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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

Y l.l/2:Serial 13769 

U.S. Congressional Serial S... 



Government 
Documents 



U.S. CONGRESSIONAL SERIAL SET 

SENATE REPORT 

No. 216 

IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX C 

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 

100th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION 

1987 



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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX C 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13769 



United States Government Printing Ofllce 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 



Appendix C 
Chronology of Events 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. -Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17. 1987. -Ordered to be printed. M 



Washington : 1988 



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SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 

Senate Resolution 23, Appendix C to the final Report of the 

Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 

and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 

of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 

available. 



Sincerely, 




uye 



Warren B. Rudman -— 



Warren B. Rudman 
Vice Chairman 



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i:S2ri.«««^ U.S. HOUSE of representatives •— j;::;^'- 

<;f 1 FTT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE MO«CJ vAMaivt ci^> mmo«tv cowmhi 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON, OC 20eit 

(202) 225-7902 

Match 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix C to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, lOOth Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix C consists of a C hronology of Events about 
the Iran-Contra Affair. All contents of Appendix C have been 
declassified for release to the pu^ 

ely yours. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Clevc 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough. Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey. Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Raynor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenhotm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Biythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge. Ill 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Nields. Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Rate! iff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minorit}' Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Roben A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis. 

Ill 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E, Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna. Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
OR Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R Spencer Oliver 
Bert D Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfietd 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Dornan 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P Wise 

Steven R Ross 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 2J volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



Contents 



Preface XII 

The Minority Critique XV 

1981 1 

1982 2 

1983 3 

1984 6 

1985 15 

1986 53 

1987 136 

Appendix 142 



Preface 



This Chronology of Events covers the period from January 27. 1981, to November 
18. 1987. it begins w ith an excerpt from President Reagan's remarks at a White 
House ceremon\ celebrating the release ol Americans who had been held hostage 
by Iran tor more than a >ear. It ends with the release ot" the Report of the Con- 
gressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair 

The Report ot the investigation is a joint publication of the House Select Com- 
mittee to Investigate Ccwert Arms Transactions w ith Iran and the Senate Select 
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposi- 
tion. This Chronology, however, was prepared by the statt at the direction ot 
the House Select Committee as an Appendix to the joint Report. Minority 
Members of the Select Committee tiled a brief critique of the Chronology. The 
Senate Select Committee also prepared a chronology that is largely based on 
the joint public hearings held by the two Select Committees. 

The House Select Committee took several steps to make this document 
something of a roadmap to guide students through Iran-Contra and to encourage 
further study of this historic time. Each entry is dated in a way that readers can 
easily determine the timeframe. When the date could ncH be pinpointed precisely, 
that fact is indicated. Each item is labeled to indicate at a glance to which facet 
of Iran-Contra the entry relates. The entries include Presidential statements and 
Congressional actions. 

This format helps to demonstrate the interaction and the meshing of Iran-Contra 
events; the interplay and maneuvering of private agents and Federal Go\ernment 
ottlcials who were secretly selling arms to terrorist Iran to free American 
ht)stages — contrary to U.S. public policy-and secretly diverting money from the 
sale to buy weapons for the Contras-also contrary to public policy and perhaps 
in violation of the law. It weaves together what was being said and done publicly 
and being said and done privately by this group of (jovernmcnt otticials and 
private agents. 

This Chronology contains a brief description of each event and sources to which 
one can refer for further study. Most sources are a matter of public record. The 
references, while comprehensive, are not all-inclusive, because of limitations 
on time and resources. 

Some sources cited in this volume were not part of the Select Committees" 
public record or otherwise available publicly at the time the Select Committees 
released their joint Report. These sources are included as an appendix to this 
Chronology The Chronology itself and all sources cited, including depositions, 
have been reviewed by the While House Declassitication Committee and 
declassitled tor publication. 

Other documents that underlie the factual statements made in this Chronology 
can be found in the Appendix publications of the Select Committees. These 
publications, listed elsewhere in this volume, contain the testimony taken at public 
hearmgs, sworn depositions, and source ilocumcnis such as letters, menmran 
dums. interotticc messages, transcripts of telephone calls, and so on. Where 
depositions are cited as sources, the page numbers cited were taken Irom the 



individual depD.sitiiins. These numbers are in the upper right-hand eorncr of 
the pages ot the Appendix B volumes. 

When an event involved several persons, an effort was made to track down 
the accounts of that event of as many participants as possible through testimony, 
depositions, and documents. In a lew cases, a single source is relied upon to 
establish the facts of an event. Such events are included in the Chronology because 
they may add small but important details to the complex mosaic that makes up 
the Iran-Contra Affair. 



The Minority Critique of 
The Majority's Chronology 

Introduction 

While the Minority has labored hard to assist the Majority in preparing a better 
chronology, and while the Minority believes that the succeeding chronology is 
a better product (more accurate, objective, complete and balanced) because ol 
our input, we cannot, tor the reasons set forth bek)w. endorse this chronology 
and we therefore admonish all who may read it, and consider relying on it, to 
refer first to the Report (Minority and Majority) to insure you have a complete 
and accurate picture of the events. 

Background 

Unlike the drafting process followed in the preparation of the Majority Report, 
the chronology was not presented to the Minority for review and input prior 
to its being sent to the White House on December 23. 1987, for declassification. 
Indeed, it wasn't until the third week of January 1988. that the Minority learned 
from the White House Counsefs Office that a draft had been completed and 
sent to the White House for declassification. In the four weeks that followed, 
the Minority staff worked with the Majority to produce a chronology both sides 
could endorse. That effort was greatly handicapped by the fact that horh staffs, 
at that point, had lost the overwhelming majority of their numbers; many of whom 
alone had a highly specialized knowledge of critical areas of the investigation. 
While many of the Minority's suggested changes and adoptions were accepted, 
the final product, though better, still cannot be endorsed. 

Problems with the Chronology 

1 

The Minority's objection to the existing chronology cannot be stated in one word 
("inaccurate") or even one sentence; there are a combination of problems that 
encumber it. 

First, the concept of writing a comprehensive chronology cijicr the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the staff has left the Committee is a Hawed one in light of the 
enormity of the project. A huge staff. Majority and Minority, labored unceas- 
ingly for months to produce a Report (Majority and Minority) that is comprehen- 
sive, accurate, and relevant That Report is the product of the distillation aiul 
synthesis of hundreds o\ depositions, thousands iA pages o\ icstimoin. and lum 
dreds of thou.sands of documents, it spans 700 printed pages and was pored over 
in multiple drafts that were reviewed by both sides. This chronology, by com- 
parison, was essentially produced over a three-week period between November 
18 and December 2.^. 1987, alter most of the staff had left the Commillec. With 
their departure went their accunuilatcd expertise in the \arious component parts 
of the investigation, rherefore, for a chronology to be produced that is noi an 



index ot that combined effort by a group of experts, is to expect an almost in- 
human and risk-fraught venture from a handful of people. The issue, therefore, 
with regard to the reliahiliry of the chronology is not whether the individual 
items are accurate, rather: whether the authors knew the subject matter siirround- 
inii each oj the highly complicated series of events well enough to insure that 
they included all of the relevant and important facts regarding each of those 
series of events. The Minority submits that it is impossible to expect that, and 
that this chronology is full of examples, some of which it no doubt failed to 
catch, of descriptions of events that are dangerously incomplete and therefore 
are likely to leave its readers with misimpressions. 

One example the Minority noted and which the Majority amended related to 
Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams. The Majority's draft failed in its 
two prior drafts to include any reference to the circumstances under which 
Abrams learned from the CIA that its Held officer, Tomas Castillo, was secretly 
communicating with the private benefactors and how he (Abrams) brought that 
to the attention of Secretary Shultz immediately upon learning it. If those facts 
had been left from the chronology, there would have been a grave misimpres- 
sion about Abrams' role in those events. 

While the Minority in its review did point this out, as well as other similar 
examples, it is confident that in other areas which are equally, if not more com- 
plicated, its limited .staff lacked the expertise and time to insure that all of the 
essential facts had been included in all of the various areas. Therefore, since 
the chronology has been written independent of the Report, it is highly ques- 
tionable, considering the extremely limited resources that went into it, that it 
is as comprehensive and balanced as the Report. 

A second problem with the chronology is that despite suggestions by the 
Minority to the contrary, the Majority has persisted in selectively recounting 
certain events in such a way as to leave a misimpression of what happened with 
the reader who does not also refer to the Report. An excellent example of this 
is the chronology's treatment of the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua. The 
sum total of the treatment of the events surrounding the CIA's involvement with 
the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua is contained in two entries dated 4/1/84 
and 4/2/84. The critical facts concerning those events were much more detailed 
and clearly included a series of briefings by the CIA to Congress and. more 
importantly perhaps, a Congressional change of direction in reaction to adverse 
public opinion. While those events are described at length in the Report at pages 
489 and 490. neither of those entries was amended to include even a reference 
to the CIA briefings of Congress and the Congress' about-face. This chronology 
therefore, in .some instances, gives a distorted and incomplete picture of certain 
facts which, even though accurate, is misleading. 

A final problem with the chronology worth noting is the host of entries (par- 
ticularly references to phone calls and meetings) which are stated cryptically 
and without explanation. This type of shorthand reference, particularly during 
the November 1986 investigation period, not only encourages speculation and 
innuendo, hut fails to clarify for the readership events which are accounted for 
by the testimony of numerous witnesses. 



Conclusion 



Because of the reasons stated above, and in light of the circumstances surround- 
ing the preparation of this chronology (especially in comparison to that done 
for the Report), the Minorit> respectfully refrains from endorsing this product 
and strongly encourages all who read it (and may rely upon it) to refer not only 
to the sources cited, but to the Report (Majority and Minority) in order to get 
a more complere and contextual reference to the events uncovered during this 
Committee's investigation. 



Chronology of Events 



1981 

01/27/81 (IRAN) 

President Reagan says at a White House ceremony marking 
the freeing of American hostages by Iran a week earlier: "Let 
terrorists be aware that when the rules of international 
behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and 
effective retribution. We hear it said that we live in an era of 
limit to our powers. Well, let it be understood, there are 
limits to our patience." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 17, at 41. 

06/01/81 (GENERAL) 

Circa Navy Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter joins the National 
Security Council (NSC) staff as military assistant to the 
National Security Adviser. He becomes deputy to Robert C. 
McFarlane in 10/83, shortly before the U.S. invasion of 
Grenada, and National Security Adviser on 1/5/86, after 
McFarlane's resignation. 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 12. 

12/01/81 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan signs a Finding authorizing covert operations 
against Nicaragua. The Administration informs the 
Congressional intelligence committees of Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) activities in Nicaragua. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 13; Chron Ex. 1. 

12/04/81 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan signs Executive Order No. 12333, which 
puts the CIA in charge of covert operations unless the 
President orders otherwise. 

Public Papers of the President, 1981. at 1128-1139. 

12/04/81 (CONTRA) 

Congressional authorization for $19 million in military 
assistance to the anti-Sandinista rebels, the Contras, is signed 
into law. 

Congressional Research Service. Contra Aid: 1981-86, 1/28/87. 



1982 

01/01/82 (CONTRA) 

Circa Adolfo Calero leaves Nicaragua in 1982, joins the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Force (FDN) and later becomes the president of 
the FDN, an anti-Sandinista Resistance organization. 

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3. at 4. 

06/08/82 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan announces his "democracy inititative." 
("Project Democracy.") He says the U.S. should work to build 
the "infrastructure of democracy" to support democratic forces 
and initiatives in other countries. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1982, Part 1 , at 746. 

07/01/82 (GENERAL) 

Circa Gaston J. Sigur is full-time Senior Director of Asian Affairs 
on the NSC staff to 10/84. He continues part time until 3/86. 

Sigur Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 285-86. 

08/03/82 (CONTRA) 

A cabinet meeting discusses ways to build support for 
Administration policies, especially in Central America. 
McFarlane in an interview says, "Project Democracy" was to 
have a covert side operated by the NSC. 

New York Times, 2/15/87, at 20. 



09/27/82 (CONTRA) 

The first Boland Amendment is enacted as part of the 
classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Bill. Funds 
are limited to interdicting arms to the El Salvador rebels and 
were not to be used to overthrow the Nicaraguan Sandinistas 
or provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua and 
Honduras. 

P.L 97-269. 96 Stat.; H.Rept. 98-122, at 8. 

12/21/82 (CONTRA) 

As part of the Defense Appropriations Act. Congress retains 
the Boland Amendment and prohibits the CIA from using 
money, arms, training or support for persons who seek the 
overthrow of the Sandinistas or provoke a military exchange 
between Nicaragua and Honduras. 

P.L. 97-377, Slat. 1865. Sc. 793. 



1983 

01/01/83 (GENERAL) 

Circa Ret. Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord's CIA security 
clearance is terminated in 1983. He directed the Iran-Contra 
operations with Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North of the NSC 
staff. North joined the staff in 1981. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 1 00- 1, at 218. 

01/01/83 (CONTRA) 

Circa From 1983 to 06/84, the FDN is funded by the U.S. 

Government. Arms and ammunition, food, clothing, and 

medicine are provided. 

Calero Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 6. 

01/01/83 (GENERAL) 

Circa In 1983, Albert Hakim, an Iranian expatriate, approaches 
Secord and asks him to join Stanford Technology Trading 
Group, Inc. (STTGI). Hakim and Secord each had a 50% 
share. STTGI was to market U.S. manufacturing companies 
overseas, mainly to foreign governments. 
Hakim Test. , Hearings. 100-5, at 198. 

02/01/83 (GENERAL) 

Circa In February 1983, Fawn Hall is detailed by the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to the NSC and becomes secretary to Lt. Col. 
North; she was his secretary until 1 1/25/86, when he was 
fired. 
Hall Test. . Hearings, 100-5, at 464. 

03/03/83 (GENERAL) 

The unclassified full text of an NSC policy paper on the 
management of public diplomacy relative to national security 
is released -National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) No. 
77. (Subsequently, the National Endowment for Democracy 
was established outside government and two public diplomacy 
offices were created in the State Department.) 

Hearings, 03/03/83, Subcommittee on International Operations House 
Foreign Affairs Committee. 

03/21/83 (IRAN) 

Circa The State Department begins "Operation Staunch" to 

discourage other countries from selling arms to Iran. The 
program was in place at the time of the U.S. arms sales to 
Iran. 

Shultz Test.. Hearings. 100 9, at 12. 70: Weinberger Test.. 
Hearings. 100 10. at 252-253. 



07/12/83 (CONTRA) 

Circa President Reagan directs DOD to provide greater support to 
the CIA in its efforts to assist the Contras. At the same 
meeting he authorizes the creation of a Central America 
Presidential Commission, also known as the Kissinger 
Commission. 

Chron. Ex. 2. 

07/18/83 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan announces the formation of a Presidential 
Commission on Central America, headed by Henry Kissinger, 
in an effort to develop bipartisan support for the 
Adminstration's policies in Central America. The 
Commission's mandate is to undertake a study of Central 
America to understand the strategic significance of the area 
for the United States. The Commission will then issue 
recommendations on initiatives to improve long-term security, 
encourage social and economic development, and defeat Soviet 
and Cuban efforts in the region. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 19, at 1047. 

09/19/83 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan issues another Finding authorizing covert 
activities in Nicaragua. It is presented to the intelligence 
committees. 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-2. 

10/17/83 (GENERAL) 

McFarlane becomes National Security Adviser, succeeding 
William Clark. 

McFaHane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 12. 

10/23/83 (IRAN) 

Terrorists kill 241 U.S. military personnel at Beirut 
International Airport. 

Media reports. 



11/18/83 (CONTRA) 

Congress limits Contra support to $24 million. 

Congressional Record, Vol. 129, ttl61, at S. 16848. H. 10488. 



11/18/83 (CONTRA) 

In the Intelligence Authorization Act. Congress limits Contras 
to $24 million. The Boland restriction is not included. 

PL. 98-215: Sc.108: 97 Stat. 1475: Congressional Record, Vol. 129. 
ffl61. at S. 16858. H. 10543. 



12/12/83 



12/19/83 



12/20/83 



12/27/83 



(IRAN) 

President Reagan says in an interview with B 
the New York Daily News: "For example, in 
if this is an Iranian group-claims that this is 
war and this is being done in the interests of 
of Iran, then I think Iran has a responsibility 
curtail these things being done in their name, 
feel if somebody went out doing these things 
were doing them in the interest of the United 
feel that I had a responsibility to corral them 



ruce Drake of 
this in Kuwait, 
part of a holy 
the government 
to curb and 
just as I would 
and said they 
States, I would 
and stop them." 



Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 19, at 1685. 

(IRAN) 

President Reagan in an interview says: "We do have the 
evidence that Khomeini has spoken a number of times about 
advocating a holy war in the Moslem world to promote his 
type of fundamentalism. So, it's hard not to believe that he 
must, in some way, instigate or at least egg on those that are 
doing these things." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1983, part II, at 
1718; Marxin Stone and Joseph Fromm, U.S. News and World 
Report, 12/15/83. 

(CONTRA) 

The Reagan Administration begins to consider a special plan 
in which DOD would declare $12 million in military 
equipment to be surplus and without value. This is to be used 
to supplement the $24 million approved by Congress for the 
Contras. The operation was never completed. 

Joint Report, at 34-35. 

(GENERAL) 

President Reagan at a press conference says: "For terrorists to 
be curbed, civilized countries must begin a new effort to work 
together, to share intelligence, to improve our training and 
security and our forces, to deny havens or legal protection for 
terrorist groups and, most important of all, to hold 
increasingly accountable those countries which sponsor 
terrorism and terrorist activity around the world." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 19. at 1748. 



1984 

01/01/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Ret. Gen. John K. Singlaub, who will become a conduit for 
arms to the Contras, meets Calero to offer his help. He offers 
to raise private funds for the Contras. Calero approves, and 
Singlaub reports this to North. 

Singlaub Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 70. North Test. , Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 147. 

01/23/84 (IRAN) 

The Reagan Administration accuses Iran of supporting 
international terrorism and places it on a list of countries 
subject to strict export controls. 

Media reports. 

02/01/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Nicaraguan harbors are mined, angering the Congress when it 
becomes public some two months later. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 199. 

03/01/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa North says the name "Secord" first came up in connection to 
the Contras in early 1984 as Contra aid was about to run out. 
William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, suggests 
using Secord to North. Casey wants North to use someone 
outside the Government. It is decided by North that the NSC 
would have increased responsibility as the CIA was phased 
out of covert operations. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 74, 116 and 100-7 part II, 
at 1-2; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 41. 

03/01/84 (GENERAL) 

Circa North says he first met Secord in 1981 in connection with the 
Saudi Arabian AWACs deal. In 1984, North says, he knew 
nothing of Secord's security clearance problems. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 2. Secord Test., Hearings, 
100- 1, at 48. 



03/01/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa McFarlane comes to see North and asks for recommendations 
regarding Contra money raising. North then goes to Casey to 
seek his advice. 

North Te.st., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 3. 



03/07/84 (GENERAL) 

Jeremy Levin, Beirut Bureau Chief for the Cable News 
Network, is seized in Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

03/16/84 (IRAN) 

CIA officer William Buckley is kidnapped in Lebanon. 

George Test., Hearings, 100-1 1, at 231; Media reports. 

03/31/84 (CONTRA) 

North goes to Central America seeking cooperation for a 
network of private benefactors to the Contras. 

North Calendar. 

03/31/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa During a regular meeting with a Country 2 official, 

McFarlane discusses the Contras' needs. Within a few days, 
the official contacts McFarlane, saying his country would 
contribute $1 million a month - "as a humanitarian gesture. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 16-17, 84-86, 130-35. 
199-202, 215. 



03/31/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa McFarlane asks North to have Calero establish an offshore 
bank account. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 17. North Test.. Hearings, 
100-7 part II, at 2-3. 

04/04/84 (CONTRA) 

After an FDN representative approaches Gray & Co., a public 
relations firm for which Robert Owen then worked, Owen 
approaches North, whom he had met previously. North tells 
him that the Contras know their funds are running out and 
were told to seek public relations representation in 
Washington. Owen becomes North's liaison to the Contras 
during the subsequent Boland ban on assistance to the 
Contras. 

Owen Test., Hearings. 100-2. at 325. 



04/06/84 (CONTRA) 

The mining of the Nicaraguan harbor is exposed. This hurts 
Administration efforts to gain supplemental funds for the 
Contras over and above the $24 million authorized in 12/83. 
McFarlane and other Admini.stration officials discuss third- 
country contributions for the Contras. 

McFarlane Test., Heahni>s, 100-2, at 13, 199. George Test., 
Hearings, 1 00 -U, at 247. 

04/10/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa The Administration tells the World Court that it lacks 

jurisdiction in the case brought by Nicaragua against the U.S. 
over the mining of the harbors. (The court in June, 1986, 
ruled for Nicaragua.) 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 20, at 503-04. 

04/18/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, says that he had 

opposed soliciting Country 1 for Contra assistance and made 
this position clear to McFarlane. McFarlane had proposed the 
solicitation earlier. 
Shultz Testimony, Hearings, 100-9, at 13, Ex. GPS- A. 

05/01/84 (CONTRA) 

Singlaub. heading a panel on El Salvador, has his "first 
substantive meeting" with North. 

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 70. 

(CONTRA) 

Ellen Garwood, a leading contributor to the Contra cause, 

first meets North. 

Garwood Test., Hearings, J 00-3, at 113. 

(IRAN) 

The Rev. Benjamin Weir is kidnapped in West Beirut, 

Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

05/09/84 (CONTRA) 

Shultz learns that Howard Teicher of the NSC staff had 
approached Country 1 for a contribution to the Contras. 
Teicher says the U.S. would serve as a conduit. Shultz is not 
informed that McFarlane sent Teicher back to Country 1 for a 
second solicitation. Shultz later ct)nfronts McFarlane. 
McFarlane says Teicher was acting on his own. Teicher, 
however, tells the Ambassador that he was acting on specific 
instructions. 
Shult: Test., Hearings. 100 9. at 13 14: Ex. GPS-A. 



05/01/84 
Circa 



05/08/84 



8 



05/15/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Calero meets North in Central America. North asks Calero 
for his bank account numbers. 

Calero Test. . Hearings, 100-3, at 7-8. 

05/15/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa CIA covert money is about to run out for aid to the Contras. 
Discussion of third-country solicitation has been going on 
since March. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 14-16, Ex. 29. at 456; Calero 
Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 6. 



05/30/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Owen takes leave from Gray & Co., travels to Centra! 

America and spends 4 days with Contra leaders discussing 
financial needs. He then sends a memo to North. 

Owen Test., Hearings. 100-2, at 327; Ex. RWO-1, at 776-77. 



06/25/84 (CONTRA) 

A National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting 
addresses questions of solicitation of third-country support for 
the Contras. Shultz says it would be necessary to do it with 
the support of Congress and the U.S. should not rely on other 
countries to provide support for vital U.S. interests. 

Shultz Test., Hearings. 100-9, at 14-15. 

06/25/84 (CONTRA) 

Congress rejects $21 -million supplemental funding for the 
Contras. 

Congressional Record, Vol. 130, lf88, at S. 8150. 

07/01/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Country 2 money starts arriving at the rate of $1 million a 
month through 2/85. From 2/22/85 to 4/9/85, an additional 
$24 million arrives, for a total of $32 million. The million a 
month was given after McFarlane discussed the Contras with 
a Country 2 official. 

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3. at 9; North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 
part in. Ex. OLN-149; McFarlane Test.. Hearings. 100-2. at 16-18. 

07/15/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Calero says he spent approximately $19 million for arms and 
ammunition from 07/84 to 1986. 

Calero Test.. Hearings, 100-3. at 11. 

9 



07/29/84 (CONTRA) 

North contacts Secord. tells him that support for the Contras 
in Congress was greatly diminished, gives him a short 
briefing on the Contras and asks if he would help the cause. 
North testifies that he contacted Secord and others, including 
Singlaub, to see if they would be willing to purchase arms 
and sell them to the Contras. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100- 1, at 48-49; North Test, Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 147, 100-7 part II, at 1-2. 

08/01/84 (GENERAL) 

Draft of NSDD 159 on Covert Actions: "[C]overt action 
undertaken by the CIA shall be authorized only by a written 
Presidential Finding." 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. J MP- 101. 

08/01/84 (CONTRA) 

North and Tomas Castillo, a CIA officer in Central America, 
meet at a conference in Central America. 

Castillo Test. , Hearings, 100-4, at 7. 

08/03/84 (IRAN) 

The CIA issues a fabricator notice on Manucher Ghorbanifar, 
an Iranian businessman and arms dealer. A fabricator notice is 
a message to the CIA around the world that a person "should 
not be dealt with because he's dishonest and untruthful." 

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 190-91; Cave Dep.. 4/17/87, at 
8-10. 

08/07/84 (CONTRA) 

Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, asks McFarlane where money for the Contras is 
coming from. McFarlane had successfully caused contributions 
from Country 2 of $1 million a month to be made to the 
Contras. According to Armacost, McFarlane says he does not 
know. 

Shultz Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 1 7. 

08/09/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa North facilitates a short meeting between Secord and Calero at 
the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB). Shortly thereafter 
Secord and Rafael Quintero (whom Secord had brought with 
him as an adviser -"I am not a Latin American expert") meet 
with Calero at a hotel near National Airport in Washington, 
D.C. and discuss arms for the Contras. 

10 



Calero gives Secord a list of arms. Arms transactions soon 
begin through Canadian Trans World Arms and then with 
Thomas Clines, a former CIA employee with ties to Secord. 

Secord Test., Hearings. 100- 1, at 49-54; Calero Test., 
Hearings, 100-3, at 8. 

08/15/84 (CONTRA) 

Singlaub meets with North at the OEOB to discuss Singlaub's 
possible role in maintaining the Contras. 

Singlaub Interview, 4/9/87. 

08/17/84 (CONTRA) 

North, Singlaub, Owen, and Calero meet in Dallas. Contra 
needs are discussed. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2. at 329-30. 

08/23/84 (CONTRA) 

A CIA legal opinion on soon-to-pass Contra fund cutoff 
affecting CIA support for the Contras says, "No" even for 
CIA staff salaries. The opinion states: "The spirit of Section 
107 is abundantly clear -the House expects Section 107 to end 
U.S. assistance to the Contras." 

Chron. Ex. 3. 

08/31/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa The first Calero weapons order goes to Secord. The down 

payment comes in November, and the sea shipment arrives in 
April. 

Calero Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 13. 

09/02/84 (CONTRA) 

In a memo to McFarlane describing the downing of the only 
operating FDN helicopter, North requests permission to 
approach a private donor to replace the copter. McFarlane 
writes, "I don't think this is legal." 

McFarlane Test., Hearings. 100-2. at 22; Ex. 30B. at 461-62. 

09/21/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Calero buys his first weapons from Gretech World. He buys 
through retired U.S. Col. James McCoy, former military 
attache in Nicaragua and now an arms dealer. Calero met 
McCoy in Nicaragua around 1978. Ronald Martin, another 
American arms dealer, is also associated with Gretech. 

Calero Test. . Hearings, 100-3, at 12. 



11 



09/21/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa North asks Secord to solicit Contra aid from Country 2. North 
tells Secord he had discussed this with McFarlane, who gave 
it his blessing. McFarlane testifies he told North it was not 
their job to tell Secord what he can or cannot do. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100- J, at 55-56; McFarlane Test., 
Hearings, 100-2, at 40; North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part I. at 
80-81. 

09/30/84 (CONTRA) 

The CIA's Central American Task Force (CATF) Chief first 
meets North. He takes office on 10/9/84. 

C/CATF Dep., 5/1/87, at 35. 

10/12/84 (CONTRA) 

Congress enacts legislation to prohibit the CIA and DOD "or 
any other agency or entity of the United States involved in 
intelligence activities" from supporting, directly or indirectly, 
military assistance to the Contras. This became known as the 
"full Boland Amendment." It passed the Senate on October 11. 

P.L. 98-473, Sec 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1935; H.J. Res. 648; 
Congressional Record, Vol. 130, ffl33 part 11, at H. 12107, Vol. 
130, No. 134, S. 14226. 

10/12/84 (CONTRA) 

With the enactment of the Boland restrictions, McFarlane says 
he encouraged North to have the Contras become a credible 
fighting force but says he also tells North to remain within the 
law and away from fund raising. North says he never heard 
McFarlane's instructions and that he was authorized to do 
everything "that I did." North also testifies that McFarlane 
knew and approved all his acts to raise money from third 
countries to help fund the Contras. North stresses that "it was 
clearly my understanding that what I was doing was legal." 
McFarlane testifies that the President wanted "something to be 
done to aid the Contras" during the period of Boland 
proscriptions. McFarlane says that he reported to the President 
what he and his NSC staff were doing to carry out the 
President's wishes. McFarlane says he never told the President 
specifically what the staff was doing. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings. 100-2, at 5-6, 20-21, 199. North Test., 
Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 75, 163. 



12 



10/22/84 (CONTRA) 

A North memo defends the CIA "Assassination Manual." A 
memo to McFarlane, written at the request of Poindexter, 
defends the objectionable material in the manual. The 
existence of the manual, which was prepared for the Contras 
in 1983, was revealed in September 1984. 

North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-178. 

11/01/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa At a meeting in the OEOB shortly before an Owen trip to 
Central America, North gives Owen maps and photos to be 
used by the Contras in a planned operation to destroy 
Sandinista military equipment. North tells Owen he got the 
material from "across the river," meaning the CIA or the 
Pentagon. North acknowledges that Owen carried intelligence 
from him to the Contras. He also testifies that he apprised his 
superiors "of intelligence that I was having passed to the 
Resistance." 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 331-32. North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part 1, at 153, 100-7 part II, at 173. 

11/07/84 (CONTRA) 

In memo to McFarlane, North seeks approval to continue 
providing intelligence support to Calero, in particular 
information to assist Calero in "taking out" Soviet-provided 
Hind-D helicopters. The memo indicates that DOD and the 
CIA had already provided North with information about both 
the Hinds and possible MIG shipments. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 31, at 463-65. 

11/07/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa The CATF Chief learns that Hind helicopters have been 
shipped to Nicaragua. He says that, while there were 
discussions about how to destroy the Hinds, it was very clear 
that the Agency's position was that it could not do anything. 
The CATF Chief says that, if he did provide North with 
intelligence at this time relating to the Hinds, it was not for 
the purpose of providing it to the Resistance. 

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 86-87; Ex. C/CATF-1. 



13 



12/04/84 (CONTRA) 

North sends a memorandum to McFarlane informing him of 
his meeting with a Country 4 official in which they discuss 
arms for the Contras and his meeting with Singlaub about 
solicitation of Countries 3 and 5. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 32, at 466-70; Sigur Test.. 
Hearings, 100-2, at 294-96. 

12/04/84 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane testifies that he was concerned that North's memo 
indicated North was not acting in conformity with the Boland 
Amendment. He asks Poindexter to investigate. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 30-31. 

12/11/84 (IRAN) 

White House statement on hijacking of Kuwaiti aircraft: 
"Previous actions by the government of Iran have shown that 
it has the capability to act rapidly and effectively to end 
hijackings when it so wishes. On this occasion, when the lives 
of innocent Americans, Kuwaiti and other citizens were at 
stake, it did otherwise." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 20, ^50, at 
1897. 

12/15/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Owen is employed by Calero from 12/84 through 10/85. He 
then goes to the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance 
Organization (NHAO). 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 428. 

12/19/84 (CONTRA) 

North takes a one-day trip to Central America. 

North calendar. 

12/21/84 (CONTRA) 

Circa Felix Rodriguez, a former CIA official, meets North and tells 
him about his idea for using helicopters for counterinsurgency 
in El Salvador. 

Rodriguez Test. , Hearings. 100-3, at 287-88. 

12/30/84 (IRAN) 

Circa Michael A. Ledeen becomes an NSC staff consultant on 
terrorism. 

Ledeen Dep. . 3/11/87. at 5-6. 



14 



12/31/84 (IRAN) 

Circa Secord tells Hakim that he had been approached by the White 
House to assist with the "Nicaraguan initiative." Hakim asks 
Secord if profit was involved. Secord says, "definitely yes" in 
the form of commission. The profit percentage was to be 
between 20-30%. 

Hakim Test. , Hearings, 100-5. at 200-01. 

January-June, 1985 

01/08/85 (IRAN) 

The Rev. Lawrence Martin Jenco is kidnapped in Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

01/09/85 (CONTRA) 

Owen sets up IDEA, the Institute for Democracy, Education 
and Assistance, which in 1985 gets $50,000 from NHAO to 
serve as liaison with the Contras. 

Owen Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 432-33. 

01/18/85 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan issues NSDD 159 on covert actions. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 37; Poindexter Test., 
Hearings, 100-8. Ex. JMP-101. 

01/22/85 (CONTRA) 

Donald Gregg, an aide to Vice President Bush, arranges for 
Rodriguez to meet the Vice President. Rodriguez and Gregg 
worked together at the CIA. Rodriguez gives a picture 
presentation of the helicopter tactic he is about to take to 
Central America. 

Rodriguez Test., Hearings. 100-3. at 288: Gregg Dep. . 5/18/87. at 
7. Ex. Gregg- 1. 

01/26/85 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

On Nicaragua receiving aid from Iran, President Reagan says: 
"1 believe that very possibly there has been some help in 
training and in certain types of munitions now that have come 
to them from Iran. The whole pattern is also this, that we 
knew that Iran has backed and supported certain terrorist 
activities. We also know that there are representatives of most 
of the prominent terrorist groups, world wide, in Nicaragua 
giving advice and training, and help to the Sandinista 
government." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #5. at 
91-92. 

15 



01/29/85 (CONTRA) 

Secord asks Ret. Air Force Lt. Col. Richard B. Gadd, a close 
associate, to arrange for the charter of aircraft to deliver 
munitions from Country 15 to a Central American country to 
support the Contras. Gadd arranged for five or six such 
flights in 1985 and 1986. 

Gadd Dep., 5/1/87. at 8-12. 

01/30/85 (CONTRA) 

Transamerica Limited ships arms to a Central American 
country using false end user certificates. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 52. 

02/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Country 2 doubles the monthly level of contributions to the 
Contras: total $24 million. The doubling follows a person-to- 
person meeting between President Reagan and a Country 2 
official. McFarlane testifies that an official of Country 2 later 
told him that whether in this meeting or not. Country 2 had 
decided to double its monthly contributions. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 22-27, 84-86, 130-35. 

02/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Singlaub, acting on his own initiative, presents three 

alternative Contra aid packages to Country 3 officials on his 
visit there. He proposes sending them a signal of approval 
from someone in the Administration. 

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 74-75. 

02/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Singlaub travels to Country 5 and offers the Contra aid 
packages. 

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 75. 

02/05/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Singlaub reports to North in Washington on his trip to 
Countries 3 and 5. He tells North a signal from the 
Administration would be appropriate. North tells Singlaub he 
will brief his superiors. 

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 76-77; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part 1, at 77, 100-7 part 111. Ex. OLN-72. 



16 



02/06/85 (CONTRA) 

In a memo to McFarlane, North asks permission for Singlaub 
to approach Country 3 and urge them to "proceed with their 
offer. . . No White House/NSC solicitation would be made." 
North says he did ask Singlaub to take the steps outlined in 
the memo. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 34, at 476-79. North Test., 
Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 77. 

02/06/85 (CONTRA) 

A North memo to McFarlane asks permission to provide 
Calero with information on the Monimbo, a Nicaraguan arms- 
carrying ship headed for home port. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 31-32; Ex. 33, at 471-72; 
Poindexter Test. . Hearings, 100-8, at 96-98. 

02/13/85 (GENERAL) 

Jeremy Levin gains his freedom. It remains uncertain whether 
he escaped or was released. 

Media reports. 

02/15/85 aRAN) 

Circa A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) source tells agents 
he has contacts in Lebanon who could arrange for release of 
hostages — at a price. 

Agent 1 Dep. . 8/28/87, at 56-57. 

02/21/85 (CONTRA) 

In response to the question of whether he is aiding in 
"removal" or "toppling" of the Sandinista government. 
President Reagan says, not if the Sandinistas will turn around 
and say "Uncle" to the U.S. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, M8, at 212, 
214. 

02/21/85 (CONTRA) 

Owen picks up more maps from North to take to Central 
America. There is a foul-up: the maps are mounted on poster 
board and cannot be easily carried. The foul-up is remedied 
and Owen takes the maps to Central America. He may have 
carried a letter to Calero on his Central America trip 
describing $20 million in bridge funding deposited "in the 
usual account." Owen returns with a weapons list. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 333-34. 



17 



03/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Calero gives North traveler's checks. North indicates he needs 
the money for a hostage-related operation. Calero gives him 
"probably" $25,000 at this point. North confirms that he asked 
Calero for traveler's checks, after Casey, citing operational 
problems, recommended setting up an operating account. The 
total he received, he says, was in excess of $100,000. He 
says he kept meticulous records, but he destroyed them in 
11/86. Poindexter testifies that he knew about the checks, saw 
the possibility of "perception problems," and told North to 
"get rid of the money." 

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 19-21; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 132; Poindexter Test., 100-8, at 74. 

03/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Singlaub meets with Contra leaders, and drafts a weapons list. 
In 4/85, he gives the list to North "to get his concurrence." 

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 77. 

03/05/85 (CONTRA) 

North asks Owen to convert $6,000-$7,000 worth of 
traveler's checks into dollars. He gives Owen the checks in his 
OEOB office after pulling them out of a safe. Jonathan Miller 
of the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy for 
Latin American Affairs, who was in the office at the time, 
also cashed some of the checks. 

Owen Test. , Hearings, 100-2. at 337-38; J. Miller Dep. , 9/30/87, at 
14-27. 

03/05/85 (CONTRA) 

Calero begins sending Country 2 money to Energy Resources, 
an offshore Hakim bank account. He sends $1.2 million on 
this day. By April he will have sent a total of about $7.4 million. 
Between 12/84 and 7/85, when the Lake Resources account 
replaces Energy, the total will come to about $11 million. 

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 9, 22; Exs. APC-1, APC-2; 
Hakim Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 207-08; Ex. AH-2. 

03/05/85 (CONTRA) 

North testifying on his memo recommending compensation for 
a third-country provider of false end user certificates says: "I 
do not recall telling any country . . . that if they did this that 
we would do that. . . All it took was saying we would be 
grateful. . . I didn't make promises based on a quid pro quo." 
(This is one of five documents altered by Fawn Hall in 11/86 
at North's direction.) 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 147-48; McFarlane Test., 
Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 35, at 492; Hall Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 496. 

