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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 9 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13750 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 9 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. — Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnited States Senate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman 
Vice Chairman 




III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, 1 transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fop-YSlease to the public. 

enely yours. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCoUum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Ray nor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard CuUen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, durine 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

Majority Staff 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanskj 
William A. Davis, 

m 

Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Tray lor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courier 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 9 



Preface XXI 

Duemling, Robert W 1 

DIA Major 103 

Dietel, J. Edwin . 247 

Dowling, Father Thomas 321 

Dutton, Robert C 463 

Earl, Robert 547 



XIII 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Harnett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig P. 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Rudd). 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward ! 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., Jr. 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Lei want, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 15 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhome A. 
Mulligan, David R 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Volume 24 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



1 






m 

Scenographic Transcript of 
HEARINGS 
Before the 



HSIS 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



DEPOSITION OF ROBEhl W. u£UMLING 
Thursday, August 20, 1987 



UNCLASSIFSED 



Partially Declassified/Released on i£ 



- ja -SI 



under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by N. Menan. National Security C ouncil 



ington. D.C. 




m 



D^Y 




-uIE-SC^. -£-Cr i.G 



(202) 329-9300 COPY NO.. 
20 ? STS£ZT, M.W. 



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(1) 



UNCLftSSlf 






1 DEPOSITION OP ROBERT W. DUIMLING 

3 Thursday, August 20, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Deposition of ROBERT W. DUEMLING, called as a 

9 witness by counsel for the Select Committee, in the 

10 offices of the Senate Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart 

11 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C, commencing at 

12 12:10 p.m., the witness having been duly sworn by SUSAK 

13 A. HARRIS, a Notary Public in and for the District of 

14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask 

15 by SUSAN A. HARRIS and transcribed under her direction. 



UNCkASSlFiED 



(3) 



WNCia^SIFlED 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of th« Senate Select Cosmlttee on Secret 

3 MllltaxY Assistance to Iran and the Nlcaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 TERRY SMILTANICH, ESQ. 



UNCLRSSIFe 



UNCmSIFSED 



1 CQNTgWTS 

2 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 

3 WITNESS SaiAIE HOUSE 

4 Robert W. Duemllng 

5 By Mr. Smiljanich 4 

6 EXHIBITS 

7 DUEMLING EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

8 1 12 

9 lA 17 

10 2 " . 

11 3 33 

12 4 44 

13 5 59 

14 6 62 

15 7 65 

16 8 66 

17 9 72 

18 10 73 

19 11 77 

20 12 79 

21 13 82 



UNCLASSIFSED 



UNCkASS!F:ED 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon , 

3 ROBERT W. DUEMLING, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY MR. SMIUANICH: 

9 Q For the record, state your name. 

10 A Robert H. Duemling. 

11 Q You have the rank or title of ambassador, is 

12 that correct, retired? 

13 A That's correct. 

14 Q Ambassador, would you give us a very brief 

15 summary of your background? I understand you recently 

16 retired from the foreign service? 

17 A That's correct. I retired on July the 3rd of 

18 this year, after approximately 3 0-plus years of federal 

19 service as a foreign service officer. 

20 Q Would you give us a brief rundown of the 

21 general types of assignments you had, leading up to the 

22 point at which you became director of the Nicaraguan 

23 Humanitarian Assistance Office? 

24 A Yes. At the beginning of my career, I had 

25 assignments in political, economic, and consular work. I 



UNCLASSIFIED 



UNCLASSIFSEt) 



1 then specialized in political work, and later in ay 

2 career I was the deputy chief of aission at the American 

3 embassy in Ottawa. 

4 I was also the U.S. Ambassador to Suriniuse, 

5 and I had a couple of management assignments as well. 

6 Q Generally, career foreign service officers 

7 tend to specialize in certain regions of the world. Did 

8 you have such a general specialty? 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q What was that? 

11 A In my mid-career I specialized in political 

12 affairs in East Asia. 

13 Q ~Hw, the couiAry -ibf Surinam* -- yotr were 

14 Ambassador to Suriname for what years? 

15 AX was Ambassador from August 1982 until August 

16 of 1984. 

17 Q Now, Suriname is in South America, correct? 

18 A Correct. 

19 Q Did you have any Central American experience 

20 in your background? 

21 A Not directly, although while I was Ambassador 

22 in Suriname, which is in the northern coast of South 

23 America, within the State Department it is grouped 

24 together with Caribbean countries and also for management 

25 purposes occasionally it is grouped together with the 



u 



NCLASSTFIED 



ONraSSIF?ED 



1 northern tier of Central America and South Aaterlca. 

2 So that Z had visited, for example, for a 

3 conference in Panama, and I had some limited, very 

4 limited experience in Central America. 

5 Q If one defines Central America as generally 

6 the countries of Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, and 

7 Costa Rica, did you have any experience in those specific 

8 countries? 

9 A Ho. 

10 Q What about your language proficiency? Did you 

11 speaJc and write Spanish? 

12 A I can read Spaniakpbecau**-!,. speak and write 

13 Italian, which la somewhat similar. _X «l8o speak and 

14 write French, so another Romance language such as Spanish 

15 is not particularly difficult. 

16 But I do not speak Spanish. I can read it 

17 with limited facility. 

18 Q ^t generally, your main proficiency in 

19 language is in Italian and French? 

20 A Italian, French, Dutch, because Suriname is 

21 Dutch-speaking. And I also could speak some Japanese, 

22 but I have largely forgotten it. 

23 Q Up to the time you became director of, I'll 

24 refer to it as either NHAO or "Know-How" — ten people 

25 pronounce it ten different ways, I think. Up to the time 



GNCL*SS!FSED 



UNCt«SS!F!ED 



1 you became director ot ^rHAO, had you ever administered an 

2 aid or refugee program for the State Department? 

3 A No, I had not. 

4 Q Your selection as director of NHAO came at 

5 approximately the end of August, beginning of September 

6 1985? 

7 A Correct . 

8 Q What had been your specific experience that 

9 you were told was being called upon to make you director 

10 of NHAO? 

11 A I was never told directly what my experience 

12 was that attracted people to the assignment. However, I 

13 think I can surmise that there were two or three things 

14 in my background that were relevant. 

15 In 1981 to '82, I participated in the creation 

16 of the peacekeeping force for the Sinai, MFO, 

17 Multinational Force and Observers, and that was a startup 

18 operation from scratch in an unusual political setting. 

19 Also, I had performed a manageiBABlk-Study for 
2 Ronald Spiers, the Under Secretary for Management, and I 

21 was considered, I think, to have been a quite successful 

22 manager in my tenure as Ambassador to Suriname, as well 

23 as in my tenure as the minister and DCM in Ottawa. 

24 So it was the management experience and 

25 abilities that I had demonstrated in the past that I 



UNCm^S'i'ED 



10 



uncl^ssif:^d 



8 



1 think were the salient factors In ay appointment. 

2 Q ThanX you. That has been conflraed by other 

3 people we've talked to, who have Indicated those Items 

4 and the fact that you were known for a person who took 

5 very much care with detail, financial matters, et cetera. 

6 When you became director of KHAO, first of 

7 all, did you have any staff to start off with? 

8 A Mo. As I think you know, NHAO was created on 

9 paper, by discussion, and did not exist when I was first 

10 appointed. I think at approximately the same time, and 

11 perhaps even sooner, the people making the assignment — 

12 and that would mean, I presume, Michael Armacost, Elliot 

13 Abrams, perhaps George Shultz — they had selected Chris 

14 Arkos to be the deputy in the organization. 

15 And then when I was appointed, I was told that 

16 he had been pretty well selected if I approved, and we 

17 had a brief meeting and he seemed to be exactly the kind 

18 of person who brought to the office skills that I did not 

19 have, and therefore he seemed like a good deputy to me. 

20 And the two of us then set about trying to 

21 staff the rest of the organization, although I did most 

22 of the selection of staff. 

23 Q Kow, Chris Arkos was proficient in and fluent 

24 in Spanish, is that correct? 

25 A Chris Arkos is an Hispanic American. He is 



GNOtSSSSF!ED 



11 



UNCmSlF'ED 

1 bilingual and bicultural in Spanish. 

2 Q H« also had axtenslve axperienca in Central 

3 America? 

4 A Ha did have very extensive experience in 

5 Central America, in Honduras and perhaps other countries. 

6 He also was intioately familiar with the Nicaraguan 

7 resistance movement and }cnev the leaders of the 

8 Nicaraguan resistance. 

9 Q Other people have stated that Mr. Arlcos had a 

10 very wide-ranging network of acquaintances and contac;^s. 

11 Did you find that to be true in Central America? 

12 A That was abundantly clear to me, that he had a 

13 wide network of friends and acquaintances among Central 

14 Americans, political people, military people, 

15 journalists, as well as a very wide circle of 

16 acquaintances in Washington, particularly people who 

17 themselves are interested in Central American affairs. 

18 Q I'd like to talk for a minute about some of 

19 the problems that you I'm sure perceived immediately in 

20 connection with the setup and operation of a program such 

21 as NHAO. First of all, this was a program which was very 
2 2 overt in the United States. It was a part of public 

23 legislation; a specific sum of money, $27 million, had 

24 been appropriated to be spent. 

25 Its creation was not a secret in any way, and 



uN(ilssir:E3 



12 



1 y«t it was In sone ways a covert oparatlon in Central 

2 Anerica. la that a fair statement? 

3 A Correct. 

4 Q What kind of problems did that cause you in 

5 general? 

6 A In general, it caused us two or three kinds of 

7 problems. First of all, we had to respect and understand 

8 the sensitivity of the governments in Central America who 

9 were going to give some assistance to this program, 

10 without whose assistance the program could not exist, at 

11 least their passive cooperation as a BinimuB. 

12 In particular, that 
13 

14 anxious not to oe seen publicly as aiding and abetting 

15 this effort. So it insisted on a degree of 

16 confidentiality. 

17 Moreover, many of the suppliers in Central 

18 America on whom we had to depend for the purchase of food 

19 and other daily items, they preferred a degree of 

20 anonymity because they feared possible political 

21 reprisals for their assistance and cooperation in the 

22 program. 

23 And indeed, these sensitivities were fairly 

24 well founded. If you wish, I could add some anecdotes to 
2 5 illustrate the point, but I don't think I need to go into 




GNCEtSSlr'ED 



13 



UNCL^H^ 



11 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



it. 



So those were the particular factors. 
Moreover, the resistance Itself needed to preserve a 
degree of secretiveness, In part so that their plans 
would not be broadcast to their adversaries. So there 
were several factors that required sooe degree of 
secrecy. 

On the other hand, our operations here within 
the United States, with our suppliers and so forth, for 
the aost part were perfectly open and above board. 

Q Okay. Now, a lot of the activities of NHAO 
had to concentrate^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Histhat 
correct? 

A Correct . 

Q In addition, however, there were also 
sensitivities in connection with other countries in the 
region, H^^^^^^^^^^^^^ isn't that 

A Correct . 

Q And to some extent the government^^^^H 



A Correct. 

Q Now, let me — in going through the records 
which you kindly gave us complete access to several 
months ago, I just picked out one particular document 



mafi^i 






14 



UNCLAil 



12 



1 bacaus* it ■••9«d to b« a pretty fair suasary of th« 

2 typ«s of problsBS that you ware ancountarlng In 

3 connection with this dichotomy between overt and covert. 

4 Let me hand you what Z have marked as Duemling 

5 Exhibit No. 1, which is a document you prepared, I 

6 believe, in Oecemiser of '85. 

7 (The document referred to was 

8 marked Duemling Exhibit No. 1 

9 for identification.) 

10 Q I don't thinX we need to go through this in 

11 detail, but generally take a moment to look at it. Does 

12 this seem to be a summary of the types of particular 

13 problems that you had to deal with early on in connection 

14 with your directorship? 

15 A Correct. 

16 Q Now, Mr. Arkos had taken a trip to the region 

17 in September-October, in that time frame, and had 

18 reported back on some of the discussions he had, both 

the embassy ^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l 

20 ^^^^^^^^^^rabout what could and couldn't be done to see 

21 the program through, is that correct? 

22 A Correct. 

23 Q Is it also correct that, in a nutshell, both 

24 the embassy there and the government of Honduras stated 

25 that NHAO employees as such could not be stationed inside 



uNcmsiriB 



15 



UNCtA^lFlEO 



13 



1 ^^^^^^Halthar at tha embassy or alsevhara, in ordar to 

2 act as a Bonitorlng agant for racaipt of goods into tha 

3 country? Is that correct? 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q As a result of that inability to station a 

6 person within your employ in tha region in order to 

7 monitor receipt of goods, what did you have to do or how 

8 did you go about keeping as much control as possible over 

9 so many things coming out, leaving this country or being 

10 purchased, ajid so many things being received in the 

11 country? 

12 A Wall, let's start with the matter of purchases 

13 within tha United States. Perhaps I should just state 

14 briefly that there were certain types of supplies that 

15 could only ba procured within the United States, such 

16 things as first class jungle boots , ponchos , poncho 

17 liners, and so forth. 

18 Wa procured those kinds of supplies in the 

19 United States, aggregated them, usually in New Orleans at 
2 a warehouse arrangement that had been created somewhat 

21 earlier by the resistance itself. 

22 We utilized that warehousing arrangement and 
2 3 their existing arrangements, contractual arrangements. 

24 We would aggregate the supplies there and in effect those 

25 supplies became the property of the resistance, really, 



ONCttSS'F'ED 



16 



UNClASSIFitQ 



14 



1 at the time that they were dispatched from the United 

2 States, because NHAO for the reasons that you describe 

3 could not really directly control those supplies once 

4 they had left the United States. 

5 So they were aggregated there. We did — I 

6 had my own personnel periodically visiting that facility, 

7 and we always had someone present for the loading and 

8 taXeoff of the aircraft. 

9 Q Let me stop you for one second. Was the 

10 individual basically in charge of that operation in 

11 Louisiana Mario Calero? 

12 A Correct. 

13 Q Go ahead. 

14 A And we would then satisfy ourselves that the 

15 materials arriving there were being then dispatched to 

16 Central America by cargo aircraft. When they departed in 

17 the custody, if you will, of the resistance from the 

18 United States, we, NHAO, no longer had any direct control 

19 over those supplies. 

20 In Central America, we procured primarily 

21 foodstuffs, some pharmaceuticals, some kinds of clothing, 

22 pants, shirts, socks, underwear, that sort of thing, also 

23 sort of daily necessities such as fuel oil or candles or 

24 matches and so forth. 

25 Those, that procurement, and to some extent 



UNCLHSSIF^ED 



17 



UNCLASSi^i 



a 15 



1 the supplies that also came from the United States, could 

2 only be monitored in Central America by other 

3 organizations or institutions. 

4 It was abundantly clear to us at the outset 

5 that we would be hindered in the way that you have 

6 described in terms of not being able to have our own 

7 personnel there. So as a fallback arrangement, I talked 

8 with ^^^^^^^H who was the CIA representative on the 

9 Inter-Agency Committee, the committee that provided 

10 policy guidance for NHAO, and I talked vith^^^^^ 

11 He discussed this whole problem within the 

12 RIG, the Restricted Inter-Agency Group. And^^^^^agreed 

13 that CIA headquarters would instruct its people in 

14 Central America to monitor insofar as they could the 

15 arrival and the transportation, the internal 

16 transportation, of these supplies. 

17 This arrangement took a while to get into 

18 operation. But in due course, and I would say certainly 

19 by about January of 1986, we were getting a fairly steady 

20 stream of what we referred to as verification reports. 

21 And these were basically messages from the field, coming 

22 from the CIA people, who would simply report that a 

23 particular truck convoy had arrived at a base and it 

24 carried such and such materials, and so forth; or that an 

25 aircraft had arrived and had offloaded such and such 



IJNOCllSlPED 



18 



WNGtitSf^'^'' ' " 



1 materials, and so forth. 

2 And this was about th« best arrangement that 

3 we had to try to check on the deliveries of these 

4 supplies arriving In Central America. 

5 That system, of course, was not 100 percent 

6 accurate. We did not get a bean for bean correlation 

7 between what we knew we were paying for and what we knew 

8 we were receiving or what was being received. But we 

9 felt that not only was It the best arrangement we could 

10 devise, but that there was sufficient correlation that we 

11 were satisfied that the system was working and that the 

12 supplies were Indeed being delivered to the Intended 

13 recipients. 

14 Q Okay, let me make sure I understand this. The 

15 original legislation appropriated $27 million and 

16 provided that neither the Department of Defense nor the 

17 CIA could be the administrator of the program? 

18 A Correct. 

19 Q But you found that, based upon the inhibitions 
2 you had with regard to your State Department employees 

21 present in the country, that essentially the only 

22 reasonable solution seemed to be to call upon the Agency 
2 3 to assist in connection with verifying actual receipt of 

24 the goods in the region? 

25 A Correct. And we saw those as intelligence 



IjNCLfiSSSF^EP 



19 



iiNCLA«SIF!EO 



17 



1 reports. And as you say Icnow, ny understanding at least 

2 is that as of about November of 1985 some of the 

3 constraints on the Agency were eased, I think in the 

4 Intelligence Appropriations Act, at about that time. 

5 And the Agency, as I understood it, was 

6 permitted to provide intelligence to the resistance 

7 movement and communications assistance, as I recall. And 

8 as part of all of that, apparently it was also deemed 

9 permissible that the Agency provide us with intelligence 

10 on what they were learning. 

11 So in effect, these were intelligence reports 

12 from the field coming back to us. 

13 Q I'm going to mark this exhibit as lA, a CIA 

14 cable dated January 4, 1986, which basically, if I could 

15 summarize it — take a moment to look at it, but if I 

16 could summarize it, basically is a direction to 

17 appropriate stations in the region to cooperate with 

18 NHAO, just as you have described. 

19 (The document referred to was 

20 marked Duemling Exhibit No. lA 

21 for identification.) 

22 (Pause.) 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q Now, there's something else that is referenced 

25 in there that I want to ask about. First of all, were 

SECRET 



UNCLASSIFES 



20 



UNCLAgSI 



riiHii ^8 



1 you basically advised at the vary beginning of th« 

2 startup of this program that, in order to facilitate 

3 coordination among the various contra factions, that most 

4 of your dealings should be with UNO, United Nicaraguan 

5 Opposition? 

6 A Yes. I was told from the policy level that 

7 the decision was that UNO would be initially the only 

8 recipient of NHAO assistance, and that others might be 

9 added in the future, but that UNO was it. 

10 Q There is a reference in this cable by code to 

11 an individual whose actual neuse is Eden Fastora, who was 

12 a contra leader basically working out of — was working 
^^^^^^^^^^^^in was called the southern front. 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q What were you told originally about dealing 

16 with Mr. Pastora and his group of people in the south? 

17 A We were told initially that we would be 

18 supporting UNO. Mr. Pastora was not part of UNO and we 

19 were told he was not part of UNO. 

20 I don't recall any particular discussion about 

21 Pastora until — and I can't give you a precise date, but 

22 probably until some time around February of 1986, when it 

23 was clear to me, although I was not involved, but it was 

24 clear that the Administration was attempting to broaden 

25 the participants in the resistance movement, that is to 



UNet^SSIFJE? 



21 



(iNCLASSIFltO 



19 



1 say tha resistance movement that was being supported by 

2 the United States. 

3 And there was apparently considerable thought 

4 being given to whether or not Mr. Pastora could be 

5 brought into the fold, so to speak. 

6 Somewhat later, I would think maybe as late as 

7 April or Nay of '86, I was directed, we were directed, to 

8 meet with representatives of Mr. Pastora to determine 

9 whether or not, under the guidelines that NHAO was 

10 operating under, whether we could be of any assistance to 

11 him. 

12 And I was not directly Involved. That was 

13 conducted primarily by Chris Arkos and some of my other 

14 staff people, who met, with the representative of 

15 Pastora. And this gentleman produced a whole series of 

16 bills and vouchers and various things for us to examine. 

17 And we concluded, after looking carefully at 

18 all of these receipts, that the vast majority of them 

19 were not things that we could pay because they did not 

20 fall within our guidelines or that the documentation was 

21 inadequate and so forth. And we so informed the policy 

22 level. 

23 I believe we told Bill Walker about that. My 

24 sense of what occurred was that meanwhile on the 

25 political level efforts to bring Mr. Pastora into some 



UNetftSSlF^ED 



22 






20 



r«lationahlp with UNO fall apart, ao that th« laau* of 
whathar or not NHAO could aupport Paatora and hla paopla 
essentially bacaae soot. 

Q Starting bac]c in September 1985 time frame and 
going forward froa there, did either ^^f^^^^Hor anyone 

6 else with the Agency ever actively either try to 

7 discourage you froa dealing with Mr. Pastora or denigrate 

8 hia in any way? 

9 A Well, first of all, it was never an issue 

10 because Pastora, as I say, was not part of UNO and our 

11 guidelines was strictly that we would support UNO. 

12 If X can make one brief diversion, there was 

13 at least one other representative of the opposition who 

14 was not part of UNO, that is to say one of the Cesar 

15 brothers, who came to call on me to inquire as to whether 

16 or not we could support them. 

17 And I gave him no particular encouragement. I 

18 simply heard him out and said I would report his approach 

19 to the policy people, for whom it was their decision, not 

20 my decision. 

21 But to go back to Mr. Pastora, yes, 

22 disparaged Pastora to me on several occasions. We met 
2 3 fairly frequently to discuss operational questions, and 
24 Pastora and Pastora 's people came up. The subject arose 
2 5 from time top time. 



UNOOSSl^lED 



23 



md ^^^Halmply said to m« 



21 




1 And ^^^■almply said to m« that th« Agency 

2 had a vary bad •xp«rienc« with Pastora, th«y thought h* 

3 was unraliabl* and not vary dep«ndabl«_. 
4 
5 

6 ' So that was ths kind of thing that they said 

7 about hia, and that they gave ne the impression that the 

8 last thing they wanted to do was to have anything to do 

9 with Eden Pastora. 

10 Q Did you also ever hear allegations that, not 

11 Mr. Pastora hinself , but that sob* other people 

12 associated with him had some connection with drug 

13 smuggling? 

14 A Yes, I believe I heard that from Elliot 

15 Abrams. 

16 Q Now, you mentioned in approximately April or 

17 May time freune, when you had some discussions with the 

18 representative of Mr. Pastora. 

19 A Yes, I believe that was the time. 

20 Q Well, let me fit in some other events which 

21 would confirm that as the time period. In late March of 

22 1986, General Singlaub was in Costa Rica and negotiated 

23 some type of agreement between himself and his people and 

24 Mr. Pastora, which caused a bit of a flurry at the State 

25 Department when the Ambassador sent a cable back about 



yNCtuss'.rio 



24 



UNCLmiFl 



1:1 

1 it. 

2 But moving forward from there, some time in 

3 May of 1986 Assistant Secretary Abrams met with Mr. 

4 Pastora and Mr. Pastora was asking for some minimal 

5 supplies to be sent to his people in Costa Rica. And Mr. 
e Abrams in some marginal notes on some memoes indicated 

7 that it certainly seemed such a small amount that, you 

8 know, why not try something. 

9 Was that a part of this sequence of events you 

10 were describing about meeting with a representative of 

11 Mr. Pastora. 

12 A It was a different aspect, to my 

13 understanding. I was told that several of the 

14 commandantes who had been loyal to Pastora were losing 

15 confidence in Pastora because he had proven to be 

16 incapable of getting material support. 

17 And as I understood it, the policy people saw 

18 this as an opportunity to wean away those particular 

19 commandantes and their men and bring them within the fold 

20 of UNO. That is to say, they would presumably sever 

21 their connections with Pastora and they would then become 

22 related to the forces that were under the control of 
2 3 Negro Chamorro. 

24 And so I was told that there was this effort 

25 under way and that NHAO was being asked to provide 



UNOTSS!rE[> 



25 



UNCLItSSIFSED 



23 



1 supplies to these forces. And what I was told was that 

2 the requirements would be for approximately 2,000 of this 

3 or that, like 2,000 shirts or 2,000 pairs of pants or 

4 whatever; and that this was essentially, if I could use 

5 the expression, this was bait to get them on board with 

6 UNO. 

7 Q Okay. Thank you. 

8 Nov, returning to the Agency for a minute, 

9 would it be fair to say that at first — and you may have 

10 already said this and I apologize if I am being 

11 repetitious — that at first there were some Initial 

12 problems in connection with receiving back from the 

13 Agency verification of receipt, and perhaps the reason 

14 was that people back at headquarters are getting ceUsles 

15 from their stations talking about beans and rice and they 

16 don't attach much significance to it, but that eventually 

17 things became smoother and you started getting a pretty 

18 good flow of information from the region about receipt of 

19 materials? 

20 Is that a fair statement? 

21 A That's correct. And I would only add that on 

22 one of my own trips to the area, when I had a chance to 

23 talk to some of the Agency people in the field and re- 

24 emphasize the great importance which NHAO placed on their 

25 field reports, they claimed that they had been sending 

SECRET 



UNCLASSIFIED 



26 



UNaASSiF:E3 



1 then in ragularly for quite a long time, but that the 

2 headquarters in Langley, the editors and so forth, in a 

3 bureaucratic fashion had failed to recognize their 

4 importance and their utility, and in fact had failed 

5 therefore to pass them on to NHAO. 

6 But eventually that glitch got worked out and, 

7 yes, we thought we were getting pretty good reporting. 

8 Q Okay. Now, some time this year — well, first 

9 of all let me ask you. During the time frame you were 

10 director of NHAO, GAO had some people who spent a lot of 

11 time over at the offices? 

12 A Correct. 

13 Q And basically audited your work during the two 

14 years — the year that NHAO was in existence? 

15 A Correct . 

16 Q GAO issued a report then later, which was 

17 somewhat critical of the paper trail or verification of 

18 actual receipt of goods? 

19 A Correct. 

20 Q I understand what your reaction is to it and 

21 your statement. Would you go ahead and tell us for the 

22 record why it is you feel that the GAO comments, if I 

23 could put it, failed to understand some of the problems 

24 that you had to face in connection with running such a 

25 program, where you couldn't have the ledger books and 



27 



UNCUSSIFSED 



25 



1 things that you normally might be able to insist upon in 

2 a typical overt program? 

3 A Yes. Hell, first of all, I was as anxious as 

4 anyone to be able to demonstrate the bona fides of the 

5 operation that I was running, and that we were adhering 

6 to a high standard of accountability, and that was 

7 important . 

8 That's just good management. But for the 

9 problems that we have already discussed, I was not able 

10 to place my own people in the field to actually monitor 

11 activities. Moreover, and we hadn't touched on this 

12 before, but one of the proscriptions was that we could 

13 also not have bank accounts in Central America. 

14 I would have preferred that we have an NHAO 

15 bank account. In fact, it was one of the things that 

16 Chris Arkos on the first trip down there in late 

17 September of '85, that was one of the things he was 

18 supposed to do, was set up a bank account, through which 

19 we could then pay suppliers directly. 

20 We were told that even that would not be 

21 tolerated by the local authorities. So we were obliged 

22 to pay people through Miami. I say Miami. It could have 

23 been any other city, but most Central American 

24 enterprises, if they bank at all in United States, they 

25 do so through Miami. 



lJN^il3S:?°iD 



28 



r^rjiiDLf^s 



1 And in fact, many of our major suppliers In 

2 Central America already maintained their own bank 

3 accounts in Miami. 

4 Now, to go back to the GAO, we felt in NHAO 

5 that we were talcing all feasible steps to monitor and 

6 observe and make sure that things were running smoothly 

7 and legally and honestly and so forth. GAO in our view 

8 applied a kind of schoolroom set of accounting standards 

9 that would be perfectly appropriate if we were running 

10 this thing in the United States, but which simply could 

11 not apply by extension in Central America, for the 

12 reasons that I've tried to explain. 

13 So we felt that the rather unusual situation 

14 which we faced called for some rather unusual methods, 

15 and we created those various methods, checks, apparatus, 

16 and so forth. But they of course did not accord with the 

17 kind of standard bookkeeping procedures that GAO was 

18 familiar with. 

19 So we really parted company with GAO on that 

20 issue. I would of course point out that GAO did not say, 

21 we have discovered malfeasance or we have discovered 

22 misappropriation of funds. They didn't say that. What 

23 they said was, we can only trace all of this so far and 

24 then after that there is not a sufficient record that 

25 meets our standards of accounting. 



(JNCmSIF.'ED 



29 



mm 



1 So it became a void from their point of view. 

2 Q Is it correct that the GAO people who were 

3 conducting this audit in connection with this report did 

4 not have access to the CIA cable traffic that you were 

5 referring to earlier? 

6 A That is correct. We discussed it with them. 

7 He told them it existed. But that was beyond our 

8 control, and the reason is that within the federal 

9 government, apparently by agreement between the Executive 

10 Branch and the Congress, CIA reports are given only to 

11 the Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House. And 

12 all of those reports were made available to the 

13 Intelligence Committees. 

14 Then it becomes the decision of the members of 

15 the Senate and the House as to whether they will or will 

16 not share those documents with other aspects, elements of 

17 the legislative branch. 

18 But of course, GAO was part of the legislative 

19 branch. It is the creation of and servant of the 

20 Congress. So under the guidelines, we cannot provide 

21 those things directly to the GAO. And so they therefore 

22 did not have them from us. 

23 They had to address themselves within their 

24 own branch of government to the Congress, and apparently, 

25 my understanding is, they never succeeded in getting 



^USSIF^EO 



30 



bNCLASSIFEED 



23 



1 access to those documents. 

2 Nov, this question will cover a lot of 

3 territory, but is it fair to say that you are as 

4 reasonably satisfied as you can be based upon the 

5 restrictions you faced, that the $27 million that was 

6 spent by NHAO was in fact appropriately spent for 

7 humanitarian aid which found its way into the hands of 

8 the proper recipients in the region? 

9 A Yes, I am completely satisfied that was the 

10 case. 

11 Q Now, let me talk for a minute about some of 

12 the other types of problems you had to face. There was 

13 talk during the passage of the legislation by some people 

14 that, well, humanitarian aid for fighting forces is kind 

15 of an oxymoron, and there would be some definitional 

16 problems that would be encountered. 

17 You in fact did have to face certain 

18 definitional problems that had to be addressed, is that 

19 correct? 

20 A That is correct. But I was told at the outset 

21 that "humanitarian aid" meant essentially non-lethal aid. 

22 Q One of the problems that you all had to face 

23 and make a policy decision about — and let me hand you 

24 Exhibit No. 2, which is a short memo to the file — and 

25 by the way, the date on the top says March 9, '86, but 



[JlieLASSfF^ED 



31 



(JNCLftSSIFlED 



29 



1 that is a mistake. I think it should be April 9, 198 6. 

2 (The document referred to was 

3 marked Duemling Exhibit No. 2 

4 for identification.) 

5 A Notice down here also it says April 9, so that 

6 is a mistake. 

7 Q Take a moment and look at it. It concerns 

8 what to do about requests for funds to be used for 

9 helicopters. 

10 (Pause.) 

11 A All right. 

12 Q I believe some of the other documents that 

13 lead up to this particular decision demonstrate that a 

14 question came up in connection with a certain helicopter 

15 called the Lady Ellen? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q Which certain contra forces wanted NHAO to 

18 help pay for the transportation of the helicopter from 

19 the United States into the region. And this generated, I 

20 assume, the question of whether or not this was getting 

21 too close to that grey area between humanitarian and 

22 lethal aid, and a series of discussions were held 

23 resulting in this policy decision. 

24 AX think that's true. It may not have been 

25 exclusively the Lady Ellen that triggered this. I can 



liNcmssr.ED 



32 



lid 

1 recall that indeed at the very outset of KHAO's coming 

2 into existence and beginning to work with the resistance, 

3 that they had nade clear that one of the biggest problems 

4 was the medical evacuation of wounded, and that they 

5 would very much like to have helicopters. 

6 And that was stated very early on. But at 

7 that time, it was also considered that it would be too 

8 problematical and too much in the grey area. Moreover, 

9 of course, helicopters are extremely expensive. 

10 So the subject — what I'm trying to suggest 

11 is the subject had been, discussed before thm Lady Ellen 

12 came along. 

13 Q Now, when this and other problems like this 

14 came up, there were occasions when you actually consulted 

15 directly with the leadership, with the Intelligence 

16 Committees, is that correct? 

17 A Coggjcjt. ^ ^ ^-^^- -^ 

18 Q You met with, I believe. Congressman Hamilton 

19 on one or more occasions? 

20 A I did. 

21 Q You met with the staff director of the Senate 

22 Intelligence Committee, Bernie McMann? 

23 A Correct. 

24 Q Did you also during the startup period of this 

25 program go around and talk to various members of Congress 



uNCLIiSSSFJED 



33 



31 

1 about soma of the problems that Bight come up or just 

2 generally what they anticipated? 

3 A I did not do very much of that. There was a 

4 little bit of that, but basically those kinds of contacts 

5 were being kept by Abrams and by Jim Michael and Walker 

6 and so forth. And I got the impression that they didn't 

7 particularly want me to be involved in very many 

8 contacts, with one general exception, and that is I did 

9 appear a couple of times before the House Intelligence 

10 Oversight Committee. 

11 But I also talked informally to their staff 

12 director on several occasions, including at the very 

13 outset, when I invited them to send their accountants to 

14 take a look at what we were doing and how we were doing 

15 it. 

16 They declined to do so because they felt that 

17 would be undue involvement of the legislative branch in 

18 an activity of the executive branch. But I did talk 

19 repeatedly, directly or by phone, with several members of 

20 the committees, and particularly their staffs. 

21 It was more often than not contacts with 

22 staff. I would go up, be summoned up sometimes to meet, 
2 3 and discover more often it was really a staff group, 

24 although one or another members of the committee might be 

25 also present. 



UN^^SSIFlED 



34 



(iNCtaSSIHED 



32 



1 Q As you know, I have had access to your records 

2 and I have received copies of many documents that I asked 

3 for, I have the impression, having gone through the 

4 files, that whenever controversy came up, areas of 

5 questionable goods or things such as that, that you and 

6 your organization seemed to take the conservative 

7 approach in order to avoid creating a problem in a 

8 sensitive area. 

9 A That's correct. 

10 Q I was going to ask you, would you agree with 

11 that summary? 

12 A Absolutely. We always took -- I always took, 

13 because I was essentially running it and making the 

14 policy for the organization, aside from of course the 

15 policies that came down on us. But in terms of what we 

16 did internally, I ran this in a quite conservative 

17 fashion in the sense of trying to adhere strictly to the 

18 guidelines contained in the legislation. 

19 And there is a good reason for that. Not only 

20 perhaps is it my temperament to manage things in that 

21 fashion, but when George Shultz asked me to undertake 

22 this job I asked him what were his objectives and what he 

23 wanted me to do. And one of his specific statements to 

24 me was: I want you to go right down the middle on this; 

25 I don't want you skating close to the edge in terms of 

SECRET 



UNCLASS! 






35 



UNGlASSlFltO 



33 



1 th« guidelines that were contained in the legislation. 

2 And it was clear to ne that George Shultz 

3 wanted this thing administered in a way that would be 

4 above reproach. And that's precisely what I tried to do. 

5 Q Along that same line, let me now ~ let's taDc 

6 for a while about the issue of mixed loads. 

7 (The document referred to was 

8 marked Duemling Exhibit No. 3 

9 for identification.) 

10 Q Let me hand you what's been marked as Exhibit 

11 3. This is a siimmary memo that you did basically after 

12 the fact, summarizing some of the events that came up in 

13 connection with mixed loads. Let's talk about that for a 

14 moment. 

15 First of all, by mixed loads what we are 

16 referring to are shipments which contain both some 

17 humanitarian goods and some lethal goods, is that 

18 correct? 

19 A Correct. 

2 Q Now, is my understanding correct that the 

21 issue of mixed loads came up solely in connection with 

22 flights or shipments within the region of Central 
2 3 America? 

24 A Correct. 

25 Q Rather than flights from the United States to 



ljNOtAi>Sir:«:J 



36 



UNCLA^IFSED 



34 



1 Central America? 

2 A Correct . 

3 Q Let's first eliminate that other part. 

4 To your knowledge, and as I say to your 

5 knowledge, did any NHAO flights originating from the 

6 United States Into the region contain any lethal aid 

7 whatsoever? 

8 A None whatsoever to my knowledge. 

9 Q Okay. So the Issue of mixed loads only 

10 relates to Inter-reglonal shipments? 

11 A Correct. 

12 Q Intra-reglonal shipments, excuse me. 

13 A Correct . 

14 Q In connection with those Intra-reglonal 

15 shipments, first let me ask you this. How did the Issue 

16 come up In connection with the mixed loads? In other 

17 words, I understand that NHAO had contracts with the air 

18 carrier services to transport goods into the region. How 

19 did the issue come up about whether NHAO would be paying 

20 for shipments within the region? 

21 Were these also NHAO contracts or were you 

22 being asked to reimburse costs that had already been 

23 incurred? 

24 A No, these were NHAO contracts. Let me just 

25 provide a little background. The resistance was based 



UNCLffSSlF?ED 



37 



UNCUSSIFlED 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



primarily, as v« have alraady said, ^^^^^^^^| Th«y 
also, how«v«r, had soma kind of a transportation 
capability utilizing^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 

They had some aircraft of thair own which they 
utilized for transport purposes, but their own air 
resources were extremely limited, and therefore we 
assisted thea with air transportation. 

And that was transportation, air 
transportation of various sorts. For example, part of it 
was utilizing commercial air se rvic 




He also moved some goods that we ourselves had 
flown from the United 




There was also, however, the question of 
whether there could be drops of goods inside Nicaragua, 
and that was raised with us, and I believe that the issue 
of mixed loads came up primarily in connection with the 
idea of drops inside Nicaragua. 

And there the reason was that dropping 
supplies inside Nicaragua was, of course, always a 
dangerous undertaking. It was also dangerous for the 



liNCLHiSSlF'.ED 



38 



UNCLA^IFEO 



36 



1 troops on the ground, who had to remain static for 

2 several hours In order to be at a drop zone and pick up 

3 supplies. 

4 So because of the danger to both the aircraft, 

5 its crew, and the troops on the ground, the operations 

6 people recognized that the best thing to do would be to 

7 send in a single aircraft which would drop the mix of 

8 supplies that were required by the troops on the ground. 

9 And that would include probably resupply of 

10 zuBjDunition as well as a resupply of boots and clothing 

11 and pharmaceuticals and whatever. So I believe that the 

12 issue of mixed loads really arose first In connection 

13 with the problem of dropping inside Nicaragua. 

14 Q Okay. Now, in connection with dropping inside 

15 Nicaragua, NHAO had a contract with a company called 

16 Vortex, which on four occasions either did or attempted 

17 to make drops directly inside Nicaragua. 

18 Are these the flights you're referring to? 

19 A I believe so. Now, Vortex was operating out of 

20 Miami, as I recall, and I think that those were the 

21 flights into Nicaragua. 

22 But what I don't recall, quite frankly, is 

23 exactly where those flights departed from. I'm sure they 

24 must have started at least from Miami. Whether they then 

25 stopped elsewhere before flying in, I don't quite recall. 



ONi^lSSIFT?) 



39 



UNCU^SSaFED 



37 



1 I think that was not th« only organization 

2 that was Involved In this. I don't recall, strictly 

3 speaking. 

4 Q Let me jump ahead for a second. There were, 

5 as I vinderstand It, although reading the Mlaal Herald 

6 story In the past week or so made me wonder whether Z 

7 truly understood the Issue -- my understanding was that 

8 there were basically two occasions when the Issue of 

9 mixed loads had to be addressed In the concrete, rather 

10 than In the theoretical. 

11 And that was In connection with one shipment 

12 that was split 93 percent humanitarian and 7 percent 

13 lethal, and another occasion when It was 50-50. 

14 A Yes. First of all, you are talking eUDOUt 

15 Charc^y's piece, which I did not see, and which people 

16 have told me about. He did call me prior to that and got 

17 some Information, which he botched. 

18 Q He seemed to. 

19 A He was flat wrong on a number of things. 

20 (Discussion off the record.) 

21 Q On the record. 

22 A Let me comment on those two flights he 

2 3 referred to. They were in fact fllghts^^^^^^^^H 

24 ^^^^^^H and those — I don't recall quite — it seems 

25 to me — let me put it to you this way. 



UNCL^^i^^ED 



40 



SiNCLASSIF'ED 



38 



1 Th« facta would seem to suggest that after we 

2 got — after ve became clear on what the mixed load 

3 policy guidance would be, which as I recall came to me 

4 from a memo from Jim Michael on about January 6th of 1986 
5 

6 Q You might look on the document in front of 

7 you. Exhibit No. 3 refers to January 3, a policy 

8 directive. 

9 A Okay, that's it. 

10 Q You see the numbered paragraph at the bottom, 

11 1 and 2. 

12 A Yes. 

13 Nov, that point three obviously is a quote 

14 from the Michael memo. 

15 Q You're referring to the top of page 2 of 

16 Exhibit No. 3? 

17 A Correct. And that point is an extract, a 

18 quotation from Michael's memo on January 3. And my 

19 recollection is that with that policy guidance, which 

20 obviously does not specify only drops in Nicaragua — 

21 it's a broader proposition than that — we then did 

22 undertake to pay for mixed loads that were what^ would 

23 ^ d escribe as lateral, that is to say from] 
^^^^^^^^H for 

25 Now, as a matter of practice we didn't need to 



UNCDTSS^i^B 



41 



39 

1 do that v«ry often because, first of all, ve could fill 

2 up those aircraft with our own NHAO supplies. So there 

3 wasn't free space available for the nost part. 

4 Secondly, the resistance had its own air 

5 transport capability, as I mentioned to you, and/or they 

6 were able to charter with their own funds other 

7 transport. So that didn't mean we were their only source 

8 of air transportation. 

9 On the two flights that were referred to in 

10 the newspaper article to which you referred, one of them 

11 was in fact a mixed load which had, as accurately stated 

12 in the article as I recall, about 7 percent lethal. The 

13 second episode, the second flight, as that identified it, 

14 that article identified it, was a different proposition. 

15 We were told — we were given an intelligence 

16 report from the field, which we then investigated 

17 further, and we had some oral reporting on it as well as 

18 written. But we were told that what had occurred is that 

19 one of our charted flights that was flying from^^^^^B 

20 ^^^^^^^Hwas only about half-full of KHAO material and 

21 that one of the ground people ^^^^^^^^^decided that he 

22 should utilize that excess capacity and put lethal on it. 
2 3 We were told that man was told by his 

24 superiors not to do that because it would be contrary to 

2 5 our guidelines, and then when somebody turned his back he 



unuLM^j*!??! 



42 



UNCbASSlHEs) 



40 



1 want ah«ad and did It. And when th« aircraft arrived at 

2 ^^^^^^B It was found to have 50 percent of its capacity 

3 lethal supplies. 

4 That was duly reported to us and NHAO called 

5 the carrier and said: We will not pay for that flight 

6 because it violated our guidelines. And the carrier 

7 accepted that and said, all right. 

8 Z do not know who paid the carrier for that 

9 flight, but NHAO did not. 

10 Q Was that carrier Southern Air Transport or, 

11 excuse me, Airaach? 

12 A Z believe it was Airaach. Yes, Z'a sure it 

13 was Airmach. 

14 Q Because it would have been -- it was an LIOO. 

15 A Because one of my people, Phil Buechler, 

16 telephoned Cynthia whoever — 

17 Q Donlinger? 

18 A Donlinger, who was the bookkeeper for Airmach, 

19 and told her. 

2 Q Right. I think I ought to put into the record 

21 some of the specific information. This is based on some 

22 CZA cables, some traffic there, that on either the 19th 

23 or 20th of February of 1986 an NHAO-chartered LIOO 

from ^|^|^|H|^^^^H^ 

2 5 consisted of — and Z have the exact poundage here, but 



yNCLftSSlBEB 



43 



UNCLJiSSlFiEB 



41 



1 It br«a]cs down into 93 p«rcent humanitarian and only 3 

2 parcant — axcusa aa, 7 parcant lathal. 

3 Than on tha 20th of Fabruary, anothar LlOO 
flight laft — cargo for FDN, laft froa^^^^^^H 

5 ^^^^^^^B which carrlad approxlaataly half and half 

6 batwean humanitarian and lathal. 

7 Thoaa vera tha two flighta you'ra rafarrlng 

8 to? 

9 A Yas, I balleva ao. 

10 Q Nov — and than tha CIA inforaation indicatea 

11 that some people vere "read the riot act" and future HHAO 

12 charters would carry no lathal aaterial and FDN was to 

13 rely on chartered DC-6 to shuttle lethal supplies from 

15 To your )tnowledge, were there any other 

16 occasions other than these two when the issue came up 

17 about whether or not to pay for a specific shipment which 

18 contained a aixed load? 

19 A I don't recall any other. I may be wrong, but 

20 to the best of my memory I don't recall any. 

21 Q I don't have^any indication of any, and your 

22 memo talked about those two particular flights and I just 
2 3 wondered if there were any others that you knew of. 

2 4 A The memo that you speak of is this Exhibit 3? 

2 5 Q Yes, Exhibit 3 on page 2 — excuse me. On 



mms 



h 



44 



UNGtftSSIF^B 



42 



1 page 3 you refer In the middle of the page to two 

2 examples demonstrating the effectiveness of the 

3 monitoring system. 

4 Z just wanted to make sure that, while you 

5 call them two examples, they weren't just simply two that 

6 you picked out of a larger group. 

7 A No, no. I think those were it. And as I 

8 recall, and perhaps you found in my files a memorandum to 

9 me from Kevin Whitaker in which I asked him to research 

10 this question. 

11 There is in the files Whitaker 's memo to me, I 

12 would have thought from about aroxind March or April of 

13 '86. And I would have drawn on that memo in compiling 

14 this. 

15 Now, I'm pretty sure that — and his memo 

16 addresses the whole issue of when did NHAO, if at all, 

17 involve itself with mixed loads. And as I recall, he 

18 came up with only — I think — now let me say this. I 

19 wonder if there wasn't — well, wait a minute. Let me 

20 look at this for just a minute. 

21 Q Take your time. 

22 A For some reason, it sticks in my mind that 

23 there were three flights that had mixed loads, of which 

24 one of them, the third, is this one that turned out to 

2 5 have half, and that there were two others that had mixed 



ONCtirSSJF^ED 



45 



UNCLASSiFIED 



43 



1 loads, of which this Is one. 

2 Nov, I can't be absolutely sure, but I think 

3 there might have been one other flight. 

4 Q Do you recall what the percentage breakdown 

5 was on that? 

6 A All I recall Is that It was within our 

7 guidelines, and I think by that — we never had — as you 

8 can see from the policy guidance, there was no firm 

9 number . 

10 I think we were using actually about 90-10. 

11 The newspaper article to which you referred I think uses 

12 80-20. 

13 Q Right. 

14 A But I don't think that was it. I think we used 

15 as a rule of thumb — as a rule of thumb we used about 

16 90-10. 

17 Q 90 percent humanitarian and ten percent? 

18 A 90 percent humanitarian and ten percent 

19 lethal. 

20 Q And you mentioned some of this off the record. 

21 Let me get this on the record. Did you receive any 

22 pressure from either Assistant Secretary Abrams or anyone 

23 else at the State Department to allow more mixed loads 

24 than the record reflects that were actually allowed? 

2 5 A No, I was under no pressure whatsoever. As a 



uNCL#SSIFi£D 



46 



«NCy.?SlflED 



44 



1 matter of fact, I thlnJc that in my files Is a memorandum 

2 that I wrote after a conversation with Elliot Abrams In 

3 which Abrams himself expressed some reservations because 

4 — about mixed loads, because of the political 

5 sensitivity of the whole Issue. 

6 And Abrams was obviously acutely sensitive to 

7 the political dimensions within the United States of 

8 this, particularly as the Administration was going to be 

9 going back to the Congress for further assistance to the 

10 resistance. 

11 So they had to keep their constituency in 

12 mind. 

13 Q Okay. 

14 Now, let me show you Exhibit No. 4, which is a 

15 summary from your files of — it appears to be a complete 

16 summary of those air chartered flights from the United 

17 States to Central America. ,ifr~|-> 

18 (The document referred to was 

19 marked Ouemling Exhibit No. 4 

20 for identification.) 

21 A Yes, I think this certainly looks like it. 

22 What's the date of this? 

23 Q Here, this copy is better. ^r. ^ 

24 It's October 21, 1986. ^ 

25 A CanJLJ-SQiS at vour copy for a moment? 



t^rd^rai^ED 



47 



UNCUS 



itiJ ^ 45 



1 Q There's a note on the side indicating that a 

2 copy was given to HPSCI. 

3 A Yes, that is here. I'm not sure that that's 

4 the date when it was actually created, but it may have 

5 been. 

6 This was put together, this exhibit was put 

7 together, by Phil Buechler at the NHAO staff. 

8 Q It just attempts to be a summary of ~ 

9 ' A I believe so. And it may even have been put 

10 together to respond to a request from Latimer. 

11 Q Okay. Let me go through a few of these 

12 flights with you here. The first four flights were with 

13 Connor Air? 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q Now, KHAO had a contract with Connor Air, as I 

16 understand it, initially because that was the airline 

17 company that t|Mk(3^^^9ple said they had been using up 
13 until that point. 

19 A Correct. 

20 Q And you all decided to go ahead and continue 

21 with the ssune air charter service they_ were using? 

22 A Correct. That was one of the policy 

2 3 guidelines, was do not disrupt the existing arrangements 

24 of the resistance movement unless there is a terribly 

2 5 good reason. 



UNCtltSSlF'ED 



48 



46 

1 Q Who told you that, by the way, going back to 

2 the beginning of this? 

3 A Ollie North. 

4 Q North told you that? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q Basically, that the FDN and the UNO people had 

7 an existing logistics network that bad been working fine 

8 and NHAO shouldn't coae in and disrupt the whole thing 

9 A Ollie North's point was, look, these guys have 

10 built up with great difficulty their own logistics system 

11 over the past year, during which they were receiving no 

12 assistance from the United States government. Now the 

13 U.S. government is back in the act. Let's not displace 

14 or dislodge or replace their existing arrangements, which 

15 seemed to be working perfectly well. 

16 And that advice seemed, generally speaking, 

17 good advice to me, because if they're handling it why 

18 should we take it over in terms of the mechanics? 

19 Q Okay. Now, going down, the second flight from 

20 Connor Air was a flight on October 10th, 1985, from New 

21 Orleans^^^^^H^^^^I which as I understand it had some 

22 notoriety surrounding it. 
2 3 A Correct. 

>4 Q Would you go ahead and give us a brief 

5 description of what problem arose in connection with that 



uNcr/rssiFiED 



I 



49 



UNCLASSIFIED 



47 



1 flight? 

2 A Y«a. Vfhat happened Is that that flight 

3 departed, as Indicated, from New Orleans and, unbeJcnovnst 

4 to NHAO, Mario Calero, who was running the operation In 

5 Kew Orleans, permitted an NBC television crew to fly 

6 along on the flight. 

7 I believe Mario himself was on the flight, 

8 too. And I guess he was doing It because he felt this 

9 was going to generate some )clnd of favorable publicity 

10 for the resistance. 

11 In amy case, they arrived, the flight arrived 
12 

14 airport for] 

15 And as I understand it, the flight taxiied 

16 over on landing to the military side of the airfield. 

17 And when the aircraft stopped and the doors opened and so 

18 forth, out came the TV crew. ^^^^^^^HHmilitary who 

19 were on the ground were astonished, and I think were 

20 concerned about what was going on. 

21 And so they^Tpparently put the NBC television 

22 folks into a van or something and drove them over to the 

23 civilian side of the airfield so that they could be 

24 processed through customs and immigration and so forth. 

25 But that episode apparently was very 




uNCLflf^lFiED 



50 



ONCUSSIflEO 



48 



•■barraaalng tha ^^^^^^^^^^^^H or laaat thay 
2 fait It waa, bacauaa It daaonatratad a dagraa — to tha 

to tha a dagraa o'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

4 Involvamant with thla vhola arrtmganant. 

And tha^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H chosa to make an 

6 Issua of that with tha U.S. govamaant. In fact ao much 

7 ao that thay auapandad thla arrangaaant and it vaa not 

8 poaalbla to continue flying directly ^^^^^^^^^Hf or, 

9 aa you will aaa from thla chronology, actually aaveral 

10 months . 

11 So wa vara not able to fly I 

12 until February of 1986, and that apiaoda vaa a terrible 

13 blow. It had certain other repercussions, too, because 

14 Oliver North used that episode as an example of vhy he 

15 felt NHAO ahould employ Robert Oven, and he claimed that 

16 if NHAO had hired Oven and Oven had been along on this, 

17 this vhola thing vould never have happened. 

IS Personally, I'm skeptical, but that vas vhat 

19 Horth argued. 

20 Q Yes, I vill return to that issua a little bit 

21 ^latar. 

22 At any rate, because of this incident NHAO was 

23 precluded essentially from using Connor and also from 

24 being able to bring air supply goods right into' 

25 for several months? 




51 



UNCLAI^IFStb 



49 



Correct. 

2 Q Nov, b«cau8« you could no longer us* Connor 

3 and when you v«r« finally allowed to go ahead and have 

4 some shipments resumed, some air shipments resumed, how 

5 did the company Airmach come to be selected? 

6 A Let me give you a little bit of background. 

7 We — the negotiations with the governments in Central 

8 America were entirely in the hands of the State 

9 Department and/or others — NSC, CIA, I don't Icnov. 

10 NHAO, myself included, were never part of .the 

11 negotiations with those governments on the subject of the 

12 transportation arrangements and what would be permitted 

13 and so forth. He were kept completely out of that. 

14 So that — I won't say necessarily even by 

15 choice — we simply were not included. And I know that 

16 there were several trips, for example, made into the area 

17 by Bill Walker, for example, by^^^^^^^B I guess by 

18 Ollie North, and so forth. 

19 And they were trying to negotiate with the 

20 ^^^^^^^^^^ All we were told, we were given the orders as 

21 to what we would be permitted to do. And indeed, we were 

22 told that when the flights did resume that only certain 

23 carriers might be acceptable to ^^^^^^^^^^Hand we had 

24 to provide aircraft types; and side numbers and so forth. 

25 There were a lot of constraints. 



l^NdOSSIF^EB 



52 



IMtflMIM- '■ iinl iii«llrtll««T Bimil-Hf^Tn rUMti^Mili^iJitia-B J'«-»nn 



ijNCfcftssira 



50 



1 And what I'm trying to g«t across her* Is the 

2 fact that v« were having to operate with a number of 

3 constraints being Imposed upon us that we never 

4 understood. They were s Imply a given. 

5 Now, what happened on the matter of Alrmach, 

6 apparently Olck Gadd, who runs Alrmach, approached Mario 

7 Calero In New Orleans and, If I understand It, had dinner 

8 with him, and the next day or so we had a letter, as I 

9 recall, from Calero either to me or to maybe Phil 

10 Buechler, because the day to day contacts were always- 

11 between Calero and Buechler. 

12 And as I recall, he said that Alrmach was 

13 prepared to fly this, to undertake this business, and 

14 that we should have a look at It. 

15 Now, I don't recall whether ~ 1 think It's 

16 almost certain that we would have double checked that 
I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H to determine whether or 

18 not this is going to be an acceptable arrangement. And 

19 we obviously were told it would be an acceptable 

20 arrangement, because, as I say, we had to refer these 
things usually througt^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B who 

22 undertook to discuss it down through the channels with 

24 And so that's how we came upon Gadd and 

25 Alrmach. 



53 



[/Ngi4SS^FicD 



51 



1 Q 0)cay. And when you w«r« looking around for 

another coapany, you had r«c«lvad^^^^^^^^^^^Ha 

3 of flv«, six, or s«v«n companlas? 

4 A Z thlnX that's right, y«s. 

5 Q And on* of th« companias on there was Southern 

6 Air Transport? 

7 A Ym. 

8 Q And I believe you told us at one of the 

9 interviews that you had talked with Hilliaa Langton, who 

10 was president of Southern Air. 

11 A Z did. 

12 g But he didn't want the business? 

13 A Correct. Let ae tell you what 1 told you. 

14 What happened was that Z was in Miaai, Z guess for one of 

15 our periodic operational neetings with the 

16 representatives of the resistance, and Z went over to 

17 actually, as Z recall, visit Vortex, Z think. And Z — 

18 we had been in touch, Z think maybe Phil Buechler had 

19 been in touch, with Southern Air. 

20 And Southern Air was providing some ground 

21 services to Vortex, but we were not paying Southern Air. 

22 We were paying Vortex. 

23 And so Z went over there just to look around 

24 and see what the facility was like and so forth. And 

25 Z've forgotten whether Z asked to see Langton or Langton 



UNet*SS!FJEr 



54 



ONCLASSIFiEO 



SECRET 52 

1 beard I waa th«r« and said h« wantad to talk to a*. 

2 In any cas«, I spent probably half an hour in 

3 Langton's office at Southern Air, and he asked Be about 

4 what NHAO was all about and what we were doing. And I 

5 told him and he — as I recall, I did not make a 

6 neaorandua for the record on this conversation, but as 

7 recall it Langton said to ae that that was all very 

8 interesting, but that Southern Air Transport was not 

9 interested in doing NHAO business. 

10 And the reason that it was not was because 

11 Southern Air had been created originally as a CIA 

12 proprietary, and then it had gone public. It beceme a 

13 private coapany. And it was trying very hard to build 

14 its coaaercial reputation as a responsible private 

15 coapany that had nothing to do with the CIA. 

16 And therefore, he did not want to coaproaise 

17 Southern Air's iaage by undertaking contracts that were 

18 politically sensitive, or soaething o f that sort. 
19 
20 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H The irony obviously is 

22 was directly contrary to what Mr. Langton had told ae was 

23 the policy and interest of his organization. 

24 Q Now, when you contracted with Airaach for 

25 their services, did you know at the time that Airaach 







iitMi 



55 



UNCLASSIFIED 

1 didn't own any airplanes and was simply going to broker 

2 the contract? 

3 A I don't )tnow when I knew that, but I certainly 

4 knew it quite early in the game. It was clear to us that 

5 in this whole world of air charters, which I had known 

6 nothing about until I got involved in this, that there 

7 are a lot of jobbers out there who undertake things of 

8 this sort, that are fairly snail undertakings by a lot of 

9 carriers ' standards . 

10 They're too small, they don't earn enough, and 

11 the conditions are too awkward or difficult. So what you 

12 find is that you are dealing with jobbers, if you will, 

13 who themselves may not own aircraft, but who put the 

14 package together and who charter the aircraft and find 

15 the pilots or whatever. 

16 My impression of Gadd was, first of all, I 

17 thought that he probably did have aircraft, or at least 

18 aircraft that he had under lease, and his own pilots and 

19 so forth. 

20 As we came to have some experience with him, 

21 it became pretty clear that, if he had aircraft, he 

22 didn't have very many, because, for example, at one point 

23 when he was supposed to be doing a job for us he called 

24 us up at the last minute and said that his aircraft had 

25 mechanical difficulties and it was down in Marseilles, 



UNCLBSIFl'ED 



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yN(^#SSIF|£0 



54 



1 and tharafors ha could not per font on his undertaking. 

2 So It was not clear to me hov many aircraft he 

3 had or if he had any. But ha certainly had control of 

4 some . 

5 Q Do you know whether or not Connor was a jobber 

6 or whether he actually owned the airplanes that he used? 

7 A I have the impression that they owned their 

8 airplanes, but I'm not sure. 

9 Q What about Vortex and Markair? 

10 A Markair, my impression is that they definitely 

11 owned theirs. 

12 Who else did you ask about? 

13 Q Vortex. 

14 A I thought that Vortex owned at least one of 

15 its aircraft. 

16 Q When did you find out that, at least for some 

17 of these flights, if not all or most of them, Airmach was 

18 subcontracting the work out to Southern Air Transport? 

19 A Not until long after the fact. I don't think 

20 we found that out — well, it was probably — I can't 

21 recall directly, but it was long after we had even ceased 

22 dealing with Airmach. 

23 By the way, we ceased dealing with them 

24 because, for a lot of reasons, we were not satisfied with 

25 their performance. And we complained. I complained to 



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1 ^^^^^■bacaus* her* again Is this problea of, they seeaed 

2 to be the designated carrier. 

And conplained ^°^^^^| a"<^ ^^^Haaid: 

4 Well, I thinX we had better continue it a little bit 

5 longer because of all of these complications and 

6 delicacies surrounding the whole business of the airlift, 

7 if you will. 

8 Q Let Be stop you here for a second. Did you get 

9 either the impression — did you get the impression from 

10 something^^^^^^^^ either said or implied to you that 

11 there were other activities that Diclc Gadd was involved 

12 with for the government, and that one of the reasons why 

13 he would — they wanted to continue to use him in this 

14 endeavor was to sort of pay him back for work he was 
doing in connection with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H? 

16 A Yes. When we complained about nonperformance 

17 and a variety of things, his people weren't showing up on 

18 schedule, their behavior was less than professional, we 

19 had complaints from Project Hope that when his guys went 

20 out to load at Dulles that they were inept or inefficient 

21 or whatever, so there were a lot of problems with it. 

22 And when I conveyed all that ^°lH^B Y^^i 

23 ^^^^^^ indicated that there was something which he didn't 

24 want to go into detail on, but that somehow the U.S. 

25 government owed Gadd something, and that he apparently 



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1 had undartaJcan — had performed sooethlng for which ha 

2 had not bean adequately compensated, and the idea of 

3 continuing to give him this business for another two or 

4 three flights was going to be a form of compensation to 

5 Gadd. 

6 Nov, mind you, we were getting something in 

7 return for what we were paying out. But in a certain 

8 sense, the contract was being channeled to him and 

9 continued with him even after we, HHAO, as the client 

10 were not satisfied with his performance. 

11 Q Right. Now, there came a point in, Z believe, 

12 April of 1986 -- I'm a little fuzzy on this, but I think 

13 it was looking at some of your notes. There was a 

14 reference somewhere to the statement coming to you from 

15 ^^^^^^^H: "We have done enough for Gadd." 

16 A Yes, Z vaguely remember something like that. 

17 Q What can you tell me eUsout what you recall 

18 about what finally happened when you were able to go to 

19 somebody else besides Airmach? 

20 A Well, first of all these arrangements, the 

21 details of all these arrangements, were all conducted 

22 really between Phil Buechler and Cynthia. And I only met 

23 Gadd, I think, once or maybe twice at the office, when he 

24 came into the office and we set up the initial contracts 

25 and so forth. 



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1 And I think that — w«ll, I don't )cnow. I 

2 hava to gat my oeoory straight hara. I think that what 

3 happanad was that aftar^^^^^in affact said, all right, 

4 wa'va dona anough for Gadd, then I guaas va informed 

5 Gadd, va informed Airmach, that wa would not be placing 

6 any further flights with then, and that was all. 

7 And I don't recall, quite frankly, whether 

8 there was any recriaination over that or not. I don't 

9 recall whether Cynthia said, hey, wait a ainute, why are 

10 you cutting us off or something. I don't remember. 

11 But I do know that when^^^H told us it was 

12 no longer essential that w« keep using Gadd, that ve did 

13 then terminate it, and that was it. 

14 Q Okay. One question about Vortex. It has been 

15 alleged by people before other committees of Congress 

16 that Vortex as a company — one of the owners of Vortex 

17 is a man by the name of Frank Moss, and that he was a 

18 "suspected drug trafficker." 

19 Did you have any information or any indication 

20 whatsoever that the company of Vortex or anybody 

21 associated with Vortex was other than on the up and up as 

22 a legitimate business? 

23 A Absolutely not. Everything I knew about it 

24 was that it was a legitimate business. But I have to say 

25 that I guess we did not spend a lot of time investigating 



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SECRET 58 

1 the company or its background or the people In It. I'n 

2 sure we must have checJced Dunn 6 Bradstreet or something 

3 of that sort to find out if they had a reputation. 

4 Z can recall that Phil Buechler, who handled 

5 these kinds of things for me on a day to day basis, was 

6 very pleased with the kind of can-do spirit of Vortex. I 

7 never heard that name that you just mentioned, Moss. I 

8 never heard that name. 

9 The only two people whom Z recall — and Z 

10 visited do%m there once and Z met — Z'm sorry, Z can't 

11 remember their names, but there was one fellow who Z 

12 thought was the president of it, with an Hispanic name of 

13 some sort; and the other fellow, it's the guy that Phil 

14 dealt with constantly and who was very helpful to us, and 

15 he has a straight Anglo name of some kind. Z've 

16 forgotten what it is, Parker or something or other. 

17 Q Just to finish up on this, Z believe it's been 

18 — the allegations are — no, that's another company. Z 

19 will get to that in a second. 

20 (Discussion off the record.) 

21 Q Z misspoke about something, the name Moss. 

22 Actually, this may be the name you're referring to. The 

23 allegation — or no, there's not an allegation. 

24 Apparently a man by the name of Mike Palmer — 

25 A Mike Palmer, that's the name. 



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1 Q Who Is the vice president of Vortex, is 

2 currently under Indlctnent In Detroit for marijuana 

3 smuggling. 

4 A I heard that, I think probably about two 

5 months ago. 

6 Q Okay. According to information that, as I 

7 say, other committees received, some time in March one of 

8 its airplaines was searched by Customs, and Palmer stated 

9 that the airplane was a "State Department mission" that 

10 Involved covert CIA operations. 

11 A When was that? 

12 Q March of '87, which doesn't even make any 

13 sense. 

14 A It's a long time after we had anything to do 

15 with them. 

16 Q But at any rate, you had no information or 

17 suspicion or indication, anyway, that Mr. Palmer or his 

18 company were at all involved in illegal activities? ' 

19 A No knowledge of that at all. 

20 Q Now let's go to Mr. Owen and quickly tell the 

21 story. First of all, let's start with Exhibit No. 5. 

22 (The document referred to was 

23 Duemling Exhibit No. 5 for 

24 identification.) 

2 5 Q This is notes that you took of a conversation 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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1 you had with Mr. Oven on, I believe, September the 18th, 

2 1985, Is that correct? 

3 A That's correct. 

4 Q He came in to talk to you about the 

5 possibility of being hired to assist NHAO? 

6 A Correct. And at this time I was trying to put 

7 together a staff for NHAO. 

8 Q And if I can quickly summarize some of this, 

9 he said that he was well acquainted with the contra 

10 leaders, he was well acquainted with Ollie North, he 

11 worked closely with him, he had no connection with the 

12 CIA or Department of Defense. 

13 He gave you a general background and stated 

14 that he could be of much help and benefit to NHAO, is 

15 that correct? 

16 A Correct. 

17 Q Now, what did you tell him at the time? 

18 A I told him at the time that — let me look at 

19 my own note here. I think I have a pretty good 

20 recollection. 

21 I told him at the time that we were indeed 

22 trying to put together a staff and I could see that his 

23 credentials certainly made him a plausible candidate, but 

24 that I did not at that time see a particular role that he 

25 could fill and that his own background and experience 



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^ftcbmiFm 



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1 would equip hia for. 

2 And I b«llava I also mentioned to him that I 

3 was attempting to put together a staff entirely from 

4 people already on the payroll of the U.S. federal 

5 government, because I could get them seconded to my 

6 operation at no cost. Their own agencies would pay their 

7 salaries. 

8 And also, I could get them more quickly and if I 

9 would have hired a civilian from outside of the 

10 government, such as he, there might be some problems 

11 quite apart from the cost. There might have to be a 

12 clearance procedure or an employment procedure. I simply 

13 didn't know. 

14 But in any case, I gave him what I considered 

15 was a polite but rather noncommittal reply. 

16 Q Okay. You just reminded me of another area I 

17 just wanted to ask one brief question about. I think you 

18 have already done these calculations. Of the total 

19 amount, $27 million, that was appropriated and ultimately 

20 spent by your organization, what percentage of it was 

21 taken up with administrative costs, salaries? 

22 A Yes, we calculated that very definitely. It 

23 was approximately one percent of the $27 million. 

24 Q Thank you. 

25 Now, after this meeting with Mr. Owen on the 

.SECRET 



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1 18th — I hand you Exhibit No. 6, which is the notes you 

2 took of the conversation you had with Lieutenant Colonel 

3 Korth on the 24th of September, 1985. 

4 A Correct. 

5 (The document referred to 

6 was marked Ouemling 

7 Exhibit No. 6 for 

8 identification.) 

9 Q Before ve get to Mr. Oven, let me just ask you 

10 briefly, he told you at this meeting that his estimate 

11 was that the war in Central America was costing the 

12 centres $2 million a month? 

13 A Correct . 

14 Q And that of that amount, he thought that $1.25 

15 million could come from NHAO, in other words to reimburse 

16 the centres for the humanitarian costs? 

17 A Correct . 

18 Q Do you have any understanding of how the 

19 figure of $27 million had been selected as an appropriate 

20 amount to spend in that time frame? 

21 A I was told that figure was plucked out of thin 

22 air. 

23 Q I think that's probably correct. 

24 Now then, towards the bottom of your notes for 

25 that day, your conversation, it says: "North wants me to 



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1 use Rob Ovan. He is 'can-do' and )cnows th« scena." 

2 That is assentlally a aumnary of what Colonal 

3 North told you? 

4 A Correct. 

5 Q Did he describe to you In any way what 

6 relationship he had with Rob Owen? 

7 A He did not go into it in any detail. Owen 

8 himself had previously mentioned to me, as we have noted, 

9 that he )cnew North. And North here indicated that he, 

10 North, was a good friend of Owen. 

11 He gave me no description of what their 

12 relationship was, but I think that Chris Arkos probably, 

13 since he knew all of these people, Arkos may have filled 

14 me in on it to some degree and said that Owen is very 

15 close to North. 

16 What seemed to be the case was that Owen, by 

17 his own description, was clearly publicly associated with 

18 support for the contras, working to support the contras, 

19 and of course as a private citizen, not in the 

20 government, he was obviously at liberty to do whatever he 

21 wanted to do with the contras. 

22 North's own sympathy and knowledge of the 

2 3 contras and sympathy for them was well known. And so I 

24 just looked upon that relationship as being, that is to 

2 5 say the North-Owen relationship, as being part of this 



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1 whole crowd of Republicans who are helping the contras 

2 and so forth. 

3 Q Okay. I think you referred to Mr. Owen as a 

4 "true believer." 

5 A That's what he called hioself. He called 

6 hinself a true believer and as a stronger supporter of 

7 the President and as a firm believer. I think he used 

8 such expressions as, I'm a true believer in the cause. 

9 Q Now, did you — did Colonel North tell you 

10 that he had been and was continuing to use Mr. Owen to 

11 make, physically make payments to contra leaders from 

12 funds located in North's office? 

13 A Absolutely not. He made no mention of that. 

14 Q Did he ever tell you that he was using Mr. 

15 Owen to transport or to convey information about military 

16 assistance to the contras, carrying munitions lists to 

17 and from contra leaders, providing Colonel North with the 

18 military needs of the contras in order for North to go 

19 out and find funding or actual materiel for them? Did he 

20 tell you that? 

21 A Absolutely not. He never told me anything of 

22 that sort. 

2 3 Q Did he tell you that he was using Mr. Owen to 

24 transport or to transmit intelligence information from 

25 the U.S. government to the contra leaders in Central 



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UN^^SSiFEB 



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1 America? 

2 A No, he did not. On the contrary, I would say 

3 that Colonel North represented Owen simply as being a 

4 nice, energetic guy who likes the contras. 

5 Q Now, after Colonel Noz-th's conversation, this 

6 didn't change your mind any aUsout hiring Mister ~ about 

7 not hiring Mr. Owen? 

8 A No. 

9 Q Let's go to the next exhibit, No. 7, whictx is 

10 a letter you received dated October 3, 1985, from the 

11 AAA's, the three directors of UNO, Adolpho Calero, Arturo 

12 Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo. 

13 A Correct. 

14 (The docviment referred to was 

15 marked Duemllng Exhibit No. 7 

16 for identification.) 

17 Q,,„ We don't need to go into the details, but 

18 essentially this letter from UNO asked you to give 

19 serious consideration to hiring Mr. Owen's company, IDEA, 

20 Institute for Democracy, Education, and Assistance, as a 

21 designated organization for UNO to facilitate and help 

22 UNO in connection with the NHAO program? 

23 A It doesn't ask me to consider it. It asks me 

24 to do it. 

25 Q Right. Actually, it says "Please consider 



^NCmSIFIED 



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UNCtASSlFiED 



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1 this a formal request." 

2 A All right. 

3 Q Kov, when you received this letter did you go 

4 out and hire Mr. Owen as a result? 

5 A No, I did not. 

6 Q How then, just a few days later on October the 

7 10th, we had that situation with the NBC crew aboard the 

8 Connor Air flight. And on October the 17th — here are 

9 your notes. Exhibit 8. On October the 17th, there was a 

10 RIG meeting which you attended, Colonel North, Assistant 

11 Secretary Abrams, and others, and the situation in 

12 connection with that flight was the central topic at that 

13 meeting, is that correct? 

14 A That's correct. 

15 (The document referred to was 

16 narked Duemling Exhibit No. 8 

17 for identification.) 

18 Q And in that meeting. Colonel North was very 

19 vehement — and correct me if I am not being fair, but he 

20 was very vehement about the fact that Rob Owen should 

21 definitely be hired by NHAO, and that if he had been on 

22 board this would never have happened; is that correct? 

23 A That is correct. 

24 Q You have a specific or separate recollection 

25 of that meeting. Colonel North being very much an 



bNeiASSSFSED 



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1 advocata for Rob Oven? 

2 A Yea. 

3 Q Now, what happened at that meeting in terms of 

4 the other participants and what was finally decided? 

5 A Well, as you have just suggested, North very 

6 vehemently and vigorously advanced the view that if we 

7 had Rob Owen on board working for NHAO, that this kind of 

8 episode would have been avoided. 

9 Ha argued that NHAO needed soma kind of an 

10 axpediter in the field to work to get things moving. 

11 North had been saying regularly — this meeting, after 

12 all, is mid-October. North had been saying for the 

13 better part of a month or six weeks that we weren't 

14 getting the assistance moving fast enough. 

15 And I don't recall whether in this meeting, 

16 but I do note from my earlier notes of my office call, he 

17 invoked the name of Bob MacFarlane and Jeane Kirkpatrick. 

18 And there was quite a lot of talk about heat from the 

19 White House. 

20 In fact, since we don't have it in front of 

21 us, but I guess it was Poindexter who raised the problem 

22 with Under Secretary Whitehead at the State Department, 

23 saying why isn't this stuff moving faster. And I was 

24 obliged to write a letter for Whitehead's signature back 

25 to Poindexter. 



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1 So there was a lot of heat and pressure about 

2 why isn't It moving. And so North also played that 

3 theme, and basically he said, you know, you've simply got 

4 to have Owen to handle this. 

5 And Z saw myself essentially isolated. The 

6 discussion — I continued to say I didn't really see the 

7 necessity for that. Z certainly didn't see the necessity 

8 for a middleman somewhere between NHAO and UNO, because Z 

9 felt that we could work directly with UNO without having 

10 some kind of a middleman. 

11 But this conversation was essentially North 

12 advocating it, Z resisting it, Elliot Abrams in the 

13 conversation a little bit discussing some of the pros and 

14 cons a bit, the others as Z recall not saying anything 

15 particularly. 

16 And finally Elliot Abrams turned to me and 

17 said: Well, Bob, Z suppose you probably ought to hire 

18 Owen. Well, in bureaucratic terms the jig was up, since 

19 1 was the only person who was speaking out against this. 

20 So Z said, all right, 1 will hire Owen, but Z will hire 

21 Owen only under some very specific conditions. 

22 Do you want me to outline those? 

23 Q That's okay. You've got it in your memo here. 

24 A They are laid out here. And Z would like to 

25 note that both Owen and North agreed to these conditions. 



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1 Ollie North typically, which is the way Ollie 

2 behaves, then of course when he's got what he wants he 

3 then becomes sweetness and light and very congenial. 

4 Q Okay. At any rate, this then led to Owen's 

5 coapany, IDEA, getting a grant or a contract with NHAO? 

6 A Correct . 

7 Q Now, the terns of that contract, and I don't 

8 have them in front of me, but they essentially, first of 

9 all, require that the work of IDEA has to be specifically 

10 limited to humanitarian work? 

11 A The contract was very explicit, very carefully 

12 drawn. The lawyer that we had working us from the legal 

13 advisor's office drew up the contract, and it contains 

14 lemguage drawn from the statute. 

15 Q It also requires Robert Owen personally to 

16 devote his full time services to the work under this 

17 contract? 

18 A Correct. 

19 Q It specifically prohibits him personally from 

20 engaging in any activities associated with lethal 

21 military aid or anything like that? 

22 A Absolutely. For the time which he is under 

23 contract, he is specifically precluded from having 

24 anything to do with lethal material or assistance. ^ 

25 Q Now, Mr. Owen testified under grant of 



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1 Imunlty b«£or« th« Coiiiaitt««s -- his depositions vera 

2 also taken — In which he described aloost — well, 

3 basically not skipping a beat, in connection with the work 

4 he had been doing for North then getting a contract with 

5 NHAO, and specifically admitted that during the time 

6 frame of his contract with NHAO he continued in his trips 

7 in Central America to deal with contra leaders in 

8 connection with Billtary matters, to assist Lieutenant 

9 Colonel North, and specifically described, if I can just 

10 summarize it, a time in I believe late March or early. — 

11 late February or early March, when he accompanied a 

12 flight carrying weapons, not a NHAO flight but a flight 

13 carrying weapons, into Central America; and that when 

14 some problems — strike that. 

15 He accompanied a flight, an empty flight, into 

16 Central America which was going to pick up weapons from 

17 ^^^^^Hand then transport them to the southern forces. 

18 And then a problem came up in connection with the weapons 

19 not being ready, and so the flight went on ^°^^^^^^^| 

20 and there was all kinds of activity there and eventually 

21 the thing turned into a bust. 

22 But essentially, he admitted to several days 

23 of activities in connection with trying to get these 

24 weapons to the southern front. 

25 He also described other trips where >>a was 



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1 essentially, as I understand it, filing two trip reports, 

2 one for you telling you what he was doing in connection 

3 with NHAO and then a second report for Colonel North 

4 telling him the other things he was doing. 

5 Did you have any awareness of this dual role 

6 that Rob Oven was playing? 

7 A I had absolutely no awareness of any of that. 

8 My attitude towards that is that those activities were a 

9 direct violation of his contract to us. I had no 

10 knowledge of those activities at the time that he was 

11 carrying them out. 

12 And as Z say, had I Icnown, it's clear that in 

13 my view at least that was a direct violation of his 

14 contract. Moreover, as you have referred to these 

15 reports, we did ask that he do trip reports, which are 

16 all on file with us, and of course there's absolutely no 

17 mention of any of that kind of activity in those trip 

18 reports. 

19 Q Now, your not knowing about those activities, 

20 is that based upon an attempt by you not to know? 

21 A Absolutely not. I was not trying to look the 

22 other way or put on any blinders, by no means. 

23 Q Okay, thank you. 

24 (Discussion off the record.) 

25 Q Let me hand you — I will start with Exhibit 



74 



GNCLASSiFSED 

1 No. 9. These are going to be a series of notes you took 

2 at your meetings with Colonel North or RIG meetings on 

3 miscellaneous subjects. 

4 (The document referred to was 

5 marked Ouemllng Exhibit No. 9 

6 for Identification.) 

7 Q First of all, on No. 9 Is the meeting you had 

8 with Colonel North on September the 11th, 1985. This was 

9 within a week or two of when you actually started? 

10 A Correct. It was within a week, less than a 

11 week. 

12 Q You went and talked with Colonel North or 

13 Colonel North came to your office? 

14 A I went to talk to him. 

15 Q You understood he was somebody who was 

16 somebody you needed to know or needed to talk to? 

17 A I was told that nobody in Washington knew more 

18 about the contras than Oliver North. ■ 

19 Q And in this meeting on the 11th, he basically 

20 gave you a little bit of history of some of the efforts 

21 down in Central America with regard to the contras. He 

22 told you that they had — that the contras had sufficient 

23 military equipment, they didn't have adequate transport ■ 

24 capability, but that they were going to be chartering two 

25 Caribous, which are a type of airplane; but that 



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1 basically their principal problems were specifically 

2 getting hiimanltarlan aid and assistance, which of course 

3 Is what your program was geared to do, Is that correct? 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q Towards the bottom of the first page of your 

6 notes, the very bottom, It says: "May 1984 money gone. 

7 Suddenly FON on Its own, starting logistics from 

8 scratch . " 

9 And on the next page It says: "July '84, 

10 money stared again. Today, excellent resupply system." 

11 Did North Indicate to you In any way where 

12 this money supply was coming from that started In July of 

13 '84? 

14 A Not that Z recall, no. 

15 Q Did he ever tell you that foreign countries 

16 were contrlbutlng,,j|B|tim for the contras starting at aibout 

17 that time? ^^^^^ -'*- 

18 A No, he did not. 

19 Q Did he ever describe for you any of his 

20 activities with either General Secord or Albert Hakim or 

21 any of those people? 

22 A No, he never mentioned that. 

23 (The document referred to was 

24 marked Duemling Exhibit No. 10 

25 ISIIAI m ^AF identification.) 



miMWiiu 



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1 Q Exhibit 10 Is a Mating on Octobar tha 1st, 

2 198S. On tha sacond paga — if you naad to raad tha 

3 contaxt, go ahaad. But on tha sacond paga at tha top, 

4 thara's a coupla o£ Itaaa I vantad to ask you about. 

5 First lat na go do%m to vhara It saysj 

6 ^^^^^H ^^ says on tha third Una down undar^ 

7 ^^^^^Byour nota says In rafaranca tof 
Airstrip baing praparad." 

9 A Yas. 

10 Q Do you hava any indapandant racollactlon of 

11 that convarsation «id what was said at that tiaa? 

12 A Not raally. Part of ay problaa is that Z 

13 cannot disantangla what I say hava subsaquantly haard 

14 about that froa what I aight hava known at tha tiaa. 

15 What Z suspect is that it was a fairly brief 

16 rafaranca, siaply saying that there was an airstrip being 

17 prepared which was going to be availetbla for use by the 

18 resistance. 

19 Q Did anybody say anything about any connection 

20 the embassy In^^^^^^^^Bpay have had with that air 

21 strip that you recall? 

22 A No, Z don't recall any. 

23 Q At the top of the page it appears to be — 

24 A Let ae look at what happened. 

25 (Pause.) 



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1 A y«s, go ahead. 

2 Q At th« top of th« paga, it looks to b« that 

3 this was cosing fron Lleutsnant Colonsl North, that h« 

4 was saying something about can us«, "Mr. Green said to 

5 call," and then he's got the name "Maximo Gomez" and a 

6 phone number appears, ^^^^^^^^^^^^H and then an 

7 arrow that says "will airlift the stuffi 

8 Do you have any Independent recollection of 

9 what those notes are referring to? 

10 A Well, not really. I think that it goes back 

11 to the previous page on this matter of food, and that if 

12 we did contract for some food ^i*^ — '^"^ ^V 

13 the way, that embassy^^^^^^^^Hcable that's mentioned 

14 at the bottom of page 1, that as Z recall refers to an 

15 initiative from the embassy, not something that we 

16 solicited, but the embassy saying that a particular 

17 person, I think maybe an American citizen, well and 

18 favorably known to the American embassy, is in the food 

19 business in^^^^^^^nd he would have come in and said 

20 to the American embassy ^"^^^^^^^ ^^V' ^^^ want to 

21 buy some C-rations and stuff like that? Because I am 

22 .producing those kinds of things for thei 

23 I can provide those, I can sell them to you. 

24 So the embassy simply passed that on and said, 

25 if you guys are interested in buying C-rations, there's 



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1 this guy that's well and favorably knovn to us ovar hara 

3 Nov, Z think what than happans hara Is that 

4 what wa wars told or North aald — if you dacida to do 

5 that or if this does happen, you can get the stuff 

from ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand that the way 

7 you did that would be to call Goaez, here was his 

8 telephone number, and I think tell hia Mr. Green said 

9 that we should call you and can you arrange to fly this 

10 stuff in. 

11 I think that's what that's all about. 

12 Q I think that's probably a pretty fair 

13 assxusption. 

14 Did you know that there was an individual 

15 located in^^^^^^^^^py the name of Felix Rodriguez, 

16 who went by the name Max Gomez? 

17 A I did not. No, this is all totally new to ae 

18 at this point. 

19 Q I believe there is other evidence to indicate 

20 that in fact Mr. Green was the code word that Colonel 

21 North would use in connection with — 

22 A I gather that's the case. 

23 Q And that Maximo Gomez is in fact this 

24 individual, Felix Rodriguez, located ^"^^^^^^^^K 

25 But essentially, what you just related to me is all you 



UN(^SSiFi£D 



79 



rfUMMMMMta 



UNCl^^iFiEB 



77 



1 can recall Independent of anything anybody els* nay have 

2 told you about this? 

3 A That's correct. 

4 g Okay. Thank you. 

5 (The document referred to was 

6 marked Dueallng Exhibit No. 11 

7 for identification.) 

8 Q Exhibit No. 11 are minutes — well, not 

9 minutes, but your notes of a RIG meeting of November 1, 

10 1985. Toward the bottom of that first page of your 

11 notes, under item number 6, the whole thing starts off 

12 with "RHD checkpoints." So Z guess these are items that 

13 you are intending to discuss at the meeting? 

14 A I would think so, yes. 

15 Q And then it says "Robelo very frank that" — 

16 talking about Alfonso Robelo? 

17 A I think that must have reflected a 

18 conversation I had with Robelo. 

19 Q Okay. And he was a contra leader in 

20 connection with factions in the south? 

21 A Correct. He would have been talking about the 

22 southern front. 

23 Q The very last item under number 6 says | 

24 very touchy," with "very" underlined. 
25 




80 



ONOLAgSIF 



78 




1 A Correct. 

2 Q "Not posslbla to sand any supplies directly, 

3 perhaps through UNFDO later." 

4 I guess all I'd asking Is, do you recall In 

5 fact that the government °^^^^^^^^^^ lllce the 

6 government of ^^^^Hj^^vas very, very touchy about any 

7 overt connection that NHAO or any overt presence of NHAO 

8 Inslde^^^ 

9 A Yes. It was represented to me that 
was far more touchy^^^^^^^^^^H and thati 

11 was not only very touchy edsout having any support for the 
contras^^^^^^^^^^^^^H but they also were playing 

13 any games behind the scenes, the way^^^^^^^^^^^were 

14 In fact supporting It behind the scenes, but didn't want 

15 It known. 

16 ^^^^^^^^Bnot only didn't want it happening, 

17 but they weren't going to help, 

18 Q All right. My question then is, when you 

19 understand this or when you hear something like this, I'm 

20 trying to fit that in with the brief reference that had 

21 been made in the October meeting about an airstrip being 

22 prepared] 

23 Did you ever make the conne ction between the 

24 fact that the government^^^^^^^^^P<'as very 
25 



sensitive about this and yet North was talking about some 



mm%%ifm 



I 



81 



UNCtASSIirB 



79 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



kind of airstrip b«lng prepared? 

A Hell, Z think what I inferred was that the 
airstrip — and here again, I 'a not sure whether I can 
disentangle later ]cnowledge. But I think Z inferred that 
the airstrip that was being prepared was in a very remote 
part^^^^^^^^^^Hthat was a seoi- 
clandestine undertaking, and that perhaps the govemsent 
Iwas not to be inforaed about it. 
And if it were — and this often happens in 
that and perhaps other parts of the world. 




And as an illustration, for example, I was 
told that some of the regional authorities, military 
authorities, police authorities, because there is no army 
^^^^^^^^^^1 but let's say the police authorities along 
the border with Nicaragua, looked the other way on some 
of the activities that the contras were conducting, 
whereas the attitudes in the capital, ^^^^^^^^H would 
have been much more negative. 

Q Okay. Now let me turn to another subject 
here. Let me hand you Exhibit No. 12. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Duemling Exhibit No. 12 
for identification.) 
FE^^a«iiijcj 



*t/| 



ifm 



yNClASSIFiES 



80 



1 g There's only on* brief reference I want to as]c 

2 about in here, but generally these are documents in 

3 connection with a SIG meeting, S-I-G, which stands for 

4 Senior Interagency Group, is that correct? 

5 A Correct. 

6 Q On May 15, 1986. This was a meeting at a one 

7 step higher level than the RIG, and I believe one of the 

8 pages here shows the participants toward the end. 

9 A It shows probably Michael Armacost as chair. 

10 Q It shows Under Secretary Armacost as chairman, 

11 Assistant Secretary Abrams, yourself, and some others 

12 from State. It shows Sam Watson from the Vice President's 

13 Office, and North and Ray Burkhart from the HSC. 

14 Now, the question I want to ask you about was 

15 contained on page -- I believe there's nothing else in 

16 here that I'm particularly interested in. Do you see the 

17 number at the top where it says 4331? 

18 A Yes. 

19 Q Starting at the bottom of that page — 

20 A Where it says "With the end of NHAO funding"? 

21 Q Right. Let me read that into the record. It 

22 says: 

23 "With the end of NHAO funding March 31, there 

24 is a discussion of alternative sources of funding for the 

25 Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. ^^^^^^^^Hnoted that 







83 






81 



1 th« Int«lllgenc« Authorization Act would allow the CIA to 

2 iapleDent a full non-lethal program if funds can be 

3 transferred for that purpose." 

4 I will skip a few sentences. 

5 "^^^Hstated that, if bridge funding is not 

6 obtained, resistance forces will encounter serious 

7 operational problems in July-August. There was some 

8 discussion of State soliciting funding from third 

9 countries or a general public appeal for donations." 

10 Z wanted to ask you eibout if you can 

11 elaborate at all upon the discussion of State soliciting 

12 funding from third countries, with the preface that at 

13 this point the existing legislation specifically 

14 authorized the State Department to solicit from third 

15 countries assistance for the contras. So there was 

16 nothing untoward about the discussion. 

17 But do you recall anything specific about the 

18 discussion? 

19 A I do not. 

20 Q Do you recall — you said you don't recall, 

21 but let me throw a few things out and see if any of it 

22 prompts your memory. 

23 Do you recall any discussion about the fact 
that ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hmight be countries 

25 be willing to contribute money for the contras? 



84 



1 A I r«ally don't renembcr. 

2 Q Oo you recall Assistant Secretary Abraas 

3 saying anything at this meeting about the fact that at 

4 this very tloe he was In discussions or his office was in 

5 discussions with General Slnglaub about General Singlaub 
soliciting funds from ^^^^J^^^^^^f^^^^Pwith some 

7 type of a wink or governaent approval? 

8 A Z don't have any recollection of that. 

9 (Discussion off the record.) 

10 Q I have handed you what's been marked as 

11 Exhibit No. 13, which is a four page letter from an 

13 individual by the neuae of Lee Mason with a conpany called 

13 Hondu Carib Cargo, with an address in Grand Cayman, 

14 British West Indies, addressed to Mr. Philip Buechler of 

15 your office, dated January 20th, 1986. 

16 (The document referred to was 

17 marked Duemling Exhibit No. 13 

18 for identification.) 

19 Q In siunmary, the letter offers the services of 

20 this particular company in connection with, I believe, 

21 making some flights into the region for NHAO. 

22 First of all, was this company solicited in 

23 any way to make a proposal to NHAO? 

24 A No, this letter arrived In our office entirely 

25 unsolicited. 



tiNCtmSSIFiEU 



85 



UN^SSIHED 



83 



1 Q Okay. Old Hondu Car lb Cargo Avar gat any kind 

2 of contract vlth NHAO to provlda any aarvlcas? 

3 A No, thay did not. 

4 Q Basically, what was tha response to this 

5 latter? 

6 A I'm not sure If we even responded. I don't 

7 think ve were very Impressed. You will note that It Is 

8 hand printed on thalr letterhead. That doesn't look like 

9 much of a business. If they can't even afford a 

10 type%n:lter. 

11 So I don't think we ware Inprassed and I don't 

12 even think ve responded. 

13 Q I had mentioned earlier In my examination 

14 allegations about a man named Frank Moss, and I 

15 incorrectly associated that name with Vortex. The name, 

16 according to the allegations, is actually associated with 

17 this company, Hondu Carib. 

18 And I noted In the last page of this letter 

19 there's a notation that has some numbers and then his 
2 name, Frank Moss. 

21 First of all, you don't know anything about 

22 Mr. Moss? 

2 3 A I don't. It's — if there was any action 

24 taken on this, It would have been perhaps by Mr. 

2 5 Buechler, to whom it is addressed. 



gnclE^sfied 



86 



UNCL^ 



1 I can't tall you offhand whether that is Buechler's 

2 handwriting or not. 

3 Q Do you have any infomation or indication in 

4 any way that Mario Calero had any connection whatsoever 

5 with Hondu Carib Cargo? 

6 A No. I have no Icnowledge of that, no 

7 indication. 

8 Q Correct ne if I'b wrong, but there was an 

9 incident. One of the things NHAO discovered was that 

10 approximately $25,000 or thereabouts of NHAO funds had 

11 bean used by sons contras improperly in connection with 

12 some purchase of weapons or something? 

13 A Correct. 

14 Q And that money was reimbursed to NHAO? 

15 A That's correct. 

16 Q So to your knowledge, none of the $27 million 

17 ever ended up in providing lethal aid in any way? On the 

18 one occasion you can recall something, you were 

19 reimJsursed? 

20 A That is correct. 

21 Q And Rob Owen talked about the use of pro forma 

22 receipts by some suppliers ^^^^^^^^^^Bbecause it was a 

23 way of sort of getting imaginative credit down there. 

24 What did you know about the use of pro forma receipts? 

25 A That was a bit complicated, because when we 



^ B cA^'%>|:i i 



iBfcD 



87 



yN(^ssif:e 



1 first started we thought we would worJc on the basis of 

2 so-called pro forma invoices, which is a standard 

3 commercial practice, in order to quote a price and 

4 quantity and that sort of thing. 

5 And then we were planning that there would be 

6 pro forma invoices, which we would then approve in 

7 principle, and then the purchase would be made and the 

8 true invoice would come back. 

9 We discovered that was going to be cumbersome 

10 and time-consximing, so we did away with that, and we 

11 dispensed with the notion of using pro forma invoices, 

12 However, we did find out that on a couple of occasions 

13 people did submit to us what I would describe, not as pro 

14 forma invoices, but as fraudulent invoices, that is to 

15 say invoices that purported to be an actual — a document 

16 representing an actual transaction which in fact had not 

17 occurred . 

18 And one such episode was the one that you just 

19 referred to. Another episode — and curiously, both of 

20 these occurred in the south, not in the north. And the 

21 other episode had to do with a firm with which we 

22 contracted for some shirts and pants. 

23 Q Do you recall the name of the company? 

24 A I think this was the one, I think it was 

25 Duque-Estrada. The other one I think was Creaciones 



bNCOSSIFEED 



88 



liNOIASSIFiEO 



1 Fancy, the one that had actually the $26,000, I think, 

2 and that was Creaclones Fancy. 

3 It was Duguue-Estrada , and what really 

4 happened was that they gave us fraudulent invoices on 

5 which we paid, but what they did was take the money and 

6 buy cloth and buttons and sewing machines and 

7 manufactured the shirts and the pants and so forth. 

8 And we spent a long time investigating that on 

9 the ground. Mr. Ortega and the staff investigated that. 

10 Q Those are the questions I had. I think we can 

11 probably finish up. If there is anything we need to come 

12 back with you on, I will let you know. 

13 That will complete the deposition and, as I 

14 say, we'll get back in touch with you if we need to go 

15 any further with any of this. 

16 (Whereupon, the taking of the instant 

17 deposition ceased.) 
18 



19 Signature of the witness 

20 SIGNED AND SWORN TO before me this 



21 day of , 19_ 

22 



23 Notary Public 

24 My Commission expires: 



UNCt/ISSIRJEP 



89 



n o^^s~ 




Oo<ff4i 



tistanee \ 



Plight* CcoB U.S. _ 
•. Plight cl«acanc*« 

b. AcctpcabiliCy of chosen carrier 

c. Maignation of entry point (aay be remote (roa UNO's 

area of operations) 

Warehousing 

a. Oeteraining where supplies must be warehoused 

b. Controlling release of supplies from warehouses 

Internal surface transportation 

a. Designating carrier and types of vehicles to be used 

b. Controlling passage of vehicles through checkpoints 

Internal air transportation 

a. Designating carrier 

b. Controlling numbers of flights by clearance procedures 

c. Designating airfields to be used (may not be most con- 

venient to UNO operations) 

Controls exercized by regional commanders 

a. Se<]uester supplies and release them only as they see fit 

(this is definitely the case] 

b. Control of transportation, chec 




NHAO:RWOueraling: 12/17/35 







UNCLASSIFIED 




2 f XHIBIT 



90 



wmm 



^i-jnr^e^ 







SUBJECT: POSITIOMINC OF NHAO SUPPLIES 
RET: DIRECTOR i7251* 

1 . THIS CABLE OUTLINES STA TION ' 
TRAJISSHIPMENT OPERATION TO BE RUM 
FREE TO SHA RE IT HIT H COM AS APP 
BACKGROUND, QlB IS CHARGED WITH 
MONITORING AND VERIFYING THE ARRIVAL, 
ULTIMATE USE OF MATERIAL SUPPLIED BT 
FORCES. (THE REASON FOR THIS IS TO kl 
POSITIONING HHAO PERSONNEL IN THE Fia_ 
CARRIES HITH IT A SERIES OF UNWANTED COMPCRATIOMS.) 

2. IH^^^BSTATION IS TO MONITOR THE ARRIVAL OF AU 
EQUIPMENT Brouatn OrNHAO FLIGHTS. THE STATION SHOULD 
REPORT BYJHHHII INTELLIGENCE C*BLE TIME OF ARRIVAL OF aiOTTS 
AND DETAIlSlIST OF MATERIAL OFFLOADED. REPORT SHOULD 
COHaUDE BI ADVISING IF MATERIAL WAS STORED OR IMMEDIAiai 
TRANSSHIPPED . TO FACILITATE THIS REPORTING THE STATION WILL 
BE ADVISED REGARDING THE TIME OF FLIGHTS AND THE MATURE AND 
AMOUNT OF CARGO. 





NHAO 

PLEASE FEEL 
WAY OF 
NSIBILITT OF 
SHIPMENT AND 
THE RESISTANCE 
NECESSITY OF 
INC WHICH 



885i 




3. SECONDLY, STATION IS TO REPORT IN DETAIL ON ONVARD 
SHIPMENT OF THE SUPPLIES. THIS REPORTING SHOULD DESCRIBE IN 
DETAIL THE CONTENTS OF THE LOAD, THE TYPE OF AIRC RAFT AND THE^ 
ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF THE CARGO. (HHi^AviLL BE ASKE^ 
TO REPORT RECEIPT OF THE SHIPMENT AND VERIFY THAT THE SUPP I5es; 
HERE IN FACT USED BY THE RESISTANCE FORCES. 

4. THIRDLY, STATI ON IS TO CON FIRM THAT NONE OF THE 
SUPPLIES fRE DIVERTED TO^HIH^HORGANIZATIGN. THISllS 



•« TEMPO 






AFTER USE »* 



REVIEWED FOR RELEAS 



91 



UNCLASSIFIED 



srm 



PA Ce 000 2 

TOT: (Mat^JUl 86 



OIXEOOft 677959 



CRUCI 

unoL\ 
Ipprqe 



THIS 

Via 

UNDERLI 



^WHICH MILL REQUIRE STATIOM'S 

Dl T HlMBakP 3T ATI0II 15 HSKEO TO Mil 
SENIORflflHlBjCSFFICIALS INOUD^NC flH^H ANT 
ON TNETHsONSDNDeRLIINC OOR RARDLIIfE roSITION IIS 
STATION HAS BEEN PROVIOCO BAOCCflOUND PAPCX ON 
IP IT lU^U^NCER AfAIUBLE PLEASE ADVISE AND VE 
JIT IT. mEo^ BRIEFINGS IT IS » 



PIT IS ALSO nffORTNT TO POINT OtfT THAT SUPPLIES 
VOL BE MADE AVAIUBLE TO FRS UNITS IN THE FIELD ?IA NHAO, IF 
THET (THE UNIT COHMANDANTES) SO REQUEST. (FYIO: SPECIFIC PLANS 
TO THIS END ARE BEING MADE.) 

lATION Sa POLD FEEL FREE TO REPORT 

^^^__^_ BACXGROOND INFORMATION 

ON THE FtmCTIONINC OF THE TlUNSS8I?RQ&fieatATICN. TO 
FACaiTATE THIS THE STATION WILL BE A SBggb IN PTj 
LUISON CONTACTS WITH ONO/FDN PERSONN^HSofED^^^^^TO 
MANAGE THEIR END OF THE TRANSSHIPMENT BVION. 




8359 



7. THERE OBVIOUSLT VILL BE OTHER QUESTIONS JHICH UIU 
ARISE, HOWEVER, THE FOREGOING PROVIDES GENERAL CUIOaiNES. 
PLEASE ADVISE IF THERE ARE ANT QUESTIONS. 



8. FILE: 
SECRET. > 
ORIG: C/LA/CAl 
(); REL: C/U/CAl 
END OF MESSAGE 



END OF MESSAGE 



.DECL OAOR DRV HUM 4-62. AU 




»* TEMPORART WORKING COPT 



Cl^\^i "bv*^ 



REVIEWED FOR RELEASE 

DAT c 1 s MAY say 



92 



93 



UffiliSSIFIED 



(^ /nfip^ ^ 



March 9, 1996 



f >x 



^^i7 



Memo to the rile 



Policy Decision concerning Helicopters 

Jim Michel telephoned w 'it'o t 9 to discuss my memo of April 1 
to Elliott Abcams requesting guidance on helicopters for UNO. 

Michel said he had discussed the issue with Bill walker, 
and they had agreed and so advised Abrams that it would be 
imprudent at this time to assist UNO in connection with 
helicopters. Michel said that if hel icopter ( s ) were to be 
marked, configured and used exclusively for medevac purposes, 
it might be possible, but any amount of dual use would create 
problems of a perceptual and practical nature. 

Therefore, the guidance at this time is that NHAO should 
not act affirmatively on any request involving expenditure of 
funds for the overhaul, maintenance, operation or transport of 
helicopters. 



RWDuemling:4/9/86 



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Nicaraqjan -ijinanitdf lan Assistance Office (NHAO) 
Policy on 'Mixed Loads* J* 



<J 



D«attlon 



'^8 



•Nixed loads' refers to the practice of combining numani- 
tai^ and letnal supplies within the same delivery load. 

Pol% as it evolved: 

— fcember S. 198S : At a nearing of the HPAC Western Hemi- 
splS Subcommittee, Mr. Abrams promised Congressmen Barnes and 
Leik that the Sub-committee would be informed if the Adminis- 
tran decided to interpret the law to allow NHAO-funded ve- 
hi4 to be used to transport weapons. 

— fcember 18, 1985 : Messrs. Michel and Duemling called on 
HFVChairman Hamilton to discuss tne mixed loads issue. 
Ha^on stated that the legislative history is ambiguous on 
tha issue, expressed tie opinion that using NUAO-funded 
vebiles to transport weapons would be 'skating close to the 
edfl and suggested a 'oest and faithful effort' in that tne 
'palpal use' of such vehicles would be humanitarian and 'in 
thi«erwnelming majority of cases* tne vehicles would be put 
toMnitarian uses. 

— fcember 18, 1985 : Duemlmg briefed SSCI Staff Director 
Mclfi on Hamilton' s views. McMahon indicated that SSCI 
Ch«tn Ourenberger was inclined to a .nore liberal interpceta- 
tianan Hamilton, but ne did not offer to pursue the issue. 

— Iwary 3, 1986 : Micnel sent Duemling a policy directive, 
reating inter-agerrcy consultations and approved by Abrams, 
coining the following points: 

— The Conference Committee on ine Intelligence Authoriza- 
tion Act for ?yas, meeting in November 1985, provided a 
tlarifying' liberal interpretation of SHAO's autnority in 
Ae matter of funding vehicles: 

— On the basis of this clarification, and suosequent 
Bundings with appropriate iiemoers of ine Congress, NHAO 
■s provided witn tne following guidance: 

1 NHAO was authorized to pay for deliveries of Tumani- 
arian assistance, including inside Nicaragua. 

I NHAO grants involving vehicles and transportation ser- 
■ices must specify tneir humanitarian purpose and pronioit 
my modifications that could inflict bodily narm. 




6»H 



untussw 









IXHrBIT 



a/i-s/i ■) 



95 



IINCUSSIFP 



<^ 



Ss 



I 'Howevec, the grant need not preclude absolutely the 
sansport of mixed loads. Rather, it should be explained 
It the beneficiary that transport of lethal items should 
« avoided if possible, that incidental transport of sucn 
<em3 in mixed loads is permissible if separate transport 
•uld be impractical or unduly hazardous, and that in any 
#ent the primary and predominant use of NHAO-funded trans- 
it must be the delivery of humanitarian assistance cora- 
•dit ies. * 

--yacy 10- 1986: ARA/CEN sent a memo to Abrams enclosing 
talis points tor the oral briefing of Congressmen Barnes and 
Le* (pursuant to the December 5 commitment) on the NHAO 
vfii^-f'^ndinq policy. This memo states that the HPSCI Staff 
Oi[#»f ■>*<! already been briefed on the policy. The talising 
poi# repeat the substance of the policy guidance sent by 
nii^ to Ouemling. 

•n;e|ticy in Practice 

Fli<M from the U. S. to Central America : SHAO contracted with 
prii* 'J- S- *ir carriers to ship humanitarian supplies pur- 
charf ih the U. S. to destinations in Central America. All 
3uaifli'3*"-3 were cleared by U. S. Customs agents for compliance 
witi'- S- laws (including no shipment of weapons). In addition 
t(iel»"^i"9 ^""^ departure of all sucn flights was monitored by 
NHM •'f '•'^'•^'■* Of their designees. In no case was tnere ever 
any i*ention to ship weapons, nor any evidence that weapons 
■jec,it).i'jfal\y introdvjced onto these flights. 

Fllf,;i within Central America : SHAO paid for the transport 
wi tu» ^^ht-f *1 America of two categories of supplies: 

:. Supplies procured in the U. S.: tnese were initially 
lelivered to rear-area bases and t-ien transshipped m 
{■ailer quantitites to several forward areas. 

1. Supplies procured in Central America: these were simi- 
lirly moved from me point of procurenent to tne forward 
i/eas. 

jistriDution was accomplished prmaril/ oy NHAO contracts 
wits local surface and air carriers, though for a limited period 
of ti* t'''° ^- S- carriers were also used. 'Tie resistance -nove- 
menl I'self was able to move some supplies on the few operation- 
al rt«ioles and aircraft in its posjession, 3ut NilAO iii not 
compeijate the resistance for any costs incurred, m par-, be- 
cau»« these snipments were always nixed loads and difficult to 
moniU'- 



UNCUS8IFIED 



96 



UNCUSSIFIEB 



^^6Q 



Secauae of the stringent requirements set Cortn in the 
poUcy guidance, NHAO decided essentially to pursue a policy of 
avoiding mixed loads. This was feasible because the quantity 
of non-lethal supplies needing to be transported, and the des- 
perate need of the resistance for these supplies, made it pos- 
sible and reasonable to completely fill the contracted capacity 
of trucKs and aircraft with exclusively non-lethal loads. 

All NHAO grants specifically included the language con- 
tained in the policy guidance concerning mixed loads. In addi- 
tion, the policy was repeatedly briefed to tne resistance move- 
ment's logistics staff. 

Compliance with this policy was monitored by U. S. intel- 
ligence agencies in Central America, and their findings were 
duly reported to Washington. Tiese reports were reasonably 
complete and comprehensive with respect to air transport, less 
so with respect to trucks, due to the nature of tne two nodes 
(large, infrequent loads were easier to keep tabs on than small, 
frequent loads ) . 

Two examples will demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
monitoring system: 

1. The system reported tnat an NHAO-chartered L-lOO air- 
craft arrived at a Central American base on February 19 
with a cargo of 47,736 lbs. of supplies purchased by NHAO 
in the U. S. Prior to departure the fallowing day, 3,163 
los. of grenades belonging to the resistance (representing 
7% of the total load) were added to the cargo before the 
entire load was flown onward to a forward area. To tne 
best of its knowledge, this was the only occasion on whicn 
NHAO paid for a aiixed load . 

2. A second L-lOO flight on February 20 from tne same in- 
termediate point of departure to the same destination con- 
tained a cargo half consisting of lethal supplies oelonging 
to the resistance. On February 25, intelligence sources 
informed NHAO tfiai cargo Handlers nad erred in utilizing 
unused capacity on tne NHAO-chartered flight to add tne 
lethal material. 3ecause tne mixed load policy nad clearly 
been violated, NHAO refused to pay tie carrier for t-iis 
flight. 

This monitoring system was important to NHAO because it 
also monitored and reported on movements and deliveries tnat 
were not funded by SHAO, tnus making it possible for SHAO to 
distinguish clearly between its own charters and those funded 



UNCLASSIFIED 



97 



ilNCUSSiflEI) 



<s^ 



^7 



by the resistance movement itself. The situation could other- 
wise have proved confusing, because the resistance independently 
contracted witn carriers also used By NHAO. This 'dual use' of 
the same carrier did create confusion among journalists, who 
interviewed flight crew members tnat were uninformed as to who 
was paying for which flights. Sometimes these crews handled 
exclusively humanitarian supplies and sometimes mixed loads, 
and some crew members wrongly assumed -- and so informed jour- 
nalists -- that NHAO paid for both. (However, one journalist 
reported that a crew member told nlm that NHAO supplies snipped 
from the U. S. were fully off-loaded before the aircraft was 
subsequently utilized to carry mixed loads.) 

In fact, only the carrier's management and resistance of- 
ficials would have known tne identity of the contracting party 
for every separate flight. 



RWDuemling:2/17/97 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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TOP (iliehl3SIHfD)twuKu 

Stenographic Transcript of 



-HEARINGS 
Before the 



HSITS.- /.O 7 ,tr, 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND TEE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



wn m~ 



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UNITED STATES SENATE 



DEPOSITION 




Partially Declassified/Released nn ?LJ/}c >o8 
undec provisions ot E 12356 
by K Jolinson, National Secunty Council 



Washington. D.C. 



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A>J£=SC^l -E-Ck ^.G 



COPY m. 



(2G2) 529-9300 
20 F STSZST, M.W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 200 01 



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1 DgposiTioN orj 

2 Thursday, July 3, 1987 

3 United Stataa Sanata 

4 Salact Cooalttaa on Sacrat 

5 Military Asalstanca to Iran 

6 and tha Hlcaraguan Oppoaition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Oaposltlon ofF 

9 callad as a vltnaas by counsal for tha Salact CoBalttaa, 

10 at tha offlca of tha Salact Coaalttaa, Rooa SH-901, Hart 

11 Sanata Offlca Building, Washington, D. C. , coaaancing at 

12 1:35 p. a., tha vitnass having baan duly svom by RAYMOKD 

13 R. HESS, III, a Notary Public in and for tha District of 

14 Coluabia, and tha tastiaony baing takan down by Stanonask 

15 by RAYMOND R. HZER, III, and transcribad undar his 

16 diraction. 



WU^SWD 



(105) 



106 



imssm 



AVVBRAMCES: 

On b«half of th« Sanat* S«l«ct Conaltt** on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nlcaraguan 
Opposition: 

TDfOTHY WOODCOCK, ESQ. 
HANK FLYNN 
On behalf of the House Select Coanittee to 
Investigate Covert Aras Transactions with Iran: 
ROBERT GENZMAN, ESQ. 

10 On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency: 

11 RHONDA M. HUGHES, ESQ. 

12 On behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency: 

13 BILL ALLARO 



TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 

UNCUSSIFIED 



107 



liCliSSIEIED 



WITyES3 



eOMTKNTS 

gXAMTWATIO W ON BEHAU OF 
SENATE QQSa£ 



By Mr. Woodcock 
By Mr. G«nzaan 



143 




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[BXHiBiT MDMBER fOR IDBWTiriCATIQW 

8S 
107 ' 
13S 



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IC 

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PR0CEBDIMG3 



WUwraupon, 



called as a wltnass by counsel on bshalf of th« Sanata 
Salact Coaalttaa and having b««n duly svom by tha Notary 
Public, was axaalnad and tastlflad as follows: 
EXAMINATZOlf 

BY MR . WOODCOCK; 
Q Najor^^^^^^^^B would you stata your naaw 
for tha racoird, plaasa? 

A H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 

Ma j or ^^^^^^^B I'm Tla Woodcock and I'm 
Associata Counsel for tha Sanata Salact CoBBlttaa on 
Sacrat Military Assistance to Iran and the Micaraguan 
Opposition. This is a deposition held under the auspices 
of the Senate Coaalttee. It is also held under the 
auspices of the House Coaaittee on the Iran-contra 
Investigation. Robert Genzaan of that Caaaittae is hare 
and representing that Coaaittae. 

Accordingly, this is an official inq[uiry of 
tbos* two Coaaittees, and the inforaation that you impart 
to these Coaaittees aay well be useful in the 
investigations under their enabling resolutions. 

Let ae begin by briefly going over your 
background. First let ae state for the record we have 



msnED 



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intmrvimwA you bmtot; l. that 
_^«t la corract. 



not corract? 




Ill 






(111) 



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Mow during this p«rlod of tia*, say beginning 
in Jun« of 1985, did you occasionally attand Bastings of 
tha Hostaga Locating Task Forca? 

A Corract — sporadically in tha beginning. Z 
baliava thay aat onca avary two vaaks or ones a month. 

Q What did you undarstand tha Hostaga Locating 
Task Forca to b«? 

A It was a clearing housa for intalliganca 
'batWMB a nuabar of agancias — DL&, CIA, Stata, and DEA, 
tha Dmg Enforcaaant Agancy. 

Q Tha FBI? 

A Tha FBI as wall, e xcuse «•■ 



113 



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Ii«t ■• back up In tla« h«r« a bit. Major 
If I alght. FroB Jun* of 1985, whan you 
vara working vith^^H||H|^^H|^^^H I gathar 
would uaa you as a raaourca from tima to tiaa at hia 
Hoataga Locating Taak Porca aaatinga; ia that corract? 
A Yaa, corract. 




Mow did thara coma a ti»a whan you bagan to 
attand thaaa Hoataga Locating Taak Forca naatinga with 



UNCaSSIFIED 



115 



25 



uimstre 



IS 




any regularity? 

A In th« S«pt«Bb«r-Octob«r tiaa fraa* I ballav* 

I was attandlng thaa with soma regularity . 

Ln fact I~ 

began to attend thea with regularity, I believe, in about 
Noveaber. 

Q Nov in attending these aeetinge did you reach 
a point where you becaae at all frustrated with the 
Hostage Locating Task Force? 

A Yes. 

Q Nhen would you think that feeling developed? 

A Towards the end of Noveaber, the beginning of 
Deceaber. Z felt th»t it had ceased to function as it 
was designed. The various agencies that were attending 
always seeaed to be less knowledgeable in fact than they 
should have been. In other words, there was information 
that was available at the TS level that they didn't seea 
concerned with, and I would bring it to their attention 




urgency. 



TS level? 



And it didn't seea to have as auch a sense of 



MR. GENZNAN: Did you say inforaation at the 



THE WITNESS: Yes, at Top Secret. At the Top 



vNcnssinED 



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2: 

24 
25 



llNfiWSSffffiB 



16 



S«cr«t or Top S«cr«t/Cod«vord l«v«l. Th«r« would b« bits 
and piacaa that I would bring In and would aay wall, I've 
aaan a CIA raport that aaya auch and auch. What doaa CIA 
think? Oh, that 'a a good and valid raport. And I waa 
not ruda anough to quaation why didn't you bring it up at 
thia aaating. But I juat thought that th9 group ahould 
ba Bora forthcoaing as a clearing housa. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Raauaing) 

Q Kow aoaa ot tha paopla who wara attending 
thaaa aeetinga, let ae auggeat aoaa naaea and aee if you 
can add to thaa. Would ^^^^^^^Hba on* of thaa? . 

