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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

Y l.l/2:Serial 13762 

United stales Congressional... 



Government 
Documents 





1 



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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 21 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13762 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 21 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. -Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. — Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnited States 3enatc 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman V^^ 
Vice Chairman 



III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515 

(202) 22&-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fop-vrelease to the public. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields. Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Armlysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Raynor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Nields. Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Tray lor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Dornan 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 21 



Preface XXI 

Posey, Thomas V 1 

Powell, Gen. Colin L 223 

Price, Charles H., II 343 

Proprietary Manager 373 

Proprietary Pilot 619 

Radzimski, James R 765 

Ramsey, John W 1011 

Ransom, David M 1 179 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Harnett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett. C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark. Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke. George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe. Adm. William J. 
Currier. Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel. J. Edwin. 
Dowling. Father Thomas. 
Dutton. Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd). 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Jr. 



Volume 15 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhorne A. 
Mulligan, David P. 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., 11. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, M. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 24 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



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N T I A L 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

DEPOSITION OF THOMAS V. POSEY 
* 

Washington, D. C. 

Thursday, April 23, 'l987 

Deposition of THOMAS V. POSEY, called for examination 
pursuant to notice of deposition, at the offcijes of the Senate 
Select Coitanittee, Hart Senate Office Building, Suite 901, at 
9:55 a.m. before VfENDY S. COX, a Notary Public within and for 
the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the 
respective parties: 



JOHN D. SAXON, ESQ. 

Associate Counsel 

TOM YOUNG, ESQ. 

United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan 
Opposition 

901 Hart Senate Office Buildil 

Wahsington, D. C. 20510 

G. DOUGLAS JONES, ESQ. 
Johnson, Cory & McNamee, P.C. 
300 Twenty First Street North 
Birmingheun, Alabeuna 35203 

_^^ ^-7^yjS)Ti behalf of the Deponent. 



^7J? 



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>r D. SU ko, N«tioful Security 



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CONTENTS 




WITNESS 






EXAMINATION 


Thomas V 
by Mr. 
by Mr. 
by Mr. 
by Mr. 


. Posey 
Saxon 
Young 
Saxon 
Young 


EXHIBITS 


3 

115 
119 
188 


POSEY EXHIBITS 




IDENTIFIED 


Exhibits 


1 thru 3 




29 


Exhibit 


4 




49 


Exhibit 


5 




51 


Exhibit 


6 




92 


Exhibit 


7 




98 


Exhibit 


8 




128 


Exhibit 


9 




136 


Exhibit 


10 




138 


Exhibit 


11 




140 


Exhibit 


12 




144 


Exhibit 


13 




146 


Exhibit 


14 




147 


R«hlbits 15 and 16 




149 


Exhibit 


17 




152 



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PROCEEDINGS 
Whereupon, 

THOMAS V. POSEY 
was called as a witness and, having first been duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q It you would, sir, please state your Cull name for 

the record. 

A Thomas Vincent Posey. 

Q What is your address, Mr. Posey? 

B^^^^^^^^^^^^fl Decatur, Alabama 
Q Could you give us a sentence or two about your 
background. 

A I am going on 41 years of age. I have served in 
the armed forces, either active duty or in the reserve 
system, for approximately 15 years, and that was with the 
Marine Corps and the Alabama National Guard. I own a produce 
business I started in 1967, that I closed up May of last 
year . 

Do you want me to tell you about being a baseball 
coach and all that other stuff? 



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^ D. Isirko, National Security Council 

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1 Q Whatever you want to add. 

2 A I was a city councilman, baseball coach, voluntee 

3 fireman, volunteer policeman. Anything I can get into, I ge 

4 into. 

5 Q Still coaching Little League? 

6 A No, I gave it up when I started this. 

7 Q Never ran a restaurant called Posey's in 

8 Tuscaloosa, Alabama, did you? 

9 A No, sir. 

10 Q Some of the best hose-cooked vegetables I ever 

11 had. 

12 Mr. Posey, are you currently employed; do you haxi 

13 an occupation, as we would normally think of it? 

14 A I would say full-time assisting the freedom 

15 fighters of Central America, which most people call the 

16 /6ontras, which I call the Freedom pighters . The FDN is the 

17 group that we mainly work with. 

18 Q It's not my intent to engage in semantic games, 

19 but I am more accustomed around here to calling them the 

20 ^ontras; so if I call them the j^ontras , understand that's 

21 what I am talking about. You call them whatever you want, 

22 and that will just make it easier. 



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Nationwide Coverin SOO-JM^tMA 



30668.0 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 Mr. Posey, if you would, tell me in a general way 

2 about CMA, its origin, its background and creation, 
3| circumstances of its creation and so forth. 

41 A Okay. CMA was started approximately four years 

5 ago by Bill Courtney, Dana Parker, Ray Potter and myself, to 

6 do something about stopping cofflnunisH in Central America. 

7 At that particular time, the news media was 
on the news^^^HH^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H He 

9 come up with a name for the organization yet; we just knew w- 

10 were going to do something about co««unis«. Then after 

11 Flight 007 was shot down -- we knew when it was shot down 

12 nobody was going to do anything about it. That's when we 

13 decided to get off our butt, go down there and find out what 

14 we could do about it. That's when I made arrangements to go 

15 Hii^^^llHi 

16 Q When would that have been? 

17 A It was in September of '63. 

18 Q Who did you meet with when you went there? 

19 A I net an individual by the name ofJ 
^^^^^^^^^^^^B rank on He had just gotten 

21 there. That was his first full day of work, I think it was. 

22 I told him that there was some concerned Americans wanting tf 




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Q Did he do that? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q What else was formally done to create CMA? 

A What do you mean? What did we do afterwards? 

Q Thus far I have a statement of what the interest 
was and the issue. I an not sure — 

A It would be siapler to tell you just what happen<^ 
afterwards. I met -- but I netl^^^^^^^ 

He did speak 

English. I told hia there were concerned Americans wanting 
to help out by sending supplies down there. We would like ' 
try to adopt a company-sized unit. So what I asked for was 
list of supplies that they could use, and I also provided a 
list of supplies that we would like to provide to them. 

So, a few days later, I hadn't heard back from tt 
American Embassy or anything like that, because there was 
another guy supposed to get ahold of them. I forget his 
name, but he was in the American Embassy there. I didn't 
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1 thereafter, I received a letter in Spanish on the supplies 

2 and everything that they were wanting, comparing to what we 

3 was wanting to give and everything like that. 

4 Q What would you say is the purpose of CMA? 

5 A Right now, the purpose of CMA is to still stop 

6 communism in Central America, and hopefully grow to where we 

7 can fight communism throughout the world. 

8 Q What is the formal or full name of CMA? What do 

9 the letters stand for? 

10 A Originally it stood for "Civilian Military 

11 Assistance." We changed it April of last year, due to the 

12 advice of some lawyers in Memphis, to "Civilian Material 

13 Assistance," because they said we have a better chance of 

14 getting tax deductible if we was to tone down the name. 

15 Q What would you say is your approximate membership? 

16 A On the rolls, a little over 900, but we have 

17 supporters out there also, such as people who send us 

18 clothes, everything of this nature. So we claim on 

19 supporters and everything about 5000. 

20 Q By "on the rolls," what does that mean? 

21 A That is people that have paid, at one time, dues 

22 or gave us enough materials to be considered members. 



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1 Q What is the threshold for enough in materials, 1 

2 I wanted to join or be a member, get on the rolls? 

3 A Right now it would be a $30 membership dues, 

4 whereas before, when we first started, it was anything. If 

5 it was $1, $5, whatever, then we put out an application 

6 asking for $20 donation. 

7 Q What if I wanted to donate ay old, no longer in 

8 use, army boots. 

9 A If you had enough of boots, yes, sir, you woul-d. 

10 become a member then, if that's what you want. A lot of 

11 people gave to us, not wanting to get on any computer roUsi 

12 Q Do you have computer rolls? 

13 A We do have a computer, yes, sir. We acquired thi 

14 February of last year. 

15 C Let me ask you a few questions about the fundingi 

16 of CMA. The first question, if you are able to answer it i 

17 this way — you may not, and I understand if you can't — 

18 iince its creation, what would you say would be the total 

19 dollar amount of contributions you have received in cash or; 

20 cash equivalent check, et cetera, not counting in^^kind 

21 contributions, supplies. 

22 Q Not counting supplies? 



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1 A Not counting that, what would be the amount of 

2 cash you received? 

3 MR. JONES: You are talking about over the 

4 four-year period? 

5 BY MR. SAXON: 

6 Q Over the whole period, sure. 

7 A Ballpark figures, I a« going to say somewhere 

8 about probably — last three, four, years, probably about 

9 maybe $70,000. 

10 Q Okay. What kind of ballpark figure would you put 

11 -- same question, but with regard to noncash contributions — 

12 materials, supplies, any kind of contributions, equipment? 

13 A He estimate probably about $6 million. 

14 Q Do you have a yearly budget? 

15 A No, sir. 

16 Q What would you say is the geographic distribution 

17 of your contributors? Where are they from? 

18 A All over. 

19 Q All over the U.S., all over the world? 

20 A We have members in all 50 states and six or seven 

21 foreign countries. 

22 Q Where do most of your members come from? 



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1 K Oh, God. Geographically, Alabama -- percentage 

2 wise, it's proteably our big<jest membership on th-e rolls, is 

3 Alabama. 

4 Q What would you say are the dewographics of your 

5 membership? What kinds of people are you talking about, ag« 

6 ethnic background, civilian, military, retired military, 

7 business people, whatever? 

8 A I am going to say that the majority of them are i 

9 their late 308 on up. Wc have a lot of retired military 

10 personnel involved. The highest ranking is a brigadier 

11 general on down to Sally th« waitress to Bill the truck 

12 driver-type individuals. 

13 Q I will ask about Sally and Bill later. 

14 A All right. 

15 Q What would you say, in terms of the cash 

16 contributions, cash or check, would be the average 

17 contribution size, 310, 550, $200? 

18 A Well, if they are joining up, it's $30 right now, 

19 and that's for over a year now. But the average, like I sa; 

20 somebody just sending a donation in, I would say anywhere 

21 from 510 to $20, somewhere in that monetary range there. 

22 Q Are you able in any way to characterize an avera< 



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contribution of noncash materials; is that one toy, a pickup 
truck full of clothes, how does that come in to you? 

A You mean on the average? 

Q Yes, just to give us an idea of any of the members 

of the committee. 

A Like when I coae down here I received two boxes of 
civilian clothes from Bluegrass, Kentucky. Whereas we have a 
nurse, that before she went to be a nurse down in Central 
America, she got us 25,000 pieces of civilian clothes, 
industrial uniforn type, donated in Birsingham. Industrial 
uniform means the brown, the blues and all that. 

Q I believe you said you have a contribution list 
itself, or the membership roll itself? 

A Membership roll, yes, sir. 

Q That's on computer? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Do you happen to have a copy of that with you? 

A No, sir. 

Q Is that soieething you could provide the committee? 

A If it is requested. 

Q I don't know that we need it for any particular 
purpose. I will think about it. 



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1 A I would appreciate that, because a lot of people 

2 are scared of "big brother." 

3 Q He are not trying to invade anybody's privacy. 

4 don't know right now whether I could nake a case for the 

5 relevance. 

6 MR. JONES: Just for his benefit, Johnny, if yoi 

7 do need it, send us a separate duces tecua specifically foi 

8 that. 

9 HR. SAXON: All right. 

10 BY MR. SAXON: 

11 Q Is CMA a tax^<ieductible entity? 

12 A No, sir. 

13 Q Have you ever portrayed it as being tax 

14 deductible? 

15 A No, sir. As a Batter of fact, we put on our 

16 advertisement that we were not tax deductible. 

17 Do you Bind if I saoke? 

18 Q I don't Bind. 

19 A If somebody is allergic, I won't. 

20 Q Since you have a coBputerized membership roster, 

21 do you do any solicitation through the mail, any direct mai 

22 fundjraising of that roster or any other? 



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1 A We have tried on that roster. 

2 Q Did you have any success? 

3 A Very dad gum little. 

4 MR. JONES: Off the record. 

5 (Discussion off the record.) 

6 BY MR. SAXON: 

7 Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about 

8 accounting for CMA. First, let ne pose the general question 

9 to you, what kind of accounting procedures do you have? 

10 A What do you nean, in what area? 

11 Q Well, you talked about receiving over a three- or 

12 four-year period upwards of $70,000, $6 million worth of 

13 goods, equipment, supplies. 

14 A Okay. 

15 Q Coming in, going out, auditing procedures, 

16 whatever. 

17 A Okay. Financially, the bank -- the records are 

18 ftwailable, you know, you get so many dollars in, you can only 

19 spend so many dollars. Receipts, things like that, like if I 

20 have travel or soiaething like that, the receipts are there to 

21 say what the money went for. 

22 Q This would be the First Stats Bank of Decatur? 



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1 A Yes, sir. The name has changed since then. Fii 

2 Alabama, I think it is now. 

3 Q No surprise. 

4 A Supplies. Accountability, I don't know, we didi 

5 sit down and itemize every little thing that cj^me in. Whai 

6 we did was book accountability. You get a pickup load of 

7 civilian clothes, we would say that's worth $5000, somethii 

8 like that. Because our staff at that particular time, whi< 

9 still is now mostly my own wife, who works at the warehous* 

10 my sons every now and then — . 

11 MR. JONES: John, I don't want to testify for h 

12 but I think one of th« things that you may be getting at, 

13 there are no journals of, like, income and distributions, 

14 that sort of thing. There are no journals like that, or 

15 accounts receivable list or anything of that nature. 

16 MR. SAXON: For the record, there are no value 

17 judgments in my questions. 

18 MR. JONES: I understand that. 

19 MR. SAXON: I am n»t suggesting you should have 

20 certain procedures. I am, for information purposes, tryinc 

21 to find out what you do and how you do it. 

22 MR. JONES: All right. 



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1 THE WITNESS: In Memphis now, Jim Turney, up until 

2 this past January, handled the Memphis accounts. 

3 BY MR. SAXON: 

4 Q Turney? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q Spell that, please. 

7 A T-u-r-n-e-y. 

8 Q What did he do in Meaphis? 

9 A He took over the administrative aspects 

10 approximately a year and a half ago. So Bcnberships and a 

11 lot of the donations went directly to Meaphis. 

12 Q Who took his place when he left? 

13 A He is still there, but it switched over to a dual 

14 signature between Ji« Kent and Jia Turney. 

15 Q Jia Kent? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q K-e-n-t? 

18 A Yes, sir. 

19 Q For the record, does CMA have a treasurer? 

20 A Yes, sir; Jia Turney. 

21 Q Do you have a comptroller? 

22 Is that a no? 




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1 A No. 

2 Q Okay. Have your books ever been audited? 

3 k No, sir. 

4 Wait a minute. Let me back up. What do you mean 

5 which books? 

6 Q The CMA books, whatever records you have? 

7 k What I do now, like I say, on taxes, I take my 

8 books to — what you call it? 

9 Q CPX, accountant? 

1' A Yes. They fix up my tax papers and everything 

i: like that. 

12. Q That's your personal return? 

13 A That's my personal — my CMA account there in 

14 Decatur. 

15 Q Your CMA account? 

16 A Yes, sir, that's what you got the copy of the 

17 checks on; yes, sir. 

18 Q Your accountant prepares your return or the CMA 

19 return; or is it one and the same? 

20 A One and the same. Most o£ the expenditures was 

21 out of my own pocket anyway. 

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1 Jim can tell you the name of the guy running the checks on 

2 the computer. 

3 Q Let me ask you about the incoming contributions or 

4 the supplies, et cetera. First, if you would, for the 

5 record, characterize the types of things that you receive. 

6 A Okay. The bulk oC what we received in weight has 

7 been civilian clothes. The dollar value and bulk of what we 

8 have received, is medical supplies. We have also received 

9 uniforms, boots, just about anything, other than we have not 

10 received no weapons. We have had people call us up and ask 

11 us, and we tell them, respectfully decline their donations of 

12 them. 

13 Q Do you tell them where they could send the 

14 weapons? 

15 A Very easy, sir. I tell the* that if they have a 

16 State Department permission to export weapons, they can do 

17 it. But they cannot send them to the ^ontras, because that 

18 would not be in receivership of the State Department forms, 

19 end-user certificate is the word I am trying to find. We did 

20 receive 20 pounds of aircraft ammunition that I turned over 

21 to the FBI, and they turned it back over to me. 

22 Q What did you do with it? 




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A Still sitting there in the warehouse. 

Q When did they turn it back to you? 

A I don't know. I gave it to him and he gave it 



back. 



Q Is this in Birmingha«? 

A No, sir; Huntsville. 

Q What has been your neans of publicizing your 
activities for purposes of k, general publicity about CHk, 
and the cause; and, B, how you are trying to solicit 
supplies, et cetera, where to send the* and so forth? 

A Honest answer to that is we hadn't really tried to 
get any publicity. The news media had come to us anyway. He 
have had an open-door policy from the very beginning, with 
the news media and anybody else, aa to what we are doing and 
how we were doing it. We have received a lot of news 
attention because of that accessibility, and as for a 
paid-type publicity, or advertisement or something like that, 
r probably wouldn't guess that we probably haven't spent more 
than $2-, $300 on something like that. 

Q Let me ask you about your warehouse facilities, 
and let me ask you in very general terms, what do you have, 
where are they, who owns them, how were they acquired, et 

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1 cetera. 

2 A The warehouse in Decatur is ny warehouse that I 

3 rent 

4 Q For the produce fir«? 

5 A Yes, sir. I have had that for, I guess, close to 

6 20 years now. The warehouse in Memphis is Ji« Turney • s 

7 garage and one rental, miniwarehouse thing. 

8 Q Yes. 

9 A The other warehouse, what we consider not ours per 

10 se, but ours as with the rreedoa fighters, is in Kenner, 

11 Louisiana, it's called Dahler. 

12 Q Spell "Dahleif-y 

13 K D-a-h-1-e-r, I think, I can check it if I have got 

14 her card here. Address and phone nuaber and everything. 

15 Before then she worked soiieplace else and it was an 

16 /fntertran^'^warchouse. 

17 Q Mho is "she? " You said "she." 

18 A Hell, we call her Rocky. Her name is Rochelle 

19 Ja«es, I think. 

20 MR. JONES: Rochelle Jaaes. 

21 THE WITNESS: Rochelle Janes, yes. 

22 MR. JONES: John, by the way, there are some 



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cancelled checks, you will sec, made out to the something 
Williams Trust Fund. 

THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, that's the rent on the 
building. The rent, I think, is $125 a month. 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Rent in Memphis? 

k No, Decatur. 

Q You do pay rent on that? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q What are your procedures for taking in physically, 
loading, unloading, warehousing, loading up again, to ship 
somewhere, all of the things you receive. If you would just 
walk us through that process. Maybe you would just start 
with a pickup truck puls« up, knowing where to come, to your 

A 

warehouse in Decatur loaded, let's say, with civilian 
clothes. What happens from that point to when it actually 
gets to someone in Central America. 

A Okay. On the law of averages, I usually pick up 
most of the supplies that comes in. They are either mailed 
to me or UPS to me, to my house. I don't have her card with 
me. We take it down to the stockroom; I am going to say 95 
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boxed stuff, stuff in the box, into bags. Becduse the boxes 
weigh more than the bags, we can get more weight on the 
plane. 

Okay. I found out fro« Mario Calero as to what is 
mostly needed at that particular tine. Then I load up what 
they are needing and truck it to Kenner, Louisiana. 

Q Before you go further, does Mr. Calero send you 
something in writing in that regard, or are you talking about 
by the phone? 

A By the phone. 

Q Who calls whoa? Do you call hi« or does he — 

A Both. 

Q He has called and he says we need aedical 
supplies, you have soae aedical supplies among the »any 
things in your warehouse. You are ready to ship him some 
medical supplies. What happens? 

A I load it up and take it down there to him. 

Q How? 

A I put it in the boxes, put it in the van, and 
drive it down that to hia. 

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1 beEore. 

2 BY MR. SAXON: 

3 Q Have you ever used any other form of 

4 transportation to get it from Decatur to Louisiana? 

5 A Besides U-Haul truck, no, sir. Now, sometimes 

6 supplies from my people or my chapters, like, say, from 

7 Louisiana, like Glen Thibideaux was bringing supplies in from 

8 Lafayette, Louisiana, which is only about two hours from New 

9 Orleans, he will take it directly to Mario. There is no 

10 sense taking to it to ■« and I have to take it all the way 

11 back down there. Same way froa California; if they were 

12 going to send it froa California, they send it directly to 

13 Mario. 

14 Q Do you have any eaployees as such of CMA, any paid 

15 positions? 

16 A No. We buy food for Dave Harrison in Memphis, but 

17 he is not on the payroll. We buy food for him to work 

18 there. 

19 Q I don't mean to pry into your personal affairs, 

20 but do you pay yourself a salary? 

21 A No, sir. 

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A Herbert Humphrey. 

Q Who is he? 

A He iS the owner of a Holiday inn in €&y«an Isiandi 

and also Cayman, Limited, in Memphis. 

Q Does he send you periodic checks? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Do you provide his anythinq in terms of receipts 
or living expense records? 

A I send receipts on expenses and things like that, 
yes, sir. 

Q Do those cheeks come on a regular basis, once a 
month? 

A For the past year, started April of last year, 
sir. 

Q I think you have adequately explained the answers 
to what would be my next q^i«stions about your records. 

What are you aware that Mr. Calero, Mario Calero, 
••eps in terms of his records? 

A From my personal experience, every penny Mario 
spent, it was written on a check, and it was sent cr taken to 
Florida by Adolf o and to the bookkeeper. 

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1 talking to Adolf o Calero's bookkeeper? 

2 A The records . 

3 Q He would write a check on an account over which he 

4 I had control and was a signatory? 

5 A Yes, sir. 

€ Q On a bank where? 

7 A I don't remember the name, but ifs there in 

8 Kenner. 

9 Q In Louisiana? 

10 A Yes, sir. 

11 Q Periodically, those records are turned over to his 

12 brother, Adolfo, and an accountant in Miami? 

13 A Yes, sir. That's what I assume, because he 

14 mentioned it one time, yes, sir. 

15 Q Does he keep records of what comes in in terms of 

16 a shipping or warehousing receipt, ledger list, packing list, 

17 et cetera? 

18 A For things that he purchased, there was a list of 

19 everything that he purchased and things like that. Now, for 

20 things that were donated, I know he didn't sit down and 

21 itemize it, no, sir. 

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1 medical supplies, let's say, that's what he has told you he 

2 wanted, you took it down, somewhere there unloaded it. 

3 A Yes, sir. 

4 Q Put it in the warehouse in Kenner, and no paper 

5 changed hands, no documents, no records? 

6 A No, sir. But when they would ship it out, I know 

7 he would type a manifest as to what was going on the plane. 

8 Q Would it be in bulk, though, would it say 43 boxes 

9 of civilian clothes, or would it have a listing by item? 

10 A I think it would be one of these things, like I 

11 say, civilian clothes, medical supplies, things like that, 

12 but I don't think they weighed it, no, sir. 

13 Q Did he ever provide you anything written in terms 

14 of what he needed, what you had sent, any quarterly, monthly, 

15 yearly compilations, et cetera? 

1€ A There was one or two articles he put in the FDN 

17 bulletin. He did write us one letter stating that he had 

18 appreciated the aid that was given to him, civilian supplies 

19 and everything like that, which I think, if I am not 

20 mistaken, the letter said 60 percent. Then the other part, 

21 the newspaper, I think it said, $70,000 worth or something 
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Q The 60 percent would have been 60 percent of what 

A Civilian supplies — you know, blue jeans, 
sweaters, things like that. 

Q I understand that, but I don't understand what thel 
reference -- 

A Oh. The rest of it was like military supplies, 
like uniforms, boots, belts, packs, things of that nature. 

Q Did you ever have occasion to use Baggett 
Transportation, B-a-g-g-e-t-t? 

A No, sir, personally, I didn't. 

Q Are you aware o£ whether CMA or Mario Calero ever 
used Baggett? 

A I did receive soae supplies, but I don't remember 
what trucking company sent them now, I will be honest with 
you . 

Q Did you ever have occasion to use Southern Air 
Transport? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. There was planes that 
come in that took the supplies down there, but I don't 
remember the name of the airline. I just remember one of the 
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Q When Mario Calero would prepare a planeload oC 
supplies and equipment to be shipped south, who made the 
determination as to where those would be shipped? 

K God, I don't know. You have to ask hia, 

seriously. Everything that I knew, it was going down to FDN, 
and there was two ports of entry that I had experienced one. 
and another one I never did experience. That was 
That's the one I Clew in on, and the ^^^H^B Indians would 
unload the supplies and steal their 25 percent. You can 
print that. 

Q Tell us what you neant by that. 

A No matter what you sent down, when it got down 
there, there would always be soaething Hissing. 

Q ^^H^^^H "ilitary, 

A The whole nine yards. 

Q All of the above? 

A All of the above. I couldn't blame them. They 
was really hurting at that tine on supplies. 

Q When Mario Calero sent these supplies, did he ever 

charge anyone for the«? 

A Did he what? 

Q Did he ever charge, bill, require payment by 

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1 anyone who received them? Has he getting paid for any o£ the 

2 things he shipped out of Kenner, Louisiana? 

3 A To my knowledge, no, because it was going down to 

4 his troops. 

5 Q One question on your Decatur warehouse, when you 

6 pay the rent, that check is written on the CMA account with 

7 the Decatur bank? 

8 A Now it is, but I think before it was written on 

9 Posey's Produce account. 

10 Q When did that change start? 

11 A We went out oC business May oC last year, sir. 

12 Q Is your warehouse guarded, or what security do yc 

13 have for it? Both the one in Decatur, the one in Memphis, 

14 and I guess, the Kenner. 

15 A Just regular police, you know, drive by every now 

16 and then. 

17 Q You don't have a security guard posted? 

18 A No, sir. 

19 Q Do you have a lock on it of any type? 

20 A Oh, I have a lock on it; yes, sir. 

21 Q What type? 

22 A Door lock. 



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Q I want to ask you a couple of questions about 
money, finances and bank accounts. Some of this we have 
covered, so I will omit anything in that category. You 
indicated that your bank was First State Bank in Decatur and 
the name is now changed and you believe it's First Alabama? 
K Yes , sir . 

Q Would that be account number 
MR. JONES: No. 

THE WITNESS: That's not CMA's; it might b« my 
personal account or Posey's Produce. 

MR. SAXON: Okay. Let me offer as Deposition 
Exhibit -- off the record a second. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

(Posey Exhibits 1 through 3 identified.) 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q If you would look at what has been marked as 
Deposition Exhibit 1, this is drawn on BAC International 
Bank, dated June 17, 1985 — 

That much Spanish I know -- paid to the First 
State Bank of Decatur, and this deposit was in the amount of 
§31,000. Does that appear to be something of which you have 
knowledge or recollection? 




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1 A Yes, sir, but they docked me $5 for the transfer. 

2 Q Okay, I can understand that problem. I have had 

3 it myself. What would this payment have been for, and who 

4 would it have been from? 

5 A It W&3 from the FDN, and it was for supplies 

6 acquired for the FDN. Just right off the top of the brain, 

7 it would either be for poncho liners, uniforms, socks, 

8 parachutes or a combination of all of them. 

9 Q How does that work, since what you have described 

10 thus far is you receiving, without any payment, expended on 

11 your part or CMA's part, giving you things. Now we have 

12 provided something H to FDN and you paid for it. 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Is this something you went and purchased for them? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q Tell me how it worked. 

17 A At this particular time, if they was needing 

18 something such as uniforms, parachutes, things like this, we 

19 put our feelers out to find the cheapest price available. 

20 Q That need would come from the FDN through Mario? 

21 A Yes. Okay. Once we found the cheapest price 

22 available, Mario would approve the purchase or, you know, 
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1 deny it. If the purchase was approved, the funds would be 

2 transferred by wire to «y bank account; I would get the 

3 money, g<t it cashed, taVe it to the supplier, and pay for 

4 th« material. Th<n the materials would b« delivered t© the 

5 FDN. 

6 Q I don't have a fixation on records, but let me 

7 just astc you, when, in that process you have described, would 

8 there be any kind of formal purchase order from Mario, or 

9 anything prepared, or would it simply be, he would call and 

10 say the folks down there would say, we need some parachutes, 

11 where can you find them. You go out and do the looking. You 

12 come back and say, I found them at XYZ parachute supply, they 

13 will cost $10, GOO; he says fine, you have got it. The money 

14 is wired to you, you buy th«B. They get, ultimately, to 

15 Mario, et cetera? 

16 A Yes, sir. Like, for instance, like I say, can you 

17 give me some parachutes. He will check his resources. If I 

18 am not mistaken, the last shipment of parachutes came from 

19 California. Hhat he would do is stand good to that creditor, 

20 because the FDN, you know, credit wasn't all that good. So 

21 he would stand good for it. Then I would get the funds to 

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1 California. 

2 Q Let me ask you to look at the second item theral 

3 which has been marked as Deposition Exhibit 2. Similar 

4 transfer document dated June 19, BAG International Bank, 

5 transfer, wire funds to your account, CMA account in Decat ; 

6 in the amount of $2000. Does this appear to be something.^ 

7 recall? 

8 A It would be the same type of purpose. 

9 Q Do you remember specifically what that might ha 
10 been for? 

U A No, sir, not right off hand. I would have to g 

12 back and look at the tickets and ask one of my suppliers t 

13 come up with something. That first one, I think, was part 

14 a 1000 backpacks; they were purchased out of New York, but 

15 through Decatur Surplus by Jeroke. 1 think they cost us 

16 $1850^ That was part of it. , 

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17 Q 918,500? ~ 

18 A Yes. Also in there we found some uniforms for 

19 95.75 a set, brand new ones. 

20 Q I would say you got a good deal. 

21 A You are dad gum right. 

22 Q Let me ask you, then, to look at Deposition 



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1 Exhibit 3, similar wire of funds dated July 25, 1985, in the 

2 amount of $7500. Same question. Does this appear to be 
something that makes sense, jogs your recollection? 

4 A Yes, sir; it's to purchase supplies. 

5 Q One question about the timing of those transfers 

6 and the sequence of those transfers. In our review of bank 

7 records tui;ned over to the comaittee by Mario Calero -- I am 

8 sorry, Adolfo Calero, these are the only three entries that 

9 we have with regard to CMA. Mere there other transfers of. 

10 which you have knowledge? 

11 A Transfers such as that, no, sir. Now, Mario 

12 Calero did write me a couple of checks out for gas expenses 

13 for getting supplies down there. At that time, gas was high 

14 and it was costing us approxiaately 9125 round trip to get 

15 the supplies down there. He did write out a couple of checks 

16 reimbursement for the gas, yea. 

17 Q And in the records that you have turned over to 

18 the committee this morning, do we have deposit slips 

19 reflecting those checks? 

20 A No, sir, I doubt it. What I would have to do is 

21 go over to the bank over there and cash it in order to get 

22 back home. 




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Q They were not deposited; they were cashed in 
Louisiana? 

A There might have been one or two that was 
deposited in my checking account. 

MR. JONES: John, just for the record, the 
deposits just listed deposits. Ue have not requested the 
banic to give us sicrofila of any of those. 
MR. SAXON: Okay. 

THE WITNESS: I think his checking account will 
vouch for it, Mario's, 

BY MR. SAXON; 
Q Is there any significance to the fact that those 
three deposits occurred within a one-month period in mid ■SS- 
A Other than they got the aoney to buy the supplies, 
they needed the supplies, we did our best to get the» the 
best and cheapest price available, which I think would be 
very easily verified through the governaent purchasing 
agency. They paid two arms and a leg. 

Q I think we know soae of those horror stories. Who 

A I never heard of them, sir, to my knowledge. 
Q Do CMA members — or I guess they would be 




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1 volunteers, since you have no paid employees — help UNO 

2 carry out warehousing and cargo and unloading operations in 

3 New Orleans? 

4 A Yes, sir. 

5 Q How does that process work? How do they wind up 

6 there, who tells them to show up there, who do they take 

7 orders from, et cetera? 

8 A We loaded every plane but one that left out of New 

9 Orleans; I think there was 54 or 55 planes. 

10 Q 54 or 55 planes? 

11 A Somewhere in there. 

12 Q Over the three- or four-year period of CMA ' s 

13 existence? 

14 A Yes, sir. 

15 Q CMA people loaded all but how many? 

16 A All but one. 

17 Q What was the nature of not loading that one? 

18 A The guy was sick. 

19 Q Do you recruit people to go down there or does 

20 Mario Calero? 

21 A No, sir, volunteers. 

22 Q How does somebody know that they are needed and 





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where to go and so forth? 

A The first one that went down there, he only lived 
two hours from there, and he had become friends with Mario 
Calero, and he wanted to do his part on helping the f'reedom 
F/ighters , because he is also a Vietnam veteran, and he felt 
like he would do more there than just sitting at home 
retired. 

Q That's understandable. But when it came time for 

a shipment, who would call him and say we are going to load 
up tomorrow morning to send a planeload of medical supplies? 

A He was living there at the house there in Kenner. 

Q I thought you said he was two hours away. 

A Right. He was staying there at the house. 

MR. JONES: Wait a minute. He lived two hours 
away . 

THE WITNESS: Right. At first he was going back 
and forth, and then he just stayed. 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q During that period he was going back and forth, 
somebody would call him and say we are going in Friday 
morning can you come back in? 

A Yes. And everytime Mario would call us up we 




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1 would go to Memphis or Decatur to help move the 

2 MR. JONES; You are saying he moved there to -- 

3 THE WITNESS: Not lock, stock and barrel, he would 

4 go home on the weekends, thing like that. 

5 BY MR. SAXON: 

6 Q Do you know a lot of these people personally? 

7 k Yes. 

8 Q Like in December oC '85, Harry or Jim, do these 

9 names ring a bell with you? 

10 A Harry, I don't think h« was involved at that 

11 time. 

12 Q But Harry rings a bell? 

13 A Yes, Dave Harrison, Harry. He may have gotten out 

14 of the Marine Corps about that time. I stand corrected on 

15 that. 

16 1 Q Jim. Who would that have been? 

17 A Probably Jim Turney. Because Jim Kent didn't come 

18 aboard until April oE last year, '86. 

19 Q Mas there a point at which there was any friction 

20 between you and/or other people associated with CMA and Marie 

21 Calero because he didn't want to permit CMA members to travel 

22 to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M tor deliveries? 



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K Yes . 

Q Tell us about that. 

A Hell, just, as I say, just two bulls in a China 
shop butting heads. 

Q Who were the two bulls? 

A Jim Turney and Mario Calero. Ji« is strong^headti 
and so is Mario. 

Q When would that have been? When did that little 
— these incidents or that friction develop? 

A Oh, it's been going on for two or three years. 
They are friends, but when it coaes to something like that, 
they butt heads, yes, sir. 

Q If you are able to recall, approximately how many 
times have you been to Central America, and where have you 
been? 

A I have been to Central America probably 
approximately 15 times. 




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Q The purpose is not to hold you to a specific 
number, but simply get a sense of your travel? 

A Yes . 

Q When you would go down there, what would you do? 

A Personally, what I would do, is take personal 
items for the friends that I developed down there, and once 
or twice there, when I was down there, at^^^Htheir boot 
training camp at that particular ti«e, which is nonexistent 
right now, I would show some oC thea how to fire a rifle 
properly, you know, correct position, where they could become 
a better shot. But most of it is just PR. 

Q Public relations? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q On any of these trips, did you ever meet with or 
coordinate with U.S. Government people, either civilians 
employed within U.S. Embassy, or military? 

Okay. Uhen to^l^^^^^Hcirst, 
I think ^ was a major. That was the only one 




there^^^^^^^^^^^H Then the first I went] 
-- the wen t^^^^^^^^^ we talked to 

individual^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^therein the 
American embassy, showed him the letter from^^^^^^^^ 






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|invitinq us down there. That was the extent of < 

military contacts or government official contacts down 

there . 

Q So as far as you can recall, those would be the 

only two individual.^ by name of whom you have recollection; 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Never met with or dealt with or talked tofllH 



A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q How about] 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you ever sect, work with, talk to, deal with, 
coordinate with, someone named Felix Rodriguez, who also 
might have been known as Hax Gobcz? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. 




Q The house that is near the airport in New Orleans 
that is used by UNO and CMA volunteers, who owns that house, 
who rents it, et cetera? 

A It's a rental house, and Mario or the FDN, they 
pay the rent on it. 

Q Let's talk about Mario Calero for a minute. How 




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did you first meet him, how did you come to link up with him 
in these enterprises, what is his role, et cetera? 

A Okay. When I first got involved with the FDN, I 
met an individua] 




THE WITNESS: This is after our first 
I was told, I was given his phone numbers and 
everything in Florida to call. He didn't live in Miami. He 
lived somewhere else. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q You were given Mario's phone number? 
No , I^^^^^^^^^^^^^H was 

and I heard from him in April. 
Q He was in Miami? 

h No, sir. Other than Miami, I forget exactly where 

he was at, Tampa or someplace like that. 

Q You were given his phone numbers in Florida when 




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you went 
A 



Yes, sir. 

In January of when? 
•64, 

Okay, continue. 

They was wanting to know if we had supplies, stu 
like that. We said yea, but we couldn't afford to forward, 
to ship them all the way to Florida. They says, well, can 
you get then to New Orleans. I said. Lord, yes. Shortly 
thereafter, either that day or a couple of days later, I 
received a phone call froB Mario Calero. He said, I am 
Adolfo Calero's brother. They are turning you over to me 
because you are in my district, and wanted to know about th« 
supplies, what we had and everything. 

Q When he would have talked with you, Mario? 
A The first ti«e, latter part of April, first part 
of May, because we had^^^^^Hin Decatur in the middle part 
of April. 

Q So that began your relationship with him? 

A Yes, sir. The first delivery of supplies to the 
FDN was, if I am not mistaken, June 1, 1984. Then 
thereafter, it was just about once a week. 




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Q Would that continue up to the present, about once 
a week -- 

A Yes, sir -- no, sir. When the planes quit going 
down, which I think the last one was June of last year, it's 
been once a month. That's the reason we have got the 
warehouses full in Decatur and Memphis. 



So as of about June of '86, it's been about once a 



month? 



A Yes , sir . 

Q Tell us what occasioned that change? 

A They don't have no place to put it. 

Q They who? 

A The FDN, the warehouses — the warehouse in New 
Orleans is full. So is the one in Decatur. I can still get 
a little more in it. Memphis is also full. That's the 
reason we had to go out and rent a storage building. 

Q But I assume that the freedom fighters would still 
h«ve need for these supplies and equipment? 

A Yes, sir, definitely. 

Q Why are you not able to make the flights as 



frequently? 



Well, I — 



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1 MR. JONES: If you know. 

2 THE WITNESS: Can I go off -- yes. 

3 MR. JONES: Go off the record. 

4 MR. SAXON: Off the record. 

5 (Discussion off the record.) 
€ BY MR. SAXON: 

7 Q Let's go on the record and let you answer it 

8 however you wish. 

9l A The reasons the planes haven't gone very often 

10 since June of last year is the FDN doesn't have the funds to 

11 pay for the trips down to Central Aaerica. 

12 Q No planes gone or just not as aany. 

13 A To »y knowledge, there have been no planes leaving 

14 since last July; I think it was last July. 

15 Q So the warehouses are filling up? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q Are you still receiving supplies, equipment, 

18 shipaents? 

19 A Yes, sir. 

20 Q Froii people? 

21 A Yes, sir. 

22 Q Packages in the mail? 




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1 A Yes, sir, 

2 Q You haven't put out the word, stop, time out? 
3| A No. Because, honest, we feel like that if the 

4 Congress was to turn tail, they are going to need the 

5 supplies more now than ever. So we want to be prepared for 
€ it. 

7 Q I am going to ask this question. IC you have an 

8| answer that you want to provide on the record. Cine. IC you 

9 want to go oCC the record. Cine. IC you have no answer, 

10 Cine. 

11 Do you have any evidence or any suspicion that in 

12 any oC the dealings with Mario Calero he has been in any way 

13 ripping oCC the Contras, skianing any money, putting any 

14 money in his pocket, or in the pockets of other individuals 

15 for purposes that you think would not have been intended? 

16 A To my knowledge, no, sir. For the mere fact his 

17 brother is the president, and he would not -- to me, I don't 

18 think he would do anything to embarrass Adolfo Calero. 

19 Q Okay, fine. Have you seen any evidence, heard of 

20 any people's assessments, or Cormed one on your own, that 

21 other players, other individuals, other than Mario Calero or 

22 Adolfo Calero, are "ripping off the ?:ontras"? People who are 



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1 part of what has come to be called the "private supply 

2 network?!' 

3 A I have no evidence, but I feel like a lot of nort 

4 Americans profiteered the heck out of the war. 

5 Q Can you be more specific than that? 

6 A In generalities, yes, sir. According to all thes 

7 so-called organizations helping the poor Miskito Indians, if. 

8 they had gotten 1/10 of what they had coming to them, they 

9 would be the richest Indiana in the world, yet they are the 

10 poorest. I feel like the Aaericans are 4kiwabusing the 

11 situation; I think most of then are misguiding the American 

12 people in making people they are think they are helping the 

13 C^ntras but taking everything for administrative costs. 

14 Q Do you know of any specific individuals or 

15 organizations that night have been in this category of what 

16 you would call profiteering? 

17 A I think everybody but us, because they seem to be 

18 making mighty fancy paychecks and attending $2000-a-plate 

19 dinners, and we have to sleep on the side of the road. 

20 Q Let me ask this for the record, and that's the 

21 purpose for which I ask it, have you or anyone involved with 

22 CMA taken any money that was not accounted for or was not 



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1 intended? 

2 A What do you mean? 

3 MR. JONES: Again, John, we have a problem when 

4 you talk about accounting for, because of just the lack of 

5 records . 

6 MR. SAXON: Sure, I am sorry. Let me rephrase 

7 that. 

e BY MR. SAXON: 

9 Q We talked about people who were ripping off the 

10 Contras and may have been profiteering. Are you in that 

11 category? 

12 A I hope to God not. 

13 Q Is anyone who is a member of or affiliated with 

14 CMA in that category, to your knowledge? 

15 A There was one individual that did try to use it 

16 for profiteering, and that was the great faaous Flaco, real 

17 naae Jack Terrell. 

18 Q The nickname you gave him for the record, can you 

19 spell that? 

20 A I didn't give the name. 

21 Q Vou just gave that though? 

22 A Spanish for "the skinny." 



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Q Spell it, if you would. 
A F-l-€-s-o or 1-a-c-o. F-1-a-c-o. 
Q Do you know what a KL-43 is? 
A No. 

Q Have you had any dealings with an encryption 
device for sending coded messagea? 
A No. 

Q Would you perhaps know what I an talking about if 
it were described as a TRW Kachine? 

A I am a grunt, not comaunications . 

Q For the record, then, you have no familiarity witl 
an encryption device by either the name KL-43 or a TRW 
machine? 

A No, sir. 

Q Have you ever had in your possession one of these 
machines? 

A Well, wait a minute. I want to explain 
something. I was in the National Guard, which was a 
communications unit, and they had machines in the ranks. 
Now, I might have walked by it but — 

Q I am talking about outside of your participation 
in the Alabama National Guard. 



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1 A No, sir. 

2 Q Or your membership in the U.S. Army -- I am sorry, 

3 Marine Corps. 

4 A It was both. I never did have no machines like 

5 that; no, sir. 

6 Q Have you ever seen one anywhere? 

7 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

8 Q Have you ever used one? 

9 A No, sir. 

10 Q Have you ever been either on the sending or 

11 receiving end of one? 

12 A No, sir. 

13 MR. SAXON: I want to offer as Deposition Exhibit 

14 4, if you would mark that, please. 

15 (Posey Exhibit 4 identified.) 

16 BY MR. SAXON; 

17 Q I believe you have had a chance to read that; 

18 correct? 

19 A Yes. 

20 Q First, for the record, have you — to your 

21 recollection, have you ever seen this before? 

22 A This piece of paper? 



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1 Q Yes. 

2 A No, sir. 

3 Q What you are looking at. Deposition Exhibit 4, is 

4 what we have come to know as called a PROF memo, which the 

5 entire Commission report talks about at great length and 

6 press reports have recounted, at the National Security 

r ^ 

7 Council. It's from Bob Pearson to Robert Earl|, E-a-r-l^. 

8 It discusses CMA assistance £or the Contras . First question, 

9 do you have any idea why people at the national security 

10 council would be concerned about a Tucson, Arizona, reporter, 

i 

11 doing an article about CMA? 

12 A God, I don't know. 

13 Do you have any idea why the NSC would be 

14 concerned about such a reporter doing a story linking CMA and 

15 the dontra or private supply network? 

16 A No, sir. 

17 Q Do you have any idea why they would be concerned 

18 that a reporter was wanting to write a story about CMA and 

19 inquiring about any connection to Oliver North? 

20 A No, sir. 

21 MR. JONES: John, let's go off just a minute, 
22 



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1 MR. SAXON: Okay. 

2 (Discussion off the record.) 

3 BY MR. SAXON: 

4 Q We are still on Deposition Exhibit 4. Final 

5 question, this PROF memo makes reference to "Some CMA folks 
S\\ — held some illegal immigrants in custody for a few hours for 

7 reasons which never seemed very clear." What can you tell me 

8 about that? Does that make any sense? 

9 A I don't know about the statement there, but they 

10 did — if I am not mistaken, they found 15 or 16 illegal 

11 alien immigrants coming across the border and held them until 

12 Customs got there. 

13 Q What border was this? 

14 A Arizona Customs border. 

15 Q CMA people, CMA volunteers? 

16 A Right. 

17 Q And just turned them over to the immigration 

18 authorities? 

19 A Yes, sir. 

20 MR. SAXON: Let me have you mark now Deposition 

21 Exhibit 5. 

22 (Posey Exhibit 5 identified.) 



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1 BY MR. SAXON; 

2 Q Have you had a chance to read Deposition Exhibit 
3 

4 A The last part of it, yes, sir. 

5 Q For the record, this is a letter obtained by the 

6 Committee from the files of the National Security Council to 

7 Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. The first sentence after 

8 "Ollie" says "FR and I." By "FR," would you know, from the 

9 contents of this letter, that that referred to Felix 

10 Rodriguez? 

11 A No, sir. 

12 Q If you look at page 2, Mr. Posey, after the "all 
131 the best," then you have a PS and a PPS. The PS statement 

14 says, and I quote, "Posey is sending four people to^Hto 

15 help with training. They are supposed to leave on Tuesday, 

16 January 27, 1985. Do you want them to hold off on going 

17 until after the meeting?" 

18 First of all, does this statement, on its face, 

19 ring a bell with you? 

20 A The first part of it, yes, sir. 

21 Q Tell us what part is something to which you have 

22 reference' 




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A The part about it says "Posey is sending four 
people to ^^^^^^^^^^^^hclp with training." 

Q 

A Yes, sir. "They arc supposed to leave on Tuesday, 
January 27, 1985." That right there makes sense. 

Q Let's break it down there. Sending them to^^^^H 
[help with training. Training of what kind? What 
would these people be doing? 

A They are supposed to be helping the Nicaraguan 
^'freedom Fighters, since at that time the southern front was 
more or less totally destroyed, there is no organization or 
anything. They were supposed to go down there to help train 
and also to help build morale and bolster the morale of what 
troops were left to fight. 

Q These would bfc Freedom f^ightera, Contras, located 



A Yes, sir. 

Q That's where the training would take place? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q Where would the P'reedoa /ighters be doing their 
fighting after they were trained? 

A Going back into Nicaragua. 



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1 Q l3 providing this kind of training something that 

2 CMA did a lot of? 

3 A At that particular time, wc tried to do it, but uc 

4 didn't get to do very much, because everybody kept jerking us 

5 around. 

6 Q So CMA's activities waa not solely limited to the 

7 collection, receipt, purchase, procurement, and provision of 

8 supplies, equipment, et cetera? 

9 A No, sir. 

10 Q As to the — 

11 MR. JONES: John, do you want him to explain what 

12 kind of training was involved? 

13 BY MR. SAXON: 

14 Q Vcs . Why don't we, at this point, before more 

15 specific questions, have you talk about that a bit, kinds of 

16 training, what people you recruited, what they did, where 

17 they went, what liaisons they had with U.S. Military group 

18 people. Embassy people, anything like that. 

19 A First of all, to my knowledge, our people didn't 

20 have no contact with the U.S. Government, other than one 

21 individual who made claim, on the trip to Miskito land, that 

22 he was working fox military intelligence. I don't know if 




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thot': true cr not, 



2 Q Army military intelligence? 

3 A I assume, yes, sir. 

4 Q What uas -chc naac of that individuax' 

5 A Individual by the name oEj 

6 Q Okay, continue. 

7 A This was after he had coae back from down there. 

8 Now, our people arc supposed to train in whatever fields thcs' 

9 could, such as medical, snail arms, tactics, things of this 

10 nature. Just a general basic-type course to take the 

11 individuals that were there, cither to help them out in the 

12 skill: they do have, or teach them skills that they do not 

13 have. 

14 Q All right. What countries was this training 

15 provided in, to the best of your recollection? 

16 A The only actual training that went on that I know 

17 of for fact was one area. That was! 

18 ^^^^^^^^^H ^ should be staying. I still haven't gotten it 

19 straight on the Miskito land training aspect of it. I don't 

20 know whether they trained or not. I have heard so many 

21 different stories. 
Q To the best of your recollection, the only country 



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1 in which CMA would have cent people or directed people to go 

2 to provide this training would be 

3 A No, sir, we sent them ^^^^fl^^^H also to the 

4 FDN . But due to circumstances beyond our control, and goof 

5 ups of a few of the men, they actually never did get down to 

6 actually training. 

7 Q Okay. Going back to the letter that Colonel Nortl-| 

8 -- it states that these individuals are supposed to leave on 

9 Tuesday, January 27, 1985. Is that more or less the time 

10 period that fits within your recollection? 

11 A Yes, sir. 

12 Q Now, the question to Colonel North, "Do you want 
13| them to hold off ongoing until after the meeting?" First of 

14 all, on this occasion or any other, did you or anyone 

15 involved with CMA ever receive any marching orders, guidance 

16 instructions, from Colonel Oliver North? 

17 A No, sir, not from Colonel North. 

19 Q Did you ever receive instructions from anyone else 

19 who was a part of the United States Government? 

20 A To ray knowledge, no, sir. But I did receive 

21 instructions . 

22 Q Who would they have been from? 




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1 A Rob Owens. 

2 MR. JONES: John, is it possible for you to tell 

3 us who wrote this letter? I can't find any indication on 

4 here -- 

5 MR. SAXON: That's correct. 

6 MR. JONES: — of who may have wrote that letter. 

7 Are we not going to -- 

8 MR. SAXON: I have a suspicion but for the record, 

9 I don't know. 

10 MR. JONES: I have a suspicion too; it probably 

11 matches yours. Okay. 

12 MR. SAXON: Would your suspicion be Rob Owen? 

13 MR. JONES: Yes. That's exactly — I think once 

14 he tells you -- 

15 MR. SAXON: Okay. 

16 BY MR. SAXON: 

17 Q You did receive some guidance or instructions from 

18 time to time from Mr. Owen? 

19 A I wouldn't say from time to time; for a short 

20 period of time there, about five or six months, it was almost 

21 constantly. 

22 Q What would be the time period for that? 



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A Between the latter part of January, constantly, 
until probably August or September of that same year. 

3 Q Of what year? 

4 A '85. 

5 Q What kinds of guidance or instructions did you 

6 receive from him? 

7 A Really, the biggest part I got, he was pumping us 
for information. 

9 Q How did you cone to meet him or know him or in 

10 whatever way enter into a working relationship with him? 

11 A First time I met him was at a meeting at Adolfo's 

12 house, early part of January of '85. We was — 

13 Q This is in Miami? 

14 A Yes, sir. Wc was there for a meeting for a dual 

15 purpose. Larry Spivcy, a producer for Orion productioif, had 

16 contacted roc a few days before that and told me about a 

17 meeting in Texas between Jack Terrell, Rob Owen and John 

18 Hull. Larry Spivey said that Jack Terrell was a loose cannon 

19 on a deck and that I needed to be at that meeting in Miami in 

20 order to get things straightened out. As a result of the 

21 phone call, curiosity, and the part about how would a person 

22 from California know about a meeting in Houston, when I just 



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found out about it the same day, fascinated mc , really. I 
said. Lord, yes, I will go to the accting for sure. 

Q Mr. Owen was at that meeting? 

A Yes, sir. 




Q Where was he located, operating out of, et cetera? 

A To my knowledge, he is out of Georgetown over 
here. I have his phone number or his old phone number. I 
did have his address. I don't know for sure if I still have 
it or not. 

Q So you met him at the aeeting at Mr. Calcro's home 
in January of '85? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q What happened? 

A Well, can I go back to the day before the meeting 
and set the stage. 



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1 Q That would be fine. 

2 A Okiy. The day before the meeting, I met, talked 

3 to. Larry Spivcy. He took me to the FBI office there in 

4 Miami, and we talked to an agent, and I am going to goof his 

5 lact name up, George Kiszynski, similar. He wanted to know 

6 about Jack Terrell's proposal to the guys out in Texas about 

7 sending 150 mcn^^^^^^^^^^^^^B to invade Nicaragua. X said 
a whoa, backup, trainers, yes. But wc was wanting to train 15' 
9 people, company^sizc level. Larry Spivey, at that particula 

10 time, after talking with George and rac there, asked if wc 

11 could use his telephone to call Washington, D.C. My mind 

12 isn't clear because both names were mentioned, he wanted to 

13 speak to Robert McFarlanc, I think he called him "Bud," or 

14 Ollie North. 

15 Q This is Spivey? 

16 A Yes, sir. I don't rcmcrabcr which one that he 

17 actually got on the telephone. 

18 Q Who is Spivcy? 

19 A He is the the producer from Orion productioi)^ he 

20 already filled mc in on his life history;] 
21 
22 Q He would be the Spivey referred to in this letter 



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1 that says "Do you want rac to go south to watch over Spivcy"? 

2 A Yes, sir. Larry Spivey at that particular time, 

3 maybe not that day, but later on in that particular month, 

4 was telling me about a program that he had proposed to UNO, 

5 at that time, where they wore to adopt the jiialij of the 

6 United States in order to get U.S. Government recognition and 

7 there was no way the U.S. Congress could turn them down. 

3 Q We wore at the point at which he attempts to make 

9 a phone call, Spivcy, from Miami to — 

10 A There was a phone call made. He attempted and the 

11 phone call went through to somebody. 

12 Q Someone, you would believe, or were led to believe 

13 would be at the White House? 

14 A Yes, sir. 

15 Q Or the National Security Council? 

16 MR. JONES: Just SO you know, John, this phone 

17 call took place from the FBI office in Miami. 

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, with George sitting 

19 there. 

20 BY MR. SAXON: 

21 Q Continue. 

22 A We had agreed, before he actually made the phone 




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call, the best way to take care of Jack Terrell was to bleed 
him dry, break him financially, or find out who is financing 

3 him to do what he is doing. I already had some ideas as to 

4 who was financing him. 

5 Q We are still trying to get to the first time you 

6 met Mr. Owen> . 

7 A Right. 

8 Q So continue. 

9 A Well, after the meeting, I talked to the FBI 

10 probably hour and a half, maybe two hours all together. 

11 Afterwards, Larry Spivey had told me that he was going to 

12 interview Adolfo Calero about doing a film on the FDN, and 

13 that he would fill Adolfo in on about what we was going to do 

14 about Jack Terrell. The meeting was set either that 

15 afternoon or the next day. 

16 Okay. Jack Terrell, myself, Joe Adams, Adolfo was 

17 there, John Hull was there, Felipe Vidal was there, Rob 
r 

18 Owen^ . There was one or two others there. I don't know who 

19 they were. My memory was refreshed that one of them was 

20 called Mario, but it was not Mario Calero. Going in the 

21 door, I shook Adolfo's hands, I said, I know about the 

22 situation, and I want to take care of it, or, you know, take 




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1 care of it, on my part. That was all said directly to mc, 

2 you know, between Adolfo and myself, because I was told by 

3 Larry Spivey^who had already talked to Xdolfo about what we 

4 was going to, about drying Jack Terrell up. Rob OwenJ was 

5 there, like I said. Generalities, in the conversation, was 

6 that wc was talking about trying to find some weapons that 

7 the Miskito Indians had that was supposedly surplus. If wo 

8 could find the weapons, purchase them, trade them, or 

9 something like that, I am saying we, as FDN, down there, 

10 okay, to get the weapons and turn thc« over to FDN, because 

11 there was supposedly some ground-to-air missiles that was in 

12 with those weapons. So, in the general part of the 

13 conversation, wc agreed to meet later on that evening at the 

14 hotel, the Howard Johnson's, where Rob and them were staying 

15 at. 

16 Okay, when wc went over there, later on that 
ITU evening, or night time, excuse me, Rob Owcn^ met us out in 
13 the hallway, and he asked — well, he told mc that Jack 

19 Terrell and Joe Adams wasn't invited to the meeting. So I 

20 turned around and told Joe Adams and Jack Terrell they 

21 weren't invited to the meetings, and that sort of ticked them 
off. 



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Okay. In the meeting, wc discussed the part about 
supplies for the southern front. I just point blank told 

3 them uc didn't have the funds to ship it all the way down 

4 there. So Rob said, that's no problem. 

5 Can I backup? He introduced himself at the house 

6 as a coordinator between the private -- American private 

r 

7 sector to the FDN. My name is Rob Owen|, I am the 

8 coordinator between the private sector aid and the FDN. 

9 Okay, getting back to the hotel now. I told him 
lOl we didn't have the funds to ship the supplies ourself. He 

11 said how arc you shipping them. I told him through Kenner, 

12 Louisiana, everything like that. He said continue doing like 

13 that, they will just prorate it out. If they have so many 

14 troops, they will get part of the supplies, I said, oh, 

15 great, that will solve my problem there. We also discussed 

16 the part about trainers. He was preferring the ones that 

17 knew Spanish, since we didn't have any. He agreed to let 
13 some go down there anyway to help us out on PR. 

19 Q Did Owenjd indicate when he said that he was the 

20 coordinator between the private sector aid and the FDN, did 

21 he indicate who designated him in that role, who gave him his 

22 portfolio, who brought him into the process? 



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A At that particular date, no, sir. 

Q Did you suboequently learn that? 

A Later on, I had heard, from him, that he was 
working for General Singlaub, because at that particular 
time, we were begging for somebody to coordinate something 
because somebody was blowing all this money, duplicating, 
triplicating all the procedures, and we was begging for a 
coordinator. I assumed he was the coordinator and General 
Singlaub was the honcho. 

Q To the best of his recollection, did he ever tell 
you that himself? 

A That he was worlcing Cor General Singlaub, yes, 
sir. 

Q Can you date that, roughly? 

A No, it was in the general time_^rame. I talked to 
him 30 many times, I couldn't actually tell you when he said 
it. 

Q Did he ever tell you he was working for Colonel 
North? 

A No, sir. 



Q Mr. McFarlane? 



A No, sir. 



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Q Admiral Poindcxter? 
A No, sir. 

Q Anyone at the NSC or the White House? 
A No, sir. 

Q Co back to Deposition Exhibit 5, if you would, in 
the PPS portion it says "Posey has nine more people waiting 
in Tallahassee, and he has people trying to find some 
equipment to send down south, including two jeeps and other 
supplies." 

A Yes, sir. 
Q Does that ring a bell? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q So among the types oC things you would provide to 
the FDN would be not only medical supplies and civilian 
closed and the like, but also vehicles? 

A No, sir. At that particular time, an individual 
by the name of Lanny Duck from Texas, his code name is Doc 
Zorro, has told us that there was two vehicles that was given 
to him for the /reedom ,/ighters. The vehicles never did 
materialize. 

Q When it says you were "trying to find," that's 
exactly what you were trying to do and they never 




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materialized? 

A According to the information I had at that 
particular time, the vehicles was ours, we was just waiting 
on the delivery and it never materialized. 

Q Did you ever — you, meaning you or CMA — ever 
provide any vehicles to the FDN? 

A Two motorbikes. I think they were Honda or Yamaha 



750: 



Were those donated to you? 
Yes, sir. 

In Alabama, through the normal channel, or how? 
I think they come from a donator in Mississippi. 
They weren't quite up to par. It took them some money to get 
them in shape. They were not new vehicles. 

Q With regard to the nine people waiting in 
Tallahassee, what can you tell us about that? 
A That's individuals — 
Q That was a correct statement? 

A Yes, sir. They were individuals that originally 
-- okay, let me get it in, what you call it, chronological 
order. 

Q Fine. 



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A Wc were sending four people down] 
Jack Terrell had just come baclc^^^^^^^^^Mthc 26th or 
27th. He found these four individuals at the airport gettinq 
ready to go down, and he hijacked them. So that was four of 
those -- the first four that were supposed to go ^HJ^^lH I 
J^^gdidn't <?o l^^^^^mm^ and I had to come up with four 
more . 

Q Since I don't have the privilege of knowing Mr. 
Terrell, would you tell us how somebody hijacks four 
individuals . 

A Okay. He saw thea at the airport. They was 
getting ready to leave the country, he was coming into the 
country. He recognized them, because two of them was, or 
three of them — three of them, I think — two of them -- two 
or three of them, he knew from a previous trip down. He 
recognized them, and he wanted them for his operation that he 
was wanting to set up in Miskito land. So he didn't know 
about themH^II|^H thing because I had already told him we 
weren't going to mess with it, because that was a request by 
Rob Owcni. 

So I was trying to operate, keep things straight 
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supposed to be under the idea there wasn't nc 

operation. He hijacks thera, not really, steal/ them. Then I 

3 got the phone call our people didn't show up ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

4 Then I find out from Jack Terrell that he got them and they 

5 was at the hotel at Howard Johnson. He was wanting to know 

6 what we were trying to do; I said PR, we are helping all the 

7 ^ontrao out, whole nine yards, so I got by that. I had to 

8 come back with other people, because Jack Terrell, as I said, 

9 already started making phone calls about the Miskito land 

10 operation. So people are starting to congregate in 

11 Tallahassee, Florida, because Fred Henning had gotten a hotel 

12 owner to donate the rooms at no cost to the men. 

13 Q To your knowledge, did any of those nine 

14 individuals make it south? 

15 A Yes, sir, all of them did. 

16 Q The next statement in this exhibit, in the letter 

17 to Colonel North, is "He," meaning you, "even wants to get 

18 Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese to go down as trainers to 

19 make it an international force." 

20 Is that correct? 

21 A Yes, sir. Now, if he is referring to "ho" is mc, 

22 yes, sir, that's a correct statement. 



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1 Q Now finally, when he says "Flacko, F-l-a-c-k-o, is 

2 supposed to be back in Florida today or tomorrow," that would 

3 be Jack Terrell? 

4 A Yes, sir. 

5 Q Have you ever met Colonel North? 

6 A No, sir. 

7 Q Have you ever talked to him on the phone? 

8 A No, sir. 

9 Q Have you ever corresponded with him? 

10 A I wrote him one letter. 

11 Q Can you tell us what that letter concerned? 

12 A I wrote a letter last summer asking him point 

13 blank why was it that we were used, abused and tattooed. 

14 Q This was not a fan letter? 

15 A No. 

16 Q Did you ever receive a response to that letter? 

17 A No, sir. 

18 Q In that letter, did you raise the issue o£ any 

19 assistance to CMA from the CIA? 

20 A No, sir, but I might have said something about wc 

21 was promised taail financial assistance, which wc never did 

22 receive. We went under operations, you know, like -- yes. 



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help is coming, keep in there, hang in there, do this, do 
that, help is coming and everything. So we did. And knowing 
the government bureaucracy, we figured it's going to take a 
while, which it never did materialise. 

Q Who made those representations to you that help is 
coming? 

A Rob Owen| and General Singlaub. 

Q Did he ever indirectly take any guidance or 
instructions from Colonel North? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q Same line of questions regarding Admiral 

Poindexter. Have you ever met him? 

A No, sir. 

Q Have you ever talked to him? 

A No, sir. 

Q Communicated with him? 

A No. 

Q To the best of your knowledge, have you ever 
directly or indirectly taken any instructions or guidance 
from Admiral Poindexter? 

A No, sir. 

Q Same questions with regard to Mr. McFarlanc. Have 



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you ever met him? 

A No, sir . 

Q Have you ever communicated with him? 

A No, sir. 

Q Have you ever taken any guidance or instructions 
from him, to the best of your knowledge? 

A No, sir. If we did, we could operate a hell of a 
lot better than we are doing. 

Q I want to ask you about what has become known as 
the assassination plot regarding Ambassador Tambs . Let nc 
start with an open;>-ended question. Tell me what you 
understand that to be and tell me what you know about the 
allegations, or any plot itself to assassinate Ambassador 
Tambs . 



l^th/^c^ 



A To me it's a figment of M aygra - Honey's imagination 

>-■ , " 

. ■. ■ ■ jc 

to know as much mud as possible at CMA because they can't get 
at us any other way. 

Q So, to the best of your knowledge, the source, the 
origin of that story would be m ra^ia Honey? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Who is the journalist and a plaintiff in the 
lawsuit in which you arc a Defendant? 



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That is correct, sir. 

Did you know Stephen P. Carr? 

I think I met him one time. 

He would have been a Naples, Florida, conotructior. 



1 A 

2 Q 

3 A 
41 Q 
5| worker? 

6 A I don't know. 

7 Q How did you meet him that one time? 

9 A I met him with an individual named Bruce Jones 

9 down in Florida. - - 

10 Q What was the occasion of that meeting? 

11 A I was going down to Florida, if I am not mistaken, 

12 I think, February of "85. I took two boxes of uniforms to 

13 them because the people were supposed to be getting ready to 

14 go down^^^^^^^^^^^B He are still trying to get the people 

15 together. 

16 Q Where in Florida was that meeting? 

17 A Howard Johnson's there by the airport. 

18 Q In what city? 

19 A Miami. 

20 Q Am I correct that Mr. Carr is now deceased? 

21 A From my understanding, yes, sir. 

22 Q Do you have any knowledge of how he died? 



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A I read in the newspaper and saw a copy of the 
autopsy where he took an overdose of drugs. 



year? 



Q That would have been roughly December of this las 

Yes, sir. 

Do you know an individual by the name of Robert 



A 

Q 
Thompson? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q How did you come to know him and when did you com 
to know him? 

A I have only met him one time, but I have heard 
about him before. He was an individual with the /rcedom 
fighters that was in the hospital when our first group of mc 
went down^^^^^^^^^H They met him at the hospital down 
there. As wc say at that time, he was adopted. 

Q By whom? 

A By CMA. He was wanting somebody to help sponsor 
him, get hira clothes, boots, things like that. That's how w 
come across Joe Adams, Lanny Duclc, also. They were already 
down there. That's the reason we was hollering for 
coordination, because everybody walking in and out, 
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1 Q What do you know about the circumstances loading 

2 up to and including the arrest of Carr and Thompson, along 

( 

3 with some other individuals, in Costa Rica in April of 1985? 

4 A The understanding that I was given by the news 

5 media was that they were arrested for violating Costa Rican 

6 Neutrality Act, but they were first charged with violating 

7 Costa Rican explosives, because they had hand grenades. When 

8 I was proven -- I may have the guards backwards now, it could 

9 be one or the other -- my understanding was that the rural 

10 guard gave them hand grenades and the National Guard arrested 

11 them, or it was vice versa. So those charges were dropped, 

12 but the charges of the violation of the Costa Rican 

13 Neutrality Act stayed on. 

14 Q So the allegations against them at that time were 

15 possession of firearms and hostile negotiations against a 

16 foreign government? 

17 A I believe, but the article didn't go into it like 

18 you did. 

19 Q Do you know the names of the individuals arrested 

20 with them? 

21 A Claude Chiffard. 

22 Q C-h-i-f-f-a-r-d? 




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1 A I believe so. Peter Clibbcry. 

2 Q G-1-i-b-b-e-r-y? 

3 A I believe so. John Daviea, Tommy Thomas, and I 

4 think it was nine Nicaraguans also, sir. 

5 Q When the gentlemen who you just listed for us were 

6 arrested in Costa Rica, do you know whether a sniper rifle 

7 was seized with then? 

8 A From my understanding, yes, sir. 

9 Q Do you know that the United States Bureau bC 

10 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms traced that rifle to you? 

11 A Possibility, but I don't think they did. I think 

12 I told Mr. Feldman in Miami where the rifle come from and 

13 everything. 

14 Q Tell us, then. 

15 A The rifle I acquired at Larry's Rifle and Gun in 

16 Miami. It was a single shot, bolt action rifle. 

17 Q Did it have a scope? 

18 A Ves, sir. It was given to Panter to hunt with, 

19 because at that particular time, the I'rcedom F'^ighters down 

20 there was very, very limited on funds or anything else. If 

21 anything, I wanted them to have the opportunity to cat, and 

22 there was a lot of hunting game in that area, because I just 




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1 had coae back from that area. That's the reason I gave them 

2 a single shot rifle, so nobody could say I was sending 

3 automatic arms down. 

4 Q Okay. When the meeting was held, which you 

5 already discussed, at the Howard Johnson's outside of Miami, 

6 was there any discussion at that meeting of a plot to 

7 assassinate Ambassador Tambs? 

8 A No, sir. If there would have been, I would have 

9 turned them over to the Feds right then and there. 

10 Q Here you present for all of that meeting? 

11 A No, sir, wait a minute — 

12 Q There was apparently a meeting — there was a 

13 meeting that night, so we are talking, I guess, about two 

14 separate meetings. 

15 A I was at both meetings the whole time. 

16 Q Both meetings the whole time? 

17 A Yes, sir. 

18 Q Your best recollection is there was never any 

19 discussion of a plot to assassinate Ambassador Tambs? 

20 A Assassinate nobody; no, sir. 

21 Q Let me ask you about a collection of weapons and 

22 ammunition. The collection of weapons and ammunition in 



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Miami for shipment to the Contras 



[that may hav( 



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2 bccnyfelony on March 6, 1985, in connection with a mission 

3 ~^^ii^iV with Carr, Thompson and Rene Corbo. Do you have any 

4 knowledge of that particular flight? 

5 A No, sir, other than what I have read in the 

6 newspapers. The only planes at that time that I knew 

7 anything about was supply planes that Dr. Asukarai was 

8 getting out of Miami to fly| 

9 Q For the record, did any oC those weapons — did 

10 any weapons which are alleged to have been onboard that 

11 flight belong to you? 

12 A No, sir; they were supposed to fly commercial. 

13 That was my understanding; that was how they were all 

14 supposed to fly down was coaaercial. 

15 Q But the question is, did the weapons that are 

16 alleged to have been on that flight, did any of those weapon: 

17 belong to you? 

18 A To my knowledge, no, sir. Panter was supposed to 

19 do like everybody else was instructed. If they took a weapon 

20 out of the country, get their Customs forms so they could get 

21 them back in. 

22 Q Were those instructions ever put in writing? 



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1 A No, sir. But I think everybody in the 

2 organization would verify they were told if they took a 

3 weapon out, they better get Customs forms so they can get it 

4 back in the country. 

5 Q Did Mr. Carr and Mr. Thompson belong to CMA; were 

6 they members of CMA? 

7 A No, sir. Like I said, we adopted Thompson because 

8 he was already down there. He already had two year^ 

9 experience. He knew more than what we did. 

10 Q Do you have any knowledge of Carr and Thompson 

11 having been interviewed by the FBI in Costa Rica on March 31, 

12 1986? 

13 A I read an article that they were, but I don't know 

14 what it was concerning or anything. 

15 . Q Do you know an individual by the name of Alan 

16 Saum, S-a-u-m? 

17 A Ves, sir, sure do. 

18 Q Am I pronouncing it correctly? 

19 A Saum, that's the way I pronounce it. 

20 Q Okay. What is the nature of your relationship 

21 with him? 

22 A He contacted mc the first time, latter part of 

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February or March of '85, said he just got back] 

and that an individual by the name of 
John Hull told him to contact me. 

Q Did you know John Hull at that point? 

A Yes . 

Q In fact, Hull had been at the meeting at Howard 



Johnson? 
A 



Yc3, sir. I said great. Then he said he was 



wanting to help out and everything like this. Then I 

contacted Rob Owcn|i and told him about Alan MBt. I don't 

A 

think anything ever come out about it. Later on, that July 
of '85, Alan Saum called again and said that he was going tc 
be down there in a few days, that's Decatur, Alabama. He 
called me, he showed up, the first time I met him at the 
Ramada Inn on Highway 31, south of Decatur. I had coffee 
with him. He said he was from the U.S. State Department and 
that he was wanting to help out CMA and everything like this 
but I was working at the time delivering produce, so I agree: 
to meet him at dinner time or after dinner at Armando's 
pizza . 

Q Saum said he was working for the State 
Department? 




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A Ycc, 3ir. He said he was a major in the U.S. 
Marine Corps . 

To be honest, he didn't look like an officer in 
nobody's armed forces. 
Q Okay. 

A I met him after dinner at Armando's. He had a 
girl with him. Her name was Catherine something. That's 
when he sat down and told me that she was supposed to go down 
^^^^^^^^^Hj^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand was 

to go down and blow up the Russian and Cuban Embassies in 
Nicaragua. 

Q He said he was going to try to get in anti-Castro 
Cubans? 

A No, sir, he didn't say any anti-Castro Cubans. He 
wanted to go down to help recruit people to help him. 

Q To obtain weapons and use them in the destruction 
of the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Nicaragua? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q To your knowledge, did he ever attempt that 
mission? 

A To my knowledge, yes, sir, he did. 

Q Did he ask you to participate or help in any way 




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or sec to it that CMA helped in any way? 

A Not CMA in essence, but he wanted information that 
would help him, yes, sir, he sure did. 

Q Did you provide him any information? 

A I provided him with information that, to me, was 
stumbling blocks that could stop him at any time where he 
would have a — if it wasn't done in the States, wc could 
stop him down there where somebody, somewhere, could chcclc 
him out to sec if he was real or not. 

Q So some information might blow his cover? 

A Yes, sir. As soon as that meeting was over, I 
contacted the FBI to let them know what this guy was up to. 

Q You contacted an agent in Huntsville? 

A Yes, sir, sure did. I let it be known then that 
the guy didn't look like a Marine Corps officer. No way. 

Q Do you know an individual by the name of Jesus 
Garcia? 

A Yes, sir, sure do. 

Q What can you tell us about Mr. Jesus Garcia? 

A One of the names I gave Alan Saum. He was a 
policeman or sheriff's deputy. 

Q He was a corporal with the Metro-Dade Corrections 




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Facility? 

A Okay. He was an officer of the law that I had met 
when I was booked for carrying a pistol that Jack Terrell 
planted in my suitcase. 

Q In Miami in the airport? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q In, what, roughly January of '85? 
A Yes, sir. He had recognized me as working with 
the preedom Fighters and everything, and we struck up a 
conversation and friendship, you sight say, like he didn't 
throw me in the slammer. He let me stay in the holding cell 
until Jack Terrell and Joe Cotine arrived with the bailsman. 
MR. JONES: Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

THE WITNESS: As a result of that, he wanted to 
help the ^cedom jFighters and everything like that. At that" 
particular time, Bruce Jones was in Miajii, and I put him in 
contact with Bruce Jones. 
BY MR. SAXON) 
Q To your knowledge, was Garcia subsequently 
arrested by the FBI and BATF? 

A From my understanding, it it was ATF that arrested 




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1 him. 

2 Q Would that have been on or about August 14, 1985? 

3 Docs that sound about right? 

4 A Yes, sir, I was in August. 

5 Q Was he subsequently convicted? 

6 A My understanding, yes, sir. 

7 Q Did Garcia ever tell you that there was an offer 

8 of a contract of 91 million for someone to assassinate 

9 Ambassador Tarabs? 

10 A No, sir. I 

11 Q You never had a discussion with him to that 

12 effect? 

13 A No, sir. 

14 Q Are you aware of him having had such a discussion 

15 with anyone else? 

16 A No, sir, other than what I read in the newspaper. 

17 Q Are you aware from anyone other than Garcia that a 

18 contract was placed by Col)^mbian narcotics traffickers on 

19 Ambassador Tambs? 

20 A No, sir. 

21 Q CMA never considered such an offer to assassinate 

22 Ambassador Tarabs in order to collect the SI million and also 



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1 try to e wip blame for the assassination ^ the Sandinistas 

2 and kill two birds with one stone? 

3 A No, sir, wc have been an organization that's been 

4 up front. That's the reason I turned Alan Saum in, was I 

5 don't believe in striking the eneny in the back. I would 

6 rather strike them face to face in the field of battle. We 
I 

7 don't believe in 007 ganes . 

8 Q Do you have any knowledge or information that the 

9 weapons supposedly shippedflj^^^^^^^^^^Bon March 6, 1985, 

10 were actually to be used in Costa Rica for the plot against 

11 Ambassador Tambs? 

12 A No, sir. 

13 Q Tell us about your relationship with Jack 

14 Terrell. How did you come to know him? What was the 

15 relationship? 

16 A Jack Terrell come to us as a CIA agent, sent to 

17 us, to give uc guidance and to help the freedom /ightcrs out 

18 financially on buying supplies. 

19 Q When would that have been? 

20 A The first contacts, I had a couple phone calls 

21 from him in September of 1984. 

22 But I had a lot of phone calls from individuals 



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wanting to help out. But he was one of the first ones that 
actually said, where can I meet you at. I told him I was 
going to be in New Orleans that week. He believed he could 
meet me there, because he was closer to New Orleans from 
Mobile than, you know, he was to me. 

So we met in New Orleans. He had a stack of money 
like that. He said, he has been sent to us by the CIA, "the 
Company," he called it, to help us out financially and also 
to get supplies to the Contras. 

Q Do you have a judgment of how much money he was 
flashing at you? 

A He said 915,000, but I didn't count it. 

Q Continue. 

A I said, this is more than I can handle. So I 
introduced him to Mario Calero. I said, Mario, this is what 
Jack Terrell wants, he wants to do. I don't have no way of 
checking him out to see T* he is or anything like that. Can 
you get approval? 

Q For some period of time, did he work with CMA? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Was he productive or helpful, or at least for some 



period? 



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1 A Okay. He was harmful in the long run, but at 

2 first he was helpful because he did spend money on supplies 

3 that the /Freedom fighters did acquire. 

4 Q He told you this money was coning from the CIA? 

5 A Yes, sir. tie said he had to have receipts and 

6 everything like this, which was provided. He had to have 

7 money somewhere because he stayed at the Hotel Contemporary 

8 for about a month there. 

9 Q Did you ever see any of those receipts or any 

10 documentation or anything tangible that would suggest either, 

11 A, he was in the employ of or under the instructions of the 

12 CIA, or, B, that they, the CIS, did provide that money? 

13 A No, sir. I never did see no receipts or 

14 anything. Receipts were given to him when he bought some 

15 poncho liners, uniforms, things like that. The purchase^ 

16 receipts was given to him. 

17 Q Do you have an estimate of how much money he spent 

18 from whatever support derived from Contra supplies? 

19 A Through me, I think he acquired or purchased $2300 

20 worth of supplies. 

21 Q Were these all nonlethal? 

22 A No, sir. He bought a shotgun from me. He said it 



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1 was for his own personal use. There was a personal weapon, 

2 because at that particular time, I was a licensed dealer, but 

3 that was for El Salvador and only El Salvador. We never did 

4 any business or give any weapons to El Salvador. So I never 

5 did purchase any weapons for El Salvador on this license. He 

6 saw ray shotgun, said he needed a personal weapon. From 

7 Vietnam, he talked a good line, and a shotgun is good in 

8 jungle warfare. 

9 Q He bought that fro« you? 

10 A Yes, sir. I let him have it for the same price I 

11 paid for it, 9225. 

12 Q Do you have independent knowledge of the fact that 

13 Terrell was interviewed by the FBI on March 5, 1986, in New 

14 Orleans? 

15 A Nothing other than what I have read. 

16 Q But your assumption is, or you believe that he has 

17 talked to the FBI? 

18 A Oh, yes, sir, definitely. 

19 Q Do you know whether Terrell claims any knowledge 

20 of the assassination plot I mentioned earlier? 

21 A I don't know, sir. I know Jack Terrell was in 

22 constant communications. I wouldn't say everyday 




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1 communications with Jesus Garcia before, because Jack Terrell 

2 called me up that past August, when he was arrested, and 

3 wanted to know what was up, because he had been talking to 

4 Jesus Carcia's wife. 

5 Q Do you have any knowledge of the fact that Terrell 

6 claims that CMA was part of a plan to attack the embassies 

7 and assassinate Ambassador Taabs? 

8 A He might have made the statement, but he is full 

9 of bull. 

10 MR. JONES: John, I think what you are getting at, 

11 we have heard that from various sources with regard to the 

12 investigation going on in Hiaai and also through newspaper 

13 accounts. He has apparently been talking to some reporters 

14 too. So we are hearing it indirectly, those kinds of 

15 things. That's the only knowledge that we have. 

16 THE WITNESS: Also heard it from HSKtrtra Honey. I 

A 

17 met the wench. 

18 BY MR. SAXON: 

19 Q To your knowledge, would all of the parties who 

20 supposedly took part in a discussion in the Howard Johnson's 
21 1 in Miami, regarding the assassination plot, have actually 
22 been there, whether that was discussed or not, but on the 




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1 times and the dates that that supposedly took place; to your 

2 knowledge, were all o£ those people there? 

3 K I don't know, sir, because, in their own 

4 statements, they admitted I was not there at those meetings, 

5 but they said that I had knowledge of such meetings. So X 

6 couldn't honestly say if they was there or not. But there is 

7 a possibility that all OC them could have been there in that 

8 time,.-£rame, yes, sir. 

9 Q Is it correct that a grand jury was convened in 

10 Miami on March 25, 1986, to look into these allegations; is 

11 that roughly the time~~frame — 

12 MR. JONES I He know a grand jury has been 

13 convened. Uhen we are not sure. 

14 BY MR. SAXON t 

15 Q To your understanding, what were the things that 

16 they were looking at In terms of any involvement you were 

17 alleged to have had, and X am not saying you did. 

18 XI was questioned basically on the parts about 

19 weapons that went out on the March 5 or the 6th, the Lewis 

20 Tambs situation and what I knew about Jack Terrell. 

21 They asked mc questions about Rob Owen^ also, who 

22 was at the meetings, what was said and things o£ this 



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1 nature. 

2 Q To the best of your recollection, how nany times 

3 have you appeared to testify before the grand jury? 

4 A Oh, just that one tiac. 

5 MR. JONES: John, just so you will Icnow for the 

6 record, in December, Assistant U.S. Attorney|i and a couple of 

7 FBI agents cane up. 

8 MR. SAXON I Feldaan? 

9 THE UITNBSS: That was Custoas agent though, 

10 Feldman. 

11 MR. JONES: Interviewed Tea. He did not have a 

12 lawyer at that time. Prior to the <Srand X^ry appearance, 

13 which I think was in February, we had another interview, 

14 pre-Grand /ury testiaony interview. In addition to the 

15 shipments of arms, and Terrell, and I think he said one other 

16 thing in question about that, he did talk about the people 

17 that were going down the southern front. 
18 I BY MR. SAXON: 

19 Q To your knowledge, are you aware of any 

20 interference with the Cfrand ^ury investigation, the D.S. 

21 Attorney's office, the criminal justice process involving 

22 these matters, by anyone at the top levels of the government 





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1 in the United States? 

2 A No, sir. 

3 Q I im not suggesting you would know that or that 

4 they took place, but those allegations have been nade. 

5 A Could I get so«e aore coffee? 

6 Q Sure. 

7 (Posey Exhibit 6 identified.) 

8 MR. SAXON: I would like to introduce Deposition 

9 Exhibit 6, which is a letter to Mr. Ralph D. Martin of the 

10 Department of Justice, public integrity section, dated 

11 November 14, 1986, from Rafael C. Lopez of the U.S. Customs 

12 Service within the Department of the Treasury. 

13 BY MR. SAXON: 

14 Q Mr. Posey, first of all, have you had a chance to 

15 read this? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q If you would look at the top of page 2, where it 

18 says states, and I quote, "There have been multiple 

19 investigations of Thomas Posey and the Civilian Military 
Croup. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Some 

21 those investigations that were closed have been referred to 

22 the appropriate U.S. Attorneys who declined prosecution. 




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Review of these closed cases revealed that in one instance 
Thomas Posey had exchanged letters with U.S. military 
personnel assigned to our embassiesi 

In his communications Posey sought guidance in 
making donations to the c/ontras . " 

Let me ask you, first of all, have you exchanged 
letters with our U.S. military personnel at enb^3sics^^^^| 



A I have exchanged correspondence with the Embassy 



Q But you would deny that statement with regard to 

A Yes, sir. 

Q The ^^^^^I^^^R correspondence would have been 
with i 

A iS^^^^^^H. That was strictl^ fc 

not the Contras . The only official I 
talked to about the C'ontras wa: 
about putting us in contact with 



Q In your best recollection, in communication you 
had with U.S. military officials in Central America, did you 





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ever seek their guidance in making donations to the Contras7| 

A No, sir. 

Q So you would deny the statement in Mr. Lopez's 
letter? 

A Yes, unless they considered that thing with 

jutting us in contact with the 
That was opened up and it was wanting to' 
assist the Freedom Fighters. 

Q That wasi 

A Yes, sir. K copy of the letter is here that we 
showed them. 

Q Let's tallc about the shipment or transport of 
lethal supplies to Central America. First question Cor the 
record, have you ever personally been involved with the 
shipment oC lethal supplies to Central America? 

A No, sir. 

Q To your knowledge, has anyone in CMA -- first 
question, acting on behalf of CMA, been involved with the 
shipment of lethal supplies? 

A Definitely not. 

Q Second, has anyone — 

MR. JONES: Let me interrupt. One question. 



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John. Again, I hate to play word games, but the lethal 
supplies . 

MR. SAXON: Yes. Let rae indicate that I am not 
talking about a web belt on which you can affix a pistol or 
on which you can affix some other device. 1 am not going to 
play word games. 

THE HITNESSi He sent some knives. 
MR. JONES t That's what I was getting at. There 
were some knives. 

THE WITNESS: Is that what you would consider? 
BY MR. SAXON I 
Q Let's talk about that. Hhat did you send, what 
kinds of knives and so on? 

A All together about four or five dozen pocket 
knives and three or four dozen Marine Corps K bars. 
Q Hhat is a K bar? 

A Just a fighting knife that the Marine Corps 
ues . 



# 



Q Like a bayonette? 

A No, it don't fix on the end of the rifle. It's a 
scalping knife. 

Q Not a pocket knife? 



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20 

21 

22 



A No, sir, straight edge, will not Cold. 

Q Where did you obtain those? 

A Different sources, I buy them at surplus stores, 
things lilce that. This was not sent out at one time — 
normally what we do, is we take the K bars down, exchange 
them or trade them Cor Russian bayonettes or Romanian or 
Chinese and bring them back up to the states. 

Q Uhen those Marine Corps K bars were sent, was that 
in response to a specific request that came through Mario 
Calero? 

A No, sir, it was from a specific request from the 
soldiers down there wanting to trade. 

Q To your knowledge, did any shipment which CMA 
participated in of nonft lethal, ever wind up having lethal 
supplies put in with it? 

A No, sir. 

Q You stated earlier that when somebody would send 
a package, box comes through the mail to you in Decatur 
froa Arizona, you said about 95 percent of the cases you rip 
it open, repackage and so forth. What about the other stuff? 

A That's stuff that was sent directly to CMA to 
Mario. 



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Q Everything that came to you in Decatur you 
actually had to reopen? 

A Yes, sir, we had to. 

Q That's important to clean up. \ 

A Yes. 

Q That's important to clean up. For the record did 
you or anyone associated with CMA ever fly lethal supplies to 
forgetting about these knives? ' 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you or anyone associated with CMA have any 
involvement with the f light^^^^^^^^Hin early 1985 
involving lethal supplies? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q If this sounds like I am reasking the same 
question, we lawyers have to do that. 

A Yes, sir, it sounds like it; okay. 

Q You know Mr. Jeffrey Feldaan, one of the assistant 
O.S. Attorneys in Miami; is that correct? 

k Yes, sir. 

Q Are you aware that Stephen Carr told Mr. Fcldman 
that he saw you and Rob Owcnf and other individuals fly six 
tons of arms ^^^^^^^^^Band the ^ontras in early 1985? 



lINClASSlf lEl .c 



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UNCLASSIRED 



;; I air, nc' iwarc !".o mad. the ctat-racnt. 

i Oicl y-j:^ nak'. a;iy juch Cliql.t? 

A r;- , zii'. I have r.cver been with Ri-b Owcr.M. 

11; j'cu make ar.y cuch fliTh" that, if nc't :i^ 
i . .tia^ h.i.-c been mere like a finale T.oitar and :;e.-K 



: 1 ; e a r ni .J ; 

A ^K 



5^; 



MR. SAXCN; I want to offer Depocition Exhibit ' 

(Posey Exhibit 7 identified.) 
.VF . SAXON: If you would take a moment and read 
i:, -t i; a .•ncmorandum to the file by Mr. Brian Eruh, 
E-r-.-'i. dated J-iiUuary 19, 1987. 
SY MR. £A::0N: 
C Have you had a chance to read Dcpocition Exhiii' 



A -{'.z. cir. 

Q I have a couple of questions bas^d on this 
jicmcrandum . Do ycu dispute the statcmc.t in it at^.ri."u: d 
Stephen Carr about th'. jix tens of armsl 
Cir.:ra;-, in ca.-ly '55 that CMA ir.oy have been in^-oiv^d -it'.. 

A I'. Ei;iit..ly . 

;. r.o you dispute the suaoestior. th>..t maj > ive i) . 



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I'.ih-i jhii^ir.- ".. L Lat rathor thin cix tor,3 of armi; , it ir.volv. i 
^ ; i..<ji-: a.C':t.or iiid ^n.^^ll irir.s? 

C Did yju cvjr meet with Adolfo Cclcro iri Mi^r.i •.,: • 
?>.,b ."'w.i.i ; ... dijcucc Getting jj. a iouthcr.i iror.t .^cain:,", .h^ 
3i...;i..ist .3? 

i. Ecji.-oily, ycc. 

Q And ir. that diccucsion, did you also discu-c ti.>. 
;;-.:pri:-..i ..f arms to the Contras? 

A Kv^. sir. 

Q I'id you discuss the assassination of Edcr. ?a-t^-_^. 

A No, sir. 

MR. JONES: Let mc clarify one tliinc, John. Ar . 
-e tclkiiic aboui. one t'riing in which the southern front -a- 
di-'.cuwsei tfiot you incnticncd a few minutes ago, there u..rc 
so:.^;. discussions about getting weapons from the Miskitc 
Tiidian;- to the FLiN' 

TKi 'jJITNESS: Ycs . Wo did discuss wcapor.s f.r.ni 
the Miskito Indians — 

EY MR. SAXON: 

'vi Let' I.- exclude that. ^crc there any other 
i-' r.c j:-.si jp, : , oM.ur tha:i that, about getti.ic arn.s :;.. tl.o 



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A t. . . 

J ;..,»; J '. ah.pn.^nis ^f lt,3C0 ;,oundc of T.ii 
li-.-;, iii r;...vcmr.c3 oi 1^65 from riiar.iil 



A N.. , cir. 

Nc kriowlcd-jc? 

A N.. , -ir. I think tliut to be verified nlliL-i 
t:.^'- t^■■. TOi.trac wcic irmcd with mostly AK-47 amm>.,-.i t i oi 
-ih:.-:;. 1 d..'.r;'t. tf.ink t^,cy referred to this calibv.r ivi ho: 
-o, t ;• r.c . it -ould he uselcGC to send ammi-ini tion for -■: 
t'"-, i'_, are r.ot using anymore. 

Q Let n;c ask you briefly about the incident in 
i,i wliieii twc. CMA members were killed in Nicaragua. 



Q If /oj wculd just tell us what happeiicd, ■-■;•, ^ 
were d^in.j tl;eie, so forth. WliO they wer^. , -'ho all u^^ 
ii,'-cl-.-.i , -.i.-t just the t'.iO individuals wlio were kill e. 

A Ke y.ud received word throuori Mario Caltr.- . 1 

k...- i.,yi.;-,i ,-,.; ar...:u-. a Harrison 1000, it's a DOT raai- r 

Aisv-, if we di^i, would t^.-y c.o down ai.d ...;f. 





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il .1. t^c -:i. So sill CourtT.cy ;;jid hn knew a ]iltli. Lit 
ui^o^i :..-r.,r..\.n; c-li..>r,c , :, o did Wcill Ela,.l-^r,. Alo/ it. it... .-„,i 
-..i^.,.-:. M./K. w>.„ a:;:ii..^ .ibo'^t the pilvt tli-t flew *. r.c :li-:'>:: 
i; I.: ...i iiri-l.^;.. , l,:,,;g tckc-in;, take-off;;, laiidir.^:j. K.. 
-cuIO do it aln.ost like .-.r. airplane instead cf -icir.M ^^p er.-. 
di •*.■; lik>. you are ruppojcd to, he will come in like an 
e.; rplar.c . He wanted to know if wc had comebcdy that wjuid 
down lhci"0 and teech them the finer arts of flying a 
helicopter. He did. That was Jim Powell from Tennessee, 
wa--. a l-,elicopter pilot shot down three times in yictiiar.;. 
That started in July of '84. 

So wc had a meeting in Memphis, Tenncss-ie. 7ul> 
'6':., latter part, where we had an open house mcctincj; at '^ 
VFW. This wa.: discussed about the possibility of even 
."crlir.g a parachutist down there to teach them how to iv::.-y 
Out oL the helicopter aiycverything. That's where Cliff 
Albriqht comes in; he is a parachute rigger and in^- tru^-t or . 

As a result of these discussions, we ogr..-:d w.: 
would get five or six people to qo down and teaoh hclicoi'. 
tik.'.-offs and larjdlng:;, communications and also paraenut.:.-; . 
That's where the first team come down to go to Central 
An.-rica. Tticy left the latter part of Au-just t,-. ci. d^ w.; 



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'l.rr.:. ^liff Alt:i.::ht. Lev MacICnich t , Jim Powell, Dcin.-. 
rcr:;:r. W^lt F.l.intrn aii,i Mcrio. I don't think I Icf* ..\f>,l.,:\ 
• :t . T: dc thic, they urrc tc cuppoocd t i take tw.. weckc, 
t;-i:»*. '.-: oil th.-.y c.-uld takr. of£ work, for two w.-.cks vocoti.:;.; 
they * O' k off for two wcckc . 

k little bit pact the first week, wr.r.k before t;..:j 
w-rr.' :-up[.OGcd to come back before a Saturday, I had heard 
rr cx\/r:ympathi = cr(| , cupportey f rem Mississippi, that he just 
heard en the radio that an American helicopter was tihot dow,-, 
-. n Nii.-.raguu, and that did scare mc. I called down to N.-. -■ 
Orleans and found out fron Mario's son that he was cominv; i., 
that, afternoon. Tfiis was Sunday morning. He said, y.s, 
Marie was coming home that afternoon. That scared mc , 
bi.,:aucc he wasn't supposed to be in till the followi.in wcik. 

So I told my wife I needed to go to New Orlcanj . 
junipcri in the van, gassed up, went to New Orleans. I qi- t 
thCT'c appro:<imatcly an hour after he did. He walked in. or, : 
I..co.;ld t.:.ll by his face that something was bad wr:.n_i, ;.:,'. 
ar-k: d him whet was wrong a\id lie told me, Jim and I'ar, u,.:-; 
dr.-.id. Ani he tf'ld r.i- how t'.icy died. 

Since then, I ha'vfc heard another story 0:1 h r-w ■>'...., 
di,.-.. I ;i.-;Vf.- heard two stories. 



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^cr,;-^j t.- us -;^;: : x v ar^. 



V.^.: t ; L- a ELF? 

2 FLF. 

A It'c th-: way you land, land and roll, lirii t^.i 
•u don't trcak your legs. Dana a;.d Jim was wc.^r: i :*■; . 
the h'.licoptci', taking off, landing f 1 _. i ■ i j 
:r.- ^c,. Is. s-. ^c is not a high tarcjct to be shot i. wr. b. 
..is::i". .. Tr.-iy were practicing this, Dana jumped out of : 
".c 1 i : op; .:r jnd ^.ollcrcd something to Bill Courtney; thoy 
■■- -ci.-.-.d a call for medical evacuation. What little tit 
■p."-.-.a.-h S^ ■ 1 Courtney knew and what little Engl i s^l^^^^■ r 
■..;.a ^.in.pr.d r,ut and translated that they were going for . 
.cc.U'al evceuatioi.. So they jumped back in th;: heli.rtc 
.fid ;er"t, a,.l :h.it wa.": th.e last tlicy ..vcr seer. oC '.).c:... 
:r.'w, tl.iiy wcie shot down. 

Th:n the second story I heard w-= that th.r. ■. 
.". .tt.-.ei-: .'.n Santa Cla:a by some FDN aircraft, ar,.'. th^t : 
... ; i r- - '. . ;• r;l..-w.:l up rich: in the middle if i*" a:.d •; ... . 



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C; Sh-wc^i up u;ii;itcr.tioT.ally? 

r;. , zir. •.hot. the helicopter showed w^ , i t u^ 
:Y.r ,-.;yiJli. c^f z).-: con;,at.. 

Kf; . JONF.S: Net nccesciarily unintentional i» , 



THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
EY MR. SAXON: 
t At that point, then, you more or lejs er.iT.-rocd . 
•-i:;, their unCortunatc dcathc, it woo soit o' left tc yoj .•.. 
tl... ri.^.i leccici c f CMA? 

A '/•'.■.':. Ac; i result of that action, I was totally 
pu- ~\.t on tie limb by myself, because Dana was dead, he wa, 
;4 vr.- of the founders. Bill Courtney and Ray Potter uuc 

working for the Alabama National Guard, and they were orl.. : 
hard:; off, d-j not have anything to do with CMA. 
Q Do you know who gave them that ord<-r"' 
A y.r, , sir, or on: of th.jr; that gav-i the ;=:■:.... 
CMo -.^1 Eogs. 

Q I'o y.ja have any knowledge: whether thct ordir .a,r 
.i::-.:.-tly frot.. CvV.: r n*;-: Wallace? 
;Jo, .;ir, I do.rt. 



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; V.-C. .;i-. RcjI i;:" icii Iv , «,i wac ^nl, fo^.: r-:.c: 
:I .. ' '.c '.ir^: ci.ql.t inor.th- . Then wo jot -ui fir^t -vlurit 
:.i -.;.>.■. V...- '..v^lT Slcn'>-^:i. 7J,-t ucc in F'.oru-iy vl! 1^?;. 
.-: .; -■■■ thij ir. -ur.o ur J'-ly of 1963, but uotody *o>..'r: •_; 

incdc the trip^^^^^^^^^^ftfor 
', ii;..- , .:..., c i>0-c^ with the photos. Ac a rc.:uit -.f the 
_ ..-'l i c i v.y , J i .-j.jt Walt Elonton. Two montlic doui, tl.o r-^crl 
■;- t *'.... pc.pL: in V.cnipl'.i.. , T forget the -juy ' -• r.an.c, if; . 
t',.: .ip .■! ,'iy tji.oa.v. Anyway, he was the guy -- he -.. ; ; 
:h.. N\.t; C".,,:.! '"uari too, in spcci-1 Eorcec, ai.d h. s:_;-t .: 
c;,;i;..:r i;, K.e.T;rhir, in M^-y of 1984. Don Cilmorc i- hie r.ei. 

C: Tjo you have any knowledge of whether Governor 
K-. ll:.c>- in^y h„vo ordered or instructed any Alabama N..:i.. ,> 
C. .a- d p:r-onn..l who were on their own time c^"..,;aijin ; in 
- :t ; .: ', i.:; iji r.'.. i.^iol Ann.riea to assist the Co/traj. ~\..\' 
C->\'^i r.K-y Kaiiacc ordered had him to get bacl; lo *;.e c'.r.t. ' 

A N .1 , sir, ^^-veausc I knew who was in.'olveJ a:-, i »: 
was in.olvLd and everything like that. I dcn't ..v.-... t,.i... 
::.•-■:.;, or KallaC'- ki.cw where Nicaragua was. 

:. H.r.w.ver, \i hea:d of t;>c Eolaad AiT;e,.am.,ii: " 



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r T- 1 1 uc :f w>(.:.t your beat u:i J .r.'; ta.idlr.g 11 ,' , 

:: :; ; . ■ di.li,' t do. 

;. ~U- ^^^ I unJ^: r. l jnd tl.c Bolj^nd Act, i,o r.n.pJc, >. 

...:" ;. ■ U.S. C;.: v.. r!..i)c iit c>..uld hu'.o -r.y thi ru; to do with tl.- 

Q oi r.cc y ju arc r.ct a lawyer, and I jir, njt 3ur. ; 

ji.'.:lc; .i.-lj yoLi. I air. i;ot tryin.; to ask you ficr fir,,? l.jocl 
d - ;i ni t i. 7,c o: ever, time periods. Did anyone i ii tlTc U . .-, . 
C-:.v..riiihcr.t ^-vcr explain t!ic Boland Amendment tc. you ..r -f; 
i ■; u ..jiyLhi,).^ i rj t'.rnic of written guidance, Icjal ■• i,.i ni..ii , 
>-rialy:;i. t£ ttie ioqislaticn, E^r ucc in year ac tiv i t • ■. o u' 
CMA : •:• y^.u ui.uldn ' t run a£oul of t>>c law? 

A No. 

t Notif'dy from tfic government ever in any way tri-. 
to e.<plaii. thi' Eoland Amendment or give guid^^ncc on th^t'' 

A N:j. 

(Ul'i oreup.jn , at 12:20 p.m., the de por i I i .;■, v.^.; 
adiouined, to j'cconvcne ...t 12:40 p.m. this ;ame d^.,. , 



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i; AFTERNOON SESSION (12:50 p.m.) 

I 

2 'I Whereupon, 

3 THOMAS U. POSEY 

4 j resumed the stand and, having been previously duly sworn, was 

5 examined and testified further as follows: 

6i EXAMINATION (Continued) 

1 
7! BY MR. SAXON: 

8| Q Now that wc are back on the record, it's my 

9; understanding that there are one or two details that you 

101 wanted to provide to further explain a couple of your 

11, previous answers. 

I 
12 j A Sometime in the latter part of January, before the 

trip H^^^^^^^^B that 

14; Q Of 198 — 

15j A 5. Larry Spivey, who initiated — helped initiate 

lej the meeting down in Miami, brought me down to Washington, 

17 1 D.C., under the pretense of meeting somebody, and the 

18 reCerencc was basically given that it was Ollic North. So I 

19 sat for four or five days up there, or three or four, 

20 I somewhere in there, and I didn't meet nobody. Then I was at 

21 the Hotel Vista, with Larry Spivey late one evening, and Rob 

22 Owenk come in, and the question was asked of him, well. 



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what's to keep mc from going on down ^^^^^^^^^^H He :aid 
nothing, you arc free to go. But, at the same time -- okay, 
at the same time, Larry Spivey made a phone call from his 
hotel room to the FBI agent in Huntavillc, Alabama, Cwcn 
Huffier, he said as soon as Ed Mecsc was confirmed as 
Attorney General. 
Q Edwin? 

A Yes. Whatever his confirmation came through or 
however they do it, that everything was going to be taken 
care of it. When I got back to Alabama a week or so later, 
met with Cwen Huffier. Gwen was upset for the mere fact tha- 
Larry had used his last name like he was personal friends 
with him over the telephone, and he is not, but he was -- 
admitted to be a personal friend with George out of Miami, 
the FBI agent out of Miami, that they had worked together 
before. George had asked rac, was there any agent that I 
could work with; I like Gwen Huffier because he seems pretty 
abovdboard. He said great, because we used to be partners. 

Q Let mc ask you a couple of follow-up questions 
based on that. You say Spivey brought you up under the 
pretense -- with the representation that you would be meeting 
certain people. Who used the name of Oliver North? 




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A Larry Spivcy freely used Oliver North and Robert 
McFarlanc in his conversations. 

Q As far as you know, was any effort made to set up 
a meeting? 

A According to what Larry Spivcy told me later, and 
I heard from a newspaper reporter also, yes. He went to 
Ollie North to ask for the meeting, and Ollic North turned it 
down because of the Boland Act. 

Q Spivey communicated that back to you? 

A Not directly, no, sir. It was later on that I 
found this out through a news reporter. 

Q In terms of the call which made reference to 
Attorney General Mcese, after the call was made, did you ask 
Spivcy about it, what he meant by it? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you ask him what his information was, to 
permit him to make that assessment? 

A No, sir. 

Q Didn't ask any questions about that at all? 

A No, sir. I did talk to Gwen about it. 

Q Did you understand what he meant when he said 
"everything will be all right"? 



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1 A Yes, sir. He had asked uo if wc were on any 

2 computers or anything of that nature. He said, yes, wc arc 

3 on the computers in Customs. I think there was a reference 

4 made to the possibility of getting us off the computers in 

5 Customs, which never was done. 

6 Q The context, though, to make sure I understand 

7 this, was in terms of some kind of adversarial proceeding in 

8 which you may have been a party, some kind of investigation, 

9 some kind of information gathering by the government? 

10 A I don't know your tcrainology, but in reference, 

11 the part about every time wc corac back in the country, 

12 Customs would go through everything that wc had. It was 

13 embarrassing; wc could be the first ones in and the last ones 

14 to leave. Be thought that was discriminatory, really. Why 

15 were they picking on us? We were supposed to be the good 

16 guys^. 

17 Q So there was an understanding on your part in some 

18 ^firmative way Attorney General Mccse would do something to 

19 aakc life easier for you guys? 

20 A Yes. 

21 Q Anything else you could think of on these points? 

22 A Just a second, please. 




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In thia oamc time Cramc, February-March, and I 
think it was concerning Alan Saum, in particular, when he 
first called me, I let it be known to Rob Owcnfj and 
everything like that, Rob Owcn|l come back to me and told me, 
he says, well, since you are talking to the FBI and 
everything like that, continue to talk to the FBI. I said, 
what do you mean? He said, well, he let it slip that, you 
know, wc have accessibility to computers. I told Gwen 
Huffier, shortly thereafter, that day or the next diy or 
something like that, that their computers weren't safe 
because basically everything I was telling him, Rob knew 
about already. Gwen got a little upact with me with that 
statement, like he was betraying me, which, if he did, he 
took it wrong. I was just telling him his computers weren't 
safe. 

Q Meaning Justice Department computers, FBI 
computers? 

A Yes, sir. If I was going to be cooperating, I 
didn't want to end up dead. 

Q Did you ask Rob Owenf when he meant by that, or 
what his means of access to Justice Department data was? 

A No, sir. I felt like it was none of my business. 



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1 Q But, if I understand what you juat told mc 

2 correctly, it was apparent to you that there were things that 

3 you had communicated to the FBI of which OwcnM had rather 

4 complete knowledge? 

5 A- Yes, sir. 

6 Q That he did not gain from you telling it to him? 

7 A Right, sir. He knew that 1 was talking to the 
S FBI, giving them information. 

9 Q He was getting that same information from 

10 somewhere? 

11 A I assumed, yes, sir, due to the tone and nature of 

12 his conversation, he knew that I was talking to the FBI. 

13 That's when I really knew then that it was something 

14 upstairs. 

15 Q Anything else on this point? 

16 A I don't think so. 

17 Q For the record, let mc ask you if you know or you 

18 arc familiar with F.A. Connor Air Cargo. Did you ever use 

19 them for anything? 

20 A That sounds familiar. I not sure, sir. There was 

21 about three or four different companies that flew supplies 

22 for the Freedom /Fighters out of New Orleans. Connors Air — 



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1 if they go by Connors Air, it docs sound familiar. 

2 Q Let mc ask you about a military and U.S. civilian 

3 exercise called RECS 84, all caps, R-E-C-S, 84, was a 

4 readiness exercise of FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management 

5 Agency, in conjunction with a military operation by the code 

6 name of operation "night train," that took place in 1984. 

7 Do you have any knowledge of such an exercise by 

8 those names? 