18 



03/08/85 (CONTRA) 

On 02/28/85, McFarlane had met with Republican members 
of the House Intelligence Committee. North, on 3/8/85 writes 
a memo for McFarlane to Max Friedersdorf describing the 
meeting. The memo notes that expansion of private sector and 
third country assistance, (such as Country 3 and Country 2), 
is suggested in the effort to support the Resistance. "I 
explained why these are just not tenable alternatives — for the 
freedom fighters or for us," North writes. (Solicitations of the 
two nations had already been made by the U.S.) With regard 
to the North PROF note, McFarlane testifies that he had no 
reason to believe any member of the Intelligence Committee 
had knowledge of fundraising efforts by any Government 
officials from third countries or private parties. And even if 
he did, it wasn't something "illegal" as it was described in the 
North PROF note, he says. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-104, OLN-105: 
McFarlane Dep. , 7)2/87, at 84-85. 

03/15/85 (CONTRA) 

Rodriguez arrives in Central America and begins giving 
military advice in El Salvador on counterinsurgency. He soon 
begins actively assisting the Contras. 

Rodriguez Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 288-89. Steele Dep. , 5/21/87, 
at 2-12, 14-18. 

03/16/85 (CONTRA) 

North proposes a "Fallback Plan" for Contra aid. (This is 
another of the documents altered by Fawn Hall.) 

McFarlane Test., Hearings. 100-2, Fx. 36, at 510-13: Hall Te.st. . 
Hearings. 100-5, at 498. 

03/16/85 (IRAN) 

American journalist Terry Anderson, Chief Middle East 
Correspondent for the Associated Press, is kidnapped in 
Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

03/20/85 (CONTRA) 

In a memo to McFarlane titled "Timing and the Nicaraguan 
Resistance Vote," North lays out a plan to inlluencc the 
Congressional vote on Contra aid scheduled for mid- April. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100 7 pan III. Ex. OLN-217. 



19 



03/22/85 (CONTRA) 

Owen makes payments to several Contra leaders. Owen also 
previously passed several thousand dollars to a Nicaraguan 
Indian leader in a parked car in Washington, D.C. He gives 
the Indians more money on other occasions. 

Owen Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 340-41. 

03/26/85 (CONTRA) 

Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the Boland Amendment prohibits the 
Administration from soliciting funds from private parties or 
foreign governments to aid the Contras. 

Hearings on Security Development Assistance, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 99th Congress, 1st Session. 

04/01/85 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan, in an interview with Lou Cannon, David 
Hoffman, and Leonard Downie of The Washington Post, cites 
evidence of increasing private support for the Contras. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, if 14, at 398. 

04/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo, and United Nicaraguan 
Opposition (UNO) leader Arturo Cruz, Sr., meet President 
Reagan. The UNO Directorate thanks the President for his 
support. This is the first of three or four times Calero meets 
with President Reagan. 

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 19. 

04/01/85 (CONTRA) 

North cashes traveler's checks for the first time: for $100 at 
the San Antonio Foreign Exchange. Through December, 
1985, he would cash $2,440. "I never took a penny that didn't 
belong to me," North says. He says he cashed the checks to 
reimburse himself. 

Calero Test, Hearings, 100-3, Ex. APC-1; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 133. 

04/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Owen describes to North plans for a Southern Front 
organization in Nicaragua. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-7, at 799-802. 



20 



04/01/85 (IRAN) 

Circa McFarlane says Ledeen tells him he is going to Israel and that 
he will inquire there about Israeli information on Iran. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 42-43, 177. 

04/11/85 (CONTRA) 

In a memo to McFarlane, North seeks approval for Country 2 
to be approached before June 1. 1985, for an additional $15 
million to $20 million. McFarlane says no. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 28-29; Ex. 37. at 519-22; 
Hall Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 499. 

04/18/85 (CONTRA) 

Motley tells a House Appropriations Subcommittee that the 
Boland Amendment prohibits the Administration from 
soliciting funds from private parties or foreign governments to 
aid the Contras. 

Hearings on DOD appropriations for fiscal year 1986. 99th 
Congress, 1st Session. 

04/24/85 (CONTRA) 

The House defeats a $l4-million aid package for the Contras. 

Congressional Record, Vol. 131, 1149, at H. 2491. 

04/25/85 (CONTRA) 

Singlaub and Calero meet with an arms dealer who gives them 
low prices for items on the Contra-Singlaub (North) weapons 
list. Singlaub and Calero then meet with North and Secord to 
discuss prices and air defense weapons. Singlaub and North 
discuss the news media. Singlaub persuades North that 
Singlaub must "maintain a high profile." 

Singlaub Test.. Hearings, 100-3, at 78-80. 83. 

05/04/85 (IRAN) 

Ledeen travels to Israel to discuss the Iranian situation with 
Prime Minister Shimon Peres. 

Ledeen Dep. . 3/11/87, at 16-20; 6/19/87, at 40-43. 

05/09/85 (CONTRA) 

North goes to Central America and returns through New 
Orleans on May 10. 

North calendar. 



21 



05/14/85 (IRAN) 

Evidence produced by the DEA source that he had access to 
the kidnapped Buckley is rejected by the CIA. Clair George, 
CIA Deputy Director for Operations, calls the source a "scam" 
and "fake" and "hocus-pocus." 

Chron. Ex. 4; George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 235-36, 253-254; 
George Dep. , 4/24/87, at 60. 

05/21/85 (CONTRA) 

At the annual conference of the Council of the Americas, 
President Reagan introduces Elliott Abrams as new Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, H21 , at 670. 

05/22/85 (IRAN) 

Two DEA agents are assigned to help North rescue hostages 
in Lebanon. The DEA agents assure North their source can 
deliver two hostages for $2.2 million. They begin operating 
under his control. 

North Notebooks, Q 1854-56; Lawn Dep., 8/20/87, at 41-42; Agent 
2 Dep., 8/12/87, at 61-64; See 6/7/85 entry herein; Meese Test., 
Hearings, 100-9, at 303-305. 

05/25/85 (CONTRA) 

North receives a report from Central America that Secord is 
overcharging the Contras for arms. North gets a price list 
from Secord and compares it with those of other dealers and 
discusses the matter with Calero. At Casey's instruction. 
North tells Secord and Calero to avoid two particular arms 
dealers. 

North Test. , Hearings, 100- 7 part I, at 124. 

05/28/85 (IRAN) 

American David Jacobsen is seized in Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

05/29/85 (IRAN) 

At the request of North, Jay Coburn, an agent of Texas 
industrialist H. Ross Perot, turns over $200,000 to a DEA 
agent for use in a hostage rescue attempt. 

Meese Test.. Hearings, 100 9, at 390-391; Kxs. EM-2, EM-4. 



22 



05/30/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Shultz is called by Ambassador Lewis, who is upset about the 
Ledeen meeting with Peres. Ledeen had been representing 
himself as an official of the U.S. on an "official mission" to 
Israel, Lewis says. Ledeen says he was acting as a private 
citizen. 

Shultz Test.. Hearings. 100-9. at 24-25. Ledeen Dep. , 3/11/87. at 
24-25; 6/19/87. at 44-45. 

05/31/85 (CONTRA) 

North indicates to McFarlane that the lethal supply operation 
has been under way since June 1984. In a memo to 
McFarlane, "The Nicaraguan Resistance: Near-Term Outlook," 
North writes: "Plans are underway to transition from current 
arrangements to a consultative capacity by the CIA for all 
political matters and intelligence" once Congress lifts 
restrictions. "The only portion of current activity which will 
be sustained as it has since last June ["84], will be the delivery 
of lethal supplies." (This is one of the documents later 
altered.) 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 38, at 529-36. Hall Test., 
Hearings. 100-5, at 500-01. 

06/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Abrams says he spoke with Lewis Tambs in 1985 prior to 

Tambs' taking his post as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica. He 
denies telling Tambs to open up the Southern Front and says 
Tambs never told him that North had instructed him to open 
the Southern Front against Nicaragua. 

Abrams Test.. Hearings, 100-5, at 16-17; Tambs Test.. Hearings, 
100-3, at 367-71. 

06/07/85 (IRAN) 

A North memo to McFarlane describes a plan to use DEA 
agents and Perot money to rescue hostages. McFarlane 
informs the President, Vice President Bush and probably 
White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan; he tells them 
Attorney General Edwin T. Meese, 3rd, is supportive. North 
seeks authorization from the head of DEA, and "if I recall 
correctly" from Meese. 

McFarlane Test.. Hearings. 100-2. at 44. 207-09. 281-82. F.x. 38.A. 
at 537 43; Meese Test.. Hearings, l(X)-9. at 303 05; North Te.st.. 
Hearings, 100-7 part I. at 162. 



23 



06/09/85 (IRAN) 

American citizen Thomas P. Sutherland is kidnapped in 
Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

06/10/85 (IRAN) 

A North memo to Meese describes the $2.2 million plan to 
rescue hostages. He asks that the DEA agents be assigned to 
the NSC. Meese approves the plan. Meese testifies he was 
unaware that it was a ransom plan. 

Meese Test. . Hearings. 100-9, at 388-89. Ex. EM-2. 

06/11/85 (IRAN) 

A Draft NSDD by the NSC staff proposes a new opening to 
Iran with possible arms sales. The Secretaries of State and 
Defense oppose the proposal. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 42; Weinberger Test., 
Hearings, 100-10, at 130-31, 161-62, Exs. CWW-4. CWW-5. 

06/15/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Owen flies to Denver and drives to meet with Singlaub. 
Present at the meeting are representatives of Soldier of 
Fortune, Robert K. Brown and Ed Deerborne. They discuss 
procurement of weapons for the Contras. Barbara Studley is 
Singlaub's facilitator in getting weapons. After leaving 
Singlaub, Owen flies to San Francisco, where Calero was 
giving a speech. Owen meets with Calero and goes over a 
Singlaub-provided arms list so that he (Owen) could then 
show Singlaub of Calero's choices. Calero calls North to tell 
him about the list. Owen then returns to Washington. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2. at 343-46. 

06/18/85 (IRAN) 

President Reagan says: "Let me further make it plain to the 
assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may 
be, that America will never make concessions to terrorists - 
to do so would only invite more terrorism — nor will we ask 
nor pressure any other government to do so. Once we head 
down that path there would be no end to it, no end to the 
suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom all 
civilized nations must pay." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21. ^25. at 806. 



24 



06/18/85 (CONTRA) 

Joseph Coors, a wealthy friend of Casey, goes to Casey to 
offer his assistance to the Contras; Casey sends him to North. 
They discuss the Contras need for a Maule plane. The cost is 
$65,000. Coors agrees to send this sum to Lake Resources, 
the Swiss account number North gave him. North in his 
testimony confirms this, saying that he did not solicit Coors. 

Coors Test., Hearings. 100-3. at 127-29. Ex. JC-1: North Test.. 
Hearings, 100-7 part I. at 89-90. 

06/19/85 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan at the annual convention of the U.S. Jaycees 
says: "But let me say we must not yield to the terrorist 
demands that invite more terrorism. We cannot reward their 
grisly deeds. We will not cave in." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21 . 
If 25, at 818. 

06/20/85 (CONTRA) 

Singlaub's ship carrying "East Bloc manufactured weapons" 
sails. The ship arrives at the port designated by the FDN on 
7/8/85. Mario Dellamico, an arms dealer with local 
connections, meets the ship. 

Singlaub Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 84-85. 

06/21/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa North asks Sigur for the name of an official from Country 5. 
Sigur gives North the official's phone number. 

Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 293-94. 

06/27/85 (CONTRA) 

After a White House briefing of private donors, the first of 
five in 1985 and 1986, Carl "Spitz" Russell Channell, a 
conservative fundraiser, later gives a $50.(X)0 check to Calcro 
at a dinner at the Hay- Adams Hotel. The $50,000 represented 
all the money ChannelTs National Endowment for the 
Preservation of Liberty (NEPL) had collected for the Contras 
to date. 

Channell Dep. . 9/1/87. at 78-80. 



25 



06/30/85 (CONTRA) 

North asks Sigur to contact a Country 3 representative to ask 
about a contribution that North and McFarlane think the 
country is considering. North says he has checked the legality 
with lawyers. Sigur relays the request. The official says he 
will check with his government. Sigur tells McFarlane the 
official said the funds would have to be "channeled through 
the [USG]." McFarlane says that cannot be done. Sigur tells 
North, who later asks him to set up a meeting with the 
. Country 3 contact. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 78-79. Sigur Test., 
Hearings, 100-2, at 286-93. 

06/30/85 (IRAN) 

Circa DEA Agent 1 and his brother give $200,000 to their source. 
The source later says hostages might be freed in exchange for 
arms. The ransom plan then lay dormant until the spring of 
1986. 

Agent 1 Dep., 8/28/87, at 99-102, 106. 

July-September, 1985 

07/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa North has a discussion with Tambs before he leaves for Costa 
Rica. North says "we" want you to open a Southern Front. 
Tambs understands the "we" to be the Restricted Interagency 
Group (RIG), which includes a member from the CATF. 
C/CATF and Elliott Abrams, members of RIG, said they gave 
no such directive. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 367-68, 370-71, 408-09, 419-20; 
Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 11; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 
part I. at 150; Abrams Test., Hearings. 100-5, at 16-17; C/CATF 
Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 94. 

07/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Tambs goes to Costa Rica. He calls in three officers and tells 
them of the North mandate to create a Southern Front. 

Tambs Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 408; Castillo Test. , Hearings, 
100-4, at 11; North Test. Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 150; Poindexter 
Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 75. 

07/01/85 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Secord says he waived all profit interests in Iran-Contra at 
this time. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 54-55; Hakim Test., Hearings, 
100-5. at 215-16. 

26 



07/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Abrams becomes Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, the senior official under the Secretary of 
State responsible for U.S. diplomacy in the Caribbean and 
Latin America. 

Abrams Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 2. 

07/01/85 (CONTRA) 

A meeting in Miami on the Contra program is attended by 
North, Calero, Secord. former CIA employee Rafael 
Quintero, Clines and Gen. Enrique Bermudez. an FDN 
military commander. McFarlane says he did not know that 
North attended the meeting. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 40: North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part II, at 162; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 57-60. 

07/03/85 (IRAN) 

David Kimche, former head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
meets at the White House with McFarlane and says some 
Iranians want to have political talks with U.S. officials. An 
arms-and-hostages swap is discussed. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 43-45, 171-73. 

07/08/85 (IRAN) 

President Reagan at the American Bar Association Convention 
says: "So, the American people are not — I repeat, not — going 
to tolerate intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war 
against this nation and its people. And we're especially not 
going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the 
strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes, and squalid 
criminals since the advent of the Third Reich." In the same 
speech. President Reagan declares Iran to be part of a 
"confederation of terrorist states ... a new version of Murder 
Incorporated." He adds, "Let me make it plain to the assassins 
in Beirut and their accomplices that America will never make 
concessions to terrorists." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21. tt2H, at S80. 

07/13/85 (IRAN) 

President Reagan enters the hospital for abdominal surgery. 
While in the hospital, he authorizes McFarlane to open 
contacts with Iran, and McFarlane conveys President Reagan's 
response to Kimche, McFarlane testifies. 



McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 
100-10, at 10-12. 



100-2, at 45. Regan Test., Hearings. 



27 



07/15/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa The financing of the Contras changes. There is a 

discontinuation of contributions to Calero, and the deposits go 
directly into Hakim's accounts. Contra arms are paid for out 
of Hakim's accounts. 

Hakim Test. . Hearings, 100-5, at 208-09. 

07/16/85 (IRAN) 

Shultz responds to the McFarlane-inspired 6/11 draft of an 
NSDD. He says Iran is still a terrorist nation, and there 
should be no arms sales to Iran. 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 26, Ex. GPS-10. 

07/18/85 (IRAN) 

Casey writes McFarlane strongly endorsing the draft NSDD 
on Iran. The draft NSDD was inspired by a 5/20/85 CIA 
memo. 

Chron. Ex. 5. 

07/18/85 (CONTRA) 

North asks the FBI to delay an interview of a self-styled Saudi 
"Prince" for about two weeks "due to tne critical timing of the 
Prince's possible large donation to the Nicaraguan Freedom 
Fighters." The FBI's Washington Field Office asks Bureau 
permission to delay interview of the "Prince" (Mousalreza 
Ebrahim Zadeh) as requested by North. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 62, at 681-85. 

07/21/85 (IRAN) 

At a White House meeting of the NSC on the pros and cons 
of opening up the Israeli-sponsored U.S. -Iran initiative, Shultz 
and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger argue the 
legal and policy implications. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 47; Weinberger Test., Test., 
Hearings. 100-10, at 134-135. 

07/25/85 (CONTRA) 

Tambs says that North, through Castillo, directed him to 
approach the Costa Rican Government to get permission to 
build a Santa Elena airstrip to help resupply the Contras 
fighting on the Southern Front of Nicaragua. Tambs says 
private funds were used to construct the airfield. Castillo 
denies Tambs' assertion that he instructed Tambs to approach 
the Costa Rican Government to get permission to build the 
strip. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 375-76, 378-80, 399-400. 
409-10; Castillo Test., Hearings. 100-4. at 29. 

28 



07/29/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Israeli arms dealers Adolph Schwimmer and Yaacov Nimrodi 
and Ledeen and others meet with Ghorbanifar in Israel. The 
subject of weapons and hostages is raised for the first time, 
Ledeen says. 

Israeli Chronoh^x: Ledeen Dep. . 3/11/87, at 34-35, 37-45: 
6/19/87. at 55-57. 

07/30/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Shlomo Gazit, former chief of Israeli military intelligence, 
meets with Ledeen. Gazit informs Ledeen of Israeli 
apprehension that the story of the Iran initiative might leak 
and that they wanted a clear and binding answer on U.S. 
support. Ledeen responds that Israel had received a positive 
response from McFarlane, who had cleared it with President 
Reagan. 

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 9/10/87, at 27-28. 

07/30/85 (CONTRA) 

The Senate approves the conference report (H. Rept. 99-237) 
to S. 960, the Foreign Aid Authorization Act for FY86 and 
FY87. The conference report includes House provisions for 
$27 million in nonlethal "humanitarian" aid to the Contras. 
The bill also contains a "Boland Amendment" type spending 
restriction. 

Congressional Record. Vol. 131. 1(104. at S. 10323. 

07/30/85 (CONTRA) 

North tells the FBI that the "Prince" and Richard Miller of 
International Business Communications, Inc., (IBC). a public 
relations firm that worked with North to rally support for the 
Contras, and the intermediary between the "Prince" and North, 
are in Europe arranging for funds to be transferred to the 
Contras. 

North Text.. Hearings, 100-7, Part ///, Ex. OLN-265. 

07/31/85 (CONTRA) 

The House approves the conference report on S. 960. 

Congressional Record. Vol. 131. ft 105. at H. 6892. 

08/02/85 (IRAN) 

Kimchc meets with McFarlanc in Washington to bring him up 
to date on the Iran initiative. TOW missiles for Iran arc 
discussed. 

Israeli Chronology: McFarlanc Test.. Hearings. 100 2. at 48. 



29 



08/05/85 (CONTRA) 

The FBI opens a case in Philadelphia based on an allegation 
that "the Prince" swindled $240,000 from the William Penn 
Bank, at the same time North was trying to develop him as an 
asset for the Iran-Contra initiative. 

North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part III. Ex. OLN-265. 

08/06/85 (IRAN) 

McFarlane conveys to Kimche President Reagan's approval of 
a TOW shipment, noting the President's concern that this not 
be perceived as swapping arms for hostages and on condition 
that weapons not be usable by terrorists or of such type or 
volume as to alter the balance in the Iran-Iraq war. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 48-50. 

08/06/85 (IRAN) 

At a meeting with President Reagan and McFarlane, Shultz 
expresses opposition to selling arms to Iran and said "that we 
are just falling into the arms-for-hostages business, and we 
shouldn't do it." The President, Shultz says, was noncommital. 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9. at 27. 

08/07/85 (CONTRA) 

Owen writes North of the Southern Front's needs. He updates 
the political and military situation. 

Owen Test.. Hearings. 100-2. Ex. RWO-8. at 803-05. 

08/08/85 (CONTRA) 

A memo written by a Republican staff member of the House 
Intelligence Committee concludes that the Boland Amendment 
applies to the NSC. 

Sciaroni Test., Hearings, 100-5. Ex. BGS-26. 

08/08/85 (CONTRA) 

Statutory restrictions on Contra aid are signed into law: $27 
million may be obligated by March 31, 1986 for humanitarian 
aid to the Contras by any agency, other than the CIA or 
DOD, designated by the President. NHAO is set up in the 
State Department. 

P.L 99-88. Supplemental Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1985. 

08/10/85 (CONTRA) 

North makes a 1-day trip to Central America. 

Castillo Test.. Hearings. 100-4. at 13: North Calendar. 



30 



08/13/85 (CONTRA) 

Castillo cables the CATF Chief that Tambs obtained 
permission to build the Southern Front airfield. The CATF 
Chief responds that the CIA was pleased, but that neither CIA 
nor DOD can become involved in building the strip. 

Castillo Test.. Hearings, 100-4. at 12. 13. Exs. TC-1, TC-2. at 87 
and 88. 

08/15/85 (CONTRA) 

Sigur sets up a meeting between North and a representative of 
Country 3. Later that summer, the representative tells Sigur 
that his country gave $1 million in humanitarian assistance to 
the Contras. 

Sigur Test.. Hearings. 100-2. at 287-93. 

08/15/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Abrams learns of the Costa Rican airstrip. He denies, 

however, knowing that Tambs had been talking with the Costa 
Rican Government about the airstrip and says he learned about 
this from Tambs' testimony. 

Abrams Test.. Hearings, 100-5, at 6. 9. and 16. 20-22. 

08/15/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Kimche briefs Ledeen, who then briefs McFarlane on the 
pending first shipment of TOWs to Iran. 

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep.. 3/11/87. at 48-51. 

08/16/85 (CONTRA) 

Rep. Michael D. Barnes .sends a letter to McFarlane asking 
about reports of North's activities regarding resupplying the 
Contras. Poindexter collects the relevant North documents for 
McFarlane, who reviews six key memos with North. North 
offers to rewrite the documents. North testifies that the actual 
alteration took place a year later as he prepared to leave the 
NSC. To protect the NSC Contra operation. North and 
McFarlane decided to keep the six key memos out of the 
System IV files. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100 7 part I. at 16-18. 169 72: McFarlane 
Test.. Hearings. 100-2. at 73-77. 108-12. 164. 214-15. Kk. 40A. at 
546-47. 

08/17/85 (CONTRA) 

Poindexter assigns North to write the Rep. Barnes" inquiry 
response. 

Poinde.xter Test.. Hearings. 100 8. at 81 89. £». JMF 7A. 
North Test.. Hearings. lOi) 7. Part I. at 272. 

31 



08/20/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Bretton G. Sciaroni, legal counsel of the President's 

Intelligence Oversight Board, meets with North for 5 minutes 
late one evening. Sciaroni asks North if there was any truth to 
news stories that North was helping the Contras operationally. 
North says, "No." Sciaroni does not ask any other factual 
questions. Sciaroni also meets with Paul Thompson, NSC 
legal counsel, who does not give Sciaroni the troublesome 
documents that are subsequently altered by Fawn Hall. 

Sciaroni Test.. Hearings. 100-5, at 409-11. 

08/20/85 (IRAN) 

96 TOW missiles are delivered to Iran from Israel. The 
missiles are taken by the commander of the Revolutionary 
Guard. 

Israeli Chronology: North Test., Hearings. 100-7 part I, at 48. 

08/20/85 (IRAN) 

Kimche meets with Ledeen in London to discuss ways to 
bring out the hostages. No hostages were released, however, 
as a result of the 8/20/85 TOW shipment. 

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 49, 52-53. 

08/20/85 (CONTRA) 

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the House Intelligence 
Committee, writes McFarlane inquiring about NSC support of 
the Contras. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 73, 108-12, 114-20, 135-36, 
Ex. 41. at 559. 

08/23/85 (CONTRA) 

North meets with Garwood in the OEOB and discusses the 
chances of the Contras invading Nicaragua. After the meeting, 
Channell asks for a contribution. Garwood gives a total of 
$90,000. 

Garwood Test.. Hearings. 100-3. at 113-16; North Calendar; 
Channell Calendar. 

08/30/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Owen and Castillo go to a Costa Rican site on North's 
instructions to determine if an airfield could be built to 
facilitate both lethal and nonlethal drops. 

Owen Test., Hearings. 100-2. at 349. Castillo Test.. Hearings. 
100-4, at 13-14. 



32 



09/01/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Kimche calls McFarlane and says he expects release of one 
hostage imminently and all hostages soon. McFarlane reports 
this to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Casey, Shultz, 
Weinberger, and Regan. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings. 100-2, at 50-51. 

09/03/85 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF note, McFarlane sends back to North an edited 
version of North's draft of a letter to Rep. Hamilton and asks 
North to edit that. McFarlane writes, "Please do not share 
either this note or the separate draft with anyone. . . Ollie, 
don't send me any PROFS notes about it." 

North Test., Hearings. 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-115. 

09/04/85 (IRAN) 

Discussions are held in Paris among Ghorbanifar, Nimrodi, 
Ledeen, and Kimche. Iran is now interested in new HAWK 
missiles capable of hitting high-flying aircraft. 

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 53-59. 95. 

09/04/85 (CONTRA) 

Abrams tells Shultz the Contras are being supplied but does 
not know how and has not asked North. Shultz says Abrams 
is State's point man on this operation, and he should keep 
himself informed on how the Contras are being supplied. 
Abrams then wrote down, "Monitor Ollie." 

Abrams Test.. Hearings, 100-5, at 14. 104-105. 125-126: Shultz 
Test. . Hearings. 100-9, at 23. 

09/05/85 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane replies to Rep. Hamilton: "I can state with deep 
personal conviction that at no time did I or any member of 
the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit 
of the law." North confirms that he helped draft this letter. He 
acknowledges that statements in it were false. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part I. at 164-67; McFarlane Test.. 
Hearings. 100-2. Ex. 41 A, at 560-63. 

09/10/85 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane briefs the House Intelligence Committee on NSC 
support for Contras. 

North Te.st.. Hearings, 100-7 part I. at 166-67. 



33 



09/11/85 (CONTRA) 

North, Garwood, and Calero meet at a Dallas airport. North 
speaks of the need to provide transportation for supplies to 
Contra camps. Channel! later asks for a contribution. 
Garwood gives $32,000. 

Garwood Test.. Hearings, 100-3, at 137. Channell Dep. , 911 187, at 
98-99. 

09/11/85 (CONTRA) 

North also meets in Dallas with millionaire Bunker Hunt. 
Channell had set a goal of $5 million for a contribution from 
Hunt. At dinner. North reviews a list of Contra needs 
totalling $5 million. This includes various types of military 
equipment. Channell and Hunt are left alone. (Hunt disputes 
this account.) Hunt donates $237,500 and provides another 
$237,500 as a loan. 

Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 101, 110, 123, 124-25. Hunt Dep., 
4/24/87. at 21, 32-33, 48. 

09/12/85 (CONTRA) 

Rep. Hamilton writes follow-up questions to McFarlane. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 77. Ex. 41 B. at 564-71. 

09/12/85 (CONTRA) 

Sciaroni writes a legal memo that states that the Boland 
Amendment does not apply to the NSC staff and that he has 
investigated press allegations about North and found them 
unsubstantiated. 

Sciaroni Test. . Hearings. 100-5, at 394-95. Exs. BGS-9. BGS-9A. 

09/12/85 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane replies to Rep. Barnes. He writes that he 
"thoroughly examined" the facts relating to the charges, and "I 
want to assure you that my actions, and those of my staff, 
have been in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of 
the law." North testifies that this and other letters were 
"clearly misleading." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I. at 170. McFarlane Test., 
Hearings. 100-2. Ex. 40B. at 548-52. 

09/14/85 (IRAN) 

A plane leaves Israel with 408 TOWs. It goes to Tabriz and 
not Tehran to prevent the missiles from being seized by the 
Revolutionary Guard. 

Israeli Chronology. 

34 



09/15/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Owen takes three trips to New York City. The first is on 

instruction of North, who gave Owen Secord's phone number. 
Secord instructs Owen to go to a Chinese restaurant and ask 
for "Mooey." Mooey gives Owen $9,500. Owen takes the 
money to Washington, D.C., and gives it to Secord. Owen 
takes two subsequent trips to New York City and brings 
envelopes back to North at the White House. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 353-55. 

09/15/85 (IRAN) 

Rev. Weir is released to the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. 
Schwimmer asks Ghorbanifar why Buckley was not released. 
Ghorbanifar responds that Buckley was too ill to move. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 48; Israeli Chronology. 

09/17/85 (CONTRA) 

The FBI tells North that the "Prince" has been involved in 
fraud schemes. 

Joint Report, at 110-112. 

09/18/85 (IRAN) 

The White House announces Weir's release. The 
announcement has been delayed in the hope that the other 
hostages would be freed. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21 , tt38, at 111: 
Media reports. 

09/19/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Channell and potential contributors attend a White House 
briefing with North. Weapons needs of the Contras are 
discussed. 

Channell Dep. , 9/1/87, at 128-30. 

09/20/85 (CONTRA) 

North sends Rodriguez a letter outlining what he wanted done 
to help the Contras. The letter was received 09/29/85. The 
letter asks Rodriguez to provide aircraft maintenance facilities 
at an air base in Central America. North and Rodriguez testify 
that Vice President Bush and his aides were not to be 
informed of Rodriguez's role. 

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3. at 289-90, 320-21: Ex. FIR 1. 



35 



09/20/85 (IRAN) 

Rev. Pat Robertson interviews President Reagan. Robertson 
notes that "a member of the White House staff was 
dispatched on Sunday to Iran to "seek the release of the 
remaining" hostages. North denies he told Robertson about the 
Iran arms initiative. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 160-63; Poindexter Test., 
Hearings, 100-8, at 346; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 383. 

09/21/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Owen is taken off the airfield project. He later joins NHAO 
through the intervention of North, Calero, Cruz, and Robelo. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 351. 

09/21/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Abrams meets with Castillo and two of Castillo's assistants. 
He says the airstrip was never mentioned in the briefings. 
Abrams later says he mentioned the airstrip to Castillo, who 
was surprised by Abrams' knowledge. Castillo had not 
mentioned the airstrip to his assistants. Abrams never reports 
knowledge of the airstrip to Shultz, because it was a private 
venture. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 378, 395, 401; Castillo Test., 
Hearings, 100-4, at 17; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 21, 23, 
54. 

09/21/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Secord tells Hakim that they had been asked to get directly 
involved in flying arms into Nicaragua and dropping them to 
the Contras. 

Hakim Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 202. 



October-December, 1985 

10/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Senators David Durenberger and Patrick J. Leahy write to 
McFarlane inquiring about NSC staff support for the Contras. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 41 D, at 581-82. 



36 



10/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa North again asks Sigur to approach Country 3. Sigur does, 

and Country 3 provides another $1 million. Owen says that he 
carried from North to the Country 3 official an envelope 
containing an account number. McFarlane testifies he did not 
know of these actions in advance. 

Sigur Test. , Hearings, 100-2. at 292: Owen Test. , Hearings, 100-2, 
at 352; McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 26. 

10/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa North gives Secord a KL-43, an encryption device. According 
to Secord, the following people had a KL-43: North; Secord; 
Gadd; Southern Air Transport; Col. James Steele, chief U.S. 
military adviser in El Salvador; the air operations chief, 
William Cooper; and Castillo. North obtained them after 
Casey and Poindexter had indicated to him that secure 
communications were needed. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 150-51; part 11, at 16-18; 
Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 75; Button Test. , 100-3, at 
208; Secord Test., Hearings. 1 00-1, at 65-66. 

10/01/85 (CONTRA) 

The Office of Latin American Public Diplomacy awards a 
secret, no-bid contract for $276,186 to IBC. It was not signed 
until 9/2/86. A State Department audit showed seven contracts 
and purchase orders totalling $441,084 between 2/14/84 and 
9/30/86 with IBC, Frank Gomez (an IBC principal along with 
Richard Miller) or the Institute for North-South Issues, 
(INSI), another Gomez company. INSI also received grants 
totalling nearly $500,000 from the National Endowment for 
Democracy. 

Audit Report No. 7PP-008, Office of Inspector General, Department 
of State (July 1987); North Test., Hearings, 100-7, part II, at 
58-59. 

10/03/85 (CONTRA) 

North writes a memo to McFarlane proposing answers to 
Senators Leahy and Durcnberger, denying allegations against 
North; North sends McFarlane a proposed reply to Rep. 
Hamilton. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part III, E.x. OLN-120. 

10/03/85 (IRAN) 

The Islamic Jihad, a pro-Iranian terrorist group, claims that it 
has murdered U.S. hostage William Buckley. 

North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part II. at 21; Media reports. 



10/07/85 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane writes to Sen. Durcnberger and Rep. Hamilton 
denying allegations of NSC-North facilitating movement of 
supplies to the Contras. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2. Ex. 41 E, at 583-88; North Test., 
Hearings 100-7 part I, at 165-66. 

10/08/85 (IRAN) 

Ledeen, Nimrodi, Schwimmer, and Ghorbanifar meet in 
Washington. The release of hostages and arms sales are 
discussed. 

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 49-50; 
Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 70-75. 

10/10/85 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane meets with the Congressional intelligence 
committees and responds to questions on Norths Contra 
activities. North said he helped prepare McFarlane's answers. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 166-67. 

10/16/85 (CONTRA) 

In a memo to McFarlane the day before Rep. Barnes visits 
McFarlane, Paul Thompson tells McFarlane to hold back from 
Rep. Barnes documents that are "Presidential Advisory paper 
that fall under the dominion of the President and are no 
longer subject to your disposition." 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, E.x. 70, at 752. 

10/17/85 (CONTRA) 

Channell, with large donors, attends a White House briefing. 

Channell Dep. , 9/2/87, at 36. 

10/17/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa North argues with Robert Duemling. head of NHAO, that he 
should hire Owen as a contractor with NHAO. Duemling 
initially resisted North's idea but compromised later and 
allowed Owen's group, IDEA, to be placed on a contract basis 
with NHAO and not liaison as North had initially requested. 
Abrams denied knowing Owen and learned of his name in a 
Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) meeting, and through a 
letter to Duemling from Cruz, Robelo, and Calcro, who also 
interceded for Owen. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2. at 355, E.x. RWO-16, at 829-30: 
Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5. at 37-38; Duemling Dep.. 8/20/87, 
at 59-69. 



38 



10/17/85 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane meets with Rep. Barnes and says no one on the 
NSC staff violated the letter or spirit of the law. He has a 
stack of documents and tells Rep. Barnes that he alone can 
look at them. Barnes declines to look at them under that 
condition. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 75. 

10/19/85 (CONTRA) 

North gives Owen a $1,000 wedding present in Calero's 
traveler's checks. Calero says North did not tell him about the 
present. 

Owen Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 369; Calero Test. , Hearings, 
100-3, at 21. 

10/21/85 (CONTRA) 

North travels to Central America and returns through Miami 
the next day. 

North calendar. 

10/25/85 (CONTRA) 

John H. Donahue of Pittsburgh gives $100,000 to the Heritage 
Foundation, which then transfers it to a Richard Miller- 
Francis Gomez entity, the Institute for North-South Issues. 
The money was donated for purposes other than the Contras. 
Miller and Gomez took a $20,000 fee from the $100,000. 

Godson Dep., 9/10/87, at 85; R. Miller Dep. , 8/20/87, at 276-81; 
Slease Dep., 6/11/87, at 20-36, 56-57. 

10/27/85 (IRAN) 

Nimrodi, Schwimmer, Ledeen, Ghorbanifar, and several 
Iranians meet in Geneva. The Iranians declare that they could 
effect the release of all the hostages without Khomeini's 
knowledge. They ask for HAWKs. 

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 79-83. 

10/29/85 (CONTRA) 

Rep. Barnes writes again, saying McFarlane's offer to let him 
see the documents is inadequate. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2. Ex. 40D. at 553 54. 



39 



11/01/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Construction of the Costa Rican airfield begins and continues 
off and on through 3/86. The airstrip was never completed. 

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4. at 16. Secord Test., Hearings, 
100-1, at 251-52. 

11/04/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa North travels to Philadelphia to meet two potential donors. 
One contributes $60,000. 

Godson Dep. . 9/10/87. at 89-96. Hirtle Dep. , 7/13/87. at 27-48. 

11/07/85 (CONTRA) 

Barbara Newington, a wealthy donor, has a meeting and photo 
opportunity with President Reagan. Channell, Miller, and 
North later meet with her in her room at the Hay-Adams 
Hotel. North says the Contras need missiles. After North 
leaves, Channell asks Newington for a contribution. In 1985 
and 1986, Newington gave more than $2.8 million to NEPL. 

Newington Dep. , 5/12/87, at 33-52. Channell Dep. , 9/1/87, at 
135-38. 

11/08/85 (CONTRA) 

North prepares a McFarlane response to Rep. Barnes. The 
letter, approved by McFarlane, turns down Rep. Barnes' 
request to provide documents, relying essentially on executive 
privilege. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 40E, at 556-58. 

11/08/85 (IRAN) 

McFarlane, North, and Ledeen meet with Kimche. McFarlane 
in his testimony accepts without recalling that another arms 
deal was discussed. During this meeting, Kimche recalls, the 
HAWK transaction was not discussed, since Kimche assumed 
it was already approved. 

Israeli Chronolgy; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 97; Ledeen 
Dep. , 6/22/87, at 231. 

11/08/85 (GENERAL) 

Casey writes a letter to President Reagan deploring leaks of 
classified information to the media and suggesting that fewer 
persons on the Congressional oversight committees have 
access to classified data. 

Chron. Ex. 6. 



40 



11/14/85 (IRAN) 

John N. McMahon, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 
and f)erhaps Casey meet with McFarlane and Poindexter. 
McMahon states that McFarlane then told them about the 
Israeli plan to move arms to certain elements of the Iranian 
military who are prepared to overthrow the government. 
McFarlane testifies, "It is entirely possible" that he said that. 

McFarlane Test.. Hearings. 100-2, at 97. 

11/15/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Singlaub meets with officials from Countries 3 and 5 in their 
Washington embassies explaining his desire to raise money for 
the Contras. After the meeting, he tells North the two 
countries are hesitant to contribute for fear of angering 
Congress. 

Singlaub Test., Hearings. 100-3, at 72-73. 

11/15/85 (IRAN) 

Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin meets with McFarlane 
at the White House. Rabin confirms with McFarlane that the 
Iran initiative was a joint project between the U.S. and Israel. 
Rabin also brings up the problem of receiving TOWs to 
replace those Israel sent to Iran. 

McFariane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 97-98, Ex. 64, at 736-37. 

11/15/85 (IRAN) 

Circa In the briefings leading up to the Geneva summit conference, 
Regan says President Reagan was told about a shipment that 
would originate in Country 15 and would be transshipped 
through Israel and all of our hostages would come out. 
According to Regan, at this time he and the President knew 
that HAWKs were being shipped and oil drilling equipment 
was a cover story. 

Regan Test., Hearings. 100-10. at 252-53, 264, 320. 

11/16/85 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan, Shultz, McFarlane, Regan and others leave 
for Geneva for a summit meeting with the Soviets. 