A Yes. 

Q 

A Yes^occasionally. 

Q ^^^^^^^^Hv *■ rapraaantativa CZA; 
that correct? 

A Correct. 

And^^l^^^^^^^Bwas a DOD or DIA rap? 

A ^H^^^l^^^^as a CIA/DO rep — 
Oix«otorata of Operations. 

Q Did ha have a relationahip to tha Oapartaant 
of Defense? 

A Not that I 'a aware of. 

Q And Abrahaa Azzaa? 

A Waa repreaentative of DBA, the Drug 



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Enforc«aant Agency 

Q And Janes Wallace, did Jama* Wallace represent 
the FBI? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q Nov did a Colonel Porter represent the 
Department of State? 

A Either Colonel Porter or a representative from 
his office was generally in attendance at the meetings. 

Q His office, would that have been Ambassador 
OeUdey's; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Do you recall what Colonel Porter's first name 
was? 

A No. I'm sorry, I don't. I don't generally 
call Colonels by their first name. 

Q "Colonel" suffices; is that correct? 

A Yes, sir. 




118 






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Q Nov, r*tumin9 to th« latter part of tha fall, 
1985, and your axparianca with tha Hoataga Locating Taalc 
?orca, do you racall during that pariod of tiaa 
axpraaaing your fruatration vith tha Hoataga Locating 
Taak Forca to a Captain in tha Nhita Houaa Situation 
Room? 

A Yaa. 

Q Do you racall who that was? 

A Kavin willay, I baliava. 

Q What waa tha upahot of your convaraation with 
Captain Willay? 

A Wall, ha said that Ollia North ia tha guy that 



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120 



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24 



1 raally counts on th« hostages. Hs's ths guy who Is 

2 rsally ths aovsr and the shaksr, and if I vantsd to make 

3 contact with sonabody that was working on that problem 

4 that It should be Colonel North. 

5 Q Now let me ask you how did It happen that you 

6 were speaking to captain wllley? 

7 A I had had a long relationship dealing with him 

8 on intelligence matters. The White House Situation Room 

9 would call up and ask for background on a very informal 

10 basis. They would take products of intelligence from DIA 

11 and CIA and %rrap them together for briefing books for the 

12 White House and sometimes they would question or request 

13 some additional background on why something was 

14 important. 

15 And over a long period of time we developed a 

16 relationship with Individual analysts. 

17 Q And you developed such a relationship with 

18 Captain Wllley, I gather. 

19 A Yes. 

20 Q What branch of the service was he in? 

21 A Air Force. 

22 Q Did Captain Wllley, having detected your 

23 frustration, encourage you to go see Oliver North? 

24 A Or to call him. He gave me his telephone 

25 number. I declined it, however, at that time. 



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25 



1 Q Old thar* con* a point vh«n you did tak* him 

2 up on hla of far to gat In touch with Ollvar North? 

3 A Yaa. It waa In nld-Dacaabar. 

4 Q How did that contact occur? 

5 AX callad Colonal North <md axpraaaad ay 

6 fruatratlon and said I didn't ballava tha Hoataga 

7 Location Task Forca waa functioning In a trua and correct 

8 moda, and ha agraad and forthwith Invltad aa to a aaating 

9 which waa going to ba hald at tha Old Exacutlva of flea 

10 Building. 

11 MR. 6ENZMAN: Can I Intarjact? Whara you 

12 apaclflc aa to your fruatratlona? 

13 THE WITNESS: I waa apaclflc In that I said 

14 that tha Hoataga Locating Task Forca waa not functioning 

15 aa it had baan daaignad, aa a daarlng houaa, and ha 

16 agraad and had indicated that thara waa a naw task forca 

17 to ba foraad. 

18 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Raauaing) 

19 Q To tha baat of your racollactlon thia was in 

20 aglrexiaataly aid-Dacaabar; la that right? 

21 A Yaa, air. 

22 Q Now ha invltad you to a aaating. Old you than 

23 go to tha aaating? 

24 A At that tlaa I contacted tha Chalraan of the 

25 Joint Chiefa to aaka sure that I had peraisslon to attend 



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OmiSSlElEO 



26 



1 such • ■••tln9, and was glvan pcraisalon to attend. I 

2 also rsqusstad parmisslon from DXA in that It was ovsr at 

3 the Whit* Housa. 

4 Q Whan you want to th« Basting, did you go by 

5 yourssl£? ^^^^^^^^^ 

tooJc^^^^^^^^^^^Hlwith Bs froB the 

7 tarrorisB section or the countartarrorisa section of DIA. 

8 Q Did Lieutenant Colonel North know in advance 
that ^^^^^^^^H was 

10 A Not during the phone call. However, I did 

11 call bade to his office to ask paraission for hl^'to 

12 attend and got peraission froa the JCS and DIA for hia to 

13 attend. 

14 Q Nov the aeeting that you attended, do you 

15 recall the date? 

16 A I believe it was just before Christaas. 

17 Q At our last aeeting you thought it aight have 

18 been Daceabar 23. Does that sound like the right date, 

19 or could it be the right date? 

20 A To the best of ay recollection, yes, sir. 

21 Q tRien you arrived at the aeeting, who do you 

22 recall was there? 

23 A Two representatives froa DIA, Mr. Charles 
Allen froa CZA. believe there ver«^^^^^^^H^^H| 

^^^^^^^^^^H Colonel North, and Z don't raaeaber 



BNtHSSIflED 



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UNeU^SIFIED 



27 



1 of th« other parties at this time who vara thars. 

2 Q Do you know whathar Stata was raprasantad? 

3 A I ballava thara sight hava baan soaabody. 

4 Yas, I ballava thara was soaabody thara froa Ambassador 

5 OaJclay's o£flca. I think It was his deputy. 

6 Q Who would that hava been at the tlae; do you 

7 recall? 

8 A His naae escapes aa. 

9 Q Oo you recall either DEA or FBI being 

10 represented at this aeetlng? 

11 A Z believe there was a representative froa FBI; 

12 I think Jia Hells or an associate of his was there. 

13 Q Now Z gather that aany of these people you had 

14 never seen before; is that correct? 

15 A That is correct. Many of the faces were new 

16 and that is why I would not have recognized thea at the 

17 tiaa. 

18 Q In fact, aany of those faces you never saw 

19 again; is that true? 

20 A Soae of thea Z did. Mr. Allen Z saw 

21 fraqoently. Colonel North Z saw frequently. 

22 Q Now at this aeetlng what was the topic? 

23 A The topic was the foraation of a new Hostage 

24 Location Task Force under the auspices of CZA, Mr. Allen 

25 specifically. 



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1 Q Oo you recall wh«th«r thar« vara any 

2 rapraaantatlvaa from tha Olractorata of Oparatlona at CIA 

3 at thia aaatlng? 

4 A I balleva thara vaa at laaat ona. I'm not 

5 aura. I raally can't aay. To ba qulta apaclflc, I don't 

6 raaaabar aaalng anybody froa tha 00 thara. 

7 Q Would that hava baan rapraaantatlon that you 

8 would hava hopad for In thia group? 

9 A Z would hava thought It had baan atranga If 

10 thara hadn't baan aonabody froa tha DO thara. 

11 Q Za that bacauaa you had hopad thia group sight 

12 taka on aoaa operational activity? 

13 A No. But intalliganca, for intalliganca to ba 

14 valuable and for intalliganca to ba collactad in a 

15 meaningful manner it ia important that the operationa 

16 people know what it ia you are looking for. 

17 Q Nov were you called upon in the courae of this 

18 meeting to put forward your otm views of the state of 

19 hostage location rescue efforts? 

20 A Yes. 

21 g How did that come about? 

22 A I believe it was Colonel North who turned to 
me and aaid, Ma j orj^^^^^^Hvhat do 

24 say. And Z made a brief atatament that Z waa not a 

25 diplomat, that Z waa not a stataaman, that Z waa a 



oNcnsno 



125 



ONCttSJfFffD 



29 



1 soldlM: and that I was working on a olsalon which was, 

2 hopsfully, to s«« th« hostages frssd In ths Middle East 

3 by ths gathering of Intslllgsnc* to locate those hostages 

4 and that heretofore I didn't think It had been a very 

5 well coordinated effort. 

6 Q Old you bring to the attention of the group 

7 gathered there any feeling on your part that the 

8 govemaent had not even properly explored the range of 

9 options that Bight be available for hostage location zmd 

10 rescue? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q Do you recall what the reaction was to your 

13 presentation? 

14 A There was general agreeaent. 

15 Q Nov do you recall any other persons taking the 

16 floor and aafclng reaarScs on the subject? 

17 A Yes. Colonel North Bade sobs reaarks about 

18 hostages being traded for HANKs. 

19 Q And when you say HAHKs you aean HAWK alsslles; 

20 m^l**^ correct? 

21 A Yes, HAWK anti-aircraft alsslles. 

22 Q How did those reaarks suddenly — or, should I 

23 say, how did those reaarks coae to be aade? 

24 A To the best of ay recollection, he aade a 

25 reaark to the effect that soaethlng about even if the 




126 



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1 laat hostag* that can* out was tradad for 80 HAWX 

2 aisallaa, a raaark in pasalng which aoaavhat ahocked me. 

3 Q Lat ma aaa If Z undaratand. Tha raaark that 

4 ha mada waa avan if tha laat hoataga waa ralaaaad in 

5 axchanga for 80 HAWK oiasilaa; la that corract? 

6 A Or words to that affact. 

7 Q Did ha conplata tha thought? 

8 A I don't raaanbar tha axact contaxt. It was 

9 just usad in — ha was not rafarring to futura tradaa of 

10 that aort. Ha aada nantion of tha fact that tha laat had 

11 baan tradad for aiaailaa, a fact that I waa unawara of. 

12 MR. 6ENZMAN: Whan h« aaid "laat" you thought 

13 ha aaant tha aoat racant hoataga that had baan ratumad? 

14 THE WITNESS: Yas, air. 

15 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Raauaing) 

16 Q Do you racall whathar ha idantifiad it or just 

17 idantifiad it aa tha last hostaga? 

18 A I think it was just laft as tha laat hoataga 

19 or tha Boat racant ralaaaa or worda to that affact. 

20 Q Nov do you racall what tha reaction waa to 

21 this idaa of Colonal North 'a? 

22 A Daad ailanca. 

23 Q Do you racall whathar this raaarlc of Colon el 

24 North ' a recal led to your aind anything! 
25 




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1 A YM. 

2 Q Hofw was that? 

3 A Thar* vaa a praaa placa, a FIBIS placa — 

4 Foralgn Information Broadcast translation of an Iranian 

5 editorial which aada aantlon of trading U.S. arms for 

6 hostagaa In Labanon. And I Bantlonad — after I 

7 racovarad froa tha Initial shock, I Bsntlonad to Colonal 

8 North that I had saan a placa In tha prass. 

9 Q Old you do that In front of tha rast of tha 

10 group? 

11 A Yas. 

12 Q Old you Identify that It was an Iranian 

13 editorial? 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q Oo you recall what Colonal North's reaction 

16 was to your revelation that this editorial had come Into 

17 being? 

18 A He was — he seemed somei^at surprised. He 

19 said, I hadn't heard that or heard of It. 

20 MR. GBMZMAN: What led you to make this 

21 cesBant about this place of Information from your file? 

22 THE WITNESS: Because there were some other 

23 pieces In the editorial vhich bore some substance to tha 

24 type of group that was holding the hostages. I did not 

25 consider the trading arms for hostages, is not a place of 



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32 



1 inforaatlon, lnt*lllg«nc« Infomatlon. I had totally 

2 dlar«9ardad it. But In reading through It I had raad 

3 that and disregarded that. 

4 But aa I racollactad, based upon Colonel 

5 North's statement, perhaps it had been a very in-depth 

6 piece, a factually correct piece. 

7 MR. GENZMAN: Was there discussion about 

8 secrecy that led you to sake this conent about a news 

9 report such as this? 

10 THE WITNESS: Discussion where? 

11 MR. GENZMAN: At the tiaa that you made this 

12 coanent. 

13 THE WITNESS: There was no discussion of 

14 secrecy — at the meeting at the Old Executive Office 

15 Building? 

16 MR. GENZMAN: Yes. 

17 THE WITNESS: There «ras no discussion of 

18 secrecy. Obviously ve were all cleared for high level 

19 Top Secret/Codeword intelligence as group members, but 

20 tHIi specif Ic reference to secrecy and the level of 

21 s^Hlitivenasa of this intelligence was not discussed that 

22 I remember. 

23 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

24 Q I think What Mr. Genzman is driving at is, as 

25 Colonel North made this remark about HAWXs being involved 



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33 

1 in fraaing tb* last hostage^ and you th«n bring up th« 

2 aubjac t of this adltorlal 

3 ^^^^^Bwhat was It that pronptad you to do that? 

4 A Simply th« fact that I had rsasabarad that It 

5 had baan an unclasslflad prass placa and that this was 

6 surprising to na and I wondarad If ha had saan that, just 

7 to lat hla know that this vaa In fact at laast In 

8 unclasslflad raala, avan If Z had dlsragardad It at tha 

9 tlaa. 

10 Q Whan you say you dlsragardad It, do you aaan 

11 you disballavad that portion of tha aditorlal that . 

12 assartad thara had baan an aras-for-hostaga trada; Is ' 

13 that right? 

14 A Complataly. I didn't ballava tha U.S. 

15 Govamaant would ba Involvad in anything Ilka that. 

16 MR. 6ENZMAV: Did Colonal North axprass any 

17 concam about oparational sacxirity? 

18 THS WITNESS: I don't racollact that ha did at 

19 this aaating. Latar Z was brlafad or axtanslvaly 

20 rilnilail of tha sansitivenass of tha cavaats that wa had. 

21 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Rasuaing) 

22 Q Did anyona althar than or tharaaftar coaaent 

23 on Colonal North's coaaant about tha 80 HAWK alsslles and 

24 hostagas or your rajolndar rafarring to tha Iranian 
25 



editorial? 



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1 A Do you nean the s<UBa day as th« maatlng? 

2 Q Either at tha maatlng or tharaaftar — any 
3' tlaa. 

4 A Yas. I ballava Mr. Allan mada a ranarlc about 

5 "0111a talking too much at thdsa aaatinga", or words to 

6 that affact. 

7 Q That was not at tha maating, howavar; is that 

8 corract? 

9 A It night hava baan just aftar tha aaating or 

10 latar. Z baliava it was latar, at soaa latar data. 

11 Q Did anyone at tha meeting coaaent on this 

12 exchange. Lieutenant Colonel North's reaark and your 

13 rejoinder? 

14 A What are you specifically referring to? 

15 Q Z'a siaply trying to determine whether this 

16 exchange generated any further coaaent or whether it 

17 occurred in an isolated context where North aakes a 

18 reaark, you answer, and then it's on to other things. In 

19 othar words, did it become a aatter for discussion? 

20 . A It did not becoae a aatter for discussion. 

21 "tMltt saaaad to be something that people were either 

22 unaware of or were not willing to make a great deal of 

23 comment on. There was some silence after my remark about 

24 tha Iranian editorial, and I believe we moved on to other 

25 svibjects, to the best of oy recollection. 



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1 Q Nov did you iindcrstand vhll* you w«r« at this 

2 masting that you w«r« a candidat* for meabarship in the 

3 CIA Hostaga Location Task Forca? 

4 A Prior to ny arrival at tha maating, no. Once 

5 I was thara I was volunteered as a repressntative. 

6 Q You were voluntsered by whom? 

7 A I believe Colonel North or Mr. Allen made some 

8 remark that he would accept me as his team leader or 

9 chief of staff, organizer, et cetera. 

10 Q Did you know Mr. Allen before this meeting? 

11 A No, sir. Z had heard his name, but I h«d not 

12 met him. 

13 Q Did you have any idea how it was that you 

14 suddenly came into this position? 

15 A Mentioning my background as having worked upon 

16 investigating the hostages since June, Z gave him a brief 

17 summary of my background in terms of that, emd I believe 

18 that Mr. Allan or Colonel North -- I'm not sure who — 

19 made the remark, well, you're my man or you're the guy 

20 I'v* baan looking for, or words to that effect. 

21 Q Did this meeting on the 23rd, then, include a 

22 discussion of tha broad range of options that might be 

23 used in hostage location emd rescue efforts? 

24 A Yes. I think I made mention of tha fact — 

25 and perhaps Colonel North reiterated — that one of the 



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1 thlnga that should b« don« 1« to looK at a b road«r range 
of opt lons^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M 

3 ^^^^^^^^Kf^^* full rang* of options that could b« 

4 avallabl* to fr«« thess hostages. I bsllsvs Colonsl 

5 North Bad* Bsntlon of ths fact that h« was asksd on a 

6 regular basis was there anything new on the hostages, and 

7 he felt this way that a fuller range of options should be 

8 stated. 

9 Q Did he tell you where these questions were 

10 coaing froa? 

11 A At one time, Z believe in the March or April 

12 tiae fraae, he sent a PROF note or a computer note to Mr. 

13 Allen that said the President of the United States 

14 regularly aslca ae, three tiaes a week, about the status 

15 of the hostages. Is there anything new? But Colonel 

16 Horth seeaed to exaggerate his relationship as well. 

17 Q with the President? 

18 A Yea. 

19 Q Was that a PROP note that you saw at the time? 

20 A I*B not sure if it was a PROFs note or there 

21 was a^^^^^^^^aessage. I 'a not sure what the naae — 

22 it's a counterterrorisa linJcup between POD , CIA, I 
believe State, and us. aight be called^^^^^^H I 

24 forget the exact title of it. 

25 Q That was an interagency emergency 



ONGDCTHI 



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37 



1 conunlcatlon network? 

2 A It 1« a fiinctlonlng network. It's not an 

3 emargency natvork. It la a computer link, a secure 

4 computer link, and I believe he sent It to Mr. Allen, who 

5 showed ma a copy. 

6 Q I gather it doesn't generate hard copy, does 

7 it? 

8 A Yes, it generates a paper copy. 

9 g Z gather, then. It was your recollection that 

10 this particular communication that you saw referring to 

11 the President's constant Inquiry was one that you saw at 

12 the time; Is that right? 

13 A Yes, sir — "at the time being approximately, 

14 I believe, March. 

15 Q March of 1986? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q Now, Major, Z gather that during this meeting 

18 you learned for the first time that you might have a role 

19 la this Hostage Location Task Force of the CZA? 

20 A Yes, sir. 

21 Q And what did you do following the conclusion 

22 of the meeting, armed with this knowledge that you might 

23 have a bremd-new assignment? 

24 A I believe Z went back to the Pentagon and 

25 discussed it with my section chief, and Z believe made 



IlilMIlD 



134 



UNGUiSSKlB^ 



38 



1 aantlon of It to th« Exacutlv* Assistant to Llsutanant 

2 Gansral Moallsrlng, Colonel Staa«y at th« tins, and ths 

3 attltuda was, wall, If Colonel North wants you, Colonel 

4 North gats you. It did not saaa to ma to ba a choice in 

5 which I had auch say. 

6 Q So whan did you affectively join the CIA 

7 Hostage Location Task Force? 

8 A I believe the first day I reported was the 

9 27th of Deceaber. It was right after Christaas. I asked 

10 Mr. Allen if I could take Christaas Eve off, and he 

11 soaewhat hesitantly agreed, I believe. 

12 Q But he did agree? 

13 A Yes, sir. 

14 Q Now when you arrived at your new position I 

15 gather you were physically located at CIA headquarters at 

16 . Langley, Virginia; is that correct? 

17 A Yes, sir. 

18 Q Where did you go to report for work? 

19 A I initially worked out of Mr. Allen's office, 

20 tl* no for Counterterrorisa. 

21 Q When you say NIC, that's National Intelligence 

22 Officer? 

23 A Yes, sir. 

24 Q That office is locate<! 

25 the CIA headquarter building; is that correct? 




mmma 



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A Correct . 

Q Was th« offica praparad to racalva you 
physically? 

A No. 

Q Was thara a parlod of tlma whan you sought out 
such fundaaantals as secratarlas and phonas and dask and 
so forth? 

A And an offica, yas, and safas and a sacura 
araa, yaa. 

Q Whara did you ultimataly and up? 

A I baliava in tha and of January-Fabruary tima 
frasa wa occupiad tha spacaM^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H the 
old spacaa of tha Offica of Ganaral Counsal, who had 
racantly dapartad to a nav building. 

Q And that is whara you finally raaidad; is that 
corract? 

A Yas, sir. 




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Do you recall who th« DEA point of contact 



was? 



UNCtSSStFIED 



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wmmi 



42 



1 A That leads into a discussion of DEA's role, 

2 which we will get into shortly, I 'a sure, in terns of the 

3 meeting with the two DEA agents. 

4 Q Let me ask you, however, just to isolate on 

5 this particular portion of your experience, if you can 

6 recall who the DEA contact was. If that is several 

7 identities, then we can reserve it for later. 

8 A To the best of my recollection, while we had a 

9 formal relationship with Mr. Azzeua — 

10 Q That is Abraham Azzam? 

11 A Abraham Azzam, I believe at Colonel North's 

12 direction we were told that there were two DEA agents 

13 that would be most useful to our efforts and we were to 

14 use them as points of contact for this special effort. 

15 So while we had a formal relationship with Mr. Azzam and 

16 he may have in fact been a member, there were two other 

17 DEA agents who we were specifically told to contact. 

18 Q In regards to a particular initiative? 

19 A In regards to the sensitive initiatives in 

20 BdHprtla to the hostages in terms of intelligence, that 

21 tHaa* had been specially designated by Mr. North, Colonel 

22 North, to be points of contact for special initiatives or 

23 special projects. 

24 Q And was that any special project relating to 

25 hostages? 



WWKD 



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43 



A Y«s. Th« Imprasalon I had was that Mr. Azzam 
vaa out of tha knowlcdgaabl* raala In tarms of tha 
apaclal projacta. I ballava I vaa told that ha waa not 
to know or waa not claarad, or worda to that affact. 

Q I gathar alao from what you'ra aaying that in 
addition to hla not balng claarad and not balng a point 
of contact for DEA that thaaa othar two aganta wara 
conaidarad to ba tha contact for DEA. 

A Vlhila Mr. Azzaa, Abrahaa Azzaa, waa our 
official contact or conduit to DBA for formal raguaata 
and whatnot, wa wara diractad by Colonal North to gat 
togathar with thaaa two DEA aganta and to do that fairly 
quiclcly. And Z baliava wa mat with thaa at tha and of 
Oacaabar. 

Q Right. And wa will gat into that in a nlnute. 
But what I'H trying to focus on hara is whsthar Colonal 
North raprasantad that contact with thasa aganta would 
atand in liau of contact with Mr. Azzaa for purpoaaa of 
a||P*s raprasantation on tha Hostaga Location Taak Force 



A No. It waa not to ba conatruad that thay 
would rapraaant DEA in a fonuil aansa, aiaply that thay 
wara vary usaful contacta for aourcas, intalliganca, and 

24 spacial projacta. Thay had baan apacially daaignated by 

25 Colonal North to gat with thaa and find out what they 




140 



mmm 



44 



1 lcn«w and us* th«a as rasourcss or special rasourcas from 

2 DBA. 

3 Q Z gathar that othar than Mr. Azzaa and these 

4 two other OEA agents that there were no other OEA 

5 representatives who were brought into the Hostage 

6 Location Task Force of CIA. 

7 A Mo, not that I can reaeaber. 

8 Q So I gather that to a certain extent failing 

9 to advise Mr. Azzaa was in effect failing to advise DEA 

10 as an entity; is that correct? 

11 A Z believe Colonel North stated — in fact, he 

12 had aade arrangeaents with the Departaent of Justice to 

13 have these two individuals specially designated as 

14 special resoxurces. I believe he aade mention of that or 

15 Mr. Allen aade aention of that to ae soaetiae in January. 

16 Z tended to disbelieve that they had been designated in a 

17 foraal sense because they seeaed to have their own 

18 regular jobs and did not seea to be tasked to work on a 

19 spaelal project. 

20 Q What I 'a really driving at here is these two 

21 agiBta could be seen in one of two capacities. They 

22 could be seen as support for the Hostage Location Task 

23 Force or they could be seen as siaple representatives 

24 bringing information back froa the Hostage Location Task 

25 Force to DEA. 



llNtBSSTO 



141 




45 

1 A I doft'^ «•• th« distinction. 

2 Q Wall, l«t a* draw th« distinction and ■•• if 

3 this helps you. If thsy ars support for DEA, than thsy 

4 may b« opsrationally involvad. Thsy nay go and do things 

5 for ths Hostaga Location Task Forca, wharaas in another, 

6 if thay ara siaply raprasantativas, than thay would ba 

7 taking inforaation aithar to or froa DEA to tha Hostaga 

8 Location Task Forca but would not nacassarlly ba 

9 otharwisa a rasourca for tha Hostaga Location Task Force. 

10 A Thay were not so Buch a resource or a point of 

11 contact or in a support Boda for tha Hostaga Location 

12 Task Force as they were a special resource for an am of 

13 Colonel North's. He used thea and he dealt with thea and 

14 we were encouraged to get in contact with thea to glean 

15 additional intelligence froa thea that he felt was 

16 useful . 

17 Q Did you understand froa Colonel North that 

18 part of their duty was to keep DEA fully inforaed of the 

19 efforts of the Hostage Location Task Force? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Nov let Be return just a aoaent to Mr. Kzzam. 

22 You testified earlier that you were aade aware that Mr. 

23 Azzaa was not to be inforaed on aany things because he 

24 had not been cleared; is that correct? 

25 A No. He was cleared for the coapartaented 



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UNKASSIflFD 



46 



Information and r«f«r*nc«d sod* of th« reports. However, 
I was, I believe , advis ed by Mr. Allen and Colonel North 
that In terns of ^^^^land^^^H — who I will refer to as 
the two DBA agents -« I was not to discuss their role 
with Mr. Azzaa, Abe Azzan. 

MR. GENZMAN: Did either of thea say why you 
were not to have nuch contact with Mr. Azzaa? 

THZ WITNESS: Those two DBA agents were under 
the iapression that Mr. Azzaa had bean once a very active 
field agent but was now very auch in a slow retlreaent 
type of aode, and it was not entirely suitable for this 
action-oriented role. 

BY MR. NOODCOCK: (Resuaing) 
Q Now the t wo agen ts who you've now refe rre d to 
bynaaeas^^^^Ban^^^^His that^^^^^^^H^landJ 





A Yes, sir. 

Q Your testiaony today, to the extent it has 
x mtmmA t o the t wo DEA^^ents as a tandea is a reference 
land^^^^^^^^lis that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Let's go off the record a 
second . 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 
(A brief recess was taken.) 
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 



llHEUSSm 



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MR. WOODCOCK: Let's go back on th« record. 

MR. GENZMAN: Didyot^ind i t unuau al that it 
was your understanding that^^^^^Han<^^^^Hwar« 
reporting up the chain to Kzzaml 

THE WITNESS: Somewhat, yes. Once I net the 
individuals I perhaps understood a little bit better why 
they were not reporting through Mr. Azzaa. 

MR. GENZMAN: And what was your understanding 
at that point? 

THE WITNESS: That they were special field 
agents detailed by Colonel North to work, to assist hia 
in this problea, that they had been of assistance to his 
in the past. 

MR. GENZMAN: Thank you. 

BY MR. WOOOCOCX: (Resuaing) 
Q We're going to return tc 
^^^H before the day closes, Majoz^^^^^^^^H but let 
■e ask you, if I might, if you could describe, after 
coaing to the CIA Hostage Location Task Force, what the 
r— ponaibility of the Hostage Location Task Force was. 
What was its function? 

A The function of the task force was to analyze 
intelliaence of the location of the U.S. hostag 





144 



2: 

2; 
24 
25 




Q Nov th« dlssaalnatlon of analysis of th* 
Inforaatlon rslatlng to th« hostages, how frsqusntly did 
that occur? Lst b« first say did your analysis rssult in 
a final product that you than dissaainatad? 

A Yas, sir. 

Q What form did that taka? 

A It was a raport which was writtan ones a vaak, 
ganarally on a Friday, and Z baliava tha first ona 
startad on January 3. 

Q So at tha and of tha first waaJc you vara 
It is that right? 




145 



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Q Nov, you a«ntlon«d that Colonal North apok* to 
you at tlaaa about tha Stata Dapartaant. Did you avar 
laam froa Colonal North that ha vaa concamad about 
aharing hoataga Inforaation with tha Stata Dapartaant? 

A Yaa, air. 

Q Old ha axpraaa to you what it waa that ha was 
' concamad about? 

A At ona point I had aantionad to Mr. Allan that 
I had baan In contact with an Individual at tha Stata 




147 



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53 



1 Q That vaa^^^^^^^^l ia that correct? 

2 A y«a, air. And I vaa apaclflcally dlractad, 

3 during that talaphona call on a aacura Una with Colonal 

4 North, that I vaa not to dlacuaa anythlng^^^^^^f^^^H 

5 of any natura that vaa operational In any way, ahapa or 

6 fora, and I aaaurad Colonal North that X had not aharad 

7 any Intalllganca with hla but was alaply maintaining 
contact^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

9 Q Lat ma back ovar thla t erritory . 1 gather 

that your contact^^^^^^^^^^fvaa f irat made Icnovn to 

11 Mr. Allen and that you then received a phone call'£roa 

12 Colonel North; la that correct? 

13 A Z'b not aura It vaa Colonel North calling me 

14 or Z called hla to brief hla on another aubject, and he 

15 reminded me of the aecurlty caution at that time. But I 

16 do remember a phone call where he warned me to 

17 apaclflcally be vary careful. 

18 Q Did he learn of your contact 

19 through you or through Mr. Allen? 

20 . A I believe It vaa through Mr. Allen. 

21 Q Did Mr. Allen ever join in Colonel North'a 

22 concern about the State Department on operational 

23 mattara? 

24 A Yea, air. I vaa told to be very careful in my 

25 deallnga vlth the State J)epartment and don't dlacuaa many 

si 





148 



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54 




of thmmm subjects that w« discussed regularly 

Q ^^^^^^^Hor anyons sis* in ths Stats 
Dspartasnt? Was it ths Stats Ospartasnt ot;^^^^|that 
was ths problsB? 

A This spec i fie i nstancs v ai 

■but at anothsr 
tias Colonsl North mads connsnts about ths Stats 
Ospartasnt not bsing involvsd opsrationally, or words to 

10 that sffsct. 

11 g That hs did not want ths Stats Ospartasnt 

12 involvsd operationally? 

13 A Yss, sir. 

14 Q Nov, did that Bors gsnsral statsasnt about not 

15 wanting ths Stats Ospartasnt involvsd opsrationally also 

16 COBS froB Nr. Allsn, or is this just Colonsl North? 

17 A It was ay iaprsssion that Nr. Allan 

18 rssaphasizsd this to as, that it was bassd upon Colonsl 

19 North's concsm. 

20 v~ Q So it was not a position that Nr. Allan 

21 • HBO— srily gsnsratsd hiasslf, but hs was snforcing ths 

22 visw of Colonsl North; is that corrsct? 

23 A Yss, sir. 

24 Q Do you rscall shortly aftsr your location with 

25 ths Hostags Location Tost fQrCfc.»t CIA Nr. Allan brisfing 




149 



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55 



1 y<M|aR th« arBa-for-hdatag«a Inltlativa? 

2 ^'» Y««, air. 

3 Q How did that coaa about? 

4 A Ha told ma that It vaa vary aanaltiva 

5 information and I vaa not to diacuaa it with anybody at 

6 tha Pantagon. 

7 Q Lat aa stop you hara. Did ha know that you 

8 alraady vara awara of thia, or waa thia aiaply in tha 

9 contaxt of Mr. North 'a aarliar raaark at tha fonutiva 

10 aaating of tha Hoataga Location Taak Forca? 

11 A Ha aantionad that Colonal North oftan ialkad 

12 out of achool, Z baliava was tha coaaant, and that ha 

13 apacifically than mantionad that any diaeussion of ans 

14 for hoatagas was to ba traatad as a vary, vary sansitiva 

15 aattar — vary cloaa hold was tha phrasa ha usad — and 

16 that I was not to discuss it with anyona without his 

17 pamission. And that was to includa anybody at tha 

18 Pantagon or anyona within CIA. 

19 Q Now, irtian ha aaid that Colonal North spoka out 

20 of aoflbol, I gathar ha was rafarring to tha aarliar 

21 raiMiSiltoB Dacaabar 23; is that corract? 

22 A Yas, sir. 

23 Q Now, did ha alao at this tiaa adviaa you that 

24 thara wara in fact arma-for-hostagas initiativas, ona or 

25 Bora, undar way? 



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k- Mo, Bir. 

Q Or just that th« topic was a topic to b« 
traatad with graat sansitlvity? 

A Ha notad that tha topic was a topic to ba 
traatad with graat sansitlvity. 

Q Did you, vhila you vara with tha Hostaga 
Location TasX Forca, bacoaa avara ot irtiat sight I guaas 
b« taraad a sub-coapartaant within tha Hostaga Location 
Task Forcal 

A Yas, sir. 




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Now In that position Z gath«r you did com* 
llnforaation. How did that bappan? 
K 1 was Inforaad by Mr. Al lan that thara va a a 
■aparata chemnai^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
H^H^^^HWhlch was sansltiva, and vhila initially I had 
soma ]cnowladga of it, it was to ba sub-coapartaantad 




Has tha tara^^^^^^uaad at that tiaa? 

Yaa, sir. 

Did you, throughout th* coursa of your tanura 



with tha Hostaga Location Task Porca with CIA, gain any 

■ora substantiva knowladga of what 

coaprisad? 

A I laamad tha t it was a back c hannal 

i^i^iva^^^^^^^^^^^^m^miH|^A 

^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H And laamad through 
tanura up till about March, tha March-April tiaa fraaa, 
that it apparantly involva d aras-f or-hostagas . 

you racall^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hvho 
primarily working with Mr. Allan on this channal? 



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2^ * Thar* was a Mr. Cava, Z baliava, who vaa also 
working with Mr. Allan. 

Q And Mr. Cava appaarad approxlmataly March, 
aarly March, of '86? 

A Approxiaataly that tlaa. 

Now you and^^^^^^^^^^rara naarly saat- 
■ataa; ia that corract? 
A Yaa, air. 

Q And I gathar you would bava pickad up aoaa 
Inforaatlon, parhapa avan through inadvartanca, fi 

[just by baing so closa to hla; is that corract? 
A Yas, sir. 




153 



UNCUSSIFIEO 






BHtmsro 



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155 



UNCUSS 




MR. WOODCOCK: L«t ■• go off th« record just a 
••oend. 

(A dlacuasion was hald off th« racord.) 
MR. HOOOCOCX: Back on th« racord. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Rasuning) 
Q Do you racall in aithar tha and of February or 



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•arly March having a convarsatlon vithl 

about th«r« b«lng an aras-for-hostagaa daal undar way? 

A I mantlonad in ay study of tha options — I 
was working on an options papar, and I aantionad ona of 
tha things that had baan discussad or had takan placa In 
tha past was tha ams-for-hostaga, and I aantionad soma 
disgust it, and^^^^^^^^^Vagraad that was bad 
buslnass and mantlonad that, vary sacrativaly, that it 
was not apparantly a daad issua, and by that I assuned 
that ha maant that thara wara still soaa afforts undar 
way in that ragard. 

Q In othar words, you infarrad froa his 
stataaant that it not balng daad nacassarily iapliad it 
was aliva? 

A Yas, sir. 

Q Do you racall, again parhaps in tha Fabruary 
tina fraaa, travaling yoursalf to London to naat with an 
Individual by tha naaa of Aalraa Nir? 

A Yas, sir. 




157 



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24 
25 




Q Nov was I right vh«n Z asked you originally 
vhathar thia raquast occurred in tha Fabruary tina frame? 
What la your recollection of the appropriate time? 

A Z believe it was the February-March tiae 
frane. Zt vae early spring. Zt was daap and rainy. 

Q Nov I gather having worked on these] 
— and Z gather that was at Mr. Allen *s request; is that^ 
right? 

A Yes, sir, and at Colonel Rbrth.'* request. 

Q You were aware that Colonel Nortlr made the 
request, or did you face to face or over the phone get a 
request froB hia on that? 

A Z spoke to Fawn Hall and got specific 
directions froa her as to hov Z vas to aeet and greet Mr. 
Nir and therefore Z knev that it was in fact being 
dix*cted froa Colonel North's office. 

Q And Z gather you understood that Mr. Nir was a 
representative of the Zsraeli govemaent; is that 
correct? 

A Yes, sir. He was the special advisor to the 
President on counterterrorisa. 



intcassinED 



(159) 



160 



mmsm 



66 



1 Q Now did you laam that from Mr. Allen or Miss 

2 Hall or Colonel North, or all three? 

3 A From Mr. Allen. 

4 Q Now, Z gather that you then did travel to, was 

5 It, London, England to meet Mr. Nir? 

6 A Yea, sir. 

7 Q When you arrived there you did in fact meet 

8 him; la that correct? 

9 A Yea, air. 

10 Q And he had a codeword greeting; ia that 

11 correct? 

12 A Yea, air. I believe the phraae waa Z waa to 

13 aay to him worda to the effect, I'm the man from Mr. 

14 Goode, and apparently Mr. Goode waa Colonel North 'a 

15 phraae name or code name, and he had aome appropriate 

16 reply, and then we recognized each other. Z waa also 

17 provided a deacription of Mr. Nir by Mr. Allen, and Z 

18 believe Colonel North did deacribe him over the phone to 

19 B^ later or earlier when Z got the call from Fawn Hall. 

20 , Bft dmacribed him and Z remembered the deacriptiona were 

21 much different. 

22 So Z waa aomewhat confuaed. 

23 Q Did you manage to ayntheaize them when you saw 



24 him? 

25 A Yea, sir. 



BNttSSStF 



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67 



1 Q Whan you mat Mr. Nlr did you hav* any 

2 dlacusalon with hia othar than paaalng of thaaa 

3 codavorda? 

4 A Wa paaaad-- va had our convaraatlon and I 
gava hlW^^^^^^^^^^ftand I vaa — triad to maka 

6 that Z vaa in fact talking to tha right individual, and I 

7 mantionad tha nana of tha laraall attacha to tha United 

8 Stataa, aaaiatant military attacha, Zur Z baliava his 

9 nana ia, and Z aaid aomathing — - ahould Z gat in contact 

10 with tha aaaiatant ailitary attacha, and ha aort of put 

11 hia handa up and said no, that ia not an appropriate way 

12 to Baka contact, or vorda to that affact. 

13 g Nhat was that? 

14 A Zt was not an appropriate way to naka contact, 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hrafaranca 

16 af forts. Zn othar words, tha ailitary chain was, or 

17 contact with tha Eabaaay was not tha corract procedure, 

15 that if Mr. Allan needed to get ahold of hia he was to 

19 get ahold of hia. Zf Z was to get ahold of Mr. Kir it 

20 woold be through Mr. Allen and not through Colonel Zur in 

21 any way, shape or fora, which confinied for ae that ha 

22 waa faailiar with the Zaraeli Eabassy and in fact he was 

23 an Zsraeli and the guy Z was supposed to meet. 

24 Q Did you have any other conversation with him? 

25 A Specifically regarding what, air? 



llfflKO 



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1 . Q W«ll, I'Bi asJclng for your b««t recollection. 

2 Did you talk to hin about Colonel North or Mr. Allen or 

3 your reeponeibilities? 

4 A Yes, sir. He asked me where I was froo, I 

5 believe was the expression, and Z said well, I worked for 

6 — I was presently working for Mr. Allen, and he said are 

7 you from Ollie's office or how are you involved? And I 

8 simply said that I was military attached to Mr. Allen, 

9 associated with Colonel North. And he said, oh, or words 

10 to that effect. He was trying to pin me down to type me 

11 by whether Z was part of the White House, CZA, Defense 

12 Zntelligence Agency, Army, or what Z was. 

13 Q Zt would have taken a fair eutount of peeling 

14 of the onion layers to get to the heart of that one, 

15 wouldn't it? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q To your knowledge, did he get to the heart of 

18 the onion by talking to you? 

19 A No, sir. Z just simply indicated that Z was 

20 Bilitary and that Z was working for Colonel North and 

21 that that was really all he needed to know. Zf he needed 

22 to gat hold of me, it would be through Colonel North or 

23 through Mr. Allen, but that Z was specifically working 

24 under Mr. Allen at that time. 
25 




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Q And I gath«r at that tima^^^^^Bmad* known 
to you that h« had participatad in tha aaa* kind of an 
exercis* several months earlier; is that correct? 




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A Y«a, sir, which apparently involved th« OEA 
ag«nt« . 

Q And whan you say that , that ia ^^^^^^^Hand 
ia that right? 

A Yaa, air. 

Q Did you laam a t that t iaa froa^^^^^^lthat 
waa in f act^^^^^l and^^^^Vin hia aarliar affort? 
Did ha identify thea by name? 

A I think ha referred to thea aa "thoae biaboa 
froa DEA". 

Q Whan ha referred to thea in that way, what 
iaage ceuae to your aind? Waa it the iaage ol^^^^Hand 





Yea, air. 

You had in fact aat thea by then? 

Yaa, air. Z aat thea at the end of Deceaber 



at the direction of Mr. Allen, or with Mr. Allen at the 
direction of Colonel North. We all aet. 

Q W ell, thia ia probably a good tiaa to get into 
^^^^^^^^Han^^^^^^^^^and your knowledge of their 
efforta. I gather that, froa what y ou have aaid, you 
firat aat^^^^^^^Hand^^^^^^lin late Deceaber 
early January of 1985-1986; ia that correct? 

A Yea, air. 

■ 

Q How did it coaa that you aet thea? 



lilTOFIRl 



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A Colonel Horth was Insistant that w« gat 
together and meet with thea. 

Q And when you eay "we", who are "we"? 

A That C olonel Worth , M r. Allen and I e lt down 
In a meeting wlth^^^^^^^Vand^^^^^^^^^^H all 
the same time, to discuss hostages. 

Q And why was Colonel North so insistent that 
you sit do%m with these two men? 

A Because he felt that these two individuals had 
resources and sources in the area which could be useful. 

g Now, was this something he told you or you 
learned this from someone else? 

A This was something that be told us — that 
they had been very useful to him in the past and they had 
some information which could be useful and some sources 
which could be useful. 

Q So did there come a point where you met 

Land 

Yes, sir. We met, strangely enough, at tlie" 
Old Irish Brogue Inn, or the Old Irish Pub, a bar which 
featured an Irish band, after work one night, about 7:30 
or 8:00. 

Q Now do you have a recollection as to where 
that was? 

A Apparently it was a meeting place that Colonel 





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1 Korth had usad bafor* and Mr. Allan was faalllar with Its 

2 location. X follovad hin In his car. It was away from 

3 Langley and way out In tha woods. It saaaad to ma tUsout 

4 a 15 or 20-minuta driva. 

5 Q Bayond Langley? 

6 A Yes, sir. 

7 Q You don't ramambar what town it's in? 

8 A No, sir. 

9 (A discussion was hald off tha racord.) 

10 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Rasuaing) 

11 Q I will just sunmariz* for tha racord. Wa went 

12 off tha racord briefly two, I won't say, sal f •^ascribed 

13 pub-crawlars have identified the gathering place as the 

14 Old Brogue Irish Inn or Irish Pub or some variation 

15 thereof, and it is in Great Palls. 

16 Now when you say we went to this inn, that is 

17 you and Charles Allen; is that correct? 

18 A Yes, sir. I followed Mr. Allen in his car. 

19 Q Nhen you arrived, this was after work, I 

20 gltter, In the early evening hours; is that correct? 

21 A Yes, sir. 

22 Q When you arrived was Colonel North there? 

23 A No, air. 

24 Q And I gather neither of you had met these men 

25 before; is that correct? 

hi 




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1 A To th« bast of my racollactlon, y«s, air. 

2 Q So how vaa It that you datamlnad who thay 

3 wara? 

4 A It was, I bellava, aarly avanlng, and tha bar 

5 vaa — tha pub was fairly aopty. Wa wara to maat In the 

6 bar and Mr. Allan mada mantion of tha fact that ha had 

7 sat thaa bafora, I baliava. Thars vara only tvo othar 

8 individuals alraady at a tabla in auits, sitting thara, 

9 ao thay vara fairly aaay to distinguish^and I^Ainl^a 

10 valkad up and aakad thaa if thay wart^^HBand^^^^B and 

11 thay said yas. 

12 And va introduced oursalvas. 

13 Q Nov vhat vas your iapraaaion upon aaeting 

14 thasa tvo fallovs? 

15 A That thay vara — 1 can only daecriba tham as 

16 straat agants. By that I aaan thay aaaaad to ba straat- 

17 smart but vara not vary knovladgaabla of othar Fadaral 

18 aganciaa nor outsida of thair otm, nor Icnovladgaabla, 

19 cartainly, in any vay, shapa or form, about tha Middle 

20 Bast or international relations or politics or the 

21 allltary. But they did have a fairly good grasp of the 

22 lover elaaants of human nature. 

23 Q Would you acknovledge that you aight have 

24 described these people at one point as being tvo street 

25 toughs in camel hair coata? 



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1 A Y««, sir. 

2 Q Kov, wh«n you mat thas* two man did you know — 

3 let me strlka that. Aftar you mat thaaa two paopla, how 

4 long did it taka North to arriva? 

5 A I believa ha arrivad about an hour aftar the 

6 prescribed meeting time, which was eUsout normal for him. 

7 Q North time? 

8 A Yes, sir. 

9 Q Ware you and Hr. Allen able to engage in any 

10 substantive discussions with these people before he 

11 arrived? 

12 A I was very hesitant to engage in substantive 

13 discussions with them because of the sensitiveness and 

14 this being em uncleared area, and I thinJc ve talked in 

15 generalities about the Middle East, and I tried to feel 

16 out and get a sense of their backgrounds. And I think I 

17 took that time to eat dinner, since we came straight from 

18 work. 

19 Q Nov whan North arrived, what happened? 

20 A He ordered a round of drinks emd a second 

21 round of drinJcs, I believe, and very in-depth substantive 

22 discussion ab out vary sensitiv e mat erial was held, 
describing to^^^^^^^^Handl 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^hvery much 

25 Secret information that the CIA and the White House were 




BMOttSSIflEO 



169 



I 

awar* of regarding tha hostages. 

Q Nov, did this appear to be new information to 
thea? 

A They appeared to be faniliar with portions of 
it and they made reference to tome of the efforts they 
had made with CIA previously. 

Q Nov, this conversation, I gather, Mr. Allen 
and Lieutenant Colonel North vere also participating in 
it; isn't that correct? 

A Mr. Allen and Colonel North were the primary 
discussers. They put out the information. I vas in a 
learn and listen mode from them. Z didn't normally 
discuss Top Secret/Sensitive information in a pub. 

Q Hell, let me ask you that question. Did your 
discussion of such a topic in the pub environment cause 
you emy concern? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And trtiat vas the source of that concern? 

A It seemed a little unusual to be holding a 
wa^^inq like this outside of a government building. If 
thair* vas a proper place <md time for such a meeting, it 
should be held In a proper environment, and this vas sort 
of a nev atmosphere to me. But it didn't feel right. 

Q There came a point, I gather, in the course of 
this conversation when a band struck up and the 



IJNCnSSSIFIED 



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UNCi^n 



76 



1 convarsation had to attain higher daclbals in order to 

2 continua; is that corract? 

3 A Yas, sir. w« wars sitting fairly closa to an 

4 Irish typa of band and it was — if you vara to try to 

5 affactivaly mask a convarsation it was probably vary 

6 affactiva. I don't think anybody could hava haard us 

7 four or fiva faat away. Laaning ovar tha tabla, it was 

8 vary difficult to haar tha convarsation that was taking 

9 placa right thara. 

10 Q So avan anong yoursalvas it vaa hard to haar 

11 ona anothar; is that corract? 

12 A Yas, sir, somatlaas. 

13 Q I can saa whara that Bight ba a vary affactiva 

14 scraan. 

15 A I bacaaa lass concamad than, but Z still was 

16 concamad. 

17 Q Nov Z gathar that tha inforaation that was 

18 baing provided in this discussion was largely flowing 

19 tv om Mr. Alle n a nd Colonel Ho rth and, to some extent, you 
to^^^^^^Hand^^^^^^^^fand not the other 

21 around; is that right? 

22 A Priaarily from Mr. Allen, with Colonel North 

23 adding additional pieces and background, and I would 

24 occasionally join in and say yes, but, and clarify a 
point. ^^^^^^Band^^^^^^BK*!^* Interject 




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occasionally that thay had spacij 
had told hia that such and auch, 





■tory aaong 



Soaa of tha Infomatlon saaaad rathar, shall 
va say, odd. 

Q And you would Includa tha] 
that ganra; la that corract? 

A Yas, sir. 

Q Naa thara any othar InforBation that thay 
providad that you can racall along thosa Unas that might 
hava found ita way lnto^^^^^^|^^^^|bad it appaared 
in papar fora? 

A Thay Indicatad that thay had soaa sourcasl 

Ihad accasa to various aitd sundry portions' 
"of Lahanon in taras of thair drug daallngs, thair drug 
daalings baing thair profaaaional DBA Agancy daalings 
with paopla in tha Middla Eaat. Thay particularly 
Mpitionad paopla who ,^^^^^^^^^^H had accasa 
of this in formation, which I fait would ba vary unuaual . 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vould hava to tha 
information; ia that rj^ 

A Yas. sir J 




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2: 

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^Q^^^o yoj^recall any diBcussion at th« Old Brogue 
froa^^^^^Hand^^^^Habout th«lr low opinion or 
difficulties with the CIA desk officer? 

A Yee, sir. 

Q Do you recall what the character of their 
problea with this officer was? 

A Yes. They had apparently taXen a trip — I 
believe it was to Europe t~ earlier to aeet with a| 

to attempt to verify access to a hostage, Mr. 
Buckley, through some mode of bona fides. 

Q What had^^^^^^adone that caused thea so 
much concern? 

A They said that he changed the rules in the 
middle of the game. 

Q And the rules were the rules that applied to 
the sufficiency of the proof to deaonstrate access to Mr. 
BucUey; is that right? -- ^^^^^^ 

A Jfas, sir. I believethat what^^^^^Hand 
back with^^^^^^^H^^^^HHI 
r, and once that was provided to^^^^^^lhe went 
baok and said, well, now I have a list of que sti ons fc 
you to go back to your source, and^^^^^^^^andl 
indicated that that was not possible or that the source 
was unavailable, that there were difficulties. 

Q Did they tell thea that or did they tell you 





K1OTE0 



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that^^^^^^guastioned tha sufflciancy of tha quality 
of tha proof? 

A Yaa, ai r. I thlnX thay aald thay ware 
inaultad by t hat, ^^^^^^^Ml_thl nJc. aantionad t o 
latar on that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

loaat 
Incorract about tha proof that was provided. 

Q Did thay lapart that Information to you at 
thla maatlng? 

A Thay Indicated that ha vaa In aoaa way 
displeased with thea and they Indicated that they were 
displeased and had no Intentions for future dealings with 
hla or with the Directorate of Operations at CIA. 

Q The entire Directorate was off their do list? 

A As far as Z was concerned from ay 
conversation, yes. "These guys" was, I think, the way 
they put It. 

Q "These guys" being the 00? 

A Yes, "these guys froa the DO". 

Q At least the way you say It, It Is 
alliterative. 

(Laughter.) 




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^aJ/BV ja) 



To i^U 



UNCLASSIFIE! 



175 




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Q Nov did th«r« coa* a tla« vhan you traveled to 
N«w Yo rk to av aluat* a aourc * that had b««n un covre d by 
mc 
A Y«a, air, two sourcas. 
Q Nov lat na ahov you vhat I vill aarlc aa 
■Exhibit Nuabar 1. 

(Tha docuaant rafarrad to vaa 
aarkadf^^^l^V Exhibit 
Nuabar 1 for Idantlflcatlon.) 
I vould aalc you If you racognlsa thla 
docuaant, which Z ballava coaprlaaa four pagaa. 
k Yaa, air, I do. 
Q What la that? 

A It la a aaaorandua for tha racord that Z %rrote 
on tha 15th of January baaad upon aaatlnga In Nav York on 
13 and 14 January vlth tvo DEA aourcaa. Z vrota this 
aaaorandua bacausa Z vaa unaura of ay rola and Z naadad 
to hava a %rrlttan racord of It. 

Q Wa vlll gat to that point In juat a aoaent. 
■■• did It happan that you caaa to go to Nav York In the 
' first placa? 

A Mr. North and Mr. Allan told aa to go to New 
York. 

Q And do you recall having separate 
conversations with each nan with respect to this 

HI 



176 




1 dlrttctlva? 

2 A I b«ll«v« at th« Old Brogu* w« aqr ««d or, I 

3 should say, th«y agrsad that Z should go wlth^^^^^^^H 

4 and/or ^^^^^^^Vto N«w York In th« near futur* to meet 

5 with their very good sources that they had on the 

6 hostages. 

7 Q Nov when you say at the Old Brogue Inn, it was 

8 only one point at which you all gathered the Old Brogue 

9 Inn; is that correct? 

10 A Yes, sir. 

11 Q So when you refer to that, it is always that 

12 meeting; is that correct? 

13 A Yes, sir. 

14 Q So at that time it was understood or at least 

15 the subject was raised of you going to New York? 

16 A Yea, sir. 

17 Q Nov following that did you question these 

18 directives at all? 

19 A Yes, sir. 

20 g Bow did you do that? 

21 A I indicated to Mr. Allen that I vas not an 

22 op«rations individual. I vas an intelligence analyst. 

23 g And you vere at the Old Brogue at this point? 

24 A No, sir. We were back at the CIA. 

25 g So this was a day or so later? 







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A This was b«twa«n tb« tlaa v« B«t at th« Brogue 
and th« tlB* I departed for New York, and Z expressed ay 
doubts as to whether that was a suitable role for an 
Intelligence analyst to be In. 

Q What was his reaction to that? 

A Go anyway. 

Q Did you raise the Batter with emyone else? 

A Z asked hla to raise It with Colonel North, 
but he Indicated that the discussion was closed and that 
Z would be going. 

Q Did you discuss It with anyons other than Mr. 
Allen? 

A Yes, sir. Z discussed It wlth^^^^^HZ 
believe, and later wlthJH 




'and Indicated that while Z had knowledge and background 
In the Middle East this was an area that was new to ae 
•aA Z was on unsure ground. Z didn't feel It was proper. 
What did ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H tell you 

•to do? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

A They Indicated that they felt Z had a 
sufficient knowledge of the siibject matter and that It 
was basically Z needed to be very specific when I came 
back In terms of my feelings of whether Z felt these guys 




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v«r« rallabl* sourcaa, based upon ay toovladga of tha 
Nlddla Eaat and baaad upon sy Jcnowladga of tha aubjact at 
hand, which was hoatagaa. 

And thay provldad ma with aoma flald polntars 
on how to go about tha astabllshing of a ralatlonshlp, at 
catara . 

Q Did you quastlon Mr. Allan at all aa to why 
aomaona from tha Olractorata of Oparationa wasn't aant up 

to parform thla evaluation? ^.^^-i^— «_ 

ha indicated that^^^^^Hp^and^^l 
^^^^uad indicated in a previous conversation at tha Old 
Brogue Inn that they didn't trust anybody from the 00, 
which Z remembered aa being the caae. 

Q Nov when you went to New York, what happened? 
A I m et with two different sources, as indicated 
by^^^^^^^Hsxhlhitl, an d I spoke wit h them and 
discussedwith^^^^^^Hand^^^^^^^Htheir background 
and their interest and any knowledge they might have of 
the hostages. 

g Now these are sources that you evaluated. One 

land tha other was a 
La that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did you form an opinion] 




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89 



A Y«s, sir. In th« raport Z Indlcat* both 
m« «ting«, on« on 13 and on« on 14 January, war* attended 
by^^^^^^^Band yialdad littl* or no substantiv* 
Intalliganc* on th« hostagaa. 

Q Old you in fact davalop tha opinion that 
parhapa thia fallow waa gatting his intalliganca from 
raading tha navapapar? 

A Yas, air. Hall, Z davalopad an opinion that 
ha had littla knovladga of tha acta, littla aubatantiva 
knovladga or trua accaaal 

I thought ha was laading us on. 
MS. GENZKAN: And who is tha "ha" that you are 
rafarring to? 

THS WITNESS) 




fait his inforaation was not vary vorth%ffaila. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Raauaing) 

Q Did you form any opinion aa to whathar or not 
ha was axaggarating his contacts? 

A Yas, sir. Z baliava ha did. I baliava ha had 
frianda who had friands who had frianda who had friands 
who night hava soma information on tha hoatagaa, but the 
connection waa vary tenuous at beat, and it would be 



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90 

difficult to arrange. 

Q Nov you also p«rfonn«<l| 
,i« that right? 
A Y«s, sir. 
Q And I thinX in sunaary your report ia that he 
more promising^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B is 
that correct? 

A Yea, air. 




as Ma jo 



Wov when you vent to thi s meeting did you go 



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91 

A I was Instructad by Mr. Allan and Mr. North to 
go aa an Individual who had an intaraat in saaing tha 
hoatagaa ralaasad. 

Q Hara you to play tha rola of a privata 
citizan? 

A That is how Z undarateod ay rola to ba, yaa, 
air. 

Q And you than did not go draaaad in uniform;- ia 
that corract? 

A No, air. I vaa apacifically diractad by Mr. 
Allan and Colonal North to lat b« hair grov long and not 
ahov up in uniform at any tima during ay attandanca at 
tha Hoataga Location Taak Forca. 

Q Now I gathar it caaa to your attantion at aoma 
point during tha couraa of this aaating that at laaat ona 
of tha paraona you vara intarviaving vaa avara that you 
vara aaaociatad with tha anad f orc aa ; ia thate^ corract? 

A Yaa, air.l 

Q Which vaa not knovn to thaaa paopla; ia that 

COKXACt? 

A No, air, not at th a f irat naating. At tha and 
of tha firat aaatingfl^^^^P^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I 
Irafarrad ma^^^^^^^na Ma jox^Hm^ which 
aurpriaad ma bac^ua* I had not told him that I vaa a ^ 
Major and tharafora I could only aaauma that! 




IJNIK 



wit ) 




182 



UNCUSSi, 




92 

1 and^^^^^^Hhad told th«a that I was a Major in tha 

2 o.s. axsad forcaa. 

Q Had you apokan to^^^^^^H and 

4 about th« gulaa you would uaa in aaatlng with thaaa 

5 individuals? 

< A Yas. I spoka to thaa about it bafora thay 

7 vara thara, amd I baliava Colonal North aantionad in fact 

8 that I would go as, whan you go, you will kind of go as a 

9 privata citizan, and Z apoka with thaa bafora I laft 

10 about ay rola and how Z was to raprasant aysalf , which Z 

11 thought I was a littla uncoafortabla with bacausa I fait 

12 it was a aisraprasantation. 

13 But, in any casa, Z discussad it with thaa, 

14 and thay said yaah, usa a privata citizan, or words to 

15 that affact. And daapita tha fact that Z discussad that 

16 with thaa thay apparantly aada tha aourca awars. 

17 g Did you quastion thaa at all about tha 

18 aourca 's knowladga that you vara a Major? 

19 A Yas. Z mantionad it to thea back in tha hotel 

20 aftnr wa laft tha initial aaating with tha sourca and 

21 thay agraad that yaah, thay aight hava scrawad up and 

22 Bight hava aantionad Z was a aajor. And Z was soaavhat 

23 displaasad vith that fact, vhich iaaadiataly aada thaa 

24 avara that Z vas an aaployaa of tha U.S. Govamaant and 

25 not a privata citizan, as Colonal North and Mr. Allen had 



tINWSlflE 



183 



WLASSIFKG 



93 



1 ■• pr«a«nt Bysalf, and that ttaay basically, aa far as I 

2 was concerned, blav ay cover. And Z was dlaplaasad with 

3 this as wall. 

4 Q You in fact andad up giving soma aonay to tha 

5 second source; is that correct? 

sir. ^^^^^^^^land^^^^^^Hhad 

7 reqpiested of Mr. Allen that $100 ba aada available to the 

8 second source, basically for his tlaa and effort coalng 

9 into New York City to aeet with us, and I was 

10 specifically instructed to draw $100 froa soae CZA fund, 

11 which there was a receipt for, to give to the sourde for 

12 compensation for his, tlae in coalng down. 

13 Q Now let a* ask you this with respect to 
^^^^^^^■sxhibit Nuaber 1. Is there anything in that 

15 report that is inaccurate or that should be changed? 

16 A This is a little over • year and a half froa 

17 seeing this. 

18 K8. HD6H2S: Maybe you would want to take a 

19 few ainutes to read the entire report to refresh your 

20 raoollection. 

21 THE WITNESS: I really don't think that is 

22 necessary. I will quicUy flip through it. 

23 MR. WOODCOCK; Why don't we go off the record 

24 while you take a look at it. 

25 (Pause.) 



esoKsnEo 



184 



94 

MR. WOODCOCK: Lat's go back on th« record. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Raaualng) 
Q Major^^^^^^^^^lyou hava had an opportunity 
now to raad througb^^^^^^^^V Exhibit Hunbar 1. la 
thara anything about it that you now in hindaight find to 
b« inaccurata or that you would lika to corract? 

A Thara is nothing apacific that I aaa in thara 
that Z know to ba factually incorract at this tlaa that I 
can raaaabar. 




Q Mow Z gathar that upon ratuming to 
Waahington, D. C, you vrota up thia raport and 
diatributad it to Mr. Allan, aaong othara, la that 



fflCDBSffltD 



185 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

LO 

LI 

L2 

L3 

L4 

L5 

L6 

L7 

LB 

L9 

20 

tl 

12 

13 

24 

25 



UmSSiHEl 



95 



eo«T«et? 
A 
Q 
A 



Y«s, sir. 

Old anyon* •!■• r«c«lv« it? 

y«s, sir. B«ln9 in a position of an outsider 



at CIA, I was a littls uncomfortabls with doing what I 
axpsctsd was Dirsctorats of Operations job and I 
providsd, Z bslisvs, a copy of this to ths Dirsctorats of 
Oparations^sithsr^^^^^^lorfl^^^^^^H^^ Z bslisvs 

vas^HH^I^^^^H an<^^^^^^Hrsad also 

provided a copy to Ouana Clarrldgs, Dsvsy Clarride 




Q Whan you dslivsrsd 
^ou discuss your sxpsrisncs vithi 




A Yss, sir. Z bslisvs that is lAsn vs hsld our 
convsrsation about thslr lack of Xnowlsdgs about ths 
Hiddls Bast and Z bslisvs Z bscaas avars at that tias 
that thsss vsrs ths saas guys that hs had dsalt with, I 
bailsnrs, in ths prsvious suaaisr and had not had good 
rMOlts with. 

Q This is ths "two biabos" convsrsation? 

A Yss, sir. 

Q That would havs bssn, Z gathsr, shortly aftar 
you rstumed f roa Nav York? 



INCtlSSSlfiE!) 



186 



w^^sm. 



96 



1 A YM, air. 

2 Q Kov, did you also B««t with th« Dlractor of 

3 Central Intalllganc* shortly aftar your ratum? 

4 A Yas, air. I ballava It was aroxind tha 20th of 

5 January Mr. Allan raquastad that Z go in with him and 

6 brlaf tha Olractor on tha sourcas and thair usafulnass. 

7 Q Was Mr. Allan of tha opinion that thasa raally 

8 Bight ba uaaful aourcas? 

9 A Yas, sir. Ha vantad to axplora tha 

10 possibilitias. 

11 Q What was tha purposa of briafing Mr. Casay? 
13 A To obtain funds, sir. 

13 Q Now whan you want to this briafing, who was 

14 prasant? 

15 A Mr. Allan and Z and Mr. Casay. 

16 Q How did tha briafing precaad? 

17 A Mr . Allan introduced ■• and said this is Major 
^^^^^^^^^H Ha's tha taaa laadar of ay Hoataga Location 

19 Task Forca, racantly foraad. As Z praviously briafad 

20 y««» Colonal North has an intarast in expanding sourcas 
31 on tastaga intalliganca gathering and aatarial and he 

33 apant sobs tiaa with a couple of sources in New York and 

33 ha would like to tell you about thea now. 

34 And 1 very briefly auaaarizad ay contacts with 

35 tha individuals up there and Z think Mr. Caaey aakad ma 



lIltCtKSSIfIB 



187 



w 



97 

1 1£ Z thought th«y v*r« vorthvbll*, and I indicated Z 

2 thought that on* of thaa was worth pursuing. And Z was 

3 asksd bow Buch aonsy do w« n««d, and Z think Mr. Allan 

4 caas up with a figur* of $25,000. 

5 Q Old you gat th« impression or did you gat any 

6 understanding froB Mr. Casay that h« was faBiliar with 

7 the OEA agents who were involved in this Batter? 

8 A No, sir. He aade very few coBsents during the 

9 meeting, to the best of ay recollection. 

10 Q Has it aade plain to bia that this was a OEA- 

11 generated effort, at least initially? 

12 A Zt was aade plain to bia that this was 

13 soaething that Colonel North had an interest in and that 

14 there were two DEA agents involved at Colonel North's 

15 direction. 

16 Q Do you recall either^^^^^^^^Hoi 

17 or both of thea, referring to having received fast boats 

18 froB Colonel North? 

19 A Z do reaeaber conversations held soaetiae 

20 daring ay ten ure at th e Hostage Location Task Force that 
^Hj^^^^Hand^^^^^fhad indicated that they soae 

22 boats froa 0111*. 

23 Q Sob* boats froa Olli*? 

24 A Or a boat 
25 




188 




98 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

IS 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



' Q Did th«y t«ll you vh«th«r th«s« boats vara 
■otor boats or ataaaars or what thay vara? 

A No, air. 

Q Did you hava any iapraaaion as to what thay 
vara? 

A I baliava Z had tha iaprassion at ona point 
that ona of thaa vas a fairly quick boat, but I can't 
tall you vhat I basad that 




189 



KNCUISWD 



^1<:,^ S^ 







190 



191 



msm 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

< 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Z b«ll«v« in our last 
a««tlng you said that th«r« was a point vhars Mr. Allan 
told you that Colonel North had one* told hia that the 
Prasidant was willing to go to Laavanworth if it was 
necessary to get the hostages released. Do you recall 
that? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Do you recall what the context of that reaark 
was, how it caae up? 

A I was arguing with Mr. Allen about what I call 
the options paper. 

Q And that is the paper that you submitted to 
Lieutenant Colonel North on April 24, 1986; is that 
correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And we will get to that in just a moaent. So 
tHis discussion occurred in the context of your 
dlseussion of the options paper; is that correct? 

A Z believe so, sir. 

Q Now when Mr. Allen aade this reaark to you, 
what did you understand hia to aean by reference to 
Leavenworth? laAi^^i a#%A||P'!li 




(191) 



192 



UNimilD 



102 



1 A That Mr. Allen was tailing na that Mr. North 

2 had told hlB that tha Praaldant had told — excusa ma, 

3 Colonal Korth — that ha waa willing to go to graat 

4 langtha to fraa tha Amarican hoatagaa. 

5 Q Now whan you — 

6 A And I aaaumad by that to includa activltlaa 

7 which wara illagal, which I did not baliava. 

8 Q You ara awara that Laavanworth ia tha aita of 

9 a military inatallation, ia it not? 

10 A Yaa, air. It aoundad peculiarly ailitary in 

11 tha context and not aonathing lilca tha Praaldant would 

12 aay. 

13 Q Hara you awara at tha tima that Laavanworth 

14 waa alao tha aita of a maximua aacurity Fadaral 

15 correctional inatitution? 

16 A Yea, air. Z'a awara now that it ia. At tha 

17 tine, I waan't awara of it. I aaauaed that bacauae there 

18 ia a ailitary one there, I gueaa I aaauaed that it waa a 

19 Federal facility,- but it aoundad, the way it waa phrased, 

20 it: 0eanded peculiarly ailitary in context and it sounded 

21 n«k ■eaethlng that a civilian would aay. 

22 Q Did you take it that President Reagan would go 

23 to Leavenworth auid coaaand ailitary forcea to get the 

24 hoatages out, that that waa what Colonel North waa trying 

25 to convey? 



wmms 



193 



iiNCussra 



103 



1 A I just took th« ••nt«nc« at fac* value, that 

2 tha Pr«ald«nt was willing to go to Lsavsnworth If h« had 

3 to. I think that was meant to construs actlvitias that 

4 psrhaps wars not lagal, and X didn't baliava that tha 

5 Prasldant, bacausa of Colonal North's rola in 

6 axaggarating his ralationship with tha Prasldant, I felt 

7 that that was probably an exaggeration as well. 

8 Q And I gather you had had some exposure to that 

9 exaggeration by that point; is that correct? 

10 A Yes, sir. 

11 Q How would you characterize trtiat Colonel Korth^ 

12 how Colonel North would exaggerate his relationship with 

13 the President? 

14 A I can't reaeaber or recollect a specific thing 

15 other than the President asks ae three tiaes a week 

16 about, and I was in Colonel North's office on a nunber of 

17 occasions, ac you have seen froa his calendar, and Z 

18 never saw, heard, or had any specific information about 

19 any direct contact between the President and Colonel 

20 Kerth irtiich was unusual, in ay opinion. 

21 Q What do you aean it was unusual? 

22 A If there was as auch a connection between 

23 Colonel North and the President as he alleged, at least 

24 during the four or five hours Z spent over there at one 

25 period I would have heard "your meeting with the 



vHmmi 



194 



UNCkASSlEP 



104 



1 Pr«aid«nt" or vorda to that affact coma up. I navar 

2 haard anything lika that. 1 navar haard that ha waa off 

3 maating with tha Praaidant, to call him thraa or four 

4 tlaaa a vaak. If ha vaa avallabla, yaa, ha waa availa ble 

5 or no, ha la oaatlng with aomabody froa CZA^^^^^Hor 

6 worda to that affact. ^^^^^* 

7 But I navar haard of a aaating that ha was 

8 having with tha Praaidant. That ia why I considarad his 

9 rola axaggaratad. It waa tha aort of thing — axcuaa ma, 

10 I want to aaka a point — it waa tha aort of thing that I 

11 think ha would hava told or aada a point, if Z had a 

12 aaating with tha Praaidant today, Z think ha would hava 

13 said that, amd Z did net haar that froa hia during ay six 

14 or aight-aonth aaaociation with hia. 

15 Q Zn othar words, you would haar aoaa ganaral 

16 stataaant about tha fraquancy of aaatinga but you navar 

17 haard any particular atataaant about a particular 

18 aaating; is that corract? 

19 A No, air. Z navar haard, othar than rumor, 

20 that ha had aat with tha Praaidant. Z had haard that he 

21 waa on« of tha individuals who was kay in convincing tha 

22 Praaidant to go into Granada, but Z was not awara of the 

23 specific instances. But Z did not know of any aaetlngs 

24 that ha had with tha Preaidant between the tiae 1 was 

25 associated with hia In Oeceaber of 1985 and tha time that 



mmm. 



*j 



195 




105 

1 I laft that offlc* th« 24th of May, at th« and of May In 

2 1986. 

3 Z haard of no subatantlva contact betvaen him 

4 and tha Prasldant. 

5 Q And Z gathar what ha allagad during that time 

6 was tha ganaral fraquancy of aaatin^s othar thani a 

7 rafaranca to particular maatinga that ha had during that 

8 pariod of tisa? 

9 A No, air. Ha didn't allaga to hava had any 

10 maatinga. Ha, Z think, axaggaratad hia contact on thia 

11 ona maao that Z indicatad, that tha Praaidant of tha 

12 Unitad Stataa aaka ma thraa tiaaa a vaak. Z aaauaad that 

13 vaa through intaraadiariaa, that Adairal Poindaxtar vaa 

14 aakad by tha Praaidant, and that Colonal North vaa tha 

15 action officar to anavar tha quaationa. Z think ha 

16 axaggaratad his rola in that aa wall. 

17 That is basad upon an intuit iva faaling that 

18 is difficult to daacriba at thia tiaa. 

19 g Wars you faailiar with tha operation of 

20 Ness's office at all, the rolea of individuala? 

21 Jt K I knew the people who worked there, yea, air. 

22 Q Prasuaably you had soaa expoaure to Fa%m Hall; 

23 is that correct? 

24 A Yes. Z met her on a nuaber of occaaiona. 

25 Q And how about Craig Coy? 



rnrnm 



196 



UNClASSra 



106 



1 A Y«s, air. H« was an Air Fore* officer 

2 asaignad — or Coast Guard? H« was an offlcar assigned 

3 to work for Colonsl North as wall as Bob Earl. 

4 Q Bob Earl was also assigned to Colonel North? 

5 A Yes, sir. 

6 Q What were Craig Coy's responsibilities, as you 

7 recall? 

8 A Z know that he was not Involved with this 

9 particular subject matter of Interest on the hostages. I 

10 think I was told to sort of keep the sensitive stuff away 

11 froB hla, or words to that effect. Z don't think he was 

12 heavily Involved In the subject, and Z think he had other 

13 duties. 

14 Q Was he playing a najor role In policy 

15 foraatlon, from your ability to observe? 

16 A Z don't believe so. 

17 Q How about Robert Earl? Nhat was his role? 

18 A Bob Earl was acre of an action officer for 

19 Colonel North, and Z believe Z once asked about his 

20 x4||||lklonship with Colonel North, did he work for Colonel 

21 uStth, and be said he worked with Colonel North, and Z 

22 nade sent Ion of that to Mr. Allen one tine and Mr. Allen 

23 made It very clear to me that Colonel Earl worked for 

24 Colonel North. 

25 Q Were you able to observe whether Mr. Earl had 



SiiULnc 



197 





107 



1 a )cnowl«d9a of tb« hostag* Initiative? 

2 A Y«>, sir. 

3 Q Did h«? 

4 A Y«s, sir, as far as I was avars. If I could 

5 not g«t hold of Colonsl North on a particular subject, 

6 particularly a hot sub j set, it was o)cay to talX to Bob. 

7 That was ths quota from Mr. Allan. 

8 Q Hov about, let's say, the DBA operation? 

9 Would he have been knowledgeable of that? 

10 A Yes, sir, I believe he was. He seeaed to be 

11 Colonel North's backup. 

12 Q Let ae put the question differently. Has 

13 there any topic you felt you could not talk to Colonel 

14 Earl aUsout in North's absence? 

15 A No. 

16 Q Now, in April of 1986 you coapleted an options 

17 paper on the hostage question, and I'm going to have this 

18 marked as^^^^^^^l Exhibit 2 and ask if you would take 

19 a aoaent to look at it and identify it, if you would. 

20 (The docuaent referred to was 

aarked^^^^^H^B Exhibit 

22 Nuaber 2 for identification.) 

2 3 MS. HUGHES: Is this a good tiae for a break? 

24 MR. WOODCOCK: Sure. 

25 (A brief recess was taken.) 




fe.;,^ 



198 



\imiSM 



108 



MR. WOODCOCK: Let's go back on th« racord. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK ; (R««u«ing) 

Q Ma j or ^^^^^^^^^B you hava had an opportunity 
to ravlav what has baan aarkad aa^^^^^^^Vsxhlblt 2; 
la that corract? 

A Yaa, sir. 

Q Nov, la that tha options papar you rafarrad to 
aarllar in your taatlnony that you had a dlscusalon with 
Mr. Allan ovar? 

A Yas, air. 

Q How did this papar coma to b« craatad? 

A At tha initial aaating with Colonal North and 
Mr. Allan in tha Old Exacutiva Building, Colonal North 
indicatad ha vantad to axplora all of tha options. 

Q And this is tha maating that occurrad in 
Oacaabar of '85? 

A Yas, sir. 

Q So this papar ia in part tha fulfillmant of 
tha purposa of tha CIA Hoataga Location Task Forca as you 
uadArstood it; is that corract? 

A Yas, sir. 

Q Now this papar raally is dividad into what 
appaar to b« two parts; is that corract? 

24 A Yas, air. 

25 Q Thara ia a covar naaorandua which Is addressed 

^'^ ■ -, . ,.r.^ , 



199 



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22 

23 

24 

25 



IINCUSSilli 



109 



fro» you to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. 

A Yee, air. 

Q And in that ia a reference to the ama-for- 
hoatagea option; ia that correct? 

A Yea, air. 

Q Then, appended to that are — 

A A full r«mqe of optiona. 




Q Za there anything about your diacuaaiona with 
Mr. Allen that cauaed thia paper to take on a form that 
appeara to turn it into two different papera? 

A Yea, air. 

Q What ia that? 

A Th« aecond aection of the paper, you will 
note, appeara to be a complete range of optiona. This is 
what I aubaitted to Mr. Allen for the optiona paper, 
vhiA I vaa intereated in aeeing be delivered to Colonel 
North. 




Q Then, when you subnitted thia range of options 



ONcrra 



200 




110 

1 to Mr. All«n, what was his reaction? 

2 A That Z had laft out an option. 

3 Q That option being th« arma-for-hostaga option; 

4 is that correct? 

5 A Yas, sir. 

6 Q So what happanad as a result of that insight 

7 on his part? 

8 A He asked ae — he directed ae to describe the 

9 ams-for-hostages channel, and in fact I indicated that Z 

been kept out^^^^^^^^^^^^^^and was 

11 coapletely privy to all of the inforaation. And he 

12 indicated that he would assist ae in the writing of that 

13 portion, so Z drafted an option and he aade considerable 

14 changes to that option in two different drafts. 

15 Q Nov in the course of your discussion with hia 

16 jUsout the aras-for-hostages option I take it that you 

17 aade known to hia that that was not an option that you 

18 favored; is that correct? 

19 A That is correct, sir. 

20 Q Did you tell hia that if you were forced to 

21 slaply incorporate it into the paper you aight withhold 

22 your signature froa it? 

23 A Yes, sir. 

24 Q Did Mr. Allen aake soae concession to you 

25 based upon this position you had assuaed? 



i/ffCDra 



201 



UNELASSIfe 



111 



1 ■ A Y«s, sir. I indicated that I fait that ha 

2 should sign this particular papar, zmd ha said, no, I 

3 should taka cradit for my work. I fait that was rather 

4 stranga bacausa ha was always insistent on signing the 
9 weeldy reports to Admiral Poindaxter, and why ha would 

6 want ma to sign the options papar, even though it was the 

7 basis of my work, most of my work was what he signed in 

8 terms of production of intelligence, struck me as 

9 somewhat strange. 

10 But after X had discussed, after Z had drafted 

11 my first draft of the options on the arms-for-hostages, Z 

12 had a number of what we call bullets, lines, that ware 

13 drawbacks or things that I had problems with — 

14 encouraging terrorism, the assumption to encourage 

15 terrorism — and there were a number of items, there were 

16 five or six different bullets, X believe, short blurbs. 

17 Q Now did you negotiate with Mr. Allen about 

18 presenting your views to Mr. North? 

19 A Yea, sir. Z said if the paper had to go this 

20 waq|J|M only way X would aign it is if Z was allowed to 

21 s«fl#it to Colonel North and explain my reservations 

22 about it. 

23 Q So he acceded to that, Z gather. 

24 A Yes, sir. 

25 Q What happened then? 




202 



L. 




112 



1 \ 1 d«llv«r*d th« pap«r to Colonel North, Z 

2 b«li«va at th« and of April, and discuas«d with Colonel 
North ay rasarvations about tha back channel initiative, 
the araa-for-hostagea. 

Q Now you referred to it aa the bade channel 
initiative. I gather that that haa a particular aeaning 
to you, the tera "back channel"; ia that correct? 

8 A I believe that waa the way that Mr. Allen 

9 firat referred to it, and that waa aiaply the way it waa 
LO referred to rather than talking about araa-for-boatagea 

becauae it waa a generic term that you could diacuaa 
without saying aoaething that in fact waa conaidered by 
Mr. Allen to be very aenaitiva. 

Q "Back channel" ia a term that ordinarily 
denotea not tha ordinary coaaunicationa ; ia that correct? 

A Yea, air. 

Q Not tha ordinary chain of coaaend; isn't that 
correct? 

A Yea, air. 

20 Q la that what you took it to aean in thia 

21 instance, too? 

22 A Yea, air. 

23 Q Nov, did anyone elae other than you contribute 

24 — and Mr. Allen — contribute to the itea that haa been 
aa^^^^^^H Exhibit 





203 



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7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNW^ 






113 



A Y«a, sir. Tb« basic pap«r that I vrota raally 
vaa tha itasa^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^f 
^^^^^l^^^^^^l^^l That vaa baalcally tha papar that 
vrota, and that vaa a covpilatlon of afforta by many of 
tha aaabars of tha Hoataaa tiscatlon Tar.k Forca taanl 




and It vaa in fact, 
vhila I draftad It, it vant through many drafts in its 
procaaa. 

And this back channal initiativa was tackad on 
at tha and just bafora it was submittad. 

Q So that you put it out for ganaral raviav 
bafora you coaplatad it; is that corract? 

A Tha back portior 
not tha front piaca. 

Q So that itaas^^^^^^^^^^^Hvant through 
tha Hoataga Location Taak Forca parsonnal? 

A Yas, air. 

Q And you ratainad your aubordinata aditorial 
aotlwrity ovar it; ia that corract? 

A Yas, sir. 

Q And than aubjact to Mr. Allan; is that 
corract? 

A Yas, sir. 




IfflWStfifD 



204 



WMMH 



114 



1 . Q Mow, did you, as a result of your discussions 

2 with Mr. Allsn, finally affix your signaturs to ths 

3 blfurcatad vsrsion of ths options papar? 

4 A Yas, sir, only with tha condition that I 

5 axplainad to Colonal Horth ay rasarvations about it. 

6 Q Corract, and your signature doas appaar on the 

7 Exhibit, does it not? 

8 A Yes, sir, it does. 

9 Q A copy of your signature appears on the second 

10 pa9«, or at least that page denoainated as 7437? 

11 A Yes, sir, it does. 

12 Q Now did you have a meeting with Colonel North 

13 about this paper? 

14 A Yes, sir, I did. 

15 Q And that was soaatime in late J^ril; is that 

16 correct? 

17 A Yes, sir. 

18 Q Did you bring to his attention your views 

19 about the lead option, or at least the first option on 

20 ife» the aras-for-hostagas option? 

21 A Yes, sir. 

22 Q How did that presentation of views proceed? 

23 A Z said that while Mr. Allen had affected ay 

24 analytical view, that he was acre of the opinion that it 

25 was an effective option than Z was, and that the words 



mmm 



205 



u 



115 



1 tbmt. w* had coa« up with v«r« In fact mor* hi* than aln« 

2 but a coaproala* v« did hava. Mr. Allan was 

3 knovladgaabla that an aras-for-hoatagas daal had baan 

4 auccaaaful in tha paat and that I had not baan Involvad 

5 with thla, and ha affactad that thla analyala ahould ba 

6 colorad by tha facta — l.a., that it had baan auccaaaful 

7 in tha paat. 

8 I Indicatad that daapita that it had baan 

9 auccaaaful In tha paat, that juat bacauaa It vorkad it 
LO vaa not naeaaaarlly tha right thing to do. 

Q In othar words, your position vaa it ahouldn't 
ba a U.S. policy avan if it did work; is that corract? 
A Basically yas, air. It vaa bad businaaa. 
Q And you convayad that to Liautanant Colonal 
North; is that corract? 

A I convayad that to Mr. Allan and ha was quits 
irata with b«, and ha aaid goddaa it, Ollia knows all 
thia. Just put tha words do«m. 
L9 Q And that was how tha first part of tha report 

20 cmm into baing; is that corract? 
!1 A Yas, air. 

22 Q Nov whan you got to Liautanant Colonal North, 

23 I taka it this saating took placa in his offica; ia that 

24 corract? 

25 A Yaa, sir. 



mmmj} 



206 



(iimssm 



116 



Q Wh«n you got to his offlca did you axchanga in 
a praaantatlon of your vlavs on thla flrat option hov you 
dlafavorad It? 

h Yaa, air. 

Q Hov did that go? 

A Ha mat for about an hour and 45 mlnutaa with 
various Intarruptlona , and Z axpraaaad ay rasarvatlons 
and By chackllat of rasarvatlons for ths first option. 
And ha aald that 'a not axactly iirtiat you'va aald hara. 
And I aald, wall, that Is not what Z'va aald hara, but 
this Is ay opportunity bacauaa of ay aqrr««>«nt vlth Mr. 
Allan to axprass ay rasarvatlons to you. 

Q Now who alsa was prasant? 

A No on*, sir. Just aysalf . 

Q Tha aaatlng Is Intarruptad parlodlcally and 
that, I gathar, alongatas tha Ufa of tha aaatlng; Is 
that corract? 

A By phona calls, by Colonal North having to 
stap out for a alnuta hara emd than coaa back and aay 
v^jpii vara wa. 

21 ' Q Now, was this discussion cantarad aolaly on 

22 tha first option, or did you gat into tha othar options 

23 as wall? 

24 A No, air. Wa apant tha bulk of tha flrat part 

25 of our aaatlng talking about that, and I axprassad ay 



uirassM 



207 



OIWUSSlFiED 



117 



1 dl««atl«f action with that as a functioning option, and he 

2 was quit* tightlippad about it and oads no conasnts on my 

3 noting that it was against official U.S. Govsrnmsnt 
A policy. H* mad* no conasnts on th« fact that it 

5 encouraged terrorism. He made no comment on any of the 

6 items that I brought up, with the exception of its effect 

7 on the Gulf war. 

8 And he asked if X thought it would have a 

9 significant effect, and I said, based on the equipment, 

10 yes, I felt that key items of equipment could have a 

11 significantly adverse effect on the Gulf war. 

13 Q And when you made that comaent, did he react 

13 to that? 

14 A He raised his eyebrows, I believe. 

15 Q So Z gather this was not a rough and tumble 

16 give and taXe discussion of the first option? 

17 A Z expressed my doubts and he listened. 

18 Q But he did not rejoin, for the most part; is 

19 that correct? 

20 A No, sir, which some what surprised me. 

21 Q You were anticipating perhaps some real give 

22 and take in the conversation? 

23 A Yes, sir. 

24 Q Do you recall, after thi s meeting, having a 
meeting or in^^^^^^^^^^Ho^'ice? 




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A _ I r«D«Bb«r at sob* tlm* going up tc 
>f£lc« in do%mtovn 0. C, y«s. 

Q~ Do you plac* it in tiaa, b«for« or after this 
meeting with Colonel North? 

A I'm not sure when it occurred during that 
time, to my recollection. 

Q Do you recall why it was you went to| 

jffice? 
'A To the best ot my recollection, he said that 
he had some notes on items that we had previously held 
discussions on, and Z said Z would like to get together 
with hia to tallc about that and take some notes. And 

land^^^^^^^^Hwere not very accurate 
recordkeepers . 

Q Did they keep any re cords at a ll, do you know? 

A After meeting with^^^^^Hin his office 
was able to find or to see nothing that was written down 
in any fora. 

Q Here they able to compensate for their 
apparent absence of notetaking with pazrticularly fine 
rM»ll? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did thay suffer the consequences, then, of 
having incomplete notes and incomplete memories? 

A Yes, sir. 



9i 





209 




inrn 

*^ 119 

1 Q Now, was ther« anything about going tc 

2 ^^^^^^Hofflc* that struclc you aa odd with respect to his 

3 purported assignment to the NSC? 

4 A Yes, sir. He was working in a rather — I 

5 shouldn't say — well, it was not the )cind of office that 

6 one would think is associated with the NSC. It was 

7 snail, rather crowded, not very well furnished, and he 

8 seemed to have no specific area dedicated to that NSC- 

9 designated task. He seemed to be just another guy 

10 working out of his DEA office at his regular job. 

11 g Did you get the impression that he, along with 

12 his NSC assignment, retained many of his ordinary DEA 

13 functions and assignments? 

14 A Yes, sir. Apparently he retained all of his 

15 regular assignments. It was as though — it seemed to me 

16 as though he had assumed his NSC advisory role as an 

17 additional duty — I would strike NSC advisory role ~ 

18 his duties dealing with Colonel North as an additional 

19 duty and that he was not given a special status or 

20 project. 

21 Q You were iible to leave your position, I guess, 

22 sometime toward May of 1986; is that correct? 

23 A Yes, sir. 

24 Q During that period of time the record, I 

25 think, now reflects that from approximately May 24 to May 
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 



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210 




120 

1 28 tha McFarlan* dalegatlon vlaltad Tshran in an «ffort 

2 to pursua the ams-for-hostag«s policy. w«ra you aware 

3 that that was undar way or undarfoot at th« tlma that you 

4 wars leaving? 

5 A Ho, sir. I Icnow that I ballava Z want down at 

6 th« end of May with the Idea that Z would sea Colonel 

7 North before Z left, and Z believe at the time Z went 

8 down there he wasn't in the office, and it seeaed to me 

9 that they said that there had been an earlier 

10 conversation where he was out of the office or he was 

11 around sooewhere, but not there at the time that Z went 

12 over, Z believe, that week to say goodbye. 

13 He was not available to say goodbye to, and Z 

14 was not informed of where ha was or what he was doing. 

15 Q Were you aware of an increased activity on the 
part of your associates^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hduring 

17 this period of time? 

18 A Z knew that there was increased activity on 

19 the part of Mr. Allen. Z don't remember if 

20 was gone yet. He was making efforts in the same way I 

21 Bade an effort to get clear of this "bad business". He 

22 was trying to effect his release from this task force, 

23 which was originally slated to last only a short period, 

24 say six weeks, and that we had been there six months 

25 already. And he was working to see himself replaced as 



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UNCUSSHy 



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wall on th« tasX fore*. 

Q War* you awar* In th« coura* o£ your tanur* 
with tha CIA Hoataga Location Taak F orca of an Individu al 
by tha nana oCl 

A Yaa, slrT 

Q How did you coma to know hla, if you did coma 
to ]cnov him? 

A I knav that ha had baan claarad into tha two 
subcompartments of tha program, and that ha on a nuabar 
of occasiona had aasiatad Mr. Allan in tha adlting of tha 
waakly raport. 

Q Whan you say ha was claarad into tha two 
subcompartmants you ara rafarring ^°^^^^|^^^^H ^" 
ona? 

A No, air. Not that. I was talking about tha — 
can I rafar to thasa two, tha| 
subcompartmants . 

Q Lat ma put tha quastion diffarantly. Did you 
undarst and or davalop an undarstanding that 

in addition to baing claarad into tha two 
■uDcoapartmanta was also claarad into^^^^^^^^^^H or 
did you hava any Jcnowladga of that ona way or tha othar? 

A I didn't hava any taiowladga that ha waa 
cleared into ^^^^^^^^^^H I was awara that Mr. 
used him for an editor and as a sounding board for some 
:T/ CODEWORD 





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of bla idaaa. 

Q Did you taow what hla poaitlon waa with CIA? 

A I waa told at ona tiaa. I don't ramember 
axactly what it waa. 

Q Now, to put aona othar charactara in context, 
you'va taatifiad that you mat Gaorga Cava aomatima, I 
ballava, in March of 1986. Would that ba corract? 

A Yaa, air. 

Q Did you ]cnow what hla rola waa, why ha had 
baan call ad into action? 

A Z baliava it waa bacauaa of hia akilla.' Z 
ballava ha h ad aoma connaction wit 

fintarprating or tranalating or 

aoaathing to do vith^^^^^^^^^^H Z waa diractad, in 
ao many worda, to kaap my noaa out of hia buainaaa and 
did, and waa glad to. 

Q I gatbar you than did not hava much 
intaraction with Gaorga Cava; ia that corract? 

A I mat him onca or twica and aaw him a number 
of timaa waiting for Mr. Allan to return or at a meeting 
with Mr. Allan, trying to gat hold of Mr. Allan. 

Q And I gather you alao mat, while you were at 

CZA, ^I^^^^V^i^^^^^^^^^^K ^* 
A Yea, air. 
Q Did you aver discuaa with thami 






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or th« ams-for-ho8tagas program? 

A I cannot recall a specific instance where I 
discussed that with then. But I believe Mr. Allen 
indicated that someone from the DO side was aware or 
involved in that effort. ^g^^^^^^^^^ 

And you also ]cnew^^^^^^^^^|is that 
correct? ^^^^^^*^* 

A Yes, sir. I had known hia from a previous 
assignment overseas as well. 

Q Did you have any understanding as to whether 
i^as either a participant or witting, as they 
say at CIA, of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^gthe arms-for-hostages 
effort? 

A I assumed he ]cnev at least a portion. 




Nov, also about the tia* that you were getting 
ready to leave the Hostage Location Task Force of the 
CIA, there was an effort under way from the DEA agents to 
release th« hostages. Were you aware of that? This is 
towards tha end of May of '86. 

A There were a number of efforts under way in a 
number of different areas. I'm not sure which one you're 
referring to. 

TOP 



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ifiUSSiSI! 



124 



1 Q This one would have Involved ransom for 

2 hostages in the amount of approximately $1 million a 

3 hostage. 

4 A There was some discussion of cash for the 

5 hostages, but early on in my discussions with DEA they 

6 mentioned it a number of times, but I, in terms of a 

7 specific recollection, shortly before my departure I 

8 don't remember. I don't have any clear recollection of a 

9 $1 million amount for the hostages through any particular 

10 intermediary. 

11 Q When you spokti toH^^^^^H about your 

12 experiences with the DEA agents, did he impart to you 

13 that he had cautioned the DEA agents ag ainst meeting with 
their soxirce or any of their sources ^"^^^^^^^^^^^^M 

15 A Z believe during — no, I don't have any 

16 recollection, any specific recollection. There was some 

17 discussion^^^^^^^Hbut in what regard Z can't be very 

18 specific. You have to remember these were often 18 and 

19 19-bour days, six days a week, and so things tend to get 

20 fussy when you are very tired. 

21 Q The DEA agent projects, let me turn to them 

22 for just a moment as a general topic. Was it your 

23 impression that Colonel North had somehow placed the DEA 

24 projects into Mr. Allen's bailiwick? 

25 A No, sir. It was somehow my impression that 




215 



UNfikn^ 



m^ 



1 th« DEA agents w«r* almost uncontrollsd varlablas In the 

2 aquation. As it was, th* DEA agants would typically, if 

3 thay could gat monay froa CIA for a particular project, 

4 would usa CIA sinca thay had, since my masting with the 

5 Director of CIA in which I presented my view of the 

6 sources and Mr. Allen asked for $25,000. Mr. Casey's 

7 comment was, get it from the DO, the Directorate of 

8 Operations, and that seemed to end Mr. Allen's efforts to 

9 get money because he was not willing to go there to get 

10 it. 

11 Once Mr. Allen's role and failure to get any 

12 money for them happened, then they seemed to lose more 

13 Interest in Mr. Allen other than a source for information 

14 or intelligence from time to time. 

15 Q Here they a regular — were they in regular 

16 contact with the Hostage Location Task Force? 

17 A Thay were in regular contact with Colonel 

18 North. On a number of occasions Mr. Allen would direct 

19 me to get together with them and meet with them because 

20 ha had gotten another call from Ollla that they had been 

21 la oontact with Ollle, and my feeling was that Colonel 

22 North wanted to have them work with Mr. Allen but that 

23 the DEA agents preferred direct contact with Mr. North. 

24 Q When Mr. Allen would ask you to have these 

25 meetings with them, would you go ahead and have them? 



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A I would tal)c to them on th« phon* or I would 
m*«t with th«H, and I would b« in contact with them, i 
visited then at their office one time. They came up to a 
hotel one Sunday. I met them at Colonel North's office 
once or twice. But I would say I've had a total of eight 
to ten or twelve — maybe eight to ten meetings with them 
during the five or six-month period. 

Q Nov, those meetings, vera they of sore 
frequency in the early part of your tenure than the 
latter, or were they spread out evenly over the six 
months? 

A More frequent at the beginning, less frequent 
late. 

Q Any reason for the diminution of frequency? 

A Personally I felt that they vera not very 
useful as sources, that Z didn't really care to deal with 
them. 

Q Hera you eUsla to assist thea much? 

A I was able to provide thea some assistance, 




et cetera, and they would refer 
questions to ma. I had soma reservation about 
talking to them over an open telephone. They did not 
have a secure line in their office. And so if we were 
going to meat to discuss classified information I 



217 



UmSSHiE!) 



127 



1 wouldn't do It ov«r an open phon*. So that hlndarad than 

2 soaavhat . 

3 Q Do you )cnov whathar thay had any aacura 

4 conmunlcatlona davlcaa, Ilka a KL-437 

5 A I vaa not avara of that. All ny contact with 

6 than vaa ovar tha phona or paraonally, ovar tha opan 

7 phona. 

8 Q Nov, do you racall having a convaraatlon late 

9 ona avanlng vlth Mr. Allan vhara ha rafarrad to Ollla and 

10 hla contra nonay? 

11 A Yaa, air. 

12 Q Hov did that coma about? 

13 A Tha apaclflc context that It cane up In, we 

14 vere talking about — I believe Mr. Allen and I vere 

15 talking about money and he made an offhand remark to the 

16 effect that Ollla vaa already Into hla contra money for 

17 the hoatagea, that he vaa ualng hla contra money. And Z 

18 knev that Colonel North had a role, acme aort of role, 

19 some aort of deallnga vlth the contras. But I'm a Middle 

20 East expert and that vaa outalda my area. 

21 And Z vaa almply not Intereated In It. 

22 Q And aa a Middle Eaat expert, Z gather you had 

23 certainly an underatandlng of vhat the reference to 

24 hoatagea vould mean; la that correct? 

25 A Yea, air. 

TOP 



mmssiFiE! 



218 



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128 

1 g Did you hav« an undarstandlng froa th« remark 

2 as to hov It was that monias aarmarlced for th* contras 

3 would and up balng used for th* hostages? 

4 A No, sir. And I did not ask. I did not know 

5 If this was officially appropriated fiinds or private 

6 funds or govemfflent funds or what sort of funds they 

7 were. He just aade the fact that Ollie was already into 

8 his contra money for the hostages, that It was a remark 

9 made in the context of monies in general, and that there 

10 was a shortage of fvmds in efforts to free the hostages. 

11 Q Old that shortage relate to the particular 

12 projects that were under way to seek the release of the 

13 hostages? 

14 A I don't remember what the context specifically 

15 was in reference to. I think it had to do with paying 

16 sources, and Z knew that there were certainly funds 

17 available for the collection of Intelligence and that no 

18 efforts were spared in that regard. But that generally 

19 in terms of monies being paid, it was for sources or to 

20 get access to sources. 

21 Q Now, the sources were these, the OEA sources, 

22 or were there more sources than just DEA sources that 

23 were in need of payment? 

24 A I don't remember specifically what the 

25 conversation was referring to, simply that there was a 



219 



UNtlffifffl 



129 



1 sbortag* of funds, that Colonel North's funds for these 

2 efforts were short. 

3 Q For the hostage efforts? 

4 A Yes, sir. 

5 Q And that he, as a result, was resorting to or 

6 digging into contra money? 

7 A Yes, sir. 

8 Q Let me ask more generally and outside the 

9 context of this particular conversation — 

10 MS. HUGHES: Off the record for a second. 

11 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

12 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

13 Q Do you recall when this conversation occurred? 

14 AX would estimate it was at least halfway 

15 through my tenure, my five or six-month tenure at the 

16 Hostage Iiocation Task Force, which would put it somewhere 

17 in probably the March to April time freuie, Z would guess. 

18 Q Can you relate it to your trip to London? Was 

19 it after that? 

20 A I can't place it specifically. 

21 g How, during this conversation where this 

22 remark was made I gather from your earlier statements 

23 this was late at night; is that correct? 

24 A Yes, sir. I assume that it could have been 

25 any day of the week. I know that typically on a Friday 
TOi 



imSfieo 



220 




130 

1 night v« would 8p«nd till midnight th«r« preparing the 

2 report, sooetimes 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning. During 

3 the week we would run sometimes 6:00, 7:00, 8:00, 9:00 at 

4 night, but Fridays were particularly brutal. 

5 Q I gather no one else was present other than 

6 Mr. Allen, or was his secretary within earshot, to your 

7 knowledge? 

8 A I don't recollect there being anyone around at 

9 that time. 

10 Q So it was you and Mr. Allen, to the best of 

11 your recollection; is that right? 

13 A Yes, sir. That doesn't mean there wasn't 

13 somebody else around. I just cannot remember anybody 

14 specifically being there. 

15 Q Do you recall whether Mr. Allen's secretary 

16 was even available at that point? 

17 A Mr. Allen's secretary is located in a 

18 different area. We were in the Hostage Location Task 

19 Force spaces. Mr. Allen's secretary was located on an 
entirely different down a^_^^^*^^^^^^^^^^^^L 
Actually he had officea^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^and later 
moved to ^*^^^^^^^^^^^| ^^ ^* 

23 different office spaces at one time, and his secretary 

24 earlier was at his office at the NIO for Counterterrorism 

25 and later she moved down to his office with the] 
TOP 



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toicv6ft?*"Tll 




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131 



1 

2 Th« secretary for th« Hostag* Location Task 

3 Forca was locatad at our spaces, not Hr. Allan's 

4 secretary. 

5 Q I see. If this conversation took place when 

6 you were putting the report together, then would there 

7 have been a secretary still there to finish up the 

8 report? 

9 A Typically yes, sir. Her desk, however, was 

10 located outside of the doors, and she wouldn't 

11 necessarily have been privy to It. 

12 Q Now I don't want to confuse yoor taatlmony 

13 here. Do you associate this remark with one of those 

14 late Friday nights that was a report -writing night, or 

15 was it another lata night? 

16 A I can only recollect that It was dark outside, 

17 that I was sitting at the table very tired when Mr. Allen 

18 made the remark. I can't associate it specifically with 

19 the preparation of the report or any particular night of 

20 the week. 

21 , Q Do you recall writ ing out a list at one point 

the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Kfforts were 

23 ongoing while you were the Hostage Location Task Force of 

24 the CIA? 

25 A Yes, sir. I remember writing what was 



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t«ntativ«ly call«d th« Initiatives Under Way. Whathar 
th« initiative* had any aubstanca or not, vm included all 
of them, and there I believe, some^^H^^^H 
reported initiatives. Some of these were spurious; some 
were in fact not really initiatives but were just press 
reflections of an initiative. 

But we Bade an analysis of all of the reported 
initiatives that vere under way and it became very 
confusing at one point. Colonel North was doing things. 
Mr. Allen was doing things. The OEA guys were involved 
in efforts. 




were aany, many people doing 
many, many things . 

And I said I can't tell the players without a 
scorecard. I need to write all these do%m, and at one 
point I did and Z included thea all. And we had a file 
on initiatives. 

Q Mow who he lped you put th at together? 
A Mr. Allen,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

t members of 

our teaml^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 




223 




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P SECRET/ CODEWORD 133 



1 canvassed avsrybody to say what Initiatives ara you aware 

2 of. 

3 At one of the biweekly Hostage Location Tas)c 

4 Force meetings, when we pulled all the individuals In, I 

5 threw it up in the air and said what initiatives are you 

6 aware of. That is where the initial list came from, and 

7 it was^^^^^^l and then as the list grew, it grew 

8 larger and more complex. 

9 g So I gather that some of these initiatives 

10 were U.S. Government-inspired and some of them were 

11 private Initiatives; is that correct? 

12 A Yes, sir, apparently. 

13 Q Now when you say "apparently", that is an 

14 initiative, if it had a U.S. Government role you didn't 

15 )cnow it; is that right? 

16 A Yes, sir. X was not privy to all of the 

17 initiatives under way. 

18 Q Now, these initiatives, if you can rscall, how 

19 many of them were associated with Lieutenant Colonel 

20 North? 

21 A That would be a hard question to answer. If 

22 amybody was aware of them, in my opinion, it would be 

23 Colonel North. He seemed to be more aware of ongoing 

24 efforts. We kept him informed of things we became aware 

25 of. He seemed to be the one, the keystone. 

tI 



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Q Would Robart Earl be awara of which ones would 
be North initiatives? 

A Ha vazy wall might. He would be more 
knowledgeable about that than I would be, I assume. 

Q Has this list disseminated? 

A An earlier copy, yes, sir, was disseminated. 
I provided a copy to the State Department, and I believe 
Z provided a copy to the FBI. 




Q Now was a copy of this, to your taiowledge, 
left with the Hostage Location Task Force of the CIA when 
you left? 

A Yes, 




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(A discussion was bsld off th« record.) 
BY MR. HOOiXOCK: (Rssuaing) 
Q Lst ■• put on th« rscord what you just said 
whila v« v«r* off ths rscord. Major^^^^^^^Hvas 
asksd whsn ths list of pro j acts,] 
^^^^^Hvas coapilad, and lat m« suanarizs his 
tsstiaony. 

Hs said that ths list was formally constructed 
in Fsbruary of 1986 and that it was regularly amended 
froa tine to time as new projects cans to the attention 
of the Hostage Location Task Force; is that correct? 
A Or alleged projects or alleged initiatives. 




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Q H« also said that th« Hat vaa dlsaaalnatad 
soaatlB* in March of 1986; la that corract? 
A Yaa, air. 




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UNCUSSii 



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(A dlscuaslon was held off th« racord.) 
MR. WOODCOCK: L«t'8 go bacX on th« record. 
BY MR. WOO DCOCK; (R ««ualng) 

Major^^^^^^^Hyou with th« 
Hostage Location Task Fores, I bsllsvs, until 
approximately the end of May; is that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q And you t hen left the Hostage Location Task 
Force^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

^^ is that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q Nov I believe in our last meeting you said 
that you were eager to leave the Task Force; is that 
correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And that after leaving the Task Force you, in 
your words, dug yourself a foxhole and kept out of both 
Mr. Allen and Mr. North's or Colonel North's way; is that 
corrvet? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And I gather what you meant by that was that 
you wanted to avoid being called back into the Hostage 
Location Task Force; is that correct? 



229 



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143 



A y«s, sir. Th« original agra«o«nt was very 
short tara. It was supposad to ba six waaks. I had the 
laprasslon that Mr. Allan, onca ha got his hands on ma, 
was not going to lat oa go under any circumstances except 
for tha fact that my pending reasslgnaant, which was 

6 delayed 90 days, and I sloply did not Inform him that my 

7 assignment had been delayed 90 days. 

8 Z simply returned to the Pentagon on my 

9 projected data of departure, which was at the end of May. 

10 Q And as far as you ]cnow you vara not 

11 discovered; correct? 

12 A Yes, sir. ^^^^^^^^ 

MR. WOODCOCK: Major^^^^^^^Hl, you 
14 can balieva it or not, Z have no more questions for you, 
is and I appreciate your patience. Zt took longer than I 

16 had anticipated, and Z know you cams hare later than you 

17 had anticipated, and so Z thank you for your time and 

18 patlanc*. 

19 THE WZTNZSS: Thank you for having me. 

20 MR. GENZMAN: Z have a couple of queatlons. 

21 BY MR. GENZMAN: 

22 Q Could you describe vary briefly the cause of 

23 your eagerness to leave the Task Force? Could you just 

24 summarize? 

25 A Yes, sir. Z didn't want to be associated in 



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1 any vay^ shap* or fora with vhat^^^^^^^^^H apparently 

2 had lad ae to ballava was mora aras-for-hoatagas whan ha 

3 told a* that tha laaua was not daad In, Z guaaa, April or 

4 May. I aaauaad that thara vara going to b« aoaa aort of 

5 af forts in that ragard and I didn't want to ba aaaociatad 

6 with thaa. 

7 I advisad against it, and ay counsal had baan 

8 givan. Whathar it was ignorad or takan was a aoot point 

9 at that point. I also, in tha March tias fraaa, daspita 

10 tha eavaats placad upon aa, inforaad tha Assistant 

11 Chairaan of tha Joint Chiafs of Staff in March that Z 

12 baliavad that back in Oacaabar-Novaabar tiaa fraaa that 

13 an aras-for-hostaga swap had takan placa, and his 

14 raaction was sttinnad. Z think his words vara: Oh, Jaaus 

15 Christ. 

16 BY MR. NOODCOCXl (Rasuaing) 

17 Q This was Ganaral Noallaring; is that corract? 

18 A Yas, sir. 

19 Q And vhwi you inforaad hia of that, you vara 

20 aoting In contravantion to tha instructions you had baan 

21 givan by Mr. Allan; is that corract? 

22 A Yas, sir. 

23 BY MR. GENZMAMt (Rasuaing) 

24 Q Z hava ona furthar quastion. Z sight hava 

25 nissad an aarliar ansvar. You aantionad aarliar that 







231 



\imissm 



14S 



1 Oir*ietor Caa«y had talksd about getting Bon«y from DO. 

2 A Yas, air. Ha dlractad Mr. Allan to gat tha 

3 monay tram tha Dlractorata of Oparatlona. 

4 Q And Z ballava you Indlcatad that Mr. Allan was 

5 not willing to go to DO. 

6 A Yaa, sir. 

7 Q Can you giva tha raaaon for that? 

8 A _I^baliava ha vaa involvad in aoaa sort of 

9 btiraaucratic atruggla with 00, tha Dlractorata of 

10 Oparatlona, and Z vaa vamad bafora going ovar to CIA 

11 that it vaa a political minaf laid that I vaa atapping 

12 into and that I vaa likaly to gat "both ay laga blovn 

13 off". And ao I uaad ay contact ovar thara to try to atap 

14 vary carafully. 

15 Q Waa thia political Binafiald any part of your 

16 raaaon for baing aagar to laava? 

17 A Yaa, air. It la vary difficult to ba at an 

18 agancy, a Fadaral agancy irtiich la aaparatad froa youra to 

19 b« undar tha oparational control of an individual yat 

20 afclll ba aavloyad by a diffarant agancy. I vaa a 

21 Mtdiar, an officar in tha O.8. Aray aaaignad froa a 

22 Joint Staff to a Fadaral agancy vorking for a guy in CIA 

23 and aaaaabling a taaa of axparta froa all thaaa othar 

24 aganciaa and had no trua oparational control ovar thaa 

25 othar than vhat I vaa abla to influanca through ay 



232 



UNtussn 



146 



1 piawBal will. 

2 And I was abl* to do that for six montha, but 

3 I vaa, franUy, vary tlrad of holding it togathar. 

4 MR. 6ENZMAN: I hava np furthar quaationa. 

5 Thank you vary such for your tiaa. 

6 (Nharaupon, at StSS p.B. , tha taking of tha 

7 inatant dapoaition caaaad.) 



8 



9 Signatura of tha Nitnaaa 

10 subaeribad and avom to bafora ■• thia day of 

11 ., 1987. 

12 



13 Notary Public 

14 My Coniaaion Bxpiraat - 



,2' 



233 



UNCLASSIFIED 



CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 



Rayncnd R. ttme III 



, ch« officer befora whoa che 



foregoing depoaletoa was calcea, do hereby certify chat che witness 
whose cesclmoay appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn 

by '"^ ; that the testimony of said witness was 

talcea by oe to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting 
under my directloa; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony 
given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor 
employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition 
was talcea, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any 
attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 



My Commission expires; ^ay 31, 1989 



MiLMievA. Nr lka^^^^SL._ 



NOTART PUBLIC 
DISTRICT OF OOUJ^SIA 



#- 



235 



wmmm 



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-w *Mt m «p^ovn«M Anoclt (• Mch CIA and N«n-CIA colatw^ Tgp Wjvi *oi.\*mm m a ttWrmA by CIA. C 

CONTtOt AND COW SHOT P0« TOf SfCXn OOCUMmT (COUATRAL) 



U for UCIIT CONTIOt NUMMI 



EX 



TS 0095 



87 



<OM-CIA OOCUMINT MCIIfT OAn rnm*O0) COHATIIai rs AHACHMNKSH- Caiird 



CIA corr/utus NUMiit 



DOCUMIMT DATt rnuiMOO) 



86011J 



Trip Report 



k oiiciNAToa (OvK>w«M. aiH*. or>»v. itoka^ 
ER 



NOt'CUk OtICINATO* lOtpi. AfancrJ CaMro' N* . Csor N« 



ATTENTION. Access to the attached document is resiricied to only authorised recipienisor Top Secret control 
personnel. For accountability purposes, all designated individuals are to sign and date this form. 



OCA 



ymau i ueciassititd/Reliased on ."^ f^A Pf^ 
under provisions ol E 12356 
* Ja hncon, Noi i o n a l Oeeu iil / Cuu ii u ll 



897 



7^ 

1^ 



< 
(^ 



Rcnnove (his sheet upon completicn of any action noted belo». classify form, and forward lothe CIA 
Top Secret Control Officer. 



OOWNCIAOIO 



Ollfl. f4 0«')CI 



WITNCSStOITrS-gnoliiM 



(UATItOMICI :Ol>{CT 



OlIfCTOIAK t OfFlCI 



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DISPATCHED TO (Nan CIA AgtMr) 



(235) 



236 



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C 6898 



IS January 1986 



KEHORANCON FOR TBE RECORD 
SOBJECT: Trip Rtpott 



Partially Declassified/Released on 3f^6& S 

under piovisions ot E 12356 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 



\. At tb« dlcactlon of LTC North oi tba HSC la coordlnatloa with ns. 
Allan (1IZ0/C7) I undactook a two day trip to Saw Tock City to Mat with 
two Deu9 Enfoccamant A^ancy (DCA) tourcai to avaluata thaa and a ny 
Intor iaation th ay had on OS hoatagaa In Labanon . Tba IndlTlduali 

ialntalo a«tan«l va coot aetX' 

tiay waraTolad by OEA a^anti 

['"'^^^^^l^^^^^^V " ^*^"9 potantially utafoT lo~~ouc 

afforta to tt9* Civa Aaatlcana cuciantly bald lo Labanon. I pcaaanttd 
ayaaie aa a prlvata Individual, rapcasantlng othat bualnaaaBa o who w ould 
pay for ralaaa^d PS boatagaa. Two ttaatlnqa wa ca bald 





SPECIAL ACCiSS REQUI' 



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ER TS0095-87 



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1 



237 



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6899 




4. During botb ■••tlo^s h« Indlcattd that ht prtfctttd to act aa an 

lot.cdlary for ho.ta,. Infor.atlon, and would ba\l[u^, to tr.5,"to 
Labanon to act In our bah.lf . a. va. not Int.ra.t.d Id ,at to, «y .".„ 
up front' to .aka additional InquUla. for ua but Indlcatad If ^ 
'^^^^^? *.Ill.E12aim-!l«a-iiM*rva^I.« light naad 'brlbt ■onav ta ,pr,4d 




SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED 

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238 



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SPECIAL ACCESS REQOIRED 



239 



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13, ■•ftltll ¥•■ 




14. B« Indicattd h« would b* contact tnq^B^i^Wfc ^° ttatt work: 
In this caqacd and would 9«t back to ua witbla a waak. 

15. Soucca ?vaIuatlon ;^[JBB*narqatle and pco bablv raaourcaful. 
ha la fully awara of tha danq ar^tnvolvad tot biaaali 
Hla Intataat la bot 




Najoi 




SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRES 



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lUUfflEO 



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241 



1 



A 



BOUTING 1 


TO 


NAME ANO AOOBESS 


DATE 


INITIALS 


1 


LTC OLlv.r North 






2 


NSC 






3 








4 








• :• 3>i 


OiltC l(»l' 




»9!»l»t Jfl- 


iPi>»0*ti 


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XCQUHilOt'iO* 


. MMf<" 'Uc 




JE'uH 


.j»i.ji9?*cs «ta»M«- ;» 




S.G»i"J«{ 


REMARKS 


^AdU NAMi. A&MtSS ANfi »H<)Ne Nd 


bkn 


DCI/HLT? 









UNCI 






(Stcurttr Claiti(jcition) 
•2^ |V.9a%^ 



CONTROL NO. 