9 A No, sir. 

10 Q The exercise supposedly involved National Guard 

11 units around the country, in conjunction with FEMA. trying to 

12 see how they would respond and act in a state of national 

13 emergency. The allegations arc that arms and ammunition were 

14 to be specially issued to these National Guard units, and 

15 that through some funny bookkeeping, only half of the arms, 

16 half of the ammunition, was to be turned back in, and that 

17 the other half was to go to the Contras . Is this something 

18 of which you have any knowledge at all? 

19 A No, sir. That wouldn't be possible in the first 

20 place, because the weapons that are used down in Central 

21 America, they do not like, and they actually hate the 

22 American M-16 because it's so prone to jamming in the jungle 



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1 atmosphere, that honest to goodness, they don't throw them 

2 away, but they just don't use them. 

3 Q But if they have them could they barter, trade, 

4 swap? 

5 A There's always that; if there were, they could do 

6 that. 

7 Q My understanding is they did that with knives; 

8 right? 

9 A Yes, we traded them Icnivcs, yea. 

10 Q Do you have any knowledge that they did that with 

11 U.S. arms, M-16s? 

12 A No, sir. I only saw maybe half a dozen M-16s down 

13 there. 

14 MR. JONES: John, go off for just a second. 

15 (Discussion off the record.) 

16 BY MR. SAXON: 

17 Q For the record, let me ask about the Christie 

18 Inatitutc. You are a Defendant in that suit in Federal Court 

19 in Miami; is that correct? 

20 A Yes, sir. 

21 Q To your best knowledge, is there any truth to any 

22 of the allegations that the Plaintiffs make with regard to 



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you or CMA? 

A On the complaints, no, sir. None of it is true at 
all. 

MR. ^Kg^i -4^^^ let me clarify that; that's a 
long suit, there are certain given allegations involving gun 
running, drugs, et cetera, et cetera. That's an important 
point to make, and that's what I intended to ask. 

MR. JONES: He also has other counsel in Miami 




that is hanolng that. 

1 

MR. SAXON: Tom, you have a couple of things you 
want to clean up from this morning? 

MR. YOUNG: Yes, if you don't mind, Mr. Posey. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YOUNG: 
Q You nentioncd Mr. Humphrey. When did you met Mr. 
Humphrey? 

A I met him at a convention. Phantom Division, April 



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funds? 



Q Did he propose that he would provide you with 

A No, sir. That's when I met him. 

Q How did it come about that he was going to be 



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1 paying you a monthly stipend? 

2 A Can we go off a second? 

3 MR. SAXON: Sure. 

4 (Discussion off the record.) 

5 THE WITNESS: About a year ago, he knew from all 

6 this mud slinging and adverse publicity that wc was 

7 receiving, my business was suffering financially big time. 

8 At the same time, he helped us buy a computer. He bought the 

9 computer in our office and wc asked him to come on as a 

10 member of the board of directors. Him finding out that we 

11 was in a financial sad shape, he offered to give us, not like 

12 a salary, but a loan. He puts it out as a loan, that will 

13 hopefully be paid back one day. That's the way it is on the 

14 records, as a loan to be paid back one day. If not, it will 

15 be adjusted, if we get a tax deduction, in the legal way. 

16 BY MR. YOUNG: 

17 Q How much was the computer? 

18 A §27- or §2200. One of the two. 

19 Q Did it go to you personally? 

20 A It went to CMA Memphis, sir. 

21 Q That's where the money still goes through? 

22 A I sec what you mean now, I receive a check each 



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month. He takes care of the office expenses in Tennessee, 
which is SIOOO a month. 

Q Do you know if he provides any other support money 
for the pontras? 

A He has donated money to the ^ontras , yes, sir. 

Q Do you know who he gave that money to? 

A I may be mistaken. It seems to me the first check 
he wrote to the Contras went to General Singlaub, in the 
form, I think, it was 520,000 and a couple of SlOOO'checks 
afterwards . 

Q To Singlaub? 

A No, sir, the first check. So he could get a tax 
deduction on it. Then I think he wrote a check or two after 
that, smaller amounts, but I think it went to the Nicaragua 
development council. I could be mistaken on it, but it seems 
to me that is what he said. 

Q Is Mr. Humphrey a U.S. citizen? 

A He is, sir. 

Q But he lives in the Cayman Islands? 

A He lives down there, but he has a home in Memphis, 
Tennessee. He is a good guy, southerner. 

Q In your earlier statement you said you knew where 



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Jack Terrell got his funds. 

A Yes, sir. During this timc_frame, I had found out 
from other sources, and also, the other sources, one of them 
was Lanny Duck and Jose Cotinc and Alex Martinez, that Jack 
Terrell was getting funds and expenses paid by Maco^uSflanBtSf 
-oce^l Stewart, Se^K»> who owns StcwartV'^cxasT Lanny Duck 
was working for Maco Stewart; Jack Terrell, finding this out, 
went out there, got Lanny Duck fired and took over his job, 
where Maco Stewart was paying his expenses and everything. 
That's how the operation from Miskito land was financed. 
Also, with the help of Jose Cotine with an individual by the 
name of Alex/ Martinez, who they got the tickets from. Miami 
sent a man down to Miskito land. 

Q Maco Stewart is — 

A He is the owner or president of, whatever it is, 
of Stewart Petroleum. 

Q He is the owner? 

A One of the two. He is the big boss man. 

MR. JONES: Do you know whereabouts in Texas that 
was? 

THE WITNESS: Houston. 




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BY MR. YOUNG: 

Q One more question. I might have misunderstood. 
You said you think that Humphrey gave Singlaub that first 
check of $20,000? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Do you know of anybody else that Humphrey gave 
money to? 

A Besides us? 
Q Besides you, yes, Singlaub. 
A He had given aoney to Singlaub. 
Q And the Nicaraguan force? 

A Yes, sir. I think he was given funds at that time 
to a<u; ocng e r -J " Messing? 

MR. SAXON: Messing. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Messing. That's just 
hearsay on ay part there. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Is there currently pending a Customs investigation 
against you or CMA? 

A I don't know. 

MR. JONES: John, just — off the record. 



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1 (Discussion off the record.) 

2 BY MR. SAXON: 

3 Q What do you understand your status to be in terras 

4 of the investigation going on out of an U.S. Attorney's 

5 office in Miami? 

6 A I think they said the terminology was subject, 

7 subject. 

8 MR. JONES: Again, to let mc clarify. My most 

9 recent conversation with JefC Fcldman. He said we might be 

10 on the borderline of being changed to target, and that we 

11 anticipate him coming to Birmingham within the next four or 

12 five weeks to sec if we can clarify some points. 

13 BY MR. SAXON: 

14 Q Let me ask you for the record a few questions 

15 about the topic of drug running. 

16 First, the general question; As far as you know, 

17 have you or anyone associated with CMA been involved in 

18 bringing contraband drugs back from Central America on any 

19 trips made down? 

20 A There is one individual. Walt Blanton got caught 

21 with, some, I think they call them quafludes or something 

22 like that, coming back into the United States, in Houston, 



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1 Texas. That io one of the things, the reason Walt Blanton 

2 isn't with us. 

3 Q Other than that, your answer would be no? 

4 A Definitely. 

5 Q For the record, would you have any knowledge of a 

6 trip from Colombia to Miami in 1984 involving CMA which would 

7 have brought back between $50- and $70,000 worth of cocaine? 

8 A Gosh no. We didn't even come up with the name CMA 

9 until November or December of 1984. Excuse mc — that was 

10 '83. 

11 Q Would you be aware of any flight from Colombia to 

12 Miami in the '84 time frame in which an aircraft with cocaine 

13 would have stopped at John H^^ll's ranch in Costa Rica to 

14 refuel? 

15 A No, sir. 

16 Q Do you have any knowledge of a meeting in early 

17 1985 which would have included Terrell, a member of the 2506 

18 brigade and John Hull at which cocaine shipments would have 

19 been discussed? 

20 MR. JONES! This is in early '85? 

21 BY MR. SAXON: 
22 



Q Early '85. 



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A No, sir . 

Q I believe you stated earlier -- let me just close 
this out, if I can — that you were never at any meeting at 
which a plot was discussed to kill Eden Pastor^? 

A Absolutely not. 

Q Same answer regarding Ambassador Tambs? 

A Right. 

Q Arc you familiar with an organization called 
CANAC? 

A No, sir . 

Q Tell me if you know a gentleman by the name of 
Rene Corbo. 

A Yes. 

Q What is your relationship with him and how did yo 
meet him? 

A I met Rene Corbo for the first timej 

Iwhen I went down in the middle of January, '85. 
He was there as a representative, in essence, you must say, 
of the Cuban community. That's when I first found out that 
the Cubans was supporting the freedom fighters down south, 
because we was trying to solicit the help of the Cubans. 
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ij They were already helping them. Rene Corbo and Felipe 

2|l Vidal. 

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3 1| Q Did you have any joint missions with Corbo? 

'.\ 
4 'I A I wouldn't say "mission." I went out in the Eiclc 

5 I with him to see the camp for the first time. 

6 1 Q Did you and Corbo recruit five mercenaries in the 

71 time frame between January and March of '85 to fight with and 

i 

si train cfontras 
9i A No, sir, no mercenaries. I had four of my people 

10| go down as volunteers to help train. 

Ill Q Who were these people? 

I 
12j MR. JONES: Let DC — Tom and I discussed this 

j 

13 i earlier. That's why I want to interrupt, because the word 

14| "mercenary" gets bantered bade and forth a good bit. Let him 

15 explain to you his definition of a mercenary so you will 

16 know. You may want to change your language. 

17 MR. SAXON: That is a loaded word. 

18 THE WITNESS: Mercenary is a soldier that gets 

19 paid. He has no allegiance and cause that he fights for. He 

20 fights for whoever pays the money. Our people were anti- 

21 ^ommunist who were not getting paid. You can't even classify 
22! them as a mercenary. 




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MR. SAXON: 

Q I accept that. Let mc rephrase the question. 

Were you and Rene Corbo involved in trying to Cine 
and place five individuals in the time frame between January 
and March of '85 to fight with and train the Contras 

;pecifically Mr. Carr, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Clibbery, Mr. 
Davies and Mr. Chiffard? 

A Half of that is right. 

Q Tell me about the part that is waS|r" 

A The part about mc and Rene Corbo. No, sir, Rene 
didn't have anything to do with that part. I was working 
with Bruce Jones. Everybody but Stephen Carr, those other 
four individuals, Clibbery, Davies, Chiffard and Pantcra was 
as a result of mc . Because I knew at that time, at that 
time, Corbo was down south and he didn't show up back in 
Miami until the telethons in Miami. 

Q So if Clibbery, Davies, Chiffard told Mr. Fcldman 
of the FBI that they were recruited by you, you would take 
issue with that statement? 

A Definitely, sir, because they all contacted mc . ! 
did not make the initial contact with them. They contacted 
me, wanted to assist with the Freedom fighters. Claude 



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Chiffard contacted mc through an individual named Mr. Keys. 

Q Did Clibbcry and Davics contact you through a 
follow named Mr. Frank Camper? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Tell us about that. 

A I received a phone call February of •85 from, if : 
am not mistaken, Peter Glibbcry, that they was wanting to go 
down south. They had just gotten in from England, things of 
that nature, this would go along with Brand Jury, Vrccdon 
fighters, all this other good stuff. I met him at a gun show 
in Birmingham, both of them, Davics and him. Also with them 
at that time was Frank Camper. That's when I found out the 
Camper connection. 

Q Did you tell Glibbery, Davies and Chiffard to 
contact John Hull? 

John Hull^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthey 
were supposed to meet him down there. They were supposed to 
wear a red baseball hat so they could be recognized when they 
come to the airport. But they were supposed to go to Miami, 
upon departure from the country, to fly out commercial, and 
they were supposed to coordinate with Bruce Jones, who was 
staying at the Howard Johnson's. 



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personal matter? 

A No, sir. 
Q You don't recall it? 

* Claude Chiffard-s English was „i,hty bad wit. a 
French accent and everything. i a« not sure. 

Q DO you recall a phone conversation in the time 

period of the sprina of iqfi«; !^ w . 

Pring oC 1985 in which you asked hia if i 

help Contra soldiers |^B^^^^ 

A Ves, Sip. That wasn^t in March, that was in 
February . 

That was in Mr. Keys' house in Massachusetts. 
They initiated the phone call. He was wanting to go bac. 
^own south. I told hi. the only place we had at that 
P-ticular ti.e he could go, because we wer en't sending 
anybody through was|^^^H|^^BM 

Q Did you put Alan Saum up to setting up Jesus 
carcia for arrest on possession of a machine gun and a 
silencer? 

A No, sir. 

Q To your knowledge is it t-rn^ ,- t , 

^"y<-, IS It true, as Jack Terrell 



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told an FBI agent in New Orleans by the name ol 
^^^^^^^^that an cmicsary from the Ochoa drug family met with 
you, Jesus Garcia, Rene Corbo and Francisco Chancs in Miami 
in January or February of 1985? 

A That's a total falsehood. 
There was no such meeting? 
There was not. 
You weren't offered $1 million to kill Ambassador 



Tambs? 



Lord no, 



A 

Q There was no point in which Adolfo Calcro 
authorized you and CMA to attack the American Embassy in 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica and Soviet Embassy in Costa Rica? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you ever supply any clay/for mines to be used 
for an embassy job? 

A No, sir. 

Q I want to ask you about some other individuals who 
have been labeled "mercenaries." But I will ask you if in 
roughly the tiracTframc in November of 1984, you were involved 
in helping recruit 10 individuals to help fight with the FDN 



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A No, sir , 

MR. JONES: Off the record. 

THE WITNESS: I was responsible for getting some 
individuals to go and help the FDN train; yes, sir. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q But you contacted those individuals? 
A No, they contacted me. 

MR. SAXON: I will offer Deposition Exhibit 8. 
Will you mark that, please. 

I'll give you a moment to loolc at that. 

(Posey Exhibit 8 identified.) 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you read it? 
A Yes, sir, I read it. 

Q I would like you to turn your attention to 
Deposition Exhibit 8, which is a cable from two individuals 
bearing the initials DV and BT. Let me ask you if you know 
an individual by the name ofj 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q Never met someone who would have been a copilot o 
any flights in March of '85 and June of '86 by that name? 
A To ray knowledge, no, sir. 



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Q Do you know Robert Thompson? 
A Yes, sir. 

MR. SAXON: For the record, let nic say that our 
evidence is that DV in this cable would bcj 
BT would be Robert Thompson. It is to an individual 
^^^Hwho would appear to be an employee of the CIA, and I 
will leave it at that. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q If you would, Mr. Posey, look at the matters that 
are asserted in this cable in which on April 12, 1986, with 
regard to the UNO southern force, there was a drop completed, 
and when told about it, someone who is called^^^^Halmost 
"cried in grateful appreciation." Do you know someone who 
would be callcd^^^Hby that name? 
A Only one I would know is] 
Q That would bej 

A I guess. I just heard him called 
Q Is that a drop you would have any knowledge of in 
that time frame? 
A No. 

Q Where it talks about a lethal drop to UNO south, 
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A No, sir. 

Q Where it says that "carrying all remaining cashed 
lethal materiel to join UNO south force," is that something 
of which you would have knowledge? 
A No, sir. 

Q Do you have any idea why these individuals would 
be concerned about press accounts involving Terrell and CMA 
in terms of arms investigations in drug trafficking? 

A No, sir, other than the part up here that says 
"new subject," sort of like starting a new thing. 

Q Have you seen this document before today? 
A No, sir. 

Q Do you know an individual by the name of Evan 
Gelio Fenjol, or something like that, E-v-a-n, G-e-1-i-o, 
F-e-n- j-o-1? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

MR. JONES: What was that last name again, John? 
MR. SAXON: F-e-n-j-o-1. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I am going to go back to the allegations regarding 
lethal shipments that may have been involved, the allegations 
that arc that CMA may have been involved with Rene Corbo 



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111 first on March 6, 1985, then on June 13, 1985. 

2. To your knowledge, was CMA involved in any 

3 shipments of any items from Ft. Lauderdale to 

4 I those dates? 

5 A No, sir. 

6:i Can I make a statement? 

71 Q Sure. 

8| A After our people were arrested in Costa Rica, I 

9| lot it be known to Rob and everybody else wc weren't going tc 

lOi do a dad gum thing lilH^^B||^BMB^"^J-^ "<^ 9^^ °^^ people out 

11 1! of jail — that was in April of 1985 — other than to try to 

12! get our peop'^ out. 

13! Q Would you have reason to know -- would you have 

14 reason to doubt a statement that Mr. Carr gave to Mr. Fcldmar 

15 i regarding Carr ' s having seen weapons onpoard the March 6 

16' flight; is that something of which you have any knowledge? 

I 

17 A No, sir, I don't have any knowledge of that 

18 aircraft. 

19 Q Do you know an individual named Jaime Ortega? Do 

20 you have any knowledge of allegations that Jaime Ortega may 
;i have said to Mr. Feldman that he saw weapons onboard a June 

22 13 flight from Ft. Lauderdale to|^^^^^^^^H which CMA may 

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1 ■ have been involved? 
2 i| A No, sir. 
3 1; Q Have you ever been to Rene Corbo's mother's home 

4 I in South Miami? 

5 A No, sir. 

6 i Q Would you have any knowledge as to whether weapon: 

7 'I were stored there on a regular basis? 

8:| A No, sir. 

I 
9^1 Q Any knowledge that weapons had ever been stored 

I 

101 there? 

J 
lli A No, Sir. 

121 Q Did you ever give Bob Thompson an AR-15 and a 308 

13i| caliber sniper rifle? 

14 I A I gave him a 308 hunting rifle only. 

1 

15 I Q What is an AR-15; do you know? 



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A AR-15 is the semiautomatic version of the militar; 
M-16. 

Q You did not give him that? 

A No, sir. 

Q Have you ever heard of| 
name of] 

A No , sir . 



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Q What can you tell us about any CMX involvement on 
an assault on thc^^^^^^Bridge -- I don't know how that is 
p r o n o u n c c d ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ t h c^^^^^H B r i d g c 
Docs this ring a bell? 

A I have heard the story. 

Q What do you understand the story to be and tell uc 
if it's something that you have personal knowledge of. 

A I have no personal knowledge of it, just other 
than the story that was given to »c by Jia Adair, Joe Adams 
and Russ D. Rossi. The story that was given to me is that 
Jack Terrell, after they was down there, approximately two t: 
three weeks -- 

MR. JONES: Put a time frame on that. 
THE WITNESS: March, I think, 1985. After they 
was down there for two or three weeks, morale is low, 
everybody going to pot. Jack Terrell decides an operation. 
Jack Terrell sends them, supposedly in, to blow up a bridge. 
Only trouble is, they can't find the bridge. So they come 
out. Jack Terrell didn't go in, because he couldn't hump his 
own pack, and a little old lady carrying his pack made him 
embarrassed. At the sane time this is supposedly going on. 
Jack Terrell is in Washington, D.C., trying to get 5100,000 




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1 from the U.S. Government. 

2 He contacts me from a hotel or motel, seems to me 

3 the name started with "Gold" — the name was Gold something. 

4 He wanted to know Meg Hunt's phone number so he could contact 

5 Jeremiah Denton's office to try to get the money. Then at 

6 the same time he wanted to try to talk to Brian Bargcr 

7 because he knew Brian Barger had an iivfaw Wii ^^fe^jy in the CIA 

8 that he might be able to get money from. I asked him what 

9 was he doing up here. He said getting money and he told mc 

10 the men were surrounded by Sandinistas and some other bull 

11 crap. This is shortly before they got booted out of the 

12 country. 

13 Q Is it your best judgment that never took place? 

14 A I will be honest with you, they might have gone in 

15 the country but never tried to blow up a bridge. 

16 Q At that time Terrell was affiliated with the CIA? 

17 A Yea, sir. 

IB Q You and he were on more or less decent terms? 

19 A No, sir. He was sent to the Miskito area to try 

20 to dry him up financially or to find out where he was getting 

21 his finances from for sure. 

22 Q What do you know about the effort in early 1984 to 

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establish state defense forces throughout the states, 
particularly in the south. Do you have any knowledge of 
that? 

A No, sir. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of the state defense 
forces that were established in Louisiana, Alabama and Texas? 

A No. You arc not talking about National Guard; arc 



you: 



No. 

No, sir. 

Have you ever, on behalf of CMA or individually, 
obtained surplus U.S. Military equipment to provide to the 
(Zontras?' 

A Could you clarify that and specify it. 
Q Excluding ponchos and web belts and things like 
that, things that are lethal — Have you ever obtained 
surplus U.S. military equipment, lethal military equipment. 
Cor provision to the contras? 
A No, sir. 

Q Have you ever obtained any such equipment from 
units or individuals of the Alabama National Guard — 



No, sir. 



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Q — for the purpose of giving them to the Contras? 

A No, sir. 

Q From any other state National Guard? 

A No, sir. 

Q From the United States Army? 

A No, sir. 

Q From the U.S. Army Reserve? 

A No, sir. 

Q From the 20th Special Forces unit in Alabama? 

A No, sir. 

Q And from a — have you ever been involved in 
procuring or obtaining a surplus airplane from the U.S. Army, 
U.S. Air Force, in New Jersey, to give to the Contras? 

A No, sir. 

MR. SAXON: I will have you mark as Deposition 
Exhibit 9, a memorandum for the record from an individual of 
the Central Intelligence Agency named on page 2. I will give 
ygiU a moment to look at that. 

(Posey Exhibit 9 identified.) 
THE WITNESS: Okay. I read it. 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q This memo purports to evidence that at one point 



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you contacted the CIA for help in finding out who the "good 
guys" were in Central America. Ic that correct? 

A Yes, sir — well, yes and no, okay? 

Q Explain. 

A I wrote a letter to them. 

Q To CIA? 

A Yes. 

Q To who? 

A Washington, D.C. 

Q CIA Washington, D.C? 

A Yes. 

Q That's a problem, it's Langlcy, Virginia. 

A I didn't find out about that until a year later. 
I wrote to them telling them we wanted to help with the 
freedom Fighters and we were about to get into a gray area. 
Please let us know, because wc didn't want to cause any 
trouble for anybody. They never wrote back. I didn't know 



:^/l 



titey gotOr'letter until the following year, November of "85, 
A 

Q Do you presently have a copy of that letter? 
A No, sir. They said they turned it over to the 
Justice Department, so they should have a copy of it. 

MR. SAXON: Let mc ask that this be marked as 



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Deposition Exhibit 10. 

(Posey Exhibit 10 identified.) 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I am going to direct your attention to page 2 of 
Deposition Exhibit 10. This exhibit is a cabJc 

The date is January of '85; I believe January 16. 
A Yes. 




Q Possible participation with Cuban funding of and 
material campaign for the support of the (Zontras? 

A Right. 

Q The sender of this cable indicates that he was 
also under the impression that Tom Posey would support the 
Miami campaign. 

A Right. 

Q If you drop down to 4, it says, a large sea 
shipment of -- if you direct your attention to numbered 



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1; paragraph 4 of page 2, it indicate: 

2' large sea shipment cTT.iM.jiJaMp3«xjU Jupport materiel is ready foi 

3 dclivcr^[^^H|^^^^|m Packed among clothing supplies 

4 I within the container will be unspecified weapons. 
5 
6 
7 




Let me aslc, is this an operation, mission or 
campaign of which you had any knowledge prior to seeing this 
document today? 

A I hadn't seen the document before today, no. 

Q No, but the operation, mission, the campaign that 
it talks about and references in there involving a large sea 
shipment? 

A That I don't know nothing about. 

The support in Miami, I attended some radio 
telethons in March of 1985 to raise support of finances and 
supplies for the freedom ^igf^ters . But that support was not 
given to me, nor the supplies. They were given and brought 
to the radio stations there in Miami and left there for the 



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Q Were you^i^^^^^pat the suggested 
here? 

A Pretty sure, ycc , 
Q Did you have any dealings" withi 
X I don't know if i did or not. There were some I 
individuals, as given in my statement to Fcldman. There wer ! 
two or three individuals that were with us. I did not 
remember their names. The only one I did rcacmbcr', the two 
individuals, Rene Corbo and| 

Q To your best recollection, you were never any par 
of effort, campaign, mission, whatever to send supplies to 
the Gontras in a container that would have clothing but 
packed within the clothing would be weapons? 

A Not to do it the way you stated, no, sir. 
Q Was there another effort to do it another way tha- 
involved clothing, weapons? 

A No weapons, no, sir. To give supplies for the 
southern front, yes, sir. 

MR. SAXON: Let mc have you mark this as 
Deposition Exhibit 11. 

(Posey Exhibit 11 identified.) 




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l! THE WITNESS: I have read it. 

i| 

2'\ MR. JONES: John, by the way, what arc these? 

3 What kinds of cables are these? 

4: MR. SAXON: What kinds of cables? 

I 

5 MR. JONES: Yes. Arc they National Security 

6 Council cables? 

7' MR. SAXON: No. These are CIA cables, normal 

81 cable traffic. 

9' BY MR. SAXON: 

J 

10i| Q If you would tell us whether you have seen this 

11 cable before today. 

12li A No, sir, I haven't. 

|i 

li 

13;| Q This cable dated 22 January of '85,1 

14'; indicates that in the time period of 18 to 21 January, you 

15, were in Central America. Docs that sound about right? 




Yes, sir. 

During that trip, did you go 



Do you have knowledge of 30 Nicaraguans being 



I don't know the name of the town, but there wa: 



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camp of about 30 to 40. 

Q Tell us about your involvement with those 
individuals and the purpose of that trip, who you saw and 
what you did. 

A Okay. The trip was made to the camp, Rene Corbo, 
"'^^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^land one or two went to the 
camp. While I was at the camp we observed how it was set up 
the camp was fairly knew, because they hadn't had a chance t 
be weeded out and everything. 

Support on the equipment, stuff like that, I 
promised them tents, uniforms, medical equipment, supplies, 
things of that nature, but no weapons, 
Q No weapons? 
A No weapons . 
Q Where it indicates thati 
addition" -- I am quoting,! 
full military equipment for 30 men, an unspecified amount of 
M-16 like machine guns would be provided by Posey to assist 
the training of the underground anti-Sandinista forces." 

First of all, with regard to the full military 
equipment to the men, did you make a representation or 
promise that you would provide military equipment to those 




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l' individuals? 

■i 
2i A Military equipment in my opinion was clothing, 

! 

3 boots, mess equipment, packs. 

4 ' Q About the machine gun. Did you make any effort to 

5 procure or provide machine guns to these individuals? 

6 A No, sir. 

7!! Q Did you tell anybody during that trip that you 

I 

8'i would try to make such an effort? 

J 

9|j A No, sir. 

10i| Q Basically you would deny the assertion in the 

11 ' cable? i 

12;j A We never discussed weapons with anybody. From the 

13 very beginning, Adolfo Calcro made it plain. He did not want 

14 ; fighters, nor did he want weapons from the United States. 

15 I The only thing he wanted was assistance in training and 

16:1 supplies, and that was it. That's the ganc rule that we have 

17 I played with ever since. I offered, at one time, ammunition 

18 i that we had collected. They wanted to know if wc had an 
I 

19 end-user certificate. They said no; if we do not, we cannot 

20 touch it. 

21 Q When did you make that offer? 

22i A When wc was down ^^^^^^^^^At he first time, 




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Q Which would have been when? 

A January of '84. They wanted to know if wc had an 
cnd-uscr certificate. Wc said, no. Wc didn't even know whi' 
it was. They said, well, wc can't touch it. 

Q When and where and how would you have gotten that 

A Collected over years. 

Q Did you personally? 

A Yes, it was my personal stuff, yes. 

MR. SAXON: I'll give you that, have you mark it, 
if you will, as Deposition Exhibit 12. 

(Posey Exhibit 12 identified.) 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Actually, I don't think there's much of interest 
on page 2. There may not be much on page 1. 
A Okay, I read it. 

Q If you would take a look at Deposition Exhibit 12, 
which is a cable bearing the date of July 1, 1985, 




If you would look under 
paragraph number 2 on the first page regarding ^^^^^^k talk 
about cannibalizing a C-47 to keep another one airworthy it 



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states that 

to land the C-47 at 




145 

a CMA pilot was going 
c repaired." Would 



you tell us anything you know about that and what the nature 

■2 
of that would be. 

A First of all, wc didn't have no pilots down there 

at that time. Second of all, as reflected or told Doug, tha 

1 

our name was -- wc had heard, had been used by other people. 
I talked to a sergeant from the U.S. Army at Hotel Alameda. 
He said he had met 15 of our members ^^^^^^^^^^^|^| I said 
great. Tell me who our members arc. He hushed up real 
fast. 



So, first of all, you don't believe that statcmcn 



is true"! 
A 
Q 



It wasn't true on our part. 

But second you arc s ay ing^^^^^^^^^^^| could have 
made that statement and himself thought it would be true, 
because a lot of people were passing themselves off as CMA c; 
being involved with it? 

A Yes, sir, that's true. 

A That's right after this happened; we didn't have ■<. 
person down there except the ones in jail. 

MR. SAXON: If you would mark that as Deposition 



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1 Exhibit 13. 

2|| (Posey Exhibit 13 identified.) 

3ij THE WITNESS: I have read it. 

4jj BY MR. SAXON: 

5: Q If you would look at Deposition Exhibit 13, I 

6 understand you have read it? 

7.j A Yes, sir. 

I 
8 I Q If you would look at the top of page 2, this is a 

t 

9I cable with the date of April 1, 1985, in which it discusses ; 

10 I delivery that was made in that timcjframc in which it says, 

11 "Approximately three unidentified civilian military 

12 assistance personnel supported the air deliveries." 

,' -2- 

13;! To your knowledge, would you have had any people 

j 

14,1 in the southern front in that time period? 

151 A What time period is that, sir? 

I 
16| MR. JONES: April 1, '85. 

17 THE WITNESS: April 1, '85. That was about the 

18 tlBC they was arrested. 

19 BY MR. SAXON; 

Q they were made -- they wcnt^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ht h e 
22i A Yes, sir, they was down there at that time. 



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Q They were? 

A Yes, sir. They £lcw commercially down there. 

Q Do you know whit that operation might have 



invo Ived? 
A 

Q 
shipment: 



Arc we talking about the same thing? 

This cable of April 1 references the March 18 

Lin which, 

8 according to the CIA, three CMA personnel supported the air 

9 deliveries. 

lOij MR. JONES: Do you understand what he is saying, 

11 ^^^^^^^ 

12;| THE WITNESS: Yes. It's a possibility. I don't 

!l 

13' know, to be honest with you. They were down there. I don't 

14 know what they were doing at the time, because I haven't had 

I 
15:1 a chance to talk to them. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q You wouldn't have any personal knowledge of a 

ohipBcnt in that locale at that time? 

A No, sir. 

MR. SAXON: Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

(Posey Exhibit 14 identified.) 



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BY MR. SAXON: 

Q If you would, I would like to have you take a loo 
at Deposition Exhibit 14, which appears to be a memorandum t 
you dated the 24th of January, 1984, froiaj 

A Yes, sir. 

M i t h ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
that the army officer to whom you referred to earlier? 

A Yes . 

Q He says he wants to thank you for the equipment 
that you donated. Do you recall specifically with regard to 
this letter what equipment that referred to? 

A Yes, sir. We had been sending mostly web 
equipment, which would be canteens, ammo pouches. There was 
some M-16 rifle magazines, first aid equipment, odds and 
ends. There's an inventory list included over there. 

Q But nothing lethal? 

A No, Sir. 

Q He says, in his letter, and I quote, "However, I 
must remind you again that I am prohibited by U.S. public la 

IfroB acting as your agent in 
any capacity." What did you understand that to be? 

A I understood that to mcani**^ as a gofer. I would 




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1 call him up, ask him to do something like that for me. 

2 That's the way I understood it. He couldn't do anything like 

3 that for any private sector group. Since at that time, we 

4 did not have an address to send these supplies to, that's the 

5 reason we were sending them to him to give them to him. To 

6 me, I didn't consider that as an agent. Just transferring. 

7 Q It's your understanding he was making very clear 

8 the limits of his involvement or assistance? 

9 A Yes, sir. 

10 Q Let me now present to you for your examination two 

11 documents you have provided the committee, which I will label 

12 Deposition Exhibit 15 and Deposition Exhibit 16. 

13 (Posey Exhibits 15 and 16 identified.) 

14 BY MR. SAXON: 

15 Q I would ask that you look at Deposition Exhibit 

16 15, which appears to be a photocopy of three checks in 

17 sequence that are on the account of CMA in Decatur, Alabama; 

18 is that correct? 

19 A Yes, sir. 

20 Q Of particular interest to us is check number 137, 

21 dated April 20, 1985, signed by you, and it's made out to 

22 whom, sir? 

llii 




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1 A Rob Owcnji. 

2 Q Is this the Rob Owen^ about whom we have spoken 

y 

3 earlier today? 

4 A Yes, sir. 

5 Q Would you tell mc what this check was for? 

6 A This particular check here was $500 also with this 

7 check there was $500 cash that I sent. 

8 Q Explain that. 

9 A I did this because he had called me up and said 

10 that the men that were arrested in Costa Rica was needing 

11 funds to help retain the lawyer, keep the lawyer, and also to 

12 buy food. 

13 1 Q Which men was that? 

14 A That was the five North Americans, as I called 

15 them, that was arrested in Costa Rica. 

16 Q Along with two British subjects? 

17 A That was counting them. The four CMA members and 

18 ^cphcn Carr. 

19 Q About which we have already had a discussion? 

20 A Yes, sir. 

21 Q Tell us, then, what the — what you were doing 

22 writing a check on the CMA account. It was to do what with 



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regard to those men? 

A It was to help out on their lawyer and also to buy 
food for them while they was in jail. There was $1000 total, 
and I sent it by Federal Express, if I am not misxa^cn. 

Q So the Federal Express envelope had one check and 
S500 in cash? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Where did you come up with the $500 in casr. . Did 
you have that on hand? 

A Yes, sir. Really, I don't know if I had it on 
hand or cash' -^r check. 

Q Owcni was to be the intermediary. How was that 
money going to get into Central America? 

A The way I understood it from previous 
conversations with him, he had been going down there just 
about once or twice a month, so I felt like it was going to 
be hand-delivered. 

Q Fine. I would ask then that you look at what I 
have marked as Deposition Exhibit 16, which is a photocopy of 
three checks, again on the CMX account, with First State Bank 
of Decatur. We are particularly interested in check number 
167, which was written on July 2, 1985, signed by you; and 



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1 it's made out to whom? 

2 A Rob Owcr>|, sir. 

3 Q It's in the amount of $140. What was that for? 

4 A That was for food for the men in jail, because he 

5 had called mc up and said they were hungry. 

6 Q These same five individuals? 

7 A Yes. At that time that's all the money I had in 

8 there, because there was other bills I knew were coming in. 

9 So that's all I could let loose. 

10 Q To the best of your knowledge, were those the only 

11 two accounts written on the CMA account to Rob Owcni? 

y 

12 A Yes, sir. 

13 Q Was that the only money that passed from CMA — 

14 these two checks, plus the $500 cash -- is that the only 

15 money that passed from CMA to Rob Owen^,? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q Did any money pass from Rob Owen^ to CMA? 
IB A No, sir. 

19 Q I would ask you to look at Deposition Exhibit 17, 

20 which you have been kind enough to provide us again. 

21 (Posey Exhibit 17 identified.) 
22 



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1 BY MR. SAXON: 

2 Q If a photocopy of three checks on the CMA 

3 account with First State Bank of Decatur; uc are interested 

4 in check 131, written on April 4, 1985. To whom was that 

5 check made payable, sir? 

6 A Sam Hall. 

7 Q It's in the amount of $100. Can you tell us what 

8 that was for? 

9 A It says "for cash and gear." Sam Hall, when he 

10 come to us, knowing that we was broke and everything like 

11 this, he offered to send out letters to his friends to 

12 solicit funds to help him on the Miskitos down there in 

13 Central America. 

14 Q As far as you know, what was this specifically to 

15 be used for? 

16 A To help defray his expenses and costs on 

17 delivering supplies and helping out the Miskito Indians down 

18 there. 

19 Q Let me ask you to look at Deposition Exhibit 18, 

20 which, again, is a photocopy of three checks written on the 

21 CMA account. First State Bank of Decatur. We arc 

22 particularly interested in check number 144, written on May 



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1 18, 1985, in the amount of §100; and to whom is that made 

2 payable? 

3 A Also to Sam Hall. 

4 Q What would that have been for? 

5 A Same thing, where checks have been billed to us on 

6 CMA, were cither put in round figures or until he was back in 

7 the country. We would cut him a check with the money that 

8 come in. 

9 Q But this was a separate §100 amount; is that 

10 correct? 

11 A Yes, sir. 

12 Q So, in total, you gave Sam Hall §200 to help in 

13 his expenses? 

14 A Really, I didn't give it to him, because the way I 

15 looked at it, he was sending the solicitation letters out, 

16 and it was like him raising his own money; we just turned it 

17 over to him. 

18 Q Let me ask for the record, to the best of your 

19 knowledge, did any of these checks we have just looked at, 

20 and those to Rob Owen^ and to Sam Hall, go to buy arms or 

21 ammunition for the Contras? 

22 A To my knowledge, no, sir. None of it went out to 




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1 buy no arms or ammunition. 

2 Q What I would like to do now is simply ask you 

3 about some particular individuals, have you tell me what your 

4 relationship to them is, if you know them, if so, how you 

5 know them and so forth. 

6 A Okay. Could I have your copy? You might 

7 pronounce a name — I might know it some other way. 

8 Q That would save us time. 

9 With respect to each of these individuals, I will 

10 ask you if you have ever had any dealings with them. By 

11 dealings, I will mean have you met them, have you worked with 

12 them, have you taken instructions from them, have you talked 

13 to them, et cetera. So if I say dealings, that's a very 

14 broad umbrella under which I put a lot of things. And then 

15 if the answer is yes, you can expressly tell us what your 

16 dealings with them were. 

17 A All right. Okay, sir. 

18 1 Q Let me ask you if you have had any dealings with 

19 Elliot/Abrams . 

20 A No, sir. 

21 Q You have already mentioned today Joe Adams. Who 

22 is he? 



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1 A Joe Adams, his code name was Theodore. He was 

2 ! Adolfo's body guard when wc met him. 

il 

3 Q That would be Adolfo Calero? 

4 A Yes. He was his body guard. That's how wc first 

5 met him. 

6 Q Briefly, what was the nature of your continuing 
7; relations with him? 

8 A He had come to us to help supply Adolfo's body^ 

guards with things that the bodyguards needed, like 
blankets, clothes, incentives to be better body guards, 
because they had plenty of weapons. All kinds of weapons. 
We agreed to send him shirts to personalize the body guards, 
things like black shirts, black hats, things of that nature. 
It got to where he was involved in cahoots with Jack Terrell, 
and that's how he moved up in Jack Terrell's graces. 

Q Have you had any dealings with Enrique Berraudcz? 

A Yes, sir. He is the military leader of the FDN . 




Q What is the nature of your dealings with 
Mr. Bermudez? 

A I have known him since we began with the freedom 
fighters. He was one of the first individuals that we met in 








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^^^^^^H -- up "'^^^^H^l first 

2| uc went out. 

j 

3; Q Would the first time you met him have been about 

4i{ October of '84? 

5| A No, sir; it was January. 

6 Q Of -84? 

7i A Yes, sir. 

8i Q Have you had any dealings with an individual name; 

9:1 Gary Bctzncr? 

;i 

10 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

11 !i Q Have you had any dealings with a pilot named 

12i| Ronald Boy, B-o-y? 
i 

13'! A No, sir. 

14 Where do we skip to on here? 

15! MR. SAXON: Off the record. 

16|l (Discussion off the record.) 

17 I THE WITNESS: No, sir, I haven't met him, to my 

18 knowledge. 

19 BY MR. SAXON: 

20 Q Do you know an individual by the name of Robert 

21 Brown? 

22 A I know an individual by the name of Robert K. 



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Brown; yes, sir. 

Q What is the nature of your relationship with him? 
A He is the owner or editor of Soldier of Fortune 
magazine . 

Q Has he contributed to CMX? 

A Yes, sir. He gave me $3000 two years ago, and by 
the time I got home, they was — Rob was wanting us to buy 
supplies with that §3000 for the Indians, under the pretense 
that it would be reimbursed later. 

Q Has he ever been reimbursed? 

A Has he? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't know about him. I know we haven't. 

MR. JONES; I think what he was talking about was 
he had given them §3000, then they turned around and wanted 
Tom to spend that and said they would reimburse Tom. 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
MR. JONES: Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

THE WITNESS: It was at that time that we got the 
§3000. 

MR. JONES: Just tell him for the record. 



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1 THE WITNESS: Okay. At that time, wc were asking 

2 for financial assistance, you know, from anybody and 

3 everybody. Wc needed it. We talked to Rob and he told us 

4 that there was going to be a meeting in Denver, Colorado, and 

5 airplane tickets would be taken by Bob K. Brown; Bob K. Brown 

6 got myself and Sam Hall round trip tickets to Denver, 

7 Colorado. We also met General Singlaub there. That was the 

8 first time I got to meet him. 

9 Q Wc will talk about him in a moment. 

10 A Okay. 

11 Q Have you had any dealings with someone named Bruce 

12 Cameron? 

13 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

14 Q What about Frank Camper. You mentioned him. I 

15 understand he introduced you to some individuals who later 

16 1 became CMA volunteers. 

17 A Ye: 

18 Q What is your relationship to Mr. Camper? 

19 A You know the way I feel about it; I don't like 

20 him. Our understanding with Peter and Davics, that they 

21 would not have anything to do with Frank Camper, plain and 

22 simple. We didn't like the way Frank operated; we didn't 



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like the way he had collected funds and materials for the 
freedom fighters and hadn't delivered either one to them. 
Q Was CMA, or were you personally, ever involved 
with any of Mr. Camper's training camps? 
A No. 

Q Have you ever had any dealings with Vincent 
Cannistraro? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir- 
Have you ever had any dealings with Carl Channel]? 
To my knowledge, no, sir. 
What about Thomas Clines? 
To my knowledge, no, sir. 
What about Theodore Shackley? 
To my knowledge, no, sir. 



'C 



You mentioned that you have had some dealings with 



General Singlaub. Why don't you tell us about that. 

A First time 1 met General Singlaub was in Denver, 
wCs at a meeting. There was Sam, myself. General Singlaub, 
Bob K. Brown and Tom Reisner at the meeting in a hotel there 
close to the Denver airport. I don't remember the name. 
General Singlaub was wanting to know what we was wanting the 
meeting for, I was up front with him that we needed financial 





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assistance and wc could do better if we got a little help, 
plain and simple. He wanted to know how much wc needed a 
month. I said, right now, wc can get by with $1200 a month. 
Wc can double, triple our supplies. Wc lost a lot of 
supplies because wc couldn't get out there and get it. He 
didn't say yes, didn't say no. He grunted most of the time. 
But at the same time he was wanting information from us. Wc 
felt, by this time, I did, at least, that the only thing wc 
were being used for, mostly, was information. Because wc had 
a lot of friends in the FDN, wc got to see a lot, get free 
movement and everything. 

Q At this time was he held of the World 
Anticommunist League? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Did you ever get any money from him? 

A No, sir. 

Q When a shipment would go out, a flight from — let 
■O ask this, where did the flights originate with the 
material that ultimately made its way to Louisiana, Mario 
Calero would arrange for the flights. Where would it go 



out? 



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1 Q Mho paid for those flights? 

2 A I don't know. 

3 Q You didn't pay for those flights? 

4 A No, sir. 

5 Q Was there a sense that the flights went whenever 

6 the money was available? 

7 A Once the money cone the flights went pretty 

8 regular, once a week, or twice a month, two or three flights 

9 a month. 

10 Q Do you know a pilot by the name of Glen Warner? 

11 A No, sir, not to my knowledge. 

12 Q Have you had any dealings with an individual namcc 
131 Daniel Conrad? 

14 A Name sounds familiar, but I can't honestly say, 

15 sir. 

16 Q What about William Cooper? 

17 A No, sir. Only pilot I know is Frank Moss. 

18 Q Has he flown missions, if you will, for CMA? 

19 A No, sir. He flew supplies out of Kcnner for 

20 Mario, not that many, then he got sidetracked. 

21 Q What do you mean he got sidetracked? 

22 A He got stabbed in the back. Not physically. 



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2 Q Did CMA have a liaison in Miami? 

3 A Well, we did up until April of '85, and that was 

4 Jose Cotine. 

5 Q What did he do for you down there? 

6 A Nothing, really. He is supposed to do a lot, but 

7 he really didn't do anything. 

8 Q Did you ever have any dealings with Arturo Cruz or 

9 Arturo Cruz, Jr.? 

10 A No, sir. 

11 Q Not at all? 

12 A No, sir. 

13 Q Never met hia? 

14 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

15 Q Have you had any dealings with someone named Jean 

16 dc Scnarclcns? 

17 A No, sir. 

18 Q What about Mario Delamico? 

19 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

20 Q What about Robert Dutton? 

21 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

22 Q Robert Earl*. 

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1 A No, sir. 

2 Q Did Rob Owen< ever mention that Earl* was one of 

3 the people he might introduce you to? 

4 A No, sir. 

5 Q Do you know, or have you had any dealings with, 

6 Pablo Escobar? 

7 A No, sir. 

8 Q How about David Fischer? 

9 A No, sir. 

10 Q Roy Furmark? 

11 A No, sir. 

12 Q Richard Gadd? 

13 A No, sir. 

14 Q Amac Galil, also known as PerAnker Hansen? 

15 A No, sir. 

16 Q Have not? 

17 A No, sir. 

18 Q Jose Garnel? 

19 A No, sir. 

20 Q Mr. Chorbanifar? 

21 A No, sir. 

22 Q Pedro Gill? 



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No, sir. 

MR. JONES: Tom, was there somcb' 
wasn't there somebody n 
THE WITNESS: I don't think 30. 
Pedro, no. The one we were talking about !■ 
Negro Chamorro, when we were talking about ■• 
here. Go ahead, sir. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you had any dealings with N'- 
A Oh, God. Honestly, no, sir. Br. 
Nestor Sanchez's phone number when I was do- 
first time. 

Q Who was Brian Barger? 
A He was a reporter for Washington, 
who works for CBS now. West 57th Street or -• 
that. He was wanting to know what we was d'- 
Him and an individual by the name of John B • 
there, so that was like our beginning togct" 
say . 

Q Barger and Buchanan were where? 



165 

dy -- when you 
«cd Pedro? 
Felipe Vidal. 
ct night was 
nc Chamorro ' s 




Post at that time 
omething like 
ing down there. 
chanan were down 
er, you might 



Down inl 



Ithe same hot^ 



were down there talking iqjtniu the Contra: 



1 wc were. We 
and they were 




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talking for the )zfontras. 

Brian Bargcr gave me a phone number. He said th 
man can help you. When you get bade to the states, call 
him. I called him. Anyway, a colonel answers the phone, a 
I stuttered a little bit. I asked him, was this Nestor 
Sanchcz-s office. He said, yes, it was. Wanted to know wh, 
I wanted. I said, well, I wanted to help the /rccdom 
fighters and everything like that. Then he abruptly gave m. 
a certain answer that Nestor Sanchez did not want to talk tt 
me. I said I think I goofed up. He says that's enough of 
the conversation, and he says bye. That was it. Then I 
inadvertently dialed it about a year later, but as soon as ] 
heard Mr. Sanchez, I hung up. 



call? 



What would have been the time period on the first 

A Probably January or February of '84. 

Q Did you ever meet Mr. Sanchez? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you ever hear his naac come up again? 

A Other than news media, no, sir. 



Q Did you have any dealings wi 



Could I ask — if that's 

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I know him. 



Q 
A 
Q 
to you? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 



What about Donald Gregg, does Gregg mean anything 



No, 2ir. 

Roy Hagcrty? 

No, sir. 

You mentioned Sam Hall, and we have talked about 
the monies, the check, the money that went to Sam Hall. What 
was your relationship with him? 

A Sam Hall come to us as a, supposedly, a private 
American who was wanting to change his brother's vote around 
in Congress. 

Q This brother was a member of Congress? 
A Yes, sir. He tried to portray himself as a world 
renowned soldier. Freedom Fighter. And at at first I 
believed him, to be honest with you. Silver medal winner, 
Olympics, everything like that. Credentials looked pretty 
good. 

I believed him at first, until a couple of things 
happened. Then I really had my doubts about him and it 



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really was confirmed a little bit later on down the road. 

found in his briefcase, from one of his trips down there, 

|i some photos where he had supposedly been in combat, and he 

1 

I laying there with a rifle and a bayonctte sticking in him, 

I which is, you know, bull crap. The bayonctte is going in o 

way but his wound was another way. That right there 

nullified that. 

Then I started reading excerpts of his so-called 

where he is making himself out something 

where he wasn't, that was a Sambo, no racial remark 

included. This is the same time going down there, I think. 

On his second or third trip ^^^^^^^^^H wc had an individu; 

with him by the name of Bill Johnson, to keep an eye on him 

That's when we found out that Sam was going to try to start 

military operation up. 

That's when wc, also Rob Owen*, stopped him and 

pulled him out, under the pretense that he had to come back 

to the states for more information and everything like this. 

But also in this same time frame, found out that Sam had tol 

-- he had told rac that he was working for Singlaub, and that 

there were certain things that he couldn't tell me. 

Q To your knowledge, was he working for Singlaub? 



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1 A I know for a fact that Singlaub did pay him some 

2 money, wired it to him, to a baiik in - BMjfcgoi^g^V Alabama . I 

3 don't remember the same. Seems to me it was commercial 

4| credit — not commercial, but commerce bank or something like 

5 I that, community. 

6 Q v/«ouldnJ-t there have been a Hartselle, Alabama, 

7 bank involved? 

8 A Hartselle and Decatur is right together. 

9 Q But this was money for Sam Hall? 

10 A Yes, sir. 

11 Q How would it have gotten from Hartselle to Sam 

12 Hall? 

13 A Ho lived there in Decatur in a hotel and 

14 everything. It was supposedly money to pay for his expenses 

15 and everything to go down south and sec the Singlaub 

16 intelligence reports and this other stuff. 

17 Q Have you ever had any dealings with Albert Hakim? 

18 A No, sir. 

19 Q John I.W. Harper? 

20 A Pardon me? 

21 Q John I.W. Harper? 

22 A I have met the individual, yes, sir. 

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That wouldn't be lethal assistance? 
Could be. ^- UJubll dirty tricks. 



What can you tell us about him? 
I like him, he knows his business. 
What is his business? 

He is a fisherman. He owns a fishing place rigl 
out here. He was down to instruct 
Q What was that name? 

A Special forces, command operation, FDN, on the i 
of dirty tricks such as putting laxative in watermelons anc 
things like that, in order to put a lot of soldier's out of 
commission . 
Q 
A 

Q Is that the limit of your contact with him? 
A Yes, sir. Get ray tongue straight. Wc went 
together down on the same aircraft. That's how I met him. 
He was very quiet, very secretive, on what he was doing. 
Q Any dealings with Eugene Hasenfus? 
A Negative. 

Q When he was shot down, that was not a mission of" 
which CMA was a part? 
A Lord, no. 
Q Cyrus Hashemi? 

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No, sir. 

Let's talk about John Hull. 

Okay. 

Have you ever been to his ranch? 



Have you ever seen weapons stored at his ranch? 
I saw a couple of rifles. 

But beyond what might be for personal use, 
hunting, personal security, did you ever see any weapons or 
ammunition stored there? 

A No, sir, not like in volumes; no, sir. 

Q Did you ever see, while there, any operations 
involving aircraft in which the aircraft cither had loaded on 
to them, loaded off of them or had on them, while refueling, 
arms or ammunition? 

A No, sir. 

Q So in terras of that ranch, and your personal 
observation or personal knowledge, arms or ammunition of any 
size, which might have been intended for the^ontras, doesn't 
connect up? 

A No, sir, not at that time, because he had told us 
that the Costa Ricans was watching him close and everything 



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1 like that, and they had free access to come on his ranch any, 

2 time that they wanted to without getting rebuttal from him 

3 his employees. He said, hey, come check me any time you wan 

4 to, to prove that I ain't doing anything. 

5 Q Same questions with regard to drugs . Did you eva( 

6 see any drugs, illegal drugs, on his property? 

7 A No, sir. 

8 Q Do you know of any passing through, being loaded, 

9 unloaded, refuel stops? 

10 A No, sir. I never did sec the — even a refueling 

11 capability, other than small tanker right there for his smal 

12 aircraft. 

13 Q Or an individual by the name of Woody Jenkins? 

14 A I have heard of him. I have not met him. 

15 Q What were the meetings, go back to John Hull. On 

16 how many occasions would you say you were in a meeting with 

17 John Hull? 

18 A Twice. Once in Miami, or twice in Miami, the same 

19 day. One with Adolf o — 

20 Q The Howard Johnson meeting? 

21 A Yes. Then when I went to Costa Rica I saw him. 

22 Q At his ranch? 





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A Yes, sir. He picked me up from the airport. 



Q Bruce Jones we have talked about. Anything 
further to add there? 

A What do you mean? 

MR. JONES: We have talked about him during the 
deposition. Is there anything that you can think of that wc 
haven't talked about? I can't think of anything. 

THE WITNESS: Honest, I can't think of liothing. 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q For the record, have you ever had any dealings 
with Adnan Khashoggi? 

A No, sir. 

Q James McCoy? 

A No, sir. 

Q Robert McFarlane? 

A No, sir. 

Q Was McFarlane one of the individuals OwcnjJ said he 
could introduce you to? 

A No, sir; that was Spivcy. 

Q I am sorry, was McFarlane one of the individuals 
Spivcy said he could introduce you to? 



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1 A He didn't say Robert McFarlanc; he caid Bud 

2 McFarlanc. 

3 Q Okay. Any dealings with David Kimchc'; 

4 A No, sir. 

5 Q Dan Kuykcndall? 

6 A No, sir. 

7 Q Michael Lcdecn? 
81 A No, sir. 

9 Q Robert Lilac? 

10 A No, sir. 

11 Q Ron Martin? 

12 A No, sir. 

13l Q Are you familiar with him? 

14 A Uho. 

15 Q Ron Martin? 

16 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

17 Q John Mattes? 

18 A If that's Jesus Carcia's lawyer, yes, sir; I know 

19 him, I have met him. 

20 Q Any dealings with him other than having met him? 

21 A He lied to me. 

22 Q He lied to you when he said what? 




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A I went down to testify on behalf of Jesus Garcia, 

Q At his trial for the possession of the machine 



gun; 



A Yes, sir. 

MR. JONES: You were subpoenaed to testify? 

THE WITNESS; Yes, sir. He asked me would I take 
a subpoena through the mail; I said yes. I got down there, 
he said expenses would be taken care of all that other 
stuff. He didn't do it. He lied. He said they would not 
allow me to be called in Jesus Garcia's behalf because they 
would not allow Alan Saum, and that testimony about him, 
because I felt like unusual circumstances, the reason Jesus 
Garcia got in trouble, is because of Alan Saum, and this is 
the lawyer talking to me, that they wouldn't -- I didn't 
gnwwri. out until later, it was Fcldman that prosecuted, would 
not allow Alan Saum or any testimony concerning him be 
brought into the case. Then when I talked to Feldman, he 
said that John lied. He didn't try to get me in there to 
testify. That's the same trial or same date that I met 
Maxai a Honey. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever had any dealings with a gentleman 



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named Steve McMahon? 

A Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Q What about Andy Mcscing? You mentioned him thi: 
morning. Have you ever talked to him? 

A No, sir; I have heard of him. 
Q Have you ever talked to him? 

No, sir. 

Ever had any dealings with hin? 

No, sir. 

What about Richard Miller? 

To my knowledge, no, sir. 



Yes, sir, I know hia. 

What can you tell us about hia? 

He was the — still is, I think, finance raani 




Q Has he ever given you any money for any reason? 

A No, sir. I have exchanged money with him. 

Q Just in a currency exchange? 

A Yes, just currency exchange, that's it. 

Q Any dealings with George Morales? 



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1 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

2 Q Yaacov Nimrodi? 

3 A No. 

4 Q Amiram Nir? 

5 A No, sir. 

6 Q Jorge Ochoa? 

7 A No, sir. 

8 Q Rob Owen? 

9 A The Rob Owen I am talking about is 32 years old, 

10 that lost his brother in Vietnam, good looking dude. 

11 Q Do you happen to know if he went to Stanford 

12 University? 

13 A No, sir. 

14 Q Do you know if he had ever worked for Gray and 

15 Company here in Washington? 

16 A No, sir. He had told me one time he worked in 

17 Spain. 

18 Q Dana Parker we have talked about. 

19 A Yes. 

20 Q Jim Powell. Armando dc Quesada. 

21 A Yes, I know him. 

22 Q Docs he run a restaurant in Decatur? 

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1 A Yes, sir, pizza. 

2 Q Did he flee Cuba? 

3 A Yes, sir. 

4 Q Has he been a supporter of CMA? 

5 A Spiritually, yes, sir. Financially, no. His wife 

6 has gotten us a lot of medical and clothes. 

7 Q Has he put you in touch with any people in Miami? 

8 A No, sir. 

9 Q Rafael Quintcro? 

10 A No, sir. 

11 Q How about someone you might have known by the name 

12 of Chichi Quintcro? 

13l A To ray knowledge, no, sir. 

14 Q Alfonso Robclo? 

15 A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

16 Q Glen Robinctte? 

17 A No, sir. 

18 Q Rodolfo Roblcs? 

19 A No, sir. 

20 Q Felix Rodriguez? 

21 A No, sir. 

22 Q What about Max Gomez? 



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A No, sir, 

Q Never met him? 

A I saw his picture in the newspapers . Never met 



him, 



Q Never talked to him? 

A No, sir. 

Q Never had any dealings with him? 

A No, sir. 

Q Mario Sacasa? 

A Now that sounds familiar, Sacasa. I would have to 
leave that one open. Sounds familiar, but I just don't 
remember. 

Q Aristidcs Sanchez? 

A Aristides? 

Q Sure. 

A If its Aristidcs, one of the FDN directors, yes, 
sir, I know him. 

Q What is the nature of your relationship? 

A I just know him as an FDN director, because he 
doesn't speak English and I don't speak Spanish. Most of the 
rest of them do speak English. 

Q What about Bob Schcrier? 



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A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q Do you know a pilot by that name, someone who 
might have made available some aircraft, provided any 
single-engine fixed gear, tail draggcrs, for drops and 
locations that arc fairly inaccessible and remote. Doesn't 
ring a bell? 

A No. 

Adolph Schwimmcr? 

No, sir. 

Richard Secord? Any dealings? 

No, sir. 

Never met, never talked to him? 

No. Not even when he bought that airplane in 



Q 
A 

Q 
A 

Q 
A 

Decatur. 

Q Any dealings with an individual named Sarkis 
Sognhanalian? 

A Cod, no. 

Q Leonardo Sommcriba? 

A No, sir. 

Q Any dealings with Ambassador Tambs? 

A No, sir. 

Q Never met, never talked to him? 



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A No, sir. 

Q Wc have covered the other territory with regard to 

What about Michael Tolivcr? 
A To my knowledge, no, sir. 
Q He wouldn't have been involved as a pilot on any 



CMA flights you arc aware of? 
^e^4«^ 



have no flights, sir. 
All the flights would have been handled by Mario? 
Yes, sir. Only pilot wc ever had down there 

Frank Moss? 

No. Frank Moss wasn't our pilot. It was Jim 



Powell . 



Q Okay. 

Q Felipe Vidal you have mentioned. 

A Yes, sir. 

Q What else can you tell us? 

A He is an individual that fled Cuba after the 
communists put his father up against the wall and shot him 
down. He was assisting the/Freedom fighters. Also, he was 
working with John Hull on his ranch and everything. He did 



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1 not go with uc out in the field. 

2 Q Erich von Marbod. 

3 A No, sir. 

4 Q Edwin Wilson? 

5 A No, sir. 

6 Q Willard Zuckcr? 

7 A No, sir. 

8 Q Any of the individuals you have mentioned having 

9 knowledge of or dealings with, to your knowledge, were any of 

10 them involved in the shipment of lethal supplies to the 

11 Contras? 

12 A To the best of my knowledge, no, sir. 

13 MR. JONES: Can I clarify one point, again, I 

14 don't want to get in the position of testifying, but in the 

15 course of my discussions with Tom, there have been a lot of 

16 people that were described or whatever that he may have had 

17 some weird code name or that he just didn't know their name 

18 or couldn't remember their name. Those may have been some of 

19 the people, especially the Spanish people, that we mentioned, 

20 or that you just read out in a list. When he said no -- 

21 MR. SAXON: For example, we know an individual 

22 known as Felix Rodriguez, also known as Max Gomez. If I ask 



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1 you do you know gl * Milp- Rodriqucz you say no, but you may have 

2 known Max Gomez. 
li 

3 1! MR. JONES: He may have been there, he may have 

4l been in a meeting in which the name was never mentioned. 
5i THE WITNESS: I think you will see in the 

6 I testimony there was a meeting that you asked specific 

7 questions about, I do not remember their names. 

8 BY MR. SAXON: 

9 Q I am not going to go through every government and 

10 private entity listed in our subpoena, you will be pleased to 

11 know. But I do want to ask you about a couple. First a 

12 broad question. Apart from exchange of letters with the 

13 military group, which we have already gone over, apart from 

14 an aborted effort to introduce you to Colonel North or some 

15 other people. Bud McFarlane, NSC staff, apart from a letter 

16 you wrote to the CIA which was never answered, arc there any 

17 other contacts you have had with the U.S. Government which I 

18 I have omitted? You have told us about an attempt to call 

19 Nestor Sanchez which got cut short. Official contacts with 

20 the U.S. Government. 

21 A When we first got started, I contacted the State 

22 Department to find out the dos and the don'ts and all this 



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other stuff. I think their phone number is listed on one of 
the pieces of paper I gave you. Also, besides talking to the 
FBI, Customs, everybody else. You know, that should be a 
matter of record. 

Q Did you ever think that in any way you were 
working for or having the assistance of the CIA in your 
operations? 

A No, sir . 

Q Co ahead. 

A I felt like that I was or CMA was spiritually 
receiving the support of the president, and he kept asking 
for help for the ^Contras . We kept trucking along. Everybody 
else kept encouraging us. 

Q For the record, you never met with or had any 
dealings with President Reagan or Vice President Bush, did 
you? 

A No, sir; I got to sec them one time, and that's 
from a distance. 

Q I am going to name a couple of corporate entities 
and ask you if you had any dealings with or involvement with 
them. Something called ACE or Amalgamated Commercial 
Enterprises? 




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A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q CSF? 

A Could you tell me what the initials stand for, 
sir? 

Q That's all they use. 

A No, sir. 

Q EAST, Inc.? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q Eagle Aviation Services and Transportation? 

A To my knowledge, no, sir. 

Q EATSCO? 

A Aviation, I have to be honest with you, if you 
want to know about the aviation part, you need to get ahold 
of Ed Dearborn. He worked for Singlaub. He was the chief 
aviation man. He can answer most of those for you. 

Q Hyde Park Holdings? 

A No, sir. 

Q IBC? 

A No, sir. 

Q Lake Resources? 

A No, sir. 

Q Lilac Associates? 

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A No, sir. 

2 Q Orca Supply? 

3 A No, sir. 

4 Q Tell us about Operation Pegasus. 

5 A Operation Pegasus started out, realistically 

6 wasn't an operation. Pegasus was the name of the group of 

7 people that went down in November of '84 to designate 

8 equipment and supplies for this particular group that was 

9 called Pegasus. So all the supplies were marked and put on 

10 the plane — Pegasus, or Pegaso in Spanish. 

11 Q That was who? 

12 A The 10 individuals or so that went down. Also the 

13 supplies to go down and help outfit the COE. All through 

14 U.S. Customs. They will vouch for that. 

15 At the same time Jack Terrell had designed a 

16 patch, shoulder patch, with Pegasus in it. It's a round 

17 patch, had CMA/FDN, something like that. I showed it to 

18 Fcldman. That was Pegasus. Just a designation code for 

19 these supplies or any supplies that was to follow, if it had 

20 Pegasus on it, that's where it was supposed to go. That's 

21 verifiable by Customs and everybody else that was involved. 

22 Q What do you know or can tell us about Partners of 



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1 the Americas? 

2 A I am not sure. There's some individuals that was 

3 involved, but I don't remember the names of the organizations 
4 1 they represent. Arc you talking about Bill Murray, I know a 

5 little bit about what he has done. 

6 Q Which is what? 

7 A He has collected a lot of Christmas gifts for them 

8 and sent down a lot of medical supplies, yes, sir. That he 

9 has done. All his supplies went down like ours did. That 

10 was through New Orleans. 

11 Q Any dealings with Sccord Associates? 

12 A No, sir. 

13 Q Southern Air Transport. Any direct dealings that 

14 you arc aware of? 

15 A No, sir. 

16 Q Stanford Technology or any of the Stanford 

17 Technology related companies? 

18 A No, sir. 

19 Q Any of the Udall Corporate Entities, Udall 

20 Corporation, Udall Research, ct cetera? 
21 
22 



No, sir. 



Q Okay. 



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1 MR. SAXON: Tom, do you have anything? 

2 EXAMINATION 

3 BY MR. YOUNG: 

4 Q Just that you said you had been to Mr. Hull 

5 ranch one time? 

6 A Yes, sir. 

7 Q What did Mr. Hull do for the /ontras? 

8 A He told mc that he had used his airplane to fly 

9 wounded to the hospital, and he has given them a lot of 

10 food. 

11 Q Did he tell you why the Costa Ricans were watching 

12 him so closely? They didn't like that kind of activity? 

13 A No, sir. They were doing that for his own 

14 protection, because the Sandinistas were trying to kill him. 

15 Q And did Uidal work for Hull? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q But Vidal also worked for the ^fontras , he 

18 supported the Contras , helped them out. 

19 A My Cod, everybody was helping the Contras, helping 

20 them out. Terminology, please. Somebody gets a pair of blue 

21 jeans. That's helping us support the (^ontras . I don't know 
22 



exactly what iek did do, because I never did observe. I was 



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1 only there for three, four days. Two of those days was out 

2 in the field away from them altogether. Only saw John and 

3 Felipe when I went in and come out. I didn't sec them in 

4 between. 

5 Q Did you only meet General Singlaub one time? 

6 A No, sir; I met him December, excuse mc, June, May 

7 or June in Denver, then in September at the World 

8 Anticommunist League meeting inyDallas-- Fort Worth area in 

9 1985. Then I talked to him once or twice over the 

10 telephone. 

11 Q Was that to try to get support? 

12 A No, sir. He had ordered some patches for the 

13 Larry McDonald task force. That's what that was concerned 

14 about. Almost got hoodooed on that one too, because it took 

15 us three months to get the money for the son-of-a-guns . The 

16 only reason I got it, Rob Owen|, I ain't got it paid for 

17 yet. Him I have got to pay. 

18 BY MR. SAXON: 

19 Q Did you have any dealings with a woman named 

20 Barbara Studley? Docs that name ring a bell? 

21 A No, sir. 

22 MR. SAXON: I think that's probably all that I 



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1 have got. I want to thank you on behalf of the committee for 

2 your time, your candor, documents you provided, and hope that 

3 we can — anything else that you think of subject to the 

4 subpoena, you can provide us. 

5 MR. JONES: Can I talk to him for a couple of 

6 seconds? 

7 (Discussion oft the record.) 

8 MR. JONES: There were just two minor points, one 

9 he wanted to make, that he thought you might be interested in 

10 involving Singlaub and Colonel North. 

11 MR. SAXON: Okay. 

12 MR. JONES: Another aspect, you had asked him 

13 about whether he thought he was working for the CIA, which he 

14 said no. I want him to expand on that just a second. 

15 MR. SAXON: I apologize. I should have said, as I 

16 generally do, is there anything else that I failed to mention 

17 or ask you about you want to add. But those two items or any 

18 others, we will be glad to have you enlighten. 

19 THE WITNESS: I will take the last one first. I 

20 never worked for the CIA, but I felt like, myself and CMA, 

21 was part of the tcaa players, as we sec it. We talked to Rob 

22 Owen^, we was nothing but team players, looking for guidance 

t 



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and leadership in helping the ^ontras, because we didn't know 
anything. Wc was mostly mud Marines, trying to do the best 
wc could. Wc needed guidance. That's about the same time 
that General Singlaub showed up. 

Then, in the conversation in Denver, General 
Singlaub let it be known to us that he was waiting on 
communications equipment to be set up between him and Colonel 
North, where they could talk safer. He said this to me and 
Sam Hall. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Did he tell you what the nature of that equipment 
was going to be? 

A He said scramblers, sir. 

Q To your knowledge, did he ever get that equipment? 

A No, sir, because our relationship started 
deteriorating shortly thereafter real bad. 

Q What would be the time period of that 
conversation? 

A At the time I went to Denver, latter part of May, 



first part of June, sir. 
Q Of what year? 



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BY MR. YOUNG: 

Q Why did that relationship deteriorate? 

A We felt like we was being jerked around, used. 

Q By Singlaub? 

A By the whole North American network, whoever was 
involved, whoever was in charge, whoever was screwing us. He 
was doing all the work and they wasn't doing anything. Wc 
know what went into it. We know who loaded the planes, got 
out, begged, borrowed the equipment and everything, supplies, 
delivered it. Here everybody else running up here, playing, 
hobnobbing, nobody doing any work but for us. 

Q What did you think Singlaub was doing for the 



C^ontras' 
A 
at it. 



He was trying to be a PR man, but he was the pits 



BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Is it your perception he raised very much money 
Cor the dontras? 

A Yes, sir, he sure did. 

Q How much would you guesstimate? 

A Total figures, I couldn't give you an idea. I 
would have to honestly say it would have to be quite a few 



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millions of dollars, listening to him talk. 
BY MR. YOUNG: 

Q Besides Mr. Humphrey, do you know of any other 
individuals who gave him money? 

A Ellon Garwood gave him over §100,000. She bought 
the helicopter that went down, and also $50,000 just to buy 
boots . 

Q What was that name again? 

A Ellen Garwood from Texas. 
BY MR. SAXON; 

Q Did you have any dealings with her? 

A No, I saw her at the Uorld Anticommunist meeting, 
but I never got to talk to her. 

Q Did she ever tell you about any money she was 
giving to the Channcll-Miller group raising money for the 
Contras? 

A No, sir. First I heard of that, I think, was a 
couple weeks ago. The way I understood it, all of her 
funding went through General Singlaub, World Anticommunist 
League. 

Q Did she ever make a comaent about having been 
given a laundry list? These are the things the Qontras need. 



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1 that would have included arms and munitions? 

2 A I might have said I talked to her, but I did not 

3 talk to her. She was at the League meeting and she gave a 

4 speech. 

5 Q In terms of face to face you never got to know 

6 her . 

7 A No, sir, I don't think I ever shook her hand. It 

8 was carefully screened to keep us away from the news media 

9 and other important people at the meeting. They put us on 

10 security and kept us away from everybody else. 

11 Q Did General Singlaub ever talk to you about 

12 assisting him in finding any retired military people to do 

13 operations, logistics or various other functions for the 

14 private supply network? 

15 A No, sir, he made it very plain, very simple, real 

16 fast, he didn't care for Marines in his life with army 

17 officers. Like I said, our relationship deteriorated real 

18 fast. 

19 Q Is there a second item? 

20 MR. JONES: That was the two. Working for CIA and 

21 then he wanted to mention that about the scrambler that 
22 



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1 BY MR. SAXON: 

2 Q Two final things. One, on any of the trips that 

3 you took to Central America, you made it very clear you were 

4 not involved, as far as you know, with maybe one exception 

5 you gave, very limited, no one in CMA was involved in 

6 shipping lethal supplies. Did you ever see anybody outside 

7 of the CMA organization but who would be part of sort of a 

8 private supply network, who was involved in shipping arms to 

9 the (tontras? 

10 A I want to answer that in two segments. First of 

11 -ill, a weapon that shoots one time to provide food for the 

12 human body to survive and exist on, I don't consider lethal 

13 aid. I figure it's humanitarian health aid to help somebody 

14 cat, because I knew what they had, they didn't have 

15 anything. I want to clarify that. 

16 As for the part of anybody else sending any 

17 weapons down, other than the ones I have mentioned in this 

18 testimony, no, sir, I have not. 

19 Q Final question. Again, for the record, with the 

20 exception of your attorney, that relationship is special and 

21 would be appropriate, has anybody tried to coach you or tell 

22 you what to say or not to say, areas to avoid, things to 



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1 avoid, in your statements to us today? 

2 A I talked to Rob Owcn^ last Thursday or Friday, and 

3 he said tell the truth. You have nothing to worry about. I 

4 said okay. 

5 Q That's the only other individual other than your 

6 lawyer with whom -- you may have talked to somebody -- 

7 A I have talked to everybody. Nobody has tried to 

8 coach me. Nobody has come to me to tell anything or say 

9 anything any particular way. Only thing that has ever gone 

10 on is we are going to tell the truth. That's what I have 

11 instructed ray people to do, Mr. Feldman, everything down 

12 there, when they go to testify, tell the truth and we don't 

13 have nothing to worry about. 

14 MR. SAXON: Anything else? 

15 MR. JONES: That's all, John. Thank you. 

16 BY MR. SAXON: 

17 Q Let me simply ask you, if you think of anything 

18 that you have forgotten or come across something we ought to 

19 know, let us do it informally. Have your lawyer to talk to 

20 us. 

21 A I would like to have you look at that letter from 

22 Peter Clibbery, because it verifies a lot of the things I 



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talked about. Living conditions and things. 

MR. SAXON: Thank you very nuch. 

(Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the deposition wa: 
concluded. ) 



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I, WENDY S. COX ^ the officer before 

whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby 
certify tt^at the witness whose testimony appeeurs in the 
foregoing deposition wets duly sworn by ne; that the 
testimony of said witness was taken in shorthand and 
thereafter reduced to typewriting by ae or under my 
direction; that said deposition is a true record of the 
testimony given by said witness; that Z am neither counsel 
for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to* 
the action in which this deposition was taken; and, further, 
tha': ~ am not a relative or employee of any attorney or 
coui employed by the parties hereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 



Notary Public in euid for the 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



My Conmission Expires 
November 14, 19 87 



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3AC INTER^.■AT:C^.'AL 3ANK 
Presente . 



Estimadcs ser.ores; 



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undct provisions of E,0 12356 
. by K Johnson, National Security Council 





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/ (j At'.* ^i. 

Froa: SSWRP --CPUA ||ilA| A A A i^l ^M^^^'"^ 08/ 16/86 09 :0i ; 12 

To- SSRLE --CPLA 



UNCLASSfflED' 



NOTE FROM; BOB PEARSON 
Subiect: Civilian Military Assistance for the Contras 
***' Forwarding note from NSPWH --CPUA 03/15/86 18:56 *** 
To: SSWR --CPUA NSOLN --CPL'A 

NSRFB --CPL'A 

SOTt FROM: PAUL W. HANLEY 

SL5.TCT: Civilian Military Assistance for the Contras 

Ton Shields of the TucsonSun is doing an article on groups 
outside the USG which provide assistance to the Contras. 

He attended the last convention, in Memphis, of Civilian 
Material Assistance, a private group foroed 3 years ago 
to provide non-lethal supplies (medical equipment, e.g.) 
to the Contras. CMA ante'd $4 to 5 mil last year. He 
mentioned other organizations like the Council for World 
Freedom, and in particular a retired USMC general nomine 
SCHMUCK from Wyoming who reportedly put together a report 
based on his first-hand observation of Nicaragua which 
served as the incubus for the request for the SlOO mil 
aid package. 

Shields would like to know what non-goverrunental organizations 

are providing aid to the Contras, what kind of aid are 
they providing, and how does 01 lie North coordinate it all? 

He points out that there is collateral interest in CMA in 
his neck of the woods because there was an incident last 
year in which some CMA folk held some illegal immigrants 
"in custody" for a few hours for reasons which never seemed 
very clear to Shields. The incident took place near Tucson. 

Would appreciate some ammo. 

Tha.-.ks . 

cc: VSVRP --CPUA 



njilijlli Oeclassified/Reieasea on Z-'^ JftiO flR 
under orovisions of E 12356 
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Lt. Colonel Oliver North 
NSC 

OEOB 392 
Washington, D.C. 

Ollie: 




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FR and I had 3 discussion and came up with several things that could 
prove to be helpful and necessary: 

o Security ia very lax both in regards to their screening of 
people and th«ir plans. To cut down on the potential loss 
of information and to find plants it would b« wise to find 
a Spanish speaking polygraph operator who could flutter those 
who have access and those who will b« put under FR's care. 
If possible, this should be done at th« bare minimum, especially 
in the short term. 

The longterm view would b« to bring someone in for a short 
time to establish a program and train sa« people. The cost 
of the investment is well worth it, especially in regards 
to FR's project. 

o It would b« good to find a retired hand who could spend 
smmetime down there and set up a program for security and 
counterintelligence. By training the people, organizing 
them and boxing them, a system is in place and a core group 
of people will exist. 

o Because the nuinbers have grown so rapidly and there is little 
in the way of a system for personnel screening, intelligence 
gathering on who has joined and what they may Xnow, would 
it be feasible to purchase a couple small portable computers 
and have written special programs for them? 3 specific pro- 
grams come to mind: intelligence, personnel, and logistics. 

Personnel program : would have such information as name, d.o.b., 
birthplace, areas familiar with, expertise, trade, possibly 
who he trusts- axxd who he doesn't trust, where family members 
may work in a city or town and so forth. This information 
will be helpful for intelligence purposes and for future 
record* if and when they are successful. A picture I.O. could 
then be issued and cross referenced by number. 

Intelligence program ; Used for targets and info on them as 
well as people wtoo could be helpful. In-house Intel Keeping. 

Logistics program : Save a lot of tine and effort as to where 
things are and where things shaild go. Could also be used 
to Keep track of financing and cash flow. 











204 



North ^.l~"t„ '~^ ^ 6 38 7 

.January 27, 1985 L' S •? ' "~ ' ' - •• • ■•' .'.'1 

o P3v«opa expert: It might b« a good idea to find a retired 
•xp«rt in this field to put together a potential program 
to b« used as things heat-up. The person probably would not 
even have to go down as long as he was fed all the necessarv 
information to put together a game plan.wfcch looJted to th» 
future 3 to 6 months. 

® Conmunic ations. Conwand and Control locations ; FR would like 
some info on the above if possible. Ideally it would include 
locations and primary and secondary targets, both military 
and civilian. If mam towers or trananitters could be taraeteH 
It would save having to hit repeaters or secondary sources! 

Do you want me to go south to watch over Spivey? 

Another concern is security ir|Hfor the meeting. Putting them all 
together maXes a very inviting target. 

All the best; 

P.S. Posey 13 sending 4 people taH|to help with training. They're 
supposed to leave on Tuesday, January 27. 1985. Do you want 
them to hold off on going until after the meeting? 

'■'■'' tJ^mg'^to liT/:j.l°'"^ ^^'^'""^ ^" Talahasse and he has people 
nee?s':n^ther°^u%^ref:'"' '° """ "^^ ""^^' ^--^-<^W 

tf ^*H ''^"''^ ^° ^*'' Cambodians. Laotians and Vietnamese 
to go down as trainers . to make it an intemationai^rce. 

working with traSai! ^^^BBB ^' 3°^"^ " be 




^'i^j/stij 






205 



r 




- UNCU$$inElh> 

D E? A-RT-M-ENT- Of— TH| -T WAS U R Y 
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE 

wasminCTOn C 2022* 



t'< 






Partially Oeclassitied/Rele.iseC in llt'cSS S 
undef provrsior.i o, f ci ;33t6 
by K Johnson. Nat,or.il 'u.:-yuf Coiiticil 



Mr. Ralph 0. Martin 
Department of Justice 
315 9tn Street, N.w. 
Public Integrity Attorney 
Washington, D.C. 20530 



NOV 1 4 'S35 



:; 1 c : 5 6 



ENr-l-C3-E:0E:S:M RGL 



'^r^'l 



Pa".ally0edass,hed/n,te3sedon,21J3^88 
^V^^o.„son,v,,„„,sl:^^^ 



Dear Mr. Martin: 

This is to confirm our telephone conversation of November 
10, 1986, regarding the results of our initial inquiry into U.S., 
Customs Service criminal investigations of alleged violations of 
the Arms Export Control Act and the Nicaragua Sanctions as they -' 
relate to certain persons identified in Senator Kerry's report. 

As explained, tire data prgvided in Senator Kerry's report 
was cross checked with the criminal indices of the Treasury 
Enforcement Communications System (TECS), and Headquarters files. 
In addition, Customs Offices of Enforcement in Miami and Atlanta 
were contacted. For your information TECS records are inoexed 
by name and other identifying data. TECS query of the names 
furnished, resulted in 21 matches. There were, however, numerous 
instances in which matches could not be refined as there were too 
many records in the universe. For example, the name John Hull 
resulted in 293 possible matches. Consequently, without further 
identifying data we are not able to determine if a record exists 
for some of the persons named. 



Regar 
violation 
Transport 
aircraft, 
investigat 
ceterminat 
matter has 
Munitions 
t^e Specia 
Miani, Fl: 
scssible v 
A.ienanent . 
ycur cues: 
Cijstoms hi 
was sold 2 
Southern A 



ding the Customs 
of the Arms Expc 
in their expcrta 
th« Special Agen 
icn into the mat 
ion as to the li 
been referred t 
Control. This i 
1 Agent in Charg 
rida, who has as 
iclstions of the 
'he r=I thersf 
icn regsrSing cw 
s , however , Ceta 
y Dean Heliccpte 
ir Transpcrt act 



investigation into a 
rt Control Act by Sou 
tion to Central, Ameri 
t in Charge, Miami, h 
ter. The investigati 
censability of the ai 
the Department of S 
nvestigation is being 
e, Feoeral Bureau of 
suned inves" igative J 

Neutrality statutes 
ors would best be abl 
nership and financing 
rmined that the aircr 
r in March 1986, for 
en behalf of Udal 




n alleged 
thern Air 
ca of a C-12 
as initiated 
on hinges on 
rcraft, and 
tate. Office 

conducted w 
Investigatio 
urisdiction 
ana the Sola 
e to resDcnc 

of the aire 
si't in ques: 
«i-5,CCC, to 
Resesroh : 



3 

an 
a 

this 
of 
ith 
n , 

ever 
nc 



206 



7 



UNCUSSIHED 



There, have been multiple investicatlon s of Thcmas P osev arc 
the Civilian Milit ary Assistance group. ^ftBB^BHH 

Some of those investigations that w«re €ict%fl 
had Deen referfed^to the appropriate U.S. Attorneys who* a^criinetf 
prosecution. Revle* of these closed cases revealed that in one 
instance Thomas Posey had exchanged let ters with U.S. military 

personnel assigned to our EmOassies 

In his communications, Posey sought "guidance in making donations" 
to the Contras. 

The open investigation of Posey and others is being 
conducted Jointly by our Special Agent in Charge, Miami, and the 
Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Miami. 
As in the Southern Air investigation, Customs has the lead in 
investigating any potential violations of the Arms Export Contrcl 
Act, and the TBI has investigative Jurisdiction over possible 
violations of the Neutrality Act and other statutes. This 
investigation has been referred to the U.S. Attorney, Southern 
District of Florida, for prosecution, if warranted. 

Our Resident Agent in Charge, Atlanta, has recently 
Initiated an investigation into possible violations of the U.S-. 
Export laws by Maule Aircraft Corp. It is alleged that Maule has 
exported to Honduras short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft 
without the requisite licenses. This matter has been referred to 
the U.S. Attorney's Office, Macon, Georgia. Grand Jury action in 
this case is contemplated. Of note is the fact that Major 
General Richard Secord, U.S. Air Force, Retired, is allegedly 
involved in these transactions. 

Finally, we identified only one Instance in which a Customs 
office reported an allegation that U.S. Government Officials were 
funnellng funds to the Contras. The report of investigation 
contained an unsubstantiated allegation that unnamed Central 
Intelligence Agency employees are passing funds to General 
Singlaub, USA, Retired, for use in acquiring material for the 
Contras . 

v;e are in the process of obtaining the data you requested in 
our conversation: the identity of the various AUSA'S handling 
these cases; the reports regarding Generals Singlaub and Secord; 
and whethtr if in the Southern Air Transport investigation, 
Customs uncovers any evidence indicative of high level government 
official involvement. This information will be forwarded to you 
in the near future. 





207 



y/jy/s7 N 15:19 

uary 19, 1987 f' ^ 



January 



MEMORANDUM TO FILE 

SUBJECT: IRANIAN/COtlTnA :iATTtR 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Paftlally C. 
byK. Jotinsoi, jaio.u iec..;i' iiu 



On January 15, 1987, special agent Michael i^^ussell and 
ayself interviewed Assistant United States Attorneys' Jeffrey 
"eldman and Ana Barnett, Miami, Florida in their office. This 
meeting followed one where Feldman introduced me to Leon 
:<ellner, the United States Attorney, ICellner's counsel was 
present. After explaining the purpose of ay visit, Kellner 
told Feldman to cooperate in any way he can with of course 
protecting grand jury information. 



At the meeting with Feldman and B 
had the investigation of Civilian Mil 
its owner Tom Posey. Other potential 
Owens and the Calero brothers. John 
in Costa Rica is also a potential wit 
or 3, 1985, Feldman went to Costa Ric 
Initially, it appeared that Hull woul 
Hull was advised, to Feldmans amazeme 
American Embassy there not to coopera 
work for Owens who Feldman believes i 
Oliver :iorth. 



arnett, Feldman said he 
itary Assistance (CMA) and 

subjects included Robert 
Hull, an American rancher 
ness/subject. On April 2 

to interview Hull, 
d cooperate. However, 
nt, by counsel in the 
te. Hull is belived to 
s the direct link to LTC 



Feldman said that a Steven Carr, deceased, who was from 
l^aples, Florida had told him_ that he sa w Owens, Posey, and 
others fly 6 tons of arms HB^^HH^I^^'^ '^^^ Contras in early 
1985. Feldman says that tn^evidence he has gathered to date 
indicates that it was more likely that only a small shipment of 
arms were sent. The arms included a single mortar and some 
small arms. The Contras believe that Carr was murdered, but 
according to Feldman, Carr, a known drug addict, died of a drug 
overdose. 

Feldman said that an Englishman by the name of Peter 
Glibbery is presently in a jail in Costa Rica for violating 
that country's neutrality laws. Glibbery was attempting to aid 
the Contra*. Glibber/ said that Hull had told him that he had 
received Jl0,000 from Uorth to aid the Contras. Feldman said 
there is no proof of such. 



Feldman said that his information is that Adolf Calero laet 



in Miami with Posey, Owens, et al to set up a southern front 
against the Sandinistas. A conflict presently exists as to 
what was discussed at tl;e meeting. One wit.iess said that the 
discussion involved the killi.ng of Pastora. \ second witness 
said they simply discussed the shipping of supplies to the 
'"ontras. 




Pan;ally DeclassiliM.'Released nn zqi^>J 88 
under D'ovisions ol E 12356 
by K JoHnson National Secutity Council 



UNCLASSIFIED «6P//^7 



208 



r 



J 



uNWSsm 



reldman _3aid he plans to subpeona the bank account and 
telephone toll records of Owens, who is 32 years old and lives 
at 1028 3l3t Street :;w, '.Washington, D.C. Feldman said that one 
source believes Owens works for the CIA. He said that Owens 
has received paychecks from the State Department, specifically 
the UNHO since sometime in 1985 for assisting that office in 
the Contra effort. Feldman said they found checks going from 
Posey to Owens. Posey claims he was only involved in obtaining 
humanitarian type supplies for the Contras. 

Feldman said that as part of the same investigation he is 
looking into the matter of three separate shipments of 16, 000 
1.S of 7.6 2 ammunitions in November, 1985 going from Miami^^^^ 
If or the Contras. The ammunition originally came from 
Feldman could not explain why it would have been 
"shipped to Miami first. 

Feldman said that the first 2 shipments went without any 
interference on the part of U.S. Customs. Customs did stop the 
3rd shipment and it was delayed for some time until an 
unidentified man from Washington O.C. came to Miami and got 
Customs to release it. 

Feldman said this investigation may cone under the umbrella 
of the Special Prosecutor as may the case against Southern Air 
Transport. He does not know aucb about the latter case. 

On 
saw the 
CIA Sta 
sent ba 
the Con 
Richard 
the Con 
April 1 



January 16, 1987, I called Fe 

article in the Miami Herald 
tion Chief in Costa Rica was 
ck to the j.S. for aiding pri 
tras and for directly communi 
Secord during the time when 
tras. Feldman said he wasn't 
985 when he was in Costa Rica 
^^B^HHI^^H^^^m^^H knew 
Feldman was the enemyT^reldman beli 
the Contras personally and knows who 



Idman and asked him if he 
which indicates that the 
relieved of his duties and 
vate organizations to aid 
eating with LTC North and 
the Agency was not to aid 
surprised. tie said in ^^ 
he interviewed the iian,^| 
and north and acte d as 
eves that^^^lHMHaided 
else aide 



Feldman said h« would call if he receives any information 
which he b«lieves could help us. 




mmm 



209 




iil 

• » ^ as 



U/4 



/12/86 1200 



l^m 



D 



/2 /^p/^/*^ 




1030 hours local April 12. Per UNO South Forct, "drop 
succesiJully completed in 15 minutei. Force requested to send 
full report/ invflr.toi-y. when told,^^^^^lmost cried in 
grateful appreciation. Our plane during next 2-3 weeks includes 

d r o p^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I 
maritime deliveries NHXO supplies to same, NHAO air drop to UNO 
South, but w/ certified air worthy aircraft, lethal drop to UNO 
South ,^^^^Hvis it to UNO South Force with photogs, UNO 
newspaper^, cap s and shirts, ard transfer of CP UNO/FKilN recruits 
^^H^^^^^^^^^Hcarrying all remaining cached lethal 
to join UNO South Force. My objective is creation of 2,500 man 
force which can strike northwest and linJc-up with quiche to form 
solid southern force. Likewise, envisage formidable opposition 
on Atlantic Coast resupplied at or by sea. Realize this may be 
overly ambitious planning but with your help, believe we can pull 
it off. 




New subject. AFP story appeared in morning papez^^^^^^^^Kon 
U.S. attorney south Florida investigation arms, drugs traffic 
involving insurgents and U.S. sympathisizers. Terrell, C.MA 
na med. Focu s on Mar 1985 shipment ft. Lauderdal* 
via 




New subject. Ref Cruz split. v;hy not offer Cruz provisional- 
presidency in secret agreement signed by principals? 
Regards, DV. BT 




210 



MEMORANDUM f« 
SUBJECT /OCl'l 




CLiSSSiFIED 



:ep-.e-tcr )98« 



- - r.; F.;:!Stry ' 



84. 91! 



«72 



'Itirening Meeting with Bud McFarlane 



11 In attendance were Bud McFarlane, the DCI and OOCI. 




'm 






PariiaNy Oeciassitied/Releassd on f^ ^ fi<o 8H 
uncict provisions of E 12356 
tiy K Johnson. Nalional Security Council 



^SCf 



7. The DCI then indicated that Posey has indeed written tf^ the Agency 

seeking help in contacting the "good guys" in Central America but tJM.W 
we had had no dealings with the man. That information has be^ ctwij ~" 
to Justice. 




Cl//^)W9 



an 

Dca' 



Siari£i:_ 

UMUR 



211 



Attachment 
As Stated 





C 4573 




cc: ES 

EA/DCI 

EA/OOCI 

EXDIR 

001 

000 

ER 



ciw/a? 





r^Ji v'A f 



212 



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i P,9e C ' ^^^/ ^^^^ ^^/^^ 



p/tfe 



Qoff^^ /o> ^v ?ry 



^a//SD /a) 



/o /(^U 




213 




I J IM'.^'-I/) 



214 



uriA^iFiED 




IPOSSIBLY PARTICIPATE IN * 

[RIAL COttPAICN FOR SUPPORT Of 
CADSGV^ilWAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT 
mo JkLSO PARTICIPATE IN THE WIAHI SUPPORT 




3952 



7. FILE: 
U-e2. ALL secret: 
END OF MESSAGE 



SECRET 



l5/oJ{^ 



l^ 




s^^'^ 



48466 

ItWtO fOH»Ktu.Ait CsJ-^ 

Pit ^j(^n 



^ 



SSC^ 



215 



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(liJn>i5is' 



IINCfiKSlFlfn 









216 



i fft<^^ C- 3^-7^ cuN^/^/^ 



^aJ/SV /^ 



I' 



'To i(^L^ 



217 




218 




219 



X 



Pff^^ 



C'O'^Hl 



^aJ/bV jJ 



aT/^/- 



220 



221 



UNCUSSIFIEDl^ 



-?< 



'o'i'=^ 







( - 



24 Jan 1984. 



MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Thomas V. Posey 

SUBJECT Attached Letter. 

Dear Mr. Posey: 

I am sorry that I have been slow notifying you 
that your donated equi pment has been arriving 
and gr eatly appreciate<^mm||Hm^^m 
Any future contibutions, also, would 
e appreciated. 

However, I must remind you again that I am 

by ^^" ^^m^^^l^^^^l 

from acting as your agent in any capacity. 

If we may be of further assistance please 
don't hesitate to contact us. 



Sincerely, 




Partially Oectass/fted/Releascd on 2'lJMioeo 

under proviswns at E 12356 

"V'^MnscnNa.onalSecon^'^.nc.l 




*W«/f© 



222 



223 



TLNOGRAPHIC MTNLTES 
(jnrevised and Unedited 
Not for QaoUtion or 
Duplication 




HS»TS-2£l2-/«7 



DEPOSITION OF GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL 
Friday, June 19, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee on Investigate Covert 
Arms Transactions with Iran, 



Committee Hearings 

of the 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



Hartially Decla5SJfied7iW*S<i m3£^Julu^ 

wiii 'prov!sio* ot Ut I^ 

by 3. RKir. IlaMal Securtty CcunW 





OFHCE OF THE CLERK 
Office of Official R« 





aaet ncx. 






-COPtfS 



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DEPOSITION OF GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL 

Friday, June 19, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee on Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a.m., 
in the Situation Room, The White House, with Joseph 
Saba presiding. 

On behalf of the House Select Committee: Joseph Saba, 
Roger Kreuzer, Robert Genzman, Tina Westby, and Bert Hammond. 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Arthur 
Liman and John Saxon. 

On behalf of the Witness: C. Dean McGrath, Jr., Associate 
Counsel to the President; and Nicholas Rostow, Deputy Legal 
Adviser, National Security Council 






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2 

Whereupon, 

GENEFIAL COLIN L. POWELL 
having" been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows : 

THE WITNESS: Let me express my appreciation 
for your coming down here. I can see the inconvenience I've 
caused you. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Good morning, sir. 

Would you please state your name, current position 
and when you assumed your current position. 

A Colin L. Powell, Deputy Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs. I assumed my present 
position on the 2nd of January 1987. 

Q Would you please state your previous position, the 
time you held that position and a brief description of your 
duties. 

A From June of 1987 until I assumed my present 
position, I was the Commanding General of the 5th United 
States Corps, Frankfurt, West Germany, commander of 72,000 
American soldiers. I'm sorry, June 1986 to January 1987. 

Q And prior to that, sir? 

A Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, from July of 1983 until March 

- HUM hQQiUlU 



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of 1986. 

Q Sir, can you tell us the first time you became 
aware af what we call an Iran Initiative? And I will 
direct your attention to the period of June 1985. 

A Sometime during that general period that you 
described as June 1985 — and I cannot be any more precise 
than that -- I beca.-.e aware that there was something being 
discussed called the Iran Initiative. 

Q All right, sir, 

I show you a document which we'll mark exhibit 
1 for the record and give you a moment to look at it. 

(Exhibit No. CP 1 was marked for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Do you recognize the first page, sir? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q For the record, the first page is a copy of 
handwritten notes on a notepad stating "Office of the Secretary 
of Defense," and can you briefly tell us, sir, about the 
circumstances of this note. 

A The note is a note from me to the Secreary of 
Defense, and I think the note is self-explanatory. The 
document was provided to me — I can't say, almost two years 
hence, whether it came in by courier or whether it came into 



uifiii£cisa£ii 



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the regular system, but apparently it came in sufficiently 
controlled that I handled it in a controlled manner, very 
controlled manner and provided it to the Secretary, as 
indicated in this note "Eyes Only," and I think the rest of 
the note concerning my comment to the Secretary and then his 
marginal note back to me , I think is self-explanatory, and 
then you can see from the typewritten note next under, which 
is our typical fashion, I then passed it up to the policy 
people. 

Q And I take it you passed it to Assistant Secretary 
Richard Armitage.' 

A My note shows that it was passed to USDP , which 
would have been Dr. Ikle, and ASDISA, who was Mr. Richard 
Armitage, with a copy to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

Whether all three of those gentlemen actually saw 
it -- I know Mr. Armitage saw it, but whether Dr. Ikle saw 
it -- and I assume Mr. Tafe, who was the DEPSECDEF at that 
time saw it if it was addressed to him. 

Q And I take it that a draft response was prepared 
by Mr. Armitage? 

A Yes. 

Q And do you recall if that response was seen and 
passed on by the Secretary of Defense? 

A My recollection is it was seen, concurred in and 
approved and passed on by the Secretary oi^ Defense. 



228 



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'00Mt: 



Q" Sir, do you recall any briefing, whether of yourself 
or Secretary of Defense or both of you, by Robert McFarlane 
in the -time period of July 1985, concerning a meeting 
Mr. McFarlane may have had with a Mr. Kimche? 

A Yes. I recall a meeting that the Secretary and I 
had with Mr. McFarlane. I can't be precise at all about 
the dates and I don't recall that it was directly related 
to a meeting or a conversation that Mr. McFarlane had with 
Mr. Kimche, but it was on this subject. 

Q Do you recall generally what Mr. McFarlane told 
you? 

A My recollection is that Mr. McFarlane described 
to the Secretary the so-called Iran Initiative and he gave 
to the Secretary a sort of a history of how we got where 
we were that particular day and some of the thinking that 
gave rise to the possibility of going forward with such an 
initiative and what the purposes of such an initiative would 
be. 

Q Were you present, sir, at that briefing? 

A Yes. 

Q And do you recall if, in the description of that 
initiative, Mr. McFarlane indicated that part of that 
initiative would be the provision by the United States of 
weapons to Iran? 

A To the best of my recollection, yes. 



229 



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ttET 



Q' Did he also discuss the provision of weapons by 
Israel to Iran? 

A- I don't recall specifically. I just don't recall. 

Q Do you recall the Secretary's response to 
Mr. McFarlane's briefing? 

A My recollection is the Secretary was negative. 

Q Did he express that at that time to Mr. McFarlane? 

A My recollection is that he did. 

Q Can you recall for us how that conversation went? 
Was this a "I don't like it," or did the Secretary raise 
specific objections? 

A To the best of my recollection, the Secretary 
was questioning of the purposes and -- behind the initiative 
and he asked Mr. McFarlane questions about it, which 
indicated that he was disinclined to think this was a useful 
endeavor. Whether, at the end of that meeting, he said 
"No, I'm against it," or just the meeting concluded on a 
negative note, I don't specifically recall. But my 
recollection is clear that the Secretary was not inclined to 
be favorable toward the initiative. 

Q Were specific weapons discussed at this meeting? 

A I don't recall if specific weapons were discussed 
at the meeting. 

Q By any chance, do you recall if TOWS or Hawks or 
Hawk systems or parts — 

» *% i J . ^ ■ T < 



_M^^L 



-^ iu_ 



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«]S^^ 



A' Not at that particular meeting. I don't recall if 
we got to the level of discussing specif ic weapons. My 
recollection is that Mr. McFarlane laid out what the 
President's -- or the Administration's objective might be 
with respect to a relationship with Iran and perhaps that 
somehow leading to some solution to the hostage problem. 

Q So the issue of hostages arose during i.his 
meeting? 

A Yes. 

Q And was the issue of hostages and weapons linked 
in any way in that discussion? 

A I cannot recall specifically. 

Q Do you recall if this discussion took place here 
at the White House or at the Pentagon? 

A It was at the Pentagon. 

Q Was the briefing at Mr. McFarlane' initiative? 

A Yes. My recollection is that Mr. McFarlane asked 
to see the Secretary. 

Q Do you recall if any memoranda of that briefing 
were kept following the briefing? 

A There were none on our side. 

Q Do you recall any conversations with the Secretary 
following the briefing by Mr. McFarlane on the subject of the 
briefing? 

A I cannot recall specifically, although I know that 

• '. ■ c-'i"fi '-^• 

■ ■■ ^ :. .,■ ;.'"//"^.!l,'*':''s^ 

.■ A ■••4 •-. ii ■'■>: \ >-* U '-^^ 



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TOMjj^SJJ 



over the course of the next several months, the Secretary had 
occasion to discuss it with Mr. McFarlane, but I can't tell 
you exactly when it was. 

Q Did Mr. McFarlane provide the Secretary or yourself 
with any papers in connection with that briefing? 

A Not that I recall. 

Q Sir, there was a meeting on August 8 at the White 
House on the subject, among other things, of the Iran 
Initiative. Do you recall conversations with the Secretary 
of Defense by way of briefing or in preparation for that 
White House meeting? And to assist in your memory, the 
President has been in the hospital briefly; he has just 
returned. The period is probably a weekend and the Iran 
Initiative is one of the subjects. 

A Not that I can recall. 

Q Do you recall following that date having discussions 
in that early August period with the Secretary concerning 
that meeting or the Iran Initiative, again focusing just 
on August? 

A Not that I can recall. Focusing just on August. 

Q Did the Secretary of Defense tell you at that 
time that he or anyone had given an assent to a transfer 
of arms to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Did he indicate to you at this time, and I'm looking 



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at August-September period at the moment, that the arms were 
moving from anyone to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Did he indicate specifically that he had information 
that there may be or was a transfer of arms from Israel to 
Iran? 

A No. 

Q Did anyone mention to you, subsequent to August 
8, 1985, and we'll take it now through the period November 
1, 1986, that arms had been transferred in the period of 
August-September and again in November 1985 to Iran? 

A At some point, I became aware that Hawks had been 
moved to Iran from Israel and, of course, I was well aware 
by sometime in early '86 that TOWS had moved from Israel to 
Iran before we had transferred TOWS for alternate 
destination to Iran, but I cannot tell you specifically when 
I became aware of those two pieces of information or how. 

Q Do you recall in a general way, sir, when you came 
to know of this — would this be in the calendar year 1985? 

A To the best of my recollection, it would have been 
in calendar year 1986. My basis for saying that with respect 
to the TOWS is that the first clear memory I have that I was 
aware of it -- something had gone from Israel to Iran with 
respect to TOWS is when I knew we had to add another 500 
to the order. That's when it clicked. 






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Whether I had some knowledge of it before that 

particular fact, I simply cannot recall. It just -- I just 

cannot "recall , but from that point on, sometime late January 

' 86 when I knew that there was a requirement for another 

500 and knew what that requirement was for. Then I can 

track it back to that data level. 

Q And Hawks, when did you first come to know of a 

1985 transfer of Hawks? 

A That I simply cannot recall. I think it was '86, 

not '85, and I simply don't remember how I finally learned 

of it, whether it was after they had been returned or -- I 

just don't recall. 

Q Do you recall, sir, any information that came to 

your attention concerning an eventual release of the hostage, 

Benjamin Weir? 

A No, other than the fact that he had been released, 

out I was not -- 

Q In connection with that release, do you recall any 

information in any way linking the concept of a transfer of 

arms and Mr. Weir's release? 

Mr. McGRATH: Could you state when he was released? 

MR. LIMAN: He was released in September of 1985. 

BY MR. SABA: 

Q September 1985. 

A No, I havgijQo recollection of that, 
f 



ife.no recollection of th; 



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Q Sir, moving on a little bit in our calendar, do 
/ou recall the visit of Israeli Minister Rabin to the United 
States in approximately mid-November 1985? 

A Yes. 

Q And, sir, do you recall any discussion then between 
/ourself and any other person in connection with that 
i/isit of the replenishment of Israeli weapons, which they 
have transferred to a third party? 

A No. As you know, I was -- in November 1985, I was 
in conversation with DSAA concerning availability of Hawks, but 
I have no recollection of being aware that those -- that that 
conversation I was having related to a replenishment action. 

Q Did you, sir, or anyone in your staff, have 
conversations with Israeli Minister Rabin or anyone named 
by him at that time in connection with the provision of 
Hawks or TOWS? 

A Not me, and my staff essentially consisted of me, 
so I don't know if anybody else in the OSD had any converations , 
but I did not. 

Q But you did not? 

A No. 

Q Did you know of anyone else at this time having 
conversations with Minister Rabin? 

A No. On that subject. On that subject? 

Q Yes, sir. 



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"Q Or TOV;S? 

A No. 

Q Sir, was there any briefing that you're aware of 
of the Secretary of Defense concerning the visit of Minister 
Rabin to the United States in that period? 

A Certainly the normal prebriefing that would have 
taken place and briefing books for the Secretary. 

Q Would you have participated -- 

A Yes. 

Q -- in that prebriefing? 

A I would have participated in the tasking out, 
preparation of and receipt of the books for the meeting, as 
well as providing to the Secretary and sitting in in whatever 
preparatory work we did for the meeting. 

Q Do you recall if, in the preparation for that 
brief, the issue of replenishment of Israeli arms came 
up? 

A No, not to my recollection. 

Q Do you recall if there's any material -- 

A I can't even -- let me be precise. 

Without going back and looking at the records, 
I can't even be sure that we had a formal prebriefing, the 
Secretary being well familiar with the Israeli/U.S. issues and 
knowing all the parties. 

I would have to refer to records to see whether we 



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■SI.-' - - 

1 actually had a formal "Let's sit around the table and prebrief 

2 this," or whether it was all done by books. But either 

3 prebrief or by books, I don't recall any discussion at that 

4 time of a need to replenish TOWS that had been shipped by 

5 Israel to Iran. 

6 Q Or Hawks? 

7 A Or Hawks . 

8 Q Either Hawks that might be shipped or Hawks that 

9 were already shipped? 

10 A I don't recall any such discussion. 

11 Q Do you recall, sir, if the Secretary of Defense 

12 met with Minister Rabin at that time? 

13 A I don't specifically recall without checking 

14 calendars, but if Rabin was in town, it would have been 

15 usual for the Secretary to have seen him. 
1g Q Do you recall — 

17 A But I don't know that he did. I'm just 

18 Q ^es, sir. 



A It would have been usual. 

Q Do you recall following the visit of Minister 
Rabin, late November, whether there was an occasion for a 

22 debriefing concerning his visit? 

23 A By? 

2A Q A debriefing by yourself of the Secretary or a 

25 debriefing by the Secretary to you? 



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A Not that I recall. And let me make sure that I 
got the last one correct. I would have to go back and 
look at the Secretary's calendars for that period to see 
whether he met with Rabin incident to Rabin meeting with others 
in the Administration, or whether it was a one-on-one with 
the Secretary in his office. The number of visitors is rather 
large and frequently the Secretary would come to a White 
House meeting or would meet with these visitors separately. 
I just don't know under what circumstances he may or may not 
have fnet with Rabin at that time. 

Q But I take it your testimony is that whether 
shortly before or just after in connection with the visit 
of Israeli Minister Rabin, you have no recollection of the 
discussion of provision of TOWS and/or Hawks to Israel? 

A For the purpose of replenishing TOWS or Hawks that 
may have been shipped by Israel -- 

Q Or might be shipped in the future? 

A No, I don't recall any linkage to a shipment to 
Iran. 

Q All right, sir. 

You mentioned that at approximately this time — and 
to help with the dates, we'll take November 19th, 1985, that 
you had received a request to obtain information about Hawks. 

Sir, from whom did this information -- did this 
request come? 



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A I cannot specifically recall as to whether I got 
it from the Secretary or from the NSC. If I received it 
from the NSC, the only two sources possible would have been, 
I think. Admiral Poindexter or perhaps Colonel North, but 
more than likely. Admiral Poindexter, but I cannot 
specifically recall which of those three -- the Secretary, 
Admiral Poindexter or Colonel North, gave me the tasking 
for that. 

