^|H^^^^H| know of the price? Did you 
ever discuss him in his presence? 

A Yes,^^^^^^^H did know the 

Q Why do you say that? 

A Because I think I talked to^^^^^^^H about 

I was trying to get a hold of, 
■ ■A BAB ■ 4%M| 




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31 
. talk and ask where^^^^^^H was, if he and the prince 

2 
3 




had moved out^^^^^^^^^Bbo the meeting. 

Q What ^^^^^^^M 3Ay about the prince? 

A Just in general, where is he, no real details 
- about his background. 

g Q Did^^^^^ever mention anything about the prince 

regarding the contras in Nicaragua, any payment or contribu- 
tions he was going to make? 

A No. 

Q Did the prince ever mention to you any planned 
contributions of any sort to the contras in Nicaragua? 

A No. He was a class act so far as being a good 
BSer. 

Q Do you know what happened to him after? 

A Yes. Hell, I am assuming because I read in the 



newspaper where Judge Webster was asked about the Saudi 
prince who turned out to be an Iranian how is now in jail 
in Philadelphia for bank fraud, and I believe, he is an 
associate of Richard Millers, and I have gotten that out of 
the newspapers. 

Is this the same fellow? 

Q Yes. 

A Okay, 

Q Did you see Richard Miller in| 

A No. 



IINClASI^iFiFn 



936 



22 
23 
24 
25 



DNCH^BIKiT 



32 



.. Q Did ^^^^^^H ever discuss Richard Miller. 

2 A No. 

2 Q What about a man named Channell, Carl Spitz 

Channel 1. 

A NO. 

Q During the trial of the prince, do you know whether 
_ or not you or any other agent of the DEA was called on to 
either testify or provide any information? 

A No. 

Q There is no contact there? 

A I am not aware of that. 

Q Did you meet the prince at any time other than 
that meeting in September of 1985? 

A No. 

Q When you saw him in September did you ask him 
about the passport thing? 

A No. 

Q Do you know under what travel papers he was 
traveling? 

A I believe^^^Bsaid he was using Iraqi papers. 



and having an Iraqi passport and having contacts in Iran. 
To be honest with you, we were very, well, I won't say, not 
suspect, but his whole story was missing a few pages. We 
all know why now, I guess. 



ONCUSSIFIED 



937 



USftffiSWBF 



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Q I have a question on the source, just in 
general. When you contacted any of them, for whatever 
reason, did you have to record that contact in their jacket? 

A No. First of all, if it would have been an 
established DEA source, then he would have been debriefed 
first of all for narcotics intelligence, which goes 
into the narcotics — into his case file on that subject, 
when it is heroine, cocaine, geographic area, and the non- 



narcotics intelligence would be put on a memorandum 




I mean unless it was specific about the Buckley 
hostage thing, because I was still under a caveat not to 
discuss that with emybody, but I can think of maybe one 
or two occasions where I«^ebriefed informants who reported 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwhi c h 

f orm , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
Q Has that during the time period of these arms 

sales? 

A Yes, apparently one of the informants was very — 
had some information about it. I don't know what follow up 
was that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

Q What time frame was that? 

A The fall of 1985, December. It could have been 
in January or February. Our general counsel has requested 



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UNtM^H^^ 



34 



.J that I forward all debrieflngs for your area, so I Instructed 

2 ray secretary to send that. 

g Q Do you recall what that informant told you about 
that arms deal? 

A Well, he said that — this was actjaUlly an inform- 
ant ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H who 
about drug traffic, cocaine trafficking^^^^^^^^^H and 
as part of his routine debriefing we get into terrorist 
weapons, anything that might interest another government 
agency that is working at it, and he stated that he had know- 
ledge that Israel was reworking TOW missiles, putting fancy 
warheads on outdated TOWs and selling then to Iran, and 
that Iranians were happy with the missiles and they wanted to 
have direct contact, Rafsanjani, I believe, was the contact 



he alleged to have direct association with. Rafsanjani wanted 
to talk directly to the United States and resolve difficulties 
end the war, whatever. 

The bottom line was to get guns, get weapons that 
he needed for his war against Iraq. 

Q Did the source say how many TOW missiles? 

A It has been two years. It would be best for 
you guys just to review the memo. It should be in there 
whatever he told me. 

Q Do you recall what nationality the source was? 
The source was ^^^^^^H 

Q How did you have any contacts 1 



. mmm\\ 



939 



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A It is really a strange thing. He apparently had 
been at one time involved in^^^^^^politics, and had 
been incarcerated by^^^^^Hand he escaped and ended up 
in Europe and got involved with weapons trafficking. 

The guy is probably still a decent source. I 
have no idea. I didn't have contact with him after the 
initial debriefing because the agency was not interested 
in purchasing any of them. They had a lot of people beating 
their door down at that time with the seune story. Do arms 
with us and we guarantee an end of the war and we will make 
a million dollars. 