1 of 1 



NOT THRU REGISTRIES 



Handit Via 

CQMINT 

Channels 



Accass to this documant wiil ba rastrictad to 

thn«a annfftwrf far th« fftilftmtna »n*gifie ^ctiviti< 




Partially Deciass,f,ed/Retased on i^^gg 
under proTOons o( £ 123Sfi^ 
^VK Johnson Na„o„. sec JfcoL, 



A 



"tX- 



Warning Nptic* 

Intalliganca Sourca* and Mathods Involvad 



I S«nctlon« 



A KAA35R. ^'^ NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 

J^ ' Unauthorized OitctoMr* S«i6i*ct to Crimmai S«fK 





(Sacaiit} QutrfieatMt) 



(241) 



242 



UNCUSSIFti 



O 



24 April 1986 



MEMORANDUM FOR: LTC OUv«r North 

N«ttonal s«curt.ty Council 



PROM: 



N 7436 



SUBJECT: 



Optiona to S«cur« tt)« R«l«aa« of OS ■e«ta9«B 




Th* back channal initlativ* with lean could wall ratult in tha 
calaai* of tba hoata9«t. Iran has aubatantlal lnflu*aca ov«c tb« captors 
and probably could affact a ralaasa of Aa«ri.can hoataqai if Ayatollah 
Khomeini intarvanad dlractly to giva h i_i_^appcoval, ayn though Iranian 
in^^«nc^ov«^th^ho<ta«tt^] ; Ti 1 n I a h ad mmi^m^^m^^^^^^^H^^I 
^^^m^^^^^^^l^^^^P Tha Stataa to na<« 

concaaaions to Itao. Iran la vary intacaatad in acqalrinq crucial 
■tlitacy aqulf 




Partially Declassified/Released m II f ^6 89 
under provisions o( E 12J56 
by K Jofiiison. Naiional Sectrir/ 'Jcuncil 



uneii^siwEfl 





243 



UNCtRSSffit 




N 7437 

On« drawback to thia initiJtava is that aith^t th« Iranun Cov.tnmant 
ot on* o( tb« factlona wUhin th« Gov«fn««nt might puSlicly •xpos* 




y}Ha*iSS\i^^|^^ 



244 



UNCLASSIFIED 












BNCUsSIFe 



245 



''*Cl4SS/f^ff, 






(S33^ 



(iNCLASSIFSEO 



247 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



m 



DEPOSITION OF J. EDWIN DIETEL 



Friday, June 5, 1987 



IINflttSafl»T - * 



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U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:22 a.m., in 
Room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, with Patrick 
Carome presiding. 

On behalf of the House Select Committee: Patrick Carome 
and Bruce Fein. 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Paul 
Barbadoro. 

Also Present: David P. Holmes, Assistant General 
Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence 
Agency, Washington, D.C, and Paul Schilling, Office of 
Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency. 







(247) 



248 



nNtt/^tH^T 



1 Whereupon, 

2 J. EDWIN DIETEL 

3 having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, 

4 and was examined and testified as follows: 

5 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

6 BY MR. CAROME: 

7 Q Mr. Dietel, for the record, my name is Pat Carome , 

8 I am staff counsel with the House Select Committee to 

9 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Also 

10 present is' another lawyer from our staff, Bruce Fein, and 

11 an attorney from the Senate Select Committee. Both 

12 committees were established -- I'm sorry, Paul Barbadoro' is 

13 the attorney for the Senate Select Committee. Both 

14 committees were established pursuant to resolutions and have 

15 various enacting roles. The CIA was providefl^^th copies 

16 of both the resolutions and the rules. I have today 

17 provided you with another set of those rules for you to read 

18 if you wish. 

19 The mandate of both the House and Senate 

20 Conunittees, which we are now — the mandate of both the 

21 committees is to investigate the circumstances primarily 

22 surrounding the Iran affair, but also the United States 

23 Government's involvement with the contras. This deposition 

24 is being conducted pursuant to those rules. 

25 Could you please briefly describe your 



IttUPi «ASMD,% 



249 



imsjffi»T 



' educational background, starting with college and law school, 

2 and then briefly state the positions you have held since 

3 law school, including year. 

^ A I graduated from Southern Methodist University with 
a 1964. ]|H|^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^^H| 

6 ^^^^H|H I went to law school at G.W. and graduated in 1969, 

7 J.D. I went back to Georgetown and took an LLM and graduated 

8 in '73, I believe. 

9 I joined the General Counsel's Office in 1973 as 

10 an attorney, and I have held various management positions 

11 throughout the office, and now I am the Deputy General 

12 Counsel. 

13 Q What are the positions that you have held in the 

14 Office of General Counsel? 

15 A I was an attorney in what was then the General Law 

16 Division. I was the Deputy Chief of that Division, I was the 

17 Chief of that Division. I was the Associate Deputy General 

18 Counsel and Deputy General Counsel. 

19 Q When did you become Deputy General Counsel? 

20 A 1982, I believe. 

21 Q And you have held that position both under Stanley 

22 Sporkin and under David Doherty; is that correct? 

23 A Correct. 

24 Q And you — 

25 A For the record, not the entire time that Stanley 



:ie record, not tne entire 



250 



DNttASSIFIEB'^ 



1 Sporkin was the General Counsel. 

2 Q You took that position during the time when he was 

3 General Counsel? 

4 A Correct. 

5 Q Did there come a time in late 1985, November 1985, 

6 when you participated in a briefing by two CIA employees 

7 concerning CIA support for a flight to Iran? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q When do you recall that briefing having occurred? 

10 A The evening of 25 January, Monday. 25 January 1985. 

11 25 of November, 1985. 25 November. 

12 Q That was a Monday evening? 

13 A Uh-huh. 

14 Q Could you describe the events of that day that 

15 pertained to that briefing, starting with whatever happened 

16 before the briefing? 

17 A My recollection is late in the day Mr. Sporkin asked 

18 me to join him explaining that John McMahonhad called and 

19 asked his advice about some activities that apparently had 

20 occurred over the previous weekend. And Stanley asked me to 

21 sit in at that briefing in his office. 

22 Q Could you recall what time Stanley asked you to sit 

23 

24 A I cannot. It was late in the day, that's the best 

25 I can pinpoint the time^ J^<ia% #nyi|\ the end of the workday 



wmM. 



251 



(Wfif^jy^ 



1 if not at the end. it may have been 5 or 6 o'clock, but it 

2 was late. 

3 Q Did Mr. Sporkin tell you when he had been in touch 

4 with John McMahon before that on this subject? 

5 A I don't recall if he did. He may have. 

6 Q what did Mr. Sporkin tell you in advance of the 

7 briefing about what had gone on? 

8 A I don't have any recollection of our having an 

9 extensive conversation. He just asked me to join him, and 

10 these two' folks showed up and we sat down and listened to 

11 what they had to say. 

12 Q Who showed up? 

13 A Well, I subsequently learned the — what I believe 

14 to be the names of the two individuals were^flHHH^H and 

15 ^IH^^^^V '^^^y were introduced but I don't remember 

16 their names myself and associated with the meeting. I 

17 believe those to be the names of the two individuals who 

18 were there. 

19 Q Before this meeting, did Mr. Sporkin tell you that 

20 this was a highly sensitive matter? 

21 A I'm sure he must have. 

22 Q Did anyone else attend this briefing — 

23 A No. 

24 Q — by the two individuals? 

25 A No, there were fQpWiVl)Pl^ ^^^ room, those four 



:here were fouwBVliPAP ^^^ 



252 



UNeu^flg^ 



1 that I described. 

2 Q And where did this meeting take place? 

3 A In his office. Mr. Sporkin's office. 

4 Q And about whit time Of day did this meeting take 

5 place, that you can best recall? 

6 A As best I can recall, at the end of the day. 

7 Q So it was shortly after Mr. Sporkin told you that 

8 the briefing needed to take place; is that right? 

9 A Uh-huh, correct. 

10 Q Who said what at the briefing? 

11 A The best I can recall it was a fairly short meeting. 

12 These two individuals — I can't be specific as to whicK of th 

13 two individuals — described to us what had happened over the 

14 previous weekend. But the sum and substance, they came in and 

15 gave Stanley the facts as they knew it and basically left. 

16 Q How long did that meeting take? 

17 A I can't recall but I would guess 15 or 20 minutes, 

18 maybe half hour. 

19 Q What were the facts that these two individuals 

20 related during the briefing? 

21 A As I recall the facts, they described a flight that 

22 had taken place. The purpose of the flight was to deliver 

23 what I remember to be described as a part of a large shipment 

24 of missiles, and that was — My recollection is they described 

25 the first was delivered to Israel, and my recollection is there 



253 



wmsi^iiT 



1 was a switch, that is, a trade that these missiles were taken 

2 there and off-loaded for replacement missiles which were on- 

3 loaded, and the objective was then to take the on-loaded 

4 missiles on to Iran. 

5 Q And you understand at this time that already missiles 

6 have been transported from the United States to Israel, off- 

7 loaded in Israel, and then on-loaded again with another plane 

8 — I'm sorry — and then different missiles are loaded in 

9 Israel. And then those different missiles are taken on to 

10 Tehran; is, that your understanding of what was described? 

11 A That's my recollection of what was described. 

12 Q Was anything said about how the American missiles 

13 had gotten to Israel? 

14 A I have no recollection of that, and I have no 

15 recollection of a fact that you just added, which was that 
15 they were shipped from the United States. I don't have a 

17 recollection that that was discussed or — it may have been, 

18 I just don't have a recollection of that. 

•(9 Q But you said that newer missiles arrived in Israel; 

20 is that right? 

21 A Correct. The point I'm trying to make is I'm not 

22 sure I can say that they were originated from the United 

23 States over that weekend. I don't remember that — the point 

24 of origin of those particular missiles that weekend being the 

25 United States. 



254 



IINfib\SSIM' 



' Q But you do remember there being two events of 

2 transportation: one to Israel and one from Israel? 

3 A That is my recollection, correct. 

* Q what was the volume of missiles that you recall 

5 being discussed at this briefing? 

6 A My recollection was it is in the order of 400 to 

7 500. The reason I have that recollection is because it was 

8 explained that it was the first of several shipments. I have 

9 the recollection of the number 2,000 being discussed and it 

10 struck me that that would mean there would be three or four 

11 flights in order to deliver the totality. Now, that's my 

12 recollection. 

13 The problem I have is I understand that there's been 

14 some dispute about that as to whether or not I have the time 

15 right in not confusing it with what may have transpired 

16 several months later. My recollection was constructed a year 

17 after all these events, that is, in November of '86. 

18 Q You are sure that you were at a briefing on 

19 November 25th; is that right? 

20 A Absolutely, and missiles were discussed at that 

21 briefing, to the best of my recollection. 

22 Q Is what you are not sure about whether it was — 

23 A Whether I — 

24 Q — Tows or Hawks that were discussed? 

25 A I have no recollection of anjL. specific missile. What 



no recollection of aPlL. spec 



255 



HNfUSSI^T 



'^ I have a recollection of is numbers in the 2,000 and only 

2 roughly a fourth of those could be taken at any one time. 

3 Now, whether I am confusing that with information I may have 
^ learned later, I can't be certain because I've only had to 

5 reconstruct this and think about it in November of '86. But 

6 when I originally tried to reconstruct it, my recollection 

7 was they were talking about 2,000 in November. 

8 Q Putting the question of numbers aside, do you have 

9 a firm recollection that at the November 25th briefing it was 

10 discussed 'that there had already been one flight and that 

11 that was the first of a series of flights to deliver a larger 

12 total amount of material? 

13 A My recollection in that respect is really tied to 

14 the numbers, because I had this distinct recollection of 

15 the 2,000 number and a quarter of it is all that the plane 

16 could take at one time. That's why I have this recollection 

17 of several flights having to be made in order to make the 

18 total delivery. 

19 Q At the time you were — withdraw that. 

20 When over the weekend did you understand this 

21 flight to have occurred? 

22 A I'm not sure it was described in any particular 

23 timetable at the meeting. It had just occurred over the 

24 weekend. 

25 Q Would it surprise you that it seems that the plane 



lUluLHudirifiipi 



256 



DNSUSSI^Pt 



10 



' involved may have still been in the air on its return 

2 journey from Iran at the time you were meeting? 

3 A It wouldn't surprise me because I was subsequently 
* trying to reconstruct and I've heard others describe what 

5 they knew the facts to be, no. 

" Q Was the question of the need for finding, or the 

7 possible need for a covert action finding, discussed between 

:2- j>- •^- 

8 you and Mr. Sporkin before this briefing took place? 

9 A I don't have any recollection of the discussion 

10 we had before the meeting took place, if we had any at all. 

11 Q You don't recall whether or not Mr. Sporkin said 

12 John McMahon says we need a finding on this question? 

13 A No, I don't have any recollection of whether he 

14 said that or not. I'm not saying he didn't say it, I'm 

15 saying I have no recollection of his having had a discussion 

16 with me in that regard at all. 

17 Q Do you recall yourself or someone else telling 

18 George Clarke before this briefing occurred that he should 

19 not attend the briefing because it was too sensitive a 

20 matter? 

21 A No. 

22 Q What types of questions did you or Mr. Sporkin 

23 ask the CIA employees that came over to do the briefing? 

24 A I don't have any recollection of our asking 

25 particular questions at all. 



257 



UNfiHS^eUlT 



11 



' Q What was it that Mr. Sporkin wanted to find out? 

2 A What had transpired over the weekend and what John 

"* McMahon apparently was concerned about. 

^ Q And what was it that Mr. McMahon was concerned 

5 about, as you understood it at the time? 

° A Well, I had had no direct conversations with him so 

7 I don't know that I gave that any thought at the time since 

8 the question as you ask it, we were there to try to understand 

9 what had happened and then advise McMahon if anything should 

10 be done aboUt it. 

11 Q When you say that a certain eunount of missiles had 

12 already been moved the previous weekend, did you understand 

13 that missiles had moved both to Israel and from Israel? 

14 A That's my recollection. 

15 Q How would you characterize the attitude of the two 

16 CIA employees who were briefing you at this briefing session? 

17 A They came and they described what they understood 

18 to characterize the events and answered any questions. If 

19 you are asking me if it was hostile or anything like that, it 

20 was not. 

21 Q Were they nervous? 

22 A They didn't seem to be. 

23 Q Were they tight-lipped? 

24 A I don't know what you mean by that. 

25 Q Were they reluctant to explain the facts? 



.i*^'*? 



258 



INiSyiSliiUkftT 



12 



' A Didn't seem to be. 

2 Q Was there any mention of Lt. Colonel North at this 

3 briefing session? 

a 

^ A I don'^'t have any recollection of thAt. I wouldn't 

•' have known who that person was at the timely I '^^ never met 

" him, so I'm not sure I would necessarily focus on whether his 

7 name would have meant anything. His name wouldn't have meant 

8 anything to me, so I'm not sure I would have focused on and 

9 remembered his name being mentioned. 

lU Q Was Dewey Clamdge's name during the briefing, to 

11 the best of your recollection? 

12 A I have no recollection of his name being mentioned. 

13 Q How about Richard Secord? 

14 A No recollection of his name being mentioned. 

15 Q Richard Copp? 

16 A No . 

17 Q What was said about the relationship of the 

18 National Security Council to this flight or flights? 

19 A I don't believe I — I have no recollection of any 

20 reference to the National Security Council being mentioned 

21 at the briefing of these two individuals. 

22 Q What eibout the issue of whether or not this was a 

23 mission involved or directed at obtaining the release of 

24 American hostages? Was that something that you were aware of 

25 during the briefing? 



^:r^X\ 



imtmm^ 



259 



UNfiMSSieilT 



13 



1 A I don't have a recollection of the two people 

2 coming and speaking on that subject. I have a recollection 

3 of that being thought of as the purpose, or at least one of 

4 the purposes of this activity, but I can't associate that, 

5 one, with the meeting or; two, with those specific days of late 

6 November '85. 

7 Q Did either of the CIA employees during the briefing 

8 say anything at all about efforts to obtain rights to overfly 

9 foreign countries during the weekend efforts? 

10 A I, don't have any recollection of that in the 

11 briefing. 

12 Q Do you recall that that did not come up? 

13 A No, I can't say that I have a recollection that it 

14 didn't come up. 

15 Q What was said about the question of the remaining 

16 flights in the series of flights to be performed during the 

17 briefing? 

18 A The best I can recall is that they described the 

19 activities over the weekend and that others were to have to 

20 take place in order to complete the overall activity. I have 

21 no recollection of their saying with any specificity when or 

22 how those might be undertaken. 

23 Q Did either of the CIA employees doing the briefing 

24 ask is it okay for us to continue on with the additional 

25 flights? 



I. . *- V ^ 



260 



UAUU HCCiOUL, 

trou/SEWtHir 



14 



A I don't have any recollection of their asking any 
such question. 

Q Did either you or Mr. Sporkin give any indication to 
the two individuals that further flights should not take 
place until some further authority was obtained? 

A I don't believe so. I don't have any recollection 
of any such instructions. 

Q What happened after the briefing by these two CIA 
employees? 

A Two people left and Mr. Sporkin decided that he 
wanted some other advice and thought on what he should tell 
John McMahon. 

Q Did he call John McMahon immediately after the 
briefing, to your knowledge? 

A I cannot recall his doing that. 

Q What did he do at this point? 

A He called a second meeting, and that second meeting 
occurred shortly after the two briefers left, and he asked 
George Clarke and Bernie Makowka to join him. 

Q Do you have a firm recollection that both of those 
individuals came into this meeting? 

22 A Yes, I do. 

23 Q If I told you that Mr. Clarke firmly recalls that he 
2* wasn't there, would that change your recollection? 

25 A No, it wouldn't 



liflifr^iSlyMtfFlHiT^ 



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tmtmffiBr 



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Q What was discuss*»rt a«- *v, 

scussed at this meeting after the 

briefing? 

A Mr. sporkin described what he understood the facts 
to be and we then discussed what should be done, if anything 
Q Let me stop you right there. what did Mr. Spor.in 
say about the facts as he understood them at that point? 

A He basically described the flights that had 
occurred. 

Q You mean to say flights, plural? 
A Yesj__^ 

>^^mean to say. my recollection is,, flights from 
into Israel and from Israel to Iran. That's why I'm using 
the word Plural. He described missiles - my recollection is 
-- missiles being transported as I've described, as we were 
told. And the issue was; is this Kind of activity require 
a presidential finding.^ we talked about that and came to the 
conclusion that our legal advice to the Deputy Director of 
central Intelligence was that we believed that would be the 
best course to take. And my recollection is he then asked „r. 
Makowka to start drafting such a finding. 

Q was there any discussion of whether or not Mr. 
McMahon had himself raised the question of whether a finding 
was needed during this meeting? ^ 

A My best recollection is that - let me strike that 
and say: i have "o "collection that Mr. McMahon asked whe 



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DKCeASSIFIEIi' 



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a finding would be needed or not. 

My best recollection is Mr. McMahon asked for Mr. 
Sporkin's advice. Now, let me add to that the fact that I 
wasn't privy to the conversations between Sporkin and 
McMahon. I have not talked to John McMahon on this at all. 
My best recollection is and the way it was characterized was, 
what should we do. I recognize that there seems to be some 
difference of opinion as to whether or not Mr. McMahon asked 
Mr. Sporkin, or suggested to Mr. Sporkin that a finding was 
needed. , 

I can't be helpful on that because I have no 
recollection nor did I participate in any conversation that 
might reflect on that issue. 

Q What were the factors that the attorneys at this 
meeting considered as weighing in favor of requiring a covert 
action finding? 

A Whether or not the activities met the statutory 
requirements, that is, whether or not these activities were 
non4intelligence collection activities, and whether or not 
they were of such a nature as to in fact involve the 
employees of CIA as opposed to non£agency employees. 

Q Was there any additional concern about the 
political sensitivity of what was beiiw^Uft^ertaken and, 
therefore, a greater concern to try to dot all the "i's" and 
cross all the "t's"? 



263 



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UNCa^fl!^ 



17 



1 A I can't associate a heightened political concern 

2 with this particular meeting and the activities that same 

3 day in our office. I know that certainly became a point of 

4 importance over the next few weeks as this — and months — as 

5 this continued, that our office continued to deal with the 

6 matter. I can't associate heightened political concern on 

7 November 25th, 1985. 

8 Q In any event, at some point during the evolution 

9 of this Iran arms transaction it became clear to you that 



there was fi high -- to put it colloqually -- flaX potential — 

11 A Yes — 

12 Q, — for this initiative; is that right? 

13 A I think that was of — when you use that term, I 

14 would suggest that that was a concern even that first day. 

15 Q And what do you mean by that? 

16 A That is, there was a very sensitive operation; few 

17 people were to know about it. And i£ it was to be done and 

18 be successful, it had to remain a very tightly guarded 

19 secret. 

20 Q In addition to just operational security, there 

21 would also have been a large political problem if this came 

22 out; is that right? 

23 A I think that's correct. 

24 Q Was there any discussion at this first meeting among 

25 the lawyers as to whether or not the finding being discussed 



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would call for notification of Congress? 

A I can't remember whether or not we discussed it 
on the evening of 25 November or not. I now have no 
recollection of discussing that particular point on that 
evening. 

Q In any event, at some point was the subject of 
congressional notification discussed? 

A It was. 

Q And this is in either that evening or the following 
day? 

A Well, it could be, I don't have any independent 
recollection of precisely when it was discussed. 

Q When it was discussed, what was the nature of the 
discussion? 

A My recollection is we thought that certainly could 
be an option that the President could choose to make. It 
would obviously have to be a presidentially directed 
construction. It couldn't be unilaterally made by the 
General Counsel or the DCR, anybody less than the President, 
in our judgment. 

Q Do you know who raised the subject of 
congressional notification? ^^ 

A No, I have no recollection who may have raised 
that. 

Q At this meeting, was specific language for a 



rfwrMh HcaBfr tlmFP 



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finding discussed? — and I'm going back again to the meeting 
among the four lawyers on the 25th of November. 

A I diSi'fKave any recollection of t4lk of word- 
smithing anything'St th^^^lnt. ^Jly recollection was 4B 
talked about the activities themselves that h«i. occurred and 
concluded that a finding jShould be prepared and that Mr. 
Makowka was assigneS^ that tsalc. ^■^- 

"l don't have em independent recollection of anybody 
saying, well, should we use these words or these words or 
those wordk. I don't have any recollectiotf^of those kimte. of 
discussions taking place the SVeniWg of the 2?th of November. 

Q Do you have any recollection of Mr. Sporkin 
dictating something to his secretary that evening? 
A No. 

MR. CAROME: Would you mark this as an exhibit, 
please? I will just call it ED-1. 

(A document was marked 
Deposition Exhibit ED No. 1 
for identification.) 



IMUSSIBEL 



266 



8 



BMf^ttBr 



20 
■J BY MR. CAROME: 

2 Q Mr. Dietel , I show you what has been marked as 

3 Exhibit 1 to this deposition, and ask if you recognize what 

4 that is? 

5 (Witness perusing docanervt.) 

g THE WITNESS: I don't know that I've ever seen 

1 this before. I can speculate as to what it is from — 

BY MR. CAROME: 

g Q First of all, why don't I ask you, do you know -- 

4Q it says a^ the top, "From^HfP shorthand notes 25 November 
198 5." Do you know what ^^Href ers to? 

A That's Mr. Sporkin's secretary,/ 
Q How does she spell her last name? 
A 

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sporkin dictated this 
sometime on that evening to his secretary? 
A It's possible. 

Q But you don't recall that having happened? 
A No. 

Q Is the contents of these shorthand notes in 
concurrence with your understanding of the nature of the 
discussion among the four lawyers that night? 

A I have no recollection of sitting down with a 
piece of paper that night and focusing on specific language 
of the finding. I'm not saying it didn't occur. I say — 



imASSD. 



267 




21 

1 my point is I have no independent recollection at this point 

2 of having something in hand that evening. 

3 In fact, I have the opposite recollection. I 

4 have the recollection that we, as I've already described, 

5 talked about the briefing that we had just received and left 
g Mr. Makowka with the task of coming up with language. 

7 Q At that meeting among the four lawyers on the 

g 25th was there any discussion about whether a direction 
g should be given that no further flights take place without 

further noljice from the Office of General Counsel? 

A No, I don't have any recollection of such a 

discussion or a decision to issue such an order. 



Q Was there a sense of urgency that a finding be 
gotten, drafted and on the record at that point? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you know where that sense of urgency emanated 
from? 

A Well it emanated from Mr. Sporkin. Mr. Sporkin 
felt we ought to do something as quickly as possible. That's 
why he had a meeting with the people that had some expertise 
in this and why he set this in motion as quickly as possible. 
And his idea was, to the best of my recollection, to have 
something immediately that he could put forward. 

Q Do you recall whether Mr. Sporkin' s urgency was 
focused more on the planned additional flights or was it 



268 



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focused on the fact that the weekend activity had already 
transpired? 

A I believe he was thinking that this ^otal effort, 
as the effort that had started and was in our understanding 
going to continue, needed a finding in order to have a basis 
to proceed. So he obviously didn't want to have a legal 
impediment to that and set forth doing what he thought was 
required, which was to produce a finding that could cover 
this, the entirety of this activity. 

Q ' Both past and future, is that right? 

A Correct. 

Q During this meeting among the four lawyers was 
there any discussion at all of CIA assistance to obtain 
overflight rights over any foreign country such as either 
or any other country? 

A I have no recollection of that. I have 
subsequently learned that there was some — there was some 
activities in that area, but 1 cannot associate nor do I have 
any recollection of their being discussed on 25 November. 

Q Was it primarily the flight activity by the CIA 
proprietary airline that was, in your mind, driving the need 
for a finding? 

r 

A Yes. 

Q And you don't recall the question of overflights 
and overflights assistance being a factor in the decision 




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23 

1 that a finding was needed? 

2 A No. 

3 Q How long did this meeting among the four lawyers 

4 take? 

5 A I would guess maybe a half an hour. That's the 
g best I could narrow it down at this point. 

7 Q So about what time of day would that be, by the 

3 time this meeting was getting underway? 

g A Well that was later in the evening, maybe 6:00 

to 6:30. . 

Q And how did the meeting end? On what note? 

A The meeting ended with the tasking of Mr. 

Makowka to draft the finding that we all agreed was 



14 appropriate. 



Q Why was Mr. Makowka selected to do this task? 

A I can't have any specific recollection of that, 
and I've tried to think about that since because normally 
it would have been Mr. Clarke. That he's the individual 
that was most heavily involved in the legal support to 
covert activities. 

On the other hand, Mr. Makowka had recently 

become ^^^ ■^IHB^^HHJI^^^^H^'^*^ 

problems associated with that, so that may well have been the 

reason. But I don't know that I focused on that and have any 

specific recollection and specific answer to your question. 



JMIliMe*. 



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Q Do you know whether Mr. Makowka had ever worked 

on the drafting of a finding before? 

A I don't know if he had or not. 

Q As far as you know, he might never have been 

involved in the drafting of a finding before? 

A He may never have been. 

Q Did Mr. Clarke ~ 

A Let me put it this way: I know of no finding 
that he had ever been involved with. 

Q And Mr. Clarke typically was the main person 
involved in the drafting of findings, is that right, at this 



^ 



time? 



A I'm not sure I can say the main person, 
the primary person at our offices 



J», 



3 ^"^m^^^HjiHi 



He was 
who 



I 



271 



WWHSfiRffiT 



25 



1 had the most expertise on that subject. 

2 As you probably know, we have a lawyer who 

3 resides at headquarters who also has expertise in that area. 

4 So that is why I'm distinguishing between somebody at our 

5 ^'^^mii^^llBi^^^lB^^ opposed to the very 

6 few lawyers that we have at our main headquarters building. 

7 Q And at that time that was Mr. Mayerfeld, this 
g other individual; is that right? 
g A Correct. 

10 Q . And that was someone whose work Mr. Clarke 

11 supervised, is that right? 

12 

13 supervisory responsibilities for Mr. 

14 Q In any event, Mr. Makowka is told by Mr. Sporkin 

15 that he is going to do the initial work on drafting a finding, 
1g is that right? 
U A That's my recollection. 

Q And then what happens? 

A Then we all leave, with the exception of Mr. 
Makowka. 

Q And was it your understanding that Mr. Makowka 
was to finish drafting a finding overnight? 

A I'm not sure that I would say that he was to 
finish. I think the expectation was, maybe unsaid, but the 
expectation was Mr. Sporkin wanted to begin looking at 



.A-.-^r^fTS 



MmA^^yu 



272 



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11 

12 
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DNttASSIPIIlT 



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•J language by the following morning. And so the expectation 

2 was Mr. Makowka would pen the paper and have something for 

3 Mr. Sporkin to begin dealing with the next day. 

4 Q What happened on this subject the following 

5 morning? 

g A I don't have any recollection of that. I 

1 understand there was a meeting. I can't remember being 
3 involved in that. I have no recollection of being involved. 
g I may have but I don't have any recollection of it. 

, MR. CAROME: Can we mark this No. 2 and 3. 
(The documents were marked 
Deposition Exhibit EO Nos. 2 
and 3 for identification.) 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Mr. Dietel, I show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 2. It is stamped "Draff at the top and appears to 
be a draft covert action finding. And I ask if you have ever 
seen that document before? 

A I've seen documents that resemble this. 
Q Do you recall seeing that on Tuesday, November 
26th? 

A NO. 

Q If I could just go back to the meeting the night 
before among the four lawyers. 
A Um hum. 






273 



UNWi^BIItT 



21 



1 Q What was said on that subject about the subject 

2 of hostages? 

3 A I can't associate that subject being discussed 

4 that night. I just don't have a recollection of that being 

5 discussed. 

6 Q Did it seem at that meeting among the four lawyers 

7 that Mr. Sporkin had additional information about what was 

8 going on above and beyond that that he had received from the 
g two briefers? 

10 A.I didn't have that impression. 

11 Q I will show you what has been marked as Exhibit 3. 

12 It is a two-page document. One is a memorandum dated 

•J3 November 26th for Admiral Poindexter, and it is signed by 
•j^ William J. Casey, and attached to it is a covert action 
15 finding. And I ask if you have seen that document before; 
1g and if so, when you saw it first? 

A I have seen this document. I have no recollection 
1g of seeing it in 198 5. My recollection is seeing it sometime 
ig in the November-December time period in 1986. 

Q Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 — all 
contain references to the ratification of acts that had 
already taken place. Do you recall any discussion on that 
subject either on the evening of November 24th or at any 
other time? 

A That was a subject of discussion. Exactly when 



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iMSKfiliT 



28 
•J the ratification theory was first brought up, I have no 

2 specific recollection. It was in that time period discussed 

3 with the idea that that might — that might be a legal 

4 theory to support that which had already occurred. 

5 Q Is it possible that that subject was discussed 
g on the evening of November 25th? 

1 A It's possible. 

g Q Do you have a recollection whether or not it was? 

A No. 

IQ Q . What was said on the subject of ratification 
when it was discussed? Whose idea was it? 

A I have no recollection of an individual 
proposing the idea. The discussion of a theory is — would 
be whether or not it would have any legal validity. 

Q And what was said on that point? 

A I think those that were involved in the discussion 
agreed that it may have a legal basis and there would be no 
harm in trying to use that as a theory to cover that which 
had already occurred. 

Q And when you say cover, what is the purpose or 
effect of the ratification? 

A I'm sorry, I don't understand your question. 

Q What was the purpose or effect of including a 



ratification clause in the finding? 
24 jz- 



Well, the theory was that the President not only 



UNCLASSra 



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18 
19 
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22 
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24 
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DimSSIFIEST 



29 

1 could approve that which is going to occur but that which had 

2 occurred. And that was the legal basis on which the 

3 ratification theory was proposed. 

4 Q You said that the subject of notification of 

5 Congress was raised either at the first meeting among the 
5 four lawyers or around that same time. Do you recall what 

7 was said on that subject once it finally was out on the 

8 table? 

g A My only recollection was that, as I've already 

10 explained, , that that would have to be a decision that only 
the President could make. 

12 Q Was there any discussion to the effect that this 

13 was an instance where notification properly ought not to be 
made? 

A I have no recollection of that kind of 



1g discussion occurring. 



Q What is your first recollection of anything 
having to do with this arms itOr^Iran matter after the meeting 
among the four lawyers on the evening of November 25th? 

A The only other recollection I have was at some 
point thereafter Mr. Sporkin may have described subsequent 
events at a meeting or meetings which I was in — which I 
was present. I can't be any more specific than that. I 
have no way to pinpoint when that might have been, but the 
best I can recall it would have been in the next month or two. 






276 



iNttf^tfilT 



30 



1 That would be December of '85 or January '86? 

2 A Correct. 

3 Q And what do you recall Mr. Sporkin saying on 

4 this subject? 

5 A I don't have a vivid recollection of any 

5 specifics. As I've already mentioned, it may have been that 

7 in the later meeting or meetings he may have been more 

3 specific in terms of numbers and the fact that I may now have 

g that confused with the November 25th, 198 5 briefing. 
1Q ' I can't be any more helpful than that because I 

•)•) just can't sort out the details of those specifics and 

•]2 precisely when I learned them. 

<2 Q Let me see if I can sort out a few things. Did 

— ^ 
you ever find out or wfere you ever told or did you ever 



learn that the finding that you had discussed in late 
November had been signed? 

A Yes; but that was in the November 1986 time 
period. 

Q And in November '86 you learned that the finding 
had been signed, is that right? 

A I learned that a finding had been signed. 

Q Did you connect that with the November '85 
finding? 

A I learned in the November 1986 time period that 
John McMahon had written a memo of the record on, I believe, 



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1 the 5th or so of December reporting that he had been told that 

2 a finding was signed. 

3 Q Do you recall — 

4 MR. CAROME: Why don't I just mark that memo as 

5 an exhibit? 

(A document was marked 

7 Deposition Exhibit ED No. 4 

S for identification.) 

g BY MR. CAROME: 

1Q Q 'Mr. Dietel, here is what has been marked as 

11 Exhibit 4, and I ask if that is the memorandum you are 

12 speaking about? 

13 A It appears to be. 

14 Q Did you see that at around the time it was 
written? 

A No. 

Q You didn't see that until November 198 6 or so. 



1g is that right? 



A Correct. 

Q In paragraph 3 of that Exhibit 4 there is a 
reference to — "He informed me later that night that a 
finding would be required," referring to Sporkin. 

Does that refresh your recollection as to whether 
or not a phone call was made to McMahon that evening? 

A I have no recollection of him calling McMahon 



1 1 wm^.^^ ^^^^^pmjji 



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21 
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32 



1 that evening. I'm not disputing that there may have been a 

2 phone call, I have no recollection of one. 

3 Q In any event, in the late '85, early '86 time 

4 period you did not hear anything about a finding being signed; 

5 is that right? 

6 A I have no recollection of that in that time 

7 period. 

3 Q In the January 1986 time period, were you aware 

g that additional findings were being drafted and/or signed? 

■^Q A.I only knew, without any great importance being 

^■j placed on it, that Mr. Sporkin was at the White House working 

■^2 on this general subject. I'm not sure I can be any more 

13 specific in my recollection than that. 

1^ Q Do you understand that Mr. Sporkin was working 

•(5 with Oliver North at that time period? 

Ig A I'm not sure I knew the particular participants 

<y at the time. I cannot identify any specifics that would lead 



me to that conclusion that were associated with the January 



*Q 1986 time period. 



Q Were you contemporaneously aware that two lawyers 
in the Office of General Counsel, a Mr. Roseman and a Mr. 
Call, were working on a draft finding on the subject of Iran 
in very early January 1986? 

A I'm not sure I knew that at the time, and 
certainly didn' t focus on ^t^ . .^hey would have been the 



279 



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24 
25 



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33 

1 logical persons if Mr. Makowka would have been absent. 

2 Certainly Mr. Roseman. 

3 Q During 1986 and before November 1986, were you 

4 aware that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in 

5 shipments of missiles and other military hardware to Iran? 
g A Repeat the time period you're interested in, 

y please. 

g Q At any time prior to the public disclosure of 

g the Iran episode, during 1986. 

10 A During 1986? Was I aware? 

11 Q Of any shijanents involving the CIA of missiles 
^2 or military equipment to Iran. 

13 A Only what we've been discussing. 

14 Q Only what you learned about in November, is that 
what you're saying? 



A No. I said that there were further dii 



1g " nu. J. sdiQ tnat Tuiere were rurtner discussions 



over the next several months about this general matter. I 
do not recall with any greater specificity when that might 
have been, only to have a fairly certain recollection that 
it was over the next two months or so. 

Q Prior to the public disclosure of this episode 
we've been discussing did you ever learn anything relating to 
the subject of diversion of funds from the Iranian arms 
transactions to anyone? 



UNGUSmiL 



280 



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34 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

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Q When Mr. Sporkin left the Agency to go to the 

Federal bench and he was succeeded by Mr. Doherty, do you 

— il 

know whether or not Mr. Doherty Was briefed at all on these 
Iranian arms transaction issues? 
A No. 

You don't know whether or not he was? 

I do not know whether he was or not. 

Did you ever discuss these matters with Mr. 



Subsequent to the public disclosures? 

Prior to the public disclosures? Let me ask you 



Q 

A 

Q 
Doherty? 

A 

Q 
that first. 

A I have no recollection of any such discussions. 

Q What was your involvement after the public 
disclosure of the Iranian arms transactions in the CIA's 
response to the disclosure? 

A My first involvement was I was called on a 
weekend, I guess it was the weekend of 20-something November, 
and asked to come to the Agency and explain my recollections 
to several people that were in the General Counsel's Office; 
and among those people were Mr. Doherty, Mr. Makowka, Chuck 
Cooper from the Department of Justice, one of his employees, 
and there may have been others in the room. 

Q Do you recall the date of that meeting? 

A No. I could guess. It must have been over the 






281 



11 



BNftH^IEer 



35 

1 weekend of 22-23 November. I believe that was the weekend. 

2 Q That would have been following Director Casey's 

3 testimony on the Hill on the subject?. 

4 A I guess it would have if that occurred on the 

5 21st. Did that occur on the 21at? :=r 
5 Q I believe it did. ■ -^.. *. 

7 Prior to Director Casey's November^Zlst testimony 

g on the Hill, were you involved in discussions about what had 
g transpired in the area of the Iranian arms transactions? 
10 A , I may have been. I don't have a specific 

recollection of those discussions or involvement at this 
12 point. 
ig Q Returning for a moment to the January 198 6 

time frame, do you have any recollection of hearing of the 
involvement in these matters of Richard Secord? 
A No. 

Q Do you recall any discussions on whether or not 
the Iranian arms transaction should include a third-party 
agent or a middleman or a commercial cutout? 

A My only recollection about the term "third party" 
was in my mind I had it associated with Israel. 
Q What do you mean by that? 

A That is, that that was a term being used for 
their participation. 

Q At what point do you understand or do you recall 



llwllB HluMV Uflui 



282 



iineBissififF 



^w..,_ 36 

1 that subject coming up? 

2 A In the November 1985 time period. It was private 

3 parties. Private parties. 

4 Q And that was language included in the finding 

5 drafted over November 25th and 26th, is that right; 

6 A Yes. 
1 Q Do you recall why that language was included in 
g the finding? 
Q A My recollection was to miniinize any political 

10 sensitivity in terms of that country being involved in this 

11 effort. That's my recollection. 

12 Q So that third parties or private parties will be 



13 



14 



15 



referred to rather than the country of Israel? 
A That's my recollection. 
Q Did it occur to you at the time that that was a 



1g somewhat misleading description of the way the transaction 



17 



was being structured? 



^P A No, it didn't. 

MR. FEIN: Would third parties include Al/|ft 

«- Schwimmer ? 

^ THE WITNESS: The word "third parties" was not 

21 

-_ used. 
22 

MR. FEIN: Private parties? 
23 

THE WITNESS: I don't know — I don't know of 
24 

that individual. I don't know who that is. 00282 



...• i irf>^ 



wii Ilk 111 Btrt bf™" 



283 



11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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tlNllll^itir 



37 



1 MR. FEIN: He was a private businessman in Israel 

2 who, in conjunction with Ghorbanifar, initiated the Iranian 

3 arms deals with the United States. 

4 THE WITNESS: Well l!^^ no recollection of that 

A 

5 name. 

6 BY MR. CAROME: 

f Q Am I correct that you never saw any of the 

g findings that were drafted or signed in January '86 on the 

e 
g subject of Iranian arms transactions until the story broke in 

•JO the press? , 

A I can't say I never saw a draft of the finding. 
I certainly never saw one that was signed until, until the 
time you're speaking about; that is, until after it broke in 
the press. I never saw one that was signed. I can't say I 
never saw one of these drafts somewhere along the way in the 
November time period. 

Q I was speaking of the January 1986 time period. 

A I have no recollection of seeing or being 
associated with specific language of drafts in the January 
time period at all. 

Q Do you recall at any time in the discussion of 
this matter Mr. Sporkin directing that no copies of the 
finding or findings be kept at the Agency? 

A I have a very vague recollection of that type of 
instruction in November 1985. 



'-Jif^ 



jiimminHin 



284 



UKDU^i^ 



38 



1 Q Do you recall that type of instruction having been 

2 given with respect to any other finding that you've known 

3 about, or is this unique in that respect? 

4 A I don't know of any other such instruction, but 

5 I'm not an expert on all the findings nor have I seen any 
g great number of them or been involved in them. So I can't 
1 say one way or the other that this is unique, or would be 
g unique. 

Q Q Is there any institutionalized manner in which 
4Q someone at the CIA monitors a finding for which there has 

been a Presidential instruction that there be no notification 
of Congress for the purpose of deciding when it is that 
Congress should be notified? 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q Is there any person who has that responsibility 
at the Agency? 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q Aside from the particular shipment or shipments 
of missiles that we have already discussed, do you know 
whether or not the Clf^ Office of Legal Counsel been called 
upon for advice on the subject of delivery of military hardware 
and military materiel to Iran by the CIA proprietary airline? 

A Repeat the question, would you, please? 

Q Aside frcxn the matters of shipments to Iran that 
we have already discussed, do you know whether or not the 



UNI"! As;5M^ 



285 



UKOkA^iEfiT 



39 

1 Office of Legal Counsel has been asked for advice on 

2 deliveries by these — the or a CIA proprietary airline of 

3 military materiel to Iran? 

4 A I do not. 

5 Q You're not familiar with that subject coming up 
g other than in the context we've been discussing about this 
•7 morning? 

g A I'm familiar with the subject coming up. Whether 
g it came up in terms of our office being involved in requests 
1Q for opinions on the subject is one I'm not familiar with, 

those kinds of requests. I am vaguely familiar with the fact 
that there may have been some other support that the 
proprietary did only after learning about and reading what 
has been in the press and been part of our own internal 
investigation. 

What I'm not — what I'm trying to answer for you 
is whether or not I knew of any legal requests coming in on 
those subjects contemporaneous with the events occurring, 
which I understood was the point of your question, and I do 
not know of any such. 

Q What has been discussed on that subject more 
recently? 

A Oh, I have some vague recollection that there were 
either requests for or support to the May flights, but this is 
all information that's either been in the press or in 



Jiaiyi^iim. 



286 



MffitiiSStPIEST 



40 



1 

2 

3 

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7 

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24 

25 



investigations. I have no contemporaneous recollections of 
any of this at the time the events were occurring. 




MR. CAROME: I'm just about done. 

(A document was marked 
Deposition Exhibit ED No. 5 
for identification.) 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Mr. Dietel, I show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 5, it is a page out of Stanley Sporkin's desk 
calendar, at least that's what I understand it to be, and for 
the date November 25th, 1985. 

There is a 2:30 entry and I'm having difficulty 
reading the subject of the entry, and I'm wondering if by any 
chance you can help me with what that says. 
A 2:30 entry? 

Q Yes. It looks like it f lows,J.ntQ^:45,^what is 
written." ^- -^^ 

A It says, "Meetipg with thfi^eOOCI »» homosexuals, 
10 minutes." 

Q Okay. Do you know what that refers to? Do you 



nNiik itAiMP tf jU I ' 



287 



20 
21 
22 
23 
24 



tlffiill^W 



41 

know whether or not that has anything at all to do with the 
Iran transactions? 

A I do not. 

MR. FEIN: That was another flaw in Ghorbanif ar ' s 
character. 

MR. CABORE: Actually, t£ad no. idea that that's 
what that said, but now'that you read it that's what it looks 

I don't have any-other questions. -^ 

10 * ^^- BARBADORClt :^A^e some^ Do you want' to ask 

11 yours? 

12 **^' FEIN: I ^st have on« question.. 

13 EXAMINATIOJ^ ON_BEHALP OF THE HOUSE SELECP-, COMMITTEE 

14 BY MR. FEIN: 

15 Q In your experience was it unprecedented that a 

16 middlemMp^ the type of Seco^j^ind Hakim wtaili_sell arps 
that were- cbtaJjwdl^roB^e CI*^^iili& •e-ca^ed j>*of it or 
markjj,up as a paSt of Sfeir covert opera tionsr 



1^ A I don't have enough experience with all the kinds 

of things we do in this area to make a judgment. I have no — 
I have no other ^exai^le o^^at happwiinsu^ I know of nonsuch 
exeunple of thaT" happening . '"—l\ - :- ^ 

^ MR. FEIN: !Hjat's all I Inve. ^ 



IMASSIEIEL 



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16 
17 
18 
19 



21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



UHSfctSSfflSlT 



42 



1 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

2 BY MR. BARBADORO: 

3 Q Mr. Dietel, what did you do to prepare yourself 

4 for this deposition today? 

5 A I did nothing. 

6 Q You didn't review any documents? 

7 A No, 

8 Q You didn't discuss this, your proposed testimony 

9 with anyonel 
10 A .That's correct. 
■J1 Q You didn't discuss it with Mr. Sporkin or with 

12 anybody at the Central Intelligence Agency? 

13 A I did not discuss it with Mr. Sporkin. I 

14 discussed it with these two gentlemen coming down in a very 

15 general way, nothing in particular about any particular 



events. 

Q Do you keep a calendar of your meetings? 

A I have a calendar. 

Q And you didn't review that calendar before coming 



20 down here today? 



A I did not. 

Q Do you ever make notes of any meetings that you 
attend? 

A I do. 

Q Do you know whether you made any notes of any of 




289 



11 



BNOUSSIPKBt 



43 

1 the meetings that have been referred to in this deposition 

2 today? 

3 A I do. 

4 Q Did you keep those notes? 

5 A I didn't make any notes. 
5 Q Oh. I misunderstood. 

7 A You asked if I knew if I made any notes. 

8 Q Thank you for being so precise. 

9 You did not make any notes of any of these 
^Q meetings? 

A I did not. 

12 Q Do you keep working files on subjects that are of 
12 concern to you? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you keep any files on these matters? 

A No. 

Q Could you describe for me what your job entailed 
when Mr. Sporkin was General Counsel? 

A Yes. When he became General Counsel I continued 
to function as the second deputy in the office, which I had 
been under the previous General Counsel, and the title of that 
job was the Associate Deputy General Counsel, and the 
function of that official or that officer was to be the 
managing attorney in the office, to be responsible for the 
management of the office in personnel matters, making sure we 



UmmiEiEflm. 



290 



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15 
16 
17 
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19 
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m^fftifiT 



44 

1 had the right staffing and it was distributed correctly, 

2 and spending a lot of time on management issues. 

3 I continued in that capacity as Associate Deputy 

4 General Counsel until the then Deputy General Counsel was 

5 reassigned to another position in the Agency. 

6 Q When was that? 

7 A In the spring of '82, I guess. And at that point 

8 I assumed the job of the Deputy General Counsel, but 

9 continued to spend most of my time on the same issues I had 

10 as the Assofiate Deputy General Counsel; that is, as the 

11 managing attorney in the office. 

^2 Q And you continued in that role during the entire 

13 time that Mr. Sporkin was General Counsel? 



A Correct. 

Q How frequently did you meet with Mr. Sporkin? 

A Very frequently. 

Q What is the proximity of your office to his? 

A Next door. 

Q Do you each have your own secretary? 

A Correct. 

Q Do you feel that you had Mr. Sporkin' s trust? 

A Yes. 

Q Did Mr. Sporkin keep you informed of what was 
going on in the office? 

A Generally. 






291 



mm^m 



45 

Q Were there things that Mr. Sporkin was involved 
in that he would deliberately not tell you about? 

A Not to my knowledge. You need to understand that 
there's two important facts. I spent most of my time on 
matters that I was respoijeible for solving; and, two, I had 
to be prepared to be the Acting General Counsel when he 
wasn't there. 

Now he was not absent very frequently, so 1 did 
not have to spend much time making sure that I knew how to 

10 deal with 'a particular matter in his absence. He traveled 

11 very little and he was there 99 percent of the time, so I did 

12 not concern myself with this second responsibility as much as 

13 I would have had he been absent more frequently. 

14 Q It strikes me that your memory about these events 

15 is spotty, to say the least. 

16 A It is? 

17 Q c. -4^S there any document available that would be 

18 helpful to you in refreshing your recollection that you have 

19 not reviewed? 

20 A Not to my knowledge. 

21 I Q Did you play any role inj^^^^^^^^^^^^B'T' 

22 

23 ^ I have^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H primarily when 

24 Mr. Sporkin either wasn't available or was absent; and that 

25 being very infrequently, I didn't routinely do that. I didn't 




JMAMifa. 



292 



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2 

3 

4 

5 

6, 

7 

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9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



OWBISW 



46 



review them necessarily on their way to him. In other words, 
/ I wasn't the filter. 

Q You anticipated my next question. 

A I wasn't the filter of everything that went to 

Stan Sporkin. 




Q Have you ever met or spoken with Colonel North: 

JJUCii£<U£lCa, 



293 



9 



12 



HNDU^fFlBi' 



47 

1 A Never. 

2 Q Have you ever spoken with Charlie Allen? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q Did you speak with Charlie Allen during the fall 

5 or winter of 1985? 

6 A No. 

7 Q Did you ever see Colonel North visit Mr. Sporkin 
g at his offices? 

A No. 

10 Q ■ Did you ever see Charlie Allen visit Mr. 

11 Sporkin' s offices during the fall or winter of 1985? 
A Not that I can recall. 

13 Q Your first memory of having any knowledge or 
^^ association with the Iran arms initiative was on November 25, 
.,5 1985, then; is that, right? 
A Correct. 

Q And I just want to review that day briefly with 
you to find out what you can remember and what you can't 
remember. 

You can remember being asked to sit in on a 
meeting with Stanley Sporkin sometime on the evening of the 
25th; correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And you remember that that meeting yas attended, 
in addition to you and Mr. Sporkin it was attended by two 



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3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

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18 

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22 

23 

24 

25 



ifSMSSIP^ 



48 

members from the Ci;t(^^^^^^^^7 

A Correct. 

Q And you do not remember the names of the two 
individuals? 

A I do not remember the names of the individuals. 

Q And you remember that the meeting was called 
because Mr. McMahon had expressed some concern to Mr. Sporkin 
about something that had happened at the CIA during the 
previous weekend? 

A , Correct. 

Q You can remember that that something had something 
to do with the use of a CIA proprietary? 

A Correct. 

Q And that that something concerned the use of the 

proprietary to transport missiles? 

A Correct. 

Q Do you recall learning that that concern about 
the proprietary and the missiles — strike that. 

Did you learn about the missiles before the meeting 
from Mr. Sporkin or during the meeting from the 
officials? 

A I can't recall that fine distinction. I can't 
recall whether Mr. Sporkin described what he knew or had been 
told when he asked me to come to the meeting. I have no way to 
sort that out. 




295 



22 
23 
24 
25 



umsitffi&T 



49 

1 Q You cannot remember whether any reference was made 

2 to the National Security Council during the meeting; correct? 

3 A I have no recollection of that reference. 

4 Q And you cannot remember whether Colonel North's 

5 name was mentioned during the meeting; correct? 

6 A Correct. 

7 Q You cannot remember whether Richard Secord's 
S name was mentioned during the meeting? 

g A Correct. 

10 Q . '^°^ cannot remember whether the subject of 

11 hostages was discussed during the meeting? 

12 A No. But I want to make sure that I'm clear that 

13 it's my recollection that the subject of hostages was 

14 discussed in this time period. I can't be precise as to 

15 whether or not that subject was mentioned at the meeting 
1g because the meeting was focused on what these two 
iy people knew that had transpired in terms of the shipment 

1g itself. That was the focus of the meeting, what had actually 

ig happened in terms of their knowledge of what had been shipped 

2Q and where and so on. 
21 Q So you think hostages were discussed at some 



point that day but you don't remember whether it was discussed 
during this meeting? 

A That's correct. 

Q Do you remember whether anybody said where the 



.t^t 



"liiwiiiilillPlftHiM 



296 



18 



mim^ 



50 



1 missiles were transported from and to by the proprietary? 

2 A I can only describe to you again my reconstructing 

3 my recollection in November '86. And my recollection was 

4 that -- I have the recollection of being told that missiles 

5 were taken to Israel, off-loaded and other missiles in their 

6 place were substituted — if you will, traded — and those 

7 then weri taken to Iran. That*ff ny recollection. 

8 Q So that I'm clear, you're saying that the CIA 

9 proprietary was used to transport missiles from somewhere to 
10 Israel and that those missiles were off-loaded and that other 
•J1 missiles were loaded onto the proprietary and that then the 

12 proprietary was used to transport those missiles from Israel 

13 to Iran? 

14 A That's my recollection. 

15 Q And you -recall that being discussed at this 

1g meeting with you, Mr. Sporkin and the two members from the 
17 CI. __ 

A That's the best I can reconstruct what was 
ig described at that meeting. 

20 Q You do not recall what kind of missiles were being 
2< shipped, do you? 

A I didn't, I didn't — and I'm not a missile 
expert, and I'm not sure if I was told I would know one from 
the other. I don't have a recollection. 

Q Do you recall whether they were missiles 



\minL. 



297 



imsuffiiT 



51 

manufactured in the United States? 

A NO. 

Q And you don't recall whether the missiles were 
transported from the United States to Israel, do you? 

A As I've already said, I have no recollection of 
the origin of that original shipment to Israel. It may have 
been discussed, I just don't remember. 

Q Do you remember whether there was any discussion 
about what the purpose of this shipment was? 

A . Not at the meeting. 

Q Do you recall any discussion about who had 
authorized the use of the proprietary? 

A No. 

Q And you don't recall any discussion at the meeting 
about obtaining overflight clearances? 

A No. 

Q And you don't recall any discussion at the 
meeting about Dewey Clarridge? 

A No. 

Q Immediately following this first meeting there 
was a second meeting with you and Mr. Sporkin; correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And that was attended by Mr. Makowka and Mr. 



Clarke? 



IHMIEIEII^ 



298 



iiStASSiEii&T 



52 



1 Q And the purpose of that meeting was to review 

2 what you had learned during the previous meeting and to 

3 determine whether the activity required a finding? 

4 A What should be done, I would characterize it. 

5 Q Okay. And at this second meeting a conclusion 

6 was reached that the activity that was described to you 

7 required a finding; correct? 

i 

8 A That was our legal judgment; yes. 

9 Q Do you know, do you remember who it was that 
10 first came . to that conclusion? 

•J1 A I don't remember that. 

•J2 Q In any event, you recall that it was your 

13 conclusion as well as the conclusion of the other lawyers 

14 who were at that meeting? 

15 A Correct. 

■jg Q Could you tell me why you thought a finding was 

■yj required here? 

^Q A Because this activity was not an intelligence 

•jg collection activity. It was something other than that, and 

20 it seems to me that's what the language of the statute that 

n* establishes the requirement for a finding mandates. 

22 Q If the CIA proprietary were used to transport 

oil drilling equipment from, let's say, hypothetically, the 
United States to Spain. Would that require a finding, in 
your judgment, if it were done solely on behalf of people 



rtiJnUMI IW^Aff'WP'^ Pli i 



299 



tmssifflrr 



^ 53 

1 unconnected to the United States? 

2 A Probably not. 

3 Q In fact, the proprietary is used all the time by 

4 private parties to haul any number of things and a finding is 

5 not obtained; correct? 

g A That is correct. 

7 Q If the proprietary were used to fly something 

3 into Iran by private parties or by other governments other 

9 than the U.S., and it were totally unconnected to any U.S. 

10 initiative,, would you have concluded that a finding were 

•j'l required? 

12 A I'd probably want to know what was being 

13 transported. 
Q If it were something other than missiles or 

military equipment, if it were oil drilling equipment, for 
example, would you have felt that a finding would have been 



y, required; 



A I'd probably have to look into whether or not 
there were any other restrictions on dealing with that 
country or not. 

Q Again, my assumption is still that these are 
parties unconnected with the United States Government that 
are going to use the proprietary. Would that make a 
_ difference in your mind? 

25 



'.MUS^IL 



300 



11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



BKCtil^tPIIS'^ 



54 



1 Q Would you say that if the people who are using 

2 the proprietary to transport equipment to Iran were totally 
unconnected with the United States Government that it would 

4 not require a finding? 

5 A No. I would want to know if there were any 

g restrictions on dealing with that particular country. In 

other words, if there were restrictions on trading with that 
g particular country, I don't believe that we could sanction, 
g knowingly at least, our proprietary doing that for private 
^Q parties. 

Q Okay. You were aware in 198 5 that there were 
restrictions on the sale of U.S. military equipment to Iran 
by any country, weren't you? 
A I was not. 
Q You were not? All right. 

Well, tell me, in this case what — what I'm 
getting at with these questions is to try to determine what 
it was in your mind that caused you to come to the conclusion 
that a finding was required in this case since you do not 
recall any discussion about the U.S. Government being 
connected in any way to this initiative — 

A The U.S. Government was connected with this 
initiative. 

Q — other than by the use of the proprietary. 
A That's enough. 



tmASSiU, 



301 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

e 

9 

10 

11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
1» 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 




55 

Q Could you explain to me what it was that in your 
mind triggered the requirement of a finding here? 

A Our Agency was involved in supporting this 
activity. 

Q Let me give you an example. Our search of your 
records have shown that the proprietary was used^ 

and there was no 

finding obtained. 

I 

Would you say that that was a violation of law? 

A • I can't make a judgment on that without doing 
some research in terras of what the restrictions are in terms 
of dealing with Iran. I don't know the answer to — 

Q Well, in your raind what was the difference between 
what I've just described to you and the shipment, 

'using the CIA proprietary, and the 
shipment in November of missiles which you concluded required 
a finding? 

A I guess there was some understanding, and I can't 
be any more specific than saying it in that way, that this 
was part of a Government-supported progrsun. In other words, 
it was not some, merely some private party shipping apples 
somewhere. 

Q And it was a Government-supported program in some 
way more than merely having the proprietary used; correct? 

A Correct. In other words,. it _y as not some private 



:. In other words,. it _vas 



302 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

II 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



ItNStASSiSfBT 



56 



party getting apples in Washington and shipping them to Iran. 

Q I'm doing this to try to jog your memory because 
it seems to me that there must have been some discussion at 
this meeting about how this was in some way more of a 
Government operation than merely the use of the proprietary. 

A What meeting are you speaking of? 

Q I'm speaking of the second meeting on November 25, 
1985, where you concluded that a finding was required. 

A I can't be more helpful to you, other than to say 
I think it .was clear at that point that the activities were 
in support of a Government effort with respect to the 
hostages. It was a Government effort. It wasn't some just 
private parties trying to get the hostages out. 

Q So by the second meeting, you are quite sure that 
the subject of hostages did come up? 

A At least in that day^iort^o time period. 

Q Well, if it — 

A I understand what you're asking but — 

Q If it played a role in your decision that a 
finding was required, it had to have come up at least by the 
time of this meeting; correct? 

A I understand. Yes. 

Q And you would agree, then, that it must have come 
up, wouldn't you? 

A It must have come up. 



liMCUSSIfl£iL 



303 



tlNttASSIftiSr 



57 



Q And it was your understanding, then, wasn't it, 
that this initiative involving the transportation of missiles 
in some way was connected with the release of the hostages in 
Lebanon? 

A Urn hum. 

Q Can you give me any more information about how you 
thought it was connected with the release of hostages in 
Lebanon? 

A I just don't have any other specific events or 
matters of discussion that I can share with you. I don't 
have any recollection that's that specific. 

Q How about general? Is there anything else that 
you can tell me about how this exchange of missiles was 
connected with the release of hostages? 

A Well, that was to me a primary or certainly a 
major aspect of this whole activity. Now precisely when -- 
I can't be precise in terms of when we discussed or focused on 
that particular aspect of the activity. 

Q Did you understand that this was in some way a 
United States Government effort to gain the release of the 
hostages? 

A Urn hum. 

MR. BARBADORO: Just for the record, his answer is 
yes. 



mmm 



304 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



wuysfiWr 



BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q Correct? 
A Yes. 

MR. FEIN: Could I just interject? 

Why did you reach\bta»<t conclusion if the arms were 

shipped out of Israeli inventory^ Why wasn't this an Israeli 

1 

effort to gain the release of the hostages? 

THE WITNESS: That was simply a trade. That was 
simply a trade. 

■ MR. FEIN: What was a trade? 

THE WITNESS: That is, missiles from United States 
stocks were being substituted for those that were eventually 
going to Iran. That was my understanding. 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q Do you have any idea whether anything was said 
about who in the United States Government was supporting this 
initiative? 

A No, I have no recollection of that. 
Q Is it fair to say it was not your understanding 
that it was a CIA initiative? Because then there's no 
question that a finding would have been required; correct? 

A That's correct. Yes. It's my recollection that 
this was merely in support of, CIA was merely facilitating 
and assisting. 

Q In an effort by some other part of the United 



iUiCUSSfflL 



305 



^ftWUJSfffflp 



59 



states Government with this initiative? 

A Correct. 

Q Do you recall anything further at the second 
meeting about the form in which this finding would be drafted, 
what would be in the finding? 

A No. 

Q And you have already testified you have no 
recollection of Mr. Sporkin actually sitting down and 
dictating a draft of a finding at the meeting? 

A 'No. 

Q You don' t recall whether there was any discussion 
at the meeting about the finding applying retroactively to 
activities that had already occurred? 

A I have no recollection of that being discussed; 
it may have been. 

Q And do you have any recollection -- 

A It was certainly discussed either that evening or 
the next day. I do recall being present when it was being 
discussed. 

Q Who was discussing it? 

A Whoever was present at the meeting. I can't be — 

Q Okay . 

A I can't be specific in terms of when it was 
discussed and therefore I can't, obviously, say who discussed 



306 



imcfeK^rpT 



60 



Q I'll represent to you that -- on a slightly 
different subject -- that I took Mr. McMahon's deposition a 
couple of days ago. Okay? And in that deposition Mr. 
McMahon said that his concern as to why a finding might be 
required was that the proprietary had been used, but that when 
Mr. Sporkin returned and told him a finding was required, 
Mr. Sporkin told him it was not the use of the proprietary 
but the use of the CIA to obtain overflight clearances that 
was the event that required a finding. 

' Does that in any way refresh your memory as to 
whether overflight clearances were discussed at this meeting? 

A No. I mean, it's in McMahon's memo, but I am- 
telling you I don't have any recollection of being involved or 
even knowing about the issue of overflights until I got 
involved in this in November of 1986 and having access to 
McMahon's memo. I never seen it before and never had the 
occasion to even know that this was an issue or had been an 
issue over the previous weekend, apparently. 

MR. BARBADORO: If we can go off the record for 
just a second. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. BARBADORO: Back on the record. 

BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q When did you first see the finding that was 
drafted in November? 



307 



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t|!|QLIiSSH' 



61 



A I can't recall but wouldn't dispute that I may 
have seen it Tuesday, the 26th of November. I can't recall 
Sitting down with a piece of paper or being involved in 
meetings on that day. 

Q Are you reasonably certain that you saw it 
sometime in November or early December of 1985? 

A I'm not reasonably certain of that. 

Q So you think you might have seen it at some point 
but you're not sure? 

A That's correct. 

Q The finding is in front of you and it refers to 
actions by private parties — is that the phrase that is' used 
there? 

A That's correct. 

Q And your understanding is that "private parties" 
made reference to the government of Israel; is that right? 

A Correct. 

Q Can you tell me anything about how you came to 
that understanding? 

A I have the recollection that Israel's involvement 
was very sensitive, and I have the recollection that it might 
be appropriate not to directly refer to that in the finding. 
And it's a vague recollection; I can't remember precisely when 
that might have been discussed but I assume it was very early 



*<?!!*'..'»■_. 



tlM£U££l£l£L 



308 



1 

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HSLIMW 



62 



Q The finding in front of you does not refer to the 
desire of the U.S. Government to open up relations with Iran 
as one of the purposes of the finding. 

A Um hum. 

Q Do you recall any discussion during this November 
time frame about the desire of the U.S. Government to open up 
relations with Iran as one purpose for the activity for which 
a finding was required? 

A Not specifically delineated as such. 

Q ' Well, if you want to expand on that, please do. 

A I don't have any recollection of that being a 
point of discussion at the time period you're talking about. 

Q Okay. Either general or specific, you have 
absolutely no recollection of that being discussed? 

A No, no recollection at all. 

Q After that finding was prepared, or since you 
don't know — you have no specific recollection of the fact 
that it was even prepared — 

A Correct. 

Q After that meeting on November 25 when do you next 
have a recollection of Mr. Sporkin raising this issue with 
you? 

A My recollection can't be precise in terms of time, 
other than to say I believe it to be over the next two months; 
that is, December '85 or January '86. 



wmilSSlElEL 



309 



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mmmi 



63 



Q Did Mr. Sporkin ever tell you whether this finding 
had been signed? 

A Not to my recollection. 

Q Did anybody ever tell you that this finding had 
been signed? 

A I came to learn of the signing or not signing of 
various finding in the November-December 1986 time period, 
but not before. 

Q And during the month of January 1986 did you know 
anything about findings on the Iran arms sale being prepared 
within your office? 

A I cannot recall any events that associate my iseing 
involved or knowing about it in that time period. 

Q So you have no memory of any findings being drafted 
in your office during the January 1986 time period? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever — 

A Other than to include that I have a recollection 
of Mr. Sporkin attending meetings at the White House related to 
this general matter. 

Q Did he ever tell you what these meetings were 
about? 

A He may have. 

Q You can't remember whether he told you or not? 

A Well, I've already told you that I have a 



\J 






310 



13 



ifflfCK^REff^T 



64 



1 recollection of learning of these continuing events over the 

2 next couple of months, and I've already mentioned to you I 

3 may have the fact of the 2,000 number confused in terms of 

4 time between the original November 25 meeting and events 

5 that occurred over the next two months. 

6 Q But do you have any memory of Mr. Sporkin telling 

7 you anything about what he was doing going to the White 

8 House in January of 1986? 

9 A I don't think anything other than what I've 
JO shared with you already. 

11 Q Have you ever discussed this matter with Dewey 

12 Clarridge? 
A I don't believe so. 

14 Q You are aware that Mr. Clarridge ' s testimony about 

15 these events is that in the November time frame he thought that 
1^ oil drilling equipment — 

A Yes. 

Q — had been shipped? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall any reference made to the use of the 
proprietary to ship oil drilling equipment in this November 
1985 time frame? 

A No. 

Q And you have no knowledge of anybody in the Office 
of General Counsel discussing this issue with Mr. Clarridge 



llELASSIfJEIL 



311 



1 

2 
3 

4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

to 

II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 

ao 

21 
22 
23 
24 



imssiflffiT 



6S 



in the November-December '85 time frame? 
A No. 

MR. BARBADORO: That's all I have. 
MR, CAROME: I have a couple of other things. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Just to clarify what you recall being told on 
November 25th by the J^^^^^H people, you recall being 
told that it was a newer type of missile that was being 
brought into Israel by the proprietary and that the 
proprietary was bringing out of Israel an older type of the 
same type of missile; is that right? 

A Urn hum. Those facts were told to me in what I 
now believe to be that original meeting. 

Q How did Mr. Sporkin handle his transition out of 
the Office of General Counsel? Did he brief Mr. Doherty on 
what was going on? 

A I was not present at any such briefings. 
Q Are you aware of whether or not he did something 
along those lines to bring Mr. Doherty up to speed? 
A No. 

Q Did he have any briefings with you to sort of 
tell you some things that you ought to know now that he is 
going to be gone? 
A No. 



iMiSSlflEIL 



312 



1 

2 
3 
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12 

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mmiEer 



66 



you ver, ™ch for „«„, ,„, 3,„,,„^ „.^^ ^^^ 

""'"^°^°-""^'«P---h. deposition... 

concluded. ) 



uMw mm 



313 







•horthand note*, 25 November 1985 



fi«vt been briefed on Che efforts being made by private parties 
CO obtain the release of Americans held hoatage In the Kiddle 
East. I find It In Che national Intcreat to provide whatever 

V / 

assistance necessary to aaslsc In Chat endeavor. Accordingly, 
■V. 

I am ^Ir^ctlng the CIA co provide whaccver asslscance Ic can to 

chose privaCe parcles In C^elr attempc co achieve Che release 

of Che Americans held hostage. Such asslscance Is to Include che 

provls^o^ of cransporcaclon , com.AunlcaC Ions , anc ochcr aupporc 

necessary co achieve chls Imporcanc objecclve. I underscand that 

as part of these efforts certain foreltn materiel and munitions may 

be provided to the Governaen^ of Iran which is taking steps co 

facilitate the release of the Americans held hostage. 

Because of che extreme sensitivity of this operation, in che 

exercise of my consc Icuc ional authorities I order the Director of 

l. _ 
Central Intelligence not to brief the Congress of the United Scaces 

as provided for in section 501 of the National Security Act of 

1947, as amended, until such time as I may direct otherwlae. 

This written finding ratifies all actions caken by U.S. Cover=- 

Bene officlale in fureherance of chls effort. / 



/ \ 



Partially Ceciassifieil/feleased orl.^^fii&i2^1 
ijnder provli'.ns of E.0. 12356 
by 2. Re^er, Nrticr.al Sec^iiiy Council 



/ 




dU/^ J3S^ 






.33, V^^ 



314 



or S E C R E 1 




UNCLASSIFIED 




6R%e2' 



rinding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Fofig n 
Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended. Concerning 
Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence 
Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than Those 
Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence 
Collectfo" 

-y~ 

have b«*n briefed on the efforts being made by private 
partieB^o obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the 
Middle East, and hereby find that the following operations in 
foreign countries (including all support necessary to such 
operations) are important to the national security of the 
united States. Because of the extreme sensitivity of these 
operations, in the exercise of the President's constitutional 
authorities, I direct the Director of Central Intelligence not 
to brief the Congress of the United States, as provided for in 
Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 
until such time as I may dirtct otherwise. 



SCOPE 

Hostage Rescue 
Middle East 



'ariially Dfciassided/Released on ^~la-f^ & 
untlcj provisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 




DESCRIPTION 



The provision of assistance by the 
:entral Intelligence Agency to 
private parties in their attempt to 
>btain the release of Americans 
)«ld hostage in the Middle East. 
Such assistance is to include the 
provision of transportation, 
communications, and other necessary 
support. As part of these efforts 
certain foreign material and 
munitions may be provided to the 
Government of Iran which is talcing 
steps to facilitate the release of 
the American hostages. 

All prior actions uken 
Government officials in 
of this effort ari her 
ratified. 



by U.S. 
furtherance 



rfcby 



The White House 
Washington, D.C. 

Date: 



c^iih/ in^ 



mmm 



TOP SECRET 




315 






Ayv>iot>ji oc ynsi 



cS Noverter 193S 



Miy,0RA!OL'M FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, U^^N 
Deputy Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs 

SUBJECT: Presidential Finding on Kiddle East 



Pursuant to our conversation this should go to 
the President for his signature and should not be 
passad around in any hands below our level. 



Attachment: 
As stated 







CL BY 00CS074 
RVW OADP. 







CrrAj ^/o 





'A- 



316 



317 



yNClAS^IFlEO 



Section £62 of the 




I ha 
parties t 
Che Middl 
in foreig 
such oper 
the Unite 
these ope 
tutional 
Intellige 
as provid 
of 1947, 



autho^Jtie^ J d!rec''^H °n-''^ President's consti- 
nce not to brief ^H V ^ Director of Central 
ed for in SectiL Jni^^^"" °^ '^^ ""^^ed states, 
as amended! S^tU such°ti''' ^^^i°"-l Security Act 

, until such time as I may direct other-,;ise. 



SCOPE 

Hostage Rescue - 
Middle East 



DESCRIPTION 

The provision of assistance by the 
Central Intelligence Agency to 

nHt^J^^.l^^""^^^ -" «^^^i^ attei.pt to 
obtain the release of A^nericans 
held hostage in the Middle East. 
Such assistance is to include the 
provision of transoortation, 
coir.-nunications, and other necessary 
support. As part of these efforts 
certain foreign materiel and munitions 
may be provided to the Government 
of Iran which is taking steps to 
facilitate the release of the 
American hostages. 

All prior actions taken by u s 
Government officials in furtherance 
Of this effort are hereby ratified. 



The White House 
Washington, D.C. 

Date: 



CxrA/ '^/a3 






uifm 



(317) 





a'SGpR 



tR TS0188 85 
Cr of CYS 



318 



t^Lu^^t^ 






S> 




7 Oecenber 1985 



\ 

\JH FOR THE RECORD 



ECT: MSC Mission 



* EXHIBIT 



l.'VOn S«turd4y, 23 Novenber 198S. Ed Juchniewicz (sked m if I was 
aware of all the activity transpirinq on the effort to get the hosuges 
out. He showed ne a cable to ■■■asking that «e pass a nessage to the 
charge froa the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, The aessage assured the charge that only the Secretary of State 
and Ambassador Oakley were aware of the operation. 1 told Juchniewicz 
that I was unaware of the specifics of the operation but due to the 
sensitivity of the operation. It was appropriate that we pass 
correspondence between the NSC and the ambassadors overseas, but only 
coainuni cations, that we could not be Involved without a Finding. 

2^0jWJonday^h^5th of Novjeinber, while visiting the Office of the 
000. B ^B^B^BB^^BB«as present and h ad given Clair George a Spot 
Report on a flight thatf^p^UHBJUH had made in support of the NSC 
mission. I went through tn^overr|?a^po^ing cut that there was no way 
we could become involved in any ifiplenentation of this mission without a 
Finding. Mr. Juchniewicz explained that we did not make the 
arrangements. When General Secor^ visited the Agency he tried to get 
leads on airlines that night be available to move equipment to the Near 
East in a secure fashion. We tol4 hln we did not have any such airlift 
capability. However, Mr. Juchniewicz' said It was pointed out to General 
Secor^ha^here was a connerclal airlift that night do it owned by ^^ 
^^BBBBMH General Secord then took it from there and made 
arrangements for a flight on a strictly coimercial basis. 

3. Somewhat distressed at tnis turn of events, I irrmediately 
informed our General Counsel a fter confirming wiin Dewey Clarridge our 
involvement. I instructed the ■! personnel to irmedlatelv go over and 
brief the General Counsel and so advised the General CounMl at 6:15, the 
evening of 2S November. He informed me later that nightyihat a Finding 
would b« required, not so nuch from the airlift standpoi/t, but from our 
involvement In Influencing foreign government officials^© assist the 
mission. A Finding was prepared the next day. The Finding w» cleared 
with tne Director who called McFarlane and Don Regan to ascertain that.^ 
indeed this had Presidential approval and to get assurances thit a i — ,^ 
Finding would be so signed. After repeated calls to^AlSC personnel onv "^Q 
27 Moveober and during the week of 2 December continuously rece1v1n5___;:ii^ 
reassurances of the President's Intent to sign the/lnding, we were 
notified on 5 December that Indeed the Finding was signed. The President 
directed us not to infonn Congress for the reason^ of the safety^_ind 
secure release of the hostages until he so directed " 




^//V //2V 



UNCUSSIFltD 



fi::'. 



..^5j: 



CL BY CCS ^Jff? 



319 



onclMfied 



A 






'*^^^^^«Ppro»4l.) " '° '"'""Pt to reactlvue our ^"""^^^ ""t 

■vr our request to 



John M. McM«hon 



00319 



ciiN ii:l^ 



WUSSlFltO 



9g^!>CT 



[ittftin »;^L^ I? ^ f !g I 



320 




321 



NAME: HIR216002 



PartUy DMlMllM/RaiM^ed 



RPTS DOTSON 
DCMN GLASSNAP 



mms,M 



V^o\Tb-\M^\s-^ 



DEPOSITION or FATHER THOMAS DOWLING 

Tuesday, August 4, 1987 

U.S. House oi Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington , D . C. 



The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., B-352, 
Rayburn House Office Building, Thomas Fryman presiding. 

Present: Thomas Fryman, on behalf of the House Select 
Committee . 

Henry J. Flynn, on behalf of the Senate Select Committee. 

James E. Kaplan, on behalf of the Senate Select Committee 

Also present: Frank U. Dunham, Jr., on behalf of the 
Witness . 



-^ft 



ofcj 



provWom o( E.0. 123J« V 

Nalioful SMurity Council 




322 



HAHE : 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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38 
39 
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41 
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HIR216002 



Whereupon. 



UN%WO 



FATHER THOHAS DOWLIKG, 
was called for examination by Counsel for the House Select 
Committee to Investigate Covert Arras Transactions With Iran, 
and having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows : 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 

2 Would you state your full name for the record 
please ? 

A Thomas Francis Bowling. 

2 What is your occupation? 

A I am a priest and also an executive director of 
Latin America Strategic Studies Institute. 

2 In what church are you a priest? 

A The Old Roman Catholic Church. 

2 Does that go by any other name? 

A Old Catholic. 

2 What is the distinction between Old Catholic Church 
and the Roman Catholic Church? 

A Papal authority, it put it simply. The Old 
Catholic Church is not under the aegis of the Vatican. Its 
primacy is in Ultrecht in Holland. 

2 Is there a head of the Old Catholic Church 
comparable to the Pope in the Roman Catholic Church? 



UIHSSIFiED 



323 



NAME 
47 
<48 

149 
50 
51 
52 
53 

5^ 

55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
6U 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 



UNCLJifflED 



HIR216002 mill I TSIY^^ HM r* I I PAGE 3 

A No. The See of Honor would be something like the 
Episcopal or Anglican situation where Canterbury would be 
the See of Honor, but not necessarily a See of Authority. 

2 Approximately how many members does the Old 
Catholic Church have in the United States? 

A Approximately, the last I have seen, and this is an 
approximation, is around half a million. 

2 And approximately how many members worldwide? 

A Possibly a million. Hainly--the rest of them would 
mainly be in Europe. Actually, I take that back. Several 
million, because there is some in Brazil. In fact, I 
understand there may be as many as two million independe°nt 
Catholics in Brazil. 

2 Is this church also known as the Celtic Catholic 
Church? 

A The Celtic Catholic Church is an independent 
Catholic Church that would derive--its bishops would derive 
its validity of orders from the Old Catholic line, so, yes. 
Although it's just a small group within the, under the 
generic term ''Old Catholic'*. 

2 Are you a part of the Celtic Church? 

A Not now. 

2 You were at some point? 

A I worked with them for several years, yes. 

2 What years? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Vr:Kbi 



324 



HAKE: 

72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
11 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
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86 
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89 
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9 1 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 




IFIED 



HIR216002 IIIVHl«lffVkAinr II PAGE U 

A From about '^&'"Vif'*^9 until '85, I believe. 

2 When you say you worked with them, what do you mean 
by that? 

A I was always under the tutelage of the archbishop. 
Archbishop Verostek, who ordained me. 

2 But you had an association with the Celtic Church 
as well? 

A That is correct, yes. 

2 Could you describe that association? 

A I actually had a small parish in San Francisco 
under their authority where we practiced the Keltic Right. 

2 But you remained under the direction of Archbis-hop 
Verostek? 

A Yes. Because he was my ordaining prelate, and ue 
had an arrangement. 

2 What sort of arrangement? 

C 

A Well, that I would work with the yj^eltic Catholic 

Church but beyond his, I guess you would call it, general 

C 

jurisdiction. But, specifically, I worked with the ^eltic 

Catholic Church. 

2 When were you ordained? 

A '75 . 

2 Do you remember the date? 

A Movember 15. 

2 And where was this? 



UNCtASSIRED 



325 



HAME: 

97 
98 
99 

100 
10 1 
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10U 
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1 1 1 
1 12 
1 13 
1 14 
1 15 
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1 17 
1 18 
1 19 
120 
121 



MiMSm 



HIR216002 Uriim M'lcVU^ITill ^^^^ 

A In San Francisco. 

fi What church? 

A Trinity Episcopal Church. 

2 Uere you ordained as an Episcopal priest? 

A No, under the Old Catholic Church by Archbishop 
Veros tek . 

2 What is the relationship between the Old Catholic 
Church and the Episcopal Church? 

A They uere simply using part of the church for 
services on a particular basis, this particular Episcopal 
Church. In Europe, there has been inter-church union for a 
long time. 

2 But between members of the Episcopal Church and the 
Old Catholic Church? 

A Yes . 

2 Do you go by the title Father Dowling? 

A Yes , correct . 

2 Where do you presently reside. Father Dowling? 

A In San Franciscc 




8 What is your present employment? You mentioned you 
work for the Latin America Strategic Studies Institute. Do 
you have a church at the present tine? 

A I am associate pastor at a church in San Pablo, 
California, Saint Monica's Old Catholic Church. 



UNCLASSIHED 



326 



NAME : 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
1 32 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
H40 
m 1 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 



ura^ou characterize that as a 



AGE 6 
full-time job? 



HIR2 16002 

2 Uou] 

A Mo . 

2 How much time do you spend there? 

A If I an in the area, which I have been lately, I 
practice, I have Sunday services and do some counseling, but 
it is not by any means, at this moment anyway, it is not a 
full-time job. 

2 How many members are there in that church? 

A In the parish itself, about 25 to 30 members. 

2 Is there another priest? 

A Yes. 

2 Who IS that? 

A Father William Arvogast. 

2 Is he the priest in charge of the parish? 

A Yes. He is the pastor. 

2 And you consider yourself associate pastor? 

A That is correct. 

2 Are there any other associate pastors? 

A No. 

2 Oo you have an affiliation with any other church at 
this time? 

A No, I don't. 

2 Now, do you still come under the direction of 
Archbishop VerosteK? 

A Yes. 




327 



NAME: 
147 

ms 

150 
151 
152 
153 
15U 
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163 
16M 
165 
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169 
170 
171 



HIR216002 
2 
A 



UNCk^e 



PAGE 




What is the address of the church. Saint Monica's? 
I don't have the number exactly. It is on^^^^^^l 

Isan Pablo. 
P-a-b-1-o? 
Yes . California . 
What is your date of birth? 
August 19, 19U7. 
And your social security nunber? 



A 

A 

Q 

A 

2 Where did you obtain your undergraduate degree? 

A I went to the University of San Francisco in San 
Francisco . 

2 Did you obtain a degree? 

A I obtained a degree through Saint Patrick's 
Seminary . 

2 Do you have an undergraduate bachelor's degree? 

A Yes . They add it onto the theology courses . I uas 
a couple courses short when I left USF, so the bachelor's 
degree is actually awarded. 

2 When were you at USF? 

A '65, roughly, to '69. 

2 And you left a couple of courses short of-- 

A I uas a couple, yes, about two I think, two 
courses . 

2 Was there any reason you did not finish? 



UNCIHtSSIFIED 



328 



KAHE : 

172 
173 

1714 

175 
176 
177 
178 
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180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
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186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
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195 
196 



HIR2 16002 



Mmm.i 



It was just a matter of not getting all the units 



2 And you went to Saint Patrick's? 

A Saint Patrick's Seminary, yes. 

2 Where is that? 

A Menlo Park, California. 

2 When did you begin there? 

A The fall of '69. 

2 And you obtained a degree there? 

A Yes . 

2 When did you obtain that degree? 

A In '74. 

2 And uhat degree? 

A A Master of Divinity. 

2 And you also obtained a bachelor's degree? 

A Yes. It may have been actually through the--there 
was a college attached in Mountain View by the same name. 

2 Is Saint Patrick's Seminary a seminary of the Old 

Catholic Church? 

A No. 

2 What — 

A Roman Catholic Church. 

2 It is a seminary of the Roman Catholic Church? 

A Yes . 

2 Were you raised as a Roman Catholic? 




329 



NAME: 
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209 
2 10 
2 1 1 
2 12 
2 13 
2 m 
2 15 
2 16 
217 
2 18 
2 19 
220 
22 1 



HIR2 16002 

A Yes 
e 

priest ? 





PAGE 



Was it your intention to become a Roman Catholic 



A When I entered Saint Patrick's, yes. 

S Why did your plans change? 

A Well--let's see, that is a real subjective question. 
I think there was a lot of turmoil in the church at the 
time. My oun sense of what the church, what was going on m 
the church radically changed through my seminary training, 
and when I left the seminary, I was given the option by the 
Old Catholic Church in early 1975 to pursue orders with 
them. It wasn't a radical departure from Catholicism, in ray 
opinion . 

2 Did you have the option to become a Roman Catholic 
priest? 

A Yes. X was never thrown out or expelled. 

2 What is the relationship between the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Old Catholic Church? 

A Well, the Catholic Encyclopedia, which I spent some 
time reading lately, defines the Old Catholic Church as a 
church with valid orders, something like the Orthodox 
Church, the Eastern Orthodox Churches. That is the status 
the Roman Church gives it. It's technically not in union or 
not m union with Rome, but, in other words, the actions of 
an Old Catholic priest are considered to be valid actions 



UMIiUSSIFIED 



330 



HAME: 
222 
223 
224 
22S 
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24 1 
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245 
246 




HIR216002 lllllll' nTlllll ll_U PAGE 10 
sacramentally . just as the actions of an Eastern Orthodox, 
Russian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox would be considered to be 
valid actions sacramentally. 

2 Did you have to go through some procedure to be 
received into the Old Catholic Church? 

A Yes. It uas just a small ceremony. 

2 Did that constitute a break of your ties with the 
Roman Catholic Church? 

A I would say the active ordination was the final, 
was probably more of a break. 

2 In your capacity as a priest of the Old Catholic 
Church, is it your understanding that you can perform any 
services on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church. 

A Hot in the normal order of things, no. 

2 What order of things could you perform such 
service ? 

A Canon 844 of the Roman Catholic Canon Law, Section 
2, states that a priest in valid orders can in an emergency 
situation or in a situation where there is no regular 
Catholic, Roman Catholic priest attending to the Catholics, 
then a priest of valid orders, a priest in valid orders, 
it's permissible for Roman Catholics to attend that service 
and receive the sacraments. 

2 It is your understanding a priest of the Old 
Catholic Church is a priest in valid-- 



\iHttJsa© 



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uNwra 



PAGE 1 1 



Absoluteiy , 



2 Would that be true of an Episcopal Church? 

A That gets questionable. 

e What is the difference? 

A There's a debate. I would say a dialogue, going on 
right now between the Roman Church and the Anglican Church 
over that issue. There was a papal announcement, a rather 
strong one, around 1890 by Leo XIII where he declared 
Anglican Orders to be null and void. Since then there has 
been a lot of progress, and I would think the average priest 
considers the orders are probably valid. 

To ray knowledge, there has not been an official' 
statement made regarding Old Catholic Orders. 

2 And just for the record, what is the official 
statement that you are referring to? 

A It's in the Catholic Encyclopedia, another 
of f icial--the Almanac, the Catholic Almanac, the official 
Roman Catholic Almanac. And I believe in that statement by 
Pope Leo XIII, there was a specific statement to the 
validity of Roman Catholic Orders, but I am not sure of 
that. 

2 Have you ever served in the military? 

A No . I have not. 

2 Beginning with your graduation from Saint Patrick's 
Seminary in 1974, would you just list the positions you have 



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HIR2 16002 



UNCU^IdED 



PAGE 12 



NAHE 

272 held in the church chronologically? 

273 A Sure. I was first attached to--there uas an Old 
27U Catholic parish in San Francisco, Saint Justin's, attached 

275 to Trinity Church where I was ordained. 

276 2 What years were those? 

277 A '75 thr ough--well , through summer of '76, and then 

278 we set up. several groups set up an ecumenical chapel at the 

279 Council of Churches Building, and I was involved in that for 

280 about a year and a half, two years. 

281 e So that IS about '76? 

282 A I would say the middle of '76. 

283 2 To '78? 

28U A Yes, '78, correct. 

285 2 And that was your only church affiliation? 

286 A Yes. 

287 2 An ecumenical Chapel? 

288 A Yes. Several groups used to participate. There 

289 was a Presbyterian group. The aegis was controlled by the 

290 Council, San Francisco Council of Churches. 
29 1 2 And then after that? 

292 A I set up an ecumenical mission in the Tenderloin of 

293 San Francisco called Saint Andrews. And it was mainly 

294 geared for older people, the elderly. At that time, 

295 particularly, there were thousands of indigent elderly in 

296 the Tenderloin, and we had services, weekly services. I ran 




333 



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31 1 
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313 

3m 

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HIR2 16002 



SECRET 



PAGE 13 



bus trips--in fact, one year I spent a year doing counseling 
in one of the hotels in the Tenderloin. 

e What year uas that? 

A I think '79. 

G 1978-1979? 

A You mean the mission? 

e The period . 

A '78 to approximately '81, early '81. 

S Did you have an affiliation with any other church 
during that point? 

A Well, at that time I started to work the Keltic 
Catholic Church also. In probably early '79. 

2 Is that the parish you described earlier? 

A Well, the mission, yes, the mission uas in the 
Tenderloin . 

Q Ue uere talking about Saint Andrews in the 
Tenderloin? 

A That is correct. 

Q Ue uere also talking earlier-- 

A No . No , no . 

2 If you would just then--during the period you uere 
associated with Saint Andrew's in the Tenderloin, uere you 
associated with any other church? 

A No, I uas not. 

2 You were with Saint Andrews from '78 to '81? 



uNeraFO 



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HIR2 16002 



WMiB 



PAGE 14 



That is correct. 



2 And after that what? 

A Ue continued Saint Andrews, but I moved it to a 
Presbyterian Church where we shared facilities, the Seventh 
Avenue Presbyterian Church. In other words, I broadened the 
outreach from being in a rather--in the Tenderloin to a more 
residential area of San Francisco. 

2 Mas that move m 1981? 

A That was in '81, yes. 

e How long did you continue there? 

A Through '84, actually. 

2 And in that approximately three-year period, was 
that your full-time occupation? 

A No. I also worked with the San Francisco Chamber 
of Commerce for several years in that period, '81-'82. 

2 what were you doing there? 

A X was the neighborhood business representative. 

2 Any other church affiliation? 

A During that period, no. 

2 And then after 1984, what church affiliation did 
you have? 

A Well, '86--'85 I was doing a lot of house Masses. 
Ue kept Saint Andrew's alive as a community by going around 
to several house Masses, particularly among Nicaraguan 
people. I got invited to do several house Masses, and we 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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35 1 
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371 



HIR216002 



UNClMFltD 



PAGE 15 



would do them on a regular, i£ possible, a regular period of 
tine. There was a retired Roman Catholic priest who helped 
me out when I wasn't around. 

e But this was still as a part of your work with 
Saint Andrews ? 

A That is correct, yes. 

fi And that goes through '85. 

A Pretty much, yes. Yes. 

2 What after that? 

A Then I joined up with Saint Monica's as associate 
pastor right around January--! think it was early '86. 

2 Now, other than your church activities, you 
mentioned working for the San Francisco Chanber of Commerce? 

A Yes. 

2 You mentioned the Latin American Strategic Studies 
Institute . 

A That is right. 

2 What other professional activities have you had? 

A I also worked in the travel business during the 
late '70s for the local travel company. Gray Line. 

2 Gray Land? 

A Gray Line. The same as they have here. 

2 What did you do there? 

A I was in sales . 

2 Any other business activity? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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3914 
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396 



HIR216002 



No. 



mvijmm 



PAGE 16 



Q What did you do for the San Francisco Chamber of 
Commerce as a neighborhood business representative? 

A I would represent the Chamber. There was concern, 
particularly at that period of time, over the fact local 
businesses were not sharing in the wealth, so to speak, and 
there was a lack of concern for small businesses, so I would 
go out to the small businesses and try to bring them in, 
actually get them to be members, if possible, of the 
Chamber. Ue worked on all kinds of street cleaning 
projects, neighborhood restoration types of things. 

2 Have you ever been employed by or have any contact 
with any intelligence agency-- 

A Ho , sir . 

2 --of the United States Government? 

A No , sir . 

2 You mentioned the Latin American Strategic Studies 
Institute . 

A Yes. 

2 What is the nature of that organization? Is it a 
corporation? 

A It is registered in the District of Columbia as a 
nonprofit corporation. Its purpose is to promulgate 
information concerning issues in Central America. 

2 When was this founded? 



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398 
399 

UOO 
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402 
U03 
MOU 
MOS 
406 
407 
408 
409 
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4 1 1 
4 1 2 
4 13 
4 14 
415 
4 16 
4 17 
418 
4 19 
420 
42 1 



HIR2 16002 



In 1985 



UNCLIMED 



PAGE 17 



2 Were you the founder? 

A Myself and Cornelius Barrington. 

2 Who is he? 

A He is the Associate Director of the Institute. 
Research. I would put it more directly, he is in charge of 
the research library. We have developed quite a library on 
Central America. 

2 Is this a full-time occupation for him? 

A It has been. yes. 

2 What did he do before? 

A He was a management consultant. 

2 With what firm? 

A I am not sure. He had something called, this is 
Health Management Services or--he was in health care anyway. 

2 What had your prior association with Mr. Barrington 
been? 

A I had worked with him briefly on developing a jobs 
program for the indigent in San Francisco. 

2 Was Linda Guell involved in the founding of the 
Latin American Strategic Studies Institute? Which I guess 
is also known as LASSI, its initials. 

A Yes. 

2 Was she involved with LASSI? 

A Yes. 



UN6{^SIFSED 



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NAME: HIR216002 



U22 
(423 

14214 
425 




PAGE 



18 



2 In what capacity' 

A She offered a shell corporation. Western Legal 
Foundation, which was inactive at the time, to us, to 
reinstate it as LASSI . 



UNetl^SIFIED 



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NAME: 
•426 
M27 
■428 
■429 
1430 
431 
M32 
433 
U3U 
1435 
436 
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439 
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441 
442 
443 
444 
445 
446 
447 
448 
449 
450 



HIR2 16002 



DCHN GLASSNAP 



UN6iSSIHED 



PAGE 19 



Q Was the name changed? 

A Yes. 

2 So it really--! don't want to be technical about 
this, but the organizational structure was in place before 
1985, and there was a name change, is that correct? 

A And a board change, et cetera. Place. Well, not 
place so much as Dust a board change, name change. 

S Nou, when the name was changed to LASSI in 1985, 
who became members of the board? 

A Myself, Cornelius Barrington, and Father Leonard 
Smith . 

e Who is Father Smith? 

A He is a retired Roman Catholic Priest living in San 
Francisco . 

2 Were there officers of LASSI as well? 

A Ves. 

2 Who uere the officers? 

A I am President, Father Smith is Secretary, and Mr. 
Barrington is Vice President, and ue had some changes, so I 
am not even--he may be Treasurer right now. I don't know 
what the last papers said. But, anyuay , I was President- 
Treasurer at first, and ue may have changed that. 

2 What was the reason for changing this organization 



mmmm 



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452 
•453 

454 
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475 



HIR216002 



UNniHED 



PAGE 20 



that uas in eKistence into this new structure that went 
under the name of LASSI? 

A Well, it uas very simple. Instead of starting out 
fresh going through the full process of applying for a new 
organization, when ue were offered an existing organization, 
ue just simply took that on. 

2 Let me rephrase my question. What was the reason 
you needed an organization? 

A Okay. My thinking at the time, and Mr. 
Harrington's, was that a systematic information network 
needed to be developed exposing what, in my opinion, and 
other people's opinions was going on in Central America," 
particularly regarding Nicaragua, but also regarding 
economic development in El Salvador, Guatemala. 

2 What were the deficiencies in this regard that you 
had observed that made you feel there was a need for this 
sort of organization? 

A Well, I found a tremendous lack of information 
getting out. If you want to put it on the side of the 
democratic, what was happening in Central America regarding 
the development of democracy, the potential for common 
development, I found there was a tremendous amount of 
information coming from groups that opposed the Reagan 
policy, for instance, or the policies of the various 
governments down there, except, of course, the present 




341 



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1479 
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M9M 
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M98 
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HIR216002 



un(^ssif;ed 



PAGE 21 
government in Nicaragua. And I just ielt that if I was 
going to do anything, it should be systematic, that people 
needed to get information. 

e What was the origin of your interests in Nicaragua 
and Central America? 

A Well, you may or may not know, San Francisco has 
about 50,000 Nicaraguans , the Bay Area, about 180,000. My 
interest really developed by meeting several Nicaraguans 
over the years. It was actually through my work at the 
Chamber. I met several of them through small businesses, a 
lot of them have small businesses. And they found out that 
I was also a clergyman and they felt strongly, they invited 
me to a few meetings of some groups they started, the 
committees, or ad hoc things, and they were sort of feeling 
very forlorn, particularly around '83 or '84, that their 
point of view was not getting out. 

2 So your interest in the region grew out of this 
contact? 

A That is correct, yes. 

2 And you began reading publicly available 
information? 

A That is true. Books, you name it. 

2 And you concluded that there was a shortage of 
information — 

A That is correct. ^^IS." 




342 



NAME: 
501 
502 
503 
50M 
505 
506 
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508 
509 
510 
51 1 
512 
513 
51M 
515 

- 516 
517 
518 
519 
520 
521 
522 
523 
524 
525 



HIR2 16002 



uNaiSSiHto 



PAGE 22 



2 --from a particular point of view? 

A That is correct. 

2 And you began LASSI in order to meet this need? 

A That uas basically the reason, to put it in a 
systematic way, yes. I certainly didn't-- 

2 Nou you say Linda Guell turned this existing 
organization over to you. I think that is a fair phrasing 
oi what you said? 

A Yes. 

2 Did she continue to have any association uith it? 

A She stayed on to help us with the books, accounting 
procedures, et cetera. 

2 Was she an officer? 

A No. 

2 Uas she a board member? 

A No . 

2 Uas she an employee? 

A On a consulting basis, yes. 

2 Did LASSI open a bank account? 

A Yes . 

2 Uhat bank? 

A Sovran Bank in Alexandria. 

2 Any other bank accounts? 

A Yes. Ue had an operational account in San 
Francisco . 



343 



NAME: 
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529 
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531 
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533 
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• 547 
548 
549 
550 



HIR216002 



UN^I^IFIED 



PAGE 23 



2 What uas the reason for an account in Washington, 
D.C. if you and Mr. Harrington and Father Smith were all in 
San Francisco? 

A Well, our intention, if things had gone the way ue 
had planned, uas to actually have a Washington office and 
wor)<--I mean, I realized very early on if ue are going to 
disseminate information that this is the information capital 
of the world probably. 

So I had absolute plans to develop a Washington 
presence . 

2 Were the Washington bank accounts or bank account 
and the San Francisco bank account opened at the sane time? 

A Approximately, yes. I think they were opened — it 
uas the early part of '86. I am not sure of the exact 
dates . 

e What bank was the account in San Francisco? 

A The Hybernia Bank. 

Q You described that as an operational account? 

A Well, in the sense that ue did some public document 
stuff. For instance, ue put out something called 
Misconceptions of Facts Regarding Nicaragua, and we actually 
put them out in San Francisco. 

2 Did you receive funds from LASSI? Did you receive 
a salary? 

A I received expenses, and I received a minimal 



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NAME: 
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552 
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55M 
555 
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568 
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570 
57 1 
572 
573 
574 
575 



HIR216002 
salary, yes. 
Q Has 






PAGE 2^ 



n Bank or the Hybernia 



Bank account? 

A There uas--well, the only expenses were--I would say 
Sovran. Sovran. When I say salary, income which I was 
clearing . 

9. Did you consider the Sovran account the more 
significant of the two accounts, the larger account? 

A Yes , yes . 

e Do you know Adolfo Calero? 

A Yes. 

2 How did you meet him? 

A I met him in San Francisco at one of these ad hoc 
committees the Hicaraguans put together. 

Q When did you meet him? 

A It was sometime in February of 'St. 

2 This was before you established LASSI? 

A Oh. yes. 

2 Do you recall who introduced you? 

A It was at a meeting . I may have even gone up and 
introduced myself. He was a speaker at a meeting in San 
Francisco . 

& Did you talk with him for a period of time? 

A No, not at that meeting. Maybe shook hands with 
him. 




345 



576 
577 

578 
579 
580 
581 
582 
583 
58M 
585 
586 
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590 
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59<4 
595 
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600 



HIR216002 



UNdl^lFlED 



PAGE 25 



Did you see him on other occasions in '8><? 



A Yes. I think he came out to San Francisco in June, 
and there was an ad hoc committee set up to organize the 
trip to San Francisco. 

2 Were you a member oi that committee? 

A Yes , I was . 

2 Do you know why you were selected for that 
committee ? 

A I am not absolutely sure, but I suspect it was 
because oi my having been in contact with several people in 
the Nicaraguan Community and also they knew I had had some 
contact with the business community in San Francisco. 

2 Did you spend time with Mr. Calero in connecti-on 
with your work on this committee? 

A In June? 

2 Yes. 

A Hot really, no. It was partly a social trip for 
him, too. 

2 Did you have other contacts with him in 198U? 

A Yes. One more in September. He came out again to 
San Francisco. 

2 Uhat was the purpose of that trip? 

A That was to speak to the Commonwealth Club. No, 
wait a minute, I could be ahead of myself. It was to speak 
to several groups of people anyway. I am not sure it was 



UlieMSSlFEED 



346 



UISIISSIFSED .. 



NAHE: HIR216002 -^ «3IJ««ifjB^» «# 1 1 Bkl# PAGE 26 

60 1 tha Conmonwealth Cluh. S«v«zal ssEvica ozganlzations 

602 anyway. 

603 2 W«ra you involved in tha planning for that? 

60^ A I did soma help, yes. Ua also had a church service 

605 that he--uell, he actually didn't attend it because he was 

606 late. 

607 2 Did you have any further contact with Hr . Calero in 

608 198U? 

609 A Ho, sir. 

6 10 S So you met him in February for the first time? 

611 A Right. 

6 12 2 And then he made two other trips, one in June and 

6 13 one in September? 

614 A Right. 

615 2 Did you receive any money from Hr . Calero in 198i4? 

616 A No. sir. 

6 17 2 So all of the work you ware doing was on a 

6 18 volunteer basis? 

619 A Absolutely. 

620 2 Kow, turning to 1985, did you sea Mr. Calero at any 

621 time in 1985? 

622 A Yes. I saw him in January of '85. 

623 2 Hhat was that occasion? 

62<4 A He had invited ma down to tha cam^sj 
6 2s|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|and saw 



UKOiASSIF^ED 



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KAMI: 
626 

627 
628 
629 
630 
631 
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633 
63U 
635 
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6M2 
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6M7 
6U8 
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650 



HIR216002 



unMssifsed 



P»GE 27 



niani--and met hin ^^^^^^^^^^flater on that w««k, toward th« 
end of Januaiy. I am not sure exactly when it was. 

S He paid for your trip? 

A Yes, he did. 

2 How was that paid? 

A I believe through his credit card, the flight. 

S What about your other expenses? 

A He gave me a couple, a few hundred dollars m 
traveler's checks. It was a rather minimal amount. 

2 Did he give you any other payment other than to 
cover expenses for that trip? 

A No, sir. 

2 How long was that trip? 

A naybe ten days . 

2 And did you accompany tlr . Calero on the trip, or 
did you meet himi 

A I met himI 

2 Who accompanied you on the trip? 

A It was one oi the Klcaraguans from Miami. I think 
It was a gentleman by the name of Jose Tefel. 

2 Any American accompany you? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did you meet any Amttxieans on that trip? 

A I briefly met Congressman HcColluii| 

2 Anyone else? 




-=6^ ^S^ 



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memm .... 



HXR216002 U II V!,««£nR,4Hi" " PAGE 28 

A Hell, whttn I want to thtt canps, it saams liKa thara 
uece several Americans. 

2 Did you meet Rob Ouan? 

A I met Rob Owen at the Hiani Airport ior like five 
minutes. I was introduced to him. 

2 By whom? 

A Adolfo Calero. 

2 Do you know what Hr . Owan was doing there? 

A I do not. That was my first encounter. I had never 
met him before . 

2 Was It a chance encounter? 

A I believe so. That was ay impression. 

2 Was it your impression that Hr . Calero's meetiTig 
with him was a chance encounter? 

A It seemed like it was. 

2 They just passed each other? 

A Yes, exactly. Ha was going soma place. I think he 
was going to Washington, I was going ^^^^^^^^^^^^H I 
don't know where Rob Owen was going. 



UN^SSIFIED 



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NAME: 

670 
671 
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693 
69(4 



HIR216002 



RPTS LYDA 



DCMH DANIELS 



PAGE 29 



UNCellSlFIED 



[ n : 30 a.n. 1 

HR. FRYHAN: Back on th« racord. 
B5f MR. FRYHAK: 
2 Father Dowling, bafota tha braak, ua ware talking 
about youz trip with Hz. Calato^|^^^^^^^Hin Januaty 1975. 
You indicated that tha tzip lasted approximately ten days . 
A Cozzect. 

2 Youz expenses uere paid, but you received no other 
conpensation ioz the tzip? 
A Correct. 

2 I believe we were talking about what you consi(I«red 
a chance encounter with Rob Owen in the Hiani Airport as you 
were leaving ^^^^H^f^^^g is 
A That is right. 

2 Hhat did you do on this ten-day trip? 
A I went into the cami^^^^^^^^^^ 

\d had a religious 

serv] 




350 



KANE 
695 

696 

6 97 
698 
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700 

70 1 
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70U 
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lai 

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7 10 

71 1 
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719 



HIR216002 



What • 



lINOmSIFIED 



PIGK 30 




I was introduced to lots oi paopl« 

knd also taXan out to tha placa callac 
uhich was like a cami 

e Anything else? 

A I was at the U.S. Embassy briefly. 

2 Who did you meet there? 

A I met maybe ioi iive minutes with the ambassador 




2 Did you meet anyone else? 
A Again, Congressman HcCollua. 
2 Anyone else? 

A Nobody that I can remember. There were severaJt 
staii people, but nobody I can remember. 

2 What else did you do on this trip? 
A Well, I went 
2 What did you do there? 

A That was mainly a visit to a very elderly 
g e n 1 1 e m an i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 




2 What did you understand the reason that Hr . Calero 
was taking you to Central America and paying your expenses 
for this trip? 

A Well, one of then was to have a religious service 



lUfELASSIFlED 



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KAME: 
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736 
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738 
739 
7140 
714 1 
7U2 
7143 
714U 



HIR216002 



UNfWIFIED 



PkGK 31 



because he said there had been no teliglous sarvlces in 
there for six or seven or eight months. He kneu I had an 
interest in the subject and he wanted ne to see first hand. 

2 So you understood he uas flying you from San 
Francisco to Central America to perform mass? 

A That is correct. 

2 That uas the principal purpose of your trip? 

A That is all we talked about, right. 

S Did he know you were not a Roman Catholic priest? 

A Yes . 

2 Uas he a Roman Catholic? 

A Yes . 

S Do you speak Spanish? 

A At that time. I certainly did not. 

2 Did you perform the mass in Spanish? 

A Yes, I got through it by studying the phonetic 
system and having whatever was not essential done by others. 

2 Did nr . Calero ever indicate why he particularly 
wanted you to perform this mass? 

A No. 

2 He didn't give you any indication why he couldn't 
find a priest who was geographically closer than you? 

A As I found out subsequently, there have been 
tremendous problems with that simple fact, that they have 
not been able to get priests who were geographically closer 



inigUSSlFlED 



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KAMI 

1U5 
746 
747 
7M8 
7149 
750 
751 
752 
753 
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755 
756 
757 
758 
759 
760 
761 
762 
763 
76U 
765 
766 
767 
768 
769 



UNCimJF!ED 



HIR216002 liraiafrllKm^lnlPHr II PAGZ 32 

e Do you know ii h« tii«d to gat a priast in Miani, 
ior exampla? 

A I think they hava baan constantly trying to gat 
ptiests to go in thare. 

2 Did you hava any discussion with Hr . Calaro about 
the fact you were not a Roman Catholic priest? 

A I believe I mentioned it to him, but I said I have 
valid orders and X askad him whan tha last time was that a 
Roman Catholic priest had been in there and he said it had 
been a long, long time. 

Q Was 2.t your understanding that the persons who' 
attended the mass ware members of the Roman Catholic Church? 

A My understanding was that they were members oi~ all 
kinds oi churches. There is a vary large Protestant 
Evangelical community among tha contras. vary large. 

& And they participated in the mass? 

A We did not hava communion because there wer< 
people. The mass was just said. There was no giving out of 
communion because it would have been logistically 
impossible . 

2 Did you have any further contact with Hr . Calero in 
1985 after this trip in January? 

A Yes, I did. 

2 What was the next contact? 

A I met him again in Washington, D.C. before Easter 



U^ASSIFSED 



353 



HIR2 16002 



UNClMlfED 



PAGE 33 



HAHE 

770 oi that year. It was the latter part of March or the early 

77 1 par t of April . 

772 2 Did you come to Washington to meet with him? 

773 A Ves. 

7714 2 How did he contact you? Did he call you in San 

775 Francisco? 

776 A Ue had a couple of phone conversations, maybe two 

777 in February and March. I mentioned to him that I was 

778 interested. He mentioned to me after the trip. I should 

779 say. would I occasionally speak on the issue. X thought 

780 about it and said that I would. 

781 2 He mentioned this in the phone conversations? 

782 A Yes. 

783 2 Then he asked you to come? 

784 A He may have said something about it when I met hira. 

785 Just before I left Central America. I met him briefly down 

t 

786 there. He had come in. 

787 2 And he asked you to come to Washington to meet with 

788 him in March or April? 

789 A Yes . I may have suggested the actual meeting 

790 because I said. ''Well, I would like to talk to you.*' 

791 2 Did he pay your expenses? 

792 A Yes. he paid for the air faze. 

793 2 How did he pay for that? 
791 A His credit card. 



UH^ASSIFSED 



354 



NAHE: 
795 
796 
797 
798 
799 
800 

80 1 
802 
803 
SOU 
805 
806 
807 
808 
809 
810 

81 1 
812 
813 
8m 
815 
816 
817 
818 
819 



HIR216002 
S 
A 
agency . 
2 
A 
2 
A 
& 
A 



Did he send you a ticket? 



PAGE 34 



No. I used his credit card number at a travel 



He had given you his credit card number? 
That is correct, yes. 
Was it an American Express card? 
That is correct; Yes, sir. 
How long did you stay in Washington? 
It was not longer than a week. I would say 
possibly six days. 

2 And he paid your expenses here? 

A Actually, no, he did not that particular week. I 
believe Western Goals had put me up in a hotel. 

2 At that time, was Western Goals an organization run 
by Linda Guell? 

A Correct. 

2 What did you do during this week in Washington? 
A I met with Calero once or maybe twice and I met 
several people. X met Mr. Ketamorris . I met Hr . Owen. 

2 What did you understand was the reason they wanted 
you here for a week, they being Calero and Guell? 

A There was no real decision that I needed to be here 
for a week. I suggested that Calero and I needed to talk if 
I was going to do any speaking on what I saw was going on in 
Nicaragua or in Central America. 



^rc 




355 



NAME 
820 
82 1 
822 
823 
82>4 
825 
826 
827 
828 
829 
830 
831 
832 
833 
8314 
835 
836 
837 
838 
839 
8H0 
8M1 
8142 
8t43 
8i4i4 



UNCk'^tFSED 



HIR216002 1 1 Bl I - bHJW^^«,r U r 1 1 PAGE 35 

iTust felt that I needed to talk. There was no 
decision that I needed to stay a specific anount of time. 

2 Hou much time did you spend with Caleio during this 
trip? 

A Not much. He had a feu basically pretty 
perfunctory meetings. 

2 Less than an hour? 

A At most, maybe an hour or an hour and a half, I 
would say . • 

2 Did you talk about your proposed speaking 
engagements ? 

A Yes. 

2 Anything else? 

A That was it, yes. 

2 Did he give you any money during this trip? 

A Ho, he did not. 

2 Hou many other times did you see Mr. Calero in 
1985? 

A Numerous, numerous. 

2 nor* than ten? 

A I would say so, yes. 

2 At some point in 1985, did you begin to b« 
compensated by Hz. Calero? 

A I was compensated for expenses, yes, sir. 

2 Nothing else? 



l«ftlASS\F!ED 



356 



NAME: 
8145 
8U6 
8U7 
8M8 
849 
850 
851 
852 
853 
SSM 
855 
856 
857 
858 
859 
860 
86 1 
862 
863 
86<4 
865 
866 
867 
868 
869 



HIR216002 



•""^u^so 



PAGE 36 



That is correct. 



2 Were you performing services for Hr . Calero after 
this meeting in Washington in the spring? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did you assist him? 

A naybe you ought to define services. 

2 Did you provide any assistance to Mr. Calero? 

A I thought you meant religious. 

2 No; any assistance. 

A I went out speaking to Rotary Clubs, various 
organizations . The agreement uas that he would compensate 
me for my travel expenses and the incidentals on the road. 
I did a lot of traveling in 1985. 

2 How did he compensate you? 

A Traveler's checks. 

2 Did he give you a block of traveler's checks in 
advance or reimburse you after you occurred the expenses? 

A Essentially it was a reimbursement. I would call 
him or call his--whoever--in Miami and just say, ''This is 
what I need.'' It was basically an honor system. 

2 Why didn't you use his credit card number? 

A Well, you can't for anything but airline travel. 

2 Did you continue to use the number for air tickets? 

A Yes . 

2 How, you say you saw him numerous times after the 



bMassified 



357 



NAHE' 
870 
87 1 
872 
873 
874 
875 
876 
877 
878 
879 
880 
881 
882 
883 
88U 
885 
886 
887 
888 
889 
890 
891 
892 
893 
8914 



HIR216002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



spring meeting during 1985 



/TO? 

SECRL 



A That is correct. 

e Were these meetings in connection with speaking 
tours ? 

A Speaking tours or ii I uas in Washington and he was 
in at the sane time, ue would meet. I don't believe I saw 
him in Miami at all that year, again. He had one tour that 
we did together, a speaking tour. 

2 Uas there any substantive discussion in any of these 
meetings that you had with Mr. Calero about any matter other 
than speeches that you were giving or speeches that he was 
to be giving? 

A Yes; the area of public relations was my major, 
concern. So I would often speak with him personally or on 
the telephone about the need to have a systematic public 
relations campaign for their point of view. 

2 What was his reaction to that? 

A Always positive. He agreed, at least in words. 

2 How, are you aware at sone point he retained a firm 
owned by Richard Miller to do public relations work for him? 

A Yes, but much later in our chronology. 

2 Did that come in 1986 according to your 
understanding? 

A Yes. I mean that is when I was aware of it. 

2 Have you met Mr. Hiller? 



n.r 




358 



NAME: 

895 
896 
897 
898 
899 
900 
90 1 
902 
903 
904 
905 
906 
907 
908 
909 
9 10 
9 1 1 
912 
913 
9 14 
915 
916 
9 17 
918 
9 19 



HIR216002 



JNCLllMlf^ED 



PAGE 38 



e When did you first meet hia? 

A In jogging my menozy. I may have met him socially 
at a party in July 1985 in Uashington at former Congressman 
Kuykendall's office. I was told by him that he met me 
there, but I met a lot of people-- 

2 When is your first recollection? 

A ny first absolute recollection is March of 1986. 

2 Who introduced you then? 

A Adolfo Calero. 

2 A couple of Congressmen have beTi mentioned this' 
morning. You mentioned Congressman HcCollun in connection 
with your trip^^^^^^^^^^^^ Has youz meeting with hin 
a chance meeting that had not been planned in 
advance ? 

A Yes. 

2 How much time did you spend with him in Central 
America? 

A I joined him to see the campi 
^^^^^^^^^^H I would not say we were even alone at any one 



time . 



2 Have you had contact with him since that trip? 

A Yes. 

2 Of what sort? 

A Him personally, very little. I have had contact 



UH^|VSS\F"a 



359 



KANE: 
920 
921 
922 
923 
92>4 
925 
926 
927 
928 
929 
930 
931 
932 
933 
934 
935 
936 
937 
938 
939 
940 
941 
942 
943 
944 



HIR216002 
with his staii 



UNCLIMflED 



PAGE 39 



2 Concerning what? 

A Basically the public relations, the need to get 
information out regarding Central America. 