Q Do you have a recollection of the time period 
that we're speaking of? 

A Novemberish, mid-November ish. 

Q If it had been the Secretary or had been someone 
from the NSC, would there have been a written request or was 
it more likely be telephone? 

A More likely, it would have been oral by telephone 
or face-to-face. 

Q Do you recall what request was made of you? 

A Not specifically, but from reading the record of 
the point paper that was prepared, it appears that I was 
asked to check the availability of Hawk missiles in certain 
quantities and to check into the procedures associated with 
a transfer of missiles of some quantity to Israel — or to 
Iran under a variety of alternatives that were apparently 
under consideration at the time. 

Q Was a dollar number mentioned? 



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A Not that I can recall. 

Q But it was your understanding that these were 
missiles that would be provided to Israel and Israel would 
be -- 

A They were missiles to be provided to Iran and one 
possible way of getting them to Iran might be through Israel. 

Q Sir, I'd like to shouu you a document which you 
may have not seen before and which we will label as exhibit 
2, and give you a moment to read it. 

(Exhibit No. CP 2 was marked for identification.) 
(Pause . ) 

THE WITNESS: This is 20 November. 
MR. SABA: The document is dated 11/20/85, the 
time, 21:27:39 and it appears to be a note from Oliver 
North to John Poindexter. 

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
(Pause. ) 
BY MR. SABA: 
Q Sir, I ask you first whether you've seen this 
document before today? 
A No. 

Q Second, sir, I ask you if you are familiar with 
the events described in the document? 
A No. 
Q I'd ask you, sir, focusing on what appears to be 



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the third full paragraph, which begins, "Replenishment 
arrangements are being made through the MOD purchasing 
office -in NYC." 

A Uh-huh. 

Q I call your attention to the date of this 
document and the date of the request which came to you 
concerning Hawks. In connection with that request, whether 
on the day -- to you, whether on the date it was first made 
or sometime shortly thereafter, were you made aware of the 
incidencfd, described in the first two paragraphs? 

A No. 

Q Were you made aware of the concern expressed in 
the paragraph I've just mentioned which begins with 
"Replenishment"? 

A No. 

Q Moving along -- two paragraphs down from the one 
I cited to the one commencing, "As soon as we have the release 
confirmed, we need to move quickly with Defense to provide 
the 120 missiles the Israelis want to buy." 

A Uh-huh. 

Q "They are concerned that they are degrading their 
defense and in view of the Syrian shoot-down, the PM has 
placed considerable pressure on both Rabin and Kimche for a 
very prompt replacement. Both called several times today." 
In connection with the request made of you, sir. 






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were the names of Mr. Rabin and Mr. Kimche mentioned? 
A Not to my recollection. 

Q In connection with the request made to you, sir, 
what was the — was there any number provided to you that 
we should look for? 

A I can't remember the exact number we started with. 
In fact, I'd have to go back to the point paper thac was 
produced -- 

Q We'll come to that in a moment. 

MR. LIMAN: Does that mean that you started with 
a higher number and then ended up with a lower one? 

THE WITNESS: The point paper seems to suggest 
that. I think it was 500 and then it somehow went down to 
120. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q Yes, but before I come to the point paper — 
A Yes. 

Q — which is, as you know, prepared by someone 
else, I wanted to understand — 

A To my lecollection, I don't have a recollection, 
and so I'm essentially relying on the point paper as being 
reflective of what I apparently had asked for, but I don't 
have a specific recollection of what number I was asked to get 
an assessment on. 

Q So if I understand, you had a request coming either 



242 




19 

1 from the Secretary of Defense or from the NSC -- and in the 

2 case of the latter, it would have been Admiral Poindexter 

3 or Oliver North, and that request was to determine availability 

4 certain quantities and modalities of transfers for Hawk 

5 missiles, whether directly to Iran or possibly by way of 

6 replenishment of Israeli stocks. 

7 Is that correct? 

8 A Yes, but replenishment of Israeli stocks, if we 

9 were moving forward to provide missiles to Iran, not in the 

10 context of missiles already having gone to Iran or about to 

11 go to Iran, I took it as a hypothetical question that was 

12 presented to me to get some data on before any policy 

13 decision had been made with respect to moving forward on the 

14 transfer of missiles to Iran. 

15 Q And you recall to whom you were to have provided 

16 this information? 

17 A To the best of my recollection, I provided it to 

18 the Secretary. 

19 Q But in the request, sir -- my question is -- 

20 A Oh, I'm sorry. 

21 Q -- you received a request from someone -- 

22 A Uh-huh. 

23 Q This person would have asked for that information. 

24 Did they ask that that information be returned to the requestor 

25 or did they ask you to provide it to someone else? 



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A I can't recall that, considering I can't even 
recall who the requestor was. But my best recollection is 
that after I got the information, I gave it to the Secretary 
and my recollection that it was in anticipation of a 
meeting he was going to. 

Q Do you recall what you did after you received 
the request? Wl«o did you speak to? 

A I am reasonably sure that I presented it and 
discussed it with the Secretary. 

Q So you received the request, and at that point, 
you discussed it with the Secretary? 

A I received the request or the response to the 
request? 

Q The request. 

A Okay, I'm sorry. 

I received the request and I'm reasonably sure 
I discussed it with the Secretary and apparently I passed 
it, to the best of my recollection, to DSAA for action 
through Noel Koch. 

Q Did you pass that information to DSAA at the 
request of the Secretary? 

A I don't think the Secretary would have told me 
how to get the information. He would have left that to me to 
find out. 

Q What was the Secretary's reaction when he heard 



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that this information was to be provided? 

A It may have been the Secretary who asked me, so 
he wouldn't have, obviously, had a reaction, but I'm sure -- 
at this point, I am speculating because I can't recall who 
asked me to do it. 

Q You have said earlier that the Secretary had, in 
July, expressed opposition in general to a policy which 
would have provided weapons to Iran. At this point, we are 
having a discussion now with the Secretary concerning a 
request to look at weapons and possibility, let's say. 

Did the Secretary express an opinion about this 
matter? 

A Every time we discussed this matter throughout the 
period July until I left him in March, his view of it was 
always a negative one. 

Q Did he indicate to you what this information 
should contain or that the information you obtained would 
be subjective in any way? 

Did the request come to you to provide information 
concerning numbers? 

A Uh-huh. 

Q And did the request ask you to provide information 
about the means of transfer? 

A What do you mean by "means of transfer"? 

Q The legalities of the transfer. 



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MR. ROSTOW: Legalities? 

MR. SABA: Yes, the legalities of the transfer. 

THE WITNESS: My recollection is that I was — the 
tasking was to determine what would be required legally 
and what legal impediments might exist to such a transfer, 
and how it could be done. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q And in your discussion with the Secretary about 
the request, did he indicate to you that the information you 
should provide should indicate in a negative way that this 
transfer should not take place? 

A I can't recall a specific discussion with the 
Secretary because, as I say -- let me answer it this way. 

I have no recollection of the Secretary ever, 
throughout this entire period, beginning in November and on 
through, ever asking for anything but the best objective 
staff laydown of the issue. 
Q All right, sir. 

Do you recall calling Noel Koch and asking him to 
obtain the information? 

A Not specifically. I don't know whether I called 
Noel or he came to visit me or how I actually got it up to 
Noel and to DSAA. 

Q All right, sir. 

I will tell you that Mr. Koch has told us that you 



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called him and made a request of him similar to such as we've 
discussed, and he in turn went to then Acting Director of 
DSAA — 

A Uh-huh. 

Q Does that sould correct? 

A It sounds very correct and plausible. 

Q Would there have been any particular reason you 
would have gone to Mr. Koch, as opposed to directly to DSAA? 

A I always tried to operate through the chain in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and I assume 
Mr. Armitage was away and Mr. Koch was the Acting Deputy, 
principal deputy to Mr. Armitage, so that's why I would have 
gone. To start out on something like this, I would have gone 
through Mr. Koch. 

Q And having made the request for information, do 
you recall next what information you received? 

A I recall that I got a point paper back. 

Q And you recall that it was a typewritten paper? 

A Yes. 

MR. SABA: I'd like to have as exhibit 3 a 
typewritten -- I've placed before you what I think is exhibit 
3. It is a three-page document, the first being a photocopy 
of handwritten notes by Dr. Gaffney — 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
MR. SABA: -- simply recording that the notes were 



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prepared by him on or after November 19, '85, at the request 
of Noel Koch and General Powell — 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 

MR. SABA: — and furnished to Mr. Koch to take 
to General Powell. 

(Exhibit No. CP 3 was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q I think we can just move right along to the next 
page -- 

A Okay. 

Q -- and I'd ask you, sir, if you have any 
recollection of this document — 

A Yes, I do. 

Q -- from that period of time. 

A Yes, I do. 

Q And you understood that this was the response 
to your original request? 

A Yes. 

Q And directing your attention, sir, to the third 
point in the paper, there's a reference to 120 missiles. 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Do you recall if that was the number that you may 
have referenced in your request? 

A It may well be, but I don't have a specific 
recollection of the number. 



248 




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Q Looking at the paragraph just above it, there's 
a reference to cost and prices -- 
A Uh-huh. 

Q -- indicating the missiles apparently in stock 
at Red River, cost 300,000, that it wouldn't be a firm 
price for replenishment, could cost as much as 5437,700 
apiece . 

Do you recall that in your request any mention 
was made of determining the cost or setting an upper limit 
on what was available? 
A No. 

Q Do you recall any discussion of there being a 
certain amount of money and a certain amount of missiles? 
A Hawk missiles? 
Q Yes, sir. 
A No. 
Q Moving down the page -- 

MR. ROSTOW: If I could just correct the record 
here, you misread "replacement" in that for "replenishment." 
MR. SABA: I'm sorry, thank you. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, what -- 

MR. ROSTOW: He read this word as "replenishment' 
instead of "replacement." 

MR. SABA: I must have had replenishment on my 
mind. 



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BY MR. SABA: 
Q Moving along down -- 

A I think .replacement in that context means 
replacement to the United States Army. 
Q Yes, sir. 

Moving down the page to the paragraph beginning 
with "The modalities for sale to Iran present formidable 
difficulties. " 

A Uh-huh. 

Q There are three points following that paragraph 
as subparagraphs. Do you recall, sir, your agreeing with 
those three points or whether there was further discussion 
of those points at the time? 

A I don't recall any further discussion or agreement 
or disagreement. We just accepted them as the facts 
presented by DSAA. 

Q Moving to the next paragraph, sir, the one 
commencing, "It is conceivable that the sale could be broken 
into 3 or 4 packages, in order to evade Congressional notice." 

Do you recall if that paragraph and the two 
subparagraphs under it were written as a result of a request 
by you? 

A I don't recall specifically, but I must say that 
it might have been that — I had a recollection that the 
question was posed that, is it possible to split a package? 



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Q Sir, in conjunction with your review of this 
document, I'd like to provide you with another document 
which w£'ll mark exhibit 4, and I will tell you that this is 
a document handwritten by Dr. Gaffne which he has identified, 
and it indicates a certain date, and I'm looking in 
particular at the upper left-hand corner. 

A Uh-huh. 

(Exhibit No. CP 4 was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q VJe understand that Dr. Gaffney has told us he 
believes that these notes were taken in response to the 
request made of him and was a brief outline of the points that 
he should cover. 

A Uh-huh. 

Q In looking at Dr. Gaffney's notes, 1 through 8, 
on the left-hand side, do you recall if that is the 1 iekly 
sequence and questions that you asked him? 

A I don't recall. 

MR. McGRATH: Did Dr. Gaffney indicate that he 
had gotten this request from General Powell? 

MR. SABA: Dr. Gaffney indicated that the request 
first came into him from Mr. Koch and that he understood it 
was for Mr. Powell and had subsequent discussions with 
General Powell. 

For the sake of the record, and since this has 



251 



1 become an exhibit, underneath the box that I've referred to 

2 on the left is a little conment, "Powell is not agitated. 

3 Told NSC to ease up." We should state that that comment has 

4 nothing to do with the matters before us now. 

5 THE WITNESS: Could you state what it has to do 

6 with, since it is apparently an exhibit? 

7 MR. GENZMAN: It comes from the opposite page; 
g doesn't it, with the arrow going over? 

g MR. SABA: It came from an opposite page, sir, in 

1Q a totally different matter. 

11 THE WITNESS: All right. 

12 BY MR. SABA: 

13 Q Returning to the Gaffney point paper, there are == 

14 Exhibit 3 — in looking at the two paragraphs, one beginning 

15 "modalities for sale to Iran," which has three subpoints, and 
1g the second being, "It is conceivable that the sale could be 
*j broken, " I take it that these two paragraphs express 

^o Dr. Gaffney 's presentation to you of the equivalent of a 
legal opinion on the matters discussed. 

A You'd have to ask Dr. Gaffney. 

Q Did you understand that to be a legal — 

A I understood it to be Dr. Gaffney 's view. 

Q Did you — 

A I don't think he's a lawyer, either. 

Q Did you make inquiry of any other person as to 



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* 29 

these legal points? 

A No. 

Q Do you recall specifically having made any 

inquiry of the General Counsel of DSAA? 

A No. 

Q What did you do with this paper? 

A To the best of my recollection, I provided it to 
the Secretary. 

Q I see, and prior to providing it to the Secretary, 
was there any further legal review of the matter? 

A No. ■ 

Q Turning to the next page of the document, there 
is a list of politically -- political points. Do you recall 
why Dr. Gaffney would have set out a series of political 
drawbacks to the transaction? 

A I do not -- I do not know specifically -- 

Q Did you ask him to outline some of the political 
difficulties? 

A I don't recall specifically. 

Q Do you recall if, in presenting the paper to the 
Secretary, there was expressed between you and the Secretary 
or by the Secretary alone any agreement or disagreement 
with those points. 

A I don't recall a specific discussion on the 
points on page 2. 



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■Q Do you recall, sir, if the intention of page 2 was 
to develop a case to discourage the intended transfer? 

MR. McGRATH: You're asking General Powell what 
Dr. Gaffney's intention was — 

MR. SABA: No, I'm — 

MR. McGRATH: — regarding the document? 
MR. SABA: I'm asking General Power who requested 
the document whether the purpose of these points, did he 
understand to be to develop a negative case -- to develop a 
case against the presentation of this transaction? 

THE WITNESS: To the best of my recollection, I 
did not direct that the paper be drafted in a way that laid 
out a negative formulation. 

Also, to the best of my recollection, I suspect 
that I asked him to give me a point paper which lays out the 
issue, and I would think that this is Dr. Gaffney's attempt 
to do that. And these were his opinions, but you'd have to 
ask Dr. Gaffney that. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. LIMAN: 
Q Sir, before we leave this paper — 
A Yeah. 
Q -- and while we're on it, could I ask a few 

questions? 

A Sure. 



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■Q General, did the Defense Department have a 
strong coirunittment to the embargo against arms to Iran? 

A Yes. 

Q And it had a program called "Operation Staunch"? 

A Yes. 

Q And it had communicated its views within the 
administration; is that correct? 

A Yes, and it -- 

Q And it had communicated its views through our 
diplomatic corps to other countries that it opposed their 
sales of arms; had it not? 

A Yes, except I have to answer this way: It wasn't 
the Defense's position, it was the administration's position. 

Q It was the administration's -- 

A Which the Defense Department was aggressive in 
pursuing. 

Q And there was no doubt that the Secretary of 
Defense subscribed fully to that position. 

A Absolutely not. 

Q So that when a request ccune in for information 
about Hawks to be shipped to Iran, that would have been 
something that would have been contrary to the whole 
philosophy of the administration on sales to Iran and to the 
position that theDefense Department subscribed to. 

A That's correct. 



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__JSEGRET 32 

_ifT» 

Q And there's no doubt in your mind that the 
Secretary of Defense would have been opposed to sale to Iran 

A None whatsoever. 

Q -- and no doubt in your mind that anyone who 
wrote a position paper for the Secretary of Defense would 
have expressed that Scime commitment to the embargo. 

A I don't want to quite give you a qualified 
agreement because the quality of the people we had in the 
DSAA and the OSD in particular about -- particularly 
Dr. Gaffney. He would give an objective statement of the 
pros and cons and my relationship with Dr. Gaffney always 
suggested that he would lay it out objectively. t-Jhether 
the Secretary would like to read that or not, he would get 
what Dr. Gaffney' s best judgment is, in my judgment. 

Q Well, in the very first paragraph of the last 
page, he indicates that there would be no effect on Iraq 
because they had more accessible sources of supply. 
So he expressed his views as he saw them. 

A Yes, uh-huh. 

MR. LIMAN: Thank you. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q What happened to this paper when you received 
it? 

A To the best of my recollection, I provided it to 



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Secretary Weinberger. 

Q Do you know if vou provided it to the Secretary 
in connection or by way of a briefing for a meeting? 

A My recollection was I gave it to him in preparation 
for a meeting. 

Q Did you provide the paper to anyone else? 

A Not to my recollection. 

Q Do you recall, sir, in providing this paper to 
the Secretary, whether you and the Secretary had discussions 
about the paper or the meeting for which it was provided? 

A VJe may have talked it about it briefly, but I have 
no specific recollection if we did, or if we did, what 
we said about it. 

Q Do you recall was this to be an NSC meeting? 

A I don't recall whether it was an NSC meeting or 
another type of -- or agency meeting. 

Q Do you recall if you also provided the Secretary 
at approximately the same time a second paper, the subject 
matter which concerned TOW missiles? 

A I may have provided him a separate paper on that. 

Q Do you recall who would have asked you to provide 
the information on TOWS? 

A It would either have been the Secretary himself 
or Admiral Poindexter or Colonel North. 

Q Do you recall if this request came at the same time 



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and ftom the same person who made the request on Hawks? 

A I can't tell you if it was the same person, and I 
regret that my recollection won't tell you timing, whether 
it was just before, just after, either side. But in that -- 
I would just say in that general time period is when the 
request — 

Q Roughly the middle of November 1985. 

A That's -- 

Q Do you recall, in receiving the request on TOWS, 
any mention of the number 3,300 TOWS in connection with 




Yes. 

A I recall the number 3,300; I don't remember it 

linke<^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^though. 

Q Do you recall, in connection with the number 
3,300, whether these were TOWS we would provide directly for 
replenishment of Israeli stocks or otherwise? 

A My recollection is that it was a transfer of 
that number, or some number of TOWS, to Iran, modality of 
transfer yet to be determined, 

Q Sir, I'd like to show you another piece of paper 
which you may not have seen, and it is, again, a page from 
Dr. Gaffney's work diary. 

A Uh-huh. 



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Q I'll give ^jfcm a few moments, and we're concerned 

only with the upper left-hand corner, which begins "164 I-TOW. 

{Exhibit No. CP 5 was marked for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Do you recall, sir, there being discussion at this 
time about the number of the TOWS in connection with a price 
for the TOWS? 

A I have a recollection that sometime in that 
late fall period, as this initiative started to pick up 
additional interest and questions were being raised about 
the availability of weapon systems, I recall the number $24 
million being on the table and representing the amount of 
money that was available for purchases. 

Q And do you recall the information which 
Mr. Gaffney provided to you? 

A Hot without seeing — 

Q Do you recall if Assistant Secretary Armitage 
provided you with « paper on TOM missiles? 

A X can't recall whether I got a paper from 
Dr. Gaffney or Mr. Amitage. It would not have been unusual 
for either of the t%fo to have been the source of any such 
papers because they essentially trare part of our team. 

Q But you do recall that there was such a paper? 



cpr^ppT 



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A I recall asking for the information and I believe 
a paper came down with the information, as opposed to having 
come down orally. 

Q Was this paper provided by you to the Secretary 
of Defense? 

A This paper I — my recollection is that all such 
papers that came into me I provided to the Secretary for his 
information and use. 

Q Do you recall if you provided him with this paper 
at the same time you provided him with the Hawk point paper? 

A I do not recall whether it was the same time, 
shortly before or shortly after — or before or after. 

I just don't have a clear cut on what the timing 
is there in November. 

Q Do you recall if the provision of this Hawk 
paper — I'm sorry — TOW paper was by way of preparation 
for or in connection with the same meeting for which the 
Secretary required the Hawk paper? 

A I don't recall that. 

MR. SAXON: Could you have been provided the TOW 
paper by Noel Koch? 

THE WITNESS: Could I have been provided — it is 
possible. The three people who I might have gotten it from 
would have been Noel Koch, Rich Armitage or Hank Gaffney. 



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1 .BY MR. SABA: 

2 Q Do you recall, sir, at that time, in connection 

3 with the TOW paper, there being any discussion or mention of 

4 a number of TOWS to replenish Israeli stocks for missiles 

5 already sent? 

6 A I don't recall a replenishment action for missiles 

7 already se:.t. 

8 Q Sir, I believe that just after this period on or 

9 about November 24th, there was information provided to 

10 the Secretary of Defense concerning possibility of talks 

11 going on between the United States and Iranian officials. 

12 Do you recall that incident? 

13 A I assume everybody here has whatever necessary 

14 clearances are required to talk to this subject. 

15 MR. LIMAN: That's r ight, and we can also talk 
about as^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vfor the purpose 

17 record . 

^g THE WITNESS: For the purposes of the record and 

19 for the hearing, I would not — I simply will — 

20 MR. LIMAN: We do not ever mention that and we 

21 generally refer to the reports. 

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was a ware of — t hroughout 

23 this period, of intellig ence repor ts! 

2^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^that suggested something was 

25 going on 



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BY MR. SABA: 

Q In connection with receiving such reports, did 
you receive reports in the fall of 1985 that weapons had 
been transferred — United States-origin weapons had been 
transferred to Iran? 

A Not that I can recall. 

Q Do you recall what reports you did receive? 

A No, and the reason I have to say that is that in 
the course of the day, I would guesstimate that I dealt with 
several hundred discrete issues and pieces of paper, and 
the United States intelligence community is able to provide 
an abundance of paper in the course of the day, not all of 
which I read, and even that which I read, I doubt I could 
recollect much longer than several days later because of its 
abundance . 

So I read a great deal of material, and to 
say saw^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vwithout 
having seen it again and refreshing my memory, I simply 
can't do that. 

Q But you recall, then, in approximately late 
November, there was information received which led the 
Secretary to have a conversation with you. 

A There was information received which made me 
aware and made the Secretary aware that there were continuing 
discussions going on with respect to some sort of an arms sale 



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to Iran. - 

And what did the Secretary ask you to do in 
connection with those reports? 

A He didn't ask me to take any specific action. 
He would ask if I had — if we were getting any more requests 
of the type we had been discussing. He might ask the status 
of that and he would express his discontent that such an 
initiative was still being pursued. 

MR. LIMAN: General, you said that there was 
information that was received that indicated that talks 
were going on relating to the sale of arms to Iran. 

Who was conducting the talks, Israelies, the 
United States? 

THE WITNESS: There were a variety of intermediaries 




they -- it 

was generally some Iranian -- people of Iranian origin. 
There were — and U.S. interlocutors. 

MR. LIMAN: You understood that these talks that 

were going on had the sanction of the United States 

/ 

Government? 

The^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hl saw 
with trying to find a way to pursue the original initiative 
that Mr. McFarlane came over and spoke about earlier in the 
summer, and they were not authorized talks. They were 



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TOPSECRET 



40 

authorized. to the extent that I considered that Mr. McFarlane 
was — the National Security Council was aware and was 
supporting and authorizing these talks. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Did you know specifically that the talks were 
authorized by the President? 

A I had no way of knowing that. 

Q Did the information indicate the identify of 
the United States person s involved? 

A No. 




Q Did it identify persons other than Iranians or 
United States citizens? 

A Yes, to the best of my recollection. 

Q Do you recall who else it identified? 

A Not by specific name, but, to the best of my 
recollection, the intelligence^^^^^^Hwould, from time to 
time, identify Israeli interlocu tors. 

Do you recall if the^^^^^^Hindicated whether 
these were private citizens or officials of the Isreali 
Government? 

A No, my recollection isn't good enough for that. 

Q Do you recall, in connection with this — with 
these reports, whether you made any inquiry or comment to 



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Assistant Secretary Armitage? 

A I'm sure Mr. Armitage and I probably discussed 
this over this fall period on a fairly regular basis. Once 
again, I just have to put it in context that I speak to -- at 
that time, my first call of the morning at 6:15 was to 
Mr. Armitage and in the course of the next 15 to 16 hours 
of the day, he and I probably talked" 15 or 20 times, so 
I'm sure we discussed this on a fairly regular basis. 

Q Did the Secretary ask you to make any 
determination about these reports? 

A A determination of what kind? 

Q As to the accuracy who, if — 

A No. 

Q — if they are taking place; who is involved? 

A The reports spoke for themselves. 

Q Did the reports indicate that arms had been 
transferred? 

A I can't recall if the reports — if the reports 
documented that or not. 

Q Did the reports discuss difficulties occuring 
at the period approximately November 19th through the 26th 
of transferring weapons to Iran? 

A I simply can't go back and describe to you reports 
of a period of time that finite -- 

Q But do you recall — 







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"A — a year and a half later. 

Q — if that was the general subject matter? 

A In these intelligence reports, you would see 
expressed some of the difficulties in arranging and 
consununating the arrangement. 

Q Do you recall if these reports specifically 
identified Hawk mxssiles? 

A I cannot recall that specifically. 

Q Or TOW missiles? 

A I cannot recall it specifically. I would be 
speculating with you. 

Q Do you recall receiving a report from Secretary 
Armitage about a lunch that he had on December 3rd, 1985, 
with Oliver North? 

A I recall Mr. Armitage telling me that he had 
a meeting with Colonel North and that they had discussed 
this matter, yes. 

Q When you refer to this matter, do you recall 
Secretary Armitage 's recounting to you of this conversation, 
what he said? 

A My recollection is that Secretary Armitage told me 
that he had more information, a better insight as to the state 
of the initiative, but that's all I specifically remember. 

Q Did he indicate that Colonel North was actively 
involved? 



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A I don't recall him indicating that. 

Q Did he — 

A. It was fairly — it wasn't anything I needed 
indicated to me. 

Q Was there any mention to you of Hawk missiles being 
part of the subject of their conversation? 

A I cannot recall that as a specific subject. It 
may have been or it may not have been; I don't recall. 

Q TOW missiles? 

A I simply can't give you a readout of that 
specific conversation a year and a half ago, which was one 
of probably 10 I had with Mr. Armitage that day, but it would 
not surprise me if that had been discussed. 

Q In connection with Secretary Armitage 's report 
to you of Colonel North's involvement, did you report that 
to Secretary Weinberger? 

A Z can't recall specifically. I don't know that I 
would have been — Z don't know why I particularly would 
have. He all were aware that Colonel North was the Action 
Officer in the NSC on the Initiative. 

Q Did you yourself, sir, have any conversations 
on this initiative in November of '8S with Colonel North? 

A Z may have. Most of the time, my conversations 
on matters relating to the Defense Department and NSC were 
with Admiral Poindexter, but Z know Colonel North and I may 



'•^^W OO^DLII' 



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44 

have had a discussion with Colonel North or he may have given 
me some cunplifying information. We may have discussed some 
details of it, but I specifically do not recall. 

Q In conversations with either Colonel North or 
Admiral Poindexter — 

A We're still in November now, right? 

Q Yes, sir. Was there any mention of weapons having 
been transferred or in the process of being transferred? 

A Not to the best of my recollection. 

Q Was there any indication that there had been an 
authorized approval of transfers? 

A Not to the best of my recollection. 

Q Do you recall, sir, a visit of Mr. Mindy Marone 
to the United States at that time? 

A Not specifically. Mr. Marone made regular trips 
back and forth, so this — nothing stands out in ray mind 
on that particular trip. 

Q Did you have any occasion to speak with 
Mr. Marone? 

A I know Mr. Marone. I have no recollection of 
seeing Mr. Marone at that time. I may have, but I don't 
have any recollection. I only see him in a social setting. 
I have no professional dealings with him. 

He would have been with someone else and I would 
have seen him and said, "Hello, Mindy, how are you?" 



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' Did you receive any information concerning a 
deposit on November 20th, 1985, by Israel of $1 million 
into a. Swiss account in connection with Hawk or TOW 
missiles or United States weapons? 
A No. 

Q I'd like, sir, to return to Exhibit 2 and if you 
could take a look at that again, please, in light of our 
conversations . 

If you could look at that again and if that could 
perhaps refresh your recollection. 

(Pause.) 

Mr. McGRATH: Specifically, what is it you're 
refreshing his recollection on? 

MR. SABA: Further to your provision of the 
memos on the Hawks and the TOWS to the Secretary — 

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q Were there further discussions at this time 
concerning provision of Hawks or TOWS to Israel? And the 
time frame now would be approximately November 19th through 
December 1985. 

MR. ROSTOW; Could you be a little bit more 
specific in it. Discussions with whom? 

MR. SABA: With anyone. 

MR. ROSTOW: In which General Powell was involved 



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MR. SABA: Yes. 

MR. ROSTOW: — or which he knew about. 
MR. SABA; In which he was involved, and 
secondly, in which he would have come to know. 

THE WITNESS: I do not recall being aware that 
we were involved in the replenishment action to replace 
TOWS — or Hawks, that had been transferred by Israel to 
Iran, as part of this arrangement. 

I just don't have that recollection. 
BY MR. SABA: 
Q Or TOWS, sir? 
A Or TOKS. 
Q All right. 

A Although TOWS are not mentioned in this 
particular exhibit. 

Q All right, sir. 

In connection with the Hawk and the TOW paper 
which you provided the Secretary, do you recall — the 
Gaffney paper — 

A That was — the only TOW paper — I haven't seen 
a TOW paper yet. We're talking about the one you were 
referring to at the time of the exhibit — 

Q I will tell you, sir, that we understand that the 
paper exists and we were told that it was — the only copy that 
we know of has been locked in someone's safe and we have not 



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been able to obtain any further copies of the paper. So I 
don't have it, but apparently there was a paper similar to 
that. 

MR. McGRATH: You're certifying for the record 
that a TOW paper was provided to — 

MR. SABA: I am not certifying. I'm stating 
that we have been informed tl.at there was a paper prepared 
and provided to General Powell — 

THE WITNESS: I don't dispute that. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q And General Powell doesn't dispute that. 

This might help sir, but I'm simply stating that 
that's what we've been informed. 

MR. McGRATH: And this was during the November 
time frame. 

MR. SABA: Yes, approximately the same time as 
the Gaffney point paper was provided. We'll provide another -- 

THE WITNESS: I have recollection of the paper; 
I just don't — want to make sure we're all talking about 
the same thing. It's not locked in any safe I have to control 
of. 

MR. SABA: No, sir, I don't mean to imply that. 

THE WITNESS: All right. 

MR. SAXON: Let me ask that this document be marked 
as deposition exhibit 6, and I'll give you a moment to look 



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48 



at it/ if you can read Noel Koch's handwriting. 

THE WITNESS: No , I never could. Let me try it. 
(Exhibit No. CP 6 was marked for identification.) 

THE WITNESS: "TOW discussed separately with 
Kidd" -- 

Mk. SAXON: Rudd . 

THE WITNESS: Rudd, okay, and Gaffney in December. 

MR. McGRATH: Do you guys have Noel Koch's 
recitation of what it says? 

MR. SAXON: We have Noel Koch's recitation m his -- 

MR. McGRATH: Why don't you just read it into the 
record. 

MR. SAXON: — deposition in which he verifies that 
this document was a handwritten chronology that he recalled, 
he thinks, in either February or March of 1986, on the 
events of previous months, in which he writes, in the item 
numbered 4 -- 

MR. McGRATH; Let's go off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Mr. Koch has told us in sworn testimony that this 
is a document he prepared on his Pentagon note paper in which 
in February or March of 1986, he recalled, as best he could, 
some of the events of previous months pertaining to -- 



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particularly TOWS, aiflr ¥ie indicates in item 1 that TOW was 
discussed directly -- excuse me, separately, with Rudd 
and Gaffney in December, December of '85, and in item number 
4, TOW paper locks in RLA safe, which he says was Richard 
L. Armitage -- 

A Uh-huh. 

Q -- wouldn't lett Rudd keep copy — 

A Uh-huh. 

And he tells us that that means that Mr. Rudd, 
Glenn Rudd, the Deputy Director of DSAA, had a copy. Mr. Armita' 
asked for it} it was locked in the safe and Dr. Gaffney 
has informed us that Mr. Armitage instructed him to destroy 
the copies that he had. 

MR. SABA: Contemporaneously with their 
preparation, that is the request to destroy, just so the 
record is clear. We understand that the request to destroy 
the copies was made approximately shortly after the copies 
were made. 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Is there a question? 
MR. SABA: I may have forgotten it. 
MR. LIMAN: I think he's trying to refresh your 
recollection as to whether you recalled the issue of TOW 
replenishment and you testified you did not recall that issue 
arising before, as I recall it, January 1986. 



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THE WITNESS:' That's correct. From January 17th, 
18th, 1986, things were fixed fairly well in my mind. But 
until that time, I was not aware that the United States 
Government had authorized anything to be done in the way of 
replenishment . 

MR. LIMAN: And you fixed in your mind your 
recollection of the replenishment when the number of TOWS 
that you were considering went up from 4,000 to 4,500. 

THE WITNESS: And I also qualify it by saying 
1 can't really tell you whether I had recollections before 
or after, but from -- it was on January 17th, 18th. That 
was my first knowledge that the United States Government , at 
the right level, had approved the transfer of weapons to 
Iran. Up until that day, this, in my judgment, and to the 
best of my recollection, was a conceptual discussion of an 
initiative to transfer weapons to Iran and it was heatedly 
debated within the administration and no decision was made 
to transfer any weapons until the direction of January 17th, 
18th. So my recollection of the months before all have to 
do with discussion about a possible initiative. 

MR. LIMAN: And General, given the fact that a 
sale to Iran would be a departure from United States policies, 
is it fair to say that if you had been informed of a U.S. 
authorization to sell previously, it's likely to have left an 
imprint upon your xecol lection? 



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■JPP;§ECRET 

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THE WITNESS: I would agree with that assessment, 
Mr. Liman. 

BY MR. SABA: 

Q Do you recall, sir, in providing the Gaffney 
point paper to the Secretary, any conversation — 

A Which paper now, this one or the one that's — 

Q The Gaffney point paper which is marked Exhibit 2. 

A Exhibit 2, okay. 

Q Do you recall, in connection with providing that, 
whether there was any discussion concerning congressional 
notification involved with such transfers? 

A I don't have any specific recollection. From the 
paper, you'll notice that the way the paper is structured, 
it's essentially talking about almost a routine sort of 
sale, as opposed to a covert action type of a thing. So we 
never got into a discussion of findings or notification other 
than the $14 million threshhold. 

Q All right, sir. 

Do you recall if, on or about December 10th, 1985, 
Mr. McFarlane again briefed either yourself or the Secretary 
of Defense concerning the initiative? 

A December 10th, 1985? 

Q Yes, sir. 

MR. LIMAN: Following his return from the visit 
to London. 



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BY MR. SABA: 

Q To assist, there was a meeting in the White House 
on the 7th of December. The initiative was discussed. We 
know from some of the public testimony. There was some 
discouragement and different views and Mr. hcFarlane went 
to London. He returned from London on or about the 10th of 
December and my question is, whether, in connection with that 
return, he briefed you or the Secretary or both of you, to 
your knowledge? 

A I can't recall. I really only recall one meeting 
with Mr. McFarlane on this initiative. I think it is the 
earlier one we talked about. I don't remember a specific 
meeting this late in the process of December. 

I have a recollection of Admiral Poindexter 
talking to the Secretary around his table, the three of us 
talking about it one night, but I don't remember two meetings 
with Bud. 

Q Do you recall — 

MR. LIMAN: Incidentally, while he's refreshed, what 
do you recall about the meeting with Admiral Poindexter? 

THE WITNESS: My recollection, Mr. Liman, is that 
it was essentially the same sort of a discussion, the policy 
initiatives being pursued, why this was something that was 
being seriously considered, and I recall the Secretary, again, 

stating his objections. 

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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. LIMAN: 

Q Was this in December o£ 1985? 

A I wish I could tell you that, but I — 

Q Was it after — 

A — can't be specific. 

Was it aft<>r Admiral Poindexter had been 
elevated? 

A I think it was. I think Admiral Poindexter was 
now the National Security Advisor, but I can't be sure of 
that without seein? the dates. 

Q Do you recall whether Admiral Poindexter advocated 
the initiative at that meeting? 

A My recollection is that Admiral Poindexter gave 
a factual objective assessment of it and pointed out the 
advantages and disadvantages, the up sides and down sides, 
and why it was something that still had merit to it, but I 
don't recall hira aggressively advocating it so much as 
intellectually presenting it. 

Q Do you recall whether, at this meeting, he was 
discussing an Israeli proposal? 

A For? 

Q An Israeli proposal presented to him for the 
shipment by Israel of TOWS with a replenishment by the United 
States only if Israel succeeded in getting the hostages out? 



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A ' He may have. I don't recall a conversation that 
specifically. 

Q That was the first play in January of 1986; that's 
why I'm putting that question to you. 

A January '86 or '85? 

Q January 2, 1986. 

A He may have, I just don't recall specifically. 

Q And was this meeting in the Secretary's office? 

A Yes. 

Q How often did Admiral Poindexter come visit the 
Secretary? 

A After he became the National Security Advisor, he 
and the Secretary arranged that on a — oh, I think he tried 
to do it once a week or once every two weeks, that he would 
come over for a private conversation with the Secretary in 
the evening and I would sit in on them. 

Q You did not take notes generally of these 
meetings, did you? 

A I would occasionally take notes, sometimes not, 
but I did not keep permanent sets of notes. Just use them 
as memory aids and then got rid of them. 

Q Maybe I should know this, but did the Secretary 
keep a diary? 

A The Secretary, to my knowledge, did not keep a 
diary. Whatever notes he kept, I don't know how he uses 



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them or what he does with them. 

Q Did he — 

A He does not have a diary of this ilk, no. 

Q -- did he dictate memos, as some people do, so 
that if they ever get around to writing their — a book on 
the era, they have some aids; they have memoirs? 

A No, the Secretary did not dictate his daily 
activities, to the best of my knowledge. I've never seen it. 
He didn't do it and I was with him every day. 

Whatever notes he took in the course of a day, 
I don't know what he did with them. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Do you recall if, in the discussion with 
Admiral Poindexter, there was discussion of money involved 
in it? 

A No, I don't think it was that kind of a meeting. 
I think Admiral Poindexter was just discussing the initiate 
with the Secretary to make sure that the Secretary had the 
state of play in mind and knew how it was moving. 

Admiral Poindexter laid it out in an objective 
manner, but it was clear from the conversation that the 
initiative was still alive and moving in the direction of 
a current — 

MR. LIMAN: Did he say — 

THE WITNESS: At that time, to the best of our 



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knowledge and belief, at that time, there was still no 
initiative. It was a concept being explored. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he say that a finding was under 
consideration? 

THE WITNESS: I don't recall a specific discussion 
over finding. 

MR. LIMAN: Do you recall whether it was an 
effort to try to reduce some of the intensity of Secretary 
Weinberger's objection? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know that I would characterize 
it that way. He didn't argue or debate the matter with 
Secretary Weinberger. He laid it out. Admiral Poindexter 
is quite good at this. He laid it out in an objective 
manner, but clearly if one ceune away from that conversation, 
he was describing to the Secretary how this was continuing to 
move forward and heard the Secretary's arguments again. 

So he was clearly showing the initiative was 
continuing to move forward, but there was no debate. 

MR. LIMANt Did he mention Ghorbanifar? 

THE WITNESS: I couldn't remember if that name 
was specifically mentioned at that meeting. 

BY MR. LIMAN: 
Q Did he mention Casey's position? 
A I can't recall, Mr. Linan. 
Q Did he mention the President's position? 

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vfQP SEGRET 

•A My recollection is that he indicated the President 
was still inclined to move forward. 

Q Did he mention hostages? 

A Yes, the hostages were discussed. 

Q What did he say on that subject? 

A There was a two-pronged strategy and the important 
prong was to improve our strategic relationship with Iran, 
and the second prong was to see if, as a result of that 
improvement, we might be able to get some movement on the 
hostage issue. That has always been in every conversation. 
MR. LIMAN: Thank you, Mr. Saba. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Do you recall, sir, if you had any separate 
conversations with Admiral Poindexter as to the -- in this 
time period approximately in December, January — before 
January 18th, concerning price of TOWS or Hawks? 

A I don't recall any specific discussions with 
Admiral Poindexter over Hawks. 

Q And TOWS? 

A I recall discussing with Admiral Poindexter at 
one time or another in a general way what the price range 
of TOWS were. 

Q Do you recall roughly when that would have been? 

A Very roughly, I would say it was in the November, 



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December time period. It might have well been earlier, 
depending on when this thing first started to germinate. 

Q Sir, on January 7th, '86, there was a White House 
meeting in which the initiative was discussed again. Do you 
recall that meeting? 

A Not specifically, since I wasn't there. 

Q Do you recall the incident of the meeting? 

A I know that early in January, the issue came up 
again and the Secretary was going to meetings on the subject. 

Q Did you provide to the Secretary any materials 
in preparation for that meeting? 

A I don't recall that we provided any specific 
material. There were no new point papers, to the best of 
my knowledge. I don't think I had received any additional 
taskings for information. The information was generally 
known by then of availability and general price ranges, so 
the Secretary was well-armed for those meetings without needing 
any additional papers and since the staff was, for the most 
part, not involved except myself and Mr. Armitage — I don't 
recall any additional papers. 

Q Upon return from that meeting, did the Secretary 
have occasion to brief you as to what went on in the 
meeting? 

A The Secretary would generally back-brief me on his 
meetings in the White House so 1 could follow up with whatever 



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action might have been required from the staff and whether it 
was the 2ndi January meeting or whatever other meetings he had 
during- the early part of January, I recall him coming back 
and continuing to express increasing dismay that the initiative 
was moving forward and that his arguments were apparently 
not winning the day. 

.0. Do you recall if he indicated, after that January 
7 meeting -- 

MR. McGRATH: Do you specifically recall the 
January 7th meeting and a discussion of that or is this just 
a general time frame? 

THE WITNESS: It's a general time frame. I don't 
recall. I couldn't tell you if it was 7 January, 8 January, 
or whether there were three meetings in a row. I'm just 
giving you a general appraisal of early January. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q In that general time frame, the first 10 days or 
so of January, do you recall the Secretary indicating that 
the Attorney General had given an opinion as to the 
legal ability of these transactions — 

A Somewhere in that time frame, the Secretary, after 
one of these meetings, reported to me that the Attorney 
General had provided an opinion that said it could be -- there 
were no legal impediments to doing it the way they were 
thinking of doing it. 



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<.» - 

Q Did the Secretary express to you his own 
opinion on that matter? 

A On the legal issue? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A No. He essentially said that the Attorney General 
had rendered information that suggested — that said it was 
legally proper to pursue it the way they were pursuing it. 

Q Did the Secretary express his opinion to you as 
to the effect of that initiative on the terrorism policy? 

A He held the same position then that he'd held 
throughout the fall, that it was not an initiative he thought 
was useful with respect to our strategic policy, our terrorist 
policy, our arms transfer policy. 

Q All right. 

Sir, we have received information from Mr. Koch 
that on or about December 3rd, 1985, he received a telephone 
call from Colonel North asking him to obtain information 
about TOW pricing and he requested Noel Koch to negotiate 
a price with a man who he gave the code name "Bookkeeper," but 
It was Abraham Benjoseph, of the Israeli Purchasing Office 
in New York, and Mr. Koch has testified to us that there came 
a time when he had a meeting with Benjoseph at the TWA Lounge 
at National Airport and negotiated that price. 
Do you recall these events? 

A No. j.^* **",•' ,^^ 



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■0 All right. 

Sir, I'd like to provide — 

A We're talking about Ben Joseph? 

Q Yes, sir. 

I'd like to provide you with — 

A What price was negotiated, how much the U.S. 
Government would sell to the Israeli Government TOWS? 

Q Yes. 

The information we have was that Mf . North informed 
Mr. Koch that Michael Ledeen had negotiated a price of $2,500 
per TOW and that Mr. North came to know that this was too 
low and requested Mr. Koch to obtain a higher price. 

Mr. Koch has told us that he obtained this 
information and he claims that upon meeting — or shortly 
after meeting with Mr. Ben Joseph, in which they agreed at a 
$4,500 price per TOW, that he went to see you. He doesn't 
recall if he saw you at your home, though that was his 
thought, but he recalls seeing you almost immediately after 
learning this information. 

He places the date of his discussion with you 
at about the 13th, 14th of January 1986. 

A Uh-huh. 

Q And he's provided us with sworn testimony as to thes< 
facts. 

A Did you say that he spoke to Colonel North in 



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December of * 8 — 

Q Yes, sir. 

A And now we're suddenly in 13 January '86? Six 

weeks later? 

Q Yes. He said that what was involved was a period 
in which he tried to obtain price information. There were 
some holidays and apparently some difficulties with travel 
schedules in setting up the meeting which occuired at the 

airport. 

But he tells us that he returned from that 
meeting and immediately informed you of the progress and the 
price, and that you told him that he should go with you and 
see the Secretary and provide this information and that there 
took place a meeting in the Secretary's office that when you 
and he went into the office, Mr. Tafe was there. There was 
some small talk; Mr. Tafe did not leave and Mr. Koch told 
the Secretary about his adventure at National Airport with 

Mr. Benjoseph. 

What I — my question to you, do you recall these 

events? 

A This is about the 13th or 14th or somewhere in 

there? 

Q That is where Mr. Koch dates it, though it is 
possible that it could have occurred at some point prior to 
that time. 



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A I wouldn't speak on it. I don't have a very 
strong recollection of such a meeting. I think I recall Noel 
coming "to see me an^ saying that a price had emerged from 
all of this discussion and I think we may have well gone in 
and talked to the Secretary about it, but the part about the 
TWA Lounge at National Airport and Ben Joseph and all that, 
I simply don't have any recollection of that or trying to 
get the price up from 2,500 to 4,500, and also that Ollie 
had asked him to do this way back in December, and it is 
now the 14th of January. I'm having a hard time — a pre- 
recollection of a suggestion that the price had to be moved 
up. Twenty-five hundred doesn't ring any kind of a bell with 
me because -- that's just too low-ball a price to start with. 
I don't know where that entered the equation. 

Q But you recall Mr. Koch at some point coming to 
you and — I'll ask you to tell us in your own words what 
your recollection is. 

A My recollection is that sometime during this 
period as we get closer to the event, Noel may have come in 
to give me a back-brief, and I may well have — I have a 
recollection of us going in and talking to the Secretary 
about it, but it doesn't stand out particularly in my mind, 
frankly, because it was just one of the number of conversations 
in a rolling basis we were having about that point on the whole 
subject of pricing and availability as we got closer and 



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closer to the actual decision to move forward. 

Q I understand. 

Why would you and Mr. Koch go into the Secretary 
about a price matter if the price had not been earlier — 

A I'm not sure if it was just price. I think Noel 
asked to see the Secretary. My recollection — if it serves 
me correctly — Noel ask=d to see the Secretary, or between 
us, we allowed as how this thing is moving right along and 
you'd better come in and give the Secretary, you know, the 
information you're now carrying around. But I specifically 
do not remember that the information he was carrying around 
was information that resulted from a request from Oliver 
North to him to get the price moved up from 2,500 to $4,500. 
I singly don't remember that. 

Q I see, but you recall that there was a tine when 
you and Mr. Koch week to the Secretary and Mr. Koch relayed 
a price to the Secretary for TOW missiles. 



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A He related to the Secretary the current state of 
play as he knew it. I don't recall him running in from the 
airport or that he was doing it in response to a previous 
six-week-ago request from Oliver North. 

I do have a recollection of Noel coming in one 
afternoon by mutual agreement between he and I thtt it would 
be useful for the Secretary to hear the latest state of play 
as Noel was receiving it, as Noel had come across it. I 
don't recall anything related to Noel serving as the NSC 
agent to get the price up. 

Q I understand, sir. Can you tell us what you do 
recall of Mr. Koch's report to the Secretary? 

A Very little other than he came in -- and if this is 
about the 14th « we are in a few days of consummating the 
arrangement. It was just an informational brief on the 
state of play. I don't specifically remember discussion of 
price. I wouldn't dispute Noel. 

Q Do you recall Mr. Tafe being there? 

A Not specifically. But if it was a late afternoon 
session, that would be quite — 

Q Would it help you to recall that Mr. Tafe was not 
necessarily supposed to be there, bad-been in the Secretary's 
office on a prior matter and didn't get the message that he 
should leave, and that there was some — 

A I would be surprised if any such message was 



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delivered- to him. As the Deputy Secretary, he was privy, 
the full Deputy Secretary, on these matters, and was not 
unmindful of this whole arrangement. 

It was very usual for Mr. Tafe and the Secretary 
and myself to be sweeping up business at the end of the day, 
and if I brought Noel in at that time, it was up to Mr. Tafe 
to either stay or leave, as he chose. Nobody would have 
asked him to leave. 

Q Do you recall in that discussion any discussion of 
legality of transfers? 

A I can't recall. 

Q Do you recall the Secretary making any comments 
as to whether the transactions apparently contemplated were 
legal or not? 

A No. I don't recall any specific discussion. 

Q Do you recall if Secretary Armitage was present 
at that discussion? 

A I do not recall. 

Q Do you recall if in providing this information to the 
Secretary the information was related to arms that would be 
transferred or arms that had been transferred? 

A Would be. All of our conversations had to do with 
"would be" . 

Q Sir, do you recall a speech at Fort McNair — 



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CAS- 3 1 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

2 BY MR. LIMAN: 

3 Q Before you leave this meeting, do you recall 

4 Mr. Koch expressing some concern about whether he could go 

5 to jail for participating in the sale of arms -- 

6 A No. 

7 Q — to Iran? 

8 A Mr. Koch — 

9 Q Or anyone else? 

10 A No. I really don't. 

11 Q Do you recall the Secretary expressing his own 

12 concerns before the Attorney General gave his opinion about 

13 the legality of selling to Iran? 

14 A Yes. I can't give you a specific date in time, but 

15 the Secretary was always concerned that we had to make sure 

16 that whatever was being done was legal and it wasn't clear 

17 that such an arrangement could be made without the right 

18 sorts of notification to the Congress. 

•|g Q And it was in the context of the Secretary's 

20 concern about the legality that he at some point reported to 

21 you that the Attorney General had apparently given, an 

22 opinion? 

23 A Yes, sir. 

24 Q And before the Attorney General had given the 

25 opinion, the Secretary had expressed some concerns about 



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whether this could be done without notification? 
A That is a fair assessment. 

Q For what it is worth, I think that the Attorney 

General and the Secretary participated in a meeting on 
January 16, which would have been after this date and the 
day before the finding, with Mr. Sporkin and other 
lawyer types. 

MR. SAXON: Could we go off the record a second? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. SABA: Back on the record. 

I have, sir, the next exhibit, which I will put 
before you and give you a chance to look at it. It is a 
note from Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter. The date is 
January 15th, 1986. 

(The document referred to was marked for identifica- 
tion as C.P. Exhibit 7.) 
THE WITNESS: The whole note isn't here, of course, 
but let the record reflect, I think this is -- it starts off, 
beginning, "Continuation of last note..." So I think there 
is a preceeding paragraph. 

MR. SABA: There is actually -- 

MR. LIMAN: Series of notes on that day. 

MR. SABA: Series of notes on that day. The one 
I am most concerned with is the subject matter discussed 
here. It actually continues on to other pages, as well. 



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69 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. SABA: 

Sir, are you familiar with the events described 



here? 



A I recall that night we -- the Secretary was giving 
a speech at the National War College. It was a conference 
that Noel Koch was sponsored for. I think it was on 
low intensity warfare, or something like that. 

And somehow in the late afternoon as we were 
getting ready to go over to this speech, we again were 
talking about this matter, and I sat with Colonel North 
at the same table, and I recall a discussion with 
Colonel North about the matter, and we were -- I was 
posing various questions to him. 

I don't recall if these are the specific questions, 
and, of course, they are not the specific answers. They are 
the answers that Colonel North subsequently related at a 
later -- later that evening as the answers. 

Q I understand. 

A But I did have a conversation with Colonel North. 

Q I understand, and I ask you if you would relate 
to the best of your recollection your own — 

A I recall the second question. I do recall that 
somewhere in the development of this initiative -- and once 
again now, the train is really picking up steam here. I 



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think- we are — are we on the 14th or 15th? The 15th? 
MR. LIMAN: The 15th. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q The meeting was on the 14th, the evening of the 
14th. 

A The evening of the 14th. I recall that at some 
point we learned -- and I don't know how -- that an 
intelligence exchange was part of this arrangement, and I 
apparently was -- I recall trying to get some more 
information about that so I can make it available to my 
secretary. 

The name Copp I don't ever remember having — no, 
I just don't have a recollection as to who that was at the 
time. I assume it is General Secord. 

Q Yes, sir. 

MR. LIMAN: I think I may have mentioned Secord to 
you. 

BY MR. SABA: 

Q Did he mention Secord to you? 

A I can't remember — 

Q Do you recall, sir, if to that day you had any 
knowledge of General Secord 's involvement in the initiative? 

A I cannot recall specifically, but I probably did. 
General Secord, I am sure I had knowledge over the fall that 
he was in some way participating on the NSC side of this issue. 



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When I knew that, how I knew that, I cannot answer. 

Q Let's go back to the evening of the 14th, and if you 
can tell us as you can recall what the exchange with 
Colonel North was and your concerns. 

A I recall discussing the intelligence matter. I 
nave a vague recollection that we probably talked in general 
terms about the price. 

With respect to the first question, I don't recall 
a specific discussion on that, although I may have -- we 
may well have discussed it. 

Q Do you recall why you would have asked about the 
price? 

A No, I do not. I don't know -- I can't remember 
what motivated me to enter into discussion with Colonel 
North that evening. I can't remember if I was -- if the 
Secretary had asked me to get some additional information 
or Noel and I had had a conversation. I can't remember why 
I entered into a conversation with Colonel North and the 
subject that night, but we did. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. LIMAN: 

Q General, can you remember talking to the Secretary 
about the structure that was being proposed for the 
contemplated sale to Iran? 

A I think by this point in time we knew that the 



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structure would be -- the alternatives being proposed were 
either a direct transfer to Iran or Israel moving it on and 
then us replenishing Israel. 

Q Do you recall that on one of the alternatives 
of the direc t sale to Iran, the question was being presented 
of whether the Department of Defense would sell directly to 
Iran using an agent? Do you remember that? 

A Not specifically, Mr. Liman. I just recall that 
when we finally got to the 17th, the arrangement that 
the Secretary had worked out with the others who were 
these interlocutors in this matter was that regardless of what 
alternatives had been thought of, the way that we were going 
to do it was the CIA will do it. And the only involvement 
of the Department would be to give the missiles to the CIA. 

Q Was that because of price or notice or for some 
other reason? 

A I don't think it was because of price. I am not 
sure that price played a part in it. I think it came out that 
way because it — frankly, I think because it minimized the 
DOD involvement. 

Q Because the Secretary of Defense felt more 
comfortable saying we will sell it to the CIA, and what the 
CIA does with it is its business? 

A He did not see it as something that was the 
Defei 



»nse Department's |-6£d},i'<tdie", transferring of weapons to 



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a country such as Iran. It is not one of the missions, roles 
of the Defense Department to be involved in that kind of 
transaction. 

To the extent that such a transaction was going to 
take place, it should be handled by elements of the Government 
that are able and agree to handle such transactions. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q So you would say that the Secretary simply didn't 
want the Department of Defense to do it? 

A That was my impression. He didn't want the 
Government to do it, but if it was going to be done, then it 
ought to be done by those agencies of Government that 
have this as a more appropriate part of their mission. 

Q And that the reason he didn't want the Department of 
Defense to do it was one of policy, would you say? 

A I think it is policy in terms of not whether we 
should be doing this at all, but policy in terms of it is 
not appropriate for the Department of Defense to be making 
this kind of exchange. It isn't an FMS sale. It was not 
any one of our security assistance arrangements. Therefore, 
it was not something the Department of Defense should be 
doing. 

But under the Economy Act, the Department of 
Defense clearly can respond to a request from another 



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Government agency to provide assets that the Department has 
that the other agency does not have, but the other agency has 
a need for. 

MR. McGRATH: Was it a feeling that the Department 
didn't have the expertise capability to do it or that it 
just shouldn't be involved — 

MR. LIMAN: Isn't within its mission, as I understand 

THE WITNESS: Wasn't within its mission because 
clearly — well, I think that answers the question. 

MR. SAXON: Do you recall any decision that was made 
at the Pentagon or into which the Pentagon had input that it 
not be an FMS sale in order to avoid congressional 
notification? 

THE WITNESS: No, the last time — to the best of 
my recollection, once the -- we gave the Secretary a 
point and essentially told him that this is something 
that is notifiable if it is a FMS sale, and I think the 
point paper clearly shows that we just do not break it up into 
little packages to get around that impediment, even though 
I think the language is a little awkward about evade 
Congress, and the next two paragraphs show exactly how you 
cannot evade Congress. 

It even says in the the ;next-to-the-last subparagraph 
that even if you could figure out that this is the best thing 
to do in the national interest, you would have to let 



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Senator Lugar and Congressman Fascell know. So the record 
in that point paper is clear that there is a responsibility 
to advise Congress, whether you broke it up or you didn't 
break it up. And if you thought about breaking it up, you 
would still have to go to the chairmen concerned. 

So clearly on record that a notification is going to 
be required. That is the last time I recall presenting the 
information to the Secretary or talking to the Secretary about 
congressional notification requirements, which was handled 
subsequent to that in a different system. 

MR. SAXON: I think that you are right in that 
assessment, but someone apparently made the decision that 
they didn't want to go the route that would require 
congressional notification. Do you have any knowledge of 
who made that decision and how it was reached? 

THE WITNESS: No. The next — once we had this 
point paper, the — I do not recall ever being asked again 
how this would be done in the security assistance channel. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q Your suggestion here, sir, is that it wasn't done by 
DOD because DOD did not wish to go through the mechanisms 
necessary to do a transfer which involved congressional 
notification. Is that the reason it was then tasked to the 
CIA? 

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judgment. If somebody had said to DOD, make a transfer of 
weapons to Israel and they have the money to pay for them, 
there 'is an established procedure to do that. It wasn't 
the Department was unwilling. 

The Department never got tasked to do that, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief. 

Q So following that to the Fort McNair meeting, I 
believe there was a meeting on January 16th in 
Admiral Poindexter's office, and do you recall that meeting? 
A Not specifically, but I accept your — 
Q Do you recall after the Fort McNair meeting 
providing any additional information to the Secretary, 
the following day, or in connection with the meeting on the 
16th? 

A No. 

Q You didn't relate to him the answers Colonel North 

provided you? 

A I may have discussed within the fact that — I am 
reasonably sure I discussed with him the fact that Colonel 
North and I had a conversation, but that was just still in 
the sense of keeping him up-to-date, that this thing is 
moving along, and this is what is going on, just as I would 
have brought Mr. Koch in a couple of days earlier. I was 
trying to make every effort to see that the Secretary was 
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AS-13 1 Q Sir, you continued to keep him informed and you 

2 told him of Colonel North's questions and response that you 

3 made , "including , perhaps, the issue of price. 

4 A The issue of price may well have been mentioned. 

5 The Secretary never really concerned himself much about price. 

6 He had no reason to, and neither did I, frankly. It is 

7 just that there was always a lot of discussion about price 

8 because depending on the model of TOW missile that you 

9 bought, the price varied considerably, and as we will learn 

10 later, you could really get into a swamp talking about the 

11 price of the TOW. 

12 But in the context of the times, the price issue 

13 was not of great import. It is not anything that would have 

14 locked into my memory, because we didn't -- all we knew is 

15 that at some point a price had to be determined. 

16 Q Do you recall on or around the 15th whether the 

17 Secretary asked you to obtain a legal review of any documents 

18 which you might have returned to the Department with? 

19 A No, not that I recall. 

20 Q Did he ask you to obtain any legal advice in the 

21 Department concerning a transfer to the CIA Sod from the CIA 

22 subsequently to a third party, particularly Iran? 

23 A No, not that I recall. 

24 What do you recall happened next after the Fort 

25 McNair meeting? And I would appreciate it if you would just 



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give us the story over the next few days in your own words. 

A Either the Friday night — I don't have any -- 
from Fort McNair, the nex t event that is locked in is 
either on Friday night or Saturday morning, I can't recall. 
The Secretary communicated to me that a.decision had been 
made, and that TOWs were to be transferred to the CIA. The 
number is 4,000. 

I can't remember if I had any conversations with 
John Poindexter during that same Friday night, Saturday 
morning, but as a result of that direction, I called 
General Max Thurmond, who was the Acting Chief of Staff of the 
Army, and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and he was a 
very, very old and dear friend. We were lieutenant colonels 
together, so I knew him rather well. 

And because of the sensitivity of the mission, the 
fact that it was being treated with the greatest sort of 
compartmentatioa, and frankly, there might have been lives 
at stake, I told him I needed to see him on a matter of some 
importance. 

He was at work, and I went down to his office 
from my home at Fort Myer, and one-on-one, I told him that 
there was a requirement for 4,000 missiles to be made 
aveuilable on demand as they needed them to the CIA. It was 
a tasking that had come from the National Command Authority, 
and he knew that to mean the President, and that it had been 



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CAS-15 1 determined to be legally sufficient to do it, and he could -- 

2 I was essentially giving him a warning order so he could spend 

3 the weekend figuring out how he would do this. 

4 And that it was to be held to the closest group of 

5 people possible, and I gave him absolutely no indication of 

6 the destination of the missiles. 

7 Q Sir, in taking it back a bit, you say it was tue 

8 Secretary who informed you of the decision? 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q Do you recall — I think you said the number was 

11 4,000? 

12 A 

13 Q 

14 A 

15 week. 

16 Q All right. I would like to get to that, but I 

17 just wanted to take it, if you don't mind, take it very 

18 slowly. 

19 A It could have been. I don't recall. But 4,000 

20 is what is locked into my memory. 

21 Q And do you recall — what did he tell you to do? 

22 Just to put it through the usual channels? Did he give you 

23 any further instructions? 

24 A His instruction was 4,000 to the CIA. We will use 

25 the Economy Act. He clearly was not happy with the tasking 



Yes. I remember 4,000. Yes, sir. 

Could it have been 4,500? 

It turned to 4,500 over the next several days or 



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"AS-ie 1 he was giving me. And I don't sense that he gave me much 

2 more -- or recall that he gave me much more guidance than that- 

3 I didn't need much. more. 

4 Q And the reference to the Economy Act is the question 

5 of, I take it, of the pricing of the missiles and the -- 

6 A It was more than that. It was an indication that 

7 we were providing a service to the Cenv.ral Intelligence 

8 Agency. 

9 MR. LIMAN: I am correct that the only way you can 

10 sell to the CIA is under the Economy Act? 

11 THE WITNESS: That is my understanding, but I 

12 would need to get a lawyer — 

13 BY MR. SABA: 

14 Q How did the number change to 4,508? 

15 A Some time over the next week -- and I can't quite 

16 recall how — either from the Secretary or one of my 

17 NSC interlocutors. It might have been Admiral Poindexter or 

18 Colonel North, I really don't recall. Or it might have been 

19 that the CIA told the Army, once I put them in touch with 

20 each other, that the number was up to 4,500, and I became 

21 aware of it, it came back to me. and I confirmed it with 

22 the -- let the Secretary know about it, and there was no 

23 objection, and it was at that noint that I realised that -- 

24 well, I have answered your question. 

25 Q I am trying to understand where the extra 508 



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came from. 

A The number that was given to me was 4,000, and 
sometime in a very — within the next week or two, that number 
was increased to 4,500. And whether it was 4,508 or not, I 
don't know. I just recall it being 4,500. 

Q But you wouldn't have increased that on your own? 
A On my own? Oh, no. 

MR. LIMAN: He said that it came from either the 
Secretary or from the NSC. 

BY MR. SABA: 
Q And you don't know. 

MR. LIMAN: And you understood that it might have 
come -- 

THE WITNESS: As a matter of information, once I 
talked to General Thurmond, and he put me in touch with 
the logistics people in the Army, General Russo, at that 
point I put General Russo in touch with the CIA and from then 
on in I was in nothing but a mongering role. 

MR. LIMAN: Is this when you learned that the 500 
were to be used to replace earlier shipments to Israel? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. It was at that point that 
things clicked, and I said — I started to find out about 
the other 500, I just realized at that point that a 
transfer must have taken place and this is the replenishment 
of some kind. 



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BY MR. SABA: 
Q Did you share your view on these 500 with anyone? 
A- I can't specifically state, ;but I would be willing 
to speculate that Mr. Armitage's testimony and the Secretary's 
would also recognize and corroborate that, too. And we all at 
that point realized — I might have learned it from 
Armitage. i just don't recall. 

Q Did you have any instruction or any understanding 
that this — the filling of the order should bypass their 
s y s t em 2^^^^^^^^^ 
A No. The^^^^^^^^|system was not something 
the Secretary would have recognized a^^system. And lots 
has been made of bypassing ofth^^^^^^B system, but 
don't think I bypassed the^^^^^Js ystenu I took it 
the top of the ^^^^^^^Tystem.^ General Thurmond sits in th 
Army at the to ^^h^^^^^H system. And when 
go to General Thurmond as a tasking, I did not in any way 
restrict how he accomplished it other than to tell him that 
it should be kept to the smallest number of people possible. 

My understanding is that h e then turned to 
Colonel^H^Hwho was his^^^^^Aof f icer , 
correct, and so I don't sense that we bypassed the 
[system. 

It wasn't used, but it wasn't bypassed in any 
deliberate, in any conscious kind of way. 




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MR. SAXON: Did you go to General Thurmond, though, 
because he was head of the^^^^^^^^^V system and because 
General Wickhaim- was out of town and he was the acting chief? 

THE WITNESS: He was the acting chief. My standard 
practice for dealing with matters within the Department 
when I was representing Mr. Weinberger was to talk to the top 
merely because it reduced conlusion. 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Did you have any conversation in this period 
with either Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter concerning 
avoiding either the^^^^^^^^^^^system -- 

A No. 

— or avoiding providing information to the 
Joint Chiefs? 

A No. I don't recall any restrictions on talking 
to the Joint Chiefs. It did not come up. 

Q I am sorry. I didn't hear you. 

A I don't recall any restrictions given to me 
by Admiral Poindexter with respect to talking to the 
Joint Chiefs. It just never came up as a subject. 

Q So I am clear, it was not your intention to 
bypass the^^^^^^^^^Hsystem in giving the order to 
General Thurmond; is that correct? 

A That is correct.^ It never entered my mind to use or 
not to use the ^^^^^^^^^| system. It simply was not -- I 




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did not go down an alternate path that said, oops, I better 
bypass t he j^^^^^^^^H system. I had a specific tasking 
that had come from the proper authorities, and had been 
rendered legally correct by the proper authority, and had been 
given to me by the Secretary of Defense. Not to over- 
complicate it, but we needed 4,000 TOWs , and the place you 
get 4,000 TuWs is from the Department of Army, so I went to the 
Department of the Army and provided them the tasking 
to come up with 4,000 TOW? 

A 

Q Between January 17th and, say, November 1st of 
'86, did anyone ever come back to you in that period and 
ask whether or not they should go through the 
system or raise that issue with you again? 

A I left the middle of March. From January 17th 
until the time I left, I had some discussions with people in 
the Army, General Art Brown, the Director of the Army Staff. 
I think I talked to General Wickham about it once. 
General Russo was my usual interlocutor, because he was the 
action officer, and from time to time the point was made 
not so much about the^^^^^^^^^H system, but about 
the notification. 

Q I would like to get to the notification in a 
minute, but I just wanted to clear up thi 

A I don't recall anyone ever saying "you fou led up" 
or "you should have taken it and sent it to the 






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system". Because — I am familiar with the^^^^^^^^^H 
system which exists for CIA requests that are coming to the 
Department. This was a request that was coming from the 
National Command Authority for the Department to provide a 
service to the CIA, which was a rather simple, clean 
tasking to provide them 4,000 missiles. So it didn't seem to 
me it was necessary, you know, it just didn't dawn on me 
or occur to me to enter the^^^^^^^^^^^ystem by calling 

Ithe Joint Staff. Having called the Vice Chief 
of Staff of the Army, he sits as not only at that date the 
Acting Chief of Staff,! 




Q I would like to move to the issue of notice, which 
you began to discuss, and I will ask you to just tell us 
what you recall. 

A My recollection is that at the time the finding was 
signed and the tasking was given, it had come from the 
National Cominand Authority, and it had been determined to be 
legally sufficient. My understanding that by "legally 
sufficient", the authority existed not to make a notification 
at this time. But that a notification would be required at 
some point, and so, therefore, go ahead with this, and 
notification will be handled at the appropriate time by the 
appropriate agency. 

So that is my understanding. The Army, after they 



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started to work the problem, recognized that a notification 
was required, but they also understood that the notification 
was to be made by .the person who was responsible for 
notifying and it wasn't the Army. They didn't even know 
where the missiles were going. They were merely providing 
an Economy Act service to the Central Intelligence Agency, 
but they knew at some point notification was going to be 
required. 

And so I guess it was in March at some point 
that the Army General Counsel in discussion with the 
Director of the Army Staff and General Russo and others 
got nervous, quite correctly, and sent me a memo on the 
subject. 

Q Our next exhibit is exhibit 8. It is a three- 
page document. The first are handwritten notes. The second 
is a memorandum for Vice Admiral Poindexter dated 
12 March 1986. And underneath that is a memorandum 
for the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
dated 7 March 198 6, and signed by Arthur Brown, Lieutenant 
General, GS, Director of the Army Staff. 

(The documents referred to were marked for 
identification as CP. Exhibit 8.) 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Is this — is the third page of this exhibit the 
memo which you just referred to? 



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CAS-2 3 1 A Yes. 

2 Q Can you tell us what you did on receipt of this 

3 memo? 

4 A Upon receipt of it, I read it, I showed it to the 

5 Secretary, and told the Secretary that the Army is 

6 uneasy about this transaction, they have a point, and that 

7 what I was going to do with the memo was provide it to 

8 Admiral Poindexter. 

9 Q And I take it the second page of this exhibit 

10 dated 12 March is that cover memorandum? 

11 A I dictated this, had it typed, and I handed it to 

12 Admiral Poindexter. 

13 Q You handed it to him personally? 

14 A Personally. The Secretary's conference room after 

15 breakfast. 

16 Q Did you have a discussion about it with him? 

17 A I said -- it was after one of our regular breakfast 

18 that we had once a week with the National Security family. 

19 And I said, John, I am going to give you this memo from 

20 the Army because they are concerned over the notification 

21 requirement, and you are the ones handling that, and the 

22 Army doesn't even know to whom the missiles are going, and so 

23 I have got to give this to you, and you can handle it 

24 either with the agency or however you plan to do it. And 

25 he noted it. We didn't discuss it any further. It didn't 



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require discussion. He put it in his folder and left with it. 
And I see now he wrote a note to Paul. 

Q Do you know -- the reference "Paul", do you know 
who that would be? 

A I speculate that it is Commander Paul Thompson. 

Q Do you recall if Admiral Poindexter told you he 
was taking any specific action? 

A I don't recall that he was — that he said he would 
take any specific action. He acknowledged receiving the 
memo and he acknowledged that a notification was required, 
but that doesn't surprise me because we always knew that a 
notification would be required at some point. So he 
acknowledged that he took it. 

Q I take it he didn't tell you what he was going to do 
about it? 

A No. 

Q So he took the memo from you and did you have any 
further inquiries about it subsequently? 

A No. Never again. I reported to the Secretary 
that I had given it to the proper person, and I may have 
told Art Brown who was concerned about it that I had passed 
it on. 

MR. McGRATH: When did you leave, again? 
THE WITNESS: About a week after this. I think 
the 17th of March. 



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MR. SABA: The time is growing short and there are 
other people in the room who maybe want to follow up on some 
of these questions themselves, so I am going to stop and 
review my own notes. 

MR. LIMAN: I have not been shy about interposing 
questions, as you noticed, as we went along. 

MR. McGRATH: Let the record reflect that it is 
not surprising us. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I have a couple of quick questions. A follow-up 
on the meeting, the luncheon meeting that Mr. Armitage had 
with Colonel North on December 3rd of 1985, after the 
reports indicated there were ongoing discussions between 
American officials and Iranians. Do you recall Mr. Armitage 
you have testified that he told you about that. Do you 
recall him saying that he said something to the effect. 
Colonel North, there are people meeting with the Iranians 
and discussing this matter, and Ollie said, yeah, it is me? 

A I don't recall if Mr. Armitage passed that 
observation on to me. 

Q The point being not just thatrthey iwere talks 
ongoing, but that Colonel North confirmed to Mr. Armitage 
that he was involved in those talks. 

A I don't recall that specifically. 



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Q Mr. Saba asked you earlier about General Malone. 
Do you recall even Mr. Koch or Mr. Armitage indicating 
that on or about the 2nd of January 1986, that they had 
occasion to meet with General Malone to discuss TOW 
prices with the Israelis? 
A Who? 

Q That Mr. Koch would have met on January 2nd with 
General Malone, and that separately Mr. Armitage would have 
met January 2nd with General Malone? 

A I don't recall. I don't have any recollection. 
Q I believe my final question, you in your sworn 
statement to the Department of the Army, I.G., the 
recall testimony that for the record would have been on 
22 December 1986. You indicated after recounting for them 
how the price moved around a lot, a wide range over the 
fall of 1985, and early 1986, for TOW missiles. You 
indicated that your interlocutors at the NSC, one of them — 
and you couldn't recall who, I believe -- indicated that 
finally the price when it got down to about $4,000, or ]ust 
under $4,000, had gotten down to where it should have been 
all along. 

Without going through all of the complicated 
pricing transactions, which we know took place, what can you 
tell us to elaborate on that time? 

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AS-27 1 military officers. I had always been carrying a price around 

2 of a TOW of about $4,000, and suddenly somewhere inflation 

3 had hit itie, and new TOWs, models, had hit me, and I discovered 

4 that you could pay as much as $12,000 for a TOW. 

5 So I recall passing this back, and finding great 

6 surprise that a TOW could cost this much because people 

7 had bought TOWs for much less. And then entering into 

8 discussions with I think mostly John Poindexter about the 

9 concept of replacement or replacement pricing if it is an 

10 FMS sale. The Army gives up an old TOW. It can't buy an 

11 old TOW. It has to buy a new TOW if it wishes to have 

12 not lost a TOW. 

13 Therefore, you have to pay $12,000 as opposed to 

14 $4,000. That kind of discussion. 

15 And I know that this was going on throughout the 

16 whole period, and when they -- I guess Noel and whoever he 

17 was discussing things with came to the conclusion that 

18 it is possible through some means either by getting the old, 

19 coated TOWs or finding another way of pricing it, had 

20 gotten down to something like $4,000. 

21 And so it finally settled out at $4,000, but that 

22 was just sort of a piece of information that was provided to 

23 me. It had no particular relevance to my concerns, because 

24 I wasn't trying to get a low price or a high price. I was 

25 only interested in providing the right price. 



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:as-28 1 Q Okay. For the record, I understand you to be saying 

2 at no point did you put any pressure on General Russo to 

3 come up with a low price? 

4 A Absolutely not. 

5 Q Are you aware — 

6 A In fact, I want to amplify on that. The steady, 

7 continuous, drum beat guidance I gave tQ=the Army and to 

8 General Russo was get every penny that this cost the Army. 

9 I don't care if it is $4,000 or $12,000, because it is the 

10 Economy Act, you ought to get full reimbursement. It is 

11 also my Army that is losing -- might lose money on this. 

12 Q Are you aware of anyone from the NSC putting any 

13 pressure on General Russo to come up with a low price? 

14 A I am not aware of anybody in the NSC putting 

15 pressure on General Russo, nor on me, for that matter. 

16 Q The same question from the CIA to General Russo — 

17 A Not to my knowledge. 

18 MR. SAXON: That is all I have. 

19 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

20 BY MR. GENZMAN: 

21 Q I have got a couple of questions regarding the 

22 TOW point paper, a copy of which we do not have, as we have 

23 mentioned earlier. Can you compare the content to the Hawk 

24 point paper, a copy of which we have as Exhibit 3? Do you 

25 recall similarities? 



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14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



,|0|lSEgRET 



93 



A . I am reluctant to do so, unless we had both papers. 

I think to clarify this, we need to get this 

paper so we all can see it. I have no idea. This afternoon 

is the first I have heard of this problem. 

Q Did you play any role in either preparing qj. 

re vising either of the two point papers? 

A No. No. I had no expertise in the matter. I wouldn 
have revised it. 

MR. GENZMAN: That is all I have. 

MR. LIMAN: Thank you very much. 

MR. SABA: General, on behalf of our Committee, 
the Joint Committees, we wish to thank you for your time. 
We appreciate your efforts. 

THE WITNESS: I appreciate it. I am sorry you 
had to come down here to get it, but I do appreciate 
giving me that opportunity of saving a little travel time. 

(Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m. the deposition was 
adjourned. ) 



'^> 



rrVMi CPrTRP.T 



317 



UNCUSSffl 



Col 




orricc Of thc sccmctamv or ocr cnu 

TMC MIUITAHY A»./TAWT /^ L I 

SEC OCF ? 

JUN18 198S 

/I 



7^ /X^c/ 



( 



fuy 



5 ^!/*0^ 



^-^ 



/ 



Aa 






^ 






>c>/* 



Partially Declassified/Released on Jo xi^HW 

under provisions of LO. 12356 

by 3. Reger, national Security Council 





318 



EYISOK 



90 



. Of rCI 0# TMI •ICRnAAT 09 OinMtl 

TM'HIWT4at««MT««T 1* J«) IS *' 

}Kfn PCR USD<P) 

Youn foe •«!«. Sm ay rtccwnwxJ^tion 
md S«cD*f' « oomntnt on th« atUd^. 
S«cOtf '• OHRKinu n«d M follows: 

*n)U U tlxoct too itturi to raownt 
on. By «li m»rm pus It to Rich, but 
th« MM^lon htrt U: I) th«t Iran is 
About to fftll, «)d 3) w« can ital with 
that on • ruicnAl btsis. MOeiikt 
takinq 0K3h«fi to Mashirtston far s 

Colin L. l>ou«ll 
Kajor Central, OSA 
Sanior Military Assistant 
to tht Stcrttary of Otfcns* 



cc: OtpSacOtf 



EYES 010 




319 



wmmm .^..r^^ 



TMC WMITC MOVSC 
J\)n« 17, ItIS 






91 



we HA r /WITH 

T O ? S BCH ^r^'ATTXCHMrKT 



Sec oer 
Has 8ee^4 



KI><.0R^_\0-Cy. FOR THE HONORXBLX CZORCX P. SMULTt 
Th« Secretary of State 

TKS HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEIHIERCER 
The Secretary of Defense 

SV3JZCT: U.S. Policy Toward Iran (S) 

?>:« Director of Central Zntelli^enca ha* just distributed an SM 
or. "Iran: Prospects for Mear-Tem Instability*, which I hcce yc 
have received. This SNIE rakes clear that instability in Iran* i 
accelerating, w. .h potentially nonentous conseque.nces for U.S. 
stratecie inter sts. It seess sensible to asX whether our 
current policy toward Iran is adequate to achieve our interests. 
Ky staff has prepared a draft KSOO (Tab A) which can serve to 
•tinulate our thinking en U.S. policy towexd Iran. X would 
appreciate your reviewing the draft ea an eyes only besis and 
providing ae with your eo— sats and suggestions. I aji coneerne< 
a^out the possibility of leakage should we decide not to pursue 
this c.har.ge in policy with the President. If yoa feel that we 
should consider this change, then X woold refer the paper to th« 
SXC(rP) in preparation for an WSPG aeetiag with the President. 
(S) 




Hobert C. Mefarlane 






. OHOtASSinEO 



320 



^$f^T?C?t?- 



DRAFT 



THC WMITC HOUf C 



yATiouAi sccuiiTr picmioii ^^ 

PltlCTIVC 

O.t. ypllev Towtrd Ir>n 

Dynamic politie«l •volition- it taking pUct in«id« Iran 
.n.t.biUty cav...d by th# prti.ur.. Itth. Iraq-??*;/ JJ^ 
•conomic itttrioration and rt9i»« infi9htin9 crtat. thi L,,.„. 
for cajor ehan^t* in i„„. th. Soviat Onion it biJtir «£!?!?*" 
than tha U.S to axploit and banafit frc 4„y JcvJr IfrSSJU^Jh! 
ra.ultt in chan^at in tba Iranian rafiM. *« vJll .« I^USiJe 
tocio-pcUtical prasturat. In thit Invironnant. tha aSir«J«'o 
• wS^* "*;• ?<»*P**iW« *'ith teariean and Vattirn intJJJlJI !/ 
unlikaly. Sovi.t tuccatt in takin, advantaft of tha J^JJiL" 
pcvar ttrussia to intin^ata ittalfinlranjould chancTtha 
ttratagie fcalan ca in thaaraajMr^ g__g nanga t na 

{^■Whlla wa purstsa a nuriar of bread 

Lon^-tarr. 9o*it. our pri»af7 thort-tana challansa mctt b« to 
Ciock Kctccv't affcrtt to incraasa Scviat iftfl-^anca (-ov And 
aftar tha daath of Wjo^ini) . TMt vill raq,sira an activa a-d 
•uttaiflad prc^raa to b«ild both our lavaraft and our 
undartta.idin? of tha iatamal titaation ao at to anabla ut to 
•xart a ^raatar and aora cooatrMCtiira inflcanca ovar Iranian 

Tb« noat ixMdlata O.S. intaraatt iacloda: 
(1) 



(2) 



Fravantia^ tha ditiata^ratioo of Iran and pratarvinc it •* 
aa i:)dapafidaat ttrata^ie b«ffar which saparatat tha Scviat 
Onion froa th« rartian Golf; 

Linitin^ th« tcopa an4 opportunity for Scviat actions in 
Iran, whila poaitioain^ ourialvaa to copa with tha chan«ina 
Iranian iatamal situation} 

(3) Maintaining accats to Fartiaa "Culf oil and. ansurin9 
uni»padad tranait of tha Strait of eonuia; and 

# 

(4) An and to tha Iranian ^ovarniMat'a apcr.sorship' of tarroric 
•Tid iti attaaptt to <i«A*f5;i-ii«w*5f .SS^ViT*"-'* «f othar 



321 



DRAFT 

D 93 

W« also •••>. oth«t bro«d «nd i»port«nt, if Itss iiwitdiattlv 
^r9«nt, 90«ls. ' 

(1) Iren'8 rtsuaption of a aod«r«tt and conatmctiva rola aa a 
aaskbar rttpactivaly of tha non-coaauniat political 
comnunity, of ita ration, and of tha world potxolaua 
aconoaty) 

(3) continuad Iranian raai-atanca to tha txpanaion of Soviat 
powar in ^anaral, and to tha Soviat occupation of 
Afghanistan in particular; 

(3) an aarly and to tha Iran-Iraq war which is not maditttd by 
tha Soviat Union and which doas not fundasantally alttr th« 
balanca of powar in tha ration; 

(4) alisination of Iran' a flagrant abusas of husan rights; 

(5) mova:»ant toward avantual normalization of O.S. -Iranian 
diplonatic consular and cultural ralations, and bilataral 
trada/coetmarcial aetivitias; 

(6) rasoluticn of Ajaarican laeal and financial claims through 
tha Ragua l.'ibunal; and 

(7) Iranian aodaration on 09CC pricing policy. 

Kany of our iatarasta will b« difficult to achlav*. Ivt givon 
th« rapidity with which avanta ara aovin^. and th« »agnitud« of 
th« atakaa, it ia clacir that axgant n«w afferta ara raquirad. 
■oviag forward, w« soat b« aspccially carafal to balanca our 
ovolvin^ ralatiooahip with Iraq ia a awnnar that doas not daaagi 
thtt le&^ar tana pzeapacta for Xzaa. 

Fraaant Iranian yplitical tm^ironrant , 

Tho Iranian laadarahip faeaa ita coa^ difficult challangas aiac« 
IStl. Tha r«^i»a*a popularity haa daelinad aifsificantly ia th* 
paat aix aontha. priaarily bacauaa of iatanaifiad diaillusionaa. 
vith a aaajsiagly uaaadia^ war, tha coatiauad iaipeaitioa of 
Zalaiaie eocial policiaa oa a popalatioa iacxaaain^ly raluetant 
accapt such harah aaararaa, and a faltarin^ aconoay brought on 
priatarily by daelinin^ oil ravanoas. Tha ia^ct of thaaa 
problaaa ia iatanaifiad by tha raalixatioa that Ayatollah 
Xhoiteini's santal and phyaical haalth ia fra^ila, which in tun 
caata a pall of oacartainty owar tha daily daeiaiod-aaking 
procasa. 



IINCUSSIFIED 



322 



lui »u.m 




DRAli 



94 



Thi. condition will t.p offici.li' •noriiotind 90v.xni.Jt*' 
r««ouTC.», int.n.ifyin^ diff«,«ne«t uoa9 Iraniw l««d7r« i. tK 
90v,rnm«nt txij. to «void nistatc.s that woold provok. pop«Ur 
uphtivtl and thr««t«n conttnuad control. tw?«i«r 

w^ilc it i* impo«»ibl« to pr.dict the cour»« of th« tmaraino 
pov.r .trugglt. it is possibla to ditctrn savar*! tranda ihiek 
,««at b« accounted for by U.S. policy. Aa doataatie prasauraa 
aount, daciaion-makin9 ia likaly to b« aoncpolixad by indi'idua' 
rapxatantin9 th« aaM unatabla six of xadical. conaarv.tiva ard 
ultra-conaarvativa factions that now control tho Iranian 
90vaxn»ant. Tho lon9«r Xhoataini lin9ars in povar. th« aora 
likaly tha powar «tru99la will intanaify, and th« craatar th« 
r.u.Tj3«r of pctantial laadars who ai^ht affact tha outcoma o' f -m , 
v^strTJ99la. * 

Tha ultieata stran9th of various clarical 9ro«ps and tha pcva- 
coalitions thay aay for» ara not k.Town. Hc^avar, tha waaknassa* 
of various opposition groups — insida Iran and abroad — ara 
avidant, aspacially tha lack of a laadar with scfficiant statu'* 
r to rival WK»aini aad bia idaas. Tha aoat likaly faction ia a* 
] powar atni99l« to shift Iranian policy la diractiona aora 
Saccaptabla to tha Waat — should thair influaaca incraaso — a^r 
/ «»«••'?« tlvas werkiaf froa within tha gevamMat agaiaat th« 
. radicals. tadicaU witMa tba ragiao, and tha laftiat 
I oppoaitioa, ara tha ^roopa aoat likaly to iaflvanca tha coursa e 
\^avants ia ways iaiaieal to Wastara iatarasta. 

Tha Xxaaian ra^vlar ar«ad forcas xaprasaat a potantial sourca el 
both poMax and iacliaatioa to aova Iran back into a aora 
pro-Vaatara peaitioa. Baprasaatativas of avary faction iaaida 
and oataida tha sa^iaa raco^aisa tba potaatial iaportanca of thi 
ailitary and •xm caltivatia^ contacts with thasa forcas. 
Rowavar, as lon^ as tha Azay raaaiaa coMiittad ia tha war with 
Iraq it will aot ba ia a pesitiea to iatarvaaa ia Tahxan. 

Tha othar instxxaaat of stata powar, tha Ravolationary Coard, i 
bacoain^ incraasia^ly fraetarad. It will probably coaM apart 
followiag Khoaaiai'a daath, and aight avaa angaga in a aajor 
powar strugg la bafora thaa. Zn aay scanario« tha Guard will ba 
at tha cantar of tha powar struggla. 



323 



llwfWfetHtB 



M > $uur 



DRAFT 

D 95 



Th« Soviets «r« w«n «w«rt of th« tvelvin^ ««v«lo?»«nt» in ittn 
Th«y will continue to tpply e«rrot-«n4-ttiek inctntivtt to lr«n* 
in th« hop« of brin^in) T«hr«a to Mcteow*t tanu for «n improved 
bil«t«ral r«l«tionthip th«t could s«rv« «• a basis for major 
frovth in Soviat infloanco ia Iran. Moscow vill claarly rasist 
4ny trand toward thm rastoration of a pro-vastara Xraniaa 
90v«rnjMat. 

0«spita strong elarical antipathy to Moscow and cooauaisa, 
Tai iren's laadtrship taaas to hava eof>elud«i 4 th^\ ^iap>ftu>«^..| f,^ 
ralations with tna sovi at- o w i an im ■ "^" tlif *'* * * "" •rinl j n 
intarast . xnay oo not saaa intarastad in iaprovin^ tias with us 
This Iranian assassmant is probably basad oa Tahraa^s viaw of 
what Moscow eaa do for — and against • Iran rathar thaa oa an 
idaolo^ical prafaranca to conduct ralations with Moscow. Th« 
USSK alraady has auch lavara9a ovar Tahraa — ia stark contrast 
to th« U.S. 



Koscov viaws Iran as a 




far aconoaic and 
LS' nca, and possibly avaa ailitary aquipaant. 
Khilo thay hav« ^aratofora balkad at providiitq eajor w««pcn 
•ystaas, tha Soviets aifht rolAX thoir aabar^o if th« rifht 
political oppor.tuniti«s prosontad thaasalvos. Khilo Moscow wouli 
probably aot act ia a sMaaar that savaraly dlsrapts its rolatioaj 
with Baghdad, fivaa Iraq's dapaadaacy oa the OSSa for ground 
fcrc4s aquip«ant( Moacew possossas considarabla rocia fox aanaova] 
if it sansas aajor opoaiaqs ia Tahraa for tha astablishaant of a 
position of sifBifieaat iafloaaca. 

Moscow aay also poxsoa • strataqy basad oa sopport of saparatist 

aovaaants . Tba So^ist Oaioa has^ tj Wplf WOTrtiaitT *** 
c altiirata111T **it lt fr^t^ ^*** ""* "t^'t *i*^ •^«.«^-T^««t^«. 
"**Tr^#ifi Hosi atluUe froupa ara aalikaly to ehallaaqa tba centra: 
qovarasMat ia Tahxaa as loaf as thay fsar savors reprisals. Bat 
in tha areas of Iraa adjacsat to tba Soviet border* the Soviets 
can provide a sacozity OBbrella to protect reballioas ethaie 
froapa froa reprisals. 

Tha 0.8. position in Tehra n is aalikely to iaorova witlwyt s ^^ 
- ' fha challenfa to tJM U.S. in tha 



•ajor chaa 



"period will 



fiSiifiX' 



ba severe. Aay saccessoz reqiae will 
probably seite' power ia tha nasM of Islaa and tha revolution and 



Mussra 



324 



l ei ^tLia ^ 



\iMiM.\i 



ORAF 




Oor l«v«r«g« with irwj !• .b^jply rtductd by Um e«rr*iit *^,.- 

of hostility that .prift,. fr« J. idtolo^ ofthrjIdJLl^ • 

Hor.ov.r, th« >od«r«t« «n4 coB.•r^•.tiv• tltSntl o?thrcUrov 

ho.til. to th« I«l«ic 9<)v«rn«.nt. Mkin^ tcec^iediuS ilth th* 

J5! S;** »•• not .cc.pt.d th« r.vSlution a»d intwdrto rIviJU 
tho court* of •v«ntfl «a4 ln«t«ll « pu3p«t oo*«rruMnt Thi. 
p«rc«ptien h«s b««n rtinforc.d by our M.tJrltloa of*dipl«Ltic 
r«l*tior.« with Xr«,. .ffort. to cut tho flow of .nu to IrU L 
firoct thr«*t« of lulitary .ction in rotali.tioa for ' 

*r»ai«n-in«?ir«d anti-O.s. torrorita. 

C-S. folicv 

Thj dyniBic political fituation in Iran and th« con.aquancaa for 
?v**«^2**'*!** *' 9'o^ia^ Soviat and radical inflgaaS. co«p«l 
tho OJ. undortAic. a ran«« of abort- ani ICB^-tara i-UtiatiJoJ 
that win anhanco ouz loiraxa^o Ui Tahxaa. aad. If poaalblt 
alaiaixa th*t of tho SowUu, Faxtioilar attantloTwlt Ja Mid 
to avoiding aituationa wMeb ccapal tho Iraaiaas to twa S Sa 
Sowiata. Short-tan aaaawaa ahoald ba ondartakaa la a aanaar 
Uiat .orastalla Sovitt pro«;«cts ^rd tnhancas oar aMl^tv 
lifr!^^'.!^'* in<i-i,c-ly, -c bui : ? ^.$. and w*,t*rr: in.'iu;,;ca in 
Iran to tha Mxiaua axtant possibla in tha futura. Planninc fox 
tha following lAltiativas aboald tharafora procaad oa a faat and 
loa^ax-tazB track. Tba ca ayoo a ata of O.S. policy wlU ba tot 



(II 



Encoaxafa Waatara alliaa and frlaods to balp Xraa aaat Ita 
iaport raquirajMota ao aa to radaca tba attractivaaaaa of 



Soviat aaaiatanca and trada effara« wbila daaoaatxatia^ th4< 

M «aat. Thia iaeladaa 



valoa of corrac^ ralatioaa with tha «-».w^. 

proviaioa of aalactad military a^ipMat a« datarmiaad on i 
eaaa-by-eaa« baala. 




TT? fTTir" 



325 






DRAFT 



97 



^f*^ 



^■BHHH^Bon th« tvelutioa of tJM lrtAl«fr^T^«777^^"^ 
^rpo«ti»i« M«iu fox laflatftclM tb« 4iztction of t^ul *?!, 
♦'• bo r««dy to cc-sunieato with lif tltfcooh thoto oriSi,.^ 



countriotl 



•g ot^» 



(4) Tako a4v«nt«9« of ^rowins pelitieol fr«9»«ntatiott byi 

di»«rt«tly eoMMi)ic«tin4 our Utixt for eerroct c\ 

relation* to potontially racaptivo Iranian laadars) ^ 




I 



(5) 
(6) 
<7) 
(i) 



providing support to alaaants oppocad to Xhcsaiai and 
tho radicals. 

Avoid actions which eotald alianata froops potantially 
racaptivo to iaprovad O.S. -Iranian ralations. ^ 

i^ospond to Iranian- SQpportad tarrorisa with Kilitary action 
against tarrorist infrastnactvra. 

Znhanca ok.: affort to discradit Kotcow's Zslasdc cradantial 
with a aora vigorous VGA affort targatad on Iran. 

Oavalop action plan in support of tho basic policy! 

cbjtctiva, both for naax-taxs contingaacias (A.g. daath o9 
Khoeaini) aa w«ll as tho long-tara rastoration of U.S. ' 
inflaaneo ia Tahraa. 



(9) With raspact to tha Coif wart 

Coatlnoo to ancouraga third party initiativas to %aaX i 
aa oad to tho w«x} 



^^{ 



Incraasa military cooparatioa with Gulf Cooporation 
Cooacil coontrias, and holstar O.S. military 'i 

capabilitias ia tho Golf araa to anablo CDVTCQH to ba 
fully capabla of earryiag oot ita aisaioa} aad 

Sooh to corb Iraa*s collaboration with ita radical v 
alllos U.o. Syria and Ubya). 



UNElASSlSe 



326 



I WSCCJ i C f 



98 



■•••k 







to Iran .nd th«t a«9otl«tlon«^y^ tLlI- «i.r^i*^^°* 

Public DlploMcy 

— 2|f public tt«t«Mat« on Iran should brino pr«ssur« to 

I^i: ?!*^^* I«l*». «• th« cocay. but should •»h««is« 
opposition to th« policiM ot^m pr«s„t IrJUn^aJIrn.., 

"•nt« should si. to soeoursg* the. •l.si.nts in Irsn who 
dis«9r«« or oppose rs^ia* policies. 



tconoalc 



\^ 






in sffsct. 




thould rsssssss the sf f sctivsnsss ot present 7 

curbin? sll but strictly civilian exports. 



327 




"^;ClASSi^l9 



99 



•« !a eeajunctien with diseratt pelltieal contacts prope««d 
•bev«, v« could •U99«st to th« Zraalans that eorract ra« 
lations vould inclada r«l«iatloa of current US trad* 
' raatrletioas aad aoraal trad* ralationa with aa Iraniaa 

90v*rnMat that ia abt ho«til* to OS iBt*r*«ta. 

(TS) Z concur with th* balanc* of th* r*coaaMndatioaa ia th* 
draft MSDD in so far as th*y support currant OS policy. My r*coai« 
SMindation* r*fl*ct ay v*ry stron9 viaw that US policy min". ranaia 
steadfast in th* fac* of international lawlessness perpetrated by 
th* Iranian re^ia*. Chang** in policy and ia conduct, tharefore. 
iBUSt b* initiatad by th* Iranian governsent. Sy remaining firnly 
opposed to current Iranian government policies and actions. y*t 
supportiv* of aoderation and a longer tens inproveoMnt ia relations, 
wa caa avoid the future enmity of the Iranian p*opl* and d*v«lop the 
lav*rag* necessary to counter a possibly very dangerous increase in 
Soviet influ*nc*. In particular, w* n**d to b« pr*par*d for a 
poasibl* p*riod of turmoil as th* ragia* b*giBS to ehang*, by 
building up affcctiv* inatrum*nts of influsnc* and aceass to p*opl* 
and organisations within Iran, so as to countar a Soviat attaopt to 
promet* a pro-Soviet successor regime. 



eet Secretary Shu Its 



I'NOASSIflED 



328 



UNaASSffiED 



D 100 






329 



NSJ."" 






ilNCLASSIFIED 



• «nd ciai* 



**^ taply C3 noct of 04/31/8S 13:26 







N 



1 IC j» 

28724 



|«t noon on Friday 22 Nov. 



•• 5EC«r» • 

NOTt FROM: OtlVljt NOHTH 
Subjaet: PRIVAH lUNK CHECK 
Wr<p tp •• of 2030 EDT. 

Th« I«r««U» will d«.liv«r 80 Mod HAWKS 

Th«t« 80 will b« lo*d«d tbo«rd chr«« chart«r«d aircraft, ownad by a propnacary 
which will caka off at two hour intarvli_f o.' Tabriz. Tha aircraft 
fila for ovarflifht throu|h cha||^BB^|^anrouta to Tabrisfr 
Appropriata arraA(«aanta hava baa^sadawith tha prop«r|H^Hkair control 
parionnal .^Oncatha aircraft ha va baan la unchad, thair TapartuTa will b a con- 
flrwadbypHHH who w 1 1 IcallJI^^HHwho 
I^HHHR^'^^^^^ ^^'*c' IHlB^Bii^^^HL^" Salrut ts'coiiact th« fiv« 
rpt fiva AiBcits fro« Hizballah and dallvar thaa to tha U.S. Cabatty. 
Thar* is also tha postibiUty that thay will hand ovar tha Franch hoata^a 
who la vary ill. 

Thar* ia a raquiraaant for 40 additional waapa of tha saa« noaaaclatur* 
for a total raquiraaant of 120. JlSH la payaaat for tha first 80 has 
baan dapositad in tha appropriata account. No aeft will land la Tabrlj until 
tha AMCITS hava baan dalivarad to tha aabassy. Tha Iraalaaa hava also aakad 
to ordar additional itasa in tha futura and hava baaa told that thay will 
ba conaidarad aftar this activity has auccaad«d. All transfar arran(aaaats 
hava baan aada by Dick Sacord, who dasarvaa a aadal for his axtraordlaary 
short notica af forts. 

Raplanishnant arrangaaants ara baing aada through tha MOO purehaslag offica 
in S^'C. Thara is, to say tha laast, considarabla anxiaty that w« will 
soaahow dalay on thair plan to purchasa 120 of thaaa waapona la tha aaxt 
faw days. lAW your instructions I hava told thair agant that wa will sail 
thaa 120 icaas at a prica that chay can aaat. I hava furthar told thaa that 
u* will oaka no affort to aova on thair purchasa LOA raquaat until wa hava 
all fiva AMCITS safaly dalivarad. In short, tha prassura is on thaa. 



Toisorrow wa will dispatch a' covart host'ai a dabriaf caaa to Wia sbadan, 
unda.« covar of an axarcisa . __^^^__ 

^_^ EUCOM will ba told to prapara 
C-14-1 for four-hour alart to pick up any hostagas who aay ba ralaasad 
ovar tha waakand. All of tha partiaa abova will ba told that wa hava 
info (fros tha saaa sourca which advisad us of Wlar'sralaasa) that 
soaa, if not all, AMCIT hostagas will ba turnad ovar|mH| 
batwaan now and Sunday. 

As soon as wa hava th* ralaasa conflraad, wa naad to nova quickly with 
Dafansa to provida tha 120 aissilaa tha Israalls want to buy. Thay ara vary 
concarnad that thay ara dagrading thair dafansa capability, and ia viaw of tha 
Syrian shoot-down yastarday tha PH has placad-considarabla prassura oa both 
Rabin and Kiacha for vary proapt raplacaaaac. Both callad savaral tiaas 
today. 

Thara is tha distinct possibility that at tha and of tha waak wa will 
hava flva Aaarlcana hoaa and tha proalsa of no futura hostage takings la 
axchanga for sailing tha Israalls 120 Nod HAVKs. Daspita tha difficulty 
^^Mkln^a^^hl^fl^n8ld^^96Jjou^window^^l|n't that bad a daal 

HHBHHBl^Bl^mHIH^HBH^^HHiHii^^l vara 

Racocaand pass to RCM aftar raviaw. North. 




UNCIASSIR! 




330 



Memo Fq 



mmim 

OCFCNSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY 



0. 



^r 



or foreign sale. 
■ "' intended for 
tended for tests , 



be $36-52.3 mi 1 lior. . 
added (\RC cost . 



be replaced, so 



I0<2re p*eAXXr<^d. ty rr>e. C^ coo apiece 

\ \ ' — K^ \ L^^^^ ^5 could c 

Aofzn3^iraQrt»r, I>5AA| On or 

-fh<2. f'ZS::\J<ZSi O? Noel k-OCS^h charges, plus 

«3Cv^ci O^YI- Colin P£?VO<iil CyWv 

m Asj5t. -h) 3e<=3>£). J^^y . 

OOC^Q- ?"\XY)liheci -t (TV. kacn~K) IdabU difficulties: 

-fate -h) G<2n. (?(X0CJ1. sales, including 

ec. J of the .^ECA. 

es of $14 million 
or indirect to a 
nclassif ied (except 
ot take place until 
\ if- P-''T\r_ ■ / V/ ys can be waived for 
"^ *~ - //-"f,' t/ transfer has no such 
(^ST'SH^^ ' Siven in any case. 

ij£'''j dered through Israel, 




ken into 5 or 4 
tice . 



r 

Oeclassified/ Released o,i -Sa-r^t^ I9if7 

under proviMons of £.0. 1235G ^ .„iirrinr 

hv R R-'cr »'-'r,-.i , > n ■, ^ against splitting 

Cy 8. Rr.i6f^.,.,o,vJ ;:..:/ Council ^ the spirit and the 
^ *- .. - and all Administrations 



-• It is conceivable that, upon satisfactory consultation with 
Chairmen Lugar and Fascell and their minority counterparts, 
they might agree to splitting the sale into smaller 
packages . 

- The customer countries (UAE and Korea) would have to be told tha 
their deliveries had been rescheduled, but we would not "a^* -°/ 
tell ther. wh)-. Ke would not want to charge them more .or lat e.^ 
deliveries . 




||: DEPOSITION V—- - 



331 









\>LUi\LI 



•n 



Ha^N Viisile? for Iran 



ost as -jc- 

5 m ii 1 i c - . 

C cos t , 
plus 



Missiles are available right nov. , suitable for foreign sale. 
rivere are 16-1 missiles at Red River Arsenal - "" intended for 
UAE and 5* for Korea. Seven of these are intended for tests. 
but the test: can be foregone. 

The missiles at Red River Arsenal cost :5?0,00? apiece. This 
not necessarily a firm price, and replacements could c 
asS-l 3 ","■"'0 apiece. 

Thus the total bill for i:0 missiles would be S36-S2. 
To this, applicable charges would have to be added (NR 
administration charge, packing and transport charges, 
storage 1 . 

The missiles for Korea and UAE would have to be replaced, so 
DSAA will need the money to replace them. 

The modalities for sale to Iran present formidable difficulties: 

-- Iran is not currently certified for sales includinR 
indirectly as a third country, per Sec. 3 of the AECA. 

-- Congress must be notified of all sales of $14 million 
or more, whether it is a direct sale or ^"^J^ff .^° ^ . 
third country. The notice must be unclassified (except 
foJ some details), and the sale cannot take place until 
30 da^r after the notice. ^The 30 days "" J« ^^^;;«^3^°,^ 
direct sales, but the third country transfer has no such 
pfJJision. aAd notice must still be given in any case. 

-. Thus, even if the missiles were laundered through Israel. 
Congress would have to be notified. 

Ki- ♦»,,,. rh» 5ale could be broken into 3 or 4 
■It is conceivable that the saie "-""^ notice 
packages, in order to evade Congressional notice. 

- While there is no explicit injunction against splitting 
^n !n^h a !ale (subject to check...), the spirit and the 
S?actice of tSe^law IS against that, and all Admmist ra t lo: 
have observed this scrupulously. 

- It is conceivable that, upon satisfactory consultation wi-J 
cSa rmeS Lugl? and Fascell and their minority counterparts 
th?y miSht Igree to splitting the sale into smaller 
packages. _^ "^ % 

- The customer countries (UAE and Korea) ^^'^^^^ *^^'% ^ "^fl^Je 'o'' 
IS^ir deliveries had been rescheduled, but we woul*not ha eo 
tell ther. why. We would , not j^ant j:o_ ch_arge Jherr. more, .or 
deliveries . 



UNIliSSIFIED 



332 



y 



mm^i^ 



:^.c political drawbacks are equally for.-.idable: 

•• If Iraq ever found out. thev would be greatly irritat*.-' 
;.-.eir sources of supplv are nore readilv acces lb e han 
• Jespec't. '*''*'■• '° '"•'' "°"^*^ ^' "° '^^'^^ In tilt ' 

•- Saud: Arabia and the other Culf States would also be 
irritated and alarned. 

-- If Israel vere used a? the laundering countrv, thev would 
be greatly encouraued to continue selling to Iran ' anc' to 
expand their sales. 

-- If the sale became known, all bars would be removed fro.Ti 
sales by such countries as Spain, Portugal, Greece, UK, 
Ita-ly, and FRG , countries who are only barely restrained 
from overt, large sales to Iran now. 

-- In short, the risk is that of prolonging and intensifying 
the Iran- Iraq war, while seriously compromising US influence 
over Israel and other countries to restrain sales to Iran. 



mhmm 



333 



,'r 













^% 






f ". ■■ '• 



% ^5 






334 




50M9 



L- ? r;:!:, !!:l::":l Jr'urity Ccjr.cil 



il(^!:i!iSS«Bf8 



"17 



335 



.'rtiriri 







I-' c r ■ ; ■'■•■' ~-i ■>. •. - 




3050 T 




- DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



I EXHIBIT 








1 Iqjni t^u^irHrrni ■ jfnaiygf 



ksnc 






■1 I f 4^ la rttttAjj^ Wxv -L cL 




under ^loviiior.s oi E 12336 
!-.. K lonnyjA National Security Council 



UOKy f >AM,f»^>\ jgqsft'l' Mark. 



fCftO^iJoa. ^rfff ^#^ej c^yrU-y. 



L^ggt 



^fiLte^ 



g. Pfoe<Ar%. 



COKq «■ Kojj p^y^ 




^/Qoi r.'^^4^>. inc^nn 



gTiJ '. liny^, crfaf ^'fl^ 



^niiffliiil ■ 



*Q>tiW' i l) I— iif yiil Ifc . 



■rff i U. i ^ AV jtf iy n ft aU ^ 



j^i^yytri? ItiJivOftt. ^ ko 



£b»,)AiLk. 