Media reports. 

11/16/85 (IRAN) 

McFarlane says he doesn't recall telling Weinberger about the 
HAWK shipments before leaving for Geneva. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings. 100-2. at 98-99. 



41 



11/17/85 (IRAN) 

North says he was "thrown into" the HAWK shipment "the 
night of November 17." North says he received a call late in 
the evening from Rabin, who was in New York. While he is 
on the line, he gets a call from McFarlane in Geneva. He tells 
North he had had a call from Rabin and there was a problem 
with a shipment. McFarlane tells North to take care of the 
problem. North talks with Rabin. This begins direct U.S. 
involvement in the transfer of HAWKs. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 29-30, 51-52, 59. 
McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 52-54. 

11/18/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Shultz says he discussed the Iran initiative with McFarlane at 
the Geneva summit over a secure telephone. Shultz testifies it 
was "a straight arms-for-hostages deal." Shultz expresses 
objection to the plan. 

Shultz Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 28-29. 

11/18/85 (IRAN) 

At the Geneva summit, Regan says McFarlane briefly tells the 
President "about the HAWKS and the hostages." McFarlane 
spoke of 80 Israeli HAWKS going to Iran and it was 
understood that there would be replenishment by the U.S., 
Regan says. 

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 13; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 
100-2, at 52-54. 

11/19/85 (IRAN) 

Secord is sent a McFarlane letter signed by North asking 
again for Secord's help on the Iran initiative. North has asked 
for the help earlier by phone. North said, according to 
Secord, that the letter was in case Secord needed proof in 
Country 15 that he was acting on behalf of the U.S. 
McFarlane says he had no recollection of the letter and he had 
never asked for Secord's help before. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 41, 79, Ex. 1, at 415. 

1 1/20/85 (CONTRA) 

North reportedly tells Gadd that he called or cabled a U.S. 
embassy in Latin America in an effort to get the local Air 
Force to agree to sell four C-123s to Gadd. Gadd testifies that 
North read to him on the phone the message he had .sent the 
embassy. Abrams .says he is unaware of any such approach by 
North. 

Gadd Dep., 5/1/87. at 16-19; Abrams Test.. Hearings, 100-5, at 
145-47. 

42 



11/20/85 (IRAN) 

After a call from North or Poindexter, Army Gen. Colin L. 
Powell, military assistant to Weinberger, calls Noel Koch, 
also a Pentagon official, to ask about the availability of 
HAWKs. Koch learns within a few days that the HAWKs 
were to be shipped to Iran. 

Koch Test.. Hearings, 100-6, at 55. Powell Dep. . 6/19/87. at 
14-18, Ex. CP-2. 

11/20/85 (IRAN) 

A PROF note from North to Poindexter describes a delivery 
of 80 HAWK missiles to be flown on 11/22/85 from Israel to 
Iran via Country 15. This is to be followed by the release of 
five American hostages, to be followed by delivery of 40 
additional HAWKs. The note says that Secord had made all 
travel arrangements. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. J MP- 17. 

11/21/85 (IRAN) 

President Reagan returns from Geneva and addresses a joint 
session of Congress. 

Congressional Record, Vol. 131, ltl61, at H. 10498. 

11/21/85 (IRAN) 

A Point Paper is prepared by Henry Gaffney, Jr., of DOD 
entitled: "HAWK Missiles for Iran." Gaffney testifies 
Weinberger was not in favor of the shipment; therefore the 
paper was supposed to be negative. 

Gaffney Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 57-63, HI, Ex. DOD-5. 

11/21/85 (IRAN) 

Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, a CIA official, gets his first call 
on the HAWKs shipment from North, in the evening at home. 
North says he needs flight clearance to get an aircraft into 
Country 15. Clarridge directs the appropriate Branch Chief to 
go to his office and send "stand-by" cables to the CIA Chief 
and his deputy in Country 15. 

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11. at 3: North Test.. Hearings. 
100-7 part I. at 60-63. 69-70. 

11/21/85 (CONTRA) 

Channel!, with large donors, attends a White House briefing 
by North and others. 

Channell Dep. 9/1/87. at 37. Ex. SC-1. 

43 



11/22/85 (IRAN) 

North next contacts Clarridge for help in finding a reliable 
commercial carrier for cargo to Iran. CIA passes on the name 
of a proprietary airline. 

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100- JI, at J 8. 

11/22/85 (IRAN) 

The CIA Chief in Country 15 cables Clarridge that, per his 
instructions, he has contacted Secord to offer assistance. 

Chron. Kx. 7. 

11/22/85 (IRAN) 

Clarridge cables the CIA Chief in Country 15 that the 
operation is "a National Security Council initiative and has the 
highest level of USG interest;" that clearance is needed over 
Country 16 for three DC-8 overflights for 11/23 and 11/24. 

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 8-9; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 60-61; Senior CIA official of Countr\' 15 Dep., 
4/13/87, at 4-6. 

11/22/85 (IRAN) 

Clarridge informs Edward Juchniewicz, CIA deputy director 
of operations, of the activities in Country 15. Clarridge asks 
what Juchniewicz thought. Juchniewicz replies that because 
the proprietary airline was a commercial entity, he had no 
objection if Secord or North contacted it. 

Juchniewicz Dep. , 4/23/87, at 6. 

11/22/85 (IRAN) 

The Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD) asks El Al Airlines 
for a cargo B-747; 80 HAWKs are loaded on board. 

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 51. 

11/22/85 (IRAN) 

North calls Schwimmer and authorizes take-off from Tel Aviv 
to Country 15; 3 1/2 hours later. North urgently calls and 
says and there is no landing permit. The aircraft is recalled to 
Israel and unloaded. This delay forces Schwimmer to abandon 
plans of using two DC-8s from a European company to fly 
the missiles from Country 15 to Tehran. Schwimmer says he 
then told North that from now on the Americans would have 
to handle the flight logistics. 

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings. 100-7 part III, Ex. 
OLN-69A; North' Notebook, 11/22/85, (incorrectly dated 11/21/85). 



44 



11/22/85 (IRAN) 

North writes a PROF note to Poindexter detailing 
arrangements of U.S. involvement in the HAWK missile 
transfer. He says McFarlane contacted Country 15's Foreign 
Minister to solve a flight clearance problem and that Clarridge 
had arranged for a "proprietary" to work for Secord, who 
"will charter two 707s in the name of Lake Resources (our 
Swiss Co.)." A late update to this note states that a Lake 
aircraft would also be used, which North said was "too bad" 
because it had been scheduled at that time "to be our first 
direct flight to the Resistance . . . inside Nicaragua." Secord 
disputes the latter statement. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 89; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 
100-2, at 53: North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part I, E.\:. OLN-45. 

11/23/85 (IRAN) 

Clarridge cables the CIA chief in Country 18 that there is an 
operation involving release of hostages that will require planes 
to land in Country 18 and will require a total of five flights 
by 707s from the proprietary airline. 

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 201-03; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 60. 

11/23/85 (IRAN) 

Secord tells the CIA Chief in Country 15 that the flights were 
carrying HAWK missiles to Iran as part of a deal for release 
of hostages. The CIA Chief sends two cables to CIA 
headquarters about his conversation with Secord. The second 
cable cannot be found. 

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 201-03; Secord Test., Hearings. 
100-1. at 88: Clarridge Test., Hearings. 100-11. at 14-15; Senior 
CIA official in Country 15 Dep. , 4/13/87. at 19-21. 25-31. 

11/23/85 (IRAN) 

From 9:00 a.m. to 3:25 p.m.. North is at CIA headquarters 
with Clarridge. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part 1, at 60; Clarridge Test., 
Hearings. 100-11. at 37 

11/23/85 (IRAN) 

Juchnicwic/ asks McMahon if he was aware of all activity 
relating to getting the hostages out. McMahon says the CIA 
could pass messages between the NSC and ambassadors but 
could not be further involved without Presidential 
authorization (a Finding). 

McMahon Dep.. 6/1/87. at 94 95. 



45 



11/24/85 (IRAN) 

Clarridge cables the CIA Chief in Country 16 that he can 
advise the U.S. Ambassador that the planes are carrying oil 
drilling equipment; he refers to it as a "cover story." 

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 1 00-11. cu 15, Ex. DRC-1-49. 

11/24/85 (IRAN) 

A proprietary Boeing 707, arranged by Secord, arrives in 
Israel. The aircraft is loaded with 18 HAWK missiles and 
takes off. The flight plan calls for the aircraft to land in 
Country 17 and then go to Tehran. The Country 15 flight plan 
is abandoned. 

Israeli Chronologx; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 29, 52; 
Secord Dep., 6/10/87, sy 83-100. 

11/25/85 (IRAN) 

McMahon, in his office with Clair George, CIA deputy 
director and chief of operations, and another CIA official, is 
told that the proprietary airline helped with the NSC mission 
at the request of Secord. McMahon "goes through the 
overhead" because of the absence of a Finding. McMahon 
calls Stanley Sporkin, CIA general counsel, and says a 
Finding is required because of intercession with Country 15's 
Government. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 63; George Test., Hearings, 
100-11, at 207-08; Sporkin Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 116; 
McMahon Dep., 6/1/87, at 95-102. 

11/25/85 (IRAN) 

The CIA legal team meets, and preparation of a Finding dated 
11/26/85 begins. Sporkin says the Finding should be 
retroactive. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 61-62; Sporkin Test., 
Hearings, 100-6, at 116-22; Deitel Dep., 6/5/87. at 14-23, 27-29, 
51-56. 

11/25/85 (IRAN) 

Poindexter briefs President Reagan and tells him that a 
shipment of arms to Iran had taken place. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. J MP -19. 



46 



11/25/85 (IRAN) 

An Iranian official complains to Ghorbanifar that the 18 
missiles sent were old missiles, a model of HAWK that Iran 
already had. According to Nimrodi, an Iranian colonel opened 
the crates and discovered that the model HAWK was not what 
was expected. 

North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part /, at 52-53. 

11/25/85 (IRAN) 

Ghorbanifar calls Ledeen. He says he has an urgent message 
from the Prime Minister of Iran to give to President Reagan, 
namely that "you are cheating us, and you must act quickly to 
remedy the situation." Ledeen conveys this to Poindexter, who 
then tells Ledeen he is being taken off the Iran project. 

Ledeen Dep., 3/1 1/87, at 87-88, 112. 

11/26/85 (IRAN) 

The draft Finding ratifying the CIA's actions retroactively is 
explicitly an arms-for-hostages Finding. The Finding is 
cleared with Casey, who calls Regan and McFarlane to verify 
that the operation had the President's approval. It is then sent 
by Casey to Poindexter for President Reagan to sign. 
Poindexter says he did not discuss the Finding with anyone 
from 11/25/85 through 12/5/85, when he says the President 
signed it. 

North Test., 100-7 part I, at 33, 61; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 
100-8. at 17-18. 123-25. Ex. JMP-18. 

11/26/85 (CONTRA) 

Owen tells North, "Nothing is moving" for the Contras. In a 
long memorandum, he writes that Calero is finding it 
increasingly difficult to go to Central America and tell people 
there that "things will get better and the planes are on the way 
etc. when nothing is moving." He also notes that "In the 
South, things look bright if we can supply the necessary items 
needed." 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-lO.at 813-15. 

11/30/85 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane submits his resignation as National Security 
Adviser. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2. at 55. 



47 



11/30/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa In late 1985, Richard Miller, a former President Reagan 
campaign aide and a partner in IBC, Inc., with Gomez, 
retains David C. Fischer, also a former Sf)ecial Assistant to 
President Reagan, for 2 years for a fee of $20,000 a month. 
Fischer and Martin Artiano, a business associate, divide this 
amount. They are purportedly paid to facilitate visits of 
private donors to the White House and meetings with 
President Reagan. Fischer and Artiano dispute this version. In 
the spring of 1986, Miller pays Artiano an additional $5,000 a 
month under a supposedly separate retainer agreement. The 
original $20,000 retainer is also included. 

Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 155-59; Gomez Dep.. 9/11/87, at 61-64; 
Artiano Dep., at 64-72, 78-90; Fischer Dep., 8/11/87, 35-58, 
97-104; Miller Dep. 8/21/87, at 358-62. 

12/01/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Ghorbanifar advances numerous arms-for-hostages proposals 
involving sophisticated missiles at a Paris meeting attended by 
Kimche, Ghorbanifar, Secord, Schwimmer, and Nimrodi. It is 
decided to meet with American representatives in London. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 90; Israeli Chronology. 

12/03/85 (IRAN) 

McFarlane returns to office for the first time since mid- 
November. He has several meetings with Poindexter, but does 
not recall the subject of the 11/26/85 Finding coming up. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 105-06. 

12/03/85 (IRAN) 

Clarridge, anticipating further shipments, cables to CIA 
officers in Countries 16 and 18: "We are still regrouping. Key 
meeting of principals will take place this weekend with 
earliest possible aircraft deployments sometime mid to late 
week of 8 December." 

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 20; Ex. DRC-1-80. 

12/04/85 (CONTRA) 

The Intelligence Authorization Act is signed into law. The act 
authorizes the CIA to provide communications equipment and 
related training to the Contras and allows the CIA to exchange 
intelligence with them. It bars the CIA from providing other 
aid to the rebels but allows the State Department to solicit 
humanitarian aid. 

PL 99-169. Intelligence Authorization Act of 1985; C/CATF Test., 
Hearings. 100-11. at 105-106. 



48 



12/05/85 (IRAN) 

Poindexter says President Reagan signed the 1 1/26 Finding 
this day without the debate and consultation that normally 
precedes a signing. Poindexter testifies he was dissatisfied 
with the quality of the Finding and wanted it rewritten. 

Poindexter Test.. Hearings. 100-8, at 17-18. 123-25. Ex. JMP-18. 

12/05/85 (IRAN) 

Poindexter briefs Shultz on the Iran initiative. Shultz tells 
Poindexter it is a bad idea. Poindexter doesn't tell Shultz that 
the President had signed a Finding on Iran. 

Shultz Test. , Hearings. 100-9, at 7, 30. 

12/05/85 (IRAN) 

North says, "I believe I saw a signed copy of that Finding. . . 
[in] Admiral Poindexter's office. . .in early December [1985]." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1. at 33. 

12/06/85 (IRAN) 

Israeli officials meet with North in New York. North has a 
position paper reviewing the progression of the Iran operation 
since 9/85; the paper is to be discussed at a 12/7 meeting at 
the White House. North reportedly states that he intends to 
divert profits from future Iranian transactions to Nicaragua. 
(The Contras were not mentioned.) 

Israeli Chronology. 

12/06/85 (IRAN) 

Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, asks Gaffney to prepare a TOW 
Point Paper. Another paper is prepared by Glenn Rudd, 
Deputy Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. 
The paper is titled "Possibility for Leaks." 

Gaffiiey Test.. Hearings. 100-6. at 67-68. 79-80. Ex. DOD-9: 
Gajfhey-Rudd Dep., 6/22/87. at 2-7. 

12/07/85 (IRAN) 

An informal White House meeting is attended by Weinberger. 
Shultz, Regan, McMahon, Poindexter, and the President. 
Poindexter says he does not recall any discussion of the 11/85 
HAWK shipment at that meeting. Shultz and Weinberger 
argue against arms sales to Iran. At the meeting it is decided 
McFarlanc should go to London to meet with Ghorbanifar. 

North Te.st., Hearings. 100-7 part I. at 33: Poindexter Test.. 
Hearings. 100-8. at 23-26: Shultz Test.. Hearings. 100 9. at 30-32: 
Weinberger Te.st.. Hearings. 100-10, at 138-141: Regan Te.st.. 
Hearings. 100-10. at 14. 106. 



49 



12/07/85 (IRAN) 

Second, Schwimmer, Nimrodi, and two senior Israeli officials 
meet in preparation for an afternoon meeting with North. 
Replenishment of the TOWs Israel shipped to Iran is 
discussed. Ghorbanifar joins the meeting later. 

Israeli Chronology; Secord Test., Hearings, 100- 1, at 91. 

12/07/85 (IRAN) 

Secord, North, Kimche, and the two senior Israeli officials 
meet in London. North discusses the Iranian initiative and the 
plans to continue it. 

Israeli Chronology; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 91. 

12/08/85 (IRAN) 

North and McFarlane meet with Ghorbanifar in London. Also 
present are Secord, Kimche, and Schwimmer. McFarlane is 
very unhappy with Ghorbanifar and his arms-for-hostages 
pitch. He, North, and Secord return together to Washington 
that evening. McFarlane says that Ghorbanifar is one of the 
most despicable characters he has ever met. Secord arrives 
home with impression that both North and McFarlane believe 
the initiative is dead. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 92, 95; McFarlane Test., 100-2, 
at 56-57, 103-04; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 281-82. 

12/09/85 (IRAN) 

A North memo to McFarlane and Poindexter reviews the 
options in the Iran initiative, including using Secord as a 
conduit for selling arms to Iran. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 45A, at 599-602. North 
Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 282. 

12/10/85 (IRAN) 

McFarlane briefs the President on the trip to London. North 
says that stopping the shipments of arms at this point might 
lead to reprisals against the hostages. President Reagan is 
disappointed that Ghorbanifar is not reliable, but he is 
unwilling to give up on the idea of a project with the Iranians 
with both the broad objectives and the possibility of getting 
the hostages back. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 282; Secord Test., 100-1, at 
96; McFarlane Test. . Hearings. 100-2, at 57-59, 150, Exs. 45A, at 
599, 49, at 630; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 26-27, 337; 
Regan Dep.. 7/15/87, at 17-18. 3/3/87, at 60-61. 



50 



12/11/85 (IRAN) 

Clarridge cables to CIA Chiefs in Country 16 and Country 
18: ". . . As late as last night the negotiating was still going 
on. We have just received word that the deal is apparently all 
off. Don't know why yet or whether there is a possibility that 
it will revive. . . . For now it looks like we are standing 
down." 

Clarridge Test.. Hearings, 1 00- 11, Ex. DRC-1-82. 

12/12/85 (CONTRA) 

North, Poindexter, (as the new National Security Adviser), 
and others take a 1-day trip to Panama, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Poindexter says that he 
and North discussed the Santa Elena airfield on this visit. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3 at 380-81; Poinde.xter Test., 
Hearings, 100-8, at 226; Walker Dep. . 5/21/87, at 46-47. 

12/13/85 (CONTRA) 

Poindexter briefs President Reagan on the airfield. Poindexter 
testifies "all we discussed was that the Costa Rican 
Government was being cooperative in terms of letting private 
individuals establish an airstrip in the remote corner of the 
country." 

Poindexter Te.st., Hearings, 100-8, at 227. 

12/15/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Ledeen meets Ghorbanifar in Geneva. Ghorbanifar complains 
that he does not like the f)erson who has replaced Ledeen in 
the operation. Ledeen suspects the replacement is Secord. 
Ghorbanifar outlines a plot against Libya's Qadhaffi and 
proposes a relationship between himself and the CIA in which 
he provides intelligence on Iran. 

Udeen Dep.. 3/11/87, at 90-93, 95-96. 

12/16/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa An SAT 707 carrying ammunition arrives in Central America. 
The ammunition is stored by Rodriguez in a warehouse on the 
airbase, together with nonlethal aid that came in on NHAO's 
L-l(X)s. 

Rodriguez Test.. Hearings, 100-3, at 291-92. 



51 



12/17/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Ledeen reports on the Ghorbanifar proposal to North, who 
agrees this is a good idea. Ledeen then reports it to Charles 
Allen, CIA National Intelligence Officer and head of the 
Hostage Rescue Locating Force, Clarridge, and Casey. Casey 
says he would see whether it could be worked out with 
Ghorbanifar. 

Ledeen Dep.. 3111 187, at 93-94. 

12/18/85 (CONTRA) 

North travels to Central America through Miami. He returns 
December 20th. 

North Appointment Cards. 

12/19/85 (CONTRA) 

The continuing appropriations bill is signed into law. It states 
that the terms and conditions of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act (P.L. 99-169) applied to assistance to the Contras and 
appropriated a classified amount for the CIA to provide 
communications equipment and training and to exchange 
intelligence with the Contras. 

P.L. 99-190 

12/21/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa Casey and Secord meet to discuss intelligence needs of the 
Contra airlift operation. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 69-71. 

12/27/85 (IRAN) 

Circa Ghorbanifar travels to Washington at the request of Ledeen 
under the alias "Nicholas Kralis." He meets with Ledeen, a 
CIA officer, and North. He agrees to be polygraphed. 

Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 97-98. 



52 



12/30/85 (CONTRA) 

Circa The CATF Chief goes to Central America with North, who is 
to coordinate the weapons transshipment from the warehouse 
to the Contras. The CATF Chief says he issued a direct 
instruction that the CIA not be involved in this operation. 
"Our role was very, very proscribed." He says at this point he 
did not know of the previous SAT 707 flight of ammunition 
into Central America or the fact that there were thousands of 
pounds of ammunition there at the time. 

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 101-02. 

12/31/85 (IRAN) 

Circa In late December, North tells Secord that the remainder of the 
$1 million that went into the Lake Resources account for the 
11/85 HAWK shipment ($800,000) would not be sought by 
Israel and could be used for any purpose. North says it was 
spent on the Contra project. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 53-56. 



January-March 1986 

01/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Poindexter says he told North to "continue on course" in his 
Contra resupply activities, which he said were ongoing when 
he took office. Poindexter says he does not recall telling the 
President "specifically" what North was doing. 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 226. 

01/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Recruiting begins for the Secord-North direct resupply 

operation. Pilot Ian Crawford says he was recruited by John 
Cupp, a Gadd employee. He .says he was told the drops would 
consist of humanitarian supplies. 

Crawford Dep., 3/ 13/87. at 13 18, 26-27. 

01/02/86 (IRAN) 

North calls Sporkin to ask him to help draft a new Finding. 
Sporkin calls Casey in Palm .Springs to get Casey's approval. 
The first draft prtwidcs for notifying Congress of covert 
actions and docs not mention hostages. 

Sporkin Test.. Hearings. 100 6, <// 128-35. North Test.. Hearings. 
100-7 part 1. at 61 62. 



53 



01/02/86 (IRAN) 

Amiram Nir, Israeli counterterrorism adviser, comes to the 
White House to meet Poindexter. He meets also with North 
and McFarlane. North says that at this meeting the idea of 
using the arms sales "residuals" for other purposes first came 
up. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 1 00- 1, at 101, 254; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 106-07; Poindexter Test., 100-8, at 27-29, Ex. 
JMP-23. 

01/05/86 (IRAN) 

Sporkin and North go to Casey's house after working on a 
draft of the new Finding. They then return to the White 
House for further editing. The new draft includes a reference 
to hostages. 

Sporkin Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 137-43. 

01/06/86 (IRAN) 

North meets with Attorney General Meese and Lowell Jensen, 
then Deputy Attorney General. North testifies that he took the 
draft Finding to the Attorney General for approval. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1 at 221-22; Meese Test., 
Hearings, 100-9, at 196, 203. 

01/06/86 (IRAN) 

The Finding is discussed by President Reagan, Vice President 
Bush, Poindexter, and Regan as a preliminary document. 
President Reagan signs the Finding in error. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 29-31; Ex. JMP-24A; Regan 
Dep. , 7/15/87, at 19-20. 

01/07/86 (IRAN) 

An Oval Office meeting is attended by President Reagan, Vice 
President Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Meese, Regan, 
and Poindexter. Meese gives an oral opinion that the Iran 
arms transaction could be done legally, with the U.S. 
replenishing Israeli missiles. Weinberger and Shultz testify 
they again objected strongly. Poindexter, Casey, and Regan 
argue for going forward. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 30-31; Shuhz Test., Hearings. 
100-9, at 7. 32-33; Meese Test.. Hearings, 100-9, at 203-05, 208, 
317; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 16-17. Weinberger Te.st., 
Hearings, 100-10. at 142-143. 



54 



01/07/86 (IRAN) 

Circa North and Koch discuss TOW prices. North tells Koch to call 
the Israeli Defense Ministry purchasing office in New York 
and arrange a meeting. 

Koch Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 70-73. North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part /. at 65. 

01/11/86 (IRAN) 

Secord attends a meeting at the White House at which 
financing of the Iranian arms sale is discussed. Secord is told 
he is to be the "commercial cutout," the private, third party 
through whom the arms deal would be handled. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100- 1, at 98-101, 132. 

01/11/86 (IRAN) 

Ghorbanifar is polygraphed by the CIA and shows deception 
on all relevant questions. George declares that Ghorbanifar 
will never be used again as a CIA source. Ghorbanifar had 
also failed a polygraph previously. He complains to Ledeen 
about the test. 

Ledeen Dep., 6/22/87. at 260-61; 3/11/87, at 99-101; George Test., 
Hearings, 100-11, at 210-11, 256-258; Ex. CG-50; C/NE Dep.. 
4/22/87, at 61-64; Cave Dep.. 4/17/87. at 16-17. 

01/12/86 (IRAN) 

Koch meets Ben Yousef of the Israeli Defense Ministry at 
National Airport in Washington, D.C., and they set a price of 
$4,500 per TOW. 

Koch Test., Hearings. 100-6, at 74-76. 

01/12/86 (IRAN) 

Casey advises the CIA Chief/Near East (C/NE), Allen, and 
George that the CIA will use Ghorbanifar in the Iran project, 
despite his flunking the polygraph. He instructs Allen to 
handle Ghorbanifar. 

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 212-13; Allen Dep.. 4/24/87. at 
311-13; C/NE Dep.. 4/22/87. at 66-69. 

01/13/86 (IRAN) 

George calls North and reports that Ghorbanifar lied on 13 of 
15 items in his polygraph examination. 

George Test.. Hearings. 100 1 1 . at 21 1 ; Ex. CG-52. 



55 



01/14/86 (IRAN) 

North meets with Casey after a Weinberger speech at Ft. 
McNair, in Washington, D.C. Casey tries to contact 
Weinberger but misses him. North tells Poindexter: "Casey 
has called urging you convene a meeting with he and Cap 
ASAP so that we can move on. Casey's view is that Cap will 
continue to create roadblocks" (on shipments to Iran). 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings. 100-8, Ex. JMP-25. 

01/15/86 (IRAN) 

Circa North and Sporkin meet with Casey at Casey's home to 

discuss the Iran Finding. Sporkin adds a paragraph regarding 
the release of hostages. 

North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 103, 100-7 part III, Exs. 
OLN-268A, OLN-268B. 

01/15/86 (CONTRA) 

In a memo to Poindexter about a meeting Poindexter is to 
have with Gen. John Galvin, then head of the Army's 
Southern Command, North writes: "You should be aware that 
Gen. Galvin is cognizant of the activities underway in (Central 
America) in support of the DRF. Gen. Galvin is enthusiastic 
about both endeavors." Galvin's testimony conflicts with this 
statement. 

Galvin Dep., 6/13/87, at 102-12, 117-27; Ex. JG-7; Taft Dep., 
6/25/87, at 62-63. 

01/16/86 (IRAN) 

At an impromptu meeting in Poindexter's office after a 
Cabinet meeting, Weinberger, Meese, Casey, and Sporkin 
discuss arms shipments to Iran. According to Poindexter, 
Shultz, who did not attend because of a scheduling conflict, 
told him, "You know my view, I don't think we ought to go 
ahead with it." Meese says the U.S. ought to sell arms 
directly to Iran, using Israelis for logistics assistance only, to 
avoid the reporting requirement of the Arms Export Control 
Act. No one recommends that Congress be informed, because 
of the fear that leaks would endanger the hostages. 
Weinberger signs off on the project the next day. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 197; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 
100-8. at 31-35, 128-29; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 33-34; 
Sporkin Test.. Hearings. 100-6, at 148-50; Weinberger Test., 
Hearings, 100-10, at 141-43. 



56 



01/17/86 (IRAN) 

An "Action Memo" from Poindexter to President Reagan 
recommends signing the attached Finding. Instead of having 
the Israelis sell arms to Iran and the U.S. replenish Israeli 
stocks, he recommends CIA action under the covert Finding: 
The objectives of the Israeli plan could be met if the CIA, 
using an authorized agent as necessary, purchased arms from 
the DOD under the Economy Act and then transferred them to 
Iran directly after receiving appropriate payment from Iran." 
President Reagan signs the Finding. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9 at 12-14: Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 
100-8, at 31, 49, 130-32, Ex. JMP-28; Shultz Test., Hearings, 
100-9, at 7-8: Regan Dep. , 7/15/87, at 20-21. 

01/18/86 (IRAN) 

Weinberger directs Gen. Powell to execute the TOW missile 
project under provisions of the Economy Act. 

Weinberger Test. , Hearings, 100-10, at 143-44. Powell Dep. , 
6/19/87, at 78-80. 

01/18/86 (IRAN) 

At a meeting with the DC/NE, George, Poindexter, North, 
and Sporkin, Poindexter says a Finding had been signed to 
gain release of hostages. North is named action officer. 

C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 73-81. George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 
213, 243. 

01/20/86 (IRAN) 

The CIA sets up a Swiss bank account to handle the Pentagon 
transfer of arms to the agency. 

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 251-52. 

01/22/86 (IRAN) 

North, Secord, Nir, and Ghorbanifar meet in London. 
Ghorbanifar takes North into the bathroom and suggests 
several incentives to make the next arms transaction work. 
North says. The attractive incentive for North is that residuals 
could flow to support the Nicaraguan Resistance, North 
testifies. 

North Te.st., Hearings, 100-7 part I. at 106-07. 296; part II at 
166-169. 



57 



01/23/86 (CONTRA) 

Gadd purchases the first plane for the direct resupply effort, a 
C-7 Caribou. A second Caribou and a C-123 are purchased in 
4/86. The fleet eventually grows to seven aircraft. 

Gadd Dep. . 5/1/87, at 26-28, 39-40. 

01/24/86 (CONTRA) 

Form thank you letters are sent from North to NEPL 
supporters of the Contras. Similar letters went out a month 
earlier. 

North Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part III, OLN-227. 

01/24/86 (IRAN) 

Poindexter meets with McMahon, shows him the Finding, and 
says he wants to give intelligence to Iran as well as TOWs. 
McMahon objects to providing intelligence. 

McMahon Dep., 6/1/87, at 138-40. 

01/25/86 (IRAN) 

A cable from McMahon to Casey, who is traveling, notes the 
new dimension in the TOW saga: "We are to get the TOWs 
from the US Army and arrange transport overseas." McMahon 
appeals to Poindexter not to use the Ghorbanifar channel or 
provide intelligence. Nevertheless, he proceeds to follow 
orders under the Finding authority. 

McMahon Dep., 6/1/87, at 148-50. 

01/26/86 (IRAN) 

Allen meets with Ghorbanifar in London for three hours and 
obtains photographs from him of alleged terrorists. 
Ghorbanifar refers to an "[increase] for Oliver North's boys" 
in Central America. 

Allen Dep. , 4/24/87, at 360; 6/29/87, at 505-08. 

01/30/86 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan, Abrams, and North brief visitors at the 
White House. Later, Channell asks for — and receives — 
$65,000 from Garwood. 

Garwood Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 137-38; Channell Dep. , 9/2/87, 
at 62-65; Abrams Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 61. 



58 



01/31/86 (CONTRA) 

Abrams meets Channel! and Richard Miller for the first time. 
They discuss Channeli's pro-Contra advertising campaign. 

Abrams Test.. Hearings. 100-5, at 60-61. 

02/01/86 (IRAN) 

Circa An interagency study concludes that "the major U.S. concern 
was collapse of Iraq on the 'Southern Front'." Poindcxter had 
advised President Reagan on 1/17 that Iran was in danger of 
collapse. Shultz and Weinberger dispute Poindcxter. 

Poindexter Test.. Hearings. 100-8, Ex. JMP-28; Weinberger Test.. 
Hearings, 100-10, at 386. 

02/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa A second Casey-Secord meeting is arranged by North. Secord 
complains about lack of help from the CIA Central American 
Task Force. Casey says he would look into the problem. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 71. 

02/01/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Circa Poindexter approves the diversion of profits from the Iran 

arms sales to the Contras. Poindexter says North came to him 
after returning from the 1/22/86 meeting in London and 
proposed using Iran arms sale profits for the Contras. Both 
testify they did not think they were breaking any law by doing 
so. Poindexter testifies he did not inform President Reagan or 
anyone else in the Administration. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8. at 35-42. 182-83. North Test., 
Hearings. 100-7 part 1, at 114. 

02/01/86 (IRAN) 

In a PROF note to McFa-lane, Poindexter reports that the 
hostages would soon be relea.sed, that Shultz and Weinberger 
"still disagree (with the Iran initiative) on policy grounds, but 
are cooperating" and that Ca.sey, Mcese, Regan, and 
Poindexter are "fully on board this risky operation, but most 
importantly. President and VP are solid in taking the position 
that we have to try." 

PROF note released by the Select Committees (m 12/1 7/87. 



59 



02/06/86 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan in a message to Congress says: "Those 
countries that support and direct the terrorists should know 
there is no refuge, there is no hiding place, there is no 
sanctuary that will keep them safe forever." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #6, at 177. 

02/07/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa A Southern Air Transport flight carrying arms from Country 
15 goes to Central America. This is the first of three or four 
such charter flights in 1986. There were two in 1985. Each 
flight carried 85,000 to 95,000 pounds of munitions. 

Gadd Dep. . 5/1/87, at 8-12. 

02/10/86 (CONTRA) 

Owen sends North a list of items needed for the Southern 
Front in Nicaragua. Owen refers to the attached munitions list 
and says it is just the first. Owen also notes that a resupply 
plane was once used to run drugs, "and part of the crew had 
criminal records. Nice group the Boys choose." 

Owen Test.. Hearings, 100-2, at 356, 380; Ex. RWO-U, at 
816-17. 

02/10/86 (IRAN) 

Today and the following day, $3.7 million is transferred to 
the CIA Swiss account from Lake Resources. CIA 
headquarters arranges through the Treasury Department to pay 
$3.7 million to DOD for 1000 TOWs. 

Interview with CIA finance officers, 3/10/87. 

02/15/86 (IRAN) 

1 ,000 TOW missiles arrive at Kelly AFB from Redstone 
Arsenal. Cost of the transfer is $3.7 million. The CIA 
surrenders control of the arms to the Enterprise, Secord's 
"commercial cutout." Ghorbanifar was to pay $10 million for 
the 1000 TOWs. 

OLN PROF note of 2/13/86, cited in Joint Report, at 217, Tower 
Report, at B-75. (For discussions of the Enterprise, see North Test., 
Hearings, 100-7 part II at 8-12, 33-40, 47-53.) 



60 



02/15/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Circa Marine Lt. Col. Robert Earl is detailed to the NSC staff from 
the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism. Coast Guard 
Lt. Cmdr. Craig Coy joins him a month later. 

Earl Dep., 5/2/87, at 7-9. Coy Dep.. 3/ J 7/87. at 6-7. 

02/19/86 (IRAN) 

SAT flies 1000 TOWs from Kelly AFB to Tel Aviv. 500 
TOWs are then flown to Tehran. No hostages are released. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 1 00-1, at 106. 

02/19/86 (IRAN) 

Ghorbanifar, North, C/NE, Secord, and Nir are in Frankfurt 
to meet with an Iranian. He does not show up. 

C/NE Dep.. 4/22/87. at 110-12. 

02/22/86 (IRAN) 

An SAT aircraft returns from Tehran to Tel Aviv carrying 17 
of the 18 HAWK missiles delivered in 11/85. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part III. Ex. OLN-271: Secord Test., 
Hearings. 100-1, at 106-07. 

02/23/86 (CONTRA) 

A $50,000 contribution goes to NEPL from Garwood. 

Garvi-ood Test. . Hearings. 100-3, at 159. 

02/24/86 (IRAN) 

Pentagon officials meet with Secretary of the Army John O. 
Marsh, Jr. They express concern over the nature of the TOW 
request, lack of documentation. Congressional notification, 
and the ultimate TOW missile destination. Marsh instructs 
Gen. Vincent Russo to keep records and raise the issue of 
notification with Weinberger. 

Russo Dep.. 6/16/87, at 48-49. Russo Ex. 2. 

02/25/86 (IRAN) 

At another meeting in Frankfurt arc Ghorbanifar and Iranian 
representatives. North, Secord, C/NE, Nir, and Hakim, who 
is pressed into .service as interpreter. The United Stales 
representatives discuss providing to Iran military intelligence 
and agree to release 500 additional TOW missiles. They 
discuss arrangements for future high-level meetings. 

North Test.. Hearings. l(X)-7 part I. at 291-92: part 11 at 4-5: 
Secord Test.. Hearings. 11K)-1. at 107: N 13/8. N 1547. see 
Appendix: C/NE Dep.. 4/22/87. at 112-18. 



61 



02/27/86 (CONTRA) 

Owen tells North the Southern troops are still waiting for a 
lethal supply drop. 

Owen Test.. Hearings. 100-2. at 356-57. Ex. RWO-I2. at 818-19. 

02/27/86 (IRAN) 

North sends a PROF note to McFarlane informing him that 
he, Casey, Poindexter, the C/NE, and George have agreed to 
press on with the Iran channel. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 45 C. D, E. F, at 609-14. 

02/27/86 (IRAN) 

The second shipment of 500 TOWs is delivered to Iran. No 
hostages are released. 

Secord Test., Hearings. 100-1, at 109. 

02/27/86 (IRAN) 

After returning from Frankfurt, the C/NE recommends to 
George that Hakim be replaced as interpreter. George 
recommends George Cave, formerly of the CIA. 

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 245. C/NE Dep.. 4/22/87, at 
112-19. 

02/28/86 (IRAN) 

Gen. Powell provides Poindexter with a memorandum on 
Congressional notification. Subsequently, Poindexter advises 
Weinberger that the CIA has the responsibility to notify 
Congress for the arms shipments; this is affirmed by the 
Attorney General. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8. Ex. JMP-78; Weinberger Test., 
Hearings, 100-10, at 147-48. 

03/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa North instructs Owen to fly to Central America on a Southern 
Air Transport plane, unload the NHAO medical supplies, and 
then load the plane with munitions. Problems arise and the 
munitions are not shipped. The weapons drop, scheduled for 
the next night, is cancelled. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2. at 357-58. 



62 



03/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Singlaub testifies that he discusses with Abrams before going 
to Central America his plan to get Eden Pastora, a Contra 
commander in the South, to rejoin the Contras. Singlaub says 
Abrams agrees with his plan. North opposes it. Abrams 
testifies he did not discuss Pastora with Singlaub at this time. 



Singlaub Test., Hearings, 
100-5, at 26-27. 



100-3. at 91. Abrams Test., Hearings, 



03/03/86 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan meets in the White House with private 
sector supporters of Contras. He says that the "four of us" 
(referring to himself and the three (Tontra leaders) here are 
"deeply grateful to you." He says he has just met with Cruz, 
Calero, and Robelo. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, it 10, at 300. 

03/06/86 (GENERAL) 

The Vice President's task force report on terrorism is made 
public. It asserts that the U.S. Government "will make no 
concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release 
prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might 
encourage additional terrorism." 

Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism; Media reports. 

03/07/86 (IRAN) 

At a Paris meeting, Ghorbanifar discusses HAWK parts. No 
hostages have been released as a result of the February TOW 
shipments. Present are Nir, Ghorbanifar, North, Cave, and 
the C/NE. Purpose of the meeting is to get the process back 
on track. 

C/NE Dep.. 4/22/87, at 124-33; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 27-33; 
Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1 , at 1 1 1. 

03/10/86 (IRAN) 

North reports in a PROF to McFarlane on the Paris meeting. 
North requests McFarlane's private counsel on orders received 
from the Marine Corps for him to be transferred out of the 
NSC. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 45G. at 615. 



63 



03/10/86 (IRAN) 

In response to a North request. McFarlane writes a PROF to 
North and arranges to meet in North's office to discuss 
North's future. McFarlane proposes that North come to work 
with him: "How's this for a self-serving scenario. . . 
McFarlane/North continue to work the Iran account as well as 
to begin to build other clandestine capabilities." 

McFarlane Test., Hearings. 100-2. Ex. 45F at 616. 

03/10/86 (CONTRA) 

Channell and large donors are briefed at the White House. 

Channell Dep. , 9/2/87. at 79-80. 

03/12/86 (CONTRA) 

Garwood makes a $41,000 contribution to NEPL. 

Garwood Test. , Hearings, 100-3. at 159. 

03/14/86 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan, at a White House briefing for private 
supporters of the Contras, directly asks for them to help him 
convince Congress to pass Contra aid legislation. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, Hll, at 354. 

03/15/86 (IRAN) 

Circa Hakim writes an agreement that, should he die, Secord would 
control the offshore bank accounts, and that, should Secord 
die. North would come into control. Hakim says North knew 
nothing of these arrangements. 

Hakim Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 221-22. 

03/15/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa The CATF Chief learns that missions are being flown to 
resupply Southern Front troops. He receives requests from 
Castillo for course information, weather reports, and 
intelligence for the southern flights. The CATF Chief 
understands the role of Castillo to be one of passing 
information to someone in the Southern Front set-up. He says 
he became aware that there was a problem with Castillo in 
that he was passing information directly to the private 
benefactors. 

C/CATF Test.. Hearings. 100-11. at 105-07; Castillo Test., 
Hearings. 100-4, at 29. 



64 



03/16/86 (CONTRA) 

North writes a memo titled "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan 
Resistance." North proposes to obtain funds for the Contras in 
the event Congress does not make the necessary 
appropriations. North writes McFarlane of the necessity to 
raise $25 million to $30 million from donors for munitions in 
1986. (This is one of the altered documents.) 

McFarlane Test., Hearings. 100-2, at 34, Ex. 36, at 510-13; Hall 
Test. , Hearings, 100-5. at 498-99. 

03/17/86 (CONTRA) 

Owen writes a memo to North saying the Contra leaders don't 
trust him or North anymore. He writes, "This war has become 
a business. If the $100 million is approved (by Congress) and 
things go on as they have these last five years, it will be like 
pouring money down a sink hole." He also writes that word is 
spreading about "Seacord's operation [sic]." He writes, "What 
you had hoped to remain quiet is now being openly discussed 
on the street." 

Owen Test. . Hearings, 100-2, at 405-06. Ex. RWO-13, at 820-24. 

(CONTRA) 

Abrams says that by this time the Contras are near 

bankruptcy. The $27 million in humanitarian aid has run out. 

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 39. 

(CONTRA) 

The House rejects, 210 to 222, H.J. Res. 540, the President's 

request for $100 million in Contra aid. 

Congressional Record. Vol. 132, tt35, at H 1493. 

03/21/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa In the spring of 1986, David Fischer is said to have arranged 
private meetings between President Reagan and several of 
Channell's large donors. 

Channel Dep. , 911187. at 174-77; Fischer Dep. . 8/11/87, at 97-120; 
Artiano Dep.. 7/31/87. at 110-116. 

03/21/86 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan remarks at a White House reception for 
private sector supporters: ". . . Wc can't let the final hop)e of 
freedom in Nicaragua be extinguished while Congress slowly 
makes up its mind to do the right thing." President Reagan 
calls Calero, Robelo, and Cruz on stage with him and says 
"We're in this together ... I give you my solemn pledge, 
we'll spare no effort. . . ." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, ft 12. at 
397-398. ^5 



03/20/86 
Circa 



03/20/86 



03/21/86 (CONTRA) 

The CATF Chief, North. Abrams, Gen. William Walker, and 
Gen. Galvin go on a 1-day trip to Central America. 

C/CATF Test.. Hearings. lOO-U. at 105-07; Galvin Dep. . 6/13/87, 
at 54-59. 84-85. 100-101. 

03/22/86 (CONTRA) 

In a radio address to the nation. President Reagan asks for 
support in providing all necessary military aid to the Contras. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, It 13, at 404. 

03/24/86 (CONTRA) 

Poindexter is briefed by Deputy Attorney General Jensen on a 
criminal investigation by the Miami U.S. Attorney into 
alleged gun-running to the Contras. Poindexter says he did not 
recall any such meeting. 

Poinde.xter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 390-91; Jensen Dep., 7/6/87, 
at 51-62. 

03/26/86 (CONTRA) 

Garwood makes a $130,000 contribution to NEPL. 

Garwood Dep. , 3/18/87, at 75. 

^imi^ti (CONTRA) 

The Senate approves $100 million for Contra aid, 53 to 47. 
The House had voted down a similar measure on 3/20. 

Congressional Record, Vol. 132, ff40, at S 3689. 

03/27/86 (CONTRA) 

Tambs cables North, Abrams, and the CIA about a Singlaub- 
Pastora agreement that would provide ammunition, encryption 
systems, etc., and Pastora would cooperate with other 
elements of the Resistance. 

Tamhs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 384-88, Ex. LAT-1; Abrams Test., 
Hearings, 100-5 , at 26-31, Ex. EA-X, EA-6. 



66 



03/28/86 (CONTRA) 

North meets with William O'Boyle, a wealthy donor, and 
describes the weapons needed for the Contras. The night 
before North had spoken to an NEPL group in the OEOB. At 
a breakfast this morning. North talks about arms on a 
weapons list he has. He says as a Government employee he 
couldn't ask for money but could provide information on what 
was needed. Prior to the breakfast, when the two were alone, 
Channell tells O'Boyle that for $300,000 he could meet with 
the President. 

O'Boyle Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 116-23, Ex. WBO-l; North Test., 
Hearings, 100-7 pan II. at 15-16; Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 142-47; 
9/2/87, at 83. 

03/28/86 (CONTRA) 

Owen writes North again of Southern Front military needs. 

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-14, at 825-26. 

03/29/86 (CONTRA) 

Abrams sends a strongly worded cable to Tambs, criticizing 
him for associating the American Embassy in Costa Rica with 
the agreement between Singlaub and Pastora. 

Tambs Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 387, Ex. LAT-2, at 825; Abrams 
Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 26-31. 

03/31/86 (CONTRA) 

Ambassador Tambs denies associating the U.S. with the 
Singlaub-Pastora agreement. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 388, Ex. LAT-3. 

03/31/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa North thanks O'Boyle after O'Boyle hand-delivers a $130,000 
check to Channell at the Hay- Adams for a plane for the 
Contras. North then discusses weapons again with O'Boyle. 

O'Boyle Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 121. 



67 



April-May, 1986 

04/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa North gives detailed instructions on a supply drop. In an 

undated KL-43 encoded message to Secord, North describes 
the "desperate need" of a unit in the southern quadrant. He 
suggests a detailed plan under which an NHAO-chartered 
L-lOO would be used to carry arms after it completed its 
humanitarian mission. Secord testifies that it was "not 
customary" for North to give instructions like this. This, 
however, "was a very unusual mission" that involved using an 
NHAO-chartered airplane after it had completed its 
humanitarian mission to Central America. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 67-68, Ex. 3; Gadd Dep. 5/1/87, 
at 38. 

04/03/86 (IRAN) 

Ghorbanifar meets in Washington with Cave, the C/NE, 
North, and Nir in the OEOB. There is a detailed discussion of 
mechanics of a planned trip to Iran, arms deliveries, and the 
release of hostages. 

C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 134-39. Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 39-42, 
50-55. 

04/04/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

North drafts a memo for Poindexter, intended for President 
Reagan, outlining plans to divert $12 million in profits from 
the Iran arms sale on behalf of the Contras. (North testifies he 
prepared five different Iran-Contra diversion memos in 1986 
with each asking for Presidential approval. The first was in 
January/February 1986. Poindexter would have received 
North's memos as they were "passed up the line." Poindexter 
testifies he recalls seeing none.) 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 11-13, 100-7 part III. Ex. 
OLN-1: Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 476-77; Poindexter Test., 
Hearings, 100-8, at 43, 51-54, 161-63, 194-99, Exs. JMP-25, 
JMP-28, JMP-34, JMP-39. 



68 



04/07/86 (CONTRA) 

An Owen memo to North describes the investigation of a 
Florida U.S. Attorney in Central America of Neutrality Act 
violations and unauthorized use of Government funds. Owen 
reports that Castillo has seen a diagram listing North, Owen, 
and John Hull, an American living in northern Costa Rica, 
with a line connecting the Resistance groups, at the time 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman was in Costa Rica on 
the investigation. Feldman says he had such a chart. Tambs 
says he also saw this diagram. Castillo testifies he did not 
know where Owen got the information; he had never seen 
such a diagram, he says. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 413-16; Castillo Test., Hearings, 
100-4, at 55-56, 69-71, Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-15, 
at 827-28: Feldman Dep.. 4/30/87. at 49-56; Currier Dep., 5/5/87, 
at 27-35. 

04/07/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

A North PROF to McFarlane mentions "a paper for our boss 
[Reagan] that lays out arrangements" for the trip to Iran that 
North says he has prepared at Poindexter's request. The paper 
he refers to is the diversion memo attached to the Terms of 
Reference (guidance for McFarlane's trip to Tehran, dated 
4/4/86). 

Tower, at B-85; North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part III, Lxs. OLN-2, 
OLN-283. 

04/09/86 (CONTRA) 

The State Department instructs Tambs to inform Pastora that 
Singlaub was not authorized by the U.S. Government to 
negotiate an agreement to supply aid to Pastora's forces. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, 388-89, Ex. LAT-4. 

04/10/86 (CONTRA) 

Plans are made for an airdrop of arms to the Contras in 
Nicaragua with Rodriguez, Ramon Medina, a Cuban-American 
involved in the resupply operation, and Col. Steele. The flight 
is made, but the cargo was not discharged because the drop 
site could not be found. 

Castillo Test.. Hearings. 100-4. at 21-23. Crawford Dep., 3/13/87, 
at 57-62. 



69 



04/10/86 (CONTRA) 

North, Channel!, and Garwood meet at the Hay- Adams after 
she meets with President Reagan. North and Channell, "in low 
tones," discuss a weapons list, which Channell gives to 
Garwood. Channell asks for contribution after North leaves. 
She provides $1,663,500 in stock and cash. By June, 
Garwood will have donated more than $2.5 million to 
Channell. North testifies he does not recall this "specific 
event" but "I showed a lot of munitions lists." 

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 113-16, Exs. ECG-1, ECG-2, 
ECG-3: Channell Dep. , 9/1/87, at 139-42; North Test. , Hearings, 
100-7 part I. at 90. 

04/10/86 (CONTRA) 

In a KL-43 to North from Secord and Quintero, Secord states 
that Col. Steele briefed the U.S. Ambassador on all ongoing 
operations. He writes that Steele is intimately involved in the 
operation, presumably on orders of North. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, Ex. 3, at 418. Steele Dep., 4/21/87, 
at 42, 69-70. 

04/11/86 (CONTRA) 

A successful drop of arms to the Contras on the Southern 
Front is made from an SAT L-100. The drop consists of 17 
containers of mortars, grenades, and other armaments. This is 
the drop that failed a night before. 

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 21-23; Ian Crawford Dep., 
3/13/87, at 62-63; Gadd Dep. , 5/1/87, at 34-35. 

04/12/86 (CONTRA) 

In a KL-43 to North, Castillo reports that the 4/1 1/86 drop 
was a success. He adds: "My objective is creation of 2,500 
man force which can strike northwest and link-up with quiche 
form solid southern force." 

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 62-63. Ex. TC-6. 

04/16/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa "Hundreds of people" attend a briefing on Nicaragua in the 
OEOB. 

Channell Dep. , 9/2/87, at 88-89. 



70 



04/20/86 (CONTRA) 

North, Second, Enrique Bermudez, military commander of the 
FDN, and a local commander meet at the airbase. Bermudez 
complains about the planes being used. North says the 
equipment was donated and there was nothing he could do; 
that if he had the money he'd buy better aircraft. 

Rodriguez Test. , Hearings. 100-3. at 297-98. 332-33; North Test. . 
Hearings. 100-7 part II. at 98. 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-4; Secord 
Test., Hearings. 100-1. at 211. 

04/20/86 (CONTRA) 

North, returning to the U.S., is briefed on the 4/11/86 drop 
by Crawford at Gadd's behest. 

Crawford Dep., 3/13/87, at 76-83; Gadd Dep., 5/1/87, at 44-45. 

04/21/86 (CONTRA) 

Secord tells North: "Current obligations nearly wipe us out." 
In a KL-43, Secord describes "big ticket" obligations, 
including $110,0(X) to David Walker, a British specialist in 
covert operations. Secord testifies that he contracted with 
Walker's firm "to provide some foreign, in this case, U.K., 
personnel. . . to act as air crews:" two pilots and one load 
master. 

North Test., Hearings. 100-7 part I, at 308; Secord Test., Hearings. 
100-1, at 68-69, Ex. 3, at 424. 

04/21/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to McFarlane, North writes, "There is great 
despair that we may fail in this effort and the resistance 
support acct. is darned near broke." North adds that the 
operation, which has seven aircraft, has delivered over $37 
million in supplies and ordnance. He says he told Secord to 
prepare to sell the Enterprise's ship Erria and then the planes 
to sustain the effort. He raises the possibility of going to 
Perot for money. He continues: "Any thoughts where we can 
put our hands on a quick $3 to $5 million? Gaston is going 
back to his friends (Country 3) who will have given $2 
million so far. . ." Sigur testifies that he had no such 
conversation with North, and that he did not return to the 
Country 3 official after the $2 million was given. 

Sigur Test., Hearings. 100-2. at 293; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 
100-2, at 122-24, Ex. 46, at 620; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 
I, at 308. 100-7 part II. at 98. 



71 



04/21/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to Poindexter Deputy Donald R. Fortier, North 
describes in detail the Contras' "dismal" financial situation. At 
this time, apparently, there is almost $5 million in the 
Secord/Hakim accounts. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 56-57, 98, part III, Exs. 
OLN-17, OLN-277. 

04/22/86 (IRAN) 

McFarlane and Poindexter exchange PROF messages. 
Poindexter instructs McFarlane that unless the hostages are 
released upon McFarlane's arrival in Iran, there would be no 
arms shipments. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 62, Exs. 45 A, 45 B, at 621, 
622. 

04/24/86 (CONTRA) 

Abrams says he first met Singlaub on this day. He adds that 
he first learned of the Singlaub-Pastora agreement when 
Tambs sent a back-channel cable giving the text of the 
agreement in March. Singlaub says that he discussed the 
agreement with Abrams before going to Costa Rica. 



Abrams Test. , Hearings, 
Hearings, 100-3. at 91. 



100-5, at 27, 55-59; Singlaub Test., 



04/28/86 (CONTRA) 

By KL-43, Secord tells North of plans to lease the ship Erria 
to the CIA at a profit. North testifies that the original 
purchase of the ship was approved by his superiors to whom 
he sent memoranda asking for permission. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100- 1, at 73, 187; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part II, at 74; George Test., Hearings. 100-11, at 218. 

04/29/86 (CONTRA) 

North meets Glenn Robinette, a retired CIA security 
specialist. They discuss a security system for North's home, 
which eventually Robinette installs and Secord pays for. North 
testifies he and his family had been harassed and threatened, 
but the Government would not provide security. 

Robinette Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 5-6. North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 126-29. 



72 



04/29/86 (CONTRA) 

North and O'Boyle meet in the OEOB for 30 to 45 minutes. 
Channell is present for the initial part. North imparts to 
O'Boyle "secret" Nicaragua plans. O'Boyle makes no 
contribution at this time. North testifies that he told O'Boyle 
the briefing was "sensitive" but not classified. 

O'Boyle Test. . Hearings. 100-3, at 123-24. 135-36. 155-57. 
162-63: Channell Dep., 9/1/87. at 142-46; North Test.. Hearings. 
100-7 part 11. at 15-16. 

04/30/86 (CONTRA) 

Singlaub meets with North to go over weapons he will 
purchase and to obtain assurance his activities are legal. North 
reports to him that they are legal if no U.S. arms or U.S. 
carriers are involved. 

Singlaub Test. . Hearings, 100-3. at 78. 

04/30/86 (IRAN) 

Ghorbanifar proposes that North go to Iran for a pre-summit 
preparation meeting. Poindexter denies North's request for 
such a meeting. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part I, at 135-36; Poindexter Test., 
Hearings, 100-8, at 178. 

05/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa A North letter, undated, to "My Friend" (probably Calero) 
tells him $20 million is to be deposited in the usual account. 
He says also that Congress must continue to believe there is a 
need for dollars for the Contras. 

Owen Test.. Hearings. 100-2, Ex. RWO-3, at 780-82. 

05/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Rodriguez meets with Vice President Bush, Gregg, Samuel J. 
Watson, another aide to the Vice President, and former 
Senator Nicholas Brady, who was a member of the Kissinger 
Commission on Central America. Gregg, Watson, Senator 
Brady, and Rodriguez all testify that the Contras were not 
discussed, even though a scheduling note for the Vice 
President says that "resupply of the Contras" was one purpose 
of the meeting. Gregg and Watson say they did not put that 
note on the schedule or order that it be put on. Phyllis Byrne, 
Gregg's secretary, says she believes she got the phrase from 
Watson. Earlier, Rodriguez had told North that he wanted out 
of the resupply operation. 

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3. at 299-302; Gregg Dep.. 
5/18/87. at 54-59; Wat.son Dep.. 6/16/87. at 22-35; Byrne Dep.. 
6/16/87. at 5-25; Brady Dep.. 10/1/87. at 3-9. 



73 



05/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Singlaub travels to Countries 3 and 5, following up on his 
previous trip. He tells Abrams he intends to solicit funds. 
Abrams tells Singlaub he would provide the official U.S. 
signal of approval that Singlaub wanted, Singlaub testifies. 
Abrams later calls Singlaub while he was in Country 3 and 
tells him the "signal" is cancelled, Singlaub testifies. Singlaub 
says he did not solicit Country 5 for money. Abrams testifies 
he does not recall meeting with Singlaub on this matter. 

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 89-90. Abrams Test., Hearings, 
100-5, at 55-56. 

05/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Before McFarlane's Tehran trip, Casey calls North while 

Secord was with North. They go to Casey's OEOB office and 
discuss the Contra fund shortage, which North says is critical. 
Casey is pessimistic about Congress, mentions a country he 
thought would donate the $10 million Secord says is needed. 
After Secord demurs, Casey says he would speak to Shultz 
about making the approach. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 71-73; North Test., Hearings, 
100- 7 part I, at 309. 

05/02/86 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan speaks of taking action "unilaterally" on the 
Contras. In a PROF to Thompson, Poindexter writes: 
"Yesterday in a meeting that I had with the President, he 
started the conversation with 'I am really serious. If we can't 
move the Contra package before June 9, I want to figure out 
a way to take action unilaterally to provide assistance.' . . . 
[T]he fact remains that the President is ready to confront the 
Congress on the Constitutional question of who controls 
foreign policy." 

Poinde.xter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 51, Ex. JMP-45. 

05/02/86 (CONTRA) 

Ret. Air Force Col. Robert C. Dutton, a Secord business 
associate, takes over as manager of the Contra resupply 
program. Secord says he brought Dutton in "to try to get this 
train back on the track, if you will, to try to get some 
operational capability generated in this airlift company. And 
ultimately he did. He did a very good job." Dutton testifies 
that Secord and North were equal commanders of the 
operation. He also says that under him the operation averaged 
about 19 pilots and flight crew members. 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 204, 207; Secord Test., Hearings, 
100- 1, at 64. 



74 



05/02/86 (CONTRA) 

North outlines for Poindexter his "Alamo" plan for direct U.S. 
involvement in a Central American war against Nicaragua. In 
September, he presents his plan to the RIG. It is dismissed. In 
a PROF to Poindexter, he writes that the CONTRAS will 
likely, within 6 to 8 weeks, try to capture a coastal population 
center, "run up the blue and white Nicaraguan flag, salute it 
— and scream like hell for help." If that occurred, "the rest of 
the world will wait to see what we do — recognize the new 
territory — and UNO as the govt — or evacuate them as in a 
Bay of Pigs ... I believe that the American body politic would 
respond very favorably to the image of the DRF engaged in a 
final desperate struggle." 

Abrams Test. . Hearings, 100-5, at 34, 126. 

05/03/86 (IRAN) 

While at the Tokyo Summit. Shultz receives a cable from 
Armacost, who tells him that Ambassador Charles Price in 
Great Britain reported that one of his officers was told by a 
British businessman that the White House had supposedly 
approved an arms sale to Iran. Poindexter is said to be the 
point man and Ghorbanifar and Adnan Khashoggi, an 
international financier and arms dealer from Saudi Arabia, are 
involved. Shultz speaks with Regan and Poindexter and 
objects strongly to the plan. Poindexter tells Shultz, and later 
Price, there is a "shred of truth" to the information. Shultz 
says he believed Poindexter, concluding the operation was not 
endorsed by the U.S. Government. 

Shultz Test. . Hearings, 100-9. at 9-10, Ex. . GPS-20; Poindexter 
Test., Hearings. 100-8, at 70-71, Ex. JMP-42. 

05/03/86 (IRAN) 

Poindexter reports to North in a PROF a call he had from 
Ambassador Price "with a wild story." Price had told 
Poindexter of a meeting of Tiny Rowlands, a British 
entrepreneur. He said Nir, Khashoggi, and Ghorbanifar had 
approached Rowlands with a business deal to sell materials to 
Iran that involved the White House. Poindexter asks North, 
"What in the hell is Nir doing? We really can't trust those 
sob's." 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8. Ex. JMP-42. 



75 



05/05/86 (IRAN) 

North in a PROF to Poindexter reports he is leaving with 
Cave for London on 05/06/86 to meet with Ghorbanifar. 
North sets forth proposed hostage-arms arrangement and says, 
"In return, we get to raise the issues of Nicaragua, no more 
terrorism . . ." 

Chron. Ex. 8. 

05/05/86 (IRAN) 

Terrorism statement after the Tokyo Economic Summit: "We, 
the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies 
and the representatives of the European Community, 
assembled here in Tokyo, strongly reaffirm our condemnation 
of international terrorism in all its forms, of its accomplices 
and of those, including governments, who sponsor or support 
it. We abhor the increase in the level of such terrorism since 
our last meeting, and in particular its blatant and cynical use 
as an instrument of government policy. Terrorism has no 
justification. It spreads only by the use of contemptible means, 
and it must be fought relentlessly and without compromise." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, §19, at 584. 

05/05/86 (IRAN) 

A PROF note from Poindexter to North instructs North to 
bypass the London Embassy during his trip to London. 



Shultz Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 10. North Test. , 
part 111, Ex. OLN-287. 



Hearings, 100-7 



05/06/86 (IRAN) 

North in a PROF complains to Poindexter that the Marine 
Corps is trying to get him detached from the NSC. North 
adds, "I do not believe this is what you or the President 
wants." Rodney McDaniel, NSC Executive Secretary, later 
sends a PROF back to Poindexter saying that he told the 
Marine Corps, "we would not support such a move." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-288. 



76 



05/06/86 (IRAN) 

Ghorbanifar meets in London with North, Nir, and Cave on 
arrangements for the McFarlane trip to Iran. 

Cave Dep.. 4/17/87, at 45-49, 60-67. 

05/08/86 (CONTRA) 

Oscar Arias Sanchez is inaugurated as President of Costa 
Rica. 

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 377. 

05/10/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

North asks Robinette, "Please try to keep [the cost of the 
security system] along those lines [from $8,000 to $8,500). 
Remember, I am a poor lieutenant colonel." 

Robinette Test. , Hearings, 100-6, at 7-8; North Test. , Hearings, 
100-7 part I, at 130. 

05/14/86 (CONTRA) 

Dutton outlines a reorganization plan whereby Dutton and 
Secord would act as communication and operation officers. 
North would give general directions, and pilot William 
Cooper would actually manage the resupply operation. 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3. at 222-25, Ex. RCD-14. 

05/14/86 (CONTRA) 

AUSA Feldman drafts a memo to Miami U.S. Attorney Leon 
Kellner analyzing evidence in the Contra gun-running case 
allegedly involving Hull. The final draft was finished on 5/22. 
A grand jury investigation is put off because Feldman's 
superiors said they believed the evidence was insufficient to 
prosecute. 

Feldman Dep., 4/30/87, at 76-83, 104-14; Kellner Dep., 4/30/87. at 
18, 33-44, 46-51, 56-58. 

05/14/86 (IRAN) 

A PROF from Vincent Cannistraro, an NSC staff member, 
says that North offered to lea.se the Erria to the CIA for a 
covert operation. The CIA declined because of the Erria's 
association with Clines. 

Joint Report, at 368; Secord Test., Hearings. 100- 1, at 181-83: 
Appendix A, Vol. 2. at 964: George Test., Hearings, 100-11 . at 218. 



11 



05/15/86 (CONTRA) 

The Costa Rican Government instructs Tambs to shut down 
the Santa Elena airstrip. 

Tambs Test. . Hearings, 100-3, at 383. 

05/15/86 (CONTRA) 

In a memo for the President signed by Poindexter and written by 
North as preparation for a 5/16/86 National Security Planning Group 
(NSPG) meeting, the "urgency" of the need to find money for the 
Contras is described. Three options are suggested: (1) "A 
reprogramming of $15 million from DOD to CIA for humanitarian 
aid;" (2) "A Presidential appeal for private donations;" and (3) "A 
direct and very private Presidential overture to certain Heads of 
State " 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, Ex. J MP -50; North Test, 
Hearings, 100-7 part I at 312-315. 

05/15/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to North headlined "Be Cautious," Poindexter 
refers to North's offering the ship Erria to the CIA and says, 
"I am afraid you are letting your operational role become too 
public." He instructs that North talk to no one but him, 
"including Casey," about "any of your operational roles. In 
fact, you need to quietly generate a cover story that I have 
insisted you stop." 

Poinde.xter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 59-61, Ex. JMP-46; North 
Test.. Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 317-18. 

05/15/86 (CONTRA) 

The CATF Chief meets with all his country chiefs. Activities 
of private benefactors are raised as a potential problem for a 
specific location. 

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 110-11; Castillo Test., 
Hearings, 100-4, at 26. 

05/16/86 (IRAN) 

The CIA Swiss account receives a deposit of $6.5 million 
from a Hakim account. The CIA notifies DOD that money is 
available for the acquisition of HAWK spare parts and 508 
TOWs. 

CIA Finance Officers Interview, 4/22/87, at 150. 



78 



05/16/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF, North says that as the Contra resupply oj^eration 
gets more money — it has $6 million available and "we will 
have a considerable amount in a few more days" — the risk of 
disclosure increases. Political embarrassment can be avoided 
by "covering it with an authorized CIA program undertaken 
with the $15M" reprogramming. In the PROF, North notes 
that the $6 million available "reduces the need to go to third 
countries for help." North says he did not discuss with 
Poindexter the possibility of bringing this to the attention of 
the President or the Secretary of State at the NSPG meeting. 
Poindexter says that he did not tell the President so as to 
preserve President Reagan's deniability. In the same PROF, 
North writes: "Unless we do this (turn the operation over to 
the CIA), we will run increasing risks of trying to manage 
this problem from here with the attendant financial and 
political liabilities. . .. While I care not a wit about what they 
say about me, it could well become a political embarrassment 
for the President and you." North also writes that although he 
does not know what Don Regan knows of the private 
operation, "the President obviously knows why he has been 
meeting with several select people to thank them for their 
support of Democracy in Cent Am." A PROF by Poindexter 
on 5/19/86 tells North. "Don Regan knows very little of your 
operation and that is just as well." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 312-315; 100-7 part III. Ex. 
OLN-192: Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8. at 65-67, Ex. JMP-51. 

05/16/86 (CONTRA) 

The NSPG meeting approves third-country solicitation. At the 
meeting are President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Shultz, 
Weinberger. Casey, Abrams, Poindexter, North, and others. 
The dire financial condition of the Contras is discussed. 
Participants are not told by Poindexter or North that the 
Contra operation has $6 million available. 

Ahrams Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 39-42; North Test. , Hearings, 
100-7 part 1. at 309-11; Poittdexter Test., Hearings. lOO-S. at 65-67, 
Ex. JMP-51; Shuhz Test.. Hearings, 100-9, at 17-18. 



79 



05/17/86 (CONTRA) 

Shultz tells Abrams to compile a list of countries that could be 
approached for Contra donations. Shultz rules out Countries 
3, 5, and 1 (which without his knowledge had already been 
solicited by this time). He also rules out any countries that 
receive aid from the U.S. Brunei is on the list. 

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 41-43. 

05/17/86 (IRAN) 

North in a PROF to Poindexter outlines plans for the 
upcoming Iran trip. Prior to leaving, North urges "That we 
have a quiet meeting with McFarlane and Ronald Reagan." He 
adds, "We should probably not have any paper on this 
meeting" and encourages Poindexter to invite to the session 
"Shultz, Weinberger and Casey." (On 05-19-86 Poindexter 
responds to North: "I don't want a meeting with Ronald 
Reagan . . . etc.") 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 10-11; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 
100-8, Ex. JMP-48. 

05/19/86 (CONTRA) 

A $350,000 contribution to NEPL is made by Garwood. 

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 116, Ex. ECG-3. 

05/20/86 (CONTRA) 

Rodriguez meets with Vice President Bush again, this time in 
Miami, when the Vice President is there to celebrate Cuban 
independence. No discussions relating to his activities in 
Central America occurred, Rodriguez testifies. 

Rodriguez Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 302. 

05/20/86 (IRAN) 

$200,000 is deposited into a "Button" account by Hakim. The 
account. Hakim says, is set up for North's benefit but without 
his knowledge. It is a family insurance policy. Hakim says. 

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 217; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 
part I, at 138-140; Hakim Dep.. 5/22/87, at 124, 129-130; 5/24/87. 
at 182-183; Secord Dep., 6/10/87. at 24-25. 27, 32-34. 

05/21/86 (CONTRA) 

An SAT flight from Country 15 lands in Central America. 
This is the last of the SAT flights from this country to Central 
America. With these new munitions, the warehouse becomes 
overloaded. 

Dutton Test., Hearings. 100-3, at 214. 



80 



05/21/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Betsy North goes to Philadelphia. Hakim says he had Willard 
Zucker, an American lawyer in Geneva, call Mrs. North 'to 
tell her that ... a certain person . . . admires her husband and 
wishes to help out with . . . education expenses of the 
children." Zucker meets with Mrs. North in Philadelphia, then 
investigates ways to get money to the North family. Hakim 
testifies that "no proper solution was found." Hakim, 
reconsidering whether North knew of the Betsy North-Zucker 
meeting in Philadelphia, says: "(E]ventually I would have 
found it impossible for him not to know." North testifies he 
knew nothing of this Hakim plan. 

Hakim Test., Hearings. 100-5. at 271-72. North Test., Hearings. 
100-7 part 1, at 136, 139-140. 

05/22/86 (IRAN) 

An SAT 707 delivers HAWK spare parts to Israel. 

Israeli Chronology. 

05/23/86 (IRAN) 

McFarlane flies to Tehran via Tel Aviv to meet with Iranian 
officials. He is joined by Cave, North, Teicher. Nir, and two 
CIA communicators in Tel Aviv. Also present is Secord. who 
remains in Tel Aviv with a CIA communicator. On the plane 
to Tehran are HAWK spare parts for the Iranians. The 
American understanding that all the hostages would be 
released upon arrival in Tehran is not honored. Over 3 days 
in Tehran, McFarlane meets with Iranians. The Iranians 
demand delivery of HAWK parts before any hostages are 
freed. On the last day, convinced that the Iranians lacked the 
influence to free the hostages, the U.S party leaves. 
McFarlane says that, on this trip, he learns for the first time 
from North that funds from the Iranian transactions are being 
diverted to the Contras. 

North Te.st.. Hearings. 100-7 part 1. at 290-294: Secord. 100-1. at 
114-15: McFarlane Te.st.. Hearings. 100-2. at 62-65. 112-13. 
140-42. 184-85. 219: 100-7. part 11. at 239-240; Cave Dep. . 
4/17/87. at 76-91. 9/29/87. at 14-22, 26-27; C/NED Dep.. 4/22/87. 
at 139-44. 



81 



05/23/86 (IRAN) 

Circa The hostage-ransom plan is revived with a new DEA source, 
at about the same time of the McFarlane mission to Iran. At 
the request of North, Perot sends a courier to Cyprus with $2 
million. Clines is standing by offshore on the Erria. The plan 
collapses and the operation fails. The money is not spent. 

Agent 2 Dep. . 8/J2/87, at 188, 204; Agent I Dep. , 8/28/87, at 
136-38. 147; McFarlane Test. . Hearings, 100-2. at 65. 

05/24/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Dutton meets with Steele, Rodriguez, William Cooper and 
Medina. Dutton advises that a lawsuit had been initiated 
against 30 to 32 persons to publicize the resupply effort and 
stop it. Secord and North feel that the suit was probably 
supported by the KGB and Cubans and that publicity would 
cause defeat of the $1(X) million Contra support package being 
considered by Congress. Dutton is instructed to advise people 
in Central America that Secord and North were no longer 
involved. Secord and North feel that Rodriguez was the 
source of the information upon which the suit was based and 
that if he were told Secord and North were no longer involved 
less pressure would be exerted. Dutton states that they, 
however, continued to be involved even though they were 
traveling a great deal. Steele does not recall discussion of the 
lawsuit. 

Dutton Test.. Hearings, 100-3, at 248. Steele Dep., 4/21/87. at 
38-39. 

05/24/86 (IRAN) 

The 508 replenishment TOWs reach Israel. 

Israeli Financial Chronology. 

05/29/86 (IRAN) 

McFarlane, North, and Teicher report to President Reagan on 
the trip to Iran. Also present are Poindexter, Regan, and Vice 
President Bush. McFarlane says President Reagan did not 
comment or react. 

Tower Board Interview, 12/1/86. at 44-45. 

05/31/86 (IRAN) 

Circa Casey calls Shultz, telling him the Iran initiative had fizzled. 
Shultz thought this meant an end to the initiative. 

Shultz Test. . Hearings. 100-9, at 35. 



82 



June-August, 1986 

06/08/86 (CONTRA) 

Dutton complains, via KL-43, that Rodriguez — whom Steele 
had made his deputy for all matters relating to the resupply 
operation - didn't understand the organization, that he wanted 
partial control of the $50,000 fuel fund, and that he wanted an 
emergency fund of $10,000. 

Dutton Test.. Heariniis. 100-3. at 220-21, Ex. RCD-I; Rodriguez 
Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 331. 

06/09/86 (CONTRA) 

A C-123 carrying 10,000 pounds of lethal and nonlethal 
supplies gets stuck in the mud in Costa Rica when it lands at 
Point West (Santa Elena). 

Dutton Test., Hearings, J 00-3, at 217, 256. Tambs Test., Hearings, 
100-3. at 381-82. 

06/09/86 (CONTRA) 

Abrams calls North on the Brunei solicitation and asks how to 
get money to Contras. Shortly after the call, Abrams is in 
North's office, and North directs Fawn Hall to type an 
account number from a piece of paper he handed her. North 
testifies that he told Abrams the account he gave him was 
under U.S. control. Abrams says North did not tell him it was 
a Lake Resources account. No money was ever received 
because North gave Abrams the wrong Swiss bank account 
number. 

Abrams Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 43-52; North Test. , Hearings, 
100-7 part I. at 329-30; Hall Test.. Hearings. 100-5. at 487. 

06/10/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to Poindexter, North writes that the Contras do 
not now need money, but rather, "What we most need is to 
get the CIA re-engaged in this effort so that it can be better 
managed than it now is by one slightly confused Marine 
Lt.Col." North writes that several million rounds of ammo are 
now on hand, and $3 million in weapons is on the way by 
ship. "Critically needed items are being flown in from Europe 
to the expanded warehouse facility." The only liability, he 
says, is that "we still have . . . one of Democracy Inc.'s 
airplanes . . . mired in the mud." 

McFarlane Test.. Hearings. 100-2. Ex. 46C. at 623. 



83 



06/10/86 (CONTRA) 

In the same PROF, North writes: "We should look to going 
back ... on the Blowpipes (missiles] if we are going to do 
anything at all about outside support in the next few days." 
North continues: "Meanwhile, I would recommend that you 
and RCM have a talk about how much Sec. Shultz does or 
does not know about (Countries 2 and 3) so that we don't 
make any mistakes ... At this point I'm not sure who on our 
side knows what. Help." 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 46C, at 623; Poindexter Test., 
Hearings, 100-8 at 78-80; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 18-19. 

06/11/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to Poindexter, McFarlane writes that "the 
Democratic left" is going after North and that they will 
eventually get him because "too many people are talking to 
reporters from the donor community and within the 
administration." McFarlane suggests getting North transferred 
to Bethesda for disability review. He notes that this would be 
"a major loss to the staff and the Contra effort." 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 46D, at 624. 

06/11/86 (IRAN) 

President Reagan writes Perot, thanking him for his efforts on 
behalf of the hostages. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-4. 

06/12/86 (IRAN) 

Payment from the CIA to DOD for TOWs amounting to $5.6 
million is made in checks of no greater amount than 
$999,999.99. Checks of $1 million and above require 
Congressional notification. 

Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 215-217; Ex. CWW-21. 

06/12/86 (CONTRA) 

By KL-43, Secord tells North the plane is out of the mud and 
the field will have limited use during heavy rain. He adds 
that, "it can still be used as a divert base since highest 3,000 
ft. is useable even during worst conditions." 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1. at 74, Ex. 3, at 427; Castillo Test., 
Hearings, 100-4, at 32. 



84 



06/15/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa After British crews do not work out. North authorizes the use 
of U.S. crews to fly missions inside Nicaragua, according to 
Dutton. According to Secord, he and not North authorized the 
use of U.S. crews. 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 214; Secord Test., Hearings, 
100-1, at 68-69. 

06/16/86 (CONTRA) 

In a KL-43 to Castillo, North explains a drop was aborted 
because the Contras were never sighted. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 111, E.x. OLN-89. 