2 Who have you dealt with on his stafi? 

A Mr. Forrest, Vaughn Forrest, and Hr . Donald 
Mor r issey . 

2 And your contacts with the Congressman have been 
limited ? 

A Just basically hello, how are you. There have been 
very few conversations. 

2 Now you also mentioned a meeting with former 
Congressman Kuykendall that you believe was in July of -1985? 

A That is correct. 

2 What was that occasion? 

A There was a party in celebration of the fact that 
they got the--the humanitarian aid bill had been passed in 
June of 1985. I was in Hashington and I was invited by 
Adolfo Calero to the party. 

2 On how many other occasions have you met 
Congressman Kuykendall? 

A In the last two years, three or four, maybe. 

2 What ware those occasions? 

A Once I went to see him, after the party at his 
office, just about getting a program started with LASSI, 



U»ttllftSS!F!EO 



360 



NAME: 
945 
9M6 
947 
948 
949 
950 
951 
952 
953 
954 
955 
956 
957 
958 
959 
960 
961 
962 
963 
964 
965 
966 
967 
968 
969 



UNCHI^FSED 



HIR216002 
Latin Anerican Strategics Instituta. 



PAGE 40 



2 What else? 

A Other times would have been informal meetings . 

2 When you discussed the PR program/ did you discuss 
funding for LASSI? 

A Yes. 

2 Did he offer you money? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did you ask for money? 

A I asked him if he could help us raise soma funds, 
Yes , sir . 

2 What did he say? 

A Kore or less, but nothing came of it. 

2 In describing your meetings with Calero, you have 
indicated that the frequency of the meetings increased 
substantially in the latter part of 1985 whereas you had had 
infrequent meetings in 1984 and infrequent meetings in early 
1985, but toward the end of ^9S^, you were seeing him on a 
frequent basis? 

A I would not say a frequent basis. We did a 
speaking touz together of Utah, Southern California, and 
Colorado in September of 1985, so I obviously spent some 
time with him then. I would not say I mat Adolfo that 
frequently, maybe once a month. It was usually here in 
Washington . 



Ult^ASSIFSED 



361 



NAME: 
970 
97 1 
972 
973 
974 
975 
976 
'ill 
918 
979 
980 
981 
982 
983 
984 
985 
986 
987 
988 
989 
990 
99 1 
992 
993 
994 



HIR216002 



UNQI^IRED 



PAGE m 



2 How would you characteiize the frequency oi your 
contact uith Calero in 1986? 

A About the same . 

e Were you involved in speaking tours uith him in 
1986? 

A Not with hire personally, but I did do some 
speaking , yes . 

Q Were your dealings with hin in 1986 limited to 
speaking or public relations matters on behalf of the 
Nicaragua resistance? 

A Yes, yes, absolutely. 

2 Was he continuing to pay your expenses in 1986? 

A He did pay some expenses in the early part of '1986. 

2 Did you use his credit card number for plane 
tickets ? 

A Yes. 

2 Did he send you traveler's checks for other 
expenses ? 

A Yes, sir, in the early part. 

2 Did he give you any other compensation other than 
reimbursement of expenses in 1986? 

A Yes. There was a check that I declared as income 
actually or I am declaring as income, 43,000. 

2 That was from whom to whom? 

A That was to me from somewhere in Miami. The check 



Ur^BSSIFSED 



362 



NAME: 
995 
996 
997 
998 
999 
1000 
100 1 
1002 
1003 
100U 
1005 
1006 
1007 
1008 
1009 
10 10 
10 11 
10 12 
1013 
1014 
10 15 
10 16 
10 17 
1018 
10 19 



HIR216002 



oNCWSgSflED 



PAGE ^^ J 

cama from Hiami . I am not sure exactly--but it was from him ' 
essentially . 

2 What was that for? 

A Basically I needed some money to--I asked him for 
some money for living expenses at that time. 

2 That was a check to you, not to LASSI; is that 
correct? 

A That is correct, sir. 

2 Do you know the total amount of traveler's checks 
that you received from Hr . Calero? 

A I really don't, sir. 

2 Would you estimate that it was in excess of 
«1 0,000? 

A It is around that figure. It could be $12,000, I 
have gone back. I don't have the records of that. I asked 
him about it and he didn't have the records, so-- 

2 Are you familiar with an organization called CAUSA, 
C-A-U-S-A? 

A I certainly am. 

2 What is that organization? 

A It is an educational organization that is primarily 
funded by the Unification Church. They have had lots of 
conferences around the country in the last few years. 

2 Is the Unification Church the church that is headed 
by Reverend Moon? 



UNCtftSSIFSED 



363 



NAME: 
1020 
102 1 
1022 
1023 
10214 
1025 
1026 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1030 
1031 
1032 
1033 
1034 
1035 
1036 
1037 
1038 
1039 
1040 

lom 

10(42 
10<43 
1044 



HIR216002 



UNCLlt^lED 



PAGE 43 



A That is correct, sir. 

2 Have you had any involvement in CAUSA activities or 
programs ? 

A I have been a speaker at several CAUSA conferences. 

S On the subject of Central America? 

A That is correct; it is always the subject of 
Central America. 

2 In what period of tine did you give these speeches? 

A Throughout 1985 and into 1986. I think the last 
one I gave was in June of 1986. 

2 Here you compensated for these speeches? 

A I was compensated minimally. 

2 So much per speech? 

A Basically they would give a couple hundred dollars 
if you came to speak. It was not much, but it was 
compensation, yes. 

2 Were they speeches in different areas? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 All in the Hest? 

A Host in the Hest, yes. I can't think of — I may have 
given one in Minnesota. 

2 Who was the individual in CAUSA that invited you to 
give the speeches? 

A Various individuals. They wara divided into 
regions. Ambassador Sanchez bacana rathaz friendly, Phillip 



UNfitlSSIFIED 



364 



10US 
10(46 
10i»7 
10U8 
1049 
1050 
1051 
1052 
1053 
1054 
1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1059 
1060 
1061 
1062 
1063 
10614 
1065 
1066 
1067 
1068 
1069 



liglftSSIFSED 



HIR216002 I IViiaiTft-ill ^ ^ I Bi U l> 1 1 PAGE MU 
Sanchez, who is the President oi CAUSA. 

e Can you identify hiii for the record? 

A Yes, he was fornerly Ambassador to Honduras and 
Colombia, Phillip Sanchez, President of CAUSA, USA. 

2 You say he was Ambassador to Honduras? 

A The United States Ambassador, correct. 

8 And he is now the director-- 

A The president, that is what he calls himself. 

S Do you know if Linda Quelle has any association 
with CAUSA? 

A She had some indirect association with them. 

8 What did you understand that to be? 

A Hell, I met her at a CAUSA conference. This i'5 my 
understanding, I have not seen anything definite, but X ' 
think they may have helped her Western Goals at one time, X 
am not sure . 

2 What is the basis for your belief of that? 

A Her statement to me. 

2 That they contributed? 

A That they contributed, yes. 

2 What was her role in the conference at the time you 
met her? 

A She was simply there as a guest, as X was. 

2 Are you aware of contributions by CAUSA to LASSX? 

A There have not been any to my knowledge. 



yMlflSSIFSED 



365 



NAHE : 

1070 
107 1 
1072 
1073 
107U 
1075 
1076 
1077 
1078 
1079 
1080 
1081 
1082 
1083 
1084 
1085 
1086 
1087 
1088 
1089 
1090 
109 1 
1092 
1093 
10914 



HIR2 16002 



Massifies^ 



2 So you ace not aware oi any? 

A No. Thece have not been any. 

2 Are you aware of any other contributions by CAUSA 
to Mr . Calero ? 

A Mo, sir. 

2 Any other organization involved in any way with 
Nicaragua? 

A No. sir. 

2 Do you know Oliver North? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 When did you first meet hin? 

A I met him in June of 1986. 

2 Do you remember the date? 

A The 5th stands out in ity namory, but don't hold me 
to that. 

2 How did you happen to meet him? 

A It was in the basement of the Hhite House . 

2 Who arranged the meeting? 

A It was not an arranged meeting. It was literally a 
passthrough. He was walking out and we were walking in. 

2 What were you doing in the basement of the White 
House ? 

A I was going to visit Patrick Buchanan. 

2 Had you known Hx . Buchanan? 

A No, sir. 



)y||)|.A$SlFlED 



366 



NAME: 
109S 
1096 
1097 
1098 
1099 
1 100 
110 1 
1 102 
1 103 
1 104 
1 10S 
1 106 
1 107 
1 108 
1 109 
1110 
1111 
1112 
1113 
1114 
1 1 15 
1116 
1117 
1 1 18 
1119 



HIR216002 



uNgef^snED 



PAGE 46 



Q Was this the first time you were going to meet hin? 

A Yes. sir. 

Q Uho arranged that meeting? 

A Colonel. Peno . 

S Uho is he? 

A At that time he was working at the State 
Department. He is a U.S. Army colonel, and tlr . William 
Bodie. They were working for Under Secretary Snyder. I 
believe . 

[Discussion off the record. ) 
By MR. FRYHAM! 

2 Your first meting with Mr. Buchanan, then, was also 
approximately June 5, 1986? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 What had your contacts with Colonel Peno and Mr. 
Bodie in the State Department been? 

A Well, I met them sometime previous to that through 
Congressman McCollum's office. Actually, I think I met them 
in Congressman McCollum's office. 

2 Was this with Mr. Forrest and Mr. Horrissey? 

A I believe it would have been Mr. Forrest. I don't 
think Mr. Morrissey was working at that time for Congressman 
McCollum . 

2 When was that? 

A Probably sometime in 1985. 



URCLASSIFIEO 



367 



NAME: 

1 120 
112 1 
1 122 
1 123 
1 12U 
1 125 
1 126 
1 127 
1 128 
1 129 
1 130 
1131 
1 132 
1 133 
1 134 
1 135 
1 136 
1 137 
1 138 
1 139 
1 H40 
1 mi 
1 142 
1 143 
1 144 



uN(i^iFe 



KIR216002 IIMITSvUlir^RirUriJ page 47 

2 Early 1985? It would hav* baan beiota Juna 1985? 

A Kot necessazily. Ua aza talking Juna of 1986. It 
was soreetlrae in 1985. I don't know whan really. 

2 What was the meeting in Congressman ncCollum's 
office ? 

A Basically they were just up visiting Hr . Forrest. 
I came in and we were chatting about sona oi my experiences 
and what I thought should be done. They ware working 
closely with the Office of Public Diplomacy at that time in 
the State Department. 

2 Who did you understand headed up that office? .Has 
that Otto Reich? 

A It was in the transition period. Somebody by the 
name of John Blanken, Ambassador Blanken headed it up. 

2 And your understanding was that Colonel Peno and 
Mr. Bodie were associated with that office? 

A Yes. 

2 And they ware meeting in Congressman McCollum's 
office in connection with their work for that office? 

A Yes. 

2 What was the subject discussed? 

A Mainly we talked about tha naed to gat information 
out to the general American public. Colonel Pano had a 
great interest in tha Catholic Church in Nicaragua, the 
persecution and whatever. 



tfSfelASSiFe 



368 



NAME: 
1 1US 
1 146 
1 1H7 
1 148 
1 149 
1 ISO 
1 151 
1 152 
1 153 
1 154 
1 155 
1 156 
1 157 
1 158 
1 159 
1 160 
116 1 
1 162 
1 163 
1 164 
1 165 
1 166 
1 167 
1 168 
1 169 



HIR216002 



UHf^SSIFlED , 



AGE 48 



2 Do you know the basis for that interest? 

A He is Cuban and he shared a sinilar experience, I 
believe . 

2 He is a Roman Catholic? 

A Yes . 

8 Was there any discussion about the old Catholic 
Church? 

A No. Ue didn't really discuss religion per se, but 
we discussed the relation of the church to the Sandinistas. 

2 This meeting in Congressman HcCollua's office was 

with Mr. Forrest? 

A I am certain it was. 

2 Mas the Congressman there? 

A No, sir. 

2 It was you, Kr . Bodie, Colonel Peno, and Mr. 
Forrest? 

A Yes. 

2 How did you happen to attend this meeting? 

A Coincidentally . 

2 You just dropped by? 

A Exactly. 

2 And that was the first time you met him? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 That was sometime in 1985? 

A It could have been early 1986, but it was quite a 



mUSSIFIED 



369 




370 



^p^S 


DEHSb 


m 


TDlRL 


pc| 50 - 5^ 



♦ 



371 



MAKE: 

1319 
1320 
132 1 
1322 
1323 
1324 
132S 
1326 
1327 
1328 
1329 
1330 
1331 
1332 
1333 
1334 
133S 
1336 
1337 
1 338 
1339 
1340 
13M 1 
13U2 
1 343 




you or LASSI evar z«c*'iv« 
any funds iron the State Depaztment? 
A Mo, sir. 

2 In no way that you are aware of? 
A Absolutely not. I can state that categorically. 




Utt^ASSIFlED 



372 



MAKE 
13MM 
1345 

late 

1347 

1348 

1349 

1350 

135 

135 

135 

135 

135 

135 

135 

1358 

135 

136 

136 

136 

136 

1 36 

136 

136 

136 

136 



HIR216002 



U|^$ISSIF3ED 



GE 56 



A At that stage, LASSI would have, well, I was still 
flying on the credit card in terns oi airline use. 

e Mr. Calero's? 

A Yes. In terms oi expenses here, it would have been 
LASSI because ue were given a grant to do some work for the 
resistance by IBC in March of 1986, from Richard Miller's 
organization . 




373 



U 



pqs 



IKJ 
pqs 57 - bO 



374 



375 



ii«s« 



NAME 
146 
1470 
147 1 
1472 
1473 
1474 
1475 
1476 
1477 
1478 
1479 
1480 
1481 
1482 
1483 
1484 
1485 
1486 
1487 
1488 
1489 
1490 
1491 
1492 
1493 



PAGE 61 




HR. FRYHAH: Of£ the record. 

[Discussion off the record. ] 

MR. FRYHAH: Back on the record. 

BY HR. FRYHAK: 
2 Father Douling, have you consulted a calendar which 
refreshes your recollection about the date of the meeting 
with Mr. Buclianan? 
A Yes. sir. 

2 What do you believe the date to be? 
A The 5th of June. 
2 1986. 
A Correct. 




2 Who went with you? 

A Colonel Peno and Hz. Bodie. 

2 This is the occasion where you ran into Colonel 

North in the baseiient hallway? 

A Correct, sir. 

2 Hho introduced you to Colonel Korth? 

A Colonel Peno andxor Hz. Bodie. They knew hin. 

2 What did they say about him? 

A They said. ''That is Ollie Korth. '" I had heard of 



UNIiSSIHED 



376 



» 



1494 
1495 
1496 
1497 
1498 
1499 
1500 
150 1 
1502 
1503 
1504 
1505 
1506 
1507 
1508 
1509 
1510 
1511 
1512 
15 13 
15 14 
1515 
1516 
1517 
1518 



HIR2 16002 
Ollie North. 



\«WJ» 



PAGE 



62 



2 Did you shake hands? 

Yes, ue hands ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
e Hou long did that last? 

A It uould not have been noie than five minutes 
because ue were waiting for Hx . Buchanan. 




your understanding 
Bodie had an ongoing working relationship with Mr. Buchanan? 

A I don't know if I would say working. I would say 
they knew him enough to pick up the phone and sat up 
meetings with him. I believe they shared soma of the same 
views regarding Central America. 




377 



NAME: 
1S19 
1520 
1521 
1522 
1523 
152U 
1525 
1526 
1527 
1528 
1529 
1530 
1531 
1532 
1533| 
1534 
1535 
1536 
1537 
1538 
1539 
1540 
1541 
1542 
1543 



HIR216002 



lAis^ssm 



PAGE 63 



2 Did you have some understanding about the 
organizational relationship between the Office of Latin 
American Public Diplomacy in the State Department and Mr. 
Buchanan's operation in the White House? 

A Mo, sir. It was never brought up or mentioned in 
my presence. 

2 But it was your understanding that Colonel Peno was 
able to pick up the phone and talk to Mr. Buchanan if he 
wanted to? 

A I saw him do it. 

2 And you saw he was able to set up a meeting with 
Mr . Buchanan? 

A Yes , sir . 




viiiissinEo 



378 



I 



I 



379 




EMI 613 
N/' 



Total 



(379) 



380 



NAn£ 

177 

177 

177 

17791 

1780 

1781 

1782 

1783 

178U 

1785 

1786 

1787 

1788 

1789 

1790 

179 1 

1792 

1793 

17914 

1795 

1796 

1797 

1798 

1799 

1800 




How, in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthls 
time that you had with Colonel Morth. was there discussion 
of provision of funds directly or indirectly by Colonel 
North for you or for LASSI? 
A 



BH^SSro 



J 



381 



NAME: 
1801 
1802 
1803 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812 
1813 
1814 
1815 
1816 
1817 
1818 
1819 
1820 
182 1 
182 2J 
1823; 
182^ 
1825 



HIR2 16002 



UNSLASSIFIED 



PAGE 75 



I mentioned I would have to give up, 
essentially give up LASSI if I didn't get some funds. It 
uas not a direct appeal; I just said we're having problt-ras . 
Actually I uas mentioning that to anybody and everybody I 
met, not the public officials but people I would normally 
meet, you know, ue needed help or else the thing was going 
to go under, and Colonel North suggested that I get in touch 
with him the following week, that he might be able to help. 




HHttHSSW 



382 



mmm 




2 Now, you say Colonel North suggested that you 
contact him the next ueeK about-- 
A Correct. 

--about funds for LASSI. 

Yes . 

And you did so? 

I did so, yes. 

Did you call hin, did you neet hin? 

I called him and then came in to meet with him. 

Mhat occurred in the meeting? 



UNSASSD 



383 



NAME: 
1851 
1852 
1853 
18514 
1855 
1856 
1857 
1858 
1859 
1860 

186 1 
1862 
1863 
186U 
1865 
1866 
1867 
1868 
1869 
1870 

187 1 
1872 
1873 
18714 
1875 



HIR2 16002 

A I 



imiteii 



PAGE 77 
ng, a I tacall. I can't 




asked me for the bank 
account of LASSI, bank account number. 

2 And you gave hire the number for Sovran Bank? 

A That's correct, sir. 

2 Did you discuss amounts? 

A No, sir — wait a minute, did we discuss it at that 
meeting? He may have said — he may have mentioned «5,000. Ha 
said there might be--it wasn't anything too definite. He 
said It might be an increment of «S,000, he would talk and 
check with the private source. 

2 Is this «5,000 per month? 

A He didn't say exactly per month. He just said 
there would be increments at «S,000. 

2 Was that amount satisfactory to you? 

A Well, I wasn't asking for any specific amount, to 
be very frank with you. I was rather delighted to get any 
assistance from this private source. 

2 Did he identify his private source? 

A Not at that meeting. 

2 Did he later? 

A Yes. 

2 What was it? 



UNGlltSSIHED 



384 



NAME: 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
188U 
188S 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
189 1 
1892 
1893 
189U 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 




usl ILy p»<5E 78 



u.mnvm\" " 

HIR216002 

.A He told me it was the Scaife Foundation. 

2 When did he identify it? 

A Probably later that month sometime . 

2 What discussion did you have with Colonel North 
about the uses to which LASSI would apply these funds? 

A A public relations program. 

2 What do you mean by that? 

A Arranging for speaking arrangements for myself, 
furthering the fund-raising ability of the institute, doing 
white papers on various subjects, setting up a phone where 
people would call in from around the country and look for 
specific information regarding Nicaragua or El Salvador, 
Honduras . 

2 Did you discuss the objective of this public 
relations program? 

A It was to affect public opinion favorably toward 
the Reagan position inside, regarding Central America, or--I 
would go farther than that; my position was to affect public 
opinion regarding the evolution of democracy in Central 
America . 

2 Was that with an eye toward influencing the votes 
of the Congress ultimately? 

A Well, I would--if you want to say ultimately, but 
there was nothing specific mentioned about Congress. 
Obviously the goal long-range would have involved that. 



r. 




385 



NAME: 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
19m 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
19 19 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 



HIR2 16002 




PAGE 79 



2 You say he Taentxfied the Scaiie--! believe that is 
spelled S-c-a-i-f-e--roundation-- 

A Right. 

2 --as the source of these funds, in another meeting 
several weeks later? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 How did the subject of the source of funds come up 
in this? 

A I might have asXed him--I thought about this--I may 
have asked him. these are legitimate private funds? Nothing 
I had--I had not received anything at that time, but I said 
this money we are receiving will be absolutely private 
funds, and he said yes. of course, they are coming from 
Scaif e . 

2 And did you begin to receive funds? 

A There was a--money was received in the account. I 
believe the end of June 1986. 

2 Now, you had previously in March of 1986 received 
«25,000 from Richard niller's organization; is that correct? 

A Correct. 

2 What do you understand was the reason for that? 

A That was for--to put out * 'misconceptions of fact'' 
and for general upkeep of the institute. That was at Hr . 
Calero's behest. 

2 Had you met Richard Hiller as of March 1986? 



lOH^FIED 



386 



KAME: 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
193U 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
19140 
19<41 
19M2 
1943 
19M14 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 



HIR2 16002 




PAGE 



80 



■_ A As I testified previously, I may have net him 
socially at a party, but I had not met him at any business 

meetings . 



And your first meeting with him occurred uhen# 



again : 



A It seems to me it uas early March. 

2 At the time of the grant? 

A Yes . 

KR. DUNHAK: That is getting confusing now. He 
thinks he met him in '85 in a passing kind of uay, not to 
discuss anything of substance, and then met him in March of 
•86. 

THE WITNESS: Correct. 
BY MR. FRYMAH: 

Q At the time of the grant? 

A That's correct. 

2 Mr. Calero arranged the grant? 

A He suggested that he do that, yes. 

2 Then after the meeting with Colonel North where you 
give him the LASSI account number, am I correct that amounts 
begin to be deposited into that account? 

A Correct, sir. 

S And the initial amounts are in approximately «5,000 
increments? 

A That's correct, sir. 




387 



MAKE ■■ 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
19614 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 



HIR216002 



imssinED 



PAGE 81 



•_ . ^ *'*"^ ^* "*^ your understanding that Has nonay that 
was being deposited pursuant to your discussion with Colonel 
North? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 Here you aware that Mr. Hiller was involved in the 
transfer of those funds? 

A I became auare . 

2 At what point? 

A Again, specifically I don't know. Sonetine during 
sunner ' 86 . 

2 Hou did you becone aware? 

A I believe in a phone call with Colonel North or 
something, his name came up, as you Know, if ther* ware any 
problems with anything like that. Richard Hillaz was soaeone 
to contact. 

2 How much money do you understand that LASSI 
received as a result of your conversations with Colonel 
North? 

A I believe it was a total of 50,000. 

2 Following your meeting or your series of meetings 
with Colonel North in early June of 19^6, did you meet with 
him further during 1986? 

A Yas . Uhen, I'm not sura. I may have mat him once 
or twice more during the summer. 

2 How many total meetings would you estimate that you 



wmvm 



388 



NAME : 

1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
198U 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
199U 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 



HIR2 16002 



wmm 



PAGE 82 



had with Colonal North after thasa initial naatings that you 
have discussed? 

A Oh-- 

2 More than ten? 

A After the initial meetings? I don't think so. I 
estimated--! thought at one time it might have been around a 
half a dozen, 




^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ It could have been between 
SIX and ten. 

HR. FRYMAM: Could you read that last answer back. 

[The answer referred to was read by the reporter as 
above recorded . 1 




mmm 



003S8 



389 



p^S 




N 



391 



NAME: 
2051 
2 52' 
2053 
2054 
2055 
2056 
2057 
2058 
2059 
2060 

206 1 
2062 
2063 
20614 
2065 
2066 
2067 
2068 
2069 
2070 

207 1 
2072 
2073 
2074 
2075 



HIR2 16002 




you had a number of other meetings with Colonel Koith in 
1986? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 What uere these meetings about? 

A Mainly about--I felt very strongly about the need to 
get the word out to, you know, out oi the Beltway, and I 
:ust felt people weren't getting the word about what 
uas--what the stakes were in Central America. And I also--a 
couple of times I may have mentioned to them, at least on 
the telephone, that LASSI could be very helpful in this 
educational process, and would be if we were properly 
funded . 




392 



NAHE' 

2076 
2077 
2078 
2079 
2080 
2081 
2082 
2083 
208(4 
2085 
2086 
2087 
2088 
2089 
2090 
209 1 
2092 
2093 
209t4 
2095 
2096 
2097 
2098 
2099 
2 100 



HIR216002 



mmsm 



PAGE 86 



2 An I coirect that tha ganaral subjact of your 
continued neetings with Colonel North was your public 
relations effort? 

A And the need for funds in the institute and any 
ideas he would have. 

2 Let me very briefly cover another subject, and I 
will cone back and we will hopefully wind up before too 
long . 

You mentioned one trip to Central America with Mr. 
Calero . 

A Yes . 

2 Have you made any other trips to Central America? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 When? 

A January of '86. 

2 Was that the only other trip or have you made 
trips-- 

A I made one last August. 

2 August of '86? 

A Yes. 

2 Any others? 

was down the re --^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hp- in 
February of this year. 

2 All right. So you have bean there a total of four 
times? 



UNCUkSSIHED 



-f- . 



393 



NAME: 
2101 
2 102 
2 103 
2 1014 
2 105 
2 106 
2 107 
2 108 
2 109 
2 110 
2 111 
2 112 
21 13 
2 114 
2 115 
2 116 
2 117 
21 18 
2 119 
2 120 
2121 
2 122 
2123 
2 12U 
2125 



HIR2 16002 



yNGlASSIHED 



PAGE 87 



A That's correct, sir. 



2 Now, what was tha purpose of the January '86 trip? 

A I went down there--I went down there with another 
gentleman, an older gentleman who wanted just to sea what 
was going on. and he went with ma. I did have a religious 
service 




2 Who was the older gentleman? 

A A man by the name of William Riordan. 

2 Who was he? 

A He was involved with the Knights of Malta. He had 
met me and wanted--asked roe if I was going down, ha just 
wanted to go with me. 

2 He paid for your trip? 

A No , sir . 

2 Who did? 

A At that time it was Adolfo Calero's credit card. 

2 Did you see Calaro there? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did you see any other Americans while you were 
there? 

MR. DUNHAM: We are talking about the trip with 
Riordan? 

MR. FRYMAN: That's right. 

THE WITNESS: I was a bit out of action at that 



UNDlASSinED 



394 



NAME; 
2 126 
2127 
2 128 
2 129 
2 1 30 
2 13 1 
2132 
2133 
213U 
2 135 
2136 
2137 
2138 
2139 

2 mo 

21U1 
2 1^2 
2 143 
2 1 44 
2145 
2 146 
2 147 
2 148 
2149 
2150 



it^tlio^ays into it I got 



HIR216002 lll%Hnl^fl-I^ICrVll-IHII PAGE 88 
tine. Abou-(J^t1(5 '^ays 'int'o' it I got the wint«E ilu that was 
going around that year, so I was knocked out ior about five 
days. So I don't recall--no, I don't think so. 
BY HR. FRYHAH: 

e Hou long a trip was this? 

A Again, maybe ten days at the outside. 

2 Uho invited you to perform the religious service? 

A I had asked if anybody had been in there since I 
went in and they said no, there had been no priest at all. 
So I said, uell--it was a year after that. So I said it 
might be appropriate to go down again. 

2 And the second trip was in August of 1986? 

A Yes. 

8 What was the purpose of that trip? 

A Again, I went down with a staff member from Mr. 
McCollura's office. 

2 Uho was that? 

A Mr. Morrisey, Donald Morrisey. 

2 Uhat ware you — 

I had been^^^^^^^^^^^^Hbef ore and he had had 
an opportunity to go to see things ^^^^^^^^^^^^H and so he 
suggested--we talked about it and we went to] 



2 Uho paid for this trip? 

A LASSI, including his part of it. 




ONDUSSIHED 



395 



NAnC= HIR216002 



2151 
21S2 
2153 
2 ISM 
2155 
2156 
2157 




PAGE 89 



Q including Mr. Ilortisey's part? 

A Yes. 

S What was the purpose o£ LASSI paying ioz his part? 

A Well, ha had no noney to go, and X ialt we would 
get--I would get some contacts, particularly in the private 
s e c t o r ^^^^^^^^^^^^H One my long-range LASSI 

IS to eventually do economic reports. 



iCUSSIflEO 



396 



NAME 
2158 
2159 
2 160 
2 16 1 
2 162 
2 163 
2 164 
2 165 
2166 
2167 
2 168 
2 169 
2 170 
2 17 1 
2172 
2 173 
2 17U 
2 175 
2176 
2 177 
2178 
2179 
2 180 
2 181 
2 182 



HIR216002 



DCMK KOEHLER 



umsno 



PAGE 90 



2 What Americans did you meet on this trip? 

A We met some people at the embassy. He met 
Ambassadoi 

Q Anybody else? 

A Who was the military colonel down there? I can't 
remember his name . 

MR. OLIVER: 

BY MR. FRYMAK: 

2 Anybody else? 

A Several American military people, because they took 
us for a helicopter ride out to see one of the rural--oue of 
the rural, I don't know what they call it down there--anyway , 
uhere they get food out into the rural communities. 

2 And you say you made a final trip in February of 
1987? 

A That's correct. 

2 Who was with you on that trip? 

A Kysc 




2 Who paid for that trip? 
A LASSI. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



397 



NAME: 
2183 
2184 
2 185 
2 186 
2 187 
2 188 
2 189 
2 190 

219 1 
2 192 
2 193 
2 194 
2195 
2 196 
2 197 
2 198 
2 199 
2200 

220 1 
2202 
2203 
220U 
2205 
2206 
2207 



HIR216002 



UNCfflflED 



PAGE 91 




2 Did Colonel North arzanga ioz you to maat a 
gentleman in Philadelphia named John Hirtle< I think that is 
h-i-r-t-1-a. 

A Yes , sir . 

2 Did he also arrange for you to meat a gentleman 
named Clyde Slease? 

A No , sir . 



UNCU^FIED 



398 



NAME: 
2208 
2209 
22 10 
22 1 1 
22 12 
2213 
2214 
2215 
2216 
2217 
2218 
2219 
2220 
2221 
2222 
2223 
222U 
2225 
2226 
2227 
2228 
2229 
2230 
2231 
2232 



HIR216002 



UNtASSIRED 



PAGE 92 



Q Did he mention Mr. Slease to you? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Did he arrange for you to meet a gentleman named 
Dan McHichael? 

A No , sir . 

Q Did he mention Dan KcKichael to you? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did rir . Slease mention McMichael to you? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 Uhich occurred first. Colonel North mentioning the 
name of Mr. Slease or his arranging the introduction with 
Mr. Hirtle? 

A I really don't Know. All X know is that I went up 
to see Mr. Hirtle in, I think it was early November, 
something like that, of 1986. 

2 Let's focus on Mr. Hirtle. How did Mr. Hirtle's 
name come up with Colonel North? 

A As I mentioned earlier, as I testified to, in the 
him^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I 
mentioning if we are going to do this, we need some serious 
funding, and is there any--do you know of anybody? And he 
says, well, there is a gentleman I want you to meet in 
Philadelphia who has access to speakers involved in the 
World Affairs Council, et cetera. 

2 And he arranged an introduction? 




399 



NAME: 
2233 
2234 
223S 
2236 
2237 
2238 
2239 
2240 
2241 
2242 
2243 
2244 
224S 
2246 
2247 
2248 
2249 
2250 
2251 
2252 
2253 
2254 
2255 
2256 
2257 



HIR2 16002 



mmmii 



PAGE 93 



A Actually, he garoe rae his number and I called him 
and then he invited me up to have dinner with him. 

2 And this was in the fall of 1986? 

A It seems to me like it was early November of--yes, 
I'd say early November of 1986, yes. 

2 Did you meet anyone other than Hirtle? 

A No, sir. 

2 What became of this? 

A Nothing really. We talked vaguely about plans, 
what needed to be done in terms of--we talked about setting 
up a speaking tour. That is the one specific thing that 
came out of it. It never happened, but we did talk 
specifically about that. 

2 Did Mr. Hirtle tell you about other fundraising 
efforts he had been engaged on behalf of Colonel North. 

A It seemed to me he mentioned something about an 
earlier process that, you know, basically about how he was 
able to make some contacts, and I think he made a comment 
somebody in--Pittsburgh , was it? I don't know what the guy's 
name is, but somebody in Pittsburgh. 

2 So you talked about possible fundraising, but I 
take it from your answer you never got any money as a result 
of meeting with Hirtle? 

A You got it. 

2 Going back to Slease, you say that North mentioned 



ONStASSIFIED 



400 



2258 
2259 
2260 
226 1 
2262 
2263 
2264 
2265 
2266 
2267 
2268 
2269 
2270 
2271 
2272 
2273 
2274 
2275 
2276 
2277 
2278 
2279 
2280 
2281 
2282 



wmm 



HIR216002 "I^JjLHJjjjJ^J^ ^»«^ ^^ 
Clyde Slease': 

A You knou, I'm not even sure of that. Now that I 
recall, I think the way it happened, Hirtle mentioned Slease 
and Hirtle had a brief phone call, I had maybe a one-minute 
phone call with Terry Slease. 

2 What was that about? 

A Just giving me Dan KcMichael's number. 

2 Who did you understand Dan Mcnichael to be? 

A He was with the Scaife Foundation. 

2 This phone call was again probably in November of 
1986? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 What did he say McMichael's position was? 

A He didn't have a high position. He didn't say . 
specifically . 

2 What was the reason he was giving you McMichael's 
number ? 

A I was going to make an effort to see if we could 
get some funding from Scaife for LASSI. 

2 I thought you were already getting funding from 
Scaife? 

A By that time I began to realize with Miller 
involved, I had some questions. I had some questions. 

2 What do you mean, you had questions? 

A Well, if it was being suggested I talk with Scaife, 




401 



KAME ■ 
2283 
22814 
228S 
2286 
2287 
2288 
2289 
2290 
2291 
2292 
2293 
229M 
2295 
2296 
2297 
2298 
2299 
2300 
230 1 
2302 
2303 
2304 
2305 
2306 
2307 



wwmsm 



HIR216002 i IIVIlK-MalflrlM II II PAGE 95 
the question cane to me: why would I--we were already 
getting the funding. I was somewhat confused at that stage 
of the game, where the funding was coning fron. 

2 Did you speak with Mcflichael? 

A Eventually. In January of 1987 actually. 

Q Uhat was said in that conversation. 

A Ue :]ust talked about what needed to be done m 
terms of public relations. Again, we sympathized, 
empathized, but basically they said they had no noney. 

Q Did you ever receive any contributions as a result 
of your conversations with Slease and HcMichael? 

A No , sir . 

2 In the LASSI account at the Sovran Bank, was that 
bank account the source of funds for the operating account 
in service or were funds deposited directly into the San 
Francisco operating account? 

A That was the source. 

2 All funds originated in the Sovran bank account and 
then you transferred such funds as needed to San Francisco? 

A That's correct, sir. 

2 Now, in the records that we have obtained from the 
Sovran Bank as well as fron your, or fron LASSI, there 
appears to be total of approximately $93,000 in receipts 
from January 1986 to May of 1987 of which you have 
Identified ♦73,000 as coning either iron Richard Hiller or 



ONCMSSIFIED 



402 



NAHE: 
2308 
2309 
2310 
231 1 
2312 
2313 
23114 
2315 
2316 
2317 
2318 
2319 
2320 
2321 
2322 
2323 
2324 
2325 
2326 
2327 
2328 
2329 
2330 
2331 
2332 




HXR216002 UllUI nilallFICJJ PAGE 96 
irora Korth, 

A Yes. 

2 There is a deposit of SU.OOO in January oi 1987. 
What is the source of that deposit? 

A I believe that is fron Western Goals. That uas a 
start-up grant to LASSI. 

2 That uas Linda Guell's organization? 

A Yes. 

8 There is a further deposit in December of 1986 of 
*10,000 apparently from the F. H. Kirby Foundation? 

A Yes. 

2 What is that? 

A To LASSI from F. M. Kirby, it was a check. 

2 What is F. M. Kirby? 

A It is a mall foundation that used to help 
foundations, and through Linda Guell's advocacy he gave it 
to LASSI. 

2 Is there an individual named F. M. Kirby? 

A I believe there is. 

2 Have you met him? 

A No, sir. 

2 Do you know where the foundation is based? 

A It used to be somewhere in--Hew Jersey, something 
like that. 

2 The contact is Linda Guell? 




403 



NAME: 
2333 
23314 
2335 
2336 
2337 
2338 
2339 
23M0 
2341 
23U2 
2343 
23UU 
23US 
2346 
2347 
2318 
23M9 
2350 
2351 
2352 
2353 
235U 
2355 
2356 
2357 



HIR2 16002 



..MNClffle 



PAGE 97 



2 In the Sovran bank account theie are disbursements 
of several thousands on occasions payable to the Sovran 
Bank. For example, the record indicates a disbursement of 
«10,000 on September 26th, 1986. Do you know what that 
relates to? 

A It was probably a transfer to, it was probably a 
check to the operational account. 

Q In San Francisco? 

A I would assume so if it is that large. For us, 
that is a large sum. 

2 The operational account is at the Hybernia Bank in 
San Francisco? 

A Yes. 

2 What branch is that? 

A It is Gary and 10th. 

2 The account is in whose name? 

A It would be under Western Legal Foundation, 
because, actually, at that time the tax papers still said 
Western Legal Foundation or LASSI. It's slash LASSI. I 
think that's the way it was. 

2 All right. Did you ever in any way transfer any 
monies from LASSI directly or indirectly to Oliver Horth. 

A Ho , sir . 

2 Have you ever appeared before a Congressional 



UNtASSIFIED 



404 



NAME: 
2358 
2359 
2360 
236 1 
2362 
2363 
2364 
2365 
2366 
2367 
2368 
2369 
2370 
2371 
2372 
2373 
2374 
2375 
2376 
2377 
2378 
2379 
2380 
2381 
2382 



HIR2 16002 



conraittee ? 



WLMED 



PAGE 98 



A Yes, SIX. 

2 How many occasions? 

A Once . 

Q Uhen uas that? 

A I think it was April oi 1985. 

2 Who arranged that appearance? 

A It was one of the staif people on tK* epmaittee at 
that time, on the--was the House Foreign Aiiairs? Or 
something like that. It was a subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere anyway. It was a staffer. 

2 Who put you in contact with the staff person? 

A Hell, it seens to me I had met the staff e^^^H 
when he was down with Congressman HcCollum. 

2 Do you remember the name of this person? 

A I don't, sir. I really don't. 

2 The staffer was ^^^^^^^^^H with Congressman 
McCollum? 

A With the trip Congressman HcCollum took, yes. He 
was not one of Congressman HcCollum's personal staff. He 
was somebody on the committee. 

2 And how did you happen to be in touch with this 
staffer? 

A Well, he met me crossing the street right by one of 
the House Office Buildings, and he--thoughf Congressman 



HNi^ra 



405 



KAKE: 
2383 
238U 
2385 
2386 
2387 
2388 
2389 
2390 
2391 
2392 
2393 
239M 
2395 
2396 
2397 
2398 
2399 
2M00 
240 1 
2U02 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2t406 
2M07 



HIR216002 



UmSSIFIED 



PAGE 99 



McCollum's office, he was able to get in touch with me later 
on that day and asked me to come over . 

2 To come over and testify? 

A Yes. 

2 Did you have any contact uith anyone in the 
Executive Branch about your testimony before this committee 
in April of 1985? 

A No , sir . 

2 This wasn't arranged to your Knowledge thought the 
State Department in any way? 

A No, sir. 

2 So far as you are concerned, it was just a chance 
encounter uith this staff person on the street? 

A That's right. 

2 Which led to a call from Congressman McCollum's 
office and they contacted you? 

A Yes. 

2 What preparation was there for your testimony in 
April of 1985? 

A Very little. It was done the same afternoon. 

2 Here you part of a panel? 

A No. What happened, it was just a f ive-minute--I 
think it was a five-minute timeframe that one of the 
Congressman had and he turned it over to me to testify on 
what I say in the camps. So, it was rather short. 



PLASSIFIED 



406 



HAME' 
2t408 
2M09 
2410 
241 1 
2U12 
2413 
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24 15 
2416 
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HIR216002 



UNUNIFIED 



PAGE 100 



2 Did you identify yourself as a Catholic priest? 

A I think I used the word Catholic, yes. I have not 
seen the transcript myself. 

2 Is that the way you normally identify yourself, as 
a Catholic priest, rather than a priest of the Old Catholic 
Church? 

A Well, I normally identify myself as an Old Catholic 
or Catholic. When I say Old Catholic without going into it. 
It generally means people look at the gray hair in ny head, 
and, to be very frank, unless you get into the theological 
discussions of this thing, it gets a little technical. 

MR. DUNHAn^ You contend you are a Catholic pri'est, 
are you not? 

THE WITNESS: I am. 

KR . DUNHAK^ The others are Roman Catholic priests. 
THE WITNESS: Mr. Owen will be testifying like he 
was there. It wasn't lik« I was trying to hide anything. I 
resent some of the things made publicly about my trying to 
hide it. If I were trying to hide it, why would I be an 
associate pastor in an Old Catholic Church? 
BY HR. FRYMAN: 

2 Was Congressman McCollum present when you 
testified? 

A No, sir, I don't believe he was--no. As far as I 
know, he is not on that committee. 



UNCWIHED 



407 



NAME: 
2(433 

2(43'4 

21435 
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UNCIilFIED 



HIR216002 nmmimtii-i ii ii page ioi 

2 He was not present in the room? 

A No. I don't think he had anything to do with it. 

e You don't know if he was aware that you were going 
to testify? 

A I don't think so. 

e Okay. I want to ask you about several individuals, 

A Sure. 

e Rob Owen, you mentioned you net him at an airport 
in Miami. Have you met him on other occasions? 

A Yes. I met him in March and April of 1985, and 

possibly May. I think the last time I saw Rob Owen was May 

of 1985. And I actually stayed at his apartment for a 
couple of days in April of 1985. 

2 Hhat was the reason for that? 

A Well, the obvious reason for Washington, not 

spending *150.00 a day in a hotel. He just said it was 
available if I wanted it, and I said, thanks. 

2 What other contacts have you had with Rob Owen. 

A Outside of that, none, really. 

2 Spitz Channell, do you know hin? 

A I met the man once . 

2 What occasion? 

A In January of 1987. 

2 Where? 

A In Rich Miller's office. 



UNtASSIFIED 



408 



KANE: 
2158 
2459 
2M60 

246 1 
2462 
2M63 
2464 
2465 
2466 
2467 
2468 
2469 
2470 

247 1 
2472 
2473 
2474 
2475 
2476 
2477 
2478 
2479 
2480 
2481 
2482 



UNCQISSIFIED 



PAGE 102 



What was the reason? 

I was there to present a speaker's bureau program 

Spitz asked me to prepare and see xi he would fund 



HIR2 16002 

2 

A 
to him. 
it. 

2 What was Channel! doing there? 

A He was there for other things. I just came in for 
about 15 minutes and presented it to him and he had several 
of his staff people there, and then I left. 

2 Did you present this to Channell as well? 

A Channell was in the room when I presented it. yes. 

2 And it lasted about 15 minutes? 

A At most . yes . 

2 That is your only contact with Channell? 

A Yes. 

2 An individual named Dan Conrad who was an assistant 
to Channell? 

A Again. I met him at that meeting. I think I met 
him one time with Linda Guell when I was looking for funds, 
and I may. if my memory strikes me. I may have met him again 
in Rich Miller's office in passing. 

2 Rich Miller's partner. Frank Gomez? 

A Again, in passing. I never had a substantive 
conversation with him. 

2 Substantive dealings with IBC have been with 



Richard Miller. 



UlASSinED 



409 



NAME: 

21483 
2148U 
2485 
2486 
2487 
2488 
2489 
2490 
249 1 
2492 
2493 
2494 
2495 
2496 
2497 
2498 
2499 
2500 
2501 
2502 
2503 
2504 
2505 
2506 
2507 



HIR2 16002 



UNCLASSIflED 



PAGE 103 



A Absolutely. 

2 You described one raeetingi 
Is that the only time you met hiit? 

A That's right. 

e You discussed one roeeting with Pat Buchanan. Have 
you ever met hira on any other occasion? 

A No, sir. I have not. ^^.^_^^^^^_^_^^_^_^^_^_ 
You one meeting ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

Have you ever met him on any other occasion? 

A No, sir, I have not. 

2 Phil Mabry. 

A Yes, I know him. 

2 How do you know him? 

A I met him at a council meeting in San Francisco. 

2 What did your dealings with him involve? 

A I don't know how to describe Phil Habry except he 
tends to, you know, ha has said a lot of things about a lot 
of people including myself. He seems to go back and forth 
on this issue, from pro-Sandinista to anti-Sandinista . I am 
never sure what side of the fence he is really on, and I an 
not sure if anybody else is either. I have gotten to the 
point I really have trouble believing just about anything he 
says. I haven't had any recent contact with him. 
MR. DUNHAH: I have. 
HR. FRYMAH: Off the record. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



410 



KAHE' 

2508 

2509 

2510 

251 1 

2512 

2513 

25 14 

251 

251 

251 

251 

251 

252 

252 

252 

252 

252 

252 

252 

252 

252 

252 

253 

2531 

2532 



HIR2 16002 



iimm 



PAGE lOU 



BY HR. FRYHAK: 



2 Going UljcK to your meetings with Colonel North, at 
a meeting with Colonel Horth in June of 1986, was there a 
discussion of Colonel Horth arranging for funds to be paid 
to a lawyer for Mr. Calero? Do you recall any discussion of 
that? 

A Mo, sir, I do not. 




2 At a meeting with Colonel North in August of 1986, 
did you discuss Robello? Do you recall ever discussing 



IMIASSIFIED 



411 



NAME: 

2533 
25314 
2535 
2536 
2537 
2538 
2539 
2S>40 
25141 
2542 
25143 
2544 
2545 
2546 
2547 
2548 
2549 
2550 
2551 
2552 
2553 
2554 
2555 
2556 
2557 



HIR216002 
Robello? 



uimssra 



PAGE 105 



A I am sure we may have. It is quite possible. 

2 For the record, who is Robello? 

A Alfonso Robello. He is actually on the new board 
oi the Nicaraguan resistance and he was on the old one also, 
the United Nicaraguan Opposition. 

2 What would your association with hin have been? 

A It's been very minimal. 

2 Did you ever have any discussion with Colonel North 
about the former leader of Haiti, Devalier? 

A Yes. I believe there was a picture or something 
regarding Robello. I had come across that piece of 
information, and I can't remember where. 

2 Could you explain that? 

A Yes. There was a picture of--I believe Robello at 
one time got the Order of Merit or whatever from Papa--not 
Papa Doc, but Baby Doc. 

2 Why were you relaying this information to Colonel 
North? 

A I found it humorous to be frank with you, that is 
all. I don't believe there was any great--I can't think of 
any other reason. Well, possibly because Robello fancied 
himself as representing the more liberal end of the spectrum 
and then somebody told me, I can't remember who told me now, 
but somebody told me there was this picture of him receiving 



UmSSiFIED 



412 



HAKE: 
2558 

2559 
2560 
2561 
2562 
2563 
2564 
2565 
2566 
2567 
2568 
2569 
2570 
2571 
2572 
2573 
2574 
2575 
2576 
2577 
2578 
2579 
2580 
2581 
2582 



HIR216002 



UNCUiSSlFIED 



PAGE 106 



<:,i:CRET 

the Order of Merit iron Baby doc. I found that rather 
incongruous, that's all. 

2 In your meetings with Colonel North, was there any 
discussion about you taking a job uith the White House? 

A No , sir . Never . 

2 Ever working for Judge Clark? 

A Absolutely not. 

2 Admiral Poindexter? 

A No , sir . 

2 Do you recall telling Colonel North in October of 
1986 and discussing a scheme of two weeks earlier? 

A You have to be more specific. 

MR. DUNHAM: We need a little more there, Tom. 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 

2 Do you recall discussing with Colonel North that 
Elliott Abrams should not go back at that time? 
MR. DUNHAM: Go back where? 

2 I'll leave the question stand if you understand it, 

A I really don't understand it. I really don't. 
Abrams should go back? 

2 Should not go back now. 

A I would really have to be-- 

MR. DUNHAM: Do you have anything to refresh his 
recollection on that? Or a reference? 

MR. FRYMAN: I'll let the question stand if you 



IMtLASSIFIED 



413 



UNetASSIRED 



HAKE: HIR216002 I 1 IM 151* A V V I L I L ll I*A<^E 107 

2S83 don' t . 

258M THE WITNESS: I don't really reisember it. It seems 

2585 strange I would make a statement about Elliott Abrams. 

2586 BY MR. FRYMAH: 

2587 S I'm asking if you recall. 

2588 A I really don't, no. 

2589 e Did you ever have any discussion with Colonel North 

2590 about whether you had been in the Nicaraguan Embassy? 

2591 A Never. First of all I've never been in it. There 

2592 would no no reason for me to discuss it. 

2593 2 There was never any discussion with Colonel North? 

2594 A No, never. 

2595 HR. FRYMAN: off the record. 



UNtftSSiriED 



414 



NAME: 
2596 
2597 
2598 
2599 
2600 

260 1 
2602 
2603 
26014 
2605 
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2607 
2608 
2609 
2610 

261 1 
26 12 
2613 
2614; 
2615 
2616 
2617 
2618 
2619 
2620 



HIR216002 



RPTS LYDA 



DCHN DANIELS 



UiiSSIFIED 



PAGE 108 



( 1 :M0 p.m. 1 

BY MR. FRYMAM: 
2 Father Douling, ate you faniliar with a bank 
account under the name of Pakefield Enterprises? 
A No , sir . 

S Are you iamiliar with an organization named 
Pakefield Enterprises? 
A No, sir. 

KR. FRYMAN: I have no further questions. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MR. KAPLAN: 
S Father Douling, as I introduced myself this 
morning, I am Jamie Kaplan, Associate Counsel with the 
Senate Select Committee. 

1 will be brief. You have been very patient today and I 
appreciate it. 

Father Dowling, you mentioned this morning in 
response to a question put to you by Mr. Fryman that you 
were never employed by a United States Government 
intelligence agency. 
A Yes. 

2 Did you ever receive any money from a United States 



lEUiSSIHED 



415 



NAME: 
2621 
2622 
2623 
262U 
2625 
2626 
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2628 
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2631 
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2633 
263U 
2635 
2636 
2637 
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2639 
26U0 
2641 
26142 
2643 
2644 
2645 



HIR2 16002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 109 



Government intelligence agency other than the money you 
testified this morning came at the direction of Colonel 
North? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did Colonel North himself actually ever give you 
any funds or traveler's checks? 

A No, no. Those traveler's checks were not given to 
me by Colonel North. 

2 So all of the traveler's checks came from Mr. 
Calero ? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 Did you receive traveler's checks at any pint i'n 
time from any other source related to the Nicaraguan 
resistance? 

A Well, from the resistance, it was from Kr Calero's 
direction. He may not have put them in the mailbox. 

2 Did Kr . Calero send you traveler's checks at 
certain times? 

A Yes. 

2 Hou would you know those checks were from him? 

A I would ask him or call him or write a quick note 
saying I needed such-and-such. 

2 Were all those checks spent on travel expenses? 

A No. Ky phone bill went from a normal person's 
phone bill to something outrageous since I was making calls 



UNCLASSIFIED 



416 



26146 
2647 
26(<8 
26149 
2650 
2651 
2652 
2653 
26514 
2655 
2656 
2657 
2658 
2659 
2660 
266 1 
2662 
2663 
266(4 
2665 
2666 
2667 
2668 
2669 
2670 



mmm 



HIR216002 IIHt«Cl»H:i.lll II^U PAGE 110 
all over the country. They were spent on things that were 
related to what I was doing. 

MR. DUNHAM: May I talk to my client a second? 

MR. KAPLAN- Sure. 

(Discussion off the record. 1 

MR. DUNHAM: Uould you read back the question about 
Colonel North? 

(Whereupon, the record uas read by the reporter, j 

MR. DUNHAM: I think he needs to amplify that 
answer. I think the ansuer he gave uas literally accurate, 
but there is a situation which I think the witness should 
disclose to you which could be construed--that answer could 
be construed as inaccurate based upon things he concluded, 
not things he knew. 

BY MR. KAPLAN: 
Q Okay. 

Can you amplify? 
A I was never given personally any money by Colonel 
North. There uas one incident where X mentioned to Colonel 
North that certain expenses needed to be taken care of — it 
was the week of the vote, the last vote which was late June 
of 1986--for two people because they had been out a lot of 
expenses. One of them was Mr. Maybury and Mrs. Guell who 
was in the process of putting people up in the Hotel 
Washington. She had no money. 




417 



NAME: 
2671 
2672 
2673 
2674 
2675 
2676 
2677 
2678 
2679 
2680 
2681 
2682 
2683 
2684 
2685 
2686 
2687 
2688 
2689 
2690 
2691 
2692 
2693 
269U 
2695 



HIR2 16002 



IllfflSSW 



PAGE 1 1 1 



So I mentioned it to him. He said, ''Would you 
corae by and pick up a package?'' I handed them the package. 
I did not see the contents of the package. 

2 When you said that Colonel North said to you, 
'•Would you come by and pick up a package,** uheze did he 
want you to come by? 

A His office . 

2 Did you go to his office? 

A Yes. 

2 He gave you a package. 
Could you describe it? 

A It was a package with two envelopes in it. That 
was all. 

2 To the best of your recollection, what was your 
assumption at that time as to what was in that package? 

A I presumed he was going to defray the expenses; it 
was money for that. 

e What did you do with that package? 

A I gave it to the two people involved. 

2 Did either Kiss Guell or Mr. Haybury say anything 
to you afterwards that would indicate the contents of the 
package? 

A Ho, sir. 

2 I think immediately before we went off the record 
and you conferred with your counsel, the question I asked 



UmSSIFIED 



418 



NAME: 
2696 
2697 
2698 
2699 
2700 
270 1 
2702 
2703 
270M 
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2706 
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2709 
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27 1 1 
2712 
27 13 
271M 
2715 
2716 
2717 



KIR2 16002 



mm\vB 



PAGE 112 



was whether traveler's checks given to you by Hr . Calero or 
people connected in some fashion with the resistance were 
spent on travel expenses in behalf of the resistance. 

I believe you responded af f irnatively to that 
question . 



Yes . 

Uho is Kathleen Douling? 

My mother . 

Do you recall giving any traveler's checks to your 



A 

2 
A 
2 
mother ? 

A X may have in exchange for cash. 

MR. KAPLAN: x will have then marked as Deposition 
Exhibit Nos . 2-A and 2-B. We have marked as Dowling 
Deposition Exhibit 2-A and 2-B what purports to be copie's of 
traveler's checks drawn on Banco Delpinchina. Exhibit 2-A 
is a copy of the front and back of one traveler's check; and 
2-B is the copy of the front and back of two traveler's 
checks all in the denomination of $50. 

[The documents marked Dowling Exhibit Nos. 2-A and 
2-B follow: 1 

x**x*x*«** COMMITTEE INSERT x*x****** 



Mmim 



419 



HAME 

2718 
2719 
2720 
272 1 
21ZZ 
2723 
2724 
2725 
2726 
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2742 



HIR2 16002 



mmm 



PAGE 113 



BY MR. KAPLAH 



SECRET 

2 Father Douling, is that your mother's name on the 
front of the check? 

A Yes. 

2 If you could turn the pages of each exhibit and 
look at them, I take it there is no signature on the checks 
on 2-B, but on the copy of the back of traveler's checks 2- 
A, is that your mother's signature? 

A Yes. 

2 Do you recall the circumstances under which you may 
have written those two checks to your mother? 

A It may have been just for immediate cash. 

2 Where does your mother live? 

A In San Raphael. 

2 Just for the record, San Raphael, California, is in 

Mann County? 

A Yes, that is right. 

|cav-C-/- 
2 Before we ^^■■0'^those checks, do those checks 

refresh your recollection as to the circumstances under 

which you gave them to your mother? 

A Hell, they actually came, some of the checks were 

actually sent to her house because obviously they were 

unsigned checks. So I would ask Calero to send them to her 

place if I was not in and about. So that would be the 

circumstances . 



wmm& 



420 



NAME: 
27143 
27144 
2745 
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2767 



HIR2 16002 



«NCL«ED 



PAGE 114 



e Do you recall any better the circumstances under 
which you would have written traveler's checks to your 
mother in July of 1985 and August of 1985? 

A July of 1985? I don't know. 

2 If you don't recall-- 

A I presume unless she had loaned me > it could have 
been a loan, it could have been just that I needed the cash, 
you know. 

2 But your testimony today is that to the best of 
your recollection, these checks were written out to your 
mother in exchange for cash? 



As far as I know, yes, or it could have been a 



loan . 



2 A loan to your mother? 

A No, that I might have borrowed from her. 

2 And you were using the traveler's checks to repay 
the loan that she had made to you? 

A It might have been an expense that I had to pay. I 
am thinking there might have been a telephone bill at about 
that time. 

2 When did you first meet Linda Guell? 

A In March of 1985. 

2 Who proposed the use of Western Legal Foundation to 
create LASSI? 

A Linda Guell. 



UNHASSIHED 



421 



NAnE: 
2768 
2769 
2770 
277 1 
2772 
2773 
2774 
2775 
2776 
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HIR216002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 115 



2 What prompted that proposal? 

A Because I mentioned that I was thinking oi setting 
up a non-profit to deal with information in a systematic 
uay . 

2 Do you recall when that proposal was made? 

A It was probably somewhere around April or Kay of 
that year, something like that. 

2 So as I understand it, you mentioned to Linda Guell 
your interest in creating something like LASSX? 

A Yes, exactly. 

2 She proposed in return that you could use the 
Western Legal Foundation as the corporate framework for 
setting LASSI up; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

2 How well did you know Linda Guell when she proposed 
that you could use Western Legal Foundation? 

A I had only met her a couple of months. She was 
very involved at that time in the freedom fighter situation. 

2 Were you surprised by her proposal? 

A Ho. It seemed logical instead of going through the 
whole process . 

2 Part of the whole process being applying for tax- 
exempt status and the like? 

A Yes, since the corporation she was suggesting was 
more or less essentially non-functioning. 



UNCOlSSiriED 



422 



NAME: 
2793 
279U 
2795 
2796 
2797 
2798 
2799 
2800 
280 1 
2802 
2803 
280U 
2805 
2806 
2807 
2808 
2809 
2810 
2811 
2812 
2813 
281U 
2815 
2816 
2817 



HIR2 16002 



UNCiJ^FlEO 



PAGE 116 



2 When did the transfer actually taXe place? 

A We put it through Curtis Herge. He was the lawyer 
of record. His office basically did nothing, to my 
surprise. According to the books, it shows we made them. 
The name change was made official only recently through 
their office in the District of Columbia. 

2 Where did the funds come from? 

A The initial funds came from Western Goals and after 
that from LASSI itself. 

2 You mentioned this morning that you drew a minimal 
salary as Executive Director of Lassi. What was that 
salary? 

A Since a lot of my expenses were paid, we are in the 
process of looking at that, it is several thousand dollars. 
We are probably looking at five or six thousand dollars. 

2 Over the course? 

A No. We are talking about 1986 now. There are 
other things, one of them I mentioned. 

2 So your salary for 1986 would have been five or six 
thousand dollars? 

A Fron LASSI itself, yes. 

2 Did you receive a salary from some other 
organizations ? 

A There were some other increments in there. I think 
I mentioned *3,000 that I was considering income. 




^~ 



423 



NAKE- 
2818 
2819 
2820 
2821 
2822 
2823 
2824 
2825 
2826 
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2828 
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2831 
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2833 
28314 
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2836 
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2838 
2839 
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28M 1 
2842 



HIR216002 



*U»ffl 



PAGE 117 



2 Any other sources of income in 1986? 

A There may have been a couple of speaking 
engagements for CAUSA. If I remember, it was *600. 

2 Is LASSI still an ongoing institution? 

A Well, ue don't have any money. We are in the 
process of getting the tax stuff straightened out. 

2 That is my next question. 
How much money is left? 

A Less than $100 in each account. I am keeping the 
accounts alive right now. 

2 How would you break it down? I realize I am asking 
you to estimate the breakdown, but how would you break down 



the use of the JwaVD or so dollars that made its way into 
LASSI's accounts. 

A I would say about *35,000 went through the 
operations account in San Francisco, roughly. Several 
thousand were paid in consultant fees to Linda Guell, I am 
not sure, maybe »6,000. Then several thousand dollars were 
expended on the trips to Central America last year. 

2 Approximately how much was spent on them? 

A Three or four thousand dollars, I forget. It is in 
the books. Most of the balance was paid for my expenses 
here in Washington. I actually tried to save some by 
renting an apartment for a while. 

2 What would you approximate those expenses to be? 



UimSSIFIED 



424 



NAME: HIR216002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 118 



28U3 
28UU 
28U5 
28U6 
28U7 
28U8 
28M9 
2850 
2851 
2852 
2853 
285U 
2855 
2856 
2857 
2858 
2859 
2860 
286 1 
2862 
2863 
286M 
2865 
2866 
2867 



A Somewhere around 30 to 35--that is including a good 
part of this year, so ue are talking about a period oi well 
over a year, uell over a year. 

2 I want to ask you a few questions about your use of 
Mr. Calero's credit card. 

A Sure. 

e Was your use of Mr. Calero's credit card monitored 
in any fashion? 

A Not really, no. 

2 He gave you the credit card nunber during what tine 
period ? 

A In late 1984 for the first trip down here. 

2 Did he give you any instructions as to how and when 
to use that credit card nureber? 

A Ho. He said I could use it for trips when I went 
out to speak or to meet with groups, setting up meetings, et 
cetera . 

2 Did you tell him when you used the credit card? 

A No, I did not. 

2 Did he ever ask you when you used the credit card 
for a particular piece of travel? 

A Ho. 

2 What class travel did you generally travel? 

A Always the economy; always. 

2 Who chose your hotels? 




425 



NAI1E' 
2868 
2869 
2870 
287 1 
2872 
2873 
287« 
2875 
2876 
IZll 
IZIQ 
2879 
2880 
2881 
2882 
2883 
288U 
2885 
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2890 
2891 
2892 



HIR2 16002 



UNCmFIED 



PAGE 119 



A Usually I did. I would have the travel agent make 
an arrangement sometimes. It would vary. 

2 Mas there an effort on your part to stay in economy 
hotels as well? 

A Yes, if I could. 

2 Did anyone ever speak to you about charges that had 
been made to Mr. Calero's account? 

A No . 

2 I believe Colonel North's calendar shows you had a 
meeting with him on November 17, 1986. 

Do you recall the substance of that meeting? 

A I had recently been in Philadelphia and I was 
talking about that. 

2 Was there any discussion of the events of the 
moment? 

A None. The only thing he said, he was really in a 
rush, I think it was less than five minutes. He seemed 
really more intense than usual. 

2 When you mentioned the trip to Philadelphia, I take 
it It is the trip you testified about earlier in response to 
Hr . Fryman's question? 

A Yes . 

2 Did Colonel North ever mention to you anything that 
related to the sale of arms to Iran? 

A Absolutely not. 



UNIMSIFIED 



426 



MAHE: 
2893 
289(4 
2895 
2896 
2897 
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2900 
2901 
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2907 
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2909 
2910 
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29 12 
2913 
2914 
2915 
2916 
2917 



HIR216002 



UtfDLASSIHED 



PAQE 120 



fi Did Colonel Hoith ever say anything to you about a 
diversion of the iunds iron the sale of arms to Iran to the 
contr as ? 

A Absolutely not. 

2 Did Colonel North ever mention to you or did you 
ever become aware of an account in Switzerland called the 
Lake Resources account? 



NO/ sir, not until I read it in The Washington 



Post. 



2 Not until public disclosure? 
A Right. 

S I take it that the same would b« true fox any 
conversations that you had with Richard Miller over the time 
of your relationship with him? 

A Yes, about any of those three or four questions you 
just asked me, absolutely not. 

nR. KAPLAN: I have no further questions. I 
believe Kr . Oliver may have some questions. 

EXAniNATION OH BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COHIIITTEE 
BY HR. OLIVER: 
2 Father Dowling, I am going to try to have a few 
follow-up questions to some of the things Hr . Fryman has 
already covered. 




Wuss/f/ra 



427 



p5 12,1- )ZZ 



429 



NAME: 
2968 
2969 
2970 
297 1 
2972 
2973 
297U 
2975 
2976 
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2979 
2980 
2981 
2982 
2983 
2984 
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2989 
2990 
299 1 
2992 



HIR2 16002 



UNCU^ED 



PAGE 123 




2 You mentioned in connection with the congtessioifal 
hearing that you testified in the spring of 1985. 

A Yes. 

2 That you had met a staffer from the committee 
walking across the street? 

A That is right. 

2 Mas that staffer Jake Dunman? 

A No. sir, it uas--if you mention the name I will be 
able to tell you. 

2 But It was a staffer from the Foreign Affairs 
Committee ? 

A No, I am not sure of that. He was on the trip to 
Central America. I am not sure what his name was. It 
should have been Foreign Affairs. I just assumed that. 



MASsra 



430 



MAKE: 
2993 
29914 
2995 
2996 
2997 
2998 
2999 
3000 
300 1 
3002 
3003 
3004 
3005 
3006 
3007 
3008 
3009 
3010 
30 1 1 
3012 
3013 
301U 
30 15 
30 16 
30 17 



HIR216002 



wm&vm 



PAGE 12<4 



2 He was with Mr. McCollum? 



A He was one of the staffers with Mr. McCollum. 
There may have been others. 

2 Mhere were you crossing the street that you 
happened to meet him? 

A Somewhere around the Capitol here. 

2 He ran into you? 

A Yes. He said, ''How are you doing?"' and the next 
thing I got the phone call. 

2 From whom? 

A From somebody in McCollum's office. 

2 Mho was that? 

A Probably one of the secretaries just saying> 
''Could you be at the committee meeting?*' 

A What did they tell you they wanted you to do at the 
committee meeting? 

A They were very indefinite. It was a spur-of-the- 
moment thing. All they suggested was that I might say what 
I saw when I was down there . 

2 How did Congressman McCollun's office know where to 
reach you J 

A Because I had been on friendly terns with Mr. 
Forrest so he knew where to reach me. 

2 Where was that? 

A Probably at some hotel. Was it at a hotel? It was 



WRUiSSIFIED 



431 



NAME: 
3018 
30 19 
3020 
302 1 
3022 
3023 
3024 
3025 
3026 
3027 
3028 
3029 
3030 
3031 
3032 
3033 
3034 
3035 
3036 
3037 
3038 
3039 
3040 
304 1 
3042 



wmm 



HIR216002 IllVhr 14dt1ll I1.U PAGE 125 
April 1985. I stayed in a lot of places in Washington. 

2 Your recollection is he called you at your hotel, 
not at somebody's office? 

A No. It was wherever I was staying, yes. 

2 When Mr. McCollun's office told you the time and 
place of the hearing, what did they tell you the subject of 
the hearing was? 

A It was the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs. I believe the debate was the humanitarian aid 
bill . 

2 When you went to the committee meeting, how did you 
identify yourself to the Congressman who yielded his time to 
you? 

A I didn't really talk to him. Since this stuff came 
out in June, I believe it was Congressman Lagomarsino. I 
didn't talk to him. One of his staffers came up and said, 
•'He will yield his six minutes to you,'' and I said fine. 

2 Who was that staffer? 

A I don't know. 

2 How did he know to come to you? 

A Because I came in. I had a collar on. He assumed 
who I was and then he asked me if I was Father Dowling . I 
said yes and he said, ''When Congressman Lagomarsino ' s time 
comes up, he will yield it to you.'" 



RPTS LYDA 



WKlASSra 



432 



HAME: 
30K3 
3044 
30145 
30U6 
3047 
3048 
3049 
3050 
3051 
3052 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3057 
3058 
3059 
3060 
3061 
3062 
3063 
3064 
3065 
3066 
3067 



HIR216002 



DCKK DANIELS 



mmm 



PAGE 126 



C That was not the same staffer you met going across 
the street? 

A No , sir . 

2 After the hearing, did you discuss what you had 
said with any of the members of the committee or any of the 
staff? 

A No, not rally. 

2 You just walked out of the room? 

A There were several witnesses after me. I think it 
was the time Sister Nancy Donavan gave the report on contra 
atrocities . 

2 Did you refute what she said? 

A I gave an opinion. If you have that in front of 
you, I have not seen it since then, but I gave an opinion 
about the type of people I saw in the camps. I could not 
specifically refute each individual incident that she 
mentioned, of course. 

2 Mas it a rather unpleasant exchange that went on at 
that time? 

A There was no exchange except I was booed by people 
in the committee room, which the chairman naturally stopped. 

2 After the hearing, did you talk with any of the 
other witnesses? 

A No, no. I went over and sat down for a while next 



HJiSSIFIED 



433 



mmm 

-who IS the actor who was 



HAKE: HIR216002 1 1 111 I <9?DaC:^1 1 11 II PAGE 127 

3068 to Calero--w"Iio is the actor who was there, Robert Foxworth, I 

3069 believe, also testified. 

3070 So I chatted with him for a while and left. 

307 1 2 Mr. Calero was there. You indicated earlier that 

3072 Mr. Calero knew you were a priest of the Old Catholic 

3073 Church. 

307M A Right. 

3075 2 Do you think the committee had the impression that 

3076 you were a priest from the regular Catholic Church? 

3077 A Well, the chairman, Hr . Gejdenson, said publicly 

3078 that he had it. My purpose of going in there was not to 

3079 discuss my priesthood, but to discuss what I personally saw 

3080 m the camps. 

3081 2 When did Mr. Calero learn that you were not a 

3082 regular Catholic priest? 

3083 A Back in 198^ because I had a service in the 

3084 Presbyterian Church which I was using at that time which he 

3085 was at. 

3086 2 When you met Congressman McCollum in 1985 in 

3087 Central America, did you tell him you were from the Old 

3088 Catholic Church? 

3089 A I don't know. I really don't. 

3090 2 Did any of his staff members. Vaughn Forrest or 
309 1 anyone, ever learn you were from the Old Catholic Church? 
3092 A X mentioned it to them. When you say Old Catholic, 



«NW«D 



434 



NAME- 
3093 
3094 
3095 
3096 
3097 
3098 
3099 
3100 
3101 
3 102 
3103 
3 lOM 
3105 
3106 
3107 
3108 
3109 
3110 
3111 
3112 
3113 
31 14 
3115 
3116 
31 17 



wmm 



HIR2 16002 |||y|.|^lX.^i:::ill II IJ PAGE 128 

and you don't go into a detailed explanation, sometimes 
people don't know, they may think you are talking about the 
hairs on your head . 

HR. DUNHAM: How do you know? 

THE WITNESS: I don't knou. I said I was uith the 
traditionalist group, uith the Latin mass. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 Mr. Calero understood the distinction? 

A Yes. He is not a theologian either, but he 
essentially understood the difference. 

2 Did you ever have discussions with members or staff 
of the committee after this story broke about your 
appearance uith Congressman Gejdenon's committee? 

A No , sir . 

2 You never discussed it uith any of them up until 
this day? 

A No, sir, I have not. 

2 I would like to switch for a moment to your trip to 
Philadelphia. Did you meet anyone else besides John Hirtle? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did you ever arrange for a speech in Philadelphia 
for Arturo Cruz? 

A No, sir. 

2 Do you knou uhether he made a speech up there? 

A I believe he had. 



imssra 



435 



HAHE 
31 18 
3119 
3120 
312 1 
3122 
3123 
3124 
3125 
3126 
3127 
3128 
3129 
3130 
3131 
3132 
3133 
313U 
3135 
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3 138 
3139 
31M0 
314 1 
3142 



HIR2 16002 



wsimm 



PAGE 129 



e This had been prior to your trip to Philadelphia? 

A I am not sure of that. The speech I am talking 
about happened a feu months ago, I believe. 

e Do you know whether Hr . Hirtle arranged that 
speech? 

A I don't know if he arranged it or not. He was part 
of the committee that was organizing it. I don't know if he 
personally arranged it. 

e You mentioned that you traveled to Central America 
with Mr. Riordan who is active in Knights of Malta? 

A He is a Knight of Malta. 

B Did you have a discussion about the Knights of 
Malta with Mr. Hirtle? 

A No, I don't think so. 

2 Did you have a discussion about Knights of Malta 
with Mr. Slease? 

A No, sir. Our conversation was literally less than 
a minute, my only conversation with him. 

2 Were you aware of any other Knights of Malta who 
contributed to the activities in Central America that 
related to the church or your activities? 

A No, to my knowledge there have been none. To the 
church, no direct knowledge at all. 

2 Did Colonel North ever mention to you the Knights 
of Malta? 




'-■ .^i- 



436 



NAMt: 
3143 
31UM 
3 145 
3146 
3147 
3 148 
3149 
3150 
3151 
3 152 
3153 
3154 
3155 
3156 
3157 
3158 
3 159 
3 160 
316 1 
3162 
3163 
3164 
3165 
3166 
3167 



HIR216002 



UNCl^flED 



PAGE 130 



A I don't think ue ever sat down and discussed ther 
It may have come up in passing, but I know it was never 
anything serious. 




2 Other than Mr. Riordan, do you knou oi any other 

Knights of Malta who were involved in contributing money? 
A X am not sure Mr. Riordan was. 
2 I just wondered if you know who were. 
A Ko. 
2 Do you know a man known as Roy Godsen? 




437 



NAME: 
3168 
3169 
3 170 
317 1 
3172 
3173 
317U 
317S 
3176 
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3178 
3179 
3180 
3181 
3182 
3183 
3184 
3185 
3186 
3187 
3188 
3189 
3190 
3191 
3192 




HIR2 16002 ^''■'•^/I.VY/I'/Lfl P^SE '31 

A No , sir . 

2 Ace you familial with an organization known as 
Prodemca? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 What do you know about that organization? 

A I know it assists the freedom fighters when they 
come to town and arranges meetings. 

Q Did you have any contact with them? 

A I have been to a number of meetings. 

S When was that? 

A The last function of Prodemca, maybe a year ago. 
It has been a while . 

2 Did you ever discuss with them the need for funds 
for LASSI's activities? 

A No. 

2 Were they aware what you were doing with Mr. 
Calero? 

A I presume they were. They must have been aware 
that I was involved with Calero, sure. 

2 Who introduced you to the Prodemca people? 

A It seems to me I went to one of their functions. 
It could have been Boscoe Metamorris or someone like that, I 
met Penn Kimball at the IRD, Institute of Religious 
Democracy . 

2 What is that? 



UNIMSSIFIED 



438 



3193 
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3198 
3199 
3200 
3201 
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320S 
3206 
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3209 
32 10 
321 1 
32 12 
3213 
32 14 
3215 
3216 
32 17 



HStiissro 



HIR216002 1H]I««I^ HaltJII IWiB' PAGE 132 

A non-profit organization that writes reports on 
religious persecution around the world. 

2 Here you involved with this in any way? 

A No. X went to get on their mailing list. 

2 Did you discuss with Penn Kimball what you were 
doing? 

A Not really, no. 

2 How did you find out about the Institution of 
Religious Democracy? 

A It has been mentioned several times as a leading 
group that talks about persecution in the church. I don't 
remember who specifically told me. It was an institute Z 
had heard about and I wanted to talk to them. 

2 Did you receive any funds or support from them .for 
your activities? 

A Absolutely not. 

2 Do you know Bruce Cameron? 

A No, sir, I do not. 

2 Linda Guell was a good friend of yours as we 
learned earlier. 

A Yes. 

S Did you become aware of the problems Linda Guell 
was having with Spitz Channell? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 How did you become aware? 



00-'i38 



439 



NAME ■ 
3218 
32 19 
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322 1 
3222 
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3230 
3231 
3232 
3233 
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3242 



HIR2 16002 



M^fsmii 



PAGE 133 



2 What did she tell you? 

A Uell. I knew that the were having a problero with 
regard to his taking over of Western Goals . 

e And she was opposed to his taking over Western 
Goals? 

A It seemed to be working for a while. I was not 
privy to all the paperwork, the intricate details. 

2 You mentioned earlier that Spitz Channell might not 
be too favorably disposed toward you because of the 
difficulties he had with Linda Guell. 

A No, I don't think I said that. 

2 Well, perhaps you didn't, but you were aware that 
they had had difficulties? 

A Yes. 

2 What specifically were the difficulties? 

A Again, I am not sure of the dynamics. I know there 
were some problems with the takeover of Western Goals by his 
organization, the National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty . 

Q Was she concerned because of what NEPL was doing? 

A She seemed to be. He did not get into a tremendous 
detailed discussion about this because my interests were 
different on this issue. I was not involved in the 
intricate details of it. 



mmm 



440 



NAME: 
32M3 
3244 
324S 
3246 
3247 
3248 
3249 
3250 
3251 
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3253 
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3256 
3257 
3258 
3259 
3260 
3261 
3262 
3263 
3264 
3265 
3266 
3267 



UNClASSiED 



HIR216002 IllVlal U^UJIil.1 II PAGE 134 

2 But you have temained involved with Linda Guelle 
since ? 

A She has helped us do the books, sure. 

2 She has helped arrange funding sources? 

A Well, nothing recently. 

2 Hell, the *10,000. 

A That uould have been October when the letter was 
written . 

2 It was December of 1986? 

A Yes. 

2 You disbursed some funds iron LASSI to her? 

A For consultants work. she has done a behemoth 'job 
on the books and keeping lots of things going. 

2 Since that December grant, our records indicate you 
gave her somewhere around $7,000. 

A That could be correct. Yes, sir. 

2 Mere you aware that Jane McLaughlin had had a split 
with Spitz Channell? 

A Yes. For one thing I saw her, I believe it was on 
ABC News. 

2 Did you discuss that with Linda or Jane before you 
saw it on ABC News? 

A I knew vaguely that there was a split, but it was 
not directly of concern to me. 

2 But in January of 1987, you made a presentation to 



mssro 



441 



NAME : 
3268 
3269 
3270 
327 1 
3272 
3273 
32714 
3275 
3276 
3277 
3278 
3279 
3280 
3281 
3282 
3283 
328U 
3285 
3286 
3287 
3288 
3289 
3290 
3291 
3292 




Spitz Channell? 

A Yes , sir . 

e Even after this split, you had already seen Jane 
McLaughlin on television? 

A No, it was before that. 

MR. DUNHAM: Jane Mas not on television. She was 
on television a number of times, but you saw her on 
Nightline; right? 

THE WITNESS: Nightline or whatever. 

MR. DUNHAM: After the Channell indictment? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know. I know it was on TV. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 Do you know Scott Miller? 

A No . 

2 John Donohue of Pittsburgh? 

A No, sir. I just suddenly got the flash, that was 
who Hirtle was talking about> but I don't know him. 

2 Did you ever meet Otto Reich? 

A No, sir. 

2 Jonathan Miler? 

A Yes . sir . 

2 When did you meet him? 

A In March of 1986 briefly in Walt Raymond's office 
at the NSC. 

2 What were you doing there? 



UHeiASSIFIED 



442 



NAME ■■ 
3293 
329U 
3295 
3296 
3297 
3298 
3299 
3300 
3301 
3302 
3303 
33014 
3305 
3306 
3307 
3308 
3309 
3310 
331 1 
33 12 
3313 
3314 
3315 
3316 
3317 



HIR2 16002 



IINWMED 



PAGE 136 



A Just talking about public relations. He was very 
concerned that not enough had been dona^ 

2 Who put you in touch with Walt Raymond? 

A Ambassador Peter Daily. 

2 How did you know Ambassador Peter Daily? 

A I met him at the World Business Council where I 
spoke at one time. 

2 When was that? 

A It would have been January of 1986, I believe. 

2 He suggested you go see Walt Raymond? 

A Yes. I gave a speech and he was impressed and 
said, ''You may want to talk to Walt Raymond.'" 

2 And Jonathan Miller was there? 

A Hot at the meeting. It seems to me he was in and 
about the office and I shook hands with him. 

2 What did you discuss with Walt Raymond? 

A Public relations strictly. 

2 About what? 

A What needed to be done to get the message out about 
what was going on in Central America. 

C What did you tell him needed to be done? 

A I told him a first-class PR campaign. 

2 Did you ask him for assistance or to involve you in 
any way? 

A No. He was very specific that he was not an 



4 




443 



NAME' 
3318 
3319 
3320 

332 1 
3322 
3323 
332U 
3325 
3326 
3327 
3328 
3329 
3330 

333 1 
3332 
3333 
33314 
3335 
3336 
3337 
3338 
3339 
3340 
3341 
3342 



HIR2 16002 
operational 



BmiB 



PAGE 137 



Q Did he indicate to you what efforts they weie 
making in the public relations field? 

A A little. He talked about the Office of Public 
Diplomacy. It uas very general stuff. 

2 Was Peter Daily involved in that? 

A No. It uas just a reference. 




444 



NAME: 

33U3 

3344 
3345 
33U6 
3347 
33M8 
3349 
3350 
3351 
3352 
3353 
3354 
3355 
3356 
3357 
3358 
3359 
3360 
336 1 
3362 
3363 
3364 
3365 
3366 
3367 



HIR216002 




2 When you were in Washington around the ti»e of that 
vote, did you meet with any other State Department officials 
besides Elliot Abrams and Bob Kagan? Did you meet with 



U 




445 



NAME: 
3368 
3369 

3370 

337 

3372 

3373 

33714 

3375 

3376 

3377 

3378 

3379 

3380 

3381 

3382 

3383 

338U 

3385 

3386 

3387 

3388 

3389 

3390 

3391 

3392 



f^e Legislative Oepaxtutt 



PAGE 139 



HIR216002 

anyone in VTie legislative Oepaxtment? 

A Ho. sir. I don't thinK I met with anybody outside 
of Kagan and Abramsl 

There were no subsequent meetings . 
2 You indicated on one of your trips to Central 
America that you met uith Ambassador! 



A That is correct, yes. 

Q Who arranged those meetings? 

A Hr . Morrissey. 

fi Why did Mr. Horrissey arrange those meetings? 

A He uas looking at some oi the medical work that' the 
Army uas doing down there. I believe they have been 
involved uith some of that stuff. It uas a perfunctory sort 
of meeting uith Ambassadoi 

2 Did Mr. Morrissey have direct access to the 
ambassador ? 



A 
2 
A 

access 
2 

uit 

A 
2 



Hell, we went in there. 

Why did he have access to the ambassador? 

X really don't know. He seemed to have direct 



there? Why did you meet 



We met him — I don't know to be very frank with you. 
It didn't seem very unusual to be meeting with a 




mmmi 



446 



NAME: 
3393 
33914 
339S 
3396 
3397 
3398 
3399 
3400 
3401 
3H02 
3403 
3404 
3405 
3406 
3407 
3408 
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34 10 
341 1 
3412 
341 3 



HIR216002 
military attache 



wmm 



PAGE 140 



A We had a helicopter that took us out to see the 
delivering of food to the people, so maybe it had something 
to do with that, I don't know. 

2 They took you to see delivery of food to the 
people ? 

A Yes . 

2 To which people? 

A The peasants, the campasino! 

2 What kind oi a helicopter, American military? 

A Yes, sir. 

D i d ^^^^^^^^^^^H a r r a n g e 

A We are presuming. I didn't see him pick up the 
phone . 

2 What was the purpose of having you see this? 

A Well. I believe that the, whatever they call the 
civilian program down there, whatever it is, they felt that 
not too many people had seen it and it would be good. 

fi Did they indicate to you who was paying for that 
food? 

A Ho, sir, they did not. 



\iHms\m 



447 



MAHE: 
3M 14 
3415 
34 16 
34 17 
3U 18 
3419 
3420 
342 1 
3422 
3423 
3424 
3425 
3426 
3427 
3428 
3429 
3430 
3431 
3432 
3433 
3434 
3435 
3436 
3437 
3438 



HIR2 16002 



DCHN KOEHLER 




PAGE 141 



2 Why Mas the American embassy so inteiested in 
showing you that? 

A They may have been interested in showing Morrisey 
that also. I uas there and went along with them for the 
ride . 

2 Uas Colonel North involved in setting up those-- 

A Not at all. 

e Did you talk with him after you came back to the 
United States? 

A I told him X had been there, what I had seen, 
that's all. 

2 You indicated that you met Rich Miller or Rich 
Miller thinks he met you at a party at Dan Kirkendahl's 
townhouse m July 1985? 

A That IS correct. 

2 What was the purpose of that party? 

A I believe it was to celebrate the humanitarian aid 
victory . 

2 Who else was there? 

A A lot of your, I mean a lot of conservative groups 
were represented. 

2 Was Colonel North there? 



CNJUSWfl 



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ff'^ilBfl/ 



A No, 

2 Was Elliott Abrans there? 

A No. sir. I don't believe any government official 
was there. I don't recall running into any of them any way. 

2 You were in Washington in August of 1986 prior to 
your departure for Central America? 

A Yes, I was. 

2 Why were you in Washington? 

A Probably to just go from Washington down, you know, 
make arrangements, final arrangements, for the trip. 

2 What kind of final arrangements did you make? 

A A travel trip, getting Horrisey set up, et cete'ra. 

2 Did you meet with Congressman tlcCollum in August of 
1986? 

A No, I don't think so. I don't believe he was there 
actually. It was a recess at that time. 

2 I would like to-- 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to make this telephone 
message as Exhibit number 3. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

8 This telephone message was in the documents turned 
over by Spitz Channel's organizations to the committee and 
it is dated 8-11-1986 to Linda at 11:36 in the morning, and 
at says, while you were ont_Ja thet Dowling, the telephone 
number it leaves i^^^^^^^^^Hthe message is, he is at 




limssim 



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HIR216002 IIIUklNtl \ \irir II PAGE 143 

Congressman McC 

A Yes. 

e He uill be there for the next five minutes. Does 
that refresh your recollection about meeting with 
Congressman McCollum? 

A No, I am sure I didn't meet with him. In fact, the 
date would indicate that he was probably on recess. 

e Did you meet uith someone else in Congressman 
McCollum's office? 

A I probably met with Morrisey preparing for the 
trip . 

e Do you remember talking to Linda Guell prior to 
your meeting in Central America in August 1986? 

A I am sure I did . 

2 Was she involved in any way in this trip? 

A Well, I was using a travel agent that she knew, so 
that may have been, we may have talked about the 
particulars, the particulars of the trip, but that would 
have been about it. 

2 Who was that travel agent? 

A I don't use it anymore. It is down here in 
Washington somewhere. I would have to, I can't remember 
which agency it was really. 

2 I have no further questions. Thank you. Father. 
MR. FRYMAN: I have one final question. When was 




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HIR216002 



im^SIFIED 



PAGK 144 



the last time you spoke to Olivet North? 

THE WITNESS: I think you just told me. Whenever 
that--one of you mentioned a meeting I had with him in 
November . 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 

2 What is your recollection? 

A That is my last recollection. 

Q You have not spoken with him in 1987? 

A Absolutely not. Whatever date you gave me of that 
meeting . 

MR. DUNHAM: November 17, 1986. 
MR. OLIVER: I am sorry, I have a couple more 
questions . 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 Who is Jim Pasado? 

A He is a gentleman who works with LASSI out in San 
Francisco . 

2 What is his job? 

A He doesn't have a job, he helps us with organized 
speaking engagements. He goes around speaking on the issue. 

2 

A 

2 How did he happen to become involved with LASSI? 

A I met him when I spoke before the retired group of 
intelligence officers a few years ago, his particular 




Ulffi^SSIFIED 



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HIR216002 linilPll/^bVli Iblk II PAGE 1<45 

branch, and ue got tb~be' IrieiTJrr^ . That's basically it. 

2 Did he organize just speaking engagements, did he 
organize other things for you? 

A That's about it. 

2 Did LASSI or other people working for you gather 
information on domestic opponents of the President's 
policies in Central America? 

A No, that has not been one of our functions. 

Q You never did pass on any information about 
opponents of the President's policy to the FBI or government 
officials ? 

A No . 

2 Do you know General Singlaub? 

A Yes , sir . 

2 Hon do you know General Singlaub? 

A I met him through Adolfo Calero. 

2 Were you ever involved in any of his activities? 

A No , sir . 

2 Did you ever receive any money from him? 

A Not to my knowledge. That *3,000 Adolio Calero 
sent me could have--at the time he could have mentioned 
something about General Singlaub, but the check did not 
indicate that, so I have no knowledge of that, and I never 
discussed it with General Singlaub. 

2 Did you ever meet Brett Sciaroni? 



UNIilMooiritiJ 



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3sm 

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HIR2 16002 



mnMm\i 



PAGE 146 



Yes, sic. 



2 Hou did you come to met hire? 

A I met him socially at Colonel Peno's house. 

2 Did you ever discuss any of your activities with 
him? 

A I am sure I did. In terms of public relations and 

what I was doing? I am sure. 

2 Did he ever mention to you what he uas doing? 

A Sure . 

Axey 
2 Did he talk to you at all about any work thatNRf 

was doing for Colonel North at the HSC? 

A Mo . 

2 Did you ever seek any information from Phil Mabry 
relating to the Christie Institute? 

A Phil Kabry volunteered that Information at one 
time. I never received it. 

2 What information did ha provide? 

A Basically their publications. 

2 Why did he volunteer that information? 

A Because Phil Ilabry, as I indicated earlier, has the 
tendency to go from one side of the fence to the other. On 
one month he will be on one side and the next month he takes 
the opposite side. 

2 Do you know why he would supply that information to 
you? 



umssiHED 



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IPUSSIFIED 



SAME: HIR216002 ^T ' • PAGE 147 



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A He knows uheie I stand. 

2 Uhat did you do with tha Iniorraation? 
A I thinX I just left it, filed it. I didn't do 
anything with it. There was nothing, believe n>e , there was 
nothing extraordinary about it. Anybody could walk into 
their offices I am sure and get the same information. 

MR. OLIVER: I have no further questions. Thank 
you . 

MR. FRYMAN: Mo questions. 

(Adjourned at 2:35 p.m.) 



IINtJlSSIfe 



454 



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STENOGRAPHIC MINDTBS 
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Committee HearinsB 

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



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DEPOSITION OF ROBERT C. DUTTON 

Friday, May 4, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions witn Iran, 
wasnington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p.m., in 
Room H-328, The Capitol Building, Ken Ballen and Ben Buck 
presiding. 

Present: Ken Ballen and Ken Buck, Staff Counsel on behalf 
of the House Selectte» Committee «n Covert Arms Transactions 
with Iraui; Paul Barbadoro, Counsel, on behalf of the Senate 
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to ^e Iran and 
the Nicaraguan Opposition; Vwti Dowd and Sara Dawson, on behalf 
of the witness. 




466 



2B 

IM 



liNE'iSSinED 



MR. DOWD: Counsel for Mr. Dutton understand that 
the reporter is a Notary in the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
the State of Maryland, and has no objection to this reporter 
administering the oath for purposes of this deposition and 
has no objection to the form of the oath, 
BY MR. BALLEN: 

Q Would you give your complete name? 

A Robert Charles Dutton. 

Q Mr. Dutton, I would like to show you what I have 
preraarked as Dutton Exhibit Number 1, a copy of a memorandum 
dated April 8, 1987, prepared by me. Have you reviewed this 
memorandum, sir? 

A Yes, I have. I 

Q And is that your handwriting that has corrected the 
various points in the memorandum? . 

A That is correct. 

Q And is that memorandum an accurate reflection of yoi. 
previous interviews with staff of the House Select Committee 
and the Senate Select Committee? 

A It doesn't cover everything we discussed but it 
does cover the major points. 

Q What it covers, is it an accurate representation 
of what you said? 



I believe so. 



Q 



Themk you. 



pror fal oi M of LO. 12356 
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Mr. Dutton, how long did you serve in the Armed 
Forces of the United States? 

A About 26 and a half years. 

Q Which branch of the service? 

A United States Air Force. 

Q What in general were your responsibilities with the 
United States Air Force? 

A I was a pilot the entire time. I served most of my 
career in the area of special operations, which includes 
unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism. 
I served from the squadron level through Headquarters Air 
Force level. I was mostly in the operational side of the 
Air Force. I dealt in current operations, things that are 
going on right now. I was involved in a number of special 
operations. I don't know how much detail you want, 

Q 

A 

Q Did you know General Richard V. Secord? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q How did you happen to know him? 

A I met him I believe it was in 1964, the first time, 
He was involved at that time with the First Air Commandos. 
We served in Vietnam and Thailand at the same time. 

I remained an acquaintance of his until 1976 when 




UNCUSSIFIED 



468 



12 



UNCLASSIFIED 



' I went to work for him in Teh«ran in the Air Force section of 

2 the Military Assistance Advisory Group. We were stationed 

3 together there two and a half years and returned to Washington 

4 D.C. I went to work on the Air Staff, General Secord went to 

5 the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and we have remained 

6 friends since. 

7 Q When did you retire from the United States Air Forci 

8 A 1 May 1986. 

9 Q What was your rank when you retired? 
'0 A , Colonel. 
^' Q And did General Secord offer you a position which 

led to your retirement? 
13 A I had made a decision that I was going to retire at 
'* which time he talked to me about a position, and did make an 
'8 offer to me. 

18 Q What was his offer? 

17 A His offer was to come to work for Stanford 
'* Technology Trading Group International, which was a partnershi 

of himself amd Albert Hakim. We would be working Internationa 

projects. 

He did tell me that he had a special operations, th 
^^ did not involve the company, that he was working to support, 
^^ and that he needed my help on, and it had to do with an 
^* operation in Central America, an air operation, and that they 
2' were having a great deal <)^ A^MI^^ f^ffr ^^' ^'^ ^® needed 



'mmm 



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help on that, and that is probably, that would be the major 
thing that I would be tied up with at first. 
Q What date did you start? 

I started on the second of May. 
And what was your salary? 
Five thousand dollars a month. 
The special operation, air operation in Central 
America that he described to you, was this Stanford Technology 
business or not? 

A No, it was not. 

Q Were you to be separately compensated for your 
efforts in regard to this? 
A No, I was not. 

Q How did General Secord describe to you the purpose 
of the air re-supply operation? Did he say where in Central 
America it would be? 

A Yes, sir. The re-supply operations themselves would 
be in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B Nicaragua, that would be operating 
out of^^^^^^^^^Hthat they had a small fleet of aircraft 
that would be delivering arms, munitions, uniforms, medicines, 
to the contras both at the forward operating base and! 
I^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ko forces 
Nicaragua. 

(Discussion off the j^cv^ 
BY MR. BALLEN: 
Q Were you to be separately compensated? 




470 



UNCLASSIHED 



Let me ask you this question: in fact, were you eve 
separately compensated for this operation? 

A No, I was not. 

Q So your only salary that you received in connection 
with it was your regular salary from Stanford Technology 
Trading Group International? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q You also performed other business for them? 

A That is right. 

Q Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. BALLEN: 

Q Let me clarify your answer. Delivering them both 
forward operating bases^^^^^^^^^^did General Secord 
mention to you deliveries inside Nicaragua 

A At the beginning, yes. We were to drop inside 
Nicaragua, I don't recall us discussing 

to any length at that time. Within the next week after 
I first started there, we discussed it as a separate issue. 
In fact, the airstrip was being built in northwestern Costa 
Rical 




Q Did General Secord ipUaSMrf^lf^ ^^^^ approved this 
operation? 

A He told me that we were working at the behest of 




471 




■" the White House. 

2 Q Did he tell you that this was a clandestine 

3j operation? 

4| A Yes. 

I 
5 1 Q Run at the behest of the White House? 

6 A Yes. 

7 Q Now, as part of the project, were you to both 

8 supply munitions and other goods to the FDN in the north and 

9 also attempt to open up the southern front? 

10 A That is correct. 

11 Q Now, sir, your responsibility in connection with 

12 this air supply operation was what? 

13 A When I first joined the operation on the first of 

14 May, the aircraft were in very poor condition. There was a 

15 lack of spare parts. We weren't able to keep them flying. 

16 Because the aircraft weren't flying, we weren't making any 

17 deliveries. 

18 The troops, especially in the south, were in dire 

19 need of assistance, and I was asked to become as familiar as 

20 I could with the entire operation down there, make whatever 

21 changes needed to be made, assist in facilitating getting spare 

22 parts, and basically getting the operation working. It just 

23 wasn't working. 

24 Q Sir, did there come a time in managing this air 

25 resupply operation that you met Lieutenant Colonel Oliver 



IINCLASSIFIFD 



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urassm 



North of the National Security Council? 

A Yes sir. 

And what were the circumstances, do you recall? 

A To the best of my knowledge, it was — 

Q Let me ask this question. Did there come a time 
when you met or talked to Oliver North? 

A I talked to him on the phone, I w©±d- say probably 
a number of times before I ever met him, and the first time 
I met him was away from the White House, and it was in Vienna, 
Virginia; 

Q Did you come to learn that North was the person 
at the White House who directed the airlift operation? 

A That is correct. 

Q Sir, you mentioned your responsibility in connection 
with this operation. Were you told by General Secord and 
Oliver North where the funds were for this operation, where 
they were coming from? 

A Eventually General Secord indicated that the funds 
were coming from Geneva. Any expenditures that I dealt with 
which would be invoices, would be sent to me, I would review 
them for correctiorv, necessary completeness, get any questions 
answered that I thought General Secord might have. I would 
present them to him, and if he approved them, then he would 
call Mr. Hakim to effect a wire transfer to whoever would 
require the funds. 



DNtlfcSW 



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Q You are now referring to the actual physical location 
of the funds as coming from Geneva; is that correct? 

A That was my understanding, yes. 

Q Let me ask a more general question. Did Colonel 
North and General Secord tell you that the monies that were 
supporting this operation were privately donated monies? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did they also tell you that there were limits to that 
money? 



Absolutely. 

What did they tell you in that regard? 

There was not a bottomless pit of money, that we 
had to be very careful in handling the funds that we had. We 
had to account for the money as it was spent, which we did. 
We could purchase those things that were necessary to complete 
or to accomplish the mission, but we were not to spend anything 
extra and anything that we felt that we really needed, we 
needed their authority to procure, such as the new aircraft, 
the fifth aircraft, that we finally got; some special 
navigation equipment; storm scopes for the aircraft. 

Q This was both Oliver North and General Secord? 
Both indicated to you the limited nature of the funds involved? 
A That is correct. 

Q Did they also describe to you their concept that 
they didn't want to see the contras ' cause destroyed before 



to see the contras' cause 

i!N(ii km\tl 



474 



UNCLASSIFIED 



10 



i 



Congress could vote additional funds, that this was the purpose 
of the operation? 

A It was my understanding the purpose of the operation 
was to keep the contras alive and growing. Colonel North did 
tell me that the forces in the south were growing at a rate of 
approximately 150 a day, and that was going to require more 
food, medicines, uniforms, and weapons, and, therefore, we 
had to get the operations working as quickly as we could. 

Q Did General Secord ever discuss with you the 
legality of the operation? 

A Yes, he did. At the initial briefing that he gave 
me in the office on the second of May, I questioned whether what 
we were doing was proper and legal, and he assured me it was, 
and gave me a copy of a legal opinion which had been signed by 
Sandy Martin, that stated in relation to the Neutrality Act 
that as long as we did not deliver personnel, that case law 
showed that we would stay within the law concerning the 
Neutrality Act. And in a separate discussion, we talked about 
the Arms Export Control Act, that we could not ship any weapons, 
munitions either through or from the United States, and that 
we would always be careful never to do that. 

Q What was your knowledge as to where the weapons were 
being shipped from? 

A My understanding was they were coming from Europe. 
Later on in the operation, I came to, understand that they were 



• 



iiMHi &Q<!inrn 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



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shipped fromi 

Q Who was involved in that? 

A Tom Clinesl 

Q Now, did General Secord also tell you at that time 
that the air resupply support for the contras was further lega 
because you could not be in violation of an Appropriation Act? 

A That was discussed. I would say that it is probably 
an accurate statement. It was probably done more in the form 
of a question, how could you be in violation of an*^Act and 
these were privately donated funds, the Act didn't apply in 
any case. 

Q Referring to what is commonly called the Boland Act? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, did Secord further explain to you at that time 
the covert nature of this operation? 

A To the degree that the sensitivity of the operation 
was in dealing with the Central American countries that we 
were working with, and who we were supporting. If, in fact, th 
operation became public knowledge 




^^^^^^^^^ or those 
reasons, it had to remain clandestine. 

Q Do you recall him also expressing to you in that 
vein that it had to be sensitive , clandestine, because of 
possibly revealiiA CiKi iAett m |9i PiflW of the donors to the 



MMssinnr 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



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program? Did he mention that to you? 

A As I recall, the identity of the donors was 
sensitive, but I don't believe it added sensitivity to the 
operation. 

Q Did he say anything in regards to the fact that 
exposure in the press in the United States could needlessly 
irritate Congress before they had an opportunity to vote again 

A That is an impression I got. I don't remember a 
particular discussion where the effect of Congress being 
needlessly antagonized was the issue. The greater issue was 
the people that were supporting us. 

Q Did General Secord, during the month of May, begin 
furnishing you with a KL-43 encryptible communications device? 

A Yes. 

Q And could you describe that a little? What is a 
KL-43? 

A A KL-43 looked like a small portable computer and 
had a little screen and a keybo 



I 




If I were to prepare a message, I would type it out 
in clear text, encrypt it, and then prepare to send. I would 
call whoever I needed to send the message to, I would tell 



needed to send the messaj 



477 



UNCUSsra 



13 



them I had a message for them. They would set up their machin 
to receive, tell me they were ready. 




Q How did General Secord obtain the machine? 
A My understanding was he got it from Colonel North. 
They had been provided by NSA. 

Q And who else had them besides yourself and General 
Secord? 

A Mr. Langton of SouthemAir Transport and Raphael 
Quintero. Mr. Gadd had one of the machines but we did not 
communicate with him once I came into the operation. 

The Chief of Station CIA, ^^^^^^^Hwhom only 
knew as^^^H had one. 

Colonel James Steele, the Commander of the Military 
Group in El Salvador had one of the machines. 

At one point in the operation he turned it over to 
Max Gomez or Felix Rodriguez for a period of about a month, am 
then took it back, and Bill Cooper, the manager of the 
operation. 

MR. DOWD: That is Max Gomez, also known as Felix 



Rodriguez? 



iii^f!! mm 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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1 THE WITNESS: Yes, and Oliver North had at least one 

2 in the office. 

3 BY MR. BALLEN: 

* Q And the code operated via secret tape, is that 

5 correct? 

6 A We received a cassette of tapes once a month, just 

7 before the beginning of the month. 

8 Q From whom did you receive that? 

9 A We would receive them from Colonel North's office. 
The mechanics of it varied but the normal way was Shirley 



1' Napier, the Administrative Assistant, would go down to the 



White House and meet Fawn Hall, who would give her a package 
containing -- If I was going to be able to get the taj 

distributed to the other members, then I would receive all of 
them. If Colonel North was going to see^fHbefore 
Mr. Quintero, then he might keep that one. 

Q Did you travel through Central America soon after 
you started working at STTGI? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q When was that, sir? 

A That was in the latter part of _May^ ^roundthe 20th, 
somewhere around there. 

Q What was the purpose of the trip? 

A This was the initial visit. It was to get eyes and 
hands on the operation, actually take a look at the aircraft, 
all of the assets that ^we h^d, i.." meet the people, and become 



■ May, around the 20th, 

UNCUSSIHEI 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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truly familiar with what the problems were and try to figure 
out why the operation wasn't working. 



How many aircraft did the operation have at that 



time? 



A We had four. 

Q And briefly, what kind were they? 

A We had a Maule, which is a light single engine 
aircraft that we used more for a taxi to get to the other 
forward operating bases. 

We had two C-7 DeHavilands, and one C-123, which 
was also a twin engine transport. 

That was the 19th of May, the first time. 

Q And how many flight crew and mechanics were 
stationed there, approximately? 

A The average over the time I believe was 19. 

Q And at that time did you have an opportunity to 
inspect the warehouse that was maintained for the operation? 

A I did. 

Q And what in general did it have in it? 

A At that time, we had one very small area that we put 
some of our spare parts in. It was totally inadequate for 
the numbers that we should have had and would need. 




480 



UNCLASSIFIED 



16 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

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16 

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Q Were there any rifles among the weapons? 

A Yes. AK-47 rifles, HK-21 machine guns. There were 

uniforms, bundles of, many bundles of uniforms. 

Q That was at your main base 

A Ves, sir, 

Q That would be| 

A Yes. 




A We were attempting to establish 

la place we referred to as either West or the Plantatio 
which was on the northwestern coast of Costa Rica, just below 
the Nicaraguan border, right on the seacoast. We had a 5600 
foot strip there that we had built. 

Q Who had initially ordered the construction of that 
airstrip? 

A My understanding was General Secord and Colonel 
North had initially had it constructed. 

Q Now, when did the air operation, to the best of your 
knowledge, that you took over in May the management of, when 
had that operation begun? 

A My understanding was around the first or second 
month, either January or February. 



iiNp.! hmB 



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16 
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22 
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UNCLASSIRED 



17 



Q Do you know how many successful drops of munitions 
and other supplies had been made by the time that you had 
taken over the operation? 

A To my knowledge, there had been no successful drops 
by the organization to the south -- the southern forces. Ther 
had been some drops inside Nicaragua to the northern forces, 
but I don't know how many. 

Q So did you know about a SAT drop that they made? 

Yes., I was told about SAT. I knew about it after. 
That was to the south? 

Yes, that is why I said our organization -- 
Maybe you should clarify that a little further. 
There had been, once I went down to visit, I was 
told and shown on the map where a Southern Air Transport L-IOO 
had made a drop to some of the southern forces wherein they 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B loaded the supplies they were going to dro; 
then flew a rather lengthy trip, penetrated f rom^^^^^^^^H 
^^^1 to make the drop. 

Q With reference to the airstrip that was being 
constructed in Costa Rica, did Oliver North ever tell you that 




482 



UNCLASSIFIED 



18 



1 
Z 
3 

4 
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Q This is what Colonel North had informed you? 

A Colonel North and General Secord one, and/or the 
other. 

Q Sir, what was the financial administrative setup? 
Specifically what role did x^^M/^^M play. Corporate Air Servic 
and East, to the best of your knowledge? 

A To the best of my knowledge, the invoices that 
I received would show expenditures, I would receive invoices 
from East Corporation, which I understood had consultants such 
as people that built the airstrip down in Costa Rica. Their 
salaries were paid through East, and other support items. If 
they helped us procure parachutes and that sort of thing, 
these sort of things would show on the invoice. Ace was 
the means by which the air crews were paid and I would receive 
a separate invoice for that. 

Q This is what you were referring to earlier, that 
they would tell General Secord of the invoice and he or you 
would contact Mr. Hakim? 

A He would normally contact Mr. Hakim. If he was 
unable to contact him at the time, or if he wasn't around, 
then I was to call Mr. Hakim. 

Q Referring back to your first trip to Central 
America, specif ica 11 v^^^^^^^^k^rhcdidiifWi meet with when 



limR 




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19 



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2 

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8 

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11 

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you arrived there? 

A We were met by Mr. Cooper, who is managerj 




That evening --we didn't mention Raphael Quintero 
flew down there with me, 

The second evening, Raphael and Felix and myself 
sat down and Felex described some of this backgroundl 



Q Did you meet at that time three crew members who wer 
from Great Britain, or British? 

A Yes, three. Two pilots and a load master or kicker, 
had been hired for the operation before I came on board. They 
were just arriving down there when I went down. 

Q What was the plan behind hiring the British crew 
people? 

A My understanding, since I wasn't there when they 
were hired, my understanding was that they were hired to fly 
missions that would go to the interior of Nicaragua, wherein 
American pilots would not cross the border. We American pilot 



UNCUSSinFO 



484 



UNCLASSIFIED 



20 



fly^^H^^HH^^^^^^^^^^^^out to the 

2 operating bases on the border. They would stay outside of 

3 Nicaragua, and likewise, the flights to locate equipment and 

4 munitions in a basi^^^^^^^^^^H they would fly those missic 

8 The idea was that the Brits would then fly the 

6 missions into Nicaragua itself. Unfortunately, when they got 

S 

' down there, while they were advertised as having been highly 

• experienced multi-engine people, it turned out that one of 

9 them did have, one of the pilots had some experience in multi- 
^0 engines', the other was a helicopter pilot, who had very littl« 
^' experience. They were never of any particular value. They 

^2 never flew operational missions for us. The pilots didn't. 

^3 I believe the kicker — loadmaster, flew one or two missions. 

^* Q Now, Mr. Dutton, back to the plan behind the 

^' British crewmen. Did Colonel North inform you of the plan? 

^^ A I believe General Secord did. 

^^ Q Did you ever have any discussions with Colonel Non 

^* about that? 

** A I probably did, especially when we were discussing 

*® the problems we were having with them, that we discussed what 

^^ the purpose had been 2uid the fact they were not going to do 

'' what it was we wanted, or needed done. 

*' Q Now, because of problems you were having with thesf 

^* individuals, did there come a time in mid-June where 

^' Colonel North 4,U^t}Qf ized^aa\iUu|*iM^°'^^ ^^ American mamned 



i 




485 



UNCLASSIFIED 



21 



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2 

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It 

19 

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2B 



crews inside Nicaragua? 

A Yes. 

And in about the middle of June again, did you seeV 
to construct additonal space in the warehouse that you already 
had? 

A Yes, we did. We, as I said, one of the big problen 
with getting the aircraft flying and keeping them flying, was 
having adequate spare parts for them. Therefore, we hired a 
separate individual to be stationed in Miami at Southern Air 
Transport to acquire the supplies that ve needed, the spare pai 
for the aircraft and then to forward the 

Once down there, we needed to have a place to store 
them out of the weather £md someplace to get it organized. 




Additionally, we had got approval to put a ramp in 
do%m by our warehouse so we could move the aircraft down and 
have them close where we needed to trork on them. 

Q Who authorized the expense involved? 

A To my knowledge, Mr. Secord. 

Q Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record) 



UNCUSSIFIED 



21 



486 



OILASSIFIED '■ 

1 BY MR. BALLEN: 

2 Q Does this rcma k your recollection? 

3 A Yes. As far as who authorized the payment, it woul 

4 have been General Secord and Colonel North. I was probably 

5 informed by General Secord but it would be something they both 

6 agreed to. Yes, we were going to make the expenditure. 

7 Q If General Secord said yes, we are going to spend 

8 it, it would be something to the effect yes , Ollie approves 

9 making the expenditure? 

10 A • Ollie and I agreed to do it. 

11 Q Now, after you returned to the U.S. in late May, 

12 did you receive communications from Oliver North? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Did he tell you the need, the urgent need to get 
^' arms to the Contra troops? 

1* A Yes. 

17 Q And what, if anything, did he say at that time 

^* concerning new recruits? 

1» A I believe I mentioned before that the force was 

*® building at a rapid rate, and that not being able to supply 

them would put them in jeopardy, and that we had to do every- 

*2 thing we could to get a viable air operation working that 

*3 could support this force. 

24 Q Let me show you what I pre-marked as Dutton 

*• Exhibits 3 and 4, #id #ijkk, Yfiu^^take a look at those. Let 




487 



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mm\m 



23 



' me direct your attention to what I am referring to on 3 is ]ust 

2 the very last paragraph. 

3 A Okay. 

^ Q On the back. 

5 A All right. Okay. 

fi Sir, do you recognize these exhibits? 

A I recognize this one as being mine, and that is 



8 Exhibit 4, as one that I sent to Colonel North 
9 

10 



Q And what are these? You say you sent to Colonel 
North. What are these exhibits? What do they represent? 

A Well, they represent communications dicussing 
firstly the general condition of the operation. Colonel North 
was looking for some help to fix some of the FDN aircraft that 
were broken that they weren't able to fix them. He was lookin< 
to see if there were some things we could do to fix the runway 
down at the Plantation, because we had stuck anl| airplane in 
the mud there because water was flowing under the runway 
unbeknownst to us, and for the first time, he introduced the 
fact we might get another aircraft, which we did definitely 
need, because this is the first time it was brought up and 
opened the door for us to now improve the operation. 

Q That is Exhibit number — 

A Three. 

Q That is dated what date? Approximately the middle 
of June? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



488 



NCIiSSIFIED 



24 



1 A Yes, the 16th of June 

2 Q That is referring to Exhibit number? 

3 A Four. 

4 Q Referring to number 4, that would be another KL-4 3 

5 message, is that correct? 

6 A Yes sir. 

7 Q Transcription? 

8 A Yes. I am sending the message to Colonel North 

9 telling him we are ready to fly and the C-7 mission that we had 

10 had arranged to get some munitions to the southern forces. 

11 Q You had also informed him in that message that we 

12 are looking for another aircraft? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Now, sir, what steps at this time did you take in 
16 addition to the possible purahHBB of another aircraft, to 

18 atteitqpt to speed air deliveries to the forces. Contra forces? 

1^ Did you look to purchase a jet engine? 

18 A Oh, we looked to get — we had to replace a jet 

^' engine on the 123. We had an accident that had destroyed the 

2^ one engine and we were looking to purchase a spare. Not only 

2^ a jet engine, but we were going to purchaae spare engines for | 

22 both the C-123 and the C-7. 

23 Q By the end of June, had any successful missions been 
2* flown to the southern forces? 

28 A The C-7 I believe flew one or two successful 



I 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



25 



missions. 



Q Did that C-7 require any special refueling? 

A Yes. 

Q Needs? 

A Ves. 

Q In order to carry any kind of load which eventuallj 
I believe was down as low as 4 or 5,000 pounds of munitions. 
They could not carry enough fuel to fly^^^^^^^^^^^ldown to 
the drop zone and return. Therefore, with the help oi 




Q Directing your attention to on or about the middle 
of July, '86, did you have a meeting with Oliver North, 
Richard Secord and Albert Hakim? 

A Yes sir. 

Q And during this meeting did North discuss his 
contacts on Capitol Hill? 

A I don't recall a specific contact. 

Q What was the general nature of the discussion? 

A The general nature of the discussion was how we we: 
going with the operation, what was being done for us to becom« 
operation^, where did we stand as far as how long we would be 
in operation. 

Q Let m«.«3k.atbi% QUQAtV^AiiBJil^s there, do you recal 



mmm 



490 



UNCLASSIREO 



45 



1 BY MR. BUCK: 

2 Do you recognize Exhibit 9? 

3 A Yes, I do. 

4 Q Would you tell me what it is? 
B A On the thirteenth of August, we received the first 

6 Q Is it a KL'>'43 message? 

7 A Three KL-43 messages. 

8 Q What are the dates of the three? 

9 A They are all on the thirteenth of August. Two of 
to them on the thirteenth. There is no date on the last one. 

11 Q Would you imagine that is around the same date? 

12 A Yes sir. 

13 Q Who was the third one from? 

14 A aob Earlfi; 
18 Q Who is it sent to? Do you know who it was sent to? 

10 A I believe it was to General Secord. 

17 Q Did you read this at the time it was sent? 

1* A Probably. 

1* Q Do you recall discussing this with General Secord? 

20 A I believe I did. 1 

21 Q I am interested in the first part of the first 
** sentence. Let me read it to you. My reading is that it 
23 results from your report last night that ^^^^^^^^^H had 
2* been directed hands off by DCI. That would be a report from 
28 General Secord to Bob Earr? 



I 



UNCLASSIFIED 



I 



491 



UNCLASSIFIED 



26 



1 a meeting between Oliver North and Felix Rodriguez? 

2 A Yes. 

3 Q What occurred during that meeting? 

4 A Colonel North asked me to have Felix come to 

5 Washington. Felix had become a rather serious problem for 

6 security reasons. He was talking to a number of people about 

7 the ope'-ation. Colonel North and General Secord were both 

8 very disturbed by that, because it could have caused the 

9 operation to become known. 

Q ' I am sorry to interrupt. How did you know that he 
was causing a problem, who had told you? 