-rAtlhiscL 



.ae^ 



*»Wr^ B8BffBBW 



jkot 



^S- 



daviloym* 



eO'Pffldv^h'fln cofMofHu^ 






^AWXaejfi ra^\y *^ 



lkltf-%'4h nichcid. 



a 



DEPOSITION 
EXHIBH 



337 



^ Lk^ ^ 



fsbjs^gg 



UNCUSSIF 



rino: TQ^II 







..l^'iV Itif^nrig,, 



; DEPOSITION 
I EXHIBIT 



£)|^n2^TPV\ 







338 






4j ^ 



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

IMTERNAHONAL KCUWTY AfPUM 
FHtCARCOION 









r 



MEMO ro^ -fY— » 



^Y ^-*^c^ '-Mf "^ "^ ^^' 








^iii 



.i.A i^ *-^ ^.«vi^:t^ ( '•^ 

<V*._v^ v"^^^ .-^^J^ -IV-^ A.»-a . 




V- 5«i •"''■ ■■''■» ^ ^"^^ - ~ ■' • — 







339 







T'>. NSJ1P ••'*?.A 

•^ Reply to not* of 0I/31/I5 I 



NOTt nOH: 0Livi%V»mi 
Sub J act: niVATI lUMK CISCX 

ContlnuAtloa •< laat ooto ihit SCND wh«n I M4ne to hit A£0 LIMtS) ... 
C«t«y b«U«v«t ;h4t C«p will eontinu* ce er«4ta ro«dblo«lu until h« is 
tot4 by you that tha Pratidant wants this to oeva NOW .nnd what Cap will 
hava to aaka it work.' Casay points out that wa hava aow gona threu|h 
thraa dlffarant oathddoleilas in an affort to satisfy Cap's eoocaras 
aa4 that no oattar what wa 4o thara Is alwsys a aaw objaetioa. As far 
as Caaay is coneamad our aarliar aathod o( having Copp daal dlractl/ with 
tha DeO as a purehasln| agant was flna. Ha di4 net saa any particular prcb* 
laa w/ aaklng Copp aa agaat (or tha CIA la this an^aavor but ha Is eoaearaa4 
that Cap will find soaa now objaetion iinlass ha Is t/-M to precaad. Colla 
Powall, who sat naxt to ■• during Cap'a spaaeh askad tha following ^aatioas 
(•y aaswars sra ladlcata^.): 
Q. Ooaa Copp daal w/ Iranians or Israalls? 
A. With tha Israalls. 



Q. Vhat cost ara tha Israalls wilUnt to pay for tha basic TOWST 

A. Thay (thru Copp) hava funds to pay Fair Harkat Value (FHV should 
b« about $4900-S400 aa. dapendlng on aga) and to covar rha coat o( 
tranaportatloa. Tliay do net hava anough to pay for I TOW (about 
$9S00 •» or TOW II ((abewv $13000 aa.). Va hava fra^uaatly sold 
tha Israalis waaps/aatarlal at FMV vlca tha replacaaaat coat to tha 
U.S. Sinca wa hava ovar ICOK of tha basic TOW la our invaatory aad 
cannot avan usa It la training dua to its aga, wa ought to look at thla aa 
en opportunity to collect on a waapea which wa aren't using (ell ara la 
PVR according to Koch) aa^ will avantually hava to dispose of bacausa 

/ wa cannot sail thaa off othervlse. (I'a told that Hughes Aeft, tha afgr. 
has an agraaaant w/ OeO that ell neraal PIS transactions will be haadlad 

-^ as a producar sale la order to kaep OoO fa undercutting tha production 
Una by laUing off old stocks). 

Tha aest racant propoaal (Copp aa ageat for the CIA and talas te tha 
Israalis who thaa dellvar vaaps to the Iranians) can only work If 
wa pan gat tha Isrsells to ceaia up on thalr price, ^havaba^i 
unabla to contact Nil who Is la Europe for a e^evlngJIPIHIHHp Ha 
ttill d<>a8 net know that we are aware that the Iranians hava oT farad 
}10K par TOW. Ha has hewavar left a aassage taat wa sua-, hava a go/ 
go daetslon today and tn^t "»"«<tttQni tP *'*■ eoattnue ta datarlorata . 



yNClASSIFiEO 



Declassified /Released on.l^jJi^^'? 
ir-.'Isr previsions of E.O- 12355 
C. Reger. National Security Council 







340 



UNCUSSlfltO 



i DEPOSITION 

! EXHIBIT 



/2 /-o/Kjf^ 



9897 






^XL^ 



V/^/o^C 




c--^ ^ 



r 



»)/nelcased op I >^^6 g g 
un(1(!r ptovisioris or ED 12356 
by K Johnson, Ndtiona; Secuniy Council 




RECEIVED 
FSI 

NOV 29 1936 
Cooy IS Receiot 



^ 



V 



-"^ 



u 




341 





orricE or thc scckctaav or ocrcNSf 

WAtHINOTON. C 20J0I 






w 



^89S 



12 March 1988 



MEHORANOUN FOR VICE 



ihom 



iUL POZNOEXTEK 



Tht attached mcoiorandun froa th« Director of th« Army staff 
is ••lf-«xplanatorv. It raflact* the un«asa of the Army Central 
Counaal'a off let ovar tha tranafar of Itaaa with which you art 
faaili'ir. As you know, w« hava b«an handlinq this program on a 
vary clost hold basis, and tha Aray has baan told nothing with 
raspact to destination. Par guidance rtcaivad froa NSC, tha Army 
has baan told that thay hava no raaponsibility for Conqrasaional 
notification. Tha Aray has alao baan told that whatever notifi- 
cationa are to be made will be taken care of at the appropriate 
time by the appropriate agency and that the Attorney General has 
provided an ooinion that supports this position. 

The Secretary asked that I make you aware of the Army's 

concerns in the event you wish to advise the OCX or the Attorney 
General. 




Colin L. Poweri 
Major General, OSA 
Senior Military Assistant 
to the Secretary of Defense 



■■^ns of E.O. :?356 "*' 




■ 0. :?356 

• it) Cc;;',ti( 



342 





OIFA«TMCNT OF TMf AMMV 

ii«««HiNor«M e loii* 



.OACS-SO 






'^ 9900 



7 MM ;s;' 



^^ ^ Am. 
M8MORAMD0M POR TBI MLITJUlY^^>#<ISTAirf TO Til SSCRBTAAY Of 0eP8NSI 



SOBJICTj 



Congr««tioa»l Notification of Significant IntalUganca 
ActiTitiaa (0) 



1. rrST^KOPORlf) Oa II January 19K, th« Aray raapondad to a verbal 
taaklng froa your offica to provid* 1,000 T0« aiaailia to th« 
Caotral Intalligaaca Agancy vith a contiagaoey for 3,S09 aora at a 
latar data. Tha first 1,000 aiasilaa vara dalivarad oa 
14 rabruary 19IC to tha CIA. 

ifOj^) Thia raquaat for aupport cireuavantad tha normal 
Syataa for raaaena of sacurity, yat tha support 
aitcaadad tTia II aillioa thraahold aatabliahad ia tha nU 
Intalligaaca Authorisatioa 1111 for rapcrtiag to Coagrasa aa a 
'significant intalliganca activity.* Puada ia axcaad of )3.S 
■i'.lion vara providad by tha CIA to raiaburaa tha Aray for tha 
firat 1,000 aisailaa. Billing aad payaaat vill occur vithin 60 
daya, or vhaa all aissilaa ara dalivarad, vhichavar ia shortar. 
Tha Agancy axpacta to coaplata tha prejaet vithin 60 days. 

3. rM/ WOrORM) SlCDir aaaoraadua o f 13 Juaa 1913, subjactt DoO 
Support ■■■{^■mHBHHH (S), aatablishas caspoasibility 
fo^ notification of Ccagraaa of^eO support to tha Agancy vith tha 
Oapaty Ondar Sacratary of Dafanaa for Feliey. It also confiras 
that priaary raaponaibility raaidaa vith tha Diractor, Cantral 
Intalliganca. Ia tha caaa of tha TOW aisailaa, tha Aray 
undarstanding oa raapoaaibilitiaa for aetificatioa coaforaa vith 
your Juaa 1913 aaaoraadoa. 

4.'>M/H0rOMI) Thla aaao is to aaaura andarstanding of statutory 
raquiraaaata ahoold tbia laaua ba raiaad by ona of tha 
Coagraaaioaal iatalligaaea coaaittaaa ia tha fatura. 






;K..e-^^*^'^ 



o Ucicf. ■"" 



AXnOK 1. BROMV, Jl. 
Llaataaaat Oaaaral, GS 
Diractor of tha Aray Staff 



imh 



CLA5SXPI80 BTi DABF 
0BCLA5SXPT OMi OAOR 




rKii^-Hu 



343 



OINKEL/bap 



UNimm 



\^o>^-l3l^^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 



PartbOy bedaisified/Rlfeaktd < 

UIM ! 



DEPOSITION OF CHAFLLES H. PRICE, II 

Monday, June 29, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., at the 
Operations Center, State Department, with Tim Traylor 
presiding. 

Present: On behalf of House Select Committee: Tim 
Traylor. 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Terry 
Smil janich. 

On behalf of the Witness: George Taft. 



^n 



A 



^Zdl. 



T provisions oi E.O. 123S6 
o, National Security Councr! 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HOHl 




344 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 





(REPORTER'S NOTE: The witness was located at 
tha?Lmerican Embassy in London, England, and was reported 
via a teleconference telephone on a secured State Departinent 
line. ) 

MR. BLANTON: Do you solemnly swear the testimony 
you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

THE WITNESS: I do. 
Whereupon, 

CHARLES H. PRICE, II 
having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, 
and was examined and testified as follows: 

MR. TRAYLOR: We need the name and the position 
of the person for the record who just administered the oath. 

THE WITNESS: Did you get that? 

MR. TRAYLOR: No. We heard the oath. 

THE WITNESS: They need your name so they know who 
administered the oath. 

MR. BLANTON: James Taylor, T-A-Y-L-O-R, Blanton, 
B-L-A-N-T-0-N. Did you copy that? 

MR. TRAYLOR: Yes. Your position? 

MR. BLANTON: First Secretary and Consul, American 
EMsassy in London. 

MR. TRAYLOR: We are ready to speak to Ambassador 



Price. 



'irtiaUy DecUsi.nc _ e -^d on ^^ "-^ ■^'^ ''^'-'^ "^ 
provr',iors cf tO. 12356 
' bv O. Siiko. NjL.or.^! Jecu-!tv Council 



UNCUSSIFIED 



345 



mmmii 



1 

2 

3 

4 
5 
6 

7 

e 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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23 
24 
25 



EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. TRAYLOR: 

Q Mr. Ambassador, for the record, would you state 
your full name and your current position, please? 

A My name is Charles H. Price, the second. I am 
currently serving as the United States Ambassador to the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 

Q If I could, let me ask you at the outset to provide 
us with a little bit of your background. You could start 
with how long you have held your current position and in a 
very brief fashion, if you could just maybe go through your 
schooling and some of your past employment positions for us? 

A I currently serve as the United States Ambassador 
to the United Kingdom since November 1985. Prior to that 
time, I served from June of 1981 to November of 1983 
as United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. 

Prior to entering the diplomatic service, I was the 
Chairman and President of the American Fan Corporation, 
which is a bank holding company in Kansas City, Missouri, and 
as Chairman of the American Bank and Trust Company held 
various directorships and prior to that time had served in 
the U.S. Air Force from 1953 to 1955; attended the University 
of Missouri, 1948 to 1953. 

Do you need anything further? 

A No. I think that is adequate. Could you hold on 



UUSSIEIED 



346 



UNCStssm 



I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

II 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



just a second. 

(Discussion held off the record.) 
BY MR. TRAYLOR: 

Q Mr. Ambassador? 

A Yes. 

Q We are back on now. We are ready to go. 

A Okay. At some particular point, I might mention 
Eleanor Murphy is on the other extension taping the conversa- 
tion, as you know. Whenever that side of the tape runs out, 
I have indicated to her to advise us so we can simply turn it 
over. 

Q Sure. We may have -- our court reporter may have to 
change his tape also. That would be a brief interruption. 

A Fine. 

Q Ambassador Price, at the outset, I would like for 
you to provide us for the record with a chronology of the 
events as you recall them. We have at our disposal a very 
brief chronology that I think you drafted dated May 1st, 1986. 
We also have the benefit of Michael Arraacost's recollection 
in the form of a cable that he sent to Ambassador Shultz-- 
excuse me. Secretary Shultz, after he spoke with you .May 1986. 
But we would like for you to give as complete as possible in 
chronology fppTn your recollection of the events, and I will 
just let you begin and you can provide it how you wish. 

A All right. On or about May 1st-- it could have 




347 



\mmm 



1 

2 
3 

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7 

8 

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10 

n 

12 
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been a day earlier -- I had a meeting here in the embassy 
with my DCM , Ray Seipz, as well as Kim Pendleton, our 
political counsellor. They advised me of the conversation 
that had taken place between Tiny Rowlandjand Bob Fraser. 

I was concerned about that conversation, and 
decided that by reason of the implications both from the 
standpoint of the problems that could develop both to the 
President and those with respect to the conflict 
that existed by what was being suggested with respect to 
oar policy of not selling arms for hostages, and trying to 
prevent other countries from selling arms to Iran, that it 
would be desirable for me to contact Michael Armacost and 
John Poindexter as well. 

As a result of our deliberations and conversation 
here, I undertook to get hold of Michael Armacost on May 
2nd and relate to him the story that had unfolded regarding 
the meeting that Tiny Rowlands indicated he had attended with, 
as you know, I think Mr. Khashoggi and Ghorbanifar and 
I believe Nir. 

You have, I think, as you indicated earlier, my 
conversation with Michael Armacost. 

Q Yes, we do. But I would like for you to start, if 
you could, start with your conversations when this was first 
brought to your attention by Bob Fraser, and I don't recall the 
other name now, and tell us what ihypA'^fid you. I want to 




348 



UiM^KKD 



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take it in a complete story, chronology form. 

A The conversation that was originally held, I believe, 
was between Bob Eraser and Kim Pendleton, the political 
counsellor. After that conversation, because I was not here 
in the office that day, which would have been then the same 
week of May 1st, which as I recall is a Thursday, both 
Kim Pendleton and Bob Fraser had a conversation with Seipz, 
the Deputy Chief of Mission. 

As a result of that conversation, Ray Seipz and 
Kim Pendleton came to me the following day and related the 
conversation to me that Bob Fraser had had with Tiny Rowlands. 

Q Okay. And what was that conversation that they 
related to you? 

A The conversation was probably related to me on, I 
guess. May 1st, although it could have been the day before, 
a meeting between Tiny Rowlandsand Bob Fraser would have taken 
place, I suppose, a day or two prior to that, probably in 
the same week. So it could have been like, I suppose, the 
28th or 29th April that Bob Fraser and Tiny Rowlands had their 
conversation. 

Q If you would, if you would relate the conversation 
that they told you, or that they had with Tiny Rowlands 

A Well, Tiny Rowlands indicated that he had had a 

meeting in London with the following people: Nir, Khashoggi, 

and Ghorbanifar. During the course of that conversation, Nir 



During the course or th^ 

mtumm 



349 



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UNCI^MttJl 






apparently tried to enlist Lonrho, which is Tiny RowlandK^ 
company, that is some sort of umbrella company for shipments 
to Iran. These shipments were to include grain, spare parts, 
and weapons. Nir apparently told — Khashoggi told Rowlands 
that the stuff, in effect the shipments, would go through 
ith an end user certificate foi^^^^H And that 

informed and on board. 
Nir also told Rowlands, that it is okay with the 
Americans, that it had been cleared, he stated, I think, by 
the White House, that a very limited number of people know 
about it. 

Poindexter is the point man, and no one at the State 
Department knows about it. Mike said that the scheme is 
for real; that I guess that what happened was Tiny Rowlands 
apparently checked with Kimche, whom he knew, through 
various dealings ^H^^^Band indicated that Nir speaks for 
the Israeli government, at least as long as Peres is around. 

Rowlands apparently checked it wi th^^^^|H who 
indicated to Rowlands that it was for real. Rowlands indicated 
that he was not inclined to get involved, but that if it is 
a U.S.G. operation, then he might reconsider. By then, I 
asked Kike where do we go from here. Mike said to me, in 
effect, that the Secretary had been aware of some of these 
activities and had fought them, but had evidently lost. 

He indicated that until my call, he and the Secretary 



UNUSsra 



350 



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had assumed that this kind of activity was on hold. 

Well, when he asked me about -- to pinpoint the time- 
frame of Eraser's contact with Rowland^ I told him that I 
believed it took place like the day before yesterday. I am 
speaking to Mike Armacost on May 2nd. Armacost said then 
I would suggest that everything is not on hold. I asked 
Mike whether that arrangement was for real, and Armacost 
said to me originally it might have been, but that the -- 
obviously the scope of the problem seemed to be more than 
he had any knowledge of. 

Armacost indicated that the Department was largely 
out of the picture in formal ways, that the Secretary had 
intervened to try and turn it off, but that this clearly 
suggested -- it was very much alive. Shultz is deeply 
opposed to the shipments and has made the case several times. 

It is apparent, Mike said, that he had not been 
fully informed recently. I think by that he meant 
George Shultz. He said that both he and the Secretary 
considered this as potentially very dangerous to the President 
for two main reasons: one, as I have stated before, was that 
it is simply contrary to U.S. Government policy to be 
selling supplies of weapons to Iran by other nations and 
that it is contrary to our policy as well that there be no 
ransom paid for hostages. 

I told Mike that Kimche had said that Nir 



Mike that Kimche had sai 

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' speaks for Israel as long as Peres is around and that 

2 KLmche find the business distasteful, but had confirmed 

3 that^^^m^was in for some percentage and that the — that 

* Rowlandswould reconsider the position he had taken to decline 

5 if he knew it was our operation; that is, the U.S.G. 

^ ! But Mike went on to say that the issue could become 

7 an extraordinary embarrassment. Mike acknowledged that the 

8 picture was very alarming and that there were many businessmen 

9 in several countries who appeared to be aware of these 

10 dealings. 

11 Obviously, it might not be long before the whole 

12 matter was no longer any secret and that the political 

13 danger to the President is a major concern and a source of 

14 great apprehension. Mike mentioned that he thought Ollie 

15 North was the prime mover at the White House, that there 

16 obviously could be others involved, as well, such as Don 
J7 Fortier, Poindexter. 

16 I asked him at that point whether he thought I 

)9 should get in touch with Poindexter or leave the issue with 
20 him, meaning Mike. He said that he thought I should put my 
2j own judgment in it; that ray instincts were correct, and he 
hoped that my calling would carry some weight. 

He said that he would report to the Secretary on a 
private channel because the Secretary was attending the 
economic summit with the President .^ ^y^Wnade clear I intend 



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to get the word to Poindexter and to let Armacost know whether 
I had been successful in doing so. 

Armacost also suggested that I call the President, 
which I ultimately did not do, simply by reason of the fact 
that having talked to Armacost — recognizing the fact that 
Armacost had related a message to Shultz; that I had talked 
to Poindexter; that I did not think it necessary because 
certainly somebody was going to -- among those would see to 
it that he got word of the concerns and the message that I 
had conveyed to Mike Armacost as well to John Poindexter. 

Q Thank you. 

Let roe go back and ask you several questions. 
Were there any follow-up meetings with Rowlands on this? 

A No. The answer to that is essentially, no. I 
can't put a specific time frame on it, but I know that one 
of the people in our political section--! think it was 
probably Jimmy Coker, had a conversation in December of 1986 

where Rowlands brought the matter up and asked him if he 

• « ~ .. ., 
was aware of the fact that he had talked to Khashoggi 

and Coker simply indicated that he had and Rowlands said he 

didn't want to talk about Khashoggi, didn't have anything 

very good to say about him, and that was the end of it. 

Q Well, to your knowledge. Ambassador, did Rowlands 
become involved in this deal at all? 

A No. As a matter of fact, I don't think he did. 
I don't have any way of knowing precisely, but based on what 



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he said, that if it was not a -- I mean, we got word back to 
Rowland^ 

I didn't permanently, but we told Bob Fraser to get 
the word back to Rowlands not to become involved, and Bob 
Fraser did get that word back to Tiny Rowland* and I understand 
he did not become involved. 

In the first place, I don't think Tiny Rowlands 
trusted Khashoggi at all. 

Q What kind of reputation does Tiny Rowlands have? 

A Well, I think Tiny Rowlands is a very entrepreneurial 
based 6n what I hear as much as anything, highly 
successful, has dealt considerably in terms of his 
investments in various parts of^^^^^B is well known and/or 
knows a lot °^^^^^^^^K^^^^K ^'^^ ^ think that as far as i 
know, he has been successful. 

I could not, I suppose, you know -- I am not in a 
position to vouch for his personal integrity. On the other 
hand, I don't have any facts that would lead me to question 
the legitimacy of his dealing. I think it is recognized 
that he is rather wide ranging, you might say, in his 
approach towards the profit motive. 

Q What does he do? Could you give me an explanation 
of what the Lonrho Company does? 

A I think it is involved in a number of different 
activities. Lonrho has got a lot of mining interests in 



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1 Africa. It has got the Observer newspaper in London. It 

2 has got a lot of agricultural interests. He owns the 

3 Princess Hotel in Bermuda. That is really about the extent 

4 of my knowledge concerning his activities. It is a good 

5 sized company. 

6 I would imagine there is ample financial informatic 

7 available from the public reports because it is a publicly 

8 held company. 

9 Q I am sure. I was just curious if this Lonrho 

jQ Company, if he more or less acts as a broker on deals, puts 

f] one party in touch with another. 

j2 A I don't think I can tell you. 

<2 Q Okay. If I could back up just a moment to prior 

tm to the Rowlands incident , what do you know, if anything, 
about the McFarlane meeting in London that occurred in 
December of 19 — I believe in December of 1985, when he 
met with some Iranians? 

Were you aware of that at the time? 
A Yes. Bud was here. I saw him. I knew that he 
was involved in something that was obviously of a sensitive 
nature, but, you know, outside of the fact that he was here 
and spent time at Winfield House, doing something of a sensi- 
tive nature, I didn't really become involved in particulars of 
it. 

Q Did you meet with Robert McFarlane? 



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A I beg your pardon. 

Q Did you meet with Mr. McFarlane when he was 
there at all? 

A I met with Bud -- he was over at Winfield House. 
He stayed there until he had an appointment downtown. 

Q Yes. 

A In a hotel, I believe. 

Q Did he -- 

A I might have been in a position, you know, to 
speculate about what he was involved in, but I didn't really 
have any clear understanding of it. 

Q I see. Well, did you have any advance warning that 
he was coming? Did you have any idea at all what he was 
there about? 

A I had some advance warning that he would be here, 
I think, but I did not have any knowledge of what he was here 
for. And if I had advance warning, it certainly wouldn't 
have been, I don't think, very much. 

Q I see. So did you know that he was meeting with 
Iranians, for instance? 

A I might have surmised at the time that he was. 

Q And how did you draw that conclusion? 

A It was closely held. 

Q I am sorry. We only got part of your answer. 

A I say, I might have had some indication from him 



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' that he was meeting with some Iranians, but what he was doing - 

2 he was clearly keeping closely held. 

3 Q I see. So you had no idea at that time that there 

4 was an arms for hostages initiative underway? 

5 A Well, I suppose on reflection, I could have surmised 

6 that that was the case. But we are-- 

7 Q Had you heard anything from the State Department or 
C any rumors elsewhere during this time frame--we are 

9 talking December of 1985 or before then, that there was 

10 an arms for hostages initiative underway? 

11 A No. I didn't get anything from the State Department 

12 suggesting that. I mean other than the usual guidance 

13 stating that, you know, that was our policy, we wouldn't 

14 trade arms for hostages, and we wanted to see to it we 

15 exercised as much influence as we could, and the various 

16 capitals to stop any shipment of arms out of the countries 
^7 in which, you know, we were operating. 

18 Q So the next event would be the Tiny Rowlands 
fg incident, which — in May of 1986? 
A That is correct. 

Q Did you draw the conclusion -- it is not clear to 
me from after you heard what Tiny Rowlandshad to say that 
there was an arms for hostages initiative underway, then? 

A At the time that this conversation between Bob 
Fraser and Tiny Rowlandswas reported to me? Is that what 



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you are asking? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A Yes. I did. 

Q Just a second. 

Ambassador, to your knowledge, did President Reagan 
have any knowledge of this operation? I mean, when you 
talked to Admiral Poindexter or anyone else that you talked 
to, did they indicate that the President had any knowledge 
of this operation? 

A Well, I think — I am not positive of this, but 
I think that in the conversation which Rowlandshad during the 
course of his meeting with Nir and Khashoggi, if you give 
me a minute, let roe check my notes. 

Q Okay. 

A I can't put my finger on it, but I think that 
during the course of the conversation, which Rowlandshad 
with Nir and Khashoggi and Ghorbanifar, that somebody 
suggested that people in the White House knew, that there may 
have been three or four that the President knew about it. 

Q I see. Could you explain to me again why you 
elected — as I understand it, you are a friend of the 
President, a personal friend of the President? 
A That is correct. 



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UNC^JO^ID 



Q Why did you elect not to advise President Reagan 
about this? 

A Can you hold on for a minute? 

Do you have to change the tape? 

MS. MURPHY: Yes, I do, Mr. Ambassador. 

THE WITNESS: Can you hold for a minute? 

MR. TRAYLOR: Sure. 

MS. MURPHY: All right. 

Thank you, sir, very much. 

THE WITNESS: All right. 

Going back to the reason I didn't call the 
President. 

BY MR. TRAYLOR: 
Q Yes. Yes, we are. 

A The reason I didn't call the President was because 
of the fact that, as I mentioned earlier, having talked to 
Armacost, having been assured by Armacost that Armacost 
would convey the message I had given him to Shultz, having 
spoken the following day to John Poindexter, and recognizing 
the fact that the President was involved in an economic 
summit, and that he was surely -- would surely be talking 
to George Shultz, if not Poindexter, or both, I just 
determined that there wasn't any particular need in me calling 
him to recite to him undoubtedly what others would have 



told him. 



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Did you subsequently talk with the President on -- 
have a meeting with the President or conversation, telephone 
conversation with the President where this issue was raised, 
either by the President or yourself? 

A No. I don't believe 1 had any personal conversation 
with the President after that, on that particular topic. 
I am trying to think. I went to a meeting at Camp David 
which, as I recall, was when Prime Minister Thatcher met 
with the President, I believe, in November. 

At that time, in November — at that particular 
time, I expressed certain thoughts to the President with 
respect as to how the White House staff was functioning or 
not functioning in lieu of what had developed by that time 
regarding this whole situation as well as other comments 
that simply dealt with the effectiveness of the White House 
staff itself, but that was the extent of it. 

MR. TRAYLOR: I don't have any further questions 
at this time. I am going to put Terry Smiljanich on. 
He has several questions. I may come back with some others 
following that. 

EXAMINATION ON BEH.ALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SMILJANICH: 
Can you hear me, Mr. Ambassador? 
A Yes, I can. 
Q As I said earlier, I am Terry Smiljanich, I am 



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with the Senate Committee. 

Let me ask you first about your conversation 
on May 3rd, 1986, with Admiral Poindexter. I would like 
you to run through that conversation again, giving us whatever 
details you can recall concerning your discussion with 
Admiral Poindexter. 

A All right. I spoke to Poindexter and, in essence, 
told him that I had spoken with Mike Armacost and that I 
wanted to relay to him that Mike and I had spoken about the 
need for me to call him, which I had intended to do, in any 
event. 

I related the same account that I have previously 
provided. 

All right? 

Q Right. 

A Over, 

Q Go ahead. 

A Poindexter said to me there was a small shred of 
truth in Nir's contention regarding the White House involve- 
ment. He added that Nir was up to his own games. That they 
had, Israelis had been caught delivering arms to Iran, and 
that there was only a small connection between what I was 
telling him, and that everything was out of all perspective, 
and he recommended that I advise Rowlands not to get involved. 
I told him of my concern that apparently news of 



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this nature had been floating around a bit in the UK, and 
that if^^^^^Hhad had knowledge of these arrangements, as 
well as apparently numerous other individuals, the whole 
thing could blow up and that it would be extremely damaging 
to the President. 

Poindexter assured me that he was sensitive to 
that particular concern, that is to say, that he was very 
much aware and concerned and shared the concern I had felt 
with respect to the President. He said that it — that 
he would follow up on the information that I had given him, 
and they would put things back the way they should be. 

I mentioned to him the same objections that I had 
previously enumerated to Mike Armacost, namely, that 
the — this business of bartering for an exchange of hostages 
in return for equipment was something that was totally 
against our policies, and that the idea of exchanging hostages 
for some form of ransom was unacceptable, that the business 
of shipping arms to Iran was a contradiction; and he said 
in return that he understood, that he would be happy to talk 
to me more if I was going to be through Washington. 

I indicated — he said that the knowledge of this 
business is very limited and that Mike .Armacost does not 
know the exact details, I told him that I did not plan on 
being in Washington, that I was going to Kansas City, as 
a matter of fact, for personal reasons, and it did not include 



for personal reasons, an 

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a stop in Washington, but that I would be glad to revise 
my itinerary to include a stop in Washington upon his return 
from the economic summit, and he suggested that there was 
no particular need for me to do so unless I simply wanted to 
come through and put my mind at rest, and as a consequence, 
I did not elect to come through Washington when I returned 
from London. 

Q Thank you. 

Did you, at any time after that, ever discuss this 
matter any further with Admiral Poindexter in any way? 

A ■ No, I didn't. 

Q You had said that one of the reasons you didn't 
go directly to President Reagan with this was that, first 
of all, Under Secretary Armacost assured you he had called 
Secretary Shultz and discussed it with him; and then secondly, 
you had this discussion with Admiral Poindexter. Admiral 
Poindexter, however, indicated to you that Undersecretary 
Armacost did not have the complete details on this operation; 
isn't that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you assume that Admiral Poindexter, who did 
have more of the details, would bring your concerns to 
the President? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you have any indication at any later time that 



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Admiral Poindexter had, in fact, brought your concerns to 
the attention of President Reagan? 

A No. 

O When Admiral Poindexter told you that "We will follow 
■up on the information you gave me and put things back the 
way they should be," what did you understand him to mean by 
that? 

A Well, I would assume that — he indicated, first 
of all, that there was a shred of truth. So I assumed that 
to the extent there was an element or shred of truth, that he 
would see to it that back around to the point where that kind 
of activity was terminated. 

Q You mean the activity of trading arms for hostages? 

A ■ I mean the activity that he referred to in terms of 
whatever the context was. I mean he didn't offer me a 
definition, but when he said there is a small shred of truth, 
I don't know whether that specifically applied to the 
trading of arms for hostages or not, but it suggested that he 
had some knowledge that some portion, even though apparently 
minimal, on the basis of his conversation with me existed 
and that to the extent that there was some element of truth, 
he would see to it, I suppose, whatever activities he was 
engaged in would be terminated. 

Q Did he indicate in any way what part of what you 
fiad related to Mr. Armacost was the truth, and what part 



wasn't the truth? 



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A Only to the extent I think of acknowledging that 

there was a small element of -- a shred of truth and that 
there was some small connection. 

Q But he didn't define that any further? 

A No. 

Q Did you understand from your — the substance of 
your conversation with Admiral Poindexter that the -- to 
whatever extent there was an ongoing arms transaction 
related to the hostages, that that operation would be 
terminated? 

A ■ Would you repeat that question, please? 

Q Yes. 

Did you have, based upon the substance of your 
conversation with Admiral Poindexter, did you believe that 
the operation which involved trading arms for hostages was 
going to somehow be terminated? Based upon what Admiral 
Poinde^er told you? __ _ .^. ^ ^ 

A 7^ ^^pdexte^hever. ac 
small shred of truth, or small connection tfii^ the operation 
was, in fact, going on. So "L,.-^ I wourdn't have any way 
of knowing. _ j^ ' ~'S^''~ 

Q_:^All right".'^^"' ' - -' "' . ^^" "^ 

Let's go back to your first meeting with your 
staff concerning this matter. Do you have in front of you 
a memo to the file, dated. May 1, 1986? 






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A Yes, I do. 

Q First of all, is that your menio? 

When it refers to "one of my political officers," 
did you write this? 

A No. The document written on May 1st, 1986, came 
from Kim PendletoHj our Political Counselor. 

Q Is that Kim or Tim Pendleton? I can't pick up 
the name? 

A That is Kim, like in K. 

Q The other individual you met with was Ray Seipz? 

A ■ That is correct. 

Q S-I-P-E-S? 

A S-E-I-P-Z. 

Q Now, the memo dated, May 1, which you have in 
front of you, which has all the details concerning Tiny 
Rowlands and Lonrho Company, et cetera, doesn't say any- 
where in it anything about hostages. Were you assuming 
at the time that this had something to do with hostages, 
or was the matter of hostages brought up in these discussions? 

A Can you hold for a minute and let me review this? 

Q Yes. 

A I guess that that was an assumption on my part, 
because I see that it does not refer to, as you point out, 
in the May 1 memo, but it is referred to in my conversation, 
I believe, with Armacost and if we were — I guess the point 



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is that if we were involved in a shipment of arms, or grain, 
or medicine, or whatever it was, the question became one of 
what would we be doing that for when it is in obvious 
conflict with our own policy, and I suppose that the 
supposition associated with that is that we had some hostages 
over there and that I, you know, was drawing a partial con- 
clusion that perhaps they were involved in this transaction 
in some fashion from the standpoint of an exchange of these 
types of commodities, you might say, in return for hostages. 
Over. 

Q . Right. 

Well, that is obviously a reasonable assumption 
to make. I am just wondering whether you recall that in 
the discussions Tiny Rowlandahad with Bob Fraser, any mention 
of hostages was brought up at that time, to your knowledge? 

A I don't think in the relation, the context of 
relating the conversation that Bob Fraser had with Tiny 
Rowland^ that there was — necessarily — the hostage 
question was involved in that conversation. 

I think rather it might have come about as a 
result of the conversation that was subsequently held in 
my office with Ray Seipz and Kim Pendleton, whereby there 
was some speculation on our part whether or not this was, 
perhaps, involved, and that is no doubt why it came up in the 
context of my conversation with Mike Armacost, as well as 



John Poindexter. 



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Okay. 



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Looking at the substance of the information that 
was obtained from Tiny Rowlandjthat is set forth in the memo 
of May 1, it does sound like a straight-forward commercial 
transaction. Did it souftd to you as though the people 
involved in this, Amiram Nir, Adnan Khashoggi, and 

V 

the person that you have as Manuche» Ghorbanifar, did you 
have the impression these people were involved in this 
operation for the comraercial benefit, for the profits 
that could be obtained from engaging in these transactions 
with the' Government of Iran? 

A Absolutely. 

Q Right. 

Was there anything said — it is not in the memo, 
and I am just wondering if you recall beyond the memo -- 
if anything was said in the conversation that was related 
to you about what Tiny Rowlands had been approached about, 
anything said about a strategic initiative to open a new 
relationship between the Government of the United Sta tES 
and the Government of Iran? 

A I don't recall that there was anything specifically 
mentioned about a strategic relationship in terms of the 
conversation that it was reported that Tiny Rowlands had 
with Bob Fraser. 

Q So, would it he fair to say that based upon the 



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information you had received as of May 1, it sounded as 
though a group of people were involved in a commercial venture 
with the Government of Iran for the puroose of obtaining, 
perhaps, substantial profits resulting from it, and that they 
were claiming that somehow the United States Government, 
through a very select group of people, were knowledgeable 
about the general operation; is that a fair statement? 

A I think that is fair. 

Q Oliver North, in his various travels back and forth 
relating to the hostages, did stop off in London on a few 
occasions. I recall having seen a cable that you sent 
some time after these revelations came to light in November 
in which you had been asked to relate any information 
you had at the embassy in which you had listed some dates 
that, according to your records, Oliver North had passed 
through? 

My question is do you recall ever '~- do you 
recall ever talking to Oliver North during any of the various 
occasions that he passed through London in connection 
with these operations? 

A I never saw Oliver North in London, nor to my 
knowledge, have I ever met him. I mean, if I did, I would 
have been shaking hands with him someplace, but I have no 
recollection of it. And I certainly did not see him in 
London. 




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Q And after those events in early May of 1986, you 
had no further indication of any kind of that there was an 
on-going operation sponsored by the U.S. Government which 
involved the trading of arms to Iran in exchange for hostages 
up until the time that the -- in early November, when the 
various revelations hit the newspapers; is that correct? 

A That is basically correct, consistent with my 
recollection. 

MR. SMILJANICH: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 
I think that is all the questions I have. 

Let me see if Tim has further questions. 
MR. TRAYLOR: I just have a couple more. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. TRAYLOR: 
Q ior the record, could you explain who 
Ls, and what was his connection in this? 




Okay. Thank you. 

I am looking at your May 3rd, 1986 memo of a 
conversation between you and Admiral Poindexter, On page 
2 of that, in the first paragraph, it says that you told 

liNHl ACCincn 



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Admiral Poindexter that, "I understood it was a U.S. 
Government policy that no ransom would be paid or any deals 
made for the release of hostages and, B, it was also U.S. 
Government policy which we strenuously pursued in London 
to try to prevent any other country from shipping arms to 
Iran. " 

And then after it, it has, "this must he Admiral 
Poindexter 's response. Roger, I understand." 

Is that all he said in response to your point? 
Or your points? 

A Yes. That is all he said, other than to say he 
would be happy to talk to me more if I were going to be in D.C. 

O Implying he didn't want to talk over the phone? 

A Well, I got the impression he didn't want to talk 
about the whole thing very long. 

Q Yes. 

A Now, whether that was my reason of the fact 
that he was obviously pressed and he was in the economic 
summit and involved in other activities, and so forth, 
or whether it was my reason of the fact he simply didn't 
want to discuss the matter more fully, I can't say. 

Q We may have covered this earlier in this deposition, 
but did you have any other conversation with Admiral Poindexter 
after that? 

A No. I don't think so, except any conversations that 



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I might have had which I don't think at all centered on 
this particular subject at the time once again of the meeting 
between Prime Minister Thatcher and the President at Camp 
David in November of 1986. 
Q Okay. 

A Poindexter was at that meeting. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COM.'^ITTEE 
BY MR. SMILJANICH: 
Q I did have one last question. 

Let me preface it by saying the level of 
classification of this deposition is secret, and we are 
talking by secure telephone. My question is after the 
revelations came out concerning our history of these 
transactions with the Government of Iran in exchange for some 
hostages, has -- has this affected in any way bilateral 
relations between the United States and Great Britain; 
and by that I mean, has it caused any particular problems 
that have come to i'our desk concerning the Great Britain's, 
perhaps, relationship with past arms transactions or, for 
example, our counterterrorist policy of not negotiating 
with terrorists? Has any of this caused a problem that 
you have had to deal with as ambassador? 

A It has caused a considerable amount of dismay 
as expressed by — by various members of the British Government. 
It has not caused any significant problems or problems of a 
specific nature as opposed relating to the fact that we 

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undertook to either attempt to establish relations with the 
so-called moderate element or trade arms for hostages. 
Q Thank you; that answers my question. 

That is all the questions I have. I think that 
probably terminates the deposition. 

George Taft wants to make a few comments. 

First, let me thank you for making yourself 
available like this, giving us your time and I think it 
worked out pretty well. 

Thank you, again. 

THE WITNESS: You are welcome. 

MR. TRAYLOR: Thank you, Ambassador. 

MR. TAFT: We will go off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
(Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the deposition concluded.) 



UimSSlEIED 



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OOPY NO.. 



DEPOSITION Of 



^ li'MTB 



Ve-ofr-ieif^^ mr^Pf^t/^ 



Ho"}^ 



y 



Thursday, June 11, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate Covert 
Arms Transactions with Iran, 

Viially DKl8Mlfi«(1/ReleaW,i flw ~2 2.&gc81 
Washington, D.c. under provisions of £.3. IHS 

byHSflk National Security Ccun:[ri 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:15 a.m.. 
Conference Room, CIA Headquarters Building, Langley, 
Virginia, with Patrick Caroma on behalf of House Select 
Committee, presiding. 

Present: On behalf of the House Select Committee: 
Patrick Carome; Bruce Fein; and Jack Taylor. 

On behalf of the Senate: Timothy Woodcock and 
Tom Polgar. 

On behalf of the Witness: David Pearline, Office of 
Congressional Affairs - CIA. 

Ms. Linda Kerns - Notary Public, Common Wealth of 



Virginia. 



UNClASSira 



-^-{^^ 



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MR. PEARLINE: We are about to take the deposition 
of ^|^^^^|H^^^^^^I and Linda Kerns from our agency, 
a notary public is — will swear the witness in. 

MS. KERNS: Would you state your name and address? 

THE WITNESS: 




having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness 
herein, and was examined and testified as follows: 

MS. KERNS: You may proceed. 

THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

MR. CAROME: Thank you. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q ^^I^^^^^^^^H ^°^ ^^^ record, my name Patrick 
Carome. I eun a staff counsel with the House of 
Representatives Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran. 

Also present is Jack Taylor, a member of our 
staff, an investigator on our staff. Also present are persons 
on the staff of the parallel Senate Select Committee. The 
House Committee is established pursuant to resolution and 
rules and just for the record, I have provided you with 
a copy of both our resolution and Qviixules. 



)ur resolution andjDur ru 



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URCUISSHit^ 



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This deposition is being conducted pursuant to 
those resolutions and rules. As you probably know, the major 
focus of our coraraittees is the Iran affair, and we are also 
looking into the events surrounding provision of aid to the 
contras in Central America. 

If you have any questions about what I am asking 
you about or you don't understand my questions, please 
don't hesitate to let me know that so that I can clarify my 
question for you. 

Could you begin by giving us your educational 
background and the positions which you have held this 
employment? 




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MR. CAROME: We can go back on the record. 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q You obviously knew that^^HHjHJB had a CIA 
relationship, I take it, is that right? 

A Yes, yes. 

Q Who else at j^^^^HH^ was aware of the relationship 
with the CIA? 

A Nobody. Nobody. 

Q None of the pilots? 

A Nobody. I was the only one. 




380 



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Q Is it correct that when the United States 
Government needed to have some operation performed, it 
would contact you through JK//f^B is that right? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you ever dea.l directly with persons at CIA 

ii&iAi Anninrn 



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Pc3 
other thanj 

A Yes. 

Q Who were those persons? 

A I don't know. Should I mention them? 

MR. PZARLINE: If they are staff, if they are 

employees, yoa can mention them. ^ /■ 

vittJ^^^K^^^^^M also 



THE WITNESS: I 
witni^^^^^^^^^^^^^H] who 





at that time. That is basically it. Others were 
just on a -- you know, maybe in meetings I met others, but 
I don't know the names or whatever. 




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plane 



Q When was the first time thatj 
traveled to Tehran? 

A It was in 1985. I don't know exactly the date 
anymore, but that was a flight which was not done on 
behalf of the U.S. Government. It was a commercial flight, 
(The document was marked as Exhibit 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q You are not aware of any ^^H^^H flights to 
Tehran prior to 1985; is that correct? 

A That is correct. I would like to say not only that 
I am not aware, I positively know we didn't do any. 

Q 



I am placing before you what has 

'IIMOI AOOinrr^ 



385 



im: 



^rjiN 



15 



1 been marked as Exhibit 1. it appears to be two cables or 

2 telegrams of some sort. The part of the Exhibit that I am 

3 primarily interested in is what is at the bottom of the 

4 page there. There appears to be a message dated June 4th, 

5 1985, and it refers ^° ^^^^^^^^^^^^H "Please inform 

6 if interested in f light H^kehran 5644 kilogrjuns detonators. 

7 Please quote." 

e Is this Exhibit 1 related to that first flight 

9 to Tehran? 

10 A I think so, yes. 

11 Q Do you know wht^^^^^^^^Bis? That appears 

12 to be the person signing this telegram or cable. 

13 A No. 

14 Q Was it — I withdraw that. Is the description 

15 of the cargo in this telegram or cables an accurate 

16 description of what it was that you took to Tehran or that 

17 |HI^IB^°°'^ ^° "^^^^^^ ^" 

18 A Well, it was part of the cargo and if I remember 

19 right, when I see this telex, this was one of the initial 

20 proposals we had. Maybe I can go a little into how this 

21 is done normally so that you understand a little better. 

22 This here cable from a company ^^^^^^1 which is 

23 a brokerage and what they usually do is they write telexes 

24 to|^HHHH||H|HH| and to other airlines offering cargoes. 

25 We get those offers from many other brokers and so this is 

IfMni AOOinrn 



386 



25 



umsuBeffT 



16 



1 in the preparation stage and it doesn't necessarily mean 

2 that that was really carried later on. Although in this 

3 case I am pretty sure it was part of the cargo, but this is 

4 only five and a half tons, roughly, and the cargo later 

5 on we flew to Tehran was about 15 tons or 16 tons. 

6 (The document was marked as ExhiL/it ^^^Ifor 

7 identification.) 

8 BY MR. CARONE: 

9 Q fl^^^^^^^^H I have placed before you what has 

10 been marked as Exhibit 2 to this deposition and ask you 

11 if you recognize what that is? Just for the record, it is— 

12 A Is there a date on it somewhere? 

13 Q There is a date of August 7, 1985? 

14 A That is the same flight we were talking about. 

15 Q This appears to be a cable from 
18 ^H^^^B^° Civil Aviation officials in Irem. Is that 




17 

1g A That is right. 

^9 Q And it is requesting trafic rights; is that 

20 

Yes. That is correct. 

And it refers to 30 tons smokeless powder and 

23 detonators; is that right? 

24 A That is right 
Q And that is a description of the cargo, which 

1*,1 <«♦•« T.Ki-an. la *-hAt- correct? 



UNCUSSIFIED 

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A Well, that is not correct, because we didn't carry 
30 tons. We carried only 15 tons, and the reason being 
is this: as you can see on the first telex, it says the 

has to go ^'^°'"H||^B ^° '^^^^^"- ^BUH^^V 
Hfl^HD Because the cargo on this flight was coming from 
several countires^^^^Bwas chosen f inall^^^^^^^^Bfor the 
departure becausd(jm^ accepted that cargo would come 
. J^IH^^^BHHIHIHHHBHHIHI^^H^ and 
consolidated and loaded on the airplane and then the plane 
was supposed to go tdf//^/^^nd load another 15 tons of 
cargo, and then go on to Tehran. 

But thefl^^^^^^H<^eal was canceled in the 
last moment and therefore we only flew with half an airplane. 
Therefore, I cannot really tell you about the smokeless 
powder and detonators because I don't know which portion 
was from ^^^^^^HV"*^ from ^^j^^^^jj^ 

Q Was a portion of the cargo moved originated in 
Israel, to your knowledge? 

A As far as I know, no. I know that the detonators 
I am pretty sure came froi<|^^H|p£rom a company^ 

The rest came f r 




CLASSIFIED 




Q Do you recall the name of the company or persons 
you were dealing with on this flight? 

A This flight we contracted_with a companj 



ignt we contractea wxuii c 

iiMOi Aooinrn 



388 



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18 



1 and the — let oe see, what is the name again? 

2 Q Wduld the nane^^^^^^l ring a bell? 

^^^^^^^^n/as manager .^^^^^^^^H is the name 

4 of the company. 

5 Q ^^H^^^Hhwas the manager of that company? 

6 n Exactly. 

7 Q The cable or telegram which is Exhibit 2 appears 

8 to refer to a flight to occur August 12 to August 13, 1985. 

9 A Yes . 

10 Q Do you recall those being the dates of the flight 

11 that took place to Tehran? 

12 A Z don't remember because the flight was delayed 

13 several times. In fact, you apply for traffic rights as earlyj 

14 as possible, and you have to give a date for the traffic 

15 rights. It would be that we flew on that date or it could 
18 be that we flew later. That, I don't remember. I would 

17 have to look into the documentation. 

18 ' Q Is it your recollection that the flight took 

19 place in August of 1985? 

20 A I think so, yes. I don't know whether it is 

21 on the 13th, but I am pretty sure it took place in 

22 August. 

23 Q Which plane went to Tehran on this flight we have 

24 been talking about? 

25 '^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



389 



ORCHI^HW^ 




19 

1 Q That is the — 

2 A ^^^^^^^^^registered airplane. It is also mentioned 

3 here on the telex. You cannot see it well because the C is or 

4 top, but it says^H^^^^^^^^^ Boeing 707 cargo, and then 

5 reg means registration 

6 Q Did you speak with^^^^^^^ about whether or not 

7 this flight should occur? 

8 A Yes . 

9 Q Did you speak to anyone at the CIA about whether or 

10 not this flight should occur? 

11 a' no. p^ 

12 Q What did l^^m^^ tell you about whether or not 

13 the flight should occur? 

14 A Again, I have to go a little more into background. 

15 Our agreement was in general that there were some countries 
1g where we wouldn't fly without prior consultation, whereas 
17 other countries, we could contract without asking first. 

1g -And Iran was one of those countries where we had agreed 

19 that we would consult before we would go there. 

20 p^ So that is why before we had this flight, I called 

21 ^^^^^^^^hand I asked him in general terms how is the situa- 

22 tion right now; could I contract a flight to Tehran right now. 

23 And he came back and he said, yes. 

24 Q Did he tell you who he checked with? 
No. 



25 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q Did he come back quickly? 

A Yes. In about two hours or so. 




(The document was marked as Exhibit 
identification.) 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I don't want to spend too much time on this first 
flight, but there are a couple of points I want to cover. 

I am placing before you Exhibit 3 to this deposition 
Does that appear to be a document pertaining to the money 
received by^^^^^^^H in connection with the August flight 
to Iran? I draw your attention to the lower part of the 
page where it says "black powder flight, strictly commercial." 

A That's right. 

Q And was 72,800 U.S. dollars the amount which 
the company received as payment for the flight? 

A Yes. 

Q Is that approximately the — withdraw that 



UNCUSSIFIED 



391 



22 
23 
24 
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21 



1 Do you know how that — withdraw that. 

2 Is there a standard rate that you used to 

3 calculate that cost for the flight? 

4 A No. 

5 Q How was that price arrived at? 

6 A Well, each ceurgo flight is being calculated 

7 on an individual basis where we calculate the fuel cost 

8 at the departure and arrival point, the overflight and 

9 navigation fees, landing/handling fees, loading/unloading 

10 fees, flight time and so on and so forth. So each 

11 particular flight is being calculated by us and then 

12 we come to a so-called production cost which means we know 

13 how much this flight will cost us. 

14 Then we will offer a certain price to a customer 

15 in order to have a profit in there, but sometimes 

1g we would kind of go below even the production costs I 

13 in order to check this price here, I would have to go into 

19 detail and look at the preparation which we did for the 

20 flight. But it looks to me like a good price. I think 

21 we had some profit on that. 
(The document was marked Exhibit^^4 for 

identification. ) 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q I am placing before you Exhibit 4 and I ask you 



UNCLASSIRED 



392 



IWtMK&T 



22 



1 if you recogniie that docunent? Just for the record, it 

2 is a document dated August 26, 1985, and all but the first 

3 several lines of the docunent have been blacked out by the 

4 agency. Can you tell what that document is from what you 

5 can see there? Is that a doctsnent that you prepared? 

6 A Could be. Z think it is one of the reports 

7 I wrote. 

8 Q-, And that is a report that you would have provided 
"O 

to^^^^^^V 

10 A Yes. Exactly. By the way, the Israel portion 

11 there, I have to explain because in the preparation of the 

12 flight, it was also discussed to start the whole flight in 

13 Israel and go from Israel to^^H||and from there on to 

14 Tehran, but then the Israel'^^^^Hportion was cancelled 

15 and therefore we only had cargo from] 

16 What did you originally understand was going 

17 to be coming from Israel? 

18 - A I don't know. Nobody ever mentioned it. 

19 Q But you understood that originally a part of the 

20 arms or military material was to originate in Israel; is 

21 that right? 

22 A No. That is not right because nobody talked 

23 about arms or anything like that. We just knew from the 

24 broker |^^HH| that he said that he had some cargo from 

25 Israel, which h^WV^J^^l tt^^^sWai," Israel, then come to 



11WAA Wirrt" • 



393 



IDKIII^FIS^'^ 



23 



1 ^^^^^m pick up the rest of the cargo, and then go to 

2 ^^^^^HHH pick up the rest, and go to Tehran. 

3 Actually what happened out of the who le flight, the 

4 Israel portion was canceled and also 

5 portion was canceled. So therefore, we ended up only 

6 with ^^^^^^H portion. Therefore, we had only 15 tons 

7 or more. 

8 Q In fact, this Exhibit Number 4 refers to 30 

9 tons smokeless powder and detonators from^^^^^Hand 

10 Israel. That is not an accurate description of what was 

11 moved? 

12 A No. That is not accurate. Because at that time 

13 I didn't have the details yet, you know. 

14 Q This was after the flight, though? 

15 A It was — 

16 Q That this document was prepared; isn't that right? 

17 A That is right, but the — I assumed at that time tha 

18 they had moved the cargo from Israel to^^^^B maybe with 

19 scnebody else or so. I really didn't know at that time where 

20 all the cargo came from, only when I saw the papers myself 

21 later on, I saw that we had only 15 tons. 

22 When I wrote this report, I had just talked to 

23 the pilot, and he had — that was his opinion, actually, 

24 what I had written do%im here. 

25 Q Who was the pilot on that flight? 



IS the pilot on that xiigt 

\\m Accincn 



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I don ' t 



ncune? 



A I think it was 
remember the rest of the crew 
Q Can you spell 
A ^^^^^^^^^^__^^ 

(The document was marked as Exhibit ^^5 for 
identification. ) 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q ^^^^I^^^^B^^ ^^ placing before you what has 
been marked as Exhibit 5. It is a memorandum dated 19/11/85 
That is November 11, 1985; is that right? 
A Yes. 

Q Is that a document which you prepared? 
A Yes. 

Q I direct your attention to the last three lines of 
the doc\iment which states, "Knowing that Israel is sending 

material^mmUmmmi^^nto I 
that that is their motivation for^^ft because it would 
'raduce transport costs dramatically." 

What did you know in November 1985, November 19, 
1985, about Israel sending war material to Tehran? 

A Actually, I have to come up with a little longer 
answer again. Because I would like to make the situation 
a little clearer for you because I believe there is some 
misconceptions here. In the aviation industry, for about, 
I would say, eight^vear* now- eyerybodY knows that Israel 



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is sending material to Iran. They started sending it from 
Israel to/^H^|H|and then to Tehran with a company 
c a 1 1 e d j^^^^HBm^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^ 
H[H[^m^^^H They to fly I^^^Hf until one was 
down by the Iraqis. Then they started buying 707 's. 

Then they flew 707 's. Instead of going to 
they changed tof|||^^^H so the origin of the 
flight would look like coming from I^^^^^^H and the 
Iraquis wouldn't intercept them on their way to Tehran. 
Q You are saying^ 

A Yes. In the aviation industry it was common 
knowledge those flights were going on all the time 

thatjUml, is ^mmm^mH company, 
wouldn't fly. 

Occasionally, other airlines would fly it. 
Another thing, in order to make the background a little 
clearer, their daily flights going on between European 
countries and Tehran, all European carriers are flying to 
Tehran and Iran Air is flying to all European countries 
every day. 

The only people who don't go to Iran is the 
Americans. So when you talk to brokers in the market and 
Tehran flights are coming, that has about the same value 
like, let's say, going to London or wherever. It is a 
normal destination 



on in the furoDe^u^jnarJift. 



396 



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1 The second thing is it is very normal in the market 

2 that Israel cannot go directly anywhere. Whenever you 

3 deal with Israel, you have to go through third countries 

4 because if our company — if our airplane would fly, let's 

5 say, directly to Israel and back to Europe, the Arabs 

6 would know about it, and therefore traffic rights in Arab 

7 countries would be denied later on. So, therefore, 

8 even when you send an airplane for maintenance to Israel, 

9 which many companies are doing — Israel Aircraft Industry — 

10 they all go through ^^^^^Vand fly from there a special 

11 flight plan to Tel Aviv. 

12 So I just want to say that for the background. 

13 In Europe it is really nothing special that flights are 

14 going through third countries from Israel to other 

15 countries, be it Iran or be it even Egypt or whatever. 

f5 Only after the Camp David agreements, the Israelis started 

17 flying directly to Egypt. Before that, that all had to 

1g -go through third countries. Coming back to your first 

19 assumption, when I get an offer from Israel, it doesn't 

20 really mean every time that it is war material. 

21 You know, it can also mean it is aircraft spare 

22 parts or whatever. 

23 Q You were aware at that time that Israel was sending 
war materials to Iran through ^^^^^^| though, is that 



24 

25 right? 



UNCLA!;<;iFIFn 



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A Yes. 

Q When you ^^y^l^^^H <^° roean^^^p 
A Yes. Like I say, I never saw it myself, but I 
heard it. You know,' it was common knowledge in the market. 
That was a direct occurrence, is that right? 
A Well, you heard about those flights once in a 
while from brokers because when — you know, the airplanes 
would break down or something, we would get an offer — 
can fly from^^^^^Hto Tehran? 

You know, we never did one, but that is why we 
heard about it. We get telexes every day, all sorts of 
propositions and those ceune once in a while. 

(The document was marked as Exhibit ^B-6 for 
identification. ) 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q fll^^^^^^^^H ^ place before you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 6. For the record, it is a 

:anduB dated November 21, 1985; is that correct? 
A Yes. 

Again, is this a report that you prepared? 
I prepared that report, yes. 



And who would this have been prepared for; 

P O 

who would 



I turned this over to 




then send it over to the agency here 



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MR. CAROME: Can we go off the record for just a 
second? 

(Discussion held off the record.) 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^H we are back on Exhibit to your 
deposition. Could you describe what this three-page 
document is? 

A That one of those ^^H||H^|H reports 
wrote. 

Q And you — this would have been a document that 
you provided toH^^^Hlwho would then provide it to the 
agency; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Is what is described in this document flights 
performed by 

A Well— 

Q At least from what you can see from the redacted 
version? 

A There are no flights which were performed by 




Because thosev I would 
mention also, once in a while when I would think that it was 
of interest. 

Q If I could focus your attention on paragraph 4 on 

IIMOI AOOinrn 



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umssui^ 



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the first page, the paragraph headed "Tehran Situation. 
A Yes. 

Q It Starts out "A flight was made from' 
^^^Mf^to Tehran with Boeing 707 on 14 November 1985." 
What airline performed that flight? 
A I don't know. That is why I wrote a flight was 
made. Otherwise I would have said such and such an airline 
made the flight. The information I had here was from 




flight to Tehran , 

flight, which I describe here on the 14th of November, 




the second flight 
I was done by somebody else now on the 



14th of November, 



they were 



escorted by Iranian fighters and so forth. 




400 



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Q You are certain that this is not a flight that 
was performed ^yflm^B ^^ ^^^^ right? 

A Absolutely certain. Let me tell you something 
about the background again. I was the only one with 
contact to the agency here. Therefore, I was the one who 
had to give the final okay for every charter flight we did. 
There was no flight performed without my personal 
okay, and that is why, you know, whatever we flew, I okayed 
and I gave the final green light to our crew to take off 
and to continue on the contract, even during the 
negotiations. 

So, therefore, you know, I know 100 percent what was 
going on in that coiapany. 

Q And it is your testimony that in 1985,1 
made only two flights into Tehran, the one we have just 
been talking about in August, and the one we are going to be 
talking about in a little bit, which was connected with a 
O.S. Government operation; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q I note that page 2 of Exhibit 6 towards the 
bottom of the page says, "Please find enclosed cargo 
documents of our last flight fromH^H[to Tehran." 

A Yes. 

Q What flight doei' tfiit^reler' 




401 



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A Well* that is the first, th« last, and the only 
fll9ht we did fre»|[|^^f to Tehran. _^ 

Why were you sending cargo documents to^^ 
soBe months later? 

A Because since Z was the only one in the company who 
knew about our relationship to the agency here, Z would 
handle those things] 




I was traveling tof^^^^^very raongh and, like 
Z say, you know, it could be two months until — plus 
a crew would be on the road maybe another three weeks after 
this flight. So by the time they turned the envelope into 

and so 



and then Z had to arrive J 

llltAI AOrtii IT 




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UNGI^SIilEibr 

on. This two months time dealy was not really unusual. 

Q Was it your general practice to provide 
with cargo documents on the flights performed b; 

A Only if I thought that they were of interest 



Why were these particular documents of interest.' 
A That was basically my decision. And the — I 
thought they were something because it showed that Europen 
countries were sending this kind of cargo to Tehre 



32-33 





(The document was marked as Exhibit\^^^|for 
identification.) 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I am placing before you what has been marked 
aa Exhibit 7. 

A Yes. 

Q And I ask you if you recognize what that 
document is. Take a moment to look at it. If you would 
like for the record, it is dated November 30, 1985. 

A Yes. I know what it is 

Q What is it? 

A It is — like it says here on point one, a 



ICUSSIFIED 



403 





34 

^ chronological report about the Tehran — second Tehran 

2 flight. 

3 Q Who prepared this document? 
* A I prepared it. 

5 Q And you then sent it on to ^U^HHV on or 

6 around November 30, 1985; is that correct? 

7 A Exactly. 

8 Q Did you understand that he then passed it on to 

9 persons at the agency? 

10 A Hell, that is what I assumed. I don't know whether 

11 he did or not, but that is — that is what usually was the 

12 practice. 

13 Q Before I get to the major subject of this 

14 Exhibit Number 7, I have a couple of questions about a matter 

15 it refers to. If you could turn to page 4 of that Exhibit, 

16 in the second last paragraph that discusses landing of the 

17 ^^^^^^^1 aircraft in Tehran. Do you see where I am 

18 speaking about? 

19 A Yes. Yes. 

20 Q There is a sentence that reads, "At this 

21 location, the aircraft had parked also during our last flight 

22 to THR — " Tehran — "a few weeks ago." 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q It is a little hard to read there. I represent to 

25 you that that says, *a few weeks ago." I have a clean copy 



says, a tew weeks ago. i n. 

llttClifi&lFjBL- 



404 




35 

1 of that if you would like to see it. 

2 A No. I remember that I wrote it. 

3 What is this last flight a few weeks ago that was 
* being referred to? 

5 A Actually, I should have written here a few months 

6 ago, because that rerers to the other flight which was made 

7 in August, but you know I don't know. I just thought the 

8 last flight a few weeks ago is nore like in the sense the 

9 Spanish say Manana. Sometime ago. 

10 You know, you see, again I have to give you a 

11 little background information. It looks to the public and 

12 also to everybody else who looks into this affair that 

13 the only flights we did wvre two flights to Tehran. |H|H 
j^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H was very busy. We 

15 I mean hundreds of flights, you know. So when I refer to 

16 our Tehran flight, I didn't really remember exactly what 

17 month we did it because it was also unimportant for me. 

18 So therefore, I said a few weeks ago. 

19 Like I say, I referred to the first flight. I know 

20 what you are aining at, but I can tell you again we did only 

21 one flight before this flight. That is it. It looks like 

22 we did another flight maybe when I say a few weeks ago, but 

23 that is not the case. 

24 The report which is Exhibit 7 is devoted pretty 

25 much entirely to a flight tha 

■lEiAi tno 



did to Tehran on or 



405 



uinnssmi^ 



it 



1 around th« 23rd or 24th of Novainbar 1985. I* that corract? 
8 A That ia corract. 

3 Haa It unuaual that you would writ* an S-paq* 

4 raport on ona flight? 

5 A Yaa. 

Wall, why don't wa go right into tha dataila of 

7 this flight? What waa tha firat thing that you haard about 

with ragard to a HJ^^^^^K flight going to Tahran in 

Novainbar 19857 

'10 A You aaa, thia ia an 8-paga raport, and you juat 

^1 hava to raad tha raport, bacauaa I can't --all I knaw at 

12 that tlna -- and I had^^^^^Hat that tima -- I wrota 

13 down in thia raport. I can't rainambar mora than I wrota 

14 at tha tiffla hara, you know. In fact, what I ramambar 

15 now would avan ba laaa than what I wrota hare. But I 

1Q think what you wara implying with your laat quaation, why 

17 did I writa auch a long raport -- 

1g No, I don't want to focua on that. I actually 

ig j»*t want to go through tha facta now of tha Novainbar 1985 

20 flight. My firat quaation ia whan did you firat haar about 

21 the poaaibllity of ^^H^HH performing thia flight? 

22 A Wall, like I wrote here, I can raad it to you, 

23 if you want. On Friday afternoon, on the 22nd of November, 

24 |^^^|^H| called me and aald to ma that I would get a phone 

25 call frcM aome body who would like to charter our airplane. 



ibody who would like to chai 



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BNtt/SSfffflT 



37 



and that I should deal with him directly because this was not 
our show. Our *ow, he means not an agency deal. 

Q Do you recall what time it was? I see the report 
here says it was in the afternoon on November 22nd. Do you 
recall more precisely what time it was that^^^^^^^^ 
called? 

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 

Where were you when you received that call? 

I was in i 



In an office or at your home? 

At home. 

And when you were in) 



you would work 



po 




to be? 



out of your home; is that correct? 

A That's right. 

Q Where did you understand 

A He was In his office 

Q He was calling you on the telephone? 

A Yes. 

Q And that is an unsecure phone; is that correct 

A That is right. 

Q Both ends? 

A Yes. 

Q You said 



said there was a flight to be 
done; is that correct? What did'flUJ^^^H describe to you 



needed to be done? 



UNClASSra 



407 



mmm 



38 



1 A Well, like I said, he said "I just want to let 

2 you know that you will get a phone call from somebody 

3 who wants you to do a flight, and so you deal with him 

4 directly because this is not an agency operation," or 

5 "Uiat is not our show" was actually what he said. 

6 Q What ~ 

7 A That is why he didn't get involved, because if it 

8 was an agency deal, he would have told me we want a flight 

9 on such and such a date from A to B with so much cazgo 

10 and so on and so forth, you know. &^ 

11 Q Did Mr. — let me start again. When I 

12 first called you, was he calling to find ut whether or not 

13 a flight could be done or was he telling — just simply 

14 telling you a customer was going to contact you? 

15 A That is right. 

16 Q The latter, a customer was going to contact you? 

17 A Yes. 

18 . Q He didn't ask are your planes available? 

19 A I don't remember. I don't think so because both 

20 planes at that tine were coomiitted, you know. We had commer- 

21 cial flights ongoing and also planned for the second air- 

22 plane. So Z didn't even know at what time those flights 

23 were to be performed. That is why I don't think we talked 

24 about it, because he just said you will be contacted and 

25 that is it. The contact could have asked me for a flight 

IINPi AQCJCIEIL. 



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In three months, for example, you know. 

Did JH^^^^^K tell you that he had learned that 
someone would be contacting you or that he had been told 
about the £light requirement from soneone at the agency? 

A No. He just said — in fact, he gave me the 
name, Copp. He said a Mr. Copp will call you and will want 
to contract a flight with you, so you handle it yourself, 
and this was basically like, you know, I took it like, you 
know, I have to go back a few years. 

Three years before that we did some flights from 
and it was handled the same way. 
I was called, and I was told somebody will call you to do a 
flight, and we just want to let you know that we have no 
objections, so go ahead and deal with them directly. 
Mainly this meant to me that there was no objections from 
the agency] 




land that they wanted to let me know that they had 
northing against it, and therefore, he said, "Somebody will 
call you and then you deal with then directly." 

He had done that before ^^^^^^H and at that time 
with ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^B which you 
know, had paid us and so forth, and Z had reported on those 
flights then later on. 

Q You knew, though, that this was a flight being 

IIMOI AOOinrn 



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requested for the United States Government, didn't you? 

A No. 

Q You knew this was a special flight, didn't you? 

A LiJce I say, I just — I knew nothing iintil I 
talked to Mr. Copp. 

Q At some point around Lhis time, for instance, 
by the time you have written this meroorandisn, you knew this 
was a special flight being carried on for the United States 
Government, didn't you? 

A I didn't know that, and when you read my report, 
I have,'l think, some pretty heavy criticism in this report 
here because I remember when I wrote the report that I said 
that — I made the proposal that when we deal with third 
parties — I don't know where it is now, but I remember that 
I wrote somewhere that flights have been done for third 
parties. They should be done in a way we don't jeopardize 
our whole operation, you know. 

Q Let's teOce a look at page 7 of the report. 

A I am just trying to findit. 

Q Page 7, under the word, "proposal." 

A Yes. 

Q There is — I guess the second paragraph says, 
"Had it not been a special flight, I would have delayed for 
about two days after I had learned about the change of 



destination.' 



UNCIA.Sf;iFiFn 



410 



25 



uiKum^ 



41 



1 You know this is a special flight being handled at 

2 the CIA's behest and for the United States Government; isn't 

3 that correct? 

4 A No. That is not correct. Because we didn't only 

5 do special flights for the CIA, we also did special flights 

6 for others. 

7 Q What made this a special flight? 

8 A Because of the circumstances, because of the 

9 destination, because of the departure point, because of the 

10 whole way it was handled, and I was really kept in the dark. 

11 That is what made me so upset. On the other hand, I didn't 

12 want to screw up, you know. 

13 My first goal was to perform and to do a good job, 

14 but on the other hand, you know, that is why I wrote this 

15 long report because I thought that if somebody wants to 

•^6 do somebody a favor and use this airline for some flights, 

17 then I should be informed in advance, and we should do it 

18 right, you know. 

19 Q I am a little confused. I mean, this report I 

20 am looking now at page 8, says, "I realize there is the 

21 aspect of security and that the missions have to be done in 

22 a clandestine way." 

23 You knew this was a clandestine mission, didn't 



24 you? 



A This sentence here refers to all our clandestine 



llMnnvviLkii 



411 



UNcn^inEF^ 



42 



1 lights, not only this one here. 

2 Q In one was a clandestine flight, this flight to 

3 Iran; is that right? 

4 A Like I say, everything between Tel Aviv and 

5 Tehran is clandestine as far as we are concerned. You know, 
I somehow suspected that — like I say, somebody 

7 apparently at the agency maybe tries to do somebody a favor 

8 or whatever. But I actually thought by myself, since 
g I talked to Mr. Al Schwimmer in Israel, who happens to be the 

10 President of Israel Aircraft Industries. I thought that we 

11 had some aircraft parts from Israel to Tehran in this 

12 cargo, and that would have been, in fact, clandestine because 

13 everybody knows that Israel and Tehran doesn't like each 

14 other officially. 

15 I thought if this comes out, that we fly aircraft 
18 parts to Tehran, then you know that is internationally 
■17 kind of a scandal. That is why that is clandestine. Plus 

18 clandestine might also mean that this is an agency airline, 

19 vhich, you know, operates in a clandestine way as a 



coBBDercial carrier. 

In other words, we have to make the impression 
internationally that we are a normal commercial carrier and 
that is what is clandestine about it. 

24 Q Well, was the August 1985 flight to Tehran a 

25 I clandestine flight? I thought that was a commercial flight. 

iiMPi AQCinrn 



412 



iiNfCJissffe^ 



43 



1 A Yes. But clandestine cononercial flight, if you 

2 want. 

3 Q Who was it clandestined from? Who was something 

4 being hidden from? 

5 A Well, it was hidden from the rest of the world, 

6 you know. I mean — 

7 Q Well, ^HHj^JK knew that that was a flight to 

8 Tehran, didn't he? 

9 A Yes. But he is kind of an insider. He is a broker 

10 and so, you know, like I said before, those flights are 

11 going on all the time and when I said before in the market 

12 it is common knowledge, then I mean in the market also 

13 secret things are common knowledge, and I am pretty sure 

14 you never read in the newspapers about those^^Bjf lights from 

15 Israel to Tehrem. 

16 We all knew about it, but officially nobody 

17 knew about it because those were secret flights. 

18 Q Well, Z must say that this report clearly Indicates 

19 to ■• that you understood that this was a flight being 

20 carried on at the behest of the United States Government 

21 and the Central Intelligence Agency, and I an a little 

22 confused by your testimony. 

23 You referred here to missions that have to be 

24 done in a clandestine way. You talk about on page 8 the 

25 preparation process, and you want to be invited to the 



cess, and you want to be 

imni Aooiricn 



413 



ONttJI^tFtilT 



44 



1 meetings of the department which are involved. 

2 MR. PEARLINE: I think I just want to say for the 

3 record he has answered several times; explained why he used 

4 the %rard, "clandestine." You have your opinion and^H| 
^^^^I^Hhas 

6 THE WITNESS; You know, I would be glad to make 

7 that a little clearer for you, and that is why I would have 

8 liked to have answered to your first implied question, and 

9 that is why— did I write such a long report. 

10 BY MR. CAROME; 

11 Q ' Why don ' t you give us the answer to that? 

12 A Because at the time when this flight had been 

13 finished, and when you read my report correctly and 

14 intensively, you will see that I was the one who cancelled 

15 the whole operation. 

1g The reason was because my understanding was that 

17 here is a CIA airline which on recommendation o^ ^^^B 

?o 

18 ^H^H enters a contract with a certain Richard Copp, and 



19 tlMO is basically, as it goes along, this thing turns 

20 out to be a thing which is amateurish. 

21 I wrote that on one page here. I wrote here, 

22 "The mission was poorly planned and directed by our contract 

23 partners in an anateruish way." This, 1 reported to the 

24 agency because I wanted to let them know, if you recommend 

25 me to somebody, then make sure you dont recommend me to 



then make sure you dont x 

lllfNniA.<!.<;inpn 



414 



um^OTifT 



45 



^ somebody who doesn't know what he is doing because — and 

2 when you read general conclusions, point 1 to 5, you know, 

3 I was really — I had the opinion after I talked to Copp 

^ several times that my contract partner was Al Schwimmer of 

5 Isreaeli Aircraft Industries. But when pushed for the money, 

6 he said to me, "Why do you ask me?" I saiu, "Last but not 

7 least, you are my contract partner. You should know." 

8 He said, "No, I am not your contract partner." I said, 

9 "Who is?" He said, "Mr. Copp is." 

10 I said, "He gave me the impression you are." - 

11 He sai<f, "That is wrong." When I talked to Copp the next 

12 time, I said, "You know, this turns out to be a little 

13 amateurish to me. I never dealt like this before, so I 

14 get the impression that I deal with people who don't know 

15 what they are doing. So before I go any further, I have 

16 to stress the commercial aspect of this here, and that is 

17 where is the money?" 

18 . So, therefore, when I didn't get a clear answer, 

19 I didn't get a payment, I said, then, the airplane was under- 

20 way on the way back. I told the captain, "When you are over 

21 I^^^Hcall me via H.F. radio. By then I will have enough 

22 information to tell you whether to go on with the mission." 

23 Together we planned four or five lights. 

24 When he called me over^^^^H I told him to go on 

25 ^^HHVand forget about this. I made the decision we 

IIMPI ACCiCiCn 



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don't continue with this because we deal with people here 
I don't know. They don't come across with the money. I 
don't know what is going on here. I just know that I was 
referred to somebody which I don't know, and maybe the 
agency knows more, but I was really upset that I was put 
in this situation where I risk the clandestine layout of 
the whole company just for a stupid flight like that. 
Q I want to get to all of that. 



UNCUSSIHED 



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HNttjmEilT 



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(Discussion off th« record.) 

MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 



I want to go back to this first 




PO 



I or 



conversation with | 

A Yes. 

Q Had^H^fever called you before informing you 

that a customer was going to be contacting you with a 
flight requirement? 

A ' No. 

So that was an unusual event; is that right? 
Yes. 

And did ^^^^^^1 tell you that it was I 
[who had gotten in touch with him on this 
subject? 

A No. I assumed that this was just general 
intelligence. Let me say something else. Just to give 
you an idea, he never called me before for a flight like 
this, but he had called me before for other things. 
For instance, at one time he called me and he said, you night 
get an application from a pilot who is named such and such, 
and when you do, let us know about it> and don't hire him. 
Because obviously I assumed at that time that there was 
intelligence that this guy was maybe an agent or whatever 
and -- for inatanca. ^hat oilot was ^^^^^I^^^^BDilot. 



417 



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I assumed there was some knowledge about him. 
So In a similar way, I assumed that there was agency 
knowledge about those flights. 

-_ Q And in that first phone call, was it, that^^f 
^^^^■told you that you would be getting a call from 
a Mr. Copp? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you know who Mr. Copp was? 

A For me he was Mr. Copp. I just learned a few 
days ago that that was obviously the code name for 
Mr. Secord. 

Q You didn't know that at the time? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever met Mr. Secord? 

A No. 

Q You have spoken to him on the telephone; is that 
correct? 

A Obviously, yes. At least he identified himself 
aa Richard Copp, so it must have been him then. 

Q What <^i<^HH^H ^^^1 y°^ about the flight 
requirement in that first phone call? 

A Like I said before, he said the guy will call you, 
you deal with him directly, it is not our show. 

Q Did he tell you what the cargo would be? 

A No. 



mu&mn 



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\ifmmF 



49 



In fact, like I wrote here, after I talked 



Q Did he tell you anything about what it was to be 
carried? 

A No. 

to Copp, Z called I^^^Hagain and I told him about the 
phone conversation with Copp, because I wanted to report to 
him. And I said, is this the thing I reported in my last 
memo that because the initial offer I got from Copp was not 
from Tel Aviv to Tehran, it was from Tel Aviv to] 

Q Yes. 

I want to go step by step with this. We will 
get to that. 

A Okay . _ 

Q . What didt^H^^^^fe say about whether or not you 
ought to perform this flight, you being 

A Like I said before, he said you go ahead, deal 
with the guy directly, do what you like, basically. 

Q Did you understand you would be free to say no, 
w don't want to do ic? 

A That is a good question. I don't know. I guess 
yes. 

Q Wasn't he directing you to deal with Copp and do 
what Copp wanted to be done? 

A No. 

Q What did he say about the urgency of the flight? 

A He said it is an ur^ep^/i^aht , the guy will call 



id It is an urgent f^xiht 

HMOl APCltlLil 



419 



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wtopseSSre' 



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you directly; you deal with him directly. 

Q Did he say why it was an urgent flight? 

A No. 

Q Did he say anything about the point of origin 

or destination of the flight? 

A Nothing. He didn't even know it. 

Q He said he didn't know it? 

A I presume he didn't know it. I reported to him 
later on. Like I said, when I said to him this goes from 
Tel Aviv to BIHHI since I know there is cargo 
I^^HHjto Tehran, is that maybe the same, which is on 
the market already? 

Everybody knew about. He ^, I will check on 
that. He came back and said, no. 



Just so the record is clear, you firmly recall 




thatHg^Hi'in his first phone call, didn't say anything 
about the agency having gotten in touch with him about 
the need for this flight being done; is that right? 

A As far as I remember, he didn't mention the agency. 
He just, like I said, only mentioned the agency in a way 
like saying it is not our show, or it is not an agency deal, 

or something like that. 

Q you were on an unsecure phone; is that right? 

A Yes. 

<* „«„^ nT-artice_ to aoaeOtAn the phone about 
Q Was it yQHi; PJgS^V^--^^ ■'^"'^^^^ 




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whether or not what you were doing had something to do with 
the Central Intelligence Agency, or did you try to avoid that 
subject? 

A Well, we would -- if we would talk on an unsecured 
phone, we would kind of speak in general terms and not refer 
to the agency at all. 

Q Did you have some sort of code to let you know 
when it was an agency matter or when it is not an agency 
matter? 

A We would usually say, "we." You know, we could 
mean everything. 




Jwould 

usually say there is something else I have to talk to you 
about why don't we meet tomorrow. Then we would talk about 
it in detail. 



PO 



what happened after the first phone call with^H^ 



A I got the phone call from Mr. Copp. 

Q When did Mr, Copp call? 

A Friday night. I think maybe seven o'clock or 
so, six o'clock, seven o'clock. 

Q You have here "at about 2000 local time" — 
I am referring to Exhibit No. 7 — "I was contacted by a 
certain RichaxdCopp. 



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Okay. Well then that is correct. 



52 




A 

Q 

A _ 

Q That would be cbout eight o'clock; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And what did Mr. Coop say to you on the phone? 
Again, I gather he contacted you by telephone; is that 
right? 

A Yes. He said, my name is Richard Copp, Have 
you been informed about a mission which has to be done; - 
and I said, no; because I hadn't. I just had been informed 
that he would call me. So I told him, no, I have not been 
informed about a mission. I just know that you would call 
me, and I presume you would tell me about it now. 

He said, okay, this is it. Then he explained 
it to me. 

Q You knew he was calling from^^^^^B is that 
right? 

A That is where he told me he was calling from. 
I don't know whether he really was||^^^^HHor not. 

Q But you recall him telling you that on the phone; 
is that right? 

A Sorry? 

Q You recall that he told you that on the telephone? 

A Yes. That is why I mentioned it to you. 



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Q Again this is on an unsecure line; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q What exactly did Mr. Copp tell you was the flight 
requirement? 

A Well, he said I need three flights done as 
quickly as possible from Tel Aviv^^^^|^^H government-to- 
governraent. 

Q What did you understand government-to-government? 

A Government-to-government means that traffic-right 
wise, usually you have no problems. Therefore, it can be 
done relatively quickly. Whereas if it is a normal flight 
with commercial companies involved, then ususally you need 
about three days to apply for traffic rights, and got the okay 

Q He was telling you that this was not a normal 
commercial flight; is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q Did government- to-government imply that there would 
b« government officials involved at each end of the flight? 

A That could well be. Usually governraent-to-governmen : 
means that traffic-right wise, you have no problems. Some- 
times the landing is free. Sometimes the loading is being 
done by government or my military or whatever, you know. 
So that was basically indicating that I wouldn't need 
much preparation because government-to-government, everything 
is taken care of, we just have to fly. 



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O What did he tell you about what was to be carried 
on the flights? 

A He didn't tell me anything. He just said three 
flights. I asked him how much cargo; and he said, how much 
can you carry. I said, 40 tons. And he said, well, it 
will not be much. That was that. 

Q Did you understand why there needed '.o be three 

flights? 

A No. I didn't know. 

Q Did he ask you how many planes you had available? 
A Yes. 

Q What didyou tell him? 

A I said, I have one plane available; and he said, 
I need two. And I said, well, you know, I have one plane 
that 1 would prefer not to use, can't you do it with one 
plane? He said, well, I guess if you have only one plane, 
we can start out with one plane, if you can fly consecutively 
one and the other. I said, yes, we can do that. 
Q Did you ask him what the cargo was? 
A No. 
Q Why not? 

A Because I didn't have to apply for traffic rights, 
usually when you apply for traffic rights, you have to know 
consignor, consignee, commodity, routing and price. But when 
it says government-to-government, you don't need all of that. 



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so it is really of no importance. 

Q you later learned that the cargo was HAWK missiles; 
isn't that right? 

A Well, I heard that after the flights, you know, 
much later. 

Q How much later? 

A I don't know. Weeks later, maybe. 

Q You are saying that at the time these flights 
were taking place, you had no knowledge that there were 
missiles on the cargo? 

A No, I didn't. In fact, I assumed that we had 
aircraft spare parts because, like I say, I dealt with the 
President of Israel Aircraft industries, so I thought this 
must have been some kind of Israeli dealer. 

Q Who told you that it was aircraft spare parts? 

A Nobody. I just assumed that. 

Q And what caused you to assume that? 

A Because I talked to the President of Israel 
Mrcraft Industries, among other things, that is producing the 
Westwind and many of the aircraft spare parts. 

Q Who is this person you are referring to? 

A Mr. Al Schwimmer. 

Q Was that someone whom you were familiar with? 

A No. But I — you know, I tried to find out 
later on who he was while I was talking to him. I found out 



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from one of my pilots that he is the President of Israel 
Aircraft Industries, so — you know 

Q You didn't know who Schwiinmer was when you were 
first talking to Copp, did you? 

A No . No . 

Q Sn at that time you were not assuming it was 
airline parts; is that right? Airplane parts? 

A I assumed that later on. -^ 

Q And you firmly recall that ^^^^^^H didn' t tell 
you at any point that this was missiles; is that right? ' 

A That is right. 

Q And is it — you also firmly recall that Mr. Copp 
never told you it was missiles; is that right? 

A That is right. 

Q That is a clear recollection you have; is that 
right? 

Yes. 
. EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. FEIN: 

Q Would you have done anything differently if they 
had informed you that it was HAWKS? 

A That is difficult to answer, because in light 
of the development of the whole thing nowadays, I would 
have said maybe no. At that time I might have said yes. 
So I really can't-^nsvex-tf 




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Q What would have caused you concern? If it was 

government -to-government? 

A In fact, had I know what I know today, I would 

have done what I wrote here as a proposal in my report. 

PO 
I would have contacted ^^^^H|H| and I would have said, we 

have sensitive cargo here, let's inform a task force and 
sit together and plan this correctly and then do it pro- 
fessional way, 

Q What was it that wojld make the HAWK missiles — 
they are sensitive certianly because of their lethal capacity 
in the country to whom they are delivered, but what otherwise 
simply about the transportation dimension of the transaction 
would have made it more sensitive than, say, dynamite? 

A It wouldn't. 

Q Then why would you — what was the planning that 
you would do differently? 

Because the political implicatj 




Q What I don't understand is that if the possibility 
of weapons would, if you knew about that, cause you to change 



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your basic modus operandi or planning, why didn't you 
invariably ask any time you were tasked to carry a cargo 
whether or not they are weapons? Why would you, if there 
was that danger, ever be silent, and not always be rather 
aggressive in understanding what you were carrying? 

A Well, because what happened in this case is this: 
Initially, we were talking about a flight between Tel Aviv 




All you need is Tel Aviv and^^^^^H- 
to say okay, even when you over flyfl|^HHH don' t need a 
permit, because all European countires let you overfly without 
a permit. 

Only in the Middle East countries and African 
countries, do you need a permit. 

MR. CAROME: I think we are going to get to some of 
these points. I would like to take it step-by-step; if that 
is all right? 

MR. PEARLINE; Could we take a break? 

THE WITNESS: I would prefer to go on to get 
through with it quicker. 

MR. PEARLINE: All right. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOOSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Did Mr. Copp give you the weight of the total 



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A No. 

Q Okay. 

A He gave me the dimensions. He told me they are 
long boxes and he gave me the rough dimensions, and 
therefore I knew that the weight was not really the problem, 
but the volume. 

Q What did Mr. Copp tell you about the dimension^? 

A I don't remember the exact dimensions now, but I 
realize they were long boxes. He said we have long 
boxes and would you have any problems loading them? He 
gave me the dimensions approximately, and I said, I don't 
think that is a problem, they should go through the door. 
And so I was pretty sure there was no problem. 

Q Did he give you the weight? 

A No. 

Q Don't you need to know the weight in order to figure 
out how much fuel you are going to need and what to charge 
the customer? 

A Only when it is coming the maximum load. When 
I have a volume problem, then I know — you know, we talked 
about the approximate weight may be, but I knew that we 
would be maybe half full or so, weightwise. 

Q How did you know that? 

A Well, like I say, I knew the dimensions of the boxes 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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MMm 



60 



and the approximate weight of the boxes. 

Q So Mr. Copp did tell you the weight of the boxes; 
is that right? 

A I think he did. They weight average such and such. 
I really don't remember. 

Q I am sorry. 

A When I have a discussion like that, you know, 
very quickly I kind of calculated in my head the weight and 
I knew we were way below maximum take off weight so I was 
not really interested in the details. 

(The document was marked Exhibit No\^^8 for 
identification: ) 

COMMITTEE INSERT 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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PO 



BY MR. CAROME: 

Q flp^^^^^^^^H I show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 8. It is a handwritten document dated, November 
22nd, 1985. I believe the handwriting is not yours but 
someone elses. In any event, I ask you if you can identify 
what that document is? 

A Yes. I think this was written by' 
When we talked about this affair, he showed this to me, but 
I didn't read it. ^ 

Q You recognize that document a s^^J^^H^^^^ document; 

is that right? Something he prepared? 

A Yes. Some of his notes. 

Q Towards the top of that document, there is a 
reference to sensitive high priority cargo? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you see that? 

A Ves . ^ 

Q Did |^^^m[ describe this to you as sensitive 
high priority cargo in your first telephone call? 

A No. I also presume that the dimensions and the 
staff he has here, he got that from me, maybe, 

Q Well, it says ^^^^^^^R called requesting avail- 
ability of^^^B707s to move sensitive high priority cargo. 
It appears from this document that that is the CIA informing 
him of the dimensions and weight of the cargo. You don't 




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62 

recall him providing that information to you? 

A As much as I want to help you, but I can't speculate 
on his notes. 

Q You see that it refers to — it does give weight 
and volume and dimensions of ~ do those refresh your 
recollection as to whatyou learned at the time about the 
nature of the cargo? Do those appear to be accurate? 

A Could be. I don't remember. 240 pounds is about — 
it is about 100 tons, so that would be about ~ that is about 
30 tons per flight, 33 tons per flight. The max load we- 
can carry is 42 tons. That is -- that seems to be 
correct. 

Q And Mr. Copp in his first phone call with you 
specifically said that the point of origin was to be Tel Aviv? 

A Yes. 

Q And destination ''^^H^HHI ^^ ^^^^ 

A That is correct. 

Q Did he tell you the number of pieces that were 

involved? 

A Yes. I think he said we were supposed to carry 18 

pieces per flight. 

Q 18 per flight? 

A Yes. 

Q You recall him giving you that number? 



I think so, yes. 



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Q Is it possible that that simply worked out to be 

the number you could fit on later and that is why you remember 
187 

A Yes. 

Q So maybe he didn't tell you 18? 

A Somehow I remembered, but it could also be that we 
only got 18 in it. I am pretty sure we talked about 18 
boxes per flight 

Q 



notes, which are Exhibit 8, refers 
to, in the third line, 80 pieces. Does that ring a bell- 
with you as to how many peices Mr. Copp said needed to be 
moved in that first phone call? 

A You know, I don't remember, because like I say, 
you know, you have to understand the atmosphere. Here I sit 

[; I prepare a flight. On Saturday, I traveled 
to If^^^^^l I mean, you know, I was working day and night 
because with the time changes and so on 





rtly, so my management 
style was that I would concentrate on the — you know, 
priorities and the important things we needed, traffic 
rights, we needed a crew, I needed the airplane ready from 
another flight, and this and that. And so once I determined 
in my mind that the cargo would pose no problem, I wouldn't 
go into the cargo anymore because it was kind of accomplished 



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UNCMMIi^ 



64 



for me then. I would then concentrate on the next 
problem. 

Q You say you traveled ^H|^^HB When did you leave 



A I think I flew on Saturday. I flew' 

then, a day later. 

Q That would have been what time on Saturday that 

you left 

A I am pretty sure I flew — 

I don't remember. 




Q Why did you 

A Well, because I had planned to go ^^^^^^B anyway, 
and then this flight was upcoming and this was not only one 
flight; we were talking about several flights. So I 
wanted to be in place because my procedure was that when I 
Started something new — and this looked to me like it 
might be a — the beginning of a series of flights, that I 
wanted to be myself in position to maybe even go on the 
first flight myself and make sure everything goes all right. 

Q You didn't fly to Tehran for the first time, 

did you also go over 

at that time. 



In fact, I think I was 




at that time? 



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A Yes. I am pretty sure I was_ 

Q Did you go on that flight? 

A No. 

Q That was a new thing, wasn't it? 

A Yes. That was a similar thing, so that was not 
really a new contract as such, you know. 

Q In any event, let's get back to the firot phone 
call with Mr. Copp. 

You negotiated a price for what it was you were 
going to do; is that right? 

A That is right. 

Q And Exhibit No. 7 seems to indicate that you 
negotiated a flight of 60,000 United States dollars 
plus some items, fuel, landing, handling, for three con- 
secutive flights; is that correct? 

A That is right. 

Q And how did you come to that figure? 

A Well, I calculated the distance between Tel Aviv 




So then I cane to $60,000. 

Q Did you have a bargaining session with Mr. Copp 
over this? 

A No. I just — you know, he said how much do you 

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66 



want for it? I said, $60,000. And I explained to him 
however, we had to charge him also for the fuel, landing 
handling and so on. He said, okayj that is acceptable. 

Q How much would you estimate the fuel would have 
been if you had done all three of those flights? 

A Let me see. I would need a calculator. Do you 
have a calculator somewhere? 

MR. CAROME: Anyone have a calculator? 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Let me estimate it. 



I would say roughly, about — depending on the fuel price, 
which I don't know, for example, but let's assume we talk 
about a dollar a gallon, I would say maybe $60,000, $70,000 
for fuel . 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q For three flights? 
A Yes. 
Q 
Is that yoxir normal rate? 

A No. That is actually a high rate. 
What is your normal cargo rate? 

Well, the normal cargo rate 

Let's say what was it in 1985? 




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[was actaully high and it was high 
because he wanted it urgent, he wanted me to pull the airplane 
out of an ongoing operation, so therefore, I said, okay, 
look, I don't have an airplane available, but I can give 
it to you if you pay the price. 

He was willing to do it. So we did the flight'. 

Q Did Mr. Copp tell you who you would be dealing 
with at the Tel Aviv end? 

A No. 

Q Did he tell you what you were supposed to do when 
you got to Tel Aviv or when your plane got to Tel Aviv? 

A No. 

Q What 

A It was like everything will be taken care of, you 
know. 

Q Did he say who was going to take care of it? , 

A No. 

Q What was said about — on the subject of a second 
plane being involved? 

A Well, like I said before, he said he would like to 
have two planes right away. And I told him I would prefer 

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to give him only one plane because I had commitments and 
why don't we agree that if the thing gets realy urgent, I pull 
in another plane, but otherwise go with one plane? So 
he agreed to that. 

Did Mr. Copp tell you who it would be that you 
would deal with ^^H^^^^B upon arrival? 

he he was |^H|^^^^^^Hm and 

so I assumed that he would take care of things. 

Q Did he tell you what would happen with the cargo 



A No. 

Q He didn't tell you that it would be unloaded and 
put on other planes, for example? 

A No. 

Q What was said on the subject of when the payment 
was to be made, the $60,000 payment? How was that going 
to be handled? 

A I just told him that I needed the money telegraphicaJ 

and since we 



transferred to our bank account 
were talking here about initially three flights and maybe 
more flights later on, I knew that this would take a few 
days anyway, so therefore, I was not too concerned. And I 
told him, you know, Monday I need a tramsfer on our bank 
account |^^|^^^|H ^^ agreed to that. 

Q Had you ever before performed cargo flights witK 



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previously unknown customers without cash In advance of 
the flight? 

A I had done that, but not with previously unknown 
customers. They were either customers I had know; or if 
they wre unknown, they were recommended to me by somebody 
I knew and I trusted. So in this case, for example, he 



fO 



so, you know, I thought 



was recommended to me by| 

that is okay. 

Q Did I^^^Hj^^V tell you he trusted Copp? 

No. 

Did he tell you anything about Mr. Copp? 

No. 

But the mere fact thatlj^H^Hsaid Mr. Copp 

will be calling you made you trust Mr. Copp? 

A Yes. Actually, when you read ray report, you will 

see that the trust wore out as the thing went on, you know. 

MR. FEIN: A declining bank account; right? 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q The last paragraph in your November 30 memorandum 

in the section headed, "Phase one," says, "During my subsequent 

phone conversation toflHM^^BH||^K I referred to my memo 

21/11/85." Do you see where I am referring to? 

A Yes. 

Q Well, first of all, I take it that after you got off 

PO 

the phone with Mr, Copp, you reported back to 



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is that right? 



A Yes. 

Q Why didyou do that? 

A Weil, I thought, you know, since he had ci/en me 
the contact, I thought he wanted to be — he woulc ^jc 
interested to know whether it worked out or not. 

Q You didn't understand that you were goirn; to — 
withdraw that question. -^ 

In fact, you kept ^^^^^^^V very well informed 
of each and every step of this flight operation; isn't that 
right? 

A Well, not exactly. In the beginning, yes; but 
then when I went over ^B^^^H, I couldn't do that 
bacause I was so busy and also initially having went well, sc 
I didn't really feel a need to inform him. This was — 
the first time I informed him here had two reasons. One 
was because I thought he might be interested in knowing 
whether this deal came together or not, and the second was i 
lAen I heard about the dimensions of the boxes, I remembered 

f rom ^^^^H to Tehran and don't forget | 
this was proposed to me Tel Aviv^^^^^H 

So when I called^^H back, I said to him, you 
know, their cargo looks very familiar to me. Is that maybe — 
is the final destination maybe Tehran, and is that maybe the 
stuff I referred to in my last memo? 



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imsawr 



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He said, no. In fact, he said, I have to check 
on that. Then I called him back later on, and he said, no, 
it is not the same cargo. 

Q You say the cargo looked very familiar to you? 
What was it about the cargo that was familiar to you? 

A The size of the boxes. 

Q You knew what the size of the boxes were of some 
other cargo that had been displayed to you; is that right? 

A That is right. 

Q And where had you learned about the size of the 
boxes? 

A 




with boxes and 

also other boxes; 

flights 

and sutff like that. 




from 
not only those boxes, but 

the nature of thos< 
is hot cargo, ammunition. 




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Q When you heard Mr. Copp describe the cargo, what 
Mr. Copp described sounded similar to this ammunition cargo 

is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q Is it still your testimony that Mr. Copp didn't 
tell you that this was ammunition cargo? 

A Exactly. 

Q What was it that made you draw that conclusion 
that this cargo that Mr. Copp wanted moved was similar to 



ilMPIAOOinrn 



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Q And when Mr. Copp described what he needyd to be 
moved, it sounded like the same thing; is that right? 

A Exactly, yes. ?0 i 

Q And, in fact, even though — ^^^^^^^H denied 
it was the same thing at the time; right. 

A Yes. 

Q But you later learned it was the same thing; 
is that right? 

A I didn't learn it. I assumed it later on because 
when our airplane was in Tel Aviv, all of a sudden I was 
told it goes to Tehran. So I thought, well, obviously, I 
was right with my first assumption. 

Q In fact, you wrote in your November memorandum 
that the cargo had been on the market for about a week? 



Yes. 



Is that right? 



UNCLASSIFIED 




445 



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80-a 
And at that time when we were in the middle of 
this — or after this mission. I was pretuy sure we were 
talking about the same cargo. 

Q So that certainly by the time you had written this 
memorandum of November 30, you knew the cargo was ammunition; 
right? 

A Well, I didn't know the cargo was ammunition. 




446 



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Q But in any event, you concluded by the time the 
flight was through that the cargo that you had moved was 
the Scime cargo 
HH ammunition; is that right? 

A That is not right, because I look to be precise 
in this one here. 




Q And you are saying that you didn't know whether 
or not it was ammunition? 

A Exactly. I didn't know. 




447 



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Both cargos 

I didn't know what it was, but I assumed that the boxes were 
the same, but when I say that I assumed the boxes were the 
same, that doesn't mean that I assumed that the contents is 

llMni Acoinrn 



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th« same. I just knew that the boxes had the same size 
Now there could be dead people in those boxes 
What do I know? 

Q But you assumed that it was the same shipment 

right? 

A That is what I assumed, yes. 

Q Why did you tell me earlier in this deposition 
that what you assumed the cargo was was aircraft parts? 

A Because in the course of the events I talked to 
Mr. Al Schwimmer several times and he works -- he is 
the President of Israel Aircraft Industries. Since he 
was involved in the deal, I thought that it must be maybe 
some of his products which is aircraft parts. It could also j 
be oil drilling equipment. In fact, when I talked t< 

we were talking about the cargo and he asked me, 
what was it and I said, I don't know, maybe oil drilling 
equipment, you know. 




jimsaDFT 



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UNI!l!t$$n£§ET 



84 



(Laughter. ) 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Just so the record is clear, it was the nature 
of the cargo description that Mr. Copp gave you that led 
you to conclude that this was the samel 



A Not the nature of the cargo, but the size of the 
boxes. 

Q The size of the boxes? 

A Yes. 

Q And at this point you had no idea that this was 
cargo that was going to Tehran, because Mr. Copp hadn't 
mentioned Tehran; isn't that right? ^q 

A That is right. That is why I asked 
are we talking about the same cargo here, because in my 
memorandujn a few days ago, I mentioned it to you, ad that 

a between mH and Tehran. So are we talking about Tehran 
go here? He said, no. 

Q It was at least your suspicion at this time that 
what you were carrying or being asked to carry by Copp was 
munitions or military equipment; isn't that right? When I 
this time, I mean the time that Mr. Copp is telephoning you 
on Novmeber 22nd? 

A November 22nd? That was the initial phone call? 





:l h^RmK 



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Q That is right. 

A Well, on the initial phone call, I just knew it 
was government-to-government, and like I said before, I 
suspected that what he proposed to me was the same cargo 
which I had heard aboutJ 

Q And that was a munitions cargo; is that right? 

A The same boxes I 




And all you knew about that shipmen 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^was that it contained ammunition 
right? 

■^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HHH^I^Hl right . 
Q And you were suspicious that the shipment 
Hipp was talking to you about was anonunition, too; right? 

A No. You can ask me 10 times. I only wis suspicious 
that we talk about the same boxes 




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UNuBBottEI 



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the small boxes. And so, therefore, you know, I can only 
say that I new it was the seune boxes, but I really didn't 
know and couldn't assume what the contents was. It could 
be, for instance, length measuring equipment or whatever. 
I really don't know. 




'h 



MR. PEARLINE: Could you hold on for a second? 
(discussion off the record.) 



UNCLASSIHED 



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MB. CAROME: Back on the record. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q l^^m^HHB I say a very 

important subject to the committee is when people were aware 
that the cargo on this plane was missiles. We have gotten 
conflicting stories all over the lot on «-hat subject. It is 
an important subject to us. 

You do understand that you are testifying under 
oath today, that this is a deposition and you are obligated 
to tell the truth; right? 
A Yes. 

Q Frankly, given what is laid out here, I am having a 
difficult time understanding how it was that you didn't 
understand right off from the start that these were weapons 
on the plane. 

Mr. PEABLINE: I think we have been over this 
ground several times. 

MR. CAROME: I understand. This is a very 
iaportant point. 

Mr. PEARLINE: I understand the committee's concern 
and that it is an important point to the conmittee. He has 
given an answer. He can give it one more time. 

THE WITNESS: I can give one more answer. You 
see, I eun not a weapons expert. I am just an aviation expert. 



iiiiimBiiiij 



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Lth the 707 

we don't deal with long boxes, usually, so often. So, 
therefore, I don't have experience in long boxes and, 
therefore, I don't redly know what is in long boxes. 

The first time I heard about rockets was a few 
weeks after the flight when I talked to the co-pilot and I 
quote the co-pilot. He said to me, I don't understand why 
we had to fly that stuff, why didn't they just shoot it over 
to Tehran, you know. 

I said I don't understand that either and that wa? 
that. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q And it is your testimony that it was that discussion 
with the co-pilot which brought to your attention for the 
first time that it was missiles on the plane; is that right? 

A Yes, and he assumed that. He didn't even know it 
because that was his assumption he told me. 

Q He assumed you would have known what the cargo was; 
is that right? 

A No. He assumed they would have flown missiles. 
That was his assumption. When he told me that, I said, well, 
was it missiles and he said, well, that is what I think. 
See, nobody can know what it was unless he opened the box. 

IIMPLlQQICICn 



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Nobody opened the box. 




Q You did not know it was not ammunition. It could 
have been. It just depended upon whether it was the long 
boxes or the small boxes? 

A It could have been anything. 

Q It could have been weapons; is that right? you 
knew it could be weapons since this is part of what the -- 

A Like I said, it could be anything. It could be 
a nuclear bomb if you want, you know. 

Q But you were aware around the time that the flight 
was taking place that this shipment was at least part of the 
shipment 

A Exactly. That was my assumption and that led 
to my final criticism here which I even wrote down and that is 
why I also wrote -(^Mm^bii aijqrt. .aSAtfil^ce here. "This was 

■■ nil! 




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UWfttSSBW^ 



90 



denied." I wrote that in the first paragraph to have it on 
record that I was — that I was told that that is not the same 
shipment although I later on assumed it was the same shipment 
and that is why I wrote my whole report, you know. To 
get clarification, if you want. 

I mean, I was in the same boat like you. I wanted 
to find out afterwards what happened here. See, I found my 
airline jeopardized because something had gone wrong because w<i 
had flown for people who didn't know what they were doing. 
They didn't behave in a professional airline way and we didn't 
know what the cargo was. We didn't know why it was sent to — 
who was the sender, who was the receiver. That was my 
criticism. What is going on here, basically. 

Q Page 6 refers to — I believe we referred to this 
earlier — the cargo having been on the market for about a 
week. 

A Yes. 

Q Does that refresh your recollection that it was 
probably about a week before November 22 



A Yes. Around about. 

Q You testified earlier that the $60,000 price 
that you negotiated with Mr. Copp was based on an estimate 




is that right? 



mmm 



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«sir 



91 



Q And what had you — withdraw that question. 

How did you work into the price calculation the 
subject of how much time would be spent loading and 
unloading the plane? 

A Well, let me see. I think I have it here. When you 
look at loading, when I talked to Copp, his estimate was that 
the loading would take five hours and — but he said that 
he would speed it up to two hours personally. 

Q Well, you knew that these boxes, these long boxes -- 




^|it would take 24 hours to put a plane- 
load of them into a plane; isn't that right? 

A I didn't say 24 hours. I said the 24 hours was a 
time period including the flight time, the rest time for the 
crew, and the loading time. So I had previously calculated 
a loading time of maybe eight hours. 

Q And the total time to do a flight load of these 
boxes would be 24 hours; is that right? 

A Including the flight and the rest time of the crew. 

Q Well, why didn't you then have the same calculations 
for the same boxes this time around? 

A I did. 

Q Wouldn't that be 72 hours? 

A No. 

Q Twenty-four hours per flight, including downtime? 



iiMPi Aooicirn 



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A No. Because when he told me he thought that the 
loading would take five hours, I said, are you sure about 
that, and he said, well, we will speed it up for you to two 
hours. I said, well, if that is the case, that is fine with 
me . 

Q So — 

A You know, I didn't know what kind of manpower he 
had available or whatever. When we calculated the first 
flight ^^^^^^^^^M^° Tehran, we had to assume that we had ^ 
normal handling agency help us to load the airplane, like 
normal airline procedures which would mean that, you know, 
they have maybe one high loader there and five people. So 
that was my normal calculation. 

Also, you always have a little leeway for, you 
know — so that you don't get close to the schedule later on 
or late on the schedule. 

When he told me that he could speed it up to two 
hours, I believed him, which turned out to be a mistake, 
but I really believed him. You know, when you come up with 
a hundred people to the airplane, you can do it in two hours 
maybe. I don't know. 

You know. £iii .til4it youli not be a normal commercial 
loading procedure. 




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Q That would be — ^^^^^■would be in the ballpark 
of what you would charge for that kind of flight; is that 
right? 

A Exactly. Including fuel and everything. 

Q Were there any special insurance costs involved in 
taking a cargo flight into Tehran that you know of? 

A Ves. 

Q Tell me about the special insurance arrangements. 

A As far as I remember, we had to pay $2.5 thousand 
,for one Tehran flight. 

Q And is that what you did on the August 198 5 flight? 

A We did, yes. 

Q And did you do that again on the November 1985 
flight? 

A I really don't remember. It could be, it could not 
be. 

Q It might be that you did not have time to do that; 
is that right? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



459 



UlffiBBSfiHFT 



94 



1 A It was not really my job. I had operations 

2 officers in our office who would take care of that. I know 

3 for a fact that — well, the first Tehran flight we did it 
^ because, you know, before we concluded the first flight, we 

5 asked the insurance how much will you charge for one Tehran 

6 flight extra insurance. They told us $2.5 thousand. 

7 So we calculated that into the price. On the next 

8 night, we didn't have to do that anymore, so it went 

9 automatically. So I really don't know. I would have to -look 

10 up the documentation myself whether we had it then or not. 

11 I assume we did, because I wouldn't think that we would go 

12 without, you know. 

13 Q Did you talk to Mr. Copp about insurance? 

14 A No. 

15 Q You affirmatively recall that subject didn't come up 

16 with him? 

17 A That was only a minor point. I knew it was only 

18 $2.5 thousand. So at that point I was — when it switched 

19 ^^HJIHHjVto Tehran, the destination, then we were just 

20 including that in the invoice later on. 

21 Q Did he tell you that he was 

22 insurance on his own for the flight? 

23 A No. We didn't talk about insurance at all. 

24 Q When did you have a subsequent phone conversation 

25 withAHH^H as referred to in the last paragraph of this 



ictsme 



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Phase I? 