06/16/86 (CONTRA) 

Shultz first learns of Country 2's contribution to the Contras 
in a phone conversation with McFarlane. He did not learn 
about Country 3's $2 million contribution and of the other 
solicitations until the Iran-Contra hearings, he testifies. 

Shultz Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 4. Abrams Test. , Hearings, 100-5, 
at 42. 

06/n/S6 (GENERAL) 

Casey signs an agreement with the Senate Intelligence 
Committee providing for new procedures for notifying 
Congress of future covert actions. 

Senate Intelligence Committee. 

06/17/86 (CONTRA) 

In a KL-43 to Rodriguez for retransmittal to Quintero, Dutton 
relays a direct order from North: "Goode [a code name for 
North] advises (Castillo) unable to determine exact location of 
the troops. Therefore, tomorrow fiy in support of Northern 
forces. We will fly the southern mission when we get the no. 
1 C-7 operating or use no. 2 later in the week." 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 216-17, Ex. RCD-2. 

06/18/86 (CONTRA) 

President Reagan meets Robelo, Cruz, and Calero. President 
Reagan pledges that the U.S. will not allow a Sandinista 
victory, that U.S. is more than just a "fair-weather friend." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #5, at 824. 



85 



06/21/86 (IRAN) 

Circa Hakim starts efforts to open up a second channel to Iran. A 
North-Secord-Hakim agreement is worked out under which 
North would handle political concerns, Secord the operational, 
Hakim the financial. Hakim -via Willard Zucker — used 
offshore companies, mostly in Panama, with some in Liberia, 
to finance the operation. 

Hakim Test. , Hearings, 100-5. at 205. 

06/21/86 (IRAN) 

Circa Hakim creates a chart of his businesses that includes a 

"reserve" that added $2 million covered by the will in which 
North is named and the $2 million covered by the other will 
in which only Secord is named. One reserve was created in 
03/86, the other in 06/86. The chart was found in North's 
office. 

Hakim Test.. Hearings, 100-5, at 279-81. Ex. AH-1; North Test.. 
Hearings. 100-7 part I, at 125. 

06/21/86 (CONTRA) 

A successful southern mission refiiels at the Costa Rica 
international airport. Arranged by North, this is the first 
successfiil southern supply mission under Dutton. As a result 
of an accident with the C-123, the C-7s were the only planes 
available. They did not have the range to make drops in the 
south without refueling. This refueling took place twice, the 
second time in July. 

Dutton Test., Hearings. 100-3, at 217-18; Tambs Test.. Hearings. 
100-3. at 391-92; Castillo Test. . Hearings. 100-4. at 28-30. 

06/24/86 (CONTRA) 

A House Resolution of Inquiry is introduced, "directing the 
President to provide to the House . . . certain information 
concerning activities of . . . North ... in support of the 
Nicaraguan Resistance." It is introduced by Rep. Ronald D. 
Coleman and is referred to the Foreign Affairs, Armed 
Services, and Intelligence Committees. 

North Test., Hearings. 100-7 part 111, Ex. OLN-122; Media reports. 

06/25/86 (CONTRA) 

The House passes, 221 to 209, a $100-million military and 
humanitarian Contra aid package, reversing the most recent 
Boland prohibition on military aid. 

Congressional Record. Vol. 132. tt88, at H 4174. 



86 



06/25/86 (CONTRA) 

North, Rodriguez, and Dutton meet at the OEOB. North tells 
Rodriguez he has information indicating that Rodriguez had 
spoken on open phone lines to unauthorized people about the 
op>eration. Rodriguez challenges him. and North does not 
produce any proof. Rodriguez is told he is to be the liaison 
between the operation and the host country. 

Dutton Test.. Hearings, 100-3, at 221-22, 275-76; Rodriguez Test., 
Hearings, 100-3, at 302-06, 333-35. 

06/25/86 (CONTRA) 

Rodriguez later complains privately to North. He says that 
people are stealing, that some of those involved — Secord and 
Clines — were connected to convicted former CIA officer 
Edwin Wilson, and that if this became known it could be 
"worse than Watergate." North denies the charges, says 
Clines, a former CIA operative and associate of Wilson, is a 
patriot just helping out with transportation. North also says at 
this time, according to Rodriguez, that Congress "cannot touch 
me because the old man loves my ass." 

Rodriguez Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 302-06, 333-35. North Test. , 
Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 88-89. 

06/25/86 (CONTRA) 

Reps. Dante E. Fascell and Hamilton write the President on 
the Resolution of Inquiry. They request comment. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-123. OLN-124. 

06/26/86 (CONTRA) 

In accord with the NSPG directive. Shultz approves a 
solicitation for humanitarian aid from Brunei. He travels to 
Brunei but does not ask for a contribution, on the advice of 
Sigur. Hakim is told by Secord that a $10-million donation "is 
in the pipeline" and is headed for the Lake Resources account. 
$3 million is targeted for arming the Contras. The remaining 
$7 million is for humanitarian aid. Hakim testifies. 

Ahrams Test.. Hearings. 100-5. at 44; Sigur Test.. 100-2. at 307; 
Shultz Test. . Hearings. 100-9. at 19-20; Hakim Test. . Hearings, 
100-5. at 369-70. 



87 



06/27/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to North, Kama Small of the NSC writes that 
CBS's "West 57th Street" is working on a segment in which 
they will say that John Hull has been boasting to friends that 
he has been receiving weekly checks from the NSC. "The 
show obviously has an interview with this guy and I can't just 
give them the 'bullshit' response." She asks North to get back 
to her. 

Chron. Ex. 9. 

06/28/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to Small after watching the "West 57th Street" 
broadcast, North denies specific allegations without denying 
the broad charge that he was involved in supplying the 
Contras. He writes, for example, "I know Robert Owen-he 
was, up until the time it went out of business — a consultant to 
the State Dept. NHAO. He was not 'paid off $50K, as alleged 
by an anonymous accuser, he was paid a salary and expenses 
for services he provided in delivering humanitarian aid for the 
USG on a State Dept contract. ... In short, neither the 
witnesses nor the slanderous piece that CBS produced have 
any credibility whatsoever." 

Chron. Ex. 10. 

06/30/86 (IRAN) 

An Iranian official challenges Cave on HAWK spare parts 
overcharges after reviewing a DOD contractor price list. 

Cave memo, quoted in Tower at B-I3I; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 
part 111, Ex. OLN-48; Cave Dep., 4/17/87. at 106-09. 

07/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa North suggests to the CATF Chief that the CIA buy the 

aircraft that were being used for resupply. The CATF Chief 
says no; they are "hot cargo" and bad airplanes. 

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 61-62. 113-114. 

07/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Dutton says that around this time the operation had trouble 

making deliveries because of: (1) poor intelligence on location 
of troops and on weather; (2) the C-123 accident; and (3) 
trouble with Rodriguez at the airbase. 

Dutton Test., Hearings. 100-3. at 219-20. Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 
68-70. 



88 



07/10/86 (IRAN) 

A Hakim Iranian contact meets in Washington with Hakim 
and Cave to explore opening a second channel. 

Cave Dep., 4/17/87. at Ul-12: 9/29/87, at 31. 

07/12/86 (CONTRA) 

A second long C-7 flight occurs in support of southern troops 
with a full stop in the Costa Rica international airport. Engine 
trouble forces the plane to leave there and return to base. 
Assistance was received from the military and Castillo in 
Costa Rica with North's help. 

Dutton Test., Hearing's, 100-3, at 218; Tamhs Test., Hearings, 
100-3, at 391-92; Castillo Test. . Hearings, 100-4, at 28-30. 

07/12/86 (CONTRA) 

Castillo is instructed to stand down on assistance. A cable 
from CIA headquarters refers to numerous allegations of 
violations of law by private benefactors, and a desire not to 
have the CIA tied to them. Castillo describes this as "soft 
instructions," not a cease and desist order. 

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 27-28. 30-32, 41, 44-47; C/CATF 
Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 111-13, Ex. C/CATF-33. 

07/15/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to Poindexter, North says it would be "ludicrous" 
to let the Contras wait for U.S. aid to become effective 
because the CIA feels Project Democracy assets are "tainted." 
He writes that the total value of the assets is more than $4.5 
million. 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-54. 

07/15/86 (CONTRA) 

North in a PROF to Poindexter: "[YJou should not be 
expected to retain on your staff someone who you suspect 
could be talking to the media or whom you believe to be too 
emotionally invt)lved in an issue to be objective in the 
development of policy options and recommendations." 
Poindexter replies later that day. "Now you are getting 
emotional again." He writes that he just wanted to lower 
North's visibility, that "I do not want you to leave and to be 
honest cannot afford to let you go." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7. Ex. OLN-295. 



89 



07/21/86 (IRAN) 

At a meeting in Europe of Ghorbanifar, Cave, Nir, and 
North, there is a discussion of hostages in exchange for the 
HAWK spare parts still undelivered from the May trip to 
Iran. 

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 114-15. 

07/21/86 (CONTRA) 

Dutton completes a Project Democracy reorganization plan. 
The plan was intended for North to use to lay out the 
southern operation for Casey, according to Dutton. North and 
Secord approve the plan, including the options listed for asset 
liquidation. The document says, "We prefer option 1," which 
called for selling the assets to the CIA for about $4 million, 
with the proceeds going back into a fund for continued 
operations. Secord denies that this was preferred option. 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 222-25, 247-50, 268-70; Ex. 
RCD-14; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1. at 77-79. 

07/21/86 (CONTRA) 

Poindexter replies to Rep. Hamilton on the Resolution of 
Inquiry. In a letter saying the Administration opposes the 
resolution, Poindexter writes that last fall McFarlane met with 
members of the Hou.se Foreign Affairs Committee and 
provided information relevant to H. Res. 485, which "made it 
clear that the actions of the National Security Council staff 
were in compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law 
regarding support of the Nicaraguan Resistance." Poindexter 
testifies: "I think it is an accurate letter. It doesn't tell 
everything. It withholds information, but it is accurate." He 
said, "I intended to withhold information from Chairman 
Hamilton, which I did. . .1 wanted to withhold information on 
the NSC operational activities in support of the Contras from 
most everybody." 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 94-96, 150-57, Ex. JMP-14. 

07/25/86 (CONTRA) 

Sigur advises the U.S. Ambassador to Brunei, Barrington 
King, that in Brunei Shultz had emphasized the threat of 
Soviet aggression in Nicaragua. Sigur asks the Ambassador to 
meet with either the Sultan or another Brunei official and 
arrange for a meeting with a high-level U.S. official. 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56C. 



90 



07/25/86 (IRAN) 

North reports to Poindexter in a PROF that Cave is meeting 
with the second channel in Frankfurt. One purpose of the 
meeting is to ascertain if new "interlocutors" are available. 

Cave Dep., 4/17/87. at 115-23. 9/29/87. at 119-22: Chron. Ex. 11. 

07/26/86 (IRAN) 

Father Jenco is released. 

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 288; Media reports. 

07/28/86 (CONTRA) 

Ambassador King meets with a Brunei official. Brunei agrees 
to meet with a high-level U.S. official in London in August. 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56D. 

07/28/86 (IRAN) 

Casey writes to Poindexter after the release of Father Jenco 
suggesting that the U.S. should move quickly to negotiate 
through Ghorbanifar as the only viable channel. 

Chron. Ex. 12. 

07/28/86 (CONTRA) 

North asks Singlaub to prepare a weapons list for Casey. 
Singlaub, in consultation with North, prepares a proposal for 
Contras to buy weapons on credit until U.S. money is 
available. 

Singlaub Test.. Hearings, 100-3, at 90-91, Ex. JKS-5. 

07/29/86 (CONTRA) 

Secord proposes to North a plan to pull out of the airbase. In 
a KL-43, Secord writes, "due to security considerations/ -i.e., 
Max/(Rodriguez), we can no longer operate from [the 
airbase). Max's demands and threats have resulted in the 
corporate leadership deciding to withdraw." 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, Ex. 3, at 428. 

07/29/86 (IRAN) 

Nir briefs Vice President Bush on the Iran initiative. Nir says 
a decision was needed as to whether the weapons requested 
should be delivered in separate shipments or whether the U.S. 
would press for the release of all hostages before delivering 
the arms. 

Fuller Dep., 3/30/87. at 23-33; Tower Report, at B-145-B-I47 



91 



07/30/86 (IRAN) 

The President is presented and approves a schedule of arms 
shipments to Iran after Father Jenco's release. No mention is 
made on the schedule of opening a dialogue with Iranian 
political factions. 

Poindexter Test.. Hearings, 100-8. Ex. JMP-56; North Test., 
Hearings. 100-7, part I, at 306-307. 

08/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa The House Armed Services Committee votes down the 

Resolution of Inquiry. Poindexter testifies: "I understood that 
under the House rules that essentially killed the resolution, 
and Chairman Hamilton indicated that he was not going to 
push that." However, Hamilton still wanted a meeting with 
North. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings. 100-8. at 150-57. 

08/02/86 (CONTRA) 

A Brunei official indicates that he will meet with a U.S. 
emissary on 08/09/86 between 9:00 a.m. -11:00 a.m. in Hyde 
Park, London. 

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5. at 46; Chron. Ex. 13. 

08/02/86 (IRAN) 

Dutton and Secord meet in Geneva, pick up cash and give it 
to the aircrew delivering HAWK parts to Iran. 

Dutton Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 241. 

08/04/86 (IRAN) 

Additional HAWK spare parts are delivered to Iran, in accord 
with President Reagan's decision of 7/30/86. 

Israeli Chronology; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-56. 

08/04/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Quintero accuses Rodriguez of stealing one of the resupply 
airplanes. Rodriguez flies a C-123 from the maintenance site 
in Miami and returns with a cargo of spare parts and 
medicine. Rodriguez later receives a call from Gregg about 
the supposedly stolen aircraft. Rodriguez tells him his version 
of events. 

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 307-09; Steele Dep., 4/21/87, 
at 80-83; Watson Dep. , 6/16/87, at 63-64; Rodriguez Dep. , 5/1/87, 
at 787-795; Ex. 3. at 430-431. 

08/05/86 (CONTRA) 

Abrams is chosen by Shultz to meet with the Brunei officials. 

Abrams Test., Hearings. 100-5, at 46, 110-11. 

92 



08/06/86 (CONTRA) 

North denies Contra involvement to the House Intelligence 
Committee. North says he had nothing to do with raising 
funds for the Contras or with helping arm them. He testifies 
at the Iran-Contra hearings that he met with Intelligence 
Committee members on the instructions of Poindexter and "I 
misled the Congress at that meeting. . .. Face to face." North 
continues: "I am admitting to you that I participated in 
preparation of documents for the Congress that were 
erroneous, misleading, evasive and wrong. And I did it again 
here when I appeared before that (intelligence) committee 
convened in the White House situation room." Poindexter says 
that he did not authorize North to make false statements. "I 
did think that he would withhold information and be evasive, 
frankly, in answering questions," Poindexter testifies. 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 152; North Test. , Hearings, 
100-7 part /. at 173. 

08/06/86 (CONTRA) 

After being briefed by an NSC staff member about North's 
testimony, Poindexter congratulates North on his meeting with 
the House Intelligence Committee. He sends a PROF saying 
"well done." Poindexter testifies that, at this point, although 
he knew North had withheld information, he did not know 
that North had made false statements. "'Well done' meant that 
I was pleased that the session was a success and that 
Chairman Hamilton seemed satisfied," he says. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 103-04, Ex. J MP- 15. 

08/07/86 (CONTRA) 

In a KL-43 message, Dutton tells Steele of the local 
commander's threats to reveal the operation or charge large 
landing fees if they do not recognize that the planes arc 
Contra property, not private company property. 

Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 68-69, Ex. 11. 



93 



08/08/86 (CONTRA) 

Rodriguez meets with Gregg, Watson, and Earl and reports to 
them on alleged corruption in the resupply operation. 
Rodriguez tells Gregg about his concerns, that Secord and 
Clines ("The Wilson Group") were involved, and that so was 
North. In Gregg's notes of that meeting is the line: "a swap of 
weapons for dollars was arranged to get aid for the Contras." 
Gregg testifies he cannot explain this reference. He calls a 
meeting of various agencies to discuss Rodriguez's allegations. 

Rodriguez Test. , Hearings. 100-3, at 309-10, 318-20; Rodriquez 
Dep., 5/1/87, at 796-802; Ex.FlR-5; Secord Test.. Hearings, 100-1, 
at 65; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 pari I, at 159; Gregg Dep., 
5/18/87, at 11-23; Earl Dep., 5/2/87, at 100-05, 5/22/87, at 165-73; 
Watson Dep.. 6/16/87, at 60-70. 

08/09/86 (CONTRA) 

The resupply team has refined delivery methods using a new 
system approved by North. They drop munitions, uniforms, 
and medicine to Contra forces. Resupply operations to 
southern forces have become "very successful." 

Dutton Test. , Hearings. 100-3, at 229-30, Ex. RCD-5. 

08/12/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa At the behest of North and Secord, Dutton meets with Col. 
Steele while Steele is visiting the U.S. with Ambassador 
Edwin Corr. Dutton says North and Secord want him to 
express their displeasure to Steele about problems with 
Rodriguez. 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 226-27; Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 
42-45, 62-67. 

08/12/86 (CONTRA) 

Rep. Hamilton tells Rep. Coleman the Resolution of Inquiry 
will not be reported. In a letter to Rep. Coleman, Hamilton 
writes, "Based on our discussions and review of the evidence 
provided, it is my belief that the published press allegations 
cannot be proven." 

Chron. Ex. 14. 



94 



08/12/86 (CONTRA) 

A meeting in Gregg's office is attended by the CATF Chief, 
Earl, Watson, and others. Gregg discusses Rodriguez's 
allegations of 8/8/86. There is a long discussion about 
Rodriguez's fears that the aircraft at the airbase would be 
stolen. (Rodriguez had just put air guards on all resupply 
missions to prevent theft). 

C/CATF T.. 100-lL at 114-16; Gregg Dep.. 5/18/87. at 28-31; 
SteeleDep., 4/21/87. at 70-78; Earl Dep.. 5/22/87. at 175-76. 
5/30/87, at 165-76; Watson Dep.. 6/16/87. at 91-97; Rodriguez 
Test.. Hearings. 100-3. at 311. 349-50. 358-59; Walker Dep., 
5/21/87. 30-41; Corr Dep.. 4/30/87, at 22-27, 38-39. 

08/13/86 (CONTRA) 

The Senate approves the $100-million package in military and 
nonlethal Contra aid. 

Conressional Record. Vol. 132. ffll2. at S 11543. 

08/13/86 (CONTRA) 

Earl tells Dutton in a KL-43 note to conduct "emergency 
recall" from the airbase. "Bring the maintenance and aircrews 
out of there quietly, but quickly. Leave all the equipment, 
including airplanes. . .. Destroy registration plates on A/C if 
possible, but don't damage the A/C." This instruction was 
given after the dispute erupted over who controlled the 
of)eration. Rodriguez learns of the planned "recall." 

Secord Test.. Hearings. 100- 1, at 75-76, Ex. 3. at 430-31; Rodriguez 
Test. . Hearings. 100-3. at 308. 335-36; Earl Dep. . 5/30/87. at 
177-81. 

08/13/86 (CONTRA) 

Secord refuses Earl's instructions. "I presume your msg results 
from telecom with Ollie," he writes to Earl via KL-43. He 
says there is more than $1 million worth of equipment owned 
by Udall, and he will not abandon it. "I insist on immediate 
meeting between Bob and Steele or I will seek out the 
Ambassador and resolve the issue." Earl replies that the threat 
of a lawsuit against the local commander for air piracy 
(relating to Rodriguez making off with a plane) "has 
apparently really poisoned the atmosphere." 

Secord Test.. Hearings. 1 00- 1, at 75-76; Ex. 3. at 430-31. 



95 



08/15/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa In London, Abrams uses the name "Kenilworth" when he calls 
the Brunei official. They meet at a hotel and go for a walk in 
the park. Abrams says $10 million was needed for "bridge 
money" to the Contras. Subsequently, Abrams hears the 
answer from Brunei was "yes." 

Abrams Test. . Hearings. 100-5, at 48-51. 

08/22/86 (CONTRA) 

North approves a drop plan involving Castillo. In a KL-43 to 
North, Dutton proposes a drop plan in which Castillo would 
act as liaison between the Contras and the supply operation. 
Dutton also suggests that the drops should take place at dusk, 
allowing a good visual sighting of the drop zone. 

Dutton Test. , Hearings. 100-3, at 228. 

08/24/86 (CONTRA) 

Dutton, Earl, and Steele meet in Washington to discuss 
Secord's plan to pull out of the airbase and the local 
commander's belief that the planes should go to the Contras. 

Steele Dep. . 4121187, at 62-67, Steele Ex. 10; Earl Dep. , 5/22/87. at 
119, 5/30/87, at 185. 

08/25/86 (IRAN) 

Secord and Hakim meet with the second channel to Iran in 
Brussels. No U.S. Government officials are there. They 
discuss normalizing U.S. -Iran relations and an arms-for- 
hostages deal. Secord then reports to North and they agree 
that the second channel should come to the U.S. for a 
meeting. 

Hakim Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 242-43; Secord Test. , Hearings, 
100- 1, at 122. 

September-October, 1986 



09/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa North meets at the OEOB with Garwood and Channell. North 
discusses the need for a plane to deliver aid to the Contras. 
After Channell and Garwood leave North's office. Channell 
asks for a contribution. Garwood complies. 

Gar\u)od Dep. . 3/18/87. at 43-45. 



96 



09/03/86 (CONTRA) 

North suggests a tax-exempt organization to replace Project 
Democracy. In a PROF to McFarlane, North writes that the 
Resistance effort is going to require support that goes beyond 
the CIA's ability to provide, chiefly in the area of public 
relations. North suggests a nonprofit "Nicaraguan Democracy 
Institute" that could raise money and pay for Contra public 
relations in the U.S. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III. OLN-299. 

09/05/86 (CONTRA) 

North calls Abrams late at night, according to Abrams. North 
asks him to ask Tambs, who is in the U.S., to get President 
Arias to cancel a scheduled press conference that would reveal 
the existence of the Santa Elena airstrip. North calls back with 
Tambs on the line, and Abrams instructs Tambs to ask Arias 
to cancel the press conference. (Tambs testifies that North so 
instructed him.) Tambs calls North and Abrams later to tell 
them the conference was canceled. 

Tambs Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 383-84, 395-96; Abrams Test. . 
Hearings, 100-5, at 24; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 
86-87. 

09/06/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to Poindexter, North describes the press 
conference incident. He claims to have called President Arias. 
North testifies, however, that he did not in fact call President 
Arias. The PROF note "was specifically cast the way it was to 
protect the other two parties engaged," he says. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II 89; Tambs Test., Hearings, 
100-3, Ex. LAT-6; North Notebook, Q 2392; Joint Report, at 143. 

09/08/86 (CONTRA) 

The State Department advises Ambassador King to contact the 
Brunei official and tell him that the $10 million transfer had 
not been effected. King is instructed to have the Brunei 
officials attempt to trace the money. 

Shuhz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56P. 



97 



09/09/86 (IRAN) 

The CIA's Allen and North meet at the OEOB. North has 
been directed by Poindexter to develop the second channel 
through Secord and Hakim; Ghorbanifar is to be cut out; 
North is to raise $4 million to pay off Ghorbanifar. 

Secord Test.. Hearings. 1 00- 1, at 123: Allen Dep.. 4/24/87. at 
443-45: 6/29/87. at 561-69. Allen Ex. 68. 

09/09/86 (IRAN) 

American Frank Herbert Reed is kidnapped in Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

09/10/86 (CONTRA) 

The "Prince" is indicted in Philadelphia on fraud charges and 
arrested the same day in Fresno, California. 

Media reports. 

09/11/86 (CONTRA) 

In a KL-43 to North, Dutton writes that Rodriguez and the 
local commander had refused to permit two-aircraft missions 
— something North and Secord had approved. 

Dutton Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 232-33. Ex. RCD-8. 

09/12/86 (IRAN) 

American Joseph James Cicippio is kidnapped in Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

09/13/86 (CONTRA) 

The resupply operation flies five planes for the first time. "A 
red letter day," Dutton writes to North via KL-43. "The surge 
is now in full force." One of the five missions was a 
successful 10,000 pound drop in the south. Dutton testifies 
that the 9/86 surge could not have been accomplished without 
Castillo's assistance. 

Dutton Test. . Hearings, 100-3, at 233-34, Ex. RCD-9. 

09/15/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Abrams asks North if the Brunei $10 million has come in. 
North calls back a day or two later and says it had not. 

Abrams Test. . Hearings. 100-5, at 50-51. 



98 



09/15/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF message. North updates Poindexter on the 
resupply mission and praises Secord. Poindexter, in his PROF 
on the 17th, writes: "As 1 told you in the other note, 1 talked 
to Casey this morning about Secord. Keep the pressure on Bill 
to make things right for Secord." 

North Test., Hearings. 100-7 part I, at 84: 100-7 part III. Exs. 
OLN-161, OLN-164. 

09/17/86 (CONTRA) 

Dutton testifies about deliveries of several thousand pounds of 
munitions. He says that about 180,000 to 185,000 pounds 
were finally delivered. About 167,000 pounds were still left in 
the warehouse. 

Dutton Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 234. 

09/19/86 (IRAN) 

Secord, North, and Cave meet in Washington with the second 
channel. Hakim attended part of the meeting. North gives the 
Iranian a White House tour and they decide to hold another 
meeting at STTGI. 

Secord Test.. Hearings, 100- 1, at 123: Hakim Test., Hearings, 
100-5, at 245: Cave Dep. , 4/17/87, at 130-39, 143, 9/29/87. at 
70-79: North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 283-84, 100-7 part 
III, Ex. OLN-201. 

09/20/86 (IRAN) 

At the STTGI meeting, financial remuneration for Hakim and 
the Iranians who helped open the second channel is discussed. 

Hakim Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 246-47. 

09/21/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa North at a RIG meeting proposes his "Alamo" plan: that the 
Contras capture a piece of Nicaraguan territory and defend it. 
The plan is rejected outright by State, DOD, and CIA 
representatives, and the idea dies. 

Abrams Test. . Hearings, 100-5. at 34. 

09/22/86 (IRAN) 

North in a PROF to Poindexter gives a detailed overview of 
results of the second channel talks. North is very upbeat about 
the new channel. 

Chron. Ex. 15. 



99 



09/24/86 (CONTRA) 

Drops to the Contras are being made so fast that a complete 
record is not being kept. The group is very successful but 
again the local commander shuts down the airbase. 

Dunon Test.. Hearings, 100-3, at 234, 274-75. Ex. RCD-15. 

09/25/86 (CONTRA) 

Both Houses of Congress pass continuing resolutions including 
$1(X) million in Contra aid, lethal and nonlethal. 

Congressional Record. Vol. 132, ft 128, at H 8504. 

09/25/86 (CONTRA) 

A Costa Rican press conference finally exposes the airstrip. In 
a PROF to Poindexter, North writes, "Believe we have taken 
all appropriate damage control measures to keep any USG 
fingerprints off this and with Elliott and the COS, have 
worked up appropriate 'if asked' press guidance." He writes 
that "one of Dick's agents [Olmstead]" was named at the press 
conference, but that Olmstead is not the name of the agent. 
Udall Research was named too. North writes that Udall, 
which he calls "a proprietary of Project Democracy," will 
cease to exist by noon today. He says Udall's 
resources — $48,000 — have been moved to another account in 
Panama. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 111, Kxs. OLN-131, OLN-203, 
OLN-307. 

09/26/86 (CONTRA) 

Ambassador King advises the State Department that Brunei 
confirms unequivocally that the transfer has been made to a 
Swiss bank account. 

Shultz Test. . Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56R. 

09/30/86 (CONTRA) 

At Channell's request for a contribution while the Contras wait 
for money from Congress "to trickle down," O'Boyle donates 
$30,000. 

O'Boyle Test., Hearings. 100-3, at 124. 

10/01/86 (IRAN) 

Shultz says: "We have intensified our efforts to discourage our 
friends from selling arms to Iran with significant, but not 
complete success." 

Speech to the Gulf Cooperation Council at the United Nations. 



100 



10/03/86 (CONTRA) 

A $90,000 contribution from the Patrick Henry Foundation 
goes to NEPL. The foundation was established by Garwood to 
give donations to "help preserve the freedom of our country." 

Garwood Dep. , 3/ J 8/87. at 56. 62. 

10/05/86 (CONTRA) 

A C123K cargo plane is shot down over Nicaragua carrying 
10,000 pounds of arms to the Contras. Three crewmen are 
killed; the fourth, Eugene Hasenfus, an American, is 
captured. Dutton notifies North's office of a missing aircraft. 
Identification cards link the plane to SAT. Learning of the 
crash, Rodriguez calls Watson, Vice President Bush's aide, 
with the news. North testifies that the flight was paid for by 
Secord's operation. Those were certainly his activities, and I 
was the U.S. Government connection," he says. 

Dutton Test. . Hearings. 100-3. at 238-39. Ex. RCD-12; North Test. . 
Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 179-81; Rodriguez Test., Hearings. 100-3. 
at 311-12; Steele Dep.. 4/21/87, at 115-16. 

10/05/86 (IRAN) 

Secord meets Nir in Israel. He delivers a letter from President 
Reagan thanking Israel for its Iran-initiative efforts and 
lauding Nir's work. This was done to assuage Nir, who knew 
he was being cut out with the rise of the second channel. 

Israeli Chronology. 

10/06/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF, Earl advises Poindexter, "Yesterday one of the 
Democracy Inc. aircraft apparently went down on a resupply 
mission to FDN forces in the north." 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8. at 159-61; Chron. Ex. 16. 

10/06/86 (CONTRA) 

Earl in a PROF tells North of the downed plane. North is out 
of the country negotiating with the second Iranian channel 
when the Contra resupply plane goes down. 

Chron. Elx. 17. 

10/07/86 (IRAN) 

Casey meets with Roy Furmark regarding financial aspects of 
the Iran arms sales. Exposure of the Iran-Contra transactions 
is threatened by Canadian financiers, Casey is told. 

Furmark Dep. , 7/22/87, at 122-26. 



101 



10/08/86 (CONTRA) 

The President tells reporters that the downed aircraft in 
Nicaragua is not connected with the U.S. Government. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, tl4] , at 
1348-49. 

10/08/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF, Cannistraro writes that at a RIG meeting "today," 
which included Abrams, it was decided, among other things: 
(1) "Press guidance was prepared which states no U.S.G. 
involvement or connection (with the Hasenfus flight), but that 
we are generally aware of such support contracted by the 
Contras." (2) "UNO to be asked to assume responsibility for 
flight and to assist families of Americans involved. Elliott will 
follow up with Ollie to facilitate this." (3) "HPSCI and SSCI 
[the intelligence committees] have been briefed and there were 
no problems." (4) "Elliott said he would continue to tell the 
press these were brave men and brave deeds. We 
recommended that he not do this because it contributes to 
perception U.S.G. inspired and encouraged private lethal aid 
effort." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 179, 100-7 part III, Ex. 
OLN-133; Abrams Test. , Hearings, 100-4, at 63-64. 

10/08/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa After a conversation with Casey - following Casey's meeting 
with Furmark — North begins shredding "in earnest," he says. 
The Contra operation was "coming unraveled," North testifies, 
"and ought to be cleaned up." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 19, 135, 326-328. 

10/08/86 (CONTRA) 

Following the crash and capture of Hasenfus, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Customs Service 
arrive at SAT to look at its records. The president of SAT 
calls Dutton, who calls North. North says he will take care of 
the investigation. North calls Meese the following day. FAA 
and Customs temporarily call off their investigation. The FBI 
soon thereafter begins its own investigation of SAT, and 
North promises to take care of that as well. North testifies 
that he, Casey, and Poindexter sought to postpone the 
investigation of SAT to secure the Iran initiative (the .second 
channel) as well as the secrecy of the Contra resupply effort. 

Dutton Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 239-240, 280: North Test. , 
Hearings, 100-7 part 11. at 105: Revell Dep., 6/11/87, at 60-71. 



102 



10/08/86 (IRAN) 

North, Secord, Cave, and Hakim meet again in Frankfurt with 
the Iranian second channel. After North returns to Washington 
and Secord departs. Hakim testifies that he negotiated an 
elaborate nine-point hostage release plan that includes seeking 
the release of 17 terrorists held in Kuwaiti jails and the 
removal of the Iraqui president. Secord returns and relays the 
plan by KL-43, Hakim says, to Washington, and the plan was 
approved by President Reagan through North and Poindexter. 
Shultz disputes this and says President Reagan was angered by 
the plan when he learned of it from Shultz weeks later. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 7, 332-34; part II at 6-8; 
Secord Test., Hearings, 100- J, at 123; Hakim Test., Hearings, 
100-5, 288-96, 305-308. 323-25, Ex. AH-40; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 
139-46, 9/29/87, at 128-39, 183; Shultz Test. , Hearings. 100-9. 
46-49 Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 68-69. 

10/10/86 (GENERAL) 

President Reagan, Shultz, Poindexter, and Regan go to 
Iceland to meet with the Soviets. 

Media reports. 

10/10/86 (IRAN) 

David Lewis, a Washington lawyer, travels to Switzerland and 
has lunch with Zucker. Others are present. Discussed was a 
real estate transaction involving "the wife of someone in the 
White House." The wife was that of "Lieutenant Col. Oliver 
North." The dollar figure approximates $70,000. Lewis never 
heard anything about the deal again. 

Lewis Test. . Hearings, 100-5, at 235-37. 

10/10/86 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane tells Poindexter to return North to the Marines. In 
a PROF, McFarlane writes: "I really think he has become 
every Democrat's best target and as hard as it would be to 
lose him, it will serve your and his long term interest to send 
him back to the Corps. 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings. 100-8. Ex. JMP-93. 

10/12/86 (CONTRA) 

In a PROF to McFarlane, North says a "high-powered lawyer" 
is needed to represent "USG/Hascnfus' interests." He says a 
donation of $100,000 has been lined up. North notes that 
President Reagan was briefed "that this plan was being 
contemplated" before going to Iceland. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7. Part 111. Ex. OLN 136. 

103 



10/14/86 (IRAN) 

North meets with DEA Administrator John C. Lawn, thanks 
him for the DEA effort to ransom the hostages, but says the 
effort failed. The ransom effort ends. 

Lawn Dep. , 8/20/87. at 53. 

10/15/86 (CONTRA) 

Abrams tells the House Foreign Affairs Committee there was 
no U.S. Government involvement in the Hasenfus flight. He 
tells the Iran-Contra hearings that he believed that statement to 
be true at the time. He testifies: "As you know, I did not 
make this statement once. I made the statement over a period 
of about three weeks . . . and anybody who had any knowledge 
which he wished to communicate to me to the effect that those 
statements were not true had ample opportunity to do so." He 
says he had checked with the CIA and the NSC before 
testifying on 10/15. 

Abrams Test. , Hearings. 100-5, at 65-67; Hearings, Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
99th Congress, 2d Session, at 6. 

10/16/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

The CIA's Charles Allen meets Furmark, who provides details 
of the financial arrangements for the arms deals supplied by 
Canadian investors. 

Allen Dep. , 6/29/87, at 604, Exs. 78. 80; Furmark Dep. , 7/22/87, at 
128-34. 

10/17/86 (CONTRA) 

Garwood contributes $100,000 to NEPL to aid the Contras. 

Garwood Dep. , 3/18/87, at 60. 

10/17/86 (CONTRA) 

The House and Senate approve the conference agreement on 
H.J. Res. 738, the continuing resolution that provides for 
$100 million in Contra aid; $70 million is unrestricted. 

Congressional Record, Vol. 132, ffl44. at H 11068, S 16638. 

10/18/86 (CONTRA) 

The President signs the legislation appropriating the $100 
million for Contra aid. 

P.L 99-500. 



104 



10/21/86 (IRAN) 

Edward Austin Tracy, an American writer, is kidnapped in 
Beruit. 

Media reports. 

10/22/86 (IRAN) 

Allen and Cave meet Furmark in New York. Furmark says 
that Ghorbanifar had told him that most of $15 million paid 
for the arms shipments to Iran was earmarked for Central 
America. 

Allen Dep., 6/29/87. at 606-07, Exs. 81. 82; Furmark Dep.. 
7/22/87, at 137-51; Cave Dep., 4/17/87. at 156-59. 9/29/87. at 
122-24. 

10/22/86 (IRAN) 

Nir, North, and Secord meet in Geneva to iron out the next 
arms shipment to Iran. Nir and North agree that the 500 
TOWs sent to Israel in May would go to Iran and the Israelis 
would keep the 500 TOWs then in the U.S. earmarked for 
Iran. Secord says he did not take part in the decision to 
switch TOWs. 

Israeli Chronology; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1. at 312-13. 

10/27/86 (CONTRA) 

The President signs legislation authorizing the $100 million 
Contra aid program. 

P.L. 99-569 

10/28/86 (IRAN) 

500 substitute TOWs are shipped to Iran from Israel. 

Secord Test.. Hearings, 100-1, at 124. Israeli Historical Chronology. 

10/28/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa CATF Chief informs his boss, the Latin American Division 
Chief, of Castillo's involvement with communications to the 
private benefactors. The Latin American Chief, in turn, 
informs Assistant Secretary Abrams of that problem. Abrams, 
in response, contacts the Executive Secretary to set up a 
meeting with Secretary Shultz immediately. The next morning 
Abrams meets with Shultz and informs him of the potential 
Boland problem and recommends an inquiry by State to insure 
that no State Department officials were similarly involved. 

C/CATFTe.st.. Hearings. 100-11. at 123-24; Castillo Test.. 
Hearings. 100-4, at 50-54. 



105 



10/29/86 (IRAN) 

Second sends Dutton to Geneva to pick up cash to deliver to 
Attorney Thomas Green in Tel Aviv. Dutton then goes to 
Beirut to await the release of hostages. 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 241-242. 

10/29/86 (IRAN) 

North, Secord, Cave, the Relative (second channel). Hakim, 
and another Iranian meet in Mainz, West Germany, to discuss 
the promised release of one or two hostages and 
implementation of Hakim's nine-point plan. At this meeting, 
the Americans learn that news of McFarlane's Tehran trip has 
been made public. 

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 147-150. 

10/30/86 (CONTRA) 

A corrected version of P.L. 99-500 is signed into law. 

Congressional Research Service, Contra Aid: 1981-86, 1/28/87. 



November 1-20, 1986 

11/02/86 (IRAN) 

Hostage Jacobsen is released. 

Media reports. 

11/03/86 (IRAN) 

North arrives in Beirut to meet Jacobsen. North, Jacobsen, 
Secord, and Quintero fly back to Larnaca, Cyprus, where a 
press conference is held. Jacobsen and North depart. Quintero 
and Secord remain, awaiting the release of more hostages. 

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 241-42. 