A Colonel North and General Secord. We thought if 
Colonel North talked to him in the White House, in the office 
rather, that it might impress him enough that he would no 
longer be a security problem. 

Q And did that conversation occur? 

A Yes, it did. 

Q Sir, after your first trip to — let me just show 
you at this time what I pre-marked Dutton Exhibit number 2 and 
ask you to take a look at it. 

A Yes, I recognize it. 

22 Q How did you recognize it? 

23 A This is a reorganization plan that I drew up, 

2* starting in, I guess I began it right after I came back from 
2* the first time, and we finished it in raid — just before I 



iiwri/iocinrn 



492 



UNCUSSIFIED 



26 A 



1 went down the second -- for my second trip in June. 

2 The first pages of it go back through the wiring 

3 diagram, what we referred to as the reorganization plan that 

4 outlined a new organization that was going to control, direct, 

5 the operation, wherein General Secord and Colonel North would 

6 ostensibly not be part of the operation any longer, and that 

7 a ".ew group, known as BC Washington, or Benefactor Company 

8 Washington, would take over the responsibilities. 

9 Q Was that in neune only? 

10 A That was in name only, and it was in fact General 

11 Secord and Colonel North r om a wa d exactl^y where they had been 

■ • 

12 in the organization, but because of zmother lawsuit and with 

13 the problems with Felix, General Secord had asked me to present 
1* this new organization and inform Felix that North and Secord 

15 were no longer in the operation, with the hope if he told the 

16 people he had been talking to that in fact North smd Secord 

17 were out of it, that they could then continue operating withou- 
1* being bothered by these outside forces. 

Q Sir, what are the last couple of pages? 

A Once we had the reorganization plan put together, 
and as I said, in July our discussions started centering 
around the fact it looked like the $100 million was going to 
be voted by Congress to support the Contras, the idea was once 
that money was voted, what_would ^i^gf 5^ j^l''^^^ organization 
that we had set up. 



lat would haopen .viLtl^Uie 



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imSSIFIfD 



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In order to make a presentation to the CIA, we 

prepared a list of all the assets and the expenditures for the 

operation which showed that we had a total value of somewhere 

in the vicinity of $4 million. It showed what our costs were, 

what sort of inventory of munitions and other supplies we had, 

a description of other assets, all the assets, the idea being 

this is a package that Colonel North could take to the CIA 
7 ^aV- 

and hand to them and say this is the operation h^*t is in beinj 

if when you get the SlOO million, this is the way you want, if 

you want to take this organization over, here is what it is. 

At least you know now what it is. 

Q Did you show this document to General Secord once 
you had prepared it? 

A Yes. 

Q And did he approve it? \ 

A Yes. 

Q Did you show the document to Colonel North once you 
had prepared it? 

A General Secord took it to Colonel North. 

Q That is what General Secord had told you? 

A Yes. In fact, they did some editorial work on some 
of it. It was Colonel North's work. 

Q How do you know that? 

A General Secord said that he wanted — I had never 

heard of Project Democracy, and they had added that into the 

I 



494 



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16 
17 
18 
19 
SO 
21 



^^vp\ Aooicim 28 



ilSLASSIFIED 



^ first general paragraph, so I didn't know where that came fron 

2 and he told me Colonel North put that in. 

3 Q Just to ask you several questions about the documer 

4 the value on the assets, is that something that you determinec 
8 A No, General Secord had most of the knowledge on the 
8 And in terms of the inventory at the warehous^^^ 

7 j^^^^^^l ^^ °^ 22 July, '86, who had conducted that? 

• A To the best of my knowlege, that was Mr. Cooper an*/ 

he was working with the local UNO representative, who kept 
^0 a complete inventory of all of the assets that went into the 
^1 warehouse at all times. 

And the last page, page 14 of the document, the 
'3 various options that were presented to the CIA, who had 
'* explained those options to you? 

A General Secord. 

Q And these options — there were two options 
presented, is that correct? 

A Yes, that is correct. 

Q The first being what? 

A Sale of the entire operation to the CIA. 

Q And the second option? 



•* A For them to take over operational control and then 
** I we would stay in place as a proprietary and continue to run t> 
• operation for them. 
•• Q And which was the preferred option? 



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A To sell it outright. We did not want to continue 
in the operation if it wasn't absolutely necessary. 

Q In that proposed sale, was the reason that the 
assets were valued so you would have a figure? 

A Yes, eventually. The major idea was though, to put 
in perspective the value. It could have been given to them bu 
here is at least a value of what is there before they said 
forget it, we are not going to have anything to do with it, 
they should at least know what was there. 

Q ■ Did Colonel North tell you that after this plan was 
presented to him that he had discussed the sale of the assets 
directly with Casey of the CIA? 

A I don't ever recall a specific discussion where he 
said he had discussed it with Mr. Casey. 




Q But the plam was that Colonel North was to discuss 
the sale of assets on behalf of the organization with the CIA? 

A That is correct. 

Q Sir, in addition to the assets, there was the 
resupply assets, also the airstrip was among them, is that 
correct? 

A That is correct. p! 



yMOUSSlFIE 



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llUSSiFiED 



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Q And you endeavored to tell the value of the airstri 
in addition to the other assets? 

A You could say that it was to sell it. Again, it 
was to put a value on it, to say this is part of the operation 
this is part of what the organization is made up of, and it 
has value and we estimated it to be this much. 

Q Wasn't the purpose that the assets would be bought 
and then run as a proprietary, perhaps as a CIA proprietary? 

A However, CIA would want to do that. 

Q Let me show what has been pre-marked as committee 
exhibit number 5. Do you recognize that document? 

A Yes, it is one of my KL-43 messages to Lieutenant 
Colonel North. 

Q And referring to about two-thirds of the way throug! 
the message, it says "this matches what Dick said to you about 
getting a firm plan from the CIA as to their program for air 
support. " 

A -Yes. 

Q And earlier in the message it was to inform that 
the ownership of the assets were to belong to a Panama based 
compauiy and upon collection of their support, they would be 
returned to that company for future disposition? 

A Yes. 

Q Was there any discussion with North at this time as 
to his seeking to get a firm glan so you could present tbat to 



:o get a firm glan so y 

mMM 



497 



fl« .1.»>o . ^ _ . 31 



smmm 




1 the people In Central America? 

2 A We are at the 20 August time frtne right now. At 

3 this time, there were a number of things we were looking for, 

4 what all of the various options could be as to how we would 

5 dispose of or move the assets once the CIA came in and took 

6 over. There was a problem wil 

7 Q Let me ask the problem with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^had 

8 he expressed the view that the assets belonged to the Contras? 

9 A Yes, he and I think with Max's help, had 

10 Q . Max being Felix Rodriguez? 

11 A Yes sir, was convinced that the assets belong, 

12 assets being the aircraft, the munitions and everything, 

13 belonged to the Contras and therefore, if we were to leave, 
1* the assets would stay amd they belonged to the Contras. 
18 General Secord's position was that they did not 
1* belong to the Contras, they were in fact purchased by a privat 
17 company, and -that they belonged to that company, and they were 
^' being used to support the Contras. 
^* Q What was Colonel North's position in this regard? 

A I believe that he agreed with General Secord. 

Q Did he tell you so? 

A Be agreed with General Secord. 

.Q Let's take a break. 
** (A short recess was taken) 

28 



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32 



^ BY MR. BALLEN: 

* Q During your management of the air resupply 

^ operation, how frequent was your contact with Colonel North? 

A Over the telephone, KL-43, almost daily, if not 
everyday, but I rarely saw him. Maybe saw him eight or ten 
' times throughout the entire operation. 
' Q And your contact -ith General Secord? 

A It was whenever he was in town, it -would have been 
daily. 

Q Sir, let me show you this document which I didn't 

mark. This is a KL-43 message. I will ask you to take a look 
at it. 

A Okay. 

Q Do you recognize that meassage, sir? 

A This is one that I received from General Secord. 

Q And what is he describing to you? It is dated. 
What is the date? 

A It is dated the tenth of September. I have now 
arrived down^^^^^^^^^^^^H I arrived there the evening of 
the eighth. On the ninth. 

Q Why did you go down there? 

A Again, we were still not flying the missions, 
accomplishing what we set out to accomplish. We were able to 
fly aircraft a little more, but weather was a problem, making 
contact with the Contras down in the operational areas was a 



ntras down in tne operati 



499 



Mmms 



33 



1 I continuing problem, and we were flying missions but nothing 

2| was being delivered because we couldn't find the troops to 

3 deliver them or they couldn't identify their own position 

4i where we could get to them. 

i 
5] Q In fact, did you not fly a mission on the ninth of 

6 September? 

7 A I did, to find out first hand exactly what those 

8 problems were. 

9 Q Did you fly inside of Nicaragua? 

10 A • Yes, I did. 

11 Q Let me, before you get to that other exhibit, show 

12 you what has been pre-marked as Exhibit Number 6. 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Do you recognize this document? 

15 A Yes. This is a message sent after the mission on 

16 the ninth of September to Lieutenant Colonel North. 

17 Q In that message did you ask for any help he could 

18 give in terms of weather and for locating troops? 

19 A Yes, that is correct. 

20 Q Did you call Colonel North late that night at home, 

21 personally call him_^ not on the KL-43,that night? 

22 A Yes, I did. 

23 Q And at that time did you tell him that you had 

24 flown personally to Nicaragua? 

25 A I described --. J was describing the problems that 




500 



16 



25 



UNCLASSIFIED '4 



1 we encountered on the mission and from the way I was describin 

2 it, he made a deduction and he said you flew on the mission, 

3 didn't you? I say, yes, I did. 

4 Q What did he say? 

5 A He said, don't do it any more- He said you are 

6 too valuable, you know too many of the people, too much about 

7 the operation, and we can't have you exposed. 

8 Q Now, sir, if you could refer to that, referring to 

9 the other document which I had as Exhibit Number 7. 

10 A ' Okay. 

11 Q This is one that you were referring to earlier 

12 dated September tenth? 

13 A Yes. 

1^ Q I am sorry, to General Secord? 
1' A No, to me from General Secord. 

Q What does it say? 
1^ A It is General Secord' s reaction to the mission that 

^* I flew on the ninth. We spent an hour flying around inside 
19 
20 
21 
22 

*^ being able emy time we flew a mission to get the delivery on 

2* the ground. That and in discussions about this later it was m\ 



Nicaragua at very low altitude trying to fund the forces that 
we were to drop to. After an hour, we had been completely 
unable to find anybody, so we brought the load home, and 
General Secord' s reaction was that we had to ^JMt/jsome way of 



costing us $6 or $7,000 every time we flew a mission, they were 



UNCLA!;.SiFiFn 



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! 
ll 

slj 

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very long and very difficult, and we had to make them pay off 
by getting the goods delivered somehow. 

Q There was a problem with funds. You couldn't spend 
limitless -- 

A That is correct, and trying to keep the money in the 
fuel fund to where we could continue to fly. We couldn't be 
wasting it on missions we weren't delivering anything. 

Q And General Secord in this message, refers to a 
surge. What was the purpose behind the surge of the southern 
force? 

A If we could find a way that we could, in fact, get 
deliveries made to the southern forces. General Secord had 
okayed us keeping both C-123s and both C-7s down there to fly 
as many missions as regularly as possible to deliver as much 
of the material in the warehouse to both the north and south 
forces . 

Q What is meant in that message when it talks about 
a force feed operation? 

A This is a force feed op don't go again unless we 
can drop without contact. What that means, we were going to 
get the munitions down into their area at some place where we 
could find them and we were going to be flying. In other words 
here are the goods, they are now in your lap, get them and use 
them. 

Q Let me show yuu ^fjia t has been pre-marked Exhibit 




502 



ONCUSSIFIEO " I 

Number 8, and ask you if you recognize that document? 

A Yes. This is a message from me to Colonel North. 

Q And in general does this message describe the 
deliveries of munitions to the south? 

A Yes, it does. 

Q Were you sending regular almost daily reports to 
Colonel North to inform him of the surge in the south? 

A Yes, starting probably around the eleventh or 
twelfth of September, we had found a way where we could locate 
drop zones that were easily identifiable on the map to where 

Icould inform the forces there is going to be a load on 
the ground at these coordinates and this place on your map 
so they could tell us how to get to them and find them. 

We tried that, and it worked, and therefore, now 
we had determined all right, we were going to be dropping 
everyday if we could find, if we could have a primary drop 
zone, we wanted to drop to an alternate in case that one was 
under weather. We would take a load down there everyday, I 
could give a report at the end of the day, and the troops 
became very successful at this. 

Q Sir, referring, it says in the message, "have 
photo proof of load in center of drop zone, positive ID of 
drop down photo proof." 

Were these photographs that were taken of the drop 
zone to avoid the flights -• 



Mi' 



UWSSIHFR 



503 



37 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 A Yes, they took -- 

2 Q And were these photographs subsequently put into a 

3 photograph album? 

* A Yes, they were. 

5 Q Why were they put into an album? Who did it? 

6 A When I returned f rom^^^^^^^^^B I believe that was 

7 around the -- I had just before leaving, gone through a stack 

8 of photographs that the troops had down there, which included 

9 pictures from air drops that showed drop zones. We call it a 

10 Parrots beak. It was easily identifiable, had the load on it. 

11 What I wanted to do was with picture evidence, try to describe 

12 for the people up here what the problems were and how we were 

13 dealing with the operation in Nicaragua. 

14 So I put together a photo album that included 

15 pictures of the aircraf t^^^^^^^^^l which showed| 

16 ^^^^H showed some of the people we had working there, working 

17 on the aircraft, and it had pictures on to show the kind of 

18 weather that they were flying into and through. 

19 It had pictures of the drop as the load came out 

20 under the parachute and pictures of the load on the drop zone 

21 so people would have positive evidc ice that the loads were 

22 delivered on the ground. 

23 Q It also had a picture of you in there with a HK-21 

24 machine gun. 

25 A We had ^yCtfiWon .3 C-123. I was sitting in the back 




504 



UNCLASSIRED 



38 



1 of theC-123 with some of the other crew members. 

2 MR. BALLEN: Off the record. 

3 (Discussion off the record.) 
* BY MR. BALLEN: 

5 Q You described one of the purposes of the surge 

6 being to get supplies, badly needed supplies, to the southern 

7 forces, is that correct? 

8 A That is correct. In addition, since we had the 

9 aircraft now working and we had a means to make the deliveries 
in part since we had all the aircraft working now, we had 
a means of making the drops, we were building up a case for 
the fact that the operation was now in fact a successful 

13 operating air resupply operation and that that would be looked 

I* at by CIA as something that was now a viable operation for 

15 them taking it over, purchasing it, or whatever reason, where 

16 they came into the operation. 

17 Q Was it your understanding at that time that North 

18 had met with^^^^Hand Casey of the CIA in order to effectuate 

19 purchase of these assets? 

20 A Yes, sir. 

21 Q And that this was something that both General 

22 Secord and Colonel Oliver North had wanted to happen? 

23 A Yes, sir. 

24 Q Sir, what did you do with the photograph album once 

25 you prepared it? ||MPIAOCiPCn 

wnlmie risited our 



I gave i 



it UMoVjw;^Vomi» 



505 



WUSSIFIEO 



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offices in Vienna. 

Q And what did he say when you gave it to him? 

A He was very pleased with it and said that he was 
going to take it to the top boss, which I assumed to be the 
President . 

Q Why did you assume that to be the President? 

A I had never heard him use that term before about 
anybody else, any of the other players. It was always some 
very general association or term. I never heard him say the 
top boss. That was just my impression. 

Q Did he ever mention to you at any other time the 
President of the United States? 

A On one occasion after we got -- when I had returned 
and we had the operation working, he mentioned that while I 
would never get any medal for what we had done, that one day 
the President would shake my hand. 

Q Now, about this time when the drops were successfully 
being made to the southern forces, how many drops were being 
made? Do you know the number of pounds, how many drops, and 
what kind of poundage of munitions were dropped to the southern 
forces? 

A We were making a drop almost every day and I would 
say we had probably accomplished between 15 and 20 drops, and 
had put somewhere in the neighborhood of 180,000 pounds of 
munitions and supplies on the ground. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



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Q , Sir, did at that time. Colonel North ask you to 
arrange a trip for him down to Central America to take a look 
at the operation? 

A Yes. J 

Q What exactly did he say he wanted to do? 

A He asked that I call down to Southern Air Transport 
and get the Jet Star set up. We would make a flight tc 

I, spend the night, and fly tol 
visit the people there, the troops, so he could talk to them. 
He was very proud of them at that point and thought it would 
be a short trip. 

Q Proud of them for what they had done during the 
month of September? 

A Yes. We didn't want to put him — he never made th 
trip. The trip was never made because I believe it was becaus 
of all the business on the Iran part of the operation that his 
schedule was such we were never able to accomplish the trip. 

Q During the month of September were there FDN or ' 
Contra representatives aboard the planes? 

A Yes. We would carry, we call them Sp2mish speeUcing 
radio man with a little ported^le radb that the plan was when 
we get in the area of the drop zone, we had a pre-set frequenc 
thatfll^would pass to the ground forces and we would be on it 
and then the troops on our airplane, the Nicaraguans could 
talk to him and if.w^^weren' t directly over their drop zone 

00516 




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UNCLASSIFIED 



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or he wanted us to come to him so they could get directions. 
We tried that over and over and we never made, to 
my knowledge, we never made contact. Maybe once or twice, but 
it never saved a mission for us. 

Q Did any of these individuals carry personal weapons 
of any kind, to your knowledge? 

A The FDN representative would carry an AK-4 7. 

The others did not have personal weapons down there 
and I do not recall whether they were carrying a weapon or not 

Q Let me just ask this question. Was it more 
advantageous from your point of view, to make these missions 
during daiigtet, nighttime, dusk — what time of day was 
optimal? 

A At this time of the year it was the rainy season, 
emd at night would have been the safest time 



IINCLIOTI 




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ONCUSSIFIED 



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Q On or about October fifth, what occurred with 
reference to one of your flights? 

A Bill Cooper, our manager and Buzz Sawyer, Gene 
Hasenfus, and an FDN radio man flew a mission daytime. They 
flew down the Pacific Coast side, entered! 
They were going to a new drop zone that was a little farther 
to the west than we had dropped before, and for some reason, 
Mr. Cooper decided to cut the corner off and enter Nicaragua 
from farther to the west than we had before. 

In doing so, he evidently flew over eui area where 
Sandinista forces were. The aircraft was hit with what we 
believe was an SA-7 missile and was shot down. Gene Hasenfus 
wore a sport parachute that I understand now that his brother 
had given him, but he had that on, he was able to get out of 
the aircraft and was subsequently captured I believe a day 
later. 

Q Did the other men have parachutes on or not? 

A No, they did not. 

Q And did you inform General Secord and Colonel Nort 
when you learned of this? 

A As soon as I got the word, yes, I did. 

Q And did Colonel North attempt to get a search 
operation underway? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCLASSIHED 



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It cou: 

have ditched in the water, any number of things could have 
happened. We wanted to get aircraft out looking for it. 

Within a few hours though, the word — I got a cai; 
that Cuban radio was carrying a report that the Sandinistas 
had shot down — I think the first report was a C-47 — in 
southwestern Nicaragua and since ie knew that is where Mr. 
Cooper was flying, we assumed that that probably was what had 
happened. That was veht had happened. That was verified shor 
thereafter. 

Q And sir, was there a discussion between yourself. 
General Secord and Colonel North as to the payment of death 
benefits to Cooper emd Buzz Sa%«yer? 

A Yes. Mr. Secord determined on his own, while ther< 
was no contractual requirement and nothing had ever been talk< 
about as far as death gratuity or benefit, that he just felt 
the right thing to do would be to pay the survivors — Buzz 
Sawyer's wife and Cooper's three daughters a debt benefit of 
$60,000 each, and I was told by General Veeord that he had 
requested the wire transfer be made. It was not made immedia 
and by the time tbe ..Vfiopnfcs J'^* ^QiQfl.' 3° t° date, that ha 



■flffisifmi 



510 



10 

11 

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44 



. not been done. 

2 Q Was there any contemplation of any death benefits 

, for the FDN representative on board that flight? 

- A I don ' t know . 

g Q I have no further questions. 

g BY MR. BARBADORO: 

. Q Just a couple of things. Could I go through this 

s month by month? 

a In May of is it '86, how many successful drops by 

aircraft, were made to the southern front troops in May of '86? 

Your answer was? 
A None . 

13 Q How about in June of Sff 86? 

14 A It depended on when the C07 mission went. Either I 
)g June or July there were two. Then after that there were none 
10 until September. 

17 Q And how many successful drops were there in 

1$ September? 

19 A I can't give you the exact number. My estimate 

20 would be 15. 

21 Q That is all. 

22 BY MS. BUCK: 

23 Q Would you please look at this? 

24 MR. BALLEN: It is Exhibit 9. 



28 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



511 



UNCLASSIRED 



45 



1 BY MR. BUCK: 

2 Q Do you recognize Exhibit 9? 

3 A Yes, I do. 

4 Q Would you tell me what it is? 

5 A On the thirteenth of August, we received the first 

6 Q Is it a KL«'4 3 message? 

7 A Three KL-43 messages. 

8 Q What are the dates of the three? 

9 A They are all on the thirteenth of August. Two of 

10 them on the thirteenth. There is no date on the last one. 

11 Would you imagine that is around the same date? 

12 A Yes sir. 

13 Q Who was the third one from? 

14 A Bob Earl^. 

18 Q who is it sent to? Do you know who it was sent tol 

16 A I believe it was to General Secord. 

17 Q Did you read this at the time it was sent? 
1* A Probably. 

18 Q Do you recall discussing this with General Secord? 

20 A I believe I did. 

21 Q I am interested in the first part of the first 
** sentence. Let me read it to you. My reading is that it 
2' results from your report last night that ^^^^^^^^^^ had 
24 been directed hands off by DCI. That would be a report from 
28 General Secord to Bob Earl^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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I don't know. 

Do you know what OCI refers to? 

Yes, Director of Central Intelligence. 

At this point in time who would that be? 

William Casey. . i 

Can you tell me whol 




What does it meim that they had been directed hand: 



off by Mr. Casey? 

A Well.^^Hhad been assisting us with the support 
for the southern front, locating troops, passing communication 
back euid forth. So 1 am sure what they were referring to is 
that he had been told not to deal with the operation, with our{ 
people any more, don't talk to them. 




Q So, is it your understanding that this is an attem 
by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Casey, to separa 
himself a little bit more from your activities? 

A Yes. 

Q Was that consistent with what you understood the 



CIA's role to be? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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513 



1 Q The CIA's role vacillated. They were — 

2 A Let's determine who in the CIA's role vacillated. 

3 A We would get word that, well — we would understand 

4 that the CIA could pass weather and intelligence information 

5 to us. 

6 You say we? 

7 A The people^^^^^^^^^^l General Secord, and myself. 
• Q You got word from General Secord, is that correct, 

9 that the intelligence officials — 

10 A ' That was always true from the beginning, that was 

11 part of the law said they couldstill provide intelligence data 

12 to the FDN, which would include weather. 

13 Q Whose understanding of the law was this? 

14 A General Secord. And mine once he told me about it. 
IB There were times that we — I would hear from 

ie Raphael Quintero that he had talked to^Hand the CIA, whoeve 
17 was talking toHHfrom the CIA had said they needed to back 
1* away from the operation and not be involved. 

Q Let me interrupt you right there. This is not an 
isolated incident? 
A No. 

Q Of the CIA instructing its official in Central 
America to back away from the private supply operation, is th. 
correct? 

A That is correct. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q Continue. 

A Now, that didn't mean that they did. 
Q But it was your understanding that the CIA from 
Headquarters was directing the officials in Central America 
to back away. Whether the official in Central America obeyed 
or not was another question. Is that a clear understanding 
or not? 

MR. DOWD: State what your understanding is. 

THE WITNESS: My understanding is that there were 
times when they would emphasize staying at arm's length. The 
were other times that they did not emphasize it. 

MR. DOWD: By "they" you mean? 

THE WITNESS:' Headquarters, Headquarters that you 
referred to. 

MR. BALLEN: What is your basis of this knowledge? 
Is that something General Secord told you, or Oliver North, 
or who, or Casey? How did you get that information? 

THE WITNESS: I would get that information from 
talking to the people that were^^^^^^^^^^H^^I as to what 
sort of cooperation were they getting 




Raphael would pass to roe that^^Hwas being told t 
back away or nobody was bothering him, that they knew that — 
when thei|set up the flight that went intc 

since the Aiii^ gtf iilm. MlJ%.KI#4li^>€""" they hxvegot the 



HUiSSinEf 



515 



UNCLASSIFIED 



49 



the military group and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H it 

2 would have been very difficult I think for that to have 

3 transpired and headquarters CIA not know about it at all. 

4 BY MR. BUCK: 

6 Q Okay, what I 2un trying to get from you is an idea 

6 when — you mentioned Ambassador, did you feel that the State 

7 Department was supporting your activities? 

• A I don't have any way of knowing whether they were 

• actively supporting it. 

10 Q ' Were these individuals acting outside of the scope 

11 of their authority from headquarters in the CIA and State 

12 Department or did you feel that they were being told by CIA 

13 Headquarters and State Department to assist you in your 

14 operation? 

18 A I don't know. 
!• Q Okay. 

17 MR. DOWD: Did General Secord have a meeting with 
1* Director Casey? 

18 THE WITNESS: He tolJ me he did. 

20 (4R. DOWD: Did he report to you the substance of 

*^ those meetings? 

22 THE WITNESS: No, not in detail. 

23 MR. DOWD: Generally? 

24 THE WTINESS: Generally it was the conduct of the 
2' operation to support the Contras and discussion of the Iran 



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operation. 



Exhibit 9. 



[iMSSIFIED 



MR. BALLEN: I just have one question on the 



BY MR. BALLEN: 

Q The first part of it is a message from Bob Earl^, 
correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Asking you to pull out the forces? 

A Yes. 

Q What did that result from, to your knowledge? 

A I don't know what specifically brought that about, 
whether it was, I don't know what caused it. It came as a 
surprise. 

Q What happened when it cane as a result of that? 

A When the message came? 

Q Yes. 

A I iiranediately contacted General Secord, who then 
sent the next message back to them, back to Bob Earl^, and 
really, to Colonel North's office. 

Q Did you ever have any discussion with Colonel North 
did you ever get any direction from Colonel North to pull out 
like that as opposed to Bob Earl? 

A Bob Earltto my knowledge, would not have had the 
authority to tell us to bring the people out. When I got this 
to me, this was word from Colonel North. 




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Q Did you have a discussion with Colonel North #about 
this particular message on the pull-out and why it had been 
issued, whether he wanted you to do it? 

A I am trying to remember. I can't recall. We did 
discuss later whether I discussed it directly with Colonel 
North or not, I don't believe I did. I believe General Secorc 
discussed it with ''olonel North, and came back to me and said 
we are not going to pull the people out and we are not going 
to give in to the threats that have been made by Felix to 
go public,! 




Q This was after General Secord had an opp'o~rtuiuty t( 
speak to Colonel North about it? 

A As I can best recall, yes. 
MR. BALLEN: Thank you. 
BY MR. BUCK. 
Q You mentioned before on your first trip ^°^Hf 

[that you met the British air crew? 
A Ves. 

Q Is that correct? 
A Yes. 

Q And it was your understanding that the Brits were 
to go into Nicaragua? 

A Missions that were flown into Nicaragua itself woi; 
be flown by the Brits. That is why they were hired. 



iiUSSIFIEfl 



518 



23 



mmB 



n.i u\\ii-ii.ii 



1 Q How did you develop this understanding? 

2 A General Secord told me. 

3 Q And do you know how he was aware of that? 

4 A No, I don't know how he was aware of it. 

5 Q Okay. 

6 BY MR. BALLEN: 

7 Q Didn't you earlier testify on that point you also 

8 had discussions with North either through Secord or — 
• A Yes, that was the theory was they were to be hired 
^0 to fly in-country missions. That was both Secord and North. 

11 BY MR. BUCK: 

12 Q You remember discussions with Colonel North on tha 

13 A Since I talked to him about the Brits, I am sure 
we discussed what they were there for, and the fact that they 
weren't going to be able to fly missions into Nicaragua. So, 
yes, I can say yes, I discussed that with Colonel North. | 

17 Q What were your general in^ressions of Felix Rodrig 
1' A My initial impression was that he was influential 

and with some very high — the Vice 
President — since it didn't take him long to tell me about t 
*' Q You gained that impression from him, not the Vice 

** President? 

A Right. As it turned out, he became a major proble 
** in the conduct of the operation. He interfered with the 
*' operation, the operational side of it. He wanted as much 

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UNCLASSIFIED 



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control of the money as he could. He wanted a $10,000 
emergency fund that he himself could use. He wanted control 
over our fuel fund. He wanted to be the big man in charge. 
He did not want to work for somebody else. 

He also had asked for Xerox machines and 
refrigerators and all sorts of things that he was keeping dowi 
r o o m ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
Q What did you consider were his motives for doing 
this? 

A Money . 
Q That is brief. 

A I will repeat, your best information cem be gotten 
from Raphael Quintero, as to his motives and why he did most 
anything. Raphael knows him very well. 

Q Who would he receive money from? 
A Raphael said that^^^^Hhad been paying Felix 
$3,000 a month for the last couple of months, which was in 
violation of his retirement, which was supposed to be a full 
disability retirement, with CIA. 

Q Why was he receiving this money? 

A Obviously, I don't know why he should have but he 
evidently he talked to Ramon and said he needed that money 
for expenses or for living, or whatever, and^^^^Hshould pay 
it to him. 

Q Mr. Dutton, could you look at Exhibit 2 again. Co; 



NCUSSIFIED 



520 



UNCLASSIFIED 



54 



1 you tell me what the purpose again of Exhibit 2 was 

2 A Two purposes. It was set originally -- well, there 

3 was three, it was set up one, as a reorganization plan, 

4 actually an organizational plan, because we didn't have an 

5 organization that you could put a wiring diagram and say who 

6 is here, this is in charge. It was an attempt to identify who 

7 had specific responsibilities for operations, for maintenance, 

8 and for support, to let all the people know who they worked 

9 for and then who they should take instructions from. 

10 The very first paragraph, as I mentioned before, was 
1' to identify a theoretical company — B.C. Washington, that was 

12 now taking over the operation so we could pass information 

13 to Felix that in fact North and Secord were no longer in the 
1* operation 

^B The third purpose was when we added the last portic 

1® of it, which was all of the inventories and pricing out, which 

gave us now a package that Colonel North could use to take to 
the CIA and say there is the operation, that is already in 
being, and here is how it is organized, here is what it is 
worth, so you can put that in your decision as to how you 
intend to take over or how you intend to go into operations 

*^ in Central America when you get the $100 million 

23 MR. BARBADORO; Off the record. 

'* I (Discussion off the record) 

2B 




521 



UNCLASSIFIED 



55 



1 MR. BUCK: Back on the record. 

2 BY MR. BUCK: 

3 Q You mentioned that this document was to be presented 

4 to the CIA to help them decide how to take over the operation 

5 or whether to take over the operation. Is that right? 

6 A It was given to Colonel North to use however he saw 

7 fit, but — 

8 Q Okay. 

9 A If you wanted to use it as a talking paper, wanted 

10 to use it as a document to leave with the CIA so they could 

11 know what was there. I don't know exactly how he handled it 

12 but that is what it was prepared for. 

13 Q 1 em trying to determine whether it was the 

1* intention of your company to sell these assets to the CIA or 

IB not? 

16 A If the CIA wanted to purchase them, then the idea 

1^ was to sell them. It was also discussed that it could be given 

1« to the CIA. 

1* Q So you are unclear about that? 

20 A That is correct. That was General Secord's decisio 

21 Q And you had never heard what General Secord's 

22 decision was on that matter or did you ever hear what General 

23 Secord's decision was on that matter? 

24 A No. I think he was waiting to hear what the CIA 
28 wanted to do and that he was basically willing to do whatever 



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UNCiiSSIflED 



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they wanted to do, but rightfully it was his feelings that th 
assets belonged to a private company and they should be 
reimbursed for them. 

Q Did he ever talk about a profit that he would make 
from the CIA? 

A NO. 

Q You said that was General Secord's decision. Did 
ever communicate any feed back from the discussions with the 
CIA whether this would be a sale, a gift, reimbursement? 

A No. 




A At this point in time, what is the time frame now 
on this? 

A Which part? At this time? 

Q Right. 

A We are talking September, mid to end of September, 
right up until the fifth of October. Everything changed at 
that point. 

Q During this time, what was Mr. Gadd's role in your 
orgemization? 

A He had no role in the operational side of it. He 
was still, he would provide the Ace and East invoices for 
services that they had delivered. 

Q Did he have d|iilM,M4^ejilih,.^b4£.luad of discussioi 




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did he have with Mr. Secord? 

A He had none that I can recall with Mr. Secord, and 
at this period of time, let's see, I talked with him when we 
were setting up the radio network, I would say once a week. 

Q When did Mr. Gadd's role become markedly decreased? 

A Probably in June. I was still very dependent on 
him for background and how the operation was set up and how 
would we purchase! the aircraft, who would inspect them, because 
we had serious problems with them. 

Q What was Mr. Secord' s contact with them? 

A To my knowledge, Mr. Secord didn't talk to him at 
all. He didn't want to. 

Q After June? 

A Yes. 

Q What would be your feeling about Mr. Gadd's role 
in amy decision making capacity after June? 

A Zero. 

Q Again, I want to try to recharacterize some of your 
statements. If I am not fair make sure you correct me. 

You mentioned before that the FDN had someone aboard 
the flights. What point of time, was that a change in policy 
at some point in time? 

A Not really. We, in June we tried to fly a mission 
with C-123S to the south. We took a Spanish speaker because 
we had to have somebodfcr-uljc^cpuld talk to the ground forces. 




^SSIREO 



524 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

251 



liWssm 



58 



At that time, we happened to tak^^^^Hvith us. We determine 
taking^^^^Von every mission was probably not a good idea 

that he was^^^Hj^^^^H The FDN offered to have one 
of their people fly along with us so that they could in fact 
talk to people on the ground. And since hardly any missions 
were flown, they did not have one on board for the two C-7 
missions . 

So once we started flying again with the 123s, they 
were on board regularly. 

Q What time period did you start flying again? 
A September. 

Q You gave the photo album to Mr. North. He said he 
would take it to his top boss? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q Was there a reason he couldn't have said I am going 
to take this to the President? I am wondering. The word 
top boss seemed odd to me. 

A All I can tell you is what he said. All I can 
tell you is the words he used. 

Q I have no more questions. 

BY MR. BALLEN: 
Q I have one question. When you drew up this 
document in July and presented the options on these, the optic i 
were furnished to you by General Secord? 



Yes, 



l^rfsh' 



UNCLA 



525 



59 



1 MR. BALLEN: No further questions. 

2 (Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the deposition was adjourned.) 



3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

8 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

18 

18 

17 

18 

18 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

28 




UNCLASSIFIED 



526 






r 






r , / 



:cb: 6/:?/36 17 20 



1821152 Jun 86. C-7 set to fly nission across fence tonight. 
Max will monitor flight on 4060 MHZ from his room. If he can get 
details (i.e. , .VSN ti.-.e and drop coords via secure mea.ns) , he 
will pass to r.e on machine. Max hopes to have info on medicine 
f rem ^^^H^l later today. Hethinl^they might donate. I have 
core details if you need. ^^^^^^^^H people starting sheemetal 
work or: C-123 today. I have bill working jet eng plus looking 
for another toad. Bob. 3T 






■/. 



'^^ c*l^ c^ CLtiiV 



1. 








5A% 







U<3v^W 



■^■-^^Xjk.U>."vC».v . f^^x^^' 



'^Cv.n'lC^^*!^ 



UNi^KSsra: 



Voiii'.vse^ '. G»\ 



UC_cx(T— \ 






527 



/^ Ju^ f(. 



J . 



;cb: 6/:?,'S6 172C 



cT.'/- 



#: 



13;il5Z Jur. 86. C-7 set to fly ^iission across fe.-.ce tcnicr.t. 
.Max will r.or.itcr flight cr. 4060 MHZ frc.-n his room. If he car. ce 
details (i.e., .^'.SN ti.-e a.-.d drop coords via secure T^ear.s) , he 
will ^^^^tc .-,e en r.achir.e. .Max hcpes to have i.ifo en -edici.-.e 
f rc.Ti^^^^^Blater today. He t hi.';iks_they might donate. I have 
sore details if you need. ^^|^^^^H people starting sheer.etal 
work or; C-123 today. I have bill working ,et eng pl'^s lco<ing 
for another toad. 5cb. 3T 






National Secj 



'J'"y Council 



^^-^ 



v:«LjJv ^V'^.^.LV -k^e^s^ 








v-£5f<^'%a 



yN(MSl?Hrr 




G.\ 



^C_cxr\— ■ 






UNCLASSSriEi) 



I Hi z A-.ii*. . 1 . '.■ '■: n: 'X r e-ngp ,:,eMc r 

■RECALL iMf-Et'IATELr. BRlNCi Twt 
1AINrc-;ANCC ANt-AISCRCWS 'Xr OF T'Hg<;e 
OUIETL/. BUT OIJIC^LV. LEAVE Act THE 
eO'Jl.e.'^SNT. INCL'JMNQ AIRPLANES. BPINiS 
BACK Or;LV PERSONAL SOU IP. :. CESTROY 
RE'JI JTRATION PLATE* ON ft/C IF P OSSIBLE . 
'iN.r lAMAr-tZ THE A/C. 3. aI^H||H 

BOB. BACON. ANO OL«STEA^ 'WOULt 
15C.E-^HER. -HE AIRFIELD REVERTS TO 
BACON. S CONTROL. ■*. CiTEfiJ? 13 
RECONSIIERl.NiS MEETING W/ YiX AND MAY 
CALL YOU. ?. IF HE HELPS PERHAPS THIS 
TWlNiS CAN BE PATCHED BACK TOGETHER FOR 
THE TRANSITION. BUT FOR THE MOMENT THE 
PEOPLE MUST BE GOTTEN OUT iDF THERE. BT 






fi 



4 671 



ve SC R ET ^ 

t 

l3:34?rAUGS6 1. THERE 19 MORE THAN I 

>OLLARS WORTMOF EOUIPWENT. SPARES, 

[LOCATED AT|H|H I PRESUHC YOUR NSQ 

RESULTS FROM TELECON T«»ITH OLLlt. IF SO 
I MUST REMIND YiXi THAT THESE ASSETS ARE 
OWNED BV UIALL RESEARCH CORP AND THERE 
IS NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING THEM. 2. I 
INSI\t ON IMMEDIATE MEETING BETWEEN BOB 
AND'«X££LB OR I WILL SEEK OUT TWC 
AMBASSADOR AND RESOLVE THE ISSUE. DICK 



ESULTS FRCjt^YOyp 



I. "■/ READING IS IT RgSijL 

S£P0RT LAST NIGHT THAT ||^ AND|^B| HAD 

BEEN t'lPECTED HANDS CFF BY DC I. COMBINED 

WITH MY REPORT THAT JIM DIDN. T WANT TO 

MEET WITH YC'i.i. SijPPO*£DLY AT DIRECTION 

OF THE AMBASSADOR^^^^HE THREAT OF A 

LAW SUIT AGAlNSTH^^HfpoR AIR PIRACY 

HAS APPAPE\TLY PEAl^^CISCNED THE 

ATMOSrMEP.E F'lR ,:l«: AND FOR TwE 

Arfi: iAt'OR .iP»ji.T 'Hg '..JOD INTENTIONS OF 

THE COMPANY. BT. 




ami^^^fj:^^ 



jil^SL^^- 



UNGLA3Si^'2LD 



(529) 



530 

,1435 SRS. Local^^^^^^^H 06-16-86r~~ 




Msi^'"*/] /cs^^L 



1. Lop«z/FOM r«c«iv«d MSJ. tzom tha £«m. Th«y arc vary happy 
awaiting Caribu. Can wa sand tham tomorrow? 

Drops taJca placa at^^^^^^Hand^^^^^^^^^^H 
3. Wa hava run out of funds. Pis sand ASAP, Ramon again using money 
of his own. Also construction not startad for sana reason. 

I leava tomorrow morning for^mH^^ ^^^^^^^^^I^^^IB 
but will ba back lata afternoon sana day. 
FIN 

\.^^^^^ ^^^■^■MB\ )- \- -i- ^ )h 

U^ldlLi J /.^cL<-.f C T iL^U> i^XbuaJL,^. (^l^ o^--a^ e>^ i^ijtuA'L 



/ 



\U 



'^i H 




^' UNCLASSIFIED 

Partially Decl.issi.'.e/ 'Peieased on/izJu^fl©' 

under ?roi/i::)n<- of E.G. P356 
oy 3. Reger, ;;:ti..:dl Security' Council 




531 






UNCLASSIFiei 



00l9L^ 



UNClASSinED ^,U6 



2^Al< -, ^<. 



i*Ji^ 




1 ■;■ 1 •* I'or AuG:it- FPM MAi: . . ref /qmr 

C If'TU-JrlON WI DICf LA'?T NITE. IN 
i"T''- >TEtLE LA'fT WEEI- . I REOUEfTEi: 
'E -^At E THE 'E.ITi.iATION CLEAR To | 
"•■ T,:, 7'_iE OWNER'fHIR OF THE AIR^-ffET- 

am: Af :.oi:iatei> eoijip. he wa-j to i,nform 

,-:r T'-'-T '..JHILE "HE A-J-JET-J WERE MAt'E 
A'-ArLAe-Lt TO 'HE 'lAiJ-fe. THEV BELONoEt' TO 
A ;:Vir..'A.'>lA BA'fEL COMPANY ANI' THAT UFON 
COMRLETrOM OF THEI= 'fUPRORT IwORf HERE 
-■-lEv' JE'E TO :^E RETURNED TO '^HAT COMPANY 
-OF F:jT'.FE [■r^PO'flTION. STEELE FELT 
^^^^H^jJiJULr HAVE TROUBLE GETTINi.t 
l^m^l'j ACCEPT THI^ until he COULD 
-■'^E ■M-'.i^^ 'Y=E OF fUPFORT WAf COMNi.i IN 
TO RE -L ACE U-^. THI> MATCHES igHAT ['ICK 
•^AII TO ^OU ABOUT CiETTING A FIRM PLAN 
irqijM THE CIA AS '0 THEIR RROlSRAM FOR AIR 
I-UCFCR'. "'HIO 'vIE MU-9T uET A'JAP AND PAS'S 
~0 :-''~ELE TO PAVE THE WAV FOR OUR 
C'ERARTi.iRE. IF WE t'ONT GET IT. OUR 
>JI-HL-RAWL COULI' &E A MES'JY AFFAIR, 
f. -.irjCAT ynij TALK TO rTEELE ANI- CONFIRM 
~^^^ >jE ape iiOlrJCi AFTER THE CIA =LAN AND 
WILL. ADVlbE -Jl^ AC.AP. BOB BT. 



@) 



"Hfler prov,3K,r,s or E lii^T^^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



(533) 



003 10 



534 



UNCLASSIFIED 



^ / , ^Pf ^<^' 



:0Cft[ ^luf.^ 
ON A/r 

IIPCULAP 
APCRCX : 



'Vf>o :oor^efL36 i.arf.ived at 

EARLY 17>^^WITH ALL MACiIC 

MOP'K ING..^K6AN E:-:PANCINij 

JEARCH P«S|rn in area TOR 

ri,-g. NO llGHTINii'J OR RAMO lONTACT. 

fZARCHED FROM A/O WITH BINOCULAR* BIJT 

•JOT^INji^A^PMF^Et' TO CiO TO ALTERNATE 

['r.^^mH^H|. 8i.iT 

= ce^^^ei^?^keti_,f.ne[, to primary DZ 

AM' continue:' T'j SEARCH UNTIL UlTOL. WJ--; 
UA; ."iET7INi."i iaJOR-tc fV THE r^INUTE AND 
A&fOLUTEi_y MO INt'I'IATION O^ANYBODY ON 
■':-'E i.'iRuUNr'. THEREFORE RET. ■■■ WITH 
-OAC. 1. >JE -'AVE eOTy A/r R:??vP^>Nr> ARE 
UilL-INCi TO BRINi.^ SO'H OF THEM t'OWN 
TOMORROW IF w:: =ERMITJ AND WE CAN GET A 
&E"^TER H'E^i^WHERE TROOP'S ARE. WILL 
WOR^ WITull^Hjjp-O CiET WX REPORTS. ANY 
HELP FORM /M^JOULD BE APPRECIATED BOTH 
FOR WX AMD FOR LOCATING TROOPS. WE GOT 
SOME MEI'ICINE FROM FARM TODAY AND WILL 
BRING IT IF C'ESIRED. 5. UNDERSTAND 
SANr'AMSTAS SHOT [OWN ONE OF THEIR OWN 
A/C yESTERI.AV. .C-47. IT HAPPENED UP IN 
AREA WHERE OUR C-^^S HAVE BEEN WORKING. 
4.S0RRV F'jR NO GOOtS TONIGHT BUT WOULD 
HAVE BEEN COMPLE'^E WASTE TO THROW IT OUT 
>il"'-t ABSOLUTELT MO CONTACT. PLS ADVISE 
"IW /C'J >JANT ': GO FROM HERE. BOB BT. 







• 




53M8 







UNCLASSIFIED 



00412 



535 



UNCUSSIHED 



: ■-■JM-iJIfEFS*! 1. ARRIVED A-^ 'lOORC INATE^ 
EAFL.' l^:"'LvWlTH ALL Mf^'hl'l ON A/C 
^0=>IN'-,. SECiAN E::FANMNi:n CIPl'JLAR 

tEarch pattern in area ROR afrro:^ J5 

■"IM. ■■•0 f I.iHTINi.i>=. ijR RAI'IO CONTACT. 
:C-.R-:^c: -=0'^ -/C with EiINOOULAR-i BUT 
•^-iFT gr. TO 'lO Tij ALTERNATE 
.B'.T SEVERE wr:. 
^c^.IriT^:' '."r. -E'^'-FNEI' TO FRI'tARY bZ 
an: ■: ON'TIm.eI' "O fEAROh until laOOL w:' 
^.Af 'iE — InCt >JOR-fE BV THE MINUTE AN!' 
ABI-OLUTEL/ MO IMt ICATION j^ANV&0[>Y ON 
■^-E '.iRClMI'. tuepecmPe ret. ■■■with 
-OAD. l.'^E HAVE BC'H A/0 REfi^^ND ARE 
'-01 --iNOi TO BRINCi BOTH OF THEM DOWN 
TOMORROW l^ w:- PERMITS ANI' WE CAN uET A 
BE'^ER: IDEA OF WHERE TROOP'?. ARE. NEED 
■'O KNOW IF THE/ HEARD Uf. IF THEY DID 
NO". THEY ARE fOMEWHERE OTHER THAN 
: 1 . UN.' i4. 1 iW. WHA' WA'i W^^^Tj^'ORS AREA 
I^ITL'- WILL WORK MITH^^^^^TO i.iET 

■<" reropt;. any help from you would be 

ARccECIATEi BOTH FOR WX AND FOR LOCATINii 
■'=OOPr. WH COT JOME MEIICINE FROM FARM 
"::Av :,f.,i WILL BRINCi IT I- DE9IRED. 
:. .'M E=-=.'Ar.;D JANIANIJTA.; 9HuT DOWN ONE 

:" "'-'e:- :wm a/c yejtefday. .c-47. it 

-.-.-cctj-v F ;nj area where OUR '.-71 HAVE 

;ii'i >jcp» :-i:.i. 4.t0rry fop no .lOOC"? 

':-.:",-- B." »JOUlD -IAVE been COr>'RL£"!"E 

^.Ar~E Tj 'hfow it out with ab>jolutel/ no 

".■■'~.:~, PL J AIVIJE HOW YOU WANT TO 'lO 
-:-M i-E-E. BOB BT. 



Partially Deoassifiea/Roieire^ o„ 1/ Pt« gp 



r MM 












^^.1^ 







0903302SKM4 X. ARRIVED AT C00RMNATE9 
EARLY t7||^MXTH ALL MAGIC ON A/C 
NORKINIfe^BlAN EXPANDING CIRCULAR 
SEARCH f^^g^ IN AREA FOR APRROX 30 
nir4. N<y^PMTINQS OR RADIO CONTACT. 
'SEARCHED PnOm A/C WITH BINOCULARS BUT 
NOTHINQ^ATT|MP^D TO GO TO ALTERNATE 

PRE^NTE^US^RTTURNED TO PRIMARY 02 
AND CONTINUED TO SEARCH UNTIL l«fOL. WX 
WAS SETTING WORSE BY THE MINUTE AND 
ABSOLUTELY NO INDICATION "J^ANYBOOY ON 
THE GROUND. THEREFORE REtJ^HIhITH 
i-OAt'. ;.WE HAVE BOTH A/C ReSSdWUd ARC 
WILLING TO BRING BOTH OF THEM DOWN 
TOMORROW IF WX PERMITS AND WE CMt SET A 
BETTER IDE^J^JHERE TROOPS ARE. WILL 
WORK WITH^^^^BrO GET WX REPORTS 
HFLP FORM YOU MOULD BE APRRgCTflTFP BOTH 
FOR, MX AND FOR LO CATING TROOPS, WE GOT 
SOME MEDICINE FROM FARM TODAY AND WILL 
BRING IT IF DESIRED. 3. UNDERSTAND 
SANDANISTAS SHOT DOWN ONE OF THEIR OWN 
A/C YESTERDAY.. C-47. IT HAPPENED UP IN 
AREA WHERE OUR C-7S HAVE BEEN WORKINS. 
4. SORRY FOR NO GOODS TONIGHT BUT WOULD 
HAVE BEEN COMPLETE WASTE TO THROW IT OUT 
XITH ABSOLUTELY NO CONTACT. XLS-ADMME <_ 
HOW YCL! WANT TO GO FROM HERE. BOB BT. 



^SW>^<c» 






Pamally Declassified/Released on llhr^ ft S 
under provisions OT E 12355 
by K Jonnson, NaUonal SecuMty Council 




ONCIASSIHED 




00412 



4 «)/*«/ 8 7 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PREVENTED US. 
AND' CCiNTINUEI' 



O-^OJJOZSEPafi I. ARRIVED AT COORCINATES 
EARLY 1717L WITH ALL MA6IC ON A/C 
WORhlNd. BEGAN EXRANMNG CIRCULAR 
9.EARCH PATTERN IN AREA FOR APPROX 3S 
MIM. NO •Jl'iHTINi.iS OR RADIO CONTACT. 
■r.EAPiCHEr' r = OM A/C WITH BINOCULARii BUT 

[Et' TO CO TO ALTERNATE 
BUT SEVERE WX. 

^TURNED TO PRIMARY DZ 
TO SEARCH UNTIL ISOOL WX 
WAS CETTlNOi WORSE BY THE MINUTE AND 
ABSOLUTELY NO INDICATION iD^ANYBODY ON 
■^HE LiROUND. THEREFORE f^'ET^HH WITH 
LOAD. ;. WE HAVE BOTH A/C REAdT AND ARE 
WILLING TO BRIN'3 BOTH OF THEM DOWN 
TOMORROW IF WX PERMITS AND WE CAN GET A 
BETTER IDEA OF WHERE TROOP'S ARE. NEED 
TO ^ NOW IF THEY HEARD US. IF THEY DID 
NOT. THEY ARE SOMEWHERE OTHER THAN 
1 1 . -1N/S:4. l:::W. WHAT WAS Wj^^TROOPS AREA 
AT 171?L'' WILL WORK. WITh|^H||KtO GET 
w:: REPORTS. ANY HELP FROM YOU WOULD BE 
APccECIATEI BOTH FOR WX AND FOR LOCATING 
TROOPS. WE uOT SOME MEDICINE FROM FARM 
TODAY AMt' WILL BRING IT IF DESIRED. 
r'.UNIEPS'AND SANDANISTAS SHOT DOWN ONE 
OF 'HEIR OWN A/C YESTERDAY. . C-47. IT 
MAPFENED UP IN AREA WHERE OUR C-7S HAVE 
SEEM WORt ING. 4. SORRY FOR NO GOODS 
TuNlGhT BUT WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETE 
WASTE TO THROW IT OUT WITH ABSOLUTELY NO 
: jr;"!"ACT. PLS AI'VISE HOW YOU WANT TO GO 
="?.0M HERE. BOB BT. 



Partially Declassit;p,l/R,;)B.iseil on J. I 
under provision,; ci ' :, ' > 
by K jjn;;s^n. r;i: .. ; / •• ' - 



t3^Q' 




. >.,-» 






(539) 



540 



iCUSdii'lED 



*"' r-;.":' "jP:, .-e r-s,vr c = : = "s:' o . ;;:-4 
:. : ■i-.'t ■Aii-tA- HE NEs:';; si." "■■:•"• w-j.^ 

i '-:£ Z'£LZ\€^:B.V. J. HAVE NOT C'ECEIVEt' 
-"•'■'"" E "~' •? 'i-~E>'E.''!~ ^■PCif^ IAN .ET. 

■•"■-: :-'iS-.'" .:z: i" Tirr^Av . t'ou may want 

:■ ■;--i-_ HI^- --riZ- BE •■■Jf.Z I .iET t^ A-iAP. 

, :-o -:-:: "OPir; or 'he rijjioN s-efopt?. 

:AVZ 'OMN JENC ME A •: / CF THE LAS' 
'.Ir 'E-ORT Ofi THE t-ACHINE. OUR . . TOF 

JO-r-SE? APE -,ETTI.NG BRIEFIMCi'; USING OUR 
■~?=IAL-. I HOPE '0 HAVE THE 
>^--.TV'iT".' "0 '.ilVE SOME OF •'HE 
'■Z~'^Zr--il -V-^E'_.- BOON. I.VE DONE A LOT 
■ =FA::,i.iI\":i ON WHAT VOU 'SUV'S HAVE 

OOMP'-UHEI'. 00 KEEP iJIVINia ME T'r-'ING'S 
: 5=Aij ABOUT BUT TLY jAFE. BOB ST. 






Oeclassided/Released on / (Fc'S 8P\ 
"irtef provisions or E 12356 

J^roson. National Security Council 




fA50 



00540 



pn'5S.<:!FiED 



541 



^Jl-ix 



UNCLA3SS?JED 






; : 1 4 7 1'.' :%•■:■ aI % p? n ma.: . . - e? .■■: :.■? 
: tf'tL^-ssrt'N w: im la^t •11-5. : 

■I'M JTSELS i.A*T WEEK, r ?£■"•"?=•: 
• E MAJ.E TmE •SIThATIl-N .rL-EAC: ^ 

-^ TO r-£ CWNEP-SHIP OF "WE AI^ -i^ETi 
-Mt ^rJOCIATED E0U:='. HE WAA TO IMFOP"! 
.-:i« T'-i^T -.JMILE 'HE A«.?ETi wEPE MAC'E 
AvAr;.Aei_£ '■:• Tue ■IAK'^Z. they BELONi.iEt' ro 
A ::-;nA,MA &^r£:. COMPANY AND THAT JFON 
.■■:nPlETXOM of THEIF: -iUFFOftT wORt- '-'ERE 
"-■EY WEFE TO BE FETnRNED TO "^HAT COMFANy 
-■:•= FLiTi.RE C'liPO'sITION. •jTEELE FELT 
iCiJi-l •-'AVE TROUBLE 'iETTINiJ 

ACCEPT THI<j UNTIL HE COULD 
■-ES AUiST -YFE OF 'fUFPOFT MA'S COI"lNCi IN 
'■:■ =E"l.AC£ U'4'. T:-.l7 MATCHES WHAT MCK 
^•Air. TO '^OU ABOUT CiETTING A FIRM PLAN 
c-cijM THE CIA A'5 TO THEIR FROCRAM FOR AIR 

--•.FFOFT. 'Hi; we mij-;t i^et asaf and fass 
'0 :-TcEL£ to fave the way for our 
T'Efartmre. if me C'Ont ijet it. our 
wit-ht'rawl could be a me's'sy affair. 

fU'SCiE-ST rOU TALK TO STEELE AND CONFIRM 
TiJAT we ARE CiOINQ AFTER THE CIA PLAN AND 
WILL At'VlSE HIM AjAP. BOB BT. 



R D 



4 60r 



J 



[JNCL^iSS'iBED 








AJi) 







'£p; 

'ttHILE OTHER 
• '^i.'CS WIL L 
TAKE HHHi ANt> 



-•T'AD 10^ 

rc'-iveii Tc 

"I^S.TOMORF 
.'■'AD PRESENTLY' 
: -123 TAKES lOK Ll 
"^-'.'T Z/r^v _S ON 2.'C-\: 

-jf'=\.oav. hxll t-ien load both a/c wn 

S'-ILT-UP LOAt'S AND FLY 2-S HJP TO 
VCRTHERN TROOPS AND RET TOMHHHl CAN 
COMPLETE MSN WI 2/Hft RESERVE. WILL "START 
WORKING ON SUPPORT FOR OTHER SOUTHERN 
rORCES. RALP H CAN H ELP GET PARACHUTE 
SUPPORT FROmB^HI UNFORTUNATELY LOOKS 
LIKE WE NEED "t 00 CHUTES TO CLEAR 
>IAREHOUS£ . EVERYTHING WE CAN DELIVER TO 

nrwEM TO Ria SAVES US. 2.T.S. 
»LS SEND FAWN.. END OF PLAN. FOR BLUEBIRD 
SAT EVE REPORT -FLEW ALL 5 A/C TODAY. 
COOPER AN D I DELIVERED lOK OF GRENADES 
■^■■IfFOR RIGGINQ. WIL^TAK^IOK OP 
MORTARS TOMORROW. MEtH||HHITODAY. 
HE ESPECIALLY HAPPY WI US NOW Si NCg H E 
BELLIE D FDN DC- 3 IN FRI. 60 HI W.^i 

IhE,S ok. (^THER C-123 DELIVERED lOK 
f wx D.S. BUT GOT LUCKY. 
HAVE PHOTO CROCF OF L OAD IN CENTER OP 
VZ. <-.--> DELIVERED IV l 
c-OPWAPD ?ASE TODAY. WILL CONFIRM W] 
PALPh WHO SETS L.OAD TOMORROW. SUN EVE. 
P.EPOP-^. FLEW 2/C-123 TODAY, OTHER A/C OK 
\0 WORK. COOP AND I PUT ANOTHER lOK 
\f', PIGCED AND READY FOR US TO 
CiF THERE TO N0RTH^J0j2C-12^^ 
VZ N0.2.J^H||H[H|^|Hii 
r-SITIVE ll- OF Dr. PHOTO IrOO?. HAVE NOW 
rLI VgPEr' 'ZV I N 2 DAYS . TAK ING TOHOHROW 

jF- 

[ RALPH COMING TOMORROW WI FUEL 
^^i^SNEY. APPROX 20K NEEDED. WILL ADVISE 
=■'. AN FOR WEEK TIJES. I RTB APPROX THURS. 
=: C-123 NOW ARMED WI HK-21/7.62 MACINE 
■y."^ ON AFT RAMP, BRING ON MI -24. PFS. 
rtND FAWN-CAN, T CONTINUE ON MILK AND 
COOKIE 7. RGDS BOB. 



UNCLASSIFSED 



Partially Declassified /Released on JlJWSSl 
under provisions of LO. 12356 ^ 
by B. Reger. National Security Council 

•- J 



004C0 



(543) 



544 



UNCUSSIFIED 



.T- iJL^r'^AO INt'TCATEJ No PftOEtL£:t .>:"H 
■iCMEf- --j -'S WIREI' ftEOi.'T.-:Er' ANiJUhT t.OmC 
-:rE Ai.iC. '-r^Lr REAL FRO&LEM F=C'.' - : j 
' JI'M^ :.- VIEW If. i:M>=''MeiLlTy OF 
-|."--ATTF" - . -<I..WE HAVE Ai.^F.EEI- TO PUT 
^■.L. " ■ "t >1AN IN ?;AN;:h HOUSE TO INS^URE 
•NO rO:.:A"EPS. . WHILI '/.E AGREE WE THAT 
rOL-TTERi. ^"O'.'Lr- BE A PROBLEM WE ONLY 
:■'.'■■: 7 i:£n. THI'i PART OF 

-•^r- "lE^^PEAL. .PRirir-LEW. OUR CONlERN I J 
^HA-JBBArvir AM&Af-fAIOR APE >%riNr-, TO t'O 
^=:F ff^TcOPEFTN XT'^EL" -JIMIE AFTER MUCH 
-'TZr-iizz r-rji' EFFOp-' ujE now have no ACCEf'; 
^,--. T^ey :;;,,-.)- fEEM TO BE ABLE TO HELP. 
JULiCE'fT rOU P'i^^^UErTION ALONi.i THESE 
lINE9 BAC:- ToJHB^AylNCi THAT WE ARE 
A^fO OONOERNEI^^BCiUT SOUATTERb BUT mORE 

:LNrERNEr as to what the/ -^FE i.ioiNi.^ to 

['0 ABOLT ~ -iB nlORE^jFCRTANT PROBLEM. 
MOREJVeP. AMB ANI^^^^NEEI '0 THINK 
ABOUT ^HAT HAPPEN-:- AF^ER CIA i^OE 5 BACK 
I'i-r-: .-ZEL['. :0 WE r.IVE THE PROPERTY 
BAC- OP --Il-L CIA ■.-JANT TO 'JbE IT"' BOB 
BT. 



5?5Si. 



Partially Dpclasafied/flelease.l ooJjFgfigR 
under provisions 0/ E 1-355^ 
Dy K Johnsor,, to„o„a, secui.ry Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 



545 



^7^4. 



0^^ 



1 A 



/o tlauj i-3j>^ 



..-.'Ei --j HE wipe:- REOUT'EI' A-'lOUNT T'lME 
ri.'^E ACiC. 'TiL/ REAL PROBLEM J^cC'i" -IJ 
rTiIN" :- VIEW IJ '^U-r^-JIblLlTy OF 
fOOA'TEP:.. P-f-L./JE HAVE ACiREEI' TO PUT 
^■'.'Lu '■:•'£ IAN IN RANCH HCU-fE TO IN'rURE 
.NO fO-.:AT'ERS. . WHILE WE AGREE WE THAT 
"rO'.'ATTER'f 'Mil.'Lt' BE A FRO&LEM WE iJNLV 
CON-firSR THI-i RART OF 

-APCi ER. .R EAL. . FRO&LEM. OUR CONCERN Jr. 
WHAT ^^H AND AMBA'f 'JAILOR ARE '.lOINiS TO DO 
REF tI^^^ROPERTY ITfELF 'JINCE AFTER MOCH 
E::FENC£ and effort we now have no ACCEf* 
AND TWEY DONT fEEM TO BE ABLE TO HELP. 
'sUi.iGEJT YOU R OjE Q UESTION ALONG THESE 
LINES BACf- TO^^BSAYING THAT WE ARE 
ALSO CO'NCERNEI^iBOUT SOUATTERS BUT piORE 
rCNCER-NED AS TO WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO 
DO ABOUT "HE MORE^^jRiI'RTANT PROBLEM. 
MOREOVER. AMB AND ^^ NEED TO THINK 

ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS AFTER CIA GOE J BACK .^, 

INTO FIELD. DO WE '.iIVE THE PROPERTY vN.?;?'.^ 

BAC> OR WILL CIA WANT TO USE IT"' BOB '. ^\^ 

BT. ;. " ~ 






r 



<fr# 



< <^* 



<0' 



<^ 



,^^^f' 



f^.e^"^ 



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}TV' 




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DEPOSITION OF ROBERT EA, 



Saturday, May 2, 1987 



RXT 



Paftially Declassified /neleas'^d on^o>)3»^7 
under provii.ons of E.O. 12356 "^ 
by B. fic^er. National Security Council 



House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 



0^"l 



The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in 
Room 901, Hart Senate Office Building, W. Neil Eggleston 
(Deputy Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee) presiding 

Present: W. Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel; Mark 
Belnick, Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel; Terry 
Smiljanich, Associate Counsel; Richard A. Arenberg, Administra 
tive Assistant to U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell; Victoria F. 
Nourse, Senate Select Committee; Richard Cullen, Administra- 
tive Assistant to Senator Paul Trible; and Dennis Dean Kirk, 
Esquire, Counsel for Robert Earl. {j(^54*7 



(547) 



548 

TOP GCCRCF 

, ._ UNCUISSIflED 

2 . ROBERT EARL, 

3 was called as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, 
* and after having been duly sworn, was examined and testified 

5 as follows: 

6 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE 

7 BY MR. BELNICK: 

8 Q Would you state your ncime for the record? 

9 A Robert Lawson Earl. 

10 Q You are a member of the military? 

11 A Correct. 

12 Q The rank of? 

13 A Lieutenant Colonel. 

14 Q Lieutenant Colonel, let me read to you an order 

15 that was entered by the United States District Court for the 

16 District of Columbia in a proceeding entitled "Senate Select 

17 Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 

18 Nicaraguan Opposition, the United States Senate, Washington, 

19 D.C." 

20 The index number is Miscellaneous Number 87-0099, 

21 and this is the text of the order. 

22 "Upon consideration of the application by the Senate 

23 Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 

24 the Nicaraguan Opposition, upon determining that the 

25 procedural requirements of 18 U.S.C 



m^\T\ OT?/^ 



MMSIFPj 



549 



24 



TOP SEG RgF 



1 been satisfied, and upon consideration of the application of 

2 Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, under 18 U.S.C., 

3 Section 6005(c), to defer this order for twenty days from the 

4 date of the Select Committee's request for the order, it is, 

5 this 30th day of March, 1987, 

6 "ORDERED That Robert Earl may not refuse to testify, 

7 and provide other information, at proceedings of the Senate 

8 Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 

9 the Nicaraguan Opposition, on the basis of his privilege 

10 against self-incrimination, and it is 

11 "FURTHER ORDERED That no testimony or other 

12 information compelled under this Order (or any information 

13 directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other 

14 information) may be used against Robert Earl in any criminal 

15 case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false state- 

16 ment, or otherwise failing to comply with this Order, and it 

17 is 

18 FURTHER ORDERED That this Order shall become 

19 effective on April 19, 1987." 

20 MR. EGGLESTON: My ncime is Neil Eggleston, Deputy 

21 Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee. The House 

22 Committee similarly has obtained an order compelling your 

23 testimony immunizing you from the use of the testimony, and 
I will identify the document simply for the record and have it 



« . ■ :■'',-' 1 . * « 



25 put into the record. V • ^ \ ^ 



550 



UNCLASSIflED^Foi^^eREf 



1 It was also signed by a United States District 

2 Judge in the District of Columbia. The caption reads, 

3 "House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Trans- 

4 actions with Iran," Miscellaneous Number 87-0105. It is 

5 dated March 30, 1987 and provides on April 18, 1987 -- signed 

6 by Judge Robinson. Obviously, it is after April 19. I would 

7 ask this as well be made part of the record. 

8 "On consideration of the application by the House 

9 Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 

10 Iran and the memorandum of points and authorities, and 

11 exhibits, in support thereof, the Court finds that the pro- 

12 cedural requisites set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 6005 for 

13 an order of the Court have been satisfied. Accordingly, it 

14 is 

15 "ORDERED that Robert Earle may not refuse to provide 

16 any evidence in proceedings before the House Select Committee 

17 to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran on the 

18 basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, and it is 

19 "FURTHER ORDERED that no evidence obtained under this 

20 Order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from 

21 such evidence) may be used against Robert Earle in any 

22 criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a 

23 false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with this 
Order. 

"FURTHER ORDERED That this Order shall become 



24 



iluASS!fi[9 



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effective on April 19, 1987." 

Let me just simply say, I think I have previously 
provided your counsel with a copy of the rules establishing 
the committee. I have got them here with me. If you would 
like to look at those, you are entitled to them as well. 

MR. BELNICK: For the record, this appearance here, 
also pursuant to compulsion of defendant, is pursuant to 
subpoena. I would mark for the record the subpoena and 
notice of deposition, dated March 16, 1987, which the Senate 
Committee . served on Colonel Earl. 

(The documents referred to were marked as Earl 
Exhibit No. 1 for identification.) 



552 



UNITED STATES Of AMERICA 
(EongrEHH of the l^nitzb Btatts 



^^^iiUSSinf^ 



Notice of 
Senate Deposition 



To 



Robert Earl 



„ (Srceting: 



]31CaBE take notice that at o'clock 



March 24 



19. 



87 



Hart Senate Office Building, 9th floor 



of the staff of the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 
Opposition of the Senate of the United Slates, will take your deposition on oral examination 
concerning what you may know relative to the subject matters under consideration by said 
Select Committee. The deposition will be taken before a notary public, or before some other 
officer authorized by local law to administer oaths; it wilt be taken pursuant to the Select 
Committee's rules, a copy of which are attached. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



(Siuetl under my hand, by authority vested in me by 
the Select Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 



Opposition on 



March 16 



1987 




I' a ^v 




553 



.^^.>'•": 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Congresi£{ of tfje V^nittt Btatzi 



To 



Robert Earl 



., 6rtet{ng: 



pursuant to lawfuZ authority. YOU ARE HEREBY COMM.i.VDED to 
appear before the SELECT COMMITTEE ON secret military 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION \of the 

Senate of the United States, on ?l?£5iLi.l , ISU^,- 

at tl22. o'clock ^' m., at their committee room Hart Senate 

Off ice Bui lding, 9th Floor ^ ^f^„ „^ ^j^^^ 

to testify what you may know relative to the subject matters wider con- 
sideration by said committee. 

Pursuan t to Com mittee Rule 6, this Subpoena directs a ppeara nce 
at the deposition whose notice accompanies it. You mus t bring 
with you the materials listed in Attachment A. 

Ji^ereof (ail not, as you wiU answer your default under the pairu and pen- 
alties in such eases made and provided. 

fp^ any Select Committee staff member or U. S. Marshal 

to serve and return. 

6iben under my hand, by order of the committee, this 

J-6 day of "^^^^ , in the year of our 

^ • • ' Lord one thousand nine Jufnd/e^ gyufg^ghty- seven 



vice Lnairman 
Warren Rudman 



554 



ATTACHMENT A 
ROBERT EARL 

The respondent, Robert Earl, shall produce: 

1. All documents referring, relating 

to or discussing Robert Earl's position on the staff of the 
National Security Council ("NSC"), or any activities by Mr. Earl 
as an NSC staff member, or the activities of Lieutenant Colonel 
Oliver North, or the activities of any other NSC staff member or 
principal. 

2. All documents discussing or relating to: 

a. Arms transactions directly or through third- 
parties with Iran, Israel, Manucher Ghorbanifar, Adnan Khashoggi, 
Yaacov Nimrodi, Amiram Nir, or Al Schwimmer, or Lake Resources, 
Inc., or any companies owned by, controlled by, or affiliated • 
with, the previously named persons and companies; or arms trans- 
transactions directly or indirectly or through third-parties with 
the Contras or any forces opposed to the Government of Nicaragua. 

b. American hostages; or 

c. The Contras or any forces opposed to the 
Government of Nicaragua, including assistance or efforts to 
assist such forces. 

3. All documents relating to any of the persons or 
entities listed on Appendix 1. 

4. For Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, 
Panama, Bermuda, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Israel, and Portugal: 

a. All correspondence, telexes, or other 
materials relating to communications to or from individuals or 
entities in these countries; 

b. All statements, checks, deposit slips, and 
other materials for bank accounts in these countries, 

whether such correspondence, telexes, other communications, 
and accounts are those of the responedent or otherwise. 

5. All of Robert Earl's appointment books, diaries or 
calendars. 



555 



ONCUSSlFlFn 



A. The documents called for by the foregoing requests are 
for the period January 1, 1981 to date. 

B. The term "document" is used in the foregoing requests in 
its broadest possible sense and means all things or media of any 
kind on which or from which information can be transcribed or 
recorded including, but not limited to, writings of any kind, 
computer printouts, cables, telexes, memoranda, letters, tape 
recordings, calendar entries, diary entries, bank statements, 
notes, other financial records, etc. 

For any questions regarding this subpoena, contact Arthur L. 
Liman, Chief Counsel, at 224-9183 or Mark A. Belnick, Executive 
Assistant to the Chief Counsel, at 224-9974. 



"^iCiasSirif" 



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MR. BELNICK: In connection with the document 
request attached to the subpoena, do I understand all 
documents responsive to our subpoena have been turned over 
by you to the Independent Counsel? 

MR. KIRK: Every single one. 

MR. BELNICK: Everything you had that was relevant 
was given to Independent Counsel, is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: And more. 

MR. BELNICK: Approximately when did you turn it 
over to the IC? Three weeks ago? 

THE WITNESS: Two weeks, two to three. 

MR. BELNICK: Two to three weeks ago? 

MR. KIRK: Yes. 

MR. EGGLESTON: You are appearing here today 
pursuant to a subpoena served upon you, I think, through your 
counsel some time ago. I don't have the subpoena here with 
me today, but, again, this deposition is being conducted to 
that subpoena. 

It also called for production of documents. I 
assume that your response to Mr. Belnick is the same as it 
would be to us, and that is the documents that you have have 
been provided to Independent Counsel, is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. BELNICK: As I have told you on behalf of both 
^teil a^d siyaelf, our understanding is that the documents you 



mm 



rrnp nrr'.pp T'- 



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provided to the Independent Counsel are going to make their 
way to us in some shape or form through the White House and the 
tlSC. We have not yet had a chance to review all of what the 
White House has because of national security concerns. I 
have seen some copies this morning, but not all. 

My House colleagues haven't had a chance to see any 
yet. SO we will work that out with the White House. That 
is not your problem. Once we have had a chance to work out 
the ground rules in subsequent sessions, I am sure we will 
have some questions for you about those notebooks. 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
For the record. Colonel, what is your address? 



Q 

A 

Q 

A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 



Where are you currently employed? 

Headquarters Marine Corps. 

Where is that? 

It is in Northern Virginia. 

Briefly, where were you employed? 

At the NSC, National Security Council. 

When did you start work on the NSC staff? 

Approximately mid-February is probably the best 
way to characterize that. There has been, there were 
differing dates on the orders that were cut at Headquarters 
Marine Corps. Rather than nail it down to the 20 or 15, I 
think mid-February is the best way to characterize it. 



i&^^srfifii 



TOP RFOPF-T 



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Q 1986? 

A ^ 1986, correct. 

Q When did you leave the NSC staff? 

A 1 January 1987. 

Q Did you resign? 

A No. 

Q What were the circumstances? 

A I was re-assigned. 

Q By the Marines? 

A By the Marines. 

Q Could you tell us what your — I understand you 
went to Annapolis. 

A Yes. 

Q Graduated? 

A 1967. 

Q Was then a Rhodes scholar? 

A Yes. 

Q How many years did you spend at Oxford? 

A Three. 

Q When you finished at Oxford, tell us what you did - 
summarize, if you could, from then until the time you joined 
the NSC staff. 

What year did you leave Oxford? 

A 1971. 

A variety of Marine Corps tours subsequent to that, 



fi.<?*^'f<fif 



Tnp grr ' Pr 'T 



559 



:' ^SSififiP ror SECRET 



a combination of command and staff operations and non- 
operational assignments. 

You want me to go through all of those? 

Q No. 

A All right. 

I was assigned to the advanced amphibious studies 
group in Quantico, Virginia, in the summer of 198 5 and had 
been there for a week as a new assignment, having just come 
from the Naval War College for a year. 

Then I was assigned temporary additional duty -- • 
TAD is what we call it. That is not a permanent change 
station but a temporary assignment to the President's Task 
Force on Combatting Terrorism, and served there for 
approximately seven months until mid-February 1986, when 
I was re-assigned permanent change of station to work on the 
NSC staff. 

Q Did Greg Corey work on the staff task force, as 
well? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q Did you seek assignment on the NSC when that para- 
terrorism task force job was over? 

A Let me explain that. 

Q Sure. 

A It is a little more difficult than a_y.ei ^f "o 
on that. 




560 



UflCLASSIFIEO^i'^^-s^i^ 



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Each of the political services assigned one member 
to the 'working group of the Vice President's task force as 
well as other members. The CIA had a member; the State 
Department had a member. 

One of the recommendations of the Vice President's 
task force was to strengthen intercombat terrorism at the 
NSC. Previously there had been one person assigned to follow 
that, and that one person following it, amongst other 
duties, and therefore not full-time, not one dedicated person, 
so the recommendation was to create a staff, a small staff 
so a full-time staff could be devoted to improve interagency 
coordination on terrorism. 

The strategy, if you will, to implement that 
recommendation that was, I understand, approved by 
Admiral Poindexter in consultation with Admiral Holloway, 
who was executive director of the task force, was to tap this 
pool of expertise that had suddenly been created on terrorism, 
half a dozen officers who had studied it for seven months, 
and seemed to waste, to send those people back to the 
service to do non-terrorism things, that it made sense to 
get up on step with this talent. 

So, the officers were informally polled as to who 
wanted to go back to his parent agency or who was available 
to go to another assignment on terrorism within the 
Washington bureaucracy, which included_ thg State Department, 



icracy, wnicn inciuaea t 



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[ASSIflEO ^Fep^eRET 



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as well as the NSC. 

Some of the officers chose to go back to their 
parent services; some were working on terrorism already in 
that billet. And some of us chose to say, "I am available 
to move on." 

I was one of those who said, "I am available to 
continue to implement the policies of combatting terrorism." 

As I understand it, Craig Coy, Lieutenant Coy 
and I, were the two that were selected to go to the NSC^ 
Lieutenant Bailey went to the State Department, and I think 
that everybody else v}^^ back to a parent agency or 
organization. 

Q Had Ollie North worked on the task force? 
A Well, he wasn't a member of the working group 
that I am talking about amongst the half a dozen officers, 
but he was part of — he was the Senate person I referred 
to as being the one person assigned, and so he was a member 
of one of the interagency review groups of the task force, 
there being a senior review group and an intermediate 
level review group. 

At that level he participated in the deliberations 
of the task force, yes. 

Q When did you first meet North? 
A Lieutenant Colonel North and I are classmates 
from the Naval Academy. He had startec^ _ou^ io t^he sa^ie 



started out^ xa the-saipe . 



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class as I, the class of 1967. But in — I guess, I am not 
sure which leave period it was -- I think spring leave, but 
I am not positive of that. One of the leave periods he 
was involved in a very serious automobile accident with a 
number of other classmates and spent a considerable time 
in the hospital and wound up having to be what we call 
"recycled" in the class of 1968. 

I don't recall him from the Naval Academy, but 
my first recollection was when we were assigned together 
as students at amphibious warfare school in Quantico, 
Virginia, as captains — and I am not recalling the year 
right now -- we were there five months for a course -- but 
it was in the early 1970s, say a couple years, 1973, 1974, 
something like that, although I will also say when I first 
saw him the first time, something about him seemed familiar, 
and just couldn't place it and have not to this day. 



•'f^Cl^XiilicO 



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itson/drg 
ike IB 

)ls mag 



CLASSIflEI^^^^-sE^RE^ 



13 



I may have seen him at the Naval Academy, but I don't 
specifically recall. From that time on, we had several 
overlap assignments on occasion in Marine Corps, transfers; 
for example, after AWS I went to Okinawa, Colonel North stayed 
in Quantico and went to a further school, but then went to 
Okinawa, so part of our year on tour in Okinawa overlapped. 
He was up in the Northern part of the island as the officer 
in charge of a, what we call the Northern Training Area, a 
very good training area, that was units on island, and went 
to conduct training. 

I was responsible for some reconnaissance units that we 
would periodically go up to conduct training. So I had 
professional conduct with him there as well, and that sort of 
thing, which included personal friendship, as well, that 
developed from then on. 

Q Do you work together with him now at Marine Head- 
quarters? 

A No. He is assigned to a different staff section 
than I, he is in PP&O, Plans and Operations, and I am in 
RD&S, Research, Development and Studies. 

Q When you got your assignment to the NSC staff, what 
was it? 

A Well, as I previously mentioned, both Lieutenant 
Commander Coy and I were assigned subsequent to his recommenda 



tion, I think recommendation number three for the Vice 



mmm 



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President's Task Force To Combat Terrorism, report to 
strengthen international agency coordination. So we knew 
that we were going to the NSC staff to augment the counter- 
terrorism office, although when we were assigned, we were 
told that because of personnel constraints in numbers, there 
were no openings on the NSC staff per so, so we were assigned 
to what is called the Crisis Management Center, CMC, which is 
an adjunct to the NSC, but different in various ways, such 
as trips, TAD trips, or things like that. 

The NSC staff had its own administrative section, 
travel, so forth, that you could get your orders to go on a 
trip right from there, whereas the CMC operated through the 
military, and I think it is a separate budget that funds the 
Crisis Management Center through DOD. So we would have to 
go to, I think. Boiling Air Force Base to get orders or submit 
your travel reports. 

Q Where was your office at DOD? 

A At first we had no office — Lieutenant Commander 
Coy was able to arrange from a previous contact on the 
domestic side who he had worked for as a White House fellow 
some temporary offices which we used for about a month until 
the arrangements ultimately occurred. A suite, 302, was 
eventually provided to us in early May, as I recall, is when 
we finally moved in there. It was right after the Tehran 
Visit by Bud McFarlane. ^<L ' ' V '* i\ 



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Q We will get to that. The temporary offices were 
just you and Lieutenant Commander Coy? 

A We were upstairs in the fourth deck of the Old 
Executive Office Buildfhg, and Colonel North was in the suite, 
Suite 392. 

Q Then all three of you moved into 302 around sometime 
in May? 

A In May. 

Q As I understand it, 302, Suite 302 was a two-level 
office. 

A Right. 

Q Lieutenant Colonel North was downstairs, outside 
his office were secretaries Fawn Hall and Barbara Brown. 

A Although Barbara Brown came quite late. It took a 
while -- 

Q She worked for you? 

A And they finally realized three guys and one 
secretary was too much for one secretary and finally hired 
another secretary. 

Q But finally it was Barbara Brown, Fawn Hall on the 
first level. 

A Correct. 

Q Upstairs were you and Coy? 

A Yes. 

Q Anybody e 



jlse upstairs? I M ' j, ^^ 4 ,\ Jl | | | '^ j » 



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A There were three offices upstairs. The middle 
office was available most of that time. When we first con- 
sidered moving into the suite, or knew we were moving into 
the suite when they were constructing it, there was, as I 
recall, an Air Force officer in the White House situation room 
who was going to move on to the staff as well. But then he, 
before all this happened, received orders from the Air Force 
and was reassigned from the White House. When we moved into 
302, that office was vacant. Ultimately, a Marine, I think he 
was a captain, I am not sure, I never saw him in uniform, • I 
think he was a captain, lawyer, Jock Scharten moved in, who 
worked for NSC Counsel, Paul Thompson. 

Q There were safes in Suite 302, as I understand. 
Were there any — am I right, there were safes? 

A Yes. 

Q Were there any safes upstairs? 

A The floor loading would not support safes. There 
were no safes. 

Q They would have been downstairs, in any event? 

A That is right. 

Q The two safes were downstairs? 

A There were more than two. 

Q How many were there? 

A Well, there were two in the little coat room, I guesjs 
we would call it, and then I think about four outside of that 



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along the wall in front of Barbara Brown's desk. So it may 
only be three, three or four. 

Q Three or four along the wall in front of Brown's 
desk? 

A Yes. So a total of five or six, approximately. 
I could be off by one or two. 

Q Did you have access to all of those five or six 
safes? 

A I had the combination to all those safes, yes. 

Q Did you have occasion during your work in Suite- 302 
to go into every one of the safes in the office? 

A I don't think I ever had to open Lieutenant Colonel 
North's safe, the one in the, what I have called the cloak 
room. 

Q Is that near the electrical — 

A If you are looking into the cloak room, there are 
two safes and a shredder. It was the one in the middle, 
the one beside the shredder, a four-door safe. 

Q Did you have the combination to that safe? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Did you ever open it? 

A I don't think I ever opened it. 

Q Did you see it opened? 

A I recall seeing it opened in 392 when it was back 
in Colonel North's old office. I am not specifically 



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recalling seeing it open while we were in 302. But it must 
have been. 

Q Only what you can recall seeing. You don't recall 
seeing it open in 302? 

A Not that I am recalling right now. 

Q When you saw it opened in 392, did you see what 
it contained? 

A It was right behind Colonel North's desk in that 
room. It was open when he was there. On occasion, he would 
pull something out of there. For example, I knew there was' 
in there a file on a particuar terrorist who, I don't think 
I really want to -- 

Q You don't need to mention the name. 

A Right now. 

Q Okay. 

A So little -- that would be an example. I would have 
occasion to know of something like that, but not the whole 
contents, no. 

Q Do you know what the safe, the same safe contained 
at any point while it was in 302? 

A I do not know what it contained, but I think it 
was just moved from 392 down to 302. 

Q You don't know what Colonel North stored in that 
safe while it was in 302? 

A I don't know. I assume it was the Seime thing that 



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he had stored in — 

Q Don't assume. 

A Don't speculate, all right. 

Q Did Colonel North ever tell you what he had in that 
safe? 

A No, he never told me what he had in that safe, 
although we are getting to something that's possibly relevant, 
which is at the time, I think it is in May or April, it was in 
the spring, I think prior to his trip to Tehran with Mr. 
McFarlane and' others, but it may not have been on that 
occasion, it may have been prior to one of the other trips 
that he made. But there was, he told me if he didn't come 
back from one of those trips, that I was to destroy the 
contents of the bottom drawer of that safe. 

Q He didn't tell you, though, what those contents 
were? 

A No, he did not. 

Q And you didn't look? 

A And I did not look. 

Q I have here what I believe is a rendition of Suite 
302, the first floor and second floor, which I will have the 
reporter mark for the record as Earl Deposition Exhibit 2. 

(The document referred to was marked as Earl 
Exhibit No. 2 for identification.) 



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BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q Let me show you Earl Exhibit 2, it is not drawn to 
scale, just approximations. Without asking youlto vouch for 
the beauty of it, does *his appear to be generally the layout 
of the first floor? 

A It has two safes. That may be true. 

Q Roughly anyway? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q All I want to know, the safe that was Colonel 
North's safe, the one you say he told you to enter the Bgttom 
drawer if something happened to him and get rid of the 
contents, which one is it? Is it one of these? Can you 
make a mark? 

A I would say this one. What throws me off is you 
have to -- oh, this is five-drawer. 



Would you make a circle around the one you think it 



was? 



(The witness complied.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q That is next to the shredder? 
A Correct. 

Q Now, we are going to get to May very fast, but let 
me ask you: Was Colonel North your immediate superior at the 
NSC staff from the time you started working there? 

A Yes. Although technically I was senior to him 



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because of my graduation date, as compared to his, but that 
didn't mean anything in terms of assignment at the NSC. 
There was no question in my mind that he had been there four 
years and was the boss. He was my superior for the office, 
that IS correct. 

Q And Commander Coy's as well? 

A Yes. 

Q You and Commander Coy were on the same level? 

A Yes. 

Q Cet me just show, if I may, while we have — the 
second page of Exhibit 2, which appears to be the sketch of 
the second floor of 302, including desk and office. Is that 
an accurate rendition of the second floor of 302 as you 
remember it? 

A Yes. 

Q All right. Now, you were the Political Military 
Affairs Section of the NSC, is that what it was called? You 
smiled. What did I do wrong now? 

A It's more complicated than that. 

Q All right. I am sorry. 

A If you look at the phone book or you called Public 
Affairs at NSC and asked what Colonel North's description was 
he would be described as Deputy Director for Political- 
Military Affairs. He is shown that way in the wiring 
diagram. But that wasn't where he really worked. He really 



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worked for Admiral Poindexter direct, with no intervening 
office, director or other layer within the NSC. And that 
was for deliberate reason of cover and protection of those 
who were working the counter-terrorism problem, and the same 
reasoning that we on the task force chose not to put a little 
sign out in front of your office that said "Vice President's 
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism." We felt we might as well 
put a bullseye if we did something like that. We didn't 
want to raise our profile as being involved with that subject 
and increase risk to the office or the staff or anything", 
like that. 

Craig Coy and I were assigned in the Crisis 
Management Center, and we asked for similar treatment of — 
similarly not to show us as working on terrorism but for 
various administrative reasons that didn't happen, and if you 
will look at the NSC phone book at that time, you will see 
Craig Coy and I are listed as Deputy Directors or officers 
in combat terrorism, 

Q You answered the next three questions. In fact, 
you, Mr. Coy and Mr. North were in one unit reporting 
directly and specially to the National Security Adviser? 

A Correct. 

Q Any other members of that unit? 

A Well, Fawn Hall, who was Colonel North's secretary, 
and was listed as working for him. Barbara Brown was listed 



^:iiflFD 



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as working for Craig Coy and me. 

Q_ Apart from that group? 

A No, that was the Office to Combat Terrorism. 

Q When did you first get briefed into, and I will 
call the Iran compartment, and I mean, of course, the Iran 
program that you know as a subject of this investigation. 

A It was prior to Mr. McFarlane ' s trip to Tehran. 
And I am not sure of the date. April or May. Sometime before 
the trip. Colonel North, since he knew he was going to Tehran 
with Mr. McFarlane and others and would be gone for a period 
of time, needed some backup for working the problem back at 
the NSC, that he would be gone. So there was now a need to 
brief someone else into that compartment, and so he briefed 
me into it and asked that I take care of certain things on it, 
such as the communications. 

We had secure communications with the McFarlane 
party, and be able to set those up and brief Admiral Poindextejr 
so he could brief the President on the status of negotiations 
as they occurred, and I helped with various things on the 
project, development of the operation and order to cover it, 
contingency, press guidance, various things to help. 

Q Where did North give you the briefing? In his 
office? Were you alone is what I am asking. Were the two of 
you together? 

A I am not sure it was one discrete formal briefing. 






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I think it was probably more likely bits and pieces over a 
period, of time. 

Q But ]ust you and he? 

A Just the two of us, yes. 

Q Taking all those occasions together, can you tell 
us as much as you can recall of what North told you about the 
program? 

A This was a sensitive program, compartment, very 
few people were in the box, and so, therefore, security was 
extremely important and that I was being brought in because of 
this need, and only me, the need-to-know principle was ruthles 
ly applied to this compartment. The compartment was the 
negotiations with the Government of Iran to do a variety of 
thigns, and I think as part of that in briefing we talked 
about the terms of reference or I looked at a copy, and we, 
so part of this in briefing into the compartment would have 
included the strategic rationale for the dialogue with this 
group who we apparently felt was pragmatic, more pragmatic 
than other elements within the Iran Government, and we could 
possibly deal with and hope for a better relationship with 
Iran after the Ayatollah died, and to forestall any Soviet 
exploitation of the chaos that might follow the Ayatollah' s 
death, and on good faith, from their side, helping with the 
release of our hostages in Lebanon, and as good faith from 
our side, something to justify the risk that these people 



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who were talking with us would be taking from the left wing 
crazies within the Iranian Government, would be the sale of 
some arms. 

Q Did he tell y©u, while you are thinking, who the 
people were who were involved in the compartment, aside from 
himself? 

A Again, taking the whole period of his departure, 
which was my being brought up to speed on this complex 
operation in a short period of time, I came to know that 
Admiral Poindexter and his EA, Paul Thompson, were both in 
the box, in the compartment. And so that would be it on the 
NSC Staff as being fully in the compartment, I believe. 

I may recall someone later, but I think ]ust the 
four of us, although there were others on the NSC staff who 
knew part of it. So they were in not all the boxes within the 
boxes but some element of the box, and that would be Howard 
Teicher, who was on the party and went on the trip to Tehran. 
But his responsibility was more the geostrategic relationship 
with Iran, and he had helped to draft in terms of reference. 
Hoping to draft the terms of reference was Peter Rodman, so 
he was, again, in the box a little bit, although not as much 
as Teicher because Teicher necessarily knew more going on the 
trip and doing the negotiations and seeing the spare parts 
that were in the back of the plane that took the party to 
Tehran. 






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As far as I understand, Peter Rodman merely knew 
about preparing the TOR, but, of course, looking at the TOR, 
it tells you quite a bit, and so one can extrapolate from 
that. I didn't know what he knew or didn't know. I don't 
know how much Rod McDaniel, the Executive Secretary, knew. I 
think most of the time I was there that I had thought he was 
not in the box, but at the tail end, and certainly since then, 
with some of the things I have read in the Tower Report that 
has made me realize he, for all practical purposes, was in 
quite a bit of the box. 

Outside NSC, General Secord, and really whoever 
worked for him, and my knowledge of people that were involved 
with him and what he did, I am not sure right now I could go 
back and say in May I knew that -- 

Q Robert Dutton? 

A -- Bob Dutton — in fact, I am not sure he was 
employed by — I am not sure. 

Q I know what you are saying. 

A Sometime later, he came on the scene. Whoever in 
that group was potentially in the box helping General Secord. 

On the Israeli side, Omni Romnier, who was 
the terrorism adviser to the Prime Minister; at CIA, the 
Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Casey,! 
maybe I have overstepped what I should — I don't know on the 
DOD — they are super-sensitive about cover. 



m 



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Q Vfou don't have to mention his title. His name and 
the others are known and are in this record. 

■ A The Tower Report didn't mention his name. 
Q Did It mention Cave? 
A George Cave. There was a Logistic Assistant for 



Q Who handled the communications? 
A It was the guy before| 
the guy who replaced him. 

MR. EGGLESTON:^^^^^^^^^ 

THE WITNESS: ^^^^^^^^^H Char lie Allen was 
part of the box, but not all. 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q Did he mention whether anyone at State knew about 




A There were references that the Secretary had been 
briefed by Admiral Poindexter and that no one else below 
that — 

Q The Secretary of State had been briefed? 

A Yes. But later on Ambassador to Combat Terrorism -- 

Q Oakley? 

A Bob Oakley. — caune to OSG meetings and seemed to 
know quite a bit — but that was later on, so I am not sure 
how early on he knew what. He at later stages seemed to 
know quite a bit. 






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Q Going back to CIA, did he mention whether Gates, Dewxy 
Clarridge or Claire George was involved? 

A I missed Claire George. He was certainly one. I 
went out to a meeting at CIA, and he was there attending. 
Claire George I should have mentioned earlier. 

Dewey Clarridge, I can't recall at this time, 
we are talking about in May, whether I knew Dewey Clarridge 
knew about the box. Certainly later I knew that he did. 

Q Robert Gates? 

A I don't think there were any references to Robert". 
Gates in May that I recall. 

Q How about at the Defense Department? 

A Let's see, the Secretary of Defense. 

Q He told you the Secretary of Defense was aware of 
it? 

A Well, I 2un just trying to think whether he actually 
told me that at one point. I can't recall that. But 
initially, from the way we purchased the weapons through! 

the DOD, I knew it was approved by 
Secretary Weinberger. I knew that certainly sometime after 
it. 

There were people who also knew at State, but I am 
not exactly sure who I knew in May. For example. Rich 
Armitage, at some point I knew — 

Q He is at Defense? 







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wmmm ^^^^^^ 



A -- part of it. But I don't know if I knew that m 



May, 



Q How about in the White House, did Colonel North tei:! 
you there had been a Presidential covert action finding? 
Did he tell you that in May? 

A I think I knew in May there was a finding. 

Q Did you see the finding? 

A I don't think I saw the finding in May. 

Q Did you ever see the finding? 

A I saw the finding in November for sure. I don't, 
think — 

Q When the news broke? 

A Yes. 

Q And the finding you saw in November was dated in 
January of 1986? 

A As it turned out, there were two findings. One 
was dated, I think, 17 January, and the other one was dated, 
I am drawing a blank. 

Q 6 or 7 January? 

A 6 or 7 January, the same month, yes, that is right. 

Q Both signed by the President? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever see a finding relating to Iran that 
was earlier in date than January, 1986? 

A No, I don't think so. 



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Q To be more specific, you probably have seen 
references in the Tower Report to a proposed finding in 
November, 1985 that would have retroactively proved certain 
actions that had been t^ken prior to that in the Iran compart 
ment. Does that sound familiar at all from anything that you 
have read? 

A November, '85? 

Q Yes. And if it doesn't, then you have answered the 
next question. You never saw a finding or heard about a 
finding like that? 

A No, I don't think so. 

Q Anything called a mini-finding? 

A I have seen references to that, but I think my 
knowledge of that is all subsequent. I don't think at the tim^ 
that I was at the NSC that, although perhaps during the 
development of chronology period. 

Q Not at any time period about that? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Certainly any findings signed by the President that 
you have ever seen are the two from January, 1986. 

A Yes. 

Q You never heard the President signed another finding 
in this compartment? You never heard whether the President 
signed another finding in this compartment? 

A No, I don't think so. 



UNCUSSiriEO 



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■ Q Returning to May, 1986 and your briefing, apart 
from the President, did Colonel North tell you that anyone 
else from the White House knew of this activity? 

MR. LEON: How about the Vice President? 
THE WITNESS: I was thinking of that. I don't 
recall, from the timeframe, whether the Vice President was 
mentioned or not. 

BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q When you were briefed in May by Colonel North, did 
he talk to you at all about the pricing of the weapons thart 
were involved in this program? 

A I am having trouble differentiating the April-May 
timeframe, which was my first dealing with this whole compart- 
ment and the weapons and the pricing from a later evolution 
where I was more substantially involved, and differentiating 
what I knew about pricing this first time as opposed to what 
I learned later. 

Q Why don't you tell us what you learned about the 
pricing and put a time on it, to the best of your ability. 
We understand time has passed, and if you can't be precise, 
]ust be approximate. Give us your best recollection. 

A There was a multi-page listing of spare parts which 
were the list of Hawk spare parts that the Iranian Government 
wanted, and this was long paper with several columns of 
information, a dozen or so parts per page down the left side 



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and would have the name of the part, the NSNOFSN, Federal 
stock number, the quantity of the parts desired, and the cost. 

Q ■ The cost to the CIA? 

A That's where I am getting confused with the later 
timeframe. I know that at least in the second phase that I 
knew there were two columns, and I can't remember now 
actual or real, real or actual. That was always a point of 
confusion, which was which. But one was the cost that the 
DOD was charging CIA, and the other was the higher cost that 
was ultimately going up a very complex circuitous chain 
en route toward the Iranians, and I don't even know if it's 
the one the Iranians got. I doubt it. I think Ghorbanifar 
added on the top of that, and God knows who else. But I knew 
there were two columns for prices. 

Q At least as of when, what was the earliest you can 
now recall knowing there were two prices? I recognize you 
may have learned that in May. If it wasn't May, when do you 
trace the evolution of your knowledge? 

A In this timeframe of being briefed into the 
compartment, April-May, Colonel North also told me, I think 
at that time, that part of the money was going to help the 
contras, part of the Ayatollah's money. 

Q Is that how he put it? 

A Well, I can't recall the exact words, whether he 
said the Iranian Government, the Ayatollah. 






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Q Whether he used the money, the Ayatollah, the Irania 
Government, he told you part of the money Iran was paying for 
the weapons was going to the contras? 

A Was going to support the contras. Not necessarily 
to the contras, but in support of the contra cause would be 
the best way I could characterize it at this point. 

Q Did he tell you how much was going for that purpose? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Did he tell you what percentage of it was going for 
for that purpose? 

A No. 

Q Did he tell you how it was going to get to the 
contras or to some place where it would be used for the 
contras' benefit? 

A No, not really. I will have to give some infer- 
ential things that might be relevant on that. I knew from 
at least the second time, prior to the Jacobsen release, that 
the ratio between the two columns, the difference, was a 
factor of 3.7, because — 

Q Meaning the cost was — 

A The higher price was 3.7 times higher. 

Q — than the actual cost from DOD? 

A Actual or real, whichever. 

Q Right. 

A And I also knew from calls that I would receive 



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from the CIA, as for example f rom^^^^^^^^^^Hthat they were 
expecting the money to show up m their Swiss bank account, 
and it wouldn't show, and so it was late, and they could call 
up and reverify the number of their account to be passed on 
to Colonel North or General Secord to make sure that it 
didn't get put in the wrong account by the digits being wrong. 

So that I knew that it was coming from some other 
Swiss account into the CIA's Swiss account. I mean, I think 
that is partially relevant to your question. 

Q Do yoil know who was setting the price to the Iranian 
or the price that you believed was going up the line to the 
Iranians? 

A Like I say, it's still very confusing to me, the 
route and who was negotiating with whom, and I knew it was 
common knowledge among all of us that Ghorbanifar was an 
untrustworthy individual and that he was no doubt taking a 
profit and putting his markup on the thing, it is a way of 
life of arms merchants, and like I say, I don't know who else 
might have been doing that, perhaps the Israelis in some way, 
either through Ghorbanifar, independently, or the exact route 
IS very, is unclear to me. 

Q Sure. But understanding that, did you have an 
understanding of who was setting the initial markup? 

Let me tell you what I hear from your testimony, 
that you saw numbers indicating that the price to the 






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Iranians so far as you knew would be at least roughly 3.7 
times higher than the DOD price, right? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, it may have been that Ghorbanifar or the Israel 
or other merchants were then slapping additional markup on 
top of that, right? 

A Correct. 

Q So, let's leave that additional layer out of it. 
Did you have any understanding of who had set the 3.7 
multiple? 

A No. The way that was derived the second time was 
in order to show consistency of markup from previous arms 
transactions. Colonel North and I took an aggregate of a 
previous transaction, it may have been the May transaction, 
I am not sure now which one, but in any case, did division to 
show what the markup in aggregate was and used that factor 
line by line in the list that we were talking about in the 
November timeframe, I think, or not November, but in the fall, 
prior to November. 

Q So that you actually worked on figuring the prices 
for that fall-1986 shipment? 

A Well — 

Q Or figuring them by using this formula that you 
have just described? 

A I am getting confused between shipments now. It 



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seams to me that the 240 spare parts, 239 or 236, whatever 
we finally could fill of the approximately 239 or 240 that 
they requested, went with the McFarlane party in May, and yet 
I am recalling doing this multiplication to that whole 
laundry list again after that, after they had already been 
delivered. So something is not tracking in my recollection. 
There was in between a new list of parts that was developed 
over time, coming from Amiram Nir, a list of replacements or 
substitutes or -- replacements is the best word for parts 
that were delivered in May that didn't work when they got., 
there. They were tested by the Iranians, they said they 
couldn't get them to work, so they wanted parts that worked. 

The original order asked for four, a quantity of 
four, and only three were delivered according to the Iranians, 
so they wanted one more according to their math. So there 
was a great deal of confusion and deliberation on putting 
together and sorting out what we had owed them and who would 
pay for that, and it's kind of confused in my mind at this 
point. 

Q We may be able to get to it on the day that we have 
your notes, maybe it will help with your recollection, 
but do I understand, at least without reference to which 
shipment, that at least on one of the shipments you worked on 
calculating the price based on differentiations that had been 
set in prior transactions? 






•^ ^p .firr>T?rT 



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37 



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21 

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23 

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25 



A Correct. 

Q Do you know, though, who was present at the creation 

of the first differentiation, who had initially decided they 
would pay at least, say, 3.7 times more? 

A No. 

Q Oliver North told you? 

A No. 

Q Did Ollie indicate to you who else knew that moneys 

A 

from the sales would be used on behalf of the contras? 



A I can't recall whether he specifically told me '". 
General Secord knew that, but certainlipy the thing that I 
already mentioned about the accounts, it seems to me that I 
knew that. 

Q How about anyone else in the government? 

A He had told me on one occasion that he had told 
the Director of Central Intelligence, and as I ]ust described 
for General Secord, I would put Admiral Poindexter in that sam^ 
category, that I can't specifically recall him telling me 
that or how I knew that, but — 

Q You felt you knew it? 

A I just can't conceive of him not knowing from the wa^ 
he dealt with him. In my general understanding of the mode 
of operation of Colonel North back briefing Admiral Poindexter 
routinely on everything and anything, either by secure phone 
call or cross note or memo or going over to see him personally 



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that he did that regularly and that was just the general, 
my general understanding. 

Q Do you recall when North told you that he had dis- 
cussed the proceeds going for the contras with Director 
Casey? 

A The closest that I can bracket it is sometime 
between May, when I first knew, until November, in that 
intervening months — sometime in there, and I am just not 
sure when. 

Q Asid'e from Casey and Admiral Poindexter, did North 
indicate whether anyone else in the government was aware of 
this use of proceeds from the Iranian arms sales? 

A I don't think so, not that I can recall. 

Q Did you learn apart from conversations with North 
whether anyone else in the government was aware of this use of 
proceeds? 

A Sometime prior to, I am not sure of the date, it 
may have been November, it may have been earlier than that, 
in October, I was aware of a memo that either the Director 
of Central Intelligence had sent down for Admiral Poindexter 
or the NIO, Charlie Allen had done for the Admiral, who 
sent it down for Poindexter, but I remember there was a memo 
dealing with the problem of OPSEC, an operational security 
problem, with some Canadian financiers, and Richard Furmark, 
I believe, is the naime . There was a memo laying out this 



\nmB 



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591 



lINClftlSIFIfO 



Tor SECRET 



■39 



potential problem — 

I was about to say that was one of the examples. 
I am not sure whether that had anything specifically on 
diversion, maybe not. I may be mis-identifying that in that 
category. 

One other thing was on the -- date, Monday, the 
25th of November. 

Q November 24. 

A The 24th, okay. 

Colonel North showed me a memo thathad a reference 
to a diversion or to 512 million going to help the contras. 

Q Let me show you this document, which I will have 
marked in a moment as Earl Exhibit 3. Does that appear to be 
the document Colonel North showed you on November 24, '86? 
A Yes. 

MR. BELNICK: We will mark that as Earl Exhibit 3 
for the record. 

(The Document referred to was marked as Earl 
Exhibit No. 3 for identification.) 






592 



I ' ' -J *^^ . I ' RZLEASE OF AMERICAK HOSTAGES IN BEIRUT N 590 

B«c)cQround . In June 1985, private American and Israeli citizens 
commencec an operation tc effect the release of the American 
hostages ir Beirut in exchange for providing certain factions m 
Iran with U.S. -origin Israeli military materiel. By September, 
U.S. and Israeli Government officials became involved m this 
endeavor in order tc ensure that the USG would: 

not object to the Israeli transfer of embargoed materiel to 
Iran; 

sell replacement items to Israel as replenishment for lilte 
Items sold to Iran by Israel. 

On September ^, the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of 
the USG, transferred 508 basic TOK missiles to Iran. Forty-eight 
hours later, Reverend Ben]amin Weir was released in Beirut. 

Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process 
have met with frustration due to the need to communicate our 
intentions through ar. Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe. 
Ir. January. 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action 
Finding, the USG demanded a meeting with responsible Iranian 
government officials. 

On Febru ar\- 20 , a U.S. Government Qf_£lci al met wi 

the first direc^JTS^Iranian contact in over five years. At 
this meeting, the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian 
attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need to 
establish a longer term relationship between our two countries 
based or more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that the 
hostage issue was a 'hurdle* which must be crossed before this 
improved relationship could prosper. During the meeting, it also 
became apparent that our conditions/demands had not been accurately 
transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it 
was agreed that: 

The USG would establish its good faith and bona fides by 
unmediately providing 1,000 TOW missiles for sale to Iran. 
This transaction was covertly completed on February 21, 
using a private O.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediaries. 

A subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior U.S 
and Iranian officials during which the O.S. hostages would 
be released. 

Immediately after the hostages were safely in our hands, the 
U.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran 
using the same procedures employed during the September 1985 
transfer. 




-g OP SECRE T- ~TnP Q-FP P CT - SENSITIVE 
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i 



In early Warch, the Iranian expatriate intennediary demanded that 
Iranian conditions for release of the hostages now included the 
prior sale of 200 PHOENIX missiles and ar. unspecified number of 
HARPOON missiles, in addition to the 3,00C TOWs which would be 
delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meetini; 
was held with the intermediary in Pans or. March 8, wherein it 
was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated 
the understandings reached in FranXfurt on February 20, and were 
therefore unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian 
aircraft and ship launchers for these missiles were in such 
disrepair that the missiles could not be laujiched -even if provided. 

From March 9 until March 30, there was no further effort 
undertaken on our behalf to contac^th^Iranian Government or the 
intermediary. On March 26 , j^Hf^HH^^made an unsolicited 
call to the phone-dro^in MaryTana which we had established for 
this purpose. AHJJI^^V asked why ve had not been in contact and 
urged that we "proceed "Bicpeditiously since the situation in Beirut 
was deteriorating rapidly. He was informed by our Farsi-speakmg 
interpreter that the conditions requiring additional materiel 
beyond the 3,00C TdWs were unacceptable and that we could in no* 
^aseprovide anything else prior tc the release of our hostages. 
|HH^Bfl|ob served that we were correct in our assessment of their 
^nabi^^y to use PHOENIX and HARPOON missiles and that the most 
urgent requirement that Iran had was to place their current HAWK 
missile inventory in working condition. In a subsequent phone 
call, we agreed to discuss this matter with him and he indicated 
that he would prepare an inventory of parts required to make 
their KAWK systems operational. This parts list was received on 
March 28, and verified by CIA. 

C urrent Situation . On April 3, Ari Gorbanifeihr , the Iranian 
^terroedi ary , arrived in Washington, D.C. with instructions from 
|^° consummate final arrangements for the return of the 
"tostageTT Gorbanifahr was reportedly enfranchised to negotiate 
the types, quantities, and delivery procedures for materiel the 
U.S. would sell to Iran through Israel. The meeting lasted 
nearly a ^i^ night on April 3-4, and involved numerous calls to 
Tehran. 




A Farsi-speaking CIA officer in 

attendance was able to verify the substance of his calls to 
Tehran during the meeting. Subject to Presidential approval, it 
was agreed to proceed as follows: 

By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer 
$17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland. The 
Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private U.S. 
corporation account in Switzerland the sua of $1S million. 



-ver SB C K gr 




SENSITIVE 



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m-%m^ 



N 592 

SENSITIVE 



Or. Tuesday, April 8 (or as soon as the transactions are 
verified), the private U.S. corporation will transfer 
$3,651 million to a CIA account m Switzerland. CIA will 
ther transfer this sum to a covert Department of the Army 
account ir. the U.S. 

On Wednesday, April 9, the CIA will cotnnence procuring 
S3. 651 million worth of HAWF missile parts (240 separate 
line Items) and transfe rring these parts ^0^/////^^^^ 

This process is 

estimated to ta)(e seven wor)(ing days. 

On Friday, April 18, a private U. ^aircraft (707B) will 
pic)c-up the RAVnc missile parts at^^fand fly them to a 
covert Israeli airfield for prepositioning (this field was 
used for the earlier delivery of the 1000 TOHs) . At this 
field, the parts will be transferred to an Israeli Defense 
Forces' (IDF) aircraft with false markings. A SATCOM 
capability will, be positioned at this location. 

Saturday, April 15, McFarlane, North, Teicher, Cave, 

and a SATCOM communicator will board a CIA aircraf: 

ir FranXfurt, Germany, enroute tc Tehran. 



On Sunday, April 20, the following series of events will 
occur: 

C.S. party arrives Tehran (A-hour) — met by 
Rafsan^ani, as head of the Iranian delegation. 

At A+7 hours, the U.S. hostages will be released in 
Beirut. 

At A+15 hours, the IDF aircraft with the HAWT missile 
parts aboard will land at Bandar Abbas, Iran. 

Discussion . The following points are relevant to this 
transaction, the discussions in Iran, and the establishment of a 
broader relationship between the United States and Iran: 

The Iranians have been told that our presence in Iran is a 
"holy commitment* on the part of the USG that w* are sincere 
and can be trusted. There is great distrust of the U.S. 
among the various Iranian parties involved. Without our 
presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that 
we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hostages 
are released. 



TOP SECRBT 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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595 



-f^ P S g gRE ?- 



40f^^fGft£f 



N 593 

SENS it: V! 



ioroanitaftr »p«cific«lly mentioned that 
Qhadhatli's «rforts to *buy* the hostages could succeed in 
the near future. Further, the Iranians are well aware that 
the situation in Beirut is deteriorating rapidly and that 
the ability of the IRGC to effect the release of the 
hostages will become increasingly more difficult over time. 

We have convinced the Iranians of a significant near tenr 
and long range threat from the Soviet Union. We have real 
and deceptive intelligence to demonstrate this threat during 
the visit. They have expressed considerable interest in 
this matter as part of the longer term relationship. 




The Iranians have been told that their provision o* 
assistance to Nicaragua is unacceptable to us and they have 
agreed to discuss this matter m Tehran. 

We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish tc 
discuss steps l eading to a cess ation of hostilities b etweer. 
Iran and 




The Iranians are well aware that their most immediate needs 
are for technical assistance in maintaining their air force 
and nav^- . We should expect that they will raise this issue 
during the discussions ir Tehran. Further conversation with 
Gorbanxfahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to 
raise the matter of the original 3,00C TOWs as a significant 
deterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They 
have also sug gested that, if agreement is reached to provide 
the TOWs, 




The Iranians have been told and agreed that they will 
receive neithe r bl ame nor credit for the seizure/tele ase of 

the hostages. 



• TOP 6 ECMT 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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596 



The residual funds from this transaction are allocated as 
follows: 

$2 million will be used to purchase replacement TOWs 
for the original 508 sold by Israel to Iran for the 
release of Benjamin Weir. This is the only way that we 
have found to meet our comnitiaent to replenish these 
stocks . 

$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed 
supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance 
Forces. This materiel is essential to cover shortages 
in resistance inventories resulting froir, their current 
offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to 
'bridge* the period between now and when Congressionally- 
approved lethal assistance (beyond the $25 million in 
'defensive' arms) can be delivered. 

The ultimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to connence the 
process of improving U.S. -Iranian relations. Both sides are 
aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a ma]or factor that must be 
discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a 
session which will result in immediare Iranian agreement to 
proceed with a settlement with Iraq. Rather, this meeting, the 
first high-level U.S. -Iranian contact m five years, should be 
seen as a chance tc move in this direction. These discussions, 
as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, 
hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, 
once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship. 

Finally, we should recognize that the Iranians will undoubtedly 
want to discuss additiona l arms and commercial trans actions as 
'quids' for accommodating ^IHJI^^BHH^^I^^^Hft Nicaragua, 
and Iraq. Our emphasis oi^tn^sovietm^itaryand^ubversive 
threat, e useful mechanism in bringing ther to agreement on the 
hostage issue, has also served to increase their desire for means 
to protect themselves against/deter the Soviets. 

R£COMMEMDATIOH 

That the President approve the structure depicted above under 
"Current Situation" and the Terms of Reference at tah A. 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachment 

Tab A - U.S. -Iranian Terns of Reference 



TOP 6 BCRET "TOP SECRET STOSITIvr 



597 




SECRET 



TEIWS or RirERENCE 

t.S.-Irar Diiioque 



SEKSi: 
*Pril 4, 1986 



I. BXSIC PILLARS OF L" . S . FOREICK POLICY (Optional) 

President R««gan c»ai» into offic« at a tiaa whan Iran had 
had a certain impact on tha Anarican political procaas -- 
parhapa not what you intandad. 

Tha Prasidant rapraaantad and ambodiad Aaarica'a racovar>- 
from a period of waaKnaai. Ba has rabuilt Aaarican military 
and aconofflic strength. 

Most important, ha has rastorad Amarican will and 
••If-eonf idanca. Tha U.S. is not afraid to uaa its powar m 
dafansa of its intaraats. Ha ara not intimidatad by Soviet 
pressure*, whether on arms control or Angola or Central 
America or Afghanistan. 

At tha same time, wa ara prepared to resolve political .. 
problems on' the basis of reciprocity. 

We see many international trends -- economic, technological, 
and political -- working m our favor. 

II. U.S. POLICY T0WAW3 IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES 

A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy . 

We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is 
not trying to turn the clocK bac<. 

Our present attitude to Iran is not a product of 
prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of 
Iran's present policies. 

Iran has used 'revolutionary Islam* as a weapon to 
undermine pro-Western governments and American 
interests throughout the Middle East. As long as this 
is Iran's policy, we are bound to be strategic 
adversaries. 

Support of terrorism and hostage-taXing is part of this 
atrategie pattern. We see it used not only against us. 
but against our friends. We cannot accept either. 
Your influence in achieving the release of aU hostages, 
return of those killed (over time) is essential. 