A That was the same evening, Friday night. 

Q And what did you tell him in that phone conversation 

A I told him the guy you mentioned to me called me and 
he offered me a flight from Tel Aviv H^^|^^ for $60,000 
plus landing, handling, and fuel which looks good to me. 
However, the cargo he offers seems to be the same cargo I 
reported before/^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand when I reported before, 
that was going to Tehran, so my question was are those boxes 
the same boxes we are talking about, is the final 
destination Tehran, do you know that yourself from Copp 
maybe, or something? And he said, no. It is not the same. 
In fact, he said, no, I don't know that, but I can check on 
it. Then I talked to him again and he said, no, it is not. 

Q You talked to him again later that night? 

A I think so, yes. 

Q Why were you interested in that point? 

A Because I wanted to know whether we were — 
whether somebody tried to trick us into a flight to Tehran. 
I wanted him to be aware of that early enough so that in 
case that was the deal, that we would maybe handle it in a 
different way or whatever. You know, 

Q Did you also want to know whether what you were 
carrying was going to be munitions or military equipment? 

A No. I was not sg. (;cQ<;&cQA(W^°^^ ^^® cargo at 



I was not so 'ITI^Ifl.I'M'W^' 



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that time, but more about the destination. Based upon the 
size of the boxes, I assumed that we talked about the 
same cargo which was destined to Tehran before. Now I was 
told it is ||m[H Since|^P||^is a familiar trans- 
shipment point from Tel Aviv to Tehran, my assumption was 
is this the same cargo, is it going to Tehran, are we going 
only Tel AvivJ^|^Hor are we also going to Tehran later on? 
That was my question. 

I was then told, no, we don't go to Tehran, it. is 
not the same. The main motivation I had to ask was that -- 
for that is, you know, if it was going to Tehran, we needed 
more time to prepare the flight for traffic rights and 
things like that. 

Q And flHHH^ ceune back to you and said, no, it is 

not the sanae flight; right? 

A Exactly. 

Q Did flH^HH tell you anything else that night? 

A He said it is not the same flight, it is not the 
same cargo. That was basically his reply, according to what 
he knew at that time or what he checked out. I don't know 
that. Have to ask him. 

Q Why was he keeping you in the dark? 

A I don't know. That is a good question. Maybe he 
was kept in the dark himself. I really don't know. I had 
the impression that hwen I talked to him that he was telling 



462 



UNWSSIifiET 



97 



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me the truth, you know. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did he say he had checked with 
someone else? 

THE WITNESS: I think he said, I checked with it and 
it is not the same. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Who did you understand he had checked with? 

A I don't know. You have to ask him. 

Q Did he tell you who? 

A ^ No. Under normal circumstances, he wouldn't tell 
me. I assume it was the agency he checked. 

Q What did you do that night to get this operation 
moving? 

A Well, I called my office ^^^^^^^^^H and, in fact, 
I worked nearly the whole night from Friday to Saturday because 
of the time change. We had already — Saturday morning 

I was coordinating. We had to dedicate a crew to 
this one flight which we initially planned. We had to make 
contingency plans for the second flight. We had to — you 
read in the Phase II positioning, we made out a code with 
the captain of that airplane which went 
we wouldn't have to talk on HF radio about the whole deal 
because whatever concerns Israel, you simply don't talk about 
it on the radio because on the HF radio everybody can listen 
in the whole world. 



« 




463 



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98 



It goes around the world. The Russians, the Arabs, 
everybody listens and usually they are also the same 
frequencies. So we made all of those plans and then 
Saturday, like I say, I went over then|^mmand Sunday 
morning, the operation was already underway. 

Q Let me just cover a few points. In your first 
conversation with Mr. Copp, did he tell you that the name of 
his company was Lake Resources? 

A No. 

Q When did you learn that Lake Resources was the 
name of the company we are dealing with? 

A I never learned that. 

Q You never learned it was Lake Resources? 

A No. In fact, I learned from you just now. I heard 
Copp. Later I thought Schwimmer was my contract partner. 
He said, no, it was Copp. That was it. Whoever Copp was. 



sort? 



Did Copp tell you he was with a company of some 



No. 



Who did you understand Copp to be? 

I thought it was kind of an Israeli operation and I 
thought maybe he works for the Israelis, you know. 
Q You knew he was an American, didn't you? 
A Yes, I could hear the accent. 
Q Did you know he was a former military person? 

iiMoi Accicicn 



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A No. In fact, when I talked to Mr. Schwinuner in 
Israel, he also had an American accent and he is an American- 
Israeli, so to speak, you know. So it looked to me like this 
is maybe an Israeli operation with some Americans involved. 
Knowing the relationship between the Israelis and the U.S., 
I thought, well, maybe that is why I was told you can deal 
with them, you know. 

Q The 707 that you were detailing initially to go to 
Tel Aviv was your U.S. registered 707, is that right? - 

A Let me see. I have to look that up myself. Yes. 
I think that was the American — which one arrived earlier 
here? I think it was the American airplane which we had 
planned for the first flight or as the only airplane because 
it was no problem to fly between Tel Aviv and ^^^^1 with the 
American airplane, American-registered airplane. 

Q Did Copp tell you anything about transfer of the 
cargo ^^IJH^B to three DC-8 airplanes? 

A No. Like I said initially and like I wrote here, 
it was a government-to-government deal, so at that time I had 
the assumption that, you know, the end user, if you want. 



PO 



y pnune caxxs uiu j\j\a na* 

UNCLASSIFIED 



Q How many phone calls did you have with ^^^B that 
first night? 

By the first night, I am talking about November 22nd 
A I think the initial call and then I think two more 



465 



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maybe three calls altogether. 

Q During any of those phone calls, did you learn that 
this was an operation in which the agency had knowledge or 
was involved? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^^K like said before, he mentioned 
that this was not an agency operation and that is why I was on 
my own dealing with Mr. Copp and that is why he couldn't 
give me any details or schedules or whatever. 

Q The first flight movement which takes place wasf^H 
o Tel Aviv flight by your U.S. registered 707, is 
that right? 

A That is right. , 

Q Who was the crew on that flight? 

A That was — it is blanked out in my report. I think 
it was 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 




And who else? 

The rest of the crew I don't remember. 

Was there a load master on that crew? 

Yes. On most airplanes are load masters. 

Do you know the name of that load master? 

One wasfl^fland the other wa€ 

Spell the second name. I 



iiNcussm 



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Q 
right? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
That wa 



And there were co-pilots on both flights; is that 



Yes. 

Which co-pilot was on the first flight? 
I don't remember. 

Do you know the names of the two co-pilots? 
I know who eventually did the flight to Tehran. 
On the other airplane I don't know 
who the co-pilot was at that time. We mainly identify the 
airplane by the captain's neune. 
Q Was the other co-pilot; 
A No. That was the Captain ol 



Ptttihuer/^A^ PiUiT Cf*^ 




, which went 



Q Who was the pilot of the plane that went to Tehran? 

A ^mi^^H ^^^ °'^® y°" just mentioned. 

Q You don't know theneune of the co-pilot that went to 
Tehran? 

A That was 

Q I am sorry. I am confusing myself. It was 
[^^^H| who made the comment to you about why didn ' t we 
fire the weapons over to Tehran? 

A Exactly. 

Q Did you have a second conversation with Copp on 
Friday the 22nd? 

A I don't think so. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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CAS-16 



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What happened next on this matter? 
A Well — 

Q You have talked to Copp at least once and you have 
talked to^^^^f^two or three times. What happened next? 

A Then, like I said, then I called our office^B] 
H^^H|^H told them about the -- this project here, and told 
them what preparations to make, crew-wise, overflight 
right-wise and so on and so on, because since I had told Copp 
that in case he needed it, we could give him the second 
airplane, I knew that the second airplane would b« 
by the time he might want it, so we already applied for 
overflight rights! 

in advance on Saturday. 
Should we need the airplane on Sunday, we would have 
the overflights granted. If not, we just wouldn't use the 
overflight rights. 

Things like that had to be done, preparations, 
Jpou know, lots of preparations. Then, like I wrote here, 
I talked then to Copp about the pallets. I asked him whether 
they had their own pallets. He called me back and 
he said, no, you have to use your own pallets. So I had to 
use our own pallets. 

That is why we had to divert the airplan 
to pick up our pallets 





NCI A!!!iin[il 




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Q When did you talk to Copp about the pallets? 

A I wrote that down here. This was — okay. 
One o'clock GMT, I had the agreement with Copp, and next 
day, 12, GMT, it must have been Saturday then — no, sorry, 
next day, 6:30 GMT, because all my times here are GMT, so 
we don't get confused with local time and a''l this. GMT 
6:30, which is 12:30 our time here, we then agreed or he told 
me then he called me and told me that how does it go and so on 
And I asked him then what about the pallets, do you have- your 
own pallets? 

He said no. So then we made the arrangements to 
pick up the pallets. 

Q So you were speaking to Copp again sometime after 
midnight? 

A Apparently, yes. I mean, I was busy the whole 
night, you know. 

Q When did Copp ask you to put the second aircraft 
into the operation? About the middle of page 2, there is a 
reference to that. When I say "page 2", I sun referring 
to what has been marked as Exhibit 7. 

A I see what you mean. Yes. That was Sunday 
morning. That was Sunday morning that Copp — when I told 
him about the delay of the airplane, he told me, well, 
then let's get also the second airplane. 

Q On page 2, there is a sentence in parenthesis that 



UNCLASSIFIEI 



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iiiiUSSIMiT 



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says "Contrary to normal procedures, this flight had not 
been prepared^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^H in 
knowledge of this flight." 

Why were you trying to reduce knowledge of this 
flight between Tel Aviv ^^^^/H/f^ 

A Well, because whenever Israel is involved, we 

usually try to reduce knowledge of those flightsj 




You know, you can't let them know that you are flying to 
Israel. We are going under the assumption that they don't 
know we also fly to Israel. 




Q And the reason was not because the United States 
Government or the CIA had some involvement with this flight, 
is that your testimony? 

A All flights to Israel we usually did without 



Q When had you previously flown into Israel? Was 
that something you did with some frequency? 

A Let me think about it. I don't think we had done 
a flight before this one to Israel with this company, but 
I personally had done with other airlines many flights to 
Israel before. AncL 4X1 .f IJ-ghts to Israel were usually handled 



AncLall flights to Israel 

JftliyjIiJPirirn 



470 



HNJMSStRffiT 



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kS 19 



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in a secretive way. 

Q What did Copp tell you was the reason for the urgency 
of the mission? 

A He didn't tell me. He just said it is urgent. 

Q Was the 707 that was busy^^^^^^^H busy on a flight 



A No, that was the sub-charter flight with general 
cargo, all sorts of things. It was actually going to several 
places] 

Q ' It wasn't^^^^^^^lhaul? 

A No, it was not 

Q When Copp asked for there to be a second plane 



^ 



to see if that was 



involved, did you check with] 
okay? 

A No. 

Q You just went ahead and did that yourself? 

A Yes. 

PQ 

you were doing that? 



Q Did you tel] 

A No. 

Q Could you take alook at what had been marked as 

Exhibit 8 towards the top of the second page. Again, this 
Po 



is l^^^^^mm handwriting, is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q It says, "He had diverted the second aircraft..." 
Then there is a word I can't read, but then it says, "At the 



ing, 13 tnat rignt.' 

UNClASSinED 



471 



oiieu^Hci^T 



106 



CAS-20 1 request of the customer." 

2 ^ Does that refresh your recollection that you told 

3 ^^^^^^^H you had diverted the second aircraft to the 

4 Copp mission? 

5 MR. PEARLINE: What is the date of that 

6 document? 

7 MR. CAROME: On the very front it says 22 November 

8 1985. 

9 THE WITNESS: I don't remember that I told him. 

10 It could be that I told him, but I don't know. I don't 

11 remember. I don't think so. 

12 BY MR. CAROME: 

13 Q You were in fairly close contact with] 

14 about this mission, weren't you? 

15 A Not really because after the initial start, I was 
15 busy preparing it and working on it and so, you know, 
17 I wasn't really in close contact with him. 
^3 Q And what time — let me rephrase that question. 

19 About what time was it again? 

20 I think you may have testified to this before, 

21 but if you could say it again, what time was it that Copp 

22 asked that the second plain become involved? 

23 A That was on the next day when it became apparent 

24 that the initial airplane, the first one, would be 

25 delayed 



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Q About what time? This is sometime Saturday, 
East Coast time? 

A Sometime during the day Saturday. 

Do you recall what time? 

A No, I don't. I don't know. I think I wrote 
that here. Let me see. Must have been Saturday morning. 
On the 2 3rd. 

Q And what time did the second pleme arrive in 
Tel Aviv-? 

A 2130 GMT on the 23rd. 

Q And it flew fromlH^^^| is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q Where 

A It came from^ 
directly over to Tel Aviv. And like I mention here, in the 
meantime, we had received the overflight rights ^^i^^^HB 
and so, therefore, we had no problems there. 

Q The first flight had arrived about six hours 
earlier, six-and-a-half hours earlier; is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q And when the plane arrived, loading commensed, is 
that right? In Tel Aviv? 

A Some time after arrival, I think they were starting 
to load, yes. 



IINHI LRmfl\ 



473 



UNtlASSlflilkT 



lOJ 



CAS-22 1 Q And were you at that time in touch with someone 

2 with the first plane? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q How were you in touch with them? 

5 A The captain of the first plane called me by 

6 telephone. 

7 Q From Tel Aviv? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q What did the captain tell you? 

10 A ' Well, he just told me, he warned me this might take 

11 a little longer because things were very slow and so forth, 

12 you know. 

13 Q Did he say who was doing the loading of the plane? 

14 A He told me that — I asked him, of course, tell me 

15 what is going on. And he said, well, we are parking here on 

16 the military side. The whole thing looks military to me, 

17 and they are very slow with loading and nobody seems to know 

18 what is going on here and it looks like this guy, 

19 Al Schwimmer, is in command here, and the military is only 

20 assisting him and that they are all totally disorganized 

21 here. 

22 It took them four hours to load one single box. So 

23 he said, you know, you can expect a big delay here. 

24 Q And did the pilot tell you anything more specific 

25 about where the loading was taking place? Did he tell you 



474 



*Nfl)Wir 



109 



CAS-23 1 it was taking place in a hot cargo area? 

2 A No. 

3 Q Did you know whether or not it was taking place 
^ in a hot cargo area? 

5 A No. 

6 Q A hot cargo area is an area where munitions would 

7 be loaded on a plane? 

8 A We refer to that as a "hot spot". 

9 Q That is because you want to do loading of 

10 explosives and munitions in a distant location; is that 

11 right? 

12 A That is right. But in this case, we didn't specify 

13 where the airplane was parked. We just talked about the 

14 military assisting Mr. Schwimmer. In fact, he even said 

15 it looks like the military is assisting him unwillingly, 

16 you know, that they are kind of dragging their feet. They 

17 don't like to load. They had only high ranking officers 

18 who were allowed to approach the airplane and load it and 

19 they never had loaded an airplane before^ so, you know, it 

20 dragged on. 

21 Q And did you later learn that the loading was 

22 taking place in a hot area, a hot spot? 

23 A No . 

24 Q It must have been since it was weapons; right? 

25 I 



t spot .' 

UNCLASSIHED 



I don't know. I just wasn't interested in that, 



475 



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opiric 




ri>ari;»' 



110 



CAS- 2 4 1 you know. 

2 Q Vou didn't discuss that with the captain, either, 

3 at that time or later; is that right? 

4 A No. I didn't discuss it. 

5 Q And it is still your testimony that at this time 

6 while you are talking to the captain who is in Tel Aviv, 

7 you didn't know chat the cargo was weapons or military 

8 equipment; is that right? 

9 A That is right. 

10 Q And I take it — I gather that around the time you 

11 learned it took four hours to load the first box, that is 

12 also the time the second plane is arriving; is that right? 

13 A No. The second plane arrived later. It was 

14 already underway at that time, but it arrived later. 

15 Q When the second plane arrived on the scene, did 

16 loading commence for that plane, as well? 

17 A Well, that was a little unclear to me because 

18 what happened then is — you know, real chaos started to 

19 develop in Tel Aviv because I had two 707s on the apron. I 

20 knew one box was in one airplane. I knew that something was 

21 wrong, that it dragged on, that everything was unusual. 

22 And so I told my captain, get me the guy on the 

23 phone who is in charge there. So he got me Al^Schwimmer on 

24 the phone. 

25 Q And you spoke to Mr. Schwimmer on the phone? 



yNcussinED 



476 



njjOTir 



111 



-'AS-25 1 A I spoke to Schwimmer. I said what is going on 

2 there? He said, what do you mean? 

3 I said, look, we load one piece in four hours. If 

4 this goes on, we stay here for days. I can't afford that. 

5 I have commitments. I need the airplane back in two days. 

6 You either speed it up or we can't do it. 

7 I He said, well, we will do our utmost, dah, dah, dah, 

8 dah, and so on. 

9 Then I kept track of the situation by calling 

10 Schwimmer several times and in the evening, I called him at 

11 his home phone number. In fact, I had told one of my crew 

12 members to go along with him to his house and verify that when 

13 I talked with him, what is going on and so and so, that I 

14 always had one of my guys in place. 

15 Q You were in telephone contact with what was going on 

16 in Tel Aviv? 

17 A Exactly. 

18 ■ Q By calling Schwimmer 's home? 

19 A Schwimmer 's home and also I called the hotel room 

20 because initially Schwimmer was in the hotel where my crew 

21 stayed in the meantime and then later on kept after him — 

22 sent the captain to go with him to his home. So we were 

23 constantly in contact. IIMPI ACQinrn 

24 Q While the planes lfll^cWW3^VllJ iLtUre also 

25 in contact with Mr. Copp; is that right? 



477 




112 



CAS-26 1 A There was a time where I was not in contact with 

2 Copp because I had Schwiminer now. So I wasn't really 

3 interested in Copp. I was interested in the guy on the scene. 

4 So, I didn't talk to Copp in that period. 

5 Q When you and Mr. Copp --it was you and Mr. Copp who 

6 agreed to bring the second plane in; is that right? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q When you had that discussion, did you re- 

9 negotiate the price of the operation? 

10 A • No. 

11 Q You left it still at $60,000 plus the other 

12 expenses; is that right? 

13 A Yes, right. I didn't discuss that. In fact, I 

14 tell you my motivation, the longer this carried on, the more 

15 I had the impression that I am dealing here with some 

16 inexperienced people who don't know what they are doing and 

17 it turned out to be more and more that this is more 

18 coBBiercial than government-to-government, and it turned out 

19 to me I had the impression that maybe they just used the 

20 expression "government-to-government" to me to make an 

21 impression or whatever. 

22 So I thought let them carry on because if they don't 

23 know what they are doing, the price will be so much higher 

24 We will make some money on this one 

25 Q Why would the price get higher 



1 be so much higher. 

.lINClASSIFltD 



478 



wmm 



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rAS-27 1 A Because when some people don't know what they are 

2 doing, you can charge them more money. 

3 Q I thought you agreed on a price with Mr. Copp? 

4 A Yes, but it was pretty sure to me he would get a 

5 much higher bill later on with all these problems. 

6 Q You intended to charge him more because of the 

7 time involved; is that right? 

8 A The time, the problems, all those things. 

9 Q Did you discuss that with him? 

10 A No. 

11 Q What made you think he would pay more later on if 

12 you had already agreed upon a price? 

13 A I think that is normal business practice. You 

14 try as much as you can get later on. You know, I sent them 

15 an invoice finally for, I think, $170,000, which I -- 

16 they paid. I gave them $10,000 a day demurrage for the 

17 airplanes, parking down there was — without being able to 

18 fly and extra costs, hotel costs, all those extra things 

19 involved. Extra communication costs. 

20 This turned out to be a real screwed-up operation. 

21 So my attitude was I stay in it because it looks like 

22 those guys have money, they don't know what they are doing, 

23 so we charge them a lot. But then as it dragged on, it 

24 turned out to be more and more dangerous to our whole outfit 

25 because, you know, what they told me was not true. 

J iiiim inninrn 



479 



mms 



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CAS-28 1 Like they had told me, we had overflight rights, 

2 we had this, we had that, it turned out to be that was not 

3 the case. He told me we load into ^^^^^^H It turned 

4 out they couldn't do that 

5 Whatever he told me, it turned out to be it 

6 was not true. I got more and more worried about the whole 

7 situation. I thought, well, if this is a total screw-up, 

8 at least we make some money on it. 

9 Q I gather that around the time that there were 

10 delays in loading, the question of whether or not the plane 

11 would fly to somewhere other thar^k^^HV arose; is that right? 

12 A That is right. 

13 Q When did that subject first arise? 

14 A What happened was this: Copp had told me that ^H^ 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H|^^^^^^^B had the 

16 rights, the landing rights. 

17 Q He told you that by telephone? 

18 A He told me that by telephone. But then I talked 

19 to my crew and they told me it was common knowledge in 

20 Tel Aviv that they had been turned down. So we coudln't 

21 9°^^^^^^^^ So then I said to Schwimmer, look, what is 

22 going on here. One guy tells me we 9°^^^^^^^^K ^^^ other 

23 9uy tells me we can't 'Jo^^^^^^^M- So where the hell do we 

24 go now with the cargo? If this drags on, I have to pull the 

25 airplanes out and we have to unload again because I can't 

imni unoi nrn 



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afford all of this. 

Q In fact, it was your crew who told you they thought 
the real destination was Tehran; is that right? 

That is what seems to be suggested by the very last 
line of page 2 of Exhibit 7 ., 

A Yes. That is righ". That was my crew who told me 
for the first time. Then I called Schwimmer and I asked 
him directly about it. He said then, well, because of the 
time delay, we don't want to go ^^|m^^^ anymore, 
we want -to go directly to Tel Aviv now. 

Q Let me get it straight. Was it Copp or Schwimmer 
who was the first to talk to you directly about going to 

Tehran? 

A I think it was Schwimmer. Like I say, at that time 
I assumed he was my contract partner. 

Q Mr. Copp gave you Mr. Schwimmer 's name; is that 

correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he give you that Friday night? 

A Yes. He said — I think he gave it to me on 
Saturday. I don't remember exactly when he gave it to me. 
But you know 1 knew that this guy was in charge in Tel Aviv. 

Q So, Mr. Schwimmer then says we have to take the 
plane -- 

A To Tel Aviv -• 



UNCLASSIHEB 



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Q To Tel Aviv — ' 

A To Tehran. 

Q I am sorry. To Tehran? 

A Yes. So when he told me that, I said, look, 
you don't know what you are doing because I cannot go to 
Tehran with an American-registered airplane. I risk that 
the airplane will be confiscated in Tehran. And he said, 
well, why don't we just paint another registration on it and 
I said, no way, you know. I have to pull it out. 

Q Let me get a few points clear. When the subject 
of taking the plane to Tehran |mim||^P came up, 
did you re-negotiate the price with either Copp or 
Schwimmer for the operation? 

A No. I didn't because all I was interested in at 
that time — you see, Tehran is a closer distance than 



Q So it should be cheaper, if anything? 

A It should be cheaper. That is why I didn't want to 
raise the subject. I thought, let them go on like before and 
then later on we can talk about the money. 

But the only change I wanted to make when Tehran 
came up, I said, I want some cash money because based on the 
fact that whatever they had told me before turned out not to 
be true or not correct, I wasn't sure whether it was true 
when they told me in Tehran everything is taken care of like 

-_llMMJli»OICICn 



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S-31 



1 fuel/ landing* handling, parking, unloading fees, you don't 

2 have to pay anything. 

3 I said, look, you know, I don't trust you anymore 

4 because the first time, last time we flew to Tehran, I had 

5 the same problems and when my guys arrived in Tehran nothing 

6 happened and we had to take care of things ourselves. But 

7 he said that was not my flight the first night. 

8 I said, yes, but still it might turn out the same 

9 way that you promise me everything is fine in Tehran, nothing 

10 is fine» At least I have to have enough money so that my 

11 crew can fuel in Tehran and fly the airplane out of there. 

12 So I want $30,000 in cash now and he said, well, I don't 

13 have the money. 

14 Q What was the $30,000 in cash going to be used for? 

15 A For fueling the airplane in Tehran and also paying 

16 fees like — see, when you have normal commercial cargo, you 

17 pay so-called non-objection fees. Sometimes you pay 25 percer 

18 of your contracted price as non-objection fee to Iran and 

19 to also some Arab countries. 

20 So I thought if push comes to shove, my airplane 

21 sits in Tehran, I have to pay non-objection fee, landing 

22 fee, handling fee, parking fee, unloading fee, fuel. I 

23 needed $30,000 to do that. 

24 The last thing I wanted is to have my plane in 

25 Tehran and not being able to pull it out again. 

iiftiAi I nnirirr^ 



483 



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Q 1 gather that Mr. Schwinvmer proposed painting a 

different registration on the plane to disguise its American 
identity; is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q And you said we are not going to do that; is that 
right? 

A Yes. 

Q And what is this reference here to formation 
flying to Tehran? 

A ^ He said being — can't you just do formation 
flying? In other words, cam't you just use(HH|of f icially 
as the airplane and have the other one flying next to it? 

Q What would be the purpose of flying the two planes 
close to each other? 

A Only one plane would talk to the radar controllers. 

Q In an attempt to disguise the fact it was two 
planes and make it look like it was only one plane going? 

A Exactly. So we wouldn't have to reveal the 
secondary plane was American registered. 

Q Did you treat that as something of an outlandish 
suggestion? 

A Well, I told him you have to be kidding. I can't 
fly a 707 formation flying down to Tehran, you know. I mean, 
you understand maybe what I said initially, the longer it 
went on, the more I had the feeling I am dealing here with 



484 



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lunatics. So that is why I didn't think it was a 
U.S. Government operation, honestly. 

Q So at that point what you intended to do was to 
take the one^^^^^^|^H registered plane into Tehran? 



A 
Q 
before? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 



Yes. 



Send the other plane back to whatever it was doing 



Exactly. 

And — 

And I did that. 

Did you check with^H^^^^H about these 

arrangements you were making? 

A No. 

Q You didn't call back and say is it okay to take 

this one plane into Tehran? 

A No. 

Q Are you sure of that? 

A I am pretty sure. Maybe I talked to him informally 

and maybe I told him about that, but the decision was made by 

myself because, you know, the nature of the company was that 

I was pretty independent in those things and that I made thos 

decisions myself, you know. I didn't even have to ask him 

about that, because I wa s pretty sure. 

Q Let me you that|^m^^^H| people 

here at the agency have told ui that not only did you tell 
■ ■■■«ha m ^^ ^ "- 



485 



UNCUSi^ElilfeT 



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PO 



but that^^^^^^^l then check with the agency 
and that there was an effort to get high-level agency approval 
for taking that one flight into Tehran. Does that 
refresh your recollection? 

A You mean the American-registered plane? 

Q No. This is th^^^^^^^^H-'egistered plane at 
this point. 

A I see. 

Q Does that refresh your recollection that you, in 

■ ?o 

fact, taJ.ked ^o(|i^HBM about taking th 
registered airplane into Tehran? 

A You asked me before did I ask him about using the 
American-registered airplane. The answer was no. You ask 
me, did I pull it out after I had consulted him, I said no, 
because that was the case. Whereas, using^^Hfor a flight to 
Tehran, yes, I think I called him on that because that kind of 
confirmed my initial suspicions. 

Of course, I wanted to make a point of that and 
say, look, here it is now. 

Q So when you say confirm your initial suspicions, 
it confirmed your suspicions it was the seune cargo 



A Exactly. And that the final destination was 
Tehran which I had suspected all along. 



You then checked witl' _^^^^^ 

IliiAi ■ M#%T7777 



I and asked him was 



486 



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-registered 



it okay to fly to Tehran with the^ 
plane; is that right? 

A I think I did that, yes. 

Q And did you -- did you recognize he needed to give 
you permission or authorization to do that? 

A As far as I remember, he said I will check and I 
think it is okay. It must have been okay, because I don't 
remember that we had any adverse discussions about it, you 
know. The only thing else — I pulled the American- 
registered plane out. X didn't even ask for that. I just 
informed him of that. That was my own decision. 

Q The only discussion you had with Mr. Schwimmer was 
about whether or not he would give you this $30,000 that you 
were asking for for cash payments in Tehran; is that right? 

A Well, the things is: as this operation continued 
and developed into, I might say, a comedy, I got more and 
more concerned that my cover was in jeopardy as a commercial 
airline. 

So, therefore, my initial cooperation in this whole 
deal kind of cooled down a little and I kind of leaned more 
on the monetary aspects to kind of confirm to all involved 
parties that I am a commercial operator and nothing else, 
because at that point, you know, I thought it looks like I am 
dealing here with people who are not in the business, who don't 
know what they are doing and I didn't know who talked to whom 



487 





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and who knew what and so on. So at this point, my motivation 
was I have to protect the cover of my airline now which means 
I have to present myself now more and more and more as a 
mercenary airline. So my major concern was money from now 
on. So that is why from that moment on, I only talked about 
money. 

Q What was your major concern about that? 

A My major concern before was that we just wanted to 
get the flight done and do it like normal, you know, 
professionally and so on. I wasn't really concerned about 
anything initially. But I thought government-to-government , 
no problem, it is a quick and easy flight and so forth. And 
I thought that since those guys were referred to me by 
^^B that maybe the Israeli Government was behind the whole 
deal and so that was my initial suspicion and that the 
U.S. had maybe given them a hint as to talk to the airline 
and they will handle it for you. But then when I found out 
I am dealing with private piarties and so forth, I more and 
■ere retreated to the commercial position, you know, and 
kind of confirmed that a little so I would kind of protect 
my cover. 

Q When you learned that you were now down to one 
flight — one plane again; is that right? 

A Yes. 



Because you can only take the] 

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CAS- 37 ' plane into Tehran? 

A Yes. ^_ 

Q ^^^^^^^^Bhas been notified of that and he hasn't 
said don't do it; right? 

A Exactly. 

Q And the plan then is for there to be a series of 
flights directly to Tehran; is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q There was going to be one after the other from 
Tel Aviv to Tehran; is that right? 

A We talked about three to five flights at that time. 

Q Who is "we"? 

A Schwimmer, I, and also Copp in the meantime. 

Q The assumption was there was going to be one flight 
after the next rapidly performing all the flights? 

A Consecutively, yes. 

Q There was an urgency to get all the flights done; 
is that right? 

A Exactly. 

But you don't know what was causing that urgency? 

A No. But they were willing to pay for it. Like I 
said before, they didn't seem to know what they were doing. 
So even the urgency, I didn't take so seriously anymore, 
because you know when I had pulled the second airplane out, 
that didn't seem to concern them too much. 

llAirl AVVlLILll 



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Q When you learned that you were going to be taking 
a series of flights into Tehran, you or your employees 
began to seek flight clearances ^^^^HHB, is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q And how did you go about doing that? 

We telex^JH^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H asking 
for overflight permission. 

Q How did that telex describe the cargo? 

A I really don't remember, but we either would write 
"general cargo" or whatever, you know. We would — in a 
case like that, we would make up some general terminology 
so that we wouldn't be bound by anything. 

Q I don't understand what you are saying. What is it 
that you would — 

A Well, we would just write "commodity, general cargo' 
Or something like that. 

Q Why wouldn't you be more specific about the cargo? 

A Because it is kind of an unwritten law that those 
countries don't want to know if you fly arms and ammunition 
or if you fly from Israel to Tehran or whatever might be 
controversial. You kind of try to hide that. That is why 
we would also not say to fllHi^l^H f rom Tel Aviv to Tehran 
but fromflH^^Hto Tehran. 

Q You just said you didn't want to tel] 

that it was military equipment; is that right? 



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CAS-39 ' A Yes. Military equipment or anything sensitive 
from Tel Aviv. 

Q And you knew this was sensitive equipment? 

A It was sensitive equipment simply because it came 
from Tel Aviv. I have to reemphasize again, because you don't 
seem to understand that, whenever you deal with Israel, you 
are on sensitive ground in the Middle East. There is 
a war situation going on right now. The Arab countries have 
a war-like attitude towards Israel. When I fly to Israel, 
I am like a blockade breaker. So I have to make enough 
preparations that people don't find out that I was in 
Israel. And, therefore, I would not reveal the nature of the 
cargo, where I came from, or whatever, try to hide it as much 
as I can, and, in fact, those countries even — although 
they might suspect that I was in Israel, they don't really 
want to know. 



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In fact, the telex tof^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bin this 
case referred to the fact that the planes — the series of 
planes would be originatin^^f^^^^^H is that correct? 

A I think so. I am not quite sure — 

MR. PEARLINE: Could hp review the texex to 
refresh his memory? 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I don't have a copy of the telex. Do you know, if a 
copy of 'the telex exists? 

A I don't know. I don't even think so because 
usually we would shred those things. We don't keep those 
records. 

Q Why would you shred that thing? 

A Because our office ^^^lH^^^^^H and, you know, 
we usually would destroy all documentation every two or three 
months ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

so that we wouldn ' t have 
things like that lying around which could be published 
maybe in the newspaper. 

Q This was strictly a commercial operation. Why was 
this a problem — why was this something you wanted to cover 
up? 

A Because Israel to Tehran, I think, speaks for 
itself 




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CAS-41I Q But this was going to bdi^^^^^Vto Tehran, so you 

2 didn't have that problem? 

3 A Well, everybody knows when you fly from 
^ you have to come from somewhere to go to 

5 Q Maybe ||^BV 

6 A Maybe. Maybe not. Why give somebody a reason 

7 for suspicion when you don't have to. 

8 Q Is there something you want to say on the record? 

9 A I want to say that it was normal procedure that we 

10 destroyed all those records from all our flights usually, 

11 all those applications, everything. 

12 Q Wasn't the normal procedure for Mr. — let 

13 me rephrase the question. 

14 Wasn't the normal procedure for the cargo documents 

15 to be forwarded to you? Didn't you testify to that before? 

16 A Yes. The cargo documents, but they came from the 

17 airplane in an envelope. We are talking here about applicatioi 

18 for traffic rights which was done by telex from our' 

19 office. 

20 Q Why would the telex be destroyed and the cargo 

21 documents kept? 

22 A The cargo documents were also destroyed eventually 

23 after I reviewed them. 

24 Q Why wouldn't they have sent you the telex, too? 

25 A Well, the telex — 



UNCUSSIHED 



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Q Did they? 

A The telex, I presume the telex was part of normal 
documentation in our office f rom(^^^^^^^B which was destroyed 
on a regular basis. 

Q Did they send you the telex? 

A I didn't even see the telex. I just saw the guys 
make application>^^^^^HV and that was that. 

Q And you told them to make application for a series 
of flights from^^l^^Hto Tehran; is that right? 

A ' No. We just made an application for one flight. 

Q You said before it was for a series of flights. 
Were you mistaken? 

A No. The contract, the agreement between Schwimmer 
and me was for an upcoming series of flights. But the 
experience is that when you apply for traffic rights, you 
don't apply for a series because it is bound to be turned 
down because usually those countries where you apply, they 
want to have their own airlines to do the flights. So if you 
have a series of flights, they think there is big business 
behind it so they don't gramt you the traffic rights. We 
would kind of go on a flight-to-flight basis, and apply for 
each flight individually. 

Q Why wouldn't you want to get all the flights 
cleared since these wer^_gping_ to be £apid-fire flights, 
one after the next 




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Weren't you concerned that you not wait until you 
were — until the first flight was done to get the next 
clearance? 

A No. Like I just said before, that is conunon 
procedures that we never apply for a series of flights. 
Never. We always apply for single flights. 

Q You were quite certain you did not apply for a 
series of flights? 

A I an quite certain. 

Q Are you quite certain that the identification of tKe' 
cargo was general cargo, is that all that was said when the — 

A I can only tell you what I told my operations 
officer to do. But I didn't check what he did because, you 
know, I wasn't — I was talking to him and all I was 
interested in was that we had the traffic rights or not. We 
had an ongoing system which was professionally understood 
between us that we would do it in a certain way and so I 
didn't question that. 

Q And what did you tell — let me withdrawn that 
question. 

Who were you giving these instructions to about 
how to fly — file for flight clearance^ 

A The guy who was in charge of the office at that 



time. 



Who was that? 



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A I don't really remember who was on duty at that 
time. It was unimportant for me. 



What was this person's title? 

He was operations manager. 

And who was the operations manager at that time? 

We had two. We haft^^^^l^^^^Bl^^^^^ft and 




^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^—^ Either one of them took 
care of that. 

(Whereupon, the document referred to was marke.d 
for identification as(^^H-9.) 

MR. CAROME: Maybe when I get through with the 
subject of flight clearances, we can take a break. 

MR. PEARLINE: All right. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q O^^^^^^^fH^IK ^ show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 9. It may well be that you have not seen this 
document previously. Let me just state for the record that 
it is a — it appears to be a CIA cable from 

to CIA headquarters, and I draw 
your attention to the second paragraph of that document and 
I will just read to you the sentence that is of interest to 
me. ^^I^^^^^^^^Hk told^^l^^^Bit was spare 

parts. Telex from carrier stated medical supplies and the 
pilot told ground controllers he was carrying military 
equipment. 



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CAS-44 1 Does that refresh your recollection as to what the 

2 telex stated about the nature of the cargo? 

3 A Well, like I said previously, it was kind of 

4 normal procedure that we would write on those things 

5 "general cargo", but it can well be that in th.i s specific 

6 case he wrote "medical supplies". 

7 Q It wasn't medical supplies that were being carried, 

8 was it? 

9 A No. 

10 Q You know that at the time, didn't you? 

11 A I knew that at the time, yes. 

12 Q Why was there a desire to deceive^^^H^HB|about 

13 the nature of the cargo? 

14 A I think that is pretty obvious. You know, for 

15 medical supplies or general cargo, you get an overflight 

16 right easier than saying we have some questionable equipment 

17 on board. 

18 Q What was questionable about the equipment at the 

19 time, as you understood it then? 

20 A Well, we didn't know what it was. We knew it was 

21 from Israel aircraft industries. It could be spare parts. 

22 It could be anything. It could be^^^^^^Hwouldn ' t want 

23 the Israelis to support the Iranians in their efforts to 

24 win the war. So, therefore, in order to kind of confirm our 

25 neutral position, ^^^9^i^d ^/r^t^^ something like this, you 



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know. 

Q Were you ever told that the pilot had told the 
ground controllers that he was carrying military equipment? 

A I am 100 percent sure that he didn't do that. I 
think that is bull shit because why would he do that? He 
would jeopardize his own plane and himself. I am 100 
percent sure he didn't do that. We never did something like 
that before. I mean, that would be totally ridiculous. 

Q Let me draw your attention — 

A ' I think that was maybe the assumption of< 
or something. 

Q How would they get that assumption? 

A Who knows? Maybe they have their own 
intelligence service. The U.S. is not the only country 
which has intelligence. Maybe they knew we were coming from 
Tel Aviv. I don't know. But I just know that our pilots 
would never say on the radio we have military equipment 
onboard, even if we had. Because that would jeopardize 
the overflight rights right away, immediately. 

Q It appears to have caused some consternation when 
it was said? 

A I don't think it was said. I doubt that seriously. 
That must be — you know, I can^t _believe that. In fact, I 
have never seen this before. 

Q I thought that you probably had not seen it before. 



\'t believe that. In fac 

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CAS-46 



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BROtiffiSffffiT 



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A No. I also just had the report of my pilot. I 
know he talked his way through. When you attempt to talk your 
way through, you don't tell the wrost thing you could say, you 
know. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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I can only assume that this was written here 
because when we didn't get over flight rights 
right away, I am pretty sure I calledjf^and I said, 
"I can't over flights J^^^^^^^^H and I don't know whether 
this will go through or so. Can I get some support here?" 
And I also — I know that I asked Schwimmer for support 
because he said to me, "Everything is taken care of." 

Then I said, "Well, we don't have the traffic 
rights ^^^^^^^^H yet, " and so on. You know. 

Q Let me get this straight. You made a phone call to 
saying can we get assistance on gettinc 
over flights? 

A I think I did. I think I called him maybe — I am 
not a hundred percent sure. Again, I have to reemphasize 
I was working day and night for three days with hundreds 
of things on my mind. I really can't tell you a hundred 
percent to whom I talked, when and so on. I am pretty sure 
that I ttied all available means which includes 
calling^^^^calling Schwimmer, calling Copp and say, 
"Hey, you tell us it is — you know from the Israeli 
government, can't you help me to get these flight rights?" 

Q By the time the effort was being made to get 
over flight rights, you wer^^^^^^^^HJ; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And was it you who sent the telex? Did you 



3U wer^^^^^^^^^Hj; 

UNCTBlED 



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write the telex for over flight rights? 

A No. 

Q You gave instructions to someone else in the 
office; is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q So you gave those instructions permanently; is 

that right? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you see the telex before it went out? 

A ' No. 

Q I draw your attention to paragraphs 5 and 6 of 
this same cable. I will state for the record this is dated 
November 25, 1985,^^^Hzulu time. 
Paragraph 5 says, 

'has impression from papers filed 
by carrier that aame plane to be utilized and shuttle from 



In paragraph 6 it talks about multiple filed 
flight planes. Do you know or rather does this refresh 
your recollection that the initial telex requested over- 
flight rights for a series of flights? 

A It could be, but I am just questioning one thing 
here. You know, the date of this telex? 

Yes, it is November 25. 

A Then that is after the event.' 



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Q That is right. But they are describing the — 

A What I cim — 

Q — the papers that were filed. 

A What I am trying to say is after the event, in 
fact, we would have applied for the second flight already 
in the meantime. 

Q When would you have applied for the second 
flight? 

A When the first flight was supposed to leave, a 
day earlier. Usually you have to do that a day earlier. 

Q Well, let's — 

A But to complicate matters further, when the first 
flight was undereway, I didn't really push on the traffic 
rights anymore because in my mind, this was the first and the 
last flight. I was already 90 percent sure that we wouldn't 
do a second flight because of the disaster which developed 
here. 

Q So to the best of your recollection you only 
applied for traffic rights once? 

A One time, yes. It could be that the guy who did 
operations for me applied for another one, you know. That, 
I don't know. 

Q But do you know whether or not the initial telex 



was for a series of flights? 
A I don't think so. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



502 



mmm 



ET 



137 



1 there would be a series of flights; is that right? 

2 A About three to five flights. 

3 Q And why was there some question as to whether it 

4 would be three or five? What was causing that to be up in 

5 the air? 

6 A I don't know. That was not my problem. 

7 Q Was it a question of how many boxes you could get 

8 on a plane? 

9 A I don't know. 

10 Q Wasn't the goal to get all of the boxes to Tehran? 

11 A I don't know. I just can tell you that he said 

12 three to five flights, and I don't know why. I didn't 

13 question it because, as long as they paid for it, that is 

14 fine with us. We wanted the traffic. You know, we wanted 

15 the cargo. 

16 Q As it turned out, 18 boxes was all that one plane 

17 could hold; is that right? 

•J8 A Yes. Yes. Roughly, I think so. Yes. Actually 

19 when the plane was undereway to Tehran, I already kind of 

20 had made up my mind that I wouldn't do a second flight, 

21 but I just wanted to wait for the pilot's report out of 

22 Tehran to see how things were going in Tehran and what the 

23 deal was. After I had talked to the pilot by phone from 

24 Tehran, then, you know, I was pretty sure that we wouldn't 

25 go on. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



503 



ma 



U-i M UIM 



0011 ILU 



138 



1 What then developed, then the problem with money 

2 developed; that they wouldn't even pay us. Then I canceled 

3 on the flight back. 

4 Q Okay. I want to follow through with a blow by blow 

5 about what happened from this point forward. It may be, 

6 David, this is a good time to break. 

7 MR. PtARLINE: Take a few minutes? 

8 THE WITNESS: Fine with me. 

9 MR. CAROME: Let's go off the record. 

10 . (Discussion held off the record.) 

11 MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 

12 BY MR. CAROME: 

13 Q ^^l^^^l^^^^k virhy don't you describe what happened 

14 on the Tehran mission once it was decided that there was 

15 going to be the O'^^V^I^^B registered plane flying in? 
15 A What do you mean? Chronologically? 
17 Q Yes. 
^3 A Well, I have to look into this memo here myself. 

19 I an on page 4. The 24th of November was Sunday. Sunday 

20 night I told the captain, "Okay, go ahead and fly." What 

21 happened then is this: the last moment they decided we 

22 would go through^^^^^B instead of f lying ^irectl^ from 

23 Tel Aviv to Tehran. 

24 Initially I was told by Schwiramer, you can go 

25 II directly. I questioned that. He said, yes, we have governmenjt 




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support. Everything will be taken care of. Don't worry about 
it. 

Thenk in fact, at the last moment he said, "No, 
you can't go direct. You have to go through^^Hf^p " I 
mentioned the negotiations about the extra money and so 
forth. 

Q Do you recall about what time it was this last 
minute change came up? 

A About an hour before take-off. 

Q , Okay. Proceed. 

A And then, in fact, the airplane took off, landed 
and the captain called roe via H.F. radio 
telling roe he had problems with custom^^^^H^^^fll and 
again I had been told by Schwimmer that 
everything would be taken care of. 

In other words, they wouldn't bother the airplane, 
you know. So then my captain called me on the radio, 
H.F. radio, and says, "We are stuck^^^^H^^^H Customs 
wzmts to see documents." I said, "Then show them to them." 
He said, "Well, the Israelis took everything off our 
airplane. They even took Coca-Cola cans off and whatever 
shows we were in Tel Aviv, so we have nothing." 

I said, "Okay, I will take care of that." I 
called Schwimmer and said, "Where are the cargo documents?" 
He aid, "What do you mean?" I said, "You have to have 




you mean? I saia, xc 

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IINC»^R^ 



140 



documents." He said, "No." I said, "Why didn't you 
prepare fake documents? We need documents." 

This was the first time I heard there were no 
documents on board. So he said, "Well, I don't know. 
So I can't help you." He said, "What should I do?" I 
said, "You bettar get your act together and get over to 

'and do something because I don't want my airplane 
to be stucJ 

Q Did you callj^^^^^B about this problemV 

A I think I called him, too. I called everybody 
then. Then, in fact, I raised hell with everybody in 
the meantime. I said — I am pretty sure I said t 




"What kind of jokers are we dealing with? Who is it 

your recommended to me?" ^ 

AS 

Q What di<^^f^l/^ff say? 

A "Well, I don't know. I don't know," And so 
on. I said, "Can you get hold of^^^^^^^^^^H and see 
whether somebody can help us?" He said, well — he came 
back and said, "I can't reach anybody. We just have to let 
the captain handle it himself." 

So I called back the airplane, and I told them, 
"The captain — make up your own papers and see what you can 
do." That is to say, I tried to do that. In the meantime, 
the airplane had already taken off, and he had done exactly 

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what I wanted to tell him to do, you know. 

Q Prepare false papers? 

A They prepared their own general declaration and 
own cargo manifest, writing on a general cargo or something. 

Q Do you know how they described the cargo? 

A I don't know. He sent the copilot with the 
papers over to customs, who had told him that they wanted 
to inspect the cargo because there were no papers on 
board. When the copilot showed up with the papers, customs 
said, "Okay, you can leave." 

Q So it is your understanding the people on the 
groun(^^^^^^^H| never inspected the cargo? 

A They never inspected it. So then the airplane took 
off, and then finally it landed in Tehran. 

Q And when did you hear that it had landed in 
Tehran? How did that news come to you? 

A I think the first thing I heard was when the 
captain called me by telephone from the hotel. 

Q You hadn't heard anything while the flight was 
en route; is that right? 

A I think I didn't — 

Q Did you know that the captain was filibustering 
his way across' 

A Let me see something. I think he didn't call me 



then. I think 



he was so busv talklnq t 

IIMCUi^lfflll 



he just 



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talked his way through. Yes. I think he didn't call me. 
But then when he was in the hotel — I told him previously — 
in fact, that is the reason I — I told him not to call me 
during the flight because I didn't want to discuss it on 
H.F. radio with the whole world listening; not to jeopardize 
the airline 

So therefore I told him don't call me on H.F. radio 
Call me by telephone when you are in the hotel in Tehreui. 
That is what he did. So after he was in the hotel, he 
called me and gave me a full report about the screw-up 

about the Iranians and this and that and so 
on. So I said to hira, "Okay, take full tanks in Tehran when 
you depart, and when you are ^^^^^^^|H| call me, because 
by then I will know whether we continue or not, because 
by then I will have talked to all these people and see 
where we stand, you know." 

Q Okay, let me cover a couple of small points before 
ve get to the decision to not go forward. 

There was a code word to be given on entry into 
Iran saying, "I am coming from Ustafa." Is that right? 

A They didn't give it to me. They gave it to the 
Captain directly. 

Q Who is they? 

A Schwimroer, I think, or somebody of his people. 
Schwimmer was not 



■•■• UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q Who else was with Schwimmer? 

A Israeli officers. 

Q Do you know their names? 

A No, but I know they were like high-ranking- 
general, colonel. 

Q Military people? 

A Yes. In uniform. 




Q Now, is it correct that when the plane landed 
that one of the people on the ground in Tehran told the pilot 
that the Iranians were expecting four more flights from 
I«l Aviv? 

A Yes. 

Q Was that basically consistent with your understanding 
of what Schwimmer wanted to do? 

A Yes. That was the only thing in the whole deal 
which went smooth — that was the landing in Tehran — because 
everything was taken care of as promised. The unloading 
went much faster than we thought. Everything worked like 



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clock work, no problem. 

Q Did you ever receive assistance from or have 
contact with CIA officials in eithei 
during any of the operation? 

A 




Q What did you tell the pilot when he called you 
from the hotel about the future of the mission? 

A Well, this might sound funney to you, but 
the pilot's major concern was that he had bought a carpet 
there and that he couldn't get it delivered the same day, 
and he asked me do we do a second flight because 
otherwise Z don't get my carpet. He wanted to know if 
he should buy the carpet or not. 

I said to him, "Go ahead and buy it, but I tell 
you quite frankly, we might not come back there, but I 
can't make the decision now. Z make it later when you are 
overj 



ONCLASCIF" 



Why was there 'some doubt In your mind at that point 



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about whether the mission would go forward as planned? 

A Well, I was the responsible manager of the airline. 
As it developed, I could see that something was wrong here. 



and I reached the point where — where^^Hwould have confirmed 
it or not. I was about to cancel the whole deal to protect 
the airline. So while th«» airplane was on the ground in 
Tehran, I talked to Copp and to Schwimmer, and also to 
HBVand I tried to find out whether I got some support from 
some side in this whole deal or whether I would — 
whether I was dealing with some — like I said before, with 
some lunatics who didn't know what they were doing. 

Ny impression was more and more that they didn't 
have the support. You see, Copp gave me initially the 
impression that he had good contacts and that government 
would support us and that like^^^^^^^B and Israel, this 
and that. 

It turned out all of that was not true. Like 
for example, the telex you just showed to me, like I said, 
tkis is news to me. I didn't even expect at that time that 
the U.S. would have interfered in that, euid that they would 
have tired to help us, because the impression I had was that 
we were lonely, lone ranger type of thing. So I said 
forget it. We don't go on with this. 



When is it that these discussions with Copp and 



Schwimmer an 



id^^Hswere taking place? I 



gather that it 



511 



llmAS^fi^' 



146 



1 would be some time after the first flight arrived in Tehran; 

2 is that right? 

3 A Yes. I think it was on Monday, I think. 

4 Q Well, I gather that — 

5 A Must have been on Monday. Twenty-fifth was Monday, 

6 wasn't *t? 

7 Q That is right. It probably was Washington time, 

8 probably very early in the morning; is that right? 

9 A Right. 
10 Q And you are talking to| 

nm^^is 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q What didHH^^HB tell you about whether ornot the 

14 flight should proceed? 

15 A I didn't really ask him that. I told him that 

16 we had a problem here and that I I kind of asked him 

17 whether he knew some more about the background of this whole 

18 t|k&iig, because, you know, I told him that — in fact, I 

19 4"^ ^° him, I don't know if you know that, but this develops 

20 into a real disaster here, and my opinion is we shouldn't 

21 continue with this. Do you have an opinion? 

22 Q What did he say? 

23 A He said I don't know. I have to check on that. 

24 Q Who did you understand he was going to check with? 

25 A 



I guess with the agencyv 

lltMl.i u.\.\M% li li 



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Q By now you under stancr^^^^^^H is in touch 
with the agency on what is going on with this flight? 

A It was very early Monday morning. At the same 
time, I was talking to Schwimmer and to Copp again, and I 
think I couldn't reach Schwimmer then. That was also a 
thing. I couldn't reach him anymore. So finally, when I 
couldn't get any positive reply from anybody, and then I 
called ray bank and there was no money in the bank account, 
then I said cancel it, you know. 

Q Well, let me try to get some of these things 
clear. You talked to Mr. Copp at around this time about 
whether the additional flight should take place; is that 
right. 

A You know, I had so many talks, so many phone 
conversations with him that I don't remember when I talked 
to him. But I know that he was^^^^^^H first, and then 
he was^^^^^^Hwhen I talked to him. 

■mtt. Q When did you talk to him^^^^^H| Was he(^^| 
^^^^^■at the time you were trying to make a decision as 
to whether to continue with the flights? 

A I think so. I think he wentHH|H|Ba day earlier. 
I don't know what he wanted^^^H^^ I said — yes. 
Here. No. That is different. I don't know. He called me 
from^^^^^lHe called me ^^^^^^^H, and, in fact, he 

to 



then asked me to charter a Lear Jet for him ' 

n<mm 



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Twhran — to Tel Aviv because, you know, I said to him, 
look, you are running an operation here from Tel Aviv to 
Tehran, but you sitf^^^H^ That doesn't make 
sense to me. 

Why don't you get over to Tel Aviv, take matters 
in your own hands, organize things, and then come back to 
me. He sais, "Well, I am stuck here ^mH^ right now, 
but I have to go backH|||^^B| to save $225,000." 
Q What did that mean? 

A I don't know. I said to him, "What do you mean 
to save $225,000. You fuck up the whole operation here, 
and you want to save $225,000^^^^^ That doesn't 
make sense to me." 

He said, "Well, I can't change that. Otherwise 
the money is gone. I have to g^^|^^H> but you charter 
a Lear jet for me so I can 9o|m|^PI^° "^^^ Aviv." 
So at that point I said basically, yes, but so far I have 

fyou only phone calls, promises, and $8,000 in cash from 
Schwinmer and nothing else. Before I don't get some monej 
into my account, you don't get anything from me anymore, 
so you better get some money over to my account. 

He said, "We have enough money. That is no 
problem." I said, "That is fine with me, but I want some 
money now." He said, "It arrive yet?" I said, "No." He 
said, "I don't understand." I said, "Well, I don't either. 

iiMpi AQQinrn 



514 





_ , _ ^ .WW-- - ^^^ 

1 Q Do you know whether this discussion that you 

2 have just described with Mr. Copp occurred before 

3 or after the decision to not involv^^^^^^^H| further 

4 in these flights? 

5 A I think it occurred before, before the decision- 

6 because based on that discussion that he wanted to go ^^^B| 

7 ^^^^^^Bagain instead of taking care of his problems in Tel 

8 Aviv, I was not about to send the airplane a second time 

9 to Tel Aviv with Schwiinroer in charge because Schwininer 

10 was — I was told by my crew and by the captain when he called 

11 me from Tehran, he told me that Schwimmer was very 

12 impolite; that he was treating the officers like shit; 

13 that he was behaving like he owned the whole airport, 

14 and that because of his attitude, things wouldn't go 

15 smooth because everybody was kind of pissed off that he used 
15 them like they were his employees. And the officers were 

17 very unwilling to help him, and so on and so on. 

18 So, you )cnow, I said to Copp, "If you take matters 

19 Jwyour own hand in Tel Aviv, that is fine with me. If 

20 w* have time to prepare and do things correctly, we go on. 

21 But since you are unwilling to do that, forget it." 

22 I said, "Call me when you are ready." Then we 

23 pulled the airplane back. The funny thing was this: a 

24 day later on Tuesday, Schwimmer calls me and asks me where 

25 the airplane is. I said, "It is back. Why?" Ha said. 



iiKim Aociurn 



515 



rdltlGtJSS^ 



150 



1 nobody called me. I thought it was still in Tehran." 

2 Q On the bottom of page 5 of your November 30 

3 memoranda, you state — I am actually reading from a 

4 clearer copy than that — in the parenthesis, you explain that 

5 the pilot had been instructed to ask for full tanks. 

6 A Yes. 

7 Q "Because after all those problems which I was 

8 aware of, because blank had called blank via telephone 

9 from the hotel, I wanted the pilot to take the aircraft 
10 directly back to blank if necessary." 

A l^^^^^H^^ necessary. 

12 Q I guess it is 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q In the other copy, apparently the telephone 

15 conversation here that is referred to is a conversation of 

16 the captain ^^mH[|^H is that right? 

17 A Yes. 

18 " Q Is that the conversation with you at the hotel? 

19 A Yes. It was with me. 

20 And the problems are the problems that we have 

21 already discussed; is that right? 

22 A By the way, I made a mistake on this page. The 

23 last page shouldn't be security, but safety. You know, I 

24 just mixed up those two words. 

25 Q All right. 



iiMN AQQinrn 



516 



TOT|jg0P 



151 



After all, I am^ 



1 

2 Q What was the original place that the plane was 

3 going to go after Tehran? 

4 A 

5 Q It was going to shuttle back ^^^^^^H and then 

6 to Tel Aviv? Was that the original plan? 

7 A The customer, which was Copp and Schwimmer, requested 

8 from me that the airplane would come back to Tel Aviv, but 

9 without telling them, I had made arrangements that we goH 
iO ^^^^^V because while we were negotiating, I didn't want 

11 the airplane in Tel Aviv, so they could have their hands 

12 on the airplane. 

13 I had a stronger position when I was not in the 

14 country, you know. Otherwise, they could have 

15 said they will grab the airplane unless you fly, and 
1g you don't get money. I didn't know who I was dealing 
17 with. So I thought I have to play it safe now. So that 
13 is why I said we go^^^^^^^^M I negotiate with Copp and 

19 Schwimmer, get some money and then we continue, plus we 

20 tiike some time to apply for traffic rights and do it the 

21 correct way. 

22 I didn't want to tell them up front that I 

23 expected privately a delay of three days because to do it 

24 right, I needed three days. 

25 Q At that point did you expect there would be such 



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a delay? 

A Yes. 

Q Okay. 

A Because to apply for traffic rights, to have every- 
thing well-organized, I needed three days because I didn't 
want to stumble into it again like I did on the first time. 
I wanted to do it like we do it normally. But then when 
not even the money came through on Monday, then I said, 
"Hell, we take it back directly^^^^^^^B Who knows 
where I ever get paid for this." 

Q So are you saying that a primary reason that the 
plane didn't goB^f^^^^Hand instead went back] 
was that the money hadn't come through; is that sort of 
the sraw that broke the caiaei 's back? Is that what you are 
saying? 

A Somehow, yes. hA\ 

Q Did you check witH^^^^^^^Hbefore making a 
decision not to continue with the additional sorties? 

A I told him that he should check on this with the 
agency here and that the way I presented it to him, like 
this, I said to him, "Look, you know, I have a real disaster 
developing here and whether we like it or not, I cannot ask 
the crew to go on this way because they are used to 
professional flying. And if I don't get a clear answer now 
and some clear support, I have to cancel the operation, and 



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smm 



153 




what is your position?" 

He said, "I have to check on it." But he 
couldn't come back with a clear answer. By the time he came 
back, I had already aborted the whole thing. Then he 
just came back and said to me, "Yes, I talked in the 
meantime to^^^^H, " who was 
"and you made the right cession." 

Q That is| 

A Yes. 

Q He told you he had spoken to] 

A Yes. 

Q And you said you asked him to check with the agency 
is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q When did you first become aware that the agency 
was involved in or at least witting of this mission? 

A When they recommended the customer to me. So as 
far as I was concerned, they were aware of this mission 
froB the beginning. The only thing was I had the 
impression they referred me to a third party without 
knowing who this third party was or without knowing how 
good or how bad that third party knew its business. 

Q That conflicts with what you testified to earlier. 



Earlier you said you thought you didn't realize tha 



fhad talke 



m pf mm ^ 



he — 



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A I don't think that is right. 

MR. PEARLINE: I don't think that is accurate. 
MR. CAROME: The record will reflect itself. 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q You understood right from the start that^^Hj 
I had been told about the requirement for this mission 
by someone at the agency; is that correct? p-. 

A Let me put it this way again: ^^^^^^HH told me 
initially, "Here is a guy who will call you. You deal 
with him. It is not our show. It is not an agency deal." 
Okay, so then while this thing progressed, I inforroed<f^P| 
about the progress, about the problems, and so on and so on. 

I had the impression that they had referred me; 
that^^^|B|to be precise, had referred me to a customer to 
somebody who was not normal, to say the least. And now 
I wanted to know on Monday, do you still support your 
customer? Do you still refer me to the guy? Do you still 
stand behind your decision that you tell me deal with a 
guy, because he is okay? 

I mean, you refer me to somebody where I am 
telling you now that the guy is not playing with a full 
deck and now I want to know from you is this in the 
interest of the agency. What is going on here? You know? 
He doesn't give me an answer. 

Q All right. Just so it is clear, did you in the 



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Simm 



155 



understand tha 



initial discussion with 
JO 
^^HBhad been told about the requirement by someone at the 

CIA? 

A No. I just know that he told what I said already 
five tiroes; that he told me that here is a guy who will 
call you and it is not our show. That is mainlj what he said. 
I don't know where he got his information from. You have 
to ask him yourself. 

Q When did you first learn that the CIA was aware 
of this mission? j^ r^^ 



A For me, the CIA was^^^^B So if you want 
was aware of this -mission all the time. Now, what went 
beyond ^^H|h^ I don't know 

to check witi 



Q Why did you as 
[about whether — 

A First I told him, and he said, I don't know. 
Then I said, "Why don't you check with somebody who is 
qtfiag on here? You know, I have to know." And he said okay, 
b«t then in fact he couldn't reach anybody or whatever. I 
don't know. 

Q And you made the decision to stop the flights before 



[got back to you; is that your testimony? 
A Yes. 

Q And Mr. Copp didn't^ ask^you to stop the flights? 
In fact he wanted the flights to go forward. Is that right? 



UNCLASSIHED 



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156 



A In fact, he wanted to continue and Schwinuner wanted 
to continue. 



So this was a unilateral decision by yourself to not 
[involvement in the flights; is that 



Q 
continu 
right? 

A Exactly. 

Q And it was a decision that you finally made while 
the plane was in the air and before the decision had to 
be made whether going W^^^^^^^jJU^/f^ is 
that right? 

A Exactly. The airplane was^^^^^^^^Hand the 
pilot called me on H.F. radio and said, "Where do I go now?" 
And I said, "You 9°^H^Bh" period. 

Q IDo .you recall about what time of day or can you 
by looking at your memo tell me about what time of day it was 
that you gave that direction? 

A I think it was some time Monday afternoon. As you 
can see, it took off at 1715 G.M.T. , which i; 
local time ^^^^^^|^B °'"<^ ^° ^ guess about an hour and 
a half later, maybe — you know,|^^^^^^^P in the eventing 
or so He arrived ^^^^^^I^H^^^^H and 

continued the next day. 

I, in fact, even Tuesday and Wednesday and 
Thursday, the next three days, I still talked to Copp and 
to Schwiramer about this. You know how we continue, whether 



IINHI AR.<wn 



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we continue. I gave them the impression I would continue 
just to get my money first, which I think I got on 
Wednesday or something. I am not quite sure. 

In fact, I sent them an invoice. I sent a telex 
invoice to Schwimmer in Tel Aviv and then the money was 
transferrec" to our account. Schwimmer called me back on 
Wednesday complaining about the invoice; that it was too 
high. I told him, look, I had two airplanes there. It 
was a total screw-up. I think it was cheap for you. 

He said, "Well, if you see it this way, yes. You 
will get your money today." So we had some money, which 
came from Switzerland. 

Q And when you made that decision to not go forward 



PO 



that you had done 



with the flights, you then tolc 

that; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And what did he say when you told him that? 



He said you did the right thing, because in the 




that we should bale out 

c 



naan time I heard frc 
of this. 

Q What didj^^^^BB s^Y thatfl^H^Bhad told him? 

A He said that I did the right decision; that we 

should get out of this; that we didn't want to have any part 
of this. 



Q When you say we, that meant 

liMOi AQQirirn 



lor the agency? 



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TctW^mED 



158 



I mean 



Well> that meant all of us, if you want. You know. 



and I. 



And was it shortly after the decision to not go 




forward that you had this conversation with<| 

A I am pretty sure. 

Q Certainly that same day? 

A Could also be on Tuesday. I am not quite sure. 
I think it was on Monday night. Yes. 
Monday night^m^^^^^^H 

A Monday night^^^^^^^^^H which was still daytime 

Q And ^^^^B^l said thatBJHH had told him we 
have to bale out, or essentially — 

A That was my wording. I mean he — the way I 

said to me, "Yes , I 



remember it now, I thinJ 

c 

talked to^HHHin the meantime, and you know it is okay 
that we get out and we don't want to continue like this." 

Q Didfl^^UBHbexplain ^^^^^^B own reasons for 
wanting to continue? 

A No. 

Q Are you aware of the captain or pilot becoming 
aware at any time while he was in Tehran that the Iranians 
were unhappy with the cargo that they had received? 

A Nq^ . On^ the contrary, they were very happy. 



What makes you say tha 



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D 



159 



A Because they told him. They said they are happy, 
and that they liked the crew and they liked the airplane, and 
they wanted hijn to come back on another crew since they 
knew him, and also for security reasons, and so on and 
that they were looking forward to the next shipment. 

Q And in fact they were disappointed when the captain 
requested a full talk; is that right? 

A Exactly. Then they kind of realized something 
was going wrong. 

Q Because you didn't need a full tank to get back 
[or Tel Aviv or wherever? 

A They just needed half a tank. They paid for the 
fuel. When the captain requested full tanks, they were 
kind of pissed off. Number one, they had to pay for it. 
Number two, they realized the guy might not come back. 
I told him — he said, "What do I tell them when they get 
upset about it?" I said, "You tell them it is a company 
requirement for safety reasons in case we have to circum- 
nanrigate countries, whatever." 

Q Did the captain say anything about whether the 
Iranians were happy with the cargo itself? 

A He told me that they were all very happy. 

Q Did he say whether the Iranians had inspected the 
cargo as it was being taken off or anything like that? 

A No 



UNCUSSD 



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TO 





y 



160 



Q Just so the record is clear, this is a fairly 
minor point, but I gather that when it became clear that the 
plane was to 9^^^mH|B you sought and received some 
additional money from Mr. Schwimmer; is that right? 

A That's right. 

Q Do you recall how much additional money you 
received? 

A My report here is a little unclear because, you 
know, I subdivided this report into several phases, 
whereas this was kind of also inter-phasing a little. So 
when I said Schwimmer came up with $8,000 after lengthy 
discussions, that means that was the final I got from him. 

Initially, he only had $8,000. Then when we 
went through^^^^^^^k said I want more money because of 
landing f ee&j|^^H|^^^ and all of that. Finally, he 
came up with 10,000. The captain still had about 2,500 in 
the ship's funds. That is why we had a total of 10,500. 
ifhan you read my report, you think he gave us 10,000, but 
b* didn't. 




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161 

Q After you made the decision to not continue with 
additional sorties, did the subject of 
actually doing more of the sorties ever come up? 

A No. 

Q No one asked you, please come back into the 
operation? 

A No. 

Q Not Copp; not Schwimmer? 

A Nobody. 

Notjj^BHf 

A ' No. 

Q Did any of those individuals tell you that they 
were going to look for another carrier to finish the sorties; 

A No. 

(The document was marked Exhibit No .^^^10 for 
identification: ) 



wmm 



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BY MR- CAROME: 
Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^M I show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 10. I ask you if you recognize what that document 
is? 

A Yes. 

Q That is a — the outside of the so-called 
ships fund envelope. Those are the envelopes which are 
referred to earlier where we have all the aircraft documents, 
you know, the flight documents in, like loading papers, and 
things like that. 

Q If I could just ask you a few items — a few 
questions about some of the entries on this envelope. 

First, this is an envelope that would actually 
contain the cash that would be aboard the plane; is that 
right? 

A Not necessarily. This is just the envelope 
which contains receipts. 
Q I see. 

A Receipts and flight documents. 

Q Could you just tell me what the sets of initials 
on the first line are. I see Tel Aviv. I gather that is 
Tel Aviv-Tehran. 



The third oneL^^H I don't know v^at that 
means? 

A That is I 
is the aircraft The company pilot is^^^^H Flight 



n't know vrtiat that 

IINCUOTL 

That^mm^m[ 



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i 



163 



engineer' 

Q What does the^Hstand fo 
A ^^H) I cannot read to you. 

That is the ground engineer. Load master was 



after that? 




and 



Q Were there two load masters on this plane? 

A Yes. 

Q What was the total number of crew on the plane? 

A One — 6. Actually, when we had both airplanes 
in Tehran and I saw that the load is difficult, I told the 
airplane, which was going bacV.^^^^^^^^^B I told them, 
leave your load master behind so the airplane which is left 
to do the flying has two load masters, so we can have this 
difficult cargo. 

Q And the entries in the right column, I take it, 
refer to amounts in the aircrafts 

A Ships funds. If you want me to explain it to 
you, I can do that. 

Q I euti not sure we need to do that. 

Do any of the payments reflected as having 
been made ^^^^^^^^H represent grease money or moeny 
paid to people on the ground^^^^^^^^Bto overcome 
the problem of not having a manifest? 

A No. 

Q Was there a bribe or grease money paid there? 

[ * • • 



Ot^ifiirft 



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A No. I don't think so. As far as I know, after 

the papers were turned over to customs ^^^^^^ everbody 
was happy. 

(The document was marked ExhibitB^ll 
COMMITTEE INSERT 



LI for identification 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^K I show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 11. It appears to be a bank notification of 
a wire transfer dated, November 27, 1985; is that right? 

A No. 

Q It appears to be just the bank records on the 
payment to ^^^^^^H for the November flight to Tehran. 
Is $127,000 the payment amount reflected on this document 
which ^^^^^^^B billed for the flight? 

A I am not quite sure. I think it was a little " 
more, but I would have to look up my invoice which hould be 
with this. 

You know, my accountant would see this. I didn't 
see this before. But I am pretty sure that we got all our 
money, because I checked on that at that time. 

Q So that 

A Could be that this was the balance. I really 
don't know. 

Q And you see on that document that there is an 
indication that the mony is being received from Lake 
Resources? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever become awaxe that it was Lake 
Resources that was making the payment? 



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Q You sent the bill to Schwimmer; is that right? 

A Yes. I sent a telex to Schwimmer and all I did 
is I called my bank whether the money was in or not. 
They said, yes, we received the money today. This would 
go into bookkeeping and accounting. I didn't look at it 
any more. I didn't really care where the money came from 
as long as we had it. 

Q Is $127,000 at least in the ballpark of what you 
billed Mr. Schwimmer? 

A Yes. 

Q Is it probably very close to what you billed him? 

A It might be the balance of what he had to pay, 
yes. 

Q When you say balance, you mean after what he 
had already given you in cash in Tel Aviv; is that right? 

A Yes. I would have to see ray own telex to verify 
that. I can't really remember the exact amounts. I thought 
it was more, but it could be that I mix it up with something 
elae. 

Q Do you still have that telex? 

A I personally don't have it. 

Q Did you provide it to the agency? 

A Yes. I mean it must have been in our accounting 
system because this income here wo-uld have to be substantiated 
with, a voucher and an invoice 



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(The document was marked Exhibit^^B-12 for identification 



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THE WITNESS: It could also be we only have the 
voucher and somebody threw the telex away. I don't know. 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 12. 
I ask you if you know what that document is? 

A It is a voucher we use in bookkeeping. 
Q It jays at the top B/0 Lake Resources; is that 
right? 

A Yes. 

Q What does this reflect? 
A It says on the Tehran flight. So it 
reflects the payment we got for the Tehran flight. 

Q There is an account number ^^^^1^°^^ master 
revenue freight 707. Did you set up a particular account 
for this particular mission? Is that what that refers to? 

A No. We had an accounting system where we had 
a computer number. 

So as you can see, the first was charter revenue 
flights, or freight. So this was the account number for all 
revenue flights we did. 

For us it was a normal revenue flight, you know. 
(The document was marked Exhibit No.^H-13 for 
identification;) 

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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 13. 

A Yes. 

Q It is a memorandum dated, 31/11/85. I gather that 
is probably November 30, 1985? Do you recognize that 
document? 

A Yes. 

Q Is that a memorandum you wrote and then provided 



A Exactly. -^ 

Q Are you answering a question °^^^^^^^^^^| here 
in this memorandum? 

A No. I wrote that by myself. Actually I wrote 
that the same day I wrote the report about the flight. 

Q It has a different date, didn't it? Maybe it 
didn't. 

A No. I wrote it the same day. 

Q What does 'display of company" mean? 

A 30/11. This should be 30/11. This 31 is a mis- 
print or something. Maybe it was a day later. I don't 
think so. 

Anyway, this Fefers to my initial criticism in the 
other memo about the clandestine way of operation in this 
company, and since I didn't know who Copp was and he was 
dealing with, and whatever, I wrote this memo to assist 



aybe it was a aay later. 

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should he have any discussions here in the agency 
about vrtio we were dealing with and how much did they 
gather information about our airline during the process. 

In other words, I wanted to pre-empt the question, 
how much did Sphwimmer and Copp find out about our airline. 

Q Was that a mattes^^^^^^^H told you he was 
concerned about? 

A No. 

Q He didn't ask you to address this question; 
is that right? 

A No, he didn't. I did that on my own. After 
this disaster, I figured out that there might be some dis- 
cussion, you know, about who we dealt with and what dangerv 
did it do to our company, and this and that. Therefore, 
I wanted to assist in those upcoming discussions which I 
estimated would come sooner or later. 

I wanted to show them how I presnted the company to 
those people so that they knew that these people, at least 
fgaa my side, didn't get the impression they were dealing 
with the agency here. 

Q You didn't want Schwimmer or Copp to have any idea 
that you were an agency proprietary; is that right? 

A Exactly. ^q 

Q Did you have a discussion witt^^^^^^^^| on that 
subject? 



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Q You just sent him this memorandum? 

A Exactly. 

Q Did you discuss that subject with him after you 
sent him this memorandum? 

A No. Never heard of it after that. 

Q There' is a conversation referred to in the middle 
of this document, when Copp called again ^^^^^^^^H I 
gather is that the conversation that you described before? 

A Yes. 

Q ' And that is the conversation 

A Here I mention also the $225,000 he wanted to save. 

Q And again you had no idea what that referred to? 

A No. Even when I asked him, he didn't explain it 
to me . I presumed that maybe he had made a downpayment 
with another airline and he tried to get his money back, 
or something like that, you know. 

Q What led you to presume that? 

A Well, why else would he go^^^^^^^Hand save 
5225,000. That didn't make sense to me. 

Q So what you thought is perhaps he had made arrange- 
ments for another airplane^^^^^^"and needed G be tnere to 
deal with them; is that right; 

A No. To get his money back. He wanted to save 
the money. He wanted to save it like you save somebody 
from drowning. Not to save it in the economic way. That 



ight is perhaps he had made arranc 
>^^^^^^Hand needed b be there 

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what I mean. 

Q The second last paragraph of this document refers 
to^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^Hwe the an 

urgent relief flight landing information problem. What does 
that refer to? 

mean^^^^^^^^^^Hwe told^^^^^Hwe an 
urgent relief flight. And^^H^H^pwe told the cusomter 
we developed landing information problemsl^^P^^^B and 
had to take the airplane back for repair. So that this 
is, by the way, a relatively standard memoradum because, 
you know, as far as the visability of a company is concerned, 
or involvement of the company, and situations were we might 
look suspicious, I would write a report like this to report 
how it looked from our side so that people would be kind of - 
the people here would know that we didn't have a problem and 
that they could sleep well, or whatever. 

They could — that they knew as far as I cun 
concerned, the agency was not revealed or the agency 
involvement. 

Q The records indicate that a few days later an 
additional payment of $700 was made by Lake Resources to 



Do you have any idea why an additional $700 




would have been made? 



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A Maybe our invoice was different than the 127 and 

they still owed us $700 or so. I don't know. 

Q Did you discuss that matter with Copp? 

A I don't remember the $700. I don't know. 

Q Did you know that on Monday, the Monday that the 

Ihad come 



flight was returning out of Iran, that 
up to the agency? 

A No. I wa^^^^^^^^ He was here. I didn't 
know what he was doing. 

Q On any of the occasions when you called him, did 
you call him here at the agency? 

A No. I never called him here. That is why he 
had his of f ice^^^^^^^l so I wouldn't have to call the 
agency. And if he wasn't in, I would] 
|H^|pass on a message, you know, in case he was out. 

Q Is it still your testimony that you did not 
perceive this flight to be a special flight in the sense that 
it was one carried on on behalf of the United States 
Government? 

A I think we talked now five hours about this, 
and I think it should be pretty clear for everybody to know 
what I said. 

MR. PEARLINE: He has answered this question, I 
think, now over a dozen times, the same question asked in 
different forma. 

MR. CAROMK: I would just like to have an answer? 



n times, tne same questic 

UNCUSSIFIED 



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THE WITNESS: Well, I think the details speak for 
themselves. I didn't think that. When I wrote those 
memos here, those two, I still had the impression that 
this was not a U.S. Government deal. 

(The document was marked Exhibit No.^^Bl4 for 
identification: ) 

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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^H I show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 14 to this deposition. I ask you if you 
recognize what that document is? 

A No. I don't know what it is. 

Q Is that your handwriting? 

A No. 

Q Could you review that document and tell me if 
it appears to be a list of flights which^^H^^^^I performed 




A I can hardly read this here. I see hei 
I think that is what it means here. I don't know. 
It could be. I don't know. 

Q Well, you know in 1986 ^^^^^^^H performed certain 
flights f rom^^^^^^H to Tel Aviv on behalf of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, don't you? 

A 




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Q Let's look at the item that is four up from the 
bottom. 

Q Yes. 

A It says 23, 24 May '86. 

Q Yes. 

A '^^^^Tel Aviv. That i-s^^^^^H from Tel Aviv. 
Then it says personal. 

A That is a flight with McFarlane. TLV, that is 
Tel Aviv. That is why the — on the bottom cannot be 
Tel Aviv. On the bottom it says^^Hor something. 




know that we flew McFarlane in May and the only 
reason why I know that this is the correct date is because 




se I had to go on this flight. 



UNCUSSiFirn 



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^ That is why I 

Q which flight is that that you are talking about? 
2 A The May flight. 

Q Let's look at the item above the May flight. 
That is also a B-707, 23 to 25 November '85. It says, 
Tel Aviv, you have actaully written out the word "Tel Aviv," 
rather than using the TLV. Over in the far right corr.er, 
it says $127,000. That obviously is the November 1985 
flight; is that right? 

A Looks like it. Yes. There you have your $700. 
Q I guess that explains that. 

Isn't this a list of the special flights that 

A Could well be. I didn't write it. I don't 
know who wrote this. 

I mean those two flights I can identify; the rest 
I can't tell you because I would have to look up the dates. 




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THE WITNESS: I didn't write that list. 
That is why I don't want to speculate on the contents of the 
list. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Let me show you what has been marked as Exhibit 
15 to your deposition. 

I ask you if you recognize what that is? 

A No. 

Q Is that your handwriting? 

A , No. 

Q Again, that is a — that is actually headed 
special flights, is it not? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you play any role in the preparation of a 
listing of the special flights performed by^^^^^^^H in the 
November 1986 time period? 

A No. 




Q And Item ^^H says drilling equipment to Tehran, 
11/85. Do you Jtnow what that i«* reference to? 

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A No. 

het me ask you one fundamental question here? 
Are you interested in facts from my side or speculation? 
Facts. That is all I want. 

A Then I don't comment on this one here, because 
I don't know anything about it. 

Q After the November 1985 flight was completed, -- 
let me withdraw that question. 

You are aware that the — tha^^H||^^m f lew- a 
:o Tel Aviv in May of 1986; is that 



Yes. 

And wereyou aware of who was aboard that flight? 

Yes. I was onboard myself. 

Who were the other people who were onboard? 



flight 
right? 

A 

Q 

A 



A HflH^^B; co-pi lot^^^^^^^l flight 
I don't remember now, but the lead master^^^^H and then 
myself, and a ground engineer, I think, we didn't have on that 
flight. I am not quite sure now. 

Q Were there any other persons on the flight? 

A Yes. 

Q Who? 

A We had five or six people out of which I recognize 
only one. That was McFarlane. 1 didn't recognize anybody 
else. 



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idWIijiSSifD 



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Q You didn't recognize Oliver North? 

A I didn't know him. 

Q Do you know whether or not he was on the flight? 

A I don't know. 

Q You don't know the names of any of the other 
individuals on the flight? 

A No. In fact, I didn't know any name. Even 
McFarlane's name I didn't know. I wasn't even sure I 
recognized him or not because he looked so much older 
in reality than on TV. Maybe he was just tired. He just 
came over on a trans-atlantic list. 

Q How were you tasked to perform that flight, meaning 
how was^^^^^^^ tasked to perform that flight? 

A ^^^^^^^H called me. I wa^^^^^^^Vat that 
time. 




The day before that happened he called me and he 
said you have to do a flight tonight. I said, I can't 
do that. He said, you have to. I said, why? He said, 
well, because there is a VIP onboard. You have to be on- 
board yourself to make sure everything goes smooth. And 
so finally I gave in ofid I said, okay, I go. So I went, 



you know. 



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That was it. He told me — I said, what are the 
details? He said,^Hm^HTel Aviv to land in Tel Aviv at 
2:30 GMT precisely because before that they don't open the 
airport. So then went ^^^^^^^^H 

The passengers boarded the plane. We flew to Tel 
Aviv. We landed at 233. The passenger got off and we flew 
back 




BY MR. CAROME: 

Q You said before that there was no| 
employee or crew member other than yourself who knew about 
the proprietary nature o^H^^I^^I^^ that right? 

A That is still the case nowadays. 

Q I am not asking for the identify of another 
person who might be aware, but there is a memorandum that 
I am looking at. I am looking for a copy here. It seems 
to indicate there is another individual who is aware. 
If you will just be patient, I will try to 

-" " - ilNCI AJlSIFIFn 



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183 
A I think you are right. I just remember there is 
another one. 



1 

2 

_ Q Was that person involved — 

4 

Q in the November 1985 Tehran flight? 

A That person came afterwards and also is not on the 

the ^" ^^^^^^^^H business. 

Q So that person — withdraw that question. 
A I forgot about that because I focused on the 707. 
There we don't have anybody else, but undet^^^Hwe hav% one 
more person. 

(The document was marked Exhibit ^Hl 6 for 
identi f ication : ) 

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166 



1 (Discussion held off the record.) 

2 (The document was marked Exhibit^Hl? for 

3 identification.) 

4 BY MR. CAROME: 

5 Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 17. 

6 I ask you if you recognize what that document is. For the 

7 record it is headed at the top, "Sumnary of Review, 30 

8 November 1986," and it refers to an auditor or an audit of 
^^^^^^^^H Do you know 

10 A No. 

11 Q Have you seen that document before? 

12 A No. 

13 Q Are you aware of an audit °^^^^^^^^M being 

14 conducted in late 1986? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q Were the auditors concerned about finding out 

17 information about cargo handled by^^^^^^^B 

18 A No. 

19 Q I just note that item 5 says, "In an attempt to 

20 identify..." I understand you haven't seen this document 

21 before. But Item 5 indicates some interest of the auditors 

22 in the nature of the cargo being hauled, and I am just 

23 wondering if you know why it was that that might have been 

24 a concern of auditors in November 1986? 

25 i 



I don't know. It is new to me. 

iiMoi Aooincn 



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1 A I don't know. It is new to me. 

2 Q Were the auditors focusing in particular or 

3 among the items that they were looking at was — was there 

4 some special emphasis on the flights into Tehran? 

5 A I don't know because the audit was happening in 

6 ^^^^^^^^^^Bof fice, and he had all the documentation, and 

7 I wasn't there. I just saw the auditor for one or two meetings 

8 where he had a list of questions which he wanted to ask me 

9 and none of them dealt with the Tehran flights. 

10 Q Was this a regular commercial auditor or was this 

11 something else that was happening here? 

12 A As far as I know, that was a normal audit like — 

13 that was not the first audit we had. We had several audits 

14 In fact, we had one every year, I think. 

15 Q Item 6 on page 2 refers to one of the Tehran 

16 flights carrying "drilling equipment which later turned out 

17 to be munitions." 
13 Do you know where the label of drilling equipment 

19 baeame associated with the November 1985 flight? 

20 A I really don't remember . I think somebody had 
2^ named it maybe drilling equipment because he didn't have 

22 any other idea or what. I don't know. I think you say my 

23 extensive memorandum about that Tehran flight and although 

24 I wrote eight pages about, I didn't get into the nature of 

25 the cargo because J.aV<Sl\y i^idn^t.lu&VLAl^ut it 



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Q Do you know whether or not the pilot might have 
listed drilling equipment on the manifest] 
A Could well be. 

Q You don ' t know one way or the other? 
A No. I didn't see those papers actually. 

mm 

(The document was marked as Exhibit^^>18 for 
identification. ) 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q This is Exhibit 18. 1 aia not sure what it is. 
I wonder if you will recognize what that document is? 
A No. 

Is that your handwriting? 



Definitely not. 



Is it^^^^^^^^Hhandwriting? 

Could be. I don't know. I can't even read it. 
I just read reimbursement, I think, and request. That is 
all. I have no opinion. 

Q You don't know -- let me rephrase that. 

Do you have any idea why the subject of reimburse- 
ment would be discussed in connection with the November 1985 
flight to Tehran? 

A Well, I would say you would have to ask me who 
wanted to reimburse whom. I don't know who. 

Q That is what I am trying to figure out. 



A Well, 



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YiiNiyfin) 



189 



MR. CAROME: I don't believe I have any further 
questions. 

MR. WOODCOCK: But I do. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^^BI Senate 

Committee. My name is Tim Woodcock. The Senate and the 
House have conducted joint depositions so that persons 
such as yourself don't have to show up at two different 
meetings. I will be asking you questions, but I have made — 
from marginal notes I have made in the course of this 
deposition. They may jump around a little bit. 

First, let me ask you as a proprietary manager, are 
you given guidelines by^^^^^^H or anybody else 
associated with the agency as to when you are supposed to 
check back with them and when you are not on commercial 
flights? 

A X don't have emy written, strict guidelines 
bat over the years, it kind of — a certain system evolved, 
becausel^^^^^l was not the first one I de^lt w^th. 
Before talked ^=^>^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^ fact] 
and I kind of built the airline up together. 

He was handling the agency side. I was handling 
the airline and the commercial side. We had frequent 




meetings and disc 



iimiOTrn 



,o on. We also had 



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T^NCWMD 



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discussions as to the strategy of the airline, what should 
we do, how should we do it, and so and so on. 

As a result, we were pretty much going the same 
direction and didn't really have to consult every time, 
you know. But then later on, when ^^^^^^^H came in, a new 
man came in where I h-d to deal with. Therefore, in fact, 
the consulting in individual cases was a little more 
direct than before. 

In other words, before I was left alone a little 



more than later, you know. Later when! 

I was more — he also asked me more and so on. 



[was there, 




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Q You have an understanding that there are certain 
countries or certain cargos associated with certain countries 
that you cannot take to those countries without first 
checking with the agency? 

A Yes. For example, we would not fly drugs, for 
example, to any country. I mean, that is an understanding 
that — in fact, I wrote several memos in our company where I 
reminded the employees that the use of drugs or the trans- 
portation of drugs was totally forbidden, and if any time 

imn i Anninrn 



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somebody would get caught, that he would be fired. So 
that is, for example, one item. 

We have a list, a book called, "Hazardous Goods." 
It is a guideline from the ICAO when you want to fly 
hazardous material. It lists what is hazardous and what not. 

Q Is this from the agency? 

A No. That is from the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. Every airline has a book like this. 
Whenever you get cargo offered, you consult the book and check 
whether it falls under the hazardous material column or not. 

Q I understand that. My question is a little dif- 
ferent. Do you have an understanding from the agency 
as to whether if certain countries are brought to your 
attention as possible end destinations, that you can't -- 
that you must check with the agency before you go to 
those countries? 

A Yes. We have a list of those countries. 

Q So that that is clear to you? 

A Yes. 

Q I gather Iran is on that list; is that correct? 

Q And Iran would have been on that list in 1985; is 
that ture? 

A Yes. 

Q And is the nature of that list such that there is — 
that you should not go to Iran at all regardless of the cargo 

IINCUIJ{SIEIEIL_ 



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without checking first with the agency? 
A Exactly. 



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Q Let me back you up, if I may, to the August 1985 
gunpowder flight. 

MR. CAROME: Can we go off the record for just one 
second? 

(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. CAROME: Let's go back on the record. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Let me you up, may^^^^^^^^^^^H to the 
August 1985 gunpowder shipment. I gather from your testimony 
that you had fore-knowledge before that flight actually 
occurred as to the character of the cargo; is that correct? 

A Vague knowledge, yes. 

Q Did you check with^^^^^^^^f before getting approval 
to take that into Tehran? 

A Yes. 

Q And was this — did he give you iimediate 
confirmation or check with somebody and then come back to you? 

A I think he checked first and then he said it is 
okay. Although when I asked him, I didn't go into detail 
with the cargo so much. I just said that is — the 
expression is like hot cargo which is like ammunition, 
whatever, in that direction. 

Q So you used a general term like hot cargo? 

A Yes. Because I didn't know myself at that time. 

Q Excuse me^ . A* jf&r ^&^^v^ jtf|u^r;pncerned, it 



iiiar^ri(t>i&icftfr' 



559 





195 

1 could have been anything from handguns to Hawk missiles? 

2 A Yes. _^ 

3 Q And I gather that^^^^^^H did not seek further 

4 clarification from you before giving you approval; is that 

5 right? 

6 A That is right. 

7 Q Let me ask you, in addition to this, did you have an 

8 understanding when you were speaking ^S^^^^^^H that the 

9 cargo also might include detonators? 

10 A I didn't know that at that time myself. 

11 Q And I gather from your testimony you are not 

12 certain whether detonators actually went to Tehrem or 

13 not, is that true? 

14 A That is true. I was not there. See, what happened 

15 was the cargo was brought tc^^^^^ffron^^^^^^Bfrom 
^^^^^^Hfrom^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H They 

17 ended up at the airport^^^^^^^^ It was loaded and then the 

18 airplane left. 

19 After the flight, you know, I got the documentation. 

20 1 sent it in. I must admit I didn't really look at the 

21 documents myself so much, you know, because for me it was 

22 history and I just sent it in for information and I concentrated 

23 on the next. 

24 We were running here a company| 

25 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ and , you 




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I didn't take a vacation in six years. I worked day and night 

Q I am not asking you these questions to be critical. 

A I am just explaining why some things I don't know 
so well anymore. They were not so important for me at that 
time. 

Q I understand. Your testimony is that in August of 
1985, you had an order to bring hot cargo into Tehran, that 
you checked with ^HHj^Hand that he gave you approval to 
bring hot cargo into Tehran? 

A Exactly. In fact, like I said before, after the 
flight, I had a meeting^^^^^^Hwith 

land so because I had to stayl^^H^^^B and so that -he 
would transmit this to the States a little faster, and 
they were very pleased with the outcome, so to speak, and were 
hoping for more. 

Q You testified that it has been common knowledge 
that — in the aircraft iidustry, or the air carrier industry, 
that Israel has been sending weapons to Iran since the 
Caap David accords; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q What is the market — 

A By the way, I have to extend that a little. Not 
only to Iran, but also to Iraq. To both countries. 

Q And is it also your testimony that these shipments 
are known to Iraa J:^.aclgln«te_iii_J_srael? 



n»Wfi?ftn 



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A As far as I know, yes. 

Does^^^^^^^^^^^^Htell you the 

frequency of these Israeli-originated arms shipments to Iran? 

A I must say no. I just — you know, you hear from 
brokers and people in the industry about those flights and 
like when the CL-144 was shot down a few years ago, those 
events are kind of highlighting the whole situation, but how 
many flights when, so on, we don't know. I didn't go into 
that. 

Q I gather that that is the kind of information that 
you would also report back to the agency; is that right? 

A On those — the^^^^^^^^| flight, 
wrote a memo five or six years ago. I never raised it again 
because — you know, it was a one-time thing and nobody 
seemed to have more interest because if I raise subjects 
where there is more interest here in the agency, then I 
will be told find out more about this, find out more about 
that. So from the reaction, I thought that they knew as well. 

Q So you didn't conclude that they were not interested 
You concluded that they already had the information; is that 
right? 

A Presumably because it was not] 
as such. It was more like, you know, people knew about it. 

Q As part of your responsibilities to the agency^H 




do you regularly debrief your pilots 

PIACCinCIL 



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when they come back? 

A I do that, but in a way that they are not aware of 
the debriefing. I do it in a commercial way, where I 
emphasize more the commercial 




Q Do you debrief just the pilots or the whole crew, 
or does it depend? 

A Usually I just talk to the captains, unless, you 
know — it depends whether — like, for exeunple, we had a 
f light^^^^^^^H There I talked to several of the crew 
members so that I wouldn't have to ask too many questions 
to the captain. 

Q When you compiled the memoremdum that was dated 
30 November 1985, — I am not sure what the exhibit number is 
on that. 

A The eight-page deal? 

Q The eight-page memorandum you prepared. Was that 
based on a debriefing of the pilot and some of the crew? 

A That was based on 90 percent captain and 
ten percent co-pilot. 

Q I gather it was also based largely or at least in 
part on your own personal knowledge from your own 
discussions? 



Of cours 



\m mtm 



and co-pilot, I 



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ifsiRyissifss 



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meant the portion where I was not there, you know. 

MR. CAROME: For the record, that is Exhibt 7 
that is being referred to. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Thank you, Pat. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q In that report, the pilot is represented as saying 
that he was met by a civilian in the Tehran airport area who 
told the pilot that he was expecting four more flights 
originating from Tel Aviv. 
A , Yes. 

Q I gather that is what the pilot told you; is that 
correct? 

A Not only that. The pilot told me also that this guy 
told him also several times please don't tell anything that 
you come from Tel Aviv here; don't talk to anybody. 

Q But it was no mystery to this civilian as to where 
this flight had originated from; is that correct? 
A It was no mystery. 

Q And, again, later on, the same civilian, I believe, 
is represented as again on the fuel question saying that he 
was disappointed because they asked for a full tank and 
knew that a full tank was not necessary to get back to Tel Avi 
is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q Did the pilot encounter anybody else from Iran who 

imm »noirirn 



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understood that this was an Israeli-originated flight? 

A No. They had — the same guy with a submachine gun 
was escorting them to the hotel. Picked them up again and 
also went with them to the officers' mess and went to the 
tower with them which I also reported there because I had 
told him to make sure that on the return flight, that the 
overflight^^^^^^H was okay and they should check it with 
them there and get a number or something. 




Q You understood that part of that shipment was 
ammunition but your testimony is that you coudln't be sure 
whether it was the large or the small boxes; is that right? 

A Exactly. 

Q You then received information that fit the 
description of at least the large boxes; is that right? 

A Yes. 



UNCLASSIHED 



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T^HCttSSIfiH) 



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You concluded from that that this might be the 




Yes. 



But your testimony is that you couldn't be sure 



whether this was ammunition or 




Q So given that background of information, you later 
learned that the — your airplane had ended up on the military 
side of the airport in Tel ^ijtil^'li^ right? 



port in Tel ^iy. is -that 



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A Yes. 

Q Now, did that suggest to you that maybe the large 
boxes were ammunition or, at least, military? 

A It could be. I didn't -- like I say, I didn't 
know. You see, in Tel Aviv, it is not so unusual that the 
military gets involved. Like I said before, on my previous 
flights with passengers, the military was involved. Because 
one passenger carried a belt with those batteries for a 
camera, you know. Somebody thought it was maybe a bomb or 
something. So the military rounded up the military airplane, 
searched everybody, and so on. So they have a close watch 
on those airplanes. 

Also, here was a civilian in charge. As my guys 
reported, "kicked around high ranking officers". So, to me, 
it had more the impression like the military was facilitating 
a private entrepreneur. 

Q Let me just say this. It sounds to me from the -- 
from your testimony that you already, by the time the plane get 
to Israel, you already have a suspicion that military cargo 
may be involved. You don't know it, but you suspect it, 
is that right? 

A Yes, but then ^^K told me no. 

Q And then you go further to the airport and you 
find that it is on the military side of the airport. You 
find further that there are military officers involved, even 

cincn 



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though they are being kicked around by a civilian and they are 
high ranking military officers, is that right? At what 
point after learning all those things, putting all those 
things together, do you go to^^^und tell him of your 
suspicions? 

A To tell you quite frankly, I didn't go to him with 
those suspicions in this particular case because he referred 
the whole deal to me. So I thought he knew more than I did. 
You know, and also everything which has to do with Israel- 
is sensitive. 

And when I was^^^^^^^^| I had to use normal 
telephones to talk to^^^Hrhatis why I wouldn't raise 
questions like this because I would have to suspect that, 
you know, it goes all through satellites, that people might 
listen to it. So, therefore, as far as I was concerned, I 
just took it as it came. 

Q Well, now you have gotten me completely confused. 
Your memorandum of 30 November — and I thought 
your earlier testimony — indicated that you had checked with 
because you suspected that lethal equipment might be on. 

A I wa 

MR. PEARLINE: I think there is a confusion on the 

j^Sm ■ ^ 

time frame. Are you asking did you check witn^^^lwhile^^H 
lor later? 



your ( 



THE WI 



checked Friday night. 



llnl tmm 



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BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

He denied it was military? 

A He denied and after that we didn't raise the subject 
anymore. 

Q Even though you later came across your original 
supposition reinforcing your opinion it was r.ilitary 
equipment? 

A Even if I had known for sure we had rockets onboard, 
I would not have called him — I would not have informed 
him because since I was referred by him and since this thing 
was underway, I would have reported after the fact. You saw 
my report. 

Q Would it be your understanding then at that point 
denial was real ly^^^^H way of saying it is none 
of your business? 

A I just took it as it was. As a denial. He said no. 
No is no. I didn't raise it any further. I thought maybe 
I made a mistake. You see, it was only an assumption from 
my part, just because of the size of the boxes. 

If he says no, then I assume, well, maybe he knows 
what he is talking about. 

Q Now, you also have testified that Mr. Copp,whom we 
now know to be Richard Secord, at no time toldyou about the 
true character of the cargo; is that correct? 



That is right. 



IINCimiFIED 



569 



■ iiMoi Aojpinrn 



205 



CAS-12 1 Q Now, if he were to testify that he did tell you, 

2 he would be wrong; is that right? 

3 A That is right. 

4 Q Do you think he would have believed that he could 

5 really keep the true character of the cargo from you? 

6 A Yes. Because wp wouldn't open the boxes. As long 

7 as you don ' t open the boxes , you don ' t know what you have . 

8 Q But the circumstances surrounding the loading of the 

9 boxes are going to suggest that is, in fact, military 

10 equipment? 

11 A But, you know, the things is this: we don't work 

12 with suggestions. We work with facts. The fact is somebody 

13 hires the airplane, puts cargo onboard, it is blessed by 

14 the government where it is being loaded, so I couldn't care 

15 less what it is. Unless a pilot says to me I don't fly this 

16 stuff because I presume there is something dangerous in there, 

17 then I would say, okay, let's see what it is, open the box. 

18 But this didn't happen on this flight. Nobody was interested 

19 in the cargo actually. 

20 ^ou have to understand the situation. This was a 

21 real — how can I say that? Maybe I can say that off the 

22 record. 

23 The pilots would say that was a real goat- fuck 

24 which meams the thing was really hilarious in the end. So, 

25 therefore, everybody wa3_pre-^c^upied with loading and timing 



30dy was pre-occupied wit 

imni Aooinrn 



570 



romiA^iED 



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and this and that and nobody could give a shit what the cargo 
was, you know. 

Q What was the quality of your contact with the pilot 
when he was on the ground in Tel Aviv? Was it frequent? 

A Pretty good. 

Q How was it accomplished? 

A By telephone. 

Q So you were getting pretty detailed reports back 
from him? 

A Yes. 

Q Things that were happening you were learning 
contemporaneously? 

A Excuse me? 

Q The things that were happening on the ground 
there you were learning pretty regularly; is that correct? 

A That is right. I learned it only from my pilots 
because I had more the impression that Schwimmer and those 
guys were in the business of kind of hiding up things in front 
of me instead of telling me what the problem was. For 
example, Schwimmer said loading is underway. My pilot said 
nobody is loading. 

Were you relaying this information back tol 




A When I talked to him, yes. I would mention that — 
you know, the thing is a disaster and so on, but I really 

lliiAi Annirirn 



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T<BNI!l)tSSRID 



207 



CAS- 14 1 don't exactly know at what point I told him what. I talked to 

2 so many people and I didn't sleep for three nights. 

3 Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^1 your 

4 underwent over the weekend of November 2 3rd would give a 

5 person to believe that there may have reached a point where 

6 you would have turned back to^^^^^^^and said, who are these 

7 clowns? Did you do that? 

8 A I did that, yes. 

9 Q What was his response to that? 

10 A He said, "I don't know." 

11 Q Did he check with the agency to find out who these 

12 clo%ms were? 

13 A He said it is not the agency. I said, 1 know that, 

14 but — in the meantime — but I was used during several years 

15 of operation with the agency, that had the agency been 

16 involved, things would have been different, like they used 

17 to be. I knew we were dealing with some kind of weirdoes 

18 here. I thought all the time they were Israelis. Only 

19 much later I heard about what it really was. 

20 I heard it from the press. Nobody really told me. 

21 I put two and two together later on when I read the 

22 newspaper reports. 

23 Q Your operation is at risk because of the amateurism 

24 of these people; is that right? 

25 A Exactly. 



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Q And that is an item of great concern to you, even 
at this time; is that right? 

A That is why I reached a point where I cancelled the 
whole deal even withou^^^^^Happroval , see, because I reached 
a point where I would say, not with me, I don't go any 
further. 

If they want more flights, they have to present a 
very good case to me. Otherwise, there is no-go. 

But then it came, they said yes, it is okay. 
Q But I gather before that point you checked back 
with^^^^Hand said these guys are amateurs, do I have to work 
with them? Did you put that question to them? 

A I didn't say it that way. I said more in a sense 
like do you know who you referred me to, do you know what 
is going on here? He said no. 

I gave him a description of the disaster. I said I 
really would like to know whether I should go on with this 
yet. And he said I don't know. Like I said, the time and 
everything went so fast. It was a weekend. 

So finally, I reached the conclusion myself that I 
wouldn't go on. At least not as it was. 

At that point, when I said I don't go on, that didn' 
mean I don't go on forever. It just meant I needed time. I 
wanted three, four days, maybe even two weeks to prepare 
this. I was not against doing those flights. 

iiiim Aonirirn 



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Q What if^^^Bhad come back to you and said, look, 
I know you have tried to shut this thing down, but you have 
got to go do it. Do it. 

A I would have called him, sorry, I can't perform. 
The pilots won't go, which would have been the truth. 

Q Except the man who wanted to pick up his rug- 
right? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he ever get his rug? 

A No. Never went back. 

Q Did Secord ever explain to you why it was it took 
so long to pay you? 

A No. In fact, he pretended that he was amazed that 
we didn't have the money. He said — he kept saying we have 
enough money in the Swiss bank account and so on, and kind of 
as a bluff, I said to him, my bank tells me that they talked 
to your bank and there is no money in your account. That is 
Why I don't get the transfer. 

Q What did he say to that? 

A He said that is totally untrue, and so on, and I 
will get on this myself immediately. That was that. 

MR. CAROME: Did he originally te-1 you you were 
going to receive payment right away as soon as he would manage 
it? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. In fact, we had agreed on a 



jioAi lAAirirf* 



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CAS-17 1 payment of Monday, assuming that we did several flights 

2 which would last until Thursday or so. So we would get our 

3 money early enough. 

4 Under normal circumstances, had this not started 

5 on a weekend, I would have insisted on pre-payment. But 

6 since this was Saturday and Sunday, «« had to be reasonable. 

7 So, you know, we waited until Monday. 

8 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

9 Q You testified earlier that you obtained insurance 

10 for this flight in the amount of, I think, $2500? 

11 A We obtained insurance for the first flight which we 

12 did^^^^^^^^H For this flight, I don't remember whether 

13 we did or not because I didn't handle it. 

14 Q I am going to show you a document. I will not have 

15 it marked because I have already marked it up myself. I 

16 will give the CNIN number for the record, it is CNIN 2553. 

17 Do you recognize that? 

f3 A That is a deposit ticket to our bank account^^^^f 

19 ^^^ 

20 Q Does that have anything to do with obtaining 

21 insurance? 

22 A No. 

23 Q Do you have an understanding of what that is all 

24 about? 

25 A I don't know what this refers to. I would have to 

IIMni AOnirirn 



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loolc it up; 26,000. The insurance would have been $2.5 
thousand. We wouldn't have a deposit into our account. We 
would have to make the payment 

Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about insurance 
When you went^^^^^^^H to get your August flight insured, 
what was insured? The plane, the pilots, the cargo? 

A Yes. 

Q Everything? 

A Yes. 

Q What is it insured up to? 

A The airplane was insured up to I think $1.5 million. 
Third party liability was $20 million. Cargo liability was, 
I think, up to $5 million. 

Q That is all for 2500 bucks. 

A No. That was additional for Tehran. We pay 
$300,000 per year roughly for the insurance. But in the 
insurance agreement, several places were exempt like, for 
example, Tehran and other places like Bagdad or whatever 
where you have a war situation. Although we carried war- 
risk insurance, still — so then in each event, we had to 
call the insurance — sometimes they would say okay, it 
doesn't cost you anything, you go ahead. Sometimes they would 
say it costs you additional money. 

In this case, it covers an additional $2.5 thousand 
on the first Iranian flight. On the second, I don't know 



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because I just let my operations people handle it and I 
presumed they did it. And if not, maybe not because it 
was a weekend. 

Q Let me ask you a different question. Answer if you 
can from your experience. Do you know if you do not have a 
baseline policy like the o»e you have described, yet you want a 
carrier to make a flight into a place like Tehran, can you 
get a single insurance policy to cover something like that? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you have any idea what that might run? 

A I think the amount is not really the problem. The 
timing is the problem. ^^^^^^Knsurance — I don't know 
if you are familiar with the^^^^^H system ,^^^^^^Vis, 
give you em ex2unple, a room like this one where 50 people are 
sitting, each one at his little desk, the so-called under- 
writers. 

If you want to have your insurance done, you need 
a' lead underwriter. You need one guy who signs on your 
paper as the first guy. Everybody else will look for the firs 
signature. If there is no first signature, you don't get 
anybody to insure you. 

Usually you need a broker who runs ove 
and tries to convince somebody to be the lead undeirwriter . 
Then the others will follow and it takes usually a week or 
three days or so. 



UNCUSSIhED 



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But it is a lengthy procedure. So, therefore, and 
then the second thing is, of course, it costs a lot of money. 
But the shortest period they would really insure is like a 
month. They wouldn't go for one single flight, 




Q So there are circumstances where you can get a policy 
that runs less than a month but it is expensive? 

A Yes, very expensive. 

Q When you say "very expensive", $50,000? 

A Well, let's say -- we pay 300 per year, which is 
about 25 per month. If you want it for one month, you would 
pay maybe twice as much. 

Q Your report of 11/30/85 uses the term "special 
flight"? 

A Yes. 

Q Some of the documents that Pat showed you also use 
the term "special flight". Does that term have a particular 
meaning to you? 

A That term means basically every -light which is 



IIIIAI IAAlMtf«n 



578 



CAS- 21 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



™iIffiEIOTED 



214 



not a normal flight. Normal flights are flights which we do 
for other airlines, regular customers, like sub-charter 
flights, and things like that. 

Q When you use the term "special flight" to, say, 
someone like^^H do you and he have a common understanding 
as to what the term means? 