11/03/86 (IRAN) 

An account of McFarlane's May trip to Tehran, as reported in 
the Lebanese magazine Al-Shiraa, is picked up by the U.S. 
news media. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7, at 26-27; Meese Test., Hearings, 
100-9, at 199: Media reports. 

11/05/86 (IRAN) 

Iranian Prime Minister Musavi announces that the major aim 
of the McFarlane trip was to resume relations between the 
U.S. and Iran. 

Media reports. 



106 



11/06/86 (IRAN) 

Allen meets Furmark in Washington. Furmark gives more 
details of what the Canadian investors intend to do; he says 
the Canadians will expose the U.S. Government, and they 
know of Secord and North's involvement in Central America. 

Allen Dep.. 6/29/87, at 610-13. Men Exs. 83. 84; Furmark Dep.. 
7/22/87, at 153-65. 

11/06/86 (IRAN) 

Reporter: "Mr. President, do we have a deal going with Iran 
of some sort?" The President: "No comment. But could I 
suggest an appeal to all of you with regard to this: that the 
speculation, the commenting and all, on a story that came out 
of the Middle East and that to us has no foundation - that all 
of that is making it more difficult for us in our effort to get 
the other hostages free." He adds: "We will never pay off 
terrorists because that only encourages more of it." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, tt45, at 
1534. 

11/06/86 (IRAN) 

Shultz says he learned of direct arms sales to Iran from press 
reports. 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 3-4. 

11/06/86 (IRAN) 

Circa North receives a phone call from a high Israeli official 

following the press disclosures of the Iran arms sales. Both 
North and the Israeli decide on a "no comment" policy, North 
testifies. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 100, 228-30. 

11/07/86 (IRAN) 

White House Spokesman Peter Roussel: "As long as Iran 
advocates the use of terrorism, the U.S. arms embargo wilj 
continue." 

Washington Times. 1 1/7/86. 

11/07/86 (IRAN) 

Mecse orders Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper to 
do legal research on the Iran arms sales, 1 1 months after the 
President signed the 1/17/86 Finding. 

Cooper Test., Hearings. 100-6. at 227^ Cooper Dep.. 6/22/87. at 
9-11; Mee.se Test., Hearings. 100-9, at 199. 



107 



11/07/86 (CONTRA) 

North draws up a chronology of the Iran initiative. 
Subsequently, he testifies, "I was provided with additional 
input that was radically different from the truth ... It is my 
recollection it was provided by Mr. McFarlane." 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 26-31. 

11/07/86 (IRAN) 

McFarlane writes a PROF note to Poindexter saying he will 
not tolerate Regan's efforts to blame him for the arms-for- 
hostages impetus of the Iran initiative. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings. 100-2, Ex. 47, at 627. 

11/07/86 (IRAN) 

500 TOWs are shipped from the U.S. to Israel as 
replacements for those sent to Iran on 10/28. 

Israeli Financial Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7, part I, 
at 226-228. 

11/08/86 (IRAN) 

Cave, North, Secord, and Hakim meet a second channel 
representative in Geneva. Because the Iran initiative has been 
exposed. North says the publicity makes it imperative that the 
hostages be released. 

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 152-54, 9/29/87, at 56; Joint Report, at 262. 

11/09/86 (IRAN) 

Donald Regan in an interview with John McLaughlin says: 
"I'll assure you we're not breaking any laws, we're not doing 
anything illegal or immoral. And I think that when we can tell 
the story, the American public will appreciate the efforts of 
this President to get American hostages released." 

John McLaughlin "One on One. " 

11/09/86 (IRAN) 

North and Secord meet with Nir. They tell Nir the Lake 
Resources account has been closed because Iranian funds had 
become mixed with Contra money. 

Israeli Chronology. 



108 



11/10/86 (IRAN) 

After a national security meeting. Presidential spokesman 
Larry Speakes says: "While specific decisions discussed at the 
meeting cannot be divulged, the President did ask that it be 
reemphasized that no U.S. laws have been or will be violated 
and that our policy of not making concessions to terrorists 
remains intact." At this NSC meeting, Poindexter reports that 
a total of 1000 TOWs and 240 HAWK spare parts had been 
sold to Iran. Shultz sees this as HAWKs for hostages. 

Media reports; Regan Test., Hearings. 100-10, at 22-23, 64, 90-91, 
108, 112-114; Exs. DTR-41, DTR-41A; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 
100-10, at 153-155, Ex. CmV-28; Shultz Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 
39-41; Keel Dep.. 3/18/87, 13-25; Meese Test.. Hearings at 100-9, 
210-213; Exs. EM-17, EM- 19. 

11/12/86 (IRAN) 

Congressional leaders come to the White House and are 
briefed for the first time on the Iran arms sales. Poindexter 
again omits material facts. 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 243-47, 312-313; Meese Test. , 
Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-21. 

11/13/86 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in an address to the Nation says: "The 
charge has been made that the United States has shipped 
weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of 
American hostages in Lebanon — that the United States 
undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy 
against trafficking with terrorists. Those charges are utterly 
false. The actions I authorized were and continue to be in full 
compliance with federal law. And the relevant committees of 
Congress are being and will be fully informed .... We did not 
trade weapons or anything else for hostages." (Poindexter says 
that he and his staff helped prepare President Reagan for this 
speech and that they had at least two sessions prior to the 
November 19 press conference to brief President Reagan for 
potential questions.) 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 281; Regan Test.. Hearings, 
100-10. at 24-26, 88-89; Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents. Vol. 22, lt46. at 1559. 

11/14/86 (IRAN) 

The Ju.stice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, headed by 
Cooper, gives Meese its opinion on Statutes Relevant to 
Recent Actions with Respect to Iran. 

Cooper Test. . Hearings. 100-6, at 234, Ex. CJC-2. 

109 



11/14/86 (IRAN) 

At a National Security Briefing with President Reagan, the 
decision is made to send the Finding on Iran to the State 
Department (for the first time). 

Shultz Test.. Hearings, 100-9, at 41-42. 

11/14/86 (IRAN) 

Ledeen meets with Meese at the Justice Department to discuss 
Iran and terrorism, Meese testifies. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 213-14. 

11/17/86 (IRAN) 

The maximum version of the White House chronology on the 
Iran initiative is finished. It says the U.S. acquiesced in Israeli 
shipment of TOWs in 09/85 at the highest levels but objected 
to the 11/85 shipment. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 125-26; North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part I. at 28, 100-7 part HI, E.x. OLN-18. 

11/17/86 (IRAN) 

Cooper receives a draft chronology from the White House. 
From this. Cooper says, he first learned that there had been 
an arms shipment to Iran prior to the January 17 Finding. 
Cooper passes this information to Meese. 

Cooper Test. , Hearings, 100-6, at 234-236. 

11/18/86 (IRAN) 

McFarlane sends a PROF to Poindexter. He suggests changes 
in the chronology to eliminate U.S. acquiesence in the 09/85 
shipment and makes only a vague one-sentence reference to 
shipments of arms "later in the fall" from Israel. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 66-67, 78-79, 87-96. 144, 214, 
Ex. 55, at 640-50, Ex. 56. at 651-55, E.x. 58. at 660-75; Poindexter 
Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 108-09. 

11/18/86 (CONTRA) 

Casey and the CATF Chief go to Central America just before 
Casey is to testify before the intelligence committees. A 
courier, who came down to give Casey his briefing book and 
other papers, says to the CATF Chief, "You know, there may 
be a problem on the diversion," the CATF Chief testifies. 
That was about a week before Meese divulged the diversion. 

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 122-23, 161, 182-83, Ex. 
C/CATF-41. 



110 



11/18/86 (IRAN) 

At a White House meeting of legal advisers from State, 
Justice, the CIA, and the NSC called by Peter Wallison, 
White House Counsel, Paul Thompson of the NSC refuses to 
divulge what he knew about the arms sales to Iran on orders 
from Poindexter, Thompson says. Later Poindexter and 
Thompson agree to brief Abraham Sofaer, State Department 
legal adviser, and Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, on the Iran issue. Sofaer testifies that no 
mention is made of any arms transfers before 1/86 other than 
the 9/85 transfer of TOWs. 

Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 11-29; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 
116-118. 

11/19/86 (IRAN) 

Secord goes to the NSC offices, reads part of McFarlane's 
revisions of the White House chronology, questions the 
changes, and leaves. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part /. at 29, 229-30. part 111, 
Ex. OLN-24; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 125-28. 

11/19/86 (IRAN) 

President Reagan at a news conference says: "Eighteen months 
ago . . . this administration began a secret initiative to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. ... I considered the risks of failure 
and the rewards of success, and I decided to proceed, and the 
responsibility for the decision and the operation is mine and 
mine alone. . . . Everything that we sold them could be put 
on one cargo plane and there would be plenty of room left 
over. . . . We did not condone, and do not condone, the 
shipment of arms from other countries. ... I don't think a 
mistake was made. It was a high-risk gamble . . . and I don't 
see that it has been a fiasco or a great failure of any kind." At 
the press conference. President Reagan says no third country 
was involved in the arms sales to Iran. A correction is quickly 
issued. Meese called Poindexter about the error, but it had 
already been corrected. Poindexter invites Meese to a 11/20 
meeting to review Casey's testimony. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, t(47, at 
1583; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 238-39; Meese Test.. 
Hearings. 100-9. at 215 16; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 
91-92. 

11/20/86 (IRAN) 

The last version of the chronology says there was no U.S. ac- 
quiesencc in 09/85 shipment of TOWs. It says the U.S. 
thought the 1 1/85 shipment was oil-drilling parts and learned 
it was HAWKs for the first time in 01/86. 

North Test.. Hearings. 1(H) 7 part I. at 29, 229-30, 100 7 part III. 
Lx. OLN 24. 

Ill 



11/20/86 (IRAN) 
13:30 PM Meese, Casey, North, Cooper, Thompson, and Robert Gates, 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, meet with Poindexter 
in his office to review the facts for Casey's Congressional 
testimony and Poindexter's briefing of the Intelligence 
Committees the next day. North is said to insert language 
saying that no one in the U.S. Government knew of the 11/86 
missile shipment. North testifies that he and Casey later fixed 
the testimony to go with the story that the 11/85 shipment was 
believed to be oil-drilling parts. Poindexter testifies that he 
knew Casey's testimony was inaccurate when he helped draft 
it but did not know what really happened in 11/85. North 
testifies that McFarlane, Poindexter, and Casey all knew the 
chronologies were false. By putting out a false version of the 
facts, according to North, they committed the President to a 
false story. No one objected to the President being so 
committed. North testifies. 

Cooper Test. , Hearings, J 00-6, at 239-43; Poindexter Test. , 
Hearings, 100-8, at 108-11; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 
197-200. 217-220; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87. at 83-106; North Test.. 
Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 30-36. 

11/20/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
15:30 PM After the meeting ended. Cooper is asked to come to White- 
House Counsel Wallison's office. He goes there with NSC 
Counsel Thompson. When they arrive, Wallison strenuously 
objects to being excluded from the just concluded meeting. 
During the course of that discussion, Sofaer telephones and 
indicates there is a potential problem with Casey's testimony. 
Wallison phones him back on a secure line and is advised that 
Secretary Shultz recalls a conversation with McFarlane in 
November 1985 in which McFarlane made specific reference 
to the shipment of HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran. 
Wallison advises Cooper and Thompson of Sofaer's report. 
Cooper asks Thompson to contact North and McFarlane to get 
the facts straight. Cooper reminds Thompson of North's 
statement at the meeting earlier that no one in the U.S. 
Government knew that the November 1985 shipment contained 
arms. Thompson agrees to contact North and Poindexter. 

Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87. at 41-45; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 
22, 43; Cooper Dep.. 6/22/87. at 83-100. 



112 



11/20/86 (IRAN) 
15:45 PM According to Cooper, Thompson then checked with North on 
the 11/85 shipment, and North said he had checked with 
McFarlane, who sticks to the oil-drilling story. Thompson 
later testifies he cannot recall talking with North. 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 249; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 
106-08: Viompson Dep., 4/28/87, at 61-62. 66-67 

11/20/86 (IRAN) 
15:45 PM Sofaer calls Deputy Attorney General Arnold 1. Burns to tell 
him of the problems with Casey's testimony. Burns calls 
Sofaer later to say that Meese "knew the facts that explained 
everything, all these matters and that laid to rest all the 
problems" Sofaer saw. Meese testifies he cannot recall details 
of his conversation with Burns. 

Sofaer Dep.. 6/18/87, 38-41, 45; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 
220-21. 

11/20/86 (IRAN) 
18:00 PM Sofaer calls Cooper at the Justice Department and tells him 
that McFarlane told Shultz in 11/85 in Geneva that the 
shipment was HAWK missiles. Sofaer says there are 
contemporaneous notes that contradict Casey's proposed 
testimony. Sofaer threatens to have the State Department 
(testifying with Casey) dispute any false statements at the 
hearings and says he will resign unless the testimony is 
corrected. 

Cooper Test. , Hearings, 100-6, at 247-49; Meese Test. , Hearings. 
100-9, at 222; Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 46-51; Cooper Dep., 
6/22/87. at 106-09. 

11/20/86 (IRAN) 
20:00 PM Shultz meets with President Reagan about the 11/19 press 
conference. Regan accompanies him. Shultz testifies that he 
told President Reagan that there were wrong and misleading 
statements that he wanted to go through and tell him what he 
thought was wrong and why. By this time, Meese is trying to 
"act as a coordinator of this testimony in order to get it 
straight," Shultz says. Shultz says he had made his views 
known to Meese. 

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9. at 44 45; Regan Test.. Hearings. 
100-10, at 27; Meese Test.. Hearings, 100-9. at 338; Regan Dep.. 
7/15/87. at 40-42. 



113 



11/20/86 (IRAN) 
22:30 PM Late at night. Cooper calls Meese at West Point and tells him 
Circa of the Shultz notes and the conflict with McFarlane version of 
events. Meese cancels a trip to Harvard and hurries back to 
Washington. He tells Cooper to get Casey's testimony 
changed. 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 250-51; Meese Test., Hearings, 
100-9. at 200, 220-21; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87. at 111-13. 

11/20/86 (IRAN) 
23:00 PM Cooper then calls Poindexter to tell him the testimony must be 
Circa changed. Poindexter says he had already called Casey at home 
that night telling him to admit to Congress the existence of a 
November HAWK shipment. Casey's response was 
inconclusive, according to Poindexter. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 113; Cooper Test., Hearings, 
100-5. at 251. 

November 21, 1986 



11/21/86 
07:20 AM 



11/21/86 
07:30 AM 
09:00 AM 



11/21/86 
08:00 AM 



11/21/86 
09:15 AM 



(IRAN) 

Casey speaks to Poindexter. 

Poindexter log. 

(IRAN) 

Poindexter and Casey begin briefings before the House and 

Senate Intelligence Committees on Iran. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 87-88, 135-37, 145-47. 312; 
Exs. J MP -69, JMP-70, JMP-79, JMP-80; Media reports. 

(IRAN) 

Cooper meets with Casey and Dave Doherty of the CIA about 
Casey's testimony. Casey accepts revisions without comment. 
George Jameson, CIA Associate General Counsel, whispers to 
Cooper that there is evidence that the pilot knew there was 
military equipment on the 11/85 shipment. 

Cooper Dep.. 6/23/87, at 11, 6/22/87, at 181-82; Cooper Test., 
Hearings, 100-6, at 252-53; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9. at 222. 

(IRAN) 

Meese, Burns, Reynolds, Cooper, and Assistant to the 
Attorney General and Chief of Staff John M. Richardson, Jr., 
meet. Meese testifies that he decided to go to the President 
and recommend that he be commissioned to gather the facts 
about the 11/85 HAWK shipment. 

Meese Test.. Hearings. 100-9. at 225-26, Ex. EM-43; Cooper Test., 
Hearings, 100-6, at 254. 



114 



11/21/86 (IRAN) 

9:22 AM Meese calls Poindexter on a secure phone and advises that he 
will ask the President to authorize fact finding. He asks that 
Regan and Poindexter join him at a meeting with the 
President. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 224; Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 
100-8. at 277. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
11:00 AM McFarlane meets with Ledeen at Ledeen's house. North 

arrives at 12:30 p.m. and meets with Ledeen for 5 minutes. 
McFarlane drives North downtown during which time North 
expresses concern that the President be protected and tells him 
that he will be shredding documents, that there will be a 
"shredding party." 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 69, 71. 72. 107-08, 213-14; 
North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1. at 146; Part II at 240-41. 
Ledeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 19; 3/11/87, at 111. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
11:17 AM Meese receives a call from Poindexter. 

Meese home and work phone log. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
11:25 AM Secord calls Poindexter. 

Poindexter phone log. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
11:30 AM President Reagan meets with Meese, Regan, and Poindexter to 
discuss the need for a fact-finding inquiry. Meese is assigned 
the task and is told to report to the National Security Planning 
Group on 11/24 at I4:(X) p.m. Meese does not ask President 
Reagan or Regan about the 11/85 HAWK shipment. 

Poinde.xter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 277; Regan Test., Hearings, 
100-10. at 27-28; Meese Test., 100-9, at 20. 224-25, Ex. EM-43; 
Meese schedule. 

11/21/86 
12:15 PM (IRAN) 

Meese and Poindexter meet. Earl, North's deputy, says North 
also meets with Mce.sc and asks whether he has 24 or 48 
hours. North says he does not recall this. North and Mcosc 
testify they do not recall meeting on 11/21. Earl says North 
tells him he (North) has been designated the scapegoat. 

Meese Test.. Hearings, 100-9. at 335-36; North Test., Hearings 
100-7 part I. at 144-45; part II at 41-44. 106-108; Earl Dep.. 
5/2/87. at 63-66. 

115 



11/21/86 (IRAN) 
12:29 AM Poindexter calls North. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 116. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
12:45 PM Meese, Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General 
William Bradford Reynolds, Cooper and Richardson have 
lunch. Meese assembles a team of lawyers and makes a list of 
those to interview. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 225-26; Ex. EM-43; Cooper Test. , 
Hearings, 100-6. at 283-84, 293. 321-22. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
13:30 PM North meets with Poindexter. North testifies that he asks 

Poindexter if he had told President Reagan of the diversion, 
and Poindexter says he had not. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 10; North calendar; 
Poindexter Test.. Hearings, 100-8, at 117. 

11/21/86 
13:45 PM (IRAN) 

Meese talks with FBI Director William H. Webster. Based on 
what Meese tells him, Webster agrees that the situation is not 
criminal in nature and therefore it is not appropriate to 
involve the FBI. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 201; Meese schedule. 

11/21/86 
14:25 PM (IRAN) 

Meese, Reynolds, Richardson, and Cooper meet with John 
Bolton, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs. 
Bolton briefs them on Casey's testimony. Reynolds' notes of 
the meeting indicate the sale of TOWs to Iran is discussed. 

Meese schedule; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, Exs. EM-38, 
EM-43. 

11/21/86 
14:25 PM (IRAN) 

North meets with Poindexter. North has his special notebooks. 
Poindexter says he had the impression that North was going to 
destroy the notebooks. North says they discussed covering up 
the diversion. After this meeting, or at the one at 13:30, 
North returns to his office, and directs Fawn Hall to alter 
documents. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 114-16; North Test., 

Hearings, 100- 7 part 1, at 22; Hall Test. , Hearings, 100-5. at 

489-90, 493-501. .., 

1 16 



11/21/86 (IRAN) 
14:28 PM Meese calls McFarlane. 

Meese home and work phone logs; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87. at 134-42: 
Meese Test., Hearings. 100-9. at 227. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
14:58 PM Meese calls Poindexter on a secure phone. He advises 

Poindexter that he will send over a "couple of his people" to 
review documents. Thereafter. Poindexter speaks to Thompson 
and North. North indicates that he will destroy his notebooks 
and Poindexter does not try to stop him. Subsequently, 
Poindexter says he destroyed the 11/26/85 Finding on the 
11/85 HAWK shipment to Iran that Poindexter says President 
Reagan signed on 12/5/85. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 226-27; Cooper Test., Hearings, 
100-6. at 256; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 19-23, 118-19, 
132, 143-44, 148-49. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
15:15 PM Ledeen visits North in North's office. North asks Ledeen what 
his story will be about the 11/85 HAWK shipment. Earlier, 
North tells Ledeen that a source at the Department of Justice 
had advised him to get a lawyer. 

Hall Test.. Hearings, 100-5, at 488; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 112. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
15:30 PM Meese and Cooper interview McFarlane and discuss the 11/85 
shipment and a Finding. According to McFarlane, Meese 
apparently volunteers that an oral Finding is sufficient; 
according to Cooper there is no discussion of an oral Finding. 
There is no mention of either the diversion or the shredding 
party. McFarlane says he believed the 11/85 shipment was 
oil-drilling parts. Meese tells him of Shultz's notes. As 
McFarlane is leaving, he speaks to Meese alone, says that the 
President was fully behind the Iranian initiative. According to 
Cooper, he expresses a desire to protect the President. 

Meese Test.. Hearings, 100-9, at 226-31; Cooper Test.. Hearings. 
100-6, at 255; McFarlane Test.. Hearings, 100-2. at 71-72. 93-95, 
215-17, 236-37, Ex. 67. at 743; North Te.st., Hearings. 1 IX) -7 part 
I. at 103. McFarlane Test.. Hearings, 100-7. part II. at 236-238. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
17:30 PM North and Hall destroy documents. 

North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part I. at 15: Hall Test.. Hearings. 
100-5. at 502 05. 



117 



11/21/86 (IRAN) 
17:30 PM North meets with lawyer Thomas Green. 

Hall Test. . Hearings, 100-5, at 489, 505. 

11/21/86 
17:45 PM (IRAN) 

Circa McFarlane phones North from outside the Department of 
Justice and tells him about his interview with the Attorney 
General. North tells McFarlane he has been urged to get an 
attorney and warned that his phone may be bugged. 

McFarlane Dep. , 7/2/87, at 1 1 , 53; North Test., Hearings, 100-7, 
part I, at 106; part II. at 216; North Notebook. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
18:00 PM McFarlane calls Sofaer and Shultz seeking copies of the State 
Department notes relating to the 11/85 HAWK shipment. 

Sofaer Dep., 6/28/87, at 62-64. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
18:09 PM Meese receives a call from Webster. 

Meese home and work phone logs. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
18:25 PM Meese, Cooper, Reynolds, and Richardson meet. Bolton joins 
the meeting. 

Meese schedule; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
18:55 PM Meese calls Weinberger. 

Meese home and work phone logs. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
19:05 PM Meese calls Casey. 

Meese home and work phone logs. 

11/21/86 (IRAN) 
19:10 PM Shultz calls Meese; an interview is arranged for the next 
morning. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 231; Meese Dep.. 7/8/87, at 94. 



118 



11/21/86 (IRAN) 
21:01 PM McFarlane sends a PROF to Poindexter about his meeting 
with Meese and says: "The only blind spot. . . concerned a 
shipment in November '85 which still doesn't ring a bell with 
me." 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 93; Poindexter Test. , 
Hearings, 100-8. Ex. JMP-71. 



11/22/86 
08:00 AM 



11/22/86 
09:50 AM 



11/22/86 
09:50 AM 



11/22/86 
09:55 AM 



11/22/86 
10:00 AM 



11/22/86 
10:15 AM 



11/22/86 
10:40 AM 



11/22/86 
10:45 AM 



November 22, 1986 

(IRAN) 

Meese and Cooper interview Shultz, with Charles Hill, 

Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State, present. 

Shultz Test. , Hearings, 100-9. at 45; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, 
at 231-33, 340, 414-15; Meese schedule; Cooper Test., Hearings, 
100-6, at 257; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 146-50. 

(IRAN) 

Meese meets with Cooper. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 233; Meese schedule. 

(IRAN) 

North speaks to Poindexter. 

Poindexter log. 

(IRAN) 

Casey calls Meese. 

Meese home and work phone logs. 

(IRAN) 

Meese, Cooper, Reynolds, and Richardson meet to review 

how the fact-finding would proceed. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9. at 233; Meese schedule. 

(IRAN) 

Meese speaks to Poindexter. 

Meese home and work logs. 

(IRAN) 

Meese calls Thompson (for Cooper). 

Meese home and work phone logs. 

(IRAN) 

Meese calls Poindexter. 

Meese home and work phone logs; Poindexter phone logs. 



119 



11/22/86 (IRAN) 
11:10 AM Meese and Cooper interview Sporkin. Meese learns of the 
11/85 Finding, he testifies. 

Meese schedule; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 233. 

11/22/86 (IRAN) 
11:38 AM Poindexter speaks to Casey. 

Poinde.xter log. 

11/22/86 (IRAN) 
12:05 PM Reynolds and Richardson examine NSC files. Thompson and 
Earl are present. These Justice Department officials review the 
documents "presented to them" and have copies made of those 
considered important. They discover the April memo that 
explicitly refers to the diversion of funds to the Contras. As 
they are leaving for lunch, North arrives and indicates he was 
aware they would be in the NSC offices; North then volunteers 
to answer their questions. According to North, he shreds 
documents while Reynolds and Richardson are in the office 
and continues while they are at lunch. The latter two deny 
North shredded in their presence. Earl testifies that North's 
shredder was broken and he had to leave his office to shred. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 254-55; part II, at 174; 
Cooper Test. , Hearings, 100-6, at 257, 259; Reynolds Dep. , 
8/27/87, at 58-89, 97, 101-02; Earl Dep., 5/2/87, at 79-81; 
Richardson Dep., 7/22/87, at 273-287; Meese Test., Hearings, 
100-9, at 296-300. 

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
13:25 PM Casey and Poindexter have lunch. North joins them at 14:50 
p.m. (until 15:40 p.m.). Alton Keel, Deputy National Security 
Adviser, may have been there briefly, according to 
Poindexter. Poindexter says there is no discussion of any 
diversion or of the destruction of the 1985 Finding on 11/21 
by Poindexter. At 14:52 p.m., during the lunch, Regan calls 
Casey. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 285, 348-52, 395-396; 
Poindexter calendar; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 50-51. 

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
13:45 PM Meese, Reynolds, Cooper, and Richardson have lunch at the 
Old Ebbitt Grill. Reynolds advises Meese of the draft 
diversion memo. Meese testifies that he is surprised and 
concerned about the document. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 41, Ex. EM-43; Cooper Test., 
Hearings, 100-6, at 257-58; Reynolds Dep., 8/27/87. at 89-96; 
Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 156-62; Richardson Dep., 7/22/87, at 
290-298. 

120 



11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Cooper interviews Sp)orkin. who says he was told in 11/85 
that the 11/85 shipment was arms. 

Cooper Dep.. 6/22/87, at 166-67. 

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
15:40 PM North calls Meese. Mccsc schedules an interview with North on 
11/23 at 2:00 p.m. to give North time to go to church in the 
morning. 

Meese Test. , Hearings. 100-9, at 235-36, 239-40; Meese home and 
work phone logs. 

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
15:46 PM Casey calls Meese to schedule a meeting later in the day. 

Meese home and work phone logs; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 
236. 

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:40 PM Poindexter talks with North. 

Poindexter log. 

1 1 /22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:45 PM Meese meets with Casey at the latter's home. They discuss 
Furmark and the Canadian investors. Meese says he is sure 
that Casey did not mention anything about Central America 
and does not believe there was any discussion of the Contras. 

Meese schedule; Meese Test., Hearings. 100-9. at 236-39, 310-11, 
321; Cooper Test.. Hearings. 100-6. at 260. 

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
18:00 PM Cooper goes to the CIA with an assistant and interviews 
several officials. 

Cooper Test.. Hearings. 100-6. at 260; Meese schedule. 



November 23, 1986 

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:00 AM Cooper goes to the CIA with an assistant and interviews 
Allen, Jameson, Doherty, and Clarridge. 

Meese .schedule; Cooper Test.. Hearings. 100-6. at 260. 

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:15 AM North calls McFarlane and asks to meet. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2. at 72. 



11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:30 AM North speaks to Secord about the interview with Meese due 
later in the day. 

Secord Test., Hearings, 1 00-1, at 280. 



11/23/86 
10:10 AM 



(IRAN/CONTRA) 

Meese speaks to Casey. Cooper then meets with Casey. 

Meese notes; Cooper Test. , Hearings, 100-6, at 260. 



11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:45 AM Reynolds and Richardson go to the NSC. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43. 

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
12:30 PM North and McFarlane meet in the latter's office with no one 
else present. According to McFarlane, North states that: (1) 
there is a problem with the diversion; (2) the diversion was a 
matter of record in a memo; (3) it was approved by 
Poindexter. Green and Secord arrive minutes later; McFarlane 
leaves them to talk in his office. North says he does not recall 
saying anything about the diversion memo to McFarlane. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 72. North Test., Hearings, 
100-7 part 11, at 106, 216. 

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
12:32 PM Meese calls Regan. 

Meese home and work phone logs. 

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
12:45 PM Meese, Cooper, Reynolds, and Richardson meet. 

Meese schedule. 



122 



11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
14:55 PM Meese. Reynolds, Cooper, and Richardson interview North. 
(Meese leaves the interview at 16:05 p.m.) North states: (1) 
he believes the arms deal was authorized by the President; (2) 
the idea of the diversion surfaced in discussions with Nir in 
1/86; (3) $3 million to $4 million was diverted after the 
February shipment of TOWs and more after the the May 
shipment of HAWK parts; (4) Israel controlled the money; (5) 
North gave the Swiss account numbers (accounts opened by 
Calero) to the Israelis; and (6) only he (North). McFarlane, 
and Poindexter were aware of the diversion. North is said to 
have been surprised when Meese showed him the draft memo 
that Reynolds and Richardson had found. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 240-47, 328-332; Ex. EM-43; 
Meese Schedule; North Test., Hearings, J 00- 7 part I, at 20-23; 
Cooper Test., Hearings. 100-6, at 261; Reynolds Dep., 9/1/87, at 
18-33; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 191-210; Richardson Dep., 
7/22/87, at 317-332. 



11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:(X) PM North calls McFarlane and tells him about the Meese 
interview. 

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 242. 

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:05 PM North calls Poindexter after the interview and then shreds 

more documents. He remains in the office until at least 4:50 
a.m. on 1 1/24. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 118; North Test., Hearings, 
'100-7 part I, at 242, 257-59. 

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
19:(K) PM Sofaer calls Cooper to find out the status of the investigation. 
He explains to Cooper that he thought there may have been a 
difference between the purchase price and cost price in the 
arms sales. Sofaer also volunteers that he suspects that SAT 
may have given excess profits from the Iran arms sales to ■ 
finance the Contra resupply operation. Cooper did not mention 
the diversion memorandum or North's interview. 



Cooper Test. 
69-70. 



Hearings, l(K)-6, at 265; Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 



123 



November 24, 1986 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
07:20 AM Meese, Reynolds, Cooper, Richardson, and T. Kenneth Cribb, 
Jr., Counselor to the Attorney General, meet to review what 
has been found. Meese directs Cooper to look over the 
criminal laws and other applicable statutes. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 207, 417. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
08:57 AM Poindexter talks with McFarlane. 

Poindexter log. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:00 AM Cooper meets with Sofaer and Hill; he sees the notes on the 
1985 HAWKs shipment. 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 265; Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 
71-72. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09: 12 AM Poindexter calls North on a secure phone. 

Poindexter phone logs. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:55 AM Meese calls William Weld, Assistant Attorney General, 

Criminal Division, to explain why the Criminal Division was 
not involved in his inquiry over the weekend. 

Meese home and work phone logs; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 
56; Weld Dep., 7/16/87, at 22-25. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:00 AM Meese meets with McFarlane about the diversion. McFarlane 
acknowleges he knew of the diversion but does not tell Meese 
about the "shredding party" North had mentioned to him. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 72; Cooper Test., Hearings. 
100-6, at 267; Meese Test. . Hearings, 100-9, at 250, 331. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:02 AM Meese calls Regan. 

Meese home and work phone logs; Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 
331. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:25 AM Poindexter sj)eaks to Casey. 

Poindexter log. 



124 



11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:29 AM Poindexter speaks to Weinberger. 

Poindexter log. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:55 AM Poindexter speaks to North on a secure telephone line. 

Poindexter log. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
1 1:00 AM According to Regan. Meese meets with him and advises him 
of the diversion memo and North's and McFarlane's 
confirmation of the diversion. Regan also testifies that Meese 
meets with the President, informs him of the diversion memo 
and the North and McFarlane confirmation. Regan and Meese 
testify that the President was shocked. Meese tells the 
President he needs more time to complete his review, and will 
report later that day. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 251; Regan Test., Hearings, 
100-10, at 29-30. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
11:44 AM Meese calls McFarlane. 

Meese work and home phone logs. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
12:30 PM Meese, Reynolds, Cooper. Cribb. and Richardson meet. 

Meese Dep. , 7/8/87, at 146. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
13:30 PM A Cooper assistant tells Richardson that he had heard rumors 
at the CIA that Iran money was diverted to the Contras. 
According to Cooper, he would likely have passed this 
information to Meese. 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 266. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
14:00 PM President Reagan, Vice President Bush. Meese, Shultz, 

Weinberger, Regan, Poindexter, Casey, and Cave meet to 
discuss Iran. The diversion was not di.scussed, participants 
testify. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 200, 225, 251, 343: Cave Dep., 
4/17/87. at 92-93, 198. 



125 



1 1 /24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
14:05 PM Reynolds and Cooper meet with Green, who describes 
Hakim's role in the diversion. Reynolds tells 
Meese of the conversation with Green, but Meese does not 
remember if Reynolds told him that Green confirmed the 
diversion. 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 268; Reynolds Dep., 9/1/87, at 
38-51, 60-66; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 134. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
14:44 PM Secord talks to North. 

North phone log. 
11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
16:15 PM Meese interviews Poindexter in the latter's office for 10 
minutes. Meese is alone and takes no notes. Poindexter 
acknowledges knowing "generally" about the diversion and 
adds that North gave him "enough hints" to know the money 
was going to the Contras. Poindexter did not inquire further, 
however, and told no one, including the President, about the 
diversion. According to Poindexter, Meese did not ask him if 
he ever told the President; according to Meese, he did ask 
him, and Poindexter responded that he had not told the 
President or Regan. 

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 119-20, 203; Meese Test., 
Hearings, 100-9, at 253, 332. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
16:30 PM Meese meets with President Reagan and Regan. He relates 
Poindexter's statements and discusses "looking at what 
applicable criminal laws there might be." Meese testifies that 
neither Regan nor President Reagan knew anything about the 
diversion. 

Cooper Test. , Hearings, 100-6, at 266; Meese Test. , Hearings, 
100-9, at 254. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:00 PM Meese meets with Vice President Bush alone. He takes no 
notes. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 331, Ex. EM -43. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:30 PM Casey calls Cooper, after meeting with Furmark at the CIA. 
He asks what Cooper knows about "Lakeside Resources." 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6. at 282-83, Ex. UC-l. 



126 



11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
18:10 PM Casey speaks to Poindexter on a secure phone. 

Poindexter log. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
18:30 PM Regan talks to Casey about the diversion. 

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 31-32, 42-44, 101-02. 

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
18:53 PM Meese calls Poindexter. 

Poindexter log. 

November 25, 1986 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
06:30 AM Casey calls Meese. 

Senate Intelligence Report, at 61. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
06:40 AM Meese meets with Casey at the latter's house. Richardson 
accompanies Meese in his car but is not at the meeting. 
According to Meese, Casey states that he had heard from 
Regan the previous evening about the diversion and that 
Poindexter was planning to resign. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 255, 332, Ex. EM-43; Regan 
Dep., 7/15/87, at 73-78. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
06:50 AM Regan calls Meese at Casey's home to talk about Poindexter's 
resignation. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9. at 255-56; Senate Intelligence Report, 
at 61. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
07:15 AM Meese meets with Poindexter and advises him the time has 
come to submit his resignation. 

Meese schedule; Meese Test. , Hearings. 100-9, at 396; Poinde.xter 
calendar; Poindexter Test. , Hearings. 100-8. at 120. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
07:50 AM Meese calls Weinberger. He takes no notes. 

Meese home and work phone logs. 



127 



11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
07:50 AM Regan tells Poindexter to tender his resignation at the 9:30 
a.m. briefing. 

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 33-34. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
08:00 AM An Iran-Contra review board is proposed by Regan. 

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 61; Meese Test., Hearings, 
100-9, at 7. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
08:15 AM Cooper meets with Wallison to draft a Presidential statement 
for a press conference later in the day. Thererafter, Cooper 
and Richardson meet with Assistant to the President and 
Director of Communications Patrick J. Buchanan, Speakes, 
and Wallison to review the statement. 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 268. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:00 AM Meese meets with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and 
Regan and advises them of what he has learned and that a 
criminal investigation probably will be undertaken. 

Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, at 255, 404. Senate Intelligence 
Report, at 61. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:20 AM Poindexter meets with North. 

Poindexter calendar. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:30 AM Meese meets with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, 
Regan, and Poindexter. Poindexter resigns. 

Meese schedule; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 121; Regan 
Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 33-34, 109-1 W. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
09:35 AM Green speaks to North. 

North log. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:05 AM Poindexter meets with Meese. 

Poindexter calendar. 



128 



11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
10:15 AM President Reagan meets with the NSC to brief them on 
developments. 

Meese schedule, Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 156-157. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
11:00 AM President Reagan, Regan, Shultz, Meese, and Casey brief 
Congressional leaders. 

Meese Test., Hearings. 100-9. at 198. 201. 203-04, 211. 214. 294; 
Ex. EM-53. 

1 1 /25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
12:00 PM Meese holds a press conference on the diversion. He 

announces Poindexter's resignation. North's firing, and the 
Tower Board appointment. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, (t48, at 
1604; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 63. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
12:03 PM Poindexter speaks to Casey on a secure phone line. 

Poindexter log. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
13:00 PM Hall relays a call from the President to North at a hotel where 
he went to meet Secord. North tells Hall later that the 
President had called him "an American hero." The President 
also tells North, "1 just didn't know," North says. North 
testifies that he thought the President meant he did not know 
of the diversion. 

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 506; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 
part I, at 244; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 135-36. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
14:05 PM Meese meets with Webster, Burns, Reynolds, Cooper, 
Richardson, and Cribb. Stephen S. Trott, the Associate 
Attorney General, joins the meeting at 14:20 p.m. At this 
meeting, Meese directs Burns to notify the White House 
Counsel to insure that documents belonging to North and 
Poindexter were secure. He directs Cooper to meet with Weld 
about applicable laws. Meese advises Webster that he is 
turning the matter over to the Criminal Division and will 
"probably" need FBI resources. (Those resources were 
requested the next day.) Cooper subsequently meets with 
Weld and briefs him. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 202, 307, 405, Ex. EM-43: 
Cooper Test.. Hearings. 100-6, at 113; Senate Intelligence Report. 
at 62. 