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We see your activity in many parts of the world, 
including even Central America. 

The U.S. )tnow« how Iran views the Soviet Union. But 
•ubveriion of Western interests and friends ob]ectively 
serves Soviet interests on a global scale. 

Thus, our assessment is that a decisive Iranian victor^- 
m the war with Iraq would only unleash greater 
regional instability, a further erosion of the Western 
position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet 
trouble-making . 

The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such 
a development. We regard the war as dangerous in many 
respects and would lil^e to see an end to it. 

B. Possible Intersections of U.S. -Iranian Interests . 

Despite fundamental conflicts, we perceive several 
possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests. 
I propose we explore these areas. 

First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in 

seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and 

independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes 
Soviet designs on Iran. 



SWJWR 




^ We are seeking an end to this 

conflict and want to usT'ar. improved relationship with 
Iran tc further that end. 

Third, we have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet 
policy there^ s naked aggression, a threat to all ir. 
the re q ion .^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

But our 

)jective is the sane: the Soviets BTTst get out and 
let the Afghan people choose their own course. 

C. U.S. Objective Today . 

We have no illusions about what is possible in our 
bilateral relations. Perhaps this meeting will reveal 
only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of 
interests. Perhaps more. We are prepared either way. 

In essence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of 
relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have 
with us. 






SENSITIVE 



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— SE'CRET 



ytfi-^i^itu 



597 

SENSITIVE 



III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURT 

MOSCOW has designs on parts of Iran. 




Afghanistan illustratas the price the Soviets are ready to 
pay to expand areas under their direct control. 

SusKDarize Soviet capabilities along border and inside 
Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran. 

U.S. is aware of Soviet activity; 



IV, 



Soviet plans! 



How they would do it. 



Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Nicaragua aids and 
abets Soviet designs -- malces O.S. -Iranian relationship more 
difficult (SlOO million m oil last year, plus arms). 

U.S. car help Iran cope with Soviet threat. 

AFGHAN I STAK 

May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to 
cooperate against Moscow in Afghanistan. 



v>e need to know who you work with, what you already provide, 
and devise strategy to exploit Iranian comparative 
advantage. 

V. HARDWARE 

We may be prepared to resume a limited military supply 
relationship. 

However, its evolution and ultimate scope will depend on 
whether our convergent or our divergent interests come to 
loom larger in the overall picture. 

What does Iran want? 



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iflSIFlEO TOP SE CI ^ ^ 



40 



THE WITNESS: There's one other instance, I can 
recall,-! think, an OSG meeting, but it may have been some 
other type of meeting in Colonel North's office in which, as 
I recall. Colonel North made a passing reference to, something 
to the effect "Wait until it's learned the Ayatollah is fund- 
ing the contras," or something like that, which was half in 
gest, a little bit flippant, perhaps, but it was, it was 
thrown out there, and I remember my reaction to it and 
wondering what others' reaction to it would be, because I 
wasn't sure the assembled were in the box. 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q When was this meeting? 

A I don ' t know. 

Q Was it a cover-up meeting? Do you remember who 
else was there? 

A I said I think it was an OSG meeting, but I am not 
sure. It may have been some other meeting. 

Q Who else would have been there? 

A One representative from State, CIA, two representa- 
tives from CIA, usually, one from FBI, one from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, and one from JCS. 

Q If it was an OSG meeting, that would have been the 
complement of peop 

A Yes, 

Q Before I go back to who might have been there, 
lo*- mp no bacTf ' '•. .fy to place the date of it. Was it after 






601 



IJNCLlSSlflEII TOP^ECRET 



41 



the Tehran mission in May, 1986? 

A. I believe so. Because if it were before, it 
wouldn't have made the same impact on me. 

Q So it was some time before June, starting in June 
of 1986 forward, and it was before the November disclosures? 

A Yes, I believe so. 

Q Can you place it any better between those two holes? 

A No. One big blur. 

Q Going back to who might have been there, if it was 
an OSG meeting, were the representatives of the different', 
agencies that you have named usually the same persons? 

A Usually, yes, although there were some substitutions 
if individuals weren't available. 



Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Defense? 
A 
Q 
A 



Who was usually there from JCS? 

General Miller. 

If he wasn't? Miller? 

General Kelley. 

Who was there usually from the Department of 



Rich Armitage. 

If he was not there? Mr. Sanchez? 

No. But one of the other deputies at that level. 
Specialty in — special operations. 

Q You may think of it, or we will find it. How about 
from the FBI? 1 ,•<>"' I A ^^ » * 



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lASSIFIEO top secret 



42 



A Oliver Reveil. 

Q- If he was not there? 

A I would have to have access to my notebook, which 
has phone lists on it. I can piclc it out from there. I am 
not recalling the name right now. 

Q Who were ordinarily the CIA representatives? 

A Dewey Clarridge and Charlie Allen were the two 
primaries, and they had alternates. 

Q Who were their alternates? 

A Names, not one of my strong points. 

Q Do your best. 

A ^^^^^^^^^Hwould have been Charlie Allen's 
substitute. I will come back. 

Q Apart from what you have testified to so far , can 
you recall any other references to the issue of, or to the -- 
yes, to the matter of the Ayatollah paying for the contras or 
use of proceeds from the Iran transactions to support or 
benefit the contras in some way? 

A Not that I am recalling right now, no. 

Q Did you ever hear any total amount that was avail- 
able or intended to be used for new transactions to benefit 
the contras? 

A No. 

Q Do you recall at the OSG meetings, was there ever 
a representative from the State Department? 






603 



T OP SECRET - 



43 



A I am sorry, I missed that. I didn't list that? 

Q- If you did, I didn't hear it. 

A You are right. Normally the State Department was 
represented, and that would have been Ambassador Robert Oakley 
and then he was relieved by the current Ambassador at Large, 
and I can't remember his name. Each of them had deputies 
who would have been substitutes in their period. 

Q I would like you to just think for a moment, the 
comment about "Wait until people find out the Ayatollah is 
paying for the contras," as you think and recall the comment 
now, how clear are you that it was an OSG meeting? 

A I am not clear on that. That is my best guess at 
the type of meeting that would have been in his room for the 
remark. 

Q Can you think of another sort of forum in which 
he might have made a remark like that? 

A Not really. It could have been an ad hoc meeting 
of some group of people. 

KR. SMILJANICH: Bremmer? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, Bremmer. 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q Did Colonel North ever assert anything with respect 
to whether the President knew or didn't know about diversion 
or use of proceeds from the Iran transactions? 
A Not prior to November — * ' ' 



604 



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8 
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11 

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44 



Q Twenty-five? 

A. Twenty-five or 26. I am not sure of the date. 

Q You are referring to the date when Colonel North 
was terminated on the NSC staff or when he left the NSC 
staff? I don't want to use the term "terminated" with a 
counter- terrorism person. When he ceased to be employed by 
the NSC staff. Was that the day? 

A Either that day or the next day. I can't place 
the day precisely. It was either Tuesday or Wednesday of 
that week. 

Q I know we will get to it in sequence, but why 
don't you tell us now what you are referring to? 

A Colonel North -- well, earlier in the day, after 
the press conference -- 

Q That was the Attorney General's press confer- 
ence? 

A Yes. We had been getting lots of calls for 
Colonel North. 

One of the calls that Ccime in was from the 
President, and Colonel North was not in the office, so 
his secretary. Fawn Hall, arranged for the call to be 
either transferred, or they gave whoever was calling for 
the President, she gave that person the number where he 
was so that — well, to try and get the call transferred. 



i!N!:U:^A'i'^' 



605 



lINCl^SSlFifli 



TOP SECRET - 



45 



A So either later that night when he returned to the 
office-or the next night when he returned to the office, I 
am not sure which of the two nights it was, prior to leaving, 
he turned and said, I think that we must have been talking 
about that call, because the remark that I recall was that he 
said, and you know that the President, you know what the 
President said, something like that, that it's important 
that I not know, something like that. I am not quoting, 
words to that effect. 

Q Who else, if anybody, was present when North said • 
this to you? 



I think Craig Coy was also present. 

Where were the three of you? 

We were at the top of the stairs in our office. 

The top of the stairs leading to the second floor 



A 

Q 

A 

Q 
of 302? 

A Correct. 

Q Your best recollection, then, is there were the 
three of you there at the top of the stairwell, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Do you recall anything else that North said to you 
about his conversation with the President in that discussion? 

A No, I don't think so, just that. 

Q Did you say anything in response? 

A No, I don't believe I did. J ' *\i ^ '■' ^■. '^ ; *~ 



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Q Did Commander Coy? 

A" I don't think so. 

Q What did you understand to be the antecedent of 
the President saying, "I can't know it" or "I shouldn't know 
it" or the words that you used? 

A My belief or my understanding of what that meant 
was in reference to the contra diversion. 

Q And just what was the basis for your having that 
understanding, Bob? 

A I can't recall why I thought that, but it seemed 
obvious to me at the time, if I could recall what led up to 
that conversation or the exact words of the conversation, it 
might be clearer. But I recall the recollection that that is 
what I thought. 

Q Apart from that conversation, which you have just 
described, did Colonel North ever comment to you about the 
President's state of knowledge regarding use of proceeds from 
the Iran sales? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Did anyone else? 

A No, I don't think' so. 

Q Have you ever seen any documents that at least on 
their face were addressed to the President that dealt with 

, 00606 

use of proceeds from the Iran arms transactions? ^ ■ 
A Well, the memo 



=mo that, you just sh^ed me is written 



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47 



in a form that talks to briefing the President and has an 
approved or disapproved line in the recommendation. So this 
memo -- 

Q This memo is Earl Exhibit 3. Had you seen Earl 
Exhibit 3 prior to Monday, November 24, 1986? 

A I can't recall that I did. But I must have, because 
at the time Colonel North showed it to me, I think I was 
drawing a blank on the document, and Colonel North said, 
"You remember ,■ that is the one that you changed the date on^ " 
There is a date that's marked out and that looks like my 
handwriting. 

Q The number 13 looks like your handwriting? 
A Yes, It looks to be my handwriting. 

Q Do you remember crossing off a date on this document 
and writing the 13? 

A I don't remember it. 

MR. LEON: It might not be. 
THE WITNESS: Sorry? 
MR. LEON: It might not be. 

THE WITNESS: It might not be. Off the record. 
MR. BELNICK: Sure. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. BELNICK: Let's go back on the record. 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q One Dosaiiiilitv Colonel Earl has mentioned off the 



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record is the possibility that he was proofreading this 
document at some point, as you had termed, the proofreader 
of last resort, and may have made some corrections, and you 
pointed us to a page which bears our Bates number stamp 
N-596, part of Earl Exhibit 3, and you have pointed to a 
proofreading correction under the paragraph that has 
capital B, 1, 2, 3, the paragraph beginning "second", typed 

et cetera, 

and someone has put a "N" after the "A", so it reads "a 
Iraqi victory." 

Does that appear to be your "N", or do you 
remember that you did that? 

A I don't remember I did that, but it could well be 
my handwriting, but I don't clearly recognize it as such. A 
printed "N" is hard to ensure. But it's plausible. 

Q In any event. Colonel North said to you, when he 
showed this to you on November 24, you had seen it earlier? 

A That I had made this correction, which I recall 
that he recalled that and was surprised that I didn't. 

Q Unfortunately, we have all become experts in some- 
thing called system 4 dealing with numbers and codes. 

A That is all right. They will change it. We are 
also the poster boys for the Ophthalmology Foundation next 
year. It has all worked out. 

Q Did you notice this document. Earl 3, as we have it 

um AN-SifiFii 



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and as everybody has it, does not have a system number on it? 
Correct? None that you can see? And I can tell you, there 
is no copy that anybody has given us that has a system 4 
number on it. 

A I don't see one. 

Q It also doesn't have the kind of cover sheet that 
we are now tragically used to seeing with NSC documents. It 
says the National Security Council, to, from, all these 
stamps and things. Do you recall having seen — my first 
question is, do you recall having seen this document in a 
form where there was a system 4 number and heading, "National 
Security Council" addressed to somebody, from somebody, with 
a date? 

A No, I do not. 

Q All right. 

Were documents prepared in your tenure at the NSC 
staff for use at the NSC which were outside the system 
completely? 

A Yes. 

Q On what occasions did that happen? 

A A lot. Anything that was in one of Colonel North's 
highly comparted projects, it was in his judgment, and I 
assume confirmed by Admiral Poindexter since he received them 
and they are objected to, they were too sensitive for system 4 
there would be a non-log memo that was hand carried to 






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Admiral Poindexter, if it were, for example, a memo going to 
Admirat Poindexter, and there were many of those prepared. 

Q Where were they filed? Let me ask you first, I 
take it those documents -- and correct me if I am wrong -- 
were not sent to Jim Radzimsky for filing in the system 4 
safes, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Where were the originals then and copies of those 
documents fil^d? 

A Filing was not one of Fawn's strong suits, so it's 
hard for me -- 

Q Where were they supposed to be filed? 

A I am not even sure of that. There were possible 
candidates, I think, is the best that I can come up with 
where they might have been; one would be the chronology file 
Fawn maintained, the office chronology or chronology of 
North-prepared documents. 

Another would be the functional file for that 
particular subject on which the memo dealt. It's possible, 
but I don't recall, there would be a so-called non-log file. 

Q Non-log or outside the system documents also were 
not routed at any time through the Executive Secretariat, 
am I correct? 

A That is correct. ■•, . ; 

Q Apart from this document. Earl Exhibit 3, did you 



( 



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ever see another document that described, discussed or 
referred to any use of proceeds from the arms transactions to 
benefit or support the contras? 

A I have a vague recollection of something, and I am 
not sure if it was the Tower Commission or something that I have 
seen since November, or what, but I have a vague recollection 
of a reference to some sort of parenthetic remark about suppor 
to the contras, or something like that, on one of the 
versions of the' chronology . I don't know where I got that, --. 
whether, like I say, it's from Tower or something I have read 
in the paper or something I haveiheard since then, or whether 
I knew that from having seen it in the week or two of 
preparation of chronologies or what. 

Q Was that week or two of chronology work all prior 
to the Attorney General's press conference on November 25? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you know prior to November 25 or November 24 
whether Bud McFarlane was aware of the use of proceeds for 
the contras? 

A No, I don't think I was. 

Q You did not know one way or the other? 

A No. 

Q You did know, of course, though, McFarlane was 
briefed into the compartment, you knew he had gone to Tehran. 



Yes. 



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Q Going back to the time you were briefed in the 
compartment, what did Colonel North tell you was Israel's 
role? 

A Well, Israel was a very important facilitator and - 
gees, how can I characterize it? 

Q Instead of -- 

A They would help with logistics. 

Q Specifically, what were they supposed to be doing? 
Help with logistics. 

A They received and stored the spare parts and weapons 
when they arrived in Tel Aviv. 

Q They positioned them there? 

A For subsequent transfer to Iran when authorized. 

Q Yes. 

A They provided a 707, unmarked 707 for the transfer, 
flying in of the party and the parts. They provided 
facilities — 

Q Let me ask you this, did North or anyone ever tell 
you one role of the Israeli transaction was to provide 
plausible deniability to the American Government? 

A I am not recalling that specifically. I can't 
recall. 

Q What did you understand from Colonel North Israel 
was to get, if anything, for its role in this transaction or 
these transactions? , t . . 



.,t)-^ 



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A Hopefully, they would get one of their hostages 
back. They had had at least two that I recall, and maybe 
more, military men shot down or captured on patrol, at least 
one of whom was believed, with some degree of hope, belief, 
that he was still alive and being held in Lebanon. 

Q Anything else? 

A Not specifically, just the general cooperation 
between close allies and friends and a mutual desire to 
deal with terrorism in the region, and hostage taking was, a 
mutually troublesome phenomenon, to say the least. 

Q Did North tell you about anything that had occurred 
in 1985 in this compartment when he braefed you into it? 

A I don't think so. I knew either then or later that 
Michael Levine had been involved in some beginning parts of 
it, but I am not sure exactly what, and it would be hard for 
me to differentiate what I have read now in Tower from what I 
knew then. 

Q Generally speaking, prior to all the disclosures 
after November and Tower, do I understand that you did not 
know about specific shipments that had been made in 1985 
and what the Israelis' role had been in those and/or the 
American Government's role? Am I correct, you did not know 
about those things until subsequent to the disclosures? 

A I think that is correct, yes. 

Q He explained to you what Israel's role was in the 



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compartment, logistical support and so forth. What did he 
tell you was General Secord's role? 

A General Secord also helped with the logistics, 
provided pilots, for example, for the aircraft, for the 
Israeli aircraft that flew the party into Tehran, flew the 
weapons into Tehran, providing aircraft and crew for some of 

them ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 to 
on at least one of the occasions, was involved in some way 
with the transfer of funds that I knew from getting the calls 
from CIA where they hadn't arrived yet. 

During the McFarlane mission to Tehran, General 
Secord remained behind in Tel Aviv and established a CP man 
post, I think, in a hotel in Tel Aviv, I am not positive, I 
think it was though, I think my notes will show the hotel 
room number and stuff, which was an alternate means of 
communication or backup means of communication with the 
party in Tehran, so we just didn't have to depend on the link 
from Tehran to CIA Headquarters and thence to the White House. 
But we had another means of communicating with the party 
direct from Tel Aviv. 

Q You understood at the time that General Secord was 
not an employee of the United States Government? 

A Yes. 

— -^orstood he wasn't with the CIA or the Defense 



\ 



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A Correct. 

Q- Did you understand that he was working for the CIA 
or the Defense Department? 

A Well, I knew that he was working in this amorphous 
structure that was referred to as Democracy, Inc., Democracy 
Incorporated. 

Q Who called it that? 

A Colonel North, and that that structure was supportiv 
on this project and was with full knowledge of the CIA and 
that -- so while not formally an employee of the CIA, none- 
theless it was with their knowledge, and they provided a 
false passport, for example, for General Secord — 

Q The CIA did? 

A Yes. So it's kind of a quasi middle-ground state. 

Q If I talk about CIA proprietaries, you, of course, 
know what I mean? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you understand Democracy, Inc. to be a CIA 
proprietary? 

A No, I don't think it was. 

Q What did you understand it to be? Did North describ 
it as a formal incorporated entity or something else? 

A Well, I was never briefed into that box, so un- 
like the Iran episode, my knowledge of that is acquired from 

bits and pieces, just my proximity of answering phone calls 
• ■ ' ^ ,•••♦. . 



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and helping where I could, not from being in a box. 

Q- From those bits and pieces of knowledge, what did 
you conclude was the nature of Democracy, Inc? 

A I concluded that it was a private-sector group that 
was doing certain things that the U.S. Government could not or 
would not do. 

Q Did you understand this private-sector group, 
Democracy, Inc, was making a profit or was getting compensated 
in money for doing what it was doing? 

A I didn't know that. But it seemed to me that they 
had operating expenses in support of this department, this 
operation, that I would have guessed were coming from that 
in some way. 

Q Let me -- 

A For example, provision of chartering a Leer Jet 
for bringing Jacobsen back from Cyprus to Wfl^sbafcen was 
provided by Democracy, Inc. 

Q Did you think that the only thing they were getting 
was their expenses covered or that they were getting compen- 
sated, being paid a fee, making a profit? 

A I don't know about that. And with the same logic 
of what I would have thought, I don't know. It doesn't 
strike me as unreasonable that they would get a salary 
for the employees that were doing this, so there was some 

being applied for the running of this. 



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Q Did North ever tell you whether that was so? 

A- No. I am speculating now, and perhaps I ought not 
to do that. 

Q I don't want you to speculate. No one else ever 
told you what "Democracy, Inc", in quotes, was getting out 
of it either. 

A No. 

Q You understood Democracy, Inc. to be Secord's 
enterprise, whatever that was? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you know a man named Albert Hakim was involved 
with Democracy, Inc.? 

A I knew that. I think I knew then he was a business 
partner of General Secord. I certainly recall that he was 
with General Secord and some of the CPs that were established 
in some of the hotels for negotiations with the Iranian 
Government and that he would be talking to the Iranians and 
transferring the word to us what they were saying about the 
release of the hostages, for example. 

Q Do you know whether General Secord had a security 
clearance at the time? Did you ever find out whether he did 
or didn't? 

A I don't know. 

Q How about Albert Hakim? 

A I don ' t know . *. ' ' • 



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Q Did Hakim ever come to the OEOB while you were 
there, -to your knowledge? 

A I don't think so. I don't think I have ever met 
him. I talked to him on the phone. 

Q Secord, did he ever come to the building? 

A Yes. 

Q How did he come in? Would he be cleared in the 
normal way? 

A Yes . 

Q Did he ever talk to you about Khashoggi and his 
role in the transaction? 

A I don't think so. I think all of my knowledge of 
Khashoggi is the Tower Report and post-November. 

Q Ghorbanifar is a name you knew? 

A Yes. 

Q You understood him to be the Iranian intermediary? 

A Yes. 

Q There are other details about Iran, but since we 
have a limited amount of time today, I would like to jump 
to the November period. When we come back again, we will 
do more on Iran. There were disclosures of the Iran program 
in the foreign press at the beginning of November. Do you 
recall that? 

A Yes. 

Q Then were you asked to work on, as you have alluded 






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to before, the chronologies? 

A' Yes. 

Q Who asked you to work on that? 

A Colonel North. 

Q What did he tell you was the project? 

A He said that Admiral Poindexter wanted a chronology 
prepared which would be, since everyone who worked on the 
project only had bits and pieces of it, even Colonel North, 
knowledge of, the project did not go all the way back to the 
beginning, to get ail of the facts about the operation, the 
project, together for use by Admiral Poindexter and the 
President so that that would be a source document from which 
testimony would be derived for use in briefing the Congress 
at whatever time that was authorized. 

It was originally done on a contingency basis, 
that there had been no decision taken yet on when or if the 
Congress would be briefed. 

Q Were you told during the period of working on the 
chronology to shade the facts in any way? 

A No. There was never any intention for all of the 
facts to go into the testimony, the briefings. There were 
even brackets, suggested deletions or material that was 
provided for use by Admiral Poindexter for his knowledge or 
background use but was too sensitive or otheprfise inappropriate 
for use in a briefing for the Hill 






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For example, the name of one of the individuals 
in Iran.. There was never any instruction or statement 
that I can recall that says "shade the facts" or anything 
like that, but there's no question in my mind if we were 
trying ultimately to create a document that would explain 
the strengths of the Iran Initiative, if there were two 
ways to say something, that you would choose the one that 
emphasized the benefits the United States was getting out of 
this rather tjjian the one that tended to minimize those. That 
seemed to me to be a clear driving force in the exercise. 

Q Did you observe any effort or hear any discussions 
whether the chronology ought to make the President look more 
involved, less involved, more knowledgeable, less knowledge- 
able, anything of that sort? 

A Not that I can recall. I don't think so. 

Q Who else worked on the chronology so far as you 
knew? 

A Colonel North, Lieutenant Commander Coy, General 
Secord, George Cave, Mr. McFarlane — when you say work on 
it, I mean they at one time or another came in and gave some 
input that we would then use to help correct because, as I 
said earlier. Colonel North did not have full knowledge of 
this. 

Q I understand. 

A I think also Howard Teiche: 






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Q At some point in the examination, but not today, 
we wilL show you various drafts we have of the chronology, 
but we have-- I just wanted to ask you about one feature 
of those drafts. Some of them say maximum version, and others 
don't. So do you recall two different, shorter and longer, 
chronologies being prepared more or less at the same time? 

A There were so many drafts of the thing that it's 
very confusing. But maximum draft means, to me, or meant to 
me that was the version that had everything in it that would 
have been for use, for reference use by Admiral Poindexter 
or the President, or whoever needed to know all of the facts 
of the operation from which to make judgments on how to 
proceed and what to do. 

Q Do I take it that you recall that one of the 
versions of the chronology had something about the contras 
getting the benefit of some of the proceeds from Iran? 

A I have this vague recollection somebody talked about 
that, I am not sure whether I saw it or whether I am here 
reading about it or hearing somebody comment on it, but 
somewhere I have this memory in one of the versions there was 
some kind of cryptic reference to it, but that may just be 
my garbled recollection of preee-garbled versions of this. 

Q Exhibit 3. 

A I don't know. 

Q When the 



witness said this, he was referring to 



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Exhibit 3. Right, Bob? 

A. Yes. 

Q Let's go later in November. The President has a 
press conference on a Wednesday, I believe, which was 
November 19. Thursday is the 20th, Friday is the 21. Now, 
that Friday is the day, just to bring you back in time, when 
the Attorney General advises that he has been asked to take a 
look and see what the facts are related to the Iran program. 
Were you in the office that Friday morning? 

A Our office? 

Q Your office. 

A Yes, I was. 

Q Did you speak to Colonel North on that day? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall a conversation with him in the morning 
with reference to, or at some point during the day with 
reference to the Attorney General's inquiry and the matter 
at hand? 

A I recall a conversation, I think in the afternoon, 
but I am not positive of that. I think — I don't recall 
whether I got an intercom call or whether I had seen Colonel 
North as he came back into the office from the meeting, but 
I recall being told to bring my Iran file to him. 

I recall taking my file, which was a duplicate file 
of some of the things that he had, and going down to his 



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office and handing it to him. And he was, I believe, in 
the process of going through files and pulling materials out 
and placing them in stacks on his desk, and I am not sure, 
but possibly also putting some materials in the burn bag, 
but that's even vaguer. That may be another memory that is 
mixed in now. 

But I think he received my file, took the documents 
out, and I believe either handed me the file back or put 
that separately down on the table and added the contents 
of my file to the stack on his desk. This seemed to me 
different from any previous of my files that he had, so I 
asked what was going on, and he said something, and again I 
can't recall the exact words, but something to the effect 
that "It's time for North to be the scapegoat, Ollie has been 
designated the scapegoat", or something like that. The term 
"scapegoat" is what I recall. 



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Q Did you ask him what he meant? 

A- I don't recall asking hxm what he meant, but I 

must have. I recall that at some point there was a discussion 

«<^ 

of the Department of Justice or the HE, or Attorney General, 

A 
some reference to that in that way, sending some people 

around to just take a look at the details, that — I think 
also in the same conversation, but again, I am not positive, 
there was some reference to the briefings of the Congress 
hadn't gone well, and there were discrepancies or more ques- 
tions were raised than answered, and there was a problem of 
some sort, oh, and that at the, I think at the end of the 
meeting, but I am not sure, he had just come back from a 
meeting across the street. 
Q In the West Wing? 

A In the West Wing of the White House. He mentioned 
that he had asked, he had said to the Attorney General or 
asked the Attorney General, "Can I have" or "Will I have 24 
or 48 hours" — he didn't say both, he said one or the other. 
I can't recall whether he said 24 or 48, but he asked for 
that. 

And he told me that the Attorney General had said 
something like that he didn't know whether he could have 
thatmuch time, something like that. Again, I am not quoting. 
Q Did Ollie tell you with whom he had met across the 
street at the West Wing? I take it he mentiqfied the Attorney 



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1 General. 

2 A. I don't think he mentioned anyone else specifically. 

3 I don't recall, he may have, but I don't recall. 

4 Q You do recall the Attorney General? 

5 A Yes. As the person that he had talked to and had 

6 this remark, I think at the end, but I am not positive. 

7 Q Did you understand he had ]ust come from seeing 

8 the Attorney General at the West Wing, in the West Wing? 

9 A That was my understanding from the fact he had just 

10 come from a meeting, from one of the usual meetings of 

11 principals, I believe. I would believe Poindexter was there, 

12 but I don't know that, and that -- so from what he told me, 

13 it was my understanding that the Attorney General was at that 

14 meeting that he had just attended. 

15 Q Did he explain at all what he meant by the time 

16 has arrived, whatever, for North to be the scapegoat? Did 

17 he explain what he meant? 
13 A No. 

19 Q Did you understand him to be referring to an 

20 agreement having been reached he would take the blame for 

21 something? I am telling you how I interpret it. 

22 A I interpreted it, I guess, similarly, that from 

23 what he was obviously engaged in, that it was -- let me 
o^ back up for a minute. , ^ 

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A I have, from my own reference, categorized phase 
one, two and three in this dcimage control operation from the 
leak we started with, phase one being no comment/deny, no 
comment, where possible, some sort of cryptic, artful truth, 
where possible, deny it if there's no other way, but to 
protect the compartment. This had been done in the past when 
there had been leaks on the fringes. 

I think there was a Jack Anderson column at some 
point in the past, and that same policy had worked in the 
past, and the press interest died down and went away. Phase 
one included, though, preparation of the chronology and the 
development of testimony for what I have since called phase 
two, which was briefing of the Congress and ultimately the 
people on what could be briefed to them about the compart- 
ment, if it beccime necessary to go from phase one to phase 
two. 

Phase three is what I believed we were now in, which 
was termination of the compartment. 

Q And termination of the compartment, including 
getting rid of all the documents related to the compartment? 

A All the sensitive, all the inner boxes, not the 
total box, that had already been briefed to the Congress, but 
the sensitive material within the box within the box within 
the box, however far it went. 

Q What did you understand — what do you mean by the 



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inner box? What was the sensitive material you understood 
had to -be disposed of? 

A That was never clear to me, and I erred on the side 
of my own sanitization of records and assuming that something 
might be in the box or point to the box and lead to the box 
and, therefore, ought not to be around, but included some 
sensitive things that we can't go into right now, but 
basically anything that would lead to possible loss of life, 
the hostages would be killed or some of the intermediaries 
we were dealing with in Iran might be killed from their side, 
possible widespread killings of Americans overseas, as we had 
had at the Pakistani Embassy being burned after the rumors 
spread that the U.S. Government had perpetrated the seizure 
of the mosque in Mecca back in, whatever year that was, but 
those sorts of things. 

Q Did you understand that anything relating to the 
use of proceeds from Iran for the contras was also something 
that had to be gotten rid of? 

A Certainly. It was my belief if that came out, the 
Ayatollah had been stung and that he was unknowingly funding 
the contras, that seemed to me to be something that would 
lead to the deaths of the hostages. 

Q What was in your file that you had handed over to 
Colonel North on that Friday, November 24? 

A I have only been able to recall a few of the 



ave only been able to re< 



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documents in there. 

Q Tell us what you recall. 

A One is what I have already talked to, the long 
paper, several pages that had the parts list and prices on 
it, anything associated with prices and parts. 

Q That is the long paper list you have described 
earlier in your testimony today? 

A Yes. I have at least one copy of that in there. 
Let me think now. There is a couple others — I think the 
operations order for the McFarlane trip and all of the materia 
associated with that, such as the contingency press guidance 
in terms of reference, all of those sorts of things whereby 
duplicate copy or working copy was in my file. 

Q Were there PROF messages in your file? 

A I don't recall. It's quite likely there were 
relevant PROF notes on that subject that I would have filed 
in there to be with all of the sensitive Iran stuff, but I 
don't recall any one specifically. 

Q We haven't discussed it yet at this deposition, but 
when I talk about the SL-4 3 machine, do you know what I mean? 

A Yes. 

Q That was a special device you had in there too, is 
that right? 

A Yes. 

Q Although we haven't hit the subject yet, you 



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communicated on that machine from time to time to Bob 
Dutton -and others involved with the Democracy, Inc. contra 
operation down south, correct? 

A As well as on the Iran project. 

Q That you have answered. Did you have CL-43 

transcribed messages in your file that you handed over to 
North? 

A My answer would be the same as for the PROF list. 
I can't recall a specific one, but it's entirely possible, 
there could have been some that were relevant. I don't 
recall . 

Q Did you understand what North intended to do with 
your file documents once you gave the documents to him? 

A It was my understanding, from all that I heard and 
was observing, they were going to be destroyed. 

Q Was there any shredding in progress in Suite 302 
at that time when you brought your file down to North that 
you observed, any shredding that you observed? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Who else was in the suite at that time? 

A The suite or the office, Ollie's office? 

Q Let's start with Ollie's office. I understood 
that was you and Ollie. Is that correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Was Fawn Hall at work at that time? The best you 



Jail at v<ork at that time 



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71 

1 can remember. 

2 A.I would assume so, but I don't recall. 

3 Q How about Barbara Brown? You don't specifically 

4 recall? 

5 A No. 

6 Q How about Coy, was he at work? You don't specif ical- 

7 ly recall? 

8 A No. 

9 Q All right. Tell us what happened, continuing on 

10 this same day after you handed your files over to North. 

11 Did he tell you to do anything more? 

12 A Basically, the conversation ended. 

13 Q What did you do? 

14 A I went back upstairs to ray office and started to 

15 review my files to see if there were any other things 

1g besides the document or file that I had just handed to Colonel 

•)7 North that would either compromise that which I believe was 

Ig being destroyed or lead to that, point to that, and, like I 

19 say, it is a little unclear to me what exactly to look for, so 

20 I erred on the side of destruction. 

2< Q Did you find documents at that time? 



A Yes. 

Q What did you do with them? 

A I either ripped them up and put them in my burn 
bag or if -- I know on at least one occjasion I shredded some 



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documents. I don't know if it was that day. It was probably 
that day. 

Q Did you have a shredder upstairs, or was the only 
shredder on the first floor? 

A The only shredder was downstairs. 

Q Do you recall seeing any shredding in process that 
day on the first floor in which North and/or Fawn Hall were 
involved? 

A The only recollection that I have is, I have an 
image of Fawn standing in front of the shredder with a pile 
of documents. That's the only one I specifically have. 

Q Was there a day during this period when you remember 
handing her documents to shred or being given documents to 
harid to Fawn Hall to shred? 

A I am not sure it was this timeframe or a merger of 
an earlier memory months before that has migrated into the 
same timefreime of I think Colonel North going through some 
documents, and I was on the way out of the office, handing 
me the docvunents and saying, "Would you stick those in the 
shredder for me on the way out?" But I don't know for sure 
that it was in this timeframe. 

Q Do you know whether any documents were altered on 
Friday, November 21? 

A No. 

Q Do you know whether any documents were altered on 

• ■ - • •■ '.a i 



633 



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73 

any day prior to that day? 
A - No. 

Q How about any day after that day? 
A No. 
Q If they were, you weren't involved in it, is that 

correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Do you know on the 21, when the file disposition 
was in progress, that the Attorney General was planning to^ 
come in by the next day? 
A No. 
Q But — 
A On Friday? 
Q Yes. 

A I knew the request, if you will, and I don't 
recall whether it was 24 or 48 hours, but there was a sense 
of urgency about that, not knowing how much time was avail- 
able. At some point later in the day, I got a call from 
Paul Thompson, who advised me that some team or other, some 
people from the Justice Department, would be coming over some- 
time on the weekend, and it was unspecified when, but he was 
:just alerting us we had to be available on call to come m 
and open up the office whenever this might occur. 

Q But even earlier, before that call from Thompson, 
you understood from North's comment to you that sometime very 



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soon the Attorney General's people were planning to come over? 

A- Yes. It was unclear whether it was going to be 
Saturday, Sunday, Monday, or exactly when. 

Q YOU understood that by the time you started 
disposing of the files? 
A Yes. 

Q Anything more on Friday? 
A Not that I can recall at the moment. 
Q When you left the office Friday, do you recall^ 
whether Colonel North and Fawn Hall still were there? 

A I think when I left the office, that only Colonel 
North was there, but I am not positive of that. 

Q The next morning is Saturday, November 22. Did 
you go to work that morning? 

A I got a call from, I believe, VJhite House Signal, 
but I am not sure now whether it was Paul Thompson calling 
.e or whether a message was relayed through the White House 
Signal, but somebody called me to say "Come and open up the 
office," that colonel North wasn't available, couldn't be 
found. so I went in and opened up the office. 

Q Just let me ask you. Back on the 21st -- do you knoj. 

Tom Green? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he come to Suite 302 on Friday, the 21st, before 

you left? 



to buite Ju* ^" ..^^--j, 

ONCLAECiflED 



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A Not that I recall. He may have, but that I recall. 

Q. Now we are back on Saturday morning. You get a 
contact from White House Signal, et cetera. Do you go to 
302 and open up? 

A I recall driving through the gate and parking on 
the street between OEOB and the West Wing. I wasn't sure 
whether I ought to go up to Paul Thompson's office or over 
to Paul's office. I recall considering that, but I don't 
recall what my solution to the dilemma was. I went to one 
of the two places first. I do recall I did eventually, 
either directly or secondly, go to the office and open it up. 

Q You were the first guy to arrive at 302 that 
morning? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, do you remember, were files laid out when you 
opened the office up? 

A This is another one that I cannot recall, whether 
the circular table in front of Colonel North's desk had files 
on it at that point when I got there or whether it was empty 
and I added all the files for them to review. 

Q In any event, the table you are referring to -- 
which I imagine you are going to tell me, the AG representa- 
tives reviewed documents, right? 

A Yes. 

Q That on Exhibit 2 is the_table jn^irked "conference 



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table" in North's office, right? 

A - Correct. 

Q Okay. Did the Attorney General's people arrive 
next or someone before them? 

A At some point, I am not sure exactly how much later, 
but I think what happened next was that Paul Thompson brought 
over two representatives from the Department of Justice, 
Bradford Reynolds, and I think his name is John Richardson, 
introduced nve, said they were there to look at files on the 
Iran project, and then I think Paul Thompson left. 

Q And Richardson and Reynolds started their review? 

A Correct. 

Q Do you recall their asking you for any specific 
docvunents, files? 

A I recall that they asked for more documents, or 
maybe all of them. If the table was empty, they asked for 
all the documents; if the table had some of them arranged, 
they asked for more. I recall going behind Colonel North's 
desk into this credenza and going thorugh files in his 
credenza pulling them out and looking at the subject title 
to see if they were relevant and putting some of them that 
were I believe relevant onto the table for their review. 




637 





77 

So I looked through all those documents behind Colonel North's 
desk, I couldn't find them. I will go into that more if you 
want. They were subsequently found. 

Q Where did you find them? 

A I didn't find them, Colonel North found them. When 
he came in, I told him of their request for them. 

Q Now, Richardson and Reynolds were in Colonel North's 
office, you were in there with them? 

A Initially, I was in there looking for the files in 
the credenza, and I also from his desk placed a call to him to 
let him know that I was in his office and the people were 
there, and to see if he had gotten the call and was en route, 
and he had said, yes, he had gotten the call, and he would be 
there in a while. I am not sure exactly how much later, an 
hour, or maybe two hours later. 

Q That was the substance of your conversation with 
him? 

A Yes. 

Q He arrived next at 302. Was he the next person to 
come in? 

A No. 

Q tVho came next? 

A The next thing that happened is that they left to 
go to lunch with the Attorney General. On their way out, 
in the passageway, they ran into Colonel North coming in. 



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They had a brief conversation in the hallway, and then Colonel 
North came into the office. 

Q Did you overhear their conversation? 

A No. I observed it, I was on my way out and saw 
them down there talking to Colonel North. So I never got out 
of the office when Colonel North arrived. 

Q North came into the office? 

A I told him of the request of the te 

He said he didn't know where they were 
filed and started looking around, and apparently found them. 
I am not sure that he found them while I was still there or 
while I was on the same floor with him. My recollection is 
when Richardson and Brad Reynolds returned, there was a file, 
an empty file folder on the desk that had not been there 
before that Bradford Reynolds held up and said, "Now, that is 
very sensitive," because it was empty, and I couldn't explain 
why it was sensitive. 

Q We get protection of documents like that from the 
White House all the time. 

A Colonel North was out of the office at that time. 
When he returned, he explained they had been filed in one of 
these files over here. 

Q In front of Barbara Brown's desk? 

A Yes, and had taken them and put them with! 





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.11 a\*fi 



1 Q Before the AG team came back, did you and North have 

2 any coaversation apart talking about^^^^^^^^^^^^^f 

3 A Not that I can recall the substance of, although 

4 there were a couple little parts that I recall before the AG's 

5 teams — before they returned. 

6 Colonel North continued to review documents, and I 

7 think found others that were suitable for the category that 

8 we had been looking for the day before. 

9 Q Termination? 

10 A Termination. 

11 MR. LEON: Where was he looking for those, among 

12 the files they had just reviewed? 

13 THE WITNESS: I don't think so, but I am not posi- 

14 tive. I think it was other files back on his desk. I am 

15 not sure where — oh, and one of the things he told me when 

16 he first came in was that the shredder had broken the night 

17 before, because I reached up to turn it on, and sure enough, 

18 it wasn't working. Then when he was compiling material — 

19 BY MR. BELNICK: 

20 Q Can I stop you there for a second. Bob? Was the 

21 shredder bag full? 

22 A I don't recall. 

23 Q Was the machine the kind of machine you could see 

24 the bag, or would you have to open it? Was the bag visible? 



25 A I think it was. 



iiiM.;iiiS'nt<^ 



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80 

1 Q It didn't work. Did he ask you to find a working 

2 shredder? 

3 A He didn't ask me. I intuited it from what he was 

4 doing. I told him I was going across the hall to CMC where 

5 I knew they had a shredder and see if we could get in there. 

6 The door was locked, so I couldn't get in. And at some 

7 point -- the recollection that I had, rather than speculate 

8 how we get to it, is of Colonel North with a file and a 

9 stack of documents that I knew from all of this were to be 

10 shredded, had Paul Thompson standing beside him and in some 

11 way a reference to going over to the sift room with a hefting 

12 of the documents -- I am not exactly sure what, but I knew 

13 what he meant, and I don't know what Thompson knew or 

14 inferred from that. 

15 Q Did Ollie have the documents he was carrying in 
1g folders? 

■^j A I think it was one folder with a bunch of papers in 

^o them, but I am not sure. 

«g Q Do you know what kinds of papers they were? You 

20 say they were the kind that qualified for the Termination 

2-1 Department. Do you remember — what were they, PROF messages, 

22 something else? 

A I don't know. 

MR. LEON: This kind of folder? . 

MR. BELMICK: The record can't see that. 



^'N'!':\!mh. 



641 



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81 



MR. LEON: Accordian-type folder. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall whether it was 
accordian or the kind that doesn't have sides on it, just a 
manila folder open. It could have been either. 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q Did Colonel North and Thompson walk toward the West 
Wing together? 

A I am not sure. I think they did. 

Q In any event, they weren't there when the AG team 
returned? 

A That is right. I was alone. 

Q The AG team came back, said hello, and they started 
to do that good work again? 

A And asked about the new folder without any documents 
in it. 

Q Other than that, it was the same as the morning 
had been, more exciting review? 

A At some point, Colonel North came back. I don't 
know which one it was, Reynolds or Richardson, told Colonel 
North the Attorney General would like to speak to him. So 
Colonel North called the Attorney General. 

Q In his office, from his office? 

A Yes. He was sitting back there talking to him. I 

believe it was to him. He called him sir, and were arranging 

for a meeting the next day. Whatk heard from Colonel North's 

* ' ' f t 



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1 end of the conversation is that he wanted to take his family 

2 to church in the morning. I think they settled on a time in 

3 the afternoon. I don't recall the time. 

4 Q Did anything else happen that you recall before 

5 you left the office, apart from the AG people continuing 

6 their review, anything said, anything that you heard or saw? 

7 A Not that I can recall right now. I don't think so. 

8 Q Were the Attorney General's representatives, as 

9 you observed them, dead-pan as they observed the documents? 

10 Did they show happiness, glee, tears from what you saw? 

11 A No. 

12 Q Did they leave before anyone else? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q About what time? 

15 A Mid afternoon. 

^g Q North and the AG were there when you left? 
^j A Yes. 

^a Q Did you speak to North again before Monday? 
19 A No. 

2Q Q Did you speak to anyone about this subject matter 
21 before Monday, from the time you left the office on Saturday? 
A No, I don't think so. 
Q So the next day when something happens, if I am 

correct, that involves this matter and you is Monday, 

November 24? 






643 





83 

A I believe so, yes. 

Q- You go to work, 302? 

A Right. 

Q And what happens? 

A I am not sure when Colonel North came in. I think, 
for whatever reason, he was a little later than normal that 
day. In any case, when I first saw him in his office, I 
asked him how it went yesterday, the day before, with the 
Attorney General. And he said that they had talked about this 
document and directed my -- 

Q You are pointing to Exhibit 3 when you say "this 
document"? 

A Yes. He pointed out to me the paragraph — 

Q With the "N" ~ 

A No, the 12 million. 

Q That is on N-594, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q He was holding this document. 

A Well, I am not sure whether he handed it to me 
f61ded back or whether he handed it to me — I started to 
page through it. 

Q He gave you the document? 

A Yes. So that I saw this paragraph. 

Q The paragraph which begins "$12 million will be 
used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan 
■ I i J • . • J 



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1 Democratic Resistance forces", et cetera? 

2 A- Yes. 

3 Q What did he say when he directed your attention to 

4 that paragraph? 

5 A Again, my memory is only little bits and pieces of 

6 this thing. At some point, he talked about parts of his 

7 meeting with the Attorney General the day before, which I 

8 remember that there were more than the Attorney General 

9 present, there were several people present. He also mentioned 

10 at least one of them was an FBI agent, although I don't know 

11 how he knew that or why. They had talked for, I think, a 

12 couple of hours, and at the end that they had shown this 

13 document to him and asked him about it and that when he had 

14 acknowledged this paragraph in question that there was a 

15 sigh from the assembled people. 

16 Q What do you mean when he had acknowledged it? 

17 A That he had started talking about it or telling 

18 them about it. 

19 Q Did he indicate to you how it happened that this 

20 document hadn't been destroyed? 

21 A No . 

22 Q Did he say in words or in substance that he had 

23 missed this one? 

24 A I don't know whether he said that or not. 

25 Q Do 



you have any. reco ligation <©€ that? 



645 



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A No, I don't. I mean, that was my inference from 
the situation, but I don't recall it being said. 

Q Do you have any recollection of whether he said he 
had made a comment to the Attorney General about his Miranda 
warnings or his rights? 

A Yes. He said at the end -- when they talked 
apparently some detail more about this episode. Colonel 
North apparently turned to the group or to the Attorney 
General and said something, again I am not quoting exactly, 
but 3ust the thrust of it was since you didn't warn me of my 
rights or because -- well, I am not sure of his words. I 
will just say since you didn't mention my rights or warn me 
of my rights, does this count? 

A Now, your conversation with North, the one that you 
have ]ust been describing where he shows you the document 
and tells you about his discussion with the AG people on 
Sunday, anything more? Did he tell you what was going to 
happen, did he ask you to do something? 

A Not that I can recall, no. He seemed to me un- 
clear what was going to happen. 

Q Did he appear agitated or upset? 

A No. 

Did he ask you to take any action of any kind? 
Not that I can recall. 



Did anything else happen that day that you recall 



646 




86 

1 that relates to this matter we are discussing? 

2 h. This is Monday. 

3 Q This is Monday, the 24th. 

4 A Not that I am recalling right now. I might 

5 remember something later. 

6 Q We are getting near the end of my allotted time for 

7 today, and I would like to finish up if we can this week. 

8 November 25, that is the day of the Attorney General's press 

9 conference. Did you go to work that day? 

10 A Yes. 

11 Q And did you have any conversations with North before 

12 the press conference that you remember? 

13 A Let's see -- well, again -- let me give you the 

14 pieces I can recall. 

15 Q Give me your memory of the day. 

16 A There was discussion of a press conference coming 

17 up, the time wasn't certain. I think it was first scheduled 

18 for 11:00 and slipped to 12:00, and from 12:00 it was delayed 

19 We knew there was going to be a press conference. I knew 

20 prior to the press conference Colonel North had submitted 

21 his resignation on a PROF note to Admiral Poindexter, and 

22 prior to the press conference Admiral Poindexter 's resigna- 

23 tion came through on a PROF note to all of the NSC staff — 

24 Q You watched -- 

25 A I think, on either that morning or the morning 



647 



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before Monday, and I am not sure which, Monday or Tuesday 
morning. Colonel North called both Lieutenant Commander Coy 
and me into his office to say that from now on that we would 
be dealing with the, really the compartment, the Iran 
hostage pro]ect, Lieutenant Commander Coy and I would no 
longer be working it. 

Q You watched the press conference? 

A I didn't catch the beginning of it. I had occasion 
to -- I wasn't going to sit there and wait for it to come on, 
so I was in my office doing work and had occasion to go down- 
stairs and was surpised everyone in Colonel North's office 
was watching the press conference. Nobody had given me a 
yell. I am not sure when I came in on that. I think I 
missed all of the President's part of it, but I may have 
caught the tail end, I am not sure. 

In any case, I go in and watch some of the press 
conference, and at some point, the buzzer sounds outside, 
indicating someone wanting to get in, and Tom Green arrives, 
comes in, and Colonel North asks if he could have some time 
with Tom Green. And so all of the rest of us who were 
watching the press conference leave Colonel North's office, 
and I think most of us went upstairs, although I am not sure 
everyone made it, the phone may have been ringing, and some- 
one may have answered the phone and came up later and left. 

Q Upstaj 

V 



:airs there was anot^ev television? 



648 



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88 

1 A Right. On the table opposite Lieutenant Commander 

2 Coy's office. 

3 Q You hear the Attorney General 's announcement -- 
^ you are watching television on the table outside Coy's 

5 office. Coy is there. 

A Craig Coy is at his desk, and I am in the chair. 
' Q Was there any conversation you remember during the 

° Attorney General's press conference or right after his 

9 announcement? 

10 A At some point, either when the Attorney General 

11 mentioned the diversion or at the end of the press conference, 

12 or, I eim not sure exactly when. Lieutenant Commander Coy 

13 asked me or said that he didn't know about that, did I know 

14 about it? It being the diversion. I was sitting in front 

15 of him, so that he was behind me, and I just continued to 

16 look at the TV set and did not answer the question. 

17 Q Now, anything else, any other conversation connected 

18 to the press conference at the time you were watching it 

19 or immediately after it ended? If not, then I am going to 

20 ask you -- 

21 A I don't think so. 

22 Q Just give us, because the time is arriving, what 

23 else you recall about that day, the 25th, that is relevant 

24 here subsequent to the press conference. Is that the day 

25 that you have ttje conversation ,late»r ^n the afternoon with 



649 



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89 
Colonel North at the top of the stairs? 

A • It's either that day or the next day, I am not sure 
which. I think on both days Colonel North was, at least for 
the afternoon of that day and certainly the next day, was gone 
from the office most of the day. For example, on Tuesday 
morning, he came m and left, I think, to go to Tom Green's 
office and then came back at night. So it's one of the two 
nights he came back to pick up his briefcase and things prior 
to going home. 

Q Apart from the conversation concerning the 
President's call, which may have taken place on the 24th, 
leaving that aside, is there anything else that you are about 
that day that pertains to what we are talking about here? 

A I am sorry, which day? 

Q The day of the press conference, the 25th. I am 
sorry, I may have said the 24th, I mean the 25th. 

A The NSC security changed the combination on the 
office. If you want to know more about that — 
(Witness conferring with his counsel .) 
THE WITNESS: I am not sure of the day again, 
either that day or the next day. Fawn Hall came up into my 
office with some documents and asked if I would take them 

out. lijXjf'' ^''^ 



BV MR. BELNICK: ** 

Q Tell us about that. This is either on November 25 



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or November 26, right? 

A Correct. 

Q Tell us everything you recall about that event. 

A She came into my office, had some documents, asked 
if I would take them out. I took them, and I think I folded 
them and put them in my suit coat, which was hanging up on 
the wall, and she left. Sometime /^)ter she ccime back and 
said that she couldn't have me do that or she didn't want me 
to do that, she asked for them back, so I handed them back 
to her or went over to my suit coat, took them out, handed 
them to her, and she proceeded to begin to conceal them 
on her person. 

Q Where were the two of you? In your office? 

A In my office. 

Q Upstairs in 302? 

A Right. In front of my desk. 

So with her doing that, I walked out so as not to 
be present while she — 

Q I understand. 

Then did she ask you to see if you could see any 
of the documents? 

A Yes. She asked if I could see anything. I think 
she did a turn, and I couldn't see anything. 

Q And then what happened? 

A She left my office and ultimately left the suite. 



651 



91 

1 I am not sure whether it was direct or an intervening period. 

2 I think she left before I did. 

3 Q Did you look at what the documents were when she 

4 handed them to you? 

5 A No. 

6 Q Could you tell whether they were PROF notes or 

7 what they were? 

8 A No, I don't recall what they were. 

9 Q Did she tell you why she wanted them out of the 

10 office? 

11 A No. 

12 Q Did you have any understanding why she wanted them 

13 out? 

14 A My understanding was that that was the only way 

15 she could get them out. One of us would have to carry them 

16 out. 

17 Q Did she tell you whether she had been asked by 

18 North to get them out of the office? 

19 A I don't recall that she did, no. 

20 Q Has she ever told you why she wanted those documents 

21 out of the office? 

22 A No. 

23 Q Has anyone ever told you that? 

24 A No . 

25 Q In any event, as far as you know, she took them out 



652 
ii 




92 

1 of the office? 

2 A- As far as I know, she did. I do not know that she 

3 did. 

^ Q Did North show up at the office during this period, 

5 during the day that this was occurring? 

6 A The two nights in question are confused to me, and 

7 I can't differentiate either one. But I think I have a 

8 recollection that at least one one of those nights the two 

9 of them walked out together, but I am not positive of that. 

10 Q Was it a night when she had the documents secreted 

11 on her? 

12 A I don't know. It could have been the other night or 

13 the same night. I don't know. 

14 Q Was she very agitated when she came to you with 

15 the documents? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q Did she say anything to you aside from "Take these 

18 and get them out of here"? 

19 A She may have, but I don't recall. 

20 Q And you didn't look at the documents? 

21 A No, I did not. 

22 Q How many documents would you say there were? 

23 A I don't know. I would guess half a dozen. 

24 Q Six? 

25 A Yes. "*^''"- ^iA.-^i*-*'^M 



653 




^ 



93 

1 Q Where were we? 

2 A The number of documents, and I don't know the 

3 number, my guess would be about six, but that's a very rough 

4 guess. It could be quite a few more, but maybe only two or 

5 three. I ]ust don't recall. 

6 Q In any event, the way it ended, as far as you 

7 remember today, is that she left your room with the documents 

8 on her? 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q And at some point left Suite 302? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q Did she ever tell you any time whether she had 

13 delivered those documents to North? 

14 A I don't think so. I had heard that, but I think my 

15 hearing of that is since November. Whether it's the press 

1g or -- what you are saying is not unfamiliar to me, but I don't 
17 think it's from the period we are talking about. I think it's 
ig subsequent knowledge. 

Q Subsequent to, using a term we have adopted. 
North ceasing to be employed at the NSC staff, did he ask 
you to take any documents out for him or to terminate any 
other documents? 
A No. 

Q Did you and Fawn Hall have a conversation subsequent 
to the event you have ]ust described involving the removal 



654 



22 
23 



94 

1 of the documents in which you agreed not to discuss what had 

2 happened with anybody? 

3 A We had -- one of the nights -- let's see, what night 

4 was that? Friday -- walked out together, and our cars were 

5 parked in the saune garage, and we had a conversation in the 

6 garage that I have repressed almost totally. I cannot recall 

7 almost anything from that conversation. I can recall at the 

8 end of the conversation wondering whether I had crossed the 

9 line that I perhaps shouldn't have or whether in her agitation 

10 she had misinterpreted what I said, and I was worried -- i 

11 asked her if you get a question, did you prepare your testiraon;' 

12 or did anybody help you with your testimony or your statement 

13 as to that, I asked her that, and she said no, that she didn't 

14 know what the answer to that was, and so I said no. 

15 Q That would be an outstanding answer. Does any- 
15 thing else about that conversation creep back in now? 

17 A I recall her being very agitated and excited, and I 

13 recall that I was worried about her, her emotional state, 

19 and I was trying to console her and to help her and to get 

20 her back in control. But we were both concerned about every- 

21 thing that had happened. 



Q Sure. 

A And what we were going to do and knowing that we 



24 had interviews coming up and not knowing what could be shared 

25 ^"-^ shouldn't be. 'MVi.^ ^4 •. \ * T • K ..i-r;/l 



655 



15 



^m^sK' 



95 

1 Q When is the last time you have spoken to Ollie 

2 about these matters? 

3 A About these matters? 

4 Q I know you see him from time to time, I would 

5 imagine, at Marine Headquarters. I am not interested in your 

6 considerations unless they pertain to this. 

7 A No. 

S Q When is the last time you spoke to him about any 
9 of these matters? 

10 A I think -- I don't think Colonel North was thefe 
■)1 on Friday. 

12 Q That is the day after Thanksgiving. 

13 A The day after Thanksgiving. 

14 Q How about over that weekend? 
A I don't think so. I think the last time that I am 

1g recalling right now was the day before Thanksgiving, which 
4j was the Wednesday. 

^a Q When you had the conversation -- when you may have 

had the conversation at the top of the stairs? 

A If that was the day, but he certainly came back 
that night. So if that wasn't the night, even if the conversa- 
tion at the top of the stairs was the night before, I would 
have seen him on Tuesday. 

Q Tuesday or Wednesday? 
A So 



>rry. If it was Tuesday, the conversation at the 



656 



I'iO 



96 

1 top of the stairs, I still would have seen him on Wednesday. 

2 Q ^ The day before Thanksgiving, 1986? 

3 A Correct. 

4 Q That, as you recall it, was the last time you spoke 

5 to him about any of the matters we have been discussing 

6 today? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q Let me ask you one other question, because I know 

9 you have to go, and you have been very patient. Do you 

10 remember there was a restricted interagency group on Central 

11 America that Elliott Abrams chaired? 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q Did you attend meetings of that group from time to 

14 time? 

15 A There were several groups, and I am not sure as to 
1g the nomenclature which was a RIG, which was a SIG. 

•)7 Q Which was a IG — 

ig A Which was an IG. I know I was not allowed to 

ig attend one of the meetings when I tried to go in Colonel 

20 North's place. I had called General Abrams' office to see if 

21 it was acceptable for me to be a substitute, he was not able 

22 to return my call. I went down to the situation room to 
fill in, if that was advisable, for Colonel North, which I 
tried to do on anything that he was doing, and was told by 



Elliott Abrams no substitutes. 



i.Nfi ••■•■ll-l} II 



657 



19 



21 
22 

23 
24 



- Jtap^glKEl 



97 



1 Q Principals only? 

2 A . Principals only. So I left. 

3 Q Did he tell you also or did someone tell you on 

4 that occasion they were going to discuss that "sensitive 

5 subject"? 

6 A I heard that. That's ringing a bell, but I am not 

7 sure who said it or what. 

8 Q Did you understand what the subject was? 

9 A No. 

10 Q Do you remember a meeting of IG, RIG, SIG, of 

11 some alphabetical thing that rhymes with IG, on Monday, 

12 November 24, the day that North told you about his conversa- 

13 tion with the Attorney General? 

14 A Yes, there was one, whatever group it was, in 

15 Colonel North's office, and I recall Elliott Abrams coming 
1g to that meeting. I did not attend the meeting. 
Aj Q You don't know what the discussion was at that 



ig meeting? 



A No. 



2Q MR. EGGLESTON: I will just take a second. 



BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q This pricing sheet that you told us about, did you 
work with anyone at the Central Intelligence Agency on the 
pricing issue during the summer of 1986? 

A After the May shipqent 



oc A After the May 



UNi!'. ANSlMt i' 



658 



98 

1 Q You had said that you thought even after the ship- 

2 ment, you continued to have dealings and -- 

3 A There was a meeting after the Tehran trip and the 

4 transfer of that package, I have forgotten the number now, 

5 240. Basically, the 240. I recall meeting at CIA Headquarter 

6 sometime after that, which would have lead up to the Jacobsen 

7 release, at which a pricing was a subject, and we even had a 

8 calculator, and so I was doing some math at that meeting, 

9 yes. 

10 Q Did your sheets which showed the price differential 

11 between the CIA, DOD price and the Iranian price, or at least 

12 the 3.7 differentiation you have talked about, were those 

13 used during the course of the meeting? 

14 AX think, I am not sure, but I think I had my 

15 copies of that, but those would not have been on the table 

1g as a discussion item for all assembled. It's my recollection, 

17 not being sure who all was in the inner boxes in that meeting, 

•|g and I think, for example, Nir was not to know some of the 

19 details of that particular calculation. 

20 So, no, it was not used generally by this group. 
2} It was dealing with logistics matters and including in part 

22 the pricing. 

23 Q Do you know anyone at the CIA who was within that 

24 inner box on the pricing? 

25 ' 



No, I do no 



' DNUAliSlflB 



659 



99 

BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q . One other quick thing, then we will pick a day. 
Do you recall attending a meeting on August 12, 1986, in 
Don Gregg's office, Burkhardt was present. Ambassador Coor, 
William Walker from the State Department -- 

A Yes. 

Q Can you just tell us everything that you recall abou : 
that meeting? 

A It was a meeting — and I am not sure who initiated 
It, whether it was Ambassador Coor or Don Gregg, but it se'emed 
to be a follow-up meeting to a meeting several days before 
that Don Gregg had with Felix Rodriguez, in which he asked 
me to come down to hear what Felix had to say, since Colonel 
North was out of the building or out of the country, not 
available, and that meeting discussed the problem, if you will 
I think, that was raised by Felix Rodriguez, which concerned 
the interim period between when the support that was current- 
ly being provided by various means and the transition to when 
the CIA would begin their support, and some problem with the 
aircraft that were down there in the current scenario and 
misunderstanding between^^^^^^^^^^^^^on the side 
and others as to who owned the aircraft, whether they belonged 
to the contras or whether they were merely in support of the 
contras and what would happen to those aircraft once the CIA 



.uppo.. ..,.„. ||N;;[;.vSIhm'' 



660 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



100 

Q Did Gregg mention any other complaints by Rodriguez 
at that August 12 meeting that you attended, or concerns, 
complaints ? 

Let me be more narrow, because we are at that time. 
Specifically, did Gregg mention that Rodriguez was concerned 
about the guys who were involved in the support operation for 
the contras, that those people included Tom Clines and others 
who had been associated with Wilson Temple and were a bad 
bunch? Did Gregg mention that? 

A That was mentioned in one of the two meetings. 

Q You were at the meeting with Gregg and Rodriguez? 

A Yes. I thought I said that. 

Q I am talking about the 12. Was it mentioned at 
the 12? 

A I think so, but I am not positive, and the reason 
I think so was the CIA representative, and I know — 

A 

A Yes. Expressed some problems with the Cuban- 
American community in that interface and that there were bad 
characters in certain parts of this that were on the fringes 
in supporting the contras and that this was a problem, that 
there were bad characters on the fringes. 

Q Let's go back to the meeting that was four days 
earlier, on the 8th, when Gregg asked you to come down and 
hear Rodriguez's complaints. You knew at that time that 



'"^^ i ^^jiia^il 



661 



jWUtnSEl&jOur 



101 



1 Rodriguez was in touch with North on various matters relating 

2 to contra support. 

3 A I knew from I think the day before, or two days 

4 before, whenever Colonel North left, ]ust prior to when that 

5 meeting was going to be held, he knew that there was, that 

6 Felix Rodriguez was coining into town and that Don Gregg 

7 wanted him. Colonel North, to see him together, I think, I am 

8 not positive of this. In any case, there was an occasion 

9 that the name Felix Rodriguez/Max Gomez was raised in that 

10 I think I knew I was going to have to sit in for Ollie at 

11 that meeting. 

12 So I asked who the hell is Felix Rodriguez? And he 

13 gave me a little bit of background. 
■J4 Q This is Ollie? 

15 A Colonel North, yes. About his Vietnam background 
15 and that. I think something about having insinuated himself 
17 into this support mechanism between the support mechanism to 
the contras and^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J but 

19 officially in there, and he was causing problems, something 

20 like that. 

21 Q Did you understand the support mechanism to be 

22 part of Democracy, Inc.? 
A Yes. 
Q And did Ollie tell you that he had worked to some 

extent with Max Gomez/Felix on this support operation? You 

iiM:i:\siMhi 



662 



f (ih l fe i itjtfr 



102 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



knew Ollie was working with Democracy, Inc. on the operation? 

A- Yes. 

Q Did Ollie tell you thathe had been giving instruc- 
tions to Rodriguez? 

A I don't think so. I think it was merely this 
reference that Rodriguez had insinuated himself into the 
organization and was giving rudder orders, and it was not his 
place to do so. 

Q But Gregg had wanted North to be in on the meeting 
with him and Rodriguez, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q North couldn't be there, so he sent you? 

A Yes. 

Q You went? 

A Yes. 

Q There were the three of you there, Gregg, Rodriguez 
and you? 

A I am not sure if Sam Watson sat in on that or not. 

Q Sam Watson was the Vice President's aid also? 

A He worked for Don Gregg. 

Q He may have been there, you don't recall? 

A He may have been there, or he may have been at the 
other one. 

Q August 12? 

A Yes. 



llNl;usSlf!^l] 



663 



103 

Q First of all, what did Rodriguez say to Don Gregg, 
or Watson, if he was there, or you about his relations with 
North on contra support? 

A I am not recalling anything specific. 

Q Tell me what you recall about the conversation 
generally. 

A When we have my notes, it will be better. 
MR. KIRK: Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q We don't have the notes of their part of the group 
at the White House, and, Dennis, I don't know if what you 
said was on the record, but it is certainly correct, and 
I will put it on the record, that Colonel Earl does have 
detailed notes. We don't have the notes here to benefit us 
or him, and that you have told me that those notes are 
detailed, and they may very well be detailed on these meetings 
in August. 

So what he is giving us today is subject to correc- 
tion with those notes. The most you can do is tell us what 
you recall. If anything changes when you see the notes, that 
is fine, and it will be perfectly understandable. So with 
that preface, if that is acceptable to you, Dennis, just tell 
us, and then we will get you out of this hot room, what you 
recall about the meeting with Gregg and Rodriguez and perhaps 



664 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




104 

Watson on August 8, 1986. 

A. Rodriguez was relaying his version of the problem 
that had arisen, there was some problem between] 

land Democracy, Inc., the people providing the 
air support to the contras. Rodriguez released it was 

Kunderstanding the aircraft belonged to the 
contras, whereas they ,^^^^^^^^^^^H and X think the 
contras were being told by the Democracy, Inc. people when 
their operation terminated, they would be taking the air- 
craft. 

So there was mutual escalation of threats and 
counter-threats between these two parties, and Felix was 
asserting that one of his, one of 
would have to accompany every flight to make sure they came 
back ^^^^^^^^^1 so they didn't fly off and never return or 
that fees would be charged landing rights for every takeoff 
and landing. There was a mess. 

There was a charge of air piracy being pursued by 
Democracy, Inc. because Felix Rodriguez had appropriated a 
Democracy aircraft, unauthorized through the mayor of Miami, 
to a in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I 

hope my notes can sort it out a little better. That is what 
I recall. 

Q When Felix was saying the Democracy, Inc. was 
asserting the plane, belonged to them, who was making the 



665 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

2'* 



■ 105 

assertion, Secord, Dutton, both? 

A . I don't know. We'll have to look at my notes. 
There may be a point where there's reference to Rafael 
somebody who I didn't know, I wasn't sure. 

Q It IS late. We don't have your notes. 

one other question: When North told you about 
Rodr.guez, before he left, did he tell you that he had a 
confrontation with Rodriguez two months earlier with Dutton 
present about problems with the supply operation? 

A Not. that I recall. He may have . I don't recairit 
The recollection that I have is that Colonel North didn't 
think very highly of — 

Q Gomez /Rodriguez? 

A Yes. 

MR. BELNICK: Before you think the same of me, 
thank you for your cooperation. We appreciate it. 

= *- c^n n m the deposition in the 
(Whereupon, at b:JU p.m., t-i"= t- 

above-entitled matter was concluded.) 



(iOL.i^\o'^^i^ 



BNCUSSIFIED 



666 



667 



stenographic Transcript of m^'. ^^^^rjfTn 
HEARINGS 



Ci^^NQ^V^KV- 



Before the 



SELECT COM-HITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSIST.VICE 
TO IRAN AND THE .IICAR-XGU.VN OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 



CDIITIHUED TEoTUlOirf OF ROBERT LAWSON EARL 
Friday, !lay 15, 1937 






(( 



i^"^ 



Washington. D.C. 

TOP SECRET -eoBEwoft^ 



ALDEBSOM ?EPOfiT!(vX3 

(202) C28-9300 
20 F STREET, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C 200 01 



on 






668 



y 






- TOP CBGRCT/ ea DEWORO 106 

CONTINUED TESTIMONY OF ROBERT LAWSON EARL 
Friday, May 15, 1987 

United States Senate 
Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nlcaraguan 
Opposition 
Washington, 0. C. 
Continued deposition of ROBERT LAWSON EARL, called 
as a witness by counsel for the Senate Select Committee, at 
the offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate 
Office Building, Washington, D. C, commencing at 9:46 a.m., 
the witness having been previously duly sworn, and the 
testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER 
and transcribed under her direction. 



TOP JEcnnT/rnnrwopp 



669 



ONOLJiSilFIED 

APPEARANCES : 

on behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition: 
MARK BELNICK, ESQ. 
VICTORIA NOURSE, ESQ. 
TERRY SMILTAKICH, ESQ. 
RICHARD A. ARENBERG, Administrative 
Assistant to Senator Mitchell 

on behalf of the House Select Committee on Covert Arms 
Sales to Iran: 

RICHARD J. LEON, ESQ. 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 
On behalf of the Witness: 

DENNIS DEAN KIRK, ESQ. 






670 



,i^(^^!rj 



T O P OECRCT/CODin^ORD 



108 



WITNESS 

Robert Lawson Earl 

By Mr. Belnick 



CONTENTS 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE 






671 



y 






TOP CEOHCT/OODCWORP - 109 

PROCEEDINGS 



Whereupon , 



ROBERT LAWSON EARL, 
called as a witness by counsel for the Senate Select 
Committee, having been previously duly sworn, was further 
examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Good morning. Colonel Earl. This is a 
continuation of your deposition pursuant to the orders that 
were marked at the last session, and you recognize that you 
are still under oath. 
A Yes, I do. 

Q Bob, I have before me copies of notebooks which we 
have received from the White House and I eui told that these 
are the notebooks that you produced, copies of notebooks that 
you produced in response to our subpoena and the House's 
subpoena, and they went to the Independent Counsel and then, 
as we discussed the last time, to the White House for review 
to delete certain material that the White House considered 
irrelevant . 

I have copies here . We have entered into an 
understanding with White House Counsel as to the terms and 
conditions on which we can use these notebooks at the 
deposition with you, and I have discussed it with you off the 
TOr g ge itli'Il/CODBWOBP 



672 






TOP SBORBT/GODDWOnD hq 

racord. But let me just put on the record the relevant 
portion of that understanding. 

Specifically, you are not to discuss on the record 
any extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods. If 
any of my questions, in your judgment, call for the 
disclosure of extremely sensitive intelligence sources and 
methods or if there is anything in the notes of yours that I 
show you that reflects same, please ask to go off the record. 
I'll as)c the court reporter to leave, and then we can discuss 
what the problem is and make sure that you don't name or cite 
any of those extremely sensitive intelligence sources and 
methods . 

Also, Bob, please avoid disclosing the names of 
any foreign countries where the disclosure might so embarrass 
the foreign country involved that it could have an adverse 
impact on the foreign relations of the United States. If any 
such matter, in your judgment, arises during the course of 
this deposition, please ask me to go off the record and again 
the court reporter will be asked to leave and you can explain 
your concerns to me and we will work something out 
appropriately to avoid any such disclosure. 

Is that clear? 
A Understood. 

Q Okay. Let's go right to the notebooks or the 
copies of them, and let me ask you first was it your practice 
- TOP ODGRCT/GODDWOnD 



Ul 



673 



u 



a.e. 



- TOP 3EGRI3T/CODCWORD m 

while you were employed on the NSC staff to keep notes on a 
regular basis of your activities, conversations, meetings and 
so forth? 

A Ves. 

Q Would you describe to us for the record how you 
kept the notes when you made the notes, as a general matter? 
You kept them in steno notebooks? 

A I kept theo^in some small notebook, wound up with 
stenographic notebooks that fit conveniently in the pocket so 
I could have it conveniently with me in the office, out of 
the office, wherever I was, in order to take notes from a 
phone call or a conversation or meeting, because I do not 
have a great memory and I need to make notes to myself. 

Q Fine. So these notes were contemporaneous with 
the events that they recorded? 

A Yes. 

Q What I'd like to do now is start going through the 
notes and asking you in most cases to tell me what they mean 
and see what recollection they trigger. You'll notice that 
at the bottom of the pages there are handwritten numbers. 
I'm pointing to one that's numbered 150. I imagine those are 
nuabers which the White House put in, and since we have an 
agreement right now, the White House or Independent Counsel, 
I don't know who — I take it you didn't put those numbers 
on, right? 

-. Ig o r ■B e niiTj'OfflBBuawp 






674 



TOP S BCnET/eODDWOnP 112 

A No. 

Q Since part of our agreement that the White House 
has asked for is that we will not at this point make copies 
of these notes, we'll use the numbers to refer to those pages 
and then work out with the White House getting any necessary 
copies so that the deposition is understandable. 

I'm pointing now to an entry from your notebook 
that I believe is the notebook which covers from the 
beginning of your work at the NSC Staff in February 1986 into 
mid-June, and I'm holding the page numbered 150. 

I can't tell what date this was written on. It 
seems to be sometime in March, when I look back at page 153. 
But the entry says "328-1125 — Rich Miller", then "Room 170? 
— Adolfo Calero." Have I read that correctly? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall what that note refers to? 

A Ko. It doesn't trigger a specific recollection. 

Q Who Is Rich Miller? 

A Rich Miller is an individual who would call for 
Colonel North or stop by the office to meet with Colonel 
North on occasion. 

Q Do you know what his role was? 

A No. At the time — I have learned a lot since 
then, so I have to try and differentiate what I know now as 
opposed to what I knew then. I knew that he would consult 
. T O P anoncT/GODCwonp - 






675 



Ui^^^-.^^^-j'il^lJ 



TOP CEGRBT/CODEWORD - 113 

with Colonel North and that — 

Q L«t na ask this. Did you know that he was 
connected with fundraising on behalf of the contras? 

A No, I don't think froB the bits and pieces that I 
was able to observe, I don't think that I concluded that at 
the time. I knew that he was somehow associated with that 
area of responsibility of Colonel North, meaning keeping 
abreast of contra activities. But I had no specific 
knowledge of how he fit into that. * -,**i 

Q Did you learn more about his role prior to the 
time or by the time that you left the NSC staff, or is it all 
subsec[uent to the disclosures in November 1986? 

A Well, most of it is subsequent to November. There 
are some things that just by proximity and being there for 
nine months that I acquired before that time. 

Q Can you give us just a general stei:tement of what 
you learned before November of '86 about Miller's role. Rich 
Miller's role, that is? 

A Well, one specific recollection is of a piece of 
paper or a memo that I saw at one point on Colonel North's 
desk that dealt with a supposed Saudi businessman who was 
offering money for the contras, and it was some sort of a 
scam essentially, and Rich Miller and Colonel North had been 
fooled, I guess, by this particular individual who was posing 
as a wealthy Saudi. 

jao> iKeiuiT/copciiTor.D - 



UiiSSsFlEO 



676 






TOP SB CIU2T/00DDW0nD — 114 

So that's one recollection. There's another one 
later that Z think we'll cone to, unless It's redacted, and 
aaybe I ought not to mention it to see whether it's redacted 
or not. 

Q Let's see if we come to it. Is the other 
recollection that you have, though, relating to Rich Miller 
connected to contras or Iran? 

A Yes. 

Q Let's go off the record. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 

Q Back on the record. The court reporter has 
returned. Bob. Would you please now tell us what your other 
recollection relating to Rich Miller is as of this moment? 

A Well, I have a recollection that somewhere in my 
notes, and when we come to it probably more will recur, but 
there is a reference to, I think, what is a Swiss bank 
account number for Lake Resources that apparently I was asked 
to pass to Rich Miller. 

Q While we've hit that subject, let me ask you a few 
questions about it. 

A Wait a minute. I'm not sure if that's right. It 
■ay have been the other way. It may have been Rich Miller 
calling me giving me that data, but there's a reference in 
there that has Rich Miller's name and this account number and 
stuff. I'm not sure right now which way the information was 
TOP gSCMT/C OP SW O RP ' 






677 



u 



'iULH;^U:l itO 



passed . 

Q When we get to it, independent of whatever 's in 
your notes, however, when did you first hear about the Lake 
Resources account; do you remember? Was it around the time 
of May? 

A Well, I would have guessed after May because there 
is that reference in the notes. It clearly was at least in 
the May time frame, but I can't recall anything before May. 

Q How did you become aware of it? 

A It may be this event that is in the notes of 
someone, and I'm not sure whether it's Rich Miller giving me 
the number or Colonel North giving me the number for him, but 
there was a reference to Lake Resources as being an account 
that was used for certain purposes. This is a hostage- 
related event that I am recalling. 

Q Prior to the disclosures in November of 1986, did 
you learn who controlled the Lake Resources account? 

A I don't think I ever knew for sure, but from 
references and bits and pieces my judgment would have been 
that it was an account that I would associate with what I 
called Democracy, Incorporated. It was in some way an 
account that was useful to the private sector people who were 
supporting the contras. 

Q Did you have an understanding before November 1986 
of who had authority over that account — to sign, withdraw, 
- TOP S g C nET/GODDHORP ' 






678 



iJlii^Lh^3:jh ILU 



TOP SBenaT/COPE We RD 116 

gat racords? 

A No, that was never clear to ne. 

Q Did you have any authority with respect to that 
account? 

A No. 

Q Oo you know if Colonel North had signature 
authority? 

A No, I do not know. 

Q Oo you know if Mr. Secord had such authority? 

A I don't think I knew that either. 
(Witness conferring with counsel.) 
THE WITNESS: That's what I was about to say. I 
don't think I knew that, but in the context of the arms 
transactions on the Iran operation, CIA would call me to say 
that the money had not arrived in their Swiss bank account 
and would give me their number to make sure that the number 
had been passed directly, and to inquire why the monies had 
not shown up. And I would be asked by CIA to confirm that 
number with either Secord or North so that it would be passed 
on to whomever. 

So that I knew General Secord was involved in that 
in some way, but it wasn't clear to me that he had signature 
authority, but that he was in some way involved. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q What about Mr. Hakim? Did you know whether he was 
TOP OB e HB T / e ODDWORD 



Of. 






A 



U' 



679 



,i pop cEciuiT/' ee pci>onD H7 



involved with the account and, if so, to what extent or in 
what capacity? 

A I think I knew even less of that. I think I knew 
that Hakim was a business partner of Secord and that he would 
sometimes be on the other end of the line in the CP that 
would be established in whatever capital in Europe that the 
negotiations happened to be taking place in. And so that I 
knew from those events that h« was part of the party that was 
involved in negotiations with the Iranian government 
representatives. But right now those are the only two 
associations with Hakim that I can recall. 

Q Okay, fair enough. Let me take you to another 
page in the notes. This one is number 148 in the lower 
righthand corner. It seems to be an entry or series of 
entries for 22 March 1986. And I'd like you to go down that 
and let's take it reference by reference so that everyone can 
follow. 

It starts at the top. It says "contra 
contributions". Does this say "call" or "car"? 

A Car. 

Q "Car. Rich Miller", and there's a telephone 
number, ^^BM^. Then over on the right it says "Kate". I 
don't know if it will be easier for you just to look at the 
whole thing and just go down. 

A I think it's better if I put the page in context 
"TOP OECRET/COODWOnD 



! 






680 



it • ■; 






TOP S8 C I «T/C0DliW0IU> - ng 

and th*n v« can go In detail as you need to. 

Q Fine. Why don't you take a look at the whole page 
and put it in context? 

A The event that this calls to aind, that Z think 
this refers to — 

Q Meaning the whole page? 

A The whole page. Let me say no, I think up to this 
line. 

Q Right up to the double line above C.A.T.f! 

A Well, no, this one does, too. 

Q So the whole page generally? 

A This one may not. I'm not sure what that one is. 
Anyway, most of the page certainly, if not all, refers to, I 
think, if I'm placing this to the event that I eun recalling, 
and on at least one occasion, but Z think twice, in my tenure 
on the NSC staff we would get as a matter of routine from 
White House correspondence a form letter that the white House 
had to respond to certain inquiries that would be received in 
the White House. 

This was a form letter that was intended to 
respond to someone who wrote to the white House and conveyed 
a desire to contribute to the contra cause for humanitarian 
purposes and help them. And the form letter had on it at the 
bottom, after thanking them for the correspondence and 
applauding the sentiments, made reference to at least, I 
■ TOP CE C nET/CODEWOnD 



III 



M-' " 






681 



Hi 



TOP CDORDT/OODrnwnP - 119 



think there were, two agencies that would qualify as 
potential sources that the person, if he so chose, could 
contribute to. 

And it seemed to me from the context in which we 
got this, a routine piece of paper with a buck slip on it, 
that it was a matter of routine within White House 
correspondence to periodically review such form letters, that 
they had to make sure that they were up to date. And so 
Colonel North was being asked to ensure that the letter was 
updated and all the information was correct. 

It came to me. I don't know whether Fawn sent it 
to me or Colonel North sent it to me. But I was asked to do 
the leg work on checking the letter out and I think I asked 
Colonel North who would be a good person to check with. I 
think I checked with several people — one, the State 
Department; two, the CIA; and, three, Richard Miller — to 
give them the names of the two organizations that were on the 
list to see if they were still in existence and still valid, 
whether this was an appropriate thing for White House 
correspondence . 

And so this page is listing organizations that 
from those various sources were coming in as potential 
nominations to be vetted and ensure that there was no problem 
with them. And I think by the double circling that I wound 
up picking that one, the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Foundation, 
TOP OCenCT/eODEWORD 






682 



and Friends of the Americas - yes, that's a one there - as 
th« two that went into that version of the letter, that the 
others fell out for whatever reasons, or these were the best 
candidates to qualify for what that letter was attempting to 
respond to. 

Q Let me ask you a few specific questions, now that 
you see Rich Miller's name on this entry in the context that 
you have just described. Do you recall, does that refresh 
your recollection as to what you may have known about his 
role in respect of contra fundraising at that time in 1986? 

A It suggests ~ and I recall — that he was 'in some 
way knowledgeable about all these organizations and that he 
had some degree of knowledge about this subject. 

Q The National Endowment for tihe rrr-amtfltuit uf 
Lib«ty is listed in your notes, it says "Spitz Channell 
PR." Why did that organization fall out at that time, to use 
your expression? H 

A I can't recall whether there were specific factors 
that were addresssed in conversations with either Rich Miller 
or State or CIA people that excluded ones, or the other way 
of the two leading candidates coming to the fore. 

Q Do you recall to whom you spoke at the State 
Department for information about these organizations? 

A No, not specifically, but it's likely that I would 
have called the Office of Public Diplomacy that was oriented 
TOr OC e RBT/OODCWOnD 



I 









y 



683 

TOP ODGRIlT/CODinfORB ' 12I 



toward the Latin American affairs. 

Q The notes on page 148 mention also Rob Owen with a 
telephone number. Did you know Rob Owen at this time, March 
1986? 

A I think I did, yes. Yes. 

Q And who did you know hin to be in respect of these 
natters? 

A I knew that ha was a friend of Colonel North and 
that he, as with Rich Miller, would call or come in to see 
him on occasion. . 

Q Did Spitz Channell con* into the (EEfAk* on 
occasion at that time? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you know what his relationship was with Colonel 
North? 

A No. Again, another person who would call or stop 
in for a meeting with Colonel North on occasion. 

Q Now I want to span not only March but the period 
through the November '86 disclosures. What was your 
understanding by November of Rob Owen's role — anything 
different than what you just told me? 

A Hell, from the context of his coming and going and 
phone calls it seemed to me that Rob Owen was frequently in 
the region. 

Q Central America? 






684 






* TOP CDOm j'f / i O O DPWORO - 122 

A Yes. And that he would either have just come from 
there or be about to go In relation to his either phone calls 
or visits. 

Q Were you aware of any of his check cashing 
activities on behalf of Colonel North? 

A Ko. 

Q Did you know that Colonel North had traveler's 
checks in the office? 

A No. 

Q The first you heard zibout it was watching TV 
yesterday? 

A Yesterday. 

Q What about this name — excuse me. Am I correct 
that Rob Owen's name is on here because he was also suggested 
to you as someone to call to check these organizations or one 
or more of the organizations? 

A No. The name would be associated with the 
director or the leader or the person, the president, the 
figurehead, someone to have a name associated with the group 
•c that if it did need to be looked into further that you had 
a point of contact. For example, Friends of the Americas is 
run by a gentleman by the name of Woody Jenkins, and I guess 
this group here, the Nicaraguan Development Council — 

Q Bosco Madamores and Rob Owen. 

A Right, that those were two points of contact. It 
TOP 0ECnST/C O0B W O ni> - 



685 



y 



-TOf J B enirr/M B wreini 123 



•••a* — you know, that's a lata antry, but It's twica. In 

soaa way that's assoclatad with tha FDN. 

Q Okay. Lat's nova down tha paga. "C.A.T.fJ 

DEA." What's this naxt word? 

I 
A Nags, I think; 

Q And then it says^^^^^H Is C.A.T.F. a reference 
to tha Central American Task Force of tha CIA? 

A I believe so. 

Q And then DEA. 

A Drug Enforcement Administration, I would assvme. 
I'm getting no specific recollection off that, but that's ho« 
I would interpret that. 

Q So you dqn't recall what thaff anitx^refers to? 

A Mo. >-* 

Q Were you familiar with tha DEA operation relating 
to tha Iran hostages? 

A I was aware of one of them. You mayCS^nferring 
to tha on* that's been so far in tha Committee, which was in 
'85r vtfclb was before my time. But there was one in May when 
Z was there that I was involved with, yes. 

Q Which we understand to be either a continuation or 
augmentation of what began in 1985. 

A I assume so, too. I didn'^Nmow of the '85 
iteration of it before. 

g Why ^n 'It yott tell us — or perhaps we should wait 






686 



{ii'iifLti'y^ii iLii 

' g a p flDORC T > 'eoP Di>onp 124 

till w« get to notes about that, and we can take it up then. 

A Either way. 

Q Okay. Let me move to the next page of the notes 
of yours that I marked, and that's page 14 0. Why don't you 
take a look at that page? It seems again to be relating to 
March 1986. 

(Pause. ) 

You've had a chance to look at page 140, Bob? 

A Um-hun. 

Q And I'm Interested in the information throughout 
that seems to pertain to Mario Calero and Adolfo Calero. 
What recollection do these notes trigger in you? 

A Not much. Let me just make a general comment that 
most of these are somebody calling up for North and North, 
because he was in meetings or out of the country or wherever, 
that I would be taking a message for someone. So I^^^dn't 
necessarily have to understand it in order to copy it down in 
my notebook, that I would at some point get it to Colonel 
North and it would make sense to him. 

Q Do you know who was asking whether the U.S. 
Government had any evidence of Calero misappropriations? 

A No, although it's within the brackets on this one, 
and this seems to me — 

Q You have to read it in because the record won't 
show it. 

TOP CE C nET/OODEWOnD 



Hi 






687 



mmsm 



TOP CDCRB T / COP EWORD 125 

A Th« reference to Space A and some dates triggers a 
aeaory, and asking the Pentagon triggers a meoory of some 
groups that had humanitarian aid that they wanted to get Into 
the region, and there was a program — and I forget the name 
of the amendment — but there's a program where military 
aircraft can be used on a certain basis to fly this material 
from the United States to Central America. 

And I think this gentlemen, Bennett, either had 
done some flights like that or was asking In this case, so 
I'm not sure If It's related to that or not. 

Q All right. At the bottom of the page you have. It 
looks like, $700,000. 

A $700,000. 

Q "Adolfo also uses this account '°^/^^^^|^^H 
^^^^^Vvihat did that reference mean or who gave you that 
Information? I'll ask both questions. What did It mean and 
who gave it to you? 

A I don't know who gave It to me. 

Q And you don't Icnow what It means? 

A No. This one's triggering a little bit of a 
■•aory. 

Q "Conversion 35 percent on black market"? 

A That somebody — that there was some discussion of 
this as the way that additional monies had been gotten by 
somebody, because of the black market, that It would go Into 
- TOP ODCRDT>' eODg 1>OnD 






688 



DP ■' mm 



TOP 0DCRlCT/CODEW e RP ~ 126 

an account and than ba convertad at a different rata. And I 
think aithar hara or later there waa aoma discussion that 
that waa one of the problama asaoclated with HHAO, the 
Nlcaraguan Humanitarian Aaalatanca Office, and that that was 
one of the cloalng, tightening of the procedures. That was a 
lesson learned from this Iteration with $27 million that was 
to be applied In the future to tighten things up. 

Q Okay. Fair enough. We'll move to the next page 
that I have marked, 139. Take a look at the notes there, 
which also appear to be In the March 1986 time period. It 
says "Slnglaub to — Steele, ^^m^^^^^HHat 
Eastern Standard Time, guidance ? Mlka Glmpany runs a 
company in Arizona that obtains aircraft. To call Ami." Is 
that Mir? 

A That's Nlr. 

Q "Friction with" — 

A "Fixation" . 

Q "Fixation with proportional response." 

A Vice something decisive. 

Q Instead of something decisive. I take it those 
two notes are referring to different things — the Slnglaub 
note and the Ami note. Let 'a take the slnglaub note first 
which also refers to Steele, and I take that to be a 
reference to Colonel Steele. 

A Correct . 



TOP CSCRCT/e eD EWOR P- 



i 



689 






TOP ODonii i r/ uu uc i fOR P"' 127 

Q Do you recall what that note was about? 

A No, not specifically, although in general it 
seemed to me that General Singlaub was calling up on occasion 
to try and help, that he was wanting to help the contras in 
some way and would frequently call to just let Colonel North 
know what he was doing or intending to do, or this seems to 
me to fit that in some way. I'm not sure whether it's coming 
from General Singlaub or who it's coming from. 

It's possible that this was a note that I took 
from General Singlaub. Let me read it and see. It doesn't 
trigger the specific recollection, but that would be my best 
guess — that this was a telephone message that I was to pass 
on to Colonel North from General Singlaub. But I'm not 
positive. 

Q Let's take note two: Call Ami, et cetera — 
referring to Nir. Now what's that about? 

A Well, that's a note from me to pass to Colonel 
North to tell him to call Nir. 

Q What does the rest of it mean — "fixation with 
proportional response instead of something decisive"? 

A What time frame was this? 

Q March 1986. 

A Again I'm not getting a specific recollection, but 
I'm kind of guessing that it pertains to ongoing discussions 
of terrorism and responses to terrorism, and that this is a 
ijiuii umilUX,i'Ll.HJEIIi.ll>U 



690 



UNCLAjafitfl 

- TOP CCCnCT/OODCW O RP - 



128 



r«f«renc« to different philosophies on response to terrorist 
incidents — the Israeli decisive response as opposed to the 
U.S. proportional response. 

Q This was before you had been briefed into the Iran 
comparment? 

A This is March? That's correct. 

Q Page 138 of your notes, I want to refer to a 
couple of things in there — not everything. In about the 
middle of the page, underneath Kopp — which I take it is a 
reference to Secord — 

A Correct. 

Underneath Kopp, it says "one month's supply of 
codes — ^^^^^^^■43." Kow is the^^^^^^^Href erred to 
Jim 

A 

it's Jim 
Q 
A 




I can't remember his first name. If it's Jim, 




Let's strike the first name. 

It wasn't clear to me whether he was 
but one of the two. 
Forty-three refers to the KL-43 machine? 
Right. 

And what does "one month's supply of codes" mean? 
On a monthly basis^^^^^^^H office 
provide our o ffice with cod es for the KL-43. 

Q was^^^^^^^|the source of the KL-4 3 machines 



\\m hmmn 



691 






- T OP a e eRS T / eo pewoRO - 129 

originally? 

A Yes. 

Q How do you know that? 

A Originally. I don't know about originally. I 
know he was the source of the codes. I know also that if we 
had a problem with a machine, that it would break, that we 
would call his office and he would replace it. ', 

Q And who had told you to deal with him — Colonel 
North or somebody else? 

A It's not exactly that clear. There are certain 
things you acquire Jcnowledge — you acquire by osmosis being 
in an office. You walk into the office and there's 

[dealing with Fawn and they are doing codes. So no 
one told you that. But you can gather what the relationship, 
or part of what the relationship is. 

Q Did ha come to the office frequently ,f 

A No, I wouldn't say frequently. 

Q From time to time? 1^ 

A From time to time. 

Q And you as«ociated him with the BL-43 machine? 

A Y«». ^ 

Q Anything else? 

A No, I don't think s<^ *; " ~'^" 

Q^j^On the same page, 1*8, "fron. Rob Owen, Slnglaub.. 
met with CMoaandMJfcs'*., et cetera. Does that trigger any 
■ ifOr CCGRCT/OODEWonD 
7'f 






^\ 



692 



lip- ... . nK, '. 

TOP ODORCT/OODmronD 130 

racollactlon? ^ * 

A Not specifically, but it seems to me it's a phone 
call from Rob Oven that I'm to pass to Colonel North, thaM 
ha, Rob Oven, had met vith Singlaub or that Singlaub had met 
vith the Commandants, these tvo Commandants. 

Q Of the contras? 

A Of the contras. 

Q Okay. By the vay, are you familiar vith either or 
both of Elizabeth Povell and Elizabeth Thomas? Have you ever 
heard those names before? 

A No, I don't thinlc so. 

Q Let me move on to another pages of your notes, 
136, and I'm interested solely in the note at the bottom of 
the page, vhich says: "Cliff Smith vith Spitz' office, 
extention 4709." Spitz is a reference to Spitz Channell? 

A Correct. J 

Q Vlho vas Cliff smith? ' 

A He seems to be someone in Spitz' office, from that 
message. I don't knov. 

Q Is this a note that indicates Cliff Smith vants to 
apeak to North? Is that how you vould read it or remember 
it? 

A It doesn't trigger the specific recollection. But 
if I vere trying to back-brief Colonel North on vhat had 
transpired that day I vould say that Cliff Smith from Spitz' 



T O P f B CnaT/' eO DDWORD 



T ' , ^- ■'^ - T* 



693 



■ TO r ODOIUCTyOODDWOnD 131 

offlc* called and he's on extension 4709. 

Q Page 135 of your notes there's a reference to 
Austin with a telephone number, ^^^HJI^^Hb Then it says 
Ellen Garwood, then Hood Jenkins, Friends of Americas, with a 
telephone number. Did you know who Ellen Garwood was at^this 
time? It appears to tMkiApril 1986. 

A It's unclear to me whether I knew then or whether 
it was later that I know. Sometime in the course of my nine 
months there. 

Q What did you learn about Ellen Garwood? 

A I believe that Ellen Garwood was a contributor to 
the contra cause, that she had contributed money. 

Q Did you learn how much? 

A No. 

Q Did you learn for what purpose she was 
contributing the funds — that is, what her money was buying? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever hear what the funds that were raised 
from private parties was being used for? Did you know they 
ware being used for weapons to some extent? 

A That wasn't clear to me. 

(Counsel conferring with the witness.) 
MR. KIRK: Off the record a second. 
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
THE WITNESS: I would say it's possible. 
C O P CEOIUjT/OODCVWnD — 



5 5';^-'^!^ ? .-^--^s^nr 



[D 



694 






-g or oBonBT/ooDcwonD 



132 



Q 
A 

Q 
A 

Q 
office? 
A 
Q 
A 



BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

What's possible? 

It was for that purpose. 

For weapons? 

I wouldn't exclude It. 

Did you hear any discussion to that effect in the 



No. 



You just had a view that probably weapons? 
I don ' t even toow whether I ' d go that far — 
probably as opposed to possible. 

Q All right. Let's go to another page in your -^ * 
notes,T^b23, which again is in April 1986, apparently, and I'm 
interested in the notes that are bracketed at the top that 
begin "Rich, Sparkplug". Is that a reference to Calero? 

A I've learned that yesterday. 

Q You didn't know at the time? 

A No. 

Q You keep watching the hearings — 

A I think I ought to stop because it's confusing my 
testiacny. 

Q That's right. I think you ought to stop, too. 
"Lives in Miami." Then it says: "Cruz?" 

A I think that's my own guess, and so I guessed 
wrong . 

■9 0P B B CMT/OODCWOnD 






695 



TOP CnGRBT/OODCWORD 



133 



Q You guessed that Sparkplug was Cruz? 

A or maybe that's Rich guessing, but that doesn't 
Bake sense, i don't know. 

Q Leaving that aside ~ 

A It wasn't clear to me who Sparkplug was. 

Q Let me read this entry into the record. "Rich". 
Does that mean it's coming to you from Rich Miller? 

A I think so, yes. 

Q By then did you know who Rich was and what he was 
doing. Where he was coming up with information all the time 
about contras? 

A Let's go off the record for a minute and then we 
can put in what is appropriate. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Bob, why don't you put on the record what you just 
told me off the record concerning the lack of a formal 
briefing of you into the contra comparment? 

A I was never formally briefed into the contra 
ccpartment, and at this time l an relaying messages. 
Q This is April 1986? 

A Correct, for Colonel North that don't necessarily 
make sense to me. My own categorization of callers would be 
that from having seen the way Colonel North would respond to 
a message from that person or seeing that he met with him and 
r"i^ irrnFT •nnnrirn in 1 1 



01 



696 



■ TOP OE e ilB T >'OO P BWOnD 



134 



daalt with hla In a cooperative fashion that I would know by 
those Indicators that this was a person that Colonel North 
trusted or was in the compartment or in some way more 
instrumental as opposed to someone that I didn't think was in 
that category. 

Q Rich Miller was in the former category as someone 
who was either in the compartment or at least Colonel North 
viewed as helpful or instrumental; correct? 

A Yes. 

Q So going back to the note on page 123, it says 
"Rich", so this is information that apparently is coming from 
Rich Miller and that you're going to pass on to Colonel 
North, right — as best you can make it out? 

A I think so, yes. 

Q And it starts off: "Spar]q)lug — lives in Miami. 
Cruz?" So that, as we have discussed, is either you or Rich 
guessing that Sparkplug is the name for Cruz. 

Then it says: "Clear statement that^^^^^^^His 
undercutting him." 

A That's! 

Q 

A I think it is. 

Q UnderctfRing who? | 





ion in the camps 



TOP oceniiT/c op pj o n p 






:d 



697 



T O P ODGRJT/C e PCWOnB 



m 



135 



wh«n th«y visited. 

Now let's stop right there for a moment. What do 
those notes mean? Do you know what th« reference te 
^^^Hundercutting him" — I guess meaning Sparkplug? 

A I believe so, but I'm not positive of that. It 
seems to me that the message coning from Rich Miller is that 
— I'm drawing a blank as to this quote — who would have 
been saying that, whether that's supposed to be a quote of 
Sparkplug oi^^^^^^H Again, I may have this backwards. 

But in general the recollection that it's 
recalling is that there was some difference in the public 
diplomacy line between what the State Department was saying 
from a public diplomacy posture as opposed to what the FDN 
was saying — that this was in some way some feedback of a 
nuance or a difference or a problem in the two philosophies 
or public diplomacy approaches. 

Q Let's go down the same page, 123: "Crile h*fe 
tomorrov^*o ISmatone" , and the word "alone" is underscored, 
"with Elliott." Is that a reference to Elliott Abrams, as 
you recall? 

A Yes, I believe i t is. 

^^^^^^^I^^^^^Hwhat does 
(Counsel conferring with the witness.) 
A I'm not sure who it's coming from. It may also 
still be from Rich, although with the line across I'm not 
TOP S ECRET/ COOE WOR P • 



IKlaSSIFIED 



698 



UNCLASSIFIED 



TOP OB«U)T/OODDWOni> - 135 

positlv* that whoever is passing along this nessaga — and I 
think It's Rich Miller — is alerting Colonel North that Cruz 
intended to be in Washington the next day, whatever, the day 
after to meet alone with Elliott Abriuns, and I thlnJc whoever 
the caller is is speculating that ^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 there is a 

Q On the part of who? 

A I don't know. 

Q Abrans? 

A I don't know. There was a problem within UNO 
about this time, I believe, between the leadership and Cruz 
versus Calero versus others, and this may be a reference to 
that. 

Q That's as best you can recall now, anyway, yes? 

A Yes. 

Q All right. Let's move on to your notes at page 
100, which appears to be notes for the 24th of April 1986, 
and here I believe we're looking at notes that to me refer to 
the Iran compartment, why don't you take a look at the page 
~ thi« is page 100, 24 April 1986 — and once you review the 
notes see what you can tell us about what they mean. 
(A brief recess was taken.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Colonel Earl, you've had a chance to look at page 
100. Can you tell us what the entry for 24 April 1986 is all 
TOP CECriBiT/OODBW O nD 



irlSLiiiiiflED 



€99 



TOP ODCnCT/CODEW O nD 137 

about? 

A Yes. This Is about the tine that I was brought 
into the compartaent for the Iran operation, because Colonel 
North was going to be going to Tehran and needed bac)cup back 
in Washington. So this, I think this is the notes of a 
meeting that 1 believe was held out at CIA headquarters with 
George Cave, Bert Dunn. 

Q Who was Bert Dunn? 

A Actually I may have already goofed, but anyway — 
Q No, the name is on this record. 

A Both of those are DDO people, although George was 
contract, retired, in fact, all three of them are.B^^^^ 
Ls also DDO, so they are all potentially under cover. 
Covers are blown in these things, I guess, routinely. 
Q Well, their names are known, but we'll be 
sensitive with them in any event at the public hearings. 
Certainly we can take appropriate precautions because we are 
sensitive to that whole matter. 

What's the substance of the meeting, discussed as 
beat you can understand. 

A That should have been redacted. 
Q The reference to something that should have been 
redacted, if that was on the record, is to the name of an 
Iranian, which is here and I will take a pencil and put a 
circle around it, and certainly if we ask for this page, that 
Tor GComj i r/GODEwonD 



%^iV~' 






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TOP C Dcmff/ e oDDwonp 133 

naa* could certainly b« reacted froa it, although I can tell 
you It does appear on other dociiaents, although I'm not aware 
that the name Is public. 

In any event, froa looking at the note on 100, 
what's the substance of the discussion? 

A It's a discussion of the logistics of the HAWK 
spare parts that have been requested by the Iranians and the 
CIA, working with their counterparts in the Defense 
Department, are attempting to fill this order by referring to 
part numbers, and the fact that some of the parts that have 
been requested by the Iranians there are probleas associated 
with it. 

For exeunple, they may no longer be made and that 
they have to go to a higher level of assembly in order to 
satisfy the need for that and you can't buy that specific 
part any more. 

Q All right. Over on the right, aidway down the 
page, it looks as if it says "only $200,000 different". Am I 
reading that correctly? 

A It says that, yes. 

Q Has there discussion of pricing at this meeting, 
as best you now recall? 

A Yes, and that refers to this problem that I just 
started talking about, about either the part is no longer 
Bade and you have to go to a higher level of assembly in 
TOP CECn B T/COPEW O RD - 



TOl 






- ^o> oneRBT/copcwoit fr-" 139 

ord«r to satisfy It and, tharsfora, thara is an increased 
cost associated with buying a bigger part than you really 
need in order to get the snaller thing which is now attached 
or that certain items aren't even nade any nore and you would 
hava to crank up the assembly line and do it. So this, I 
think, refers — well, the arrow points to the higher level 
of assembly. ^ 

So I think that's a specific reference to how much 
difference there is if w^fill that need by going to the 
higher order of assembly. It increases the total cost of the 
order by^ $200, 000. '^^ %- *^ > "^^ " «^ 

Q Was that fha exteirt of the ^lcin?r^»«cu8«ion\t 
this meeting? 

A There could well have been other discussions like 
that on specific parts or ~ 

Q Was there any discussion of marking up the price 
at that meeting? 

A No. 

Q You testified last time about the 3.7 factor. Was 
thara any discussion of that at this meeting? 

A No, Z don't believe so. 

Q And as best you now know, the participants were 
Gecrga, Bertj^^^^and yourself? 

A No. There ware others. 
~ ' Q Who? ^^ 

ifor onGnpp/coPBwonp — 






702 



Ol^ul^dSirlEfl 



TOP CEcncT/ooDDtronr H' X40 

A If this Is the v«etlng I'm recalling out at CIA — 
which I think it is, but I'm not positive — 

Q Then tell us who you think was there in a«Uition 
to those I*ve named. 

A Kow wait a minute. I'm starting to confuse 
meetings. This may be a different meetings, since I'M».only 
put those three names at the top. I'm recalling another 
meeting. ^ ^ :, * fit 

Q Tell us about it, notwithstanding the note ftnd -= 

knowing that it may be another meetiao^ Tell us..j^$«i^ tB» 

meeting you recall . ^ . _l'"~ ^"^". 

MeerivwL out' ^^ 
A Okay. I'm recalling a m«et£!%;j«Eit at CSTiii about 

A A /- 

this time tram». -j*- 

Q April-Hay '86? -^ .'^' '-^ . 

A Yes, at which Cotohel North and I attended for tb« 
NSC and CIA rep^sentatives were — it was in Cl»ir George's 
office — -~Clair George, Bert Dunn, I believe^^^^^^^^^| I 
thinN^^^^^^^^^^and I'm not sure whether George Case was 
there or not. I think he was. -^- W^- ' 

Q What do you recall at that meeting? *" 

A Well, it was just a general operations briefing, 
if you will, for the upcoming trip to Tehran and how to fill 
the request and communications and passports and all the 
logistics problems. It was operational discussion on how to 
proceed with this approved mission that we were about to 
TOP CECnBT/CODEW O nD 



703 



mUMMB 



T O P 3BeRDT/'U0DIH> e RP 141 

•abark on soDetln* later, It turned out In Hay. 

Q Was there discussion of prices at that meeting? 

A I don't believe so, although there nay have been 
some references to the generic problem of differences between 
what the Iranians had rec[uested as opposed to what we could 
fill and the incidental pricing implications of that. 

Q Bob, moving forward, did there come a time that 
you became aware of complaints from the Iranian side of the 
prices being charged for the weapons? 

A Yes. 

Q When did you first hear of such complaints? 

A I can't put a date on it, but it was sometime 
after May, after the delivery of the first wave of parts, the 
sampling, if you will — the pallet or so that went in with 
the party — and it may even have been later than that, which 
was the subsequent delivery of the rest of the parts. But 
certainly after May, sometime between May and, let's say, 
October, to put a bound on it at the other end, and I just 
right now can't put — although there may be some notes and 
references that will nail it down more — that the Iranians 
had complained to Ghorbanifar, the channel, that they were 
paying through the nose for these parts and that they didn't 
understand the markup and why it was so expensive. 

And so there was concern on the U.S. side as to 
how to deal with that. And at one point the Iranians said 
TOP 6 Boiu]T/c e Dinfonp 



mimn 



704 






lED 



g op gie nnT/'coDEijeiiD 142 

that they had the parts and their prices on microfiche and 
that they were looking at what the so-called U.S. Government 
price was and that, therefore, they Icnew what they were 
talking about. 

Q Do you remember them saying that in light of that 
price that they believed that the markup to them was 
something like 600 percent? 

A I don't recall the specific reference of how much 
higher, but certainly it was significant — a several-fold 
increase that they complained eUsout. Anyway, that led — it 
was always uncertain on our side how much of that was just 
negotiating posturing on their part to be complaining and how 
much was legit as to how serious their reservations were 
about the actual prices. 

But it resulted that we asked for these microfiche 
that they claimed to be referring to, and, although it took a 
long time, eventually that was provided through Nir, and we 
got those and CIA analyzed then. 

Q And what conclusion did CIA reach? 

A Hell, I'm not sure. I never got the feedback 
directly, but whatever they had seemed to be legitimate, that 
in some way they were getting perhaps contractor information, 
the cost of manufacture, if you will, in some way on some 
sort of microfiche. There were 40-some microfiche that were 
eventually forwarded to us. 

Tor oceRB T y i' e e DDH o nD 



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■ TOP OECRBr/ O ODinroRD '- 143 

Th« solution to the problem that was worked out 
was to explain to the Iranians that there were many levels of 
pricing in the same way that MAC, the Military Airlift 
Command, charges different rates for different passengers. 
If I were to travel on MAC as a military officer, there would 
be a certain rate per DOD. If you were to travel as a U.S. 
Government employee but not DOd, you would pay a higher 
price. Or, if a civilian were to be evacuated from an area 
on a MAC aircraft and have to subsequently reimburse the 
government, that would be a still higher price that he would 
have to pay for the same seat In the same aircraft. 

So there were layers of pricing involved. In the 
same manner, there are layers of pricing that the U.S. 
Government gives for prices. The U.S. Army pays a certain 
price for a TOW missile part. Another country under FMS 
would pay a higher price, and a country that was buying it 
not only FMS would get a third price higher, or a commercial 
transaction direct, not being through the government, would 
be even higher. 

So that there were all kinds of prices that were 
possible and that's enough. 

Q All right. Who was involved on the U.S. side in 
this issue? 

A Colonel North. 

Q You? 

- 4 io r ODGRP T /OODCWOnD 



706 






-jgo F aceRar/coDEwoR& -' 



144 



A Wall, I was. 

Q Who from the CIA? 

A Wall, w* delivered the alcroflche when we got them 
toHHHm^^^^so he took thea back and had then analyzed. 
So hie division or the group of people, since it was a 
compartmented program, within his division that were dealing 
with this problem, these folks. 

Q That's Cave, Dunn and 

A And^^^^^^^^Hwere certainly aware of this issue 
raised on the Iranian side and how ve were going to respond. 




Q Was there any consideration of going back to them 
with lower prices? 

A Ko, X don't think so. 

Q Why not? 

A It just wasn't. 

Q It was no surprise to the CIA that these prices 
were coiMiderably higher than what they vitre paying to DOO, 
was it? 

A Didn't seem to be. 




TOP CBCBOT/gQDTOOHfr- 



WS 'W ^iaik' 



Hi 



Vi 



r 



707 



ONCLJlSSiFIED 



1 9 9 aBcnm ' /' co PB w onD ' 



145 




Z •xplaln«d, which eventually, as I recall, was the solution 
that Bade this thing go away, was an explanation of different 
layers of pricing on FMS and so forth and they didn't qualify 
for the cheapest price. 

- TOP ODGRPT/ CODEWORD 



IMlSiriED 



708 






BOP SDORB I / 'tJO DCWOR tr 146 

Q But one option that was not considered was 
lowering the price to then? 

A Not that I'n aware of. 

Q Did anyone express the concern that by keeping the 
price high In the light of the Iranian complaints the 
operation was being jeopardized? 

A Not really. The only other source that the 
Iranians could have would be through black market, where the 
markups would be much, much higher, and some of the materials 
that we were providing probably weren't available on the 
black market. So it was take it from us or not at all. 
(Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

Q As I understand from your testimony and others, 
the purpose of the arms part of this transaction was as a 
demonstration of good faith on our side, which it was hoped 
would on the long range lead to a strategic objective of the 
opening to Iran, correct, and in the near term would result 
in the release of the hostages? Am I generally correct? 
That was the purpose of selling arms, right? 

A There were a variety of purposes and objectives. 

Q Then let me ask it in a non-leading way. What did 
you understand to be the purposes and objectives of the arms 
sales to Iran? 

A Well, from my first briefing into the program, the 
terms of reference figured significantly, which had been 
- TOP ODGHPT/OODIilWOnD 



709 



Oi 



\bLriijviii 



TOP 0DOIUl i I ! /'iiODin>eWff - X47 

drafted by Teicher and a State Department guy that was on the 
HSC staff whose name I can't recall at the moment. And the 
strategic value of the opening of this dialogue was clearly a 
part of this whole evolution and it was always discussed that 
the ongoing hostage situation in Lebanon, even though it 
didn't involve Iran per se but because of Iran's degree of 
influence over the believed hostage-holders, that we from our 
side, the U.S. Government, viewed this as an obstacle to 
bettering relations with the Iran government. 

And because of the geographic location and the 
Soviet menace on the northern border and the Iran-Iraq war, 
all these other geopolitical concerns, that the hostage 
situation was viewed as an obstacle to getting on and doing 
things that were in our mutual interest and improving the 
relationship. So really the answer to your question is yes. 
I mean, it wasn't leading. It's the way I believed. 

In other words, I've read a lot about, in the 
press, speculation that the strategic dialogue was just a 
cover or a justification after the fact to cover what was 
really just a straight arms-for-hostages deal, and from the 
inside I never viewed it as that. 

Q Well, that's what I was saying. 

A It was certainly a part of this whole evolution. 

Q Where were two, and I've referred to them as the 
long-term or strategic, what you call the geopolitical, 
- TOP ODGIUjT/O OPB WOnD — 



Oi 



710 



Ai ttmU 



TOP 8B CnCTy' ee DEl?0nD i4g 

objective, and then, in the near term, the release of the 
hostages, which was interfering with all kinds of relations. 
Correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And on our side the arms would come aimed at 
achieving those two purposes — the opening of the dialogue 
and the release of the hostages — and indeed on the other 
side the release of the hostages would be their contribution 
towards easing that obstacle that kept us from one another; 
correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Given those objectives and given the geopolitical 
objective, once the Iranians started to complain about the 
price, didn't anybody say perhaps the pricing is interfering 
with the geopolitical objective? Instead of the arms now 
being a way to open a dialogue, we're in an argument; maybe 
we should lower the price. 

A I don't recall any conversations on that. And, 
like I say, it was felt that this was posturing on the part 
of the Iranians just to complain because by their nature they 
complain that, looking at any alternative source, if any, for 
what they were getting that they were not getting a bad deal 
and that this was not a serious obstacle to the relationship. 

Q Let me just try one more. I understand what 
you're saying. But if the objective, if the overall 






711 



w 

obj«ctlv« la to op«n a dialogue and now tha mechanisa that's 
b««n aalacted is opening an argument, wasn't there any 
concern that the pricing had becone counter-productive and i| 
was counter to the objective of getting involved with the 
ame sale in the first place? You weren't selling ans to 
sake a profit, as I understand it, right? That wasn't the 
reason for getting involved with the arms sales to Iran, as 
far as you knew? 

A No. 

Q If that wasn't the objective, then why not lower 
the price? I'm just asking. 

A You're not involved in the process. You're 
looking from the outside and making what I certainly 
understand is a reasonable question on your part. "But it 
doesn't track to me. It doesn't make sense. I don't have 
the same intellectual question or hangup because my own 
perception of the relationship, from what little I gathered 
by observing it from the bits and pieces that I saw — andH 

didn't have a full appreciation, but I think I had a better 

one than yours from looking out. 

This was very much a^^^^^^^^H trading 
negotiation and each side bluffing and counter-bluffing, and 
Ghorbanifar bluffing both sides, and never being able to 
believe. It was a dance of artful negotiation and it was 
■ TOr ODOnnT/OODDOORP 



Ui'tiilri^dit^vii iLii 



712 



~W> P OECnBT/CODDWOnD 

inconcivabl., it would ..« to .., that from a negotiating 
po.tur. that you could go back to th.» after having stated a 
certain price and then say oh, well, we goofed and it's 
lower. I mean, they would have run with that. You would 
have given the inch that they would take a nile with. 
^^^^^^^That'e not the way to deal with Iraniar 
^^^^^^^^Hit seems to 

Q Looking at it on the other end, was there any 
consideration of the kind I have asked about given when the 
price was set in the first place? 

A I don't know. I'm extrapolating a little from 
later knowledge, like you said, about the 3.7. i didn't know 
about the 3.7 at this time. 
Q In April 1986? 

A I don't think, i think I acquired it later. I 
think it was after the delivery of the 500, when we then had 
the Iranians coming back, saying, developing a list of 
complaints with the delivery of the 239 spare parts, that 
certain ones didn't work. They had asked for a certain 
quantity, say four of an item, and only three were supposedly 
delivered. Where's the fourth? 

So there began to develop a new list of things 
that they from their side felt that we owed them based on the 
original transaction, and we had to then develop compatible 
pricing from ;^hat which had occurred before. And that's 



713 






TOF c EonnT/fooDmwruy - 151 

vh«ra I think I first became aware of the 3.7 factor. 