A Yes. 

MR. CAROME: Was the August 1985 flight a special 
flight? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. It was a special flight because 
it involved Israel and Tehran, two hostile countries. So 
that is special. 

MR. CAROME: How did it involve Israel? 

THE WITNESS: Did you say August or November 198 5? 

MR. CAROME: I said August 1985. 

THE WITNESS: I thought you said November 1985. 

MR. CAROME: Wa s the August 1985 flight a special 
flight? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. CAROME: What made it special? 

THE WITNESS: There were countries sending equipment 
to countries fighting a war. 

In fact, I think in view of the later revelations 
here in the States, I think it was etty good we did that 
first flight to indicate that the U.S. is not the only country 



579 



ittHiy^W 



215 



CAS-22 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




who would support a deal like this, but alsoj 

who then cried outloud after all this was revealed, and in 

reality they had all along supported Iran. 

foreign trade with Iran is one of the biggestl 

MR. WOODCOCK: I think that is all I hcve. 

MR. CAROME: I have just a few — I a... talking less 
than three minutes of questions. 

MR. PEARLINE: Promises, promises. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Did^^^^^^^^Hpnake any flights to Central 
America that you are aware of? 
A Yes. 

Q Were any of those flights special flights in that 
they were on behalf of the United States Government? 

MR. PEARLINE: I think he said the special flights 
are not always upon behalf of the U.S. Government. 

You can answer with respect to if it involved the 
contra program. 

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know what it involved. 
I just know that we did those flights^ 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q What were the flic ^ 

A ^^^^^^^Hf light s^^^^^ ^^P really a 

big thing because the equipment we flew as far as I could see 




580 



ilN(itASli»r 



216 



CAS-23 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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13 
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20 
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22 
23 
24 
25 



at least when I was onboard was our regular equipment 




581 



CAS- 2 4 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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25 




Q Were you ever aware that t.-.e November 1985 fligh" 
to Tehran that you were involved in was somehow connected 



IIAlA LiftfitririY 



582 



miSSHRIS' 



218 



CAS- 2 5 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

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18 

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23 

24 

25 



with the hostage release operation? 

A NO. 

Q Did you ever hear either Oliver North's or 
Dewey Clarridge's ncune mentioned in connection with the 
November 1985 flight? 

A No names were mentioned at all. 

Q And neithei^^^^^lnor Copp nor Schwimmer nor the 

pilot ever referred to it as hot cargo; is that right? 

A No. Like I say, we didn't talk about the nature 
at all. 

MR. WOODCOCK: When you say "no", you mean that 
they did not refer to it as hot cargo; is that right? 

THE WITNESS: No. They didn't say "hot cargo". 
You know, everybody was so preoccupied with the size of the 
boxes that in the process, everybody forgot what was in the 
boxes. You know, nobody really cared. 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Do you know whther the boxes had any identifying 
writing on them? 

A I don't think so. Because the pilots would have 
reported that to me. 

Q You believe that if the pilots knew it was weapons 
they would have reported that to you right away? 

A Well, if they had seen a description on the boxes, 
they would have reported that to me because when I asked 



583 



mytssiffiB' 



219 



CAS-26 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

6 

9 

10 

11 

end 5 ■\2 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



them what was the cargo, the general opinion was we don't 
know. Like I said, one co-pilot said why didn't they shot the 
stuff over to Tehran, assuming that that was rockets, you 
know. 

Q But that was after the fact; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q How long after the fact? 

A A week or two later. When we got together and 
talked personally. 

Q Was it before you wrote your November 30 memorandum 
or after? 



llWttK?MlL 



584 



1 5a bap-1 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

i7 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mmm 



220 



A After. You see, the sane crew who came back from 
that flight, as I wrote here, went onl 
and continued the contract I had there, which went 
on for another week or so. So it took quite some time 
until I got together with the crew. 

Q So obviously the crew learned during the flight that 
it was weapons, but they didn't report that to you right 
away; is that right? 

A Maybe they assumed that, but they didn't report 
anything to me. 

Q When you learned that it^was rockets, did you 
pass that information on t<| 

A No. 

Q You didn't think that was significant? 

A I didn't learn it was rockets. I just had the 



opinion of the co-pilot and, in fact, I think I quoted 




the co-pilot to^^^^P and we laughed about it. But that 

Q So you did pass that on tc 
A Much later. I told him what the co-pilot said. 
We laughed about the comment. 

Q Did you not believe the conraent? 
A I believed it, yes. 



believe it? 



I don't know. 



IINnUl^fllFM 



585 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



THp^sESfiifi' 



221 




Q That was certainly a significant 

information, wasn't it, the kind of thing you 
"would certainly pass back to the CIA if you knew that 
weapons had been shipped to Tehran, right? 

A I had two things I have to say. Number one, 
like I said, he referred the whole dea'' to me, so I 
thought he knew more about it than I aid. Number two, 
I just quoted a joke. What he made out of it, that was 
not ray problem. 




record is clear; is that right? 

A Yes. That is right. 

Q Did you at any time in November or December 1985 
learn that the National Security Council was involved in 
the November 1985 shipment? 

A I just — I don't know when I read it in the 

IIMN Aocicicn 



586 



bp-3 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



dWIMSSifl) 



222 



newspaper, but I can't remember. 

Q But at the time of the flight and around that 
time, you didn't hear that; is that what you are saying? 

A No. No. Not at all. In fact, I would have been 
very amazed to learn that, you know. 




Q Do you still have in your possession or control 
any documents relating to the November 1985 flight? 
A No. 

MR. CAROME: I don't have anything more. 
MR. WOODCOCK: Well, I don't hve anything more 
except 1 do have an admonition. I would think that you 
might want to have the agency check up on any member of 

Iwho would profess to know the intimacies of goats. 
THE WITNESS: That is a common expression with 
our pilots. Everybody knows what that means. 
MR. WOODCOCK: Thank you. 
MR. CAROME: Thank you very much. 
(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the deposition was 



concluded. ) 



UNCUSSIFIED 



587 



1 NCONiULT 



I "cr:.'£ULT 



^~4imASS!F!ED_ 






_26JUN&5 12:l<i/i2:i4 est 



1^ ~^ 




I.'.'CC.'.'iULT PCHP 



:,,,;j,:,e-jmeie«edon_^!df2^*<y 

,„i.r: iroviSlCS Of E 1235B . 

Joniison National Secunly Council 






-^-^ <^3- 



041633JUNc5 







ASAP YR' QUOTE 



G.^ a 6.^- |jNCLASSIF"EDrr'C°^^ 



,^7 



588 



-^ moss? 1)839* 
?.i 3nR9 eoo ir 
i*iB9fla5 rmo d 



UNCLASaiFe 



Released on o^^ J^J-^S g 
under provisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. Nalional Security Council 

LvlLaylatlon "clvlLalr tehran 






attn: di rector general 

from -.y 

aate: OT.^aug.^-^ 

we (lereoy "reQ. ' your^x ind aoprovaL for traffic rights for fLLng 

fit. 




consignor ; 

ccm-si^ne&i— tue -1 sTaml c resuDLlc of Iran, defence Industry organlzatlb 

n, oasoaran street 5, p.o. box 16765/183, tenran -i6 stp ' 




\\M_^i5^^ 



NcUssfipra:^"' 



589 



PAID ID 



UNCLASSIFIED 






fCOIVlD FMX 




- //Jl> 



<?^ 



/^v^ 




ajLOi: # AKXKi 



(^ w Ml D.^^\ 



UNCLASSIFSED 

pgrPAsm BY >C 



2 6 C 3 ' vojQSi^ 



1 ""'•^^^k^>d^"pn ^ 1 



/"i?/-^ _^ 



590 



(; DEPO' 



DEPOSITION 
HIBIT 

L 



T ''>*£ 



Mernorandua to 





v 



August 26, 1985 



riiailv Cecia 



vity 12-24 August 1985 °"- """'"'' '^^"'"y Counoi 



night ^from^^H^^B^o T.hr.^^^ ^> 
had previously reported, fli, cargo was 
tons smoiceless powder and detonators 
d Israel. 





WNClASS/flED ^ 



C//^ <35'3y 






591 



<) aJO'J f^i' 



DEPOSITION 1 j^Q^ 15 




1185 






UNCtRSSlFltD ^ ^- 




Knowing that Isra«l is sending war o^YtTlil vial 
to Teheran I believe that that is their ootlvatioo for| 
reduce transport ccsts dramatically. 




because 

f :; 



^ o» 






592 



<^i AJc\^ c^r" 



KEMO : i I : £5 



LNCLASSIFBED 




UNCLASSIfllO 



.-as g*<i « :roa| 

Nov 85 

e st; rrrr by Ir-nian figr.-trs until Ic reacT.ec .e' 

•■« - ■ » o-t ior* fU cottlng In Dtct«b«t|_ 

JvMch w« art n«fotl«tIn| pr«nn cly/_ 
:s ir« planntd ^«|inninj_86 te go| 
lr:cr-cc about thost. 



^ .../ ^^-x^ 



'^'M''p?^ 



593 



■ I^C A "Ji flCUlU 4U*0V Vs^' 



UNCLASSIF9I 



5. VAJtIOUS FITS. 




r iihj 35-55 



I^jC^I^^ 



594 



i/NClASSIFIED 







UNCLASSIFIED 




595 



«D10RA>JWh 301185 I 



3o 



^ 







1. CHRONOLOCICAL R£PORT 




- Contacc and Concract 



'•*Triday afternoon 22 Nov first info to oe vi _.^^;^,^,^„_ 
that I would be contacted concerning an urgent flight and 
that it was in our Interest to pcrfom those upcoaing fits. 
At abo ut 20 00 Loca l^^^a^^j^^^m^ted by a certain Mr. Richard 
Copp 

He asked~Be whether^lnad already been informed about a aission 
which I denied. He then e1fpl"ained to ae that there had to 



?S 



be 3 flights done 
from Tel Aviv 
we could do i 
of 60 000.00 USD p 
Further it was agr 
on request should 
During ay subseque 
CO ay MEMO 21118S 
to ae aod supposed 
indicated. This wa 



PHASE II - PositionXtig 




kly as possible " Government to Covernxcnt" 
cr a shore discussion we agreed that 
raft consecutively for a flat fee 
landg.handlg had to be paid by hio. 
t second Boeing would be made available 
ter get urgent. ^^^^^^^^ 
ic conversation to our|H|^m^pi 
and questioned the way it was displayed 
his cargo was the saae as in ay memo 
d. 



3 3^ ?A3 



UNCLASSIFIEI 




LJr c raft was taken o ver b^ 

had the order* that upon the receipt of the code "Celia" he would 
find an excuse for the custoaer and depart 
offici ally fot<|||||||||H|, Traffic rights *°^^^^^^^^^ 
mHMwcrc tea^^^^y applied for by ourf^^^^l^^^^H should 
this become necessary. 



Our cecood Boeing was parked in 
the airport opened the next aorn 
At the c iae I ha d »ade the agreement 
The crev^^^^B which was suppos ed to 



kthe nex-c day 
"early departure 
airport had o pene_d 
ithis aircraft 
llnformed by Copp cnac 





tb^el Aviv. 
'^tOivailabl 



e foSffu«lling 



[was 
.rcraf ti 
'u el company ^l'< Mlvailabl« f6r*fu«lling 
At about this_time 
"pTlle ts _h ad to be taken along. 

own pallets were scarce 



596 



P««t 2 or MIMO 30118$ 



liNCLASSiFlii'D 




:s had b«cn put on a forkllfc in cne 
inlc W3S vaitlni for thc.alrcrafc Co 
arrive. Afctr ch« aircraft -had arrived tht pallets were loaded and 
the aircraft continued to fly to Tel Aviv after having refuelled 
a little because of the extra flv 




PHASE III - Loading 



Although Richard Copp.l 
loading wat. altnned to taV 



^_<« 2 hours i^JUMwhlch had first arrived, h 
«flfY*' "*■ piece out of 19 pieces in 4 hours. Therefo 
concerned parties were concerned that Che 
long a« possibly 24 hours. Therefore 
traffic rights had not been granted 
that now the load had to be transporT 
confirmed ay initial suspicions and 
several things had to be changed. 
before that the traffic rights in 

i^^m^ii^mi^mHBHim va s 

crew told me that in TLV evervonc kn 



Ihad said to ae that the 

hours but would be speeded up to 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Zo 



rned doi.Ti and that the real dcst 

CO 




- 3 



597 



-L-iv J.,.: 85 



UNCLASSIFIED 



ivS«a»:M»l 




-1 was »lv«n the contact o.' Mr . A. 0:hviana«r In T1.V by Mr.Copp *^-^ 
■-tllkid CO Schvlnmer sc «ral claes on ch« phon«. .^^^ 

told.ht« that we ccu'-l not fly co THR wlth^^A^M 

^^^ and tha t w« ; .trefort \^i to unload^HJJS^ialn-^ 
^^^^^^^^^ H* tritS^«v«ral Cl»«s to convTncI •* ana tvtn 
^^^^TTn^a different registration on the aircraft and 
do some kind of fonwcion flying into THR. Keeping In mind that 
conversations to Israel »lght be listened to. 1 told 
we were a oomal Airline and wanted to stay In business 
time CO come and that thinl y w«y to do it was ^« ■ j y-'j-y 
,s to do it. Therefore^MW^Ts umoaoea agai-n. rf» T ' 
'ddiclon to that 1 exp:aine<i B ku that we needed traffic rig-.:s 
Hv«jfli||0which we had applied fo^entat Ively the moment 
the r»i) ne<:t. hart '-or'* out, but only for^^B 

/o^d alsc wt'.stimst.d tnat it wo uld take tla . to get those rights. 
In addition 1 nac confer -eJ vithgHM*"'' T',^ nr^L. 
thos* traffic rifir.c. .:.,id.be supported diploaaticallyjnd^that 

wc coula count or. t.... |^. /^r^7\\\ 

1 w-< ir rr.ucr. vitr. .---^'■rfv- all the timean^rif led all 

them. In fact WKm"*^ ^" Schuimoers 

home and w. r...otisWti*re that w. neTdTdJJ 000 l-'SD in 
order to go co the^feiilination because we had not Pl*""*-! 
on i and thereforl^T^ enough cash with u.. Also w. did 
^ot trust the. th.^£rythin, wa. paid In THR. Schwi«.er cam. 
up with 8000 USD ^Ofi& enghcy discussions because it was Sundas 
in tne «eantl»e ^R could not g.t wre aon.y 



^ 




performed 



^^ 



«1 



uHCUSS\nto 



Accoroinp to ta. nev ij." eaent between Schwiimaer 
had bee n un loaeea atiir. and dep«rte 

" on s'..'.»4y cue 2ft Nov. 
^^i^_,oid th.. flight and took all extra crew back except 
■■irefond loadmaster because it had beco-e ^^^-i'"* "Z;^ 
that the TLV/TKR rour- -.ould be flown by on2_cr.w due to the 
lenghtv loading .nd ,. . icted unloadg proc 
In the -«a ntime Schvi maer confirmed th« 
overflight ■■■h*^ b*" ""^1™*'* 
vlthftHIa* tooSas it#i« loaded. 
However. th»4«»« "o** ■ ttrtvd||idjd 
that the ainnCc sbou. lan<fp|^r 
This required a^dittflK* funds by us 
defuelled in T1.V becaus it would h 
MinKnd had to refue ."^bis ais 
^^V^^^^ -r 'w»---' •» .3nev but 



Ights for 
could go 

ir agreement 
ing on to TH? 

CO be 
landir.g 



cog^.-i*' 



REVIEY/eS FOK KELEASC 



..nether 2 
yjth Che 

3<^ 




598 



f«»« 



of MEMO 301185 



UNCLASSIFIED 



■mm' 

1 thWi Ne 



•nd 




Finally w« gav* ch« grttn litht f or^^^^co c«kt off 
ht Itfc wlch|m|H^B^Hon ch< li> Nov. 

Since arrival 1 1 ha^taTt^hl^txaetly 24 houra for loading 
•nd.xlaarlng all che probltas. ^k&^ 

rlvalJ|^|0^H|^^«j ncv aa cht cuscooar 

daily cha allicary In TLV had aoc only ooc glvan hlo any 
a for the lea's buj also had caktn ouc avcry evidence which 
roved that the aircraft waa in TIV. 

therefore did not want to release the aircraft 



ocuaents were produce, 
c inspected'! Finally 



nd therefore the load also 



-lU'^ 



wrote a' cargo manifest 
which was accepted although it had no stamp of the 
point and finally he could ta lk his way o ut of this 
on. Finally he therefore left at iHHUHHf direction 
as planned. - ^^^ ^^^^^ 

Howeva'r, nothing was prepared for overflight ^B^^H[ and he had 
again to talk his way through. Since they repeatedly Insisted 
on a dlplooatic clearance number, ha made one up which was 
not accepted after long negotiatlonsandthen ha filibustered 
one hour and 30 ain hl^'^^^7HH||^|[mB> using di fferen t 
alt itudes, positions and estimates that ha toldf 

with whoa StSQwu obviously in radio contact. 



However, 
for arguacnta and 
AC cha TUR border 
not have to aay th4 
because Radar treat 
Finally ha landed 



lis off- poslclons which gave additional re; 
■lays. 

received without any problems but he did 
id coda "I aa coming for Mustafa" 
very normal ly. 

^on the 25 Nov(monday) 



PHASE V - Unloading 




After landing in THR the a ire raft. -had to reaain on the runway 
for about 10 ain until a "follow ■•" caaa and directed them to 
the parking area which waa on the ailitary aide. 
Thclandlng had been done on runway 29 r and the aircraft was 
directed Co the south of this runway c~ro :he t'-e ror;h/ves: 
part of th« southern military apron. At Chit location the 



aAxKTttM. J m4 parked aiao auiiDg -ju: laat f 

QRHMHIk It is a special area which Is s 
to cha oucsida so that people outside th 



zc 



^^^^lOimpHwaa first con 
«^I the unloading later a 
^•///2 this flight and were surprised c 
/ 30 ain after arrival a civilian 



UNCLASSif^Elf 



taccad by an office 
nd who Cold hia t 
hat it 
with 
back arrived at the aircraft iVt aske 
"What are the nationalities of the 
here do you come from 
n he calked to 

Ik 



a few 

by a high fence 
nnot see the 

who directed 
know about 



'o ^ ^: 




celling .^jfik^hat he should^Ot 



599 



p«l« 5 



KEHO 301185 



uNCLASSIF:i:D 







DOC to worry and chat ivcrythlng 
liUcary 



3 ?^ 



UNCLASSlF':tD 



.^.^J-ttll- «nyon« Including the alUtary whtrt ch« aircraft raally 
H« chtn aantloncd that chay wtra axpccclni <> aor* 
TI.V . H» woul^ .l i itt to sat cht (aa« craw than dut 
Whcn^^H^was aiklng for aonay or arrangcacota 
of fual, parking ate. ha r.oId hli 
would b* cakan cara of. 

;arv laor than atartad to dirtct tha unloading, ona 
rclvlllan with subeachlnt gun. 
wa« $«nt to tha offlcara Haadquarcars whara thay wera 
Tgaln by cha civilian to kaap thtlr south thuc about this 
talk to anyone about thalr ■Itslon. 
"Capt mJlP ^han tpld hla ih * t our cra w did not want to pass 
through p aaapcrt and cuato aa control b aeauaa" duTT ng TE a T^at f iJKhc 
It had tafcan tavaral hour* an d thay wan tad to a void that this 
t'lna as thay txpactad aaulck unloading anTtha n had to laava agai n. 
Therefora tKa"clvlllan~took thaa In a car through back roads 
off tha airport and was not chackad or stopped at tha gata although 
even ellltary had to pre^ftnt thilr Id - cards at that gata. 
The trip to tha Hotal^opk one hour and finally they arrived 
at tha forvcr Sherjtc5l$?tel. (Different nasa now. could not 
remember) 

Ml rooas were occ 
together. After be 
curprlse of tha cr 
unloaded and that 
This wa* 6 hours a 
remained at the ai 
really took place 
time In the office 
soae tlae.) _^^_ 

However, after this alert It took 2 hours until the car finally 
arrived. In the aeantlM the civilian had apologitad several j^ 
tiaes and the crew was offered coffee and cake*. ..^^^^^riit^^ 
After arrival at the airport through th^^backdo«r"^|^^^5T'^ 
required a pervit nuaber for overf llght|||^^^^^ in order to 
avoid the problem he had coming in. He refused to leave without. 
Thereforehean^h^civlllan went to the Tower froa where they 
tried to^^^HH^^HHTo^tain this cumber. After 
hours of ^rying^^H^ptold thea that 
but they could not get a nuaber. Alsof 
Air Defense of Iran was informed and 
which ha finally accepted. 
When the crew was taken over to the alr^ 
the aircraft had been towed to the civl 
and that It w as being fuelled by clvlj 
Whcn^mmf^sked for full tanks (ord 
after all those problems which I waj 
had called^Hvla Telcfone froa th< 
to take th^^^craft directly back' 
the civilian who had received him was-Very disappol 
he realizedthat so much fuel was not needed to go back to TLV. 
However flM^m^o Id hia that he needed the extra for aecuricy. 




nd therefore they had to take a suite 
the hotel for about 2 hours to the 

got a phone call that the aircraft was 
uld be picked up in a fej^^n utes. ^*"1 
e aircraft had landed . |[mHp|[^>adtH'^'^ 
for some time to see that the unloading 
t it was done correctly. Then the 

and the trip to the Hotel had taken 




600 



p«|« 6 of KQ10 30118S 



iiJiCLASSIfc'cD 



tBASt VI 



- Return flight 



th« 25 Nov, «(ttr 14:35 hours 



The aircraft cook of at' 
on Cht (round In THJl. 
Th« aircraft was dlrectad by radar off tn« alrvays a Uttlt more 
■^ ch than normally, cloit to tht Russian border. 

"Jwas jlvtn a special exit time which he had to meet 

,. -- coaply with the Iranian Air Defense. 

ching Tabtli th* aircraft w ordered dow n from FL 350 

280, shortly before reachingJ^^H^H^H border again up 
to n. 350. (reason unUiown) . ^^^^^^^^^ jJJiiH^'^ 

No transponder wa^use^lrwh^lynlanairspac^J^'Sn 

arrival mm^H[|^H^HBHfl|L<Jstold by radar that 
Cla« h« was accepted but -&h*t in futur^tor further flights, the 
ok of Che civilair was noc. enough but that he had to get also the 
ok .of the Ministry of foreign affairs and that otherwise the 
aircraft would be tur ned back. -M u^yj*^*^ 

Based on all thi s lAxi jht iition, I ordered MB BB^vi* radio to 
dircctly^^HHHI^^^^^^^^^BM^Hi^^l which we 
had planned Inic 




GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 



^ 



.v»S^* 



2^ 







Th« Mission was poorly planned and directed by our contract 

partnarc In a aaateurtti^ u^^^^ 

I. MV^Mia.JM4Jtafle^H^H^k«t for about a week with 



2. Copp was sitting inN 



I althoug 



not flown to 



and ha as our contract partner cou 
going on in TLV. 

In TLV the aircraft was on the aillta 
high ranking •llitary personnel who 
this type of work. (The lowest rankio 
In addition they did not work ouch 
coffe brakes. 

A certain Mr . A. Schwimmrr which *'**k- ._*. 

the representative in TLV of Copp,i'wa«?*ery 

military, somecimes to a point where he was Insulting, but 

he did not understand the special aviation protleas ar.o <iii 

not have t hings urdtx co r.trol. I.E. He srlousl>- proposed tc 

the I III! I ii^BMBUB II change the rcgistra:i:i c: t.-.< 




ii^-;b7 ^°VV *s 
push>^.v(th the 



601 



Pa|t 7 of 



MEMO 301185 



UNCLASSIFIED 



rH^ 



r 




r^^^_^Pi^airer»ft and to forMth^re«p«ctive papars " In 2 hours" 
{^/''TEis was turned down byflHHHH|^*"d t\%o by aysalf when 

^Scbwlomar Banclontd Ic o^thaphona dua to cha bafora aandoned 

nt. ^^^-r 

cha cash aonay which Copp had proalsad was not available 
and Schwl^ar apparently did noc know about chla raqulrcaanc. 



•j|Toutlng changes, destination changes. Involved traffic 
"cs ware dona too lata and the crew grew sore and bore 
ecurc as they are not usad to this type of makeshift' 
irline direction and control. 



6. The aisslon was still parforaad successfully because of the 

initiative cha crew had displayed and because they are used 
also under adverse clrfruastancas to complete the mission 
before problems will bd. discussed. However, this is not the 

way it can be done rep«»iadly because the good will will be 

worn out. 



PROPQfta 




iplex business which requires a- lot of 
rnad and also because the feed back 
or the operation, Che directly involved 
of the decision making- and planning 



As Aviation Is a v 

experieoca from al 

information Is so 

employees have to 

as early as during the contracting stage. 

Had it not bean a special flight, I would have delayed for .^bouc 

2 days £ftar I had learned about the change of Oastination in 

order co have enough tlma for correct planning and the aquisicion 

of tha nacasaary traffic rights. 

The licda radar concrolla does not know policical decisions and will 

not even be informed by his superiors. Ue experienced chat time anil 

again. Therefore all those things have to b a prese nted in a normal 



Olf^ Q533 



way so that the controller simply has a d 

number Ilka he has for every other aircra 

will look totally normal for hla. 

In other words: Those flights can ba par 

by only with tha proper planning. 

In order to have proper planning, tha 

happens to ba myself, should ba heard 

making commitmencs to third parties 

planning process. 



-^^^7 HHCLASSlflti) 



learance 
this flight 

any problec 




/^a^ 



<,<r 



602 



, Faia • of MDO 301 18S 




ifort tuiiisc ch«c during ch« prtp«raclon procttt I thould 
cid to th« ■••clni of cb« d«p«rtB«nts which trt involved 




icuricy and chat tb« 
hava to ba dooa in a elandaatina way. Bowavar. it cannot 
r thao It waa during thia laat aiaaion and it could 
baan parforaad totally elandaatina, had tha abovt propottd 
Mating takan placa in advanca. ^ 

-In aadditloo to chat, ay praaanca 'ktIm t ^|u Jft% i jSff ^- couI4fe ^ 
provida tha concarnad offlctra who TfflfftSl^tha dlrtaranc 
dapartsaota with uaaful fa adba ck information ao that for futura 
planning aosa thinga can ba- rulad out right away without avan 
going into datail wharaaa_ flc'bar a can ba aceaptad right away 
without chacking dataila. 



In addition to that! 
should ba part of al 
I aa not awara of ip 
would ba aaaiar to 
aaalar to plan tha 
airplanaa hava to bl 



jingla aiaaiona or taaka to ba parforaad 
c*fy which I aa aura axiata, but which 
Ul. Knowing tha all-ovar atratagy it 
:artain aisalona and it would avan be 
»udgat which dafinea whathar naw 
(haaad/laaaad or othara hava to be sold. 



In ahorc: I would aMHaiata if I could ba given aora responsibillcy 
by being aore part ^|^S taaa aa far aa the planning of the 
avaition aapeeta ar^^Hamed. I think it ia a waste of experlanct 
and information whe^^Bi* nor aada part of the planning process. 
I alao like to aake aura that I aa not on a "ago trip", but that 
I hava tha aucceaa of our coapany in aind which laat not leaat 
ia alao tha aucceaa of thia country. 



uHtusm 



CMJisi^ 




r-T^rc 



603 











'^-**^<» '^ y^- c-k-^ «^*.» *J#^ OtW./ o. 



* 



^K».^-^ A^- ^-ri- /d>^ y^^j ,^e 



y ^^ 



-ri <=^/-^--. 









lo 

A6 










604 




2 2 -v^ t/ fe' lU22/\ 

■ < DEPOSITION 
'^Vno^ct I , EXHIBIT 






^ 






■'^-•--'- -A^.y^-^ ^"^^^^ IK/^J-/c /*,X ^c^^^^. 






,^ ?•.-/<■. 



t-'-^-r _X«rwCj( 



— ^^j-< 



^ , Ik/ '^ ^ O^ 






^. A^rf a^. 



^ 






>'-«-^ <-.-.-*- 



^ 



7^ t< J 









a ^■c'^ ^ 



<A 




u^^ 



.4C _/-j ^i^^ 



y^.r-y^^ 




CiiN 9.t^^ 



RtVirw£OfOflf^LEA^E 



li 



^iT^c/rrr 



606 



.;.:...,. mm: 




aiair- 



^1 



A-^.' -/r <r 7-.- 









A*^~'U'^ ./^Z^ 



t 




607 







C 6538 






/7. 






/^ -^^.c:: 



t.HJ^...Jr^ :j 



aro 



:jX>- 




wwww 



>*^ <3-/- 



.^ 



-Oo:ot, _. . .. 




fvj 



C///V a 



iwwfem: 



608 



OP^^ycBdED 



2. I'>wvu/r ^</. 

C/EUR 

ACTION 




-SJJBJECT: — M5C-«£QUEST 

1. ACTION REQUESTED: 
FOLLOWING. 



2. ^^Imet W 
ALSO CONVOKED. M^^HbrnTTu^ET 
RECEIVED. FACT F IRST. FL ICHT. CAM' 
NOT REQUEST CL EARANC E BEFOREHAN^ AN 
P.LANE IS CARGO. ■■■iTOLO ■■iAililT 
TELEX TRtm-OffiRinrSTATEDMEDIcTl S 
GROUND CONTROLLERS J^l WAS CARRY «G 



Mially DeelaSifiedVfielfiase'd on^^W^^tl^l 

Under provisions of La. 12356 

_ by 3, Reger. .National Security Council 



FLASH RESPONSE SOONEST TO REF AND 



___CARRIED THE CAN ON T> I S 
AND DEPARTMENT (DEMARCHE WILL'NCT 6 
CHANNEL) . . LL n. , o 



■ED.THAT FU>--HER FLIGHTS r 



A. BOTTOM LINE IS THAT^Bj'il 
OEVELOPE^^;;^E_CYNICIS^B^T OUR 

SUBSEQUENT ^^__^_^^^_ 
PLANES FOLLOW NUHMAL PROCEDURE? 
AND THAT THEY 00 NOT SHUTTLE FR", 
PLANES MUST NOT COME DIRECTLY f; 
•ND PICK UP OTHER m ff fin cw r. g 




URS.. AMBASSADOR WAS ' 

ROM^BB^ND DID' ." 
-CTING-STORIES JlBOUr.- " 

INDUSTRY SPARE PARTS. 
AND THE PILOT TOLD 

EQUIPMENT. . 

rfo INVOLVE AMBASSADOR 
ED OTHER THAN IN THIS 



TO ASSIST BUT HAS 
ACTION WITH THEM ON THE 
'"'!LD PROCEED • 

/LSO INSISTS THAT 
7ERFLJ- - 
.AS NOTED 
THEY SHoT 
_B|^NOT TO 



[Ij^^CL^ARANCE. 
SHOOC^WIW^^ 



[ILI2E 



5 . ANOTHE 
AIRCRAFT. 



MATTER REQUIRING :LARIF ICATION 
HAS IMPRESSION FfCM PAPERS 
E UTILIZED AND SH/TTLE FRO 
MPRESSION FROM EARLIl^ TRAFFIC 



IS THE QUESTION- 
" "■■ " iRRIER Th 

THAT IS^ 

FY. 



»TI0N IS THE 
i^Ui^yA 



3 



EXPLAIN AWAY THE MULTIPLE FILED ^L IGHT Pl'iu* ??' ,3° J^^i 

JuGHT'r^^ak'^^ri;!'^ 'P^^'' t^' res^ ?io Ja g!^ 

hIrtI^ M d!S 2 f \'^ \T^A^u''^.^\'vB 

EXPLANATIONHiBPRESENTED ^qJJ|^^^^7 THI€ IS A POS< 
mj^^^Ji^^^OI><^ HAVE TO TRY iun 



NJRUN^I^K 



21 426 



609 




? HATEMENT OF FLIGHT RECEIPTS k EXPENDITURE 




610 



WNCUSSIfiED 



2 9 ^oi/ fr 





FA-MENT AMOlJi 
COMMISSION 

TOTAL USD 



cate: 27.Nov.es 



OPcDeRING CUSTOMER - 

, K CREMT SUISSE SUCCUKSaIe OFS 

^-y,) 127.000,00 EAUX -WIVES 
" GENEVE 
USD 190.50 



126.809,00 DETAILS OF PAYMENT 

h/O LAKE RESOURCES 



. CREDIT YOilR ACCOUNT 
ALUt" 29. NOV. 8? UITH US 




PENEPICIARY 



ACCOUNT UITH PANS 



RECEIVING tANK 



Pari,3iry DecldssKied/ReleaseO oo-?U*«,8P THI S ADV 
unoer piovis;ors u( E 12356 
»y » Johnson. National Secun^ Council 



NOT &E SICNt: 





Sr7^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 







DVe 



V--Ar- r r 



611 



PAID 10 



UNCLASSIFIED 



^ '^ aJc-^ P^ 



TrTTvrn nOH Zjo L^KC eesoueces 

DfkiE >:"';^^^>.wo^ 8 5 





DNUrasSIFIED „„,^.^ 



CHEQ: ( AM3HT 



PSBTABED BV ^'* 



612 



(JNCLASSIFIEDI 

MDIORANDUM 3/li85 fc*^^ 



SO 



/^^(/ <f 



R«.:TLV/THJl fit 




Dliplay of coopany 



•sslon ch.c I was .alnly ine.r.st.d m th. »on«y. 

'Af?;r the first flight wh.n I had goncJ^M^^ .nH c k 
caiied at on Tuesday in ny of f iceBBi^^^^9flW^< .w 
-oney had not arrived y.c^s pro."!" that ' . .' ^dl :.„ 
it further, wa needed our aoney a.scuss 

Si^en 'cooo'ca n'dM!!.""."!^^;^^^?"'?' P"""' ^"' ^opp. 

""■■■'° —t -"'►'^^^'^^di!cis.^il,'j!^ent'^H^"as 
very amazed that the «on^ had not co«. in vejJ nr h^; J. 
could not come beca *•■""■ ■ '* ■ ' ""^ "* 

He then promised to 



as soon at possible 
Alltogether they aus 
dealing with a aerc 
a job to Bake soncy. 




i^ye^n 
had to go back^l|^co"save 225 OOOUSD' 
re the aoney would be transferred 

had the iapression that they were 
inline and that we were Just doing 



The saa. i»pr«jlon mgde in TLV in discussion with Schwi«m„r 
' ^ IHHHP'^^KV '^* "^" points were how to get 
^^C%f^^ '"""g" ^'■ySa^|'"fflfff " handle things the coam.rci.l 
^^ ^ ■ ' ■ Wr° iBBg '"^'«"r that he would only fly after 

anal ok bTTTTT? .flfSiStould coae after I had agreed with 
Se hwiaaer about the a oney and th« ca.h which he had to get. 

,?^mm^^^^H"* ^"^ excuses of having a urgent relief 

fllght7I«TOgg7Trprobl.M and after the airplanes returned 

■,CA^P. ! "^P* •^•'■yt>>i'»I vent back to noraal and no questions 

PaniaiivOeoa-.5ilied/Reit3seOonj23^*!!«» were askad. M-'^-ions 

undei D'Ovisions Ol E 12356 The craws did nnr r>1b m .. v 

byK Jonnson National SecumyCouncl i"Vv "r TV. I ^^ ^°"* *^''"' '"^ company matters 

tL?'\ k J^ concerned should have ttW^te impression 

that a business was conducted in a professic 



^en UNCLASSIFIED 




^M 



/^ I !»/ "^ /- 1 yl 



>' ^/^ip-) 



613 



/\/c) J fr 




C i/Ai ^s-^ 



'- \'i> J ".> 'i> . 



614 



5 « ^< ^ rf^4 



yNCLASSIF'ED 






t^JlJL , iiiied/Released on_it5£j 
1. ofovisions ol E 12356 
lohnson. National Security Council 




3/:.3^ ^As 



-vi) 




-^JMCLASSiflED 



615 



Z/ Mc>\y ?^ 






efJ/BD /^ 



7o/4L^ 



^^8 



V 



i\i 2o 6 



r^. 



616 



SumA«ry of 

Novvmbvr 1986 



MNPLASSIFIE 



'?G'^OV £^ 





W 1 I 

discusttd wi 
validity of th 
and the wor k ings 



and financf officer HfmBflj 

• tda>4 night_(2 Otc. 1986) 

managtr iflMIPmBl^' ^HMF 

rning ( 3' Dtc. ^^^86) and 

»Ptcial f 1 ightt ^^^^^^ tht 

and summar 1 tt , rtvtnu* sources/ 



ffortic4jr 



3. 




Th 


xor t I 


ng 


ai 


-solve 


d/e 


IP 


recording 


c 


pr emi um 


comp 


flight 


recor 


vn coll 


us I on 



flight log s_< il^.-aO fo 

■f o'r^unusual destination 
are complied from de 
ite~d i>'i the ftiaht ^e ngineer 
H^vfTad on 1 >4 ^^H^^^V^^ light 
nmaries^ Th-e flight logs 
i will the missing monthl<^ 
iruard the detailed flight 
k) and the two missin 
• n Jiaonday (8 Dec. 1986) 

OACoUftKna ^fftct. 

e review of tht flight rec^Sd' 
nd we fo uojt no except 

by ^Hm^/^ICt ^ '^ * 
ertain flights is unlike 
ensation (overtime/ bonus^' 
ds. A large number of perso 
to pull it off in any event. 



sequent 
s. Mo 

tai led 



1 O^S/ 



thefH^B 

lal dates< 

nthly flight 

flight 1 ogs 

roved by the 




and most of 
sent -in from 
s (9,11/86). 

the special 
summaries to 
n pic k 1 1 up 



ate accurate 
were not 
ity of not 
e air crew 
sed on these 
d have to be 







I i I 
its 



4. A review of the revenue ^^^^^^■."^^ cf* 
accounts was also made to collaborate the flight rT 
We found no exceptions. Airline records were eiamin 
deteriT.ine the major sourc es of cash. Host large dtp 
were f r om^^^|^^HH^^^m^|^^^and the be 

to specific c 1 i^^^^^w^^^^^^^^wn air cargo or broker 
companies with the possible exception of Lake Resour 
) . 



f**^ 



uled, 
tame 
her c 



In attempt to^^^^ntify the type of cargo 
we were told by.^H||||||K that cargo manifest* ar 
d by^l^m^Hnor is this procedure commonly d 
ommercial cargo haulers. Apparently the proct^ 



-.3 



C 



UNCLASSIFIED 




617 



»,,^, r» a liPUt»». 
4T90 carrier l» 



If tvidtnce i» founo to provt mit -r.t 
rt»Pon»iblt, in«ur«nct -ill Covtr__tht 



UNCLASSIFIED 

. »K.* «^h>r* w«rt two flight* into Tthtran. Ont 

6. NO*' *^** ''^; ;;;^ w„ ,tr.cti«* co«-..rci*i 

night in yil*J^jSL^ll,r/i*tor..tor.^^^ «nd on. 




rri«d th» 
nit ions. 



t9U IPfMH t ' 



AViAJy /tiANf^€t. 



i»htd cargo broker* and airlint 
of those sptcial flights listed 






C 00 

.tination and not because o 



f the type of cargo. 
..o.ers fre.o.ntl. blanket tele. car goh^rs asking for 




Oil 



^^^^^ 



5 \ 



618 



UNCLASSIFIED 



/l^'O A.)cJ~-^^ 




oarijally Deciassilied/Reieasefl wSflJ^fpQ^ 
unoef pfuv;siORa of E 12356 
by K Johnson. Nalional Security Council 



C//A/ D5<4Cp 



L\-o .7:0. /Ml^-^ 



0-^cj 



619 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 




^'iilS-lCb 



pgoPRieTA^r P/ uo T 




DEPOSITION OF 



Thursday, June 25, 1987 

House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with 
Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:07 
p.m., in Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, with 
Pat Carome (House Staff Counsel) presiding. 

On behalf of the House Select Committee: Pat Carome 
and Bruce Fein. 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Tim 
Woodcock. 

On behalf of the Witness: David Pearline, Attorney, 



P^MfaStsr OKlbssifierf/Release,' iin^3JM^i§2 

wSm fawis:an» of LO. 12:56 

IfflHIK National Security Counfll 



¥05-3, 



36' 



mmk 




'i J 



620 



iieeiissiFiEST 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Whereupon, 





having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, 
and was examined and testified as follows: 

EXAIIINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Could you please state your name for the record. 

How do you spell your name? 

First name l^^^^^^^^l Do I have to spel] 

No. How do you spell your s econd na me? 

Second naune isf 

Just for the 

Patrick Carome. I am a lawyer with the House Select 
Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 
Iran. This is a committee of the United States House of 
Representatives, Congress, which has been set up to look 
into United States arms transactions with the country of 
Iran, deliveries of arms, and also matters relating to 
diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan contras. 

Our committee has been set up, pursuant to a 
resolution and rules, and just for the record, I've given 
you copies of each of those today. 

I'm going to be asking you a number of questions 
relating to -- primarily to a shipment of cargo into Iran 




621 



tEmsiU' 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



back in November 1985. 

As I said before we went on the record, this is a 
deposition. You're testifying under oath; I'm going to be 
asking you a series of questions. If you don't understand 
something that I'm asking you, please tell me that, let me 
know. I understand that English is not your first language 
and I want you to be able to understand the question so you 
can understand and give me an answer. 

If we could begin -- if you could state, please, 
your current address and where you live. 

Q ^Andthatj^l^^^H^^Hright? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^Hl^o you need the suite and everything? 

Q Yes, please. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

Q Could you spell that for the Reporter or perhaps 
he can get that off the record. 

MR. CAROME: Why don't we go off the record for 
a second. 

THE WITNESS: Yeah, maybe I can give it written 
because I have to see it written. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. CAROME: We're back on the record. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Of what country are you a citizen? 



MKHipTTOGIWT 



622 



WKHSSfffiF 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A 



Q And how old are you? 
A 

Q And could you please state how you are employed, 
I am Captain^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HHow 
employed. 

Q No, you are currently a captain, a pilot for 
is that right? 




623 



^ 



V 



Ck<r:^S O fNvovxt^ | 



"b^ 



O 



^aJ/bV /J 



To /^L^ 



624 




Q Now I'd like to turn your attention to specific 
flight activity ofJ 

In 1985, the entire year 1985, how many times 
did a^^^^^^Bp plane fly into Iran? 

A Twice, I did it myself. I was flying. 

Q You were the pilot of both flights; is that 
right? 

A Yes. 

Q And when you say you're the pilot, you are the 
person in charge of the plane; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And what is the normal crew on a 707? 

A The normal crew is one captain, one co-pilot, 
a flight engineer and a loadmaster, and also a mechanic. 
We used to carry a mechanic, not all the time, but because 



iums»a, 



625 



bm^ffii^ 



12 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



when we flew^^^^^^^^B they had mechanics based at the 
stations, but when we went to different stations, then we 
took a mechanic along. 

Q You mentioned flying fo^^^^^^^Hcould you 
briefly describe what that was 

A Yes. Ninety-five -- or maybe even more than 
95 percent, we flew 




Q Returning to the flights into Iran, if we could 
talk first about the flight that feppened first in time, can 



mmm. 



626 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

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25 



nssiffifi' 



13 



you tell me when that was? 

A I tell you, because I was flying every day, more 
or less every day, I was the one who flew more than the 
others, and I can't remember the date, but I got it from 
the newspaper, when I flew there, but because this is 
already some time back, but the first one was, as I learned, 
in August of '85. You probably know — 

Q I understand^^^^^^^Hdid make a flight into 
Iran -- 

A , Yes. 

Q -- in August of '85. 

A Yes. 

Q Can you tell me, first of all, who was on that 
flight? 

A Well, it was up to me to select people when we 
had some^^^^^^^^Hf lights, and it was myself and the 
co-pilot -- 

Q Who was that? 

A His name i£ 

Q And wha t is his first name! 

A 

Q And he was the co-pilot? 

A The co-pilot. But he is not withl 




anymore. He's out. And the flight engineer was 



^ 




imPUSSlElEIL 



627 



TUffiLRSaRffl 



14 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

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7 

8 

9 

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11 

12 

13 

14 

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22 

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Q Do you know his name? 

A I hope this is correct now. I don't know if it 
•- I really don't know, really, if it 




name was 



Q What were the two names that you're thinking of? 

A First,! 

Q D o you know h is first name? 

Q And was he^^^^^^^J^Hemployee? 

A Yes. 

Q And he might have been one -- he might have 

been the flight engineer; you're not sure, is that right? 

A That's right. 

Q And the other person it might have been was 
who? 

A And the other person — he' stt^^^^^^^Hhis name 



Q And what was his first name? 

A ^^^^^^^^B^^HI '^'^ really 

I don't remember — 

Q That's all right. 

A The second one, I know who it was and the first 
one I really — 

Q Who else was on that first August flight into 
Iran? 





yj} 



628 



»Kiffi*' 



15 



A Then we had the loadmaster -- I think it was the 
loadmaster . I'm not sure whether we had loadmaster on 
board this time. I don't know, but we had the mechanic 
and the mechanic's najne was -- well the first na 




A ^^■^^^^^■^^H yes. 
Q And what was the cargo on the flight? 
A It was powder, not black powder, I think we don't 
have that anymore, but, you know, powder. 
Q Explosive powder? 
A Explosive powder, yeah. 
Q And was all the cargo for that flight picked up 



A Yes. 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



629 





16 



1 Q And was there any other material that was 

2 shipped on that flight, that you know of? 

3 A Some detonators we had. 

4 Q And could you describe how this material was 

5 packed? 

6 A I think in boxes and I think I saw barrels, but 

7 I'm not sure because it was plastic on top, you know. I saw 

8 them offload the stuff, but it wasn't very much, really, 

9 only 17 tons, about 35,000 pounds. It was nothing, really. 

10 Not very much. 

11 When I flew this, I got the cargo manifest and it 

12 was mentioned, you know. 

13 Q And that's how you knew what the cargo was? 

14 A Yes, not by seeing it. Not by seeing it. On some 

15 pallets, you know, and then there's plastic on top. Not 

16 very much you can see. 

17 Q And do you know where that material had come from? 
'fg A As far as I remembei 

19 Q And — 

20 A At least a part, not everything, not the whole 

21 shipment, but I think some^^^^^^Hnentioned. 

22 Q Was this material taken off of trucks? 

23 A Yes, trucks. 

24 Q And do you know where the trucks had come from? 

25 A They were not;^^^^^^|I think they were from 




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Q The trucks? 

A I'm not sure now. I really have forgotten or I 
didn't look because I had more to do, really. 

Q Did that flight go directl;y^^^^^^^^|to Iran, 
or was there a stopping point? 

A No, we landed' 

Q And what did yoi 

A For fueling because 
we couldn't take the amount of fuel we needed, so we had to 
land for refueling. 

Q Did you pick up anything else| 

A No. 

Q And then you flew on to Iran; is that right? 

A (Witness nodding in affirmative.) 

Q You have to say yes for the record. 

A Oh, I'm sorry. Yes.^^^^^^Hdirect to Iran, 




too far, you know, 



Tehran. 

Q Was that the only time that you've ever flown 
a plane to Iran, other than -- was that the first time 
you'd ever flown — 

A That was the first time, never been there before. 

Q And when you arrived in Tehran, that occasion, 
who did you deal with in Tehran? 

A Well, we were a little bit late, already, and they 



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expected us, and they guided us to a quiet place opposite 
from the arrival hall, or whatever you call it, from the 
airport, and they started right away off-loading and there 
was one guy -- I think he was the leader — but they look, 
all the same, you know. 

Q Were these military people? 
A No, no military people. 
Q They were civilians? 
A Civilians, yeah. 

Q Dressed as civilians. As far as you could tell, 
they were civilians? 

A Yes, yes, yes. 

And one was the boss of them, I think, and he said 
"Why didn't you bring more?" I said, "I don't know. I'm only 
the pilot." Well, he said, "We expected more." 

When they started off-loading, I said, "Be 
careful with them," because they were just throwing it 
out, "Be careful," and the guy said, "It is our problem." 

We went in the hotel, then, and we left, I think, 
one or two days later because we had technical problems 
there. 

Q Did — 

A I think it was the first time. 
Q Did the loading^^^^^Htake place in what's 
known as a "hot cargo" areal 




632 



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23 



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mmssm 



19 



1 A Yes. 

2 Q What is a "hot cargo" area? 

3 A Well, they don't have -- we don't have -- they 

4 have not such places in civil airports. ^ They only have 

5 them in military airports, but I think a "hot spot" is away 

6 from the buildings. 

7 Q And why are there "hot cargo" areas? What is 

8 their purpose? 

9 A No, it is not in civil airports; we don't have 
10 these on civil airports, only on military airports. 
•J1 Q And what is the purpose of having a "hot cargo" 
•J2 area at a military airport? 

■J3 A If you have to load sensitive explosive stuff. 
•^4 Q That's so that if there is an explosion or an 

■)5 accident of some sort, it won't hurt other people or 

1g property; is that right? 

A Yes. 
^Q Q And^^^^^^H, was there a "hot cargo" areal 

.|g A I tell you, they don't have like hot spots there 

2Q from the Air Force, but it was — the cargo area is always 

21 away from the civilian side; it is separated because they 



are driving big high-loaders and all this, and it was not 
really a hot spot. It was away from the civilian -- from 



24 the passenger side. 



And the airport is small, really small. It was 



;he airport is small, rea 

IINI^I AQQIPIPn 



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still close to this sort of thing. 

Q All right. If we could turn our attention now 
to the next occasion -- 

A Yes. 

Q -- on which^^^^^^^^Hf lew a plane to Iran in 
1985, I want to go through this in more detail than we did 
on the first flight. 

A Yes. 

Q Could you just start with the beginning of the 
story when you first found out that there might be a need 
to go to Iran and tell us what happened? 

A Yes. 

At that time -- I have to start a little bit 
earlier — we had flights for — I don't know exactly 
what we did ~ ~^^^^^^^^^9i^^^^9 Maybe it was also for an 

well, we had such others. We had a couple 




[I recall, and 
I flew on that date -- I left^^^^i" the morning — 

Q What date -- what time are you talking about 
now? 

A It must be the 24th or 27th. You say it was the 
25th when we went there. I cannot tell you the date. If 
you can -- 

Q Can you remember the day of the week? I gather 



nifP 



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that — 

A Not really. 

Q The 22nd was a Friday. The 23rd was a Saturday. 
The 24th was a Sunday. 

A When did I land in Tel Aviv? 

Q I believe -- 

A I don't know, really. Can you show me the log 
book and -- it should be in the log book. 

The day before I went to Tel Aviv. 

Q It would have been Saturday, the 23rd, I believe, 
is when you would have landed in Tel Aviv, according to the 
records that we've looked at. 

A Okay, then it must have been the day before. 

Q Friday. 

A Must be Friday, but -- I am not sure now, but 
according to this -- it was the day before I left -- I went 
to Tel Aviv. I had a flight 

Q Where were you at the time on Friday? 

A Where? In the airplane. 

Q And where was the airplane? 
I see, you were flyingl 




A Yes. 

Q All right, I'm sorry. 

A And it's a seven-, eight-hour flight. I think it 



iiiiifiiMe.. 



635 



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mmm 



22 



was over eight hours flying time, you know, and -- well, we 
landed -- no, didn't go^^^^^lK we landed in| 




Q And where is that? 
A The same country. 

Q 

A Yeah. And we had furniture for a hotel on board, 
furniture , and from there ,^^^^^^^^^^^^B we 
^Q f ly^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ndit 
schedule. They did it, I think, maybe twice a week, the 

schedule. 

J were suppos 




When I was on the ground, I received a call over 
HF, HF radio, and -- 

Q Who was calling? 

I was^^^^^^H our 

But I can't remember to whom I talked. I don't 
r was it somebody else? I really 



know. Was i 

don't know. I can't remember anymore 



All right. 



IINPIM^^IFIED 



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A And they told me to change schedule -- not schedule 
to change route and to proceed^^^^^^f^^f to, I think -- I 
don't know --^^^^^^^^| I think they said proceed 
that call from the air when you're airborne. 

Q Just so it's clear, which^^^^^^^H7 7 were 
you flying at the time? 

A It was the one which belonged tc 
the one with the registration 

Q And what was that plane's registration number? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^^H The other one was registered 

'And the other one was flying somewhere else; I 
thmk^^^^^^^^^^B Yeah, they told me to proceed onj 

Q Did they tell you what it was you were to do? 

A No, I didn't ask, really, because they wouldn't 
have told me, because everyone can listen to the HF , you 
know, it's like general radio, and they -- but they just 
said, "Call us again from the air, when you're in the air." 
Later on, I called and -- 

Q Do you know about what time of day this was? 

A Yes. I think it was in the afternoon, about 
what time are you using? European time or -- 

Q Say we used Greenwich time or Zulu time. 

A I would say about 1500 in the afternoon. Then I 
called again from the air — I'm airborne now, and they told 




IIMPI ftCOIDTJ) 



637 



18 
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24 
25 



UMU^SStBil' 



1 me that I have to go to Tel Aviv. And then I asked, "Do we 

2 have traffic rights," because it's difficult area and they 

3 said, "Yes, everything's arranged; you have traffic rights, 

4 You can land there." 

5 I think they even passed me a number, a permit 

6 number, but I don't know, really. At least they didn't 

7 ask when we arrived -- normally when you are on approach, 

8 they ask, "Do you have permit to land or permission to 

9 land or permit number?" I can't remember really, but I think 
10 they didn't' ask; they just let us land there. 
■J1 It was dark -- when I landed, it was dark 

12 already. From there, I think I have to fly about 5 hours, 

13 5-1/2 hours to Tel Aviv. 

14 Q And do you know about what time it would have 

15 been, say, let's say local time, Tel Aviv, when you 
■)g arrived? 
17 A There it was dark. It was probably 9 or 10 



local time there. 
Q P.m. 
A P.m. 



21 Q And what airport did you land afi 



A There's only one Tel Aviv, as far as I know. 



23 Q Is that Ben Gurrion Airport? 



A Yeah, right, that one. 

Q And what did you do when you landed, if you could 



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just keep telling the story. 

A Well, I went and saw the other airplane, the other 
one we had -- 

The other^^^^^^JVplane? 

A Yes, was standing there, and we were parked 
next to them and -- 

Q Just show -- I guess at this point, who were 
the people who were on the plane that you were flying? 

A Sir? 

Q Who was on the plane that you were flying? 

A I have to think -- the co-pilot -- we changed 
co-pilots. Yes. There was myself. The co-pilot was 

He was the 
co-pilot. And the flight engineer — I think it was a 
change -- yeah, the flight engineer was| 
I mentioned the name already earlier. 

Q What is it again? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H '^he flight engineer 
fand then we had a loadmaster — 

Q And who was that? 

A Name is — well, there are many loadmasters. We 
don't -- didn't have only one. I don't want to tell you 
something which is wrong, but I'm not sur e. I think it was 
He is 

Q First name? 





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A ^^^B^H I think he was on my plane because there 
are so many loadmasters that I have seen. They may have 
come with the other one, the other airplane, and we -- I'm 
not really sure, but I think he was on this flight. 

And wF 'ad a mechanic, as I learned -- I didn't know 
that he was on my flight and it wa 




employees or were 



Q All these people arej 
at the time; is that right? 

A Oh, yes. 

Q And who was the pilot of the other plane that 
was on the ground? 

A The other one 
It was 




And his first name was? 
I really don't know. 
All right. 



Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q So that when you landed in Tel .^viv, the other -- 
the United States-registered^^^^^^^Hplane was already on 
the ground -- 

A Already on the ground, yes. 

Q -- in Tel Aviv? If you could just pick up the 
story there again and tell me what was going on and then 



what happened. 



m^icLASsm. 



640 



mmms 



27 



1 A Okay. And it was very difficult — I think nobody - 

2 we came there unexpected, or maybe it's always like this. It 

3 was ]ust towers there. There was people around, but nobody 
^ came and tell us anything. The other crew came over to talk 

5 to me and I asked them what our -- what the reason is why 

6 we are here, and when he told me that if we have to fly 

7 ^^^^^^^^^Hover to -- or we have to pick up some cargo from 

8 there, and, yeah, that's all. He didn't know very much. 

9 He ]ust told me that we have to pick up some cargo. 

10 Q Did he say where you were to fly? 

11 A No. I think he didn't know. I think nobody knew, 

12 really. And yes. And I spent some time on the ground. I saw 

13 some containers on the ground. 

14 Q Where on the airport were the planes parked? 

15 A They have their own -- the junkies, you know, 

16 what do you call it -- you know, where they leave airplanes 

17 which are not used anymore, which they are not using 

18 any more, such airplanes. It's not the military side. Have 

19 you ever been there? 

20 Q No , I have not . 

21 A It's a very, very big airport and there is 

22 construction everywhere. We parked — it was almost 

23 opposite from -- there's a runway between -- opposite the 

24 passenger terminal. 

25 Q Was it a remote part of the airport? Distant 



641 



IWBa^RItT 



28 



from other parts of the airport? 

A Not -- I would say maybe a mile distance away 
from the terminal. And it's a very narrow place, actually, 
very narrow to taxi -- difficult to taxi there. And I saw 
some old 707s standing there. 

And -- well, we opened the cargo door and then 
somebody told me, "Okay, we're going to" — I really 
don't know if they started right away or the next morning 
or the next day. I really can't remember that. I think that 
they starteB the next morning loading. 

Q ■ Who's "they"? Who are you talking about? 

A Well, I saw a lot of people there and there 
were -- not wearing uniforms, but I could see that they 
were not loaders. You know, a loader loads different. 

Q Are these Israeli people that you're speaking 
about? 

A Only Israeli people. 

Q And you said they weren't wearing uniforms. Did 
you understand whether or not they were military personnel? 

A No, but I think not ordinary loaders. They were 
not ordinary loaders. 

Q They were not ordinary loaders? 

A No. I don't know because I never — I didn't 
talk to them and when I talked to somebody, they did not 
answer. You know, they did not answer, really, the question. 



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but, yeah, and I think they start loading, but they didn't 
know how to do it, really. 

Q Whose job is it to load a plane? Is it the 
people on the ground or the people on your plane? 

A No, it is the people on the ground because they 
have to handle the high-loader and the forklift, and you 
know, they normally know how to do it because sometimes you 
have offsize pieces and it is very difficult to load because 
the loading door is not very big and so it needs some 
technique tb load, really. 

Q And these people didn't seem to know what they 
were doing; is that right? 

A Why at least they were slow and didn't — and 
I said, "It's very slow here loading," because I was supposed 
to leave the same day. That was what my schedule was, to 
leave the same night or — 

Q Who told you that? 

A Z think somebody there. I think somebody there. 

Q One of these Israelis? 

A Yes, one of the Israelis. One person who came 
to me and talked to ne. 

Q Who's that? 

A I don't know. They were very concerned about 
this and the did not say what, really. They just said, 
"Okay, we'll load the airplane now and it will take two 



lUmSSIElEIL 



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hours, about two hours." They needed, I think, at least 
a day, and "You and your crew better go in the hotel and 
wait until we finish and then we call you and that's it." 

Q Was anyone left with the plane when it was 
being — 

A We left the loadmaster there. And I think we 
left the mechanic there, but 1 cem't remember it. 

Q Do you remember who those people were? 

A We left there? 

Q ' Yes. Who — 

Yeah, we leftJ^f^^Hl told you. We left him 
and, of course, was still the loadmaster from the other 
airplane. 

And who was that? 

And it wasi 
Let me think. 

Q And what was his first name? 

A ^^^^Hhc's a strong guy. 

Q You spent that night in a hotel — 

A They picked us up and they — we went to the 
hotel and then I met the other crew and we were^ talking and — 
I didn't telephone to the of fic^^^^^^^^^The other 
guy did it. He called — I think he spoke wil 






CLASSIEIEIL 



644 



23 
24 



diKemir 



31 



1 Q What time was that? 

2 A Z think it was about midnight, local time there, 

3 because everything was closed. The bar was closed. 

4 Q Midnight, Friday night? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q And what happened in that conversation? 

7 A Yeah, well, Z don't Icnow really what the other 

8 person said — Z think it was^^^^^^Hhe talked to ~ at 

9 least he got details, and then afterwards, he told me they 

10 have decided that^^^^^^^^^|airplane is not going to 

11 fly. 

12 Q When you say^^^^^^^Aairplane , " you're referring 

13 to the United States-registered plane. 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q Zs that right? 

18 A Yes, that's right. And — and — 
17 Q Nhat were the details that he got? 

^g A Z thiitk there were no details. He just told me 

19 they cannot use this airplane because of the regisration. Or 

20 it was probably a decision from^^^^^^^^^H Z don't know 

21 what inforaation he had. 

22 Q This is before any loading has taken place in 




the planes) is that right, that this conversation's happening? 
A Yes — well, actually, they talked — they loaded 



25 the airplane during the night, but it was in progress, the 

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UKClAWHkT 



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1 loading, but the next day when I went there to the airport, 

2 there was nothing really. Very litt le. But they didn't 

3 load th^jHHone, the^|^|one, the 

4 airplane. 
Q There was never any loading of that plane? 
A No. Maybe they started — I don't know because 

I wasn't tnere at night, you know. Maybe they had started 
and off-loaded again. It is possible. I don't know. 

Q But it was around midnight that word came that 
thJBregistered aircraft wouldn't go on the flight; is 
that correct? 

A Yes, I think it was midnight, yes, right. 

Q What were you told at that point about the nature 

of the cargo? 

A They didn't mention anything. 

Q Had you seen the cargo when you arrived? 

A Yes, I had seen it. It was containers, big. 

Q What were the dimensions, roughly, of the 

containers? 

A Well, I'll show you -- this, what do you call 

it, about two-thirds — ^ . .-—*••' 

Q The witness is referring to a large desk. If 
you could speak in terms of feet, I think it might be 

clearer. 

A First, I have to say it in meters. 



UltCLAmk 



646 



mrn^iffliT 



33 



1 Q Or meters if that's — either way. 

2 A Seven meters long and one meter wide. It was, 

3 I think, metal. I didn't touch it and I didn't go close 

4 to it really. It was green; it was green or gray and such 

5 boxes. 

6 Q They were metal boxes? 

7 A Maybe it was plastic. I really don't know that. 

8 Q Were there markings on the boxes? 

9 A No. I haven't seen any. 

10 Q And what did you understand to be in the boxes? 

11 A If — I tell you, I cannot remember, really. Maybe 

12 1 looked at them and maybe I saw something, but I really 

13 can't remember what I saw because I wasn't very much 

14 interested in this. What I thought they were — well, I 

15 don't have to think. 

1g Q At the time, what did you think was in the 

17 boxes? 

^g A I really didn't know. I didn't say anything. I 

^g don't like to answer this thing. 

2Q Q Well, you have to answer the question and you 

~ have to tell us the truth. What was in the boxes? What 

22 <3icl you at that time understand was in the boxes? 

23 A Well, that's what I thought, but nobody told me. 

24 Q And what did you think? 

ne A I think they were missiles. 

mm <iCQICIPn 



647 



llHSft^BHfc' 



34-35 



1 Q And what made you think that? 

2 A Because of the size, but I never seen anything 

3 and didn't look through -- I didn't look inside because 

4 it was not possible, and also, I had a lot of work to do 

5 there and there were people talking to me and — the loadmaster 

6 maybe he was closer to it, and he would probably know more, 

7 but — that's it. 

8 Q All right. 

9 When did — did you reach the conclusion that 

10 there were missiles that first night that you landed in 

11 Tel Aviv? 

12 A No, the next day because it was really dark 

13 there and 1 just saw, you know, big, how you call it, a lot 

14 of cargo there, or boxes. I think they were covered with 

15 some plastic, so it was just a lot of cargo there and where 

16 the airplane was parked -- really, I couldn't see what it 

17 was. 

18 Q How many items were stacked up there? 

19 A Oh, a lot — of those boxes, maybe 20, 30, 40, 

20 1 can't remember, you know. And I don't know if they are 

21 supposed to go in our airplane. We wouldn't have had the 

22 room to carry all this, anyway. But they were there, 

23 standing there. 

24 Q Let's go back to the midnight phone call. What 

25 information did the other pilot learn — 



lltiaiLS^iEIL, 



648 



25 



lIKSII^SHSilT 



36 



1 A Yes, we were in the hotel, in the lobby, and we 

2 had a couple of beers and we were talking who was going to 

3 fly because they canceled one, or the flight for one 

4 airplane, and we were talking who's going. At that time, 

5 I knew that we were going to Tel Aviv, to Tehran. 

6 Q Did you know it was going to be Tehran right 

7 away? 

8 A I was told that. 

9 Q Was there ever any mention of Tabriz being the 

10 location where you're going to fly to? 

11 A No. Tabriz? 

12 Q Tabriz. It's another city around — 

13 A Oh, yeah, I know it. No. It was up to us, 

14 really. Really, they mentioned this, but only because -- 

15 no, no, that was the first time. No, that's wrong. The first 
1g flight because of fuel. Maybe it was the second flight; 

17 I can't remember, but this was only because of fuel, because 

•jg of the — you know -- 

19 Q Tabriz might be a refueling place; is that right? 

20 A A refueling place, just to refuel this thing, I 

21 think. The only reason was that. Isn't that north of Iran, 

22 Tabriz, or the south of Tehran? 

50 Q It's northeast. I believe it would be — 



24 A Well, maybe if we were talking about this for some 



reason, but I have never been told to go there. It was Tehran. 



rp 




649 



ONDtlffilFlEP' 



37 



I heard of Tabriz, but no one was talking about this. 

Q If you could just continue with your story of 
your -- what was going on. 

A Okay. Well, I said to him, "Well, I'm going to 
fly," and we changed the co-pilot and — 

Q Who was the co-pilot changed to? 
A I took the other co-pilot from the other 
airplane. " " 

And what was his name? 

Because he is — well, I can talk about 
this later, and I took him and the flight engineer was 

Und the mechanic was^^^^Hand the loadmaster — 





I an in doubt — was it^^^^flor was it — yeah, it must 
have been! 

Well — 

Q And you made this decision — 

A Yes? 

Q Friday night at the hotel; is that right? 

A Yeah, and the other crew — I think they left 
the next day, but I don't know what time they left, but they 
left — 

Q After dawn? 

A After — 

Q After dawn? 

A The next day, but the date, really, I'm not so 

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1 sure about. When they say it was Friday, it was then 

2 Saturday, then. 

3 MR. CAROME: Let's go off the record for a 

4 second . 

5 (Discussion off the record.) 

g MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 

7 BY MR. CAROME: 

3 Q You spent one night at Tel Aviv; is that right? 
g A Yes, from midnight — we left the next day, which 
^g was Sunday, again, in the evening. 

Q That's right. 

A Yeah, we arrived in the evening and we left again 



^3 in the evening. He spent one day in Tel Aviv, yes. 



Q All right. 

And what happened during that day in Tel Aviv? 

A The next — well, I'm not sure about the times 
now, really. Has it 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock or so. I called 
think Z called the next morning^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and — 
but Z can't say did I call him ii^^^^^^^^Hor did I call 
hii^^^^^^^^P he was^^^^^^^^H at 
time. Z called bin at home and asked for more details, and 
Z think he didn't have very much more, but he said to me, 
"Listen, you're supposed to catch — to get soaw money «" 
which was the money for the flight, you know. Hhen we flew 
for somebody, we were asking for, Z don't know, let's say 



lUmSSlFlEHn 



651 



imSSiisrT 



39 



$1,300, depending on the deal, the customer paying the fuel 
or not, you know, like you rent -- when you rent a car. 

He said, "You' re^upposed to get," I think he 
said 517,000. It was a paydown. You say paydown, no? 

Q Downpayment . 

A Downpayment. Downpayment, and — yeah, I remember, 
it was Sunday. I said, "Okay," and he said, "You're supposed 
to get it from somebody there." He couldn't tell me a name 
or what, but somebody will approach you and they will pay 
you then. ' 

Q Did he give you the name Al Schwimmer? 

A No, I gave him the name, and that comes later 
on. 

Q All right. 

A And we talke d a little bit and he said, "Don't go 
without money," he said, no. If they don't give you money, 
because it was the deal that they pay — let's say — I 
don't know what, maybe $1,500 or $2,000 per hour that they 
have to make downpayment. I said, "Okay, and keep me advised," 
because he didn't know much really, you know. 

"Keep me advised if you hear something or if somebody 
comes to you," and all this. And then — 

Q Where did you call him from? 

A From the hotel in Tel Aviv. And I think it was 
midday — yeah, midday, when some Israelis came to my hotel 



immssMiL. 



652 



u 



iiTjmnj" 




40 



1 room — ther« w«r« two, but they — 

2 Q Who were they? 

3 A They didn't say their names. But — tough guys. 

4 Q Here they military people? 

5 A I think, but I don't Icnow. They didn't say 

6 where they come from so Z — 

7 Q Were they dressed in military uniform? 

8 A No, no. In normal clothes. And they said, "Okay, 

9 we have to talk about the routing you want to take" — 

10 'Do you want me to stop there? 

11 Q' No, just keep going. 

12 A And I said, "Yes, which way do you want me to go?" 

13 And they came up with some stupid ideas and because I have 

14 done it before and know how — even if you don't fly through 

15 ^^^^H it is still dangerous to — 

16 Q Nhat were their ideas? 

17 A They wanted to give mm • — how you call this — 
16 if you have somebody torment you — take then out and just — 

19 the English %#ord — they want to follow me with — not to 

20 follow me, but give ■• two fighters, give me — 

21 Q Escort? 

22 A Escort, escort, give me escort just to get through 

23 ^^^^^^^^^^Htheir territory. 

24 Q Israeli territory. 

25 A Yes, until the exit, you know. But I said you 

iUII!li^<UB£lL_ 



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1 

2 
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wateliSSff^ 



make a lot of noise then 




And then he said, "I think you'd better gc 
route." I said, "Okay." What we also discussed^ 
Tas — yeah, in the beginning of it, okay, take! 
route, but you have to — I had to tell him the minutes, 
how long it would take from Tel Aviv to get to this point, 
a certain point, you know, where they have probably defense 
devices to make sure that they don't shoot us because it 
— if I had a map, I could show you. 



MR. CAROME: Let's go off the record for a 



654 



25 



mssm 



42 



1 moment . 

2 (Discussion off the record.) 

3 MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 

4 BY MR. CAROME: 

5 Q He were just talking about the question about 

6 notifying the Israelis how long it would take to get to a 

7 certain point. I understand from what you've just shown 

8 us on the map that that was a point in^^^^^^^Israel where 

9 there are some sort of air defense batteries and the point 

10 was to tell them — 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q — tell them that so that the air defense 

13 batteries — 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q — wouldn't shoot you down. Is that right? 
1g A Yes. Right, yes. 

^j Q Okay, if you could go on with your story. 

fg A And — well, they changed our minds really 

19 quickly, always, and the guy who was in my room — there 

20 were two, one was, I think, just a driver — the other one 
2} was the important person there. He was — 

22 Q Did you ever learn that person's name? 

23 A No . 

24 Q Was that Al Schwimmer? 



No, no. No, no. 



IiMfl^[£irji_ 



655 



25 



\lH9ft^B8fe' 



43 



1 Q That was someone other than Al Schwiiwner? 

2 A I think it was from government or — I don't 

3 know . 

4 Q You thought he was a government official? 

5 A Maybe he was Air Force guy; I don't know really, 

6 because he wanted to know this, you know. Anyway, he was 

7 always on the telephone, always calling, but of course, they 

8 talked their own language, and he was a nervous guy, and 

9 he changed always his mind, you know, and then he said 

10 suddenly, "Why don't you come with us to our place," and 

11 I said, "No, I'm not leaving the hotel because I expect a 

12 call from^^^^^^H" which was not true, but — because 

13 he asked for the money and — he didn't come with the 

14 money and I thought if I go with him, myabe I never come 

15 back, you know. 

^g Q Did you actually fear for your safety at that 

^7 time? 

<fg A Not rezblly-- f or this, but, you know, I didn't 

19 want to be in this business because^^^^^^His the manager 

20 and I wanted to leave it up to him to do the business with 

21 tnem — why I called him, and I called^^^^^^Hand said, 

22 "Look, they want me to come with them and to discuss details 

23 and to" — yeah, to give him more information. "And is it 

24 okay with you if I go with them and deal with them, the 
routings," and he said, "Go with them and give me advised 



lumsMa 



656 



msM^ 



44 



1 what they are up to . " 

2 Q Just so it's clear in my mind as you're going 

3 through this, was it^^^^^^lwho told you that the destinatioi 

4 was to be Tehran? He told you that in the first phone call 

5 that morning? 

6 A No, it was^^^^^^^^^B the other guy. He kn^w 

7 it when he was on telephone with -- I think it was! 

8 Q And that was the night before, around midnight? 

9 A Yes, around midnight, yeah. 

10 Q ' All right, keep -- 

11 A And so I went with those two to — 

12 Q Meaning the two Israelis; is that right? 

13 A The two Israelis, to a nice villa, and there were 

14 some people there and then I met Mr. Schwimmer. 

15 Q Was this his villa? Was this where he lived? 
1g A Yes, it was his place. 

17 And this — 

13 Q This is Al Schwimmer; is that right? 

19 A Right, yeah. And he said, "I'm Mr. Schwimmer," 

20 or Al Schwimmer, but I heard it from somebody else, maybe 

21 Mr. Schwimmer, and then — and he was real friendly and he 

22 said "^nd you are the one who is going to fly," and I said, 

23 "Look, my boss told me not to do any step further until I 

24 get the money, a downpayment, " but he said, "But, look," he 

25 said, "today is Sunday. I'm not^abl^ to give you money 



657 



m0^ 



45 




1 because the banks are closed." And I said, "Okay, then, I 

2 cannot decide this. You have to talk to my boss, 

3 and I leave that to him. He must decide this, no." 

4 So — 

5 Q Just so it's clear, did you go by yourself with 

6 these two Israelis — 

7 A Yes , 

8 Q — to Mr. Schwinuner ' s house — 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q 'And where was the rest of the crew at that time? 

11 A They stayed in the hotel, 

12 Q And how many people were at Mr. Schwiromer's 

13 house when you arrived there? 

14 A It was his wife and two more people. 

15 Q And do you know who they were? 
18 A No. No. 

17 Q Were they men? 

18 A Yes. 
•J9 Q And were they involved in the planning for this 

20 operation, from what you could tell? 

21 A Probably. I don't think that they were visitors. 

22 I think they were involved in this, but I'm not sure, they 

23 could also be visitors, but because when we talked, he didn't 

24 tell them to go out, so they were listening to our conversation 

25 so I think they were involved in this a little bit, because 



i< 



..llNfUSSMIl 



658 



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46 



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2 

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20 

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23 

24 

25 



they knew what we were talking about. 

It take it you were speaking to these people in 
English; is that right? ^^ 

cal led^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vand 
"I'm now in Mr. Schwinutier ' s house and he doesn't have 
money" --oh yeah, he gave me some money. He gave me some 
money — 

How much did he give you? 

A I think he gave me $2,000, but 2,000 is nothing, 
and I said, "Okay." After a while, maybe after a half hour 
or so, "Maybe I find some more." He gave me another 2,000. 
It was 4,000. I had — 

Q This was cash, right? 

A Cash, yeah, cash, but I signed for it. And 
I think I had another 3,000 from my ship funds, you know, 
so I think I had a total of $7,000. I called 

land told him there's no money here and you told 
me not to go if I don't have the money. 

He said, "Pass me to Mr. Schwimmer on this," so 
he talked a long time — 

saying ^^^^^^^^^H — 
and Mr. Schwimmer then spoke together? 

A Yes, and I only saw that his eyes, Mr. Schwimmer, 
got bigger and bigger. I think he said, "What kind of 
crooks you are?" He spoke like this. He told me afterwards, 




mmssL 



659 



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47 



1 

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9 

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24 

25 




"No, no." 

Q What you understood was that 
asking for too much money; is that right? 

A Not too much money, but for the money which was 
part of the deal, probably, you know. Look, we are an 
airline and we fly, you know, not for fun. I mean — well, 
we have to live and it was the deal probably, you know. it 
was the deal that he pay $17,000, which is not much anyway, 
and I thought it would just cover the fuel and a little 
bit, you know, landing fee and all these things, hotels, 
for example. 

heard him saying, ^^^^^^^^^^^B today 
Sunday," same thing that he told me, "today is Sunday and 
the banks are closed, and I will — tomorrow, the first thing, 
I go to bank and I will get you the money and sent it to 
— or give it to me or send it to wherever, to your 
account." 

They were talking a little bit and then he said 
to me ,^^^^^^^H^^^B wants to talk to you," to me, "again," 
sc^^^^^^H said , "Okay, I hope he is right. He promised 
me that he would pay tomorrow and" — he didn't know this 
guy.^^^^^^^Hdidn' t know this guy and — well, he said, 
"I don't know if I can believe this guy really but I think 
it's okay. 

So he gave^^me gr&eQ. ligbL.t6 proceed on. 




660 



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48 



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Q With just the $7,000? 

A Yes. And we — then we finally decided to take 



Who's "we"? 

Well, he and myself. 

Mr. Schwijraner and you? 

Mr. Schwimmer and myself. 

And why did you make that choice? 

Well, that's what he wanted. He said] 

which I would have done — 
You would have 
Prefl 
Because 
Because 



^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I said 
we need permission to overflj^^^^^^^^^^need permission. 
And he said, "You have permission," and I said, "Could you 
give me the permit number?" He said, "Just stand by," and 
he called somebody and he was talking for a long time. I 
figured — well, I don't speak the language, but I felt he 
didn't get the number. 

Q Was he speaking in Israeli on the phone? 

A Yes, Israeli. And he said, "I'm sorry, I can't 




get the number because' 



nMClASSIflEU 

'tfl^MLnilllTilMnin 



661 



«S9»' 



49 



1 Q Hebrew, I guess, is the appropriate name for 

2 the language. 

3 MR. PEARLINE: Yes, that is the appropriate 
* name. 

5 MR. WOODCOCK: Like we're speaking American. 

6 (Laughter.) 

7 THE WITNESS: And he said, "I'm sorry, because 
6 it's late already and the people are not in the office 

9 any more and I cannot reach the right person who knows — 

10 he has done everything." 

11 BY MR. CAROME: 

12 Q What time of day is it by now? 

13 A Late evening. I don't know exactly what time it 

14 was. It was dark already, and I remember I was tired 

15 because I was up in the morning and talked to the people — 

16 all day, it took me all day. 

17 Q Were you at the airport at any time during that 

18 day? 

19 A Yes. I think I went to the airport just to have 

20 a quick look and I saw them loading the airplane. 

21 Q And was it at that point that you reached the 

22 conclusion that it was missiles? 

23 A But this is really my own. I haven't seen — 

24 I don't know what was inside, but it was — I guessed. 

25 Q Based on the appearance of the boxes, you concluded 



IINCLASML 



662 



nmssKfiiT 



50 



1 they were missiles; is that right? 

2 A That's right, yes. That's right. 

3 Q Was there any doubt in your mind about that? 

4 I know you didn't see the inside of the box, but 

5 was there any doubt in your mind as to what was in the 

6 boxes? 

7 A It could have been — I have seen ammunition 

8 boxes. They're different. What else? No, really -- 

9 Q There was nothing else that they could be, other 

10 than missiles? Is that right? 

11 A Computers are different, you know. We sometimes 

12 flew sensitive stuff like computers sometime, not to Israel, 

13 of course, but they are also in safe boxes. 

14 But it was my guess, and I talked to the other 

15 guys, "Do you know what this is?" Nobody knew. And I don't 
•J6 know where they were made. Normally it is stamed "Made in 
■)7 Taiwan," or whatever. I think there was nothing on really. 
13 Q So you went and looked at what was sitting out 

19 to be put into the plane, is that right? 

20 A Yeah. I was not close to it like we are sitting 

21 together now. I was maybe 50 meters away because I was -- 

22 I think I was sitting in the car and I just wanted to know 

23 if they are loading because they vere telling me they're 

24 loading and just to make sure they're loading, but I'm flying 

25 cargo since -- 11 years, and so I know a little bit, and I 



inkwodPfrULPT 



663 



11 

12 
13 
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51 



1 don't really ask unless it is maybe dynamite or something 

2 and you have to know a little bit — you know, if it's 

3 explosive stuff, but then you have to worry about thunderstorms 

4 you know, and things like that. 

5 But just — you have a rough idea, but nobody 

6 told me what it is and it is just a guess that it was 

7 missiles inside because of the size of the boxes. 
3 But this is only a guess. 

9 Q Did you mention that guess to any of the other 
^0 people were there, ^^^^^^^^^Bpeople? 

A I think — no, they were quite busy and the 
loaders — the loadmaster was quite busy. He just told me 
that they are stupid and very, very lazy, and ~ because 
I had a schedule — I think they told me to leave at 1800 
GMT time, 1800, and I thought that they wouldn't make it 
because they were so slow. 

Well, that wa» in the afternoon when I was there 
to have a look. For me, it was not something special, not 
at all, because, you know, we were flying every day, cargo, 
cargo, cargo. You never know what is in there, really, in 
the boxes . 

Q But you knew it wa« unusual to go to Iran, didn't 
you? This was only the second time you'd ever done that in 
your life; right? 

A That is true. YA»a. . Arf ■J»JP«*' there was fighting 



is true. .Y£»A>.ftrf»^»JP**' ' 

iGlMiEL 



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52 




there. Everybody knew — 

Q And you knew Iran wa» involved in a military 
conflict, right? 

A Of cour! ^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

I was a little bit 
concerned, quite a little bit. Very much worried because — 
well, I've never — I go back to this. 

It was in the afternoon I had a quick look to 
see just how far the loading is — how far the loading was, 
and then we went back to Mr. Schwimmer's — I spent a couple 
of hours, two or three hours with Mr. Schwinuner in their 
office. And after — 

Q I'm sorry, you were at Mr. Schwimmer's office or 
at his house? 

A Well, I ttiink it was like an office in the house. 

Q I aee. 

A You know, he had a big desk there and maybe two 
or three telephones or so. It was a big house, anyway, and 
he said, "Come into my office," when I got there. Well, 
finally I got the green light fron^^^^^^^^^^K and then 
we to take^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vand then suddenly, 
I was just about to leave and he said — there was a telephone 
call and he talked to somebody and he said"We have to change 
route — we have to change the route again," and he said — 
he said, "You have to landl 



lMJJi.fi£inrji_ 



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1 Q Who do you understand he was speaking to to get 

2 that news? 

3 A Somebody important. 

4 Q Was he speaking in English or Hebrew? 

5 A No, Hebrew. Israeli. I couldn't understand 

6 what he was saying. But he was — I think he was also a 

7 little bit concerned because he changed it — or he had to 

8 tell me again to change it. And I didn't like it. I said, 

9 "Look, we didn't have any cargo papers, no cargo manifests," 

10 and you normally get a cargo manifest, for the cargo you 

11 are flying. 

12 Q So this was unusual, you weren't having — given 

13 a cargo manifest; is that right? 

14 A Yes, I didn't get one. 

15 Q Why didn't you get one? 

15 A Well, they gave me the weights, and — but -- 

^j Q Had you ever flown a mission before that — where 

18 you only had oral information about what the cargo was and 

19 you didn't get a written manifest, or was this the only 

20 time? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



A When we flewH^^^^^b they always gave us 
only a general cargo — it was general cargo because too 
many parts, you know, like plastic chairs and everything, 
you know, everything really. It just. happened*. sometimes. 

Q It's normal practice to have a written manifest, 

IIWCLASS1EIE0l_ 



666 



otrctlvwn 



54 



;*-ij:i;m 



1 is that right? 

2 A Normally you had a manifest where everything is 

3 itemized, but sometimes, if it was too much, you know, 

4 then they just declared it general cargo. 

5 Q But there would still be a written manifest 

6 normally, right? Even if there were many types of items. 

7 Is that right? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q But in this case, you didn't have any manifest 

10 at all, is that right? 

11 A No, I didn't have any. 

12 Q So that was extremely unusual; wasn't it. 

13 A Not extremely unusual, but it happens now and 

14 then. Important for us is the weight, how much a pallet 

15 weighs because of the trim of the airplane. You have to 
Ig know the weights, which pallets — the weight of each 

17 pallet which is important for us, really, and — but it was 

Ig a little bit unusual. 

^g Q Had that ever happened before that you flew a 

20 cargo plane without a manifest at all? 

21 A I think yes, now and then, it happened, but maybe 

22 by mistake that they didn't come in time, you know, because 

23 in some places, they did it by hand, you know, and then it 

24 takes just too long and we — sometimes we didn't wait for 

25 it, you know. 



JlMUmiElFn 



667 



wam^ 



55 



1 Q What was the problem this time? 

2 A Well/ there was nobody really — I mean, they 

3 didn't have a loader, like, you know, when you fly for an 

4 airline, there is a department -- loading department that 

5 does the -- the chief loadmaster, they call it, or chief 

6 loader and then the operation -- operation people. They come 

7 out with the load chief then, with the loading manifest 

8 and all these things. 

9 Q And this time, that was not available. Is that 

10 right? 

11 A There was no person which was — not the airline 

12 person, but we had our loadmaster there and they gave me 

13 the load sheet, with the weights on, and that was it. 

14 Q Did the load sheet identify the cargo? 

15 A No. T^z -. 
15 Q Did it say what it was? 

17 A No, just the weights. I don't know — it's too 

18 long ago; I don't know what the weight was. Whether they 

19 were heavy or light, I don't know, really, but just normal, 

20 I think. So not overweight, not too light. I don't know 

21 how heavy it was. I don't even know how many boxes they 

22 put on. I don't know how many. 

23 Q Does 18 sound like it may have been the number? 
94 That's the number that we understand from other sources. 



A I think you're right, yeah. I think 18 is a good 

iiMoi Aooinrn 





668 



JStF.T 

1 figure, because there was a discussion how many we could 

2 put on and I think — when I said 17 or 18, it is possible. 

3 Yes. That's correct. I think 18 we had. But I'm not 100 

4 percent sure. 

5 Q Is that as many as the plane could take in one 

6 flight? 

7 A Yes. Yes. And -- I think we had three or four 

8 boxes, that direction — 

9 Q Lengthwise? 

10 A No. 

11 Q Wldthwiser. 

12 A Wide-wise, wide-wise. Four and another four on 

13 top, and then — so 18 is a good figure. I think it was 

14 18. They told me — the loadmaster told me, but I have 

15 forgotten. It was not really so important for me, really. 

16 He told me — I asked him and then I remember now — how 

17 many did he put on and I think he said 18. 

18 Q All right. 

19 A Not more than 20 probably. So, how far were we? 

20 Suddenly, he changed the routing and said, "You have to land 

21 ^^^^^^^H. " I said, "I don't like this because, first of 
all," — I think I mentioned this — "first of all, I don't 
have a cargo manifest," but I understand he is a businessman 
and he has nothing to do with loading of it, and things 
like that. That's what he told me. "I'm not responsible 



liMPi Accincn 



669 



mmm 



57 



1 for thii. I'm just « businessman. I hav« nothing, really" — 

2 and Z don't like to land because it could cause problems 

3 there. 

4 Q Not having a manifest? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q And that would cause problems. 

7 A And he said, "You don't have to worry. You don't 

8 have to worry, because they expect us." 

9 Q 

10 A Yeah. And — 

11 Q You said that there were two problems; there were 

12 two reasons why you were worried about going^^^^^^^K What 

13 was the other reason? 

14 A No, only one, because we didn't have the cargo 

15 manifest and — yeah, because Z didn't know really what Z 
^S have — what kind of loading Z have, what kind of load Z 
17 have, and because he didn't tell me, and Z don't know if 
1g Z asked him. Z think Z didn't even ask him. 

19 Q Why didn't you ask hin what the cargo was? 

20 A Z think it's better not to ask — 

21 Q Why is that? 

22 A Zf Z don't know what it is, then it is better 

23 for me. 

24 Q Zsn't it importtuit to know what the plane is 

25 carrying? 



■?.-V 



mn ACQinrn 



670 



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58 



1 A Yes. Yes. But — 

2 Q Didn't you, in fact, ask him what the cargo 

3 was? 

4 A I don't think so. At least, he didn't tell me. 

5 Maybe I asked him — I think I asked many times, many 

6 people. 

7 Q You asked many people what the cargo was. 

6 A What the cargo was because of course I have to 

9 know it, but — 

10 Q And what did they tell you? 

11 A They told me that it is just, you know, general 

12 cargo. 

13 Q You knew it wasn't general cargo; didn't you? 

14 A Well, I cannot say yes beciiuse those — whatever 

15 It was, it was in boxes and — 

1g Q You thought it was missile: . 

•J7 A I thought it was missiles. 

•)3 Q Did anyone ever tell you that it was missiles? 

19 A No, no. 

20 Q Are you 100 percent sure of that? 

21 A One hundred percent sure. Nobody told me that. 

22 Q But you asked a number of people what it was. 
A Yes. 
Q And you're saying that what people told you was 

it was general cargo? 

«^ 



671 



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59 

^ A General cargo, and there's really you have to 

2 worry about, nothing explosive stuff, nothing. And that was 

3 it, yes. 

A Q If it was missiles, wouldn't there be a concern 

5 that some part of the missiles, either the propellant or 

g something, might be explisve? 
y A As far as I know, you can — well, as long as 

the missile is not — how do you call it — shoot them, before 
g you shoot them, you have to activate it, no? 

Q And did you understand that these were not 
activated? 

A Yes. 

Q How did you know that? 

A Otherwise, they wouldn't have put it on there. 

Q How did you know that? 

A No, I don't know. That's a guess for me. 

That's just a guess, I mean. Just the same with 
the dynamite I flew the first time — or at the time with 
this black powder. I said black powder here, this powder 
stuff, and the detonators, isn't it dangerous, and they told 
me, as long as they are separated, then nothing will 
happen, and I think they wouldn't put me something on which 
would explode. I think they would have told me that. 

Q Now, these are total strangers you're dealing 
with, right? 



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A Yet, I think, yes. 

Q And -- 

A Or at least, Mr. Schwinuner, I think he was a 
person -- he talked now, but he didn't tell me what it was, 
but he understood what my concern and so -- he was telling 
me a little bit about the other guy -- the Israelis, they 
did not -- just didn't answer when I was asking. 

Q But what did Mr. Schwimmer tell you about the 
cargo? 

A Well, he just -- when I said, "Look, I understand 
there is something sensitive here," he said, "Yes," and 
therefore, I would like to go direct. I don't want to land 
there. And then he said, "you don't have to worry about 
this." 

Q You're talking about going^^^^^^^^l is that 



right? 



Yes. 



A 

Q Z guess I want to focus a little bit more on what 
you learned in Israel about the cargo. 

You recall them being in long, large — 
A Yes. 

Q — boxes; is that right? 
A Yes, yes. 
Q Were they square boxes or were they cylinders. 



rounded? 



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A 
Q 
before? 
A 
Q 
A 



I think square. 

And had you ever seen cargo that looked like this 



Of course, I seen something similar. I'd seen — 
When before had you seen similar-looking cargo? 
Everywhere, in warehouses, but I think the boxes 
were not wooden. I have seen wooden boxes, about this size, 
you know, you can put pipes in, and you can put whatever, 
but I think they were plastic or metal. I think they were 
plastic, plastic. 

Q And what color were they? 

A I think they were green or gray, something like 
that. 

Q And, as I understand from what you said before, 
you don't recall there being any markings on the outside 
of these boxes; is that right? 

A I haven't seen any. 

Q You looked at these boxes? 

A Yes, I looked once at the boxes, but only very 
briefly because there was always somebody -- I was always -- 
somebody -- was never really alone, really, and I ask 
loadmaster, "V7hat is this? Are they made here or where are 
they coming from?" and he said, "I don't know, there'e 
nothing on them." 

We were talking a little bit about what's inside, 



njiniKCinrn 



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but really, we were only guessing when we said it could be 
missiles. It was totally empty, there was nothing on it. 
And nobody would answer -- 

Q Nobody would answer your questions about what it 
was? 

A Asking what it was inside. 

Q Who did you ask? 

A There was one person -- I think was the chief of 
the Israelis -- where it was, I don't know. He was always 
with me. He never let me go alone near it. 

Q Is this the person who came to your hotel? 

A Yes, yes. 

Q And you never learned his name; is that right? 

A No, no. He was about my size, tough guy, about 
my age and I think he was responsible for this -- for loading, 
probably, that everything go smooth. 

Q Is he the same person that raised the question 
about the air defense battery in Israel? 

A Yes, I think. 

Q And did you ask him what is the cargo? 

A I asked him, yes. 

Q And what did he say? 

A He cannot talk about this, something like that. 
"It is nothing special," he said, "nothing special." 

Q Did you ask him whether there was anything 



a ask him whether ther^e w. 

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1 explosive in the cargo? 

2 A I think I asked, yes, and he said no. I mean, 

3 it would have been stupid for him to say yes. 

4 Q But that was important to you. You were 

5 responsible for the safety of your plane and your crew; is 
5 that right? 

7 A Yes, of course, yes. 

Q And so it mattered a great deal to you that this 
9 cargo not be something that would be unsafe to carry; is 
1Q that right? 
^■) A Yes, yes. 

Q Who else did you ask what the cargo was? 
A Well, this is a long time ago, and I was flying 
quite a bit, but it's not — it is not so close anymore, but 
I asked at least three people, different people. I ask this 
guy and I asked the loader — 

Q Did you ask Mr. Schwimmer? 

A And, yes, I'm sure I asked him what kind of 
cargo we had and he said, "It's nothing special," or something 
like that. 

Q Why did you think these people were reluctant 
to tell you what the cargo was? 

A Because I think it was something sensitive and — 
Q And by "sensitive," you mean military equipment? 
A When you fly from Israel to Tehran, that is 



iiMpi mm w 



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iiseafflRBp 



64 



1 alreadty something special, of course, and so I thought there 

2 must be something special inside. 

3 Q And you put that fact together, I take it, with 

4 the appearance of the boxes — 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q -- and you, yourself, thought these were missiles 

7 you were carrying. 

8 A Yes, yes, that's right. 

9 Because they hate each other, the Israelis and 

10 the Iranians. 

11 Q Were you aware of reports in the air cargo 

12 business, or just the international business generally, that 

13 Israel was shipping arms to Iran around that time? 

14 Had you ever heard that? 

15 A No -- I think I heard it later on, but not at that 
■\Q time. I tell you, I was flying with every day. I was the 

17 only who flew most the time or others in the company. I was 

18 ^^^^^^^1-^ ^^^ only a few times at home, really, and I was 

19 always in the air. And — so I really didn't know all about 

20 it and — I really must say I was not very much interested 

21 because always rely or^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwhen he tells 

22 fe something and I do it — go there and pick up cargo, so 

23 I'm sure he would have -- he knows what it is, so, you know, 

24 he's deciding things. 

25 Q Did you understand that^^^^^^^^^^^l knew what 




that^^^^^^^^^H 



677 



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65 



1 the cargo was? 

2 A I don't know. I don't think so, because he would 

3 have told me. Maybe he knows; maybe not. He told me, "Keep 

4 me advised what's going on there." 

5 Q Did you tell him on that Sunday -- 

6 A Yes -- 

7 Q — that you thought it was missiles? 

8 A No, but I told him that the cargo looked a bit 

9 funny or the boxes, yeah. 

10 Q What did you mean by that? 

11 A Well, you know — well, what I told you. I thought 

12 it looked like missiles and 

13 Q Did you tell that tc 

14 A I don't think so. Because we were talking very 

15 briefly and -- when I called him, I was either in the 

15 office of Mr. Schwimmer or in my hotel room and -- with these 

17 people around, so I didn't want to mention that at all, 

18 anyway. And, no, I just told him, let's say, 30 tons of 

19 cargo here and some, you know, some boxes, off -size pieces, 

20 off-size boxes, and he said, "Okay." 

21 Q All right, let's proceed with this -- 

22 A Okay. 

23 Q We were last talking about the decision to take 

24 the planel 
A Yes. And he said — when I said, "Do we have 



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landing permission^^H^^^^^B?" he said "Yes" -- Mr. Schwimmer 
said, "Yes," and then I asked, "Do we have overflight 
permission^^^^^^^^^H?" and he said, "Yes, everything is" 
did he say "achieved" or -- "We have everything available. 
Everything is ready." And so I said, "Okay, I'll go." 

Q Did you understand who Mr. Schwimmer was working 
with to get these landing rights taken care of? 

A No. I would like to -- I didn't ask him because -- 
maybe he wouldn't have told me, anyway. But it must be 
somebody with, I think, a little power probably. Because they 
told him not to go straight, to lan<^^^^^^^|H- There 
must have been a reason for that, and — I don't know why. 
Finally we departed and we wentHJ^^^I^HIH and 




Q Was there a concern about needing additional 
money and fueling problems that came up whei 
destination caune up? 

A I told him that and I figured my money, you 
know, and — I didn't need any fuel, I think — or we — yeah, 
we put some fuel in, but very, very^^i^l*, .aad-- — 

Q Was there a situation where you had to dump fuel 
because you had filled the tanks up and you needed to -- 

IIRini iionirirn 



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A No. No, no. We were waiting in Tel Aviv -- 
Q Yes. 

p^ __ we were waiting until the last moment because 

I told him, because I saw how they are changing their 
minds every half hour here, because if we had t 
we would have probably ha 
me, total flight time, and you need full tanks, but to go 
then it only^^^^^^^H-- not exceed the 
maximum landing weight, you have to have only little fuel, 
less fuel, at least. So I figured in his office how much 
I would need for landing, for the handling and for fuel, and 
I figured I could -- I need -- I think it was 4,000 for fuel 
and 2-1/2 thousand handling and landing, which has been my 
experience, and yes, that was it. 
Can I continue on? 
Q Yes, you asked him for more money because you 
needed more money; is that right? 

A No, I didn't need more money. I could cover that 
with the money I had. It was -- seven or eight thousand 
dollars. I think I had 58,000, and I didn't have any 
private — I think I had maybe S500 onlv^private , but the 
other guys I asked, they had nothing, really, nothing big. 

But it was enough to cover the flight, and he 
said, "VOien you land in Tehran, you don't have to pay anything 
there. It will be — it is paid already." 



ilKini ACCICICD 



680 



pusaaefe' 



68 



1 Q Mr. Schwimmer told you that; is that right? 

2 A Yes, yes, yes. I said, "You're sure," and he 

3 said, "100 percent sure, don't worry. I wouldn't let you 

4 go without money." 

5 And finally we left then, and we departed and I 

6 filed the flight -- the co-pilot filed the flight plan] 

7 ^^^^^^^^■~~ sure he f iled^^Hj^^^^^Hor 

8 place -- I can't remember, maybe it was not a destination. 

9 Q Why would you have done a flight plan to a false 

10 destination? 

11 A I'm not sure, really, because I haven't done the 

12 flighr plan, but I think they were talking about using another 

13 destination aid then changing in the air the destination. 

14 Because — well, I didn't ask because the answer is easy 

15 because -- I mean, they probably didn't want to have any 

16 witnesses -- witnesses -- let's say their own people from 

17 the Israeli — I mean, all these people would know that 

18 they go to Tehran, and they don't like each other, as I 

19 said, they are, you know -- 

20 Q So you might have used a false destination on 

21 take-off so that you would hide from the people in Israel 

22 and help cover up where the cargo is actually be taken; 

23 is that what you understood? 

24 A I'm not sure because I didn't file the flight plan 

25 myself, but I thinjt^he ^o_ld_u^ this^_and^ — but I can't 



nk he told us this, and — : 

iilASSJfJEIL 



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remember what it was -- maybe -- what is close to fly? I 
don't know really, but I think we did it like this and we 
changed the routing in the air -- when we were in the air, 
we called^^^^^^^^^Hchanging destination. 

Q Do you recall what the original reported 
destination was? 

A Yeah -- I'm not 100 percent sure if we did it, but 
at least we talked about it and I think it was like this, that 
we had different destination and we changed the destination 
in the air and we had to change routing, then, when we were 
in contactJ^^^^^^^^^H. We told them that we have to land 
there -- we intend to land there. I think we did it, but 
I'm not 100 percent sure. I think we talked about this and 

land^^^^^^^^H and then --^^^^^^^^^^^His a busy 
airport and not big and so they want you to turn around 
quickly. I sent the co-pilot inside to file the flight 
plan and, as far as I remember, he filed Tehran, destination 
Tehran. Yeah. 
Q Was that at your direction that he did that? 
A Yes, yes. 

MR. CAROME: Could we go off the record for a 
second . 

(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Picking up where we left off, we were just talking 
about your arrival^^H^^^^^^^ and what happened there. 

v;hy don't you^^^^^^^^^^f continue with the story. 

A Yes. I sent the co-pilot to file a flight 
plan and I fueled the airplane and -- which didn't take 
long. 

Q Did you top off the tanks? 

A Yes. We put some fuel on, not very much. Little 
bit. 

Q You filled the tanks up all the way? 

A No, no, just a little bit, you know. I figured, 
you know, before you fly, you figure air time and then 
according your fuel, and it was just a little bit. I think 
I paid $4,000 for the fuel. Well, actually, we put — I had 
fuel for $4,000, I think it was like this, $4,000 and I will 
have the fuel for this because I didn't know the price. It 
was enough to get there anyway, and the co-pilot cajne back 
after -- I don't know, 20 minutes, 30 minutes, and he was 
a little bit excited and he said -- yeah, he was excited, and 
"They want to talk to you," he said, "They want to talk to 
you " I said, "Why?" Well, I have to say, I did the cargo 
manifest myself. 

Q On the groundJ 

A I think I did it in the air^^ because you have to 



683 



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71 



1 have it when you land somewhere, you have to have it. You 

2 have to pass it to the handling people. They always ask for 

3 It, you know, so I made one with the general cargo, because 

4 they told me general cargo. 

5 C You say that's what they told you. Who told you 

6 that? 

7 A Yeah, everybody. 

8 Q Oh, I see; that's what people -- 

9 A We have general cargo; that was always the answer 

10 from Mr. Schwimmer and all of the other guys. 

11 Q But you knew this was not general cargo, right? 

12 A No, I don't say I knew it because how did I know 

13 when I cannot inside really? 

14 Q ■ But you believed it was not general cargo; isn't 

15 that right? 

16 A Okay, that's — 

17 Q You've said a number of times here today -- 

18 A It was my guess, whether it was right impression - 

19 I believed, maybe. 

20 Q That it was missiles, right? 

21 A But I thought it was not general cargo, but I 

22 hadn't seen it. Maybe it was something else. 1 don't know. 

23 Q But the belief that you had formed at Tel Aviv -- 

24 I believe we went over this before -- was that you were 

25 carrying missiles; isn't that right? 



lltiM'&fc-Hiomr4l JJ jhi 



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}010SSe- 



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1 A I don't know. Can I answer that -- like this? 

2 MR. PEARLINE: Do you want to say "suspected" or -- 

3 THE WITNESS: Maybe that's a better expression. 

4 I was -- what did you say? 

5 MR. PEARLINE: Suspected. 

6 THE V7ITNESS: Suspected. Oh, you mean -- I don't 

7 have to answer this or -- 

8 MR. PEARLINE: Let's go off the record. 

9 (Discussion off the record.) 

10 MR. CAROME: Let's go back on the record. 

11 BY MR. CAROME: 

12 Q We've been speaking briefly off the record about 

13 the best way to describe what your nature of mind was or 

14 state of mind was about what it was in the missiles -- I'm 

15 sorry, what it was in the -- what the cargo was that you 

16 were carrying and let me state what I understand you have 

17 said, and you please correct me if I'm wrong. As I understand 

18 it, because you didn't actually open up a box -- 

19 A They wouldn't have let me, anyway. 

20 Q Because you didn't, you were not 100 percent 

21 certain what was in the boxes; is that right? You can't -- 

22 y^'J were not 100 percent sure. Is that right? 

23 A Not 100 percent sure, no. 

24 Q But at the time, as I understand what you're 

25 saying, you believed that -- 



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A More than 50 percent; but not 100 percent. 

Q All right. 

A See? 

Q You thought it was more likely than not that it 
was missiles in the boxes. Is that right? 

A For me, it was nothing really special too much 
because I_ have been flying arms before when I was with 

lyou knew, many years back, it was official because 
you may fly this. You have to have permission, but it is 
not forbidden to fly missiles or whatever it is, and I have 
done it many times before, but not with 
of course, but before, we had stations in the Far East or 
where it's going. 

So I was really not very much concerned about this, 
but to come back to this, to size and color and — I thought 
it must be something like this. But I haven't seen it. 
And nobody told me what is really inside. They only told me 
general cargo and they put this on the cargo manifest, 
general cargo, 18 boxes of general cargo and the weight, 
that's it. The guy who is coming collecting the papers, 
he is just operation guy from the airlines, so he would 
not check on this. 

If he would be — or the airport authority, if they 
would be in doubt, or like me when we came froml 

Ls, what do they do here, going to 






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'' ^^^^^^H~~ going to Tehran, then he would have sent, maybe 

2 police or something like that, but the airliner, the 

3 operation guy from the airline, he cannot do anything. 

4 Anyway, I passed him the papers -- I gave him the 

5 papers and he went off -- and let's go back -- the co-pilot 

6 came back and he said -- 

7 Q This is^H^^^^Jthat we're speaking about, ^ust 

8 so It's clear for the racord. 

^^I^^I^H yeah . 

10 He said, "They want to talk to you. They don't 

11 believe that you are carrying general cargo.^' He told me 

12 that. 

13 Q You had written "general cargo" on the manifest, 

14 right? 

15 A Yes. And he was a bit excited -- no, he said, 
15 "They asked me what kind of general cargo we have, what is 

17 in the boxes?" I mentioned 18 boxes general cargo and 

18 I said why didn't you tell them general cargo something? We 

19 didn't know; we hadn't looked inside. General cargo can 

20 be everything. I said, only the captain — he said, "Only 

21 the captain knows what is in it." He said — which was the 

22 truth, -^nd -- 

23 Q So that put the heat on you, didn't it? 

24 A Right. And I took him along because -- I should 

25 tell you that he is a little bit behind, a heavy guy, and — 

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but he put -- and — I can't believe. I can't believe it 
because he said they're coming now to check on this. 

Q And who did you understand that to be? These are 
the officials at the airport? 

A Yes. The place where he filed the flight plan 



Q All right. 

A And he said to me, "They want to talk to you,' and 
anyway, he said they will send some people here to check 
our cargo. I said, "I don't believe that, really, I don't 
believe that because" -- 

Q What didn't you believe? 

A Because -- that they want to check the cargo 
because Mr. Schwimmer told me there was no problemi 
I told him that we -- you know, are froml 

[and — suspicious, no, is 
the right word, and because he told me, "Don't worry." 

I just didn't go there. I didn't go there, and 
nobody came and I asked for start-up clearance and we a 
start-up clearance. 

Q Did you notify Mr. Schwimmer or| 
that there was a probiem| 

A Yes. 

Q How did you do that? 






I called 



that is, I calle' 



vmmm: 



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HF. I said, "The co-pilot just came back and he said they 
want to talk to me and they do not believe that I -- that we 
have general cargo onboard," and I told him I don't know what 
they going to do, but I keep you informed, but just be 
advised that I might get in trouble here. And I told him, 
"Could you please inform Mr. Schwimmer because he told me 
there's no problem here; there would be no problems." 

I think it was like this. I first waited for 
acall and I really don't know exactly how 
it was, but maybe he called me back and he said, "I have 
informed Mr. Schwimmer that you have problems,' or maybe 
he said, "If you get in trouble, just call me back," and I 
don't know how it was because it was really -- first of all, 
it was very late and we were the whole day up and I really 
don't know. 

But what I didn't do was -- I didn't go there, 
I just called them by radio and asked for the 
flight available and requested start-up clearance, and I 
got it. Then — 

Q Was there some concern about getting overflight 
clearance rights^^H^^^^^^^before you took off? 

A No. No, no, we don't have to do anything. They 
are only concerned about their country, really. They 
wouldn't ask whether you have the overflight rights or -- 
it's easy anyway. It's very easy. 




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1 Everybody can fly without clearance unless you have -- unless 

2 you have sensitive stuff like arms aboard, and then you have 

3 to have diplomatic clearance. 

4 MR. WOODCOCK: You can fly all the way to Red 

5 Square. 

6 (Laughter.) 