129 



11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
15:00 PM McFarlane calls North from London after the Meese press 

conference and reads to North a statement he has prepared. It 
says that he learned of the diversion in Tehran and took it to 
be approved policy. North says the statement is accurate. 
McFarlane asks if the diversion was approved. North 
responds, "Yes, . . . You know I wasn't doing anything that 
wasn't approved." McFarlane asks how the diversion became 
known. North says they must have found a memo. Asked on 
5/11/87 whether he previously had told the Committees that 
North's words were "I missed one," McFarlane replied, "Yes." 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 79-80. 

11/25/86 (CONTRA) 

Abrams, appearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
is questioned about third-country solicitation. He fails to 
disclose the Brunei solicitation. Abrams later asks Shultz 
about disclosing the Brunei contribution; Shultz responds "[I]f 
you think you should, go ahead." 

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 71-79, 88-91; 147-151. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
16:00 PM Meese meets with Poindexter. 

Poindexter calendar. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
16:10 PM Meese meets with Reynolds, Cooper, Cribb, and Richardson. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
16:40 PM Meese has a telephone conversation with Israeli Foreign 
Minister Peres. Peres disputes Meese's press conference 
account of the Israeli role in the 1986 arms-for-hostages 
initiative. 

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 261-262; Israeli Chronology. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:00 PM Hall discovers the originals of the documents she altered on 
11/21 and realizes she had not completed the process of 
replacing the original versions. Hall also notices PROF notes 
and minutes of the May Tehran meeting and becomes 
concerned that these had not been destroyed. 

Hall Test. . Hearings, 100-5, at 508-10. 



130 



11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:15 PM 17:15 PM Hall calls North in a panic because the NSC 

security officer has taken custody of the office, and documents 
no longer could be destroyed. North agrees to come back to 
the office. He tells Hall to clear Thomas Green through 
security officers. 

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 508-10; North Test., Hearings. 
100-7 part 11. at 90. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:20 PM Hall takes the materials that concerned her to the upper level 
of her office. There she stuffs the altered copies into her 
boots. Hall asks Earl to help her pull the PROF notes from 
the file. Hall puts those PROF notes "in my back." 

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 508-10. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
17:30 PM North and Green arrive at the office. Hall, North, and Green 
leave together after their briefcases are inspected by the NSC 
security staff and go to Green's car. Hall gives the documents 
she had removed to North in the car. Green asks her what she 
would say about shredding. She says that she will say it is 
done every day. He says, "Good," Hall testifies. 

Hall Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 510. 

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
18:40 PM Meese meets again with Richardson, Cribb, Burns, Trott, 

Reynolds, Cooper, Weld, and others for an update regarding 
their prior meeting. Meese asks Burns if he had secured the 
White House documents. Burns indicated he had not done so 
and left the room to make a call. Meese, according to 
Cooper, was upset that Burns had not accomplished this yet. 
As it turned out. Burns was not able to get through to 
Wallison until the next afternoon. Wallison told him the , 
documents had in fact already been secured by the NSC 
security officer. 



Meese Test. , Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43; Weld Dep. 
29-32. 



7/16/87. at 



11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

19:00 PM Cooper, Reynolds, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General 
William R. McGinnis meet with Department of the Army 
General Counsel Susan J. Crawford and DOD personnel to 
discuss the transfer and pricing of arms to Iran under the 
Economy Act. 



Susan Crawford Dep. 



6/15/87. at 47-56. Exs. 7. 8. 

131 



11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 
9:05 PM McFarlane calls Meese. 

Meese home and work phone log 



November 26-December 31, 1986 

11/26/86 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in a Time magazine interview says of Lieut. 
Colonel North: "He has a fine record. He is a national hero. 
My only criticism is that I wasn't told everything." He adds: 
"We think we took the only action we could have in Iran. I'm 
not going to disavow it. I do not think it was a mistake. No, 
it has not worked out the way we had hoped, but I don't see 
anything I would have done differently. ... I believe that as 
the truth comes out, people will see what we were doing was 
right." 

Phone interview with Hugh Sidey, Washington Contributing Editor. 

11/26/86 (CONTRA) 

Green stops representing North. 

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 511. 

11/26/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

The full investigative team from the Justice Department and 
the FBI meets. Meese designates Cooper and Weld as the 
leaders of the investigation. Cooper subsequently leaves the 
team, because of FBI misgivings. Cooper and Weld testify. 

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 269-70. Weld Dep., 7/16/87, at 
36-38. 

11/26/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

President Reagan appoints the Special Review Board (Tower 
Board). 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, M8, at 
1605-1606; Media reports. 

11/27/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Jay Stephens from the White House Counsel's office calls Hall 
and asks her about the shredding incident. Hall says, "We 
shred every day," and she "led him to believe that there was 
nothing unusual about what had occurred." 

Hall Test., Hearings. 100-5. at 511. 



132 



11/28/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Hall and Earl agree not to discuss the removal of documents 
with FBI investigators. 

Hall Test. , Hearings, 100-5, at 512. 

11/28/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Rodney McDaniel, NSC Executive Secretary, orders an end to 
NSC covert operations pending conclusion of the Tower 
Board's investigation. 

Media reports. 

11/29/86 (CONTRA) 

Acting National Security Adviser Keel, under President 
Reagan's orders, ends all NSC staff involvement in operational 
activities. 

Keel Dep., 9/3/87, at 13-14. 

11/29/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Hall calls Brendan Sullivan, North's new lawyer, drives to his 
office, and tells him she smuggled documents from the White 
House. Sullivan tells her to get a lawyer. 

Hall Test., Hearings. 100-5, at 511-12. 

11/30/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

President Reagan at a Naval Air Station in California says: 
"We will do everything necessary to get at the truth and then 
we will make the truth known." 

Media reports. 

12/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Shultz cables the U.S. Ambassador in Brunei instructing him 
to tell government officials that, if they had not sent the 
money by then, do not. The U.S. Ambassador cables back to 
say when he gave the Brunei official the message, the official 
became visibly shaken. 

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 51; Shultz Test., Hearings, 
100-9, Exs. GPS-56S, GPS-56T. 

12/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Without notifying the State Department, Tambs resigns as 
U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica and announces to his staff 
that he believes he has accomplished the mission of of>cning 
the Southern Front. 

Tambs Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 366. 



133 



12/01/86 (CONTRA) 

Circa Channel] asks Garwood for $10,000 for. a North legal defense 
fund. Garwood later asks for a refund to send the money to a 
similar fund after she is told that Channell "takes 35% for his 
own organization." 

Garwood Test. , Hearings, 100-3, at 132-33. 

12/02/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Meese applies to Federal court for an Independent Counsel to 
investigate the Iran-Contra Affair. 

Media reports. 

12/04/86 (CONTRA) 

A Brunei official advises the U.S. Ambassador to Brunei that 
David Conner, Manager of Citibank, in Brunei had 
transferred $10 million to Jacob Steger, Credit Suisse Bank, 
Geneva, Switzerland on 8/19/86, because they had been given 
the wrong account number. 

Shultz Test. , Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56T. 

12/04/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Robinette sends North two phony bills and North sends 
Robinette two fabricated responses to give North the 
appearance of having paid for the home-security system. The 
bill was actually paid by Secord. Robinette says he never 
asked North for payment. North never offered any. Robinette 
received a $7,000 payment from Secord in 05/86. In 08/86, 
when the job was completed, he received an additional $9,000 
and received a Secord check for that amount. Robinette said 
the security system cost $13,875 and he took $2,125 as a 
consulting fee. Senator Mitchell asks Robinette, "The purpose 
of these phony bills was to cover up what you were aware 
was at least wrong and possibly illegal?" Robinette says: 
"That's correct, sir." 

Robinette Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 14-18, 40, Exs. GR-8A, 
GR-8B, GR-9A, GR-9B; North Test.. Hearings. 100-7 part 1. at 
126-32. 



134 



12/05/86 (CONTRA) 

After reviewing his testimony of November 25, 1986 and 
receiving permission from Secretary Shultz to reveal the 
Brunei solicitation, Abrams contacts members of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and requests another hearing to correct 
the record. During that appearance, Abrams reveals the 
Brunei solicitation and apologizes for misleading the 
Committee on November 25th. 

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 75-79, 88, 147-50. 

12/06/86 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in a radio address says: "While we are 
seeking all the facts, it's obvious that the execution of these 
policies was flawed and mistakes were made." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #50, at 
1629.' 

12/08/86 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane testifies before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. He says that neither he nor North solicited Contra 
funds. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, at 82, 125, Ex. 63, at 686, Ex. 
74, at 759. 

12/10/86 (CONTRA) 

Castillo is interviewed at CIA headquarters about contacts 
with private benefactors and the airstrip in Costa Rica. 

Castillo Test. , Hearings, 100-4, at 5. 

12/10/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

McFarlane testifies before the House Intelligence Committee. 
He says he believed the Boland Amendment applied to the 
NSC staff. 

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2. at 125-26, Ex. 75. at 761. 

12/11/86 (IRAN) 

McFarlane is interviewed by the Tower Board. 

Tower index. 

12/13/86 (IRAN) 

Cave and Charles Dunbar of the State Department meet with 
the second channel in Frankfurt. Dunbar learns of the nine- 
point plan. He later tells Shultz of the plan. Shultz is shocked 
and outraged. He tells President Reagan of it. Weinberger 
learns of the Frankfurt meeting and writes a strong protest 
memo to Keel, with a copy to Shultz. 

Shultz Test.. Hearings. 100-9. at 4-5. 4649: 61 63: 146 147: /•:». 
GPS 50. 51: Weinberger Test.. 100-10. at 157 160. Ex. CWW .U: 
Cave Dep., 4/17/87. at 154-59. 9/29/87. at 174-83: Keel Dep. . 
3/18/87. at 956-970. 

135 



12/15/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Casey suffers a "minor cerebral seizure" the day before his 
scheduled testimony at the Senate Intelligence Committee. 

Media reports. 

12/16/86 (IRAN) 

Poindexter says he knows nothing about a meeting on this day 
at which a discussion allegedly took place among Meese, 
Regan, and the President about getting North and Poindexter 
either Congressional immunity or a Presidential pardon. 

Poindexter Test. , Hearings, 100-8, at 89; Regan Test. , Hearings, 
100- JO. at 104-105; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 392-93. 

12/16/86 (IRAN) 

President Reagan says: "It is my desire to have the full story 
about Iran come out now — the alleged transfer of funds, the 
Swiss bank accounts, who was involved — everything." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22 §51 , at 
1653-1654. 

12/18/86 (IRAN) 

Vice President Bush is interviewed by the Tower Board. 

Tower index. 

12/18/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Casey undergoes surgery at Georgetown University Hospital. 

Media reports. 

12/19/86 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Lawrence Walsh is appointed Independent Counsel to conduct 
a criminal investigation of the Iran-Contra Affair. 

Media reports. 

1987 

01/01/87 (CONTRA) 

Circa Castillo is recalled to Washington. 

Castillo Test. , Hearings, 100-4, at 5. 



136 



01/05/87 (CONTRA) 

The fake "Prince", in reality an Iranian con man, pleads guilty 
to fraud charges in Philadelphia. 

Media reports. 

01/06/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

The Senate establishes the Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. 

S. Res. 23. 100th Cong. . 1st Sess. (1987) 

01/07/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

The House establishes the Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 

H. Res. 12, 100th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1987) 

01/14/87 (IRAN) 

Weinberger is interviewed by the Tower Board. 

Tower index. 

01/20/87 (IRAN) 

Meese is interviewed by the Tower Board. 

Tower index. 

01/24/87 (IRAN) 

Americans Allan Steen, Jesse Turner, and Robert Polhill are 
kidnapped in Lebanon. 

Media reports. 

01/26/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan is interviewed by the Tower Board. The 
Tower Board reports that "The President told the Board on 
January 26, 1987, that he did not know that the NSC staff 
was engaged in helping the Contras." 

Tower Report at 111-24; North Test. , Hearings, 100- 7 part 1, at 
265-66. 



137 



01/27/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in his State of the Union address says: "I do 
not believe it was wrong to establish contacts with a country 
of strategic importance or to try to save lives." He also says: 
"But though we have made much progress, I have one major 
regret. I took a risk with regard to our action in Iran. It did 
not work, and for that I assume full responsibility. . . . We 
did not achieve what we wished, and serious mistakes were 
made in trying to do so. We will get to the bottom of this, 
and take whatever action is called for." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, U7, at 60. 

02/08/87 (CONTRA) 

McFarlane amends his 12/86 testimony in a letter to Rep. 
Hamilton, saying that he told a foreign official where to send 
a $5 million donation to the Contras. 

McFarlane Test. , Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 60, at 677. 

02/09/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

McFarlane takes an overdose of valium and is confined to 
Bethesda Naval Hospital. He had been scheduled to testify 
before the Tower Board the following day. 

Media reports. 

02/11/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan is again interviewed by the Tower Board. 

Tower index. 

02/19/87 (IRAN) 

McFarlane is interviewed by the Tower Board. 

Tower index. 

02/20/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in a statement to the Tower Board says: 
"Try as I might, I cannot recall anything whatsoever about 
whether I approved an Israeli sale in advance or whether I 
approved replenishment of Israeli stocks around August, 1985. 
My answer therefore and the simple truth is, I don't remember 
— period." 

Tower Report, at B- 19-20. 

02/21/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

McFarlane testifies for the third time before Tower Board. 

Tower index. 



138 



02/25/87 (CONTRA) 

The fake "Prince" is sentenced to 5 years on fraud charges in 
Philadelphia. 

Media reports. 

02/26/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in opening a Tower Board news conference 
says: "But I pledge to the American people today that I will 
do whatever is necessary to enact the proper reforms and to 
meet the challenges ahead." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, tt8, at 193. 

03/04/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

President Reagan in addressing the Nation says: "First let me 
say I take full responsibility for my own actions and for those 
of my own administration. As angry as I may be about 
activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am still 
accountable to those activities. As disappointed as I may be in 
some who served me, I am still the one who must answer to 
the American people for this behavior. And as personally 
distasteful as I find secret bank accounts and diverted funds, 
as the Navy would say, this happened on my own watch." He 
adds: "A few months ago, I told the American people I did 
not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions 
still tell me that is true, but the facts and evidence tell me it 
is not. What began as a strategic opening to Iran 
deteriorated . . . into trading arms for hostages." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, #9, at 220. 

03/13/87 (IRAN) 

The General Accounting Office issues a report to the House 
and Senate Select Committees that concludes that DOD acted 
properly regarding the Economy Act; that it undercharged 
CIA by $2.1 million; and that DOD bypassed normal review, 
and approval channels. It recommends that DOD adjust the 
billing. 

Report to House and Senate Select Committees: "DOD's Transfer of 
Arms to the CIA. " 



139 



03/26/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in a talk to schoolchildren at Columbia, 
Missouri says: "It sort of settled down to just trading arms for 
hostages, and that's a little like paying ransom to a 
kidnapper. ... If you do it, then the kidnapper's just 
encouraged to go kidnap someone else." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, ft 12, at 301. 

04/29/87 (CONTRA) 

Channell pleads guilty to a charge by the Independent Counsel 
of conspiring with others to defraud the Internal Revenue 
Service. Channell named Richard Miller and North as 
co-conspirators. 

Media reports; Joint Report, at 100. 

05/05/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Joint Iran-Contra public hearings begin with Secord as the 
first witness. 

Secord Test. , Hearings, 100-1. 

05/05/87 (CONTRA) 

On solicitation of private aid for the Contras, President 
Reagan says: "I don't know how that was to be used, and I 
have no knowledge that there was ever any solicitation by our 
people with these people." 

Media reports. 

05/06/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Casey dies, one day after the Iran-Contra hearings begin. 

Media reports. 

05/06/87 (CONTRA) 

Richard Miller pleads guilty to a charge nearly identical to the 
Channell charge. 

Media reports. 

08/06/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

Joint Iran-Contra hearings end. 

Media reports. 



140 



08/12/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan in an address to the Nation says: "I let my 
preoccupation with the hostages intrude into areas it didn't 
belong. ... I was stubborn in my pursuit of a policy that 
went astray." 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, §22, at 929. 

10/12/87 (IRAN) 

President Reagan says, "It was not trading arms for hostages." 

New Republic, 10/12/87. 

11/18/87 (IRAN/CONTRA) 

The House and Senate Iran-Contra Committees issue their 
joint report on the results of their investigation. 

H. Kept. No. 100-433; Sen. Rept. No. 100-216, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session. 



141 



EXHIBITS 



UNCLASSinED 



i.?/l/2( 



Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of 
Th« Foraiqn Aasxatance Act og 1961, 
Aj Amendea, Concerning CpTationa 
Undertaxen by the Central Intelligence 
Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than 
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose 
of Intelligence Collection 



'^ U659 



I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign 
country (including ail support necessary to such operation) is 
important to the national security of the United States, and direct 
the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report 
this Finding to the intelligence committees of the Congress 
pursuant to Section 501 of the National Security Act of 194T, as 
amended, and to provide such briefings as necessary. 



SCOPE 



Central America 



PURPOSE 

Support and conduct 

paramilitary operations agaimt 



The VThita Houae 
Washington, D. C. 
December 1, 1981 




/ 





Q nCL Q Hl?l Oil -3 Nov 



143 



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J.ily 12. 1983 



147G'J 



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jcmoiuurooM roR thi honorable ceopce p. shultz 

Th« S«cr«t«ry of Stot« 

BONOBXBU CVSPAJI W. WriNiEMIH 
Th« S«cr«tary o( Dafent* 

BOMOKABLX WILLIAM J. CASEY 
Diractor of C«ntr«I Int«Xllq«nc* 

cnitwa JOHN w. vt$snf, jh. 

Ch«lrmtn, Joint CM«ft of Staff 
SUBJBCTi CantrsI Axtarica lUI 



t«a*4 oo tha NSC ■•ctin<; of July 8, 19(3. it !• ny .^udgnent that: 

• Tha aecurlty tltuation in Ctntral \pi«rica i( deteriorating. 

• Ttola la a conaaqutnca of, avonq other thinqa, inadequate 
raaourcaa. 

• Thara la a paraiatcnt lack of public underctandinq of ocr 
intaraata, ob^cctivaa, the threat, and our policies for 
daalinq with Central A»erican probleaa. (TS/S) 

Accordingly, in order to deal with these xtcuca I hava rcachad Lfaa 
following tantatlva concluilonti 



Wa should Mowa l><»ediataly . in accordance vith the plan at 

Tab A, to convene a Praaidential CoHilsalon to develop 

r»7Miaita bipartisan aupport for our policies and tha 

proviaion of adequate rttaources. 



O.S. military Pf**'"^* • |HHH^^Hi^^HiH^^I *"*^ ^* 
capability to respond t^con^ffoeneie^i^^^^rTqion should 
b« significantly enhanced as soon aa poaaible ir. accord 
witb th« plan at Tab h. 

A ravitalitad public af f airs/l^qialat ive action plan, aa 
depicted at Tab C, should be inpla»ented imaediatf ly . 
ITS/K) 



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D«claaai(y oni CMkCK i^ 



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artially DtdanJnatf/fiahaBrf « J/ Julc, \ n /^ ^ ^ 

by 3. Regff, Nj-jonjl S«Ciu1t| Councfl , ^ y 






145 



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^^iWi^^r'^^ 



iJ 4 9 3't8 



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Th« Baaturff tteV* *re dtsiqntd to ivprove, as quickly at possible, 
oor Ability to 4«tcr th* conaolidatxon of a Karxitt/L«niniat ttat* 
la Caotral A»«rlca vhich could ■•rv* ax a base for Soviet power 
projection «Ad/er d«at«bliiation of othar state* in the reqicn. 



\. 



•^^ \ .>.->.,. 



Attachaants 

Tab A •> Prtiidantlal Cotmission 

Tab B - Carttxal Axj rica U.S. Military Preiervce, 

_^^_^^^^^^ and Contingency Response 
Tab C - Public Affaira/l^gislatlvr Action Plan 



e«t Mcretary of tb« Traasucy 

Director, Office of Hanaqewent and Budget 



SWSlTIVr 



COFf. 



jL- OF_Z- 



coFies 



4&?-«eGH-.-T 



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!l[ii:;:^!nED 



146 



4 




i.5."';!FIED 

CENTRAL AMIRICA 
:hE PPtSlDCNTlAL CCWIISSIOK 



srjri£a349 



A Prt«id«ntnl CoiWMssion i^ould be constitute*; m bocn ac 
poailbl* to d«v«lop • long-r«n<3« program of ecciinry, economic 
and huBAmtariAn «tciat«nct for C«r.cral Ajnerica. Accordintjly : 

• Th« Prcaidcnt and the Secretary of State ."hould meet 
with Senators Jackson and Mathias and Concre3sn«n 
Xeap and Barnes promptly to discuss a mandate tor a 
bipartisan Presidential Comntissicn on Certral 
AflMrica. 

• Th« Conaitsion's mandate ia to b« carefulJy and 
praciscly defined. The duties of the Compission 
will b« to undertake a study of the situation in 
Central Anverica (drawing a<;ain upon all official 
•ourcea) so that the ComnisBion mcmi>€rs will under- 
stand the strategic importance of the area and the 
threats to US security and national interests. 

• The Commission will m^ke recommendations to the ^_ 
President on initiatives that could be undertaken 

to improve the long-term security of the region, 
tha social and economic b«ttenftent of the people of 
Central Ancriea, and how best to defeat the Soviet 
and Cuban effort to destabilize the area. 

• It should b« fully understood by everyone that the 
President, in creating such an organization, is in 
DO way abdicating his responsibilities m foreign 
policy or in defending the interests of the United 
States. tn particular: 

The Secretary of State should rake clear that the 
^iBinistration ' s pending reprogramming and supple- 
••ntal requests pust be met promptly. He should 
also forward protaptly a proposal for increases as 
appropriate in nf-84 resources devoted to the area. 

It will b« made clear in launching the Cormission 
that we expect support for pending requests and for 
the removal of current restrictions on our actions. 

• The Coirmission' s treatment of covert action should 
be limited to one or two m«rTvb«r« with experience in 
such matters. (S) 



^mm^^m^tmi^i^^t^ I ^»..^ « . 



b*claasi^y cm OADR 



Tib A 




'^m^m 



147 



•^ ^'IS^KED 



4JI«iJ!U 



ffl P S ECRQ 






Th« Director of whit« House Personnel should coor- 
dinate tuggettiont en the membership of the Comrais- 
•ion with the Secretaries of State end Defense, the 
US Repreientetxve to the United Nations, «nd the 
Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission 
of naaes to the President. He should also work in 
close coordination with the White House Office of 
La^islatlve Affairs in carrying out th«se tasks. IC) 



'••%*^*^»^* 



b«cl«t«ify cm OADR 



TO P SCCRET - 7 



) 






''ED I 

I 



148 



4 



SENSITIVE 






•A 4 > ^ I 



f.S. HIJ.ITAPY 



CENTRA 




The Secretary of Ocf^n^r, m concert with the S''cr''l^r\ .t '•.i.cr 
and tM» director n{ Cpntral Intelligence, will devt-lof ,, prcir.-ir r 
approrrva'e rilitary actions, exercises, and cortinqency ruiisjrf-r 
daaiqned to curtail and eventually halt Cuban/Soviet Plcc 
aaaiatance and presence in Nicaragua. These U.S. jneo.«u-cs shoula 
he a>m*d -^t creating a credible, escalatory deterrent m .irc^-d 
with the follow ing plan-. (TS/S) 




identified and provided to Director, 0MB at seen <t 
possible. All available funding authorities «.houl<". l.c 
"^ns 1 rtPTPfi . (C) 



T. 5 I 



terlassity on: OADR 



-._^.".2L, 






149 






- s «« 



Ttrr-t)tbKt^ 



N 49332 



•f"'!' I'l'. r 




r.t 

r.r 
• h 
("^ 
•<r 
J >■ 

*r 

po 



• S 

of p 

* ii 

• « a 

'TC 

-! o 
-•;] 

1 r f ' 



and 

at>o 

- n'! 



Id 



i-ary of Defense, in cooperation with the Secret. iry <->i 
th» Director of Central Intelliqence, will prfvidc a 
implementation strategy for the eight point action -pl.Ti 
•'c. This strategy should be based upon tdo ratior.<Tl«- th.i: 
; ange benefits of the Presidential Cor^nission (':.^^ A) 

r«'alized -unless ddequate measures arc taken it ', !.i- n••^r 
rTr>. In accor-l.ince with Tab C, the Dfparttrent of Delensk 
cntify the public affairs guidance and Cong res r lon.i'i 
"soltation rtquirea to accomplish each of th» .ict irr 
-ntified *bov«. (C) w-» 



This plan should b* submitted by COB Wedrtesday, vuly 11 



y o r SE gMT/SENSITIVE 



7: 






150 






■ TOP sccna 



/8EWHTIVE 



9UI. >. I 

li 4 7 353 



CENTRAL A.1EP1CA 
^ •. PUBLIC KrrAIRS/LrClSLATlVC ACTION PLAN 




our 

proc«a« of iapleiMntinq naar and xld-tvna actloni (Tab B) and 
rap^rt for th« Presidential Cofwlttlon (Tab Al . (C) 

• Tba ob]«ctlv« of thia plan will b« to educate and heighten 
the perceptions of the AiMrican people re9ardin9 th« 
situation In Central American and the dangers posed by the 
lUrxlst/Uenlnist qovcrnjnent of NlraraqMS in their export of 
revolution to democratically oriented states. This 
caapalqn should also stress the dan9er of Soviet, Soviet 
Bloc, and Cuban interference in the reqioni the threat it 
poses for states in the area and its effect on U.S. 
security and national interests. Eaphasis »ust be placed 
on the international dimension of the threat since the 
iapact on U.S. interests will obviously affect the 
Intereats of friends and allies as well. (S) 

• Tbe plan should provide for periodic visits (at least twice 
■onthly) by senior officers to each of the twelve maior 
Media centers. Heetinqs should be planned with editorial 
boards, public fora, appearances on talk shows, rtc, in 
order to reach the larqest number cf Ajierican citirens. 

(C) 

• A detailed legislative action plan should be prepared to 
carry our »essa9e to Capitol Hill, to appropriate funds 
already re<)uested and thoae to be requested under thia 
plan. Responsibility for the outcome of events ohnuld be 
clearly delineated. (C) 

• Me ahould seek to relieve current legislative constraints 
reqardinq 'certification* and the Boland Artendffvcnt. Full 
support will be souqht to continue funding for Nicaraquan 
resistance activities. (TS/S) 

e To protect options for the Coranission, we must prevent the 
situation fro* deterioratinq further. This rationale 
should be used in all public a( (airs/leqislstive action 
planning. (S) 

TblB <-nnrdina»*<l plan ahnuld be delivered bv rrt« . .Tuiy 11. Itl). (Ul 



a. tBOWgT/SgWSmvX TRD QTrDPT Tab C 

; ;iassi/y on. oAb* lUr OLUT\tr~ 






151 



o 



>; 



UNCLASSIFtED 



2 3 August :<&< 



0415 



FROMi 

SUBJECT: 



Cenerol Cour:.el 



Off 1 ce ol 



jenrral Counsel 



e>^ttx^.tx.3 



H.R. 53?9 -- Section 107, Prohibition on Ccvtrt 
As*iktanc« for Military Operations in Sitar-iTua 



1. Th« Director has asked for < legal i nterpretetion of the 
restriction ccr^tained in Section 107 of H.R. 5399, which was 
recently passed by the House of Representatives. More specif- 
ically, OGC has been asked to anal ytt the effect of this prov ision 
on expendi tures { orsti 

In ny view, while we plainly can pay all of these 
lixed costs un (he basis of other appropriations, we ^ust aa 
clearly cannot utilize these raaources in any activities which 
wojld have the effect of supporting paraaillrary operations in 
Nicaragua by anyone. 

2. In addition, we have b««n asked to coB«ent upon the use 
of third countries to continue th« Nicaragua project. I believe 
the Agency can request third countries r :> carry on the prograa~at 
their own expense so long as it Is aade ;lear that no U.S. funds 
would be used either not> or in th« future to repay such a coaait- 
aent. The extent to which Ageacy peraornel can be involved in 
soliciting third country support would have to be deterained on a 
case-by-CAse basis. 

3. Although the language of Section 107 differs. only 
slightly fro* that of Section 108 of the Intelligence Authorisa- 
tion Act for rt 84 (hereinafter Section 108), the legal effect of 
those differences ia aubatantlal. Section 107 reads as followai 

PROHIBITION OH COVERT ASSISTA>JCE FOR 
MILITARY OPCRATIOUS IN NICARAGUA 



Sec. 107. During fiscal year 1965, no fund* 
available to the Central Intelligence Agency, th« 
Departaent of Oefenae, or any other agency or entity 
of the United Statea involved in intelligence activ- 
ities may be obligated or eipenjJed for the purpoee or 



.iXHiirr 



ALL PORTIONS 
p i^af^ f IT - 



[37 ?0^ 



u 



NOLASSiFiED 



CL BY -V. uoj* 

DECL OADR 

DERIVtD FROM FO* 5. «. 7, 8 






Ejgtmlnirtnf ^'^^i 




152 



UNCLASSIF'P.^ 



»>w.->i -r-:-l --i.r •"-.• (.•ffci o( supporting diipctly cr 
>nd : ri'Cf ^y . military or p*.r j*") 1 1 1 Jry nperstiore i r, 
Nirtcfl9i-« by any i-i«ti9n, -^loup. cr 9411 1 la t ■ on , move- 



-i^ 0416 



or I ndl vidual . k 



r- 



On 1 t. • tac»- •««^ by it% v^ry title, the Hc-»e veision optratee at < 
total problb>'tion on the uie of any (undfc by L.S. intelligence 
elemonta durir--? FY 89 for direct or indirect s.pport of .military 
or parasilltaiy ^jerAtlona in Sicara9aa by d::yor,«. Th 1 e 1.. -g^agj 
effectively blocks all direct U.S. activities in Nicara^ja and 
preclude* U.S. (inancia; ^uppv^rt for the Contra* durir.g FY &S ty 
<ny rsana. In dissecting Section 107, we ore faced with the fci- 
luwKig rest! ict lori* I 



A) RESTRICTION ON TIME -- Th : s prohibition 
would operate throughout FY85 and any sutseqient sup- 
plenentAl appropriations would likewise be subject to 
Its restrictions. Should this language beccoe the 
final veriiion of next year's Intelligence Authoriza- 
tion Act. as of 30 Septenber 1964, an arendment of the 
Section wDuld be required in order to legalize spend- 
ing for t.ie Nicaragua pco^^raa. 

ON FUNDS -- The wording con- 
that 'no funds available' day be 
for the restricted purpose 
1 prohibition on rll activities 
y operatlooe in Nicaragua that 
U.S. Th« funds available are 
appropriation. Thus, reoro- 
funds and releases froa the 
ies would ba proh. cited. More- 
is not 'lalted by its language 
The broadness cf tha wording 
s to prohibit rhe u^* of funds 



B) RESTRICTION 


tained in Section 107 


obligated or expended 


translates into a tota 


supporting paraailitar 


require funding by the 


not limited by year of 


graaaing of prior year 


Reserve tor Contingenc 


over, t);e prohibition 


to afprofriated funds. 


of this section appear 



1/ By coBparison, Section 108 of th< 
zation Act for FY 1984 reads as followat 



Int^l 1 igenc* Authori- 



LIMITATIOM OM COVKRT ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY 
OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA 



Sec. 108. During fiscal year 1984, not aore than 
124,000,000 of tha funda available to the Central 
Intelligence Agency, tha Department of Defense, or arty 
other agency or entity of tha United States involvad 
In intelligonce activities aay ba obligated or ex- 
pended for tha purpose or which would have tha affact 
of supporting, directly or 1 nd i r<»ct 1^', Tili'^ry or 
(.^cani 1 1 1 oi y operations .n Nicaragua by any nation, 
group, organization, aoveaent. or individual. 



eij/2)J,is7 



NCL/^SIFIED 




153 



owrassiFiED 



rrid* "sv^i ; f LjI«" to th« ."'gene, by other ndtioni, 

Tcoupt or ind I v^^^J*!* • T>,ore<cr«. the Agency could r _ 

rot conduct ^•fc^WOWfcf t action »iilt another nation, '' U 4 1 J 

aroup oc pci^wtetrf attl^i dua 1 foot.' th« bill. 



C)'' Ks;PICT/CT»r ON OBLICATTCNS OR tXf'END; -fRES 
-- ."hl» r»«t.riction on both obligations a^d expendi- 
tuies ol fundi available in FY05 not only preclude* 
Agency •pand 1 ng now for the .csiricted purpose, but 
forbid*- th* making of comoiitirent • to sper.d available 
funds «C sooia futur* tla*. This sane language is con- 
tained In rTB4 ' s spending cap and the question was 
raised in thAt situAtion whether fund* obligated in 
FY83, but eap«nd«d.ln FYe4, would te subject to the 
i24 million lioitation. It is my understanding that 
the question was informally reso'ved because the Cob- 
rittees reportedly did not intend the liaitatio.i to 
effect funds already obligated. In any event, funds 
that have been obligated arguably r.re not 'available* 
to the Agency in a technical sense. To «void future 
uestior.s by the Comnittees, however, it night b« 
appropriate to urge Congress to modify any final 
restrictive language in a manner that clarifies this 
point. Perhaps adding to the phr«ee *bo funds avail- 
able* the words "for obligation* woaltf narrow the 
restr ict lon.i/ 



2/ There has been at least one instance where the linguage 
of • proposed amendment required the daobllgation of funds and 
their return to the Treasury. Senator Prozaire offered the fol- 
lowing anenJment to the Oepartaent of State Authorization Act foe 
nr84-85, S. 1342: 

PROHIBITION OH CEXTAIM ASSISTANCE TO THE 
KHMEK NOUCK IH KAMPUCHEA 

Sec. 70i. (a) Notwithstanding any other provi* 
sion of law, none of the funds authorised to be appro- 
priated by this Act or any other Act say be obligated 
or expended for the purpose, or with the effect, of 
prpBoting, sustaining or nugaenting, directly or indi- 
rectly, the capacity of the IQiaer Rouge or any of its 
members to conduct ailitary or paraailitary operations 
in Kaapuchea or elsewhere in Indochina. 

.^)(1) All funds appropriAted before the date ot 

enactment of this section which were obligated but not 

expended for activities having the purpose or effect 

described in subsection (a) shall be deobligated. 

(3) All funds deobligated pursuant to paragraph 
(1) shall be deposited in the Treasury of the Unit 
States as aiscellaneous receipts. 



C/^l6S7 



yN€)fASSIF!ED 




154 



uNCtftSSIFeED 



r.) Kcs: 

agency or cfl 
a . ' I V » t 1 e»*^ 
rfstriclt 9*Kr<^ 

fi.nd* rad'a Ava 

th« effect of 
SacL ion iOT do 
tcoa oC/ll9*tin 
other purpa«*« 
do** not apply 
g*nc*, (uch «■ 
exampl*. any a 
a9*nci«s could 
riz*d purpos*^ 
Obviously luch 
1«H to conduct 




N CN ^MO :iAY SPEND 

ih* CIA, DoO and 
ltt» U.S . involved 
'kp** fund* ar* *^ 
1* lAaif^^e «ppeac* to 
liable CO til* Oeparteiant 
t I'lpandilur* of uhoii* fu 
jupportinq paramilitary o 
ei Not , however, prohibit 
9 or expcndtnq fundc for 
in Nicaz*9ua. Although 
to •fltltlas not involved 
th« D«p*Tt.Tent cf Agricu 
pproprla:ed f.iida availab 
not legally be expended 
under traditional approp 
ether agencies are not a 
paraailitary operation*. 



- - . i.c pr wv 1 - 
any - ther 
n 1 nl e 1 '. 1 gunc* 
b;i»ct to the 
pro» I bi t -se of 
of Sta'e. tc 
nd* wo'ild have 
per a t loni . 

the r«-pa r r B ent 
diplomatic or 
the re»trictiori 

in intelii- 
Iture, for 
1* to those 
for unautho- 
r 1 St ions 1 aw . 
uthorizad by 



C 0418 



C) RESTRICTION ON PURPOSE OR EFFECT -- Th* 
language of Section 107 require* tha Agency nor only 
CO refrain froa coaaitting or spending funds (oi the 
express puipore of supporting paraailltasy activiCie* 
in Nicaragua, but also daaand* that tk« CIA ancicipaca 
th* "•ff*ct' of Its expend 1 Cures . Thua, funds given 
to th* Contras that were being expended, for azaapl*, 
to provid* nuaanitarian support, intardlct th* finw of 
aras in th* r*gion or aasist with public raiations 
afforts, would b* proh\bit*d only if auch a**istan:* 
w<tr* d*t*rain*d to hav* th* **ff*ct* oi supporting 
paraailitary activiti** in Nicaragua. Mill* th* lan- 
guag* of Saction 107 Itself can be construed to perait 
huaar^i tar lan aid by U.S. intelligenca alasients, the 
legislative history indicates that th* bill's propo- 
nents would oppose any assistance to tha Contras. 

f ) RXSTRICTIOW CM DIRXCT OR INDIRECT SUPPORT 
FOR MILITAHY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS -- Th* r*- 
•triction on direct or indirect support for ailitary/ 
paraailitary oparations prohibits th* funding of any 
Ag*ncy accivici** which have a rea*on*bl* nexus wich 
the Hicaraguan covert action progrsM. While the 
int*rpr*tatlon of 'direct* support aay cause us few 
probi*as, how to dafin* what will have the effect of 
indirectly supporting such activities in Nicaragua 
cannot be dstetained with certainty. Rather than 
drawing a thin line, this language paints a gray zone 
subject to interpretation. The provision of aedicsl 
supplies to Che Contras, for aaaapl*, arguably has the 
"effect" of "indirectly" supporting Chelr paraailitary 
act i vi t ies . 



uNet*ssiEiEa 



[notml^iPT ^l3. 




Cna)l^7 



135 



uNeiASSIFIED 



TM • point, take* on particular iignificdcca -►.in 
wa ---y* ••- thla yaar'a C24 million cap bith the "no 
taaMR pcoMbitlon ot Section 107. A* we lera 
■ppaiftcftl ny the cap. CIA informed the Ccjrin i 1 1 ceo that 
tik^-t^gancy had not rxcaeded th4 s'atu'ory S24 niil]:cn 
llaitation. M« responded tc cor.gr ess; icna I inquiries 
regarding certain expenditure* by treating t>.e rat'.er 
a* an accounting isaue and di *t ingui shi ng direct or 
irdiract support fron direct and indirect cost*. We 
noted that the legislative hi*tory gave no indication 
th*t all "indirect cost*" ccnceivably related to the 
proqiao auac b« charged again*t the cap and that we 
had chatgad costs in accordance with long-standing 
Agency accounting procedure*. The SSCI found no prct- 
lecs with this explanation, but the majority aemceis 
of HPSCI stated their belief that all direct and indi- 
rect costs of the pcogran should have been charged 
against the cap. 2/ 

Tha esaential difference batuean tha cap and the 
prohibition is that, in the foraar, tha Agency had 
author 1 tat ion for an ongoing prograa ar.d could expend 
funds and account foe thaa is soaa way until i24 Bil- 
lion was reached; in Sactioe 107 no expenditures can 
be chargi'd against tha Nicaxaquan covert action pro- 
gran. 