Q Talking again about the period where there were 
the complaints, did you hear any discussion on the U.S. side 
in connection with that issue of the need to make sure that 
funds were available for the contras in connection with the 
price negotiations that were then in progress? Has that area 
discussed? 

A These meetings? 

Q Not the meeting in April but we have sort of 
jumped to the period between May to October, which you've 
described as the period during which you became aware of 
complaints by the Iranians about the prices. We've talked 
about the microfiche and had a dialogue about the concerns on 
the U.S. side. 

A Right. 

Q In connection with any of those discussions did 
you hear contra needs discussed? 

A Well, Colonel Noxrth had told me at some point — 
and I don't know when; I think it was in this early time 
frame — that part of the Ayatollah's money was going to help 
the contras, and so there was a reference to that that he 
made to me, I think just one-on-one, and that that was one of 
the boxes within a box. 

Q And that was one of the factors, as you understood 
it, that influenced the price? 

- TOP oDonij i i i / capB vi o nD 






714 



TOP oDomi ' p/ ca DEW o nD - 15; 

A Clearly I don't think I really correlated it 
explicitly in my ovm sind that way, but clearly it was. 

Q Was General Secord, to your knowledge, involved iri 
the discussions May to October 2ibout the price complaints? 

A Well, I don't have a specific recollection. I 
can't recall him contributing to that in some way explicitly. 
But in general General Secord was involved with these 
negotiations with the Iranians, so it seems inconceivable to 
me that he was not also contributing. 

Q But you didn't have a direct )cnowledge of it? 

A I can't recall one right now, but I may later. 
It's inconceivable to me that he was not involved on that. 

Q Once you were briefed into the Iranian compartment 
and then in the months after, what was your understanding of 
Secord 's role? 

A Well, I would say that General Secord was a person 
in the private sector who had an organization that was able 
to got things done when elements of the U.S. bureaucracy were 
unable to do so. 

Q Did you understand whether his organization was 
making a profit, making money on his participation? 

A I didn't know that explicitly. My feeling at the 
time would be — was that it seemed to me some of that which 
I saw occurring, such as the rental of a Lear jet to bring 
certain people and the return of a hostage to Weisbaden was 
TOP ononriT> 'eo DEw o RP 



Ui^^^n\>uai ILU 



715 



.-^ifj) 



^ TOP SEOKPT/ ee PEWOnD — 153 

financed by this private sector organization, so those sort 
of expenses, It seened to oe, were probably coning from that 
pot, but that's speculation on my part. I didn't know that. 

Q Leaving speculation aside, did Colonel North ever 
tell you whether the private organization that was assisting 
here was being compensated in some way, a commission, profit? 

A No, I don't think so. 

Q He never discussed that with you? 

A No. 

Q Let's go to page 98 of your notes, and this 
appears to be a discussion on, it looks like, April 2S or 
thereabouts, with^^^^^^^Halso about the forthcoming 
delivery to Tehran; am I correct? 

A What's the date again? 

Q I think it's April 25, judging by the date on page 
99. There is no date on 98. 

A Yes. This would be similar. It's probably a 
follow-up discussion. 

Q To the one on April 24, page 100? 

A That he was calling me with some further 
information that they didn't have back then. 

Q For example, 209 Instead of 206 are now available 
and so forth? 

A Correct. 

Q This pricing at the bottom, it says "$ figure with 






716 



TOP C S CBOT/ O ODBW O RP - 154 

241, U.S. Any, $4,286,573.72; CIA, $4,103,819.64." What do 
thoa* nuobcrs refer to, as you now recall? 

A Okay. This Is^^^^^^Hpasslng to me that the 
U.S. Army had calculated the total cost. Including the price 
with part number 241, which was not on the sheet that the 
Iranians had given us, and this refers to 241 being one of 
those combined into a higher assembly of two other parts. 
But, anyway, including that contentious part it would cost 
that much. And the CIA's costing-out of that same collection 
of parts was this amount. 

And I think that's the difference between the two. 

Q So the difference is recorded as $165,416. That's 
about right, isn't it? 

A Um-hum, was because of their differing 
calculations on part number 241. 

Q Okay. Let's see. Page 97. Is that an additional 
reference to the arms shipment to Iran, the HAWK shipment, or 
am I reading something else? 

A Yes. Continuing discussions of part numbers. 

Q Now on the same page near the bottom it says: 
"not" — 

A "Not provided" or "not being provided". 

Q And there's a string of numbers and then 
"partial". 

A Part numbers. 

— i jor ODOnBT/OODDWORD 






m' 



717 



TOP ODOHL H y uu UnWORP -'" 155 

Q These are all part numbers? Okay. 

A And then "partial shipment". 

Q Let's move along to page 91, and I believe this 
page Is referring to the Iran compartment and I'd like you to 
tell us what the entries on that page are about. Maybe we 
can first establish some nzunes. The notes refer to Abe. Is 
that a code name for Hakim? 

A Yes, although I think in the time freune that I was 
writing this, which is — 

Q April, I believe — April-May 1986. Let me look 
at the nearest note that has a date. 

A It's that general time frame. I didn't know that, 
because X subsequently wrote in — and I don't know when, but 
sometime later — that I learned who that was, but at the 
time I wrote this note I did not know who Abe was. 

Q Sam. Is that George Cave? 

A Yes. 

Q Adam. Who was Adam? 

A Adam is Nir. 

Q And Merchant is Ghorbanifar? 

A Correct. 0-N, Oliver Korth. 

Q Yes, that I understand. Why don't you tell us 
what that is? 

A Let me just read the whole thing and get it in 
context, that will make the explanation a little more clear. 
- TOP oc e nDT/ooDnwoR P • 

V' ^ .: ^ , ... ■...-■ ■} Si iiJiJ 



718 



lih -..,.;_ J i£ij 



- mop ODCiuiT/eoDEw ei tP ' ise 

Q Fln«. 

(Pause. ) 

A If ve want to spend more time, Z could probably 
figure It all out, but let me just give a general at this 
point. This is — and I'm not sure who is offering up this 
option, but because of some problem that arose — and that's 
the historic relationship of this whole thing, is just a 
series of problems — some snafu, some problem, and this is 
somebody's option on how to solve it with Abe, Hakim, to call 
that person, that Iranian official whose name we won't 
divulge yet, introduce George Cave to him on the phone to 
talk. 

And that — 

Q That Nir would pass the suggestion to Ghorbanifar? 

A Correct . 

Q So this is a proposal to solve a problem they had. 
Anything else? That's what it's about? 

A Yes. 

Q Nov let me go down on the page. Can we go off the 
record for a second? 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 

Q It says "Merchant to deposit dollars on Monday". 
That's Ghorbanifar depositing what money — from his Iranian 

A However he acquired it, if we ever find that out. 
- TOP aEGRnT/' eO DDWORD 






w: 



■J'.i ai-jn 



719 






TOP CDORIlT/'OODinWRP ' 157 

Q Now "George worried, we're so dependent on Ghorba 
to bring unnamed Iranian out". What does that mean to you, 
"George worried we're so dependent on Ghorba," ot cetera? 

A That's a concern that a lot of us had, all of us 
had, I think, and just George Cave expressing it explicitly 
on this occasion, that the channel was so dependent on 
Ghorbanifar. 

Q Did you hear discussions after you became familiar 
with the compartment that Ghorbanifar had never met a 
polygraph he didn't flunk? 

A Much later I learned that, very late in the game, 
like October or September, that there were bum notices put 
out on Ghorbanifar by the CIA. So I didn't know that then, 
but my recollection is even up here everyone distrusted 
Ghorbanifar, that you couldn't tell whether he was telling 
the truth or not. 

Everyone recognized that Ghorbanifar was 
untrustworthy, that he was making up stuff and looking out 
for his own interests, which were probably to make an 
enormous profit^ but that it was the only channel available, 
that at least it worked, that it was able through him to get 
to th« Iranian leadership — these pragmatists or people we 
were dealing with that were willing to talk about this and 
seemed to want to have a more balanced relationship with the 
United States. 

Teg flconiiir/ coPB W o RD ■ 



r 

I. 



I 



720 
I 



ij 



V- . .. - . - .. .- .. 

TOP SEeRDT/OODinroRD 158 

So it was not because everybody liked Ghorbanifar 
or trusted him, but for lack of any other alternative, which 
is what led to this pressure for search for a second channel 
to get Ghorbanifar out of the loop so we could deal one on 
one with the pragnatists in Iran that we wanted to deal with. 
But because it worked, there was always a germ of 
truth in some of the things that Ghorbanifar said, so you 
could get intelligence value from some of what he gave you. 
It took enormous analysis and vetting to separate the wheat 
from the chaff. 

Q In terms of some recent famous words, he wasn't 
the most despicable man anybody had ever met. 

A Yes. 

Q Let's see if we can do a few more before we break. 
Off the record. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 

Q He'll take this one and then we will break. Page 
85. We've passed page 89 and done that off the record, and 
we're not interested in putting that on the record. So now 
we're at page 85. I'm looking at the portion of the note 
which reads: "Casey. Yes, he supports current." 

A "He supports the current." 

Q What does that mean? 

A It's incomplete. He supports the current I don't 
know. 






i) 



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TOP CS C nCT/C OP BW C RP - 159 

Q Wall, you sea down on th« pag* also there's a 
group of initials. It says "Roger on instructions. Yes, the 
DCI supports the current plan/ op." 

A Operation. Let me read the whole thing. 
(Pause.) 

Q It appears to be an entry, based on the date at 
page 84, or at page 86, rather, of May 5, '86. Does it refer 
to the DEA operation at all? 

A That's a possibility. I'm not sure. 

Q If you look at the note at the top of the page **$l 
Billion". 

A For one alive, per live hostage, yes. 

Then says^^^^^^^^^^l who believe is a 
DEA agent. 

A Correct. 

Q And if this is going to start a long discussion, 
we may want to do it when you come back, because I Icnow your 
la%ryer has to go to an important appointment. 

A Hell, it's not ringing any bells. This is clearly 
a message that I'm to pass, a message from North for Admiral 
Poindexter. 

Q That's what all those initials mean? 

A The following message from Colonel Korth for 
Admiral Poindexter, "Roger on instruction. Yes, the DCI 
supports the current plan/ operation" . 

. T O P S EOnCT/'GODEWORD 



722 



y 



TOP S SCRgr/OOP g W O B P - ISO 



Q Now that's a message Korth wants you to give to 
Polndexter? 

A Correct . 

Q And does it refer to the DEA operation? 

A I'm not sure. Certainly there's a reference to 
that on the top of the page, but it doesn't necessarily mean 
by the time we get down to here that the two references are 
to the same thing, that it's still the same, and I'm drawing 
a blank as to whether it is the same thing or something 
different. 

Q Do you have an itfdip«ndfiit recollection, and we're 
going to talk about the DEA operation this afternoon — do 
you have an independent recollection of whether the DCI did 
support that operation? 

A I don't have a recollection of that. I don't know 
whether the DCI supported that or even knew about it, from my 
knowledge. 

Off the record. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 
MR. BELNICK: On the record. We're going to break 
now. We will resume at 2:00 p.m. Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., the 
same day.) 



■ TO? oc e ncfT/ooDEwonD 



723 



ta p CDORB T /OO PB WOnD ■ 161 



AFTESKOON SESSION 



(2:10 p.m.) 



Whereupon, 



ROBERT LAWSON EARL, 
the witness herein, having been previously duly sworn, was 
further examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ~ RESUMED 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q Good afternoon. Colonel. 

Now we're on page 83 of your notes for the same 
period, and I think page 83 Is still in May of 1986, from the 
context it appears to be. 

A We're going baclcwards? Oh, we are going 
backwards. 

Q We've been coming backwards from the back because 
that's how they're ordered. It's to confuse the enemy, and 
me. 

Page 83, which appears, as I said, to still be in 
7 May 1986, I'm Interested in the note that starts "Elliott". 
Then it looks as if it says "R-squared" and there's a line — 
"new mad scheme." What does that refer to? Who is R- 
squared? 

A I'm not getting a distinct memory, but my guess is 
that it's Ronald Reagan. 

Q Does Elliott refer to Elliott Abrams? 

^ TOV CCGnCT/OODinWRD L^;!V^23 



<ii^.. .......... -0 



724 







■ T O P ' oncium/copsw o nB - igj 

I think. That's th« only Elliott that i know. 
KR. LEOK; How about Ben Elliott, the speech 



writer? 



THE WITNESS: Possibly. I knew him but never 
really — well, on speeches, but I doubt it. You're right; 
it's possible, but I don't think so. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuaing) 
Q But take a look at the whole note and see if your 
neaory is at least refreshed as to what it means. 
A Those two relate. 

Q Hell, tell se what you recall eU3out it. 
A Okay. This is from — that looks like my 
handwriting, although it looks like a different time than 
when I wrote this. But anyway it looks to be a note from 
Colonel North. 

Q That Ghorba called? 

A The merchant called. The merchant's in room 926, 
and I think at the hotel, the Churchill Hotel in Portland 
Square in London. Talks begin, 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^■and Nir him. 

Q Had called Ghorbanifar? 

A Had called Ghorbanifar. And this is the room 
number where ha is. 
f^ Q Rooia(j728) indicates where Adam was? 

A Correct. 

TOP CCCItET/CODEWOnD 



725 



■■ TOP CEORIjT/C0DIH>0nD 



163 




Q Then there's a thing that says "ON, order 508 TOWs 
for Israel." 

A j^^H 

Is that^ 

I assume. 
Allen? 

This would be Charlie Allen. And this is again 
for doing that, that that was a route. 

Q He'll ignore the Allen comment, but ^^^H order 
508 TOWs for Israel", is that^^Htelling you that he's 
ordered 508 TOWs for Israel? Do you recall the question 
being raised around this time of replacing the Israeli TOWs 
which had been shipped to Iran in August and September of 
1985, roughly, if not exactly, 508 TOWs? 

A I don't have a specific recollection on when we 
paid those back ultimately. I Icnow it was way long after the 
original. That was one of the bones of contention from the 
Israelis, that we didn't pay it back as quickly as they would 
have liked. 




So that in some way refers to that, but I'm not 
sure from this whether it's coning from^^Hor I'm to tell 
^^Hthat or what. 

Q Let's go back, then, to the reference we started 
-J TOr OCGRCT/^CODgW e R P 






726 



y 



■■■'J 

TOP fiBCB£T/CODEWOIU>— 16 



out vith on th« pag*: "Elliott, R-squared, new mad scheme." 
Any racollectlon today of what that means? If you don't 
recall, you don't recall. 

A I'm getting nothing from that one. 

Q Does anything else on the page either help you 
with that or refer to the matters we've been talking about? 
For the record, I'm going to draw a red line, a red circle 
around the comment attributed to Allen here and some other 
material which I will suggest be redacted. 

A I agree. 

Q In the event that we request this page to be 
declassified. And that's on page 83 that I drew those red 
circles. Let's move on, if you can't recall. 

A There's a possibility. Something just clicked, 
and this may be it. This may be where he was at the time. 

Q Where Elliott Abrams was? 

A Yeah. 

Q At the Intercontinental? 

A Yeah, with that number. Because what I just 
remembered was there was a time when Colonel North was 
traveling on one of his trips where he said he saw Elliott at 
an airport somewhere, and Elliott had not seen him. He made 
that comment in passing — that his tradecraft, if you will, 
of observing was better than Elliott's. So Elliott had 
missed seeing Colonel North. 

TOP S BOngr/OODEW O RD • 
J 2 i " -■' ' ~ " - ;» -^"^ 

U ' ■ l-P 



i 



727 

is: 

• t iaj 3in wt /e ap D»onp — 155 

So this nay hav* b«an thla tina frama, whan thay 
vara both abroad aeparataly, but for aoma reaaon ona waa 
trying to gat tha othar and that wa vara a clearing housa for 
exchanging phona numbara and rooa nunbara in hotels. That's 
juat a gueaa. 

Q But the reference to R-squared, "new nad schene" 
meana nothing to you now? 

A Ko. 

Q Let* a nova on. Okay. Tha next page I have marked 
ia page 82 of your notea. which reads; "Falix,^^^^^^^^H 
to Miami^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H" at 
reference to Felix Rodriguez? 

A Yes. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^H Is that^^^^^^^Hfrom the 
American country ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H as 
recall? 

A I'B not getting a specific recollection of this, 
but probably because it relates, it seems to relate to 
something else that I recall — what we talked about before, 
tha two maatings. 

Q Thia is May 7, which is months earlier than the 
August Beatings you discussed at tha last session of your 
deposition. 

MR. LEOH: Hera on tha May 8 calendar for North it 
shows an Israeli general arriving, Thursday, May 8, the next 
TOP aBcnPT/ eep inronD 






728 



? ■' ■ ^ ! 
'a ^ ujim, ., .^v -.. i:d Mi^i 



166 



day. 



MR. BELNICK: I don't think that's the same 



BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q What do you recall about the note? 

A Nothing specific. It seems to be a message from 
Felix that I assume, although I don't recall specifically, 
that I assume I was to be passing to Colonel North. 

Q Okay. Let's move along. The next page that 
interested me was page 78 of your notes, which I believe is 
still in the same May 7, 8, 9, 10, something like that, time 
period of 1986. Why don't you look at that? 

A The whole page? 

Q I think the whole page for the most part, insofar 
as it pertains to what we are interested in. It refers to 
the same subject, seems to be referring to the Iran arms 
shipment, replacement of Israeli TOWs and so forth. But I'd 
like to know — 

A Do you want me to indicate — 

Q And Colonel North is also going to draw some 
circles in red on things. 

A Colonel North is? 

Q Colonel Earl, things that he thinks ought to be 
redacted from page 78. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 
■ TOf gCGnCT/OODDIJOnD - 



729 



' . . . Mi^' 

TOr CEORM/ e OPDWOnD - ^ 1S7 

A In answer to your question, yes, it is a 
continuation of similar previous pages we were talking about 
on Iran arms. 

Q There's numbers here about expenses. Where were 
you getting these price figures from? Are they coming to you 
from Nir? ^^^ 

A No, I don't think so. I think it c*ould be coming 
from CIA, from the logistics people. 

Q Expenses for what? There are expenses listed here 
totaling $3.8 million, $3.2 million, and then another big 
number. 

A What's the date OR^ this again 

Q I think it's about May 7-8, 1986, is my best guess 
based on the surrounding pages. 

A Well, here's an example. This number here, the S3 
million, $3.2 million is an example of an expense, if you 
will, which includes the cost of the Israeli TOWs and the 
transportation and packing cost of moving those TOWs within 
the United States and en route to Israel. 

Q And this is an expense that would be borne by 
whoa? 

A They'd be added to the price ultimately that the 
Ayatollah would pay. I mean, he paid for the train delivery 
t o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

Q So the idea was to put, among other things, to put 
TOP CECrUST/e e DEHORP - 



730 



* Tor oneM T /GODEWoru) - igg 

enough Into the price to the Iranians to enable you to cover 
the expenses of replacing the Israeli weapons, In effect? 

A Yeah. 

Q In addition to whatever other markups there were, 
correct? 

A Yeah. I hadn't really thought of It In those 
terms till you phrased it that way, but this suggests to me 
that. Let me just caveat this by saying that this was my 
first introduction to this whole thing and so these didn't 
make sense to me at the time, and I had never really, until 
you just mentioned it, realized that that's what was going on 
here. I was just copying numbers down that I got from 
somebody and having then available if needed. 

And at times Colonel North would look for 
something in the records that I kept, knowing that I kept 
notes, but they didn't necessaarily make sense to me. So 
yes, I agree with what you say, although that's based on ex 
post facto knowledge. I didn't know that at the time. 

Q Let me go to the next page of your notes, 77. 
What I'm interested in is the note at the top, which seems to 
say "lath ON to" — 

A I think the N aval War College. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^WCL-43, two What did that 
mean? 

A I think they're unrelated. The first one is that 
TOP ODCIUiT/GODSW O nD — 



tji^\ 



■isLiJ 



731 



TOP cs c m}T/coDcwon& - i^^ 

Colonel North had a plan to go brief, give a speech, or 
something at the Mava l War Colle ge. 

Then the^^^^^^^Hreference? 

A ^^^^^^^^Hthat we were to ask him for two more 
KL-4 3S because others were broken or needed replacement or 
they needed two more; I don't know. 

Q Now we move to page 76 of your notes. May 9, 1986, 
and this looks like planning for the upcoming Tehran mission, 
that is, things to say to the Iranians and so forth; is that 
correct? 

A Correct. 

Q What does this mean: "Israelis want to be there, 
offered two 707s. Israelis provide some degree of plausible 
deniability"? What did those two lines mean? Let's take the 
first one: "Israelis want to be there, offered two 707s." 

A I read that without specific recollection, but the 
way I read that, interpret that, now is that it meant that 
the Israelis wanted to be part of this, that the option of 
just the U.S. going in was not preferred by them, that they 
would prefer to have an Israeli as part of this, that this 
was a joint venture of sorts, they were a major player, and 
they wanted to be there to participate, as, of course, it 
turned out, with Nir attending. 

They offered two 707s in this, at least one of 
which — and maybe two, I'm not sure — were subsequently 
■ TOP OEGRCT/CODEWOnD -- 



>a i 



732 



I P O P g B CWJT/OODEWOm) - 170 



us«d. 



Q Now the line: "Israelis provide some degree of 
plausible denlablllty". What did that mean? Who said It? 

A Well, see, I don't Icnow who said It. As far as 
what It meant, It was a suggestion that cover was a consuming 
concern of this whole enterprise, to protect the cover of 
this thing, and to the extent that we were dealing with a lot 
of people In various countries and Ghorbanlfar, dealing with 
all kinds of people, that the circle of knowledge of parts of 
this was ever-expanding and of operational security concern. 
And there was always a need for cover to explain 
that which people could see, so that the covert operation 
(ouild not be blown by the press or somebody else stumbling 
onto something and not having a plausible explanation to make 
It go away, as happened in the past, prior to November, when 
I think there were some references in the press — I think it 
was Jack Anderson — to an Iranian connection on hostages and 
those things came and went. 

Q This would enable who to deny what — the United 
States to deny that it had any role in the arms that were 
going to Iran? 

A Well, in the context of coming right after the 
7078, It suggests to me that if the movement of aircraft to 
Tehran were picked up because of the necessity to file a 
flight plan in certain portions of it, that the fact that it 
( P e > DDOnCT/GODEW e RD 

if* ■ 



1 



J 



733 



li; 



- TOP ae e RBT/co D gw o np — m 



was Israeli would help provide protection of the operation, 
that it didn't automatically point the finger that the United 
States was doing this. Sure. 

Q Was plausible deniability a term that you 
associated with anyone in particular? 

A It's a term of art that I'm very familiar with 
from my days at the CIA. It's a general mode of operation in 
establishing covert operations. 

Q It's a CIA term, though, isn't it? 

A Oh, definitely. If you set up a cover, if you 
have a covert operation, unless everything that you do will 
be seen by no one, ^hen what's the difference of doing 
nothing, then? You have to do something that somebody can 
see. you have to have an explanation for what you're doing 
that does not give away that which you are attempting to keep 
secret. 

Q Let me ask you a question. There are references 
on page 76 and others to the false passports, and we're aware 
thati^^^^Bpassports were used on this mission to Tehran; 
correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Was any thought given to the danger that that use 
of false passports may have exposed the participants to in 
terms of their possibly being arrested on a legitimate charge 
in Tehran, which is not unknown to have taken captives from 
TOP OEOnST/ COO EWOnD — 



'i ti i>?:Ui ^iyii^i j i^- 



734 



;^iJ 



TOP CECnET/CODSWQR &-' 17 

tia* to time? 

A I'm not sure of the antecedents that led up to 
that decision. I assumed that that was because that was 
being requested by the Iranians, but I'm not positive of 
that, that they had wanted us to come, that this was coming 
again through Ghorbanifar, so you don't know who is making u] 
what. 

Q Precisely. 

A But I don't know who asked for it and how it was 
decided and blessed, but by the time I got to deal with it i' 
was already a decision. And here the only discussion is 
whether to go^^^^^^^^^^^|that there was an established 
need for foreign documentation. 

Q But whoever asked for it, you didn't hear any 
discussion to the extent you were involved as to the risk of 
using a false passport and exposing the carriers of those 
passports to arrest? 

A No, not on that -one per se. There was concern 
with the fact that they could have been taken hostage, and 
there was concern that all kinds of things could have gone 
trrong with the mission that would have led to the cover being 
blown. For example, we even in the operation order had 
contingency press guidance developed for those sorts of 
circumstances, if the party was taken captive in Tehran, what 
would we say with Bud McFarlane there being held prisoner. 
iJ C P i DOnaT/OOODWORD 



i 



735 



f ov cceimT/coDcwon& — ^73 

Q That's why I was going to ask you what "plausible 
dsniedDility" meant in this context. You were going to have 
the former National Security Advisor and Oliver North in 
these airplanes. Did people think it would be plausible to 
deny that they were Oliver North and Bud McFarlane or was 
there another theory? 

A There are different scenarios of what is exposed 
and how you react to it. That is certainly the worst case, 
where the people that we were trusting to go and speak as 
emissaries would jeopardize all that by blowing it and taking 
them prisoner. That was the worst case, and there's only so 
much you can do in that circumstance, but that would be for 
something less than that, it seems to me, that the other 
party in this dialogue had just turned 180. 

Q Page 75 seems to be further discussion of the 
plans for the Tehran mission; am I correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And it says here: "Gifts okay. Replica of Colt 
.45s." Whose idea was the gifts; do you remember? 

A No, not specifically. It occurred in one of the 
briefings and conversations. It may have been George Cave, 
someone who knew Iranians pretty well, made the protocol 
point that whenever a visiting delegation would come to 
discuss important things that there would be a symbolic 
exchange of gifts, and that we would expect that from their 
Tnr nnnnnfij'rnnTTTTiiig 






736 



I ■ 



174 



■id« and what would we do on our aid*. 

And that led to a discussion that they liked hand 
guns and so these .45s were acc[uired and taken, but I don't 
think they were given. 

Q Hopefully not loaded. 
(Laughter.) 

Page 75 of the notes also contains this entry: 
"When brief Weinberger, Casey, Shultz, et cetera, what if 
they can't deliver." Explain those two lines to me. 

A They are unrelated. 

Q Give me the first one: "When brief Weinberger, 
Casey, Shultz". 

A This is raising the question of when are they to 
be briefed on all the timing and so forth. 

Q Who raised that question? 

A Well, I haven't figured out from this whole thing 
where it's coming from. That's why I was looking back on 
what day of the week is this, because I had looked back and 
seen this reference to Saturday a.m. meeting, so if it were a 
Saturday it would have tracked. 

MR. LEON: There was a meeting the 9th. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Friday, May 9, according to Colonel North's 
calender, which Rich is pointing out there is a meeting that 
North has listed with Clair George an^^^^^^^H Cave and 



^--.^^.-.^.^■"£ 



737 



To y aECRg T /'eoDDwonD 175 



A That must be It. 

Q Then later In the day, that same Friday, May 9, 
there is an entry on North's calendar that says Bob Earl, 
4:15. 

A No. That was unrelated. 

Q So looking at the earlier one? 

A Yes. The reason I was thrown off was this 
reference to the Saturday a.m. meeting, so I'm looking for a 
Saturday, but it must have been rescheduled up a day to 
Friday. So this is the Friday meeting, what I previously 
described to you went around the room and said all the people 
there. 

So this is a significant operational meeting of 
all the players in planning for this operation. And this was 
kind of stream of consciousness, recollection, so I don't 
know who said what. But it was discussed at some point in 
the meeting. 

Q Do you recall it being discussed that the 
Secretary of State did not know anything about this operation 
at that time? 

A No. It doesn't necessarily mean that. He could 
have known of previous iterations or whatever. But the 
details of the Tehran trip by Bud McFarlane is the way I 
Interpret that, when to brief them on this specific part of 
TOP CECTCT/ eO DCW O nD 



738 



UMCLASSIFIED 



■go» fill uitf,nwwpwnyn" i7« 

th« operation. 

Q So would It b« fair to say that as of that tlna. 
May 9, 1986, you did not know whathar tha Sacratary of Stata 
knaw about tha nlsslon or not; corract? 

A Corract. 

Q Tha Sana with raspact to Hainbargar? 

A Hall, again it would ba corract to say that I 
don't know to my dlract knowladga. I would circuastantially 
baliava it fairly likaly that ha knaw at that point bacausa 
wa had to gat his approval to buy tha waapons in tha first 
placa and through that channal, through tha CIA to DOD, it 
had to ba approvad by him. 

Q But again you ara making that on tho basis of an 
infarenca. You didn't know ona way or tha othor, corract? 

A Corract . 

Q DC! Casay, though, you undarstood was awara of 
this oparation? 

A Yas. 

Q Paga 74 looks lika mora of tha sama, mora 
additional planning for tha mission, am Z correct, probably 
coming out of that sama maating? 

A Yas. 

Q Now lat's look at paga 71 and I'd lika you to read 
what I hava bracketed here in pencil, which starts: 

A Okay. 

JB^r-s ECMgjigOIIBHOnD 




739 



1^ ■ -^ . 

. T O P CC0IU3T/G0DDH0IIP - 177 

Q To what do these notes refer on page 71? 

A I'b just trying to get the specific. I know 
generally what it is, but let's see if I can get it. Do you 
have the page before? Oh, great, that's a big help. 

I just don't quite have the specific on it, but in 
general it refers to, well, the hostages and — maybe we 
ought to go off the record and decide what needs to go on the 
record. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 

Q We had a discussion off the record concerning the 
notes on page 71 and, based on what Colonel Earl told us 
we're satisfied that the material there is both sensitive and 
that it doesn't really pexrtain to the subject matter of our 
inquiry, so we'll pass it by and go to page 70, the note in 
the middle of that page which reads: "Radars, Taft to 
release $6.5 million? Need this to start TOWs and spare 
parts. If money today, 20th, equals,||^H. 

Q What's it all mean? 

A I'm not sure of the part numbers again, but it's 
Icind of one of the last items in the list of originally 239, 
240, 241, however many spare parts there were, in the laundry 
list from the Iranians. There were two high-power radars 
that were added on at the end, so this concerns them. 

There were two radars in stock in Lederkenny, or 
- TOP OEGRCT/ eO DCWORD 



I! 



740 



TOP QB e M T /OODBW O nfl — 179 

•o««thing Ilk* that, Pennsylvania, that wer« available, that 
w«r« being held for the Iranians, and so there was, if we 
wanted to do certain things, ways to get that available so 
that we could get thea If the decision were taken to send 
then to the Iranians. But it required some action at a high 
level on the part of the number two person at the Defense 
Department. 

Q What does the reference here mean to $6.5 millionl 

A That's the cost of the radars. 

Q The cost to whom? The cost to CIA? 

A The cost. That's how much those radars cost. 
Again, in this Catch-22 situation, that the Iranians wouldn' 
put the money up until they had delivery, and DOD wouldn't 
release the parts until they had the money. So that in order 
to get movement on that there had to be a movement of money. 
So that was a sticking point on that. 

Q On the $6.5 million? 

A Was for the radars. And this is merely a time 
projection, that if the money were sent today, then whatever 
today is on this date, then on the 20th the radars would be 
ready at thl^^^^^^^^^^B It was looking at a time 
for when the radars could be available for subsequent 
shipping to Tehran. 

Q Then it says "new cost $6,375 times 508." We come 
up with $3,238,500. Now what did that mean, new cost? 

i g e r fl Ponfli i /g sBB H a nB 



■.I'Lii 



741 



........ .. .t^-cJ 

TOP OB e MT/OODDW e nB 179 

A Things were always changing. There was an earlier 
reference that had a different unit cost, Z think, for the 
TOWs. It was out on the column on one of those that you 
showed me before that I think was slightly different. It was 
$6,000-somethlng. $6,083. And this Is $6,375. So there's 
about $300 difference In unit cost. 

Q But Is this the cost that was going to be charged? 
This was tad actual cost for^ replacing TOW missiles? 

A This is ~ 

Q Just for the record, I'm looking at the 
computation on page 70, the $6,375 times 508. The 508 
clearly refers to the 508 TOWs that Israel shipped In 1985, I 
believe. And the new cost of $6,375 is what I eun trying to 
understand. Is that the cost per replacement TOW or the cost 
of replacing each TOW to Israel? 

A There's yet another price. Well, there is It. 

Q The same price? Colonel Earl is-showing me the 
seme price appears on page 78 of his notes. 

A But this was always confusing as to which price, 
real or actual, and I don't Icnow which one we've got there. 

Q Here is another note on page 78, '*$822,500 in the 
bank". Do you remember what that referred to? 

A I'm not sure who I'm getting this from, whether 
it's coming from CIA, which is possible, or coming from 
General Secord, or Colonel North, somebody like that. It 
■ aap ononnT/e eB im o nD 



i 






742 

i - "^ 

T 9 P B D e RCT/OODIWOnD - iso 

could b« fron althar. 

Q I'll try to refresh. Do you recall Independently 
what you meant or what was meant by $822,500 In the bank? 

A No. 

Q Let me try and refresh your recollection. Do you 
remember having a conversation with Hlr around this same 
time. May 10-12, something like that, 1986, in which he asked 
you how much Israel would have to pay for the replacement 
TOWs and you quoted certain figures? 

A Could be. I don't specifically recall that. 

Q Let me ask you to probe your recollection. Do you 
recall any conversation with Nir in which you were quoting 
figures as to the cost to Israel for replacing the TOWs? 

A I'm not getting a specific recollection of it, but 
it certainly fits into the pattern that Nir is one of the 
people I would talk to and pass messages on for North or 
whatever, or he would call up. He couldn't get North becaust 
North would be In a meeting, so he would ask me, I need to 
know this. So I was a middle man and relaying messages back 
emd forth to people. And that is quite possible. 

Q It would be consistent with that role? 

A Sure. I'm just not specifically recalling it. 

Q And if it happened, from where would you get the 
numbers that you gave Nir? 

A If he had asked for the cost to Israel, then I 
-9«r 3 Bei iB T /eeip gw e».p - 



743 






181 



would go back to CIA and ask them, and that's — ilka this. 
No, back her*, this one nay have come — the 707 cost. 

Q On page 70 of your notes? 

A If that's a Secord-provided aircraft, then the 
cost would come from Secord. If it's a military aircraft, it 
would come from CIA. Some of the earlier ones definitely 

from because they did^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 All those numbers cjune from CIA. 

Q The witness has just been referring to numbers on 
page 78. 

Continuing, do you recall learning In this time 
period from CIA or Secord or someone that roughly $822,500 
had been set aside for Israel out of the second TOW 
transaction? 

A I'm not specifically recalling that, no. 

Q Do you remember any discussion of an amount 
$822,500 which had been set aside for Israel in effect to 
bring down the price that Israel would have to pay for the 
replacement TOWs? 

A There's something about that which you just 
described which is just starting to ring a little bit of a 
memory of something, discussions associated with it, but it': 
not enough to say yes, I remember that. But I just got 
something out of that that sounds familiar. But it still is 
not tracking to this. 

t or oBenBT/ e eMwoRg 






744 



TOP CEGIUjT/OODEWOR &'- 182 

Q Still a very vague recollection. Well, let's not 
worry about the note right now on page 70. Do you have any 
recollection of where the Boney that had been set aside for 
Israel for the replacements had cone? Where did that money 
originate? 

A The money set aside for Israel? 

Q This "$822,500 in the bank", which had been set 
aside for Israel to bring down the price of the replacement 
TOWS. Do you know the source of those funds? 

A No. 

Q So if you were dealing with these funds or passing 
these numbers on to Nir or anyone else at that time. May 
1986, you were functioning, as I understand, as a conduit, a 
simple messenger; correct? 

A And not understanding quite a bit of what I was 
writing down and passing on. 

Q Okay. Page 69 of your notes looks like more of 
the same, more data concerning the cost of the radar and 
shipping and so forth of the HAWKs. 

A Yes. 

Q There's reference on this page 69 and elsewhere in 
your notes to Phase II unit cost. What was Phase II? 

A There were two kinds of radars, and the Phase II 
was a more recent one, and it was too complicated or too 
recent to be compatible with the HAWK system that the 
TOP CE C nijT/GODEWOnD 

r ■ ■ ■'^ '^"••^-•"jr^ 

. -J 



A 



745 






TOP a ee RB T ^'OODDWORB 



183 




Iranian* had, so it had to b« backwards-engineered to be 
coapatible. So wa had to pay twice for it — to become Phase 
IZ in the first place, and then bac}cwards to Phase I. 

Q At the bottom page is a note ^^^^^^^^^^H 
with an address and an account number, 
I Whose account was that? 
A I don't Jcnow. 

Q You have no recollection of what that number 
refers to? 

A No. I've seen in the tines subsequent, looking at 
this with other people, that there are several bank account 
numbers that crop up over time. 

Q Oo you know what the initials^Hstand for? 
A No. 

Q Okay. Page 68 of your notes. The one I'm 
interested in is the entry that reads: "Tom Clines, 
associated with ship?" Do you recall the nature of that note 
and what it meant? 

A What time frame are we in again? 
We're in mid-May 1986. 
But it's before the Tehran trip? 
Yes. 

If it were after, during the Tehran trip I would 
have a guess, but before it doesn't make any sense to me. 

Q Did you know at that time of any involvement that 
TOf e aoniff/e e DGw e np 



746 



UNCLASSIFIED 



184 



Colon«l North had with Toa Clln«s? 

A No, Z don't thlnX so. Thar* nay hav* been some 
press reports, but I don't know when, whether it was back 
then or later, but except for press reports, no. 

Q Let's look at page 64 of the notes. We're still 
in Bid-May, 1986. I'n interested in the note at the bottom, 
"Phase IZ, $2.8 to $3 million each, cheaper than Phase I. 
andHH^m^m Is that 

A Right. 

Q. Tell me what that note means? 

A This is again referring to the radars and that 
even though — there was a paradox here that even though you 
had to pay for the backwards engineering from Phase II to 
Phase I, it wound up cheaper than if you bought Phase I 
originally, which made no sense to me. 
And^^^^^^^^l 

A I think this is separate. ^^^^^^^^H doesn ' t 
mean anything to me right now. 




I think of the three the third is most likely, but 



T^SB CRBT;' C O PWOR D 

UNCIASSIHED 



I 



747 



>Q P B B a iB l /eOD B W e RP — 185 

Z*B not poaltiv*. 

Q Let m« direct you to pag« 63, th« note: ^^^H| 

K "Saturday through Hadncsday, 28 May." 

Q "KL 43". Is that another rafaranca to sooa need 
regarding a nachine? 

A Wall, Z baliava it 's^^H letting us know that he 
vaa going to be out of the country until then, and that he 
would check in with ue when he returned, because ve had just 
had a problea or he had aade a delivery or something, so he 
vaa just keeping in touch with us if there were a problem. 

Q Then there's a whole series of alphabetical 
letters and some numbers. Is that a code? 

A Probably . 

Q Do you remember what this coded page 63 referred 
to? 

A No. 

Q He'll take one final entry for today and then 
we'll schedule to resume. Page 62 of the notes, 19 May, at 
the bottom: "Charlie, conversation with Ghorba." 

A "This weekend, more money moving Tuesday, 
Saturday, Sunday, ready to receive Mr. Robert" — Mr. Robert? 

Q "Boxes in good shape". "Boxes" refers to 
hostages? 

A Yes. "Ready when Robert hits P(T." Point Tango, 
■ MP Jfl t HUJl ' / ' LU B DW e RB 



UP' A^5?^|| 



748 



Wh 






»T e P OCCRg T /OODEWOIU) — 186 

got it. When Robert — I'm trying to figure out who Robert 
is. 

Q Would it be Bud McFarlane? 

A Yeah. That's the way I interpret it. 

Q Tell me what you think the notes on page 62 mean. 

A That Charlie Allen had had a conversation with 
Ghorbanifar over the weekend. Ghorbanifar had told Charlie 
that more money was moving Tuesday, that on Saturday and 
Sunday they would be ready to receive* Bud McFarlane, that 
the hostages were in good shape and that they would be* ready, 
they, the hostages, would be ready when McFarlane hit Point 
Tango, which is Tehran. 

MR. BELNICK: Thank you. We will resume at a 
later date. 

(Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m.. May 
22, 1987.) 



Signature of the Witness 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day 

of 1987. 



Notary Public 



My Conaission Expires: 



y 






.u 




749 

, ,€O0EVpm^ 

Stenographic Transcript or 

HEARINGS ^^^^^^v 

Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



TESTIMONY OF ROBERT L. EARL 
Friday, May 22, 1937 



()0V5) 



Washington, D.C. 



-T O P SECRET eODEWei^ 




ALDERSCN ^PORT-r G 



^ (202) 623-9300 

a/Mj DeclasSflar/EelcaSd aJllV».i««8a ^° ^ street, n-W- 

imAi, «-^u r^» :ir5*^*^-^ 'WASHINGTON , D . C . ' 20001 

»Jnderpjw6Ion3 Of £0.1235? ilMAI HOOiri^rn 

by 2. Reggr, National Security Cnnnrii MWf'l H^}^"!' tM 



750 



751 



NCLASSSFSED 

TOP CEOniiT/ eOPE WORD -- 1 

1 TESTIMONY OF ROBERT L. EARL 

2 ■ Friday, May 22, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Continued deposition of ROBERT L. EARL, called 

9 as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, at the 

10 offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate 

11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 9^5 

12 a.m., the witness having been previously duly sworn, and 

13 the testimony being taken down by Stenomask by ANNE 

14 PELLECCHIA HOROWITZ and transcribed under her direction. 
15 



OHCLASSIFIED 

TO? JECnET/CODEW O R D 



752 



DMCLASSifSED 

TOP OCCRET/eODCWOnD . 2 

1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 ARTHUR LIMAN, ESQ. 

6 Chief Counsel 

7 MARK BELNICK, ESQ. 

8 Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel 

9 TERRY SMILJANICH, ESQ. 

10 VICTORIA NOURSE, ESQ, 

11 On behalf of Senator Mitchell: ■* 

12 RICHARD A. ARENBERG 

13 Administrative Assistant 

14 On behalf of the House Select Committee to 

15 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

16 RICHARD J. LEON, ESQ. 

17 Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 

18 On behalf of the witness: 

19 DENNIS DEAN KIRK, ESQ. 

20 Suite 1213, National Place 

21 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

22 Washington, D. C. 20004 
23 



TOP OCCRCT/CODDV ' fOnP 



ED 



753 



TOP OCCnDT/GODDWORB 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 



WITNESS 
Robert L. Earl 

By Mr. Belnick 



CONTENTS 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 
SENATE HOUSE 



EXHIBITS 



EARL EXHIBIT NX^BER 
lA 



FOR IDENTIFICATION 

96=. 



TOP CEOnCT/GODEWOR D 



754 



UNCLASS3FSED 

TO P aEeRCT/CODCWORD . 4 

1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon , 

3 ROBERT L. EARL, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been previously duly sworn, 

6 was further examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE - Resumed 

8 BY MR. BELNICK: 

9 Q Colonel Earl, you recognize you are still 

10 under oath? 

11 A ■ Yes. ^ • 

12 Q We will continue with your notes from last 

13 time. We are up to numbered page 61, which is May 19, 

14 1986. There is a reference to^^^^^^^^^Hand then under 

15 it "1300 CIA" and there are somenames^^^^^^^B Secord, 

16 Earl, North, et cetera. Could you please explain those 

17 notes? 

18 A I think that the arrow coming down tends to 

19 point up to the line and that the two are related, and 

20 that because of this 1300 CIA appointment with these 

21 folks, the appointment with^^^^^^^^^was going to have 

22 to be moved to 1600, so I think they are related in terms 

23 of scheduling but not substance. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^1 had nothing to do with the 

25 meeting? 

T OP SECRCT/CODCWORD 



^NGLASSiFSED 



755 



^LASSfFBED 

TOP 6 ECIIET/C0DEW0R & 



1 A The meeting was Secord, Earl, ^^^^^^H Cave, 

2 and Dunn at CIA. 

3 Q He will be delighted to have had you so 

4 confirm. I take ^^^^^^^^^^B ^^^ nothing to do with 

5 the Iran compartment or anything else we are looking at, 

6 right? 

7 A No. As we talked last time, it was strictly 

8 he was a consultant or one of the persons we talked to on 

9 the task force, although this is May. 
10, Q May '86? 

11 A I'm not quite sure who we had an appointment 

12 with or why on this date, it was probably with Colonel 

13 North, but I'm not sure. That would probably show up on 

14 his appointments calendar. It was not related; that much 

15 I'm pretty sure of. 

16 Q Okay. Old you have the meeting wlthl 

17 Secord, North, ^^^^^H Cave, and Dunn that's recorded on 

18 the May 19 entry? 

19 A Do you know what day of the week? It must be 

20 a weekday. 

21 Q He can find out. I don't have it offhand. We 

22 need a 1985 calendar — '86, rather. 

23 A I recall a meeting. 

24 MR. LIMAN: You indicated you asked whether it 

25 was a weekday. Is that because you recall a meeting on a 

TOP OCCRET/ CODEW O R D 



vJS- 



m^m 



756 



UNSLASSIFED 

TOP aCCRnT/CODCWORD - 6 

1 weekend? 

2 THE WITNESS: That's what I started to think 

3 about, but now I'm not sure. There is more than one 

4 meeting. I have a visual recollection of one in the DDO. 

5 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

6 Q Clair George? 

7 A Clair George's office. I was thinking that 

8 was a weekend, but now I'm not sure. It might have been 

9 a weekday as well. But there were other meetings in 

10 weekdays because I can recall one. At one of the 

11 meetingis — it may not be the one with Clair George*^ but 

12 on one of the meetings coming out through the front 

13 entrance there were all kinds of people coming and going. 

14 It was clearly a weekday. 

15 And I also have a recollection of coming in 

16 the back entrance on a weekend when nobody was around, 

17 but that one may not have been the May time frame. That 

18 may have been leading up to one of the later releases. 

19 Q I have a calendar. May 19, 1986 was a Monday. 

20 A Okay. I can't, independently of this, recall 

21 that yes, it occurred on that day. It's probable that it 

22 did, but it would have been one of the lead-up meetings 

23 prior to the Tehran visit by McFarlane, North and others, 

24 dealing with all the operational and logistics aspects of 

25 the Tehran thing, trip. 

TO ? SECRET/CODEWO RD 



UN^^LASSIFED 



757 



■POP OCCRC T /CODEWOR B- 7 

1 Q Okay. Going dovm the page, still on page 61, 

2 there is a reference to Nir with some numbers. is that a 

3 description of him physically — 5 '7", 155 pounds? 

4 A Yes. 

5 Q What was the purpose of that entry? 

6 A The purpose of that e ntry was to have his 

7 physical particulars so that his^^^^Hpassport could be 

8 prepared. ^^^^^ 

9 Q Okay. Let's move on. The next page I have 

10 marked is page 57 of your notes, and from the surrounding 

11 pages this is still May 1986. You will notice near the 

12 bottom of the page it says "Weinberger", then "Casey, 

13 George ,^^^^^^^BClarridge, Cave, Allen, Shultz, Koch" 

14 K-o-c-h. 

15 A Koch, Noel Koch, yes. 

16 Q Now I want to go over this entry in some 

17 detail. Let me ask you first who was Noel Koch? 

18 A Okay. Noel Koch was — I'm not sure of his 

19 exact title, but he was a fairly senior Department of 

20 Defense official in OSD and worked, I believe, for 

21 Richard Armitage, was a deputy to Richard Armitaga. 

22 Q Did you meet Koch in connection with the Iran 

23 initiative? 

24 A I don't think so, but let me just read this 

25 and refresh my memory on this entry. 

TOP □CeRB T / e ODEWORD 



758 



UNCIASSSF.'^D 



TOP aricnFT/cTonEWQBn . 8 

1 Q You are looking at the notes on page 57. You 

2 can start anywhere. I have just marked the bottom 

3 portion of the page. 

4 A The bottom is what you are interested in? 

5 Q Yes. 

6 A May we go off the record for a minute? 

7 Q Yes. 

8 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

9 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

10 Q Back on the record. Please proceed. 

11 A I'm not positive of this, but from the 

12 context, particularly the last two entries, I think that 

13 this is an attempt to come to grips with who was in the 

14 compartment and to what extent they are in the 

15 compartment as far as knowing compartments within 

16 compartments. So it is a listing of people who know at 

17 least some of which, some of the compartment, the Iran 
13 compartment. 

19 Q Where did you get the list from? 

2 A I think it was from Colonel North. That would 

21 be my best guess, but I don't have a distinct 

22 recollection of how I acquired that. 

2 3 Q You can't recall in what context you got it? 

24 A No. It's possible it was related to some of 

2 5 these workups out at CIA and getting me up to speed on my 
TOP aCCRIjiI'/OODEWOnP 



yNCLASS'^lD 



759 



UNCLASS^rED 

Tnr "irrnrTi ' rn nKM n n n 9 

1 portions of the operation. 

2 Q I was going to ask about this entry under Vice 

3 President. Does that say "Fuller knows some of it"? 

4 A Yes, it does. 

5 Q That's a reference to Craig Fuller? 

6 A Craig Fuller, yes. 

7 Q Do you know which part of it he was familiar 

8 with? 

9 A No, I don't think so. I think my knowledge at 

10 the time was strictly that. 

11 Q Don Regan knows some of it? Is that who this 

12 is a reference to, Regan? 

13 A Well, it's written Reagan. 

14 Q I understand. Who did you mean? 

15 A I'm not sure. It's quite possible I miswrote 

16 and meant Regan, but I don't know. 

17 MR. LIMAN: May I ask, on this part you 

18 indicate President, Vice President and Poindexter on top. 

19 THE WITNESS: As being in the compartment. 

20 MR. LIMAN: As being in the compartment. And 

21 then after them you list Reagan. 

22 ■ THE WITNESS: And I think I mean Regan. 

23 MR. LIMAN: You think you mean Don Regan on 

24 that? 

25 THE WITNESS: I think so. I'm not positive, 

TOP SE C Rg T / e ODEWOnO 



UNCLASS^FED 



760 



UNCLASS^r'^F^ 



TOP gECnET/CODEWOnP 10 

1 but, as you correctly point out, it doesn't make any 

2 sense. It's a redundant listing of the President, so I 

3 think it must mean Regan, even though I wrote it Reagan. 

4 MR. LIMAN: And the date of this note? 

5 MR. BELNICK: There is no date, but it looks 

6 like it's May 19. 

7 MR. LIMAN: And, as I understand it, by May 19 

8 you had been told that some of the money from the 

9 proceeds would be funneled to the contras? 

10 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure exactly when I knew 

11 that. 

12 MR. LIMAN: But you knew it in time in 

13 connection with the Tehran trip, as I understand your 

14 prior testimony is when you place it. 

15 THE WITNESS: I think that's the best guess. 

16 I cannot be positive exactly when, but I think the best 

17 guess is that it's in this general time frame of workup 

18 toward the Tehran trip. 

19 MR. LIMAN: Now, when you are talking about 
2 people knowing some of it, others knowing more of it, I 

21 mean, you are indicating that people know parts of it. 

22 Are you including in that compartment, what you call 

23 compartment, the diversion of money to the contras? 

24 THE WITNESS: My knowledge in writing this 

25 note would not refer specifically to any particular fact 

iUP SELKLiyCUUEWURD 



uncla3sl^:ed 



761 



TOP cecdkt/codewpb . d'^ 11 

1 or part but merely generically that there is a big box, 

2 referring to the whole Iran operation, and that there are 

3 boxes within that or parts of that. But it doesn't refer 

4 to any particular sub-box or sub-compartment. 

5 MR. LIMAN: As you looked at it conceptually, 

6 you see a compartment as a box which contains 

7 information. 

8 THE WITNESS: Correct. 

9 MR. LIMAN: And that information is secret 
10 information, whether it's top secret or codeword, but 
IX it's secret information; correct? 

12 THE WITNESS: It is classified information of 

13 varying degrees of classification. But it is all further 

14 compartmentalized and treated as a compartment separate 

15 from its classification, and it may even include 

16 unclassified data that is still compartmented. 

17 MR. LIMAN: Now, if I can think of it in terms 

18 of a box which may have different drawers in it because 

19 it is sub-compartmentalized, within this general box of 

20 Iran did you consider the diversion of funds to the 

21 contras to be part of it? 

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 

23 MR. LIMAN: I'm sorry. 

24 THE WITNESS: Being at least one part. It may 

25 have been the innermost box or it may have overlapped 

TO P ShC RET/CgpgWOR& 



0NC11SS.^?^ED 



762 



UMCLASS^rED 



TOr OEOnET/GODCHORB - 12 

1 with other sub-boxes, but it was within that compartment, 

2 yes. 

3 MR. LIMAN: And do you know now whether when 

4 you talked about the fact that people knew some of it 

5 whether you were referring to the fact that they did not 

6 know that subpart involving the contras? 

7 THE WITNESS: I do not know whether that 

8 referred either way on that issue. It may or may not 

9 have been part of it. 

10 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

11 Q But if there is no qualification, if you are 

12 just listing the people who know about it, then, as you 

13 understood it, they knew about the whole box? 

14 MR. KIRK: Off the record for a second. 

15 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

16 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

17 Q Back on the record. 

18 A The answer to your question is that no, when I 

19 wrote that I don't think I necessarily meant that even 

2 the people who have no caveats attached implied that they 

21 knew absolutely everything in the box. But it was some 

22 sort of differentiation of people that clearly were only 

23 in part of it, kind of incidentally, whereas the other 

24 people were generally in the box, not necessarily knowing 
2 5 all of it, however. 

TO P SELKh ' iVLUtJEWORP - 



nNCl"^G5:^^ED 



763 



L^NCLASSLIED 



9 0V OEGnCT/GODCWORD 13 

1 Q Who is Don Jones? 

2 A I don't know. I'm not getting a recollection 

3 at all. I don't know. 

4 Q But why did you make the note? Why was it 

5 relevant to you to know who was in the box in whole or in 

6 part? 

7 A What's the next page? Could I see the page 

8 above it so I can get the context on both sides? 

9 Q Certainly. 

10 (Pause.) 

11 A Can we go back one further page, please? 

12 Q Sure. So now the witness has pages 56, 7,8 

13 and 9 before him. 

14 (Pause.) 

15 A Okay. And can we go forward until we get to 

16 the next date? 

17 Q Sure. 

18 MR. LIMAN: You can have all of your notes. 

19 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

20 Q Here is page 55. Here we go. Fifty-four 

21 starts a new date. It appears to start May 20. 

22 MR. LIMAN: And the trip was May 27. 

23 THE WITNESS: Okay. It appears that my notes 

24 of this meeting at CIA headquarters on 19 May began here, 

25 on page 59, and I was looking for how far they go 

TOP SECItt ' iV LUDE W ORI> - 



UNCnSS'fiiED 



764 



UNCLASS:/'£E> 



TOP CS C B S T/CO DE WO R O — 14 

1 through, and I can't find the exact stopping point. But 

2 I think — and I'm not positive of this — that we're 

3 still in the meeting on page 57, that this is some 

4 discussion in that meeting of who is in the compartment 

5 and who isn't for the purposes of all assembled to know 

6 who they could deal with and who not to deal with in 

7 implementing the op plan and effect the trip. 

8 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

9 Q Okay, fine. Thanks. 

10 MR. LIMAN: Now there was no discussion at 

11 that meeting of giving money to the contras? 

12 THE WITNESS: No. 

13 MR. LIMAN: So that when they were talking 

14 about who knew and who didn't know, they were talking 

15 really about the Iranian transaction as such? 

16 THE WITNESS: Correct. 

17 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

18 Q And you recall somebody saying at that meeting 

19 that Secretary Shultz knew about the Iranian — 

20 A That he was in the box generally. 

21 Q And so was Noel Koch? 

22 A Correct. 

23 Q And so was Don Jones, who you can't recall? 

24 A Yeah. I'm getting a blank on that name 

25 completely. I don't know who Don Jones is. 

Tor sgr?fT/^orifH"pr 



GNCLASSlFSED 



765 



"jnclass:?:ed 



TOP CECnCT/ CODEWORD ■ 15 

1 Q Did you know at that time that Teicher was 

2 going to Tehran? 

3 A Yes', I did. 

4 Q Teicher you knew was going to Tehran but 

5 nevertheless somebody said he only knew part of the 

6 compartment? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q And you can't recall now, as you answered to 

9 Arthur before, what part he knew and what part he didn't 

1 know? 

11 A No, although I have some related information 

12 before or after, I think after. My memory is that 

13 Teicher didn't know much of anything about the arms side 

14 of this and really only found out because he was in the 

15 airplane, and that's when he was formally brought into 

16 that part of it, or compartment. 

17 Q All right. We are moving now to page 4 5 of 

18 your notes, which don't have a date on them themselves 

19 but the nearest date at page 47 is 22 May 1986. The part 

20 that I'm interested in on 45 appears to be that — is 

21 that your code again? 

22 A That is — that wasn't my code. That was a 
2 3 Nir code. 

24 Q How would you have written this note? That 

2 5 is, were you taking it from the telephone? was somebody 



UMC'JS'^^"£D 



766 



UNCLASS.T'ED 



TOP S ee RET/ e ODEWORD 16 

1 comaunicating this to you? 

2 A Probably from the telephone, yes. 

3 Q And this is the code that we can break with — 

4 A That which you have. 

5 Q The document we have. You can't make any 

6 sense just out of looking at it, can you? 

7 A I think I might. 

8 Q Great. Go ahead. 

9 A The fi rst question from Nir is, are the 

10 passports^^^^H and my response to him was yes, or would 

11 have been to him yes. The second question is what is the 

12 tail number of the first — and I will need the code. . 

13 sheet to determine exactly, but tail number indicates to 

14 me aircraft, so he's asking for some aircraft tail 

15 number. And I have to get the code to see exactly which 

16 aircraft he is asking about, whether it's one coming into 

17 Tel Aviv or one to Tehran or what. 

18 How will it, the aircraft, identify itself to 

19 the tower in Iran? Saturday. And I think that's the end 

20 of that message. 

21 Q Okay. Then next entry that I have marked is 

22 at page 43, May 23, '86. And it's an entry in the middle 

23 of the page that refers to Rich Miller on the left, with 

24 the Lake Resources account number, "call Texas man", and 

25 on the right is Ross Perot. 

T OP SgCRg T / COD CWOR O 



UNCLASS'^ED 



767 



UNCLASSi^ED 



T Or SSC B BT/CODEWOnD 17 

1 I want you to take a look at that whole entry 

2 and then explain it to us, please. 

3 (Pause.) 

4 A Can I see — 

5 Q Sure. Which page would you like? 

6 A The one after this, 42. 

7 (Pause.) 

8 Q If you take a look at page 44, there are some 

9 references to Rich Miller on that page as well. 

10 A I'm just trying to get everything here. I'm 

11 still confused on it. 

12 (Pause.) 

13 I am not sure whether this is — 

14 Q Pointing to the note on page 43? 

15 A Right. A call that I received from Rich 

16 Miller with this information or if it's a note that 

17 Colonel North has given me to give to Rich Miller. 

18 That's why I'm looking for context and timing, to see if 

19 I can get which one of those two. But it seems to me to 

20 be one or the other. 

21 Q Do you think Rich Miller may have given you 

22 the Lake Resources account number? 

2 3 A That's possible. I don't know which way this 

24 goes. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Will this be the first time you 

■T OP 3ECRE T /'e O DCWORO 



UNCL^SSfED 



768 



-T OP CECRET/OODEWOni> 18 

1 had the Lake Resources account number? 

2 THE WITNESS: I think so. Previous to seeing 

3 this the first time, again about a month ago, I would 

4 have said that I didn't have any of that, and so I didn't 

5 realize that at one point that I had been given the 

6 account number for that. My recollection of account 

7 numbers was strictly when the CIA called me up and said 

8 the money hasn't arrived; here's our account number. 

9 They gave it to me very carefully so that I could make 

10 sure there was no error in passing the number on to 

11 Secord. 

12 But there are other numbers in my book as . 

13 well, such as this one, that I hadn't remembered. 

14 Let me set the general context because I'm 

15 still having trouble placing this exactly. This 

16 eventually involved the DEA operation with a group that 

17 had said that they would be able to obtain one or more 

18 hostages and turn them over to the DEA agents, and it 

19 eventually wound up being, the plan was to be an at-sea 

20 turnover. And this is connected to that. 

21 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

22 Q The note on page 4 3? 

23 A The note concerning Ross Perot is because Ross 

24 Perot's representative. Jay somebody, eventually came to 

25 my office. Colonel North's office where I was. Colonel 

T O P CECRCT/GODCWOnD 



UNCLA$S^?I9 



769 



T - Or CECnET/C ODB MOnD 19 

1 North was already abroad and was working the details of 

2 this out and eventually wound up flying to the region to 

3 be on board this ship for the turnover, if it had 

4 occurred. 

5 The reason that this is all confused in my 

6 mind is that at one point in this week or two-week 

7 period, working up and getting him briefed and getting 

8 all this information about the Iran trip. Colonel North 

9 had confided to me that the thing, that this whole 

10 process had so affected him that he had even conceived of 

11 a plan that he could get money from Ross Perot for the 

12 contras by having him deposit some money ostensibly for 

13 hostages, but that it would go to the contras. 

14 MR. LIMAN: Would you explain that more? 

15 THE WITNESS: Well, it was never clear to me, 

16 because when I first me with — 

17 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

18 Q Jay? 

19 A Jay, and this DEA operation was occurring, the 

20 remembrance of that conversation occurred to me, and I 

21 feared that we were in that. 

22 Q The remembrance of your conversation with 

23 Ollie? 

24 A Yes, that this was somehow related to that. 

25 And it turned out subsequently that I was wrong. 

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TOP CDOnCT/GOPE W O fiB- 20 - 

1 MR. LIMAN: But was what Colonel North said to 

2 you in sxibstance that the money that Perot had pleged to 

3 help get the hostages could be used for the contras? 

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

5 MR. LIMAN: And therefore you were concerned 

6 that when the Perot representative came to you, that that 

7 was what was occurring and then you found out that no — 

8 THE WITNESS: That it wasn't. 

9 MR. LIMAN: And that he was giving the money 

10 really for the hostages? 

11 THE WITNESS: Exactly. I was greatly reAeved 

12 once I realized what was actually occurring because that 

13 troubled me. I didn't mind at all taking the Ayatollah's 

14 money for that purpose. 

15 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

16 Q But taking Perot's would be something else. 

17 How much did Perot give? 

18 A I don't think he wound up giving anything. 

19 The DEA operation didn't materialize. There was no 

20 transfer at sea. And that's where I think the money was 

21 to have been transferred. I don't recall the amount, but 

22 I think it was on the order of $1 million that was being 

23 talked about for a transfer. 

24 Q Did Mr. Perot deliver any part of that? 

25 A Well, I think Jay, whatever his last name is~ 

Top aceRi!T/c oo Ew o nt> 



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T O P aCGRCT/OODDWOn P 21 

Q You can't recall his last name? 

A No, but I think it's probably in my notes 
elsewhere, had access to it out there. 

Q Access to? 

A The money, that he had brought it with him or 
he had picked it up en route at a bank, or that he was 
going to be the custodian of Ross Perot's money to affect 
the transaction, if it occurred, when the hostage 
materialized. 

Q, So far as you know, was any of Ross Perot '.s 
money delivered to North? 

A Not to my knowledge, no. 

Q Any walking around money, something to start 
the operation to give to the DEA agents? 

A Not that I know of, no. 

Q What was your meeting with Jay? 

A Well, again my recollection of this whole 
thing is very confused. But he came to the office to get 
more information about this operation that was occurring, 
and I was trying to fill him in about an operation I 
didn't understand. So I was not being very helpful to 
him because I didn't understand what was going on. 

At one point, I met, though, with a DEA agent 
and acquired more details from him on the operation so 
that I was able to then brief Jay and get the operation 
TOP OECRET/CODEWOnD 



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772 



UNCLASS^r^ED 



for OECnET/CODEMOnD - 2 2 

1 moving . 

2 One of the missing elements in the operation, 

3 as it began to evolve, was a boat, a sufficiently large 

4 and safe boat, on which to effect the transfer off the 

5 coast of Lebanon. And so I went to JCS to see if we had 

6 any naval vessels in the area that could be moved and 

7 serve as a platform and received the answer back that 

8 there was nothing at that point available in the eastern 

9 Mediterranean. 

10 Q Did you find a solution for the boat? 

11 A Yes. I then turned to Dick Secord, who was at 

12 that time in Tel Aviv, and explained to him that there's 

13 this operation that I'm not sure of. It appears to be 

14 occurring separate from the one we were working on 

15 Tehran, and that I couldn't get a boat from other 

16 sources. Did he have any ideas? And he did and was able 

17 to get and did move a boat to Cyprus. 

18 MR. LIMAN: Was that the Erria? 

19 THE WITNESS: I believe it was, yes. I'm not 

20 positive of that, but the name might occur in my notes 

21 and we could confirm that. 

22 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

23 Q Who suggested that you call General Secord 

24 about the boat? 

25 A I did. I was ad libbing without instructions 

TOP 3ECRg T /00DDW0RD 



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773 



UNCLASSiS'SED 



TOP GEGnET/CODEHOnD 23 

1 and went the Defense Department was unable to provide I 

2 knew that Colonel North had a lot of faith in General 

3 Secord and that he seemed to be a person that could get 

4 things done when the traditional bureaucracy could not. 

5 And so I was sharing my problem with him to see if he 

6 could help, and he could. 

7 Q You telephoned him in Tel Aviv? 

8 A Yes. I talked on the telephone. I'm not sure 

9 how we communicated. We may have used a KL-4 3 for that. 

10 I think we did, for protection of the information because 

11 it was obviously sensitive. 

12 Q How was Rich Miller connected to this DEA ' 

13 operation? 

14 A Well, that's where I'm drawing a blank. I 

15 don't know which way this occurs right now and the date. 

16 There is something about the date that isn't tracking 

17 right. 

18 Q May 23? It was a Friday, if that's any help. 

19 I, think they left for Tehran that day, didn't they? The 

20 mission, I think, took off on the 23rd and got under way. 

21 A I'm no longer certain. I'm pretty sure that 

22 Colonel North was gone at this point; otherwise, I would 

23 not have been groping for how to solve this problem. But 

24 I'm not positive. Like I say, it could have gone either 

25 way — either to Rich Miller or from Rich Miller. But I 

"T OP 3EGRET/G0DEV)0nD - 



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yNCLAdSjrJtiD 



TOP CEOnET/CO DB HO aD- 24 

1 think this is a call from Rich Miller telling me to call 

2 the Texas man, who would be Ross Perot, and give him — 

3 Q The Lake Resources information? 

4 A Give him this information, yes. 

5 Q Do you recall whether Rich Miller had any 

6 connection with the DEA plan, the DEA operation? 

7 A I don't recall any subsequent involvement, no. 

8 Q Or any involvement apart from telling you to 

9 give the Texas man this account number? 

10 A I don't believe so. I don't recall any right 

11 " now. 

12 Q Colonel North never discussed with you Rich 

13 Miller's role or knowledge of the proposed DEA operation? 

14 A Well, I don't think Colonel North discussed 

15 the DEA operation with me at all, which was part of my 

16 problem. 

17 Q How did you learn of it? 

18 A By putting everything together when this all 

19 started to occur and getting in contact with the DEA 

20 individual and getting the details on the DEA operation 

21 from him. 

22 Q Who is "he"? 

23 A I'd have to have my calendar — not calendar 

24 but list of phone numbers and names. It's one of the 

25 ones on there. 

TO P aCCnET/CODEWORD 



UNCLA3S:?'ED 



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UNCLAS52FES 



-?G P OEeRCT/CODEWORD — 25 

1 Q How did you know whether this was an 

2 authorized operation? 

3 A Okay. That's what I was looking for. Can we 

4 go off the record so I can read this? 

5 Q Yes, sure. Go right ahead. 

6 (Pause.) 

7 Back on the record. Colonel Earl? 

8 A Okay. One of the nam es that you earlier asked 

9 for, the DEA agent, ^^^^^^^^^^^B is one of at least two 

10 individuals that I knew Colonel North dealt with, that I 

11 talked to on the phone, and may be the one that I mA 

12 with in this time frame, although again it nay be the 

13 other one. I'm not sure. 

14 Q Was the other agent namec^^^^^ or was he one 

15 of the other agents? 

16 l^^^^^^i^^ Do y°u knovg^^^^^^|f irst name? Is it 
17 

18 Q I'm not sure. We'll check. 

19 A I think so, but I'm not positive. 

20 Q Having looked at some additional pages of your 

21 notes, and let the record reflect that the witness has 

22 before him pages numbered 40 through 44 of his notes, my 
2 3 pending question was how did you find out that this was 

24 an authorized operation in light of the fact that North 

25 hadn't discussed it with you and that you were picking up 

TO P 5 E CRET/G0DCW0nD 





^Mi 



776 



UNCLAOS'rEO 



TO f aCCnET/C O DEWORD 26 

1 bits and pieces. 

2 A Well, there Is later a message that I sent to 

3 Colonel North. 

4 Q Reflected on page 41 of your notes? 

5 -A Forty-one, that lays out what is occurring 

6 back here in Washington that I'm trying to deal with and 

7 seeking his guidance. And subsequently he — I don't see 

8 in the notes — 

9 Q You recall? 

10 A I know that he confirmed to me about the DEA 

11 operation and I think even said yeah, that's one I flbrgot 

12 to brief you on or should have and didn't, or something 

13 to that effect. There's no question in my mind that 

14 after he got back to me, when I passed him the message 

15 about what was occurring, he informed me to pursue it, 

16 and 1 think confirmed my actions with Secord, that that 

17 was the right thing to have done and so forth. 

18 Q Did North ever tell you, either on that 

19 occasion or subsequently, who was in the DEA box? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Okay. If I may have the papers, and the note 
on page 40, in which you refer ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^'^ 

23 that's the DEA agent, and these notes are additional 

24 references to the proposed plan? 

25 A The DEA operation. There are people being out 

- TOP OEGRET/ COO EW O R P 



yNCLASS'HED 



777 



0NClA3S.f.^ED 



TOP accnET/coDDwonD 27 

1 in a particular place that I can tell you where, if you 

2 need to — 

3 Q It's not necessary. Page 39 of your notes, 24 

4 May, code name for Ross equals Ralph. Is that Ross 

5 Perot? 

6 A Correct. 

7 Q And this is more about the DEA operation? 

8 A Yes, I think so. Let me read the rest of it. 

9 (Pause.) ^^ 

10 Yes. The Ross Perot/DEA operation, yes. 

11 Q What does this mean "he balked at first plan 

12 depositing after delivery. He couldn't see second plan 

13 either, cash, messy, hard to get over holiday weekend. 

14 Wants failsafe plan since they ripped us off mvmr/ time." 

15 A This was what really raised the issue with me 

16 having to deal with Ross Perot's reservations with 

17 certain portions of the plan as he understood it, and 

18 that Jay was trying to acquire details for him. And not 

19 being familiar with the plan I couldn't resolve, and so I 

20 sun passing or making notes to myself to pass to Colonel 

21 North, giving him feedback on how the thing was evolving 

22 in Washington. 

23 Q What did you understand Jay to mean when he 

24 said that they have ripped us off every time? 

25 A "They" being, I think, the Iranians or whoever 

'T OP S CCRIIT/eODEW O nD 



yNCLASS^i'^Et) 



778 



yNCLA3S!/lD 



TOP OCCRET/CODCWOnD - 28 

1 was alleging that they could deliver the hostages — the 

2 Lebanese Shia or faction in Lebanon. 

3 Q Did you understand from Jay that there had 

4 been prior attempts that Perot was involved in to get the 

5 hostages out? 

6 A I don't think anybody said that explicitly, 

7 but by context in dealing with Jay there seemed to be a 

8 longstanding relationship. To me it seemed that they had 

9 dealt previously on hostage issues and so I was coming in 

10 midway along in the operation, that people had dealt with 

11 on this thing before. 

12 Q Okay. On page 3 3 you have a note in the 

13 middle of the page that reads: "JMP, RCM, and OLN — 

14 long relationship". What was that note all about? 

15 A I don't know. I'm getting a blank. It 

16 doesn't appear to be related to anything top or bottom. 

17 Q Those are Poindexter's, McFarlane's, and 

18 North's initials, right? 

19 A Yes, those are the three individuals, but I'm 

20 drawing a blank on what it means, why I wrote it. 

21 Q Okay. 

22 A Not right now. I can't place it. 

23 Q Does it help recalling this is the period they 

24 are in Tehran — McFarlane and North? 

25 A No. 

■ TOP CECnCT/GODCWORD - 



yNCLASS^^^ED 



779 



^NCIASS3??ED 



TOP OCCRCT/CODDWORD 29 

1 MR. LIMAN: Mark, can I ask some questions? 

2 MR. BELNICK: Yes. 

3 MR.' LIMAN: Did North tell you why they had 

4 selected Bud McFarlane for the trip? 

5 THE WITNESS: I don't think so, not 

6 explicitly. The question didn't really arise in my mind. 

7 It seemed logical to me, because of his previous 

8 involvement on it, that he could be an ideal intermediary 

9 because of his previous job — not in the government now 

10 — for this meeting with senior Iranian officials. It 

11 didn't occur to me to even ask the question. 

12 MR. LIMAN: Did you know that North had a • 

13 close relationship with McFarlane? It's been described 

14 as father-son by some people. 

15 THE WITNESS: I am aware of that now, but I'm 

16 not sure when I read those press reports or heard Mr. 

17 McFarlane having stated something to that effect. I 

18 think that may have been after May, but I'm not sure what 

19 I knew then. I think I knew that they had great respect 
2 for each other — it was mutual — at that time. 

21 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

22 Q Moving on to page 33, which appears to be a 

23 note from May 26, at the top of the page is that a report 

24 in from Tehran? 

25 A Can I see the page before? 

- TOP C ECRET/ CODE WOBD . 



UNCLASS^l'ID 



780 



mmsimo 



-?op gEcncT/ co DDwonp - 30 

1 Q Sure, page 34. 

2 (Pause.) 

3 A It appears to be my note that one of the radio 

4 calls back from Mr. McFarlane concerned the issue of 

5 whether to remain in Tehran to continue to negotiate, or 

6 to leave Tehran. But I'm not getting anything else on 

7 either side of it to give anything more than that. 

8 Q Can you — excuse me one moment. I have an 

9 emergency call here. Excuse me one second. 

10 (Pause.) 

11 Q When we broke we were looking at the message 

12 on page 33. So McFarlane was looking for guidance as to 

13 whether to stay in Tehran or to go. To whom was he 

14 addressing that question? 

15 A It would have been passed to Admiral 

16 Poindexter and ultimately the President. 

17 Q Do you recall passing the message to Admiral 

18 Poindexter? 

19 A Not specifically, but certainly anything that 

20 I got would have been passed to him either personally or 

21 in a phone call, or I would probably have gone over to 

22 see him. 

23 Q Do you have a recollection of what Admiral 

24 Poindexter told you? 

25 A No, not in the specific context of this remark 

TUP SELKi-T/LUDEHORD 



UNCLASS'FSED 



781 



UNCLASS^S^^ED 



T OP SECRE T /eODEWOnD 31 

1 and whether it occurred right here. My recollection is 

2 that Admiral Poindexter was involved whenever necessary 

3 in guiding the operation, and toward the later stages, as 

4 it turned out that the Iranians were expecting something 

5 different than what we had in our understanding — 

6 whether it was miscommunication or deliberate deception 

7 on Ghorbanifar's part and there was not this meeting of 

8 the minds as had been hoped — that there were extensive 

9 secure voice radio calls direct between Admiral 

10 Poindexter and Bud McFarlane. 

11 So that they would have worked out that sort 

12 of thing, the tactics of the negotiations, directly. I 

13 only could hear Admiral Poindexter 's side of the 

14 conversation, although CIA can give you both sides. 

15 Q All three sides, in fact. 

16 At the bottom of page 3 3 there is a note "Jay 

17 in D. C. tomorrow". That refers to Perot's 

18 representative? 

19 A Let me look. Yes. 

20 Q And then part of that note reads: "0100 

21 Beirut, Wednesday — transfer." I guess that's referring 

22 to the proposed plan. 

23 A The proposed transfer of a hostage, yes. 

24 Q As part of this DEA operation, correct? 

25 A Correct. 

-?eP- SECRET/ CO DEVJORD 



yNCLASS:?3ED 



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UNeLASS!F3E0 



^OP SSCRET/CODEWORfl 32 

1 Q Then the note reads: "300K immediately to 

2 Lebanon to show good faith". Who told you that $300,000 

3 had to be transferred immediately to Lebanon to show good 

4 faith? 

5 A May I see the next page after this one? 

6 Q You have page 34 and 33. Here is page 32, 

7 which does have a note about the PEA. It 's dated May 26. 

A In there ^^^^^^^^^^^1 
9 Q Then it says "Earl to Copp. I met with^ 

10 to get more details", et cetera. 

11 (Pause.) 

12 A I think that this would have — that I would 

13 have received this information, particularly your 

14 information about the $300K, froi^^^^^^^^^^^^ either 

15 by phone or by personal meeting. I'm not sure which. 

16 They were the ones who were dealing with the faction that 

17 was claiming to have some control or suasion over the 

18 hostages, the hostage-holders, and would be able to, 

19 however they were going to obtain, at least one, that 

20 there was a wrinkle in the negotiations, that this was, 

21 from their side, the faction's side, a request that was 

22 being relayed to help move this thing along. 

23 Q Now did you understand the factions were 

24 asking for ransom payments? 

25 A Well, it's not clear to me exactly how this 

TOP GECnCT/CODEWORD 



yHeiA3S5?:£S 



783 



yNCLASS'.rED 



T OP S EGnET/C O DEWORI> 3 3 

1 thing was going to occur. It was that through DEA's 

2 contacts with this faction and their cooperation or work 

3 together in the past on other things led to this offer 

4 from the faction's side of some ability to be able to get 

5 their hands on at least one hostage and maybe more, and 

6 this that was involved would be transferred to the 

7 faction that would be delivering. 

8 Now what that money was going to be used for 

9 by the faction was never clear, whether they were going 

10 to use it to pay off the hostage-holders, in effect 

11 acting as an intermediary on the bribe or ransom, or 

12 whether it was going to be used to fund whatever their 

13 operation was to acquire this hostage. That was never 

14 laid out. 

15 Q But our side of it — that is, the U.S. side 

16 of it — was to pay money in exchange for getting the 

17 hostages out? 

18 A It was to pay money to the faction. The 

19 transfer at sea would have been one hostage put on the 

20 boat and $1 million would be delivered to the faction — 

21 not the hostage-holders but the faction that had acquired 

22 the hostage from the hostage-holders. 

23 Q Do you know whether this faction was part of 

24 the hostage-holding group or not? 

25 A I knew they were not. 

TOr OECnET/CODEWOa P 



UNCLASSSS'ED 



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VoP^CC - R E T,tcODgwonD • * ^' 34 



1 Q How did you know that? 

2 A Well, I know what faction is and I know it's 

3 not the faction that's holding the hostages. 

4 Q Okay. 

5 A Off the record? 

6 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

7 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

8 Q Okay. Let's go to page 31, notes that appear 

9 still to be on May 26 referring to Tehran. It starts: 

10 "For JMP, guidance on team split or Bud's call". 

11 A I'll read it for you, if you want me to.* 

12 Q Why don't you read the notes? You will 

13 recognize them better. 

14 A Let me just read quickly both sides. 

15 (Pause.) 

16 All right. Okay. This is a note that I am to 

17 deliver to Admiral Poindexter. Three points. Point 

18 number one is that the team in Tehran needs guidance on 

19 the issue of whether — guidance on whether the team 

20 should split up, that some portion of the team should 

21 return, which would probably be Bud and some of the 

22 others, and that a residual would remain to continue to 

23 negotiate, and that there were some hopeful signs, but 

24 because of the mismatch on understanding at the beginning 

25 that it was taking time to build confidence and converge 

-^eP-SECRET7^ D EW0RD - 



I3NCLRSS!?^B 



785 



,A3S!?JED 



^ OP OECRET/C ODS W O RD - 3 5 

1 on the solution — whether that would be a decision taken 

2 in Washington by Admiral Poindexter and the President or 

3 whether it would be delegated to Bud McFarlane to make 

4 that judgment. 

5 Secondly, do you know the time of Bud's 

6 requirement here Thursday? One of the driver's for Bud's 

7 return was that he had a speaking engagement or some kind 

8 of obligation in Washington and so he would be missed 

9 from that and op sec would be jeopardized if the press 

10 began to pick up that he was gone from Washington for 

11 this period. So it was an op sec worry — operational 

12 security. 

13 And three. Bud's wife, home. 

14 Q We can pass that one. 

15 A I think it's personal. 

16 Q I'm sure it is. 

17 Moving down the page, it says: "Bud, extreme 

18 paranoia, met by Ghorba and^K et cetera. What are 

19 those notes about? 

20 A This is a note from Bud McFarlane which is a 

21 recap of some of the issues, the status of the 

22 negotiations as they are occuring there for me to pass to 

23 Admiral Poindexter and further up the chain. Do you want 

24 me to explain them? 

25 Q If you would. 

)DCWOnD - 



UNCLASS^^^ED 



786 



UNCIASSjFJED 



' ^Or CECP .E T/CeDgWOR& — 36 

1 A That our team in Tehran had been met by Ghorba 

2 and one other person, who I prefer not to name. 

3 Q An Iranian, correct? 

4 A Correct. That there was extreme paranoia in 

5 the country amongst the Iranians, although we knew that 

6 going in. Just going there and seeing it firsthand and 

7 observing it made it even more crystal clear that it was 

8 not rubbish, that it was real, that these folks were 

9 paranoid about us and that that was one of the problems 

10 with getting cooperation, that this first meeting was 

11 only a foundation meeting, as the way it turned out, that 

12 there had been a bad faith accusation that not all the 

13 supplies were delivered quickly on their part when the 

14 team arrived without the 500 TOW parts, which was 

15 apparently the misunderstanding between the two sides, 

16 that the Iranians claimed at least that they thought the 

17 500 parts would arrive, and so they accused us of bad 

18 faith. 

19 And Bud is saying here that they were able to 

20 explain that very quickly, the miscommunications between 

21 the two sides, and I think most people recognized that 

22 Ghorbanifar was instrumental in causing that 

23 miscommunication by his telling each side what he thought 

24 it wanted to hear and not being a faithful intermediary. 

25 Our plan had been to leave the crew on the 

TOP SEcnE r /c o DCwor. D. 



UNCLASS^FlED 



787 



^^NCl.^i3-^.TTi 



TOP 3EGgFT/i: DEWOR D 37 

1 airplane to protect the airplane, the TOW parts that were 

2 on it and so forth, and that they didn't stand for that 

3 and removed the crew from the airplane, but that they 

4 eventually apologized for having done that. Again, that 

5 was their first reaction on paranoia, but as they began 

6 to talk to us they began to realize that they had 

7 overreacted. 

8 However, they still cannot overcome the trauma 

9 of speaking with the great Satan. That is still a hangup 

10 with them. The paranoia is real. And that Bud had 

11 stressed to one of the Iranian intermediaries at this 

12 meeting that we must first remove the obstacle, the 

13 principal obstacle, all the obstacles to the 

14 normalization of relations with the United States. In 

15 other words, the hostage issue is the sine qua non. 

16 without that, we cannot proceed with the development of 

17 the strategic relationship, that that was an obstacle, 

18 and Bud reinforced that with the Iranian side. 

19 So that we accomplished that firsthand, 

20 direct, for the first time. We've made that point in the 

21 past to them, but never direct, and now we were making it 

22 direct to them without this intermediary who was 

23 filtering everything. 

24 A couple of milestones that had been obtained 

25 in this meeting, that with the time of several days of 

■ top SCGriDT/ CODEW ORD 



yNCLa3S;?ID 



788 



UNCLflSS^FID 



TOP SEeRCT>'C O DEWORD - 38 

1 face-to-face negotiation that both sides apparently 

2 agreed that they would end the rhetoric on both sides and 

3 that they would begin to talk to each other on substance 

4 without rhetoric, and that we needed to establish 

5 communications directly between us and exactly the 

6 mechanics of that weren't worked out from the U.S. side. 

7 They wanted to have an actual team there to pass secure 

8 information direct, but that was one proposal. But at 

9 least the principle of establishing direct communications 

10 between the two sides was recognized on both sides. 

11 Two other points, one of which I didn't get 

12 around to writing. It could have been — well, I don't 

13 know what it was, but number two was that there would be 

14 no further terrorist attacks against us, the United 

15 States. That was again emphasized directly to them. We 

16 previously had made that clear to them, but we never 

17 really knew for sure that they had received it and 

18 understood it and that it wasn't negotiating posturing on 

19 our part, as conveyed by Ghorba, but that Bud felt he had 

20 made that clear to them and they understood it. 

21 But the bottom line was that further 

22 maturation of this relationship was going to be painfully 

23 slow and it was just going to take a lot of time, that it 

24 was not going to be easy. It was something where we had 

25 been wrong, I guess, in thinking that we had had this 

I ' UP biLLKLl ' /CODEWORD 



uncl;^sss/"b 



789 






39 



1 meeting of the minds enough that we could clearly expect 

2 instant results, as in all the hostages to be obtained 

3 for us and delivered and then go from there, that it was 

4 going to be much more difficult than that. 

5 Q Thank you very much. On page 30, at the 

6 bottom of the page, which refers to the M. S. Erria, and 

7 has other lines, am I right these notes again refer to 

8 the ongoing DEA operation and Dick, who I take it is 

9 Secord? 

10 A Correct. 

11 Q Is telling you that on May 27, 1986, per this 

12 note, that the Erria is now on station in effect ready, to 

13 receive the hostages? 

14 A Correct, yes. 

15 Q Was there any discussion anywhere at this time 

16 as to whether the DEA operation which was going forward 

17 and the Tehran meeting, which was simultaneously going 

18 forward, were inconsistent with one another? 

19 A I don't recall any specific addressal of that 

20 subject in this time frame. More generally, though, 

21 relevant to your question is a strategy, if you will, 

22 that my observation is that the U.S. side was adopting on 

23 the hostage issue, which was to proceed simultaneously on 

24 multi fronts in that there were so many dry holes out 

25 there as to what would succeed that you couldn't put all 

T OP SECRET/ CODDWQg . D . 



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1 your eggs in one basket and try one approach, and that 

2 that would be the most effective way to go at the hostage 

3 issue, that because there were so many dry holes you had 

4 to take that risk of occasional interference between a 

5 couple of your initiatives, but that you had to 

6 simultaneously proceed on a wide variety of fronts in the 

7 hopes that eventually one would pan out and lead to 

8 results. 

9 Q Did Colonel North ever talk to you — strike 

10 that. Let me start with Admiral Poindexter. Did Admiral 

11 Poindexter ever convey to you a sense of the President's 

12 view on the hostages? That is, we've heard that the 

13 President was personally consumed with the problem of the 

14 Americans held hostage and with the desire to obtain 

15 their release. Did Admiral Poindexter ever give you any 

16 sense of the President's feelings on that matter? 

17 A Well, let me answer that in a couple of ways. 

18 I'm not recalling a specific instance exactly as you have 

19 asked the question, did Admiral Poindexter say the 

20 President said such and such, but in this particular time 

21 frame — 

22 Q May '86. 

23 A I was getting pretty instantaneous almost, 

24 pretty direct and rapid feedback from the meetings that 

25 Admiral Poindexter would attend with the President. For 

- r ep gg e RCT/coDEwonD 



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■ TOP 3 g CRL: 'i' / 00 ULWUKU 41 

1 example, whenever there was an issue to be resolved, as 

2 in some of the ones we referred to asking for guidance, 

3 split the team and so forth, that Admiral Poindexter 

4 would almost immediately thereafter or very soon 

5 thereafter brief the President. 

6 Q While the Tehran mission was in progress? 

7 A Yes. The President received daily briefings 

8 on it and usually more than once a day, I would say, that 

9 he was being briefed on the ongoing operation. X don't 

10 have a specific recollection of feedback from those 

11 meetings, although there may be something in the notes. 

12 But my general recollection is that the 

13 President was being briefed on the status of the 

14 operation, was aware of it, understood it, disappointed 

15 as we all were with the slowness of it and some of the 

16 problems, but — well, I can't really go much further 

17 than that. 

18 Then, wider than that, not just this time 

19 frame or Admiral Poindexter, I had a generalized 

20 knowledge of an intense interest and concern for the 

21 hostages, the hostage issue, the hostage families. 

22 Q On the part of the President? 

23 A On the part of the President. One of the 

24 recommendations, for example, that I got involved with on 

25 the Vice President's Task Force, because there were 

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1 hostage family meetings being asked for in that time 

2 frame with the President, was a proposal to, if you will, 

3 protect the President from the emotional pressures of 

4 such a meeting by announcing publicly a policy that while 

5 there were hostages held by, whether it is an Achille 

6 Lauro or TWA 4 07, or a short-term thing or long-term 

7 thing such as the Tehran one, the Tehran one during the 

8 Carter Administration, or this one in Lebanon, that the 

9 President, at least the President but perhaps also the 

10 Vice President, but at least the President would announce 

11 that it was a policy not to meet with hostage families so 

12 that he would not personally be subjected to the emotion 

13 of a distraught family coming in and making this 

14 humanistic, this human appeal to his heart to do certain 

15 things that in a more deliberate and considered fashion 

16 and objective, considering the welfare of 230 Americans 

17 and the implications for hostage-taking in the future, 

18 might not be in the national interest of the country but 

19 would be, if your scope, if your focus was strictly this 

20 one hostage or this group of hostages and their families, 

21 that the hostage family interest didn't necessarily 

22 coincide with the U.S. government interests in this 
2 3 particular aspect. 

24 Generally we wanted the hostages back. We 

25 certainly had coincidence of objective in that, but the 

T O P 3EGRCT/C0DEW0nD 



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1 tactics one would use and what one would be prepared to 

2 do to effect that did not necessarily coincide. I and 

3 others tried to float that idea as a policy and it was 

4 considered in the interagency process. It was a very 

5 sensitive one, but ultimately it was not accepted and it 

6 was not printed up in the VP Task Force report. 

7 But my involvement with that caused me to 

8 realize how sensitive an issue this was politically, that 

9 even though our people would acknowledge the merit of 

10 that argumentation rationally, objectively, still there 

11 was a political constraint against appearing to be 

12 insensitive by announcing that you weren't going to meet 

13 with hostage families, that that was considered to be 

14 unacceptable politically, even though it would help the 

15 President to be more objective, to remain objective in 

16 dealing with hostage issues, that the Administration 

17 could not be that callous as not to meet with hostage 

18 families. 

19 So I am aware of that whole discussion. I am 

20 aware of hostage family meetings that were held with the 

21 President and Vice President, and in all cases, as the 

22 drafters of this proposal had anticipated, the principals 

23 involved — the President and the Vice President — were 

24 very much affected personally and emotionally with the 

25 families and their appeal. And it just can't help but 

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1 have some impact on an individual. 

2 So my own feeling from dealing in bits and 

3 pieces of this is that the President was emotionally 

4 affected by the human concern of getting the hostages 

5 back for the families, doing what he could. 

6 Q And here was the additional concern also, 

7 wasn't there, of Mr. Buckley. 

8 A Oh, very much so. While there was always some 

9 — the two cases of Mr. Buckley- on the one hand, and 

10 other hostages, private citizen hostages as opposed to 

11 U.S. Government employees on the other, were always 

12 considered at least different in the sense that one was 

13 there under orders from the U.S. Government and, 

14 therefore, the government had a very strong obligation to 

15 protect that individual and try to effect his return. 

16 Similarly with private people, but not as — 

17 the other case was even stronger. But there was a 

18 general sense of obligation for any U.S. citizen that 

19 happened to find himself in this situation. It was 

20 mitigated a bit by the fact that the State Department had 

21 over years been putting out travel advisories and that 

22 these people had, by their own choice, chosen to ignore 
2 3 the travel advisories and remain in a very dangerous 

24 area, Beirut and Lebanon in general, since the civil war, 

25 and that, therefore, they were on their own initiative, 

TOP OCCnET/CODSW ORD 



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^OP OCCRET/CO DB WOnD 45 

1 placing themselves in harm's way, which is quite 

2 different from the U.S. Government employee who was being 

3 directed by his government to go into that situation. 

4 So there was some difference there. 

5 Q Did you ever hear Director Casey talk on the 

6 subject of the hostage release or Mr. Buckley's situation 

7 in particular? 

8 A No. I don't believe so. I was aware, again, 

9 by this juxtaposition of people and ambience, really, of 

10 dealing with the Agency, my judgment would be that thQ 

11 CIA was consumed with this issue, that one of their own 

12 was in harm's way, and that they were doing everything' 

13 possible to try to seek his safe return, that they felt 

14 that obligation. 

15 Q Sure. I understand that. Did you hear that 

16 from any of the Agency people with whom you were dealing 

17 on the Iran initiative? 

18 A Not that I can recall explicitly. It's almost 

19 an irrelevant question to me. You didn't have to — 

2 although the extent of the consuming nature of it made an 

21 impact on me when I went out and visited another unit 

22 concerned with terrorism in general, not specifically the 

23 hostages. So they were peripherally involved, but not 

24 directly. 

25 There were some photographs or artist's 

TOP 3EeRJ. T /C0DgW0n[> - 



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- TOP SEeRE T /GODCtJORD 4 6 

1 Sketches — I forget which — luckily that had been 

2 prepared and that were up there on the wall showing 

3 before and after. 

4 Q This was at Langley? 

5 A Yes. The impact of this, that one of their 

6 own was in harm's way and needed help, was obvious to me, 

7 that people were very much concerned with this issue and 

8 trying to do what they could to get him back. 

9 Q Okay. Let's move on now to page 27 of your 

10 notes. Bob, which appear to be on — well, let's go to. 

11 page 28 first, which appears to be May 27, 1986, and it 

12 seems to be reporting secure telephone conversation 

13 between Admiral Poindexter and Bud McFarlane. Am I 

14 right? 

15 A Correct. 

16 Q Would you just review those notes for us and 

17 explain what they mean? 

18 (Pause.) 

19 A In this secure — well, it's telecom, but it's 

20 really via secure radio, but the instrtiment that Admiral 

21 Poindexter had in his hand was a telephone, in talking to 

22 Bud McFarlane the first point that Admiral Poindexter 

23 made was that he. Admiral Poindexter, had briefed the 

24 President on the first hard copy message that Mr. 

25 McFarlane had sent back, which was again — and if you 

T OP SECnCT/ CO B EWORfl 



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I 



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^Or S S Ca ET/CODEVfOR P 47 

1 have that message that might help me with later things. 

2 MR. LIMAN: We do have that. 

3 THE WITNESS: All right. That might help with 

4 the second point, because I am unaware of those 

5 conditions. 

6 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

7 Q While we are getting it, let me say that in 

8 the first meeting Mr. McFarlane reported that the 

9 Iranians who he saw imposed all kinds of conditions above 

10 and beyond whatever one thought had been agreed to, 

11 including Israel would get out of the Golan Heights and 

12 that the Da'Wa prisoners would be released and so on and 

13 so forth. 

14 MR. LIMAN: And that the arms had to be 

15 shipped first before they would release the hostages. 

16 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

17 Q Right. 

18 A Okay. I think those are the conditions 

19 Admiral Poindexter is referring to here. I am not sure 

20 of point number three, but I think it may be a reference 

21 to the proposal that was surfacing at that point in order 

22 to force the issue of launching the second 707 from Tel 

23 Aviv so that we could show good faith to them that they 

24 were en route, but we would still have control over it so 

25 that if they didn't deliver on their side that we could 

TO P aECRE T /eODEWORD 



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1 turn it around before it ever entered Iranian air space. 

2 But I 'IE not positive of that. 

3 Q Is that the turning around of the aircraft? 

4 A Possibly, but it nay be something else. But 

5 that's certainly one possibility, that that triggers. 

6 Q Let me stop you there. Do you recall whether 

7 an order was given during that trip for the second 

8 aircraft? 

9 A Oh, yes, that did happen. 

10 Q Who gave the order? 

11 A Well, I don't recall specifically. It seems 

12 to me it was Bud McFarlane, but my recollection is it- was 

13 cleared by everyone. I mean, everyone was aware of it. 

14 It was in these phone calls and hard copy messages back 

15 and forth discussing what to do to take action in 

16 response to the situation as we then saw it, that that 

17 was agreed to by everyone as the way we would proceed on 

18 attempting to put a little more pressure on their side 

19 and get some success out of this thing before the party 

20 left. 

21 Q Put more pressure on them by having the second 

22 ait'craft carrying the arms leave Tel Aviv? 

23 A Yes, so that the U.S. side could say they are 

24 en route now. You have sent your folks to deal with the 

25 hostage-holders. You show something from your side and 

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1 we will have, and they will be here in X number of hours. 

2 Q Did Admiral Poindexter approve that order, as 

3 far as you recall? 

4 A I can't recall specifically, but it's 

5 inconceivable to me that that would have occurred without 

6 Admiral Poindexter being aware of it and approving it. 

7 That wasn't something that — 

8 Q Same for the President? 

9 A — that anybody would have generated on his 

10 otm. 

11 Q The same for the President as you understood 

12 the chain of command in this? 

13 A I would assume so generally. Whether that 

14 specific level of detail of tactics would have been 

15 briefed and approved by the President, I don't know. But 

16 certainly the more general context in which that arose 

17 seemed to me to be going to the President. 

18 Q That order was given and then subsequently the 

19 order was reversed and the aircraft was sent back? 

20 A When they flew for several hours, two hours- 

21 something, when they came to that point, at which we were 

22 supposed to have something to show for it on the Iranian 

23 side, there was nothing and we were getting continued 

24 delaying and stalling tactics and the Iranians then — 

25 the aircraft was ordered to return. I think it had a 

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1 fail-safe built in. The crew was briefed that if they 

2 got no conununications at that point that they would turn 

3 around. 

4 So even if we had a radio problem we were not 

5 going to have inadvertent delivery of the second 

6 aircraft. 

7 Q Go to condition 4 on page 28 of your notes. 

8 What does that say and mean? 

9 A I think that — "what about the Wednesday New 

10 York conunitment" — 

11 Q Is that Bud's speech? 

12 A I think again that's the op sec problem of how 

13 do we deal with this speaking engagement that Bud had. 

14 Q Okay. 

15 A Then there is a reference to the plan at this 

16 point, at 10:43 Eastern Daylight Time, that the plan was 

17 to have the party depart, meaning local tomorrow, which 

18 would have been noon, local Tehran time, the next day. 

19 Q Arthur has the hard copy message from 

20 HcFarlane. 

21 MR. LIMAN: I will give it to you from the 

22 Tower report because it is easy to read there. It starts 

23 at B-lOO, which is their arrival, and it goes on to B- 

24 103, which is another hard copy. 

25 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

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1 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

2 Q Okay. Moving to the next note on page 27, 

3 which still seems to be May 27, is that a message from 

4 the top by Secord about a decision by the Prime Minister 

5 of Israel? 

6 A Correct. This is a message from Secord that I 

7 am to pass to Bud McFarlane and Colonel North. 

8 Q And what is the message? 

9 A The message is "Peres has directed Nir to 

10 return to Israel with Bud McFarlane". 

11 Q Did Secord give you any more information than 

12 just that directive? 

13 A I'm not positive, but I am getting an 

14 indistinct recollection that there was some issue of how 

15 the party would return and the routing and so forth, and 

16 it was a possibility of bypassing Israel on the way out 

17 in order to get Bud back for this meeting, if we were 

18 going to preserve op sec, and that this pertained to 

19 that, that Nir was wanted back in Tel Aviv. So I think 
2 that relates to the routing issue and the timing of the 

21 party coming out of Tehran. 

22 MR. LIMAN: May I ask you a question? In 

23 light of your prior recollection of a plane leaving, the 

24 notes that went back to Washington, including the May 2 7 

25 note, which is on B-115 of Tower, reflect a rather 

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1 persistent request by the Iranians that the second plane 

2 be allowed to leave and an obstinacy on the part of 

3 McFarlane, saying that he will not let the plane take off 

4 until the hostages are released? 

5 You may know that McFarlane has testified that 

6 while he was sleeping North directed that the plane take 

7 off and that McFarlane cancelled it. Does that ring a 

8 bell with you at all? 

9 THE WITNESS: No. 

10 MR. LIMAN: Do you have an actual recollection 

11 of these events about the second plane, or is it all just 

12 reconstruction of your notes? 

13 THE WITNESS: I think there might be some 

14 notes that might help. I have a distinct recollection of 

15 dealing with Secord on the communications with the 

16 airplane and talking to Tehran and implementing in real 

17 time the flight and the turnaround and that time frame. 

18 I know the airplane took off. I know it went to the 

19 turnaround point, and I know it returned. 

20 MR. LIMAN: But did anyone bring to your 

21 attention that there was a disagreement between either 

22 North and Secord — I mean, between McFarlane and Secord 

23 or McFarlane and Ollie on whether that plane should have 

24 taken off? 

25 THE WITNESS: No, not really. It's possible, 

TOP S EC RE T /e O PEWORD 



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■BT/€€>PEWCIRD, 53 

1 because it seems to me we had a very fluid situation here 

2 and a lot was not as we expected it. And so people were 

3 improvising and trying to decide how to deal with this 

4 situation and split the party or not, and this issue of 

5 part of the plane, did it at least go par'^ay, that it 

6 seemed to me, one, that the staff dealt with this 

7 proposal and that it would be approved or not approved as 

8 it was investigated, pros and cons weighed and so forth. 

9 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

10 Q , Take a look at the note on page 28. 

11 A Oh, that's good. Wait a minute. Which plane, 

12 though? 

13 (Pause.) 

14 Okay. This is good. 

15 Q Looking at the notes on page 28 ~ 

16 A Correct. I think this is a message from Bud 

17 rather than to Bud. 

18 MR. LIMAN: What does it say? 

19 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure of that now. Wait 

20 a minute. Anyway, the message either for or from him is 

21 "coming into a delivery", and I think that means 

22 hostages. Counsel points out the previous entry that 
2 3 puts it into some context. Guidance from Admiral 

24 Poindexter was to continue as planned. 

25 This is interim guidance for the party, that 

T OP SECRIIT/CODBWOnD 



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1 there are some issues pending for resolution, and the 

2 interim guidance is to continue as planned, but that 

3 there would be a call at 2:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, 

4 that Admiral Poindexter would call personally and resolve 

5 the pending issues, whatever they were. 

6 All right. Then down to the six points listed 

7 under Bud. One is commitment to delivery, and I think 

8 that refers to the hostages, the consummation of the 

9 deal, the hostages in exchange for parts. Secondly, that 

10 the aircraft is to take off tonight and I'm not positive, 

11 but I think that refers to the 707 that held the bulk of 

12 the HAWK parts. 

13 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

14 Q The second one. 

15 A The second aircraft. I'm not positive, but 

16 that's the way I read it right now. Point three — okay 

17 — is that if our Ambassador, the U.S. Ambassador in 

18 Beirut doesn't report that the hostages have showed up in 

19 Beirut, then the aircraft will turn around three hours 

20 after takeoff. 

21 Q So now you are more confident that those notes 

22 refer to the second aircraft? 

23 A Yes. Point four, that there will be follow-on 

24 meetings between the Iranian side and the U.S. side. 

25 This is eliminating the obstacle to progression of 

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1 relations. That would solve it; then there would be 

2 follow-on meetings and the relationship would continue to 

3 develop. 

4 Point five, that we, the U.S., would at least 

5 be open to receiving any follow-on requests for 

6 equipment. And, point number six, that at noon tomorrow, 

7 which is 0530 Eastern Daylight time, our team. Bud's 

8 team, departs. 

9 MR. LIMAN: What day is that message? 

10 THE WITNESS: You got me. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Is that the 27th? 

12 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

13 Q I think it's the 27th. 

14 A Let's see. Yes, the 27th is on both sides. 

15 MR. LIMAN: What time did they say they were 

16 going to depart? 

17 THE WITNESS: 0530 Eastern Daylight time is 

18 the departure of the team. And that's — what is it, 

19 seven and a half ~ it's 13 00. 

20 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

21 Q Yes, 1300 hours, 1:00 in the afternoon. 

22 A Tehran time. 

23 MR. LIMAN: Yes. 

24 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

25 Q So looking at those notes it's still your 

TOP 3EeRCT/C0DCW0R D 



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-yeP-SECRET/C OD EW ORD - 56 

1 recollection that the order to the second aircraft was an 

2 authorized one? 

3 A Oh, yes. I mean, even though I still can't 

4 quite — I don't know whether it's to Bud or from Bud, 

5 but in some way it's my recollection that Bud is very 

6 much aware of all this, either telling us the proposal or 

7 we telling him. 

8 Q And Admiral Poindexter is aware of it? 

9 Indeed, he's given the guidance, correct? 

10 A Hell, depending on which way that is. If this 

11 came from Bud to me, I would have passed it to Admiral 

12 Poindexter. If this is to Bud, it's coming from Admlrhl 

13 Poindexter. 

14 Q But either way Poindexter knows? 

15 A Exactly, yes. 

16 Q Thank you. Also, looking just again briefly 

17 at the balance of page 27, there are a number of notes 

18 there which, if I'm correct, refer to the continuing DEA 

19 operation which is in progress at the same time as the 

20 Tehran meeting, right? 

21 A Well, they are intermixed. 

22 Q Yes, but the references ^^^^^^1 ^° '^^V' ^° 

23 Ross, that's to the DEA? ^^^^ 

24 A Yes, both operations are intermixed. 

25 Q Do you recall when the government, our 

TOP SEeRET/CODEWORD 

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1 government, learned that Mr. Buckley had been killed? 

2 A Do you have my calendar? Those — 

3 MR. LIMAN: Do you remember what the event 

4 was? If you just tell us the event. 

5 MR. LEON: This is Ollie's calendar. 

6 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

7 Q Was it in connection with the release of any 

8 of the hostages? 

9 A Well, I am trying to recall a memory I have of 

10 an announcement, I think it was, from the Iranian side — 

11 I mean, the hostage-holders, from Lebanon — that h^had 

12 been executed. 

13 MR. LIMAN: But that message came at the time 

14 of the Libyan bombing. Well, they did announce at that 

15 time. 

16 THE WITNESS: But there was something before 

17 that, I think. 

18 MR. LIMAN: But you wouldn't necessarily 

19 credit a message that came from the hostage-holders? 
2 THE WITNESS: Oh, no, no. 

21 MR. LIMAN: Was there some other harder 

22 evidence that led you to conclude he had been killed? 

23 THE WITNESS: Well, there are other people who 

24 have all the facts together on that that would be able to 

25 testify very accurately, Charlie Allen being one. There 

TOP 5ECRE T >'C0DCW0nD 






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•TCP- SE C R ET / CO D EWeRS- 58 

1 was a series of bits and pieces over time that had 

2 accumulated that eventually caused the government to — 

3 MR. LIMAN: Do you remember one of the 

4 hostages in the Middle East and he was debriefed in the 

5 summer of 1986? 

6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

7 MR. LIMAN: And do I assume you saw the 

8 debriefing about the fact that Buckley had been suffering 

9 and coughing? 

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, and that was further 

11 details that confirmed what was believed but not kn<3tm 

12 for sure at that point, that he had either been executed 

13 or had died under interrogation or had died as a result 

14 of neglect. 

15 MR. LIMAN: Because at that time the demand 

16 then became for the return of Buckley's body. Do you 

17 remember that? 

18 THE WITNESS: I don't recall when that became. 

19 MR. LIMAN: But you remember that some change 

20 did occur? 

21 THE WITNESS: Oh, sure. At some point there 

22 was no longer any doubt with i t. and I th ink the Iranian 

23 side virtually acknowledged 
24 
25 




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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 




Q At the time of the Tehran mission you believed 
he was still alive? 

A That ' s why I ' d have to go back through my 
notes. I'm not sure. Someone else who followed this 
like Charlie Allen would be able to give you exactly when 
we began to know this and the accumulation of evidence 
that It was a very real possibility and people begaJf to 
believe it. I'm not sure. It's a longer-term evolution 
of belief that he was dead. 

Q One other question before we go back to the 
notes. Did you ever discuss with Admiral Polndexter that 
any of the funds from the Iran transactions were being 
used for the benefit of the contras? Did you discuss 
that subject with him at any time? 

A I don't think so. I don't think that ever 
came up. 

Q Did you ever hear him refer to it? 

A I don't think so. I just don't think it ever 
came up in my conversations with him and meetings with 
him. My assumption was that he knew, but I don't think I 
had any firsthand acknowledgement of that. 
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1 MR. KIRK: Off the record. 

2 (A brief recess was taken.) 

3 Q This is a note on page 24. It's still May 27, 

4 0115 Eastern Daylight Time. "We are departing because 

5 the Iranians don't even have control of two hostages." 

6 From whom did you get that message? 

7 A I'm not sure whether it was direct or indirect 

8 from somebody in the party. I don't know. I don't 

9 recall who in the party it might have been. It may have 

10 been Bud. It may have been Teicher. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Somebody in the party? 

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, somebody in the part, but 

13 again it may not have been direct. It may have come 

14 through Secord, because sometimes they had direct comms 

15 when ours weren't. 

16 Q But they were telling you that the people — 

17 A That the party was departing because — 

18 Q The people with whom we were dealing with 

19 didn't even have control over two hostages? 

20 A Correct, because that was one of the 

21 compromise solutions that was arrived at in one of the 

22 later stages. Well, how about two now? We'll give you 

23 two now and work on the others later — I think. You 

24 just triggered a memory. I'm not positive of that, but 

25 even their fallback position — that's why the "even two" 

- t 'U P SECRE T / e ODEWORB - 



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61 



1 makes some sense — that even this more modest 

2 counterproposal from the Iranian side they couldn't 

3 deliver on. 

4 Q You have a note on the next page, 23, which is 

5 May 28, 1986. It looks like a briefing by Bud McFarlane. 

6 Is that what it is? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q Bud briefing you or are you taking notes at a 

9 meeting of him briefing someone else? 

10 A What day are we on? 

11 Q May 28. May 28 is indeed Wednesday. The 

12 party was supposedly lifting off. 

13 A Let me read this to be sure. 

14 (Pause.) 

15 I think it's coming from — I think this is a 

16 message from Bud to me just recapping — 

17 Q Tell us what the message was. 

18 A That the U.S. delegation did come to Tehran 

19 and were accepted by the Iranians. We, the U.S., have 

2 opened a door that has been closed to us in the past for 

21 many years, and now there is finally some air going 

22 through this open door, that the suddenness of this 

23 change has scared the Iranian side, the interlocutors, 

24 from their side, but we expect them to come back to us in 

25 some period in the future — a month, a week, several 

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TOP S E C RST/CODCWOnP - 62 

1 weeks — that they, the Iranian side, are sobered by our 

2 firmness, that they are serious in helpingi 

3 and perhaps Nicaragua, which was one of the terms of 

4 reference in some of the confluence of interest between 

5 us and the Iranians on certain issues, that the whole 

6 experience was very frustrating but nonetheless 

7 worthwhile, and that they were intending to arrive at 

8 Dulles 6:00 a.m., local EDT. 

9 Q And that was Bud HcFarlane's position as he 

10 conveyed it to you at that time? 

11 A At 10:13 Eastern Daylight Time, correct. 

12 Q And then you briefed Admiral Poindexter? That 

13 would have been your practice? 

14 A That would have been my practice, to, as soon 

15 as he was available, and during the day, at some point 

16 that day, he was certainly available that I could pass 

17 that on to him. 

18 Q And given the way things were going at that 

19 mission your understanding would have been that 

20 Poindexter would then probably have briefed the President 

21 on what McFarlane had reported? 

22 A On whatever he felt was appropriate from that. 

23 Again, I'm not sure that the level of detail would go 

24 forward. 

25 Q Would you consider agreement to help with 

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- TOP OECHET/GODEWOR Ol 63 

1 ^^^^^^^^Hand Nicaragua would hav« been just a detail? 

2 A I really don't have any basis to judge where 

3 the detail line would be drawn with the President. And 

4 then there's a follow-on note unrelated to that. At some 

5 point after it there's my note that Admiral Polndexter 

6 briefed the President at 9:30 and a question — I assume 

7 that it's coming from the President — of whether we 

8 should look at other alternatives and that there's a 

9 possibility that Bud, vrtien he returned on that Thursdi^;'^ 

10 arriving at 6:00 Dulles, would have a meeting with the 

e 

11 President later that morning at 9:30. 

12 Q Do you know if he did? 

13 A Z think he did. It may not have been exactly 

14 9:30, but I met the party at Dulles. It was early, at 

15 5:30, and everybody went home in order to freshen up and 

16 get ready. But there were plans to meet later that 

17 morning at the White House complex. I'm almost positive. 

18 I'm pretty sure that they briefed the President later 

19 that morning. 

20 Q Did you receive a report on that briefing? 

21 A Not that I can recall specifically. There may 

22 be some notes on it that occurred. 

23 Q I haven't seen any. 

24 A The situation by definition had changed at 

25 this point now that Colonel North was back, and so he 

■f Of SECRET/GODEW O P J a 



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tjNCLflgSgED 

1 would be talking to Admiral Poindexter, and so I may or 

2 may not get some feedback from Colonel North. 

3 Q Do you remember Colonel North telling you 

4 anything about the briefing of the President? 

5 A Not that I can recall right now. Nothing 

6 substantive is jumping out. I think that I recall that 

7 it was talked about after the fact a little bit in some 

8 way, because I think I have a recollection that Howard 

9 Teicher and Colonel North talked, because I think both of 

10 them went to that meeting. But again I'm not positive of 

11 that. 

12 MR. LIMAN: Was the sense that you had one' of 

13 disappointment? 

14 THE WITNESS: If you were forced to 

15 encapsulate this in one word, that would probably be the 

16 fairest word, that a major operation with great risk had 

17 been undertaken. 

18 MR. LIMAN: And failed? 

19 THE WITNESS: And failed, although the door 

20 was not shut. There was some potential in the future, 

21 but it was certainly disappointing that it had not 

22 succeeded as folks at the beginning had been led to 

23 believe, through Ghorbanifar, that things were going to 

24 go. It certainly wasn't as anticipated. 

25 So with those caveats I would agree with you, 

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1 yes. 

2 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

3 Q Okay. Let's take a look at page 20 of the 

4 notes, which appears to be May 29. And there's a 

5 reference to Rich Miller, "urgent", with an arrow 

6 pointing to a line that says "Phil Mabrw contacted, 

7 Western goals, and recant all he has said, news confer", 

8 short for news conference. 

9 What do those notes mean? 

10 A I think there was a phone call from Rich 

11 Miller with a message to be passed to Colonel North, the 

12 substance of which was that this individual, Phil Mabfe, 

13 had contacted Western goals, whoever they are, and was in 

14 effect recanting all of his previous positions and 

15 accusations and was about to hold a news conference in 

16 order to do that. 

17 Q That's as much as you recall now? 

18 A One other addition, without knowing the 

19 specifics, but my general sense from the tenor of this or 
2 related ambience, for lack of a better word, was that the 

21 previous position that he was recanting was a bunch of 

22 accijsations about — well, I'm not sure what — things 

23 adverse to the contra cause, whether it's corruption or 

24 drugs or something that was unfavorable to the cause of 

25 the contras. 

■ iJOr □CCRET/eODCHOR D~ 



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T OP OCCnST/ C ODCWOn O- 66 

1 So that it was a favorable development for the 

2 contra cause that he was now going to tell the truth and 

3 say that he had been lying in the previous accusations or 

4 statements. 

5 Q Okay. There's a note on page 15. Take a look 

6 at that note before I read any of it int6 the record. 

7 Does that pertain to the Iran compartment? 

8 A Could I see both sides? 

9 Q I think this will help you. Page 16 is 

10 completely redacted except for some names at the bottom. 

11 (Laughter.) 

12 This, I believe, is page 14. 

13 A What date are we? 

14 Q We're around the end of May or early June. I 

15 think we're in June by now. Yeah, I think we're around 

16 June 10, June 11. 

17 (Pause.) 

18 A I'm still trying to focus on the names. I'm 

19 not getting anything, obviously, from the context. There 

20 isn't any. 