7 THE WITNESS: Yeah. And I think after -- when I 

8 got the clearance, I think -- I'm not sure — I think I 

9 called^^^^^^H^^a again and told him, "It's okay now." I 

10 don't know really. Did I call him later on or did I call 

11 him when I was on the ground still? I don't know already. 

^2 Anyway, I didn't go there and nobody came to check, 

13 and that was it, and we departed again. 

14 BY MR. CAROME: 

15 Q How long were you on the ground^^^^^^HH? 

1g A Probably an hour, hour 10, hour 20, no longer than 
that. It was a bit funny and -- but what I thought was -- 
I heard it from other pilots, you know, that — because I 
talked about this to somebody else -- I said, "What is the 
procedure there|H|^HB" and then everybody — even if you 
have something to hide or what, they let them land. I think 
you have to pay them, just have to pay them. 

Q A bribe? 

A A bribe, yeah. 

Q But that didn't happen here? 



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A No, no. 

Q I understand. 

A But — 

Q Let me just -- a few questions more about 
I take you didn't want someone fron 

1 to come over and inspect the cargo. 
You feared that that would cause problems for you, didn't 
it? 

A Yes. Of course. 

Q And you knew that perhaps you wouldn't be able 
to continue on with thenission if someone came over and 
found out what the cargo was; is that right? 

A Could have been, yes. Could have caused problems. 

Q And that was because of your belief of what it 
was you were carrying; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q Okay. 

If we could continue, now you've -- could just 
continue with the story after you've taken offj 

A Yes. After we'd taken of f^^^^^^^^^K it was 
just a normal flight, no problems at all. 

Q Well, you had to overf lii^^^^^^^^Hthat right? 

A Yeah, and there was no problem at all. We had -- 
I don't know whether it was on the return flight or on this 
flight, but I think — I try to remember — we had no problems 




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79 



at all. Maybe we change -- we had to change frequencies, 
which was I though;, was a military frequency because the 
military has — they have different radios -- they are very 
bad, yeah, but they didn't ask. It was really a smooth 
flight. 

Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about 
overf lying^^^^^^H We have heard that -- I believe from 





A Uh-huh. 

Q -- that there were difficulties overflying 
[because the people on the ground^H^H^^Hhadn' t 
gotten information necessary for a flight clearance. 
Does that refresh your recollection? 

A No, and I try to remember -- it was on the return 
flight when' we were empty, they were asking, "D you have" -- 
as far as I remember, you know -- if I had known you were 
going to ask me today, I would have made notes of it, but 
then as far as I remember, it was a smooth flight and, to me, 
it appears that they were informed, that they know about 
the flight. I think it was no problem. I think what the 
problem on the way back when we flew from Tehran back to 

MR. WOODCOCK: What do you remember the problem 
being on the way back? 

THE WITNESS: That they were asking, "Do you have 



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overflight permits? Do you have overflight permission on 
this?" I said, "Of course, we have," and then they asked 
me for the number. I said, "I don't know the number; I have 
to call my office because it is not my problem.. It is 
operation -- part of operation to get overflight permissions. 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Let me read you -- 
A Yes. 

MR. CAROME: I'm sorry. 
MR. WOODCOCK: No, no, go ahead. 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q I'd like to read you a paragraph from a report 
[prepared a few days after the flight. 
A Uh-huh. 

Q I believe he prepared it fcr^^^^^^^^g reporting 
on what had gone on with this activity. 

I'll just read you a paragraph. "Nothing was 
prepared for overf light^^^^^^f^aand he," meaning you, 
I believe, "had again to talk his way through. Since they 
repeatedly insisted on a diplomatic clearance number, he 
made one up, which was not accepted after long neogotiations 
and then he filibustered one hour and 30 minutes his way 
througl-^^^^^Husing different altitudes, positions and 

that he told^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H with whom he 
obviously in radio contact." Then it says in parentheses, 



whic 



lififJiSSlElfil. 



693 



uMeffissmRE' 



81 



1 "Not the normal frequencies." Then it says, "However, radar 

2 realized his off positions, which gave additional reason 

3 for arguments and time delays. At the Tehran border, he was 

4 received without any problems, but he did not have to say 

5 the code neune , 'I aim coming from Mustafa,' because radar 

6 treated him very" -- does that refresh your recollection 

7 about -- 

8 A Yes, a little bit, yes. 

9 Q What do you now — 

10 A They were asking for the number of -- but I'm 

11 not sure, but if he had mentioned it, I must have told him. 

12 It's what I told him probably, that they asked for diplomatic 

13 clearance, and of course, we have diplomatic clearance or 

14 whatever it was — not diplomatic clearance but we asked 

15 for clearance number, and what was little bit different was 

16 they told me to change the frequency and I think -- that half 

17 of the flight through^^^^^Hwas with normal ATC and the 

18 second half was with military ATC. But it is true that I 

19 have -- little different altitude and different -- I gave 

20 them different estimates of the -- beacon to beacon, because 

21 I thought mayb^^^^|^^^^Hare listening to this frequency 

22 as well, and — 

23 Q Did you essentially have to talk your way 

24 through? 

25 A I talked quite a bit, I remember, I talked quite 



694 



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a bit. 

Q And — 

A But^^^^^^^^H -- it was because of radio 
sometimes. The radios are very, very bad and they ask. you -- 
always they ask you again the scime thing, and I don't know 
if I have given them the number, but it is if you -- shall we 
say -- I talked myself through -- yeah, something like that. 

Q Did you -- 

A But we didn't have really problems. If we would 
have had problems, I wouldn't have taken the same route back 
because we used -- when you file a flight plan, you have to 
put your registration and that is passed to the -- the ATC 
people. 

Q Did you, at any time while you were flyingl 
tell the ground controllers there something about 
the cargo you were carrying? 

A No. On one flight, but I don't remember which 
one it was — it was the return flight or was the first 
flight we did -- but the first flight we did, we flew -- 
no, it must be this one -- I know that they were asking, 
"Are you carrying arms," but I can't remember was it this 
flight or the other flight, but — 

Q What did you think they had asked you? 

A "Are you carrying arms?" or I think they asked us 



questions. 



lEUfflttL 



695 



■g^K^gik' 



1 Q On this flight? 

2 A I think it was this flight, but maybe it was the 

3 return flight. Also a possibility. 

4 And I said, "No," but it also could have been 

5 on the first flight we ^^'''^^H^^^B ^ cannot remember now 

6 whether it was this flight or that flight. 

7 Q There was a report which our cominittees have 

8 received on what was said from the plane to ground 

9 controllers and the written report that we have states 

10 that the pilot told ground controllers he was carrying 

11 military equipment. 

12 A No. 

■J3 Q Does that refresh your recollection as to what 

14 you said while you were flyin 
•(5 A Look, in case we would have had this, what I thought 

16 maybe anyway — if you don't have permission, you know, for 

17 such equipment, you need diplomatic clearance, it's very 

18 difficult to get. It takes probably two weeks or even 

19 longer to get this permission, and if you don't have 

20 permission, you have — if they force you down, they force 

21 you down, you know, and then — if you say you have and 

22 you don't have — well, I didn't have anything. I didn't 

23 have any diplomatic clearance nximber -- 

24 Q And you thought that given what you thought was 

25 the nature of the cargo, that was thejcind of cargo for 



lU^Cii^SlElEDL, 



696 



BMlSSiflBF 



84 



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which you'd need diplomatic clearance; is that right? 

A I can't remember how the question was, but there 
something coming up, I remember, but I don't know whether 
it was the flight there or the return flight. On one of 
the flights, they were asking, "Are you carrying arms or are 
you carrying" -~ maybe they were asking what kind of cargo 
I have, and I said, "General cargo." 

Q And — 

A I think they aske(^. on both ways, and -- on the way 
to Iran and on the way back home again, and I think that is 
a standard question anyway. Maybe if you come from there or 
go there, they ask what kind of cargo you have -- no, do 
you carry -- are you carrying passengers? The first is are 
you carrying passengers? No. Then, "I'm a cargo airplane," 
and they ask what kind of cargo you have. I think this 
question came up twice probably, but it was not -- I think 
was not very serious because I said, "General cargo," and 
then we didn't talk further about this. 

Q And are you certain that on the way! 
or overf lying^^^HH[ you did not say that you were carrying 
military equipment? 

A I'm 100 percent -- more than 100 percent sure 
because it would — that would be really stupid, I mean. 
You cannot be that dumb even if you have something. 

Q And the reason it would be dumb is that that would. 



697 




65 



likelihood, causef^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hto force you 

2 down; is that right? 

3 A Yes, they would because they have airports 

4 everywhere and they would have radar and they don't know -- 

5 I mean, if you say yes and they don't know which nationality 

6 you are or whatever, you know, you can lie and they would 

7 never let you proceed, never, ever, and everybody knows -- 

8 at least I know that -- I know it very well -- that you 

9 have to have diplomatic clearance to carry -- you can carry 

10 everything, you know, but you have to have diplomatic 

11 clearance. 

12 Q When you tol<^^^^|9^^H ground controllers that 

13 you had general cargo, didn't that cause them to ask more 

14 questions? 

15 A No, not at all. 

16 Q They just accepted that at face value and didn't 

17 ask more questions? 

18 A Yes. But they were asking — many times I 

19 remember the registration -- the registration — they wanted 

20 to know the registration — 

21 Q Of the plane? 

22 A Of the plane, yeah. I told them maybe five times. 

23 Well, you have to — you know, when__ycLUj,f Ly» -y»»»Mve to 

24 change frequencies because of the range of the ground 

25 equipment. I changed off — JL^"'^iiP"S*[ ^°^ many times I 



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changed, often, the frequencies and I think half of the way 
through^^^^H, I was with the military, the military 
agency, but I -- I did the radios myself -- nobody said we had 
arms onboard. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I want to clarify a point, if I 
may. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, please. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Your testimony is that they first asked you 
whether -- what kind of cargo you were flying; is that 
right? 

A Yes. 

Q And your response was "general cargo." 

A I don't know -- did they ask what kind of cargo 
you have or did they say -- or did they ask, "Are you 
carrying arms?" 

Q All right. 

A I don't know, really. What's — 

Q That's really the point I'm driving at, did they — 
do you recall whether -- let's first take the flight into 
Iran. Do you recall whether you were asked whether you 
were carrying arms? 

A Froml^^^^H^^Aside? 



Right. 



lEL^ 




■QT-im 



699 





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241 

25 



87 



A You know -- when -- after this flight, I talked 
kabout this and I don't know, but he probably 
has -- what he says is probably right, but I — when -- I 
really don't know, did they ask, "Are you carrying arms or 
what kind of cargo." I think they asked, "What kind of 
cargo you are carrying?" The first question was maybe, "Are 
you passenger or cargo?' I say, "Cargo." Then they asked 
"What kind of cargo you are carrying," and then I said, "General 
cargo. " 

I think it was like that. 

Q I had gotten the impression from your earlier 
answers that you thought it wasn't unusual that they might 
ask you whether you were carrying military equipment. That's 
why I'm pursuing the question — 

A Oh, yes — 

Q -- as to whether they would have asked you at 
that time whether you were carrying military equipment as 
a standard question. 

A Yeah, I think it is a standard question if you 
are not scheduled airline -- 

Q Which you were not. 

A Which we were not. Because, from earlier, I 
remember when I was not with|^^^H|^^^^^^^^^H I was with 

|we flew often and it was charter flights, like 
charter flights. We had the route to the Far East twice a 



iiycimEia. 



700 



aiasaHffi' 



88 



week and that was -- then we had different flights, not only 
.so everybody -- they -- it is a standard question, 
what kind of cargo, type of cargo, what kind of cargo are 
you carrying? Often, often, and they always ask the number 
of the overflight nujnber .^^^^^^^^^^B for example, 
[always ask. 
Q Now, when you're flying through 




I tell you, I never went this way, really, as 




So, in your case, they knew already that you 
were headed for Iran; is that right? 

A Oh, yes, yes, yes, they knew. 

Q So that it would be a logical question for them 
to ask whether you were carrying arms. Is that right? 

A Yes. Yes. Yes. But at that time, when they were 



UHCUSmL 



701 




l^ffUflT 



89 



1 asking, I was a little bit surprised, you know, but then later 

2 on -- because they asked also on the return flight. I 

3 remember that. Then it was an empty flight. That is probably 

4 standard question. Maybe not, but I think it was standard 

5 question. 

6 Q So since Iran is the destination and Iran is at 

7 war with Iraq, if you give a general answer like general 

8 cargo, that almost begs another question as to what is the 

9 general cargo, so, following that sequence through, do you 

10 have a recollection as to whether you were asked on the way 

11 in, specifically, whether you were carrying arms? Do you 

12 remember now? Did they specifically say to you, "Are you 

13 carrying arms?" when you gave them the general cargo 

14 request? 

15 A No . No , I don't know whether the question was, 

16 "Are you carrying arms?" or "What kind of cargo are you 

17 carrying?" 

18 Q All right. 

19 A And — 

20 Q Let me turn the question around. On the way out, 

21 your destination, obviously, is not going to be Iran. 

22 Presumably then, the concern would be less that you might 

23 be carrying arms; is that right? 

24 A But they ask -- they always ask a-id -- 

25 Q So either way, they might ask? 



UMnmiEe. 



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A Yeah. They were asking. 

Q Right. 

A I remember that. 

Q All right. 

A But I thought that they have -- that they were 
informed about our flight. They must have been because when 
you file a flight plan -- but maybe they were informed about 
our cargo could be -- but to me, it was not as difficult -- 
it was a smooth flight. They asked us questions, but — 
general cargo, or when they were asking, "Are you carrying 




There isn't very much they can do, 
really, even if they would follow you or whatever. But they 
wouldn't be able -- but I mean, you come back again, and you 
know, if there's something wrong, then they would take you 
down because we returned shortly after this and there was 
nothing. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Do you know whether nol^^^^^^^^^^^Hof f ice 
^had done anything to try to get overflight rights 
^for your flight? 
How was it — I had asked -- who did I ask — I 




think I aske 






or did I asy 



msL 



703 



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WEftsafiffiT 



91 



caii ' t remember -- I asked somebody, probably the operation 

I don't know, really, was i^^^^^^^^B i^ut 
I told him I need overflight permits and somebody -- maybe 

was^^^^^^^^k or was the guy^^^^^^^^^^^-- who 
me, "Those people in Tel Aviv, they take care of it." 

Before I left, I think I mentioned it before, I 
asked Mr. Schwimmer, because he was not sure about the 
routing, and said, "Do we have permits; do we have overflight 
permission?" and he said, "Yes, how did you know that we'd 
take this route because we were talking about different 
routes before, no? He said, "No, no, this was anyway our 
idea to let you proceed this way and we have permission for 
this, 100 percent sure." I think he was not telling me 
stories . 

MR. WOODCOCK: How do you account for 

arent belief that you had difficulty 
getting acros'^^^^^^^^^lthe way in? 

THE WITNESS: He was asking — I think I called 
him from the ground and he told me, "Tell me everything, 
how the flight was, give me details," and I gave him the 
details, everything, you know. I don't know whether he did 
notes or — 

MR. WOODCOCK: His notes are dated November 30. 

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. ._- 

MR. WOODCOCK: So they would be very close to the 




tta4W. ttrtiMrtuIflL 



704 



TINSLSSSiffi' 



92 



1 event itself. 

2 THE WITNESS: Look, when we talked together, it 

3 was on the telephone and I don't think -- I think I did it 

4 briefly and when he said that they had asked,/ "Are you 

5 carrying arms," then it is probably correct. He wouldn't 

6 change this thing around. But, it was general cargo. 

7 MR. WOODCOCK: But I'm not -- I'm focusing not on 

8 the question of the cargo, but on whether you had difficulty 

9 flying <^vsi^^^|H^^^B l^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^P'^'^'t ' ^s seems to 

10 be under the impression that you encountered difficulty flying 

11 into Iran^^^^^^^^^H and what I'm wondering is, do you 

12 have any explanation since you believe you didn't encounter 

13 that kind of difficulty hov^^H^^^^^Agot that 

14 impression. 

15 THE WITNESS: I heard what he said, but -- I had 
15 to change frequencies -- yeah, I talked the whole time -- I 

17 talked on the radio, but, as I said, they were asking many, 

18 many times about the registration and this is unusual, you 
•)9 know, that is not standard. Normally you give your position 

20 report and the next one, you estimate and that's it. But this 

21 time, we had to change frequencies often and, as I said, 

22 we were probably with the military and maybe there was some 

23 discussion on the ground between there because they were 

24 always asking, asking, asking, and then they were asking for 

25 



overflight permission. 



lujiHissi^yLrL 



705 



wffi^SEA 



93 



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Then I probably said, "Wait a minute," or -- I 
don ' t Joiow -- 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q You did not have a nuir.ber to give them; is that 

A remember, but when^^^^^^^^^^^ksaid 

there was a number, then there was, but as far as I know, 
we didn't have a number for this — we didn't have the 
number -- he didn't get the number because I was asking 
Mr. Schwimmer permission number and he couldn't get me. 
But I always tolc^^^^^^^^^^^ we had permission and all 
this — 

Q But the fact that you didn't have a number, I 
gather, caused difficulty as you were flying ovei 

A Yeah. Well, there was lot of questions, but not 
concerning the cargo. I think it was more concerning the 
flight. Destination and point of departure, you know, and 
this -- yeah, I remember now more. There was a lot of 
talking, but ict really concerning the cargo, I think. It 
was just the flight itself. 

Q All right. What happened after you cross« 




706 




Q ^^^ 

p^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^H to be a on 
safe side, I went off the airway and I didn't talk anymore, 
but then suddenly, they are — the Iranians, they called me 
and I was surprised at the frequency --i 




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iifffiasafsft' 



95 




Tehran approach, and they called me on this frequency and 
"Everything all right," and so, like this? 

Q Did they speak English? 

A Yes. And I gave them an estimate which was 
not correct -- or naybe I didn't give them any estimate. I 
just said, "Everything's all right and we just passed^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^1 We are now inside the Iran." They have to 
know that you are coming. They have groun^^^^n^siles ■ 



It was also a smooth flight. I never called him, 
but he called me and "Everything all right?" Then he asked 
me for -- I think he asked me for estimates. 

Q When you say "estimate," estimate of what? 
A When you pass a certain station, you know, in the 
area, but I think he didn't say what time he said to call 
me at being that point, you know, radio beacon. Call me 
when you are beamed there or when you pass the station. I 
think we didn't pass any estimates. 

That was all. It was a smooth flight. 
Q And what happened when you got near Tehran? 
I take it you flew directly^^^^^^^^^to 
Tehran without stopping in between? 

A Yes, it was direct fLiaht^iust — it wasn't on the 



708 



20 



22 
23 
24 
25 



USKRSSBffifiE' 



96 



1 airway, it was a little off, you know. It wasn't the 

2 center line of the area; it was a little bit away. 

3 Q And you were doing that to protect yourself; is 

4 that right? 

5 A Yes, and switched off the lights, the navigation 
lights. And then it was just normal approach. Approach 

7 control, landing and then we were on the ground and I think 

g it was 6:00 in the morning — 

g Q Local time? 

1Q A Local time. They had just opened the airport, 

•jl I think. Just very early. It was foggy when we landed and 

12 there was nothing happening. They couldn't tell me -- they 

•)3 couldn't tell us where to taxi, you know, give us position. 
1^ Q Who were you speaking with? 
12 A The tower or ground control, whatever. 
1g Q Were these military people or civilian people? 
.J A Civilian people. And they couldn't tell us. I 

ig said, "We have cargo onboard and where do you want us to 

ig go? Where do you want us to proceed?" Then we were waiting. 



He said he would send a follow-me car and it took 



21 a long time, I think 20 minutes standing there — 



Q What is a "follow-me" car? 

A A little car, black and yellow, squares, they guide 
you, they guide you to your parking number or spot or -- 
guiding car. 



isiAssm 



709 



UlffiiSl^fllt^l' 



97 



1 And then -- yeah, it took about 20 minutes. We 

2 had the engines running and I didn't like it. 

3 Q Were you concerned for the safety of your plane 

4 and crew; is that right? 

5 A No, no. But because they expect us and nobody 

6 comes to pick you up, then. And then after quite a long time, 

7 I think it was a half hour, somebody came with just ordinary 

8 car -- it was not -- I think it was small truck or something 

9 like that. And he --yeah, he guided us to the military side, 

10 the military ramp. 

11 I know it because I was there before, you know. 

12 Q This was the same place that you had been 

13 directed to before, is that right? 

14 A Same place. 

15 Q And that was one time before; is that right? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q Just once? 

18 A I flew twice and that was the second time. 

19 Q All right. 

20 A And — yeah, and then I saw a lot of people -- 

21 I can't remember, was it military? 1 think — it was military 

22 ar^d civilian dressed like me. They don't wear ties there, no. 

23 They don't wear ties, by the way. It is forbidden, you know, 

24 and a guy came and he said, "You are late." We were late. 

25 They had a different schedule, proba^^U'. I said, "Yeah, the 



llr»U>uW/**Tyc'T 



710 



wmm 



98 



1 Jews, they were too slow," I said. "Don't mention it, don't 

2 mention it," he said. 

3 Q You mean, don't mention the fact that there were 

4 Jewish people who you had been dealing with on theother 

5 end of the flight? 

6 A Yeah, and then I said, "What do you want us to 

7 do here?" He said, "We take you to the town and then you go 

8 in the hotel and when we finish off-loading, then we give you 

9 a call and pick you up. Do you need anything?" I said, "Yes, 

10 we need fuel," and he said, "No problem, no problem," and 

11 I said, "How much — how long is it going to take? How much 

12 time do you need? One day or two days?" And he looked at 

13 me and he was a bit angry, you know. He said, "No, it's 

14 not easy to off-load because it took them almost a day 

15 to load the airplane because, you know, we arrived at 

16 late evening and we departed at evening. It was 2 4 hours 

17 we were on the ground at Tel Aviv, and they said, "Well, 

18 you know, we are not the Jewish and if they have need -- if 

19 they needed one day, we do it in 10 hours." And it was 

20 really true, they finished in 10 hours. I don't know how they 

21 did it, but they did it. 

22 Yeah, and then — 

23 Q Who was this that you were talking to on the 

24 ground in Tehran? 
A I don't know but he wasj)jjDbably --he must be 



25 



on ' t know but he V3£^SDt 



711 



Bfia^i^BWiT 



99 



something, I don't know. 

Q You took him to be — was he a military person? 

A No, no, he was just like me. Gray jacket and 
shirt and trousers. 

Q But you took him to be a powerful person from 
the — ■ connected with the government? 

A He was in charge of the whole thing and — 

Q Let me just see if I can ask you a couple of 
questions. You took him to be associated with the government 
of Iran; is that right? 

A Whether he was a military type or was he a 
government type, I don't know. I don't know, but I think 
he was a government type. But maybe he was both. I don't 
know the difference, really, if there is a difference, and 
because they have — there they have — the military and 
then they have the Khomeini Guard and — see, there is a 
difference really. They don't like each other and they are 
different. They have more power -- the Khomeini Guard has 
more power than the other. 

Q The distinction you're making is between the 
regular military and the revolutionary guard; is that right? 

A Yes, that's correct. 

Q And did you know which group this particular 
person was associated with? Was he associated with — 

A No, I don't know, but I think he was one of these 



wWbndwfll&ff'f 



712 



imSSSI&T 



100 



1 revolution types. 

2 Q What made you think that? 

3 A Because he was very religious. When he came to 

4 the hotel and it was 4:00, when the sun goes down, and he 

5 said, "May I go to your bathroom," and took off his shoes 

6 and washed and then he start praying. But that was later. 

7 Anyway, and he said, "I'm going to bring you and 

8 take you to your hotel," and so he arranged a car and then 

9 he took us out — it was a special exit, you know, and because 

10 they didn't ask for our passport or they didn't ask for 

11 anything, I think he was a well-known guy. When I was there 

12 the first time, it took us hours to get through immigration; 

13 it took us hours and Customs the first time, you know, when 

14 we were there^^^^^^^^H It was so difficult and the 

15 second time, they just took us through there quickly. 

•jg This guy was very well known there. And he brought 

17 us to the hotel and we stayed there in the hotel -- 

18 Q Was this a hotel in downtown Tehran? 

19 A Yes. I think it was the — used to be Sheraton, 

20 but a different name today. 

21 And I think we spent the night there. 

22 Q Did anything happen that night? Did you speak to 

23 anyone? _^ 

A I called^^^^^^^^^^^^H^"*^ 



that we are there and everything was okay. 

iiMoi nocinciL 



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Q Did you talk about what would happen next after 
you left Tehran? Were you making plans? 

A Yeah, I asked him what the next schedule is and 
that they probably need 10 hours because when I was in 
Tel Aviv day before, they were talking about a couple of 
flights, and -- 

Q Let me see if I understand what you're saying. 
When you were back in Tel Aviv -- 

A Not back, before, when I was in Tel Aviv -- 

Q That's right, earlier in Tel Aviv — 

A -- earlier in Tel Aviv, yes. 

Q At that time — 

A Upon arrival^^^^^^^^^Hwhen I got there, no, 
from -- 

Q Let me ask the question so -- it may be difficult 
to read this later — my question is, am I right that when 
you were at Tel Aviv, the plan was for youi^^^^^^^^Bplane 
to make a series of flights back and forth from Tel Aviv 
and that was to move all of the cargo that needed to be 
moved; is that right? 

A That's right. 

Q It all wouldn't fit in one plane, right, and so 
there needed to be a series of flights. 

A Yes, when I was -- I told you that there was a 
lot of cargo there, boxes there. I think — I'm not sure 



MCliOTOL 



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whether there were only these long boxes or was there 
something else, maybe, because it had plastic on top, and 
I told them right away when I saw this, I said, "Is that 
for us? We cannot take that much. You should have chartered 
a 747 for this. It would have done it at once." And he 
said, "Yes, yes, I agree, I agree." 

Q Let me ask you a few more questions about that. 
How many flights did you think were going to be 
needed to move the whole cargo? 

A I think five. And they were talking about five, 
I think. Five flights, they were talking about. 

Q Who was talking about five flights? 

A I think that was — they were talking about this, 
as I said, the flights 

Q Did you just say a neime? 

A H^^^^^^^^^Hthe guy who was on the other airplane 
who was contacted in the beginning -- 

Q I see. 

He was -- this guy, by the way, 
was operations^^^^^^H^^H mostly and 
he was more in the operations things, you know, and I think 
he had a couple of flights taking place anyway — 

Q Let me see if I understand what you're saying. 
You're saying that the other pilot told you that there are 




going to be five 



flights needed; is that right/ 



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1 A Let's say a couple of flights, couple of flights. 

2 Q And — 

3 A We figured five flights, about. 

4 Q And did you understand that — 

5 A This one airplane. 

6 Q Okay, and did you understand that the flights 

7 were going to be done back to back, just shuttling back 

8 and forth, to do it as quickly as possible? 

9 A Yes. And I've forgotten something, when we arrived 

10 in Tehran, this guy I was mentioning, the leader there, 

11 he said, "Okay, we need 10 hours," and he said, "That means 

12 that you can leave this evening and come back tomorrow 

13 morning," and it was impossible anyway because it took them 

14 in Tel Aviv too long. Then he was asking, "Are you coming 

15 back?" He asked me that. "Are you coming back?" I said, 

16 "Yes, I will do everything here until we finish." 

•J7 Q What you were saying was that you were going to 

■J8 do the rest of the flights -- 

•jg A The rest of the flights, and he asked me if the 

20 rest of the crew that's also with me doing those flights and 

21 I said, "Yes." 

22 I think his concern was not to have too many 

23 people involved, you know. This is his concern. 

24 Q Why did you understand him to have that concern? 

25 A It was what I thought because otherwise he 



llNmS^lElEll, 



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1 wouldn't -- you know, for him, it wouldn't have mattered 

2 who's flying on it. 

3 Q But he said he wanted — 

4 A And he also said, "Don't talk to anybody here." 

5 So I thought he is very concerned about these things, so 

6 I think he doesn't want to have too many people knowing 

7 about these flights and — but I thought at that time, really, 

8 that he was — it was not the cargo itself, it was because 

9 of the flight from Tel Aviv to Tehran, you know, because 

10 for their own people in Iran, it would be bad if they would 

11 make business with them now and — 

12 Q All right, if we could — I think the point in 

13 the story that we had gotten up to was the telephone call 
tc^^^^^^^^^^^Hfrom the 

15 A Yes, I think it was from the hotel. I just told 

16 him that we are there and everything is all right and everything 

17 is done. 

18 Q What did you and^^^^^^^^^H talk about with 

19 respect to the remaining flights that needed to be done? 

20 A Yeah, and then I told him that it took a long time, 

21 you know, to load the airplane and that I was a little bit — 

22 how do you say -- can't remember the word now, and out — 

23 I didn't like this. 

24 Q You were upset — 



25 



A The operation, the operation in Tel Aviv, I didn't 

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like it. It was terrible, you know. Nobody is 
responsible here, really, and it is difficult to get it 
going. And he said, "Don't worry. Don't tell anybody, but 
you fly back^^^^^^^H," wen^^^^^^^^V- 

Q He told you — let me see if I understand what 
was being said. He told you that the plan would be for you 
to fly directly back^^^^HH; is that right? 

A Yes, and I think it was not because I was 
complaining about service or things like that. I think it 
was not a reason for that. 

Q What other reason was it? 

A I don't know. I didn't talk and, even later, 
I did not ask him why. He said he didn't like it, you know. 
Q He didn't like what? 
A The flights. 

Q And what didn't he like about those flights? 
A The operation of these — how it goes on them. 
Maybe it was money; I don't know. I never asked him because 
when 1 flew back afterwards, I had a next flight going^^^ 
^^|Hagain and we haven't seen each other for a long time 
and so -- we never mentioned this again, really. He had a 
certain reason for that. But I don't know what it was. 

I think we had some maintenance anyway, and — to 
do. Maybe it was an engine change, which we would have — it 
was — I mean, we could have^don§ ^p^^r flight probably, but 



llNHl KS.\ 




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not more because you have to do an engine change and maintenam 
at a certain time, you know, depends on hours. 

Q All right, let me ask you a couple of specific 
questions about the phone call witl' 

I take it from what you've said that he 
communicated to you a decision t ha t^^^^^^^H would not 
perform any additional flights back and forth between 
Tel Aviv and Iran. Is that what he told you? 

A No. He just said, "I tell you what, tomorrow 
you tell this guy I was always with in Tehran, tell him 
we have to do some maintenance," I think it was, "and we will 
tell him when we come back," or something like that, and "You 
proceed homel 

Q Was the plan that was reached in Tel Aviv to 
fly from Tehran to sane other city and then back to Tel Aviv; 
was that the original plan? 

A No — I thought so, I thought so. I thought that 
we have something more important to do, you know, an urgent 
flight or something, but I had to go bac)<^^^^^^^^^H do 
this flight, and then come back maybe, you know, and 
as far as I remember ,^^^^^^^^^^^1 told me that we will 
do another flight maybe later, but he didn't tell me any 
reason why he wanted me to go back. 

Q D id ^^^^^^^^^^H tell you that phone call to 
make sure you got a full tank of gas when you were leaving? 



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A No, but — I did it myself, you know. I think we 
filled up wings because it was for free; we got the fuel 

Q me you whal^^^^^^^^^^H recalls about 
this. He says that when you spoke to him from the hotel, 
he told you to fill up your tanks all the way because you 
might be f lying^^^^^^^H rather than going back to 
Tel Aviv and that a decision was going to be made, perhaps 
in the air, while you were flying out. Is that what 
happened or do you recall him deciding while you were in 
Tel Aviv that you wouldn't be going back to Tel Aviv? 

A I think he said, "Prepare to go back! 
maybe he said to call me from the air, but I have to file 
the flight plan somewhere, no? So I really can't remember 
where we filed the flight plan to. Maybe the Iranians 
filed the flight plan for us. I really don't know. 

But the wings, I think we had already filled up 
the wings, and maybe — probably he said, "Fill up the 
wings," but I think we had done it already. Anyway, because 
it was cheap, it was nothing. We would have had the capacity 
of -- I don't know what. Everything was for free, you know. 

Q All right — 

A I'm not sure really. He's probably right. Maybe 
he gave me instructions in the air to proceed all the way 



back 




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that you 




Q As I recall, he said it was 
were to go back to. Do you recall that 

A Oh, that is possible, yeah, that he said to go 
but we landed! 
MR. WOODCOCK: Let me add a little bit more. 
As recall^^^^^^^^^^^^^B testimony, he 
that he told you that there might be two possible 
destinations. 

THE WITNESS: That was possible, yeah. 
MR. WOODCOCK: That is, that one destination 
would be^^^^^^^^^^^^M and that you might stc 
^^^^^^Kor a period of time where the decision would be 
made for either to procee(^^^^^^^^ or to go back to 
Tel Aviv. That's not correct? 

THE WITNESS: That is true, yes. Flj 
MR. WOODCOCK: Then he testified further that 
in fact, you didn't stop^^^^^^^K that the decision was 
made before you get^^^^^^^Hjthat you were just going to go 
Does that sound correct? 
THE WITNESS: I think yes, and we didn't land^^| 
didn't we? I don't know. 
MR. WOODCOCK: No, his testimony was that you 
didn't landi 

THE WITNESS: Yeah, that is true. They told us 




I really can't remember if it wa 



flfflf 



or it was another 



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place, but it was en route, at least, and he said, "Yeah, that 
was correct." But he didn't say why. That's right, that's 
correct. Yeah, he said, "Proceed on." 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I guess my question is, then, when was it 
finally determined that you weren't going to be continuing 
with the movement of the cargo that was in Tel Aviv? 

A You mean the -- 

Q When was it determined that you weren't going to 
finish the rest of -- moving the rest of the cargo? 

A I think that was on the telephone when I talked 
after landing to him. Or was the next morning. It could 
be the next morning. I don't know. I think it was the 
next morning. Normally I call right away after landing, and 
maybe -- I can't remember because I called a couple of times 
from the hotel, maybe twice or three times, the office, and -- 
to check if there is any news, but I think I did not call 
from the airport after then — from the airplane after then 
because we didn't have the ground power unit. 

I really don't know that, but anyway, I called 
from the hotel and I just told him to — that everything 
was fine and tJien he saj.* — he probably said, "Okay, go to 
sleep, " or something and mybe call him back or I call him 
back. 

I think I called him again. Finally, anyway. 



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1 that was shortly afterward. And I didn't ask any questions 

2 and he said, "You are going -- I think you are not going -- 

3 further flights for them and you get instructions." 

4 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

5 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

6 Q Let me see if I understand this. There is -- 

7 understood^^^^^^^^^^^^B testimony, there a 

8 point at which he developed a question in his mind as to 

9 whether any further flight from — with this Tel Aviv 

10 connection -- should occur. He did not, however, make a 

11 decision that there would be no more flights necessarily 

12 from Tel Aviv, but that he reached a point where he felt 

13 perhaps there would be a delay before there would be any 

14 more flights to Tel Aviv. 

15 A That is correct, yes. 

•J5 Q Okay. Then later, there reached a point where 
•J7 a decision was made that there would not just be a delay; 
^3 there would be no more flights at all -- 

19 A Yes, yes, yes. 

20 Q — from this Tel Aviv connection. 

21 A Yes. 
Q And I think what Mr. Carome is trying to determine 

from you is, first, at what point did — was the decision 
made that there would be a delay in flights — 
A That's true. 



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Q -- and second, when did you become aware that 
there were going to be no more flights at all? 

A Yeah. ^^^^^^^^^^^1 made better notes and I didn't 
do it. 

Q We're asking only for your best recollection. You'r 
not — we understand that you didn't make notes of this so 
it's whatever you best can recall. 

A Yes. Let me see when it was. I think it was when 
I was in the hotel and I talked to him that he said, "You're 
proceeding — there might be no more flights," or "You're not 
going to Tel Aviv; you're goinq^^^^^^^Hand then on the 
way to the west, respond when you're in the air. Call again 
and let me tell you where to go." 

I think that the question was only going; 

— to 
continue with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H was to continue for the 
other airline. One airplane was^^^^^^^^^^^H and the other 
one was flying for this airline. 

And this was — he told me — I mentioned this — 
when do I go there again? He said — 

MR. CAROME: ^^^^HH|^^^Bdid say that you had — 
that someone on the crew had purchased a carpet; is that 
right? 

THE WITNESS: I wanted to go back, you know, and 
he said, I think, there be no more flights. That was — maybe 




, there be no more flights. 



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1 it was two weeks later, something like that. One week later, 

2 two weeks later, I don't know really when it was. 

3 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

4 Q So when you were in Tehran and vou called 

5 UJ^^^^^^^^^H you Ccime to understand that there would 

6 probably be a delay in the shuttle flight plan, and then 

7 I gather from your testimony that it wasn't until perhaps 

8 two weeks later or 10 days later — 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q -- that you came to learn that there would not 

11 be any more flights at all -- 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q -- involving the Tel Aviv landing. Is that 

14 correct? 

15 A Yes. Yes. At least, not in the future, I think, 
1g maybe -- but that is correct, yes. But I didn't know -- I 
ly didn't ask why, at least why we do not continue. In the 

Ig beginning, I thought it was because of maybe money. He 
■^g didn't come up with the money on time because he was paying 
20 us. He had been told by somebody else to continue this. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q But just so it's clear, you thought that, as late 
as 10 days or two weeks after the first flight, that there 



was some possibility of going back to Tehran; is that right? 



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1 A When I -- when we departed from Tehran going 

2 westbound^^^^^^^^^Hand then when I was -- I thought that 

3 we go after two days to do just maintenance or whatever -- 

4 I thought there was something else we had to go back because 

5 of another flight or something. 

6 Q But you thought you were going to continue with 

7 the Tel Aviv to Tehran flights? 

8 A Yes, yes, that's what I thought, yes. After a 

9 short time, after two or three days or so — 
■JO Q And about when was it, how many days later was it 

11 that you learned that the flights were off completely? 

12 A I think when I had the chance to talk tol 

13 I said, next flight, I don't know, but I don't think that we 

14 continue with that. It was not definite. It wasn't 

15 definite. If you want to know the date, I don't know really. 
•]5 It was not — maybe it was a week after, 10 days after. I 
^7 really don't know. I can't remember. 

^Q Q I take it you bought a carpet, or put money down 

•jg on a carpet when you were in Tehran; is that right? 



20 



22 
23 
24 
25 



A A little bit. 



2^ Q Can you tell me about that? 



A My carpet. Yeah, there was an exhibition there, 
but I think it is not really concerning this here. 

Q But you gave someone money for a carpet; is that 
right, or you ordered a carpet? 



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A Yes. I was about the deal and I was -- it was 
10 percent of the -- you know, he was asking for 510,000 and 
if you can pay me in dollars, you can pay me only 10 percent. 

What I did was I -- because I remember, when I was 
there the first time, we had to go -- we were departing and 
we had to go through Customs again and they take everything 
out of the suitcases. You can take a carpet out, but you 
have to pay tax which makes it more than you can buy it 
here and so I asked this guy here, who picked us up, this 
Iranian guy, I said, "May I buy a carpet here?" and he said, 
"Yes, why not?" and then I said, "Well, last time, when we 
went through Customs, they were very difficult and I think 
It is not possible." And then I -- "Okay, I go with you." 
We went up to this guy and he saw that I wanted to pay with 
dollars and it was a big deal, you know. 

So I said, "Okay, I come back tomorrow, keep it for 
me," that's all. 

Q Because at that time, you thought you were going 
to be going right back; is that right? 
A I hoped. 

MR. WOODCOCK: That was before or after your 
to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l from the 

THE WITNESS: I think that was after that. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q So did that perhaps now make you think that it 

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wasn't until some point later that you learned from 

that it was unlikely that you would be making 
any immediate flights — 

A No, it was true already that we had to go back, 
either way, because when he told me, "Okay, go back, don't 
go to Tel Aviv, go there," for me it was that we won't do 
another shot immediately. It was sure, it was 100 percent 
sure. And — but because he didn't tell me — he said, "I'll 
tell you later" or something, I thought that we come back 
after certain time or a couple of days or whatever. But, 
of course, I didn't have any background on this. Probably 
Iknew more. 

He did not say on the telephone that was the last 
one and you go back and we don't go there any more. No, he 
didn't say this but he said -- he just said don't go to 

you go^^^^^^^^A I was ,^^^^Kj^^^^^B 

or he said go flile a f light^^^^^^^^^Hand there's 
a possibility that we have to lanc^^^^^^^^Hand then 
change to a different route. Something like that. 

Q What happened next in the story? 

A Yeah, I think -- where were we? 

Q We were at the point where you were having a 
phone conversation with 

A Yeah, well, yeah. I think I told this guy, 
the Iranian guy who was with me, yeah, he said -- I told him 



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that we want to come back next day, but they don't expect 
us there. We have to do some maintenance. I think we have 
to do some maintenance, because we file the flight plan. 
He saw it. It was not Tel Aviv. 

Q What was the destination on the flight plan? 

A I can't remember. Maybe^^^^^^^^^^^ft maybe 
I think it — I didn't tell him that I had 
been in contact with^^^^^^^^Band we would fly westbound. 

I think he didn't like it, but I said, "Don't 
worry, we come back." 

Q You went back to the airport the next morning; 
is that right? 

A Yeah. It was in the morning or in the afternoon, 
I don't know. I think it was midday. We delayed a little 
bit the flight or the flight was a little bit delayed, the 
departure. I think we planned to go earlier, but because 
of overflight permit again, I said make sure, when I talked 
to the of f ice^^^^^^^^^^H make sure we have all the permits 
and the problem was -- I get mixed up with the other flight -- 
yeah, anyway, we delayed a little bit the flight just to make 
sure that we don't have problems, but I think the delay 
was to coordinate our flight with the Air Force, the Iranian 
Air Force, and I think that is what they told me. I think 
he said, "We have to coordinate this and it is very difficult 

'cause we're not 



to coordinate." They have to tell 

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scheduled flight, it take some time, he said. 

But he said, "There will be no problem, no problem, 
because if somebody is in the air, then it could be a plane 
from Iraq, so he had to coordinate all the stations 
and I think we left midday — yeah, and he took us to — he 
came in two cars and he took us again so we didn't have to 
go through Customs and all this. 

Q And did you request that the tanks, the fuel 
tanks, be filled up? 

A I think we had full tanks, yes, but I remember 
thatfl^H|^Htold me to take full tanks, but it was already 
done, I think. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^B report and his testimony suggested 
that when you asked the people on the ground in Tehran for 
full tanks of gas, they \e re disappointed because they read 
from that you weren't going to be returning directly to 
Tel Aviv. You were taking more gas for that and I think they 
feared that that meant that the operation wasn't going to 
be proceeding. 

A I don't know that. 

Q Do you recall that? 

A It's possible. 

Q Was there some concern -- 

A This guy -- I don't know whether the concern -- 
because when we took full tanks that we would not come back. 



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1 It was too much. I think it was a concern because of his - 

2 money because, you know, he thought that we would maybe put 

3 20 tons on, which is, say, $10,000, but we took full tanks, 

4 which is maybe $30,000. --I think it was the money he was 

5 concerned with, not the eunount of fuel, actually. 

6 Q But he certainly thought that there were going to 

7 be more flights, right? 

8 A Oh, yeah, he was sure. 

9 Q And you -- 

10 A I told him we were coming back. 

11 Q And he wanted them to happen sooner, rather than 

12 later; isn't that right? 

13 A Of course, yes. --< 

14 Q And was he saying, "Hurry up and come back soon"? 

15 Did he say, "Please come right back"? 


1g A I think he said, "Why don't you have mre onboard, 

17 more cargo?" and I said, "You can see that we can't put more 

1g on." I said, "You should have used the ♦W for this, no, and 

^g you would have everything here." 

20 Of course, he was pushing, you know, he was 

21 pushing. He said, "Come back soon" — he didn't say, "Come 

22 back soon," but he said, "Okay, 10 hours there and or 15 
hours there and another 15 hours back." 

Q Did you see any of the unloading happening when 
you were in Tehran? 



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1 A No. 

2 When you got back to the plane, it was all 

3 unloaded, is that right? 

4 A Yes, and everything was finished. I only -- and 

5 as far as I remember, he didn't want the loadmaster to be 

6 there and I think they took us immediately off the airplane 

7 and brought us to the hotel. They didn't want to have 

8 anybody there. I think it was because he didn't want to have 

9 contact between us and the other people there. 

10 MR. WOODCOCK: Was that again because of his 

11 concern about where the flight had originated from? 

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes, yes. Well, he didn't 

13 tell me that, of course, but — 

14 MR. WOODCOCK: That is your assumption. 

15 THE WITNESS: Because he told me, "Don't tell 
1g anybody. Don't tell anybody that you are coming from 

17 Israel." 

f3 Then I went down from the airport to -- 

19 (Telephone call.) 

20 MR. CAROME: Let's go off the record for just a 

21 second. 

22 (Discussion off the record.) 

23 MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 

24 THE WITNESS: I forgot what I was going to say. 

25 Oh, yeah, from the airport, they drove us from 



VWilmRuuir^^gnri 



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1 the airport to the hotel, about 30 minutes, 40 minutes ride, 

2 you know, and I saw on the walls big, big jail there, maybe 

3 10 miles long with high walls and you see big letters, 

4 you know, "Down with USA," and also against Israel and then 

5 you understand that he was concerned if somebody would have 
g heard that we were coming from Israel./ 

1 They are really -- they hate each other very, very 

much. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Did you have any discussion with this person 
about what the cargo was that you were carrying? Did you 
talk about what was in the boxes? 

A No. 

Q Were you able to tell whether or not any of the 
Iranians had inspected the cargo? 

A No. They inspected it, the cargo, earlier, I 
think, and said, "You are late," and all this, and because 
they off-loaded it so quickly, I thought they really needed 
it, and I didn't talk. And this guy, who was the leader, 
he didn't talk much. 

Q Was he giving orders to people? 

A Yes, he was. He was a young fellow, maybe 35, 
40. Maybe I'm wrong, maybe he was 45. 

Q Where was the cargo when you went back to the 
airport? Was it near the planes? 



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1 A It was gone now. It was not there anymore. 

2 Q Do you know what happened to it? 

3 A No. 

4 Q You didn't see any of it being driven off? 

5 A No, but there was a hangar nearby. I think tiaybe 

6 it was in the hangar*, but I don't know really. I don't 

y 

7 think that they would have kept it there. They probably 

8 drove it away. 

g Q Did anyone during the time that you were there 

10 tell you that they were happy with the cargo, unhappy with 

11 the cargo? 

12 A No. No. But I think they were happy. 

13 Q What makes you say that? 

^4 A Well, because they were very friendly to us and 
15 when we left, I said, "We would like to buy some caviar and 
•jg some" you know, these nuts, and they had to -- they had 
yi everything for us. I said I wanted to pay, "No, no, that's 
■jq for you, and thanks so much for coming," and all this. 
^g MR. WOODCOCK: They also made it clear to you 

20 that they expected you to return — 

THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: — with more cargo. 

THE WITNESS: And that's what he told me actually. 
He said, "Where is the rest of the cargo? When you bring the 



rest'of the cargo, no?" 

IIMPI ACCIPrf> 



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MR. WOODCOCK: If they'd been unhappy with the 
cargo, presumably they wouldn't be asking you for more. 
THE WITNESS: No, 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q What happened on the flight out of Tehran? 
A Out of Tehran, I think it was the same as we 
came. It was a little bit off airway again. 





with the same frequency changes again, the way coming, and 
they wanted to taow in format! on, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B and but 
nothing special really. 

Q And were you in communication with 
while you were flyin 

A Yes, but I can't remember, really, what I said 
but I must have been in contact with him because when you 
say he said we were supposed to go to file flight plan^^HH 

I really don't remember this really so much because 
for him, it probably was important. For me, it was not 
important where I have to file the flight plan because the 
next flight was the next day and -- but he probably noted 
everything and wrote it down. 

I was sure I was in contact with him and they 
told us to go^^^^^^^^^^H iil''v<rf tf^r' t\"''^ just a confirmation 



■Hfflm 



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that they say, "Okay, we confirm you. Proceed] 

and take the next flight which is departing in the evening." 

Q It's not a significant point, really, in my 
mind, but^^^^^^^^^^^^^B report indicates that the plane 
went back^^^^^^^^Hooes that ring a bell with you? 

A I don't think so. 

Q You recall that you flew back^^^^^^^^^^l is that 
what you're saying? 

A I think we flew bac)' 

Q Okay. 

A It is possible, but I thought I flew backj^^^H 
That doesn't matter anyway. 

Q When you ti^^^^^^^^^^Hafter 

the flight? I believe he recalls that he — either that day 
or the next day, debriefed you. 

A Yes, right. I think he wanted to have a report 
from me, a briefing report. I don't know if we did it on 
paper or if I just talked on the telephone. I think I just 
talked on the telephone. I wrote something down, all the 
details because he forgets things, you know, and I passed 
it to him. 

Q Where did you pass it to him? I mean, did you 
meet him face to face? 

A I don't know really. Maybe he was I 
when I talked to him on the telenhone. _^I really don't know. 



him on the teieDnone. _^i 



736 




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1 For me, it was not important, really, this — the 

2 whole thing, but -- because I had -- for me, it was nothing 

3 really difficult. It was just interesting, really, but nothing 

4 really difficult. We had some flights before where we had 

5 really problems and those flights I don't forget, you know, 

6 but this, for me, was not really special. 

7 But at least, it was shortly after -- maybe it was 

8 two or three days later -- probably the same week, that 

9 I gave him, a report about it. 

10 Q When you gave him a report on what the flight 

11 had happened, did you tell him, either orally or in writing, 

12 that you thought that the cargo had been missiles? 

13 A No. 

14 Q Let me just -- 

15 A No, it was just an operation, really. 

1g Q ^^^^^^^^^^^H had testified that one of the crew 

17 members -- I don't know if he was referring to you or 

18 someone else -- told him at some point after the flight 

19 that one of the crew had said, "Why didn't they just shoot 

20 those things over to Iran?" 

21 A Yes, I think so, yeah. 

22 Q Was that you? Was that your joke? 

23 A I don't think so. It sounds familiar to me, 
2A though. 

Q Who said that? 



25 



iiMni afifiiFiFn 



737 




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' A I don't know who it was. 

2 MR. WOODCOCK: Did you have some discussion with 

3 the other crew members about your suspicion that this cargo 
^ might have been missiles? 

5 THE WITNESS: Uh — 

6 MR. WOODCOCK: And I'm speaking either while the 

7 operation was under way -- 

8 THE WITNESS: Probably briefly. You know, I mean, 

9 you talk about it, going to Tel Aviv and going to Tehran 

10 and you don't have this every day, you know, and we were 

11 talking a little bit but -- I think it was not -- better not 

12 to talk about it. 

13 MR. WOODCOCK: Once you emerged from Iran and you 

14 were not -- you found you were not going back to -- at least 

15 immediately, to Tel Aviv, there would be less reason not to 

16 talk about the cargo ?j|fis that right? 

17 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

18 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

19 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

20 Q And if you had suspicions that it was military 

21 equipment, then you and the other crew members would 

22 probably have felt more free to talk about your thoughts that 

23 perhaps this was missiles; is that right? 

24 A No, you probably think this is different because 

25 you are affected more, but for us, it was not really -- was 

iiMPi AQQincn 



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1 ;)ust a flight rec 

2 Q Well, let me put it differently. When you're in 

3 Tel Aviv, no one is telling you what the cargo is; is that 

4 right, they're ]ust saying general cargo. 

5 A Yes, yes. 

g Q So you would have felt a little concerned about 
7 bringing your crew together with perhaps the Israelis nearby 
S and saying, "Well, these guys are telling us it's general 
9 cargo, but you know, I think it's missiles." 

•jQ Would you have felt some concern about that? 

•^•j In Tel Aviv? 

12 A Yes, I think -- 

•J3 Q Okay. When you suspected it was missiles, you 

didn't confront Mr. Schwimmer or anybody else and say, "Well, 

15 you're not telling me the truth. I know it's missiles"? 

16 Right? 
A No, but to tell you the truth — because nobody 

talked about this and I thought they had a reason for that. 



ig you know. 



Q Right. 
2^ A They must have reasons, and I think that is, you 

know, an important thing and — not to talk about this and — 

Q And so you and the crew were not discussing so much 
among yourselves what the cargo was at that point because 



there was an understanding that the people who were your 



739 



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127 



1 customers didn't really want to talk about what the true 

2 contents were; is that right? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q Okay. Then you get to Iran and you're dealing 

5 again here with a person who is concerned about the origin 

6 of the flight; is that right? 

7 A Yes, yes. 

8 Q And you're also in a society that very clearly is 

9 a closed society; is that right? 

10 A (Witness nodding affirmatively.) 

11 Q Now, did you feel some restrictions on -- you and 

12 the crew feel some restrictions about freely talking in front 

13 of people about what your suspicions were about the true 

14 content of the cargo when you were in Iran? 

15 A No. 

16 Q You didn't? 

17 A No, really not because -- 

•)8 Q Do you recall when you were with the crew -- 
■(9 A Everybody was calm, it was surprising. Maybe 

20 because we were tired. You know, when I flew to Tel Aviv, 

21 I had a very long flight, maybe 16 hours already, and you 

22 know -- and then they came -- I remember I was very tired 

23 and very little sleep. No, we didn't talk very much. We 

24 mentioned this, but only once, I think. 

25 Q While you were in Iran? 



MMoi Aooinrn 



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128 



1 A No, that was still in Tel Aviv. In Iran, we didn't 

2 talk about this. 

3 Q Okay. So while you were in Iran, you didn't 

4 talk to the -- you and the crew didn't talk about what the 

5 contents of the cargo were? 

6 A No. 

7 Q And what I'm driving at is that because you felt 

8 some constraints, some -- let me say, restriction by the 

9 nature of your being in Iran and this being an Israeli- 

10 originated flight in not talking among yourselves about it? 

11 A No, but I was a little bit — I was a little bit 

12 surprised, but we didn't talk about — you know, what kind 

13 of cargo. We did not talk about it because he said we may 

14 not talk about it, but for me, it was a bit strange, the whole 

15 tning, because I know the relations between the USA and Iran 
■)6 and Tel Aviv. And -- 

17 Q How did the US come into this? 

13 A I think they worked together with the Israelis. 

ig Q You had a concern about the relationship between 

20 the USA and Israel and Iran and that caused you some concern 

21 as far as discussing the flight is concerned; is that 

22 right, or discussing the cargo? 

23 A Well, flying there, you know, and — it was a bit 

24 strange for me. 

25 ^ 



But how did you understand ^hat 



t the United States 



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was involved it that? 

A There is nothing there — I shouldn't have said 
this, because there was nothing. Now, maybe I read the 
newspaper and -- by that time, it was -- I think -- maybe 
I shouldn't have said this. It's not nothing, really. 

Q Well, now, you've got me confused. 

The -- you go to Tel .^viv and, therefore, you 
understand that Israel is involved, and while you're on -- 

A (Witness nodding affirmatively.) 

Q You have to respond "Yes." 

A Oh, yes, yes. 

Q And while you're in Tel Aviv, you come across 
cargo that you suspect, you believe is possible that it's 
missiles. Is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And you fly to Tehran and so you understand that 
Iran is also involved here; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And then you have just said to me that one of 
the concerns you had was that there was a U.S. -- that you 
were concerned because there was the U.S., there was Israel, 
and there was Iran -- 

A Yeah. 

Q And now I'm trying to understand how it is you 
came to develop in your mind an understanding that the United 



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1 States had anything to do with this. 

2 A Not really, no, I shouldn't have said this, but 

3 I think if Israel is selling something like this, say, need 

4 permission from the USA. 

5 MR. CAROME: What makes you think that? 

6 THE WITNESS: Everybody knows that. I think they 

7 are very close -- Israel is very close to the USA and I 

8 think that they produce, the Israelis produce arms and the 

9 U.S. license — 

10 • BY MP. WOODCOCK: 

•J1 Q You're telling us that to the extent you've 

12 assumed that these were missiles, you assumed that they 

13 either were created under license from the United States or 

14 imported from the United States; is that right? 
ie A I don't think they were imported from the United 
1g States, but -- because they produce -- I know that they 
■^■j produce -- they are selling -- Israel is selling arms to -- 



you know, to the whole world. 

Q Okay. Let me put the question differently. 

Was it your understanding, and this may have been 
a guess on your part, but it was your guess that because 
you were dealing -- you felt you were dealing with missiles 
here, that they probabably somehow had a U.S. connection; is 
that right? 

A No. 



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1 Q Okay, now -- see, now you've got me confused 

2 again. 

3 How is it that you understood that there was 

4 some kind of a U.S. role in this shipment? 

5 A No, this is -- you've really got me wrong. I 

6 think that, as I said, maybe I'm wrong, I don't know, what 

7 was in there, but I thought -- it looked like missiles and 

8 if we are going to sell this to Tehran, I think we have to 

9 have a permission — 

10 Q Permission of the United States? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q Because you're assuming that the missiles either 

13 have -- are created under some license from the United 

14 States or have come from the United States originally; is that 

15 the idea? 

16 A Well, I don't know what the procedure is, but 

17 I know that they are producing this stuff and — 

18 Q That is, Israel is? 

19 A Yes. And that they are selling it because we 

20 had applications to fly to other states from Israel and 

21 that's all. 

22 Q Okay, let me -- 

23 A That is my own opinion. 

24 Q I understand, but -- 

25 A There is no indication, really — there are no 



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indications that the Americans were -- but -- because, as 
I said, there were no signs on this stuff and nobody talked 
about -- nothing at all. 

Q I understand -- 

A Except my own -- 

Q VJell, I understand that that's your own opinion, 
but I also understand from your testimony that you have 
been flying cargo airplanes for many years and you're very 
experienced in this field. Is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And you would understand that -- or you understand 
from your experience in this field that Israel does provide 
arms to other countries in the world; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, what Israel produces on its own, it can sell 
without the permission of the United States; is that right? 

A I don't know. 

Q Well, I mean, if -- 

A I don't think so. I thought that's not like 
this. 

Q Well, let me ask the question differently. 

Do you understand that whatever Israel produces, 
it needs -- in terms of armaments — it has to get the 
permission of the United States to transport to another 



country? 



iiNr.1 Aj;!;iFiEO 



745 



uueaws^' 



133 



1 A To a certain country, I would say yes. 

2 Q So that's just your understanding and you're not 

3 an expert in the field, you would admit that. 

4 A No . 

5 Q But your understanding would be that if Israel 

6 were going to traffic in a particular -- with a particular 

7 country in arms, that it needs some kind of approval from 

8 the United States. Is that right? 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q Now, is that the reason why you felt that there 

11 must have been a U.S. connection when you said earlier that 

12 you thought there was a U.S. connection? Is that the 

13 reasoning that you were going through? 

14 A A little bit, maybe, because I have read newspapers 

15 now and all this. Maybe it's why I said this, but I think 

16 that they have to have — that they would ask. 

17 Q And that's what you were thinking — 

18 A I don't know if this was done or if it was, 

19 you know — 

20 Q Okay, well, I'm not asking you to say that what 
2-) you assumed was true or not, that it was true in fact. I'm 

22 not asking you that. What I'm trying to drive at is whether 

23 what you assumed was true or not, what precisely it was you 

24 were assuming. That's what I'm trying to get you to answer, 

25 and I want to review your testimony on this point. 



mm Acoincn 



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134 



First, your understanding, whether it was true in 
fact or not, was that if Israel was going to transfer arms 
to another country, it needed the approval of the United 
States; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And that was your assumption as of November of '85, 
is that right? November of 1985; is that right? 

A (Witness nodding affirmatively.) 

Q So, when you testified a moment ago that you 
were -- that you assumed that there must be some U.S. 
connection in this flight, your assumption was based on 
your belief that in order for Israel to transfer arms to 
another country like Iran, there had to be some point at 
which the U.S. approved it, is that right? 

A Yes, that's what I think, yeah. 

Q So what you're saying is — what youte saying 
is not necessarily that what you -- when you mentioned the 
United States, it wasn't because of what you read in the 
newspaper, it was because of your understanding or your 
belief -- 

A Yes, I think that's — 

Q — as to what the relationship between the U.S. 
and Israel was on international arms transfers originating 
from Israel; is that right? 



Yes, 



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Q Okay. 

A But they never mentioned really the U.S. -- never - 

Q Well, the Isralis never mentioned the United 
States. 

A Never, ever. I mean, not in Tehran either, not 
anybody. 

Q Did you mention the United States when you were 
in Tehran? 

A What? 

Q Did you mention the United States to the Iranians 
when you were in Iran? "^ 

A No, but — 

Q Did the Iranians mention the United States to 
you -- 

A Oh, no. 

Q — while you were in Iran? 

A They only mentioned Israel, when they said, "Don't 
say that you're coming from Tel Aviv." That's all. 

MR. CAROME: Could we go off the record for ]ust 



a seonad, 



(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q I take it that you left Iran -- you flewj 

MtiAi unnirirn 



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136 



and you remember f lying ^^^^^^^^^^ is that right. 

A Yes, but maybe^^^^^^^^^^V I think it was 
but it doesn't matter anyway. 

Q All right, and after you landed^^^^^^^^, when 
was the next time you spoke tc 

A Yes. 

Q Was it that day? 

A It was not that day. It was a couple of days 
later. 

Q. You saw him in person? 

A I'm not sure, really, did I saw him in person or 
did_I talk to him on telephone. I think I saw him in person 
but I'm not sure about this, really. 

Q Is it possible that you saw hin^^^^^^^^^^B the 
very same day that you left Iran? 

A It wouldn't be possible, no, because -- what time 
did I land there, I don't know. I don't think so. No. I 
mean, you probably have the log book, don't you? These times 
are correct. Let me look. I doubt it that I saw him the 
same day. It is impossible. 

It would be possible the next day, but the same 
day I think is not possible because we probably land in 
the evening, wherever was ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H, and then, 
you know, until you get off the airplane and they have parked 
the airplane, always — 



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Q It was 2:15 p.m., Washington time, that the plane 
left Tehran. 

A It is in the afternoon, then. It is 2:00 in the 
afternoon, then. 

Q Two in the afternoon here in Washington, so that 
would have been -- 

A Oh. Six hours later, then. 

Q GMT, I gather it would be — 

A 1400. 

Q 7:15 p.m., maybe that would be 1900, 2000, Greenich 
Mean Time, I think, that you would have taken off from 
Tehran. 

A That late? I thought it was earlier. 
Well, anyway, that would put usi 




Q So did you arrive^^^^^^^Vaf ter dark? 

A As far as I remember, we arrived in the 
evening, and — well, it's a problem now, I get mixed up 
a little bit with the first flight. I remember that we -- 
as to this flight or the first flight, but maybe it was 
at the first, we had a little party somewhere with the 
crew. I don't know now was it the first or second flight, 



I don't know. 



I can't remember 



\\m RR^^IFIFR 



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Q All right. 

Did you talk to^^l^^^^^^^H more than once 
in the air while you were flying back? 

A I don't think so. 

Q You remember just one time you talked to him? 

A Yes. 

Q And that would have been the time he directed you 
to go back^^^^^^^^^B Yes? 

A Maybe it was -- maybe I didn't even talk to him. 
Maybe it was somebody from operations. I think I was supposed 
to call operations^^^^^^^^^H and I think they just 
relayed something. I really can't remember did I talk to 
him or did I talk to somebody else. I don't know. 

Q In any event, you have a recollection, I take it, 
that there was a joke made about why didn't they just shoot 
the missiles over to Tehran; is that right? 

A Yeah, I remember that, yes. 

Q And do you remember -- was it you that made the 
joke? 

A No, I don't remember that really. 

Q And do you remember who made the joke? 

A No, but I must ask my colleagues who were with 
me. No, I don't know, really. 

Q Do you remember the joke being told to 




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139 



Answer for the microphone. 

A Sorry, no. 

Q Do you recall ever speaking with 
about the fact that it was your understanding or belief 
that it was missiles that were in the boxes? 

A I can't remember that. I think I just mentioned 
it, as I said, there were some boxes. Maybe I said, "They 
look like missiles," but I'm not sure. 

Q And when did you tell him that? 

A When? That was in Tel Aviv, but -- because -- I 
think I asked him, you know, "What kind of cargo do we have 
there, what it is?" I think we talked about it briefly. 
He probably said, "No, and keep me advised," something 
like that. 

I think he didn't know really. 

Q So you felt that the burden was on you to tell 
him — 

A Yeah, I think it was like that. 

Q -- what the cargo was, is that right? 

A Yes, it was. 

Q And so what did you tell him? You told him in 
Tel Aviv that the boxes looked funny, I think you said at 
one point. 

A Yes. The boxes looked like -- maybe I said, "look 
like missiles," maybe not, I don't know whether I said that. 



IIMPI a^J^JFIFR 



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"We have boxes. " 

Q I guess -- 

A Ycu know, I would like to be honest and I would 
like to tell you more, but I'm really sorry, but this is such 
a long time ago and, as I said, for me, it was nothing 
really special. H^^^^I^^^^^H had notes more than me, than 
I know, because he made the arrangements. He was general 
manager and I think I don't have to ask if he knows what 
it IS, anyway. 

Q Well, let me just see if I understand what your 
testimony is. I gather you recall talking ^°^^^^B^^^^^^H 
from Tel Aviv about the cargo; is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And you told him that the boxes seemed large 
and maybe you didn't know what the — well, what did you 
tell him? 

A I'm trying to — 

Q I gather from what you said before -- 

A — remember. 

Q — that you thought that you may have told him 
that you thought it was missiles; is that right? 

A Well, as I said, the first time, we were in the 
hotel in Tel Aviv, my colleagu^^^^^^^^^^ he was on the 
telephone all the time with him and he told me that — until 
that time, I didn't know "" Jj^VkW *^f ^^*^ ^ ^^^® *^° '?° ^° 



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map 



141 



Tehran and — but he didn't tell me what cargo is and when 
I talked ^S^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ the day after, and -- 

Q That was after you had a chance to see the 
boxes, right? 

A Yes. I think, yes, it was like this, but our 
concern was really the money because he told me, "Don't do 
anything until they pay you," and I said, "Okay, now I leave 
and they don't have the money," and it was my concern. Not 
what we have — not what the cargo is like. It was really 
the money, the payment. 

Q You said a moment ago that you may have told him 
it was missiles; is that right? 
A Yes. I may have. 
Q You're not sure? 
A Not sure, no. 

Q But you do recall that you told him that there 
was something funny about the cargo; is that right? 

A I think I told nothing funny, but that we have 
off-size boxes like this, you know, and long — maybe I said 
they looked like missiles. Maybe I said this. 
Q But you're not sure? 

A I think I said this, but I'm not sure. 
Q Do you think it is more likely than not that you 
said that? 

A I don't know. I don't know. I think I mentioned 



754 





142 

"I it and -- but as I said, I think there was more concern 

2 about the money because if I would have done it without his 

3 permission to go without money, then I must be crazy because 
^ it is a business, you know. 

5 But I think that was the reason why I called, not 

6 what kind of cargo. It was only if he agrees -- if I fly 

7 without money, if I fly without this payment, this 

8 downpayment . 

9 Q Who did you understand the customer was on this 

10 flight? 

11 A I don't know. I didn't ask^f^^^HH He must 

12 have known the customer. The Israelis, of course, because 

13 they had to pay me; they were supposed to pay me, the company. 

14 Q Did you understand it was the Israeli Government? 

15 A Must have been. 

16 Q Did you think it was the United States Government? 

17 A No, but the Israeli Government must have been 

18 because -- you need — to do such a deal between two parties 

19 which are not involved -- which are against, you have to 

20 have probably -- must come from government. 

21 Q And you -- 

22 A The deal must have been between the government. 

23 Q Did you think that Mr. Schwimmer was associated 

24 with the Israeli Government? 
A Yes. 



25 



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'U 



Q Were there any special insurance arrangments 
made for the flight to Tehran in November? 

A No. 

Q Did the question of insurance come up at all? 

A No. I think it came up very quickly, the whole 
thing. 

Q How did it come up? What was discussed about the 
insurance? 

A Oh, no, insurance, not at all. I mean, the 
flight itself came up -- 

Q Oh, I understand. 

A — very quickly so it wouldn't have been time, 
really, to do this. They would have no -- I think there 
would have been no time, really, to have -- 

Q I'm sorry, I misunderstood you. 

Do you recall any discussion in Tel Aviv about 
trying to take two of ^^^^^^^^^^H planes in, taking both 
planes in through formation flying? 

A No . No . 

Q Do you recall any discussion about repainting 
the -- 

A No. 

Q -- U.S. -registered plane so to disguise its 
identity? 

A No . I never come uc 



I'MPI 






756 





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Q Did anyone describe the cargo to you or say that 
the cargo should be referred to as oil-drilling equipment? 
A How was that — I think I did it myself. 
Q Did you hear anything about references to the 
cargo as oil-drilling equipment? 

A Sounds to me familiar, but I think I put general 
cargo on. Maybe they're telling me that, but oil-drilling 
equipment to -- Tehran, they have oil. 

I think it is possible, but I heard something 
about this. 

Q You can't place the reference; is that right? 
A No, I can't place the reference. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Was that at the time or was that 
sometime later that you heard this reference to 
oil-drilling equipm.ent? 

THE WITNESS: I think it was in Mr. Schwimmer's 
office. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Was that in the form of some 
advice to you? 

THE WITNESS: I think so, yes, because I said, 
look, when I land^^^^^^^^f I need the cargo manifest and 
I have to present it to the people^H^^^^H They need it; 
they want it. What do I put in? Maybe he said put in 
oil-drilling equipment, but — I think it was there. 






757 



MBm 



145 



1 BY MR. CAROME: 

2 Q I take it never occurred to you that it was 
^ oil-drilling equipment that you were shipping, did it? 
^ A No, no. I flew oil-drilling equipment -- 

5 Q And this didn't look at all like oil-drilling 

6 equipment, did it? 

7 A No. No. I don't know, maybe it's possible, but 

8 I never seen it. 

9 Q You've never seen oil-drilling equipment that 

10 looked like this, had you? 

11 A That's correct, yes. 

12 MR. CAROME: If you have some questions, why don't 

13 you go ahead. 

14 MR. WOODCOCK: I have just a couple of questions. 

15 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

16 BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

17 Q When you were in Tel Aviv, who paid your hotel? 

18 You and the crew? 

19 A I really can't remember. It was — I'm sure that 

20 I paid it once. But was the first time or the second time, 

21 I don't know, because I have forgotten my — I have forgotten 

22 the bill once and — you know, to take along because the 

23 company will pay me back, so we sent a telex there and then 

24 after two weeks, the bill ceune , but I cannot remember was it 
pc the first flight or the second fliahi^^r both, really, where 



758 



wsmw 



146 



^ I had to pay the hotel. 

2 MR. CAROME: I think you may be confusing his 

3 question. I think he asked about the hotel in Tel Aviv. 
^ THE WITNESS: Oh, Tel Aviv, I did. 

5 MR. WOODCOCK: You did? 

6 THE WITNESS: Yes. I thought you were talking 

7 about Tehran. 

8 BY .MR. WOODCOCK: 

9 Q Are you familiar with a cargo airline by the 

10 neune of Gemini? 

11 A Yes, I heard the name. 

12 Q Do you know where it's located? 

13 A No. There was a company, English company, with 

14 this name, but I don't know where they are located, but you 

15 are probably talking about another company. 

16 Q Do you know of one that's associated with the 

17 African country of Guana? 

18 A You are talking about DC-0? 

19 Q It might be. 

20 A Well, I heard — I really don't know. There 

21 was -- when we were^^^^^^^^^f with this airplane, our 

22 hangar was there, and when all this was in newspaper, 

23 somebody said that — you know, in the newspaper, they 

24 mentioned that we went continuously like this and I heard then 

25 that somebody else went to Tehran. It was a DC-8 and 



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registered, I think, at least in the blginning, it was 
registered in Africa, someplace, and I think he was -- the 
owner was Persian or French, but I don't know if it's true. 

Q Do you associate that with Gemini? 

A No, they -- different name — Volkan Air, but 
maybe he has changed -- somebody told me that he went there, 
or is it this airline -- what was the name of this -- I think 
it is an American owner -- do you have any more information? 

Q No. 

A I heard there was another airplanej^^^^^^^^^Hand 
there are some funny airplanes sometimes, you know, that 
one airplane operating and they're owned more or less -- and 
I also heard that he went to Tehran with arms, but I 
don't know for whom. I think he was flying for the Polish -- 
from Poland. 

Q All right. 

A By the way, we had also applications from -- in 
our of f ice^^^^^^^^^H-- to to Tehrat^^^^^^^^^^H 
they are looking for airplanes that are available because 
nobody is interested in this, but anyway, it was -- it goes 
through a broker anyway. The broker will pay you and then -- 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q While we'et) on this subject of other airlines, I 
have one airline I wanted to ask you about. Do you know 



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148 



Have you ever 



anything about 
heard that name? 

A Yes, I heard it. 

Q Do you know where they're located? 
A I don't know if they still exist. I think that -- 
you know, the second airplane we had, which was leased to us, 
I think it came from there. I think it was flying for 
^^^^H- for this -- or it was a private owner and -- I might 
be wrong now because there are so many different airlines. 
I think this airplane came from there. 
Q This is the leased airplane? 

A Yes, but this was sold -- this airplane -- if it 
is the same, I am not sure, but I think it Ccime from! 

Or maybe there were more airplanes. It was under 
for sale, and the American bought it. 

Q You said,^^^^^^^^^^' I said — are you -- my 
question was about^ 

A Oh, no, that 

No, no, that ws 
think it is the same place 

MR. WOODCOCK: 
out ^^^^^^^K>r was headquarteredl 

THE WITNESS: I think it was 
engineer, I think he was flying there. He would know it, 

niple times, but he 




Our flight 



I think he was there foj 



: he was there for .acftu 



761 



KfflW 



149 



pulled out long time ago. 

MR. CAROME: He was flying with which? 
THE WITNESS: 
MR. CAROME: I see. 

THE WITNESS: ^B^^^^^M'- ^ think they are conning 
and going -- so many small airlines, so -- with one 
airplane and they are flying for half year and they cease 
operation — no. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q All right, on another subject, when you first 
arrived in Tel Aviv for this November 1985 flight, was there 
any discussion at all about the destination out of Tel Aviv 
being someplace other than Tehran? Was the initial plan 
to take it to another countryl 

A No, no, no, but this place you mention in the 
beginning, I think they talked about this, but I can be wrong 
now. Maybe it was on the first flight. Tabriz. 

Q Tabriz, you remember -- 

A Tabriz. I'm not sure now, was it the first time 
or the second time? They were talking about this, but not 
seriously, actually, to land there. 

Q And you don't know anything about why they might 
have changed the destination from Tabriz to Tehran; is that 
right? 

A No, but maybe there's no fuel. 



762 



BNttiSSStPlfiT 



150 



1 Q It might have been a fueling requirement? 

2 A I think they have problems with fuel. Tabriz was 

3 an airport open for everybody now, I think, and now in Iran, 

4 they only use Tehran -- or they still go there probably, but 

5 they have difficulties there. 

g Q Difficulties getting fuel there? 
-J A Fuel and everything there. Yes. 

o Q Do you remember a discussion there about, at the 
g time, about not being able to go to Tabriz because of a 
•]Q refueling problem? 

A I think -- but I'm not sure whether the first or 
the second, really, I get mixed up a little bit, but 
I think it was myself that said, "It's probably no good to 
go there because of fuel," because I heard from somebody 
else that they have no fuel or they have other problems. 
Q What other problems? 

A Like, let's say, no -- you cannot do an instrument 
landing. You know, you can only land in daytime or something. 
I heard it from a person who was flying. Tabriz is not good 
anymore. If you get there at night, it is no good. 

Q And as I understand what you're saying, on either 
one or the other flight, there was some discussion -- 
A Yes. 

Q -- about possibly going to Tabriz -- 
A Yes. ._-. 



763 





151 



^ Q -- an<^ yo" can't remember whether it was the first 

2 flight back in August — 

3 A That is correct, yes. 

4 Q -- or the November '85 flight. 

5 A Yes. And I don't know from whom it came from — 

6 who talked about this, maybe it was -- was it the Israelis 

7 or was it somebody from our side, I don't know, but I heard 

8 it, I heard a discussion of it — that it was no good. 

9 Q 'Did you ever fly into Iran again after your -- 

10 A No. 

11 Q — November 1985? 

12 No? 

13 A No. 

14 Q Are you aware of any^^^^^^^^Hf lights into -- 

15 A No. 

16 Q -- Iran after 1985? 

17 A No. We were there only twice. 

18 MR. CAROME: I think that's all we have. 

19 Okay. 

20 MR. WOODCOCK: Before we go off the record, I 

21 want to thank you for coming all the way here and sitting 

22 through all this. You should be aware, as I think you 

23 probably are, that your English is excellent. 

24 THE WITNESS: Oh, no, I wish it were better. I 

25 am really tired, you know. To me, it is now midnight almost. 



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But -- maybe it is not much, but on the other hand, I don't 
want to speculate, but this probably caused complications, 
however . 

MR. WOODCOCK: Well, we appreciate your coming. 

THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 

MR. CAROME: Thank you very, very much. 
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the deposition was concluded.] 




765 



UHiHSSA 




P\GE 1 

DEPOSITION OF JAMES R. RADZIMSKI 
Wednesday. April 29. 1937 

United States Senate 
Select Committee on Secret 
Ml I Itary Assistance to Iran 
and the Nlcaraguan 
Res I stance 
Wash I ngton . D . c . 
Deposition of JAMES R. RADZIMSKI. caned as a 
witness by counsel for the Senate Select Committee, 
commencing at 9:35 a.m.. at the offices of the Select 
committee. Room SH-90,. Hart SenateOff.ee Building. 

Washington D r «-►,.>. ,^ 

9 on. D. c.. the witness having been duly sworn by 

RAYMOND HEER 



M, a Notary Public in and for the D,str,ct of 
-oceedlngs taken down by Stenom; 
HEER. in, and transcribed under his direction, 



Columbia, the proceedings taken down by Stenomask by RAVMOND 



ammB 

Partially Dedassified/ Released on 
under provisions of £.0, 



"1 






17 m55; 



^ ^^^-^^kS^mMm^^m ^— ^ 



766 




APPEARANCES: 

.On behalf of the Senate Select Comm I t tee ; 
MARK, A. BELNICK, ESQ. 
VICTORIA NOURSE, ESQ. 

On behalf of the House Select Committee: 
CLARK B. HALL, ESQ. 
DIANE DORNAN, ESQ. 
ALSO PRESENT: 

C. DEAN MC GRATH, JR.. ESQ. 
PETER KEISLER, ESQ. 
White House Counsel 



oiffiMD 



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PAGE 3 



CONTENTS 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE 



W 1 TNESS 






SENATE COMMITTEE HOUSE 


James R. 


Radz Imsk 1 




By 


Mr . 


Bel nick 


4 


By 


Ms. 


Dornan 




By 


Mr . 


Belnick 


8 


By 


Ms. 


Oornan 


i 


By 


Mr . 


Bein Ick 


49 


By 


Ms. 


Dornan 




By 


Mr . 


Be In Ick 


53 


By 


Ms. 


Dornan 


EXHIBITS 


EXHIBIT NUMBER 


FOR IDENTIFICATION 


Radz Imsk 1 


1 




38 


Radz Imsk 1 


2 




86 



49 



52 



94 



wkmm- 



768 




PAGE 4 

PROCEED I NGS 
Whereupon , 

JAMES R. RADZIMSKI 
was ca I led as a witness by counsel for the Senate Select 
Committee and, having been duly sworn by the Notary Pub I ic. 
was examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE 
BY MR. BELNiCK: 

Q Jim, would you state your ful I name for the 
record? 

A James Raymond Radzlmskl. 

Q By whom are you now employed? 

A I am w I th TRW . 

Q But prior to that you were with the NSC staff' 

A That I s correct . 

Q That Is the NSC, an arm of the National Security 
Counc I I ? 

A Yes. 

Q What was your position? 

A I was an administrative support special 1st for tne 



Q During what period of time? 

A From August of 1983 through October of 1936. 

Q And what were your responsibilities as an 



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PAGE 5 



administrative suDDort specialist? 

- A I was responsible for the administrative, NSC 
administrative correspondence within System l\Oand I also 
assisted the Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, Ken 
deGraf f enre I d , on an administrative basis. 

Q Would you describe what you mean by System iv. i 
take It the four there is a Roman numeral four? 

A That I s correct . 

Q Would you please describe what you mean by System 
IV? 

A I was charged with the responsibility of 
maintaining the original document file for any System IV 
material that was originated by NSC staff principals, 
forwarded to the National Security Advisor and then returneca 
with a dec I s i on . 

Q What Is System IV? At the NSC, what is a System 
IV document? 

A A System IV document Is a correspondence from an 
NSC principal to the National Security Advisor which dealt 
primarily with either covert actions or sensitive 
Intelligence operations or matters. 

Q Now you said you maintained the original file for 
System IV documents, correct? 

A Correct . 



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Q Where was that file malhtalned? 
- A That file was malhtalned In Room 300. 

Q Room 300 of the Old Executive Office Bui iding? 

A The Old Executive Office Building, correct. 

Q You said you had -- 

A I had two Mosler-type safes which were the actual 
storage for the material. 

Q Who had access to those safes? 

A Access to the safes primarily was mine; however, 
the combinations were maintained In an additional safe witnm 
300, and access could be granted by any particular Individual 
that worked In the office. 

Q Access could be granted by whom? 

A We I I , access would -- 

Q I wasn't clear. You said access could be granted 
by any -- 

A Access to the System IV material could be obtained 
by any one within the office, any Individual that worked in 
Room 300. They knew where the combinations were and they 
knew the location of it and so forth. 

Q Now how many people worked In Room 300 during the 
roughly three years that you were in your position? 

A Let me count. Why don't I just name names and 
then count that way. 



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771 



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PAGE 7 



Why don't you tel I me who was there in 1985. 

A In 1935 there was, of course. Ken deGraf f enre i c3 
There was vince Cannlstraro. There was, I believe, David 
Major. There was Gilbert Rye. 



Q 

A 
Bart lett 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 



Would you spel I that last name? 

R-y-e. There was Patricia Rawson and June 



Was June Bartlett Mr. deGraf f enre I d ' s secretary' 
Yes, she was. 

And who was Patricia Rawson? 
Patricia Rawson, the secretary for Gil Rye. 
Who was he? 

He was the director for soace programs. 
And David Major? 

David Major was Deputy Director for intelligence. 
And, of course, In addition to those persons you 
have Just mentioned you worked in Boom 300 as well. 
A That is correct. 
Q Who worked In — 

A I'm sorry. There is one individual that came in. 
and that was Kathy Gibbs. She was secretary for Vince 
Cann I straro . 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE 
BY MS. DORNAN: 



UNffLTSW 



772 



\m?] 



^ PAGE 8 

Q Jim. didn't other people also have access to that 
safe? My recollection Is that In particular emergencies they 
could come over; 

A That Is correct. I'm sorry. That Is correct. 
Thank you. The combinations were also maintained by George 
Van Eron as the Director for the NSC Secretariat. They were 
In a sealed envelope. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Were the same persons who you mentioned employed 
In Room 300 during 1986, during that period of 1986 while you 
were there? 

A Gil Rye was not. He was an active duty Air Force 
Individual that retired and his replacement was Gerry May -- 
M-a-y . 

Q Otherwise the persons in that room were the same' 

A Correct . 

Q And the same procedures were followed with respect 
to System IV document filing In 1985 as they were in 1986' 

A That Is correct. 

Q You left the NSC on October 25, 1986? 

A Correct. I believe right around that date. 

Q And you were succeeded In your position by Brian 
Merchant? 



By Br I an Merchant . 



/ 



773 



UNCLASmU. 



PAGE 9 



Q Now let's go back to the orocedures that you 
f o I howed In filing System IV documents . \ f there was a 
change wh I le you were there from 1983-on I am Interested in 
the years '85 and '86. But why don't I ask you did you 
follow the same procedures throughout your tenure with the 
NSC staff? 

A Yes. I did. 

Q And what were the procedures you fol lowed for 
f I I ing System IV documents and making records of their 
ex I stence? 

A After an Item that was identified to be In System 
IV was originated, It would be delivered to me with one cooy 

Q Who would del Iver It to you? 

A It would either be del Ivered by the secretary of 
the Individual that originated It and could be delivered by 
the originator or I myself may go down to receive It. 

Q And that was the original that was given to you'' 

A That was the original. Subseduent to that i wou i 3 
Immediately enter it onto a computer system that was an 
eiectronics record of the particular item, and i would 
Identify It — what the subject was and so forth, and who t^e 
action officer was -- accordingly. i would take the copy a^c 
I would immediately Indicate that as a suspense copy and put 
that in a file on a temporary basis, and i would begin then 



UHtttSSfflfB 



774 



uNWsm 



to deliver the original to the Intended recipient. 

1^ 't was headed for the National Security 
Advisor, then it would normally go to the Executive 
Secretary's office and they would in turn forward it ud 
through the chain, if you will, that being to the Decuty ana 
then to the National Security Advisor. 

Subsequent to that, i could either be called to 
say that it was ready for pickup, that the action had been 
completed. If It was an action item, or It could be sent back 
down to the Executive Secretary's office, who would, i 
believe, note It so that he was aware of what action was 
taken, if it was an action memorandum, and i would be called 
from his office, go over to his office, receive the item. 
bring It back to my office, record the result or the 
decision, whichever. Into the computer file, make a copy of 
those. If It was an action memorandum and It had a decision 
at the end whether approve or disapprove. 

Let's say that it was three pages long. i would 
make a copy of the last page unless some of the other pages 
had a marginalia and make a copy of that response or 
decision. Also I would make a copy of -- we had at the NSC 
staff a routing slip that Identified the people that they 
normal iy Initialed on, and l would make a copy of that. And 
If there were any other notes attached to it and so forth i 



mm 



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PAGE 1 1 



would make a copy of those. 

I would then take the original, with all the 
original notes, the original routing slip and so forthfrana 
place It Into the safe that held the System iv files. i 
would remove the suspense copy that had been there, attach 
the copy of the notes or decision on It from the original 
that I had made, and forward those In a sealed envelope back 
to the originator so that he was aware of what the final 
results were and so forth and have a complete copy. If you 
will, with all the transactions of the original. 

Q Did you make any entries In the computer when you 
got the original back? 

A Yes, yes, I did that prior to making the Xerox 
copies or anything. 

Q We w I I I talk about the computer entries In a 
moment, but let me understand a little better the procedure, 
the procedure you Just described. was that procedure 
supposed to be followed for all System IV documents that were 
going to the National Security Advisor? 

A Correct. 

Q Did you have a procedure for tracking when you got 
back the original and whether you had received back the 
or I g I na I ? 

A I would, as far as a set procedure was concerned. 






776 



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PAGE 12 



I would somewhat follow up, I guess you would say, on a 
weekJy basis of going though my file and see what items were 
In suspense and then trying to determine where those may 
still be had . 

Q And did you do that regularly? 

A As regularly as I could. 

Q What does that mean? 

A Wei I . I mean that I can't say -- I did it maybe 
sixty to seventy percent of the time. I didn't do It 
continual ly. I would sometimes get busy and not have time to 
do It and so forth and stuff like that. Or If I could 
Identify maybe one or two additional I terns that had been 
added to System IV since I had done the check and there was 
no further update, let's say. on two previous occasions of 
trying to track one particular Item, then I would not foi low 
It up. I would Just assume that It was still -- let's say 
for three weeks it had been with Admiral Polndexter; 1 would 
assume that it was st l l l there. So 1 did not do anything 
else as far as following up. 

Q Well, did you have a procedure that if a certain 
amount of time elapsed and you st I l i hadn't received back fie 
original you would check its whereabouts? 

A Yes, I would do that. Here again, I determined 
where It would be. and If it was with the National Security 



le , and If It was w I 



777 




PAGE 13 



Advisor, the Deputy or Secretary, the general comment would 
probably be, you know, that they are still holding it or they 
have a lot of other material. There was a hold file, that 
type of thing. And i would not follow It up any more. 

Q Explain to me. Let me ask was there ever an 
occasion In which you didn't get back, that you knew you 
hadn't gotten back the original of a System iv document? 

A Yes. 

Q How many times did that happen? 

A I can't specifically say with any certainty, but 
there were Quite a few occasions where originals did not 
return . 

Q And what was the excuse you were given on those 
occas Ions? 

A Well, the normal comment, particularly If they 
were somewhat dated or that they were a couple of months old 
or whatever, it seemed as though there was a general 
statement that many people have things out that are still 
outstanding, not only with my particular system but with 
other systems, and that Is that eventually the stuff will be 
returned to you. You know, people will start to go through 
their hold baskets, their pending baskets — this type of 
thing — and they will start coming out. And this did occur 
throughout the whole time that I was there. 



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PAGE 14 



Q Who was your Invned I ate supervisor? 
- A Ken deGraf f enre I d . 

Q Had Ken deGraf f enre I d given you any instructions, 
general Instructions, about whether you were supposed to get 
back all originals sooner or later? 

A As best as I can recall. I'm sure that he probably 
said make sure that you always get the original back, should 
I t ever be reca i I ed . 

Q Unt I I you got an original back of a System IV 
document, did you preserve the suspense copy? 

A Yes. 

Q So that If an original never came back the 
suspense copy would remain In the suspense file forever? 

A That Is correct. 

O And If you put out. If you Just hypothet lea I 1 y . if 
an original document was out as of 1985 and hadn't come back 
as of October 25, 1986, the copy would have still been in 
your suspense file as of October 25. 1986. the day you left? 

A That's correct, as long as I received a copy of 
the original, I had a copy of the original — I would have 
the copy In the file and there would be a computer record of 
I t . 

Q Now let's talk for a moment about the computer 
records. You are now speaking to someone who can only turn 



wmm 



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PAGE 15 



on a light by turning the switch, and that's as much as i 
understand, and so you will have to be gentle. Old you have 
^T /^ ^ terminal with a screen, things like that? Tell me what 
this comouter system was, describe it for me in terms that 
even i can understand. 

A Okay. I had an IBM. I think It was a 3278 IBM 
l^^^erm I na I , and a keyboard, and It was tied into a ma i r ^j ame 
which was located on the other side of the Old Executive 
Office Building. And not being a computer specialist myself 
either, System iv was maintained in a manner that access 
could only be by, number one, certain people that had the 
passwords or the key words to get into it. 

Q Get into the computer systeni? 

A To get Into System IV. i wli l refer to the 
computer file as System iv. Plus, NSC advised WHCA — 

Q That ■ s W-H-C-A7 

A White House Communications Office had malntainea 
the system l believe it was via a memorandum that said where 
System IV could be brought on line, such as It could be 
brought on my terminal, which was identified by a number and 
a location, and one or two other terminals throughout the nsc 
or the White House complex. And I think there was a i 1st of 
people also who were authorized to access. 

Q And to access the computer file did you have to 



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PAGE 16 



use the terminal in your office? 

- A No. As I said, there were, I think, two other 
term I na I s . 

Q You did say that. 

A That were authorized to use System iv. 

Q Where were they? 

A One was In the West wing of the White House 
basement and the other one was located In the NSC 
Secretar i at . 

Q Under whose Jurisdiction was the basement terminal 
over In the West wing? Was there somebody there all the 
t Ime? 

A Yes. 

O Who was that during 1985 and 1986? 

A It would have been Brian Merchant. 

Q And how about the other terminal? 

A That was located in Room 381, the NSC Secretariat, 
and that would have been George Van Eron. 

Q In both '85 and '86? 

A Yes. 

Q Now when you entered a System (V document into tne 
comouter file, what entries did you make? Did you put the 
System IV number? 

A Correct. I would enter the System IV number. 



UNCtSSS 



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PAGE 17 



Q The date of the document? 

A- The date of the document. 

Q The author? 

A The author . 

Q And the addresses? 

A The addressee. 

Q What else? 

A The classification of it, the subject, a few key 
words of what the Item was, and then I would also enter on 
the second page -- there were three pages to the computer 
file. The second page i would list the author again and i 
would I 1st the addressee and what action was to be taken, 
along with the date that it went to that individual. 

Q The date that you sent the original on? 

A Correct . 

Q Were those al l the entries that you made when you 
got an original document? 

A Correct. 

Q Now when you received the original back I think 
you told me before that you made an additional entry or 
entries into the computer file, correct? 

A Correct . 

Q What additional entry or entries did you make when 
you received back the original? 



mmm 



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PAGE 18 



A Okay. What I would do It go to the second page of 
the eomputer file. I would, by alphabetic code indicate tnat 
the person had seen It. I'd enter their name again. I'd 
enter the date, and I 'd enter what action had been taken oy 
that Individual. And then I would Just indicate that 
particular item was closed -- in other words, no further 
act I on . 

Q Now typical ly would you have occasion once you 
made the entry that the document was closed, would you 
typically have occasion to go back to the file on that 
document again or not? 

A No . I would not, unless someone asked for It. 

O Someone asked for what' 

A For the document. 

Q So to f I nd the document you would locate It by 
using the computer file? 

A Correct . 

Q As opposed to going back to where you had stored 
the hard copies? 

A Well. It could be either way. 

Q Wei I , Just so I know, how would you decide whicn 
to use? 

A If I was given the System IV number, I would 
obviously go right to the file and then go to the computer. 



wffm 



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PAGE 19 



if I was not. but was given a general Idea of what the I tern 
was^ I would go to the computer and then go to the file. 

Did you ever erase any of the entries that you 
made on your computer at any time while you were employed at 
the NSC staff? 

MR. MC GRATH: Let me ask do you mean by "erase" 
erase the whole file or part of the Information in it? 

MR. BELNICK: Erase a document from the file, from 
the computer file, erase the entry. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm sure I had. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Was that something -- well, how many times did 
that happen, as best as you can remember? 
A I can't remember. 

Q It wasn't a frequent occurrence? 
A No. 

Q Can you recal I what occasioned you to erase a 
document entry from your computer system? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 

A Just before l departed the NSC i -- not 
reconstructed -- l had gone through ail the CA Findings that 
we had and assured that they were entered properly and put 
the file back together. If you will, in a more easily 

cliEjfy 



ilMlf 



784 



m. 



TOP SECRET 



PAGE 20 



readable manner, I guess you would say. 

- Q You are talking about covert action Findings? 

A Yes. 

Q And when did you do that? 

A This was August, probably, through September. 

Of 36? 

A Correct . 

Q Did anyone ask you to do that? 

A I had talked to I think it was Vince Cannistraro 
and told him that I was going to be doing this. 

Q was I t your Idea? 

A Yes. 

Q Had you done It before? 

A I had reconstructed some other type f I les before. 

Q What caused you to want to do this on the Findings 
file at that t ime? 

A The reason that I had decided to do this was, 
number one. we had Just recently had our office spaces 
totally refurbished. There was a time that l no longer had 
any safes. The area was now considered a SC I F , so safes were 
being removed because the place actually turned out to be a 
little bit smaller. We didn't have the room. And everyone 
was attempting, or were supposed to be attempting, to 



somewhat go through the files and get them straightened out 



785 






PAGE 2 1 



and out them into a more manageable order. 

" Q So I t was basically file efficiency that led you 
to do I t? 

A Correct . 

Q Now did you erase any documents from the computer 
file as part of this process? 

A As best I can be l I eve I may very we l l have done 
one or some only because some of the dates or some of the 
things, whatever. I may have found were not exactly correct 
and so forth. 

O But something that you erased at that time would 
have been something that you put back In another file at the 
same t Ime? 

A Correct, exactly. 

Q So It wasn't that you took an entry and sent it 
out of the system completely; you Just were revising It or 
putting it In a different form but staying in the computer? 

A Correct. If i could tell you how i did that, i 
would take the actual document and go through the computer 
entry that was there and see how everything matched up. if 
there were a few discrepancies or maybe a few items were not 
Indicated that I felt should have been and so on and so 
forth, I would write these down and then i would go back in. 
I would clear out of that I tern and then I would go back and i 



wm7> 



786 









PAGE 22 



would remake the wnole entry and Include these items. And 
then" I matched the two together, made sure I had everthing 
exactly the same, and then delete the former out. 

Q Now leaving this process aside, which I understana 
did not result In deletion of any substantive entry from the 
System -- correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Do I understand that you typically did not — 
strike "typically" -- you did not erase document entries from 
the computer system or delete them, whatever the appropriate 
term I s7 

A That Is correct. I did not. 

Q So that If you entered a document in your computer 
file for System IV In 1985 that entry would have still been 
there as of October 25. 1986 when you left? 

A That I s correct . 

Q And that would have been true for documents that 
you entered as of 19837 

A That I s correct . 

MR. MC GRATH; If I might ask one follow-up 
question. if a document was entered In a suspense and there 
was a decision made of no action, affirmatively not to do 
something, what would happen to the file In that Instance' 

THE WITNESS: Let me understand. I enter an item 




787 







PAGE 23 



and then It comes back and there's no action on it? if tne 
original comes back, I keep the original. I would keen the 
or I g I na I , def I n'l te I y . 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q And you would make an entry In the computer, 
correct? 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 



Correct . 

And that entry would be preserved? 

Correct . 

Just like all other entries? 

Correct . 

Tell me what the System IV control number 
procedure was In 1985 and 1986. 

A The procedure was that at the beginning of each 
year we would start over. it was run throughout the year, 
and If an individual had created a system for a document ne 
or his secretary would ca i I me on the phone and they would 
say that they are originating a System IV document and they 
need a number . 

I would take the next number, tell them what it 
was, and then I would write the originator's name down next 
to that. The item would be created and it would come back 
through me and the process would go on. That is basical ly 
how I t worked . 



lH^iMy^Mj 



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PAGE 24 



Q All right. You would enter the number when you 
rece-lved the original of the document, or would you give the 
numOer to the requestor? 

A I would give the number to the requestor. There 
was Just a piece of paper to maintain or to assign the next 
number. I would not do any computer additions or anything 
i il<e that unt I I I actual ly had the I tern in my hand. 

Q Were there cases In which a number you gave out 
was not used? 

A Yes . 

Q And what would happen In those instances? 

A What would happen Is someone would ca I I up and 
receive a number, and if I didn't get something, a copy or an 
original, within a few days l called them and asked them what 
state are we in here. And i would be told, on some 
occasions, that the number was not uti I I zed . I would say 
okay, and I would Just take and l l ne it out on the paper that 
I had maintained. The number would not be reused; it would 
be cance i I ed out . 

Q Did that happen at al I In the case of 01 Iver North 
or his secretary? 

A Yes. 

What do you recall? 

A All i recall Is the fact that on several occasions 



•;*> 



789 



UNl'MSm 



PAGE 25 



— "several" being maybe two or three occasions, maybe as 
many-as five -- that i would be Informed that a number was 
not ut I I I zed . 

Q And who Informed you of that? 

A HIS secretary . 

Q Fawn Ha 11 7 

A Correct . 

Q On any of those occasions do you remember what the 
subject matter was of a proposed document? Let me strike 
that and ask it to you this way. Do you recall Fawn Hall 
tel I I ng you that she wanted to cancel a number that you had 
given her to use on a document relating to Central America? 

A I can't say for certain. i can't. 
BY MS. DORNAN: (Resuming) 

Q Jim, ordinarily you didn't know the subject matter 
when you gave out that number? 

A That Is correct. I did not ask them what the 
subject was. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q That I understand. That is why l asked him if ne 
recalled Fawn Hall telling him that a document was relating 
to Central America. 

A No , I can ■ t . 

Q Did North have access to System IV originals 






790 



uNtussm 



PAGE 26 



without going through you or deGraf f enre I d Insofar as you 
know? 

A As far as I know, no. And In regard to once It 
was put Into my file, no. 

Q Did North ever ask you to produce an original for 
him wh I le you were at the NSC staff? 

A I think he may nave, yes. 

Q When? 

A I'm trying to recall one specific Item. I think 
this was In 1984, and I think this doesn't pertain — 

It doesn't pertain to Central America? 

A Correct . 

Q I t d Idn ■ t? 

A I t d Id not . 

Q Did It pertain to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Did you get back the original? 

A Yes. 

Q Aside from that Instance did North ever ask you 
for an original System IV document? 

A Not that I can recal l , no. 

Q Did Fawn Hall ever ask you for an original System 
IV document? 

A She had asked me to retain or obtain an original 



wmmm 



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UNCUSW 



PAGE 27 



System IV that was put Into the system that was not Dack into 
the /lie, I should say, in other words. 

Q You lost me. 

A What I mean was a System IV I tern was originated Dy 

IP I Iver North, given to me, and sent across for, let'i say, 
the National Security Advisor? and she would come and say we 
need to get that Back because we want to make some changes. 
And then i would go get It and bring it back to them. 
Changes would be made, but then it would go right Back into 
the system. That is the only occasion that I can reeai I . 

Q These were changes that were made after the 
document had been routed to the National Security Advisor? 

A Before. 

Q Aside from those instances — and were those 
ca I I ed redos? 

A Yes. 

Q When I see an NSC System iv document with "redo" 
In the upper righthand corner, is that the kind of thing you 
Just described occurring? 

A Yes. 

Q Aside from redos, did Fawn Hall ask you for 
original System IV documents? 

A No, I don't believe so. 

Q How about Bud McFariane or his secretary, Wiima 



mmvm 



792 





PAGE 23 



Hall, aside from any redos? 

- A I dont recall soeclficaMy either one -- we II, it 
would be Wi ima Hal I , actual ly. 

Q You never were asked by Bud McFariane? 

A No. I don't recall any by Wlima Hall specifically 
to the Central America or Iran. 

Q How about Admiral Polndexter? 

A He did not, no, and any request would basically 
come via his secretary, Flo Ghant, and I don't recall any. 

Q You filed the hard copies of System IV documents 
In the safes in your office? 

A Correct. 

Q Can you give us an estimate of how many drawers 
the System IV documents for 1985 took up in those safes? 

A In 1985 I would say maybe two and a half. 

Q Approximately how many pages of material? 

A I be I I eve 1985 was the year that we went over, 
Just over 1200 System IV documents. 

Now where did you file hard copies of covert 
act Ion F I nd I ngs? 

A I had separate folders for any covert action 
F I nd I ngs . 

Q And were they maintained In the same safe as 
System IV documents? 



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PAGE 29 



A They were in the same safe, but they were a 
separate file tota i ly . 

O Now we are all familiar nowadays with the Finding 
that the Pr-esident signed In January 1986 relating to the 
Iran program. Do you know what I'm referring to? 
A Yes . 

O There was a Finding signed apparently on January 
17, 1987. 

MR. MC GRATH: ' 86 . 

MR. BELNICK: '86, yes, excuse me. l can't 
disclose the 1987 Finding. 
(Laughter . ) 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q There was one on January 17, 1986, and then 
apparently one was signed on January 6 or 7, 1986. Did you 
have either of those Findings, do you recall. In your file'' 
A No, I did not. 

Q When did you learn about either one or both of 
those signed Findings? 

A When they were disclosed In the newspapers. 
Q Do you recall whether you had In your files a 
Finding relating to Iran and weapons to Iran dated around 
November 25 or November 28, of 19857 

A I'm sorry. Could you repeat that? 



mmsm 



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PAGE 30 



^ 



Q Have you seen reoorted In the newsoapers or in tne 
Tower Board report that there was at least a proposed covert 
action Finding relating to Iran in late November 1985? 

A Yes. I ' ve seen that in the Tower report. 

Q Old you ever see It anyplace else? 

A No. I d I d not . 

Q You did not have such a Finding In your f 1 les? 

A Not that I reca II. no . 

Q At any time before you left the NSC did anyone asK 
you for a Finding or whether you had In your files a Finding 
relating to an Iran arms program? 

A No . 

Now I understand that you received a ca I I after 
the November 1986 disclosures from Srian Merchant asking you 
a question about a Finding; correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Would you please tell us about the conversation -- 
when It was and what Brian asked you and what you told him'' 

A He had called me at work and Inquired as to 
whether or not I knew of or was aware that an Iran Finding 
dated sometime in January was located, and i told him no, i 
don ■ t know anything about It. I had never seen it. 

I had none on f I le. and I stated to him that 
possibly, If anyone had It. the Agency would have itT and 



UNGUtSSn 



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PAGE 3 1 



that was the end of the conversation. 

Q When Is your best recol lection that this ca i i 
occurred? 

A Two or three days after it was disclosed in the 
newsDaoer , and I don't know what date that was. 

Q Two or three days after the Iran initiative was 
first disclosed In the newspaper? 

A Two or three days after It was reported in the 
newspaper that the President had signed a Finding dated 
somet h I ng in 1 986 . 

Q Do you remember whether the ca I I between you and 
Brian took place before or after the Attorney General's press 
conference when he announced that he had found a document 
showing diversion of proceeds to the contras? 

A This was after that. 

Q The ca I I from Merchant was after the Attorney 
General's press conference? 

A Yes. 

Q About how long after? 

A it was In January, maybe the early part of 
February, I think. '87. 

Q The call came in January or February 1987? 

A Yes. 

Q After that call between you and Brian did you ana 



yndfflw 



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PAGE 32 



he SDCak again about the Finding? 
- A No. 

O Did Brian call you again requesting any other 
documents or asking about any other documents? 

A Yes. 

Q When? 

A It was. let's see, in November, and I think also 
possibly In December of '86. 

Q What did he ask you for In November? 

A I don't remember spec I f I ca M y , but seeing, If you 
will, the fact that i left in October of '86 and Merchant 
steoped In and assumed my particular responsibilities about 
two days before I departed, he real ly had no corporate memory 
or know ledge of where a lot of things may be filed. If they 
weren't very obvious. 

Q Aside from those calls, which were, you know, heia 
me out, I 'm new on the Job, did he make any request to you in 
November or December that had to do with the Iran program or 
the contras or that seemed to you, in any event, to be 
related to the disclosures that were then in the newspapers? 

A I don't recall, but I think very possibly there 
may have been, yes. 

Q But you Just don't recall? 

A I Just don ■ t reca I I . 



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PAGE 33 



O Nothing stand out? 

A No. 

O Did 'you maintain a log or some other system for 
signing in or signing out original System IV documents? 

A No. 

Q How did you keep track of an original that had 
been taken out by somebody after the document had been 
through its routing and after it had been closed and someone 
came and said I et me see that original and you gave it to him 
or her? How did you keep track of who had it and when you 
got I t back? 

A Okay. When someone came to me and asked me for an 
original and I would Immediately make a copy of the item. i' 
It was leaving our office, leading Room 300. I would make a 
copy of that item and put that on file. If It was not 
leaving our office. I would go Into the computer and I wou ! a 
make an entry, reopened, who had it and the date. 

O And If you kept a copy because the document left 
your office, where did you keep the copy? What file? 

A Again, It would Just take the place of the 
original in the System iV file, again as a suspense item. 

Q Did you only make the computer entry when the 
document stayed in your office? 

A Correct. 



IINCtA$»D 



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PAGE 34 



Q So I f the document went out the only "entry" that 
you made was by making a copy of the original and putting 
that copy In the original's place; correct? 

A And also the computer entry, too. i did both. 

Q So you always made a computer entry? 

A R I ght . 

Q But the only time you would make the copy was when 
the document left the office? 

A Correct. 

Q And those computer entries were, so far as you 
were concerned, permanent entries, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q That Is, you didn't go back and erase those 
entr I es? 

A I don't believe I did. no. I think I left them 
that way. 

Q So that the computer, unless something happened to 
It after you left, should be able to tell somebody today 
which documents In 1985, which original System IV documents, 
had been signed out by somebody in 1985 and who that somebody 
was or who those somebodies were; correct? 

A Correct. 

Q The same for 1986? 

A R Ight . 



urasmi 



m 



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PAGE 35 



Q That can be gotten off the computer; is that 
correct? 

A It should be. 

Q Is that a big Job to try to get those kind of 
entries off the comouter? Let me take a document and say i 
wanted to find out how many people and who they were, if 
anyone, took out a document from System IV In 1985 and I had 
the date of the document or the control number. How long 
would It take to go to the computer and find the answer to 
that quest i on? 

A You should have a result or an answer within five 
minutes at the most, max. 

Q Now am I right also, Jim, that it was. as I 
understand from your interview, that it was a rare occurrence 
when someone asked for an original System IV document? 

A That I s correct . 