He didn't mention about hostages or anything 
though. 




Q Going back to my question about the sources, of 
the sources witK whom you would talk zibout the hostages in 
Lebanon, would you make a record of that contact on their 
file? 

A No, because they were not established DEA 
informants, not informants, DEA cooperating individuals, 

mm ftcciiprn 



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sources, whatever you want to call then. 

Q They didn't have numbers? 

A No. None of the ones I met — well, the one 
that I met Initially was not an established numbered DEA 
source. The subject that he introduced to us had never had 
contact with U.S. authorities before, so he obviously wasn't 
numbered, and the prince and his associate also had not had 
contact with DEA prior to our meeting with then. 

So you didn't establish them? 

A No, there was no establishment. My issue was 
never explained to become directly involved in any debriefings 
of these people. It was supposed to be handled by^^^^B 
H^^Hand the agency people who were working on this thing. 

Q What was your next contact with this activity of 
September of 1985? 

A In May of 1986, I received a telephone call from 
who was ^^^^^^^^^H I think it was about o'clock 
In the morning, and he told me he had to f ly^^^^^^^^the 
following day to pick up money for expenses for himself and 
his sources, and he asked me, he gave me an arrival time 

land asked what the turn-around time would be, or 
if he could make it back ^^^^^^^It hat evening. And I 
explained to him that that wouldn't be possible, so he 
asked me if I would be willing to pick up the expense money 
initially^^^^^^ltake it to him^^^^^^flso he could get 



^^^^^^^Htake to him^^^^^^^|: 



941 



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back on the plane and get down there, and I said I surely woul^ 
assist him. So he told me that someone would be calling 
me the following day and would make arrangements to give 
roe the money. 

Q Is that what happened? 

A Yes. 

Q Someone called you the next day? 

A Yes. 

Q Was this a local call? 

A No. Well, I can't remember if I had a telephone 
number ^H^^Hor if he gave my number out. Anyway 

Q Excuse me just a minute. Did ^^j^ tell you 
where the money was coming from? On the other hand, did he 
say "I am waiting for so and so to wire it"? 

A No. He was 1» contact with, I believe, ^^^^^ 
t^H^|in Washington, andH^Hwas coordinating in 
Washington the payment, deliver, whatever, of expense 

money for^^^^^^^H In^^^^^^l^H^^^^^Bi 

Q So the next day didyou get a call? 

A Yes. A person who identified himself as Albert, 
and he said that he had a package for[^f and asked if I 
could meet with him |||H|Bto pick it up, because there 
was some problem. He also had some time constraints getting 
|HHH| so we arranged to meet at 2:00 p.m. at the 
apartment building. It was a short-term lease apartment 



942 




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like you could lease it for a month or two, or a couple 
of weeks 

Q Do you have the name of the street? 

A It was the 

Q Clve ne that again. 

A 




is an expensive apartment building. 
He also gave roe a room or an apartment number. 

Q Do you remember that number? 

A No name. No, it was on the fifth floor, I believe, 
next to tie last floor, because I took the elevator up one 
too high and had to come down one. In fact, there was 
no number on it. That was the problem I had. The number 
had fallen off the door, and I kept looking around for it 
and I was pounding on doors, and Mr. Albert poked his 
head out finally and asked if I was^^^^H 

Q Have you seen pictures of Albert Hakim? 

A Yes, I have. 

Q Is that the person that came out the door? 



CNi;U5.^lRFn 



943 



ONCBBSfflEFr 



39 



1 Q Let me show you that time-worn photo, 

2 A Yes, that is Albert 

3 Q And he asked if you werej 

4 A Yes. 

5 Q Was anyone with him? 

6 A No. He was by himself. 

7 Q What happened then? 

8 A He invited me in the apartment, excused himself 

9 for the condition of the apartment because he said he had 

10 just moved in there that day. I thought Albert was 

11 CIA, because he was very guarded in his discussion with me, 

12 and he was not going to tell me anything that I didn't 

13 absolutely need to know, and I wasn't going to offer anything 

14 that he didn't need to know. So it was kind of like a 

15 Mexican standoff. •p 

16 Q Was indeed the apartment like full of boxes 

17 as if he was moving in? 

18 A It was empty. There were no cloths hanging up. 

19 Well, I think the excuse was he had nothing to offer me to 

20 drink in the form of a beverage. He had just moved in. 

21 Q Was there furniture? 

22 A Yes, it was a fully- furnished apartment, but 

23 there were no signs of any inhabitation 

25 



Q You say he excused himself? Ui lULnO^i J Tj Lj 



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24 

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A He said he had a package £^^ 



40 



A Well, he said "I am sorry I don't have anything to 
offer you to drink. I just moved in and I haven't gotten 
situated." 

Q What happened? 

^^^M and asked 
me if^^H h3<3 arrived ^^^^^^^^^1 and him that^^^f 
would be arriving that afternoon, and I would be traveling to 
to pass the envelope to him. 