The only useful ciscuasion of the aaaning of tha 
terainology "directly or Indirectly' is found in tha 
House Report on H.R. 2760, wlllch atiemptad to ioposc 
an absolute ban or. support fo^ ai 1 1 1 jry/parani 1 itary 
operations in Nicaragua. Tha language ot that bill is 



0419 



2,/ Only ona rafarsnca waa aade during tha floor debate to 
the accounting practices utilited by the intelligence ccsiuunity in 
accounting fot TtBA funda. Congressman Millar remarked: 



I would alao auggast that tha fundi 
because never hava I saan aurh aagnifica 
that can allow thia 131 aillion to go th 
aontha that it has. Thay are always goi 
just before wa taka up tha bill, but wha 
does not coaa out tha way tha intalllgen 
likaa, than chav ara able to fund it for 
•onths because aonahow tha aconoalea ara 
This Is tha Boat afficlantly run war in 
they can uaKa iZl Million go thia far. 
that is not what ia going on. There i* 
other ailitary aourcea and thara ia the 
uoney in the private sector to support t 
ansa. 



ng ia illegal, 
nt bookkeeping 
e nuBber of 
ng to run out 
n tha bill 
ca coaaunity 

several 

worked oat. 
history if 
But w* knoM 
divarslon o< 
salain^ of 
haa* aarcan- 



'Cjj^6S? 



U 



NClMlF^ED 



[notiw^fnili 5^7 f^ 



156 



ONOIASSIFIED 




<otdin9 ot Section )07 and ray h« KtJp- 
wh»t th« Mou»« had in rinc.l/ TTi« 
Lanalyais of th* calcvant provi- 
of "Iniftlract aupport" In tha context o( 
ant I tl«» out • :d* Nicaragua whlc>i np«r«ta 
Nicaragua. The apacid': exarpla given to show 
t)i»-«yf)« of indiract aupport that would ba prohibited 
wavtnining conducted eicluaivaly ouiaida Nicaragua 
ie^mt.T»n in pr«;p«cation for ailitary or paraallitary 
ac>y Ht intid* VlcAxagua. 

nm r«porc capi csaly no'ad that th« (action would 
not prolkiiU& th« collection, production or analyaia of 
intelligence. Noc would it prohibit the proviaion of 
that intelligence to foreign governnenCs, aa long aa 
the proviaion of auch intelligence did not aupport 
■ 1 1 itary/param lltary operation* in Nicaragua by for- 
eign >.<itiona or other entities. 

G) R£STRICTIOM OM PLACE -- Section 107 pro- 
hibit* the financial aupport of Military or paraalli- 
tary activitiaa Ir; Micarague . F— din^ for any activ- 
ity which would take place outal4« Hlcara9ua but would 
have the effect of supp>?rtinq paraallitary operations 
inside Nicaragua would thus b* (ocbiddan. 

H) RESTRICTION ON WHO DOSS THE OPERATIONS -- 
The reatriction against funding applies to paraaili- 
tary operations 'by any nation, fsoup, organi cat ion, 
Boveaent , or individual.' Thia wording effectively 
piohibits the Agency's funding ot such activities via 
interaediariaa. 



Legislative History 

4. The leqislativa history ia helpful only for dlscerninq 
the spirit behind Section 107. There is no analysis of the word- 
ing Ir. 20 pages o< floor dabata. 130 CONQ. REC. HB264-e4 



^420 



i/ OPERATIONS IN IIICAJ<AGUA 

SEC. 801. (a) Nona of tha funds appropriated (or 
fiscal year 1983 or 1984 (or the Central Intellifaaca 
Agancy or any other dapartaant, agency, or entity ot 
the United States Involved in intelligence activities 
aay be obligated or expended (or tha purpose or which 
would have tha e((act o( supporting, directly ox Indi- 
rectly, allltary or paraailitary-operat ions la 
Nicaragua by any nation, group, organl cat ioa« oorw- 
aant, or individual. H.R. 3760, 98th Cong., lat Sass. 
(a?83J. 



,,^/,;, oNCLftS5IF?ED L 



[aatw ^(gtry 5'?? 



157 



^Net»SSIF!ED 



(■1«ily wd. Auq. 2. 1984). Both tho«c in (avot o( «n<l thus* 

• >niin«l— *4^ »«*tcict »on agrr»d, ho«<uv«t , l^at S«ctiun 107 '^ans n.c 

r>to<^hl^tftmt-maf-tun<i» (or fiilltary or (ntratn\ \iacy •ctivuKc ; r, 



tlMt th« tncent >• to terminate U.S. aiiiit; 



'^'^ "ft 421 



$. Conqr*- snan- Poland statad in his opening rciark* that, tha 
H ia9^ i!<sua la "d i la^rcemant. on tha e( f act > vcneaa and Appcopri- 
II caiiaM of a particular coven action to ovarthrow tha goverrinent 
of aiiothar nation." Id^ at ei66. Ha latar addad that our policy 
do«« »■• atran9t)««a der.nctacy m Nicaragua* and that '(t)hia 
■ rcr*« VAT ahoald and -- today." I<S. at 6276. Congraiitsan Hydt 
not«<5 th«t Section 107 "forbids any assistanca to tha (raadoB 
flghcarv i» Wlraragua .... No food, no aadicina, no aoouni t ion, 
net avan aoral awpport." Id . at bifc9. Tha spirit of Section 107 
is abundantly claar -- tha House axpects Section 107 to end U.S. 
assistance to th« Contrbs. 

6. Whila tha drafters aora tlian likaly attespted to ivitata 
tha Clark Aaandtiant ' s prohibition on assistanca of any kind foe 
paraailitary operations in Angola,!' It can b« argued that the 
Section 107 restriction ia soaawhat different. Unlike the Clark 
Aaendaent, this aection liiaits all.' funds rather than ill 
aaain tan ce and it could be Choa^kt, therefore, to permit certain 
activities precluded under the Clark Aaendaent. Section 107 can 
be read to allow assistance that alther does not require funding 
by intelligence elements or that does not directly or indirectly 
support paranilitary operationa. 

S t a ff Salaries,] 

7. Wit h regard to the stait salanat 

prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds available to the 




1'' The Clark Asiendaent reeds, in pertinent partt 

Liaitation on certain assistance to and activities in Ajigola 

Sec. 401(a) notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, no aaaistance of any kind aay be provided for 
the purpose, or which would have the effect, of pro- 
noting or augaenting. directly or indirectly, the 
capacity of any nation, group, organization, •otreaent. 
or individual to conduct ailitary or paraailitary 
operations in Angola unless and unt'l the Congress 
expressly authorltes such assistance by law enacted 
after the data of enactaent of this section. 



iNCLASSiF'EO 



[flBtw %fit>T S 1 ? 3. 



0-Jw)/^y 



158 



UNCtnSSIF'ED 




<A 1 ar 1 <•■ I 
lt«nt t h« t^ l.o«« rf ipcnd 1 t - I *• "OjM )ic vTT 
rijpporCJo^. p«r am J 1 t.<iry op«r«ciona in NicjijqM*. 77, « 
qu«»«iott o( «lloc«tlo*i of (.l.«c«; c<.-<i;f. which .a* an .i.o./ri^m 
po 1 ■* tiSilt-r lh» ipar.dinq cjp. it not »ri i«kuc under ttia - .- i i .-.q „■ ( 
S« .t t o w 10'. Sinc« no (un-ls can b« obl'gatrd oc <-np<rro<»d in ffBS. 
no nj»wl ' ^cviun j..r)>ji^m by tt.« U.S. ««hn.h juppotia (ja r ,» «• 1 1 ; ; a j y 

-.^v C 0422 



Proviftow a t AK by Tn ird Count r if 

8. With rcoard (o t.h« prevision of aid by third count..' 1 •«. 
Section 107 prohibit* fundinq. not diicutsion. This iisu* also 
pr«afnra a 9ray zona subjact 10 1 n t arprata t < on . Cartainly atkinq 
other countriaa to provide aid on their own ie not prohibited to 
loi.q a* there ii no quid pro q-'o . If, however, the third country 
expected repayscnt froB the U.S., such aatiatance would be for- 
bidden. If auch a country prov.ded aid with the under ttandlnq 
that the U.S. would provide an equel aaount for one of their pic- 
graaa, the Agency would be in vlol»tlon of both the letter and the 
apirit of Section 107 and would b« open to charoee of deliberate 
ci rcuiivent :on of the law. 



pars 
V 1 ew 
sala 

try 
roct 

*9«» 
thir 
and 
«zpe 

in9 

othe 

cour 



9. The 
onnel ca 
hen F 
riea and 
a 3a 1 atan 
ly suppo 
n, on th 
d countr 
other* a 
n • e * of 
•uch aa* 
r hand, 
■e of hi 



more 
n be 
Y8S b 

ezpe 
ce be 
r t ing 
e *pe 
y aaa 
re ar 
an ea 
I atan 
reque 
• nor 



dif f 1 
used t 
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cauae 

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9uably 
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nal du 



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ill tar 

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ueetlan 1* 
clt third c 
oa 107 proh 
onnml for ■ 
ffofta woui 
y op«Tation 
■Ibl* Aqenc 
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need. Pay 

full-tifie 
travene t 
atance by 
reaent* a c 



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ount 

'.bit 
-lie 
i ha 
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y • = 

ould 
rent 
wa* 
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ry a 
a th 
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cle 

of 
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fit to which Agency 
**i*tanc*. In ay 
a payaent of the 
Ion of third coun- 
ha effect of indi- 
•ragua. Onca 
tie* to •oXicit 
arly be prohibited 
tha aelary and 
cated tu aolicit- 
tion_^^^n tha 

^^ in tha 
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10. A lother hypothatlcal (ituation poaaa t roubl 1 nq' 1 e^al 
qje*tior.*: t)ia uaa of Aqancy pereonnel aa courier* for fund* pro- 
vided by third countrlea to tha Contra*, ^ila I believe auch 
activity would ta prohibited by Section 107 if the courier* aola 
function wa* to pa** the** fund*, if that itea wa* • da ainial* 
part of the courier'* function*, it could be argued that no fund* 
were expended for tha rcatricted purpoea. 



i^ If tha Preeident taeka tha repreeent atlva of a noniotel- 
li9ence a9ency to aollctt auch aariatanca in diplomatic or other 
channel*, tha letter of Section 107 would not apyaar to ba vio- 
lated, but auch action aigbt ba viewed by supporter* of tha 
raetrlction a* a violation of tha « pi rit of that prohibition. 



l2Jja)/U7 



UNCtteSIF'ED 




159 



UNClrASSIFIED 



\\, In •ny •v«nt, uijd«r th« r«qulr«««n» to k««p Con9r«sa 
fvjily and c urrent ly Intotaad cc .c»rnln9 lntalll9*nc« •ctivltlaa, 
th« Agano|^^^^|M raqviirad to advlaa th« Coaaittaaa of any plana 
to aol^l^^^^^HBtf try ataiatanca (or tha Contraa. 




Conf iBalon 



C 0423 



Tlia conqresaional intant bahind Saction 107 la to avop 
S. aaaiatanca to tha Contraa. Tha Houaa craftad tha lan- 



luaqttJlMf^bat aactioa- Ciqhtly in ordar to raatrlct in avary way 
>oaat%tV>|tf oblifAtlAna or axpandituraa by U.S. Intalllqanca aia- 



cov« 

■•nta «l|Att|^«iotf# r««ult m continuad aaaiatanca to ailltary or 
p«raBllf^^L*etl*4tiaa in tiicaraqua. Should that languaga raaain 
in tha t i .tI» i '—I Tor i tat ion act. in ay viaw, any cloaa caaaa would 
ba viawad by tha proponanta of Saction 107 aa afforta to circua- 
vant tha a\:atuuory prohibitic 




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CVTentx.O w 7 58? 

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 402010 A ^C 

COPY NO nP : 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONL^ 



EYES ONLY 

NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



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Warning Notice 

inttlligtnct Sources *nd Method* Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
U.-«»uthofited D'\clotur»Sub|t<t to Cf^i^ji Sanctons 




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165 



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N 7585 



OCJOMl 



18 July 1985 



MEMORANDUM FOR; 



SOBJECT: 



The Honorable Robert C. McFarltne 
Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs 

Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran 



1 
Policy To 



I strongly endorse the thrust of the draft NSDD on U.S. 

ward Iran , particularly its eaphasls on the need to take 
concrete and tlmelv steps to enhance U.S. leverage In order to 
ensure that the USSR is not the primary beneficiary of change and 
turaoll in this critical country. While I am broadly in 
agreenent with its assessment of the current political situation, 
the NSDD needs to reflect more fully on the complex of Soviet 
motives and recent actions towards Iran and their iapll cat tons 
for U.S. policy initiatives. Moreover, I believe that the NSDD 
should be more precise about the extent and nature of domestic 
disaffection with the regime and about the potential for 
encouraging a more pro-Western stance within the regular armed 
forces and the Revolutionary Guard. Finally, I offer some 
specific suggestions on the draft Itself that refine and add to 
the proposed U.S. policy actions. 

2. The draft NSDD portrays the current Iranian regime as 
moving to improve its relations with the Soviet Union because of 
Iran's mounting difficulties. While true, it ignores the 
following recent developments indicating that Moscow has rebuffed 
the Iranians: 




The Soviets recently withdrew between 1,000 and 1,500 
Soviet economic advisers from Iran. 



TS 85351? 

Copy _Z of / O 



CL BY SIGNER 
DECL OADR 




166 



UNCUSSiFIED 



SUBJECT: Dr«ft N5DD rt U.S. Policy Tow«Pd Irtn 



N 7584 



Sov It t -I r» n l«n tr»de his declined significantly over 
past year. 



the 



a hard-line stance In thtlp 



There are 
actions 



The Soviets have resuoed 
propaganda on Iran. 

several possible explanations for these Soviet 
Moscow nay be questioning Tehran's sincerity In 




3. This downturn In So v le t -I ra nla n relations strengthens 
th« case aade In the NSCO for our Allies filling the vacuum left 
by the withdrawal of Sovj 

Soviet-Iranian trade 

•re well positioned to help on the projects abandoned by the 
Soviets. Quick action could block a future return of the Soviets 
to these projects and r»nove a aajor source of Soviet influence . 
in Iran . 

" . On the question of the declining popularity of the 
re«lne, I would underline that the recent decline has largely 
occurred aaonft that portion of the populace that is largely 
unconaltted and passive. The regioe still retains steadfast 
adherents among the lower and peasant classes that are very 
active politically. At the same time, the NSDO could better 
reflect that we have seen evidence of a jt-owing cleavage between 

those loyal to th e regime and th ose opposed to It. U.S. 

• ctlons-- 

can exploTt this cleavage and activate the uncommittec 

5. In formulating U.S. policy, we need to keep In mind that 
Iranian policy actions do not spring from a single source. The 
NSOD therefore might usefully highlight on page 3 that we might 
well witness a move toward moderation and accommodation on the 
part of the pragmatlsts while at the same time the radicals will 
be seeking to undermine those policies and seek the Initiative 
through engaging in terrorist acts designed to radicalize the 
atmosphere and upstage the pragmatlsts. 



- 2 - 



TS 8535 13 



'tJNClASStflEO 



167 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 7585 



SUBJECT: Draft HSDD r« O.S. Policy Towtpd Irtn 




tela* >nd tht llktly 
Revolutlentry Guard In a futurt Iran, I btll«T« tht draft NSDD 
should laeludt an explicit statement In poin t > . page 5 that we 
acak to davalop contacts with leaders In the! 



8. The* following are comments or reconaenda t Ions on 
specific points in the NSDD: 




TS 853513 



168 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SUBJECT: Drtft HSDD pt U.S. Policy Toward Ir«n 



N 7586 




Th« U.S also should find opportunities for public 
statenents that stress that we have no antipathy towards 
Islaa and furtheroore that we view Islan as a positive 
Boral force in the region in an age when aateriallsa and 
atheiSB are on the rise. We should also sake clear our 
lack of hostility to an Islamic Pfpublie in Iran as long 
as international norms of terror'.sm and subversion are 
no t V iolated . 

I agree strongly with points 3 and 5 on page 6 of the 
draft NSDO that we should seek to open lines of 
communications to the existing Iranian leadership and 
should avoid actions that could alienate Iranians 
potentially receptive to Improved relations with the 
U.S.. At the same time, if the OS adopts po int 6 and 
responds to Iranian-supported terrorism wlth^ 





TS 853513 



169 



mussifiH 



SOBJECT: Drift NSDO r* U.S. Policy Towipd Irtn " 7587 




WlAliaa J. Cai 
Olrectop «f/centr«l Iwtelllgenee 



All portions » re classified TCJ?~-*fre»iL — . 



5 - 



S«H^^^*.ti^ 



TS 853513 



170 



^^ 



miM. 



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'his IS or.lj one of rjny unauthorized disclosures d'"ls1ng from a 
"ack of discipline in t^e Executive as well as the Cong-essioral oversight 
corrittees. This is a cs'ier v.nich mDrtally threatens vcjr PresiCential 
authority to conduct foreign policy, our national security process, and 
our intelligence capabilities. It increasingly erodes tfe morale and the 
security ethic of all t^cse who respect and comply with our security prograns. 

As you knox, I have long been deeply concerned about this because I cannot 
adequately meet my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and 
methods unless those in government who receive and handle our intelligence are 
required to live up to their responsibilities. 



On the FrIdayJ 



ll told 

Igence, that 



the Senate Intelligence Comittee, In a hearing on counterlntel 
media leaks which broadcast sensitive Information to the world do more darage 
than hostile services to our reputation for reliability and to our relationships 
with other nations. 1 put It this way: 

'....Virtually every category o' source we have has teen <3a-;:e: :» 
j'authorued discTis.res ever the last year or so. 'aUInc tc tne :-t-s 
ascut intelligence information received in the deepest confidence has 
jeoparoized the lives 'of_aqents. Public discussion of what we k-^t 
when we knew It a'i 




been spending large sjms tc 

loose talk to seriously da-jge their value. 



_ .As we stand today , we 

ge^ce capabilities and perrttlng 



C 1* NovcTiber I98i, 1 wrote to you about the urgent need to establis" 
ciscp'iine ir. the handling of classified information. In that re'^cra'-au''. '. 
cited elever cases of redia revelations of classified infc-'atlcn v.Mrh "i: 
d;-?;'-: cr ability to ■ ■ ■ 1 .^r. :' rfff:tSe 'crelc,-, •' tc". " ' ;;■ -.e pr;;->-. - 
i s-i'-z-e'^t I.SPG rc:tir,g ^cj O'.rccted that the SIGd), t^e NSC subcomltee 
■en intellicence which 1 cr.air, present recomrendatlons for dealing with this 
plaque. On 29 November 1984, I sent to Bud McFarlane • conprehenslve 
set of proposals, developed by the SlG(l), a subcorr.ittee chaired by 
Judge Webster, to bring the unauthorized disclosure probler under control 
lere are 16 separate action Hems to be considered. 




CXTaJ ^/^i 



WIW\^ 



Partiaili DccIadJfici/Seliastd on 
cndfer provliiinS Oi £.0 
by 3. Reger. N:tic-.:1 Sjc.:,-; 



Lh-iM> 



12356 

c. jwi: 



171 



S«i^t* 



pf!UsS!flM 



;:?4l 'r^ *r*th t^U :-::" e- . 



fr'.e-'C'.y ♦ore';'^ nai' s ha*e to'i -S •."a: ouf <na£T 1 Uy 
"•■'as created c"ej". o''» '.y■a^out :^o:?'^•.^ •'; 




1 have been talc"^ g steps to limit inforination provided the oversight 
connittees: 

• restricting briefings to their staffs, of whom the Senate 
Connittee has ab^ut 60; 

- confining sensitive information to the chairmen and vice chairmen; 

- no briefings for the purpose of media disclosures; and 

- no sanitizatlon of intelligence for Congressional publications 
without the expl'cit approval of me or my deputy. 

Now, with your authorization to use the polygraoh for eligibility to 
conpartments ir\<i for counterintelligence investigations, I an pla-oirg to 
esta?lish a s;e:iai c:;npartment for covert actior irf orma'.'on tc :9 a.a'lable 
only tc nenie'S and perhaps one staff reiser for t"e nnonty a*: ra::rity sides. 
To na>;e this e"ecti.e it is essential that your new directive peT.it use of the 
polygraph In investigating unauthorized disclosures as well as counterintelligence. 

We shou'd also *zn. to require Congressional staffers to reet the. sar.e 
security starda-ds aod requirenents as intelligence pe'sc.nel , including 
polygraph sc-ee'.ing on courterintel 1 i gence issues i-z keeping of records on 
press contacts. 

To carrv this off with the Congress, it Is necessary to put cjr o».n hojse 
'n c'Zi'. ":-£ 'in% e~anate f'on the Executive s'ce tha r fro - *.--: 
Corj-eis . 




mMm 






172 



WvatT- 



UNCLASSIFIED 




Su?startlany fe Si"e '■j'es "^ust »pp1y fziz' y . T»e*e s ^-eai. 
se'.ween t^e Execoiive tezf'-'i"-^ 4"3 age^c'es. m e"P'3»ees o^ CIAJ 

ft ?o1»g'i;re; j-^c i-e s^tjec: '.o repo1»9'a&r. :-ess io'".a: 

conlrollea In inose a:9'>:"e$ jna are recordea a': ccc.r^efiec. 

p.eila contacis ana ais:'Mjres are covered ty pc'/g-s:" re-eia-i nations . 'fie 

prospect of being i%iet aDOut unauthorized disclosures 1r a po'ygraDn re.»ij-' na'.i ;• 



's g-eat 



:s are sT 



(^>w3^cv.L u. ueini^ db*r- dULfU* U''au^i'(jriicu ut>wiuiuici 'i a r'^ /"j'o^" 'c-t»S"C 

Is the strongest aete-rent to leaitlng we have found to date. In recent years . 
CIA's repolygraph prog-ai' has surfaced unauthorized d'sclos-res iy aboutJI^eo; 
Most of them were demea or separated from Agency e<nployment or, 1n the case of 
Industrial personnel, haa their security approvals renovea. 



The polyg'aph is effective. More thanBBjte'cert of CIA security disapproval 
decisions are based on polygraph-developed Inforratior, . Its success Is a function 
c' admissions made by Individuals during or after polygraph testing. 



Most of the classifies Int^^^ence leaks published 
Infornation collected by ClAH|H|HThe strong personne 
strict security discipline ii^nes^agencles naie l^jnll 
leaks emanated from them. Over the last two years ,H^ 
of unauthorized disclosures of classified Intelligence we 
Security Co<Tm1ttee by Intelligence Coimunlty agencies, A 
were othe^ases that were not reported. The Intelllgenc 
conductedHjpnvestlgatlons o^hos^eaks, with more th 
Investigating the same leak . HH|HIH[|cases were refe 
Justice. Only one of these, the Morlson case, was prosec 
Is the result of there being so many recipients of the In 
job 1$ like searching for a needle In a haystack. 



by the media are of 
1 security programs and 
kely that many of the 
ases of the publication 
re reported to iry 
Ireost certainly there 
e Conmunlty agencies 
an one agency sonetlmes 
rred to the Department of 
uted. Usually no action 
forratlon that their 



I have already taken steps to reduce the dissemination of Intelligence and 
your new directive will enable me to take further steps. We need to 
consider the further sifting of the haystack, a-d put leakers at risk by 
use of the polygraph or a g-'and jury, or both. »e need a'^so a high volta;s 
specialized Investiga:- ve tea'', and Ed Meese is ;-e?j'ed t: establish one. 




nis Illustrates a grave need for all elements c' t*-e 
equally diligent in identifying and acting on lejks. 




Tf ftf T 



173 



mim\m 




concerned about: the lafic of action on the nrst two or these 
Items; the failure for two'tionths to bring th^BMn on t^e third; and, 
In the fourth case, cl osing the ri::( i nil liBBB^Bl n ' ' i of, at a minimum, 
removal of the offlcer F 

Respectfully yours, 



7|Z Wimani J. Ca&ey. 

wmiam J. Casey 



INfBSHiPjFP 



174 



■ r'v 



UNEUI^SIFIED 



2 2 KOVE 





y summoned to' 

eceived instructions 

ntacted Copp. "Everyihini appears under control. Kill 
0945 hours." Gave contact instructions and 
standing by. 

Only requirement was to assist in verifying phone 
ot PM and FM. "A very senior official will call them. 

Copp called. Advised that prevlou5WF>^»^«pp roved an 
El-Al charfer flight before goinflHI||BPf 8ut h»d not 

er. Now bus y «ornin| of 22 Noveacer with| 

Foreign Ministry was refusing to 




what next, 



He is St 



g by 



Foreign Ministry still had made no decision. Copp » 



NSC IS now con 



C//^ <P3>^\ 



miZMM'KT 



i^dT 



175 




mtmm 



C 6179 



his requested the phone numbers of the FM and Pm, 



if 




request^querled headquarters to 
re of mission and if he approves 
Message comes back saying Sec State and Amb 
. two State officials aware of mission, they 
and all traffic should be kept in our channels. 
lacFarlane trying to phone FM. • 



s Charge. H^note^FM meeting just concluded 
reachedfl|H||B^B says step is for 
q send formal dipTomJ^re note to FM. Note 
shouia; Character is tics of aircraft, routes to and fro| 
JJpon receipt FM will consider request 
■^ note _by 1100 hours 23 Nov. 
^__^^_^_^_^^^__^ Informed Copp. He s 
will allow time tor my report to reach liTashington then 
phone to discuss options. 





Received msg direct! 
MacFarlane just talk 
clearance. 



23 NOVEMBER 85 



T_|contacte 
acFarlane 
that time at MFAJ^ 
MacFarlane/FM. Opi 




to contac^^^p^^land to not 

M who agreed to aircraft 



land conveyed 

^_ [y person available 

^ )t aware of telephone conversatior 
ip note still needed. 



Charge went to For Ministry to mee | 
presented note. Copp phoned to advise ot new plan 
Lve involving three flights by two planes to 




as going on-- 
ut could make 

parking 

Hostages deal 



Hi 

3^ 



>• 

or 






fflrj:e''^'onveying 
'd^Vwfc:-it had to 
been ursTjrtaken for 
ree Ajnerurak postage; 



told Charge decision reached^ 
ign Ministry would require 
contain two statements: a) operatic 
human 1 1 ariin_r^^ons , and b) the operation i 

]^^Bsaid if note delivered forthwith, decision would 
ow immediately. Obvious Implication is decision would 
^ ._f^j-^be positive. All found no problem with first point 
C//»r«0/-J but hung up on second. Copp deferred to Washington. Copp 



^fon 



176 



mumm 



c ei-: 





I ng 



MacFirline and been tryin| for past two hours to 
tot successful. 



)pp adv^BE^e can anticipate negative response 
quest through our channels. Charge sen^^^^^^ecommen 
Iternate part b wording which he bel iev«^|[^HBl|H at 
his point would accept. Obviously patience running out 
end at this point for answer received that 
ion stands and Charge should simply 

^saying "Xe regret your Government 
e use request for this humanitarian 
Charge delivered same to FM who was greatly 
troubled. Conversation re self defeating way this entire 
activity handled. 



Washii 
[at iv< 



'i( 




Message r»ce 
closing down 

Shut things do 




headquarters: "It obvious from above we a: 
spect of this operation." 



C2//V ^S'P^" 



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Dlt« tnd tiiB« 06/27/86 12 52 4i 



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N 4951 



•'" R*?ly to not* of 06/27/86 11: 12 
»>:~ -501 OLIVER KORTH 
S-:;*;t Ouestion from CBS 
: r.jv* just had » chance to watch the W 3Tth piece As far as I un concerned. 
;•- ;5 the single most distorted piece of "reprotmg" 1 hjve ever seen. Hull 
dce« -oi allege that he knous me. does not confess to receiving money from me 
-r i.--.\rne else ai the ^SC The only charges made about the nSC are made by 
pe:r.# uhc are ir. jail, on their way to jail or just out of ja.'. If this is 
supposed to be credible, then I'll eat aiy shirt. I have never oet A.SY of the 
accuaersor had anything to do with any of them Obviously, I know and have met 
several times with Eden Pastora. He does not allege any wrongdoing I kjiow 
Rob«rt Oi/en - he was, up until the time it went out of business - a consultant 
to :he State Dept I^AO. He was not "paid off" SSOk. as alleged by an 
ar.caoaious accuser, he was paid a salary and e.xpenses for services he provided 
in delivering humanitarian aid for the USG on a State Dept contract Finally 
their main "witness," Hr. Terrell was not called to appear before Sen. Kerry's 
inquisition • apparently because people have learned that Mr. Terrell was not, 
as be claiaed, a former Special Forces Officer, nor a CIA agent, nor a "contra 
cotbat leader "In short, neither the witnesses nor the slanderous piece that 
CBS produced have any credibility whatsoever. 



CVvorv. 1cy. 10 



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28 July 1986 



HEMORANDUM FOR: 



SUBJECT: 



Vice Admiral John M. Polndexter. USN 
Assistant to th« Prtsldent for 
National Security Affairs 

American Hostages 



I 0176 




After dtscusslng.tht release of Father Ltwrcnce Jenco with Charlie Allen 

and Dewey Clarrldgc. I believe It It isportant that you kave our assessaent of 

this devdopaent and prospects for release of additional hostages. 

First, It Is Indisputable that the Iranian connection ectualTjr worked 
this time, after a series of failures. You will recall that the 
Ghorbanlfar connection *lso resulted In the release of Reverend 
September 1985. 

After the lupass ___ 

Initiate direct contact with one of ay officers, George Cave, even though the 
Iranians had beentoldjthat we were no longer interested In pursuing the natter. 
The fact that JflSiV^erslsted In contacting us indicates his desire t- arrange 
• "deal* with Washington. either through Ghorbanlfar or. If necessary, wt Cave. 
He also clearly wantedfp keep • channel open. Aniraa Mir, Special Ass1i:ant to 
the PriM Minister of Israel on Counter-terrorisa, has also played a critical role 
in a determined effort to force Iran to begin the release of Aoerlcan hostages.- 
He has been supported by Prine Minister Peres and Defense Mlnister'Rabln in 
this endeavor. In order to sake the terms of the arrangeaents Bore palatable, ' 
Israel, on its own, offered additional arms 'to sweeten the deal.' 




10 reinforce this conoltAcnt, 
he transferred $4 Bmion to a West European wnr to pay his European Inten^dlary 
for the HAWK spere perts removed froa our alsslon aircraft In May. On Wednesday, 
23 July, when no hostage had been_r^ased, Gho rbanlfar was instructed to infora 
that "the deal was off. 



r -n 

Partially nchssifi^ri.'hcjjind o.i^tlV^aJlt? : 
L'nder proviiions of EO. 12355 
by 3. Reger, NoUcnal Security Council 



OM/i) ^^al / n ni 





iflroSRACT/ORToH 



91 - 051 "^f 



183 




UNCUSSIfliI— 



0177 



In return for the release, J|fl|hHi prob«b1y expects to receive 
fliost of the HAWX spare parts not yet delivered, along with additional 
■llitary equipment that Israel unllaterall^has added to the arrangemen 
Once this equipment Is delivered, lBMf|k"ta ted that Iran would take 



action to obtain the release of one more hostage and would pay the rema 
* "' aney owed to the Ir anian Intermediary for the HAWK spare parts. 



t. 

inder 




•oreover. Indicated a willingness to meet 
■atters, either In Tehran or fsocnewhere else*", 

. .This 1i:hoii'wt'set:th« ciifcebi jituitlflrt 



5e 



officials again on these 
presumably Western Europe. 



The 6horban1far«m|0^ connection has worked for the second 
tine — and another American has been released. 

- 'Ghorbanlfarts an uncontronabic factor, but appears to respond 
^riiJen'r^lli to Hlr's.dlr^ctlorf, ., , . .. 



-i 



'Nff has 'every reason 'to work for further releases of our hos tages . '_ 
;]iPercs And Rabin have "put their rcputatlon.on the 'Ghorbanlfar^WMpd. 
''fconnectldfi arrti support Hlr. -fully .in J)fs endeavors'.'. There would be' a f 

'considerable loss d/ '-face for Mir and his superiors If the link wece / 
'--broken. "This connection: app'ears to be 'the only hope they have fori..' 

•recovering thetr own ■fssfng. sol41cri,: f ,_ .;. . .. . '. 

— 4i0PSPi'h8S now acted and likely expects the United States to respond 
quickly In turn by delivering most of the renalnlng HAWK spare parts. 
He probably believes the United States Is also supplying the additional 
nllltary equipment that has been promised. 

— Whether we are prepared to negotiate or meet their demands or 
cxpectlons at this point, w* should find out what they are. • 



If the deliveries do' not occur, ^■■i^wlll lose >adly with his 

■sup5^dr$HT»Te>irarf'and liatferr coindT^m iigly,- especially since the . 

"* "Ve"bVnVs*e''Hl2ba'11ah'caDtoHs ]^rpt*b\y frf. not pleased >»1th the 3enco release. 
r-- -r.. ..„,.. ».:trt ri'^i i^e-;-*: t*:;.. z.r"^.. .r . .. . ^ 

-'" If thtrt Is' no US6 'contact is 'a reVu'lt of Jenco's release. It, Is entirely 
possible that Iran and/or Hizballah could r«sort to the murder of one or * 
wort of the remaining hostages. . 



^jra7 



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184 




DNCLASSIfffllP^ 



0178 




In swmtry, based on the Intelligence «t ei. 
w* should continue to nelhttin the 6horb«n1f<r 

consider whit we «*y b« prepered to do to meet 

th«t would lead to release of the rest of the hostagcsT 
pleased by segmented releases of the American hostages, 
this may be the only way to proceed, given the delicate 
In Iran. I also sec resolution of the hostage Issue as 
to contacts with noderate factions In Iran that w« may 
In the longer te™. 



0:,.l believe that 
'contact and 

■Inlfiuo requirements 

Although I am not 

I am convinced that 

factiontl balance 

potentially leading 

be able to deal with 



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W1111«ffl J. Casey 



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SECRET STATE 24] 120 



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fOR THE AMSASSAOOR FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
E.G. 12 356 DECl OA DR 
SUBJECT ^^^VpROJECT 



REF 



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ENTIRE TEXT, 



2 WE APPRECIATE YOUR EXCEllEr.'T v.ORK IN i.'AnjjG TEMIATIVE 
ARRANGE l.'.E NTS FOR A UEETING IN lOVOON WiIH^^dAMO 
HOPEFUL L r mi^Hi^ '.YE HAVE N'OT YET 3ErE9MINE0 v/H OUR 
EMISSARY vniL BE, HOv;[V£R YOU MAY I N F OR M ^|^ T H A T v/E 
WILL HAVE A use EMISSARY IN LO.'.'DON NElT ;vE E K T ME E T WITH 
HIM, WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE IHE MEETING AS EARLY AS 
POSSIBLE BUT ANY OF THE PERIODS SUGGESTED PARA, 4 REFTEL 
iSE ACCEPTABLE, PLEASE SEE IF YOU CAN PIN DOWN A TIME 
FOR A !.'.EETIMG WE HOPE ^0 BE ABLE TO GtvE rOU THE NAME 



P..ui:.; -...;:.:.:- i;.-:::::i o;^/ ^/?/f , W" 
by p.. P 'gsr, t'atijnal SiruriJy Council 



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PiG: '3 3 Of a: SIAIE :il\29 

Or OUR EvtISSART 9T f.OI.'Oir. iUCUSI < 

3 neiSC ALSO REASSURE^H^^""^ ^'^ ^"^ '" ^OTAL 
AGREfMEMr Wi:h him about The /;EE0 fOR THE JT'HOST 
I SCRE T ION' Si^ULTZ 




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ssiT^ UNCLASSIFIED »■-" -_, 



tjfrmy^ C UUVtffi 




U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

PeHMAN€NT SELfCT COMMfmi 

ON INTEUJGfNCE 

WASHINGTON. OC 20518 



to* k 



August 12, 1986 






CH 7 



Hor.oca^sle Ranald 0. Coleman 

416 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, D.C, 20515 

Dear Ron: 

As you are aware, there have been numerous stories published in the press 
during the last year alleging that members of the National Security Council 
violated the 3olai.d amendiier.t prohibiting certain assistincj to the contrci, 
fighting the governinent of -Nicaragua. As a result of these allegations, you 
introduced a resolution of inquiry to conpel the National Security Council to 
provide certain information so the Congress could make a determination as to 
whether or not the Soland amendment was violated during the time it was m 
effect. 

Because of the highly classified nature of the work of the National 
Security Council, t.he resolution of inquiry was referred to the House 
Jenanent Select Conroittee on Intelligence. Members of the Committee, 
includLng inyself , went to the White House to examine the issues raised sy t.ie 
resolution with Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a member of the National 
Security Council staff and one of the principal subjects of the resolution; 
tne President's National Security Adviser; and other members of the NSC staff, 
including White House counsel. In addition, the Connittee also examined otr.er 
classified evidence concerning the resolution. 

Based on our discussions and review of the evidence provided, it is my 
belief that the published press allegations cannot be proven. 

The resolution of inquiry was the proper vehicle by which to bring these 
matters to tne attention of the Congress and to this Committee, a.nd we 
appreciate your efforts to remove doubts about United States activities. 



With best wisties/ I am 



eNCUSSIFIED 



Sincertly yours, 

£muL 

Le« B. Hamilton 
Chairman 




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NCLASSIF2ED 






Team NSRL£ --CPUA 
To: SSCPC --CPLA 

NOTE FROH; Robert L. E«rl 
Sub'«ct: TEST 



D«t« and tlo* 10/06/86 12:67:Sl 

N 93C0 



Tht only change I have on this so far is that it was in support of FDN forces 
in !.*■.• SOUTH not in the north of Nicaragua. I'll correct that w/ JMP when/if 
h« responds, or if we get something else significant to pass "" "> *••- 
♦*• Forwarding not* from NSRLE --CPL'A 10/06/86 n:<.9 " 



on to hio. 



•-CPL'A 



♦*• Reply to note of 08/24/86 13:01 

NOTE FROH: Robert L. Earl 

Subject: TEST 

Yesterday one of the Democracy Inc aircraft apparently went down on a 

resvzpply oission to FDN forces in the north. It is overdue froa its aission, 

and no radio contact wa a_xecely«d ■ It is current ly unknown where or why the 

do^.Ti, but^^^mBH^m^^^|p4ssets are 
organizing a SAR effort over intemat^n^^u^^^ & friendly territory 
portions of the route. Three Americans and one Nicaraguan national aboard. 
I will keep you advised of details as I get then. 




jnder provision*: of E.O. 12^56 
by B Reger, National Security Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 



194 

O 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 



3 9999 06313 232 6