Q And I'm told, and correct me If we misunderstand 
it, aside from some occasions with North and deGraf f enre i d -- 
which we will talk about -- you only can recall, say, five 
or six times that you sent original documents out to the west 
Wing, to the Executive Secretary? 

A Correct . 

Q Now I also understand that in reference to 
deGraf fenrel d and North that there were some occasions when 



IITOOTOl 



800 



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PAGE 36 



deGraf fenre I d and North were together and deGraf f enre I d asked 
to see an original and you actually stood by while 
deGraf f enre I d and North reviewed the document. 

A Yes . 

Q I understand that none of those occasions involved 
a request for a covert action Finding. Am i still correct' 

A No, they did. 

Q They did? 

A Yes. 

Q On how many times did that occur? 

A Just on one. 

Q When was that? 

A 1984. 

Q Did It relate to Central America or Iran? 

A No. Weil, wait a minute. No, it did not relate 
to Central America. 

Q Aside from that Instance, did you recall whether 
any of the other original documents that North and 
deGraf f enre I d reviewed while you were standing there related 
to Central America or Iran? 

A To Central America I would say yes. 

Q To Nicaragua? 

A Yes . 

Q And when do you recal i them reviewing documents 



mim 



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PAGE 37 



related to Nicaragua? First of all, on how many occasions'' 

■ A There were several occasions, but i don't rememDer 
spec I f I c dates . 

Q Was It 1985 or what year was It? 

A I want to say yes, it was 1985. Dosslbiy late '85, 
early '86, maybe. I'm not certain. 

Q On how many occasions at that time In late '85 or 
early '86 did deGraf f enre I d and North come to look at an 
original document which pertained to Nicaragua? 

A Maybe no more than three. 

Q Can you recall any of the documents that they 
asked for and that you showed them on those occasions? 

A Let me think. what i am remembering is on only 
one specific document. 

Q Then tel I us what you remember. 

A That particular document was — let's see — the 
new covert action Finding on Nicaragua at that time. 1 don ■ t 
remember the date. I want to say 1985, I think it was. They 
used It for reference purposes. 

Q That's the only one you remember? 

A That Is the only one l remember. 

Q Do you recall Polndexter asking you for an 
original System I V document on any occasion? 

A Yes, at least on one occasion. 



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PAGE 38 



Q On any of ths occasions that you remember did the 

document involve Central America or Iran? 

A It did not Involve Central America or Iran. 

Q Now I understand that there came a time in late 
August or early September 1985 when a request was made to you 
by Mr. deGraf fenrel d to pull certain original System iv 
documents . 

A Correct. 

Q Would you tell us first, give us your best 
recollection of when this request was made? 

A Well, the request, I believe, was made right 
around the beginning to middle, the beginning to middle of 
September of '85. 

Q And tel I us how the request wa'^ade' and what the 
request was. 

A I was called. He called me into his office and he 
handed me a piece of paper that listed a few System iv items 
and asked me to pull those originals and give them to him. 

Q Let me stop you there and ask the Reporter to mark 
this document as Radzimski Exhibit 1. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Radzimski Exhibit 
Number 1 for Identification.) 
For the record. Exhibit 1 bears our Bates number 



the request waamade and wh« 



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PAGE 39 



N-16346. It Is a single page, a cooy of a single cage with 
handwritten notes. You have the exhibit In front of you, 
Jim. Is that a copy of the note that Mr. deQraf f enre I d 
handed you In late August or early September 19857 

A Yes. It Is. 

Q Is that the way the note looked when it was given 
to you, do you remember? 

A No. 

Q What was different about the one you saw? 

A There was no writing on the righthand side here. 

Q Let's Identify that because the record can't see 
It. Were there check marks there on the right? 

A The one word here that says "cover", that word was 
there. The word below that, which I can't read, were not 
there. 

Q 19 J-somethlng. and then — it's 19-J and then 
some other letters after J, and then It says Y-E-D-l-O-T and 
the A-H-A-R-0-N-O-T. and the P. 7. None of what I Just read 
was there when you saw the note? 

A That I s correct . 

Q Do you see the asterisk and star? 

A Yes. 

Q Were they there when you saw the note, do you 



reca I I ? 



UNCtASSm 



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PAGE 40 



A I believe they were, as best I can recall. 
" Q So that was already on the oaoer when it was 
handed to you? 

A I be I I eve so, yes . 

Q You didn't write on this paper at all? 

A NO. I did not. 

The circle around the number 401214. was that 
there when you saw the note? 

A I don't recall that being there, no. 

Oo you see check marks on the right? 

A Yes. 

Q Were they there when you saw the note, as best you 
can remember? 

A As best as i can remember. I don't think so, no. 
I don't think they were. 

Q And there appear to be little checks on the left; 
do you see those? 

A Correct. 

Q Oo you recall whether those were there when you 
saw the note? 

A They were not. 

Q Do you recognize any of the handwriting on this 



note? 



A No, I don't. 



mmsmi 



805 




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PAGE 4 1 

Q Now -- yes, 3lr7 

A - I believe the word here "cover" that i identified 
already, i beiieve-that is deGraf f enre i d ' s handwriting. 

Q Is that based upon having seen him put it there or 
Just recognizing? 

A Recognizing his handwriting. 

O Recognizing his han<lwr 1 1 1 ng? 

A Recognizing his handwriting. 

Q Now I understand that the words below "cover", i9, 
"et cetera , and the word beginning with Y and an A and so 
forth were not there when you saw it, but by any chance do 
you recognize that handwriting? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Do those words mean anything to you? 

A No, they do not. 

Q Now let's go back to the event. When we marked 
the exhibit I believe you were telling us that Mr. 
deGraf fenrald handed you what's now been marked as Exhibit i, 
and did he ask you to pui I those documents? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q Old he tel I you why? 

A No. 

Q Old he tel I you for whom? 

A No 



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PAGE 42 



Q Old he tell you by when he wanted them? 
■ A I bei I eve he said he wanted them today. 

Q Did you give him the documents? 

A No. I did not. 

Q Old you ever pu I I the documents for him? 

A No, I did not. 

Q Old he ask you for them again? 

A Yes, on at least two occasions. 

Q Two more occasions after that? 

A Yes. 

Q And what did he say on those occasions? 

A As best I recall, It was I need those documents 
that I asked you to pull and I think on the third occasion or 
the second foiiow-uD was via a note from his secretary as a 
rem I nder . 

Q June Bart I ett? 

A Yes. 

Q What did the note say? 

A I think It was have you, if you haven't pulled 
these yet, or if you haven't got these yet for deGraf fenrei d . 
he needs them. He wants them. 

Q What did you answer deGraf f enre I d on the second 
occasion when he said I need those documents? 

A As best I can recall, i Just said oh. yes, I will 



DNtAWWD 



807 




Ai)l 



Oil 



PAGE 43 



get them; I have been busy. 

0' Old you get them? 

A No. 

Q So then you got a note from June Bartiett? 

A Correct. 

Q What did you say to her? 

A I said oh, yes, he metioned this to me a couoie of 
days ago. 

Q Did you write that to her or Just say that to her? 

A I Just said that to her. 

And what did she say? 

A I don't recall If she said anything. 

Q What did you do with the note she sent you? 

A I be! I eve l threw it away. 

And I take it you didn't pull the documents In 
response to the note? 

A Correct. 

Q You never pulled the documents for Mr. 
deGraf fenreld. Is that correct? 

A That Is correct. 

Q Did you hear from him or Bartiett again, or anyone 

acting on his behalf about these documents after the note? 

A No. 

He never referred to the fact that you didnt 



mmm 



808 



utfsn 



PAGE 44 



comply with his request? 

- A No. 

Q He was your boss? 

A Yes. 

Q He was your supervisor? 

A Yes. 

Q You didn't comply with three requests he made? 

A Yes. 

Q And he r\e>/er said another word about It? 

A Nope . 

Q You saw him on occasion after that? 

A Yes. 

Q And you were able to look him straight In the 
face? 

A Yes. 

Q And he didn't say anything about them? 

A No. 

Q Were there other requests that he made to you 
during your time there that you didn't comply with? 

A Yes. 

Q Where can I get a Job with this guy? 
(Laughter . ) 
What kinds of requests were those? 

A Maybe obtain some newspaper clippings or something 



UNCtltSW! 



809 




PAGE 45 



a I ong that I I ne . 

- Q But nothing of a magnitude as significant as 
asking you for original documents and you not giving them to 
h Im? 

A Correct. 

Q Why didn't you give him the documents that he 
asked you for? 

A I felt very uneasy about doing it. 

Q Why? 

A This will probably be a long answer. 

Q Well, as long as It's accurate, go ahead. 

A At this particular time frame there was a lot of 
news media reports about the NSC or the White House assisting 
the contras, and possible. In regards to the Boland Amendment 
or not being able to assist them. We had or I had received a 
briefing by Brenda Reger to conduct a search of System iv 
documents for X amount, for a time frame, and to key In key 
words that would associate Nicaragua, North, contras, and 
some others I can't recall. 

Q She made this request to you before deGraf f enre i d 
gave you the request and the note? 

A That Is correct. 

O And Brenda Reger, for the record, her Job at the 



t ime was? 



wmm 



810 



mmm 



PAGE 46 



A She was -- she handled all of the Freedom of 
Information requests and assisted In other Congressional 
requests that she was asked to support. 

Q And do you recall that request that Brenda Reger 
made to you, the search request, related to an Inquiry that 
Congressman Barnes had Initiated concerning North's 
activities In Central America? 

A That Is correct. 

Q P I ease cont i nue. 

A So subsequent to that meeting, which included not 
only myself but representatives from each system of the NSC. 
corresponding system, we went back and I Identified X amount 
of I terns and advised Brenda Reger. As a matter of fact, i 
made a hard copy of the computer page when I Identified the 
item and she gave us a memorandum that detailed their 
research and the procedures we were to follow, and I recall i 
wrote a short note back to her and i attached those to it and 
I submitted them for her review. 

She came back to me or one of her office 
representatives came back and said that they wanted a copy of 
those I terns that I identified so that they could review the 
I terns personally. y 

Q So that who could review It -- Brenda's office? 

A Brenda's office could review the items personally. 



UNCBSSra 



811 



liNCUSMD 



PAGE 47 



I then went into the System IV files and I Dulled eacn one of 
those Items. I Xeroxed a copy of that, put the original bactc 
In the files, and forwarded copies to Brenda Reger ' s office. 
And that was, subsequent to that, probably three or four days 
after that, i Inquired as to where the copies were. 

Q Who did you ask? 

A I 'm not certain if I asked Brenda Reger herself. 
I may have asked one of the people from the office. I think 
Donna Sirko was the one that was helping Brenda pull all of 
this material together. If you will. I think I asked her. 
But the response that I received back was that they were with 
Paul Thompson, i believe, and I made the statement, well, I 
want a I l those copies back. I wanted to destroy them when 
they were returned. 

The Items, sometime after my Initial request and 
finding out where the location was, copies came back. im 
trying to recall. I don't believe all the copies that l had 
originally given were returned. 

Q Did you look further for those copies? 

A No, I did not. I assumed — well, I Just assumed 
that. well, they still have them. As i said, i believe they 
were with Paul Thompson and I figured they were still looking 
at them further . 

Q Do you remember how many documents? 



mmssm 



812 



mvw 



PAGE 48 



A I know there were some that were not returned 
because 1 did an accountability check. i knew which ones i 
had given. i had done an accountability check. There were 
some that were not there. Ana then i received this note so"-e 
t ime after . 

Q Let's stOD there for a second. Do you recall at 
least aoprox irrate I y how many documents you found in resconse 
to Brenda Reger ' s search reauest? 

A I don ■ t reca m , no . 

I'm told that the last time the number 22 had come 
UD In discussion with you. 

A That Is what came up in discussion, and i bei leve 
that that IS very oossible as to how -nany. 

Q Now how does tre story you Just told us about tr,e 
search reauest. the Congressional inauiry, the news 
Bubiicity, your activities in ou i ii ng documents relate to 
your decision not to comply with deGraf f enre i d ' s reauest 
memorialized in Exhibit 17 

A I Just felt, of everything you Just said, i just 
felt very uneasy and i decided not to comply with his 
reauest . 

O Weil, when he gave you the document. Exhibit i, 
did you recognize that some or ai i of the numbers on those 
documents were the same as some of the 22 or so documents you 



813 





PAtSE 49 



nad Dulled in resDonse to Seger ■ s searcn rea^est as ce rg 
raievant to North and Nicaragua? 

A Correct. I did recognize some o* t^ose "urneers. 

Q Ana I take it the numbers on Exhioit i are Syste- 
IV control numoers? 

A They are. 

And when you got that you recognized that soi^e of 
them were the same documents or numbers of documents that you 
had Dulled relevant to North and Nicaragua for Srenda-. is 
that correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And you understood that the contra Issues was a 
volatile issue at the time? 

A Very much. 

BY MS. OORNAN: (Resuming) 

Was It after the Hasenfus shootaown, do you 
remember 7 

A No, this preceded that. 

MR. BELNiCK: The Hasefus shootdown was m octcDc 
of '86. This was the year before. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q And you recognized the issue was a significant one 
for the Congress? 



Mmmm 



814 



mmm 



PAGE 50 



Q And Is that why you decided to refuse to give 
deGraf f enreld these documents? 

A Like I said, when I looked at the note he gave me. 
I recognized some of the numbers and, like I said, I just 
felt very uneasy doing that. 

Q I Just want to understand something. The Issue 
was significant, and the Issue may even have been volatile at 
the time, but why would that have led you not to give your 
supervisor, who was head of the Intelligence directorate at 
the NSC, these documents? 

A I apparently decided at the time I Just could not 
do that, and I didn't do It. 

Q Recognizing that, did you have any belief that Mr. 
deGraf fenre I d was going to do something Inappropriate with 
the documents? 

A I must have had some sort of bel lef , but I don't 
know . 

Q Well, had you ever known Mr. deGraf fenre id to do 
anything that you considered to be Inappropriate In the 
course of his official duties? 

A No. 

Q You had never known him to alter any documents or 
try to destroy any documents or anything like that, had you? 

A No. 



UNetAffiED 



815 



mmm 



PAGE 51 



Q And you had known him, as far as you know, to be 
an honorable man? 

A Correct. 

Q And that is still your view up until today? 

A Correct. 

Q Then what was It that made you hold back on giving 
them? I mean, you knew you were taking a r I sk that he would 
come In and chop your head off. 

A That I s correct . 

Q Why did you take the risk? 

A I figured I could withstand It. 

Q But why did you decide that It would be 
appropriate for you to make a decision that your supervisor 
shouldn't be given access to these documents? I'm just 
trying to understand. 

A I Just couldn't bring myself to do It. The note 
was handed to me a very short period of time after all of 
this transpired and what was happening, and for some reason i 
felt I'm not going to do this. 

O Did you tell anyone that he had made the request 
to you? 

A No, I did not. 

Q You didn't mention It to Brenda Reger? 

A No. I did not. 



UNcnssinni 



816 



UNCIASSW 



PAGE 52 



Q Old you ever say to deGraf f enre I d -- and i take it 
from your prior testimony, Just so It Is clear, did you ever 
say to Mr. deGraf f enre I d , Ken, or Mr. deGraf f enre I d , or 
whatever you called him. I Just don't feel right giving you 
these documents? 

A No, I newer said a word to him. 

Q And there came a point after what i guess was 
three requests that he Just stopped asking? 

A Correct. 

Q And you never heard from him about It again? 

A He d I d not ask me about It again. 

Q Or from anybody else? 

A Correct . 

Q That was end of the issue? 

A Correct . 

Q Did anyone other than deGraf f enre I d and apart from 
Brenda Reger ask you for this type of document at that time 
In early September 1986? 

A No, I do not recai I . 

Do you recall whether Mr. McFar lane's office made 
any request? 

A I don't recall, no. I do not think so. 
BY MS. DORNAN: (Resuming) 

Q Jim, did you subsequently check the safe to make 



mmsm 



817 





PAGE 53 

sure the originals were still there of these numbers, given 
that" Ken and other people had access to it? 

A No, I did not. I never went back to look to see 
If the originals were there. 

BY MR. 8ELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q As far as you know, by the time you left in the 
end of October 1986, was It still the case that some of the 
copies you had given of System ly documents to Brenda Reger 
for distribution in September 1985 still had not been 
returned? 

A I think that that was true, that all of them had 
not been returned. 

Q And did you ever check further after September or 
October 1985 as to where those copies were and why they were 
st II I out? 

A No, I didn't. 

Q I understand also from your discussions with my 
colleagues the other day that you recall having seen a System 
IV document some time in 1985 that you believe referred to 
what Is now at least termed diversion? 

A Correct . 

Q Tell me what you recal I . / 

A I'm fairly certain I recall seeing a System IV 
document that detailed a transfer of weapons. Indicated 



mmssm 



818 



iEUSSlniJ 



PAGE 54 



dollar figures that would be received from this. My 
reco-< I ect I on is that the memorandum is a page and a half 
long. It was addressed to, I believe. Admiral Polndexter. 
It was from 01 iver North. 

Q Dated? 

A It was dated. The reason i say It was dated was 
the fact that if l had seen it then It was entered in System 
IV. 

O And did It have a System IV control number? 

A It had a System iv control number on It. 

O Do you remember what the date was? 

A The best that I can recall is that It was In late 
November of '85. but It could have been early '86. 

Q That Is your best recollection of what the date 
was on the document? 

A In that time frame, correct. 

Q And when do you recall seeing It for the first 
1 1 me? 

A Well, obviously If it was late '85 i saw It at 
that time. 

Q In other words, you recall seeing it aoprox imate i y 
at the time that It was dated? 

A Yes. 

Q It wasn't like you saw it months after the date on 



UNSbnStflED 



819 




l!l 



uinni 



PAGE 55 



A. Correct. 



I t was more 
A ves. 
Q 
document? 

A Yes. 



or less contemporaneous with the date' 
Ano .o you recau rea.lng tM s one an. a ha , f page 



Q An. What do you reca.. that .t said as .est you 
can now remember 7 Was . t c .ass . f . ed. by the way 7 

A Yes. 

O What was It Classified? 

A It was minimum Too Secret. it could have had. an. 
' Know It may have had a codewor. on ,t= i -m not certain. ... 
It was a minimum of TS. 

Q What do you recall the document sa . . . based upon 
your reading of It? 

A There were three things that jump out i n .y .m. 
at^out the Item. it had Identified or had discussed two 

''*°'" '" •* '" * ^ ''-* paragraph, which was lengthy 

no.*n« '* ^-^ '-entlfied or It had a dollar amount - , ..nt to say 
something lUe around approximately — 
Q Millions? 

A There was a dollar amount that was in the 
-"Ml ions. There was a second dollar amount that said ,,2 



WSSIFIED 



^ 



820 



vw&ms 



PAGE 56 



million and said that this would be used for assistance to 
the contras . 

Q So there were two dollar amounts, both In the 
ml I I Ions, and one of them said $12 ml I i Ion to be used for 
assistance to the contras? 

A Correct. 

Q All right. What else do you recall from the 
document? 

A That It — I can't recall if It was an action, 
which meant an aooroval type thing, or disapproval, or if it 
was Just an Informational type thing. That l can't remember. 

Old the document mention anything about Iran? 

A Yes, yes. It mentioned weapons going to Iran, and 
I believe it mentioned Israel in there also. 

Q And did the document, as best you recall, link the 
proceeds from the weapons to Iran with assistance to the 
contras? 

A Yes. 

Q Was there something — what was your reaction to 
the document when you read It? 

A I almost fell out of my chair. 

Why? 

A Because it was not. If you will, the policy at the 
time. Iran was considered a terrorist state, we had no 



mtmm 



821 



\immm 



PAGE 57 



relations with them whatsoever, and here there was a 
discussion of the transfer of weapons to them. 

Q Was 'there anything else that surprised you or 
struck you about the document when you read it? 

A No. It was Just this diversion — well, that 
along with funds going to the contras. 

Q And what was striking to you about that? 

A It was not — well, the funding was not — well. 
It was not authorized. I mean, I thought It was illegal. 

How did you know It wasn't authorized? 

A Well, here again I think the Boiand Amendment was 
In effect at the time and so forth. Because of the material 
that I handled and so forth and stuff like that i was very 
acutely aware of what the bolides and the situations were, 
and so l could determine. 

Q Did the document refer to the President at all? 

A No. It did not. 

Q Were you reading the original of the document? 

A I was reading the copy. 

Q Had you ever received the original? 

A I don't think i did. 

How did that happen? 

A Well. If a System iv Item was originated and could 



be considered to be a very urgent item, let's say. the item 



mmmm 



822 



UNtussra 



PAGE 58 



could actually be walked over by the Drlnclpai Individual wno 
or I g-l mated that, and a copy would be sent to me by the 
Secretary. 

Q And that was a orocedure that would bypass what 
you described at the beginning this morning about the 
original going to the Executive Secretariat and then to the 
Deputy and then to the National Security Advisor and so 
forth? 

A That Is correct. 

Q And so I f a document was urgent, the originator 
might Just bypass that system and walk It over? 

A Correct. 

Q And what was up to the originator to decide? 

A Yes, I guess so. 

Q And If he could get away with It. namely If the 
recipient would take the document, then there It was, and on 
an occasion when that procedure was followed you were still 
supposed to get a copy? 

A That I 3 correct . 

Q And who was supposed to send you the copy? 

A Either the principal or his secretary. I should 
get a copy. 

Q On those occasions when you got a copy would you 
check to find out if the original Indeed had been walked over 



ICUSKD 



823 



UNGlASSn 



PAGE 59 



and by whom and so forth, whether it had arrived, in other 
words? " 

A I would 'check. I would ask about it. Nine times 
out of ten they would come back and say yes, it was hand- 
car r I ed over . 

Q Let's talk about, then, the specific document the 
"diversion memo". Old you check to see if that document, if 
the original of that document had been walked over to Admiral 
Polndexter's office? 

A I don ■ t reca I I . 

O You don't recall one way or the other? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Would It have been your practice to make such a 
check? 

A Yes, I did It as normal, yes — at normal practice 
I would. But, as I said, nine times out of ten that Is what 
happened, so on those occasions l would not check. i would 
assume that that Is what happened, that it was taken by the 
or I g I nator . 

Q I 'm a little unclear, was it your normal practice 
to check when you got a copy whether the original had been 
walked over from the originator of the document to the 
addressee? 

A Yes. It was. 
? TOP 1S£CJ 



824 




PAGE 60 



Q Is there any reason to think you would not have 
folfowed that normal practice In the case of this "diversion 
memo" 7 

A No. 

MR. MC GRATH: When you say it was your normal 
practice, was it unusual for you not to call? 

THE WITNESS: I would say It would be unusual for 
me not to ca M . 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q On any occasion when you made such a ca I I do you 
recall would It be usual to hear from the person you were 
cal ling that the document was walked over by us to the 
addressee and delivered? 

A Correct . 

Q That Is what you usual ly heard? 

A Correct. 

And It would be unusual to hear otherwise? 

A That Is correct. 

Q Can you recal l on how many occasions you heard 
otherwise, namely that something else had happened? 

A No. It was always we walked It over. 

Q And what other explanation would you hear If it 
weren't that we walked It over to the person to whom it was 



addressed? 



UNIBSW) 



825 




PAGE 61 



A You might possibly hear that Instead of being 
deli-vered to the addressee that It was intended it was 
delivered to someone else because they had made the request. 

Q But that was unusual, too? 

A No, not necessarily, no. 

Q You always heard It was delivered? 

A We always heard It was delivered over to the west 
wing. 

Q To the West wing either to the addressee or to 
someone acting for the addressee? 

A That Is correct. 

Q And you can't recall whether you checked 
specifically in the case of what we're calling the diversion 
memo, but It would have been your practice to make that 
check, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And you can't think of any reason why you wouldn't 
have followed that practice in the case of this memo, 
correct? 

A That I s correct . 

Q And If you followed that practice, then, what you 
heard on every such occasion was that it was either del ivered 
to the addressee or someone acting for him? 

A Correct. 



wm 



826 



u 




PAGE 62 



Q So that here you would have heard that documeht 
was delivered to Admiral Polndexter or someone receiving it 
from him, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Was It a practice of yours to read System iv memos 
when they came In? 

A Yes. 

Q Al I of them? 

A Yes. 

So I t wasn't unusual for you to be reading this 
one? 

A Correct. 

Q What did you do with the copy that you had? 

A After I had finished reading it 1 entered it into 
the computer and filed It Into the file. 

Q Now you entered It Into your computer file, 
correct? 

A Yes. 

Making all of the entries that you described 
earlier this morning on that computer file? 

A Correct. 

Q The date, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q The author? 



wm 




827 



\Mimm 



PAGE 63 



A R Ight . 

_0' The control number? 
A Yes. 

Q Something about — you Identified the subject 
matter? 

A Yes. 

You Identified the action officer if it was an 
action memorandum? 

A Yes. 

Q And who would have that been If this was an action 
memorandum? Would North have been the action officer because 
he wrote I t? 

A Yes. 

Q And you don't remember whether this was an action 
or an Information memorandum? 

A I do not . 

Q But you made the typical entries in the computer 
file, correct? 

A Yes. I did. 

Q And from the day you made them to the day you left 
the NSC at the end of October 1986 you did not erase those 
entries In the computer file, did you? 

A That Is correct. 

Q Did you ever go back to that document on the 



UNcmsme 



828 



UNcuissim 



PAGE 64 



computer file after you entered It — that is. reooen the 
file- to make an additional entry or anything like that? 

A I don't think so. no. 

Q Old anyone ever ask to see that document from the 
date you saw it? 

A I don't recall, no. 

As far as you recall that did not happen; is that 
correct? 

A That Is correct. 

BY MS. CX)RNAN: (Resuming) 

O As a normal procedure. If someone had walked over 
a document would you eventually get the original back? 

A I should eventually get the original back. 
MR. BELNICK: I am going to come to that. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Now you took the copy of this document, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And you said you filed It. 

A Correct. 

O Old you file It In your suspense file? 

A Yes. 

Q Old you ever get the original back? 

A I don't recall if I ever got the original back. i 



don't think I did. 



'"r*^ 



829 



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PAGE 85 



Q Actual ly back Is the wrong word. You never got 
the original in the first place, correct? 

A I never got the or l.g I na i in the first place. 

Q Did you ever receive the original? 

A I don't think i na'^er received the original. 

Q Old you ever check on where It was? 

A Maybe on one occasion and that would be It. 

Q Can you remember I f you checked? 

A I don't remember sped flea My if I checked. 

Q Do you have a vague recollection that you checked? 

Do you have any recollection that you checked? 

A i have no recollection. 

Q Fair enough. And so you put the copy in your 
suspense file, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Mhere was the suspense file? 

A Right there In my office In the safe that i 
maintained the files In. 

Q Was it in the same safe as all System iv 
documents? 

A Yes, It was. 

Q In a separate folder that said "suspense"? 

A Correct. I wrote down folders by 50 Items, and it 
would have been in the folder — if it was item 51. it would 



IINCttSSIflfO 



830 




PAGE 66 

be In folder 51 through 100. 

Q. And would that folder nave had a title written on 
I t , suspense? 

A No, no. It would Just have the block of control 
numbers that It contained. 

Q And how did you distinguish those suspense files 
from non-suspense flies? 

A They were Intermingled. You couldn't lool< at it 
and determine what was suspense or what was original. You'd 
have to look at each individual Item. 

Q And how would you know If it was suspense if you 
looked at the item? Old you have a note on the document? 

A I t wou I d be a copy . 

Q And copy to you meant suspense? 

A A copy to me meant suspense. 

Q Old you ever take the copy of the diversion memo 
out of that System iV suspense file after you put it In 
there? 

A No, I don't recall ever doing that. 

Q So as far as you know that document was sti i I In 
your System IV flies in the secure safe the day that you left 
the NSC staff? 

A Correct. 

Q And, as far as you know, the entries that you made 




831 



PtPW 



PAGE 67 



In the computer file at the NSC about this "diversion memo" 
were still there on October 25, 1986 when you left the NSC 
staf f , correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Has anybody asked you since then to go back to the 
files and look for this document? 

A No, no one ever asked me. 

Q Has anybody asked you since then to go to the 
computer and look for the entry that you made? 

A No. 

Q And there was nothing different, as far as I 
understand, about the way that you entered this document on 
the computer or filed it in the hard copy file than the way 
you treated any other document; am i correct? 

A That Is correct. It Is the same. 

Q Now let me try and go back on one point in terms 
of your recollection of when you read it and I'm reluctant to 
bring up a subject like this, but forgive me. I understand 
your father passed away in November of 1985. 

A That Is correct. 

Q And I'm told that there may be some correlation in 
your mind between that event and when you read the document. 
Does that do anything to your recollection? 

A Well — 




832 



oimiisu 



PAGE 68 



Q It was after that time? 

A- It was after that time. i was gone for the 
majority of November, the first part of It, up to about the 
middle, and then I came back. 

Q So your best recollection Is that the document was 
dated and you saw It either In late '85 or early '86? 

A Correct. 

Q And late '85 means sometime after November? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever see another document that pertained 
to this kind of subject matter -- weapons to Iran and money 
from those transactions to the contras? 

A I think I recal I seeing a document later on, I Ike 
a few months after that. it was a very much more detailed 
type of memorandum. 

Q When do you recall seeing that? 

A I think that would be In somewhere around maybe 



m I d-Apr I I 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 



Was It a System iv document? 

Yes, It was. 

And to whom was It addressed? 

I believe It was -- first of all, I don't believe 
that I recall seeing the original. Here again it was a copy 
that was sent and I believe it was addressed to Admiral 



mmSMJi 



833 



fiyi'H ^i^R% 




- - - ^=a„ PAGE 69 

Po I ndexter . 

Q" From whom? 

A It was 'from Ol I ver North. 

Q And It was dated sometime In April 1986? 

A It was dated sometime mid-Apr il '86. 

Q You said mid-Aprll? 

A Yes. 

Q And how long was It? 

A I believe there was actually — normal procedure 
tells me there would have been two memorandums, one addressed 
to Admiral Polndexter from Oliver North and a second 
memorandum from Admiral Polndexter to the President, and so I 
would say there were two. And then i believe there were some 
attachments . 

Q So we had a memo from Polndexter to North and 
attached to that was a memo -- strike that. There was a memo 
from North to Polndexter. and attached to that was a 
memorandum from Polndexter to the President, with some 
attachments? 

A I be M eve so . 

Q Was this whole package what you would call an 
action memorandum? 
A Yes. 
Q And did It have a cover sheet? Do you know what i 



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mean by the NSC cover sheets? 

- A Yes. well, I would say that It would have had a 
cover Sheet, although I have not seen the original. I would 
say It had a cover sheet. 

When you saw It, since It was a copy you didnt 
see a cover sheet on It; is that correct? 

A That Is correct. 

Q And that was true earlier or that was true also tc 
what we have referred to as the diversion memo that you saw 
In November, the copy? Or did that one have a cover sheet. 
as you remember? 

A I believe that one had a cover sheet on it. 

Q Now let's go back to the one you saw In Aor i i . 
There were two memoranda, one from North to Polndexter. 

to the Pres Ident . 
What was the other attachment? 

A I don't remember what the attachments were. I 
know that there were some other attachments. 

Q And this was an action memorandum. Do you 
remember if it was asking Polndexter to aoprove sending the 
attached memorandum to the President? 

A I believe that Is what It said, yes. Normal 
procedure Is It would have. 

Q And did you see a check mark where there Is 



inere were two memoranaa, one from North 
^^Attached thereio was one from Polndexter 



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usually a box that says approved, disapproved. 

recommendation? Had anybody put a check mark in the approved 
or disapproved box? 

A I don't recall. I would say I don't recall, even 
If the original had come back to me. 

Q Well, we will get back to the original. Now I 
would I Ike you to tei i me about how many pages was this whole 
document, the two memos and the attachments. 

A Maybe around ten, a I Ittle bit less maybe. 

Q And tel I me what you recal I . You read It. 

A I made It normal practice to read al I the items. 
Now on some occasions if they were rather lengthy, like I 
would consider this one to be and so forth. I would probably 
Just restrict myself to reading the original memo, the one to 
Polndexter. because that was more or less a snapshot of what 
the whole thing was. 

Q And do you recal I doing that in this Instance? 

A I 'm sure that I did. 

Q And tel 1 me what you recal i reading. 

A I be 1 I eve I recal l reading again about the funds 
going to the contras. I believe It said in there about 
weapons sale or whatever to Iran. I think there was a 
description or a backgruond as to what had transpired up to 
that particular point of the whole arms transfer and so 




836 



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forth. I think mayDe also that possibly one of the 
attachments -- and here again I can't be certain, but I think 
It had something to do with the current strategy type thing 
towards Iran. And that's all I can recall. 

Q Do you remember any do I lar figures? 

A Yes. I recall one dollar figure. 

Q And what ■ s that? 

A That was the $12 ml I I Ion to go for assistance to 
the contras. 

Q Twelve ml I I ion do I lars, which the memo said was 
coming from weapons sales to Iran? 

A Yes. 

Q And that Is the secona figure that you saw In the 
earlier diversion memo 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recal I what the recommendation was to 
Admiral Polndexter with respect to the President? 

A No, I do not recal I that. 

Q Did you look at the attached memo proposed to be 
sent, I guess, from Polndexter to the President? 

A I think It could have said something like -- it 
went to Polndexter for his Initial and It would have said 
something like that you could concur with this and forward it 
on to the President. i think that was it. it was Just 



wm 




an 



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■il 



CO 



ncur and forward this on to tnft*#res I dent 



PAGE 73 



Q That you concur and what? 

A And forward your memorandum, the attached, to the 
Pr es I dent . 

Q And what was the attached memorandum about, the 

same thing as North's to Polndexter? 

A Yes. It should have been. 

Q Did you look at It to see If it was? 

A Again. I may have looked at it. but I may not have 



read It. 
Q 
A 
Q 



Do you have a recol lection? 
No. 

But your assumption, based upon your experience 
with these kinds of memoranda. Is that the attached one which 
was proposed to be sent was substantial ly the same as the one 
on top of the one from North to Polndexter? 
A Yes. 

Q The only difference, based upon your experience, 
would have been that the attached one would have been from 
the National Security Advisor himself, in this case 
^^^ Polndexter, orthe President? 

A Yes. That is correct. And it maybe was a I Ittie 
bit shorter. The cover memorandum to the National Security 
Advisor always had, if you will, maybe a little bit more meat 



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to It, or background. 



Q More deta lis? 

A More detal Is that were dropped out of the one that 
went to the President. 

Q But the guts of it would always be in the one that 
went to the President? 

A Yes. 

Q The heart of It, right? 

A Yes . 

Q Now, by the way, again going back to the earlier 
diversion memo. In terms of trying a little bit to narrow the 
date, do ou recal I whether Admiral Polndexter was the 
National Security Advisor as opposed to the Deputy when you 
saw the first diversion memo? 

A I 'm sorry? I lost my train of thought. 

Q I 'm trying to narrow, If I can. even more the date 
when you saw the first diversion memo, the one which we have 
placed as late '35 or early '86. And to try to help you witn 
that -- and it may not help you -- i am asking whether you 
can recall whether Admiral Polndexter was Deputy National 
Security Advisor or the National Security Advisor at the time 
you saw the first diversion memo. 

A Now I --Mr. McFariane was still on board at the 
National Security Council as the National Security Advisor. 




Iran 



839 



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and Admiral Polndexter had been Identified to succeed him, 
and I want to say I believe that Admiral Polndexter was 
functioning as the National Security Advisor. 

Q So It doesn't really help you but he was at least 
functioning as National Security Advisor. If not the actual 
atlonal Security Advisor? 

A R I ght . 

Q So again were back to your best recollection 
being that the first diversion memo that you saw was in late 
■ 85 or ear I y • 867 

A Correct . 

Q All right. The first diversion memo, did it 
Indicate an addressee or a carbon cooy or CC or a copy to 
anybody other than Polndexter -- the one and a half page 
memo? 

A No . 

Q Was there a routing slip on it? 

A I couldn't tell If there was a routing slip on it. 

Q It wasn't on your copy? 

A it wasn't on my copy. it wouldn't be on my copy 
at that point. 

Q Now how about the second diversion memo, the one 

In April? Did that have a routing slip on the copy? 



No . 



D 



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PAGE 76 



Q And did It Indicate a reclDlent or orooosed 
recipient other than Polndexter and, In the case of the 
attachment, other than the President? 

A I don't recall. No, I don't think it did. 

Q You read it. What was your reaction to this one' 

A The second one? 

Q The second diversion memo; let's ca I I that the 
April '86 diversion memo. 

A I didn't have an overwhelming reaction to it. I 
wasn't. If you will, as startled as I was. The one key thing 
would have been the fact that this was Just more detail and a 
capsule of what had transpired over X amount of months prior 
to that po I nt . 

Q Did It seem to you by April that what you were 
reading was now authorized or unauthorized? 

A What I was reading In April -- well, I don't know 
how to answer that. 

Q Okay. Let's strike it, then. Old the memo that 
you read In Apr I I '86, the Apr I I diversion memo indicate 
whether anyone else knew about the subject matter apart from 
North and Polndexter? 

A In looking at and remembering and recalling that 
particular memo and so forth, since It came or orlglnatec by 
Oliver North and was for Admiral Polndexter, that Is all i 







841 



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can reca I i . 

- Q You don't recal I it saying that the President 
knows or doesn't know about this one way or the other? 

A No , I don ' t . 

Q Now when you got the copy, did you ca I I the 
originator, In this case North, or his secretary to find out 
what had happened with the original per your usual practice'' 

A As a usual practice I probably did call and ask 
and was told It has gone forward. 

Q It was walked over would have been the usual 
th I ng? 

A Wa I ked over . 

Q But do you have a specific recollection of making 
the ca I I and hearing that answer? 

A No . don ' t . 

Q You are basing it upon what was your invariable 
practice, correct? 

A Correct . 

Q Now did you take that document and enter It into 
your system for computer file? 

A Yes. 

Q Putting all the entries in that you described in 
the record today, correct? 

A Correct . 



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Q 
" A 

Q 
A 
O 
A 

Q 
A 

Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
matter 7 
A 
Q 



You Qut In the date of the document? 

Yes. 

The System IV control number? 

Yes. 

And It had a System IV control number? 

Yes, It did. 

You out In the author. North? 

Correct . 

You out In the addresse. Polndexter? 

Correct . 

You out In the subject matter? 

Correct . 

Do you recall how you described the subject 



No, I don't. 

Do you recall how you described the subject matter 
of the earlier diversion memo that you had? 

A No, I don't either. 

Q And those would have been the standard entries? 

A Correct. 

Q Old you make any other entries to indicate that 
you had a copy only as opoosed to the original? 

A Well, what I would do Is I would Indicate on the 
second page of this computer file that It was originated by 



ll«TO.!:!?P 



' * * r^ • t s • 



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PAGE 79 



North on X date and It was sent to, lefs say, Poindexter on 
X date for decision. And I would Just. If you win. use used 
an S to indicate ^usoense as a code as to what the status of 
that particular I tern was. 

Q And did you put an S In there? 

A I put an S In there. 

Q The same thing as with the. earl ler diversion memo' 

A Correct . 

Q The second page of the computer file you indicated 
an S on It? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever get the original of the April 
diversion memo, the April '86 diversion memo? 

A I can't recall If i did. I just don't. 

You don't recall one way or the other? 

A I don't recall one way or the other. 

Q But If you did not -- well, strike It. Did you 
take the copy and put it In your suspense file? 

A Yes. 

Q Following the same procedure you previously 
descr i bed? 

A Exact I y , yes . 

Q And If you didn't receive the original, the 
suspense copy would have remained In the System iv file in a 



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fo I der , correct 7 

. A That I s correct . 

Q And as far as you know that folder and what it 
contained, either the copy or the original, because if the 
original came you would have substituted the original for the 
copy, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And as far as you knew, as of the day you left, 
October 25, '86, or thereabouts, that April '86 diversion 
memo, either the original or the copy, was -- the hard 
original or the hard copy -- was In your System IV file safe; 
Is that correct? 

A That I s correct . 

Q And the entries about that document were still in 
your System IV computer f I le, correct? 

A That ' s cor rect . 

Q Has anybody ever asked you to look at your 
computer file for that document? 

A No. 

Q Has anybody asked you to come back and look 
through your hard copy files drawers for that document? 

A I don't recal l anybody ever doing that. 

Q Now from the date you saw the April 1986 diversion 
memo unt I I the date you left the NSC staff, did anyone ask 



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PAGE 81 



you for that document? 

" A I don't recal I anybody ever asking me for it. no. 

Q By the way, did you resign from the NSC staff? 

A No , I d I d not . 

Q What was the occasion of your leaving? 

A I was at the National Security Council as an 
assignment. l was on active duty with the United States 
Navy. That was an assignment for me. I decided I was coming 
up to 20-year retirement and I submitted a retirement back in 
June or, excuse me, January of '86. it was normal 
ret I rement . 

Q You weren't asked to leave? 

A I wasn't asked to leave. 

Q Forgive me for asking. That's Just for the 
record . 

A That 'sail r I ght . 

Q Now when you heard the Attorney General's press 
conference In November 1986 or heard about It -- 

A Yes. 

Q Did you actual ly hear the press conference or see 
It? 

A I heard some of It and i saw some of it. 

Q Were you surprised by what you heard? 

A Yes, very much. 




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PAGE 82 



Q Why? 

A Wei I , his press conference came on, i bel leve, the 
25th of November. The 25th of November. My actual 
retirement date from the Navy was 30 November. i left the 
NSC around the 25th of October or 26th of October . i had 
taken pre-retirement leave, standard practice. Associated 
with my military retirement, I asked that Admiral Polndexter 
preside at a retirement ceremony for me, and that transpired 
on the 25th of November. 

Q Aside from that, were you surprised? Well, we 
wl 1 I let that go. Were you surprised when you heard the 
Attorney General announce that monies had apparently been 
diverted from the Iran program? 

A Yes. 

Q And why was that surprising to you? 

A Although I was aware of it prior to that, this was 
a publ ic announcment, exposure of the item. 

Q So It was that it was being made publ ic that was 
surpr I 3 I ng? 

A Correct . 

Q You weren't surprised to find out that monies had 
been diverted from the Iran sales to the contras? 

A That I s correct . 

Q Now did you come forward at that point and tell 



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PAGE 83 

any officials that you had seen documents about that very 
matter 7 

A No. I never came forward. 

Q Old Brian Merchant or Brenda Reger or anyone 
acting on behalf of the NSC call you at any time after the 
Attorney General's Dress conference and ask you If you had 
ever seen any memos on diversion or the memo that the 
Attorney General was talking about? 

A Although I received a few phone calls from Brian 
Merchant to assist him on trying to possibly locate 
something, no, I don't think so. 

Q Did anybody, did any lawyer acting for the White 
House or the NSC ever call you up and ask you If you had ever 
seen a memo or a piece of paper aoout diversion? 

A No . 

Q Nobody did? 

A No one did. 

Q Did anyone from the FBI visit you or call you and 
ask you If you had seen such a piece of paper? 

A The FBI did call me, and I Interviewed with them 
about this subject matter. 

Q The same things you have told me today? 

A Correct . 

Q Did you tell them everything you told me? 



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A I told them -- I described this what I believe -- 
the November '85 memorandum, yes. 

Did you tell them you had also seen the April 1986 
memorandum? 

A I be I I eve l did, yes . 

Q When was this Interview between you and the FBI' 

A It was 1987, I want to say. I don ■ t remember a 
specific date or month. It was after Walsh was Identified as 
Special Prosecutor. it was, let's say, two to three weeks 
after that. 

Q Did you meet with an FBI agent on Just one 
occasion, more than one occasion? 

A Just on one occasion. 

Q How long was your Interview? 

A I believe it ran an hour and a half. 

Q And how many agents were there? 

A There were two. 

Q What were their names? Do you remember? 

A I don't remember the names, but I do have them. 

Q Oo you have them with you? 

A No. Well, let me check. i think I left their 
ca II I ng card at my house. 

MR. MC GRATH: Old they at any point in that 
Interview ask you to not disclose that interview or the 



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contents of the Interview with anyone else? 

MR. BELNICK: If they would, they surely did not 
have any right to, so don't worry about that. 

THE WITNESS: No. they didn't say anything like 
that. The only thing they said In conclusion is that they 
may very well get back to me again. 

3Y MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q But they didn't tell you not to disclose the 
Interview, did they? 

A No. I don't recal I that at al I . I don't have 
their card with me; It must be at home. 

Q Fine. If you could let me know. 

A Because the interview was conducted at my house. 

Q They took notes, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Were you asked to testify to the grand Jury? 

A No. 

Q Have you met with any lawyer from the independent 
Counse I ' s off Ice? 

A No. 

Q Have you met with a lawyer from the White House 
oreoarlng for this deposition or interview? 

A No . We II . we met . 

Q You met with my friend Dean? 



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A Right. I rnet with Dean McGrath last Thursday. 
- Before you saw Victoria Nourse and Bud Hall? 
A Yes . 

Q Apart from that meeting have you met with any 
lawyers from the White House? 
A No. 

Q And the FBI to this day and nobody else acting for 
the Federal Government has asked you to look on your computer 
for these entries or making a search for these documents? 
A That I s cor rect . 

Q Now I 'm going to show you a document which I wl I I 
ask -- I only have one copy, but I think we have al I seen -- 
at least, leaving the witness out. al l of the rest of us have 
seen this. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Radzlmski Exhibit 
Number 2 for identification.) 
I show you Radzlmski Exhibit 2. Does that look to 
you like a document you've seen before, if not the document 
you recal l seeing In Apr i l of '86 or part of a document? 
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
BY MR. BELNICK; (Resuming) 
Q Looking at Radzlmski Exhibit 2, Is this the first 
time you've seen that document? 



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A Yes. 

O Do any of the -- I f you want to take a moment to 

read It, what I arri Interesting In -- we can take a break 
wh I le you look at i t -- what l would real ly I ike to know is 
whether you know this is the first time you have seen this 
particular document In this form, whether the contents of any 
part of It are fami l lar to you, whether you recal l having 
seen It In substance -- any of i t -- before. 

Why don't we take a break wh I le Jim takes a look 
at It and wh l le we do other Important things, and then we 
will come back . 

A I would I Ike to take a break, too. 

MR. BELNICK: That's fine. Let's go off the 



record . 



2? 

A 
Q 
correct? 
A 
Q 



(A brief recess was taken.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Have you had a chance now, jim, to review Exhibit 



Just again, you never saw this document before. 



Correct . 

But what about the contents of It that you have 



now read? Does It sound famI 1 lar? 



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A Yes, some of It does sound familiar. 

Q Can you point out what sounds fami I lar and whether 
you saw It In the earl I er diversion -- in, let's say, the 
'85-'86 diversion memo or the April of '86 diversion memo, or 
both, or somewhere else? 

A The Apr I I '86 memorandum contains the majority of 
what is In this particular Item. 

Q Exh I b I t 27 

A Yes. 

Q Was some of It In the earl ler diversion memo? Any 
of I t? 

A The only thing that I could probably say that 
comes out of this earlier memorandum that I recall Is the 
statement In here on the $12 ml I I ion going to the Nlcaraguan 
Democratic Resistance Force. 

Q That number is the same as you remember In the 
earlier diversion memo? 

A Correct . 

Q But much of -- and I 'm paraphrasing, so you tei I 
me If It is correct -- what l understand you to be saying Is 
that much of the substance -- strike that -- that much of 
what you read in RadzlmskI Exhibit 2 was in the April 1986 , 
diversion memo that you saw addressed from North to 
Polndexter with the attachment proposed to go to the 






853 



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PAGE 89 



President; is that correct? 

A That I s correct . 

Q And 'the same substance about diverting it 

doesn't use the word ■'diverting" but about $12 million m 
proceeds going for the benefit of the Nicaraguan Democratic 
Resistance, that sort of thing, you recall that In the Apr 1 1 
■ 36 memo? 

A I dont recall that In the Apr 11 '86 memorandum. 
It IS here. 1 see it here. 1 recall seeing that In this 
earlier memorandum that I have described to you. 

Q But I think you did tell me that you do recall 
that in the Aor 1 1 '86 diversion memorandum there was a 
discussion Of using millions of dollars in proceeds from the 
Iran arms sales to go to the contras. 

A That's true. 

Q And you thought It was $12 million In that memo as 
wel I , r I ght? 

A Correct. 

Q So you are saying it may not have been these exact 
words from Exhibit 2 that you saw in the April '86 memo, but 
the substance was there, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Aside from — 

MR. MC GRATH: Does this memo in substance appear 



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to be what you saw as the Apr I I '86 memorandum? 

THE WITNESS: In substance, yes. The format is a 
little d I f f erent . 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q The one you saw In April '86 had a System IV 
number on It, correct? 

A Yes . 

Q And It was addressed from North to Polndexter? 

A That I s correct . 

Q And It had attached to I t a memo from Polndexter 
to the President, correct? 

A I be I I eve so , yes . 

Q Do you remember also with It, being the April 1986 
memo, that you saw had attached to It this document ca I led 
Terms of Reference, US-Iran Dialogue, which Is part of 
Radz Imsk I Exh I b I t 27 

A I be I I eve it did, yes. 

Q And do you recal I whether that Terms of Reference 
was then dated April 4, 1986? 

A I don't recal I a date on it. 

Q But this was the other attachment to the April 'BS 
diversion memo? 

A Yes, to the best of my knowledge It was. 

Q Were there any other attachments that you recal I 



UNCtASJm 



855 



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PAQE 9t 



to the April -86 diversion memo? 

* * No. I tnink It was just one attachment. 

So your best recollection now is that what we ha^ 
referred to as the April 1986 diversion memo consisted of a 
memo from North to Polndexter. dated April 1986 -- 
A Yes. 

Q Which was an action memorandum. 
A Correct. 
Q Attached to it was a memo from Polndexter to the 



Pres ident 
A 
Q 



I be I I eve so, yes. 

And also attached was these Terms of Reference. 
US-iran Dialogue, a copy of whicn is part of Radzlmski 
Exhibit 2; correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Now do you recall seeing, apart from the April 
1986 diversion memo and apart from the earlier one, do you 
recall seeing any other documents that dealt with or 
concerned sending or diverting or using proceeds from the 
Iran arms sales on behalf of the contras? 

A No. I never recall any other documents that 
talked about the utilization of funds. 

Q When you read the one and a ha I f page diversion 
memo, did you discuss It with anybody? 



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A No. 
• Q Either at that time or shortly thereafter? 

A No. i did not. 

Q You didn't talk to Mr. deGraf f enre i d about it? 

A No . 

Or ask anyone at the NSC staff, hey, what do you 
know about this or anything like that? 

A No, I didn't. 

Q You didn't tel I anybody about It? 

A Nobody at all. 

Q How about with respect to the Apr I l 1986 diversion 
memo? Did you discuss that with anyone? 

A No. 

Q Did you tel I anyone you had seen It? 

A No . 

Q So am I correct that the first person or persons 
you ever told about either of those memos were the FBI agents 
that you spoke to sometime after Judge Walsh was appointed 
Independent Counsel; correct? 

A That I s correct . 

Q May I ask did you think about coming forward with 
your knowledge of either of these memos or both of them after 
you heard the Attorney General's press conference? What im 
really asking Is did you make a decision not to, or did it 



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Just not occur to you? 



■ A It didn't occur to me to come forward. 

Q But as soon as you were asked for your knowledge 
you disclosed what you disclosed here this morning'' 
A Correct, yes. 

MR. MC GRATH: I would Just like to say for the 
record that Mr. Radzlmski appeared here today voluntarily ana 
that the remarks are classified at the Top Secret/Codeword 
level, and thank the Committee for Its courtesies. 

MR. BELNICK: I would like thank you, as ever. 
Dean, and your colleague for your courtesy and cooperation, 
and unescorted Mr. Radzlmski not only appeared here today 
voluntarily, but had appeared for a prior interview and both 
the House and the Senate Committees are appreciative of your 
cooperation with the Investigation, and so i thank you. 

But before we go off the record, i wi ii ask you a 
question that Is sweeping but that l think i know the answer 
to. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q You know the subject matter that we are investing 
and talking about related to the contras and Iran. Are there 
any other matters that you covered with the FBI agents that 
we haven't gone Into today that you can recal I and consider 
something we ought to know? 



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A No. I don't recal I anything. 

MR. BELNICK: Then again than you for your 
courtesy. Jim, 'and thank you. Dean and Peter. 

MS. DORNAN: Could I just tie up a few loose ends? 
BY MS. DORNAN: (Resuming) 

Q One was, Jim, before you left you said you were 
cleaning up your files and so on. At this point that first 
action had been In suspension for a year and the second one 
for nearly six months. Did you go through your files to look 
at these suspensions and tidy them up or anything? 

A No. 

Q Secondly, the fact that both these memos were — 
you Just got copies of them Is sort of striking. 01 lie often 
worked late in the evenings and on the weekends. is that 
often when you got such things that were walked over during 
non-normal working hours? 

A Yes. if he was working late at night and so on 
and so forth, he might have obtained a System IV number. I 
would get the item the next day. 

Q Did you get a large number of those from North? 

A He seemed to be about the only one that uti I I zed 
System IV numbers late in the evening. He was the only one 
that -- he really worked late. He was the one that really 
utilized It the most, yes. His secretary would call me at 



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home. I would get home from spending an hour and a half in 
traffic, walk in the door, and Fawn would be on the chone. 
She would say. Jim, we need a System IV number. i would say, 
my gosh, he's working late again, and l would give them a 
number . 

Q As far as the procedure went, when something like 
that happened did anybody — were the documents processed 
through anybody else, through the Executive Secretary? 

A They were hand-carried by either Fawn or North. 
They could circumvent the administrative support people and 
get It right to the person. Oille cou i d take it right In and 
see Poindexter or McFarlane. Fawn might not be able to do 
that, but she might be able to hand it to the secretary and 
say Admiral Poindexter is waiting for this, and they might 
take I t r I ght I n . 

Q Was there anybody in Polndexter's office besides 
himself who would normally look at the documents 
substant I vei y? 

A If anyone did. It would be Paul Thompson. 

Q If somebody were going to try, other than you or 
Brian, were going to try to get some documents out of the 
System IV files, how easy would It be for them to do that? 
What would they do? 

A It could be done. What they probably could do is 




LHOOir 




860 



ouksmp 



PAGE 96 



notify the Secretariat, whoever \s down there, stating that 
they needed to get in to get an item under some oretense, 
whatever, and oossibiy get it. I don't know how successful 
they would be. i would think that they would be able to do 
It that way. 

Q There are substance flies, labeled files that they 
cou Id go to? 

A We I I , anybody who had the combination could get 
I n. 

Q Once they got In the safe, would It be fairly easy 
for them to find them? 

A It would take them some time, but the flies were 
arranged In a manner -- I Ike I said, i put 50 Items In one 
folder and as long as you knew that this was current year and 
you ooened the drawer up and saw the numbers and you could 
recal I what number you had or you had a copy of It, you could 
locate It within a matter of minutes. 

Q They are not labeled i ike Iran or Contras? 

A No. 

Q They had to go by date chronological ly? 
A Right. They went by date. 
MR . BELNICK : That ' s a i i . 

(Whereupon, at i 2 : 00 p.m.. the taking of the 
Instant deposition ceased.) 



i«W 



861 



Stenographic Transcript of 



HEARINGS 
Before the 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



UNITED STATES SENATE 

CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF JAMES R. RADZIMSKI 
Tuesday, August 11, 1987 






Washington. D.C. 










862 



- UNCUSSinED 



iUl" JELKUi^LUUUIIUUU 1 

1 CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF JAMES R. RADZIMSKI 

2 Tuesday, August 11, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Continued deposition of JAMES R. RADZIMSKI, 

9 called as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, 

10 at the offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart 

11 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 

12 10:07 a.m., the witness having been previously duly 

13 sworn, and the testimony being taken down by Stenonask by 

14 MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction. 



UNSMftHI 



863 




APPEARAlf CSS : 

On b«half of th« S«n«t« Select Coaaltta* on s«cr«t 
Military Assistanc* to Iran and tha Nicaraguan 
Opposition: 

ARTHUR LIKAN, ESQ. 

Chiaf Counsel 

HARK BELNICX, ESQ. 

VZCTORZA NOURSE, ESQ. 

LANCE MORGAN 

10 On bahalf of th« Rous* Salaet Coaaittaa to 

11 Invastigat* Covart Arms Transactions with Iran: 

12 GEORGE H. VAN CLEVE, ESQ. 

13 Chiaf Minority Counsel 

14 PATRICK CAROME, ESQ. 

15 On behalf of the witness: 

16 ROGER C. SPAEDER, ESQ. 

17 Zuclceraan, Speeder, Goldstein, Taylor & Kolker 

18 1201 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 

19 Washington, D. C. 20036 



mmm 



864 



mMWB 



1 CONTENTS 

2 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 

3 WITNESS SENATE HOUSE 

4 James R. Radzimski 

5 By Mr. Liman 4 

6 By Mr. Carome 56 

7 By Mr. Van Cleva 67 

8 EXHIBITS 

9 RADZIMSKI EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

10 3 19 

11 4 46 

12 5 64 



UNCl^SlfllD 



865 



UNCUS»D 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 vniarcupon, 

3 JAMES R. RAOZIMSKZ, 

4 callad as a vltnass by counaal on bahalf of th« Sanat* 

5 Salact Conalttaa and having baan praviously duly sworn, 

6 was furthar axanlnad and tastiflad as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY MR. LIMAN: 

9 Q Mr. Radzlnski, I want to thank you for coning 

10 in today. You'va baan mora than ganarous with your tima. 

11 You'va had a nusbar of aaatings with aanbars of both 

12 Cooaittaa staffs sine* your last daposition. You hava 

13 cooparatad in attanpting to find docufflsnts on ths 

14 computar for Systaa IV. And tha purposa of today's 

15 axanination is to conplsta tha racord by incorporating in 

16 it soma of tha facts and avants that hava occurrad sinca 

17 your last daposition or that you hava ralatad to us sinca 

18 your last daposition. 

19 I'd lika to bagin with Mr. daGraffanraid. In 

20 your last axaaination you tastifiad, on tha pagas 

21 baginning froa 38 to 44, about sobs raquasts that Mr. 

22 daGraffanraid sada of you in August or Saptanbar 1985 for 

23 soma Systan IV docunants. I ballava that you rafarred to 

24 about thraa raquasts and you said you didn't comply with 

25 thosa raquasts and that daGraffanraid didn't say anything 



wtmsm 



wmm 



1 ;urth«r to you about it. 

2 A Yes. 

3 Q I understand that you now have a recollection 

4 o£ a conversation with Mr. deGraffenreid in which you 

5 expressed some views on this subject. I would like you, 

6 since you have seen your examination, to add to it what 

7 more you recall of this incident. 

8 A Well, after reviewing my deposition and 

9 reviewing back in my mind what could have transpired or 

10 if there was additional items that could have transpired, 

11 whatever, I recalled that after the so-called second 

12 request, I think it was, or the third request that I 

13 received from him for pulling some System IV documents 

14 out of the file that he asked me into his office. 

15 And when Z entered his office he addressed me 

16 and asked me where or asked me if I had time to pull 

17 those particular System IV documents that were on a piece 

18 of paper. I believe there were six. 

19 Q That's Exhibit 1, I believe. 

20 A Correct — if I had pulled those yet. And I 

21 told hia I had not, and he asked me if I would please 

22 pull those because they were very important. And I 

23 hesitated and was very nervous and I replied to him that 

24 I would not pull those documents. I said — I told him 

25 that I just do not feel right and I just cannot pull them 



mmsm 



867 



UNWSIFSD 



1 ^or hia. 

2 Ha was obviously startled and surprised at my 

3 response. He replied in the fom of saying — asking me 

4 if Z could possibly believe that there may be some 

5 underlying reason or — not underlying reason, but I mean 

6 some possible impropriety or improper reason for him 

7 asking me for those, if something was going to happen to 

8 them, and if I felt that there could possibly be 

9 something immoral or illegal aibout pulling those 

10 documents. 

11 And I thought about it. I was very nervous 

12 and I replied to him, yes, Z just feel very uneasy about 

13 pulling those. I just cem't do it. And he says, well, 

14 he says, I would never ask you to do anything improper or 

15 illegal, and if you feel that there may be that 

16 particular type of attachment to this request or 

17 whatever, then thank you. And Z departed the office. 

18 ' Q Do you have an actual recollection of that 

19 conversation as you sit here? 

20 A Yes, sir, Z do. 

21 Q And at the time that Mr. daGraffenreid made 

22 these requests to you, who else could have had access to 

23 these documents? 

24 A Well, obviously Mr. deGraffenreid could have 

25 had access, his secretary or the other secretaries or 



UNttmEB 



868 



UNcussm 



individuals that vorkad In tha Intalliganca Olrectorata. 

Q Nov as I undarstand It, tha documants wara 
kapt in nunarical ordar; corract? 

A That's corract. 

Q And ha had in Exhibit 1 a list of tha 
dociiBants; is that corract? 

A That is corract. 

Q Had ha on any prior occasions avar gona to 
Systaa ZV doeunants just in tha ragular coursa of 
businass to look at tham? 

A I don't avar — lat ma think. No, I don't 
racall him avar going parsonally to tha System IV filas 
and raaoving anything. 

Q Had ha avar in your prasenca saan how tha 
files were kept? 

A Well, he Bade requests throughout ay tenure 
there for docuaents and he would be right there alongside 
me when Z would pull them, if he asked for it. 

Q So that you know of no reason why Mr. 
deGraffenreid, if he wanted to, could not have gone to 
the file, located the number, and pulled the document? 

A That's correct. He could have done that. 

Q And were there occasions when Mr. 
deGraffenreid remained in his office after you had gona 
home? 



\mmm 



869 



ONttASSfFIEe 



1 A Oh, y«s. Oh, yes. 

2 Q So that Mr. deGraf fenreld would hav* had 

3 access to the docxu&ents without your Icnowlng It? 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q Is there any explanation that you can offer to 

6 us as to why, after you had turned Mr. deGraf fenreld down 

7 on two or three occasions, he just didn't go and pull the 

8 documents himself? 

9 A No. X really don't have an answer for that 

10 other than he may not have wanted — well, not knowing 

11 how — although he would have seen ne pull material out 

12 for him upon other requests and so forth, he may have not 

13 upon his own taken the time to look Into the files and so 

14 on and so forth. Besides, In the evening when I did 

15 leave and he was working late I maybe nine times out of 

16 ten or 95 out of 100 would lock the safes and depart. 

17 Nov the combinations were available In another 

18 safe and the safe could be reopened. 

19 Q But you also vent out to lunch. 

20 A Well, X didn't go out to lunch that much. X'd 

21 go down and get a sandvlch and bring it up and sit at my 

22 desk and brovnbag all the time, so X was there. My own 

23 view would be that if he himself — obviously the 

24 occasions were there, in my view, for him to go to the 

25 files and take the time to locate them and pull them. 



UNtHSSIFKD 



870 



mmm 



1 ^es, ha could do that. Th« occasion for that would 

2 obviously, Z think, hav« to b« lata in the svaning after 

3 ay departure, or possibly on a weekend. I tried to stay 

4 away on the weekend. 

5 Q Just to complete the record on the 

6 deGraffenreid incident, the last time you were here for 

7 an informal interview we brought Mr. deGraffenreid into 

8 this room; do you recall that? 

9 A Yes, Z do. 

10 Q And you sat opposite him or next to him and 

11 you were prepared to and did tell him to his face what 

12 you've told us? 

13 A Correct. 

14 Q You didn't shrink from that, from saying that 

15 to him? 

16 A No, I did not. 

17 Q And you recall, did he say in your presence 

18 that he just didn't remember the incident? 

19 A That is true. 

20 Q Let's go on to the subject of the two 

21 diversion memos that you recall. Is there anything that 

22 you now recall about those documents that you didn't 

23 recall at the time? 

24 A With regard to the November '85 memorandum 

25 that I have addressed, the only clarification or further 



ttNemnED 



871 



UNEUmiD 



10 



1 .-•collection of that mcmorandua that I racall is that 

2 th«r« was dsfinitsly a rsfsrsnc* to a profit. Ths only 

3 thing that Z nssd to clarify on it, if you will, is I'm 

4 not certain with that it said X aaount of dollars to aid 

5 ths contras. It could havs bssn in two different 

6 contexts . 

7 In other words, X euaount of dollars made from 

8 the sale, or a profit, of weapons, and then the 

9 possibility that that profit could go to aid the contras. 

10 I'm not certain if there was a direct link between the 

11 two. 

12 Q Let me just see if I understand this. 

13 A Okay. 

14 Q You have an actual recollection of this 

15 document? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q You have what I call a picture in your mind's 

18 eye of the document? 

19 A Yes, sir. 

20 Q And, as I recall your prior testimony, it was, 

21 what, two pages? 

22 A That's correct — a page and a half. 

23 Q Now you recall as you sit here now that it 

24 referred to the fact that there would be a profit made on 

25 the Iranian arms sale? 



UNtmiflED 



872 



UNCussm 



11 



1 A That'* correct. 

2 Q What, if anything, do you racall that this 

3 sam* document said about support for tha contras? 

4 A Okay. At th« point in tha mamorandum that 

5 statad that thara would b« a profit of X amount of 

6 dollars, that tha dacision on how a way — or a dacision 

7 on how to usa thosa profits, what to do with thosa 

8 profits, in that context, what to do with that profit or 

9 thosa profits, a possibility could ba for assistance to 

10 tha contras. 

11 Q vnian you say "a possibility", that's what tha 

12 mamorandum said or just a possibility that you ara 

13 considering? 

14 A I think that's a posclbility I'm considering 

15 now. 

16 Q But the meaorandua itself did not say that tha 

17 profits could ba used for tha contras; or did it? 

18 AX don't actually racall the memorandum said 

19 tha profits could ba used to aid the contras, but that — 

20 what to do with tha profits, one way of handling tha 

21 profits or to deal with the profits could be for tha 

22 assistance to the contras. 

23 Q Well, did it say that or is that what you are 

24 now telling us? 

25 A In reflecting on the whole thing I'm really 



UNCtASStFIED 



873 



UNCyiSSIHS) 



12 



X conaldaring what that mamorandvia contained. I thi<n)c I 

2 statad bafor* that thara was a dlract atatamant to tha 

3 fact that tha monay would go, tha profit would go to aid 

4 tha contra*. I 'a not too cartain if that is tha casa 

9 now, but that thara was a suggastion, if you will, that 

6 tha profits could go. 

7 Q But tha last tlma you — !•■ sorry. Did you 
• finish your answar? 

9 A Yas. 

10 Q Tha last tima you had a rathar vivid 

11 racollaction that your raactlon to tha aaBoranduB was 

12 that aid to tha contras would violata tha lav, and tha 

13 ona thing I do not want to do is to put words in your 

14 aouth — and psopla can aaka aistakas. Thair 

19 racollactions could ba tricky. Tha mind is fragila. 

16 And baaring all of that in aind, I raally 

17 would Ilka you, as bast you can, to giv* us what your 

15 prasant racollaction is. If you don't h«v* any 

19 racollaction that it rafarrad to using his profits for 

20 th« contras, than so stata. If your racollaction is that 

21 it discussad that as ona of a nuabar of options, stata 

22 that. But whatavar it is you racall, lat us hava tha 

23 bast of your racollaction today. 

24 A Hy racollaction is that on* of, if you will, 
29 tha options or aaans of what to do with tha profits would 



mmsm 



874 



wmmm 



13 



1 ;;av« b*«n to assist th« contras. 

2 Q vmat war* th« othar options that it raferred 

3 to, if any, for using tha profit? 

4 A I had vrittan down what I had racallad that 

5 Novambar '85 mamorandun saying, and I ramambarad tha 

6 individuals' nzunas. I ramambarad tha transfar of weapons 

7 or tha sala of weapons. Tha Israelis or Israeli 

8 government was involved. 

9 Q You wrote that down when, just recently? , 

10 A No. I think I wrote this down after we had 

11 discussions over in the Raybum Building. That 

12 particular day I went back and I tried to think of 

13 everything that particular evening. 

14 Q Those discussions were the discussions with 

15 Mr. Van Cleve? 

16 X Yea, and Mr. Nialds and so forth. 

17 Q Why don't you look at what you %n:ot* down, and 

18 I would also ask tha counsel to look at it, and we'll 

19 mark it at soma point, if he has no objection. 

20 A Wall, what I had written down, my recollection 

21 of that particular November '85 memorandum was two 

22 individuals, name Nimrodl and Schwlmaer. It stated or it 

23 had Israel involved, the country Israel, Iran, a weapons 

24 transfer, $12 million, and the reference to contras. 

25 Q Were there any other options? 



UNCDtSSIFIfO 



875 



IH«ffiD 



14 



A Ho. 

Q w«r« thar* any other options mentioned? 

K I don't have any written down here, which 
means at that particular time I didn't recall any. And * 
I've looked this over and consistently thought about this 
November '85, and no other Items come to my mind from 
that. 

Q Were there any other Israeli names mentioned 
that you can recall? 

A No, not In this particular memorandum. No. 

Q Do you remember the name Nlmrodl and Schwlmmer 
because you saw their names In the Tower Board report and 
In the newspaper articles? 

A No. I saw the names before that. 

Q I'm not arguing with you about that. I'm just 
asking you whether seeing their names In the Tower Board 
report or the newspapers Is what refreshed your 
recollection about Nlmrodl and Schwlmmer. 
L9 A It nay have assisted some In my going back and 

10 trying to recall what I had seen and when I had seen it 

21 and what the context could have been Involved in certain 

22 things. 

23 Q This is a good point to deal with, just how 

24 you would come to read memos. How many System IV 

25 docximents a year would you normally get and file?- 




876 



UHCIAWO 



15 



1 A Items in System IV probably averaged around 

2 

3 Q And, as I understand it, when you got a System 

4 IV document or the copy, as you've described it in prior 

5 testimony, one of your duties would be to read the 

6 document and then put key words in a computerized index; 

7 is that correct? 

8 A That is correct. 

9 Q And that would enable a computerized search to 

10 be used to identify documents on a particular subject? 

11 A That's correct. 

12 Q Now in the case of this document do you have 

13 an actual recollection of what key words you fed in? 

14 Again, if you don't have one, I don't want you to 

15 reconstruct because we can come to reconstructing. I 

16 just want to know what your actual recollection is. 

17 A Let me take a moment to put myself back there, 

18 if you will. 

19 (Pause. ) 

20 Ko, I have no recollection of actually 

21 entering that item. 

22 Q Just to help me with how you would in the 

23 normal course process a dociuaent, if there was a document 

24 that said the United States is going to sell arms to Iran 

25 through Israel, that there will be a profit of $12 



llim$IFIED 



877 



)immm 



16 



1 Million, that that profit will b« available for United 

2 StaciS geopolitical purposes, including, if w« wish, to 

3 the contras, that mors or less is the dascription of tha 

4 dociunsnt you hava in your nind? 

5 A Correct. 

6 Q How would you have key-worded that docunent in 

7 the index? Do you want a piece of paper? Would it be 

8 easier for you? 

9 A No. I'd put in the countries involved, 

10 excluding the United States. I'd put in "Israel". I'd 

11 put in "Iran". And I aay put in "Nicaragua", but then 

12 again I may put in the word "contra" or "contras". I 

13 would put in "weapons; or "arma»ent". And I don't think 

14 I would enter anything else. I may probably put in the 

15 word "relations", but I don't taiow. 

16 Q Now do I understand that in the case of this 

17 document that there are two points of reference that you 

18 are using to identify the time? One is that it occurred 

19 after your father had died and you had returned to the 

20 office. 

21 A Correct. 

22 Q And the second was that Admiral Poindextar had 

23 been announced as the National Security Advisor but his 

24 appointment had not formally taken effect. 

25 A Correct. 



uimssire 



878 



UKMtftES 



17 



1 Q My recollection is that Admiral Poindexter's 

2 formal appointment became effective on January 1, though 

3 he was announced in the beginning of December. And when 

4 was it that your father passed away? 

5 A It was the middle of November. 

6 Q And did you take off some time after his 

7 death? 

8 A Yes. I was off, I think, a week prior to 

9 because he was admitted to the hospital and passed away 

10 when I was at home. And then I returned a few days after 

11 that, because of the funeral and so forth and everything. 

12 But I recall that I was back at my home in Virginia at 

13 Thanksgiving. 

14 Q So you had not returned to your office before 

15 Thanksgiving? 

16 A I think it may have been after Thanksgiving, 

17 which would have been probably the last week in November. 

18 Q Nov in addition to entering the information 

19 that you've described into the computerized index, you 

20 would also have identified the name of the sender of the 

21 document. Colonel North? 

22 A The originator, correct. 

23 Q And the recipient. Admiral Poindexter? 

24 A That's correct. 

25 Q You mentioned after your last examination that 



UNOti^lHED 



879 



UNMSm 



18 



1 you kapt a log, handvrittan log, of Syataa IV nunbars 

2 that you aaalgnad to originators of dociiaants. 

3 A That's trua. 

4 Q Explain to us how that vorkad. 

5 A Okay. Tha log of Systam IV nuabars was 

6 handwrittan in my panaanship or othars, if I was away, 

7 and assignad Systaa IV nuabars to individuals originating 

8 thosa docuaants and officially put thaa into tha NSC 

9 corraspondanca systaa. Tha originator's offica — aithar 

10 tha originator thaasalvas or thair sacratary — would 

11 call aa and stata that thay wars originating a Systaa IV 

12 docuaant and that thay naadad a nuabar. 

13 I would than assic^n thaa tha naxt consacutiva 

14 nuabar and vrita thair naaa or tha naaa of tha 

15 originator, along with tha data, alongsida that 

16 particular nuabar. That's how tha nuabars wars assignad. 

17 Tha logs wars kapt in ay dask drawar. Thay wara not 

18 sacurad or put in tha safa in tha avanings or anything 

19 lika that. 

20 Q Now as a rasult of your making availeUsla that 

21 information to us wa obtainad a copy of your handwritten 

22 logs and I hava thaa hara, and you'va lookad thaa over, 

23 hava you not? 

24 A Yes, sir. 

25 Q Let's mark this as tha naxt Exhibit, Exhibit 



IINebt$«D 



880 



^mmm 



19 



1 :.'umb«r 3. 

2 (Th« document rafarred to was 

3 markad Radzimskl Exhibit Number 

4 3 for Identification.) 

5 Exhibit 3 are your handwritten logs; is that 
« correct? 

7 A Correct, for three years. 

8 Q Now let's take the one for 1985. It indicates 

9 in the first number here Fawn Hall-0. North. 

10 A Correct. 

11 Q That meant chat for that number, which was the 

12 first number for the year — 

13 A Um-hum. 

14 Q — that the originator was North? 

15 A That's correct. Let me also say that this was 

16 not the first number assigned for the year 1985. This 

17 first sheet that you are looking at are log numbers that 

18 were set aside for individuals that were, let's say, they 

19 were working late or on a weekend and I was not available 

20 and they could not obtain a System IV number from me. 

21 They would go to the NSC Secretariat and they would 

22 obtain a number. And that's how they would do it. 

23 But you are correct. Fawn Hall obtained this 

24 number. System IV number, for Oliver North, and this was 

25 the person that gave them that number. 



UNCdiSStFIED 



881 



mmm 



20 



1 Q CT? 

2 A CT, and it was on th« 25th of January, 1/2 5. 

3 Q And In th« case of 1985 you r«vlawad, both 

4 with tha FBI and with us, tha Systaa IV nunbars that were 

5 assigned to North in November and December 1985; am Z 

6 correct? 

7 A Yes. I had my original logs that I went 

8 through with the FBI. He have always worked with a copy. 

9 Q The FBI had the originals available? 

10 A That's correct. I brought it to their 

11 attention. 

12 Q Now at the time that you looked at the logs, 

13 you had some questions about whether some of your 

14 initials were put on there by you or were put on by 

15 someone else. 

16 A That's correct. 

17 Q I will say for the record that we had our 

18 document examiner look at the originals and, while it's 

19 difficult to make conclusive evaluations of just 

20 initials, his best opinion was that there was no 

21 indication that these were forg«ri«s and that they 

22 appeared to be in your writing. 

23 If we look at th« last pages, can you tell by 

24 the dates your writing? Ther«'« one on 11/26 and I don't 

25 want to, for security reasons, indicate the name of the 



UNttitssm 



882 



UNGUSSiED 



21 



1 ::«raon, but it's not Mr. North. 

2 A That's correct. 

3 Q Is that your writing, th« 11/26 on*? 

4 A This on*? Y*s, that Is my vnritlng. 

5 Q So that would suggsst to you that you were 

6 bade on Novenber 26? 

7 A Yes, sir. 

8 Q Now the 11/21 ones are not in your writing. 

9 A That is correct. 

10 Q Do you ]cnow whose writing those are? 

11 A Yes, I do. 

12 Q And who is that? 

13 A These initials here are the individual that 

14 filled in for me during my absence. 

15 Q That's the one that ends on 11/22 and the 

16 initial is set opposite the document that ends with 89? 

17 A Correct. 

18 Q Now in a number of cases here, if we look at 

19 the ones that end on the following page with 01, 02, 03, 

20 they are just your initials. 

21 A Correct. 

22 Q What does that represent? 

2 3 A That represents items that I myself assigned 

24 System IV numbers to, and those were only CIA 

2 5 intelligence 




D 



883 



Mimm 



22 



1 Q In other words, those were documents that were 

2 originated outside of the KSC? 

3 A That's true. 

4 Q And that's why you don't list an originator 

5 opposite your initial? 

6 A Correct . 

7 Q And, as we look at these pages for November 

8 and December, in the period after you returned following 

9 your dad's death can you see any that you assigned where 

10 you have North listed for either November or December? 

11 A No. No, there are none listed there for 

12 North. 

13 Q Nov is there any explanation that you have as 

14 to why, if the document that you recall seeing in 

15 Noveaber-Deceaber was in fact submitted to you and filed 

16 then, why you don't have a System IV number through that 

17 period? 

18 MR. SPAEDER: Before he responds to that, let 

19 me ask one clarifying question. Can you tell us, Mr. 

20 Radzimaki, whether the 1985 version of Exhibit 3 includes 

21 thoee portions of the log that cover the logging of 

22 System IV documents that you yourself handled, as opposed 

23 to someone else handling in your absence? You said a few 

24 moments ago, for example, that the first page of Exhibit 

25 3, the 1985 version of same, did not actually commence 



UNCDCTED 



884 



UNCIASSIHiD 



23 



1 ;:h« Issuanca of System IV docimants for January of 1985. 

2 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 

3 MR. SPAEOER: Is thsr* a portion of th« log in 

4 sxlstsnc* which would contain thoss entries which is not 

5 present In Exhibit 3, or does Exhibit 3 contain all of 

6 those pages? 

7 THE WITNESS: Exhibit 3 Is a complete log. 

8 What I was saying here Is that the first particular page 

9 here was separata. If you will. It was used for 

10 emergency. 

11 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

12 Q Is there some explanation. If your 

13 recollection Is a true one, that the docxiaent detected by 

14 you in November after your dad's death or December, why 

15 you don't have a ntimber assigned to North In that period 

16 — to North or Fawn Hall? 

17 A No. I have no explanation for It. 

18 Q I'm going to ask you this. 

19 A Okay. 

20 Q Why don't you go ahead? 

21 A Well, I could make one comment. On occasions, 

22 when I was not present because of vacation or some time 

23 off or whatever and someone filled in for me, I did 

24 always go back or go into the file and see what had 

25 transpired during my absence. 



UNGUiSSm 



885 



UKSy^SiED 



24 



1 Q Ar« you saying It's possible that your 

2 recollection that you entered the document Is wrong and 

3 that you just read the document after someone else 

4 entered it? 

5 A That is possible, yes. 

6 Q But, if you look at this log, it's also ttue 

7 that there are no documents entered for North. 

8 A Correct . 

9 Q Even during the period that you went away. 

10 A There's one here. 

11 Q There was one document entered, not in your 

12 writing, on 11/8. Is that not in your writing? 

13 A That is not my writing. 

14 Q That's not your %nriting on 11/8. 

15 A Correct. 

16 Q And then there is one that I think is in your 

17 writing on Noveaber 5. Is that your writing? 

18 A Ho, that Is not my writing either. I was 

19 there, though, because this is my writing. 

20 Q So you were there but someone else entered the 

21 on* on November 5? 

22 A That's correct. 

23 Q Now, after your examination on April 29 by 

24 Mr. Belniclc the FBI, at our request, arranged to go with 

25 you to the NSC to see whether you could find these 



uimsn 



886 



m&mm 



25 



1 Uccuaants on a computarizcd index; am I correct? 

2 A That Is true. 

3 Q And you gave various key words to the FBI; am 

4 I correct? 

5 A That's true. 

6 Q And they in your presence were punching them 

7 up on the computer? 

8 A Correct. A representative from the NSC was. 

9 Q With the FBI there? 

10 A That's correct. 

11 Q And aa Z correct that that search failed to 

12 turn up either this document or the one that you 

13 remembered later in April? 

14 A That is true. 

15 Q Were you told also that the FBI, as a result 

16 of the information you provided, reviewed all of the 

17 System IV doc\iments, one by one, to attempt to locate 

18 these documents? 

19 A I think that was stated by one of the people 

20 that was assigned down there. 

21 Q I should tell you — I don't recall whether we 

22 have — that Mr. Nields went over to the NSC and, for 

23 this period, had the NSC pull up documents with a view to 

24 seeing whether there could have been either a misfiling 

25 or substitution, and he was not able to find either these 



UNtmstniD 



887 



mmsm 



26 



1 documents or documents that would have lent themselves to 

2 being substitutes for these documents. 

3 A Um-hun. 

4 Q When I say that, I mean that the documents 

5 assigned to North in your log tended to be, for this 

6 particular period or the later one, either cables or 

7 documents which had other people's writings on them, so 

8 that for a substitution to have occurred it would have 

9 involved getting a number of people to substitute their 

10 signature onto a back-dated document; you are aware of 

11 that? 

12 A Yes, I am. 

13 MR. VAN CLEVE: I might just add, too, for the 

14 record, Arthur, that Mr. Carome and I were present, as 

15 well as a handwriting expert from the Senate Committee, 

16 when this exzusination occurred to look at the documents. 

17 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuaing) 

18 Q Aa I correct that if the document that you 

19 recall cannot be found in the computerized index and 

20 cannot be found in the whole file of System IV documents, 

21 that if your recollection is correct the following would 

22 have had to have happened? One, the document that you 

23 recall would have had to be pulled from the files and 

24 another one substituted that didn't have the references. 

25 Two, someone would have had to erase from the 



UNebtSSIFIED 



888 



\Mmm 



27 



computerized index the key words that would have referred 
to this. 

And, three, in your handwritten ledger, to the 
extent it doesn't show any numbers assigned to North for 
the relevant period, it would mean that someone made a 
mistake — either you or whoever was covering for you — 
and didn't bother to put his name down. That's fair? 
A That's fair. 
9 Q When you consider what would have had to have 

LO happened in order to have eliminated this kind of 

document and all traces of it, I ask you is it possible, 
having dealt with so many documents over your tenure at 
the NSC, having read all of the publicity about the 
diversion, that your mind has played a trick on you? Is 
it possible? 

(Counsel conferring with the witness.) 
MR. LIMAN: I mean it in all good faith. I 
hope you heard me. I said I mean that in all good faith, 
because I don't believe for one moment that Mr. Radzimski 
is deliberately dissembling. 

MR. SPA£OER: I understand and all parties are 
proceeding in good faith and the Committee is simply 
trying to develop a record. 

THE WITNESS: It is possible. However, I 
25 still feel that what I have seen and what I have stated, 



UNCCKSSra 



889 



tlNfiUWKB 



28 



1 1 havtt 100 parccnt baliaf in It. 

2 BY MR. LIMAN; (Rcsuaing) 

3 Q It's in your alnd's ay*? 

4 A Y«s, sir. It is. 

5 Q It's In your mind's sys. And ths qusstion 

6 that Z'B putting is, is it in your aind's aya — I hava 

7 no doubt it's in your nind's aya, bacausa you hava 

8 describad it consistantly sinca va'va baan talking to 

9 you. Tha guastion I 'a putting is, is it in your mind's 

10 aya bacausa you actually saw or, or is it possibla that 

11 your Bind has baan trickad by all of tha suggastions. 

12 And your answar, I taka it, is you saa it in your mind's 

13 aya and anything 's possibla. 

14 A Yas, sir. Likavisa, to taka thosa three steps 

15 that you hava aantionad and walk over thosa, if you will, 

16 to changa thosa or whatever, is possibla also. 

17 Q It is possibla? 

18 A Yaa, sir. 

19 Q But it would hava meant — 

20 A Z understand that. 

21 Q But it would have meant in tha handwritten 

22 log, which is tha additional document that we and the FBI 

23 have located, it would have meant this coincidence, that 

24 for tha two periods involved you didn't enter the North 
2 5 document . 



uNtossm 



890 



iiNWsra 



29 



1 A Un-huB. 

2 Q And so there are a lot of things that would 

3 have had to happen in order for this to have been 

4 accomplished as your mind's eye tells you. 

5 A Yes, sir. 

6 Q Nov let me go on. 

7 MR. CAROME: Arthur, could I ask a couple of 

8 questions about this? 

9 MR. LIMAN: Sure. 

10 MR. CAROME: Could we go off the record for a 

11 second? 

12 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

13 MR. LIMAN: Let's go on the record. 

14 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

15 Q What is the name of the person who filled in 

16 during your absence? 

17 A Kirk Lieferman. 

18 MR. SPAEDER: Spell that for the record. 

19 THE WITNESS: L-i-e-f-e-r-m-a-n. 

20 MR. CAROME; Is there any possibility that a 

21 log number was signed out to Oliver North either by you 

22 or by another person and that his name would not be there 

23 on the log? Either someone else's name would be there 

24 or, for some other reason, his name wouldn't be there; is 

25 that possible? Would that have been your practice ever? 



imCOtSSIFIED 



891 



\immm 



30 



1 THE WITNESS: No, I really don't think so, 

2 because if I was away tor a short period of time and 

3 someone had called and one of the secretaries took the 

4 call and gave out the next number, they would write the 

5 name in and the date, or they would tell me or leave me a 

6 note and I would do that. 

7 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

8 Q It was precisely because of this possibility, 

9 I should say for the record, that the FBI went through 

10 the documents one by one, not just on the North 

11 documents. And, second, it's because of that 

12 possibility, as I understand it, that John Nields went 

13 over there with you and did what I guess you'd call an 

14 audit test, pulling particular numbers that looked like 

15 they might be productive to see whether there was 

16 anything there that would look like a substitute, and we 

17 had our dooiment exzuainer. 

18 MR. CAROME: I just have one other question. 

19 Is it possible that a document could have been signed out 

20 — given a System IV number much earlier, weeks or a 

21 month earlier, not used and then have the actual document 

22 come into your office and be signed into or put into the 

23 document index much later? What would be the normal time 

24 span between signout and arrival of the actual document 

25 in your office? 



IWCOtSSIftH) 



892 



mmm 



31 



1 THE WITNESS: No longer than thre«, four days. 

2 BY MR. LIMAN: (Rasuming) 

3 Q Lat ma just axplora that. If Fawn Hall called 

4 in, say, October of a year and said I want a number, and 

5 she's given a number and then, for some reason or 

6 another, the document isn't prepared, what happens to 

7 that number? At what point doea she give that number up? 

8 A She would give the number up if the item never 

9 did materialize and a decision was made not to send it 

10 on. She would call me and tell me. 

11 Q So it would be her initiative? 

12 A Yes. Or I would follow up because I would 

13 check after three or four days and Z )cnew an item was out 

14 or Z ]cnew nothing had been done. Z would try to verify 

15 where is this item. 

16 Q How long would you wait before you would 

17 check? 

18 A Three, four days. 

19 Q Were there any occasions where a number would 

20 be assigned and then, either because you didn't check or 

21 because the explanation that was given as to why it was 

22 out was satisfactory, that you might not have had a 

23 docximent in your file for that number for a period of 

24 three weeks or four weeks? 

25 A That's possible. 



IINCraFKD 



893 



wmsm 



32 



1 Q And tharafora th« question really was, is it 

2 possible that a secretary in effect was warehousing 

3 numbers and just simply put a number on? You thinSc 

4 that's unlikely, I take it. 

5 A It's unlikely, but I had never thought about 

6 it like that. But it's possible, yes. 

7 MR. LIMAN: Does that get those questions? 

8 MR. CAROME: Do you know whether it was the 

9 normal practice for secretaries or originators of 

10 documents to call in for niunbers towards the very end, 

11 towards the point where a docximent was being finalized, 

12 or would they get the number at the time where it 

13 occurred to them to actually create the document? 

14 THE HZTKESS: It was their preference, really. 

15 If they were advised way at the very beginning of 

16 something that this is going to be a System IV item, they 

17 would call and get a number right away and use that for 

18 reference purposes in calling it up from the word 

19 processor, or they might just wait until the actual item 

20 was going into a final form. 

21 MR. CAROME: Do you know what Fawn Hall's 

22 practice was on that score? 

23 THE WITNESS: No, I don't. 

24 BY MR. LINAN: (Resuming) 

25 Q Okay. Now let's move forward to the document 



UNtttSSIFIED 



894 



uiMsra 



33 



1 you recall in April. My understanding from your prior 

2 testimony was that that was a copy. 

3 A Correct. 

4 Q And that it was a copy of a docunent from 

5 North to Poindexter. 

6 A Correct. 

7 Q And it had attached to it a copy of a proposed 

8 memo from Poindexter to the President. 

9 A The beat I recall, yes, that's true. 

10 Q And you do not recall ever seeing the original 

11 of those documents? 

12 A That is correct. 

13 Q And you do not know as you sit here today 

14 whether the document was or wasn't send to the President? 

15 A That's true. I do not Icnow. 

16 Q And if I put all the same questions to you 

17 with respect to this April document that I put with 

18 respect to Koveaber concerning our inability to find it 

19 and what could be the explanation, your answers would be 

20 the same? 

21 A That is true. 

22 Q And again while your mind's eye sees these 

23 documents, you accept the possibility that your mind 

24 could have been tricked and your recollection could have 

25 been tricked? 



wmmm 



895 



9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 



25 



IWIMSSiED 



34 



A I accept that possibility, yes. 

2 Q Now on that document you also recall that one 

3 has the same number, $12 million? 
* A Correct. 

5 Q And that's the same $12 million, of course, 

6 that was in the diversion memo which we do have? 
^ A Correct. 
8 Q And you don't remember any profit number in 

the two diversion memos that you see in your mind's eye 
other than the $12 million? That's the number? 

A That's the number. 

Q And you recall that number being unchanged 
between the November-December memo and the April memo? 

A The dollar figure that I recall and have 
stated repeatedly in the April memorandum was $12 

16 million. The one that was in November I believe was the 

17 same amount. Something tells me that it may have been 

18 even higher, but I can't put a lot of credence about the 

19 fact that it was higher. 

^° Q Vou can't put a lot of credence in that. I am 

21 not clear in ay own mind whether when you first talked to 

22 the FBI you recalled the April memo or just the November 

23 one. Do you remember? 

^* ^ Well, the first time that I spoke with them 

they initiated the discussion of the April memorandum — 



oNwsm 



896 



UNtUSSHD 



35 



at th« and of that discussion asksd If Z had anything 
•Is* I wantad to add or whatever. And this is whan I 
isantionad to tham and brought up to thaa a Novambar 
staBorandUB. 

Q Whan you say thay mantionad the April memo, 
did thay mention the April diversion memo that we have? 

A They never shoved me the memorandUB . that they 
spoke of, but they talked about April. 

Q They talked about an April diversion memo with 
$12 Billion in it? 

A UB-hua. Z believe they did, yes. 

Q But that's the April diversion bsbo that we 
have and that v* got froa the FBI, which is the famous 
diversion bsbo. 

A Z'B sorry. 

Q That's a Batter of public record that th* 
Attorney General announced. 

A Halt a Blnute. Let ae think. My first 
L9 discussions with thea were in February. The 
20 investigators caae out. 

Q And that diversion aeao was Exhibit 2 to your 
deposition. 

MR. SPAEDER: For the record, have you had a 
chance since being interviewed by the FBI to review any 
of their interview notes or 302 reports on your • 



mmim 



897 



UKCtASSm 



36 



1 ^ntarvlav? 

2 THE WITNESS: No. 

3 HR. LIKAN: No, h« hasn't s««n thoss. 

4 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Thsir questions to 

5 me were had I known about weapons sales and transfers, 

6 and I said yes. And then I told them that I knew of — 

7 now I'm getting confused here. They did not ask about, I 

8 don't believe, about diversion of funds. They were 

9 talking 2U30ut weapons sales, I believe, and questioned me 

10 on that and so forth. 

11 And then I said that I recalled back in 

12 November I had seen a memorandua. I think they did talk 

13 to me about funds. Yes, they did. 

14 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

15 Q As you sit here today, what's your best 

16 recollection about to %rhoa you first mentioned that you 

17 had seen these diversion memos — Mr. Belnick? 

18 A No. He was not the first. 

19 Q Or the FBI? 

20 A The FBI. 

21 Q And your recollection is that you mentioned 

22 both of the diversion memos to the FBI? 

23 A Correct. 

24 Q But it wasn't until after Mr. Belnick 

25 conducted his examination i^*kttfsf ^^ brought you over 






If 



898 



mimm 



37 



1 to th« NSC? 

2 A That's correct. 

3 Q And that was sevaral months later? 

4 A Yeah. That was April 30. 

5 Q Nov I also understand that since your last 

6 examination on the record you have a recollection of some 

7 three other documents relating to the arms sales 

8 mentioning the Israelis in the early fall of 1985; is 

9 that correct? 

10 A Correct. 

11 Q When did you first recall those? 

12 A These came to my mind or my recollection at 

13 the time that we first met at the Raybum building. 

14 MR. VAN CLEVE: This would be late July. 

15 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

16 Q What is it that triggered the recollection 

17 about those? 

18 A Hell, it was the questioning by everyone 

19 presence of facts concerning memorandums that I had seen 

20 in November and in April, and then specific questions of 

21 any other that dealt with shipment of arms and so forth. 

22 I'm trying to remember the one — 

23 Q What do these documents say, as you see them 

24 today? 

25 A Well, the ones I recall in early '85 or prior 



msmm 



899 



lINCimiFIED 



38 



1 to the November '85 — I recall at least two other 

2 memorandums that dealt with the transfer of arms to Iran 

3 — Israeli transfer of arms. 

4 Q And these dealt with Israeli transfers of arms 

5 but not diversion? 

6 A Correct. 

7 Q And do you remember anything about the 

8 substance of them? 

9 A I think there was only actually one more or 

10 one other memorandum prior to November that discussed 

11 Israeli transfer of weapons to Iran. 

12 Q You just looked at the piece of paper that you 

13 referred to before. As I understand it, at one point you 

14 recalled that there were three documents before November. 

15 A moment ago your recollection, as I heard it, was two, 

16 and now you've looked at the paper and it was one. I 

17 would just again urge you to sit back and what is your 

18 best recollection. 

19 (Pause.) 

20 A Okay. My best recollection is that there was 

21 one other memorandum prior to Hovember. 

22 Q Were there other memo* besides these that we 

23 have just discussed — the one prior to November and the 

24 two diversion memos? 

25 A My recollection — and I wrote some notes down 



UNCtASSIflED 



900 



UNMSm 



39 



I'.ar* so I would not forgat thesa, if you will — in 1985 
I racall two mcBoranduas that daalt with arm* shipment. 

Q On« b«for« Movarabar? 

A Ona bafora Movaobar and ona in November, or it 
could have been October. 

Q Before your father's death? 

A Yes. And those were discussions about Israeli 
shipments of weapons to Iran. 

(Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

10 Q Do you have anything you want to add? 

11 MR. SPAEOER: I've asked him to reflect a 

12 little bit more on his answer before he responds. 

13 (Pause.) 

14 THE WITNESS: I know that there were three 

15 shipments of weapons to Iran that involved the Israelis 
1« in '85. 

17 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

18 Q How do you know that? I'll let him finish his 

19 answer. I didn't mean to interrupt. 

20 A And I know of two of those shipments that I 

21 can state, one being in November and one before that, 

22 because there had been a System IV memorandum concerning 

23 that, discussing it. The other one, or the third one, 

24 which I think was sometime earlier in '85, I think that 

2 5 particular one came out. I can't recall seeing a System 



IINCtJtSffiD 



901 



"nmjif/hi 



40 



1 IV lt«a on it. I thinJc that was soaathlng that I hav* 

3 leamad through all th« public testinony. 

3 Q You said ther* war* thra* shipmanta in '85. 

4 How do you Jcnow that? Is that from tha tastimony and the 

5 Towar Board report? 

6 A Yeeih. That caBe out during teetiaony, Z 

7 believe, and during the Tower report, but I recall seeing 

8 also two aeaoranduae on two o£ those particular iteaa. 

9 Q When you say that there were three shipaenta 

10 in '85, you are referring to the 100 TOHs in Septeaber, 

11 the 400-odd additional TOWs in Septeaber, and the HAWKs 

12 in Hoveaber; is that what you are referring to? 

13 A It would have to be, although I don't know 

14 weapons per se — HAWKs and so forth — but if that's 

15 what they were, then that's what they were referring to. 

16 Q Hov closely have you, incidentally, been 

17 following this? Did you read the Tower Board report? 

18 A I haven't read all of it, but I've read 

19 portions of it. 

20 Q And have you been watching the hearings? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q Let's go on. I aa interested in that April 
2 3 aeao . 

24 A April '86? 

25 Q 1 can understand you had a fraae of reference 



UNCU^FIEir 



902 



cNcwFe 



41 



1 lor your dating of what you s«« as the memo in November. 

2 How do you plac* a documsnt that you later saw as being 

3 April as opposed to May or March or June? 

4 A The April meaorandua that I recall seeing 

5 myself, a copy of it, was entered in System IV. I recall 

6 it being April. I recall it being April because I 

7 attached significance to it because the item was drafted 

8 — there was a memorandum for the President in that 

9 memorandum. 

10 Q I'm asking about dating. 

11 A And I recall that to me this was the first 

12 time that I could see a monetary figure, $12 million, 

13 going to aid the contras and this being sent to the 

14 President and the President becoming aware of it in 

15 writing, across my desk. 

16 Q That was the significance attached to it? 

17 A That was significant. And because of that 

18 I've stated, and I recall, that I tried to remember the 

19 date specifically because of that significance and I 

2 looked at the date and tried to recall the specific date, 

21 which I'm not able to do by day or date, but by month, 

22 yes. 

2 3 Q Before or after Easter? 

24 A Not knowing when Easter was in '85, I've 

25 stated it was mid- '85 — excuse me, mid-April. 



DNCCItSSIFe' 



903 



wmm 



42 



1 Q Olcay. As I understand what you arc saying, 

2 for sum* rsason or another you have a recollection of it 

3 ceing April and you've selected mid-April because that's 

4 the middle of April? 

5 A Um-huB. No. I also attach to it the fact 

6 that attached to that particular memorandum was this 

7 attachment that's called Terms of Reference, and it was 

8 through various interviews that I recalled the fact that 

9 I had seen the terms of reference before and that was 

10 with regard to Mr. McFarlane's trip. 

11 Q You saw the terms of reference before you saw 

12 them published in the Tower Board report? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q And you saw them, attached to a memo? 

15 A As best as Z can recall, they were attached to 

16 a memorandum, yes. 

17 Q And is it your recollection that you saw them 

18 attached to a memo that referred to diversion? 

19 A If we were referring to the April '85, yes. 

20 Q April '86. 

21 A April '86. 

22 Q Are those terms of reference that you recall 

23 an exhibit to the April diversion memo that you entered 

24 into the System IV files, as you recall it? 

25 A Yes. 



iwetftswD 



904 





43 



1 Q Nov do you recall in your mind's eya, again, 

2 whether th« mamo that want to tha Prasidant rafarred to 

3 tha diversion or just tha mamo from North to Poindaxtar? 

4 (Counsel conferring with the witness.) 

5 A My recollection is that the nemoranduas were 

6 capsulizad that were addressed from the National Security 

7 Advisor to the President, and I do not recall — I think 

8 I've stated before I do not recall seeing $12 million 

9 going to the contras in that particular memorandum, 

10 although Z do recall seeing it in the other memorandum. 

11 Q When you say in the other memorandum, you mean 

12 in the memo from North to Poindexter? 

13 A Yes, sir. 

14 Q Let me turn to the last subject on my agenda. 

15 You have recalled since our last meeting, I believe, a 

16 conversation with Colonel North in November. 

17 A Yes, sir. 

18 Q Nov is this something that you've recalled 

19 since the last meeting or was this something that you 

20 just veren't asked about on the record in April and that 

21 you actually recalled then? 

2 2 A Well, I recalled it after v« had initially met 

2 3 in July, I think it vas. 

24 Q So you didn't recall it at the time you were 

2 5 questioned in April? 



iiHWsm 



905 



wmsB 



44 



1 A I did not. 

2 Q Okay. Tall us about this convsrsatlon. 

3 A Wall, my rscollsction of what transplrad and 

4 of tha convarsatlon was that It was tha baginning waaks, 

5 within tha first two waaks of Novambar. I raturnad to 

6 tha KSC to chack on arrangamants that wara baing mada for 

7 my ratlramant, a caramony and so forth. Z also had 

8 wrlttan Inputs for my particular parformanca avaluation 

9 that had to ba complatad. So I raturnad to tha NSC to 

10 handla thosa coupla of things, and to also stop in tha 

11 offica and saa tha paopla and'saa what was going on. 

12 Q How long had you vorkad thara? 

13 A At tha NSC? 

14 Q Yas. 

15 A From August of '83 until Octobar '86, so it 

16 was thraa, thraa and a half yaars. 

17 Q It had bacoaa hoaa? 

18 A It had bacoaa hoaa, axactly. So I was 

19 chatting with paopla and so forth, and I also knav that 

20 if ay ratiraaant caramony was going to transpira that Z 

21 wantad to kaap it vary low kay. I didn't want a larga 

22 turnout, a traditional turnout, so I wantad to maka sura 

23 that would transpira and I wantad to ask kay paopla if 

24 thay would attand. 

25 Q Paopla who you wara friandly with or you had 



DNCBSSIFIED 



906 



UNfiyWED 



45 



1 ;;ork«d with? 

2 A Who I had worked with and paopl* that I liked, 

3 it you will, and would appreciate having them come and so 

4 forth. But during that particular visit I was looking 

5 for Colonel North to ask him, and I didn't find him 

6 initially, so at my departure, when Z was leaving, I did 

7 see him. 

8 Q As you were leaving that day? 

9 A As Z was leaving that day. I'd only been 

10 there for about maybe two hours, I guess. 

11 Q Where did you see him? 

12 At had just departed room 300, which was my 

13 particular office there, or suite of offices, and he was 

14 outside his office, best I can recall. And I just made a 

15 general coouBent to hia about, you know, good afternoon, 

16 or exchanged courtesies, and he looked at ne and he says: 

17 Oh, hi Jia. And be aade a coaaent: Have you been 

18 following what's been going on in the newspapers — or 

19 soaething like that. 

20 Q Referring to all the storm about the Iranian 

21 arms sales? 

22 A Correct. And I said yes. And he just shook 

23 his head and he said: All those Systea IV documents. 

24 And I don't reaeaber if I replied back or if I said 

25 anything or I just acknowledged what he was referring to. 



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1 And that was it, bacausa we wer* soma distance away. We 

2 weren't standing next to each other. We were some 

3 Uistanca away from each other. 

4 And he went on his way and I went on mine. 

5 MR. LIMAN: Let's take a recess for a monent. 

6 Would you look at this handwritten note and see if you 

7 have any objection to our marking it since he's used it 

8 to refresh his recollection? 

9 (A brief recess was taken.) 

10 MR. LIMAN; Let's go on the record. 

11 Would you mark this as the next e::hibit? 

12 (The document referred to was 

13 marked Radzimski Exhibit Number 

14 4 for identification.) 

15 BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) 

16 Q Exhibit 4 are the handwritten notes. Would 

17 you just describe what they represent without getting 

18 into the entries, because we will cover the entries? 

19 A Well, this represents an attempt by me of 

20 trying to commit to writing System IV documents that I 

21 had, that I recalled seeing concerning this Iran and the 

22 contra episode. 

23 Q Now you prepared this after your last meeting 

24 in July with us? 

25 A That is correct. 



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1 Q If you look at It, tha first lln* is Memos to 

2 RCM. 

3 A That's correct. 

4 Q That meant these were memos that you recalled 

5 going to RCM? 

6 A To Mr. McFarlane. 

7 Q Then under that it says September. 

8 A Or about Mr. McFarlane, if you will. 

9 Q September-November shipment approvals. What 

10 does that mean, "approvals"? 

11 A September-November shipment approvals. Tliat's 

12 my recollection of specific System IV docviments 

13 originated by Oliver North to Mr. McFarlane concerning 

14 shipments of weapons by the Israelis to Iran. 

15 Q And "approvals" means what? 

16 A Approval means that the transactions were 

17 approved or, if you will, were okay. 

18 Q Approved by whom? 

19 A Approved by the United States Government. 

20 Q After that it has P in parentheses. 

21 A P approved. 

22 Q P with a circle. P means President? 

23 A President approved, which my recollection is 

24 that this was a memorandum or these two items were 

25 memorandums by Colonel North to Mr. McFarlane that 



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1 Uscussad th« shipments and sought Mr. McFarlans's 

2 appicTfal, approach the President and obtain his approval 

3 for this to transpire, if you will. 

4 Q When did you first recall that you had seen 

5 any memos seeking the President's approval for the 

6 September-November shipments? 

7 A Well, my first recalling this was — well, 

8 since I made these notes after our gathering in July, I 

9 recalled it after that. During the course of that 

10 interview Z was asked if I had seen other ones, and Z 

11 tried to commit these to paper from that. 

12 Q So your first recollection that you have in 

13 your mind of documents seeking the President's approval 

14 for the Israeli shipments took place sometime in late 

15 July or early August, 1987? 

16 A Well, I think — personally I think 1 recalled 

17 it before that, but Z never stated it to anybody, in 

18 other worda. 

19 Q When do you think you first recalled seeing 

20 any meaoa seeking the President's approval for the 

21 Israeli shipments? 

22 A Z don't think I can say with any assurance 

23 that Z recall seeing it ~ you know, remembering this on 

24 any specific occasion prior to July of this year. 

25 Q You would have told us if you had remembered 



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1 i-i, wouldn't you? 

2 A Y«s. 

3 Q Let's go to th« next one. The next one are 

H 

4 memos to J«P. That's your effort at reconstructing what 

5 you recalled of memos to John Polndexter; am I correct? 

6 A Correct . 

7 Q And the first one is November and it has in 

8 parentheses various names, and this refers to what you 

9 have described as that November-December diversion memo, 

10 right? 

11 A That is correct. 

12 Q And it says Nimrodl, Schwimmer, Israel, Iran, 

13 weapons transfer, $12 million, contras? 

14 A Correct. 

15 Q Then you had something down there right after 

16 it which is, I thinX, November-December, oil equipment in 

17 parentheses. 

18 A Yes. 

19 Q Vlhat's that all about? 

20 A That refers to a memorandum that I saw during 

21 that tla* frame, and it was probably more December now 

22 than November, concerning oil equipment, and specifically 

23 transfers of weapons under the premise that it was oil 

24 equipment. 

25 Q Okay. And you remembered that for the first 



IINOraMTFD 



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so 



1 tiB«, I ta)c« it — 

2 A Correct. 

3 Q — Aft«r our July in««ting? 

4 A Um-hua . 

5 Q And aft«r you had h«ard th« testimony about 

6 thi« whol« oil equipment cov«r story? 

7 A Correct, b«caus« at our July interview, if you 

8 will, Colonal North had alraady t«8tifi«d and Poindaxter 

9 vaa still tastifying and ao forth, so avants vara coming 

10 out, and I vaa going back. 

11 Q Tha naxt sano that you rsfar to is Dacaabar- 

12 March, sacond channal. That 'a a aaao ralating to tha 

13 sacond channal? 

14 A Vaa. 

15 Q Now you navar saw any mamo that usad tha tarm