21 Q And I'm not sure whether it pertains to the 

22 Iran thing, and I don't want to go into it if it doesn't. 

23 MR. LIMAN: You know who Murphy is, don't you? 

24 THE WITNESS: Ambassador Murphy. 

25 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

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-T OP anGnCT/ e ODCVJOR D. 67 

1 Q He knows who the people are. We are just 

2 trying to fit it in. 

3 MR. LIMAN: Ambassador Murphy was Ambassador 

4 for where? 

5 MR. BELNICK: He was Assistant Secretary for 

6 Near East. 

7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

8 MR. LIMAN: What were the six initiatives that 

9 were proposed? 

10 THE WITNESS: I think if I could look again — 

11 I think that pertains to Syrian terrorism. If you want 

12 to go further, I can. 

13 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

14 Q No. 

15 A One of the points on the top part I don't 

16 think — no, there are some names in there that lead me 

17 to believe it was not Iran. 

18 Q Let's go off the record a moment. 

19 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

20 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

21 Q Back on the record. Now we are in what 

22 appears to be the middle of June 1986 on page 13. You 

23 have notes that start the top "VAXB". Is that a PROF 

24 machine, VAXB? 

25 A It's not PROFS. It's not IBM, but it's a 

•re^ SECRET/CODDWOn ^- 



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68 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



dlffarent computer system that Is supposedly taking over 
and consuming, replacing IBM. You get into proprietary 
competition here. 

Q All right. It's a message-transmitting 
system, right? 

A Yes. 

Q Is this a message from Copp, namely Secord? 
What I'm really intere sted in is the language that 
ap pears nex t to the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
Is that "Central American proposal"? 

A It could be covert action. ^ 

Q Why don't you take a look? 
(Pause. ) 

A Well, it still could be either. 

Q Why don't you read the note into the record 
and tell us what it means? 

A The note is point number one. 

Q This isl 

A^ From 

Ion the CA proposal, and I'm not sure whether it 
is cover action or Central American. It could be either 
one. 

Q What about point number two? - 

A Point number two does put it into a Central 
American context, "provide secure training ir 
Tey st:cKi::T/cuuEW RD - 








819 



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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Three is "provide arms and ammo." 

2 Q Doesn't it seem to you from the context that 

3 CA probably refers to Central America? 

4 A Well, it still could be covert action in 

5 Central America, so I still don't know. But certainly it 

6 wouldn't be wrong. 

7 Q Okay. Anyway, the context is referring to a 

8 covert operation in Central America? 

9 A Well, it may not be a covert action. 

10 Q Some action in Central America. 

11 A Yes. ^^^^ 

12 Q To whom did you conve^^^^^Hmessage? 

13 A Can I see both sides? 

14 Q Sure. What do you have there, 13? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q That is 14. Here is 12. 

17 A Are you sure that's 14? 

18 Q Yes, only because it comes between 13 and 15. 

19 A It's not misfiled? 

20 Q I don't think it's misfiled. That's how it 

21 was given to us anyway. Do you recall reporting this to 

22 Admiral Poindexter? 

23 A What date was that? 

24 Q I think June 15, 1986 — June 15 or 16. June 

25 15 happens to be a Sunday, so it may be June 16. 

rV V SELKtlVLODE W OR P 



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TOr aCCRET/GODCWORP 70 

1 A It's 16 or 15. 

2 Q Probably 16. 

3 A Well, your question strikes me a little bit 

4 strange because I'm not sure whether Colonel North is out 

5 of the country. If Colonel North is in the country, I 

6 have no reason to report to Admiral Poindexter. 

7 MR. LIMAN: Well, we have his diary. We can 

8 find out. 

9 MR. BELNICK: What does North show on June 15? 

10 MR. LEON: On June 15 he shows nothing. On 

11 June 14, nothing in terms of being out of the country. 

12 He shows meetings all day the 13th and on the 16th he ' 

13 shows meetings all day. 

14 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

15 Q So he's in the country, and assuming that's so 

16 then you would have reported this to Colonel North? 

17 A That is my normal assumption, messages that 

18 I'm getting from whoever or from Colonel North, yes. 

19 Q Do you Icnow anything more about this proposal 

20 that's reflected on page 13 of your notes other than what 

21 you've written down here? 

22 ■ A I'm just trying to see if it relates to this 

23 down here. 

24 Q On page 12? 

25 A Yes. The answer to your question right now is 

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TOP a gC RCT/CODCWQRD 71 

1 no, but let me see this. 

2 (Pause.) 

3 It may or may not be related. This — 

4 Q Page 12? 

5 A The bottom of page 12 appears to be some 

6 discussion of terrorism or international terrorism in the 

7 Central American region and the extent to which Nicaragua 

8 has been cooperating with international terrorists or 

9 states that support or contribute to terrorism. 

10 Q Including the PLO? 

11 A Correct. A base of PLO is Nicaragua is one 

12 phrase. The PLO has cooperated with the Sandinistas. ' 

13 There is a PLO base there. 

14 Q Let's go back to page 13. 

15 MR. LEON: Mark, I just noticed something. On 

16 Tuesday, June 17, it says at 9:30 — I don't know what it 

17 means, but it says "OLN returns". It doesn't say from 

18 where. 

19 MR. BELNICK: That's in Ollie's diary. 

20 MR. LEON: It's in his diary on the 17th. I 

21 don't know what that means. Maybe it jogs any 

22 recollections for you? 

23 THE WITNESS: No. My best reference would be 

24 my calendar, if you have that. 

25 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

TO P SECRET/'C ODEWO R P 



• y\ 






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■?0r CECBET/CODEWOnP 72 

1 Q Let's take a look. 

2 ( Pause . ) 

3 Vickie will look for that while you are 

4 looking at the remaining notes on page 13 , which appears 

5 to pertain to pricing in the Iran arms transaction. 

6 MR. LIMAN: The June 16 note? 

7 THE WITNESS: Right. There is a note on 16 

8 June where it defines actual, as in actual prices, as the 

9 higher prices of the two between what were called real 

10 and actual prices. So real — 

11 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

12 Q Was the Economy Act price? 

13 A Real — whatever price the CIA charged, was 

14 charged by DOO, that's real. Actual is 3.7 times that. 

15 Q And actual is what was charged to the 

16 Iranians? 

17 A It went forward in some way through that 

18 intermediary and I'm not clear on it. 

19 Q Apart from any markups? 

20 A That Gorbanifar may have had on top of that, 

21 that's correct. 

22 MR. LIMAN: And you wrote the 3.7 factor and 

23 that was to convey that the price that was charged to 

24 Ghorbanifar was 3.7 times what the CIA/DOD price was? 

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

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• TOP S ECRET/' CODCW O RD ■ 73 

1 MR. LIMAN: Did you ever actually do the 

2 arithmetic, have the number, the CIA/DOD price, and then 

3 multiply it by 3.7? 

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I did a lot. 

5 MR. LIMAN: And then was it rounded off, 

6 because obviously the price that was charged to 

7 Ghorbanifar was, as I recall it, $15 million or it wasn't 

8 the kind of — you know, you didn't get the odd dollar 

9 figure that you'd get if you used 3.7. 

10 THE WITNESS: I don't really have a specific 

11 recollection of that. My recollection, from your 

12 question, is that about a ten or 12-page document which 

13 had all the HAWK parts on it and the nomenclature and the 

14 FSN and so forth and the quantity desired by the Iranians 

15 had two columns on the right. One was the actual price, 

16 which was the DOD price, and then I did the math of 

17 multiplying each one by 3.7 to come up with the actual 

18 price column. 

19 And that led then to a number, an aggregate, 

20 which may have been rounded off, but I don't recall what 

21 happened to that or how it evolved from there. 

22 MR. LIMAN: Were any parts stricken because 

23 when you applied the 3.7 figure it was in excess of some 

24 budgeted amount? 

25 THE WITNESS: I'm not understanding the 

TOP 3CeRET/C0DEW0n0 



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unclass:;-:ed 



1 question. Who budgeted it? 

2 MR. LIMAN: Were you told that you could not 

3 come up with a figure in excess of a certain amount? 

4 THE WITNESS: No, not that I recall. 

5 MR. LIMAN: So that if 3.7 yielded $20 

6 million, then that would have been the price you would 

7 have put down? If it yielded $15 million, that would 

8 have been the price; correct? 

9 THE WITNESS: I believe so. That seems to me 

10 to be a logical result of the process, as I understood 

11 it. 

12 MR. LIMAN: But nobody told you that you had 

13 to keep the price to be charged to Ghorbanifar below a 

14 certain amount? 

15 THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall, no. 

16 MR. LIMAN: This, I take, it would refresh 

17 your recollection that you were doing the arithmetic on 

18 June 16? 

19 THE WITNESS: Well — 

20 MR. LIMAN: At least at that point? 

21 THE WITNESS: Right. 

22 MR. LIMAN: And did you do it also earlier? 

23 THE WITNESS: My own recollection is that it 

24 was later than this, but obviously it was at least as 

25 early as June. 

T OP SgCnET/CODDWOnD 



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1 MR. LIMAN: But how could it be later than 

2 that when the only other transaction for which we got 

3 paid was in October and that was not — that was the 

4 second channel transaction and it was a lower price? 

5 THE WITNESS: As best I can relate, my 

6 involvement with the 3.7 factor and the timing of it, I 

7 think it pertains to the second list of parts owed the 

8 Iranians that resulted after the transfer of the 500 

9 parts and some of them didn't work. But it may have been 

10 before. It appears to be. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Let me see if we understand each 

12 other on this. The Iranians paid for HAWK spares at the 

13 time of the mission that McFarlane went and you knew 

14 that. 

15 THE WITNESS: The Iranian government I don't 

16 think had — no, they wouldn't pay until they got 

17 delivery. Ghorbanifar or somebody had come up with this 

18 bridge loan that would make the transaction begin to 

19 occur. 

20 MR. LIMAN: You knew that Ghorbanifar had 

21 paid? 

22 THE WITNESS: Somebody had paid. 

23 MR. LIMAN: And you understood that he was 

24 paying at this 3.7 multiple? 

25 THE WITNESS: At least. 

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1 MR. LIMAN: No, you understood that he was 

2 paying the CIA, that he was paying Lake. Did you 

3 understand who he was paying the money to? 

4 THE WITNESS: I knew that there was an 

5 account . 

6 MR. LIMAN: And he paid the money into that 

7 account? 

8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

9 MR. LIMAN: And you knew that the amount that 

10 he had paid was 3.7 times what the CIA's cost had been, 

11 right? 

12 THE WITNESS: I never really consciously 

13 focused on that. Nobody ever told me that, but that 

14 certainly follows from the parts that I was aware of. 

15 MR. LIMAN: You also knew that some of the 

16 spares for which he had paid had been delivered, one 

17 pallet's worth, right, in Tehran? Correct? 

18 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

19 MR. LIMAN: And you knew that the bulk of the 

20 HAWK parts for which he had paid were still back in 

21 Israel? 

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

23 MR. LIMAN: And when there were later 

24 shipments in the summer of 1986 did you not understand 

25 that those shipments were for the parts that Ghorbanifar 

- g O P SECRJ,l/ '' LUCEWaRD 



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TOP aCCnET/GODCV ' ?OnD- 77 

1 had already paid for? 

2 THE WITNESS: The later shipments? Do you 

3 mean when the pallets were subsequently delivered? 

4 MR. LIMAN: That's right. 

5 THE WITNESS: My recollection is that the 

6 timing of that delivery was to complete the deal as it 

7 had been arranged because one hostage had been released, 

8 Jenko, I think. 

9 MR. BELNICK: That's correct. 

10 MR. LIMAN: So that whatever money that 

11 Ghorbanifar had paid for the HAWK parts had been paid in 

12 May of 1986, even though some of those parts weren't 

13 delivered until after the release of Jeryfo; right? 

14 THE WITNESS: What date was that? 

15 MR. LIMAN: Well, they didn't deliver the 

16 additional ones until August 3, 1986. 

17 THE WITNESS: Okay. 

18 MR. LIMAN: Now, therefore, does that not 

19 refresh your recollection that the arithmetic that you 
2 did in which you used the 3.7 multiple was done in 

21 connection with the May transaction? 

22 THE WITNESS: Not necessarily, and let me 

2 3 explain why. ' It seems to me that the arithmetic that was 

24 done for conveying to the Iranian side through 

25 Ghorbanifar of the prices for this transaction of the 

-geP gBCRET/CODIj^<ORD 



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yCODEWORI> ~ 78 

1 500, which was delivered In two separate shipments, was 

2 all done in the April-early May time frame or before, and 

3 that this June time frame that we're talking about has 

4 nothing to do with that because that's already done and 

5 over, that we are now talking about the complaints that 

6 are beginning to accrue from the Iranians with at least a 

7 sampling of parts that they have. 

8 MR. LIMAN: But, Mr. Earl, what other 

9 transaction was there after Ghorbanifar paid in May for 

10 the HAWK parts? 

11 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know. It's not 

12 clear to me what was — I still don't know how that was 

13 resolved, the second laundry list of parts. 

14 MR. LIMAN: But you know, don't you, that 

15 after Ghorbanifar paid for the spare parts in May that 

16 the only additional transaction that was done with Iran 

17 was the one involving the second channel; isn't that 

18 right? 

19 THE WITNESS: I believe that's correct, except 

20 there is one caveat. This new list became a fairly long 

21 list of complaints with the originals which led to some 

22 different part numbers and different prices that had to 

23 be resolved as to who was going to pay, the Iranian side 

24 wanting it for free, that they felt they had paid for it 

25 on the 500, and the U.S. side having to somehow come up 

- gOP SECRE T /CODEW O RD 



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79 



1 with parts for which they had no money, 

2 MR. LIMAN: But that was talking about an 

3 adjustment, about making good to them. 

4 THE WITNESS: On the original, yes, I agree. 

5 MR. LIMAN: Now were you involved in the 

6 pricing of the TOWs to the second channel? You'd have to 

7 look at your notes? You don't remember that? 

8 THE WITNESS: My recollection, before being 

9 refreshed, I was much more involved in the second 

10 transaction. 

11 MR. LIMAN: You mean in the complex — what do 

12 you mean by the second transaction? 

13 THE WITNESS: Well, now I'm confused as to 

14 whether it's the second transaction involving the second 

15 channel, which was TOWs, as I recall, or the HAWK 

16 complaints on the parts as opposed to the very first 

17 pricing of the 500. But it seems from some of my notes 

18 that I was more involved in the first one than I recall, 

19 so I could have been. 

20 MR. LIMAN: Mr. Earl, do you remember without 

21 even looking at your notes that the second channel was 

22 given a better price on the TOWs than had been given to 

23 the first channel? 

24 THE WITNESS: Not really, no. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Do you have a recollection as to 

TOP jEeRg T /e eDEwe RB - 



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T OP CEcncT/ eo DCwonp - so 

1 whether you applied a 3.7 multiple to the cost of the 

2 TOWs to arrive at the price for the second channel's 

3 TOWs? 

4 THE WITNESS: I don't know whether I did or 

5 not. My recollection is the 3.7 applies to HAWK parts. 

6 I'm not sure that it applies to TOWs. 

7 MR. LIMAN: And therefore at least by process 

8 of deduction you must have applied the 3.7 multiple to 

9 the May shipment because that's the only HAWK parts that 

10 they were ever charged for. 

11 THE WITNESS: If that's true, that the 3.7 

12 applies only to HAWK parts, then it follows, what you 

13 just said. 

14 MR. LIMAN: Well, let's do arithemetic right 

15 after lunch. 

16 THE WITNESS: But my recollection of the way 

17 the 3.7 was derived, which I had previously told you 

18 about — 

19 MR. LIMAN: Yes, and I've read it. 

20 THE WITNESS: Was that it was in order to show 

21 consistency from previous transactions or statements of 

22 the price, and that we dealt with the aggregate in some 

23 form of the totals and divided them and found out that 

24 the factor was 3.7 and then applied them to this other 

25 collection, new collection, new list in order to show 

T O P aCCnET/CODEW O RD 



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831 



-TO P BCGncT/coDcwona ai 

1 consistency. 

2 MR. LIMAN: But did you do that arithmetic 

3 yourself? 

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

5 MR. LIMAN: And did you do that with the HAWKs 

6 that the Israelis had contracted to sell to the Iranians, 

7 the November HAWKs, whether it was 120 or 80 or 18? 

8 THE WITNESS: I don't know which aggregates I 

9 used to derive that 3.7. From Colonel North I had gotten 

10 the aggregate numbers and did the math and found out. that 

11 that number was 3.7 and then used that on a line-by-line 

12 basis with whatever the list of HAWK parts were. 

13 MR. KIRK: May we stop for a second and go off 

14 the record? 

15 MR. LIMAN: Sure. 

16 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

17 MR. BELNICK: We will break now for lunch and 

18 return at 1:00. 

19 (Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the taking of the 

20 instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., 

21 the same day.) 



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1 AFTERNOON SESSION 

2 (1: 10 p.m. ) 

3 Whereupon, 

4 ROBERT L. EARL, 

5 the witness herein, having been previously duly sworn, 

6 was further examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE - Resumed 

8 BY MR. BELNICK: 

9 Q Good afternoon. Back into the notes at page 

10 13, there is a note at the bottom, June 17, that I 

11 believe pertains to the Iran compartment — "Uriah II". 

12 Do you remember for whom that was a code name? 

13 A Not off the top of my head. It is in one of 

14 the things that I provided for the Committee. It could 

15 have been the President or McFarlane. 

16 Q Well, I know Oliver North is listed on one of 

17 these. 

18 A No, it's not Oliver North. 

19 Q As Uriah. 

20 A Oh, is he? 

21 Q Yes, he's Uriah on one of these. This is 

22 Uriah II. Oh, well, we'll move on. 

23 A Well, that surprises me, that Uriah I or Uriah 

24 without a number is Oliver North, because I would have 

25 guessed that this is somebody senior in the chain to 

■ TOP aCGRET/ CO DEWO aa 



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5JN«5LASS^?L,:9 



TOr OECnET/ e ODCWOR& ~ 83 

1 Colonel North, but it may not be. 

2 Q I'm sure your document produced by the White 

3 House, which bears our Bates number N-9267, which is 

4 entitled Operation Homeport, one word, code sheet, and 

5 you see "0. North, Uriah." 

6 A I don't think that's one of the ones that I 

7 was familiar with. 

8 Q Well, all right. We'll just go on. Did you 

9 have a code name or cryptonym at any time? 

10 A No. 

11 Q Here Poindexter is listed on page N-9055 as 

12 Uriah. 

13 AX think that's the code name I'm familiar 

14 with. 

15 Q So maybe Uriah II is — well, let's not guess. 

16 Does this note that we were looking at on June 17 pertain 

17 to the Iran compartment? 

18 A Yes, it does. 

19 Q Okay. And do you recall — can you explain 

2 the reference, leaving out the name of the Iranian? Is 

21 this a message you received from George Cave? 

22 A Possibly, but I think more likely is it's — 

23 well, I won't even say more likely. Two possibilities. 

24 One is it is from Cave telling me of a conversation he 

25 had had with this Uriah. The other possibility is that 

TOP 3CeRgT/C0DDVJ0RD - 



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1 it's instructions for Cave to have a conversation with 

2 the Iranian coming to me from, probably, North to give to 

3 Cave . 

4 Q Well, whether it comes from Cave or is a 

5 proposed message to Cave, can you explain what the notes 

6 mean? 

7 A Well, it says very specific: "Adhere to our 

8 written proposal. Call us." My explanation of that 

9 would be that it is guidance for this individual. 

10 Q For Cave or for the Iranian? 

11 A For the Iranian, and perhaps an admonition to 

12 be precise on the specifics of the negotiation that's at 

13 issue at this time and to call us and refer back to the 

14 written proposal as opposed to any embellishment of that 

15 that may be being done by others. 

16 Q And then he's to be told, the Iranian, that 

17 Uriah II, whoever that is, is unhappy. 

18 A Uh-huh. 

19 Q And has issued instructions no more talking 

20 with the Iranians until there is a movement. 

21 A Correct. 

22 Q And "bullshit to proving ourselves" means just 

23 that? 

24 A Yes. From the Iranian side there is the 

25 negotiating statement that we, the U.S. has to prove 

TOP aCGRCT/CODEVJOnD - 



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1 itself and we are rejecting that, saying no, it is not we 

2 who have to prove ourselves. We have taken suitable 

3 risks and it is you who have to deliver. So that's a 

4 bogus argument. 

5 Q Okay. We'll move on. 

6 A Let me look at that list, please. 

7 (Pause.) 

8 I don't think this is it. I think there may 

9 be another one, too. 

10 Q , There is a note on page 11, which appears ^o 

11 be June 16, 1986, "$5,820,000 apiece". Then it says 

12 "radar". What does that note means? Is that referring 

13 to the Iran compartment? 

14 A I believe it is. I believe it's a dollar 

15 figure. 

16 Q For the HAWKs? 

17 A No, for the high-power radars. If we could 

18 cross reference to the other reference to prices on 

19 radars, we can see whether that means each or per radar 
2 rather than total cost for both radars. I'm not sure 
21 right now. We were looking at that page earlier. 

2 2 Q I am showing the witness page 100 of his 

23 notes. 

24 A That's not the page that I'm remembering. I 

25 think there's something else that gives some prices on 

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• ^OP aCCREl/LUUbWUKB - 86 

1 radars and the only reason I referred to that is so that 

2 we can figure out whether it ' s per radar or for two 

3 radars. I'm just not sure which it is at this point. I 

4 think it is per, because here is a reference to $8,000 

5 each down here. 

6 Q All right. On the same page, 11, of the 

7 notes? 

8 A Right. So I think that is a symbol for each 

9 or per. 

10 Q , Looking at these references to figures on page 

11 11 can you tell us where you got them from? 

12 A No. Nothing springs to mind. But the fact 

13 that I'm multiplying by the 3.7 suggests to me that this 

14 number probably came from — 

15 Q That's the number $8,270.83? 

16 A From CIA in some way. 

17 Q And you are using the 3.7 factor? 

18 A Yes. 

19 Q To multiply? 

20 A Correct. 

21 Q The next note I would like to go over with 

22 you. Colonel, is on page five. Let me show you the note. 

23 A That time frame are we in now? I've lost 

24 that. 

25 Q This is still June '86. You will see the name 

■ TOP SECRCT/CODEWOnD 



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TOP gCCnET/^CODCVJO Rn-, 87 

1 Ellen Garwood there and by context this note appears to 

2 be around the end of June, June 23, June 24 of 1986. Can 

3 you tell us what those notes refer to, including the 

4 reference to Ellen Garwood with a telephone number? 

5 A No. I'm not recalling anything. I )cnow who 

6 Ellen Garwood is. I know she would come in to the office 

7 on occasion and meet with Colonel North, and this may 

8 just be establishing that she called in with a phone 

9 number or that someone provided us with a phone number so 

10 that Colonel North would be able to call her. I'm 

11 recalling no context. 

12 Q Did you know at the time that she was a 

13 contributor of financial aid to the contras? 

14 A I don't know in the June time frame whether I 

15 knew that or not. At some point I intuited that, that 

16 she was a wealthy individual who contributed. But as 

17 early as June, I don't know. I may have. 

18 Q Actually I said June 23. This looks more like 

19 June 13, according to what's later on page five. 

2 The next note I want to show you is on page 

21 four, also dated June 13, 1986, and it reads: 

22 ^^^^^^Uoesn ' t take the Corr threat too seriously. Is it 

23 true he was going to beach this" — and ~then it's 

24 oblierated. What's the word after this? It's 

25 obliterated by the Top Secret designation. 

■ TOP SgCRg T /CODWORP 



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1 A Oh, I see. "Going to beach this weekend". 

2 Q Well, that's some threat, let me tell you. 

3 Now we're at the bottom of this. 

4 (Laughter.) 

5 Now is this to Corr, to Ambassador Corr? 

6 A Yes. 

7 Q This reference that we have now read from page 

8 four of the notes. What does it mean? 

9 A There was a terrorist threat against 

10 Ambassatjor Corr at the time. He wasn't taking it 

11 seriously because he was going on to the beach, and so 

12 that was CIA's analysis of the threat. 

13 Q You'll be as delighted as I to know that we 

14 have just finished one notebook. 

15 Now we have another notebook that the White 

16 House has just produced to us this morning, as a matter 

17 of fact, saying that it was only recently found, at least 

18 for us, and this one. Colonel, appears to predate. Up 

19 until now the one we were just going through was our 

20 earliest Earl notebook. This one, I think, is earlier 

21 and appears to go from — Vickie, what are the dates of 

22 this? Does this go in order? 

23 MS. NOURSE: Well, 10/3. 

24 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

25 Q From October 3, 1985 to March 10, '86. So we 

TOr SECRET/CODDWOR D 



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1 want to go through some references that we have marked 

2 here. 

3 A May I see the cover of the notebook? 

4 Q Moving into the new notebook for the period 

5 just described, October '85 to March 10, '86, page 52, 

6 there are references to Nir, the same Nir, I take it, 

7 with whom you worked on the Iran program? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q What were you doing with Nir on November 18, 

10 '85? First of all, where were you at that time? 

11 A On the Vice President's Task Force. 

12 Q Combatting terrorism? 

13 A Combatting terrorism. 

14 Q Was Nir a consultant to that task force? 

15 A I wouldn't use the term "consultant". That 

16 has a special meaning to me. I mean, nobody was paid, 

17 but he was one of the so-called experts on terrorism that 

18 was brought in to advise and talk to the task force, yes. 

19 Q So are those simply notes pertaining to advice 
2 that he gave the task force? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q Okay. You didn't know a thing about the Iran 
2 3 program at this time? 

2 4 A No . 

25 Q Or about any HAWK shipments that were being 

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T& r G E CRE T/CODEVfOR a 90 

1 made in November of '85? 

2 A No. 

3 Q On page 61 this reference "mercenaries can be 

4 tapped", that relates to the task force also? 

5 A I think so. Let me just put it into context. 

6 (Pause.) 

7 Q It looks like it. Any of it has nothing to do 

8 with — 

9 A Yes, I think all of that is terrorism-related 

10 discussi,on for the task force. 

11 Q Let me show you a note that appears on page 

12 115 of the same notebook. The date appears to be around, 

13 if not on, January 16 of 1986. The notes are toward the 

14 bottom of the page. You see the names "Rich Miller, Dave 

15 Fisher, Nicaragua group raising funds, Roosevelt Room." 

16 It said "Elliott Abraham". Does that mean Elliot Abrams? 

17 A That's my, at that time, phonetic spelling, 

18 Elliot Abrams, right. 

19 Q From reading it and not knowing what it is, it 

20 appears to be setting up some sort of meeting that will 

21 be related to raising funds for the freedom fighters in 

22 Nicaragua. You tell us what it is. 

23 A Yes, I think you have described it fairly 

24 well. It's related to a group raising funds in support 

25 of the contras, I guess, and this is Don Regan. Again, I 

■ TOP 3CCRDT/ CODEWORD 



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TOP CSrPET/CODEWOnP 91 

1 guess it took me a while to spell the name correctly. 

2 But that's Don Regan and David Chew, who worked for him, 

3 and setting something up in the Roosevelt Room and 

4 confirmation, the date. And so these two people were 

5 involved on setting it up. 

6 Q Rich Miller? 

7 A And Dave Fisher is somehow involved in setting 

8 up this meeting in the Roosevelt Room. So I'm passing 

9 that message to Colonel North. And I'm not sure whether 

10 he called or who called. 

11 Q Dave Fisher or Rich Miller? 

12 A Yes. It's one of the two. 

13 Q Okay. Now page 119, I'm interested in one 

14 specific note on that page: "Who's Richard (relative to 

15 Mr. Goode?)". What can you tell us about that note? 

16 (Pause.) 

17 MR. LEON: Do you have a date on that, Mark? 

18 MR. BELNICK: 17 January '86. 

19 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

20 Q Is the "Richard" reference to Secord? 

21 A Well, I'm not sure. This is an asterisk, so 

22 I'm looking to see if it was an asterisk for something 

23 that may be blocked out. My best guess right now is that 

24 that's a note to myself to ask Colonel North who's 

25 Richard and that I don't recognize the name in the 

-■i'O y SELRLiVLODEWORD 



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T ap gE C RET/GODDWOR P 92 

1 context of a message that I'm getting. 

2 MR. LEON: Could it be Gadd? 

3 MR. LIMAN: No, not at that point. 

4 Q Not at that point. When did you first know 

5 who Secord was? 

6 A I don't know. I've never really thought about 

7 that. 

8 Q Did you first learn about him from Ollie? 

9 A Yes, sometime. I met him at the office or a 

10 phone call or something and something prior to the May- 

11 April time frame leading up to Tehran, that I knew him, 

12 but how much before that I don't know. But somewhere' 

13 between those two periods, between January and April. 

14 Q All right. On page 122 from the notebook I'm 

15 interested in the note which I'll read into the record. 

16 "Watson, two contra leaders, back to see VP" , and it says 

17 "one, names — check that with CIA? Two, state of the 

18 union intentions? Just guerrillas? Some political 

19 types, too?" with a telephone number, 941-1468. 

20 Now is the reference to Watson to the Vice 

21 President's aide Sam Watson? 

22 A I believe so. I can't recall any other Watson 

23 that I knew. 

24 Q You knew him from the terrorist task force, 

25 didn't you? 

-4!©P-»ECKK'i7 CUUKWUKD- 



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TOP aCCnET/CODEWonD ■ 93 

1 A Yes. 

2 Q Now can you explain those notes that I have 

3 just read about Watson, contra leaders and the VP? 

4 A Okay. I think that the general subject of the 

5 section relates to the issue of whether there were to be 

6 some Nicaraguan freedom fighters in the audience for the 

7 state of the union that would be acknowledged in the 

8 course of the speech and would stand and be recognized. 

9 Q That's what the reference to State of the 

10 Union means? 

11 A I think so. 

12 Q What about the reference to two contra leaders 

13 back to see VP? 

14 A I'm not sure if that's related to that or 

15 different because the names checked out with the CIA 

16 right below it may be different than state of the Union 

17 intentions and related to the separate issue of two 

18 contra leaders, or it may be checking out the names of 

19 the people who are to appear. I'm not sure. 

20 Q Do you have any recollection or are you just 

21 guessing? 

22 A No, I'm guessing. From the context, it could 

23 be either way. 

24 Q You don't recall independently? 

25 A No. 

'T OP SCCnCT /CaPEVORD— 



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TOP SECR gi y COP EW O RD 94 

1 Q Who did you consider to be in the contra 

2 compartment box among people at the NSC? Were there 

3 people in the Vice President's office who you felt were 

4 part of that box? 

5 A No, no. And again it's amorphous. Even as we 

6 previously discussed for the Iran box, but even more 

7 amorphous on the contra box, since I was, as I said, 

8 never formally brought into that box. But my working 

9 assumption was nobody on the Vice President's staff was 

10 in the contra box. 

11 Q What about Don Gregg? 

12 A I don't know, but my working assumption is ■ 

13 that he was not. 

14 Q Okay, fine. And did you ever learn any fact 

15 that caused you to question that assumption? 

16 A No, no, not really. There were the meetings 

17 when Max Gomez came up, but that was all — completely 

18 consistent with my working assumption that he was being 

19 dragged into the box by his previous friendship with Max 

20 Gomez, that it wasn't because he was in the box. 

21 Q January 23, '86, appears to be numberedpage 

22 123, notes th at tead: "Jim Steele — problems about 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hmessage to^^^^vtoday 

24 and then Ambassador concerned." 

25 A This is 23 January. Do you know off the top 

TOP S E C RST/C O DEWORD 



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95 



1 of your head the dates of what I just referred to, the 

2 meeting? That was August? 

3 Q August 8 and August 12. 

4 A Well, that's not right. No, I'm not getting a 

5 specific recollection. It's some reference to a problem 

6 that these people needed to work out — ^^^^H North, 

7 Steele and the Ambassador. Let me read the full context. 

8 (Pause.) 

9 Below that on the same page is a more detailed 

10 message i^elaying some of the problems. I think these are 

11 related. 

12 Q Some of the problems that Steele was talking 

13 about? 

14 A Right. And it concerns deployment bags, A-7A 

15 straps, and Conex inserts, some confusion on equipment 

16 back to New Orleans, which is a code name which I never 

17 did know, where New Orleans was. I mean, it's not the 

18 real New Orleans. 1,000 pairs of socks, backpacks, some 

19 kind of problem related to equipment. 

20 Q Let's go on. We're almost finished. 

21 We will interrupt the sequence and I will show 

22 you a document that I will ask the reporter to mark as 

23 the next Earl Exhibit, whatever that is.- Let's just call 

24 this — well, we'll call it Earl Exhibit lA. Would you 

25 take a look at that document? It bears our Bates 

' SOP gE < 



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TOP GCGnET/C O PEWOR D 96 

1 discovery stamp of N-604. See if you can identify it. 

2 (The document referred to was 

3 marked Earl Exhibit Number lA 

4 for identification.) 

5 A No, I don't think I've ever seen it before. 

6 Q Do you recognize the handwriting? 

7 A No. 

8 Q Did you know someone named Bill at the 

9 National Security Council on the staff, or a principal? 

10 MR. LEON: Could that be a note written on a 

11 notepad? 

12 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

13 Q Why don't we let him think for a second? 

14 A I'm not recalling one off the top of my head. 

15 If I had the NSC phone book, I could flip through the 

16 names to refresh my memory on guys that might be named 

17 Bill, but right now I'm not coming up with anybody. 

18 Q Was there anybody in the legal counsel's 

19 office named Bill in Commander Thompson's office? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Nobody? 

22 A I mean, the only Bill that leaps to mind is 

23 Bill Casey. 

24 Q I understand that. 

25 MR. LIMAN: But it's not his writing. 

■ T O P 3ELKh,i ' /C0DgW0RD ' 



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»5-lD 



1 Q It's not his writing; I understand that. But 

2 it leaped to some other minds. 

3 (Laughter.) 

4 But Rich was suggesting that perhaps somebody 

5 wrote it on an NSC notepad who is not with the NSC. Does 

6 that mean anything? 

7 A Could be. I don't know. 

8 Q You have no idea? 

9 A No. But if you want me to search my memory 

10 further in Bills at the NSC, if you have an NSC phone 

11 book with all the list of names. 

12 Q Off the record. 

13 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

14 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

15 Q While we are waiting, let's go on. There's a 

16 note at page 160 which is March 6, 1986. You see at the 

17 top it says "Nir, 1900", et cetera. Before I read it, 
13 does that have anything to do with matters that we're 

19 interested in? 

20 A I think it does. I think it relates to an 

21 Iran hostage, but I'm not positive. That's the way I 
2 2 read it. 

2 3 Q All right. Would you explain the note? This 

24 is before you were formally briefed into the compartment, 

25 wasn't it, in March of 1986? 

-gey- bhCKbT/CODEWORD - 



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1 A All right. This is March, 6 March. Again, 

2 I'm not sure exactly when I was formally briefed in. 

3 Before, or refreshing from my notes, I would have guessed 

4 early May, but obviously it was before that, from my 

5 notes early April. It could have been as early as March, 

6 possibly, but very doubtful. 

7 Q All right. What does the note mean? 

8 A It's a cryptic note from Nir passed over an 

9 open phone, so it is intended not to be understood by 

10 those not in the compartment, and I don't know what it 

11 means beyond telling Colonel North that he, Nir, has 

12 gotten in touch with the person in question, that the new 

13 location, whatever "they", Nir and North, had agreed was 

14 okay, that they were in a hotel in town with that person, 

15 so to prevent that person from knowing the location of 

16 the meeting, that he knew he was in a hotel but not — 

17 they were protecting something about who they were 

18 meeting with and why. 

19 Q Okay. 

20 A Will call William — and William is another 

21 code name, and I think that's for — I was going to guess 

22 North, but he would have used Goode, so it doesn't make 

23 sense, so I don't know who William is. Nir is going to 

24 call William as soon as he gets to the hotel about noon 

25 Friday. 

9 0f SEeRCT/CODDWOnD - 



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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Goods was? 



right. 



TOP SECRET/ CODEWOni> - 99 

MR. LIMAN: Do you know what the first name of 

THE WITNESS: Now that's right. 

MR. LIMAN: William. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's right. So it is. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

That's a double code, then. 

Well, it fooled me for a while, but I guessed 

Let's go back to the Exhibit lA question we 



were discussing. We now have a world-famous Federal 
yellow book and here comes the document back. I am 
putting Exhibit lA before you again, and there is a 
listing in here in the yellow book under National 
Security Council, under Latin American Affairs. Director 
William Perry. Did you know a William Perry when you 
were there? 

A Yes. 

Did you ever see his handwriting? 

I don't think so. It's possible, but I am 



Q 
A 

doubtful. 
Q 

Williams. 



See if you, looking at this list, can see any 

(Pause. ) 

Did you know Bob Turner? 
41UP JELULT/'COUJiWOUU 



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850 



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TOr C ECnET/CODDWOn& ^ 100 

1 A Bob Turner? No. 

2 MR. LIMAN: This may be a moment to ask him 

3 some other questions, if I may. Did you ever have any 

4 discussions as to whether the NSC was covered by Boland? 

5 THE WITNESS: Two answers to that question. 

6 One is a generic one, that from talk just amongst people 

7 at the staff my impression from that talk was that there 

8 were all kinds of loopholes in the law, so I think that's 

9 partially relevant. 

10 But the specific answer to your question is I 

11 recall one conversation at around the time Colonel North 

12 was going to meet with or brief some members of one of 

13 the Committees. I think he did that in the White House 

14 situation room. And either before or after, but in that 

15 time frame, I asked him about that argument, which I had 

16 heard either from the newspaper or from talking with 

17 people around the NSC how much applicability was the line 

18 of argument that Boland did not apply to the NSC. Well, 

19 I think I knew it was Boland. 

20 My recollection was that there were a bunch of 

21 laws that had relevance, and then I had a bunch of 

22 phrases that I remember from them, and I'm not 

23 necessarily sure which correlates to which, but I think 

24 that it would have been, from the group of relevant laws 
2 5 then, that there was an argument that I was aware of, 



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0Nciass;7'E9 



TOP CECnET/eODCWOnD -- 101 

1 that the NSC was exempted because it was not part of the 

2 Intelligence community. 

3 Ana so I asked that question of Colonel North, 

4 if that argument had utility, whether it was a credible 

5 argument. And the answer was — I don't recall the 

6 answer specifically. I recall that it was a balanced 

7 answer, a neutral answer. It wasn't hell, no it has no 

8 applicability, and it wasn't oh, yeah, that's absolutely 

9 right. It was a little grayer and more complicated than 

10 that, that I would characterize as neutral or middle. 

11 And so that's, I think, right now the only 

12 specific conversation that I can recall on that subject. 

13 MR. LIMAN: You said this occurred at the time 

14 he was to brief one of the Congressional Committees? 

15 THE WITNESS: I think so. I think that's why 

16 I was asking him, because I knew that he had either just 

17 had or was about to meet with some members of the 

18 Committees. 

19 MR. LIMAN: Do you recall that there was a 

20 resolution of inquiry regarding Colonel North in, I 

21 believe, the summer of 1986? 

22 THE WITNESS: A resolution of inquiry? I'm 

23 not recalling that term of art. 

24 MR. LIMAN: Well, do you remember that he was 

25 on the hot seat in terms of some kind of Congressional 

-?ep- &£CKii. T / '' e O DEWORB 






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^ Or aCCRE T / COD gWORD - 102 

1 investigation? 

2 THE WITNESS: Well, I think that's what I'm 

3 referring to here. 

4 MR. LIMAN: And that he ultimately gave an 

5 interview to one of the Committees. Is that what you are 

6 referring to? 

7 THE WITNESS: I'm referring to his meeting 

8 with members of the Committee in the White House 

9 situation room at some point, summer, I guess. 

10 MR. LIMAN: Was he concerned before he went 

11 for that interview? Did he express concern to you? 

12 THE WITNESS: I would say that there was • 

13 concern, yes, that he was aware that he was going to be 

14 doing this, and his concern involved what he was 

15 authorized to say and going to say, I think. 

16 MR. LIMAN: Well, you knew, for example, that 

17 he was not in a position to disclose the use of the 

18 proceeds of the arms sale. 

19 THE WITNESS: Sure. 

20 MR. LIMAN: And so he was in a very 

21 uncomfortable position? 

2 2 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

23 MR. LIMAN: And I take it you realized that. 

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I knew that there was 

25 compartmented information that was not to be shared, yes. 

TOP TrmrT/cnnrrwoFn 



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■ TOP S E C RET/CODCWOR a 103 

1 MR. LIMAN: When you say there was 

2 compartmented information not to be shared, you didn't 

3 understand that to mean that if a Congressman asked him a 

4 question that he was free to lie, did you, in order to 

5 protect compartmentalized information? 

6 THE WITNESS: Well, that is the area of 

7 concern that if there is a compartmented program that the 

8 President of the United States said will not get briefed 

9 to the Congress, how do you respond to a question that 

10 refers to that which is in the compartment? 

11 MR. LIMAN: Well, one way you respond, of 

12 course, is by saying I'm not free to answer that 

13 question. That's an option. And another option is to 

14 protect the information by lying. That's correct, too, 

15 right? 

16 THE WITNESS: Sure. I mean, I would say a 

17 cover story. 

18 MR. LIMAN: But a cover story can be a lie, 

19 right? 

20 THE WITNESS: It can be, or it can be a half- 

21 truth, a partial truth, a limited statement that 

22 protects. 

23 MR. LIMAN: But a lie is one of the options. 

24 And, you know, without trying to make you more 

25 uncomfortable than you probably feel at this moment, 

T OP aECRET/ LUU&WORD 



0NGLa3i»iii^'£9 



854 



GNCL9SS^?^ED 



■ge P SECnCT/CODEWOR D- 104 

1 there are times that it's appropriate for a member of the 

2 military to lie, such as when he's being interrogated by 

3 enemy forces. 

4 THE WITNESS: Certainly. 

5 MR. LIMAN: And so what I've been trying to 

6 find out is whether in the context of the way you looked 

7 at things at the time, if a Congressional Committee put 

8 questions that would uncover compartmentalized 

9 information that you were not authorized to reveal, was 

10 the response to treat it as if it were the North Koreans 

11 and to lie, or would it be to say I just can't answer? 

12 How did you see things? 

13 THE WITNESS: Well, I was not directly 

14 involved in the preparation of that testimony. 

15 MR. LIMAN: I know that. 

16 THE WITNESS: And so I was never addressed 

17 with the question you are posing, and I was not involved 

18 in the discussions, so I don't know. 

19 MR. LIMAN: And you've never had a discussion 

20 of that? 

21 THE WITNESS: No. 

22 MR. LIMAN: And when Colonel North finished 

23 with his interview with the Committee I take it he told 

24 you that he had been interviewed. You knew it took place 

25 in the situation room. 

-g OP SECRET/CODEWORD 



rH5^L^SSt7ID 



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J» jM;^^^^ril^' ^«^P 



105 



1 THE WITNESS: And I don't know how I knew 

2 that, whether it was from others. 

3 MR. LIMAM: Did he discuss it with you 

4 afterward? 

5 THE WITNESS: Well, there was no debrief 

6 afterwards. If there was any discussion of it afterwards 

7 it would have been just a passing reference. I'm not 

8 recalling anything at the moment, but possibly. 

9 MR. LIMAN: Did he express any relief to you? 

10 THE WITNESS: Any relief? 

11 (Pause.) 

12 No, I can't even say that, although I will say 

13 that that would have been my assumption, that the thing 

14 was over and it was resolved in some way, which would in 

15 some way convey to me relief that this situation of 

16 concern is completed, is over. 

17 MR. LIMAN: Was there any activity to prepare 

18 Colonel North for his interview with the Congressional 

19 Committee? 

20 THE WITNESS: I think so. 

21 MR. LIMAN: What do you remember? 

22 THE WITNESS: My best recollection is that 

23 Colonel North was trying to get guidance for this meeting 

24 and was experiencing difficulty in getting that guidance. 

25 I know that NSC Congressional Affairs was involved in 

TOP QECR£ T /C O DC<> 0aD- 



'jiA-y")-'^'^-^ 



856 

TO P 3ECRCT/C0DEW0R &. log 



3S.?"E[)i 



1 that. NSC Congressional Affairs was involved in setting 

2 up a meeting, so they were involved in a certain amount 

3 of the preparation of it. 

4 But I recall that he was having difficulty 

5 getting guidance from Admiral Poindexter on the specific 

6 reason, and Admiral Poindexter was on leave during the 

7 time frame. 

8 MR. LIMAN: Admiral Poindexter was away from 

9 the office? 

10 THE WITNESS: He was on leave, yes, out of the 

11 office. ■• 

12 MR. LIMAN: Leave in civilian terms means he 

13 was on vacation or out of the office for some other 

14 purpose? 

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

16 MR. LIMAN: And the difficulty he was having 

17 getting guidance was that Admiral Poindexter wasn't 

18 accessible? 

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, but it may have been more 

20 than that. I'm not sure. 

21 MR. LIMAN: But I'm trying to find out whether 

22 it was more than that. Was it that he was a hot potato 

23 and people just sort of were leaving him to fend for 

24 himself? Or was that your impression? 

25 THE WITNESS: My impression was that the leave 

^e? SECRE T / CODEWORD 



UNCU^i^^ay'SED 



4 



857 



■ ^OP SECnST/CODEWORD — j^07 

1 was not accidental. The timing of the leave was just not 

2 a coincidence. 

3 MR. LIMAN: And did Ollie express that to you? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know how i 

5 gathered that. I gathered that from his demeanor and 

6 actions. I don't recall that he specifically said that 
to me, but something about the way he was dealing and 
talking or calling over the phono, trying to get to see 
Poindexter, trying to prepare for his meeting, that is 
the impression that I recall. 

^^ MR. LIMAN: So that your impression of it, 

12 your observation of it, was that Colonel North had some 

13 information to protect and that he was being left to 

14 figure out how to protect it on his own? 

^^ THE WITNESS: I think that's a fair statement. 

^^ MR- LIMAN: And being the type of person he 

^'' was, he didn't complain about it? Or did he? 

^^ THE WITNESS: Well, he did the job that was 

19 required of him. He would have preferred to have 

2 guidance, it was clear to me, but given that he wasn't 

21 getting any he did the job, what was left to him. 

22 MR. LIMAN: Did he tell you that one of the 

23 subjects of concern to him was that they might ask him 

24 where the contras were getting the funding? 

25 THE WITNESS: I don't think I knew any of the 

TOP aCGRCT/CODCWOR B- 



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TOP S SC a ST/CODEWOnD - 108 

1 specifics of the areas. We had no discussions of that. 

2 MR. LIMAN: What other compartmentalized 

3 information did you believe that he had that committees 

4 that were inquiring about the contras might wander into? 

5 THE WITNESS: Well, the connection to Iran 

6 we've already talked about. I don't know whether there's 

7 anything in my notes that will help on that. I am not 

8 recalling anything specific beyond a general feeling that 

9 perhaps some of this could have been politically 

10 embarrassing to the President. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Like what? ^ 

12 THE WITNESS: Whatever Colonel North was 

13 doing. 

14 MR. LIMAN: What was he doing that could be 

15 politically embarrassing? 

16 THE WITNESS: That the things, that whatever 

17 he was doing to support the contras. 

18 MR. LIMAN: And what was he doing to support 

19 the contras, as you understood it? 

20 THE WITNESS: Well, I mean I have bits and 

21 pieces of it from my notes and my day-to-day involvement. 

22 MR. LIMAN: I understand that. But, you know, 
2 3 the notes have become so much of a crutch for you, if I 

24 may say, that it's almost as if you weren't there and 

25 that it was somebody who can just read the notes well. 

- TOP EGRET/ CO DCWORD - 



[INCL^-iS-riO 



859 



gnclasss7:ed 

- TOP OECnET/CODEWonD 109 

1 And what I'm trying to do, knowing, you know, that the 

2 notes may refresh your recollection, they may lead you to 

3 correct your recollection, but to assume for a moment 

4 that Fawn made a mistake and shredded your notes as well, 

5 you still would have been there. Some of these things 

6 would clearly have left some imprint on your 

7 recollection. 

8 So I want you to throw away th« crulMh and 

9 just see if you could tell me what you understood he was 

10 doing for the contras with as much particularity as your 

11 memory can summon. 

12 THE WITNESS: Well, at any of the activities 

13 that I knew that Colonel North was doing, like talking to 

14 Jim Steele, Ambassador Corr, all of these people, that 

15 that could be embarrassing to the President and the 

16 Administration, that it would identify the loophole 

17 through which the Administration was going and cause 

18 Congress to pass legislation to close that loophole. 

19 MR. LIMAN: Well, except that in 1986, in the 

20 summer of '86, when we're talking about it, Congress was 

21 on the verge of appropriating $100 million for contra 

22 sujJport without virtually any restrictions, most of it 

23 for lethal aid. 

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't recall the vote 

25 and the timing. 

TOP SECRCT/COPSW ORD . 



r^f!«lL^3S:""ED 



860 



HNCLA3S:'^'ED 



TO P SECRrT/C O PEWOR O 110 

1 MR. LIMAN: Well, it was contemplated. It was 

2 not a surprise when that appropriation bill came through, 

3 because by the summer of '86 the handwriting was on the 

4 wall. 

5 THE WITNESS: Well, my recollection is that 

6 there was an earlier vote that went the other way and 

7 that this was another visitation of that and could have 

8 gone either way. '- s^ 

9 MR. LIHAN: So was there concern that if what 

10 Colonel North was doing came out that the Congress could 

11 have flip-flopped again? 

12 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm not relating to thht, 

13 to anything specific. I'm just saying generally. I'm 

14 referring to nine months' worth of knowledge with that 

15 statement 

16 MR. LIMAN: Well, let's talk about things that 

17 I think you probably knew that Colonel North was doing. 

18 I mean, did you think that Colonel North was planning 

19 military campaigns for the contras? 

20 THE WITNESS: Even that one's hard to answer 

21 in terms of being a military advisor and telling the 

22 contra leadership how to do certain things or planning an 

23 operation for them, no. In the context of being very 

24 concerned with the contra cause and brainstorming of 

25 ideas, yes. I mean, he was always thinking about what 

T OP sg c RE T / ee Dcwono 



UNCLA3S:r:2D 



861 



ONCL/liS.^rED 



TOP aEOnCT/GODDWOnD 111 

1 was going on in Nicaragua and related countries and 

2 keeping abreast of the military campaign from an 

3 intelligence viewpoint and brainstorming. 

4 MR. LIMAN: Was he involved, so far as you 

5 knew, in planning where the contras would get their air 

6 drops? 

7 THE WITNESS: I wouldn't be able to identify 

8 when in the nine months I knew exactly what, but 

9 certainly cumulation of involvement, passing on phone 

10 calls, the KL-43 notes, that I eventually became aware 

11 that this Secord operation was doing air drops in 

12 Nicaragua for the contras and that Colonel North was ' 

13 aware of a lot of the details of that operation. 

14 Now whether he was planning them, that I don't 

15 know . 

16 MR. LIMAN: Were you aware that Colonel North 

17 was concerned about the fact that the contras had not 

18 been given funding by the United States Congress for the 

19 lethal activities? 

20 THE WITNESS: Was I aware that Colonel North 

21 was concerned that Congress would not appropriate lethal 

22 aid? Is that the question? 

23 MR. LIMAN: Yes. Was he concerned about 

24 getting the money for lethal aid? 

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, he was aware that 

- giOP ac e RE T /e O PEW ORD 



862 



0NCIS3S'RED 



TOP SSCBFT/rnPEWOBD 112 

1 th« program under which $27 million had been appropriated 

2 was not enough, yes. 

3 MR. LIMAN: And you understood that that was 

4 why money was being used from the Iranian arms sale for 

5 the contras, right? 

6 THE WITNESS: Hell, I was aware that some 

7 monies from that were being used in support of the 

8 contras. I didn't necessarily correlate it to the 

9 specific deficiencies that you just identified, but I 

10 knew it was in some way going to help the contra cause. 

11 But whether it was for the purchase of arms or for the 

12 air drop or for what facet of supporting the contras,'! 

13 never did know that. 

14 MR. LIMAN: Did he ever talk to you about the 

15 fact that the contras needed bridge financing? 

16 THE WITNESS: I have heard that term and I 

17 think I have heard it before, whatever references there 

18 are, since November, but I'm not positive of that. I 

19 don't think that I didn't hear the term until Tower. I 

20 think I heard it before. 

21 MR. LIMAN: Did he ever tell you how much 

22 money was being generated for the contras by the Iranian 

23 arms sales? 

24 THE WITNESS: No, he did not. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Did he ever talk to you about the 

-TOP-SEClSfTCODEWORB- 



0NeLiSS.'?"E9 



863 



f]W'^l,«l3-Sf^fc0 



TOP-sscRcr/coDEwnRn 113 

1 fact that the Secord operation needed money? 

2 THE WITNESS: No. I don't believe he did, 

3 although, related to that, it caused me to recall that 

4 there would be notes that would come on the KL-4 3 that 

5 were related to financial difficulties, that the pay was 

6 late, or that people weren't being paid or something like 

7 that, which would suggest a pay problem or a money 

8 problem. 

9 MR. LIMAN: Were you aware of any efforts to 

10 sell the assets of either Project Democracy or the Secord 

11 organization to the CIA once it was allowed to come back 

12 in? 

13 THE WITNESS: I recall that I think that there 

14 was discussion of both giving and selling, that it was 

15 not exclusive reference to either, that both 

16 possibilities were talked about by various people. I 

17 think that's correct. 

18 MR. LIMAN: Who do you remember talking about 

19 it? Who wanted to sell it and who wanted to give it 

20 away? Because they are generally pretty exclusive 

21 things. 

22 THE WITNESS: Well, the two Don Gregg meetings 

23 that we have previously talked about started in on that 

24 issue of the transition, if you will, from what Secord 's 

25 operation was providing and what the CIA would start up 

TOP aECRET/CODEWOR P 



uncla3SSf:ed 



864 



wi/issjFe 



TOtt-SEO U ii T/CODCWORP 114 

1 with. I am not really recalling any specific 

2 conversation that I can say person X was saying sell, 

3 person Y was saying give. 

4 I can recall that^^^^^^^Hwas conveying the 

5 view that the CIA didn't want anything from the operation 

6 that was previously there , that the CIA's position was it 

7 was going tc 

8 HR. LIMAN: It wanted to^^^^^^^H right? 

9 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, I understand the 

10 conceptual distinction you are making in your question, 

11 but it doesn't maXe any sense to ma because I'm not 

12 recalling anything except that I heard both things talked 

13 about. 

14 MR. LEON: Well, what was Ollie's position? 

15 MR. LIMAN: I'm going to come to that. It's 

16 not a matter of conceptual distinction. Generally, if 

17 somebody wants to give something away then they don't ask 

18 for money for it. So either somebody said look, I prefer 

19 to sell it, or they didn't. Do you have any recollection 

20 of let's take first the position of the Secord group, the 

21 owners? What was their position? 

22 THE WITNESS: I don't think I can even 

23 identify and distinguish the Secord group from Colonel 

24 North or anybody else who might have talked about this. 

25 The only other thing that I — recalling that there was 

TOP SECRCT/CODEWORD 



[JNCLASS^rED 



865 



UNCLASS:y-ID 



1 discussion of both, it seems to me that the selling would 

2 have preceded the free discussion, but I'm not even 

3 positive of that. I mean, that would make sense to me. 

4 And the way I am remembering all of this, that 

5 there would have been an attempt to recoup some of the 

6 money expended in purchasing these assets and other debts 

7 or whatever and with the opposition that 1 have already 

8 mentioned to that from CIA, of wanting ^°^^^^^^^^^^^| 

9 ^^^^^^ft^^ follows to me logically that there would be a 

10 position of giving away from that, which was also 

11 rejected. 

12 But I'm not positive of that. I'm starting to 

13 speculate, which I don't really want to do. 

14 MR. LIMAN: I thinJc what you're doing is 

15 deduction and speculation, and I'm looking for memory. 

16 THE WITNESS: No. 

17 MR. LIMAN: Do you remember North's position 

18 on any of this? 

19 THE WITNESS: My only recollection is that I 

20 think both were discussed, were talked about in that time 

21 frame. 

22 MR. LIMAN: Who do you remember discussing it? 

23 THE WITNESS: I don't know. What I am lumping 

24 into there is probably Secord and North, but I'm unable 

25 to differentiate. 

VO P ag C Rg T / C OD EW OR B- 



UNGLA^Sii^^ED 



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TOP gncnrT/ e oDCwon o- ng 



1 MR. LIMAN: Dutton? 

2 THE WITNESS: Possibly. I mean, I associate 

3 that with Secord. 

4 MR. LIMAN: Were you ever together with North 

5 and Secord when they discussed this? 

6 THE WITNESS: I don't believe so, no. 

7 MR. LIMAN: Or with North, Secord and Dutton? 

8 THE WITNESS: I can't recall that those things 

9 were discussed in any of the meetings that I sat in on 

10 with Dutton, Secord and North or any mixture of those. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Have you testified to what ^ 

12 meetings you had with Dutton? 

13 THE WITNESS: No. 

14 MR. LIMAN: Tell US what meetings you had with 

15 Dutton. 

16 MR. KIRK: May we go off the record? 

17 (A brief recess was taken.) 

18 MR. LIMAN: Back on the record. 

19 Colonel Earl, I understand that you are 

20 talking about events that occurred more than a year ago, 

21 that you were handling scores of other projects, that 

22 many of these cases you were basically taking messages or 

23 information for Colonel North and just passing it on or 

24 doing vice versa, and that since you were not the prime 

25 mover in these projects you were not always familiar with 

TOP aCCRET/ C ODEWORD 



867 



UNCLASSiFED 



?OP SSCRET/CODEWnPD . 117 

1 all the details and that they all leave imprints on your 

2 memory . 

3 I also know that your memory can be subject to 

4 correction when you look at the notes or even can be 

5 subject to correction when you hear other witnesses 

6 testify after you. And with all of those caveats and 

7 bearing in mind that all that you are going to try to do 

8 is make your best effort at recalling the substance of 

9 what happened and what was said, can you tell us what you 

10 recall of your meetings with Mr. Dutton? 

11 THE WITNESS: Okay. I think my first meeting 

12 with Bob Dutton was in a restaurant and I'm not sure of 

13 the time frame. It may come later. 

14 But it was a meeting over some problem that 

15 had arisen and Colonel North was not available, and that 

16 I was going to have to try to take care of it. And so we 

17 met at a restaurant out near Tyson's Corner, because I 

18 didn't know what he looked like when I met him, so I 

19 recall having to arrange exactly where we would meet, and 

20 he didn't know what I looked like either. 

21 So that was the first meeting. If I could 

22 remember what the problem was it might help the time 

23 frame. I can't right now even recall the problem. There 

24 are a couple of problems I recall dealing with him, so it 

25 may have been one of those. 

TO P SECRET/ CODEW O RD -- 



^ficimmn 



868 



UNCLASSIFl^ED 



TO ? SE C RET/ CO DCWOR P 118 

1 MR. LIMAN: What problems? 

2 THE WITNESS: One concerned Max Gomez and this 

3 meeting, a couple of meetings, in Don Gregg's office. 

4 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

5 Q In August of 1986? 

6 A In August of 1986, so it could possibly have 

7 been in that time frame. Another problem which is a 

8 candidate, I guess, a possibility, although this one 

9 seems a little late in time, is the shooting down of the 

10 C-123, the Hasenfus episode, and that was October, I 

11 believe. And it's possible that that was my first 

12 meeting with him. 

13 So one of those two are possible, or it could 

14 have been a third that I'm not recalling. 

15 MR. LEON: Let me help you in one respect 

16 there. On June 25 Colonel Korth met with Dutton and 

17 Gomez in his office and, according to different accounts, 

18 woodshedded him, Gomez, on his conduct down there. 

19 THE WITNESS: And what? Woodshedded? 

20 MR. LEON: Reprimanded him. That was on June 

21 25, the day the contra aid vote came through. Now could 

22 it have been before then? 

23 THE WITNESS: I don't recall that meeting. I 

24 don't think I knew. Well, I know I didn't know Max Gomez 

25 then. 

TOP aCCnLT/eOPEWORD - 



UNCLASSSPlE^ 



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UNCLASS^^ED 



T O P SgCRE T /eODC»ORD - 119 

1 MR. LEON: As early as that? 

2 THE WITNESS: My first meeting with Max Gomez 

3 was in that very first meeting in August with Don Gregg, 

4 so I know I wasn't in that meeting. I did not meet Max 

5 Gomez. I did not. I don't think I knew Dutton then 

6 either, but I'm not sure. 

7 MR. LEON: Okay. 

8 THE WITNESS: So those are two problem areas. 

9 That's one meeting that I recall. I recall another 

10 meeting with him, him being Dutton, with Colonel North, 

11 and that was some time after the C-123 incident. Colonel 

12 North was out of the country when the C-12 3 was actually 

13 shot down, so it was at whatever point, however many days 

14 after that he finally returned to the country and then 

15 had a meeting. 

16 I recall a meeting with Colonel Steele and Bob 

17 Dutton and me in — I think it was in the Watergate 

18 Hotel, and again that concerned some problem with the 

19 operation. It may have been the Max Gomez thing or it 

20 may have been something else with other internal problems 

21 on the operation and Colonel Steele's inability to help 

22 on that. 

23 So that's what, three meetings with Dutton. I 

24 talked to him on the phone a lot. I mean, I couldn't 

25 begin to count the phone calls, but meetings, I don't 

TO P S Ee R £ T /CODE WO RD — 



UNCUSSSFEED 



870 



UN^'^SSIFSED 



- TOP SCGRCT/G e DEWOnD 120 

1 think he ever came in to the Old Executive Office 

2 Building. I don't think I ever met him there. He may 

3 have come for other reasons that I wasn't there, but I 

4 don't think I ever had a meeting with him. I think all 

5 three of those that I'm talking about were meetings 

6 outside the building. And right now I'm not recalling 

7 any other meetings. 

8 MR. LIMAK: What do you remember about the 

9 Hasenfus affair at that meeting? 

10 THE WITNESS: Okay. That was a meeting with 

11 Colonel North, Bob Dutton and myself, and it was a 

12 meeting to discuss the Hasenfus situation and the fact 

13 that Hasenfus was captured and what to do about that, 

14 what to do about the logistics on the bodies of the pilot 

15 and the copilot. 

16 MR. LIMAN: Well, was there discussion about 

17 the fact that Hasenfus was working for Dutton? 

18 THE WITNESS: No one specifically mentioned 

19 that. It was clear to me from the context that that was 

20 one of Secord's airplanes and that Hasenfus was a crew 

21 member, a member of that operation. 

22 MR. LIMAN: Was there any discussion about the 

23 fact that the United States Government was denying any 

24 involvement in it? 

25 THE WITNESS: I don't recall specifically, but 

TOP CECRET/C &BgWqRir 



UNf^LRSSSFEa 



871 



ONflASSm 



V 'i fODEWOnO 121 

1 the statements that the State Department had been making 

2 on that affair could have been discussed. I mean, that's 

3 not inconsistent with kind of the subject and the broad- 

4 ranging nature of what in my recollection was suitable 

5 for discussion at that meeting. 

6 MR. LIMAN: Do you remember anything about 

7 talking about a cover story or whether there had to be a 

8 cover story? 

9 THE WITNESS: Not per se, not that I can 

10 recall right now. Let me give you what I can recall from 

11 it. There was an initial reference to getting a beeper 

12 in on Hasenfus so that his location could be identified 

13 in case there were, or to develop a potential for a 

14 rescue, and I think there was some discussion about some 

15 of the logistics on the pilots' bodies, funeral expenses, 

16 and relations with the State Department on that aspect. 

17 I also recall a list that Bob Dutton had drawn 

18 up of questions, just hypotheticals, what-ifs, trying to 

19 anticipate the way this thing could go, what could 

20 happen, and what needed to be thought about and resolved. 

21 And I recall that there was a phone call. This was in a 

22 restaurant or a bar. There was a phone call from Fawn 

23 for something that had to be picked up over there or 

24 whatever, but anyway the manager called for — it was Mr. 

25 McAlister and so he answered the phone and it was Fawn 

TOP 3ECRET/G0DEW0RD 



yw^i,R!5?^"rE^ 



872 



UN^llS^"?'® 



TOP cEcncT/e eP EwonD 122 

1 calling for Ollie. 

2 And the phone message was that there was 

3 something over at the office that had to be picked up, so 

4 I wound up going back to the office in order to get this 

5 and left the two of them to finish their conversation. I 

6 went back to the office, got whatever it was that Fawn 

7 had, and I think came back to the meeting, although at 

8 that point it was — yes, I did. It was done at that 

9 point. 

10 I went out and they both got in their car and 

11 left, and then I went. So I came back to this mee^ng 

12 place. 

13 MR. LIHAN: How many meetings do you recall 

14 with General Secord? 

15 THE WITNESS: There were — there's more than 

16 one out at CIA headquarters, as in a few or maybe 

17 several. 

18 MR. LIMAN: At CIA headquarters? 

19 THE WITNESS: At CIA headquarters — more than 

20 one; maybe two, three or four. I don't know. This is on 

21 the Iran hostage case. I don't think he was at that one 

22 that I mentioned earlier in Clair George's office. I'm 

23 not sure; he might have been, but I don't think so. 

24 He was at one — I have a recollection of him 

25 driving to the gate and waiting and that we met him there 

-i'ep-sccg.ET/rnpRwoRn 






873 



TOP S EC RET/CO &EWORO- 123 

1 and proceeded in, and I )cnow he went in but I can't place 

2 him in a room at which we had the meetings, one meeting 

3 I recall was in Clair George's office; another one was in 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hof fice; another was in a conference room 

5 somewhere that ^^^^^^H folks had acquired and I just 

6 don't know which one he is sitting in. 

7 MR. LIMAN: Did you talk about pricing in any 

8 of these meetings? 

9 THE WITNESS: There is what I think is the 

10 last meeting, but it may not necessarily be the last, but 

11 one of the later meetings out at CIA headquarters, and I 

12 think Nir was there. But, anyway, there was discussion 

13 at that meeting of pricing, and I'm not sure whether 

14 Secord was at that or not. 

15 MR. LIMAN: Was that a meeting at which the 

16 discussion was of pricing of future transactions or of 

17 the Iranians' complaints? 

18 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I can't answer 

19 that right now. 

20 MR. LIMAN: Do you have any recollection of 

21 any meeting at the CIA in which there was a discussion of 

22 the use of proceeds for the contras? 

23 THE WITNESS: No. 

24 MR. LIMAN: There was never any discussion 

25 there about the fact that the Iranians might make that 

To y ggcRg T / e oDEVJon o 



UN«*l'\S*^".^iD 



874 



.mmid 



■ TOP g CCnKT/CODEWOBn ^ 124 

1 claim or that some of the financiers might claim that 

2 they were shortchanged because money went to the contras? 

3 THE WITNESS: I don't think so. This might 

4 help, and I think we've already talked about it. There 

5 was the issue that you alluded to of dissatisfaction with 

6 the high prices. It had been an issue. I don't think at 

7 that meeting that we were just talking about that the 

8 Iranians eventually delivered these 40-some microfiche, 

9 that that pertained to this issue of how to explain the 

10 price. 

11 But I'm not sure that this meeting that I'm 

12 recalling, I'm not sure that that was the driving force 

13 behind the meeting or whether it was the next delivery or 

14 what . 

15 MR. LIMAN: So you remember meetings with 

16 General Secord at the CIA? 

17 THE WITNESS: Ves. 

18 MR. LIMAN: Where else do you remember a 

19 meeting? 

20 THE WITNESS: In Colonel North's office. 

21 General Secord would come fairly often. 

22 ' MR. LIMAN: Do you have any recollection of 

23 any discussions of those meetings? 

24 THE WITNESS: Let's see. Well, I recall a 

25 series of meetings in development of the chronology and 



UNeiRSSSFSEO 



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-TOP SECRg T /CODCHORO — 125 

1 General Secord is one of the participants in helping to 

2 offer up the facts of the Iranian episode. 

3 MR. LIMAN: Was he at more than one meeting on 

4 the chronology? 

5 THE WITNESS: I think so. I'm not positive, 

6 but my recollection is that he was a significant 

7 participant in that, that he had a lot of the facts and 

8 figures and knowledge in his head, and so he was there 

9 more than once in that week or ten-day or two-week 

10 period, whatever it was. 

11 MR. LIMAN: But do you remember Secord in 

12 connection with meetings on the chronology? 

13 THE WITNESS: Yes. I remember him there in 

14 relation to secure voice telephone calls to the Iranian 

15 intermediaries, Channel 2. 

16 MR. LIMAN: Using your phone? 

17 THE WITNESS: Using the commercial secure, the 

18 commercial encryption device provided by, I guess — 

19 MR. LIMAN: The KL-43? 

2 THE WITNESS: No, a different one. 

21 MR. LIMAN: Provided by the United States 

22 Government? 

23 THE WITNESS: No. 

24 MR. LIMAN: No? 

2 5 THE WITNESS: Provided by others. 

jpeP-srCKETTOJTJEWORO- 



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- TOP aEeRET/eODi:WOR& - 126 

1 MR. LIMAN: Oh. 

2 THE WITNESS: We can go off the record if you 

3 want to go further into that. 

4 MR. BELNICK: Off the record. 

5 (A discussion was held off the record.} 

6 MR. BELNICK: Back on the record. 

7 THE WITNESS: I recall seeing General Secord 

8 coining to Colonel North's old office, Room 392, and 

9 either coming out of his office or waiting in the two 

10 chairs in front of Fawn's desk to go in and have a 

11 private meeting with Colonel North. So I recall seeing 

12 him there on business with Colonel North but not a 

13 meeting that I participated in. 

14 And I recall one meeting at General Secord 's 

15 home which was a follow-up meeting from, I think, one of 

16 the CIA meetings, I think on a weekend, that we had had a 

17 meeting at CIA and then there was some residual to be 

18 discussed. So Colonel North and I drove over to General 

19 Secord 's home. 

20 MR. LIMAN: Oo you remember what you discussed 

21 thare? 

22 THE WITNESS: Well, I think it was Iran, but I 

23 don't know which arms transaction or which episode. I 

24 can't get it in time. I have a feeling it's later in the 

25 process, so that we're talking about Channel 2 and the 

?€ H* bli.LKi:.T/CUUi:;WUKE r— 



yr^DLASSSFlD 



877 



UNSlASSff'CE) 



^ HDP CEGRET/C0 0S W0n6 ■ ' 127 

1 last shipment of TOWS, but I'm not sure of that. 

2 MR. LIMAN: Now you've seen in the Tower 

3 report at least some PROF notes in which North talks 

4 about Lake as "our" contra company, "our" proprietary — 

5 words to that effect. Did he ever use those words with 

6 you? 

7 THE WITNESS: I don't think so, although if he 

8 did I would have interpreted it in an almost royal "we" 

9 sense, not in the sense of the way I was struck in 

10 reading it. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Well, the royal "we" to me means 

12 "I" and you use "we". 

13 THE WITNESS: Okay. I've said it bass- 

14 ackwards. In the context of that my feeling at the time, 

15 when I was on the staff, before reading the Tower report, 

16 was that there was this private organization, Secord was 

17 doing this service, and that Colonel North had some 

18 affiliation with it. I mean, he was getting information 

19 from it or he was dealing with people on it, but that he 

20 was not a member of it, that he was not a part of the 

21 organization, that he was not a board of director, if you 

22 will, of Democracy, Inc., which was a more familiar way 
2 3 of referring to this firm. 

24 MR. LIMAN: And you understand what a 

2 5 proprietary is, don't you, in CIA terms? 
-TOP sgcncT/'ceiDcwnnp 



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TOP CECnET/CODCWOnD 128 

1 THE WITNESS: CIA proprietary, yes, I 

2 understand. 

3 MR. LIMAN: Did he ever speak of Lake or the 

4 Secord organization as an NSC proprietary? 

5 THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall, no. 

6 MR. LIMAN: Did you view it that way? 

7 THE WITNESS: I'm having difficulty with that 

8 because I never really focused on it in those terms 

9 before, and so I am doing this after the fact. 

10 MR. LIMAN: Well, I don't want you to do it 

11 after the fact. Let's just stop on that. Let me put the 

12 question to you differently. 

13 You understood that you were working on a 

14 markup of 370 percent. That's the way you were doing the 

15 arithmetic on prices, correct? 

16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

17 MR. LIMAN: And you understood that this money 

18 was going into an account in Switzerland, correct? 

19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

20 MR. LIMAN: And you didn't think that this 

21 money belonged to Oliver North personally, right? 

22 THE WITNESS: No. 

23 MR. LIMAN: And there wasn't any doubt in your 

24 mind that Oliver North was not making money out of these 

25 transactions, correct? 

■ TOP SECRET/ CODEWORD 



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yNCLASSSFED 



TOP JECRg T /e OP CWORD 129 

1 THE WITNESS: Correct. 

2 MR. LIMAN: Now who did you think you were 

3 giving a 370 percent profit margin to? I think you can 

4 handle this without counsel. 

5 MR. KIRK: Let me do my counsel's job, if you 

6 please. 

7 MR. LIMAN: I know that. I'm not trying to 

8 embarrass him. I just want him to focus on that with me. 

9 THE WITNESS: But my problem is I have never 

10 really focused in the terms in which you identified. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Then say that. I never thought of 

12 who I was giving 370 percent to. 

13 THE WITNESS: Okay. Could we go off the 

14 record for a minute? 

15 MR. LIMAN: Sure. 

16 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

17 MR. LIMAN: Back on the record. 

18 Colonel Earl, at one point in time you 

19 understood you were working on a schedule which would 

20 provide for a profit margin, a gross profit margin of 370 

21 percent, correct — doing it at 3.7 times cost? 

2 2 THE WITNESS: Yes, it would be incorrect to 

23 say that I had used the terms profit margin. 

24 MR. LIMAN: That's my term. 

25 THE WITNESS: That's your term, so that's even 

TOP CECRET/CODEWnRn 



yNCLP.3s:r£0i 



880 



130 

1 one step further than I took it in my own mind. But it 

2 is the logical extension. 

3 MR. LIMAN: I stand corrected. You understood 

4 that Ghorbanifar was going to be paid substantially more 

5 to the account than the CIA was charging, correct? 

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I think that's accurate. 

7 MR. LIMAN: That's fair? 

8 THE WITNESS: That's fair. 

9 MR. LIMAN: And you understood from something 

10 that Colonel North said to you that part of this money_ 

11 was going to the contras, correct? 

12 THE WITNESS: To support the contra cause. ' It 

13 may not have been going to the contras, but in support of 

14 the contra cause. 

15 MR. LIMAN: And did you ask him what kind of 

16 arrangement he had with the account holders for that 

17 money? 

18 THE WITNESS: No, I did not. 

19 MR. LIMAN: And you didn't ask him what 

20 percentage was going to support the contra cause? 

21 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

22 MR. LIMAN: And you didn't ask him how it was 

23 going to the contra support? 

24 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Did you think about whether it was 



UNCLftS5i?KD 



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»lflS-^5F?ED 



TOP SECBET/CODEWOnP 131 

1 b«ing used for the airlift operation? 

2 THE WITNESS: Again, I'm not sure that I 

3 consciously linked the two as you are suggesting, but 

4 from what I knew — 

5 MR. LIMAN: Let me just say that I'm not 

6 trying to suggest it. 

7 THE WITNESS: Well, that's not inconsistent. 

8 I mean, that's logical, but I'm not sure I even linked it 

9 quite as explicitly as you suggest. 

10 MR. LIMAN: Let me try it differently. You 

11 understood that Secord was involved in the airlift 

12 operation; am I correct? 

13 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

14 MR. LIMAN: And you understood that Secord was 

15 involved at least in the logistics of the Iranian 

16 transaction? 

17 THE WITNESS: And more than that, and the 

18 negotiation. 

19 MR. LIMAN: And in the negotiation? 
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

21 MR. LIMAN: The negotiation of the price to 

2 2 the Iranians? 

23 THE WITNESS: The total negotiation, which 

2 4 would include price, I assume. I don't know that. I 

2 5 mean, he was one who talked in Channel 2, was talking to 
-T OP SLCRtlT/ C OD E WO RD 



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882 



•T OP S ECg .£ T,'XODEWSro 



132 



1 the Iranians. 

2 MR. LIMAN: Well, let's go back to Channel l 

3 before you even get to Channel 2. Let's take it step by 

4 step. You knew that Secord was involved in logistics in 

5 the Iranian transaction. 

6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

7 MR. LIMAN: You knew that he was involved in 

8 discussions on the whole approach to the Iranian 

9 initiative with Ghorbanifar and others, or did you not? 

10 THE WITNESS: Well, I think that's fair. I'm 

11 just trying to recall. 

12 MR. LIMAN: You're not sure when you learned 

13 that? Is that what's bothering you? 

14 THE WITNESS: Well, for example, in the May 

15 time frame, when I am talking to General Secord on the 

16 phone in Tel Aviv, I'm not sure it's clear to me at that 

17 time how substantively he's involved on the negotiations 

18 and the whole relationship, that it's only logistics or 

19 whether it's something more. I'm not sure. I know it's 

20 logistics for sure, but it may be more at that point. 

21 MR. LIMAN: Well, when he's in Tel Aviv and 

22 they're in Tehran, you probably assumed that they were 

23 doing the negotiations in Tehran and he was really the 

24 communications link or one of the communications links 

25 between you and Tehran; isn't that fair to say? 

■ TOP CEGRrT/eODEW O RD 



UNSLSSSSFSED 



883 



BN01ASS3FID 



- TOP 3 EGRET/ CODEWORD - 13 3 

1 THE WITNESS: Certainly, and it's possible 

2 that he was more than that, but I'm not sure if that was 

3 true. 

4 MR. LIMAN: Right. You don't know. 

5 THE WITNESS: I can't recall whether any of 

6 the discussions that we had would lead me to conclude 

7 that he was more deeply involved in that, substantively 

8 involved in the relationship. 

9 MR. LIMAN: Did you understand that he had any 

10 control over the bank account into which the proceeds of 

11 the arms sales were going? 

12 THE WITNESS: On more than one occasion, on at 

13 least one occasion, on more than one occasion, I received 

14 a phone call from the CIA asking to confirm the bank 

15 account number of the CIA Swiss bank account into which 

16 the money was to be deposited, so that CIA could pay DOD 

17 for the arms, that the money, even though it was supposed 

18 to be there at that point, had not shown up. 

19 It was late and CIA was wanting to backtrack 

20 through this complicated chain to see where it was hung 

21 up and passed to me the number of the bank account to 

22 double-check the number to make sure that it had been 

23 passed correctly and that it hadn't gone to somebody 

24 else's account, and that when they passed me this 

25 information it was for Colonel North or General Secord, 

^IOP-SE€ RCT/ CODEWOR D 



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884 



• ?op gECRcl y-coji CTa s fr ^ 



i/ CODEWOHi r. 134 

1 that either of them would do as far as being able to 

2 accomplish that purpose. 

3 KR, LIMAN: Now you understood that Colonel 

4 North was acting as an agent of the United states 

5 Government? 

6 THE WITNESS: Was acting as an agent of the 

7 United States Government? North was an employee of the 

8 NSC. 

9 MR. LIMAN: Well, that's an agent. He was 

10 acting n,ot for himself but for the United States 

11 Government, correct? 

12 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

13 MR. LIMAN: And did you understand that Secord 

14 in receiving this money, in disbursing the money, was 

15 acting for the United States Government? 

16 (Pause.) 

17 THE WITNESS: I don't know if I really focused 
13 on that. I assume so. 

19 MR. LIMAN: But you don't know whether you 

20 thought of it at the time and no one told you at the time 

21 that Secord is acting for the United States Government in 

22 receiving an disbursing these funds; is that fair to say? 

23 THE WITNESS: Well, it was clear to me that 

24 this was a covert operation in which he was involved and 
2 5 that he was doing certain things that were not 

TOP aeCRE T /CO D g W ORD 



UNCLASS'fSED 



885 



W?.flSS!?e 



TOP SECRCT/ CODE W ORD 13 5 

1 incompatible with the Administration desires and 

2 objectives and part of this covert plan. 

3 MrI LIMAN: But did you think whether apart 

4 from the expenses of the operation and reasonable 

5 compensation at the time and services, whether Secord was 

6 to receive profit from this? 

7 THE WITNESS: I don't think I ever focused on 

8 that. 

9 MR. LIMAN: You never focused on it? 

10 THE WITNESS: That there was a profit margin 

11 or not, no. 

12 MR. LIMAN: And that was not anything that you 

13 discussed with Colonel North? 

14 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

15 MR. LIMAN: Did you ever discuss with Colonel 

16 North why the money was going through a bank account that 

17 Secord seemed to be connected with rather than a CIA 

18 account? 

19 THE WITNESS: No, sir. I never did. 

20 MR. LIMAN: Was there any reason that was ever 

21 advanced to you why the CIA couldn't have established a 

22 covert bank account? 

23 THE WITNESS: It did. That was the bank 

24 account into which the money was deposited. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Well, was there any discussion 

?eP- SLCKi,T/e ODE W O R P- 



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TO P S gC RE T /CODEWORD 136 

1 with you as to why they needed another account, the Lake 

2 account? 

3 THE WITNESS: No, sir, not that I can recall. 

4 I mean, CIA knew that. Colonel North knew that. Secord 

5 — I mean everybody who was in this operation knew it and 

6 accepted it. It just seemed like the way it was set up. 

7 MR. LIMAN: Now you had never seen anything 

8 like this before — is that fair to say — of marking up 

9 the price of goods so that the money could be used for a 

10 covert purpose? 

11 THE WITNESS: I think that's fair. I had 

12 never been involved in a similar covert operation like 

13 this, yes. 

14 MR. LIMAN: And so you assumed that whoever 

15 established this mechanism knew what he was doing? 

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

17 MR. LIMAN: And you testified before that you 

18 were told by North that Casey knew. 

19 THE WITNESS: Yes. At one point Colonel North 

20 told me about what — I'm sorry. 

21 MR. LIMAN: About the fact that money was 
2 2 being used for the contras. 

2 3 THE WITNESS: Yes. At one point Colonel North 

24 told me that he had told Director Casey that, yes. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Do you remember how soon after you 

TOP SECRgT/CODEWORD 



UNCLASSSF^a 



887 



"(EUMP 



137 



1 learned of this — by "this" I mean of the fact that 

2 money was being used for the contras? 

3 THE WITNESS: Oh, I can't place that 

4 conversation in time. It's sometime, obviously, after I 

5 knew of it, which I think was about the April-May time 

6 frame. But I'm not sure. 

7 MR, LIMAN: What occasioned him to tell you 

8 that Casey knew? 

9 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I'm not attaching 

10 that to any particular — I have a recollection. It's a 

11 very distinct memory, but it is not associated with 

12 anything. 

13 MR. LIMAN: When you heard that money was 

14 being used for the support of the contras did you think 

15 that there was anything peculiar about it? 

16 THE WITNESS: Peculiar? 

17 MR. LIMAN: Yes, that it was unusual, 

18 idiosyncratic, that this is the way money would be 

19 generated to help the contras? 

20 THE WITNESS: I thought it was a rather 

21 innovative sting on the Ayatollah in a way to make this 

22 whole hostage negotiation business, which no one felt 

23 very comfortable with. It had a lot of things that 

24 people didn't like — a way to take a negative and turn 

25 it to advantage for the country with some pluses coming 

- TOP SECRET/CODCVfOnD 



UMCLASSSF^^ 



888 



- TOP S g CRE T /CODCWO Ra- 138 

1 out of a bad situation. 

2 MR. LIMAN: Did North tell you about it? 

3 THE WITNESS: No, that's my — you asked for 

4 my reaction, my judgment, I thought when I was told, and 

5 that was what I thought at the time. I don't think he 

6 mentioned anything like that. He only told me that some 

7 money, that some money was going to support the contra 

8 cause . 

9 MR. LIMAN: Vou knew this was very secret. 

10 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

11 MR. LIMAN: And you knew indeed that if It 

12 became revealed that it could affect the fate of the . 

13 hostages. 

14 THE WITNESS: Very definitely. 

15 MR. LIMAN: Did you also have any feeling as 

16 to whether it might be illegal? 

17 THE WITNESS: I don't think I focused on that. 

18 Even now I don't think it was. 

19 MR. LIMAN: Now you're not going to play 

20 lawyer with me, are you? 

21 THE WITNESS: That's the last thing I would 

22 like to become or play or emulate. 

23 MR. LEON: You're asking him for a layman's 

24 opinion. 

25 MR. LIMAN: I assume — and tell me if I'm 

-*Of iELKhiyCUUEWUKU 



uNCLASSsra 



889 



PW^<JSBF,Tn 



TOP SECRET/ CO DCWOR P- 139 

1 correct, but I assume, Colonel Earl, that if North told 

2 you that he was about to do something that you thought 

3 was illegal, such as rob a bank to get money for the 

4 contras, that you wouldn't just simply write it down in 

5 your book. 

6 THE WITNESS: I would not have been a party to 

7 something that I knew was illegal, that clearly was 

8 illegal to me. I mean, it's my obligation and my duty to 

9 not carry out an immoral or illegal order. 

10 MR. LIMAN: And wouldn't you have said to 

XI Oliver North, who you clearly respected and admired, 

12 Ollie, there are some limits to what you ought to do for 

13 a good cause? 

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. In fact, I guess I 

15 prided myself on the devil's advocate role that I felt 

16 that I could play for him whenever I could. He trusted 

17 me. He listened to me. He respected my judgment and 

18 when I felt he was wrong then I would tell him so and he 

19 would listen to it and take it aboard and would 

20 acknowledge that when he had made a mistake in the past 

21 on certain things. 

22 So that was one of the things that I thought I 

23 could do. 

24 MR. LIMAN: And you didn't do it on this? 

25 THE WITNESS: I did not, because I didn't 

■^SO f SECRE T /CO D CWORD 



uNCUSSira 



890 



ON^LASSIFED 



T O r SECRET/CODEWORD 140 

1 think there was anything wrong with it. 

2 MR. LIMAN: Why didn't you write it in your 

3 book? You write so much else in your book. Why didn't 

4 you make a single reference to this in your book? 

5 THE WITNESS: I don't know. Most of the 

6 references in my book are phone calls. 

7 MR. LIMAN: Messages? 

8 THE WITNESS: Messages that I have to jog my 

9 memory on something that came in so that I can pass it to 

10 somebody, and there's going to be subsequent follow-up 

11 action on my part, that I don't want to forget something 

12 that I have to do. This wasn't something that required 

13 action on my part or that I had to remember in order to 

14 take any action. 

15 MR. LIMAN: Now you said that you did play 

16 devil's advocate with North. Can you recall any 

17 occasions in which you discussed some things that North 

18 was going to do and you counseled either caution or don't 

19 do it? 

20 THE WITNESS: Well, right now I can recall an 

21 after the fact playing of that role in order to help in 

22 future with interagency cooperation on terrorism that I 

23 tried to identify a mistake, if you will, that I thought 

24 was a mistake that he had made in a previous terrorist 

25 incident in handling it, and suggested to him that there 

TOP 3ECRET/C0D8W 0R0 



llHCLRSSaFEO 



891 



■ TOP GCCRCT/CODCWOnD - 



141 



1 was a different way to have handled this particular 

2 aspect, because the way he chose had defined 

3 repercussions. I can give you the details if you want. 

4 And he acknowledged that. He listened. He 

5 took it aboard and he'd say yes, you're right, that was a 

6 mistake . 

7 MR. LIMAN: Do you recall any problems that he 

8 put on your lap besides this one that you referred to, 

9 the way he handled the coordination on the terrorist 

10 incident? 

11 THE WITNESS: I'm not tracking your question. 

12 He didn't put that problem on my lap. I offered that' for 

13 free, 

14 MR. LIMAN: But were there times when he came 

15 to you and put a problem on your lap and said, Bob, I've 

16 got this problem. We've talked about the fact that he 

17 was troubled about a Congressional inquiry, that he was 

18 left on his own to deal with it. Were there other 

19 problems that he came to you with and sought your advice 

20 on? 

21 THE WITNESS: No. That's not really tracking. 

22 He wouldn't dump a problem on my lap. I mean, he would 

23 deal with his problems. 

24 MR. LIMAN: And you would observe it. 

25 THE WITNESS: And I would help him with it if 

TOP QnCRL"17CUUbWUKEJ 



HNGia^S'JSED 



892 



TOP j ge Rg T / e O D CHORD - 142 

1 I could, but that doesn't track with my perception of 

2 Ollie North. He would feel that that was shirking his 

3 responsibility. If he had a problem, he would deal with 

4 it. He wouldn't dump it on me to help him with it or 

5 deal with it. 

6 There are occasions when he would confide 

7 things in me, just because we were like — well, I guess 

8 like — 

9 MR. LIMAN: The Iranian, the diversion? 

10 THE WITNESS: The diversion. That to me was 

11 one of the confitiences that I would put in that category. 

12 Another one would be when the negotiations got under way 

13 again in the last phase for the last hostage in November 

14 or October or even September, whenever it started again, 

15 that the Iran initiative got under way again. He 

16 confided in me then on the genesis of that and what was 

17 driving it. 

18 He didn't have to. He wasn't giving me a 

19 problem, but he was just sharing something with me in a 

20 confidence basis. But I'm getting a completely 

21 disconnected type reaction from the way you phrased the 

22 question of dumping a problem in my lap. 

23 MR. LIMAN: Did he ever tell you that one of 

24 the — 

25 THE WITNESS: Oh ~ 

- TOP OCCRET/GODCWORD 



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893 



[INCLASSSr^ED 



TO P SECRET/ CO PEWORD 143 

1 MR. LIMAN: You can strike that question 

2 because he is looking at the Tower report. 

3 THE WITNESS: Counsel has pointed out a PROF 

4 note here where I was explaining the devil's advocate 

5 quote, and it was concerning the tactics of getting the 

6 aircraft flight plan clearance and dealing with Nir, 

7 where I had an op sec concern on certain things that we 

8 were going to share with Nir. So in a PROFs note on 

9 playing the devil's advocate role and suggesting that he 

10 might be able to protect op sec by not telling certain 

11 things to Nir until later. 

12 MR. LIMAN: Did North tell you at the time. of 

13 this Congressional inquiry that he was worried about the 

14 diversion? 

15 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

16 MR. LIMAN: That did not come up as such? 

17 THE WITNESS: No, and I don't think there were 

18 any specific worries of any sort that he raised with me. 

19 Now I described that he was concerned, but that's my 

20 feeling by observing him without specific conversation on 

21 anything. 

22 MR. LIMAN: Did he discuss the diversion with 

23 you in connection with this Congressional inquiry? 

24 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

25 MR. LIMAN: Did he discuss the diversion with 

■TOP-SECRET7COOEWOR©- 



PHi^lft^S'FP-O 



894 



rW^lASSiFlD 



TOP SECRET/eOUEWURD I44 

1 you at the time he was working on the chronologies? 

2 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I don't think so. I 

3 think we've already gone over this. I have some hazy 

4 recollection that there was at least one version or one 

5 draft of a chronology or part of a chronology that had a 

6 parenthetic reference to value to the contra cause or 

7 something in the credit column adding up all the good 

8 things out of this relationship with Iran, that there was 

9 some cryptic or vague reference to Nicaragua or the 

10 contras. 

11 MR. LIMAN: You discussed that and you don't 

12 know who wrote that particular point? 

13 THE WITNESS: I don't know who wrote it and I 

14 haven't gotten any feedback from anybody who recalls 

15 this. So I'm wondering if I carved that out of whole 

16 cloth or what. It may not be true. 

17 MR. LIMAN: Well, on that subject, you know, 

18 of what you actually remember and what you now think you 

19 may not remember, you do remember being told about what 

20 we call the diversion. 

21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

22 MR. LIMAN: Do you definitely remember the 

23 conversation that you have placed on the landing of the 

24 stairs? 

25 THE WITNESS: Do I definitely recall it? 



ONSLASS'r^f^ 



895 



UNeiASSfFL^Ef) 



-^ OP GCCnCT/eODCWOn D. 145 

1 MR. LIMAN: Yes. You do recall it. Did you 

2 invent it? 

3 THE WITNESS: No. I recall that conversation. 

4 In our previous discussion of certain things you tend to 

5 remember because of the gravity of them or whatever. 

6 That one is in that category. I recall that. 

7 MR. LIMAN: Okay. Mark, if you want to go 

8 through the notes, go ahead. 

9 MR. LEON: On that particular conversation I 

10 have heard different versions or seen memos, whatever, 

11 different versions of what your recollection is. But 

12 before we go back to the notes could you just recount it? 

13 THE WITNESS: My recollection is being at the 

14 top of the spiral staircase in our office after Colonel 

15 North had either resigned or been fired, depending on 

16 which version was real, and after the President's phone 

17 call to Colonel North, that he. Colonel North, was at the 

18 top of the stairs and turned to me, and I think Craig Coy 

19 was beside me on the right, and confided that one of the 

20 things the President had said in the phone call was that 

21 he, the President, recognized or that it was important 

22 that he, the President, not know — words to that effect. 

23 I don't have an exact quote. 

24 MR. LIMAN: But that was the substance? 

25 THE WITNESS: That was the substance, yes. 

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1 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

2 Q And you understood that the thing he couldn't 

3 know was what we've called diversion? 

4 A That's the way I've interpreted it. 

5 MR. LEON: But it was he could not )cnow, not 

6 he did not know — that he can't know. It was he could 

7 not know? 

8 MR. KIRK: Or not know. 

9 MR. LEON: You see, that's where I get 

10 confused, and there seems to me to be quite a bit of 

11 distinction between I did not know, I could not know, and 

12 I can't know. 

13 MR. LIMAN: You have testified before the 

14 grand jury on this one. 

15 MR. BELNICK: And on this record also. 

16 MR. LIMAN: Yes, and on this record. You've 

17 been through this any number of times. 

18 THE WITNESS: And it's could not know, as 

19 opposed to didn't know — could not know or can't know as 

20 opposed to didn't know. Didn't know is something 

21 different. 

22 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

23 Q Well, you understood him to be saying that the 

24 President was saying to Colonel North that you understand 

25 there are certain things that I as President can't know, 

T C P CDCRBT/OODDWOn D 



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- TOP SCOnET/ CO DE I VyonD 147 

1 and he was sending Colonel North a message. That's how 

2 you understood it, right? 

3 A Or that he was relaying that some people 

4 around him were saying, had made the observations that 

5 this thing you don't know about. 

6 Q Meaning that even if you do know about it, you 

7 don't know about it any more, right? 

8 MR. LIMAN: That's the way you would interpret 

9 it. 

10 MR. BELNICK: That's how you understood it. 

11 MR. LIMAN: I mean, look, what Colonel North 

12 told you is not necessarily true, believe it or not. .But 

13 your interpretation of it was this; am I correct? 

14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

15 MR. LEON: But I just want to be very specific 

16 on one thing, to the extent he does recall. Has it his 

17 impression that the President was — that North was 

18 saying the President said I could not know or I can't 

19 know. There are things I can't know or things that I 

20 could not know. 

21 THE WITNESS: I'm not differentiating. You'll 

22 have to amplify that for me. I don't see any difference. 

23 MR. LEON: You don't see any difference 

24 between them? 

2 5 THE WITNESS: No. Explain further between 

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TOP OECnET/CODEWORD - 148 

1 can't and couldn't. 

2 MR. LEON: Well, if you're saying I can't 

3 know, you mean things like can't right now or in the 

4 future, but if you are saying things I could not know, 

5 then that would include within it not being told 

6 something on a prior occasion. 

7 THE WITNESS: You mean I'm the only one who 

8 can't differentiate those two? 

9 MR. KIRK: May we take a break for a minute? 

10 MR. LEON: Let me see if I can explain it . 

11 simpler after we take a break. I will see if I can 

12 explain it. 

13 (A brief recess was taken.) 

14 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

15 Q Are we ready? 

16 A I am ready. 

17 Q Did you ever have any meetings with the 

18 President? 

19 A I met the President once when Father Jenko was 

20 released and was meeting with Father Jenko 's family in 

21 the CeOjinet room. I met the President then. 

22 Q Was that the only occasion? 

23 A That was the only occasion. Well, I was in 

24 the Oval Office once for another subsequent hostage 

25 release, but I didn't meet the President, shake his hand 

■5GP- 3ECKLT/ CUUllWORD 



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r^M^i 



T UP SEGnET/ ' 'CODEWOnO - 149 

1 or talk to him or anything. 

2 Q You have had a conversation with the 

3 President? 

4 A No, I have not. 

5 Q You testified the first day of the 

6 examination, Bob, about North's statement to you on, I 

7 believe it was, Friday, November 21, when he returned 

8 from a meeting at the West wing, that it was time for 

9 01 lie North to become the scapegoat, or words to that 

10 effect; do you recall that testimony? 

11 A Yes. ^ 

12 Q Aside from that, was there ever an occasion 

13 when North told you that he thought he was being treated 

14 unfairly in connection with his job, his termination, 

15 anything? 

16 A I am not recalling anything right now. 

17 MR. LEON: What about the Poindexter incident? 

18 THE WITNESS: Well, I was about to mention 

19 that, but I've already talked about it. That could 

20 possibly qualify, that he was trying to get guidance for 

21 this thing. 

22 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

23 Q Aside from that? 

24 A I have a general impression — and I don't 

25 really know why — but my impression is that Colonel 

TOP S ECRCT/ CO DSWOUD 



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l^Ni^LASSSFED 



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1 Korth was surprised when his release was phrased the way 

2 it was — rather than his resignation being accepted in 

3 the manner that Poindexter's was. So that possibly is 

4 relevant to your question as well. That's all I'm 

5 recalling at the moment. 

6 Q Do you recall now whether North told you who 

7 had decided that it was time for him to become the 

8 scapegoat on November 21? 

9 A No. It was just a generic reference from his 

10 statement, having come from the meeting — unidentified 

11 who it was coming from — collectively or an individual, 

12 whether he was told to be or whether he volunteered t6 

13 be. I don't know. 

14 Q Did he seem angry when he told you? 

15 A No, he didn't seem angry. 

16 Q He was just telling you that I'm about to be 

17 the scapegoat? 

18 A Ves. He was purposeful would be the best 

19 adjective. I think I would describe it that because he 

20 was beginning to go through material to do a job that 

21 needed to be done. 

22 Q I know that I've asked you this before. 

23 MR. LIMAN: Wait a minute. I'm sorry. He was 

24 about to go through material? 

25 THE WITNESS: He was going through material 

T OP SECRE T /COPEWG SO- 



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901 



•? 0r S ECRET/CODCVJORD 151 

1 when he told me this. He was starting to review files 

2 and accumulate material . 

3 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

4 Q A pile to be shredded? 

5 A Well, I'm not sure whether he was turning and 

6 throwing some in the garbage, but my impression was that 

7 he was already then beginning to — 

8 MR, LIMAN: Accept the role? Is that what 

9 you're talking about? 

10 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

11 MR. LIMAN: Because, you see, to me when* 

12 someone accepts the role of a scapegoat he doesn't gc 

13 around defending himself or protecting himself by 

14 shredding documents. Who did you think he was protecting 

15 by destroying all these documents? 

16 THE WITNESS: The Administration. 

17 MR. LIMAN: Okay. 

18 MR. LEON: As opposed to the Admiral? 

19 THE WITNESS: Well, the whole thing together 
2 of what he said there, also with the statement that he 

21 said that the Attorney General had said. It seemed to me 

2 2 that the box, the compartment, the Iran project, was not, 

23 that phase two on that, which was the explanation to the 

24 Congress, was not washing, was not going over, and that 
2 5 therefore the decision was taken to go to phase three, 

TOP 0ECRCT/CODEV7 O R D 



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TOP aconET/rnpEwoRD 152 

1 which was termination of the project, that it was 

2 politically embarrassing and that the political mistake, 

3 if you will, of the whole Iran operation would be blamed 

4 on Oliver North. 

5 That's the sense that I interpreted that he 

6 was going to be the scapegoat for this failure, this mess 

7 of the Iran thing, and so he was doing his duty. He was 

8 going to be the recipient of the blame for it, and I 

9 don't know what. 

10 MR. LIMAN: And shred anything that showed 

11 that other people were involved? 

12 THE WITNESS: And close down the compartment 

13 completely on anything sensitive, which would include, 

14 for example, the diversion as a very sensitive part of 

15 that box. 

16 I recall previously in trying to get some 

17 guidance from him on things that were sensitive as to 

18 not, when Lieutenant Commander Coy, when I inadvertently 

19 brought Lieutenant Commander Coy into the box, that he 

20 mentioned the pricing and the list on the weapons as 

21 being one of those sensitive areas. 

22 MR. LIMAN: That he didn't want Coy to know? 

23 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

24 MR. LEON: Colonel, did you get the impression 

25 from anything North said or did with regard to the 

TOP aCCRET/GOPCWOR D 



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TOT aDcncT/GcyricwoTO* ^ 



TOT GDCnETy^ODIIWOTO" ' 153 

1 culling of these documents and the shredding of these 

2 documents that Admiral Poindexter was aware of it? 

3 MR; LIMAN: Was aware of what? 

4 MR. LEON: Was aware of what he was doing, of 

5 what North was doing. Did you get any impression from 

6 what either North said or what he was doing or how he was 

7 doing it that this was something that he was doing with 

8 the knowledge of Admiral Poindexter? 

9 THE WITNESS: No. There was no specific 

10 reference to Admiral Poindexter or anything that was said 

11 that would indicate one way or the other beyond a general 

12 -- my presumption would have been that Admiral Poindexter 

13 was at this meeting in the West wing that he had 

14 attended, from which he came, so that's kind of a general 

15 sense of it. But nothing more specific than that 

16 MR. LIMAN: Along the same line, shredding of 

17 documents, you would agree with me that shredding of 

18 documents by one person would be ineffective if there 

19 were copies kept by other people, right? 
2 THE WITNESS: Certainly. 

21 MR. LIMAN: Did you have any discussion with 

22 Oliver North about whether others would be shredding 
2 3 documents? 

24 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

2 5 MR. LIMAN: And you had no indication from 

TUV SbLKhi'/LUDEWORB 






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1 anyone else about whether anyone else was shredding 

2 docximents besides the people in your suite? 

3 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I did not. No, I had 

4 no indication. 

5 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

6 Q Okay. Let's see if we can get through these. 

7 Okay, page 164, the 12th of March, 1986. There is this 

8 reference, "pills, tested for hallucinogen? Get pills to 

9 Rich Miller". What's it mean? 

10 MR. LEON: What page is that? 

11 THE WITNESS: Page 164. * 

12 (Pause.) i | 

13 I kind of generally recall having written 

14 this, but I don't recall what it was about. It's in the 

15 context here of contra, a pro-contra presentation, if you 

16 will, that ultimately was presented at the State 

17 Department. The President then gave a speech. There were 

18 photos around and various Nicaraguans gave short 

19 speeches. 

20 March? No, I'm not sure if that's the right 

21 time frame. 

22 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

23 Q Did anyone give out pills? 

24 (Laughter.) 

25 A No, no. I don't know. But there are a lot of 

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1 references on this page to DEA, drug photos, Pablo 

2 Escobar. 

3 MR. LIMAN: Well, you know what this was 

4 about. This was when there was a discussion about the 

5 fact that the Sandinistas were exporting narcotics. 

6 Isn't that what this refers to? 

7 THE WITNESS: Well, the other references are, 

8 but I'm not sure if that one. 

9 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

10 Q Get pills to Rich Miller. 

11 A It seems to me that somehow we had acquired 

12 some pills. 

13 Q It's hard work, but someone has to do it. 

14 (Laughter.) 

15 It may have fit in this category. 

16 A And Rich Miller would have gotten them tested 

17 to see what they were. 

18 Q Somebody would have tested them. All right, 

19 we're on to the next notebook. 

20 A I mean, part of that display that I mentioned 

21 at State Department included a photograph with Frederico 

22 Vaughn and Barry Seale in the C-123 which ultimately was 

23 shot down, which was the sting on the Nicaraguans, on the 

24 Sandinistas for — 

25 MR. LIMAN: Drugs. 

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1 THE WITNESS : For the drugs being smuggled 

2 through Nicaragua to the United States, yes. 

3 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

4 Q Okay. We're into the third notebook. This 

5 one is your notes from June 17, 1986 to September 5, 

6 1986. Now there's a note on page 20, which appears to be 

7 the second of July 1986. Most of the page, as you can 

8 see, has been blacked out by our friends at the White 

9 House and then there's a number 6, and it says: 

10 "Treasury — Bank Secrecy Act, $10,000 transactions. 

11 Must we report it, 501(3) (c) organizations, tax exempt. 

12 IRS has all information." 

13 A "And they are wide open." 

14 Q "And they are wide open. Freedom of 

15 Information Act, anyone can get." Do you recall what 

16 that note is about? 

17 A Do you have the page in front? 

18 Q Yes, and the page in front is completely 

19 redacted by the redactors. 

20 A Well, it appears to be something that occurred 

21 in an I6/T meeting. 

22 Q What was IG/T? 

23 A The interdepartmental group on terrorism. I'm 

24 sorry. What are we looking for — 2 July? IG/T meeting 

25 at State at 1000 on 2 July. So I think this is my notes 

TOP SE C aZT/LODEWORD 



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-TOP GEGRETydroEy g RP ^ 



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1 from that meeting, most of which are irrelevant to our 

2 discussion here, which is why they are blacked out, 

3 because they pertain to terrorism. But whoever did the 

4 redactions feels that that one is not irrelevant. 

5 Q Well, how do you feel as the author of the 

6 note? Does it have anything to do with Central America 

7 or Iran? I can see why the redactor left it in. 

8 A No, I don't think it does. I think it's a 

9 worldwide application on countering terrorism as opposed 

10 to something on Central America itself. 

11 • Q Gotcha. Here's a note, page 24 of your 

12 notebook, and as best Z can tell from the earlier pag6s 

13 we're still in July. We'll take a look later. Yes, 

14 still in July. 

15 The note I'm looking at is "G beats on 

16 Iranian" , correct? 

17 A Uh-huh. 

18 Q "For using price as an excuse." 

19 A Uh-huh. 

20 Q What was that all about? 

21 A Okay. This is CIA relaying to me, I believe , 

22 I suspect CIA r elaying to me the substa nce of al 
^conversation^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthat occurredl 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^petween 

25 and that individual, and that was the subject. 
- TOP SE C Rg T / L UOEWORD 




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TO P aECRrT/CeDEWOR D 158 

1 Q An Iranian? 

2 A Yes. 

3 - Q Now there is a note on page 28, and I'm trying 

4 to get a date. I think it's clearly still July, around 

5 the 6th or 7th of July. "G concluded deal with someone 

6 other than the Iranian Channel 1. Another Iranian 

7 relative in Paris in contact with G." That's 

8 Ghorbanifar? 

9 A Correct . 

10 Q "Because we were once again lied to, all 

11 commitments off. We are closing this thing down." ^*hat 

12 do those notes mean? 

13 A May I see the page before it? 

14 Q Yes, certainly. Here's page 27. 

15 A Well, I recall that this line, this argument, 

16 this statement — 

17 Q "Because we were once again lied to"? 

18 A Well, I recall it as a negotiating statement 

19 that our side would use on at least one occasion, on that 

20 occasion, I guess. 

21 Q Again, just for the record, thisl 

22 reference on page 26 has nothing to do with this, I take 

23 it, or does it? 

24 A No, I don't think it does, but I am looking to 

25 see what the rest is around it. 

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TOP aECRET/CODEWOR D 159 

1 MR. LIMAN: What were you talking to| 

2 about? 

3 THE WITNESS: I don't know. This is July? 

4 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

5 Q Ves, July '86. 

6 A That looks like a Hill telephone number. 

7 Q That is a Hill telephone number. 

8 A It could have been he called up to talk to 

9 Colonel North and I took the phone number down to relay 

10 what was going on. 

11 MR. LIMAN: The message to be cited has'* 

12 nothing to do with! 

13 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

14 Q Page 29 of your notes, still the same day in 

15 July, "mail that was lost was finally found". It appears 

16 to be a message from Dutton. 

17 A May I see the page in front of it? 

18 Q Sure. 

19 A Well, this is a phone message that I think I 

2 am copying down so that I can get it to Colonel North and 

21 it appears to be from Dutton, although I'm not quite sure 

22 why I have a question mark there. 

23 MR. LIMAN: Maybe because ha used one of his 

24 many names. 

25 THE WITNESS: Okay. That's a good point, 

TOP OECnET/CODEWORD 



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-T OP SEO R ST/CODEWOnP 160 

1 becaus* for a long time I only knew him as Bob McAlister 

2 and did not )tnow hi3 real name. That's quite true. And 

3 maybe even at this point in July I'm treating Dutton as a 

4 separate person than McAlister. But, in any case, the 

5 substan ce_of the message suggests to me that a KL 43 
message^^^^^^^^^^Hthat people had been talking 

7 about or running or referring to finally was tracked down 

8 and showed up. 

9 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

10 Q Okay. Page 59 of your notes, at the end of 

11 July 1986, "Ami" — is that a reference to Ami? * 

12 A Amir. 

13 Q "Ami briefs VP re G-Iranian channel. VP said 

14 he thought it had died." Then's a fragment, "VP to". 

15 What do you recall about that note? Did someone tell you 

16 that Nir had briefed the Vice President in Israel at the 

17 time on the Iran? 

18 A Yes. Clearly somebody ""^s conveying to me. 

19 MR. LIMAN: Is the somebody Gregg, Don Gregg? 

20 THE WITNESS: Don Gregg? 

21 MR. LIMAN: Watson? 

22 THE WITNESS: That's possible. That's 

23 somebody on the VP's staff — Gregg, Watson or somebody 

24 else. Could have been passed on to us. 

25 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

4'OP OEGRCT/CODEWOnD 



on5i/!??jf::£9 



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ASSIFDED 



T OP 5ECRCT/G0DEW e RD - 161 

1 Q Just so the record is clear, Don Gregg didn't 

2 know anything about it, so it probably would have been 

3 Craig Fuller, if somebody on the Vice President's staff. 

4 A Another possibility is Nir is passing on to us 

5 that he had briefed the Vice President, and I have a real 

6 note there. 

7 Q But you knew nothing more than what someone 

8 was reporting to you to give to Ollie? 

9 A Correct. 

10 Q Okay. Now we are in the period of August and 

11 I'm at page 77 of your notes, which begin with references 

12 to Felix Rodriguez/Maximo Gomez "suicidal, crazy. 

13 helicopter pilot", et cetera. "George Bush real Darth 

14 Vadar." Why don't you look at those notes and tell me 

15 who was giving you that information? 

16 (Pause.) 

17 A All right. I think that this section of page 

18 77 refers to a conversation that I had with Colonel North 

19 prior to my meeting with Felix Rodriguez with Don Gregg, 

20 the next day or very shortly thereafter and Don Gregg was 

21 wanting Colonel North to meet with Felix, who was coming 

22 into town, but Colonel North was leaving that night or 

23 was going to be out of the country and therefore I was 

24 going to represent Colonel North at the meeting. 

25 And I asked who the hell is Felix Rodriguez, 

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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



and so in a couple of minutes or seconds Colonel North 
gava na some description of Felix, that he had been a 
suicidal, crazy helicopter pilot in Vietnam, I think, 
that he had participated in the Bay of Pigs. Yes — SVN, 
that he had been in South Vietnam, that he had somehow 
arranged for the Miami mayor to fly to^^^^^^^^^Hbase 
froi^^^^^^^^^^^on one of the Project Democracy 
aircraft, and that these two reporters, who I think are 
Miami Herald or Miami Times or something like that, were 
breaking a story that was going to claim — I think the 
next line is related — that George Bush was the real 
Darth Vadar behind all of this. 

And that (indicating) is a repeat of the 
earlier. Oh, and then he mentioned whc 
was, that he was a friend of Max Gomez, 

Q Did North tell you what Rodriguez was doing 
down there in Central America? 

A I'm not sure whether he told me then or later. 
I subsequently learned about this involvement on advising 

Ln their guerrilla battle and use of 
helicopters, I think, in that. 

Q Did you learn whether he had a role — "he" 
being Rodriguez — let na ask you again, did you learn 
whether he, Rodriguez, had a role in helping the contras? 
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TOP SECRST/ C O DEHQBB, 163 

1 A I gathered from all of this that Felix was not 

2 really involved with that, but that because of his 
relationship to^^^^^^^^^^^Hhe 

4 himself into an indispensible position and was effecting 

5 some control and that this was a problem because he was 

6 not in the Democracy, Inc. chain of command or structure. 

7 Q Didn't North ever tell you that he had given 

8 Felix instructions and that Felix was working tor^ini 

9 A I don't think so. I don't think he told me 

10 that. My impression was that he was someone who was, 

11 mucking things up. 

12 MR. LIMAN: Out of control, right? 

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

14 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

15 Q You went to the meeting the next day in Don 

16 Gregg's office? 

17 A Was that the next day? Whatever the day is. 

18 I don't recall specifically. 

19 MR. LEON: Let me just ask one question before 

20 you go to the next one. Did North indicate on that day 

21 that he had previously met with Gomez, with Dutton 

22 present, back in June and had reprimanded him back then? 

23 Did he indicate that to you? 

24 THE WITNESS: I don't think so, no. Until you 

25 mentioned that meeting just an hour ago, that's my first 

TOP SECRCT/CODEWOnD - 



914 



umimmm 



TOP SCCRET/CPDEWC i nB - 164 

1 ]cnowledge of that meeting of the three of them. 

2 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

3 Q We have pages 80, 81, 82, 83 of your notes, 

4 which are all August 8, and I think all pertain to the 

5 meeting that you attended. Why don't you look at the 

6 notes, scan them first briefly, and confirm that they 

7 pertain to that meeting, and then you can use them to 

8 refresh your recollection as you tell us what happened at 

9 that meeting. 

10 A starting here where it says "Felix"? 

11 Q Yes, I believe so. It's starting on page 80 

12 of your notes. This was a meeting with you, Don Greg^, 

13 and Rodriguez? 

14 A And I'm not sure whether Sam Watson was 

15 present on that one. I think he was present at at least 

16 one of the two meetings, possibly both but maybe only 

17 one, and the one being the second one. But I'm just not 

18 positive. 

19 Q Apart from that, though, apart from Watson 

20 being present, it was you, Don Gregg and Rodriguez? 

21 A Yes. It may have just been the three of us. 

22 If there was a fourth, it would have been Sam Watson. 

23 Q Fine. And this was in Gregg's office? 

24 A Yes. 

25 Q Okay. 

■ TOP CECnET/CODEWORD 



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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A L«t me just skim through the whole thing to 
get the context. 

(Pause. ) 

Q vniat happened at the August meeting, as your 
recollection and your notes indicate? 

A Don Gregg introduced me to Felix. We sat down 
and they had already been meeting for some time, so Felix 
had already related to Don Gregg the substance of his 
concern, but because I did come to the meeting, I came in 
late, Don asked for him to repeat what he had already 
told him, Don, and so Felix said that he felt that — it 
says the folks buying the aircraft, but the way I 
interpret it is that the folks operating the aircraft in 
Central America, the resupply operation, that he thought 
they were cutting and running, I guess is the best way to 

describe it. 

And that^^^^^^^^^^^^^H according to 
was under the impression that the aircraft that were 
supporting the contras belonged to the contras as opposed 
to were an independent entity's property in direct 
support of, and that therefore rather than lose these_ 
contra assets that Felix claimed thai 
was not going to re lease the three aircral 

U.S. would lose credibility if this all happened, that 




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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



I would threaten to close dovml 
And there's a reference to SAT having cleared 
an aircraft dovm, but I'm not sure exactly what that 
means any more, but that this aircraft was loaded with 
medicines. Felix said that Quintero wanted to sell the 
aircraft for his own profit, and then we got into a 
discussion of the mayor of Miami and his flight from 
Miami to wherever it was, whether that was authorized or 
not. 

And Felix claimed that General Bermudez had 
requested that the Mayor of Miami come down and that 
that's why it was done or why he arranged it and it was 
authorized, et cetera, et cetera. And