I asked him if he wanted me to sign a receipt, 
and he said no, that won't be necessary. There is 30, right? 
I said, well, I don't know the details. I have just been 
asked to pick up the package and deliver it to 
He said, "Good Luck." All of maybe two minutes. 

Q Did he mention any other naunes? 

A No, just 

Q Did you get the impression that he knew 



A Excuse me. He did not say^^^^^^^B I got 
the impression that he had been told about ^^^H that he 
knew him. I doubt if he knew him because he would 
have said, "Tell ^^^1 hello for me" if he knew him, and he 
did not send him a type of greeting toJ 

Q How did the money come? On the other hand, 
was it in an envelope? 

A It was in a brown envelope. 






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Q Sealed? 
A Sealed. 

Q Any markings on it? 
A No. 

Q It was American money, I assxune? 
" A I don't know. I never opened the envelope. It 

was an envelope maybe about that big. I put it in my pocket 
We handle large atmounts of money ^^^^^^^^^^H for drug 
® operations, up to $3 or $4 million. It is surprising 

how small $30,000 can be if it is in big notes. I am assuming 
it is $30,000. I am speculating on that because of hearing 
Mr. Secord testify, and having Albert say 30. I would 
hope there was 30 in there. 
"•^ Q What was his reaction when you said "Do you 
^^ want me to sign a receiIJ^IP 

16 Q Not necessarily 

17 A Did he laugh? Did he look surprised? 

18 A No 

19 Q Did he hesitate? 

20 A He acted like he was very cool, like he was used 

21 to the intelligence community and no unnecessary movements 

22 or discussions 

23 Q What happened after you left his apartment 

24 A I drove directlyJ^HH^Iand met with 

25 ^^HH I believe I may have even met his flight, drove 



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him to the^^^^^^HHHotel and he asked if I had 
picked up his package, and I said, yes, and handed it to him 
We were in the lobby area. We didn't have a chance to get 
into any discussions about the details of it because of 
a lot of people standing around there, and I told him that 
I told him that I had to get back 

We had a drug operation going, and seeing to it 
the next morning. 

Q So you never really discussed Albert with him. 
A No. I told him there was a guy by the name of 
Albert that gave the money to me, and that I suspected 
he was an agent of the CIA, an officer. 

Q What did^^^Hsay when you said you suspected 
he was a- CIA agent? 

A He said he di^'t know he was, that Washington 
had arranged the money to be passed. 
'' Q Did he jpecifically say Washington, or any name, 

18 



or any person? 

A Washington. He had mentioned earlier he talked 
to^^^^Habout assume<^^^^^^^^^^^^|was the that 

was in contact with whoever had Albert make the money availabl 

Q What is the next thing that you recall occurring? 



23 A Did you have any involvement or know of any 

2^ actual p^ljbs to extricate the hostages? 

25 



*■ UNClASSinED 



A No. 



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I know I had asked ^^H on occasion how things 
were going, and he said that they developed a good network of 
sources down there, but the situation kept changing so 
quickly that It was not as easy as they assumed it would 
be when they initially got involved in assisting, and 
I inquired if Mr. Buckley was still alive, or what they 
knew about that. And they said there were reports that 
he was dead but still they had no conclusive evidence. 




But never during 
these discussions was there anything about Iranian arms or 
contras. It was DEA operations to try to locate the hostages, 
We talked about different ways of how we might be able to be 
more effective. They were hesitant to get too many DEA 
people involved, doing like European wide search for 
sources. 

If one of us came up with ideas- — 

Q But did you ever discuss any specific plans with 
regarding getting the hostages out? On the 
other hand, how to do it mechanically: 

A No. I don't believe it ever got to that point 
that we actually got into the mechanics. 

Q So you were aware of no specific plans that 
they were involved in! 



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No. 

Did either ^^^Hor^^^|mentlon Oliver North. 

No. I overheard Ollie before. 

In what context? 

I believe when^^^^^^^^^s ^^^^^^■orj 




A 

Q 
A 
Q 

A ______^ 

■l^e was talking toMBBI^^and the name Ollie 
came up. I can't remember in what context It was, but I 
thought that to be a rather strange name. I assume that if 
anybody in the White House is running it it was Admiral 
Poindexter, since that was the name that was mentioned 

initially. 

Q Ollie was discussed in connection with the White 

House though? 

A I believe^dwas talking toUU about how 
things were going, and *»ked or inquired if the latests had 

been given to Ollie. 

Q Did either^|or^d discuss with you how 

their expenses were paid? 

A That they were reimbursed. On^^he things 
that BBj mentioned when I with him^^^^Hwas that 
they were continually out-of-pocket during this operation, 
that they were given a minimal travel amount in Washington, 
and in this instanceJJ had been overseas for, I think, 
five or six weeks, and his American Express Card had taken 



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substantial